Tort Liability and Vaccine Manufacturers

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Tort Liability and Vaccine Manufacturers

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dc.contributor.advisor Hutt, Peter Barton en_US
dc.contributor.author Aaronson, William H. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2012-06-07T02:52:57Z
dc.date.issued 1994 en_US
dc.identifier.citation Tort Liability and Vaccine Manufacturers (1994 Third Year Paper) en
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8846751
dc.description.abstract This paper has been written with future vaccines in mind. It is true, of course, that most vaccines currently available are extremely safe and not prohibitively expensive. For the few injuries caused by these vaccines, an insurance system paid for by their manufacturers might be feasible and reasonable. The small increase in a manufacturer's cost of doing business could be offset by a similarly small increase in the price of the particular vaccine. Disincentive to create new vaccines would be minimal. But vaccines of the future may only become this safe if government insures them during their earliest stages of development. In this light, a government-paid system may be a necessary bridge between the riskier and safer periods of a vaccine's life. en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dash.license LAA en_US
dc.subject Food and Drug Law en
dc.subject vaccination en
dc.subject Biologics Act en
dc.subject Reyes V. Wyeth Laboratories en
dc.title Tort Liability and Vaccine Manufacturers en
dc.type Paper (for course/seminar/workshop) en_US
dc.date.available 2012-06-07T02:52:57Z

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