Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism

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Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Authoritarianism

A dissertation presented

by

Sheena Elise Greitens

to

the Department of Government

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Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Authoritarianism

Abstract

Why do we observe such widely differing patterns of repression and state violence under authoritarian rule? Despite a wave of recent interest in authoritarian politics, the origins, design and behavior of the coercive institutions that embody the state’s monopoly on violence remain relatively unexamined.

This project draws on new statistical and geographic data, elite interviews, and archival evidence from the U.S. and Asia to chronicle the origins and operation of the internal security apparatus in three Cold War anti-communist authoritarian regimes – Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea – and compares them to similar processes in Communist authoritarian regimes in North Korea and China. Its findings challenge dominant narratives about contentious politics and state-society conflict in Asia; offer an unprecedented view inside ‘secret police’ use of surveillance, coercion, and violence; and provide a new understanding of the institutional and social foundations of authoritarian power.

I argue that autocrats face a fundamental tradeoff between designing their internal security apparatus to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to defend against elite rivals. Coup-proofing requires an internally fragmented security force drawn from narrow segments of society; managing popular unrest requires a unitary apparatus with broadly embedded, socially inclusive intelligence networks. Autocrats construct coercive institutions based on the dominant perceived threat when they come to power, but these organizational tradeoffs, exacerbated by institutional stickiness, blunt their ability to adapt as new threats arise. Organizational characteristics thus give rise to predictable patterns of state violence. A more fragmented, exclusive security apparatus – associated with a high initial threat from fellow elites – is likely to be more violent, both because it has stronger incentives to engage in violence and because it lacks the intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate, pre-emptive repression. In contrast to existing threat-based explanations of repression, I demonstrate that autocrats who are deeply concerned about popular threats use less violence rather than more, and do so because they mobilize organizations expressly designed for that purpose. In
these organizations, intelligence becomes a substitute for violence, and citizens relinquish their privacy, but less often their lives.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I arrived at Stanford two weeks after September 11th, 2001, intending to study English and biology in preparation for medical school. At the end of my first year, out of curiosity about current events, I enrolled in Laura Donohue’s course “Security, Civil Liberties, and Terrorism.” The course examined how security threats, particularly terrorism, changed the structure and behavior of democracies, both internally and externally. Eleven years later, preparing for my dissertation defense, I realized I had come full circle, asking how threats work through autocratic governments to affect the lives of citizens. I thank Professor Donohue for kindling my interest in these questions and first pushing me to think critically about the answers.

In all likelihood, I would not have embarked on a PhD without the example and encouragement of a phenomenal group of undergraduate advisors, who encouraged me to pursue my interests wholeheartedly and with hard work. Shin Gi-Wook’s overseas seminar in Seoul in fall 2002 took me to Asia for the very first time, and transformed Korea from a personal and family interest to an intellectual one. For three years my undergraduate advisor, Chip Blacker, was a source of wise words and guidance about my studies on campus and my interests in policy work and public service. A term abroad at Oxford brought me into contact with Vipin Narang, then my tutor for a course in security studies and
later my colleague in the Government Department. Though our friendship unquestionably reflects the fact that we began by arguing every week in Holywell Manor, he has been a source of trusted advice ever since, and a close friend.

In my final year at Stanford, the Center for International Security and Cooperation took me on as an honors thesis advisee, and taught me how exciting and relevant research in security studies could be. For their support and guidance throughout that process, I thank Tino Cuellar, Lynn Eden, Keith Hansen, and Tonya Putnam. I also owe a profound debt to Scott Sagan and Bill Perry, who agreed to advise a fairly unconventional investigation into North Korean involvement in illicit criminal networks, and whose support made the project better than I could possibly have imagined. I admire, and strive to emulate, their commitments to scholarship and public service. To this date, I think of CISAC as a model for combining rigor and relevance, and remain deeply appreciative of their example and support.

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my skills up to the level necessary to do the project justice. She counseled me early on to make my dissertation not only an interesting idea, but an exercise in excellent craftsmanship. My work has become immensely better for her patient encouragement and insistence on high standards, and I hope that it reflects the degree to which I’ve taken her advice to heart. As a mentor and role model from my first semester, Iain Johnston gave me my first opportunity to teach, gave me a true intellectual apprenticeship by involving me in a project on China’s rise, and taught me an enormous amount about thinking like a social scientist. Steve Rosen generously agreed to oversee my general exam in security studies while otherwise on leave, offered an unparalleled reservoir of comments and readings from which to draw new and creative ideas, and provided a formative example of razor-sharp, humble dedication to intellectual inquiry and to teaching. Steve Levitsky generously took the time to teach and advise me in several courses during my third year while I retrained as a comparativist in order to embark on this project. I am grateful for his patience and counsel, and remain in awe of the encyclopedic knowledge, energy, and enthusiasm with which he approaches both teaching and research.

I could not have imagined when I began this doctoral program how challenged I would be by it, or how much I would grow as a result of this work. I cannot imagine four better scholars, or four finer people, to work with and learn from for the past six years. Their encouragement, support, and adherence to the highest intellectual standards has been both intimidating and motivating, and this manuscript would not have been possible without their training, their advice, and their example (and sometimes their humor). Perhaps more than anything, I am grateful for their faith in the potential of this project and in my ability to carry it off. At a time when many advisors would have suggested I change topics, they encouraged me to aim high and helped me maximize my chances of success. They remind me what a privilege and a joy this work can be.

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Sheena Chestnut Greitens
St. Louis, Missouri
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“Cruelty badly used is that which, although infrequent to start with, as time goes on, rather than disappearing, grows in intensity.”
- Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince

“His Majesty Haile Selassie opposed impious and noisy violence, preferring an exchange in careful doses, thought out.”
- Ryszard Kapucinski, The Emperor

“Cutting off heads isn’t like growing chives. Chives regrow. Heads don’t.”
- Mao Zedong
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Chapter One

Introduction

I. Introduction

Compared to the voluminous studies on international and civil conflict, abuses committed by states against their citizens are a relatively overlooked yet important source of political violence in the world today. Autocracies comprise a significant fraction of the world’s countries, both in historical terms and at present; Freedom House listed forty-eight “not free” and sixty only “partially free” countries at the end of 2011, comprising almost sixty percent of the world’s population. Non-democratic regimes dominate critical regions of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and lead several of the world’s great powers, including China and Russia. From Stalin’s ‘Gulag archipelago’ to Tiananmen Square in 1989 to the 2011 crackdowns in Bahrain and Syria, our mental images of authoritarianism depict these regimes as overwhelmingly repressive and dependent on coercion. Where that coercion is unopposed, some of the world’s worst human rights abuses can come to pass. Where it is resisted, the struggle can metastasize into insurgency or even civil war.

The conceptualization of authoritarian regimes as monolithically repressive, however, ignores a critical element of variation: the different levels and types of violence that they use to

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maintain power. In reality, the level and kind of force employed by autocrats varies dramatically across countries. Eighteen people per year died under Brazil’s military junta; the annual death rate in Argentina was a staggering 1,280.\(^2\) State violence also varies within countries across space and time. In Asia, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces killed thousands in the early years of Taiwan’s “White Terror,” but executed almost no-one in the last two decades of authoritarian rule; in neighboring South Korea, state violence and executions oscillated over time and by region; in the Philippines, violence rose steadily under Marcos – despite U.S. pressure to lower human rights violations in all three cases. The events of the Arab Spring provided yet another indication that authoritarian security services display wide variation in whether and how they use force against the population, with profound consequences for a range of outcomes including regime stability, civil conflict, and foreign policy.

In some places and at some times, regimes rely on low-intensity forms of repression like surveillance and intimidation, while at other times they turn to high-intensity violence like mass killing. What explains this variation? Why do we observe such different patterns of repression and state violence under authoritarian rule?

In recent years, the field of political science has experienced a resurgence of interest in authoritarian political systems, spanning a range of methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives.\(^3\) Much of this work has specifically focused on authoritarian political institutions,
especially those with quasi-democratic features, such as courts, parties, legislatures and elections.⁴

Some studies even examine mechanisms such as delegate responsiveness, accountability, and credible commitment.⁵

Despite this focus, however, and despite the centrality of coercion in works on the nation-state and its stability,⁶ the origins and behavior of coercive institutions – the organizations that embody an authoritarian regime’s monopoly on violence – remain strikingly under-examined.⁷

Intelligence organizations receive similarly scant theoretical treatment.⁸ The handful of works that

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do examine the coercive apparatus – all single-case analyses – do not examine variations in the design of these institutions, nor do they attempt to explain variations in these institutions' behavior.\(^9\) Despite acute contemporary relevance, theoretical significance, and a burgeoning literature on authoritarianism, we lack a nuanced understanding of the micro-foundations of authoritarian rule, especially a clear theory of the organization and use of violence.

This gap seems all the more surprising when we consider that history and literature have provided us with profoundly moving accounts of the human effects of institutionalized terror.\(^10\) This is especially true in the cases of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, about which historians, biographers, and novelists have produced enough volumes to fill library shelf upon library shelf.\(^11\)

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One exception to the single-case approach is Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2: 139-57. Bellin notes that the strength of the coercive apparatus is important, but treats these institutions’ strength as proceeding from structural factors – resource endowments, either material (oil wealth) or social (patrimonialism) – that remain roughly constant in a society or in a regime across time. This argument leaves unexplained both the reorganizations that take place without shifts in these underlying structural factors, and the trends of repression which also vary more quickly than structural factors evolve.


There is, however, little work by political scientists that either examines whether the coercive dynamics of the Nazi and Soviet regimes replicated themselves in the scores of authoritarian regimes that populated the world in the seven subsequent decades. There is also little work that has sought to discern an underlying pattern in their organization and use of violence.\textsuperscript{12} As early as 1970, Dallin and Breslauer’s work on political terror noted the “paucity of discussion about its functions and dynamics.”\textsuperscript{13} Over thirty years later, in 2003, Charles Tilly called for more scrutiny of how different regimes managed their ‘specialists in violence,’ and as late as 2007 Christian Davenport echoed Dallin and Breslauer’s observation, remarking that academic literature still pays more attention to the “evils done against governments” than the evils done by them.\textsuperscript{14}

This oversight may be rooted in the perceived difficulty of accessing sources on the sensitive decision-making processes of closed regimes. It may have originated in the perception that authoritarian repression was fast becoming a topic of dwindling real-world relevance. As the number of democracies multiplied at the end of the Cold War, and civil conflict accumulated in weak states across the globe, it may have seemed logical for scholars to focus more on political transition, democratization, and civil conflict than on state terror, which likely appeared almost old-fashioned, limited to a handful of bizarre Cold War holdouts like North Korea whose time would surely run out soon. It may also have originated in what Holocaust scholars have called the “moral sensitivity


\textsuperscript{12} A partial exception to this is Gregory, \textit{Terror By Quota}. Gregory examines the state security apparatus and proposes explanations for the “stylized facts” of Soviet repression, but does not compare these stylized facts or the motivations for them to other systems.

\textsuperscript{13} Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, \textit{Political Terror in Communist Systems} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970). I thank David Art for bringing this quotation to my attention.

exclusion,” in which scholars avoid examining the motivations of perpetrators of evil because it seems uncomfortably close to justifying their behavior. 15 Whatever the reason, today’s literature on political violence focuses more on periods of transition than on the conditions that precede them, and more on the organization of violence by non-state actors than by states. 16 As a result, we do not know how dictators manage their coercive agents, what tradeoffs they confront as they do so, why their institutional choices vary, or what the consequences of those choices are — for them or for the people they rule. We also do not know what drives temporal, cross-national, and sub-national variation in the patterns of state violence, or why — given the significant costs of indiscriminate violence — regimes use it at some times, but avoid it at others.

Repression in authoritarian political systems, in short, is something that is assumed far more than it is analyzed. Coupled with the field’s current focus on the role played by other political institutions, this oversight could be fundamentally misleading. As David Art has noted, “In the rush to analyze the quasi-democratic institutions of closed autocracies or competitive authoritarian regimes, there is the risk of neglecting their defining feature: the use of coercion, and sometimes terror.”17 Moreover, when scholars omit coercive institutions, they risk overstating the contribution of these other institutions to outcomes such as regime stability or longevity.

In the following pages, I argue that the design of coercive institutions fundamentally shapes patterns of repression and state violence under authoritarianism. Autocrats who want to stay in

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15 Inga Clendinnen, Reading the Holocaust (New York: Cambridge, 1998).


power must defend themselves from a number of different threats: external threats, internal mass-based threats, and internal elite-based threats. However, they face a fundamental tradeoff between designing their internal security apparatus to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to defend against rival elites. As a result, they construct coercive institutions based on the primary perceived threat at the time they come to power, but these organizational tradeoffs, coupled with the stickiness of the coercive apparatus once established, blunt the regime’s ability to adapt as new threats arise. Organizational characteristics thus give rise to predictable patterns of state violence. A more fragmented, socially isolated security apparatus – typically associated with a high initial threat from elites – is likely to be more violent, both because it has higher incentives to engage in violence and because it lacks the intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate, pre-emptive repression. By contrast, autocrats who are truly concerned about popular threats use less violence rather than more, and do so because they mobilize organizations expressly designed for that purpose.

Section Two of this chapter explains how autocrats construct and manage their internal security apparatus. It introduces the fundamental organizational challenge of an autocrat, outlines the process by which regimes construct their security apparatus (including how they deal with organizational tradeoffs), and establishes the independent effect of coercive institutions. This section focuses particularly on explaining choices about the degree of fragmentation (organizational structure) and the exclusivity of the coercive apparatus (social composition). Section Three shifts from using organizational outcomes as a dependent variable to using them as an independent variable that explains variations in the patterns of state violence. I explain two mechanisms by which coercive institutional structure and composition are likely to affect the scope and intensity of state violence: a pathway based on the incentives provided to agents within the coercive apparatus, and a pathway based on the intelligence capacity that the apparatus possesses. Sections Two and Three also discuss
the alternative explanations against which I test my theory. Section Four concludes by providing an overview of the research design and empirical strategy used in this project.

II. The Origins of Coercive Institutions

Autocrats seeking to organize violence face a fundamental dilemma: how should they construct and manage their internal security apparatus – what Charles Tilly called their “specialists in violence” – so that these forces are an asset to their survival and not a threat? It is a paradox of empowerment versus control: how can they establish security forces capable of conducting violence against their enemies, while simultaneously preventing that capacity for violence from being directed at themselves?

A. The Fundamental Problem of Autocratic Self-Preservation and the Paradox of Organizing Violence

To a dictator seeking to ensure his survival, the world presents a number of potential threats. Existing political science literature, however, commonly treats autocrats as if they focus on only one of these problems at a time. The literature on totalitarian government, for example, deals primarily with the threat of mass mobilization and popular revolt, as does some of the recent work on social movements and repression, autocratic institution-building, and democratic transition. There is

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also an extensive literature on coup-proofing (sometimes referred to as political intervention) that spans comparative politics and international security studies. More recent work focuses on the task of elite management, examining how autocrats create and sustain the coalitions necessary to stay in power.

Some of this work has attempted to address tradeoffs. The coup-proofing literature, for example, commonly uses the threat posed by military elites to explain why autocrats pursue forms of political intervention that are sub-optimal from an external security standpoint. Stephen David’s omnibalancing theory looks at how states assess internal versus external threats when making alliance choices. Internally, Milan Svolik explains outcomes related to political institutions and leadership change by focusing on what he calls the twin problems of dictatorship: the problem of authoritarian control over the masses, and the problem of authoritarian power-sharing to counter...

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the threat from fellow elites. None of these works, however, addresses all three types of threats (external, elite, and popular), nor do they directly address the consequences of this multidimensional threat balancing for patterns of authoritarian state violence against civilians.

This project seeks to extend the existing body of knowledge, incorporating all three types of threat into a comprehensive explanation of the origins of authoritarian coercive institutions, and then using those institutions to explain patterns of violence by the state against its people. Addressing only one type of threat is a luxury that dictators simply do not have – at least not if they want to stick around for long. Figure 1.1 illustrates the set of threats that populate an autocrat’s political landscape.

![Figure 1.1: Threat Landscape for Authoritarian Regimes](image)

A dictator may face secessionist movements whose independence would dismember his territory, as in contemporary China, Sudan, Burma, or parts of the former Soviet Union. He may be conquered by another country’s military, as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003. He can be deposed by a mass movement or revolution, such as the ones that have overturned Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, anti-Communist regimes in Asia, or recent incumbents in the Middle East. Finally,

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he could be overthrown or assassinated by fellow elites in a coup. Any of these threats are ignored at the dictator’s peril.

To defend himself, an autocrat creates coercive institutions: a cluster of organizations collectively responsible for intelligence and internal security.26 In creating these institutions, however, the autocrat encounters his particular variant of a universal problem of political order, one shared with any regime that creates forces to hold a monopoly on violence within its territory. Who guards the Guardians? How do rulers both give the armed forces the capacity for violence, and ensure that that capacity will be directed toward its intended end rather than at them?

Most of us have encountered this problem through the lens of democratic political theory and civil-military relations. James Madison wrote in the Federalist Papers that “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”27 Even for democracies, the ability of a government to enforce order is not just a necessary evil, but a fundamental reason justifying government’s existence. The first obligation and raison d’être of any government is to eliminate the dangers of anarchy; the additional obligation of a democracy is to then check itself so that it does not become a tyrannical Leviathan.

Contemporary theorists have extended these arguments to explicitly examine the problems of achieving civilian control over the military, the actor with the most obvious capacity for unchecked tyranny. Feaver summarizes the observation that “the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat” to it, and elaborates:

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26 Ronald Weitzer calls this the “internal security sector”; the most common lay term is “internal security apparatus.” I use these terms interchangeably. Art, “What Do We Know About Authoritarianism.” Ronald Weitzer, Transforming Settler States: Communal Violence and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war…. On the other hand, just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect. Because the military must face enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power gives it the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it.28

To those who seek to ensure self-government, these dual requirements of power and self-control pose a fundamental challenge. The armed forces must be strong enough to maintain order – the purpose for which they are created – but not so strong that they become abusive and pervert the ends for which they were brought into existence.

Autocrats face the same dilemma, but to a different end. An autocratic ruler seeks not to preserve the polity’s or society’s ability to govern, but his own. And although contemporary scholarship on civil-military relations most often frames the issue as a tradeoff between external defense and internal freedom, Madison’s observation reminds us that the tradeoff can be purely internal, balancing the capacity to enforce order with control over the order-enforcers. Dictators do not worry about the security services destroying democracy; they worry about the security services destroying them. Machiavelli identified this risk in the fifteenth century, warning that there are two faults in a general that can pose a danger to the ruler: technical incompetence, and disloyal ambition. “Commanders are either skilled in warfare, or they are not,” he writes, and “if they are, you cannot trust them, because they are anxious to advance their own greatness… If, however, the commander is lacking in prowess, in the normal way he brings about your ruin.”29 A commander who is not strong enough will bring about disaster through defeat on the battlefield, while a commander who is too strong can usurp power.


The threat of usurpation by fellow members of the ruling elite—typically, the military or security forces—is, statistically speaking, the most common way for a twentieth-century autocrat to be deposed. In Milan Svolik’s analysis of 316 authoritarian leaders who held power between 1946 and 2008 and exited office extra-constitutionally, he finds that 68% lost power through a coup d’etat, compared to 11% by popular uprising, and only 5% by foreign intervention. When it comes to the security forces, autocrats face a real and acute dilemma between empowerment and control.

Organized violence requires collective action. Autocrats must therefore empower the security forces for enough collective action to enforce order and conduct external defense missions, but limit or control the capacity for collective action so that it is not turned against the autocrat and used to replace him. To obtain control, they use a range of techniques, usually grouped under the heading “coup-proofing.” The following section explains what these management efforts look like, before turning to the question of when they are most prevalent.

B. Controlling the Coercive Apparatus: An Overview of Coup-Proofing Techniques

To manage their internal security apparatus, autocrats use a range of techniques designed to ensure loyalty and limit the security forces’ ability to plan and stage a successful coup. These methods of political intervention lead autocratic coercive institutions toward two organizational characteristics: coup-proofed security services tend to have a higher degree of fragmentation, and are more exclusive in terms of their social composition. Optimizing an organization against coup-proofing creates

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31 Svolik, Politics of Authoritarian Rule, pp. 5-6.

32 Keefer, “Why Follow the Leader?”
tradeoffs in terms of institutional design that make that institution suboptimal for popular policing and external defense – costs that will be explored further in the next section.

On balance, attempts at coup-proofing are likely to increase the degree of fragmentation within the internal security apparatus. Authoritarian security forces are commonly divided into multiple organizations with overlapping or competing responsibilities. This prevents collusion, and keeps any one organization from amassing enough political power to carry out a coup. Journalistic accounts and historical case studies of autocratic security services are rife with observations about competition and hostility between rival organizations. During the reign of the Dominican Republic’s infamous dictator, Rafael Trujillo, “high command was always diluted among several contenders.”33 North Korea’s Kim Jong Il created intelligence and internal security services with “deliberately blurred and overlapping” lines of responsibility to ensure that none could gather enough power to stage a challenge.34 Saddam Hussein created a network of Iraqi civilian and military security organizations with “overlapping and redundant functions,” designed to impede collusion and foster competition.35 In later years, Indonesia’s Suharto created a divide-and-rule strategy among powerful generals, creating “multiple informal chains of command that led only to Suharto.”36

Two things are worth noting about this definition of fragmentation. First, its form varies. Power may be divided between internal security forces and the military (as in North Korea), or between different branches of the armed forces (such as the Army-Navy rivalry under the Argentine

junta), or among different domestic organizations (police, interior ministry, paramilitaries, presidential or royal guard, etc), as in Iraq and the Philippines. Second, as this handful of examples readily shows, fragmentation is not obviously correlated with regime type; it appears to be an independently varying attribute of authoritarian coercive institutions.

Fragmentation is often reinforced by the doctrines and practices that deliberately impede coordination and cooperation between forces. In many non-democratic countries in the Middle East, joint commands and exercises are rare, and require presidential approval. In Saudi Arabia, for example, even relatively simple and routine activities like assembling road convoys require authorization from multiple command channels. Information sharing across military units is severely restricted, and authority is not delegated to ground-level commanders.

Autocratic security services that have been coup-proofed also tend to be socially exclusive. Autocrats manipulate the social composition of their security forces in ways that they believe will make those forces more loyal – or at least, less likely to rebel. This can be either because autocrats are actually trying to lower the social representativeness or embeddedness of the security forces in order to prevent defection, or because it happens as a byproduct of other mechanisms designed to induce loyalty. Stephen Rosen notes that militaries that reflect the society from which they are drawn are likely to engender higher trust among democratic leaders, but in autocratic regimes, the converse is more likely to be true – isolated insiders are perceived to be most trustworthy. Security

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37 A quick examination of data indicates wide variation in the ratio of military to internal security personnel in authoritarian regimes, ranging from very small internal security forces to countries in which the internal security forces outnumber the regular military. See the compendium The Military Balance, issued annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

38 If for some reason certain regime types were likely to perceive different dominant threats, then one would expect more correlation with regime type. This is a question that should be explored using a wider sample of authoritarian regimes.


forces composed of the same ethnic group are thought to be more reliable because they share regime interests, defined by common identity. By not reflecting the fissures of a multiethnic society, moreover, they are expected to operate more cohesively.\textsuperscript{41}

Examples abound of autocratic security forces staffed with favored ethnic groups or tribes and led by the dictator’s family members. In Libya, Muammar Qadhafi’s son Khamis ran the elite “Khamis brigade” designated for regime protection, his brother-in-law Abdullah Senussi ran the intelligence services, and organizations such as the Republican Guard were predominantly drawn from Qadhafi’s own tribe.\textsuperscript{42} Brett Carter documents how Denis Sassou Nguesso in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) has used intermarriage and other techniques to stitch together an elite based on family and social networks.\textsuperscript{43} In Asia, Chiang Ching-kuo managed Taiwan’s secret police for decades on his father’s behalf before assuming power himself; Kim Jong Un reportedly ran North Korea’s State Security Department before succeeding his father in a regime where he is surrounded by relatives.\textsuperscript{44}

Beyond family, the leadership and even the rank-and-file of the intelligence and security forces are often drawn from favored social or ethnic groups. After 1968, Saddam Hussein replaced the ethnically and religiously representative Iraqi National Police with the Special Security Directorate (SSD, al-Amn al-Khas) run by his youngest son Qusay and composed of 5,000 members.

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\textsuperscript{44} Author’s conversations with two Korean defense analysts, September 2011 and January 2012. At the time, however, personnel appointment power was still thought to rest with the KWP’s Organization and Guidance Department, believed to be run by Kim Jong Il’s sister Kim Kyung Hee. See also Andrei Lankov, \textit{From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: the Formation of North Korea, 1945-60} (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 2002), pp. 72-73.
\end{flushright}
of his Tikrit clan. Alawite and Druze minorities make up most of the officer corps in Syria, and pro-regime Alawite militias (shabiha) from the Assad family stronghold of Latakia were blamed for some of the worst abuses during the conflict that began in 2011.

In Iran, the government has employed basij, volunteer forces from the impoverished areas in the countryside who lack “social bonds to the city dwellers… and are expected to be capable of violently suppressing urban, middle-class uprisings.” In South Korea, Chun Doo Hwan preferentially appointed military officials from his own region – Kyongsang, the southeast – to key posts, particularly those in charge of units in Seoul and those that held responsibility for enforcing martial law.

Chad’s President Habre created a state security force (the Documentation and Security Directorate/Direction de la Documentation et de la Securite, DDS) composed entirely of his own ethnic group, the Gorane, and purged security officials of rival ethnicities. John Doe in Libera replaced most of the government and army with the Krahn tribe from which he came – an estimated 4% of the country’s population. As with fragmentation, the exact form of social exclusion from the coercive apparatus varies based on the country in question’s particular social cleavages.

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47 Ali Alfoneh, cited in Caryl, “Plague of Thugs.”


Use of the autocrat’s own social group is not the only technique that predisposes autocratic security services toward exclusivity, though it does seem to be most common. Another common technique is the use of mercenaries imported across international borders. The Ottoman rulers drew their Janissaries – palace guard units – from Christian areas in the Balkans; and Gadhafi gained notoriety before his demise in 2011 for having imported foreign fighters from countries including Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Niger to counter the escalating rebellion. Autocrats can also employ minorities from within the country who are too small in number and influence to have a hope of seizing power themselves. Stalin deliberately promoted minorities whose lack of a power base neutralized them as a threat, and members of Saddam Hussein’s palace staff were almost entirely Christian speakers of Assyrian and Chaldean. A similar logic may inform the use of child soldiers among armed groups in Africa; younger fighters are believed to be more likely to follow orders and less likely to defect or stage a coup.

As with management techniques that heighten the structural tendency toward fragmentation, social exclusiveness is often paired with practices that lower the security forces’ ability to represent, participate in, and penetrate society. Autocratic militaries and paramilitary organizations commonly employ a system of rotation designed to ensure that no one person can accumulate too much power in a single base: Selassie’s Ethiopia, Hussein’s Iraq, and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea all operated


53 Gregory, *Terror by Quota*.

54 Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party*.

systems in which the top leaders directly controlled personnel appointments, and commanders were transferred frequently, sometimes without warning.\textsuperscript{56} Police officers who returned to Latin America from training in the United States with knowledge that would make their units more effective at domestic policing were also frequently assigned to new commands or positions with different responsibilities, based on the fear that their training would increase their ability to use their forces to aggrandize power.\textsuperscript{57}

Additionally, coercive institutions can be exclusive as a byproduct of other ways of weakening the security forces to protect against a coup. Autocrats can, for example, simply reduce the number of internal security personnel or the resources allotted to them to ensure that their power does not grow too strong. Although the East German Stasi are famous for the high degree of social penetration that they achieved and their use of technology to create a massive surveillance state, I find that they are a rarity among authoritarian internal security services; the level of surveillance used on East German citizens was, in fact, almost unparalleled. As Table 1.1 shows, most autocratic internal security services employ far fewer personnel per capita.


Table 1.1: Ratio of Internal Security Personnel to Population\textsuperscript{58}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad (Habre, 1982-1990)</td>
<td>1: 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>1: 5830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq (Saddam Hussein)</td>
<td>1: 5090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazi Gestapo (c. 1940)</td>
<td>1: 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (Marcos, 1980s)</td>
<td>1: 1120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (Marcos, 1976)</td>
<td>1: 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>1: 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany (officers only)</td>
<td>1: 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of China (Taiwan)</td>
<td>1: 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea (w/informants, 2012)</td>
<td>1: 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Germany (w/informants)</td>
<td>1: 67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dictators can also deprive coercive institutions of funding, either because they have fiscal constraints on the amount of resources available, or as a deliberate method of keeping these forces weak and dependent on the leader’s patronage. Smaller numbers and lower resources make it harder to be or even come into contact with a representative sample of the population, and also decrease the internal security sector’s capacity for social penetration, whether achieved by human or technical means.

C. Creating Coercive Institutions: Organizational Tradeoffs

If dictators have to defend themselves from multiple threats, and have access to the techniques described above, then how do they organize the institutions of coercion? If all autocrats were chiefly concerned with coup-proofing, then we should see a single optimal model of organization for internal security along the lines described above – but this is not the case. How, then, does variation arise?

\textsuperscript{58} Author’s dataset on coercive institutions, under development. Note that the number of internal security personnel, or even their per capita numbers, cannot be taken as a face value metric of societal penetration. The percentage of workers assigned to administrative rather than operational roles, and the deployment/assignments of the operational personnel (for example, whether they engage in presidential security duties rather than on-the-ground intelligence gathering) will also affect how these numbers translate into societal penetration. They are nevertheless a useful illustration of variation.
I argue that it arises because autocrats configure their internal security apparatus based on whatever they perceive to be the dominant threat at the time they come to power. Decisions about both the structure and social composition of that apparatus are made based on the desire to optimize coercive institutions to deal with that threat. Table 1.2 shows what we would expect the security apparatus to look like if this was the case:

**Table 1.2: Predicted Institutional Configuration Based on Threat Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Fragmentation</th>
<th>Exclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>Low (battlefield effectiveness)</td>
<td>High (draft, unity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Low (coordinated operations)</td>
<td>High (intelligence, support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>High (prevent collusion)</td>
<td>Low (trusted insider/Janissary)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coercive institutions that are designed to deal primarily with an elite threat will tend toward high fragmentation and social exclusivity, for the reasons discussed above. This places the elite-oriented institutional design at odds with the institutional designs that optimize for defense against both popular and external threats.

The optimal institutional designs to deal with external and popular threats overlap quite a bit, though the mechanisms leading to institutional similarity (indicated shorthand in parentheses above) are different in each of the two cases. The presence of an existentially high external threat is likely to suppress fragmentation that would hamper effective warfighting capabilities. Countries with high external threats are also more likely to have mechanisms, like a draft, that widen the social base of the military and make it inclusive. Coercive institutions designed to deal with a severe popular threat must also be able to engage in coordinated operations like multi-city riot control or counter-insurgency work, and so are also less likely to be fragmented (though the lead institution is more likely to be the police or gendarmerie than the military). Moreover, the intelligence demands of a
popular threat and the goal of winning “hearts and minds” make it more likely that coercive institutions will be inclusive, to draw information and support from as broad a swathe of society as possible.

Several points related to organizational design are worth emphasizing here. First, what matters is the dominant threat: the one that is perceived to be most acute at the time the autocrat assumes power. Although the intensity of each individual threat may rise or fall over time, what matters is which threat the autocrat perceives to take priority, relative to others. Because an autocrat must decide whether his security apparatus will be representative or not, and because he must decide whether the apparatus will be fragmented or not, he cannot simultaneously hedge against all threats at once. Organizationally speaking, he has to prioritize which threat is dominant.

Second, the theory is based on dominant perceived threat. Threat perception is notoriously difficult to define ex ante. In the cases that follow, I reference objective indicators of threat – the level of popular protest, balance of military forces, etc. – but it is clear that, in at least some of the cases in question, a dictator’s subjective perception of threat does not correlate perfectly with reality. I have therefore opted to assess threat perceptions on a case-by-case basis, using as wide a range of materials as possible to consider both objective threat and subjective perception: official historical documents from the regime, threat analyses conducted by the various security organizations, archival records containing American assessments of the threat in each of these countries, newspaper accounts and commentaries, diaries and private papers, speeches, and personal conversations with the autocrat (then recounted to me in interviews). This approach is certainly imperfect, but the available alternatives all posed even bigger problems for drawing inferences on the questions considered here.

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Third, because fragmentation and representation are organizational attributes driven by a common imperative, these attributes usually co-vary. In other words, if you set up fragmentation and representation as a 2x2 matrix, cases would only tend to fall into two quadrants: high fragmentation/high exclusion, and low fragmentation/low exclusion. (For ease of reference, I refer to the former as “elite-oriented” coercive institutions, and the latter as “mass-oriented” coercive institutions.) Variation exists on a spectrum within each of these “types,” but the types are nonetheless conceptually distinct and identifiable.

Fourth and last, viewed through this lens, organizational design poses fundamental tradeoffs for regime security. It is theoretically impossible to create an internal security apparatus that is truly optimized to defend against both a popular threat and an elite one. Organizations that are set up to pre-empt popular threats short of violence get the intelligence that they need to do so by being inclusive, representative, and embedded in society. This makes violence harder to use when they are called upon to repress. By contrast, organizations that are set up to capably use violence against threats when they do emerge have a harder time getting the information to pre-empt those threats in the first place. Similarly, lack of fragmentation enables coordinated action against either an external or popular threat, but heightens the risk that the security apparatus will unite to remove the autocrat. Finally, resource constraints heighten the tradeoff between external and popular threats if it is difficult to fund both a large military and a large police force. No theory currently addresses the tradeoffs that come from all three of these threats, nor do existing theories link those tradeoffs to the consequences for state violence against the civilian population. If correct, the theory advanced here should successfully explain the origins of coercive institutions and the level of violence these institutions are likely to employ.
D. Independent Effects

If autocrats are optimizing their coercive institutions to deal with the dominant threat at the time they come to power, can we simply use threats to explain the patterns of violence that these institutions engage in? Are institutions superfluous?

The dominant argument in the literature on repression suggests that they are. Christian Davenport’s “Law of Coercive Response” argues that autocrats respond to rising threats with rising violence intended to stamp out that threat. If this is true, we should not need to know anything about the organizations that engage in violence in order to predict their patterns of behavior. Structure would be simply responding to threat, in which case threat is the actual driver of patterns of violence. For organizational characteristics to have an independent causal effect on the patterns of violence, they must vary in some way that is not correlated with the incentives for violence in the first place. So can threats directly explain the pattern of violence?

I argue that they cannot, for several reasons. First, dictators do not perceive threats perfectly. Threats are notoriously difficult to identify and measure, and there is good reason to think that it is as hard or harder for dictators to do this ex ante as it is for political scientists to do it ex post. Second, even if an autocrat feels a sense of threat, violence/not is not the only choice available to address it. Autocrats do not just decide whether to respond to threats with direct violence; they respond by creating institutions to administer that violence, especially if they expect to be in power for some time. Staying in power requires violence at scale, and at a sustained level of organization over time. In other

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words, it requires an institution. And because violence has costs, a smart dictator will want his organization to have as broad a range of tools as possible, including both violent and non-violent means. A smart dictator will also try to have his organization pre-empt threats before they emerge and escalate, rather than choosing to repress a protest that has already blossomed. Given even minimal costs to using violence, he has strong incentives to try to deal with that threat by other methods. Organizational dynamics therefore matter in the process of repression. Third, institutions are sticky. Once they are created, internal interests exert countervailing logics upon their behavior, and so institutions evolve more slowly than threats do. In short, coercive institutions exert powerful and independent effects. The patterns of violence that they create are not simply linear responses to changes in threat.

The argument that autocrats create coercive institutions to deal with the dominant threat at the time they come to power is broadly consistent with what Paul Pierson calls “actor-centered functionalism,” in which a particular institution comes into existence “because it is expected to serve the interests of those who created it.” Political scientists have long argued the common-sense case that organizations are created for rational reasons, to serve specific actors’ needs; like Pierson, Robert Keohane notes that “institutions exist because they could have reasonably been expected to increase the welfare of their creators.” The explanation advanced here offers no disagreement with the claim that dictators are generally rational actors whose behavior is motivated by the desire to

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preserve their own power, or with the contention that this desire is the primary motivating force behind their creation of coercive institutions.

Arguing that actors create institutions for certain purposes, however, is not the same as arguing that the actors then employ those institutions perfectly. Theorists working from formal bargaining models often offer this kind of rational and frictionless story. By and large, these works have adopted a choice theoretic framework, in which protestors use government behavior to determine their optimal tactic, or the government chooses an optimal repressive strategy based on protestors’ behavior. Drawn from micro-economic producer theory, this framework suggests that the overall goal of protestors and governments alike is to optimize the production of a good (some policy demand for the protestors; cessation of protest or maintenance of public order for the government) at minimal cost. This framework thereby suggests that “all observed incidents of peaceful compromise, deterrence, or escalation to violence are then actually a product of the optimal choices of the government” – and those choices should never backfire. Autocrats calculate the costs and benefits of violence, the argument goes, and so if autocrats use violence, it must be because violence is useful to them. The institutions of violence exist to make violence most efficient for their creators.

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64 Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation.”


67 For a recent notable example, see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, *The Dictator’s Handbook*.

Unlike the argument that violence is a direct response to threat, this line of argument does take into account the costs of violence and the incentives that an autocrat has to find solutions that eschew violence in excess. It is, however, still incomplete. Even if they recognize and factor into their behavior the costs of violence, autocrats still do not live in a frictionless world of perfect optimization. (If they did, one might imagine that their efforts would be more successful.) As Kiren Aziz Chaudhry writes when discussing authoritarian economic institutions in the Middle East, institutions do not “flow effortlessly from the design table of omniscient rulers.”69 Several factors can interfere with the attempt to optimize, and optimization is especially hard to achieve perfectly over an extended period of time.

First, dictators may see threats imperfectly.70 Stalin engaged in extensive purges in order to coup-proof his officer corps at a time when the Soviet Union was facing a clear external threat but there appears to have been no credible threat of a coup;71 similarly, Mao Zedong prioritized internal enemies at the expense of external efficacy.72 Conversely, both Hitler and Mussolini emphasized external threats, even though history documents that both leaders faced real – and in Mussolini’s


70 Talmadge, “‘Explaining Military Effectiveness,’” p. 41.


case, eventually fatal – threats from within their own officer corps. Misperception and miscalculation are the first possible sources of failure to optimize autocratic institutions to threat.

It may also be difficult to optimize coercive institutions because these institutions are sticky. Institutional development is path-dependent, and the people who drive that development process are concerned not only with efficiency, but with preservation of “the power, prestige, privileges, and importantly, distributional advantages of the dominant elite and its allies.” This is especially true of coercive institutions, which are often among the most powerfully entrenched players, and whose desire and ability to preserve their advantageous place in the power structure can override rational incentives for redesign if that redesign would occur at their expense. Thus among government bureaucracies, the security sector is relatively likely to possess not only an organizational interest in defending the status quo, but also sufficient organizational power to do so successfully; it is therefore among the actors that are most likely to successfully resist change. As Kenneth Grundy writes, “Institutions instinctively behave in ways designed to solidify or enhance their power. The security institution is a model example.” This does not mean that institutional change is non-existent, but it does mean that entrenched interests place non-trivial constraints on the process of change, and that optimization will be sticky and slow – if it happens at all.


E. A Note on Alternative Explanations

Note that while institutional path dependence and external influence are both factors that can and do interfere with a continuous process of optimizing institutions to threat, neither suffices as a stand-alone alternative explanation for the creation and design of coercive institutions.76

The literature on path-dependence has primarily focused on institutional continuity across regimes, rather than over time within them.77 Path-dependent dynamics have been highlighted in work on post-Soviet Russia, where scholars argue that the transition toward democracy has been stalled largely by successful resistance to reform by the intelligence and security agencies.78 Mary Callahan suggests that an institutional legacy of strong British control facilitated the implementation of authoritarianism in contemporary Burma;79 Elizabeth Perry notes the continuity of militias in the People’s Republic of China;80 Reo Matsuzaki attributes the divergent outcomes of Taiwan and the Philippines to the different institutions bequeathed by Japanese and American statebuilding efforts;81 Stephen Cook traces the path dependence of military involvement in politics in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey; and Ronald Weitzer outlines the effects of an institutional heritage of “settler rule” in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.82

76 “There is a vast literature on institutions, but relatively little on how institutions are created.” Joseph Fewsmith, The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 8; Pierson, Politics in Time, p. 103.


82 Cook, Ruling But Not Governing; Weitzer, Transforming Settler States.
I find, however, that the moment at which an autocrat ascends to power represents a critical juncture, one that empowers him to engage in a significant degree of institutional reconstruction. It seems logical that a dictator strong enough to seize power would also be strong enough to remake institutions. Indeed, purges and reorganizations within the coercive apparatus commonly accompany the first year or two of an autocrat’s ascent to power. Even in the cases of path dependence cited above, institutional continuity is not absolute. Elizabeth Perry finds that “institutional inversion” in the early years of the People’s Republic of China maintained the institutions of “militia,” but transformed them from institutions of state-breaking to institutions of state-making, and Ronald Weitzer notes that similar repressive organizations inherited by successor regimes in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe were constrained in Ireland but fortified and further mobilized in Zimbabwe.

This is not to say that institutions are wholly remade, or that no continuity exists. To argue for strict path dependence, however, neglects the dynamics of power that pervade institutional creation, and particularly the dynamics of power that surround the seizure of power by a new autocrat. I find that what determines the degree of continuity between past coercive institutions and those put into place by a new autocrat is the degree to which the threat environment is similar to that facing the past regime: in other words, the degree to which past dominant threats correlate with present ones. (The idea that threats at the moment of state formation lock in certain patterns

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83 Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution*.

84 Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States*.


86 This raises two additional questions: do the regime’s path to power and the direction of transition influence the degree of continuity? On the first point, there may be a greater difference between pre- and post-transition interests (and threats) in a revolutionary ascent to power than a coup, which could explain why
of domestic institutions is not new; external threats have long been posited to have this effect. What is relatively new is applying the same logic to internal threats, and then using it to explain variations in the degree of path dependence.) Where threats change with the rise of a new regime, institutions are likely to change also. Only after those institutions are created and put into place does path dependence start to exert a drag on the process of optimization.

In some cases, we do observe evolution in coercive institutions even after the initial configuration has been established. Where we do, however, there is a clear trend, logically consistent with the overall argument advanced here: evolution is almost uniformly in the direction of fragmentation and exclusivity. It is easier to fragment coercive institutions than to un-fragment them, for two reasons. First, an autocrat who has fragmented his security apparatus and set pieces of it in competition will always be able to see that competition as evidence of ambition and aggrandizement on the part of elite rivals, further heightening his belief in the need to coup-proof by fragmenting even more: a negative feedback loop that propels the system ever further toward the extreme. Second, the two types of coercive institutions differ in terms of their ability to collect and process the feedback that would enable successful adaptation. Even if a fragmented system should face a serious and rising coups seem to contain more baseline institutional continuity. On the second, we would expect a new democrat to have less freedom to remake the security apparatus than a new autocrat, especially if the new democrat comes to power through a typical “pact.” This would explain why, for example, Mohamed Nasheed, the democratically elected president of the Maldives ousted in a coup on 7 February 2012, credits his overthrow to the entrenchment of old military and police institutions, writing, “long after the revolutions, powerful networks of regime loyalists can remain behind and can attempt to strangle their nascent democracies.” Mohamed Nasheed, “The Dregs of Dictatorship,” The New York Times, 8 February 2012.

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88 For a notable exception, see Slater, Ordering Power.
popular threat, the system will not collect and process information so that the autocrat could reliably identify new threats and adjust his strategy and institutional design accordingly.

For this reason, an elite-oriented system may become more and more fragmented and exclusive, but will rarely reverse type, absent a major shock to the system. A unified, inclusive system, on the other hand, may develop fragmentation over time, but it also may not, and is more likely to preserve its ability to adapt.\(^8^9\) (If deterioration toward the elite orientation occurs, it can create the rare cases in which the two attributes of coercive institutions do not co-vary; Patrick McEachern finds, for example, that North Korea under Kim Il Sung fit the classic totalitarian model in which the party-state achieved high penetration and low fragmentation, but that his son and successor Kim Jong Il ruled in a “post-totalitarian” system that maintained high penetration and inclusivity but also increasingly exhibited fragmentation and competition within its coercive apparatus.\(^9^0\)) Both systems have some stickiness built in, but it is easier to move toward fragmented and elite-oriented coercive institutions than it is to get away from them.

External influence is also sometimes posited as a source of coercive institutional design, especially given its prevalence on both sides of the Cold War. The United States began training and providing aid to foreign police forces in the 1950’s, and the Kennedy administration expanded the “internal defense” program under the auspices of the Office for Public Safety (OPS) in the Agency for International Development. Their stated goal was to “deal with and eliminate the causes of dissidence and violence,” and their efforts focused on local police, who American government

\(^8^9\) This raises an interesting question: how does a mass-oriented coercive apparatus deal with coup-proofing? In Chapter 5, I explore the idea that a specific process of coming to power, as in Communist revolutionary regimes, leads to a mass orientation and \textit{a temporary lull in elite threat}, thereby enabling these regimes to bypass the organizational tradeoff outlined above – until a succession is necessary.

officials believed were “the first line of defense” against Communist proto-insurgency.\(^9\) Starting in 1963, Georgetown’s International Police Academy – the “West Point” for international police forces – provided equipment and advice to 52 countries’ police departments. After the Academy had hosted trainees from 77 countries in what one scholar characterized as direct attempt to disseminate American models of social control,\(^9\) Congress terminated the program in 1974 due to mounting concern about its support for repressive regimes.\(^9\) Under Mielke, the East German Stasi trained foreign police and intelligence forces across the Third World, educating African insurgents at the Department for International Relations from 1971 onward, and sending advisors to Allende’s Chile, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ghana, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Zanzibar, among others.\(^9\) North Korea trained foreign security forces as well, including those of Robert Mugabe.\(^9\) External assistance often transmitted norms about models of policing whose influence seemed to run counter to what threat-based explanations should predict – as, for example, when Chiang Kai-shek adopted Western policing models that crippled his intelligence on local populations in mainland China in the 1920s and 1930’s (see Chapter Two).

Upon closer examination, however, this interpretation is flawed. History does not bear out the claim that external influence is a determinate alternative explanation, for two reasons. First,


\(^9\) Martin Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); see also Bermudez, Armed Forces of North Korea.
external influence correlates strongly with the presence of an external threat, and pushes institutional outcomes in the same direction that the presence of an external threat would be expected to. Security aid transmitted through American military alliances, for example, usually reinforced the orientation of allied forces to deal with the external threats they faced.

Second, the reception and use of that aid depended on what the regime perceived to be its dominant threat rather than on what the external patron thought best. Where the autocrat shared American officials’ perception that the dominant threat was external – as in Korea, and sometimes in Taiwan – the United States’ influence was strong. Ultimately, Chiang Kai-shek favored a professionalized and socially isolated police force on the Chinese mainland because of his desire to keep police loyal to him rather than local warlords, not because he believed in American ideals of policing. Where perceptions of threat conflict, however – as they did in the early years of the KMT on Taiwan, when Chiang Kai-shek violated U.S. military advice by using political commissars in the Nationalist military, or in the Philippines where American efforts at police reform were stymied by Marcos’ manipulation of police institutions to outmaneuver elite rivals – the threat perceptions of the autocrat clearly triumph.

In sum, though both institutional path dependence and external influence are clearly present, and do exert an influence on the process of coercive institution-building, neither provides a satisfactory alternative explanation for the origins of coercive institutions under authoritarian government. A reasonable case can be made that exogenous variation exists in the internal security apparatus, especially after an autocrat has been in power for a long time. The next section examines how these variations in coercive institutions shape patterns of state violence.
III. The Effect of Coercive Institutions on Violence

The section above established that, the more threatened they feel by fellow elites, the more incentives autocrats will have to create coercive institutions that are fractured, internally competitive, socially exclusive, and isolated from the population. The detrimental effect of these “coup-proofing” techniques on autocratic military performance during interstate war is well-documented. But these techniques also negatively impact patterns of internal violence carried out by autocratic regimes against the civilian population. Their presence is likely to increase both the scope and intensity of state violence.

There are two chief pathways by which the structure and social composition of coercive institutions affect patterns of state violence. There is one pathway based on the incentives provided to agents within the coercive apparatus, and another pathway based on the intelligence capacity that the apparatus possesses. Figure 1.2 illustrates these pathways:

Figure 1.2: How Coercive Institutions Affect Violence

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97 For a fuller discussion of the operationalization and measurement of state violence, please see Chapter One, Section IV. Scope should be thought of as the breadth of violence, or the swathe of the population targeted by it. Intensity has more to do with the severity of violence levied; it increases, for example, from arrest to torture to execution.
Regimes that are oriented around an elite threat – that are internally fragmented and socially exclusive – are more likely to engage in high-intensity, indiscriminate violence for reasons that involve both of these mechanisms:

- Fragmentation creates incentives for violence because it creates competition between different coercive agencies, which often takes the form of “who arrests the most “enemies of the state”?” – giving those units motivations to escalate violence rather than minimize it.

  \textbf{H}_1: \text{Fragmentation leads to increased violence because it increases incentives for violence.}

- Exclusivity also creates incentives for violence because an exclusive security apparatus – one that is very small, for example, or composed of a favored tribe – will have fewer incentives to minimize civilian violence, since that violence lacks the relatively higher social or psychological costs associated with killing or torturing friends, neighbors, or co-ethnics.

  \textbf{H}_2: \text{Exclusivity leads to increased violence because it increases incentives for violence.}

- An apparatus that is exclusive is also likely to have weaker intelligence capacity, because it will lack the local social knowledge to uncover plots in advance and engage in discriminate, targeted arrests.

  \textbf{H}_3: \text{Social exclusivity leads to increased violence because it decreases the intelligence capacity for targeted, discriminate, and pre-emptive repression.}

- Coercive institutions that are fragmented will also have weaker intelligence capability, because fragmentation hampers the sharing of information and analysis.

  \textbf{H}_4: \text{Higher fragmentation leads to increased violence because it decreases the intelligence capacity for targeted, discriminate, and pre-emptive repression.}

For these reasons, we should see the most intense and indiscriminate violence against civilians in regimes for whom these autocratic coup-proofing incentives are most intense. The following subsections will explain each of these pathways in greater detail.
A. The Intelligence Pathway

Autocrats are most likely to be able to rule civilian populations with minimal violence when their domestic intelligence and security agencies effectively collect, analyze, and communicate information on emerging threats. This is not a new idea. At a fundamental theoretical level, some of the classic texts on the causes of violence suggest that we observe violence even when it is inefficient because of a lack of information (among other reasons). As applied to various conflict environments, the argument that close relationships with local actors create good intelligence, and that good intelligence is necessary to sustain discriminate levels of violence, appears in counterinsurgency doctrine, studies of colonial history, and democratic ideas about ‘community-based policing.

In all three of the above branches of literature, discriminate violence is critically important: the minimization of violence against the population, and the minimization of the cost associated

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with that violence, is the regime’s chief goal.\footnote{There are times in which a regime may find it useful to engage in a burst of high-intensity violence as a deterrent. Generally, however, this means that the regime has already failed at the low-cost strategy of deterring or pre-empting collective action short of mass violence. The costs of violence also mean that it is not an optimal long-term strategy.} Intelligence is the key factor that enables regimes to use violence only when necessary. Information is expensive, and obtaining it poses difficulties for those who must gather it from the bottom up, but doing so is critical to achieving the appropriately calibrated use of force.\footnote{Colonel David J. Clark, “The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations,” (Army War College, 2006).} John Ferris calls intelligence “not a form of power, but a means to guide its use, whether as a combat multiplier or by helping one to understand one’s environment and options.”\footnote{Cited in Peter Jackson, “Historical Reflections on the Use and Limits of Intelligence,” in Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel, eds., \textit{Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society}, (Westport: Praeger, 2005), p. 12; see also Michael I. Handel, \textit{Intelligence and Military Operations} (New York: Routledge, 1996).} Martin Thomas notes in his study of British and French colonial government that it was the intelligence relayed from the periphery to central administration that acted as a force multiplier and “enabled colonial governments, garrison commanders, and police inspectors to deploy limited resources to maximum effect at minimum cost.”\footnote{Thomas, “Colonial States as Intelligence States.”} The Army’s counterinsurgency field manual argues that good intelligence enables the precise use of force, enabling security forces to operate “like surgeons cutting out the cancerous tissue while leaving the vital organs intact.”\footnote{U.S. Army, Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgent Field Manual (FM 3-24), p. 41. Available online at www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf} A regime with better intelligence collection, analysis, and transmission will be able to identify the leaders of a protest or attack, track their movements, and arrest them quietly the night before their action would have taken place. They will be less likely to feel compelled to engage in mass arrest and torture, less likely to execute fifty people for fear of letting one conspirator go, and less likely to be surprised by
large public protests that cannot be dispersed without mass public violence. Intelligence enables selective and lower-intensity violence.

The bottom-up expensiveness of information suggests that all incumbents, independent of regime type, confront informational difficulties in identifying and neutralizing threats from within the population. Han Fei Tzu, the Chinese legalist political philosopher who has been compared to Machiavelli, stresses nothing as strongly as the need for a dictator to obtain complete and accurate information from his ministers; his treatise is largely a study of strategies that can be used to achieve this outcome.\textsuperscript{107} Autocracies, however, confront an even more acute version of the informational problem, because they impose barriers that make information expensive from the top down as well. At least four mechanisms have been proposed for why dictators have a worse “information problem” than autocracies. Victor Shih focuses on an autocrat’s need to present a façade of strength to avoid challenges from within.\textsuperscript{108} Stephen Rosen discusses the fact that a tyrant’s mid-level underlings face strong incentives to avoid being the bearers of bad news.\textsuperscript{109} Pablo Policzer notes that the lack of monitoring by civil society and alternative centers of power cuts off mechanisms to monitor and


obtain feedback on agents’ performance.¹¹⁰ Timur Kuran explores the ways in which citizens under autocratic rule live lives characterized by “private truths and public lies.”¹¹¹

Without contesting these statements, I suggest an additional explanation rooted in the organizational dynamics of authoritarian coercive institutions. The defining characteristics of elite-oriented coercive institutions – high fragmentation and social exclusivity – hamper two steps in the intelligence process that are critical to producing targeted and discriminate repression: 1) collection and 2) analysis. Figure 1.3a outlines a simple, three-step model of the intelligence process:

![Figure 1.3a: Steps in the Intelligence Process](image)

Each of the above arguments about autocratic systems can be fit into one of these steps. Public lies make it harder for the intelligence services to collect accurate information from the population. Shutting down civil society removes a potential alternative source from which that information could be collected. The need to present a façade of strength hampers or biases the analytic process. And disincentives to bear bad news can either prevent subordinates from conducting analysis that will lead to pessimistic conclusions, or prevent them from delivering the correct but negative analytic judgment to those who could act on it.

This figure also helps to elucidate why and how the organizational pathologies outlined in the preceding sections are likely to weaken an autocratic coercive apparatus’ intelligence capability. Building on Figure 1.3a, Figure 1.3b provides a structured view of these arguments.

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¹¹⁰ Policzer, Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile, p. 18.

The following subsections explain how exclusiveness and the level of fragmentation affect the intelligence capacity of an authoritarian regime’s coercive apparatus.

Exclusivity and Intelligence

Because social penetration is a critical requirement for intelligence collection, each of the autocratic habits that make the social composition of the coercive apparatus more exclusive also hampers the collection of accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence. As in counterinsurgency and imperial policing, authoritarian security forces face the challenge of identifying and pre-empting threats to established authorities in a potentially hostile environment, and the key task of separating the minority of hostile or threatening actors from the majority of non-hostile civilians who pose no threat. Shared ethnicity carries with it demonstrated informational advantages in these environments, because co-ethnics are “enmeshed in dense intraethnic networks, [and] are better positioned to identify insurgents within the population and to issue credible threats against civilians for non-cooperation.” Jason Lyall finds that, partly for intelligence reasons, the participation of co-ethnics in security operations has led to greater counterinsurgency success in Chechnya; Janet Lewis argues

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112 Thomas, Empires of Intelligence; Bayly, Empire and Information; Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2009).

that the development of a civil intelligence system with broad-based ethnic participation has improved the Ugandan government’s ability to identify and pre-empt the launch of internal rebel groups, particularly in difficult-to-penetrate ethnically homogeneous areas of the country.\textsuperscript{114} Shared ethnic or social identification provides a deep foundation of local social knowledge, understanding of networks, and an intuitive grasp of local norms. It also builds trust among the population and makes them more likely to share sensitive information. For this reason, an inclusive security force is likely to have an easier time obtaining timely and relevant intelligence; an exclusive intelligence and security apparatus composed only of a small segment of society will have more difficulty.

Rotation can also create social distance between police and society and makes it harder for the police to include society in their information-gathering. As mentioned previously, moving officers or units through different locations prevents them from building vertical bonds within the military that can evolve into factions, as well as an independent social or geographic power base from which they could challenge central authority. However, a police officer who has worked in an area for a long period of time will have a network of contacts, knowledge of local history and potential flashpoints, and an understanding of local norms. He or she will be more trusted by local residents and is therefore more likely to be given access to sensitive information. ( Democracies complain that short rotations during attempted state-building projects are a handicap for the same reasons: the need for familiarity with local governmental structures, social institutions, logistics, and language, built over a lifetime of living in a country and society.\textsuperscript{115} ) Rotation hampers the accumulation of individual and


\textsuperscript{115} Rory Stewart, “What Can Afghanistan and Bosnia Teach Us About Libya?” \textit{The Guardian}, 7 October 2011, online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/08/libya-intervention-rory-stewart
organizational memory about a place, and therefore makes the collection, recognition, and analysis of key pieces of information much more difficult to achieve.

Exclusivity achieved by reducing the number of intelligence and security personnel available to patrol and collect information likewise reduce these forces’ ability to obtain intelligence on popular threats. In some cases, technical capabilities (surveillance and monitoring technology, such as that used by the Stasi and in Libya\textsuperscript{116}) can offset low personnel numbers. However, this strategy is likely to be both infrequently employed and ineffective. It is a resource-intensive strategy in places that often have resource constraints, or where those resources could as/more effectively be allocated to patronage. Studies also suggest that for threats such as terrorism and insurgency, technical intelligence collection devices deliver inferior results when compared to human intelligence.\textsuperscript{117} Even the Stasi, famous for their use of surveillance technology – as dramatized in the Oscar-winning movie \textit{The Lives of Others} – complemented that technical capability with an extraordinary number of unofficial informants (\textit{Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter}, IM’s), illustrated in Table 1.1.\textsuperscript{118} Reducing personnel and budget numbers is also a form of exclusivity that damages intelligence collection.

\textit{Fragmentation and Intelligence}

Fragmentation within the internal security apparatus, on the other hand, predominantly damages the analytic component of a regime’s intelligence capability. It does this by constricting or cutting off the vertical and horizontal flow of information among the various organizations that make up the internal security apparatus. The multiplication of organizations or growth of

\textsuperscript{116} Levinson and Coker, “Inside a Flawed Spy Machine,” p. 1; Koehler, \textit{Stasi}.

\textsuperscript{117} Gallagher, “Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,” p 1.

bureaucracy in any political system can lead to a proliferation of agencies with partially overlapping responsibilities but different missions and clearance procedures. Stovepiping leads to a failure to share relevant information with the agencies that need it, and a lack of information coordination. Poor interservice communication after the 1973 coup against Allende, for example, rendered coordination “haphazard and without established procedure” and the “consistency of reporting problematic at best.” As a result, “no information was collected on those who were ‘disappeared’ or executed.”

Fragmentation can also create mixed messages in the information that is transmitted vertically. For reasons that have to do with organizational mission, bureaucratic culture, or leadership style, different organizations are likely to gather, emphasize, and transmit different information upward to their superiors. As a result, fragmentation among multiple agencies can increase confusion over the nature and breadth of threat, as well as increasing the likelihood of conflicting estimates of success or failure. Coupled with incentives against providing negative feedback, this can lead to an underestimation of threats – leaving them to grow until it’s too late – and an overestimation of the efficacy of violent solutions.

The idea that fragmentation creates barriers to information sharing and coordination is not exclusive to autocracies, as evidenced by widespread acceptance of the claim that failure to share intelligence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency

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119 Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, pp. 18, 58.

120 Conflicted reporting may be deliberate – having organizations report on each other gives the autocrat more information on potential elite threats – but can also happen for reasons unrelated to threat management. For example, Scott Gartner writes about “dominant indicators,” in which military organizations pick certain metrics by which to assess success and collect information at the expense or exclusion of others. Scott Gartner, *Strategic Assessment in War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
contributed to the United States’ pre-September 11th security failures.\textsuperscript{121} Regardless of regime type, fragmentation creates an information and coordination problem and increases the transaction costs that make timely and complete provision of information unlikely. In authoritarian regimes, however, these pathologies are more likely, and the incentives provided to the different security organizations and agents heighten the problem – an effect that will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

In sum, both fragmentation and exclusivity in coercive institutions damage these institutions’ intelligence capacity, as illustrated in Figure 1.4.

![Figure 1.4: The Intelligence Pathway](image)

\textit{Ceteris paribus}, when intelligence does not provide the ability to engage in selective and targeted repression, autocratic security forces are more likely to engage in intense and indiscriminate violence.

\textbf{B. The Incentives Pathway}

Coercive institutions that are fragmented and exclusive will not only lack the intelligence capacity to police using discriminate and low-intensity violence, but will also have incentives to use force in more intense and indiscriminate ways.

\textit{Fragmentation and Incentives for Violence}

Fragmentation creates incentives for violence among the organizations and agents of the internal security apparatus. One direct way in which it does so is by creating competition that rewards agents for acts of violence. One frequent metric for success for an internal security agency,

for example, is the number of ‘enemies of the state’ that it has identified or neutralized, and ‘performance-based rewards systems’ therefore reward agents for arresting these enemies. A democratic variant of this incentive structure was uncovered – and rescinded after public outcry – when in 2007 the Los Angeles Times discovered that the L.A. County Sheriff’s Department was holding competitions between stations to see who could arrest the most people in a given twenty-four hour period (Operation Any Booking). A similar exercise (Operation Vehicle Impound) led to spike in the number of vehicles seized, and a competition to see how many suspected gang members could be stopped for questioning boosted those statistics as well.\textsuperscript{122} Other, less sensational studies corroborate the argument that organizational characteristics of police departments provide incentives that influence arrest rates.\textsuperscript{123} These professional incentive structures operate worldwide; Lauren McCarthy has shown that the absence of career incentives leads Russian law enforcement personnel to avoid prosecutions under the new human trafficking legislation,\textsuperscript{124} while James Kai-sing Kung and Shuo Chen find that opportunities for professional advancement motivated excess grain procurement during China’s Great Leap Forward and may explain almost 17\% of the excess deaths in China during this time.\textsuperscript{125} The problem is exacerbated if performance and rewards are allocated to the best-performing agency, rather than to all of those who meet a certain standard. Doing so incentivizes agencies and individuals to compete on the grounds of violence to secure or further

\textsuperscript{122} Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, eds., \textit{Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict} (Ithaca: Cornell, 2010); Scott Glover and Matt Lait, “For deputies, arrests can be a contest,” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 2007, online at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/04/local/me-games4


their bureaucratic interests and individual professional standing. It encourages fabrication of cases and the use of extreme measures, including additional violence and torture, to elicit confessions. It also incentivizes organizations to accuse each other of being the “enemies” they seek, creating the possibility of intra-organizational violence and vendetta-settling. There is seldom a penalty exacted for excessive zeal in the pursuit of duty.

In addition to creating incentives for violence, fragmentation can also create incentives against other factors that might limit or restrain violence. Chief among these is the damage that fragmentation and inter-agency competition can do to a coercive institution’s intelligence capability. There are at least two ways in which this can happen. First, when different agencies are incentivized to compete for power by making arrests and claiming credit for security “victories,” their competition is more likely to become zero sum, and they are less likely to share information that would negate their inter-agency competitive advantage. Policzer documents the detrimental effect of competition between branches of the armed service on information collection and intelligence coordination in Chile during the worst of the post-coup violence in 1973 and 1974.126 Second, when competing security agencies monitor and report on each other, it directs attention away from obtaining intelligence on the domestic population, and detracts resources and manpower from that task. The incentives to avoid sharing information and to waste resources on inter-agency monitoring hamper the development of intelligence that could be used to make violence more discriminate.

Finally, fragmentation and competition create obstacles to vertical transmission of information. This is a likely outcome in two specific circumstances: 1) if subordinates have an incentive to conceal accurate but negative information from the autocrat (the “shoot the messenger” problem that plagued Hussein’s Iraq), or 2) if subordinates have incentives to provide misinformation on their rivals in order to eliminate competitors and accumulate personal or

126 Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 58.
organizational power. Currying favor and casting aspersions on one’s rivals distort the content and provision of intelligence assessments. Kapucinski suggests, for example, that the competition for power between the police and the army was a major factor that prevented officials from delivering accurate information about unrest in provincial army garrisons to Ethiopian ruler Haile Selassie before these problems escalated into full-blown revolt. Structure skews incentives, which then affect the quality of intelligence, which in turn drives violence. The overarching point is that fragmented systems are likely to offer more positive incentives to state actors for engaging in violence and fewer negative incentives for avoiding it, thereby widening the probable scope and intensity of that violence.

**Exclusivity and Incentives for Violence**

Exclusivity also creates incentives for violence. The policies outlined — composing the security forces of a narrow social or ethnic base, instituting a system of geographic and functional rotation, etc — make members of the internal security apparatus into social outsiders. Studies in social psychology strongly suggest that engaging in violence against fellow human beings, a difficult task for ordinary people in ordinary circumstances, becomes easier when the objects of violence are removed from the perpetrator both physically and socially. In an interview on the fortieth anniversary of the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment, the experiment’s most abusive guard, Dave Eshelman, explained, “The only person I knew going in was John Mark. He was another guard and wasn’t even on my shift. That was critical. If there were prisoners in there who knew me before

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127 Shih, “The Autocratic Difference.”

128 Kapucinski, *The Emperor*.

they encountered me, then I never would have been able to pull off anything I did.”

Members of the security apparatus who do not have regular interaction or social identification with the people around them will perceive a lower social and psychological cost to violence than they would if they were being asked to commit it against friends, neighbors, and co-ethnics. Exclusivity does not so much provide positive incentives to commit violence as it does lessen the negative sanction against it. In a study of protest violence in Ethiopia, Leonardo Arriola finds that protests were more likely to spiral into violence when multiethnic federal police confronted ethnic Oromo protestors than when local, ethnically Oromo police handled the protest.

In sum, both fragmentation and exclusivity create incentives for coercive institutions that predispose them toward violence, as shown in Figure 1.5.

**Figure 1.5: The Incentives Pathway**

* Ceteris paribus, authoritarian regimes with more fragmented and exclusive coercive institutions should exhibit higher levels of state violence.

### C. Alternative Explanations for Violence

The argument advanced here diverges significantly from existing explanations for state violence and repression, including those that are threat-based. Each chapter tests the argument proposed above against several alternatives, each outlined briefly below.

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One of the most prominent arguments about state violence suggests that states use repressive or violent measures as a response to rising domestic challenges or threats. This “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” is, along with the argument that democratic regimes use less repression, one of only two relatively uncontested findings in the literature.\(^{132}\) An assortment of studies have corroborated this proposition,\(^{133}\) though others, attempting to make it \textit{ex ante} falsifiable, have struggled to find empirical support.\(^{134}\)

My explanation departs from existing threat-based explanations in several ways. First, a dictator cannot personally use violence against everyone that threatens him. Staying in power over time requires violence to be organized and deployed at scale, which is best accomplished through an institution. Second, these arguments usually suggest that autocrats make calculations about violence based only on the threat from the population, whereas successfully staying in power requires managing multiple threats at once – threats that pose fundamental institutional design tradeoffs. Third, violence has costs, whether in the form of domestic backlash or international opprobrium; a smart dictator will presumably respond to incentives to minimize costly violence whenever possible.

Thus, in contrast to commonly proposed threat-based explanations, I argue here that autocrats who are worried about popular threats will create organizations that are designed to counter that threat, and in doing so, will use less violence rather than more. In the empirical chapters that follow here, strict and falsifiable definitions of threat – such as the number or size of protests – lack predictive power.

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\(^{132}\) Davenport, \textit{Paths to State Repression}.


