Pleasure, Leisure, or Vice? Public Morality in Imperial Cairo, 1882-1949

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Pleasure, Leisure, or Vice? Public Morality in Imperial Cairo, 1882-1949

A dissertation presented
by
Nathan Lambert Fonder
to
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Pleasure, Leisure, or Vice? Public Morality in Imperial Cairo, 1882-1949

Abstract

I investigate the social history of Egypt under British imperial occupation through the lens of morality in order to understand the contestation of cultural change and authority under empire. Points of cultural cleavage between European and local inhabitants in British-occupied Cairo included two customs, gambling and the consumption of intoxicants, which elicited sustained and dynamic reactions from observers of Egyptian society on the local and international level. I show that the presence of alcohol and gambling in public spaces in Cairo contributed directly to the politicization and selective criminalization of public morality. However, the meanings attributed to social practices relating to leisure were continually under negotiation and challenge as state authorities, British liberals, Egyptian reformers and religious leaders, foreign missionaries, and representatives of international temperance movements vied to impose their visions of morality upon Egyptian society.

My work speaks to the questions of how public morality and popular culture are socially defined, and how these contested definitions have shaped, and been shaped by, the colonial encounter in the Middle East. I demonstrate that the struggle over who could claim ultimate cultural or religious authority on a given moral issue was not limited to the realm of ideas and ethics, but had practical and profound ramifications for state politics. In moving my analysis from the market of ideas to the physical
market for intoxicating goods and wagering services, I argue that power and authority in Egypt, as in other states under imperial occupation, retained a fluidity that transcended the expression of force or threats of violence. The resiliency of these social issues testifies to the weaknesses of both the British imperial and the Egyptian monarchial states, which were never able to enforce their claims to moral and political authority and effectively exert power over the urban population. I detail the local Egyptian articulation of global social reform efforts and anti-vice projects during the colonial period.
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Introduction

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the people of the Middle East became increasingly linked to imperial metropoles through diplomacy, commerce, law, conquest, and occupation. Customers and salesmen, soldiers and lawgivers, religious missionaries and tourists came in increasing numbers to work and play among the urban residents of the region. In Cairo, these foreigners joined a rising number of migrants from the countryside who moved to the city in search of work. Urban settings devoted to the enjoyment of pleasure were crossroads where individuals from diverse socio-economic, cultural, and national origins came together. Such venues had long occupied an ambiguous position in the urban landscape of the city, since many of the goods and services available within were religiously prohibited yet socially tolerated. Within these contested spaces, each individual carried his or her own cultural baggage, in the form of preferred modes of socialization and consumption patterns, understandings of public morality, and status under the law.

The British occupation and rule of Egypt from 1882 to 1949 unleashed a flood of debates surrounding alcohol consumption and gambling, their apparent increase and ubiquity, their origins and causes. My primary aim is to contribute to the study of the relationship between empire and culture by focusing upon the debates surrounding the spread of alcohol consumption and gambling. The market for pleasure was opened to the powerful and poor alike, and during the period under study, the number and variety of sites for gambling and the consumption of alcohol, such as coffee shops,
taverns, clubs, and racetracks, rose dramatically. How did such cultural practices evolve under imperial rule and occupation? Of the moral absolutes in the foundational texts of Islam, the message against alcohol and gambling is clear.\(^1\) The injunction against these substances and practices marked the early Muslim community from other groups, and condemnation of gambling and intoxicants has remained a noticeable constant point of orthodoxy across the heterodox doctrinal spectrum of the Islamic faith. Despite the unequivocal language of scripture, these practices and substances have enjoyed a ubiquity that defies efforts to control or eradicate them. Since these practices were imbued with such deep religious and socio-political meaning, what discussion and debate did they encourage?

The presence of alcohol and gambling in public spaces in Cairo contributed directly to the politicization and selective criminalization of public morality. Investigating how cultural practices related to leisure changed under the seventy years under study reveals that urban settings for the pursuit of leisure became a site of debate within both local and imperial discursive spaces. As the critique of colonial culture intensified first among the Islamic modernists and then the nationalists, the meaning ascribed to the pursuit of leisure, pleasure, and vice expanded beyond the narrow

\(^1\) In the Quran, gambling and alcohol are twinned on several occasions and condemned as sinful behavior to be avoided (Quran 2:219)"They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say: In them is great sin, and some profit, for men; but the sin is greater than the profit"; (Quran 5:90). "O ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, sacrificing to stones, and (divination by) arrows, are an abomination, of Satan’s handiwork: eschew such (abomination), that ye may prosper"; (Quran 5:91) "Satan’s plan is (but) to excite enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and gambling, and hinder you from the remembrance of Allah, and from prayer: will ye not then abstain?" al-Bukhari, Muslim, and other compliers of the sayings and practices of the prophet and his companions relate many instances that testify to the evil nature of gambling and intoxicants.
confines of religiously informed morality. The meanings attributed to social practices relating to leisure were continually under negotiation and contestation as state authorities, local religious leaders, foreign missionaries, representatives of international reform movements all vied to impose their vision of morality. Yet, no single group could claim the monopoly on moral authority. Changing social practices of alcohol consumption and gambling in the public spaces of Cairo were matched by a transformation in the accordant discourses. How did the religious leaders, politicians, and intellectuals distinguish between leisure and vice? How were the dividing lines between leisure and vice negotiated and contested? To understand how moral questions raised by cultural change were mediated, I track the process by which social practices became public issues. In the transformation from public space to a public sphere, reformers sought to shape public opinion, organize, and effect changes in policy. Agents for reform used moral issues to lay claims to greater political authority: the politics of morality were a fight for authority to control cultural change.

The study of gambling and the consumption of alcoholic drinks provides a good opportunity to examine the interplay between rhetoric and practice within the larger context of power, space, and behavior. The battle for control in the market of ideas was also waged over the physical market for intoxicating goods and wagering services. The struggle over who could claim ultimate cultural or religious authority on a given moral issue was not limited to the realm of ideas and ethics, but had practical and profound ramifications for state politics. Efforts to define public spaces as a locale for
governmental control necessitated the creation of legislation and the enforcement of new laws to ensure public order. The expansion of the political and bureaucratic authority of the state over the growing populace of the capital, however, was never total. The study of control over alcohol and gambling is ultimately a story of the failure of a disciplining project. Despite state and societal efforts to curtail or eliminate these practices, individuals persisted in their pursuit of pleasure.

**Historiography of Modern Egypt**

In her review of the state of social history of the Middle East, Judith Tucker posited that historiography revolved around three themes: "patterns in the growth of the state, the penetration of capitalism into the region, and the cultural impact of the West." Since the pioneering work of Gabriel Baer, the study of the social history of modern Egypt has expanded significantly. The expansion of state power in Egypt under imperial is well-documented; this rich historiographical tradition has detailed the political and economic histories of the imperial period and the monarchical era.

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Studies of the Egyptian working class have brought to light political and economic activities of subaltern groups. The cultural impact of the West has been the site of vigorous debates, especially the issues of nationalism or identity. Professional historians of Egypt have given comparatively less attention to patterns of socialization and social behavior. General works of social history of modern Egypt written by journalists and amateur historians, including Peter Mansfield, Trevor Mostyn, and Anthony Sattin, relied, often uncritically, upon the same source base of memoirs and travelers’ accounts to depict the social history of the period. Will Hanely did admirable work depicting the social milieu of Alexandria through his use of the British

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consular court records. Magda Baraka secured records of the sporting clubs to explore the dynamics of social life in Egypt under British occupation. The study of public morality in Cairo, and the history of alcohol and gambling in particular, draws insights from and invites comparisons with scholarship and debates in a number of fields of historical study, including the history of morality, alcohol, leisure, sport, and gambling.

**Historiography of Morality in the Modern Middle East**

The history of morality is an emerging field of inquiry in the social history of the Middle East. Within this literature, the history of sexuality has drawn the most attention from scholars of historical and contemporary morality both in modern Egypt and the region as a whole. For example, the anthropologist Karin van Nieuwkirk integrated morality, sexuality, and alcohol in a single field of analysis in her work on Egyptian nightclubs and female entertainers. Certainly, in Cairo during the period under study, concerns about sexual (im)morality were often twinned with the problems

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of drinking and gambling in the minds of moralizers and administrators. However, the historical study of alcohol and gambling in Egypt warrants independent and specific study given the sizeable archive pertaining to each issue and the range of questions that each topic engendered.

One approach to the history of morality more broadly is epitomized by Eugene Rogan’s edited volume *Outside in: on the margins of the modern Middle East*, an invaluable contribution to the history of popular culture in the Middle East. A chapter on fin-de-siècle Beirut by Jens Hanssen lends itself to comparison with the history of urban space, alcohol and gambling in Cairo. By tracing the evolution of physical urban space and the development of public moral discourses, Hanssen highlighted how Ottoman imperial ideals of a well disciplined society were constantly challenged by local practices, despite state and societal efforts to curtail transgressive behaviors. In keeping with the general theme of the volume, Hanssen apprehended social actors and spaces analogous through the lens of liminality.

I evince that locales where alcohol and gambling were offered were frequented by imperial administrators, local statesmen, soldiers, intellectuals, artists, workers, and travelers: that is, historical actors who came from diverse religious and ethnic groups and social origins, each with a different legal status or relationship to state power. In

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the case of Cairo under British occupation and rule, pushing such disparate groups “to the margins” would obscure the realities of local power and authority. For while drinking and gambling may have been judged marginal by the cultural standards of the majority of the population, pleasure centers occupied conspicuous physical locations among the steadily growing urban populations of Cairo. The suggestion that an individual, regardless of his position within society, should be relegated to marginality because of conduct which deviates from the ‘norm’ in effect reifies the notion of a homogenous Egyptian society.

A second approach to the history of morality writ large is offered in Michael Cook’s encyclopedic work on the Islamic religious obligation to command right and forbid wrong. In stressing the centrality of subversion and intrusion in his analysis of historical debates about the enforcement of morality, Cook detailed the contested process by which Islamic legal thought and lived experience of Muslims informed one another in the contemplation of public and private behavior. The decision-making process by which a behavior fell under censure was open to debate by the individual believer and scholar. Cook concluded that there was no moral monopoly among the many voices claiming right in the contestation for authority over moral questions. The final section of the work, “Modern Islamic Developments,” addresses the contemporary era, observing that things “get interesting” when forbidding wrong lines up with liberal

values. Indeed, the union of liberalism, progressive thought, and Islamic orthodoxy in the struggle against alcohol and gambling provides a unique window into political and cultural history.

Cook’s emphasis on the omnipresence of debate and subversion concerning morally good Muslim behavior offers a helpful model for considering how moral debates were waged under imperial occupation. During this period of Cairo’s history, questions of morality regarding drink and gambling and their presence in the urban environment were central matters of public order and concern in moralists’ speeches, newspapers, government correspondence, or police records. Yet this was a time when the identity of the “public” was legally and culturally plural, and when the authority to declare a behavior moral or immoral was heavily freighted by imperial privilege and power. Moreover, alcohol and gambling were subjects of local, imperial, and inter-imperial debates in this period. The pluralism of authorities and publics, and constant negotiation between them, rather than their liminality, provides the framework for this dissertation.

**Historiography of Alcohol**

The study of the social history of alcohol and temperance has long been an area of intense activity, particularly among historians of United States and Great Britain. The field of alcohol studies boasts several journals, research centers, and professional

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16 Cook, *Commanding right*, 514.
associations. However, the study of alcohol has a resolutely global hue, as scholars from nearly all regional specializations have contributed to the global history of alcohol. Recent works have sought to write world history using alcohol as a lens. Outside of the confines of Western history, the study of alcohol is most developed for sub-Saharan African history. Ambler and Crush, and Akyeampong, among others, have followed flows of alcohol in order to connect the histories of labor markets, consumer economies, and colonial governance. Scholars of West African history have demonstrated that not only did majority Muslim societies drink prior to the imposition of colonial rule, but local populations continued to consume alcohol despite long standing religious prohibition and efforts by Western imperial powers to enforce anti-alcohol policies. Similarly, Egyptians under imperial rule, in common with other

17 The field boasts several journals, research centers, and professional associations. The Alcohol and Drugs History Society and its journal, The Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, are the most recent entry into the field. The Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs (JSAD), based at Rutgers University, is the inheritor of a long tradition of American scholarship on the physiological study of alcohol. Prior to its current incarnation, JSAD was known as Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol and operated out of Yale University since its inception in 1940.

18 This bibliography is twenty years old, but it provides a glimpse into the scope of the history of alcohol. Jeffrey Verhey, ”Sources for the Social History of Alcohol,” in Drinking: behavior and belief in modern history, eds. Susanna Barrows and Robin Room (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 425-439.

19 Gina Hames, Alcohol in world history (Routledge: New York, 2012)


Muslim communities in Africa, continued and may have increased their consumption of alcohol, regardless of established cultural mores.


was a dominant crop and export product in French Algeria. However, the consumption of alcohol – particularly hard liquor – formed a topic of concern for local religious leaders and political leaders, as well as journalists and colonial officials, in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, just as it did in other imperial settings.  

It should also be mentioned that while the history of alcohol has not been pursued as extensively by historians of North Africa and the Middle East, for a number of scholars it has provided a site for exploring larger debates in Middle Eastern history, including cosmopolitanism, marginality, modernity, and identity. Thus, François Georgeon’s investigation of alcohol consumption in nineteenth-century Istanbul aimed to explain why modern Turks drink more alcohol than other Muslims in the modern Middle East and North Africa, by illuminating the drinking patterns of a heterogeneous urban population and the development of drinking districts.

In Cairo as in Istanbul, each resident and visitor to these capital cities had idiosyncratic or community-based consumption patterns, which they could pursue in public areas dedicated to pleasure. In evaluating the composition of Istanbul’s drinking

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population, Georgeon noted that Ottoman soldiers had the reputation as heavy consumers. I show that Georgeon’s “hypothesis on the connection between the consumption of alcoholic beverages and the military profession,” holds for Cairo, where British soldiers had a major impact on the growth of public establishments serving alcohol.  

Georgeon also emphasized the role of non-Muslims in the alcohol market as operators of public establishments. The Greeks of Egypt played an similarly important role in the social and economic life of Cairo, and the role played by Greeks in the Egyptian alcohol trade is worthy of more in-depth study.

Beyond questions of consumption, sociability and interaction between different communities, scholars of the Middle East have also put alcohol to work in the discussion of contested modernities and the ‘cosmopolitan’. Too often, the issue of alcohol in the Middle East has been dealt with in a binary of free-thinking cosmopolitanism or religious conservatism. In a short article on cosmopolitanism, the sociologist Sami Zubaida stressed that Islam had an ambivalent attitude towards alcohol by highlighting the disconnect between religious belief, authority, and lived experience in his article on cosmopolitanism. Will Hanley questioned the place of

29 Georgeon, "Ottomans and drinkers," 11.
drinking culture in Zubaida’s understanding what constitutes cosmopolitanism.\textsuperscript{32} Hanley convincingly challenged the utility of the term cosmopolitanism for its over-emphasis on elite experiences, nostalgia, and imprecision. Hanley questioned why Zubaida repeatedly identified the drinking of alcohol by Muslims as a mark of being cosmopolitan: Hanley noted that in Zubaida’s elite-centered argument, “Cosmopolitanism is a long word that is shorthand for wealth and secularism, both of which are signaled (in the context of Islam) by consumption of alcohol.”\textsuperscript{33} This critique of cosmopolitanism seems to exclude the possibility of humble drink-shop customers from the Egyptian lower and middle classes. While much of Hanley’s critique of cosmopolitanism as an analytical category is compelling, the term retains its utility if carefully qualified, such as in order to focus on the cultural exchanges that occur when multiple ethnic and religious groups shared urban spaces.

For Zubaida, alcohol and secularism went hand in hand; for Georgeon, in \textit{tanzimat}-era Istanbul, “[d]rinking was now seen as a sign of modernity.”\textsuperscript{34} I seek to complicate this picture, by showing that, on the one hand, all classes potentially consumed alcohol, and on the other hand, that abstaining from alcohol consumption could equally be portrayed as modern, even progressive, thereby challenging the simplistic formula of cultural change under empire in which Egyptians changed their leisure pursuits and took up alcohol consumption out of the desire to be ‘modern,’

\textsuperscript{33} Hanley, “Grieving Cosmopolitanism,” 1350.
\textsuperscript{34} Georgeon, “Ottomans and drinkers,” 16.
‘civilized,’ or ‘cosmopolitan.’ Moreover, Zubaida unconsciously recapitulated the binaries upheld by the temperance activists, imperialists, and Muslim religious leaders whose activities are brought to light in this dissertation.

**Historiography of Leisure, Sport, and Gambling**

The second part of the dissertation on gambling opens onto debates within the historical study of sport, leisure, and play. Study of the history of leisure and sport received growing attention from the 1960s, and the field blossomed with the establishment of professional associations and journals. The field was interdisciplinary from the outset, attracting sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, as well as historians. Huizinga’s and Caillois’ influential works argued for the importance of play in social history. Thorstein Veblen’s classic, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, argued that the elite of a society devotes itselfs to the pursuit of pleasure as a sign of affluence. Those less privileged, in turn, emulate the cultural practices of the elite to lay claim to that prestige.

Debates about the history of leisure in society have ranged widely in tracking the relationship between social practice, class, identity, and place. Two generations of

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38 Eric Hobsbawm and his colleagues debated leisure and work at the seventh Past and Present Conference at Birkbeck College in July 1964 and linked the distinction between leisure time and work as
scholars have sought to orient the evolution of public pursuit of leisure with larger historical processes, such as industrialization, urbanization, and globalization. European forms of leisure spread with empire and modern capitalism, with sport being one of the most portable and enthusiastically received. The recent Burke-Marfany exchange in *Past & Present* continued the debate over the importance of looking for points of rupture in the history of leisure. I concur with their insights, in that points of political rupture in the history of modern Egypt, including the imposition of imperial rule in Egypt, war, and independence, were also transformative in the history of leisure.

The history of sport has attracted the attention of an equally impressive collection of historians and sociologists. Eric Hobsbawm stressed that sport was one of the most important new social practices that formed political and social traditions in Europe from 1870-1914. British sport and the connection to the globalization of games has been a popular theme. J. A. Mangan declared sport to be "Britain's Chief Spiritual Export." Norbert Elias argued that the most of the world adopted English style of

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sport, whereby most modern societies now play non-violent, highly regulated games.\textsuperscript{43} Elias and Dunning sought to explain why sport arose first in England by linking it to state control and the channeling of aggression. Sociologists, like social historians, concerned themselves with two major themes in the study of sport: social stratification and institutional context.\textsuperscript{44} Bourdieu highlighted that the class element inherent in sport, stressing the "shift whereby sport as an elite practice reserved for amateurs became sport as spectacle produced by professionals for consumption by the masses."\textsuperscript{45}

This work examines the intersection between class and empire on the sporting field and explores how the contested popularization of the British style of horse racing reflected the globalization of sport. Following Akyeampong and Ambler, this work demonstrates that horse racing should not be regarded as merely an imported style of sport.\textsuperscript{46} Rather, I argue that racing developed as the union of British and established local Egyptian traditions, and this process was fraught with the contestation for power and privilege.

Among historians of the Middle East, the history of leisure generally, and sport and play specifically, has attracted growing attention. In his work on Egypt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, On Barak analyzed the evolution of temporality and

the division between work and conviviality, or social time. Jacob Wilson’s work on masculinity in Egypt demonstrated the importance of sport in defining male conceptions of self and gender identity. Shaun Lopez’s study of press coverage of the Olympics has shown how sport and national identity became linked in popular imagination. I demonstrate that sport under imperial occupation had a profoundly divisive aspect even as these sporting events drew together participants from both the colonizing and the colonized communities, especially once sport and national identity became intertwined.

Within the twinned fields of sport and leisure studies, the history of gambling is a narrow sub-field. Scholarship in the history of the role of gambling in British society is particularly well-documented. General histories of gambling have to contend with its great variety and scope. Clifford Geertz’s seminal work, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," is undoubtedly the most famous modern scholarly treatment of gambling. Geertz’s influence crossed over many disciplines and inspired historians to

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reconsider their approaches to the quotidian in the writing of social history, but did not translate into a robust body of historical work on the study of gambling outside of the confines of the West. Gambling as a specific field of inquiry into social history, has received sporadic attention by scholars of the non-Western world. Historians of gambling in Africa and Asia have stressed the importance of tradition in games of chance. In his piece on traditional gambling in Africa, Thomas Reefe combined anthropological observation of games in West Africa with a history of games of chance across the continent.\textsuperscript{53} John Price, in his piece on gambling in “traditional” Asia, demonstrated how games of chance in China grew in complexity to match changing socio-economic conditions. Price also stressed the specificity of gambling to local contexts, writing:

\begin{quote}
Gambling does not diffuse easily from one culture to another, like technological innovations such as matches or potatoes. It is integrated or woven into the pattern of cultures, active in its social functions, and in terms of demonstration effects is of questionable practical value so that we would not expect it to diffuse readily.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

While Price’s findings may have held true in the pre-modern locales, I demonstrate that gambling diffused quickly across Egyptian society and with striking variety.

The definitive work on gambling in the Middle East is noted medievalist Franz Rosenthal’s \textit{Gambling in Islam}, an impressive blend of religious and social history.\textsuperscript{55}

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Rosenthal included a large variety of different games, including horse racing, playing cards, and dice. Rosenthal agreed with scholars who identified the ancestor to the modern playing card first in late Fatimid or early Mamluk Cairo. Since Rosenthal, the history of gambling has attracted little attention from specialists in Middle Eastern studies. In his piece on traditional gambling in Africa, the Africanist Thomas Reefe tried to apply his knowledge of West African history to include the countries of North Africa. While Reefe's treatment of gambling in his region of specialization was impressive, he was writing outside his expertise in his treatment of North Africa gambling practices. Nearly all of his references to modern North Africa cited Rosenthal as his primary source: Reefe based his analysis on the faulty assumption that North African gambling practices remained static over hundreds of years. Scholars of the modern Middle East writing on the period before 1950 have acknowledged the presence of gambling in many urban settings, but no in-depth analysis of gambling has been written to date.

Sources

I have grounded this dissertation on what Will Hanley has usefully described as “conventional” sources. The perspectives afforded by these documents are that of the

56 L. A. Mayer, Mamluk Playing Cards (Leiden: Brill, 1971)
58 “Evidence from memoirs, film, and literature is always relevant, but never sufficient, to social history. Histories of Middle East cosmopolitanism must depend on more conventional sources, such as administrative, economic, and legal records.” Hanley, “Grieving Cosmopolitanism,” 1352.
institutions and individuals that sought to control these commodities and services. These materials were located in three national archives, as well as several private institutions. In the Egyptian state archives, the records of Egyptian parliament, the Ministry of the Interior, and annual reports of the Cairo police (1925-1948) provide a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data detailing Egyptian state regulation of alcohol and gambling. The royal archives from Abdeen Palace yielded letters written by social reformers, religious leaders, and ordinary citizens complaining about governmental inaction on moral issues. The National Archives in London provided annual reports on the administration of Egypt, as well as communications and internal correspondence from British residency in Cairo, which allow a glimpse into the “official mind” of British imperialists in Cairo.\(^{59}\) British consular court records offer another window into social history through legal cases related to intoxicants, gambling, and criminality.

Periodicals provided a primary means of tracking the growth of public discussion of the place of alcohol and gambling in Egypt. This dissertation relies upon numerous Arabic language newspapers with varying editorial profiles and different audiences, including al-Manar; al-Kashkul; al-Latā'if; al-Siyasah al-Uṣbu'iyah; al-Ahram; al-Fath; al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, and al-Nadhīr. Two English language newspapers published in Cairo, The Egyptian Gazette and The Sphinx, contained regular coverage of horse racing. Two Cairo-based French periodicals, the scholarly journal L'Egypte

Contemporaine and the elite newspaper Nouvelle Egypte, also offered pertinent public coverage of drink and gambling. Memoirs of retired imperialists were mined for their attempts to justify past actions or criticize aspects of the British occupation of Egypt. Travelers' accounts and travel guides were read for their depiction of changing attitudes in non-Egyptian perceptions of local society.

For the chapters on temperance, reports from conferences of leading international anti-alcohol organizations, specifically the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (W.W.C.T.U.) and the World League Against Alcoholism, have allowed me to bring to light the unexamined role of American-led temperance organizations in the fight against alcohol in Egypt. Two annual reports from the Egyptian Temperance Society provided exceptional information about the Egyptian-led struggle against alcohol and cooperation with like-minded international organizations. The National Archives in College Park, MD were consulted in order to further analyze American support of the Egyptian temperance fight.

The source base for this work relies heavily upon those who were uniform in their condemnation of alcohol. Voices advocating anti-temperance policies are largely absent. One of the pitfalls to avoid when examining debates about social morality is the uncritical reproduction of the singularity of viewpoint in the sources. When dealing

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60 Unlike in Great Britain, the United States, and other countries with vigorous temperance movements, the ‘wet’ lobby of the alcohol industry and its consumers in Egypt rarely took their fight public. For an analysis of anti-temperance organization in the United Kingdom, see Gutzke, David. Protecting the Pub: brewers and publicans against temperance. London: Royal Historical Society, 1989.
with moralists, one must always be cognizant of the line between rhetoric and the realities of social practice, namely what people are saying about those practices and what was occurring in the market. Moralists involved sought to influence perception of social realities and shape public awareness, and the sources testify to the degree which these issues were important to the historical actors involved. However, their vehemence did not ultimately determine the degree of activity in the public market for pleasure.

Overall, I try to move beyond the history of ideas to a socio-intellectual history of debates over leisure, pleasure and vice. However, the project of writing the social history of a subject as broad and diverse as public morality in a capital city over seventy years would involve first finding out what residents of Cairo were doing where, on what scale, and with what frequency. Contemporary observers and social critics insisted that drinking increased, but we often have no way of reconstructing the evidence on which they drew. The claims of moralists and temperance activists, for example, regarding the drinking habits and number of drink shops open, are compared with official government figures, including records from the Interior Ministry on licensing patterns of public establishments. Ultimately, both activists and the authorities used statistics for their own ends.

Unexplored archives in Egypt
The selection of periodicals consulted for this dissertation has been circumscribed by time restraints. Coverage of public morality in many influential newspapers, especially those leading periodicals prior to World War I such as *al-Mu‘ayyad*, *al-Muqattam*, and *al-Liwa*, will provide a window into how the politics of morality under imperial occupation evolved. Future research will explore moral commentary of public intellectuals of the Egyptian *nahda* like Abdallah al-Nadim61, Qasim Amin62, and Mustafa Kamil. Since alcohol and gambling were present in every community in Cairo, any social history of these universal practices must recognize absent voices. In relying on English, French, and Arabic language periodicals, my choice of sources has privileged British, American, and Muslim Egyptian voices. In this dissertation, the Jewish, Coptic, Greek, and Italian communities of Cairo are largely spoken about by state agents or social moralists, rather than speaking for themselves from and through their archive.

In addition to studying a wider base of periodicals, there are also archival resources that need to be identified and explored. I have not had the opportunity to consult the separate archive for the Egyptian Foreign Ministry from the monarchical period, which could yield insight into how the quasi-independent state navigated the international market for alcohol. Beyond state archives, I have not yet determined if the

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62 Marilyn Booth’s forthcoming work on Qasim Amin will hopefully shed light on his attitude on the connections between public morality and social reform.
personal archive of the leading Egyptian temperance activist, Ahmad Ghalwash, has survived. I hope that members of the Ghalwash family in Egypt have preserved some of his papers. This work relies largely on the public words of Ahmad Ghalwash in his role as a public critic and moral reformer. As my analysis of Ghalwash is limited to this public face, I can only speculate on motivations, intellectual development, and the events that brought Ghalwash into contact with international temperance activists and Egyptian political figures.

**Structure of Project**

The dissertation consists of two parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first two chapters devoted to debates surrounding alcohol and the final two chapters dedicated to the study of the spread of various forms of gambling, including horse racing, casino-style games, and lotteries.

**Chapter I: Drink in Egypt and Challenges to Imperial Prestige, 1882-1914**

From early in the British occupation, the presence of the British military, as well as the rising tourist trade, drove the expansion of the Egyptian market for intoxicants. I analyze the crafting of a British critique of imperialism and the negatives of free trade by examining how observers of Egyptian society publicly condemned the spread of alcohol consumption among Egyptians. As pressure from liberal British journalists and politicians grew, I show how the British administration in Cairo responded both by carefully reshaping the narrative concerning alcohol and through the creation of a
coercive state apparatus to enforce new limits of public behavior. The imperial state, however, did not have the monopoly on the discourse about alcohol. Local temperance agents on the ground advocating anti-alcohol policies included Muslim religious figures, the nascent Egyptian temperance movement, and American Presbyterian missionaries.

Chapter II: Alcohol, Contested Authority, and the Limits of Independence, 1914-1949

To continue my study of the market for alcohol, I confirm that British troops were a primary reason for the rising level of alcohol in Egypt. Following the outbreak of World War I, the massive influx of British imperial troops into Cairo caused a massive spike in alcohol consumption. To explore the limits of state power and regulatory regimes, I illustrate how even under martial law and the assumption of direct rule of Egypt, the imperial state could not control public space. Egyptian independence, which however nominal, gave a great boost to temperance activism, and alcohol became a national issue bound to the larger political struggle. I offer a new interpretation of American-Egyptian relations during the period by showing how the American embassy in Cairo became a powerful ally in the fight against intoxicants in Egypt following prohibition in the United States. I demonstrate how temperance agents made alcohol a public policy issue that was invoked to pressure Egyptian politicians to enact reform as the flow of information about alcohol rose sharply. Using the records of the Egyptian Temperance Society, I reveal that Egyptians no longer were spoken of, but entered into the temperance conversation as partners in the global conversation about
controlling alcohol in Egypt. Continuing existing scholarship on the religious turn of
interwar Egyptian society and the rise of reform projects, I conclude with the Muslim
Brothers’ adoption of temperance as a pillar of their moral reform package following
the end of prohibition and American patronage.

Chapter III: The Imperial State as Games Master, 1882-1914

Moving from alcohol to gambling, I investigate the diffusion of gambling
practices and spaces, which provided new points of interaction and conflict between
and among the social classes of Cairo. The introduction into Cairo of British spaces,
such as the racetrack and private gentleman's club, carried with them British attitudes
towards power, control, sociability, and play. The study of the societal ramifications of
these new spaces makes clear that the British clubs formed the only truly colonial social
edifice under occupation, for only within the walls of the clubs did the British form the
majority and flaunt their power and status in an obtrusive fashion. In a break with
existing scholarship that has stressed the paucity of social interaction between British
and Egyptian elites, I detail how horse-racing brought together elite Egyptians and the
British colony in regular displays of prestige and conspicuous betting. As a
manifestation of the globalization of games in the late nineteenth century, casino-style
gambling became extremely popular in the tourist areas connected to hotels until casino
operators, especially those that ran dishonest games, ran afoul of the British
administration. I argue that campaigns against "gambling hells" provided the British
occupation with proof as to commitment to moral progress. I elucidate the ways in
which the police could not stamp out illegal gambling clubs, whose operators and members exploited the blurry line between public and private space to avoid government censure. To offer a contrast to state and societal attitudes towards elite and middle class gambling practices, I then turn to the gaming practices of the popular classes and explain that lotteries were allowed to proliferate with little interference from the state because of their connection to charitable fundraising and poor relief.

Chapter IV: The Regulation of Gambling and Elite Privilege, 1914-1949

The changing political relationship between Great Britain and Egypt defined state and societal responses to gambling. In a departure from the insular world of racing prior to World War I, the commercialization of horse racing resulted in scandals that forced government intervention. I advance the larger argument about the limits of state authority and the hypocrisy of the imperial project by showing that a licensing scheme of horse racing failed to stop illegal gambling, which proceeded with open impunity and governmental collusion. I consider why savvy gamesmen adopted the language of elite and declared their establishments to be private clubs where they could wager on cards with impunity. The police turned to the gaming practices of the masses after being stymied in the fight against elite and middle-class gambling. I contend that the state targeted poor itinerant gamesmen selling unlicensed lottery tickets or offering simple odd-or-even games due to the failures in prosecuting elite gaming practices. Deepening the scholarship on the Islamic turn in the interwar period, I establish that
conservative Egyptians, particularly the Muslim Brothers, railed against state endorsed gambling.
Chapter I: Drink in Egypt and Challenges to Imperial Prestige, 1882-1914

[Egypt] is the half-way house of the whole world...English Masters of Arts keep American bars, and United Presbyterians work hard at their offices on Sundays—and you will own that Egypt is a piquant country enough. The men that have been broke, the men that have been disbarred, the men that have cheated at cards, the men that have done nothing in particular except not get on with civilization—you will find them between ten and early morning clutching brass rails before the bars of Cairo. Where two or three are met together it is odds that one of them has changed his names. And what do you say to this social picturesqueness?63

The spread of alcohol in Cairo following the British invasion can be used to illuminate the dynamics of the struggle for moral and political authority among state and non-state actors. I establish that the public presence of alcohol in Cairo increased under British occupation: more locales selling alcohol changed the physical spaces of the city and created new venues for socialization. As an imported and locally produced commodity, the state endeavored to control a publicly traded commodity by regulating alcohol through taxation and licensing. I argue that the issue of alcohol politicized morality and analyze the struggle to control over alcohol in terms of physical and discursive spaces.

I hope to make a small contribution to the new imperial history in linking drinking alcohol in Egypt to larger British imperial politics.64 In Egypt under the British occupation, the contestation to control the discourse about alcohol was fraught with tension: in the competition for moral authority, the drink issue could be used against the British imperialists in scandalous public critiques, but in turn the British

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administrations of the occupation could also manipulate the narrative about alcohol to expand their authority on the ground. While the imperial state claimed ultimate moral authority, this authority was self-consciously aware that the imperial project was flawed, whereby guiding principles like free trade carried the potential to impact Egyptian society in negative ways.

As the new imperialism of the late nineteenth century gave way to liberal imperialism, the issue of consumption and trade of alcohol in Egypt attracted the attention of a disparate group of historical actors, each with their own motivations for confronting greater alcohol consumption. I scrutinize, in turn, the critiques, forms of engagement, and recommendations for reform endorsed by British temperance activists, Muslim religious leaders, Egyptian reformers, and Protestant missionaries in order to elucidate how alcohol emerged as a public issue that transcended the locality of Cairo or Egypt. Faced with continued criticism both in Great Britain and in Egypt, the imperial state in Egypt was forced to acknowledge that rising alcohol consumption was worrisome. In its official rhetoric, the British administration expanded justifications for the continued occupation of Egypt to include moral progress, which acknowledged the need to address the spread of alcohol. Not only did the Residency have to field frequent complaints from Egyptian Muslims pushing for more stringent alcohol regulation, but the administration also had to contend with foreign powers pushing for less governmental oversight in the intoxicant market. Alcohol allowed the imperial state to try to extend its power over public space, economic activity, and social practice.
The form and content of that response were similar to other imperial settings in that the Egyptian state instituted a system of regulation that was not universally applied and enshrined European privilege: the government crafted different policies depending on the setting (urban or rural) and population (foreign or Egyptian.) The inclusion of legal exceptions to any proposed restriction on access to alcohol hamstrung governmental regulation. In failing to stem the visible spread of alcohol after claiming custodianship over public morality, the British occupation exposed itself to increasing and recurrent censure. These critics of alcohol consumption devoted themselves to publicity campaigns in Egypt, Great Britain, and abroad in hopes of shaping popular participation in politics before the rise of popular nationalism and thereby pressuring the state to enact social reform.

**A Historiographical Note on the Problem of Quantitative Data**

Before beginning my treatment of the discourse surrounding alcohol, it is prudent to address the some aspects of the source base. A fundamental question in any study of alcohol is “Did the amount of alcohol in a country increase over time?” Historians and temperance activists share the concern for volume, for obtaining reliable figures is required to prove that consumption rates across a population rose over a given period.\(^{65}\) Substantiating any claim to changes in consumption must question the soundness of census figures and confront the problems of data on the amount of alcohol in Egypt. The primary sources for demographic data for this period are the population

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\(^{65}\) Willis, "Drinking Power" 2-3.
censuses conducted by the British administration in 1882, 1897 and every ten years after. Given the unscientific methods used in these early censuses, the reliability of these figures has been called into question.\textsuperscript{66} In the nineteenth century, reliable figures regarding the exact amount of alcohol being produced and consumed annually were difficult to obtain for European states.\textsuperscript{67} The observatory and coercive powers of the Egyptian state did not keep pace with the market for alcohol, which grew with little state oversight. Determining the exact amount of alcohol present in Egypt at a given movement based on a precise tally of importation and local production has never been a possibility. Given the scarcity of hard date, the amount of alcohol circulating in Egyptian markets remained a source of constant speculation and argumentation. However, this imprecision of figures did not prevent moralists from making quantitative and qualitative claims in an effort to prove that alcohol consumption indeed was rising.

Figures from the tax officials at the revenue house only reveal one aspect of the story. For example, an American missionary in the late nineteenth century provided a temperance organization with the following figures regarding the value of spirits, beer, and wine imported annually into Egypt.


\textsuperscript{67} Harrison, \textit{Drink and the Victorians}
Table 1: Alcohol Import Figures according to Temperance Activists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1878</th>
<th>1879</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1882</th>
<th>1883</th>
<th>1884</th>
<th>1885</th>
<th>1886</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>$821,565</td>
<td>$861,125</td>
<td>$921,720</td>
<td>$1,163,830</td>
<td>$1,299,095</td>
<td>$1,721,615</td>
<td>$1,733,605</td>
<td>$1,951,405</td>
<td>$1,815,605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers were cited as proof that Great Britain was allowing drink to proliferate under its rule. But such references to the value of imports lose their utility without accompanying data regarding the type and volume of alcohol. Moreover, imported alcohol was in turn exported to other countries. In addition to foreign alcohol imports, domestic production pumped locally brewed beer and spirits into the taverns throughout Egypt. With so many unknown factors, no one, including the government and temperance activists, actually knew the amount of alcohol in Egypt.

The Pleasure Center of al-Azbakiyah: A European or Egyptian Space?

In order to set the stage for the analysis of the struggle to control alcohol in British occupied Egypt, it is necessary to establish that the public presence of alcohol increased during the high point of British imperial occupation. Rather than attempting to prove an increase in consumption rates based on unreliable or non-existent figures, the focus of analysis rests upon the public presence and availability of alcohol in the market through the expansion of spaces devoted to its sale and consumption. I describe the market for alcohol in Cairo by looking at spaces, vendors, products, and consumers.

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68 The Cyclopædia of temperance and prohibition: a reference book of facts, statistics, and general information on all phases of the drink question, the temperance movement and the prohibition agitation (London: Funk & Wagnalls, 1891), 11. The editor of the entry ‘Africa: Mediterranean Coast Countries: Egypt,’ from which these figures are drawn, states “These figures are only approximate, the exact quantities imported not being known to the Custom House officials.” The editor acknowledged in a footnote that the information regarding Egypt was provided by Rev. J. O. Ashenhurst, an American missionary in Cairo.
Historians of modern Egypt have studied in depth the changing urban landscape of Cairo, which exhibited a particular dynamism over the course of the British occupation. An in-depth history of the different quarters and neighborhoods of Cairo is beyond the scope of this work. Scholarship from the 1960s and 1970s on the urban history of Cairo has stressed the separateness of the European and Egyptian quarters of the city. Emphasizing difference in the urban framework of a city like Cairo misses the importance of mobility within and across those spaces. Egyptians from across the economic spectrum moved within the city and participated in different markets, thanks to the local transportation network and especially following the introduction of the tram system. Focusing on analogous spaces that offered similar goods and services, such as alcohol, within the urban landscape of Cairo allows us to move beyond the closed model of urban social life.

