Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

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Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms

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dc.contributor.author Fudenberg, Drew
dc.contributor.author Archetti, Marco
dc.contributor.author Green, Jerry R.
dc.contributor.author Pierce, Naomi Ellen
dc.contributor.author Yu, Douglas W.
dc.contributor.author Úbeda, Francisco
dc.date.accessioned 2012-11-28T19:58:13Z
dc.date.issued 2011
dc.identifier.citation Archetti, Marco, Francisco Úbeda, Drew Fudenberg, Jerry R. Green, Naomi Ellen Pierce, and Douglas W. Yu. 2011. Let the right one in: A microeconomic approach to partner choice in mutualisms. The American Naturalist 177(1): 75-85. en_US
dc.identifier.issn 0003-0147 en_US
dc.identifier.issn 1537-5323 en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9962009
dc.description.abstract One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however, exist without signaling, and the mechanisms by which hosts might select the right partners are unclear. Here we propose a general mechanism of partner choice, "screening," that is similar to the economic theory of mechanism design. Imposing the appropriate costs and rewards may induce the informed individuals to screen themselves according to their types and therefore allow a noninformed individual to establish associations with the correct partners in the absence of signaling. Several types of biological symbioses are good candidates for screening, including bobtail squid, ant-plants, gut microbiomes, and many animal and plant species that produce reactive oxygen species. We describe a series of diagnostic tests for screening. Screening games can apply to the cases where by-products, partner fidelity feedback, or host sanctions do not apply, therefore explaining the evolution of mutualism in systems where it is impossible for potential symbionts to signal their cooperativeness beforehand and where the host does not punish symbiont misbehavior. en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Economics en_US
dc.description.sponsorship Organismic and Evolutionary Biology en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher University of Chicago Press en_US
dc.relation.isversionof doi:10.1086/657622 en_US
dc.relation.hasversion http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21091210 en_US
dash.license LAA
dc.subject cooperation en_US
dc.subject symbiosis en_US
dc.subject microbiome en_US
dc.subject Vibrio fishceri en_US
dc.subject virulence en_US
dc.subject parasitism en_US
dc.title Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.description.version Version of Record en_US
dc.relation.journal The American Naturalist en_US
dash.depositing.author Fudenberg, Drew
dc.date.available 2012-11-28T19:58:13Z

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  • FAS Scholarly Articles [6466]
    Peer reviewed scholarly articles from the Faculty of Arts and Sciences of Harvard University

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