Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

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Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance

dc.contributor.author	Chetty, Nadarajan
dc.contributor.author	Saez, Emmanuel
dc.date.accessioned	2012-10-05T19:39:33Z
dc.date.issued	2010
dc.identifier.citation	Chetty, Raj and Emannuel Saez. 2010. Optimal taxation and social insurance with endogenous private insurance. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(2): 85-116.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0898-2937	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	1945-774X	en_US
dc.identifier.uri	http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9696326
dc.description.abstract	This paper characterizes the welfare gains from redistributive taxation and social insurance in an environment where the private sector provides partial insurance. We analyze stylized models in which adverse selection, pre-existing information, or imperfect optimization in private insurance markets create a role for government intervention. We derive simple formulas that map reduced-form empirical estimates into quantitative predictions for optimal tax and social insurance policy. Applications to unemployment and health insurance show that taking private market insurance into account matters significantly for optimal benefit levels given existing empirical estimates of the key parameters.	en_US
dc.description.sponsorship	Economics	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	National Bureau of Economic Research	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	doi:10.1257/pol.2.2.85	en_US
dc.relation.hasversion	http://www.nber.org/papers/w14403.pdf	en_US
dash.license	OAP
dc.title	Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance	en_US
dc.type	Journal Article	en_US
dc.description.version	Author's Original	en_US
dc.relation.journal	American Economic Journal: Economic Policy	en_US
dash.depositing.author	Chetty, Nadarajan
dc.date.available	2012-10-05T19:39:33Z