The public spaces in Cairo catering to entertainment and amusement, such as hotels, clubs, cafes, and restaurants, expanded dramatically under the British occupation. Like other Eastern Mediterranean capitals such as Istanbul and Beirut, the

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71 Chalcraft, The striking cabbies of Cairo and other stories
market for intoxicants in Cairo was centered on the area frequented by Europeans. The locus for the public pursuit of pleasure was the al-Azbakiyah district, which had served as the center of Cairene nocturnal life since the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha. The famous gardens al-Azbakiyah that gave the name to the entire district formed the centerpiece around which the European quarter expanded. What made the quarter of al-Azbakiyah European? The primary connection of the district to foreign European communities was through tourism. The most storied hotel of Cairo, Shepheard's, was centrally located across from the gardens, and other elite hotels such as the Continental and the Savoy also were constructed in the same area. British officers and administrators, as well as other wealthy residents, enjoyed themselves at the hotels, which quickly evolved into centers of social activity for the elite. In the confluence of European owned businesses and European customers with particular tastes and consumption patterns, the market catering to tourists and elite residents grew to include a wide selection of cafes, restaurants, and bars that all served alcohol.

al-Azbakiyah and the market for alcohol were not limited to the wealthy in the hotels and elite haunts. The respectable institutions of the hotels in al-Azbakiyah and

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72 Georgeon, "Ottomans and drinkers" and Hanssen, "Public morality and marginality"
73 Al-Azbakiyah contained a lake that was filled in during the 1830s. For histories of the district, see Muhammad Sayyid al-Kilani, Fi rubū‘al-Azbakiyah: dirāsah adabīyah, tārīkhīyah, ijtīmā‘īyah (Cairo: Dār al-‘Arab, 1958-1959); Fahmy, "Prostitution in Egypt"
75 Both the Savoy and the Continental were owned by the noted hotelier George Nungovich, a former waiter at Shepheard’s who established a impressive hotel empire in Egypt and later became a Pasha. For an in-depth analysis of the importance of hotels in the social life of Egypt, see Andrew Humphreys, Grand hotels of Egypt in the golden age of travel (Cairo: American University Press, 2011)
less prestigious public establishments coexisted in close proximity to one another. An entire industry of restaurants, wine-shops, and bars catering to all manner of appetites and budgets grew up around the hotels. To accommodate a wide customer base, the proprietors of Cairo’s pleasure district tailored their services to meet the varying consumption patterns among the diverse population with its conflux of different cultural norms, drinking habits and modalities of pleasure-seeking. Guidebooks from the 1880s and 1890s listed respectable public establishments, while alluding to the teeming number of local cafes and low-bars in the surrounding area. These guidebooks for foreign tourists made clear that these numerous cafés, wine-shops and taverns were “low” and not suitable for European women. Their access to capital allowed the elite to afford the goods and services available in all manner of public establishments, but they chose to practice of self-exclusion and limit their public socialization. While al-Azbakiyah formed the heart of the European quarter, it was not a closed public space, nor was it the only area in Cairo where alcohol could be purchased.

Egyptians freely participated in the market for alcohol as consumers and purveyors. The non-elite had a wide array of cafes, food-shops, and bars from which to choose. In early 1890, “there were 1,320 cafes, of which 180 were kept by Europeans, and in every one of these European shops liquors were for sale; while of the 1,140 cafes

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76 Nieuwkirk, “The Pleasure of public space”
77 Of the public establishments frequented by local Egyptians, the guide stated, “None of them are suitable for ladies, and many of them have gaming-tables in separate rooms.” Karl Baedeker, Egypt: handbook for travellers (Leipsic, Karl Baedeker, 1898), 24. The same text on cafes from the 1898 is repeated verbatim in the 1902 edition. Karl Baedeker, Egypt: handbook for travellers (Leipsic: Karl Baedeker, 1902), 25.
kept by natives, only 287 had liquors in stock." According to this data, Egyptians operated more public establishments where alcohol was available for purchase and consumption than Europeans. Yet, the involvement of non-Egyptians in the market for alcohol, especially the Greek community, became the source of much controversy and comment. The economic activities of the various foreign communities in Egypt have been the site of vigorous scholarship. The Greek community has particular significance for this work, as their community was primarily involved in the food service industry and the alcohol trade. While the people of Ottoman Istanbul during this period consumed mostly raki and wine according to Georgeon, drinkers in Cairo had the choice of a vast array of imported spirits, bottled and draft beer, aperitifs, absinthes, and wines, as well as the products of the burgeoning domestic alcohol industry. Products of the long viticultural traditions of the Mediterranean were enjoyed by Southern Europeans enjoyed including wine, grappa, appertifs, and brandy. Beer from Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany was also widely available.

78 The Cyclopædia of temperance and prohibition, 11.
80 While Kitroeff’s work focuses on a later period, his work does indicate a long-standing connection between the Greeks and the food and alcohol trade. Kitroeff, The Greeks in Egypt
81 Georgeon, "Ottomans and drinkers"
A fundamental question that must be addressed is identifying who was drinking alcohol. Like other Eastern Mediterranean capitals such as Istanbul and Beirut, the diversity of the population of Cairo was reflected in drinking patterns. The market for alcohol was not restricted to a single ethnic, national, religious group, or socio-economic class: consumption and socialization patterns were largely defined by class. The market for alcohol provided a unique space for points of interaction among different groups, as the following description of a Cairo bar as seen by a British journalist indicates:

I went into the St James’s bar yesterday afternoon: at the door a wind-burned Arab face looked out of a white hood and offered to guide me to some snipe-shooting. Inside the bar was a fat-faced young native in a shepherd’s plaid lounge-suit, talking the English of Piccadilly to the barmaid. The man outside was no more a Bedawin [sic] than I am; he was one of the imitations who hang about the Pyramids with fierce looks, and blackmail timid tourists for backsheesh. But the man inside really was a Bedawin—a Bedawin chief; not one of whose people except himself had ever seen a town. And he had been educated at Haileybury! And beside him sat a prince of the Khedival house standing Scotch whisky to a British sergeant! The man was half-awed, half patronizing; the prince was half condescending, half propitiatory, and he was saying how much he admired the English. Can there be any place in the world like Cairo?

The bar described by Steevens was but one public establishment of many in Cairo, each with its own clientele. Military men have long been associated with a love of drink, and the British soldier in Egypt was no different. The British military had a long tradition of providing a daily ration of alcohol to its soldiers and sailors. Recognizing the social importance of alcohol consumption among its troops, the British administration

83 Steevens, Egypt in 1898, 83-5.
provided beer for the soldiers at military canteens throughout the occupation.\textsuperscript{84} But the British soldiers were not content to stay in the barracks and drink: they took to the streets of Cairo in search of amusement, which generally was accompanied by the consumption of alcohol. According to travelers’ guides, German beer halls became popular around the turn of the century. American bars that served a variety of cocktails became well known enough to warrant comment by Lord Cromer, who commented upon them in a public address about the Anglo-American Hospital.\textsuperscript{85}

al-Azbakiyah was not the only district in Cairo that offered alcohol, but consumers from across the socio-economic spectrum frequented the public spaces of the pleasure district. While a major difference between the European and native quarters centered upon the degree to which alcohol was available, the potential market for alcohol included the entirety of Cairo’s population. The variety of alcohol available in Cairo reflected the international clientele of the drinking market. With more places serving a wide variety of alcohol, it was clear to the most casual observer of Cairo that drink was readily available. Having established that the market for alcohol expanded

\textsuperscript{84} This service was costly, which indicates the importance to the British military command ascribed to controlling the supply and consumption of alcohol by its soldiers. The records of a lawsuit filed in the British consular court regarding the contract to provide beer to British troops at the barracks FO 841-99. National Archives, London.

\textsuperscript{85} “Gentlemen, American institutions have already to a certain extent invaded this country. There are, in the first place, the excellent schools of the American Mission, which have for a long time past spread the knowledge of our common language broadcast through the land. Then also there are American institutions of another description. I am told, though I have little personal experience of the matter, that those who like them can readily obtain the multifarious and refreshing drinks for which America is justly famous at the numerous establishments termed “American Bars” which exist in the city. (Laughter) As I am not a teetotaler I have a word to say against bars in general, and certainly not against American bars; but I say let there be some other American institution in Cairo besides bars and even besides mission schools, however useful the latter may be.” Cromer, Evelyn Baring, Earl of, \textit{Speeches and miscellaneous writings 1882-1911} (Edinburgh: R. & R. Clark, ltd., 1912), 93.
during the first two decades of British rule, I now address the beginning of the discourse about alcohol to understand how moralists and reformers ascribed meaning to this new economic reality of Cairo.

I. Raising the Alarm: British Criticism and The Limits of Liberal Imperialism

In the historiography on temperance movements across the world, a popular and successful topic of research has emphasized the importance of the social entrepreneur, or the prime mover. I begin my analysis of the anti-alcohol discourse in Egypt with an in-depth critical analysis of the most important piece on alcohol consumption in Egypt published in the nineteenth century, an interview with the British temperance activist, W.S. Caine, which was first published on the front page of the *Pall Mall Gazette*. His account of alcohol consumption in Egypt was widely reproduced, particularly by the international temperance movement. My intention here is neither to ascribe to Caine prime mover status of the Egyptian temperance movement, nor to question the degree to which Caine influenced domestic British politics. Rather, I am interested in how alcohol in Egypt was discursively created and politicized as an imperial and civilizational issue connected to larger reform efforts. Caine introduced the many of the fundamental terms of subsequent debates about alcohol by describing the growth of the

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86 Any such argument would be tenuous as Caine’s activism did not result in the creation of a local temperance movement. The main secondary source on Caine’s international temperance activism by Lucy Carroll ascribed to Caine the role of primary mover in the politicization of alcohol as a moral issue in colonial India. Lucy Carroll, “The Temperance Movement in India: Politics and Social Reform,” *Modern Asian Studies* 10.3 (1976): 417-447.
market for alcohol, Egyptian anger at the spread of intoxicant consumption, and the role and responsibilities of the British imperial government.

William Sproston Caine, a British parliamentarian and temperance activist, brought the issue of moral degradation caused by the spread of alcohol in Egypt before the British public. Caine, a Baptist from Liverpool, was one of the most active and well-known British temperance activists in the late nineteenth century, second perhaps only to Sir Wilfrid Lawson.\(^87\) Caine served as an active member of the major British temperance associations.\(^88\) He was president of the National Temperance Federation, a coalition of various British dry organizations who sought consensus in bringing about effective change in the government alcohol policies.\(^89\) He also served as president of the Congregational and Baptist temperance associations. Caine was elected M.P. for Scarborough as a Liberal in the early 1880s, but he broke with his party over Irish Home Rule and helped to form the Liberal Unionist Party. As Chief Whip for the Liberal Unionists, he represented Barrow-in-Furness and, later, East Bradford. Caine frequently pressed for reform of the licensing laws in the United Kingdom on the floor of the House of Commons. He helped to write *The Local Option* (1886) which stressed that temperance should be left to the electoral choice of local communities. The visit of


this established British politician and social reformer did much to publicize changing social practices among Egyptians.

During his two month stay in Egypt in December 1886 and January 1887, Caine busied himself by becoming familiar with the realities of the British occupation. Upon his return to the United Kingdom, Caine was interviewed by the *Pall Mall Gazette*, the liberal newspaper edited by William Stead.90 Stead had scandalized Britain in 1885 with his piece on child prostitution, “The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon.” The subsequent uproar resulted in the Criminal Law Amendment Act, which raised the age of consent and stiffened laws against prostitution. With the case of Egypt, Stead had the opportunity to shock Victorian society with a new moral outrage while spreading an anti-alcohol message. In the front page article entitled "As Seen in Egypt: An Interview with Mr. Caine," W.S. Caine excoriated the British administration for its role in stimulating the spread of intoxicants in Egypt.91

The initial justifications for the British invasion of Egypt centered upon debt repayment and the protection of European residents.92 Beyond questions relating to

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91 “As Seen in Egypt: An Interview with Mr. Caine,” *Pall Mall Gazette*, January 27, 1887, 1-2.

financial concerns and security, the continued occupation of Egypt in the face of criticism was justified by various arguments that included a strong moral component. By the late 1880s, Cromer touted the British defeat of the three 'C's,' corvée, courbash, and corruption. The administration claimed victory over what they portrayed to be the most egregious examples of oriental despotism and misrule. Caine was familiar with the official account of Great Britain's successes in administering Egypt. When asked if the British were doing any good in Egypt, Caine was quick to praise the occupation for “abolition of the courbash and the corvée, with relief from compulsory service in the army by payment.” Vanquishing the three “C’s” did not remove morality from the political lexicon of the British imperialists in Cairo, and Caine used official claims of moral custodianship over the Egyptian masses to blame the administration for its failures in stopping the spread of alcohol.

Caine turned those imperial ideals, whereby the purpose of empire was to uplift the lesser peoples of the world through enlightened foreign rule, against the British occupation. When asked by the interviewer if the British were doing any harm in Egypt, Caine retorted,

Moral evil of the worst kind. When we went to Egypt we were going to establish the civil, moral, and Christian influences of our country on the banks of the Nile. What we have done has been to establish an enormous number of grog-shops


93 Corvée was a form of seasonal, unpaid labor where peasants were forced to repair canals and roads. Nathan J. Brown, “Who Abolished Corvée Labour in Egypt and Why?” Past & Present 144 (1994): 116-137. The courbash was a form of corporal punishment where offenders were whipped on the soles of their feet with a leather cord.
94 “As Seen in Egypt,” 2.
and brothels. That is the most conspicuous sign of our civilizing mission in the land of the Pharaohs.\textsuperscript{95}

In ignoring the financial reasons behind Britain’s occupation of Egypt, Caine shifted the focus to issues of morality and religion. According to Caine, alcohol affected local public perception of Great Britain and fueled growing awareness that the civilizing mission of European imperialists in Africa was not uniformly positive.

Caine singled out the British military as the prime movers in the proliferation of bars in Egypt. During his tour of downtown Cairo, Caine counted 400 grog-shops in Cairo, most of them with English signs like ‘Peace and Plenty,’ ‘the Union Jack,’ and ‘the Soldier’s Home.’ Rather than a paradigm of moral virtue, the British soldier, as depicted by Caine, was a man of base desires that he frequently indulged in a very public fashion. Caine explicitly linked the conspicuous consumption of alcohol in Cairo by British soldiers with noticeable effects on the local population. Caine observed, “Whatever may be the case elsewhere, Tommy Atkins can hardly be said to be a civilizing agent in Egypt... The Arabs are learning to drink, and no one can say where the mischief will stop.”\textsuperscript{96}  Caine argued that rather than encouraging the moral progress of the Egyptian people by example and tutelage, the British occupier had chosen to pursue a lifestyle that encouraged the trade in alcohol, which in turn had negative repercussions on local society. The sight of soldiers enjoying a drink together in their spare time was perfectly normal in the United Kingdom, but such public socialization had much different connotations in Egypt. The spread of grog-shops, bars, and taverns

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
became not merely a question of military discipline, but central to the greater imperial mission of Great Britain.

The British soldier possessed certain appetites, and the market had responded in kind. When asked by the Pall Mall reporter if the British soldiers were the sole customers of these drinking establishments, Caine responded,

Our soldiers have created sufficient demand to justify the Greek speculator opening a grog-shop, and when it is opened it serves as a constant source of temptation to all the natives round about. But for ‘Tommy Atkins’ the shop would never have taken down its shutters; when once the business is started it goes on increasing.97

Caine introduced a fixture of future discussions of the spread of intoxicants: the foreign tavern owner. For the next half century, temperance activists and social critics would single out the Greeks and Levantines as the predominant supplier of intoxicants in the Egyptian market. The Greek and Levantine barmen were routinely lambasted for spreading vice among the Egyptians while giving nothing back to Egypt. The foreign communities were protected under the Capitulations, a series of treaties between the Ottoman Empire and other Western states.98 The Capitulations granted various extra-territorial privileges to the non-Egyptian residents and ensured that protected foreign communities were not subject to Egyptian law. In addition to not having to pay local taxes, foreign subjects/citizens could not be arrested or have their homes searched without the involvement of consular representatives. A firm advocate of a “free hand” in Egypt, Caine urged the Residency to act decisively without regard to the

97 Ibid.
Capitulations, the continued existence of which he connected to the decline in public morality.

For all his indictments of the British military, Caine admitted that not every soldier was an agent of intemperance. He noted that his cause had some allies in the barracks, acknowledging that there were a few ‘dry’ men among the entire officer corps in Cairo. Caine found a far more receptive audience to among the enlisted men, and he spoke before a meeting of 130 abstainers from among the rank and file. Having stressed the importance of the British setting a good example for the Egyptians, Caine curiously did not comment on this divide between the officer corps and the common soldiers.

Here, Caine presaged the paucity of temperance supporters among the British colony: throughout the occupation, administrators, military leadership, and the non-official community were disinclined to support temperance as a movement. Having identified the cause of rising alcohol consumption and found a number of allies among his countrymen, Caine sought out the opinions of local Egyptians on the matter of drink.

Caine met with powerful and influential Egyptians, including Khedive Tawfiq (r. 1879-1892), the Prime Minister Nubar Pasha, and various unnamed notables. The growth of the alcohol industry had rankled the Egyptian leadership, and Caine conveyed their resentment to the British public:

The better class of Egyptians are angry, but what can they do? The Khedive complained to me about it, and expressed the indignation and despair with which he saw the demoralization of his subjects going on under his eyes without his being able to do anything whatever to check the spreading plague. A sheik [sic], he told me, had come into his presence only a few days before foaming at
the mouth with rage. Some scoundrel Levantine had opened a gin-shop right opposite the doors of his mosque, and he was powerless to prevent it. The Khedive was equally powerless. No one has any power under the cursed system of Capitulations, which leave the country helpless before an imported evil, the special detestation of all pious Mahommedans.99

From a pragmatic reading of this exchange, the Khedive tried to use the issue of drink as leverage against the British. In relating the depths of his subjects' righteous anger, the Khedive portrayed himself as a responsible leader, receptive to the pleas of his people. The implicit threat behind the Khedive's complaint was that British risked alienating the population unless the Khedive was granted more authority for he understood the religious and moral sensitivities of the Egyptians where the British did not.

Egyptian opposition to the spread of drink was not limited to the Khedive and his advisors. Once word had spread of his visit, Caine was able to make contact with many like-minded Egyptians who lamented the present state of Egyptian society. Caine communicated the ire of this 'better class' of Egyptians to the British public:

I attended a crowded Arab temperance meeting when I was in Cairo, and heard several addresses energetically delivered by native advocates, who in choicest Arabic adjured their hearers to forswear the fiery poison, and who cursed the English for having brought this temptation into their midst.100

The image described by Caine of a throng of agitated Muslims cursing the Englishman was evocative and threatening. The event was also a warning, foreshadowing popular rage against the occupation lest the British not change their ways in Egypt. For a

99 “As Seen in Egypt,” 1.
100 Ibid.
temperance activist such as Caine, the passionate response boded well for future organized Egyptian resistance to the spread of drink.

Caine did not only comment, but also proposed solutions. Turning to his area of expertise, drafting licensing laws, Caine again blamed the Capitulations, saying “a licensing law is declared to be out of the question at present, though the Khedive would prefer prohibition.” Again, Caine praised the Khedive as a willing ally in reforming British rule. Caine then switched his argument from a position of moral indignation to one of financial acumen: he argued that taxing the liquor trade would bring £100,000 to government coffers. If invested in Egyptian irrigation on a yearly basis for a decade, that amount, Caine figured, would add £200,000 to £300,000 a year in revenue. Thus, taxing the liquor trade would speed British withdrawal from Egypt, which is dependent on the establishment of “sound finance” and restoring “a stable government.” Ever the savvy politician, Caine realized that solid financial arguments had far greater persuasive powers than unpopular moral convictions that not all of his countrymen shared. The increased revenue would placate the administration while achieving a goal of the 'dry' movement, namely decreased consumption. In Caine's logic, once prices of alcohol were raised significantly, many Egyptians could no longer afford to purchase imported alcohol. Such a plan discounted increased local production or other methods to avoid taxation, but Caine presented increased taxation as a concrete, achievable, and profitable step.

101 “As Seen in Egypt,” 2.
Caine’s interview in *Pall Mall* was the first salvo in an international war against alcohol in British Egypt, and his observations sparked significant debate in Great Britain. So great was the reaction that Stead and the editors of the *Pall Mall Gazette* dedicated the front page of the following issue to the indignant responses. In the lead article “The New Plagues of Egypt and Our Hand in Them,” the editors wrote,

> In Egypt the foreigner is untaxed and uncontrolled, and the local government piteously appeal to us to save the natives from his influence...Egypt is under the eyes of the whole world. Elsewhere our sin is more or less hidden. In Cairo, it is exposed to the full gaze of a scoffing world. ‘These be the fruits of your civilizing and Christianizing occupation!’ is the cry, and it is one the justice of which cannot be gainsaid.\(^{102}\)

Stead and the editors appealed to their readers' sense of responsible governance, propriety, and imperial prestige. The editors printed four responses to Caine’s interview under the headings of religion, health, morality, and temperance, which read in tandem with Caine, outlined many of the major themes that came to dominate subsequent debates about alcohol. The erudite and outraged authors identified significant points of contention that later arose between the occupier and the occupied about the issue of alcohol.

A fellow temperance activist, Archdeacon Frederic Farrar, who later coined the dicta “We have girdled the world with a zone of drink” and “We found India sober,

and left it drunken,” wrote to the *Pall Mall* to express his disgust.\(^{103}\) Archdeacon Farrar wrote,

> Surely no Englishman could have read without a blush of shame and a bitter sense of indignation, the evidence furnished by Mr. W.S. Caine of the curse which we are causing to Egypt by drink and by the vices with which drink is always accompanied. The conscience of the nation seems to be hopelessly torpid to our awful responsibility for the wrongs which our drink trade has inflicted upon the helpless and perishing races of mankind.\(^{104}\)

Here, Farrar portrayed Egypt as hapless victim. By underscoring the causal connection between British imperialism and the rise of alcohol consumption among native Egyptians, Farrar simultaneously stripped Egyptian of agency in choosing to drink and placed the burden of that choice on the British occupation. In Farrar’s reasoning, the changes in Egypt were synonymous with the demoralization of South Asians, Africans under the slave trade, “Redmen…decimated or destroyed by brandy,” and the Maori of New Zealand.\(^{105}\) In Farrar's hierarchy of civilizations, Egyptians were similar to other subject peoples who needed protection from the corrupting influence of Western imperialism.

> Under the section entitled ‘Health,’ Dr. Benjamin W. Richardson wrote of his concern for the physical well-being of the British fighting man.\(^{106}\) Dr. Richardson framed alcohol consumption as a universal medical issue with a host of serious physical side-effects that endangered all drinkers. Beneath the title “Morality,” Benjamin Scott,

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\(^{104}\) Frederic Farrar, “Religion,” *Pall Mall Gazette*, February 1, 1887, 1.


\(^{106}\) Dr. Richardson was a prominent sanitary reformer and public medical figure, as well as an advocate of abstention from alcohol.
the Chamberlain of the City of London, penned, “That which is degrading vice at home cannot be a necessity, to be provided, patronized, and marked with the broad arrow of State approval, abroad... Well might the indignant Arab sheikh to whom Mr. Caine refers fall into the same error when we licensed and place the State mark of approval on a sink of iniquity opposite his mosque.”¹⁰⁷ In defending the sanctity of the area around the mosque and not simply the building itself, Scott displayed a prescient reading of Egyptian understanding of public space.¹⁰⁸ The proximity of public establishments serving alcohol and religious institutions remained a major source of complaint from Egyptians for many years to come. The final comment was given to Sir Wilfrid Lawson, one of the most active temperance spokesmen in Victorian England. Rather than focusing on Egypt, Lawson brought the debate back to British shores, praising Caine and the Pall Mall editors for “…the powerful way in which you are calling attention to this Cairo scandal, are doing much to improve the prospects of success in this popular movement at home.”¹⁰⁹ The issue of alcohol consumption by Egyptians was used by British politicians and journalists to score points at home. Lawson’s comments showed that meanings ascribed to practices and substances did not arise in an Egyptian vacuum, but were linked to global discourses. British experiences with alcohol at home informed these authors' view of alcohol in Egypt. The sharing of information and opinions about alcohol use in different lands guided the evolution of an international

¹⁰⁸ Benjamin Scott had worked closely with Stead the previous year in publicizing and combating child prostitution. The non-conformist Scott was an active temperance agent, as well as a patron of working class improvement schemes.
body of knowledge. Caine and the respondents to his interview encapsulated the debate that raged in Egypt and Great Britain for the duration of the occupation.

Caine’s intervention in Egyptian affairs contributed to the larger critical engagement with the deleterious events of alcohol among local populations under imperial rule. Led in large part by activists in Great Britain, these liberal critics of the new imperialism that divided Africa began to organize and share information. Caine’s interview was heavily quoted by cotemporaneous supporters of temperance in Great Britain and the United States. Caine provided powerful ammunition for those critics of supposed British moral superiority. After quoting at length from Caine’s damning testimony, an English temperance activist expressed doubt if Christian imperialism was truly the path to earthly salvation for Africans, solemnly intoning, “In fact, Mohammedanism would appear to be the chief hope of Africa, and, if Christianity does not rid itself of alcohol, may yet be of the world.”

Rhetorically, this total rejection of Western imperial logic and assumptions of civilizational superiority whereby Christian Europe was to bring progress to the Africans was likely shocking to many readers. The consumption of alcohol complicated the Christian missionary movement to convince potential converts of the moral superiority of Western Christianity. As another theme in anti-alcohol propaganda, temperance activists endorsed the view that while the West was technologically superior, the East had higher standards of morality if judged solely

by consumption of alcohol. Combating this perception of Western immorality vis-à-vis drink was a motivating factor for British temperance agitation. The fear that the efforts of Christian missionaries in the Islamic world were being handicapped by the spread of alcohol was a reoccurring theme throughout the history of the global prohibition movement.

American Christians, in particular, were keen to reproduce Caine’s comments in their publications in the 1890s. The official organ of the United Presbyterian of North America reproduced Caine’s commentary on Egypt and offered the following observation: “Very much has been written of late in regard to the disastrous influence of the Anglo Saxon civilization whenever and wherever it is unattended by Christian influence. It is becoming a serious question whether the extension of commerce and science with the evils that attend them is not, in its result, a positive blight and curse.”

Moralists on both sides of the Atlantic contended that unchecked materialism of imperial expansion led to moral degeneration in subject societies became a common critique in the nineteenth century.

Caine's activism on behalf of Egypt did not cease following his interview with the Pall Mall Gazette. He continued to publicize the case of alcohol consumption in

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112 “'Civilization' in Egypt,” The Church at home and abroad vol. 2. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work, 1897), 597.
113 Building on his experience in Egypt, Caine went on to India in late 1887-8. He returned to England founded the Anglo-Indian Temperance Association, made of Englishmen and Indians rather than not Anglo-Indians. Traveling regularly to British India, Caine helped to found over 100 temperance associations and found supporters among the Indian National Congress who moved alcohol from social program to political one. Whereas Caine found established Indian political parties with whom to work, the Egyptian political system in 1886-7 was dominated by a small elite with little influence over policy.
Egypt to an international audience of temperance activists. Caine presented the Egyptian case again on March 30, 1887 before the Native Races and the Liquor Traffic United Committee, sponsored by the Church of England Temperance Society. This landmark meeting brought together clergy and laypersons out of a concern that the sale of spirits to local populations in the non-Western world had a profoundly negative impact on indigenous societies and exposed them to the easy manipulation of unprincipled Europeans. At this seminal gathering, speakers detailed the pernicious effects of alcohol on colonial populations throughout the world. This insistent association of British imperialism with the spread of alcohol was intended to spur the government of the United Kingdom to address the issue and act. This growing British critique decried material progress across the Empire without moral guidance and support from the state eventually garnered the attention from official circles in London and other imperial capitals.

An experienced temperance activist, Caine was familiar with analyzing and critiquing alcohol in Great Britain, and he used this expertise to evaluate the Egyptian intoxicant market. In detailing how Caine’s narrative set the terms of the debate about alcohol in Egypt in his analysis of consumers, suppliers, and the call for reform, this section demonstrated that Caine challenged directly the authority of the British occupation. While Caine did not bring about lasting change, his publicizing of the issue had global import, for Caine’s piece in the *Pall Mall Gazette* connected alcohol in Egypt to the broader interrogation of British imperial rule. As part of the ongoing liberal
critique of empire, Caine’s speech was not merely an Egyptian issue, but challenged Great Britain’s larger imperial policy regarding its responsibilities to populations under its control.\textsuperscript{114} This chapter confirms the exclusionary nature of imperial rule and the prioritizing of British voices, whereby moralists speaking to the public in Great Britain have a greater effect than local voices in exerting pressure in Cairo. Further sections will examine how Caine’s narrative was manipulated by the state. The next section examines the tentative steps towards state regulation of alcohol in Egypt and the wider imperial system: like those first attempts by the international community to impose limits on free trade, the British imperial state in Egypt would falter in its first steps towards regulation.

**III. State Responses to Alcohol and Rising Local Activism, 1890-1906**

Caine and the respondents to *Pall Mall Gazette* were not an isolated incident: the British temperance movement helped to make the control of alcohol an international issue. I consider the first attempts by the imperial powers to regulate the trade of alcohol in Africa. How did Egypt’s unique position as an official territory of the Ottoman Empire under military occupation by British imperial forces affect the first attempts towards a global regime of regulation of the alcohol trade? The evaluation of the Egyptian state’s first hesitant steps in its engagement with rising alcohol consumption introduces another recurrent theme in official discourse: deference to the extra-territorial privileges of non-Egyptians. This section explores the rise of local

resistance to the spread of alcohol in Egypt. For native Egyptians, the available avenues
to express their dissatisfaction relied heavily on traditional social hierarchies. Egyptian 'dry' elements fought alcohol on the community level through the involvement of notables and petitions, but they did not create a sustained body to pressure the central government. Foreign missionaries living in Cairo attempted to battle intemperance with limited success. The imperial state sought to shift the terms of the discussion away from consumers and thereby eliminate any culpability in stimulating the alcohol trade.

**Empire, Drink and Political Will: The Brussels Convention and Early Regulation**

Caine's visit brought the issue of alcohol consumption in Egypt to an international audience. The rising influence of temperance movements in Great Britain pressured Parliament to address the issue of drink on an empire-wide level. But the global market for alcohol could not be controlled by the decisions of one power. Regulation required cooperation from other actors in the market, but securing the faithful commitment of competitors and allies necessitated significant diplomacy. Complete prohibition of alcohol production and consumption was not a viable option for officials in Egypt and in other imperial settings. Instead, the hallmark of alcohol regulation in the late nineteenth century was the inclusion of stipulated exceptions. States ostensibly limited access to alcohol by certain communities depicted as especially vulnerable to alcohol while preserving rights for Europeans. Under this schizophrenic
system, regulation was never universally applied, thus ensuring that access to alcohol continued untrammeled by governmental interference.

The late nineteenth century upsurge in international temperance work with its criticism of the linkage between imperialism and the trade in alcohol led to the Brussels Convention of 1890, the first cooperative attempt to limit the flow of alcohol in Africa. The convention in Brussels was convened primarily to combat the slave trade, with the control of the arms and alcohol trade as secondary concerns. After trying unsuccessfully to bring up the issue during the Berlin conference of 1884-5, British delegates demanded that the alcohol trade be addressed in tandem with abolition efforts. The British argued that the sale of spirits had long been intimately linked to the trade in West African slaves, so combating the latter required the suppression of the former. The treaty stated that the imperial powers were “[j]ustly anxious respecting the moral and material consequences which the abuse of spirituous liquors entails on the native population” and forbade the importation or production of distilled spirits for African consumption in sub-Saharan Africa between 20 degrees north and 22 degrees south in areas where “the use of distilled liquors does not exist or has not been


developed.”117 Crucially, the Brussels Act also included a provision to tax spirits in locales where spirits were already established.118 By permitting colonial governments to tax alcohol, the Brussels Act codified its own impotence by ensuring that colonial governments in Africa would not willingly deprive themselves of revenue. The loose language of the Brussels Act provided ample latitude for interpretation. An unspecified amount of spirits could be obtained for non-native use, which served as another loophole that undermined the efficacy of the Brussels Convention from the beginning.

During negotiations over the scope of the Brussels Convention, the diplomats secured the exemption of the countries of North Africa and the Union of South Africa. Egypt would not be included in any systematic regulation of the alcohol trade. The reasons behind this exemption require some consideration. French grape producers in Algeria were extremely influential, and the French delegation would have accepted no curtailment on their lucrative trade. To counter British efforts, the French suggested that any anti-alcohol agreement extend to the entire continent, knowing that such a proposal had little chance of succeeding while demonstrating French support for the ideals behind the British suggestions.119 The British representatives at Brussels likely

117 Articles XC and XCI. General Act of the Brussels African Conference relatives to the African slave trade, signed at Brussels, July 2, 1890. / Presented to both houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty. February 1892 (London: H.M.S.O., 1892), 60.
118 For case studies of the ramifications of this treaty, see Akyeampong, Drink, power, and cultural change. Willis, Potent Brews.
119 Portugal suggested that the limits on the trade in alcohol apply to South Africa, but stopped short at including North Africa. The Portuguese proposal, like the French one, was a diplomatic maneuver to check British efforts. Miers, “The Brussels Conference,” 113.
would have had a difficult time convincing their fellow countrymen in the military bases in Egypt and South Africa to give up their drink.

Beyond economic interests, the specter of the Capitulations loomed over any attempt by the British to control the flow of alcohol in Egypt. The British consul-general in Egypt, Lord Cromer, admitted that he was familiar with these efforts to control the alcohol trade in Africa: “I am aware that the special provisions of the Brussels Convention do not apply to Egypt, but the fact that such a Convention should have been signed shows that the opinion of the civilised world is in favour of restricting the sale of liquor amongst a very backward and ill-educated population.”\(^{120}\) While Cromer agreed in principal with the ideals of Brussels Convention where Egyptians, like other Africans, deserved special consideration and protection from the dangers of the larger world, he was unwilling or unable to use the expansive powers of the occupation to enforce a coherent, nationwide policy of strict regulation. The relationship between Sudan and Egypt caused some confusion on the part of the British administration, as much of Sudan falls between the forbidden 20 degrees north and 22 degrees south. Was Sudan part of North Africa and thus exempt, or was it part of Africa? The matter was decided by the decree of September 5, 1892, which declared that the importation of spirits into the territories of Sudan below 20 degrees north was forbidden.\(^{121}\)


\(^{121}\) FO 141/435. National Archives, London.
did, however, include a stipulation that the trade in spirits was permitted in Suakin, the major British port in northern Sudan, provided that the consumers were not locals.

**Local Control of an International Issue: Regulation and Defining Public Space**

Following the rise in publicity over alcohol consumption in colonial territories under European imperial rule, the Anglo-Egyptian government pursued policies of limited regulation. The international nature of alcohol regulation in the late nineteenth century shaped state control over public space in Cairo. As with the attempt to control the flow of alcohol in other British African possessions following the Brussels Convention of 1890, the British imperial government in Egypt had to contend with multiple voices both on the ground in Cairo and in the halls of European capitals. Unlike British imperial territories in West Africa, Egypt was not reliant on tax revenue from ‘trade spirits:’ the monetary needs of the occupation government were met by agricultural production. The Anglo-Egyptian state pursued a system of licensing whereby it sought to control behavior through inspection of public spaces. Despite the size of the British presence on the ground, in barracks and the halls of government, the power of the occupation was not matched by legal authority.

On January 31, 1889, the government sought to extend the power of the police over public space with the first law governing public establishments. By this law, the British imperial state made its first venture to codify control over public spaces within the market. Even a law granting the police such a basic right as to enter public establishments engendered opposition from other capitulatory powers: Cromer wrote
that the Russian and French governments objected to the law. That the resistance came from Great Britain’s major European imperial rivals in the Middle East and North Africa points to how domestic politics and the exercise of state power in Egypt were of international import. Such opposition was a reflection of inter-imperial competition where power was seen as a zero-sum game: the smallest extension of British power in Egypt was seen by the French and their Russian allies as a direct threat to their own power.

Despite the initial resistance to the law on public establishments, the Anglo-Egyptian government went forward with its first attempt to regulate the flow of intoxicants within the country. The bye-law “Règlements de Police pour des établissements publics” governed the granting of licenses for the selling of alcoholic beverages. This new licensing law, issued on November 21, 1891, was quite comprehensive in scope, expanding the definition of public establishments to include any café, restaurant, cabaret, tavern, bar, brasserie, theater, circus, club, and other similar establishments. Those establishments already in existence prior to the promulgation of the law had thirty days to register and get the license. Anyone, whether Egyptian or foreign, who wished to open a public establishment was required to inform the local government at least fifteen days prior to opening. If the government did not notify the applicant by the sixteenth day, opening could proceed. For those

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123 For the full text of the 1891 Public Establishment law, see Journal Officiel du Gouvernement Égyptien, November 21, 1891, 1481-1484.
establishments where alcoholic beverages were to be served, a special license was required. Establishments in the European quarters of Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Ismailiyah, and Suez automatically received the license. By singling out of Egyptian urban areas of European economic and social activity for special consideration, the British administration left colonial privilege intact. The license was free: if economic interest was the driving force behind alcohol regulation, the imperial government would have charged for the license. The license could be revoked if the licensee had been convicted twice of serving drinks containing harmful compounds. The inclusion of such a provision indicates that adulterated drinks were a recurrent problem in Cairo, especially as proving that the products served by a public establishment were adulterated necessitated state oversight and testing facilities.

In addressing the issue of access to alcohol in rural areas, the imperial government pursued a separate policy, and the reasoning behind the focus on regulation in rural settings rather than urban ones stemmed from pragmatic considerations. The privileging of urban locales over rural areas reflected official views of the Egyptian peasants as more susceptible to corruption and the practical need for a sober, industrious agricultural work force. The base for the entire Egyptian economy was agriculture, so any threat to productivity had to be taken seriously. From the viewpoint of the imperial administrator in charge of drafting laws, the creation of a comprehensive, country-wide law governing both native Egyptians and foreigners with capitulatory rights was beyond the abilities of the Residency. Among the various
communities that comprised the heterogeneous population of Egypt, the British occupation had legal authority over Egyptian and British subjects only. Depriving foreign nationals in Egypt of their right to free trade, even trade in products or services that had observable deleterious costs to local society, carried with it the risk that other imperial powers would follow suit and enact retaliatory measures in lands under their control. Cromer and his colleagues were not willing to threaten larger British financial interests in economies outside the British Empire.

The enlarged authority over public establishments did not translate into discernible results either in the cities or the countryside. In his first official treatment of the drink problem, Lord Cromer discussed various aspects of the spread of intoxicants in the *Annual Report on the Administration of Egypt and Sudan* for the year 1894. In his carefully crafted summary to parliament, Lord Cromer detailed the difficulties in combating the spread of drink through legal channels, particularly when faced with other capitulatory powers defending their rights to free trade. Of the Greek drink-sellers, Cromer wrote,

> In almost every Egyptian village there is a drinking-shop, which is usually kept by a Greek. It cannot be doubted that these drinking-shops exercise a very demoralizing effect on the population. There is no subject on which I have heard more frequent and more justifiable complaints from respectable Mahommedans than that now under discussion.\(^\text{124}\)

In placing the blame for the spread of alcohol on Greek drink peddlers, Cromer's rhetoric mirrored that of Caine while deflecting the focus from the role of British

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soldiers in stimulating the drink trade. To obviate the British occupation of responsibility in stimulating the market for alcohol, Cromer shifted the debate about causality from drinking British soldiers, which the imperial state could control, to individuals that fell outside its legal purview under the Capitulations. In this way, the state placed the blame on the supply side, rather than on consumers. Businesses, namely public establishments, grocers, importers and distilleries, were easier to police than the public behavior and associational drinking practices. Cromer's acknowledgement of Egyptian complaints confirmed that the spread of alcohol had become a serious issue that warranted action from the Residency.

The method by which Cromer learned of Egyptian displeasure with the increase in the sale of intoxicants is worth consideration in order to understand how the flow of information between the imperial government and the Egyptian populace functioned. On the local scene, ordinary Egyptians in the late nineteenth century expressed their moral outrage through channels that reflected local power arrangements. Early Egyptian protests against the spread of drink relied on personal intervention. The familiar method of seeking redress was to operate through the network of local notables. Large landowners or nobility who had access to halls of power could present a problem to governmental officials. The avenues open to those ordinary Egyptians who lacked such powerful contacts were very limited. There was no formal Egyptian temperance organization to agitate and publicize: individual voices raised in complaint could be ignored. The lack of concerted pressure on politicians allowed the status quo
to continue, where the trade and consumption of alcohol proceeded without impairment.

Not only did the Residency have to field frequent complaints from Egyptian Muslims pushing for more stringent alcohol regulation, but the administration also had to contend with foreign powers pushing for less governmental oversight in the intoxicant market. In the 1894 annual report, Cromer commented that resistance to this new licensing law came not from the Russians and French as in 1891, but from the Greek government. The licensing law threatened, or at least complicated, the livelihood of influential Greek subjects who in turn contacted their consulate. Faced with resistance from a capitulatory power, Cromer penned,

I have frequently been instrumental in settling minor questions which have from time to time arisen between the Greek and Egyptian Governments. I should be very glad if, in respect to this particular subject, I could suggest some solution which would serve to conciliate Greek and Egyptian interests. I fear, however, that I shall be unable to do so. It is the duty of the Egyptian Government to look first to the welfare of the people of Egypt, and there can be no question that, from this point of view, it is most desirable that some restrictions should be placed on the unlimited sale of alcoholic liquors, more especially in the rural districts of the country.\(^{125}\)

In admitting his responsibilities to the Egyptian people, Cromer recognized that there must be limits to the hallmark of the British Empire: untrammeled free trade. But deferring to Greek extra-territorial rights saved him the difficult task of confronting the spread of drink.

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The early years of the twentieth century saw an upsurge in crime in Egypt, and the police were heavily scrutinized for their failures. Administrators, journalists, and security officials themselves crafted various theories to explain this decrease in public order. While there were positive results such as the institution of an ‘Anthropometric Bureau’ under the leadership of Baker Pasha, the police struggled to vindicate themselves from criticism. A reoccurring theme in the discussion of crime in the annual reports of the late 1890s and early 1900s is the emphasis on how different Egypt was from Europe. Theories and techniques of crime-fighting and social control imported from Europe did not necessarily translate onto Egyptian soil. In the 1904 annual report, Lord Cromer tried to offer an explanation, “The greater portion of the crime which still exists is of a wholly different character in some European countries, drink is at the bottom of the large proportion of the crime which is committed. In Egypt the case is different.” The connection between crime and intoxication among local populations that drove British policy in other African possessions did not hold true in Egypt. Officially, any increase in alcohol consumption among the resident of Cairo had not translated into greater disorder. By eliminating alcohol as a cause of rising criminality, Cromer removed a potential justification for controlling access to alcohol. However,

126 The expansion of state control over the Egyptian population included the creation of new forms of criminal behavior and the accordant growth of security services. As the enforcement of these new types of crime grew, official figures showed a noticeable rise in crime, which led to further concerns over public security. Nathan Brown, “Brigands and State Building: The Invention of Banditry in Modern Egypt,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 32. 2 (1990): 258-281.
128 Heap, “‘We think prohibition is a farce’
acknowledging that alcohol and public order disturbances were linked in Europe only compounded the negative ramifications of British inaction. While drunken Egyptians did not commit crimes, British soldiers, Italians, Greeks, and other European residents of Egypt did.

While Cromer and the administration denied the relationship between alcohol and public order in Egypt was the same as in Europe, the government nonetheless took steps to control its use. As seen with the Brussels Convention of 1890 and policies in Great Britain and across the British Empire, the fundamental method of deterrence was through increased taxation. In the logic of the British government and temperance organizations, increased prices would invariably lead to a noticeable decrease in consumption levels if salaries and wages remained constant. Yet, this policy was untested in Egypt. The imposition of financial levies remained a sensitive subject among the capitulatory powers and subject to their approval. Increased taxes on those in the alcohol trade could quickly translate into decreased profits, certainly so if the traders did not pass on the cost to the consumer through higher prices.

Despite the risk to upsetting other European powers, the Egyptian government raised the duty on alcohol in 1902. Alcohol above fifty percent proof could be taxed up to fifteen percent, and alcohol under fifty percent proof could be taxed up to ten percent. The maximum tax that could be levied on all other products was limited to eight percent. The significant increase on the tax for strong liquors intended to be a strong statement from the government regarding its new, tougher attitude on drink.
Justifying the decision to raise tariffs, Lord Cromer wrote, “I need hardly to say that the reason why a special rate is reserved for alcohol is not in order to increase the revenue, but in order to check consumption.” The disavowal of financial motivations was a blatant attempt to mollify critics who maintained that the administration was not doing enough to deal with drink. Cromer undermined his own contention that the Residency was serious about checking consumption in writing, “There can, be no reason, based on grounds of public morality, why light wines should pay any specially high rate of duty. They are, therefore, included in the 8 per cent.” The exemption of light wines reflects the school of thought among prevailing theorists of alcoholism and its control that distinctions should be made among various intoxicating beverages. In such literature, spirits were the source of the worst kind depravity and public nuisance, whereas light wine and beer were thought less likely to cause habitual drunkenness. For the temperance activist and religious Muslim, the distinction between light wine and other forms of alcohol was baseless: they were all intoxicants whose consumption had great social costs.

After employing a new tactic against the rise of alcohol consumption, the government in Egypt revisited the previously tried policy of containment and control.

131 The French experience with the temperance movement is particularly interesting for differing attitudes towards beverages with low alcohol content such as beer versus spirits such as absinthe. Patricia Prestwich, Drink and the politics of social reform: antialcoholism in France since 1870 (Palo Alto: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1988)
Operators of public establishments that served alcohol in the European quarters of Cairo automatically received a license. The government publicly avowed that it sought to check the number of public establishments licensed to sell alcohol. Despite its licensing laws, the Egyptian government did not succeed to decrease significantly the availability of intoxicants, and complaints continued. R. T. Kelly, a visitor to Cairo in the early twentieth century, penned:

> It seems to me a crying shame that Cairo should be so overrun with low class wine bars, whose tenants are not required to have any licence, or apparently submit to any control whatever, and where wines and spirits of the vilest and most inflammatory nature are retailed. Surely something in the nature of supervision might be attempted; for it is a most regrettable fact that when once the Mohammedan violates his religion by indulging in strong drink, he almost invariably becomes a sot, even if the regular consumption of absinthe and brandy, to which he becomes a slave, does not make of him a criminal or a lunatic.\(^{132}\)

Here Kelly invoked a Western trope of alcohol consumption among Muslims in Egypt, whereby alcohol was as marker of difference of between the Christian European and the Muslim. Because alcohol is denied by orthodoxy to the individual Muslim, choosing to drink “invariably” resulted in the ruination of the drinker. The existence of a licensing law did not affect the perception that trade in drink was untrammeled by governmental control.

The Egyptian state also attempted to control the use of alcohol and public space. On January 9, 1904, the Egyptian government modified the public establishment law yet again in hopes of mollifying some of the critics.\(^{133}\) While much of the text of the law

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133 A copy of the 1904 law can be found in *Majmū‘at al-Qawānīn al-Juz‘ al-Thānī* (al-Qāhirah: 1911), 50-60.
remained unchanged, the addition of a new clause sought to eliminate two glaring sources of offense. First, the government crafted a clause which forbade the opening a public establishment in a district designated by the local authorities as being reserved for residential buildings or in close proximity to places of worship, schools, cemeteries and tombs. These public spaces were effectively ‘privatized’ and placed under the dominion of religion and the family. Seventeen years had passed since Caine had publicized the outrage of the shaykh who protested to the Khedive over the Greek drink-shop across from a mosque. In the interim, enough similar incidents had disturbed public order to warrant a legal redefinition of public space. The government sought to insulate those fundamental institutions of morality and decorum that had proven to be sensitive.

The state did not limit its intervention into the market for alcohol only through the licensing the supply side. The Egyptian government also legislated acceptable levels of consumption. In addition to rezoning public space, the 1904 law forbade public establishments from serving alcohol to a customer who was visibly intoxicated. The state put the onus of consumption regulation on the barmen. To control their customers' degree of inebriety, the proprietor was forced to refuse service or face potential problems with the police. The sight of a drunken individual in the streets of Cairo was common, and had very different meanings for those who observed public intoxication. Depending on the view, a drunk could have been a visual testimony to the shortcomings of the Western Christian civilizing mission, an offensive reminder of the
supplantation of Islamic law by foreign power, embarrassing, or humorous. The issue of public drunkenness remained sensitive enough to require reevaluation during the revision of the penal code for native Egyptian in 1909. Section 338.2 listed contraventions relative to public morality. Any native Egyptian "found on the street or in public places in a state of obvious intoxication" could be fined up to 1£E or imprisoned up to seven days.¹³⁴ The criminalization of public drunkenness marked the first time the state directly addressed the consumer of alcohol, rather than the supplier. Consumption remained legal, but the state instituted individual self-regulation. If an Egyptian subject chose to drink excessively outside the home, then that individual faced arrest if observed by the police. The number for arrests for public drunkenness is unclear. In the government reports regarding crime, the more serious crimes were broken down by offense. All contraventions, the least serious of the three types of crime, were lumped together in official statistics of the crime rate, thus obscuring the number of Egyptians charged with public intoxication.

**II. Liberal Critics and Local Voices: Reform of the Licensing System 1906-1914**

The global movement against alcohol made impressive strides prior to World War I. Like-minded social reformers from across the globe grew increasingly aware of their collective struggle. The sharing of information about the particular experience of a society with alcohol reinforced their shared belief in the universal truth of temperance. As the body of knowledge about alcohol spread, reformers were able to craft more

convincing arguments, expand their authority, and exert greater pressure on the political system. Local articulations of the increasingly global anti-alcohol discourse conflicted with the managed narrative of the British imperial administration.

Various local actors attempted to popularize the temperance debate and shape public opinion about alcohol in Egypt but with limited success in terms of securing new governmental policies. As with Caine’s visit to Egypt and the subsequent public outcry, the involvement of the British liberal politician J. M. Robertson with Egyptian temperance supporters garnered greater publicity than the actions of local actors. To investigate the beginnings of the Egyptian anti-alcohol public discourse, I turn to the coverage of the spread of alcohol in the leading religious periodical, *al-Manar*, which called for the reform of religious practice among Muslims. The rise of Arabic-language press, particularly religious-oriented periodicals, did much to raise the profile of social reformers. Muslim religious authorities were not the only Egyptian actors who claimed authority to speak out about the evils of alcohol. I then introduce the founder of the first Egyptian-led temperance organization, Ahmad Ghalwash. Following the analysis of Egyptian-led critiques of alcohol, I detail the temperance work of American missionaries. Confronted with increased interest and growing anger at the spread of alcohol, the imperial state sought to deflect criticism through revision of the licensing law and increased taxation on imported alcohol.

**J. M. Robertson and Lord Cromer**
In the final years of Cromer’s long tenure, the swelling tide of criticism from reformers and critics in Great Britain and Egypt threatened to undermine the official narrative of British-led progress. The British Liberals’ moral critique of Conservative-led imperialism reverberated from Cairo to London, and the coming to power of the British Liberal Party in 1906 and its policy of promoting temperance for Africans had ramifications for Lord Cromer and Egypt. The British administration in Egypt fell under increasing amounts of public criticism from British and Egyptian voices united in their condemnation of governmental inaction in suppressing the drink trade.

As with Caine in the 1880s, the arrival of a British politician to Cairo who was critical of the occupation and keen to establish relations with like-minded Egyptians heralded a new chapter in the public debate about alcohol. John M. Robertson was an atheist, anti-imperialist, and secularist active in the South Place Ethical Society, as well as a member of the Rainbow Circle with J. A. Hobson and James Ramsay MacDonald. Robertson was an established critic of literature, philosophy, as well as current politics. Robertson traveled to South Africa during the Boer War, and, writing under a pseudonym, provided critical coverage of the conflict. As a freethinking proponent

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of progressive causes, he served as a Liberal MP from Tyneside (1906-1918) and parliamentary under-secretary to the board of trade from 1911-15. Robertson proved to be particularly vexing to Cromer. Robertson, speaking for his Egyptian allies, brought the issue of the growing market for alcohol in Egypt before an international audience.

John M. Robertson publicly critiqued Lord Cromer and his administration for the failure to address social reform, education in particular. Robertson’s writings from the last years of Cromer were published as *Letters from an Egyptian to an English politician upon the affairs of Egypt*. Robertson did not reveal the identity of his Egyptian informer, but Robertson used the views of his unnamed source as indicative of larger Egyptian opinions regarding the spread of drink. Robertson’s critique singled out the spread of alcohol as representative of systemic failures in British rule, which in his opinion, had focused too intently on economic gains rather than social concerns:

*The material progress of Egypt, thanks to Lord Cromer’s admirable governance, is acknowledged on all hands. But what are his achievements as regards to its moral advancement? In other words, has moral kept pace with material progress in Egypt? I greatly fear that the answer must be in the negative. Crime, notwithstanding prosperity, has for several years past increased; and that the rate of increase is less in 1904 compared with 1903 is a result for which Lord Cromer, it seems to me, takes credit unduly. Besides this, and perhaps in connexion with it, drink is making inroads amongst the native population in defiance of the teaching of the Koran. This loosening of the religious tie is, especially in the East, of most unfavourable augury. What stronger proofs could be offered that moral and material progress have not marched hand in hand?*

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139 “And he seems to have become more than usually discomforted by the way in which the Egyptian nationalists fed special items of news to their radical supporters in England like the member of Parliament John Robertson, or the journalist Theodore Rothstein.” Owen, “From Liberalism to Liberal Imperialism,” 108.
The facts point to a condition of moral degeneracy gradually creeping over the nation, which all true friends of Egypt must equally deplore, and which it is in Britain’s bounden duty to endeavor, by every possible means, to arrest.\(^{140}\)

Criticism from Robertson and others forced new expenditures on education in the coming year. In the final years of his tenure in Egypt, Lord Cromer devoted increasing effort to addressing the issue of alcohol in particular in the annual reports to Parliament on the status of British rule in Egypt. Following the complaints of British reformers and Egyptian notables, Lord Cromer was cognizant of the sizeable resistance to rising levels of alcohol consumption in Egypt. Eager to deflect criticism from Robertson and other British liberal critics, as well as from local Egyptians, Cromer detailed the efforts by which the Anglo-Egyptian state engaged alcohol on multiple fronts, including taxation, licensing, zoning of public space, and criminalizing over-consumption. Lord Cromer’s engagement with alcohol was emblematic of a larger shift in focus in official rhetoric, as he came to stress moral progress over material issues.\(^{141}\) This late shift in emphasis is most noticeable in Lord Cromer’s final public appearance as the British consul-general of Egypt.

In his farewell speech in 1907, Lord Cromer expressed his deep umbrage at criticism that the British had not brought any measure of moral progress after criticism from Egyptian and British sources. His impassioned defense of British-led progress in Egypt is worth repeating in its entirety:


I hear it frequently stated that although the material prosperity of Egypt has increased marvelously of late years, nothing has been done towards the moral and intellectual advancement of the people. What! gentlemen, has there been no moral advancement? Is the country any longer governed, as was formally the case, exclusively by the use of the whip? Is not forced labour a thing of the past? Has not the accursed institution of slavery practically ceased to exist? Is it not a fact that every individual in the country, from the highest to the lowest, is now equal in the eyes of the law; that thrift has been encouraged, and that the most humble member of society can reap the fruits of his own labour and industry; that justice is no longer bought and sold; that everyone is free, perhaps some would think too free, to express his opinions; that King Baksheesh has been dethroned from high places and now only lingers in the purlieus and byways of the administration; that the fertilising water of the Nile is distributed impartially to prince and peasant alike; that the sick man can be tended in a well-equipped hospital; that the criminal and the lunatic are no longer treated as wild beasts; that even the lot of the brute creation has not escaped the eyes of the reformer; that the solidarity of interests between the governors and the governed has been recognised in theory and in practice; that every act of the Administration even if at times mistaken—for no one is infallible—bears the mark of honesty of purpose and an earnest desire to secure the well being of the population; and further, that the funds, very much reduced in amount, which are now taken from the pockets of the taxpayers, instead of being, for the most part, spent on useless palaces and other objects in which they were in no degree interested, are devoted to purposes which are of real benefit to the country? If all these, and many other points to which I could allude, do not constitute some moral advancement, then, of a truth, I do not know what the word morality implies.¹⁴²

Cromer vigorously defended the successes with familiar litany of the courbash, corvee, and corruption, but he also focused on the supposed rational allocation of state resources and successes against the institution of slavery. Cromer was unwilling to admit the limits of liberal imperialism to effect wide-reaching change.

**Once a Sin, Always a Sin: Rashid Rida and Religious Authority**

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At the start of the twentieth century, the public discussion of the drink problem in Egypt was not limited to Lord Cromer’s comments in official reports or the editorial agitation of liberal critics of British imperialism. Egyptians, particularly those in the religious establishment, began to agitate publicly against alcohol. In the 1880s, the initial Egyptian public engagement with alcohol reflected established social hierarchy. With position came social roles that carried responsibilities and expectations. Complaints about the spread of alcohol among the community were expressed first through existing networks of notables, by which individuals who derived their authority from religious knowledge, landownership, and/or commerce approached the authorities with their concerns and complaints. Muslim religious figures fulfilled their expected duty in enjoining good and forbidding vice, and as such, their justifications and rhetoric for the limitation of alcohol within Egyptian society relied upon the long standing religious injunction against consumption of intoxicating beverages by Muslims.\(^\text{143}\) In the 1890s, Egyptian Muslim authorities utilized print media in their fight against alcohol, which in turn resulted in the expansion of their authority as their message reached an ever larger audience.\(^\text{144}\) No longer were Muslim religious figures limited to the delivery of sermons to remind Egyptian Muslims of their religious obligations. Muslim conservatives in Egypt condemned the spread of intoxicant

\(^{143}\) For an in-depth analysis of the changing social role of religious scholars, see Cook, Commanding right and forbidding wrong

\(^{144}\) Ami Ayalon, The Press in the Arab Middle East: a history (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)

consumption, and their reaction took several forms. The primary response of Muslim religious leaders was to remind the masses of their religious obligations. A corollary to this call to piety was the reaffirming of the importance of their own social role as arbiters and instructors of morality. They stressed the need for religious education under the guidance of the religious establishment. Without learned clergy to remind the masses of their obligation to avoid sin, the Egyptian public would give in to temptation, take up drink, and a variety of terrible social problems would befall the country.

The 1898 foundation of the weekly journal *al-Manār* by the conservative, reform-minded religious scholar Muhammad Rashid Rida filled an important niche in the periodical and intellectual landscape of Egypt. Following the disappearance of the brief-lived but enormously influential *al-Urwa al-Wuthqah*, which spread the words of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, Cairo witnessed a dearth of regular periodical publication in Arabic by editors well-versed in religious tradition. As a student of Muhammad Abduh, Rida was eager to correct the behavior of Muslims in Egypt and across the Islamic world. Rida quickly entered into the fray concerning the

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spread of drink in Egypt by publishing articles each year condemning those Muslims who consumed alcohol in direct contravention to Islamic teaching.

In the first decade of publication, Rida wrote on alcohol on several occasions. The February 24, 1902 edition of al-Manâr tackled the alcohol problem in depth with the lead article, entitled “Drink is the Mother of Wickedness (al-Khamr Um al-Khabâ’ith).” Beginning with the familiar Quranic injunction against alcohol and gambling, he turned to theological discussion about divinely created difference between man and animal. Reason, "the greatest blessing God gave to man," alone separated man from beast and allowed him to control unlimited desires through moderation. In describing twelve dangers of alcohol consumption, Rida stressed the corrupting effect of drink and warned his readers that drink encouraged all manner of evils: loss of reason and madness; indolence; corruption of morality; deterioration of health; committing bestial crimes; loosening of the tongue; prodigality; infertility; corruption of child-rearing and virtue of women; enmity and hatred; turning away from God and prayer; loss of wealth to Greeks and Italians. Rida employed a wide-ranging set of proofs to convince his readership of his thesis, appealing to the sanctity of family, wealth, societal harmony, religious belief, and community identity.

Rida did not limit his discussion of the dangers of alcohol to abstract warnings. On August 5, 1902, Rashid Rida related a great scandal to shock his readers.147 He observed that Muslims in Egypt had taken to drink and were doing so openly, as if it

147 al-Manâr, August 5, 1902.
was permitted or commendable under Islamic law. Rida noted that it was said that Muslims even out-drank Copts and Europeans and had taken to selling alcohol. One Egyptian drinker seller had gone so far as to boast that he operated the only "Islamic" bar. Rida was compelled to see this "Islamic" bar himself, so he passed by the establishment one evening. Outside the bar, Rida spied a man in his sixties standing outside the front door with a glass in his hand. The man was shouting "Oh Sayyid! Oh door to the Prophet!" The man toasted Sayyid Badawi, praising his name in hopes that the saint would intercede on his behalf.148 Rida asked the man, "Did the Prophet command you to do this?" The drunk shouted back "He forgives me! He loves the Sayyid [Badawi]! God loves the Prophet and the Sayyid! The Prophet is an Arab, not a Turk!" Rida realized that the man was alluding to the shaykh's headwear, which resembled that of Turkish clergy. Such a scene was meant to demonstrate the depravity and impiety that accompanied drunkenness. The Muslim publican asked for saintly intercession, a popular belief that Rida and other conservative scholars had dubbed superstition and innovation.149 Moreover, the drunk insulted a leading religious figure and scholar. In further offense, the proprietor committed the egregious sin of praying while intoxicated. Rida's account of unchecked sin likely outraged and scandalized his readers. Islamic religious conservatism preached a message of temperance as part of a larger conversion process that stressed orthodoxy and orthopraxy.

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148 Sayyid Ahmad al-Badawi was the founder of a Sufi order named in his honor. He died in Tanta, Egypt.

*al-Manār* was a hugely influential periodical, and Rida's highlighting the drink problem served to shore up clerical claims to moral authority on alcohol as a religious issue. For the virtuous reader, coverage of drink informed those who avoided the European quarter about a rising social and moral problem. Describing blatant sin was meant to offend, outrage, thereby reinforcing the belief in righteousness of continued observance of the established religious practice of sobriety. For the Muslim reader who drank, Rida's articles were meant to frighten into abandoning alcohol and returning to orthopraxy. Rida challenged and inspired many Muslims to change their thinking about faith and behavior. The Egyptian Muslim majority was the biggest market for drink and the temperance message. The masses had proven receptive to drink in direct defiance of religious authority. For Egyptians committed to wide-ranging reform of state policies and public attitudes towards drink, the confrontation had to adapt in form and content.

**Egyptians Organize: The Good Templars and Ahmad Ghalwash, 1905-1914**

Early Egyptian resistance to intoxicants was waged largely on the community level and short-lived. These ‘dry’ sentiments among the Egyptian population did not coalesce into a formal, Egyptian-led anti-alcohol lobby that would coordinate its efforts to pressure the Egyptian government and influence public opinion. While one of the most powerful religious authorities in Egypt, Rashid Rida could only reach a portion of the Egyptian population, the literate minority that read *al-Manār* or those who personally heard Rida speak. As with other temperance movements generally, the first
step towards the creation of an organized interest group required leadership and a prime mover, or what the sociologist J. Banks termed a “social entrepreneur.” In Egypt, that social entrepreneur was Ahmad Effendi Ghalwash, a young resident of Alexandria. The increased profile of the drink question inspired Ahmed Ghalwash to take action. Beginning in May 1905, he labored alone, spreading word of the dangers of drink and exhorting his listeners in the mosque, market, and cafe to action. His initial efforts were focused on effecting public opinion for the first two years of his campaign. He gave lectures, published articles in the local press, and spoke in mosques. In July 1908, Ghalwash made contact with like-minded individuals in the Good Templars, an internationalist temperance movement founded in upstate New York in the 1850s that spread with great success to the United Kingdom, the British Empire, and Nordic countries. The only requirement to be a Good Templar was to express belief in God and to swear to abstain totally from all contact with alcohol. While the invocation of the Knights Templar likely conjured images in the Western world of armored zealots inspired by their Christian belief to do battle and sacrifice themselves for their faith, the name of the organization, however, had far different connotations in the Middle East. As an ardent recruit in the global moral crusade against alcohol, Ghalwash selected a fitting equivalent from Islamic history and translated the name of the movement as al-

151 A detailed biography of Ahmad Ghalwash is not yet possible, as sources regarding Ghalwash’s private life have not yet come to light. His prodigious production of anti-alcohol literature allows for an in-depth study of a public persona and Ghalwash’s position as a social activist, reformer, and public intellectual.
Mujāhidūn al-Ṣādiqūn, a name which in an Egyptian context was culturally familiar to a Muslim public and did not have the potentially divisive connection with Christian Crusaders. He adopted the organizational techniques of the Good Templars and sought out the support of some of the Alexandrian notables. Success in Alexandria encouraged Ghalwash to take his message to the capital. In 1909, a branch in Cairo was founded under the leadership of Ahmed Bey Fahmi Bashmuhandis of the survey department. The two branches of al-Mujāhidūn al-Ṣādiqūn worked on attracting more attention to their cause. Ghalwash led a coordinated and persistent war on society's acceptance of alcohol in their midst. The formation of an Arabic-speaking, Muslim Egyptian temperance organization carved out a niche in the struggle over drink that quickly developed into a rising authority.

As the national leader of an international organization, Ghalwash was able to capitalize upon his position to establish notable connections with individuals who had access to a wide, influential public. The 1911 return of John M. Robertson to Cairo helped to stimulate awareness of alcohol in Egypt and Great Britain. When visiting Egypt, J. M. Robertson met with Ghalwash and some young men from al-Mujāhidūn al-Ṣādiqūn. Ghalwash complained to Robertson about the spread of alcohol and subsequent the decrease in morality and increase in crime. Ghalwash asked Robertson to inform the British government of the unfortunate situation happening under British

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153 al-Mujāhidūn al-Ṣādiqūn can be translated as “the true fighters.”
154 Bashmuhandis was an Egyptian colloquial honorific for an engineer.
155 It is unclear exactly when and how Ghalwash and Robertson first became acquainted.
Upon his return to England, Robertson’s account of the spread of drink in Egypt was published in the Liberal *London Daily Chronicle* on May 25, 1911.157

Robertson wrote:

> It is no use to plead the difficulties in the way of good Government in Egypt. So long as we pronounce the Egyptians unfitted to govern themselves there lies upon us the clear duty of showing them wherein good government consists. Under our rule, forms of retrogression and degeneration are arising alongside of forms of betterment. The traditional Moslem sobriety is being undermined by a rapidly growing traffic in strong drink of the worst kind, and we are not in a position to deny that a native Government with a free hand would restrain evils which we entirely fail to check.158

While not discounting the fact that some improvements to Egypt occurred under British occupation, Robertson put the blame for the spread of alcohol firmly onto British shoulders. Rather than relying on excuses centered on spirit-selling Greeks and capitulatory handicaps, he laid bare the fallacies used to justify the continued political dominance of Egypt. Robertson declared that since the British had failed its moral obligations to the Egyptian people, the Egyptians were entitled to assume authority of morality and politics for themselves. Robertson stressed the linkage of the temperance movement with the larger Egyptian national struggle whereby Egyptians had the authority to determine the enforcement of their own moral and legal codes. For this explicit nationalization of the anti-alcohol effort in Egypt, Ghalwash later praised

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157 The *London Daily Chronicle* was London paper owned from 1876 by Edward Lloyd, a liberal party supporter, until his death in 1890, when it passed to his son Frank. The editor of the Chronicle from 1904-1918, Robert Donald, had a close relationship with the Prime Minister David Lloyd George.

Robertson. The international position of Ahmad Ghalwash and his organization continued to rise. In January 1914, Ghalwash and Fahmi hosted the head of the international movement of Good Templars, Edward Wavrinsky, a Swedish politician and social reformer, at receptions in Cairo and Alexandria which raised the profile of the organization and helped attract more supporters from among the elite. Ghalwash and his fellow Egyptian temperance activists succeeded in raising local and international publicity about the drink issue, but the gains were to be short-lived. The onset of World War I and the declaration of martial law ended Ghalwash’s prohibition agitation, thus leaving the combat against the spread of alcohol to the military authorities.

**The World Woman's Christian Temperance Union: Humble Beginnings 1890-1900**

Finally, I consider the foundation and activities of the first international temperance organization in Egypt, the World Woman's Christian Temperance Union (W.W.C.T.U.). The W.W.C.T.U. was staffed primarily by Presbyterian missionaries from the United States whose primary task was proselytization and education. Despite international connections to a large, well-organized network of temperance activists, the influence of the Egyptian branch of the W.W.C.T.U. was limited by a lack of support among Europeans and Egyptians, the former because abstention from alcohol was not widespread among the Europeans in Egypt and the latter because temperance activism was intimately connected to evangelical missionary work. Nonetheless, the members of

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159 Ghalwash, Āthār al-khumūr, 45.
the W.W.C.T.U. continued in their struggle against the spread of alcohol in Egypt through educational and publicity campaigns.

The archive left by these missionaries is vast and reflects the scope of their work in Egypt in education, health, and other fields. The work of missionaries has attracted significant attention from scholars of Egypt who have studied the role of missionaries in education and their role in the spread of ideas and identity formation, as well as inter-communal relations. By analyzing missionary efforts to influence public opinion and politics on the issue of alcohol, I provide an interesting foil to scholarship on Egyptian women’s political role prior to World War I. While anti-alcohol activism was always subservient to the greater goal of proselytization, focusing on this narrow aspect of the work of missionaries as social and moral reformers reveals the limited extent of their influence over local society and government.

The Egyptian branch of the W.W.C.T.U. produced regular reports on the status of alcohol consumption in Egypt, and the official records of the W.W.C.T.U.’s conventions detail the activities: press campaigns, public meetings, leaflet distribution, outreach in the education system, and the establishment of contacts with like-minded individuals. Of particular interest are the specific attitudes and strategies used by the

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W.W.C.T.U. in appealing to Egyptian and European audiences. In addition to a unique insight into perceptions of changing consumption patterns of alcohol, reports from W.W.C.T.U. members in Egypt highlight the successes and failures of different methods used by activists in their struggle to ameliorate social ills.

**Planting the Seed of Temperance in the Wet Soils of Cairo**

Founded in early 1874 in Ohio, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) spread its message of temperance and social justice throughout the United States. The activists, known as the White Ribboners, understood alcohol to be a global problem and formed an international wing, the World Woman's Christian Temperance Union (W.W.C.T.U.) in 1883. The W.W.C.T.U. was a religious organization supported largely by the Presbyterian Church. Ideologically, the W.W.C.T.U. was intimately intertwined with evangelical Christianity and presumptions of Anglo-American superiority.162

The Egyptian branch of the W.W.C.T.U. started small with the visit in December 1890 of the famous activist and "round-the-world missionary," Mary Greenleaf Clement Leavitt. Leavitt left the United States in November 1883 on a global crusade that lasted over a decade. As the “Superintendent of Reconnaissance for the World’s WCTU,” Leavitt spread the message of temperance in Hawaii, Australia, Japan, China, Korea, India, Ceylon, Madagascar, Turkey, Egypt, and Europe, ultimately founding eighty-six

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branches of the W.W.C.T.U. Leavitt spent three months in Egypt, from December 1890 to February 1891, during which time she relied almost exclusively on the Presbyterian missionaries to aid her in starting a W.W.C.T.U. branch, stating “American Presbyterian missionaries were my best, indeed, almost my only helpers in Cairo.” According to church publications, all of the Presbyterian missionaries in Egypt were teetotalers. The Presbyterian Church stressed sobriety as an integral part of Christian life, thus temperance advocacy was part of the larger missionary effort.

Willard spent the majority of her time in Cairo, where she spoke publicly on fifteen occasions, eleven of which were for native Egyptians. Cairo, as the capital, was a natural choice, particularly after Caine's description of the city had become internationally known among temperance activists. Her choice to focus her appeal primarily to Egyptians suggests that the initial strategy of the W.W.C.T.U. was to inspire locals to get involved in the movement, or perhaps, to convert to Christianity. The composition of the Egyptian audiences at these eleven events warrants consideration, given Leavitt's reliance on the American missionaries for logistics, such as advertising the lectures and securing a public forum from which to speak. The Egyptians with whom the Presbyterian missionaries had regular contact, and thus could invite to hear Leavitt speak, were not representative of the majority of the population. It is probable that Leavitt addressed her message to Egyptians converts to evangelical Christianity, or those Copts interested in ecumenical collaboration. It is

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unlikely that the missionaries were able to attract significant numbers of Muslim adults interested in the message of global prohibition and the evils of drink to Leavitt's eleven speaking engagements.

Beyond her outreach to Egyptians, Leavitt met with British soldiers with the help of ‘dry’ elements within the barracks. She reported that nearly every soldier in attendance who had not been an affirmed abstainer beforehand signed a pledge of personal abstinence at the end of her talk. The pledge of the W.W.C.T.U. is as follows: “I hereby promise, God helping me, to abstain from all alcoholic liquor, whether distilled, fermented, or malted; from opium in all its forms, and to employ all proper means to discourage the use of and traffic in the same.” While some British soldiers who promised to avoid alcohol henceforth were likely sincere in their new commitment to sobriety, others probably gave into the pressure to sign the abstinence pledge at the end of Leavitt's speech but without the intention of remaining sober in the future. The inclusion of opium in the core pledge of the association reflected the global scope of the organization. As the connection between drinking British soldiers and the growth of bars and taverns had already been established by Caine, it is surprising that only four of Leavitt's fifteen speaking engagements were aimed at the British military.

Despite the positive start, the work of the W.W.C.T.U. in Egypt proceeded slowly after the departure of the star temperance activist. Beyond the Presbyterian missionaries, Leavitt had few allies on the ground to spread the message once she left Egypt. Anne Y. Thompson, an American missionary from Pennsylvania living in Cairo
since 1872, served as the president of the W.W.C.T.U. Egyptian branch for nearly thirty-six years. Temperance, however, was not the chief priority behind Thompson’s presence in Egypt. The two biographies of Thompson stress that evangelical missionary activity was the driving force of her life.\textsuperscript{164} The majority of Thompson’s energies were devoted to teaching at the American Mission in Cairo, as well as conducting visits to the homes of Egyptian women to spread the message of evangelical Christianity.

The first two years of the W.W.C.T.U. in Egypt were challenging ones that yielded few gains. Reports written by Miss Thompson to the second convention of the W.W.C.T.U. held in Chicago in October 16-17, 1893 conveyed the difficulties of starting temperance work in Egypt. The report from the corresponding secretary related that beyond the monthly meetings “among the missionaries” and the addition of two native members, the organization has done “but little work.”\textsuperscript{165} With only two new Egyptian members, the organization clearly had not succeeded in expanding their base to any significant degree. As to the slow pace of the movement’s advancement, the secretary explained: “Temperance sentiment is not strong among English church members, and it is hard to combat the influence.”\textsuperscript{166} The frustration at the lack of support from fellow Protestants stemmed from dogmatic differences between the Presbyterians and


\textsuperscript{165} World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, \textit{Minutes of the Biennial Convention and Executive Committee meetings of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union} (Chicago: Woman’s Temperance Publishing Association: 1893), 165.

\textsuperscript{166} World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, \textit{Minutes of the Biennial Convention and Executive Committee meetings of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union} (Chicago: Woman’s Temperance Publishing Association: 1893), 165.
Anglicans in Cairo. The Church of England had a tradition of temperance activism, but the Anglican clergy were not united in their support of prohibition. The members of the W.W.C.T.U. saw the church as the ultimate arbiter of morality to which believers looked for guidance. As the clergy of the Church of England in Cairo during the 1890s saw no harm in the consumption of alcohol, members of the W.W.C.T.U., who belonged to a different denomination, had little hope of claiming moral authority and winning Anglicans over to the cause.

Stymied in their efforts to win over British residents in Cairo, the organization extended its work with native Egyptians through a publicity campaign. According to the press secretary, the most positive development in the growth of the organization was the establishment of connections with the sympathetic editors of The Egyptian Gazette and al-Muqattam, both of which printed announcements and reports of the monthly meetings. One of the Syrian Christian editors of al-Muqattam was particularly enthusiastic in supporting the organization and printed a large number of temperance tracts free of charge. Reports to the third W.W.C.T.U. convention in June 16-24, 1895 in London confirmed that contacts with The Egyptian Gazette and al-Muqattam continued to bear fruit, with the editors of the two newspapers publicizing the work of the organization in Egypt, as well as printing leaflets and pledge cards. The relationship with al-Muqattam, in particular, proved to be beneficial over the years, and the expansion of the prohibition message to the pages of Egyptian press, both English and Arabic, was a key step in the effort to affect public opinion about alcohol.
Keen on spreading the message of the dangers of alcohol to the youth of the world, the W.W.C.T.U. formed a youth wing of the movement. Activism with the younger generations fit well with the work of the Presbyterian missions as much of their day-to-day work centered upon education. The American Presbyterian missionary, Mrs. Margaret Watson, whose son Dr. Charles Watson would go on to found the American University of Cairo, became involved in the W.W.C.T.U. as its secretary. Mrs. Watson reported that work in the American mission schools continued with oral lessons on temperance, though she mentioned that they needed further temperance literature in Arabic. The encouragement of pupils to sign pledge cards had a snowballing effect, as some of the sworn abstainers succeeded in convincing their friends to cease consuming alcohol. Outside the classroom, activists encouraged the youth to sign pledges as well. A missionary printed three hundred pledge cards in Arabic and secured the signatures of mostly young Muslims and Copts.167 Whether a pledge signed in childhood or adolescence would be upheld in adulthood was debatable. Signatures on pledge cards, however, did not mean that the W.W.C.T.U. had brought about major changes in attitudes towards drinking. Of the progress of temperance in Egypt, Mrs. Watson painted a decidedly negative picture,

This is a Mohammedan country and the religion of the Mohammedans forbids all use of intoxicating drinks but I am sorry to say that a large portion of the Mohammedans are using wines and other intoxicants and among them intemperance is on the increase...The leading educators are not in favour of Temperance...The Temperance work here is yet in its infancy and very

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unpopular, as few residents are abstainers, and the (Natives) Copts all drink more or less.\textsuperscript{168}

The W.W.C.T.U. failed to convince Europeans and local Christians to cease in their alcohol consumption. Worse still for the W.W.C.T.U., the major group who, in theory, should have been on the side of temperance, namely the Muslim majority, were straying from their beliefs.

By the fourth W.W.C.T.U. convention in Toronto in 1897, active membership in the W.W.C.T.U. in Egypt reached twenty members. The W.W.C.T.U. devoted much of its energy to publicity. Monthly meetings were held at the American Mission, where members gave Bible readings. Two annual open-air meetings were also held, one in Arabic and the other in English. Given the known predilection of the British soldiery, efforts continued to be made among the troops. Leaflets in Arabic and Greek were distributed regularly. Previously, this was the first instance of the women of the W.W.C.T.U. reaching out to the Hellenic community. Given public perceptions of the Greeks playing a prominent role in the drink trade, the W.W.C.T.U. tried new tactics and tackled the suppliers of alcohol rather than only the consumers. In an effort to expand its audience, the American Mission began to publish its own Arabic-language weekly religious newspaper in which the anti-alcohol activists were free to publish any temperance articles sent to them by the W.W.C.T.U. It seems that earlier problems

\textsuperscript{168} Woman's Christian Temperance Union, \textit{Over the sea; The world's Women's Christian temperance union convention, held at London, Eng., June 1895. Papers of the delegates read at the State convention at Lime, Ohio, October, 1895} (Cleveland: Williams publishing, 1895), 195.
involving the translation of temperance tracts from English into Arabic had been solved.

As educators, the Presbyterians naturally sought out other teachers in the hope that the message of temperance could be brought into the classroom. Miss Thompson mentioned that The Child’s Health Primer, a Scientific Temperance textbook, for primary school instruction had been translated into Arabic. Scientific Temperance Instruction was a specific branch within the global W.W.C.T.U. network that focused upon the production and distribution of instructional material on the negative physical consequences of alcohol consumption. In the organization’s first effort to enlist the assistance of the Egyptian government in temperance work, copies of The Child’s Health Primer in both English and Arabic, were sent to the superintendent of public instruction in the hope that the message against alcohol could be disseminated within governmental schools. No mention was made as to the response from the superintendent, though Mrs. Watson’s comments from two years previous regarding the hostility of leading educators towards temperance likely continued to hold true. Although the W.W.C.T.U. did not gain access to government school, Scientific Temperance lessons proved successful within the mission school. Miss Thompson related that a number of young men who had listened to these lessons at the mission school had forsworn alcohol altogether. However, without access to the government schools, the influence of the W.W.C.T.U. continued to be limited.
While most of the supporters of the W.W.C.T.U. were women, some men also worked for temperance in Egypt. The Scottish-born, American-trained missionary, Andrew Waston, was intimately familiar with the struggles of the WCTU to spread temperance ideals among the residents of Egypt. His wife, Margaret, served as secretary of the organization. In 1899, he summarized the state of (in)temperance in Egypt:

Another evil of widespread power among the native Christian sects when our mission began was intemperance. Although it was a rare thing to see a drunken man on the streets, yet drunkenness and debauchery were prevalent among the Copts. I am very happy to say that there has been a wonderful improvement in this regard, and I am not afraid to assert that this amendment is entirely due to the influence of mission work in the schools and churches and to the dissemination of Christian literature and also in no small degree to the personal efforts of missionaries with the people in their homes. I am sorry however to have to say that the habit of drinking has rather increased than otherwise among the Mohammedan inhabitants because while they naturally avoid contact with the missionaries they are brought into close relationship with the foreign drinking populations in connection with business and government work.\footnote{J. S. Dennis, \textit{Christian missions and social progress a sociological study of foreign missions} (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1899), 111.}

It is not clear how Watson knew with certainty that “drunkenness and debauchery were prevalent” in the Coptic community. Were Watson’s sweeping conclusions about Coptic morality based on personal experience, hearsay and rumor within the Western community, or did Egyptian interlocutors inform him of the secret practices of the ‘debauched’ Copts? Watson presented a textbook case of the civilizing Western Christian: the backward, debauched Easterner, here the imbibing Copt, needed instruction from the missionary as to proper and true religious observance. Watson portrayed the Americans as having won over the Orthodox Christian Egyptians, but the
basis for such claims result is unclear. Were the Copts convinced of temperance or Presbyterianism? The conflation of the missionary message with that of temperance shows clearly in Watson’s words. Egyptian Muslims, however, placed themselves outside the purview of missionary activity and thus could not be saved from temptation and iniquity. The source of Muslim corruption emanated from British rule itself whereby, generally, material progress through increased economic activity and efficient administration was accompanied by moral degradation. Watson inverted the Western-as-corrupter theme: rather than the unscrupulous Greek leading the susceptible Egyptian astray out of greed, the secular and worldly professional classes subverted the industrious Egyptian. Egyptian cooperation and collaboration with the imperial project led to intemperance. In Watson’s narrative, the West was both savior and debaser.

In the first decade of its existence, the Egyptian branch of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union faced significant struggles in its efforts against the spread of alcohol. Nearly all reports of the work of the W.W.C.T.U. stressed the negative, such as increases in consumption or local opposition to temperance. Doing so made the small gains appear all the more impressive. As a Christian organization, the members of the W.W.C.T.U. naturally looked for support among other Christians, only to find that their European and Egyptian co-religionists did not share the same interpretation of Christianity in regard to intoxicating drink. The majority of the population was religiously forbidden from partaking in alcohol, but this injunction did not prevent increasing numbers of Muslims from doing so. Outreach to Muslim Egyptians was
hampered by the strong missionary connection, with most activities involving invocation of Christian belief in some manner. Led by the teacher Miss Anna Thompson, the W.W.C.T.U. was rebuffed by the educators in the government schools.

Despite the long list of setbacks and significant resistance, there were positive developments. Fruitful connections had been made among Cairene journalists, both in the English and Arabic language press, allowing the spread of their message to new audiences. Thanks to the strong connection with the American Presbyterians, the W.W.C.T.U. was able to capitalize on a captive audience, namely the hundreds of young Muslim, Coptic, and Protestant Egyptian students in mission schools. Temperance lessons based on scientific evidence and independent of reliance on scriptural interpretation proved to be the most successful with the younger generation, which in turn influenced the direction of subsequent temperance work.

**The W.W.C.T.U.: Increased Outreach and Rising Public Presence, 1900-1914**

After ten years of activity, the W.W.C.T.U. in Egypt had found its *modus operandi*. The main loci of action were the mission schools connected to the Presbyterian Church. Beyond working with students, the W.W.C.T.U. increasingly focused on British military and public outreach, especially the distribution of pamphlets. Conservative elements within the British establishment, specifically the Church of England and the police, became increasingly aware of the scope of alcohol consumption and chose to cooperate with the W.W.C.T.U. The tentative union in Cairo between American temperance
agents and influential individuals with significant symbolic and practical authority
presaged the possibilities of substantive change when those in power took up the cause
against alcohol.

The W.W.C.T.U. benefited greatly from the growth of the American mission in
the number of missionaries and students in their schools. Reports to the seventh
convention of the W.W.C.T.U. in Boston from October 17-23, 1906 told of significant
gains in outreach work. The W.W.C.T.U. was able to spread its message in the 172
Sabbath Schools and the twenty-nine Christian Endeavor Societies: the activists claimed
that they had instructed 11,200 pupils in temperance lessons. However, as the
mission grew, the line between the mission and the work of the W.W.C.T.U. blurred
further. Miss Thompson recognized this, writing “…it is hard to separate the work of
the Society from the work of our church and mission which stand for temperance and
purity of life in this land.” Temperance lessons were given in Sunday school and the
Christian Endeavor Societies in Cairo. The signing of pledges continued, and at the
mission school in Cairo, seventy girls pledged to abstain from all alcohol. An update
on the state of moral education in Egypt stated, “Moral standards are not what we
would desire. The foreign influences are not helpful. Seeing this, the people of the

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country believe that Christianity is no improvement on their own religions.”\textsuperscript{173} The self-perception of Christian prestige was based on assumptions of moral authority. In the minds of the W.W.C.T.U. missionaries, the comparative public moral face of religion factored into the conversion process, which echoed the earlier concern of Archdeacon Farrar in his response to Caine’s \textit{Pall Mall Gazette} exposé.

In addition to the work in the mission schools, the W.W.C.T.U. made a concerted effort to attract more soldiers to their cause. The W.W.C.T.U. adapted techniques used by temperance agents in Great Britain, the United States, and Western Europe to create an alternative public space without alcohol. The promotion of “rational” recreation as an alternative to the pub had some successes in Great Britain in the late Victorian and Edwardian period.\textsuperscript{174} As a counter to the bars of Cairo, these locales were designed to be attractive and edifying by offering reading material and games in a comfortable space. British W.W.C.T.U. members operated a Soldiers’ rest home, with a large reading room, at which weekly temperance meetings were held for men of the British occupying forces. The missionaries viewed their temperance work as a bulwark against a sea of iniquity: Miss Anna Thompson confidently reported, “We are thankful here that open sin is being checked in Cairo and Alexandria.”\textsuperscript{175} Sinful alcohol was not eliminated, merely slowed in its seemingly inexorable advance. The W.W.C.T.U.

\textsuperscript{174} These programs, supported by philanthropists, dry activists, and the clergy, sought to provide healthy, approved, sober alternatives while fostering a community spirit. David W. Gutzke, “Gentrifying the British Public House, 1896-1914,” \textit{International Labor and Working-Class History} 45 (1994): 29-43.
sought to involve the families of soldiers as well and began to hold monthly meetings for the women of the British garrison, at which Bible readings were given in addition to temperance lessons. The W.W.C.T.U. also sought to offer the soldiers wholesome alternatives by holding debates, lectures, readings, games, music, and social hours. While Miss Thompson emphasized the successes with the British military, she failed to provide concrete figures of the number of ‘dry’ soldiers, leading to the conclusion that the percentage of abstainers within the British soldiers in Cairo was probably not great. Reiterating the moral dangers of life in Cairo, Miss Thompson warned, “There is great need of work here, and some forms of sin appear to be on the increase, as many people seem to think that life was made for the pleasures of this world.”

The puritanical enjoinment to turn away from the good life doubtless convinced few members of the British garrison. The taverns remained full, so the W.W.C.T.U. physically took their message to the public.

The missionaries moved out of the schools and barracks and engaged the people of Cairo directly. Outreach to the general public through the production, publication, and distribution of leaflets and pamphlets increased. From 1903 to 1906, the W.W.C.T.U. distributed over 7,000 pamphlets against alcohol, the majority of which were written in Arabic. That number increased dramatically in a short period. In 1910, Miss Thompson claimed that every week an impressive 9,000 leaflets were handed out.

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176 Ibid.
across Egypt and Sudan, with a particular focus on the young men of Cairo. The W.W.C.T.U. made a special outreach to young men with the assistance of the Saturday Evening Christian Endeavor Society of Cairo. The majority of the participants in the Saturday Evening Society were educated young Egyptians familiar with the English language. In a move away from the distribution and translation of official W.W.C.T.U. materials sent to Egypt from offices in America or Great Britain, these young Egyptians prepared and published their own temperance leaflet for circulation. Miss Thompson singled out for particular praise the Chairman of the Temperance Committee, who “was very earnest, and he (a law student) and other companions went personally to cafes and distributed these leaflets, which had been prepared specially for educated young men who had been led off by bad company.” The targeting of the specific demographic of educated young male drinkers reflected the W.W.C.T.U.’s emphasis on stopping the consumption of alcohol at an early age in hopes that one ‘dry’ individual would convince his or her family and friends to follow the same path. The active involvement of native Egyptians thus opened spaces for the W.W.C.T.U. and the Anglo-American Christian temperance movement that had likely been closed to them previously. Whether confronting drinkers outside bars or trying to attract the attention of the passerby with a pamphlet, conducting this public awareness campaign on the streets of Cairo required boldness and strength of conviction. The W.W.C.T.U. had evolved from

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177 World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, Report of the eighth convention., 68.
178 Ibid.
a marginal offshoot of a missionary movement to a small but persistent presence in public spaces and consciousness.

When the W.W.C.T.U. lacked powerful patrons within the administrative establishment, it centered its attention on securing individual abstinence rather than on the collective level. Individual outreach finally paid dividends: Miss Thompson reported revealed that membership in the W.W.C.T.U. had swelled to seventy-two members by 1913.179 As numbers grew, the W.W.C.T.U. sought to capitalize on its growth and agitate for larger changes in governmental policy. Recognizing that their message would be greatly aided by gaining influential patronage, Miss Thompson emphasized “the importance of reaching influential people in Cairo” to her fellow activists at the eighth convention held in Glasgow, June 4th-11th 1910.180 Three years later, at the ninth convention of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in Brooklyn in October 1913, Miss Thompson relayed that the W.W.C.T.U. established a close relationship with Colonel Harvey Pasha, the police commandant of Cairo, who promised them that he “is trying hard to improve the morals of Cairo.”181 Attracting the support of the head of the police was a tremendous moral victory for the W.W.C.T.U., but the question remained as to whether Harvey Pasha would able to bring about any real change.

Influential members of the Anglican Church, an institution which previously was deaf to W.W.C.T.U. appeals, came to recognize that alcohol consumption in Cairo had become a problem. Mrs. E.L. Butcher, the wife of the leading Anglican clergyman known as 'the Dean,' confessed in her memoirs that drunks of both sexes came to the Church House and appealed for aid. With new allies in the police and the English church, Miss Thompson’s engagement with the British authorities took on a more critical bent. Even as the W.W.C.T.U. built closer relations with the British establishment, it did not refrain from criticizing governmental inaction, but actually became more strident. In early dispatches to other dry activists, Thompson refrained from directly referencing individual administrators for their work, or lack thereof, regarding temperance. She was no longer shy about critiquing a British administrator by name. In a July 30, 1913 letter, Miss Thompson contrasted the stance on the temperance issue of Lord Cromer with Lord Kitchener, to the latter’s detriment. The ever-increasing impediments to Thompson’s calling come through in the body of that same letter from 1913:

I am sorry that beer drinking seems to be much on the increase among the Mohammedans I cannot say among the better classes but among the middle and poorer classes I have seen a good deal of it in Cairo...Some small efforts are being put forth among the natives, but without the help of the Government very

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182 “Sometimes the doctor had to be called in to decide whether manifestly incapable people on our doorstep were drunk or ill. I have had to call native servants to take up a drunken Irishwoman, speechless and unconscious, and carry her off to deposit her like a log on a hospital bed to be dealt with by the nurses. But I think that this was the only case of a woman drunkard we had to deal with, though I heard tales of another Irishwoman who indulged in throwing vitriol when she was in that condition, but that was before I married the Dean. Male drunkards were unfortunately common.” E.L. Butcher, *Egypt as we knew it* (London: Mills & Boon, 1911), 157-8.

183 Hayler, *Prohibition advance*, 212.
little permanent good will be effected. A very great restriction in the importation of European spirits, or better still their entire prohibition, should be secured.\textsuperscript{184} Thompson's rhetoric showed growing sophistication. In earlier dispatches, she gave general statements about drinking writ large, but this report broke down changing consumption patterns by class and preference. Thompson also moved beyond complaints about government inaction to proposing the adoption of specific reforms. The W.W.C.T.U. did not sit idly by while critiquing the inaction of political and social authorities: continued agitation in the streets, schools, and press established as the W.W.C.T.U. as the leading voice for temperance in Egypt. As awareness of the growing presence of drink rose, other voices joined the W.W.C.T.U. in condemning alcohol and demanding change.

**Conclusion**

Reflecting on the public presence of the British soldiers in Cairo, the last Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi II, noted in his memoirs:

They made the Palace of Qasr al-Nil their barracks in Cairo. Their horse-racing, their violent games, sports, dancing, English billiards, and sometimes also 'home' life, sufficed to make them happy. Egypt in itself did not interest them except in a remote and vague sort of way. … As for the soldiers, they lived in comfortable barracks which they never left except to ensconce themselves in special little bars where they danced, in between whiskys, to the sound of a player-piano, atrociously out of tune. A very strict military police kept them within the limits of decency and intervened at the least incident. Such interventions were, moreover, fairly rare, and often did not usually involve more than settling some pecuniary conflict between street donkey-drivers and the soldiers of His Britannic Majesty. Thus, one hardly noticed the presence of an army composed

\textsuperscript{184} Hayler, *Prohibition advance*, 212.
of a few battalions, whose role was to remain unobtrusive, and whose international mission was to ensure order in a country with a population, in 1914, of 14 million inhabitants. But the inhabitants did not want to be protected at all.\footnote{Abbas II, Khedive of Egypt, The last khedive of Egypt: memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II / translated & edited by Amira Sonbol (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998) 156.}

The low profile of the British military occupation ended with the World War I and martial law. I have attempted to show that the British military, and, by extension the colonial edifice that the military power supported, played a determinative role in the expansion for the market of alcohol in Cairo. Once the market had expanded, the British imperial state put more effort into controlling the discourse about alcohol than the physical market. Like other imperial possession in Africa and Asia, British metropolitan politics and local Egyptian struggles to control the market for alcohol were intertwined. Lord Cromer and his successors in the British imperial government in Cairo blamed the Capitulations for the spread of drink. The rise of non-governmental organizations committed to social reform in Egypt provided another voice that largely confirmed the state’s line of reasoning and then perpetuated that narrative. While the American missionaries advocated temperance, their influence was limited because of their Christian proselytizing. Ahmad Ghalwash and other Egyptian temperance activists made contacts with international organizations, but their activities in Egypt were also circumscribed. The spread of alcohol consumption in Egypt was intimately linked to British concerns over imperial prestige and authority, and it was British voices that received the greatest response from the imperial government.
Chapter II: Alcohol, Contested Authority, and the Limits of Independence, 1914-1949

In this chapter, I examine state and societal discourse about alcohol and the continued politicalization of public morality during the period 1914-1949. During this time frame, the struggle to alcohol in Egypt evolved from an intra- and inter-imperial matter to (inter)national issue and became linked to larger demands for political independence. In the previous chapter, the debate over the control in the trade of alcohol corresponded to the calculus of occupation whereby the occupied population and non-Egyptian reformers strove to convince the imperialists to respect the mores and wishes of the people and safeguard religious morality. In turn, imperial administrators sought to legitimate their rule by acknowledging these concerns, and control over alcohol allowed the British imperial state to expand its powers in the public sphere under claims to moral progress. I argue that during the period under study, the issue of alcohol expanded from a matter of state control to one of control of the state.

Examining the growth of local articulations of the global anti-alcohol discourse reveals the ways in which national politics colored the debate about alcohol in the Egyptian public sphere. The activism of Ahmad Ghalwash, the leading Egyptian temperance activist, made control over alcohol a national issue with increasing local and international support. American involvement in the Egyptian temperance movement, in particular, provided crucial political and cultural support in furthering the link between anti-alcohol activism and larger political claims. Following Egyptian independence, the issue of temperance gained increasing number of adherents as local interest groups and political actors come to the fore to challenge British authority on
morality, and through those moral claims, Egyptian temperance activists sought to secure substantive change in government policy.

Not only did support for the ban of alcohol increase with the rise of Egyptian nationalist sentiment, but the language of temperance also gained greater currency in the broader public sphere, especially as calls for various forms of social reform and religious idiom gained in popularity. As more claimants to moral authority over alcohol asserted their demands for broader political and social reform, I demonstrate the ways in which temperance became bound up with the promise - and limits - of independence. In the familiar narrative of Egyptian political history, three camps vied for dominance over Egyptian politics during the interwar period: the palace, the Wafd, and the British Residency. Lesser political actors had to navigate the complicated and evolving web of authority in the search for patronage or leverage. The study of temperance activism adds to the complexity of national debates by tracking the opening of the political process to new actors over the interwar period.

I first sketch the drastic transformations in the market for alcohol during World War I to explore the ramifications of Egypt’s formal incorporation into the British Empire and to argue that the inability of the state to regulate alcohol and public behavior under martial law demonstrates the problematic weaknesses of regulatory regimes. To investigate the social history of the first decade of independent Egypt during, I then turn to the nationalization of the alcohol question during the high point of temperance activism in Egypt. The analysis of the Egyptian Temperance Society
provides insight into the larger process of international progressive reform movements and anti-vice campaigns. The direct collaboration and exchange of ideas between Egyptian and American temperance activists warrants a re-evaluation of the relationship between the countries following the positive reception of Wilsonian ideals. The incorporation of the anti-alcohol policies into the party platforms of new claimants to political and moral authority, the Muslim Brothers in particular, reflects the larger rise of religious and reformist idiom in Egypt.

I. Egypt under the British Protectorate: Martial Law and Drunken soldiers, 1914-1922

The outbreak of World War I and the entry of the Ottoman Empire on the side of the Central powers placed Great Britain in an awkward position vis-à-vis the status of Egypt. Throughout the thirty-two year British occupation and administration, Egypt had formally remained part of the Ottoman Empire. The declaration of war between the British and Ottoman empires resulted in the severance of vassal ties between Cairo and Constantinople. The British government in London and its agents in Cairo were concerned over the loyalties of the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi. In December 1914, the British forced Khedive Abbas Hilmi from the throne and replaced him with his uncle, Husayn Kamil. The British declared Egypt a Sultanate and a protectorate under British rule. This section uses the issue of alcohol as a tracer dye to examine how the declaration of a protectorate affected the relationship between the government of occupation and the people of Cairo. Thousands of soldiers on the streets were clearly visible manifestations
of Egypt's formal incorporation into British Empire, and controlling their access to alcohol had a wide-reaching impact on the public spaces of the Egyptian capital.

This first section demonstrates that the consumption patterns of the British military stimulated the market for intoxicants in Cairo to previously unseen levels, and thereby calls into question previous official explanations that blamed the capitulations for the spread of drink in Egyptian society rather than the British soldier as consumer. The British imperial administration had argued that the culpability over the spread of drink lay with the lack of state authority to govern all residents equally before the law. I argue that British policies regarding alcohol and public establishments during the period 1914-1922 presaged the possibilities, and limits, of a sovereignty wherein all residents of Egypt were equal before the law. This equality, however, was achieved only under the repressive, autocratic rule of British military authorities through the imposition of martial law. Even so, the heavy-handed rule of martial law could not eliminate threats to public order and health that stemmed from widespread alcohol consumption.

This section then considers the postwar effort to resurrect the international regulatory regime to limit alcohol in colonial Africa in order to examine how these efforts became a national issue following the incorporation of Egypt into the British Empire and subsequent popular demands for Egyptian independence. The suspension of the capitulations and martial law were only temporary measures: control over alcohol was dependent on a negotiated settlement defining the long-term relationship
between Great Britain and Egypt. Until larger political questions were settled, British administrators and military officials were hesitant to enact permanent policies regarding the flow of alcohol in Egypt.

**The Empire Comes to Cairo: Foreign Troops and Martial Law**

Following the entrance of the Ottoman Empire in the war in late October 1914, General John Maxwell, the General Officer Commanding the British military in Egypt, found it expedient to declare martial law throughout the country on November 2, 1914. Under the rubric of the maintenance of security and public order, the British military assumed significant powers that allowed the British to enact numerous policies impossible under pre-war circumstances because of the capitulations. Censorship of the press prevented publication of any article that attacked the British military. Political activities among Egyptians were banned, much to the dismay of the Egyptian political class. These policies had considerable bearing on the issue of alcohol, since military enforced limits on expression of public opinion and activism by Egyptians included those involved in the temperance struggle.

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186 General Maxwell assumed control of the British military in Egypt on September 10, 1914.
187 Letter from General Maxwell to Lord Kitchener, written in Cairo and dated October 21, 1914. “The situation in Egypt presents some anomalies and difficulties, but really the position of the General Officer Commanding the Army of Occupation is very powerful, for it is defined nowhere, and though his powers have been kept in the background for years, yet these latent powers have been there and have never been suppressed. So as a matter of legal fact it is not really necessary to declare martial law by Proclamation as it is done in Colonies. Of course the General Officer Commanding must be backed up by his Government, and this is what has been done here. For instance I take it that in a state of war the will of the General Officer Commanding is superior to the Capitulations, and all foreigners in Egypt are subject to his will!” Underlining in original. Sir John Grenfell Maxwell papers. Box 4. Princeton University.
The imposition of martial law in 1914 put a stop to the formal agitation of Ahmad Effendi Ghalwash and the Egyptian branch of the International Order of the Good Templars. As the last chapter has shown, Ghalwash and his band of dry supporters had campaigned to pressure the government on alcohol regulation with limited success, but they had succeeded in raising publicity about the issue. Under the military rule, authorities deemed Ghalwash's group to be a political body, so they forbade Ghalwash and his cohort from formally agitating against alcohol. The British military and civilian administrators closed the public sphere to Egyptians, while public spaces were dominated physically by British khaki-covered bodies. Despite the injunction, Ghalwash and other reformers continued in the crusade on an informal, individual level by speaking in mosques and other public areas. Egyptian voices on temperance were stymied from organizing and raising attention to the issue of alcohol. British voices, however, could raise their voices in complaint against the social costs of alcohol. The inequalities of imperial rule gave British critics privileged access to a restricted public sphere while the participation of Egyptian actors was repressed.

The influx of tens of thousands of imperial troops into Egypt in late 1914 had a dramatic effect on the urban scene, as Australians, New Zealanders, Indians, and British troops tramped down the city streets looking for relaxation, adventure, and a good time. The poor behavior of imperial troops in Cairo has been well-documented by
historians of World War I. With thousands of imperial troops garrisoned or temporarily stationed in Cairo, the publicans, tavern-owners, and other of the pleasure districts greatly expanded their operations to accommodate the surge in new customers. Intoxicated soldiers, the Australians most infamously, became a serious public security issue and made a mockery of military order. During the months of troop build-up in Egypt before the Gallipoli campaign, soldiers waited for their imminent deployment. The mixture of anticipation, fear, and boredom among the troops made for a frenetic and chaotic atmosphere fueled by high consumption of alcohol. Arthur Garrels, the American Consul at Alexandria, noted that alcohol consumption increased tremendously thanks to the troops.

Rowdy overindulgence in alcohol among the imperial troops upset public order. General Maxwell used the exigencies of war to try to curtail the torrent of drink in Egypt through a series of proclamations. Under martial law, the closing hour for all public establishments was changed from 2:00 am to 9:00 p.m. Reductions in the hours

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188 Most recently, Peter Stanley won the 2010-11 Prime Minister's Prize for Australian History for his popular work on the behavior of Australian troops in World War I. Peter Stanley, Bad characters: sex, crime, mutiny, murder and the Australian imperial force (Sydney: Murdoch Books, 2010) P. G. Elgood, Egypt and the army (London: Oxford University Press, 1924)

189 The Gallipoli, or Dardanelles, Campaign began in late April 1915. After months of heavy causalities on both sides and failure of the British forces to advance beyond the beach-head, the British withdrew in early January 1916.

190 Garrels wrote, "As a Mohammedan country the per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages is naturally very low. Yet the production of beer in Egypt has increased from 1,320,000 gallons in 1908 to 4,000,000 gallons in 1917...The beer importation for 1917 was only one tenth of that of 1916, owing to the presence of large bodies of British troops in Egypt during 1915-16 for the Saloniki and Palestinian campaigns. Their withdrawal by 1917 of course reduced the consumption of beer. The ordinary importation of beer in the years before the World War was principally for the army of occupation." Garrels wrote the report “Production and Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages in Egypt and Laws Relating to Their Manufacture and Sale, with Statement Concerning Temperance and Prohibition Movement” in August 1918. Cherrington, Standard encyclopedia, 899.
during which soldiers could consume alcohol was matched by limits on what they could consume. Maxwell issued an order banning the sale of absinthe, which had been popular at gatherings of French and Egyptian Gallophiles since the 1890s. In a report to Maxwell dated March 20, 1916 from the Commandant of Cairo City Police, Harvey Pasha wrote that this earlier closing time was “most strictly enforced, not only in public establishments including hotels, but also in all clubs... The opening of any new establishment for the sale of drink was forbidden, as also the sale of drink to E.C.Cs. and men in bottles...The diminution of drunkenness since these measures were taken in hand is very marked.”

Until the declaration of martial law, the forces of the government had been unable to enter public establishments operated by foreigners without the assistance of consular agents. Clubs, in particular, had long been outside the control of the police. It seemed that after decades of impotence before the capitulations, the forces of the British military command exercised full authority over all public spaces in Egypt. However, despite Baker's reports of success in the reduction of the alcohol supply and the increased presence of state agents in public life, alcohol consumption among the troops remained a constant concern to both the authorities and residents of Cairo.

The issue of alcohol consumption among the imperial troops was not merely a question of public order. Alcohol consumption threatened the physical health of the troops, a risk raised in the pages of Pall Mall Gazette in the days of Cromer. Adulterated alcohol

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191 FO 144/466, National Archives, London.
192 The issue of clubs will be examined in detail in chapters 3 and 4.
drinks had been a concern for years, as evidenced by the public establishment law that threatened closure or financial penalty to any bar or tavern found to be serving them. However, the continuing problem of adulterated drinks prior to 1914 was another instance in which a government mandate was not followed by substantive enforcement.\textsuperscript{193} According to the commandant of the Cairo police, the expanded police powers under martial law allowed for greater inspection, in marked contrast to pre-war conditions:

A Special Inspector was appointed for the control of the quality of the drink and special powers were given to selected police officers in connection with this question...The total number of samples of drink, taken by the Inspectors detailed for this duty from 27\textsuperscript{th} March, 1915 to 2\textsuperscript{nd} March, 1916 was 622. Out of this number 137 or 22\% were found to be not genuine. The total number of cases sent for trial by the Military Courts was 87, resulting in 54 convictions, 19 cases are still awaiting confirmation. Amount of fines imposed £E 590.\textsuperscript{194}

The Military Courts imposed a new degree of control over public establishments, and punishment from the state was severe. Quality controls over adulterated drink were important not only because of the associated health risks, but also because of the belief that purveyors of doctored intoxicants sold their product in order to rob their befuddled customers or entice them to make spend their money more freely in the pursuit of other physical pleasures.

Military doctors were quick to connect alcohol consumption by soldiers with the threat of sexually transmitted infections. As the number of bars and taverns rose to

\textsuperscript{193} The records of the British Consular Courts only contain one case of state prosecution for counterfeit whiskey. FO 831/107. National Archives, London.

\textsuperscript{194} Of pre-war enforcement, Baker wrote "There was absolutely no power of control on the quality of drink sold." A report from Harvey Pasha to Maxwell from March 20, 1916. FO 141/466. National Archives, London.
meet the higher demand, similar increases in trade were seen at the brothels in Cairo.

General Birdwood issued a circular "Warning to Soldiers Respecting Venereal Diseases" to Australians troops advising them against drinking any native alcohol:

These beverages are nearly always adulterated, and it is said that the mixture offered for sale is often composed of pure alcohol and other ingredients, including urine, and certainly produces serious consequences to those who consume it. As these drinks are drugged, a very small amount is sufficient to make a man absolutely irresponsible for his actions.195

The circular was meant to dissuade soldiers from drinking, but there is little evidence that troops heeded the advice. In light of the continued patronage of bars and houses of ill repute, another military report stressed that authorities needed to address access to alcohol if they wished to prevent infection among the troops. The report argued for the "[s]trongest possible restrictions as to the sale of intoxicants. A very large percentage of the men affected visit disorderly houses and contract the disease whilst under the influence of intoxicants."196 Since drunken soldiers made poor decisions that threatened their health, military doctors sought to impose their authority over the socialization of the troops. For example, to limit temptation, the report suggested that the military police "[e]xclude women from public houses and liquor bars: no woman should be allowed to keep a bar or serve in any capacity in a bar, restaurant, or other place where alcoholic drinks are served to soldiers."197 Until World War I, sex

196 “Suggested methods for the reduction of venereal diseases amongst troops in Egypt”, Colonel T.W. Gibbard, Assistant Director Medical Services, Camps & Effective Troops, Alexandria, April 18, 1916. (FO 141-466)
197 Ibid.
segregation in public establishments was largely voluntary and self-policing.\textsuperscript{198} The proposed expulsion of women from public spaces connected to alcohol sought to replicate the male world of the barracks and club throughout the entire urban scene of Egypt. The military attempted to apply city-wide the politics of the brothel and thereby sexualize a woman's public proximity to alcohol.

Military concern for the connection between alcohol consumption, prostitution, and public order proved to be well-founded. On April 2, 1915, drunken Australians and New Zealanders rampaged through the Red Light district in downtown Cairo, which was located around the corner from Shepheard's Hotel. These troops commenced to attack the brothels, throwing furniture through the windows and setting the broken fixtures alight in the street. The chaos continued for over five hours and only abated with the deployment of mounted troops. A military inquest into the "Battle of the Wazza" followed, but failed to identify the troublemakers.\textsuperscript{199} Many of the rowdy troops were shipped off to fight on the shores of Gallipoli shortly thereafter, so the matter was dropped. Those soldiers who did remain in Cairo engaged in drunken rioting yet again in late July 1915 when intoxicated soldiers arguing with prostitutes spiraled into violent clashes with the toughs of the brothel.

\textsuperscript{198} The issue of gender segregation in public establishments will be examined in more detail in the following chapter.

\textsuperscript{199} "Wazza" was an English approximation of the local Arabic name for the red-light district, Wijh al-Birka (Face of the lake), in the Al-Azbakiyah pleasure district.
Explanations among historians for the rioting in April and July 1915 differ. Popular histories have downplayed the seriousness of the violence, likening the riots to horseplay. Brugger blamed "bad liquor" for the "highly excited state" of the riotous soldiers, and she argued that the local 'toughs' in the brothels and bars could not deal with the overwhelming superiority of the troops. Fewster noted that the timing of the orders for deployment came only hours before the outbreak of violence. Regardless of the interpretation proposed by these historians, it is clear that alcohol played a major factor in the behavior of the troops. Social habits and the added stress of an uncertain future before German and Ottoman guns drove some men to drink, others to violence: incidents of the latter always included the former in abundance.

Shocked by the behavior of drunken troops and the accordant rise in prostitution in Cairo, leading British officers, the head of the police, and health officials were instructed by General Maxwell to form the Cairo Purification Committee in order to "'thoroughly consider the soldier's life and to submit recommendations from time to time of the most efficient methods which should be adopted under martial law to ensure the amelioration of the welfare and health of the troops.'"

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201 Stanley emphasized the connection between venereal infection and violence. Stanley, *Bad characters*, 26-37.
204 The Chairman of the Cairo Purification Committee was Lieutenant-General E. A. Altham, Inspector-General of Communications, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and members included The Right Reverend the Bishop in Jerusalem Rennie Macllnnes; Major-General W. A. Watson, Commanding Delta District and L. of C. Defences; Bt.-Colonel T. W. Gibbard; Colonel Harvey Pasha, Commandant Police, Cairo; Dr. H. P.
Committee met for the first time in April 1916 and held twelve subsequent meetings. The fight against venereal disease was a priority for the Committee, especially after the outbreak of violence the previous year. The Cairo Purification Committee sought even more stringent controls on military access to alcohol, particularly around the red-light district:

That all bars, hotels, etc., where alcoholic liquor is sold in the prostitutes’ quarters of towns should be closed between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m. The effect of alcoholic drink as an incentive to immorality is well known; it is in the Committee’s opinion important that the facilities for obtaining such drinks should be limited as possible in the vicinity of the prostitutes’ quarter.  

The Cairo Purification Committee sought to limit the imperial troops’ access to alcohol by further curtailing the hours which public establishments could operate. The military rulers of Cairo had already cut short the hours of operation of these locales, but this policy had not prevented drunken disorder or dissuaded the troops from pursuing various forms of pleasure. Again, military commanders and health officials connected alcohol consumption with sexual impropriety. In response to petition put forward by the Cairo Purification Committee, Sir John Maxwell wrote:

These difficulties [namely the suppression of vice], some of which are peculiar to Egypt, exist in every city in every country in the world. To affect any real amelioration a government has the right to demand the cordial cooperation of the masses of the population. We are fortunate in that, in this Moslem country the vast majority are in favour of and welcome any measures that will prevent the abuse of intoxicants or the encouragement of prostitution. Vice, however, no


205 “That all bars, hotels, etc., where alcoholic liquor is sold in the prostitutes’ quarters of towns should be closed between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m. The effect of alcoholic drink as an incentive to immorality is well known; it is in the Committee’s opinion important that the facilities for obtaining such drinks should be limited as possible in the vicinity of the prostitutes’ quarter.” Report of the Cairo Purification Committee, 11. FO 141/466. National Archives, London.
matter what forms it takes would be largely non-existent if it were not encouraged by: (1) Those who make money out of it. (2) Those who demand it.”

Acknowledging the universality of vice, Maxwell's comments exposed the basic futility of any attempts to exert total control over the market for pleasure, regardless of locale or culture. The market for pleasure remained resilient even under martial law. Maxwell's performance in dealing with alcohol and public space was later lauded in Great Britain. Lord Lloyd would later inscribe Maxwell's successes into the official history of the British occupation in the canonical work *Egypt since Cromer*:

> By degrees under martial law he delivered Egypt from that scourge of adulterated liquor from which she had long been suffering helplessly. The traffic in such liquor had been flourishing in many towns, and the Egyptian Government were, because of the Capitulations, powerless to prevent it. Under martial law it was possible to authorise entry without Consular authority upon suspected premises, and to impose deterrent penalties—even to prohibit absolutely the sale or possession of absinthe.

When the British troops returned to Egypt following the retreat from the Dardanelles, they joined the wounded from the campaign. Martin Shaw Briggs was among those troops who came to Cairo in 1917: he described the soldiers' mood: "They had come out of the jaws of death, they might be returning there at any moment, and they made the most of the present, as only soldiers can." Once again, the markets of Cairo teemed

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208 "...Egypt must have reaped a rich harvest from the Army, and most of that money has been spent in Alexandria and Cairo. Had one been able to foresee the war, I can think of few more profitable ways of profiteering than to float a soda water manufactory in one of these cities. But it has been the Greek who has scored in most cases...All the accumulated arrears of money that were paid out to the Anzacs and the British troops who had been fighting for months at Gallipoli came in a great windfall to Cairo and Alexandria before the movement to the Canal began. A proportion—probably a small proportion—of these men were married, and there is a vast difference between the married man and the bachelor in
with troops with money and a motivation to spend their money on alcohol and other public pleasures.

**Local and Global Temperance on hold: Waiting for a Political Settlement**

Following the cease-fire on November 1, 1918, post-war struggles for Egyptian independence dominated the political scene. Saad Zaghloul, the former minister of education under Cromer, attempted to represent Egypt at the Versailles Peace Conference. His imprisonment and banishment by the British authorities in Egypt helped ignite widespread protests in 1919.209 The people manifested their demands through strikes, demonstrations, and violence. While the armed forces and police struggled to control popular political participation on the ground, British administrators and Egyptian politicians still had to carry on with negotiations of a final settlement. The relationship between the state and alcohol consumption remained matters of economy. But even the Benedict[s] had been away from shops and canteens for months, whereas the boys who composed the bulk of the Territorial divisions from Suvla, and above all the Australians with their trade-union wages, had no scruple at all in squandering enormous sums on worthless 'souvenirs,' on trinkets and handkerchiefs for their lady-loves and in ininterminable drinks and drives. They had come out of the jaws of death, they might be returning there at any moment, and they made the most of the present, as only soldiers can. Nobody would be so pharisaical as to grudge them their fling, but one could hardly feel pleased to see English sovereigns, or their paper equivalent, pouring so profusely into the rapidly swelling pockets of oily Levantines. It was a great chance for the Greek, and he rose to the occasion.


Stress mine.  

awkwardly unanswered during the turbulent period preceding Egyptian independence.

The end of hostilities in late 1918 allowed civilian administrators in Cairo to focus their energies on crafting a proposal to reform penal code. A bureaucratic commission had been assigned the task in December 1914, but the war put an end to these tentative plans. While the future of the relationship between Egypt and Great Britain was unsure, administrators knew that the maintenance of public order remained paramount. The new penal code was intended to be "suitable to be applied to foreigners as well as natives." The draft of the new penal code circulated among the British bureaucracy in Cairo and generated much discussion, particularly regarding proposed reform of the laws governing public morality. Commenting on the failings of the existing laws, A. C. McBarnet, a judge in the native court of appeal, wrote, "Penal legislation limps cautiously behind moral law and only awards penalties where it can see to separate material injuries from the sin denounced by moralists." Judge McBarnet identified the primary difficulty of meeting the demands of moral activists under the social and legal realities of Egypt under occupation: multiple law codes and a diverse society complicated the task of the legal reformers.

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210 Commentary on draft penal code (Cairo: Government Press, 1919), 1. The penal code for Egyptians was written in 1883 and reformed in 1904. The proposed reforms were based on William Bruyante’s draft penal code from 1913 for international zone of Tangier.
With memories of the alcohol-fueled disorders of 1914-5 still fresh, the British administrators considered how best to revise the public drunkenness law of 1904. The 1904 law had struck a balance between local precedent and inter-imperial law where it:

applied to any case of manifest drunkenness, without any other conditions, whereas in almost all other legislations a person is not punishable unless he is also disorderly or makes himself a nuisance in some way. It appears that it is the practice of the police in this country also not to prosecute except in these circumstances. Although we fully realize how serious drunkenness in itself is considered in a Mussulman [sic] country from the religious point of view, still the Code is to be applied to Europeans also, to whom this consideration does not apply, and we are of opinion that in order to fall within the scope of the Penal Law a man should be something more than merely drunk. The proposed article agrees with the Indian, Sudan and Italian codes.212

The British bureaucrats believed that drunkenness, while offensive to local sentiment, was not criminal, and over-consumption of alcohol remained a personal freedom. In crafting an ordinance governing the consumption patterns of both Egyptians and foreigners, the British had to strike a balance between local attitudes and precedents in international law.

The creation of the League of Nations in June 1919 provided a forum to forge a new agreement on limiting the importation of alcohol into Africa that would improve upon the stillborn Brussels Convention of 1890. The preamble of the new convention noted previous efforts to stymie the spread of alcoholism among Africans living under European imperialism through ever increasing taxation. A draft of the new Convention passed through the British embassy in Cairo in August 1919. Whereas the Brussels Convention of 1890 was impotent from the onset by the refusal of France, Spain, and

212 Commentary on draft penal code, 82.
Portugal to agree to limit the alcohol trade within their imperial spheres of influence, there were no major imperial dissenters to the 1919 draft. All major European imperial powers in Africa, including U.S.A., Belgium, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and Portugal, were signatories to the Convention on September 10, 1919 at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Yet, as with the Brussels Convention, the countries of North Africa from Morocco to Egypt and the Union of South Africa were singled out for exemption from the new convention.

Egyptian officials were never asked if they wished to be exempt from the terms of the Convention. In September 1919, Egypt remained under martial law and was not party to the negotiations as either an independent state or part of the British Empire. When it came time to ratify the Convention in April 1920, British administrators in Cairo debated the necessity or desirability of securing Egyptian consent prior to the ratification of the treaty. Lord Milner approved a procedure by which

conventions should be officially communicated to Egyptian Ministry and that their acceptance should be invited. That at the same time it should be explained to Ministers that if they can show grounds for thinking it contrary to Egyptian interests to accept Conventions, British ratification will be so worded as to exclude Egypt. We should, however, at the same time express hope that Egypt will not decline to accept the Conventions.213

In a conciliatory gesture reflecting the shifting balance in the relationship between occupier-occupied, the embattled Egyptian leadership was contacted about ratification of the convention.

Financial Adviser, Sir H.P. Harvey, drafted a letter to the Egyptian government inviting them to adhere to the anti-alcohol convention. In view of the sensitivity of the political situation, Harvey decided to show the letter to Prime Minister Yusuf Wahba Pasha in confidence, out of “a desire to respect to the utmost Egyptian susceptibilities by giving to the Egyptian Government an opportunity of expressing its view whether these Conventions should or should not apply to Egypt.”

Prime Minister Wahba's response related not to the issue of alcohol itself, but to Egypt's larger political status:

In what capacity is the Egyptian Government asked to accept the Conventions, i.e. does it retain its national personality in doing so or not? Would it figure separately as adhering, or would the ratification by His Majesty’s Government cover Egypt unless Egypt were specifically excluded. And the fact that the Egyptian Government is requested to show cause why it should not accept the Conventions suggests a relation between the Egyptian and the British Governments which, it is at any rate believed in Egypt, is under reconsideration.”

'Reconsideration' was a diplomatic way of alluding to the chaos of the last month, March 1919, when nationwide demonstrations and violence rocked the entire country. At this delicate stage, the Prime Minister expressed his worry that some or all of the Ministers would resign if pushed to sign a document in Egypt's name when what that signified was so much in doubt. Given the potential for embarrassment, Lord Allenby decided that the question of getting Egyptian consent was better delayed until after the Milner report, or as long as Martial Law remained in Effect. When Muhammad Tawfiq Nasim Pasha became Prime Minister in May 1920, it was decided to avoid bringing ratification up with the Egyptian government altogether. The struggles for

independence from took precedence over temperance activism among the Egyptian political class and the populace.

II. Temperance politics in Independent Egypt 1922-1933

At the start of the 1920s, the global prohibition movement was on the march, along with the rise of progressivism and new forms of international cooperation on humanitarian and social issues. While Egypt had been battling for independence, governments across the globe enacted legislation banning alcohol. The United States passed the eighteenth amendment with the requisite ratification of thirty-six states on January 16, 1919, and the total prohibition of alcohol manufacture, sale, and transportation came into effect one year later. Canada experimented briefly with prohibition from 1918-1919. Iceland, Finland, and Norway had also enacted some form of prohibition by 1919. Even Russia attempted briefly and unsuccessfully to control public drinking, especially of spirits. The decision to limit access to alcohol by Western states, particularly the United States, provided a powerful boost to the

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216 The amount of literature on American prohibition is impressive, encompassing scholarly and popular history on the national, state, and local levels. A few well received titles include: Thomas Pegram, Battling demoral: the struggle for a dry America, 1800-1933 (Chicago: Ivan. R. Dee, 1998); David Okrent, Last call: the rise and fall of Prohibition (New York: Scribner, 2010); Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic crusade: status politics and the American temperance movement (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986)


international temperance movement. How did newly independent Egypt come to participate in the global discussion about the place of alcohol in society? How did Egypt's unique position, independent but still beholden to imperial oversight, color Egyptian participation in international temperance?

Following the end of the First World War, Egypt became another frontline in the global battle of progressives against the evils of alcohol. This section analyzes the acme of temperance agitation in Egypt during first decade of independence. The realization of national Prohibition in the United States gave a powerful stimulus to temperance reform in Egypt. The popular press publicized the American position on the drink issue. The union of international progressive thought and local Egyptian conservative activism made for a powerful combination, as did the support of the diplomatic representative of a Western, capitalist, Christian power. Egyptian independence ushered in a new era of temperance activism, despite the continued existence of the capitulations and the presence of thousands of British troops on Egyptian soil. The call for prohibition by Egyptians took on a new political dimension as temperance activists used the issue to test the extent of Egyptian independence and sovereignty. The union of international progressive thought and local Egyptian activism made for a powerful combination. Temperance activism provides a case study for examining how Egyptian actors capitalized on connections to international organizations and ideals to establish themselves as legitimate local authorities.

**Egyptian Temperance and Independence: Patronage, Power, and Politics**

Great Britain declared Egyptian independence on February 28, 1922. The protectorate had ended, and according to international law, Egypt was an independent sovereign state. While independence had great symbolic meaning, the practicalities of
governance fell under a complicated web of legal exceptions to full Egyptian sovereignty. The declaration of Egyptian independence included stipulations that came to be known as the "four reserved points," which were to be resolved at an unnamed future date. These four points included defense, Suez Canal, Capitulations and the status of Sudan. In addition to these four major limitations on Egyptian independence, British negotiators arranged that martial law, which had been in action since November 2, 1914, would end once the Egyptian government issued an Act of indemnity. The Egyptian cabinet freed the British military of any legal culpability for their actions over the previous eight years in issuing that act on March 30, 1923. Martial law finally ended, after outliving the British protectorate and continuing even after Egyptian independence.

Martial law, war, and revolution had interrupted the work of temperance associations in Egypt. The declaration of independence transformed the debate about alcohol in Egypt, and the formation of Egyptian-led temperance movements made alcohol a national issue. Weeks after the declaration of Egyptian independence on February 28, 1922, Ahmad Ghalwash resuscitated his formal temperance work in way

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221 "[T]his final Clause defines the special relation between His Majesty's Government and Egypt. It declares that the following four matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government:
(1) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.
(2) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.
(3) the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.
(4) The Sudan."
222 Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experiment, 68.
that would attract attention to his cause and its maximize public impact. Jurists and legal experts were busy writing the new Egyptian constitution using the Belgian constitution as a template. Ghalwash publicly called upon the drafting body to include an article establishing the prohibition of alcohol. While this attempt ultimately failed, Ghalwash’s unsuccessful effort to influence the writing of the first Egyptian constitution was paradigmatic of his activism throughout the period under study. Ghalwash did not achieve his desired goal of prohibition, but he did succeed in publicizing the issue of alcohol in independent Egypt. Ghalwash’s call for constitutional prohibition attracted the attention of Prince Omar Toussoun, who offered to serve as the official patron to Ghalwash's group and provide an annual subsidy. Ghalwash named his organization as Jamʿīyat Manʿal-Muskirāt al-ʿĀmmah bil-Qutr al-Misrī, or the Egyptian Temperance Society. In October 1922, the Society was placed under the patronage of Prince Omar Toussoun and formally re-organized with a central branch in Cairo.

Ghalwash and the Egyptian prohibition movement benefited materially and symbolically from royal patronage. The great-grandson of Muhammad Ali Pasha, Omar Toussoun was active in public life through many charitable, sporting, and

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224 Ghalwash’s organization is referred to by English-speaking temperance activists as both the Egyptian Temperance Society and the Egyptian Temperance Association. I use the former designation, as it is appears more regularly in temperance literature.
academic organizations. Prince Toussoun offered access to the halls of government, and his endorsement of temperance imparted a further degree of respectability to the cause. Not to be outdone by his relative, Prince Muhammad Ali also aligned himself with the movement and hosted temperance events. The active involvement of two high level members of the royal family lifted the national profile of the Egyptian Temperance Society, which in turn drew the attention of local political actors.

**Egyptian Ecumenical Support for Temperance and Political Pressure**

The Egyptian Temperance Society used the momentum of rising publicity through royal patronage to expand their power base among the Egyptian people. Ghalwash established his organization as the Egyptian authority on temperance, and the Egyptian Temperance Society gained access to influential Egyptians, especially among the religious leadership. Ghalwash quickly was able to count luminaries of the Muslim clergy among his supporters. The annual report of the Egyptian Temperance Society reproduced letters of support from ‘Abd al-Ghani Mahmud, Shaykh al-Ulama’ of Alexandria, and Muhammad al-Zawahiri, Shaykh of the al-Ahmadi mosque in Tanta. The report also announced that Shaykh of al-Azhar himself requested the enactment of prohibition in a personal plea to King Fu’ad and the cabinet in August 1923. While the support of the leaders of the Egyptian Muslim community for anti-alcohol policies

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was to be expected, Ghalwash also turned to the Coptic and Jewish authorities for their endorsement of the temperance movement.

In order to expand his anti-alcohol message in an inclusive manner that included all Egyptians regardless of religious belief, Ghalwash reached out to Egyptian Coptic and Jewish religious leaders. Rather than raising the potentially divisive issue of the ritualistic use of alcohol in Christian and Jewish religious ceremonies, Ghalwash sought to combat the widespread belief among Egyptian Christians and Jews that they were not forbidden by their respective faiths from consuming alcohol in their personal lives. Ghalwash secured the support of the Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Jews in Egypt, Haim Nahum Effendi, who wrote a letter of support for the Egyptian Temperance Society in December 1922. In this letter, Nahum stated that Judaism, as the oldest of the Abrahamic faiths, had always forbade the consumption of alcohol, and Nahum quoted the Torah to validate this view.227 In the same month, Ghalwash also received a similar condemnation of alcohol from the Coptic Archbishops of Qena, Asyut, Manfalut, and al-Balina. The Coptic Archbishops quoted the Bible to argue that Christians were clearly not permitted under religious law to consume alcohol.228 These letters followed an outreach to the Coptic community by Ghalwash and his supporters in the summer of 1923 when Ghalwash requested that the Coptic clergy provide religious justification for abstaining from alcohol. It is noteworthy that the leading Coptic participants in the

227 Ghalwash, Āthār al-khumūr, 62-63.
prohibition movement come from an area in Upper Egypt where American
Presbyterians had an active presence and were known to criticize the Orthodox Church
for its ‘wet’ ways. With the backing of the leaders of the three major religions of
Egyptians, Ghalwash could claim that the temperance movement reflected the morality
of the entire country.

Rather than waiting until a critical mass of the Egyptian populace became active
supporters of prohibition, members of the Egyptian Temperance Society directly
appealed to the government towards changing official policy. The temperance
movement was relentless in appealing to the government through letters and telegrams
to representatives in different ministries on local and national levels. They appealed to
the Royal Palace, the Prime Minister, as well as the Ministries of Interior, Religious
Endowments, and Education. When possible, Ahmad Ghalwash arranged one-on-one
meetings with various functionaries within the ministries. The frequent turnover in
ministerial portfolio necessitated establishing contacts anew with each shift in power.

After months of activism, Ghalwash and the temperance movement succeeded
in getting the Egyptian government to respond formally with the decree of January 26,
1923 by the Ministry of the Interior which forbade the granting of new licenses for
selling alcohol. The Ministry, however, did include an important and predictable
exception: the European quarters of the five major cities Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said,
Ismailiyah, and Mansurah were exempt. As an intervention into the market for alcohol,
the exemption of European quarters ensured that alcohol flowed unimpeded at the bars
and wine-shops owned by foreigners. By freezing the level of Egyptian participation in the alcohol trade, the government ensured any growth in the alcohol trade enriched only the Greeks and other Europeans. The Egyptian Temperance Society complained bitterly that this exemption severely weakened the effectiveness of the decree.

Once again, the capitulatory privileges of Europeans were cited as the reason why reform of alcohol regulation could not be enacted. This setback frustrated some members within the Egyptian dry movement to such a degree that Ghalwash had to make a special lecture in Ismailiyah to address their concerns. Despite the initial frustration at being blocked by European extra-territorial rights, temperance activists expanded their efforts and took enforcement of government regulation into their own hands. Teetotalers conducted surveillance on public establishments thought to be selling alcohol in contravention to the ministerial decree and reported their findings to the police. Ghalwash and his supporters assumed the duties of a civilian watch patrolling the public spaces of Cairo, but one without any real authority.

The Egyptian Temperance Society pressed the Egyptian government to reform the licensing system. In an appeal to the Vice-Minister of the Interior, Ali Pasha Jamāl al-Dīn, on August 12, 1924, the dry movement made four demands: 1) end the exemption and make the decree applicable to all Egyptian cities and quarters without difference 2) forbid the selling of alcohol from carts in the streets and forbid wholesalers from selling to individuals 3) stop permitting licensee from being absent from his tavern for more than three months and revoke licenses for anyone who had exceeded this
period 4) limit the validity of transferred licenses to three months, after which point the inheritor reapply for licensing.\footnote{Jam`īyat Man` al-Muskirāt al-`Āmmah bil-Qutr al-Misrī, Taqrīr `an a `māl lil-`jama`iyah wa-sayrihā li-sanatihā al-lāsī `ashr (Iskandariya: Matba`at al-Taqaddum, 1925), 40.} Through their surveillance of the alcohol market, the dry activists identified the many failings of existing regulation. Operators of wineshops and taverns manipulated the licensing process by obscuring the identity of the licensee. The small scale trade in alcohol by unlicensed mobile drink sellers regularly avoided detection by official agents. Temperance activists could pass on information to the police, but following through on that intelligence and effecting change remained the purview of the state.

Pressure on the Egyptian government for action from the dry lobby was not limited to issues of enforcement. The Egyptian Temperance Society sought to further public awareness by using machinery of the state in two venues that provided moral instruction: the mosque and the classroom. The temperance activists urged the state to allow the giving of sermons on temperance and the evils of drink in mosques controlled by the Ministry of Religious Endowments. As part of the outreach into the community, the association thought it prudent to ask the Ministry of Transportation to provide free rail-passes for traveling prohibition preachers, which would defray the costs of the existing program of itinerant preachers. Ghalwash and his associates called upon the Minister of Education to include lessons on physiology in all governmental middle and high schools with an emphasis on the health costs of alcohol consumption. Ghalwash offered to provide the state with two textbooks to this effect. Easy lessons on alcohol
and its effects on body and mind, written by W. Taylor, Master of Method at Battersea Training College, was published by the Church of England Temperance Society as the syllabus of instruction for the Band of Hope for the season 1892-3.\textsuperscript{230} Ghalwash also touted \textit{Alcohol and life: a manual of scientific temperance teaching for schools} (1918) by John A. Hunter for its inclusion as mandatory reading in military colleges in Ireland.\textsuperscript{231} The association chose texts written by authors that had already received official approval in the United Kingdom and a former imperial possession. The implicit argument behind the choice of these particular texts is that if such texts were deemed useful and appropriate by such respectable institutions as the Church of England and the military, the Egyptian government and the British staff at the Department of Education could have little objections to following suit and using the books in schools.

As with enforcement, the Egyptian Temperance Society did not wait for the government to deliver on public education on the evils of drink. The activists began an awareness campaign intended to reach a wide array of listeners. Influencing public opinion took several predictable forms common to the international temperance movement. In 1923, the association hired professional speakers to spread the dry message in the major towns and villages, but this proved prohibitively expensive and was discontinued. The handing out of pamphlets written in Arabic by Egyptian


temperance activists had proven very fruitful before World War I, so activists gathered in public places, such as the railroad stations, markets, and the cafes, to distribute propaganda and post handbills warning of the evils of drink.

**Egyptian Women Join the Anti-Alcohol Cause**

The Egyptian men who advocated temperance were not the only local voices among the Egyptian public. The public role of Egyptian women in national politics expanded to include anti-alcohol activism. Historians of women and gender in Egypt have shown that the popular nationalism of the 1919 revolution allowed women to participate publicly in the political arena, and that following independence, the disenfranchisement of women under the constitution threatened to relegate women to the private sphere. Yet denying women the right to vote did not mean the end to public political activity. Temperance activism, like charity work, was politics by other means: becoming involved in the anti-drink campaign allowed elite Egyptian women to express their demands for political change and to take on public roles. The temperance movement in Egypt had gained a new ally in November 1922 with the formation of the Egyptian Women’s Temperance Society. The Egyptian Women's Temperance Society was closely aligned with the W.W.C.T.U., and many of the members were protestant.

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Christians. Unlike the W.W.C.T.U., the membership of the Egyptian Women's Temperance Society was entirely Egyptian, save the President. Madame George Khayat, the wife of a leading Egyptian Protestant Wafdist politician with close ties to Saad Zaghloul, was one of the more prominent and active members. By 1925, the involvement of more Egyptian women in the local temperance movement increased the total number of W.W.C.T.U. members up to 500.

The members of the Egyptian Women’s Temperance Society began their activism by securing support for a petition calling for the total prohibition of alcohol in Egypt. Written in Arabic, French, and English, the petition was addressed to the King and contained the signatures of 6,000 Muslim and Christian Egyptian women. This petition testified to the resilient public role of Egyptian women in politics. The Egyptian women of the W.W.C.T.U. used their connections to the American community in Cairo to secure the support of the leading American diplomat in Egypt, which further expanded the publicity of the anti-alcohol discourse.

**Temperance Diplomacy: The United States and Dr. J. Morton Howell**

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234 George Khayat converted from Orthodox Christianity to Presbyterianism after his interactions with American missionaries in Asyut. Khayat was imprisoned by the British with three Copt Wafdist leaders for their political activities. Sana Hassan, *Christians versus Muslims in modern Egypt: the century-long struggle for equality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 37.


The relationship between the United States and Egypt during the interwar period was dynamic, and existing scholarship has highlighted many points of cleavage between Egyptians and American diplomats, missionaries, educators, and Egyptologists living and working in Egypt. Egyptians embraced the message of Wilsonian self-determination, and Erez Manela has studied the ramifications of dashed expectations among Egyptians following the postwar peace conference at Versailles.\footnote{Erez Manela, "Goodwill and Bad: Rethinking US-Egyptian Relations in the Interwar Years," \textit{Middle Eastern Studies} 38:1 (2002): 71-89.} Manela noted that after Wilson's death, some Egyptian intellectuals continued to praise the man and his ideals. In a subsequent article on Egyptian-American relations in the interwar period, Manela argued that "currents of disappointment and suspicion" defined Egyptian perceptions of the United States.\footnote{Manela, "Goodwill and Bad," 80-83.} In his treatment of the period 1921-1927, Manela portrayed the relationship between Americans and Egyptians as having little political content, and cultural relations were limited to mediating the dispute between Egyptian nationalists and British Egyptologists over the relics of Tutankhamon.\footnote{Erez Manela, "Is This Not the Ugliest of Treacheries?!" Diplomacy, Culture, and the Origins of Anti-Americanism in Egypt." in \textit{U.S.-Middle East Historical Encounters: A Critical Survey}, eds. Abbas Amanat and Magnus Bernhardsson (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), 101-120.} In an effort to determine roots of modern anti-American sentiment in Egypt, Manela again downplayed cooperation between American political and cultural agents with Egyptians.\footnote{Erez Manela, "Is This Not the Ugliest of Treacheries?!"} Rather than a period of distrust devoid of political content or cultural cooperation, this section demonstrates that this period in Egyptian-American
relations was one of active support and cooperation among American and Egyptian temperance organizations. Rather than abandoning Egyptian claims to self-determination, Dr. J. Morton Howell, the American diplomatic representative in Cairo from 1921-1927, publicly and repeatedly advocated for an Egyptian independence that was meaningful in its representation of popular will, particularly on the issue of Egyptian prohibition. American support for Egyptian engagement the cultural issue of alcohol had a profound political dimension.

A corollary to the larger question of American-Egyptian relations is the debate about the role of American missionaries in Egyptian society. Many American missionary activities elicited negative responses from Egyptians, such as Samuel Zwemer's handing out missionary pamphlets on the grounds of al-Azhar.241 As Sharkey and Manela have observed, missionaries frequently came into conflict with Egyptians over proselytization. These conflicts, however, did not preclude cooperation. Focusing only on the points of conflict between American missionaries and Egyptians fails to account for the moral diplomacy of temperance, the global importance of which has been highlighted by Ian Tyrrell.242 As the previous chapter demonstrated, American missionaries formed the first temperance organization in Egypt, the World Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (W.W.C.T.U.), in 1891. In the period prior to World War I, the influence of the W.W.C.T.U. among Egyptians was limited, largely

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241 Sharkey, American evangelicals, 115.
because of the organization's connection to missionary activity. However, this isolation changed following Egyptian independence. American missionaries and Egyptian converts to Protestant Christianity continued to be active in the temperance struggle, but they increasingly collaborated with their Egyptian counterparts during the 1920s and early 1930s. Dr. J. Morton Howell, the American minister to Egypt, served as the bridge that brought together various temperance groups: the Christian-led temperance organizations such as the Egyptian branch of the W.W.C.T.U., Ghalwash of the Egyptian Temperance Society, and American-led international temperance groups such as the World League Against Alcoholism.

Dr. J. Morton Howell, the American plenipotentiary and minister to Egypt from 1921-1927, was a deeply polarizing character in Egypt. Dr. Howell did not act like other diplomats in Cairo and remained oblivious to many of the nuances of Egyptian society under British occupation. He did not hire servants. His wife did the cooking, and he did not serve alcohol at official embassy functions. He spoke plainly and often with little of the tact expected of a statesman, of which he had no previous experience. After a long and noted career as a physician in Ohio, Dr. Howell had entered foreign service after contacting his good friend and fellow Ohioan, President Warren Harding.243 Ohio had long been a hotbed of American temperance agitation and the home of prominent dry organizations, which helped to shape Howell's attitudes on alcohol. Egypt was

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Howell's first and only appointment as a diplomat. He first arrived in October 1921.244 Following Egyptian independence, Dr. Howell assumed a very public persona that blurred the line between private citizen and official diplomatic representative. Dr. Howell’s detractors among the Western community in Egypt were many: an American Egyptologist dubbed him a megalomaniac, connected to fanatical Egyptians, and hopelessly anti-British.245 While powerful elements within the American and British communities in Egypt may have disliked the man, his supporters among Egyptians were legion.

From his first public appearance, Dr. Howell supported Egyptian independence and was heralded by the local press. On August 28, 1922, Dr. Howell presented himself and his "Letter of Credence" before King Fuad in a diplomatic ritual. Dr. Howell seized the opportunity presented by that regal public forum to deliver a speech condemning the "duplicity" and "subterfuge" of the diplomacy of Versailles and endorsing Egyptian nationalist aspirations. Howell called for forthright dealings between nations, where "'yes' is 'yes' and 'no' is 'no.'" Dr. Howell reported to his superiors in Washington that

244 Memorandum. (Compiled from dispatches, memoranda and other official and reliable data now assembled in the office of the Third Assistance Secretary of State.) August 24, 1923. State Department (RG 59) Central decimal File 1910-29, box 1440. National Archives, College Park.

245 The Harvard and Boston Art Museum Egyptologist, Dr. George Reisner, described Howell as "a politician of the 'glad hand' type, and an old white-haired man with a winning benevolent smile; but I judge him to be really very selfish, rather mean to his subordinates and afflicted with a conceit which approaches megalomania. He does not speak Arabic, French, or any language except English, and has not the faintest comprehension of the character and manner of thought of British, Egyptians, French or anyone not from his own part of our country. He is very fond of making speeches and having them printed in the newspapers. Those before the American community in Cairo have been prolix and pompous, but the community has sat patiently through their tedious progress and has loyalty applauded at the end deferring to the office, not the man." pp. 2-3. June 11, 1927. State Department (RG 59) Central decimal File 1910-29, box 1440. National Archives, College Park.
after his speech, he privately received the praise from the King and the Cabinet for his frankness and support. The Egyptian press was effusive in its praise of Dr. Howell's speech and of the United States as a supporter of ideal of democracy.

On September 5, 1922, al-Ahram declared Howell's speech to represent "The Metamorphosis of Diplomacy" and caused "a revolution in diplomatic protocol similar to the general intellectual revolution that Wilson produced with his Fourteen Points." Howell's call for honesty among international representatives inspired the author to detail the various times the British had betrayed their promises to the Egyptian people on independence. After severely critiquing martial law, Lloyd George, and British perfidy, al-Ahram declared Egyptian independence to be false as long as the British imposed conditions on it. Wadi al-Nil, published an article entitled "Frankness in Diplomacy" lauding Dr. Howell for breaking from protocol by speaking plainly on weighty issues. Wadi al-Nil averred that Dr. Howell's speech on "moral diplomacy" was understood by the Egyptian people as an attack on the British:

Today, we wish the British nation to hear the words of the American Minister as we have heard them, and that they should understand them as we have understood them; let them ask themselves if the relation between their present policy in Egypt, and the modern views to which His Excellency the Minister refers, agree.


247 "Tatawwur al-diblūmāsiyah," al-Ahram, September 5, 1922. The author declared America at the forefront in defending international peace, human freedom and dignity, neutrality, and integrity.

Wadi al-Nil went on to criticize the British for totally disregarding Egyptian public opinion and depriving the country of true independence because of the four reserved points. Calling the United States "the greatest power in the West," al-Muqattam published its coverage of Dr. Howell's speech under the title "The True Diplomacy in the Relations among Nations."\(^{249}\) al-Muqattam extolled Howell as signaling the end of the diplomacy of Metternich and Talleyrand that led to the Great War, and expressed with conviction that the twentieth century would be the age for democracy and popular sovereignty.

While other State Department officials in Cairo and Washington did not believe criticizing British imperial rule made for sound foreign policy, Dr. Howell thrust himself into the middle of the Egyptian struggle. The archive of the American State Department contains voluminous records of the speeches that Howell delivered at numerous gatherings and the positive response in the local press. Dr. Howell, by virtue of his position (many of his colleagues in the State Department would have said in spite of), challenged what he saw as the moral turpitude of British rule embodied in the continued existence of capitulatory privileges. In his frequent public speeches across Cairo, Dr. Howell demonstrated his assumptions about of the moral superiority of Americans vis-à-vis Europeans and threatened to upset the delicate balance among capitulatory powers in Egypt.

\(^{249}\) "al-Siyāsah al-saḥīḥah fi al-‘alaqāt bayna al-shu‘ūb," al-Muqattam, September 1, 1922.
In addition to making pronouncements on international relations and British policy in Egypt, Howell was drawn into the local scene of moral activism. The Egyptian women's branch of the W.W.C.T.U. asked Dr. J. Morton Howell to present their petition of 6,000 signatures to the King and Parliament on behalf of the Egyptian people. The Egyptian Women’s Temperance Society publicly presented the final petition at the Y.M.C.A. on May 23, 1923 at an event that brought together the various temperance activists. The evening had royal patronage, as the tickets were issued in the name of Prince Muhammad Ali. Ahmad Effendi Ghalwash delivered a speech on Egyptian prohibition, as did Madame Khayat. A major contemporary American temperance source noted, "This appearance of an Egyptian lady as a public speaker was a most unusual event."250 Several princesses of the Egyptian royal family were present as well. Dr. Howell delivered the keynote address. After praising the efforts of Egyptians to secure prohibition, Dr. Howell declared his support for Egyptian democracy and independence, saying:

Personally, I pity any nation or any people represented in Egypt today, who would...protest or demur to the passing and execution of any legal measure which the people of this country wish to adopt; or who in other words would insist that they be permitted...to continue to feed and poison your people for the sole reason of enriching their own bank account.251

Dr. Howell continued by assailing extra-territorial rights granted under the Capitulations for their role in the spread of drink, faulting the British for allowing the Capitulations to continue despite Egyptian opposition. Whereas Ghalwash and the

250 Cherrington, Standard Encyclopedia, 899.
Egyptian prohibitionists did not publicly attack their opponents or single out a particular group for censure, Dr. Howell was not so restrained. Many in the local press, both English and Arabic, welcomed Howell's support of Egyptian temperance and independence.252

However, Howell's was not the only American voice in Egypt, and not all Americans endorsed prohibition as sound policy in the United States. In the June 16, 1923 issue of *The Egyptian Gazette*, letters to the editor included "Some Facts about the Liquor Law," penned by an unnamed American from Boston. The author challenged the practicality of enforcement of the Volstead Act in the United States, reporting that during his visits home over the last two years, public drunkenness was non-existent, but alcohol could still be obtained for large sums. The 'wet' American pointed out that the criminal element that once inhabited the saloons had now taken to smuggling and boot-legging. Moving to the case of Egypt, the anonymous writer claimed that in thirty years of life in Egypt, he had found alcohol consumption to be a feature of urban life only:

> Excessive drinking, as far as I have seen, is more common in the towns and cities, especially Cairo and Alexandria and among the educated classes of Egyptians. But even in these centres, a great body of the people feel themselves bound by the religious prohibition. In other words, the problem is practically the visible one which we all see in the streets of Cairo and Alexandria. It is by no means the problem which we had in America, and there can be no doubt that a law which cured this one sore would have the hearty support of all good

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Moslems in Egypt, and of all Europeans who have the welfare of Egypt at heart.\textsuperscript{253}

Despite his personal objection to American prohibition, the anonymous author recognized that Egyptian public opinion was for restricting the flow of alcohol in their country. While he was against banning alcohol in the United States, he supported prohibition in Egypt.

**American Support against Intoxicants and The World League Against Alcoholism**

Egyptian-American cooperation on the issue of prohibition of intoxicants extended beyond the involvement of Dr. J. Morton Howell and the missionaries of the W.W.C.T.U. During the meeting of the League of Nation’s World Opium Conference in 1924, Egypt proposed that hashish be added to the list of banned narcotics under the International Opium Convention.\textsuperscript{254} The Egyptian proposal was backed by the United States and China, and the measure passed. Hashish was entered into the list of banned narcotics in the revised International Opium Convention in early 1925, but the ban did not go into effect until 1928. As Liat Kozma has shown, Egyptian efforts to ban hashish locally, which the state did in 1879, were linked to the belief that doing so would lead to greater productivity and increased general order.\textsuperscript{255} Similar to the underlying reasons behind the prohibition on opium, the Egyptian delegation at the World Opium

\textsuperscript{253} The Egyptian Gazette, June 16, 1923.
Conference argued that prohibiting hashish would remove a danger to public health and morality, which in turn would lead to overall economic and social progress. From the Brussels Convention of 1890 to the Saint-Germain-en-Laye Convention of 1919 and the International Opium Convention, banning social and economic activities thought to be immoral or deleterious, including the trade in slaves, guns, narcotics, and alcohol, was intimately linked to notions of progress and modernity.

The increased public profile of the Egyptian Temperance Society brought new opportunities for international collaboration. Ghalwash had worked with the members of one international temperance organization, the International Order of the Good Templars (IOGT), in the pre-war period. After 1919, new dry associations, many of them funded and led by Americans, took the message of temperance to a global audience. The Anti-Saloon League was one of the more influential American prohibition movements that played a significant role in bringing about the passage of the 18th Amendment.256 Flushed with the success in the United States, the Anti-Saloon League decided to spread its message globally and formed an international wing, the World League Against Alcoholism (WLAA). Signatories to the WLAA’s constitution included another international dry movement, the IOGT, as well as national and denominational movements, including British, Scottish, Irish, Australian, New Zealander, Canadian, French, Mexican, Japanese, and American representatives. In

1919, the WLAA opened its main office and press on Fleet Street in London. The London office coordinated the operation of the international publicity campaign through the distribution of literature and funds, as well as speaking tours of professional temperance activists. Leadership of the World League Against Alcoholism declared itself happy to work with any organization, religious or otherwise, provided it was dedicated to advanced the cause of prohibition.

Unlike earlier manifestations of the global temperance movement, in which idealistic Western individuals sought to reform Egyptian society, support for prohibition grew in popularity among Egyptians following World War I. Egyptians were not relegated to merely supporting roles, but spoke for themselves, for their situation, on an international stage where they were guaranteed a sympathetic reception. Ghalwash made contact with the WLAA in early 1920s, and the League became a very important ally to the Egyptian Temperance Society both materially and symbolically. One of primary functions of the WLAA office in Fleet Street in London was the dissemination of information. Ernest Cherrington, General Secretary of the WLAA, was a tireless writer. Pamphlets, articles, monographs and the Anti-Saloon League of American Year Book flowed from the London office to all branches across the world. Cherrington claimed that his bulletins were translated and published in all of the nearly 1,000 newspapers in the Muslim world. In Egypt, Cherrington established close relations with al-Muqattam, whose editor had been a strong supporter of

temperance and an ally of the WWCTU since the 1890s. According to a report of the WLAA, Egypt was second only to South Africa in terms of financial aid in Africa and received over $2500 from 1921-27 for education and outreach. These documents joined the war of ideas that took the progress and successes of American prohibition as exemplary. Ammunition provided by Cherrington and the Fleet Street office included figures about reduction in crime and consumption, increases in productivity, scientific findings on the harmful effects of alcohol consumption, and exhortatory speeches of prominent men.

Just as the WLAA provided the Egyptian dry movement information about the American prohibition experience, Ghalwash and the other temperance activists on the ground in Egypt reported back about the progress and setbacks in their local struggle. Information about the fight against alcohol traveled between Cairo, the WLAA office in London, and the activists in the United States. Cherrington and the WLAA also publicized the efforts of Ghalwash and the Egyptian Temperance Society to a global network, most notably in The Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem, edited by Cherrington and published by the WLAA from 1925-1930. This massive six volume opus praised the Egyptian Temperance Society and described their activities for the international temperance community, as well as covering the W.W.C.T.U.'s contribution.

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258 World League Against Alcoholism, Report of the Activities, 76.
The highest profile lectures sponsored by the Egyptian Temperance Society were those of the world famous temperance speaker, William Eugene Johnson, commonly known as “Pussyfoot” Johnson. Johnson was a professional temperance activist from New York paid by the WLAA to promote temperance across the world. Johnson began his work with alcohol control under Teddy Roosevelt, who appointed him to combat illicit liquor trade in Indian Territories, a task he approached with great zeal and a certain disregard for by-the-book practices. Afterwards, he worked for the Anti-Saloon League, and the charismatic speaker became the international face of the American prohibition movement with the WLAA. He circled the world on at least three global tours in the 1920s, visiting Cairo twice in 1923 and 1926. "Pussyfoot" brought with him the attention of the international press, and the activities of temperance organizations in Egypt benefited from the exposure.

During his visit to Cairo in late 1923, Johnson was feted by Princes and ministers, had audiences with the king, and presented lectures on American prohibition to sizable audiences. On his first visit in December 1923, Mr. Johnson addressed a large meeting in the al-Azbakiyah Garden Theater, invitations for which had been issued by Prince Mohammed Ali. The choice to hold the lecture in al-Azbakiyah had great symbolic power with the proximity to the elite playgrounds of the hotels and the taverns and wineshops of the popular classes. In his address, Johnson played to his audience, explaining that "he had not come to Egypt to tell them what to do in the matter of temperance, but to inform his Egyptian audience that America had adopted Muslim
teaching as to strong drink.\textsuperscript{259} While such a claim was likely intended to curry favor with the Egyptian audience, the public recognition by a famous American anti-alcohol activist carried significant symbolic meaning wherein American progressive ideals lined up with Islamic orthodoxy. Johnson explained to his Egyptian audience how prohibition was achieved in America. Mr. Johnson encouraged the like-minded activists in the audience, declaring that the prospects for a similar prohibition act in Egypt were positive.

An internationally known speaker mingling with members of the royal family at a temperance event sponsored by the Egyptian Temperance Society raised the exposure of the entire association and its cause. Beyond the publicity and fundraising provided by his lectures, “Pussyfoot” Johnson and the London office of the World League supplied the Egyptian Temperance Society with printed material for Egyptian reformers. With an increased public profile and access to resources, Ghalwash was able to pursue with a press campaign with great vigor. Egyptian teetotalers wrote pro-temperance articles, submitted translations of American reports of success, and responded to articles describing the failures of Prohibition. To continue the fight against alcohol in Egypt, Ghalwash and his group required reliable moral and financial capital: the Americans had provided both amply.

\textbf{Fighting each other's fight: Attacks on American Prohibition and the Capitulations}

\textsuperscript{259} Cherrington, \textit{Standard encyclopedia}, 899.
To emphasize the importance of the symbolic link between the Egyptian and American anti-alcohol movements, this section examines Egyptian efforts to defend prohibition in the United States. In holding up the United States as the model of progressive sobriety, Ghalwash and the Egyptian Temperance Society linked the fate of alcohol in Egypt to that of American prohibition. Any attack on American prohibition undermined the Egyptian dry position: in holding up America as a model for emulation by describing in detail the successes that prohibition had achieved, Ghalwash had to defend prohibition in America as if it was Egypt. Ghalwash and his colleagues were intent on countering any public claims against the United States and the universal efficacy of alcohol regulation. As the Egyptian Temperance Society grew increasingly linked to US politics and championed the American cause in Egypt, Dr. J. Morton Howell became an active advocate for Egyptian nationalist demands.

On May 5, 1925, an article entitled, "The Tragedy of Prohibition and its effects upon the American Society," appeared in the Arabic language newspaper, al-Siyasah. The article cited a recent article in a British newspaper that attacked American prohibition and questioned American claims of its success. The author stressed the rising violence, both from state agents and criminal elements, had resulted from enforcement efforts to stop the illicit trade in alcohol. An attack on American temperance was an attack on Egyptian temperance, and Ghalwash rose to defend its ally and model. Ghalwash translated the article into English and sent a copy to Howell asking for a formal response that could be used by his association.
Howell responded in his typical fashion: he attacked directly the British author of the anti-prohibition article, denigrating the author as a "devotee of the class who believes in, and practices, the use of large draughts of whiskey and soda and is, therefore, terribly exercised lest the 'personal liberty' of Americans be curtailed."260

Howell went on to demean all foreign detractors of American prohibition, questioning their understanding of American public resolve. In typical fashion, Howell forwarded this exchange to Washington, but the response was less than positive. The Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, reprimanded Howell:

> While appreciating the motives which influenced your action in this matter, the Department desires to call your attention to the undesirability of including in such communications as your letter to Mr. Ahmed Galwash [sic] statements of criticism and censure of other persons. These statements if made public as might well have been the case in this instance, would result in involving you in controversies of a character not in keeping with dignity of the American minister.261

Controversies had yet to dissuade Dr. Howell from speaking his mind, and the rebuke of his superiors in Washington did not succeed in silencing his support for Egyptian self-determination and temperance. Henceforth at public speaking engagements, Howell repeatedly stated that he was not there in any official capacity but rather as a regular right-minded citizen who loved the U.S. constitution.

When "Pussyfoot" Johnson returned to Egypt in late September 1926, he was met with similar fanfare. "Pussyfoot" gave speeches around Cairo and met with Ghalwash

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and other dry reformers to learn about the local struggle. A significant point of
difference between American and Egyptian movements was the manner in which the
‘Wets’ were dealt. A common theme among the various American temperance
movements was the antagonism and vehement attacks on their opponents. In the
United States, the ideologues of the Anti-Saloon League found it helpful to have an
amorphous but omnipotent and omnipresent enemy: the liquor interest. When the
American teetotaler Johnson examined the Egyptian case, he sought out his familiar
enemy. As the shown in the previous chapter, Cromer had already singled out a
particular community for its role in the drink trade: the Greeks. Johnson followed suit,
but with a slight twist, in his brief treatment of the temperance struggle in Egypt,
"Movement for a Dry Egypt." The pamphlet, published by the WLAA in Ohio and then
distributed internationally, blamed not only the minorities, but British defenders of the
Capitulations as well, for the spread of drink:

The Greek element is wet almost to a man. In fact, the liquor business with its
kindred vices is almost wholly in the hands of the Greeks, with a few Jews and
Armenians sprinkled in. Because all Greeks and Armenians class themselves as
‘Christians,’ the liquor business, in the popular mind, has come to be regarded as
a ‘Christian’ institution. This idea is strengthened by the fact that the British
official influence aggressively fosters the drink traffic and constitutes its chief
defense....the liquor oligarchy whose chief power is the Greek liquordom and the
British officialdom. There is the alcoholic stronghold. 262

In pointing out the religious dimension of the alcohol trade in Egypt and using the term
Christian in quotes, Johnson also brought the debate back to a denominational dispute.

262 William Johnson, Movement for a dry Egypt (Westerville: World League Against Alcoholism, 192[7]), 2.
Johnson emphasized the ecumenical connections between Presbyterian missionaries, Ghalwash and the Egyptian Temperance Society, and new supporters among the Copts.

The departure of Dr. J. Morton Howell in the summer of 1927 following his wife's illness provided a final opportunity to attack the British and praise Egyptians. Omar Toussoun, Ghalwash, and the Egyptian Temperance Society hosted a tea in Howell's honor at the Majestic Hotel in Alexandria. Once again, Howell broke from diplomatic protocol and chose not to limit his comments to standard expressions of gratitude and friendship. Instead, his farewell speech was a moralizing sermon on how the Capitulations and British intransigence prevented the passage of full prohibition in Egypt. After congratulating Ghalwash and the other Egyptian temperance agents, Howell repeated American support, as a capitulatory power, for any Egyptian effort towards prohibition, and attacked personal freedoms that led to the debasement of his fellow man. Responding in his memoir to British criticism of his speech and his work in Egypt, Dr. Howell wrote, “Well, all this is not pleasing to a people who believe that ‘whisky and soda’ is a part of the stuff of life.” When Dr. Howell boarded his ship on July 6, 1927, Ahmad Ghalwash, Prince Omar Toussoun, Fakry Bey representing Zaghloul Pasha and the Wafd, and other notables were there to see Howell off with

fanfare. The attendance of such notable Egyptians testified to the importance of Howell’s support for the Egyptian national and anti-alcohol causes.

Following the departure of Howell, Egyptian and American cooperation on temperance continued into the 1930s. Missionaries and members of the W.W.C.T.U. continued their work educating the public in school and through the distribution of massive numbers of pamphlets. The various temperance groups worked in concert as parallel movements, spreading their message in public spaces and appealing to different audiences. Yet, tumultuous local politics led to the stifling of political expression when in 1930, the Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi suspended the 1923 constitution. Political life in Egypt was greatly circumscribed, including temperance activism.

**Resisting Cup by Cup: Public Inspections and Control of Alcohol as a Commodity**

This section contrasts politicized rhetoric with actual enforcement of existing regulation through an analysis of annual reports of the Cairo police. While temperance activists sought to influence public opinion and pressure the government to enact ever stricter forms of regulation, the drinkers of Cairo demonstrated their rejection of temperance activism by continuing to frequent public establishments that served alcohol. Operators of public establishments avoided government regulation, and the police were hard pressed to handle the scope of the task. Government control of the

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market for alcohol and public establishments was never absolute as drinkers and
operators of public establishments defied state efforts to influence their behavior and
participation in the market for pleasure. The data for the following tables was collected
from the Arabic version of the annual reports from the Cairo police for the period 1924-
1933.

Table 2: Licenses given to public establishments 1924-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Granted</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1204</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These licenses encompass all public establishments, not just the ones serving alcohol,
which obscures the number of establishments that served alcoholic drinks, testify to the
vibrant economic activity connected to public socialization. Capitulatory
subjects/citizens automatically received licenses, so the number of refused licenses in
the chart refers only to aspiring Egyptian operators of public establishments. In 1924,
the Ministry of the Interior agreed to issue no new licenses for Egyptian drink sellers
following pressure from Ghalwash and his associates. The Egyptian Temperance
Society did bring about a decrease of over thirty percent in the number of total public
establishments in 1925 and 1926. However, after that two year period, the total number
of licenses rose once again, though not to previous levels. That same year, 1927, the
number of refusals rose dramatically, but this increase was not the result of a
fundamental change in governmental attitudes towards alcohol. In the annual Cairo
police report of 1927, Russell Pasha admitted to difficulties in coping with the licensing
system, writing “I cannot solve many of the problems without legislation and more employees to deal with many requests for licensing from administration of places for drinking and dancing called cabarets but I am forced to refuse licensing because the increase in workload on employees who are already doing more than they can.”

Table 3: Operating public establishment without a license 1927-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (£E)</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>36.65</td>
<td>23.15</td>
<td>12.95</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (£E)</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to state law, only Egyptians were required to apply for a license to operate a public establishment: non-Egyptian protected by the Capitulations automatically received a license. For those Egyptian operators of public establishments who did not secure state approval for their economic activities, falling afoul of the police did not force them out of business. As per state regulations, operating a public establishment without a license could result in the closure of the offending locale. However, state enforcement of the licensing regime of public establishments during this period was not overly punitive. The police imposed fines, but did not order the closure of any unlicensed public establishments. State agents demonstrated a clear preference to allow these Egyptian operators to continue their business. After a spike in fines in 1928 and 1929, the number of fines decreased thereafter, suggesting that Egyptian operators who

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were cited by the police sought licenses after being discovered by the police to be lacking the proper paperwork.

Table 4: Opening public establishment without informing police 1927-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (£E)</td>
<td>175.25</td>
<td>21.25</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>168.55</td>
<td>109.23</td>
<td>132.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (£E)</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the police did not order the closure of unlicensed public establishments, state agents were far more likely to use the full extent of their authority if owners of public establishments sought to operate surreptitiously. Both Egyptians and Europeans were required by law to notify the police prior to the opening of a public establishment, so the number of infractions in this table includes both groups and explains the higher incidence of prosecution.

Table 5: Selling alcohol without a license in unlicensed public establishment 1927-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (£E)</td>
<td>19.65</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (£E)</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When confronted with purveyors of alcoholic beverages who lacked any manner of license, the state was harsh in its treatment of offenders. In comparison to enforcement of other public establishment crimes, the police were far more prone to demand the closure of unlicensed tavern or bar.
Table 6: Selling alcohol without a license in licensed public establishment 1927-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (£E)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (£E)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operators of public establishments who undertook the licensing process were not likely to sell alcohol illegally. Here, the regulatory process appeared to function as intended in that licensed operators obeyed the letter of the law. As registered public establishments, these locales were known to the police and thus subject to surveillance.

Table 7: Operating public establishment outside hours 1927-1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (£E)</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>141.25</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>91.35</td>
<td>63.25</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (£E)</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By far the most common legal infraction committed by operators of public establishments was failing to obey prescribed hours of operation. The number of cases indicates that operators of public establishments were unwilling, or unable, to eject paying customers at the mandated closing hour. Of all fines imposed about public establishments, the state earned its highest revenue from ticketing operators who ignored regulated hours of operation. Save in 1929, the police were unwilling to mandate the closure of offending locales.

III. Cooperation, Rhetoric, Violence: Muslim Brothers and Temperance, 1933-1948
Unfortunately for Ghalwash and the Egyptian Temperance Society, the highest profile experiment in prohibition did not succeed. The passage of the 21st amendment to the American constitution repealed prohibition in 1933, and other examples in Western Europe had already abandoned national bans on alcohol. The dry movement was discredited as unworkable. Membership and funding for temperance shrunk worldwide. In Egypt, the loss of foreign patronage, both in the material and discursive sense, hurt Ghalwash and his movement. Less money from international temperance movement, such as the World League Against Alcoholism, meant Ghalwash had to find a replacement patron. Since Europeans and Americans had abandoned temperance at home, Ghalwash was hard pressed to convince Europeans to curtail their own pleasure in Egypt. The failures of the most popular Egyptian political party, the Wafd, to address social reform generally, and temperance specifically, alienated Ghalwash and his fellow temperance activists. In the changing political landscape of Cairo and global temperance scene, how did the various political movements and actors incorporate anti-alcohol messages into their calls for reform?

Negotiations between the leaders of the Wafd, the most popular political party, and the British during the 1920s had failed to achieve progress on resolving the four reserved points. On the issue of temperance, the Wafd had failed to deliver substantive change in response to calls for total prohibition. Just as the Wafd had not satisfied the demands of Ghalwash and his reform-minded supporters, the party of the Egyptian revolution had failed to secure popular demands to resolve fundamental limitations to
Egyptian independence. In the turbulent 1930s, politics in Cairo were chaotic and dynamic. King Fuad dismissed Sidqi in September 1933, allowing for popular political activism to return to the public sphere, and new challengers to the Wafd’s authority vied for public support. Historians of Egypt in the 1930s and 1940s have identified the rise of religious rhetoric in the politics and the public sphere, in contrast to semi-secular progressive 1920s. The message of prohibition remained an important public issue, adopted by new political actors who used the issue of alcohol to agitate for political and cultural reform. As religious idiom rose in the public sphere, the language of reform became the shibboleth of the period. Reform of state policies towards alcohol, however, were surpassed by other public reform projects, including combating


narcotics and improving the welfare of the rural populations.\textsuperscript{269} Egyptian temperance agitation moved within the larger popular political scene, invoking both religion and reform as justifications for prohibition even after the failure of the American model. Ghalwash and the Egyptian Temperance Society made new allies and found new patrons.

**Temperance and the Muslim Brothers**

The Society of Muslim Brothers was founded in 1928 in the canal city of Ismailiyah by Hasan al-Bannā, an Arabic teacher in a government primary school.\textsuperscript{270} Like Ahmad Ghalwash, Hasan al-Bannā had taken the personal initiative to begin speaking in local mosques and cafes about the need for social and moral reform. In the early years, al-Bannā and his nascent group devoted their energies to building their base in Ismailiyah. In 1932, al-Bannā was transferred to Cairo, where he and his brother founded the first branch of the Muslim Brothers in the capital. Ghalwash had traveled to al-Bannā's city of Ismailiyah during the 1920s and spoken publicly at the local branch of the Egyptian Temperance Society. The precise date when al-Bannā and Ghalwash established contact is unclear, but the union of the two movements proved formidable.


\textsuperscript{270} Since its first publication in 1959, Mitchell's work has remained the standard work on the Muslim Brothers. Richard Mitchell, *The society of Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) For a more recent work, see Lia Brynjarsdóttir, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: the rise of an Islamic mass movement, 1928-1942* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998) Brynjarsdóttir's work is particularly strong in its use of Muslim Brothers' periodicals to temporise her study of al-Banna's evolution as a political leader and his organization as a popular movement.
With Ghalwash's association with the movement, the Muslim Brothers added an important ally with an established record of public advocacy and political activism on the local and international scenes. The relationship between Ghalwash and al-Bannā was mutually beneficial whereby the Muslim Brothers could claim the temperance message as their own and the Egyptian Temperance Society gained access to a growing network of members with a developed associational life and an increasingly active press. The Egyptian Temperance Society was devoted singularly to temperance, whereas the Muslim Brothers advocated temperance as part of a larger platform of comprehensive social and political reform. Jumʿah Amin Abd al-Aziz, an Egyptian historian of the Muslim Brothers, has lauded the public work of the Egyptian Temperance Society while highlighting the reproduction of that activism by the Muslim Brothers.271 The press of the Muslim Brothers served as a particularly useful vehicle for the anti-alcohol message.

A press campaign carried out in pages of the Muslim Brothers' press provides insight into the collaboration with the Egyptian Temperance Society. The Egyptian public was regularly exposed to advertisements for alcohol in the press and on the streets. Egyptian dry reformers could do little to remove public advertisements for beer or whiskey in the thoroughfare as the public establishment law required bars and taverns to have public signage. Operators of public establishments followed the law

and profited by endorsing one brand of whisky or a brew of beer on their signs.

Advertisements in the press, however, were voluntary: editors chose to accept money from importers, brewers, and distilleries. Ghalwash and the Egyptian Temperance Society sought to convince the editors of Egyptian newspapers to abstain from promoting alcohol by contacting directly the offices of all Egyptian newspapers that published advertisements for alcoholic beverages. A copy of that letter was reproduced in the Muslim Brothers' eponymous weekly newspaper, which began publication in the summer of 1933. Ghalwash's text was forthright, appealing alternately to religious sentiment, public health, humanitarianism, and nationalism:

We noticed that your paper publishes some advertisements for alcohol. Because of this, the administrative council of our association is writing to you in hopes that you stop these advertisements and refuse them. These advertisements encourage and promote drinking in the Islamic Egyptian kingdom. We hope that you will agree with us on the physical damages that this pernicious disease causes. We hope that you will work with us towards its abolition as righteous mujahidin taking part in this honorable humanitarian work. What organization is worthier than the press and more suited to helping us in this calling of ours? We well know that the matter entails financial sacrifices. But someone like you would sacrifice materially in the cause of public benefit and good of the country.272

The easy switching in rhetoric and argumentation reflected nearly thirty years of Ghalwash's temperance work. Given the steady volume of advertisements for alcohol in Egyptian periodicals during the 1930s and 1940s, it seems that few editors answered the appeal of Ghalwash and the Muslim Brothers. But given the volatility of the

272 al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, November 23, 1933, 22.
political scene and the printing industry, strong moral stands taken publicly by a political actor or an editor could capture attention, if only temporarily.

Ghalwash, the Egyptian Temperance Society, and the Muslim Brothers did not have the monopoly on prohibition agitation among the Egyptian public. Young Egypt, a fascist-inspired youth movement headed by Ahmad Husayn, also advocated temperance policies. In the thirty-eight articles of the group’s charter, Hussein spelled out the platform of Young Egypt, including the advancement of Egyptian nationalism, the dismantling of the capitulatory system, increased industrialization and modernization of existing Egyptian industry, agricultural reform, expansion and improvement of the educational system, strict protective tariffs to aid Egyptian industry, the fostering of the ‘martial spirit’ among Egyptian youth, and the elimination of sin, prostitution, alcohol, and effeminacy. Towards the end of 1935 and the beginning of 1936, shirted youth movements fought in the streets. This series of large student protests and demonstrations were organized with the goal of pushing the Palace and the government to return to constitutional rule, as well as pressuring the British to re-enter negotiations with Egypt to end the remaining vestiges of occupation.

The End of the Capitulations, Sovereignty Deferred, and Deportation


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Popular protests over the constitutional crisis brought the Wafd back to power in May 1936. The increasing popularity of the Muslim Brothers and the movement’s charismatic leader, Hasan al-Bannā, threatened the political dominance of al-Wafd and the Prime Minister, Mustafa al-Nahhas. al-Nahhas and the Wafd were under great domestic political pressure when they re-opened negotiations with the British over the future of their relations. This was the fourth round of formal talks since the end of the British protectorate in February 1922, and every previous diplomatic effort had failed to deliver on substantive independence. During the talks in Cairo and London, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, and the High Commissioner, Sir Miles Lampson, tried to reach an understanding with the Egyptian diplomats lead by Mustafa al-Nahhas and the Wafdist delegation. From Cromer to Ghalwash, observers of Egyptian society under occupation identified the Capitulations as the major hindrance to regulation of alcohol and public space. The British formally recognized that the extra-territorial rights of many foreign residents in Egypt had to end, which meant the Egyptian state would have total control over public space according to the law. The final settlement to end the Capitulations required the participation of diplomats from all the capitulatory powers.

Negotiations in Switzerland among the twelve capitulatory powers commenced in April 1936. Mustafa al-Nahhas brought the leading lights of the Wafd as the Egyptian delegation. The delegations from the capitulatory powers varied in size, depending on the size of the capitulatory population in Egypt. Italy brought the
greatest number of delegates, reflecting the number of Italians in Egypt. The Capitulatory powers had vested interests in protecting the commercial and personal rights of their citizens in Egypt, many of whom had lived there for generations. After three and a half weeks of negotiation, the diplomats agreed to the Montreux Convention in early May 1936. Article 13 of the 1936 Treaty recognized that the capitulations were "no longer commiserate to the spirit of the age or the present situation of Egypt."275 In August 1936, representatives of Egypt and Great Britain signed a treaty of alliance, often referred to as the Treaty of Honor and Independence, which sought to finalize the four reserved points that had plagued earlier diplomacy, namely defense, the Suez Canal, Capitulations, and Sudan. Regarding the first two reserved points, much of the text of the treaty centered upon the terms future military alliance between the two states and the continued presence of British troops on Egyptian soil, particularly in the Canal Zone. Regardless of the details of the political settlement between Egypt and the United Kingdom, British troops would continue to drink. As ratification by the respective capitals took time, the treaty stipulated that the Capitulations would end in 1949, allowing a twelve year period of transition.

During the interim between the capitulatory regime and full Egyptian legal sovereignty, the work of the consular courts shifted to the Mixed Courts. The Mixed Courts were established in 1876 and were staffed by Egyptian and various Western

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275 Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty, in respect of the United Kingdom, and His Majesty the King of Egypt and a Convention concerning the Immunities and Privileges to be enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt (London: H.M.S.O., 1937), 11.
judges who heard civil and commercial cases between Egyptians and capitulatory subjects.\textsuperscript{276} With the closure of the consular courts, the Mixed Courts assumed responsibility over criminal cases involving individuals formerly protected by capitulatory privilege. Beyond the closure of the consular courts, the Egyptian state secured the right to expel foreigners for gross infractions of public morality.\textsuperscript{277} Deportation became a convenient legal justification for removing the immoral, and the politically radical, from Egypt. The prime difficulty in deportation then became what government agency would shoulder the costs of repatriating the offender.\textsuperscript{278} Great Britain had already repeatedly deported drunken British subjects from Egypt prior to


\textsuperscript{277} "4. Deportation. Although the abolition of Capitulations entails the removal of all the existing restrictions on the Royal Egyptian Government's right to deport foreigners who are within Egyptian territory, nevertheless that Government does not intend to exercise during the transition period its right of deportation in respect of a foreigner subject to the jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals, who shall have resided in Egypt for at least five years, or to refuse such a foreigner access to Egyptian territory, if he has temporarily quitted that territory, unless:

(a) He has been convicted in respect of a crime or misdemeanour punishable by more than three months' imprisonment, or

(b) He had been guilty of activities of a subversive nature or to the prejudice of public order or public tranquility morality or health, or

(c) He is indigent and a burden upon the State." Declaration by the Royal Egyptian Government; signed at Montreux, May 8, 1937. \textit{League of Nations Treaty Series}. no. 4202. 1937.

\textsuperscript{278} British administrators had been discussing the utility of deporting 'undesirables' from Egypt since 1921. British records from 1921 contain a list of known British pimps and other undesirables. CO 323/867. National Archives, London.
the 1936 Treaty. The new arrangement allowed the Egyptian government more authority in initiating deportation proceedings, rather than having to defer to the will of consular courts.

The 1936 treaty affirmed that Egypt was not legally sovereign and would remain so until 1949. Until all residents in Egypt were subject to the same legislation, the Egyptian state still could not claim the monopoly on the use or threat of violence. Furthermore, the continued military occupation of Egyptian cities during the interim twelve year period underscored the precariousness of independence. Despite its diplomatic successes, the Egyptian state and the Wafd had to contend with continued challenges to its moral and political authority from Egyptian actors.

**Prohibition by Force? The Muslim Brothers and the Use of Violence**

The Egyptian state was confronted once again with an outbreak of violence connected to alcohol. In January 1939, violence broke out in bars, involving some members of the Muslim Brothers. While the exact details of the violence remain unclear, the incident was sufficiently serious to warrant a front-page statement by Hasan al-Bannā in the Muslim Brothers' paper *al-Nadhīr*. al-Bannā’s piece, entitled "Destroying the Bars," explained his views on personal freedom and the responsibility

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279 For a case study of such a deportation, see Chapter 4. Other deportation cases of British subjects for drunkenness can be found in consular court records from the 1920s and 1930s: FO 841/228, FO 841/233, FO 841/256, and others. National Archives, London.
of government in limiting that liberty for the good of the nation. Having just gone through years of calling for independence from British interference, the head of the Muslim Brothers led the fight to limit that freedom. According to al-Bannā, the purpose of government was to protect the people from every manifestation of corruption. State responsibility extended to the individual: the state must protect a person even from himself, if he wished to use his freedom. In al-Bannā’s view, drinkers took advantage of individual and societal freedoms, thereby spreading corruption among the Egyptian people. Alcoholics, compulsive gamblers, playboys, the regulars at the cafes, drink-shops, bars, and beer halls sullied Egyptian society with their libertine freedom. In a sweeping condemnation of alcohol, al-Bannā declared that alcohol killed the spirit, reason, psyche, honor, strength, and financial resources of the drinker. The silence of proponents of free access to alcohol allowed al-Bannā to paint them as degenerates.

al-Bannā went on to criticize strongly government inaction on temperance in the face of strong public expressions of support across the country. He dismissed governmental responses to calls for social reform, writing "The government moved sometimes, and looked, then promised the people that it would do its best." Alcohol had been alternately the fault of soldiers, British administrators, Greeks, and the whole capitulatory system. Here al-Bannā shifted the blame onto the Egyptian government for failing to address public outcry. al-Bannā justified the recent violence against public immorality by quoting incidents in early Islamic history when those who committed

281 Ibid.
adultery were lashed one hundred times. This justification for violence to impose Islamic orthopraxy had serious ramifications for public order.

Shortly after his first article on the violence against the wineshops, al-Bannā reached out again to the Egyptian government on the issue in an article "About the incidents of destroying the bars."282 In a speech published in the Muslim Brother newspaper al-Nadhir, al-Bannā addressed the Minister of Justice directly and in the style of a sermonizer. To the Minister of Justice, al-Bannā stated, "You are a Muslim who believes in God, the Prophet, and his book. You know from the depths of yourself that the teachings and rulings of Islam are the best and the most just."283 al-Bannā referenced the various Quranic injunctions against alcohol. After the traditional opening, al-Bannā switched tack and brought the issue back to Egypt.

Egypt, oh esteemed Minister, is a Muslim country and the leader of the Islamic world. In spite of this, you walk along any street in Cairo, and you see with your own eyes how the bars outnumber the shops and shops have turned into wineshops protected by the law. You see how the odor of alcohol polluted the good, pure air in this poor country. You see how the bon vivants of the bars and winesinks sit after midnight in their corners: they are skin and bones that do not know the value of money, or a child, or a wife, or family. In one section of Muhammad Ali Street between Atabah and Bab al-Khalq you see over twenty bars and this neighborhood is not one of those districts of immorality and corruption.284

283 Hasan al-Banna, al-Nadhir, January 25, 1939, 11
al-Bannā emphasized the importance of teaching the new generation for the youth who drink tread on the honor of the entire nation. In closing, al-Bannā turned to the constitutionality of the presence of alcohol given that Islam was the official religion of Egypt according to the 1923 Constitution.

After the publicity of the Hawādith, Hasan al-Bannā acted to ensure that his followers would not repeat their attacks on public establishments serving alcohol. al-Bannā issued a fatwa on the use of violence in combating the public consumption of alcohol, which Michael Cook has analyzed. al-Bannā argued that forbidding wrong with 'with the hand,' namely through physical violence, was reserved for the ruler rather than the individual. al-Bannā preached that his followers should address the presence of alcohol, especially in mixed company, with a 'good admonition' or 'mild rebuke.' Violence for political ends was not new to the Muslim Brothers, as seen during the heady days of the shirt movement. Violence in controlling public morality, especially alcohol, invited anarchy, and al-Bannā did not want zealots descending upon the wineshops. Public disorders could lead to riots, and the response of the Egyptian state would be assuredly harsh in such a scenario.

**Ghalwash and the Turn to Religious Activism**

Ghalwash had maintained contacts with other activists in the international temperance movement, despite the setbacks to the prohibition cause. In May 1939,

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Ghalwash was to attend the 22nd international conference on prohibition in Helsinki as the representative of the Egyptian government. Prince Omar Toussoun, the long-standing patron of the association, used his influence at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secure Ghalwash's participation. In late August or early September 1939, Ghalwash traveled to Berlin on his way to Finland. War was declared while Ghalwash was in transit in Berlin. Ghalwash was subsequently arrested by the Nazis. Prince Omar Toussoun intervened on Ghalwash's behalf through the Swiss Red Cross, and the Nazis freed Ghalwash to return to Egypt.286

As the beginning of this chapter demonstrated, the outbreak of war in 1914 brought martial law and tens of thousands of imperial troops to Cairo, and despite military efforts to regulate public spaces and the market for alcohol, the rate of alcohol consumption soared incredibly. Similarly, the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939 brought the return of martial law that stifled political activities, as well as a precipitous increase in alcohol consumption thanks to the arrival of Allied troops. Artemis Cooper's masterful work, Cairo in the War, depicted the leisure moments of the Allied soldiers.287 Once again, the entire market of pleasure benefited from the uncertainty of war as bars, taverns, cinemas, and racing clubs all saw enormous profits from British soldiers. While the British troops pursued pleasure in Cairo, the return of martial law stifled political activities.

286 Hamouda, Omar Toussoun, 33.
287 Artemis Cooper, Cairo in the War (London: H. Hamilton, 1989)
Once back in Egypt, Ghalwash found a tense local political scene in Cairo, given the uncertainties of war, martial law, and increased military presence. Rather than engaging in activity that could be deemed overtly political and therefore a threat by the British military, Ghalwash devoted himself to a different type of outreach: popular religious scholarship and proselytization. In the turn to religious matters, Ghalwash avoided censorship by the British military and found a new Anglophone audience eager for accessible literature on Islam. Utilizing his English proficiency honed after decades of cooperation with international temperance agencies, Ghalwash wrote a series of articles for *al-Azhar Magazine* in 1940 under the title "The Religion of Islam." These articles made their way to India where Sir Liakat Ali, an Indian Muslim and retired minister, read the series and was very impressed. Sir Ali then reached out to the Egyptian consul in India. Encouraged by the positive response, Ghalwash put together a manuscript, which he sent to many long-standing contacts for review, and *The Religion of Islam: a standard book* was first published in 1940. The introduction includes letters of praise from familiar names from the 1920s: the former American diplomat, Dr. H. E. Morton Howell wrote a glowing review of Ghalwash's work, as did "Pussyfoot" Johnson, the old ally from the World League Against Alcoholism. In addition to his collected articles for *al-Azhar*, Ghalwash included two supplements to the first volume, which were his PhD and Litt.D theses, written at the University of Brussels and Helsinki respectively. Ghalwash wrote explicitly as a believer: his two

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288 *al-Azhar* started publication of its periodical in May 1936. Articles appeared mostly in Arabic with occasional articles in English.

volumes are statements of faith and a handbook for orthodoxy. In producing popular
English-language, scholarship on Islam, Ghalwash achieved international renown that
surpassed his successes in publicizing alcohol in Egypt.\textsuperscript{290} The global Muslim public
proved to be a more receptive market for Ghalwash’s ideas than the increasingly
narrow world of anti-alcohol activism.

**The Abdeen Palace Incident of 1942, the Muslim Brothers, and Political Capital**

While Ghalwash dedicated himself to writing on religion, the political instability
that had plagued monarchial Egypt was exacerbated by the war. British officials were
deply concerned over the political loyalties of some Egyptian politicians. To prevent
the formation of an Egyptian cabinet friendly to British foes, Sir Miles Lampson, the
British Ambassador, chose to intervene in Egyptian politics.\textsuperscript{291} With tanks surrounding
the royal palace, the commander of British troops and armed men delivered an
ultimatum to King Faruq: appoint al-Nahhas Pasha as Prime Minister or abdicate the
Egyptian throne. In installing al-Nahhas as Prime Minister, the English undermined the
popularity of two pillars of Egyptian politics. Historians agree the Abdeen Palace
incident in February 1942 as a pivotal moment in Egyptian political history.\textsuperscript{292}

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\textsuperscript{291} Miles Lampson, *The Killearn Diaries, 1934-1946* (London: Sidwick and Jackson, 1972)

the popularity and authority of both the Palace and the Wafd were waning, the Muslim Brothers stood to capitalize on the political vacuum in an extremely tense environment.

With the new cabinet of Mustafa al-Nahhas installed by British tanks, general elections were to follow. Even before the call for parliamentary elections under the Wafd, al-Bannā and other members of the Brotherhood discussed their plans at a party congress and decided to run as candidates for parliament. Hasan al-Bannā himself planned on running as the candidate for his home city, Ismailiyah. al-Nahhas met personally with al-Bannā to dissuade al-Bannā from becoming formally involved in Egyptian politics. This momentous meeting has been the source of much speculation regarding promises and threats.293 al-Bannā agreed not to stand as a candidate in the elections in exchange for legislative concessions from al-Nahhas regarding issues of public morality. al-Bannā demanded total prohibition of alcohol. al-Nahhas could not promise prohibition: the enactment of such a sweeping change was beyond the powers of the Egyptian state and not in the interest of the British military authorities. al-Nahhas did recognize the sensitivity of the open alcohol consumption in an atmosphere of politicized faith. The Prime Minister agreed to the banning of alcohol sales on Islamic holidays and to outlaw prostitution.

The Muslim Brothers' press heralded the meeting between Prime Minister al-Nahhas and Hasan al-Bannā. In an article entitled “The Duty of the Officials in

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Ramadan,” the Muslim Brother commented on al-Nahhas’ speech to his fellow ministers on his plans to enforce the public observance of Ramadan by ordering the closure of restaurants and bars and to have police arrest people who openly consumed food or drink in contravention of the Islamic religious obligation to fast during daylight hours.294 Another article in the same issue, entitled "In the Path to Reform," also commented on the banning of prostitution and drinking during Ramadan.295 The Muslim Brothers won concessions from the government, which was a public relations coup given steady pressure over the last several years. Political pressure succeeded in bringing about moral reform, but the commitment of al-Nahhas to follow through on his promises called into question the difficulties of enforcement. In order to evaluate in a quantitative fashion the impact of al-Bannā’s success in securing reform of alcohol polices, I now turn to the records of the Cairo Police.

**State Enforcement of Public Establishment and Commodity Regulation 1934-1946**

Moving from the rhetorical campaign to control the debate over alcohol in Egyptian society, I analyze statistics from the annual reports of the Cairo police to gain new insights into state control over public behavior. When political pressure demanded a response from the government, the ministerial administration in turn pressured the police to be more vigorous in their campaign of enforcement. As the

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295 It is unclear if the Cairo Police actually arrested anyone found eating or drinking during the day in Ramadan, or if this claim was merely political rhetoric. “Fī Tariq al-islāh,” Jaridat al-ikhwan al-nisf shahrīyah, September 12, 1942, 8.
figures below show, al-Bannā succeeded in bringing about substantive change in the enforcement of alcohol regulation following the events of 1942. As the number of fines and infractions indicate, operators of coffeeshops, taverns, and restaurants, as well as their customers, sought to avoid government regulation throughout the period. The data from the following tables is taken from the Arabic translation of the annual reports for the Cairo police for the period 1933-1946.

Table 8: Licenses given to public establishments 1934-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Granted</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1030</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first glance, the drastic decrease in the number of licensed public establishments suggests that the Egyptian government had successfully limited the flow of alcohol in Cairo. In twelve years, the number of licensed public establishments dropped by 64%. However, the lack of a license did not stop sellers of alcohol and other goods from conducting their trade.

Table 9: Operating public establishment without a license 1934-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (£E)</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>28.65</td>
<td>32.65</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>152.8</td>
<td>342.7</td>
<td>360.5</td>
<td>468.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (£E)</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>1.184</td>
<td>1.832</td>
<td>1.716</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlicensed public establishments remained a constant problem for the Cairo police, but they were generally lenient in their punishment prior to 1942. Before the agreement of
al-Nahhas and al-Bannā over alcohol, unlicensed public establishments only received a 
fine, but were allowed to continue to operate. From 1942 onwards, the police changed 
their policies and began a stricter regime of enforcement by closing illegal public 
establishments regularly.

Table 10: Opening public establishment without informing police 1934-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (£E)</td>
<td>119.9</td>
<td>144.15</td>
<td>196.75</td>
<td>252.55</td>
<td>253.65</td>
<td>198.68</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>965.35</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>1577</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (£E)</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>1.165</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.233</td>
<td>1.524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most common crime associated with public establishments was failing to register 
with the police. Registration was the first step to licensing, and the data shows that 
hundreds of individuals every year chose to open places of entertainment without 
bothering with state approval. The state, in turn, closed and fined an ever rising 
number of public establishments.

Table 11: Selling alcohol without a license in unlicensed public establishment 1934-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (£E)</td>
<td>11.85</td>
<td>17.95</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.85</td>
<td>12.55</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>152.6</td>
<td>250.5</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (£E)</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.453</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.907</td>
<td>2.505</td>
<td>3.964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the number of licenses for public establishments lowered, the number of infractions 
for selling alcohol illegally rose. The threat of a fine did not deter operators from
opening unofficial bars and wineshops. Interestingly, 1942, the year al-Bannā won promises from the Wafdist Prime Minister al-Nahhas, had the greatest number of fines for unlicensed alcohol sales. When pressured, the state had responded by issuing fines, but these numbers of fines and closures decreased steadily afterwards. Confronting the flow of illicit alcohol followed political expediency.

Table 12: Selling alcohol without a license in licensed public establishment 1934-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (££)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>11.15</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (££)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.435</td>
<td>1.156</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those operators of public establishments who went through the licensing process were less likely to sell alcohol illegally until the later years of World War II. With fewer licensed taverns and bars for the soldiers, more operators were tempted to operate outside the confines of legality.

Table 13: Operating public establishment outside hours 1934-1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure + Fine</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fines (££)</td>
<td>102.65</td>
<td>130.15</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>98.25</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>600.25</td>
<td>795.6</td>
<td>812.6</td>
<td>1020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Fine (££)</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>1.272</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.149</td>
<td>1.182</td>
<td>1.227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Egyptian state set the hours during which the public could gather, but the public regularly ignored the government decrees over when they could socialize outside their homes. As with the other crimes connected to public establishments, more locales catering to a nocturnal clientele fell afoul of the police in the period after 1942.
War’s End and the Eruption of Political Violence

The end of the war and the period thereafter saw the resumption of political violence, and the secret apparatus of the Muslim Brothers played a significant role in the bloodshed. The Egyptian Prime Minister, Ahmad Mahir, was assassinated on February 24, 1945 after declaring war on the Axis Powers. In January 1946, the former Minister of Finance during the war, Amin Uthman Pasha, was also struck down by a member of Young Egypt for his pro-British tendencies. The secret apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood also began to eliminate those public officials who favored the British colonizers. The President of the Cairo Court of Appeals, Ahmed al-Khazindar, and the Cairo Chief of Police, General Salim Zaki, died at the hands of Ikhwan assassins. In response, the state initiated widespread arrest of Muslim Brothers, which disrupted the chain of command within the organization and allowed more radical elements to pursue political violence on their own initiative. The Muslim Brotherhood committed a series of bombings of courthouses and residences of public figures. In Cairo in November 1948, violence continued in the streets. The people rioted, expressing their rage in a xenophobic display of arson, looting, and murder. Jews, Jewish property, and Europeans became the main target, as Jewish stores were looted and destroyed. Some one hundred and fifty Jews were killed in the violence. After a preliminary investigation, it became known that the leaders of the riots were members of the

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296 Vatikiotis, The modern history of Egypt , 34.
Muslim Brotherhood, and the Wafdist Prime Minister Nuqrashi ordered the dissolution of the group in December 1948. For this, the Prime Minister was assassinated three weeks later by a Muslim Brother. Nuqrashi’s successor, Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi, or the palace directed the secret police to retaliate and murder the Supreme Guide. al-Bannā died at the hands of unidentified assassins on February 12, 1949 while outside the headquarters of the Muslim Youth Association. While the capitulations ended in 1949, martial law remained in effect until 1950.

**Conclusion**

Following independence, temperance activists and their supporters used alcohol as a test of the limits of Egyptian sovereignty. The temperance discourse reflected the changing political landscape, and public spaces connected to the drink trade became the topic of intense debate within the vibrant public sphere. During the period under study, Egyptians began actively participating in the global struggle against intoxicants. Egyptians took charge of representing themselves on the international scene, where they exchanged information with like-minded activists committed to social reform. The union of Egyptian voices with a global network of temperance activists, including foreign politicians, high level diplomatic representatives, journalists, and missionaries failed to secure prohibition or any real substantive change in government policy towards alcohol. However, Egyptian temperance activists did succeed on several levels. Through their organizational public outreach, Egyptian anti-alcohol reformers publicized the alcohol issue to such a degree as to attract the attention and support of
powerful and influential allies. Egyptian temperance activists also succeeded in articulating their arguments in such a way to appeal to a broad spectrum of the Egyptian populace as the political climate changed. Temperance became linked the larger nationalist struggle, social reform, and calls for a greater role for religious influence in politics. While the language and arguments surrounding proposed limits to alcohol evolved during the period under study, the difficulties in controlling alcohol remained constant. The independent Egyptian government had found it as difficult to control alcohol and public behavior as its imperial predecessor. Both the imperial and the independent governments struggled to regulate the market for alcohol and public behavior.
Chapter III: The Imperial State as Games Master: Gambling in Egypt, 1882-1914

From the first days of the British occupation until the start of World War, organized public gambling spread across Cairene society. The market for pleasure in Cairo was vast: gambling took many forms, including horse racing, casino-style games, lotteries, and simple games of chance offered by itinerant gamesmen. As with alcohol consumption, I illustrate that gambling in Egypt was not limited to a single class, religious group, or nationality. While the type of gambling open to participants was limited by access to capital, enterprising gamesmen tailored their services to appeal to all sectors of Egyptian society. I analyze state efforts to control gaming, as well as societal reactions to changes in leisure patterns. State engagement with gambling and alcohol wavered along a gradient of untrammeled access, licensed control, and enforced prohibition. Much of the success of the Egyptian state in stemming the spread of alcohol and gambling hinged upon the division between the European capitulatory subject/citizen and the Egyptian local population. The responses of British imperial authorities to the rise of gambling, as well as alcohol consumption, in Cairo were marked by issues of capitulatory privilege involving claims to freedom of action, as well as the vilification of a religious-ethnic minority as the primary purveyor of a specialized form of vice. Debates about the legality of gambling pushed at the division between private and public space through legislative action and saw concerted efforts by the police to assume the power to distinguish between the two. I investigate how and why the British imperial state and Egyptian society allowed certain forms of gambling to continue in the public spaces of Cairo.
Beyond the movement of troops and goods, the British Empire facilitated the spread of games and sports. Card games, dice, roulette, and other gaming implements were easily transferred from locale to locale, and similar games could be played across the world of the nineteenth century. What types of games of chance did the people of Cairo play? Where did gamblers find a receptive environment for wagering? Why did particular forms of gambling become popular, while others were condemned and persecuted by the state? The evolution of public establishments in Cairo reflects the larger process of the internationalization of games and sport. I track how the connection between the British military and the Egyptian nobility helped to enshrine horse racing, with the concordant betting, as a cornerstone of elite social life in Cairo. Casino-style gaming in public establishments was permitted during the 1880s and became popular despite commonplace cheating. When betting on cards or the spin of a roulette wheel in public establishments was made illegal, gaming continued behind half-closed doors in locales that gamblers sought to classify as private spaces. The imperial state aggressively pursued enforcement policies that challenged the capitulatory rights of the inviolability of the European home. During the highly publicized war on public gaming, the administration failed to prosecute widespread gambling in clubs frequented by the elite, which escaped governmental censure through the paradoxical designation of 'private' public establishments.

I then contrast governmental treatment of lotteries and itinerant gamesmen with horse racing and casino-style games, which generally attracted the wealthy and middle
class. As lotteries and other simple games of chance were generally the limit of
 gambling open to the lower classes, the examination of state and societal responses to
 this genre of gaming reveals differences in attitudes when compared to the gaming
 practices of the elite. With the attention of the state focused on discovering and
 destroying covert gaming rooms, low-stake gambling in public became commonplace
 for those who sat in cafes or walked among the city’s markets.

 The drive to control gambling mirrored the larger British imperial project in
 Egypt whereby the forces of the occupation sought to maximize their authority while
 maintaining the fiction of Egyptian sovereignty. In under a decade, talk in London and
 the British residency had evolved from self-government and quick evacuation to
 British-managed reform. Once a measure of material progress had been achieved, the
 British occupation initiated campaigns against various forms of vice, including specific
 types of gambling, under the aegis of moral paternalism. In this drive to reform, the
 British strove to reconcile their version of the rules of the game, whether racing, poker,
or lotteries, with the rule of law. The practical need to stamp out dishonest gambling to
 preserve public order in the 1880s evolved into a moral imperative to ensure that fair
 play guided games of chance. As the ultimate arbiter of games-making, the imperial
 state reserved the right to determine who was permitted to run games of chance. This
 investigation of the process by which certain types of games were tolerated and others
 aggressively combated by the state reveals much about the scope of expanded state
 control over the urban population of Cairo, details the evolving logic of imperial
governance, and depicts loci of local power capable of circumventing governmental control over public space.

I. The Arabian and the Thoroughbred: The Races become an Institution, 1882-1914

Reflecting on his first days in Egypt before an audience of supporters of the Cairo Anglo-American Hospital on March 8, 1901, Lord Cromer, the British Consul-General in Egypt, remarked,

I arrived in Egypt to take up the position, which I still have the honor to hold, eighteen years ago, that is to say, in 1883, about a year after the British Occupation. I found matters in a somewhat chaotic condition. But there were not wanting signs that a better time was coming. I found, I need hardly to say, that even during this short period a race-course had been established and a grand-stand erected. (Laughter)298

While Lord Cromer’s account of the alacrity with which British soldiers building the first racecourse amused his audience, his light-hearted remarks belie the prominent place horseracing came to occupy in the social life of Cairo under British occupation. The "better time" envisioned by Cromer came into being with the establishment of sporting clubs and racecourses, which provided one of the few venues for British soldiers and administrators to socialize publicly with elite Egyptians.

During the period under study, the racetrack developed into a hybrid of British and Egyptian racing traditions. I establish that certain Egyptians gained access to the exclusive sporting enclaves through racing. Existing scholarship that has stressed the total separation between British and Egyptians has not used the extremely limited

298 Cromer, Speeches, 88.
primary source material as a basis for that assertion.\textsuperscript{299} Horse racing provides a window into this closed social world that has left little in the way of sources for the historian. I posit that the racetrack and sporting club remained British spaces governed by British rules into which Egyptian elites entered but could never control. While most forms of gambling were subject to ever increasing societal and governmental censure, horse racing and betting flourished under British occupation.\textsuperscript{300} I show how the participation of British and Egyptian elites in horse racing ensured that their leisure activities, including gambling, remained outside larger state anti-vice efforts. To demonstrate how the dynamics of the racecourse reflected the larger imperial project, I relate the creation of the first racing club, investigates the insular elite world of owners and the racehorse trade, examines a typical race, and tracks rising divisions among the racehorse owners.

\textsuperscript{299} Writing of the Gezira and Turf Clubs, Robert Tignor maintained that the two institutions “were almost completely barred to the Egyptian population before the outbreak of the First World War. No Egyptian obtained membership in either of them in this period; additionally, it was regarded as being extremely bad taste for a British member to bring an Egyptian into the club as a guest.” Tignor, \textit{Modernization and British Colonial Rule}, 193. Emphasis mine. While it is true that Egyptians were generally excluded from the Turf Club, members of the Egyptian nobility did become members of the Khedivial Sporting Club. Tignor’s claim about the total exclusivity of the sporting club has been recapitulated by later scholarly and popular works. William Welch, \textit{No country for a gentleman: British rule in Egypt, 1883-1907} (London: Greenwood Press, 1988) Lanver Mak, \textit{The British in Egypt: community, crimes and crises 1882-1922} (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012)

Laying the Turf of Yet Another Racetrack in the Empire

By the close of the nineteenth century, wherever British troops were stationed, a racecourse was likely to be nearby. Lord Curzon, the great imperialist, noted the ubiquity of horse racing in a speech given in India:

From my own experience, I would say that the first thing an Englishman does in the outlying portions of the Empire is to make a race-course; the second is to make a golf-course. When I arrived in Cairo, less than a year after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir had been fought, every department of the Administration was in a state of utmost confusion. Nevertheless, a race-course had already been laid out and a grandstand erected. A golf-course followed after a short interval.301

Similar spaces were to be found throughout the British Empire in India, Asia, Africa, and the Americas as the British followed a familiar pattern of socialization centered upon sports and games like cricket, golf, and football.302 The British also institutionalized horse-racing across their empire.303 The creation of a racetrack in Cairo provided a unique space for the analysis of the diffusion of a British social practice and the interaction with existent Egyptian sporting traditions.

Fresh from trouncing the Ottoman-Egyptian army of Ahmad 'Urabi in September 1882, the men of the British army were unsure of the duration of their stay in Egypt. While they waited for their orders, the soldiers opted to build a racetrack, a place of

301 Thomas Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India; being a selection from his speeches as viceroy & governor-general of India 1898-1905 (London: Macmillan and co., 1906), 13.
diversion and gambling. At first glance, the choice to build a racetrack seems odd, as primacy suggests priority. While the precise story of its creation is a matter of some debate, the Khedival Sporting Club (K.S.C.) was founded in late 1882. Khedive Tawfiq granted over one hundred acres to the British military from the Khedival botanical gardens located on Gezirah, the island in the Nile a short journey across a bridge from the barracks on the East Bank. In recognition of this generous donation, the Khedive was recognized as the official patron of the club. Given that soldiers need places of entertainment, a racetrack was an ideal project from a military logistical viewpoint, and the initial startup costs were low. A track was easy to lay out, needing only a large, reasonably flat tract of land and minimal construction beyond fencing posts marking the course. Horses were readily available thanks to the presence of mounted troops. The turf was a popular enjoyment for officers and enlisted men alike. Throughout the British presence in Egypt, the races were intimately connected with the military.

Outside the confines of the club, the British preferred to rule Egypt indirectly through British heads atop Egyptian bureaucratic bodies. The club was a unique space in the physical and political landscape of Cairo for it was truly colonial rather than imperial in nature. Even with their military barracks, British subjects were small in

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304 According to Coles Pasha, one Captain Humphreys, an officer of the Mounted Infantry, took the personal initiative to approach the Khedive about creating an area for the British soldiers to exercise their horses. Humphreys subsequently broke his neck while riding a horse around the course. Coles Pasha, Recollections and Reflections (London: Saint Catherine Press, 1918), 155-6.

305 The Khedival botanical gardens were on the island to the west of downtown Cairo. The K.S.C. was also known as the Gezireh Club, referring to the Arabic word for island.
number in comparison to the rest of the population of Cairo. Inside the club, however, the British had recreated home and came to regard the Khedival Sporting Club as a little England where they had authority. A British visitor to Egypt testified to singularity of the club in Egypt:

Of course there is nothing extraordinary in the Gezireh racecourse, or the Sports Club. The same institutions, giving the same opportunities for out of door exercise exist in every Anglo-Indian centre, at Singapore, at Hong Kong, and on a larger and more democratic scale in South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. But what is noticeable at Cairo is the comparative display of Anglo Saxon characteristics which is made at Gezireh, when we notice, as we cannot fail to do, the unobtrusive manner in which the Englishman otherwise lives.306

Within the confines of the club, British bodies formed the majority, and they determined the rules of membership and participation. The British members of the K.S.C. replicated their cultural mores, sociability patterns, and familiar hierarchies.

From Lord Cromer on the tennis court to officers on the race course, British imperial servants of all stripes delighted in sport and relished their own company at the sporting club. As the guardians of the British presence, officers enjoyed unparalleled status in Cairo and especially in the club. The club was an attractive place for the servants of the British Empire, for it was there they could be among themselves in a familiar setting, relax, play games, begin romances, and gamble on horses. The club was, as one visitor in 1896 observed, "Egypt as England would have it: polo twice a week, croquet and rackets, a grandstand and a steeplechase course."307 Club life was a

social world closed to most people in Egypt, but British administrators and military were not the only pleasure-seekers whiling away the hours at the K.S.C.

The Western leisure class had discovered the joys of wintering in Cairo. During their extended stay, they regularly joined the British in sport at the club. With the rise of tourism in Egypt at the close of the nineteenth century thanks to Thomas Cook, increasing numbers of tourists wandered the streets of Cairo in the morning and spent the afternoon at the club.\textsuperscript{308} The high point of club life was undoubtedly the races, where the powerful and wealthy mingled among the paddocks and cheered from the grandstand. Of all the varied options of leisure available in Cairo in the period under study, only the races brought together the tourists, British civilian and military community, and Egyptian notables.

\textbf{Masters of the(ir) Races: British and Egyptian Elites United in Racehorses}

The British soldiers who built the first racetrack in 1882 did not introduce horseracing to Egypt, but they revolutionized the sport in the country. The introduction of large numbers of British horseflesh by cavalry officers drastically expanded the level of competition on the local racing circuit of Cairo. The mixing of English thoroughbreds with Arab bloodlines reflected the union of Egyptian and British aficionados in cheering side by side in the grandstand. Noble households built alliances

based on marriages of eligible sons and daughters, but British and Egyptian notables did not intermarry in significant numbers. While inter-communal gender relations proved to be a point of cultural cleavage between British and Egyptian elites, they willingly bred Egyptian and English horses together, forging ties based on studs and stables. What had been the obsession of a select few residents of Egypt evolved into a mainstay of elite social life in Cairo. The owners of horses, those knowledgeable British officers and Egyptian nobility, formed the passionate core of spectators around whom the rest of the race attendees revolved.

When the British seized the country in 1882, breeding and racing horses had long been a treasured pastime of the Egyptian nobility. The Egyptian royal family had maintained stables of Arabian horses since the reign of Muhammad Ali Pasha (1769-1849). Decades of trade, military incursions, and diplomacy led to links between the Egyptian dynasty and Bedouin horse breeders in Syria and the Arabian Peninsula. Muhammad Ali Pasha’s successors Ibrahim Pasha (1789-1848) and Abbas I Pasha (1812-1854) both continued the tradition of breeding Arabian horses. Abbas I had one of the finest stables in the world, and in early 1849, he challenged any British comer to pit a thoroughbred against his Arabians. The potential contest was commented upon with interest by members of the Jockey Club in London, the aristocratic governing body of

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310 The British consul-general in Egypt conveyed the challenge to the Jockey Club and then the larger British racing community through a letter to the editor in Bell’s Life in London. The race was to be ten-miles for stakes of between £10,000-15,000. Replies from interested British horse-owners focused on the particulars of the wager, especially as whether or not the Pasha was to be trusted and if the British would be ensured fair play. The exchange of letters was reproduced in Horse-racing: its history and early records of the principal and other race meetings: with anecdotes, etc. (London: Saunders, Otley, 1863), 418-431.
British horseracing. Ultimately, the race did not take place due to logistical concerns among the British members of the Jockey Club. Word of races in Egypt between Arabians continued to filter back to Great Britain. During the festivities for the opening of the Suez Canal, Khedive Ismail held a series of races at a hippodrome built especially for the occasion. The invasion of British forces ushered in a period of regular races heretofore unknown in modern Egypt.

The Egyptian Arabian stock continued to enjoy royal patronage even after the British invasion, and British interest in racing only served to increase the value of this elite breed. Khedive Abbas Hilmi II (1874-1944), the patron of the eponymous Sporting Club during his reign 1892-1914, kept a remarkable stable of prized Arabians, English thoroughbreds, and American trotters at his estate, Koubbeh. Egyptian jockeys riding royal horses frequently won races for the Khedive, which further added to the fame and worth of his stables. Younger relatives of the Khedive came to share his passion for racing, including his brother, Prince Muhammad Ali, and cousins Prince Ahmad Kamal, Prince Omar Toussoun, and Prince Kamal al-Din Hussayn all maintained racing stables. Thanks to long-standing ties between the Egyptian royal family and horse dealers in the region, the Khedive and his kin fielded formidable challengers on the track.

One of the benefits of membership in the Egyptian royal family was the ability to steer state initiatives to favor pet projects, such as horse breeding. Personal royal

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patronage and state support were united in improving horse stocks. In 1892, the Egyptian government created the Horse Commission to improve the quality of the horses ostensibly for the police and army, but it is likely that the Khedivial house would have access to any promising stock. Unfortunately for the Commission and its President, Prince Omar Toussoun, the Ottoman government refused to allow the export of Arabians from Syria to Egypt. British officers could buy the much-prized Arabians in Ottoman lands, albeit with great difficulty. For the want of access to true Arabians, the Commission chose English thoroughbreds whose physique corresponded with ideal type for Arabians: "lean, small, and closely resembling Arab horses in order to increase the size and strength of the offspring." The official history of the royal stables repeatedly noted that the Egyptian state was unable to secure horses for its breeding program, so Egyptian breeders mixed Arabians with English stock.

The most notable stable in British-occupied Egypt kept by a non-Egyptian was that of Lady Anne and Sir Wilfrid Blunt. The Blunts cultivated long standing social and political connections with Egyptian royalty, thanks, in part, to a shared obsession for racehorses. Through these friendships, the Blunts gained access to some of the finest

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312 For a first-hand account of the process of obtaining horses in Syria and importing them into Egypt, see the personal papers of Sir John Francis Burn-Murdoch held at the National Army Museum, London, reference 7708/44. Burn-Murdoch was in charge of the Egyptian cavalry from 1894-1896.
314 Wilfrid Blunt had a tumultuous relationship with the British imperial administration and frequently criticized the policies of Lord Cromer. Roger Owen, “Poet against Proconsul: Wilfrid Blunt’s Struggle with Lord Cromer over British rule in Egypt,” in Historians in Cairo: Essays in Honor of George Scanlon, ed. Jill Edwards (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2002), 223-236. For Blunt’s political
Arabian horses in the world. The Blunts' stud farm, Shaykh Obayd, was built outside Cairo in 1880. The Blunts sent the best stock back to England, at their estate Crabbet Stud. Aficionados of Egyptian Arabian bloodlines have given many detailed accounts of the histories of famed mounts owned by the Blunts. While famous horses once owned by aristocrats are still spoken of today, these rarities were but a handful of the scores of horses that raced down the tracks of the club. A far greater number of anonymous horses owned by less luminous characters competed on the course at the K.S.C.

One Race of Many: The 1900 Second Winter Meeting of the Khedivial Sporting Club

The regularity with which races were held in Cairo over the span of the British occupation has a blurring effect for the historian: the individual race has lost its significance as but one of many spectacles. The frequent races fell into a familiar pattern that matched the schedules of the elites: races were held in Cairo during the months of the winter season, and when the weather turned hot, the court, residency officials, tourists, and the races moved to Alexandria. Yet, every race was unique: the track provided a space for heroics and excitement for those searching for novelty. In an effort to tease out the meaningful in the quotidian, I depict a typical race meeting at the Khedivial Sporting Club held in late January 1900 to illuminate the social forces at play.

315 The passionate community of Arabian horse fanciers has recounted the storied and dramatic life of the Blunts. Spencer Borden, The Arab Horse (New York: Doubleday, 1906) For a well-researched popular history from this community, see Forbis, The Classic Arabian Horse.
around the racecourse as the forces of the British Empire came out in a display. This particular race occurred at a unique point in the history of racing in Egypt: racing in 1900 had become a regular feature of social life in Cairo, but it had not yet become the weekly spectacle of later years. The regular mixing of political, military, and economic powers embodied in the Egyptian and European race-horse owners saw competition not merely for monetary gains, but status and honor as well.

The Second Winter Meeting of the Khedivial Sporting Club was held over two days, Wednesday, January 24 and Friday, January 26, 1900. The races had been announced many weeks in advance; newspapers that catered to an elite readership, such as *The Egyptian Gazette*, devoted consistent coverage of action on the racecourse in their section devoted to social life, including details of entrance fees and the size of the winning purses.\(^{316}\) As British and Egyptian owners paid their fees and enrolled their horses, the press reported the gradual expansion of the field, fueling the anticipation among bettors and casual fans before the races.\(^{317}\) The equine entrants for the Second Winter Meeting were owned by the elite of Egypt, including British officers, imperial administrators, and local nobility. The insular world of horse ownership was a topic of frequent commentary and speculation, particularly among those who hoped to pick up

\(^{316}\) *The Egyptian Gazette* was an English-language daily newspaper published in Alexandria that catered to the interests of the British community in Egypt and visiting tourists. Beyond the races, coverage of the Cairene social calendar included other sporting events at the Khedivial Sporting Club, such as polo, football, and cricket. *The Egyptian Gazette* covered dances at the hotels, musical and dramatic performances, and charitable events.

\(^{317}\) The first entrants to the various races of the Second Meeting were announced in *The Egyptian Gazette*, January 5, 1900. The deadline for final entry was January 19, 1900, and it was proclaimed in *The Egyptian Gazette*, January 18, 1900. Owners enrolled their horses by contacting the Clerk of the Course, whose office was at the Turf Club.
inside knowledge that could be turned for a profit with the handicappers. The epicenter of horse racing, the Turf Club, attracted those men eager to debate the worth of their favorites.

When the core administration of the British occupation moved their offices into the newly constructed residency beside the Nile, the old administrative building in downtown Cairo became the headquarters of a new social center, dubbed the Turf Club. Founded in April 1893 with Lord Cromer as its first President, the Turf Club was modeled on those venerable institutions of urban social life back in the home country, the English Clubs. “[A]ffording the advantages of an English Club and centre of social life, for the large and increasing numbers of Officers, Government Officials and Civilians, of British Nationality, whose duties necessitated their residing for the greater part of the year, in Egypt,” the Turf Club was an elite institution intimately connected to the British administration. ³¹⁸ British men gathered at the Turf Club to talk racing, enjoy a cigar, read the newspapers, play cards and billiards, or have a drink. Similarly to clubs in the British Isles and throughout the Empire, women were not permitted entrance to the inner rooms of the Turf Club. Members could reside at the club, though the number of rooms was small. As with the Khedivial Sporting Club, male guests, such as tourists, could obtain temporary membership and gain access to the Turf Club. Beyond its social aspects, the Turf Club regularly held meetings of the Jockey Club, the body responsible for the organization of the races.

The organizers of the races at the Khedivial Sporting Club followed British traditions. British soldiers and administrators across the empire could draw upon an established tradition of horse stewardship and race-making. Based on the prestigious London club of the same name, the Jockey Club of Egypt served as the highest authority in classification and judging the races during the early twentieth century.\(^{319}\) As the races were divided into categories based on bloodline, Arabian or other, the judges had the final say as to participation in the races.\(^{320}\) In a nod to their shared passion for horse racing, both Egyptian and British elite served on the Jockey Club. While members of the Egyptian nobility active in horse racing served on the Jockey Club in a largely symbolic function, British military men served as the public face of the Jockey Club and conducted much of the management of the races.

With the enthusiasm and zeal to which the British officers and Egyptian elites took to buying, breeding, and training local horse stock, they quickly created new crosses of horse bloodlines. The emergence of this "Egyptian country-bred" (E.C.B.) category of racehorse greatly complicated the job of the race-makers as the easily recognizable traits of Arabian or thoroughbred blurred. Selective breeding blended the respective qualities of each type of horse, creating formidable racehorses that inspired confident betting. Classification by breed determined which race an individual horse could enter and the terms of the handicap. To even the playing field, the Race Secretary

\(^{319}\) Unlike its namesake in London, the Jockey Club of Egypt was an organization not an actual physical establishment, as Lanver Mak mistakenly wrote. Mak, *The British in Egypt*, 97.

\(^{320}\) Forbis, *The Classic Arabian Horse*, 373.
assigned an amount of weight known as an impost to each horse, normally lead weights. Under the weight for age handicapping system, race stewards determined the impost based on the horse's age, sex, race length, and time of year. Beyond physical measurements, the racemasters made judgments on the pedigree of horses, a particularly difficult task when mixed parentage was suspected. Depending on the number of entrants, classification of the field into categories took many hours, particularly if an owner disputed the ruling of the judges.

The increased blending of equine bloodlines and greater variety in horseflesh increased the complexity of the racing field. The legitimacy of the races relied upon on the participants' acceptance of an authority, here the Jockey Club stewards, to arbitrate standards in an objective manner. In a field where proof of the genealogical pedigree of an individual horse could be easily invented, a system of mutual trust based on the presumed honor of all contestants was essential. Given the unverifiability of parentage of individual horses and the inherently subjective nature of classification, disagreements had the potential to escalate quickly as considerable stakes were at risk and honor impinged. Proper classification stood at the core of racing, for it ensured honest odds for the bettor and fair play for the jockeys and owners.

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The two-day spectacle of the Second Winter Meeting included a total of thirteen races, six on January 24th and seven on January 26th, that were divided by bloodline, age, and weight. Most races were limited to Arabs and Egypt-country-bred horses. Prior to the races, the horses were inspected by four British officers, Major H. Ormsby Gore, Major Rycroft, Captain Gaisford, and Vet. Captain Marriott. No mention was made of any objections to classification decisions. Press coverage of the event included the performance of horses favored in pre-race betting and pre-race odds for the top three finishers. Like most other forms of gambling, successful betting on horse racing depended on a combination of luck and informed risk-taking. The inner core of owners and ardent race fans possessed the greatest degree of familiarity with the handicapping system and strengths of particular steeds. A comparative lack of understanding among most bettors about the nuances of the handicapping system gave this motivated, knowledgeable minority a distinct advantage towards placing successful bets. Despite the risks inherent in making a semi-educated wager, the prospect of an easy profit ensured that the field of bettors was wide. Betting on horse-racing, like other games of chance, was likely profitable for a select group of devotees dedicated to elite leisure. At the Khedivial Sporting Club, British officers and administrators dominated the races from a numerical view, but they did not own the field. The Egyptians who managed to hold their own at the British enclave, played by British rules, and won honors, as well as bets.

322 The Egyptian Gazette, January 22, 1900.
On Wednesday January 24th 1900, the much anticipated Second Winter Meeting was run. The published race results included the owner's name, name of horse, first name of the jockey, and the trainer of the winning horse. Journalistic description of the action on the turf made frequent reference to the amount of betting on particular horses and the final odds before the races. The first of six races of the day, The Maiden Pony Plate, was reserved for maiden Arabs and country-bred ponies that met standards for weight, age, class, and inches, and awarded a purse of P.T. 2,500. To give the value of these prizes meaning, a brief note on purchasing power in Cairo in 1900 is needed. According to the Baedeker’s 1898 and 1902 guides to Egypt, a basic room in the most exclusive hotels in Cairo cost 80 P.T. per night. Even the smallest prize in the Second Winter Meeting was a considerable windfall for the winner.323 Of the six entrants, two British officers finished first and second, defeating the mounts owned by four Egyptian Pashas.324 The second race, The Grand Civil and Military Steeplechase Handicap, awarded P.T. 10,000 for the winner, and all seven entrants were owned by British officers. The eponymous race of the K.S.C., The Khedivial, was won by Kamel Effendi Maher, who owned, trained, and rode his horse to victory, winning P.T. 2,500.325

323 In 1898, basic rooms in the Shepheard’s and the Continental cost 80 P. T. Karl Baedeker, Egypt: handbook for travellers (Leipsic: Karl Baedeker, 1898), 23. Four years later, a night in the Shepheard’s dropped to 60 P.T., while the new Savoy commanded 80 P.T., as did the Continental. Karl Baedeker, Egypt: handbook for travellers (Leipsic: Karl Baedeker, 1902), 24.
324 In use in Egypt throughout the Ottoman period, pasha was an honorific Turkish title, generally limited to nobility and military commanders. After 1882, the title was extended to various British and other state officials during the occupation.
325 Kamel Effendi Maher was the only owner to style himself "Effendi." Effendi, another Turkish honorific denoting class status, was largely self-ascribed, rather than hereditary. In addition to the mount he personally rode to the winner’s circle, Maher owned another horse that ran, albeit unsuccessfully, in the Khedivial. Lucie Ryzova explored the changing conception of the Effendis in Egyptian society. Lucie
most lucrative race, the Eclipse Stakes Handicap, awarded P. T. 20,000 to the winner and saw the largest field of entrants of maiden Arabs and E.C.B. steeds. With final odds at 12-1 against, J.L. Gorst's Rainbow shocked the field and outpaced nine other horses, including those owned by Prince Omar Toussoun and Khalil Pasha Khayat, the tobacco giant and holder of the monopoly of *tumbak* imports.\textsuperscript{326} The day was not a total disappointment for Khayat Pasha, who captured one race, the Pony Scurry. The final race of the day, the Selling Stakes, was won by an Italian, J. Valensin. Of the six races on the first day, British owned-horses won half, but the field was competitive and profitable.

The second day of races on Friday, January 26, 1900 offered another chance for socializing and betting on the horses, but at this meeting, the Egyptian owners dominated the day, winning four of the six races with mixed ownership. Kamel Effendi Maher had the best result, capturing 10,000 P.T. in the principal race of the day, the Paddock Handicap. Maher also trumped his competition in two races traditionally dominated by British: the steeplechase and the Galloway.\textsuperscript{327} Handsome financial rewards were not the only prizes to be won on the track. A measure of symbolic authority was also at stake. On the first day, British officers trained and rode their own

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\textsuperscript{326} Relli Schetcher, *Smoking, culture, and economy in the Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 36.
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\textsuperscript{327} The steeplechase, a contest in which horses and riders must clear obstacles such as hedges and water-filled ditches, is a tradition introduced into Egyptian racing by the British. Galloways were a type of pony native to Scotland but disappeared as a unique breed in the nineteenth century. The use of Galloway here refers to English thoroughbred.
\end{flushright}
Arabians, besting the finest stock of the Egyptian nobility. Conversely, an Egyptian Effendi defeated British officers in races of their devising while riding a horse native to the British Isles. Until the next race meeting, Kamel Effendi Maher was the owner of the moment, with four victories in thirteen races. As another race was always soon to come, any claim over mastery of a particular breed horses was temporary as honors had to be won again and again.

Following the successful completion of the first day of racing, 'A Lady Contributor' penned an article, "The 1st Day's Social Aspect," for The Egyptian Gazette. The author noted with approval that the spectacle enticed a large number of tourists to the racetrack, "indeed the strangers quite equaled the residents in point of numbers. The stand was, however, at no time quite full."328 The world of races and club life was intimate enough that the regulars knew each other at least by sight. The observer lamented the absence of the Khedive at the race, "especially with visitors whose opportunities of seeing His Highness are not numerous, that fact very materially affects the attendance at the meeting."329 The Khedive added to the spectacle of raceday and attracted attendees who hoped to glimpse the nominal leader of Egypt. The observer praised the present Prince Muhammad Ali as "a staunch supporter of 'le sport' where his favorite animal, the horse, is concerned" and approvingly noted that the Prince "was

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328 "Cairo Second Winter Races: The 1st Day's Social Aspect," The Egyptian Gazette, January 26, 1900, 5. Italics in original.
329 Ibid.
everywhere on the ground and an interesting and interested spectator." While some members of the Egyptian nobility did come out to cheer their animals and mingle, the British dominated the stands.

The Second Winter Meeting provided an event for the entire British establishment, from the military, financial institutions, ministry of agriculture, and the police, to make a public display of their authority. The highest-ranked soldier in Egypt, the Sirdar, Major General R.A.J. Talbot, was in attendance, as was Sir Rudolph Slatin Pasha, who would be appointed Consul-General of the Sudan later that year. Sir Elwin Palmer, the governor of the Central Bank of Egypt since its creation in 1898, joined Sir William Garstin, under-secretary of the department of public works, in the grandstand. Harvey Pasha, head of the Cairo police, watched alongside Major Rycroft of the Hussars, who would lead the disastrous fox hunt on the Blunts' property the following year. Mr. Eldon Gorst, financial advisor and eventual successor to Cromer in 1907, had a widely successful outing as the owner of a winning horse. The sight of such major personalities from the British community lent the race considerable prestige and also served as a display of power of the occupation.

Ibid.

The confrontation between Rycroft’s hunting party and the Egyptian staff employed on Blunt’s stable, Shaykh Obayd, created an international incident. The manager of Blunts’ stud farm was arrested for accosting three officers dressed in mufti after he found them trespassing. Blunt took his complaint public, notifying the British media and seeking redress from Parliament. Blunt maintained that the incident was reflective of the endemic abuse of the Egyptian peasantry by European hunters.
The men of the British community did not attend the races by themselves. The presence of women at the races was a matter of much journalistic commentary, and the author of the "Social Aspects" devoted much of her attention to describing the fashions on display by notable women. 332 On the second day of racing, the horses of the final race were sold at the conclusion of the event. Before the men began trading horses, the women left the grandstand to have a cup of tea amongst themselves. No mention was made of the wives of any Egyptian attendees: there were limits to Egyptians' embrace of British racing customs. Whereas the races were a social opportunity for both sexes from the British community, the wives and daughters of the Egyptian owners did not mix in the grandstands or at tea. The division of the sexes was not the only social custom upon which the mixed company at the Khedivial Sporting Club did not wholly agree. Behind the spectacle, the racecourse held the possibility for scandal.

**A Union of Wealth and Power: The Races as an Elite Institution**

Of the various amusements available at the social and sporting clubs of Cairo, only the horse-race united the British officer corps, tourists, administrators, professional classes, and Egyptian notables. In the twenty years since the founding of the K.S.C., the fortnightly races had become a fixture in the weekend life of Cairo during the tourist season. 333 The upper classes were over-represented: the races offered a unique opportunity for the elite to mingle socially. Pashas and Beys who shied away from the

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332 The first coverage of the races noted that of "the ladies being extremely well-represented." "Cairo Second Winter Races," *The Egyptian Gazette*, 5.
hotel set or did not call upon their British neighbors cheered the horses at the K.S.C.

Remarking on the races as the nexus for tourists, officers, and residents, an observer of British Egypt made the following summation:

The British officer, in a place like Cairo, does not entertain: he picks and chooses where he will be entertained. The success of balls or races or any other form of entertainment depends on the presence of the officers... Society for visitors, therefore, consists of the visitors themselves and the officers they happen to meet. ...so there is in Cairo a gay and highly entertaining Society into which residents hardly enter, except at the Sports Club, and the futile little race meetings... Life in Egypt, meaning practically life in Cairo, is very pleasant for those who do not have to think about money.334

The races had a respectability and pageantry that other leisure activities lacked, and the British officers were at the heart of the races. The union of money and political power was conspicuously displayed each race meeting. Horse racing had the potential to be extremely lucrative, both in financial and social sense, for those with the means and motivation. For what was to be a hobby, horse racing was extremely expensive, employing a whole range of professionals, including stable masters, trainers, jockeys, and assorted handlers. The extensive resources required to purchase, train, maintain, and compete race horses ensured that the clique of owners remained circumscribed. The chance for more races and greater pageantry encouraged the construction of a second racecourse.

The races had proven so popular that the founders of Heliopolis, a new suburb constructed to the northeast of downtown Cairo, chose to construct a racecourse in their

334 Douglas Sladen, Egypt and the English, showing British public opinion in Egypt upon the Egyptian question: with chapters on success of the Sudan and the delights of travel in Egypt and the Sudan (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1908), 502-3.
new development in the desert. The addition of a second racecourse ended the monopoly on serious racing and wagering that the Khedivial Sporting Club had enjoyed for over two decades. The new racecourse in an entirely new suburb tapped into the aura of exclusivity, power, and wealth surrounding the races at the K.S.C. More races meant more people could strive to be seen enjoying the sport. Superficially, the weekly races were frivolous entertainment for the Egyptian elite and the public face of British occupation. Regular contests ensured that conspicuous betting was always on clear display through the betting tickets nervously clutched, the anguished cries of disappointment over poor performances of pre-race favorites, and the too-large excitement of a bettor when a particular horse placed. Even those spectators who chose not to gamble could still participate vicariously in the thrill and agonies of wagering through proximity to gamblers. While money was obviously being won and lost, the pageantry of the races had to be maintained by self-appointed custodians of etiquette.

Decorum at the races was not as rigid as elsewhere in the Empire, the most notably staid being British India. Yet financial and social position in Egypt carried with certain expectations in regard to etiquette. Only wealthy Egyptians delighted in the excitement of the race. Ordinary Egyptians could not gain access to the races unless they were connected to the horse trade or the service industry. For much of the reign of Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, the prestige of the races stemmed from the elitism of the crowd

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335 The planners of Cairo Electric Railways and Heliopolis Oases Company were keen to build places of entertainment for the new residents. The Heliopolis Sporting Club and the racecourse were at the heart of the social life of the new suburb.
of British power and Egyptian nobility. The departure of Lord Cromer in 1907 resulted in a slight relaxing of British elitism in public, for the new Consul-General Eldon Gorst was a much different man from his predecessor. Gorst was an avid sportsman, rider, and raced his own horses for much of his time in Egypt. He gained a reputation as a heavy bettor after gaining access to the world of horse racing and the Egyptian notables who had the means to indulge in a very expensive pastime. A mutual appreciation for horses facilitated access to Khedive Abbas Hilmi II, with whom Gorst had become rather familiar by the time Cromer left imperial service. This familiarity with Egyptian royalty carried with it certain expectations that could lead to embarrassing moments of breaks of protocol. A visitor to Cairo described the scene after a race as such:

Gorst was walking with a jockey who had ridden one of his horses. On an English racecourse no one would have taken any notice. But the East is different. An Egyptian said to me: ‘Lord Cromer would never have done that. He was seldom seen at races, let alone making friends with jockeys.’... But the East does divide people up into first and second class. It is not considered the right thing for a man of Sir Eldon Gorst’s position to be openly familiar with any but the top layer.

The Egyptian nobleman's explicit endorsement of the exclusivity of the races in the days of Cromer reflects the prestige associated with the races. Save the intrusion of novelty-hungry tourists, only the elite residents mingled at the races. The proximity of the upper echelon of Egyptian society to military and administrative core of the occupation at the racecourse can be read as a public endorsement of not merely the races, but of the

larger social order in Cairo. The British community had its own norms regarding class and station, but Gorst's intimacy with a man below his station clashed with Egyptian elite understanding of social hierarchy. The rapprochement that blossomed around the racetrack between the British and the Egyptian elite after the departure of Cromer and the rise of the horse-loving Gorst was not to last.

With the early death of Sir Eldon Gorst in April 1911, the races in Egypt lost their greatest patron in the British establishment. While Gorst and the Khedive had their disagreements toward the end of Gorst's life, they remained so close that the Khedive traveled quietly to visit Gorst at his deathbed.338 Gorst's replacement, Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, arrived in fall 1911 to take up the post of Consul-General. While Kitchener was met by cheering crowds when he arrived at the train station and favorable press coverage, not all were pleased with the new appointment. Kitchener had served as the British commander of the Egyptian army from 1892-1899, and the decorated soldier's return to Cairo threatened to disturb the improved relations between the British and Egyptian elite.

Khedive Abbas Hilmi II and Kitchener shared an unpleasant personal history. In January 1894, the nineteen-year old Khedive chose his words poorly after a military review of Egyptian troops trained by British officers. Kitchener immediately offered his resignation, which the Khedive was not free to accept. The young Khedive was shamed into retracting his statements by his ministers and Lord Cromer. In the intervening

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years between this infamous event and the return of Kitchener, Khedive Abbas had matured politically. The reappearance of this aged, yet still formidable, figure from the Khedive's youth upset the power balance between the palace and the residency. The weekly races transformed from an occasion for the horse-loving Abbas and Gorst to relish in a shared, lucrative passion into an opportunity for awkwardness if the Khedive and Kitchener met at the paddocks or in the grandstand.

Despite tensions between the Egyptian nobility and the British administration, the weekly races continued to enjoy great prestige and popularity. These races provided the opportunity for the social interaction among the British residents, Egyptian elite, and tourists. However, a growing propensity for clannishness among the British who frequented the club appeared. As the occupation of Egypt stretched across decades, the British increasingly spent more and more idle moments together at the club as their isolation from the larger population grew accordingly. As the next chapter will show, the delicate balance of authority between British and Egyptian owners in the closed world of the racetrack passed away with the start of World War I.

II. The "Quixotic" Crusade against Casino-Style Gambling, 1882-1914

I now turn to the spread of a variety of games of chance common to Western gambling halls among the population of Cairo. In the 1880s, casino-style gaming in public establishments flourished, and widespread cheating forced the government to act. In making gambling illegal, the British government created a new type of crime,

339 Sydney Moseley, With Kitchener in Cairo (London: Cassell and Company, 1917)
which necessitated the creation of both a discourse to justify criminalization and institutionalized coercive power to enforce the new edicts. Nathan Brown tracked a similar process in his article on brigandage and banditry in rural Egypt.\textsuperscript{340} Once driven from the hotels and public view, gambling was hardly a fearsome menace to general order and popular morality. Yet, the imperial state persisted in its public war on casino-style gambling. British administrators and police officers used gambling as a pretext to expand the power of the Egyptian state over public space, as well as freedom of action and livelihood of the population. My work adds to our understanding of the work of the Egyptian police force, as described in administrative detail by Tollefson.\textsuperscript{341} Increased focus of state resources on gambling and more public raids raised the profile of gambling, which in turn put pressure on the Egyptian state to continue its efforts lest it be seen to be soft on crime or disinterested in Egyptian moral progress. The highly publicized war on public gaming formed part of a larger effort by the imperial state to extend its authority over the people and spaces of Egypt. However, the administration failed to prosecute widespread gambling in clubs, which escaped governmental censure through the paradoxical designation of ‘private’ public establishments. The inability of the Egyptian state to stop gambling resulted from the weaknesses of its own legislation and the impossibility of enforcement in the face of persistent desire to gamble among residents of Cairo.


\textsuperscript{341} Harold Tollefson, \textit{Policing Islam: The British occupation of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian struggle over control of the police, 1882-1914} (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999)
Caveat Aleator: Rigged Casino Gambling, 1882-1891

In the decade following the defeat of ‘Urabi in 1882, casino-style games of chance, in particular roulette and baccarat, were to be found in many Cairene public establishments, particularly in the thriving pleasure district centered on al-Azbakiyah Gardens and the major hotels. With leisure time outside the barracks and pockets flush with cash, the British soldiery freely pursued a variety of pleasures, not all of them sound. The gaming world quickly attracted an enthusiastic clientele from beyond the barracks, and the turn of a card and the spin of a wheel lured the high and the lowly to the gaming tables. As competition among public establishments in al-Azbakiyah rose, an increasing number of locales offered roulette and baccarat to entice customers. Faced with stiff competition for a limited but enthusiastic clientele in a market that was steadily saturated with more locales offering similar products, some individuals chose to operate crooked games. This willing base of customers eagerly gambled despite the risks, and gamesmen profited handsomely.

Throughout the 1880s, roulette was a favorite game among the gambling set in Cairo, and many locales in al-Azbakiyah set their roulette tables in prominent positions where the play could easily be viewed by passers-by in the street. An American professional baseball player who visited Cairo in 1888 was surprised by the scope of open gaming, writing “[G]ambling, then… being conducted on the wide-open plan, and
roulette wheels being operated within full view of the crowded streets.” The 1885 edition of the Baedeker guide to Egypt warned the visitor that the delights of al-Azbakiyyah came with dangers: “Cafes in the European style abound (beer ½ fr. per glass). Most of them have a separate room in which roulette is played, and the traveler need hardly be cautioned against joining in the game.” For the uninitiated, roulette is a simple game where a ball is placed into a spinning wheel with numbered slots colored red or black. Gamblers place wagers on individual numbers, groups of numbers, even or odd, and red or black. What makes roulette particularly insidious was the capacity for deception and manipulation. The spinning wheel sits in a wooden box, whose hidden workings can easily be doctored so that the croupier controls the outcome to ensure that the house wins.

Beyond roulette, players enjoyed card games in the gambling halls, and baccarat was a particular favorite among the gaming set. Faro, as it was known in the United States where it was one of the most popular card games in the nineteenth century, was offered in many locales. But the player had a wide range of options from which to choose, as the casinos and gaming rooms of Cairo offered a veritable buffet of card games from different states across continental Europe. As with all card games, but especially when money was at stake, players needed to keep a keen eye open for all

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342 Adrian Anson, A ball player’s career: being the personal experiences and reminiscences of Adrian C. Anson (Chicago: Era Publishing Company, 1900), 233.
344 This game is thought to have originated in seventeenth-century France where it was known as ‘Pharaon.’ The game gained in popularity in Great Britain in the eighteenth-century under the name ‘Pharaoh.’
manner of sleights of hand and irregular dealing. Baccarat employed a dealer’s box, from which cards were dealt to players. As the gaming establishment was responsible for the preparation of these boxes, ‘stacking’ or ‘loading’ the deck was a real concern for players, whether in Cairo, Paris, or Chicago.

Another scam common to gambling dens victimized the transient, such as sailors and tourists. Employees of gaming houses ostentatiously counted pieces of gold outside their establishments in hopes of luring in the passer-by to play baccarat and roulette. Enticed by the prospect of being paid in gold, the gambler wagered hard currency, won gold coins or ingots, and discovered only later that the ‘winnings’ were useless metal. But by the time of the discovery, the gambler’s ship had sailed or moved on to another destination, so it was impossible for the cheated individual to appeal to the police. The swindle only functioned if the gambler was to leave the country or city in the immediate future and was more popular in port cities though not unknown in Cairo.

Yet despite the general belief within the Cairene community of gamblers that most games were rigged, the players continued to risk their wealth at the tables. This acknowledgement of deception in games of chance begs the question: aside from unknowing novices, why would anyone wager their money on a game known to be dishonest? Clever gamblers operated under the assumption that all games were rigged in favor of the house. However, baccarat and other card games permitted players to bet with the house, meaning against other gamblers. Even in an honest and regulated
environment, the odds in most casino games favored the dealer, banker, or house, hence why gambling was such a lucrative endeavor. Doctoring the roulette wheel or pre-arranging the decks of cards further strengthened the advantage of the gaming establishment, but such tampering did not eliminate the possibility that the customer could win. Understanding that the establishment engineered the games to its favor, some gaming adepts tailored their betting to mirror the house and reap the benefits. The ability to make money on a rigged game depended upon the familiarity of the player with both the rules of the game and the potential for deception. A former British administrator and fellow gambler commented, “The officers, non-co’s, and even men, had accumulated pay, and most of it went to the keepers of these dens.” While such an observation is likely an exaggeration, the British military filled a primary role in the casino market, in addition to the rising number of tourists.

Naturally, the stakes wagered on a particular game depended upon the means and wagering patterns of the clientele. The memoirs of Ardern Hulme-Beaman, a graduate of the British dragoman school in Constantinople, employee of the foreign ministry, publisher of the Cairene newspaper *Times of Egypt*, sportsman, and gambler, gave some indication of the sums regularly wagered among the gaming set of 1880s Cairo. While Hulme-Beaman declined to name the heavy bettors among his peers, he admitted that betting on baccarat, whist, poker, and roulette was a primary source of diversion among the British residents. Dubbing himself an “amateur” and a “moderate

player,” he described his gaming pattern: “There were a certain number of very regular attendants, amongst whom I was one, who for four or five years missed very few nights.” If gambling nightly for half a decade only made him a ‘moderate’ gambler, the heavy or intemperate gambler among the British community must have been a thing to behold. Hulme-Beaman included a daily ledger of his gambling winnings and losses for a one month period:

![Figure 1: The Betting Ledger of Ardern Hulme-Beaman from August 1885](image)

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348 Hulme-Beaman, *Twenty years*, 110.
For a mere amateur, Hulme-Beaman performed well on the gaming tables of Cairo. The scale of the wagers suggests that a talented gambler could forgo formal employment all together, provided luck and skill held.

As with all games of chance, many customers walked away from the gaming tables with empty wallets. Hulme-Beaman confessed in his memoir that he ultimately lost all of his gaming winnings after a prolonged streak of bad luck and poor choices. Fleeced of their specie, some stayed away from the tables, lest they be stung again. Others, possessed of a different temperament, were compelled to return again and again to the tables, whether out of boredom or chasing the dream of winning a fortune that would free them of financial worries for the rest of their lives. Hulme-Beaman explained the attraction to gambling: “Except a few, almost professionals, most of us played not from any great passion for the game, but for want of something better to do, and for good company.” More darkly, some gamblers needed the thrill of risk: in the late nineteenth century, compulsive gamblers were dubbed degenerate or notorious, rather than addicted. The losses incurred by the average gambler did not make headlines, nor did the depravations suffered by their families.

A shining star in the gaming rooms of the late 1880s Cairo was the renowned American fight promoter and professional gambler, Patrick Sheedy. Having won and then lost more than an estimated $2,000,000 during his days working the felt, Sheedy made a name for breaking faro banks in Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and Boston,

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349 Hulme-Beaman, Twenty years, 109.
where his nightly winnings were reported with incredulity in the local press that hailed him as “the most representative American gambler.”350 With the surge in gaming in Cairo in the 1880s, Patrick Sheedy traveled to Egypt and established himself in the “sumptuous” gaming room of Shepheard’s Hotel. The combination of the most storied hotel in all of Egypt with a famous professional gambler made for excellent business. During the several seasons he worked in Shepheard’s, the charismatic American attracted a large number of gamblers and spectators from across Cairene society.

Given the widespread cheating in gaming across Cairo, it was unsurprising that similar accusations were made against Sheedy. However, these complaints were made by British officers, and their displeasure eventually reached the ears of Lord Cromer. Following several scandals, and at the instigation of the British officer corps, Lord Cromer ordered the police to shut down Sheedy’s operation in Shepheard’s hotel. The police confiscated the hotel’s gaming equipment, and the authorities unsuccessfully sought to have Sheedy deported. When asked later about his eviction from Shepheard’s, Sheedy maintained he ran a “‘square game’” and “‘never had the slightest difficulty with the pashas or the beys, or the Greeks, or the Jews, or the tourists, but every British officer who dropped a shilling squealed.’”351 In blaming the British officers for his fall from grace, the American gamesman revealed how poorly he understood political realities in Cairo. Sheedy took money from the most powerful group in Cairo, military men with clearly defined notions of honor and fair play. The

351 William Eleroy Curtis, Egypt, Burma, and British Malaysia (Chicago: F. H. Revell, 1905), 66.
wrong word from these officers to their superiors brought down the wrath of the state and closed down the entire operation. If even the famed Shepheard’s Hotel was suspected of running a dishonest gaming operation, what then of those establishments that attracted a rougher clientele?

Not all gamblers who believed that they had been swindled were content with complaints to the authorities, and only a group as select as the officer corps had access to Lord Cromer himself to seek redress. Most wronged gamblers lacked the connections to authority or preferred to avoid state agents, so they handled suspected cheating by themselves. Mix alcohol consumption with accusations of cheating, and violence could easily result. These gambling shops that were known to cheat threatened public security, but many of the owners were protected by capitulatory privilege and thus their places of business could not be entered except with consular assistance. In the event of active mayhem within a public establishment, having to wait for the arrival of a representative from a consulate could cost lives. The 1889 declaration of the first law governing public establishments defined the responsibilities of the Egyptian state towards the maintenance of order: the edict granted the police the right to enter public establishments in the case of violence. However, as long as public gaming remained legal, these gaming establishments continued to be the source of scandal, outrage, and the occasional outbreak of violence.

