Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games

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Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games

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dc.contributor.author Fudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.author Yamamoto, Yuichi
dc.date.accessioned 2012-11-28T19:47:27Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.citation Fudenberg, Drew, and Yuichi Yamamoto. 2011. Learning from private information in noisy repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory 146(5): 1733-1769. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0022-0531 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9962008
dc.description.abstract We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this characterization, we develop conditions under which play can be as if the players have learned the state. We provide a sufficient condition for the folk theorem, and a characterization of the PTXE payoffs in games with a known monitoring structure. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Elsevier en_US
dc.relation.isversionof doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.003 en_US
dc.relation.hasversion http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1703580 en_US
dash.license OAP
dc.subject repeated game en_US
dc.subject public monitoring en_US
dc.subject incomplete information en_US
dc.subject perfect public equilibrium en_US
dc.subject folk theorem en_US
dc.subject belief-free equilibrium en_US
dc.subject ex-post equilibrium en_US
dc.title Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Accepted Manuscript en_US
dc.relation.journal Journal of Economic Theory en_US
dash.depositing.author Fudenberg, Drew
dc.date.available 2012-11-28T19:47:27Z

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [7374]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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