Conflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nations

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Conflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nations

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Title: Conflict, Defense Spending, and the Number of Nations
Author: Spolaore, Enrico; Alesina, Alberto

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Citation: Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. 2006. Conflict, defense spending, and the number of nations. European Economic Review 50(1): 91-120.
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Abstract: This paper provides a formal model of endogenous border formation and choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. We examine both the case of democratic governments and of dictatorships. The model is consistent with three observations. First, breakup of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflicts. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the breakup of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace dividend (the reduction in defense spending in a more peaceful world) is limited by the process of country breakup.
Published Version: doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.06.003
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553016

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7218]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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