Prosperity is Associated with Instability in Dynamical Networks

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Prosperity is Associated with Instability in Dynamical Networks

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dc.contributor.author Cavaliere, Matteo
dc.contributor.author Sedwards, Sean
dc.contributor.author Csikász-Nagy, Attila
dc.contributor.author Tarnita, Corina Elena
dc.contributor.author Nowak, Martin A.
dc.date.accessioned 2012-03-05T17:09:53Z
dc.date.issued 2012
dc.identifier.citation Cavaliere, Matteo, Sean Sedwards, Corina Elena Tarnita, Martin A. Nowak, and Attila Csikász-Nagy. Forthcoming. Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks. Journal of Theoretical Biology. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0022-5193 en_US
dc.identifier.issn 1095-8541 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8311705
dc.description.abstract Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and re-formation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and internal conflicts between ‘cooperators’ and ‘defectors’. We employ a game-theoretic model of dynamic network formation where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who adopt their strategies and copy their social network. We find that, despite using the same mechanism, cooperators promote well-connected highly prosperous networks and defectors cause the network to fragment and lose its prosperity; defectors are unable to maintain the highly connected networks they invade. Once the network is fragmented it can be reconstructed by a new invasion of cooperators, leading to the cycle of formation and fragmentation seen, for example, in bacterial communities and socio-economic networks. In this endless struggle between cooperators and defectors we observe that cooperation leads to prosperity, but prosperity is associated with instability. Cooperation is prosperous when the network has frequent formation and fragmentation. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Mathematics en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Other Research Unit en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier en_US
dc.relation.isversionof doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.005 en_US
dc.relation.hasversion http://arxiv.org/abs/1102.4947 en_US
dash.license OAP
dc.subject evolutionary game theory en_US
dc.subject network dynamics en_US
dc.subject imitation en_US
dc.subject evolution of cooperation en_US
dc.subject network formation and fragmentation en_US
dc.subject populations and evolution en_US
dc.title Prosperity is Associated with Instability in Dynamical Networks en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Author's Original en_US
dc.relation.journal Journal of Theoretical Biology en_US
dash.depositing.author Nowak, Martin A.
dc.date.available 2012-03-05T17:09:53Z

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7495]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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