Voting on the Budget Deficit

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Voting on the Budget Deficit

Citable link to this page

. . . . . .

Title: Voting on the Budget Deficit
Author: Tabellini, Guido; Alesina, Alberto

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Tabellini, Guido, and Alberto Alesina, 1990. Voting on the budget deficit. American Economic Review 80(1): 37-49.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimal. However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule. Under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit, and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters.
Published Version: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2759
Other Sources: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006732
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553030

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7219]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters