Translation in Foreign Language Pedagogy: The Rise and Fall of the Grammar Translation Method

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Translation in Foreign Language Pedagogy:
The Rise and Fall of the Grammar Translation Method

A dissertation presented

by

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Abstract

Translation in Foreign Language Pedagogy: The Rise and Fall of the Grammar Translation Method

Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) is identified as dismissing translation, applying to all “translation” the restricted expression of translation within the discredited Grammar Translation Method (GTM). Recent, negative classifications of the GTM are considered and, this dissertation observes, the concept of the GTM is shown as prone to being mythologized. A summary definition of the GTM is offered.

Of the five Prussian language teachers viewed by history as originating the GTM, Joahnn Valentin Meidinger and, to a lesser degree, Heinrich Gottfried Ollendorff are shown offering methods and an approach to translation that are most similar to the definition of the GTM used today. Johann Heinrich Philipp Seidenstücker, Johann Franz Ahn, and Carl Julius Ploetz are found also to stand in the lineage of the GTM, but with important qualifications.

The name “Grammar Translation Method” is asserted by this dissertation to originate in the Reform Movement, specifically, Wilhelm Viëtor’s Der Sprachunterricht muß umkehren! (1882) and a lecture of Viëtor’s from 1899. Viëtor is noted characterizing “traditional” methodologies with the terms “Grammatik” and “Übersetzung,” beginning with Meidinger’s Practische Französische Grammatik (1783). Translation is found to remain problematic for the Reform Movement. A separate, concurrent movement, resulting in the Direct Method, is seen banishing all use of translation, and arguably lives on in CLT today.

The formulation of a novel definition of the translation of texts is attempted. This definition, along with opinions from Translation Studies, is applied to a statement by Viëtor, where translation is particularly problematized, with the goal of mitigating this problematic. The dissertation recommends that CLT similarly use this definition of translation, so as to mitigate its own skepticism towards translation.
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To my parents, would that they could have read it.

Also to Francis Drury McGinn, III, without whom this never would have gotten written.
(Thank you, Frank.)
INTRODUCTION

The Downfall of Translation in Language Teaching Is a Result of Translation’s Obfuscation by and Conflation with the Grammar Translation Method.

Disdain of the Grammar Translation Method is widespread today.

It can be hard to say which of the following causes most concern for language teachers today: translation-based instruction, grammar-based instruction, or instruction based on the Grammar Translation Method. Animosity towards the Grammar Translation Method (GTM) has been so great that the entire method has by now been largely cast aside by those in the fields of second language (L2) instruction and Second Language Acquisition (SLA).¹ The GTM is treated by many now as if it were only a relic of history, unworthy of serious consideration as a viable methodology for language teaching and learning today. See, for example, Richards and Rogers (2001):

[T]hough it may be true to say that the Grammar-Translation Method is still widely practiced, it has no advocates. It is a method for which there is no theory. There is no literature that offers a rationale or justification for it or that attempts to relate it to issues in linguistics, psychology, or educational theory. (Richards and Rodgers 2001: 7)

In a similar vein, Brown (2007) pronounces his judgement:

It is remarkable, in one sense, that this method has been so stalwart among many competing models. It does virtually nothing to enhance a student’s communicative ability in the language. … As we continue to examine theoretical principles in this book, I think we will understand more fully the ‘theorylessness’ of the Grammar Translation Method. (Brown 2007: 16-17, quotation marks in original)

And Omaggio Hadley (2001), too, states in convinced terms:

¹ I am using L“2”and “S”LA also to refer to third, and further, language instruction and acquisition.
Very few, if any of the elements hypothesized to contribute to the development of proficiency are present in the grammar-translation method. … [G]rammar-translation methodology is not necessarily conducive to building toward proficiency and may, in fact, be quite counterproductive. (Omaggio Hadley 2001: 106-107, italics in original)

Along with the ousting of the GTM as a whole, its component parts, grammar and translation, have also been widely questioned by the fields of L2 instruction and SLA, although translation has been more roundly rejected than grammar.

*Grammar cannot actually be ignored when using a language.*

One can attribute the difference in the fates of grammar and translation after the decline of the GTM’s widespread use to the fact that by definition every language has a grammar that its users agree upon. By implication, a language’s grammar must be learned if that particular language is to be learned. But since a translation of itself is not an essential aspect to any language, no translation must necessarily be learned for learning any one, particular language. (Translation in L2 pedagogy traditionally speaks to the interaction of two languages, not just the operation of one.) Thus, rather than rejecting and banning grammar – which was the fate of translation – L2 instructors and SLA practitioners have instead been developing novel presentations of grammar, often, for example, more intuitive by design, in an effort to avoid associations with the traditionally rote and deductive grammar presentations of the GTM.

Therefore, whether one sides with the camp of Universal Grammar espoused by Chomsky (1975) and the subsequent proponents of Language “Acquisition” (as opposed
to Language “Learning”) such as Krashen (1981), for whom grammar and language development are considered to be unique human processes separate from other human learning, or with the more recent cognitive camp, who understand grammar and language development not as separate, but rather akin to all human learning and development, knowledge of grammar remains an active goal in language teaching. Or even if one sides with other camps, such as those of the Direct Method, the Audio-Lingual Method, or Communicative Language Teaching (CLT – today’s dominant method), for all of whom the imparting of grammar still remains a goal, even though their inductive approach frowns upon the explicit use of grammar explanation, especially at the beginning stages of language acquisition – grammar has clearly survived in some form or another within the practice of L2 instruction and SLA.

*Translation, defined much by its use in the GTM, is dispensable.*

Yet, as opposed to their retention of some form of eventual grammar instruction, the prevailing opinions towards translation in L2 instruction and SLA today can be described as overwhelmingly dismissive, or at best skeptical. Indeed, as G. Cook (2010) notes:

Translation in language teaching has been treated as a pariah in almost all of the fashionable high-profile language teaching theories of the 20th century. (G. Cook 2010: xv)

However, this dismissive attitude seems undeserved and begs its own skepticism, when we consider that what counts as translation in L2 instruction and SLA literature has typically been understood in overly narrow terms or has been left wholly undefined.
At one extreme, some L2 and SLA literature scarcely even mentions translation, as is the case with Lee and VanPatten (2003), who treat translation only twice in their text on language teaching. First, in an unanswered question to their reader, concerning a classroom transcript wherein a teacher utters a translation of her instructions into a student’s L1, Lee and VanPatten (2003: 57) ask: “What effect does translating one’s utterances have on the classroom dynamic?” It is worth mentioning that they had identified their target readers in their preface as “language teachers” (Lee and VanPatten 2003: xv). By not answering their own question, Lee and VanPatten leave available the interpretation that they think that the effect of translating one’s utterances is somehow not good.

And as evidence of Lee and VanPatten’s narrow definition of translation, they mention

At some point in the writing process, writers make their thoughts visible to others; this physical process has been called translating thought to print (Flower & Hayes, 1981), or transcribing (Dvorak, 1986); we prefer the latter term. (Lee and VanPatten 2003:248, italics and references in original.)

By their preferring not to allow translation also to refer to the movement of “thought to print,” beyond translation’s traditional definition and its perceived use within the GTM, Lee and VanPatten contribute to a narrowing view of translation, and thus to its readier dismissal.

Indeed, for most experts in L2 instruction and SLA today, any and all ‘translation’ is limitedly equated only with that translation which is assumed to have been manifested within the Grammar Translation Method. Such “GTM-translation” is consistently understood only as the translation of texts between two distinct verbal languages, in
written form. This translation is assumed to be performed according to narrow and inflexible principles such as word-for-word equivalency, and a quasi-arithmetic approach to the translation of grammatical categories across languages, often resulting in one allegedly “true” translation of a text. The texts for translation are typically observed to be disunified wholes, and often marked by sentences of incoherent or disconnected content, beyond shared grammar or vocabulary words. The texts that are marked explicitly for translation are generally presented in the student’s mother tongue, for translation into the foreign language. Sometimes the author deliberately alters the language in the mother tongue text, by numbering certain words or moving text around from its normal position, in an effort meant to elicit better translations. Whether to translate texts that are presented in the foreign language is not always made clear by the GTM, as opposed to reading or somehow treating the texts grammatically.

Many authors in L2 instruction and SLA make no pretense about the conflation of all translation with this restricted GTM-definition. As evidence, consider that none of the following authors treats translation as a separate topic independently of their treatments of the GTM – Brandl (2008), Brown (2007), Lightbown and Spada (2006), Omaggio Hadley (2001), V. Cook (2001), Rutherford and Sharwood Smith (1988), Rivers (1968), and Lado (1964). The implied assumption is that all translation is defined solely by that certain type of translating that was an integral part of the GTM.

Then again, often the Grammar Translation Method is not even named explicitly when the topic of translation is handled, but L2 instruction and SLA, with words such as
“traditional,” “old-fashioned,” or “historic,” still manage to make references to the GTM in coded form during their discussions of translation. Or, the literature of L2 instruction and SLA may describe translation within a narrow set of specifications that must clearly mean translation only as it was performed in the GTM, specifications that are also roundly criticized: trying to translate word for word, trying to translate long and difficult texts, being presented as a student with unfamiliar material and with no choice over the content.

Consider Brooks (1964) where, without mentioning the GTM outright, he criticizes, “The principal mistake is to attempt to translate at the level of words,” and later makes mention of:

the type of translation problem with which the student is ordinarily presented, in which he takes sentences and paragraphs he has not worked with before and attempts to render them into another language. (Brooks 1964: 256-257)

Brooks does not name the GTM here, but by naming the hallmarks of translation as it was understood to be performed within the GTM, he brings his reader to the GTM while also implying that all translation can be understood in this restricted, GTM association.

And still other times, along with the use of the aforementioned coded references to the GTM, not even the term “translation” gets named, but becomes itself encoded. See for example Johnson (1996):

We shall focus on three language teaching approaches: a version of ‘traditional’ language teaching which we shall characterize below, recent ‘acquisition’ approaches, and a version of communicative methodology (CM). (Johnson 1996: 170, quotation marks in original)
Thereafter, Johnson’s presentation of the ‘traditional’ approach employs the stereotypical code words for the GTM:

A carefully graded structural syllabus is used, presentation is through key sentences, there is a good deal of controlled practice, and the production stage is all but absent. (Johnson 1996: 170)

Read “graded structural syllabus” as “grammar instruction”, “key sentences” as “inauthentic, prefabricated examples of language without context,” “controlled practice” as “restricted, translation-based exercises,” and the “absent production stage” as a reference to one of the most common arguments lobbied against translation in the GTM, namely that, lacking an emphasis on free writing and speaking, it does not count as real, productive use of the language. Another way in which textbooks use code for “translation” is with instructions given in the mother tongue that necessarily imply translation as the exercise at hand, essentially encoding its practice. Such instructions might ask students to say, write, or otherwise “express” a word or longer mother tongue text in the foreign language.2

Despite so much skepticism, the GTM and translation nonetheless persist, suggesting the need for more investigation.

Granted, the GTM is on its surface exceedingly traditional, with approaches that represent historically some of the oldest language teaching methodologies that we have a record of (see Kelly 1976), and pressures today (and in the past) to be innovative in education might well seem to justify the dismissal, or at least questioning, of such an old method; however, the outright dismissal of a method (along with the dismissal of all of its

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2 See, for example, Sparks and Vail’s textbook German in Review, which instructs: “Express in German.”
component parts) that despite any of its faults still persists in many parts of the world today could be a mistake. The GTM typically underlies language courses today labelled as “for reading purposes,” and it is a widely used method of approach in Britain\(^3\), China, and India today, as well as in many other areas. Richards and Rogers (2001: 7) note that the GTM is still “widely in practice,” although they do not say where. Similarly, Brown (2007: 17) maintains that the GTM is “so stalwart,” but he too does not mention where it still persists. Malmkjær (1998: 1) also mentions that translation of the GTM variety is “a significant component in the teaching of many languages in many parts of the world,” though she too does not name these parts.

At this juncture, an in-depth analysis of the GTM would seem in order. The goal of the analysis will be a better degree of clarity about exactly what this time-honored method comprises and espouses, especially in light of the fact that there is not whole scale agreement about the nature of the GTM. With the GTM more clearly defined, later references to it in the literature of L2 instruction and SLA, especially those in coded form, will also be easier to recognize and process. Additionally, a more clearly delimited understanding of the GTM will enable a cleaner analysis later of the topic of translation, separated out from its troubling associations with the GTM.

What is, or was, the Grammar Translation Method? Defining the GTM.

For this analysis, I will propose a definition of the Grammar Translation Method based on the “negative definitions” of the type cited above which appear again and again in

\(^3\) See the textbook *Thinking German Translation*, by Sándor Hervery et al.
methods that aspire to be “different” from the GTM. An interesting aspect of this method, in comparison with later methodologies for language teaching and learning, is that the GTM was never really a named method. That is to say, no author ever coined the name for his or her own method. Its name was only developed by later observers who recognized a dual emphasis within the method on the learning of grammar and on the use of translation. The GTM, as conceived by textbook authors in the latter part of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries, appears to be a negative definition, formulated in order to present a background against which a “new method” may be described. Before offering my own definition, I will first examine six existing ones.

**Definitions of the GTM. Rivers’ Definition.**

As a starting point I offer a classic definition of the GTM as presented by Rivers in 1968. Her passage is long, and so in advance and for efficiency’s sake I have put into italics the features of the GTM as a “method”:

This method, then, aims at inculcating an understanding of the grammar of the language, expressed in traditional terms, and at training the student to write the language accurately by regular practice in translating from his native language. It aims at providing the student with a wide literary vocabulary, often of an unnecessarily detailed nature; it aims at training the student to extract the meaning from foreign texts by translation into the native language and, at advanced stages, to appreciate the literary significance and value of what he has been reading. These aims are achieved in the classroom by long and elaborate grammatical explanations and demonstrations in the native language, followed by practice on the part of the student in the writing of paradigms, in the applying of the rules he has learned to the construction of sentences in the foreign language, and in the translation of consecutive passages of prose from the native language to the foreign language. Texts in the foreign language are translated into the native language orally and in writing and, ideally, their literary and cultural significance is discussed, although in many classes, because of the limitation in the time available, this is done very perfunctorily, if at all. Students are expected to know
the rules for the correct association of sounds with the graphic symbols in the foreign writing system, but are given little opportunity to practice these associations except in occasional reading practice in class and in the writing from dictation of passages which are usually of a literary character. The foreign language is not used in class to any extent, except when stereotyped questions may be asked about the subject matter of a reading passage, and the students answer in the foreign language with sentences drawn directly from the text. Often these questions are given in writing and answered in writing. Students taught by this method are frequently confused when addressed in the foreign language and may be very embarrassed when asked to pronounce anything themselves. (Rivers 1968: 16-17, italics added)

Rivers bases her definition based on her experiences in Australia as a teacher-in-training.

She offers the above definition after first having detailed a hypothetical teacher-in-training’s visit to one “Classroom A,” a prototypical and composite GTM-classroom, where a lesson displaying the above methodological features plays out (1968: 1-3). That is, Rivers’ definition treats the GTM as an extant methodology, still being used actively when she writes her above definition. Her reference to “traditional terms” of grammar nonetheless also speaks to a history underlying this method. She does not name or offer any representative examples of textbooks or teachers, present or past, known to espouse this method.

*Chastain’s definition.*

The next definition that I offer for consideration comes from Chastain (1976). His passage is also long, and so again I have highlighted the portions that illustrate the features of the GTM as a “method”:

The Grammar-Translation Method
The first step in comprehending the direction second-language teaching took in the fifties is to consider the grammar-translation method of language teaching that preceded it. The audio-lingual approach was the outgrowth of a swing away from
the traditional methodology employed to teach Latin and Greek. Modern languages had been established in the curriculum under the guise of the classical approach to language teaching. The problem was that the profession later neglected to revamp its procedures to keep them in line with evolving objectives. The times and rationale changed, but the techniques did not change. Grammar-translation teaching satisfied the desires of the “mental faculties” school of thought and the traditional humanistic orientation, which placed primary emphasis on the belles-lettres [italics in original] of the country, but it did not prove to be entirely suitable to the world that emerged after World War II. The primary purpose of the grammar-translation method of the thirties, forties, and fifties was to prepare the students to be able to explore the depth and breadth of the second language’s literature. A secondary objective was to gain a greater understanding of the first language. An equally important goal was to improve the students’ capability of coping with difficult learning situations and materials, i.e., to develop the students’ minds.

In attaining these objectives, the students first had to learn grammar and vocabulary. Grammar was taught deductively by means of long and elaborate explanations. All the regularities and irregularities, all the rules and exceptions to the rules were described in grammatical terms. This presentation contained the prescription that the students were to apply in order to translate the readings and do the exercises. (Textbooks written in the grammar-translation format were easily identifiable: the explanations took several pages and the exercises were usually quite short.) Much class time was spent “talking about” the language. Normally, the vocabulary was listed somewhere in the chapter, and the students memorized these lists of words along with the native-language meanings. Comprehension and assimilation of grammar and vocabulary were put to the test in translation. If the students could translate the readings to the first language and if they knew enough to translate especially selected and prepared exercises from the first to the second language, they were judged to have learned the language. In addition to translating, the students were commonly asked to “state the rule.”

During the entire process of going from complete explanations designed to teach the students the rules of the language through to the end of the translation exercises, there was a constant comparison of the native language and the second language. The goal was to be able to convert each language into the other, and the process was one of problem solving, the problem being that of puzzling out the correct forms assisted by the grammar rules and the dictionary. There was little concern with being able to communicate orally in the language. Consequently, there were few opportunities to listen or to speak the language in class. Learning the grammar and vocabulary was achieved by reading and writing exercises.

1This author once observed a class in which a student who was reading aloud misplaced the accent on a word in Spanish. Becoming confused, the best she could do was to sit in embarrassed silence until the teacher finally put an end to her ordeal telling her, “For tomorrow I want you to copy the rules for accentuation in the back of the book fifty [italics in original] times.” (Chastain 1976: 103-104, quotation marks and footnote in original; italics added, except where noted)
Chastain’s definition essentially shares all of the features of Rivers’ definition. Chastain additionally mentions the GTM features of a heritage in Latin and Greek instruction, as well as an objective of the humanistic goal of mental development. Although Rivers does not mention these two features in her definition that I quoted above, earlier in her book (1968: 14), she also claims underpinnings to the GTM in the learning of Latin and Greek with a goal of “intellectual discipline: the mind being trained.” Thus, as far as the GTM features that Chastain and Rivers describe, their definitions appear to be a match. I would also note that Chastain makes specific historical references that place the GTM to which he refers into the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, although his references to Latin and Greek, as well as his use of the word “traditional” twice, speak to a much longer tradition for the method. This time frame for the method is similar to the one that Rivers presents, where she both implies the GTM’s use in her own time while also establishing its long tradition. Differentiating Chastain and Rivers in this aspect, however, is Chastain’s use of the past tense for describing the GTM, as opposed to Rivers’ use of the present tense. Chastain thereby implies that the GTM may somehow be “over.” Similarly to Rivers, Chastain offers no specific, named examples of representative GTM textbooks or teachers.

*The definition from Prator and Celce-Murcia.*

Another influential definition of the GTM comes from Prator and Celce-Murcia (1979), who present their definition in list form:
GRAMMAR-TRANSLATION APPROACH
Typically used in teaching Greek and Latin, and generalized to modern languages.
1. Classes are taught in the mother tongue, with little active use of the target language.
2. Much vocabulary is taught in the form of lists of isolated words.
3. Long elaborate explanations of the intricacies of grammar are given.
4. Grammar provides the rules for putting words together, and instruction often focuses on the form and inflection of words.
5. Reading of difficult classical texts is begun early.
6. Little attention is paid to the content of texts, which are treated as exercises in grammatical analysis.
7. Often the only drills are exercises in translating disconnected sentences from the target language into the mother tongue.
8. Little or no attention is given to pronunciation. (Prator and Celce-Murcia 1979: 3)

Prator and Celce-Murcia is a handy distillation of the definitions of Rivers and Chastain (though they do not cite Rivers or Chastain as sources.) Prator and Celce-Murcia do not address the GTM’s goal of mental and intellectual development that Rivers and Chastain mention. This goal might nonetheless be implied by their reference to Latin and Greek, the learning of which, as Rivers points out, was traditionally tied to a goal of mental training. Prator and Celce-Murcia also acknowledge that the GTM occurs still in the 20th century (for above their list, on the same page, they note that they are presenting “various teaching approaches that have been used in the United States during the twentieth century”). Prator and Celce-Murcia only explicitly mention translation in one direction (into the mother tongue), whereas Rivers and Chastain note translation in both directions (i.e., also into the foreign language). By mentioning the reading of classical texts and a grammatical analysis of those texts, Prator and Celce-Murcia nonetheless leave translation into the mother tongue as an implied possibility.
Number 5 in the list from Prator and Celce-Murcia appears anomalous in comparison to Rivers and Chastain; that is, the assertion of an *early* start to reading classical texts is not present in the definitions of Rivers and Chastain. And as regards number 6 in their list, I ask what type of “grammatical analysis” that they mean. As Chastain notes, the GTM treated grammar learning deductively; that is, first rules are learned and then the knowledge of those rules is applied to the synthesis of sentences and texts. The opposite approach, an inductive approach, works by examples, instead of rules; first an example text is read or observed, and then it is analyzed for its grammar. This analysis of examples to elucidate underlying rules is why the inductive approach to grammar is sometimes even called an analytical one. See Christ (1999), where he differentiates between the terms “synthetische Methode” (for deductive methodologies like the GTM) and “analytische Methode” (for inductive ones) in reference to the nineteenth century methods that he studies in an analysis of the GTM’s origins. Perhaps the “grammatical analysis” that Prator and Celce-Murcia here mean is not an inductive exercise to learn new grammar, but a more deductive activity of identifying previously learned grammar phenomena in a text that has been read.

As with the above definitions, Prator and Celce-Murcia also do not name any specific, representative GTM books or teachers. Their use of a list prevents Prator and Celce-Murcia from the exposition that both Rivers and Chastain provide, but, essentially, their definition matches the previous ones. I would ask whether their use of a list, as opposed to a more detailed prose description is at all reflective of a downward trend in the GTM’s greater use or popularity, akin to Chastain’s use of the past tense for defining the GTM. I
would also note that, in my opinion, translation of texts into the foreign language is such a significant feature of the GTM that it deserves inclusion here.

More contemporary definitions of the GTM also appear as lists. Richards and Rodgers’ list.

More contemporary definitions of the GTM appear to confirm many of the previous ones, frequently using the list form. I will examine three of these lists, the most extensive of which comes from Richards and Rodgers (2001):

The principal characteristics of the Grammar-Translation Method were these:
1. The goal of foreign language study is to learn a language in order to read its literature or in order to benefit from the mental discipline and intellectual development that result from foreign language study. Grammar Translation is a way of studying the language that approaches the language first through detailed analysis of its grammar rules, followed by application of this knowledge to the task of translating sentences and texts into and out of the target language. It hence views language learning as consisting of little more than memorizing rules and facts in order to understand and manipulate the morphology and syntax of the foreign language. “The first language is maintained as the reference system in the acquisition of the second language.” (Stern 1983: 455)
2. Reading and writing are the major focus; little or no systematic attention is paid to speaking or listening.
3. Vocabulary selection is based solely on the reading texts used, and words are taught through bilingual word lists, dictionary study, and memorization. In a typical Grammar-Translation text, the grammar rules are presented and illustrated, a list of vocabulary items is presented with their translation equivalents, and translation exercises are prescribed.
4. The sentence is the basic unit of teaching and language practice. Much of the lesson is devoted to translating sentences into and out of the target language, and it is the focus on the sentence that is the distinctive feature of the method. Earlier approaches to foreign language study used grammar as an aid to the study of texts in a foreign language. But this was thought to be too difficult for students in secondary schools, and the focus on the sentence was an attempt to make language learning easier (see Howatt 1984: 131).
5. Accuracy is emphasized. Students are expected to achieve high standards in translation because of “the high priority attached to meticulous standards of
accuracy which, as well as having an intrinsic moral value, was a prerequisite for passing the increasing number of formal written examinations that grew up during the century” (Howatt 1984: 132).

6. Grammar is taught deductively – that is, by presentation and study of grammar rules, which are then practiced through translation exercises. In most Grammar-Translation texts, a syllabus was followed for the sequencing of grammar points throughout the text, and there was an attempt to teach grammar in an organized and systematic way.

7. The student’s native language is the medium of instruction. It is used to explain new items and to enable comparisons to be made between the foreign language and the student’s native language. (Richards and Rodgers 2001: 5-6, quotation marks and references in original)

As opposed to Prator and Celce-Murcia, Richards and Rodgers indeed mention translation’s occurring in both directions. The only feature that appears to be lacking in the definition from Richards and Rodgers, vis-à-vis the others, is the heritage of the GTM in Latin and Greek instruction. Their list appears to treat the GTM as it is used for the teaching and learning of modern, living languages. Nonetheless, they include the feature of the GTM’s goal of “mental discipline and intellectual development,” which speaks to this classical heritage. In Number 5 of their list, they quote Howatt, referring to certain “examinations that grew up during the century.” The century that Howatt refers to is the 19th century, which means that the GTM that Richards and Rodgers define is indeed one with a long heritage. Ultimately, they do not place the GTM into one specific era as clearly as, for example, Chastain (who places it in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s).

Otherwise, Richards and Rodgers appear here to have offered every feature that Rivers and Chastain do. Like Chastain, Richards and Rodgers also imply that the GTM has ended, in that they introduce their list with a sentence in the past tense. In common with all the above definitions, Richards and Rodgers do not name any representative GTM works, teachers, or authors.
The next list of features of the GTM comes from Omaggio Hadley (2001). She consolidates Chastain’s (1976) presentation of the GTM into this summary list:

1. Students first learned the rules of grammar and bilingual lists of vocabulary pertaining to the reading or readings of the lesson. Grammar was learned deductively by means of long and elaborate explanations. All rules were learned with their exceptions and irregularities explained in grammatical terms.

2. Once rules and vocabulary were learned, prescriptions for translating the exercises that followed the grammar explanations were given.

3. Comprehension of the rules and readings was tested via translation (target language to native language and vice versa). Students had learned the language if they could translate the passages well.

4. The native and target languages were constantly compared. The goal of instruction was to convert L1 into L2 and vice versa, using a dictionary if necessary.

5. There were very few opportunities for listening and speaking practice (with the exception of reading passages and sentences aloud), since the method concentrated on reading and translation exercises. Much of the class time was devoted to talking about the language; virtually no time was spent talking in the language. (Omaggio Hadley 2001: 107, italics and reference in original)

Although she is quoting Chastain, Omaggio Hadley leaves out Chastain’s mention of the GTM’s heritage in the teaching of Latin and Greek, as well as the goal of mental development. She nonetheless implies a heritage with her use of the superlative (“in its purest form”), or, if not a heritage, at least the existence of more than one version of the GTM. In fact, by relying on Chastain, she contributes to an additional heritage beyond just that of the method: that of the building of the GTM’s definition. Omaggio Hadley also, like Chastain, as well as Richards and Rodgers, implies that the GTM has already ended, by introducing her list with the past tense. I would also ask, as with the lists of
Prator and Celce-Murcia and of Richards and Rodgers, whether the use of a list, instead of prose, adds to this implication of the GTM’s having waning significance.

As regards the last item in Omaggio Hadley’s list, I argue that it is not as direct a quote of Chastain as the other items. That is, Chastain only mentions “few opportunities” for listening and speaking, not “very few.” As well, whereas Chastain indeed mentions that much class time was spent talking about the language, he nevertheless only implies the follow-up that Omaggio Hadley explicitly formulates: “virtually no time was spent talking in the language.” Finally, Chastain does not mention “reading passages and sentences aloud” as a feature of the GTM. He observes, in his footnote, a student reading aloud in a GTM Spanish class, but he does not explicitly offer reading aloud as a defining GTM feature. Ultimately, Omaggio Hadley’s list is nonetheless a helpful consolidation of Chastain’s definition, and while it does not contain Chastain’s references to Latin, Greek, and certain decades of the twentieth century, this might merely be a factor of Omaggio Hadley’s writing her list later, that much more removed from the “heyday” of the Classics’ influence on education generally. Notably, Omaggio Hadley – like all the definitions above – does not include any names of representative GTM works or practitioners.

Brown’s list.

Finally, the last definition of the GTM that I offer is from Brown (2007). He consolidates the list above from Prator and Celce-Murcia into the following:
Prator and Celce-Murcia (1979, p. 3) listed the major characteristics of Grammar Translation:
1. Classes taught in the mother tongue; little use of the L2
2. Much vocabulary taught in the form of lists of isolated words
3. Elaborate explanations of the intricacies of grammar
4. Reading of difficult classical texts begun early
5. Texts treated as exercises in grammatical analysis
6. Occasional drills and exercises in translating sentences from L1 to L2
7. Little or no attention to pronunciation (Brown 2007: 16, reference in original)

It is interesting that Brown eliminates the fourth item in the list of Prator and Celce-
Murcia (which concerns using grammar rules for putting together words, and instruction
focused on words’ inflections), but it is possible that he finds this item redundant in light
of the other two grammar-oriented items in the list. Brown also notably leaves out any
references to mental discipline, as well as to a GTM-heritage in the instruction of Latin
and Greek; yet, he leaves the latter reference available if his reader chooses to go to
Prator and Celce-Murcia. Brown’s sixth item represents considerable conversion of his
source text. Firstly, Prator and Celce Murcia do not speak of any “occasional” drills – in
fact, they say that translating exercises are “often the only drills” and leave the matter of
the frequency of these drills unattended. Secondly, Prator and Celce-Murcia indicate that
during translation drills students converted sentences “from the target language into the
mother tongue,” whereas Brown indicates the opposite direction of translation. As I
noted in my observations of Prator and Celce-Murcia’s list, Brown is indeed correct to
include translation from L1 to L2 as a significant feature of the GTM; however, he does
not actually quote Prator and Celce-Murcia here.

Brown’s list is very brief by comparison to the other definitions, which may be another
indicator of the GTM’s waning significance in language teaching currently (Brown’s is
also the most recent definition); however, Brown does not use the past tense or other markers that might also indicate the GTM’s being over, and his short list may merely be a matter of convenience. As a convenient list, it appears to function in reasonable corroboration with all of the above definitions. Notably, Brown’s definition of the GTM again provides no named books, authors, or teachers of the GTM.

*Negative judgements are present in the definitions of the GTM.*

Earlier in this dissertation, I detailed several negative attitudes towards the GTM. In advance of offering the above definitions of the GTM, I also asserted that these definitions are “negative.” I will now go over the above definitions, observing where they display negative judgements towards the GTM.

Rivers, for example, weaves certain stylistic elements into her presentation that cast her definition of the GTM as an unfortunate method. She frames her presentation with two rather negative wordings – at the beginning, she asserts that the GTM has an aim of “*inculcating* an understanding of the grammar” (as opposed to, for example, *providing* an understanding) and at the end, she observes “confused and embarrassed” students who cannot speak the foreign language. The GTM that Rivers observed appears to have been practiced in a particularly strict institutional setting. Rivers also adds a significant, negative observation in the middle of her presentation, anchoring the text as it were, concerning the lack of available time that allegedly marks the GTM. This observation about the paucity of time might again be attributed to the institutional setting of the
method’s use, where the GTM’s “long and elaborate explanations” may have competed with the institution’s own scheduling system. The observation’s placement in the middle of Rivers’ presentation nonetheless adds to the negativity framing her definition.

Chastain also offers an arguably negative definition. For example, early on in his presentation, he maintains that there is a “problem” associated with the continued use of the method, because “the times and rationale changed” in the language teaching profession. He does not question whether the changes in rationale are appropriate and perhaps also a part of the problem. In fact, Chastain’s placement of his presentation of the GTM (1976: 103), as the first item under “antecedents to the audio-lingual approach,” sets up his defined GTM to fail, i.e., it has to end and be replaced by the audio-lingual method in order for Chastain’s presentation to follow logically. Chastain’s past tense usage, as noted above, adds to the sense that Chastain believes the GTM is on an exit path; as he even notes, “it did not prove to be entirely suitable to the world that emerged after World War II.” What are arguably more specific characterizations of the unsuitability of the GTM arise in certain words and style that Chastain chooses. For example, there is Chastain’s hyperbole in “All the regularities and irregularities, all the rules and the exceptions to the rules…” He also uses alliteration for a concept that implies a dull and routine approach: “constant comparison of the native language…” And he implies an incompleteness to the GTM’s standards for evaluation when he maintains that students were “judged to have learned the language” if they could “translate the readings to the first language and if they knew enough to translate … exercises from the first to the second language.” That is, Chastain implies that translating
capabilities might not be enough evidence that one has “learned the language.” Omaggio Hadley, summarizing Chastain, actually adds to this negativity with the subtle conversions that she makes to his definition. As noted earlier, out of Chastain’s “few opportunities to listen or to speak,” Omaggio Hadley makes “very few opportunities.” As well, Omaggio Hadley explicates the implied, negative observation that Chastain does not actually state: “virtually no time was spent talking in the language.”

Prator and Celce-Murcia, with their use of a list, are more concise than Rivers or Chastain. Nonetheless, there is still language in their list that suggests a negative attitude to the GTM. In their first item, their mention of “little active use of the target language” suggests that “more active use” is an option worth considering. Also, their choice to include the word “difficult” in their fifth item (“Reading of difficult classical texts is begun early.”) could be construed as unnecessary. That is, the reading of a classical text early on in learning a language would arguably already represent an obviously difficult activity. Yet, by specifically introducing the term “difficult,” Prator and Celce-Murcia make their judgement clear, i.e., they suggest that this type of reading activity at this stage is “too difficult.” As well, the “little attention” that they see paid to the content of texts (item 6), the fact that they see translation exercises as often the “only” drills (item 7), and the “little or no attention” that they see given to pronunciation (item 8) all add up to a strongly implied inadequacy intrinsic to the GTM, which they might state as: “There are other methods that offer more completeness in these aspects.” Brown, in paraphrasing their list, endorses it and any implied negativity. In fact, by his choice to shorten the list of Prator and Celce-Murcia (recall, he removes one item), and by not
quoting their list accurately (regarding the direction of translation, whether by mistake or by choice), Brown suggests that, for him, a more precise and complete definition of the GTM is not entirely critical, as if, in his regard, the GTM as a whole were not entirely relevant.

The tone of Richards and Rodgers’ list is perhaps not as negative as the other definitions of the GTM; however, in three instances they choose words that, as in Prator and Celce-Murcia’s presentation, can be interpreted as implying a negative attitude towards the GTM. In the first item of their list, their use of “little more than” in the following sentence: “It [the GTM] hence views language learning as consisting of little more than memorizing rules and facts” implies a judgement that the GTM should consider more factors in language learning. In the second item of their list, their similar use of the phrase “little or no attention” in: “little or no systematic attention is paid to speaking or listening” also implies a judgement that “more” attention would of course be better. Finally, in the fifth item of their list, one could question the necessity of their choice to include the phrase “meticulous standards” in their quote from Howatt. Richards and Rodgers could have paraphrased Howatt with something less judgemental than “meticulous.”

*The features of the GTM appear to be becoming mythologized.*

The many echoes and the reciprocal quotations among the above definitions of the GTM, the fact that some of the definitions appear to place the GTM simply in a time
“before now” while others (such as Chastain’s) afford it actual dates of existence, as well as the fact that none of the definitions offers a source text or person as an originator of the GTM, all highlight an important factor: The definition of the GTM is not a constant and may be based entirely on stories. That is, there is an extensive GTM-story that may be being passed on from speaker to speaker, which is similar to the passing among speakers historically of myths. Of course, with each individual passing of the GTM-story from one speaker to the next, there is individual embellishment or loss (e.g., no two definitions above of the GTM’s features are identical, not even when someone allegedly quotes another person’s definition), but in the story’s continued passing on, the GTM’s core, negative status is upheld: it is denigrated in a mythology that regards it as a monster.

Adding to this mythologizing process, Omaggio Hadley even resorts to quoting someone else’s story when giving her concluding (second-hand) statement about the GTM:

Strasheim (1976) summed up her appraisal of the shortcomings of the grammar-translation approach with the following personal anecdote:

It was one day while my third-year class was parsing one of Cicero’s lengthier Latin accusations of Catiline that the mental discipline objective proved its real efficacy, for I fell asleep in a class I was teaching. All I can say in my own defense is that the mass of the class had preceded me into the Land of Nod by at least a clause – or two (p.40) (Omaggio Hadley 2001: 108, italics and reference in the original)

I include the story only as evidence for people’s readiness to mythologize the GTM, here accepting an anecdote as useful source material for a presentation of the method in a teaching manual. The inclusion of the story, as well as Omaggio Hadley’s introduction to it, promising that the story will show “shortcomings” of the GTM, contributes to, and caps, the negative judgement against the GTM that marks Omaggio Hadley’s presentation. Notably, Chastain, too, includes an anecdote in his definition of the GTM
(his footnoted reference to a student paralyzed by and punished for her mis-accenting a Spanish word). Chastain’s anecdote is, however, from his own past and thus does not qualify as second-hand.

Mythologizing the GTM’s features has been an observed phenomenon, claims about the detriments of using the mother tongue are a dominant component of the myth.

On the topic of the powerful role of myths and mythologizing in the modern conceptualization of the GTM, I wish to introduce here Levine (2010) who also comes across myths that are proliferated against the GTM. Levine’s agenda is to facilitate “code choice” in language pedagogy (specifically in the language classroom) – that is, he does not discourage students and teachers from using the language, or code, of their choice, whether that code would be the mother tongue or the foreign language (Levine calls the foreign language the target language). Levine is thus a supporter of one of the GTM’s agreed-upon salient features: the free use of the students’ mother tongue during foreign language instruction. Yet, Levine also recognizes that his stance is controversial, since the end of the GTM’s popularity has meant a concomitant end to the acceptance of mother tongue usage in language pedagogy:

It is, in any case, interesting that what most approaches since earlier grammar-translation methods have in common is the view of the L1 as an interference or a hindrance in L2 learning. (Levine 2010:71)

That is, in today’s overwhelmingly anti-GTM culture, there has also developed a history against use of the mother tongue. Levine notes that, along with this rising sentiment against the mother tongue, at least five myths have since come into existence that are
being used to support the abandonment of the mother tongue, in favor of a strictly monolingual, foreign language classroom. I will list the myths that Levine identifies here, although the content of each is not as relevant as the fact that Levine casts them as myths:

Myth 1: Monolingual second language use is the most intuitive mode of communication in the language classroom. …
Myth 2: Monolingual native speaker norms represent an appropriate target for the language learner. …
Myth 3: A monolingual approach reflects the reality of language classroom communication. …
Myth 4: Use of the first language could bring about fossilized errors or pidginization. …
Myth 5: Use of the first language minimizes time spent using the second language. (Levine 2010: 10-16)

Levine does not use the word “myth” pejoratively, rather as a description of a discourse that people observably and consistently take part in. He uses a firm theoretical foundation to refute all of the above five claims and convincingly shows that these claims stem only from history, as opposed to “nature,” and, thus, are myths. In the following quote, one can easily apply what Levine says about the myth-making underlying the abandonment of the mother tongue to the myth-making that I identified above as at play in the definitions of the GTM’s alleged features. That is, where Levine uses the phrase “code choice,” consider the word “translation”:

In this chapter I have sought to show that the ways we think about the place of the L1 and code choice within our language pedagogy, even the eclectic approaches that come under the heading of CLT [Communicative Language Teaching], are not ‘natural’, but derive from the particular historical trends and trajectories in language education of the last few hundred years, and perhaps from popular, intuitive beliefs, or beliefs based on anecdotal evidence (which themselves have historical roots that one could trace). … In language teaching, our myths about code choice are linked to our eclectic CLT pedagogies, but here the very terms ‘exclusive target-language use’ and ‘resorting to L1’, so often heard in discussions of language teaching, point toward the existence and deep roots of our myths. Thus, the agenda of this book comes into focus: to establish a framework
for classroom code choice that liberates us from the constraints of these myths, in order to facilitate communication and learning in a classroom community of practice. (Levine 2010: 17, quotation marks in original)

It is interesting to read Levine’s observation that myths can be used as “constraints,” since the authors whose definitions of the GTM’s features were cited above, resorting to certain familiar anecdotes and claims, also appear to have a goal of constraining the use of the GTM.

One might then return to the definitions of the GTM presented here with an added degree of skepticism, resulting from the possibility that the definitions more so reflect shared stories, with each other and with history generally, than a grounding in historical facts. For example, the last sentence in Rivers’ presentation – concerning students who are “very embarrassed when asked to pronounce anything themselves” – could be reviewed as a possible anecdote or myth. Remember, Rivers bases this “observation” on only a generalized and hypothetical visit to a prototypical “Classroom A,” where these students display their embarrassment. Even if Rivers has indeed observed such embarrassment from real students learning via the GTM, she does not offer any real evidence here, instead only echoes of her experience that she is turning into a story, and one that makes for a compelling narrative, but it remains a story.

Nonetheless – and this is perhaps what makes the pulling apart of myths and facts concerning the GTM so difficult – there is indeed evidence for Rivers’ claim about such imagined students who cannot speak the language they are learning, purportedly because of the GTM. That is, we have historical evidence that for some users of the GTM – both
teachers and students – the goal was indeed not to speak. Lovich (1983), writing about the history of the Department of Germanic Languages and Literature at the University of Auckland, recounts an observation made by two teachers in the department, John Asher and Roland Marleyn, in 1957:

One of the factors which contributed to their excellent working relationship was that they had both received their postgraduate training at universities in German-speaking countries, and while Roland Marleyn was, in the best sense, a traditional scholar of the British mould, he had become distrustful of the methodology of the British German departments during his years of teaching there. The two most severe shortcomings, Asher and Marleyn agreed, were the superficiality of approach to literature, and the ‘lunatic tradition’ that a British German scholar need not, even should not, speak German well. (Lovich 1983: 20, quotation marks in original)

Thus, if not speaking is a goal of the GTM, as Lovich details, then perhaps Rivers truly would encounter students too embarrassed to pronounce words (embarrassed because, for these students, speaking well would actually appear to be a goal). Whereas Lovich does not say that the method in Britain was particularly the GTM, alone his term “traditional scholar” implies as much.

My definition of what a GTM would be:

At this point I wish to offer my own definition of the GTM’s features, as it has been expressed by others and illustrated herein. Since the GTM appears to be flawed by definition, some of my features may appear to highlight lacks in the method, but I only mean to be illustrating alleged lacks. I do not mean to express judgements for or against the GTM. Due to the fact that no source proper appears to exist for the GTM as it is customarily defined, I will phrase my definition as a possibility. Thus: given a “method
X,” I offer that “method X” would be a GTM, as it has been described by others, if that method would display the following features:

1) A student’s language study includes from the outset detailed rules of the grammar of the foreign language, usually explained in the student’s mother tongue and intended for memorization.

2) In addition to the rules of grammar, the student also memorizes long, bilingual vocabulary lists.

3) After memorizing rules and vocabulary, the student’s primary mode of foreign language production is through written translation exercises.

Note: Points 1, 2, and 3 all entail that both the foreign language and the mother tongue are freely used.

4) The texts for translation have often been created by the book or teacher to illustrate specific, pre-learned grammatical rules, without regard for unity or more connected content. Literary texts by well-known authors in the foreign language are also used, both for reading and translation.

5) The student is not exposed to the foreign language in its “natural” state: the teacher scarcely talks in the foreign language. Speaking and listening comprehension are not stressed.

6) The student becomes conditioned to this routine of rule-learning and rule-application and thus remains a stilted user of the foreign language.

7) The goal of this program is for the student to become a good reader and writer of the foreign language.

I pointedly choose to leave my definition as one of “a” GTM, rather than “the” GTM. In so doing I attempt to mitigate the tendency to mythologize something that has not necessarily been definitively identified. I will be guided by this definition in my later analysis of several Prussian authors who are often associated with “the” GTM’s origins.
The GTM is more a concept than a reality in language pedagogy today.

At this stage, I hope to have shown that the definitions and summaries of the GTM, made by language pedagogues at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries, are consistently negative and appear to have evolved from no single, clear source. The echoes in their phraseology and the references to personal anecdotes and stories from others speak to a tendency to mythologize the GTM. It is therefore arguable that today’s critics have not defined the GTM directly from reality. Instead it appears to be a generally agreed-upon concept that they offer, and then rail against. Additionally, I suggest that the consistently negative judgements used by these critics in their definitions of the GTM can be seen as a strategy to remain “on top” of the competition from the past. That is, Communicative Language Teaching (CLT), the dominant movement of language teaching today, may be merely translating “historical trends and trajectories in language education” (Levine’s words) into a concise summary, giving CLT power while actually robbing the GTM of its more complex and not so easily summarized history. Therefore, despite ongoing listings of its features that might appear authoritative and complete (as well as dismissive), the GTM remains nebulous. In a search for greater clarity, I will now investigate when and where there were methods that may have contributed to the existence of an alleged GTM, as well as examine how the method received its name.
CHAPTER ONE


There is this “traditional” method.

As observed earlier, the GTM was not originally a named method and cannot be traced back easily to one creator. Rather, it became something assumed, “traditional.” On the method’s genesis, Rivers (1968) notes deep origins going back “centuries”:

This method cannot be traced back to the tenets of any particular master teacher, but it is clearly rooted in the formal teaching of Latin and Greek which prevailed in Europe for many centuries. (Rivers 1968: 14)

Kelly (1976), like Rivers, refers to models of language teaching similar to the GTM that are traceable back even to Classical times, yet no such methodologies were referred to as a “grammar translation” method. Rather, the style of language teaching methodology that the GTM represents, having such ancient roots, more often gets referred to simply as “traditional,” “classical,” “old-fashioned,” “time honored,” etc. Thus, the question of the origin of the GTM proper is not necessarily one that concerns when such age-old hallmarks as “learning grammar” and “using translation” entered into language instruction. Rather, the question concerns when the consistent mention of these two descriptors – “grammar” and “translation” – entered into use for this approach and then became cemented enough into the public consciousness to qualify as a “name” for the method, differentiating it from other methods. As such, the question is also one, as I
show later, concerning the effects of market competition, for the naming of a language teaching method becomes most imperative once there are named alternatives.

Being a “traditional method” would become over time less a solid moniker for the method that we today call the GTM and more a critical observation about its status, usually made by its detractors (i.e., the GTM is not “new” and “modern” – perhaps also, not “salable” – enough). Concerning this unfortunate power of the word “traditional,” Christ (1999) makes explicit mention of his avoiding its use (German: “traditionell”), when he undertakes his own investigation into the history of the GTM. Christ also therefore avoids naming the method that he investigates as the GTM (German: “GÜM” or “Grammatik-Übersetzungsmethode”), choosing instead, as noted earlier, “synthetische Methode.” For Christ, calling the method “traditional” entails a potentially combative stance:

Das Ziel meiner Untersuchung war die Herausarbeitung der (lehr-lern-) methodischen Konzepte der Lehrwerkauthoren, die ich als “synthetisch” bezeichne. Dieses Methodenkonzept ... wird von den meisten Betrachtern als “Grammatik-Übersetzungsmethode” bezeichnet. ... Nicht wenige Betrachter haben zudem die Tendenz, die Grammatik-Übersetzungsmethode unter der Bezeichnung “traditionelle” Methode laufen zu lassen. Man sollte aber nicht vergessen, dass dies ein (Kampf-)Begriff ist. (Christ 1999: 48, quotation marks in original)

The goal of my investigation was to work out the (pedagogical and) methodological concepts of the textbook authors, whom I classify as “synthetic.” This methodological concept ... is classified by most observers as “grammar translation method.”... More than a few observers also have the tendency to let the grammar translation method run along under the classification “traditional” method. But one should not forget that this is a (combat-ready) term. (My transl.)

This citation is also significant because Christ demonstrates that it is later observers who have ultimately named this traditional method, as opposed to any of the originators whom
Christ or I examine. Interestingly, in addition to claiming that it is his own choice to use the word “synthetisch,” Christ nonetheless implies that the phrase “synthetic method” is not entirely his own invention, but that the phrases “synthetic method” and its opposite, “analytic method,” were in use during the 19th century:

Allerdings war die synthetische Methode nicht die einzige, die das 19. Jahrhundert ... bestimmte. Daneben gab es eine mächtige “analytische” Strömung: ausgehend von (in der Regel geschriebenen) Texten wurden diese sprachlich und inhaltlich analysiert. (Christ 1999: 48, quotation marks in original)

Nevertheless, the synthetic method was not the only one that characterized the 19th century. Along with it there was a powerful “analytic” current: Starting out with (usually written) texts, these texts were then analyzed for their language and content. (My transl.)

However, it is noted that the terms “synthetic method” and “analytic method” are not in wide use today, at least not where “synthetic method” is a synonym for the GTM. In fact, as noted earlier, Brown (2007) indicates a disposition nowadays that casts the GTM more as a method that features “analysis.” Thus, Christ’s choice of “synthetisch” remains mostly a personal choice to avoid premature use of the name that would not come until later (“GTM”) and to avoid the name whose use was becoming more judgemental (“traditional”).

Prussian origins.

There is consensus that the method now known as the GTM began in Prussia. For example, Vermes (2010: 85) notes with reasonableness that the GTM can be credited to several language teachers “employed in the secondary schools of Prussia at the end of the 18th century.” The existence of a method originating in Prussia is also confirmed by the
publication in 1844 of a book for learning Latin by B. Sears entitled: The Ciceronian: or, The Prussian method of teaching the elements of the Latin language. Adapted to the use of American schools. Noting the publication of Sears’ book, Richards and Rodgers (2001: 5) remind us that, “Grammar Translation was in fact first known in the United States as the Prussian Method.” In fact, I would add that Sears does not actually name the same Prussians who are conventionally regarded as originating the GTM (following), but he does describe a method which is at face value equatable with the GTM: one with grammar rules, translating, a gradation of textual difficulty, a role for memorization, etc. (see the “Plan of Instruction” in his book). Kelly (1976: 53) also mentions Sears’ book as evidence for the GTM’s Prussian origin, as well as a supplying a quotation from Rouse (1925), indicating “German” origins for the GTM:

I will only add finally, that the current method is not older than the nineteenth century. It is the offspring of German scholarship. (Rouse 1925, in Kelly 1976: 53)

As for the identity of these “Prussian scholars,” investigators consistently narrow the pool of prospective candidates for the method’s originators down to the same five men. In order of birth, they are: Johann Valentin Meidinger (1756-1822); Johann Heinrich Philipp Seidenstücker (1765-1817); Johann Franz Ahn (1796-1865); Heinrich Gottfried Ollendorff (1803-1865), whose year of birth is also sometimes reported as 1802; and Carl Julius Ploetz (1819-1881), who is also mentioned with the spelling variants “Karl” and “Plötz.”

Disagreement persists over which of these five men presented a method that today is regarded as the most representative form of the GTM. What essentially unites the five is
that all of them were language pedagogues who produced textbooks for learning French (Ollendorff, actually, at first for German, and then other languages) in which a similar methodology is presented again and again. As well, and as I will note later, these men sometimes make reference to each other in their textbooks in a manner that confirms a shared, common base beyond merely the often similar look and feel of their methods.

Kelly (1976) names Meidinger and Seidenstücker as creators and advocates of the GTM, without serious differentiation between these two authors, and then he names Ollendorff and Ploetz as successors, mostly to Meidinger, leaving out Ahn. Richards and Rodgers (2001) group four of them together – Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ollendorff, and Ploetz – and do not bother with separating them out hierarchically, nor do they include Ahn. Criado-Sánchez (2005) does not look as far back as the time of Meidinger and Seidenstücker and concentrates primarily on Ollendorff and Ahn, without consideration of Ploetz. And Christ (1993 and 1999) offers a straightforward trajectory encompassing all five of the men. Consider the title alone of Christ’s article from 1993 (remembering that he uses “synthetic method” for referring to the GTM): “De Meidinger à Ploetz, en passant par Seidenstücker, Ahn et Ollendorff, ou le cheminement de la méthodologie synthétique” (My translation: “From Meidinger to Ploetz, by way of Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ollendorff, or the pathway of the synthetic method”). I therefore, for the sake of completeness, examine all five of these Prussians.
By means of an analysis of the publication chronology of these Prussian scholars’ language manuals and of the chain of influence that these men had on each other, I mean to establish that we can best look to Meidinger as the source of the GTM, as it is referred to in name today (although it lacks a precise definition), and that we may consider Meidinger’s methodology as one which was simply revised by the later four. In so doing, I will side ultimately with Christ (1999), who asserts that Meidinger invented the GTM:

Was macht nun die synthetische Methode aus? Ich zeige es an Meidinger, der als ihr Erfinder gelten darf. (Christ 1999: 48)

What, then, constitutes the synthetic method? I will use Meidinger, who can count as its inventor, to show this. (My transl.)

As good as Christ’s analysis is, it is based on the exercises alone as found in the manuals of the five Prussians, without benefit of the authors’ own commentary. I will show how these men explicitly, and in some instances implicitly, mentioned one another’s influence in the various prefaces to their manuals.

Meidinger’s method, a veritably encyclopedic approach.

Historically speaking, there is no doubt that Meidinger was the first of these five Prussian language scholars to publish a language teaching manual espousing a method that counts as the GTM, his *Praktische Französische Grammatik* from 1783.4 The oldest copy that I

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4 Full original title: *Praktische Französische Grammatik, wodurch man diese Sprache auf eine ganz neue und sehr leichte Art in kurzer Zeit gründlich erlernen kann.*

My translation:
have found available is the 8th edition, from 1792. Other copies that I have used for this
dissertation are the 15th edition, from 1799, and the 35th edition, from 1834, which
contains an added preface from Meidinger’s year of death, 1822. (In the 15th and 18th
editions, the word “practische” in the title now becomes spelled “praktische.”)

Meidinger’s motivations to create his manual are best found in his “preface” (German:
“Vorrede”), a copy of which begins the eighth edition of his manual. This particular
“Vorrede” (in the eight edition) appears to be the same preface as would have appeared in
the first edition of the manual; for later in the eighth edition – immediately after the
“Vorrede” – Meidinger offers a more specific “preliminary report to this new edition”
(German: “Vorbericht zu dieser neuen Auflage”). Also, the “Vorrede,” as it appears in
the eighth edition, appears again, verbatim, in the 15th and 35th editions mentioned
above.

In the “Vorrede,” Meidinger explains that he was compelled to create a new textbook for
learning French after witnessing too many students fail in their attempts to learn the
language, and after observing too many textbooks that offer misguided instruction:

Ich kenne verschiedene Personen, die acht, zehen, bis zwölf Jahre Französisch
gelernet haben, und mit all ihrem Fleiße, sehr fehlerhaft sprechen, und noch sehr
fehlerhafter schreiben. ...
Da ich nun befand, daß die so sehr nöthig zu wissende [sic] Regeln, in allen mir
bekannten Grammatiken zu weitläufig, und für diejenigen[, sic] die noch keine
andere Sprache kunstmäßig erlernet haben, zu undeutlich, zu schwer und zu
verworren vorgetragen sind, sich auch darüber viele meiner Schüler (worunter
sich einsichtsvolle und kluge Personen befinden) beklagten, so entschloß ich
mich, um ihnen das Lernen und mir das Lehren leichter zu machen, denselben den

Practical French Grammar, with which one can quickly and thoroughly learn the language in a
quite novel and very easy manner.
It is interesting to note that his observations share some similarity to the ones in currency today concerning the GTM, suggesting a perennial portrayal of older methods as “worse.” For example, Meidinger makes note, negatively, of what might be paraphrased as “long and elaborate” grammar explanations in previous methods. Recall, “long and elaborate explanations” is the phrase that appears in both Omaggio Hadley’s second-hand list of the GTM’s features, as well as in Rivers’ description thereof.

Whether Meidinger is as successful at achieving his end goal as he asserts is questionable. In fact, concerning his goal, he is even somewhat at odds with himself, trying both to make a grammar that is presented less “extensively” than previous ones, while also endeavoring to describe the “entire syntax” of French. Perhaps that is why his manual contains very lengthy explanations that are typically hard to digest without some
sort of practice. Yet, Meidinger often holds off on offering practice texts until he has presented a rule quite thoroughly, with all of its possible exceptions and nuances, including lengthy remarks and many examples. His explanatory remarks are in sentence form, and the examples, given in French with German translations, are usually presented side by side in columns, separate from the explanation sentences. Sometimes he also embeds examples as strings of prose in the explanation sentences, resulting in denser blocks of text than the column format. As an example of Meidinger’s thoroughness, the manual begins with 15 dense pages of rules about pronunciation before Meidinger offers his very first exercise.

Meidinger’s first exercise is labelled as a “reading exercise” (German: “Leseübung”). The text is entirely in French, presented with no attendant vocabulary, and so, with “reading,” Meidinger appears only to mean pronouncing the words (either aloud or sounding them out in one’s head) as opposed to understanding their meaning:

Leseübung.
L’oraison dominicale.
Notre Père qui es aux cieux. Ton nom soit sanctifié. Ton règne vienne. Ta volonté soit faite en la terre comme au ciel. Donne-nous aujourd’hui notre pain quotidien. Et nous pardonne nos offenses, ainsi que nous pardonnons à ceux qui nous ont offensés. Et ne nous indui point en tentation, mais nous délivre du mal; car à toi est le règne & la puissance & la gloire, aux siècles des siècles. Ainsi soit-il. (Meidinger 1792: 15)

This text – the “Our Father” – would surely be known to Meidinger’s students, probably both in German and in Latin. It therefore seems probable that Meidinger is relying on the text’s familiarity as a way to mitigate any confusion the reader might confront concerning the text’s meaning, quite likely due to the text’s similarity to the Latin version. The use of this text here is also significant because it will be Meidinger’s only use of a free-
standing French text until the final portion of his manual, some 444 pages later (Meidinger’s manual is 582 pages long). French is otherwise presented in Meidinger’s manual largely as a means of labelling German words in vocabulary lists and translating German texts into French, rather than as an independent language indivisible from its own culture. In fact, the use of the “Our Father” in French here is arguably its own expression of French’s being studied primarily as a system for labelling – here not a labelling of German, but of Latin.

After this “Leseübung” follow nine more pages of explanation, about the rules of French orthography, followed by six pages of explanation of the definite article and the case system in French. From today’s perspective, the manual does not begin in an easy-to-understand manner (which is also one of Meidinger’s stated goals). Rather, the explanations are consistently arduous to work through, at least by today’s standards. Meidinger explains everything in German, although he uses the French names for the cases – “Nominatif, Accusatif, Datif, Genitif, Ablatif, Vocatif” – which would not need translating anyway for a German speaking student (for in German they are: “Nominativ, Akkusativ, Dativ, Genitiv, Ablativ, Vokativ”) – and in either case participating in a tradition of imposing Latinate vocabulary for grammatical terms onto French. Only then, on page 30, does Meidinger offer his first translation exercise, a short text in German to translate into French, specifically, a translation of ten short phrases highlighting the nominative and genitive cases. The student begins with “der Vater des Sohnes” (“the son’s father”) and ends with “das Ende der ersten Aufgabe” ( “the end of
the first exercise”). All further exercise texts in his grammar presentations will also always be presented in German, intended for translation into French.

However, as lengthy as its preceding explanation is to read through, the translation exercise that Meidinger finally offers on page 30 is, by contrast, extremely easy to complete: one simply translates German into French, with the help of the vocabulary words that are immediately under the phrases to translate. Meidinger leaves no word in the exercise unglossed, such that all the student needs to process is the preceding grammatical explanation. Conveniently, the structures in Meidinger’s phrases to translate are the same as in the examples from the immediately preceding explanation. Meidinger also ensures that the student always knows the meaning of what he or she is writing in French, because the writing is always a translation of the student’s mother tongue.

The facility with which this translation exercise is completed only becomes problematic when one then realizes that another 17 translation exercises, all in the same vein, follow it (now with full sentences, instead of phrases). Although they are all comparatively “easy,” in that there are no tricks and no absent vocabulary, they are nonetheless exhaustive.

Then, the next grammatical topic is presented, the indefinite article, and its explanation takes up, by comparison, only two pages, followed by three translation exercises that are not especially long, except that for one of the exercises there is a half-page long vocabulary list underneath it, making the vocabulary list, visually, as long as the text to
translate. This tendency towards lengthiness appears time and again in Meidinger’s manual and has various effects. On the one hand, long grammar explanations are arduous to digest. But, on the other hand, long vocabulary lists ensure that the student has everything readily available so as to complete the translation exercise quickly and easily. However, a long and thorough vocabulary list, useful as it is, still creates a visual hurdle that can compete against the objective of making the exercise simpler to complete.

Meidinger’s protocol – grammar explanations about French, followed by texts in German for translation, with thorough vocabulary lists underneath – remains constant for the entire program. Significantly, as noted earlier, this protocol’s approach to vocabulary is consistently one of French labels for German words. That is, the French vocabulary is not treated as having its own independent meaning except as a means of translating, or, in effect, labelling, the German language. Similarly, concerning grammar, there is an implication that the French grammar system is being learned not as a means of understanding and producing French per se, but rather as a means of translating German expressions into passing French structures. French is therefore not presented as its own, independent system of expression nor as a self-standing object of study.

It should also be noted that, beginning with his second translation exercise, Meidinger’s German texts for translation are always “coherent” in content. That is, even when they are only two sentences long (although they soon grow into paragraphs of several sentences in length), the texts are always presented as unified wholes, as opposed to strings of thematically disconnected and unrelated sentences. Arguably, even
Meidinger’s first text, with its self-referential final phrase (“the end of the first exercise”), displays a certain independence and coherence. I mention the coherence of Meidinger’s texts because a lack of coherence among sentences in the texts to translate is actually an oft repeated, later criticism of the Grammar Translation Method, and the criticism does not appear to apply to Meidinger.

Yet, although coherent, the language in Meidinger’s texts can nonetheless sometimes be marked in ways that can strike a reader as bizarre. Here, I refer to a small manipulation that Meidinger performs with German word order in some of his texts when the perfect and pluperfect tenses of German verbs are used. A particularly clear example comes up much later in Meidinger’s book, in his 91st and 92nd texts, which are meant as practice translation exercises, for, respectively, the perfect and the pluperfect:

91.
Ihr habt gehabt mein Buch; wo ist es? – Ich habe es gehabt; allein ich habe es nicht mehr. – Wer hat gehabt meine Feder? ...

92.
Wir hatten gehabt euer Rechenbuch, aber wir hatten nicht gehabt euer Schreibbuch. ... – Wer hatte denn meine Streubüchse gehabt? ... (Meidinger 1792: 128)

You have had my book; where is it? – I have had it, but I have it no longer. – Who has had my pen? ...
We had had your math book, but we had not had your writing book. ... –Who had had then my ink blotter?  (My transl.)

The somewhat bizarre feature that I refer to here is Meidinger’s unnatural placement of the German past participle “gehabt.” Normally, this participle would always be used at the very end of a main clause in German, but in three instances here Meidinger places it earlier, before a direct object (“mein Buch,” “meine Feder,” and “euer Rechenbuch”). Meidinger does not remain consistent with this manipulation – for example, in the last
sentence cited here, with the direct object “meine Streubüchse.” It is unclear whether this
technique is an innovation of Meidinger’s, but he does mention it in his preface as an aid
for translating the German into French – that is, his German is thus mirroring French
word order:

[V]orher überliest man aber wohl die vorhergegangenen Regel [, sic] worüber
dieselbe [Aufgabe] gemacht ist, und lernet die darauf folgende [sic] Wörter und
Phrases auswendig. Um das Übersetzen der Aufgaben zu erleichtern, habe ich
im Anfange die Deutsche Construction etwas nach der Französischen eingerichtet.
Wenn also ein Schüler behörig acht giebt, wird er sie ohne Fehler übersetzen.
(Meidinger 1792: *5 verso)

[B]ut beforehand, one reads over well the preceding rule about which the
exercise is made and learns by heart the vocabulary and phrases that follow upon
that. In order to make the translating of the exercises easier, I have modeled the
German construction somewhat according to the French. If thus a pupil properly
pays attention, he will translate them without mistakes. (My transl.)

Meidinger’s change from the natural order of German is not only an implied instruction
to translate; rather, it also implies belief in a principle that translation between German
and French is easiest when it can be done on a straightforward, left-to-right, word-for-
word basis. Also noteworthy about Meidinger’s manipulation of German here is that his
choice to do so actually affords more autonomy to French as its own independent
language. That is, an assumed, yet nonexistent French text (the text that “would be” the
source of this disconnected German) is here so strongly dictating the presentation of
German that the German is not even in its own natural state anymore. German word
order is thus being applied here as a label over what would be the pre-existing French
word order, a practice that stands in opposition to Meidinger’s usual practice, where
French functions to label German.
At the end of his program – after all the grammar has been presented, along with practice texts for translating – Meidinger then provides copious, dense supplemental material, compounding his tendency towards encyclopedic thoroughness. First, he includes an appendix of German idioms that “for the most part cannot otherwise be given in good French” (German: “die meistens auf gut Französisch nicht anders gegeben werden können”) – almost 200 of them over six pages, with accompanying French translations nonetheless. Meidinger’s choice to offer these idioms speaks again to the lack of autonomy that is granted to French in his manual. For with these idioms, the manual appears not really to teach French as a language indivisible from its own culture, but rather, again, as a means of translating German language and culture into French conceived as a code. It is worth noting as well that Meidinger offers no corresponding list of French idioms that “for the most part cannot otherwise be given in good” German.

After these German idioms, Meidinger offers 12 short, “amusements on the physical world” (German: “physikalische Belustungen”), all written in German. Each “Belustung” is a half-page long text with a vocabulary list that is of equal length. These texts are assumed to be for translation into French, although Meidinger offers no instructions for them. Although their topics are diverse and do not appear to be in any way tied specifically to German culture, their broad range of content may reflect the kinds of topics that Meidinger expects his students might typically address. As well, their description as amusing or appealing “Belustungen” indicates that Meidinger may intend them as a kind of “fun” reward to the student at this later stage of the French course. The topics include “Diving for Pearls,” “Sugar,” and “Our Bones and Blood” (German: “Von
der Perlenfischerei,” “Vom Zucker,” “Von den Knochen und dem Blute”), presumably topics that could have universal, or perhaps even an exotic or scientific appeal reflecting Europe’s increasing commercial trade worldwide and also Enlightenment culture.

After these “Belustungen,” Meidinger presents 72 letters (German: “Briefe”) of progressively greater length, all in German (assumed as texts to be translated into French), except for one (number 29) that is given in incorrect French with the instruction that the student correct it. The letters are mostly between friends and family members, concerning generalities such as invitations to dances, checking in on a sick relative, or requests for the return of loaned items. As such, the letters are culturally German, but also do not appear to be exclusively reflective of German culture. Each letter is also followed by an extensive vocabulary list. Following these “friendly” letters are samples of business letters and bills of sale, given fully in German and then fully in French. Meidinger’s comment as to his inclusion of the full French text for these business letters, as opposed to just a vocabulary list, is significant:

Bei Verfertigung derselben muß man die Formeln beibehalten[, sic] die jeder Sprache eigen sind: deswegen habe ich die Französischen gleich nach den Deutschen gesetzt. (Meidinger 1792: 322)

In preparing these, one has to adhere to the conventions that are particular to each language: therefore I have placed the French ones right after the German ones. (My transl.)

Up until this point, Meidinger has been dealing with left-right, word-for-word translation, without taking into account cultural issues in language, such as socio-linguistic and discourse features, always treating French as some sort of appliqué over an underlying
German fabric. These fully translated letters are the first acknowledgment of the limits of word-for-word translation that without cultural content.

Following the “Briefe” are 36 extensive vocabulary lists about everyday items such as “The days of the Week,” “Morals and Vices,” and “Playing Games” (German: “Die Tage der Woche,” “Von Tugenden und Lastern,” “Vom Spielen”). Meidinger offers these lists ostensibly for conversation practice, since he heads them with the title, “Collection of words that are most necessary for speaking” (German: “Sammlung der zum Sprechen nöthigsten Wörter”)\(^5\). – As for speaking in general, Meidinger mentions it in the beginning of his preface as an item that needs addressing generally – that is, he observes that students are not really speaking well despite their foreign language studies – and he claims his method will address that lack. Yet, he also acknowledges a certain limit to learning to speak by his method, for he ends his preface with the reminder (or perhaps instruction) that at the end of his program a student will still need contact with people who “sprechen” (“speak”) French. – The length of these lists of words for speaking with is impossible to ignore: Meidinger requires 92 pages for the 36 lists. Adding to the difficulty that the length of the lists presents, only one of the lists is in alphabetical order. How the lists are to be used is left unattended – Meidinger perhaps believed that students, having mastered the grammar, now required vocabulary on a variety of topics, to which they could apply the grammar structures learned.

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\(^5\) They are also similar to vocabulary lists given in phrase books for travelers today.
After these vocabulary lists that are meant as an inventory of words with which to speak, Meidinger presents – in what he seems to consider a logical follow-up – 17 “new, easy conversations of various content” (German: “neue, leichte Gespräche von verschiedenem Inhalt”). The titles of these conversations include, “The Weather,” “Between Two Friends,” “Tableside Talk,” and also, again, “Playing Games” (German: “Vom Wetter,” “Zwischen zwei Freunden,” “Tischgespräche,” “Vom Spielen”). Such topics are certainly German culturally, but they are presumably of French cultural interest too.

Since Meidinger prints all 17 of the conversations bilingually in toto, with the French on the left and the German on the right, the inclusion of vocabulary lists with these conversations is no longer relevant. As such, these conversations are reminiscent of the business letters for which Meidinger had earlier included full French versions, and the conversations may be regarded as another instance where French is given more independence in Meidinger’s manual. Additionally, the inclusion of the entire text in both languages for these conversations means that translation is also removed from the table, and the conversations thus appear to be meant to be read aloud, as if practicing the dramatic reading of a script. Alternatively, they may be meant to be memorized and spoken without the manual in hand, but Meidinger does not offer instructions here.

Finally, as if to represent a crowning achievement, Meidinger gives his student texts entirely written in French. First there are 140 “selected vignettes” of Meidinger’s own crafting (German: “auserlesene Histörchen” – Meidinger notes in his “Vorrede” that he crafted these himself). Following Meidinger’s own compositions, he provides 16 original French texts: 12 “Énigmes,” one “Description de Paris,” and 3 “Épitaphes.”
Meidinger does not attribute these last items to any particular French authors; however, the “Description de Paris” is a poem by Paul Scallon (1610 – 1660). The “épitaphes” and “énigmes” also make use of rhyme and word play in such a way that they too appear to be of French cultural origin. There are again extensive vocabulary lists, this time from French to German, for all of these texts, both for the “Histörchen” and also for the 16 texts of French cultural origin, but their vocabulary lists do not appear until after the last text, in what appears to be an attempt by Meidinger to leave the experience of reading the French texts uninterrupted. Meidinger actually instructs students to learn the vocabulary before reading the texts; in his “Vorrede,” he notes that, after the student has first memorized the attendant vocabulary, each text is to be read for comprehension purposes and also to be translated. It is important to note that these texts represent the first time that Meidinger provides for translation out of French into the student’s mother tongue of German (excluding the use of the “Our Father” in French early on as a reading and pronunciation exercise). Thus, French in this final section of the manual is given much independence and is not presented anymore as a means solely of labelling and translating the German language.

In summary, whether Meidinger therefore truly improves upon the lengthy nature that he notices in other books is debatable. However, it is at any rate clear that Meidinger assumes that his method represents something new (the word “neu” also appears in the full title of his manual). His manual is also intended, in his words, to be more “understandable,” less “abstruse and rambling,” “simpler,” and “easier.” It is also clear that Meidinger stresses knowledge of grammar and that he believes that his manner of
stressing grammar is different from in the past. Translation, primarily from the mother
tongue into the foreign language, is also a hallmark of his method. His philosophy of
translation appears to be marked by a belief in the efficacy of such restrictive principles
as word-for-word translation (as evidenced by his use of French vocabulary lists as
labelling tools for German words) and the assumption that grammatical categories can be
matched up between languages, in fact by imposing Latin terminology on French syntax.6
If his work is encyclopedically long, it also provides a useful reference work for students
for years beyond their initial French course.

Indeed, Meidinger’s manual was hugely successful. According to the Allgemeine
deutsche Biographie of 1885 (available from the Historische Kommission 2007),
Meidinger’s manual was reprinted in its 37th edition in 1857, well after his death, and it
sold a quarter million copies in Germany, not including copies sold in Reutlingen,
Schaffhausen, and Vienna. (Reutlingen, Schaffhausen, and Vienna were politically
independent at the time and not included in the Historische Kommission’s statistics.)

Johann Heinrich Philipp Seidenstücker comes onto the scene. His method largely
represents an opposing approach to Meidinger’s. Is it a reaction to Meidinger’s?

The next of the five Prussians to publish a language teaching manual was Seidenstücker
in 1811, with his Elementarbuch zur Erlernung der französischen Sprache (my
translation: Elementary Book for Learning the French Language). At first look,

6 Such a philosophy was likely also present at this time in the French Academy, which presumably would
have found it unimaginable that Latin terminology was not applicable to French.
Seidenstücker’s manual can appear radically different from Meidinger’s, as if Seidenstücker might have even started the process completely afresh. But upon closer inspection, I assert that, as different as Seidenstücker’s approach is, Meidinger’s methodology was nonetheless clearly an influential model for Seidenstücker; to be sure, Seidenstücker appears to have been less inclined to replicate Meidinger’s approach than to react against it. I will first examine the apparent changes that Seidenstücker made to Meidinger’s method (in the approaches to grammar and translation), before noting some possible areas of overlap (especially in the approach to vocabulary). I use an eighth edition of Seidenstücker’s book, from 1833, which contains the prefaces to his first, second, third, and eighth editions.

On the surface, Seidenstücker’s approach seems to be radically different from Meidinger’s. In the preface to his first edition, Seidenstücker claims that his book’s methodology is an imitation of the natural processes that a child goes through in learning its mother tongue. That argument stands in striking opposition to Meidinger’s implicit assumption that learning a foreign language was unrelated to, and farther removed from, childhood language learning. Seidenstücker views his book as a preparation for later, controlled grammar study and literature reading – whereas Meidinger’s manual stresses explicit grammar study and literary appreciation from the outset:

Dieses Elementarbuch sollte den natürlichen Gang, auf welchem Kinder zur ersten Kenntnis und zum ersten Gebrauche ihrer Muttersprache gelangen, möglichst nachahmen, und auf den Gebrauch einer geordneten Grammatik und die Lektüre größerer Lesebücher vorbereiten. (Seidenstücker 1833, III)
This elementary book ought to imitate as much as possible the natural way in which children reach an initial knowledge and an initial ability to use their mother tongue. This book ought also to prepare a person for the use of an ordered grammar book and the reading of more extensive books with reading selections. (My transl.)

It appears that Seidenstücker believes that overt grammar explanation and heavy reading would not be “natural” at such an early stage of learning a language. Yet, as he states, knowledge of grammar and a reading ability are indeed his eventual goals (only for after his book). Seidenstücker thus chooses to leave out any explanation of the grammar before his translation exercises. Whereas Meidinger’s sequence is: grammar explanation, then texts to translate, with vocabulary directly under each text, Seidenstücker, omitting any overt grammar explanation, places the vocabulary above the texts that are to be translated and leaves “the presentation” at that. This amounts to a generally inductive approach to teaching grammar. That is, without a more explicit approach to grammar such as Meidinger’s (by not including pre-explanations that use a meta-level terminology to refer to grammar phenomena), Seidenstücker appears actually to wish that his example illustrations will naturally provoke questions or inferences about grammar from his reader on a more direct level. This inductive approach to grammar by Seidenstücker stands in stark contrast to what would be classified as the deductive grammar approach that Meidinger advocates.

In general terms, an inductive approach to grammar goes from the unknown to the known, or the illustration to the rule – a learner, for example using Seidenstücker’s book, builds grammatical knowledge by analyzing and sorting out illustrative examples of texts as presented in a not yet fully known foreign language. By contrast, a deductive
approach to grammar, such as Meidinger’s, goes from the known to the unknown, or the rule to the illustration – a leaner applies already sorted out grammatical knowledge, explained in the mother tongue, by synthesizing successful utterances and texts in the foreign language. Seidenstücker’s inductive approach to grammar allies itself well with his professed goal of imitating a child’s natural path towards the knowledge and acquisition of its mother tongue. For an instructive discussion on some of the differences between inductive and deductive methodologies, see Gollin (1998), and for an example of a textbook espousing inductive principles, see German: A Structural Approach by Lohnes and Strothmann7.

Consider the first four exercise texts in Seidenstücker’s book:

Le père, la mère.

Bon, bonne, *gut*.
Le bon père, la bonne mère.

Est, *ist*.
Le père est bon. La mère est bon.

Mon, *mein*, *meinen*, *meine*, ma, *mein*, *meinen*, *meine*.
Mon père, ma mere, mon bon père, ma bonne mere, mon père est bon, ma mere est bonne. (Seidenstücker 1833: 1)

Note that Seidenstücker implicitly asks the student at first to translate from French into German (foreign language into mother tongue), whereas Meidinger does the opposite (until the very end of his program, where Meidinger also presents French texts for translation into German). In doing so, Seidenstücker thus affords French an

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7 Lohnes and Strothmann combine an inductive approach to grammar with intensive repetition of grammatically correct sentences. The repetition aimed to make the production of natural grammatical structures second nature for the student.
independence and primacy from the outset, fulfilling his goal of imitating the manner in which a child is confronted by the mother tongue, while also setting him apart from Meidinger. Meidinger would have German phrases and sentences here, and beforehand he would have lengthy explanations specifying, for example, the differences between “mon” and “ma.” Arguably, Seidenstücker’s system may even be unclear here about the differences between “mon” and “ma,” since he both bothers to differentiate them, yet also offers the same translations for each.

Very soon after this exercise, starting with his thirteenth translation exercise on page 3, Seidenstücker includes texts in German too (it is assumed for their translation into French, the foreign language). Seidenstücker’s texts to translate – both his German and his French texts – are different from Meidinger’s texts to translate (which are always presented in German) in that, thematically, Seidenstücker’s texts are not unified and coherent wholes. Rather, Seidenstücker provides arrays of sentences that are usually disconnected and share little content. His sentences are most related to each other only in that they all feature the same structures and words that had just been illustrated above. Here, as an example, is his sixteenth exercise:

Car, denn, je, ich, ai, habe, j’ai, ich habe, tu, du, as, hast, suis, bin, je suis, ich bin, ami, Freund, l’ami, der Freund, l’animal, das Thier.


The horse is a good animal. I have a good horse. I have bought a horse. My sister has bought a bird. You have received my sister’s bird. I am your friend. Your brother is my sister’s friend …

We have lost our duck. Have you seen the duck? It is very big. My father’s horse is lost. The horse is useful. (My transl.)

Beyond the questionably natural “follow-the-bouncing-ball” formula (i.e., “horse,” “bought,” “bird,” etc.) that characterizes almost all of Seidenstücker’s sentences, it should also be pointed out that, in his German sentences, he, like Meidinger, alters the word order so that it matches French word order more closely. For example, he places the perfect participle “verloren” before the direct object “unsre Ente” instead of after it, where it is normally placed in German. Seidenstücker does this manipulation consistently with the perfect tense in all his German sentences for translation, the underlying idea being to make it easier for the student to produce correct translations. Seidenstücker’s choice here would indicate that although he is using an inductive approach, since his primary technique is translation, he feels he must more clearly prompt the student to produce French word order.

In his next exercise, Seidenstücker also illustrates the moving of the conjugated verb in German, now in a relative clause, from its normal, final position, to one that reflects where the conjugated verb would be in a relative clause in French:

Mein Bruder hat einen Hund, welcher sehr falsch ist (welcher ist sehr falsch). (Seidenstücker 1833: 5)

My brother has a dog that very disloyal is (that is very disloyal). (My transl.)
Thereafter, Seidenstücker always presents his German relative clauses with the verb already moved to its “French” position. Seidenstücker’s manipulation of the German word order is a clear signal that translation is his intended goal for the texts. This approach appears almost inspired by Meidinger, who, as noted above, also purposefully rearranges the order of German verbs in an attempt to facilitate the translation of German into French.

Meidinger displays a strict and explicit presentational approach in that he numbers every lesson and text. Seidenstücker’s system appears in comparison more nonchalant; he does not start numbering his texts until page 38 (his text contains 92 pages total). The first numbered text in Seidenstücker’s book is a text in French about the people of Greenland. This text is the first to stand alone, with no attendant list of words above itself illustrating either structures or vocabulary in the text. It is also the first text in Seidenstücker’s book that can be described as having its own coherent and unified expository content. It appears as if the text’s numbering has become necessary as a matter of convenience, for even though Seidenstücker presents the text with no attendant vocabulary list, he has a list to offer later in his book, as he notes in a parenthetical aside above the text:

(B e m e r k u n g: Die Wörter einer jeden folgenden Aufgabe stehen jetzt am Ende des Buchs, weil sie vor der Ausarbeitung vollständig müssen auswendig gelernt werden. Die Aussprache ist vorher einzuüben.) (Seidenstücker 1833: 37, emphasis in original)

( N o t e: The words for every following exercise are now at the end of the book, because, the words must be learned by heart completely before working with the text.) (My transl.)

In one sense, Seidenstücker might be offering a straightforward reading exercise here, as opposed to a translation activity, but the unspecified nature of the “Ausarbeitung” that he
assigns could include translation. That is, the removal of the vocabulary list to the back of the book acts as a reading aid, in that the visual presentation of the French text on the page is left uninterrupted.

This French text on Greenlanders is the first of a four-text alternation; first, a German text about reindeer, then a French text about the rhinoceros, and then another German text about the human being’s five senses. The inclusion of the two German texts is an implied translation activity, for there would seem to be no other task to do with these texts. Their inclusion also seems to be a possible implication that, beyond reading alone, translation is also an expected treatment for the French texts. The language in the German texts has not been overtly manipulated by Seidenstücker, but their language is also so “simple” – with no verbs in the perfect tense and no relative clauses – that any manipulation would be moot. Ultimately, Seidenstücker does not say how or whether the two French texts here are to be read or handled differently from the two German ones.

After these four texts, Seidenstücker then returns to his earlier routine: commencing each lesson with illustrations of a grammar topic by use of examples, without any explicit explanation and along with some attendant vocabulary, followed by texts to translate. The texts also return to becoming an array of, at best, formulaically connected sentences, most related by a repetitive sharing of structural features or a word.

The bifurcation of inductive and deductive language teaching methods marks much of the twentieth century’s language teaching trends, and it is interesting to note that an example of such bifurcation obtains already here in the disparate approaches of Meidinger and
Seidenstücker to grammar and translating. Also recall that, specifically in Chastain’s (1976) description of the features of the Grammar Translation Method, as well implicitly in the definitions and lists given above by others, the GTM is unanimously considered as a deductive approach. From this perspective, it may appear surprising that Seidenstücker, with his inductive approach to grammar and translating, is so consistently included in the GTM’s lineage by historians.

However, Seidenstücker and Meidinger’s approaches are not always in opposition. As regards vocabulary, both authors actually ascribe to a deductive methodology of providing the equivalents and expecting their memorization. Vocabulary is, for example, the only information that Seidenstücker gives an explicit explanation of (via his translating the French words into German) before offering his French texts. That is, Seidenstücker treats foreign language vocabulary as something that the student is to know fully before attempting to read the foreign language. Seidenstücker underscores this deductive principle towards vocabulary when, as noted above, he eventually places his vocabulary lists at the end of his book, but still nonetheless instructs his student first to “learn these words by heart” before reading the texts where they appear. A more inductive approach to vocabulary might encourage the student to try and arrive at a word’s meaning while reading, by analyzing the word’s use in context; or an inductive vocabulary approach might use pictures with foreign language words as labels, instead of a bilingual glossary. Meidinger, too, instructs his students first to memorize vocabulary before actually reading any of the free-standing French texts that he provides at the end of his book.
I assert that at least two other possibilities exist – beyond his deductive approach to vocabulary – that could lead one to classify Seidenstücker as a contributor to the GTM, despite his markedly inductive approach to grammar and translating. Firstly, Seidenstücker’s rather natural-seeming method of illustrative examples without overt explanation at times devolves into what could appear to be a rather unnaturally repetitive and laborious system, comparable with the exhaustive zeal for thoroughness that Meidinger displays. For example, consider the following exercise from Seidenstücker that is intended to illustrate the use of the demonstrative pronoun in French:

Celui-ci, dieser, diese, dieses, celui-là, jener, jene, jenes, ceux-ci, diese, ceux-là, jene, ce cheval-ci, dieses Pferd, ce cheval-là, jenes Pferd; ces chevaux-ci, diese Pferde, ces chevaux-là, jene Pferde; ce garçon-ci, dieser Knabe, ce garçon-là, jener Knabe; celle-ci, dieser, diese, dieses, celle-là, jener, jene, jenes; celles-ci, diese, celles-là, jene, cette fille-ci, dieses Mädchen, cette fille-là, jenes Mädchen, ces filles-ci, diese Mädchen, ces-filles-là, jene Mädchen, paresseux, se, faul, le compagnon, der Gespielle, la danseuse, die Tänzerin, la maison, das Haus, la femme, die Frau, l’enfant, das Kind, le tailleur, der Schneider, le cordonnier, der Schuhmacher, la blanchisseuse, die Wäscherin, le marchand, der Kaufmann, riche, reich, la vache, die Kuh, gras, sse, fett, tendre, zärtlich, le chapeau, der Hut, l’habit (le), das Kleid, le chanteur, der Sänger, chante mieux, singt besser, le musicien, der Musikus, joue mieux du violon, spielt die Violine besser, l’écolier, der Schüler, appliqué, fleißig, la table, der Tisch, je me souviens, ich erinnere mich, je pense, ich denke, à, an, des habits, Kleider.

Cet homme-ci est plus grand que celui-là. Ce livre-ci est meilleur que celui-là. Cette table-ci est plus belle que celle-là. Ce garçon-là est plus paresseux que celui-ci. Cette fille-là est plus modeste que celle-ci. Je me souviens de cet ami-ci et de celui-là, de cette amie-ci et de celle-là, de ce compagnon-là et de celui-ci, de cette danseuse-là et de celle-ci. Je pense à ce cheval-ci et à celui-là, à cet enfant-ci et a celui-là, à cette maison-ci et à celle-là, à cette femme-là et à celle-ci, à ce canard-là et a celui-ci. J’aime cet home-ci et celui-là, cette femme-ci et celle-là, ce garçon-là et celui-ci, cette fille-là et celle-ci. La mere parle de cet enfant-ci et de celui-là, de ce tailleur-là et de celui-ci, de ce cordonnier-ci et de celui-là, de cette blanchisseuse-là et de celle-ci. (Seidenstücker 1833: 36)

On a visual level alone, the repetitive images of so many similar words in the exercise could be considered unnatural looking. This presentational format may not have been
Seidenstücker’s first choice, per se, instead representing a way for more material to be presented in fewer pages than would be needed if the phrases were in columns. Additionally, the repeated use of so many variants on the same theme (singular and plural, masculine and feminine, etc.) could also come across as no longer truly imitative of a child’s natural experiences. In a sense, Seidenstücker is demonstrating here a degree of “length and elaborateness” that Meidinger achieves with his more explicitly explained grammatical explanations. Recall that the phrase “long and elaborate” appears in reference to various forms of explanation in all of the previously examined definitions of the GTM today.

Secondly, which is actually out of Seidenstücker’s control, it is possible that his largely inductive textbook was nonetheless being used by teachers and institutions who taught according to philosophies that were more defined by Meidinger’s deductive approach. This second possibility is hinted at, as I note later, by Ahn, who, in the preface to his own manual, both professes himself as an adherent to Seidenstücker’s method while also asking users of his own book not to fall prey to the trap of over-translating. That is, Ahn implies that the reality may have been the use of Seidenstücker’s book in an approach so heavily dependent on translation that the difference was obscured, ignoring in the process the intention of Seidenstücker and Ahn that their methods resemble a child’s natural learning, as opposed to learning through translation. Indeed, one can easily envision that a deductive grammar explanation, marked with academic grammar terminology, could be effectively layered onto Seidenstücker’s pages, even if only done via a classroom discussion and / or writing on the blackboard. Such a practice, disregarding, or, in certain
deductive-oriented cultures, even allegedly “raising” Seidenstücker’s inductive approach, might be responsible for the consistent placement of Seidenstücker in the line of Meidinger’s descendants. But at any rate, Seidenstücker’s approach is ultimately running in parallel with Meidinger’s, just perhaps at a strategically decelerated or attentuated rate; for Seidenstücker indeed states that he has as a eventual goal that the student confront grammar in an ordered fashion, such as would be represented by Meidinger.

The reasons why institutions with deductive philosophies might use Seidenstücker’s method are unclear, and may include a desire for a gentler, more natural beginning for schoolchildren, but another factor is possible. Doff (2008) makes an interesting case for the growing influence during the 19th century in Germany of the women teachers at girls’ schools, where inductive approaches were the norm:

[I]t is well worth noting that the tradition of improving one’s language skills by a longer stay in the target culture following the mostly theory-oriented training at a teachers’ seminar had long been an established practice among female teachers of modern languages. However, they usually had to pay for this extra training themselves, which is why they regularly started work at private colleges or as private teachers in families in Britain or France. The fact that after their return female teachers had on average a significantly higher oral proficiency in the target language than their male colleagues was repeatedly stated in the public debate. Their comparatively high language competence in English or French often provided female language teachers the only opportunity to become employed in higher state schools (also for boys) and can thus be interpreted as their gateway to higher education in Germany in general. (Doff 2008)

Significantly, Doff’s observations concern the teaching of living languages and specifically the speaking proficiency of these women teachers. As Doff also notes, observations were increasingly being made at this time that boys were not speaking the modern languages that they were learning at their schools, where living languages were still conventionally studied in the traditional manner of Latin and Greek. Possibly,
inductive books like Seidenstücker’s found more resonance with these women teachers as they made their way more and more into higher state schools. At any rate, the popularity and influence of Seidenstücker’s method are attested to later not only by Ahn, but also by Ollendorff and Ploetz.

As for other similarities, beyond their shared deductive approach to vocabulary learning, Seidenstücker also has in common with Meidinger a lack of much explicit instruction about how actually to treat the texts that he provides in the foreign language. That is, except for implied instructions to read and perhaps translate the French texts in his book, Seidenstücker does not provide cues for other possible treatments. Perhaps Seidenstücker assumes that a teacher would know how to treat the texts. Meidinger at least suggests reading the texts aloud in class and also using them to practice grammar routines in class, like orally declining and conjugating selected words from the texts. And Meidinger includes a pronunciation guide as help for such oral work. But if Seidenstücker intends his French texts to be read aloud or otherwise activated orally, then his student would also need to know how the words and language sound. However, Seidenstücker includes no guide to the pronunciation of French (which is another difference from Meidinger’s book). Seidenstücker addresses this omission in his preface, stating that he indeed expects the assistance of a teacher:

Das Buch verlangt nur in Hinsicht der Aussprache die Hilfe eines Lehrers, übrigens würde ein fleißiger Lehrling ohne Lehrer in demselben von Seite zu Seite fortarbeiten können. (Seidenstücker 1833: III)

The book requires the help of a teacher only in regard to the topic of pronunciation. Yet, a diligent learner without a teacher would be able to continue in the book from page to page. (My transl.)
Seidenstücker’s deference to help from a teacher here suggests that a teacher may indeed be an important figure for suggesting how to use other parts of his book that lack instructions, such as the French texts mentioned above. He seems to believe that his book would only work as a self-study book if the learner were “diligent” enough, i.e., able, essentially, to be her or his own teacher. Meidinger also maintains that a learner could hypothetically use his book productively without a teacher, but ultimately stresses, in the third to last sentence of his preface, that the presence of a good teacher makes his book easier and quicker to complete.

Without including a pronunciation guide and by suggesting that models of spoken language from a teacher are the best route for learning pronunciation, Seidenstücker follows an inductive philosophy to the learning of pronunciation. That is, he eschews the use of a written pronunciation guide as a means of gaining knowledge in advance about how to produce the sounds of the foreign language. Seidenstücker advocates instead the inductive analysis of examples of French speech, such as utterances voiced by the teacher. The process is akin to Seidenstücker’s belief in the use of unexplained, yet illustrative examples in written form to help in grammar acquisition. I postulate that, if he had available today’s sound recording technology, Seidenstücker might choose to include with his book samples of recorded speech in French, as models for his students to analyze, imitate, and thus learn about French pronunciation.

As Seidenstücker’s book proceeds further, more overt grammar explanation gradually gets presented before his texts. This practice of gradually becoming more explanatory
allies itself well with Seidenstücker’s stated goal in his preface of preparing the student for a more ordered approach to grammar eventually. As an example of this gradual trend towards overt grammar explanation, here is Seidenstücker’s “explanation” of the conjugation of the verb “to be” in French, where the grammar explanation is still markedly inductive. The conjugation pattern is attached to the front of a vocabulary list without any overt explanation:

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Je suis, ich bin, tu es, du bist, il est und elle est, er, sie, es ist, on est, man ist, le père est, der Vater ist, nous sommes, wir sind, vous êtes, ihr seyd, ils sont und elles sont, sie sind, les pères sont, die Väter sind, la partie, der Theil, la lune, der Mond, l’année (la), das Jahr, le mois, der Monat, la semaine, die Woche, nécessaire, nothwendig, la cause, die Ursache, la lumière, das Licht, la chaleur, die Wärme
Je suis malheureux et vous êtes bien heureux. Mon frère est pauvre et vous êtes riche... (Seidenstücker 1833: 22)
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For a student who has not studied languages before, Seidenstücker’s tactics here can even qualify as purely inductive. However, there is also a certain echo from deductive methodology that an experienced student would surely recognize. Namely,

Seidenstücker does not choose to randomize the person and number in the conjugation routine of the verb, rather he offers it in the traditionally deductive pattern of “first person, singular; second, singular; third, singular; first, plural; second, plural; third, plural” – as it would probably have appeared in, for example, Meidinger’s manual.

Seidenstücker appears to address this echoing of a deductive approach by inserting an interruption (“le père est”) into the typical conjugation routine. Or, Seidenstücker includes “le père est” simply out of the inductive principle to provide illustrative examples. The exercise remains for me as a possible “graduation step” for Seidenstücker’s student towards a more explicit, meta-level awareness of grammar.
What is especially interesting: Seidenstücker also seems to realize that his weaving of a “slightly overt” grammar explanation into a vocabulary list is an effective means of accustoming his student to a later, and necessary, confrontation with explicit grammar terminology. One might also recall that Seidenstücker establishes a practice of learning vocabulary lists by heart, and it is entirely presumable that the declined or conjugated phrases included in the vocabulary lists are also meant to be memorized before the student proceeds to the exercises. In later exercises, Seidenstücker begins resorting to more overt grammar explanation, though it is often still “woven into” his examples and does not always stand starkly apart. Consider, for example, the following exercise from Seidenstücker, where the examples above the text are now wholly of a grammatical nature (with no real vocabulary information, as these words have already been given and used earlier in his book):

Je parlois, ich redete, tu parlois, du redetest, il, elle parloit, er, sie, es redete, on parloit, man redete, le père parloit, der Vater redete, nous parlions, wir redeten, vouz parliez, ihr redetet, ils, elles parloient, sie redeten, les pères parloient, die Väter redeten, qui parloient, welche redeten. J’amois [sic], ich liebte, nous aimions, wir liebten, je vendois, ich verkaufte, tu vendois, tu verkauftest, nous vendions, wir verkauften, ils vendoient, sie verkauften. 1. –ois, 2. –ois, 3. –oit, 1. –ions, 2. –iez, 3. –oient8 (Seidenstücker 1833, 42)

Whether Seidenstücker is here only inductively illustrating the imperfect tense, or perhaps also deductively explaining it, is becoming unclear, as evidenced by his systematic use of the numbers and personal verb endings at the end. He has not yet in his book introduced the terms “first person, second person, third person,” but here he appears to assume that his reader will know what is meant, that schoolchildren studying written German would know this terminology. These students would presumably also have

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8 Seidenstücker uses forms characteristic of French at that time; the singular forms have now become -ais, -ais, -ait; and the third-person plural form is now -aient.
learned some Latin previously. Seidenstücker’s use of the explicitly described
conjugation pattern in final position here may also represent a “pre-emptive fix” of sorts,
so that he might ensure that the student indeed has noticed the important information in
the preceding examples.

At a later exercise in his book, Seidenstücker finally resorts to more overt grammar
explanation, actually using words such as “first person singular,” beyond merely
numbering:

Die erste Person des Singulärs geht auf s oder i. *Je vendi, reçus, parla*, ich
verkaufte, bekam, redete.
Die zweite auf *s*. *Tu vendis, reçus, parlas*, du verkauftest, bekamst, redetest.
Die dritte auf *t* (a). *Il vendit, reçut, parla*, er verkaufte, bekam, redete.
1. –*mes*. *Nous vendîmes, reçûmes, parlâmes*, wir verkauften u.s.w.
2. –*tes*. *Vous vendîtes, reçûtes, parlâtes*, ihr verkauftet u.s.w.
3. –*rent* (*eren*). *Ils vendirent, reçurent, parlèrent*, sie verkauften u.s.w.
(Seidenstücker 1833: 57)

Since this passage appears relatively later in his book, Seidenstücker appears here to be
acknowledging, if only tacitly, the path towards achieving the goal that he mentioned in
his preface: reading an “ordered grammar book.” Confirming this suspicion, one
suddenly finds even later, on pages 69-72 in Seidenstücker’s book, a “complete
conjugation” (German: “vollständige Konjugation”) of the fours classes of French verbs
(using the example conjugations of “parler,” “finir,” “recevoir,” and “vendre”), and also
of the helping verbs “avoir” and “être.” The conjugations are tabularized (in contrast to
Seidenstücker’s prose-form examples up to this point), and they include a plethora of
grammatical terms (“infinitive,” “participle,” “singular and plural,” “imperfect,” “future,”
“conditional,” etc.) both in German and in French. The conjugations are hardly
differentiable from how Meidinger would present them.
This tabularized conjugation presentation is not the only manifestation of what Seidenstücker means by the goals mentioned in his preface of using an “ordered grammar” (“eine geordnete Grammatik”) and reading “more extensive books with reading selections” (“größere Lesebücher”). As noted earlier, Seidenstücker eventually stops placing complete vocabulary lists in visual proximity of his longer French texts (beginning on page 37), instead placing the vocabulary at a later portion of the book, in what is probably an attempt to cultivate the student’s reading experience as a natural and seamless activity, uninterrupted by vocabulary checking. Meidinger, it will be recalled, uses the same procedure with his vocabulary lists for his final French texts (the 140 “Histörchen” and the “énigmes,” “description de Paris,” and “épitaphes.”).

While their goals appear to be similar in outcome, their approaches to those goals, at least at the beginning of instruction are very different. Grammar, translation, and pronunciation are all treated inductively by Seidenstücker, in contrast to Meidinger’s deductive approach. In their shared deductive approach to vocabulary there is, however, overlap between the two authors. As well, both authors appear to agree on a format of presentation that favors short texts with prefabricated sentences into which the author has incorporated significant features. In both books, there is a tendency towards repetitiveness and thoroughness that, in Seidenstücker’s case, can belie his promise of imitating natural processes and, in Meidinger’s case, can lead to exhaustive rule processing. Despite this obtained thoroughness, Seidenstücker never initially promises,
as does Meidinger, that his book will present “the entire syntax” of French, nor any aspect of French in its “entirety.”

As to the question of Meidinger’s explicit influence – i.e., as to whether Seidenstücker’s manual is a direct reaction to Meidinger or more an accidental phenomenon – it is improbable that Seidenstücker would have been unfamiliar with Meidinger’s popular text. (See also the discussion of Ollendorff below, where Ollendorff attests to Meidinger’s enduring influence.) Although Seidenstücker does not name Meidinger as a direct influence, Christ (1999) maintains that Meidinger indeed influenced Seidenstücker. Christ notes (1999: 49) that Seidenstücker “accuses Meidinger of not providing his pupils with models in the target language,” suggesting that Seidenstücker indeed names Meidinger somewhere in a document. However, Christ does not provide a citation, nor have I been able to find any statement by Seidenstücker that mentions Meidinger. Latin grammar books, with which both Meidinger and Seidenstücker would probably have been familiar, may also have been a significant interface here.

As regards Meidinger’s own awareness of his influence on other textbooks and teachers, in a supplemental preface to his book that is dated 1821 (and available to read in the 35th edition of his manual), he addresses concerns raised about his method by unnamed “various people” (German: “Verschiedene”). This may be his way of acknowledging Seidenstücker, among other contemporary critics. At any rate, it seems certain that Seidenstücker and Meidinger must have been aware of each other’s works, and since

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9 My translation. Original German: 
[E]r wirft Meidinger vor, seinen Schülern keine Modelle in der Zielsprache vorzugeben.
Meidinger came first, he would have the surest claim to be the influencer. Thus, it would appear reasonable to assert that Meidinger’s methodology is indeed both an influential model for copying (where it is in harmony with Seidenstücker’s approach), and also an influential spark for change (where Seidenstücker chooses inductive pathways).

*Johann Franz Ahn reproduces Seidenstücker’s book with some minor improvements, and the first explicit backlash against over-translating.*

Ahn is the next of the Prussian scholars who published a language teaching manual, his *Praktischer Lehrgang zur schnellen und leichten Erlernung der französischen Sprache* of 1834 (my translation: *Practical Course for Quickly and Easily Learning the French Language*). Ahn’s work, like Meidinger’s and Seidenstücker’s, was also extremely popular, which alone the high number of editions in a small number of years attests to. For this dissertation I use his 48th edition, published in Cologne in 1850. This 48th edition contains two prefaces: the one, dated June and December, 1834, is labelled as a preface to the first and second editions, and the other is a preface to the third edition, dated December, 1835.

Ahn’s work is characterized by its striking similarity to Seidenstücker’s, which is to be completely expected, since Ahn states explicitly that he is continuing and developing Seidenstücker’s method. Ahn’s brief preface to his first and second editions reads at first as a near copy of Seidenstücker’s. Ahn also mentions Seidenstücker’s influence therein:
Vorwort zur ersten und zweiten Auflage.
Der vorliegende Lehrgang ist für den ersten Unterricht in der französischen Sprache bestimmt; er will den natürlichen Gang, auf welchem Kinder zur ersten Kenntnis und zum ersten Gebrauche ihrer Muttersprache gelangen, möglichst nachahmen, und auf den Gebrauch einer geordneten Grammatik und die Lektüre größerer Lesebücher vorbereiten. Obgleich derselbe alles Erlernen von Regeln ausschließt, so ist er selbst doch nicht ohne Regel entstanden, sondern befolgt eine nach bestimmten Grundsätzen fortschreitende Methode. Der verstorbene Rector Seidenstücker hat diese Methode zuerst vorgezeichnet, wir haben es nur versucht, sie näher zu entwickeln und näher durchzuführen. (Ahn 1850: III)

Preface to the first and second editions.
The present course of study is intended for beginning instruction in the French language; it aims to imitate as much as possible the natural way in which children reach an initial knowledge and an initial ability to use their mother tongue. And it aims to prepare a person for the use of an ordered grammar book and the reading of more extensive books with reading selections. Although this course of study excludes the practice of all learning by rules, it did not actually come into being absent any rule; rather it follows an ongoing method that is characterized by certain fundamental principles. The deceased rector Seidenstücker was the first to delineate this method. We have simply tried to develop and realize it further. (My transl.)

Ahn’s goal of imitating a child’s natural learning processes implies that his manual will, like Seidenstücker’s, also be marked by inductive approaches. Indeed, the similarities of Ahn’s book to Seidenstücker’s book only continue from here. For example, as concerns an inductive approach to grammar, Ahn, like Seidenstücker, initially refrains from overt grammar explanations, instead just offering illustrative examples above his texts.

Consider, for example, Ahn’s first four exercises:

1. Père, Vater. le, der, den, die, das
mère, Mutter. la, die, der, die, den, das.

   Le père, la mère.

2. Frère, Bruder; soeur, Schwester; et, und.

   Le frère et la soeur.

3. Bon, bonne, gut; est, ist.

   Le bon père, la bonne mère. Le père est bon, la mère est bon. Le bon frère, la bonne soeur. Le frère est bon, la soeur est bonne.
4.
Mon, ma, *mein, meinen, meine*.
Mon père, ma mere. Mon bon père, ma bonne mere. Mon père est bon, ma mere est bonne. Mon frère et ma soeur. Mon bon frère et ma bonne soeur. Mon frère est bon, ma soeur est bonne. (Ahn 1850: 1)

In comparison to Seidenstücker’s first four exercises that I cited earlier, Ahn uses all of the same words as well as the same sequence of presentation. As for Ahn’s changes in content, none of them is a substantive one. Instead, he appears merely to be editing — or, as Ahn puts it in his preface, “developing” — Seidenstücker, at one point providing three additional words, probably for better variety (“frère,” “soeur,” and “et”), while also consolidating the presentation of “mon” and “ma,” in a probable attempt to tidy up Seidenstücker’s presentation. An arguable improvement in Ahn’s formatting, compared to Seidenstücker’s, is the visual clarity that Ahn achieves with his use of columns.

Ahn, like Seidenstücker, progressively uses more overt grammar explanation in his word lists, in fulfillment of his stated goal of preparing the student for “ordered grammar” study. Here, as an example, is Ahn’s illustration of the conjugation of the verb “to be” in the list above the text of his 69th exercise, still presented more covertly, and inductively, than overtly:

- je suis, *ich bin*.
- tu es, *du bist*; il est, *er ist*.
- nous sommes, *wir sind*.
- vous êtes, *ihr seid*.
- ils sont, *sie sind*.
- venu, *gekommen*.

le matin, *der Morgen*.
la visite, *der Besuch*.
la raison, *das Recht*.
le tort, *das Unrecht*.
la famille, *die Familie*.
parce que, *weil*; déjà, *schon*.

Où est ton frère? Est-il ici? Il est malade, il est dans sa chambre. Je suis…
(Ahn 1850: 24)

Like Seidenstücker, Ahn presents the conjugation in a pattern that partially echoes deductive approaches in its order of first person, second person, third person, etc.
However, Ahn, also like Seidenstücker, refrains from any use of explicit grammar terminology here. Note again the visual clarity that Ahn achieves with his columns, in comparison to Seidenstücker’s prose presentation of the same examples.

Later, also like Seidenstücker, Ahn transitions to lists that only contain grammatical phenomena, with no extra vocabulary words. Consider this list – with illustrative models for forming the imperfect tense – which precedes the text of Ahn’s 101st exercise:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Je parlais, } & \text{ich redete, sprach.} & \text{nous parlions, wir redeten.} \\
\text{tu parlais, } & \text{du redetest.} & \text{vous parliez, ihr redetet.} \\
\text{il parlait, } & \text{er redete.} & \text{ils parlaient, sie redeten.} \\
\text{Autrefois j’aimais le jeu, mais à présent j’aime les livres. Tu n’aimais pas les fleurs, tu parlais toujours de tes chiens et de tes chats. … (Ahn 1850: 38)}
\end{align*}
\]

Aside from the use of columns, the presentation is very close to Seidenstücker’s illustration of the imperfect cited above.

Finally, Ahn eventually provides, just as Seidenstücker does, a systematic and tabularized presentation of verb conjugations replete with grammar terminology that, in Ahn’s version, covers seven pages (pages 61-67). (Ahn’s book contains 126 pages total.) Thus, one recognizes a similar trajectory to Seidenstücker’s – Ahn gradually accustoms the uninitiated student to a more systematic treatment of grammar, in preparation for an eventual confrontation with a more “ordered” grammar presentation.

As concerns vocabulary, Ahn’s approach is generally the same as Seidenstücker’s. That is, vocabulary is always presented in bilingual word lists, suggesting a deductive approach. Also similar is that Ahn removes vocabulary to the back of the book, once he
starts offering longer French texts on page 67. However, whereas Seidenstücker instructs his student at this point first to memorize the vocabulary before reading the texts, Ahn takes memorization off the table, only noting parenthetically:

(Die nöthigen Wörter stehen jetzt am Ende dieses Buches.) (Ahn 1850: 67)

(The necessary words are now found at the end of this book.) (My transl.)

Thus, Ahn leaves open the possibility for the student to choose an inductive approach to vocabulary learning, such as learning the meaning of words from their context in reading selections.

Other similarities between Ahn and Seidenstücker are found in the disconnected nature of their exercise sentences. Here is the beginning of the exercise text for Ahn’s 154th lesson as an example:


This merchant sells paper, ink, and pens. Bring me some water, soap, and a towel. Would you prefer hot or cold water? I will give you all some apples and cherries if you are well behaved and work hard. My brother has some good ink and good paper. We had some fine dogs. You have little patience, my friend. … (My transl.)

Additionally, Ahn, like Seidenstücker can tend to offer illustration of every possible formulation of a structure in a manner that verges on becoming unnaturally repetitive or exhaustively thorough. For example, here is Ahn’s exercise text for practicing questions formed in the negative:


Like both Meidinger and Seidenstücker, Ahn manipulates the word order of German verbs in sentences. In the following exercise I have underlined the verbs that have been moved:

... Wir sind gewesen sehr zufrieden, aber meine Schwestern sind gewesen sehr unartig: sie haben genommen Obst, welches der Gärtner hatte gelegt in ein kleines Körbchen für Josephine. Als der Nachbar ist gekommen, er hat gesagt zu meinen Schwestern: ...

These manipulations are again intended to facilitate the translation of these sentences into French and confirm that Ahn envisions translation as an activity within his program.

Regarding translation, it deserves noting that Ahn nevertheless makes one attempt to differentiate his method from previous ones; although, in so doing, he might actually be cementing his (and Seidenstücker’s) lineage more solidly back to Meidinger. I am referring to a passage in Ahn’s preface to the third edition of his book where he cautions against excessive translation:

Die gute Aufnahme, welche dieses Büchlein gefunden, und der überaus günstige Erfolg, welchen der Unterricht nach denselben geliefert, ist die beste Bürgschaft für die Zweckmäßigkeit der darin befolgten Methode. Der Verfasser hat es für unnöthig erachtet, in eine Auseinandersetzung derselben einzugehen, da sie in ihrer Einfachkeit dem verständigen Lehrer sich selbst erschließen wird. Wer aber beim Gebrauche des Buches sich darin beginnen wollte, dem Schüler eine fortlaufende
The high degree of acceptance that this little book has found, as well as the thoroughly favorable success that instruction performed according to the book has produced, is the best witness to the usefulness of the method that is followed in it. The author has considered it unnecessary to enter into a discussion of this method, since, in its simplicity, it will make itself clear to any competent teacher. However, no one, while using this book, should wish to be satisfied by having the student perform a continual translation of all the exercises therein. Whoever would do such would fail greatly at recognizing the true sense of this method, and would thus not be able to have any idea of the surprising results that the method produces. ... Trying to offer the teacher here any specific instructions would mean wanting to tether the spirit to dead letters on the page and dissolving the individuality of all teachers and students into a single one. Therefore, one expects that this little book might again this time go out into the world without any methodological guidance and in its previous shape. As well, one expects that the book might manage more and more to broaden the circle of the friends it has already gained. (My transl.)

As can be seen in this passage, Ahn initially requests that teachers using his book do not fall prey to a continuation of constantly assigning translating, which is his way of speaking to the tradition of translation exercises in the methods that precede his. With this admonition, Ahn is clearly referring back to the methodology of Meidinger. Yet, it is possible that he is also referring to Seidenstücker, or, more accurately, to the conventional manner of implementing all language textbooks as practiced by his contemporary, and historical, colleagues. That is, as I noted earlier, Ahn might be acknowledging an institutional language teaching culture that operates out of deductive philosophies, regardless of the nature of the approach of any individual textbook that enters into the institution. Thus, deductive institutional traditions may lead to a similar
treatment of such disparate works as Meidinger’s and Seidenstücker’s. Ahn appears not to want his book to endure a similar fate. Ahn’s warning about over-translating is a noteworthy and early backlash against translation.

However, it is also worth noting that Ahn here does not cast aside the entire method of yore; rather, he appears to be saying that the method, as is, can produce surprisingly good results, but that translation is not the sole route to those results. Yet, Ahn does not take the extra step and actually offer any alternatives to translating the texts in his book, instead explicitly passing that task on to the teacher to figure out. His admonition against too much translating without any alternative suggestion therefore makes Ahn come across as genuinely concerned, but not necessarily as helpful as one might hope for. I conclude that Ahn belongs in the same line as Seidenstücker, in fulfillment of his goal to offer a version of Seidenstücker’s inductive and natural approach. If anything, Ahn’s approach to vocabulary may be even more inductive than Seidenstücker’s. That history places Ahn into the lineage of the deductive Grammar Translation Method may be based on his (and Seidenstücker’s) propensity for offering exhaustive examples that, at a cursory look, can appear to be long and elaborate explanations in the style of Meidinger. Ahn tries to differentiate his method by recommending less translating, and in so doing, and without offering any alternatives, he reminds that his method is embedded in translation practices.
*Heinrich Gottfried Ollendorff offers a method that he describes as “new.” He tries simultaneously to dismiss and embrace his forbears.*

Very shortly after Ahn, in Paris in 1835, Ollendorff published his very successful language teaching manual: *Nouvelle Méthode pour apprendre à lire, à écrire, et à parler une langue en six mois, appliquée à l’allemand*\(^\text{10}\) (“New Method for Learning to Read, Write, and Speak a Language in Six Months, Applied to German”). For the purposes of this dissertation, I will refer mostly to an edition of Ollendorff’s manual, applied not to German, but to French, and published in English in 1848 in New York, *Ollendorff’s New Method of Learning to Read, Write, and Speak the French Language*, by J. L. Jewett. It is not clear whether Jewett translated Ollendorff’s text on his own or whether the work was first translated in London, perhaps by a publishing house; for in Jewett’s “Preface to the American Edition,” dated 1846, he mentions (p. iv) a “London edition, from which this [edition] is reprinted.” Earlier in Jewett’s preface (p. iii), he also assures the reader: “The text of OLLENDORFF is given in the present edition without abridgement.”

Jewett’s edition of Ollendorff is especially useful for my purposes because it contains a copy of Ollendorff’s introductory remarks to his first edition from Paris. These remarks are labelled in Jewett’s edition as:

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION OF OLLENDORFF’S “NOUVELLE MÉTHODE,” APPLIED TO THE GERMAN*
[TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN.] …
* First published in 1835. (Jewett, 1848: v, asterisked comment in original)
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\(^{10}\) NB: some citations of this work – for example, Christ (1999) and the Bibliographie de la France (1847) – do not include the “à” before the word “écrire.”
I have been unable to locate an edition with Ollendorff’s preface still in the original German. The labeling above does not make clear who translated Ollendorff’s preface into English.

I have also been able to locate a French version of Ollendorff’s preface to the first edition, in the 14th edition of his original manual. This 14th edition is for French speakers learning German and was published in Paris in 1855. The French preface therein matches the English version in Jewett’s edition. This 14th edition is also significant because it contains both part one (“première partie”) and part two (“deuxième partie”) of Ollendorff’s course of study. Jewett’s edition contains only part one of Ollendorff’s course. Although I concentrate on Jewett’s edition as my source for Ollendorff, I will also later make references to this 14th Paris edition from 1855.

In its structure, I characterize Ollendorff’s manual as a near copy of Meidinger’s. That is, Ollendorff, like Meidinger, presents long and detailed explanations of grammar from the very outset – never shying away from a heavy use of grammatical terminology, including Latinate terms – followed by exercise texts to translate. A good example of Ollendorff’s, like Meidinger’s, tendency towards inordinately long grammar explanations is Lesson 78. The topic of lesson 78 is “Present of the Subjunctive” and the lesson begins on page 351 in the English translation of Ollendorff. The explanations that follow, replete with inserted “observations” and several detailed cases of exceptions, extend for six and a half pages before the translation exercise appears. Also like Meidinger, Ollendorff always presents the exercise texts in the mother tongue (in Jewett’s edition, English), for
translation into the foreign language (in Jewett’s edition, French). Recall, setting Seidenstücker and Ahn apart in this aspect is that they supply both mother tongue texts and also foreign language texts under their word lists from nearly the very beginning, allowing for translation in both directions. Therefore, the structure of Ollendorff’s method essentially reproduces Meidinger’s with the exception that Ollendorff’s exercises are always presented in a question-and-answer format in his texts. As an example for illustration, here is exercise 81:

Are these men Germans? – No, they are Russians. Do the Russians speak Polish? – They do not speak Polish, but Latin, Greek, and Arabic. Is your brother a merchant? – No, he is a joiner. Are these men merchants? – No, they are carpenters. Are you a cook? – No, I am a baker. Are we tailors? – No, we are shoemakers. Art thou a fool? - No, I am not a fool. (Jewett 1848: 99)

The topic of this exercise is nationalities and occupations. Ollendorff’s grammar explanations are often even more detailed and systematized than Meidinger’s. For example, Ollendorff offers, in the 82nd lesson of Jewett’s American edition (p. 379), a “table for the formation of all the tenses in the French verbs.” Ollendorff first lists out rules for an entire page before actually getting to the table, and then the detailed table extends over eight whole pages. Even Meidinger does not have such a long table in his book. Also attesting to Ollendorff’s great detail is the sheer length of his book. Jewett’s edition, representing only part one of Ollendorff’s course, encompasses 498 pages. The complete 14th Paris edition of Ollendorff’s course (parts one and two) contains 1009 pages in total. By comparison, the eighth edition of Meidinger’s book that I presented above contains “only” 582 pages.
Yet, the great number of pages in Ollendorff’s complete 14th edition is not solely a result of lengthy grammar explanations. For Ollendorff also includes a great number of the very same types of “extras” at the end of his program that Meidinger includes: anecdotes, model letters, sample bilingual conversations, and, at the very end (just like in Meidinger’s book), texts that are entirely in the foreign language. (All of these extras are not included in Jewett’s edition, which, as noted above, only represents part one of Ollendorff’s course.) These foreign language texts alone take up 231 pages in Ollendorff’s 14th edition. Meidinger’s “Histörchen” by contrast take up only 55 pages (and then another 53 pages for their respective vocabulary lists). It could be said that a reader of either manual, Meidinger’s or Ollendorff’s, has to work too hard in this final section of their books, where, coincidentally, reading the foreign language is most emphasized.

However, one significant aspect setting Ollendorff’s final texts in the foreign language apart from Meidinger’s is that Ollendorff does not compose his own texts. Meidinger, we may recall, composes his own “Histörchen” in French (140 of them), and his students are intended both to read these vignettes for comprehension as well as translate them into their mother tongue (German). Meidinger instructs as much in his preface, and he also implies as much with the vocabulary lists that he includes. The “épitaphes,” “description de Paris,” and “énigmes” that Meidinger offers are indeed literature, but they are all very short – the “épitaphes” are one to two lines long, the “énigmes” one to three lines, and the “description” 14 lines. By contrast, Ollendorff provides his students with selected
literary extracts from classic authors which he intends for reading practice, labelling these literary texts as “reading pieces” (German: “Lesestücke”). Ollendorff includes 90 selected extracts from classic stories, poems, dramas, dialogues, satires, and historical texts in German by such literary heavyweights as Schiller, Goethe, Liebeskind, Meißner, and Herder – but without glossaries. Ollendorff also even ends his 14th edition with a list (on the last two pages) of 20 recommended classic literary German-language “titles that due to space restrictions are left out” (German: “Titel der aus Mangel am Raum ausgelassenen Lesestücke”). The literary texts, including the ones not in the book but only left as recommendations, seem to indicate an expectation of more advanced students than were envisaged by Meidinger and Seidenstücker.

Ollendorff does not explicitly ask his students to translate the literary texts. Nor does he explicitly say that his students should not translate these texts at his book’s end; yet, without a glossary, the only alternative being a dictionary, it would seem that he is not stressing that his students consider translating them. As noted above, Seidenstücker and Ahn, by providing texts in both French and German from nearly the beginning, provide many opportunities for translating in both directions. And even though Meidinger, like Ollendorff, at first only uses translation into the foreign language for his grammar portion, he too, with the extensive collection of “Histörchen” at his book’s end, ultimately provides an opportunity for (and in his preface explicitly calls for) translation into the mother tongue. (Ploetz, whom I analyze presently, also gives, like Seidenstücker and Ahn, texts for translation in both directions.)
Ollendorff names both Meidinger and Seidenstücker in his preface as a quasi-dual source of his day’s leading methodology. What follows is Ollendorff’s preface in its English translation. After its presentation, I will address Ollendorff’s main assertions:

EVERY one who learns German naturally desires to be able to speak and write it: and as the Grammars that have heretofore appeared are not adapted to this purpose, I have thought it might be useful to make public the method which I have made use of in teaching for seventeen years, and which has enabled my scholars not only to read this language, but also to speak and write it like native Germans.

I might here expatiate with great fluency on the greater or lesser advantages which the different grammars of the present day offer; this, however, would lead me too far. I shall confine myself to the remark, that none of those in common use corresponds to my idea of a good German Grammar: they all appear to me wanting in clearness, order, and precision. As to those which have lately appeared, the authors of which commence by giving examples from the best poets, they resemble the canvass on which a painter has begun at the feet to paint his picture; or rather they resemble one who appropriates to himself some characteristic features which he has borrowed from the great masters, and which he merely disfigures, while he arranges and exhibits them without a plan or a leading object. …

I must here be permitted to give a few explanations of my method; it is intended not only to teach the reading of a language, but also to enable one to express himself in it with ease, and to write a letter correctly.

I have often been led to reflect upon the manner in which a language can be taught in the shortest time; and I have found it everywhere surrounded with difficulties. Meidinger, who holds the first rank among those who have essentially contributed to improve the methods of teaching languages, is yet very far from leading the scholar to the object he wishes to attain; and although his Grammar has had an extraordinary sale, and imitators without number, it by no means contains the requisites of a good method. I have myself used it for a long time in teaching; later, however, I found that this grammar, besides its deficiency in grammatical accuracy, and precise and definite rules, accustome [sic] the learner to recite lessons too rapidly, without affording him a previous opportunity of practically applying them. It has also the disadvantage of containing ready-made, and therefore comparatively useless, sentences; the author mixes too much those rules of which the scholar is quite ignorant, with those which he already knows; and not till the 143d lesson, after he has explained the compound tenses of the verbs, can the teacher form questions and answers of the sentences; and even then he is still obliged to adapt all such sentences to the very limited knowledge of his scholars.

After Meidinger, Seidensticker [sic] has also done something to improve the method of teaching languages, especially in placing the dissected or analyzed [zergliederte] sentences before the Lessons, and introducing the verb in his first
exercise. But besides not attempting any grammatical explanations, he also fails, equally with Meidinger, in putting\textsuperscript{11} questions which the scholars may readily answer in the language they are learning. Nothing, therefore, availed, but to unite the excellences which these two grammars afforded; the sentences must be so dissected that the teacher may propose questions, and the scholar be able to answer them, in the language taught. …

I therefore prefixed to all my sentences a clear and intelligible grammatical statement; I then arranged them in questions and answers, at the same time embracing all the parts of speech, the general as well as the particular rules of grammar, the idiomatic phrases, and the greater part of the familiar forms of conversation. I was not guided by arbitrary laws, but by the manner in which a child begins to learn his mother tongue. I left the scholar in freedom to meditate upon what he had learned, and to give an account of every thing before he applied it. I thus succeeded in teaching my scholars at the same time to read, write, and amuse themselves. Experience has taught me that in less than one hundred and twenty lessons I can attain my object. …

I have felt it necessary thus to explain how I have succeeded, step by step, in forming my Method, that I might anticipate those who should feel disposed to criticise my work without waiting till at a future time it shall appear complete. I beg to remind them that this Method is not, like many others, the work of a day, or the product of a fiery imagination, but the fruit of seventeen years’ labor and experience. H. G. OLLENDORFF (Ollendorff, in Jewett 1848: v-viii)

Ollendorff’s opening sentence serves to prove that Ollendorff must be aware of authors such as Meidinger, Seidenstücker, and Ahn. For his 17 years in the language teaching practice and also his knowledge of “Grammars that have heretofore appeared” say as much. (Ollendorff additionally appears to use the mention of his 17 years of experience to stylistic effect, by framing his preface at its end therewith.) The sentence also is helpful for establishing that Ollendorff has goals of speaking, writing, and reading.

\textsuperscript{11} N.B. As noted, I lack the German original for comparison, yet I sense that ‘fails … in putting’ might well be better rendered today as ‘fails … to put or pose.’ Indeed, the French version of Ollendorff’s preface that is in the 14th edition (1855, Paris) of his original manual (made for French speakers to learn German) reads at this passage:

… mais, outre qu’il s’abstient d’explications grammaticales, il lui manqué, comme à Meidinger, l’avantage de pouvoir adresser à ses élèves des questions dans la langue même qu’il leur enseigne, et d’en exiger les réponses. (Ollendorff 1850: iv)

… but, other than his abstaining from grammar explanations, what is lacking with him, as with Meidinger, is the advantage of being able to pose questions to his students in the same language that he is teaching them, and requiring the answers in it. (My transl.)
Additionally, he notes that contemporary grammars do not meet speaking and writing goals, echoing some of the criticism today against the GTM.

In the next paragraph, Ollendorff proceeds to characterize some of the grammars that he has experienced, but then declines to in any extensive fashion, to which I would add two comments. Firstly, Ollendorff here continues to establish that he is not in a professional vacuum. Rather, he has first-hand knowledge of his book’s “poorer” competition, but – in what might be a strategic, or advertising tactic – he refrains from naming them. (Later, of course, Ollendorff names Meidinger and Seidenstücker, but it is unclear if he means to connect them to his observations in this paragraph.) My second comment concerns Ollendorff’s remark about grammar books that “commence by giving examples from the best poets.” Such books are clearly not in the same vein as Meidinger’s, Seidenstücker’s, or Ahn’s, so Ollendorff here is referring to yet another camp of language instruction. The nature of Ollendorff’s comment is reminiscent of one of the alleged features of the Grammar Translation Method that appeared in Prator and Celce-Murcia’s list quoted earlier (“Reading of difficult classical texts is begun early”), where I submitted that this feature actually refers to an “analytical” and inductive methodology, as opposed to a “synthetic” and deductive one like the GTM. It would be helpful if Ollendorff would name some books here that begin with examples of poetry.

In his next paragraph, Ollendorff makes another statement of some of his goals: reading, self expression, and letter writing. His assertion about the goal of writing a letter is again reminiscent of Meidinger, who also mentions letter writing as a goal in his own preface.
The goal of letter writing is hard to find an exact analog for in today’s world of electronic communication. But in Ollendorff’s time, as Howatt and Widdowson point out in a discussion of the GTM in the nineteenth century:

[M]eeting foreigners face-to-face was an uncommon experience until the railways provided realistic opportunities for foreign travel from around 1840 onwards. (Howatt and Widdowson 2004: 132)

Thus, letter writing may well have had a more significant communicative role than today, been viewed as an essential component of language learning.

In Ollendorff’s next paragraph, his important mention of Meidinger occurs. He initially acknowledges that Meidinger “holds the first rank” among teachers who have “contributed to improve the methods of teaching languages,” but then immediately questions this conventional ranking of Meidinger, finding that Meidinger’s method “by no means contains the requisites of a good method.” Ollendorff also notes that Meidinger has many “imitators,” which is significant because it indicates that Meidinger’s types of exercises, texts, and other materials were likely in high circulation among language teachers and students, possibly even without Meidinger’s name attached.

Ollendorff states that he is able to judge Meidinger’s method first-hand, having made use of the textbook for a “long time.” Ollendorff therefore implies that Meidinger’s is at this time a very well-known and entrenched method. Significantly, Ollendorff claims that Meidinger’s textbook contains inaccuracies. Although Ollendorff never details where these mistakes are in Meidinger’s book, it is interesting to note that the historian Hübner (1929: 11) also notes that Meidinger’s French is “contestable and not even free of grammatical errors” (German: “ein anfechtbares, sogar von grammatischen Verstößen

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nicht freies Französisch”). Hübner also does not detail where Meidinger’s “Verstöße” show up. It also appears that important issues for Ollendorff include the sequencing of topics (for he finds Meidinger’s 143rd lesson too late for an explanation of the past perfect) and the preferred use of literary texts as opposed to synthesized texts such as Meidinger’s.

Regarding texts, Ollendorff expresses concern over Meidinger’s “ready-made, and therefore comparatively useless, sentences.” I included the feature of prefabricated sentences above in my own definition of the GTM as it is described today. As well, the significance of “sentences” is observed by the presentations of the GTM’s features offered earlier, although the nature of the sentences is not described as “ready-made” or “useless.” Ollendorff’s remark could count as one of the earliest backlashes against these sentences and it is reminiscent of Ahn’s briefly mentioned concern about too much translating. Nonetheless, Ollendorff clearly uses self-constructed texts. Consider the following exercise from Ollendorff’s 22nd lesson:

Will the English give us some bread? –They will give you some. –Will they give us as much butter as bread? –They will give you more of the latter than of the former. –Will you give this man a franc? –I will give him several. –How many francs will you give him? –I will give him five. –What will the French lend us? –They will lend us many books. –Have you time to write to the merchant? –I wish to write to him, but I have no time to-day. –When will you answer the German? –I will answer him to-morrow. –At what o’clock? –At eight. —Where does the Spaniard wish to go to? –He wishes to go no whither. –Does your servant wish to warm my broth? –He wishes to warm it. –Is he willing to make my fire? –He is willing to make it. –Where does the baker wish to go to? –He wishes to go to the wood. –Where is the youth? –He is at the play. –Who is at the captain’s ball? –Our children and our friends are there. (Jewett 1848: 76-77)
Despite that these sentences are clearly self constructed and ready-made, Ollendorff appears to assert, later in his preface, that the fact he is using a question-and-answer format differentiates and validates the use of these sentences.

In a curious choice, beyond using his own ready-made texts, Ollendorff can be observed actually using some of the same material that Meidinger uses. I am referring to the fact that Ollendorff, in his 78th lesson (in Jewett’s edition), uses texts that may be translations of Meidinger’s first two “Histörchen.” As noted earlier, Meidinger’s materials are apparently in wide circulation in Ollendorff’s day, and it is possible that Ollendorff does not know or consider the stories as Meidinger’s alone. In fact, even though Meidinger claims to have constructed his own “Histörchen,” Meidinger does not claim that the stories therein are his own invention. It is possible that these stories were circulating as cultural anecdotes at the time. Before presenting this lesson as it appears in Ollendorff, I will first give my own telling of these two vignettes from Meidinger.

Meidinger’s first “Histörchen” (written all in French) recounts an exchange between a shopkeeper and a customer. The customer finds the prices in the shop too high and challenges the shopkeeper to lower them, seeing as they are on friendly terms. The shopkeeper responds that he makes his living from his friends, because his enemies do not come to his shop for purchases. That is, everyone who comes is a friend, so he does not have separate prices for friends and enemies:

Un Gentilhomme étoit un jour allé dans une boutique, pour acheter quelques marchandises, & comme il trouva qu’on les mettoit à un prix trop haut, il dit, qu’étant des amis de la maison, on ne devoit pas lui vendre si cher. Le Marchand
Meidinger’s second “Histörchen” recounts the tale of a clever boy at the dinner table.

The boy asks his father for some meat, but his father tells him that the request is impolite, that he must wait until the meat is given to him. Then, seeing that everyone is eating and he has received nothing, the clever boy soon asks his father for some salt. The father asks why, and the boy “reminds” him that the salt is for the meat that his father will give him. The father realizes he has forgotten the boy’s meat and gives him some, since the boy did not actually ask for it:

Un petit garçon demandant un jour à table de la viande, son père lui dit qu’il étoit incivil d’en demander, & qu’il devoit attendre qu’on lui en donnât. Ce pauvre petit garçon voyant que tout le monde mangeoit, & qu’on ne lui donnoit rien, dit à son père, donnés-moi, s’il vous plaît, un peu de sel. Qu’en voulés-vous faire? lui demanda le père. C’est pour le manger avec la viande que vous me donnerés, répliqua l’enfant. Alors son père s’appercevant qu’il n’avoit rien, lui donna de la viande sans qu’il en demandât. (Meidinger 1792: 459)

In case my translations above were not clear, one can also look to Ollendorff for his own versions, for Ollendorff uses these same vignettes, translated into English, and then offers them to his student as a text to translate into French. The text appears in the English translation of Ollendorff as exercise 236 in lesson number 78:

Will you relate (raconter) something to me? –What do you wish me to relate to you? –A little anecdote, if you like. –A little boy one day at table (à table) asked for some meat; his father said that it was not polite to ask for any, and that he should wait until some was given to him, (qu’on lui en donnât, imperf. subjunctive; see the following Lesson.) The poor boy, seeing every one eat, and that nothing was given to him, said to his father: “My dear father, give me a little salt, if you please,” “What will you do with it?” asked the father. “I wish to eat it with the meat which you will give me,” replied (répliquer) the child. Everybody admired (admirer) the little boy’s wit; and his father, perceiving that he had nothing, gave him meat without his asking for it. Who was that little boy that
asked for meat at table? –He was the son of one of my friends. –Why did he ask for some meat? –He asked for some because he had a good appetite.—Why did his father not give him some immediately? –Because he had forgotten it.—Was the little boy wrong in asking for some? –He was wrong, for he ought to have waited. –Why did he ask his father for some salt? –He asked for some salt, that his father might perceive (pour que son père s’aperçût, imperf. subjunctive; see next Lesson) that he had no meat, and that he might give him some, (et qu’il lui en donnât, imperf. subjunctive; see next Lesson.)

Do you wish me to relate to you another anecdote? –You will greatly (beaucoup) oblige me. –Some one purchasing some goods of a shopkeeper, (un marchand,) said to him: “You ask too much; you should not sell so dear to me as to another, because I am a friend, (puisque je suis des amis de la maison.”) The merchant replied: “Sir, we must gain something by (avec) our friends, for our enemies will never come to the shop.” (Jewett 1848: 357-358, italics in original)

I have also found the tale of the clever boy at the dinner table in the complete 14th edition of Ollendorff’s manual in lesson 98, exercise 215, page 386. But these two stories are not the only cases where Ollendorff uses some of the same material that Meidinger uses. Also in this 14th edition from 1855 are translated versions of at least three of the “amusements about the physical world” (“physikalische Belustungen”) that appear in Meidinger’s book – specifically, texts on coffee (“Vom Kaffé”), on tea (“Vom Thee”), and on diving for pearls (“Von der Perlenfischerei”). These three “Belustungen” appear now as “thèmes” number 282, 283, and 284 in the second part (“deuxième partie”) of Ollendorff’s 14th Paris edition, in lesson 115 on pages 188-190 as, respectively: “DU THÉ,” “DU CAFÉ,” and “LA PÊCHE DES PERLES (Die Perlenfischerei).” As noted above, it is a curious overlap between Ollendorff and Meidinger, perhaps explained by a common circulation of these texts in their contemporary culture. Neither Meidinger nor Ollendorff details their sources for these texts.

Therefore, whether Ollendorff, in his preface, is objecting to “the disadvantage of ready-made, useless sentences” generally or just to the content of some of the sentences that
Meidinger specifically uses, both of his objections become questionable here. For one can see here that Ollendorff finds some of the same material that Meidinger uses rather useful. I might ask if Ollendorff’s practice is possibly plagiarism, but I do not know if Ollendorff or the laws of his time would have considered a translation as plagiarism (in any event, the question is not in the scope of this dissertation). At any rate, Meidinger had already died in 1822, so Ollendorff is not risking any real ire from Meidinger proper. Perhaps Meidinger would even have felt complimented. It remains curious that Ollendorff can rail against Meidinger so strongly and also so blithely use some of the same material that Meidinger does.

As Ollendorff’s preface continues, he also criticizes Seidenstücker in a similar fashion to Meidinger. That is, Ollendorff both acknowledges Seidenstücker’s contributions to “improve the method of teaching languages,” while also asserting that Seidenstücker’s grammar is not sufficient on its own. What Ollendorff appears to value in Seidenstücker is an inductive approach, exemplified in the next paragraph of the preface by Ollendorff’s mention of being guided not “by arbitrary laws, but by the manner in which a child begins to learn his mother tongue.” This sentiment is a clear echo of Seidenstücker’s own preface. Ollendorff appears to assert that he has achieved this manner in which a child learns by having “prefixed to all my sentences a clear and intelligible grammatical statement; I then arranged them in questions and answers.” The prefixed grammatical statement is not necessarily presented as inductively by Ollendorff as by Seidenstücker. That is, Ollendorff also uses grammatical terminology along with his examples, which appears more deductive in approach. The question-and-answer format, by contrast, does
appear to be an inductive way of teaching, in that the student may “inadvertently” concentrate on the question’s content and not appreciate at first the example in grammar that the structure of the question illustrates. As well, questions and answers align themselves well with Ollendorff’s stated intention to increase speaking – for it feels “natural” to answer a question. Ollendorff does not use the word “natural,” but Seidenstücker uses it in association with a child’s way of learning.

Finally, Ollendorff here appears to fault Meidinger and Seidenstücker for not including questions that the students can readily answer in the foreign language, French. It is hard to know exactly what Ollendorff means with this comment, since I lack his statement in the original German and the English here is not entirely clear to me; however, the French version of the preface leaves me confident that Ollendorff wishes essentially that Meidinger and Seidenstücker would take advantage of using the foreign language more often with their students. I would only note in rebuttal that Ollendorff himself never includes one question-and-answer text in the foreign language in his entire book, neither in Jewett’s edition, nor in the complete 14th Paris edition.

In summary, I find Ollendorff’s manual to be a curious mixture of existing approaches, all of which he appears to acknowledge in his preface: there is influence from Meidinger’s methodology, Seidenstücker’s, and also from other sources that emphasize, for example, an early confrontation with literature in the foreign language. Ollendorff seems to have culled and rearranged what he considers to be the most advantageous
elements from these existing methodologies. It is this editing work that Ollendorff performs which appears to lead him to declare that his method is “new.”

His assertion of his method’s being new may also be displaying the fact that it was not uncommon in his day (nor perhaps today too) for virtually every language teacher to make such claims to newness, success, and superiority. Consider this statement from 1834, which might be as true today, from the Brockhaus *Repertorium der gesammten deutschen Literatur, Zweiter Band*, in a review of Johannes Seyerlen’s French textbook, *Lehr- und Übungsbuch für den ersten Unterricht in der französischen Sprache*:

> Aber jeder Lehrer geht einen etwas verschiedenen Gang, und heut zu Tage will jeder Lehrer sein eigenes Handbuch oder Lehrbuch gedruckt sehen. (p. 6)

> But every teacher takes a slightly different path, and nowadays every teacher desires to see his very own manual or textbook in print. (My transl.)

Perhaps Ollendorff is in some sense “every teacher” and resorts to some of the strategies that any teacher might use when practicing a profession that one wishes to improve – for example, checking what one’s colleagues are doing while setting oneself apart as better and new. In the end, I only had the goal of showing that Ollendorff belongs squarely in the mold that Meidinger, Seidenstücker, and Ahn had already begun forming, and I find his book to be most similar to Meidinger’s.

Concerning the lineage of Ollendorff’s method, the clearer perspective that history now provides also suggests, as I do, that Ollendorff’s “new” method may really be an extension of that which Meidinger (followed by Seidenstücker and Ahn) had started. I refer again to the title of Christ’s aforementioned article from 1993 as evidence of how
history sees Ollendorff in a clear line with his predecessors: “De Meidinger à Ploetz, en passant par Seidenstücker, Ahn et Ollendorff, ou le cheminement de la méthodologie synthétique.” Concerning this lineage, Kelly (1976) agrees, connecting Ollendorff and Meidinger more directly as such:

The first editions [of Ollendorff’s manual] followed Meidinger’s technique. (Kelly 1976:52)

However, in contrast to Kelly’s attribution of Ollendorff’s method to the influence of Meidinger, another historian, Criado-Sánchez, makes observations (2005: 25) that lead her to maintain that Ollendorff’s language teaching manuals were “initially based on Ahn’s.” Unfortunately, Criado-Sánchez does not explain why she does not go back so far in history as actually to investigate Meidinger (or Seidenstücker), so that the scope of her comparison is limited. Ultimately, Ollendorff’s method, if new, is at most only new in its rearrangement of pre-existing material. His claims for newness are relative to the fact that, in his own words, he places himself directly onto the lineage that began with Meidinger. Perhaps Ollendorff represents a new model of the spirit of language teaching that Meidinger offers, with some differences in features: literary texts are not necessarily for translating, more emphasis is paid to speaking, and there is a belief in the question-and-answer exercise format as superior to other sentence-based translation exercises.

*Carl Julius Ploetz: not as deductive as Meidinger, but not as inductive as Seidenstücker.*

Finally, the fifth of the Prussian scholars to publish a language teaching manual was Ploetz. Ploetz first published his *Elementarbuch der französischen Sprache* in 1848. The great number of editions in a short number of years, as well as the publication of
international editions, speaks to the success that Ploetz’s book met with. I have been unable to locate any first or second edition of Ploetz’s book. The earliest edition available appears to be Ploetz’s third edition from 1853. This third edition is labelled as “unchanged from the second” (German: “mit der zweiten gleichlautend”) and contains an introduction, dated October, 1852, labelled as the “preface to the second edition” (German: “Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage”). In addition, there is available an “American Edition” of Ploetz that was published in 1865 and contains a preface dated March, 1864, and labelled as coming “from the preface to the 22nd unchanged original edition” (German: “aus dem Vorwort zur zweiundzwanzigsten unveränderten Original-Auflage”). I also refer to the preface from the 31st edition of Ploetz, published in 1877.

In his own words, drawn from the earliest of his prefaces that I have found (to Ploetz’s second edition), Ploetz does not actually name anyone who influenced his method. Instead, Ploetz refers to “the step-wise progressing method” (German: “stufenweise fortschreitende Methode”) that he has adhered to in making his book, as if it might have been a known methodology that already exists in his day:

> daß … die Forderungen der stufenweise fortschreitenden Methode nirgends außer Acht gelassen würden. (Ploetz 1853: v, emphasis in original)

> that ... the postulates of the step-wise progressing method would never be left unheeded. (My transl.)

Ploetz also uses this phrase in the full title of his book:

> Elementarbuch der französischen Sprache, oder vollständige Schulgrammatik für die mittlere Unterrichtsstufe. Nach der stufenweise fortschreitenden Methode, in unmittelbarem Zusammenhange mit zahlreichen französischen und deutschen Übungsbeispielen bearbeitet (my underlining added).
If this “step-wise method” was not a known method in Ploetz’s day, Ploetz himself may have coined the term earlier and here be trying to propagate and authenticate it, i.e., “the” method could simply mean “my” method. At any rate, he does not specify whether he coined this term or whether it might come from another person.

Interestingly, at least one other historian whose work I have encountered – Hübner (1929) – also uses the phrase “step-wise progression” within a discussion of language teaching methodologies of the 18th and 19th centuries. Hübner gives commentary on Meidinger, Seidenstücker, and Ploetz in his work. However, in his bibliography, Hübner names none of his primary references, so it is not possible to know exactly which manuals from these men Hübner has studied. Hübner references Meidinger as such:

Aber er [Meidinger] … baute sein System so auf, wie es ihm für das stufenweise Fortschreiten und das Interesse des Schülers als richtig erschien. (Hübner 1929: 11, my underlining added.)

But he [Meidinger] … built up his system in such a way as appeared appropriate to him for the step-wise progression and interest of his pupil. (My transl.)

One should keep in mind that, although Meidinger’s protocol indeed calls for many steps, Meidinger does not actually use the word “steps,” nor the verb “progress” (German: “Stufen,” “fortschreiten”), in the explanation of his method in his preface. Perhaps Hübner found Meidinger using the phrase in another document, or perhaps Hübner is trying to construct a bridge between Ploetz and Meidinger. Hübner certainly appears keen to ally Ploetz’s methodology directly with both Meidinger’s and Seidenstücker’s. For example, in Hübner’s presentation of Ploetz, he maintains, as if it were a given, that:

Ploetz (1819-1881) verfährt bei dem Aufbau seiner Lektionen im wesentlichen wie Meidinger und Seidenstücker. (Hübner 1929: 16)
Ploetz (1819-1881) proceeds in constructing his lessons essentially as Meidinger and Seidenstücker did. (My transl.)

If Hübner is therefore familiar with Ploetz’s work, it is likely that Hübner must also have known of Ploetz’s use of the phrase “step-wise progression method” in the title to his work. But, again, Hübner does not indicate which edition or editions of Ploetz he is studying, so it is also possible that Hübner is not aware that Ploetz uses the “step-wise” phrase so saliently. If this is the case, then only Hübner’s second quote here establishes an explicit connection, as history sees it, among Meidinger, Seidenstücker, and Ploetz. Ultimately, for the purposes of tracing the history of the GTM, we might regret that “step-wise progressing method” did not survive as a term – whether the phrase is Ploetz’s own creation or not – since it would have added some certainly to the formulation of the GTM as a “method.”

In addition to calling his method one that progresses step-wise, Ploetz, also eventually refers to his method as coming from Seidenstücker. That is, in prefaces to later editions of his book, and in the title to later editions of his book, Ploetz indicates that his approach is based on “Seidenstücker’s method.” For example, in the prefaces to his 22nd edition (1864) and to his 31st edition (1877), Ploetz tells us that he is not inventing anything new, rather, only improving upon Seidenstücker’s method. The introduction to the 22nd edition (dated March, 1864, and available to read in the “American Edition” of 1865) reads:

Ich habe keine neue Methode erfunden, sondern nur in dem methodischen Theile meiner Bücher die Lehrweise des trefflichen Seidenstücker … nach Kräften verbessert und mit den Forderungen des schulmäßigen Unterrichts in Einklang zu bringen versucht. (Ploetz 1865: II, emphasis in original)
I have not invented any new method; rather, in the methodological portion of my books, I have simply used my powers to improve upon the teaching approach of the honorable Seidenstüber and attempted to bring his approach in harmony with the demands of our schools’ instruction. (My transl.)

Similarly, in the introduction to the 31st edition, Ploetz notes:

Ich habe die Methode Seidenstückers ... nach Kräften zu verbessern und mit den Forderungen des schulmäßigen Unterrichts in Einklang zu bringen gesucht. (Ploetz 1877: V, italics in original)

I have used my powers to improve the method of Seidenstüber and sought to bring it in harmony with the demands of our schools’ instruction. (My transl.)

Ploetz eventually becomes so transparent about Seidenstüber’s influence that he even begins lengthening the title of his manual at some point by adding a near-dedication, “according to Seidenstüber’s Method” (German: *Elementarbuch der französischen Sprache: nach Seidenstüber’s Methode*). This addition to the title can be found at least as early as the 23rd edition. Whether it might have developed as a marketing ploy or out of a desire to honor Seidenstüber is not known.

However, Ploetz’s supplement to his title with Seidenstüber’s name so prominent might also have had less honorable marketing motivations. Christ writes about the fact that Seidenstüber’s works were most successful only until the 1830s, when his books began becoming crowded out of the market by competitors (1999: 47). To wit, Ploetz might have been less motivated by giving respect to Seidenstüber and might more have recognized and tapped into the selling power of Seidenstüber’s name, even over thirty years after the man’s death. It would be beneficial if Christ would have named some of these competitors to Seidenstüber’s works in the 1830s.
As a brief aside, it appears possible that Ploetz actually mentions one of these competitors in the preface to his second edition, namely by mentioning foreign language teaching methods that he disapproves of and are based on the system of “the Becker school”:

> Diesen Forderungen war weder bei unbedingter Annahme des herkömmlichen grammatischen Schemas der Redetheile, noch durch Anschließen an die zwar wissenschaftlich begründete, aber bei der Erlernung einer fremden Sprache für die untere und mittlere Unterrichtsstufe durchaus unpädagogische Anordnung der Beckerischen Schule zu genügen. Es mußte also ein Mittelweg gesucht werden. (Ploetz 1853: v, emphasis in original)

_Satisfying these requirements was not possible by either a complete adherence to the customary grammatical scheme based on the parts of speech or an attachment to the school of Becker, whose approach, although it is scientifically founded, constitutes an ordering that is thoroughly un-pedagogical for the learning of a foreign language at the beginning or intermediate level. Thus a middle road had to be found._ (My trans.)

The “Becker” to whom Ploetz refers is Karl Ferdinand Becker (1775-1849). Becker published several books of and on German grammar, but he did not teach foreign languages. On Becker’s philosophy of grammar, his book _Organism der Sprache_ (“_The Organism of Language_”), first published in 1827, is most significant. Therein, Becker notes that his philosophy of grammar rests upon his questioning of the conventional approach in his day, where the grammar of human language is viewed as a product of human culture, thus superior and separate from nature. Becker chooses instead to investigate grammar as an organic product of the human being’s body that reflects natural phenomena and is therefore part of nature, not something separate and superior. (See the prefaces to the first and second editions of Becker’s book, available to read in the second edition, published in 1841.)
Ploetz here is not discrediting Becker’s philosophy – indeed, Ploetz finds it “scientifically founded.” Rather, Ploetz is pointing out that certain teachers in his day are turning to Becker’s system as a source for foreign language instruction, a decision that Ploetz finds misguided. One such teacher is J. H. James, who takes Becker’s system and uses it as a guide to teaching translation. Consider just the title of James’ book, published in 1847, as evidence for this trend:

*The Elements of Grammar according to Dr. Becker’s System Displayed by the Structure of the English Tongue, (With copious Examples from the Best Writers,) Arranged as a Practice for Translation into Foreign Languages.*

Becker’s grammar is however not intended for foreign language study, but rather for those interested in grammar as a subject irrespective of any particular language. It seems that, in Ploetz’s day, there must have been many books similar to James’ – using Becker’s system for unintended purposes – in order for Becker to deserve a mention in Ploetz’s preface. However, I do not ultimately know if Becker’s name and system were being attached to foreign language textbooks for reasons of principle, or merely because Becker was a popular (i.e., well selling) name or figure. Thus, Ploetz’s remark about Becker in his preface does not prove that Ploetz’s citing of Seidenstücker in his title is for competitive marketing purposes – differentiating Ploetz’s book from books that follow another popular system. Instead, Ploetz might truly only mention Seidenstücker, and Becker, out of concerns over principles – differentiating Ploetz’s book from books that he believes misguidedly follow an approach not meant for foreign language study.

Ploetz’s self-proclaimed connections to Seidenstücker still do not connect Ploetz directly to Meidinger. However, if one returns to the quote above from Ploetz’s preface, where
he mentions Becker, one notes that the methodology that Ploetz describes in contrast to Becker’s system is “the customary grammatical scheme based on the parts of speech.” This “customary,” or “traditional” (the German word that Ploetz uses is “herkömmlich”), grammatical approach cannot only be the approach that Seidenstücker follows, for if Ploetz meant Seidenstücker alone, then the use of “herkömmlich” would be exaggerated.

If not to times before Seidenstücker, it is possible that Ploetz uses “herkömmlich” in reference to the traditions since Seidenstücker (though unlikely, since there was not all so much time between Seidenstücker and Ploetz). If this is the case, Ploetz’s “herkömmlich” might also refer to Ahn, for Ploetz himself actually acknowledges Ahn’s descendance from Seidenstücker, on at least two occasions. In the introductions to his 22nd and 31st editions, Ploetz states that “people commonly and mistakenly call it [Seidenstücker’s method] Ahn’s method.” However, Ploetz’s brief acknowledgements of Ahn appear simply to be efforts to show that Ahn’s method is nothing more than Seidenstücker’s (as I also asserted earlier). This leaves Ploetz’s use of “herkömmlich” more likely as a reference to unnamed contributors further in the past than just Seidenstücker and Ahn (who is obviously anyway insignificant for Ploetz).

I maintain that Ploetz does not need to name Meidinger outright to have implied Meidinger’s influence here. Indeed, Ploetz may not even sense his own direct connections to Meidinger. But, by referring both to “Seidenstücker’s method” and to a “tradition of grammar based on the parts of speech,” Ploetz acknowledges a deductive

grammar methodology based on the parts of speech that is not generally followed by Seidenstücker. As well, whether Ploetz knows directly of Meidinger’s work or not, it is clear that Meidinger, perhaps even more than Seidenstücker, adheres to an understanding of grammar explicitly “based on the parts of speech.” For, Meidinger details the parts of speech in the introductory portion of his book (beginning on page 18) well before the first exercise, announcing more or less that his manual will base its grammar presentations on them. Concerning the parts of speech in Seidenstücker’s book, he only details the verb, never explicitly calling it a “part of speech,” and he holds off on doing so until the aforementioned, later portion of his book presenting the “complete conjugation” of several example verbs.

However, beyond these implications by Ploetz connecting himself to times before Seidenstücker, still other evidence exists that can be used to form a bridge from Ploetz to Meidinger. For example, Kelly (1976) offers a connection between Ploetz and Meidinger by noting the obvious similarities between Ploetz’s “system” and Ollendorff’s. Kelly notes:

> During the second half of the nineteenth century the grip of Grammar Translation was tightened by Karl Plötz. In his system, which was basically that of Ollendorff, the disciplinary and analytical value of language study was paramount, and the linguistic aims quite secondary. (Kelly 1976: 53)

It should be noted that Kelly, in his analysis, has already contended that “Grammar Translation” refers undoubtedly to the works of Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ollendorff, and Ploetz, whereas I am careful about not referring to the method of Ploetz and the other Prussians as Grammar Translation proper (since the name came about well after these men’s publications). However, as I have shown, Ollendorff is largely an imitation or
copy of Meidinger. Thus, Kelly’s observation, even if he does not mean it as such, can be taken as an observation that Ploetz has similarities to Meidinger. Further evidence is provided by Christ, who (1999: 50) demonstrates through a detailed examination of Ploetz’s presentation of the French definite article “for the purpose of comparison with Meidinger” (original German: “um der Vergleichbarkeit mit Meidinger willen”), that Ploetz consistently follows the same rule-oriented approach as Meidinger, only much more thoroughly. Ultimately, I maintain that Ploetz’s method manages to represent much of what both Meidinger and Seidenstücker did before him.

Regarding my assertion that Ploetz is following Seidenstücker, I note that Ploetz displays an inductive approach to grammar, like Seidenstücker’s, by first presenting examples above his texts to translate. However, between the examples and the text, Ploetz then takes a deductive approach and inserts a detailed explanation, with traditional grammar terminology, of the grammar rules, exceptions, etc. This deductive approach thus makes Ploetz seem like Meidinger. Also like Seidenstücker – and Ahn – Ploetz begins with exercise texts in French, the foreign language, and also German, letting the student translate in both directions from the very first exercise (Seidenstücker does not actually do this in his very first exercise, but very nearly at the beginning, in the thirteenth exercise). However, unlike all the Prussians, Ploetz never exits this routine of grammar example, followed by grammar explanation, followed by text to translate. That is, this sequence controls the entire content of the book; there are no “extras” at the end like sample conversations or stand-alone reading passages that are not tied to a certain
grammar topic. Instead, Ploetz consistently presents all of his texts as follow-ups to and illustrations of his grammar explanations, always to be translated.

Ploetz’s texts are often marked, like Seidenstücker’s and Ahn’s by a disconnectedness due to formulaic sentences. Ploetz indeed offers some anecdotes that are unified texts, but his regular exercises contain sentences unrelated to each other, which well illustrate the classic complaint about GTM exercises, with an added technique of highlighting the grammar feature under discussion:

B. 22. ²Grammatische ¹Übungen sind nothwendig, um eine Sprache gründlich zu erlernen. 23. Die Geschichte der orientalischen Völker bildet die erste Gruppe der alten (ancien) ¹Geschichte. 24. Überall sahen wir grüne ¹Hügel mit (de) Weinbergen bepflanzt, Hütten von glücklichen ³Familien bewohnt, reinliche und friedliche Dörfer und blühende Städte. 25. Kalte und eisige ³Winde beherrschen die nördlichen ¹Districte Sibiriens. ... (Ploetz 1853: 153, emphasis in original)

B. 22. Grammar exercises are necessary in order to learn a language thoroughly. 23. The history of the oriental peoples constitutes the first group of ancient history. 24. Everywhere we saw green hills planted with vineyards, cottages lived in by happy families, pristine and peaceful villages, and blooming cities. 25. Cold and icy winds dominate the northern districts of Siberia. ... (My transl.)

The sentences are perhaps more disconnected in content and form than in any author examined yet, their apparent unifying factor being that they offer practice with adjectives. N.B. I discuss the superscript numbering system in the above exercise in regard to a separate example on the next page. Here, I mean only to highlight the disconnected nature of Ploetz’s sentences to one another.

In an innovation over the other Prussians, all of the vocabulary in Ploetz’s book has been moved to the end of the book, presented in individual lists designated by lesson number.
This represents a difference from the approach that Meidinger and Seidenstücker take in the early part of their books – Meidinger initially puts the vocabulary lists under the texts, Seidenstücker initially puts the lists above; however, in later sections of their books, both Meidinger and Seidenstücker also move the vocabulary to its own section in the back. Ploetz’s vocabulary lists are long: he needs 38 pages, with two columns of vocabulary per page, for glossing his 73 lessons.

Another difference in Ploetz’s book is an addition and is found in the way that Ploetz incorporates supplemental instructions and aids into his translation exercises. For example, he consistently emphasizes those words in his translation texts that correspond specifically to the grammatical topic just presented. For French texts, he uses italics, and for German texts, he spaces the letters apart in these “important” words. As an example, in the following translation exercises (one in French, one in German), the emphasized words all illustrate the grammar that was just presented in Ploetz’s “Lection 9,” the topic of which is verbs in French that are derived from the root verbs venir and tenir:

1. Pendant vingt ans la reine Élisabeth tint entre ses mains la vie de Marie Stuart.
2. Tous les biens nous viennent de la grâce de Dieu. 3. Cicéron obtint le suffrage de ses concitoyens et détint consul.
4. Samson renversa une des colonnes qui soutenaient la salle. …


Beyond the emphasizing of French words that are based on venir and tenir, and the German words whose French translations will be based on those verbs, one also notes the
superscript numbers and parenthetical abbreviations in the German text. Ploetz alerts his reader about these added instructional aids on page one:

Die in den deutschen Übungen anfänglich befindlichen kleinen Zahlen deuten die französischen Wortstellung an; p. d. heißt passé défini; imp. bedeutet imparfait; subj. heißt subjonctiv. (Ploetz 1853: 1)

The small numbers found at the beginning of words in the German exercises indicates the French word order; p. d. means passé défini; imp. means imparfait; subj. means subjonctiv. (My transl.)

It is thus clear that translation is the primary intention for all of Ploetz’s texts. It is also clear that Ploetz subscribes to a certain restricted philosophy of “translating by numbers” and “word-for-word translation.” His manipulation of the text to facilitate translation is reminiscent of the translation-minded manipulations that Meidinger, Seidenstücker, and Ahn perform on German word order. In fact, Meidinger also performs a similar numbering operation in his own manual, but only with one brief illustration of the technique, followed by one practice exercise (1792: 217-218). This suggests that Ploetz may have been guided by Meidinger here, or perhaps merely that this technique was commonplace. Yet, none of the other Prussians gives as consistently explicit and deductive instructions as these numbered words in the text, regarding how the translation should proceed. Beyond these helpfully intended aids, Ploetz is also the first of the Prussians to number systematically every sentence within his exercises, it is assumed for the sake of convenience, as also can be seen in the above example. It is a systematicity that is again more reminiscent of Meidinger than Seidenstücker, even though only the latter of the two is named as an influence by Ploetz.
Returning to Meidinger as the source, while qualifying history’s casting of a clear lineage.

It is my conclusion that 1) Meidinger indeed deserves recognition as the primary originator of a successful and lasting method that conforms to later-formed definitions of the Grammar Translation Method, and 2) that only one of Meidinger’s alleged successors – Ollendorff – also offers a method that could be called as much a GTM as Meidinger’s, despite history’s general assertion that Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ploetz also belong in the GTM’s lineage. I find that the methods of Seidenstücker and Ahn, by contrast, do not appear to conform to the definitions of the GTM, as their methods are significantly marked by inductive approaches to grammar, translation, and pronunciation.

Nonetheless, Seidenstücker – and Ahn, by virtue of his professed descendence from Seidenstücker – demonstrate a belief in the principles of the GTM, in that among their stated later goals is for the student to be able to confront an ordered, presumably deductive grammar. As well, Seidenstücker and Ahn consistently offer translation exercises, suggesting that they ascribe to the GTM principle of translation as a demonstration of proficiency with a language. Ploetz’s methodology represents an interesting hybrid of approaches that make his method difficult to classify as either purely deductive or inductive, and thus not as Meidinger-esque or Ollendorff-esque a GTM as possible. Historical reaction to and categorization of these five authors as a group remains an understandable curiosity – that is, despite their differences, certain overlaps seem too great to ignore, for example: Seidenstücker’s deductive approach to vocabulary overlaps Meidinger’s; markedly formulaic or disconnected sentences can be found.
among all; there appears to be a shared goal of a student’s eventually knowing grammar
on a highly deductive level; and there also appears to be a shared philosophy in
translation as the most apparent activity to do when learning a language. Of course, their
shared geopolitical origins and their shared interest in language pedagogy makes these
five Prussians also conveniently assemblable as a unit. This analysis has had value in
determining that Meidinger indeed put a methodology into motion long ago that would
qualify as a GTM today.

Now, I would like to leave the question of who may have started the GTM as it is
understood today and embark on an examination of the naming of the method. I will
offer that the originators of the Reform Movement, as well as those in the concurrent
movement that leads to the Direct Method, out of a need to differentiate themselves from
prevailing methodologies, are the first to fix the use of the terms “grammar” and
“translation” to describe methods such as the ones of Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn,
Ollendorff, and Ploetz. Another goal will be to isolate the concept of translation as it is
understood by the Reform Movement and the Direct Method. I will argue that the
Reform Movement and the Direct Method do not express a conceptualization of
translation outside of translation’s traditional manifestation in the GTM. That is, they
continue to treat the notion of translation as strictly the interlingual translation of written
texts, usually performed as an exercise that operates out of restrictive principles (such as
word-for-word, left-to-right translation between German and French), and usually meant
to demonstrate that a student “has learned” a language. For the Reform Movement and
the Direct Method, any explicit mention or use of translation appears to corral any
methodology into alignment with the “flawed” GTM. Later I will argue that the type of translation that occurred in the GTM is just one of many types of translation that the Reform Movement and the Direct Method ought to have considered.
CHAPTER TWO

Naming and Characterizing the Prussians’ Method: The Reform Movement and Wilhelm Viëtor’s Important Contribution.

It is not an easy question to answer: When was the Prussians’ approach first called a “Grammar Translation Method?” In fact, I will not endeavor to claim to answer who first said, or even perhaps played with, the phrase “Grammar Translation Method.” Instead, I will show that this phrase came into being at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, largely out of a need for those people who opposed the “method of old,” e.g., Reformers like Wilhelm Viëtor (1850-1918) and Otto Jespersen (1860-1943), to identify and characterize the traditional approach. That is, I will show in the Reform Movement some of the first written references to a method that eventually becomes characterized, as it still is today, as a “grammar translation” method (German: “Grammatik-Übersetzungsmethode”).

First, the consideration of some other names than “grammar translation method.”

Before treating the Reform Movement, and Viëtor’s significant use of the descriptors “Grammatik” and “Übersetzung” for the “traditional” method, I would remind the reader again that neither Meidinger nor his “successors” (Seidenstücker, Ahn, Ollendorff, and Ploetz) ever name their methods as Grammar Translation. Since one convention for naming methodologies is of course to include the name of the method’s perceived
creator, we might have expected at some point in history, such as at the beginning of the Reform Movement, the coining of a name like “Meidinger’s Method,” “Seidenstücker’s Method,” etc. Indeed, such nomenclature appears to have been practiced briefly: As was mentioned earlier, Ollendorff referred to an “Ahn Method” (German: “Ahnsche Methode”) and Ploetz made reference to “Seidenstücker’s Methode.” Then too, the “Ollendorff Method” was also a term in wide public use during the 1800s—see for example Bates (1860), who notes on methods:

One is called the Ollendorff method, from the fact that he first introduced the leading features of the system into practice in his classes, and afterward published them for the use of pupils in the German. (Bates 1860: 176)

But even if such method naming, based on a method’s author, might have occurred briefly, obviously none of the five Prussians who contributed to what we today call the GTM managed to endow the method with his name for perpetuity.

On the other hand, methodologies are also often named based on their salient features or operational hallmarks. I noted earlier about this aspect that Ploetz at one point gives to his own method the name “Step-wise Progressing Method.” I also noted that Hübner (1929) uses this “step-wise progression” descriptor for Meidinger’s method. Yet, as history has shown, the name “Step-wise Progressing Method” did not survive generally, leaving the name now largely as an indicator specifically of what Ploetz found salient in his own approach, and Hübner in Meidinger’s approach. Yet, regarding the naming of a method based on its hallmarks, Hübner does not refer to Meidinger’s method only as one that “progresses step-wise.” That is, Hübner notices another salient feature in Meidinger’s method, beyond the many controlled steps that Meidinger has his pupils take.

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13 Versions of books using “Ollendorff’s Method” even appear today as collector’s items online.
learning about grammar – and so he describes the method in Meidinger’s book as “the grammaticizing method”:

Insofern begründete dies Buch die eigentliche grammatisierende Methode, die den praktischen Gebrauch der Sprache in den Hintergrund drängte. (Hübner 1929: 12, emphasis in original)

In so doing, this book founded the grammaticizing method proper, which pushed into the background the practical use of the language. (My transl.)

Hübner is not the first to use this term “the grammaticizing method,” for, as I will show, Viëtor also uses the term (although in association with “translation” too). Indeed, Hübner’s use of the definite article and also the word “eigentlich” (my translation: “proper”), indicate that Hübner is referring to a name already in circulation. As well, his use of the term confirms that in his time the generally “traditional” or “classical” method of language teaching (as exemplified by Meidinger’s method) had apparently been undergoing a more specific re-naming, based on its grammatical hallmarks. This re-naming of the “traditional” way to teach languages was largely inspired by the Reform Movement in German education during the last decades of the 19th century, a movement that had particularly strong ramifications for language teaching and was felt well beyond the borders of just Germany, as noted by Doff (2008), who observes the Reform’s effects over continental Europe.

Viëtor starts the Reform Movement.

The Reform Movement begins with the publication of Viëtor's treatise in 1882, Der Sprachunterricht muß umkehren! Ein Beitrag zur Überburdungsfrage, initially published
under the pseudonym Quousque Tandem.\(^\text{14}\) Along with Jespersen in Denmark, Henry Sweet (1845-1912) in Great Britain, Paul Passy (1859-1940) in France, and others, Viëtor calls for a reinvigoration of the teaching of modern languages by stressing the spoken language. In the hands of the Reformers, phonetics becomes a new science and, under Passy in 1886, they form Dhi Fonêtik Tîcerz' Asóciécon (“The Phonetic Teachers’ Association”) in Paris. Later, in January, 1889, the association’s name is changed to L'Association Phonétique des Professeurs de Langues Vivantes, and, in 1897, to L'Association Phonétique Internationale (API), or, in English, the International Phonetic Association (IPA). As well, the Reformers create the first incarnations of today's International Phonetic Alphabet. They also begin journals such as *Phonetische Studien* (founded by Viëtor in 1887, renamed *Die Neueren Sprachen* in 1893) and *Le Maître Phonétique* (begun by Passy and originally published as *The Phonetic Teacher* from 1886 to 1889, and then under the French title from 1889 to 1970). The Reformers are marked by a spirit of collaboration and collective endeavor to improve education in general, beyond just language teaching – as an example, Viëtor’s treatise, although it is dedicated to language teaching, actually begins by addressing the more general problem of the “overburdening” of students by the school system (German: “Überburdung”), as he puts it in the end of his treatise’s title.

The accepted “official” translation of the title of Viëtor’s treatise is *Language teaching must start afresh!* and was offered by Henry Sweet. My English translation of the title is:

*Language Teaching Has to Turn Itself Around! A Contribution to the Debate about*

\(^{14}\) There is consensus that Viëtor's treatise brought the Reform ideas most significantly into public debate, although the movement was already brewing. See Howatt and Widdowson (2004), Doff (2008), Criado-Sánchez (2005), Kelly (1976), Hübner (1929), etc.
Overburdening\textsuperscript{15}. I have been unable to find a first edition of Viëtor’s treatise. However, a second edition from 1886 is available. In the second edition there is an added preface wherein Viëtor reveals his true identity as the treatise’s author. A third edition from 1905 is also available, to which Viëtor has added a brief preface and, more significantly, substantial commentary in the form of endnotes (the preface from the second edition is also included therein). In both the second and third editions, the body of the treatise remains unchanged from the first edition. For simplicity’s sake, I will therefore cite exclusively from this third edition of the treatise (1905). For the purposes of this dissertation, it is most significant to note which terms Viëtor uses in the body of his treatise to describe the past, traditional language teaching methodologies. Additionally, his added preface to the second edition and the endnotes to the third edition offer evidence of an evolution in Viëtor’s understanding of the effects of his call for a language teaching reform.

The nature of the Reform Movement: an emphasis on the sounds of a language.

Using phonetics to teach language is the single most characterizing factor defining the Reform Movement’s methodology. Viëtor recognizes and constantly stresses the role of phonetics. He publishes several textbooks on the phonetics of English, French, and German, and he remarks in a lecture published in 1902, that his efforts may have gone too far for some teachers:

\textsuperscript{15} As Howatt and Widdowson (2004: 207) note, Sweet’s translation of the title “does not quite capture the notion of revolutionary change expressed in ‘umkehren’. I would add that the sweeping motion of “kehren” tied with the turning or circular motion in “um” justify my translation of the title.
Mein bereits 1879 gemachter Versuch (Englische Schulgrammatik I), die englische Formenlehre ganz auf den Laut an Stelle der Schrift zu begründen, geht den meisten auch der Reformer zu weit. (Viëtor 1902: 36)

The attempt that I made to base English morphology entirely on sound as opposed to the written language – that is, my “Englische Schulgrammatik I” from 1879 – goes too far for most teachers, even the Reformers. (My transl.)

Jespersen in 1904 will devote a chapter of his book, How to Teach a Foreign Language, to pronunciation:

Here, last but not least, comes the treatment of the pronunciation, which for several reasons I have not taken up first, although the questions which are here to be discussed necessarily play a part already from the very first lesson in a foreign language. I have for many years advocated the use of phonetics. (Jespersen 1904: 152)

When one compares these statements from Jespersen and Viëtor to the definitions of the GTM that were examined earlier (in the Introduction), one notices that, indeed, “inadequately speaking the language” is a consistent refrain in GTM criticisms. The Reformers are reacting to the subordination of speaking by suggesting that the written language is not the appropriate basis for language study, thus addressing the criticisms of the traditional methods, that proficiency at written translation exercises is not sufficient evidence of a student’s having learned a language.

In terms of methodology, Viëtor and the Reformers seek to accustom the student to learning and appreciating language as a phenomenon of an “aggregate of sounds” (Sweet 1877: 86)\(^{16}\). The Reformers stress vocal articulation and hearing, and conventional systems of writing are oftentimes avoided, in favor of phonetic transcriptions, so as to prevent visual crutches and focus the student on mastering the production and recognition

\(^{16}\) Sweet mentions this in his Handbook of Phonetics. Sweet’s book, although an influential part of the Reform’s origins, did not manage to enter into public consciousness as greatly as Viëtor’s treatise would five years later.
of sounds. Sweet, for example, invents a new “Romic” alphabet that he trains his students to use during their first phases of learning the foreign language. Written work is generally only done as a dictation exercise. Writing creative texts in the foreign language is not stressed early on.¹⁷ Viëtor suggests that students learning foreign languages not be given written homework. Class time is spent speaking and listening as much as possible, often by repeatedly going through readings aloud. The reading of a text is always carried out aloud before a student reads the text in silence. Grammar is addressed primarily as a phenomenon of the structuring of sounds and is taught inductively. As regards translation, it is mostly used orally. A teacher may say the translation of a foreign word aloud, for example during a class reading session, in order to aid in comprehension and in the flow of instruction, and a student may also be asked at times to translate a selection from the reading aloud in class, generally as a check of comprehension. Oral translation in the other direction, into the foreign language, is considered too difficult and unproductive. As regards written translation exercises, these are generally considered difficult regardless of the direction of translating. They are only considered for a later stage of language learning, but are not considered essential. The Reformers characterize written translation, especially from the mother tongue into the foreign language, not only as an “art,” but - as it is practiced in the traditional methodologies that they observe, with texts that are made of prefabricated sentences of disconnected content - as “mindless.” Viëtor associates the methods that espouse such translation explicitly with Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, Ollendorff, and Ploetz. Nonetheless, the Reformers never ban translation outright.

¹⁷ Writing creative texts does not appear to be encouraged by the textbooks examined in Chapter One, as they do not address the task.
Viëtor grapples with the issue of names.

As noted earlier, in their efforts to advocate for a reformed approach to language teaching, the Reformers face a need to name what has preceded their reforms. That is, they are forced to give a description, or name, to what teachers and textbook authors such as Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, Ollendorff, and Ploetz were doing. Some reviewers of the Reform Method, such as G. Cook (2010), are more critical of this need of the Reformers to characterize the past:

> All new movements need an old regime to replace – one they can caricature and ridicule, whose weaknesses will nicely show off their own virtues in contrast. In Grammar Translation, the orthodoxy of their time, both the Reform Movement and the new Direct Method language schools found an easy target. (G. Cook 2010:9)

Note that Cook seems to take as a given that a “Grammar Translation” method is already a defined and existing name at the Reformers’ time, although this, as will become clearer later, is not yet so. I would also note that the Reformers do not appear to be ones to “caricature and ridicule” nor to “show off,” as this behavior does not come through in their texts, and their collaborative scientific pursuits speak against such posturing. Possibly the originators of the Direct Method that Cook mentions (a concurrent movement with the Reform) are such types, due to their commercial motivations, which Cook himself details. Thus, Cook’s statement here seems unnecessarily strong, as well as more likely relevant only to the Direct Method than to the Reform Movement. Yet, Cook’s observation is important because it confirms that the Reformers did indeed have a need to identify and name their “target.”
However, the use of names appears to be problematic for Viëtor. Consider that Viëtor, as mentioned above, refrains from using his own name when first publishing his treatise, instead resorting to a pseudonym. The use of a pseudonym suggests a tension with identifying himself, and this tension reverberates in Viëtor’s omission throughout his treatise of the names of any personal “targets” from the past whose methods he criticizes. Instead, Viëtor names only those personages whom he compliments (such as Sweet, and also, among others, a Günther, Kühn, Kräuter, and Trautmann), or who appear to be living contemporaries. As for the past opposition, Viëtor generally identifies issues, not people. The incompleteness of out-and-out naming might actually be a strategic choice on his part so as not to step on any toes prematurely, while also shielding himself. It may also explain why Viëtor never chooses to classify the traditional methodologies of his day as, perhaps, “Meidinger’s Method” or a method joined with another of the Prussians’ names. As such, one might read the first edition of his treatise as an initially incomplete attempt by Viëtor to bring all of the historical figures and issues to light against whom and against which he is rallying – incomplete, in that only the issues are well lit, not the figures.

The pseudonym itself, Quousque Tandem, is a castigation or veiled insult that can be translated as an exasperated, “For how much longer?” It comes from a quote from Cicero’s Catiline Orations (63 B.C.): “Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?” or “How long will you continue to abuse our patience, Catiline?” Viëtor neither explains the pseudonym’s historical origin nor its translation. With the greater degree of Latin usage in his day, Viëtor may have been able to assume that the pseudonym’s origin and meaning would be known to his audience – or perhaps he leaves the name unexplained because he does not want to be impudent. Jespersen and others eventually form a society for language education reform in Sweden in 1886, called Quousque Tandem, in honor of Viëtor. In his book, Jespersen (1904: 1) translates Viëtor’s “Ciceronian flourish” of a pseudonym as, “Cannot we soon put an end to this?” (Viëtor, for his part, honors Jespersen with some praise in the preface to the third edition of his treatise.)
Viëtor promptly labels the pseudonym as no longer necessary in the preface to the second edition of his treatise:

Mit dem Quousque Tandem auf dem Titel wurde der Ton des Schriftchens fast von selbst frischer und freier, vielleicht ein wenig ungestüm. Es tut mir leid, wenn dies hier und da Anstoß erregt hat. ... Das Pseudonym länger zu wahren, war weder nötig noch thunlich, nachdem ich von Freunden in der Nähe und Ferne als Verfasser erraten und verraten worden bin. (Viëtor 1905: V-VI)

With the Quousque Tandem on the title page the tone of the little text became almost in and of itself fresher and freer, maybe a little irreverent. I apologize if this provoked any umbrage here or there. ... To hold onto the pseudonym was neither necessary nor doable, after it was guessed and revealed by friends near and far that I am the author. (My transl.)

This revelation of Viëtor’s name is a significant development from the first edition. Viëtor here, especially with his apology, essentially reveals that his use of the pseudonym indeed entailed certain tensions; that is, while freeing his “little text” from a stale tone, the pseudonym may also have made the text appear flippant. He also leaves open the possibility that he intended these tensions, as if – albeit only by the implication of opposites – the reasons necessary for a radical change in language teaching are that there exist a staleness, a lack of liberty, and an overly high degree of reverence in the current, traditional state of language teaching. The revelation of his own name may also indicate that a certain maturation is taking place, which can be seen as culminating in the extensive endnotes that he adds to the third edition, wherein Viëtor is much freer with his use of names. The tensions about naming are, however, arguably never entirely relieved by Viëtor. As the apology in the preface in his second edition of his treatise intimates,
Viëtor’s avoidance of names might also have been out of an uncertainty over his own power in the discussion with history that he was starting.19

Viëtor names Ploetz.

Regarding the names of the Prussian heavyweights of the past (Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, Ollendorff, Ploetz), Viëtor only briefly names Ploetz. Significantly, Ploetz is also the only one of the five who is still living while Viëtor is an adult (Meidinger and Seidenstücker predecease Viëtor, and Ahn and Ollendorff both die while Viëtor is approximately 15 years old). Ploetz is, therefore, the only one of the five who might actually have felt any real consequences of direct naming, or ignoring. Viëtor does not ultimately praise the methodology of Ploetz. Rather, Viëtor casts Ploetz in at best a dubiously positive light. In his two mentions of Ploetz, Viëtor uses qualifying language that never grants Ploetz any whole scale merit.

Viëtor first mentions Ploetz during a scathing presentation about the “mistakes” (German: “Fehler”) that Viëtor has witnessed in various textbooks’ phonetic explanations of the vowels “e,” “o,” “ö,” and “a”:

Offenes und geschlossenes e, o und ö und erst gar helles und dunkles a gehen (wenn auch Plötz hier das Richtige bietet) bunt durcheinander. (Viëtor 1905: 10)

[Explanations of] open and closed e, o, and ö – and at first even front and back a – are made into a pretty mess (even if Plötz gets it right here.) (My transl.)

19 In fact, grappling with “unequal power” is a topic that, as I will endeavor to show later, arguably reappears in at least one significant instance where Viëtor expresses his notions of translation in an example of a native German speaker’s being in a conversation with a “foreigner.”
Although Viëtor grants that Ploetz’s explanation of these vowels “gets it right here,” he as good as says that Ploetz does not “get it right” in other instances. In the second mention of Ploetz, Viëtor appears to compliment Ploetz’s inclusion of authentic reading material in his book for learning French (as opposed to artificially constructed sentences and texts):

Plötz’ „Lese- und Übungsbuch“ ist jedenfalls ein Fortschritt. (Viëtor 1905: 30)

_Ploetz’s “Book of Readings and Exercises” is in any case a step forward. (My transl.)_

Yet, with his use of “in any case” and with no adjective or other modifier strengthening this “step forward,” beyond the indefinite article, Viëtor refrains from declaring Ploetz’s book a flat-out success. Notably, Viëtor never associates Ploetz’s motivations to make such a book with the principles of the Reformers, as if that which is worthwhile in Ploetz’s works represents for Viëtor merely an accidental overlap with what Viëtor might himself offer in such a book. Thus, for Viëtor, Ploetz remains a representative of the old, unreformed method. But Viëtor nevertheless does not choose to classify the old method as “Ploetz’s Method.”

Interestingly, besides in the body of the treatise as it appears in 1882, Ploetz comes up again in Viëtor’s “comments” (German: “Anmerkungen”) to his treatise, which were first published 22 years later as endnotes to the third edition in 1905. Viëtor comments in these endnotes on a book for learning French, co-written by Ploetz’s son Gustav and one Otto Kares, and describes the work as representative of a “mediating method” (German: “vermittelnnde Methode”). Viëtor’s comment number 17, where he mentions this book, reads:

Thus today there dominates a ‘mediating’ method that is somewhere between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ (i.e., the Reform) and is exemplified by the textbooks of Ploetz-Kares and Plate-Kares. I confess that in this mediation I find much more of the old than the new. Instead of having the individual and strange sentences presented after the rules, we have before the rules a unified text that is, however, as grammatical and methodical as the earlier sentences had been. The complementary texts in German are of the same nature. With the vocabulary words, things are just as they had been before. (My transl.)

Viëtor thus considers the books by Ploetz and Kares, and Plate and Kares, as potentially valuable, being somewhere between the old method and the new, reformed method. But Viëtor ultimately dismisses this book as “more old than new,” which may also be a significant jab at Ploetz the elder, since the book, published in 1888 in Berlin by Ploetz and Kares – with the title: Schulgrammatik der französischen Sprache von Dr. Karl Ploetz in kurzer Fassung herausgegeben von Dr. Gustav Ploetz & Dr. Otto Kares (my translation: Dr. Karl Ploetz’s School Grammar of the French Language in Shortened Form, authored by Dr. Gustav Ploetz & Dr. Otto Kares) – actually declares itself to be nothing other than a revised version of the late Ploetz’s very book. It is also worthwhile noting here that Viëtor, in the above quote, refers to a “grammatisch-methodisch” approach, which represents one of numerous examples (discussion coming) where Viëtor brings together the concept of “grammar” with that of a “method.” As well, Viëtor’s lament of “individual and strange sentences” is another refrain that will be found in his criticisms of the old methodologies; Viëtor apparently prefers the use of unified texts. By mentioning such sentences, Viëtor touches upon a topic that was also (as noted earlier)
mentioned by Ollendorff, who criticizes Meidinger’s “ready-made and useless sentences” (recall, I observed by contrast that the texts that Meidinger uses are actually unified, setting Meidinger apart from the other Prussians). Additionally, it is significant that Viëtor here refers to exercises and texts in German, since such texts in the mother tongue are clearly meant for translation. Yet, Viëtor does not of course state “translation” (German: “Übersetzung”) explicitly here.

Viëtor uses implications of inadequacy and brings descriptors such as “old” into play when characterizing the traditional methodology.

As discussed above, Viëtor’s reticence to name names, perhaps in union with a larger set of motivations, appears to be a factor in his avoidance of a term like “Ploetz’s Method.” Often, Viëtor resorts to less overt ways of referring to and defining examples of the past methodology that he finds so inappropriate, such as implication. At several points he implies that the traditional methodology has been inadequate. Viëtor implies inadequacy when he mentions that the method already did not work for creating true Latin or Greek scholars, let alone good French or English speakers:

Widerspreche mir, wer kann: Läßt ihn die Schule endlich frei, so ist dem abgehetzten Schüler die Sprache der alten Römer und Hellenen, ja das lebendige Englisch und Französisch der Gegenwart im wahren Sinne des Wortes fremd wie zuvor. (Viëtor 1905: 26)

If you can, contradict me: When the school finally sets him free, the harried student finds the language of the ancient Romans and Hellenes – indeed the living languages of the present day English and French – are in the true sense of the word as foreign as before. (My transl.)
In addition to implying inadequacy in the traditional language instruction at schools, this citation is also important for establishing that Viëtor appears to agree with modern descriptions that cast the GTM as a mere extension of the teaching of ancient languages, assumed to be applicable to living languages like English and French. Viëtor returns to the theme of inadequacy at the end of his treatise, now cast as what one might call “over-adequacy.” Viëtor asks language teachers, metaphorically, to consider the advantages of toning down their goal of total, “over-adequate” coverage, since this approach can result in a treatment of materials that does not ultimately bear fruit:

Wohlan, ihr Sprachlehrer! Zeigt doch zunächst einmal, daß die Hälfte eines Ackers, wohl gepflegt und bestellt, mehr Früchte trägt als der ganze, über den man nur immerzu mit vollen Händen ungesäuberten Samen ausstreute. (Viëtor 1905: 34)

So, you language teachers, have courage! Go and show first and foremost that half of a field, well cultivated and tilled, bears more fruits than an entire field would if a person only, and constantly, sowed it with her or his hands full of seeds that have not been cleaned. (My transl.)

Recall, Meidinger was earlier observed stating a goal of offering “the entire French syntax,” and Viëtor appears to be attacking this totalistic approach in the passage above. Viëtor says that this totalistic approach sacrifices such important factors as the time and space necessary for knowledge’s germination and growth, such that it ironically leads to less complete success. Viëtor also implies that this approach results in the unnecessary treatment of topics that would better be picked over and culled out, for they do not eventually take root strongly enough. The sentiment is reminiscent of Ollendorff’s and Ploetz’s acknowledgements that they picked over several methods before culling the best parts. Viëtor’s metaphor of tilling and cultivating the entire field is also reflective of the criticism against the GTM’s tendency to be “long and elaborate,” as opposed to clean and
simple. Finally, as a sort of precursory statement to this metaphor of the overly and improperly farmed field that bears too little fruit, placed at the end of his treatise, one may revisit the opening of Viëtor’s treatise – specifically, the title; for in the second part of the treatise’s title – *Ein Beitrag zur Überburdungsfrage* – is another implied reference to the “over-adequacy” of traditional methodologies, here expressed with concern as “overburdening.” Although Viëtor at first contextualizes the overburdening in the number of hours expected of pupils to partake in all their courses and homework per week, he quickly segues into a treatment of the overburdening specifically as a feature of the traditional old language instruction.

In fact, instead of remaining just an implication, “old” (German: “alt”) is a term that Viëtor repeatedly uses explicitly for describing aspects of the traditional methodologies. He resorts to “alt” in four instances, in order to describe, or rather dismiss, the following (my translations follow the original German):

1) a textbook by an author named Planus that gives questionable pronunciation models by spelling French with the German alphabet:

   der alte Planus. (Viëtor 1905: 10)

   *the old book by Planus.*

2) an approach to teaching French grammar:

   Traurig ist es, die althergebrachten „vier Konjugationen“ zu sehen. (Viëtor 1905: 16)

   *It is sad to see the old-school ‘four conjugations.’*

3) the “classical” voices of the past:
Mehr Stimmen schon, und nicht wenige altklassische, erheben sich zu dem Ruf: Tod den Regeln und Sätzen! (Viëtor 1905: 30)

More and more voices, among them even more than a few from the (ancient) Classical field, are raising themselves up to the rallying cry: Death to the rules and sentences [for translation]!

4) the “mean” preconceptions of language teachers:

Vielleicht findet ihr dann, daß es sich der Mühe lohnt, ein paar böse alte Vorurteile zu opfern. (Viëtor 1905: 34)

Perhaps you [language teachers] will then find that it is worth the effort to sacrifice some bad, old preconceptions.

The third instance above is also valuable in that there is another reference to the translation “sentences” and “rules” that are consistently associated with the GTM today.

As well, I will show presently that the mention of “rules” represents another refrain in Viëtor’s characterization of traditional methods.

Viëtor also uses another Reformer’s mention of “alt,” when he quotes Günther, who himself uses the word “alt” to dismiss the entire approach which the old method rested on, calling it and “old joke.” First, Viëtor cites Günther (1905: 21) as the author of „Der Lateinunterricht am Seminar“ (my translation: “Latin instruction at the seminary”) in the „Jahrbuch des Vereins für wissensch. Pädagogik“ (my translation: “Yearbook of the association for scientific pedagogy”) from 1881. (I have been unable to locate Günther’s text.) Then, two pages later, Viëtor quotes Günther’s article, adding his own concluding observation:

„Nur wenn ein neuer Abschnitt beginnt, der nach einer neuen Regel und nach neuen Formen schematisiert ist, gibt solcher Unterricht dem Geiste der Schüler einen kleinen Ruck, ein anderes Register wird aufgezogen, der Schüler achtet wieder auf die ersten paar Sätze, und nach der kurzen Mühe ihrer Übersetzung
kann die alte Schnurre von neuem beginnen.“ Das paßt auf neunundneunzig von hundert unserer Lehrbücher. (Viëtor 1905: 23, quotation marks in original)

_As Günther further emphasizes, ... ‘Only when a new lesson begins that is schematized according to a new rule and new forms do the students’ minds get any sort of jolt from such instruction. A new register is brought to light. The student again pays attention to the first few sentences, and after the short effort needed to translate them, the old joke can begin anew.’ That is true for ninety-nine out of a hundred of our textbooks. (My transl.)_

Beyond the use of the word “alt” here, it is also significant that Viëtor chooses a citation from Günther that explicitly refers to, with disdain, the often observed GTM features of learning according to a “rule,” focusing on “sentences,” and performing “translation.” Whether it is these collective features which Viëtor then immediately affirms with his subject pronoun “das” (at least for ninety-nine percent of the books that he knows), or whether the “das” refers more specifically to the fact that these features make for an “alte Schnurre,” is – perhaps intentionally – left open by Viëtor. This passage represents the first time that “translation” is explicitly mentioned in Viëtor’s treatise, notably as someone else’s term, for characterizing the “old” method.

_Viëtor eventually fixes more attention on the “Grammatik” and “Regeln” (“rules”) of the traditional methodologies._

Perhaps because such names as “The Inadequate Method” or “The Old Method” would appear themselves inadequately specific, Viëtor can be seen exploring yet other “names” for the traditional method. Besides “old,” two other terms that Viëtor explicitly resorts to for identifying features of the traditional methodologies are “grammar” and “rules.” In reading the following passage, it is important to know that, in the paragraph before it,
Viëtor has just described, deplorably, the Donatus System of education, with an example
of a carpenter who shows and teaches an apprentice about every possible type and cut of
wood, but who never lets the apprentice actually saw or create anything with his own
hands:

Nun, unsere Sprachunterrichtsmethode ist über die Donatusmanier noch gar nicht
so weit hinaus! Es handelt sich darum, den Inhalt der Schulgrammatik und
nebenher den nötigen Wortvorrat dem Schüler zu überliefern. Wie man das
anfängt, darüber klären uns schon die Lehrbücher allein auf. Eine Portion
grammatischer regeln wird einer „Lektion“ oder einem „Kapitel“ zugewiesen;
Übungssätze in der fremden Sprache, sodann deutsche, folgen; die zugehörigen
Vokabeln stehen entweder mit oder ohne Verweisungsziffern unter den Stücken
oder sind, und das ist das Gewöhnliche, in einem Anhang untergebracht, d. h., sie
sollen auswendig gelernt werden. (Viëtor 1905: 20-21)

Now, our method for language teaching is still not at all that far beyond the
manner of Donatus! All that matters is delivering to the student the contents of
the schoolbook grammar and, alongside that, the necessary vocabulary. How one
is supposed to begin doing this is cleared up for us by the textbooks themselves:
A certain portion of grammatical rules are apportioned to a ‘lesson’ or a
‘chapter;’ exercise sentences in the foreign language follow, then German ones;
the corresponding vocabulary words are found either under the texts (with or
without indexing numbers) or – and this is the usual custom – they are relegated
to an appendix, that is, they are supposed to be memorized by heart. (My transl.)

Here, with his explicit reference to “grammar” and “grammatical rules,” Viëtor
contributes to the identification of rule-oriented grammar as a hallmark of “our method
for language teaching” (he means “our method heretofore”). Indeed, Viëtor actually
describes here several of the features that are used today in describing the GTM (see
Introduction), and his description of the format of a typical textbook using this method is
markedly reminiscent of the textbooks of Meidinger and the other Prussians examined
earlier (see Chapter One). Significantly, Viëtor also refers to translation here, for
translation is the obvious intended activity for the exercise sentences that Viëtor
observes, especially, of course, the German ones. However, Viëtor notably does not state the term “translation” explicitly.

In another passage as well, Viëtor characterizes the old method as rule-oriented and grammar-based. Here, he does not describe the traditional method of language teaching per se, but rather the method’s traditional goal – reading. Viëtor finds that reading is put into practice in such a way that makes its purpose unclear:

Welchen Zweck sich die Schulroutine eigentlich mit der fremdsprachlichen Lektüre verbunden denkt, ist nicht so ganz klar. Ich glaube, man betrachtet sie als eine Art fortlaufender Bestätigung der Grammatik und ihrer Regeln. (Viëtor 1905: 25)

It is not entirely clear what purpose the school program actually considers to be connected with reading in a foreign language. I believe that one regards this reading as a kind of ongoing confirmation of the grammar and its rules. (My transl.)

Viëtor here echoes concerns attached to modern descriptions of the GTM, namely that reading is conducted as a means of grammatical analysis (recall, for example, Prator and Celce-Murcia’s definition of the GTM). This concern about “reading for grammar” appears also to have been addressed by Ollendorff, who chooses to include no vocabulary lists and also no explicit instructions for the literature in the foreign language that he includes at the end of his textbook, implying that the literature is meant purely for reading (and not necessarily for translation or a grammar analysis). Viëtor’s statement here is also reminiscent of the criticisms against the GTM that a student is judged to know the language if the student can translate and recite the rules of grammar. (Recall, Chastain maintains that students under the GTM are often required to “state the rule.”) Viëtor implies here a better purpose for reading that might be described as “literary appreciation.
of a self-standing language,” since, as I will later show, Viëtor also appears to express concern over the manner in which the traditional method ignores the “art” (German: “Kunst”) of translating texts into the foreign language, extending to the foreign language a certain preciosity. Ultimately, despite these references to grammar and rules, Viëtor never explicitly offers such a clean and clear phrase as “The Grammar-Based Method” or “The Rule-Oriented Method.”

Viëtor ambivalently mentions the term “translation” in reference both to the old method and to his own.

If, in addition to these explicit mentions of “grammar” and “rules” in his treatise, Viëtor were also to offer in his treatise an explicit description of the old method as a “translation-based” one, then one might well be justified in surmising that Viëtor’s treatise is one of the earliest documents to assemble and name the characteristics of the old method in such a way that comes close to its modern designation as “Grammar Translation.” Yet, Viëtor scarcely refers to “Übersetzung” explicitly in his treatise. More often, he makes implicit references to translation, such as his previously cited mention of sentences and texts within the old method that are presented in German (the mother tongue), and therefore, by implication, meant to be translation exercises. In fact, the few times when Viëtor mentions translation explicitly, he does so ambivalently. This ambivalence may stem from the fact that, as Viëtor himself notes, he actually includes some translation in his own methodology.
Viëtor’s first explicit mention of translation illustrates his stance against translation. He
decrees the mindless, formulaic, and mechanical nature of translation in the old method,
thereby also establishing that he considers the old method to be at least partially a
translation-based one. Viëtor actually accomplishes this portrayal of the method by again
quoting and paraphrasing Günther (such that the explicit mention of “translating” here is
actually both Günther’s and Viëtor’s). Viëtor cites Günther’s use of the words
“mindlessly translating” in describing what a student traditionally is expected to do:

> Er lese nur gedankenlos seine Regel, gedankenlos lerne er sie auswendig, und
gedankenlos übersetze er dann die nach ihrer Schablone verfaßten Übungssätze.

(Günther, as quoted in Viëtor 1905: 23)

> The student is only expected to read his rule mindlessly, he mindlessly learns it by
heart, and then he mindlessly translates the exercise sentences that were
fashioned according to the schema. (My transl.)

Besides the term “translate,” the text from Günther here is also significant for its mention
of the terms “rule,” “learning by heart,” and “sentences” – all of them of course “typical”
features of the GTM. The direction of translation here is left untreated – it could be from
or into the mother tongue. It appears to be written translation, since the sentences
referred to are likely from the written translation exercises that characterize the textbooks
of the old method. Shortly thereafter (on the same page), Viëtor then paraphrases Günther
in reference to the formulaic and mechanical nature of traditional translation exercises:

> Denn selbstverständlich wird der Schüler – wie Günther weiter hervorhebt –
nachdem er die ersten zwei oder drei Sätze übersetzt hat, ... die übrigen fünfhzig
oder mehr Sätze ... rein mechanisch nach dem Schema der vorhergehenden
übertragen. (Viëtor 1905: 23)

> After the student has translated the first few sentences, he will of course – as
Günther further stresses – ... translate purely mechanically the remaining fifty or
more sentences according to the scheme in the previous ones. (My transl.)

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The fact that the student referred to here is confronting fifty or more sentences, one after the other, indicates that written translation is probably meant here. It is also notable here that Viëtor uses two different German verbs for “translate.” The first verb mentioned (“übersetzen”) refers to the act of translation generally; however, the second verb for translation here (“übertragen”) refers specifically to translating “literally” or “formulaically.” As such, the adverbial modifier “mechanisch” almost does not need stating, and my translation above might not be as accurate as “operate purely mechanically with the remaining fifty or more sentences …” He does not use the term “übertragen” again in his treatise. Viëtor speaks here again to the concern expressed repeatedly about the GTM that students who translate might not actually know the language. That is, a mindless, mechanical, and formulaic operation would hardly seem to indicate that the student has learned the language fully enough. Viëtor thus sets a tone for translation here that is undeniably skeptical.

But later, Viëtor asserts that translation can actually deserve a place in his version of reformed language instruction, implying that his new methodology is also to a degree translation-based. For example, Viëtor is positive in his consideration of translation from the foreign language into German (that is, the student’s mother tongue), if the class is allowed control over the end product. In a description of his own vision of teaching, Viëtor writes:

Von dem Schüler wird keine häusliche Präparation verlangt. In der Schule liest der Lehrer ein kurzes Lesestück so oft wie nötig langsam und deutlich vor, wobei die Bücher der Schüler geschlossen sind. Er suppliert die deutsche Bedeutung der

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20 For example, a German translation of the question, “Did you mean that literally?” could well use the past participle of “übertragen” adverbially: “Hast du das übertragen gemeint?” (By word: “Have you that literally meant?”)
No preparation at home is demanded from the student. In school, the teacher reads aloud a short reading piece slowly and clearly, as often as necessary, during which the pupils’ books are closed. He supplies the German meaning of words that are not previously well-known or that arise out of the context, and he gives over the complete translation to the competition of the class which he can of course have a hand in inspecting. Then, they open their books for the first time. The teacher reads aloud again or has one of the better students read; others – the onrush of those willing and ready for it will be great – follow up with reading and then also translating. (My transl.)

Notably here, Viëtor is talking about oral translation in a group setting. In Reform Movement fashion, it is very clear that this lesson is based on speaking and reading aloud, and together, as opposed to writing and reading in silence. (Viëtor significantly does not ask his students to work alone at home, for there would be no spoken word there, and, as he details in the opening of his treatise, he finds that students are overburdened with excessive homework as it is.) Also important in the above lesson is that it is clear that any translating, either by the teacher or the students, is done into the mother tongue.

And then, on a note of skepticism towards translation again, Viëtor expresses caution about written translation from German, or the mother tongue, into the foreign language. He views this type of translating, as mentioned earlier, as “an art that is of no concern for the school”:

Auch stimme ich gegen Kühn dem letzteren vollkommen bei in der Verurteilung zusammenhängender deutscher Übungsstücke. Bringen wir den Schüler dahin, daß er außer in seiner Muttersprache auch in der fremden Sprache denken und
sich ausdrücken lernt, so haben wir, dächte ich, genug geleistet. Das Übersetzen in fremde Sprachen ist eine Kunst, welche die Schule nichts angeht. (Viëtor 1905: 33)

I also agree completely with the latter Kühn in his condemnation of artificially contextualized German exercise sentences. If we get the student to the point that he learns to think and express himself besides not just in his mother tongue but also in the foreign language, then I would think we have accomplished enough. Translating into foreign languages is an art that is of no concern for the school. (My transl.)

Although Viëtor does not state explicitly here that the translation he means is written, it appears to be the case. That is, the use of the word “exercise” suggests that the German sentences are from the traditional, written translation exercises of the old method. Therefore, one may surmise that Viëtor favors only oral translation, and at that, only from the foreign language into the mother tongue. However, whether Viëtor has provided enough evidence that the “old” method, characterized by him as based on “grammar” and “rules,” is also understood by him as a “translation method” remains unclear. Viëtor actually allies translation with both the old method (written translation into the foreign language) and his own reformed method (oral translation into the mother tongue). The translation in the old method is for him “mindless” and “mechanical,” and it is performed formulaically. The translation in his own method appears to be an aid to comprehension and flow in the classroom, not a routine exercise or goal. Thus, as his treatise stands in 1882, Viëtor has most explicitly characterized the old and traditional method as a rule-oriented, grammar-based one and less explicitly as a translation one.
Viëtor more explicitly associates “translation” with the old method in the endnotes to the third edition of his treatise.

In 1886, four years after his treatise’s publication, Viëtor publishes a second edition. As noted earlier, the second edition has an added, brief preface wherein Viëtor addresses the pseudonym that he used for the first edition and ultimately reveals his identity as the author. The preface to the second edition does not contain any characterizations of the “old” method of language teaching. Besides the addition of this preface, Viëtor leaves his treatise unchanged in the second edition. A third edition appears in 1905, also with an added, brief preface. This preface to the third edition is most notable for Viëtor’s acknowledgement (1905: VIII) of the “stellar book” (German: “prächtiges Buch”) by his fellow reformer Jespersen. Viëtor does not name Jespersen’s book, but gives its dates of publication in Danish and English (“dänisch 1901, englisch 1904”), such that one can know it is Jespersen’s Sprogundervisning (English: How to Teach a Foreign Language). The preface to the third edition, like that of the second, does not contain any characterizations of the old method, and the body of the treatise in the third edition remains unchanged. The addition of commentary in the form of endnotes (German: “Anmerkungen”) to the third edition is its most significant new aspect.

In the endnotes to his treatise’s third edition, Viëtor now uses the word “übersetzen,” or a form of it, 30 times, as opposed to only eight times in the treatise itself (and also the one instance in the treatise of “übertragen,” as mentioned above), which contributes to the
sense that translation has become an issue of greater concern to his methodology.\textsuperscript{21}

Beyond the greater frequency with which he mentions translation in the endnotes, there is little of the ambivalence towards translation anymore that had characterized the first edition of the treatise; rather, Viëtor’s tone has become clearly anti-translation. For evidence of his anti-translation stance, see “Anmerkung 19”:

\begin{quote}
Daher auch der ‘schlechte Ausfall’ der ‘Formen-’ und ‘Übersetzungsextemporalien’, den jeder junge Lehrer zu seiner Überraschung erfahren muß. (Viëtor 1905: 43, quotation marks in original)
\end{quote}

From that also come the ‘poor results’ on ‘sight-unseen’ texts meant for testing forms and translation, something that every young teacher is destined to have the surprise experience of. (My transl.)

Viëtor is questioning translation as an appropriate activity to perform with material that has not yet been adequately processed by the student for its meaning. Such “sight translations” (“Extemporalien”) are reminiscent of the modern observation that the GTM equates a student’s knowledge of the language based only on her or his facility with “forms” and “translation,” as opposed to, for example, answering reading comprehension questions. That is, with sight translation, the student is not being asked to say what the text “means” beyond largely identifying the grammar and vocabulary that it uses.

Although sight translation proper is not necessarily a characteristic customarily associated with the GTM, Viëtor appears also to be saying that the principles behind sight translation are flawed, since these “Extemporalien” ignore the deeper meaning of a text. Significantly, Viëtor does not address whether the translation here is written or oral, and whether it is from or into the mother tongue. As such, “translation” as a whole, rather than just one expression of it, is becoming problematized.

\textsuperscript{21} It would therefore be interesting to know if something specifically related to translation happened to Viëtor between 1882 (the year of publication of his treatise) and the early 1900s.
In “Anmerkung 30,” Viëtor again displays a disregard for translation, asserting that translation may even be bypassed or ignored:

In der fremden Sprache denken lerne man, so wird entgegnet, überhaupt nicht; es bleibe stets beim – wenn auch ‘blitzschnellen’ – Übersetzen. Das ist ein als solcher zu beweisender Irrtum. (Viëtor 1905: 48, quotation marks in original)

The opposition maintains that a person may not really learn to think fully in the foreign language; there will always remain – even if ‘lightning fast’ – translating. That is an error that can be proved as such. (My transl.)

Viëtor does not appear to be addressing here a stereotyped feature of the GTM per se. That is, none of the definitions of the GTM today maintains that the GTM’s use of translation stems from a belief that a person is incapable ever of “learning to think fully in the foreign language.” However, he is implying that the translation he means is from the mother tongue into the foreign language, which is in fact the direction most associated with the GTM today (and, for Viëtor, with the “old” method). His comment makes it possible that people in his day were trying to maintain support for the use of translation per the old method, despite movements like the Reform that were questioning translation’s value. By bringing the topic of translation into the realm of thought, Viëtor’s opposition appears to be resorting to a strategic tactic of shifting focus: up until now, their “old” method was consistently characterized by others as one where translation was intimately bound to writing, and sometimes to speaking, but not to thinking. Significantly, this strategy entails the possibility of translation as a cognitive activity. Viëtor himself does not actually dispute this possibility – that translation can occur solely in the mind – instead seeming to emphasize that such translation should not be a permanent mode of thought for a student of a new language. I.e., Viëtor seems to
imply a possible trajectory beginning with slow translation in one’s mind while initially mastering the foreign language, followed by a faster interior translation process that eventually is to be abandoned. Yet, even if Viëtor accepts this process, he also appears to view translating-while-thinking as at most a phase, and that it could represent some sort of an “error” if a person does not expect that this phase should later be exited.

In the endnotes, despite his stronger stance against translation generally, Viëtor nonetheless maintains the opinion that he expresses in the body of his treatise that, as regards the direction of translation, translation into German (or the mother tongue) may have some value. He also still maintains in the endnotes that translation into the foreign language is too difficult an “art” (German: “Kunst”). However, he now qualifies both stances towards a position that is more generally anti-translation, regardless of the translation’s directionality. In “Anmerkung 31,” he now calls translation into the mother tongue, in which, in the body of the treatise, he finds some value, a “crutch” (German: “Krücke”). He now also calls this direction of translating an art that is difficult, or more precisely “an artful exercise” (German: “eine Kunstübung”), whereas in the body of the treatise he only considers translation into the foreign language “an art,” that is, he more directly uses the phrase “eine Kunst”). In endote 31, Viëtor reminds his reader:

Eine Übersetzung in die eigene lasse ich z. B. in der Skizze des Unterrichtsganges ausdrücklich zu. Aber auch sie kann ich nur als ‘Krücke’ betrachten, deren man sich entledigt, sobald es geht. ... Den Wert einer guten Übersetzung in die Muttersprache leugne ich deshalb nicht. Das Verständnis des fremden Textes aber muß ihr vorausgehen; sie bildet eine Kunstübung in einer Sprache, die man beherrscht. (Viëtor 1905: 49-50, quotation marks in original)

Viëtor’s aesthetic concerns here are notable, because they indicate that complex literary texts were being translated by students in his time under the old method. Indeed, such translation seems perhaps more suited to the work of a professional translator than of a student in a language class. Today’s GTM descriptions do not touch on this activity, implying that it stopped being a salient GTM feature.
I expressly allow for a translation into one’s own [language], for example in my sample teaching lesson. But I can only view that as a ‘crutch’ that one needs to get rid of as soon as possible. … I therefore do not deny the value of a good translation into the mother tongue. But the comprehension of the foreign-language text must precede it. Translation amounts to an artful exercise in a language of which one is a master. (My transl.)

The sample teaching lesson that Viëtor refers to in this endnote is the same one that I referenced earlier, where Viëtor is significantly talking about oral translation, performed in a group setting, into the mother tongue. Yet, the translation that Viëtor refers to at the end of this quote is no longer so clearly restricted. That is, if one “is a master of” (my translation of the verb “beherrscht”) a language, then arguably one is able to speak and write it well. Therefore, Viëtor may be including written translation, out of a group setting, in his casting of translation here as a “Kunstübung.” Importantly as well, Viëtor implies that translation into the mother tongue is not necessarily a tool for assessing a student’s comprehension of a text in the foreign language; for he only sanctions such translation after comprehension of a foreign language text. It would be welcome if Viëtor would include suggestions for checking such reading comprehension without resorting to translation.

Later in this same endnote, Viëtor holds translation into the foreign language away at greater distance than he does in his treatise when first published. Recall, in the treatise, he finds that translating into the foreign language represents “an art of no concern for the school,” technically leaving it open as an out-of-school possibility. Now, by contrast, he dismisses this direction of translation even more strongly, maintaining that it is not something to be expected for anyone at his students’ level:
Mit dem Übersetzen in die fremde Sprache ist es ein anderes Ding. Es ist eine Aufgabe, die nach meiner Erfahrung über die Kräfte mindestens der Schüler, auch auf der Oberstufe, hinausgeht. ... Was ist von einer Übersetzung zu erwarten, bei der dem Übersetzer das Korrektiv zum wenigsten des Stilgefühls noch fehlt? (Viëtor 1905: 50)

*Translating into the foreign language is a different thing. In my experience it is a task that goes beyond the powers at least of the young students, also even of those in the upper level. ... What is to be expected of a translation by a translator who is unable to make corrections due to a lack of, at the very least, a feeling for the style of the language?* (My transl.)

Here, Viëtor could well be addressing textbooks such as those examined in Chapter One, especially those of Meidinger and Ollendorff where from the first written translation exercise to the last, the student is only translating the mother tongue into the foreign language, with few foreign language examples to go by, beyond those in the preceding grammatical explanations. In addition, Viëtor’s lack of tolerance might extend also to books such as those of Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ploetz, wherein this direction of translation is also consistently offered, although not exclusively. His reference to “style” also underscores his belief that this type of translation is an art. Perhaps Viëtor’s statement is most applicable to Ollendorff’s textbook, which is replete with literary selections in the foreign language.

_In his endnotes, Viëtor also importantly binds “grammar” and “translation” together, with a hyphen, putting an early version of the eventual name of the GTM into print._

Finally – and what is arguably most significant to the discussion at hand about the endnotes to the third edition of Viëtor’s treatise – Viëtor actually brings “grammar” and “translation” into contact when, in two instances, he uses the phrase “grammaticizing-
translating” for describing the traditional “Methode.” The German phrase that Viëtor uses is “grammatisierend-übersetzend” (my translation: “grammaticizing-translating”).

Anmerkung 29 represents Viëtor’s first mention of the phrase:

Besonders bei dem gewöhnlichen ‘grammatisierend-übersetzenden’ Betrieb wollen mir die Resultate der Schriftstellerlektüre keineswegs befriedigend erscheinen. (Viëtor 1905: 47-48, quotation marks in original)

_Especially with the customary ‘grammaticizing-translating’ practice, I cannot say that the results from the reading of great writers are shown in a satisfactory way._ (My transl.)

Importantly, Viëtor here actually refers not to a “method” but to “the customary ‘grammaticizing-translating’ mechanical operation or practice.” In other words, he refers here to a practice (“Betrieb”) within a method, rather than a method proper (“Methode”). His use of “Betrieb” suggests again the earlier criticism by Viëtor of translation’s mechanical nature. The “Betrieb” consisted in interspersing an oral translation, as it proceeded phrase by phrase, with grammatical analysis, such as stating what case a word was in, and the like. One might, for example, translate a noun in the dative with extra explanation such as “dative of interest,” “dative of purpose,” or whatever the form may have been. One might also then decline the noun in other cases, before proceeding again with the oral translation. It would seem that this “Betrieb” of both “grammatisieren” and “übersetzen” underscores that translation was not only at the heart of the reading and writing exercises, but also the oral ones in the “old” method.

Additionally, identifying the grammar phenomena in a text and then reciting related ones - that is, performing the action meant by the verb “grammatisieren” – also appears to be its own form of translation exercise, or perhaps more a limited or sharply focused translation exercise; for identifying the grammar of a sentence or text, or even the part of
speech of a word, is its own type of (restricted) recasting of the text or word in new terms. This practice of “grammaticizing translation” as an oral exercise during class could additionally be yet more evidence that, in the old method, translation did not necessarily focus on the “meaning” of words or texts. Still, the method also emphasized the vocabulary used in the text (with words presented as memorizable lists of singularly and reliably translatable items across languages), or its grammar (with a terminology that is treated as a reliable, restricted language for parsing the words in a text).

Interestingly, Viëtor also indicates a preferred direction of translation here, that is, from great authors of the foreign language tradition into the students’ mother tongue. It also seems that the translating he means with this “Betrieb” might sometimes be written, for literature could foreseeably present longer, more complicated passages that would be unsuitable for oral translation. Technically, here Viëtor may also mean German-language (that is, mother tongue) literature for translating into the foreign language, but it seems unlikely that the use of such texts would be classified by Viëtor at all as a “reading” (German: “Lektüre”).

In the second instance when Viëtor mentions the “grammatisierend-übersetzend” practice, in Anmerkung 31, he includes the word “Methode.” The comment begins:

Der eben (Anm. 30) angedeutete Zwang war ein Hauptmittel der weiland herrschenden, wie sie oben gennant ist, „grammatisierend-übersetzenden” Methode. Kein Wunder, daß diesem Angriff auf das Übersetzen eine verzweifelte Abwehr zuteil geworden ist. (Viëtor 1905: 49, quotation marks in original)

The compulsory approach just referred to (in comment 30) was the chief means of the formerly dominant ‘grammaticizing-translating’ Method, as it was called above. It is no wonder that a desperate rejection has come into being to deal with this attack on translation. (My transl.)
As a brief note, the “desperate rejection” of the attack on translation (i.e., the desperate defense of translation) that Viëtor notes here may be a reference to the same oppositional camp whom he cites a page earlier, who defend translation because, as they allege, a person will always think first in the mother tongue and carry out a “lightning fast” translation in their mind anyway, before producing the foreign language. As regards the significant use of a version of the phrase “Grammatik-Übersetzungsmethode,” while it is apparently Viëtor’s first use of the phrase in print, he also calls this method here “customary.” Perhaps “customary” entails that the method was already being characterized customarily as a “grammar” and “translation” one. As well, the fact that Viëtor uses quotation marks around the “grammaticizing-translating” name, both with “Betrieb” and “Methode,” suggests that the phrase (“grammatisierend-übersetzend”) was already customarily used enough to be considered a common currency name or title. As for the “compulsory approach just referred to” in the above passage, Viëtor is referring to his mention (on the same page) of the manner in which the old method forces students to go from the mother tongue into the foreign language, even for such words as “ja” and “nein” (English: “yes” and “no”), effectively forcing translation onto the student when, according to Viëtor, the student arguably would not need it for such basic and common words. Regardless of whether Viëtor is the first person to coin the phrase in print here, his use of the term “grammaticizing-translating” in 1905 appears, at least for himself, to be a final answer to the question that he implicitly poses starting with the first edition of his treatise from 1882: What might we Reformers (both appropriately, as academics and scientists, and also out of necessity, as reformers confronting the status quo) call the old method?
In a lecture published in 1902, Viëtor also bring the terms “Grammatik” and “Übersetzung” into contact, and more explicitly names figures from the past tradition.

If Viëtor’s phrase “grammatisierend-übersetzend” printed in 1905, represents a culminating moment of sorts for the origin of the term GTM, then it is likely the phrase might have found its genesis for Viëtor in a series of four lectures that he gives in 1899. The lectures cover four chronologically ordered eras, and they are eventually published in 1902, under the title Die Methodik des neusprachlichen Unterrichts. Ein geschichtlicher Überblick in vier Vorträgen (my translation: The methodology of modern language teaching. A historical overview in four lectures). In the preface to this book is where Viëtor mentions that the lectures were first given in 1899 (and again in 1900 and 1901), but he does not name where. The second of these lectures is most significant for this discussion, as it contains more evidence that Viëtor was apparently in the process of identifying “grammar” and “translation” as particularly applicable terms for naming the traditional, old method. Note the book’s table of contents:

INHALT
1. Vortrag. Vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit
2. Vortrag. Grammatik und Übersetzung
3. Vortrag. Die moderne Reform
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That Viëtor is referring with the title of the second lecture explicitly to the time of Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, Ollendorff, and Ploetz is already clear from the sandwiching of the second lecture’s title chronologically within the eras covered by the titles of the other three lectures. Indeed, Lecture 1 ends with references in the 17th century (not long before Meidinger’s time), and Lecture 3 begins with a reference to Viëtor’s own treatise of 1882 (marking the beginning of the end for what I will call “Meidinger’s era”); and so the time between – Lecture 2’s “grammar and translation” time – is largely the time during which the method of Meidinger and his successors flourished. Indeed, Viëtor’s references to grammar textbooks in Lecture 2 begin with a book published in 1665 (Viëtor 1902: 16); but later in the lecture (Viëtor 1902: 18) he notes that the real era of “dominance” (German: “Herrschaft”) for grammar and translation is later, in the 18th century. Notably, Viëtor here is more general about translation – that is, he just uses the term “Übersetzung” and does not detail explicitly whether he may mean written translation exercises, or even the oral “Betrieb” mentioned above. Thus, “translation” is becoming more categorically addressed by virtue of Viëtor’s remaining unspecific. In Lecture 2, Viëtor no longer shies away from calling out his historical opponents as he had in 1882; for example, all five of the Prussian textbook authors examined here in Chapter One (Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, Ollendorff, and Ploetz) are now named by Viëtor outright. Ploetz is the first to be mentioned, already in Viëtor’s preface, wherein he warns:

Wer meine Ansichten unledlich findet, ist im voraus nun gewarnt; ich habe sie, – aufdrängen will ich sie keinem, und ich weiß, daß es Leute gibt, die mit Plötz (oder Plötz-Kares) leben und sterben müssen. (Viëtor 1902: Vorwort)
Whoever finds my views insufferable is hereby warned in advance: I have them – I
do not mean to push them onto anyone, for I know that there are people who just
have to stand and fall with Ploetz (or Ploetz-Kares). (My transl.)

That Viëtor has come to be as forthright as he is in the above quote is a stark contrast to
his use of a pseudonym for his treatise in 1882. Viëtor soon enough also mentions
Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ollendorff (Viëtor 1902: 19-28), systematically
submitting each of their methods, as well as Ploetz’s, to critical scrutiny. In conclusion,
Viëtor assigns (1902: 28) to the five of them collective blame for the “tyranny of
grammar and translation” (German: “die Tyrannei der Grammatik und der
Übersetzung”), which also represents yet another instance in this lecture (aside from the
title) where Viëtor associates together explicitly the concepts of grammar and translation
in describing the traditional methodology. Significantly as well, Viëtor does not qualify
the word “Übersetzung” so as to restrict it to its traditional expression in the old method,
for example, to translation into the foreign language done with attendant grammaticizing
– the type of translation that Viëtor appears most averse to in his treatise.

However, Viëtor, in Lecture 2, never quite associates the two concepts as tightly and
clearly as he does in his treatise’s endnotes from 1905, where he uses the phrase
“grammatisierend-übersetzend.” In Lecture 2, he does, however, get very close to
pairing the terms “grammar” and “translation,” with scarcely more than a hyphen at two
points. Viëtor once uses an “and” (German: “und”) in the phrase “grammar and
translation method,” when he exhorts rhetorically about Ploetz:

Aber wie ist diese verbesserte Grammatik- und Übersetzungsmethode so bequem
und sicher! (Viëtor 1902: 24)
But how is this improved grammar and translation method so relaxed and comfortable! (My transl.)

And he also once uses an “or” (German: “oder”) in mentioning:

die alte grammatisistische oder Übersetzungsmethode. (Viëtor 1902: 28)

the old grammatical or translation-method. (My transl.)

In both of the above mentions, it is significant that Viëtor does not specify exactly how he understands translation, such that any and all translation could be meant, despite that he is often more specific about its directionality and mode (oral or written) in his treatise. As well, Viëtor does not seem to be specifying the particular grammaticizing-while-translating “Betrieb” that he refers to in the endnotes of his treatise. And Viëtor even switches the position of the two concepts around once in Lecture 2:

Das bedeutet nicht etwa eine Empfehlung der auf das Deutsche zugeschnittenen Übersetzungs-Grammatik, mit der ich mich früher auseinandergesetzt habe. (Viëtor 1902: 55)

But that does not signify a recommendation of a translation-oriented grammar that is tailored to German, with which I dealt earlier. (My transl.)

Here, Viëtor is actually talking about a grammar book that adheres to the traditional method, rather than about a “Methode” proper. With his reference to a translation book, he could well mean something beyond just the oral “Betrieb” of analyzing grammar while translating. It is interesting that his phrasing implies that there is a grammar book available that is exclusively translation-oriented, for, as the examination of all the “GTM” textbooks in Chapter One here showed, such books actually often offered at least some other options besides always, and only, translating. Finally, in one instance Viëtor mentions a “translation method” alone regarding the old method, and leaves grammar unstated:
Die „Übersetzungsmethode“ zur Herrschaft zu bringen, war dem 18. Jahrhundert vorbehalten, das in diesem Punkte mit nichten das Jahrhundert der Aufklärung war. (Viëtor 1902: 18, quotation marks in original)

That the “translation method” would come to dominate was an event reserved for the 18th century, which was in this regard not at all the century of enlightenment. (My transl.)

Significantly, Viëtor equates adherence to this “translation method” here as an unenlightened choice for otherwise enlightened times. As well, he leaves “Übersetzung” notably unmodified or explained, as if it could now refer to all translation.

Positing Viëtor as the “father of the name” of the GTM, borrowing from Viëtor’s positing of Meidinger as “the father of the method.”

All in all, Viëtor’s publications from 1902 and 1905 make quite clear that the budding name at the close of the 1800s for the methodology of Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, Ollendorff, and Ploetz was a name that explicitly stated the method’s hallmarks of grammar and translation. Quite possibly, Viëtor’s endnotes and lecture are responsible for helping to fix the GTM’s emergent name into the public consciousness. Additionally, the conversations that Viëtor starts will propagate negative associations (inadequacy, burdensomeness, stale oldness, undue reverence for the past, etc.) with the emerging name “Grammar Translation Method,” such that the need to state those associations would eventually become unnecessary, being implied by the name alone. As well, while he formulates the name of the GTM, Viëtor also becomes less systematic about clarifying exactly which type of translation causes the most concern for him, whether it be oral or written, and whether it be from or into the mother tongue. As a result of not clarifying
these aspects, Viëtor allows for all translation to become tinged by the negative observations that are more tightly associated with GTM-translation. I will conclude this treatment of Viëtor by asking whether it might indeed be permissible to name him the “father of the name” of the Grammar Translation Method, a question that I pose in explicit reference to Viëtor’s own characterization of Meidinger in Lecture 2 (1902: 19) as the “father of the method” (German: “der Vater der Methode”). Viëtor’s moniker for Meidinger could also be used as evidence to establish with even more certainty my earlier conclusion: that what Viëtor describes as “grammatisierend-übersetzend” practices and approaches indeed refers back to a methodology begun by Meidinger.23

A jump forward in time reveals that Viëtor’s use of “grammar” and “translation” for describing the old method appears to hold, for example, in Hübner’s book.

Yet, even if Viëtor were not the true “father” of the name of the GTM, what is not disputable is that the “grammar translation” name was indeed emerging in the late 1800s and early 1900s. As mentioned earlier, Hübner (1929) attests to this emergence when he refers to Meidinger’s method as “the grammatizing” one. This grammaticizing seems not to refer specifically to the analyzing of grammar during an oral translation exercise (such as the “Betrieb” that Viëtor mentions), but rather to the emphasis on grammar generally. Yet, Hübner, it should be added, also observes that translation (and rules) are

23 At this point I had wanted also to suggest as a valuable project for the future an annotated translation (in English, for the sake of its broadest use and appeal) of the two works of Viëtor that I have treated. However, I have discovered, according to Howatt and Widdowson (2004: 208), that Howatt and Smith (2002, in facsimile form; 2007 hardcover from Routledge) have already translated Viëtor’s treatise Der Sprachunterricht muß umkehren! into English. But I cannot locate Howatt and Smith’s publication in any library and it is prohibitively expensive to purchase (over $1500). I still have not found any English translation of Viëtor’s lecture collection Die Methodik des neusprachlichen Unterrichts.
very strongly tied to “the grammaticizing method,” even if he does not formally connect
“the grammaticizing method” with the term “translation” in close proximity. For
example, in describing Meidinger’s “grammaticizing” approach, Hübner also emphasizes
the role of translation (and rules) as follows:

   Voran steht in den einzelnen Lektionen das Paradigma und die Regel mit
deutschen Erläuterungen. Dann folgt das Übersetzungsmaterial zur Einübung der
Regel. Das Wesentliche und Neue bei Meidinger ist, daß er die Übersetzung
deutscher Sätze in die Fremdsprache als die wichtigste Übung verwendet,
während bisher die Herübersetzung im Vordergrund gestanden hatte und die
Hinübersetzung nur gelegentlich nebenher gegangen war. (Hübner 1929: 11,
italics in original)

At the beginning of the individual lessons are the paradigm and the rule with
explanations in German. Then follows the translation material for the purpose of
practicing the rule. The fundamental and new aspect of Meidinger is that he uses
the translation of German sentences into the foreign language as the most
important exercise, whereas, until his time, translation out of the foreign
language had stood in the foreground and translation into the foreign language
had only sometimes occurred on the side. (My transl.)

It is also interesting here that Hübner acknowledges an opposing approach to Meidinger
before Meidinger’s time that, in accord with Hübner’s description, could also sound like
the approach in the textbooks of Seidenstücker and Ahn, after Meidinger. Since
Hübner’s book is from 1929, it may ultimately be more valid as a later observation of the
earlier emergence of the name “GTM,” and as an example of the name’s initial
endurance, rather than as a real contributor to the name’s emergence. That is, Hübner’s
book appears to be evidence that the GTM’s new name is indeed catching on. A more
historically significant, and earlier, publication than Hübner’s, that arguably contributes
to the “grammar translation” name-giving, comes in 1901 from Viëtor’s fellow Reformer
Otto Jespersen.

In a manner similar to my examination of Viëtor’s Der Sprachunterricht muß umkehren!, I have also examined Jespersen’s seminal book How to Teach a Foreign Language – that is, with a view to finding therein how Jespersen names and characterizes the “old method.” As noted earlier, Jespersen originally publishes the book in Danish in 1901 with the title Sprogundervisning. He has it translated into English in 1904. In content and style, Jespersen’s book is less a rallying call for reform (like Viëtor’s treatise) and more a post-Reform manual for teachers, incorporating and illustrating the Reform Movement’s principles. Jespersen refers to “old methods” already in his brief preface to the translated English edition of his book:

[W]hat is now the really important thing is less the destruction of bad old methods than a positive indication of the new ways to be followed. (Jespersen 1904: Preface)

Significantly, Jespersen’s use of “old” could be an echo of Viëtor’s use of the same concept to characterize the traditional method, while Jespersen’s use of “bad” is reminiscent of some of Viëtor’s more judgemental observations and statements (e.g., “Death to the rules and sentences!” and “the tyranny of grammar and translation”). However, that Jespersen uses the indefinite plural form “methods” also suggests that he is not concerned with specifying that he means specifically Meidinger’s or another’s method. At any rate, Jespersen actually is more interested in naming his new, reformed method than in naming any “bad old” one:
What is the [new] method, then, that I allude to? ... The method ... has many names. ... The method is by some called the 'new' or 'newer'; ... 'die neuere richtung' [sic] ... the 'reform-method,' ... the 'natural,' the 'rational,' the 'correct,' or 'sensible' ... the 'direct' ... the 'phonetical' ... the 'phonetical transcription method,' ... the 'imitative' ... the 'analytical' ... the 'concrete' ... the German 'anschauungsmethode' [sic] ... 'the conversation method' ... Words with 'anti,' like 'anticlassical,' 'antigrammatical,' or 'antitranslation' method, are clumsy and stupidly negative -- so there is nothing left for us but to give up the attempt to find a name, and recognize that this difficulty is due to the fact that it is not one thing, but many things that we have to reform. (Jespersen 1904: 2-3, quotation marks in original)

Jespersen’s quote is valuable as it speaks not only to the need that I observed earlier -- the need of a new method to find a name for its opposition -- but also to the need of of a new method to find a name for itself. His quote is also significant because therein are indeed three implied characterizations of the old method. That is, Jespersen’s reference to the old method in the negative -- with the words “anticlassical, antigrammatical and antitranslation” -- indeed helps us to understand that the conventional understanding of his day is that there exists a “classical” method, characterized also both as a “grammar” method and a “translation” one.

Jespersen cements this relationship throughout his book, repeatedly using the terms “grammar” and “translation,” often in close association, for describing the traditional methodology. Consider, for example, this relatively positive evaluation by Jespersen of the method of a language teacher from Germany named von Pfeil:

His method of procedure is simple: no grammar; no translation from the mother-tongue. ... From the very beginning, an author is taken up; the same piece ... is first read aloud by the teacher, then by the pupil, ... is thereupon translated word by word by the teacher ... and afterwards in the same way by the pupil. ... Translation is omitted as soon as there is no danger of miscomprehension. ... But the method is terribly spiritless and mechanical, perhaps you will say. ... [I]t really more spiritless to read something aloud many times in which there is some meaning -- and some meaning you understand -- than to translate something just as
many times in which there is no meaning at all, to say nothing of all the other inane things which our old methods bring in their train, such as grammatical rigmaroles, etc. However, it is by no means my intention to give the v. Pfeil method an unqualified recommendation, … here I shall merely call attention to some things which we can learn from it: first, that we must as soon as possible dispense with translation where it is decidedly superfluous. (Jespersen 1904: 88-90)

Von Pfeil’s method appears to represent a reformed approach for Jespersen – note the emphasis on reading aloud – or at least not a copy of the “old methods.” (I maintain that “no grammar” would not truly describe the Reform Movement’s approach.) It is interesting that Jespersen addresses the direction of translation here, sanctioning translation performed into the mother tongue (as does Viëtor). Jespersen also appears to recommend an oral mode for translation. And it appears that Jespersen views this type of translation as most valuable for checking a student’s reading comprehension. Significantly as well, Jespersen agrees with von Pfeil that even this type of translation should not persist as an activity, but must eventually be omitted.

In other references specifically to the old method’s “grammatical” aspect, Jespersen repeatedly adjoins negative associations, here with the word “rigmarole”:

[A]nd still the old grammar-instruction lives and flourishes with its rigmaroles and rules and exceptions. (Jespersen 1904: 11)

The way in which Jespersen describes the “old grammar instruction” here is almost an exact copy of some of the GTM’s features considered earlier in the Introduction. Recall the oft cited “long and elaborate” explanations detailing, as Chastain alleges, “all the regularities and irregularities, all the rules and exceptions to the rules.” In another
reference to grammar, Jespersen here mentions “the traditional, grammatical, theoretical method,” thus displaying in the process a contribution to the emergent GTM name:

Therefore there is even among persons who have to any extent studied languages theoretically … a great tendency to avoid as much as possible the traditional, grammatical, theoretical method when they want to take up a new language. (Jespersen 1904: 26)

With his mention of studying languages “theoretically,” Jespersen appears to mean “deductively,” i.e., not studying the language based on examples of its use (as is stressed in Seidenstücker’s, Ahn’s, and Ploetz’s books), but rather on explanations of its rules and systems (as is stressed in Meidinger’s and Ollendorff’s books). Jespersen also appears to be suggesting that anyone who has already learned a language per the traditional approach now knows better, i.e., that the traditional approach is inadequate for learning a new language. This sentiment echoes Viëtor’s implications of inadequacy detailed above. In the next quotation, Jespersen again mentions “grammatical rigmaroles” in the context of the old methodology:

[I]t seems to me that grammatical rigmaroles are of little value …; they are remnants of the old-fashioned would-be pedagogy where a teacher in any subject was satisfied if the pupil ‘knew his lesson,’ that is, could recite the words of the book, and where no one ever thought about understanding or other such-like modern inventions. (Jespersen 1904: 113, quotation marks in original)

Besides the criticism inherent in the word “rigmarole,” Jespersen also assails the traditional methodology as “old-fashioned” and as a “would-be pedagogy.” He addresses the criticism of the GTM today that it does not accurately assess a student’s knowledge of a language, by focusing on recitation, as opposed to understanding.
As for “translation” specifically (and not “grammar”), Jespersen refers to the “translation-method” (with and without the hyphen) three times, first here:

It is the school with its translation-method that has sown the dragon’s teeth, and it must now reap the consequences. (Jespersen 1904: 47)

Jespersen’s “dragon’s teeth” metaphor makes the “translation-method” quite ominous.24 Notably, he does not bother qualifying exactly how he understands translation here (in terms of directionality and whether or not he only means written translation). In the following passage, Jespersen mentions the “translation method” for a second time:

Klinghardt … confesses that he has been converted to the reform, because, in spite of years of vigorous efforts, he had not succeeded by means of the translation method. (Jespersen 1904: 122)

Again, Jespersen is confirming the sentiment that the GTM, or translation anyway, even after “years of vigorous efforts” is just not effective or adequate. Jespersen’s reference here to the teacher Hermann Klinghardt (1847-1926) is significant. Klinghardt is at this time an English teacher at a Realgymnasium, or practical high school, in Reichenbach in Silesia. Inspired by a paper of Henry Sweet’s,25 Klinghardt conducts a year-long experiment using, or testing, the Reformed Method in his school with his own students. According to Howatt and Widdowson (2004: 192-194), Klinghardt’s decision to implement and document the results of a new method qualifies as an early scientific experiment in applied linguistics, the likes of which was unheard of in language teaching in his day. During the first semester, Klinghardt’s students only use an experimental

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24 Interestingly, Jespersen’s use this mythical reference to the stories of Cadmus and Jason strikes a chord with the discussion earlier about the mythologizing of the GTM.

25 The paper is Sweet’s *On the practical study of language* from 1884, which would later become Sweet’s book, *The Practical Study of Languages*, in 1900.
phonetic transcription for reading and writing the English that they were learning, i.e., not
the Roman alphabet, but rather a version of the phonetic, “Romie” alphabet that was
developed by Sweet. See Howatt and Widdowson for an example text in this script as
well as other details about the content of Klinghardt’s lessons with his students during
this experiment. Jespersen makes his third mention of the “translation-method” here:

The translation-method is injurious here too, because it veils contours which
ought to be sharp. For instance, the pupils will not get the proper conception of
gender and its relation to expressions for sex, if er referring to der hut [sic] and
sie referring to die bank [sic], and likewise il referring to le chapeau, and elle
referring to la chaise, are all translated by the English it, while the same
pronouns, when used about persons, are translated by he and she. (Jespersen
1904: 135, italics in original)

Clearly it is an anti-translation sentiment that Jespersen expresses here, for he finds the
translation-method “injurious.” The injury that he details is another expression of the oft
repeated criticism that the GTM does not emphasize really knowing the language, i.e.,
really knowing the “contours which ought to be sharp.”

Also on translation, Jespersen refers to “old-fashioned translating”:

If anyone now says that this method of procedure by which translation as a test of
the pupils’ comprehension of what they have read is limited to the least possible,
… is far less satisfactory that the old-fashioned translating over and over again of
the whole lesson, … I answer that, in the first place, … the old way is often poor
enough. (Jespersen 1904: 85)

Here, Jespersen illustrates an apparently charged conversation that must have been going
on in his day – on the one side, he and the Reform advocate the translation of reading
material (representing translation into the mother tongue), primarily as a comprehension
check, while, on the other side, “old-fashioned” traditionalists maintain rote translating,
not of a reading, but of a “lesson.” Similarly, Jespersen also refers to “the old-fashioned method of translation”:

[W]e thus risk all the dangers which are commonly associated with the old-fashioned method of translation from the native to the foreign language. (Jespersen 1904: 93)

Clearly, here Jespersen leaves the door open to translation into the mother tongue.

Finally, regarding translation, Jespersen also makes reference to the leading role that translation plays within the “usual method”:

If you take a clever boy who has been taught according to the usual method and, after he has translated a little piece of his lesson, close his book and ask him to give the original of the last sentence which he has translated, it will in many cases be impossible for him to do it. (Jespersen 1904: 43)

This quote represents yet another formulation from Jespersen alleging the inefficacy and inadequacy of the “usual method.” Translation appears here to be cast as, at best, of only short-term value, not even retaining any use once the book is closed. As well, Jespersen underscores yet again that translation is used in this usual method for lesson material, as opposed to for reading comprehension.

Jespersen and other terms for the old method, beyond “grammar” and “translation,” for example: “the artificial method.”

Significantly, Jespersen also brings up several other possible names for and associations with the old method, beyond its being old, grammar-oriented, and translation-oriented. For example, at one point he mentions the name “artificial method” for the old method, though not in his own words, but rather in a quote from N. M. Petersen’s 1870 work Sprogkundskab i Norden (my translation: Language Study in the Norse Countries):
With respect to method, the artificial one must be given up and a more natural one must take its place. According to the artificial method, the first thing done is to hand the boy a grammar and cram it into him piece by piece. (Petersen, quoted in Jespersen 1904: 110)

“Artificiality,” it should be noted, is another major criticism against the GTM, as noticed in the modern definitions presented earlier, where the natural, spoken language is noticed as being left out, and where the GTM is not considered to be a pathway to knowing the language for real. Yet, in the quote above, the word “artificial” appears perhaps not as judgemental as it would today, and may be meant neutrally, simply referring to a deductive approach. But an artificial and deductive approach, even when “artificial” is meant neutrally, can still be problematic for some critics, which is already evident in Seidenstücker’s and Ahn’s prefaces, where they, as in the above quote, endeavor to form a more “natural” method than the deductive one characteristic of books like Meidinger’s. For Seidenstücker and Ahn, a less artificial approach is reflected in the “natural” way that a child learns its mother tongue. “Artificial” may, however, also be a reference to the traditional lessons of the GTM, that is, to the “sentences” that students are asked to translate, which are often observed as artificially constructed by GTM critics. Today, this criticism of the artificiality of GTM lessons is often cast against the now generally preferred, if not revered, notion of “authenticity” in language teaching and language teaching materials. For a valuable discussion of this dichotomy between “artificial and authentic,” see Van Lier (1996: 123-146), who makes a strong case for a re-evaluation of the primacy of “authenticity” as it is commonly understood today, where it refers to the use of “authentic” texts that originate inside of and are written for the foreign language culture and the employment of “authentic” teachers who are native speakers, as opposed to texts constructed for pedagogical purposes and teachers who themselves learned the
foreign language as a second language. Van Lier asserts that actually any text or teacher, regardless of any allegedly artificial origins, can become authenticated by the introduction of some simple, yet valuable linguistic “repair procedures.” As regards the name “artificial method,” even though it appears to have been in circulation in Jespersen’s day, it nonetheless does not obviously survive to today, at least as a synonym for the GTM.

Jespersen and the old method as a method of “rules.”

In still other references to the old method, Jespersen generally highlights the “rules” associated with it. For example, Jespersen implies that the old method had lists and rules, when, in one passage, he addresses the newer “imitative method,” which he finds some positive use for:

As a bright contrast to this “constructive” method of procedure, we have the “imitative” method, which may be so called partly because it is an imitation of the way in which a child learns his native language, partly because it depends upon that invaluable faculty, the natural imitative instinct of the pupils, to give them the proper linguistic feeling, if it only has ample opportunity to come into play. As a motto for this method, we might perhaps say: Away with lists and rules. Practise what is right again and again! (Jespersen 1904: 124, quotation marks in original)

It is interesting that Jespersen does not equate the Reformed Method with this “imitative” one. Yet, he also clearly considers the imitative method as different from the old method, for he casts the old method here as a “constructive” method. The imitative method here appears to be the same, in principle, as Seidenstücker’s and Ahn’s methods, where their use of inductive grammar presentations is guided by a child’s natural instincts to imitate. It could also be a reference to the movement that leads to the Direct Method, which is also guided by the principle of a child’s natural learning of its mother tongue (the Direct
Method will be discussed in the next chapter). Another significant observation to make here is that Jespersen, with his exhortation, “Away with lists and rules,” is possibly echoing Viëtor, though not quite so vehemently. Recall Viëtor’s more specific rallying cry mentioned earlier: “Death to the rules and sentences!” Jespersen’s discomfort with the old, traditional emphasis on the learning of “rules” (which, on page 111, he worries creates “parrots” out of students) comes up time and time again in his book, though not always in immediate proximity to the word “method.”

*Jespersen and the old method as a “single sentence system.”*

Yet another salient characteristic that Jespersen associates with the old method is the use of “disconnected sentences” as practice material for the student. The observation of disconnected sentences in the old method prompts Jespersen at one point even to name the old method a “single sentence system”:

> Indeed not even disconnected sentences ought to be used, at all events, not in such a manner and to such an extent as in most books according to the old method. … When people say that instruction in languages ought to be a kind of mental gymnastics, I do not know if one of the things they have in mind is such sudden and violent leaps from one range of ideas to another. … Now it must be immediately admitted that there may be a big difference in the schoolbooks made, even according to this single-sentence system. (Jespersen 1904: 11-13)

Ploetz’s book that was examined earlier comes to mind here, for the sentences in his lessons were observed as especially “disconnected” in comparison to the texts of the other Prussians. Indeed, Jespersen acknowledges at the end of this passage that the degree of disconnectedness in texts varies among schoolbooks that use sentences extensively. This statement is also valuable for it contains an acknowledgement from
Jespersen (in his phrase “mental gymnastics”) of the “mental discipline and intellectual development” goal of the GTM as it is understood today. Jespersen makes light of, or perhaps even sees danger in, using disconnected sentences to achieve this goal, as if asking: will the constant use of disconnected sentences lead to a disconnected mind? In a later passage, Jespersen mentions the “isolated” sentences again, noting that even he might be accused of using such sentences in his oral and written substitution drills (note Jespersen does not comply with the convention of capitalizing German nouns in writing out his sample, German oral drill):

Ich habe meinen vater um etwas brot gebeten.  Du hast deinen vater um etwas geld gebeten.  Er hat seinen vater um ein stück papier gebeten. Sie hat ihren vater um einen kuchen gebeten, etc.  Of course one can also assign written exercises of a similar kind, as for instance: construct five sentences like Le père de Jean est allé à la maison de sa soeur, using different words in each sentence in place of those here italicized, etc., etc.; but it were best if these sentences were suggested by, or in some way associated with, sentences in the text-book.

Now some people will say that this is only another way of employing those grammatical isolated sentences which I have declaimed against – and they are right in so far as I admit that the more the exercises are made to resemble the old-fashioned ones, the poorer they are for the purpose, and … easily degenerate into tiresome mechanical routine-work. But if used to moderation they will only be beneficial, and then, besides, they differ from the single sentences of the old method in being associated with a text which has been read, so they are not thus quite isolated from a sensible connection. (Jespersen 1904: 120, italics in original)

Jespersen’s significant instruction to keep exercise sentences contextualized, for example, by associating them with a text that has been read, is an interesting alleged improvement on the GTM that does not seem to have been addressed by the likes of Ollendorff or Ploetz, who themselves claimed to be improving upon, among others, Meidinger and Seidenstücker. It is also interesting to observe how Jespersen notes that using sentences can “easily degenerate into tiresome mechanical routine-work,” which is reminiscent of Viëtor’s criticism about mechanical and mindless translation operations. Jespersen seems
to avoid this development of a mechanical routine by not emphasizing translation drills with his sentences, but rather substitution drills. He may therefore be implying generally that the use of translation, not necessarily the use of isolated sentences per se, is responsible for “tiresome mechanical routine-work.”

_A brief examination of “disconnected sentences” in a modern reference to the GTM._

Interestingly, as with “artificiality,” the use of “disconnected sentences” is of course still alluded to by critics of the GTM today. G. Cook (2010: 15-18) addresses both concerns in a treatment of what he labels as the “invented sentences” that are characteristic of the GTM (where his word “invented” brings up a nature of the disconnected sentences that might be cast as both “inauthentic” and “artificial”). On this topic, G. Cook is persuasive in questioning the assumed detriment of these sentences, at one point writing:

> So it may be that some startlingly bizarre sentences such as *The philosopher pulled the lower jaw of the hen* are pedagogically useful, while some ‘real’ instances, being bland and forgettable, are much less so. (G. Cook 2010: 16, italics and quotation marks in original.)

Cook thus manages to suggest, like Jespersen above, that there may indeed be a place for disconnected sentences in language teaching. However, whereas Jespersen specifically suggests substitution drills as a possible place for these sentences, Cook only treats such sentences as they are traditionally treated – as objects intended for translation and grammatical analysis. Cook means to point out that certain seemingly “bizarre” sentences can actually be so marked that they just as effectively imprint themselves on the memory, becoming usable later as models, as sentences that are allegedly less bizarre or more contextualized.
A look back at Viëtor, and his take on pedagogically constructed sentences and texts.

Even Viëtor, references these disconnected sentences – recall his invocation, mentioned earlier, “Death to the rules and sentences!” Beyond these artificially constructed sentences, Viëtor also focuses in on the artificially constructed “anecdotes” (German: “Anekdoten”) presented by Meidinger to his students for translation, questioning the educative value of such anecdotes. Meidinger himself, as noted earlier, uses the light-hearted term “Histörchen” for his anecdotes, which I translated as “vignette.” Viëtor alludes to the “Histörchen” in the following sentence, where, as pointed out earlier, he calls Meidinger the “father” of the Grammar Translation Method:

Als Text bevorzugt der Vater der Methode zusammenhängende Stücke, jene Anekdoten, Histörchen, mit denen sein Name jetzt sprüchwörtlich verbunden ist. (Viëtor 1902: 19)

As text examples, the father of the method prefers teacher-contextualized pieces, those anecdotes, vignettes, with which his name is now proverbially connected. (My transl.)

Viëtor implies that he himself would not use such prefabricated anecdotes, but he does not suggest explicitly what texts he would recommend for use. Despite his intention to reform the method that, for him, Meidinger is the father of, Viëtor nonetheless acknowledges that Meidinger’s “Histörchen” have indeed had a degree of success. That is, Viëtor acknowledges that the vignettes have now become proverbial in his day, establishing themselves as a neologism in German-speaking culture: “Meidingereien” (my translation: “Meidinger-isms”). A “Meidingerei” might be described as a droll yet inconsequential tale that is told more to show off one’s academic pedigree and wit than
actually to say something of substance, for example, during a parlor conversation. Since Meidinger-isms are considered inconsequential in his day, Viëtor may be taking a possible stab at Meidinger’s method and the legacy of these “Histörchen,” implying that Meidinger’s only real contribution to history is in the form of the proverbial “Meidingerei.” As one example of the use of the term “Meidingerei” in this proverbial context, there is this excerpt from the novel *The Eccentric Countess (Die tolle Komteß)* by Ernst von Wolzogen (1889):

… denn der war ein recht wohlwollender, harmloser Fröhlichkeit nicht abgeneigter Herr, welcher sogar beim traulichen Glase Wein mit dem Grafen allein sich nicht ganz unbewandert zeigte im klassischen Repertorium altherwürdiger Schwänklein und Meidingereien. (von Wolzogen 1889: 64)

… for he was a truly well meaning gentleman, unopposed to harmless fun, who, even while drinking a friendly glass of wine with the Count himself, showed himself to be not entirely un-cosmopolitan with his classical repertoire of old and prized little drolleries and Meidingerisms. (My transl.)

Interestingly, the “Meidingereien” here, as with Meidinger’s language teaching methods, are still associated with a “classical repertoire of old.” Beyond this droll meaning, the term “Meidingerei” also had negative connotations. Viëtor actually uses the term himself as well, but here as a reference to Meidinger’s unwelcome orthodoxy, imbuing the term with indoctrination and robbing it of any endearment or respect:

Und, wie gesagt, und wie Sie alle wissen: die Meidingerei ist noch heute in Schwang. (Viëtor 1902: 20)

*And, as said, and as you all know: Meidinger-ism is still quite alive today. (My transl.)*

Here, “Meidinger-ism” is now presented as an approach to teaching and learning that appears to be synonymous with anything allegedly “bad” about the GTM: being overly thorough and elaborate, translating mechanically, memorizing grammar and vocabulary
burdensomely, etc. Yet another example of the term’s use with negative connotations is found in an essay entitled “On German language instruction, with reference to Becker, Hoffmann, Götzinger” (original German: “Ueber den deutschen Sprachunterricht, mit Beziehung auf Becker, Hoffmann, Götzinger”) by one “Dr. Ed. Krüger” in the *Archiv für Philologie und Pädagogik, Volume 10* from 1844. In his text, Krüger offers an initially positive review about the tone and style of Becker’s grammar book, only to note later that Becker’s book becomes too detailed, even for the teacher:

… selbst dem Lehrer die Becker’sche Grammatik nichts hilft, und leicht auf den verderblichen Abweg führt, unverstandene Namen wie mystische Geheimnisse aufzuhäufen; ein schlimmerer Gedächtnisscultus als die absolute Meidingerei. (Krüger 1844: 294)

... even for the teacher, the Becker grammar is of no help and too easily goes into that baleful detour where incomprehensible terms are heaped upon each other like mystical secrets; a worse cult of the mind than absolute Meidinger-ism. (My transl.)

Krüger’s mention of “Meidingerei” here is also significant because he associates it with the “cult of the mind,” which appears to be a reference to the GTM’s asserted goal of mental discipline. Apparently for Krüger, the Meidingerei – probably whether meant either harmlessly as a vignette or, as he uses it, as a critical description of an overly detailed approach to language teaching – does not fulfill the goal of mental discipline and intellectual development.

*Returning to Jespersen, and still other references to the “old” method.*

Finally, Jespersen also finds the old method to be one which fosters “poor pronunciation.” In fact, despite his vehement concerns about the way “grammar,” “translation,” “rules,” “artificiality,” and “isolated sentences” play out their roles in the
old method, Jespersen’s concern about the diminished or nonexistent roles of pronunciation and phonetics in the old method is actually his most serious criticism of it:

Our pronunciation according to the old school is extremely poor, indeed, much more frightful than most people imagine. (Jespersen 1904: 145)

Here, Jespersen is confronting the concerned refrain in GTM descriptions that students do not speak or hear the foreign language enough. Recall, Rivers (1968) alleges in her GTM definition that this de-emphasis on speaking and listening leads to students who “are frequently confused when addressed in the foreign language and may be very embarrassed when asked to pronounce anything themselves.” As noted above, Jespersen’s desire to improve pronunciation and focus on phonetics represents the single most characterizing factor defining the Reform Movement.

* A brief look at the Reformer Henry Sweet, his own emphasis on phonetics, and his view of the old method.

The topic of phonetics was of keen interest to Henry Sweet, another influential Reformer that I mentioned earlier and would like to present briefly here. Sweet’s works provide a good general reference on the principles of the Reform Movement as written in English. Of particular relevance here are Sweet’s *A Handbook of Phonetics*, published in 1877 and his *The Practical Study of Languages*, published in 1900. In these works, even more evidence for the Reform Movement’s role in naming and characterizing the “old method” as a “grammar translation” one can be found. In fact, in the quotation from G. Cook (2010) above, where a “bizarre” GTM sentence about a philosopher and a hen is mentioned, one is actually reading a sentence that Sweet memorably quotes from a
bygone GTM-style Greek course that he once took. Sweet mentions the sentence
anecdotally while expounding on the “arithmetical fallacy” that he sees as responsible for
the “insipid, colourless combinations” in the “strange” sentences of the old method:

The ‘arithmetical fallacy,’ as we may call it, is well illustrated in the practice of
exercise-writing and translation into the foreign language, a subject to which we
will return later on. In the well-known methods of Ahn, Ollendorff, and Arnold it is developed into a
regular system, intended as a substitute for the ordinary grammar and dictionary
method – at least for the beginner. The result is to exclude the really natural and
idiomatic combinations, which cannot be found à priori, and to produce insipid,
colourless combinations, which do no stamp themselves on the memory, many of
which, indeed, could hardly occur in real life, such as the cat of my aunt is more
treacherous than the dog of your uncle | we speak about your cousin, and your
cousin Amelia is loved by her uncle and her aunt | my sons have bought the
mirror of the duke | horses are taller than tigers. At one school where I learnt –
or rather made a pretence of learning – Greek on this system, the master used to
reconstruct the materials of the exercises given in our book into new and strange
combinations, till at last, with a faint smile on his ascetic countenance, he evolved
the following sentence, which I remembered long after I had forgotten all the rest
of my Greek – the philosopher pulled the lower jaw of the hen (tou tijz ς-naiPOS
ανου γναPOS). The results of this method have been well parodied by Burnand
in his New Sandford and Merton, thus: the merchant is swimming with (avec) the
gardener’s son, but the Dutchman has the fine gun. (Sweet 1900: 73-74, quotation
marks and italics in original.)

Sweet’s quotation is not just entertaining, but provides yet another Reformer’s
characterization of the “ordinary” method, here as a “grammar and dictionary method”
(where the mention of a dictionary entails that the method is also associated with
“translation”). Importantly, the translation that Sweet refers to here is, again, into the
foreign language, and appears to be meant as written translation (for Sweet mentions
“exercise-writing and translation”). It is also interesting that Sweet uses anecdotal
evidence from his Greek class for characterizing the old method, as was observed to be
occurring in the definitions of the GTM presented in the Introduction. G. Cook
emphasizes, in his own analysis of this passage, that Sweet’s remembering the sentence

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about the philosopher and the hen long after he had forgotten the rest of his Greek may actually speak to the effectiveness of the GTM-style Greek class that Sweet experienced, in contrast to most people’s view of the GTM today. That Sweet also mentions Ahn and Ollendorff is very significant, for he seems to find some equivalency between their methods, and also that their methods represent something different from the “ordinary” method. By contrast, I observed earlier that Ahn’s and Ollendorff’s approaches do not appear to overlap as well as either Ahn’s and Seidenstücker’s do, or as Ollendorff’s and Meidinger’s do. In addition, I found Ahn’s and especially Ollendorff’s methods indeed to belong in the lineage of the “ordinary” traditional “GTM” method. Regarding Sweet’s mention of “Arnold,” Sweet surely means Arnold’s Latin Grammar, by Thomas K. Arnold, although there is no Arnold in Sweet’s bibliography. The arithmetical fallacy that Sweet mentions is his way of addressing the approach to translation that is exemplified in the manipulations that Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ploetz all were observed doing with their mother tongue (German) texts, intended for translation into the foreign language (French). That is, the manipulation of the German word order, or, as Ploetz chooses, the use of superscript numbers in front of German words both amount to the expression of a principle that appears to espouse that translation can succeed on a formulaic, left-to-right, word-for-word, ultimately mathematical basis. This mathematical approach, as Sweet notes, results in the ignoring of the colorful expressions found in many “natural and idiomatic combinations,” for these expressions would apparently be to hard to manipulate into an arithmetical translation formula. Thus, Sweet’s “arithmetical fallacy” may really be another way of his saying “the fallacy of translation.”
Today, the Reformers are often credited with the founding of the field of applied linguistics. R. Smith refers to this legacy of the Reform in his opening remarks to a panel that he organized and chaired on “Developing the History of Applied Linguistics” in September, 2000, at the University of Edinburgh:

Today though we’ll mostly be focusing on developing the history of applied linguistics back into the relatively recent past, as far back as the late 19th Century Reform Movement, when linguistics, in particular phonetics, began to be systematically referred to in relation to practical problems, including spelling reform and language teaching.

Kaplan too (2010) makes the connection between the Reform and the emergence of applied linguistics:

It appears that applied linguistics emerged out of the contention of a widely proliferated and marginally successful “grammar/translation” model of foreign and/or second-language teaching popular during the nineteenth century and the needs of teachers and students caught in the immediacy of practical learning and reflective of the European “reform movement” together with the coincident rise of modern linguistics. (Kaplan 2010: 26, quotation marks in original)

Kaplan also makes some significant observations about grammar translation methodology. He situates it in the 19th century, yet also displays a reticence to do so firmly, calling it “a” model of teaching, avoiding more definitively naming it as “the” GTM. Kaplan seems to cast a “grammar/translation” method as removed from “practical learning,” treating “practical” as a synonym here for “applied,” and thus as a bridge to the term “applied linguistics.” Yet, Meidinger calls his book, which is of course representative of a “grammar/translation” method, a “practische” French grammar.

Howatt and Widdowson (2004) note about Meidinger’s book:
One point to notice is the use of the word *practical* in the title. It appears time and again in nineteenth-century language courses and had an extra meaning it would not carry today. To us ‘practical’ is more or less a synonym for ‘useful’, but in the nineteenth century a practical course was also one which required *practice*. … There is, of course, another reason for the emphasis on practice, namely the high priority attached to meticulous standards of accuracy which, as well as having an intrinsic moral value, was a prerequisite for passing the increasing number of formal written examinations that grew up during the century. (Howatt and Widdowson 2004: 152, italics and quotation marks in original)

Thus, the contention that Kaplan observes – that an increased emphasis on “practical learning” was somehow in opposition to a “grammar/translation” approach – may not reflect the nature of the word “practical” exactly as it was used in the 19th century.

Nonetheless, Kaplan would be right to use the term “practical learning” about the Reform Movement, if one considers today’s meaning of “practical.”

Finally, Berns and Matsuda (2010), also connect the Reform Movement to the beginnings of applied linguistics. In a discussion of just one “strand” of applied linguistics, they manage to draw a line all the way from the Reformers to “[w]hat is probably the first use of the term applied linguistics in English” in 1931. Berns and Matsuda draw their connections via the Reformers’ use of the term “Applications” and also via connections among a constellation of figures, including C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and Henry Sweet:

Another strand of early applied linguistics can be traced back to the Reform Movement, particularly the efforts of Henry Sweet in England, Paul Passy in France, and Otto Jespersen in Denmark. Although the Reformists did not use the term applied linguistics, Sweet made the distinction between theoretical and practical language studies: the former was concerned with the historical studies of language and etymology and the latter with language learning. … The Reformists’ principles of language teaching were summarized in *La Phonétique et ses Applications* (*Phonetics and its Applications*), published by the International Phonetic Association (Passy, 1929). … Another significant tradition of applied
linguistics that emerged in early 20th-century England is associated with the work of C. K. Ogden, who is most well-known for his collaboration with I. A. Richards in developing Basic (British American Scientific International Commercial) English. One of the central features of Basic English was the use of a limited vocabulary – an approach that was also used by Henry Sweet, Charles Fries, Michael West, and others. What is probably the first use of the term applied linguistics in English occurred in *World Economy: A Study in Applied Linguistics* by Leonora Wilhelmina Lockhart (1931), a publication sponsored by Ogden’s Orthological Institute, where Lockhart was a staff member. (Berns and Matsuda 2010: 7)

Berns and Matsuda additionally note, in their exploration of other possible origins for the applied linguistics field, notes that two Indo-Europeanists, Hermann Hirt from Germany and Paul Regnaud from France, as well as the Slavist Jan Baudouin de Courtenay from Poland, also contributed to the emergence of the name “applied linguistics.” Howatt and Widdowson (2004, chapter 14) make the observation that the legacy of the Reform Movement includes not only the founding of the field of applied linguistics, but also the field of English as a foreign language. Finally, Anderman and Rogers (2008) identify Reformers such as Sweet and Jespersen as influential forefathers to Corpus Studies26, citing (2008: 6) the Reformers’ “awareness of the importance of not viewing words and constructions in isolation.”

*The Reform Movement in summary.*

Thus, in their quest to reform and also name the old method, I hope to have shown convincingly that Viëtor and Jespersen – and the other Reformers like Sweet – were calling, referring to, and characterizing the method of old – and specific activities within it – as “grammaticizing-translating.” Viëtor’s use of the phrase “grammatisierend-

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26 Corpus Studies makes use of electronic corpora – large collections of digitized text, intended to be a representative sample of how a word is used in a language – as a tool for identifying a word’s meaning.
übersetzend” appears to be a culmination of his and the Reform Movement’s search for an appropriate term to describe their opposition, and the phrase is a clear precursor to both the German “Grammatik-Übersetzungs methode” and the English “Grammar Translation Method,” as the names are used today. Additionally, Viëtor derives the “grammatisierend-übersetzend” practices of this method explicitly from Meidinger, calling him its “father,” while also naming and casting all of Meidinger’s methodological descendants that were examined earlier (Seidenstücker, Ahn, Ollendorff, and Ploetz) directly into a GTM lineage. Of course, the Reformers’ other characterizations of the old method (all of them skeptical or critical) do not disappear with the subsequent and enduring use of the GTM moniker; rather, these negative criticisms remain as implications behind the “grammar translation” name, and, as indicated in the Introduction, they survive to this day. The negative criticisms by the Reformers are largely directed at translation as it is performed in the GTM. The Reformers consistently problematize the GTM’s focus on written translation of texts into the foreign language. This mode and direction of translation is described either explicitly or implicitly by the Reformers as, among other descriptions: mindless, mechanical, burdensome, old, overly ruled, inadequate, ineffective, unrepresentative of a person’s language ability, and a fallacy. As regards translation in oral form and performed into the mother tongue as a comprehension aid (when performed by a teacher for students) or a comprehension check (when performed by students for a teacher), the Reformers are more welcoming. Despite the Reformers’ careful attention to specifying which type of translation they find most useful or useless, later criticisms of translation by the Reformers are not so clearly aimed at GTM-translation specifically. This lack of clear specification about which type of
translation is meant (for example, in the title of Viëtor’s Lecture 2: “Grammatik und Übersetzung”) leads eventually to a stance that can appear skeptical towards all translation. Thus, the Reformers pave the way, with their negative characterizations of the GTM as a whole, and specifically of translation, towards the eventual dismissal of both by the dominant language teaching methods of today. I intend to show later that the Reformers, as conscientious as they often are about specifying the type of translation that they criticize, nonetheless, and perhaps unwittingly, maintain adherence to a definition of translation that only allows for the limited options that they consider: oral or written translation, and translation that goes either from or into the mother tongue. I will assert that, regarding translation, the Reformers may need to heed their own call to “turn around” (German: “umkehren”) as much as they ask the old methodology to do so itself. That is, later, in the Conclusion, I intend to show that a less restricted definition of translation, that might include such things as rewording within one language or translating from a language into a non-verbal system, might have guided the Reformers to a more embracing and exploratory stance concerning translation’s appropriateness for language teaching. First, in Chapter Three, I will take a look at the Direct Method that comes into being concurrently with the unfolding of the Reform Movement; for the Direct Method is also a significant contributor to the characterizing of old methodologies as “grammar translation” ones, and it has an important influence on the fate of translation to this day. Although I have posited that Viëtor is the Reformer most responsible for the what eventually became the name “grammar translation method,” I will nonetheless close this chapter with a quotation from his fellow Reformer Jespersen. The following are Jespersen’s closing remarks to his book How to Teach a Foreign Language. The passage
contains what are perhaps Jespersen’s most explicit associations of “grammar and translation” with the old methodology, as well as many criticisms that still plague the GTM as it is defined today. I have highlighted what I consider some of Jespersen’s key wordings:

In closing let me try to sum up. The old-fashioned disconnected sentences proved to be a failure for many reasons, and one reason was because there was nothing else to do with them but to translate them. They could arouse no interest; they could not even be read aloud intelligently; they could not be remembered in that definite form which they happened to have, so they could not be used as patterns for the construction of other sentences; therefore the rules of the grammar, which was committed to memory, came to play such an important part. It all became lifeless and monotonous. (Jespersen 1904: 190-191, italics added)
CHAPTER THREE

Banning Translation for Good: The Direct Method.

While the Reform Movement progresses, another language teaching movement is also underway, leading to the influential Direct Method.

The Reformed Method caught on with vigor and contributed greatly to a naming and subsequent dismissal of the “old” “GTM” method (and by proxy a dismissal of rule-oriented grammar instruction and the use of translation). For evidence of the Reform Movement’s success, within and outside Germany, see Doff (2008), Howatt and Widdowson (2004), and Howatt (1982). However, it is actually the force of a contemporaneous method, the Direct Method, which appears to deal a final death blow to the Grammar Translation Method, and also the use of translation in language teaching:

However, the final and severest blow to the grammar translation method came from methods of language teaching, known variously as Natural Method, Conversation Method, Direct Method, Communicative Approach, etc. (Malmkjær 1998: 4)

This passage from Malmkjær is significant because it attests to the lasting influence that the Direct Method has had on the genesis of other, similar methodologies. The Communicative Approach, for example, is a dominant methodology today, referred to as Communicative Language Teaching (CLT). While others may differentiate CLT from the Direct Method more strongly, Malmkjær’s statement here demonstrates that, for many, the two approaches are more similar than different.
Immersion in the foreign language as a reflection of the Direct Method’s principle of imitating a child’s natural language learning processes.

The Direct Method’s greatest hallmark is its principle of being guided by the natural processes that a child goes through in learning its mother tongue. This principle is of course reminiscent of the method of Seidenstücker (and Ahn and Ploetz, who both cite Seidenstücker as an influence). However, the Direct Method attaches to this principle one corollary that Seidenstücker does not: completely immersing the student in the foreign language, as if the student were indeed a child again in a monolingual environment. Seidenstücker, it is remembered, uses bilingual grammar illustrations and vocabulary lists, and also offers exercises in both the foreign language and the mother tongue, even though he also advocates imitating a child’s natural learning processes. For the Direct Method, however, any use of the mother tongue represents a violation of its principle of complete immersion in the foreign language. The teacher and textbook therefore use exclusively the foreign language, whether spoken or written, and students are also not allowed to use the mother tongue. Additionally, the immersion is considered to be more natural if the teacher is also a native speaker of the foreign language. This immersive approach can appear similar to Seidenstücker’s inductive approach to teaching grammar, where he uses illustrative examples of text in the foreign language in order to get the student to notice important grammatical features without resorting to explicit grammar terminology and explanation. As well, the immersive approach of the Direct Method can appear similar to Seidenstücker’s inductive approach to pronunciation, where Seidenstücker includes no explicit explanation in his book, except for the instruction that
the teacher would be a good example to follow for pronunciation. However, the Direct Method’s insistence on immersion is not necessarily equivalent with advocacy of inductive over deductive approaches – for, theoretically, the Direct Method would tolerate deductive approaches to grammar and pronunciation, as long as all the explicit explanation that is characteristic of deductive approaches were carried out in the foreign language. Texts, too, in the Direct Method need not necessarily be “authentic” foreign language texts, such as the literature from great authors that Ollendorff includes at the end of his textbook; rather, the Direct Method makes ample use of foreign language texts constructed for pedagogical purposes. Perhaps the most significant result of the Direct Method’s principle of immersion as a valid reflection of a child’s natural language learning processes is that translation no longer has a role. Not only is translation moot, but, along with the use of the mother tongue, the Direct Method explicitly bans it.

The origins of the Direct Method: Gouin and Berlitz.

The Direct Method is considered by many today to have significant origins with François Gouin (1831-1896) and Maximilian Berlitz (1852-1921). Gouin’s book from 1880 L’art d’enseigner et d’étudier les langues (The Art of Teaching and Studying Languages) is often considered to be the most influential publication in the early history of the Direct Method. Gouin’s book is both an autobiographical account of his failure at learning German by the “classical” method, as well as a report of how he becomes inspired to form his new method, including examples of exercises that he uses. For this dissertation, I will use the 1892 English language translation of Gouin’s book by Howard Swan and
Victor Bétis. Berlitz is the arguable pinnacle of the Direct Method; however, Berlitz does not detail his method in any particular book. As Howatt and Widdowson (2004: 224) note, Berlitz writes very little about his methodology at all – the instructions to the teacher in all of his manuals are the same, and only in some editions does Berlitz provide a short preface detailing the “Fundamental Principles of the Berlitz Method,” in which one finds Berlitz’s references to translation. I will quote from this preface as it appears in the 1919 “American edition” of The Berlitz Method for Teaching Modern Languages: English Part. Berlitz of course goes on to found the highly successful Berlitz language schools – the first in 1878 in Providence, Rhode Island – which still survive with his unchanged version of the Direct Method today. Several other scholars, such as Titone (Titone 2000: 390) and Howatt and Widdowson (2004, especially chapters 13 and 14), add Claude Marcel (1796-1876), Lambert Sauveur (1826-1907), and Gottlieb Heness to the list of contributors to the formation of the Direct Method. Due to the success and influence of Gouin’s book and the enduring influence of Berlitz still today, I will focus my analysis on these two Direct Method authors.

Accidents lead to a method.

An interesting, shared aspect of the origin of Gouin’s and Berlitz’s methods is that each method is born as if by accident. That is, neither Gouin nor Berlitz takes a scientific or systematic approach to developing his method. Instead, they each seize upon an unexpected observation that they then market as a language teaching method. As well,

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27 Dates unavailable for Heness, but he was a contemporary of, and acquainted with, Berlitz. Berlitz names Heness (1889: 3) as helpful in implementing Berlitz’s method in New Haven.
neither Gouin nor Berlitz is in contact with the other in developing his method. Let us first consider Gouin.

On how translation fails Gouin and the consequences: translation is dismissed.

Gouin begins his book with a withering attack on the deficiencies of the “classical” method, which he essentially casts as a GTM-style method. He notes how this method failed him in his own attempt at learning German, and therefore adopts a warring stance against “the classical method of teaching, which I shall attack and combat later on” (1892: 7). Shortly after this near declaration of war, Gouin details the following woeful account of his time in Germany:

“The fire smoulders under the ashes,” I assured myself, “and will brighten up little by little. We must read, read, read, day in and day out; translate, translate continually; hunt, hunt a hundred times the same word in the dictionary; catch it a hundred times, a hundred times release it; we shall finish by taming it.”

The first day I had much difficulty in deciphering even one page, and I was not sure I had not made a dozen blunders in this. The second page seemed to be equally difficult with the first. For a week I worried and tossed about my dictionary. In this week I had hardly interpreted the meaning of eight pages, and the ninth did not promise to be less obscure or less laborious than the preceding. I felt I was not advancing, that I should never by this means arrive at the knowledge of the language in its totality, that the words did not grave themselves upon my memory, and that my work this time was indeed a Penelope’s web. Translation might be a useful and necessary exercise for the study of Greek and Latin; it appeared to me to be far less fruitful for living languages.

For the first time in my life I dared to question the efficacy of the classical methods of the university. I still maintained them, it is true, for the ancient tongues; but I boldly condemned them for modern languages, and these are the considerations upon which I grounded my judgment. (Gouin 1892: 16-17, quotation marks in original)

As background information, Gouin is describing his situation in Hamburg, where he has just arrived, bought a “classic”-style German textbook, and is now learning German in
the same way that he learned Latin and Greek at the university in Caen, France. Gouin’s account represents a near “textbook definition” of the GTM as it is understood today, perhaps most significantly in his bold condemnation of it. The one notable exception here is that Gouin is performing self-study, as opposed to language study in a class setting. Seidenstücker, it will be recalled, offers that his book could be used for self-study, although he reminds that the student will therefore have no pronunciation models from a teacher. Gouin would have of course numerous models of pronunciation all around himself in Hamburg, but significantly, no dedicated teacher among them. Thus, Gouin’s account may be evidence that a GTM-style is actually less effective for the self-study of a living language, i.e., without a teacher’s active participation.

Interestingly, Gouin recounts one page later (1892: 18) that he goes back to the bookstore in Hamburg and purchases instead Ollendorff’s textbook for learning German, which the bookseller recommends on the basis of Ollendorff’s book already being in its 54th edition. However, Ollendorff’s approach, although it at first appeals to Gouin, fails Gouin as well. Gouin tries still more textbooks, to no avail, and soon offers his conclusion about his misguided attempt to learn German – a living language – by the classical method:

The classical method, with its grammar, its dictionary, and its translations, is a delusion – nothing but a delusion. Nature knows and applies another method. Her method is infallible; this is an undeniable, indisputable fact. And with this method all children are equally apt in learning languages. Do they not all learn their mother-tongue, and this within a time sensibly the same? (Gouin 1892: 35)

With this passage, Gouin clearly again describes the “classical” method as a grammar and translation, and also effectively condemns this method again, now as a “delusion.” It is
interesting that Gouin finds the alternative to the classical method in “nature,” implying a
divide between the two that does not come into play for Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ploetz.
That is, the latter three also cite “nature,” while still offering methods that are, as
observed, largely “classical” in approach, suggesting that the divide that Gouin
accentuates may not be a given. With the above passage, Gouin leaves any treatment of
the classical method behind – including translation – for most of the rest of his book.

Gouin only returns twice to a treatment of translation and the traditional, classical
method. Each instance represents an even stronger oppositional stance than at the
beginning of his book:

> Be certain of this, that it is only by thinking directly in the language studied that
you will arrive at reading fluently a page of Virgil or a page of Homer. From the
height of a long experience, I venture to denounce translation as the true cause of
our ignorance in which we are of those two unfortunate ancient languages, which
we study all our lives and know never. (Gouin 1892: 141)

This passage represents a significant increase in the amplitude of Gouin’s stance against
the classical method, and, particularly, translation. Earlier (as cited above), Gouin
maintained that the classical method can be appropriate for ancient languages, but here he
appears to be recanting. As well, it is significant here that he distills the “true cause” of
the classical method’s deficiency down to translation alone (as opposed to grammar or
other possibilities). Gouin’s denouncement of translation here is appropriate within his
methodology as he describes it in his book, essentially an immersion method.
Translation would apparently interfere with a person’s “thinking directly in the language
studied” for Gouin. The use of the word “direct” here is important as well, as it will of
course later be used to describe Gouin’s (and Berlitz’s) method as a “direct method.”
Significantly, Gouin does not detail the translation that he means precisely here. It appears to be the “standard” GTM-type of translation – primarily in written form, probably into the foreign language – and it is indeed being used for the languages that is earliest associated with – Latin and Greek – but Gouin is not explicit, suggesting perhaps that he believes it does not need to be stated that he means a GTM-type of translation. In Gouin’s final arguable mention of the classical method, he becomes as extreme about the use of the mother tongue as he did about translation in the above quotation:

The man, therefore, who has never spoken any other language than, say, English or French, is incapable of constructing properly a single phrase in either Latin or German, even if he is in possession of all the elements of those languages. Consequently, if he wishes to learn one of those languages, what is required of him is that he should study the construction of the phrase in this language itself. So far as regards our mother-tongue, each of us has learnt the construction directly while learning to think, and we apply it intuitively. Our own language is not, therefore, the place to study it, at least with the view of its practical application. (Gouin 1892: 279)

That Gouin is referring to mother tongue usage as represented in the classical, GTM-style method is implied here; for it is the classical method that would start with explanations in “our own language,” and the classical method would not be one wherein a student applies ideas “intuitively.” Gouin’s choice of interspersing his book with criticisms against the classical method and translating that become progressively stronger may be an intentional stylistic technique. As it is, his book is already a curious amalgam of autobiographical narrative and pedagogical treatise. Aside from these later two passages, where critical aspects of the classical method are most explicitly dismissed (that is, mother tongue usage and the use of translation), Gouin’s book otherwise recounts the striking story of the genesis and implementation of his own “Series Method.”
Gouin’s Series Method as reflective of an individual’s conceptualization of his or her own experiences.

On his method’s genesis, Gouin tells the story of how he was first inspired to invent his method only after observing by chance how easily his young nephew (three years old) was able to pick up new words in French (the nephew’s mother tongue) during a fortuitous visit to a grist mill one day (the nephew had never been to a mill before) – see Gouin, pages 34-39, for a compelling narrative thereof:

“What,” I thought, “this child and I have been working the same time, each at a language. He playing round his mother, running after flowers, butterflies, and birds, without weariness, without apparent effort, without even being conscious of his work, is able to say all he thinks, express all sees, understand all he hears; and when he began his work his intelligence was yet a ‘futurity,’ a glimmer, a hope. And I, versed in the sciences, versed in literature, versed in philosophy, armed with a powerful will, gifted with a memory, guided by an enlightened reason, furnished besides with books and all the aids of science, have arrived at nothing, or at practically nothing!” (Gouin 1892: 34, quotation marks in original)

Gouin is here remarking generally about observations he makes of his nephew before the trip to the grist mill, detailing a growing, personal curiosity over his nephew’s ability to speak more and more French every day, while Gouin himself has never achieved fluency with German, even after repeated efforts. Notably as well, Gouin dismisses science in this passage, as well as literature and philosophy – this may not be an intended strategy of Gouin’s, but it nevertheless liberates him from having to justify his method later on any scientific or philosophical principles. It also permits him to formulate a method that does not stress literature.
After these initial observations, Gouin details the visit with his nephew to the grist mill.

After the visit, Gouin’s nephew promptly goes about “playing grist mill” back at home, which is where Gouin makes the following observations:

When the [play] mill was definitely mounted and set agoing, the little miller filled his sacks with sand, loaded them on his shoulder with a simulated effort accompanied with a grimace; then, bent and grunting beneath the weight, carried his grain to the mill, shot it out and ground it, so reproducing the scene of the real mill – not as he had seen it, but as he had afterwards “conceived” it to himself, as he had “generalized” it. Whilst doing all this, he expressed all his acts aloud, dwelling most particularly upon one word – and this word was the “verb,” always the verb. The other terms came and tumbled about as they might. Ten times the same sack was emptied, refilled, carried to the mill, and its contents ground in imagination. It was during the course of this operation, carried out again and again without ceasing, “repeated aloud,” that a flash of light suddenly shot across my mind, and I exclaimed softly to myself, “I have found it! Now I understand!” And following with a fresh interest this precious operation by means of which I had caught a glimpse of the secret so long sought after. I caught sight of a fresh art, that of learning a language. (Gouin 1892: 38, quotation marks in the original)

Gouin makes significant observations: his nephew creates his own conceptualization of the grist mill experience, breaks the experience down into component parts or steps, appears to fixate on verbs in so doing, and repeatedly performs these steps. In his nephew’s breaking down of an experience into component parts that are focused on a verb, or action, Gouin finds a potential new manner of language learning.

As Gouin explains in the next passage, the critical aspect of his method rests on the fact that his nephew personalized his experience, which was reflected in the language that his nephew spoke while playing grist mill:

While before the mill, the child’s mind had taken a passive and entirely receptive attitude; but after the hour of “intellectual digestion” he had changed the part he played, and reacting upon the impressions thus received and experienced, he had worked upon them as upon raw material, and had transformed them into realities, or, if the term be preferred, into “subjective images,” that is to say, into ideas. To
this phase – the passive attitude of perception – had succeeded the active phase –
the reactionary attitude, first of the reflection, then of the conception. In other
terms, he no longer saw in reality; he “saw in the mind’s eye;” he represented.
“To see in the mind’s eye” – let us not forget this fact, this psychological moment.
It is the point of departure of Nature’s method; it will be the first basis of our
linguistic method. We shall not commence either by declining or conjugating
verbs, nor by the recitation of abstract rules, nor by mumbling over scores of roots
or columns of a vocabulary. We shall commence by representing to ourselves –
“seeing in the mind’s eye” – real and tangible facts – facts already perceived by
us and already transformed by the reflection and conception into constituent parts
of our own individuality. (Gouin 1892: 39, quotation marks in original)

Gouin here is leaving the classical method behind; for he as much as dismisses grammar
(“declining or conjugating”), “rules,” and, with his mention of long vocabulary lists,
translation. Yet, he is curiously leaving some form of translation on the table, suggesting
that certain “real and tangible facts” that we see in our “mind’s eye” are routinely
“transformed” into “ideas” by us, i.e., translated into language by us – as exemplified by
the personally chosen verbs that Gouin’s nephew uses to play out his memory of his
experience at the grist mill. These observations lead Gouin to postulate that the memory
of any experience can be (and routinely is) broken down into component parts by people
that they then represent and express with language. Gouin decides that in this breaking
down of an experience into steps there is a key to language learning and teaching;
however, he does not explain exactly how he understands this key, leaving it as “Nature’s
method” (and he dismissed science earlier anyway). As a result, Gouin interviews
myriad people in an effort to get them to describe the steps that they break down various
experiences into. Gouin then prints up these steps and offers them as a “series” that can
be used as language teaching material. Gouin, remembering his observations of his
nephew, always stresses the verb in these series. Following his “Series Method,” a
teacher, or textbook, demonstrates to a student all of the smaller steps that comprise any larger action, repetitively. Here is a sample “series”:

The maid chops a log of wood

– The maid goes and seeks her hatchet, seeks
  the maid takes a log of wood, takes
  the maid draws near to the chopping block, draws near
  the maid kneels down near this block, kneels down
  the maid places the log of wood upright upon this block. places
  – The maid raises her hatchet, raises
  the maid brings down her hatchet, brings down
  the hatchet cleaves the air, cleaves
  the blade strikes the wood, strikes
  the blade buries itself in the wood, buries itself
  the blade cleaves the wood, cleaves
  the two pieces fall to the ground. fall (Gouin 1892: 69)

It is Gouin’s assertion that this series is only one of many possible series that would all have the same title: “The maid chops a log of wood.” That is, this particular series represents the chopping of wood as told to Gouin by one particular “maid.” Gouin therefore uses the series as both a straightforward linguistic exercise in new vocabulary and sentences, as well as an opportunity to raise awareness in his student that every person would describe the experience with a different series. As such, Gouin, as I noted above, intimates that the production of the series represents a certain type of personal translation of an individual’s experience into language.
An acceptable form of translation: Gouin’s series as an example of “translating our individuality.”

Indeed, whereas Gouin dismisses any translation in its “classical method” sense early on in his book, he nonetheless uses the word “translation” several times later in his book in a very different sense, in reference to translation’s background position to his series. He calls this type of translation “translating our individuality”:

To learn a language was to translate into this language not Ollendorff, not Goethe, not Virgil, not Homer, but the vast book of our own individuality. (Gouin 1892: 49)

We will reply further once again, that to learn a given language is to translate into this language the whole of our individuality. (Gouin 1892: 79)

For what is required to be translated is not a sequence of hackneyed phrases written down upon paper, but a page of our own individuality – a page which is to be found written in the depths of the memory of every one of us upon the bed-rock of our intellectual substance. (Gouin 1892: 97)

To learn a language is, as we have said, to translate one's own individuality into this language. (Gouin 1892: 294)

To learn a language, let us recollect for the hundredth time, is not to translate a book; it is to translate our own individuality into this language. (Gouin 1892: 338, italics in original)

On one level, it could be argued that Gouin is offering here what could be described as an example of translation into the foreign language, which would be an overlap with traditional, GTM-style translation (that is, mother tongue into the foreign language). But Gouin’s concept of “translating one’s individuality” is not entirely linguistic in nature. That is, Gouin appears to mean that a person’s non-linguistically bound “individuality” is infinitely expressible by, or translatable into, any given language, whether that language is the mother tongue or any language that is later studied. It is a potentially radical
definition, or example, of translation, where only one side of the translation divide is represented by a verbal language proper. Gouin does not explain how the translation of individuality precisely takes place or can be controlled. Instead, he leaves it implied as the expression of individuality that is evident in any person’s idiosyncratic use of language in describing one’s own actions and thoughts, starting with one’s childhood and one’s mastering of the mother tongue. For Gouin, one expression of this type of translation is the concept of “series” on which he bases his method:

Remember once more that they were little children who aided us to translate our individuality in German, as afterwards in English and in other tongues, and that we owe the development of our series to the simple workmen who figure as actors therein. It was a ploughman who told us the Series of Tilling the Ground; it was a shepherd who gave us the Series of the Shepherd, and a woodman who gave us that of the Woodman. (Gouin 1892: 300)

In the above passage, Gouin is obviously referring to his “Series Method.” He acknowledges that his series were first inspired, or “aided,” by observing “little children” and that all the series in his book represent specific expressions, or translations, of individuality from identified source “actors.” While Gouin does not say that the series represent the only example of how he understands “translating one’s individuality,” he nonetheless does not offer other specific examples. In Gouin’s book, “translating one’s individuality” therefore remains as a significant alternative to its unwelcome cousin – “translating in the classical method sense.” For Gouin the former is an ideal, and the latter is useless.

In summary, Gouin can be seen initially declaring a sort of personal war against the classical GTM-type methodologies, such as Ollendorff’s, that fail him in his attempts to learn German. His own lack of success at learning German via a GTM-style approach
leads Gouin to dismiss the entire classical method. Simultaneously, his fortuitous
observations of his young nephew inspire Gouin to create a method that allegedly reflects
the natural processes involved in translating one’s individuality into any language. In
detailing the origins and operation of his resultant Series Method over the course of his
book, Gouin becomes even more extreme in denouncing the classical method, especially
the aspects of mother tongue usage and translation. As I will now show, Berlitz similarly
takes pains to denounce the mother tongue and translation.

_The origins of Berlitz’s method._

Both Berlitz and Gouin can thank good fortune for the existence of their methods.
Whereas Gouin has his nephew and a chance visit to a grist mill to thank, Berlitz has the
good fortune of getting sick. The Berlitz Company website explains:

As he needed an assistant for French, Berlitz employed a young Frenchman
named Joly, who obviously came with top references. When Joly arrived in
Providence, he found that his employer was completely exhausted, feverish and
very ill. The situation only worsened when Berlitz found out that his new
assistant did not speak a single word of English. Desperately trying to find a way
to use Joly in his teaching, Berlitz instructed him to explain objects using gestures
and to act out verbs as well as he could. He then returned to bed.
He returned to the classroom six weeks later, expecting his desperate students to
be angry with him. Instead, he found his students engaging in an animated
exchange of questions and answers – in elegant French. The normal venerable
atmosphere of a traditional classroom had disappeared. His students were also
much further ahead in terms of what they had learned than Berlitz would have
achieved in the same period of time. Berlitz came to a significant conclusion: the
“emergency solution” had formed the basis for a completely new method of
teaching. (from: http://www.berlitz.de/en/berlitz_company/tradition/history/,
quotation marks in original)

One notes that both Gouin’s and Berlitz’s stories are marked by pre-histories of
experience with a “traditional” (for Gouin, “classical”) methodology that is probably akin
to the GTM. That is, while Gouin explicitly names Ollendorff and describes other aspects of his failed German study that indicate he was learning under a GTM-style approach, the passage above maintains that Berlitz also has, previous to his illness, conducted his language teaching in the “normal venerable atmosphere of a traditional classroom,” which suggests a GTM-type classroom. The fact that Berlitz’s situation is “worsened” when he discovers that his new teaching assistant does not speak English is also an indicator of possible GTM-style learning, for the use of the students’ mother tongue would be more necessary or expected in a GTM-approach, for example, for grammar explanations, vocabulary lists, and translating. It is also significant that Berlitz instructs Joly to use gestures, or body language, for communicating. Although Berlitz never casts these gestures as such, they could be reminiscent of Gouin’s series, where one person’s idiosyncratic description of the steps in an activity represents a translation of that person’s non-linguistic individuality into verbal language. That is, the gesturing that Joly does could be seen as a non-verbal expression of his individuality that gets translated into the foreign language for the students. Additionally, gesturing is important because it adds an extra physical aspect to the task of the language teacher that is not included in the other methodologies examined in this dissertation. Significantly, the above passage does not necessarily characterize the “traditional” style as negative, although some negative implications could be said to arise. For example, Berlitz finds that his students have progressed “much further ahead” than they would probably have in the same time with the traditional approach, and that they speak “in elegant French.” This can be read as a negative comment on the inefficacy of the traditional approach – both its implied slow pace and its implied inelegant results. The fact that Berlitz chooses to make a completely
new method based on the above “emergency solution,” leaving the traditional approach behind, also implies a negative association with the traditional approach, as if it were thought of as entirely expendable and as if one had perhaps been waiting around for a viable alternative to show up.

_The nature of Berlitz’s new approach: the mother tongue and translation thrown overboard._

What follows is the description of the Berlitz Method as it appears in the 1919 American Edition of the Berlitz manual for learning English:

**Fundamental Principles of the Berlitz Method**
1. – Direct association of Perception and Thought with the Foreign Speech and Sound.
2. – Constant and exclusive use of the Foreign Language.

**Means of Attaining this End**
I. – Teaching of the Concrete by Object Lessons.
II. – Teaching of the Abstract by the Association of Ideas.
III. – Teaching of Grammar by Examples and Ocular Demonstration.

The Berlitz Method is the systematized application of the psychological process which enables a child to learn its mother tongue; it is adapted, however, to the different stages of mental maturity reached by a youth or an adult. In the Berlitz Method, translation as a means of acquiring a foreign language is entirely abandoned. From the first lesson, the student hears only the language he is studying. The reasons for this feature of the method are as follows:
1. In all translation-methods, most of the time is taken up by explanations in the student’s mother tongue, while but few words are spoken in the language to be learned. It is evident that such a procedure is contrary to common sense.
2. He who is studying a foreign language by means of translation, neither gets hold of its spirit nor becomes accustomed to think in it; on the contrary, he has a tendency to base all he says upon what he would say in his mother tongue, and he cannot prevent his vernacular from invading the foreign idiom, thereby rendering the latter unintelligible or, at least, incorrect.
3. A knowledge of a foreign tongue, acquired by means of translation, is necessarily defective and incomplete; for there is by no means for every word of
the one language, the exact equivalent in the other. Every language has its peculiarities, its idiomatic expressions and terms, which cannot possibly be rendered by translation. Furthermore, the ideas conveyed by an expression in one language are frequently not the same as those conveyed by the same words in the other. These undeniable facts suffice to show clearly that all translation-methods are deficient and prove that every language must be learned out of itself. …

[T]he student thus forms the habit of using the foreign tongue spontaneously and easily, as he does his mother tongue, and not in the roundabout way of translation. The difficulties of grammar, which frequently are created only by translation and the consequent comparison with the mother tongue, are greatly diminished. (Berlitz 1919: 1-3)

The use of the word “direct” as the first word of the first principle of this method is what leads to this method’s eventually being cast as the Direct Method. The method here can appear to be an outright abandonment of the traditional method that we now call the GTM – except, notably, that “grammar” is retained. The approach to grammar appears actually to be similar to Seidenstücker’s and Ahn’s – that is, an inductive approach to grammar is suggested above with the phrase “Teaching of Grammar by Examples and Ocular Demonstration,” yet, despite this small overlap, Berlitz’s method is clearly not operating out of the greater GTM principles, as Seidenstücker’s and Ahn’s were observed to be. An additional similarity with Seidenstücker and Ahn, as well as with Ploetz, is that Berlitz describes his method as based on a child’s way of learning. However, this similarity also does not need to entail an alliance with those authors. For example, Gouin, too, bases his method on a child’s way of learning, but Gouin’s method is not in alliance with the GTM-like methods of Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ploetz. In fact, it is actually to Gouin that I would ally Berlitz’s understanding of what it means to base a method on a child’s way of learning. Berlitz names no specific goals in the above presentation, beyond “acquiring” and “using” the foreign language, as well as getting “a hold of its spirit” and becoming “accustomed to think in it.” That is, Berlitz neither
addresses traditional GTM-like goals such as reading literature, writing letters, and intellectual development, nor possible “newer” or untraditional goals, such as Gouin’s desire that a student translate her or his individuality into the foreign language.

Regarding this latter goal, it would appear to contrast too starkly with Berlitz’s principle that “translation is … entirely abandoned;” for even though Berlitz clearly means GTM-style translation, he does make that specification when he abandons it so outright, and so Gouin’s more untraditional casting of translation must therefore be disallowed too. That the translation that Berlitz means is the more traditional GTM-style translation is evidenced by the restricted principles that he associates with translation. That is, Berlitz appears to be operating out of a belief that any translation that would take place, were it not entirely abandoned, would amount to a word-for-word, spiritless endeavor doomed to rob the student of opportunities to speak while also leading to “unintelligible or, at least, incorrect” foreign language production. These arguments against translation are very reminiscent of the alleged deficiencies examined earlier of the GTM as a whole.

_Berlitz’s description of his method is marked by “absolute certainty.”_

In fact, Berlitz’s language in the description of his method above is often so extreme, that no room for options or questioning seems left open (consider his later mention of “undeniable facts”). Additionally, the reasoning behind Berlitz’s statements here could be described as overly confident and opaque. For example, he asserts that his method is a “systematized application” of a “psychological process,” but offers no evidence from psychology for this assertion. Instead he simply offers the argument that his method
operates out of “common sense.” Additionally, he declares that there exist certain “idiomatic expressions and terms, which cannot possibly be rendered by translation” and other “undeniable facts” about translation that ignore the historical fact that people have nonetheless been translating, successfully, for as long as is known. Perhaps this lack of more thoroughly examined statements is what leads Howatt and Widdowson to declare:

Berlitz was not an academic methodologist, but he was an excellent systematizer of basic language teaching materials organized on ‘direct method’ lines. (Howatt and Widdowson 2004: 224, quotation marks in original)

That is, as much as Berlitz claims that his method works so well and as clear as he is about the reasons why it does, the more important factor in his method’s undeniable popularity may be the fact the Berlitz is so systematic in creating materials for his method. In other words, Berlitz’s method, with its consistency in look, tenor, and design – potentially even ignoring the quality of the product – shows itself nonetheless to “succeed” (if success is measured on popularity). It is like the approach of a company endeavoring to be consistent in the appearance of the products that it manufactures, because the appearance is what matters to the customers more than the quality. On this note, G. Cook (2010) attributes Berlitz’s confidence and opacity to the fact that Berlitz, seeking paying students for his private schools, is writing within commercial discourse – a discourse that is not allowed to question itself and must appear absolutely certain:

This absolute certainty may be further evidence of a commercial rather than academic origin for Direct Method. For this extreme self-confidence seems to have more in common with the discourse of advertising and public relations which never expresses doubt about its own claims …, than with the self-questioning and provisional nature of academic argument. (G. Cook 2010: 9)

Perhaps, it is this claim to “absolute certainty” in Berlitz’s text that, for me, appears to disinvite, or even make impossible, any sincere theoretical engagement with his preface.
It is also reminiscent of some of the excessively combative language of Gouin, who essentially says that he is at war with the classic method. I would also note that Berlitz’s extreme reaction to translation – banning it – actually serves to invite translation more strongly into conversation and play, which, to a person who also claims sensitivity to the way in which psychological processes work, would seem to be obvious (that is, by telling a person that she or he may not do translation may actually keep translation in mind).

In summary, Berlitz offers a method that shares two great similarities with Gouin’s: the abandonment of translation and the banning of the mother tongue. It is these two similarities which unite Berlitz and Gouin’s methods as precursors of the Direct Method as it is known today (although Gouin technically calls his method the Series Method, and Berlitz names his after himself). Additionally, their methods’ “accidental” origins represent an interesting area of overlap. Berlitz displays an understanding of translating and mother tongue use that clearly stems from associations with their use in the classic version of the GTM. Berlitz also demonstrates an air of confidence and certainty that may stem from his need to be commercially successful. Being absolutely consistent both with his claims and also with the nature of his materials may be more important factors to Berlitz’s ultimate commercial success than any of his underlying methodological principles. His and Gouin’s influence on methodologies can still be felt today. That is, Berlitz and Gouin here find common principles that will set the Direct Method in motion as a model for virtually all future methods: the rejection of translation and the banning of the use of the mother tongue.
I will explore the question of whether the Reformed Method and the Direct Method represent truly distinct events, for the two methods can be difficult to separate from one another. Their distinctness is clouded historically by virtue of the similar dates of emergence of each movement – both in the late 1800s. Importantly, I would note that some historians resist such periodization, such as Benson (2000) and Kelly (1976), observing that the underlying features of all methodologies have presumably always existed and that any features or method might come to the fore, or ebb away, by virtue of greater historical forces. Yet, by this reasoning, names become insignificant and only features and strands remain relevant, but in this dissertation I am explicitly concerned with the development of methods’ names; and, there were no methodologies being called a “reformed” or “direct method” in the late 1800s, even if some may have existed that might have shared content with the Reformed Method and the Direct Method. On the subject of content matter, as opposed to their shared period of emergence, historians have also identified overlap in several of the Reformed Method’s and the Direct Method’s salient features. The sharing of certain features leads to great variance in historians’ degree of distinguishing between the Reformed Method and the Direct Method. The one feature which unites the Reformed Method and the Direct Method most is their emphasis on the primacy of speaking from the moment that people begin to learn a new language. Another feature that they share is that grammar is not taught until after the beginning stages, and it is then taught inductively (as opposed to a GTM-style rule-oriented, deductive treatment of grammar starting with the very first lesson). Additionally, and on
a separate note, the Reform Movement and the Direct Method share a common “enemy,” that is, the prevailing traditional method that they repeatedly cast as being most marked by its approaches to grammar and translation – consider Viëtor’s use of an exclamation point (is it a rallying call to arms?) at the end of the title of his treatise (*Der Sprachunterricht muß umkehren!* and also Gouin’s readiness, observed earlier, to “attack and combat” the classical method.

*Historical variance on the differentiating the Reform Movement and the Direct Method.*

As for how consistently historians have distinguished between the two methods, Criado-Sánchez (2005) makes a clear distinction between the Reformed Method and the Direct Method as separate, but concurrent phenomena; however, Krause (1916), even though he names the two methods separately, effectively treats them synonymously, by liberally going back and forth between the two terms. For example, Krause – his book is entitled *The Direct Method in Modern Languages* – begins his sixth chapter by listing three trends related to the Direct Method that are specific to the US. The trends are not as important here as the way that Krause casually interchanges the names of the method on page 65. For the first trend, he begins:

The direct method is simply …

With the second trend, Krause begins:

The aim of the reform method is …

Krause switches the method’s name, suggesting sameness. Then, for the third trend in the list, Krause begins:
No one has a right to speak upon a direct method authoritatively unless …

By naming the Direct Method again, Krause adds to the sameness of the Direct Method and the Reform that he has just implied with the opening to the second trend. Then, a few sentences later, Krause, refers back to the first trend in the list:

*The direct method or the reform method* is not the so-called … (italics added)

With the above choice of phrasing, Krause essentially synonymizes the two methods. As a blurrier example, Lado (1964) does not even make any mention of the Reform Movement in his historical treatment of the era, instead only naming the Direct Method; however, as “some of the leaders of the [Direct Method] movement,” Lado (1964: 4) then names three figures: two Reformers, Viëtor and Jespersen, and also Harold Palmer (1877-1949). Viëtor and Jespersen would surely disagree with Lado, since they, not surprisingly, classify their Reformed Method as distinct from the Direct Method. Recall Viëtor’s mention earlier of new school books that make use of the “direkte Methode,” distinguishing the Direct Method from his own method. Jespersen, for his part, notes twice (1904: 2 and 3) that his method is not the same as the one of Berlitz, nor the “Berlitz schools.”

*A brief aside on Harold Palmer.*

Palmer came onto the scene well after the onset of the Reform and the Direct Method. Palmer’s first publication, *The Scientific Study and Teaching of Languages*, from 1917, marked him not as a leader of any one movement (as Lado contends in the above paragraph), but as a clear descendant of all that came before (Grammar Translation, the
Reform Movement, and the Direct Method). Consider the opening to his book – the passage is an energized question-and-answer session with his imagined readers in which he manages to encapsulate, with wit, the trends of the past 200 plus years:

Does the science of language-study exist? ‘Of course it exists!’ some readers may answer. ‘Was it not initiated, created, discussed, fought for, and finally established by the leaders of the Reform Movement years ago? Is not the principle of the Direct Method an accomplished fact? Have we not witnessed the introduction, growth, and triumph of the Phonetic principle? Do we not find the textbooks of the science of language-study in every teacher’s library? Has it not been proved that grammar should be taught inductively, that translation is a delusion, that the dictionary is a snare? Has not “the aunt of the Dutchman in the garden of the baker’s brother” been consigned to the limbo of forgotten things? Are we not living in the age of object-lessons, pictures, and the total exclusion of the mother tongue? Are we not…?’ Just so, just so; all these things have come to pass, and many others also; reforms have been effected, many bad things (and some good things) have been swept away, many good things (and some bad things) have apparently come to stay. (Palmer 1917. In Harper, 1968: 1, quotation marks in original)

Palmer here acknowledges his own, multifaceted methodological ancestry, in contrast to Lado’s characterization of Palmer as a leader of the Direct Method. Notably, Palmer meets the above rhetorical questions, and their implied answers, with skepticism, answering very soon thereafter:

The science of language-study does not exist, but it is high time that it should exist. (Palmer 1917. In Harper 1968: 3, italics in original)

Palmer thus appears to disavow any solid connection to one particular method, instead opening up the door for the scientific pursuit of his books title for the remainder of his text.
The debate becomes triangulated.

Despite conflations sometimes of the Reformed Method and the Direct Method – such as in Lado and Krause – and despite their strict separation at other times – such as by Criado-Sánchez – there are also other examples of, perhaps, more reticence, or even attempts at compromise – on the question of the distinctness of the Reformed Method and the Direct Method. For example, Howatt (1982) turns the table and offers that the real distinction is between the Direct Method and the old method (i.e., Grammar Translation). Concerning the Reformed Method, Howatt offers a centrist position, finding that the Reformed Method represents a:

middle-of-the-road compromise between the extreme bilingualism of the traditional approach and the extreme monolingualism of the Direct Method. (Howatt 1982: 5)

The “extreme bilingualism” that Howatt refers to here must be in reference to the great degree of use of the mother tongue in the GTM – both during translating and grammar explanations – along with use of the foreign language. However, “bilingualism” can also imply a use of both languages in equal amounts, and one of the greatest criticisms repeatedly made against the GTM is the predominant use of the mother tongue and the near absence of significant use of the foreign language. Thus, Howatt’s classification might have been better made along the lines of the degree of use of the mother tongue, where the GTM would use the mother tongue the most, the Reformed Method only to some degree, and the Direct Method not at all. In his characterization, however, Howatt nevertheless still implies that a certain difference existed between the Reformed Method
Stressing some differences between the Reform Movement and the Direct Method, starting with the classroom atmosphere.

Besides the difference that Howatt notes (but does not stress) in their degree of monolingualism, the Direct Method and the Reformed Method can also be said to differ from one another in their approach to the relationship between teacher and student. On this topic, Howatt notes the contrast of the two methods as follows:

[T]he Reform Movement … won widespread and continuing support among secondary school teachers. … The academic function of the secondary school had to be preserved, and ‘natural methods’, as the Direct Method was commonly referred to at the time, meant emphasizing the more ‘trivial’ aspects of language and language-use. ‘Natural methods’ also implied a significant change in the social relationships of teachers and pupils, a move towards egalitarian ‘matiness’, that neither the teachers nor the pupils would have accepted. … The Reform Movement succeeded, in part anyway, because it preserved the Socratic principle in the secondary school classroom. (Howatt 1982: 5-6, quotation marks in original)

Howatt notes that the Direct Method afforded more power and control to the student. It is interesting that Howatt also notes that this egalitarianism would not be accepted by teachers and students in the late 1800s, for it has become a feature that is valued today in Communicative Language Teaching. It is also significant that Howatt here equates “natural methods” with the Direct Method. “Natural” appears to be used here in the way that Gouin and Berlitz mean it – entailing the abandonment of the mother tongue and translation – as opposed to its use by Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ploetz. It should be added that, although Howatt and Widdowson go to lengths to differentiate the two methods,
they also acknowledge that the boundaries between the Reformed Method and the Direct Method can be fuzzy:

[Paul Passy] may also have been the first writer to use the term ‘direct method’ in a published work in a pamphlet called *De la méthode directe dans l’enseignement des langues vivantes* in 1899, but for him … the label carried Reform Movement connotations rather than the ‘conversational’ overtones associated with, for example, Berlitz. (Howatt and Widdowson 2004: 197, quotation marks and italics in original)

Thus, Howatt and Widdowson, by reminding that the names of the methods often need to be qualified, underscore that they believe in a real difference between the Reform Movement and the Direct Method.

A difference in origins, highlighting the scientific principles behind the Reform Movement and the accidents behind the Direct Method.

Another important difference between the Direct Method and the Reformed Method, that I have found is rarely stressed (except by Howatt 1982 and Howatt and Widdowson 2004, and to a lesser degree by G. Cook 2010), concerns the very different motivational origins of the two methods. As noted, the Reformers were phonetic scientists whose method arose out of principles that the Reformers were able to express clearly and test. Such a test is exemplified by Klinghardt’s experimental implementation of the Reformed Method at his high school in Reichenbach in Silesia that was cited earlier. In contrast, the rise of the Direct Method, as Gouin and Berlitz tell it, was less motivated by principle and more by accidents, such as Gouin’s chance visit to a grist mill with his nephew and Berlitz’s unfortunate illness that made him rely on a native-speaker substitute teacher.
Returning to Palmer’s quote above (his question-and-answer with his reader), one can note that he too implies the significance of the accidental and unscientific origins of the Direct Method. When Palmer’s imagines that his reader uses the word “principle,” specifically in the question about the Direct Method (“Is not the principle of the Direct Method an accomplished fact?”), it might be better to read “principle” with a tone of skepticism as “so-called principle.” For Palmer actually casts a skeptical look at all that has been assumed to be a principle until his day (remember, Palmer’s unequivocal answer to his rhetorical questioning, two pages later, is “no”). As such, Palmer imputes not only a lack of principle to the Direct Method, but implies that he may find all approaches before his day unsatisfactorily supported by any science. Alone the title of Palmer’s book, *The Scientific Study and Teaching of Languages*, implies to us that he does not feel such a scientific study has yet occurred. Nonetheless, when, in his fifth chapter, Palmer offers “an ideal standard programme” for teaching French, it is clear from his emphasis on phonetics, including even phonetic transcription, that his “programme” is largely influenced by the pre-established scientific endeavors and principles of the Reformers. Therefore, Palmer is clearly extending out from the Reformers, and not from the Direct Method, possibly because he finds the Direct Method’s principle, to use the wording that he has his imagined reader use, “not an accomplished fact.”

*A difference in substance that also reflects the divide between “scientific” and “accidental” origins.*

Beyond the happenstance origins of the Direct Method, its substance too has been classified by many as unscientific or unexamined. As noted earlier, G. Cook (2010) contrasts the lack of science behind the Direct Method, as opposed to the Reform
Movement, observing that the Direct Method operates out of “assumptions” and “claims” that are made with “absolute certainty,” but that are “untested – and arguably untestable.” Ultimately, Cook characterizes this difference between the Reformed Method and the Direct as “academic” (Reformed Method) “versus commercial” (Direct Method). Cook returns to this important split between commercial and academic motivations often. In a similar vein, Lado (1964) considers the problematic science behind the Direct Method:

The direct method assumed that learning a foreign language is the same as learning the mother tongue, that is, that exposing the student directly to the foreign language impresses it perfectly upon his mind. This is true only up to a point, since the psychology of learning a second language differs from that of learning the first. (Lado 1964: 5)

Lado importantly mentions the role of psychology in learning a language, differentiating between first and second language use, which is reminiscent of, and stands in contrast to, Berlitz’s claim that his method is based on a psychological process where all language learning is based on the learning of the mother tongue.  

As well, Howatt and Widdowson (2004) touch upon the lack of rationale behind the philosophy of the Direct Method in their following assessment of it:

But the underlying philosophy [of the Direct Method] has remained constant. Learning how to speak a new language, it is held, is not a rational process which can be organized in a step-by-step manner following graded syllabuses of new points to learn, exercises and explanations. It is an intuitive process for which human beings have a natural capacity that can be awakened provided only that the proper conditions exist. Put simply, there are three such conditions: someone to talk to, something to talk about, and a desire to understand and make yourself understood. Interaction is at the heart of natural language acquisition, or conversation as Lambert Sauveur called it when he initiated a revival of interest.

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28 See also Butzkamm and Caldwell (2009) and Butzkamm and Butzkamm (1999). The former makes the case for allowing the mother tongue into foreign language pedagogy basing its argument in part on the psychological findings by the latter where the mother tongue is found to prepare a person for all future language study.
that led eventually to the Direct Method. (Howatt and Widdowson 2004: 210, italics in original.)

In other words, Howatt and Widdowson appear to imply that it would be fruitless to look for scientific inquiry within or guiding the Direct Method, as not “rational process” is claimed to underlie it. Interestingly, on the topic of “conversation” as it appears above, Howatt and Widdowson acknowledge that conversation appears to overlap with the goal of the Reformers, that the students begin to hear and speak the foreign language from the very first day. Yet, in contrast to the Direct Method’s belief in what one might call “conversation as a gateway interaction to language acquisition,” Howatt and Widdowson illustrate the very different philosophy of the Reformers concerning conversation, à la the Reformer and phonetician Henry Sweet:

> It is clear from this order of priorities that when Sweet talked about teaching the spoken language first, he did not mean what would be meant today. Spoken interaction, or conversation, was the end-point of classroom instruction, not its point of departure. (Howatt and Widdowson 2004: 205)

That is, the Reform treats speaking at first as the controlled production of sounds, with conversation being a graduation step for later; whereas the Direct Method bypasses the stage of learning controlled sound production and skips to confrontation with natural conversations from the beginning. Thus, the Direct Method can here again be seen as not just originating in, but also relying philosophically on human intuition and fortuitous accidents, for even armed with human intuition, one still needs the luck of encountering the right conversation. The Reformed Movement, in contrast, would appear to prefer relying on testable, and tested, principles.
In consideration of ignoring the differences between the Reform Movement and the
Direct Method based on their shared era of emergence: what then to do after the early
1900s when the Reform ends and the Direct Method continues?

Here I would add that, even given their differences, it is not necessarily incumbent on one
to make a strict decision about the two methods’ distinctness from one another in order to
reach valuable conclusions. That is, I assert that there is value to be gained for the
discussion at hand in both of the alternatives: either deciding that the Reformed Method
and the Direct Method are “the same” or that they are “not the same.” I will first explain
some ramifications of taking the former stance, for sameness.

If one emphasizes the Reformed Method and the Direct Method as similar phenomena
with negligible differences, then the simultaneous emergence of the two methods can be
seen as contributing to the historical fate of the Grammar Translation Method, whose
name and presence the two movements helped to build up. In this argument, the two
methods can be considered as a single or collective historical force operating in unison.
From this position, one can explain the historical trajectory of the GTM as follows: “The
GTM was to become eclipsed effectively by events and developments in the language
teaching of the late 1800s known variably as the Reform Movement and the Direct
Method.” Thus, if the only goal is an historical discussion about the fate of the GTM,
one might reasonably adopt the stance that the Reformed Method and the Direct Method
are similar and hence could work in unison.
Yet, taking the stance that the Reformed Method and the Direct Method are a collective historical force presents one with a quandary when one leaves the 1800s and enters the twentieth century. For the Reformed Method, as successful as it was, did not survive, in name at least, for more than a few decades. In fact, Doff (2008: 7) only puts the Reform Movement’s lifetime as “two decades,” and Howatt and Widdowson (2004: 188) count just “a period of about twenty years” (although they all maintain longer-lasting effects of the movement). And so the Reform ceased being able to make contributions under its own name anymore, either alone or collectively with the Direct Method. Part of this fate was determined by virtue of the method’s “reformative” nature, for once the Reform was implemented, there would no longer be the same need for reform, and and the name would automatically fall into disuse. Indeed, one wonders whether the Reformed Method might have survived in name if it had actually adopted a different moniker at the outset that was not so dependent on history, such as the “Phonetic Method” or “Applied Method.” At any rate, tracing the Reformed Method beyond approximately 1905 becomes a choice of tracing the Direct Method – which did survive in name – as a sort of umbrella under which the Reformed Method can be considered to continue to dwell, or of tracing relics of the Reformed Method’s characteristics as embodied in other ongoing, but differently named events.

Choosing the former route can appear to be a preservation, or extension, of the stance that the Reformed Method and the Direct Method are roughly the same phenomenon. For example, G. Cook (2010) appears to choose this route and posits that, after a certain time:
the ideas and practices of these two streams [the Reform and Berlitz], one academic and one commercial, merged to yield a strong and coherent new programme for language teaching which became known as the Direct Method. (G. Cook 2010: 7)

However, it seems unlikely that Viëtor, Jespersen, Sweet, and other Reformers would agree with Cook’s proposition that their ideas were “merge-able” with Berlitz or Gouin. Instead, Cook’s take may reflect both a noble motivation among himself and certain other supporters of the Reform to ascribe to the Reform a “strong and coherent,” lasting influence, while also a reticence to admit the fact that the Reform was in fact designed primarily for a particular moment, which ultimately turned out to be transitional. As Cook argues, the Reform may indeed have once been a collective force historically with the Direct Method, but the Reformed Method, once enacted, became essentially just an enlightened method of language teaching, without commercial motivations to preserve its own name. Preserving the Reformed name for the long-term would actually be illogical. If, as an academic exercise, one were to take Cook’s route as well – i.e., that eventually the Direct Method represents also the Reformed Method – then perhaps one might find a more suitable concept than “merger,” as if both movements agreed to their union. Rather, it appears that any conveniently shared or usable aspects of the Reformed Method might have become also used by the longer-lasting, more “successful” Direct Method with our credit. (With “success,” I refer to the Direct Method’s popularity, and not necessarily its effectiveness, since, of course, the “success” of a method in language teaching is open to interpretation.) That is, whereas, as formerly mentioned, the Reformed Method did find its way into schools via such figures as Klinghardt, and whereas the Reform had repercussions all over Europe (see Doff 2008), nonetheless it was the Direct Method that was adopted by a majority margin and ultimately had staying
power. As evidence for the quick dominance of the Direct Method, Krause (1916) makes note of the method’s overwhelming success in France as early as 1902:

In no country has the direct method held more absolute sway than in France, since the first of January, 1902, when all modern language teachers there had to make the foreign language the strict medium of instruction. In 1908, the Minister of Public Instruction in France reported upon the highly gratifying success and the results achieved with the radical direct method. To cap the climax: on May 14, 1912, the direct-method advocates gained a signal victory over their adversaries by electing their champion, M. Paul Schlienger, Representative to the Conseil Supérieur de l’Instruction Publique, by a snug majority. A few sentences from M. Schlienger’s circular to his colleagues, prior to the election, may be of interest; cf. Die Neueren Sprachen, October, 1912. He says, among other things, the following which I trust will find an echo in our country:

“I am a sincere believer in the direct method which has vivified and regenerated our instruction. The results that we have obtained have furthermore shown themselves so clearly that at present all, even the old-time opponents, make use of that method which is called the direct, inductive, or practical method. If, so far as I am concerned, this method is intangible in its principle, still I think that it is and always will be capable of new enrichment and of continued improvement; it ought to constitute a frame in the limits of which it will be permissible for any individual initiative to display freedom.” (Krause 1916: 68)

Krause also quotes here one M. Paul Schlienger, whose mention here of the Direct Method’s “intangible principle” is also of significance regarding the earlier discussion of the unprincipled or unscientific origins of the Direct Method. This lack of clear principle does not appear to be have been held against the Direct Method by Schlienger or the French school system.

Stressing the differences between the Reform Movement and the Direct Method as a more useful choice.

In summary, the route of regarding the Direct Method as a sort of vessel in which the Reformed Method also remains hidden, yet contained, leads in essence to observing the
Direct Method alone, as a single historical force, especially after approximately 1905; and although this observation can appear to hold, it requires the assumption that the Reformed Method truly sacrificed both its name and substance to the Direct Method, or that it truly became synonymous with the Direct Method. But, as observed earlier, the Reform Movement is seen by many as a clear precursor to today’s field of applied linguistics, and it is also seen as a forerunner of the fields English as a foreign language and Corpus Studies. It seems therefore to be more suitable to view the Reformed Method and the Direct Method as disparate, and consider that the relics of the Reformed Method live on in differently named approaches. This view represents a further historical interpretation beyond the one explored above, which wholly places the Reformed Method onto the same trajectory as the Direct Method. Instead, seen as its own independent, but unnamed, force, the Reformed Method now can be viewed as only having temporarily shared a path with the Direct Method, but never as having been the same as – or as having merged with – the Direct Method. One might imagine the two methods as eventually diverging via a fork in the path on which they had once, by chance, been travelling together; or one might also think of a complex roadway system, where the Reformed Method and the Direct Method are differently numbered routes that sometimes share the same stretch of road, although they ultimately have their own, very distinct destinations.
In conclusion on the differentiation of the Reform Movement and the Direct Method from each other.

I conclude that there are arguable similarities but also differences between the Reformed Method and Direct Method, and depending on how one stresses these relationships, different conclusions arise. I surmise that stressing the methods’ differences leads to more usable conclusions – conclusions concerning their different origins (e.g., Reform as scientific or Direct Method haphazard), conclusions concerning their differently manifested emphasis on the primacy of speech (e.g., speech in the Reform as the controlled production of sounds with carefully graded interaction, or speech in the Direct Method as unfettered conversation), conclusions concerning their different milieus (e.g., an academic Reform or a commercial Direct Method), and also conclusions concerning their different legacies (e.g., the Reform’s contributing to the renovation of the GTM-tradition and the foundation of new fields of study, or the Direct Method’s contributing to the same renovation of the GTM-tradition while also contributing to the demise of a historically competing methodology, the Reform). The usefulness that I assert in consideration of these conclusions obtains in their leading to yet another useful conclusion, one tied to the fate of translation.
In conclusion on the fate of translation as a result of the Reform Movement and the Direct Method.

I conclude additionally then that the Reformed Method contributed less to the problematic status of translation today than the Direct Method did. For although the Reform problematizes translation, it still retains a vestige of translation that, although not typically emphasized, was still part of the methods of the Prussians’ tradition: oral translation into the mother tongue. By contrast, the Direct Method as seen in Gouin and Berlitz denounces and abandons all traditional translation. (The only translation “left” in the Direct Method is actually a new understanding of translation independent of the GTM: Gouin’s translation of individuality into language). Arguably, the Reform to a degree enabled the Direct Movement to abandon translation so strongly, for the Reform does question and scrutinize translation repeatedly; and arguably both movements can be seen adhering somewhat blindly to a belief that “translation” is really only ever applicable to the translation of texts across languages (although, again, Gouin offers one alternative here). Nonetheless, even though the Reform finds little or no value in written, GTM-style translation into the foreign language, the Reform never summarily bans the practice, leaving its assessment as a warning.

The Direct Method lives on in Communicative Language Teaching.

The exclusionism of the Direct Method towards translation is still often proffered by the method that dominates language teaching today, Communicative Language Teaching
(CLT). CLT is, for many who have examined it alongside the Direct Method, a near replica of it. G. Cook says:

As such, my use of the term ‘Direct Method’ embraces much more than these early methods developed just before and just after the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, but extends to include almost all major methods and approaches initiated since, including major approaches such as graded structures, situational teaching, audiolingualism, communicative language teaching, task-based instruction, lexical syllabuses, and so forth, as well as some – but not all – alternative ‘ways’ of the 1970s (Stevick 1981) such as the Silent Way and Total Physical Response. All of these apparently disparate approaches and methods are, in my terms, Direct Method in the sense that they use neither translation nor first-language explanation. (G. Cook 2010: 7, quotation marks in original)

One may note from earlier that Malmkjær (1998: 4) similarly lumps together the “Natural Method, Conversation Method, Direct Method, Communicative Approach, etc.” Additionally, one can find evidence that CLT coincides significantly with the Direct Method if one considers the list of characterizations of CLT that Wesche and Skehan (2002) offer:

- Activities that require frequent interaction among learners or with other interlocutors to exchange information and solve problems.

- Use of authentic (nonpedagogic) texts and communication activities linked to “real-world” contexts, often emphasizing links across written and spoken modes and channels.

- Approaches that are learner centered in that they take into account learners’ backgrounds, language needs, and goals and generally allow learners some creativity and role in instructional decisions. (Wesche and Skehan 2002: 208, quotation marks in original)

Concerning the first item in the above list, Direct Method contributors such as Sauveur, Gouin, and Berlitz, as noted earlier, also emphasize interaction and conversation. As for the second item, one might be reminded of the most possibly authentic and “real-world” contextual element that the Direct Method venerates: the native speaker of the foreign language as the ideal teacher, or at least a teacher who never speaks the mother tongue to
the teacher, appearing as a “real-world,” native speaker. That is, the native speaker
teacher does not just “emphasize,” but rather *embodies* “links across written and spoken
modes and channels.” One might think back as well to the founding of the Berlitz
method, where Berlitz requested that his native speaker teaching assistant, Joly, use “non-
pedagogic” (traditionally speaking) gesticulations and acting in order to explain the “real
world.” Finally, in reference to the last item above, one might consider the earlier
citation from Howatt (1982: 5), who finds that the Direct Method “implied a significant
change in the social relationships of teachers and pupils, a move towards egalitarian
‘matiness’” – that is, the Direct Method, too, is noted as giving students a “role in
instruction.”

Earlier in this dissertation as well, I showed attitudes in CLT that are similar to ones in
the Direct Method. For example, the practitioners of CLT today, as staunch opponents of
the Grammar Translation Method, dismiss the GTM with short-shrift definitions and
second-hand lists, demonstrating their own form of “absolute certainty,” in unison with
the style of Berlitz that G. Cook notes. It is because the Direct Method’s methodological
tenets and its attitudes to the past still live on today in CLT that I assert not only that it
was the Direct Method that dealt the GTM a final death blow, but also that the Direct
Method holds the responsibility for the ultimate banning of translation. I wish here to
make express acknowledgement of G. Cook, whose recent book confirmed many of the
intuitions I express in this paragraph. As specifically significant in Cook’s treatment of
the Direct Method, I would mention his use of the phrases “absolute certainty” and
“absolute confidence,” his breakdown of the “four pillars of the Direct Method” into four
“assumptions,” and also his recurring observations about the effects of the commercial market on language teaching methodologies. Here is one example of the last item, with which I close this chapter:

The Reform Movement had developed its ideas with reference to secondary school teaching. The impetus for the new developments, however, was a new market of adult language learners outside the regular education system: immigrants to the USA, traders, and tourists in Europe. Both [sic] groups needed to learn a language fast and for very functional reasons: to survive and prosper in their new homeland, or to do business and cope with the communicative demands of travel. It was to cater to this market that a new type of language learning establishment appeared: private language schools. Most notable among them were the Berlitz Schools, named after their founder Maximilian Berlitz. Established in the USA in 1882 [sic], the schools rapidly expanded both there and in Europe. By the end of the century there were 16 in the USA and 30 in Europe, teaching at first a variety of European languages, but increasingly concentrating on English. It is in the ideas put into practice in these schools, the so-called ‘Berlitz Method’, that we find the first true hard-line rejection of translation. (G. Cook 2010: 6, quotation marks in original)

Cook suggests here that commercial factors might have played a significant role in the rejection of translation. Indeed, considering that translation would likely be associated with the GTM in Berlitz’s day, and therefore also with both inadequacies and long and elaborate exercises (requiring hard work), it might not be so surprising that banning translation would sell well. If Berlitz were advertising a successful approach with minimal effort, then it is understandable that busy immigrants and traders, as well as prospective tourists – all of whom might not have had the time, ability, or interest to register for language courses with a public institute or school – could be attracted to a method that looked and felt so different from the arduous, even painful, GTM of old. Translation is not an effortless exercise, regardless of whether it achieves its alleged GTM purpose of demonstrating a person’s knowledge of a language, and effort is not always the human path of choice. Concerning the “hard-line rejection of translation” that
Cook mentions, I therefore ask if it might not also be, metaphorically, a rejection also of hard work that Berlitz, or the Direct Method generally, is tacitly promoting by rejecting translation. In the next chapter, I will posit a novel definition of translation that is not so tied to the GTM (although it also notably does not entail translation as an effortless activity). Such a definition of translation might have been useful for the Reformers and for the creators of the Direct Method to consider, before the former problematized translation and the latter banned it.
CONCLUSION

Formulating a Novel Definition of Translation, Unbound from the Grammar Translation Method.

*Etymologically, “translate” and “übersetzen” imply movement.*

In formulating a definition of the translation of texts, I will begin with a look at the word “translate.” The roots of the word “translate” suggest a sort of movement when one breaks down the word into its component parts: “trans-” (Latin: “across”) and “-late” (Latin: infinitive *ferre* “carry, bear”; past participle, *latus*). That is, “translation” implies a space or field, across which a carrying occurs. The entailments include a necessary definition of that field (Where?) and an identification of the matter that is “carrying” (or being carried) across it (What?). Translation as an instance of movement is also attested to by the conventional prepositions of motion that are normally used with the term “translate”: “out of,” “from,” “to,” and “into.” These prepositions serve to define more specific areas of the field across which the matter carries. It is also important to note the movement inherent to the German word for “translate” (“übersetzen”). That is, “über” means “across” and “setzen” means “to place, put, set.” Thus, “übersetzen,” like “translate,” also implies a field across which a placing or putting occurs.29 As I observed earlier, another German word “übertragen” can also denote translating. Accordingly, movement also obtains, as “tragen” means “to bear or carry.” Therefore “übertragen”

29 Depending on the stress, there are actually two different forms of the word “übersetzen”: when the syllable “setz” is stressed, the verb means to translate from one language to another; when the prefix “über” is stressed, it means to carry something across, in a tangible sense, as in to ferry a person over a river.
also implies a carrying motion across a field. As with the word “translate” in English, German uses prepositions of motion with “übersetzen” and “übertragen” – “aus,” (“out of, from”) “von,” (“from”) and “in” (“to, into”). German additionally has two adverbial particles that are commonly used as prefixes to verbs of motion: “hin” (“away from”) and “her” (“from away or afar”). These prefixes can be attached to the verb “übersetzen,” although it is not a common practice for this verb. The verb “hinübersetzen” has an added element of meaning, describing physical movement in a direction going away from the speaker, as if “translating away from oneself,” and it correspondingly refers to translation out of the mother tongue into the foreign language. The prefix “her” in “herübersetzen” indicates physical movement in a direction going towards the speaker, “translating towards or at oneself.” “Herübersetzen” therefore means translation from the foreign language into the mother tongue. Viëtor uses these adverbial prefixes of motion for the verb “übersetzen” in two instances\(^\text{30}\), but otherwise uses prepositional phrases for indicating the directionality of translation.

“Carrying across” is not what people generally say when they mean “translation.”

Notably, “carry across from” and “carry across to” are not used generally as synonyms for “translate from” and “translate to.” That is, people choose to say “translate” in specific instances where “carry across” would potentially fit, but nonetheless it is not selected because it is not idiomatic in English. The converse is also true: when one uses “translate” it is not necessarily a context where one could alternatively use “carry across.”

\(^{30}\) “Hinübersetzen” is found once in Viëtor’s lecture on grammar and translation (1902: 18). “Hin”-Übersetzung, and “Her”-Übersetzung are each used once in his treatise (1905: 52).
This choice – in specific instances to say specifically the term “translate” – speaks to Wittgenstein’s famous quote on the meaning of a word:


The meaning of a word is its use in the language. (My transl.)

Guided by this principle of use-as-meaning, I thus propose to examine the use of the word “translate” in several contexts, in an effort to elucidate its meaning. That is, I will examine contexts where people conventionally choose to say the word “translate,” even when perhaps other options for expressing motion would be available. Additionally, I will explore whether various uses of the word “translation” indeed speak to the carrying of a What? across a field Where?

Physics and geometry offer basic, yet idealized definitions of translation in the physical world.

Arguably the most concrete uses of the word “translation” are found in the fields of physics and geometry. Whittaker (1917) offers the following description in physics for the use of the term “translation” as a “displacement”:

If a rigid body is moved from one position to another, … and if the lines joining the initial and final points of each of the points of the body are a set of parallel straight lines of length \( \ell \), so that the orientation of the body in space is unaltered, the displacement is called a translation parallel to the direction of the lines, through a distance \( \ell \). (Whittaker 1917: 1, italics in original)

Notably, movement is a feature of Whittaker’s definition of translation. The rigid body that moves is said to undergo a “displacement,” reminiscent of the placing motion in the “setzen” (“to place, put, set”) of “übersetzen.” Prepositions of motion are also used for
describing the body’s path, rather generically “from one position to another.” As well, the definition details a linear pathway. The field for the movement is described as generic “space.” There is a carrying motion across a field in this definition, which might be reduced to: A rigid body carries, or is carried, in a line across space. In offering generic “space” as the field of translation (the Where?), this definition seems to focus most of our attention on the What? – in this case, the rigid body.

Osgood and Caspar (1921) also use the word “displacement” to describe “translation” in geometry, providing the tangible example of a window pane:

> By a translation of a plane region \( S \) is meant a displacement of \( S \) whereby each point of \( S \) is carried in a given fixed direction by one and the same given distance. Thus, when a window is raised, a pane of glass in the window experiences a translation. (Osgood and Caspar 1921: 330, italics in original)

This is essentially the same definition as in physics, where the rigid body is a plane. Movement is again fundamental to the idea of translation here, and it is even expressed by the word “carried,” speaking to the root “-late” in “translate.” This definition does not even name the field for the movement, but it appears to be space. Translation can here again be described as the carrying of a What? over a Where? – a plane carries, or is carried across space. As well, the What? seems to be the focus, since the Where? is not even named.

Finally, the “Math is Fun” website distills the geometric definition of translation even further:
In Geometry “Translation” simply means Moving … without rotating, resizing or anything else, just moving. To translate a shape:

Every point of the shape must move:
- the same distance
- in the same direction.
(from http://www.mathsisfun.com/geometry/translation.html, quotation marks in original)

Here, the “displacement” of a body or plane in the above definitions has been replaced with the “moving” of a “shape.” The shape’s movement appears to be again generically in space, for the field (Where?) is not named. Attention is therefore again focused on the What? (the shape). This translation therefore represents the movement of a shape across space.

Notably, all of the above three definitions of translation treat physical objects. Interestingly, “carrying across” could indeed be a foreseeable synonym for translation in these definitions. Consider: “A rigid body is carried across space.” That “carry across” obtains appears to be related to the tangible nature of a rigid body, a plane (or window pane), and a shape.

Also notable is that none of these three definitions addresses any change to the physical object being translated. Theoretically, parallel lines can be drawn joining all points of the body from its initial to its final position. The implication is that the body still has all its same original points, that its content and substance have not changed; yet all movement entails change.
As well, it is significant that none of these three definitions treats time. Technically, all objects are always translating across time – aging. Time does not seem relevant to these definitions, and is in a sense ignored. Consider that, in the translation of a rigid body, the definition maintains an unaltered orientation of the body in space from its initial to final position, proved by drawing parallel lines that join each point on the body in its final position to the same point on the body in its initial position. Yet, time’s passing prevents the rigid body from still being in its initial position after its translation.

As such, the definition is an ideal, only achievable “on paper” as a formula. In the real world, the definition still functions, even though the above definitions act as if the body or shape is the same body or shape that it was before the translation, unaffected by its transfer, or displacement, across space and time. The “point” of these definitions of translation in physics and geometry appears to be to consider the translating object as a constant, acting as if it does not change, rather than to track the unavoidable changes that occur to moving entities. The definition of “translation” in physics and geometry might therefore be summarized as: the movement of a body across space where the resultant changes on the body are either imperceptible or irrelevant.

*The use of the term “translate” in the Church.*

In the Church, “translation” denotes either the transfer of a bishop to another diocese, or the transfer of a saint’s remains to a new location. The field across which these entities are transferred again appears to be generic space. As such, in ecclesiastical translation, a
bishop or a saint’s relics carry, or are carried, across space. The lack of a more well-defined field again forces focus on the What? here.

Notably, a bishop and a saint’s relics are physical entities, and here again, the alternative locution “carry across” might technically be usable. However, the greater implied distance of travel, as well as the nature of the physical objects here, would seem to exclude regular use of “carrying a bishop across space to a new diocese, or a saint’s relics to a new location.”

As physical entities, the What? here are also considered to be constants. That is, the changes to the bishop or to the relics that result from their being moved are not addressed. It is presumed that the bishop remains the same bishop and the relics the same relics. Aging too is not addressed. As such, this use of translation is very similar to the use of the term in physics and geometry.

*Translation in biochemistry.*

In biochemistry, “translation” refers to the conversion of messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) into an amino acid polypeptide (or protein). The mRNA is made up of nucleotides and the protein is made up of amino acids. The conversion occurs in physical space along a ribosome, but this use of the term “translation” appears to make use of a different field from “space.” Instead of space, biochemical translation refers to a field defined as the genetic code. In this field are two distinct subfields: nucleotide code and
amino acid code. Genetic information is the What? – or the “body” – that moves across these subfields in the genetic code. The subfields can also be looked at as independent fields. Thus, biochemical translation is the movement of genetic information across – or rather between – genetic sub-codes: the code of nucleotides and the code of amino acids. Now that the factors have become conceptual, “carrying across” becomes less logical, which is perhaps how “translation” might be seen as different from “carrying across” – that is, “carrying across” seems to be more natural for physical objects, as opposed to concepts like genetic information and a genetic code. There is a physical manifestation of biochemical translation in the actual mRNA and protein molecules, but here their small size makes “carrying across” an unlikely synonym for “translating” them. The translation in biochemistry arguably speaks more to the concepts of genetic information and a genetic code, i.e., they are not physical objects.

That biochemical translation is a movement between fields, as opposed to across one field, is significant. As noted, in biochemical translation, the “body” that begins its movement as a piece of mRNA, in nucleotide code, gets converted into a body that is now a protein, in amino acid code. This conversion appears to be the result of the translating body’s crossing over to a new field. The conversion of the molecule is able to be tested and confirmed physically in a laboratory, while it is also confirmed by the new name that the genetic information has (i.e., the “nucleic acid” is now a “protein”). The conversion could also be proved by the use of parallel lines drawn to join the protein back to the mRNA – they would not match, and the lack of a match would indicate a conversion. In contrast to translation as used in the contexts of physics, geometry, and
the Church, biochemical translation appears to focus our attention on the great changes to
the body that is translated. This shift in focus appears to be the result of the presence of
two distinct fields.

An interesting aspect about “conversion” is that there is a feature in conversion of “no
going back” to the original state, which is also confirmed by the lack of ability to draw
any pathway of parallel lines from the points of a converted object’s end position back to
the points of its original position when it was not yet converted. The body will have
changed so much that no points on the converted body will match the points on the
original body. This aspect of irreversible change stands in stark contrast to the definition
of “translation” in physics and geometry, where, for example, the translation of a window
pane when a window is opened implies its reversibility by simply closing the window.
Yet, even though converted into a protein, the genetic information is assumed to be as
much a constant as the window pane. Returning to the summary of the physics and
geometry definitions above, one might now formulate “translation” as: the movement of
a body across a field, or between two fields, where the resultant changes on the body can
amount to its outright conversion in form.

Time and aging, although they also represent changes occurring to the mRNA and the
protein, are not addressed by the concept of “translation” in biochemistry.
Translation in sociology.

Another use of the word “translation” occurs in sociology. Callon (1986) offers the term “sociology of translation” where the translation field is now people (either individuals or groups), and the entity being translated across the field is power. In reporting on a failed attempt to instill more replenishable scallop fishing practices among the inhabitants of a village in France, Callon (1968: 196-197) breaks down the “power relationships” being translated across people and across groups of people into four “moments of translation”: problematisation, ... interessement, ... enrolment, ... mobilization.

(Callon uses the above spellings.) The use of different names for the moments of sociological translation indicates that power is being converted into a new entity with each movement. This conversion can be explained by consideration of the fact that each new individual or group to whom the power translates represents a new field. Thus, translation in sociology is the carrying of power across people, where the fact that each new individual or group is a new field entails that the power is converted into a newly worded concept. “Carrying across” might be acceptable to use in place of “translation” here. Conceivably, people can “carry” power, even though it is not a physical object.

Time appears to plays a role in sociological translation. Since the field is people – i.e., living, growing organisms – they are always changing over time. This inconstant field means that timing actually becomes a factor in the sociology of translation affecting the outcome of the translational act. Indeed, Callon details often in the study about which he
reports the crucial role of timing in translating power successfully, so as to encourage a seashore community to adopt new fishing practices.

*The translation of texts.*

Finally, of course, the use of the term “translation” as it has been used for the bulk of this dissertation, that is, the translation of texts across languages, requires consideration. Before analyzing two guiding definitions of the translation of texts, some introductory observations are included here about the translation of texts vis-à-vis the concept of a body (What?) moving across a field (Where?). It would appear that in the translation of texts, the body that is moving is the text, and the field across which it is carried or moved is language. More specifically, the text can be said to be carried between two fields, or languages. For the translation of a text, the term “carrying across” appears to be a plausible recasting of the movement. Although one may not so often speak of “carrying a text,” one can imagine carrying across “meaning,” “significance,” “a history,” and other words that might be used to describe a text or aspects of a text. In the translation of texts, the precise definitions of these What? and Where? components – “text” and “language” – become critical, for they are both conceptual (like the “power” above in sociological translation) and not as defined as a rigid body or a bishop. In essence, they are subjective, and not always easily identifiable.

“Conversion” is also a significant aspect to the translation of texts, seemingly resulting from the two distinct fields between which the text moves: language A and language B.
The conversion of a text into a new language is much like the conversion of genetic information from the genetic code of nucleotides into the code of amino acids in biochemical translation. Practice also confirms that it is typically infeasible to render an original text back from its translation, underscoring the fact that a text undergoes conversion when translated. Similarly, it is nearly impossible to convert a protein back to mRNA. Yet, the genetic information, like the text, is assumed to remain a constant in any of its translated incarnations or conversions.

Time would appear to be a potential factor in translating texts. One can even imagine time as a field that is as relevant as the field of language in the translation of texts. That is, a text’s translation could be seen as the movement of that text across eras. The translation of texts even appears to be performable across two entirely different systems of fields, almost as if two translations occur simultaneously. Consider the possibility of translating a text simultaneously both across languages and across time.

In preliminary summary, a definition of the “translation of texts” would surely need to address the fundamental questions of what a text is and what language is. A definition of the translation of texts would likely also have to address the possibility of a conversion of the text’s form, while also addressing the constancy of the text underneath the form. I will now consider two definitions of the translation of texts as offered in Translation Studies, one formulated by Catford and the other by Jakobson.
Catford’s definition of the translation of texts.

One of the most influential definitions of “translation” within the field of Translation Studies is from Catford (1965), where “SL” is “Source Language” and “TL” “Target Language”:

*Translation* may be defined as follows:
the replacement of textual material in one language (SL) by equivalent textual material in another language (TL). (Catford 1965: 20, italics in original)

Catford’s use of “replacement” is a good piece of evidence linking the translation of texts to the translation of objects; for in the definitions in physics and geometry the term “displacement” is roughly equivalent to the phenomenon of “replacement.” There appears to be no fundamental difference between Catford’s phrase “the replacement of textual material … by equivalent material” and “the displacement of textual material … by equivalent material.” The use of vocabulary containing “placing” action also speaks to the inherent motion involved in the translation of texts. Returning to the template of a body’s motion across a field is somewhat problematic here: Catford’s definition of translation suggests that the body is here “textual material,” but he actually mentions two distinct fields – the “source language” and the “target language.” Since Catford illustrates translation across two fields, a conversion is implied. This conversion appears to be inherent in Catford’s word “equivalent” – i.e., not a reproduction or copy. The “equivalent textual material” that Catford mentions would not appear to be conveniently pre-existing material that could be found and used by a translator to replace the source text. Instead, Catford appears to imply that a translator must create this equivalent textual material, therefore entailing a process of deciding what would be appropriate equivalent
material to create as a replacement for the source text. This implies in turn that the
source text will indeed be “made into” or “converted into” material that represents an
equivalent. Catford notably leaves “equivalent” undefined. His use of the terms “textual
material” and “language” without further definition of those terms is also significant. It
appears that Catford has endeavored to offer a functional definition that, without every
component part being explicitly defined, acknowledges the subjective forces in the real-
world practice of the translation of texts. In fact, his important terms – “language,”
“textual material,” and “equivalency” – are not actually definable, but rather result only
from a reader’s subjective analysis and choice. The success and productivity of Catford’s
definition may actually be a result of its nonspecificity. His definition remains widely
applicable to most any instance of a text being translated, as long as the text’s recipient
(the translator or reader) is able to describe meaningfully the particular “textual material,”
“languages,” and “equivalency” involved in any particular translation event. Ultimately,
Catford’s definition of the translation of texts therefore speaks to the movement of a body
– textual material – across two distinct fields – source language and target language –
with an identifiable conversion resulting from this crossing of fields (source language
converted to target language). The conversion of language, a surface form, results
nonetheless in an equivalency, suggesting perhaps a deeper constant to texts beyond their
surface form.
Jakobson’s tripartite definition of the translation of texts.

Jakobson’s seminal article *On Linguistic Aspects of Translation* (1959) offers a typology of translation that is still commonly used in Translation Studies today, especially in discussions of the definition of “translation.” Per Jakobson, “translation” is broken down into three types:

1) Intralingual translation or *rewording* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language.

2) Interlingual translation or *translation proper* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language.

3) Intersemiotic translation or *transmutation* is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems. (Jakobson 1959: 233, italics in original.)

Jakobson seems to leave out any overt references to movement, but it may be found etymologically in the word “interpretation” (as “a taking between or among”). An interpretation interestingly also implies a conversion. As this word is common to all three of Jakobson’s categories, it will be useful to let the word “interpretation” function as another word for “movement” in Jakobson’s definitions.

As for the body that moves and its field of movement, Jakobson defaults to the terms “verbal signs,” for the former, and “language” or “system,” for the latter. That is, instead of “textual material,” as Catford casts it, Jakobson identifies the translatable content of a text not as material, but as signs. This represents a nuanced difference in their respective ideas of what a “text” is. Catford and Jakobson both use the word “language” for describing the field over which they see their textual material, or signs, moving. But
Jakobson seems to associate “language” intrinsically with words (“verbal signs”), whereas Catford does not specify what a “language” is. Jakobson’s association of verbal content with a “language” is underscored in his definition of intersemiotic translation, where it appears that a hypothetical “nonverbal language” would not exist for Jakobson. Rather, Jakobson chooses to use the term “nonverbal sign system,” instead of “language,” if the signs within that system are not specifically verbal ones. Thus, for Jakobson, a text would be made up of “verbal signs” that reside in a “system” of verbal signage, which system is called a “language.” Jakobson implies that all systems that have signs can be differentiated by whether those signs are verbal or nonverbal, and therefore the only systems that he leaves untreated would be hypothetical systems without any signs at all. It is evident in both Jakobson’s and Catford’s definitions that the understanding of the translation of texts is marked by subjective definitions of such fundamental elements as the nature of the body moving – as a “text,” “text material,” “verbal signs,” or just “signs” – and of the field – as a “language” or “nonverbal sign system.”

Another important aspect to note in Jakobson’s tripartite division of translation is that he manages to encompass a wide range of concepts for the field, or fields, across which translational motion, or “interpretation,” can occur. In Jakobson’s “translation proper,” or “interlingual translation,” he mentions two verbal sign systems, or “languages,” that could each be seen as separate fields, similar to Catford’s “source language” and “target language.” The fact that two fields are again at play implies that an conversion will occur when the interpretation of verbal signs is performed across these fields. Yet, Jakobson’s definition of interlingual translation does not attest to the idea that crossing over two
fields necessarily entails a conversion to the text, or verbal signs, beyond his acknowledgement that the interpretation of the verbal signs will be accomplished by some “other” language. Jakobson’s definition suggests, then, that the use of another language would also make the verbal signs “other,” or “converted.” Yet, he does not go on to specify, as Catford does, that this “other” language might be expected to produce “other,” converted verbal signs that then amount to what Catford calls “equivalent textual material.” Nonetheless, Jakobson eventually confronts issues of equivalency with interlingual translation – not saliently in his definition, but throughout the bulk of his article. He begins his article with the interlingual example of whether “cottage cheese” is really equal to a “cheese” for a Russian speaker. Another later example is Jakobson’s treatment of the question of how to translate a noun across languages that use different genders for that noun.

In Jakobson’s “intralingual translation,” the entire field is now composed only of one language. This means that the sub-fields within that field, across which the verbal signs are translated, may not have the same systems for nomenclature or delimiting that are found in the greater field in which they reside. Instead of conventional field-level categories like “English” or “German” (or even “source language” and “target language”), that obtain in interlingual translation, Jakobson implies in “intralingual translation” a more focused differentiation of sub-fields all within one conventional language. One might postulate that such intralingual sub-fields could be represented by such intralingual conventions as “register” and “jargon,” but Jakobson does not address these sub-fields’ identity in his definition. Later, on the same page, Jakobson offers the
use of “synonyms” and “circumlocution” as examples of intralingual translation, as well, of course, as the example of “rewording” in his definition, but neglects to address more precisely the exact nature of the sub-field in a language where one word would reside and the corresponding sub-field in that same language where its rewording, synonym or circumlocution might dwell.

Finally, in his category of intersemiotic translation, Jakobson implies yet another cross-wise movement available to verbal signs that are being translated: neither across a single field as he describes in the phenomenon of intralingual translation, nor even across two separate fields both of which are nonetheless “languages” as in interlingual translation, but rather, from one “language” field to one “nonverbal sign system” field. During a discussion of the translation of poetry near his article’s end, he only offers one brief set of possible intersemiotic examples of translation: “from verbal art into music, dance, cinema, or painting.” (1959: 238) Jakobson only describes the movement of signs from a verbal sign system into a non-verbal one as intersemiotic translation. He does not specifically treat the other intersemiotic direction, i.e., verbal art from music, dance, etc., but conceivably he might also call such an interpretation an intersemiotic translation. He also does not specifically treat the intersemiotic translation of nonverbal texts across two nonverbal sign systems – for example, the translation of a painting into music. Jakobson also notably uses the word “transmutation” as a synonym for intersemiotic translation. This suggests, at least etymologically (i.e., “change across,” cf. “mutate,” and Latin “mutare;” – “to change”), that he means to stress the change that is always an inherent result from any movement, i.e., from translation generally, but that also, as noted above,
is marked by being a conversion when the translation, as in intersemiotic translation, occurs across two distinct fields. As such, it appears that Jakobson means “transmutation” as synonym for “conversion,” expressing that interpreted signs may in fact change so much of their original character, or body, during intersemiotic translation, that they undergo an irreversible change. Jakobson’s understanding of intersemiotic translation therefore seems to express for Jakobson both the most extreme type of change a verbal sign can undergo due to its movement (i.e., “transmutation”), as well as an example of the most extreme cross-field movement for a text, in which a verbal sign moves from a “verbal sign system” to a “nonverbal” one in the process of intersemiotic translation, rather than simply moving across fields that are both still “languages.”

In summary, I argue that Jakobson’s definition of translating texts is another expression of a body’s movement across a field or fields. For Jakobson, the body that moves is now a sign, its movement is now called an interpretation, and this interpretation is performed across a system – or systems – of signs. For a sign’s interpretation across languages (“interlingual translation”), and for its interpretation across fields within a language (“intralingual translation”), Jakobson refers to the system of language as a “verbal system.” According to Jakobson, “intersemiotic translation” involves the sign being interpreted from a language’s verbal system into an unspecified, “non-verbal” system. Jakobson uses the word “rewording” as a synonym for intralingual translation, illustrating by the examples of “synonyms” and “circumlocution” as some examples; and for intersemiotic translation, he offers the synonym “transmutation” which I argue is an
equivalent to the “conversion” seen in the biochemical and sociological definitions of translation.

**Summarizing translation.**

I assert that translation can indeed be defined as the movement of a body across a field, and that this definition can be applied productively to the use of the term “translation” in various subjects:

- The *body* may be a physical object such as a rigid body, a geometrical plane, a bishop, the relics of a saint, or a nucleotide like mRNA; or the body may be an abstract concept such as power, a sign, textual material, etc.

- The *field* across which the body moves may be the physical field of the real world, i.e., space and time, or it may instead be a conceptual field, such as a social grouping of people, a language, or a system.

- The *movement* may be described more specifically with such terms as displacement, replacement, or interpretation. The movement of a body across two fields is also classifiable as a translation, and appears to lead to an outright conversion of the body.

Regarding the translation of texts specifically, the important factors to keep track of are the fields across which the text moves – one language, two languages, or a language and a non-lingual system – and what exactly the nature of the “text” is. Catford does not specify what he means by “textual material,” and Jakobson refers to text as “verbal signs.” I suggested in my preliminary discussion to the translation of texts that “a text” might also be understood by such terms as “meaning,” “significance,” and “a history.
In formulating a new definition of the translation of texts it is useful to refer to the model of a body moving across a field. I would organize my definition around these elements: the “body” as a text’s “meaning,” the “field” as “system.” Thus, I posit the following definition.

**Definition:**
The translation of a text is the moving of the text’s meaning across a system or systems, where the text remains a constant despite apparent and often quite striking changes to it.

**Corollaries:**
1) Meaning is not a constant.
2) Movement necessarily entails an inherent *change*. The translation of texts, like the translation of objects in the physical world, can never occur without a change to a text’s meaning.
3) As when physical objects move between two distinct fields, the translation of texts also entails a potential conversion of the text’s meaning. This conversion is irreversible and may even also entail that the translated text is not recognizable as a product of translation.
Applying this definition of the translation of texts, as well as opinions in Translation Studies, to a key statement about translation made by Viëtor.

Viëtor problematizes the use of translation as a method of language instruction by asserting that translation into the mother tongue may have a place in his methodology, whereas translation into the foreign language is too difficult for most students:

Den Wert einer guten Übersetzung in die Muttersprache leugne ich deshalb nicht. ... Mit dem Übersetzen in die fremde Sprache ist es ein anderes Ding. Es ist eine Aufgabe, die nach meiner Erfahrung über die Kräfte mindestens der Schüler, auch auf der Oberstufe, hinausgeht. (Viëtor 1905: 49-50)

I therefore do not deny the value of a good translation into the mother tongue. ... Translating into the foreign language is a different thing. In my experience it is a task that goes beyond the powers at least of the young students, also even of those in the upper level. (My transl.)

As I noted earlier, Viëtor addresses here a classic area of concern for critics of the GTM: that translation into the foreign language may not be an appropriate activity for language students. Meidinger, Seidenstücker, Ahn, and Ploetz also seemed cognizant of the difficulty represented by this direction of translation represents, when they were observed manipulating the word order of texts in their mother tongue, German, in what appeared to be an effort to ease the translation of them into French. Viëtor’s concern about the difficulty and utility of translation into the foreign language is primarily in reference to interlingual translation. Viëtor elaborates on this with the following, which I would like to examine further:

Bedenken wir doch, wie schwer es uns ist, in die eigene Sprache gut, ja nur richtig, zu übersetzen, wir wir uns oft vergeblich bemühen, aus dem Übersetzungsdeutsch eines Ausländers wirkliches Deutsch zu machen. (Viëtor 1905: 50)
Let us just give some thought to how difficult it is for us to translate into our own language well, or even just correctly, as when we often make an effort in vain to make real German out of the translation-German of a foreigner. (My transl.)

Viëtor’s use of “wir” (“we”) suggests that he imagines a native German speaker here, making efforts to understand a foreigner’s hard-to-understand German. Viëtor is no longer ostensibly addressing the topic of translation as a potential classroom or homework exercise, instead appearing to offer a concrete example of the use of translation in the “real world.” Possibly he is intimating that the context of translation affects its value or effectiveness, such that translation into the mother tongue might be more appropriate inside the classroom than outside of it. Viëtor seems to be qualifying, or perhaps even contradicting, his earlier stance – that he does not deny the value of translation into the mother tongue. Here, translation into the mother tongue is not described as having any value, but rather as difficult and something often done in vain. Yet, even though this translational act occurs outside of the school milieu, the translation features that Viëtor seems to apply automatically to the description of the situation are similar or identical to features of GTM-style translation. Firstly, Viëtor casts this translation activity as inherently hard to do by using the words “schwer” (“difficult”) and “bemühen” (“making an effort”), reminiscent of complaints against translation in the GTM. In addition, Viëtor notes that this effort is often made in vain, reflecting again the concerns of GTM critics that translation is ultimately not effective. Finally, Viëtor expresses anxieties or goals that would foreseeably reflect ones that a student under the GTM might express: wondering whether the translation performed amounts to something “gut” (“good”), “richtig” (“correct”), or even “wirklich” (“real”). In summary, Viëtor
treats the imagined, out-of-school translation act very much as if it were an exercise in a GTM language class.

Viëtor also seems to cast the foreigner here as an paradigmatic graduate of a GTM program; the foreigner speaks a marked “translation-German,” suggesting that this German had been learned by a translation-based methodology and underscoring Viëtor’s skepticism of this methodology. This observation brings up the fact that in this scenario there are actually two translation events occurring – the first by the foreigner, and the second by the native speaker. The foreigner in this scenario is arguably performing an interlingual translation – Jakobson’s “translation proper.” Viëtor does not tell us what the foreigner’s mother tongue might be, but presumably, the foreigner is translating from that mother tongue into German. A language other than the mother tongue is of course possible, but the scenario would still be interlingual.

Applying my definition of the translation of texts to this example, the foreigner is moving the meaning of a text formed inside her or his mind, presumably formulated in her or his mother tongue, out of the system of the mother tongue, and moving it into the system of German, and then producing a German translation of that mentally formulated text as a spoken text, or utterance. The fact that the foreigner’s original internal text in the mother tongue is not actually uttered means that the native speaker interlocutor here must only be able to identify the foreigner’s utterance as a translation by some sort of salient feature of the utterance that marks it as not being “real German” (“wirkliches Deutsch”); in other words, the spoken text is identifiable as a translation by its flaws. Since this is an
example of interlingual translation involving two distinct fields, ideally one would expect a complete conversion upon full translation; however, the nature of the foreigner’s translation product, described as “translation-German” rather than merely “German,” indicates that the expected or desired conversion has not been attained fully. Notably, Viëtor does not describe the native speaker asking the foreigner for any confirmation that, indeed, translation is the background operation that the foreigner is performing – there could arguably be other reasons why the foreigner’s utterance sounds like “translation-German.” It would actually be helpful if Viëtor would recount some of the foreigner’s utterances in order to gain perspective on what Viëtor’s native speaker would imagine as translation-German. It would also be interesting to note whether another foreigner who spoke German incompletely, but whose incomplete German did not stem from the performance of flawed translation from the mother tongue in the background, would also strike the native speaker here as speaking “translation-German” or as speaking some other version of incomplete German. Viëtor seems to imply that within the language system called “German,” there is actually a systematic way of determining whether a person is speaking “real German” or “translation-German,” as if translation-German were a type of dysfunctional, yet also recognizable system in the entire German system.

Turning to the native speaker in this scenario, the translation activity occurs entirely within the system of German and could be classified as Jakobson’s intralingual translation. Jakobson might point out that Viëtor’s native speaker is essentially involved in rewording the foreigner’s speech, possibly by making use of synonyms or circumlocution.
According to my definition of translation, the native speaker appears to be moving the meaning of the foreigner’s spoken text – or utterance – across distinct fields within the single, greater field of the German language. The native speaker appears to have divided up the field of German into one field of origin – “the translation-German of a foreigner” – and three smaller fields of possible destinations – “good German,” “correct German,” and “real German.” At this stage, I would make my first recommendation to Viëtor and his imagined native speaker: Consider a different division of fields. It could be an unrealistic expectation to make “translation-German” into something “good,” “correct,” and/or “real,” and from this perspective, the consequences of a less than ideal translation product may not seem necessarily dire. Viëtor, for his part, seems to take for granted that these would be the most appropriate fields. I would suggest a field of origin such as “new German” and a destination field such as “German enough.”

Arguably the native speaker also conducts an unstated translation, analogous to the one the foreigner allegedly does in the background during this scenario, without uttering the original mother tongue text that exists in her or his mind. It would be difficult to imagine that the native speaker would first say the “real German” that he or she translated out of the foreigner’s “translation-German,” before replying back with the next conversational turn. As such, the scenario turns into an interesting “mixed bag” of translating: the

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31 By analogy, one might consider Donald Winnicott’s (1953) concept of the “good enough mother,” whom he contrasts with the “perfect” mother. The “perfect” mother satisfies all of her infant’s needs so thoroughly that the infant fails to develop. By contrast, the “good enough mother” grants her infant more autonomy because she is more “normal” and “ordinary” (other key words for Winnicott).

32 By contrast, as a language teacher I notice how I actually often do recast a student’s flawed statements before taking my conversational turn – a very different context.
foreigner is translating interlingually, never actually stating the original text in the foreign language aloud, and eventually only uttering the target, German text translation. The native speaker, though, hearing and taking the foreigner’s utterance as an original text that has been uttered in translation-German, translates it intralingually, and never utters her or his translation aloud. Viëtor never claims, at any rate, that the native speaker and foreigner actually utter both the texts and both translation processes aloud. It would seem unnecessarily burdensome to state aloud first the mother tongue text as it is formulated in one’s mind, and then also the attempted translation of it into German. As well, it would seem equally burdensome for the native speaker to say something akin to: “Before I reply to your comment, first let me translate it aloud into real German.” This conversation becomes a very good example of the role that implication plays in communication – here, all the translating remains implied while the conversational turns go on. I would therefore connect this entire example from Viëtor with Grice (1975), and Grice’s cooperative principles of conversation and his conversational maxims.

*Applying Grice’s Cooperative Principle and his Conversational Maxims to Viëtor’s example.*

The significance of implications in conversation is the focus of Grice, who prefers to refer to them as “conversational implicatures” in his seminal lecture and essay *Logic and Conversation*. Although Grice does not specifically contextualize his philosophy of conversation in the framework of translation, there is considerable overlap between his concerns and the concerns of Translation Studies, especially as pertains to the
problematic nature of transferring and converting (i.e., translating) an utterance’s (Grice’s preferred term) or text’s meaning. For Grice, the gathering of meaning from an utterance is aided by a tacit “cooperative principle” that is essentially always at play when people converse:

Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. … We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE. (Grice 1975: 45, capitals in original.)

It is perhaps unavoidable in the context of this dissertation to make note of Grice’s mention of “disconnected remarks.” Here, Grice maintains quite reasonably that disconnected remarks “would not be rational,” which is a strong echo of the complaints of the Reformers, and of today’s critics of the GTM, about the “disconnected sentences” used in “mindless” translation exercises. Grice seems to indicate that these remarks would not belong in a natural and rational conversation, which may also be the reason for the discomfort that the sentences cause in so many GTM observers. At any rate, under this cooperative principle, Grice attaches four categories, and then he elaborates within each category on the conversational “maxims” therein:

Echoing Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. The category of QUANTITY relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under it fall the following maxims:
1. Make your contributions as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. …
Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim – ‘Try to make your contribution one that is true’ – and two more specific maxims:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, namely, ‘Be relevant.’

… Finally, under the category of MANNER, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said but, rather, to HOW what is said is to be said, I include the supermaxim – ‘Be perspicuous’ – and various maxims such as:

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly. (Grice 1975: 45-46, capitals in original.)

For Grice, the meaning of an utterance would be the same as what is uttered, if all of these maxims were relentlessly followed. However, Grice acknowledges readily that in practice these maxims are not binding and never wholly followed, which is where conversational implicature arises. For whenever one of these maxims is not fulfilled during a conversation, i.e., absent complete explication, the interlocutors are, per Grice, compelled to resort to an analysis of what has thus been implicated. Grice offers three categories of how the conversational maxims might be left unfulfilled – “infringing” on a maxim, “violating” a maxim, and “flouting” a maxim. He also offers several useful examples in each category. As just one example, Grice illustrates what “infringing” on a maxim would be in his parenthetical comment at the end of this exchange:

A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage around the corner. (Gloss: B would be infringing the maxim ‘Be relevant’ unless he thinks, or thinks it possible, that the garage is open, and has petrol to sell; so he implicates that the garage is, or at least may be open, etc.) (Grice 1975: 51, italics in original)

It is at this point that one can review Viëtor’s example and note the lack of fulfillment of Grice’s conversational maxims that the example illustrates, for here “the foreigner” simply lacks the ability or experience necessary to fulfill, at the very least, the maxims of the category of manner concerning obscurity, ambiguity, brevity, and orderliness.
I would note that Viëtor’s example also speaks to an aspect of Grice’s conversational maxims that Grice does not treat explicitly, namely: the *expectation* of any two interlocutors that their conversation will be marked by implicatures. Whereas Grice suggests that it is primarily when maxims are explicitly unfulfilled that implicatures arise; I would add that implicatures are expected by both interlocutors regardless of any maxim’s actually being clearly and explicitly flouted or violated. For the nature of human conversation is such that, as human experience shows, the cooperative conversational principles are never fully followed. Therefore, no interlocutor with any conversational experience enters into a conversation with an expectation of complete cooperation, i.e., of complete explicature. Even if the other interlocutor would follow every conversational maxim completely, the first interlocutor would nonetheless expect otherwise, and would treat every utterance as one that might not accord with all of the maxims, i.e., would always expect and look for implicatures. The first interlocutor can even infer implicatures that were never actually implicated by the other interlocutor. This makes for a near impossibility of two persons’ conversing solely in explicatures, for even if they tried to do so, the one interlocutor would nevertheless always be inferring implicatures from the other. Viëtor’s example illustrates this expectation factor quite overtly: in the native speaker’s unexplained classification of the one interlocutor as a “foreigner,” there is already a not so veiled expectation of the “effort” that will be required for dealing with the expected implicatures in the ensuing conversation. Yet, I maintain that even when the differences of language competence are not obvious, this expectation of effort and implicatures is also present, so long as the one interlocutor
perceives the other interlocutor simply as “another.” For “another” person will always have unique experiences that tinge her or his language in ways that have to be inferred by the interlocutor via identifying that “other” person’s implications – for either interlocutor to state everything that is implicated behind an utterance would simply take too long.

The native German speaker in conversation with this foreigner, in Viëtor’s example, must therefore make efforts at comprehension, which efforts, per Grice, would amount to the identification and working out of implicatures. These efforts are intrinsic to any conversation, not just ones of the type that Viëtor recounts. Thus, I would wish to be able to ask Viëtor if he is trying to imply that there ever would exist a conversational exchange where effort were unnecessary. I would ask Viëtor whether it is justified to lament the work necessary in one particular conversation with a foreigner, and whether that work truly represents more or harder work than other conversations might, where the translation that Viëtor describes were not at play. In fact, I would appreciate being able to ask Viëtor why translation in particular appears to make the conversation so difficult for his imagined native speaker; for translation, especially if the native speaker might be versed in it, could actually represent a convenient strategy for elucidating the foreigner’s implicatures. As well, translations of some sort or another arguably underlie the entire conversation, as every utterance requires an interpretation (recall, Jakobson used “interpretation” as the common expression among his three types of translating), so fixating on the one particular translational act of making the foreigner’s German into a more real German could distract from the working out and arguably more profitable translating of the other important implicatures that the conversation offers.
Grice, too, offers “translation” as a method for untangling the implicatures that arise when utterances do not fulfill conversational maxims. Specifically, Grice’s illustrates the use of translation in order to deal with a case of “phonemic ambiguity,” which ambiguity he characterizes as a flouting of the “Be perspicuous” supermaxim of manner:

Take the complex example of the British General who captured the town of Sind and sent back the message Peccavi. The ambiguity involved (‘I have Sind’ / ‘I have sinned’) is phonemic, not morphemic; and the expression actually used is unambiguous, but since it is in a language foreign to speaker and hearer, translation is called for, and the ambiguity resides in the standard translation into native English. (Grice 1975: 54-55, quotation marks and italics in original)

Some factual notes may help elucidate Grice’s words: “Peccavi” is Latin for “I have sinned.” Sindh – the name of the town, or province, in Grice’s quote as it is currently spelled – is located in present-day Pakistan. The British General here was Sir Charles James Napier, who actually may never have said, “Peccavi,” upon winning Sindh.

According to Gascoigne’s Encyclopedia of Britain, the pun is now attributed to the English translator Catherine Winkworth who, upon learning of Napier’s victory:

> remarked to her teacher that Napier's dispatch to the governor general of India, after capturing Sind, should have been Peccavi (Latin for ‘I have sinned’). She sent her joke to the new humorous magazine Punch, which printed it as a factual report under Foreign Affairs. (Gascoigne 1993: 483, quotation marks and italics in original)

Historically accurate or not, Grice’s example actually illustrates two instances of the flouting of the maxim “Be perspicuous” – firstly, the use of Latin could count as “obscure,” and secondly, there is phonemic ambiguity in the English into which the Latin translates. Although Grice’s example therefore is not exactly analog to Viëtor’s imagined conversation, the same conditions are ultimately present: the person receiving the utterance initially perceives it to be somehow “foreign” and is forced to “translate it”
or “make out of it” something “real.” Then, the translation itself proves to be ambiguous and so the ambiguity forces a choice between translations for which there might not be clear guidance. In a different essay (“Meaning”), Grice (1957) refers to the significance of the choice involved in fixing ambiguous implicatures, when he writes about how attention to “context” can help narrow down the “alternatives”:

Again, in cases where there is doubt, say, about which of two or more things an utterer intends to convey, we tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance and ask which of the alternatives would be relevant to other things he is saying or doing, or which intention in a particular situation would fit in with some purpose he obviously has (e.g., a man who calls for a “pump” at a fire would not want a bicycle pump.) (Grice 1957: 387, quotation marks in original.)

I would add that Grice’s example here of “pump” is but another example of translation, here an intralingual re-wording. That is, the listener here, needs to translate “pump” into something akin to “water pump for the fire,” although this translation would obviously not need to be uttered by the listener and could even cause unwelcome delays if uttered.

In Viëtor’s scenario, it is very likely that the “translation-German” that the native German speaker feels compelled to translate into “real German” is not perspicuous enough to provide the native speaker with just one unambiguous translation. More likely is that the native speaker will be forced to choose between or among translations into “real German” that are all potentially inadequate. This likelihood of an inadequate translation into “real German” is only underscored by Viëtor’s reminder that such an endeavor is “often in vain.” Thus, in both Grice’s example of “pump” and Viëtor’s example of a conversation with a foreigner still learning the language, incomplete explicature, or a lack of perspicuity, has forced translation into a conversation, as well as the choosing among
translations, so as to elucidate any implicatures. Yet, as mentioned earlier, Viëtor leaves open the possibility in his example that the native speaker’s translations into “real German” are left unstated; and Grice leaves this possibility open as well. Per Grice, the redundancy of actually uttering these “internal” translations would violate, minimally, the conversational maxims of quantity (“Do not make your contribution more informative than required”) and also of manner (“Be brief”). For, whenever the listener succeeds in actually translating the utterance of the interlocutor adequately, i.e., when the listener’s translating is not done in vain, it would actually be a potential conversation stopper, or a violation of a conversational maxim, if the listener were both to utter the translation and then also the concomitant conversational response. Ultimately, Grice does not state explicitly that the activity that a listener is doing in catching implicatures amounts to an internal translational activity, and that the translation itself remains only implied in the response that this listener (who is also the translator) offers. Nonetheless, I argue that Grice, like Viëtor, acknowledges, albeit by implication, the fact that an interlocutor first translates what is heard before uttering a conversational response, and that the uttered response “contains” or “reveals” the implied translation for the other interlocutor to induce. I make this claim even when the two interlocutors are using the same language at a comparable level of expertise, as opposed to Viëtor’s example where clearly one of the conversation partners cannot use the language as competently as the other. Neale (1992) also finds that translation underlies the conversational processing that Grice posits, even if Grice does not use the word “translate.” Neale notes that Grice himself uses a translation in a 1961 address that Grice gave to the Aristotelian Society, when Grice, in a passage about causal theory says:
… the thesis that “I am perceiving $M$” (in one sense of that expression) is to be regarded as equivalent to “I am having (or sensing) a sense-datum which is caused by $M$.” (Grice 1962: 225, italics in original, quoted in Neale 1992: 516)

Neale interprets Grice’s use of an intralingual translation here (i.e., the “equivalent” re-wording of the initial “thesis”) as a principle or instruction for speaking, and therein mentions translating:

Each theoretical sentence containing an apparent reference to a sense-datum is to be translated into a sentence of ordinary English in which there is no such reference. The favored form of translation, although not specified precisely by Grice, involves pairing each “sense-datum statement” with an “$L$-statement” of the form ‘$X$ looks (sounds/feels, etc.) $\Phi$ to $A$’ (e.g., “that looks red to me”), an idea floated by Ayer. (Neale 1992: 516, quotation marks and italics in original)

In other words, Neale is illustrating how Grice observes that translation functions to create “ordinary” speech out of complex causal relationships that our senses pick up on, relationships that would be awkward to utter in their complexity, if we consider Grice’s lengthy, more explicated re-wording of his initial thesis statement. As such, Neale identifies a kernel here of some of Grice’s later-formulated maxims, namely: avoiding obscurity and being orderly without being overly informative. Perhaps, then, the “real German” that Viëtor’s native speaker is trying to translate out of his interlocutor’s utterances would be preferably understood by Neale and Grice as “ordinary German.”

Yet, Viëtor is ostensibly only trying to illustrate that translation is in his opinion often so difficult as to be unfruitful; and it is unlikely that he intends for his caveats to be turned into precursory examples of the categories and maxims that Jakobson and Grice would formulate decades later.
Post-colonial translation concerns applied to Viëtor’s statement.

Even if Viëtor did not mean for his statement to be provocative, his example can be mined for even more theoretical translation concerns that Viëtor may or may not have intended. Especially with his use of the terms “we” (“wir”), “foreigner” (“Ausländer”), and “real German” (“wirkliches Deutsch”) in this example, Viëtor calls to mind certain post-colonial concerns that have been brought to light in translation studies. For example, Bandia (2010) notes:

The inter-play of translation and post-colonial literatures is two-pronged. It occurs when postcolonial writing in its materiality overlaps with the act of translating … and also in the interlingual translation of postcolonial literature. … The first instance, also known as “writing as translation,” is related to the fact that although postcolonial writing is different from translation, they both employ similar strategies for linguistic and cultural representations. Based on this assumption, postcolonial literature is understood metaphorically as a form of translation, whereby the language of colonization is bent, twisted or plied to capture and convey the sociocultural reality or worldview of an alien dominated language culture. (Bandia 2010: 264-265, quotation marks in original)

In this context, the “writing as translation” that Bandia refers to could be equated to the “listening and implicature fixing as translation” that I have asserted is at play in Viëtor’s example conversation; for the native German speaker in Viëtor’s example is as good as “writing” in his or her own head that which he or she is having trouble understanding from the foreigner. Thus, the “literature,” or text, that Bandia describes could be seen to be, in Viëtor’s example, as the conversation itself. And akin to Viëtor’s declaration that the native German speaker must “make an effort, often in vain,” are Bandia’s words about the colonizer’s “bending, twisting, and plying” his or her own German in order to understand, or as Bandia puts it, “to capture” the foreigner. However, the foreigner in Viëtor’s example does use some German, i.e., the native German speaker who is doing
the listening is not doing all of the “writing,” so the second prong that Bandia referred to – “the interlingual translation of postcolonial literature” – might be even more relevant. According to this view, the foreigner’s utterances in “translation-German” could be seen as the foreigner’s own offering of a “postcolonial” text in a personal language that is this foreigner’s alone. Likewise, the native German speaker here is tasked with translating this “foreign German” into a different language, i.e., “real German,” if the native speaker is to attain any satisfactory comprehension. In so doing, the native German speaker takes control of the entire conversation and essentially constructs the statements, and therefore the identity, of the foreigner. But also in so doing, the native German speaker risks what another post-colonial theorist, Nirañjana (1992), describes as perpetrating “violence” upon the foreigner (“the colonized”) in a way that robs the foreigner of any personal “history”:

In forming a certain kind of subject, in presenting particular versions of the colonized, translation brings into being overarching concepts of reality and representation. These concepts, and what they allow us to assume, completely occlude the violence that accompanies the construction of the colonial subject. Translation thus produces strategies of containment. By employing certain modes of representing the other – which it thereby also brings into being – translation reinforces hegemonic versions of the colonized, helping them acquire the status of what Edward Said calls representations, or objects without history. (Nirañjana 1992: 2-3)

Confronted with Nirañjana’s text here, Viëtor might be asked whether his native speaker did not start a “strategy of containment” when she or he first translated the identity of the interlocutor unequivocally as a “foreigner.” As corrective action for this type of violence and identity suppression, Spivak (1993) recommends “cultural translation,” which involves, as Bandia (2010: 266) paraphrases, “calling on the translator, much like the field anthropologist, to seek an intimate knowledge of the language, culture, and history
of the colonized.” Thus, in reaction to Viëtor’s foreigner who only speaks “translation-German,” Spivak might recommend that the native German speaker consider this solidarity-based alternative, instead of Viëtor’s hegemonic, Germanizing approach:

Rather than imagining that women automatically have something identifiable in common, why not say, humbly and practically, my first obligation in understanding solidarity is to learn her mother-tongue. You will see immediately what the differences are. You will also feel the solidarity every day as you make the attempt to learn the language in which the other woman learned to recognize reality at her mother’s knee. This is preparation for the intimacy of cultural translation. (Spivak 1993: 191-192)

Spivak’s is an enticing way out of the power inequities involved with Viëtor’s conversation between a native speaker and a foreigner, although I would add that her prescription might ultimately involve even more “effort” that could also be “in vain” (to hark back to Viëtor’s words), since learning the language of “the other woman” is of course a mountainous task.

Relevance theory in Translation Studies applied to Viëtor’s statement.

Even without his overt references to culture and nation (“real German”) and to outsider status (“we” and the “foreigner”), a post-colonial critique of Viëtor’s example is still arguably valid along the less geopolitically defined lines of “ours” and “not ours.” For Viëtor’s conversational scenario illustrates the power struggles that arise out of the fact that every individual person, and not just geopolitically or culturally united collections of people, arguably speaks an idiosyncratically individual, or individually nuanced, language. Such an individualized language is referred to in Translation Studies as an idiolect. Thus Viëtor’s provocative statement about “making real German out of a
foreigner’s translation-German” might really reflect the more immediately and intimately personal struggles for maintaining power and control that arguably underlie any discourse between two people. Viëtor’s statement then might really be saying, “It is difficult to translate when we make ‘our’ German out of ‘not our’ or out of ‘someone else’s’ German.” As just one piece of evidence for the assertion that all individuals indeed speak an idiolect, I would refer back to Grice’s cooperative principle; for if any two, or indeed all, individuals spoke the same way, then a need for a principle of conversational cooperation would become moot. Looked at from another perspective: even if two people were to utter the same language, their utterances would still, for a listener, differ – if only for the difference in voices. (Notably, Grice never touches on the topics of voice or the sound of an utterance.) Due to this essential uniqueness in people’s language use, the listener is therefore always tasked with both identifying the real or imagined differences in an utterance – as compared to how the listener herself or himself might have formulated or expected the utterance – and also deciding on the degree of those differences’ relevance. Hatim and Munday (2004: 176) touch upon this observation as well, when they consider specifically Grice’s conversational maxim of “Be relevant.” For Hatim and Munday, Grice’s relevance maxim brings to light the pragmatics involved in interpreting another individual’s language use, whether for the purposes of holding a conversation or for translating another person’s utterance. That is, for the purposes of any communication, a listener must make decisions about the relevance of any specific interlocutor’s utterances in creating a pragmatically informed interpretation and in offering a pragmatically informed response. Regarding the relationship of this necessary
appreciation for an individual’s language use to translation in particular, Hatim and
Munday point out:

Translation is seen as a special instance of the wider concept of communication, and this, together with the decision-making process involved, is accounted for in terms of such coherence relationships as ‘cause and effect’. These relationships underpin the process of inferencing, a cognitive activity taken to be central to any act of communication and thus crucial in any act of reading or translation. (Hatim and Munday 2004: 57, quotation marks and bold in original)

Hatim and Munday then offer conversational utterances as a possible stimulus, or “cause,” in these “cause and effect” relationships. The nature of the individual who is speaking (for example, the speaker’s perceived reliability), the nature of the uttered stimulus (for example, its degree of perceived relevance), and all the possible effects of this stimulus-utterance (for example, how it makes or could make the listener react or feel), then, are what the listener’s inferencing focuses on. Hatim and Munday thus note the connection of inferencing to relevance:

Within Relevance Theory … communication is usually sparked off by a ‘stimulus’, verbal or otherwise (e.g., humming…). These stimuli guide the hearer (or reader) through the maze of what one could infinitely mean. The ultimate aim is to enable the hearer to reach the speaker’s ‘informative intention.’ (Hatim and Munday 2004: 58, quotation marks and bold in original)

Arriving at a any individual speaker’s informative intention (especially considering the “infinite” possibilities) assumes that the speaker speaks an individualized language, or speaks a conventional language in an individualized manner – for the opposite assumption would indicate a lack of individuality and, by extension, an irrelevant interlocutor.
The topic of idiolect applied to Viëtor’s statement.

Gregory (1980) also confronts this individuality of the speaker as reflected in the speaker’s language and suggests that every person therefore speaks her or his own idiolect. Gregory likens an idiolect to a “restricted language.” Firth (1968) introduced the concept of a “restricted language” as follows:

A restricted language serves a circumscribed field of experience or action and can be said to have its own grammar and dictionary. (Firth, in Palmer 1968: 87)

In the following passage, Firth details some examples of restricted languages:

The study of English is a very vague expression referring to a whole universe of possibilities which must be reduced and circumscribed to make exact study and disciplined teaching possible. Hence the notion of a restricted language. Restricted languages function in situations or sets or series of situations proper to them, e.g. technical languages such as those operative in industry, aviation, military services, politics, commerce or, indeed, any form of speech or writing with specialized vocabulary, grammar and style. (Firth, in Palmer 1968: 112)

Arguably, Viëtor’s native speaker is confronting a special type of restricted language in the “translation-German” of the foreigner, one that does not actually “function,” as Firth puts it, but that still has its own “specialized vocabulary, grammar and style.” If we understand Firth’s “circumscribed field of experience or action” as any individual’s idiosyncratic, yet circumscribed personhood, then Gregory’s notion of an idiolect reflects an idiolect’s nature as a restricted language. Thus, every individual has a restricted and “specialized” sense of “vocabulary, grammar, and style.” Gregory locates examples of this personalized idiolect in the “linguistic curiosities” of “characters strongly marked linguistically as individuals,” and he finds that an idiolect has ramifications on translation:
Idiolect is the individual dialect, the variety related to the personal identity of the user. It is not always necessary to translate idiolects; the personal identity of the user might not be relevant situationally. It usually is not, for example, in scientific or “official” texts; however, this is not always the case, particularly in plays and novels. Many of Shakespeare’s greatest characters are strongly marked linguistically as individuals: Richard III, Falstaff, Hamlet, Iago, Juliet’s Nurse, Beatrice, Cleopatra, to mention but a few; and the work for (sic) Dickens is full of linguistic curiosities. In such instances I suggest that in the search for “equivalence” the translator has a responsibility to try to distinguish them linguistically as individual in the target language. (Gregory 1980: 463, quotation marks and italics in original)

Seen in this light, Viëtor’s statement about the difficulty in converting another person’s version of the language into the “real” language might actually reflect a certain ideological stubbornness, or even a psychological aversion – not on a national or cultural level, but on a personal and individual level – towards accepting other people’s idiolects. Thus Viëtor’s problematic statement might be amended from: “It is difficult to translate when we make real German out of translation-German,” to: “It is difficult to translate when we make our own idiolect out of another person’s idiolect.” In response to this aversion, translation critics operating according to a post-colonial perspective might ask whether Viëtor’s goal should not better be to “un-make” our German, in an effort towards increasing solidarity and, per Narañjana, decreasing violence. However, by casting Viëtor’s statement into such problematic generic binaries as “our idiolect” and “not our idiolect,” there is still also another possibility for interpretation – an interpretation that is less associated with corrective, post-colonial, or personally ideological motivations and more associated with linguistic and aesthetic motivations.
Concerning linguistic and aesthetic motivations, when one considers that Viëtor implies the making of “real German” as a goal of translation, a certain linguistic or aesthetic prejudice is revealed that can be said to seek the erasure of any linguistic or stylistic identification of the foreigner’s utterances as having originally come from a foreign language. That is, Viëtor’s implied goal is for the German of the foreigner to be eventually linguistically and aesthetically indistinguishable from the un-translated, original, “real” German of a native speaker. In this sense, “real German” becomes both a problematic vacuum (sucking in any non-German-ness it encounters) and problematic generator (only ever offering more of the same “real German” back), resulting in a situation where “real German” could become developmentally (as well as linguistically and aesthetically) static. Benjamin (1923) recognizes the problematic here when he criticizes that, actually:

Es ist … das höchste Lob einer Übersetzung nicht, sich wie ein Original ihrer Sprache zu lesen. (Benjamin 1923: XV)

*It is … not the highest praise for a translation to say that it reads the same as an original text in that language.* (My transl.)

In other words, Benjamin wants that the translation be recognizable as such, because for him, the task of the translator is, removed from the specificities of language X or language Y, the supplementing of all languages in pursuit of what he calls a “reine Sprache” or “pure language.” In his citation of Rudolf Pannwitz, Benjamin provides another formulation of this tenet (that the translator must be highly cautious about having
any goal of preserving the integrity of the foreign language, and also cautious of using the foreign language as a mask for the original’s language):

The fundamental error of the translator is that he maintains the state of his own language as it happens to be at the moment, instead of having it be radically stirred up by the foreign language. He must, even when he is translating out of a very distant language, penetrate back to the endmost elements of language itself, where word, image, and sound come together as one. He must expand and deepen his language with the foreign one. (My transl.)

Thus, Benjamin and Pannwitz might question the goals of the native German speaker in Viëtor’s example and point out to this native speaker that an invariable translation goal of “real German” could lead to a certain linguistic and aesthetic stagnation thereof.

My own concerns about Viëtor’s statement.

With regard to an interpretation of Viëtor’s example out of pedagogical motivations, I would begin by expressing my own surprise, as a fellow language educator, that Viëtor does not see the potential educative value in being confronted by a foreigner whose language is not fully comprehensible. The efforts involved in translating the utterances of such an interlocutor could be seen as a valuable chance for language development, where the native German speaker has an opportunity to learn more about German, or the foreigner’s language, or communication generally. Viëtor’s example could serve as just one useable model of the innumerable conversational scenarios where linguistic
inequities among the speakers present an educational opportunity that is dealt with by some form of translation, whether there are two languages at play or just one. I might share Viëtor’s statement with my own language students and ask them for negotiation techniques that could diminish the unwelcome divide that Viëtor suggests exists between the foreigner and the native German speaker. For I hold negotiation between individuals as pedagogically valuable.

Eco’s casting of translation as negotiation applied to Viëtor’s statement.

To the students might even be told that the concept, and activity, of negotiation is at the heart of translating for many translation theorists, for example, Eco (2003):

What I want to emphasize is that many concepts circulating in translation studies (such as adequacy, equivalence, faithfulness) will be considered in the course of my lectures from the point of view of negotiation. Negotiation is a process by virtue of which, in order to get something, each party renounces something else, and at the end everybody feels satisfied since one cannot have everything.

In this kind of negotiation there may be many parties: on one side, there is the original text, with its own rights, sometimes an author who claims right over the whole process, along with the cultural framework in which the original text is born; on the other side, there is the destination text, the cultural milieu in which it is expected to be read, and even the publishing industry, which can recommend different translation criteria, according to whether the translated text is to be put as an academic pursuit or in a popular one. … A translator is the negotiator between those parties, whose explicit assent is not necessary. (Eco 2003: 6, italics in original)

Although Eco appears to cast negotiation as only a related concept to translation, he seems here also to propose a synonymy between the two terms; for besides the negotiation that Eco describes as such, translation too is arguably “a process … to get something” where “each party renounces something else” with the goal that eventually “everybody feels satisfied.” Additionally, Eco offers the equation, “A translator is the
negotiator.” Even though Eco is not writing in a pedagogical context, his striking comments could be cast in the form of questions to students (e.g., If the translator is a negotiator, then is translation negotiation?). If these students have previously been sensitized to the evaluation necessary to perform and appreciate translation, then they could answer questions of negotiation’s relation to translation more knowingly. Going back to Viëtor’s example conversation, one might, if one could, endeavor to persuade Viëtor to re-think his terms and consider a formulation less un-negotiable than “making real German out of a foreigner’s translation-German” such as “negotiating with each other so as to arrive at a mutually acceptable translation.”

In conclusion about Viëtor’s statement problematizing translation.

I thus hope to have shown how Viëtor’s seemingly benignly meant statement concerning an example of translation outside of the context of the GTM – that is, his imagined conversation between a native German speaker and a foreigner speaking translation-German – provides ample fodder for multiple theoretical analyses in the context of translation studies. As well, I hope to have shown that the problematic concerning translation in Viëtor’s statement can be mitigated when my definition of translation is applied, pointing out that Viëtor’s imagined native speaker may not be considering the most realistic fields for the intralingual destination of the meaning of the foreigner’s “translation-German.” I would further suggest that, in response to his own demand that language teaching must turn itself around (Der Sprachunterricht muß umkehren!), that Viëtor might have considered a greater degree of turning himself around as concerns translation. Additionally, I would recommend that Communicative Language Teaching
consider a fresh look at translation. It appears that, at least since Meidinger’s day, the trajectory of translation has been set on a course for forced extinction, even though, as my exploration of the definition of translation shows, translation – when viewed as movement – underlies our lives. Banning, or even just denigrating translation could be tantamount to ignoring our own human capacity, habit, and need, to interpret, i.e., to translate, our surroundings as an integral part of our survival.
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