Now showing items 401-420 of 2408

    • Corporate Philanthropy as Signaling and Co-Optation 

      Shapira, Roy (2012)
      This Article provides a new perspective on corporate philanthropy by examining a previously unnoticed mechanism through which corporate pro-sociality enhances firm value: signaling. In particular, cash donations can signal ...
    • Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters 

      Sitkoff, Robert H (University of Chicago Press, 2002)
      This article explores the policy bases for, and the political economy of, the law's long-standing discrimination against corporate political speech. This Article also explores the relevance of state law regulation of ...
    • Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides? 

      Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Jackson Jr., Robert (Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2010)
      The Supreme Court spoke clearly this Term on the issue of corporate political speech, concluding in Citizens United v. FEC that the First Amendment protects corporations’ freedom to spend corporate funds on indirect support ...
    • Corporate Responsibility in a Free and Democratic Society 

      Singer, Joseph William (Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2008)
      The article discusses the social responsibility of corporations in a democratic society in the U.S. It notes the potential of corporations to cut wages of employees and giving robust salary to executives as a moral obtuseness. ...
    • The Corporate Shareholder's Vote and its Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington 

      Roe, Mark J. (Harvard Law School, 2012)
      Shareholder power to effectively nominate, contest, and elect the company's board of directors became core to the corporate governance reform agenda in the past decade, as corporate scandal and financial stress put business ...
    • Corporate Short-termism -- In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom 

      Roe, Mark J. (2013)
      A long-held view in corporate circles has been that furious rapid trading in stock markets has been increasing in recent decades, justifying corporate governance and corporate law measures that would further shield managers ...
    • The Corrective Tax Versus Liability As Solutions to the Problem of Harmful Externalities 

      Shavell, Steven (2010)
      Although the corrective tax has long been viewed by economists as a theoretically desirable remedy for the problem of harmful externalities, its actual use has been limited, mainly to the domain of pollution. Liability, ...
    • Corrective Taxation versus Liability 

      Shavell, Steven (American Economic Association, 2011)
    • Correspondence: A New Era of Corruption 

      Benkler, Yochai (New Republic, 2009)
    • Cosmeceuticals or CosmePSEUDOcals: Examining the FDA's Under-sight of Celebrity Dermatologists in the Cosmeceuticals Industry 

      Brown, Laurel (2005)
      This paper will examine the Food and Drug Administration's regulation of the cosmeceuticals industry by exploring the legal (and ethical) implications of the industry's employment of physicians and dermatologists who sell ...
    • Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position 

      Sunstein, Cass Robert; Frank, Robert Allen (University of Chicago Law School, 2000)
      Current estimates of regulatory benefits are too low, and likely far too low, because they ignore a central point about valuation - namely, that people care not only about their absolute economic position, but also about ...
    • Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment 

      Sunstein, Cass Robert (University of Chicago Press, 2005)
      This review-essay explores the uses and limits of cost-benefit analysis in the context of environmental protection, focusing on three recent books: Priceless, by Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling; Cellular Phones, Public ...
    • Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Knowledge Problem 

      Sunstein, Cass Robert (2014)
      In the modern regulatory state, there is a serious tension between two indispensable ideas. The first is that it is important to measure, both in advance and on a continuing basis, the effects of regulation on social ...
    • Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: A Reply 

      Coates, John (Yale Law Journal Co, 2015)
      Still, for reasons I try to illuminate in Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications , efforts to quantify and monetize costs and benefits of significant financial regulations in precise ...
    • Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications 

      Coates, John (Yale Law School, 2015)
      Some members of Congress, the D.C. Circuit, and legal academia are promoting a particular, abstract form of cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation: judicially enforced quantification. How would CBA work in practice, ...
    • Cost-Benefit Default Principles 

      Sunstein, Cass Robert (University of Chicago Law School, 2014-09-17)
      In an important but thus far unnoticed development, federal courts have created a new series of "default principles" for statutory interpretation, authorizing regulatory agencies, when statutes are unclear, (a) to exempt ...
    • Costing Mead 

      Sunstein, Cass Robert (Yale Law School, 2006)
    • Costly litigation and optimal damages 

      Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Shavell, Steven (Elsevier BV, 2014)
      A basic principle of law is that damages paid by a liable party should equal the harm caused by that party. However, this principle is not correct when account is taken of litigation costs, because they too are part of the ...
    • The Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of Situationist Law and Economics 

      Benforado, Adam; Hanson, Jon (2005)
      This article was written for the 2005 Symposium: "Calabresi's Costs of Accidents: A Generation of Impact on Law and Scholarship" held at the University of Maryland Law School. Donald Gifford provided the following summary ...
    • The Costs of Entrenched Boards 

      Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma (Elsevier, 2005)
      This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially ...