The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution
View/ Open
Juda_Sequential.pdf (223.0Kb)
Access Status
Full text of the requested work is not available in DASH at this time ("restricted access"). For more information on restricted deposits, see our FAQ.Published Version
https://doi.org/10.1145/1134707.1134727Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Juda, Adam I. and David C. Parkes. 2006. The sequential auction problem on eBay: An empirical analysis and a solution. In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce: June 11-15, 2006, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. ed. J. Feigenbaum, J. Chuang, D. Pennock, Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce, and Association for Computing Machinery, 180-189. New York, N.Y.: ACM Press.Abstract
Bidders on eBay have no dominant bidding strategy when faced with multiple auctions each offering an item of interest. As seen through an analysis of 1,956 auctions on eBay for a Dell E193FP LCD monitor, some bidders win auctions at prices higher than those of other available auctions, while others never win an auction despite placing bids in losing efforts that are greater than the closing prices of other available auctions. These misqueues in strategic behavior hamper the efficiency of the system, and in so doing limit the revenue potential for sellers. This paper proposes a novel options-based extension to eBay's proxy-bidding system that resolves this strategic issue for buyers in commoditized markets. An empirical analysis of eBay provides a basis for computer simulations that investigate the market effects of the options-based scheme, and demonstrates that the options-based scheme provides greater efficiency than eBay, while also increasing seller revenue.Other Sources
http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/seqAucEbay.pdfCitable link to this page
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4686808
Collections
- FAS Scholarly Articles [18256]
Contact administrator regarding this item (to report mistakes or request changes)