The Illusory Promise: Patents (Lack of) Power to Incentivize Drug Development for Poor Countries

The Illusory Promise: Patents (Lack of) Power to Incentivize Drug Development for Poor Countries

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The Illusory Promise: Patents (Lack of) Power to Incentivize Drug Development for Poor Countries

dc.contributor.advisor	Hutt, Peter Barton	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Lau, Stacy
dc.date.accessioned	2012-08-17T14:41:49Z
dc.date.issued	2006
dc.identifier.citation	The Illusory Promise: Patents (Lack of) Power to Incentivize Drug Development for Poor Countries (2006 Third Year Paper)	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9414569
dc.description.abstract	Low-income countries suffer infectious and communicable diseases at a greater rate than any other income group. Because people living in these countries are not able to pay high drug prices, pharmaceutical companies do not have sufficient incentive to research and develop cures for infectious diseases. This essay examines strong intellectual property rights and patent enforcement as a solution to this problem. It will provide a description of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (â€&oelig;TRIPSâ€) negotiations, where high- and low-income countries polarized to the degree that they failed to address incentivizing new cures for infectious diseases. It will then examine the incentive effects of TRIPS on the Indian pharmaceutical industry, and find that Indian companies are beginning to shift their research and development towards high-income markets. Finally, it will conclude that though intellectual property rights are important, ultimately, a market-creating solution is necessary.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en
dash.license	LAA
dc.subject	Food and Drug Law	en_US
dc.subject	patent	en_US
dc.title	The Illusory Promise: Patents (Lack of) Power to Incentivize Drug Development for Poor Countries	en_US
dc.type	Paper (for course/seminar/workshop)	en_US
dc.date.available	2012-08-17T14:41:49Z