DUE PROCESS TRADITIONALISM

Cass R. Sunstein

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

March 2007, revised

Due Process Traditionalism

Cass R. Sunstein*

Abstract

In important cases, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of “substantive due process” by reference to tradition, but it has yet to explain why it has done so. Due process traditionalism might be defended in several distinctive ways. The most ambitious defense draws on a set of ideas associated with Edmund Burke and Friedrich Hayek, who suggested that traditions have special credentials by virtue of their acceptance by many minds. But this defense runs into three problems. Those who have participated in a tradition may not have accepted any relevant proposition; they might suffer from a systematic bias; and they might have joined a cascade. An alternative defense sees due process traditionalism as a second-best substitute for two preferable alternatives: a purely procedural approach to the due process clause, and an approach that gives legislatures the benefit of every reasonable doubt. But it is not clear that in these domains, the first-best approaches are especially attractive; and even if they are, the second-best may be an unacceptably crude substitute. The most plausible defense of due process traditionalism operates on rule-consequentialist grounds, with the suggestion that even if traditions are not great, they are often good, and judges do best if they defer to traditions rather than attempting to specify the content of “liberty” on their own. But the rule-consequentialist defense depends on controversial and probably false assumptions about the likely goodness of traditions and the institutional incapacities of judges.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court and individual justices have often suggested that under the Due Process Clause, rights qualify as such only if they can claim firm roots in longstanding traditions.1 In Washington v. Glucksberg,2 for example, the Court appeared to settle on a kind of due process traditionalism, captured in the view that longstanding cultural understandings are both necessary and sufficient for the substantive protection of

---

rights under the due process clause. On this view, no interest qualifies for protection under that clause if it lacks historical credentials; and interests that can claim such credentials deserve protection for that very reason.

Due process traditionalism is hardly novel. It can itself claim firm roots in American traditions. In his dissenting opinion in *Lochner v. New York*, Justice Holmes wrote that the Due Process Clause would be violated only if “a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.” In the same vein, Justice Felix Frankfurter explicitly urged that in assessing due process questions, courts should ask whether proceedings “offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples.” In important cases, the Court has sought to cabin the reach of “substantive due process” by asking whether the relevant rights are based on longstanding cultural commitments, or instead on novel ones, or on the commitments of particular litigants and particular judges.

Importantly, those who embrace due process traditionalism do not claim that judicial practices, as they develop over time, deserve support; they offer no plea for common law constitutionalism or for a strong rule of stare decisis. On the contrary, their focus is on the claims of the longstanding practices of “our people,” not of our judges. It should come as no surprise to find that some due process traditionalists contend that judicial practices, constructing rights in common law fashion, are illegitimate and should be overruled.

---

3 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
6 See cases cited supra note.
9 *Lawrence*, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)). The full quotation – that a state regulation violates the Due Process Clause only when it “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental” – comes from Justice Cardozo’s majority opinion in *Snyder v. Massachusetts*, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
10 See *Lawrence v Texas*, 539 US at 592-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Of course it is true that due process traditionalists must come to terms with the Equal Protection Clause, which operates as a constraint on longstanding practices, such as discrimination on the basis of race. Due process traditionalists might well acknowledge the tradition-rejecting nature of the equal protection guarantee while also insisting that longstanding practices are the best guide to understanding the scope of substantive due process.
Although due process traditionalism has played a large role in the Court’s decisions, it is highly controversial. Indeed, the major fault line within the Court itself has long been between those who seek to limit the reach of the due process clause to rights that longstanding traditions recognize as such, and those who believe that “evolving traditions” are what matter, or that the Court legitimately brings its own moral judgments to bear on substantive due process questions. A decade after the Court’s decision, it is clear that Glucksberg failed to entrench due process traditionalism. In striking down bans on same-sex relations, Lawrence v. Texas explicitly relies on “evolving” judgments, rather than longstanding practices. But the battle between traditionalist and more rationalist or critical approaches, allowing courts to scrutinize social practices, has yet to be authoritatively resolved. The Court remains sharply divided on the proper role of tradition, which continues to play a large role in lower court decisions.

Due process traditionalists have yet to explain exactly why traditionalism might be an appealing approach to the due process clause. In this Essay, I explore three families of explanations. The first, and the most ambitious, points to the fact that traditions have been supported by many minds across long periods of time. The second sees traditionalism as a second-best substitute for more radical restrictions on substantive uses of the due process clause. The third justifies traditionalism on rule-consequentialist grounds.

What I shall call “many minds traditionalism” has intuitive appeal insofar as it attempts to anchor constitutional rights in practices that have been wide and deep support. Many minds traditionalism has been defended in different ways by Edmund Burke and

---

14 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 528 US 558 (2003) (rejecting exclusive use of tradition) with id. at 573-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that use of substantive due process should be disciplined by reference to tradition).
Friedrich Hayek, and under certain conditions, this defense is more than plausible. Burke’s own account was largely *aggregative*, with the suggestion that numerous people have signed onto traditions and therefore given them epistemic credentials. Hayek’s variety was *evolutionary*, with the suggestion that traditions have stood the test of time and are thus likely to serve valuable social functions. On both the aggregative and evolutionary accounts, the persistence of a practice across many minds and many years makes it more likely to be correct, wise, or good. The two accounts might even be developed into a democratic defense of traditionalism, on the ground that participants in traditions are “voters,” to whom judges ought to defer. In the end, however, I shall conclude that neither the aggregative nor the evolutionary account adequately justifies due process traditionalism.

If ambitious accounts of this kind fail, it might nonetheless be possible to defend due process traditionalism as a kind of second-best solution for those who would like to reject substantive due process altogether, but who accept the constraints of stare decisis. Suppose that the due process clause is best seen as purely procedural, or that courts should approach legislation with a strong presumption of validity. If so, due process traditionalism can be understood as a precedent-preserving and indirect way of producing the results that would follow from either a procedural approach to the clause or a presumption of validity. But there are two problems with this defense of due process traditionalism. The first is that it depends on a controversial judgment about what counts as a first-best approach. The second problem is that the purportedly second-best might turn out to be a wholly inadequate way of accomplishing the first-best goals.

A third justification for due process traditionalism is rule-consequentialist. The simple idea here is that whatever its faults, due process traditionalism produces better results than the likely alternatives. If judicial judgments about the substantive content of liberty were entirely unreliable, due process traditionalism might look plausible by comparison. Perhaps traditions are not especially good, but perhaps they are not so bad, and perhaps it is better to tether judges to traditions than to ask them to think about the

---

19 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006).
nature of “liberty” on their own. This conclusion depends on normative and empirical assumptions that might well be wrong. In the end, however, it points to the most promising basis for due process traditionalism. At the very least, it helps to show what those who disagree about due process traditionalism are disagreeing about.

My focus here is on traditionalist approaches to the due process clause, but if the analysis is correct, it should have implications for many other constitutional problems. It is easy to imagine a traditionalist approach to the separation of powers, with the suggestion that longstanding practices deserve respectful attention even if they seem to deviate from the original understanding or from an independent analysis of the governing constitutional provisions.\textsuperscript{20} Traditionalism might also be defended as the proper approach to the religion clauses. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s defense of the use of the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance was an almost entirely traditionalist exercise, stressing practices rather than reasons for practices.\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view of the Establishment Clause had a persistent traditionalist feature, at least insofar as he would permit public recognition of God by reference not to theories or principle, but by reference to history alone.\textsuperscript{22}

In numerous domains, traditionalism might be defended on the ground that longstanding practices reflect the judgments of many minds, or serve as a second-best substitute for an account forbidden by stare decisis, or on rule-consequentialist grounds. Whether such a defense could be made convincing cannot be resolved without an exploration of the particular domains. But the discussion of these justifications for due process traditionalism will bear on traditionalist approaches in numerous other areas.

The remainder of this Essay comes in three parts. Part II explores many minds traditionalism. It begins with the test of numbers, captured in the view that traditions are likely to be good or right because they have been supported by so many people over long periods of time. Part II also investigates the evolutionary account and the test of time; it culminates in an exploration of the claims of democratic traditionalism. Part III asks whether due process traditionalism might be adopted as a second-best solution by those

\textsuperscript{20}The Steel Seizure Case, 343 US 579, 594-597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
\textsuperscript{22} See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
who want to restrict the scope of the due process clause in more radical ways. Part IV explores the possibility of a rule-consequentialist defense of due process traditionalism.

II. Many Minds Traditionalism

My goal in this section is to explore the most ambitious arguments on behalf of due process traditionalism, involving the aggregation of numerous views and the benefits of evolutionary pressures. For those who invoke the test of numbers and the test of time, traditions are highly likely to be wise, right, or good. A related argument points to the democratic credentials of longstanding practices. Such practices appear to have been supported by numerous people who have “voted” on their behalf. Judges might be asked to hesitate before disturbing practices that have obtained so many “votes” over long periods of time.

A. The Test of Numbers

1. Prejudice as “latent wisdom.” Might traditions deserve respect simply because they have been accepted by numerous people? Edmund Burke offered the canonical argument on behalf of this view.23 Above all, Burke was skeptical of efforts to deploy reason in the service of “exploding general prejudices.”24 On the contrary, he believed that it is best to try “to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in” those very prejudices. Burke argued that the “science of government . . requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be.” 25 In his view, sensible people “are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations, and of ages.”26

---

23 I explore a Burkean approach in some detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev 353 (2006). My goal there was to reconstruct, as sympathetically as possible, the nature and foundations of Burkean approaches to the Constitution; here I ask more critically whether that approach is proper for the due process clause.
25 Id. at 428.
26 Id.
Burke’s central argument against the “private stock of reason,” and on behalf of society’s “general bank and capital,” points to the large number of people who are responsible for creating traditions. The “latent wisdom” of traditions lies in the fact that so many people have subscribed to them.

Suppose in this light that there is a longstanding tradition of allowing married people to decide how many children to have, and that there is no tradition of allowing people to commit suicide. If so, it seems clear that numerous people have believed that married people should be permitted to decide how many children to have, and that numerous people have also concluded should not be permitted to kill themselves. And if many people have reached these conclusions, perhaps the Court should pay careful attention to their judgments. It would be foolish for the Court to use an abstract account, invoked by lawyers and theorists, as the basis for challenging practices long accepted by many. The aggregative view certainly so suggests.

That view has become newly salient, for a great deal of recent attention has been given to the “wisdom of crowds.” Those who emphasize crowd wisdom notice that on many questions, the average or majority answer of a large group of people is often better than the answer of an actual or appointed expert. Much of the wisdom of crowds is best understood in light of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. To understand the operation of the Jury Theorem, assume that a group consists of a number of people, all of whom has a greater than 50 percent chance of being right on some question of fact. The Jury Theorem says that the likelihood that the group’s majority will be right approaches 100 percent as the size of the group expands. The Jury Theorem provides an apparent basis for answering hard questions by asking about the views of large groups of people. Perhaps such groups are highly likely to be right.

We can readily see how the Jury Theorem might support a great deal of faith in traditions. If the public has long rejected one alleged right, and long supported another, there is reason to believe that many people have made relevant judgments, in a way that gives a longstanding practice a kind of epistemic credential. Even if evolutionary

---

pressures are put to one side, the support of large numbers of people suggests that traditions are likely to have solid foundations. On this view, the Court should be reluctant to reject rights that are deeply rooted in actual practice, or to create rights that are not so rooted, precisely because the Court’s judges are few and the supporters of traditions are many. If the Constitution is unclear, the Court might do best to investigate longstanding social practices, instead of imposing a view of its own.

2. *Three problems.* In many domains, the aggregative view has considerable force. But as a defense of due process traditionalism, the aggregative view run into three serious problems. Taken as a whole, these problems raise real doubts about the view that such traditionalism can be supported by reference to the judgments of many minds.

a. *What proposition?* The Jury Theorem is concerned with the truth of certain propositions. If a majority of people believe that X is true, X is highly likely to be true (under the stated conditions). But what proposition does a tradition support? By participating in the creation of a tradition, have people thereby “voted” in favor of some proposition, and if so, which one?

It would be easiest to answer this question if the tradition reflects a judgment in favor of a proposition of fact. But is there a question of fact to which a tradition offers an implicit answer? Suppose that a society has long imposed capital punishment. It might be tempting to say that the tradition reflects a judgment that capital punishment has a deterrent effect. But such a tradition might persist not on deterrence grounds, but because most people believe that capital punishment is justified for reasons of retribution—in which case it would be hard to discern a factual proposition implicit in the tradition. Or suppose that a society has long permitted married couples to have as many children as they want, or that it has long forbidden people from committing suicide, smoking marijuana, or engaging in same-sex relations. It would be difficult to say that the longstanding practice suggests support for some identifiable proposition of fact.

Much more plausibly, a longstanding tradition is best taken to suggest the truth of some normative proposition that the tradition endorses by definition, such as, “married couples should be allowed to have as many children as they like,” or “people should be

---

prevented from committing suicide.” If many people have independently accepted or rejected such a proposition, their judgment might be entitled to weight. At first glance, the Jury Theorem so suggests.

