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dc.contributor.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.contributor.authorSpolaore, Enrico
dc.contributor.authorWacziarg, Romain
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-09T20:26:25Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.citationAlesina, Alberto, Enrico Spolaore, and Romain Wacziarg. 2000. Economic integration and political disintegration. American Economic Review 90(5): 1276-1296.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553029
dc.description.abstractIn a world of trade restrictions, large countries enjoy economic benefits, because political boundaries determine the size of the market. Under free trade and global markets even relatively small cultural, linguistic or ethnic groups can benefit from forming small, homogeneous political jurisdictions. This paper provides a formal model of the relationship between openness and the equilibrium number and size of countries, and successfully tests two implications of the model. Firstly, the economic benefits of country size are mediated by the degree of openness to trade. Secondly, the history of nation-state creations and secessions is influenced by the trade regime.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipEconomicsen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2677851en_US
dash.licenseLAA
dc.titleEconomic Integration and Political Disintegrationen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalAmerican Economic Reviewen_US
dash.depositing.authorAlesina, Alberto
dc.date.available2010-11-09T20:26:25Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedAlesina, Alberto


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