Against Intentionalism

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Against Intentionalism

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Title: Against Intentionalism
Author: Nickel, Bernhard
Citation: Nickel, Bernhard. 2007. Against intentionalism. Philosophical Studies 136(3): 279-304.
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Abstract: Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to superficially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke’s examples cannot be extended to mine. If Intentionalism fails, it is impossible to reduce the phenomenology of an experience to its content.
Published Version: doi:10.1007/s11098-005-2013-2
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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [8094]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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