But there are two possible objections to this view. The first is that the Jury Theorem is best taken only to concern matters of fact, on which it is easy to speak of truth or falsity. It might well seem jarring to suggest that a judgment in favor of some tradition is “true.” Is it sensible to say that if many people believe that married people should be allowed to choose the number of children that they will have, they are likely to be right? The answer is that it is indeed sensible to speak in these terms if we are not relativists or skeptics about normative questions, and if we believe that such questions have correct answers. Those entrusted with the job of interpretation the Due Process Clause had better avoid relativism or skepticism, because it is difficult to construe the clause without thinking that it is possible to think well or badly about normative questions.31 And on reflection, the grounds for moral or political relativism and skepticism are exceedingly weak.32 It follows that the Jury Theorem is indeed applicable to normative statements as well as to statements of fact.

The second objection is much more powerful. We might be able to agree that for a long time, many people have accepted the proposition that married couples should be allowed to have as many children as they like. But suppose that in 2050, the nation imposes a ceiling—say, of four—on the number of children that people may have. Does the tradition set itself in opposition to that ceiling? The answer may not be so clear. If the nation, or even a state, imposes such a ceiling, circumstances are likely to be very different from what they were when the tradition was in force. And if this is so, the proposition supported by the tradition is properly described in the following way: “Under the circumstances prevailing between (say) 1800 and 2049, married couples should be permitted to have as many children as they wanted.” And if it is so described, it does not, in fact, bear on the problem at hand.

31 An ambitious version of this view can be found in Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006). Contested moral or political arguments might be avoided if we could agree that the text of the clause forbids substantive due process, and if we believed that the word “liberty” should be given content by reference to the original understanding. But a controversial argument is needed on behalf of the view that the text should be controlling in light of many decades of decisions employing substantive due process, and also in defense of originalism.

32 See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Morality (1972).
Perhaps circumstances have changed because of a significant problem of overpopulation; perhaps a new disease has prompted the new policy. Whatever the reason for that policy, the proposition definitionally supported by the tradition may not definitionally decide the question that arises if and when the government imposes the ceiling.\textsuperscript{33} Hence we may not be able to agree that many minds have, in fact, committed themselves to the relevant proposition, which is whether a ceiling on the number of children is acceptable in 2050. And if the nation does impose that ceiling at that time, many minds are likely to have supported it under the current conditions.\textsuperscript{34} Is it so clear that they do not deserve priority over the many minds who came before\textsuperscript{35}? By hypothesis, the current minds are speaking to the circumstances of the present, which no one has done in the past.

The problem, in short, is that traditions apply only to the circumstances in which they governed, and when circumstances have changed, it is not clear that many minds have decided in favor of the particular tradition that is being invoked. This claim has general implications. Suppose that there is a tradition against physician-assisted suicide, extending from the founding until the day before yesterday. It remains possible that physician-assisted suicide under contemporary conditions is meaningfully different from physician-assisted suicide under previous conditions. Perhaps physician-assisted suicide is more appealing because of technological changes that have made it possible for physicians to honor people’s requests for death in a humane way. In that event, the proposition supported by the tradition does not speak to the current problem. Whenever a longstanding tradition is being violated, there is a good chance that the existing situation is indeed relevantly different.

It is true that due process traditionalists need not be entirely discomfited by the latter conclusion. Perhaps they would readily agree that traditions often will not speak, with any kind of clarity, to the current question, but perhaps that is no problem for them. They believe that a clear tradition is a \textit{necessary} condition for a convincing substantive due process claim, and if no such tradition can be identified, the plaintiff loses. The real

\textsuperscript{33} I am grateful to Adrian Vermeule for pressing this point.
\textsuperscript{34} See Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason (unpublished manuscript 2007).
\textsuperscript{35} See id.
problem for due process traditionalism is the claim that a longstanding tradition is a sufficient condition for invalidation. If circumstances have changed, then the proposition for which the tradition speaks may not bear on the question at hand. To the extent that this is so, due process traditionalists will have to concede that even when a practice has endured for a long time, it may not justify invalidation of apparently tradition-rejecting enactments, because those enactments may not, on reflection, reject the proposition that the tradition actually supports.

b. Systematic bias or “prejudice.” The Jury Theorem says that if the group is larger enough, the majority view is likely to be correct if all or most members are more than 50 percent likely to be right. But suppose that all or most members are less than 50 percent likely to be right. If so, the likelihood that the majority will be wrong approaches 100 percent as the size of the group expands.\(^\text{36}\) It follows that even if some proposition has passed the test of numbers, it will be incorrect if most people are more likely to be wrong than right. This point raises serious problems for many minds traditionalism.

Condorcet himself emphasized that “prejudice” can introduce a distortion that makes aggregated judgments unlikely to produce good results: “In effect, when the probability of the truth of a voter’s opinion falls below 1/2, there must be a reason why he decides less well than one would at random. The reason can only be found in the prejudices to which this voter is subject.”\(^\text{37}\) For due process traditionalists, the irony is that Burke himself wrote as if “prejudices” are reliable, contending that a “prejudice” is “wisdom without reflection, and above it.”\(^\text{38}\) But if prejudices are systematic biases, then they are wisdom without reflection, and below it; and endorsement of a proposition by many minds is no protection against error.

Suppose that traditions reject a certain right—say, the right to racial intermarriage, to same-sex relations, or to same-sex marriage. If those who create the tradition are systematically biased, the tradition lacks epistemic credentials. For purposes of constitutional law, Condorcet’s reference to “prejudice” suggests the possibility that the Equal Protection Clause might be used to test the question whether the tradition

\(^{36}\) See also Page, supra note, at 205-14 (showing that if individuals are especially inaccurate, group average will be inaccurate too, though number of group errors will be lower than individual errors if group is diverse).


\(^{38}\) See Burke, supra note.
embeds discrimination. Alternatively, judges who engage in substantive due process might want not to entrench traditions but to ask whether there is, in principle, any distinction between a challenged practice and the practices that the tradition unambiguously supports. If no such distinction can be identified, a systematic bias might well be at work. The general point is that such a bias might mean that the proposition on which the tradition has converged is false. To the extent that this is so, the aggregative defense of many minds traditionalism, rooted in Burke, seems to be in tatters.

c. Independent judgments. For the aggregative view to work, those who contribute to a tradition must be making independent judgments. This point raises distinctive difficulties.

(i) Authoritarianism and its analogues. It should be obvious that on the aggregative view, longstanding practices would have no epistemic force in an authoritarian society. In such a society, many traditions are an imposition; they are enforced by an oppressive government. If so, there is no reason to think that they reflect the judgments of large numbers of people. It follows that many minds arguments on behalf of longstanding practices are implausible in regimes that lack a high degree of freedom, at least if those practices are themselves an imposition by the few on the many. Burke’s own claims have greatest weight in democratic societies whose citizens are able to assess and to refashion traditions; their force is greatly diminished in societies that have long lived under autocratic rule. We might therefore understand the conclusion that while many minds traditionalism makes sense for England and America, it is ill-suited to such nations as China, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.39

For purposes of substantive due process in the United States, the point about authoritarian societies might seem uninteresting. No one contends that judges in new democracies should decide on the content of rights by asking about the judgments of their authoritarian precursors.40 But even in free societies, there may be analogous problems. Perhaps a relevant tradition has been imposed by some on others through the force of

---
39 It remains possible that tradition-rejecting initiatives will cause serious problems in authoritarian societies, simply because citizens will refuse to accept those initiatives. See James Scott, Seeing Like A State (1999). But this pragmatic argument is not a point in favor of many minds traditionalism.
40 Of course there are complex questions here about the relationship between culture and law. Perhaps legal initiatives cannot succeed if they fit poorly with culture, at least if they cannot change culture. For illuminating discussion, see Scott, supra note.
law. The most obvious example is slavery. It is implausible to think that slavery can be defended by reference to the fact that many people lived in accordance with it. Or consider practices of discrimination on the basis of sex and disability. To the extent that these forms of discrimination have been imposed or encouraged by law, it is odd to say that they should be perpetuated on the ground that many people have accepted them. The Jury Theorem is not easily invoked to suggest that the best way to evaluate social practices involving the treatment of those with mental illness, or the relationship between men and women, is to ask a large number of people and to accept the majority’s answer.

As I have suggested, the Equal Protection Clause is the natural source of judicial skepticism about longstanding practices. By requiring unequal treatment to be justified in principle, the equal protection guarantee explicitly rejects many minds traditionalism.\(^ {41}\) But suppose that no serious equal protection issue is present, and that a tradition is challenged by those who contend that it has long been imposed rather than freely accepted. If the contention is correct, the force of the aggregative view is sharply diminished.

(ii) The Burkean paradox. Adrian Vermeule has drawn attention to the Burkean paradox\(^ {42}\)—the possibility that many minds traditionalism will turn out to be self-defeating. Suppose that people generally follow traditions, not because they believe that the traditions are good, but because they believe that traditions are likely to embody collective wisdom. To the extent that people have long behaved in this way, traditions lose their epistemic credentials, simply because they have been followed by people who have not made any judgment on their behalf. The Jury Theorem argument works well only if the practices of those who accept the argument are not taken into account by those who are deciding whether to accept the argument!

For the aggregative view to work, it must be the case that many of those who have contributed to the tradition have made an independent judgment on its behalf. In

\(^{41}\) This point should be accepted even by those who seek to cabin the scope of the equal protection clause by rooting its requirements in the defining case of discrimination on the basis of race. Even if the domain of the equal protection clause is narrow, it rejects practices of discrimination that are, in an important respect, time-honored.

\(^{42}\) See Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism, supra note.
Veneule’s account, this is the Burkean paradox. Those who follow traditions, on Burkean grounds, end up undermining the Burkean defense of traditionalism.

This argument is devastating to due process traditionalism insofar as (a) established practices are being taken as a sufficient condition for judicial invalidation and (b) those practices are not a product of the independent judgments of many minds. But perhaps many minds traditionalism can be justified in terms that deny (b). Let us suppose that most of those who follow a tradition are usually not doing so mechanically; if the tradition is evidently silly or harmful, they will reject it. Even the most committed traditionalists should be willing to rethink their practices if they are evidently destructive or pointless. But for the aggregative argument, a real problem remains: Many minds traditionalism has to be discounted to the extent that the relevant traditions have been followed by those who have not made their own judgments.

(iii) Traditions as cascades. A related problem for the aggregative argument will arise if people’s judgments are a product of a cascade. In an informational cascade, most people form their judgments on the basis of the actual or apparent judgments of others. Consider a stylized example. Adams says that in her view, the death penalty deters crime. Barnes does not have a great deal of private information, but having heard Adams’ belief, she agrees that the death penalty deters crime. Carlton might well believe that he must have to reliable independent information in order to reject the shared views of Adams and Barnes—and he lacks that information. If he follows Adams and Barnes on the ground that their belief is likely to be right, Carlton is in a cascade.

This cascade involves a question of fact: whether the death penalty deters crime. But it is easy to imagine normative analogues, in which Carlton follows Adams and Barnes, not because not because he independently agrees with them, but because he, like Barnes, does not have enough confidence in his antecedent normative views to reject the

43 Id.
46 See Cristina Bicchieri and Yoshitaka Fukui, The Great Illusion: Ignorance, Informational Cascades, and the Persistence of Unpopular Norms, in Experience, Reality, and Scientific Explanation 89 (M.C. Galavotti and A. Pagnini eds. 1999); STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS (rev. ed. 2002). Of course moral judgments might well be a product of relevant information, in which case moral cascades are informational cascades too.
judgments of others who came before. The general objection is that many traditions may persist only because of a cascade effect, depriving them of the epistemic credentials urged by the aggregative view. “Moral panics” often reflect cascade effects. Perhaps some traditions are, to a greater or lesser extent, a product of moral panics. And whether or not they are, it is easy to imagine traditions that continue through imitative behavior, ensuring the perpetuation of cascades, rather than independent support from many minds.

The best response is that an informational cascade is most unlikely to account for a tradition, simply because such cascades are quite fragile. Suppose that people engage in certain behavior or accept certain beliefs solely on the ground that other people have engaged in that behavior or accepted those beliefs. Once private information begins to emerge, it should defeat the cascade. If people learn that a supposed cure for the common cold does not work, they will cease purchasing the relevant product. Informational cascades stop once people have sufficient information to outweigh the signals given by the acts and statements of their predecessors.

Cascade effects can account for fads and fashions, but they should not be able to explain longstanding practices, simply because those practices should be exposed if they are based on falsehoods or do not properly serve the people who participate in them. But for purposes of due process traditionalism, the problem of cascade effects cannot be dismissed so easily. Reputational pressures might ensure that people do not break the cascade, even if their private information suggests that they ought to do so; as a result, unpopular practices can persist for long periods. An additional question is whether in the relevant domains, people receive a clear signal that the general practice is a bad one. An answer to this question requires a shift from the aggregative view to the evolutionary alternative; I will turn to that alternative momentarily.

47 Id.
49 See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind, in The New Economics of Human Behavior (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds. 1995).
50 See Bicchieri and Fukui, supra note; Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies (1997).
For the moment, it should be clear that on purely aggregative grounds, it is very hard to defend due process traditionalism. Even if a tradition has been accepted by many minds, it may not reflect approval of any relevant proposition. Even if it does, those who created and perpetuated the tradition may suffer from a systematic bias. Even if they do not, many of them may have simply followed the tradition, rather than independently agreeing to it. It follows that a longstanding practice provides a fragile basis for judicial invalidation of democratic outcomes. It also follows that even if a practice has been longstanding, it may lack the credentials that give many minds traditionalism its appeal.

B. The Test of Time

Perhaps due process traditionalists should emphasize the test of time. On one view, practices are likely to endure if and only if they are good. The central point is that an enduring tradition must be serving some valuable function; if it were not doing so, it would not be enduring. As we shall see, this point might ultimately form the foundation for a democratic conception of traditionalism, one that sees longstanding practices as a product of numerous “voters” extending over time.

1. “The grown morals of tradition.” The most elaborate version of this view comes from Hayek. Like Burke, Hayek urges that existing moral commitments are not the product of any single mind; what Hayek adds is that our “undesigned moral tradition” is a product of evolutionary pressures. That moral tradition covers the family and the rules of property, including “the rules of the stability of possessions, its transference by consent, and the keeping of promises.” Human beings were not clever enough to design the order “from which billions . . . now draw their sustenance.” On the contrary, that sustenance comes from our “obedience to traditional customs which were selected by group evolution without [our] understanding them.” The system of property rights developed “not because some liked or understood its effects, but because it made possible the growth of the groups practicing it to grow faster than others.”

---

52 See Vermeule, supra note.
53 See Hayek, supra note.
54 Id. at 321.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 322.
Hayek explicitly calls attention to evolution in this regard. What is crucial is the process of group selection, which “will select customs whose beneficial assistance to the survival of men are not perceived by the individuals.” Human beings are dependent for their survival on the observance of “practices which they cannot rationally justify, and which may conflict with both their innate instincts on the one hand, and their intellectual insight on the other.” At least this is so for “the grown morals of tradition.” In Hayek’s hands, the villain of the piece is rationalism, which attempts to deduce moral principles from reason. (The connection with constitutional debates should be plain.) In the end the “moral tradition remains a treasure which reason cannot replace, but can only endeavor to improve by immanent criticism, that is, by endeavoring to make a system which we cannot create as a whole, serve more consistently the same set of interests.” What rationalists ridicule as “‘the dead hand of tradition’ may contain conditions for the existence of modern mankind.”

2. **Mechanisms and criteria.** Hayek’s arguments, growing out of his work on the price system, have considerable intuitive appeal, but they face a central problem. Those who defend traditions by reference to evolutionary accounts must undertake two independent tasks. First, they must specify the mechanisms by which evolutionary pressures produce good outcomes. Second, they must offer some kind of account by which we can judge outcomes to be good. In biology, both the specification and the account are easy to produce. Natural selection ensures the survival of those who are most likely to be able to reproduce, and those who have survived are good by reference to the criterion of reproductive fitness. In the domain of social practices, what is the analogue?

Hayek himself drew directly on natural selection, and if we are speaking literally of survival, his argument may be on firm ground. Perhaps some moral principles, or commitments, are necessary or at least extremely helpful for survival of the species. In

---

57 Id. at 324.
58 Id.
59 See id; see also Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (reprint ed. 2002).
60 Hayek, supra note, at 329.
61 Id.
fact it is plausible to say that some such principles are hard-wired and have been specifically selected by their contribution to human survival.\textsuperscript{64} Perhaps certain moral attitudes toward young children, and even respect for property rights, can be understood in these terms. Indeed, Hayek’s arguments might point to a defense of those forms of substantive due process that attempt to entrench the evolved moral order.\textsuperscript{65} But principles of this kind are most unlikely to be tested in modern substantive due process cases. If people are given a right to use contraceptives, to use marijuana or sexual devices, to seek physician-assisted suicide, to wear motorcycles without helmets, or to engage in same-sex relations, the species will not be endangered. Human survival may well depend on some kind of system of property rights, but does it really depend on those aspects of traditional morality that are challenged in courts via a more critical or rationalist approach to the due process clause? Even if it did, many due process claims do not reject traditions; they simply cannot claim strong roots in traditions.

Perhaps survival is beside the point. Perhaps we should say that an enduring practice is likely, by definition, to promote economic efficiency (or some other conception of human welfare). If evolution is not at work, perhaps the mechanism is a form of market competition. The notion of customary law, emphasized by Hayek himself, is helpful here.\textsuperscript{66} To the extent that commercial practices are a product of a spontaneous order, those practices might operate to promote efficiency. If efficiency is desirable in the commercial domain, judges and legislatures might build on those practices, rather than displacing them by reference to theories of their own.\textsuperscript{67} But what, exactly, is the market that produces traditional morality, and why is it so clear that this particular market functions well? Why should invisible hand mechanisms, or spontaneous orders, be celebrated in the moral domain? Consider the set of practices that have been or might be challenged in due process cases: bans on the use of contraceptives, on abortion, on same-sex relations, on certain living arrangements, on same-sex marriage, on physician-

\textsuperscript{64} See The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (Leda Cosmides and John Tooby eds. 1995).
\textsuperscript{65} Thus the line of decisions associated with Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905), might be defended on Hayekian grounds, at least to the extent that those decisions strike down legislation invalidating practices consistent with the evolved moral order.
\textsuperscript{67} See id.
\textsuperscript{68} The question is pressed in Ullmann-Margalit, supra note.
assisted suicide, on the use of sexual aids or certain drugs. To the extent that such bans are time-honored, it is clear that the political market has long favored them. But in a democracy, the political market hardly guarantees efficiency, and it need not promote welfare; the role of collective action problems, incomplete information, and interest-group pressures need not be belabored here.

Even if the relevant “market” did promote efficiency, it remains necessary to defend the proposition that efficient traditions should be upheld because they are efficient. In the commercial realm, it is plausible to say that courts should generally respect practices that have evolved in a way that ensures efficiency. But why should the due process clause should be read to promote economic efficiency?

The evolutionary defense of many minds traditionalism turns out to be extremely fragile, at least in due process cases. To accept that defense, we would need to identify mechanisms that ensure that longstanding practices are good by reference to some constitutionally relevant criterion. In the absence of such mechanisms, the most that might be said is that even if evolutionary practices offer no guarantees, the likelihood of judicial error is so high that judges do best if they attend to traditions. I will explore this claim below. But unless judges are wholly at sea, it might be best to explore whether the practice in question is, in fact, good, or good enough, by reference to a constitutionally relevant criterion. Evolutionary pressures are beside the point.

C. Democratic Traditionalism

Perhaps it would be possible to understand many minds traditionalism in general, and the tests of numbers and time in particular, in a different way. On one view, the judgments of many people, extending over long periods, deserve respect on essentially democratic grounds. The claim is not that those judgments are necessarily right or true. It is instead that they are, in a sense, votes; and if the same votes have been made by multiple generations, then they deserve respect. We might describe this approach as a

---

70 See, e.g., Chicago Studies in Political Economy (George Stigler ed. 1988).
71 See Vermeule, supra note.
72 Cf. Ullmann-Margalit, supra note (arguing that this question must be asked to evaluate the outcome of invisible hand processes).
kind of democratic traditionalism. It supports traditionalist approaches to the due process clause not on the epistemic grounds suggested by the aggregative and evolutionary accounts, but on the theory that if so many citizens have committed themselves to a practice, their judgments deserve judicial deference for that very reason. Justice Scalia, speaking for a plurality of the Court, has spoken in just these terms, suggesting that consultation of specific traditions ensures that judges will remain faithful to “the society’s views.”73

To be sure, it is difficult to see either Burke or Hayek themselves as democrats; both of them had serious reservations about self-government as an organizing ideal.74 But if traditions have been created and repeatedly affirmed by free citizens, they might well be defended on democratic grounds. Courts might be asked to consult those traditions, and to uphold them, on the ground that the judges’ “private stock of wisdom” has far less legitimacy than do practices that so many people have voluntarily accepted.

The initial problem for this defense of due process traditionalism is that democratic processes might and often do reject longstanding practices. Suppose, for example, that a democratic public challenges practices of discrimination on the basis of sex or sexual orientation, or that a democratic public concludes that the occupancy of buildings should be narrowly limited to “a few categories of related individuals.”75 On democratic grounds, why should the old tradition prevail over the current judgment? Democratic traditionalists will want to reply that longstanding practices have survived the test of time, but we have seen many problems with that particular test. For this reason, democratic traditionalists might have to agree that longstanding practices must yield before an explicit democratic repudiation. Perhaps they will ask for a clear democratic judgment in opposition to the tradition; but if such a judgment has been made, traditions will have to bow before democracy.76

74 On Burke’s skepticism about democracy, see Don Herzog, Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Classes (2002); for Hayek’s complex and ambivalent view, see his own Whither Democracy?, in Hayek, supra note, at 352.
76 Burke was of course skeptical of this conclusion. See Burke, supra note. Perhaps a deliberative democrat might conclude that the public, swept up by short-term considerations, may not shown sufficient deliberation, and that longstanding practices are preferable because they embed a degree of reflection over time.
What remains, for such traditionalists, is the narrower but nonetheless important claim that courts should not lightly reject longstanding practices on their own; if a plaintiff’s claim cannot find support in such practices, judges should reject it. This approach is undoubtedly attractive, for it might be seen as doubly democratic. First, it refuses to permit plaintiffs to attack longstanding practices; second, the refusal operates to support existing legislation against judicial attack. The problem with this position is that for reasons explored above, traditions may lack anything like a good democratic pedigree. They might be an imposition. They might reflect a systematic bias. People might have supported traditions not because they are good, but because they are following their predecessors. The problems with the aggregative and evolutionary accounts turn out to beset democratic traditionalism as well.

To be sure, those problems are not entirely devastating. We could imagine domains in which practices are not an imposition, are unlikely to reflect a bias, and have been perpetuated by a large number of independent judgments. But in many cases in which longstanding practices are challenged, democratic traditionalism will not have much force.

III. Traditionalism as a Second-Best Solution

Even if the aggregative and evolutionary accounts turn out to be unconvincing, and even if democratic traditionalism is rejected, we can imagine other grounds for due process traditionalism. Most obviously, the effort to root substantive due process in longstanding practices might operate as a second-best substitute for another, preferable approach.

A. First-Best, Second-Best

Many people believe that the due process clause is purely procedural and that the whole idea of substantive due process is textually unrooted.77 On this view, the best approach would be to abandon substantive due process altogether. But even if this is so, it would seem too late in the day to take that approach, which would challenge not merely

77 See Ely, supra note.
the most controversial exercises in substantive due process, 78 but also a range of
decisions that are firmly entrenched in constitutional law. 79 If those decisions are taken as
given, due process traditionalism might be seen to be a second-best substitute for the
complete abandonment of substantive due process. With due process traditionalism, it
should be possible to prevent other ventures in substantive due process while also
preserving a great deal of the doctrinal status quo.

There is a second view for which due process traditionalism might be a second-
best substitute. Suppose that we embrace the position associated with James Bradley
Thayer, which asks judges to defer to any plausible understanding of the Constitution. 80
Thayer insisted that because the American Constitution is often ambiguous, those who
decide on its meaning must inevitably exercise discretion. 81 Thayer thought that courts
should strike down laws only “when those who have the right to make laws have not
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to
rational question.” 82 The question for courts “is not one of the mere and simple
preponderance of reasons for or against, but of what is very plain and clear, clear beyond
a reasonable doubt . . . .” 83 For committed Thayerians, aggressive decisions under the due
process clause are objectionable not because substantive due process does not exist, but
solely because of their aggressiveness; courts should give democratic processes the
benefit of every doubt.

It should be easy to see how due process traditionalism might be a second-best
substitute for a Thayerian approach to the Constitution. Suppose it is believed that very
few legislative decisions will actually violate longstanding understandings of rights, and
that most plaintiffs, invoking the due process clause, will be attempting not to vindicate
traditions but to create new rights grounded in some theory of what people should be able
to do—as, for example, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 84 Roe v. Wade, 85 and Lawrence v.

79 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925); Griswold v.
80 See Thayer, supra note; Vermeule, supra note.
81 See Thayer, supra note, at 144 (noting that laws “will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body of men,
may reasonably not seem so to another; . . . the constitution often admits of different interpretations; . . .
there is often a range of choice and judgment . . . ”).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 151.
Texas.\textsuperscript{86} If this is so, then due process traditionalism is likely to operate as a kind of shield for government, one that produces results identical to those that would be achieved by a Thayerian approach to the Constitution. It is for this reason that committed Thayerians, aware that their general approach is both inconsistent with current law and unlikely to receive widespread assent, might be drawn to due process traditionalism. In fact it is easy to imagine an incompletely theorized agreement between proceduralists and Thayerians, both taking traditionalism as an acceptable second-best.

Here is a different way to understand the basic point. To decide difficult cases, judges must identify their preferred approach to constitutional provisions; they must also ask how that approach can be squared with existing law. If judges are committed to stare decisis, they might have to depart from the reasoning and the results suggested by their preferred approach. From one perspective, the departure is actually the first-best, because it incorporates the (principled) commitment to respecting past rulings. When I describe traditionalism as a second-best, it is with the understanding that if the slate were clean, a procedural approach, or a Thayerian one, would be preferable.

\textbf{B. Three Problems}

For both camps, however, there are serious problems.

1. \textit{Traditions can be swords}. Traditionalism can operate as a sword against government, not merely a shield in government’s favor. To that extent, it disserves the goals of those who seek to cabin the role of substantive due process. In striking down President Bush’s effort to use military commissions to try suspected terrorists, the Court relied heavily on its judgment that conspiracy counts had not, by tradition, been subject to trial in military courts.\textsuperscript{87} The Court’s decision was not based on the due process clause, of course, but it would not exactly be stunning to find that traditionalism could lead to invalidations no less than validations. Indeed, two of the most prominent due process cases do exactly that. Justice Harlan defended the outcome in \textit{Griswold} by reference to what he describes as the longstanding tradition of respect for sexual privacy within

\textsuperscript{85} 410 US 113 (1973).
\textsuperscript{86} 539 US 558 (2003).
\textsuperscript{87} Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S Ct 2981 (2006).
marriage, and Justice Harlan’s view is now largely taken to provide the most plausible understanding of *Griswold*. In any event, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Moore v. City of Cleveland struck down a ban on family living arrangements on the ground that the ban was inconsistent with longstanding traditions.

Perhaps second-best defenses of due process traditionalism might recognize that on some occasions, the approach will require invalidation. But perhaps the fear of invalidation should not be taken as devastating to the second-best project, because new practices will frequently be distinguishable from those that came before, and hence will rarely be struck down under a traditionalist approach. On this view, *Griswold* and *Moore* are outliers, and unlikely to have many successors. It is true that traditions may turn out to be swords, but traditionalists will insist that their approach will rarely require invalidation of democratically approved legislation.

2. *Traditions unleashed.* Even if this is so, there is an additional problem. Traditions can be read at many different levels of generality, ranging from the highly particularistic to the very abstract. Because traditions can be read abstractly, due process traditionalism might not constrain discretion at all. On the contrary, it might turn out to be an invitation for judges to invalidate practices however they see fit. If judges read American traditions to create a right to sexual autonomy, bans on prostitution and incest would face serious constitutional doubts. If judges read American traditions to suggest a right of free choice in the domain of marriage, bans on same-sex marriage would seem to be in constitutional jeopardy. Perhaps any characterization of a tradition will be interpretive in the sense that it is inevitably an effort not simply to describe something, but to cast past practices in the best constructive light. If this is so, judges will disagree about the appropriate characterization, because they will disagree about what counts as the best constructive light; and their disagreements will defeat the goals of those who favor proceduralism or Thayerism.

---

91 *Id.*
To avoid these problems, and to ensure that due process traditionalism will actually operate as a second-best, proceduralists and Thayerians have to urge that traditions, to count as such, must be read at a low level of specificity.\footnote{See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 505 (1989).} Specific readings are necessary both to cabin judicial discretion and to ensure that judges behave (roughly) in a way that proceduralists and Thayerians approve.\footnote{At the same time, specific readings will appeal to many minds traditionalists, who believe that the specific traditions have epistemic credentials, because those are the traditions of which many minds have approved.} Thus Justice Scalia has urged that the problem with general readings is that they provide “such imprecise guidance” and “permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society’s views”; and if judges are not bound “by any particular, identifiable tradition,” they are not bound by the “rule of law at all.”\footnote{Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 US 505 (1989).} Perhaps due process traditionalism can operate as a second-best, and in any case succeed in disciplining judicial discretion, if past practices are read at a level of great specificity.

A skeptic might respond that if past practices are so read, they will not offer guidance at all. Read specifically, traditions govern only the periods and persons to whom they actually applied. There does appear to be a tradition in favor of allowing parents to have as many children as they like. But as we have seen, that tradition, read at a level of great specificity, may not “apply” in any context in which democratic processes have repudiated them. A traditionalist must acknowledge that specific readings of past practices will have an irreducible interpretive dimension—enabling the judge to explain whether current circumstances are relevantly different, so as to render the tradition inapplicable. If a due process traditionalist will not allow states to restrict couples to two children, or to ban married people from using contraceptives, it must be because any difference between the past and the present is deemed irrelevant.

But perhaps Justice Scalia, and other traditionalists, need not be disturbed by this concession. In insisting that traditions must be read at a high level of specificity, they are saying only that judges must avoid general characterizations that turn traditionalism into a license for highly discretionary judgments about the substantive content of liberty. If this is their claim, their real problem is empirical, not conceptual: If specific readings are unlikely, then due process traditionalism will fail to serve as a second-best. Optimistic
proceduralists and Thayerians will think that failure is avoidable, and they will work hard to vindicate their optimism. They will devote every effort to reading traditions in such a way as to reduce the risks of open-ended judicial judgments. But as a matter of actual practice, their efforts might fail. Traditionalist approaches to individual rights might well turn out to be unstable.

3. First-best? The second-best defense of due process traditionalism will lack much appeal for those who count neither proceduralism nor Thayerism as a first-best. It is true that the text of the due process clause is naturally read to be purely procedural, but there are countervailing indications in the history of the fourteenth amendment,\footnote{See Lawrence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Theories of Constitutional Law, 89 Yale LJ 1063, 1066 n. 9 (1980).} and in any event the existence of a substantive component is well-settled.\footnote{See note supra.} Within the legal culture, there seems to be broad and deep convergence on some form of substantive due process, captured in the view that certain intimate choices deserve protection against democratic intrusions, at least if those intrusions cannot be convincingly justified. To the extent that a purely procedural reading of the due process clause is unappealing, second-best justifications of due process traditionalism will seem weak.

Thayerism has been defended quite powerfully,\footnote{See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006).} but it has no supporters on the Supreme Court, and it will hardly seem a first-best to those who believe that in some domains, relatively aggressive forms of substantive due process are both legitimate and desirable. To defend due process traditionalism as a second-best for Thayerism, it is necessary to convince skeptics both that they should prefer a Thayerian approach to the due process clause and that traditionalism is a reasonable way of adopting the basic goals of that approach. Skeptics will not be easily persuaded.

VI. Rule-Consequentialism

There is a final possibility. Perhaps due process traditionalism can be justified on rule-consequentialist grounds.\footnote{On rule-consequentialism, see Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality (2000).} The basic idea is that if judges are unleashed from traditions, they will produce many bad results, and that if judges are tethered to traditions, they will do fairly well—simply because our particular traditions, with respect to
substantive rights, outperform any catalogue likely to be produced by judges. At least this might be so if we consider the fact that democratic majorities, at the state or federal level, can create substantive rights if they choose to do so.

A basic concern here is that the idea of “liberty,” taken in the abstract, can be read in diverse ways, and there is no particular reason to trust judicial readings, even or perhaps especially if they are morally infused. It is true that the aggregative and evolutionary accounts offer insufficient reason to accept many minds traditionalism in its most ambitious forms, but the real question is comparative, and perhaps we can agree that at least in the United States, traditional conceptions of individual rights are good place to start. When such conceptions prove inadequate, political processes can and often do pick up the slack, as for example through statutory protections accorded to privacy rights. And when traditions are palpably unjust, the Equal Protection Clause is the natural route by which they might be challenged. If judicial judgments about the substantive content of “liberty” are highly unreliable, due process traditionalism might turn out to be the best imaginable approach.

The underlying questions cannot be answered in the abstract; they call for both normative and predictive judgments. Due process traditionalists might reasonably believe that judicial judgments will reflect normative commitments that do not deserve special respect and that in any case ought not to be imposed on citizens. Lochner v. New York, prompting Holmes’ traditionalism, is the obvious example for most, whereas Roe v. Wade is the salient example for many. Those who reject due process traditionalism insist that judicial elaboration of the content of “liberty” is far more likely to produce better outcomes than an approach that is tied to longstanding practices. They favor a more rationalist or critical approach to the due process clause, in which judges question traditions by the light of reason, ensuring that they can survive the appropriate standard of review.

If such an approach is to be defended, it might be on the institutional grounds sketched by Alexander Bickel, who insisted that “courts have certain capacities for

---

102 198 US 45 (1905).
103 410 US 113 (1973).
dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess.”104 In Bickel’s view, “judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation follow the ways of the scholar” in thinking about those enduring values.105 “Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment’s hue and cry.”106 Thus Bickel concluded that “no other branch of government is nearly so well equipped to conduct” a kind of vital natural seminar, through which the most basic principles are discovered and announced.107

To those who fear the exercise of judicial discretion, it might be responded that the appointments process, together with internal restraints on judicial judgments,108 creates sufficient protection against the relevant risks. Judges do not create due process doctrine out of whole cloth; they rely on their previous decisions, and they rarely depart radically from them. If Bickel is right about judicial capacities, and if the external and internal constraints on judicial discretion are real, the rule-consequentialist defense of due process traditionalism is unlikely to seem unconvincing. We are better off if traditions are a place to start but not to end, and if courts occasionally deploy a more critical approach, testing whether the tradition is sensible in principle. It is not clear that the underlying disagreement can be resolved in the abstract; it depends on both normative judgments and predictions about judicial performance. But at least we should now be in a position to identify the questions on which reasonable people might disagree.

105 Id.
106 Id. at 26.
107 Id.
108 See Strauss, supra note.
Conclusion

The most ambitious defenses of due process traditionalism, drawing on Burke and Hayek, emphasize that many minds are necessary to constitute a tradition, and that many minds are far more likely to be right than those who deploy their private stock of reason. The aggregative version of this view runs into three problems. First, numerous people may not have accepted a proposition that is relevant to the legal issue at hand. Second, many minds might suffer from a systematic bias. Third, people may have participated in a cascade, depriving the tradition of the degree of support that the aggregative view demands. The problem with the evolutionary account is that it is hard to identify a mechanism to ensure that traditional practices are good, or even good enough, in any relevant sense. Democratic traditionalists insist that longstanding practices are supported by numerous “votes.” But at least for the problems typically raised in due process cases, the same difficulties that undermine the aggregative and evolutionary accounts beset efforts to defend traditions on democratic grounds.

Alternative defenses see due process traditionalism as a kind of second-best substitute for a procedural account of the due process clause or for a form of Thayerism. Ideas of this sort undoubtedly help explain the appeal of due process traditionalism within the judiciary. If “substantive due process” is constitutionally baseless but firmly entrenched, a traditionalist approach might seem the best way out of a bad situation. Unfortunately, the substitute is likely to be quite crude, and it is not clear that a procedural account or Thayerism can be convincingly described as first-best.

It is also possible to defend due process traditionalism in rule-consequentialist terms. The central idea would be that notwithstanding the failures of the aggregative and evolutionary accounts, our own traditions are generally good, and judicial judgments about the content of “liberty” are systematically unreliable. The rule-consequentialist argument cannot easily be rejected in the abstract. On the one hand, it is easy to imagine a world in which the rule-consequentialist argument might be persuasively defended. On the other hand, it is doubtful that this world is our own.
Readers with comments should address them to:

Professor Cass Sunstein  
University of Chicago Law School  
1111 East 60th Street  
Chicago, IL  60637  
csunstei@uchicago.edu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003)</td>
<td>Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202</td>
<td>Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004)</td>
<td>David A. Weisbach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004)</td>
<td>David A. Weisbach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205</td>
<td>The Right to Destroy (January 2004)</td>
<td>Lior Jacob Strahilevitz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>A Theory of International Adjudication (February 2004)</td>
<td>Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute (May 2004)</td>
<td>Alan O. Sykes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor within and between Law Firms (April 2004)</td>
<td>Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215</td>
<td>The Economics of Public International Law (July 2004)</td>
<td>Alan O. Sykes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable (July 2004)</td>
<td>Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>223</td>
<td>Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing Entry Barriers? (September 2004)</td>
<td>Randal C. Picker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>224</td>
<td>Debiasing through Law (September 2004)</td>
<td>Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227</td>
<td>The Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO (October 2004)</td>
<td>Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228</td>
<td>The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (November 2004)</td>
<td>Richard A. Posner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229</td>
<td>A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)</td>
<td>Lior Jacob Strahilevitz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>Minimalism at War (December 2004)</td>
<td>Cass R. Sunstein</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)</td>
<td>Eric A. Posner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233</td>
<td>Is the International Court of Justice Biased? (December 2004)</td>
<td>Eric A. Posner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237</td>
<td>Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts (March 2005)</td>
<td>Randal C. Picker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs (March 2005)</td>
<td>Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239</td>
<td>Trade Remedy Laws (March 2005)</td>
<td>Alan O. Sykes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242</td>
<td>IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response (May 2005)</td>
<td>James C. Spindler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a listing of papers 1–200 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities (July 2005)
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity (July 2005)
David A. Weisbach, Paretoian Intergenerational Discounting (August 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005)
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure (August 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein,Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong (November 2005)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism (November 2005, revised January 2006)
Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago (November 2005)
Kenneth W. Dam, Institutions, History, and Economics Development (January 2006, revised October 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Land, Law and Economic Development (January 2006, revised October 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply (January 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth (January 2006, revised October 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism (January 2006, revised August 2006)
Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (January 2006)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility under International Law (February 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Equity Markets, The Corporation and Economic Development (February 2006, revised October 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Credit Markets, Creditors’ Rights and Economic Development (February 2006)
Douglas G. Lichtman, Defusing DRM (February 2006)
Jeff Leslie and Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights without Controversy (March 2006)
Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery (March 2006)
Shahar J. Dibary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs” (March 2006)
Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency Powers (March 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development (March 2006, revised October 2006)
291. Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management (April 2006)
293. Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, *Chevron* as a Voting Rule (June 2006)
295. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change (June 2006)
296. Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation (June 2006)
299. David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principle Agent Problems, and Redundancy (June 2006)
300. Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006)
301. Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (July 2006)
303. Kenneth W. Dam, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance (August 2006)
305. Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006)
306. M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs Are Low (September 2006)
310. David Gilo and Ariel Porat, The Unconventional Uses of Transaction Costs (October 2006)
312. Dennis W. Carlton and Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (October 2006)
316. Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks (November 2006)
322. Cass R. Sunstein, Completeley Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law (January 2007)
324. Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals (January 2007)
332. Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care? (February 2007)
334. Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law (March 2007)
335. Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the Incarceration Revolution. Part II: State Level Analysis (March 2007)
336. Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism (March 2007, revised)