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dc.contributor.authorBoyle, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-25T19:38:40Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationBoyle, Matthew. Forthcoming. Active belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0045-5091en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4875850
dc.description.abstractI argue that cognitively mature human beings have an important sort of control or discretion over their own beliefs, but that to make good sense of this control, we must reject the common idea that it consists in a capacity to act on our belief-state by forming new beliefs or modifying ones we already hold. I propose that we exercise agential control over our beliefs, not primarily in doing things to alter our belief-state, but in holding whatever beliefs we hold. Our beliefs are thus not normally things on which we act; they are themselves our acts, in a sense I seek to explicate.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipPhilosophyen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Calgary Pressen_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleActive Beliefen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAccepted Manuscripten_US
dc.relation.journalCanadian Journal of Philosophyen_US
dash.depositing.authorBoyle, Matthew
dc.date.available2011-04-25T19:38:40Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00455091.2009.10717646
dash.contributor.affiliatedBoyle, Matthew


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