Voting on the Budget Deficit
| Title: | Voting on the Budget Deficit |
| Author: |
Tabellini, Guido; Alesina, Alberto
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina, 1990. Voting on the budget deficit. American Economic Review 80(1): 37-49. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
alesina_votingbudget.pdf (287.9Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule. Under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit, and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters. |
| Published Version: | http://www.nber.org/papers/w2759 |
| Other Sources: | http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006732 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553030 |
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