Bar-On on Self-Knowledge and Expression
| Title: | Bar-On on Self-Knowledge and Expression |
| Author: | Boyle, Matthew |
| Citation: | Boyle, Matthew. 2010. Bar-On on self-knowledge and expression. Acta Analytica 25(1): 9-20. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Boyle_BarOnSelfknow.pdf (88.46Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’ solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate avowals about our own present mental states, but how we can reasonably regard ourselves as entitled to claim self-knowledge. Addressing this aspect of the problem of self-knowledge requires confronting questions about the metaphysical nature of mental states, questions that Bar-On’s approach seeks to avoid. |
| Published Version: | doi:10.1007/s12136-009-0075-z |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4879142 |
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