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dc.contributor.author	Roubini, Nouriel
dc.contributor.author	Cohen, Gerald
dc.contributor.author	Alesina, Alberto
dc.date.accessioned	2010-11-09T20:09:51Z
dc.date.issued	1992
dc.identifier.citation	Alesina, Alberto, Gerald D. Cohen, and Nouriel Roubini. 1992. Macroeconomic policy and elections in OECD democracies. Economics & Politics 4(1): 1-30.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0954-1985	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553023
dc.description.abstract	The purpose of this paper is to test for evidence of opportunistic "political business cycles" in a large sample of 18 OECD economies. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1) We find very little evidence of pre-electoral effects on economic outcomes, in particular, on GDP growth and unemployment; 2) We see some evidence of "political monetary cycles," that is, expansionary monetary policy in election years; 3) We also observe indications of "political budget cycles," or "loose" fiscal policy prior to elections; 4) Inflation exhibits a post-electoral jump, which could be explained by either the pre-electoral "loose" monetary and fiscal policies and/or by an opportunistic timing of increases in publicly controlled prices, or indirect taxes.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	Blackwell Publishing	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1992.tb00052.x	en_US
dash.license	LAA
dc.title	Macroeconomic Policy and Elections in OECD Democracies	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Author's Original	en_US
dc.relation.journal	Economics & Politics	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Alesina, Alberto
dc.date.available	2010-11-09T20:09:51Z

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  Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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