The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

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The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

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Title: The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
Author: Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Fudenberg, Drew, and Yuichi Yamamoto. 2011. The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 146(4): 1664–1683.
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Abstract: This paper introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals. It provides a sufficient condition for the folk theorem when the game is irreducible, thus generalizing the results of Dutta (1995) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994). To do this, the paper extends the concept of self-generation (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti, 1990) to “return generation,” which explicitly tracks actions and incentives until the next time the state returns to its current value, and asks that players not wish to deviate given the way their continuation payoffs from the time of this return depend on the public signals that have been observed.
Published Version: doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.004
Other Sources: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706269
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8896226

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7176]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
 
 

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