Transparency and Accountability: Empirical Results for US States
| Title: | Transparency and Accountability: Empirical Results for US States |
| Author: |
Alt, James E.; Lowry, Robert C.
Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors. |
| Citation: | Alt, James E. and Robert C. Lowry. 2010. Transparency and accountability: Empirical results for US states. Journal of Theoretical Politics 22(4): 379–406. |
| Full Text & Related Files: |
Alt_Transparency.pdf (401.4Kb; PDF) 
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| Abstract: | Recent formal models of accountability allow us to make different conditional predictions about how transparency affects voters’ willingness to reelect incumbents and acceptance of higher taxes. We review two models and investigate empirical implications derived from or related to them, using panel data from 1972-2000 for U.S. state budget process transparency, gubernatorial elections, and tax increases in a small structural model. We do not find that budget transparency has a direct effect on incumbent retention, but we do find clear evidence that increased transparency dampens the negative effect of tax increases on retention of incumbent governors. Independent of this, we also find that increased transparency leads to greater fiscal scale. We suggest some possible directions for future models based on our results. |
| Published Version: | doi:10.1177/0951629810375641 |
| Terms of Use: | This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP |
| Citable link to this page: | http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9468172 |
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Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University
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