The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution

DSpace/Manakin Repository

The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution

Citable link to this page

. . . . . .

Title: The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution
Author: Juda, Adam I.; Parkes, David C.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Juda, Adam I. and David C. Parkes. 2006. The sequential auction problem on eBay: An empirical analysis and a solution. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce: June 11-15, 2006, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. ed. J. Feigenbaum, J. Chuang, D. Pennock, Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce, and Association for Computing Machinery, 180-189. New York, N.Y.: ACM Press.
Access Status: At the direction of the depositing author this work is not currently accessible through DASH.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Bidders on eBay have no dominant bidding strategy when faced with multiple auctions each offering an item of interest. As seen through an analysis of 1,956 auctions on eBay for a Dell E193FP LCD monitor, some bidders win auctions at prices higher than those of other available auctions, while others never win an auction despite placing bids in losing efforts that are greater than the closing prices of other available auctions. These misqueues in strategic behavior hamper the efficiency of the system, and in so doing limit the revenue potential for sellers. This paper proposes a novel options-based extension to eBay's proxy-bidding system that resolves this strategic issue for buyers in commoditized markets. An empirical analysis of eBay provides a basis for computer simulations that investigate the market effects of the options-based scheme, and demonstrates that the options-based scheme provides greater efficiency than eBay, while also increasing seller revenue.
Published Version: doi:10.1145/1134707.1134727
Other Sources: http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/seqAucEbay.pdf
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4686808

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

  • FAS Scholarly Articles [6463]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters