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Mapping the World: Justin, Tatian, Lucian, and the Second Sophistic

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In the late 1960s, African American children in Boston were asked to draw maps of their neighborhood, near the old Mission Hill housing project. The housing project, largely white at the time, took up a large part of their hand-drawn maps, but was figured in various ways as a big blank: a no-man’s land, a topography absent of marks or monuments. The streets around it, as well as schools, restaurants, and stores, were often carefully and clearly articulated, but the housing project itself was an open, unmarked rectangle. Recent critical geographers have been interested in the way “people’s spatial behaviour is shaped by the hills and valleys of the invisible information and environmental stress surfaces over them.” Landscape and the built environment of the city are not neutral, but have their own rhetoric, exerting influence on the bodies of those who move through them. And humans map and interpret space, understanding and defining the limits of their known world through the movements of their bodies.

The idea that humans produce concrete place out of abstract space is not new, nor is the concept of the perils of a city or of configuring fear as a topographical


2Gould and White, Mental Maps, 108. See also their mention of perceived areas of safety and danger in cities, “invisible stress surfaces” which lie over cities and influence people’s movements. For a more recent discussion of an approach to archaeology which “allows us to think about the ways in which landscapes and built forms were experienced, perceived, and represented by ancient subjects, working from the starting point of a contemporary body in the same space,” see Ruth M. Van Dyke and Susan E. Alcock, “Archaeologies of Memory: An Introduction,” in Archaeologies of Memory (ed. caedem; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003) 5–6.

3On space and place, see especially David Harvey, “From Space to Place and Back Again,” in his Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996) 291–326. See the cautionary words of Henri Lefebvre on uses of the term “space” in his The Production of

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blank. Subjects of the Roman Empire also talked about urban decay, speculated on the limits of the *oikoumenē*, or inhabited world, and knew the danger of not knowing where one was. The idea that ignorance about geography can lead to danger is well demonstrated in a section from Strabo’s first-century *Geography*, which seeks to persuade the reader of the utility of geography for states and commanders, among others. He writes, “The barbarians carried on a *topomachia* [etymologically speaking, a battle of place] in swamps, in pathless forests, and in deserts, and they made the ignorant Romans believe to be far away what was really near at hand, and kept them in ignorance of the roads and of the facilities for procuring provisions.” According to Strabo, geography serves the needs of empire (preventing *topomachia*, for instance) at the same time that the spread of empire leads to more empirical knowledge of geography—and, presumably, to the pushing back of barbarian boundaries. Knowledge, space, and imperial power are

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3 *Geogr*. 2.1. Among Alexander the Great’s workers were two road measurers who recorded distances between stopping places and described geography, soil, flora, and fauna (O. A. W. Dilke, *Greek and Roman Maps* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985] 29; see also book 15 of Strabo’s *Geography*).
imbricated. Strabo tries to sell his audience on the importance of geography and of his *Geography* in particular by pointing to the dangers of ignorance and the power of knowing one’s place in the *oikoumen*.

Writings in the Roman period that are labeled as geographies, like Strabo’s, may contain some or all of the following discussions: ethnographic writing; lists of cities’ longitudes and latitudes; descriptions of topography; land itineraries and merchants’ accounts of voyages; speculations on the relationship between the mapping of the heavens, especially the zodiac, and the terrestrial regions governed by those heavens. Yet these same components are found not only in geographies. What I term “geographical thinking” thrived in a variety of texts and genres—like that of the first-century merchant traveling the Erythrean Sea, or the fantastic voyages of Greek novels⁹—in the first and second centuries C.E.¹⁰ Those who used this kind of thinking often offered complex pictures of the world, folding issues of ethnicity, *paideia* or culture, language and dialect, politics and power into descriptions, or *ekphraseis*, of locations.

One aspect of geographical thinking is the evaluation of the relative locations and importance of cities, and the tracing of routes both real and imaginary between them.¹¹ From the new conditions of the Roman Empire emerge complex mappings

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⁹On itineraries and fear in ancient Greek literature, see also François Hartog, *Memories of Odysseus: Frontier Tales from Ancient Greece* (trans. Janet Lloyd; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001) 88: “Designed as it was to produce an inventory, a *periplo* held the void (blank spaces) in horror.” On Strabo’s particular attitude toward geography, see p. 92, where Hartog argues that Strabo, unlike Herodotus, “confines the geographer solely to an investigation of the ‘inhabited world’, to wit the space dominated by Rome.” Regarding Strabo, see also Dille, *Greek and Roman Maps*, 62–64; and especially Nicolet, *Space, Geography, and Politics*, 8, who argues: “It is not a coincidence that the most complete geographic work handed down from antiquity, that of Strabo, is from the Augustan period.”

¹⁰Geography pervades many other discourses in the Roman world. For an example of the difficulty of defining geography, see among others Clarke, *Between Geography and History*. The range of sources that Nicolet treats in his *Space, Geography, and Politics* is a helpful reminder of the many aspects of thought in the Roman world that touch upon geography. It is worth noting that Greco-Roman novels tend to omit Rome entirely in their depictions of the world. Simon Swain explains this “world without Rome” in terms of a deliberate Greek blindness to the present and an assertion of Greek urban values apart from Rome; see his *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 30–250* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) ch. 4; quotation from p. 109. For the most fantastic of these travel novels, see Lucian’s *True Story*. For a merchant’s itinerary, see Lionel Casson, *The Periplo Maris Erythraei: Text with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).

¹¹Here I agree with Nicolet’s broad definition and exploration of geography in the early Roman empire: “This geography (representation through discourse, description, an account of a voyage, or an itinerary and geometric conceptualization) also comes with a cartography, or rather, it is cartography. In antiquity the same words specify *discourse and drawings*” (*Space, Geography, and Politics*, 4). For more on maps and cartography and for a survey of geographical literature from the classical to the Roman period, see Dille, *Greek and Roman Maps*.

— Claudio Ptolemy’s *Geography* is basically an expanded list of significant cities, originally intended merely as a handbook for helping with the use of his astronomical treatise, the *Almagest*; it then expanded to a work in its own right.
like that of Vitruvius, who addresses his *De architectura* to Augustus. Vitruvius centers the map on Italy and the Roman people:

The populations of Italy partake in equal measure of the qualities of both north and south, both with regard to their physiques and to the vigor of their minds, to produce the greatest strength.... Thus the divine intelligence established the state of the Roman People as an outstanding and balanced region—so that it could take command over the earthly orb.12

Yet first- and second-century geographical thinking about the Roman world is not stable—it shifts even within this one text. In the same passage, Vitruvius celebrates the man who is shipwrecked, the universal traveler: “An educated person is the only one who is never a stranger in a foreign land, nor at a loss for friends even when bereft of household and intimates. Rather, he is a citizen in every country.”13

Vitruvius’s text oscillates between two poles: in one, the map of the world centers on Rome; in the other, the map of the world has no center but is traced by the universal traveler, citizen of everywhere, *paideia* in hand. Mappings such as Vitruvius’s and Strabo’s are products of and implements for politics.

This article focuses on three second-century figures, Justin, his student Tatian, and Lucian, who are educated travelers like the shipwreck victim that Vitruvius describes. I investigate how they map their world, and in particular how *paideia*, or Greek culture and education, and the conditions of the Roman Empire inflect their geographical thinking. By using the term “geographical thinking” to talk about the works of Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, I do not refer to “authentic” psychological states, but rather to how these authors constructed their world in the context of the Roman Empire and the culture wars of the so-called second sophistic. The second century was perhaps a peak in the production and exhibition of an elite, antiquar-

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12Vitruvius, *Architectura* 6.1.11 (Ten Books on Architecture [trans. Ingrid D. Rowland; commentary and illustrations by Thomas Noble Howe; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999] 77). For Vitruvius, architecture, geography, cosmography, and ethnicity are all part of the same complex of problems; see also Arch. 6.1.12. Arguments like Vitruvius’s (or like those of others in the Roman period) presage Herder’s and others’ debates over *Volk* and land in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On Herder, autochthony, and hybridity, see Robert Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race (New York: Routledge, 1995) 36–43. For more on climate/region and ethnic identity, see, e.g., Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, 138–39. Nicolet (Space, Geography, and Politics, 194) mentions this passage and its engagement with “the imperial destiny of Rome.” He misses, however, the tension between this passage and the one I discuss next.

13Arch. 6.preface.2 (trans, Rowland, 75). Citizenship and displacement are discussed often in literature of the first two centuries; one example is Paul’s statement in Phil 3:20: “But our commonwealth is in heaven” (καὶ ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ παλιτεύμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει). For an analysis of exile and elite male identity in the second sophistic, see Tim Whitmarsh, “ ‘Greece is the World’: Exile and Identity in the Second Sophistic,” in Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire (ed. Simon Goldhill; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 269–305. On the traveler in Greek and Roman literature, see Hartog, Memories of Odysseus.
ian Greek identity that was (variously) an act of resistance towards the Roman Empire and an item of social capital to be acquired by provincial and Roman elites alike. From this context of the second sophistic emerged mental maps of the world, sometimes centered on an invented Greece, an imagined Athens, a real Rome, or an idealized barbarian land.

The term “second sophistic” is borrowed from the third-century C.E. writer Philostratus’s characterization of those who had more recently imitated the sophists of classical-period Greece. Among those who participated in and resisted the second sophistic, “Greek” marked not only a region, ethnicity, or language, but also a set of practices which included antiquarian impulses, an emphasis on the importance of Plato and Homer, the use of the Attic dialect, and the manipulations of genres associated with classical Greece, such as dialogue. The second sophistic was not a club to be joined, but rather an educational and political trend in which Justin, Tatian, and Lucian participated, which spawned satire and debate over culture or education (paideia), cultic practices, and ethnic identity under Rome. Instead of understanding Justin as central to Christian apology (and Tatian as disturbingly and angrily at its margins), as scholars often do, I read both authors, and Lucian too, as traveling points on a broader map. Not only do all three talk about their travels; their rhetorical constructions of these travels also function to authorize their arguments, to guarantee their experience, and most importantly to signal something about their relationship to the fluidity of Greek identity and the seeming solidity of Greek paideia in the Roman world. The literature of the second

14 On the construction of Greek identity in antiquity, see especially Jonathan Hall’s Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Although Hall’s book treats an earlier period, his concluding chapter mentions the way in which the second sophistic’s interest in defining Hellenic identity in terms of culture borrows from certain definitions of Hell nes in the classical period (e.g., pp. 225–26).

15 See Maud Gleason’s neat formulation: “Paideia, for both Greek and Roman gentlemen, was a form of symbolic capital” (Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995] xxii). Interest in (elite) male bodies and their representation in antiquity is widespread in scholarship today. Much of this work is excellent and has inspired and challenged my own readings, yet I want to signal the potential problems and politics of this turn, in which I admittedly participate in this article. Why are scholars today so interested in the construction of ancient masculinity, and especially in ancient males who are represented as melancholic in their exile, struggling to negotiate their way under the conditions of empire, benefiting from that empire and resisting it at the same time, elite but vulnerable? We may be interested in them because we conflate our understanding of their situation with perceptions of our own contexts of elite educations, participation in current academic struggles over “great books” and canon, the itinerancy of academia, feelings of hybridity. One danger is that studies of masculinity can draw from feminist research on gender, yet avoid the ethical turn that many feminists insist upon.

16 See Swain, Hellenism and Empire, 1–7.

17 See Timothy Horner, Listening to Trypho: Justin Martyr’s Dialogue Reconsidered (Leuven: Peeters, 2001) esp. 72–83, where Horner observes that Justin should be read within the context of the second sophistic.

18 In the context of a discussion of Parmenides and Lucian, Tim Whitmarsh writes: “Rather than confining him to his native land, Paideia offers him access to the whole world; and, in particular, access to the centre, Rome. Education offers a relocation from the parochial to the universal, from
sophistic, including geographical texts, turned to Odysseus as a model; exile and wandering built up cultural credentials, whether you are Paul as depicted by Luke, Apollonius as depicted by Philostratus, or Lucian meditating upon the fatherland. Yet these conceptions and self-constructions of traveling teachers emerge from a context of sometimes violent struggles over provincial and metropolitan identities under colonial conditions, and of elite production and manipulation of cultural identities and sources of authoritative knowledge. Postcolonial critics’ interest in the hybrid identities of subject elites keeps our eyes open to something analogous in antiquity, something we see in Justin, Tatian, and Lucian: the negotiation of authoritative culture under conditions of empire, and simultaneous resistance and assimilation to this paideia.19

In what follows I have three intertwined goals. First, I seek to complicate the model of center and periphery that has often been used to talk about the Roman Empire or about Greeks and barbarians in the ancient world. Justin, Tatian, and Lucian do not merely contrast Rome and their marginal, eastern homeland. Their geographical thinking is far more complex: they are Vitruvian men, traveling between cities and accruing the authority that such cosmopolitanism lends; they weigh and debate the metropolitan claims of cities like Athens or Jerusalem or even Lucian’s homeland in Syria, which he calls Hierapolis, the “holy city.” Second, in placing Justin and Tatian alongside Lucian, I remap the traditional scholarly approach that frames Justin and Tatian in terms of Christian apologetic and the boundaries of Christianity and Hellenism, and show instead that these authors engage in the broader debates of the second sophistic. Third, scholars have attended to issues of geography and space in the writings of Greeks and Romans. But insufficient attention has been paid to the same topic among Christians in the Roman Empire, despite the fact that Christianity has long been depicted as thriving because of cities and travels between them,20 and despite the fact that Christians lived in a world where discussions of geography were widely prevalent. Thus, I take up and nuance this theme of cities, travel, and geography. I turn now to explore how Lucian, Tatian, and Justin construct maps of the empire and their own places within it, paying special attention to their characterizations of cities and

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19See Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). On state control of space and resistance to that control, see, e.g., Lefebvre, Production of Space, 23.

especially of real and epistemic violence—that is, violence toward certain kinds of knowledge—in Rome.

Justin, Tatian, and Lucian

From their places within the influence of the second sophistic, Justin, Tatian, and Lucian offer similar self-constructions. They are philosophers (or at least truth-seekers) from the eastern ranges of the empire, struggling with what it means to be a rhetor, sophist, and/or philosopher in their common cultural context. Like Vitruvius’s shipwrecked traveller, their paideia renders them universal travelers of sorts, but they tweak and question both this paideia and their imagined and real travels between cities. Justin not only famously constructs himself as a philosopher, but also does not challenge the appellation of sophist when it is applied to him. Tatian describes himself as “having played the sophist”; he also criticizes those who are attracted to the glossomantia of the philosophers rather than a “serious quest for the truth.” Lucian, of course, has multiple texts in which he toys with the roles of rhetor and philosopher, most famously A Double Accusation.

All three also present their philosophical quests by drawing upon a narrative common to the time: that of the truth-seeker who wanders through the philosophical marketplace, see the shortcomings of various teachers: their greed, their deception, their folly. Justin presents himself as having progressed through Stoic, Peripatetic, Pythagorean, and finally Platonist philosophy, but he only became a

21 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone 3.3. Φιλόλογος οὖν τις εἴ σὺ, ἐφι, φιλεργός δὲ οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲ φιλαλήθης, οὐ δὲ πειρὰ πρακτικός εἶ ναι μᾶλλον ἡ σοφιστής. “Therefore are you some philologist, he said, who is not at all industrious or a truth-lover, nor does he attempt to be a practical man, but rather a sophist?” The edition is that of Miroslav Marcovich, Justin Martyris Dialogus cum Tryphone (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1997).

22 Tatian, To the Greeks (Oratio ad Graecos), 35.1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Tatian are from Whittaker (Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments [ed. and trans. Molly Whittaker; Oxford: Clarendon, 1982]). When I offer my own translations, these have been helped by hers. I use the Greek edition of Miroslav Marcovich, Tatiani Oratio ad Graecos (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1995).

23 Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos, 3.3 (Whittaker, 9).


25 Oratio ad Graecos 29.1. In Paul too we find discussion of Greek and barbarian, in particular the idea of obligation “both to Greeks and barbarians, both to the wise and to the foolish” (Rom 1:14).
philosopher as his spirit was set on fire with an “affection for the prophets, and for those who are friends of Christ.” Tatian, too, asserts that he “participated in mysteries and tested cults” and rejected them in favor of “barbarian writings.” From reading Lucian, we would think that everyone in the second century was running around in philosophical drag, claiming serious interest in philosophy, but really in love with money and fame. All guarantee the rightness of the truth to which they have come by ekphraseis, or “descriptions,” which remind the reader of the authenticity of their travels and the certitude of what they learned, especially through seeing.

All three also critique what we would call religion:

If anyone sacrifices, [the gods] all have a feast, opening their mouths for the smoke and drinking the blood that is spilt at the altars, just like flies. . . . Then too they [humans] erect temples, in order that the gods may not be houseless and heartless, of course; and they fashion images in their [human] likeness. . . . Those who offer victims. . . . deck the animal with garlands. . . . Then they bring it to the altar and slaughter it under the god’s eyes, while it bellows plaintively—making, we must suppose, auspicious sounds, and fluting low music to accompany the sacrifice! Who would not suppose that the gods like to see all this? And although the notice says that no one is to be allowed within the holy-water who has not clean hands, the priest himself stands there all bloody, just like the Cyclops of old, cutting up the victim, removing the entrails, plucking out the heart, pouring the blood about the altar, and doing everything possible in the way of piety.

Reading this without attribution, one might guess that it was written by Tatian or some other Christian satirist bitter about other religious practices, such as Minucius Felix. But it comes from the pen of Lucian, whose mockery of claims to piety extended to various Mediterranean rituals and cults, including the perpetually insulted Egyptian and (then, much later) Christian cults. If we were to read Justin

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25 See also his True Story (Vera historia), which mocks the travelogue and admits to being full of lies, even as it claims also to be spurred by the desire for travel in order to quest for knowledge: “Once upon a time, setting out from the Pillars of Hercules and heading for the western ocean with a fair wind, I went voyaging. The motive and purpose of my journey lay in my intellectual activity [ἡ τις διανοοις περιηγήσιον] and desire for adventure, and in my wish to find out what the end of the ocean was, and who the people were that lived at its end” (Vera historia 1.5; Lucian: Works [trans. Harmon, LCL, 1.253], with small modifications). Note that the phrase here translated “intellectual activity” has a sharp undertone of futility and needless excess of learning. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Lucian are from the Loeb edition.

26 On the connection between travel and theoría, or seeing, see Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, 90–91. Hartog also discusses the way in which Maximus of Tyre depicts Anacharsis’s tour of Greece not as a moment of gaining knowledge from Greece, but rather of testing its wisdom (p. 112).

27 Lucian, De sacrificiis 9–13 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.165–169). For a critique of religious chicanery of the style of Lucian’s Alexander the False Prophet, see Tatian’s mockery of Heraclitus and Empedocles (Oratio ad Graecos 2.1: 3.2).

28 See, for example, Justin, 1 Apol. 4–5.

29 Rebecca Lyman’s “The Politics of Passing: Justin Martyr’s Conversion as a Problem of ‘Hellenization’” (in Conversion in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages: Seeing and Believing [ed.
and Tatian merely as (Christian) apologists, we would miss this larger context of debate over Greek education, Greco-Roman myths, and the panoply of cult practices around the Mediterranean.  

I have called Justin, Tatian, and Lucian Vitruvian men because their rhetorical constructions of their lives echo Vitruvius’s account of the shipwrecked traveler who needs only paideia to fit into foreign country or household. But in using this term I intend, too, to conjure up Leonardo da Vinci’s famous drawing of the perfectly balanced man, inscribed within a circle, and the source that the drawing interprets—Vitruvius’s comments about the ideal symmetry of the human body and the analogy of this body to architectural measure. Several disciplines—from religion to critical geographical theory to feminist theory—open our eyes to the way in which space is understood and geographical understanding is developed from our particular bodies. Jonathan Z. Smith, discussing geography, puts it well: “It is the relationship to the human body, and our experience of it, that orients us in space, that confers meaning to place. Human beings are not placed, they bring place into being. . . . Place is best understood as a locus of meaning.” We shape our maps and orient ourselves through our bodies, and Justin’s, Tatian’s, and Lucian’s very specific bodies are represented as tracing the geography of the empire in various ways.  

Thinking with and beyond Vitruvius, we can see that the human body is a site from which an understanding of space emerges, but that it is also a measure for

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See Arch. 3.1, esp. sect. 9. Vitruvius also understands human bodies and columns to be analogous, and genders his columns (Doric are male; Ionic and Corinthian are female); see Arch. 4.1.6–8.  

Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward a Theory in Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) 27–28; this emerges in a discussion of Kant. For an extremely succinct overview of the concept of space in the history of philosophy, see Lefebvre, Production of Space, 1–2; this is followed by a strenuous critique of postmodern uses of the term “space.” Smith has elsewhere reminded us of the importance of geography and space to the study of religion. In his “What a Difference a Difference Makes” (“To See Ourselves as Others See Us: Christians, Jews, ‘Others’ in Late Antiquity” ed. Jacob Neusner and Ernest S. Frerichs; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1985) 3–48), Smith discusses the power of Greco-Roman understandings of geography even over Christopher Columbus. Regarding religion, ritual, and geography, see also David Frankfurter, “Introduction: Approaches to Coptic Pilgrimage,” in Pilgrimage and Holy Space in Late Antique Egypt (ed. idem; Leiden: Brill, 1998) esp. 13–18.  

This concept of the body’s movement through space has also been developed by theorists such as Soja and Lefebvre, mentioned earlier (see above, n. 3), as well as Smith in To Take Place. See also Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (trans. Steven Rendall; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); and Heidi J. Nast and Steve Pile, “Introduction: MakingPlacesBodies,” in Places through the Body (ed. idem; New York: Routledge, 1998) esp. 1–6.
defining the architectures, cities, and the spaces surrounding the body. For example, Vitruvius suggests that altars and gods be placed at various heights in relation to the human body in order to create the proper effects for awe and worship.\(^{35}\) Humans are transformed by the rhetoric of given places and by their movements through space.\(^{36}\) And as feminist scholars have stressed, the body is itself a space open to use and penetration, subject to mapping, with borders that are discrete yet penetrable. Justin, Tatian, and Lucian are elite males who are concerned both with their approaches to cities, gods, and altars, and with how the borders of their bodies and minds are pressed upon by Greek paideia and the Roman Empire to which they are subject.\(^{37}\) Recent scholarly analysis of hybridity and ambiguity, of assimilation and negotiation under the conditions of empire, helps us to read Justin’s, Tatian’s, and Lucian’s geographical thinking and their deployment of ethnic, cultic, and local categories as part of their colonial condition, part of the structures of real and epistemic violence under Rome and its (re)production of a Greek cultural hegemony.\(^{38}\)

In the sections that follow, I shall read Justin and Tatian—the latter of whom, I will argue, is not as lugubrious as has been thought—alongside Lucian, the David Sedaris of the second century.\(^{39}\) All three are from the eastern parts of the empire, toying with barbarian identity as well as Greekness, mentally mapping the oikoumenē, simultaneously in terms of its geography, its ethnicities, and its authorita-

\(^{35}\)Arch. 4.5–9.

\(^{36}\)For more discussion, see, for example, Elizabeth Wilson, The Sphinx in the City: Urban Life, the Control of Disorder, and Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); and Dolores Hayden, The Power of Place: Urban Landscapes as Public History (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995).


\(^{40}\)On ethnicity and race in antiquity, and especially on Christians’ manipulation of the rhetoric of race’s fixity and fluidity, see Buell, Why This New Race? Buell’s work has influenced many
tive locations of knowledge. They draw on the long tradition, studied by scholars like François Hartog and Arnoldo Momigliano, of Greek concerns about alien or barbarian wisdom and thus Greek anxiety about what constitutes Greek identity and knowledge. Their works construct maps of the relative epistemic topography of the Roman Empire, and the writers present themselves as authoritative bodies that, having toured the Roman Empire, can guarantee the truth of their evaluations by ekphrasis itself—by their “description” or, rather, constructions of authentic experiences of various sites of knowledge in important cities. They also present themselves as bodies subject to potential danger, whether real or epistemic. I begin with Lucian in order to set Justin and Tatian within their broader cultural context, and in order to resist the urge to frame Justin and Tatian in terms of apologetic or intramural Christian debate.

Lucian

aspects of my thought on the rhetorical deployment of ethnicity.

Hartog, Memories of Odysseus; Arnoldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). In my approach I appreciate but differ from Guy Stroumsa’s Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (WUNT 112; Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1999); Stroumsa understands Christians as developing “some kind of ethnological curiosity, or interest in exotic peoples” (p. 58). I read figures like Justin and Tatian instead as reworking barbarian identity from within.


See Gleason, Making Men, and R. Bracht Branham, Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) 1–4 on oratorical performance in the second sophistic. On defining Lucian as a sophist, see R. Bracht Branham, “Introducing a Sophist: Lucian’s Prologues,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 115 (1985) 237. Christopher Jones (Culture and Society in Lucian [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986] 12–14) argues that even if Lucian “converted” from sophistical oration to more philosophical dialogue (conversion is a problematic framework for such analysis, in my view, and Jones himself calls the situation “irrecoverable”), his work would have been performed orally. For a reading of Lucian using postcolonial and feminist theory, see Rosa Cornford Parent, “Mapping Identity in the Lucianic Corpus” (Ph.D. diss., Department of Classics, University of Southern California, 2000). Lucian discusses his own career turn in The Dream (Somnium), also called Lucian’s Career (Vita Luciani), in which he depicts Sculpture and Paideia (both personified) competing over him in a dream, and his choice to attach himself to Paideia. In this work he admits that it is Paideia that allows him to travel and to see the map of the world from on high, literally: on Paideia’s chariot, “I was carried up into the heights and went from the East to the very West, surveying cities and nations and peoples, sowing something broadcast over the earth like Triptolemus” (Lucian, Vita Luciani 15 [trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.229]. The barbarian Lucian claims that he cannot remember what he sowed, only the applause of those over whose heads he flew, but with this image he signals that he carried something like Triptolemus’s plate of corn, a sign for cultivation and civilization in Greek literature. On the fatherland, see Lucian, My
Lucian, born between 115–125 C.E. in Samosata, constructs a Syrian character who is a truth-teller at the center of many of his dialogues. He himself literally and literarily performs his Syrian identity as a rhetor, a master of Greek oratory and Greek paideia performing and writing in the cities of the Mediterranean basin. As we shall see, Lucian is like Justin in his admiration of Greek philosophy and rhetoric, and like Tatian in his impulse to use and satirize Greekness. Here I deal only briefly with a few works from Lucian’s wide corpus, focusing on his discussion and depiction of three cities, and their relative epistemic values: his home city Hierapolis, Athens, and Rome.

Although elsewhere in his writings he appears as the character of the Syrian, in On the Syrian Goddess, Lucian offers a more autobiographical tone: “I myself that write am an Assyrian.” Lucian maps his home city, Hierapolis, or “holy city,” as the center of the sacred and holy. It is also the place that literally holds a part of him, a lock of hair that he placed in the city’s main sanctuary, in obedience to local tradition. The city not only holds a fragment of him, but also exhibits hybridity and ambiguity on multiple levels, and thus, the writer suggests, mirrors or produces his own complex identity and literary impulses. Speaking of the city’s central cult—located topographically on a hill in the middle of the city, Lucian says that “many stories were told, of which some were sacred, some manifest, some thoroughly mythological, and others were barbarian, of which some agreed with the Greeks. I shall relate them all, but by no means accept them all.”

Native Land (Patrisiae encomium).

40 “De dea Syria” 1 (trans. Lightfoot, 249). All translations are from Lightfoot’s translation and edition of Lucian’s On the Syrian Goddess. Lucianic authorship of this piece has been questioned because of its Ionic dialect and its relatively uncritical presentation of a local cult. But Simon Swain has convincingly argued that the piece is indeed Lucian’s, attributing the Greek dialect to Lucian’s conscious imitation of Herodotus’s ethnographic work, and the positive tone to Lucian’s appreciation of his Syrian heritage. See Swain, Hellenism and Empire, 304–7; and Jones, Culture and Society in Lucian, 41. Lucian himself talks explicitly about a desire to imitate Herodotus—even if this is in a very particular rhetorical situation of introducing a speech in Macedonia—in his Herodotus or Action. Lightfoot, too, concludes that Lucian is the author, while also learnedly surveying the history of scholarship on the question of authorship (“The Authorship of De Dea Syria Revisited,” in On the Syrian Goddess, 184–208).

45 “De dea Syria” 10. Lucian’s ekphrasis of the central cult is such that the city itself recedes except as a kind of platform for the temple and its festivals.

40 “De dea Syria” 60.

40 For a similar reading of De dea Syria, see Elsner, “Describing Self in the language of Other,” 123–53. This tendency toward hybridity and ambiguity is also true of Syria more broadly. Lucian’s description of cults in Syria points to the sort of hybridity of religions and identities that occurred in the second-century Roman world, particularly in the Greek East: “There is another large temple in Phoenicia, one that belongs to the Sidonians. As they themselves say, it is Astarte’s—I myself think that Astarte is Selene—but as one of the priests told me, it belongs to Europa the sister of Cadmus” (De dea Syria 4 [trans. Lightfoot, 249]).

40 “De dea Syria” 28.

does not foreclose on competing stories or multiple scenarios of origins; indeed, he includes four possible accounts of the temple’s foundation.\textsuperscript{50}

This ambiguity and hybridity is woven into the very characters who are key to one of the holy city’s stories of origin, which includes a castrated man who helped in the building of the temple and whose statue stands there “in the shape of a woman but still in the clothing of a man.”\textsuperscript{51} Even the image of Hera in the sanctuary offers its own ambiguities, since it “appears to be of many forms” and “has something of Athena and Aphrodite and Selene and Rhea and Artemis and Nemesis and the Fates” in her many attributes.\textsuperscript{52} And if this were not enough to prove that Lucian constructs his home city as a theme park of hybridity, we can note that he mentions another statue that “has no shape of its own, but bears the forms of the other gods. It is called the standard (σημαίνων) by the Assyrians themselves, who have not given it a name of its own, nor have they anything to say about its place of origin and form.”\textsuperscript{53}

Elsewhere in his corpus, Lucian’s mappings are again particularly focused on cities and ethnicities, and even more particularly on the alchemies of their intersections. Again, he is fascinated with the conjoining of things that are or seem different. He is interested in how Syrians, for example, perform in Athens, and how Greek identity performs in Rome. The former situation is played out in *The Dead Come to Life* (*Revivescentes sive Piscator*).\textsuperscript{54} Here Parrh siad σ, literally “of free speech,” is a stand-in character for the likes of Lucian. Questioned by the character Philosophy about his fatherland, Parrh siad σ replies: “I am Syrian, Philosophy,

\textsuperscript{50}*De dea Syria* 1–16.
\textsuperscript{51}*De dea Syria* 26 (trans. Lightfoot, 265). Stratonike is ordered by Hera to build her a temple in the Holy City. Upon the order of Stratonike’s husband the king, she is accompanied by the beautiful Combabos. Sensing what might happen on the trip, Combabos “unmanned himself,” yet Stratonike still fell in love with him; his severed testicles, resting back home in a small casket with myrrh, honey, and other spices, serve as proof to the king of the innocence of his relationship with Stratonike. The story offers an etiology for ongoing sexual ambiguity in the city. Lucian slyly reports: “This sort of love exists in the Holy City and still endures today: women desire galli and galli go mad for women, but no one is jealous and they believe the thing to be entirely sacred” (22; trans. Lightfoot, 263).
\textsuperscript{52}*De dea Syria* 32 (trans. Lightfoot, 269). The statue itself embodies many things not only in its ambiguous reference to Hera, but also in its materials, which include precious stones “sent by Egyptians, Indians, Aethiopians, Medes, Armenians, and Babylonians” (32).
\textsuperscript{53}*De dea Syria* 33 (trans. Lightfoot, 271). See also the unusual bearded Apollo (34–35).
\textsuperscript{54}It is particularly interesting to look at *Revivescentes sive Piscator*, since it performs a situation so often associated with Christian apologetic: trial and defense. The theme is also evidenced in *The Double Indictment (Bis accusatus)*, which is set in Athens, on the Areopagus. A rhetor, called only “the Syrian,” is called up to trial for having offended both Rhetoric and Dialogue. The real offence, it seems, is the hybridizing of genres and the bringing of humor into dialogues. Regarding genre-mixing in Lucian, see, e.g., Branham, “Introducing a Sophist,” 237–43.
\textsuperscript{55}Lucian, *Revivescentes sive Piscator* 19 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3:31). *Revivescentes sive Piscator* claims to respond to complaints about *Philosophies for Sale (Vitarum auctio)*; in this earlier writing, Lucian had depicted various philosophical lives as being up for sale; in *Revivescentes sive Piscator*, the philosophers themselves seem to rise from the dead to protest Lucian’s cheap sale of
from the banks of the Euphrates. But what of that? I know that some of my opponents here are just as foreign-born as I. . . . Yet as far as you are concerned it would make no difference even if a man’s speech were foreign, if only his way of thinking were manifestly right and true.”\(^5\) On one level, the story tells of Lucian’s own danger and discomfort, as all the old prestigious philosophers gather in Athens to judge him—or Parrh siaj s. The setting is the Athenian acropolis, where piety (Parrh siaj s prays to Athena Polias) and prosecution can coexist. Lucian performs Greek paideia in part by conjuring up Greek philosophers of the past, including Plato and Diogenes, and ventriloquizing their arguments; he does so also by the form of The Dead Come to Life itself, which deftly mixes literary conventions of this time. Through the Syrian Parrh siaj s, Lucian argues that he in fact defends philosophy against those who are merely costumed philosophers: “in beard, I mean, and walk and garb”—an image to which Justin too conforms and which Justin accuses others of using wrongly.\(^6\) Athens itself is depicted as a magnet for every kind of philosophical fakery,\(^7\) for those who claim to be interested in philosophy but instead are lured by wealth. Often, Lucian jokes that he is concerned with the confusion between true and false philosophy. This confusion results from the many who dress up with long beards and mantles to look like philosophers.

While The Dead Come to Life depicts Athens simultaneously as the polis of true philosophy and of fake philosophy, Nigrinus, set in Rome, offers a less ambivalent picture of Athens. It begins by measuring in terms of true paideia the distance on the map between Rome and Athens. Lucian writes, “The talk began with praise of Greece and of the people of Athens.” Athens is here praised not as a magnet of false philosophy, but as the ultimate philosophical and pedagogical city: when the nouveau riche enter, Athenians gently correct by mocking displays of wealth, and “disciplining” with “public education.”\(^8\) Those who love wealth and power “should live in Rome,” states the philosophical Nigrinus, “for every street and

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\(^5\) See especially the account of the second part of the trial, where “philosophers” are lured for judgment by the promise of gifts.

\(^6\) Lucian, Nigrinus (trans. Harmon, LCL, 1.113). For more on Rome and Lucian, see Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, chap. 5, especially for a discussion of the complexity of Lucian’s construction of Rome in Nigrinus and its pair, the Apology, in which Lucian somewhat apologizes for his critique of the patronage system (291–93). Whitmarsh also discusses the difficulties of reading Nigrinus because of its complicated literary frame (265–79).
every square is full of the things they cherish most, and they can admit pleasure by every gate—by the eyes, by the ears and nostrils, by the throat and genital. Its everflowing, turbid stream widens every street . . . and sweeps the flooded soul bare of self-respect, virtue, and righteousness.”

Lucian conflates the geography of the city and the individual’s body so that urban and philosophical ills are one; literal and philosophical sewage streams through both city and person. The city itself is a perfect testing ground for the philosopher, since it is so full of temptations, from food to races to philosophical lecture-rooms that were mere “factories and bazaars.”

Rome is not only a center for dangers, temptations, and potential pollutions; it is also the site of a kind of voluntary slavery for philosophers hawking Greek-ness. This is something of which Tatian, too, accuses the Greeks—or those who claim Greek identity through paideia, although he does not locate the compromised philosophers in Rome: “You established rhetoric on a basis of injustice and chicanery, selling your freedom of speech for pay.” While The Dead Come to Life mocks those who are costumed as philosophers, On Salaried Posts in Great Houses implies that Lucian is precisely that: a costumed philosopher for hire. On Salaried Posts maps Rome as a site for ethnic hierarchy and humiliation. The client-philosopher seeking a patron is “subordinate to a doorman with a vile Syrian accent”—Lucian’s sly joke points to his own vulnerability as a Syrian masking his accent and marketing his paideia in various venues. Not only is the Syrian doorman superior, but the patron’s unphilosophical friends complain about the new client, saying, “It is only these Greeks who have the freedom of the city of Rome. And yet, why is it that they are preferred to us? Isn’t it true that they think they confer a tremendous benefit by turning wretched phrases?”

Lucian points to the ways in which the patron buys or “collects” the philosopher:

[As you have a long beard, present a distinguished appearance, are neatly dressed in a Greek mantle, and everybody knows you for a grammarian or a rhetorician or a philosopher . . . it will make people think him a devoted student of Greek learning and in general a person of taste in literary matters.

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59Nigrinus (trans. Harmon, LCL, 1.117, slightly modified).
60Nigrinus (trans. Harmon, LCL, 1.125).
61Voluntary entry into a salaried post for a rich patron leads only to servitude: “Remember never again . . . to think yourself free or noble. All that—you pride of race, your freedom, your ancient lineage—you will leave outside the threshold, let me tell you, when you go in after having sold yourself into such servitude” (Lucian, De mercede conductis 23 [On Salaried Posts; trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.449]).
63Oratio ad Graecos 1.3 (trans. Whittaker, 5).
64De mercede conductis 10 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.431).
65De mercede conductis 17 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.441).
67De mercede conductis 23 (trans. Harmon, LCL, 3.459). See also Whitmarsh, Greek Literature
Eventually, Lucian claims, the philosopher will become part of a Roman-owned collection, one among many performers for the rich Roman patron, juxtaposed perhaps with “an Alexandrian dwarf who recites Ionics.” The bearded philosopher’s Lent identity and Attic dialect are visually and acoustically odd, a collectible trinket of paideia for the wealthy, upwardly mobile Roman.

Some scholars understand the Roman Empire to have generously incorporated and given voice to a figure like Lucian. While it is difficult to reconstruct fully Lucian’s reception by the imperial elite, he at least hints that his rhetorical self-formation occurs under imperial eyes. In the works we have investigated, Lucian uses geographical thinking to consider the conditions of the Roman Empire, toying with the claims of different cities to be the center of the world. When Rome is at the center, it is shown to be a city mapped as analogous to a hungry and excreting body, with gateways that welcome pleasures and roads that run with sewage. Indeed, Rome is ravenous, collecting Greekness and other oddities, buying philosophy with no understanding. When Athens is the center of Lucian’s map, it is shown to be a haunt of those who claim to be true philosophers and rhetoricians, but are lacking; even a Syrian can show them up. Rome and Athens also hold within them hybrid possibilities, but this mixing is presented as hierarchical, abusive, dangerous. Only when Lucian’s map centers on the holy city in Syria does his focus remain there. Hierapolis is depicted as homeland, as holding a bit of Lucian, and as a center for every sort of hybridity and ambiguity.

*and the Roman Empire*, 280, on how this work maps power and the Roman house; Whitmarsh also states with regard to another writing, *Somnium*: “[I]t is notable, however, that *paideia* offers a success premised entirely upon appearance [ὁδὸς]: the attraction is that he will be ‘in good repute’ [ἐοδοκοιμών] and ‘regarded’ [ἐντὸςἐπηχόμενος]. The splendid clothing he will wear suggests concealment and deceit” (125), but his conclusion that “*paideia* does not simply realize innate destiny: it transforms the subject, crossing sociocultural barriers” (124) does not sufficiently account for Lucian’s ambivalence and mockery of paideia elsewhere in his corpus.

*It marks a certain degree of cultural self-confidence when a system such as the Roman empire can not only incorporate ‘foreigners’ like the Gallic eunuch Favorinus or the Syrian ‘barbarian’ Lucian among its major Greek writers but can also give the ‘other’ a critical voice in commenting on its own customs and attitudes* (Ja Elsner and Joan-Pau Rubíes, “Introduction,” in *Voyages and Visions: Towards a Cultural History of Travel* [ed. eide; London: Reaktion, 1999] 10–11). While I agree with Swain’s comment that “Lucian’s attitude towards Rome is complex,” I disagree with his overall characterization of Lucian: e.g., “For most of the time Lucian’s adopted cultural identity as a Hellenic did not clash with his loyalties to Rome’s Empire. But in cases where Greek culture was abused by Roman power, it is clear where he stood” (*Greek Literature in the Roman Empire*, 329). I think that Lucian is far more complex than this.

*Eusebius, *Historia ecclesiastica* 4.29. Later, Eusebius is more positive in his representation of Tatian and lumps him with Justin, Miltiades, Clement, and others who speak of Christ as God (5.28.4). Eusebius considers Tatian’s *Oratio ad Graecos* (and, incidentally, his *Diatessaron*) to be useful and appropriate (4.29.7).

*Jerome, In epistulam ad Titum, praef; cited in Whittaker, *Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments*, 83. Epiphanius calls the Encratites “Tatian’s successors” (Pan. 47.1.1); translated in
Tatian

Nobody likes Tatian. Eusebius, citing Irenaeus, says that Tatian introduced the “blasphemy” of Encratism.69 Jerome labels him the “patriarch of the Encratites”; Epiphanius concurs.70 Even those who more recently have worked intimately enough with Tatian to edit his work offer judgments like this: “[T]he harshness and obscurity of his style seem to mirror his arrogant and intransigent personality.”71 He is often characterized as Justin Martyr’s slightly crazed student:72 vicious and brutal, excessive in his rhetoric. Both are understood as early apologists for Christianity, who struggled with the question of how to fit Christianity and Hellenism together. But Justin is depicted as offering a better kind of apologetic to the empire. He offers the possibility of the assimilation of Christianity and Hellenism, or at least the articulation of Christianity as philosophically competent, a necessary negotiation or syncretism for the sake of Christianity’s success. Tatian, with his vitriol against Greekness, is seen as the failed path that Christianity did not pursue.

This reading of Tatian does serious injustice to the passion and humor of To the Greeks. Tatian’s over-the-top critique of the Greeks is not the product of embarrassingly angry Christian apologetic, but draws upon satirical conventions of the second sophistic.73 Like Lucian, his near-contemporary and fellow Syrian, Tatian performs Greekness—he has a full repertoire of philosophical and cultural references on hand—at the same time that he subverts the contemporary cultural valuation of Greekness and praises barbarian identity. Lucian wrote two different pieces about Anacharsis, the Scythian who signaled so much about barbarian identity, barbarian wisdom, and barbarian hunger for Greek philosophy. Tatian, too,

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69The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis (trans. Frank Williams; 2 vols.; New York: E. J. Brill, 1987–1994) 2.3. Tatian is famed and maligned for at least three things: first, for his Diatessaron, a gospel harmony; second, for being the founder of Encratism, which is understood as heresy; and third, for the bitterness of his late-second-century Oration ad Graecos—the only of Tatian’s works to survive in its original form. L. W. Barnard (“The Heresy of Tatian—Once Again,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 19 [1968] 1–10) reads Tatian’s detractors uncritically and seeks to secure a timeline of the evolution of Tatian’s “heretical” thought—that is, his Encratism—and the writing of his Oration ad Graecos. Others read Tatian as tainted by his “Oriental” background; for a critique of this approach, see Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus, 290. On the dating of Oration ad Graecos, see G. W. Clarke, “The Date of the Oration of Tatian,” HTR 60 (1967) 123–26, who argues that it may not be as late as 177 C.E., as R. M. Grant has dated it.

70Whittaker, Tatian: Oration ad Graecos and Fragments, xiv–xv. Elsewhere, Whittaker proves herself slightly more a champion for Tatian: “Tatian is not an Oriental with an inferiority complex; the differentiation is one of culture, not of race” (“Tatian’s Educational Background,” 59). For a newer champion of Tatian that takes him seriously in his context, see Emily J. Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian (New York: Routledge, 2003).

71On Tatian as Justin’s student, as an apologist, and as a heretic, see, e.g., Barnard, “The Heresy of Tatian—Once Again.”

72On Tatian’s education, see Lampe, From Paul to Valentinus, 285–90, where he argues that Tatian is less educated in philosophy than Justin, but more educated in classical literature and in rhetoric. Lampe asserts that Tatian was influenced by the famous sophist Dio of Prusa (pp. 287–88).
shows knowledge of that tradition and throws it in the face of the “men of Greece” (ἄνδρες Ἑλληνες) whom he addresses. Like Lucian he makes himself into a kind of misunderstood Anacharsis: “You, who don’t curse the Scythian Anacharsis now, also shouldn’t be indignant at being educated by those who follow a barbarian code of laws.”73 Both Lucian and Tatian try on different topos and barbarian roles in their play with Greek paideia.

While the genre of Tatian’s work remains elusive,74 part of its purpose becomes clear as one reads: it is a piece of humor, a satire, a joke of sorts. Because it is hard to hear the sound of play in cultures different from our own, Tatian’s wicked humor has gone unrecognized.75 But he does signal that what he said may or should be taken as a joke. At a crucial moment in his argument, when Tatian has explained his tour of Greek cult and his “conversion” to Christianity, he turns to his inscribed audience and says, “To you, the Greeks, what else can I say but do not revile your betters, nor, if they are called barbarians, take this as an occasion for a joke.”76 In To the Greeks, vocabulary of jokes and laughter is used again and again; we know from Lucian that irony, joking, and satire can reveal the core of a bitter truth. In

On Tatian as a sophist, see Whittaker, “Tatian’s Educational Background,” 57.

72Oratio ad Graecos 12.5 (my translation).

73Michael McGeehe (“Why Tatian Never ‘Apologized’ to the Greeks,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 1 [1993] 143–58) has argued that the Oratio is protreptikos, advertising to students Tatian’s philosophical stance and rhetorical skills. Molly Whittaker, too, understood Oratio ad Graecos as hortatory, but pointed to a different audience: “[H]is main concern is to urge pagan readers to leave the error of their ways in order that they may turn to the truth” (Oratio, xv). Robert Grant argued that Tatian’s oration takes the form of a “logos syntaktikos or ‘farewell discourse’ to the culture of Greece and Rome”; but instead of offering praise, as one usually would, Tatian inverts praise into ὑψός, “blame, censure” (“Five Apologists and Marcus Aurelius,” Vigiliae Christianae 42 [1988] 12). See, however, Anniewes van den Hoek’s “Apologetic and Protreptic Discourse in Clement of Alexandria” (in La littérature apolégétique avant Nicée. Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique [ed. A. Wlosok; Vandeuvers-Génèse: Fondation Hardt, forthcoming]), where she points out that protreptic is not a genre in antiquity. Part of the problem of identifying the genre of Tatian’s work (and thus of understanding its tone) may be the tendency of writers of the second sophistic to mix genres, as we saw with Lucian.

74Cicero, in the The Making of an Orator (De oratore), states that “all . . . who tried to teach anything like a theory or art of this matter [humor] proved themselves so conspicuously silly that their very silliness is the only laughable thing about them. That is why I think this accomplishment cannot possibly be imparted by teaching” (2.54.217–218; in Cicero [trans. Sutton and Rackham, LCL, 3.359]). On humor, rhetoric, and Lucian, see also R. Bracht Branham, “Authorizing Humor: Lucian’s Demonax and Cynic Rhetoric,” Semeia 64 (2001) 33–48. Within Oratio ad Graecos there are many references to laughter and joking (e.g., 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 17.1).


76Elsewhere, Tatian rhetorically turns as if to face an audience that does not understand which parts of his speech are funny and which are not. In a section on demons and disease, he states: “And you, if you do not stop your laughter, will enjoy the same punishment as the sorcerers. Therefore, O Greeks, listen to me when I issue my platform call, and do not in mockery transfer your own
Tatian's work, the joke is on the Greeks, since he mocks their famed philosophers and customs through quick, devastating character sketches and illustrations.78

With his biting critique of Greekness, Tatian maps his understanding of the Roman Empire, discussing not only his homeland and the travels he has made, but also constructing a topography of the relative values of knowledge in these regions, and of the peaks and valleys of epistemic violence. Tatian, moreover, directly engages geographical (and thus also what we would call astronomical) theories of the time, in a passage where he points to the superior knowledge of the (barbarian) prophets:

For heaven . . . is not infinite, but bounded and within a limit; and above this one are better worlds which have no change of season . . . but experience a wholly good climate and have a permanent day and light inaccessible to people from here. Now those who worked out geographies described the regions, as far as is humanly possible, but since they could not speak of the ones beyond, because they could not see them, they claimed that there were tides, and seas leek-green and muddy, and one area burning hot while another was cold and frozen.79

The overlap between ethnic identity, geographical thinking, and knowledge becomes clear at important moments in his text at the beginning and end. Tatian ends To the Greeks in this way: “All this, men of Greece, I have compiled for you—I Tatian, a philosopher among the barbarians, born in the land of the Assyrians, and educated first in your learning and secondly in what I profess to preach.”80 The first lines of Tatian’s To the Greeks read: “Do not maintain a totally hostile attitude toward barbarians, men of Greece, nor resent their teachings. For which of your own practices did not have a barbarian origin?”81 He then launches into a full-throttle performance of his knowledge of the true genealogies of what the Greeks claim as their own: the Phrygians Marsyas and Olympus taught them flute-playing, Etruscans taught sculpture, Egyptians taught about history.82

With these pendants, we can see how Tatian dives into the contemporary culture wars; he addresses Hell nes and critiques them, putting them in their place as inferior to the so-called barbarian culture that, despite their sneers, the Greeks appropriate.

irrationality to the herald of truth” (Oratio ad Graecos 17.1 [trans. Whittaker, 35]).

78Oratio ad Graecos 20.2–3 (trans. Whittaker, 41). See Lampe, From Paul to Valentine, 429, for a list of geographers to whom Tatian alludes.
80Oratio ad Graecos 42.1 (trans. Whittaker, 77).
81Oratio ad Graecos 1.1 (my translation).
82Oratio ad Graecos 1.1–2.
83Strabo, too, admits that Greek language appropriates others’ terms; see Geogr. 14.2.28. See also his intriguing comment (in a different context) about mixing in 14.5.25 (trans. Sterrett and Jones, LCL, 6.365): “And who are the ‘mixed’ tribes? For we would be unable to say that, as compared with the aforesaid places, others were either named or omitted by him [Apollodorus] which we shall assign to the ‘mixed’ tribes; neither can we call ‘mixed’ any of these peoples themselves whom he has mentioned or omitted; for, even if they had become mixed, still the predominant element has made them either Hellenes or barbarians; and I know nothing of a third tribe of people that is ‘mixed’.”
Thus, his opening statement ossifies the categories of Greek and barbarian, but then immediately questions those same categories. Taking up the long tradition of discussing “barbarian” or foreign influences on Greek knowledge, Tatian argues that on every level Greekness itself is a fiction, born of miscegenation: Greek language appropriates words from other languages and dialects from other cultures. And by the end of his piece, Tatian marks his location and implies the travels he has taken to get there: he is among barbarians (a term reclaimed as positive); he is originally and finally Assyrian; he can guarantee that he has taken the educational tour through Greece and Rome, yet found Greek culture and paideia wanting.

If scholars refer to Tatian at all, other than to point to the rabidity of his prose or to his purported role as founder of the Encratites, they often mention his “conversion” and that he, like Justin, was attracted to Christianity through reading the Scriptures. Tatian frames the end of his journey for truth in terms of the antiquity, divinity, and simplicity of wording of “barbarian writings.” What scholars do not generally observe is the carefully crafted autobiographical context of this conversion, which plays upon two themes especially relevant to the second sophistic, which we have seen already in Lucian: first, travel and education, or paideia, and second, education and language.

In this passage on Tatian’s apprehension of truth, Tatian’s introductory themes of the false pretensions of Attic purity and the “arrogant and crazy talk” of pseudo-philosophers arise again and lead to a kind of climax: the story of Tatian’s own philosophical choices. Tatian had begun his To the Greeks not with a critique of philosophy—mocking philosophers comes second on his list—but with an incisive cut at the impure genealogy of Greek language itself. It is made up of multiple dialects: Dorians differ from Attic speakers, Aeolians from Ionians. What is even stranger than this impurity—literally most out of place, most no-place of all (ὁτοπόστατον), is that those who consider themselves Greeks have mixed with expressions that are not “akin” (τὰς μη συγγένεις ἵμας ἐρμηνεύεις); they are not genetically Greek, so to speak. Later, in the crucial passage about his own “conversion,” Tatian reprises this theme. In a pattern that mimics but reverses his introduction, he attacks philosophers first, and then turns to the related issue of language. He accuses his inscribed audience of constructing itself by its relationship to words, and of engag-

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84 Oratio ad Graecos 29.1.

85 Oratio ad Graecos 3.3, where we find a pun on philoposphos. While Justin, as we shall see, applied the term to Crescens, Tatian here contrasts it explicitly with (true) philosophers.

86 He precedes this by saying that he does not know “whom to call a Greek” in light of so many regional variations in Greek (Oratio ad Graecos 1.3 [trans. Whittaker, 5]).

87 Oratio ad Graecos 25–26. See sections 1–2 for the opposite ordering of argument. For Tatian, philosophy and language are always linked.

88 Tatian continues: “Why do you assert that wisdom is yours alone? . . . The grammarians have been the origin of your nonsense. . . . You are puffed up with opinions, but you are humiliated by
ing in verbal imperialism. “Stop your triumphal procession of another’s words,” he insists. The word ὅρμωμεντες conjures up a ritual parade of prisoners and spoils of war—verbal pillaging. “Stop decorating yourselves with feathers that aren’t your own, as if you’re a jackdaw!” he says, using an image of linguistic pretension that also appears in Lucian. He goes on to point specifically at current trends in Greek education—and in particular, trends in rhetoric—as the root cause of tragic and comedic misunderstandings of the truth.

As part of his story of conversion, Tatian adopts another theme of the second sophistic: that of the traveler or ethnographer. In the second century, Pausanias’ tour of Greece imitated Herodotus, celebrated classical culture, and constructed Greek identity in the face of Roman imperialism, ignoring any recent changes to the landscape. Like Pausanias, but with a twist, Tatian offers a brief tour of the empire and its various customs. Greeks avoid intercourse with their mothers; Per-

misfortunes; you abuse beyond reason figures of speech. . . . Why do you get ready for a war of letters? Why, like boxers, do you strike together their pronunciations through Athenian stammerings, when it’s right to speak more naturally? For if you articulate but aren’t an Athenian, tell me why you don’t ‘doricize’? Why does it seem to you that one [dialect] is more barbarian, while the other is more satisfactory for communication?” (Oratio ad Graecos 26.2–4; my translation). For second-sophistic play with dialect, see, e.g., De dea Syria, discussed above.

Oratio ad Graecos 27.1. See also his critique of the fact that some philosophers receive salaries from the Roman emperor (19).

Tatian mocks Greek myths and superstitions and particularly critiques what we might call “ancient pluralism.” In the context of thinking about apology, it is interesting to note that Tatian employs the language of the courtroom to condemn the pluralism which undergirds “their” legislation: “Therefore I lay a verdict against your legislation. There should be a common constitution for all. But now, there are as many legal positions as there are kinds of cities, and what is considered shameful by some is considered good by others” (Oratio ad Graecos 28.1 [my translation]). For a different take on the theme of legal diversity in the Roman empire, see Athenagoras, Supp. 1, which indicates that the multiplicity of legal systems in the Roman empire marks Roman tolerance.

The theme of the traveler in Greek literature of course predates the second sophistic. See Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, which traces these traditions. But the second sophistic, with its strong antiquarian interests, and its love of Homer, is particularly interested in picking up this ancient discursive thread. Its detractors, too, imitate and satirize the theme of travel. Lucian of course “describes” fantastic journeys to the moon, among other places, in Vera historia. See also Elsner and Rubiés’s introduction to Voyages and Visions, 10–11, 15. Regarding philosophers/rhetors and exile and travel, see Whitmarsh, “‘Greece is the World,’” 269–305.


Geographical thinking infuses Tatian’s tour; in reading these passages we are reminded of Pausanias, but even more of Claudius Ptolemy, the second-century c.e. geographer and astronomer famous for his cool mathematical calculations of the cosmos, who also wrote the Tetrabiblos, a book of what he calls “astronomical prognostication.” In this work, some of his references both to customs and to the effect of the fixed stars and planets upon various ethnicities remind one of
sians think it is a good idea. Barbarians avoid pederasty, but Romans herd children together. Tatian constructs an authentic experience of travel and cultic tourism that left him cold: he partook in mysteries, like so many of the elites of his time, and he tested the cults (which he claims were organized by the effeminate and the androgynes), and what he found was Zeus Latiaris and Artemis of Ephesus enjoying human gore and blood, and demons inspiring wrongdoing. Tatian found truth not in this tour of the marketplace of Greek cults, but in “barbarian writings.” He was persuaded by the “unaffected nature of the words” and by the “artlessness of the things which they said.” There he found clarity of language and of philosophical thought, and he mocks the Greeks for lacking these characteristics. In this section, Tatian twice uses the word plan to mark the Greek error in which he had participated. Plan of course means “error” but also a “wandering” or “roaming off.” Tatian’s very travels were the source of error; back in Syria (there’s no place like home), he found simple and true philosophy.

In To the Greeks, Tatian also deploys one of the rhetorical techniques of the second sophist: ekphrasis, or narrative description. Pausanias and Lucian, among others, describe statues and buildings in detail, in part to demonstrate the scope of their knowledge and the power of their rhetoric to recreate in words the skilled lineaments of artwork. In The Dream, in fact, Lucian states that his career choice was between sculpture and paideia, an interesting self-presentation given his intricate ekphrasis of art elsewhere in his work. But Tatian’s ekphrasis does not work the power of rhetoric to celebrate aesthetics: his list and his descriptions of statues focus on sculptures of females and famous figures that exemplify not the art and grace of Greece, but its shame: all the women described have engaged in some questionable activity, according to Tatian, usually of a sexual sort; other figures described are “memorials of evil.” “Our” women, in contrast, Tatian asserts, are chaste. Tatian follows and guarantees the truth of this ekphrasis by returning to the theme of his own travels, and by focusing on the city of Rome, which collects Greekness:

Tatian’s characterization of various nations. See, e.g., Tetrabíblos 4.10.

98Oratio ad Graecos 28–29.1.
99Oratio ad Graecos 29.1–2 (my translation). See also Dial. 8. And if we look more carefully, we see that Justin moved to this singular and true philosophy not by reading the prophets, but by their mere mention (Dial. 7). See also Tatian’s critique of grammarians and of misuses of language in Oratio ad Graecos 26. On the topos of barbarians speaking simple truth, see Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, 112.
100Oratio ad Graecos 29.1, 2.
102See the interesting analysis of Whitmarsh, Greek Literature and the Roman Empire, 122–24.
I set forth these things, not having learned them from another, but having
haunted much of the earth. I played the part of the sophist, using your goods.
I met with much art and many ideas. Finally, having spent time in the city
of the Romans, I thoroughly learned about the varied statues which they
brought back from you as theirs. For I do not try, as is the custom of many,
to strengthen with others’ opinions my own, but I wanted to compile a record
of all these things which I myself directly apprehended. . . . Therefore, say-
ing goodbye to Roman arrogance and Athenian nonsense—incoherent
 teachings—I sought after what you say is a barbarian philosophy. Don’t
scorn our paideia nor busy yourself with a quarrel directed against us, full
of nonsense and coarse jesting, saying, “Tatian is instituting anew barbarian
doctrines, over and above the Greeks and the countless mass of those who
philosophize!”

Tatian here places himself in the midst of the rhetorical conventions of the second
sophistic and, like others, critiques its shallowness. He asserts that he has played
the part of the sophist. He affirms his personal experience through repeated travel
(ἐπιστρέφοντας ουσίαν). He also offers a particularly biting comment “to the Greeks”: he
learned Greek paideia and their patrimony by visiting Rome, where one can find
Greek statuary, now spoils of war. Tatian maps the Roman Empire as a site of
relative appropriations and valuations of kinds of knowledge. Rome has robbed
Greece of its knowledge, but the barbarians’ edges of the world, with their simple
and truthful knowledge, should be at the center of the empire.

Earlier, Tatian provided a laundry list of shocking habits of Greeks, Romans,
and others. This list should not be read as pure venom against “pagan” religion, but
rather alongside the above passage as a mockery of the conventions of contemporary
travel or ethnographic literature and as engaged in discussion with other writers
who employ geographical thinking. Lucian did the same. Tatian, like Pausanias,
presents himself as a traveler in the culturally elite realms of the Roman Empire.
He frames the equivalent of a “Grand Tour” of his time not in terms of a description
of piety, history, cult, or aesthetics, but in terms of cultic oddities and shame, insult
and comparison. Tatian’s travels, whether in his imagination or in reality, have al-
lowed him to see how language, philosophy, geography, and paideia are conjoined.
“What is the benefit of Attic style and sorties of philosophers and plausibilities of
sylogisms and measurement of the earth and positions of stars and courses of

99See *Oratio ad Graecos* 33–34; the last quotation is from 34.1.
100*Oratio ad Graecos* 35.1 (my translation).
101Tatian uses the familiar argument that Moses is older: “So it is clear from the preceding argu-
ments that Moses is older than heroes, cities, demons. We should believe one who has priority in
time in preference to Greeks who learned his doctrines at second hand. For with much labour their
sophists tried to counterfeit all they knew from Moses’ teaching and from those who philosophized
like him” (*Oratio ad Graecos* 40.1 [trans. Whittaker, 73]).
102And as we learn elsewhere in *Oratio ad Graecos*, in Rome one can also find philosophers
salaried by the Roman emperor “for no useful purpose but that they may even be paid for letting
their beards grow long” (19.1 [trans. Whittaker, 39]).
the sun? For to be engaged in such investigation is the work of one who frames his own teachings as law." For Tatian, language, philosophy, and terrestrial and astronomical cartographies are linked, part of one system of paideia.

Throughout, Tatian’s focus is on the Greek paideia and identity that elite Romans adore and seek to appropriate, and which Greek elites configure and market for their own and others’ consumption. Like other writers of the second sophistic, Tatian meditates upon Greekness. And like his contemporary Lucian, he meditates upon Greekness in part in order to mock it, but he does so while using its tools and topos with great sophistication. In Tatian’s geographical thinking, Rome is important both as the guarantor of the authenticity of Tatian’s view and as a scavenger city, location of the prizes of Greek cultural identity. But Tatian inverts the traditional importance of travel to Rome—with the prestige and higher speaking fees that this trip often yielded to a rhetor or teacher—and concludes his work by asserting Assyrian identity and the joys of philosophizing among the barbarians.

Justin Martyr

Justin, writing in the mid-second century, begins both the First and the Second Apologies by marking Rome as the center of his map, both in terms of its political and philosophical importance. The First Apology starts:

To the Emperor Titus Aelius Adrianus Antoninus Pius Augustus Caesar, and to his son Verissimus the Philosopher, and to Lucius the Philosopher, the natural son of Caesar, and the adopted son of Pius, a lover of learning, and to the sacred Senate, with the whole People of the Romans, I, Justin, the son of Priscus and grandson of Bacchius, from the city of Flavia Neapolis in Syria Palestine, have made this address and petition on behalf of those of every race who are unjustly hated and abusively threatened, myself being one of them.

Thus, unlike Lucian and Tatian, whose critiques of Rome are scathing, and whose geographical thinking tends to center on their barbarian home, Justin’s Apologies

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103 Oratio ad Graecos 27.3 (my translation).
104 Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, 193. See below, p. 308.
105 I Apol. 1.1 (my translation). See Thomas B. Falls, Writings of Saint Justin Martyr (Fathers of the Church; New York: Christian Heritage, Inc., 1948) 33, n. 1: Palestina was used as an adjective limiting the region of Syria to its eastern parts. Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Justin will be from Falls. I use the Greek editions of Miroslav Marcovich, Justini Martyris Apologiae Pro Christianis (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1994).
106 In doing so, Justin participates in a long and continuing tradition of provincial/Greek elites who address themselves to Rome, such as Polybius, Josephus, and Aelius Aristides. Rebecca Lyman has argued in the context of her larger discussion of the creation of “orthodoxy”: “Justin’s intellectual hybrid reflected his own attempt as a Christian provincial and a philosopher to portray universal truth within the cultural traditions of the second century” (“Hellenism and Heresy: 2002 NAPS Presidential Address,” 220; see also 221). Athenagoras Supp., esp. 1, 6, 37, presents a similar appeal to the Roman imperial family’s piety and policies of toleration.
107 The actual audience of Justin’s Second Apology, which was probably written between 150 and 155 C.E. as a part of the First Apology, is elusive, but it has the same inscribed audience as the First
emphasize Rome’s centrality. He appeals to this center’s claims to tolerance and addresses himself to Rome as one of its provincial elites, speaking the common language of Greek, of privileged philosophy, and of Roman subject-hood.\textsuperscript{106}

A thin wire of violence threads through the introductions to Justin’s \textit{First} and \textit{Second Apologies}.\textsuperscript{107} In both, Justin had marked Rome as the center of his mental map. But in the \textit{Second Apology}, Rome is also the site where a Christian woman “does violence to herself” (βιαζομένη ἔστη) by remaining with her abusive non-Christian husband in the hopes of persuading him to amend. Not only that, but she is forced into court proceedings when her husband accuses her of being a Christian. Her appeals to the emperor for time to prepare a defense ultimately result in the arrest (and imprisonment and punishment) of three others (her teacher, and two Christian bystanders), in a kind of domino effect of witness to Christianity. Lucius, one of the arrested, addresses the prefect: “Your judgment is not fitting to the Emperor Pius, nor to the philosopher, Caesar’s son, nor to the sacred Senate!”\textsuperscript{108}

With the story of this Christian woman, Justin offers an illustrative and sharp situation of \textit{apologia} within his own \textit{apologia}. Moreover, he nicely dodges the need to critique the emperors directly by putting his assessment in another’s mouth; it is Lucius who cries out that due process and imperial piety and philosophy are not being served by the courts. Similarly, by using the phrase “she does violence to herself,” Justin points to Rome as a location of violence, but avoids directly accusing the city of effecting violence. Yet in the \textit{First Apology}, Justin directly states that “the rulers should give their decision in obedience, not to violence and tyranny, but to piety and philosophy.”\textsuperscript{109} Justin, unlike Tatian and Lucian, aligns himself with the center of imperial power: the Roman emperors and their philosophical piety. He also attaches himself to the unimpeachable Socrates, a \textit{semeion} or standard for Greeks, Christians, Romans, and barbarians alike, whom he renders a kind of reasonable forerunner to the \textit{Logos Jesus}.\textsuperscript{110} Political power will honor the \textit{paideia} of its subjects, Justin asserts; the emperors are not really to blame, but must respond to the need for justice. When Justin critiques violent cult practices and those who abuse Christians, he points the finger not at the imperial family but implies that

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\textsuperscript{106} Justin, \textit{2 Apol.} 1.16 (my translation).

\textsuperscript{107} Justin, \textit{2 Apol.} 1.16 (my translation).

\textsuperscript{108} \textsuperscript{1} Apol. 3.2; ωμοίς δ’ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄρχονται μὴ βια μὴ δὲ τυραννίζω, ἀλλ’ ἐνσεβείᾳ καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀκολουθοῦντος τὴν ψήφον τίθεσθαι. In the same passage, Justin alludes to Plato’s \textit{Republic} in which all rulers in the ideal city are philosophers; see Marcovich, \textit{Iustini Martyris Apologiae Pro Christianis}, 35.

\textsuperscript{109} \textsuperscript{1} Apol. 5 (trans. Falls, 38): “And not only among the Greeks were these things through Socrates condemned by reason [logos], but also among the non-Hellenic peoples by the Logos Himself, who assumed a human form and became man, and was called Jesus Christ.” Justin also presents himself as a kind of Socrates in \textit{2 Apol.} 3, where he says that he thoroughly examined Crescens and found
such violence and impiety emerge from those who are of lower status—the lackeys or misinterpreters of the pious, paideia-titled emperors.

Justin thus takes up Roman imperial propaganda about the emperor’s household as philosophical, pious, and peaceful, and places Rome at the center of his plea that the empire live up to its own claims. But elsewhere in the Second Apology, it becomes clear that the very claim to philosophy can itself become a cause for violence in Rome, given the ongoing culture wars. “I too,” Justin writes, “expect to be plotted against and fixed to the stake, by some of those I have named, or perhaps by Crescens, that philosophos and philokompas, lover of noise and din.” Justin himself has made the “Roman voyage,” with all that implies. According to Hartog, only by making this voyage “could renown and prestige be won: higher fees could then be charged by a professor or a lecturer, and a greater social and political role could be exercised, in particular as an (effective) intercessor on behalf of one’s native city.” Having traced the world from Neapolis in Syria through (perhaps) Asia Minor and into Rome, Justin’s own experienced and cultured body is able to offer up an authentic tour of knowledge, but nonetheless is vulnerable. As Lucian presented himself (or the client-philosopher) as subject to the vagaries and corruptions of life in Rome, so too Justin, but in a more extreme way. Justin himself maps Rome not only as a site of demons and exorcisms and intra-Christian conflict, but also as the dangerous site of philosophical battles and disputes between the likes of himself and Crescens. Tatian, too, alludes to the dangers of Crescens, and later readers versed in the tradition of Justin’s martyrdom in Rome—his beheading—might turn back to Justin’s own writings to read him as extremely vulnerable in Rome.

The defiant Christian response that Justin offers in the Apologies addresses civil injustice, yet implicitly praises the imperial family and the Senate, and confirms Rome’s central place on the map: a location where violence is possible and likely, but where redress and justice are sought. Ashis Nandy asks, “Has the dominant idea of metropolitan civility, grounded in the vision of the European Enlightenment, itself been in league with that hidden record of violence?” The question that Crescens knew nothing.

112 2 Apol. 3.1 (my translation). Tatian, too, uses the term philosophos in contrast to those who truly seek truth, as we have seen (Oratio ad Graecos 3.3). Moreover, he represents Rome as dimly open to violence, with his mention of Crescens’s threats to Justin. The third-century account of Justin’s martyrdom places it in Rome.

113 Hartog, Memories of Odysseus, 193.

114 On Crescens, see 2 Apol. 11.4 (also Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 19.1 = Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 4.16.8–9).

115 Oratio ad Graecos 19.

116 Recensions of the martyrdom of Justin and his companions can be found in Herbert Musurillo, Acts of the Christian Martyrs (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972) 42–61. Lampe treats the Acta Iustini as if they offer a fairly straightforward account of events and yield prosopographical evidence regarding Christianity in Rome (From Paul to Valentinus, 276–79).

117 Ashis Nandy, Time Warps: Silent and Evasive Pasts in Indian Politics and Religion (New
can be fruitfully applied to antiquity as well. In the Apologies, which map Rome as center, Justin legitimates Rome’s metropolitan status and claims to civility, only barely exposing the “record of violence” found there.

The Dialogue with Trypho, in contrast, offers an understanding of the world that differs from the Apologies. This is due in part to the texts’ differences in genre: the Apologies take the form of an appeal and a direct address, while the Dialogue takes up the conventions of a philosophical dialogue. It is also due to the different implied audiences: the Apologies at least claim for their audience non-Christians in Rome, while the Dialogue has no clearly inscribed audience. The Dialogue asserts and constructs a Christian identity apart from Judaism—a Christian identity that is universal rather than particular, attached to no place rather than to some place, especially not the Jerusalem and surrounding regions of the Bar Kokhba revolt. The Dialogue’s mapping is far more complex than that of the Apologies, in part because of the Dialogue’s complicated allegorical interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures. Justin deftly moves between maps of actual and allegorical locations; geographies and ethnic markers become fluid expressions. For example, while in the Apologies the categories of barbarian and Christian were sometimes used as overlapping, the Dialogue’s one significant use of the term “barbarian” rejects


119 “But we Christians are not only a people, but a holy people, as we have already shown: ‘And they shall call it a holy people, redeemed by the Lord.’ Wherefore, we are not a contemptible people, nor a tribe of barbarians, nor just any nation as the Carians or the Phrygians, but the chosen people of God” (Dial. 119.4 [trans. Falls, 331–32]). In contrast, in the Apologies the categories of barbarian and Christian were sometimes used as overlapping (1 Apol. 5.4; 7.3; see esp. 46.3, where philosophical models are set in parallel: the “barbarian” Abraham, Ananias, and other figures from the Jewish Scriptures are juxtaposed to the “Greeks” Socrates and Heraclitus). On the rhetorical deployment of the categories of the particular and the universal in the construction of early Christian ethnicity, see Buell, Why This New Race? In contrast, see the implicit method of someone like Nock, who,
the characterization of Christians as barbarians, and thus as a people mapped in a particular region, rather than a people who transcend the bounds of *ethnos* and region. Justin argues that Christians must be understood as God’s “holy people” mentioned in prophecy. In the *Apologies*, as in Lucian’s and Tatian’s writings, Rome is a center of violence—a violence produced both by the empire and by (false) claims to philosophy at the empire’s center. In the *Dialogue*, Justin maps Christians as a new Israel that is not geographically conceived, but rather understood as infusing all places and nations. At the same time, Justin uses the Scriptures of Israel to insist that it was foretold that the real Syria Palestine and especially its metropolis of Jerusalem would burn, consumed by God’s justified violence—not Roman injustice.

Although elsewhere in his writings his identity as a Samaritan from Syria-Palestine emerges, in the *Dialogue*, especially in contrast to the Jew Trypho, Justin rises as the consummate universal Greek, a kind of philosophical everyman. Trypho, his interlocutor—who, of course, speaks in Justin’s voice—greets Justin as a philosopher because of Justin’s dress. Trypho’s Jewish identity is mapped in a few brief strokes: “I am a Hebrew of the circumcision; having fled the on-going war, I am spending time in Greece, and mostly in Corinth.” These point to Trypho’s location slightly off-center: a Jew from the war-ravaged province of Palestine, philosophically located not quite at the center of Greek thought, but slightly to the west, in Corinth, an ancient rival of Athens, which Rome razed and

in his *Conversion*, contrasts universal (prophetic) and particular religion.


124E.g., *I Apol.*, 1.

125In addition to this costuming as a Greek philosopher, further elements point to its allusion to themes of the second sophistic. Immediately in the dialogue, there is an allusion to Socratic techniques of questioning, and a reference to Homer (J. C. M. Van Winden, *An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho Chapters One to Nine. Introduction, Text and Commentary* [Leiden: Brill, 1971] 22).

126Dia. l. 3.

127Regarding problems in Judea, see also *Dia.* 9. Judea as a real location is mentioned only *sotto voce*. As the group moves from one section of the colonnade to another to sit, Trypho turns to a companion to mention the war in Judea; in his introduction of himself, Trypho only alludes to location, referring to having escaped the “ongoing war” (1.3). The violence of the Bar Kokhba revolt is the background noise. See Shelly Matthews’s “The Need for the Stoning of Stephen,” in *Violence in the New Testament: Jesus Followers and Other Jews Under Empire* (ed. eadem and E. Leigh Gibson; New York: T&T Clark International, 2005) 124–39, which discusses a situation analogous to Justin’s construction of Trypho: Luke-Acts’ construction of Jews as other and barbarous in the story of the stoning of Stephen.

128On Justin’s “conversion,” see Nasrallah, “The Rhetoric of Conversion and the Construction of Experience.” Attempts to find a concrete historical and geographical setting for this event of “conversion” (e.g., Oskar Skarsaune, *The Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr’s Proof-Text Tradition: Text-Type, Provenance, Theological Profile* [Leiden: Brill, 1987] 245–46) miss the conventionality of the image of the philosophical seeker. Note Rajak’s astute observation that “the narrative has to be set up in such a way as to pull the participants into the ambit of philosophy.
reestablished as a colony. Justin in contrast is not introduced with simple identity markers paralleling those of Trypho—for example, “a Christian, son of Priscus, lately in Samaria.” Instead, he offers a long conversion story, which expands upon Trypho’s first impression of him (or Vitruvius’s ideal victim of shipwreck) as cloaked in such a way that markers of ethnic origin or ritual affiliation fall away, with only the identity of philosopher remaining. The Dialogue asserts Justin’s universal appeal, but in the present, ties Jews intimately to Jerusalem and its environs. Jerusalem is not just another city, but it is the quintessential city over time, “God’s holy mountain” of Zion, where Jesus Christ will appear again and will reign for a thousand years. Justin also depicts Jerusalem as the city from which persecution of Christians has recently emerged: “[Y]ou even dispatched certain picked men from Jerusalem to every land, to report the outbreak of the godless heresy of the Christians,” he accuses. Thus, he implies, it is also now a site of violent destruction. Justin adopts Scriptures about the Babylonian destruction of Jerusalem in order to talk about its destruction by the Romans—except that he attributes this destruction to God, not to the forces of human empire. I quote the famous passage about circumcision marking Jews for abuse:

Indeed the custom of circumcision the flesh, handed down from Abraham, was given to you as a distinguishing mark, to set you off from other nations and from us Christians. The purpose of this was that you and only you might suffer the afflictions that are now justly yours; that only your land be desolate, and your cities ruined by fire; that the fruits of your land be eaten by strangers before your very eyes; that not one of you be permitted to enter your city of Jerusalem.

The Roman Empire’s involvement in this violence is not recognized; the word “Rome” does not even appear in the Dialogue. The Dialogue maps a world where violence is located on the edge, in a region that was once center: the ruined Jerusalem and weakened Syria-Palestine. Its

The Jew is attracted by Justin’s garb, and thus Trypho is temporarily constructed as ‘one of us’” (“Talking at Trypho,” 64). See also Horner, Listening to Trypho, 73–83, on Justin’s self-crafting in relation to the second sophistic.

125Dial. 80–81, 85.
126Dial. 17 (trans. Falls, 173).
128Justin does allude to the future centrality of Jerusalem; see discussion above.
129Dial. 1.1.
own central setting is a kind of neither land of generic Greekness. Eusebius historicizes the dialogue, placing it in Ephesus, but I think that Justin is deliberately vague and generic in his location of his interaction with Trypho. He offers a kind of stage set for acting out philosophy: a covered colonnade,\(^{130}\) and later, some stone benches.\(^{131}\) Throughout his corpus, Justin alludes to Plato and to Stoic thought and appeals to the story of Socrates’ life and death in order to muse on the persecution of Christians and on his own role as a philosopher. In the Dialogue, such references become part of Justin’s own costuming in philosophical garb. Just as the location of the Dialogue is a kind of generic philosophical stage set, so also the costuming for the production. While Justin’s Apologies constructed a map centered on Rome, the Dialogue asserts no place in particular. Jerusalem burns on its margins, but a philosopher like Justin cannot be tied down to one place.

### Conclusions

This paper has used a framework of geographical thinking to place Justin’s and Tatian’s references to travel and cities within the broader cultural context of the

\(^{131}\)Dial. 9.3.  

\(^{132}\)Although, note that Martin Elze, while still holding to the category of apologetic, recognizes that Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos is not an apology (Tatian und seine Theologie [Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1960] 41). Johannes Quasten’s Patrology ([3 vols.; Utrecht: Spectrum, 1964–1966] 1.186), however, categorizes Justin and Tatian as apologists, and further explains that “with the Greek Apologists the literature of the Church addresses itself for the first time to the outside world and enters the domain of culture and science.” We know, however, that even if Justin inscribes his audience as the Roman emperors and the people of Rome, and even if Tatian inscribes his audience as Greeks, these writings were probably directed to and popular with Christian communities, and inscribe or construct an audience of outsiders in their claim to defend Christianity. See Loveday Alexander, “The Acts of the Apostles as an Apologetic Text,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire (ed. Edwards et al.) 21–22. My own thinking about defining apologetic was sparked in part by Anniewies van den Hoek’s “Apologetic and Protreptic Discourse in Clement of Alexandria,” and discussion of this paper at the Boston Patristic Society in September 2004; see also Lyman’s “The Politics of Passing,” 43–44. For excellent considerations of the genre of apologetic, see J.-C. Fredouille, “L’apologétique chrétienne antique. Naissance d’un genre littéraire,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 38 (1992) 219–34 and idem, “L’apologétique chrétienne antique. Metamorphoses d’un genre polymorphe,” Revue des Études Augustiniennes 41 (1995) 201–16. Alain Le Boulluec, in De Justin à Irénée (vol. 1 of La notion d’hérésie dans la littérature grecque, IIe–IIIe siècles; Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1985), argues that Justin’s apologetic, in fact, invented the category of heresy. On Christian paideia and relations with Greek culture, see the seminal work of Werner Jaeger, such as his Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1961).

\(^{133}\)Quasten asserted that “we may speak therefore of a Christianization of Hellenism but hardly of a Hellenization of Christianity” (Patrology, 1.188).

\(^{134}\)In the recent volume Apologetics in the Roman Empire, apologetic is largely understood as a Christian phenomenon; only two of its ten chapters deal with non-Christian sources. Frances Young’s learned and useful survey chapter on “Greek Apologists of the Second Century,” discusses only Christian authors, and states that writings like those of Justin and Tatian justify their authors’ unpopular decisions to “turn their backs on the classical literature inherited from antiquity . . .
second sophistic, rather than marginalizing them as Christian apologists. Scholars have generally understood apologetic as a Christian (or perhaps Jewish and Christian) phenomenon that offers some resistance either to Hellenism or to the Roman Empire or to both. Apologetic is thus a modern category that helps scholars to frame their understandings of the ancient world, rather than a commonly understood genre of antiquity. While it is clear that Christians and others defended themselves against accusations in antiquity—offered up apologiai—ancient rhetorical handbooks do not discuss apologetic as a genre. Plato’s Apology certainly cast a long and influential shadow over the Greco-Roman world, but while early Christians frequently invoked Socrates as a way of figuring their own oppression and response, they did so in a variety of ways that cannot easily be clustered under the one category. Even an early Christian writer like Eusebius, listing various figures who would come to be called apologists, does so not in the context of discussing apologetic, but in a chronological account of various writers who emerged under various emperors. Rather than being a generic term from antiquity or an organic literary phenomenon arising from Christian persecution, the category of apologetic may emerge from the taxonomic impulses of seventeenth-century European scholars, struggling in the context of the rise of Protestantism and the clash of

thus abandoning the comfortable ethos of the Graeco-Roman synthesis into which they had been born, nurtured, and educated” (81). But, as we have seen, Justin and Tatian hardly reject “classical literature” or the “Graeco-Roman synthesis.” Some scholarship on apologetic does imply that the boundaries between (Christian) apologists and others are porous. See Robert Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster, 1988) esp. 9.

135 Alexander, “The Acts of the Apostles,” 24. Van den Hoek (“Apologetic and Protreptic Discourse in Clement of Alexandria”) questions traditional definitions of apologetic and protreptic. If we try to explore what apologetic might be by searching for apologia and its cognates in what is usually termed early Christian apologetic, we find very little. Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos contains no such terms, and Justin uses apologia or its cognates only once in the Dialogus cum Tryphone, and only four times within his writings altogether.


137 Van den Hoek reaches this conclusion in her “Apologetic and Protreptic Discourse in Clement of Alexandria.” See especially Hist. eccl. 4.3.

138 For first uses of apologetic in seventeenth-century English literature, s.v. “apologetic,” “apology,” Oxford English Dictionary. The concern about Hellenism and Christianity has long fuelled the question that scholars bring to the study of Justin—a question that often reveals scholars’ anxieties about the relationship between Platonic philosophy and Christian theology in their own times. See Niels Hyldahl, Philosophie und Christentum. Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966); and Oskar Skarsaune, “The Conversion of Justin Martyr,” Studia Theologica 30 (1976) 56–59. These two argue that Justin understands there to be a rift between Platonism and Christianity. See Van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher, 24, for a review of the history of scholarship on Justin’s philosopher’s cloak, and what it might indicate about the continuity or discontinuity of his relationship with philosophy. For a sophisticated reading of the categories of Christianity and Hellenism as they relate to Justin, see Lyman, “The Politics
religion and science, as well as from Christian concerns about the self-definition of Christianity, especially in relation to Platonist philosophy.138

In this article, I am engaged in my own shifting of the traditional scholarly map: Justin and Tatian should not be sequestered into Christian apologetic—itself a questionable category, but instead should be read as engaged in the broader cultural conversations, in which Lucian represents one satirical and strong voice. These writings take part in a struggle within (and against) the Roman Empire, whose conquests occurred not only through military means, but also through an uneven policy of tolerance that rewarded and at times demanded assimilation. We have also seen that Justin, Tatian, and Lucian teach us about one use of the sign “barbarian” under this Roman Empire: the person who has mastered Greekness and yet is ambivalent about that mastery.

This article has shown how Justin, Tatian, and Lucian are Vitruvian men in two senses. They remind us of Vitruvius’s shipwrecked traveler, at home everywhere in the world with only paideia in hand. They rhetorically construct themselves as wandering truth-seekers from the empire’s eastern ranges, struggling with their quests for truth in their common cultural context, and questioning the value of Greek paideia even as they have mastered it. Yet they are also Vitruvian men in that their bodies, which contain the perfect symmetry of their mastery of Greek paideia, become the measure by which they map the world. Because of their proximity to or embracing of barbarian identity, they are vulnerable in the Roman world. In the city of Rome, Justin and Lucian especially are vulnerable to real violence and to violence done to certain kinds of knowledge, and Tatian depicts Greeks as vulnerable to the city of Rome’s appropriation of their cultural patrimony.

In addition to using the framework of geography to bring together the mental mappings of Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, three easterners with complex relationships to Greek paideia, this article has sought to complicate the model of center and periphery that is often used to talk about the Roman Empire, instead pointing to the ambiguous and complicated ways in which cities like Rome, Athens, and the barbarian homeland are mapped. It has used this model of mapping and geography in order to investigate how Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, two Christians and one satirist of everything, including Christianity, conceive of cities, geography, and travel under the Roman Empire. Key to their rhetorical constructions of these cities—Jerusalem, Rome, Athens, Hierapolis—is the issue of the dangers of travel, both to body and mind. These writers do not so much fear topomachia in the blank spaces of the map, but rather offer a kind of cartography of epistemic violence across the empire as they question whose sources of knowledge are trammeled and whose are falsely elevated. In the works of Justin, Tatian, and Lucian, the second sophistic’s usual elevation of Greek paideia is challenged. Rome is portrayed as complicit in a sometimes violent consumption of purchased paideia and of enslaved goods—both statuary bodies and real live philosophers’ bodies. According to all three writers, out of Syria, coded as barbarian, may come a purer, simpler knowledge.