Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game

Show simple item record Alesina, Alberto 2010-11-09T18:44:13Z 1987
dc.identifier.citation Alesina, Alberto. 1987. Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(3): 651-678. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0033-5533 en_US
dc.description.abstract This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significantly different from the traditional "political business cycle." Reputational mechanisms due to the repeated interaction of the two parties and the public or commitments to a common policy rule can improve upon the discretionary outcome by reducing or eliminating the magnitude of the economic fluctuations. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher MIT Press en_US
dc.relation.isversionof en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.title Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Version of Record en_US
dc.relation.journal Quarterly Journal of Economics en_US Alesina, Alberto 2010-11-09T18:44:13Z

Files in this item

Files Size Format View xmlui.dri2xhtml.METS-1.0.item-files-description
alesina_macroeconomic.pdf 6.021Mb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • FAS Scholarly Articles [8326]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

Show simple item record


Search DASH

Advanced Search