Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game

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dc.contributor.author	Alesina, Alberto
dc.date.accessioned	2010-11-09T18:44:13Z
dc.date.issued	1987
dc.identifier.citation	Alesina, Alberto. 1987. Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(3): 651-678.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0033-5533	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4552531
dc.description.abstract	This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significantly different from the traditional "political business cycle." Reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	MIT Press	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1884222	en_US
dash.license	LAA
dc.title	Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Version of Record	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Quarterly Journal of Economics	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Alesina, Alberto
dc.date.available	2010-11-09T18:44:13Z