# Challenging Deliberation

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Civic education is and has been a primary aim of public schooling virtually everywhere. Among liberal democratic states, especially, which rely on a well-educated, civic-minded citizenry for their very existence, health, and perpetuation, civic education is rightly seen as being an essential component of public education. Both through formal curricular mechanisms such as the design of history, language, and literature curricula and establishment and assessment of civics standards, and through institutional mechanisms such as open or comprehensive school admissions policies, mixed-ability classes, and recess or lunchroom rules, public schools in many liberal democratic societies are designed — at least in part — to promote the goals of establishing common civic membership and civic virtue among all students. Historically, this was one of the primary arguments given in favor of publicly funding “common schools,” as Horace Bushnell wrote in 1853: “There needs to be some place where, in early childhood, [children] may be brought together and made acquainted with each other; thus to wear away the sense of distance, otherwise certain to become an established animosity of orders; to form friendships; to be exercised together on a common footing of ingenuous rivalry. . . . Without this he can never be a fully qualified citizen, or prepared to act his part wisely as a citizen.” Similar sentiments have been articulated (albeit sometimes in updated language) by educators and politicians ever since. In addition, once through the doors of the common school, students were and are subjected to a barrage of lessons meant to teach them civic virtue: to teach them about their rights and obligations in a democratic society, respect for local and national political, cultural, and social institutions, patriotism, and so forth. Even education in basic skills such as
reading, writing, and mathematics is often justified on civic (as well as vocational and other) grounds, as being crucial for citizens to participate in civic affairs knowledgeably and effectively.

Clearly, these civic aspects of public education should be and are significantly shaped by the kind of civic structure we think we are educating children for. Civic education in a tyrannical state will inevitably be significantly different from civic education in a democratic state — and more to the point for the purposes of this article, civic education for a democracy characterized by separation of powers, say, will be different from civic education for a parliamentary democracy. We know in the modern American and European context that we are educating children to participate in a democratic polis. We want students to learn to exercise their rights and fulfill their duties in a democratic setting. But as both theorists and practitioners of civic education, we need to ask specifically what kind of democracy we think we are — or should be — educating for.

Recently, a number of prominent democratic theorists have started promoting *deliberative democracy* as a political goal, arguing that it is superior to more adversarial forms of democracy that seem to privilege power over consensus. In this article, I critically examine deliberative democracy as a political goal both in itself and in regard to its implications for democratic civic education. I first show that deliberative democracy is likely unjustly to minimize the influence of deliberants who are members of minority groups, even when all citizens (minority and majority group members alike) are motivated by the purest and most civic-minded of intentions. I then show that a deliberative civic education designed to overcome this problem in future generations imposes additional undesirable costs, especially on children who grow up in racially, economically, or religiously segregated minority communities. These costs,
I suggest, probably outweigh deliberative democracy’s putative benefits over adversarial
democracy. I conclude, however, that we are not immune to these challenges even here and
now; to the extent that deliberative obligations and opportunities are already built into the
structures of modern democratic politics, educating students effectively to participate in public
deliberation raises significant challenges to the form and legitimacy of current public civic
education that need to be — and have not yet been — satisfactorily addressed.

The Challenge of Deliberative Equality

Over the past decade or two, such well-known political theorists as Jane Mansbridge,
David Miller, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have published books advocating
deliberative democracy as being both superior to adversarial democracy and desirable in and of
itself. Because of the prominence of these (and other like-minded) theorists, and the ensuing
debate that they have inspired, it is not an exaggeration to say that deliberation has assumed
center stage as the democratic ideal for the beginning of the twenty-first century. As such, it
merits careful scrutiny by philosophers, public policy makers, and educators. Although both the
form of the argument and the justifications vary somewhat from theorist to theorist, there is
sufficient overlap in their broad characterization of deliberative democracy that there’s no need
to analyze each one separately. Hence, for simplicity’s sake, I will focus on David Miller’s
recent book Citizenship and National Identity, which does a good job of setting out the
aspirations of most deliberative democrats in a clear and non-idiosyncratic way.

According to Miller, deliberative democracy promotes a process by which politics
proceeds “through an open and uncoerced discussion of the issue at stake with the aim of
arriving at an agreed judgement.” This is in contrast to what he terms liberal adversarial
democracy, which he suggests aims merely at a “fair and efficient” aggregation of preferences. In adversarial democracy, people give reasons to support their position and convert people to their side, but they also try to win adherents by bargaining, airing attack ads, making alliances, and so forth. In deliberative democracy, on the other hand, people give and listen to reasons in order to reach a consensus; alliances and bargains are not made because decisions are not made through majority voting but through deliberation and compromise until all members of the deliberative body agree. Deliberative democracy thus has many attractive elements: it fosters cooperation and mutual understanding rather than winning and losing (as adversarial democracy seems to); it purports to give all citizens a “voice” rather than just the most powerful or the most numerous (as tends to occur in majoritarian democracy); and it encourages citizens to make decisions based on “public reasons” that can be supported through deliberation rather than on individual prejudices that thrive in the privacy of the voting booth.

To achieve deliberative democracy in practice is, of course, difficult. As Miller (and other deliberative democratic theorists) clearly understands, aspiration and realization are two very different things. Even if it is desirable that decisions are made through deliberative rather than liberal adversarial processes, certain social and political conditions must be present if deliberative democracy is to live up to its promise. Crucially, Miller points out, the ability (as opposed to merely the right) of all groups to participate equally is central to deliberative democracy’s rationality and legitimacy:

Deliberative democracy may be formally inclusive, in the sense that everyone is permitted to enter and speak in democratic forums, but if the debate by its very nature favours some groups at the expense of others, it is not inclusive in a substantive sense. Similarly if the reasons that prove to count in deliberative settings are not reasons for everyone, but only reasons for particular groups or coalitions of groups, then the outcome cannot be described as rational in a sense that transcends group membership. If the rationality claim falls, so does the legitimacy claim, for why should the disadvantaged
groups accept as legitimate a procedure that relies upon methods of argument and reasons that they cannot share?5

As a result, it is essential that Miller and other deliberative democrats be able to show that deliberative democracy does enable members of all groups to participate on an equal basis, not only in the sense of their simply being present at the discussions, but also in the sense of their speaking out, being listened to and understood, and influencing the debate where appropriate.

There are have been many objections to deliberative democracy that focus on these two issues: inclusion of multiple voices and appropriate recognition of their contributions to the deliberation. Iris Marion Young, especially, has raised important questions about minorities’ membership in deliberative political bodies and their comfort in speaking up even when they are included. She and Lynn Sanders point out that women and blacks participate less often and less effectively than men and whites in verdict-driven jury deliberation and in adversarial settings such as courts or parliaments — and thus presumably in other combative deliberative settings such as a deliberative democracy might institutionalize.6 In another context, Young also argues that minorities employ different kinds of discourse — including witnessing and storytelling — that will not be welcomed into or respected in deliberative discourse.

Both of these objections are well-taken, I believe, and should influence the shape and development of deliberative democracy. Miller points out, however, that research shows there are ways to structure deliberation that encourage greater participation by traditionally “silent” groups, including evidence-based jury deliberation and non-adversarial lawmaking bodies.

The lesson for deliberative democrats, therefore, is not that they should throw up their hands in dismay when it is pointed out that members of disadvantaged groups tend to participate less in collective deliberation, but that they should look for ways of ensuring that deliberation takes a form that corresponds to an evidence-driven jury, which means that instead of trying to move quickly to a yes/no decision, the arguments for and against different options should be explored without individual participants having to declare
which they support. This, it seems to me, is what good political deliberation would in any case require.\textsuperscript{7}

Thus, properly structured deliberative institutions present a kind of “win-win” situation: they reduce or eliminate inequalities in people’s comfort in contributing to the deliberations, and they improve the overall quality of political deliberation. Furthermore, as Miller later argues, deliberative institutions such as these are the best — and really the only — way of rationally reaching political solutions to common problems, and thus members of all groups, and especially minority groups, are well served by participating in them.\textsuperscript{8}

For the purposes of this article, I will take these responses as sufficient to answer deliberative democracy’s critics, because it is not the problem of unequal participation that worries me the most. Rather, what concerns me more are the other aspects of participation that matter for deliberative democracy to be rational and legitimate: namely, all participants’ being listened to and understood, and their thereby actually influencing the debate where appropriate. Deliberative democrats, Miller among them, seem to assume a direct causal relationship between “relevant views and arguments” “enter[ing]” the debate, on the one hand, and the “ensuing discussion” “genuinely reflect[ing] the concerns, interests, and convictions” of the participants, on the other. This causal inference strikes me as being wrong. Even if members of groups from across the political and social spectrum are present in a deliberative body, and even the participants all “enter” their ideas by speaking up, it is not clear that everything that is said will be heard and understood in such a way as to be appropriately reflected in the deliberations. The reasons for this, I believe, say a lot about the continued weakness, and potential illegitimacy, of this aspect of the deliberative democratic model.

\textit{Minority “extremism”}
One reason that equal participation (or at least “vocalization”) does not necessarily translate to equal appropriate consideration within a deliberative setting is that minority groups may have such different experiences from the majority group that they come to understand how the world (or the nation) works in a way that is significantly different from, and even incomprehensible to, members of the advantaged majority. As a result, a member from the minority group may put forth arguments within a political debate that rest on premises about the world that are generally accepted by all of the other members of his group but are rejected as bizarre or crazy by the majority of the deliberative body. In this case, the deliberation is unlikely to be substantively inclusive, and therefore unlikely to be legitimate from the minority group’s point of view. This lack of legitimacy would be further increased if the contributions of a number of minority groups were regularly viewed this way by the majority of the deliberants, or if the group that was viewed this way constituted a substantial (albeit still minority) share of the population, or if the group whose ideas were regularly rejected were constituted by something other than belief (i.e. ethnicity, race, gender, etc.). For although it is true that there are some groups in the world whose ideas really are crazy across the board, these groups are rarely very large, presumably not numerous within any one deliberative setting (city, district, or nation), and almost inevitably formed around the crazy beliefs they espouse. If we discover, therefore, that the contributions of blacks, women, or Muslims in general, say, are consistently viewed in this way in deliberative settings, then we would be right to conclude that such deliberations are not substantively inclusive.

There is substantial evidence that this disparity in life experience and perspective exists in the United States between blacks and whites. Robert C. Smith and Richard Seltzer show in their extremely comprehensive analysis of *Contemporary Controversies and the American*
Racial Divide\textsuperscript{9} that blacks and whites are often divided by a “chasm” of more than forty percentage points in their opinions about public policy issues, which they explain in part on the basis that blacks and whites live in “historically different worlds”\textsuperscript{10} as characterized by culture, history, income, education, residence, and employment.\textsuperscript{11} To highlight just a few examples, blacks and whites were divided by almost fifty points in their attitude that “people cannot be trusted” (85 percent of blacks agreed vs. 38 percent of whites) and that there’s “no sense planning for the future” (73 percent of blacks agreed vs. 27 percent of whites); twice as many blacks as whites (54 vs. 25 percent) agreed that government should spend more on schools even if that would require a tax increase, and that the government should provide financial aid for college students (62 vs. 30 percent); and over three times the percentage of blacks as whites (54 vs. 14 percent) believe that providing “decent housing for all” is a government responsibility.\textsuperscript{12} Clearly these attitudinal and political differences would (and already do) have a huge impact on public policy deliberations — and on the extent to which whites and blacks are sympathetic to each others’ perspectives. Although I am less familiar with the research in other countries, I would expect that similar examples could be found in most heterogeneous societies, including Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Southeast Asians and whites in England, Palestinians and Jews in Israel and the occupied territories, Anglophones and Francophones in Quebec, East and West Germans, and so forth.

It is important to emphasize that this problem may arise even when the claims that the minority group makes appeal to common interests of all citizens rather than to the group’s own interests only, and when the norms behind the appeals are also generally shared among all citizens, minorities and others alike. Because of different life experiences or other cultural differences, members of a minority group may put forward claims about a common interest (such
as community protection through policing) that appeal to common norms, and that seem totally
mundane from that group’s perspective, yet seem absolutely extreme from the majority group’s
perspective. This problem can not necessarily be solved by “drawing attention to facts that have
hitherto gone unnoticed,”\textsuperscript{13} as it is the facts themselves that may be a matter of debate.

For example, many American blacks remain extremely suspicious of government health
care policy in the United States as a result of revelations about the government-sponsored
Tuskegee syphilis study. This lack of trust has led to significant suspicion within the black
community of state-mandated childhood immunizations, and even of the antiretroviral drug
“cocktails” now used to combat HIV and AIDS.\textsuperscript{14} A smaller but still surprisingly significant
number of blacks also believe, or at least seriously entertain the idea — again stemming from the
Tuskegee experience — that the CIA developed and spread AIDS in inner cities and Africa, and
developed and sold crack cocaine in the inner cities in the 1980’s.\textsuperscript{15} A further example of what
might seem like “extremism” or “lunacy” to many white Americans but which is well-
entrenched in many American black communities is the belief that blacks who rise too high in
America other than in sports or entertainment, and especially in politics, are inevitable targets for
(possibly government-sponsored) assassination. As a middle school teacher, teaching American
history and English to thirteen to fifteen year-olds, I am frequently confronted by questions from
my students in this regard. During the Republican presidential primary season in 1999, my
students in Boston asked me if I thought that Alan Keyes, a black candidate, would soon be
assassinated.\textsuperscript{16} Similarly, my students in Atlanta (all African-American) and my (black)
colleague there who taught American history were sure that Ron Brown, the Democratic
National Committee chairman and Clinton’s cabinet secretary who died in an airplane crash in
the Balkans, was killed on governmental orders. Just a few years before that, it was widely
reported that celebrated Persian Gulf War general Colin Powell did not run for president because his wife was afraid he would be assassinated. And finally, probably the most celebrated recent example of vast disparities in white and black interpretations of “the facts” was the OJ Simpson case, in which blacks and whites arguably subscribed to the same norms of justice but tended to be 180 degrees opposed in their beliefs about the justice of the verdict.  

These examples remind us, I hope, of the crucial disparities in how many blacks and whites in America experience and interpret American life, and therefore of the often incredibly different interpretations of how “facts on the ground” relate to governmental policy or political decisions more generally. (Again, I would expect that similar disjunctions could be found between other groups in the United States, and among minority and majority groups in other countries.) It is unlikely that blacks and whites disagree about the desirability of good quality low-cost health care, of improving the prospects for terminally-ill patients by developing new drugs, free and open elections, or of proper channels for procedural and substantive justice. But blacks who subscribe to the beliefs related above may have surprising — and possibly even incomprehensible or just crazy — things to say as far as most whites are concerned about public policies in these areas. (Blacks are unlikely to be as surprised at white perspectives on these matters, since majority perspectives are better expressed in the media, etc.) Assuming that whites would make up the majority of deliberative institutions, therefore, which would presumably be appropriate or at least acceptable since they make up the majority of the population, they may end up consistently rejecting blacks’ contributions to the debate as irrelevant or unsupportable — despite every intention to foster a mutually-respectful deliberative forum that is focused on finding common solutions rather than “winning.”
Now it may be too quick to say that blacks’ impotence in influencing debate under such conditions is the fault of deliberative democracy. It may simply be up to black Americans to make the case to white Americans that their understanding of the “facts on the ground” is true. They need to prove that politically powerful blacks are being targeted for assassination, for example, as slow and painful a process as that proof may be, just like whites in America are finally accepting the idea that being harassed or arrested for “Driving While Black” is a real phenomenon, now known as “racial profiling.” After all, white Americans have no reason to accept the idea that there are sinister government forces targeting politically powerful blacks just because many black Americans think this is true. (I was never convinced by my colleague that Ron Brown was assassinated, despite our discussions about the topic, and I therefore disagreed with him on policy issues that related to our beliefs in this matter.) This may be the time for “personal testimony” to enter the deliberation, as blacks try to help whites understand the experience of being black in America, and thus to understand also why they believe that black politicians are subject to government attack, federal agencies are spreading disease and drugs in the inner-cities, and so forth.

In the meantime, however, it strikes me as being very unlikely that blacks, who make up 12-13 percent of the American population, should necessarily accept the rationality and legitimacy of the deliberative democratic process, and of the political decisions that are made prior to white America’s acceptance of black America’s descriptions of its experiences. Furthermore, to the extent that similar disconnects could be found between women and men, religious minorities and Christians, and poor people versus wealthy people, deliberative democracy becomes increasingly untenable. To take an example driven by class rather than race, many of my students — Puerto Rican, Cape Verdean, Jamaican, Irish, African-American,
Dominican, but all essentially poor — are convinced that rents are going up in their neighborhoods because of a conspiracy on the part of wealthy Bostonians to exile poor people to the suburbs (!) and get rid of all subsidized housing now that poor people have cleaned up the neighborhoods for them. Although my students undoubtedly hold these beliefs in part because of predictable early-adolescent misinterpretation of complex economic forces, my students are not alone in their convictions. Many of their parents subscribe to the same conspiracy theories, and similar views are articulated by community newspapers and local activists. Whether or not they are right, many middle-class residents of Boston who are searching for decent housing in good neighborhoods will reject their arguments as absurd or paranoid — not out of ill-will, but because their views seem extreme. To the extent that this pattern of mutual incomprehension — especially on the part of majority group members who listen to but don’t “hear” minority group members — to the extent that this replicates itself across racial, ethnic, religious, class, gender, or other lines, deliberative democracy suffers real problems with legitimacy.

Unacknowledged norms and “sectarian” reasons

A second reason that minority groups may end up having an inappropriately small effect on deliberation despite having representatives who appropriately voice their concerns and ideas is that members of the majority group may live by certain norms, or benefit from experiences of the world, that they deny when these are articulated by members of minority communities. For example, studies of identity development in the US have shown that white children are the only ones who generally do not use race to describe themselves.¹⁹ Black, Hispanic, and Asian children consistently describe themselves from a very young age as being black, Hispanic, or Asian (as well as being tall, having brown eyes, etc.). White children do not describe themselves
as being white. It is clearly a white privilege to see oneself as not having a race, or as not being even partially defined by race. But this differential experience of race (the experience of its not seeming to matter, because it is taken as a default assumption — being white is “normal” in a way that being anything else is not) is very hard for whites to acknowledge. Thus, in response to a black person’s invocation of race in a political debate, whites in America (and I expect in many other countries) will often complain, privately at least, “Why do blacks talk about race all the time?” They have listened to the black person’s reason or idea, but they do not “hear” it or allow it to influence them appropriately — despite having the best of intentions — because of their inability to acknowledge that their own experiences have been shaped by race — but in their case by the privilege of white race.

A second example, one that occasionally comes up in the cafeteria of the school where I teach and that was a very live issue when I was a college student, concerns apparent minority self-segregation. At Yale in the late 1980’s, fierce debates raged about the appropriateness of “heritage houses” and separate freshman orientations for minority students. Furthermore, in the college dining halls (as sometimes in our school cafeteria now), the question would quietly be raised, “Why are all the blacks sitting together?” As Beverly Daniel Tatum points out in her terrific book, *Why Are All the Blacks Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?*, whites ask these questions because although the process of building a racial identity involves similar activities and experiences for both blacks and whites, including the experiences of interacting with same-race peer groups, it’s again an invisible process in the white community, since whites are almost always “naturally” surrounded by other whites. (Notice that the question is rarely asked, “Why are all the whites sitting together?” — and that’s not because all-white groups don’t form.) This
same process will be quite visible for minority students in a majority setting, however, because they will have (visibly) to seek same-race peers out.

A third and final example will help take the discussion out of a solely racial context, and may shed further light on how good arguments may end up being excluded from deliberation for bad reasons, thereby putting the legitimacy of the deliberative process itself into question. In *Citizenship and National Identity*, Miller discusses the case of a Muslim parent who tries to argue in favor of the establishment of Muslim schools. In his example, the parent starts out by saying that “it is vitally important that a child’s religious background be supported by his or her school,” but this argument gets nowhere as “many people held precisely the opposite opinion.” The parent thus switches to arguing that “Muslim children would in many cases not flourish academically unless they were sent to schools where the teaching reflected their cultural values,” which invokes the more acceptable norm of the “principle of equal opportunity,” and which therefore ends up (possibly) being successful. Miller concludes from this:

> the search for agreement will itself act as a filter on the kinds of reason that prevail in the discussion, sectarian reasons being weeded out precisely because it becomes apparent to their supporters that they are not going to command wide assent.\(^{21}\)

In other words, Miller interprets the Muslim parent’s arguments are representing a movement from unpalatable sectarian values (that are permitted in debate but will gain no purchase and will therefore naturally be filtered out) to desirable common norms.

I suggest, however, that the Muslim parent might have been drawing on common norms in both cases, but that in response to the first argument the presumably Christian majority weeded out a norm to which they unknowingly subscribe in practice and benefit from themselves, but are unwilling or unable to acknowledge. In other words, a norm that was so well-entrenched as to be invisible in the mainstream, Christian context became “sectarian” as
soon as it was applied in a non-mainstream (e.g. Muslim) context. After all, this example was rooted in the British context, and most British school children do have their religious background supported by their schools. Bland Christianity is part of most Britons’ culture, and as such is supported by the religious education curriculum, school assemblies and holidays, and other aspects of the school calendar and curriculum. But because they are in the majority, and because British Christianity is in general such a mushy thing, Christian parents in Britain don’t think about the fact that their children daily benefit from the application of the first norm in their schools. They don’t have to subscribe to it consciously, and even have the luxury of consciously rejecting it in non-Christian contexts as inappropriately “sectarian,” because the Christian state educational establishment already subscribes to the same norm for them, much to their children’s benefit.

Again, it’s possible that in a properly respectful deliberative setting, these unacknowledged norms and experiences will be exposed and understood by all participants because whites and Christians would feel comfortable articulating their complaints and questions (“Why are you always obsessed with race?” “Why do you have to put religion into everything?”) and blacks and non-Christians would feel comfortable answering them. If so, then blacks’ claims about the importance of establishing certain segregated settings such as “heritage houses,” and Muslim’s claims about the importance of schools’ supporting children’s religious background, would likely be “heard” as well as listened to. But there is a question as to how ideal we can envision deliberative democratic institutions as being without our losing purchase on positive, applicable political theory and action. Even in a solution-oriented (rather than victory-oriented) setting in which people interacted according to principles of mutual respect, it may be too much to hope that participants will expend the time and energy to engage in what is
an inevitably slow and painful process of self-discovery. As a result, I suggest that often, even in a mutually respectful deliberative setting, it’s likely that whites/members of other majority groups will shy away from claims that seem too racially-focused or self-segregating. They will listen to but then reject them, and these reasons may therefore wrongly — and illegitimately, from minority groups’ perspectives — not gain purchase on future deliberations.

“What you really mean to say is...”

A third way in which minorities’ influence on democratic deliberation may be illegitimately limited is by members of the majority group’s unintentionally but pervasively reinterpreting what minorities say in order to make minorities’ claims make sense to them. This may be done unconsciously, or may be done as a misguided extension of respect — they may think that by saying or thinking, “What you’re really trying to say is...,” they are doing a service to the minority group. Miller himself provides an example of this, I believe, in the following comment:

If we take, not militant Islam . . . but Islamic religious identity of the more usual kind, it is perfectly possible for a Christian to value this identity while holding to Christian values. There is likely to be sufficient overlap in the virtues embodied in the two ways of life for the Christian to endorse the Muslim identity, even while recognizing that this is not an identity he or she would wish to embrace.  

This claim misses the point, I think, about what it means to value other cultures (and highlights the difficulty of really “hearing” the claims made by members of other cultures). Valuing the overlaps between one’s own culture and somebody else’s means that one simply values other cultures to the extent that they replicate or mirror one’s own (with sufficient, “open-minded” discount for superficial differences). This is not the kind of respect or “valuation” that Iris Marion Young (to whom Miller is responding) means, and it’s not sufficient respect for a
deliberative democracy to work without privileging majority groups over minority groups. For an individual's “concerns, interests and convictions”\textsuperscript{24} really to count in and appropriately influence deliberation, the \textit{differences} between his position and others’ must be recognized and taken into account; otherwise, he might as well not participate. Similarly, efforts to rephrase a person’s position (“What she’s really trying to say is...”) often have the outcome, whether intended or not, of neutralizing her claims; in the process of rephrasing, the “weight of reasons”\textsuperscript{25} often is shifted to fit comfortably into the other discussants’ already-present understanding of the matter at hand, rather than forcing people to grapple with an idea that is new or challenging. As a result, dissenting individuals, especially if they come to an issue as outsiders whose views and experiences are different from the mainstream, run the risk of having their positions seemingly assimilated into the deliberations without their actually exerting influence in the appropriate way.

\textbf{Deliberative Civic Education and the “Language of Power”}

Even within well-designed and well-intentioned deliberative contexts, therefore, the differential experiences of majority and minority group members can result in a loss of deliberative equality, and thus in a delegitimizing of deliberative democracy itself. If deliberative democracy nonetheless remains a civic goal, as it does for Miller, then civic education must be structured so as to overcome these liabilities as much as possible. How it might do so is the focus of this section.

For those of us who teach individuals who are members of what I have been terming majority groups — and this description includes not just teachers in the formal sense of the word but also members of mainstream media outlets, politicians, public thinkers, etc.: in other words,
all people who help to shape and influence public opinion — our goal insofar as we are civic educators should clearly be to help members of majority groups “hear” the claims of minority co-deliberators without automatically rejecting them as “extreme” or “sectarian” or rephrasing them to fit our own beliefs and experience. This is hard. It is hard to teach, and hard for others to learn. “Hearing” the claims made by people who seem very different from us requires a real exercise of thoughtful imagination combined with complex historical knowledge and understanding, and as those of us who teach know, it is extremely difficult to help students reach this point. As a teacher of English and American history to early adolescents, I am thrilled if once or twice per term students really seem to grasp a complex set of ideas from the inside and to be able to rethink and reimagine their own experience in that historical context. It is possible that I set my goals too low, but I don’t believe I do. This kind of thoughtful, historically-, culturally-, and politically-informed imaginative work is difficult, and can even be painful. Although I advocate it strongly, therefore, we cannot trust that this type of civic education will on its own equip citizens to engage and fully “hear” each other in deliberative democratic settings.

On the other side, minorities can make themselves more comprehensible to majorities by adopting the language of the majority in setting forth their claims. For those of us who teach members of minority groups, therefore, it is our responsibility as civic educators to teach our students how to express themselves in terms that others will naturally understand. To put it baldly — as baldly as I put it to my students each year — in every country and in every community, there is a language of power, and if one wants to be effective through political dialogue (as opposed to through direct action, boycotts, radical street theater, etc.), one must master and use that language. For members of the majority group(s) (whether these are based
on class, race, religion, ethnicity, other features, or some combination), this language is usually easy to master because it is their own language. It is spoken at home, reinforced in the books they read, and repeated in the TV and movies they watch. Members of disadvantaged groups, however, have a harder row to hoe. They have to learn to express themselves in language that make sense to the majority group — in the language of power — and this may require minorities to shift their grammar, vocabulary, and narrative or expository form, as well as their cultural, political, and experiential referents in order to be understood and respected. When members of minority or disadvantaged groups do not make this switch, then it is easy for even well-intentioned majorities to reject, misunderstand, or misinterpret their arguments, as I discussed in the first section of this article. If they are able to make this switch, however, then they may be able to reduce or eliminate one of the barriers to effective cross-cultural communication.

Just as it is difficult for majority listeners to learn fully to “hear” the claims of others, it is also difficult for minority speakers to learn to master the language of power, particularly if they attend all-minority schools, which is the case for students in many urban schools. When I taught English in Atlanta, for example, my students attended an all-black school in which 87 percent of students lived at or below the poverty line; they lived in all-black neighborhoods, traveled on public transportation that was used almost exclusively by blacks, visited mostly black rap sites on the web, watched black-oriented TV, and listened to black-oriented radio stations. Almost none of their daily experiences, therefore, other than those explicitly designed and directed by their teachers in school, exposed them to or encouraged them to use and master Standard American English — the “language of power” in the United States. Most of my students wanted to learn to “speak right” and “write correctly” anyway, and we focused on that throughout the year. But these circumstances present a huge challenge for both teachers and students. Students
have to master so much vocabulary to which they have never been exposed (two years in a row, the second story we read in September caused confusion because my eighth graders didn’t know the words *ditch, wade, peasant, monarch, shore*, etc.), as well as learn grammatical constructions that are simply different in Standard American English from Black English. This is not to mention the skills they have to learn in structuring an argument, dressing appropriately, speaking convincingly (my students had explicitly to practice looking at the person they were trying to convince, because one of the continuing legacies of slavery is that in black culture in the American South, looking somebody in the eye is a sign of disrespect), and so forth.

It was also a challenge — but no less important from a civic perspective — to teach them all that they needed to know about mainstream — in this case, white and middle class — culture, history, and politics, so that they could learn to couch arguments intended for a mainstream audience in that context. When we studied Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech, for example, we focused on how many of King’s allusions were to Shakespeare, the Bible, Abraham Lincoln — not to Langston Hughes, Phyllis Wheatley, Frederick Douglass, or Sojourner Truth, as important as those black Americans are to American history and culture. To students whose exposure to mainstream culture and history is slim (they could all recite Maya Angelou’s poem “Still I Rise,” but none had heard of Robert Frost or Walt Whitman; and, on a lighter but I think no less telling note, they lost a quiz bowl round against a mostly-white team from the northern part of the city because they had never heard of Kurt Cobain, Nirvana, or grunge, but were disbelieving when I told them the other team had probably never heard of Master P or Mia X) — to students whose exposure to mainstream culture and history is slim, mastering the language of power is a daunting task, even with rhetorical masters such as Martin Luther King, Jr., to guide us.
This is not to say that this isn’t a worthwhile task. It absolutely is. Frost, Whitman, Lincoln, Emerson — and yes, non-Americans such as Shakespeare, Milton, Dickens, Shelley — are part of all Americans’ cultural heritage or “birthright,” and it massively disserves black Americans or other minorities if they are taught otherwise. Likewise, Angelou, Hughes, Douglass, Zora Neale Hurston, Ralph Ellison, and James Baldwin are equally part of American culture and should thus be taught to and embraced by all Americans as well. Americans’ heritage is America; I do not believe it divides down the color, class, religion, or any other line. But to say this is not and cannot be to minimize the vastly different exposure of and experience with — the “social capital” possessed by — members of majority and minority groups in America to these cultural, historical, and experiential norms. Furthermore, America is not alone in this level of social and cultural division; examples of privileged access to and exclusion from the language and experience of power can be found across most societies, and thus should be of concern to all deliberative democrats.

**Civic Education for Deliberative Democracy**

To educate future citizens to be effective members of a deliberative democracy, therefore, is a heavy task. It requires that children learn how to listen to each other in such a way that they actually “hear” the import of claims that on the surface may seem bizarre, irrational, unappealing, or confused. It also requires that children learn to express themselves in ways that other citizens find palatable and easier to “hear” and understand, by changing their modes of speech, dress, vocabulary, cultural referents, and so forth. Neither of these lessons is easy to teach or to learn, and they bring challenges in their wake.
I wish in this section to focus more specifically on the implications and challenges of the second lesson — that minority students should learn to speak and use a “language of power” that is not intrinsically their own. This aspect of deliberative civic education is of special interest to me — and should be of particular concern for deliberative democrats — for a few reasons. First, as I will show below, this model of civic education implicates the school in partially defining a student’s personal identity and then attaching that to his or her civic identity — both actions that Miller and other deliberative democrats deplore. Also, by emphasizing their outsider status to minority students, the school potentially fosters an oppositional attitude — one intended to enable deliberative cooperation, of course, but one that in the meantime might seem to undercut the trust that is crucial for deliberative justice. These issues (and others that I will discuss below) cut to the heart of the deliberative democratic project, and thus should be of foremost concern.

Second, I concentrate on minority deliberative civic education because it is important to recognize that many minority students will have to learn the language of power as an explicit educational task, rather than more “naturally” through regular interaction with students from majority groups. This is because so many minority students attend predominantly or all-minority schools. While it is true that integrated schools may foster mutual understanding and the development of cross-cultural communication skills through students’ natural interactions in the classroom and on the playground, many minority students, even in liberal democracies such as Britain and the United States, attend schools that are virtually or totally segregated. The United States is perhaps most shocking when one considers segregation by race: fully one-third of black and Latino students attend schools that are 90-100 percent minority. But it is important to remember that just as “majority” and “minority” refer not just to race, but also to ethnicity, religion, national origin, class, sexual orientation, and possibly gender, so should “segregated
schools” be taken to apply to these various aspects of identity. In the United States, many students attend schools that are effectively segregated by race and class; in Britain, Australia, and even France, many schools are effectively segregated by class, religion, and/or gender; in Canada, schools are purposely segregated by religion and, in Quebec, language; in Israel, virtually all public schools are intentionally segregated by religion and ethnicity. Thus, minority students (and, correlatively, majority students) are likely to attend segregated schools in many democracies. This situation is unlikely to change because democratic states cannot force children to attend integrated schools, and empirical evidence shows that full integration will not happen naturally. In any democracy it is extremely unlikely that citizens would decide to approve the kind of heavy-handed intervention into educational institutions, property rights, local taxation, and so forth that the state would have to take in order to foster truly integrated schools. Thus, unless we undemocratically (although in my view, more liberally) legislated new patterns for integrated children’s education as a sort of paternalistic preparation for future entry into a new deliberative democratic order, then integrated schools will be unlikely ever to be sufficiently prevalent to solve the problem of cross-cultural communication barriers on their own. As a result, it is important to consider the political and personal implications of deliberative civic education that is specifically designed for minority students.

A final reason that I choose to focus on civic education in minority settings is because that is the context in which I have experience as a teacher. My primary teaching experiences have been in Atlanta, at an all-black school, and now in Boston, at a school that is 85 percent minority and composed primarily of first- and second-generation immigrants. In both schools, about 90 percent of the student body live near or below the poverty line, so they are outside the mainstream in terms of class as well as race, ethnicity, and/or residency status, and although my
students in Atlanta were overwhelmingly Christian — members especially of the Southern Baptist, AME, or sometimes Pentecostal churches, and thus members of the religious mainstream in the South in that respect — many of my students in Boston are either religiously unaffiliated or members of minority religious groups: Hindu, Buddhist, Jehovah’s Witness, Seventh Day Adventist, even Wicca. My experience as a teacher, therefore, is firmly rooted in schools that serve minority populations, whether measured by class, ethnicity, race, or to a lesser extent, religion, and it is in this context that I started thinking seriously as a theorist-practitioner about civic education.

Taking all of this into account, it is clearly important to consider the implications, if any, of my argument that civic education for a deliberative democracy requires explicitly teaching minority students to master a “language of power” that is not, at least initially, their own. I suggest that there are at least five difficulties posed by this conception of deliberative civic education.

First, from both a pedagogical and a more broadly civic standpoint, it is obviously extremely troubling to teach citizens (or future citizens) that they are “outsiders” of a civic community. The school’s goal, of course, is to teach minority children (and all others as well, of course) that they are all civic beings who can and should function like insiders in deliberative settings: i.e., they should join, speak up, vote, etc. In order to teach them to function effectively as insiders in the deliberative process, however, the school must simultaneously teach minority students that they are outsiders in the sense of having to learn and use a “language of power” that is initially not their own. This places the school in a bind — as it places society in a bind. It runs the real risk of reinforcing many students’ already-strong sense of being excluded or discriminated against.
Of course, this may also be a more honest way of teaching. Many minority students, at least whom I teach, do feel excluded from and/or discriminated against by American history and American society — and I’m sure that many Asian students in England, Mahgrebi students in France, Sephardic and Arab students in Israel, and aboriginal students everywhere feel similarly about their countries. It does them and us no good, therefore, to pretend otherwise. To admit this explicitly, however, and especially to adopt this as a model of civic education, is to abandon the cherished notion that contemporary citizenship is a common right and experience. Let me explain. Almost all contemporary discussions of citizenship emphasize the common heritage of citizenship. To be a citizen, almost by definition, is to have the same bundle of rights and obligations, to “share the same legal status,”30 and even the same civic identity (qua citizen), as all other citizens. As Miller comments in a line typical of virtually all political theorists, “Citizenship is supposed to provide [a common] reference point. Our personal lives and commitments may be very different, but we are all equally citizens, and it is as citizens that we advance claims in the public realm and assess the claims made by others.”31 Consequently, it is to be expected that civic education would also be a common experience of all future citizens within a community. Regardless of individual, personal differences, children would all learn equally about their rights and obligations as citizens, and would develop the same citizenship skills. As I made clear earlier, however, this is not necessarily the case, neither in reality nor even possibly as an ideal (within the real world, that is). Because of the different status and life experiences of members of advantaged majority and disadvantaged minority groups, children from one group may need to develop different skills from children in another group in order to become equally effective citizens within a republic. As I argued before, children from disadvantaged backgrounds may need to learn to translate their experiences, both literally in
terms of language and figuratively in terms of the references and contextual descriptions they use, in order to ensure that other people properly understand and pay attention to what they are trying to say. Children from advantaged backgrounds just don’t need to learn these skills to the same extent, because these skills are not relevant to their becoming effective citizens of a deliberative democracy.

Furthermore, even if teachers’ approach to the curriculum were the same for all students, students’ responses to the curriculum — and their experiences of citizenship in general — would vary dramatically, in part due to their identity and group membership. This is true even if Miller’s (extremely improbable) dream comes true of reconstructing national identity so as to be less historically or culturally tainted. Miller argues:

I want to reply to [the argument that national identities are always in practice biased in favour of the dominant group] first by conceding that it is descriptively true in many historical cases — national identities have very often been formed by taking over elements from the group culture that happens to be dominant in a particular state — but then adding that it is not integral to national identities that they should be loaded in this way. . . . Although in standard cases a national identity is something one is born into. . . . there is no reason why others should not acquire it by adoption. . . . Although a priori a nation might define itself tightly by descent, in practice nations extend membership more or less freely to those who are resident and show willingness to exhibit those traits that make up national character.  

Thus Miller would like for nations to redefine themselves along nationally specific but non-culturally-specific lines. This would have the virtue, he believes, of negating the need for identity politics, because all citizens, no matter what their cultural background or identification, would be able to identify equally with the conditions for and character of national membership, and would therefore also feel comfortable participating as equals in the civic sphere.

This is a nice idea, but it is problematic on a number of levels. Even if national identity is not culturally biased, there is inevitably cultural bias within the citizenry who make up the nation, and in order to be effective politically, one has to be able to play to that bias, or be
comprehensible within that culture. It would be inefficient, to say the least, to try to participate in political deliberation in England but not couch arguments in terms that whites and Christians are likely to be sympathetic to. Also, even if a gradual recreation of a national character is possible — for example, even if England or Britain were to find or create symbols of nationhood that are inclusive and could be adopted by anyone who is resident and wishes to become a citizen (i.e., not the Union Jack, fox-hunting, “English gentleman,” servant of empire, etc.) — one still has to deal with the history of the nation as it stands. England could not simply ignore the downsides of its colonial history in its program of civic education, even if its history and experience as an empire no longer were central to English identity. After all, the lives and histories of most ethnic minority families in England — whether Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Afro-Caribbean, African, Irish, Arab, Chinese, or other — have been directly shaped by English colonialism, missionarism, racism, and the “white man’s burden.” The fact that England has (according to this counter-factual example) reconstructed its national identity in a non-culturally biased way is good, but it does not and cannot remove the sense of distance, exclusion, and/or ambivalence about citizenship and subjecthood that many minority students who are aware of its history are likely to feel.

Likewise, America has some powerful symbols of nationhood that are unifying and to some extent can be adopted by all citizens as a common heritage: the Constitution, Declaration of Independence, flag, “American Dream,” etc. But it, too, cannot thereby simply ignore the parts of American history that contradict these more desirable aspects of American nationhood: slavery, the destruction of Native American tribes and their land, isolationism and anti-immigrationism, segregation, etc. As a result, despite the common heritage of the Constitution and the American Dream (for example), a black person’s civic identity in America is extremely
likely to be different from a white person’s American civic identity. Acts of civil injustice — from slavery through Jim Crow through Tuskegee — have partially shaped the family history of every black person whose family has lived in America for longer than a few decades (as well as more recent immigrants, realistically speaking). White children’s family histories rarely show the scars of racial injustice in the same way; generally, parents, grandparents, and other ancestors benefited from the white privilege bestowed by these laws, even if they were personally opposed to them, or even if they ignored politics altogether. (Their histories may also have been marked and stunted by prejudice against ethnic whites or anti-Semitism, but that is separate from anti-black hatred.) This is not to say that entrenched civil injustice and racism did not harm whites; it did certainly on psychological and moral grounds, and potentially in other ways as well. (Some psychologists argue that the current antisocial and violent behavior of some white adolescent boys and men derives from anger resulting from having been raised with an implicit sense of entitlement that is no longer fulfilled.) But it harmed them differently from how it harmed blacks.

It does not require educating children to be explicitly race-conscious, therefore, to have black children react to American racial history in a significantly different way (with an added personal sense of injustice, say) from how white children might. Both black and white children might be equally appalled when they learn about the Jim Crow laws or about white resistance to school desegregation orders. How that sense of horror is channeled, however, may differ for whites and blacks. White children may feel a sense of shame that blacks will not feel. Blacks may feel alienated from a country that would do these things, whereas whites may simply feel relieved that their country has grown up and become more overtly just. Furthermore, the connections students draw to their own lives may well be different. This is especially likely to
happen in segregated schools, where teachers and the students themselves both often reinforce racialized readings of history and literature.\textsuperscript{33}

What does this mean for our conception of civic education in a deliberative democracy? In addition to the first problem of reinforcing minorities’ sense of alienation by stressing their “outsider” status, a second, related problem arises that it is likely to be harder to build the kind of trust that deliberative democrats correctly argue is required for deliberative democracy to function effectively and justly, since minorities will be consistently aware of working in a world that is partly not their own. Miller comments, “[F]or deliberative democracy to work well, people must exercise what we might call democratic self-restraint; they must think it more important that the decision reached should be a genuinely democratic one than that it is the decision that they themselves favour. This depends in turn on the level of trust that exists in the deliberating body: people will tend to behave in a democratic spirit to the extent that they believe that others can be trusted to behave likewise.”\textsuperscript{34} Although Miller is right about the importance of trust, it is easy to see how minority citizens might find it hard to put trust in mainstream deliberative institutions, given the tainted history of so many liberal democracies.

Third, this model of civic education implicates the school (and almost always the state school, since most minority children, with the possible exception of religious minorities, attend state schools) in partially interpreting the relationship between personal identity and civic identity. In some sense, the school at least temporarily “fixes” what a minority student’s identity means in the civic context by stressing the knowledge and skills particular to minority membership in a deliberative democracy. Thus, black students are consciously and intentionally introduced to a civic education curriculum different from that taught to white students, and within that curriculum they are explicitly taught that \textit{as blacks}, they must develop particular
skills in order to be successful as citizens. This is again extremely problematic for deliberative democrats such as Miller, who opposes institutionalizing in any way a politics of recognition — but it is also a necessary component of civic education, I argue, if minority children are to learn how to participate most effectively in deliberative political institutions.

Two additional problems with this conception of deliberative civic education are unrelated to “outsider” vs. “insider” status. One of these is the problem of translation. Merely learning the language of power does not mean that every good idea can necessarily be expressed within it. This may be especially clear if we consider the cultural, political, and social referents implicit within majority dialogue. A religious conservative, for example, may be against pornography for religious reasons but know that these reasons will not be “heard” by a secularly-oriented majority. She may choose, therefore, to translate her arguments into secular terms — arguing not that pornography desecrates God’s sacred vessel, for example, but that it promotes violence against women. While this act of translation may allow her to promote her ultimate goal of banning pornography, however, it also distorts her position in the meantime. This is not the reason that she is against pornography (she may in fact be more convinced by research showing that soft-core pornography reduces violence against women by giving men another outlet), and she would not be satisfied by a ban simply on violent, hard-core pornography. Furthermore, in contrast to the notion that deliberative democracy promotes mutual communication and understanding, this woman is reduced virtually to lying to her fellow citizens; she is promoting an action based on reasons to which she does not necessarily subscribe, and cannot give the reasons that she truly believes in. Members of other minority groups — blacks, the poor, recent immigrants — may feel the same way in other situations. Thus, teaching students to translate their ideas, thoughts, and concerns into language that
members of mainstream groups will understand does not guarantee that they will feel free and able to express themselves honestly and openly, free of distortion.

Finally, learning the language of power may in some, even many, cases extract the ultimate cost of permanently altering students’ personal identities. Short-term accommodations, made over and over again, can have transformative long-term consequences in the form of assimilation and loss of original language. Being effective in a deliberative setting in many ways is a function of “fitting in,” of seeming reasonable rather than radical, an insider rather than an outsider. To what extent can we expect individuals to fit themselves into mainstream dialogue, repeatedly and completely, without expecting that they will eventually fit permanently into the mainstream — that they will assimilate? If this is a goal of civic education — and it certainly has been one historically in many societies — then well and good. There is no problem with this model of civic education for a deliberative democracy. But if assimilation into the mainstream is not an explicit goal of civic education today, then we may be led to question a model of civic participation — that of deliberative rather than adversarial democracy — that requires so many individuals to shed their own languages, their own experiences, their own cultural or social referents, at the door of the polis.

One possible response to these problems is to abandon a deliberative model of democracy for a different democratic model — probably adversarial democracy. Insofar as adversarial democracy requires that individuals master the technologies of power — building alliances, gaining media exposure, lobbying effectively, voting strategically, etc. — rather than only the language of power, it would enable a form of civic education that might be less problematic than what I have described so far.\textsuperscript{35} In an adversarial democracy, for example, Hispanics or Muslims or gays may exert influence and power not by convincing politicians of the \textit{reasonableness} of
their positions, but by convincing those politicians that their positions must be treated as reasonable if they want to earn the Hispanic/Muslim/gay vote in their (re)election bid. Thus, for example, almost nobody in mainstream American society in 1999 thought that six-year-old Cuban refugee Elian Gonzales should be forcibly kept in the United States or that his Cuban father’s custody claims should be rejected. But because of the strategic voting power of Miami Cuban-Americans, many mainstream media outlets and politicians (including Al Gore, who was even then acutely aware of Florida’s potential importance in the 2000 presidential election) treated these claims seriously nonetheless. Cuban-Americans in Miami did not have to convince anyone of their position, as would be required in a deliberative democracy; rather, they used their power as a voting block to compel people to treat their position as reasonable despite their apparent extremity. Applying this example to the design of civic education, this suggests that in a liberal adversarial democracy, all students might learn the same skills of employing the technologies of power, regardless of their identity or minority status, and be encouraged to use these technologies to influence politics, achieve their political aims, and strive for liberal democratic justice. All students under this model can be taught to think of themselves as insiders of various groups — as well as learn how to organize communities or interest groups and to build coalitions in which they will be insiders — as a means of helping them achieve appropriate political power and influence. As a result, liberal adversarial civic education would seem to free the state school from distinguishing among students based on its perception of their personal identities and group membership, and also free students from having to learn that they must both acknowledge and overcome their outsider status in order to succeed in the political realm.

Despite the attractions of this approach, however, it is clear that adversarial democracy — which is essentially what exists now in most modern liberal democracies — does not solve
everything. After all, the pedagogical dilemmas that I have described throughout this essay stem from my experience as a teacher now, teaching in the context of adversarial democracy, not just as a teacher educating for deliberative democracy. Adversarial democracy still requires that individuals master the language of power if they wish to be politically efficient and effective. Also, even if the school under this model is not implicated in “fixing” students’ identities, the technologies of adversarial democracy — bloc voting, building strategic alliances, keeping people “on message” — would seem to promote group identification and identity politics above a sense of common citizenship and a shared political mission. The Elian Gonzales case illuminates how much turned on group loyalty and narrow interest politics; this cannot be what we, and certainly not deliberative democrats such as Miller, hope to foster in developing liberal democracies. Finally, even if all students can equally benefit from learning how to master the technologies of power in a liberal democracy, it will be patently clear to children and adults alike that these technologies are not equally distributed or effective. Teachers will still have to confront the pessimism and frustration of minority students who feel that the majority will always have the upper hand in employing the technologies of power — in gaining access to the nightly news, financing campaigns, lobbying the right people, even using the police to intimidate other groups in subtle but effective ways. Certainly students’ study of history and culture in many liberal nations will not dissuade them from this conclusion. As a result, teachers and schools will still have to grapple with students’ feelings of being outsiders, and will have to find ways to convert disaffection and cynicism into activism and involvement. In these respects, teachers, schools, and states face similar challenges in adversarial and deliberative democracies alike.
Hence, the questions still remain: is there a single sense of civic identity that children can adopt and sustain even in the face of the divisiveness of past and recent civic history, and students’ inevitably different reactions to it? Likewise, even if minority children do have to learn to think of themselves as partial outsiders in order to improve their capacity to function as insiders in civic life, can this be taught in a way that doesn’t alienate them from civic life altogether? Can a school successfully teach minority children that they are full civic beings who should try to function like “insiders” in deliberative settings (i.e. they should join, speak up, vote, etc.) while simultaneously teaching them that they are “outsiders” in the sense of having to learn and use a language of power that is not their own? The answers to these questions are crucial to the work of deliberative democrats, both because of their centrality to the deliberative process and because of the fine line they walk between fostering civic egalitarianism and promoting an identity politics of recognition. I must confess that I don’t know the answers to these questions — they are some of the reasons that it remains interesting to be a teacher. But I hope that the answers to these questions are (or can become) “yes,” for the sake of national unity within liberal democracies, and because we want all future citizens ultimately to view citizenship positively, as an opportunity to participate in political deliberation and to enact positive political change. These are dilemmas in such quasi-liberal states as America and Britain today, and would be dilemmas in the deliberative democracies of tomorrow, as well.

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1 This article is a revised and updated version of material previously published in Daniel Bell and Avner de Shalit, *Forms of Justice: Critical Perspectives on David Miller’s Political Philosophy* (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), as well as in the *Philosophy of Education Yearbook 2000* (Philosophy of Education Society). I am grateful to the publishers for allowing me to reprint portions of those earlier articles here. I would also like to thank Rob Reich, Ajume Wingo, Sanford Levinson, Marc Stears, Cecile Fabre, and participants in the Nuffield Miller Conference (July 2000), Teachers College Philosophy and Education Seminar (April 2001), Mid-Atlantic States Philosophy of Education Society spring conference (April 2001), Citizenship Education, Political Theory, and the Problem of Language Conference (November 2001), and the Philosophy of Education Society Annual Meeting (April 2002) for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

3 Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity*, p. 9. (Hereinafter CNI.)

4 Miller, CNI, p. 9.

5 Miller, CNI, p. 144.

6 Miller, CNI, pp. 142-7.

7 Miller, CNI, p. 146.

8 See Miller, CNI, pp. 147-160, for a spirited and convincing argument against the idea that “greeting,” “rhetoric,” or “personal testimony” should replace the deliberative ideal, and against the idea that some minority groups are culturally unable to present solutions supported by reasons in a deliberative forum.


10 Smith and Seltzer, *Contemporary Controversies*, p. 11.

11 Smith and Seltzer, *Contemporary Controversies*, pp. 10-17.

12 Smith and Seltzer, *Contemporary Controversies*, Tables 2.2, 2.5, 2.6.

13 Miller, CNI, p. 56.


16 I didn’t answer them directly, although I did tell them that he was (objectively) such a kook that he would never get far enough to become a significant target.

17 For national survey evidence of black-white opinion disparities on all of these issues, see Smith and Seltzer, *Contemporary Controversies*, especially chapter 5.

18 See Miller, CNI, p. 156.


20 Miller, CNI, p. 151.

21 Miller, CNI, p. 151.

22 I should note that even if these reasons are “heard,” they won’t necessarily decide the debate in favor of “heritage houses.” Considerations of racial identity development do not trump all other arguments, just as one may acknowledge the role that self-segregated minority groups play in fostering adolescents’ development of racial identity without necessarily favoring any particular self-segregation proposal.

23 Miller, CNI, p. 74.

24 Miller, CNI, pp. 146.

25 Miller, CNI, pp. 146.

26 I am indebted in this paragraph and in the discussion that follows to Lisa Delpit’s phenomenal book, *Other People’s Children* (New York: The New Press, 1995).

Gary Orfield, in fact, provides compelling empirical evidence that school segregation is actually increasing in the United States, now that many integration-oriented court orders are being lifted and districts are free to set policies on their own again. See Orfield, Eaton, and The Harvard Project on School Desegregation, *Dismantling Desegregation*.


Miller, *CNI*, p. 41.

Miller, *CNI*, p. 41.

Miller, *CNI*, p. 35.

“Racialized” should not necessarily be interpreted to mean prejudiced or discriminatory. When I reflected on my teaching in Atlanta, where I taught English in an all-black school, I was stunned to realize how racially-oriented I was (and also certainly my colleagues were) in selecting course materials, in approaching the texts, and in drawing connections for our students to modern life. None of us was prejudiced, I believe; we just oriented all aspects of the curriculum, possibly too much, to the African-American context in which we were teaching.

Miller, *CNI*, p. 22.

I am grateful to the Nuffield Miller Conference attendees, and especially to Marc Stears, for pushing me on this point.

Miller makes this point well in *CNI*, p. 159.