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The Modest Professor: Interpretive Charity and Interpretive Humility in John Rawls’s Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy

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Given the extraordinary level of his philosophical achievements, John Rawls was by all accounts a remarkably modest man. Those who knew him personally recall Rawls’s humility as perhaps his most characteristic trait. Part of the value of the recent publication of Rawls’s Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy—as well as the earlier publication of his Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy—is that those who did not have the privilege of knowing Rawls personally now have greater insight into his character as both a philosopher and a teacher. Rawls’s personal modesty is evident throughout both these collections of the lectures from his undergraduate courses at Harvard. One even begins to wonder whether such humility is appropriate for someone of Rawls’s intellectual stature. Perhaps something more closely resembling Aristotle’s greatness of soul would be called for: an accurate assessment of the superlative degree of one’s excellence, and a proper contempt for one’s inferiors. Steven B. Smith has even argued that Rawls’s “very modesty and lack of speculative curiosity are what exclude him from the ranks of the great philosophers.”

Fortunately, few of us have to worry about the personal virtues appropriate to a philosopher of genius. Yet many of us teach undergraduate courses much like Rawls’s own on the modern canon of political thought. Like Rawls, we offer lectures twice weekly on Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Mill and Marx—often concluding with Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, just as Rawls himself often did. While it would be presumptuous for most contemporary philosophers to present their own works as canonical texts in an introductory

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course, it would be inappropriate for Rawls not to have done so. No amount of personal modesty would have justified depriving Rawls’s students of the opportunity to learn about the most influential twentieth-century theory of justice from the teacher best qualified to explain it to them.

This essay will focus, not on the role that Rawls’s modesty played in the presentation of his own ideas, but on the role it plays in his interpretations of the other canonical texts under examination in his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. It argues that the personal virtue of humility stands in a complicated relationship with the preeminent hermeneutic virtue of interpretive charity: the principle (which Rawls repeatedly, explicitly endorses throughout his Lectures) that a text must always be read in its intellectually strongest form. Sometimes, interpretive charity is taken to imply that a text ought merely to be read in its most consistent form. Yet while this approach has the benefit of charitably reconstructing a text’s meaning without appeal to any standards outside the work itself, mere consistency is neither necessary nor sufficient for philosophical excellence. Once can certainly argue that, while Bentham’s utilitarianism was more consistent than that of J. S. Mill, Mill was the greater philosopher. Even when Mill is at his most inconsistent, his very contradictions reveal greater insight into the human condition than Bentham ever possessed. In order to make a judgment of this nature, however, we must appeal to an understanding of the human condition independent of the philosophical works under consideration.

When charitably interpreting the work of our intellectual inferiors—when grading our students’ papers, for example—we can rightly import external standards of excellence from our own knowledge of the matters under discussion, since our understanding of these subjects is greater than that of the author. Our goal will then be to read the text in a way that brings its views as close as possible to these external standards. This approach to charitable interpretation, however, is inappropriate when interpreting the work of those whose wisdom is greater than our own, and Rawls repeatedly insists that canonical philosophers must be interpreted under the assumption that they are more intelligent and insightful than their interpreters. His insistence on this second hermeneutic virtue—which can be termed “interpretive humility”—severely complicates the activity of charitable interpretation. I will not attempt to reconcile the conflicting demands of interpretive charity and interpretive humility within the narrow confines of this essay. My argument is simply that, despite his commitment to interpretive humility in principle,
Rawls often adopts a mode of interpretive charity which reveals a lack of interpretive humility in practice. Yet this thesis is not meant to accuse Rawls of a lack of humility as such. To the contrary, it is Rawls’s great personal and political-philosophical humility which often leads him to practice an insufficient degree of interpretive humility.

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In his editor’s foreword to the Lectures, Samuel Freeman includes significant selections from an unpublished piece by Rawls entitled “Some Remarks About My Teaching.” Here, Rawls explains that he always had two goals in mind when teaching canonical authors. The first “was to pose their philosophical problems as they saw them, given what their understanding of the state of moral and political philosophy then was” (p. xiii). His second goal was always “to present each writer’s thought in what I took to be its strongest from. I took to heart Mill’s remark in his review of [Alfred] Sedgwick: ‘A doctrine is not judged at all until it is judged in its best form’” (p. xiii). Rawls discusses both of these goals repeatedly throughout his lectures.

In the introduction to his lectures on Locke, Rawls discusses the first of his two goals using a quote from R. G. Collingwood which is also cited in the “Remarks,” “The history of political theory is not the history of different answers to one and the same question, but the history of a problem more or less constantly changing, whose solution was changing with it” (p. xiii and 103). Rawls thinks that Collingwood exaggerates somewhat. There are certain basic, permanent questions of political philosophy, “but these questions, when they come up in different historical contexts, can be taken in different ways and have been seen by different writers from different points of view, given their political and social worlds and their circumstances and problems as they saw them” (p. 103).

It might be thought that this acknowledgement of the importance of historical context would make Rawls a fellow-traveler of the intellectual historians of the so-called “Cambridge School.” As Michael Zuckert has argued, however, “After reading Rawls’s Lectures, nobody would rank him among those scholars of the history of philosophy who single-mindedly attempt

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to reproduce the context of a given thinker’s philosophic activity down to the most minute minutiae (I will name no names).” Zuckert explains that “Rawls avoids reducing philosophers to their historical context because he approaches past texts with a philosophic aim.”\(^8\) In looking at a text like Hobbes’s *Leviathan* or Locke’s *Second Treatise*, Rawls insists that the goal is not to understand the text as an outmoded artifact of its time and place. Instead, as he tells his students, “You must try to interpret it in the best and most interesting way... Otherwise, I think it is a waste of time to read it, or to read any of the important philosophers” (p. 52). Far from presenting the imperative to understand an author’s work in its historical context as an end in itself, Rawls presents the first of his two goals as a means to the achievement of this second goal, the goal of interpretive charity. When we “try to think ourselves into each writer’s scheme of thought, so far as we can, and try to understand their problem and their solution from their point of view and not from ours... it often happens that their answers to their questions strike us as much better than we might otherwise have supposed” (p. 103).

Zuckert argues that Rawls’s approach is surprisingly close to that of Leo Strauss in this regard. Like Strauss, Rawls “is not afraid to learn from as well as to learn about the philosophers of the past.”\(^9\) Just as this places Rawls at a considerable distance from the Cambridge contextualists, so too does it place him far from the school of analytic philosophers who consider philosophy a progressive discipline on the model of a natural science, and who therefore see Hobbes and Locke as no more relevant for the practice of philosophy today than Hippocrates and Galen are for the practice of biology. It was evident long before the publication of his two volumes of lectures that Rawls did not take this view, given the explicitly acknowledged debts which all of Rawls’s works owe to many of the most prominent figures in the political-philosophical canon. The lectures serve to confirm just how much Rawls relies on the insights of his predecessors. Here, Rawls appears not only as a teacher but also as a fellow-student of the canon alongside his undergraduates. “We learn moral and political philosophy, and indeed any other part of philosophy, by studying the exemplars,” he explains (p. xiv). The study of our philosophical exemplars can be enriched by examining their historical context, but historical questions are ultimately subservient to philosophical ones. Using canonical texts to help answer

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9 Zuckert (2002), op. cit.
philosophical questions, in turn, requires a strong principle of interpretive charity—an insistence on always reading these texts so as to render them as philosophically compelling as possible.

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If interpretive charity is indeed the primary virtue necessary when studying the great philosophical works of the past, the obvious question is what hermeneutic methods this virtue properly entails. Unsurprisingly, Rawls never takes interpretive charity to the extremes often associated with the Straussian school, under which every seeming contradiction in a canonical text must be assumed to be intentional, and hence a possible key to a deeper truth. Rawls is happy to acknowledge that even the greatest philosophical works may contain “little mistakes and slips… They don’t matter and we can fix them up. But fundamental errors at the very bottom level: no. That we should regard as very implausible, unless it turns out to our dismay that there is no other alternative” (p. 268).

Often, the appearance of “fundamental errors” in a text involves apparent contradictions among its basic premises. Rawls feels it is his responsibility to read the text in a way that resolves these contradictions, even if doing so goes against its most obvious, superficial meaning. For example, Rawls argues that interpretive charity requires a “wide” interpretation of Rousseau’s conception of *amour-propre*—under which a certain form of *amour-propre* is natural and proper—rather than the more obvious “narrow” interpretation under which *amour-propre* is always “unnatural and perverted.” This is because choosing the narrow interpretation of *amour-propre* over the wide interpretation would lead us “to say foolish things about Rousseau, such as that he is a dazzling though confused and inconsistent writer” (pp. 198-200).

If this drive to resolve contradictions is taken too far, however, it can lead us away from the text entirely. Even as he strives to present the works of canonical authors purged of all “fundamental errors,” Rawls nonetheless insists that a proper interpretation of a work does not elaborate on what a text ideally should have said, but what it in fact does say (p. xiii). The danger of departing too far from the text is greatest if the “fundamental errors” which we may find in a work are understood to include not only internal contradictions, but also failures to correspond to the truth of things as we understand it. As was already mentioned, the imposition of such external standards on a text is inappropriate when it is the work of our intellectual superiors, and Rawls’s modesty makes him convinced that the authors of the canon are indeed his superiors.
The hermeneutic assumption that the canonical authors under consideration are one’s intellectual superiors has been termed “interpretive humility.” Interpretive humility in this sense must be distinguished from a number of other forms of humility. First, it must be distinguished from personal modesty, from the overall attitude one takes to one’s general degree of individual excellence. To be sure, there is an elective affinity between personal and interpretive humility; Rawls himself certainly presents his commitment to the latter as an outgrowth of the former. Yet even the greatest egotists can force themselves to consider texts under consideration as the work of their intellectual superiors, if only as a working assumption that is unlikely to prove true in reality.

Interpretive humility in my sense must also be distinguished from another virtue which might rightly be termed interpretive humility: modesty with regard to one’s abilities as an interpreter, and hence from humility with regard to the possibility that one’s interpretations of texts are accurate. It should be noted that Rawls showed great humility in this regard as well as in so many others. Throughout his lectures Rawls repeatedly admits, “I am never altogether satisfied that what I say about these books is correct” (p. 34). Rawls is surely to be praised for this form of modesty, which is an appropriate reaction to the fact of human fallibility. We may even take a certain pride in the proper acknowledgement of our own intellectual imperfection. One imagines that Rawls might have done so when contrasting his own attitude on these matters with that of J. S. Mill, whom he criticizes for being “untroubled by self-doubt, even when the most intricate questions are being discussed” (p. 253).

Most importantly, interpretive humility should not be confused with what might be termed political-philosophical humility, humility with regard to the importance of political philosophy. Again, there is an elective affinity between this form of humility and personal modesty, but there is no necessary connection. Modest political philosophers are likely to take a modest view of political philosophy, but it is always possible that they think very highly of their profession while nonetheless thinking they themselves rank rather low as practitioners of such a noble calling. Clearly, however, Rawls is as modest with regard to the importance of his vocation as he is with regard to his personal abilities as a practitioner of it.

Political-philosophical humility itself can take at least two distinct but related forms, and Rawls displays both of them throughout the Lectures. First, political-philosophical humility can involve a modest appraisal of the political role of philosophers and the political authority of their
conclusions. In his introductory lecture on the nature and purposes of political philosophy, Rawls writes:

Political philosophy has no special access to fundamental truths, or reasonable ideas, about justice and the common good, or to other basic notions. Its merit, to the extent it has any, is that by study and reflection it may elaborate deeper and more instructive conceptions of basic political ideas that help us to clarify our judgments about the institutions and policies of a democratic regime (p. 1).

It should then come as no surprise that, in Rawls’s view, philosophy can make no rightful claim to political authority in a democratic society. This is the case even when we take a rather modest view of what political authority may entail, even if by authority we mean not a formal legal standing but nothing more than a high cultural status (p. 2). Rather than holding even this most modest form of cultural authority, Rawls concludes that political philosophy merely “has a not insignificant role as part of general background culture in providing a source of potential political principles and ideals” (pp. 6-7).

A second, related form of political-philosophical humility can involve a modest appraisal of the appropriate intellectual ambitions of political philosophy. This second form of political-philosophical humility is familiar as the defining characteristic of Political Liberalism and Rawls’s other later works, in which he presents the theory of justice as fairness as “political not metaphysical.” Rawls here argues that political philosophy cannot and must not address the most basic questions of the human condition, since it must present principles justifiable on the basis of “public reason,” drawing on principles “familiar from the public political culture of a democratic society and its traditions.” A truly political philosophy should prove acceptable to all reasonable people in a democratic society, even though they are divided in their beliefs on the fundamental questions of theology and metaphysics which are traditionally thought necessary to ground ethical norms. Such a political philosophy may very well succeed in achieving its modest goals, but only at the expense at bracketing the most important questions of political existence. Much can be said both for and against this distinctively Rawlsian version of political-philosophical humility, but a vast literature on the subject already exists. It seems prudent to adopt Rawls’s own strategy of bracketing such important if difficult questions, at least for purposes of this essay.

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Despite the strong elective affinities among all the forms of humility discussed above, interpretive humility and political-philosophical humility can come into genuine conflict with one another. This is likely to occur when the interpreter and the author being interpreted differ sharply on the proper intellectual and political role of political philosophy. Interpreters who are deeply humble with regards to political philosophy cannot help but believe that theirs is the correct appraisal of the vocation. Even if they are committed to the assumption that the authors they interpret are more intelligent than they are, this commitment will weaken when they consider the foolishness of philosophical hubris, and the wisdom of their own philosophical humility. They will then be forced to choose between interpretive charity and interpretive humility, between rejecting the authors being interpreted as foolishly hubristic or doing violence to their work by imposing foreign standards of political-philosophical humility onto their immodestly ambitious works.

This is precisely the dilemma which Rawls faces throughout his lectures. As Steven B. Smith has observed, none of the authors who Rawls discusses (“with the possible exception of Hume”) share his modest conception of political philosophy. Instead, Smith insists, “they were all ‘untimely’ philosophers in Nietzsche’s sense of the term, setting out not to rationalize but to challenge the dogmas and preconceptions of their age.”\(^\text{11}\) The fact that these authors so clearly reject political-philosophical humility makes it difficult for Rawls to present the texts he discusses with both interpretive charity and interpretive humility.

Consider Rawls’s position on whether Hobbes’s political theory can be described as exhibiting the second of the two forms of political-philosophical humility discussed above, if it can qualify as “political, not metaphysical.” Rawls’s argument that Hobbes’s positions on politics are separable from his positions on religion is certainly a plausible, if nonetheless controversial reading. “The whole order of Hobbes’s expositions seems to imply that the secular structure and content of his doctrine is regarded by him as basic,” Rawls reasons. “If theological presuppositions were fundamental, he would, it seems, have started with them” (p. 39, emphasis in original). Yet not only does he present Hobbes’s political philosophy as a “secular system” wholly separable from his theology; Rawls also presents it as separable from Hobbes’s materialist scientific method. According to Rawls, Hobbes’s politics “doesn’t show any signs of

\(^{11}\) Smith (2007), op. cit.
actually having been thought out and derived on the basis of mechanical principles of materialism, the so-called method of science” (p. 29). Yet while Rawls is correct to note that theological questions are reserved for the concluding sections of *Leviathan*, Hobbes’s masterwork undeniably begins with a thoroughly materialist account of human nature, one which Hobbes explicitly presents as the source of the premises from which his political conclusions are derived.

Rawls explicitly defends his “political, not metaphysical” reading of Hobbes on grounds of interpretive charity. He is concerned that certain elements in Hobbes’s moral and political psychology may appear inconsistent or implausible when interpreted as claims about the true constitution of human nature. If Hobbes is an appropriately modest political philosopher, however, his theory of human nature need not be wholly accurate, but only “accurate enough to represent the major influences on human conduct in the kinds of social and political situations he is concerned with.” His theory need not be true full-stop, but only “true enough to model some of the major psychological and institutional forces that influence human behavior in political situations” (p. 51). Yet such humble ambitions seem more in keeping with Rawls’s conception of political philosophy than with that of Hobbes, who is typically understood to have thought that the truth of his political theory gave it a unique claim to authority in structuring human societies. This is not to say that Rawls’s interpretation of Hobbes is incorrect; here is hardly the place to begin a debate on the true meaning of *Leviathan*. It is enough to conclude that the real virtue of interpretive charity, when combined with strong political-philosophical humility but an insufficient degree of interpretive humility, certainly might lead an interpreter awry.  

It must be said in his defense that Rawls does not always impose his distinctive version of political-philosophical humility on all the authors he interprets, insisting that their political views are wholly separable from both their religious and their metaphysical views. Rawls observes that this is certainly not the case with Locke, whose conception of natural law rests on unambiguously theological premises, and “contains a conception of justification distinct from the conception of public justification in justice as fairness as a form of political liberalism” (p. 112).

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12 Kerstin Budde has argued that, in his *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*, Rawls misinterprets Kant for roughly these reasons. “Rawls’s interpretation of Kant,” Budde argues, is “crucially determined by his own theoretical position which cannot accept certain key features of Kant’s position, and as a consequence Rawls interprets Kant in a way that incorporates his own presuppositions, but changes Kant’s theory in vital respects, up to the very nature of how to perceive and justify normative principles.” Budde (2007), “Rawls on Kant: Is Rawls a Kantian or Kant a Rawlsian?” *European Journal of Political Theory*. 6:3, pp. 339-358, p. 354.
Rawls repeatedly emphasizes Locke’s theological foundations, a subject which he argues “deserves emphasis because Locke is often discussed apart from his religious background” (p. 121).

Yet the primary theme of Rawls’s lectures on Locke is not the theological grounding of Locke’s political philosophy. Instead, it is the question of why, although “there are ideas of liberty and equality in Locke that can provide much of, though perhaps not all of, the basis of a conception of what we would regard as a just and equal democratic regime” (p. 151), Locke nonetheless accepts what Rawls calls a “class state.” This is a regime in which there are not merely significant inequalities in resources, but in which these material inequalities translate directly into political inequalities through a property qualification for suffrage. Since Locke accepts the legitimacy of a “class state,” Rawls argues that those of us committed to a deeper form of equality must ultimately conclude that Locke’s political theory “is not well framed for our purposes.” Yet Rawls believes historical contextualization can come to the aid of interpretive charity in such situations. To conclude that Locke’s theory is insufficient for us today is not to criticize Locke, “since as Collingwood would say, our problems are not his problems and they call for different solutions” (p. 155).

Perhaps Rawls could have said something similar about Locke’s religious and metaphysical positions. Although appropriate in Locke’s own highly religious era, such foundational views may be inappropriate in our own religiously and philosophically pluralist age, which calls for a higher degree of political-philosophical humility. The problem with such contextualization, however, is that it implies there is less that we can learn from Locke today than we might otherwise have believed. Even if Rawls’s position does not amount to a criticism of Locke as such, it does seem to compromise his commitment to a strong form of interpretive charity.

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It is unclear how the tension between interpretive charity and interpretive humility can be negotiated successfully, and the fact that Rawls does not always do so in his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy is no argument against the importance of the volume. If nothing else, these lectures are, in the words of J. B. Schneewind, “a perfect treasure-house of material
for understanding how Rawls saw the relation of his own work to that of his predecessors.”

Even if they did not share his political-philosophical humility, each of the authors under discussion made a real contribution to Rawls’s formulation of justice as fairness, and he explicitly explains the contribution of each. Since Rawls’s own views owe so much of their formulation to those of the authors he interprets, even when Rawls seems to impose his views on them, the violence done to the text is never that great. When one is interpreting philosophical positions with a strong affinity to one’s own, the tension between interpretive charity and interpretive humility is considerably mitigated.

Since Rawls has always made his debt to the main figures of the political-philosophical canon clear, his lectures are particularly valuable when they discuss more marginal authors and the role they played in the development of Rawls’s philosophy. In addition to the lectures on Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Mill and Marx which were standard parts of Rawls’s course, the Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy also includes an appendix with lectures on Henry Sidgwick and Joseph Butler. The former was author was occasionally included in Rawls’s course on the history of political philosophy, while the latter was included at least once in his course on moral philosophy. Rawls’s idiosyncratic inclusion of these authors in his otherwise typical syllabi is telling. In his editor’s foreword, Freeman explains that Rawls thought Sidgwick gave his students a better appreciation of classical utilitarianism—the doctrine which Rawls always felt provided the best contrast and strongest alternative to his own—while also providing a clear, systematic method for moral philosophers today to emulate. The fact that, according to Freeman, Rawls considered Butler “among the major figures in modern moral philosophy” (p. xi) is even more unexpected, and hence more illuminating. Rawls’s lectures on Butler focus on how our moral commitments can be seen as essential outgrowths of human beings’ non-egoistic nature.

The lectures on Butler help flesh out one of the main themes of Rawls’s lectures on Mill. Here, Mill’s utilitarian defense of something quite akin to Rawls’s own theory of justice is seen to depend “on a quite specific human psychology.” Rawls admits that “we may think it better for a political conception of justice to be more robust in its principles and to depend, so far as possible, only on psychological features of human nature more evident to common sense” (p.

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At the same time, however, he admits that “all moral doctrines depend on their underlying moral psychology,” Rawls’s own theory of justice as fairness included (p. 313). If any still thought that Rawls’s political philosophy was an essentially Kantian project seeking to determine moral principles a priori, wholly independent of the empirical facts of human psychology, then the publication of the Lectures should put this interpretation to rest once and for all.14

One only wishes that Rawls provided interpretations of more canonical philosophers outside the utilitarian and social contract traditions, including pre-modern and post-modern thinkers with philosophical methodologies and substantive moral positions radically at odds with Rawls’s own. The tension between interpretive charity and interpretive humility would have been very great in a discussion of these anti-liberal and anti-democratic philosophers. Perhaps that is part of the reason Rawls chose not to discuss them. It is not that Rawls had a low opinion of these authors. Quite the opposite; Rawls acknowledges that Aristotle stands alongside Kant as a philosopher whose ethical works are “in a class by themselves” (p. 162), and St. Augustine stands alongside Dostoyevsky as one of the two great “dark minds in Western thought” (p. 302). Another “dark mind” excluded from Rawls’s syllabus is Nietzsche, although Rawls acknowledges Nietzsche as a “great stylist” whose “works do not belong to political philosophy, though his views certainly bear on it” (p. 192).

The closest Rawls comes to a full treatment of views radically opposed to his own is in his lectures on Marx. Characteristically, however, Rawls begins these lectures by insisting that that the scope and purpose of his discussion of Marx is “extremely modest”; he “will consider Marx solely as a critic of liberalism” (p. 320). What follows is primarily a review of the debate among analytic commentators on Marx as to whether Marx’s critique of liberal capitalism is grounded in an implicit theory of justice. (Unsurprisingly, Rawls concludes that it is.) Yet Rawls never confronts Marx on philosophy’s proper social and political role. Although he cites Marx’s famous Thesis 11 on Feurbach (p. 356), Rawls never grapples with its implications. For Rawls, the modest vocation allotted to philosophers is to interpret the world in various ways. Yet this makes it very difficult for him to interpret those who believe that the point is to change it.