\(^{134}\) Mahoney-Norris, “Political Repression.”
Another school of thought seeks to explain the outbreak of violence between the state and protestors by using formal bargaining models. By and large, these works have adopted a choice theoretic framework, in which protestors use government behavior to determine their optimal tactic, or the government chooses an optimal repressive strategy based on protestors’ behavior. Drawn from micro-economic producer theory, this framework suggests that the overall goal of protestors and governments alike is to optimize the production of a good (a policy demand for the protestors; cessation of protest or maintenance of public order for the government) at minimal cost. Violence, then, emerges as the logical and even optimal ex post response to the failure of less violent ex ante measures; the framework suggests that “all observed incidents of peaceful compromise, deterrence, or escalation to violence are then actually a product of the optimal choices of the government.”

This framework is not so much wrong as it is incomplete. First, it cannot explain the vast amount of state violence that takes place outside the context of protest. Second, it risks mischaracterizing the goals of an autocrat vis-a-vis the population. Governments who have any cost-sensitivity at all should not simply make choices about whether to violently repress a protest once it has erupted; instead, they should think with a longer-term strategic perspective about how to prevent protest and collective action from coalescing in the first place – and as mentioned above, to do that, they create coercive institutions capable of a broader range of actions than a “repress/not” binary. Third, an autocrat who faces thousands of angry protestors in the street has already experienced some kind of failure, so focusing only on protest response introduces selection bias into the cases that we

135 Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation.”


137 O’Brien and Stern distinguish between ex ante suppression (measures such surveillance, censorship, etc) and ex post repression (violent crackdowns on protest, etc). Kevin O’Brien, ed., Popular Protest in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Harvard Contemporary China Series, 2008).

138 Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation.”
examine as “repression.” Rather than asking, “When are regimes willing to pay the cost of intense public repression?” we should consider why the choice between resigning power and paying that cost became necessary in the first place. Doing so requires that we consider the broader context of repression, which is the object of this study.

Third, the framework I propose explains why violence is not always used optimally – why it sometimes works, and sometimes simply inflames further resistance. Studies on the effect of government action on protest and collective action (much of it stemming from literature on political opportunity structures139) have identified nearly every possible relationship between state repression and protest: positive,140 negative,141 inverted U-shaped,142 mixed,143 and relationships that are driven by substitution effects.144 If regimes were actually perfectly calibrating their levels of violence, as bargaining models suggest, we should expect their efforts to produce more consistent success. Instead, however, I argue that violence is used in sub-optimal ways because of the fundamental tradeoffs involved in organizing to counter multiple different threats, and because of the failure of coercive institutions to adapt as threats evolve.

139 Tarrow, Power in Movement; Douglas McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Vincent Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).


144 Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation?”, Will H. Moore, “Repression and Dissent.”
A third set of alternative explanations argues that the use of violence depends on *state capacity*. Using a strategic interaction framework, Pierskalla finds that strong governments deter protests, whereas weak governments will be forced to compromise, and that third parties who may be interested in seizing power from the government (i.e., through a coup) can use protests as a screening device to test incumbent strength. (A strong government or incumbent, in this case, is one that has control of a “strong” military or police force.\textsuperscript{145}) The “Murder in the Middle” hypothesis similarly suggests that weak state institutions coupled with expansion of democracy will be associated with increased repression.\textsuperscript{146} This, however, begs the question of what exactly makes for a state with high capacity (or strong coercive institutions) in the first place; the term “state capacity” has been used to denote an almost dizzying array of functions.\textsuperscript{147} It also suggests that a government would be strong vis-à-vis protestors in the same way that it is strong against potential coup-plotters, whereas I find that strength against one of these opponents creates weakness or vulnerability against the other. State capacity, therefore, is a quality manipulated by the autocrat based on what he thinks will maximize his chances of staying in power, and is almost by definition uneven against different types of threats.

A more specific variant of this alternative is that the *organizational cohesion of the security forces* affects state violence, and that more cohesive militaries will follow orders to crack down.\textsuperscript{148} As with the bargaining model approach, I find that this frames the question of violence and repression too narrowly, and that it leaves a good deal of reality unexplained. First, organizational cohesion can

\textsuperscript{145} Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation,” p. 136.


explain the *implementation* of the decision to crack down, but it cannot explain the decision itself, nor why the regime allowed protests to blossom to the point of a military crackdown in the first place. In reality, we sometimes see that regimes decide not to deploy cohesive coercive institutions against popular protest, as happened in both South Korea and Taiwan. Second, this explanation conflates multiple sources of organizational cohesion, combining social uniformity, a lack of institutional fragmentation, and political control, when in fact those explanations need to be disentangled. Third, an opposing body of literature has suggested precisely the opposite relationship between cohesion and violence: that weak cohesion and control lead to increased abuse by armed groups.\(^{149}\) In the chapters that follow, I find that in the broader context of repression, institutional fragmentation rather than cohesion facilitates state violence; my findings also suggest that whether coercive institutions are willing to engage in repression depends not just on the social uniformity of the institution (an intra-organizational characteristic), but on the institution’s inclusiveness (a characteristic of the relationship between the organization and society at large).

The final set of alternative explanations posits that *international factors* play a decisive role in shaping patterns of state violence. International influence is operationalized in a myriad of ways – from transnational solidarity groups to trade agreements to direct pressure to the density of cross-border activity – but it is generally thought to correlate with reduced violence.\(^{150}\) I find, however, that international factors are generally a better predictor of political liberalization or of democratization.

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\(^{149}\) Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion*; Shapiro, *The Terrorists’ Challenge*.

than they are of state violence during the authoritarian period. South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines all experienced American pressure to improve their human rights record, and all democratized at around the same time, yet their authoritarian periods were marked by very different patterns of state violence. Moreover, the in-case evidence does not support the argument that American or international factors were decisive; violence in Taiwan declined before the peak period of American interest in human rights, and in the Philippines, American pressure to lower visible signs of repression actually appear to have worsened violence by driving it underground and into the hands of less accountable actors. Organizational factors, rather than international or American influence, drove variations in violence.

IV. Empirical Approach

The central argument to be tested is as follows: autocrats who want to stay in power must defend themselves from a number of different threats: external threats, internal mass-based threats, and internal elite-based threats. In constructing their internal security apparatus, however, they face fundamental organizational tradeoffs – most starkly, the choice between optimizing to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing against an elite one. Autocrats respond by creating coercive institutions based on the threat that they perceive to be dominant at the time they come to power, but these tradeoffs and the sticky nature of coercive institutions once established prevents them from responding effectively as threats evolve and new ones materialize. Variations in institutional structure and social composition then give rise to predictable patterns in the scope and intensity of state violence. A high initial threat from fellow elites is typically associated with a more fragmented, exclusive security apparatus, which has higher incentives to engage in violence and lacks the

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151 This is consistent with observations that Western pressure has tended to prioritize visibly “democratic” practices like elections over liberal ones like the rule of law. Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003).
intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate and pre-emptive repression. Autocrats who are particularly concerned about popular threats, by contrast, use less violence rather than more, in large part because they mobilize organizations expressly designed for that purpose.

This section briefly outlines the research design and empirical strategy used to test this argument. First, I explain how I measure state violence and outline why comparative case studies are the optimal empirical strategy. I then outline the scope of the study and possible universe of cases, and discuss the logic behind my case selection.

A. Measuring State Violence

The project purports to explain variations in the pattern of state violence under authoritarianism. But how does one measure state violence? Donna Della Porta's work on police response to protest in Italy and Germany explores five attributes of state response, each binary: the range of behaviors prohibited (repressive versus tolerant); the groups subject to repression (selective versus diffuse); the timing of intervention (preventive versus reactive); the degree of force involved (hard versus soft); and “the degree to which respect for legal and democratic procedures is emphasized” (dirty versus lawful).152

From these, I chose to focus on two attributes, which I refer to as the scope and intensity of state violence. Although I refer to the other attributes outlined by Della Porta, I chose to focus my data collection efforts most intensively on these two dimensions because they seemed the most essential qualities – without which one could not plausibly hope to understand why violence was generated and employed – and because they displayed clear-cut variation across time and space. Along the way, I paid attention to and collected more qualitative information about the range of

proscribed behaviors, the legal framework for violence, the timing of violence, and other attributes that would help me test my theory about the causes of state violence against the alternatives.

_Scope_ has to do with the breadth of violence employed, though scholars more commonly refer to this characteristic in its negative form, _indiscriminacy_. It asks, “How narrowly is violence against the population applied? Does the regime use force against the people it wants to use force against, and avoid using force against those it does not want to?” By contrast, _intensity_ refers to the depth or height of violence, rather than breadth; it encapsulates the aggregate level of force levied against the population. Extrajudicial killings are thus a more “intense” form of violence than arrest, while torture falls in between.

In each case, I sought to collect data using a standard set of indicators that addressed both scope and intensity. I collected statistics on the number of people arrested; the number of people tortured; the number of people who were tried; the number of people who were imprisoned; and the number of people who were executed and/or who disappeared. In the Philippines, I also collected data on the number of people who were “salvaged” – that is, whose executed bodies were mutilated and publicly disposed of along a roadside, field, or other public area. The number of people was an attempt to measure scope, while the different forms of violence allowed me to get at the question of intensity. Complete data on all of these indicators was not always available, but I collected data at the most granular level – by month or year, as well as by geographic location – whenever possible.

The major quantitative datasets on repression proved to be unsuited for answering this particular research question. The Political Terror Scale goes back only to 1976,\(^{153}\) while the CIRI Human Rights dataset begins in 1981.\(^{154}\) It was immediately clear that this limited timeframe would

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censor the data on state violence in ways that could easily produce misleading conclusions. A scholar who examined Taiwan’s authoritarianism from 1976 or 1981 onward, for example, especially within a cross-national comparative context, would come to very different conclusions than one who began his or her analysis in 1945. Moreover, existing quantitative datasets sometimes combined violent forms of repression with non-violent ones (such as restrictions of civil liberties like free speech and assembly), and made it difficult to distinguish scope from intensity. Finally, digging into the cases even at a preliminary level revealed serious questions about the accuracy and completeness of the existing quantitative data. In a few weeks of fieldwork in Taiwan, for example, I discovered that the statistics commonly used in Western scholarship on executions during the martial law period were probably an order of magnitude off: 3-4,000 executed rather than the commonly used figure of 45,000.\textsuperscript{155}

Qualitative analysis, by contrast, provided several advantages. First, it provided additional leverage for an argument that is as much about causal processes and causal mechanisms as it is about causal effects.\textsuperscript{156} Second, key independent variables in the argument were operationalized differently in different countries (for example, social cleavages and exclusion were defined in terms of ethnicity in Taiwan, region in Korea, and clan in the Philippines); qualitative analysis allowed me to minimize the risk of measurement error while retaining conceptual rigor and coherence. At the same time, a qualitative approach allowed me to test my hypothesis using the widest range of empirical implications – an important consideration given relative data paucity – and to explicitly assess the strength of my argument relative to alternatives by using the Bayesian logic of process tracing

\textsuperscript{155} See Chapter Two.

outlined by Andrew Bennett. Where quantitative methods might have been handicapped by missing data in attempting to generate estimates of causal effect, sufficient qualitative data existed to make rigorous arguments about causal processes.

As a result, I focused my research efforts on collecting as much finely grained data as possible within a few central case studies that form the backbone of the dissertation. The following section discusses how I selected those cases.

B. Case Studies and the Comparative Historical Method

Before selecting cases, it was necessary to define the scope of the project. This project focuses on explaining patterns of state violence under authoritarianism since 1945. I have chosen to limit the scope of the present study to authoritarian regimes because multiple bodies of theory and empirics, including the theory and evidence proffered here, suggest that the patterns of state violence differ systematically with regime type. This is not to suggest that only authoritarian political systems use excessive or indiscriminate force against their citizens; all states use force or the threat of force to maintain political order, and coercive power is not limited to non-democracies. And it is also not the case that the organizational dynamics driving state violence are completely absent from autocracies, or that autocratic coercion somehow operates according to a separate logic. I expect many of the mechanisms I highlight to explain patterns of violence in democratic political systems as


well. The difference, however, is that we should expect the organizational dynamics that produce violence to be present much less frequently under democratic government, and where they are present, we should expect them to be checked and constrained in different ways. In other words, the incentives and threats facing autocratic leaders prompt them to engage in a systematically different degree of organizational manipulation, which then changes patterns of violence.

I selected cases according to several criteria. First, I wanted them to have both within-case variation and cross-national variation. Second, I wanted system-level attributes to be as constant as possible across cases. Third, I sought regimes with a certain longevity, both so that I could hold constant national-level factors in explaining variation over time, and in order to have the most data to work with. Finally, I sought regimes that had sufficient amounts of information available on the independent and dependent variables in question, so that I could test both the hypothesized correlations and the processes proposed by my argument.

Taken together, these criteria argued strongly for choosing a single region, and East Asia offered particular theoretical and practical advantages. In the pages that follow, I test my argument using a controlled comparison of three historical case studies: Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, with a final chapter that addresses China and North Korea.

This approach had several theoretical advantages. Each of the three main case countries had within-case variations in violence across space and time, which held constant national factors such as regime type and the personality of the autocrat. Choosing more than one case allowed me to complement subnational and longitudinal variation with an examination of cross-national variation, and to speak to, though not resolve, questions about the external validity of any single case. In selecting cases for cross-national comparison, I sought to hold constant – insofar as was possible –

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the other variables that might be driving patterns of violence (outlined in the section on alternative explanations, above). These alternative explanations discussed previously should have predicted very little variation in the pattern of state violence across these three countries. The three regimes all espoused an anticommunist ideology, were all allied with the United States within the overall framework of international politics defined by the Cold War, and all faced popular threats that increased over time. Holding roughly constant major alternative explanations like international influence or rising popular threat allowed me to get the cleanest test of my theory possible. Originally selected because they appeared to display exogenous variation on the independent variable of interest – the configuration of the internal security apparatus – these cases therefore offered a clear empirical puzzle, the ability to control for potentially confounding factors, the opportunity for multiple tests of the theory’s predictions, and rich data from which to craft a compelling explanation. And finally, although Eastern European communism, Latin American military rule, Middle Eastern petro-states, and African personalist dictatorships have become templates for our understanding of non-democracies, Asian authoritarianism – either communist or anti-communist – remains relatively understudied, especially from a comparative perspective, allowing me to fill a geographic gap in the study of autocracy.\textsuperscript{161}

Focusing on East Asia had practical advantages as well. This project faced non-trivial constraints on the availability of data for both the independent and dependent variables of interest – organizational characteristics of the internal security apparatus, and patterns of state violence. Because of this, it was important to go to where the data was, and where my language skills would allow me to access that data. The democratization of Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines in the late 1980’s has resulted in the recent publication of archival material and other documentation related to the political history of the authoritarian period – among them new documents from the

\textsuperscript{161} For an important exception focused on Southeast Asia, see Slater, \textit{Ordering Power}. 

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internal security and intelligence agencies themselves – sufficient to enable a comparative research project.\textsuperscript{162} Having access to these documents allowed me to assess not just the correlation between independent and dependent variables, but the processes that linked them.\textsuperscript{163} The length of time that has elapsed since democratization, and the conclusion of formal transitional justice processes, has also increased the willingness of former officials to speak candidly. Finally, studying the internal security apparatus of three countries that democratized should not have introduced selection bias, since it did not happen as a result of failure or defection by that apparatus; however, the choice to examine China and North Korea in the final chapter was intended to address that question, as well as to maximize the variation that could be obtained given my language skills in the region. The result is that East Asia offered an extraordinarily valuable type and volume of accurate micro-empirical data on the organization, processes, and logic of violence within a theoretically justified comparative framework.

Data for this project was collected over the course of a year of fieldwork in Asia, plus several months of research in the U.S. National Archives and university or private library collections within the United States. Working with academic centers, libraries, and truth commissions in each of the three primary case-countries, I obtained an array of in-country scholarship; news reports from local periodicals; and personal recollections such as memoirs and oral histories, in both published form and from private papers. I gathered official documentation from party and government archives, including material on the surveillance, trial, and sentencing of political prisoners, and compared this to the data collected by prominent dissident or human rights organizations present on the ground at

\textsuperscript{162} The assumption that these organizations do not generate paperwork appears to be simply incorrect. Huggins et al found that Brazil’s military junta kept extensive and relatively accurate records; Reed Brody found the same for Chad under Hissene Habre. Brody, “Inside a Dictator’s Secret Police”; Martha K. Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip G. Zimbardo, \textit{Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 74.

\textsuperscript{163} Bennett, “Process Tracing.”
the time. I acquired statistical data on the internal security apparatus’ personnel and deployment, as well as on the different forms of state violence discussed above: arrests, trials, imprisonments, executions, and salvagings. I also conducted a series of over one hundred and thirty semi-structured interviews with former police, military, and intelligence officials, as well as with former political prisoners and human rights activists who were targets of state social control techniques, repressive mechanisms, and violence. Much of this information has only become available in recent years or months, and has yet to appear in English-language scholarship. I complemented the data gathered in Asia with several months of research in American archives, particularly military and State Department records in the National Archives and documents from the presidential libraries. Extensive U.S. government reporting and analysis on American allies in Asia – over eighty boxes of correspondence and reporting on Taiwan alone – provided a way to corroborate and verify information contained in source materials from Asia. A fuller discussion of the sources consulted for each chapter can be found in Appendix A.

C. The Plan of the Study

This chapter presented the project’s central argument about coercive institutions and state violence under authoritarianism, differentiated it from alternative explanations, and explained the research design and empirical strategy used to test it. Chapters Two, Three, and Four examine how the argument works in each of three case studies: Taiwan (Ch. 2); the Philippines (Ch. 3); and South Korea (Ch. 4). Chapter Five turns to China and North Korea, examining how this argument travels to two communist authoritarian regimes on the opposite side of the Cold War divide.
Chapter Two

Taiwan

I. Introduction

This chapter illustrates the argument of the dissertation through an examination of the Kuomintang (KMT) party’s rule on Taiwan during what is now called the martial law era (jieyan shiqi, 戒嚴時期, 1947-87).¹ The island of Taiwan, a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, came under the administration of the Republic of China’s Kuomintang (Nationalist) government at the end of the Second World War.² Shortly after the end of the Second World War in Asia, fighting re-emerged between Nationalist and Communist forces on the Chinese mainland. By 1949, the collapsed Nationalist Government had been forced to retreat to Taiwan, where the KMT – under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek until 1975 and his son Chiang Ching-kuo thereafter – ruled under martial law until July 1987: at the time the longest unbroken stretch of martial law in the world.³

¹ In Taiwan, the martial law era (jieyan shiqi, 戒嚴時期) refers to a formal period of history; martial law was first imposed in 1947 and lifted in July 1987. The term “White Terror” (baise kongbu, 白色恐怖) is both more politically charged and more varied in its use. It is sometimes used to refer to state violence occurring across the whole period of martial law, but sometimes only to refer to the period of particularly high violence in the late 1940’s and 1950’s.

² Following an agreement made at the Cairo Conference in 1943. Richard C. Bush, At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), Ch. 2.

³ Subsequently overtaken by Syria, where martial law and rule by emergency decree began in 1963.
In the sections below, I trace the origins of Taiwan’s martial law-era coercive apparatus to dramatic changes in Chiang Kai-shek’s threat environment after he arrived on Taiwan, and link those changes in Taiwan’s coercive institutions to the patterns of state violence that it experienced. When he came to power, Chiang Kai-shek focused principally on managing the threat from fellow elites, rival warlords and military commanders. Accordingly, the Nationalist security apparatus that took over Taiwan in 1945 was fragmented and exclusive. The exclusivity of the KMT’s early coercive institutions isolated them from Taiwan’s society and made it harder for the security forces to identify and deal with popular threats without resort to public, indiscriminate violence. Fragmentation of the coercive apparatus also fostered violence both against civilians and between rival security organizations. After being forced to retreat to Taiwan, however, Chiang decided that a lack of focus on the population, and on the rise of the peasant-based Red Army, had cost the KMT their hold on the Chinese mainland. Many of his elite rivals had also been eliminated by the civil war and flight to Taiwan. As a result, the dominant perceived threat shifted to that of an internal popular uprising. As a result, in the early 1950s, Chiang Kai-shek launched a set of extensive reforms that included the internal security apparatus. By 1955, Taiwan’s coercive institutions had become not only much less fragmented, but much more inclusive of society, particularly in terms of intelligence-gathering. These organizational changes shaped the scope and intensity of subsequent state violence. After Chiang created a unitary, inclusive, and socially embedded coercive apparatus, violence declined markedly and remained low for the rest of the martial law period.

This chapter proceeds in six sections. Section II provides an overview of the pattern of state violence, identifying key trends and suggesting corrections to current Western scholarship on Taiwan’s political history. Section III traces the origins of the internal security apparatus on Taiwan, examining the Japanese institutional legacy and the operation of Nationalist policing and intelligence efforts on the Chinese mainland. Section IV uses the organizational characteristics of the initial
coercive apparatus to explain the period of high violence that characterized the KMT’s first decade of rule. Section V discusses the drop in violence produced by institutional reforms that occurred in the first half of the 1950s and remained in place for the rest of the martial law period. Section VI weighs the above argument against alternative explanations, and concludes.

II. Overview of the Pattern of State Violence

Changing patterns of state violence in Taiwan were driven largely by reforms made to the coercive apparatus under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo in the early 1950’s. Figures 2.1 and 2.2, below, illustrate the temporal patterns explained in this chapter.\(^4\)

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\(^4\) Data provided by the Foundation for Compensation for Improper Trials during the Martial Law Era (財團法人戒嚴時期不當叛亂暨匪諜審判案件補償基金會), [www.cf.org.tw/data.php](http://www.cf.org.tw/data.php). Following Foundation precedent, these figures omit casualties from the 2-28 Incident, which are recorded separately for reasons attributable to the Foundation’s legal mandate. Separating them is also helpful because if included, the magnitude of casualties from that single incident would overwhelm the pattern otherwise revealed. However, I do discuss 2-28 below, because omitting the largest incident of political violence in Taiwan would be a fairly questionable representation of reality.
Figure 2.2: Annual Number of Executions for Political Crimes

Three points are worth highlighting. First, the aggregate numbers on state violence – the latest statistics extracted from Taiwan’s archives – are much different than the figures cited in Western scholarship. The estimate most frequently mentioned is Douglas Mendel’s claim that 90,000 people were arrested in Taiwan between 1949 and 1955, and that over half of these were executed. As of October 2010, however, the Compensation Foundation had only confirmed around 7,000 political cases and 786 executions. Even the official investigations – which were mandated by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) when it first assumed power, and led by former political prisoner, then-Vice President Annette Lu – arrived at the much lower figure of

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6 Foundation for Compensation; see also Loa Lok-Sin, “Former Premier’s Praise of Martial Law Draws Fire,” *Taipei Times*, 1 November 2011.
10,000 trials and 2-3,000 executions. If anything, opposition-led investigations run by former political prisoners should exhibit a bias toward overestimating state violence – yet these numbers are far lower than those used by Western scholars. What explains this discrepancy?

The simplest answer is that Mendel’s estimates are likely inaccurate. They come from a single unverifiable anonymous source, are internally inconsistent, and assume a constant level of violence throughout the period of martial law – an assumption not supported by any existing historical evidence. A more thorough answer requires some explanation of how these statistics relate to the process of state violence as it was implemented by the authorities in Taiwan at the time.

Statistical data exist on three forms of state violence, at increasing levels of intensity. These are: 1) the number of individuals who were arrested or detained for political crimes; 2) the number who actually went to trial and were sentenced (given the military court system in place at the time, the difference between trials and sentencings is almost zero); and 3) the number of people executed. A significant percentage of those detained or arrested were let go without proceeding to the stage of a formal trial and sentencing. Because the records became more extensive the further a case proceeded, confidence in the estimates of these different forms of state violence increases with the intensity of violence. The police may not have filed a report for every person they investigated or even detained, but by the time someone was executed, an extensive paper trail had been created,

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7 Taiwan has not had a formal transitional justice process, and investigations of this period of history remain controversial. For a summary of the findings of the Presidential Office investigations led by then-opposition party Vice President Annette Lu, former democratic activist and political prisoner, see Tai-lin Huang, “White Terror Exhibit Reveals Part of Truth,” *Taipei Times*, 20 May 2005; see also Tien, “Taiwan in Transition,” p. 629. For a summary of political issues around historical research see Amber Parcher, “Remembering the White Terror,” *Foreign Policy*, 12 October 2012.


often numbering in the hundreds of pages and including, in most cases, a before-death and after-death photo of the accused to verify that the sentence had been correctly carried out. Mendel appears to have underestimated the scope of violence at low intensity, but overstated it at high intensity – in other words, he overstated the number of executions, but may actually have understated the number arrested.

Estimates of the number of people who stood trial, based on records from Taiwan’s military courts, generally converge at around 10,000 people. The number of death sentences is estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000 people. Court records represent the best estimates currently available, more apt to be accurate than either the claims filed for compensation (which likely underestimate, since victims or their families may no longer be around or motivated to file), or more speculative guesswork such as that which led to Mendel’s figure. A report by former political prisoner and DPP legislator Hsieh (Xie) Cong-min (謝聰敏), in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, estimated that there were 29,000 total cases of political persecution investigated (the step prior to arrest) during the martial law era, involving a total of 140,000 people, and that these cases resulted in 3-4,000 executions. Western scholarship on Taiwan’s political history should therefore be revised to reflect this new understanding: political violence in Taiwan was broader in scope in the earlier periods, and lower in intensity in the later periods, than previously understood. Corroboration and further investigation await the full opening of Taiwan’s archives to researchers and scholars, as well as to victims and their families.

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9 If one recalculates using Mendel’s original source and an internally consistent method, the resulting figure is closer to this evolving consensus: 10,000 trials and 5,000 executions, though only for the period 1949-55.


11 Wu Nai-teh, “Transition without Justice, or Justice without History: Transitional Justice in Taiwan,” Taiwan
The second important point about these statistics has to do with temporal variation, another point commonly overlooked by scholars currently writing in English. State violence in Taiwan was not constant over time, in terms of either the numbers of people who experienced violence or the intensity of the violence to which they were subject. Both the scope and intensity of violence in Taiwan dropped precipitously in the mid-1950’s. Figure 2.1, for example, shows the decrease in the number of individuals who stood trial for political crimes. Although martial law lasted another twenty-seven years, three-quarters of documented political cases had already occurred by 1960, even if 2-28 is not included.\(^{12}\) (Put another way, three-quarters of the cases took place in the first one-third of the martial law period.) The number of individuals arrested, another measure of the scope of state violence, dropped at a similar rate. In the first eight months of 1950, a reported 23,000 people were arrested, but fourteen years later, in the first ten months of 1964, the Provincial Police Commissioner reported only 1,345 arrests.\(^{13}\) Figure 2.2 shows that the intensity of violence declined as well. Sentences issued by martial law courts decreased in severity, moving away from executions toward lower-intensity forms of punishment, mostly incarceration. After Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975, almost all of the prisoners waiting for death sentences had their terms commuted to life imprisonment.\(^{14}\) This temporal variation is largely overlooked in existing English-language literature.

Third, the targets of state violence changed over time: from Mainlanders accused of Communist activity to native Taiwanese accused of pursuing Taiwan independence. The home


\(^{13}\) U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, 1 November 1950, National Archives Record Group 59, 794A.00/11-150.

\(^{14}\) Clemency was also granted to criminals convicted of non-violent offenses. “Taiwan reducing prisoners’ terms: clemency will cover many held on political charges,” *New York Times*, 1 June 1975, p. 11.
province of each person under trial for political offenses was recorded in their case files; summary lists have been published by the Compensation Foundation and Taiwan’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Based on these sources, at least one-third of the total victims of state violence during the martial law era appear to have been Mainlanders, who make up only fifteen percent of the population. Moreover, in the early years of KMT rule on Taiwan, Mainlanders were more likely to be arrested, and if they were arrested, could expect to receive harsher sentences. Not only were a surprising proportion of those targeted of Mainland origin, but many of them were members of the Nationalist government, military, and intelligence agencies. This finding should call into question, or at least significantly complicate, the impulse to conceptualize the White Terror as a quasi-imperial enterprise wherein Mainlander arrivistes crushed native Taiwanese resistance.

Correcting our current histories of the White Terror and martial law era is the first step toward a better understanding of the dynamics of state violence. The trends outlined above challenge the dominant historical narrative of Taiwan’s White Terror. The sections that follow provide an alternative explanatory account.

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15 Data provided to the author by the Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation (台灣民間真相與和解促進會), www.taiwantrc.org, and by the Foundation for Compensation (see note 4 above). For corroboration, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia’s Two ‘Third-Wave’ Democracies,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4 (December 2007), p. 36.

16 Author’s interview with a retired Admiral, Republic of China Navy, Taipei, November 2010.

17 Popular representations of the White Terror sometimes use the 2-28 incident to symbolize the state’s violence, and depict it as primarily a clash between Mainlanders and Taiwanese; other sources link the targeting of Taiwanese elites during 2-28 and the Formosa Incident of 1979. For a discussion of various representations of 2-28 and the White Terror, including ethnic dimensions, see Lin, Representing Atrocity in Taiwan, especially Ch. 1; for links between 2-28 and the Formosa Incident, see Stephen Kosack, The Education of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 133. See also Roy, Taiwan, pp. 77-78.
III. Origins of the Internal Security Apparatus on Taiwan

In 1945, the KMT on Taiwan inherited from the Japanese a centralized, internally coordinated, inclusive, and socially penetrative internal security apparatus that relied on the *baojia* system of communal responsibility to create strong local networks of monitoring and surveillance. Rather than continuing to use that system, however, they dismantled it, grafting onto the island instead a very different set of coercive institutions: those then in use on the Chinese mainland. In contrast to the Japanese system, KMT internal security was fragmented and internally competitive, particularly in terms of the rivalry between the Military Bureau of Investigation and Statistics and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (MBIS and CBIS, *Jun tong* and *Zhong tong*, 軍統 and 中統). Nationalist officials also adhered to a model of police professionalism, then internationally acclaimed, that isolated the police force from society; social penetration and participation in society were actively discouraged. The exclusivity and fragmentation of the KMT coercive apparatus were deliberately cultivated by Chiang Kai-shek, because he believed it necessary to keep rival warlords and military commanders from betraying him and aggrandizing power. This was a strategy geared toward the dominant threat during the earlier years of Chiang’s rule – the factionalism of the warlord era and the Nanjing decade – but which worked less well after 1937, once the Chinese Communist Party had established their wartime bases.

*Japanese Colonial Policing and the Baojia System in Taiwan*

After the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded the island of Taiwan to Japan in April 1895, the Japanese pursued a variety of strategies against a restive colonial population. The early Japanese policing apparatus was poorly coordinated and socially isolated, but its evolution over the course of fifty years of colonial rule was dramatic, and by 1945, Japanese authorities bequeathed to the new rulers of the island a strong and internally coordinated policing system that was heavily enmeshed with
and inclusive of local society. Though the KMT initially disregarded the Japanese system, they eventually made effective use of it; for that reason, its development merits attention here.

Japan’s early efforts at establishing a secure colonial order were a far cry from the success eventually achieved. Disorder consumed the island during the first two decades of Japanese rule, as the colonial government faced opposition first from bands of “bandit-rebels” and partisans, and then from a series of local uprisings. The Japanese initially employed a military-dominated strategy: the civil police operated under military command and were outnumbered 3,100 to 3,400 by military police.\(^{18}\) In 1897, the third Governor-General employed a “triple-guard” system, which relied on army units assisted by military police in the highlands; military and civil police forces in the resistant mid-lowlands; and civil police alone in the more settled plains locations.\(^{19}\) According to the accounts of two key officials, however – Chief Civil Administrator Goto Shimpei and Japanese Diet Member Yosaburo Takekoshi – poor coordination between the different units and heavy-handedness rendered the campaign ineffective.\(^{20}\) Takekoshi also lamented that the interference of the gendarmes and army made it impossible for the police to achieve the necessary “opportunity of coming into contact with the people.”\(^{21}\) In contrast to the later periods of Japanese administration, newly arriving policemen did not know native Taiwanese customs, language, and local dialects, nor were they provided incentives to


\(^{20}\) Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” p. 21; Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, pp. 144-5.

\(^{21}\) Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, p. 145.
do so. Locally organized self-defense associations also remained outside the police hierarchy.\textsuperscript{22} The early Japanese policing system, therefore, was fragmented and not inclusive. Not surprisingly, it was more violent than the later periods of Japanese rule.

Both of these attributes of Japanese coercive institutions soon changed. Although some heavy-handed tactics to subjugate resistance continued through 1915, Japanese authorities gradually shifted to a system of civil administration not unlike that of the British empire, which included extensive organizational reform.\textsuperscript{23} They began to quickly enlarge the island’s civil police force, from 726 in 1895, to 3,270 by late 1897, to 4,061 by the end of 1899.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, as early as 1901, the Governor-General’s office began to give the police rather than the gendarmes primary responsibility for maintaining order against domestic unrest. The military police was then held in reserve for emergencies; by 1905, only one company of 230 men remained in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{25} Over 900 police stations were established across the island, each with 4-5 officers and responsible for up to five boko (see below). By 1945, there were over one thousand police stations.\textsuperscript{26}

Japanese colonial administration also sought to enmesh the police into native Taiwanese society. As part of an expanded training program, the colonial police received Taiwanese language


\textsuperscript{24} Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 175, 180.


instruction – and bonuses for those who also learned to speak one of the various local dialects. The Japanese also aggressively recruited Taiwanese to fill the shortfall in police forces. Within two or three years, they had a force of 1,500, and after 1910, this number increased to 5,000. After 1901, native Taiwanese comprised between 20 and 30% of the police force. Although observers commonly note that the Taiwanese held primarily junior grade (junsabō) positions, never exceeding the rank of captain, what is interesting is how the Taiwanese were employed: they were hired to concentrate particularly on investigative work. An official observer commented in 1907 on the usefulness of employing some 1,398 Formosans as sub-policemen: “they are well-acquainted with the circumstances and condition of their fellow-countrymen.” At each police branch station, one Taiwanese was stationed with two Japanese policemen – a clear advantage in penetrating a society where, in 1920, only around 10% of the town and village heads spoke Japanese. These stations and substations were integrated into colonial administration at the district and sub-district level; police officers became sub-district heads, making them, as Matsuzaki writes, not just “a powerful branch of the local administration, but the local administration itself.” Below that, patrolmen integrated closely with villages through local headmen or section chiefs.

In his post-surrender study of Japanese police organizations on Taiwan, U.S. State Department official George Kerr observed, “In dealing with all matters the police are thoroughly indoctrinated with the official philosophy of minute control of private and public life.” Japanese policing was founded on the principle that it was the policeman’s “quality of omniscience” that would “enable him


29 Takekoshi, Japanese Rule in Formosa, p. 150.

to appraise correctly the importance of all happenings, large and small,” and identify potential problems before they escalated. Accordingly, the “Peace Preservation” category of police duties outlines the following responsibilities:

[S]upervision of publications; supervision of all public meetings and private organizations (the detection of any group or society that might endanger the existing form of government or the system of private property is chief purpose); supervision of religion; control of situation in case of accident, flood, earthquake (fire departments and auxiliaries such as youth groups are under police control); and maintenance of public morals (contact with schools and social-educational bodies to insure “correct thinking” on political and economic questions).31

Policemen were explicitly instructed to obtain “minute and detailed knowledge of a multitudinous state of affairs” within their jurisdiction. In order to collect that information, bicycles were explicitly forbidden and the number of steps per minute that a policeman should walk to have time for proper observation was specified in the training manual (“on foot at a speed of about 60 steps a minute.”) Policemen collected regular reports from taxi drivers, rail and bus line workers, prostitutes, waitresses, and managers of hotels and boarding houses – as well as the reliable leaders of the bo and ke, whose offices the police inspected and supervised regularly.32 Every time a former rebel surrendered, a commemorative photograph was taken and filed in the police station “as a means of identifying past troublemakers”; a raft of household and personal information was also recorded to enable the police to keep a close eye on ex-insurgents.33 Ching-chih Chen’s verdict seems justified: “Until 1945, the

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32 Kerr, “Shu (Province) and Cho (District) Police System,” pp. 14-16.

police system remained highly centralized and widely dispersed in the countryside, with awesome authority to manage and to intervene in the life of the Chinese [on Taiwan].”

It is critically important that Taiwan’s boko system came under direct police authority in May 1903, with the passage of the Working Rules for the Implementation of the Hoko Bylaw. Called pao-chia or baojia (保甲) in Chinese and extended to Taiwan under the Qing dynasty, the boko system was a collective responsibility system that functioned as a form of local, community-based governance and law enforcement, relying on local leaders and civil society to maintain control. Goto Shimpei, the Japanese administrator largely responsible for the expansion and strengthening of the boko system, was enthusiastic about the system’s potential to enhance self-rule, and to co-opt local forms of governance to the Japanese advantage. Even before the Japanese arrival, baojia units had formed local militias (called soteidan in Japanese, or chuantingtuan in Chinese) among Taiwan’s Han population, while groups of Taiwanese and aboriginals, called aiyung, were organized to act as local self-defense forces against aboriginal attack. Under the Japanese, however, the baojia system assumed the duties of collective


35 Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: State-building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 165 (2001), pp. 102-129. Prior to that, from August 1898 until the system was standardized in May 1903, boko served as an auxiliary to the police and was not fully integrated into local administration and governance structures. For clarification of the timeline, see Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 191.

36 According to Han Fei, a Chinese philosopher perhaps most closely aligned with Machiavelli, “Lord Shang taught Duke Hsiao [r. 361-338 B.C.] of Ch’in how to organize the people into groups of five and ten families that would spy on each other and be corporately responsible for crimes committed by their members.” Burton Watson, trans., Han Fei Tsu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 82. See also The Book of Lord Shang, another early Legalist work in Chinese political philosophy.

37 Goto asserted that this system drew on the “organic politics” of Taiwan: communal obligations, kinship relations, and tradition. To be fair, it is also probable that the exodus of 2,000 elites at the beginning of the Japanese takeover made it easier to restructure local forms of governance to the Japanese advantage. Goto, “The Administration of Formosa,” pp. 536-7.
responsibility and punishment, of internal social control as well as external self-defense. Ten households comprised one ko (led by a kocho), and ten ko formed a ho (led by a hosei), though variance in community sizes meant that in actual fact the size of boko units varied between 50 and 300 households. In both cases, the police supervised the hosei and kocho directly.

Although the boko system was nominally one of communitarian self-governance – with elected hosei, mutually agreed upon fees, and compacts decided annually by community assemblies – the reality was less democratic. Each boko unit served three primary functions: it assigned collective responsibility (renza) among the Taiwanese; it was responsible for recruiting men to fill the soteidan militias; and it assisted police officers with duties such as monitoring population movements, labor conscription, and public health works. Hosei selection and boko fees were controlled in practice by local police; their offices were often co-located with local police stations, and boko meetings typically occurred inside the stations themselves. A Taiwanese corps chief ran each soteidan under the supervision of a Japanese officer, and kocho officials could only command the unit to engage in these activities with the permission of police officials, which was granted during the meetings held at their police stations. Japanese officials approvingly noted that the practice of collective responsibility encouraged Taiwanese to monitor and spy on each other on behalf of the police; villages were fined for offenses such as


failing to prevent unrest from escalating into a riot, and for failure to report information on insurgent attacks.\(^{42}\)

By 1905, Taiwan had fifty-eight thousand *bōsei*, *kocho*, and *sotëidan* leaders – five percent of Taiwan’s population, more people than the Japanese civilian presence.\(^{43}\) Prior to 1925, each official policeman supervised approximately 500 people; by the end of World War II, George Kerr had calculated that “The government had about one armed Japanese in service for every one hundred Formosans.”\(^{44}\) If one includes the *bōko* leaders, the ratio of surveillance personnel to citizens during the Japanese colonial period reached approximately 1:47.\(^{45}\) Scholars thus credit the close integration of police and *bōko* as the “key factor” enabling Japan’s colonial administration to exercise effective control over Taiwan’s population. The Japanese used this system to mobilize labor for public works, to monitor the declining insurgency, to report deaths and other demographic changes, to monitor and contain the use of opium, and to improve public health – all through an intensive penetration of the island down to the household level. (In 1901, for example, the government launched an effort to catch rats to eradicate the plague and administrated rewards on a household basis; in Tainan, a household earned 5 sen (1/20\(^{th}\) of a yen) for every rat, and in central Taiwan, households that failed to meet a 10-rat monthly quota were fined 5 sen – which resulted in an estimated 4-5 million rats eradicated from 1901-1904.\(^{46}\)) Reo Matsuzaki terms this process the “hybridization” of institutions of

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\(^{44}\) Kerr, *Formosa*, p. 57-58.

\(^{45}\) Taiwan’s population in 1895 was approximately 3 million. Tsai, “One Kind of Control.”

Japanese colonial rule on the one hand, and native Taiwanese local governance structures on the other. American analyst George Kerr referred to the system less charitably as a “community straitjacket.”

The entire system fell under the highly centralized control of the Japanese Governor-General. The Governor General’s Police Affairs Bureau controlled the operations of the civil police in all branches, which meant that police chiefs at intermediate levels took orders directly from the governors, and mayors had no ‘horizontal’ control over local public safety. Direct lines of reporting from the civil police to the Governor-General made centralized control “the essence of the organization.” Within that system, “intelligence [was] transmitted freely from one part to another, and the relations between the rural officers and the central government resemble those existing between the hands and the brain.” The pyramidal structure was especially useful for the swift and complete transmission of information between the Japanese authorities and Taiwan’s society. Kerr’s report observes:

Announcements and police directives handed to a senior boko member were transmitted promptly down the line, each representative at the next lower level acknowledging receipt until it became a matter of record that all concerned were properly informed. No one could plead ignorance of the government’s wishes. Conversely, each individual and household was expected to volunteer information and to report to the police the overnight absence of a family member or the presence of visitors staying under the family roof. It was extremely difficult for a stranger to pass through the countryside unnoticed and unreported.

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47 Ts’ai, “One Kind of Control;” Tsai, Taiwan in Japan’s Empire Building; Kerr, Formosa, p. 58.

48 Kerr noted that in the cases where fragmentation did occur, violence otherwise unusual to the system was the result. Although Goto was, for the most part, able to harness the gendarmes and civil police in a single system, Kerr writes, “in later years an intense rivalry sprang up between the gendarmes and the civil police, each driving to outdo the other in demonstrating superiority in detection and punishment of alleged subversion.” See Kerr, “Shu (Province) and Cho (District) Police System,” p. 3; Kerr, Formosa, p. 58.


50 Kerr, Formosa, pp. 60-61.
The tightly woven social penetration achieved by the hoko system, therefore, enabled it to function as an auxiliary arm of the civil police in Japanese colonial authorities’ efforts to maintain domestic order. The internal security system as a whole was remarkably successful in atomizing potential collective resistance to Japanese rule. Official visitors remarked on the effectiveness of the system in “preventing offences, detecting crime, collecting taxes, and even assisting greatly in putting down the brigands.”

Ching-chih Chen credits the informant network nature of the pao-chia system with “making almost impossible any attempt at armed opposition”; reports provided by citizens through the pao-chia system did lead in several important cases to the discovery and arrest of anti-Japanese plans and conspirators and the prevention of armed attack.

The Japanese maintained this system until two months before the end of World War II (until June 17, 1945), though it became less important after 1936 when the policy of imperialization (kominka) undercut the Japanese rationale for and interest in fostering locally-originated systems of governance. By 1945, then, the Japanese colonial policing apparatus on the ground in Taiwan was an unfragmented, inclusive internal security force that had replaced “repressive mechanisms” with “information superiority.”

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53 Kuo, “Origins of State-Local Relations in Taiwan,” p. 37; Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 192. Administrative reforms in 1920 changed the reporting lines to make provincial governors the supervisory agents over local policing, but the fusion of police with local administration was maintained at the county level and actually accelerated by the extension of zones (ku) within villages, typically headed by the hosei.

54 Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan,” p. 111.
Nationalist Rule and Internal Security in Mainland China

At the end of the Second World War in the Pacific, the Nationalist Government of China replaced Japan as the sovereign authority on the island of Taiwan. After retrocession – the official end of Japanese rule in Taiwan, on 25 October 1945 – the island was administered as a re-acquired province while the Nationalist government negotiated with and then engaged in civil war against Communist forces on the Chinese mainland. During this time, the KMT transplanted to Taiwan the organs of government used on the mainland, including intelligence and coercive agencies. Internal security in the first decade of KMT rule on Taiwan, therefore, was influenced far more by Nationalist coercive institutions on the mainland than by the institutions built under the Japanese – and the fact that the Nationalist coercive apparatus achieved neither internal coordination nor inclusiveness of society largely explains the decade of high violence that marked early KMT rule on Taiwan.

In 1928, the Nationalist government began its efforts to create a modern national police system for China. Drawing on international models (Germany, Japan, and the United States in particular), it established a commission of police experts and, over the succeeding decade, set up police academies in multiple provinces, as well as a Central Police Academy (Zhongyang Jingguan Xuexiao) in Nanjing in 1935. Academy instructors began to apply and teach some of the newest scientific techniques used in police work, including finger-printing and forensics. This commission also began the arduous process of trying to vertically integrate local militia under local authorities, who would report in turn to the Ministry of the Interior. 55 A nucleus of core officials had been trained at Japanese academies, while German advisors shaped Chinese perceptions of the appropriate structure and deployment patterns. Shanghai police chief Colonel Yuan Liang modeled his plans for organization and training after American models, particularly those of August Vollmer: Berkeley town marshal,

head of the International Association of Police Chiefs, and the University of California’s first Criminology Professor. At the national level, Vollmer’s deputy served as an advisor to the Ministry of the Interior in Nanjing, while two of his students taught at Zhejiang Police Academy and one, Feng Yukun, became director of the Department of Police Administration. In a detailed study of the attempt to reform Shanghai’s police to make them China’s flagship force, Frederic Wakeman notes the irony of the Nationalist effort: an anti-imperialist drive to reclaim sovereignty resulted in reliance on Western models and advisors, because successful performance would justify the reclamation of policing authority from the foreign concessions.

Nationalist attempts at police professionalization resulted in a police force that was, by design, exclusive of society rather than inclusive of it. Wakeman refers to it as “more like an army of occupation than a domestically recruited constabulary.” The first problem was one of low numbers; in 1929 Colonel Yuan Liang complained that Shanghai’s ratio of one uniformed officer for every 425 inhabitants of the Chinese-administered section of Shanghai was too low; in 1935, the ratio appeared to be closer to 1:300.

In hindsight, however, the more important issue appears to have been who composed the police force, rather than how many they numbered. The KMT simply believed that outsiders were better policemen. Throughout the period 1927-37, southern police officials actively recruited policemen from the north, on the grounds that they had superior physical attributes for policing, that they would be better able to man the new Japanese police-box system of law enforcement, and

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56 There is debate over how much Vollmer’s work emphasized closer community involvement on the part of the police, leading to some argument that the Nationalists misinterpreted his advice. William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp. 55-56; Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 245.

57 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 49-50.

58 Beijing had 2-3 times as many officers for the same population in about one-third the area, with none of the jurisdictional issues that accompanied Shanghai’s foreign concessions. Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 165-66.
particularly on the basis that their “linguistic incompetence” in the Shanghai dialect made them less susceptible to corruption. After 1927, only 18% of the Shanghai PSB’s agents were local. The police chiefs came from Guangdong and Hainan.\(^59\)

Moreover, the uniforms worn by the new police force were designed to give them a visibly military appearance, in the style of Japanese gendarmerie. This detail clearly and intentionally set them apart not only from society, but from the detective force, whose plainclothes attire symbolized that they were “immersed in, similar to, and contaminated by ordinary Shanghai society.” Not until 1930 did Colonel Yuan Liang, the Japanese-trained Shanghai police chief, propose drawing up separate uniforms for the army and the police.\(^60\)

In the 1930’s, as policing became more political, officials became aware of the intelligence handicap that came from excluding the locals. They lamented that physically imposing northern patrolmen might be good for deterring crime on the beat, but that their inability to understand the Shanghai dialect made them “unfit for assignments at rallies, during demonstration, or around railroad stations, where travelers’ stray conversations would provide clues about the enemy’s political conspiracies.”\(^61\) Although efforts to ease out locally embedded experts declined temporarily as a result, the trend was short-lived, and there appears to have been no fundamental rethinking of the ideal social composition of a police force. Shanghai continued to import outsiders; 500 from Beijing in 1932 (including the commander of the reclaimed Zhabei PSB post), and more in 1934.\(^62\) Given the intelligence costs – which were apparent to authorities at the time – the insistent drive to set Nationalist policemen as a profession apart from society is understandable only in light of higher


\(^60\) Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, p. 54, 75.

\(^61\) Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, p. 137.

the loyalty and deterrent power achieved by outsider policing were more important than the information that socially embedded policemen could obtain.

In addition to the composition of the official police force, the Nationalist model of ‘professional’ policing also eschewed the informal mechanisms of societal inclusion and penetration utilized by the Japanese in Taiwan. KMT attempts to employ the baojia system were much less thoroughly implemented, and continually subject to political contestation and renegotiation. The Nationalist government initially moved to reinstate the system in 1929; in 1931, while fighting the Communists in Jiangxi, Chiang Kai-shek issued the “Rules for Organizing Households into Pao-Chia in Bandit-Suppression Areas.” The guidelines were implemented in forty-three counties that year and expanded by decree to all provinces in 1934. Like many Nationalist decrees, however, the baojia rules were adopted unevenly. By 1937, only sixteen of China’s (thirty five) provinces had fully implemented them.63 The Nationalist baojia system also placed local elites in the position of enforcing unpopular central directives – most notably conscription, for which the heads of the system have been thoroughly vilified.64 Only under the extreme pressure and partial collapse of wartime did officials allow the organization of militia units (fanghutuan and tweutuan) that used local recruits.65 In the eyes of Nationalist authorities, who sought to hold together a country under tremendous centrifugal pressure,

63 Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” p. 559. The number of provinces is according to the Republic of China in 1946; today, Beijing administers 33 province-level sub-divisions and claims Taiwan as the 34th. The 33 administrative regions consist of 22 provinces; 5 autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Tibet, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia); 4 municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing); and 2 Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau).

64 Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937-49 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), p. 147. In Taiwan, on the other hand, local elites could choose to leave after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki; 2,000 chose to do so. Those that remained were seen as collaborationist, but did not become primary targets of dissidence.

65 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 277-291. See also Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution: worker militias, citizenship, and the modern Chinese state (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), Ch. 3.
local self-government was a threat to central control rather than a tool of it. As a result of the fear of local collusion against central authority, the Nationalist \textit{baojia} system, which executed administrative functions, was separate from the policing system designed to enforce social control. This reinforced the existing exclusivity and isolation that characterized KMT policing on the mainland.

The coercive apparatus was also riven by fragmentation. In the 1930’s, Chiang Kai-shek established two competing intelligence and security organizations: the Kuomintang’s Central Bureau for Intelligence and Statistics (\textit{Zhongtong}, 中統), and the Military Bureau for Intelligence and Statistics (\textit{Juntong}, 軍統) under the Nationalist Government’s Military Affairs Committee. Headed by Xu En-zeng and Dai Li, respectively, these two organizations had somewhat separate responsibilities on paper, but in practice competed bitterly for power throughout the Sino-Japanese and Chinese Civil War. Chiang also created a military police in 1931 to offset and undercut the Public Security Bureau, which he perceived as ineffective and untrustworthy; this further stoked inter-agency competition.

Horizontal communication and transmission of information across agencies was limited, ostensibly to

\begin{itemize}
  \item Social disorder and natural disaster produced population movements that complicated these efforts in the cities, where they might have otherwise been most feasible. For example, the Shanghai Public Security Bureau’s 1928 reorganization plan called for much tighter population control through the household registration (\textit{hukou}) system, but efforts to update the census in 1930-31 were complicated by the hundreds of thousands of refugees entering the city. Wakeman, \textit{Policing Shanghai}, pp. 85-6; Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” p. 574.
  \item Chiang’s \textit{annei rangwai} policy – first subjugate the internal enemy, then expel the external – also resulted in the police force’s gradual militarization.
\end{itemize}
limit damage from Communist infiltration. Even within any single organization, information-sharing and coordination across bureaus was poor. Public Security Bureau offices relied on a stovepiped flow of case documents, while bureau chiefs operated fiefdoms that exercised exclusive control over personnel and resources.69

Competition between agencies swirled together with tension between the central and local levels. Coordination between city and national authorities was almost utterly lacking. At times like the “Kiangan incident” of November 1927 – in which the Public Security Bureau intercepted a shipment of opium entering Shanghai under Garrison Command guard and each subsequently accused the other of involvement in the trade while claiming their own prerogative of enforcement – the dysfunction reached almost comical levels.70 After 1934, MBIS agents began to assume positions in the local PSBs and police academies, and in 1935, Chiang authorized them to take over the duties of detective and transport police units in Shanghai, thereby endowing them with direct police authority for the first time. Unsurprisingly, the MBIS takeover encountered resistance from Shanghai’s deputy brigade commander and regular detectives (jichayuan). The end result was friction in Shanghai among multiple groups who together were responsible for public security: the PSB “locals”; the Beijing-imported officers and Beijinger-led paramilitary Peace Preservation Corps (baoandui or baoantuan); Chiang’s expanding military police; and military intelligence.71 This tension was echoed across China, as central leaders pushed for new police forces trained and directed by the center – but financed locally. Provincial officials, unsurprisingly, balked; they preferred to maintain control of their own local

69 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 51, 54-55, see also pp. 179, 193.

70 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 129-31.

71 This increased their writ for violence, because what they had done extrajudicially could now be signed off on by Garrison Command, transforming “a kidnapping into an arrest.” Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, p. 211, 249, 251. For a discussion of how this fragmentation affected the Shanghai labor movement, see Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: the politics of Chinese labor (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
militias, especially if they were footing the bill. Chiang ruled in favor of nationalization, and the baoandui began to fold into county police departments in 1936, but the process was never completed; authority over each local police station remained divided between the local magistrate and the provincial government.72

Other organizational features of Nationalist policing contributed to official incentive and latitude to exercise harsh and arbitrary control. A range of administrative laws and regulations allowed the police to prosecute and sentence offenders, including assigning short jail sentences or fines for misdemeanors. These fines funded police budgets, which were already an issue of political contention between the fragmented centers of power. The ability to augment local budgets by sentencing offenders gave police forces added incentives for excessive enforcement of misdemeanors – especially relative to the more serious criminal charges, which had to be processed by the courts.73 Though the Nationalists would do away with on-the-spot police sentencing on Taiwan, they maintained for some time the habit of allowing the informants and arresting officers to share the confiscated property of the accused, thereby incentivizing false or unjust accusation and imprisonment.

China during this period did not lack for social and political fragmentation, but Chiang Kai-shek deliberately aggravated what fragmentation did exist in order to increase his political power vis-à-vis potential elite rivals. Descriptions of Chiang written during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and Chinese Civil War (1927-49)74 portray him as a typical strongman in a weakly institutionalized polity, playing rival factions off one another to secure his own precarious position and failing in the process

72 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 245-46.

73 Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, pp. 91-92.

74 I have chosen to date the start of the Chinese Civil War from the Northern Expedition in 1927, though conflict was intermittent and interrupted by the Second United Front against the Japanese from 1937-1945.
to build the social base that might have ensured popular support, or at least compliance.

He tried to monopolize power and fragment it at the same time, monitoring and interfering with subordinates while stoking competition between them. This was particularly true of the rivalry between MBIS and CBIS, organizations that were both loyal to Chiang but bitterly opposed to each other. As Lloyd Eastman summarizes, “Like an emperor of the Ch’ing dynasty, politics for [Chiang] was a matter of competition among elites. To maximize his power, therefore, he manipulated and combined the support of one group of elites against rival elites…. He never comprehended – as Mao Tse-tung did – that it was possible to generate new sources of power by mobilizing support from outside the elite structure.”

Claire Chennault, though sympathetic to Chiang’s difficulties in finding competent subordinates, also noted his tendency to “[play] one off against the other, getting what he could from them, and every now and then lopping off a few heads as a warning that there was a limit to his patience.”

Firsthand accounts from this period chronicle fissure after fissure within what General Wedemeyer termed the “loose coalition” that was called the Nationalist regime: faction versus faction within the party, center versus provincial level of government, clique versus clique in the army.

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Chiang’s distrust for his commanders was extreme; he claimed they exaggerated their successes and could not be trusted to follow orders. He once complained to American General Joe Stilwell:

I have to lie awake nights thinking what fool things my commanders may do. Then I write and tell them not to do these things. But they are so dumb, they will do a lot of foolishness unless you anticipate them. That is the secret of handling them - you must imagine everything that they can do that would be wrong, and warn them against it.\(^{80}\)

This distrust was not entirely unwarranted: in 1936 in Xi’an, Chiang was kidnapped by generals ostensibly under his command, and the unwillingness of Nationalist units to follow central government orders and help each other on the battlefield led on more than one occasion to the near-complete elimination of entire units in combat. Chiang’s answer, however, was equally dangerous. He blocked units from sharing information from each other when he thought doing so might lead to collusion. Moreover, he restricted the latitude of field officers to make independent decisions and interfered in field operations down to the regimental level, worsening confusion, slowing response time, and increasing the incidence of military failure.\(^{81}\) Disastrous losses on the battlefield in late 1948 and 1949 culminated in the Nationalists’ eventual retreat to Taiwan, the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing in October 1949, and the establishment of the RoC’s temporary capital in Taipei in December of that year.

The KMT coercive apparatus that took over Taiwan in 1945, and which moved there en masse in 1949, was designed primarily to deal with Chiang’s fears of elite and military disloyalty. As a result, it was both fragmented and exclusive by design. Rather than maintaining the Japanese colonial police system that had achieved both internal cohesion and societal penetration, Chiang initially opted to

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\(^{80}\) Cited in Eastman, p. 146.

import the coercive apparatus that on the mainland had achieved neither. That decision largely explains the violence of 1945-55.

**IV. Retrocession and the White Terror**

During the early years of their rule on Taiwan, the Nationalist regime – simultaneously engaged in civil war with the Communists on the mainland – took over administration of the island from the Japanese. As a response to the deterioration of their rule in both Taiwan and on the mainland, where the tide of civil war was turning against them, they instituted the martial law framework that would undergird the public security system on Taiwan for the next four decades, and engaged in violence against the native population, as well as against the Mainlanders who moved to the island with them in 1949. This section attempts to explain the patterns of high violence that occurred during the decade of reoccupation, civil conflict, and state (re-)consolidation, in which Taiwan shifted from a reclaimed backwater province to the sole remaining bastion of Nationalist power.

In 1945, when Taiwan returned to Chinese sovereignty, the KMT transplanted its coercive institutions to the island, with negative consequences. Fragmentation was high; multiple security organizations competed to make arrests and eliminate opponents, with no clear coordinating authority. Inclusivity was low. As the KMT’s military and financial woes mounted, they drained men from the island to fight in the civil war and fired former Japanese police, replacing them with newly imported and often unqualified Mainlanders. This lowered the overall numerical strength of the police force and reduced its representativeness of Taiwanese society, isolating the security forces and reducing their ability to communicate with local residents.

Unsurprisingly, the coercive apparatus struggled to anticipate unrest and handle it without recourse to overt, indiscriminate violence. Readers are likely most familiar with the consequences of these policies through the 2-28 Incident – in which the KMT’s crackdown on island-wide unrest
resulted in the deaths of an estimated 6–10,000 people, mostly native Taiwanese.\textsuperscript{82} The contemporary scholarly focus on 2-28, however, obscures the disproportionately high rate at which Mainlanders became targets of state violence after 1947, especially once the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949. In contrast to native Taiwanese who were individually monitored and disciplined by the baogia system, the two million refugees who arrived with Chiang Kai-shek came from a military that had been badly infiltrated, which had had whole divisions defect en masse, and whose claims to past loyalty were often unverifiable. Much of the state violence between 1949 and 1955, when the White Terror was at its highest, was actually among the Nationalist’s own officials and military, where the KMT’s intelligence weakness was greatest.

\textit{The Violence of Reoccupation: 1945-47}

Anyone reading accounts – foreign or otherwise – of Taiwan in the late 1940’s cannot help but be struck by the vast problems of public order that followed the island’s retrocession. While the crowds who greeted the thirty thousand Nationalist troops that first arrived in Taipei were initially enthusiastic about rejoining China, subsequent events led to swift disillusionment, and a combination of factors heightened tensions between the newly arrived Mainlanders and the Taiwanese. Taiwan was put under military rather than civilian rule by the Nationalists, more akin to conquered enemy territory than long-lost brethren. Arriving Mainland officials were both suspicious of their Taiwanese


counterparts’ potentially collaborationist histories and contemptuous of the administrative competence instilled in them by Japanese colonialism. Already severe economic problems from the war were exacerbated by KMT actions – both a clumsily-executed official policy of extracting resources from Taiwan to prosecute the war on the worn-out Mainland, and the uncontrolled looting and theft on the part of KMT soldiers, who were not paid enough to keep up with inflation and so followed standard Mainland army practice of ‘living off’ local communities. Governor Chen Yi placed a huge number of enterprises under state control and declared retroactively invalid the sale of property from departing Japanese to the Taiwanese who remained – thereby confiscating what many Taiwanese believed was legitimately-purchased property. Inattention and conflicts of interest by newly appointed public officials led to the breakdown of the Japanese-maintained public health system and outbreaks of various illnesses. Disease, crime and unemployment soared.

The fragmented and exclusive security sector that had been operating on the mainland became even more pronounced in Taiwan after 1945. Before 1947-48, this was due to the relative inattention of the Nationalist government to conditions on the ground; after 1949, it was attributable to the crowding of enough security officials for the entire mainland into a much smaller territory. According to reports obtained from the police authorities and transmitted by the American consulate in Taipei to Washington, as many as thirteen different security organizations operated in each city. Each security office “administered its own affairs without coordination and at times competed for power with others.” Factionalism and unchecked competition ran rampant,

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83 U.S. Department of State, Taipei consulate to Washington, 27 April 1950, 20 July 1950, 26 July 1950, 1 November 1950. In the April cable, see statement in particular by Sun Li-jen about Kaohsiung.

and “abuses of the regular police system were felt in every town and village across the island.”

Open competition for power and resources between internal security and police agencies, compounded by the less-than-impressive quality of personnel sent to Taiwan (a low priority on the KMT’s long list of priorities) resulted in indiscriminate looting and violent abuse.

The Nationalists also lacked the organizational capacity, manpower, and social knowledge to administer the society over which they had assumed power. Over the course of their first year, the KMT managed to destroy the capillary system by which their predecessors had penetrated local communities. First, there was an acute shortage of security personnel to monitor and police the population. Over the course of 1946, the number of soldiers and police on Taiwan decreased from 48,000 to 11,000, and many of the individuals that remained were of poor quality. By February 1947, the month of the infamous 2-28 incident, “troop transfers back to the Mainland in 1946 [had] reduced the total police-troop presence to 6 percent of the Japanese level.”

Consistent with the professional model of police administration applied on the Mainland, KMT authorities in Taiwan were also unconcerned about decreasing the inclusiveness of Taiwan’s civil police. In October 1945, 5,600 of the 13,000-strong police force (43%) had been Formosan, as were 46,955 of the 84,559 civil service positions (55%). Under budgetary pressure, however, the KMT shrunk the total number of civil servants to half the Japanese level, and replaced the Formosans who

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did remain with inexperienced but politically connected Mainlanders in need of jobs. American observer George Kerr describes the period after the handover:

[Governor] Chen Yi did not promote experienced Formosans and recruit others for “freshman” jobs. Thousands of newcomers were placed on the rolls, inexperienced relatives and friends of mainland Chinese already established in the Administration. Many policemen could speak neither Japanese [then the official lingua franca] nor the local Chinese dialects... When all the police jobs vacated by the Japanese had been filled, the Government began to discharge Formosans to make room for more newcomers.\textsuperscript{88}

Though local elections in April 1946 did lead to an increase in the participation of Taiwanese in local elected government, an estimated 36,000 Taiwanese civil servants lost their jobs, and the ones that remained were paid less than the Mainlanders in equivalent positions. By 1946, only 9,951 of the 44,451 government positions were occupied by Taiwanese (22%, compared to 55% at the time of handover).\textsuperscript{89} As had happened during the early days of Japanese colonial rule, many of the new KMT-appointed Mainlander policemen spoke neither Japanese nor any local dialect.\textsuperscript{90}

In the inaugural issue of \textit{Taiwan Police}, Chen Yi proclaimed, somewhat paradoxically, “From now on in Taiwan, although our policies will be completely different from those of the Japanese, the things that the police had to do should continue to be done as before.”\textsuperscript{91} Whatever Chen Yi’s intent, differences between the old and new police system were far more pronounced than similarities. Experienced Taiwanese police officers and patrolmen were fired, and the \textit{baojia} system essentially broke down as changes in police location severed the remaining police relationships with local \textit{boko}

\textsuperscript{88} Kerr, \textit{Formosa Betrayed}, p. 190.


\textsuperscript{91} Wicentowski, \textit{Policing Health in Modern Taiwan}, pp. 164-5.
heads. The *hoko* system itself, when the authorities attempted to use it, was employed only as an enforcement mechanism for unpopular orders, not for building relationships within or obtaining information from the local population. Although the Taiwan People’s Political Council convocation in late 1946 had acknowledged the need to build an “information network” among the population, the lack of language skills among the official police and the breakdown of the *baojia* system that could have supplemented it led to inefficiency, misunderstanding, and conflict. At the same time as it did away with the old Japanese system’s informational advantages, the KMT retained its coercive features, such as the use of (potentially arbitrary) police judgments. In actuality, though the KMT authorities thought that they were keeping much of the Japanese colonial police structure, they (initially) failed to maintain the very features of the system that had led the Japanese to adopt it in the first place: its unity and its ability to create ties with the local population.

Probably the most prominent and egregious example of the failure of early KMT internal security policies is the 2-28 incident, in which the KMT’s crackdown in response to island-wide unrest (provoked by authorities confiscating cigarettes from a woman illegally selling them on the street) resulted in the deaths of an estimated 6-10,000 people, most of whom were native Taiwanese. The Nationalist government claimed that 2-28 was caused by a trifecta of Communist instigation, Japanese training, and misplaced Formosan ambition, but U.S. General Albert Wedemeyer, tasked to report on the incident and the state of affairs on the island of Taiwan, lay blame squarely with the poor discipline, internal feuding, and social incompetence of Nationalist security forces on the island.

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92 U.S. State Department, Taipei to Washington, 28 January 1947.


94 U.S. State Department, Taipei to Washington, 4 December 1946; 28 January 1947.

– in other words, with its fragmentation and exclusivity.\textsuperscript{96} Among the critical requirements in the “Thirty-Two Demands” presented to Governor Chen Yi by the 2-28 Settlement Committee – a committee formed by local elites to restore order after the incident escalated and before forces arrived from the mainland to crack down – were the disbanding of independent police forces to reduce competition between units, filling police leadership posts with Taiwanese rather than Mainlanders, outlawing politically-based detention, and eventually, to abolish Garrison Command and restrict soldiers’ power.\textsuperscript{97}

Internal competition, the shortage of troop/police manpower on Taiwan, and the language difference that exacerbated the gap between the population and police force – these factors not only triggered high levels of popular dissatisfaction and created potential for civil unrest on the island, but also intensified violence when troops from the Mainland arrived to quell the island population. Some of the officials responsible for commanding the suppression forces gave orders based on factional guidance and interest; they failed to help rival units under pressure, and attempted to outbid them in forcible suppression, rather than implementing a coordinated strategy to quiet the protests with minimal violence. Lack of coordination and competition between the arriving forces and the Nationalist organizations that were already operating on Taiwan also contributed to civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{98}

Mainlander lack of understanding of local dialects and customs worsened violence by handicapping the intelligence capacity of the KMT forces. One army colonel recounted:


\textsuperscript{97} Settlement Committee, “Thirty-Two Demands” presented to Governor Chen Yi, Taipei, 7 March 1947; translations of these demands are included in Kerr, \textit{Formosa Betrayed}, and Lai et al.

\textsuperscript{98} Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20\textsuperscript{th} Century Taiwan,” p. 112; Chen, \textit{Factional Conflict and Power Politics}. 
Some young and middle-aged Taiwanese did not understand these wartime regulations or did not understand Mandarin. Our soldiers also did not understand the Minnan dialect... [W]hen our troops questioned the Taiwanese, they simply did not understand, and continued walking. Our troops had no recourse but to shoot.

In an implicit acknowledgement that local administrative problems had contributed to the 2-28 violence, Chen Yi attempted to revive the *baojia* system in the census that followed the quelling of unrest. He declared in Procedure 7:

*The household head must guarantee a survey and exposure of any traitors in the neighborhood association and in the unit to which the household belongs..... When a traitor is found in that household or within that neighborhood association, it will be the responsibility of the household head and the neighborhood association head to report to the officials of the township or the district police, who will investigate this matter. At such time, the chief official organs or the household and neighboring association head will share equally the responsibility for that crime [haboring traitors] and will be dealt with according to the law.*

These efforts, however, carried the flavor of retroactive desperation rather than forethought; the *baojia* system was being used for retroactive punishment rather than pre-emptive information collection and conflict prevention. A series of cables from American officials on Taiwan noted that indiscriminate violence by the police and Taiwan Garrison Headquarters continued throughout 1947 and 1948. It would not be until the early 1950’s that Chiang Ching-kuo took hold of this fragmented apparatus and converted it into a unified system of monitoring and control.

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100 Lai et al, p. 154.

101 See U.S. Department of State cables from the Taipei consulate to Washington on 22 August 1947; 14 November 1947; 14 September 1948.
Constructing the Martial Law Framework, 1948-49

After the violence of 2-28, and as Kuomintang forces suffered successive setbacks in the civil war on the mainland, the task of consolidating control on Taiwan became more urgent and more important. Deterioration in Nationalist military fortunes – the Communist approach to Changchun in March 1947, and the KMT’s disastrous defeat at Huaihai in late 1948 – heightened fears of a potential insurgent threat in KMT-controlled areas like Taiwan. This shift in threat perceptions contributed to initial attempts at consolidation and repression on the island.

In December 1948, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Chen Cheng to replace the reviled Chen Yi as Taiwan’s new governor. Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who had earned a reputation as an unusually capable administrator on the mainland, took over the Taiwan provincial party organization, and was tasked with reorganizing the “overlapping, often incompetent faction-based spy organs” on the island, though the process would not be completed for several years. In August 1949, Ching-kuo assumed leadership of the Political Action Committee (政治行動委員會), a secret organization run under the president’s office. Created to manage the reorganization, it registered all personnel in the security system from its second year on, and was the precursor to the National Security Bureau (NSB, Guojia Anquanbu, 国家安全部), which Thomas Gold described as “a new super-spy organ charged with coordinating and overseeing security work throughout the party, army, state, and society.”

102 Roy, Taiwan, p. 69; Bush, At Cross Purposes, p. 50.
103 Gold, p. 54; Shih Ming, Four Hundred Years of the History of the Taiwanese People, (San Jose: Paradise Culture Associates, 1980) / 史明 著, 台灣人四百年史 (San Jose: Paradise Culture Associates, 1980), pp. 875-78.
This period also laid the legal foundation for what would be nearly forty years of authoritarian rule by the KMT. The framework was composed of two primary, interlocking pieces: 1) the Temporary Provisions, and 2) Martial Law. The Nationalist government promulgated the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion (動員戡亂時期臨時條款) on the Chinese mainland in late spring of 1948. The four articles of the Temporary Provisions, as they were known, suspended many of the provisions of the 1946 Republic of China constitution. Amended in March 1960, February-March 1966, and March 1972, these extra-constitutional arrangements also “suspended the re-election of the three national representative bodies – the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan – extended the tenure of their incumbent members for life, and deferred the election of provincial and municipal heads indefinitely,” vitiating electoral procedure at the national level while maintaining it at the grass-roots level. The Temporary Provisions also heightened the emergency powers given to the president, waiving his two-term limit (and that of the vice president), and empowering him “to make changes in the organization and personnel of the central government.” Most broadly, Article 1 allowed the

106 I am grateful to Professor Tay-Sheng Wang for his explanation of the legal issues surrounding this period in Taiwan’s history. Any errors of fact or interpretation are my own. Wang Tay-sheng (王泰升), Jurisprudence with Historical Thinking: Combination of Taiwanese Social History of Law and Legal Reasoning <具有歷史思維的法學：結合臺灣法律社會史法律論證> (臺北市：王泰升出版, 2010).

107 The Temporary Provisions were passed by the 1202 delegates to the First National Assembly on April 18, 1948, and promulgated on May 1. For the original and subsequent revisions, see the copies of National Government Gazette No. 3129 and Presidential Office Gazettes No. 482, No. 1104, No. 1723, No. 1733, and No. 2394, reprinted in Chu Chung-Sheng, ed., From Governor-General’s Office to the President’s Office: The Presidents (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2009), pp. 48-53.


President and Executive Yuan “to take emergency measures to avert an imminent danger to the security of the state or of the people – without being subject to the procedural restrictions prescribed in Article 39 or Article 43.” Article 1 thereby conferred “practically unlimited authority” on the president.\textsuperscript{110} Archival records of the National Security Council in the Presidential Office show that, despite the Executive Yuan’s constitutionally given status as the highest administrative organ of the state, it in practice reported directly to Chiang Kai-shek – rendering Taiwan’s separation of powers even more limited in practice than in theory.\textsuperscript{111}

The second component of the KMT’s authoritarian legal framework was martial law. On May 19, 1949, Chen Cheng, then Chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government and head of Taiwan Garrison Command, declared martial law on Taiwan. It was to last for 38 years and 56 days: until July 15, 1987.\textsuperscript{112} Under martial law, political offenses were tried in military courts according to military tribunal law. Article 8 also specified ten categories of criminal offenses for which civilians could be tried in military tribunals rather than the constitutionally mandated civilian courts.\textsuperscript{113} The heads of the tribunals – for the appellate court, the head was the President himself – had to approve any and all decisions made by the court. The Council of Grand Justices, the only body in Taiwan with the hypothetical power of judicial review, was composed mostly of Mainlander KMT members, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Tien, \textit{The Great Transition}, pp. 108-112.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Wang and Chou, “The Emergence of Modern Constitutional Culture,” pp. 15-16; Wang, \textit{Jurisprudence with Historical Thinking}.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} A copy of the order was transmitted in the U.S. State Department cable from Taipei to Washington, 19 May 1949. Copies of the declaration implementing martial law and the order to lift it are reprinted in Chu, \textit{From Governor-General’s Office to the President’s Office}, pp. 27-37. Chen Cheng’s declaration of martial law was lifted, but martial law was reimposed in Taiwan in December 1949 by an administrative order from the Executive Yuan, on the grounds that it was a combat area in the Chinese Civil War. (On the mainland, martial law was first declared in 1934.) In January 1950 after the RoC capital moved to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek issued another administrative order that activated martial law and was subsequently confirmed by the Legislative Yuan, making it Taiwan’s permanent legal status for thirty-eight years. Tien Hung-mao, \textit{The Great Transition}, pp. 110.
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Wang, \textit{Jurisprudence with Historical Thinking}.
\end{itemize}
functioned to “legitimatize rather than supervise government action.” As with the Temporary Provisions, therefore, the substantive effect of martial law was an expansion of presidential authority: in essence, a concentration of power in the person of Chiang Kai-shek.

The Temporary Provisions and declaration of Martial Law jointly led to creation of two additional, powerful institutions that would become critical to the organization and implementation of violence in the latter part of the martial law era – the National Security Bureau and Taiwan Garrison Command. Eventually, the result would be a powerful, unified coercive apparatus – but not immediately.

Rather, the 1948-50 period of consolidation was violent. Media reported on mass arrests numbering in the tens of thousands, and evidence from American archives confirms the accuracy of these accounts. Under Chiang Ching-kuo’s new leadership of the security apparatus, the U.S. State Department reported, 10,000 people were interrogated and over 1,000 reportedly executed. A series of over twenty cables transmitted to Washington by Consul-General Robert Strong and his staff in 1950 itemize meeting after meeting with citizens on Taiwan that testify to heightened repression. One summary report, sent from the U.S. State Department’s post in Taipei back to Washington on August 19, 1950, noted:

During recent Executive Yuan meeting Premier admitted that in 1949 some 15,000 persons were arrested by secret police for political reasons, and in 1950 alone total so far is 23,000. He admitted there may have been other arrests of which he ignorant.


115 Wang, Jurisprudence with Historical Thinking.

116 Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, p. 368.

117 See the following series of U.S. State Department cables from Taipei to Washington, all in 1950: January 6, February 9, February 11, February 21, March 1, March 10, March 21, April 8, April 25, May 3, May 5, May 19, June 2, June 10, June 21, July 8, July 15, July 21, July 24, August 3, Nov. 18.
[sic]. Also could not state how many of those arrested had been released or executed. Thus in past 19 months about 1 of every 200 persons arrested on political grounds.\footnote{118}

A subsequent political report written on the period from June 25 to October 10 of 1950 repeated these arrest numbers: 15,000 in 1949 and 23,000 for the “first eight months of 1950.” The otherwise liberal politician K.C. Wu insisted to his U.S. interlocutors that Taiwan needed to be severe with “Communist instigators…whose many plots and tricks could easily defeat the law if we showed too much leniency toward them.”\footnote{119} In March 1951, General Tang Zong, director of one of the internal security agencies, told the new American consul and his staff that the problem of Communist subversion was coming under control. He acknowledged that complaints had surfaced about lengthy delays and long detainments before political trials and the use of torture to force confessions, but chided the Americans that to “to do away with such methods in this area of the world was perhaps too much to expect, especially in such critical times.”\footnote{120}

When British diplomat Bevin raised concerns that the charges of Communist infiltration in Taiwan might be accurate, the Taipei consulate responded tersely that they found “no merit” in his concern.\footnote{121} As General Wedemeyer had concluded with regard to 2-28, American diplomats believed emphatically that the popular unrest threatening the KMT had arisen due to factors other than Communist subversion.\footnote{122}

\footnote{118} U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, 19 August 1950, National Archives Record Group 59, 794A.00(W)/8-1950.

\footnote{119} U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, 3 August 1950.

\footnote{120} U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, 26 March 1950. The role of General Tang Zong (referred to in cables as Tang Tsung) is also mentioned in the cable of 6 January 1950.

\footnote{121} See U.S. State Department correspondence between Taipei and Washington on 12, 18 and 21 July 1950.

\footnote{122} Rankin, who succeeded Strong as Consul in late 1950, did not share Strong’s view that repression was undermining the government and therefore negatively affected US interests.
In August 1950, as the Kuomintang party prepared itself for reform, the Executive Yuan issued a new ruling to limit ‘illegal’ arrests, after which the U.S. Consulate noted that most agencies seemed to stop making arrests “without warrants and at least a semblance of evidence.” This represented the beginnings of a shift that would accelerate in the coming years: from a fragmented collection of ‘outsider’ internal security organs engaged in chaotic, extrajudicial, and intense violence against society, to a unified system of internal security that had deep roots into Taiwan’s population and depended on targeted surveillance to administer atomized, bureaucratized, and judicially sanctioned repression. At the time, however, American observers did not view these developments positively. When Consul General Strong departed in August 1950, he warned that Taiwan was descending into “a reign of terror, more silken than in other countries or in other times, but nevertheless in progress.”

KMT coercive institutions in Taiwan were especially violent from 1945 to the early 1950’s. Much of this violence stemmed from the fact that the coercive apparatus was designed to protect Chiang Kai-shek from elite rivals and warlords who could challenge him for power on the Mainland. Unsurprisingly, that elite-oriented apparatus – fragmented, exclusive, and socially isolated – performed poorly when it was suddenly required to manage the completely different threat of an unhappy and unfamiliar population. Accustomed to competing for power and lacking local social knowledge, its organizations possessed incentives for violence and lacked the intelligence capacity to do anything else.

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123 He added that the rate of arrests had declined significantly by October, and that of those arrested, actual executions were “not particularly numerous” and were publicly announced “in nearly all cases.” U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, 1 November 1950, National Archives Record Group 59, 794A.00/11-150.

VI. Coercive Institutional Reform and Institutionalization of Repression

As political scientist Wu Yu-Shan succinctly states, “At the beginning of the 1950’s, an exhausted KMT state was surrounded by an alienated population, overwhelmed by an external security threat, and abandoned by its most important ally.”125 The disastrous losses of the KMT forced upon Chiang the realization that his principal threat now came not from fellow elites, but from the hostile occupants of the island from which he clung to power.126 The Communist military massed across the Strait represented a sizeable external threat, but absent an impending invasion, which was deemed unlikely, the threat posed by CCP forces on the mainland took second place to the urgency of retaining Chiang’s last territorial foothold on Taiwan.127 This shift in the dominant threat prompted Chiang to rethink his approach to internal security, and to make the most of an institutional legacy that the KMT had this far neglected.

During the Reform (Gaizao, 改造) Period from August 1950 to October 1952, the KMT analyzed its past failures and developed plans for reform.128 Chiang Kai-shek saw the organizational weakness of the KMT as a disease of the heart. On the mainland, however, he was constrained by the presence of elite rivals in a way that he was not in post-1949 Taiwan. See John King Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, The Cambridge History of China Vol. 13, Part 2: Republican China, 1912-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).


126 Even in the 1930’s, Chiang Kai-shek had referred to the Japanese as a disease of the skin, but the Communists as a disease of the heart. On the mainland, however, he was constrained by the presence of elite rivals in a way that he was not in post-1949 Taiwan. See John King Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, The Cambridge History of China Vol. 13, Part 2: Republican China, 1912-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

127 Observers disagree about the severity of the external threat; certainly it rose during the Taiwan Straits crises of 1954-55 and 1958, but especially once American support for the defense of Taiwan became clear, the threat was not existential. Chiang continued to believe that he could plausibly return to the Mainland for some years. See Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

establish a new, solid, organizational system... we have lost the basic means to rebuild and save our country. This is why we have been defeated.” In 1950, therefore, he handpicked sixteen younger, well-educated, trusted cadres to convene the Central Reform Committee (CRC): a new core leadership team for planning and implementing party reform. Over the course of two years and over four hundred working meetings, the CRC drafted and implemented extensive reforms of the Kuomintang, including the establishment of party branches throughout society, re-registration of party members, and purges and/or re-education of remaining cadres. The CRC marginalized factions by assigning their leaders to honorary but powerless positions, and consolidated the power of Chiang and premier Chen Cheng. They coupled martial law with a program of land reform designed to deflect popular discontent.

The regime also allowed electoral participation at the local level, adopting a deliberate strategy of using local elections to pressure cadres to keep up the pace of reform and work diligently to expand the party’s social base. Chiang suggested that having local elections in which party cadres stood a chance of losing would “provide the party with a good opportunity to be introspective. This time, two of our nominees lost in their campaigns. But without this failure, our fellow comrades probably would still retain their old conceited attitudes, as was the case in the mainland. They may still believe that, having the party’s usual organization and propaganda support, our party’s social

129 Hoover Institution Archives, KMT Central Reform Committee Archive (CRCA), 6.4-2, reel 1, Chiang Kai-shek’s introduction to the Resolution on the Reforming of our Party, 18 July 1950; originally cited in Myers and Lin, “Breaking With the Past,” p. 2. This was quite a change in assessment of party strength from the late 1920s; see Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution*, p. 106.

130 The powers of both the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee were temporarily suspended during this period.

base will be easily consolidated.” By the time the Central Executive Committee resumed power in 1952, the Nationalist party had become a political force to be reckoned with. It combined “strong leadership, concrete structure, tight discipline, high morale, common faith in shared doctrine, greater efficiency, and less corruption.”

One major consequence was a new approach to internal security, one that responded to the new threat environment by creating a coercive apparatus that was unitary and inclusive. The principal driver (and beneficiary) of this process was Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo. Ching-kuo had spent a decade in the Soviet Union and witnessed firsthand the political persecution that accompanied the Stalinist purges of the 1930’s; his instructor in strategy in Leningrad was Marshal Tukashevsky, a high-ranking general executed in the purges. One observer of Chiang Ching-kuo wrote of him, “Sons who succeed to the positions of forceful fathers often turn out to be weak and disappointing. Chiang Ching-kuo does not fit this pattern,” and later described him as “strong-willed, decisive, and effective… [with a] man-of-the-masses approach… [and] the outward geniality suited to his rotund appearance.” After Chiang Kai-shek’s death, Ching-kuo would set the country on a course toward a liberal democracy.

In the meantime, however, he took over his father’s internal security apparatus and remade it, turning it into a feared and effective secret police organization. Hard-working and organized – unlike many dictators, Ching-kuo had an unusual tolerance for paperwork – he assumed directorship of the Ministry of Defense’s General Political Department in 1950. Within the KMT party, he held

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133 Myers and Lin, “Breaking With the Past”; see also Wang, Jurisprudence With Historical Thinking, p. 322.
136 Durdin, “Chiang Ching-kuo and Taiwan,” p. 1024.
positions on the Central Reform Committee (1950-52) and Central Standing Committee (1952 and after), and he subsequently directed the China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps. His reforms focused on three elements: political control of the military, creating a unified, coordinated bureaucracy for internal security; and increasing the capacity of the intelligence and police agencies to penetrate and gather intelligence on Taiwan’s society.

**Strengthening Political Control of the Republic of China Military**

One of Chiang Ching-kuo’s first priorities was to establish a political commissar program within the military.\(^{137}\) He believed that the lack of political commissar system within the Republic of China military had been an organizational weakness from an intelligence standpoint; the absence of political reporting on officers’ loyalties and activities, and inadequate surveillance of them, had prevented Chiang Kai-shek from discovering and punishing those who sent him misleading reports.\(^{138}\)

In 1950, as the new head of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) within the armed forces, Chiang Ching-kuo reshuffled military units and reassigned or removed potentially troublesome personnel.\(^{139}\) He established a Leninist-style political commissar program within the military to supervise and politically educate the armed forces and ensure their loyalty. Political officers were assigned to all units at and below the regimental unit, and had their own independent chain of upward reporting through Party channels. By 1957, there were 17,000 political staff within the Republic of China’s military: one for every 35 members of the armed forces.\(^{140}\) American military observers reported that the system was widely unpopular among both officers and men,


\(^{139}\) U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, cable on 29 June 1951.

who saw these steps as ones deliberately designed to tighten Chiang Ching-kuo’s control. Disapproving reports from the early 1950s repeated the following (unconfirmed) story about initiation rites forced on Republic of China soldiers by political officers:

Pledges of loyalty to Generalissimo required of all members military and police forces take form of drop of blood from each person of group into glass of water from which each member of group then sips, plus verbal pledge and in some cases written…

While the story may be apocryphal, it is worth noting that the Shanghai Green Gang (青幫) – which Chiang Kai-shek participated in and then used against Shanghai’s striking workers in 1927 – traditionally used these blood sharing rites, as did the Triads and other secret society brotherhoods, though typically they mixed the blood with wine rather than water.

To further political control of the military, Chiang set up a “rotation system of military command” for officers. Designed to limit regional and factional splits, the rotation system prohibited any general from serving in a single post for longer than two years. Tun-jen Cheng credits this system with eliminating “military paternalism based on personal and regional ties,” but it also prevented officers from building a power base among their men and limited their abilities for operational collusion with each other. Ching-kuo recruited native Taiwanese to augment and further mix up military personnel, though he and Chiang Kai-shek insisted that there would be “no purely Formosan units.” He also protected the prerogatives of the military, particularly its political

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141 U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, cable on 7 August 1950.


143 Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan,” p. 114.


officers, vis-à-vis other security agencies that had not yet come under his control. For example, when Governor K.C. Wu sought to “give civilian law enforcement officials exclusive jurisdiction to make arrests for non-military crimes,” Ching-kuo blocked him, keeping arrest authority and power concentrated not just in the military’s hands, but in the hands of the political units most trusted to be loyal to him and to his father.\footnote{Wu’s account of this was published in the U.S. in \textit{Life} magazine, and is also mentioned in Kerr, \textit{Formosa Betrayed}, pp. 480-486.} Finally, in his capacity as head of the GWPD, Chiang Ching-kuo set up and supervised a training center for intelligence agents at Shihpai.\footnote{Gao Minghui was trained at this school as part of its first class of new recruits (fourth class overall). See Gao Minghui (高明輝), \textit{Intelligence Archives: an Old Investigator’s Story} 《情治檔案：一個老調查員的自述》(臺北市, 商周文化發行, 1995), pp. 267-70; Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”}

To accomplish this, Chiang got rid of military officers that he distrusted or disliked, particularly ones that could be plausible rivals to his power or that of Chiang Kai-shek. Beginning in early 1950, the GPWD under Chiang Ching-kuo purged and executed officers ostensibly suspected of Communist sympathies. These included the Vice Minister of National Defense, the Chief of Military Conscription, the Chief of Army Supply Services, and the Commander of the 70th Division.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, 12 June 1950.} The last and perhaps most important of these was Army commander-in-chief General Sun Li-jen, an American-educated officer who had close ties to the United States and reportedly opposed Chiang’s plans to insert Soviet-style commissars in the Republic of China military. A State Department cable from 7 March 1950, notes the arrest of 36 generals in the Nationalist military for their connections with Chiang’s rival Sun Li-jen;\footnote{U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, cable from 7 March 1950.} other spy ring cases within the security apparatus were uncovered in June and July 1951.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, cables from 29 June, 5 July, and 6 July 1951.} (From 1950-1954, Chiang Ching-kuo claimed to have...
broken up an average of thirteen Communist conspiracies per month, a total of 550 in all.\(^{151}\) In 1954, Sun was removed from operational command and assigned an honorary role within the military. In 1955, he was accused of plotting a coup with the CIA, court-martialed, and placed under house arrest in Taichung, where he remained until his exoneration in the late 1980’s – shortly after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death.\(^{152}\)

Chiang’s purges within the security apparatus led to a short-term increase in violence; the only detailed English-language analysis of this process refers to it as an internal campaign of “indiscriminate ferocity.”\(^{153}\) Indeed, much of the state violence visible in Figure 1 between 1949 and 1955, typically thought of as the peak of the White Terror, was actually concentrated among the Nationalist’s own officials and military.\(^{154}\) In contrast to native Taiwanese who were individually monitored and disciplined by the *baojia* system (see below), the two million Mainlander refugees who arrived with Chiang Kai-shek presented a much more difficult intelligence and counter-intelligence problem. They came from a military that had been badly infiltrated by Communist operatives and that had had whole divisions defect en masse; claims to loyal behavior during the Civil War were often unverifiable. Chiang believed – and some reports corroborated – that Communist spies had attempted to infiltrate the flotilla of refugees who accompanied him to Taiwan.\(^{155}\) Lacking the

\(^{151}\) U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, cables from 1954.


\(^{154}\) White Terror typically carries the implication that it was directed against native Taiwanese; without contesting that, I simply wish to point out that state violence within the coercive apparatus took place in parallel. Author’s interviews with two senior retired officers of the Republic of China Navy, October and November 2010, Taipei; see also data from the Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation, previously cited.

intelligence capacity to separate real from imagined threats, and believing that the exigencies of the situation left no margin for error, any suspicious activity became grounds for violence. American officials at the time explicitly noted the inward turn to the island’s repressive operations, as the Nationalists sought to purge their security forces of any potential disloyalty and establish methods to prevent future contamination. The contemporary scholarly focus on 2-28 as the principal manifestation of state violence in Taiwan has somewhat obscured the disproportionately high rate at which Mainlanders became targets of their own coercive apparatus during this period, and the extent to which the ferocity of the early 1950’s was directed not outward at the Taiwanese population (who had indeed borne the brunt of violence in the late 1940’s), but inward, at the KMT’s own personnel.

Reducing Fragmentation within the Coercive Apparatus

Chiang Ching-kuo also took steps to reduce the fragmentation of the coercive apparatus. As with his efforts to establish political control over the military, the desire to improve Nationalist intelligence capability was a chief driver of his actions. Despite the perception today that Chinese military culture strongly emphasizes the role of intelligence, KMT military officers writing after the war drew particular attention to the weakness of the Nationalist intelligence system relative to that of their Communist adversaries. 156 Nationalist intelligence reports were formal, bureaucratized, and not particularly useful in understanding the local population and countering insurgency – in clear contrast to the Communists, who drew on a network throughout the whole population to supply their intelligence. Moreover, infiltration gave the Communists advance notice of Nationalist plans, while the flow of information inside the Nationalist military was restricted due to suspicion and distrust. 157

156 The quote most commonly cited is Sun-tzu’s “It is said that if you know your enemy and know yourself, you can win a hundred battles without a single loss.” See “Sun-Tzu’s Art of War,” in Ralph Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 145-186.

Accordingly, plans to reform the intelligence apparatus actually preceded those of the overall party reform effort. One month after arriving in Taipei, in July 1949, Chiang Kai-shek gathered together a group of trusted young aides in Kaohsiung: Chiang Ching-kuo, Tang Zong, Zheng Jiemin, Mao Renfeng, Ye Xiufeng, Zhang Zhen, Mao Lin, Tao Yishan, Peng Mengji, and Wei Daming. On August 15th, they formally became known as the Political Action Committee (PAC), led by the former Director of the 7th organization of the “President’s Office” Tang Zong. The Committee’s express purpose was to unify and streamline the intelligence organizations to improve their (currently catastrophic) performance. By December 1949, the PAC had about 100 personnel detailed to it, with plans to select another fifty. When Chiang Kai-shek was reinstated to the presidency in March 1950, the President’s Office was broken up and incorporated into the formal Office of the President and KMT party headquarters, and the Political Action Committee transformed into the Confidential Office Data Group of the Office of the President. Tang Zong moved over to head party intelligence work under the 6th Division of the KMT’s Central Reform Committee, and Chiang Ching-kuo took over the Confidential Office Data Group. According to Chen Tsui-lien, by 1953, the Confidential Office Data Group exercised either a supervisory role or had “guidance and coordination” authority over nearly all of the government’s security agencies.

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158 The “President’s Office” run by Tang Zong existed only from mid-1949 to March 1950, when Chiang Kai-shek was reinstated to the presidency. Chen, “Secret Agent Rule,” p. 47; Sun Jiaqi, The Secrets Behind Chiang Ching-kuo’s Establishment of Taiwan’s Intelligence Services (Hong Kong: Ri Li Publishers, 1961) / 孫家麒, < 蔣經國建立特務系統密辛> (香港: 日力, 1961), p. 22.


161 Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”
Chiang Ching-kuo eliminated and merged overlapping agencies, reducing their total number, and reassigned responsibilities among the organizations that remained in order to minimize institutional conflict.¹⁶² In 1952, the National Defense Council formed, with Chiang Ching-kuo as Deputy Secretary-General, and under its auspices the National Security Bureau was established in 1955. Though Zhou Zhirou was named formal director, vice-director Chiang Ching-kuo was unquestionably the figure in charge.¹⁶³ The NSB was in charge of coordinating the activities of all police, security, and intelligence agencies, and because it coordinated not only government but also party intelligence work, it held even broader jurisdiction than that of the Confidential Office Data Group.¹⁶⁴ The agencies that it oversaw included the various organs of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan Garrison Command, military intelligence, and local police forces.¹⁶⁵ Among the NSB’s new and augmented responsibilities were: synchronizing each agency’s policies, approving the allocation and use of their funding, reviewing their investigation data and reports, planning staff training and research, and monitoring all agencies’ recordkeeping and human resources practices.¹⁶⁶

The result was a centralized and internally coordinated security apparatus. Internal security policies were managed from the top by the NSB, and their implementation was directed and overseen by Taiwan’s Garrison Command (TGC). At the local level, the four regional garrison commanders

¹⁶² U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, cables sent 3 August, 7 August, and 6 September 1950.

¹⁶³ Hsu Rei-Hao, “How Did the Authorities Deal With the Lei Chen Case,” Academia Historica Paper (in Chinese), manuscript provided to the author.

¹⁶⁴ Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”


¹⁶⁶ These responsibilities are outlined in a December 1954 document available in the President Chiang Ching-kuo case files, Vol. 43, Academia Historica Archives.
directed “Party, Government, and Military Joint Warfare Meetings,” which were attended by all of the KMT party chairmen in the region, leaders of local legislative and government offices, county and city police chiefs, leaders of military and military police units, Investigation Bureau groups, and personnel in charge of telecommunications monitoring. The reports that were compiled from these meetings were then forwarded to Garrison Command Headquarters for review.167

Among the chief effects of this reform was the reduction and eventually the elimination of the decades-long rivalry between the MBIS (Juntong) and CBIS (Zhongtong). As with the process of producing a politically loyal military, this led in the short-term to higher violence within the security apparatus, and relatively less violence once consolidation had been achieved. CBIS had long been affiliated with the Central Club (“CC”) clique: the faction based around brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, whose uncle Chen Qimei had been an early mentor to Chiang Kai-shek. Despite these close personal ties – or perhaps because of them – the Chen brothers became rivals to Chiang Ching-kuo when the Nationalists were still administering the Chinese mainland.168 Most of the cadres that drove the reforms of the security apparatus – namely, members of the Political Action Committee and then the Confidential Data Group of the Office of the President – came from the Whampoa military academy and the Zhejiang school, both affiliated with CBIS’ rival organization, MBIS. The fact that members of the CC Clique-affiliated CBIS were under-represented in the reform process was identified by Tang Zong as one of the early obstacles to reform (in 1949).169

From 1949-1956, both agencies went through several name changes and were located in different places in the organizational structure. Eventually, the Central Bureau became the Ministry


168 Guo, History of the KMT’s Fractional Struggles, p. 613; Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”

169 See Tang Zong (head of Political Action Committee)’s 1949 year-end report to Chiang Kai-shek, President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files, Academia Historica, p. 22.
of the Interior/Ministry of Justice’s Bureau of Investigation (Diaochaju, led by Li Yuanpu and often abbreviated MJIB in English), and the Military Bureau became the Ministry of National Defense’s Intelligence Bureau (Qingbaoju, led by Mao Renfeng). More importantly, however, the portfolios of work were clearly divided; the Investigative Bureau concentrated on domestic intelligence work in Taiwan, and the Intelligence Bureau directed its operations toward mainland China and other external areas.

Chiang Ching-kuo attempted to water down the MBIS-CBIS rivalry by transferring personnel across the two departments under a slogan that roughly translates to “communication between bureau personnel.” This policy was less successful at completely eliminating tension than in it was at simply consolidating the intelligence apparatus in favor of the MBIS at the expense of the CBIS (and its CC clique backers). It did, however, have a limiting effect on violence, which afterward mainly took the form of agencies accusing each other’s personnel of being spies, and rarely went beyond the boundaries of the coercive apparatus itself. In 1964, Shen Zhiyue became the first person from the old Military Bureau to assume the Directorship of the Investigative Bureau, and after that, no Central Bureau person held the Directorship of the MJIB again.

Shen Zhiyue became the Investigative Bureau’s longest-tenured Director (1964-78); though he earned the nickname of “Taiwan’s Heinrich Himmler” for his aggressive prosecution of spies and political criminals, many of them appear to have been his own employees. Under his tenure, an astonishing number of intelligence and security agency officials, many from the former Central Bureau staff, were themselves accused of spying for the Communists. Chen Tsui-lien documents a

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170 I have simplified the institutional changes here for readability’s sake. Chen, “Intelligence Agencies’ Internal Competition.”

171 Li, Study of the Investigative Bureau, p. 134.

172 Li, Study of the Investigative Bureau, p. 134.
set of interconnected cases that implicated at least sixty high-ranking individuals from the Investigative Bureau: First Division vice director Li Shijie, former Third Division director Jiang Hairong, Fourth Division director Fan Ziwen, his wife and Training Council assistant director Man Suyu, assistant director Shi Yuwei, section chief Zhu Weiru, Sixth Division assistant director Yu Zhenbang, First Division assistant director Deng Qichang, Sixth Division vice director Chen Zhengmin. Shen also used his position within the Investigative Bureau to target officials from a rival faction that remained behind in the Intelligence Bureau (the Ye clique around Ye Xiangzhi). Regional rivalries were another factor that contributed to lingering violence within the security apparatus against members of the Investigative Bureau (the old CBIS). Many of the early Mainlander arrivals to Taiwan – some immediately after the Second World War – were from Fujian province; they took over Japanese properties and occupied preferential positions, including in the security apparatus, particularly in the Investigative Bureau. For example, Jiang Hairong, director of the MJIB’s Third Division, hailed from Fuzhou in Fujian; he appointed numerous officials from his hometown, including Sixth Division Vice Director Chen Zhengmin, Fourth Division Section Chief Huang Xiang, and the Third Division’s Dai Guangwu, as well as appointing Fujianese First Division Vice Director Li Shijie, who subsequently promoted numerous other Fujianese: the so-called “Fujian Gang.” When the Investigative Bureau was targeted for housecleaning, the Fujianese were among the most prominent targets; after the native Taiwanese, Fujian province had the largest number of cases processed by Garrison Command’s military tribunals. Even those in the Intelligence Bureau

173 Chen calls this a shift from “struggles between factions” to “struggles between personnel.” Chen, “Intelligence Agencies’ Internal Competition.”

174 Li Shijie’s memoir provides an overview: Li, Study of the Investigative Bureau.
were not safe; over 130 of them were arrested as well. Only the intervention of a senior NSB official – Yan Lingfeng, himself from Fujian – halted the attacks.\textsuperscript{175}

This history is complicated, but it underscores several points that are consistent with the overall argument of the dissertation. First, the authorities in Taiwan recognized fragmentation as a cause of political violence, and sought to minimize it through various institutional reforms. Second, their efforts to limit it were partly successful; the competition between bureaus was limited first, while informal factional and regional competition persisted until the mid-1960s. Third, where fragmentation, social difference, and organizational rivalry remained, they continued to cause violence – primarily within the coercive apparatus, but occasionally pulling in citizens from outside.

The KMT also achieved only partial success in limiting direct incentives for violence. In June of 1950, they established the Regulations for the Inspection and Elimination of Spies During the Period of Rebellion, which offered financial rewards to those who reported a spy. According to Article 14 of the regulations, informants were given 30\% of a convicted spy’s confiscated property, and another 35\% was allocated either as a reward or payment to those who prosecuted the investigation and case. (The government Treasury took the remainder.) Former members of the Investigative Bureau later explained that this system led the intelligence agencies to compete over performance levels by exaggerating both the capabilities of the enemy spies and the numbers caught. In order to impress their superiors and to claim the rewards that came with confiscated property, intelligence personnel fabricated cases and accused people falsely.\textsuperscript{176}


\textsuperscript{176} Manufactured cases included the Hui-an Case (130 people); the Nanjing Teacher Training School case (20 people); the Zhongzheng University case (30 people); the Ye Jiaban case (20 people), and the Watchmaker’s Case (40 people). Li, Study of the Investigative Bureau, pp. 115-118, 195-200; Wei, Report on Human Rights in Taiwan, p. 52.
By November 1953, the KMT’s Sixth Division (responsible for intelligence matters) complained that high rewards were leading to efforts to trap people into crimes, collusion with undercover agents to forge documentation, and other problems, all of which were being exacerbated by the lack of punishment for false accusations. The regulations were revised so that all of the confiscated property and money went to the Treasury, which then was responsible for paying a smaller, unspecified reward to informers and helpers on the case. This policy change limited—though it did not eliminate—the financial and material incentives for violence.

*Decreasing Social Exclusivity and Increasing Social Penetration*

Finally, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo’s reforms to the security apparatus were designed to reverse that apparatus’ isolation from society and instead embed it into every corner of Taiwan. This took several forms: the recruitment of native Taiwanese into the party and government, including the military and police; the use of party organizations to monitor workplaces, schools, and other parts of society; the reactivation of the *baojia* system and its linkage into government and party networks; and the development of an extensive network of informants.

Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo recognized early on—as early as Chiang’s directive to Chen Cheng in January 1949, if not before—that exclusion and under-representation of native Taiwanese were problematic, and that they needed to recruit native Taiwanese into local and provincial political roles. The Republic of China army—starting from basically 100% Mainlander when Taiwan returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1945—attempted to ameliorate the problem of native Taiwanese under-representation through recruitment and promotion, but given the time required for advancement in any military, these were slow mechanisms of change even if promotions


178 Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”
were accelerated. Chiang Kai-shek also so strongly feared the defection or collusion of units composed entirely of native Taiwanese that he issued an order in 1951 forbidding their creation and forcing Taiwanese to intermix with Mainlanders – a policy that was not popular among the native Taiwanese.\(^{179}\) As a result, Taiwanese were under-represented in the government of Taiwan in general, but the trend was “even more pronounced at the top levels of the military and security forces.”\(^{180}\) As also happened on the KMT Central Committee and in other government posts, Chiang Ching-kuo did his best to accelerate Taiwanization, as is shown in Table 3.1 below:\(^{181}\)

### Table 3.1: Level of Native Taiwanese Representation in the RoC Military

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade/Rank</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Col, Lt. Col, Major</th>
<th>Lowest 3 ranks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960’s</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970’s</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980’s</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the 1980’s, therefore, the number of Taiwanese in the lowest levels of the military had almost become equivalent to their proportion of the population, though under-representation persisted at higher levels. Native Taiwanese also remained under-represented in the police, consisting of around twelve percent of the top officers and a third of the city or county police station chiefs.\(^{182}\)

Party reform coupled with local administrative reform probably played a greater role than military reform in KMT efforts both to involve native Taiwanese and to penetrate the broader

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\(^{179}\) U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, 28 July 1951.


society of the island. Chiang Kai-shek identified the organizational weakness of the KMT as the chief cause of their defeat, and laid blame for organizational weakness on factionalism and the fact that the KMT was out of touch with society. Both the Central Reform Committee and the reforms that were specific to the intelligence and security apparatus aimed to fix this problem. As early as January 1949, Chiang Kai-shek had telegraphed Chen Cheng, then the head of the Taiwan Provincial Government, to order him to recruit more native Taiwanese. Chiang Ching-kuo subsequently increased this recruitment island-wide; the Party’s re-registration campaign increased membership from 50,000 members who crossed the Straits from the Mainland to an estimated 280,000 by the Seventh Party Congress in October 1952 -- as many as 57% of them Taiwanese. By summer 1952, the KMT had at least thirty thousand work teams – nine or more members, the lowest level of party organization – who worked across Taiwan’s geographical, occupational, and societal areas. These were augmented by KMT cells in workplaces and throughout organizations: for example, the Anti-Communist Youth Corps established in 1952 and headed by Chiang Ching-kuo, was the only intercollegiate organization allowed by law, and was designed to entertain, monitor, and recruit students, especially Taiwanese. Eventually, almost 20% of the population were KMT party members – higher than average for a Leninist party.

183 Chu, From Governor-General’s Office to the President’s Office, p. 14.
186 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, p. 312.
Figure 2.3 shows how these organizations combined to create overlapping layers of surveillance:

**Figure 2.3: Intelligence Agencies’ Network for Social Monitoring**

The net effect of this reform process was that each part of society fell under multiple organs and organizations. It also meant that their reports were not stovepiped or compartmentalized, but shared across the coercive apparatus in a coordinated fashion. All reporting was done upward to the KMT and to Taiwan Garrison Command, who then in turn reported in a coordinated fashion to the National Security Bureau and the President.

The clear purpose of these teams and organizations – along with political education and recruitment – was, in fact, to monitor and investigate Taiwan society (*shehui diaocha*). Party members were instructed to carry out social investigation at least once a month, and to become “the eyes and ears” of the party. These reports included lists of local notables, statistical information and analyses of social trends, and evidence of illegal and communist-sympathizing activity. Lin and Myers

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conclude that this information was then used to identify people for more targeted surveillance. The public service stations set up by the KMT in 1953-54 in every town and village were also ordered to gather investigative statistics on local organizations, agencies, schools, religions, factions, gangs, criminals, influential citizens, and leaders. Societal investigation work was coordinated at the top by the Sixth Division of the KMT Central Committee, responsible for intelligence gathering and prevention work. These tasks were not secret; Douglas Mendel, a critical American observer teaching in Taiwan during martial law, wrote that his students “abbreviated my lectures on the Communist Party of the USSR, explaining it was very similar to their own KMT in its organization and its use of secret police, political commissars, youth corps, labor indoctrination, and dogmatic slogans. KMT party spies appear to infest every local government office, private organization, school campus, and community organization.” He also recounted being warned by a local official not to trust even low-level native bureaucrats, because they “would sell their own brothers to the security police.”

Chiang also drew on old Japanese legacies to reinforce the security apparatus’ penetration of and control over society. The baojia system was reactivated and subsumed into the party and local government monitoring network, so that it was once again closely linked to the deployment of coercive power. The bao and jia were merged into local governments; jia become lin of 6-15 families, and bao became li of 150-300 families. The secretaries of the bao and jia (baojia shuji), who

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188 Work teams rather than party branches were the fundamental blocks of KMT organization. Lin and Myers, “Breaking With the Past,” p. 12; CRCA 6.4-2, reel 4, minutes of 168th CRC meeting, 9 July 1951. Hoover Institution Archives; Gaižuo, no. 19 (June 1951), pp. 65; Gaižuo, no. 47-48 (August 1952), pp. 42-43.


190 Mendel, Politics of Formosan Nationalism, pp. 94, 100.

had assisted the baojia heads during the Japanese colonial era, subsequently became the employees of KMT local governments.\(^{192}\) This system was, as under the Japanese, coupled with a clear system of collective responsibility. Regulations established in June of 1950 required mutual monitoring: according to Article 5, each person in society had to ‘associate’ with at least two other people, and if it was discovered that the individual in question was a spy, his two associates as well as his supervisor would be held responsible, with a penalty of jail time ranging from one to seven years (the charge: failing to report a spy).\(^{193}\) Sanctions could also be issued to the entire neighborhood or organization. In general, the local neighborhood leaders (the old baojia heads) were responsible for maintaining a spy-free area.\(^{194}\)

Finally, Taiwan’s coercive institutions plugged into an extraordinarily large network of unofficial informers, who were used to monitor and keep track of potentially subversive activity. A 1964 manuscript prepared by Tillman Durdin for the Council on Foreign Relations estimated that “Ching-kuo had 50,000 regular policing agents in the many organization under his control, and that the number of paid informants active on Formosa might be ten times that figure.”\(^{195}\) This seems to be something of an overstatement, but according to the former Vice Minister of the Investigative Bureau (Diaochaju, 調查局), his organization alone in 1979 had two thousand investigators, each of whom were in turn responsible for thirty to forty informants (xianmin, 線民), each assigned either to a particular community, or to an organization. This totals 80,000 xianmin for a population of 17.5


\(^{193}\) Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”

\(^{194}\) Gao, Intelligence Archives: an Old Investigator’s Story, pp. 160-168.

million (10.6 adults) – a ratio of one informant for every 219 citizens, and a ratio of 1:132 if one excludes children. And this does not count the informants working for other agencies, or the information provided by KMT offices located in schools, large companies, and civic associations. Even if one only counts the informants employed by the Ministry of Justice’s Investigative Bureau, one informant for every 132 adults is a level of societal penetration historically matched by very few – among them contemporary North Korea and the East German Stasi. A popular expression throughout the martial law era was that “everyone has a police headquarters in their hearts.”

The system used for processing the information once it was collected was also impressive, both on a local and a central level. As Matsuzaki notes, at the local level, “the police continued to regulate inter-personal relations not just by enforcing laws, but by relying on detailed household records to understand how people were connected and who should be contacted were some incident to occur.” At the central level, the National Security Bureau established a Data Center, in keeping with its charge to provide the data necessary to set internal security policy. By 1967, the Data Center held a total of nearly 140,000 case files on suspected spies, Taiwan independence activists, and other persons of concern: 26,000 individual case files, some of which dated back to 1950, plus another

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196 Gao, Intelligence Archives; Li Shijie, Study of the Investigative Bureau.

197 Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, p. 60.

198 See Chapter One.


110,000 files or pieces of data provided by the Office of the President. This was in addition to the separate files kept by each intelligence agency, nicknamed AB files since the A files held basic data, and the B files held secret information.

*Intelligence: the Substitute for Violence*

In the early 1960's, American officials conducted a review, mandated by the National Security Council, of the internal security threats facing America’s allies and the capabilities of each country to deal with the threats it faced. The six-part report on Taiwan, which spanned several hundred pages, recommended against offering assistance to Taiwan. Its authors noted that Taiwan’s security agencies had been successful in neutralizing any hint of movement toward armed opposition. In fact, one of the six sections complained about the method by which Taiwan’s authorities had achieved this competence, describing it as “saturation to the point of inefficiency.”

As the system described above took hold, intelligence became a substitute for violence. What replaced the previous high-intensity, indiscriminate violence was a more targeted, selective, preventative, and bureaucratic approach to repression. The number of people arrested declined sharply, and individual arrests took the place of mass arrests. Internal meeting notes from the Presidential Office and Taiwan Garrison Command also reveal that as the regime grew more confident of its ability to uncover and pre-empt threats, it adopted a less lethal approach to the dissidents it did arrest. Instead of firing squads, political criminals faced incarceration in a set of

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202 Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”

203 U.S. State Department, Internal Security Assessment of the Republic of China (Taiwan), State Department archival record holdings, record group 59.

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newly constructed prisons, including places like the infamous Green Island – Taiwan’s Alcatraz, thirty miles off the southeastern coast.204

The process worked as follows. Based on the various lines of surveillance and reporting, investigators prepared dossiers, typically numbering in the hundreds to thousands of pages.205 Garrison Command’s Martial Law Section would then prepare a draft sentencing document and forward it to the Martial Law Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, which in turn sent its findings and recommendations to the Office of the President. There, the files were personally approved or revised by Chiang Kai-shek, whose seal appears on nearly every sentencing document and is often accompanied by handwritten revisions to the sentence recommended. A death sentence required – among other things – Chiang’s personal seal of approval, marked in red on the pages, and before-death and after-death photographs to document that the sentence had been correctly carried out.206 Executions, usually by firing squad, were carried out on a racetrack in southern Taipei. Extrajudicial disappearances were almost unheard of; the names of those executed by the regime were publicly posted at Taipei Main Station.207


205 Until establishment of a National Archives Administration makes case files more easily accessible, selected cases are available in Academia Historica volumes titled “Documentary Collection on Political Incidents.” 戰後臺灣政治案件 (臺北縣新店市: 國史館; 臺北市: 文建會, 2008). Each case is 1-2 volumes of 450-600 pages each.

206 There are cases where Chiang personally increased the harshness of a suggested sentence, such as changing from life imprisonment to death. This procedural emphasis, coupled with a lack of empirical reports of extrajudicial violence after the first year or two of martial law, also suggests that the security apparatus documented the majority of the cases that it handled. Lee Chen-hsiang et al., eds., The Road to Freedom: Taiwan’s Postwar Human Rights Movement (Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and Haiwang Printing Company, 2004), pp. 94-95; Wei, Report on Human Rights in Taiwan.

207 Author’s interviews with several political prisoners, Taipei, November and December 2010.
Lesser offenders were arrested, processed through Garrison Command’s military tribunal system, and kept in confinement in one of the island’s various prisons until their sentence expired. Upon release, the name and recorded data of each offender was forwarded to their district police headquarters, as well as placed on a list kept by the National Security Bureau of individuals who required special observation. Released individuals were then subject to regular interrogations. Two neighbors also had to sign each prisoner’s release paperwork, vouching for them and agreeing to submit weekly reports on their activity to the local security officials. The former Vice-Director of the Investigative Bureau, Gao Minghui, estimates that this watch-list was approximately 15,000 people in 1969-70.²⁰⁸

The example of Lei Chen, a pro-democracy figure who helped found and run the Free China periodical and was arrested in 1960, is instructive.²⁰⁹ Lei Chen founded Free China in 1949 (with initial support from a KMT seeking to differentiate itself from the Chinese Communist Party), but a series of more critical articles in the mid-to-late 1950s began to arouse the enmity of authorities. By 1958, Garrison Command had begun investigating Free China, highlighting it as a major object of investigation in the Second Division’s annual report issued in November 1958. In January 1959, the periodical published a reader’s letter titled “Why the Military Should Consider Themselves Dogs,” prompting an investigation on the grounds of having revealed military secrets (the case was eventually settled). That same month, according to the office diary of the Taiwan Garrison Commander Huang Chieh, Chiang grew angry after Lei’s name came up at a meeting of security

²⁰⁸ Gao, Intelligence Archives, p. 227.

²⁰⁹ The following section draws on archival materials from the Ministry of National Defense and the diary of Taiwan Garrison Commander Huang Chieh, contained in the Academia Historica Archives. See Shih-hung Chen, ed., Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: the Selected Archives of the Ministry of Defense (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002); 陳世宏 編輯, <雷震案史料彙編 : 國防部檔案選輯> (臺北市新店市 : 國史館 / 臺北縣板橋市 : 三民總經銷, 2002); Academia Historica web database; Hsu, “How Did the Authorities Deal with the Lei Chen Case.”
officials. After complaining about Lei’s “bad influence” and the disrespect that proved “his illegal connection with the Communists,” Chiang ordered several security organs – including the GPWD and Garrison Command – to figure out how to deal with the case such that the publication of content violating national policy would not be allowed to continue. 210 Extensive surveillance followed; among the files are photographs of the two security agents sitting with their bicycles on a wall outside the Free China offices, watching them and reporting on Lei’s activities. 211

After articles in 1960 criticized Chiang’s consecutive terms as president, and as reports indicated that Lei Chen was apparently participating in movements to develop an opposition party, surveillance increased. From May to September, Garrison Vice Commander Li Libai, General Bao Lie, and representatives from at least seven other intelligence agencies gathered to make “regular and speedy reports” on the movement and activities of Lei Chen and others involved in the opposition party movement. 212 By June 1960, Garrison Command’s Political Department, Security Department, and Military Law Department had prepared plans for “Operation Tianyu,” to arrest Lei Chen, indicating what he would be charged with and calling on the Security Department to swiftly collect the evidence required for prosecution. For the next two months, members of the KMT Sixth Division, General Political Department, Investigation Bureau, Garrison Command, and National Security Bureau met as a working group to further develop the plans, with occasional input from Taiwan Police Headquarters and the Military Police. Chiang Kai-shek’s orders were transmitted to the working group by the Secretary General of the Office of the President or by KMT General


211 See, for example, photos reprinted in Lee, The Road to Freedom.

212 Huang Chieh’s Office Diary, Academia Historica Archives; Chen, Documentary Collection.
Secretary Tang Zong. In mid-August, Chiang met personally with Garrison Commander Huang Chieh to inquire about the plans and issue instructions on the general timing of the operation. His questions and instructions were specific, down to which jail Lei Chen would be taken to, and which military judge had been selected for his tribunal.

In early September, Chiang reviewed an “Operation Tianyu Action Plan” and ordered Garrison Command to execute the operation on September 4. That day, the Garrison Commander received multiple phonecalls from Chiang Kai-shek, who wanted personally to confirm that the arrest had gone according to plan and to check on the development of the case. Afterward, Huang Chieh sent regular reports to his superiors on how the case and interrogation were progressing. When Chiang read the confession of one of the men arrested with Lei Chen, Liu Ziyi, he told Huang Chieh that it lacked punch, and ordered him to ask several additional, specific questions. He also ordered the authorities to treat this as a spying case (rather than something to do with the development of an opposition party). The trial took place on 3 October 1960. Chiang had given guidance on how to prepare Lei Chen’s sentencing document, and in a meeting in the Office of the President on October 8, he reviewed the three options that had been submitted to him, each listing the pros and cons of that course of action. He then directed the length, wording, and appeal process of Lei Chen’s sentence, as well as the deregistering and dissolution of Free China. The Chief of the Appellate Military Court also guaranteed to Chiang and the other officials in attendance that Lei’s appeal would be rejected. After the verdict was announced, various security departments sent regular reports to Chiang on domestic and international reactions to Lei’s imprisonment, which they

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had been monitoring since before his arrest. Lei Chen’s appeal, filed on New Year’s Eve 1960, was rejected as planned on 11th January 1961, and he served out the full duration of his ten-year sentence.

What is important to note about Lei Chen’s case is the entire system, documented above, that made it possible: a massive bureaucracy with an impressive capacity for surveillance, a controlled and unitary process of top-level deliberation about how to handle political opposition, and the confidence that targeted surveillance and imprisonment would be sufficient to achieve the state’s ends. Researchers at Taiwan’s Academia Historica have called the Lei Chen case a classic example of the KMT’s top-down “capacity of organizational control and mobilization” and bottom-up “capacity of information collection and feedback.” By 1960, the smooth internal coordination of the KMT’s coercive apparatus was complemented by the information-gathering advantages provided by increased social inclusiveness. This system was then brought to bear on Lei Chen and other dissidents.

VII. Conclusion

This chapter has advanced two primary arguments: first, that the change in design of Taiwan’s coercive institutions can be attributed to a change in the dominant threat facing Chiang Kai-shek around 1950, and second, that the replacement of a fragmented and socially isolated set of coercive institutions with ones that were unified and deeply embedded in society is responsible for the drop in state violence that occurred in the mid-1950s.

214 Huang Chieh’s Office Diary, Academia Historica Archives. For corroboration that this kind of monitoring happened in other cases, see Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles, eds., A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights Through International Networks, 1960-1980 (Taiwan: Social Empowerment Alliance and Hanyao Color Printing Co., Ltd., May 2008).

Alternative explanations do not perform as well as the two arguments above in explaining either the origins of Taiwan’s coercive institutions, or their consequences for state violence. In terms of origins, arguments about institutional path dependence help us identify two conflicting institutional legacies that the Nationalist government had to work with (one from the Japanese, and one from their own Mainland experience), but do not tell us which of these legacies would ultimately dominate, or why. International influence does not explain the design of Taiwan’s coercive institutions either, since Chiang Kai-shek rejected the international models favored by his allies – both of policing and of political intervention in the military – when he reconfigured his security apparatus in the early 1950s. The shift from elite to popular threat, however, explains not only the timing and direction of reforms to the internal security apparatus, but the process by which they were carried out.

Similarly, alternative explanations do not satisfactorily explain the observed patterns of state violence. The high violence from 1945-55 may look like a response to the rising popular threat, but the fact that much of this violence was directed within the security apparatus rather than at the population suggests that other factors must be at work. Moreover, we see Chiang Kai-shek responding to the conditions of the late 1940’s not merely by ordering violence – though that was indeed his short-term response to the crisis of early 1947 – but by concentrating his attention, and that of some of his most trusted advisors, on institutional reform. The fact that the coercive apparatus did not respond to increasing popular protest with increased violence in the 1970’s and 1980’s also suggests that an increase in threat is not sufficient to explain patterns of violence.216

In addition to confirming the shortcomings of the threat model, this emphasis on developing the capacity for intelligence collection and prevention of collective action also suggests

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that the bargaining model literature’s focus on response to protest, rather than pre-emption of it, misses important aspects of the drivers of repression. Similarly, explanations rooted in state capacity and organizational cohesion cannot explain why Chiang put so much effort into strengthening the state’s capacity and the organizational cohesion of the security apparatus in the early 1950s, when he had previously found it advantageous to weaken them with various coup-proofing devices. The Taiwan case also shows that a more cohesive set of institutions used less violence rather than more, which confirms the prediction of half of those who study organizational cohesion but contradicts the other half. Finally, international explanations are poor predictors, especially those that focus on American influence. If American dislike of KMT repression on Taiwan had led to decreased repression, then repression would have been lower under Consul-General Strong in the late 1940’s and risen under his more permissive successor Rankin in the early 1950s. Exactly the opposite happened. High-level American pressure on Taiwan to improve its human rights record did not begin again until the 1970s, which means that it could help explain overall political liberalization, but not a drop in violence that occurred fifteen years earlier.

Instead, changes in the KMT approach to internal security can be attributed to the fact that Chiang’s perceptions of threat evolved dramatically at the end of the 1940s. Having lost the mainland, and especially after eliminating elite rivals in the first half of the 1950’s, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo shifted their focus, and set about constructing a security apparatus that was more focused on managing popular unrest and defending against external attack than it was on out-maneuvering other elites. The resulting shift in the coercive institutions’ structure and social composition – from a fragmented, internally competitive, and socially isolated security apparatus in the early years of KMT rule to a unified and internally coordinated apparatus built on an inclusive

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capillary network of local information provision – made it possible for the KMT to rely on targeted, selective, and more discriminate violence in the years after 1955.
Chapter Three

The Philippines

I. Introduction

This chapter illustrates the argument of the dissertation by examining the period after Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines until his removal from office by military coup-defection and the People’s Power movement in 1986. A Spanish colony since the mid-1500’s, the Philippine Islands at the turn of the twentieth century experienced in swift succession the Philippine Revolution against Spanish rule (1896-98); the Spanish-American War which ceded the Philippines to the Americans (1898); and the Philippine-American War (1899-1902). After that, the Philippines remained an American colony throughout the first half of the twentieth century, achieving Commonwealth status and limited domestic autonomy in 1935. Occupied by the Japanese in 1941, the archipelago returned to American hands after brutal fighting in 1944-45, and became independent in July 1946. From the mid-1940’s to the mid-1950’s, the central government sought to suppress a rebellion by the Communist Hukbalahap (Huk) insurgency. During that time and after, the island was governed by a series of democratically elected presidents: Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay (who, as Defense Secretary under Quirino and then as President prosecuted and won the Huk campaign), Garcia, Macapagal, and then Marcos, who was elected in 1965 and re-elected in 1969. Unable to run for a third term, Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, and remained in
office until deposed by a combination of military coup-defection and mass uprising – the so-called “People’s Power” revolution – in 1986.

In the sections below, I trace the development of the Philippine internal security apparatus from the American colonial period through Marcos’ time, and link the development of coercive institutions to patterns of violence. I argue that Marcos, like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, had the opportunity to engage in extensive reorganization of the Philippines’ coercive apparatus, and did so when he assumed dictatorial power in 1972. Unlike Chiang Kai-shek, however, after declaring martial law, Marcos’ primary fears were of a coup and his elite rivals. This prompted him to create a security apparatus that was the opposite of the one created during the Reform Period in Taiwan: both internally fragmented and socially exclusive. Marcos’ manipulation of the coercive apparatus gave these institutions both material and social incentives to engage in violence, and prevented them from developing the intelligence capacity necessary to deal with threats that emanated from the population -- organizational dynamics which explain the escalating intensity of state violence against civilians over the course of the Marcos dictatorship.

This chapter proceeds in five sections. Section II provides an overview of the pattern of state violence under Marcos, identifying key trends to be explained by the theory. Section III traces the origins of the Philippine internal security apparatus. It examines the legacy of American colonialism in terms of both the structure and social composition of the country’s coercive institutions, and discusses their development between independence in 1945 and Marcos’ election in 1965. Section IV examines the policies that Marcos implemented with regard to coercive institutions around the time of the inauguration of martial law in September 1972. It analyzes the way in which Marcos exacerbated existing institutional and social rivalries to create fragmentation and competition, as well as the ways in which his coercive apparatus became increasingly exclusive and socially isolated. The section discusses how these institutional characteristics affected the incentives
and intelligence capacity of the Philippines’ coercive institutions, and links these factors to the
escalation in state violence over time between 1972 and 1986. Section V weighs this argument
against alternative explanations, and then concludes.

II. Overview of the Pattern of State Violence

Figures 3.1 and 3.2, below, show the trend of increasing state violence in the Philippines
over the period from 1975 to 1986 – a striking contrast to the decrease in the scope and intensity of
state violence in Taiwan that was demonstrated in the previous chapter.

Figure 3.1: Annual Number of Political Arrests, 1975-86

1 Note that Marcos was deposed in late February 1986, explaining the drop in that year. Data provided to the
author by Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, December 2011. For qualitative and case study reporting
on violence against civilians, see Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Salvaging Democracy: Human Rights in
the Philippines (New York: December 1985); Commission of the Churches on International Affairs/World
Council of Churches, Philippines: Testimonies on Human Rights Violations (Geneva, 1986); Bishop Francisco F.
Claver, The Stones Will Cry Out: Grassroots Pastorals (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1978); Task Force Detainees of the
Philippines, Political Prisoners of Our Time (Quezon City, 1989); Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the
The figures above are the most reliable statistics existing to date on state violence in the Philippines. They were generated by the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), which was organized in 1974 by the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP). In a country whose population is 90% Catholic, the Church possessed a uniquely broad geographic reach, with networks down to the local level in nearly every province and barangay. Thompson refers to it as the only institution outside of government capable of serving as a bridge between elites and masses. The Church’s geographic and social reach, plus its semi-protected status under martial law, allowed Church personnel to conduct surveys that generated the best non-governmental information found on these events in the Philippines.\(^2\) In the absence of records and statistics generated by a

transitional justice process, and without complete declassification of government records, these are likely to remain the authoritative figures on state violence during the Marcos period for the indefinite future. Regrettably, no systematic records of state violence prior to 1975 are currently available.

Indeed, the Philippines’ lack of transitional justice mechanisms, which have characterized other countries’ transitions away from periods of state terror and violence, hampers researchers’ attempt to obtain a full picture of the Marcos era. The pact between Corazon Aquino and the military that cemented the 1986 revolution, and the subsequent ascension to the Presidency of Fidel Ramos, former Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, resulted not only in limited security sector reform, but the promotion of key officers of the repressive apparatus – including alleged torturers – to positions of political and police power under the Philippines’ democratic government.\(^3\) Investigations into the violence committed by military and security forces prior to 1986 have, unsurprisingly, stalled, limiting the amount of information available.

During the research for this project, the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) agreed to release a large quantity of records to the Commission on Human Rights – a move that, when fully implemented, has the potential to provide a critically important source of information to complement NGO documentation and the author’s interviews.\(^4\) These documents include intelligence estimates, reports on the difficulties of obtaining good intelligence

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\(^3\) For example, the deputy of one of the notorious “anti-subversion” squads became the national police chief in 1999. Lack of security sector reform, I hypothesize, is one reason human rights violations by the Philippine security agencies continued after the transition to democracy: a topic for future research. See Jefferson Plantilla, “Elusive Promise: Transitional Justice in the Philippines,” *Human Rights Dialogue*, Vol. 1, No. 8 (Spring 1997).

on supposed subversive activities, and individual surveillance files and surveillance photographs. Selections from these archival materials are included in the final section of this chapter, their first appearance in Western scholarship. They have already begun to improve our understanding of the operations during this period by ISAFP and the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and undoubtedly, much more remains to be discovered in the yet-to-be-transferred files.

Even if these sources are fully released, omissions will likely remain. For example, ISAFP documents obtained for this project were sanitized; information that could be used to identify individuals involved, such as the name of the report author or even its originating unit, had been blacked out. Reports in Manila that ISAFP was combing through files before releasing them to CHR also raise concerns about what is and is not being preserved in the historical record. And including the ISAFP files will still leave gaps in our knowledge about the behavior of non-military units such as the Integrated National Police (INP) and the Civil Home Defense Forces (CHDF) – organizations whose role, while less central, is nonetheless important to a complete historical narrative and analysis of state violence under Marcos.

The dominance of accounts and statistics collected by non-governmental organizations in existing source materials also means that the data omit the first three years of martial law, before these organizations had organized their data collection effort. Both government records and my interviews suggest that this period was characterized by a somewhat different pattern of state violence than the years that followed: wider in scope, but lower in intensity. By the government’s own estimate, 60,000 people were arrested in the first few years of martial law. These arrests were short-lived: the majority of the detainees apprehended in the first flush of martial law were released

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5 Author’s interview with an individual involved in the transfer process, Quezon City, November 2011. This individual assured me that nothing important was being shredded: “only lists of who was invited to what meetings, and so on.”
anywhere from a few months to a year later.\textsuperscript{6} By 1977, somewhere between 563 and 4,000 detainees remained in prison.\textsuperscript{7} Torture during detention, however, not a common practice in pre-martial law Philippines, became widespread after 1972: in 1986, an association of former political detainees named SELDA estimated that 35,000 political prisoners had suffered “some form of torture” during their confinement.\textsuperscript{8} All of interviewees to whom I spoke had experienced what ISAFP documents understatedly refer to as “the physical extraction of information.”\textsuperscript{9}

Not all of these early detainees, however, appear to have filed formal claims or to have been represented in the documentation upon which the above figures are based, meaning that these estimates likely significantly understate the scope of violence. Historian Al McCoy uses a figure of 3,257 deaths;\textsuperscript{10} the claim filed against Marcos in a class-action suit in U.S. federal court – which in September 1992 found Marcos guilty and held his estate liable for damages that eventually totaled almost $2 billion – included 9541 claimants.\textsuperscript{11} All of the former detainees I met in Manila had been detained during this 1972-75 period, and their past detentions were common social knowledge, but

\textsuperscript{6} Author’s interviews with four former political detainees, Quezon City, November 2011.

\textsuperscript{7} This was the military and presidential office’s own estimate. See, for example, David Briscoe, “Martial Law may be lifted, but Marcos remains secure,” \textit{Associated Press}, 25 December 1980. See also a report by the International Commission of Jurists, “The Decline of Democracy in the Philippines,” (Geneva, Switzerland: August 1977). Marcos’ own statements were inconsistent; in a national radio address in December 1974, Marcos said that 5,234 people were under detention as a result of the declaration of martial law (1,165 political detainees, 4,069 criminal offenders). In a June 1977 speech to the Foreign Correspondents Club, however, he denied that the Philippines had any political prisoners. In February of that year, the government had said that of approximately 60,000 arrested, 4,000 remained in detention (1,500 “subversive” detainees, and 2500 criminal offenders). See Jesus Castila et al, “State of Political Detainees: the Philippine Setting,” \textit{Philippine Law Journal}, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1979), pp. 497-549.


\textsuperscript{9} “Institution of Safehouses,” Top Secret agent’s report, ISAFP files, 2 January 1973; author’s interviews.

\textsuperscript{10} McCoy, \textit{Closer Than Brothers}, p. 192.

they had neither joined the class-action suit nor reported their detention to an NGO. Their names do not appear in TFDP or SELDA files. This leads me to believe that both the NGO reporting and class-action suit understate both the number of arrests and the number of tortures, and that a correct estimate would likely be nearer to the numbers estimated by SELDA and the Marcos government itself.

Despite these gaps and problems, the statistics illustrated above do reveal a clear pattern, corroborated by qualitative research. This pattern is the primary object of explanation tackled in subsequent sections. After the early wave of indiscriminate arrests and ‘short-term’ detentions, the level of state violence in the Philippines rose steadily over time. The breadth of arrests dropped after the 1972-74 period, but from 1972 to 1986, the number of killings increased. Despite Marcos’ lawyerly claims to “constitutional authoritarianism” (a term coined by a president who passed the 1939 bar exam while awaiting trial for the murder of his father’s political rival), many of these killings were extrajudicial in nature – meaning that they took place outside a legal framework but were executed by individuals who were identifiable, even uniformed members of the security apparatus. Some of the targets of state violence simply disappeared (an estimated 737 individuals between 1975 and 1985). Many more of the killings, however, especially the later ones, were “salvagings” – a term peculiar to Filipino-English that denotes the public disposal of a mutilated corpse in a field, along a roadside, or in another location where it would be found by the public. According to Amnesty International, of the 2,540 people killed, 77% were salvaged in the process.

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12 Author’s interviews with former political detainees, Quezon City, November 2011.
13 TFDP data provided to author; also cited in McCoy, Closer Than Brothers.
14 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 29 June 1996.
Whereas violence in Taiwan declined over time regardless of form, under Marcos arrests declined but killings increased – and those killings were increasingly done in a brutal, highly visible way.

The following sections chronicle the origins and institutional evolution of the agencies responsible for internal security in the Philippine archipelago.

III. Origins of the Security Apparatus in the Philippines

No modern work on the Philippine military or police forces begins without referencing the legacy bequeathed by Spanish and American colonial institutions. The institutions inherited by Filipino leaders in 1945 – and by Ferdinand Marcos in 1965 – were fragmented, most notably between the military, a paramilitary constabulary, and a scattered array of local security actors (primarily municipal police, supplemented by rural police whose role was essentially one of private security forces for prominent local officials). The colonial legacy was, however, one of relative social inclusion, in that it relied on Filipino officers and men, and emphasized the development of broad social networks to provide intelligence. As a democratically elected leader elected on a platform that promised to reduce violence (primarily criminal violence) against civilians, Marcos initially sought to improve the centralization and coordination of the internal security apparatus – a course of action that he would reverse after seizing power through martial law. Thus the origins of the Philippine coercive apparatus as it existed during the martial law period should be attributed to Marcos’ desire to protect himself from threats to his power, rather than to the institutions he inherited or American influence.

Colonial Rule: Local Police and the Philippine Constabulary

Spanish colonial authorities set an institutional tradition within Philippine policing that was to persist throughout subsequent history: a tripartite division between 1) the army, with primary
responsibility for external defense, 2) a paramilitary constabulary to enforce internal order, and 3) scattered municipal forces that operated at the behest of local officials.

At the local level, Filipino villages traditionally relied for law and order on a militia called the *cuerpo de cuadrilleros*, raised from men who had been conscripted for military service. It was typically led by a local official and staffed by men selected by and loyal to the *gobernadorcillo*, the municipality’s most senior civil official. The *gobernadorcillo* held both civil and criminal jurisdiction, an overlap that provided multiple opportunities for self-enrichment and limited the recourse of local citizens who, if they objected to extortion or corruption, had to accuse a defendant who was also both the local police chief and presiding judge. The *gobernadorcillo’s* primary accountability was either to provincial officials, who were most likely to intervene if his actions were at the expense of the central government, or to the parish priest, who held an expansive set of social responsibilities (including the power to recommend citizens for banishment), and an independent line of reporting to the provincial governor.16

In 1868, however, Spanish authorities also formed the Guardia Civil, a paramilitary police designed to suppress warlords and bandits (*ladrones*) and to insure social order.17 The Philippine Guardia Civil (GC) emerged in response two trends: demand for better control of the countryside, and the rising dominance of the Spanish Army in Spain itself by the middle of the nineteenth century. The combination of these two factors created the belief that militarizing internal security

16 Under Spanish rule, Philippine local priests were usually Spanish friars. In this capacity, they were religious figures but also agents of the Crown; in the latter role, their duties included monitoring elections, supervising the election of the police force specifically, and ordering corporal punishment for moral transgressions, among a range of other obligations. Greg Bankoff, “Big Fish in Small Ponds: The Exercise of Power in a Nineteenth-Century Philippine Municipality,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1992), pp. 684-87.

17 The Guardia Civil was created in Spain itself after the Duke of Valencia (Narvaez) assumed power in 1844. For a (non-neutral) chronology of police forces in the Philippines under Spanish rule by the National Historical Commission of the Philippines, see Quennie Ann J. Palafox, “The Dreaded Guardia Civil and other Police Forces in Spanish Philippines,” National Historical Commission of the Philippines, online at http://www.nhi.gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=533&Itemid=3
was the answer to Spain’s problems of colonial order.¹⁸ According to the Guardia Civil’s organizing regulations, “municipal officials were expressly denied any authority to interfere with the personnel, administration, discipline, or military movements of the force.”¹⁹ The GC comprised 3,500 men (two tercios, or regiments, in Luzon, and one in the Visayas after 1880), organized into companies of 20 to 35 men. It was militaristic in organization and accoutrement; men could only join after having served in other branches of the army, and after doing so, they lived in barracks and wore military-style uniforms.

Under the Spanish, the social composition of the Guardia Civil was exclusive, and isolated the institution from Filipino society. Many of the guards were Filipinos, but only Spaniards could serve as commissioned officers – an arrangement whose defects became evident when Filipino guards mutinied and deserted during the Filipino Revolution.²⁰ In order to achieve its mission of “determining the loyalty and disloyalty of individuals” to Church and Crown, the Guardia Civil operated separately from the Spanish military, and was allowed broad powers of search and arrest.²¹ It was not expressly authorized to torture, but accounts published at the time noted that the force was “not scrupulous in the matter of accepting confessions so obtained,” and guards were seldom punished for mistreatment of those in their custody.²² Moreover, both in Spain and in the Philippines, the Spanish authorities “deliberately recruited its members not from their own locality, but from the areas of their traditional enemies” – one reason why the reputation of the Guardia


²¹ Grossman, “The Guardia Civil,” pp. 4-7; McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, p. 15.

Civil to this day is that of “a savage and brutal police force something along the lines of Hitler’s Gestapo.”23 Their arrests were indiscriminate; after their formation, “the number of apprehensions for the most trivial crimes rose.”24

In short succession at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, the archipelago experienced the Philippine Revolution against Spanish rule (1896-98); the Spanish-American War which ceded the Philippines to the U.S. in the Treaty of Paris (1898); and the Philippine-American War (1899-1902). The United States, after winning the war against Spain and crushing Philippine resistance, followed Spanish tradition with regard to internal security and policing. As the Army “pacified” various areas, American officials made the village-level cuerpo de cuadrilleros into municipal police organizations. The first of these was organized before the war’s end, in March 1899, by U.S. Army Major William Kobbe, in the areas north of Manila around Malolos; under General Order 43, Kobbe’s template was then applied to create other municipal governments (and their police forces).25 Following Spanish precedent, the U.S. Army retained oversight of local police; though they had powers of arrest, municipal police could only detain suspects for a day before transferring them to the custody of the U.S. Army’s provost court.26 Authority to hire and dismiss policemen rested with the presidente of the local municipal council.27

23 “During the Revolution, the Guardia Civil detained and imprisoned so many people that they even lacked place to put them,” and the force became known for torture and extrajudicial execution. Quotes from George Yarrington Coats, The Philippine Constabulary 1901-1917 (PhD Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1968), p. 15; Grossman, “The Guardia Civil,” p. 6.


In practice, the unchecked command of the local presidente meant that unless it somehow directly contravened American interests, municipal police functioned as personal or private security for local notables. Often this led to unchecked corruption between police and local prominent families, as strict laws on “vice trades” like gambling provided ample opportunities for collusion, graft, and racketeering.\textsuperscript{28} American officials describe policemen doing things like supplying childcare and running errands for prominent local officials, and one official, Harry Bandholtz – who later went on to be Chief of the Constabulary – reported that fourteen of the sixteen Filipino officials within his Constabulary district judged the municipal police incapable of maintaining public order.\textsuperscript{29} Additionally, American colonial authorities sanctioned “rural police” in some areas; in essence, provincial governors were allowed to maintain private forces that they then tasked to guard roads from highway thievery – and to protect haciendas from angry peasants. The governor of Pangasinan fielded a private militia from 1918 to 1926, and the governor of Pampanga led the “Knights of Peace” in promoting landlord-tenant ‘harmony’.\textsuperscript{30} The result was a fragmented mosaic of private security forces operating at the local level, often on behalf of private more than public interest, with little centralization or coordination.

Critical to the fragmented security apparatus bequeathed to post-independence Philippine leaders was the fact that American colonial authorities consistently chose not to bring municipal and semi-private police forces into the national police structure: the Philippine Constabulary.\textsuperscript{31} This was

\textsuperscript{28} McCoy, \textit{Policing America’s Empire}, pp. 349-356.


\textsuperscript{31} Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 169.
not because the security situation on the ground demanded it; in fact, colonial police officials repeatedly proposed hybridizing local and national police forces. In 1905, David Prescott Barrows suggested replacing the Constabulary system with a system like that of the U.S. Marshals; Taft’s private security chief James LeRoy recommended disbanding the Constabulary in favor of local police in 1906; and Constabulary officer Harry Bandholtz recommended bringing municipal police under the control of the Constabulary in reports submitted every year from 1905 to 1913. The Constabulary was given limited inspection prerogatives over the municipal police in 1912, but this cosmetic revision was unaccompanied by disciplinary or command power.

Instead, the apparatus of American colonial security was based on normative beliefs that underpinned the colonial project, which envisioned Philippine institutions as reproductions of American ones. The two major consequences of this normative template were 1) the emphasis on local autonomy rather than centralized control, and 2) a push to civilianize the American occupation in order to declare the Philippine War over. At the turn of the century, America had no national police force; the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the Justice Department was not founded until 1908. Moreover, an emphasis on local autonomy and control was central to the McKinley administration’s vision of democracy-building. Like American states and cities, then, Philippine

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33 He wrote, “It is a great waste to have both the Constabulary and the useless municipal police.” Quote from Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 224.

34 Bandholtz’s reports suggest that he might have favored dismissing the municipal police entirely had he not judged that this would completely antagonize local elites and disrupt the collaborative arrangements he was then trying to forge. Matsuzaki, p. 235; see also Records of the Philippine Constabulary (1905-1908) and Philippine Constabulary, Annual Report of the Director of Constabulary (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1909-1912).


municipalities would field and fund their own police forces, and they would remain locally rather than centrally controlled. When American officials – for reasons outlined in the next paragraph – eventually did opt for a small national police force to replace the U.S. Army, Civil Governor Taft described the policy to Secretary of War Elihu Root as “a departure from the ordinary methods pursued in America, but … a departure rendered necessary only by the difference in condition.”

In terms of civilianization of American rule, increasing domestic backlash against U.S. occupation of the Philippines -- in particular, the Army’s “military rule” and the violent counter-insurgency war being waged in America’s name – prompted colonial officials in the McKinley and Roosevelt cabinets to seek a less militant face of American presence. In March 1900, President McKinley formed the Second Philippine Commission, headed by William Howard Taft, which in turn established a civil government in July 1901. The Philippine Constabulary (PC), established in July and August of 1901, was therefore born out of Civil Governor William Howard Taft and Philippine Secretary of Commerce and Police Luke Wright’s attempts to remove provincial and municipal administration from the U.S. Army, which objected vociferously and repeatedly to the transfer of authority. Policing was supposed to become more civilianized and also more indigenized; according to the diary of Mrs. Taft, Wright drew the idea of a native force led by

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37 Quote in Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 216; Taft’s papers are in the Library of Congress in Washington, DC.


colonial officers from the success of “the British in the Indian and Straits settlements, by the Dutch in Java, and by our own General Davis in Puerto Rico.”

The PC, responsible for administering colonial order, thus replaced the U.S. Army’s 70,000 forces with a total of approximately 5,000 men. Though the initial intent was to have “not exceeding 150 men for each province, selected from the natives thereof”, in practice the number of companies assigned to each province varied by size and the local security situation. Subsequent American efforts to train and improve Philippine police forces would focus on the Constabulary, and the PC’s writ would increase as colonial officials sought to avoid reintroducing the Army in rebellious provinces. But budget constraints handicapped investment in the Constabulary. The administration could not ask the American public – then clamoring against a mounting deficit – to support an expensive Constabulary for a war it had declared over, and the U.S. Army’s dislike of the Constabulary meant that no support was forthcoming from those quarters (at one point, the Army blocked the Commission’s order of rifles for new Constabulary troops, while lavishly supporting and paying its own Philippine Scouts). Instead, local revenues funded the PC, limiting its size, equipment, and salary. This meant that the PC never achieved a monopoly on the use of force at the local level. Instead, security in the villages and municipalities was left to the untrained, fragmented municipal forces, which numbered between seven and eight thousand. In Manila in 1934, the police-citizen ratio was 1:407, but the national average was 1:1,525.

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40 Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” pp. 8, 12. The British, however, believed reliance on natives to be an error; one Hong Kong newspaper suggested that imported Chinese troops would be more reliable.


44 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. 357.
Tensions also existed not just between the PC and the various municipal police agencies, but between the PC and the Philippine Scouts. The Scouts were an organization within the U.S. Army, incorporated in the second half of 1901. They functioned as regular infantry and were envisioned as an auxiliary force for external defense. Both the Scouts and the PC relied on native enlisted men, but the Scouts’ placement under the U.S. Army resulted in clear differences between the two forces. Unlike the Scouts, which sent a handful of its officers to West Point, the constabulary trained its forces at a domestic academy – which became especially important after the outbreak of World War One drained away the remaining American officers to fight in Europe. Moreover, because the Scouts were under the aegis of the Army, they were generally well-fed, well-paid, and well-equipped; observers at the time noted the obvious contrast to the locally raised and locally funded Constabulary forces. Perhaps unsurprisingly, news reports from an English paper in Hong Kong at the time reported that the ragged Constabulary members, deployed alongside the Scouts, regarded “the well-dressed, overfed Scout with bitter hatred.”

Despite the initial intent that the PC should represent civilianization of the American presence, the Constabulary was in practice organized and administered like a military organization, after the Guardia Civil it was modeled on. It was organized into companies, in which two or three officers oversaw 40-60 constables; it operated from barracks, albeit in smaller detachments than a typical military arrangement; its companies were assigned across five districts: three in Luzon, two in the Visayas, and one in Mindanao (the last of which operated alongside the U.S. Army). A company’s jurisdiction generally ranged from a population of 10,000 to several hundred thousand,

45 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, pp. 17-18.

46 Cited in Cojuangco,”Islands in Turmoil,” p. 18.

and across a territory that spanned anywhere from a few square miles to a few hundred. Secretary of the Interior and Philippine Commission member Dean Worcester described the PC as: “A body of armed men with a military organization, recruited from among the people of the islands, officered in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos and employed primarily for police duty in connection with the establishment and maintenance of public order.”

Worcester’s description highlights two notable characteristics of the envisioned and actual composition of the Philippine Constabulary. First, its officers were largely men trained by the U.S. Army, who instructed their companies on the basis of Army Manuals – reinforcing the strong military character of the initial Constabulary. As the counter-insurgency continued through 1905, the PC gained authority to command native military divisions, including the Scouts, along with volunteer deployments. After 1905, however, Taft ordered Allen to restore the civil policing focus of the Constabulary and purge the military mindset, with the result that American officials serving in the Constabulary for the next ten years collaborated more closely with local elites. From the correspondence of American officials serving in the Philippines, these changes and the ones described in the following paragraphs were generally successful; the Philippine Commission noted appreciatively the improved discipline and cessation of abuses by PC forces, but then proceeded to worry that the PC had actually made itself too popular with the locals.

Second, in contrast to the Spanish colonial period, the men of the PC under American rule – including the officer corps – were mainly Filipinos. For the first decade, PC officers were generally U.S. Army officers on detail (70% of officers before 1917); but a change in regulations in 1913 and the exodus of American officers to fight in World War I prompted “Filipinization,” such that by

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1933 only 3% of Constabulary officers were American. Perhaps most importantly, each province of the archipelago furnished its own quota of men, and they were assigned within their home province – an important difference from the Spanish system. The Philippine Commission explicitly reasoned that the risk of corruption and defection would be offset by an intelligence advantage: “their familiarity with local dialects, geography, and political conditions was seen as an important asset in combating outlaws and insurgents.” Ex-revolutionaries, they thought, would know “the locations of the safehouses and the meeting places of the outlaws.” Relatedly, in-group policing was also seen as a way to reduce the brutality for which the Guardia Civil had been known, for which the American occupation had been criticized, and which had also been recently employed by Filipino soldiers in the Philippine Scouts against other ethnic groups.

Early efforts at establishing the Constabulary also aimed to foster an intelligence system that was deeply embedded in Philippine society, and that would give the Americans and their Filipino allies an informational advantage. The first Chief of Constabulary, Brigadier General Henry Allen, had served in the Information Division of the United States Army and as a military attaché in tsarist Russia, and established an Information Division within the Philippine Constabulary. An early and strident critic of using torture to obtain information, Allen instead sought to establish a wide network of paid and voluntary informants throughout the island chain. Colonial officials give several examples in memoirs of local intelligence forestalling insurrections:

“When General Harbord was acting chief, an organization which had been working for months planned an insurrection. The night before the outbreak was to occur, six Filipinos were invited to assemble in Gen. Harbord’s office, where they found six chairs placed in a

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53 For Allen’s biography, see Coats, *Philippine Constabulary*, p. 9.
row and upon which they were told to sit. He then informed them that an insurrection was planned to break out at ten-thirty the following morning, and that it would be the duty of the Constabulary to put it down; that there would be some loss of life attached to the process, and that probably a good many innocent lives would be lost because the real culprits in these movements usually acted under cover. He informed them that in this case, however, the real instigators of the insurrection were known to the police, and that they would be the first men shot. With this information he opened the door and told them they could go out and start their insurrection if they wished. Six badly frightened conspirators spent the next ten and a half hours in suppressing a movement they had spent as many months in fomenting. No blood was spilt, no arrests made, no harm ensued.”

In 1904, the Constabulary had 118 paid informants and an unknown number of volunteers, and had investigated 1598 cases (information on the activities of the Information Division, and assessments of its efficacy, are not available after that year). Metropolitan Manila’s police force, which benefited more than any other from the transmission of state-of-the-art intelligence techniques and technologies, also amassed an alphabetized file card index of two hundred thousand Filipinos: 70% of the population of Manila. Perhaps as a result, the period from 1905 to World War II was relatively peaceful in the Philippines; the major insurgencies were defeated by around 1905 (all by 1911, with the partial exception of Mindanao), and the PC quickly and effectively suppressed rural unrest related to rising inequality and land tenancy that began in the 1920’s.

The colonial period, in short, bequeathed to the archipelago an internal security apparatus that was tripartite and fragmented, but socially inclusive – one that sought to rely on Filipinos’ own local social knowledge to provide the intelligence fundamental to effective policing.

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56 Alfred McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire*, p. 28.

After Independence: The Philippine Military and Philippine Constabulary

In the years between 1935 – when Philippine leaders began preparing for the independence promised in 1945 – and 1965, when Ferdinand Marcos assumed the presidency, the Philippine coercive apparatus underwent multiple changes and reorganizations. These were oriented first around preparing the country to defend itself against external threats – namely, the threat of Japanese invasion – and second around establishing domestic order and combating insurgency after the war ended in the Pacific.

After the Philippine Commonwealth was established in 1935, U.S. colonial officials took a more hands-off role in domestic issues, though the High Commissioner retained the right of veto.\footnote{Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 166.} In place of the Governor-General, the Philippine Constitution drafted in July 1934 empowered the President as commander-in-chief of both the Constabulary and any new external defense force; Article VII also provided him the constitutional authority to suspend habeas corpus or place the Philippines under martial law “in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it.”\footnote{Cited in David Wurfel, \textit{Philippine Politics: Development and Decay} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 76-77.} These broad executive powers – not granted to American presidents – were assumed by President Manuel Quezon in 1935.

Before his election to the presidency, Quezon had fostered a close relationship with the Philippine Constabulary.\footnote{On Quezon’s relationship with the Constabulary, see McCoy, \textit{Policing America’s Empire}, p. 359-62.} As early as the mid-1920’s, he had championed greater pay and pensions for the PC, advocated for the promotion of Filipino officers, and tried to influence the choice of a new PC chief in 1932. He also argued that the PC should become the foundation of a new national army responsible for external defense, a belief shared by the Governor-General and the legislature.
(though how the PC would act as both national army and national police was never entirely clarified).61 Correctly anticipating that Quezon and his Nacionalista Party would be the next inhabitants of Malacanang, PC officials responded by courting Quezon’s patronage, offering him political intelligence during the election and physical protection before and after, against assassination and mobilization threats made by his primary opponent, ex-General Emilio Aguinaldo. Thus, historian Alfred McCoy notes, while the PC avoided compromising itself at the local level, like the municipal forces often did during the colonial era, it remained subject to political influence at the national level. The Constabulary became a tool of central state power and executive authority, and some classic tools of autocratic control began to appear: in 1936, in the name of restraining clientalism, Quezon promulgated a “fixed policy not to permit the retention of Constabulary officers in the same province for too long a time, especially when they have relatives in that province,” with the goal of persuading people that kinship was no longer “a consideration which influences public officials in their official acts.”62

With independence a promised ten years away, Quezon faced a serious external security challenge, and responded by reorganizing the Philippines’ security forces to address this threat – particularly by attempting to make them a truly national military force representative of all of Philippine society. As historian Alfred McCoy explains, “The United States had decided to give up its bases. Japan was on the march in China. The threat of invasion was very real.”63 His first Executive Order, therefore, was the National Defense Act, which began mobilizing an army of

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63 McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 23.
10,000 regular soldiers and 400,000 reservists (a goal to be achieved by 1945). The Philippine Constabulary became the Army’s First Regular Division, and its veterans assumed leadership positions throughout the new army.\textsuperscript{64} This, however, created two problems: how to construct the officer corps of the new Army, and how to fill the domestic policing vacuum left by the withdrawal of the 8,700-strong Philippine Constabulary.

Attempts to fill the domestic vacuum were inconsistent, chaotic, and ineffective.\textsuperscript{65} Quezon did succeed in creating a nonpartisan professionalized investigative agency: the Justice Department’s Division of Investigation, eventually called the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In October 1936, he unsuccessfully attempted to integrate city, municipal, and provincial police under a Department of Interior State Police. As this program faltered, blocked by unhappy legislators and provincial authorities who stood to lose control over their forces under Quezon’s plan, the Constabulary was pulled back into domestic policing; in June 1938, it was partially re-detached from the Army and placed under direct presidential control. But Quezon’s Executive Order 153 placed the Constabulary in a supervisory role over local police, while the legislature’s Commonwealth Act 343 did exactly the opposite. After a tense standoff, Quezon caved; November’s Executive Order 175 made governors and mayors responsible for their jurisdiction’s police forces, and removed the constabulary from presidential control. The exceptions were a handful of new cities chartered by Quezon himself – including the new capital, Quezon City, on Manila’s northern border – where Constabulary officials still headed the police force and answered directly to Quezon.\textsuperscript{66} Near the end of the Commonwealth period, the municipal police remained “political henchmen” at the behest of

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{New York Times}, 20 November 1934 and 25 November 1934; see also 30 May 1936 and 20 June 1936; see also McCoy, \textit{Policing America’s Empire}, pp. 363-64.


local officials, and “instruments of oppression rather than of law.”67 And after all that shuffling, by January 1939, the Army was under the Department of Defense, the Constabulary was under the Department of the Interior, and local police forces were back under the control of local politicians – a tripartite structure not so different from that of the pre-Commonwealth era.

In order to combat the looming external threat, Quezon wanted a united officer corps and a national military whose effectiveness would not be compromised by local politicians (who were also, sometimes, his legislative opponents at the central level). He rejected the option of composing his officer corps solely from graduates of ROTC programs at the country’s elite universities – a move that would have drawn the country’s military elite from the same ranks as its economic elite, and bound them together through shared class ties. Instead, he followed a “professionalized” military model along Western (and especially American) lines, which sought to make the military more broadly inclusive of all of Philippine society. In 1936, the National Defense Act / Commonwealth Order No. 1 established the Philippine Military Academy (PMA, formerly the Philippine Constabulary Academy). The PMA admitted many officer candidates from a broad swathe of the lower middle class, while families from the upper tiers of society could join the military after participating in a university ROTC program – an attempt to make the military a representative and truly national institution.

Creation of this system was quickly overtaken by the widening of the Second World War in the Pacific.68 On 26 July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called the Philippine Army to the service of the United States, and American forces in the Philippines came under attack ten hours

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67 Hayden, The Philippines.

after the Japanese attack on U.S. forces stationed at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.\textsuperscript{69} General Douglas MacArthur’s air forces were destroyed, and the navy was ordered to withdraw; MacArthur himself escaped to Australia, and Quezon and Sergio Osmena left to form a government-in-exile in the United States. The remaining American and Filipino troops withdrew to the Bataan peninsula and Manila Bay’s Corregidor Island, without the possibility of reinforcement or resupply. Manila was occupied in January 1942, and in April and May the forces at Bataan and Corregidor surrendered, leading to the infamous Bataan death march and paving the way for a harsh occupation that provoked resistance from an estimated quarter-million guerillas.\textsuperscript{70} In October 1944, American forces fighting their way back northward landed in the Philippines. MacArthur brought with him President Sergio Osmeña, who had assumed the office-in-exile after Quezon’s death.

Several major factors at the end of World War II shaped the evolution of Philippine security institutions after 1945. First was the sheer complexity of the security challenge awaiting the reconstituted Philippine authorities. The process of reconquering the Philippines was both one of expelling the Japanese and of re-establishing domestic order – and the latter task meant reaching some institutional arrangement between arriving Army forces and the domestic insurgent groups who had taken up arms against the Japanese in their absence. In 1946, local police agencies were overwhelmed by the disruptions of war, and in many cases had also been discredited by accusations of collaboration with the occupying Japanese. Weakening of state control had led to an increase in the use of private armies by local officials and families, and the strength of private militias-turned-guerilla-groups relative to local municipal forces had increased. The result was what Matsuzaki calls a de facto ‘warlordism’ in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{71} In an attempt to regain control during the war, the


\textsuperscript{70} McCoy, \textit{Policing America’s Empire}, p. 372.

\textsuperscript{71} Matsuzaki, \textit{Institutions Through Imposition}, p. 209.
military actively recognized anti-Japanese guerilla forces, and after reviewing them for potential acts of disloyalty, incorporated them into regular Army units. (After the war, Loyalty Status Boards investigated accused collaborators.) Even after a postwar firearm recovery program confiscated several hundred thousand small arms, officials estimated in 1950 that four thousand more firearms remained “loose in irresponsible hands.”

The proliferation of local armed groups in wartime had shattered any public monopoly on coercive power. One of the most egregious examples in the late 1940's is Governor Rafael Lacson in Negros Occidental and his private militia, composed of 130 “Special Police” supplemented by 59 provincial guards. Lacson obtained control over the municipal police forces by manipulating the 1947 local elections, and then used those to intimidate the private security forces of the local sugar mill into acquiescence. Most importantly, he delivered a stunning 92% majority for unpopular incumbent Quirino in his province during the October 1949 election (compared to a national average of 51%). In exchange, he demanded – and received – control over the personnel appointments of the local Philippine Constabulary, including commanding Captain Marcial Enriquez. The Constabulary then assisted Lacson in merging all municipal police into a single provincial command reporting directly to him, and in forming local vigilante groups also directly responsible to the Provincial Governor. During the 1951 election, Lacson accused the mayoral candidate of being a Communist; his Special Police then publicly tortured the man for three days in four different public plazas before murdering him – all while Captain Enriquez held Constabulary forces in abeyance. Defense Secretary Magsaysay, who had ordered Marines and ROTC cadets to the area to attempt to prevent the anticipated electoral violence, paid homage to the slain candidate in a trip that received prominent coverage in the *Manila Times* – written by then-star reporter and

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future politician-dissident Benigno Aquino, Jr. Even with the brutality of the murder and ensuing public outcry, Quirino hesitated; not until the government filed charges and Magsaysay informed him that the people were “ready to stone Malacanang Palace,” did Quirino remove Lacson from office. Nor was this the only case of warlord politics; the dynamics persisted elsewhere, founded on what observers cynically termed the trinity of Philippine politics: guns, goons, and gold.\textsuperscript{74} Private fiefdoms operated personal security forces that wielded unchecked coercive force against those outside the leaders’ social network, exerting a strong disintegrationist pull against central authority.

American assistance also proved influential to the evolution of the Philippine coercive apparatus, primarily because it freed a rapidly demobilizing Army to concentrate on domestic tasks, while U.S. forces assumed responsibility for external defense. After Osmeña’s return, the Philippine Army was reconstituted under the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) under operational command of General MacArthur. The wartime and immediately post-war Philippine Army remained under the U.S. military’s operational command and financial control; it was “not only paid, but fed, clothes, and equipped” by the U.S. Army.\textsuperscript{75} Members of the Philippine Army were released from American service, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was officially re-activated on 30\textsuperscript{th} June 1946, four days before the July 4\textsuperscript{th} declaration of Philippine independence. Neither the army’s size nor resource allocation, however, could be maintained after it was released from U.S. control and support. The result was a rapid decrease in the Army’s size: from an estimated peak of 317,792 to less than 10\% of that (30,000) after a multi-stage demobilization process.\textsuperscript{76}


\textsuperscript{75} Pobre, \textit{History of the Armed Forces}, pp. 361-365.

\textsuperscript{76} Pobre, \textit{History of the Armed Forces}, pp. 363-368.
At the same time, however, Philippine authorities had to find a way to exert control over the 7,000 islands that made up the archipelago. Because of the weak capacity and low legitimacy of local police forces, in June 1945 Osmena created the Military Police Command (MPC) within the Philippine Army. As with the rest of the Army, the Philippine MPC remained under the command of the MPC of the U.S. Army until June 1946. The MPC’s 23,000 troops were tasked to maintain law and order, to assist enforcement of civil government’s laws, and, additionally, “to supervise local police forces and to assist in their reorganization.”77 From the beginning, the MPC was also tasked with anti-dissident operations. This placed the MPC in a role nearly identical to that of the previous Philippine Constabulary, and in fact, its first two commanders – Brigadier General Federico Oboza and Brigadier General Mariano Castaneda – were both officers of the prewar PC.

After the war, American and Philippine leaders agreed on a division of labor: that the Philippine military should concentrate primarily on internal defense and anti-subversion in addition to national reconstruction. Under the Military Base Agreement concluded on 14 March 1947, the American military would handle external defense through its bases at Clark Air Field and Subic Bay Naval Station – which during the Cold War became the largest overseas American military bases in the world.78 The Secretary of Defense advised President Truman that “the strategic importance of the Philippines is not open to question” and suggested that assistance to the Philippines would be advisable.79 The Philippines thus signed a Military Assistance Agreement (21 March 1947) to provide defense equipment and supplies, and the U.S. Military Advisory Group (USMAG) based at Fort


78 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces p. 370; McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. 375.

Bonifacio in Manila provided training and advice – with the result that from 1946 to 1971, the United States sent Manila a total of $704 million in military equipment and training. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the U.S and the Philippines signed a Mutual Defense Treaty on 30 August 1951 (predating the MDT with Japan by just over a week). The Philippines also participated in SEATO, signing the agreement in September 1954 and ratifying it in February 1955. America’s de facto authority over external defense arrangements meant that the United States Department of Defense determined the post-war troop strength of the AFP, increasing it from 37,000 to 57,000 in 1952. The United States also “set [the AFP’s] order of battle and supplied much of its equipment.”

With American forces assuming responsibility for external threats, the primary focus of the Philippine military and coercive apparatus became establishing order among the population. In the late 1940’s, the AFP and MPC confronted a serious internal security challenge: peasant rebellion in central Luzon by the Communist Party and its 15,000 Hukbalahap, or Huk, guerillas. The Huk had learned their combat skills fighting the Japanese occupation, and had refused to rejoin the Philippine Army unless they could remain a distinct unit – a demand that was not accepted. The absence of land reform coalesced Central Luzon’s 2.5 million peasants behind the Huk partisans, especially after


81 Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 374. The signatories were the Philippines, the US, the UK, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Pakistan.

82 McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 27.


its leaders were dismissed from Congress on unproven charges of corruption in 1946. Indeed, a November 1950 study by the National Security Council accurately concluded that the failure to pursue land reform in the Philippines, in contrast to its progress in both Taiwan and South Korea, fomented grievances that provided the opportunity for Communist mobilization. The lack of land reform was also one of the major factors that kept an upper crust of interlocking elite families in control in the provinces, where they fielded local police forces who were effective executors of local bossism, but inadequate in the face of organized armed rebellion.

Philippine authorities seemed unable to decide whether they wanted their Constabulary to be a military or a police force; they experimented with both to see which might be more effective in dealing with the Huk. In the early years of the rebellion, the brutality and ineffectiveness of the MPC in responding to peasant dissidence prompted President Manuel Roxas to split it away from the Armed Forces. Under Executive Order No. 94 in October 1947 (six months after the signing of the initial mutual defense agreements) the now-renamed Philippine Constabulary was moved back to the Department of the Interior. As of 1 January 1948, its troop strength stood at 12,000: 4 zone headquarters, 50 provincial commands, 84 MP companies, two light tank companies, and several other units. Renaming the PC and redrawing organizational lines, however, seemed ineffective either in terms of reducing police brutality or in terms of quelling the rebellion. A U.S. Army study, observing the decline in Constabulary performance as compared to pre-war conditions, concluded

85 “A charge which, if equally applied, would have reduced the legislature to fewer than enough people for a poker game.” Bonner, Waltzing With a Dictator.


that its troops were inflicting “terror and oppression” amongst the inhabitants of Central Luzon.\(^89\)

Seeing the PC’s ineffectiveness and the escalation of the Huk rebellion to its apex in 1949-50, President Quirino aborted the civilianization of the Philippine Constabulary. On 30 March 1950, Executive Order No. 308 again made the PC one of the services of the AFP (along with the Army, Air Force, and Navy) and placed PC units in Luzon under AFP command. Under the advice of Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay, who assumed his position in August 1950, President Quirino confirmed the PC’s status as an AFP service under Executive Order No. 389 (23 December 1950).\(^90\) The Constabulary would remain a military service from then on.

Magsaysay worked with U.S. advisors – in particular, ethnographer Col. Charles Bohannan and the CIA’s Maj. Edward Lansdale, later fictionalized in *The Quiet American* and *The Ugly American* – to reshape the AFP’s structure and strategy for effective guerrilla war.\(^91\) The Army became the Philippine government’s major striking force, relying on twenty-six American-equipped Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) who operated with unusual autonomy from division headquarters. The Scout Rangers, now company-sized mobile commando units, protected BCTs from ambush. Magsaysay’s approach to counterinsurgency, which paired “all-out friendship” toward civilians with “all-out force” against guerilla fighters, relied heavily on the Military Intelligence Services (MIS) to distinguish between the two populations. He placed MIS personnel within the BCTs,\(^92\) and directed military personnel engaged in anti-Huk operations to emphasize public relations to facilitate “the

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 These efforts were paired with psychological warfare operations, supported by the U.S. Information Service and USMAG and run by Jose Cristol in the Civil Affairs Office, that ran the gamut from banal (using public affairs officers to publicize military successes) to ruthless (staged executions to frighten the local population into giving up names of Huk operatives) to bizarrely macabre (staging attacks by asuwang, a Philippine folk version of the vampire). On the more conventional “hearts and minds” side of things, Magsaysay also attempted to address the social and economic sources of discontent. Finally, Magsaysay promised significant (250,000 peso) monetary awards for information on top communist leaders; AFP members received promotions and awards rather than money, but it is especially important to note that – in contrast to the bounty system later used by Marcos – rewards were given for information rather than for capture or killing.

The information accumulated through this military intelligence program culminated in the headhunting and capture of multiple high-level targets in the first half of the 1950’s, including elimination of entire Huk Regional Commands and the capture of Huk leader Taruc’s son Romeo. The Huk campaign also led to passage of Act No. 1700, called the Anti-Subversion Law, which passed on 19 June 1957 and outlawed dissident organizations such as the Communist Party of the Philippines and which was to remain relevant after the Huk insurgency had dissipated. All in all, the campaign was judged an unequivocal success by Philippine and American authorities; the global

93 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces, p. 405.
96 Pobre, History of the Armed Forces, p. 408.

As the PC worked to gradually neutralize the Huks, local police attempted, less successfully, to keep local warlords and organized crime in check. (The PC, however, were not wholly relieved from these duties, leading one Brigadier General to observe that the PC may have been “overcommitted and undersupported” and that it existed in a state of fragmented and partially overlapping responsibility with local forces of questionable commitment and quality.\footnote{Campos, \textit{The Role of Police in Philippine Society}, p. 184.}) Local mayors appointed officers on the basis of “political servitude” rather than loyalty, and they served under a combination of political pressure and “conflicting, confusing, and antiquated laws,” with no training, inspection, or attention to their professional development; performance and morale were low.\footnote{Report to the President of the [Philippine] Police Commission (Manila: 3 May 1968). Originally cited in Campos, p. 210.} In 1955, the first postwar study of Philippine policing noted that more than 85% of the country’s 13,100 municipal police received no training;\footnote{Jeter L. Williamson, \textit{A Survey of Police Services and Problems in the Philippines} (Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1955), pp. 17-31.} in April 1965, the Philippine Civil Service Commission found that only 30% of municipal police officers would be eligible to join the civil service on meritocratic grounds.\footnote{Cited in Frank E. Walton et al, \textit{Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement} (Washington, DC: USAID, 1966), pp. 178-79.}

Because jurisdictions were unclear, competition between rival police forces obstructed professional behavior.\footnote{Fidel V. Ramos, “New Perspectives in the Fight Against Crime,” \textit{Diamond Jubilee Issue of the Philippine Constabulary}, 1976, pp. 40-41.} Salaries did not meet living standards, but high import duties made...
smuggling and other illicit activities lucrative – so the local police often supplemented their wages with racketeering and outright participation in criminal operations. Of 1,600 suspected smugglers identified in an AFP investigation in the early 1960’s, fifty were in the constabulary and fourteen were provincial commanders;\textsuperscript{104} in 1967 an NBI investigation concluded that an average of forty-eight policemen were implicated in major crimes every month.\textsuperscript{105} When they did try to enforce the laws, police had to communicate across the sprawling metropolis with commercial long-distance telephones that were “frequently out of order.”\textsuperscript{106} Unsurprisingly, rising urban crime and provincial lawlessness spiraled the country into a perceived crisis of public disorder and instability under President Macapagal. Metro Manila – by 1962 a 155-square-mile metropolitan area of 2.4 million people – experienced rising crime and decreasing police capacity. The appalling consequences were documented in the studies done by the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Public Safety (OPS): in seven years, robberies rose 100%, homicide 150%, and auto theft 300%.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Marcos the Democrat: Institutions of Public Security 1965-72}

Ferdinand Marcos was elected in 1965 on a promise to restore law and order in the Philippines, a policy he termed “Armor con Amor.”\textsuperscript{108} For the first thirteen months he was in office, Marcos occupied both the office of the president and the post of defense minister. As a democratically elected leader whose electoral constituency would hold him accountable for

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\textsuperscript{104} Manila Times, 11 December 1965; Manila Times, 17 December 1965.


\textsuperscript{108} Pobre, \textit{History of the Armed Forces}, p. 429.
\end{flushleft}
promising to restore popular order and decrease violence in the Philippines, Marcos pursued a set of reforms to do exactly that; he sought to increase centralization and coordination within the security apparatus and to expand the inclusiveness and reach of Philippine coercive institutions. These were steps that he would reverse after declaring martial law in September 1972, when his primary vulnerability shifted from electoral defeat by the population to forcible overthrow by the military.

During his first term (1965-69), Marcos sought to centralize police power and coordinate it through the executive branch. His efforts took the form of interagency coordinating centers rather than complete institutional overhaul or a national police force: the Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC); the President’s Agency for the Reform of Government Operations (PARGO); the Peace and Order Coordinating Council.109 In September 1966, in the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act No. 4864), he also established the National Police Commission, charged with implementing the provisions of police reform and coordinating among various police agencies.110

His flagship effort was Metro Manila. In July 1967, Marcos delegated appointment of the city’s police chief to the mayor; at the same time, he created the Metropolitan Police (Metropol) to coordinate the various police forces of Metro Manila’s four cities and nine municipalities (Executive Order No. 76), and created under Metropol a new Philippine Constabulary anti-riot force of two thousand mobile troopers.111 The creation of Metropolitan Command (Metrocom), as it was eventually called, marked the first operation of the Philippine Constabulary in Manila, which had previously relied on its own metropolitan police force and left the Constabulary to manage order in the provinces. (Metrocom’s Intelligence Service Group (MISG), an “elite anti-subversion unit”

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110 Campos, Role of Police in Philippine Society, pp. 211-12.

formed in 1972 after the declaration of martial law, would one day become infamous for its use of torture and extrajudicial killing.) Four years after its creation, in 1971, Metrocom had established an integrated communications network and fingerprint system spanning four provinces, 113 municipalities, and six million people in a forty-mile radius centered on Manila.\(^{112}\) Marcos’ Metrocom project received millions of dollars of U.S. assistance through the Office of Public Security, so much that it dwarfed the poorly funded and badly trained municipal force (which had 2,800 policemen to cover the area, a ratio of 1:3,000 – and a grand total of fourteen working police cars in a city of 8,000 vehicles).\(^{113}\)

Like Metrocom, the majority of Marcos’ efforts at police reform and improvement in Philippine public security were assisted and financially supported by the State Department’s USAID Office of Public Safety, which shared Marcos’ publicly pronounced goal of increased security and safety for the Philippine population. Eisenhower had employed police programs with 115 advisors in 24 countries with a budget of $14.2 million,\(^{114}\) but the OPS program, begun in 1962 by President John F. Kennedy, was by 1968 a global counterinsurgency effort with over 400 advisors – who were recruited from American police departments, the FBI, the CIA, and sometimes Special Forces – and a budget of $35 million.\(^{115}\) The goal, as stated by the 1962 USAID Public Relations Guide, was that America’s police training programs would serve as “a vital part of our effort to help less developed


countries achieve internal security, which is essential if economic development is to create viable free nations.”116 – or, as stated internally, to use the strengthened police capacity “to identify early the symptoms of an incipient subversive situation.”117 Robert Kennedy, a member of the Counter-Insurgency Special Group [at the NSC] famously remarked, “I hope we teach these guys more than just how to direct traffic.”118 The Director of OPS – former Kansas City policeman turned career CIA employee Byron Engle, who served as a police administrator in MacArthur’s occupation of Japan – added that “Giving economic assistance without police assistance is like cooking soup without the salt” or “a football player running down the field with his pants down.”119 On a less colorful note, NSC official Robert Komer, the driving force behind the Kennedy administration’s expansion of Eisenhower-era police programs, argued, “We get more from the police in terms of preventative medicine than from any single U.S. program…. They are cost-effective… They provide the first line of defense against demonstrations, riots, and local insurrections.”120

USAID expert Frank Walton had conducted a survey of the Manila Police Department in October 1964. In April 1966, at Marcos’ request, Engle tasked Walton and a team of experts contracted by OPS to conduct a three-month nationwide survey that began in July. This 1966 USAID report, written after a ten-member survey team had visited for three months, opened with the bald statement: “Peace and order in the Philippines is deteriorating rapidly,” and went on to


support that assertion with the statistics that closed the previous section.\textsuperscript{121} OPS then budgeted $2.4 million for the Philippines in the mid-1960’s – a relatively small amount compared to other recipients in Southeast Asia, such as Vietnam at $94 million, Thailand at $70-80 million, and Indonesia at $10 million – and spent around $5 million from 1969 to 1973.\textsuperscript{122} These efforts were primarily intended to provide training to Philippine police officers and improve police infrastructure, and they provided most of the training that police anywhere in the Philippines got. The Police Commission’s 1968 report to Marcos, for example, noted, “except for a few large departments, the bulk of the training of local policemen was provided from outside sources.”\textsuperscript{123} 284 Filipinos went to the United States for advanced training, and ten regional centers were constructed to train an estimated 23,902 police (60% of the nationwide total), including Metrocom’s riot squad of 2,325 men. Only 8% were trained by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Academy and 23% by the Constabulary’s Police School.\textsuperscript{124} Between 1962 and 1972, eighty-five Filipino officers trained at the International Police Academy in Washington, DC.\textsuperscript{125} The U.S. also helped supply communications networks and data management tools.\textsuperscript{126}

As with the police, Marcos initially sought to decrease fragmentation within the military, and to improve the AFP’s inclusiveness by increasing its size. An upsurge in insurgency in the south


\textsuperscript{124} Campos, \textit{The Role of Police}, pp. 210-11.

\textsuperscript{125} Lobe, “U.S. Police Assistance,” pp. 56-57, 60-61, 67.

\textsuperscript{126} McCoy, \textit{Policing America’s Empire}, p. 373; Kuzmarov, “Modernizing Repression,” pp. 201-204.
during the mid-1960’s led to the creation of a new defense concept in which Luzon and Mindanao were accorded equal importance, and of the establishment of a unified command to protect both areas – ostensibly a move that decreased fragmentation and improved coordination within the armed forces.\(^\text{127}\) Marcos also increased the overall strength of the armed forces from a baseline of 45,000 to 55,000 in 1971 and 63,000 by 1972.\(^\text{128}\) Much of this increase was in the PC, which was the most widely deployed component of the AFP and took the brunt of insurgent attacks in Mindanao and elsewhere.\(^\text{129}\) At the same time, however, Marcos began to create parallel commands and units that answered solely to him rather than to the established military hierarchy; these included a special commando force that conducted Operation Merdeka in 1967,\(^\text{130}\) and an AFP-controlled “special force” that was used to coerce votes in at least two locations during the 1969 elections.\(^\text{131}\)

Marcos also relied increasingly on particular sets of trusted officials at the top of the internal security apparatus, a narrowing of the coercive apparatus’ social composition at the top that offset its more inclusive recruiting at the ground level. On the grounds of cleaning up a corrupt constabulary, he removed one-third of the provincial commanders from office and forced fourteen of the AFP’s twenty-five general officers into retirement. In their place, he began to lay the foundation of “a hierarchy bound to him by strong personal ties: old classmates from the [University of the Philippines] (UP) cadet corps, blood relatives, and fellows Ilocanos, the northern Luzon ethnic group known for being clannish.”\(^\text{132}\) Ilocano generals recalled from retirement to active duty


\(^{128}\) McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 29.

\(^{129}\) Campos, *The Role of Police*, p. 190.


\(^{132}\) McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 28.
included with positions including General Ernesto Mata, who became Chief of Staff, and General Segundo Velasco, chief of the Philippine Constabulary. Marcos looked the other way when it came to legal infractions committed by his relatives and cronies. For example, General Fabian Crisologo Ver, chief of presidential security, temporarily allowed one of his relatives – Congressman Floro Crisologo in Ilocos Sur, to the south of Marcos’ Ilocos Norte – to maintain a private army of 300 men who imposed a roadblock “tax” on all tobacco being shipped from the province to the south, and who were used to kill local opponents and burn their villages.

Ultimately, Marcos’ efforts were far from effective in terms of improving public security. Crime in Metro Manila soared, including one of the highest murder rates in the world, and heroin use exploded. Though the various police agencies may have achieved some increased level of coordination, fragmentation and lack of cooperation between local police forces and the PC persisted; Constabulary officials complained that attempting to further collaboration simply drained resources that they could have applied to basic patrolling, and made them reactive rather than preventive in their approach to crime. General Rafael Ileto later complained that the disorder in the country was the result of a lack of political will at the top rather than limited PC capacity; Marcos’ reluctance to crack down on the activities of his friends and supporters blocked coordinated

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efforts that would have been conducive to public security, such as confiscation of the archipelago’s growing number of loose firearms.\textsuperscript{137}

IV. Coercive Institutions and State Violence, 1972-86

After Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, he accelerated the process of establishing a security apparatus that was fragmented, competitive, and socially exclusive. He divided power between different parts of the security apparatus and allowed each to create special teams to track and arrest or kill political dissidents. He also made the security apparatus more exclusive and socially isolated: he preferentially hired members of his own ethnic group, decreased the police-citizen ratio, and assigned so many men to presidential protection that it hampered their surveillance of dissidents and their ability to patrol. These changes to the security apparatus provided the individuals inside Marcos’ coercive institutions with both material and social incentives for violence, and decimated the intelligence capability that might have allowed them to maintain control with more judicious and pre-emptive forms of repression.

Enabling Martial Law

From March to August 1972, a set of twenty bombings racked Manila, including an explosion on August 21 at Plaza Miranda outside the famous Quiapo church, during a 10,000-person rally organized by ex-Senator Benigno Aquino’s Liberal Party, then the strongest opposition to Marcos and the Nacionalistas.\textsuperscript{138} The final pretext for the declaration of martial law was an assassination attempt on Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile on September 22\textsuperscript{nd}, which Enrile later


\textsuperscript{138} Bonner, \textit{Waltzing With a Dictator}, pp. 126-27.
reportedly admitted to having staged himself. Marcos ordered martial law into effect at midnight, and the military moved swiftly. (The Metrocom chief had been a military attaché to Indonesia and observed the trouble that pro-Sukarno radio and TV stations had caused; he recommended midnight because the major stations would be off the air, and had a plan to blow up the transmitter stations had martial law been imposed in daytime.)

The first person arrested, at midnight sharp during a meeting at the Manila Hilton, was Benigno Aquino. By 4am scores of Philippine politicians, journalists, and other prominent figures had also been taken into custody. Amnesty International estimated that the total number of detainees in the weeks after the declaration reached 30,000; the broad and high-level nature of the crackdown suggests that it was Marcos’ political opponents, not the small number of plausible NPA sympathizers, who were the real targets. The authorities also began to disarm private militias: perhaps corroborating Ileto’s allegations that will, not capacity, was the fundamental issue, the government had confiscated nearly 600,000 firearms by Christmas, and disbanded no less than 145 private armies. A curfew was implemented, and the Constabulary’s Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) launched a largely successful crackdown on the heroin trade.

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140 Brillantes, Dictatorship and Martial Law, p. 46. Note: Bonner says Gen Ignacio Paz, not Montoya, had been the attaché to Indonesia and initiated contact with the generals there to receive advice; his source is a letter from Aquino to a contact in the United States which was provided to him pursuant to a FOIA request filed to write his book. Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 98, 483.


142 Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, p. 121; McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. 400.

143 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. 400.
In the fifteen pages of Proclamation 1081, which declared martial law, Marcos laid primary blame (18 of 22 “whereas” clauses) on a rising threat from the Communist New People’s Army, which he claimed had at least 8,000 active guerillas, 10,000 active support cadres, and 100,000 sympathizers.144 No one shared this alarmist estimate of NPA strength, which was mocked in some of the leading political cartoons of the day.145 The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that the number of guerillas plus support cadres totaled 9,000 – half Marcos’ estimate – while a Rand Corporation report for the U.S. Army placed it even lower: 1,000 guerillas and 5-6,000 part-time militia members. Moreover, the reports concluded, the NPA’s “military operations were at a low level and confined to remote areas, while it concentrated on recruitment and organization-building”; the NPA’s history records only 350 men with modern rifles.146 No objective evidence suggests that a rise in popular threat necessitated the need for martial law.

In fact, evidence from conversations with Marcos, and from his private diaries, suggest that Marcos used martial law as a pretext to remain in office past his constitutionally mandated term, and that once he had decided to do so, his primary worry was that he would be opposed and deposed by other members of the Philippine elite – either other politically powerful families, or his own military, or some combination thereof.147 In his diary, he attributed popular opposition, and even the growth of the NPA itself, to the backing of elite families, including the Lopez family and that of his primary


145 Ely Santiago cartoon, Graphic, nd. Lopez Museum Library collection.


147 On the fragmentation of the Philippine elite, see Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
political opponent, Benigno Aquino. These families were among the first targeted for arrest when Marcos declared martial law. Marcos knew that he needed to manage the military if he wanted to survive in office. “Marcos was not stupid,” one interviewee observed “He knew that to declare martial law he needed as broad a support from the military as possible... so he cultivated broad support, but gave the most sensitive work to the people he trusted most.” Marcos feared a coup, even in places that did not seem to have the power to execute one – such as a think tank that he himself had founded to do advisory work for the presidential office. However incorrect his perception might have been, the balance of evidence suggests that Marcos’ dominant perceived threat was that of a coup rather than the NPA insurgency.

There is strong evidence to suggest that the bombings were orchestrated by Marcos to convince people of the need for martial law, and that Enrile’s assassination attempt was a manufactured operation. The man who reportedly organized the bombings, General Ramon Cannu, was one of General Ver’s deputies, a “countersubversion specialist” and chief of Marcos’ Physical Protection Brigade in the PSU. He was promoted to brigadier general on September 19, 1972 – two days before the imposition of martial law. According to sworn affidavits and interviews with American and Philippine military officials, the bombings were financed by “private corporations controlled by persons connected with President Ferdinand Marcos,” and actually carried out by


149 Author’s interview with a former member of the coercive apparatus, Metro Manila, September 2012.

150 Author’s interview with Professor Felipe Miranda, Quezon City, September 2012.

151 Author’s interview with General Jose Almonte, Metro Manila, September 2012.

152 New York Times, 23 February 1986; Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator, pp. 125, 468; McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. fn. 120.
squad composed of highly trusted Constabulary officers, called the Monkees.\(^{153}\) (The Monkees originated in 1969 as armed gangs in the service of local politician-landlords in central Luzon; the Huk units they fought were nicknamed the Beatles.) In Manila, two trusted Constabulary officers supervised Monkee operations. Enrile later admitted that the bombing had been planned, explaining why he was not in his usual car, but the security vehicle following behind. Marcos’ writings suggest that he decided to impose martial law on September 17, rather than after the attack.\(^{154}\)

Whatever the exact truth of the bombings, there is no doubt that Marcos had been discussing and planning for the implementation of martial law with a small group of trusted officials for several months. These generals – whom he named publicly two years later – became known as the “twelve apostles,” or more cynically, the “Rolex 12,” in memory of the reward with which he expressed his appreciation to each of them.\(^{155}\)


\(^{154}\) Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Introduction to the Politics of Transition* (Manila: Marcos Foundation, 1978), p. 26. Proclamation 1081 was dated September 21, the day before he ordered its implementation.

Table 3.1: The “Rolex 12”  
[* denotes “major service commander”]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title (in <em>Official Gazette</em>)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Juan Ponce Enrile</td>
<td>Secretary of National Defense</td>
<td>Principal architect of martial law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. Romeo Espino</td>
<td>AFP Chief of Staff</td>
<td>Marcos’ college classmate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Rafael Zagala*</td>
<td>Commanding General, Army</td>
<td>ROTC graduate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabian Ver</td>
<td>Flag Officer in Command, Navy</td>
<td>Head of Presidential Security. Marcos’ cousin. ROTC graduate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Ignacio Paz</td>
<td>Chief of Intelligence, Joint General Staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Tomas Diaz</td>
<td>Commander, First PC Zone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Alfredo Montoya</td>
<td>Commander, METROCOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Romeo Gatan</td>
<td>Provincial PC Commander of Rizal, Special Projects Officer</td>
<td>PC Commander in Tarlac (Aquino’s district).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. Eduardo Cojuangco</td>
<td>“Recalled to active duty in the Armed Forces for Special Projects”</td>
<td>Only civilian other than Enrile. Corazon Aquino’s cousin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interviews suggest that Marcos discussed plans for martial law as early as July 1972 with a smaller group, nicknamed the Seven Wise Men by presidential aides in Malacanang: Marcos himself, Enrile, Ver, Diaz, Montoya, Gatan, and Cojuangco – a circle that, notably, excludes the major service commanders. The fact that the service commanders were reportedly not privy to the operational planning that took place in July and August meant that the group making the initial plans had to do so assuming that one of their first tasks would be to “neutralize the Chief-of-Staff, even maybe the Chief of the Constabulary and all the other chiefs of major services.”156 The initial planning therefore relied almost exclusively on the forces that Marcos had developed or reorganized such that they reported directly to him, or to one of his most trusted inner circle.

Marcos therefore ensured that loyalists occupied the positions most critical for seizing and maintaining power. In preparation for the declaration, in January 1972, he “promoted” two commanders who had made clear their belief that the armed forces’ role was to protect democracy

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156 Brillantes, *Dictatorship and Martial Law*, p. 44.
rather than to protect Marcos as the incumbent president. General Rafael (“Rocky”) Ileto became the AFP’s deputy chief of staff, and General Manuel Yan became the ambassador to Indonesia. These promotions, while flattering on paper, removed the generals from operational control over any troops.\footnote{Bonner, \textit{Waltzing with a Dictator}, pp. 482-83.} To command key positions around Metro Manila, he named loyalists Tomas Diaz and Alfredo Montoya: Diaz at the Philippine Constabulary 1st Zone, and Montoya as the head of Metrocom. This targeted rotation of commanders responsible for key internal security positions laid the operational groundwork for Marcos’ declaration.

To make sure that his plans would not meet with strong opposition from the guarantors of his external security, Marcos had also discussed the possibility of martial law with U.S. Ambassador Henry Byroade. When Byroade indicated the “undesirability” of martial law,”\footnote{For Byroade’s cable, see U.S. Department of State, Embassy Manila to Washington, 22 September 1972.} Marcos pressed him for clarification, and – after flying to the U.S. to brief Nixon and Kissinger on the conditions and potential consequences – the ambassador responded that Washington would back Marcos if martial law was necessary to put down the Communist insurgency.\footnote{The best summary of these consultations is Bonner, \textit{Waltzing with a Dictator}, pp. 96-97.} American and Philippine sources, including General Romulo, claim that Marcos spoke directly to Nixon about whether the United States would object, and received a permissive answer. (Nixon denied this and his records, which are generally incomplete, contain no information on communications with Marcos.)\footnote{See Bonner, \textit{Waltzing With a Dictator}, pp. 98-99.}

In declaring martial law, Proclamation 1081 invoked Article VII of the Constitution, which allowed the President to suspend habeas corpus and place the Philippines under martial law.\footnote{The 1973 Constitution affirmed this power by declaring that habeas corpus “shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it.” Quoted in \textit{Martial Law and the New Society}, p. 1832; see also Ferdinand E. Marcos, \textit{Revolution from the Center: How the Philippines is Using Martial Law to Build a New Society} (Manila: Raya Books, 1978).}
Marcos next ordered that anyone detained for violating public order be “kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me.”\textsuperscript{162} Amendment 6 to the Constitution explicitly authorized the President – whenever he judged there was a sufficiently severe threat to the country – to issue whatever executive decrees he deemed necessary. Marcos used these decrees liberally, publishing over a thousand and issuing others that remained secret.\textsuperscript{163} These decrees were the legal tools that enabled the first wave of detentions of between 30,000 and 50,000 suspected subversives immediately after the declaration of martial law.\textsuperscript{164} And from the instigation of martial law in 1972 until at least Marcos’ downfall in 1986, the Philippines also had Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders (ASSOs) or Presidential Commitment Orders (PCOs), which allowed the military to make arrests without warrants, confine suspects in “safe houses,” and conduct unlimited “tactical interrogations.”\textsuperscript{165} Because Marcos’ suspension of habeas corpus also removed the military’s anti-dissident activities from judicial oversight, each squad was armed with legal backing for their actions and de facto immunity for any abuses committed.

\textit{Structure and Fragmentation of the Coercive Apparatus}

After declaring martial law, Marcos pursued two major changes to the structure of the coercive apparatus. First, he consolidated the police and merged them into the Philippine Constabulary. Second, however, he made the PC one of four rival organizations with responsibility for internal security, each of which was placed in competition with the others.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{162} Marcos’ comment in \textit{Martial Law and New Society in the Philippines} (Manila, 1977), pp. 1878-79.


\textsuperscript{164} See conflicting government statements described in footnote 7.

\end{footnotesize}
At the start of the martial law period, local police were a conglomerate of “multi-structured, diverse, autonomous, and totally fragmented organizations,” ranging in size from two people to several thousand. The Philippines’ 33,865 police filled 1,611 municipal police forces and 62 city ones spread across a 7,000-island archipelago with minimal cross-unit communications ability. In 1975, Marcos implemented reforms intended to centralize police power into a single national force and pull control away from politically powerful local families. In March 1974, he created a unified command (police, fire, and prison services) for Metro Manila. On August 8, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 765 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under a joint command structure with the Philippine Constabulary, in which the PC assumed administrative and operational control over local police forces, and the Constabulary chief became Director-General of the INP. The PC zone commander (and in Manila, the head of Metrocom) became the zone directors and director of the Metropolitan Police, and the four PC zones that had divided the country were realigned into 13 regional commands mirroring that of the government and military. The PC’s 42,000 officers and the 65,000 policemen of the INP were hypothetically supposed to be able to work side by side after formal integration was completed around January 1976.

Other changes taking place at the same time, however, meant that the consolidation of the PC simply made it one of several competing coercive organizations under the Marcos regime. Marcos divided authority and power for internal security across several services and their commanders: AFP chief of staff General Romeo Espino (until 1981); General Fabian Ver at the

Presidential Security Command (and AFP chief of staff after 1981); Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile; and Chief of the Philippine Constabulary General Fidel Ramos. Each organization possessed its own spy and anti-subversion units and interrogation facilities, and Marcos fostered competition among them.

At the outset of martial law, Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, a civilian protégé of Marcos and the primary drafter of Proclamation 1081, was the second most powerful man in the Philippine archipelago. Enrile established the National Defense Intelligence Office (NIDO) and “ran a small antisubversion operation through his Security Unit.” As chief of staff of the AFP, Marcos named his college classmate General Romeo Espino, who served in that post until 1981 (a ten-year retention, unusually long tenure by normal standards). Espino attempted to collect military intelligence under the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) and pursued suspected communists through the Military Intelligence Group (MIG). Marcos placed his cousin General Fabian Ver in charge of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Presidential Security Command (PSC). The PSC under Ver grew remarkably: from a marginal detachment when he was a captain to a 1,000-strong force headed by then-General Ver in 1972. After martial law began, the PSC’s power expanded still further, to 7,000 men across what would have been multiple services – armed with helicopters, ships, and tanks. Finally, Marcos’ cousin and PC chief General Fidel Ramos controlled the Fifth Constabulary Security Unit (CSU) and the Metrocom’s Intelligence and Security Group (MISG, commanded by Col. Rolando Abadilla), which would become particularly notorious for their use of torture. Competition between these anti-subversion squads and their leaders became one of the key drivers of political violence in the post-1972 period. The rivalry that developed between Ver and Imelda Marcos on the one hand

170 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, pp. 401-405.
and Ramos and Enrile on the other, which intensified as Ver accumulated power, was also to be particularly consequential for the Marcos regime.\textsuperscript{171}

\textit{Social Composition and Exclusivity of the Coercive Apparatus}

Marcos deliberately designed a set of coercive institutions that were socially exclusive and isolated from the wider Philippine population. He achieved this in two ways: decreasing the number of military and police who were assigned to patrol in and work alongside the population, and relying increasingly on a small number of Ilocanos and family members for internal security responsibilities.

This was not, however, how things looked initially. The 1971 ratio of military to population, 0.1\% of the population (55,000 troops), was the lowest in Asia, but Marcos expanded the AFP’s numbers throughout the period of martial law: 62,000 in 1972; 113,000 by 1977; 150,000 by 1982.\textsuperscript{172} He increased the AFP’s budget by 500\% in the first four years, something made possible partly by a massive influx of American military aid.\textsuperscript{173} He also initially increased the number of police. In Manila, for example, Marcos increased the police force to 3,200, though he still left significant power in the hands of Metrocom and its antiriot squads. By 1975, these increases in police and constabulary had raised the total number of internal security forces to 84,000: a police-citizen ratio of 1:492, nearly double the ratio four years earlier.

But these initial results were misleading. In practice, budget increases were directed at ensuring senior officers’ political loyalty, not improving the intelligence and fighting competence of the forces as a whole. Marcos increased the salaries of officers by 150\% the week after martial law was declared, and kept on generals who had passed retirement age to ensure that senior positions


\textsuperscript{172} McCoy, \textit{Closer Than Brothers}, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{173} McCoy, \textit{Closer Than Brothers}, p. 29, 193.
remained in loyal hands; by 1984, over half of the Philippines’ generals had exceeded retirement age.\textsuperscript{174} Moreover, the increase in security personnel was both temporary and misallocated if the real goal had been policing the population. Despite short-term increases after 1972, in the last five years of the Marcos regime, the ratio of police to population decreased to 1:1,120 (from 1:492 in 1976), even though serious crime continued to rise, exceeding 7.2 per hundred thousand by 1983 – over twice what it had been before martial law.\textsuperscript{175}

Rather than tackling crime and public safety, however, police and constabulary power was allocated elsewhere. By 1985, fully one-third of the AFP’s combat forces were assigned to presidential security duties, rather than external defense, counter-insurgency, or regular patrols.\textsuperscript{176} Ver’s focus on presidential security was relentless and destructive to the AFP’s ability to prosecute the insurgency that had justified Marcos declaring martial law in the first place. After martial law came into force, Marcos also re-enforced the personnel rotation policy, previously codified on paper but not consistently enforced in practice, which required PC commanders to be transferred at the end of each three year-tour.\textsuperscript{177} These rotation policies further hampered the ability of the PC to get to know a particular area and understand its geography, social networks, and political dynamics.

For security, Marcos relied increasingly on family and fellow Ilocanos. One Filipino scholar explained, “It’s about people you can implicitly trust. Here that means relatives, school or fraternity members, and people of the same ethnic group or language… there were also Pampango and Tagalog generals” in addition to Ilocanos, bound to Marcos by some other social tie.\textsuperscript{178} From his

\textsuperscript{174} Bonner, \textit{Waltzing With a Dictator}, p. 364.

\textsuperscript{175} McCoy, \textit{Policing America’s Empire}, p. 400.

\textsuperscript{176} McCoy, \textit{Closer Than Brothers}, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{177} Campos, \textit{The Role of Police in Philippine Society}, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{178} Author’s interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011.
first political campaign in 1949, Marcos had played on ethnic loyalties, shouting to crowds in Ilocos Norte, “Elect me a Congressman now, and I pledge you an Ilocano President in twenty years.”

The appeals worked; as historian Teodoro Agoncillo explains clan and regional loyalties, “the Filipino believes that a candidate from his province or region, no matter how repugnant, is better than one who comes from another region.” Moreover, as the cartoon in Figure 3.3 shows, the public was well aware of Marcos’ Ilocano preference:

![Political Cartoon: Ilocano “Goon Rule”](image)

**Figure 3.3: Political Cartoon: Ilocano “Goon Rule”**

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Ilocanos were particularly over-represented when it came to key positions in internal security.\(^{182}\) Marcos’ chief of presidential security, Fabian Ver, was an Ilocano and a cousin, as was Marcos’ Constabulary chief Fidel Ramos. Ver relied particularly heavily on family and ethnic loyalties to staff the Presidential Security Command; he appointed his son Irwin as PSC chief of staff, his son Wyrlo head of its anti-aircraft unit, and his son Rexor commanded the president’s close-in security. Ver also opened a camp in Ilocos Norte to train Ilocanos for the PSC staff.\(^{183}\) Defense Minister Enrile was also an Ilocano, though when Ver monopolized the Ilocano ethnic group, he began to recruit Ilongo officers from the western Visayas to staff his security unit.\(^{184}\) Ver and Ramos had the added credibility of having served in Major Marcos’ anti-Japanese guerilla unit (the exact history of which is much debated) -- Ver as a Third Lieutenant and Ramos as a Staff Sargeant.\(^{185}\)

School ties were important as well. Two streams of recruitment fed officers into the AFP, each with its own social composition: one from the ROTC programs at elite civilian universities, the other through the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). The ROTC cadets were often members of the elite class that attended university, whereas PMA cadets were recruited from a “broad, lower-middle social stratum.”\(^{186}\) Over time, more and more PMA officers were themselves the children and siblings of PMA graduates, creating a tight network among particular families and increasing the

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\(^{185}\) McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 227.

\(^{186}\) McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 8-9.
military’s insularity.\textsuperscript{187} By Marcos’ time, these networks of tightly connected PMA cadets dominated the more diffuse group of ROTC alumni.

Marcos, who had attended the UP ROTC program, was suspicious of the tight class bonds formed at the PMA. The fact that various classes could conspire to replace him made the PMA network a significant threat. To head his Presidential Security Command, then, he chose Fabian Ver, a graduate of the University of the Philippines’ ROTC program, who promoted subordinates from the ROTC’s Vanguard Fraternity. As Ver and Imelda Marcos increasingly aligned against Enrile and Ramos, Enrile began to actively balance Ver’s promotion of ROTC reservists with advocacy for the traditionally dominant PMA graduates. (Ramos attended West Point rather than the Philippine Military Academy; he had neither automatic backing from a PMA class nor the ROTC identity that helped Ver’s protégés.) By creating an alternative bloc within the military, Marcos took what had been a nationally inclusive institution, and manipulated its social composition to form two rival groups. He used these to protect himself, strengthening the hand of Ver and the ROTC faction to provide a check on the threatening lateral ties among PMA graduates.

Competition between these leaders extended to the ranks below, playing out as the divide between PMA graduates and “integrees,” which is what graduates of university reservist/ROTC programs were called.\textsuperscript{188} For the first decade of martial law, Marcos chose to appoint ROTC graduates as major service commanders, rather than PMA graduates (see Table 3.1.) These commanders included General Rafael Zagala for the Army; General Jose Rancudo for the Air Force;

\textsuperscript{187} Felipe B. Miranda, \textit{The Politicization of the Military} (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1992); McCoy, \textit{Closer Than Brothers}, pp. 5-6. McCoy argues that this explains why, by 1990, “no other Southeast Asian military had launched so many coups with so little success.” See also Republic of the Philippines, Report of the Fact Finding Commission, ch. 2.

\textsuperscript{188} Pobre, \textit{History of the Armed Forces}, p. 576.
and Admiral Hilario Ruiz for the Navy. When Espino retired in 1981, Marcos selected Ver – a reserve officer without the combat experience that had hardened most of the AFP – as the next AFP Chief of Staff, appointing him over Ramos, the other principal candidate. After Ver was named AFP chief of staff, he continued to promote followers from the ROTC and his previous intelligence work: Army General Josephus Ramas; Admiral Brillante Ochoco for the Navy; Gen. Roland Pattagulan in the infantry; Col. Pedro Balbanero in the military police; Gen. Artemio Tadiar as the Marine commandant. His promotion of his son Irwin (PMA class of 1970) to the rank of colonel over candidates from more senior PMA classes was particularly galling. So, too, was the perception that Ver’s inteeges, like him, received political sinecures in Manila, where they enriched themselves at the expense of PMA graduates who were baptized by fire fighting the insurgency in Mindanao. In an interview with an American scholar in 1975, an AFP colonel described the academy-reservist rivalry as “our own silent war.”

From 1975 to 1985, a series of reforms and personnel shifts were enacted to strengthen Ver as Marcos’ consigliere and as a counterbalance to Ramos and Enrile. Though these changes were intended to defend against Enrile and Ramos, they actually served to alienate both men, as well as the military networks that they commanded. In 1978, Marcos removed Enrile from the chain of command: the first defense secretary in three decades who did not have operational control over


190 McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 227.


192 The MNLF had coalesced in Mindanao in 1973. Author’s interview with Professor Francisco Nemenzo, Quezon City, November 2011.

troop movements. As a consequence, Enrile began to recruit Ilongo officers from the western Visayas to staff his security unit, to balance Ver’s promotion of reservists with his own advocacy of PMA graduates, and, in late 1981, to begin building a 300-person security force under Col. Honasan.

Other changes marginalized and alienated Fidel Ramos. After he became AFP chief of staff, Ver created Regional Unified Commands (RUCs) that superseded the Constabulary’s regional commands, and maneuvered the promotion of his own people into these positions; only one of twelve RUC commanders was loyal to Ramos. In August 1983, Marcos moved the INP under Ver’s headquarters, removing Ramos’ last operational units, and centralized the budget so that none of the service commanders, Ramos included, retained financial control. Marcos also blocked promotions recommended by Ramos, who though he lacked a PMA class network had become well-liked among the Constabulary for his extensive field visits over the course of fourteen years in office. This not only antagonized Ramos, but every officer denied promotion. By 1983, Ramos had formed his own “PC Special Action Force,” which began sharing smuggled-in weapons and engaging in joint training exercises with Col. Honasan’s forces; these would become the basis of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM). Although reservists now served in the most politically influential positions, the fact that the 44% of the officer corps that had graduated from PMA dominated command posts would become problematic to Marcos when Ramos and Enrile, with RAM officers behind them, staged a mutiny-coup in February 1986.

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195 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, p. 229.

196 Santiago, Duet for EDSA, p. 11; McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, pp. 231-32; Kudeta! The Challenge to Philippine Democracy (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990).

197 Ronald G. Bauer, Military Profession Socialization in a Developing Country (PhD dissertation, University of Michigan), p. 27; Maynard, Comparison of Military Elite, p. 423.
Intelligence and State Violence

Fragmentation and social exclusivity within the coercive apparatus both contributed to a weak intelligence capacity vis-a-vis Philippine society. Poor intelligence led to indiscriminate violence by coercive institutions that were “flying blind.”

First, Marcos limited the budget of the intelligence and security services and redeployed massive resources toward patronage of the elites he was truly worried about. Just prior to 1975, budgetary restrictions placed the AFP’s “armament capability [at] only 60%, mobility 4%, communications capability 8%, and investigative capacity 4%” of their targets. Poorly financed troops on the ground lacked effective communications and surveillance ability, and had limited training and capacity to engage in analysis of the information that did exist. In 1984, after the fiscal crisis restricted the government’s budgets, surveillance agents were allowed no more than 5 liters of gasoline a day in which to cover the sprawling, traffic-clogged metropolis – so even if the services had cars, they sometimes lacked gas to continue patrolling. Foot patrols were discarded. Photographs, which the agents used to identify wanted dissidents, were restricted in circulation to a single province, meaning that positive identification of suspects once they’d been apprehended was difficult. Despite the fact that the ISAFP files contain several mentions of “American friends” having provided “advance equipment and gadgets for surveillance,” no evidence of these gadgets or their use has yet been located; the most sophisticated technology appears to have been a camera, used to create paper books of photographs, many of public events such as rallies or protests, with

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198 Campos, *The Role of Police*, p. 211.
handwritten annotations of varying accuracy and detail. Record-keeping was spotty, and the official police journal flags in mid-1985 as one of the “chief defects” of the Philippine police its inability to make effective use of a records system.

Comparatively speaking, the Philippines’ coercive apparatus relied heavily on violent methods to generate its information – much more so than Taiwan, which used pre-arrest surveillance to amass files on suspected dissidents that numbered in the hundreds or thousands of pages before any “kinetic action” (i.e., arrest) was taken. In the Philippines, the AFP and security apparatus had three major sources of information: pre-arrest surveillance work; analysis of documents captured from the NPA and other dissidents during arrest raids; and information obtained through interrogation and torture in detention centers. Of these information-gathering methods, only surveillance does not involve the use of force against another individual. Surveillance capacity was limited, however, and where it existed, its purpose appears to have been conceived of as intimidation, deterrence, and coercion rather than genuine information-gathering. When asked about surveillance during the martial law period, interviewees consistently interpreted the question and spoke about the visible presence of armed forces on campus and in other public places. One interviewee who was then teaching at the University of the Philippines, for example, recounted students he did not recognize, in plain clothes but with a military demeanor, arriving to sit at the back of his class. Randy David, then the director of the Third World Studies Center at UP, commented, “it was not so much espionage, but a demonstration of their capacity to surveill you…

201 “Recruitment of Agents,” Agent’s Report, ISAFP files, Top Secret, 1 June 1974; author’s examination of several hundred surveillance photographs contained in the ISAFP files.


203 Author’s interviews with Randy David and Romeo Candazo, Quezon City, November 2011.

204 Author’s interview with a former detainee, Quezon City, November 2011.
The whole idea was to show the capacity of the government to monitor. It was really to intimidate you more than to gather information.” Surveillance seems to have served the function of intimidation and (unsuccessful) deterrence, rather than of actual information-gathering. Not until the mid-1980’s, when Marcos’ rule was almost at its end, does one see a serious discussion of the informational advantages of community participation in policing, or an attempt to set up an intelligence network to offset the one operated by dissidents.

The AFP’s intelligence operatives also had difficulty infiltrating groups that it suspected of radical or subversive activity. In a memo titled “Recruitment of Agents,” which discusses lessons shared between the United States and the Intelligence Services of the AFP, the writer is candid about the difficulty of recruiting effective infiltrators. According to the report, neither surrenderees nor detainees who had been coerced into signing an agreement to cooperate were terribly effective infiltrators. The former were too suspicious to their comrades, and most of the latter broke their bargain with ISAFP to go back underground (though the report did note that the few who remained loyal provided valuable information on “organizations and personalities” of interest). ISAFP’s attempts to plant agents among student activists – generally using individuals with family inside the coercive apparatus – faltered because these individuals, too, were objects of suspicion.

In other words, the Philippines’ domestic intelligence capacity suffered because of the limited social strata from which it could draw infiltrators and assets, and because of agents’ apparent failure to recognize that social differences would handicap their intelligence collection efforts. Agent instructions did not encourage infiltrators to mingle with the population, and one 1975 report

205 Author’s interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011.


described social distance between intelligence assets and villagers as the official policy, writing “Our people are advised to maintain distance between themselves and the village people” for fear that local women might be employed as spies. At other times, ISAFP agents simply had to be reassigned or pulled out because they had been exposed due to their own lack of understanding of the social networks and cultural landscape in which they had been directed to operate. For example, agents sent to infiltrate stronghold areas of the New People’s Army were exposed because of their recurrent socialization and drinking with the government-backed Civilian Home Defense Forces. ISAFP reported that they were unable “to blend well with the residents of the poor barrios. They prefer fraternizing with the well-off farmers.”

Finally, intelligence was weak because the government appears not to have made much use of organizations outside the coercive apparatus to gather information – ones that in other countries serve as additional conduits of information. For example, in April 1975, Marcos used Presidential Decree 684 to create the Kabataang Barangay (KB) youth movement. Modeled on the Chinese Red Guards – Marcos was an admirer of Mao, reportedly for what he did to unite China – Kabataang Barangay was led by Marcos’ (then nineteen-year-old) daughter Imee, and provided for organization of youth KB units in the country’s 42,000 barangay. The primary reason that the KB does not seem to have served as a channel of information for the regime is that its chair participated only in the barangay council, which lacked an institutionalized, close working relationship with either the police


210 Barangay, abbreviated Bgy., is Filipino for village, district, or ward – the smallest administrative unit. KB units were abolished/replaced in 1991. Author’s interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011.

or the Constabulary. The government also did not make use of the reservists and paramilitaries that it employed as cheaper substitutes for full-time AFP personnel, at least not in terms of tapping them for intelligence collection. Although Home Defense activities were organized from 1970 on to coordinate non-combat and civil actions by the military, and were used increasingly in the 1980’s to help counter the insurgency, the AFP seems to have used them more as a cheap personnel management tool than a channel for gathering intelligence.\(^{211}\) They were badly trained and poorly supervised; hundreds of reports filed by human rights NGO SELDA show that the Civilian Home Defense Forces were responsible for at least some of the extrajudicial killings and salvagings, especially in Mindanao.\(^{212}\)

Torture, on the other hand, was commonly used after 1972 in an attempt to generate information (and evidence).\(^{213}\) In 1975, Amnesty International’s report noted with outrage that “star chamber methods have been used on a wide scale to literally torture evidence into existence.”\(^{214}\) Most often, this “physical extraction of information” was done at rented “safehouses,” managed by ISAFP and institutionalized upon advice from U.S. Embassy advisors, who based their guidance on American experiences in Vietnam and Central America, and taught the Filipino forces American terminology.\(^{215}\) Because of time pressure to extract information before someone realized the

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\(^{211}\) Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, pp. 430, 565. This program educated military personnel in craftsmanship, including auto mechanics and basket and mat-weaving. (Yes, really.) Pobre also mentions the organization of Barrio Self-Defense Units, but these seem to have existed more on paper than as effective institutions in practice.

\(^{212}\) Kessler, *Rebellion and Repression*, pp. 120-121.

\(^{213}\) Torture does not appear to have been used prior to the declaration of martial law, though prisoner abuse in ordinary police custody had been a problem.


detainee was missing and arrived at a military camp to ask for their whereabouts, safehouse interrogations quickly turned violent. Detainee accounts suggest that if they did not provide information quickly, their interrogators simply escalated violence until they did. One account describes a prisoner’s 1982 detention and interrogation by one of the regime’s most infamous torturers, Lieutenant Rodolfo Agualdo (member of PMA class of 1972) of the 5th CSU:

Agualdo grew frustrated when strangulation, beating, and electrocution failed to extract information from a twenty-five year old male prisoner named Marco Palo. “Sonofabitch,” the lieutenant shouted at his subordinates, “Make him undress completely and electrocute his balls!”

When asked on a visit to the U.S. in 1986 about his responsibility for torture and other abuses, Agualdo’s comrade at the 5th CSU, Lieutenant Vic Batac (PMA class of 1971), replied that torture arose from “individual initiatives to get information in a short time.” A survey by the Philippine Medical Action Group of 120 political prisoners held at the National Penitentiary found that 102 had been tortured. Other surveys showed similar ratios, and human right group SELDA placed the number of people tortured under Marcos at a total of 35,000. According to ISAFP’s own assessment, however, these efforts contributed little information of quality to ISAFP intelligence: “Forced confessions while they yield some information are generally not reliable and generate adverse publicity.”

216 Author’s interviews with five former detainees, Quezon City, November 2011 and September 2012.
217 Recounted in McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, p. 214.
218 See The Daily Cardinal, 17 October 1986; The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), 17 October 1986. My thanks to Alfred McCoy for pointing me to these articles.
In cases where the coercive apparatus could not rely on coercion to extract information, the files make clear that intelligence was either non-existent or of poor quality. In some cases, coercive institutions simply did not have the information, while in other cases, information collected by one organization was not shared with competing units. One former detainee recounted, for example, that when he was detained, the Constabulary unit that had arrested him did not understand that the Communist movement had split between the old Communist Party (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, PKP) and the new faction set up in December 1968 by Jose Maria Sison (the CPP and its armed wing, the NPA).\textsuperscript{221} ISAFP wrote a memo reporting on the split in late 1967 (as it was developing),\textsuperscript{222} but that information had not been transmitted to the men responsible for tactical interrogation. Believing that he belonged to the CPP/NPA rather than PKP, they tortured him for a night, all the while asking questions appropriate to someone from the other wing.\textsuperscript{223} Another, who had been out of the country for most of the decade before martial law, was detained in 1972 and interrogated by a young second lieutenant about a lecture he’d given at the University of the Philippines that had no relevance to politics. “They had terrible intelligence,” he said, shaking his head, “It continues to this day. It was partly interference by politicians… Each service had its own intelligence, including the police, and they competed with each other.”\textsuperscript{224}

The impact of fragmentation and bad intelligence on operational effectiveness becomes clear when one considers the outcome of one of the few times in which the competing services – ISAEP, MIG-15, MIG-4, MISG, and the Naval Intelligence Service Group – were forced to collaborate:


\textsuperscript{222} “Reported Split within the PKP,” Case Evaluation, Confidential, ISAEP files, 30 November-25 December 1967.

\textsuperscript{223} Eventually, he was transferred to a unit where a more experienced interrogator knew the difference. Author’s interview with a former detainee, Quezon City, November 2011.

\textsuperscript{224} Author’s interview with Joel Rocamora, Quezon City, November 2011.
Task Force Makabans, which achieved some notable tactical successes in February 1982. This unusual collaboration also seems to have been one of the few times that the coercive apparatus was able to act pre-emptively rather than reacting to developments that had already unfolded: the task force was organized to “conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist [CT] underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila.” Cross-unit cooperation, however, was generally rare. Years later, high ranking Philippine intelligence officials still discussed intelligence as important, but reactive; even as he emphasized that “the best way to neutralize a threat to a country’s stability is the use of intelligence, which is the acquisition of correct information that gives a basis for action,” ISAFP Chief General Galileo Kintanar spoke of the development of intelligence as a response to the emergence of the CPP, rather than information collected in anticipation of dissident action.

For all of these reasons, the files of dissidents who had not yet been arrested – and, presumably, tortured – are fewer and less detailed than the files of those who had been captured and incarcerated. Perhaps the simplest illustration of this is a summary of the contents of two files, one

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225 I count these as tactical successes only, and strategic failures, because they prompted the historic, if belated, Aberca v. Ver civil suit against some of Marcos’ most notorious torturers. The suit is described in McCoy, _Policing America’s Empire_, p. 408-413, and the original case proceedings are available in the UP Law Library.


227 In one exception, Maria Elena Ang recounts torture conducted by Atty. Lazaro Castillo of the NISA; Lt. Victor Batac of the 5th CSU, and Major Arsenio Esguerra of the 5th Military Intelligence Group, ISAFP. McCoy, _Closer Than Brothers_, pp. 214-15.

of a captured activist, and one of a wanted man who remained at large.\textsuperscript{229} The file of Person A lists four aliases, the man’s height, the fact that he sometimes wears eyeglasses (and photos with and without eyewear), his date and place of birth, citizenship, marital status and wife’s name, parents’ names, educational background (major and year of graduation), last known address, and a list of seven previous positions held in the CPP/NPA and other leftist organizations. A “note” reads: “Apprehended by elements of the 5\textsuperscript{th} CSU, Camp Crame, QC on 6\textsuperscript{th} April 1973 at Salinas, San Dionisio, Paranaque, while he was about to get some of his clothes in their safehouse in Salinas.”\textsuperscript{230} Contrast this to the file of Person B, wanted for violations of Section 4 of RA 1700, who remained at large. His file contains only a photo, his citizenship, a list of six possible aliases and two suspected positions, and a last known address of “Bulan, Soraogon.” The rest of the fields are blank.\textsuperscript{231}

The treatment of detainees after they were released from detention further confirms the coercive apparatus’ weak capacity for surveillance and information processing. Former detainees in the Philippines spoke about being under “house detention” or, in some cases, “city arrest,” in which they were released from Camp Crame or Fort Bonifacio, but for a period of several years afterward had to appear once a month at the gates to report their activities and verify their presence.\textsuperscript{232} Others recounted having to appear once a week at Camp Crame so that an officer there could sign a report card certifying their presence in Manila.\textsuperscript{233} In contrast to Taiwan, however, the reports appear to have been less frequent and less detailed, and only the detainee him/herself was required to appear, with no cross-checking, corroboration, or even elaboration on their activities.

\textsuperscript{229} Names redacted to protect privacy. While I use these two files for purposes of illustration, I was allowed to view approximately twenty files in total; in general, the pattern held.

\textsuperscript{230} ISAFP Surveillance File, “Person A,” p. 27. SECRET. Anonymized for privacy protection.

\textsuperscript{231} ISAFP Surveillance File, “Person B,” p. 28. SECRET. Anonymized for privacy protection.

\textsuperscript{232} Author’s interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011.

\textsuperscript{233} Author’s interview with Professor Amado Mendoza, Quezon City, November 2011.
Coercive Institutions and Incentives for Violence

The fragmentation and exclusivity of the coercive apparatus provided agents within these institutions with social and material incentives for violence. In material terms, top officials were rewarded with access to coveted sectors of the economy, acclaim from Marcos and his wife, and public gifts like those that earned Marcos’ martial law planners their “Rolex 12” nickname. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, for example, established extensive holdings in coconut and lumber, two of the Philippines’ most important industries. Other regime insiders amassed extensive financial holdings, most of which were kept in overseas bank accounts.234

At the lower levels, Marcos’ coercive institutions operated a bounty system to reward those who captured or killed suspected subversives.235 In 1982, the Philippines’ official police journal noted that police performance was measured in terms of body counts rather than information obtained or threats neutralized. An article listed out these metrics: “the accomplishment of the PC/INP consists of body counts and quantities, namely: number arrested, numbers killed in encounters and raids, volume and amount of confiscated contraband…”236 In contrast to Magsaysay, who gave agents and individuals incentives for providing accurate information, the system set up by Marcos used acts of violence as the chief measures of professional success – whether the targets of that violence had actually done anything to deserve it or not.


235 Author’s interview with former detainee and congressman Romeo Candazo, Quezon City, September 2012; author’s interview with a human rights lawyer during the martial law period, Quezon City, September 2012.

Rewards for meeting these professional standards were significant, and clearly outlined. The capture of CPP leader Edgar Jopson (Edjop), for example, was worth an unusual promotion and P180,000 to Major Nelson Estares, head of the Constabulary Security Unit that captured him. The suspected chairman of the CPP Central Committee was worth P250,000; Rafael Baylosis, CPP Secretary-General, brought P200,000; and three other members of the CPP had a reward value of P125,000 or P100,000. When PC junior officer Rodolfo Aguinaldo successfully apprehended NPA leader Jose Maria Sison in Ilocos, he earned a promotion (to captain) and command of his own “anti-subversion” unit, equipped with more sophisticated weaponry than usual and a pool of fast cars. The 1985 issue of the official police journal details numerous medals that Marcos awarded to top-performing officers, complete with detailed descriptions of how an officer could earn each one. ISAFP appeared to regard these incentives as unfortunate but necessary; the former head of the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Galileo Kintanar, reflected, “The key is motivation. Unfortunately, this is what motivates people – some by patriotism, others by material factors.”

At least some Philippine police officials writing at the time also understood the downsides of this system of incentivization. In the early 1980’s, one review of police misbehavior noted that “as long as police promotions are based more on arrest made than on ability to improve police-community relations... it is not likely that citizen misconduct against citizens will be controlled.”


240 Author’s interview with former ISAFP chief General Galileo Kintanar, Metro Manila, September 2012.
(The same study also recommended that police not drink on duty, as over 20% of those found guilty of unnecessary violence were under the influence of alcohol at the time the abuse occurred.\textsuperscript{241}) A 1985 article noted police reluctance to spend time on small cases, because it was big ones that would “earn them extra income.”\textsuperscript{242} And in 1984, the journal bemoaned the negative effects of fragmentation and competition between law enforcement agencies, wherein “jealousies precluded cooperation among them, and accomplishments were oriented not so much on the desire to serve the public as in the desire to outdo one another. The duplication of their functions further aggravated the problem.”\textsuperscript{243}

Social incentives created by exclusivity also mattered. The social bonds among military officers are clear even decades later; ISAFP General Kintanar recounted, “The people I worked with in the 1960’s and 1970’s – even today, I still take care of and help their kids.”\textsuperscript{244} Tight bonds among members of the in-group sheltered them from violence, but also appear to have enabled higher violence against individuals in the out-group. They did so partly by reinforcing the intensity of interagency competition. Interrogators in Marcos’ security units were almost always junior officers, who worked in relatively stable, tight-knit teams with a competitive attitude toward rival units.\textsuperscript{245} According to detainee accounts contained in the SELDA archive on human rights at the University

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\textsuperscript{242} Campos, “The Police Professional,” p. 32.


\textsuperscript{244} Author’s interview with General Galileo Kintanar, former ISAFP chief, Metro Manila, September 2012.

\textsuperscript{245} After Amnesty released its 1976 report, the embassy cabled its assessment that abuse was not “explicit government policy at the political level” but a matter of leaving detainees in the custody of “not so tender mercies of lower-ranking military, many of whom had to drink to be able to inflict the torture.” Amnesty International, \textit{Report on Developments in the Philippines} 1976 (New York, 1976); U.S. Department of State, Embassy Manila to Washington, 4 September 1976.
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of the Philippines, Aguinaldo worked routinely with Lieutenant Billy Bibit, (also PMA class of 1972), and Lt. Vic Batac, who graduated one class before them. At interrogation centers managed by MISG, by contrast, Col. Rolando Abadilla (PMA class of 1965) worked with Roberto Ortega and Panfilo Lacson (PMA class of 1971); Lacson’s work in MISG from the time he graduated PMA until Marcos’ downfall in 1986, including a stint as Abadilla’s Deputy Commander, placed him on “a fast track to national police power” – which he achieved when he served as Director-General of the National Police Administration from 1999 to 2001. Accounts from detainees also suggest identifiable differences in unit ‘work styles’: MISG’s interrogation team usually blindfolded their victims, maintaining both distance and anonymity, while the 5th CSU’s interrogators became known for a brutal, highly personalized torture that “imprinted their names in victims’ memories.”

The way in which these social ties contributed to the eventual demise of the Marcos regime is relatively well known. When Ramos and Enrile staged their February 1986 coup, members of their security services called on kinship and school connections to prevent fellow officers from crushing the revolt at Camp Crame. Social ties caused a chain reaction of defection across the military; commander after commander first refused to attack the troops with Enrile and Ramos, and then defected to them. In one of the critical moments, Marine commandant General Tadiar (PMA

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246 See Proof of Claim Forms for Torture Victims in the SELDA collection, Filipiniana Multimedia Collection, University of the Philippines Main Library: Domingo Luneta (22 November 1993); Marcelio M. Talam, Jr. (4 November 1992); Ma. Paz Castronuevo Talam (2 November 1992); Eliseo C. Tellez, Jr. (8 December 1992); Oliver G. Teves (13 July 1993).

247 See Proof of Claim Forms for Torture Victims in the SELDA collection, Filipiniana Multimedia Collection, University of the Philippines Main Library: Romeo I. Chan (11 March 1993) and Damaso de la Cruz (27 October 1992).

248 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, pp. 206-217.

249 McCoy, Policing America’s Empire, p. 406.

250 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, pp. 242-254.
class of 1959) was ordered to attack Camp Crame, outside which thousands of Filipinos had gathered in answer to the Archbishop’s radio call to “protect our friends, the soldiers”:

“Ram through,” Ramas ordered, “Ram through the crowds, regardless of the casualties.” But in front of Tadiar were thousands kneeling in the path of his tanks, nuns in white habits reciting the rosary, children in his firing line. His uncle’s voice pleaded with him over the radio to turn back. His bishop’s voice came next, saying “We’re all Filipinos.” His former PMA superintendent, General Manuel Flores, urged him not to kill “classmates and fellow alumni.” Three military wives pushed their way through the Marines and lunged forward, gripping Tadiar’s arm. “Temy,” said Aida Ciron, the wife of Enrile’s aid Ruben Ciron (PMA ’68), “you also have a wife and children, please don’t do it.” Another, Vangie Durian, cried out “Temy, you know me – we were neighbors in Navy Village.” Referring to her husband, Commander Jesus Durian (PMA ’60), Tadiar asked “Is Jess there?” Yes, she replied, her husband was inside the camp with the rebels.251

Tadiar withdrew, and the tide of combat power swung decisively in favor of Ramos and Enrile, who were negotiating with opposition leaders for a provisional government headed by Cory Aquino. By the evening after Tadiar’s aborted attack, Ramos estimated that “60% of the troops in the field had either declared their support or promised to refuse orders” to fire. Later that night, without Philippine aircraft to command, Marcos and his contingent – including all twenty-six members of the Ver clan – lifted off from the palace in American helicopters.252

What is less well-known is that these same social ties – close familial, educational, or social relationships to those in the coercive apparatus – had sheltered individuals with those ties from violence for years prior to 1986. Professor Amado Mendoza, the son of a government engineer, recalled being stopped in the countryside when he was out at night during martial law; when the police recognized him, one called to another, “Oh, it’s the son of engineer Mendoza, he can go.” Later arrested in Manila, Mendoza went through a series of detention centers where he was tortured, including the custody of the Metropolitan Police Investigative Service (the investigative unit of

251 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, p. 249.

252 McCoy, Closer Than Brothers, pp. 242-255.
Metrocom), the 5th CSU, and eventually a detention center at Fort Bonifacio. At Fort Bonifacio, he underwent intensive interrogation and torture until one of the ISAFP interrogators recognized that his uncle had been the interrogator’s commanding officer. “You’re Ray’s nephew,” the man said, and from then on, Mendoza recounted, “I noticed a reduction in pressure.” Later he found out that the guards had consulted his uncle, who asked them to hold him to keep him from joining the NPA, but not to mix him with any hardliners in confinement, and to treat him relatively well.253

Multiple interviews corroborate the argument that competition provided incentives that exacerbated violence, but social ties to members of the coercive apparatus could offset it. The dynamic is so familiar to Filipinos that it determines the outcome in Gina Apostol’s novel, The Gun Dealer’s Daughter; it is also portrayed in the cartoon in Figure 3.4, below:254

![Figure 3.4: Political Cartoon: Protecting the Children of “Big Shots”](image)

253 Author’s interview with Professor Amado Mendoza, Quezon City, November 2011.

254 In Apostol’s novel, parents who sell arms to Marcos are able to protect their daughter from the consequences of subversive student activity, while others who played minor roles are punished harshly, even killed. Gina Apostol, The Gun Dealer’s Daughter (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012); Roces, Medals and Shoes.
One former political prisoner recalled receiving a phone call in 1975 from a friend who was the niece of the chief of naval intelligence. “I heard from my uncle that they’re all looking for you, all of the units are trying to find you,” she told him. “But if you surrender to him, they guarantee not to torture you. The others will not guarantee that.”

Another detainee, who spent almost four months at Fort Bonifacio, heard one day that a famous general – a distant relative who shared his last name, Magno – would be visiting the camp. “So I watched out the window just above the ground, at the top of my cell, and when I saw the shiny pair of boots passing, I yelled “Tito Joe! [Uncle Joe]” The general asked them who it was, and they told him, “Oh, just some fellow named Magno.”” Two weeks later, he was released.

A third former prisoner, Francisco Nemenzo, explained that he was captured by the Criminal Investigative Service, one of two strike forces of the Operations division (C3) of the Philippine Constabulary, rather than CSU (the strike force of C2, the intelligence division). There was a rivalry between C2 and C3, and so when C3 received a tip, they decided to arrest him themselves rather than passing the information on to C2. After a night in tactical interrogation, where he was tortured and asked the wrong questions because the interrogators had mistaken his background, the phone rang. When the officer hung up, he said, “Why didn’t you tell us you were a friend of General Ramos? He would like to have breakfast tomorrow. Please forget what has happened here, we are just doing our job.” Nemenzo did not know Ramos, but played along; the next morning, he was brought to the C2 office to meet Ramos. He discovered that Ramos’ mother and Nemenzo’s wife’s mother were good friends, and his wife had known Ramos as a small girl. Because release required the signature of a senior officer, Nemenzo was signed out under Ramos’

255 Author’s interview with Joel Rocamora, Quezon City, November 2011; verified in author’s interview with Etta Rosales, Chair of the Human Rights Commission, Quezon City, November 2011.

256 Author’s interview with Professor Alex Magno, Quezon City, November 2011.
name for house arrest in Ramos’ personal custody – custody which was then deputized to his mother-in-law, Ramos’ neighbor. Repeatedly in interviews, detainees and members of the security apparatus recounted incidents in which competition between units led to violence, but a social tie to a member of the security apparatus, especially a prominent one, could mitigate it.

These incidents appear to have repeated themselves across the country. According to a study published in National Police Command (Napolcom)’s official journal, two-thirds of prisoner escapes between 1973 and 1979 occurred when guards let prisoners that they were on friendly terms with out of their cells, and sometimes out of the prisons entirely – for example, to run errands such as picking up alcohol for the guards to drink on duty, or for conjugal home visits, which were regularly allowed to prominent citizens, or ones who had befriended or bribed the guards. The study reported that these incidents were most common when the police forces were controlled by local officials, rather than under the centralized and distant supervision of officials in Manila, but central control was more strictly enforced from 1973 onward, heightening the social distance between those ordering violence and those on the receiving end. These social dynamics probably also help explain why violence by the major anti-dissident units was worse in the provinces, a fact reported on by the U.S. embassy. The small in-group that made up the coercive apparatus was centered on Manila, and activists in rural areas of the provinces often lacked the social ties and pedigree that protected privileged university students in the capital.

257 Author’s interview with Francisco Nemenzo, Quezon City, November 2011.


259 In response to a 1976 Amnesty International report alleging widespread use of torture, the American embassy wrote to Washington its own assessment. They concluded that the reports were “both essentially balanced and accurate,” and might have been even worse had the team traveled outside of Luzon, since “reports of torture, etc. become more common the farther one gets from Manila.” See Amnesty International, Report--1976; U.S. Department of State, Embassy Manila to Washington, 4 September 1976.
V. Conclusion

This chapter has advanced two primary arguments. First, it has argued that the fragmentation and exclusive social composition of the coercive apparatus under Ferdinand Marcos can be attributed to Marcos’ fear of elite threats after he declared martial law in 1972. Second, it has demonstrated that the fragmentation and exclusivity of Marcos’ coercive institutions led to rising state violence.

Alternative explanations do not perform well in predicting the structure and composition of the security apparatus under Marcos. Although fragmentation has been a consistent feature of Philippine internal security institutions since the Spanish and American colonial days, the social composition of that apparatus has fluctuated, and in fact, what Marcos inherited was an apparatus that – given the dual recruitment channels of the AFP – could easily have been a broadly inclusive national force. Marcos chose, however, to make the security apparatus more exclusive and to foster internal divisions, fragmentation, and competition – a choice that is highlighted by the fact that as a democratic leader, he pursued nearly opposite policies of inclusion and coordination. The instability of Philippine military and security structures throughout the twentieth century, as well as Marcos’ ability to pursue significant reforms, suggest that path dependence cannot account for the design of coercive institutions from 1972-86. Explanations rooted in American or international influence do not provide satisfactory explanations either. American influence was focused largely on external defense, leaving the Philippines to its own devices internally; though the U.S. provided support for counter-subversion, American influence waned when Marcos’ priorities began to diverge in the late 1960’s. Thus neither institutional path dependence nor external influence provides a satisfactory explanation for the origins of Marcos’ fragmented and exclusive coercive apparatus.

Alternative explanations also fare poorly in explaining the patterns of state violence observed under Marcos. As in the case of Taiwan, explanations rooted in state capacity and organizational
cohesion cannot explain why Marcos put so much effort into fragmenting the coercive institutions and making them exclusive after 1972, especially when he had pursued such different policies prior to declaring martial law. And similar to the Taiwan case, the Philippine case demonstrates that a less cohesive coercive apparatus uses more violence than a cohesive one does, which is consistent with some of the predictions of the literature on organizational cohesion but contradictory with the predictions made by others.

Rising threat is also not a satisfactory explanation. The strength of the NPA did grow over time: from between 350 and 1030 estimated fighters in 1972 to around 8,000 in 1984, and in excess of 100,000 supporters (loosely defined) by the mid-1980’s. The timing of this growth, however, coupled with within-case evidence, suggests that the indiscriminacy of Marcos’ coercive apparatus was the cause of growing opposition from the population, not the effect. Rather than mobilization causing violence, it seems that in the Philippines it was exactly the reverse. “If I am going to have to go through three-and-a-half months of jail when I did nothing wrong,” one interviewee commented wryly, “I decided that next time I might as well do something to deserve it.”

Moreover, proponents of a threat-based argument generally attribute increased violence by the security forces in the 1980’s to swelling popular mobilization after the assassination of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino in late 1983, but the statistics in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that the use of violence by the state had already begun to climb before that. Instead, rising violence most closely correlates with the institutional and social changes to the coercive apparatus made early in the martial law period.

International influence had at best a cosmetic effect on the escalating intensity of state violence. More likely, it actually seems to have shifted the regime from semi-institutionalized visible repression toward even less restrained violence conducted underground. At the same time that the

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260 Author’s interview with Joel Rocamora, Quezon City, November 2011.
United States publicly provided large amounts of military aid,\(^{261}\) covert advising on internal security also occurred. (Congressional strictures on assistance to repressive police organizations did not cover the military relationship.) Documents obtained from ISAFP clearly show that American advisors instructed Filipino counterparts on the use of safehouses where the “physical extraction of information” could be conducted without the accountability imposed by taking someone to a formal camp or detention facility, as well as on how to conceal safehouse activities from public view.\(^{262}\)

American advisors made clear that they were under pressure to have their allies improve the appearance of human rights performance – a distinction not lost on ISAFP, which recorded dutifully in briefing notes that “The US government is being pressured by some international organizations to advise its allies not to be perceived as tyrants or violators of citizens’ rights.”\(^{263}\)

The reporting of groups like Amnesty International, coupled with public pressure from the Carter administration and other countries, did force Marcos to formally restore the trappings of democracy over the period from 1978 to 1981. He emptied the prisons, reducing their numbers from 6,000 in May 1975 to 563 two years later, announced disciplinary actions against abusive soldiers, and renamed the notorious 5\(^{th}\) CSU (which became Regional Security Unit 4, RSU-4).\(^{264}\) In Proclamation 2045 on 17 January 1981, just before Reagan’s inauguration and a visit from Pope John Paul II, Marcos lifted martial law.\(^{265}\) At the same time, however, Marcos privately threatened to close the bases at Clark and Subic – then America’s largest military installations overseas – and


\(^{265}\) Despite Marcos’ charm offensive, the Pope publicly chastised the Philippine government during his visit.
agreed to extend the lease only in exchange for a $500 million aid deal.\textsuperscript{266} In July, after Marcos was re-elected in a ‘highly controlled’ election, Vice President Bush visited Malacanang and applauded Marcos’ “adherence to democratic principle.”\textsuperscript{267}

State violence, however, did not drop. Proclamation 2045 continued the suspension of habeas corpus in subversion cases; decrees that Marcos had passed during martial law, allowing the security services broad powers and de facto immunity, remained in effect.\textsuperscript{268} As Figures 3.1, 3.2, and Figure 3.5 below indicate, the Philippines experienced its worst violence \textit{after} martial law was lifted, not before. Salvagings, which numbered only 3 in 1975, rose to 538 by 1984.\textsuperscript{269}

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure3.5.png}
\caption{Political Cartoon: The Lifting of Martial Law\textsuperscript{270}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{266} McCoy, \textit{Policing America’s Empire}, p. 407.

\textsuperscript{267} State Department official Richard Holbrooke admitted, “We had to choose between using our bilateral relationship for human rights objectives, and using it first for putting our military facilities on a stable basis.” Bonner, \textit{Waltzing With a Dictator}, pp. 245-46.


\textsuperscript{269} Data provided by the Task Force Detainees-Philippines, email communication, December 2011.

\textsuperscript{270} Roces, \textit{Medals and Shoes}. 
Promises to court-martial or charge abusive soldiers were a sham. Two officers court-martialed in 1977 were later found not guilty; two of three lieutenants sentenced to prison for torture in 1978 were back at work at MISG within a year; of 123 military personnel charged with human rights violations in 1985, only five were convicted.\textsuperscript{271} The State Department concluded that Marcos lifted martial law to improve his image overseas, but felt free to do so because all of the powers he needed were already “adequately institutionalized in one form or another – economic, military, police, media, and of course, political control.”\textsuperscript{272} In an earlier cable, the embassy had written, “Marcos can have the best of both worlds – he rids himself of the onus of martial law while retaining the broad powers he now holds.”\textsuperscript{273} Lifting martial law might well have been prompted by international and American pressure, but that cosmetic change had little substantive effect on state violence, because the institutions that organized and implemented that violence had already acquired their fundamental character.

Like Chiang Kai-shek, Marcos was able to significantly redesign the Philippines’ institutions of coercion. Unlike Chiang on Taiwan, however, Marcos’ principal fear was of an elite threat, so he created coercive institutions that were fragmented and exclusive. As a result, the coercive apparatus possessed social and material incentives for violence, and lacked the intelligence capacity to engage in targeted and discriminate violence. When popular opposition materialized, the coercive apparatus was unable to deal with it without resorting to violence, a fact which explains not only the rising levels of violence against ordinary Filipino people, but that violence’s increasing brutality.


\textsuperscript{272} U.S. Department of State, Embassy Manila to Washington, 26 December 1980.

\textsuperscript{273} U.S. Department of State, Embassy Manila to Washington, 16 September 1980.
Chapter Four

South Korea

I. Introduction

This chapter illustrates the argument of the dissertation by examining the period of authoritarian rule in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) under Presidents Syngman Rhee (1948-60), Park Chung Hee (1961-79) and Chun Doo Hwan (1980-88). The Korean peninsula, a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945, was effectively partitioned into Soviet and American zones of control at the end of the Second World War, and “South” Korea was under a trusteeship arrangement administered by the American military government from 1945-48. The North did not participate in the 1948 elections held in the South, a decision that reinforced the peninsula’s division and led to Syngman Rhee’s election as president of the new Republic of Korea (ROK). After the Korean War (1950-53), Rhee maintained a controversial presidency until 1960, when his victory in a disputed election sparked widespread protests that culminated in his resignation and exile in Hawaii.

On May 19, 1961, Park Chung Hee and a group of soldiers aligned with him established a military government that ruled until elections in 1963 put Park into the presidency. Against the backdrop of superpower detente, and after being re-elected for a third term in the surprisingly close 1971 election, Park declared martial law and assumed dictatorial powers through the Yushin Constitution (유신) in 1972. Park was assassinated by his KCIA Director in October 1979, and
power passed to General Chun Doo Hwan. Chun held power until 1988, when he handed power to former General Roh Tae Woo, who kept his pre-election promise to democratize the country.

In the sections below, I trace the origins, evolution, and operation of the internal security apparatus in South Korea. Under all three leaders, the South Korean coercive apparatus was strongly shaped by the continuous presence of an existential external threat from North Korea. That threat prompted an unusually high degree of external (American) involvement in South Korea’s coercive apparatus, including the retention of U.S. command authority over the ROK military even under armistice conditions. The presence of an external threat and unusually high external influence limited the amount that any Korean autocrat was able to engage in coup-proofing behaviors within the military, and also imposed a national service requirement in which every Korean male served in the military. The Korean military, therefore, displays low levels of fragmentation and high levels of inclusivity.

Outside the military, however, the degree of fragmentation and exclusivity in the rest of the coercive apparatus fluctuated under each of the three presidents. Consistent with the theory advanced in Chapter One, the degree of fragmentation and exclusivity depended largely on how each autocrat viewed the threats he faced, and also exerted a decisive effect on patterns of state violence during their tenure. Syngman Rhee’s perception of a high threat from elite rivals prompted him to create a fragmented and exclusive security apparatus wherever he could bypass the American chain of command to do so, and it was these units who were known for large-scale violence against civilians during the late 1940’s and 1950’s. Park Chung Hee’s military background appears to have predisposed him to prioritize the external threat and the linked threat of Communist infiltration, and he created a coercive apparatus dominated by the KCIA that was unitary and relatively inclusive. The declaration of Yushin, however, appears to have shifted Park’s threat perceptions, as it did with Marcos; increasing fear of rivals in the KCIA and military led him to create a more fragmented and
competitive coercive apparatus whose violence ultimately claimed his life. Chun Doo Hwan, on the other hand, faced a popular uprising immediately after taking office; though he relied on a regionally exclusive set of officials at the top level, he broadened participation in the riot police to conscripts, making the forces in charge of dealing with the population far more representative of Korean society than they had been under Park. Not surprisingly, this made his attempts at protest suppression unpopular, and also changed spatial patterns of violence. The restive Cholla region was excluded from the security apparatus at the top levels under both Park and Chun; the region, however, was targeted disproportionately for violence under Park but not under Chun, which I attribute to the shift to conscription-based and socially inclusive riot police units.

This chapter proceeds in six sections. Section II provides an overview of the patterns of violence that this chapter seeks to explain. Section III outlines the origins of the coercive apparatus, discussing the influence of Japanese colonial policing and American efforts to rebuild the police and military from 1945 to 1960. It also analyzes Syngman Rhee’s manipulation of coercive institutions to protect himself politically, and demonstrates the effect that this had on violence against civilians. Section IV traces the changes that Park made to the structure and social composition of the security apparatus during his tenure, both before and after the 1972 declaration of the Yushin regime. It focuses on structural changes that accompanied the creation of the KCIA and social changes that occurred as Park replaced Rhee-aligned former Japanese elites with a coalition of his own making. Section V discusses changes made under Chun, who relied primarily on the Defense Security Command, and explores the contradiction that existed in the social composition of his coercive apparatus: it was socially exclusive at the top, but actually became more inclusive at the bottom with the adoption of conscript-based riot police units. Section VI examines alternative explanations and concludes.
II. Overview of Patterns of State Violence in South Korea

The theory advanced in Chapter One purports to explain variations in state violence under authoritarianism. It does not address levels of state violence against civilians during war.\(^1\) Because statistics on state violence under Rhee are confounded by high levels of civil conflict prior to 1950 and war between 1950 and 1953, I have not included them here. Explaining these statistics falls outside the scope of the project, though I demonstrate in Section III that the non-war patterns of state violence under Rhee are consistent with my argument. The Figures below show the trends in state violence under Park Chung Hee (Figure 4.1) and Chun Doo Hwan (Figure 4.2), as measured by the number of individuals who were indicted for political crimes each year.

![Figure 4.1: Individuals Indicted for Political Offenses under Park Chung Hee\(^2\)](image)


Figure 4.2: Individuals Indicted for Political Offenses under Chun Doo Hwan\textsuperscript{3}

The first pattern to notice here is that state violence is relatively constant in Korea over both Park and Chun’s tenure, fluctuating between approximately 150 and 700 people indicted per year. South Korea displays neither the clear drop in violence observed in Taiwan, nor the steady rise observed in the Philippines. This oscillation within a narrow band can be attributed to the constant presence of a high external threat, and the institutional stability that this induced within the ROK military, which was a major part of the country’s coercive apparatus.

Second, under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, Korea occupies an intermediate level of state violence as compared to Taiwan or the Philippines. Between 1981 and 1987, 1,512 individuals were prosecuted and sentenced under the NSL: several hundred a year, a figure only slightly lower than the average number indicted under Park during the Yushin period.\textsuperscript{4} Of those, only 13 were death sentences and 28 life sentences – an intensity of state violence that is lower than

\textsuperscript{3} Park, Review of the National Security Law, p. 37.

the Philippines and the early period in Taiwan, but higher than the later period in Taiwan when no executions were conducted at all. In an otherwise critical account of Park, Kim Sukjo acknowledges that South Korea’s authoritarianism was not always more brutal than the authoritarianism of its contemporaries elsewhere in the world: “To President Park’s credit, political murder and “disappearances” did not become staples of life under the Yushin regime as they have in other regimes of kindred spirit.”

Third, by this measure, state violence actually appears to be somewhat lower for much of Chun Doo Hwan’s tenure than Park’s. Under Park, the number of indictments each year averaged around 500; under Chun, that number averaged around 100 until 1985, and around 250 thereafter. This finding contrasts with popular perceptions of Park and Chun; Chun is the more vilified of the two. As I will explain below, this is likely because Chun relied more on public, visible repression than did Park – using paekkol strikebreakers in noticeable uniforms, for example, and employing tear gas against protestors that became known among international activists and reporters as the worst in use worldwide.

The fourth element of variation that is worth explaining is spatial. Figure 4.3, below, shows the geographic distribution of violent state repression in response to protest. It draws on data taken

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5 Recall that Taiwan had around 2,000 executions and 8,000 other sentences for political offenses between 1949 and 1960, but executed no-one after 1970.

6 Sukjo Kim, “The Politics of Transition: South Korea After Park,” unpublished manuscript prepared for East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School, March 1980, p. 23. One of the difficulties of studying state violence under authoritarianism is that no country wants to understate the brutality and violence of its own repressive experience. This makes comparison a morally and emotionally fraught issue for domestic historians as well as foreign scholars.

7 A 2009 poll showed that Park was the most popular South Korean president. See http://segye.com/Articles/Issue/INQUIRY/Article.asp?aid=20090129003271&subctg1=&subctg2=

8 See the graduation speech given by Maria Ressa, former CNN reporter originally from the Philippines: Maria Ressa, “Draw the Line,” commencement address at Far Eastern University in Manila, 18 April 2012, online at http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/4047-draw-the-line#
from an original dataset that I created on protest and repression events in Korea during the 1970s and 1980s, using sourcebooks compiled by the Korea Democracy Foundation.9

Figure 4.3 Probability of State Responding to Protest with Violent Repression, By Region10

As with temporal patterns, the spatial pattern of violence is not necessarily what contemporary accounts would have predicted. First, conditional on a protest occurring, Chun is less likely to have responded violently than Park, regardless of region – a finding that is consistent with the indictment statistics above, but at odds with popular perception of the two dictators. Second, Park was much

9 The same sourcebooks were used by Stanford’s Korea Democracy Project, but their data is not yet publicly available. See Korea Democracy Foundation, The KDF Sourcebook on Events [민주화운동기념사업회 연구소, 한국민주화운동사 연표] (Seoul: KDF, 2004); Korea Democracy Foundation, Chronology of Korean Democratization Movement [한국민주화운동기념사업회 연구소, 한국민주화운동사 연표] (Seoul: KDF, 2006); Korea Democracy Foundation, History of Korea’s Democratization Movement [한국민주화운동기념사업회 한국민주주의 연구소, 한국민주화운동사] Seoul: 2008-2010, 3 vols.); Gaudim et Spes Pastoral Institute, Torch in the Dark: Witness Reports of the Democratization Movement in 1970s and 1980s, [기쁨과 희망 사목연구원, 암흑속의 횃불: 7,80년대 민주화 운동의 증언 (Seoul, 1996-2001, 8 vols.). Paul Chang’s dissertation, which uses KDF data in a dataset that links protest and repressive incidents, and which was part of the basis of the Stanford KDP project, is Paul Y. Chang, Protest and Repression in South Korea (1970-1979): the Dialectics of Movement Emergence and Evolution (PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 2008).

10 Repression could be violent (if it involved an act of force) or non-violent (censorship, curfew imposition, etc). Figure 4.3 illustrates the pattern of violent response to protest, but the same pattern holds for repressive response generally (including both violent and non-violent kinds).
more likely to respond to protest with violence against rival region Cholla (a 37% probability of repression versus around 25-26% chance for either his home region of Kyongsang or the rest of the country). Chun, on the other hand, was actually slightly less likely to respond repressively in Cholla (4% probability of a repressive response, versus 9% in Kyongsang and 13% in the rest of the country). The reasons for these differences will be explored in Sections IV and V, but to telegraph the argument here, I suggest that the explosion of popular protest in Kwangju in 1980 made Chun much more concerned with popular protest, and that his subsequent diversion of conscripts to staff the riot police made the security apparatus more inclusive and representative of Korean society, and less likely to engage in repressive behavior than under Park.

Fifth and finally, it is worth noting that large amounts of data are missing in the South Korean case, particularly at the lower bounds of intensity. In the 1970s and 1980s, the police or KCIA could arrest and detain someone for several days before the prosecutor decided on the charges and filed an indictment; often people were tortured – or at least “knocked about,” to use one interviewee’s term – during this confinement. (Once someone was indicted, KCIA oversight of the prosecutor’s office ensured the success of those indictments in court, creating a narrow gap between the number of people indicted and those sentenced, akin to Taiwan’s military court system.\footnote{On the prosecutorial system in Korea, see Lee Jung-Soo, “The Characteristics of the Korean Prosecution System and the Prosecutor’s Direct Investigation,” \textit{Annual Report of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders} (UNAFEI) (Japan, 1997); Lee Jung-Soo, \textit{Report: The Relationship of the Prosecution with the Police and Investigative Responsibility}, report for the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI, Japan, 1997); Kim Young-Chul, “The Effective System of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution in Korea,” \textit{UNAFEI Annual Report for 2001} and Resource Material Series No. 60 (February 2003).} Anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of individuals arrested but never indicted is large, but no systematic data exist that accurately capture this. Existing statistics, for example, do not include the 2,000 students arrested in 1971 under Park’s first Garrison Decree, or the mass arrests that typically accompanied the declaration of Emergency Measures, or the individuals
arrested but never indicted during Chun’s purification (jeonghwa) campaign.\textsuperscript{12} Nor do they record the experiences of a reported but little discussed 39,000 people who were imprisoned in Chun’s remote Samchung Re-education Camp, many of whom were political dissidents.\textsuperscript{13} As with previous chapters, our estimates of violence become more precise at the higher bound of intensity, and at the lower end of the scale, significant omissions and a high degree of uncertainty remain.

III. Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Syngman Rhee\textsuperscript{14}

The presence of a high external threat from North Korea – supported by the Soviet Union – strongly shaped the initial structure and social composition of the security apparatus in South Korea. From 1948 to 1960, the United States provided security assistance intended to build a strong, cohesive, and professional institution capable of repelling the threat posed by the Communist North. Because of this threat, American troops remained stationed in South Korea, and the United States retained peacetime operational control over the ROK military; it also increased the military’s size so much that the institution became broadly representative, unlike its smaller police counterpart.

I had initially expected the presence of an external threat, and the unusually high degree of American influence that resulted from it, to overwhelm any incentives for coup-proofing. However, Rhee did not share the U.S. perception that the external threat was dominant, and focused on eliminating potential rivals for power. He therefore created a good deal of fragmentation within the parts of the coercive apparatus outside the military chain of command. Rhee also shared an interest

\textsuperscript{12} Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, \textit{South Korea Since 1980} (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2010), p. 35.

\textsuperscript{13} Lee, \textit{Making of Minjung}; Heo and Roehrig, \textit{South Korea Since 1980}, p. 46; Bruce Cumings, \textit{Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History} (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 379; George Ogle, \textit{South Korea: Dissent Within the Economic Miracle} (Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books, 1990), especially around p. 55; Cumings suggests that almost all of those incarcerated were “journalists, students, teachers, labor organizers, and civil servants” there for political reasons.

\textsuperscript{14} For a list of internal security institutions in Korea after 1945, please see Appendices.
with the Americans in a certain degree of social exclusivity – distrusted leftists were not allowed to participate – meaning that South Korea’s coercive institutions also fell squarely on the conservative side of the postwar social cleavage between right and left. The division between the military and non-military parts of the coercive apparatus was not something predicted by my theory – it is rare for one country to retain peacetime command authority over another country’s military. The finding that the most fragmented and exclusive parts of Rhee’s coercive apparatus were the main organizations used to violently repress civilians, however, is consistent with my overall argument.

Policing in Korea under Japanese Rule (1905-1945)

The Japanese colonial experience in Korea left the peninsula with a legacy of strong but not particularly inclusive police organization. Consistent with an overall difference in Japan’s approach to the two colonies, and in contrast to Japanese policing in Taiwan, the police institutions developed in Korea were more militaristic in nature and less socially embedded in Korean society.

According to Jinsok Jun, the ‘overdevelopment’ of the Korean state and its dominance over civil society date back to the Choson dynasty, but were magnified and strengthened under Japanese colonialism.\textsuperscript{15} The first Japanese police authorities were actually consular police, sent by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Korean peninsula as early as the 1880’s.\textsuperscript{16} They were stationed in treaty port consulate offices across late Choson Korea with the mission to “serve and control” the Japanese

\textsuperscript{15} Jun argues that Choson was not a militarized state, since its military officers were subject to control by the scholar-gentry. Jinsok Jun, “South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control,” in Muthiah Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: the declining political role of the military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 121-142; Hagen Koo, ed., State and Society in Contemporary Korea (Ithaca: Cornell, 1993), especially the chapter by Jang-Jip Choi on “Political Cleavages in South Korea.” See also comments on this problem as applied to the Chang Myon period of 1960-61 by Han Sung-joo, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berekeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 2-5.

civilian community, but also played a significant role in later political intelligence work, including the surveillance and suppression of the Korean independence movement on the peninsula and in Manchuria. With the establishment of the “protectorate” in 1905, Japanese police began to patrol in Korea en masse, and after the imperial army was disbanded and resistance from the *nibyong* guerillas largely put down, Korea formally became a colony in August 1910.17

Though Korea and Taiwan were both Japanese colonies for the first half of the twentieth century, the policing arrangements in the two colonies were quite different. Korea’s was also a centralized system that blended police functions with regional administrative responsibility, but the internal security organizations in Korea also remained militarized and less integrated with local, pre-colonial institutions of security and governance. Korea’s Governor-Generals came from the Japanese Army, and possessed authority that was not divided with any civilian counterpart.18 Police functions were subordinated to the gendarmerie; a gendarme captain headed every provincial police bureau.19 The peninsula was ruled not by regular Japanese law, but frequently by executive or emergency decree, and the gendarmes appear to have had a more combative attitude toward the Korean population than to the Taiwanese; one colonial official remarked, “what can be done with

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18 In Taiwan, by contrast, civilians occupied the Governor-Generalship after 1919, had more limited authority, and deliberately eschewed use of the military and gendarmerie to police the native population, choosing instead to integrate civilian police deeply into existing systems of local administration.

incentives in Taiwan must be done with coercion in Korea.” Thus the occupation of Korea never took on the civilian character that was deliberately adopted in Taiwan, and coercive institutions during the Japanese period were characterized as a “centrally controlled, highly mobile national police force, responsive to the center and possessing its own communications and transportation facilities” rather than being integrated with local structures.

The coercive apparatus in colonial Korea was formally more inclusive, but lacked the informal mechanisms of societal penetration that had led to them being deeply embedded in Taiwan. A higher percentage of police forces serving in Korea were themselves Korean. By 1943, Koreans made up between forty and fifty percent of the police force (versus one-sixth in Formosa), and they achieved comparatively higher rank within police administration. This advantage, however, was offset by the fact that there were simply fewer police to go around in Korea (8:100 police-to-population ratio in Korea versus 14:100 in Formosa), perhaps due to the fact that the Japanese in Korea never penetrated rural areas as thoroughly. Moreover, police supervision of the boko/baojia – an additional, predominantly Taiwanese level of colonial administration – had no real counterpart in Korea. Thus, although the police and intelligence agencies in Korea did constitute “an avenue of upward mobility for thousands of the lower class,” the state that they joined was, as Yong-pyo Hong describes it, “detached from the civil society” and from local communities. Mark Caprio similarly


21 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 152.


23 See Chapter Two.

characterizes the Japanese occupation of Korea as highly segregated and exclusive. Not until wartime mobilization efforts began did organizations like the Korean League for the General Mobilization of the National Spirit or the Korean Anti-Communist Association establish branches at the province, county, town, workplace, and local levels that were capable of even approaching the social penetration that had long been institutionalized in Taiwan.

External Threats and External Influence: Building the Military

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, Korea became an American trusteeship until 1948. The primary focus of the U.S. military occupation, and the impetus for American assistance after 1948, was to strengthen the Korean military to counter the external threat posed by communism and the North Korean regime. As historian Gregg Brazinsky explains, “Between 1946 and 1960, the United States transformed the military of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from a small disorganized constabulary into the most dominant institution in South Korean society.” In terms of its size, group cohesion, institutionalization, and mobilization, the military exceeded any other political organization, and over the course of two decades, it became a capable, highly professional force with regards to its mission of external defense.

Formation and expansion of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) were among the earliest priorities of commanding General John Hodge and the U.S. Military Government in Korea


26 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 177.


29 Jun, “South Korea,” p. 123.
In December 1945, the American military government established the Military English Language School (MLES), precursor to the Korean Military Academy. “Plan Bamboo,” approved in January 1946, had called for a 25,000-strong “constabulary” force, organized into one light infantry regiment for each province, a total of nine in all. Under military adviser Army Captain James Hausman, however, the MLES became Officer Candidate School, and the constabulary swelled from 6,000 in November 1946 to 31,000 in December 1947 to almost 50,000 upon the declaration of statehood in August 1948. By summer 1949, five hundred American military advisors comprised the Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG), which operated with a $20 million annual budget and opened a range of new centers for military training. Between 1945 and 1950, the Korean military had grown rapidly in terms of size and professionalism.

Japanese-trained personnel were the foundation of this new military. By 1945, approximately 50,000 Koreans had served in the Japanese military; most were conscripts or enlistees, but several hundred had served as officers. Park Chung Hee and his KCIA-chief-turned-assassin Kim Chae-kyu, both former officers in the Japanese armed forces (Park had even taken the Japanese name Masao Takagi), graduated from the second class of the American-organized military academy. USAMGIK drew the school’s first classes from those who had served in the Japanese or Kwangbok army (Korean nationalists who fought with Chinese forces against the Japanese), but a high rate of attrition by the Kwangbok army led to a majority of the officer pool being men who had served

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30 The plan was a compromise worked out with the State Department, which modified the intention to create a full military because of concerns about the Soviet reaction. Allan Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-50: A House Burning* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2005), pp. 78-80.


under the Japanese rather than nationalists who had fought them. In addition to Park and Kim, this included the officers in charge of all six divisions with which the ROKA was inaugurated in 1948.

A mutiny at Yosu in October 1948 further skewed the military’s political orientation. The incident prompted a backlash against alleged American pressure to include leftist Koreans in the military, and resulted in a purge of about 10% of the 80,000-strong force, as well as the execution of between thirty and forty officers. Eventually, a military structure modeled on the American template was populated by men whose ethos and values came from “Japanese imperial military tradition with its nondemocratic, authoritarian, and militaristic, not to mention brutal, values.”

The Leftist Threat: Postwar Policing in South Korea

In addition to the military, former Japanese officials also dominated the police. Unlike Taiwan, where the Japanese colonial legacy conflicted with institutions imported by the Nationalist government from the Mainland, in Korea the interests of the new rulers were more congruent with those of the old, and there was a higher degree of institutional consistency. In the North, the nascent, Soviet-supported North Korean regime purged all former Japanese-colonial administrators, using the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee decree of 7 March 1946 to shut them out of power, and marking them with a negative social classification that followed them for life. By contrast, South Korea maintained many of the police and administrative officials who had served under Japan.

Under the military trusteeship that governed Korea from 1945 to 1948, American officials faced a choice: they could choose to govern Korea with the centralized bureaucracy used under

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33 Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea, p. 75.

34 Jun, “South Korea,” p. 123.

35 See Chapter Five.
Japanese rule, or they could align with the nascent, leftist, provisional government, which had established local branches (“People’s Committees”) to assume administrative functions and christened itself the Korean People’s Republic in Seoul on 9 September 1945. Despite initial calls by the Supreme Command, Allied Powers (SCAP) for lustration of collaborators, USAMGIK administrators, suspicious of Communism, chose the former option. Syngman Rhee, a long-time exile, advocate of Korean independence, and graduate of both Harvard and Princeton, became the “uncontested leader of the right,” with American rather than local backing. In fact, U.S. officials perceived it as an advantage that “he had no deep local roots outside of Seoul” because they thought this would give him the advantage of demanding fealty “from more men and more groups and in a more super-local way than could a leader of strong regional attachments.” What mattered most to the American, however, were his anti-Communist credentials.

Beyond Rhee, American administrators opted for a policy that grafted a coalition of conservative domestic politicians and exiled nationalists onto and into the Japanese administrative apparatus. They chose this over two alternatives: either relying on anti-Japanese nationalists who had fought with Chinese partisans, or turning to the fledgling “indigenous mass-based movement with leftist leanings.” Jun attributes USAMGIK’s decision to a combination of “pervasive social and political chaos followed by national liberation; time and resource constraints in building new


37 Rhee’s papers are still being catalogued and organized, but are open on a partial basis to researchers. For a partial English-language catalogue, see Young Ick Lew and Sangchul Cha, eds., The Syngman Rhee Presidential Papers: A Catalogue (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2005).


39 Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 4.
institutions; and scarcity of administrative human resources amid acute social and political crises resulting from the ideological confrontation of left and right."40 From the American vantage point, their policy had the added advantage of meeting with approval from leader-elect Syngman Rhee, who quickly realized the political advantage conferred by this coalitional composition.

The pattern of appointments extended directly to the Korea National Police. Whereas American administrators in the Philippines had preferred decentralized police forces under local control, in Korea USAMGIK opted to maintain the existing centralized, national force, supplemented in the short term by local auxiliaries.41 National director Cho Pyong-ok and head of Seoul’s metropolitan police force Chang Taek-sang were both American-favored appointees. In November 1946, 83% of officers of the Korean National Police had served in the Japanese colonial police: 806 out of 969. (Note that, in late 1946, the Army already had 6,000 men, indicating the importance of the Army relative to the police.) Many of these former Japanese officials continued their careers through 1960 – for example, Kim Tong-jo, who began as a National Police officer under the Japanese, worked for the American occupation, and then worked for Rhee in the foreign ministry and as vice minister.42 The new police force also accepted individuals who had fled South after being removed from their jobs in the North; many of them “had records of brutality in arresting and torturing their fellow countrymen” during the Japanese era.43 Those who had worked in police intelligence were recruited into army intelligence units (G-2) and the Counter-Intelligence

40 Jun “South Korea,” p. 123.

41 Henderson, Korea, p. x.

42 After 1961, he would become a foreign affairs adviser to the ruling party and KCIA. Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 173.

43 Henderson, Korea, p. 143.
Corps. One interviewee recounted that after his family moved south in 1946, his father saw a police official who had tortured him: the man was now a provincial police chief in the new postwar administration.

While some historians are critical of what they see as a highly ideological decision, others regard it as pragmatism: the Americans simply hired people who looked like they knew how to be policemen. Whether one defines the social cleavage as one of rightist versus leftist ideology, or nationalist versus collaborator, there was significant overlap in practice, and very little question about which side the police fell on. By 1948, the Korean National Police was directly aligned with executive power, and understood to be “faithful and fanatically loyal to the government.”

Internal Security under Civil Strife, 1948-53

Conflict was endemic on the Korean peninsula between 1948 and 1953. Internal security demands collided with external security problems, and together exceeded the capacity of the newly formed coercive institutions. ROKA and KNP forces tried to suppress the rural people's committees that formed in the aftermath of war, fought the leftist rebellion that followed this suppression – including the insurrection at Cheju Island by supporters of the People's Committee and a related military insubordination at Yosu – and worked to combat the guerilla campaign that existed through 1948-49. Though American officials assessed subversive activity to be on the

45 Author’s interview, Seoul, Korea, March 2011.
46 Author’s interviews with four scholars of Korean history, Seoul, March 2011 and January 2012.
47 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, p. 198.
48 Henderson, Korea, p. 173.
49 Cumings, Korea's Place in the Sun, pp. 192.
decline by the spring of 1950,\textsuperscript{50} the outbreak of civil war in late June of that year quickly handed the KNP responsibility for policing areas in the North with which it was wholly unfamiliar, and which it regarded as hostile.

These conditions led to an increase in the number of personnel and resources devoted to policing, but also heightened the adversarial nature of the police-population relationship. In December 1948, Rhee’s government passed the National Security Law, which was used to prosecute political offenders for decades afterward.\textsuperscript{51} Originally approved as a response to the Cheju uprising and Yosu insurrection, and based in part on imperial Japan’s Security Maintenance Law,\textsuperscript{52} the National Security Law gave vague and expansive powers to the state, enabling it to deploy the army and police in response to domestic disorder and making any citizen who criticized the government subject to draconian punishment, up to and including execution.\textsuperscript{53}

Under NSC 8/2, adopted by the Truman administration in March 1949, America also poured millions of dollars into police and military aid ($56 million by June of that year) to the Republic of Korea, with the aim of creating a 35,000-man police force and a 65,000-strong army “suitable for maintaining internal order under conditions of political strife and inspired disorder, and for maintaining border security.”\textsuperscript{54} Not content with these numbers, Rhee swelled the army to

\textsuperscript{50}Brazinsky, p. 73; Cumings, \textit{Korea’s Place in the Sun}, pp. 217-224, 243-47.


\textsuperscript{52}Kim, “The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation,” pp. 525-552 (cite on p. 531).


\textsuperscript{54}Truman Papers, “Brief History of U.S. Military Assistance to the Republic of Korea,” WHCF, Box 25, Harry S Truman Presidential Library.
nearly 100,000 and the police force to 50,000 by the beginning of September – making the KNP more than twice the size of the Japanese colonial force.\textsuperscript{55}

The Korean War led to a dramatic expansion of the size and resources of the ROK military. During the war, Rhee convinced American officials that to avoid an ROK collapse, they had to either provide extensive military assistance, or send more troops; the Americans chose aid. After the war, Rhee continued to exploit American fears of Korea’s weakness to extract support.\textsuperscript{56} Army strength increased from 100,000 to almost half a million by the time the armistice was signed, and under the 1953-54 negotiations surrounding the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States agreed to provide assistance for a military of up to 720,000 men. For the rest of Rhee’s tenure, American aid totaled around $300 million a year: as much as 87% of the ROK defense budget.\textsuperscript{57}

The United States also provided extensive advising. During the war, KMAG used a “counterpart system” to pair U.S. advisors with South Korean officers in an attempt to replicate American military structures and practices. The Korean Military Academy, a version of MLES modeled to an extraordinary degree on West Point, opened in January 1952. Command and staff colleges opened in the 1950’s similarly mirrored the organization and curriculum of their U.S. counterparts, their development supervised by American personnel. Finally, top Korean officers received training in U.S. From 1950-57, over 7,000 ROK Army officers were trained at American schools through the Continental United States (CONUS) program – including future president Park

\textsuperscript{55} U.S. State Department, “Memorandum concerning United States Political Objectives in Korea,” 30 November 1950, RG59, CDF 795.00/12-150; Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 25.


Chung Hee, who went to Fort Sill’s artillery school in 1954. The preferential placement given to these graduates upon their return guaranteed that their influence outstripped their already-remarkable numbers.58

From 1948 to 1953, Korea’s isolated and conservative security forces pursued aggressive policies of counter-subversion that resulted in violence against civilians. In 1949, visiting American officials observed police boxes that were fortified like military outposts, and commented openly on the high levels of distrust between the police and the population.59 The police and military forces were accused of widespread abuses of civilians, including executions of thousands of suspected communists, and arrests and detentions made on political charges reached extraordinarily high levels.60 There appear to have been 17,000 people in prison in southern Korea in August 1945, increasing to 21,458 in prison in December 1947; by 1949, there were a total of 30,000.61 In spring of 1950, the Ministry of Finance listed 21 prisons with a population of 58,000.62 From September 1948 to April 1949, 89,710 people were reported to have been arrested; of these, 28,404 were released; 21,606 sent to the prosecutor’s office; 29,284 transferred to some kind of “security office”; 6,985 remanded to military police custody; and 1,187 pending. Between 50% and 80% of prisoners

58 Kenneth W. Meyers, “K MAG’s Wartime Experiences: 11 July 1951 to 27 July 1953,” RG338, Box 85; Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, pp. 84-96.

59 Report of Vice Consuls John Rozier and Donald MacDonald, Embassy Seoul to Washington, 17 March 1949, Box 7127, 895.00, NARA.

60 See statement by KNP head Kim Tae-son that his forces had executed 1,200 suspected communists between June 25 and July 14. K MAG Report, 2 August 1950, Box 5418, RG338, NARA; see also New York Times coverage from 11 July 1950.

61 The figures are somewhat contradictory. A.T. Steele, New York Herald Tribune, 30 October 1949; Central Intelligence Agency, “Review of the World Situation,” 16 December 1948, Box 205, NSC File, PSF, Truman Library, Independence, MO; CIA “Communist Capabilities in South Korea,” 21 February 1949, Box 257, Truman Library; Embassy to Washington, 12 December 1947, Box 7124, 895.00, NARA; Embassy to Washington, 10 December 1949, Box 7128, NARA.

62 Reports from the time indicate that these numbers may have been inflated to account for the police selling rice for extra income on the side.
had been charged with violating the National Security Law, and of the cases turned over to the prosecutor, 80% were found guilty.\textsuperscript{63} War intensified these dynamics; during the brief southern occupation of northern Korea in late 1950, Cho Pyong-ok reported that almost 56,000 collaborators and traitors had been arrested.\textsuperscript{64} South Korean and American forces have been accused of atrocities and “white terror” killings of civilians during the war as well.\textsuperscript{65}

Rhee used the Korean National Police both to implement this agenda and to intimidate the other branches of government into collaboration with his actions. Under Rhee, the KNP became known as “the political tool of the president,”\textsuperscript{66} engaging in “surveillance, sudden arrests, unjust trials, trumped-up accusations, threats of all kinds to the opposition, and torture.”\textsuperscript{67} During wartime, the KNP was so heavy-handed in supposed Communist areas that U.S. commanders recommended that they not be allowed to operate north of the DMZ.\textsuperscript{68} The judiciary was either appointed because they would be compliant, or were intimidated into cooperation; according to Gregory Henderson, a diplomat in Korea during this period, police requests for arrest warrants were not turned down in a single instance in 1948, 1949, or 1950.\textsuperscript{69} Rhee also took advantage of KNP loyalty to press for political advantage, intimidating rivals and, in some cases, intervening to stop his opponents from voting.

\textsuperscript{63} Henderson, \textit{Korea}, p. 163.

\textsuperscript{64} Cumings, \textit{Korea’s Place in the Sun}, p. 282.


\textsuperscript{66} Kim, \textit{Politics of Military Revolution}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{67} Henderson, \textit{Korea}, p. 173.

\textsuperscript{68} Cumings, \textit{Korea’s Place in the Sun}, p. 281.

\textsuperscript{69} “Memorandum Concerning United States Political Objectives”; see also Henderson, \textit{Korea}. 

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The result was fragmentation; resistance to Rhee’s actions prompted the National Assembly to create on a separate police force that they, not Rhee, controlled. In August 1948, the National Assembly accused Rhee’s police chiefs of collaboration, and set up its own police and courts to investigate and sentence the offenders. “Institutional warfare” broke out between the Assembly and their Special Police (SP) on the one hand, and Rhee and the KNP on the other. From January to June 1949, SP forces arrested members of the KNP; in May and June, the KNP responded by arresting sixteen assemblymen, murdering opposition leader Kim Ku, and physically attacking the SP. Syngman Rhee then issued an executive order dissolving the SP, and replaced the National Assembly’s courts with trials of the assemblymen themselves. By early October, 7% of the Assembly had been jailed.70

Institutional infighting continued during the Korean War, as the legislature tried to remove Rhee from office. Rhee’s security forces conducted reprisal killings against Koreans who collaborated with northern occupation, and when the National Assembly objected, Rhee not only ignored their protests, but used a joint army-police inquiry commission to punish individuals suspected of treason: 16,115 arrested by November 1950. In summer 1952, when the National Assembly looked likely to oust Rhee from the presidency, Rhee simply declared martial law. Army chief of staff Yi Chong’an refused to divert combat divisions to hold the legislature hostage, so Rhee sent military police instead, arresting some 45 lawmakers on their way to the Assembly and detaining them for several days. He later dismissed Yi, and put seven of them on trial for “Communist conspiracy.”71 (Yi apparently offered in the interim to oust Rhee in a coup, something American

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officials seem to have seriously considered.\textsuperscript{73} The distrust of the KNP that began in this period would remain in place for decades to come.\textsuperscript{73}

*After the Korean War: Circumscribed Autocratic Manipulation*

After the signing of the 1953 armistice, the continued presence of the North Korean threat led to ongoing U.S. involvement in the ROK military. The Americans were sufficiently concerned that Rhee’s views on how to handle the threat did not align with theirs that they took pains to limit his authority over the military. In ensuring that he would not be able to order an attack across the DMZ without U.S. approval, the State Department observed in 1955 that fortunately, “the present leaders of the Army are friendly to us and it is our belief that they will not act against our interests even under orders from Rhee.”\textsuperscript{74} Moreover, from July 1950 onward, operational control of the ROK military remained with UN Command (and therefore under American military authority).

The presence of this external threat therefore created a bifurcation in Korea’s coercive apparatus, between an American-controlled military focused on external defense, and the purely internal forces responsible to the ROK president. On the one hand, American retention of command authority insulated the Korean *military* from Rhee’s meddling. At the same time, however, American support vis-a-vis the external threat seems to have freed Rhee to focus on elite rivals – not unlike Ferdinand Marcos. As Brazinsky observes, “Whereas most governments must bargain with


\textsuperscript{73} See, for example, Kim Cheol-Sung, “Study on the Decentralization of Korea National Police System” [한국 경찰의분권화에관한연구], (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Public Administration, Kyungnam University, 2008), in Korean (title and abstract in English).

key elites or the general population to acquire the resources necessary for waging wars, Syngman Rhee wheedled support for the expansion of ROK forces from the United States.”

American support, therefore, narrowed the space in which Rhee could pursue coup-proofing practices, but also freed him to do so within those confines. Wherever he was allowed to do so, Rhee engaged in coup-proofing measures designed to marginalize rivals. He fostered competition between factions and regional groups, and controlled appointments to promote loyalists. He particularly relied on the KNP and a handful of small units that remained outside CFC command as a parallel force to ensure his security. Unsurprisingly, it was these forces who engaged in the work of domestic repression for the remainder of the 1950s.

Rhee fostered fragmentation within the coercive apparatus. He used a military police unit headed by Lieutenant General Won Yong-dok, designated the Joint Military Provost Marshal or Joint Provost Marshal Command (JMPM or JPMC), a unit that was outside Army jurisdiction and responsible only to the civilian Minister of Defense and to Rhee. Rhee played this unit off the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) headed by Major General Kim Chang-yong. After Kim’s assassination in January 1956, one of the first people arrested was the commander of General Won’s unit. U.S. embassy cables from Seoul to Washington throughout the 1950’s testify to Rhee’s use of these special military and police units to intimidate, arrest, and eliminate political opponents. Both

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75 Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 27.

76 This latter unit was then called the Special Task Command, *Tenkmudae*, but most of the literature refers to it by the name it acquired under Chang Myon’s government, which renamed it the Counter-Intelligence Corps, or *Bangchupdae*, in an attempt to rehabilitate its image. Jun, “South Korea,” p. 136.

the CIC and the JPMC were specifically named as units used for “security as well as political actions.”78

Rhee personally controlled most national and provincial-level appointments, reportedly even reviewing passport application approvals. He used this power to purge KDP (conservative) rivals who had served in the American-led military government;79 six months after taking office, half of the old ministers were gone.80 By 1949, the State Department reported, not a single one of Rhee’s ministers or vice ministers were individuals who had held significant positions in the American military government.81 He appointed loyalists as a reward, and “relied on those who professed their personal allegiance to him rather than on those who demonstrated administrative competence.”82 He also used personnel rotation to prevent bureaucracies and individuals from amassing power that could challenge him; “periodic cabinet shake-ups deprived the administrative agencies of stability and consistency and, at the same time, engendered the temptation for the ministers to amass a fortune and pay off political debts while in office.”83 Periodic is perhaps an understatement; according to Henderson, “Rhee ran through ministers at the rate of more than ten a year,” a total of 129 in less than twelve years.84 The policy was used “to destroy or to prevent the consolidation of


79 Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 17.

80 Henderson, Korea, p. 239.


84 Henderson, Korea, pp. 216, 239-40.
groups, bonds, personal powers, and vested interests in any province, ministry, or board.”

Comparing Rhee to Haile Selassie and the rulers of the late Yi dynasty, Henderson adds that “streams of aspirants depended on him alone for advancement and, through the frequent shifts he made, were rendered addedly [sic] incapable of attaching themselves to an interest group.”

A baffled State Department observed that without the appeal of these appointments and the threat of dismissal, it was “difficult to imagine how a political leader with such a small quantity of actual ability and substance to offer his following has been able to attain such great popularity.”

Rotation of high officials deliberately exploited regional and factional rivalries. Under Rhee, “the façade of top-down control masked a fractured regime that frequently splintered into competing clusters of power,” as he fostered competition between subordinates in different positions and different organizations. Regional alliances dominated the Army. There was a northwest faction based in the Pyongan area, headed by the two Paek brothers from the Japanese Kwantung Army and later by Chang To-yong; these men were patrons of Park Chung Hee, who had strong ties there despite his southeastern origins. Their faction was counterbalanced by a northeast faction based in Hamkyong, led by former Japanese officer Chong Il-gwon and then Yi Yong-mun.

Though Paek and Chong both came from the north and served in the Manchurian Army, they led rival factions grouped around their respective provinces; Rhee rotated the position of army chief of staff between the two groups to ensure continued competition and prevent one from dominating.

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85 Henderson, Korea, pp. 239-40.
86 Henderson, Korea, p. 214.
87 U.S. State Department, “Intimate Report on Rhee Syngman,” 9 February 1958, RG59, CDF 1945-49, 895.00/2-948; see also Brazinsky, p. 17.
88 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 341.
89 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, pp. 201-02, 212, 247, 261; Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, pp. 57-58.
90 Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 99.
There was also a third faction, from the middle-southern provinces, headed by Yi Hyong-gun.\footnote{Yong-sup Han, “The May 16th Military Coup,” in Kim Byungkook and Ezra Vogel, eds., The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 39.} According to Yong-sup Han, there were also rival factions based around schools: graduates of the Japanese Military Academy were rivals to those who had been trained at the Fengtian and Xinjing Officers’ Schools (the latter of which was attended by Park Chung Hee).\footnote{Yong-sup Han, “The May 16th Military Coup,” pp. 37-40.}

In addition to stoking factional competition, Rhee engineered appointments to marginalize the supporters of his potential political rivals. He was able to pursue these policies because the preferences dictated by his personal desire for power overlapped with those of Americans concerned about Communist subversion, who found former Japanese officials to be better trained and politically more reliable. Rhee used this bias to avoid assigning command posts to the Koreans who had fought for independence in China, and to sideline their leader Kim Koo.\footnote{Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, pp. 43-48.} Instead, he promoted a younger, more malleable group of commanders, including young soldiers from North Korea who professed a particularly strong anti-Communist orientation based on their experience there. (Somewhat paradoxically, Rhee was able to use their experience to reassure the Americans of their loyalty, while calling the political orientation of Korean nationalists form China into question.) These officers’ pursuit of American training and appreciation for U.S. support against the communist North further increased American counterparts’ trust, enabling Rhee to simultaneously strengthen the relationship with his U.S. patron and marginalize his political opponents.\footnote{Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 76; Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, p. 56.}

At the same time, however, Rhee’s attempts to create a coercive apparatus that was personally loyal made the security forces as well as his inner circle more exclusive than before.
First, Rhee reduced the size of the police force; between 1953 and 1957, its numbers decreased from 63,427 to 33,000.\textsuperscript{95} At the top, moreover, the octogenarian leader Rhee relied more and more on his wife, Austrian-born Francesca Rhee, and on his Presidential Assistant Park Chan-II. The two “strictly controlled and limited the matters brought to Rhee’s attention, removing those which might excite or disturb him.”\textsuperscript{96} This reliance on a narrow group of individuals decreased the quality of intelligence available to him, particularly regarding popular unrest, and led to unnecessary repression. Opposition leaders lamented that Rhee was “not aware of the manner in which his policies were implemented, of the full nature of the problems that they confronted, or of the changing nature of the domestic political situation.”\textsuperscript{97} He became “isolated from the uncontrolled outside information needed for effective leadership,” and subject to the information presented by subordinates whose view was skewed by parochial and personal interest.\textsuperscript{98}

As a result of this misinformation, Rhee overestimated certain threats, allowed hardliners to use coercion for political ends, and was unaware of the indiscriminacy of the violence that he had unleashed. In December 1958, for example, his Liberal Party pushed through an amendment to the National Security Law by using some 300 special ‘security guards’ to haul opposition assemblymen from the Democratic Party (DP) from the chamber and lock in the basement. Justified on anti-Communist grounds, the bill looked much more like a way to muzzle the press and target political


\textsuperscript{96} Hong, \textit{State Security and Regime Security}, p. 125.

\textsuperscript{97} Quoted in U.S. State Department, “Democrats Look to 1960,” 1 December 1958, RG59, 795B.00/12-158; see also Hong, \textit{State Security and Regime Security}, p. 125.

opponents; the British Foreign Office less subtly called it “a hunting license.”

Rhee claimed (wrongly) to the protesting U.S. ambassador that the DP had been infiltrated by Communists; he did not know that his subordinates had locked the opposition in the basement to secure passage of the law. The law was then used to close an opposition newspaper that supported Vice President Chang Myon, to weaken the opposition party, and to execute Progressive Party leader Cho Pong-am on grounds of espionage, subversion, and collaboration with Communists.

Ultimately, however, Rhee’s efforts at fragmentation backfired. As happened under Marcos, Rhee’s interference created a divide within the military between the (senior) officers who benefitted from his patronage, and those who were excluded – largely, a group of ambitious, American-trained junior officers. These men resented the fact that officers who received early loyalty-based promotions were still young enough to remain in service for years to come, allowing less room to promote those below and limiting junior officers’ opportunities for advancement. In September

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99 Article 17 allowed the government to penalize “anyone who has benefited the enemy by disturbing the people by reporting or spreading false facts or distorted news.” American embassy officials reported suspicions that the bill had been proposed to cripple the opposition in the run-up to the next presidential election. Park, The National Security Law; Hong, State Security and Regime Security, pp. 126-27.

100 Rhee later wrote to Eisenhower that opposition Assembly members had been confined because they were disrupting normal proceedings. See Dowling’s report on 27 December 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60, Vol. 18, pp. 523-35; U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, 19 January 1959, RG 59, 795B.00/1-1959.

101 The Director of Rhee’s Office of Public Information, Oh Chae-Kyong, resigned in January 1959, which the State Department reported was because of his unwillingness to use the new NSL against opposition papers. The NSL was used to arrest and charge two of the paper’s reporters, but the paper was eventually closed under U.S. Military Ordinance 88, rather than the new NSL. U.S. Department of State, Embassy Seoul to Washington, 14 January 1959, RG59, 795B.00/1-1459.

102 U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, 3 February 1959, RG59, 795B.00/2-359; U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, 3 May 1959, RG 59 795B.5/5-359; U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, 8 May 1959, RG59, 795B.00(W)/5-859; Han, Failure of Democracy in South Korea, p. 45; Park Chi-Young, Political Opposition in Korea 1945-60 (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980), pp. 153-75.

103 U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, 6 March 1959, RG59 795B.00/(W)/3-659.

104 Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 99.
1960, sixteen officers, including eventual coup-architect Kim Jong Pil, demanded that the Army’s Chief of Staff remove senior commanders tainted by politicization and corruption. The junior officers were arrested for insubordination and no action against the senior officers was taken.\textsuperscript{105} Discontent among the lower ranks helped push these officers to intervene in politics in 1961;\textsuperscript{106} Rhee’s pursuit of intra-military fragmentation for political advantage ultimately contributed to his own downfall.

In sum, the external threat from North Korea led to an American presence that, through retention of command authority, insulated the South Korean military from standard coup-proofing. Both the Americans and Rhee, however, sought to exclude large swathes of Korean society from participation in the institutions of public security and coercion. And in the parts of the coercive apparatus not under American control, Rhee deliberately fostered a high degree of fragmentation. This helps explain why Rhee’s tenure was relatively violent compared to those of the autocrats who followed, and why under Rhee it was the police, rather than the military, who were known for violence against Korea’s civilian population.

### III. Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Park Chung Hee

Although Park’s authoritarianism is typically associated with the 1961 coup and post-1972 military dictatorship, a comprehensive new examination concludes that the 1972 Yushin declaration formalized rather than established his “imperial presidency.”\textsuperscript{107} As with Marcos, it is helpful to examine Park’s design and management of the coercive apparatus both before and after 1972. This

\textsuperscript{105} Heo and Roehrig, \textit{South Korea Since 1980}, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{106} Jun, \textit{“South Korea,”} p. 125.

\textsuperscript{107} Kim and Vogel, \textit{The Park Chung Hee Era}, p. 29-30. For a similar conclusion, see Oh, \textit{Study of the Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime}, p. 118.
section therefore discusses the structure and social composition of the coercive apparatus across Park’s time in office, with particular emphasis on the post-1972 period.

In the 1960’s, Park Chung Hee presided over a coercive apparatus that was principally focused on defending South Korea from external threat. He therefore created a new coalition that was relatively inclusive, and also established a single, unitary coordinating institution to handle internal security: the KCIA. After he declared Yushin, however, Park’s perception of the dominant threat appears to have shifted; he became more concerned about managing elites and protecting himself from his own coercive apparatus, with the result that fragmentation and competition re-emerged over the course of the 1970’s. Regional favoritism also deepened. Consistent with the arguments made in Chapter One, the increase in fragmentation and exclusion of Cholla from the security apparatus help to explain both the higher rate of violence in the 1970s (relative to the 1960s), and the higher rate of repression directed at Cholla during that decade.

Overview: Political Developments under Park

On 19 April 1960 (4.19, sa-il-gui), popular protests began that toppled the unpopular Syngman Rhee: what would come to be known as the April Revolution. A brief interregnum – the democratic, weak Second Republic under prime minister Chang Myon – ended on May 16, 1961 (5.16), when Park Chung Hee and a group of colonels from the Korean army and marines – an estimated 250 officers and 3,500 men out of a military of 600,000 – seized power in a coup. A military junta of around thirty colonels and brigadier generals declared the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR); on June 6, they issued the “Law Regarding Extraordinary

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Measures for National Reconstruction,” which superseded the constitution and appropriated the powers of the legislature, executive, and judiciary to the SCNR.

On May 17, the junta headed by Park closed the National Assembly and banned political activity. Within six days, 2,014 politicians had been arrested, including the prime minister, and by March 1962, 4,367 of them had been banned from engaging in political activity for the next six years.109 In June 1961, the SCNR issued its “Law Regarding Extraordinary Measures,” and Park added the Anti-Communist Law (ACL) to the National Security Law (NSL) and other “political control laws” (chongchi kyujepop).110 The junta closed newspapers, instituted a curfew, and arrested nearly 14,000 people as “hooligans.”111 13,300 members of the civil service and military were purged or retired within weeks, and the total rose to 17,000 by the end of summer 1961. Military officers formed a revolutionary tribunal headed by one of the colonels of the coup, and military court cases handled increasing numbers of criminal cases: 10,080 in 1960; 22,195 in 1961; 35,044 in 1962.112

Partially due to pressure from the Kennedy administration, Park agreed to hold elections and form a civilian government in 1963.113 He and the government-backed Democratic Republican Party (DRP, 민주공화당) won the presidency and a legislative majority. The 1964-65 protests over

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109 The government allowed them to reapply for permission to participate in politics and cleared most of them by late February 1963. Henderson, Korea, p. 184.

110 Other political control laws included the Law of Purification of Political Activities, the Social Safety Law, the Law on Public Gatherings and Demonstrations, the Special Law on the Punishment of Crimes under Emergency Situation, the Special Law on Protection of the State, and eventually, Emergency Decree #9. See Shin et al, South Korea’s Democracy Movement, p. 89.

111 For overviews of this period, see Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, pp. 347-51; Jang-jip Choi, Labor and the Authoritarian State (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1990); Kim, Politics of Military Revolution; Henderson, Korea.

112 Henderson, Korea, pp. 183-84.

the Korea-Japan normalization talks, however, resulted in the declaration of martial law in June 1964, the passing of a Garrison Decree in August 1965, and a US-supplied crackdown by the ROK Army (ROKA). August 1964 also saw the creation of a Media Ethics Committee Law, which, though held in abeyance, served as an ever-present reminder that the regime could become more restrictive if it wished.

After Park was re-elected in 1967, domestic and international developments heightened his sense of threat. In the late 1960’s, North Korean infiltration attempts increased, most notably the 1968 Blue House raid by commandos from the (North) Korean People’s Army, who got within a kilometer of Blue House before being apprehended. In 1970-71, international developments also made Korea’s external situation seem more precarious: the Nixon doctrine, Nixon’s visit to China, the withdrawal of a full division of American troops from Korea (decreasing troop strength from 62,000 to 42,000), and superpower détente. In response, Park initiated South Korea’s pursuit of a plutonium-based nuclear weapons program, and dispatched KCIA chief Lee Hu-rak to Pyongyang to negotiate a joint declaration. He also created new squadrons of combat police (chongtu kyongchal) under the Ministry of National Defense to conduct counter-espionage and counter-infiltration missions.

Park’s 1969 attempt at constitutional revision (to make himself eligible to run for a third term) prompted widespread student protest, and in 1971, as labor disputes rose, he eked out an

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114 The talks provided funding needed for Park’s economic development drive, but pursuing them created opposition, and therefore the perceived need for repression.


116 Park had originally drawn the combat police from existing police squadrons in 1967, but in 1970-71, the National Assembly placed the CP under MND. Men conscripted for military service could opt to join the CP, and were often posted to remote locations along the DMZ. By 1973, they had taken over counter-infiltration from the police. Author’s interviews with three members of the Korea National Police Agency, Seoul, Korea, January 2012. Some of this history is recounted in the official police history textbook used at the Korea National Police Academy: Kim Sung-soo et al, *History of National Police in Korea* (Seoul, Police Mutual Aid Association, 2010)/ 김성수 외 7명, “2010 한국경찰사,” 서울, 경찰공제회.
uncomfortably narrow victory in the presidential race (53%-45%) over Cholla-based challenger Kim Dae Jung.\textsuperscript{117} According to testimony from his former chief of staff, Kim Chong-ryom, Park began planning for Yushin in April 1971, as he ran for his third presidential term.\textsuperscript{118} In October 1971, he issued a Garrison Decree that stationed troops on eight different university campuses; in December he declared a state of national emergency, and moved against the so-called “Four Man faction” that was challenging his authority in the National Assembly. The KCIA and Kim Jong-Pil protégé Oh Chi-Sung arrested and interrogated twenty-three DRP politicians, torturing at least nine in the process.\textsuperscript{119}

Finally, in October 1972, Park declared martial law, dissolving the National Assembly, closing colleges and universities, and banning political parties.\textsuperscript{120} In a “self-coup” in November, Park promulgated the Yushin constitution, which allowed him to appoint and fire the prime minister and cabinet, appoint one-third of the National Assembly, suspend civil liberties, and rule by emergency decree.\textsuperscript{121} Shifting to indirect election by a body whose membership Park now controlled ensured that he could remain in office for life.\textsuperscript{122}


\textsuperscript{120} For Park’s own justification, see Park Chung Hee, \textit{Major Speeches} (Seoul: Samhwa, 1973), pp. 24-26.


\textsuperscript{122} Heo and Roehrig, p. 23; Kim, “Korea at the Crossroads.”
The Yushin system also adapted the legal structure used to deal with dissidents and opposition; Park gained the ability to make Emergency Decrees (EDs, or Emergency Measures, EMs) without the approval of the National Assembly. In the years that followed, Emergency Measures were used for ordering repressive responses to campus unrest, outlawing work stoppages and strikes, and were usually accompanied by mass arrests (*minchong sagon*). The infamous EM #9, passed after the 1975 fall of Vietnam, made mere criticism of the regime a violation of national security laws, and unlike the other, more specifically targeted EMs, remained in effect until Park’s death nearly five years later. Table 4.1, below, shows a list of these Emergency Measures:

**Table 4.1 List of Garrison and Emergency Decrees in South Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decree Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garrison Decree</td>
<td>15 Oct. 1971</td>
<td>Reaction to major student protests against military training. Soldiers deployed to major universities, 2000 arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM #1</td>
<td>8 Jan. 1974</td>
<td>Disallowed criticism of Yushin, forbade anti-government petitions, and created General Emergency Court Martial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM #2</td>
<td>14 Jan. 1974</td>
<td>Eased tax burden of low-income earners to stabilize economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM #3</td>
<td>3 Apr. 1974</td>
<td>Made student political organizing illegal; targeted National Democratic Youth-Student League (<em>minchonghangnyon</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM #4</td>
<td>23 Aug. 1974</td>
<td>Annulling EM #1 and EM #4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM #5</td>
<td>31 Dec. 1974</td>
<td>Annulling EM #3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM #6</td>
<td>8 Apr. 1975</td>
<td>Closed Korea University (because of student activism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM #7</td>
<td>13 May 1975</td>
<td>Annulling EM #7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM #8</td>
<td>13 May 1975</td>
<td>Made criticism of government illegal and allowed imprisonment without due process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison Decree</td>
<td>20 Oct. 1979</td>
<td>Reaction to major protests in Pusan, Masan, and Changwon that followed KYS’ expulsion from NA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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125 Compiled from Shin et al, *South Korea’s Democracy Movement*, pp. 88-90.
Park ruled under this “Fourth Republic” until his assassination by KCIA chief Kim Jae-kyu in October 1979.

The Social Composition of Park’s Coercive Apparatus

In the early 1960’s, the social composition of South Korea’s coercive apparatus changed significantly. Many of the Japanese-era police and military officials were removed from their positions. To better understand who replaced them, I constructed a new dataset of internal security elites.\(^{126}\) This dataset suggests that the coercive apparatus that Park created was relatively broad and inclusive in terms of its social composition. I find that Park’s reputation for regional favoritism was true at high levels in the coercive apparatus, but only to a limited degree; that he relied on a fairly broad coalition of military elites from different classes; and that he pursued deliberately inclusive and faction-minimizing personnel policies. These policies were largely motivated by the need for South Korea to combat the external threat it faced from North Korea.

The interim government, Chang Myon government, and the first years of military rule removed former Japanese officials from office. In 1960-61, a massive purge of civil servants and officials occurred, including provincial and local levels. Turnover was rapid; ministers, advisors, and councilors rotated frequently. Chang Myon “changed his ministers at the most rapid rate … since the end of the Yi Dynasty, some remaining in office only a few weeks or even days. There was a new Minister of Home Affairs in each of the first four months of the government.”\(^{127}\) The majority of the approximately six hundred KNP officers from the colonial police force – many of them now in

\(^{126}\) This dataset included the heads of the KCIA, the Presidential Security Service, the Capitol Garrison Command, the Army Security Command/Defense Security Command, and the National Police Agency, as well as the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief Prosecutor. Drawing on biographies provided by the *Joong-Ang Ilbo* newspaper and other supplemental sources, I coded each candidate for their province of origin, military background (including KMA/ROTC training and class of graduation), and family ties to other members of the coercive apparatus.

\(^{127}\) Henderson, *Korea*, p. 239.
key positions – resigned or were fired. They were replaced by “recruits, some of them college graduates, who were hostile to older police traditions.” Over the course of 1960-63, senior military officers were similarly purged or retired, especially members of the Northeastern and Northwestern factions and officers of North Korean origin who had risen to prominence under Syngman Rhee. All seven of the lieutenant generals ousted from the military after the 5.16 coup were of North Korean origin. Observers also noted that the “penalties for those dropped became decidedly more extreme; imprisonment and even torture were visited on many who were dropped from high posts.” The purges led to a short-term spike in NSL indictments in 1961-63.

After 1963, however, Park made what one State Department observer called “a conscious effort to stabilize the bureaucracy” by decreasing the frequency of rotation and reshuffling. Appointment patterns from 1963-72 were remarkably different: 50.4% of those at the vice-ministerial level or above under Park stayed in office for two years or more (versus Rhee’s 10-11 months); from 1972-79 that share increased to 60.9%. Multiple appointments also contributed to stability. Of 162 men at that level between 1963 and 1972, 37 men held such posts twice, and 35 of them did so three times or more. After Yushin began, 22 of 91 served twice and 24 served three times or more.

128 Henderson, Korea, p. 430.
129 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 354-46.
130 Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, pp. 116-117.
131 Henderson, Korea, p. 239.
133 Henderson, Korea, p. 239.
134 Statistics in Byung-Kook Kim, “The Labyrinth of Solitude: Park and the Exercise of Presidential Power,” in Kim and Vogel, eds., p. 155. David Kang argues that no trend is visible, but based on his own table, I cannot agree; only two cabinet positions (Ministers of Agriculture and Home Affairs) had longer average tenures under Rhee than under Park. See Kang, Crony Capitalism, p. 67.
One might plausibly expect Park to have exploited regional rivalries in constructing his coercive apparatus. Regionalism (chiyokju'ui) is a long-standing and sensitive subject in Korea, whose origins extend back to the Three Kingdoms period (7th century). Regionally-based political factions have been a hallmark of Korean politics since the Choson dynasty, in which a regional education system called seowon was used to recruit faction members. A number of authors have noted Park’s tendency to preferentially allocate economic resources toward his home province of Kyongsang:

Bruce Cumings, for example, writes:

Park’s one great mistake (completely predictable, given his political coalition) was to festoon his home region with all these new industrial complexes and to shortchange the Chollas. Of the six new target industries, only one went to the southwest… the steel mills, auto plans, shipbuilding facilities, free-export zones, the capital to pay for them, the jobs they created, the new highways and sprouting cities they needed were all going with clockwork regularity to Korea’s southeast, home to Park and just about everyone associated with him…. [Towns] were transformed overnight because they were near Park’s birthplace (next to Kumi) or were hometowns of one of his close associates (Pohang).

Kyongsang elites dominated the interpenetrated business-government elite fostered by Park.

Byung-Kook Kim writes that Park’s time as the deputy director of the army headquarters’ intelligence bureau taught him three rules: “control the flow of information, divide and conquer, and use regionalist sentiments,” and that in economic policy Park preferred to recruit rising stars from

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138 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 326.

139 One-third of chaebol owners’ fathers-in-law were high-ranking government officials. Kang, Crony Capitalism.
the Kyongsang region “for an additional assurance of loyalty.”[140] Kyongsang was about a third of Korea’s population, but by 1989, individuals from Kyongsang region comprised twenty-three of the fifty biggest *chaebol* owners (46%), nine of twenty-four cabinet ministers (37%), and half of the central bank’s board; they openly credited their success to provincial origins.[141] The southwestern region of Cholla – Kyongsang’s historical rival and the ancestral home of Syngman Rhee – was systematically neglected, its economy underdeveloped.

No previous analysis has examined whether Park’s preference for Kyongsang affected appointments within the coercive apparatus. Several factors might push against regional favoritism, including Park’s reliance on members of the northwest faction to execute the 1961 coup and the idea that Park, not having belonged to the Kyongsang elite, would not actually have had access to elite regional networks.[142] The data that I gathered suggests that Park did have some preference for personnel from Kyongsang, though not necessarily to the degree evidenced in the economic realm. Figure 4.4 below shows the provincial origins of security officials under Park:

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142 Author’s interview with a Korean historian, Seoul, January 2012; Han, “The May 16th Coup,” p. 39.
Figure 4.4 Regional Makeup of the Coercive Apparatus under Park

In 1960, Kyongsang (including Busan) made up 35% of South Korea’s population, but 38% of internal security elites under Park. Chungcheong, the regional home of coup architect and KCIA creator Kim Jong Pil, is also slightly over-represented (16.7%, relative to 15.6% of population). Regional favoritism was more pronounced for individuals without a military background; all of the Chief Prosecutors responsible for prosecuting political crimes, for example, came from Kyongsang or Chungcheong. Table 4.2 summarizes regional representation in the coercive apparatus:

Table 4.2 Regional Representation in Coercive Institutions under Park

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population in 1960</th>
<th>Number of Internal Security Officials</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Internal Security Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>281,720</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cholla</td>
<td>5,948,498</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>2,444,883</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangwon</td>
<td>1,636,726</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeonggi</td>
<td>2,758,027</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungcheong</td>
<td>3,894,959</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongsang</td>
<td>8,029,304</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,994,117</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most striking is the exclusion of officials from Cholla, which when Park assumed office in 1961 comprised around a quarter of the Republic of Korea’s population (23.8% to Kyongsang’s 32.1%). Compared to 23 officials from Kyongsang who were involved in internal security decision-making, however, only one official from Cholla is known to have held an important position related to internal security in the eighteen years of Park’s tenure: Chang Il-hoon, who headed the National Police for a mere seven months from May 1975 to January 1976. North Korea was actually better represented than Cholla; four prominent individuals in the coercive apparatus came from provinces north of the DMZ. Table 4.3 shows that the coercive apparatus was less representative, regionally speaking, than the broader political elite under Park:

Table 4.3 Regional Origins of Officials in Government & Internal Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Percentage of RoK Population in 1960</th>
<th>Percentage of High Officials from Province</th>
<th>Percentage of Ministers from Province</th>
<th>Percentage of Internal Security Officials from Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cholla</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul/Gyeonggi</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangwon/Cheju</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungcheong</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongsang</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

143 These official statistics combine Seoul with Gyeonggi province, which surrounds the city. For reasons that escape me, they also combine Gangnam (a province in the northeastern part of the Republic of Korea), with Cheju (an island off the southwestern coast). These combinations explain the differences between Table 1 and Table 2. Statistics on ministers and high officials from [Joo Seung-man, "Reflection on and Resolution Of the Fundamental Cause of Regional-Based Voting," (Seoul: Yonsei University, 2003), p. 47.]
Importantly, the regional backgrounds of internal security elites narrowed over time. Consistent with the argument that Park’s perception of the dominant threat shifted from external to elite, there is a more pronounced bias toward Kyongsang in internal security in the 1970’s.

Park relied on a broader range of military ties and a more inclusive military network than is sometimes asserted. As in the Philippines, lateral networks among classes of KMA graduates are important. In 1969, for example, all five corps commanders (the position between Korea’s division and Field Army commanders) were members of Park’s class.\(^{144}\) Figure 4.5, below, shows the military education background of forty-one elites who rose to the top ranks of the coercive apparatus from 1961-1979.\(^{145}\)

![Diagram showing military education background of internal security elites under Park.](image)

**Figure 4.5: Military-Education Background of Internal Security Elites under Park**

This reveals both Park’s reliance on particular military classes to form his coalition, but also a heterogeneity somewhat at odds with existing accounts.\(^{146}\) Park forged close ties with members of the 5\(^{th}\) KMA class as a company commander at the Academy, and with members of the 8\(^{th}\) class while working in the intelligence division at army headquarters. By forming a bridge between them

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\(^{144}\) Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, p. 156.

\(^{145}\) I omit the Chief Prosecutors and post-1966 police chiefs, none of whom received a military education.

\(^{146}\) Kang also finds that Park selectively, rather than blindly, employed people from his military networks. Kang, *Crony Capitalism*. 
and the senior members of the Northwestern faction, Park “put himself at the center of the coalition” and became the glue that held it together.\textsuperscript{147} Park had been in command of a logistical headquarters in Busan during the initial stages of planning, and even later, in Seoul, he did not have many operational troops under his command. Because of this, he was forced to reach out to the lieutenant colonels and colonels of the 8\textsuperscript{th} KMA class, by then in command of combat battalions and regiments, to get operational control of the troops in and around Seoul that he would need to stage a successful coup. Over the course of his presidencies, these classes were well-represented in the internal security apparatus; the 5\textsuperscript{th} and 8\textsuperscript{th} KMA classes and 1\textsuperscript{st} MLA class (the class immediately prior to Park’s) together comprised over half of the internal security elites who held top-ranking positions under Park (17\%, 22\%, and 19.5\%, respectively). Kim Jong-pil’s famous 8\textsuperscript{th} KMA class, for example, produced twenty-four national assemblymen and sixteen ministerial-level officials, including two KCIA directors, the founding director of the Presidential Security Service, four of the seven heads of Capitol Garrison Command, and three heads of Army/Defense Security Command.\textsuperscript{148} There are also a few surprises, however. The KMA 3\textsuperscript{rd} class achieves more prominence than historical accounts would have suggested (15\%), and not a single member of the KMA 9\textsuperscript{th} class achieved one of the top-ranking positions included here, somewhat surprising if the claim of current scholarship is correct that this class was part of the core group joining the KMA 8\textsuperscript{th} to execute the May 1961 coup.\textsuperscript{149}

Park’s external orientation is reflected not only in this relatively inclusive coalition, but also in the fact that he attempted to minimize intra-military division and competition, focusing instead on

\textsuperscript{147} Han, “The May 16\textsuperscript{th} Coup,” pp. 40, 44.

\textsuperscript{148} Data taken from the author’s dataset on security elites, drawn from JoongAng Ilbo database.

\textsuperscript{149} Asserted in Han, “The May 16\textsuperscript{th} Coup,” p. 48.
coordination and external effectiveness. He found ways to protect himself from collusion of the same type that had vaulted him into office without compromising the ROK’s combat preparedness. In contrast to Marcos, Park deliberately tried to smooth over the difference between officers produced at the Korean Military Academy, by ROTC, and by Officer Candidate School programs.  

He de-emphasized the differences between these groups of officers, and spread KMA graduates across a wide range of posts to mix them with the other groups and prevent them from acting as a cohesive bloc. As a result, American observers such as Ambassador Samuel Berger praised Park for his efforts to combat factionalism. Park’s active cultivation of networks across the different classes, and the fact that prominent positions were fairly broadly distributed across classes, also ensured that no class or group of classes would have reason to unify against him.

At the same time that Park made the military an internally cohesive unit bound by regional and military ties centered on him, he prevented the military from developing ties to social groups, business interests, or rival politicians who could support a future coup. Joo-Hong Kim characterizes his strategy as one of “isolation and monopolization.” Park made clear that close collaboration between military officials and national assemblymen could derail an officer’s career. Until they retired, active-duty officers focused on their professional responsibilities rather than getting involved in civil administration or business -- and once retired, they kept their distance from those on active duty.

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150 This system is similar to the American one, in which an individual may become a military officer through three processes: 1) attending a service academy; 2) participating in ROTC at a civilian university; or 3) graduating from a civilian university and successfully applying to and completing Officer Candidate School.

151 Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, p. 160.


153 Kim, “The Armed Forces.”

duty. In May 1965, for example, when Park named the Northwestern faction’s retired general Chong Il-kwon to be prime minister, he issued a stern warning: “Do not socialize with generals who command key military units, nor with chaebol leaders… Be wary when people of the northern regions approach you, lest others perceive you as building a personal power base.” When Prime Minister Chong recommended a particular army general for promotion, Park retired the general instead. Keeping officers away from domestic politics kept the military focused on its primary task, external defense, and prevented younger officers from developing ties to Park’s political opponents.

Many autocratic leaders rely on appointment, monitoring, and promotion practices that compromise the military’s external effectiveness. Park, unusually, found ways of considering political factors that did not compromise the military’s combat effectiveness. First, he created a two-track system that allowed him to promote commanders with responsibility for external defense on the basis of professional merit, and commanders in the most politically sensitive internal positions on a basis that laid relatively more emphasis on loyalty. Jinsun Jun explains:

He divided military positions into two levels: one consisted of command structure positions, including the army chief of staff and the joint chief of staff; the other consisted of intelligence/security positions such as commander of the Defense Security Command and commander of the Capital Defense Command. He then had the defense security commander report directly to him rather than to the minister of defense or the army chief of staff. Park used this dual structure to ensure a system of checks and balances…. Park politicized the military security apparatus in depoliticizing the military.

Joo-hong Kim similarly argues that Park used a two-track system, placing politically loyal “praetorian guards” in strategic military intelligence units and promoting professional soldiers through the field

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155 Prime Minister Chong had also served as Rhee’s army chief of staff. Quoted in Kim, “Labyrinth of Solitude,” p. 152.

156 Incident recounted in Oh, Study of the Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime, p. 123.

army, with little overlap between the two career paths. This comparatively unusual two-track system was designed to protect Park internally while still allowing the majority of the ROK military to stay focused on its primary external security mission.

Second, Park paid special attention to the activities of military and internal security elites. A former intelligence official himself, he monitored loyalty through the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (renamed the Army Security Command in 1968), whose director reported to Park in writing on a daily basis. He directed his security and intelligence agencies to specifically track relationships between retired and active officers, to detect and prevent coalescence of an opposition bloc. Unlike Rhee, who had used a “fire alarm” strategy of controlling his agents (waiting to react until a problem arose), Park used a “police patrol” strategy of routine and proactive information-gathering, holding monthly meetings and visiting various sites and units to dispense “on the spot guidance.” When he died, officials found that his private safe was full of meticulous, handwritten notes on various individuals, organized and indexed according to Park’s own particular scheme.

Monitoring was accompanied by incentives that Park controlled and used to minimize collusion. Promotions in the combat track were merit-based, but Park “personally awarded every pip.” And though he maintained strict separation between active-duty military officers and civilian politicians, those same military officers could count on doing well in both business and politics after

159 Oh, Study of the Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime, p. 121.
160 Jun, “South Korea,” p. 128.
162 Interview with Park’s former chief of staff Kim Chung Yum, recounted in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 35, see also p. 32.
their retirement, occupying prominent positions in state enterprises, ambassdorial posts, and the cabinet. Whereas retired officers had been 7% of the cabinet in the First Republic (under Rhee) and 3% in the Second (under Chang Myon), under Park they averaged 28%; they also made up 16% of the National Assembly.\footnote{Note that these percentages declined somewhat over time, and that military governance accelerated during the Yushin period (1972-79), when “Yushin cadres” from the military went into civil service in strategic posts throughout the bureaucracy – similar to the system that Kim Jong-Pil used in the 1960’s to position officers of the KCIA (see below). Jun, “South Korea,” pp. 128-29.} Though Park himself lived a spartan lifestyle, he offered the promise of business success in the future to military officers as a reward in exchange for loyal and effective service in the present.

*Structure and the Creation of the KCIA*

The central change made by Park Chung Hee to the structure of the internal security apparatus was the establishment of a new organization with coordinating authority across the internal security apparatus: the Korean CIA (KCIA, Chungang Chongbobu, though the English abbreviation is used most commonly even in Korean texts).

The creation of the KCIA stemmed from two factors: a desire to take power away from the KNP, and the desire to prevent a counter-coup. When Syngman Rhee fell from power in 1960, much of the public’s anger was directed at the Korean National Police; some 65% of Seoul National University students who participated in the events of April 1960 said that they did so because of “anger at the outrageous police.”\footnote{Henderson, *Korea*, p. 430, esp. fn. 81 and 84.} The creation of the KCIA was largely an effort to reduce the power of an organization strongly associated with Syngman Rhee and generally abhorred. It was also, however, to prevent a counter-coup against the junta. Se-jin Kim remarked, “A clique that has seized power must guard itself against those who might seek to emulate its successful actions.”\footnote{Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, p. 111.}

\footnote{Note that these percentages declined somewhat over time, and that military governance accelerated during the Yushin period (1972-79), when “Yushin cadres” from the military went into civil service in strategic posts throughout the bureaucracy – similar to the system that Kim Jong-Pil used in the 1960’s to position officers of the KCIA (see below). Jun, “South Korea,” pp. 128-29.}
When Park came to power, his potential opposition was scattered, and the KCIA, ordered into existence by Decree No. 619 on 19 June 1961, was inaugurated to see to it “that the scattered particles nowhere cohered.” Though modeled in name on the American CIA, the merging of domestic and external surveillance and operations in the KCIA made it closer in substance to that of the Soviet KGB. The KCIA was divided into three major wings, which written scholarship characterizes as management, security, and intelligence, but which former KCIA officials explained in interviews as having more to do with the focus of each branch’s work: one branch handled all foreign intelligence and operations, one handled domestic intelligence and operations, and the third handled North Korea (which didn’t fall neatly into either the domestic or foreign category).

The key official behind the creation of the KCIA was thirty-five-year-old retired Lt. Col. Kim Jong-Pil, Park’s protégé and nephew by marriage. He was a graduate of the 8th class of the KMA in 1949, and, along with Park and Kim Dong-ha, one of the principal planners of the 5.16 coup. To staff the KCIA, Kim Jong-Pil recruited a 3,000-person elite corps, drawn in part from members of the existing Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (the precursor to the Army/Defense Security Command). He hand-picked the director, deputy director, and heads of the agency’s six

167 Henderson, Korea, p. 185.
168 FOIA request filed on American assistance to KCIA under the Internal Security Assistance Program run by the Kennedy Administration and OPS; Jeremy Kuzmarov, Modernizing Repression: Police Training and the Violence of Empire (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012).
169 Jun, “South Korea,” p. 137.
170 Jun, “South Korea,” p. 138. According to Jun, the intelligence wing gathered intelligence on North Korea and the security branch was tasked with counter-espionage. It is unclear where the rest of the world falls in the division Jun proposes.
171 Author’s interviews with three former KCIA officials, Seoul, March 2011.
bureaus and six divisions, filling these positions with members of his clique. An organizational architect of the highest degree, Kim Jong-Pil also organized the Democratic Republican Party (민주공화당), a government party formed during the 1961-63 period that won a legislative majority in the November 1963 elections, and was thought to have been funded by the KCIA. (There is some indication that Kim Jong-Pil attempted to model the DRP on the Kuomintang in Taiwan, albeit with mixed success.) Kim would also serve as the Republic of Korea’s prime minister under Park from 1971-75, and again from 1998 to 2002.

The process by which the KCIA established dominance over the internal security apparatus was remarkably similar to that of Taiwan in terms of both process and effects: a short-term increase in violence, and a post-consolidation decrease in fragmentation, competition, and violence. Among the KCIA’s first tasks was a loyalty review of all major political and government figures, wherein the KCIA reported that 1,863 of the 41,000 people screened were found to have committed some offense. The KCIA also claimed to have uncovered at least thirteen “anti-revolutionary” cases between June 1961 and May 1963. As in Taiwan, two of the most notable early cases eliminated potential rivals to Park and to Kim Jong-Pil; State Department officials noted that during the 1961-63 period, “the main danger courted was internal factional struggle for a control too tightly exercised by the KCIA.” The first casualty of this struggle was Lt. Gen. Chang Do-young (To-yong), the original chairman of the SCNR, who with 45 “co-conspirators” was implicated in an alleged plot to assassinate Park, and arrested on July 3, 1961. The second case was that of Maj. Gen. Kim Dong-


173 Henderson, Korea, p. 185.

174 Henderson hypothesizes that members of the 5th KMA class who had participated in the coup became nervous about the ascendance of Kim Jong-Pil’s 8th KMA class in post-coup Korea and approached Chang to convey their concerns; Chang paid a steep price for listening. Kim, Politics of Military Revolution, p. x; Henderson, Korea, p. 267.
ha, who had helped plan the 5.16 events with Park Chung Hee and Kim Jong-Pil. Maj. Gen. Kim’s attempt to remove Kim Jong-Pil from leadership of the Democratic Republican Party culminated in the court-martial of Kim Dong-ha and Kim Jong-Pil’s resignation to take a multi-month trip overseas.

With his potential rivals sidelined and only six of the original 32 members of the SCNR remaining, Park’s authority was unchallenged by any remaining elites. The KCIA settled into a supervisory role, unifying and streamlining internal security operations under its aegis. Article 1 of the KCIA’s founding decree (Law No. 619), drafted by members of the KMA 8th class, spelled out its purpose and intended authority:

The [Korean] Central Intelligence Agency was created directly under the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction in order to supervise and coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, including that of the military.

Article 3 gave the KCIA the right to set up domestic branches, and article 7 authorized it to receive “support and assistance from all state institutions when necessary for work,” including hiding the KCIA budget in that of other agencies’ for reasons of national security, a measure that allowed it to evade National Assembly supervision. A regulation enacted in December 1963 confirmed the KCIA’s powers of control and coordination. In the mid- and late 1960’s, the KCIA assumed what later histories referred to as “coordinating power” or “coordinating authority” over the internal security apparatus, unifying intelligence and anti-dissident investigations and operations under a

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177 Kim, “Labyrinth of Solitude,” pp. 143-44.
single authority.\textsuperscript{178} Henderson identifies the KCIA’s role as a blend of the rule-by-council tradition that characterized traditional Korea and Communist organizational methods, which he refers to as “tyranny by council”; he writes that the KCIA “and its relationship to President Park [were] closer to Yi council in its relationship to the king than either the assembly or the liberal party were.”\textsuperscript{179} Noting the familiarity of KCIA officials with North Korean communist organization, he adds that, like Ngo Dhin Nhu in Vietnam, the KCIA appears to have been “influenced by Communist techniques while retaining anti-Communist motivations.”\textsuperscript{180} (In this, the Korean peninsula may bear some resemblance to the “interactive borrowing” between Nationalists and Communists in China, though the process is much less well documented.\textsuperscript{181})

The “coordinating power” of the KCIA meant that, in practice, it had the authority to show up at a local police station and demand to see someone’s records,\textsuperscript{182} or to issue commands to the other police and intelligence agencies.\textsuperscript{183} The KCIA also directed the activities of the Prosecutor’s Office, which under Korean law manages police investigations and whose approval is required for warrants related to arrest and search/seizure.\textsuperscript{184} By law, any agency that initiated an investigation had

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\item \textsuperscript{178} National Intelligence Service, \textit{Communication with the Past}, pp. 245-252, 431-436, 662-665.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Henderson, \textit{Korea}, p. 265.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Henderson, \textit{Korea}, p. 447, fn. 35.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Author’s interviews with a police officer who served prior to democratization, Seoul, March 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Author’s interview with a writer of the official history of the National Intelligence Service, who was allowed to view but not cite KCIA files to this effect, Seoul, March 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{184} To this day, Korean police express that additional independence from the prosecutor during investigations would protect them from political pressure, and further the professional performance and reputation of the police; in 2012, they won partial authority to conduct investigations, but the issue is unresolved. Author’s interviews with Korean police officials, Seoul, Korea, January 2012.; Kim “Effective System of Criminal
\end{itemize}
to notify the director of the KCIA of its action, and the prosecutor had to notify the KCIA of which charges he had decided to press and of each sentence handed down. In one notable case in 1981, prosecutor Koo Sang-jin attempted to suspend the arraignment of two Yonsei University students that the KCIA wanted to charge with treason; the KCIA overruled him and the prosecutor resigned. The KCIA’s authority over other security agencies gave it de facto legal immunity; according to Christian activist and law graduate Shin In-ryong, the KCIA agents who tortured her told her, “The KCIA is the top policy-making body of the government. We are not regulated by any law. We can kill any traitor like you… We can set free any individual.” In short, the rise of the KCIA reduced fragmentation among the security agencies in South Korea, in favor of a single powerful bureaucracy.

Though the assertion of being ungoverned by law was only partly correct – the KCIA was established by law, but governed by presidential statute and executive order – this passage does accurately convey the place that the KCIA occupied relative to other government agencies. (It was, however, not always the case that the KCIA agents themselves engaged in arrest and torture; rather than get their hands dirty, they could order police inspectors to do it for them.) The official history of the National Intelligence Service (NIS, the organizational descendant of the KCIA) explicitly


185 National Intelligence Service, Communication with the Past, pp. 431, 434.

186 National Intelligence Service, Communication with the Past, pp. 435.


188 Author’s interviews with individuals arrested and tortured by RoK officials during the democratization movement, Seoul, Korea, March 2011. See also Kim Rahn, “Call Mounting to Deprive Ex-Torturer of Pastorship,” Korea Times, 12 January 2012.
notes that the KCIA possessed this authority “to enhance efficiency in security investigations by decreasing the waste of effort from engaging in unnecessary competition or executing redundant tasks.”

By the start of the Yushin period in 1972, some interpersonal power struggles within the KCIA remained, but for all intents and purposes it was “a smooth-functioning agency, with swift communications up and down its lines, and sideways with the National Police, the Army Security Command, district and local governmental offices, and many other agencies.”

The KCIA achieved a high level of social penetration. By 1964, it had 370,000 employees: one for every 54 of Korea’s twenty million citizens. The KCIA sent informants to campuses and to monitor dissidents overseas; it had a presence in other government agencies and branch offices in each province and major city. One college professor claimed that he had to report to seven different intelligence agencies every week, several of which were in the KCIA (in addition to reporting to district police, government offices, and military intelligence). A source of career mobility for thousands of ambitious officers and politically minded citizens, the KCIA also sponsored entrants into every other ministry, allowing it to monitor and influence politics in those agencies. Korean citizens generally speak of the KCIA as omnipresent under Park; one resident wrote, “The impression that Park’s domain was infested with his intelligence agents permeated every nook and cranny of society.” Another writes, “Its agents penetrated virtually every segment of society, from

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189 National Intelligence Service, Communication with the Past, p. 433.
190 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 365.
192 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 366.
193 In 1962, for example, there were 25 in the Foreign Ministry. Henderson, Korea, p. 434, fn. 115.
students and churches to labor and the military.”¹⁹⁵ The regime also pursued broader attempts at popular mobilization and co-optation through civil society groups like the Student Corps for Defense of the State and the New Village Movement (Saemaul Undong) in rural areas.¹⁹⁶

Finally, KCIA personnel had primary responsibility for enforcing the regime’s informational control and censorship policies, a task that allowed them to collect information even as they prevented its public dissemination. (Besides the KCIA, other agencies with authority to censor media included Blue House (Cheongwadae, the Korean White House); the Ministry of Culture and Information; the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the headquarters of the Korean Army and Navy.) KCIA members regularly showed up at media offices to “discuss” certain cases and to advise papers on whether and how politically sensitive developments should be reported. One media office (TBC, previously Tongyang Bangsong) recorded a list of all visits and media censorship requests for a period of four years and six months during Yushin, from May 1975 to November 1979. Though reporting guidelines were often delivered by phone (sometimes 3-4 times a day), the documentation also highlights the frequent in-person appearances of KCIA official Park Kwangsu – often referred to as “Park Namsan,” a nickname based on the mountain in the center of Seoul where the KCIA’s infamous interrogation facility was located. Sometimes entire articles were embargoed, and at other times, more specific guidelines were issued on the depth and length of coverage desired. Among the topics censored were controversies over Park’s Emergency Measure No. 9, accidents involving military vehicles, armed deserters from the military, the issue of Koreans


who remained in Vietnam after the end of the Vietnam War, and statements made by opposition
politician Kim Dae Jung.\textsuperscript{197}

\textit{Renewed Elite Threat: Fragmentation Re-Emerges}

Like Marcos, Park became more worried about elite threats as an autocrat than he had been as a democratically elected leader, and like Marcos, his coercive apparatus reflected that shift in thinking, characterized after Yushin by increasing fragmentation. Two rival organizations, the Army Security Command (ASC) and the Presidential Security Service (PSS) – weakened the KCIA’s monopoly, and inter-agency competition re-emerged. Factional competition also developed between Kim Jong Pil and the KMA 8\textsuperscript{th} class on the one hand, and Hanahoe (“unity”) on the other – a group established by Chun Doo-hwan and other members of the 11\textsuperscript{th} KMA class from Kyongsang region to act as a counterweight to Kim Jong Pil.\textsuperscript{198}

The early 1970’s saw a rivalry between Kang Chang-song’s ASC and members of the Hanahoe faction in the Capital Garrison Command (CGC) led by Commander Yun Pil-yong. In 1968, Park had transformed the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) into the Army Security Command (ASC), headed first by Kim Jae-kyu (the man who would go on to head the KCIA and assassinate Park), and then by Kang Chang-song.\textsuperscript{199} In early 1973, KCIA Director Lee Hu-rak – best known to Americans for brokering the 1972 agreement between North and South Korea, and for the KCIA’s

\textsuperscript{197} Kim Jin-a, “Kim Dae Jung, 8-15 Declaration HOLD <Namsan Park>” \textit{Issue Reporting: Don't trust the journalism in this country - Reporting Guidelines under Yushin Regime} (Media Oneul, 1996), pp. 101-104.

\textsuperscript{198} As in 1961 coup, this was a split between senior military officers and junior ones. After his disgrace in 1969, Kim Jong Pil had been kicked upstairs to the office of the prime minister.

\textsuperscript{199} Jun, “South Korea,” p. 136.
1973 kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung\textsuperscript{200} – discovered a coup plot by CGC’s Yun Pil-yong and Hanahoe members, and appointed the ASC’s Kang Chang-song to investigate.\textsuperscript{201} Yun and nine other Kyongsang-origin Hanahoe members were sentenced for corruption, while he and three other generals received maximum sentences of fifteen years in prison. Two hundred other officers were forced to resign in a related investigation.\textsuperscript{202} It was widely believed, though never confirmed, that the investigation was approved by Park because he felt threatened by Yun.\textsuperscript{203}

The Army Security Command continued to gain power throughout the 1970’s at the expense of the KCIA. After the advent of Yushin, the KCIA lost the authority to monitor the military, which was transferred to the ASC,\textsuperscript{204} and military men serving in the KCIA were forced to either retire or go back to active duty. In 1977, Park further strengthened the ASC by merging the various services’ CIC units into it, creating a new National Defense Security Command (NDSC, or DSC, \textit{kukkun poan saryongbu}), whose head reported directly to him rather than to the minister of defense or the chief of staff of the army.\textsuperscript{205} In March 1979, Hanahoe founder Chun Doo-Hwan was appointed the head of DSC. By then, Hanahoe members dominated many of the “political” military units located inside or near Seoul – units like the CGC, ASC, PSS, KCIA, and Airborne Command, which “lay outside the US-dominated CFC command structure and hence were available for Park’s mobilization without consultation with the United States.”\textsuperscript{206} Park also began to use the KCIA as a public scapegoat for


\textsuperscript{201} Sukjo Kim, “The Politics of Transition,” p. 6.


\textsuperscript{203} Jun, “South Korea,” p. 507.

\textsuperscript{204} Jun, “South Korea,” p. 138.

\textsuperscript{205} Jun, “South Korea,” p. 136.

regime excesses: directors Kim Jong-Pil, Kim Hyong-uk, and Lee Hu-rak all received the lion’s share of opposition and public blame and discontent.\textsuperscript{207}

In addition to ASC/DSC competition with CGC and the KCIA, the KCIA also had an organizational rivalry with the increasingly powerful Presidential Security Service (PSS).\textsuperscript{208} Increasingly concerned about the power of the KCIA as well as about its competence – especially following the 1968 Blue House raid and the 1974 assassination of Park’s wife – Park allowed the PSS to aggrandize more and more power. This rivalry began in the early 1970’s, when Lee Hu-rak was head of the KCIA and the PSS was run by Park Chong-Kyu,\textsuperscript{209} and became acute during the period after that, in which the PSS was headed by Park’s former bodyguard, non-KMA retired army lieutenant colonel Cha Ji-chol,\textsuperscript{210} who historian Bruce Cumings describes as “a short squat man without a visible neck, known for his ability to kill a man with his bare hands.”\textsuperscript{211} Cha’s role in presidential security, and his effect on the coercive apparatus, seem to have been similar to that of Ver in the Philippines: powerful, antagonistic, and ultimately disruptive.

During the 1970’s, Cha created new offices within the PSS and recruited elite KMA graduates to fill them, bringing in Hanahoe members to serve in key positions to cultivate their trust.

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\textsuperscript{207} Kim, “Labyrinth of Solitude,” p. 144.
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\textsuperscript{208} The Presidential Security Service began as the Presidential Security Police (Kyongmudae Kyongchal) in 1949, and was renamed the Blue House Presidential Police upon Park’s accession in 1961. In 1963, it legally became the Presidential Security Service (대통령경호실, or daetongryung kyonghosil). See the history posted on the PSS website, http://www.pss.go.kr/pssEng/introduce/historyOfPSS.jsp, as well as the history of their activities which provides information on each Republic, online at the same website, http://www.pss.go.kr/pssEng/majorActivities/historyOfActivities.jsp
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\textsuperscript{209} Lee Hu-rak was removed from the KCIA for his role in the Yun Pil-yong scandal in 1973; Park Chong-kyu left office after the assassination of the First Lady Yuk Yong-su in 1974. Kim Sukjo, “Politics of Transition,” p. 7.
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\textsuperscript{210} One interviewee mentioned that the “multiple chairs” in terms of KCIA directorship were symptoms of this rivalry. However, the KCIA only had three directors in the 1970’s, compared to five in the 1960’s, so this hypothesis awaits further investigation into the removal of the first two directors.
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\textsuperscript{211} Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 374.
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He expanded important Presidential Security Guard Units, and appropriated equipment and troops from other military units to increase the firepower under direct PSS authority. He also obtained a presidential decree that gave the PSS command over Capitol Garrison Command in the case of an emergency. Finally, he began to distribute bonuses in Park’s name to win favors inside the military, and started to interfere with the army’s promotion of officers and personnel policies. These activities created intense friction between PSS head Cha Ji-chol and KCIA director Kim Chae-gyu.

On October 26, 1979, Kim Chae-gyu assassinated Park and Cha over dinner at a KCIA facility on the Blue House grounds. A post-assassination investigation did not resolve whether Kim’s actions were pre-meditated, or whether he acted as part of a larger conspiracy. The shooting followed the “YH incident” of August 1979 and a disagreement over how to handle the protests that followed in Busan and Masan (the “Pu-Ma struggle”). Reportedly Cha Ji-chol, who came from Seoul, favored a hardline response; Park was reportedly leaning toward violent suppression as well. Kim, who (like Park) came from the Kyongsang region where the protests were occurring, opposed a crackdown and favored a more moderate response. Reportedly, when it became clear that Park was inclined toward Cha’s hardline stance, Kim exclaimed, “How can you do politics with a worm like that by your side?” and shot both men. Internal competition and violence, which had led to attacks on and the fall of so many key members of the security apparatus already, escalated at the end to include Park himself – as well as Kim Chae-gyu, who was hanged in May 1980 with four other conspirators.215


214 Brazinsky, Nation-Building in South Korea, p. 232.

215 A sixth was executed by firing squad in March 1980.
Park’s perceived need to address the external threat from North Korea resulted in a coercive apparatus that was initially unfragmented and broadly representative of Korean society, which is one reason why violence in Korea under Park never approached the level observed in the KMT’s early years on Taiwan or the later years of the Marcos dictatorship. The smaller fluctuations in violence that do occur, however, correlate with the rising level of fragmentation and competition observed in Park’s coercive apparatus, as well as its increasing exclusivity. Violence is high from 1961-63 when fragmentation and rotation practices from the past regime have not been abolished, when former Japanese officials are being removed, and when the KCIA is being established. After the KCIA establishes its coordinating authority, violence is low until around the declaration of Yushin. After Yushin, competition between factions and rivalry between the KCIA and PSS becomes more acute, Park’s coercive apparatus becomes (slowly) less inclusive, and violence rises over time.

IV. Coercive Institutions and State Violence under Chun Doo Hwan

Chun Doo Hwan, who assumed power as the head of Defense Security Command, gave that organization the same coordinating authority that had previously been given to the KCIA. This, combined with the fact that DSC was a military organization and strongly influenced by the U.S., meant that the coercive apparatus under Chun was relatively unfragmented. Its social composition and degree of exclusivity, however, were more complicated. The top levels of Chun’s coercive apparatus were heavily drawn from Kyongsang, even more than Park’s elites were. At the ground level, however, Chun responded to high levels of popular protest during his ascent to power – including the May 1980 Kwangju incident – by creating riot police units that were staffed by conscripts randomly assigned from the pool of people summoned for compulsory military service. This may explain why, under Chun, Cholla was no longer singled out for regional violence, and why overall levels of repression were lower than they had been under Park. Combined with a highly
visible style of repression, the inclusivity and representativeness of his riot police may explain why his coercive apparatus eventually balked at engaging in further repression, and advocated for democracy. Consistent with my larger argument, South Korea under Chun shows that high external and popular threats contribute to a less fragmented and more inclusive coercive apparatus, and that that apparatus will be less willing to engage in repression against its own people.

Political Developments in Korea in the 1980s

Immediately after Park’s death in October 1979, Choi Kyu-ha became the acting president, and Army Chief of Staff General Chong Seung-hwa assumed the post of the martial law commander. Choi began a cautious liberalization, pledging support for democracy and releasing activists who had been in detention. Meanwhile, Chong appointed the head of Defense Security Command, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, to lead the investigation into Park’s murder. Chun, a long-time supporter of Park, had led a demonstration in favor of Park during the 1961 coup, and had been a favored acolyte ever since, rising through positions at the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, KCIA, the office of the Army Chief of Staff, and the deputy directorship of the PSS. In 1968, as head of Capital Security Command, he had led the effort to apprehend the North Korean commandos who launched a raid against Blue House.216

On December 12 (12.12), General Chun and his allies launched a “multistage military coup.”217 Chun was assisted by thirty six other officers, among them General Roh Tae Woo: a classmate of Chun’s from the 1955 11th KMA class and commander of the Ninth Division, which

216 Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 121.

Roh pulled off its assigned post at the DMZ to assist Chun in the coup. Their first move was against General Chong, who had been rumored to be thinking about removing or reassigning Chun (and several other generals) and sending him to the backwater East Coast Security Command. Under the pretext of the assassination investigation, Chun arrested General Chong and (falsely) accused him of conspiring with Kim Jae-kyu to assassinate Park – a move that meant that Chun assumed power over the military chain of command. At this point, U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen Jr. cabled to Washington, “We have been through a coup in all but name. The flabby façade of civilian government remains but almost all signs point to a carefully planned takeover of the military power positions.”

Two days after the coup, on December 14th, Chun reshuffled the security apparatus to place his classmates and friends in important posts; Roh Tae Woo, for example, became the head of Capital Security Command. In late April, Chun was promoted to Lieutenant General, and assumed leadership of the KCIA while staying at the helm of Defense Security Command, thereby consolidating control of the military and civilian intelligence and security apparatus in the hands of a single person.

On May 17, President Choi declared martial law, placing Chun in effective command of the country. Chun dissolved the National Assembly, banned political activities including labor strikes, closed the universities, and arrested thousands of opposition leaders and activists. Among those arrested were the “three Kims”: Kim Jong-Pil, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung. He also

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218 Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 118.

219 Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 117.

220 Chong was convicted, stripped of his rank, and sent to prison; his conviction was reversed in 1997. Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, p. 29.

221 See Gleysteen, *Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence.*

222 Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 121.

appointed himself the head of a new committee on national security measures. When these measures failed to calm – and actually inflamed resistance in the city of Kwangju in Cholla province – Chun ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations in a violent crackdown that many have called “Korea’s Tiananmen.” In August 1980, Chun promoted himself to four-star general, and resigned his military commission to run for the presidency. The government also launched a media purification campaign and passed a Basic Media Act that closed periodicals, fired journalists, and forced integration within the media industry; in a parallel to media requirements north of the border, newspapers were required to feature Chun’s photo every day. A similar purification campaign cleaned out labor unions and forced them under government control. Chun was elected President on August 27th, using the indirect electoral college system (the National Conference for Unification) constructed by Park. After amending the constitution to maintain Yushin but set a seven-year single-term limit, Chun won the presidency again (and again, indirectly) in February 1981.

Protests intensified in spring 1987, as social movement organizations began to cooperate with each other, and the minjung (common people or masses) movement – a blend of “Marxism, nationalism, Catholic liberation theology, anti-economic dependency, and a peace movement – gained force. The middle class increasingly supported students, workers, and churches in their demonstrations, coalescing the movement into what Sunhyuk Kim refers to as a “grand democratic alliance.” The United States, having been burned by Kwangju, pressed Chun not to repress the

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224 Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 380.

225 Shin et al, South Korea’s Democracy Movement, pp. 44, 31.


227 Sunhyuk Kim, “Civil Society in South Korea: from Grand Democracy Movements to Petty Interests Groups?,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 90-93; Sunhyuk Kim, Politics of
growing protests. In June 1987, with the regime under pressure from protestors and abroad, with Chun nearing the end of his seven-year term, and with the 1988 Seoul Olympics in sight, his successor-designate Roh Tae Woo announced that the country would hold open democratic elections in 1988.

Chun also seemed to believe that leaving power voluntarily would prolong his life. Having set himself a single, seven-year term, he appeared less worried about the threat of a coup or elite plotting than the problem of dealing with popular resentment and a potential assassin’s bullet. He volunteered to Reagan that the demise of Rhee and Park had convinced the people “that a change of presidents is possible only through violence… a very dangerous way of thinking” and quizzed the United States Secret Service on their arrangements for protecting ex-presidents. (Having assigned the PSS that responsibility in 1981, in 1988 he became the first former president to receive PSS protection.) Thanks to a split between the two opposition candidates Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, Roh won the heavily regionalized election, and South Korea moved toward democracy.

Historical scholarship has expended much less ink on examining Chun’s regime than Park’s. While Park remains Korea’s most admired president despite his authoritarian legacy, Chun is – with the exception of a small group of devotees – held in contempt for both his dictatorship and his corruption. Despite the fact that he eventually relaxed some social and cultural policies, such as

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James Cotton, ed., Korea Under Roh Tae-Woo (Canberra: Australia National University, 1993); Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. x; Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun, p. 388; John Wickham, Korea on the Brink: a memoir of political intrigue and military crisis (Washington: Brassey’s, 2000).

Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 163; history of the PSS online at http://www.pss.go.kr/pssEng/introduce/historyOfPSS.jsp

Both Kims would go on to occupy the Blue House after Roh. Heo and Roehrig, pp. 40-41.

In 1988, Chun apologized and agreed to return nearly $17 million in various assets. That did not satisfy Korean society; in 1995, he was put on trial for charges of treason, repression, bribery, and corruption, and in
the curfew, in a “decompression phase” (yubwa kungmyon) after 1984, his rule is generally perceived to have been more heavy-handed.\footnote{Heo and Roehrig, p. 35; Shin et al., \textit{South Korea’s Democracy Movement}, p. 56.} By then, Park’s ideology of total security (chongryok anbo) had been discredited by its misuse to justify domestic crackdowns, and by a drop in provocations from the North. Chun tried, unsuccessfully, to use the threat of North Korea’s increasingly forward-deployed troops to bolster his claim that military rule was necessary.\footnote{Jun, “South Korea,” p. 133. For an examination of the shift of KPA troops, who have moved more and more toward forward-deployment along the DMZ since 1981 (40% in 1981 to 70% today), see Robert M. Collins, “North Korea’s Strategy of Compellence, Provocations, and the Northern Limit Line,” in Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., ed., \textit{Confronting the Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula} (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2011), p. 19; Andrew Scobell and John Sanford, \textit{North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles} (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007), p. 66.} From the beginning, he lacked the economic or popular legitimacy that had characterized Park Chung Hee’s time in office; people who objected to Yushin but refrained from criticizing President Park personally did not shy away from criticizing Chun.\footnote{Shin et al., \textit{South Korea’s Democracy Movement}, p. 54.}

\textit{Structure: Defense Security Command and Military Dominance}

Under Chun, Defense Security Command (kukkun poan saryongbu) rather than the KCIA became the coordinating organization for internal security in South Korea. After the KCIA Director assassinated Park Chung Hee, Chun removed the KCIA’s coordinating authority over other internal security agencies. He personally assumed leadership of the KCIA while retaining his role as head of the DSC, uniting civilian and military intelligence and security agencies that had previously been at loggerheads. Through presidential orders and in legislation, he redefined and limited its role to

\footnotetext[232]{1996 the court not only ordered him to pay a total of $283 million, but sentenced him to death – a sentence later commuted to life imprisonment by the Court and pardoned by Kim Dae Jung. Heo and Roehrig, p. 46; Terence Roehrig, \textit{The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea} (Jefferson: McFarland, 2002), especially ch. 6-7.}
collecting and processing intelligence. He also renamed it the Agency for National Security Planning (*Kukka Anjon Kibokku*).²³⁵

The military dominated top positions across the coercive apparatus. Except for the Chief Prosecutors and Directors of the Korean National Police, every individual who held an internal security leadership position under Chun had attended a military academy; all but two had attended the KMA.²³⁶ Figure 4.6 shows the military-educational backgrounds of Chun’s internal security elites:

![Figure 4.6 Military-Educational Background of Internal Security Elites under Chun]

Three main trends emerge from these statistics. First, Chun’s regime drew its internal security elites almost exclusively from the KMA, whose graduates occupied almost every leadership position for every year that Chun was in power. Second, Chun relied on a wide range of KMA class backgrounds, even broader than Park’s. Though his classmates were instrumental in the 12.12 coup, the conventional wisdom that the coup brought the KMA’s 11th class to power seems unwarranted; they did not dominate post-coup leadership, even as much as the 5th and 8th classes did under Park.

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²³⁵ Shin et al, *South Korea’s Democracy Movement*, p. 94.

²³⁶ The chief prosecutors had legal degrees, and the police chiefs generally came from the Korea National Police Academy.

²³⁷ Author’s dataset on internal security elites.
Third, there is strikingly little overlap between these elites under Park and Chun. Chun Doo Hwan was Park’s trusted protege, but they relied on different military coalitions, in part for generational reasons. Two of the three members of the KMA 5th and 8th classes included in Chun’s regime were replaced after December 1979, and all were gone by 1981. Even before he became head of the KCIA in April 1980, Chun purged and reshuffled numerous personnel, particularly those he thought might have been loyal to fallen General Chung. A major financial scandal in May 1982 completed the housecleaning; Chun replaced half of his 22-person cabinet and five officials from the Democratic Justice Party that month, and a twelfth cabinet official — Yoo Hak Sung, head of the (formerly KCIA) Agency for National Security Planning and an appointee of President Choi — was replaced the following month.

In the realm of public politics and the legislative domain, however, Chun relied less on the military than did Park. Retired military officers comprised 16% of National Assemblymen under Park, but under Chun that percentage dropped to 9%. Cabinet positions given to former military personnel also dropped from 28% to 21%.

Kwangju: The Regionalization of Violence?

Even before Chun assumed formal power, he faced widespread popular protest, particularly in the area of Cholla and its capital city, Kwangju. Like 2-28 in Taiwan, the Kwangju protests in May 1980, which observers have called “Korea’s Tiananmen,” have become the subject of extensive

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238 Oberdorfer’s claim that this was a “generational battle within the military” is probably overstated, but it does seem like a generational handover. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 118.

239 Heo and Roehrig, South Korea Since 1980, p. 30.


241 Jun, “South Korea,” p. 129.
historical scholarship and popular commemoration. This incident has also strongly shaped the narrative about state violence under Chun. While it is indeed possible to view the Kwangju suppression through a regional lens, it is also important to realize that the incident – which took place before Chun had completely assumed power – does not necessarily represent the broader pattern of state violence during his regime, just as there was more to state violence in Taiwan than the Mainlander-native fault lines of 2-28.

After Chun Doo Kwan took over as head of the KCIA in April 1980, protests flooded the streets. On May 17, Chun declared martial law, closed schools, banned political activities, dissolved the legislature, and arrested thousands of activists – among them Kim Dae Jung, Cholla’s champion and one of Chun’s principal political opponents. Protests continued in Cholla, particularly Kwangju, which observers at the time blamed on past regional discrimination and the attempt to use Kim as a scapegoat. U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen reported, “Having their hero singled out by the military as the trouble maker in Seoul tapped into a deep pool of resentment in Cholla, where people felt they had been treated as second-class citizens if not outcasts by the rival region of Kyongsang and the leadership in Seoul.”


The Korean-language multi-volume source collections include Center for Research on Contemporary Korean History [Hanguk byondesa saryo yongseo], A Comprehensive Collection of Historical Documents on the May People’s Uprising [Kwangju owol minjung bangjaeng saryo chonjip], (Seoul: P’ulpit, 1990). Other references translate this as Korean Modern Historical Materials Research Institute, Complete Collection of the Historical Record of the Kwangju May People’s Uprising. See also City of Kwangju, 5-18 Minjinha Undong Charyo Chongsa [General collection of documents of the Kwangju democratization movement], (Kwangju: 5-18 Saryo Pyonchan wiwonhoe, 1997).

243 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 127.

National University was violently suppressed by paratroopers, the people of Kwangju ejected the soldiers from the city, setting up “Citizens Committees (also called a Citizens Army, simingun)." Ambassador Gleysteen called Kwangju “a massive insurrection… [it is] out of control and poses an alarming situation for the ROK military.” On May 27th, approximately 20,000 soldiers from the Korean military entered the city and forcibly subdued the uprising. The Martial Law Command announced in late May that 170 people had died (144 civilians, 22 soldiers, 4 policemen), and 380 people had been wounded (127 civilians, 109 soldiers, and 144 policemen); contemporary estimates place the total closer to 500 dead and 3,000 wounded.

The suppression, one of the most politically sensitive issues in South Korea, has at times been viewed through a regional lens. It was widely believed in Korea in 1980 that the troops used in Kwangju came from Kyongsang. The paratroopers sent on May 18th were under the command of Lt. General (and eventual Chief of Staff) Chung Ho-Yong, who came from Taegu in Kyongsang province and graduated with Chun in the KMA’s 11th class. His soldiers came from Special Warfare Command, identified that February as part of Chun’s power base, and trained in guerilla warfare.


247 Quoted in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 128.


counter-infiltration combat, and riot control. They may have been told that the uprising was the work of North Korean instigators; to this day, though most elites now see the crackdown as unnecessary, at least some senior ROK military officials still argue that a failure to act would have allowed North Korea to take advantage of the disorder. Accounts by Western missionaries report that airborne units spoke in a Kyongsang accent about killing “no good Cholla rascals.” The American embassy, too, accepted a regional interpretation of the violence, reporting rumors that “Special Forces employed in Kwangju are from the area’s traditional rival Kyongsang,” and adding a day later that police and military severity was due both to “the spirit of the challenge, but possibly because that was how they felt they should treat Cholla people.”

The regional origins of the paratroopers has never been clarified, but the Chun regime’s response suggests not only that the Kyongsang rumors had some truth behind them, but that the leadership, too, believed that Kyongsang-born soldiers would be more violent and Cholla-born ones less so. On May 21, a Defense Department/Joint Chiefs of Staff report noted that the regime was specifically identifying Cholla-born officers within the ROK military and ordering them to Kwangju to do riot control. The rationale, they said, was “that these officers will have more success in quelling the demonstrations that [sic] others due to their provincial ties, knowledge and accents.”

The report also commented that the orders were “meeting with some limited resistance but were for

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251 Author’s interview with a Korean senior military official, Seoul, March 2011; for corroboration, see Heo and Roehrig, South Korea Since 1980, pp. 30-31; Shin and Hwang, p. 76.


the most part being grudgingly obeyed. Officers from Cholla, the authorities believed, would have the local intelligence necessary to calm the situation without excessive violence.

After the immediate crisis had passed, attempts were made to reassure officers from Cholla whose loyalties might have become conflicted or who feared discrimination on the basis of their regional background. A “respected Kwangju man,” Major General So Chun Yol, was promoted and selected to command the ROKA Training Command, and the provincial governor was also replaced by a South Cholla native. No disciplinary action against the paratroopers has been discovered – most likely, the embassy noted, because its commanding general was part of Chun’s “first echelon core group members” -- but the KNP Director and the provincial police chief were also replaced. In September, Cholla leader Kim Dae Jung was sentenced to death for plotting the uprising – among the men arguing most forcefully for his execution was Chung Ho-Young, the Taegu commander associated with the Kwangju suppression – but Kim’s sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in exchange for Chun’s state visit to the Reagan White House. Not surprisingly, the incident worsened regional tensions in South Korea.

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255 Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff report, 21 May 1980.
256 Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The ROK Army in Perspective,” 29 May 1980. In the 8 May 1980 report, the JCS had noted that “many were growing weary of the internal security role that SF was assigned”; officers “ready to break heads” at Pusan/Masan in October had, by the April coal miners’ incident, begun to believe that the miners were right, and expressed no enthusiasm at the future prospect of quelling student protests. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “ROKG Shifts SF Units,” 8 May 1980.
259 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 135; Heo and Roehrig, South Korea Since 1980, p. 36.
The social composition and regional makeup of internal security elites during the remainder of Chun’s tenure is telling. On the one hand, Chun, even more than Park, favored officials from Kyongsang at the top level of his coercive institutions; his Hanahoe clique was composed of so many officials from Taegu and Kyongsang that the faction was nicknamed “TK.” On the other hand, at the ground level, Chun pursued almost the opposite strategy, introducing riot police units that were conscript-based, and therefore broadly inclusive and representative of Korean society. Figure 4.7 shows the percentage of top internal security officials from each region:

**Figure 4.7: Regional Origins of Internal Security Elites under Chun**

Individuals from the Kyongsang region held nearly two-thirds of top positions related to internal security during the 1980’s, despite being less than a third of the population. See Table 4.4 below:

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262 Kyongsang’s population increased in the 1960’s and 1970’s as economic growth stimulated by Park’s preferential policies brought people to the region. However, the increase in internal security officials from Kyongsang far outstrips population growth. Population statistics taken from the 1980 census, Korean Statistical Information Service, online at http://kosis.kr/eng/database/database_001000.jsp?listid=Z
Table 4.4 Regional Origins of Security Officials under Chun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Population in 1980</th>
<th>Number of Internal Security Officials</th>
<th>Percentage of Population</th>
<th>Percentage of Internal Security Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>462,941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cholla</td>
<td>6,067,425</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>8,364,379</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangwon</td>
<td>1,790,954</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeonggi</td>
<td>4,933,862</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungcheong</td>
<td>4,380,297</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongsang</td>
<td>11,436,457</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37,436,315</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it was under Park, the Kyongsang bias was especially pronounced in the coercive apparatus. See Table 4.5:

Table 4.5: Regional Origins of Officials in Government Versus Internal Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Percentage of RoK Population in 1960</th>
<th>Percentage of High Officials from Province</th>
<th>Percentage of Ministers from Province</th>
<th>Percentage of Internal Security Officials from Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cholla</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul/Gyeonggi</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangwon/Cheju</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungcheong</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongsang</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is a far higher proportion of individuals from the Kyongsang region in internal security (62.8%) than among regular ministers (41.2%, only slightly over-represented) or high-ranking officials (who, at 33% of the total, are very close to the actual percentage of population that Kyongsang represented at the time). Some of this can be explained by the fact that military promotions are a slow mechanism of change; it would be relatively easy to replace a provincial

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263 Statistics on ministers and high officials taken from Joo, "Reflection on and Resolution Of the Fundamental Cause of Regional-Based Voting," p. 47.
governor, but if military elites drew predominantly from Kyongsang, Chun’s choices for internal security appointments might be more limited.

At the same time, however, Chun expanded the size of the coercive apparatus to deal with the threat of popular protest. In December 1980, just after Chun’s takeover, the Combat Police (*chontu kyongchal*) were assigned an auxiliary mission of protecting peace and public order. At the end of that year, however, a new amendment to the law on the “compulsory duty police service system” was added, which divided the CP into two different types.264 The first, the Combat Police for counterespionage (Combat Police) were assigned to the Ministry of National Defense, and would be selected by random assignment at basic military training.265 The second group was the combat police for public order, also known as the Auxiliary or Riot Police (*nikyong*). The *nikyong* were originally supposed to be recruited by the National Police Agency, but because there was a surplus of men who needed to do their compulsory military service, the government began simply assigning them to riot police units and dispatching them to protests instead. (In late November 1980, President-elect Ronald Reagan exclaimed to outgoing President Jimmy Carter, “Mr. President, I’d like to have the power that Korean presidents have to draft dissenters.”266) Riot Police conscripts were randomly assigned and not grouped by the region from which they came, though interviewees who had been through the system told me that someone assigned to the riot police could sometimes

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264 In English, the term Combat Police has been used to refer to both types, creating confusion. I am grateful to officers at the Korea National Police University for explaining the differences and this history to me. The following sources in Korean provide some further information. Kim et al, *History of National Police*; Kim, *Military Service System*; Jung et al, *Directions of Military Service Policy*.

265 Author’s interview with Dr. Ahn Seokki, Seoul, Korea, January 2012; see also Kim Doosung, *Military Service System in South Korea* (Seoul: Jacil Press, 2002); Jung Joosung, Wonyoung Jung, and Seokki Ahn, *Directions of Military Service Policy in South Korea* (Seoul: Institute for Defense Analysis, n.d.). For general background on the Military Service Law mandating conscription and on the Military Manpower Administration that administers this law, see publications by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis titled “Military Service System in South Korea” and “The Military Service Law lays out rules regarding military service responsibilities,” (Seoul, KIDA, nd).

finagle their way into being assigned near their home district. The system of assignment took effect nationally in late 1982, and by the mid-1980's, the number of riot police had reached 150,000.

One of the effects that the reliance on large numbers of conscripted riot police had was to make repression much more visible to the population. In general, Chun seems to have used his forces for intimidation rather than intelligence-gathering, with little regard for the costs of public violence. Bruce Cumings describes the *nikyong* as “Darth Vader-like figures,” wearing: “black helmets, tight screens over the face, leather scabbard protecting the back of their neck, padded clothing, thick elbow, knee, and shin guards, heavy combat boots, and long metal shield in the left hand and riot batons in the right.” Chun’s regime also became famous for its use of “white skull” (*paekkol*) strikebreakers: padded and shielded troops who arrived on motorcycles to break up labor strikes and thrash the participants. A similar emphasis on force without apparent attention to the unnecessary cost it incurred was observable upon Kim Dae Jung’s return from exile; when Kim arrived at the airport, escorted by an American delegation that included two congressmen, the KCIA attacked the delegation, knocked some of them to the floor, and whisked Kim and his wife away to house arrest.

The practice of “afforestation” (*nokhwasaop*), seemingly unique to Chun’s regime, also reveals the heavy-handedness of his approach and the abandonment of potentially useful intelligence-gathering mechanisms. In the early 1980’s, Defense Security Command created a list of young men suspected of politically problematic views or potential for anti-government activity, who they

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267 Author’s interviews with Korean National Police officials, Seoul, Korea, January 2012.

268 Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 381.

269 Chun sought tighter control over labor from early in his regime, and one-third of the political prisoners arrested under NSL violations in the early 1980’s were workers. Shin et al, *South Korea’s Democracy Movement*, p. x; Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 379.

270 Cumings, *Korea’s Place in the Sun*, p. 381; the photo is in the Kim Dae Jung Presidential Library in Seoul.
planned to draft for military service, indoctrinate, and send back to spy on students and anti-regime activists. (At one point in the 1980’s, over 1,000 dissenters were on their watch list.) After the suspicious deaths of several students undergoing military training caused public furor, however, nokhwasaop was abolished in 1984.\textsuperscript{271}

Using conscripts to police Korean society provoked an outcry because it forced the coercive apparatus to repress in ways that were socially and morally problematic; the inclusiveness of these units created strong incentives against repressing the incidents that had led to their creation in the first place. Forcing young Koreans to repress their fellow citizens was seen as a perversion of the patriotic purposes of national military service. Additionally, it imposed heavy social costs by forcing members of Korean society to do the regime’s repressive work – pitting students against their friends and sons against their parents. One police officer recounted the following story from when he, a junior officer recently graduated from the Korea National Police University, was assigned to a conscript-based riot police unit – a standard assignment for police university graduates and new officers – and sent to a farmers’ protest:

My lieutenant came to me and said, “You need to go talk to this guy, his father is one of the protestors.” I went to the front of the line, and there was a young man, just out of military training, and it was true, he could see the face of his father, and his father’s friends in the crowd. I told him, “Get out of line, go back to the barracks. You don’t need to be here today.” I could see him clenching his shield, and I could see that he had tears on his face under his helmet. But he said, “Sir, I cannot leave my post, I cannot leave my unit.” He thought it would be a dishonor. But then how could he go against his own father, and the friends of his father? It affected everyone in the unit. Not just that day, but for a long time.\textsuperscript{272}


\textsuperscript{272} Author’s interview, Seoul, Korea, March 2011.
Interviewees also recounted stories of students who had graduated from university and gone to complete their military service, only to be sent back to campus on the other side of the protest line, aiming tear gas at their friends and classmates.\textsuperscript{273} The trope is so common in South Korea that it was the storyline of the 1999 movie \textit{Peppermint Candy} (박하사탕, Pakha Satang), in which the protagonist transforms from student to military conscript in Kwangju to police torturer.\textsuperscript{274} Former policemen and activists alike asserted that because of this dynamic, the police became unwilling to actually inflict violence. As a result, democracy protests evolved into a scripted performance: the students would come out, they would chant and drum, and eventually the police would fire the tear gas and everyone would disperse. Sometimes the protestors even coordinated with the police in advance.\textsuperscript{275} The performativity of protest during the Korean democracy movement was actually a way of coping with the social tensions that protest and repression had engendered within society.\textsuperscript{276}

When Chun Doo Hwan came into office, he appears to have focused primarily on the threat of popular unrest, particularly in Kwangju and the Cholla region, and secondarily on the continued external threat from North Korea. He managed internal security primarily through the unfragmented use of Defense Security Command. Though he relied heavily on Kyongsang military men to staff the top levels of his coercive apparatus, he widened participation in the ground-level police units to include conscripts from all corners of Korean society (albeit still all young men). As a

\textsuperscript{273} Author’s interviews, Seoul, Korea, March 2011 and January 2012.

\textsuperscript{274} For an English-language synopsis of the plot, see http://www.yaentertainment.com/catalog/pc.html

\textsuperscript{275} Author’s interview with a democracy activist, Seoul, Korea, March 2011; author’s interview with a reporter in Korea during the democracy movement, Seoul, Korea, January 2012.

\textsuperscript{276} These protests also explicitly sought to turn the regime’s claims to legitimacy on their head. One example is the use of traditional drumming, which the regime had protected under its national heritage preservation laws, and which became so associated with protest that the drum found in the backpack of one student was used as evidence of his intent to protest. See Katherine Lee, “The Drumming of Dissent during South Korea’s Democratization Movement,” paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Toronto, Canada, March 2012.
result of these decisions, violence against Cholla dropped (after Kwangju), as did state violence against society at large. Unsurprisingly, however, this coercive institutional design created tension within the repressive apparatus itself. South Korea under Chun, therefore, illustrates the broader point that popular threats push autocrats toward unitary and socially inclusive coercive institutions, which have strong incentives to avoid using violence against their own people.

VI. Alternative Explanations and Conclusion

South Korea’s leaders perceived their threat environment in ways that shaped the structure and social composition of their coercive institutions, which in turn shaped temporal and spatial patterns of state violence. Broadly speaking, all three autocrats operated within constraints imposed by an existentially high North Korean threat, which precipitated extensive American involvement and even U.S. command authority over the ROK military. At times, however, Syngman Rhee (for most of his tenure) and Park Chung Hee (after declaring Yushin) appeared to worry relatively more about elite threats to their power; when they did, they fostered fragmentation and competition within (the non-military parts of) the coercive apparatus; they were also more likely to make it socially exclusive. Consistent with the theory proposed in Chapter One, it was at these times that state violence was the highest. By contrast, Chun Doo Hwan, who was forced to deal with popular unrest in the earliest months he was in office, sought to minimize fragmentation, maintain a strong military, and create a large and inclusive coercive apparatus to handle popular protest. The social composition of these frontline coercive units explains not only the lower level of violence under Chun, but why the violence that did occur was so detested.

Neither the idea that autocrats use increased violence to handle increased threats nor the explanations founded in American and international influence successfully explain the patterns of violence observed in Korea. A study by the Korea Democracy Project at Stanford found that the
opposition movement became most active and most threatening (as measured both by the number of protestors and by the extent to which protests employed disruptive or aggressive tactics) in the 1980’s, yet the coercive apparatus at that point is not noticeably more violent toward civilians than it had been throughout Park’s tenure. As in Korea, the timing of protest participation post-dates rather than precedes the increase in violence observed under Chun in the late 1980’s – suggesting that, as in the Philippines, mobilization is caused by violent repression as much as causes it.

American and international influence is also not a strong predictor of the patterns of state violence observed here, nor does that theory correlate with some of the within-case evidence we have about the drivers of repressive behavior. The evidence is simply mixed. Violence against civilians peaked under Syngman Rhee, when American assistance was at its highest, but declined during the 1970s and 1980s as Korea’s international linkages increased and the United States placed human rights more centrally in its (public) foreign policy. Within-case evidence provides relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that international or American influence was decisive. In 1972, the United States adopted a policy of “dis-association” from Park’s declaration of Yushin rather than one of active opposition or criticism, and in 1980, officials expressed more concern about the need to maintain stability in Korea than either Chun’s seizure of power or the crackdown in Kwangju. Although American military support was a potential bargaining chip, as were the sanctions and potential trade losses created by increased linkage with the American/international economy, policymakers either used those tools ineffectively (under Carter) or rarely (under Reagan).

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277 Shin et al, *South Korea’s Democracy Movement*, pp. 10, 12.

278 The American government reacted to Chun’s policies rather than influencing them in advance. That the debate centers on whether the CFC “approved” or “was notified” of troop transfers to Kwangju emphasizes that there was no strong American objection until after the initial reports of brutality appeared. U.S. officials did urge restraint, and intervened to save Kim Dae Jung’s life, but also supported the “restoration of order” against the “Kwangju mob.” They tacitly approved of the deployment of the 20th Division to retake the city because they thought the conduct of those troops would be preferable to that of the special forces. Throughout, their policies were reactive.
American influence appears highest in two cases: first when officials intervened to save the life of Kim Dae Jung after his kidnapping by the KCIA in 1973 and his post-Kwangju death sentence in 1980, and second in a diplomatic note delivered in 1987, just as Chun was preparing to pull troops off the DMZ for a crackdown, urging him to avoid military suppression. Aides recount that Chun commented on domestic and international backlash if the police lost control and he had to use the military; Reagan’s letter reinforced this concern. But the actual impact of American advocacy is unclear, especially in the face of active opposition to that course of action from within Chun’s military and coercive apparatus, coupled with Chun’s reluctance to allow the military to intrude into domestic affairs even in times of crisis. Even when America did actively intervene, its influence was either limited, or must be weighed against domestic factors of equal or greater importance. Over the course of Korea’s post-1945 trajectory, American influence had its deepest and longest lasting effect on state violence and human rights violations not through any direct interventions in Korean policies on repression and violence, but by shaping the structure and composition of the institutions that carried them out.

279 In Korea as elsewhere in Asia, American human rights diplomacy tended to prioritize the cases of high-profile individual dissidents, who had a face and a story attached and who had often spent time in the West. For a contemporary example, see American officials’ comments in 2012 on their personal interactions with Chen Guangcheng: http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2012/05/182850.htm

280 Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 169.

281 Chun’s military officers conveyed these concerns to outgoing Minister of Home Affairs/soon-to-be Minister of Defense Chung Ho Yong, who conveyed them to Chun via Roh Tae Woo. Chun also believed that forcing unwilling junior officers into internal security work could make them likely to seize power from him as he had done from Choi in 1979. Shin and Hwang, pp. 76-77; also Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas.
Chapter Five

North Korea & China

I. Introduction

This chapter discusses how the argument of the dissertation travels to North Korea and China. Because information on the coercive institutions of these countries is limited, and almost no systematic data are available on the ultimate dependent variable of this project – patterns of state violence – the treatment of these two countries cannot be identical to the cases in preceding chapters. For this reason, I do not treat North Korea and China as full in-sample cases.

Instead, I have treated them as an out-of-sample test of my argument, to examine how it applies to two Communist Asian regimes on the opposite side of the Cold War divide. I ask: what would

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1 Primary source materials on North Korean internal security are essentially non-existent, with the exception of a cache of documents captured during the Korean War and used in Charles Armstrong’s book cited below. I have also incorporated defector memoirs, testimonies, and interviews wherever possible. See Thomas Hosuck Kang, “North Korean Captured Records at the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland,” in Association for Asian Studies, Committee Asia Libraries Bulletin (Feb 1979). For NARA’s overview of the collection, now at College Park, see http://research.archives.gov/description/569.

Sources on China are somewhat more plentiful, though systematic data is still lacking. Archival access to public security files remains non-existent, since these organs have been exempted from the standard requirement to transfer documents to state, provincial, or municipal archives after a set period of time has elapsed. The best work on domestic intelligence under Mao, by Michael Schoenhals, makes extensive use of private sources collected from Beijing flea markets. Wherever possible, I have used original Chinese sources, including memoirs, official histories, documentary compilations, journal articles, and a handful of books. For archival processes related to public security, see Guojia Dang’anju Bangongshi, Collected Documents on Archival Work (Beijing: Dang’an Chubanshe, 1985-86) / 国家档案局办公室编, 档案工作文件汇集 (北京: 档案出版社, 1985-86), Vol. 1, pp. 124-25.
the theory predict about these countries, in terms of both the construction of their coercive apparatus and its subsequent behavior? What evidence is there that the theory can explain important features of the two cases, and what evidence does not fit with the predictions made by my argument? In what ways do these two countries differ from the anti-communist cases described in previous chapters, and how do such differences refine our thinking about internal security in authoritarian regimes?

In an attempt to think through these questions, the sections that follow outline what is known about the development of coercive institutions in North Korea and in China. The chapter compares these countries’ approaches to internal security to each other, and provides an initial cut at comparing and contrasting them with the anti-Communist countries examined in previous chapters.

Several themes emerge. Some corroborate the arguments advanced in previous chapters, albeit preliminarily. The connection between the nature of threats and the design of the coercive apparatus holds: the combination of popular-external threat that occurred in both North Korea and China during their revolutionary history leads to the predicted institutional configuration characterized by low degrees of institutional fragmentation and high degrees of societal inclusion, particularly in the intelligence networks employed by both regimes. Threat is a more convincing explanation for the structure and composition of coercive institutions than either path dependence or Soviet influence. The attention paid to social classification and its use as a tool of intelligence is particularly striking in both countries, as is the process by which initial classifications come to define the boundaries of participation and inclusion. In the Chinese case, moreover, attention to intelligence appears to have been explicitly linked to the belief that inclusivity in intelligence gathering would allow the regime to calibrate violence at the narrowest level sufficient to maintain power.
These cases also raise additional issues to consider about both the origins of the coercive apparatus and its effects. In terms of institutional origins, they prompt questions about the effect of revolution on threat perceptions (and particularly the relationship between revolution and elite threats); about the relatively high rate of institutional evolution and adaptation observed in both countries; and about the ways in which generational change and succession alter the use of the coercive apparatus. In terms of effects, they ask us to consider whether the basic patterns of violence are similar in communist versus non-communist countries; and what coercive institutions can and cannot explain about those patterns – including the claims that China and North Korea are generally considered to be among the most destructive and violent political systems ever to have existed.2

This chapter proceeds in four sections. Section II discusses the development of coercive institutions in North Korea, Section III addresses the development of these institutions in China, and Section IV concludes with some comparative thoughts.

II. The Development of Internal Security in North Korea

The development of the coercive apparatus in North Korea highlights several arguments consistent with the overall theory advanced by the dissertation. As in the previous cases, neither path dependence nor external influence is a full and satisfactory explanation for the development of the country’s internal security institutions. The North Korean regime did originate under extraordinarily high external influence: Kim Il Sung was essentially installed as the leader of North Korea by the Soviet military occupation, and the initial institutions of coercion reflected both Soviet

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influence and the presence of a high degree of external threat from the nascent American-backed regime in the South.

Over time, however, threat exerted a decisive influence over the shape of the coercive apparatus. Admittedly, the dominant perceived threat is difficult to determine in the case of North Korea – probably impossible to determine with any degree of confidence, given that all three types of threats could be perceived as existentially high, and no sources offer a reliable view inside the thinking of Kim Il Sung at this time. What is known, however suggests that the case is broadly consistent with the theory presented in Chapter One. Kim Il Sung was installed as the head of the regime as the leader of one of four factions, and not the strongest one. Rather than trying to fragment the coercive apparatus in order to manage these elite threats – and perhaps because he was constrained from doing so by a combination of Soviet organization, external threat, and the pressures of state-building – Kim Il Sung appears to have responded to this elite threat by eliminating rivals through Soviet-style purges. Rather than subordinating elite politics to the demands of war, he used battlefield failures within the KPA as a pretext for eliminating his rivals from North Korea’s security institutions during the war and in the years afterward.

The reduction of these elite threats enabled (though it is not clear that it caused) a full-scale turn to the task of popular management and social penetration. The North Korean regime accomplished this not only through reliance on formal institutions of public security, but also by employing policies that focused on social classification and mass mobilization, implemented through institutions like resident registration and organizational life. Over time, North Korea revised the inherited and imposed coercive structures and replaced them with institutions of its own making – ones that relied on an extraordinary informational superiority to achieve popular control.
Origins of Internal Security in North Korea

North Korea’s initial public security institutions were established in the second half of the 1940’s, and originated from a mix of factors. Imposed under de facto Soviet military occupation, they exhibited Soviet influence as well as institutional legacies from both Japanese administrative precedent and traditional Korean practices at the local level. The makeup of these early institutions also reflected the power distribution across four factions: the domestic faction, the Soviet Korean faction, the Chinese or Yenan Korean faction, and the guerilla faction headed by Kim Il Sung (sometimes also called the Kapsan faction). According to Soviet sources present at the time, the differences between the factions were less a matter of “fundamental differences on important political issues” and more a matter of “personal interests, the struggle for dominant positions… aggravated by a lack of experience and political maturity.”

In the chaos following Japanese surrender, a variety of indigenous self-protection units emerged in North Korea, based more on local tradition than anything else. Historian Charles Armstrong notes that self-defense institutions were a “common feature of traditional Korean villages,” and Japanese colonial authorities had already linked these to the central state. While Armstrong argues that this means that the Soviet role was essentially one of formalizing existing structures, Soviet oversight clearly did exist. In October 1945, when the Soviet Civil Administration (and 25th Army) became the governing authority, it set up local units for protection and security of

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law and order (bo-an-dae), comprised of local citizens but also staffed by the transfer of 2,000 Soviet Koreans. Kim Il Sung himself reportedly entered North Korea from Russia in September as a major in the Soviet military group. Soviet Colonel Balasanov oversaw the construction of the police forces, with Soviet Korean Pang Hak-se second in command. The contribution of these early Soviet and Korean administrators to the social composition of local units, however, was perhaps even more significant than their contributions to institutional structure. Speaking of these organizations as explicitly inclusive and participatory, Soviet and Korean administrators upended local order, putting poor local peasants rather than village elders in charge.

Without better information on where the Soviets and Koreans would have preferred courses of action that differed from one another, the exact balance of influence between the two groups is probably unknowable. It is clear, however, that the formalization and centralization of local units took place under Soviet oversight, over the course of several years. In November 1945, the bo-an-dae were placed under a new Administrative Committee in charge of North Korea’s five provinces; People’s Committees (inmin wiwonhoe) were established as local governing bodies in the provinces. When the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee (NKPPC) was established under Kim Il Sung’s leadership in February 1946, Soviet advisors “occupied positions of authority in the ten

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bureaus of the NKPPC.”¹⁰ Kim’s guerilla comrade Choe Yong-gon led the Protection and Security Bureau (PSB or bo’an-guk, which oversaw the bo-an-dae), and also led the Korean Democratic Party and at least two military training centers.¹¹ The new legal code of 1946, as well as the courts and procuratorial system, combined old Japanese provisions with Soviet judicial structure, and were extended down to the local level by early 1947.¹² In February 1947, the NKPPC became the North Korean People’s Committee, and the PSB became the Bureau of Internal Affairs (Naemu-guk).¹³

Meanwhile, the broader contours of the new regime were also taking shape. The Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) formally came into being in late August 1946, as a merger of the Korean Communist Party (Northern Branch) headed by Kim Il Sung, and Kim Tu-bong’s Korean New People’s Party composed of Yenan Koreans who were veterans of the Chinese Civil War. Kim Tu-bong became party chairman, and Kim Il Sung vice chairman.¹⁴ These leaders began a period of “anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution,” seeking to restructure North Korea’s social classes, overturn the pre-colonial Choson-era social order dominated by the gentry (yangban), and empower the working class.¹⁵ One major element of the revolution was land reform, promulgated in

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¹¹ Gause, Coercion, p. 86; Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army, pp. 30-31.


¹³ Gause, Coercion, p. 87.

¹⁴ At that time, the KWP shared power on the Central People’s Committee with the conservative KDP and the Young Friends’ Party

March 1946; rather than collectivization or distribution for payment, it was a “land to the tiller” program that redistributed land to around 700,000 peasant households.\(^{16}\)

Other elements of reform would have important effects on the internal security apparatus in both the immediate and the long term. In March 1946, and unlike the American-backed South, authorities in the northern half of the Korean peninsula ordered a thorough purging of administrators who had worked under the Japanese.\(^{17}\) They also began to form social organizations nationwide that were closely connected to the state and KWP. Thanks to overlapping membership, “by the fall of 1946, nearly every resident of North Korea over the age of 15 belonged to one or more of these social organizations.”\(^{18}\) In autumn 1946, a citizen registration campaign was also conducted, and the traditional family registry system replaced with new citizen identification cards.

The authorities changed the old 10-household Japanese “Patriotic Units” (Aegukban) into “People’s Units” (Inminban), and required each of the units to register all of its households.\(^{19}\) By 1947, head of the Bureau of Internal Affairs Pak Il-U indicated to provincial chiefs that they should “examine the class background and thoughts” of all neighborhood leaders under their jurisdiction.\(^{20}\) And as the Korean People’s Army was constructed (see below), North Korea’s leaders organized the National


\(^{17}\) Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

\(^{18}\) Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 49.


Defense Sponsors Association, with branches at the village level designed to link the people to their army.  

Soviet influence throughout this period remained strong. The DPRK constitution was modeled on (though not identical to) the 1936 Stalin constitution; Soviet and Eastern Bloc aid to North Korea was significant; and the economy centered on heavy industry industrialization laid out in multi-year economic plans. The term Suryong, or Great Leader – now famously used only for Kim Il Sung – was until 1948 used solely to refer to Stalin.  

Soviet investigators did background checks on the individuals who replaced Japanese-trained administrators, as well as on those elevated to the People’s Committees in November 1946 and the NKPC in February 1947. Moscow dispatched security advisors to work in the DPRK Bureau of Internal Affairs, including Colonel Bodyagin, who commanded the Soviets’ own secret police in Korea during the occupation. These advisors had more direct powers of oversight over the internal security system than North Korea’s own cabinet, and stayed from the launching of a full Ministry of the Interior (Naemu-seong) in 1948 through the late 1950’s. The initial lack of jails in North Korea and the presence of Soviet military

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24 U.S. State Department, *North Korea*, p. 100.  
courts during the occupation period also resulted in prisoners being deported to serve their sentences in the Siberian gulag in the late 1940s.\textsuperscript{26}

There were elements of Chinese influence, too, transmitted largely by the Yenan faction with whom Kim Il Sung shared power for a decade.\textsuperscript{27} Lankov notes that the Chinese faction ascribed to a Maoist rather than Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism, and brought to Korea “the ethos of Chinese communism and its bureaucratic patterns and political idioms.”\textsuperscript{28} On the cultural front, DPRK policies adhered to both Soviet Zhdanovism and Maoist themes – for example, a 1951 speech by Kim not only echoed Mao’s “Talk on Arts and Literature” nine years earlier, but was drafted by Yenan faction member Kim Chang-man. Kim Il Sung quoted from Mao frequently, and concepts embedded in Maoism influenced the development of both chuch’ e ideology and the DPRK “mass line.”\textsuperscript{29} North Korea drew closer to China after parting ways with a Khruschev’s de-Stalinization campaign in the late 1950’s (a process described more fully below).\textsuperscript{30}

A mix of Soviet and Chinese influence was in evidence in the construction of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Created in 1948, the KPA was built around a core of Kim Il Sung’s most trusted Kapsan colleagues, and had three regular divisions, one infantry regiment/brigade, and two


\textsuperscript{27} Suh, \textit{The Korean Communist Movement}, pp. 220-221; Lankov, \textit{From Stalin to Kim Il Sung}, p. 80.

Bruce Cumings argues that Lankov’s background leads him to overstate the degree of Soviet influence relative to Chinese and indigenous sources. See Bruce Cumings, “Review: Lifting the Veil on North Korea,” \textit{The National Interest}, May/June 2013.

\textsuperscript{28} Lankov, \textit{From Stalin to Kim Il Sung}, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{29} Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” pp. 51-52.

border security brigades.\textsuperscript{31} Its leadership worked closely with the Soviets to adapt Soviet military organization to Korean circumstance, meaning a heavier focus on infantry than the armored and mechanized force emphasis of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{32} The USSR initially provided a colonel to advise each individual Korean division commander, and 150 advisors to each division, but rapidly decreased their presence after the formal inauguration of the DPRK in September 1948, to 20 per division in 1949, and 3-8 per division in 1950.\textsuperscript{33}

Much of the KPA’s fighting power, however, was aligned with the Yenan faction, since the three divisions that existed in 1948 were dramatically strengthened by the arrival in in 1949 and 1950 of three ethnically Korean divisions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – largely composed of ethnic Koreans from Manchuria.\textsuperscript{34} Historians differ on the exact number of troops transferred back; Bruce Cumings says 75,000-100,000, while Donggil Kim estimates just over 35,000. It is clear, however, that at the outbreak of the Korean War, 10 of the 21 regiments on the frontline were PLA repatriates, many of whom had gained combat experience fighting the Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War.\textsuperscript{35} Political control over the KPA was exercised by the


\textsuperscript{32} These included Choe Yong-gon, Kim Chaek, An Kil, Choe Hyon, and Kang Kon. Minnich, \textit{The North Korean People’s Army}, pp. 21-22.


\textsuperscript{34} For details on the transfer’s motivation and processes, see Kim, “Prelude to War,” p. 234.

\textsuperscript{35} Cumings, \textit{Korea’s Place in the Sun}, pp. 239-41; Kim, “Prelude to War,” p. 228.
Political Defense Bureau (PDB) of the Ministry of Defense, which provided administrative oversight, while the Ministry of the Interior’s PSB gave operational guidance.\textsuperscript{36}

The internal security apparatus also reflected the regime’s mixed heritage, most notably in the appointment of its personnel. In 1948, the Ministry of the Interior (\textit{Naemusong}) was established, and by 1949 political policing responsibilities rested with the four main offices of the Ministry’s Political Security Bureau (PSB).\textsuperscript{37} The Ministry was led by Pak Il-u, from the Yenan faction, while the PSB was headed by Pang Hak-se, a Soviet Korean who had reportedly worked for Soviet law enforcement and came to be known as “North Korea’s Beria.” Soviet Koreans were rumored to be over-represented in the PSB, even compared to other bureaus of the Interior Ministry, though no precise data on this exists.\textsuperscript{38} Chinese and Soviet influence was also apparent in the guidance circulated, which included a Soviet manual on self-criticism and various Chinese articles about “thought guidance” – instructions that were also not dissimilar to practices employed by the Japanese, sometimes on the Korean communists themselves.\textsuperscript{39}

From the beginning, the Ministry of the Interior kept close watch on North Korean society. It reportedly employed 4,500 people at its headquarters, plus 12,000 regular and 3,000 political police organized down to the village level, and 45,000 additional employees of the Security Guard (a mobile police reserve with regular guard duties), Border Constabulary, and Railroad Guard; it also

\begin{footnotes}
\item[36] Gause, \textit{Coercion}, pp. 94-95. The U.S. State Department’s North Korea report portrays a much heavier Soviet influence in terms of personnel appointments within the KPA. This must be read with some caution; they also characterize Kim Il Sung as a Soviet-aligned Korean.
\item[37] Reports differ on whether the PSB was created in the Ministry in February 1948, or emerged from in July 1949 from renaming the “Department of Special Information” established in the Ministry in September 1948. Lankov, “The Repressive System,” p. 12; U.S. Department of State, \textit{North Korea}, p. x.
\item[38] Lankov, “The Repressive System,” p. 12; Gause, \textit{Coercion}, p. 92.
\end{footnotes}
administered prisons through its Prisons Bureau. Regular police, with frontline responsibility for law and order, reported to the Ministry through the Security Bureau, and typically employed about 5-10 officers at the village and township level. The police drew on networks of unpaid informants from local organizations such as the Youth League, approximately 3-10 people per village; one source estimates their number at 5% of the population – a total of 400,000 – at the start of the Korean War. They drew maps showing the residence location of “suspicious persons” and reported every other week to the Internal Ministry. In addition to the regular police, the PSB also had offices at the county and city level (13-15 officers each) to conduct political policing work, where they gathered information on public opinion and reported it upward every three days, employing their own informant network to do so. These informants – who probably overlapped in places with those of the regular police – numbered between 3-10 people per township: about 5% of the population. They were paid 1-2,000 won/month, and given bonuses for providing information in important cases, ranging up to 20-30,000 won. Accusations of guilt by one informant were invariably cross-checked by another.

The police system in North Korea was inclusive and information-focused by design, and much attention was paid to the social relationship between the police and the people. Pak Il-U


41 U.S. State Department, North Korea, pp. 42-43; Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army, p. 39.

42 Gause, Coercion, p. 91.


45 U.S. State Department, North Korea, p. 43.

46 U.S. State Department, North Korea, p. 89.
urged police to “come from amidst the people [and have] ceaseless comradely love for the masses [minjung].”\textsuperscript{47} The PSB deliberately urged recruitment from women, farmers, and workers in order to broaden the social composition of the “people’s police.”\textsuperscript{48} Inclusivity was seen as both normatively desirable and politically useful. Though one historian calls the spying a “clumsy and ill-coordinated venture” that failed to produce much actual evidence of subversive activity, U.S.-UN surveys of occupied areas later concluded that the “omniscient informant network” had been quite effective at deterring the formation of potential opposition – a different but probably even more successful outcome than catching conspirators in the act.\textsuperscript{49} This system of “detection and prevention of crime” advanced well beyond what Japanese authorities had constructed; the U.S. State Department observed in 1961 that North Korea had replaced Japanese reliance on forcible interrogation with “thorough organization” and an emphasis on information superiority.\textsuperscript{50}

\textit{War and the Indigenization of Internal Security}

North Korea’s rejection of foreign influence began with the Korean War. Somewhat paradoxically, it is possible to see in the Korean War not the pressures on external defense imposed by wartime stalemate, but a near-obsession with domestic security. The war not only provides evidence of a continuing focus on popular control, as one might expect in a civil war environment, but a surprising emphasis on elite threats. War appears to have heightened the perceived threat to


\textsuperscript{50} U.S. State Department, \textit{North Korea}, p. 88.
Kim Il Sung from the three rival factions, and led to a concerted campaign in the 1950s to eliminate his opponents.

First, Kim maintained the focus on popular management that had already become a hallmark of the North Korea regime. He did so even at the cost of prosecuting the war he had just launched; for example, on 28 June 1950, after the fall of the Ongjin peninsula and capture of Seoul, the KPA chose not to continue its attack on the weak, disorganized, and retreating U.S. and ROK forces, but to stop in Seoul to construct “people’s committees.” Though the decision has baffled Western military historians and experts,\(^1\) it is consistent with the regime’s previous and later emphasis on domestic consolidation. The dislocations of wartime, if anything, increased the need for effective popular management; an estimated 685,000 North Koreans fled south during the war, and in fall 1950, the PSB launched a campaign to eradicate political prisoners and round up the opposition that had not yet fled south.

In addition to sparking worries about popular management and internal subversion, the war substantially increased Kim’s fear of elite rivals – particularly those from the Yenan faction who comprised so much of the fighting power of the KPA. These concerns became particularly acute after North Korea’s retreat from Naktong in the fall of 1950, which prompted the intervention of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) under General Peng Dehuai.\(^2\) Peng took operational control over KPA forces through the North Korea-China Combined Forces Command (NKCCFC), and Yenan faction member and former Interior Minister Pak Il-U became his deputy commander and political officer. Officers affiliated with the Yenan faction commanded many of the important combat units of the KPA, possessed some of the most seasoned experience, and were trusted by the

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NKCCFC and CPV leadership because of their fluent Chinese and close interpersonal ties. Among them was renowned general Mu Chong (Jeong), “the best known of the Yanan generals.”

In response to heightened threat from the Yenan faction, Kim Il Sung pursued a major intrawar reorganization of the internal security apparatus, centered around three key changes. First, he reorganized public security, removing the PSB from the Interior Ministry in March 1951 and establishing it as a new Ministry of Public Security (MPS, *Sahoe Anjon Song*), headed by Pang Hak-se. (The PSB was moved back to the Ministry of the Interior in October 1952, with Pang Hak-se still serving as Minister.) The second and third levels of response focused on improving his command over the military. Kim sought to strengthen the KPA’s political commissar system, establishing party committees at every level and expanding the small Cultural Department into a full General Political Bureau (GPB). He also purged high-level commanders – eventually, 90% of North Korea’s generals during the Korean War – for ostensible wartime failures.

53 Kim, “Prelude to War.”

54 Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung*, pp. 91-92.


The war thus provided pretext, over time, for eliminating elite rivals from the other factions. North Korea held its first show trial in August 1953, and convicted twelve defendants of the “domestic” faction, including Yi Sung-yop, former secretary of the Central Committee, and Pae Chol, the head of the KWP’s liaison department responsible for operations in the South. They were charged and convicted first and foremost of planning a coup, though their other offenses included sabotaging the southern Communist movement, spying for the US, and cooperating with Japanese police. Ten were sentenced to death and the remaining two given prison sentences. It is not clear whether the Soviet Union, which advised similar show trials in Eastern Europe at around the same time, helped to orchestrate these proceedings in North Korea. Pak Hon-yong, leader of the domestic faction, was also arrested in August 1953, but was not tried and sentenced until 1955, when he was the center of North Korea’s second (last and smaller) ‘show trial’; he was sentenced to death and is believed to have been killed in 1955 or 1956.

Kim then turned his attention to the Soviet and Chinese factions. As de-Stalinization got underway in the Soviet Union, Soviet Koreans in the north began to call for more collective rule and “de-Stalinization” in North Korea. North Korea officially denounced these efforts – and continued to do so for decades. It was in this context of a transition away from the liberalizing Soviet Union, that North Korea first promulgated the idea of juche (loosely translated as self-reliance) in December 1955 – partly as a critique of Soviet Koreans and a call for self-reliance in place of reliance on the

57 Gause, Coercion, p. 97; Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p. 95.

58 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, pp. 98-99.

59 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung; Minnich, The North Korean People’s Army, p. 31; Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 324.

60 Charles Armstrong cites Rodong Sinmun denunciations of de-Stalinization that were printed as late as the 1990’s, and calls North Korea the most successful example of the “indigenization” of Stalinism anywhere in the world. Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 39. See Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-64 (Stanford and Washington: Stanford University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2005).
Soviet model. Purges directed at the Yenan faction followed. Pak Il-U, for example, was relieved of duty and transferred to the Ministry of Communications in 1952-53, and purged from the leadership in 1955. Mu Jeong, the influential Yenan figure who participated in the Chinese Long March, fought as an officer in the Chinese Red Army, and commanded North Korean forces during the Korean War, was denounced and purged after the war also; he moved back to China and died there. So, too, was Choe Chang-ik, Politburo and Finance Minister; arrested and imprisoned for Communist activities in Korea until 1935, and afterward leader of the Korean communists in Yenan, Choe held a series of influential party and government posts until he was purged in 1956 after the Third Party Congress. Other prominent leaders purged in the mid-1950’s included Pak Chang-ok, chair of the State Planning Commission; Kim Yol, Politburo member and chair of the party in Hwanghae province; and Ho Kai, head of the KWP Organization Department.

Events surrounding the Third Party Congress in 1956 both revealed and continued the swing toward the consolidation of power by Kim Il Sung and his guerilla faction. Of 67 Central Committee members from the Second Party Congress in 1948, only 29 were re-elected to the new 71-member Central Committee, indicating the high rate of elite turnover. The Standing Committee, which replaced the presidium and the Politburo, was made up of eleven members: five were former members of Kim Il Sung’s small guerilla group, compared to two each for the Soviet and Chinese

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62 Gause, Coercion, p. 97.

63 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p. 92.

64 Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 221-22.

65 Gause, Coercion, p. 97-98, fn. 165-166.
factions. Kim publicly praised the accomplishments of the guerilla faction, and the number of power holders from rival factions continued to decline.\textsuperscript{66}

When Kim Il Sung took a trip to the Soviet Union in summer 1956 after the Party Congress, remaining members of the Soviet and Chinese factions cooperated to mount an unsuccessful challenge, declaring Kim “anti-people” in August. The challenge failed, but it resulted in a further expansion and reorganization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs – still, interestingly, under the leadership of Soviet Korean Pang Hak-se – and the reported creation of a Political Security Bureau within the Ministry of Defense, headed by former guerilla Sok San.\textsuperscript{67} Large-scale purges of the Yenan faction began in 1957, and over a quarter of the Soviet Korean leadership were purged and had died by the early 1960’s. The violence precipitated a mass exodus of former Soviet citizens between 1958-61. Members of the Yenan faction were not so fortunate; despite the attempted intervention of a joint Soviet-Chinese delegation in 1957, very few of them were able to escape, and by 1957-58, Lankov writes, “the Yanan faction ceased to exist.”\textsuperscript{68} By September 1961, at the Fourth Party Congress, Kim Il Sung reported triumphantly that the party had successfully “eliminated factionalism” and achieved “complete unity” within.\textsuperscript{69}

\textit{The Turn to Popular Control}

As the threat from elite rivals decreased, the Kim regime increasingly turned its attention to popular control. Social classification processes were used to widen the purges from the elite to the


\textsuperscript{67} Gause, \textit{Coercion}, p. 99. The relationship between this organization and the PDB is unclear.

\textsuperscript{68} Lankov, \textit{From Stalin to Kim Il Sung}, pp. 103-105.

popular level, and to organize Korean society for the purposes of obtaining information on every citizen.

As mentioned previously, these processes were not new. The Soviet Civil Authority had conducted background checks to purge those who had worked for the Japanese, and new categories of enemies had been added during the Korean War.\textsuperscript{70} In May 1957, however, the process expanded significantly. The KWP Standing Committee announced a resolution that called for “The Transformation of the Struggle with Counter-Revolutionary Elements into an All-People’s All-Party Movement,” which became the basis for an extensive social classification project designed to establish people's class background, or *songbun*.\textsuperscript{71} In 1958-59, the KWP Central Committee established the Central Guidance Office, headed by Kim Il Sung’s brother Kim Yong-ju, to implement the “Party Intensive Guidance Project.”\textsuperscript{72} Replicas of this committee at lower levels, over 7,000 people nationwide, were trained in Pyongyang and dispatched to supervise provincial “security committee” investigations. As a result of this survey process from 1957-60, an estimated 100,000 people were punished, including 2,500 executions, and an estimated 70,000 members of the “hostile class” forcibly transferred away from the urban, border, and coastal areas to remote inland mountains.\textsuperscript{73} Their ID cards marked with a special stamp, these “special settlers” were subject to


\textsuperscript{73} Collins, p. 22, says 6,000 given prison sentences; Lankov counts 2,500 executed. Pang Hak-se also reportedly boasted to a Soviet diplomat in 1959 of having punished nearly 100,000 people for political crimes, but this figure may have been exaggerated. Andrei Lankov, “Pang Hak-se: Founder of the North Korean Security Police,” *Korea Times*, 22 February 2012.
extra monitoring, and travel outside their districts was restricted. In parallel with the Party Intensive Guidance Project, control mechanisms in the countryside were decentralized to be closer to villagers; in 1958, the police boxes or substations that had existed at the county level (exercising control over a cluster of villages) were replaced by a policeman resident in each village, who reported to MPS at the district level.

Both the formal internal security apparatus and the classification of the population were subject to perpetual adjustment. At the end of the 1960’s, Pang Hak-se was replaced as Minister of the Interior by Sok San, former leader of the Defense Ministry’s PSB (Inmingun Jeongchi). (Reports on personnel shuffling in the security bureaus of the Defense Ministry and MPS agree that other reassignments happened at the same time, but offer conflicting reports about who else was moved from where to where.) The Ministry of Public Security was re-established in October 1962 and again given control over both criminal and political policing, while the Guard Bureau led by Chon Mun-sop took over personal security for Kim Il Sung. By October 1966, Col. Gen. Sok San had joined the Politburo as Minister of Public Security, along with six other military men.

Social classification and re-classification continued as well. In 1961, Kim observed that the majority of the North Korean population had at least one “unreliable” relative, and called for re-educating the majority. In 1964, perhaps influenced by China’s Socialist Education Movement, he declared “we cannot make a revolution with young people who do not know who a landlord or a

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76 It is not clear whether Choe Won-sok or Paek Hak-nim replaced Sok San at MND’s PSB. One source says Paek did replace Sok; another says he became MPS’s Security Bureau chief. Gause, Coercion, p. 102, fn. 180.
capitalist is.” Additional classification campaigns followed, in 1964-69, and again from 1966-67, each time increasing the regime’s information on its citizens. Yet another round of classification, from 1967-70, produced the system known today: it sub-divided the population into 51 categories, each placed into the core, wavering, or hostile class (baeksim/kibon kyechung, dongjo kyechung, and choktae kyechung). Kim affirmed this tripartite structure to the Fifth Party Congress of 1970, and it was circulated to party cadres by order of the KWP secretariat in February 1971. An estimated 3.9 million people were classified as part of the core class; 3.1 million fell in the wavering class; and 7.9 million belonged to the hostile class. In a bit of gallows humor, North Koreans joke that the core classes are ‘tomatoes’ (red inside and out), the wavering class are ‘apples’ (red outside but white inside), and the hostile class are politically unredeemable ‘grapes’ (Chinese public security officials referred to double agents with a similar agricultural metaphor, as ‘radishes’).

The result was a coercive apparatus that achieved a remarkably high degree of societal penetration, providing the regime with an almost unmatched level of surveillance. An extraordinarily large number of people were included in the process of information provision, though either formal or informal means. These included two (eventually three) main formal security agencies, as well as three less formal institutions that nevertheless provided the coercive apparatus with significant


79 At some point official terminology changed; the old term is still common colloquially, so I include it here.

80 Suh, “The Transformation of Class Structure,” p. 75.

quantities of information. (For the sake of brevity, I omit judicial and penal institutions from my discussion,\textsuperscript{82} including the prison camp system for which North Korea has become infamous.\textsuperscript{83})

The three formal agencies are the State Security Department, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Military Security Command. The State Security Department (SSD, \textit{kukka anjon bowibu}) employs an estimated 50-70,000 people, and is organized into provincial headquarters in all 9 provinces (with 200-300 personnel at each), county offices (70-80 officers), and district offices (6-10 people) – allocated at a ratio of approximately 1:1,000 residents.\textsuperscript{84} The Ministry of People’s Security (MPS, \textit{Inmin Bo’anbu}, sometimes referred to as the \textit{Anjeonbu}) handles most non-political policing; it employs an estimated 210,000 police, with an additional 100,000 civilian staff, and is more deeply embedded at the local level than the SSD, with officers down to the village level.\textsuperscript{85} Third is the Military Security Command (MSC, \textit{Bowi Saryeongbu}), which handles surveillance and internal security inside the armed forces (\textit{Choson Inmingun}, the world’s fourth largest military at 1.2 million people).\textsuperscript{86}


\textsuperscript{84} Gause, \textit{Coercion}, pp. 17, 25.


\textsuperscript{86} These are mostly draftees serving ten-year terms. Lankov, \textit{Beyond the DMZ}, p. 193.
Smaller than the MPS or the SSD, the MSC employs an estimated 10,000 people, stationed within all command bodies of the KPA and in units down to the battalion level.\textsuperscript{87}

All three agencies employ informants. MSC officers manage an estimated 6-7 informants in each 120-soldier company.\textsuperscript{88} Defectors who previously worked for the SSD claim that under normal circumstances, the SSD aims for one informer per fifty people, with an even higher proportion in “politically difficult” circumstances; another suggests that each SSD agent fields about fifty informants, so one in every twenty North Koreans informs for the SSD.\textsuperscript{89} Informants are not rewarded materially; instead, they are usually chosen from “amongst those with a minor weakness, such as having a relative who had defected to South Korea or a grandfather who was close to the Japanese.” This makes the informant less likely to be identified by his or her neighbors, more susceptible to threats and control by the security agencies, and more motivated to provide information that might lead to a “mark of honor” on his record or the expunging of something bad.\textsuperscript{90} The quality of informants’ reports is questionable, as anecdotal evidence suggests significant political pressure by “control officers” to come up with evidence of subversion; in at least one case, falsified reports created under pressure resulted in the report’s subject and family being arrested.\textsuperscript{91}

Beyond formal informants, however, much of North Korea’s intelligence advantage appears to come from social institutions that are linked to the coercive apparatus and regularly gather extensive information on society (mechanisms similar to the \textit{baojia} on Taiwan). These institutions

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{87} Gause, \textit{Coercion}, pp. 36-41. In Korean, see memoir by former SSD official Yun Tae-il, \textit{The Inside Story of the State Security Department} (Seoul: Wolgan Choson, 2002).
\item \textsuperscript{88} Gause, \textit{Coercion}, pp. 36-41; Yun, \textit{Inside Story}.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Lankov, \textit{North of the DMZ}, p. 172; Gause, \textit{Coercion}, p. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Gause, \textit{Coercion}, p. 45, footnote 54.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Lankov, \textit{North of the DMZ}, p. 173.
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broaden participation and improve the volume and accuracy of the regime’s information. The principal institutions are the *songbun* system of social classification; the system of “people’s groups,” or *inminban*, and the “organizational life” in which every North Korean citizen must participate.

The first of these social institutions is the classification system developed through the Party Intensive Guidance Project and refined continuously afterward. It is based on an individual’s *songbun*, or class background, and implemented through the Resident Registration System. *Songbun* technically consists both of one’s ideological background (*chulsin songbun*) and one’s individual behavior (*sahoe songbun*), and can evolve over time. In practice, however, a bad family background is difficult to overcome, and it is easier to move down the ladder than up; there are many ways to become an enemy of the regime, but fewer ways to earn merits (many of which rested on historical opportunities that have now passed). As Andrei Lankov explains, the key determinant of a North Korean’s status, in practice, is “what his or her direct male ancestors did in the 1930’s and 1940’s.” The father’s *songbun* matters much more than the mother’s, he argues, and once determined, one’s status is essentially “unchallengeable.” As a result, the institutionalization of the *songbun* concept has made North Korea one of the only Communist systems to formally enshrine hereditary privilege, Oh and Hassig compare it to India’s social castes.

A class category turned to caste, *songbun* is a critical determinant of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in North Korea. It is the “starting point for the regime’s security policies,” as it determines who is an enemy and who is a friend; as one might expect for a system primarily designed to monitor one’s (real or potential) enemies, the most detailed classification system relates

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to the ‘hostile forces’” – 30 of the 51 categories. Songbun investigations are conducted for the explicit purpose of isolating hostile elements, serving the majority of the people, and furthering the protection of the Kim family. Among the system’s guiding principles is the need to investigate everyone’s past and present, in detail and without exception. Where one falls determines whether and how one is include, down to a very granular level: where you live, what school you attend, what job you are assigned, and even perhaps your food allocation through Public Distribution System. Even though North Korea has a reputation for being more inclusive than other Leninist regimes when it comes to party membership, individuals with bad songbun are usually prohibited from joining the KWP. And although 20% of the KPA comes from the hostile class, they serve only in rear areas, on assignments such as construction work. They are not allowed to occupy the front lines or carry weapons, nor are they represented in the officer corps. The officer corps is 80% core class and 20% wavering, and the wavering class members are not allowed to lead units larger than a battalion,

94 Collins, Songbun, p. 16.

95 There is some debate over the size of each class; see Lankov, “The Repressive System,” p. 5. Kim Il-Sung stated publicly in 1958 that the core class represented 25% of the population (an estimated 3.2 million people); the wavering class 55%; and the hostile class 20%, but sources have since suggested that membership in the hostile class may be growing; the 1980 Party Congress reportedly said 25-50-25%. For various figures, see Collins, Songbun, p. iv; Oh and Hassig, The Hidden People of North Korea, p. 198; Lankov, “The Repressive System,” p. 5; Kongdan Katy Oh, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 June 2003, reprinted as “Political Classification and Social Structure in North Korea,” Brookings Institution, available online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2003/06/05northkorea-oh.


97 Collins, Songbun, pp.iii, 65-70.

98 Around 15% of the population belongs to the KWP. The comparable statistic for Romania is 15.8%, compared to 6.8% in the USSR, 8.3% in Poland, and 7.6 in Hungary. See also comparable figures on Taiwan in Chapter Two. Lankov et al, pp. 196-197; Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1995), p. 309; Lankov, North of the DMZ, p. 198-201; Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 41; Mackerras, “The Juche Idea,” p. 159.
(roughly 500 people). Those outside the boundaries of the “core class” are, not surprisingly, targeted for violence: if accused of a crime, people with low songbun generally receive harsher sentences than those with a more favorable background.

*Songbun* and the Resident Registration System create an impressive informational advantage for the regime, providing organized and detailed intelligence on every individual in North Korea. Both the individual files and the classifications themselves are extensive, and are updated regularly to reflect new events and emerging social and economic categories, such as the return of ethnic Koreans from Japan and changes to the DPRK domestic economy that occurred in the 1990s.

Individual files, created at age 17, contain information on one’s family background (*chulsin songbun*), birthplace, birthdate, basic family information, medical information, fingerprints, blood type, handwriting samples, as well as birth records, military service records, citizen registration papers, records of internal and foreign travel, organizational entrance and membership documentation, marriage records, housing unit forms, political information, and any prison or security-related paperwork. Changes or updates must be reported within 15 days or a penalty is imposed (three

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99 Collins, *Songbun*, pp. 60, 63-4.; Oh and Hassig, *The Hidden People of North Korea*, p. 202. The percentage was lower than that until the late 1980’s, when North Korea’s military expansion forced some inclusion of the hostile class.


days in the case of changes in residence). An investigative update is conducted every two years by local MPS officers assigned to the “ Resident Registration Project” unit, a process that includes interviews with the individual as well as with family members, local members of the party committee, and members of his/her housing and work unit.

As a concept, *songbun* is determined, implemented, and used by the coercive apparatus. The initial survey is done by an investigating officer, reported to a committee including the city/county police chief, MPS section chiefs, and a Resident Registration officer, and then approved by the local party secretary. The file is then held by the Registration Officer at the local MPS office, and this person works with the local “people’s group” supervisor (*inminbanjang*, see below) to keep the records up to date. Files are now digitized and stored underground, and are available to a wide range of local and national security and “organizational life” personnel for use in investigations (SSD for civilians, MSC in the KPA). A second copy is regularly held by the SSD in order to prevent officers from being bribed to upgrade one’s status. The files of any personnel assigned to the protection of the Kim family – including those that work on products that they consume – are color-coded to facilitate special monitoring.

Another feature of surveillance and social control is the * inminban* system. A “people’s group” (*inminban*) typically consists of 30-40 families living in the same neighborhood or apartment building,
with the *inminban* number labeled on the outside of the residence. Each is headed by an *inminbanjang*, usually a middle-aged or older woman who receives increased food rations or a small payment as a perk for the position. Her tasks typically include conducting ideological study sessions and organizing people for civic duties like neighborhood maintenance. However, *inminbanjang* are also a front-line component of the surveillance system; they formally report to the local party offices and also consult with the MPS and SSD approximately once a week.¹⁰⁸ *Inminbanjang* own copies of keys to all residences, conduct radio checks, and make unannounced home visits (*sukpak komyol*) at night. They are responsible for recording and reporting to the local police on any overnight visitors: name, gender, place of registration, identification number on their citizens’ certificate (*gongminchung*), travel permit (*tonghaengjung*) number, length of visit, and reason for visiting.¹⁰⁹ *Inminban* heads are held responsible if members of their group do anything wrong, and the system is enforced through overlapping jurisdictions designed to prevent bribery and misreporting; MPS or SSD officials accompany the *inminbanjang* on home checks, and each *inminban* has one undercover informant reporting to MPS, and one to SSD—leading to triplicate reporting on each residential unit.¹¹⁰

If *songbun* investigations, resident registration, and the *inminban* are not enough, yet another feature of North Korea’s social control system is “organizational life” (*chochik saenghwal*), described as “a highly formalized array of surveillance and indoctrination practices that are conducted within a set of networks, each run by a particular government-controlled ‘organization’.”¹¹¹ North Korea has five

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organizations, the most important of which is the Korean Workers’ Party. For those ages 14-30, there is the Youth Union; for those over thirty in agriculture or industry, the Farmers’ and Trade Unions; and for unemployed women over age 30, the Women’s Union. Derived from Soviet “social life” (obshhestvennaia zhizn) and having some resemblance to its Chinese cognate (zuzhi shenghun), North Korea’s organizational life is nevertheless distinctive in two significant ways. First, the system is totally inclusive: in contrast to the Soviet Union, which included Party members but not the general population in its organizational reach, membership in one of the five organizations in North Korea is compulsory and non-voluntary. Except for KWP membership, it is assigned automatically based on one’s workplace, age, gender, etc. Second, membership is non-duplicative: unlike the Soviet Union, since 1974 overlapping membership has not been allowed. Both universality and non-redundancy of membership prevent ambiguity and facilitate efficient social control. North Korea still discusses organizational life using the Stalinist metaphor of a “transmission belt” (inchontae); cells of 10-20 members conduct twice-weekly education and mutual criticism sessions (saenghwa chonghwa) that perform the functions of indoctrination and surveillance.

112 The Children’s Union is reportedly not considered a full organization.


114 Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, p. 1301.

115 With the exception of when KWP cadres assume managerial positions in other organizations. Armstrong, “Name, Origins, and Development,” p. 49.


For a more extensive study of the Mutual Criticism Sessions system, in Korean, see Yi, U-yong, and Hwang Kyu-Chin. “A Study of the Formation of the Mutual Criticism Session in North Korea” [“Pukhanui
Kim Jong Il: Succession and the Re-Emergence of Elite Threats?

As Kim Yong-ju’s health weakened, the role of successor shifted to Kim Jong Il, a son of Kim Il Sung who had spent the 1960’s working on party organization and propaganda. While the balance of threats in the minds of the North Korean leadership cannot be determined with any certainty, the succession process appears to have re-awakened fears of an elite threat in North Korea, particularly from powerful figures in the military and security apparatus. According to Hajime Izumi, Kim concluded from the Lin Biao incident in China that appointing a non-relative as a successor had weakened Mao too much, and that only a son could be trusted to manage the country on his behalf without creating an alternate center of power. Kim Il Sung therefore orchestrated the succession process to avoid that risk; the limited evidence available suggests that he did not entirely succeed. As Kim Jong Il gradually assumed power, rumors of opposition and coup plots began to mount, particularly in the early 1990s when he formally took control of the KPA and the National Defense Commission. These included both a supposed Soviet-backed plot in April 1992 that resulted in the purge and execution of a supposed 300+ officers, and a second plot among the 6th Corps in North Hamgyong province in 1995.


On mutual criticism sessions in China, see Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China; on somewhat similar ideological campaigns in the Soviet Union, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

117 Kim Yong-ju was reportedly purged in 1975, but reappeared in 1993 without explanation.

118 Author’s interview with Hajime Izumi, Tokyo, February 2013. Lin Biao was Mao’s designated successor from 1966 but died in 1971 in a plane crash, allegedly while fleeing to Mongolia after plotting a coup. See Jin Qiu, The Culture of Power: the Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

119 See “300 High-Ranking Officers Executed,” JoongAng Ilbo, 21 March 1996; Lee Kyo Duk and Chung Kyu Sup, Study of Disciplinary Problems in the North Korean Army (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification,
Kim Jong Il’s rise to power in the 1970s was characterized not only “by a dramatic expansion and reorganization of the internal security apparatus,” but by institutional changes that one would expect to see from a regime suddenly more concerned about coup-proofing and elite threats. Kim Jong Il ruled differently than his father, personalizing and weakening the institutions that Kim Il Sung had constructed. With respect to coercive institutions, this meant that he introduced fragmentation and competition. The two major developments in the coercive apparatus under Kim Jong Il were the creation of the State Security Department, and the rise in power of the Military Security Command. As a result, North Korea shifted from a relatively unitary internal security system to one that fragmented power among three security agencies, all of which reported not to the Cabinet (like other ministries), but directly to the head of state. Under Kim Jong Il, the social composition of North Korea’s ruling circle also narrowed, including only the descendants of the Kim family and a few families who fought with Kim Il Sung; to date, however, the regime maintains the inclusive (if non-voluntary) intelligence-gathering apparatus described above.

Though North Korea under Kim Jong Il continued its emphasis on popular penetration and social control, it also narrowed the ruling elite and made that group more exclusive. Over time, power became vested in the Kim family and their relatives, as well as a handful of elite families who had fought with Kim Il Sung. At the end of the 1960s, another purge removed a group of military


120 Gause, *Coercion*, p. 110.


leaders who supported Pak Kum-Chol rather than Kim Yong-ju as heir apparent. Kim Il Sung replaced Minister of Public Security Sok San with a relative, Kim Pyong-ha, further strengthened the role of the KPA’s political commissars (now placing them at the regimental level), and allowed Kim’s Ministry of Public Security to monitor the military. By the end of the 1960’s, North Korea’s inner circle only included those with whom Kim IL Sung shared either a family tie or a strong bond from the Manchurian guerilla campaign. Kang Song-san, Hwang Jang-yop, and a dozen others were among the relatives with prominent leadership positions; the use of familial metaphors to characterize the regime grew more prevalent. In the 1980 Politburo, the twelve former guerilla comrades of Kim’s formed the majority; as time passed, their posts were handed to their children, leading Andrei Lankov to characterize the North Korean elite as “closed and hereditary.”

Lankov also directly attributes this narrowing of elites to Kim Il Sung’s need to protect Kim Jong Il from a potential elite/coup threat: “Kim hoped to safeguard his (and his son’s) position, to protect himself from the dangerous moves of the nomenklatura which toppled not one Communist leader.” There is little question that over time, the upper echelons of the North Korean regime have become more exclusive.

The other methods of reorganization were structural rather than compositional; they gradually increased the level of fragmentation within the coercive apparatus. When a new constitution was adopted in 1972, the Ministry of Public Security became the Public Security

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123 These leaders had also reportedly pushed for a more militaristic foreign policy, leading to the increase in infiltrations in the late 1960’s described in the chapter on South Korea. Gause, pp. 106-07; Yun, Inside Story of the State Security Department.


125 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p. 72.

126 Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung, p. 73.
More significant, however, was the February 1973 creation of the State Political Security Department (SPSD, *Gukga Jeongchi Bowibu*), formed by extracting four Bureaus from Public Security. Former Minister of Public Security Kim Pyong-ha became SPSD’s minister.\(^\text{128}\)

In October 1973, when Kim Jong Il became head of the KWP Secretariat for Organization and Guidance (OGD), he acquired appointment and inspection power, as well as authority over the internal security apparatus; the new SPSD reported to Kim Il Sung through the President’s Office, and to Kim Jong Il through the KWP.

In this new capacity, Kim Jong Il altered the lines of reporting that provided him with information. Under the “monolithic guidance system,” all information was supposed to flow to him, and all decisions come from him.\(^\text{129}\)

He sent out OGD inspection teams to party and government offices, and instituted a “three-line, three-day” reporting system in which the three lines – party, government, and secret police – each briefed him every three days. In 1975, when “Kimilsungization” was applied to the KPA, OGD inspection teams visited the military, and an additional three lines of reporting were established: the General Political Bureau (political commissar system), the General Staff, and the Military Security Command. Drawing from a Soviet template, reporting within these organizations moved primarily along vertical lines, and was highly stovepiped. Where lateral relationships existed, they were carefully monitored, strictly limited in substance, and functioned differently from the comparable relationships in China or the Soviet Union. Ken Gause notes that North Korea has typically been “even more reluctant about forming lateral bonds than the Soviet Union under Stalin” because these relationships could turn into collusion that would

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\(^{127}\) Gause, *Coercion*, p. 110.


\(^{129}\) For a description of this system and its institutionalization, see Gause, *Coercion*, pp. 113-115.
threaten the Kim family. Unlike in China, North Korea’s MPS and SSD report to local party bosses, but do not take orders from them, and provide input to party committees at provincial, district, and city levels, rather than the other way around.

Kim also began to shuffle personnel at a higher rate. In 1975-76, Oh Yong-pang took Han Yong-ok’s place as MPAF Security Bureau Director, former MND-GPD head Choe Won-sik replaced Ri Chin-su at the Department of Public Security, and Ri became Procurator General. After an outbreak of conflict within the SPSD, that agency was renamed the State Security Department (SSD, Gukga Anjeon Bowibu). Many of its personnel were purged and replaced by trusted people who had previously worked for Kim Jong Il in OGD. In April 1982, the SSD and Public Security Department were moved under the KWP. Neither individual appointments nor institutional structures were stable; two vice ministers of public security promoted to the Politburo in 1980 were demoted in 1985, the PSD was returned to the purview of the Administrative Council in 1986, and the SSD was made subordinate to the National Defense Commission (NDC) in 1992. Kim Jong Il continued to assume not only informal but formal control, becoming Supreme Commander of the KPA in 1991 and chair of the NDC in 1993.

The result of this restructuring and reshuffling was to create overlapping missions, multiple channels of command, and “layers of competing and conflicting responsibilities.” Each of these attributes was advantageous to Kim Jong Il – he could use whichever part of whichever organization he preferred, especially if he suspected disloyalty among one organization – but it also stoked incentives for competition. The Political and Security Bureaus in MPS, for example, could report to

130 Author’s conversation with Ken Gause, email, 1 March 2013.


132 Gause, Coercion, p. 19.
to their Minister, directly to Kim outside the normal chain of command, or through KWP OGD and the SSD, making it unclear whether the MPS was the SSD’s peer organization, or subordinate to it.\textsuperscript{133} The Military Security Command similarly reported both through MPAF and directly to Kim. Portfolios increasingly overlapped; for example, monitoring the military, a task previously delegated to the SSD, was done at times during the 1990s by the Military Security Command, whose responsibilities in turn overlapped with the General Political Bureau. An increase in MSC responsibilities in the 1990s also placed it in conflict with the MPS, as the MSC established its own offices at the provincial and city levels to conduct and support non-military operations and investigations.\textsuperscript{134} Kim Jong Il frequently changed missions and tasks between agencies — moving the supervision of border security posts, for example — depending on which agency he wanted to deal with a particular crisis, as well as to keep power balanced among different agencies.\textsuperscript{135} Intelligence gathering was compartmentalized, so that “different intelligence organizations [had] limited contact with each other,”\textsuperscript{136} and the security agencies were encouraged to compete politically to accomplish feats that would honor Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.\textsuperscript{137}

This fragmentation was associated with a higher level of conflict within the security apparatus. Although the causal relationship is not conclusive, Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig argue that fragmentation prevented “the emergence of a monolithic security force that could overthrow the regime,” but also made coordination of intelligence more difficult and created “the possibility of

\textsuperscript{133} Gause, \textit{Coercion}, pp. 29-30.

\textsuperscript{134} Gause, \textit{Coercion}, pp. 18-19, 41.

\textsuperscript{135} Author’s conversation with Bob Collins, email, 2 March 2013.


competition and conflict among the security services.”

Another expert noted, “competition is valued over cooperation… the MPS, SSD, and MSC have often competed and even had turf battles – many times because one did not know what the other was up to.” In the early 1980s, after SPSD head Kim Pyong-ha found himself in conflict with 15 veterans of the organization, he tried to arrest, try, and execute his opponents. The attempt backfired, Kim’s followers were purged, and he took his own life in custody. One former PSD agent recounted turf wars between the SSD and the PSD over what counted as an anti-regime case (subject to SSD authority) versus an economic or social crime (handled by MPS). Other, more recent reports have identified clashes between the SSD and the MPAF, as both sought to enlarge their roles at MPS expense; for example, MPAF reported information about the Youth League in 1997 that the SSD had failed to report, resulting in rewards for the MPAF’s Security Bureau and punishment for both the Youth League and SSD.

III. Development of Internal Security in the People’s Republic of China, 1927-57

Like the North Korean case, the case of China provides some support for the arguments made in previous chapters, as well as raising additional questions for future consideration. First, the nature of the threats confronted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) early in its history decisively shaped its approach to internal security, and did so more than institutional inheritance or external influence. Where China is different, however, is that that early – and institutionally decisive – revolutionary history actually preceded the regime’s assumption of power, whereas social revolutions

138 Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, p. 115, 138.

139 Author’s conversation with Ken Gause, email, 1 March 2013.


141 Oh and Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass, p. 136; Gause, Coercion, p. 130.

142 Gause, Coercion, pp. 18-19, 125-28; “Officers’ Families Just Like the Rest,” DailyNK, 2 December 2011; Kang, Pyongyang Dreams of Exile.
in Taiwan and North Korea occurred afterward.\textsuperscript{143} Much of China’s coercive apparatus, therefore, evolved from CCP experiences in the two decades prior to assuming power in 1949. These institutions originally drew heavily on Soviet organizational structure and practice, with Chinese public security organs playing a functionally equivalent role to the state security agencies of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{144} Before even assuming power, however, Chinese leaders had rejected the Soviet Union’s foreign template in favor of a distinctively Chinese approach to intelligence, coercion, and social control, which they deemed more appropriate to the conditions facing the CCP at the time. Examining China’s experience thus confirms that threat management, rather than institutional path dependence or external influence, was the principal factor driving the design of coercive institutions.

As in Taiwan and North Korea, the CCP’s internal security apparatus became primarily oriented toward popular control. In the context of civil war against the Nationalists, the major threat to the CCP was popular defection and support for the KMT. In order to win, the CCP needed good intelligence from the people and support from them; this, in turn, required not alienating them with excessive violence. After initially failing to construct this kind of apparatus and engaging in costly violence among the party and society – developments that helped precipitate the Long March and near-extinction of the CCP’s fortunes – CCP leaders addressed this need by altering their coercive institutions and their approach to internal security. China’s coercive organizations became distinct from their Soviet counterparts in that they were no longer simply

\textsuperscript{143} The KMT is also a revolutionary Leninist party. However, I argue that one of the fundamental attributes of revolution that matters for internal security is the close linkage that revolution engenders between the coercive apparatus and the population. The KMT’s revolution did not take place on Taiwan, and so it was forced to develop those linkages after assuming power. The same is true of the territory of North Korea. On the KMT’s revolutionary heritage, see C. Martin Wilbur, \textit{The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-28} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Lloyd E. Eastman, \textit{The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-37} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Jonathan D. Spence, \textit{The Search for Modern China} (New York: Norton, 1999, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed.).

\textsuperscript{144} Schoenhals, \textit{Spying for the People}, p. 15.
vertically controlled, but also responsible to and integrated horizontally with local party leadership: the *tiao-kuai* (条块) system.\textsuperscript{145} China's use of an extensive network of agents and informants, as well as its use of rural and urban militias to mobilize and involve the population in security work, also played an important role in making the institutions relatively unfragmented and inclusive.

The Chinese case also suggests that the CCP was able to retain this model after 1949 because their prior revolutionary experience – as happened in both Taiwan and North Korea after the KMT and KWP came to power – not only made public security institutions popularly inclusive at the ground level, but because, at the top level, the process weeded out elites who might otherwise have been a significant threat and created a need for organizational coup-proofing. (Joseph Fewsmith’s observation with respect to contemporary China that “the key to political stability was strong and stable relations at the top of the system and regularization of the party system below” seems equally applicable to the immediate post-1949 period; the elimination of elite rivals in the course of revolution seems to explain why the CCP avoided, at least temporarily, the organizational tradeoffs that other autocrats face between the priority of elite protection and popular management.\textsuperscript{146}) As a result, until the advent of the Cultural Revolution, China relied on a coercive apparatus that was both unitary and inclusive, and which recognized the imperative of obtaining intelligence from outside its immediate power base. As in North Korea, however, there is some evidence that awareness of an impending succession may have reactivated elite rivalries. And as in North Korea, there is also limited evidence – far from systematic – suggesting that where organizational


competition and social isolation have been present in the CCP’s history, their coercive institutions have engaged in heightened violence.

**Early Foundations: Pre-1949 Experiments with the Soviet Model**

The primary impetus for the Chinese Communist Party’s formation of intelligence and security organizations was the threat posed by the Nationalist government against which the CCP was struggling in civil conflict. Though security committees had existed inside the CCP-organized labor movement prior to 1927, the party first created a central organization for security purposes in spring of that year, after the collapse of the United Front with the Kuomintang led to violent Nationalist attacks against the Communists in both urban and rural areas. That year, the CCP Central Committee set up a Special Services Division (zhongyang teke, or SSD), and in 1929, they established in the Jiangxi Soviet (at the provincial level) the Commission for Suppressing/Eliminating Counterrevolutionaries.

The Commission was an ad hoc organization that emerged to cope with the urgent security crisis imposed by the collapse of the United Front. Unrestrained by legal status or structure, it assumed broad extralegal powers of investigation and summary justice, and was initially quite violent. Fear of infiltration prompted the Commission to engage in wide-scale anti-counterrevolutionary (sufan) campaigns inside the base areas, which resulted in purges and killings of

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thousands of suspected counterrevolutionaries. The purges were significant not only for the violence they caused, but because of what the justifications of violence revealed about the CCP’s understanding of the threats it faced. First, the thinking of CCP leaders linked internal security and external defense in ways that analogized from the Soviet Union. Somewhat like the Soviet reasoning behind orders to punish soldiers who retreated during World War II, Commission member General Li Zhimin argued explicitly that a campaign of purges would incentivize military performance and lead to victory on the battlefield. The idea that fear, coupled with the need to prove loyalty – or simply innocence – would improve front-line units’ combat effectiveness therefore justified the extensive purges. Second, “army units at the level of battalion and above were reorganized so that officers and soldiers were not familiar with each other.” Social heterogeneity, it was believed, would prevent collusion, because soldiers who did not know each other would avoid any conversation that might lead to them being accused of participation in a counterrevolutionary clique. Both of these decisions de-prioritized the importance of unit cohesion, which Western militaries have long identified as a critical factor in combat effectiveness; no unit-level data on battlefield performance exists that could test General Li’s hypothesis. Though the measures were justified on


151 Guo, China’s State Security, p. 29.

the grounds of external defense, however, they were also an early attempt to protect the CCP leadership from its own soldiers.

When the CCP decided to formalize the Commission, they drew on Soviet models for institutional creation. In March 1931, the Commission was replaced by a Political Security Department (Zhengzhi Baowei Chu, PSD); local branches of the Commission became local branches of the PSD. The PSD, renamed the State Political Security Bureau with the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic in late 1931, followed the organizational template of the Soviet GPU/NKVD.\textsuperscript{153} Under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, it recruited massive networks of informants throughout the base areas to spy on the population, the party, and the Red Army; within the military, it sent supervisory political officers (tēpāi yuàn) to every regiment and secretly recruited informants (wàng yuàn) at the company level and often even below.\textsuperscript{154} Perhaps most importantly, the early SPSB, like its Soviet template but unlike later incarnations of Chinese internal security organizations, did not answer to local governments or local party committees; it took orders and reported only vertically, to its own leadership.\textsuperscript{155}

The behavior of the Commission and its PSD/SPSB successor organization reflected the impact of leadership struggles in both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist movement; factionalism above led to violence below. In July 1929, after sidelining Bukharin, the Soviet

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Comintern began to reflect Stalin’s harder line, and called for struggle against “right deviationists and rich peasants.” A parallel campaign unfolded in China. As Guo Xuezhi writes:

The SPSB carried out mass terror operations and purges, killing tens of thousands of people… the 1931 campaign against the [Nationalist Anti-Bolshevik] AB Corps in the Jiangxi base areas; the great suppression of counter-revolutionaries in the Hubei, Hunan, and Anhui base areas from 1932 to 1934; and the purges against the Reorganization Clique [Gaizu pai] in the Hunan and Western Hubei base areas from 1932 to 1934. The logic of these purges had to do with both the strategy of revolution and internal elite politics. Revolutionary struggle linked external and internal security in the minds of the CCP’s leaders. Purging internal spies was necessary to break the external threat of Nationalist encirclement, and party leaders similarly credited the soldiers’ mutiny in the Futian/AB Corps incident to infiltration by a pro-Nationalist faction. The purges also, however, resulted from purely internal conflict between Mao and leading CCP figures in southwest Jiangxi, who disagreed with him over the extent of land seizure, Mao’s desire to appoint Liu Shiqi and Zeng Shan as party leaders, and the rejection at the October 1930 Luofang conference, of Mao’s military strategy against the Nationalist encirclement. Purging rivals on the grounds that they were members of the AB Corps helped to solidify Mao’s control, as well as that of Kang Sheng, who had aligned himself with Mao and taken charge of intelligence activities after returning from the Soviet Union in the late 1930’s.

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Soviet-style organization led to Soviet-style purges, marked by dramatic levels of violence. As a result of the Futian mutiny, a total of 4,400 soldiers and officers from the First Front Army were arrested (11% of its total fighting strength), and over two thousand killed.\textsuperscript{160} The 1931 campaign led by Zhang Guotao in Hubei, Henan, and Anhui led to purges of 2,500 soldiers and the death of 60-70% of the officers at or above the regimental level.\textsuperscript{161} Purges in four large-scale campaigns mounted by Xia Xi in the Hunan and Hubei border base areas led to the death of over 10,000 people between 1932 and 1934, and a decrease in the strength of the Third Army by over 25%.\textsuperscript{162} Michael Dutton cites a figure of 46,000 people wrongfully arrested or executed in just three of the base camps.\textsuperscript{163} As in the Philippines, accounts of the time indicate that both a lack of real intelligence and political incentives for violence fed the rising wave of executions. Severe torture was used to extract false confessions (an interrogation practice called \textit{bigongxin}), and confessions were generally considered insufficient unless they also implicated others – a process that led to ever widening spirals of violence based on false information and no concrete evidence.\textsuperscript{164} Party leaders in the different base areas also competed with each other to prove their commitment to the cause. Zealotry was success, measured in body counts: a question of who could flush out the most counter-revolutionaries and promote the highest degree of loyalty-to-the-death among military units. The consequences of this approach were deadly.


\textsuperscript{161} Guo, \textit{China's State Security}, pp. 36-37.

\textsuperscript{162} Part of this decrease may be due to losses in battles with the Nationalist military. Xiao Ke, “Hong er, liu juntuan huishi qianhou,” [Red Army Second and Sixth Army Group Joint Force, before and after],” \textit{Jindaishi Yanjiu} [Research on Contemporary Chinese History], Vol. 1 (1980), pp. 1-38; Guo, \textit{China's State Security}, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{163} Dutton, \textit{Policing Chinese Politics}, p. 66.

Relatively quickly, China’s approach to internal security organization began to diverge from that of the Soviet Union. There appear to have been two reasons for this, the first of which was a growing awareness of the costs of political terror by members of the Communist leadership surrounding Mao. As early as 1931, both Xiang Ying and Zhou Enlai, from their positions in the CCP’s Central Bureau in Jiangxi, wrote letters or reports critical of Mao’s behavior in the Futian Incident and the *sufan* campaign against the AB Corps. Zhou Enlai particularly emphasized the *sufan* campaign’s “development toward simplification and expansion,” and the costly excesses that had followed.\(^{165}\) Evidence of popular unrest and dissatisfaction with the campaign mounted, as village populations organized to hide or protect accused local officials from the SPSB’s persecutions. CCP officials later credited this overreach with having tipped the balance in favor of the Nationalist military during the fifth encirclement campaign in 1933-34, precipitating the collapse of the base areas and the Long March to Yan’an.\(^ {166}\)

This failure appears to have produced a change in CCP thinking about violence and control. Mao’s influence over internal security was diminished by the arrival of Zhou Enlai in the base area and his assumption of the leadership of SPSB in 1931.\(^ {167}\) The first check on SPSB power was created in spring of that year, separating the functions of investigation/interrogation from the powers of conviction and execution. The way that *sufan* campaigns were incentivized also changed; Zhang Guotao, for example, moved from focusing on the quantity of arrests and killings to defining

\(^{165}\) Quoted in Guo, *China’s State Security*, p. 39; see also Dutton, *Policing Chinese Politics*, p. 53.


\(^{167}\) Guo, *China’s State Security*, p. 42.
success in terms of quality cases of voluntary surrender, confession, and prosecution, before deciding to phase out the campaigns altogether.\(^{168}\)

The second reason was a change in the thinking of Mao himself; the Long March appears to have marked a transition in his thinking to focus on popular mobilization rather than terror.\(^{169}\) Mao admitted to mistakes during the *sufan* campaigns in 1956, but well before that, in Yan’an, he announced a principle of “killing none and arresting few,” and emphasized the role of evidence rather than forced false confessions. When Kang Sheng tried to rejuvenate Soviet-style investigations and purges in the Yan’an rectification and “rescue campaign” (*qiangjiu yundong*) of 1942-43, including the use of false confessions and false accusations, Mao sided with those within the party who objected to these methods, and removed Kang Sheng.\(^{170}\) Afterwards, in the counterrevolutionary campaigns of the 1950s, he directed MPS to ensure that it killed no more than 0.1\% of the population: enough to make a point, but not enough to antagonize the population.\(^{171}\) Apparently sharing the communist preference for agricultural metaphor, he once observed, “Cutting off heads isn’t like cutting up chives. Chives regrow. Heads don’t.”\(^{172}\)

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The result was a change in the organization and management of internal security. During the period of the Second United Front with the Nationalist government from 1937-45, the Central Special Work Commission and then the Central Security Commission (CSC, Zhonggong Zhongyang Baowei Weiyuanhui) handled party security and intelligence, commanding the impeccably named Department of Eliminating Traitors, Spies, and Trotskyites (DETST) to implement its directives in the 8th Route Army and elsewhere. Intelligence and counterespionage became key priorities for the CCP's survival during the conflict with the Japanese, and for achieving an advantageous position vis-à-vis the Nationalist military as well. Under Kang Sheng, DETST and the Central Security Commission created local branches of the CSC as well as DETST-branch organizations (Chujian Baowei Weiyuanhui) and pervasive networks of local informers (wang yuan). The instinct to resist excessive and indiscriminate campaigns of violence remained; when Wang Ming encouraged an unpopular anti-Trotskyite campaign, for example, he lost influence among a CCP leadership who still vividly remembered the costs of the sufan campaigns.

In 1939, the SPSB was abolished in favor of the Social Affairs Department (SAD), and the Central Security Commission was merged into SAD in October of that year. SAD was led by Kang Sheng, who was also appointed head of the CCP Central Committee’s Intelligence Department in

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July 1941, an organization that was also shortly thereafter merged into SAD.\textsuperscript{176} SAD was explicitly assigned both “external” and “internal” intelligence functions. It combined external espionage with internal surveillance of military, party, and government organizations; guarded the top leaders; and established schools for public security education and training.\textsuperscript{177} The Social Affairs Department was complemented by Bureaus of Public Security in CCP-controlled areas, where public security had to at least publicly reflect a united front rather than communist orientation, and so had to have a government face that was at least nominally separate from party security. The Bureaus of Public Security also had a clear division of labor with DETST (the former handled the government, the latter the military), and operated on the principle of “respecting their respective independent work and organization.”\textsuperscript{178} As the civil war progressed, however, the Bureaus of Public Security and SAD essentially merged; by 1946, the CCP had established a General Bureau of Public Security in each regional bureau of its Central Committee, and operated corresponding local bureaus. During the civil war, public security also began to take responsibility for labor camps that held Nationalist prisoners of war and counterrevolutionaries sentenced to reform through labor (\textit{laogai}).\textsuperscript{179}

The development of the Social Affairs Department marked a significant step in the evolution of Chinese public security organs, and a departure from both Soviet precedent and China’s own past practice. Unlike the vertical chain of command that characterized the SPSB, SAD was governed through a two-tiered system. Its officials reported both vertically, to the next-highest SAD agency,

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\item[\textsuperscript{176}] Guo, China’s State Security, p. 67; Liu Xingyi, \textit{Biography of Yang Qiqing} (Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 2006) / 刘星宜, 杨奇清传 (北京市：群众出版社, 2006), p. 94.
\item[\textsuperscript{177}] Guo, China’s State Security, pp. 56, 70; Jeffrey Richelson, \textit{Foreign Intelligence Organizations} (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988), p. 274.
\item[\textsuperscript{178}] Gong’an Shigao, pp. 80-85.
\end{itemize}
and also horizontally, to the local area’s party committee. It both sought advice from the local party committee as it conducted its activities, and reported the results of investigations of any suspicious persons.180

The effect of this structure was to constrain the SPSB, which had two advantages for Mao. First, the change addressed the previous problem of an unaccountable SPSB’s excessive violence by giving local officials oversight over investigations and punishment in their own areas. Party leaders believed that allowing local party organs a say in the operations of public security would prevent the costly excesses of the sufan campaigns and the backlash that followed. Second, it satisfied Mao’s own desire to avoid having the SPSB become so powerful that it could threaten him. In addition to vertical oversight, multiple horizontal checks on the activity of the security apparatus could keep the internal security apparatus from growing too powerful and independent; local party accountability served as a sort of Lilliputian tying down of Gulliver.181

Militias, both urban and rural, played an important role in both the success of the Chinese revolution, and in making the institutions of public and internal security relatively inclusive.182 CCP leaders had organized the first Red Guards (chiweidui) during the Autumn Harvest uprising and the establishment of the Hailufeng Soviet in Guangdong in 1927, and charged them with community defense and with surveillance on behalf of the party.183 Red Guards and the related, more mobile guerilla organizations (youjidui) grew in size during the anti-Japanese resistance, so much so that by

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1945, the People’s Anti-Japanese Defense Corps encompassed nearly 10 million people (10% of the population in liberated areas), of which the militias numbered around 2.2 million; during the civil war that followed, their strength was estimated to exceed 5.5 million.\footnote{184} Urban attempts at organization were generally less successful, since these areas were under KMT and then Japanese control, but throughout, underground party organizations clandestinely tried to recruit worker pickets.\footnote{185} These rural and urban militias, eventually incorporated into the army, constituted fundamental building-blocks of Chinese communist state-building efforts. As such, they were a major channel for recruiting and including large swathes of the population in revolutionary activity. That inclusiveness marked another way in which Chinese coercive institutions were distinct from their Soviet counterparts, who after 1945 incorporated the militias into the OGPU as full-time employees (rather than the army) – and who never achieved the level of popular participation in public security accomplished by China’s part time citizen militias.\footnote{186}

Thus by the early 1940s, some of the distinguishing characteristics of Chinese coercive institutions were already in place. The instinct to make China’s security agencies subject to an overlapping web of both vertical and horizontal constraints was already in evidence, as a way to address both the need to avoid indiscriminate killing of the CCP’s popular base and to ensure that a powerful embedded security organization would not then be able to challenge the Chinese leadership. In keeping with the dissertation’s broader arguments about the origins of internal


\footnote{185} Perry, \textit{Patrolling the Revolution}, Ch. 3.

security institutions, it is clear that threats exerted greater force on the shape of early coercive institutions than did foreign influence or simple institutional path dependence. Kang Sheng’s demotion in 1946 after the excesses of the Yan’an rectification was a personal story emblematic of this process; before even formally taking power, China had moved on to a model of internal security that in organization and practice was distinct from its Soviet predecessor.

After the Revolution: Public Security and Intelligence Post-1949

The Ministry of Public Security was formally created and assumed CSAD’s duties over intelligence and security in October 1949. This work was overseen by Zhou Enlai and Mao, who insisted early on that the public security apparatus report directly to him and not just to Zhou’s cabinet.\(^{187}\) The informational and coercive architecture set up after 1949, largely continuous with what the CCP had established before, explicitly sought to be both unitary and socially inclusive.

The Ministry of Public Security was the chief agency in charge of public and state security in the People’s Republic of China. Based on the similarly integrated SAD, the MPS was unitary in the sense that it was the only agency authorized to deploy operational agents (teqing renyuan) for intelligence gathering purposes; Schoenhals’ observation that it was referred to colloquially as the “Central” MPS (Zhongyang gonganbu, or Zhonggongbu), even after the word central had been formally removed from the organization’s title, suggests the coordinating and unifying role that it was intended to play for the CCP’s Central Committee.\(^{188}\) Boundaries and responsibilities were also clearly demarcated within the geographic and functional subdivisions of the Ministry; provincial officers were not allowed to run agents in other provinces, and the MPS was explicitly forbidden

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from recruiting operatives inside the courts, party organizations, or public security organs.\(^{189}\) (This does not mean, however, that the organizational structure was static; MPS underwent a number of internal restructurings.)\(^{190}\)

As unitary as it was, China was still a large country, and the machinery of the new state did not always run smoothly. Schoenhals characterizes cooperation across the different bureaus of the Ministry, for example, as “an elusive goal,” and notes “a bare minimum of lateral information sharing.” He also, however, describes regional leaders complaining about lower levels not working hard enough to share information and exhorting their subordinates to “fight shoulder to shoulder” with each other, indicating that the goal of the MPS leadership was explicitly not fragmentation and informational stovepiping. Certain cases also testify to the presence of cross-bureau and cross-regional collaboration: for example, one anti-sabotage case whose decade-long operations spanned the central ministry, fourteen provinces, and three municipalities, or another in December 1952 against a “Trotskyite network” spread across eastern China.\(^{191}\) If anything, MPS officials’ complaints reflect that overly thorough coverage was leading in some cases to duplication of efforts and inefficiency.

The early history of the MPS suggests that the Soviet experience was still a major basis for CCP security work, but also implies significant differences of opinion between the KGB and MPS.\(^{192}\) (The Soviet Union’s role was, admittedly, likely to have been minimized in historical accounts written after the Sino-Soviet split, and differences between the two styles inflated. Equally unreliable,

\(^{189}\) Schoenhals, *Spying for the People*, p. 83.

\(^{190}\) Schoenhals, *Spying for the People*, p. 41.

\(^{191}\) Schoenhals, *Spying for the People*, pp. 46-48, p. 75.

however, are American media reports like the *Time* magazine cover story in 1956 that referred to Luo Ruiqing as China’s Beria and the MPS as a direct corollary to the NKVD.\(^{193}\) On the side of collaboration, Soviet tradecraft appears to have been disseminated in MPS textbooks; the USSR’s technical surveillance capabilities also appear to have been much admired (though because of resource constraints, more admired than actually duplicated).\(^{194}\) Over time, however, Soviet experience was de-emphasized and China’s own knowledge and experience became the basis for training. In contrast to Kang Sheng, Chen Long, one of the heads of the 1st Bureau of the MPS who had also studied in the Soviet Union during the purges of the 1930s, had returned in 1938 with a view of Soviet methods and their efficacy that was much more skeptical and less enthusiastic.\(^{195}\) One Chinese participant in the advising process complained that the Soviet advisors “did not understand the Chinese situation, were unfamiliar with their Chinese surroundings…. Hence much of the time their proposals were in appropriate, at times even laughable.”\(^{196}\) Differences appear to have been particularly acute in the Campaign to Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries (*zhengfan*) from 1950-53, where Soviet advisors favored a more jurisprudential approach and disliked Mao’s reliance on the mass line and (to Soviet thinking, unruly) popular participation – participation that was in part a lesson learned from the problems that had emerged with the previous *sufan* campaigns.\(^{197}\)

\(^{193}\) “High Tide of Terror,” *Time*, 5 March 1956, online at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,808241,00.html


advisors departed as a group in 1958, and later CCP resolutions referred negatively to this experience, referencing the “problem of learning from foreign countries.”\footnote{Schoenhals, \textit{Spying for the People}, p. 25.}

Rather than draw blindly from foreign models, the MPS sought to understand the threat environment in which it operated and to adjust its policies and actions accordingly. In 1950, its work report included an explicit threat assessment and identified priority targets within the population that should have resources allocated to their surveillance.\footnote{Gong’an Shigao, p. 251.} The principal threat was popular: police sources estimated 2 million armed bandits, 600,000 spies, and 600,000 Nationalist elements at large in autumn of 1949.\footnote{Dutton, \textit{Policing Chinese Politics}, p. 149; Yang, “Reconsidering the Campaign.”} Subsequent years’ reports included discussion of redistributing attention to coastal areas, for example, or industrial and mining regions, where the threat level was higher. Regional and provincial bureaus were allowed some latitude in determining what was necessary, and on that basis sometimes tried to recruit more agents, and sometimes reported that no new agents were necessary.\footnote{Schoenhals, \textit{Spying for the People}, p. 23.} These reports are incomplete, but they clearly illustrate that the public security organs consciously assessed the threats that they faced, and assigned resources and personnel accordingly.

Once the threats had been identified, obtaining and managing information on them was a priority of the CCP, and especially a priority of the first Vice Minister of the MPS, Yang Qiqing.\footnote{Liu, \textit{Yang Qiqing Zhuan}, p. 183.} In 1948, SAD had issued an order to transfer all documents and archives to the public security departments, and prohibited the destruction of any records.\footnote{Schoenhals, \textit{Spying for the People}, p. 122.} MPS officers also constructed

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\item Schoenhals, \textit{Spying for the People}, p. 25.
\item Gong’an Shigao, p. 251.
\item Dutton, \textit{Policing Chinese Politics}, p. 149; Yang, “Reconsidering the Campaign.”
\item Schoenhals, \textit{Spying for the People}, p. 23.
\item Liu, \textit{Yang Qiqing Zhuan}, p. 183.
\item Schoenhals, \textit{Spying for the People}, p. 122.
\end{enumerate}
additional files of their own, both on the agents they recruited and on the information obtained through these agents. MPS officers who recruited agents did extensive research on a potential agent's background, using archives, personal interviews, and conversations. They recorded this data in an “Agent Personal File” that summarized an agent’s name, sex, age, ancestral home, address, education, occupation, ethnicity, religion, status (shenfen, including both class background (chushen) and personal circumstance (chengfen)), organizational and political affiliations, personal and social relationships, political attitudes, behavior since recruitment, achievements during service, and any incriminating information that could later be used to control the agent if necessary; it sometimes also contained a photograph.204 Precise statistics on the number of agents and informants employed by the MPS are not available, but in 1956, the MPS stipulated that each of its officers should manage 15 or more agents, with senior officers managing 3-5 higher-level agents.205 Agents in turn obtained information from an array of shehui ermu (“social eyes and ears,” or local activist-informants).206

Although the MPS archival files appear to contained contradictory information, and archival record-keeping was especially weak in rural areas, they were still a major advantage in the eyes of public security officials, and were used accordingly. Extensive use of the files occurred across China; in 1955, for example, officials in Harbin examined the files of over 22,000 individuals, a Hunanese county-level archivist boasted in 1958 of having records on 85% of the township’s adult population and using them in the rural rectification movement, and an article that discussed operations in Fujian province asserted that “a public security archive is a substantial resource in the struggle against the

204 Schoenhals, Spying for the People, pp. 159-166.
205 Schoenhals, Spying for the People, p. 206.
adversary and should be valued accordingly.” One of the main things that information permitted was precise targeting and pre-emptive action with regard to potentially threatening actors, as in a case in Harbin where archival resources allowed officials to find relatives of an arriving target; the officers reported that these resources allowed them to “control the premises where he was likely to attempt to take up residence, and had managed to grasp the initiative.”

MPS officials understood the importance of accurate intelligence enough to grapple seriously with several problems of how best that information could be obtained. Agents were reminded to be scrupulously accurate in debriefing, and wherever possible, the MPS relied on two separate agents to verify all information passed to them by an agent – the second of whom was called a “duplicate line” (fuxian) – or verified information by using physical or technical surveillance. One Case Group explicitly records that having multiple sources of information helped confirm the truthfulness of the information supplied by an individual agent. In contrast to the Philippines and Chun’s apparatus in South Korea, the MPS also cautioned against using agents in visible ways to simply intimidate people, rather than covertly for obtaining information. As one official argued in 1950, “to merely position more guards and restrict people’s movements, that is to take a passive attitude and is of limited use.”

The Ministry also wrestled with whether the incentives it provided to lower-level officers would skew the information provided by them. The initial quotas for numbers of agents reporting to each officer may have been reasonable at the beginning, when public security officers themselves were in short supply: less than 73,000 nationally in 1950, and 330,000 by 1953 for a population of


209 Schoenhals, *Spying for the People*, p. 73, 113-14, 118, 218.

588 million people – a ratio of 1:1,781. However, MPS officers quickly objected that this numerical emphasis was leading to recruitment practices that counted quantity more than quality. As early as 1952, a bureau expressed concern with the quota system, noting “mere numbers are enough; quality is not asked for.” A more formal 1967 document criticized the quota system as a wholesale adoption of inappropriate Soviet practice, arguing that it had led agents to create fictional success stories to avoid falling short. In response, the MPS stressed the need for agents to be recruited for a specific purpose; when an agent was thought to have exhausted his usefulness, the reasons for termination were outlined and approved, and the agent released from service.

The MPS also debated whether setting targets for percentages of cases that should be cracked in a given year – for example, 60% nationwide in 1958 – would lead officers to act on cases before full intelligence could be obtained. In October 1950, first Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing delivered a report from a nationwide conference on public security operational work, in which he stated that for each case, “consideration should be given to other cases that tie in with it. Myopia as well as impetuosity are to be resisted.” To balance the quotas, the MPS emphasized the need to maintain a long-term view and avoid hasty arrests that might lead to incomplete neutralization of threats.

The MPS also considered questions around how material rewards and physical coercion would play into the supply of intelligence. One textbook criticized the materially-motivated agents of the capitalist countries, while praising the patriotic purity of CCP agents; though this assessment is undoubtedly self-motivated, it does appear that officers were generally limited, at least on paper, to


212 Quoted in Schoenhals, Spying for the People, p. 112.

213 Schoenhals, Spying for the People, p. 206.

214 Cited in Schoenhals, Spying for the People, p. 22.
making sure their agents did not suffer so much economic hardship that it would prevent them from reporting. Excessive generosity to agent sources, however, was considered “counterproductive.” Information obtained through physical interrogation was also distrusted because of the incentives for falsification. Both of these policies stand in notable contrast to the ways in which information was obtained in places like the Philippines under Marcos, and limited the personal incentives that MPS officials might have had to increase the levels of violence.

The MPS was also aware that social inclusivity would improve information provision. Officers in training at the Central People’s Public Security Academy, for example, were told in 1957 that “agents are secretly recruited from all social strata” – including not just party members, but also backward elements and members of the hostile classes. Luo Ruiqing reminded his ministry in 1950 that the officers could not limit themselves to working with Party and Youth League members; pure members of the revolutionary masses would stand out in the hostile environments from which the CCP most needed information. Nor was this mere rhetoric; a task force visiting Shanxi in 1954-55 criticized plainclothes MPS officers because their dress and appearance didn’t blend with the local population. Backwards elements, though less reliable, were seen as critical “societal assets” (shehui liliang), and specific instructions were provided on how to handle agents from the different social strata. In obtaining information and recruiting sources, MPS officials were also cautioned to be aware of the “power ladder” in Chinese society, and to send someone from the target’s own social strata to recruit him/her, rather than someone in an inferior position. Information was most effectively obtained, they advised, when “common soldiers approach other common soldiers and


generals approach other generals.” 

Social distance between the public security officials and their targets, in other words, would hamper intelligence collection, while a degree of social closeness and similarity would facilitate it. For this reason, the MPS needed to be as inclusive as possible.

The MPS’s emphasis on inclusion also covered ethnic minorities, where the CCP was aware that it lacked officers and informants. These populations were therefore subject to special attempts to recruit public security officials and agents. Recruitment instructions for ethnic minority areas issued in 1954 specifically stressed that the lessons from the interior might not be appropriate, that coercive recruitment practices were prohibited, that agents should pay attention to recruiting in culturally appropriate ways, and that public security work should focus on “a long term commitment to uniting with [ethnic minorities] so as to make them work for us.”

As in other areas, long-term information gathering was the goal; in 1961, a report called for the need to “build up resources over a long period of time.”

Public security academies gave preferential admittance to certain ethnic groups; starting in 1954, the Central People’s Public Security Academy (CPPSA) “organized special classes for officers from some of China’s larger ethnic minority groups,” including thirteen different minorities from Xinjiang.

The CCP specifically believed that having public security officers from these regions would help to limit tensions, writing that Mongolians who were discontented with the CCP would object less if unappealing policies were implemented by Mongolian officers, thereby avoiding the outbreak of ethnic conflict. Some of the Tibetan students who received training from the MPS in 1955-57 were sent back to help calm Tibet when the 1959 revolt broke out.

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221 Schoenhals, *Spying for the People*, p. 68.

222 Schoenhals, *Spying for the People*, p. 175.

223 Schoenhals, *Spying for the People*, p. 175.
Finally, CCP efforts at social control employed two different file systems: the household registry (户口, *hukou*) and personnel file (人事档案, *renshi dang’an*) systems. These systems have deep historical roots; in his work on the *hukou*, Fei-Ling Wang observes that Chinese rulers have sought to measure, organize, and register the population through census investigations, household registration projects, and files for centuries.\(^{224}\) The *dang’an* file has been called the basic socialist database by which the Chinese state keeps track of its citizens; the file is usually held at an individual's work unit, and a copy placed with the local office of the Ministry of Public Security.\(^{225}\)

Contemporary China’s household registration system inherited its spatially oriented logic of social control from the historic *baojia*.\(^{226}\) Since Chapter 3 treats at some length the failed attempt of the Nationalist government to institutionalize the *baojia* system in the chaotic period from 1927 to 1949, for the sake of brevity I will not recapitulate its origins here.\(^{227}\) The CCP, however, organized its own version of the *baojia* in areas under Communist control as early as 1939, using the system in Jiangxi as well as later on in northern Shanxi. Every five families formed a “connected assurance” (*lianbao*) group collectively responsible for ensuring the revolutionary fidelity of inhabitants and reporting the presence of any outsiders.

When the CCP assumed control over major cities from the Japanese or Nationalist authorities, it also took over the registration and file systems, even inheriting the old *baojia* cadres at

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the local level, as well as the clerks responsible for verifying and updating dang'an records. The CCP launched household registration drives beginning in the Northeast in April 1948, and also established special files for those deemed a potential political threat. Various campaigns since 1949, as well as a nationwide cadre investigation project in 1956, helped party officials to cross-check and consolidate the personnel dossiers of party members.

Using household registration files for population control and internal security became one of the CCP’s earliest priorities, and thus hukou was almost immediately conceived of as something that would be operated by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). As a 1994 MPS manual for officials explained about the period in 1949:

On the one hand, [we] need to find out [hidden] enemies quickly, assist struggles against the enemy, and maintain the revolutionary order through the hukou management that controls the information on the population. On the other hand, we can provide data to the agencies of the state for their making policies and plans through hukou management that controls the population.

Minister of Public Security Luo Ruiqing stated in November 1950 that maintenance of the hukou system was “a major task.” By 1956, the MPS and its local offices had been given authority to manage the system in both rural and urban areas, and the formal Regulations on Household (Hukou) Registration in the People’s Republic of China were passed in January 1958. In an estimate that actually seems somewhat conservative, MPS sources report that “our hukou system was not only widely established in both rural and urban areas but also basically completed and consolidated” by 1965.

228 Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, pp. 365-71.

229 Hong-Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 330-31. [Note: Lee says this is just for cadres, party members, and YL members; is there a dossier system that includes all citizens? Wang seems to suggest that this is the hukou system.]

230 Cited in Wang, Organizing, p. 44.

231 Cited in Wang, Organizing, p. 46.
As with North Korea’s Resident Registration System, one of the primary advantages of household registration, as well as of the individual file system, is informational. In the 1990’s, China’s police-citizen ratio was between 2-4 police per thousand residents: more than the average of 2:1,000 in developed countries, but far less than the intensive ratio found in either Taiwan or North Korea. Each police station is supposed to have at least one hukou official, at a ratio of one to every 500-700 households, but news reporting in China suggests that the ratio in practice is as low as one for every 800-1,000 households, or even, in one reported case, 2,100 households under supervision of a single “model officer” in Nanchang, Jiangxi. The officer in charge of overseeing these households is mandated to spend at least thirty hours a week in them. Files contain information on an individual’s birth, death, personal data (unspecified), family relations, and migration in/out, and the ideal hukou officer is also expected to know each household’s financial status, social relationships, physical features, accent, and personal or familial habits and preferences.

IV. Comparisons and Conclusions

What do the examples of North Korea and China teach us about coercive institutions, internal security, and state violence under authoritarianism?

Although the evidence is speculative, the cases in this chapter do provide some support for the theory advanced in Chapter One, most convincingly when it comes to the origins of authoritarian coercive institutions. In both China and North Korea, the exigencies of the threats the leaders faced became more important than either path dependence or external influence in

232 About a quarter to a third of these are thought to be assigned to hukou management. Wang, Organizing, p. 79.

233 Wang, Organizing, p. 69.

234 Wang, Organizing, p. 69.
determining the structure and composition of the coercive apparatus. The leaders of both countries initially adopted Soviet structures and accepted Soviet guidance; later, however, they each consciously rejected it in favor of institutional frameworks they found more appropriate for their own circumstances and the threats they faced. International institutional borrowing was undoubtedly present, and I suspect that internal security in these countries would have developed very differently without it, but it was the failure of foreign models, as much as their success, that created the eventual shape of North Korean and Chinese approaches to internal security.

In both cases, threat perceptions appear to have deeply informed the structure and social composition of the coercive apparatus. Revolution-turned-civil-conflict linked external and internal threats, eliminated elite rivalries by violently selecting out rivals who opposed the dominant leader, and contributed to the creation of a unitary, inclusive coercive apparatus that relied on detailed social classification and extensive surveillance as tools of popular control. This popular focus appears to have been the combination of a Leninist predisposition toward cell-like penetration of society combined with the chief security demand of a popular revolution – to win support and information from society. In both cases, the result was a coercive apparatus focused intensively not just on intelligence and popular surveillance, but on social investigation and organization at the household level. And in both cases, the ossification of these categories has, over time, turned class into caste and made the two countries’ political systems much more exclusive.

While historical debates on the success of the Chinese communist revolution often focus on the contributions of either the CCP’s anti-Japanese leadership or its socioeconomic program to popular legitimacy, this chapter identifies a third component of revolutionary success (or perhaps of stability): the contribution that revolution makes to elite politics. In both cases, the popular orientation of the coercive apparatus appears to have been made possible by the reduction of elite conflicts, which dampened the pressure to engage in coup-proofing devices such as institutional
fragmentation and social exclusion. Elite conflict was eliminated during revolution, however, not simply because shared experience somehow produced an enlightened solidarity against outside threats, as some of the comparative literature has argued, but by violently weeding out of the group the rivals whom the dominant leader distrusted and suspected of wanting to take power.235

In other significant ways, however, the two systems discussed in this chapter differ from each other. Their revolutionary struggles occurred in different contexts, especially relative to the process of state-building. China’s revolution and civil war swept Mao and the CCP to power in 1949, while North Korea’s leaders were installed in power in 1945, and pressed on to revolution and civil conflict afterward. Though in both cases elite threats were eliminated violently during the course of revolution, this process took place before the CCP is typically considered a “regime,” while for the KWP it took place afterward. In terms of the timing and consolidation of the coercive apparatus, then, the experience of Kim Il Sung and the KWP is perhaps more similar to that of Chiang Kai-shek and the (also-Leninist) KMT party in Taiwan. Interestingly, all three of these quasi-revolutionary regimes (Taiwan, China, and North Korea) exhibit high violence early in their histories, but because of the timing of revolution relative to statehood, only the experiences in Taiwan and North Korea count formally as “state” violence.

The arguments made by this dissertation also cannot explain everything about coercion and violence in the two cases in this chapter – or even some of the most interesting and important things. Elite purges occurred at parallel points during the history of the regimes in China, Taiwan, and North Korea, but the exact relationship between revolution, communist organization, and elite threat remains puzzling, and many questions remain. The parallel timing of the purges does not answer the question of why they all happened at similar times, nor does it explain why the extended

and violent revolutionary process of solidarity-by-selection seems to have dampened elite threats for at least a generation – something that did not happen in non-revolutionary authoritarian regimes like South Korea or the Philippines, which also had high rates of elite turnover in the first few years. Moreover, the history of both China and North Korea suggests that the onset of succession and generational transfer of power reactivates fears of elite threat – particularly for the successor, but potentially also for the aging incumbent autocrat – but does not explain why elite rivalry surfaced in the context of succession in North Korea and China, but not in Taiwan. Finally, the argument advanced here also fails to fully explain the differential rates of coercive institutional adaptation observed across these five countries. There is therefore a lot of future work that could be done to investigate the relationship between factors such as changing threats, coercive institutions, violence, and authoritarian stability.

This chapter also does not address the question of how the coercive institutions created in China and North Korea shaped patterns of state violence under these regimes. (For reasons explained at the beginning of this chapter, it does not really even try.) Readers will no doubt have noticed that this chapter omitted, and the theory advanced here fails to explain, the best-known episode of state-sponsored violence that occurred in either China or North Korea: China’s Cultural Revolution, which according to recent estimates based on county gazetteers, may have killed between 492,000 and 1,970,000 people. There are indications that some of the factors identified in this study as conducive to increased state violence – such as elite conflict and increased fear of a coup, organizational and factional conflict, and social cleavages – all contributed to the


dynamics of violence during the Cultural Revolution. To argue that these factors caused the Cultural Revolution itself, however, strains credulity. Moreover, even the predictions that we could make about the Cultural Revolution are not necessarily borne out by the limited data that exist: pre-existing factional divisions do not appear to have determined student behavior, and rural violence appears to have fallen along lineage or other “communal” group lines, rather than along the boundaries of class-caste that the regime had so carefully constructed. 240 One could argue that the theory is not meant to explain violence in which a mass movement targeted the public security organs rather than the other way around; one could also argue that because the Red Guards represent the construction of an alternate and competing security organization, the Cultural Revolution is in the broadest of senses consistent with my theory. Neither explanation is particularly satisfying.

What the argument made here does purport to explain is routinized political violence under authoritarianism: variations in the everyday practice of repression carried out by the institutions of surveillance and coercion. Some striking examples suggest that the dynamics of intelligence, social exclusion, and incentives, identified as critical in previous chapters, also played an important role in driving state violence in China and North Korea – for example, Li Chengyu’s decription of how the need to fulfill Mao’s 0.1% quota put pressure on Shandong University to identify exactly 204

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240 Yang Su suggests that violence in rural China during the Cultural Revolution was done in the name of class, but actually implemented along lineage group lines, and violence was especially intense in areas like the Hakka counties of Guangdong and Guangxi where lineage groups are an especially intense form of identity. One might examine how lineage groups mapped onto public security organs in the Hakka counties of Guangdong and Guangxi where violence was especially intense, and then compare that pattern of inclusion to a place where violence was more limited. Yang Su, *Collective Killings*, p. 93.
rightists within its ranks between 1956 and 1958, and led to the public execution of 300 individuals in a stadium in Shanghai in 1951. However, systematic data that capture this kind of routinized repressive violence is currently absent from the historical record on China and North Korea, and what we do know suggests a higher level of state violence than would have been predicted by this theory. Therefore, a comprehensive investigation of how state violence occurred in these countries, and rigorous comparison of communist internal security practices to the practices of anti-communist authoritarianism, must await the opening of archives and records in these two countries. Given that scholarship on the Holocaust is still evolving today, sixty years after those events took place, even the opening of archives will likely be only the beginning of the process of discovery, documentation, and debate.

The theory proposed here suggests that the strength of the coercive apparatus in China and North Korea, and particularly their focus on popular control through inclusive intelligence, should have violence that was fairly targeted at specific sectors of the population. In both systems, but particularly in North Korea, one would have expected state violence to rise over time with the increase in fragmentation that accompanied political succession, and in North Korea’s case, one would expect it to be increasingly severe over time against the individuals classified as having bad songbun. Residents of North Korea’s prison camps (an estimated 1% of North Korea’s population) are indeed believed to be citizens with bad songbun. In China, past observers have commented that political terror, despite its excesses and evils, seems to have taken a generally different form than its Soviet counterpart. The leaders of the Chinese intelligence and internal security apparatus did not

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241 Li, “Mao’s Killing Quotas.”

suffer the same consistently dismal fate as their Soviet counterparts, and state violence in China was also often “directed not against a hypothetically recalcitrant population in general, but only selected sectors in specific conjectural campaigns to suppress counter-revolutionaries, remold intellectuals, etc.” In other words, it was more concentrated and targeted, both across time and within society, than Soviet terror seemed to have been.

Comparing China and North Korea to the three countries examined earlier in this dissertation, however, suggests a possible different way of thinking about political violence. Though it may have been targeted by design, state violence in China and North Korea seems to have relied on classifications for guiding violence that in the end encompassed a comparatively larger proportion of society. One percent may sound low, and it may even have been intended to be low, but it appears to have been higher than the percentage of individuals who were targeted in Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Moreover, rather than repression being the top-down work of a faceless bureaucracy, the greater role of mass movements in China meant that the regime depended on ordinary citizens to supply both violence on behalf of the state, and the information that directed that violence. In some ways, it is not only the scale of violence, but also the opportunity that the Chinese and North Korean regimes provided for ordinary citizens to participate in the work of surveillance and repression, that makes their violence all the more disturbing.

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245 Mass movements appear to be more a feature of Chinese political violence than North Korean. In this respect, North Korea bears more similarity to the Soviet system.
Chapter Six

Conclusion

This project is a first cut at understanding the origins and operation of authoritarian coercive institutions. Although the literature on authoritarian regimes and authoritarian political institutions has largely overlooked the set of institutions in charge of domestic surveillance, repression, and violence, I find that the design of these institutions fundamentally shapes the patterns of state violence experienced by citizens. Authoritarian coercive institutions are not all alike, and neither is the violence that they produce.

Main Findings

The first part of each chapter in this manuscript examined the origins of coercive institutions, and the reasons for variations in their structure and social composition. The second part – with the exception of Chapter Five – examined the effect of these variations on patterns of state violence. I find that autocrats face a fundamental tradeoff between designing their internal security apparatus to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to defend against elite rivals. Coup-proofing against elite threats calls for an internally fragmented security force, drawn exclusively from narrow segments of society. Managing popular unrest requires a unitary, non-fragmented apparatus.
with broadly embedded, socially inclusive intelligence networks. Autocrats construct coercive institutions based on whichever of these threats they perceive to be dominant at the time they come to power. Over time, however, the organizational tradeoffs outlined above, exacerbated by institutional stickiness, blunt these autocrats’ ability to adapt as new threats arise. Organizational characteristics thus give rise to predictable patterns of state violence. A more fragmented, socially exclusive security apparatus – associated with a high initial threat from fellow elites – is likely to be more violent, both because it has stronger incentives to engage in violence and because it lacks the intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate, pre-emptive repression.

The cases examined here conform to this theory. Prior to 1949, Chiang Kai-shek’s coercive apparatus was oriented toward protecting him from the elite rivals he faced on the mainland; it was fragmented and excluded native Taiwanese, and state violence on Taiwan was high. The move to Taiwan in 1949 caused Chiang to re-evaluate his threat environment, however, and in the early 1950’s, the KMT instituted a series of reforms, reducing fragmentation and increasing the number of Taiwanese who were involved in the coercive apparatus and particularly its intelligence collection networks – with the result that violence dropped in the mid-1950s and remained low thereafter. By contrast, Ferdinand Marcos, motivated by the elite threat from his own security forces and from the elite families that dominated the Philippines, fostered fragmentation among four different internal security agencies and decreased the inclusivity of his coercive apparatus by taking measures such as reducing the number of police and preferentially hiring people from his own ethnic Ilocano and clan networks. These organizational measures gave Marcos’ coercive agents both social and material incentives for violence, and also handicapped the intelligence that they would have needed to deal with the population using a more pre-emptive, targeted, and discriminate approach. As a result, state violence against civilians rose steadily from the time Marcos declared martial law in 1972 to when he was ousted in 1986.
In Korea, the presence of an existential external threat gave operational control of the Republic of Korea military to the United States, and limited South Korean autocrats’ ability to manipulate the military itself. Outside of the military, however, the degree of coup-proofing they engaged in correlated with their beliefs about the dominant threat. Syngman Rhee, who was primarily concerned with marginalizing political rivals, created fragmentation in the form of competing agencies and rival regional factions, and staffed his exclusive security forces predominantly with those who had served under the Japanese. As a result, violence from inter-agency feuding and against the excluded leftists was high. Park Chung Hee began with a more inclusive and less fragmented security apparatus (led by the KCIA), but after declaring Yushin in 1972, fears of a coup increased. His coercive apparatus became increasingly fragmented and exclusive, as he relied on a trusted network of military-educated Kyongsang elites and on rivalry between the KCIA, Presidential Security Service, and Army Security Command to assure himself of power. Violence rose after 1972 under Park, and was particularly directed at Kyongsang’s rival region, Cholla, which had been almost entirely shut out of the internal security apparatus. Chun Doo Hwan, who faced a major popular uprising in his first months in power and who saw popular resentment and assassination as the major threat, reduced fragmentation by coordinating internal security through Defense Security Command. He also made the riot police more inclusive by using conscripts to staff those units – a measure which reduced state violence, but placed a strain on his coercive apparatus that was ultimately untenable. In all of these cases, elite threats correlated with fragmentation and social exclusivity in the coercive apparatus, creating incentives and intelligence handicaps that lead to less discriminate and higher state violence. Mass or popular threats on the other hand, correlated with a unitary and inclusive security apparatus with better intelligence on the population and incentives to avoid acting violently against it.
This project is the first comparative study of the origins, design, and operations of authoritarian coercive institutions. In each case, the theory presented here was tested against possible alternative explanations, both for the origins of coercive institutions, and for patterns of state violence. A theory based on coercive institutional design had more explanatory power than the plausible alternatives, particularly in predicting the timing, targets, and processes of violence, within a single case and across multiple cases.

Project Contributions

The project makes substantive contributions to our historical knowledge of East Asia and theoretical contributions to the study of authoritarianism and political violence. Substantively speaking, the project draws on new historical data on the processes and decisions that led to the creation of coercive institutions in the five countries mentioned in previous chapters. The data also shows how authoritarian coercive institutions are linked to violence, and illustrates two key linking mechanisms: one grounded in the intelligence capacity of the institutions, and another in the incentives for or against violence that these institutions provide to coercive agents. Much of the documentary and interview evidence brought to bear in these chapters has not appeared before in English-language scholarship, and makes an original contribution to our historical understanding of the authoritarian periods in these countries.

The primary theoretical contribution of the project is that it presents a novel theory about authoritarian coercive institutions and their importance for state violence. First, it presents a new explanation for the origins of authoritarian coercive institutions, predicting the conditions and timing under which these institutions are most likely to be formed or re-formed, and explaining why an autocrat might select a particular organizational structure and pattern of social composition for the coercive apparatus. Second, it presents an original argument about how and why coercive
institutions matter for state violence: by shaping the incentives and intelligence capacity of the organizations that carry out that violence. It predicts when we should expect to see a rise in the level and indiscriminacy of state violence against civilians, and what mechanisms are most likely to drive that violence. I hope that this framework will be of interest within and beyond the scholarly community.

The argument advanced here challenges much of the existing theoretical work on the determinants of repression, which suggests that autocrats respond to increasing threats with increasing violence. (A fuller examination of that literature appeared in Chapter One.) As noted above, I agree that autocrats are driven to use violence by a sense of threat, but I further argue that they think more strategically about institutional creation, on a longer time frame – thereby producing a very different relationship between threat and violence than the one that currently dominates the literature. Paradoxically, and in contrast to the existing threat-based explanations of repression, the project demonstrates that autocrats who are truly concerned about popular threats use less violence rather than more, and do so because they mobilize organizations that they have designed expressly for that purpose. In these organizations, intelligence becomes a substitute for violence; citizens relinquish their privacy, but less often their lives. Thus this manuscript depicts a fundamentally different understanding of repression and why it varies – something that is central to authoritarian rule, and yet poorly understood and theorized.

In addition, the project provides new empirical knowledge of several theoretical concepts that are important to the study of contentious politics, repression, and conflict. For example, though social and ethnic cleavages are commonly discussed in the literature on civil war, I show here that they can also be manipulated as part of authoritarian coalition-building and security force management strategies. The project identifies conditions under which an autocrat is likely either to exclude parts of society based on those cleavages, or to opt for a broader base of participation, and
unpacks some of the implications of that choice. I hope that this study is the first step in provoking scholars to think about how the relationship between state and society is constituted when inclusion means participation not just in self-governance, but in the processes of surveillance and violence, with consequences for repression and political violence.

Second, I hope that scholars of both comparative politics and international relations will be interested in the role of intelligence in determining the scope and intensity of state violence. Information is a concept that is theoretically central to theories of conflict and violence, but empirically difficult to observe; our theories also presume that it is always desirable. I demonstrate here, however, that the priority placed on obtaining information – and information from whom, about whom – varies systematically with the political interests of the autocrat. The fact that autocrats are sometimes willing to handicap their own domestic intelligence services because it serves their political ends vis-a-vis fellow elites should help us to identify which countries are going to be prone to internal conflict as a result of a lack of information or informational asymmetries.

The project also has significant potential implications for policy. American foreign policymakers devote an enormous amount of time and attention to training overseas security forces; human rights advocates press for authoritarian governments to improve their treatment of particular dissidents; constructivists recommend policies designed to diffuse human rights norms worldwide. This project suggests that interventions at the level of policy are not likely to be especially fruitful, and that interventions to shape institutional structure – while difficult – are more promising. To the extent that the United States can signal that it will not support coup plots, direct its attention and assistance at reducing overlapping and competitive jurisdictions within the coercive apparatus, and push for broadly inclusive recruitment into the security forces, it may be able to reduce violence. Without question, these efforts are likely to be difficult; fundamental instincts for self-preservation drive coercive institutional creation, and threat perceptions may ultimately be hard to alter from
outside, especially once the window of initial institutional formation has passed. Even if institutions are malleable, the reforms that might decrease violence within a particular regime (short of changing the regime itself) would involve taking steps toward a single powerful organization with a strong surveillance capacity directed at citizens – a course of action that, in turn, raises many moral questions. Yet absent institutional reform, systematic improvement in the treatment of citizens, and alleviation of human suffering at the hands of the government, will remain unlikely.

Scope Conditions and Limitations

This project’s research design, though it offered the many advantages outlined in Chapter One, also imposed certain limitations. It focused on understanding causal mechanisms at a fine-grained level of detail within a relatively small number of cases, and so prioritized historical accuracy at the expense of easy generalizability. Generalizing the theory advanced here will require detailed knowledge of many cases, something that can only be accumulated through significant expenditure of research time and resources. It will be difficult, for example, to use this theory to make falsifiable predictions about how an autocrat will construct coercive institutions unless we are able to obtain a fairly good understanding of how that autocrat sees the threats around him – information that was present to a reasonable degree in these cases, but which might be difficult to find for all authoritarian rulers, especially those for whom memoirs and primary source documentation and interviews are not available. Additionally, because the dominant social cleavage differs from country to country, defining whether or not the coercive apparatus of each country is “exclusive” will require detailed knowledge of that country’s social dynamics, cross-referenced with information on their coercive apparatus. That information has proven difficult to obtain and challenging to code consistently across almost a hundred countries, though efforts to do so are underway. This both limits the present manuscript, and highlights one possible avenue for future research.
Other limitations have emerged from the findings of the project itself, and have helped to define its scope conditions. The argument here appears to be strongest in explaining variations in and dynamics of state violence in non-communist authoritarian regimes. (As discussed in Chapter One, there is some indication that similar mechanisms can produce violence in democracies, but that the mechanisms should be systematically less present than they are for authoritarian regimes.) Authoritarian regimes that are revolutionary communist regimes, however, may fall outside the scope of the argument. Based on the information gathered here, I cannot conclude this with certainty; the chapter on China and North Korea confirmed that threats shape institutional design in communist as well as anti-communist authoritarian regimes, but the chapter lacked the data on internal violence that would be necessary to test whether the effect of coercive institutions is similar across these regime types as well. The data that do exist suggest that my argument may explain some of the day-to-day rhythms of repression, but that it is unlikely to fully explain the comparatively higher levels of state violence in China and North Korea, or their most significant episodes of violence – events that produced some of history’s most extreme human suffering. There is no question that this is a significant and disappointing limitation of the project. Nevertheless, the majority of authoritarian regimes since 1945 have not been revolutionary communist regimes, and so the argument still explains much of the historical and current variation observed in authoritarianism and authoritarian state violence.

*Questions and Directions for Future Research*

The above discussion highlights several possible avenues for future research, in terms of both data collection and theoretical investigation. On the data collection front, one possible way to proceed would be to further investigate the generalizability of the argument by compiling cross-national comparative data on coercive institutions. Another would be to try to collect systematic,
detailed, and reliable data on state violence across time and space within countries like China and North Korea, where such information is currently absent.

Several interesting theoretical questions also emerge. One, mentioned above, has to do with whether revolutionary communist regimes somehow handle coercion differently, and produce different patterns of violence. (As discussed in previous chapters, these regimes also seem to display a higher rate of institutional adaptation, so they are clearly different in some respects.) The exact mechanism that might lead to different patterns of violence is unclear – whether it is Marxist ideology, Leninist organization with its focus on the use of cell-like structures to penetrate society, or something about revolutionary experience that leaves a formative imprint on these regimes and makes them a distinct category or type. More broadly, it raises the question of whether the way a regime comes to power decisively influences the coercive institutions it creates and how they are used. The ascent to power could shape how an authoritarian regime’s leaders see the world and its possible threats, how they might want to shape the institutions of coercion, and how constrained they would eventually be in doing so. In examining the causal mechanisms at work, it would be useful to compare Asia’s communist revolutionary regimes to non-revolutionary communist regimes such as those in Eastern Europe and revolutionary non-communist regimes such as Iran.

This research also raises questions about how various factors shape the relative threat perceptions of autocrats. If the tradeoff posited in Chapter One actually exists, mass-oriented revolutionary communist regimes should be vulnerable to elite or coup threats, but this does not seem to have been the case. Perhaps a coup is somehow perceived to be less of a threat in these regimes – but if so, why is that the case? Or perhaps these regimes have found a way to address coup threats without creating the fragmentation and exclusivity often observed in other authoritarian regimes – in which case we would want to know what that is. An additional question about threat perceptions arises if the regime persists for long enough: in China and North Korea, but not in
Taiwan, succession appears to have re-activated fears of elite threat, and produced fragmentation as a coup-proofing device designed to secure the successor. How does succession affect threat perceptions, particularly perceptions of a coup or elite threat – and what, then, is the likely effect of succession on coercive institutional structure?

A final set of questions that bears further investigation emerges from debate on the effects of repression. As Chapter One outlined, political science has often modelled violent repression as a linear and efficient response to increases in threat. Yet, although state repression sometimes works, it can also backfire and trigger more radical protest – an outcome that seems unlikely if repression is actually being efficiently calibrated. The framework in this dissertation suggests a possible explanation and prediction for when repression is likely to be effective versus when it will be counterproductive. If repression is indiscriminate, then it is uncorrelated with the actual behavior of individuals; the probability of being repressed is essentially random. There is then no reason for an individual not to engage in subversive activity; one might as well take the chance, however small, that subversive activity will result in a change of regime. My interviews suggest that dissidents faced with the prospect of blindly indiscriminate violence eventually adopted exactly this line of thinking, and that this dynamic helped catalyze individual and collective action against the dictatorship. Additionally, if dissidents are from parts of society that are excluded from regime intelligence networks, they are more likely to be able to cooperate without being detected, leading to a greater chance of success. Thus, if regimes with certain coercive institutional designs are more likely to engage in indiscriminate violence, and if it is indiscriminate violence that catalyzes opposition (especially opposition that can organize undetected), then understanding the creation and operation of coercive institutions may also provide new insight into the social and institutional factors that underpin authoritarian power and durability.
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Appendix A:

A Note on Sources

Materials for this project were drawn from the following libraries, archives, and collections:

**United States**
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- National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD)
- National Security Archives, George Washington University (Washington, DC)
- John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (Boston, MA)
- Harry S Truman Presidential Library (Independence, MO)
- Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (Stanford, CA)
- Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (Princeton, NJ)

**Taiwan**
- Academia Sinica Libraries (especially Joint Library of Humanities and Social Sciences)
- Institute of Modern History Archives, Academia Sinica
- National Central Library
- National Taiwan University Library
- Academia Historica Archives
- Kuomintang Party History Archives
- National Archives Administration
- Compensation Foundation
- Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation

**China**
- National Library
- Foreign Ministry Archives

**South Korea**
- Seoul National University Library
- National Assembly Library
- Kim Dae Jung Presidential Library and Archives, Yonsei University
- Woon Am Institute/Rhee Syngman Library, Yonsei University
- Korea Democracy Foundation Library and Archives

**Philippines**
- University of the Philippines (various libraries and University Archives)
- Lopez Museum and Library
- National Library of the Philippines
- Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
- Commission on Human Rights
- Task Force Detainees – Philippines, Museum of Courage and Resistance
- SELDA Archives, University of the Philippines