Tort Liability and Vaccine Manufacturers

DSpace/Manakin Repository

dc.contributor.advisor	Hutt, Peter Barton	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Aaronson, William H.	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2012-06-07T02:52:57Z
dc.date.issued	1994	en_US
dc.identifier.citation	Tort Liability and Vaccine Manufacturers (1994 Third Year Paper)	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8846751
dc.description.abstract	This paper has been written with future vaccines in mind. It is true, of course, that most vaccines currently available are extremely safe and not prohibitively expensive. For the few injuries caused by these vaccines, an insurance system paid for by their manufacturers might be feasible and reasonable. The small increase in a manufacturer's cost of doing business could be offset by a similarly small increase in the price of the particular vaccine. Disincentive to create new vaccines would be minimal. But vaccines of the future may only become this safe if government insures them during their earliest stages of development. In this light, a government-paid system may be a necessary bridge between the riskier and safer periods of a vaccine's life.	en
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dash.license	LAA	en_US
dc.subject	Food and Drug Law	en
dc.subject	vaccination	en
dc.subject	Biologics Act	en
dc.subject	Reyes V. Wyeth Laboratories	en
dc.title	Tort Liability and Vaccine Manufacturers	en
dc.type	Paper (for course/seminar/workshop)	en_US
dc.date.available	2012-06-07T02:52:57Z