The first comprehensive effort on the part of the Egyptian government to control gaming was the public establishment law issued on November 21, 1891. This landmark
law expanded upon the 1889 law, giving the Egyptian government further power to control public establishments in the name of public security through the creation of a licensing regime. The third article of the 1891 law detailed the application process for an individual who wished to open a public establishment. Beyond supplying basic biographic information, applicants were required to define exactly what type of establishment they wished to open and to affirm that they would not allow games of chance to be played within their business.\footnote{Journal Officiel du Gouvernement Egyptien, November 21, 1891, 1482.} Article seventeen described in detail what the government meant by this affirmation: “It is forbidden for tenants of public establishments to operate gambling of any kind, such as baccarat, lansquenet, trente-et-un, trente-et-quarante, pharaoh, roulette, petits chevaux, and other similar games.”\footnote{Journal Officiel du Gouvernement Egyptien, November 21, 1891, 1483.} The level of detail in the text indicated the scope and variety of card games available in Cairo. As a deterrent to public gaming, the law declared that “the stakes and objects served under the contravention will be seized.”\footnote{Ibid.} This particular clause served as an ongoing motivation for the police force to conduct the laborious detective work and planning of raids. On the third violation of the gaming clause, offending public establishments were closed permanently. The Egyptian government thus banned the public gambling-halls, but the law also placed the onus of self-policing on the operators of public establishments.
Public establishment proprietors could be held legally responsible for the actions of their customers, who would not be prosecuted for gambling. However, the law did not outlaw wagering on casino-style games everywhere, simply in public establishments. Professional gamblers exploited this distinction, and betting on cards and roulette continued behind closed doors in private apartments and homes. Rather than eliminating gambling altogether, the 1891 law complicated the enforcement of state authority by eliminating gambling in visible urban settings and driving it into hidden locales open to a select clientele.

Gambling Behind Closed Doors: The Battle for the Apartment, 1891-1914

The British administration in Cairo took a very public stand against gambling on cards, roulette, and dice by stressing the dishonesty of the gamesmen involved. If gambling was not to be had in the finest public establishments in Cairo, it was not to be had anywhere. The decision to end gambling had larger repercussions for the British occupation. Raids on gambling shops provided Cromer with evidence of British concern for moral progress while attempting to demonstrate British dominance. The inability of the imperial state to stop gambling revealed the limits of its power over public space and behavior.

With the casinos shuttered, a parallel gaming world sprouted beside that of the hotels and former gaming halls of downtown Cairo: one that centered upon the quasi-private club and long outlived its public counterpart in al-Azbakiyah. When the casinos were open and legal, private gaming clubs attracted a more exclusive clientele.
that tended to self-select along national and class lines. To gain access to one of these secretive establishments, an individual had to be invited or introduced by another patron. The British had their preferred semi-private baccarat and card clubs, as did the French and other nationalities. The operators of these ‘private’ clubs tried to operate under the official radar of the state, though Lord Cromer was kept abreast of the gaming habits of the British community as well as those of Egyptian notables. Given the wealth of this elite clientele, competition among the operators of these private gaming concerns was fierce and led to violence on occasion. This cutthroat network of exclusive gambling establishment absorbed some of the former staff of those public gaming rooms closed by the 1891 act. With gaming made illegal in public establishments, some croupiers and gaming managers continued to practice their craft illicitly.

Despite the legal proscription of gambling and the attention of Lord Cromer, gaming did not vanish from the streets of Cairo overnight. Following the Egyptian state’s first efforts to shutter the gambling halls, Lord Cromer entertained the visit of a world-traveling artist, H. Jones Thaddeus. Thaddeus had acquired certain habits in his travels among the courts of Europe, and while staying in Cairo, he wasted little time in hunting out the company of like-minded men. His account of his conversation with Lord Cromer and his nocturnal pursuit of entertainment is worth repeating in its entirety:

On one occasion the consul-general told me many interesting stories of the different forms of corruption he had succeeded in abolishing; and amongst them mentioned the barefaced gambling which once prevailed openly in Cairo, such as roulette, cards, &c. After much difficulty, he said, he had succeeded in closing all the gambling dens; and in that respect Cairo could now show a clean record to the whole world. I listen amazed to this statement. On my many wanderings, my habit has been to study the customs and characteristics of the people with whom I sojourn; and in Cairo my most amusing evenings were spent in some one or other of the myriad gambling hells, conducted in the most flagrantly open manner, which abounded in every street of the city. There was no attempt at privacy; on the contrary, these resorts were brilliantly lit up, and if you were too virtuous to play, you could watch the roulette-wheel turning from the street outside. The cheating with this roulette was delightfully simple and primitive. When the money staked was chiefly on black, red always turned up, and vice versa. For some time I wondered how the trick was done, only discovering the secret by accident. I dropped a coin, and, stooping to pick it up, noticed a piece of string attached to the toe of the Syrian ‘croupier,’ the other end communicating with the table. By some contrivance connected with the string, he regulated the colour into which the ball was to fall. After that discovery I backed the colour on which there was least money, and always won. There was another game still more profitable to its proprietor, and equally popular. This was a cut-throat form of baccarat, with a cagnotte. The players—perhaps twenty of them—sat around a table, with a croupier in the centre. Each played with his neighbor; and whoever turned up eight or nine with a service of two cards, won the money staked by the dealer; and so the game made its round indefinitely. As the majority of the players were dragomans, waiters in the hotels, interpreters, and small traders-Greeks, Jews, Syrians, &c.—the stakes were limited. But the magnitude of the profit was great in proportion.356

Ignorant of his audience’s predilections for games of chance, Cromer’s attempt at spreading the word of the great moral progress in Egypt achieved under his tenure fell flat. This passage further illustrates the reality that games of chances were tailored to the means of the players with stakes appropriate to their socio-economic station. It is

356 Thaddeus, Recollections, 210-211.
noteworthy that the many baccarat players had been exposed to the game through working in, or because of their close proximity to, the tourist industry. Like the British soldier or American holidaymaker, these dragomen and clerks were likely enticed to gamble during the heady days of licit casino gambling. Of course, making an act illegal did not remove an individual’s desire or enjoyment of that practice or habit, however risky it may have been. Indeed, to a motivated individual with certain appetites, the element of danger associated with engaging in illegal behavior may have served to heighten the pleasure of the act. Labeling an action such as playing a game a vice subject to criminal prosecution deterred some individuals from making a wager, but not all. And so those middle class and elite residents of Cairo continued to risk willingly the fruits of their livelihood on the spin of a crooked wheel or the deal of a card despite the increased hazard and regardless of the legality of their actions. On paper, the closure of public gaming establishments and the criminalization of the gaming industry removed all institutional protection for those individuals who continued to gamble.

The issue of gambling debt collection, for example, became a personal, rather than a legal, matter. In response to a March 6, 1892 circular from the American government “regarding debts of honor, or debts not collectible at law,” A. M. Keiley, the American judge on mixed courts, informed the acting American consul in Egypt, Louis Grant, that “Drinking debts are collectible at law. Gambling debts are not, and betting debts are gambling debts, because the law says that the consideration of any debt must be *licite*; and, since the law will not help a man to collect his gambling debts,
these debts…are called debts of honor, that is, debts due, but to which the creditor has not the means of enforcing payment.”

Some operators of underground gaming houses had criminal connections and demonstrated a willingness to use violence: these creditors provided extra-legal incentives for debtors to repay their fiduciary obligations incurred on the gaming tables. Among more polite society where the threat of violence was not imminent, creditors relied upon notions of honor and group pressure. The American consul reported, “[A]mong gentlemen gamblers, debts of honor have a higher rank because the refusal to pay means exclusion from clubs and race courses and social ostracism.”

For the elite residents in the grandstand at the Khedivial Sporting Club, failing to pay a wager was unthinkable and meant social suicide. In the small and insular world of illegal gambling establishments and semi-private clubs, failing to pay a debt could have more dangerous implications to a gambler's physical well-being. Earning the reputation of an unscrupulous bettor who did not honor his or her word ensured pariahdom among the elite and lower classes alike.

Banging down the Door: Police Raids and the Capitulations

The legislative criminalization of public gaming required enforcement, which meant that the police of Cairo had new responsibilities. The expansion of the gambling industry into private apartments demanded new tactics among the security forces to gather information and bring offenders to justice. As the new underground gaming

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358 Ibid.
establishments were covert, potential gamblers were vetted, and uniformed police officers could not easily gain access to determine if in fact illegal gaming was underway. The police relied upon a network of informants to provide information about the location and details of the gaming operations of these new locales. Yet, the expansion of police powers could not score a decisive victory over gamblers.

A friend of Harvey Pasha, the commandant of police in Cairo, came to Egypt in the 1890s and was quickly enlisted in a sting operation. Posing as a gambling aficionado and tourist, the amateur undercover agent traveled to three suspected gambling outfits in private apartments and reported back to Harvey Pasha. Having gained the trust of the gamers, the informant was able to facilitate a police raid, which he described thus:

It was arranged that they should all be raided at exactly the same hour, and I was to introduce Harvey into the one which was suspected of having a table which did not run fair. As I was known by sight, he came in with me easily, in smart evening dress, with a beard on, and we sat played a little. ... As agreed, I got up just before the minute of the raid, strolled round the room, and got near the door, and the moment the alarm was given below seized hold of the door to prevent its being shut... and then the police rushed in.359

Police raids required subterfuge and considerable coordination. The operator of this particular gambling den was a familiar figure among the gaming set: Pat Sheedy. After being exiled from Shepheard’s Hotel, Sheedy continued to ply his trade, though in less conspicuous fashion. The police confiscated the cash, gaming accessories, and Sheedey’s roulette wheel, which when dismantled was found to be rigged with two steel bars that

allowed the croupier to prevent the ball from falling into particular slots. Sheedy did not remain long in Cairo, though American visitors to Egypt were still invoking his name with a measure of pride well into the next decade. An American tourist, George Ade, wrote of Cairo night life in his article “Round About Cairo With and Without the Assistance of the Dragoman or Simon Legree of the Orient,” that “There is no wild night life, and gambling, which flourished here for many seasons under skillful direction of Mr. Pat Sheedy, an American. It has yielded to British reformatory influence.” The public face of casino gambling had retreated in the face of Anglo-Egyptian government suppression, but the illicit gambling industry evolved and adapted to the new legal circumstances.

As the police closed down one gambling den, another quickly rose to fill the gap. Gamblers quickly learned police methods of detection and did their best to conceal their operations and stymie police work. Some clever barmen sought to capitalize upon their capitulatory privileges and take advantage of the inviolability of the domicile of the protected subject. These operators of bars in downtown Cairo rented private apartments adjacent to their public establishment. Customers moved freely from the public barroom to the private gaming room where they enjoyed card games and roulette as if the heady days of the 1880s had returned. When the police arrived to raid the premises, the staff shut the doors of the gaming apartment and claimed capitulatory

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privilege. Under capitulatory law, the police required the presence of consular officials to enter the private residences of protected subjects and citizens.

The difficulties of securing consular cooperation plagued police efforts to combat clandestine card games. As the raid on Sheedy’s club showed, the police had to be swift if they wished to secure any evidence of gaming. Lord Cromer described the ingenuity of the illicit gamesmen:

The police in Cairo and Alexandria continue to wage war against gambling, but proprietors of gambling establishments are adepts at evading the law. They select apartments adjacent to bars, which have all the appearances of private houses, and into which the police cannot penetrate without Consular aid. The moment the electric bell is rung, the gaming apparatus disappears, and the gamblers are found reading the papers, or engaged in other innocent pursuits.\(^{362}\) Requiring consular assistance further complicated an already delicate operation.

Following the criminalization of organized casino-style gaming, the formal discussion of gambling as a threat to public order and safety became a regular feature of the annual reports to the British Parliament on the administration of Egypt in which Lord Cromer devoted a special section to the government’s battle against the ‘gambling hells.’ The majority of Cromer’s complaints focused on the fact that the various games of chance were unfair, and thus the proprietors were essentially fraudsters and thieves who duped the gullible and the greedy. The fact that many of the operators of these establishments held Greek nationality and the accompanying capitulatory rights led Lord Cromer to single out the Greek consulate for particular criticism in his annual report.

\(^{362}\)“Public Gaming” in Report by Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan. (London: H.M.S.O., 1905), 53.
reports. Lord Cromer repeatedly conveyed the frustration of the police of Cairo charged with combating clandestine gaming.

In 1904, an updated public establishment law retained the clause requiring licensed proprietors to agree that they will not permit gaming in their establishment. The law’s eighteenth clause repeated the list of banned games and threatened violators with confiscation of all wagers and gambling materials. For the operator of a public establishment found guilty under the gambling law, punishment was limited to seven days’ imprisonment and a fine of £1. In parroting the terms of the 1891 public establishment law, this new version did little to confront the ingenuity of the operators of illegal card games and roulette rooms. The passage on gambling in the 1904 Annual Report on the Administration of Egypt included the summation of Percy Machell from the Ministry of the Interior, "'All we can do is to perpetually harass gambling establishments, so as to make owners so careful as to prevent their offering extraordinary temptations and facilities. But usually we cannot do much more.'"\textsuperscript{363}

The acknowledgment that harassment was the limit of state control did not dissuade police efforts. Once the police discovered the stratagem of using a private apartment near to an existing bar as a gambling den, they shut down these rooms with the begrudging and recalcitrant assistance of consular agents. In response to this move by the authorities, the game-masters employed yet another tactic to challenge the Egyptian state’s conception of public versus private space.

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid.
Rather than devoting an entire apartment solely to gaming, the croupiers and dealers moved the gambling into their own homes. They set up the gaming tables in a spare bedroom in their familial residence, so when the police and consular agent appeared at their door, the legal-minded gamblers could point to their family members in the living room and insist that the closed bedroom containing the gaming equipment was merely private quarters. The gamblers adamantly refused entry to police on grounds that a bedroom in a family residence was clearly intimate space and unequivocally protected under capitulatory rights. Without gambling implements in clear view, “the Janissaries of the Greek Consulate refuse to aid in this matter, saying that they are private apartments, and they cannot do so without orders from their Chiefs.”

As the orders from the Chiefs were not forthcoming, the police were once again publicly thwarted in their efforts to close illicit gambling dens.

In 1906, the Egyptian government secured the support of the Greek consulate in the battle against Greek gambling establishments. Lord Cromer took advantage of the opportunity to pressure the Greek state during the negotiation of a commercial treaty between Egypt and Greece. The Greek state agreed to place a Greek consular constable “at the disposition of the police force” on a permanent basis. The police no longer had to scramble to locate a Greek diplomatic agent willing to participate with a raid on their fellow countryman. Another concession on the part of the Greek government in

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365 “Public Gambling” in Report by Her Majesty’s Agent and Consul-General on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan (London: H.M.S.O., 1907), 76-7.
the face of British pressure was to allow the police to enter every room in a gambling
den-apartment, rather than only the rooms where gaming equipment was evident. The incursion into the private homes of Europeans gave Lord Cromer some pause for thought after his return to Great Britain. In his opus Modern Egypt, Cromer wrote,

Inviolability of domicile is one of the cornerstones of European privilege in the East. It is well that the Police should be able to penetrate into a gambling hell and stop an infamous trade, but what guarantee is there that under the orders of an official incapable of any fine discrimination of character or of circumstances, these same Police will not invade the house of some individual who never in the course of his life held a playing card or a dice box in his hand?366

Having long championed an expansion of police powers needed to carry out the anti-gambling mandate, Cromer expressed the nagging insecurity of the European resident over ceding a measure of personal freedoms to Egyptian authorities. Despite this expansion in police powers to gain access to gaming rooms and seize evidence, the government was severely hampered in its crusade against gambling because existing punishments for those found guilty of illegal gaming were hardly a deterrent.

Even though they could not eradicate gaming rooms from the Egyptian landscape, the Cairene police endeavored to make operating an illegal gaming establishment as unpleasant and difficult as possible. After a particularly elaborate raid on a Levantine gaming room, Russell Pasha, who later became Commandant of the Cairo police, delighted in “confiscating every stick of furniture and fitment in the flat, and felt that we could at last afford a good laugh at the management and the protecting

The government continued its policy of allowing the police to seize all monies and equipment found during a raid for the material benefit of the officers. This added incentive spurred on the Egyptian officers, whose efforts were applauded by advocates of social reform in Egypt. Public raids made for good press, but police action did not stop casino-style gambling.

**A Game among Friends: Private Clubs and Rights of Free Association**

Amidst the much publicized inquisition against illegal gaming, the British continued to gamble freely in their clubs. Betting on horses was still gambling, but who was to tell the British that they could not do so? As the section on the Second Winter Meeting at the K.S.C. has shown, the entire power structure of the British occupation was actively involved in racing and betting. The Jockey Club planned the races from the Turf Club, where members were known to enjoy gambling on cards and billiards despite the legal prohibitions. This flagrant breach of law was well known, as a visitor to Cairo in 1906 wrote, “When Lord Cromer consented to be a patron of the Turf Club, it was, I am told, on one condition and that was that there should be no gambling. The promise then made has no doubt been forgotten for card playing is now very much in vogue.”

There were no midnight raids on the Turf Club: in a display of the blatant hypocrisy, those same British police officers who relished in discovering and destroying Greek-run gaming rooms turned a blind eye to the crimes of their compatriots and colleagues.

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The Khedivial Sporting Club and the Turf Club were not the only private clubs on the scene. Founded in 1905, the Muhammad Ali Club had a membership limited to the very wealthy, most of whom were Egyptian nobility but included Greek and Jewish notables. Non-elite clubs also formed, many of which were along linguistic or religious lines. Gambling continued in many of these private clubs, and the legality of police raids was publicly called into question. In 1911, a leading legal scholar in Egypt and professor at the Khedival Law School, Henri Lamba, wrote an article entitled, “Games of Chance in Egypt in relation to internal and international law," that was published in the authoritative journal, *Egypte Contemporaine.* In this piece, Lamba employed his legal knowledge to explain what had already become a reality: despite the laws assigning clubs the status of a public establishment and there by placing them under the authority of laws governing public behavior, these clubs were in fact outside the purview of Egyptian law. Lamba devoted much of the article summarizing the various laws regarding public establishments and gambling. He pointed out that Egyptian subjects were forbidden from keeping gambling parlors under Article 307 of the *code penal indigène*, which threatened bankers of the house with imprisonment of up to six months and/or a fine of up to 50 £E. After reviewing the extension of state power over foreign owned public establishments in 1889, 1891, and 1904, he tackled two important questions: did foreign clubs qualify under the law as public establishments, and what distinguishes the foreign clubs from gambling halls?

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369 Henri Lamba, "Les Jeux de hasard en Egypte devant le droit interne et le droit international," *L’Egypte Contemporaine* 2.7 (1911), 396-400.
Lamba argued that as early as the second public establishment law in 1891, the French, Italian, Greek, and English clubs were effectively immune from police supervision. Rather than public establishments, Lamba defined private clubs as such: “They form in effect a civic center, under the flag of their nationality, and are, then, as inviolable as the private homes of each of their members.”

Lamba’s argument to preserve the sanctity of the private club effectively mirrored the logic of Greek and Levantine gamblers. Much like the professional and national clubs, access to the Greek and Levantine gambling dens was tightly controlled and dependent upon the recommendation or approval of other gamblers. To Lamba, the institution of exclusivity in the form of rigid membership rules precluded the government from labeling these clubs as open to the public. The primary difference between so-called 'gambling hells' and these exclusive clubs was the patina of administrative organization: published club rules, voting on the admission of new members, the paying of nominal subscription fees, and most importantly, registration with the police as a private club. Thus, if these exclusive clubs could not be labeled as a public establishment due to restrictive rules of access, then the existing laws governing gambling did not apply either. From a legal perspective, Lamba maintained that the police cannot enter these clubs, and members were free to behave as they wish without fear of state intervention. Lamba acknowledged that some clubs, despite their artistic or sporting titles, were thinly concealed gaming houses. The police could raid the secret gambling club, but

security forces were prevented from entering the private club. As I will illustrate in the
next chapter, the freedom of British clubs from the threat of police action set an example
for others to follow in the quest to escape public scrutiny and governmental
intervention.

III. Bringing the Game to the Customer: Itinerant Salesmen and Lotteries

Exposure to, and participation in, gambling was not limited to Egyptian nobility,
foreign soldiers, tourists, and middle class customers from capitulatory states at the
racetracks, hotels, and gaming halls of Cairo. I detail how the incorporation of games of
chance into ordinary market exchanges by wandering salesmen developed into a
regular feature in the cafés and coffee shops throughout Cairo. These simple games of
chance such as odd-or-even and lotteries did not fit neatly within the legal definition of
public or private space. The vendors of lottery tickets and other gaming operators were
not restricted to a single locale that could be inspected by state agents and controlled,
and thus the roaming gamer exposed a wide customer base to gambling. As opposed to
gaming establishments which pandered to the middle and upper classes that
frequented the pleasure district centered on al-Azbakiyah Gardens, the wandering
gamer sold his wares across the city in all manner of venues. As with the fight against
gambling salons, the struggle to combat gaming among the ordinary Egyptians was
waged over the meanings and uses of public space, as well as the limits of freedom of
economic activity.
In the first two decades of occupation, the British administration of Egypt placed economic and security concerns over social issues. Unemployment in Egypt became a security concern to the government, particularly in the cities where thousands of landless and jobless migrants sought new lives. I focus here on a small subset of the urban poor of Cairo, itinerant gamesmen, whose lives in Cairo were marked by insecurity and the need for mobility. Attitudes towards the urban poor in the period have been examined Mine Ener in her article on begging and loitering in nineteenth-century Egypt. Ener detailed the difficulties of avoiding state control and securing employment for migrants. I confirm her characterization of the imperial state attitudes towards itinerant poor by exploring how the state sought to limit the presence of itinerant gamesmen in public spaces and their attempts to make a living among the cafes and markets of Cairo. I examine the state response, or the lack thereof, to the spread of low stakes gambling among the popular classes of Cairo in order to reveal the priorities of the British imperial state. I demonstrate that the British administration was willing to condone, even license, certain forms of popular gaming provided there was some connection to philanthropy. These official attitudes towards popular gaming and charity were not unique in the wider Eastern Mediterranean: the Ottoman government of Sultan Abd al-Hamid II also sought to regulate charitable lotteries during the same period, and the involvement of non-Muslim communities in gambling necessitated a degree of flexibility in the application of Islamic religious injunctions against

As with the Ottoman example, popular gambling in Cairo, especially when connected to charitable works and foreign privilege, raised political questions about government responsibilities towards public morality.

**Wandering among the Cafés: Itinerant Peddlers and Gamesmen**

Sellers of sundries, particularly nuts, newspapers, and cigarettes, circulated among the cafés and coffee shops. The goods they offered could be obtained easily throughout the city, but enterprising salesmen from the lower classes opted to bring the products to the consumer directly. These mobile salesmen made a profit by charging more than the retail price of their goods, and the café customer enjoyed the convenience of having their periodical or salty snack of choice delivered to their seat. To distinguish themselves from their competitors, to enliven their workday, or to take the chance to make a tidy profit, some roaming peddlers offered games of chances with café and coffee shop customers. Observers of Cairene café culture reported the popularity of smoking the water pipe, drinking coffee, listening to Arabic music, and playing “dice with the hawkers who pass from café to café, dice-box in hand to play you for their wares—ducks and fowls, scents and soaps, brushes and combs and writing paper, and the like.”

Playing dice for small stakes or portable consumer goods was not limited to the hotel district of downtown Cairo, but also popular among the residents of the

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374 “European Life in Egypt,” *The eclectic magazine of foreign literature, science, and art* 37.1 (1883), 132.
'native quarters.' The conservative Rashid Rida, editor of the influential Arabic periodical *al-Manār*, complained that the love of gambling in Egypt had spread to even the common man, “the sellers of pistachios” who would grab a handful of nuts and ask their customers to guess “odd or even.” If the customers guessed correctly, they won the nuts for free; if they guessed incorrectly, they had to pay double the price. Unlike roulette, dice, or card games, gambling on pistachios appeared safe from the specter of cheating, save for those dexterous adepts at sleight of hand who could make a pistachio disappear from the palm of their hand. The simplicity and apparent soundness of the game explain, in part, the popularity of such simple games among the urban population of Cairo. The line between roaming merchant and purveyor of games of chance was indistinct, as such figures were a common feature of café life across Cairo.

**Another Game for the Popular Classes: The Growth of Lotteries**

While the individual gamesman could escape the notice of the state, organized gaming operations, such as lotteries, became popular with the lower classes and concerned both the Egyptian government and social critics. Most salesmen of lottery tickets were from the poorer classes: individuals who could not afford to establish a fixed store took their wares in their arms and went out in search of customers. Customers of the cafés, bars, and restaurants comprised a major share of the intended market, but public markets were also a site to lure customers. The low cost of tickets

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375 William McMahon, *A journey with the sun around the world* (Cleveland: Catholic Universe Publishing Co., 1900), 189.
376 “al-Qimār fī al-Kubār wa al-Ṣughār (Gambling among the Great and the Lowly)” *al-Manār*, October 5, 1900, 527.
and the attractive prospect of winning a proportionally sizeable sum tempted many lower and middle class customers to try their luck. While cash prizes were popular, lottery salesmen also sought to entice customers by parading livestock or slaughtered animals through the streets and proclaiming the excellent odds of their game. As many of the Egyptian poor could not afford to eat meat on a daily basis, the chance of bringing home huge quantities of meat held a strong allure. The owner of the livestock stood to make a significant profit selling lottery tickets rather than competing with butchers, fishmongers, and poultry purveyors. The positive response to lotteries and other games of chance among the poor and lower classes came to the notice of Egyptian authorities and moralizers.

The sellers of lottery-tickets did not limit their appeal to pure greed or physical appetites, but they also appealed to the charitable nature of the Egyptian and European café-dwellers, bar patrons, tourists, and market-goers. Through the invocation of worthy causes and low participation costs, the lottery-seller could induce an individual who normally would never enter a casino, play cards, or wager on sports to gamble. Lotteries were declaimed to be for the assistance of orphans, widows, the sick, and the building of religious institutions. In the late nineteenth century, various charities, many religious in character, arose to help ameliorate some of the more glaring social ills, such as orphans and widows. Many of these charities operated lotteries to fund their programs, and the holding of lotteries had proved to be a successful method to raise funds, particularly among the Italian Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Maltese
The American Mission did not engage in lotteries, given that the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States declared lotteries to be “immoral in their nature and ruinous in their effects upon individual character and the public welfare.” The conservative Protestant missionaries were joined in their condemnation of lotteries and gambling in general by Muslim Egyptian luminaries from the religious establishment. Despite the opprobrium of these voices, lotteries continued to fund social services that the state did not provide. As the state was not willing to spend state monies or increase taxation to spend on social services, much of the burden of caring for the vulnerable elements of society fell upon nascent charities, which increasingly relied upon lotteries to fund these projects.

**State and Societal Condemnation of the Itinerant Gamesmen**

The increase in the number of charitable lotteries was a boon to the itinerant gamesmen, who added lottery tickets to their limited wares. In the early 1890s, the state responded to the proliferation of wandering gamers in the public areas of Cairo. The Egyptian government issued the first two vagrancy (mutasharriq) laws in 1891 and 1894, which defined tramps as the homeless, beggars capable of work, and “those who seek to win their livelihood through gambling and astrology.” The second clause spelled out the punishment for those vagrants found guilty of being gamblers or astrologers: imprisonment for fifteen to forty-five days. The lack of a fine for this infraction, a misdemeanor, suggests that the state did not impose a levy it did not expect to receive.

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377 *The Presbyterian Digest of 1898* (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Church of the United States, 1898), 616.
378 The two vagrancy laws of the early 1890s were issued on July 13, 1891 and February 13, 1894. *Majmūʿat al-Qawānin al-Juzʿ al-Thāni* (al-Qāhirah: 1911)
given the tight financial straits of the criminal. For those Egyptians without capital like itinerant gamesmen and other ‘vagrants,’ the state could only take time from the lives of the offending subjects.

Individuals were considered automatically suspect vagrants if they had been previously convicted of theft or fraud. Similarly, anyone under police surveillance for a felony or misdemeanor was listed as a suspect vagrant in Egyptian law. The wide legal definition of vagrancy included former thieves, gamblers, and suspects in ongoing legal proceedings. In a further effort to limit the activities of vagrants, the law stipulated that anyone convicted previously for vagrancy and found roaming at night could be thrown into jail for up to a month and a half. As per the eighth clause, anyone convicted of a vagrancy law violation was placed under police surveillance upon release for a minimum of one year and up to three. The power accorded to the police to track known itinerant gamblers still necessitated the tiresome job of trailing individuals who actively sought to avoid detection by the state. Following the passage of these vagrancy laws, the lives of itinerant gamesmen became further complicated by the need for evasion from state agents.

Driven by economic need or persuasion, these peripatetic gamblers continued to sell illegal lottery tickets of unknown veracity and play the simple odds of odd or even on the number of pistachios in a palm. Rashid Rida, the influential editor of the leading religious Arabic-language periodical *al-Manār*, responded to the spread of lotteries. In its question and answer section, a reader wrote the newspaper asking for the religious
scholars to explain what a lottery was, having not encountered one in person. As to whether or not buying a ticket by a Muslim was religiously acceptable under Islamic law, the answer was unequivocal. The scholar declared lotteries to be a form of gambling, “which is forbidden as is known.” 379 The scholar explained to the uninitiated how a lottery worked, describing the anxious anticipation of the lottery ticket holder at the moment of selection of the winning ticket, the holder of which stood to win big after buying a cheap ticket while sitting at a cafe. The religious scholar found particular fault with the fact that an individual participant in the lottery stood to earn more money than originally invested in the ticket. The basic fact that a gambler stood to acquire an unearned monetary gain remained at the heart of religious injunction of gambling. Conservative Muslim Egyptians did not move from their moral condemnation of lotteries: there was not a debate to be held, for the Muslim religious establishment was universal in its disapprobation of gambling.

The issue of vagabonds engaging in public gambling in cafes continued to rankle the police, as well as social critics of the public sphere. The November 4, 1900 edition of al-Manār noted with approval recent changes in the penal law for vagrants, especially those assorted gamblers, professional fortune-telling swindlers, and the proclamations of lotteries in public streets and places.380 To the state and conservative of Cairo, the mobile gamer was not recognized as a legitimate profession but as a public nuisance

380 al-Manar. 3.26. Nov. 4, 1900, 621-623. Rida offered commentary on the piece of legislation no. 115, which was announced by the central governmental on October 23, 1900.
that threatened public order and had to be removed. Legislators and social critics grouped simple game makers with all manner of the destitute, from alms-seeking beggars to the lowest group in the hierarchy of vagabonds: the collectors of cigarette butts, often the children of the poorest elements in Cairene society. The public presence of the poor roaming the streets in search of a few millemes was painted by the governmental and societal authorities as shameful nuisance to be eradicated.

**The Emergence of State Regulated Charitable Lotteries**

From the viewpoint of the customer and the government, a chief criticism of lotteries was the question of the legitimacy of a given contest. In an ideal and unlikely situation, customers could learn the number of tickets available for sale and thus calculate the odds of winning before making an informed decision. Those lotteries purported to benefit a charity or altruistic cause could have been dishonest, trading on the good name of a worthwhile charity, or perhaps only donated a small token to the charity in question while keeping the lion’s share of the proceeds for the lottery-maker. Any enterprising individual with access to a printing press could print out tickets and dangle tantalizing prizes for the eventual winner without any intention of actually holding a lottery. Lotteries could easily be fixed, with a friend of the lottery-maker being declared the winner. With limited supervision or control, the lottery-makers and their agents in the streets continued their trade.
The Egyptian government responded to the spread of lotteries by issuing a law on March 7, 1905 in an attempt to rein in fraudsters and regulate legitimate lotteries. Rather than banning lotteries altogether, the government sought to regulate them by requiring individuals wishing to operate a lottery to seek approval from the Ministry of the Interior. To curtail both Egyptian and European participation in lotteries, the law was recognized by both the Mixed Courts and the native courts. Lottery-makers, sellers of tickets in public establishments, promoters who travelled with live or dead animals, and publishers of notices in the press advertising their lottery needed a governmental license. The government also mandated that the drawing of the winning number be random to prevent manipulation. First-time offenders could be punished by a fine of up to one hundred piastres. Repeat offenders could be imprisoned for up to one week, and the tickets and material of the lottery could be confiscated. It was unlikely that illiterate and vulnerable individuals who struggled to make a living by selling lottery tickets would go through the process of securing an official license from the ministry of the interior.

The passage of the first law on lotteries was welcomed by conservative elements within Cairene society. The American reformers of the World’s Woman’s Christian Temperance Union noted that lotteries heretofore had been a ‘grave scandal.’ Following the declaration of the 1905 lotteries law, various charities applied for permission from the Egyptian government. After securing the appropriate licensing,

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these altruistic organizations employed local agents to conduct the lotteries. These sub-
contractors, however, were not all honest, and complaints of malfeasance reached the 
Residency. In one of his final annual reports to British Parliament on the administration 
of Egypt, Lord Cromer discussed at length the issue of lotteries and noted with 
approval the passage by the of recent legislation, writing:

The existence of public lotteries was for long a grave scandal in Egypt. The 
individuals who were engaged in the sale of the tickets usually averred that their 
object was to benefit some charitable society. As a matter of fact, they almost 
always realized considerable profits themselves. Their operations were not in 
any way controlled by the police. They were generally foreign subjects, who, 
under the protection afforded by the Capitulations, carried on a business which 
in many other countries is absolutely forbidden.  

As with gaming dens, Lord Cromer blamed the spread of lotteries on foreigners. By 
highlighting the supposed greed of a minority rather than on the economic needs of the 
Egyptian urban poor, Lord Cromer shifted the attention from why lotteries should have 
become popular and what social function they served.

After the departure of Lord Cromer from Egypt, his successor as Consul-General, 
Eldon Gorst, acted to rein in charitable lotteries. In a letter to the British Foreign 
Minister, Sir Edward Grey, Eldon Gorst explained that the government was forced to 
act “with a view to protecting the public from irregularities and abuses which had been 
discovered in the working of certain of these lotteries.”  

On February 7, 1909, the 
Egyptian government issued a circular to those charities that employed lotteries as 

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means of fund-raising. This circular instructed charities to take more direct
management of lotteries. A delegate from the government was to be present at the
drawing of the lots to determine the winner, and the official was to sign a written
account of the proceedings. Every three months these charities were told to submit an
account of their lotteries to the government. The records of these registered charitable
lotteries during this period have not been located, so an evaluation of the scale of the
operation and number of participants is impossible. In the following chapter, sources
on the registration of charities and police activity provide a more comprehensive
picture of the scope of these itinerant salesmen.

Itinerant salesmen, many of whom sold lottery tickets and engaged in simple
games of chance with customers in cafes and markets, had become commonplace by the
start of World War I. These men’s willingness to take the monetary risks of gambling
on something as simple as pistachios despite their limited capital struck social observers
as a symptom of the prevailing moral corruption of the Egyptian people. Unregulated
lotteries proliferated, but the lack of effective legislation and adequate resources meant
that the police were powerless to arrest the movement of these unlicensed mobile
gamesmen. These itinerant salesmen established a niche in the market of entertainment
and leisure and became a feature of public life in Cairo despite police attention and
disapproval among conservative elements within Egyptian society.

Conclusion
With the flash and seductive glamour of casino gambling extinguished, the game merely moved behind the closed door where men freely gathered to gamble outside the gaze of the state. The struggle against illegal gaming establishments continued throughout the British occupation of Egypt. The state was never able to eradicate betting on cards or roulette, despite a vigilant police force. Once gambling reached the masses through simple games of chances and lotteries, the war on gambling was lost. Reflecting on the near impossibility of his battle against, Lord Cromer commented:

I am aware that some persons are of opinion that, as no Government would care to embark on the quixotic attempt to put a stop to all gambling, it is useless to interfere at all, and that, therefore, the campaign conducted against gambling establishments in Egypt had better be abandoned. I am unable to share this view. It is perfectly true that so long as gamblers exist they will generally find some means of gambling, even though they have to frequent establishments where there is no very sure guarantee that the play is conducted fairly. But it is equally true that facilities for gambling make gamblers, and not infrequently contribute to the ruin of casual spectators, who are not habitual gamblers.\(^{385}\)

The hopelessness of stopping man's confirmed predilection to risk money at games of chance did not deter Cromer. The closing argument of Cromer is spurious in light of the reality of casino style gambling in Cairo, but apt when applied to the cases of horse racing and lotteries and wandering pistachio vendors. Following the criminalization of casino-style gaming, police pressure forced illegal gambling operations to be extremely circumspect in their day-to-day business. Elaborate security precautions sought to prevent unknown individuals gaining entry from off the street. Unlike the 1880s when

manifold gambling temptations lined the streets of downtown Cairo, the discrete private apartment with gaming facilities—whether crooked or honest—could hardly have a pervasive negative effect on Egyptian society. Cairo society, however, became habituated to the presence of gambling. The wealthy took to the pageantry and conspicuous consumption of racing, and the public enjoyed less formal and organized games of chance, such as lotteries and guessing odd-or-even for a handful of nuts. The innocuous and ever present mobile gamesman became a tolerated feature of public life in Cairo, despite official disapproval. Cromer was correct, however, in acknowledging the ultimate futility of the state’s war on gambling.

The Egyptian state could not be everywhere, and ingenious gamblers took their games to the people. The expansion of legal powers over public spaces, and more importantly the activities of the entire population therein, assumed by the government of the occupation were impressive on paper. But there could never be enough boots on the ground, or more aptly, eyes on Cairo's market of pleasure. Criminalizing gambling and establishing a licensing process for public establishments, clubs, and charitable lotteries demanded the herculean of the Cairo police force. Declaring crimes against morality to be a matter of public policy opened the doors to persistent criticism that the state was not fulfilling its responsibilities to bring comprehensive progress to Egypt.

It is not surprising that the imperial state floundered in its battle against the basic human appetite for excitement and profit. If the British occupation could not prevent its own military and administrators, who were comparatively few in number, not to
gamble, how could it hope to stop the general public from doing likewise? The elite, both European and Egyptian, fought to selectively privatize urban spaces previously designated as public to partake in lucrative gambling. The state acceded to this closing off public spaces except to a select European and Egyptian elite. When dealing with the gambling habits of non-elite members, the imperial government pursued a policy that forcibly ‘publicized’ gambling establishments that catered to the middle and lower classes in order to shut them down. For all of the British and American complaints about the predations wrought upon Egyptian society by the capitulations, the members of the private clubs were equally guilty of circumventing local laws for their own material benefit and enjoyment. The justification for this turn centered upon the supposed fairness of play, which the British alone had the power to determine. The hypocrisy inherent in British and elite Egyptian attitudes towards the leisure activities of everyone except for their group only worsened as the occupation continued.
Chapter IV: The Regulation of Gambling and Elite Privilege, 1914-1949

This chapter examines gambling in Cairo from 1914-1949 to explore how power over public space and behavior was contested between state and society. I highlight several continuities with the previous chapter, including elite defense of privilege, limits of state power, and the continual contestation of governmental restrictions. In a break from the imperial period, I investigate how national politics invaded public space and socialization patterns related to gambling. The two main processes under study are commercialization and politicalization of gambling, which reveal how boundaries established by the state and society remained open to manipulation.

From the start of World War I, the practical distinction between licensed, approved forms of gambling and prohibited gaming in Egypt blurred. The gap between legislation and enforcement continued to widen. In its engagement with the various forms of gambling, government intervention rarely produced the desired results, and state attempts to control gambling failed both in criminalization and regulation. In the struggle to contain prohibited forms of gambling, the project of monitoring all public spaces in Cairo was too large for the police to handle. Beyond the limitations of coercive power as a deterrence, I illustrate how the licensing of gaming depended upon self-regulation, which collapsed under economic interest and competition from unlicensed operators. I also reveal how selective criminalization and governmental regulation defended privilege. A licensing scheme failed to stop illegal off-track gambling at turf agencies, which continued to operate with the government's
knowledge. Savvy gamesmen adopted the language of elite and declared their establishments to be private clubs where they could wager on cards with impunity. Stymied in the fight against elite and middle-class gambling, the police turned to the gaming practices of the masses. Poor itinerant gamesmen selling unlicensed lottery tickets or offering simple odd-or-even games became a new target, but the police again could do little.

While the state floundered, social critics in Egypt noted with regret the gradual process by which gamesmen proliferated among all the public spaces of Cairo. Conservative Egyptians, particularly the Muslim Brothers, railed against state endorsed gambling with minimal success. Yet, the people of Cairo continued to risk their money for thrills and profit in spite, or partly because of, governmental and societal prohibition. I show how Egyptians became habituated to, at least the presence of gambling, if not to the active participation and enjoyment of simple games of chance.

I. A Dwindling Monopoly: Racing, Old Elites, and Commercialization 1914-1949

As the previous chapter has shown, the horse-racing track in Cairo prior to World War I was the primary site of regular socialization that brought the British administrative and military community together with Egyptian elite. I track how the transformation of racing from an elite pastime to a commercial sport with significant capital at risk initiated a struggle to monopolize gambling revenue. In detailing how political and economic elites in Cairo conspired to profit from legal and illegal wagering on racehorses, I argue that horse racing is emblematic of the hypocrisy that girded the
late imperial project. Egyptian and British elites gambled with impunity, while the state focused its coercive powers on controlling the gambling habits of the middle class, and increasingly, the lower classes.386 I explore how changes in the political relationship between Great Britain and Egypt reverberated among the racing community and then illustrate how the racetrack became a site for inter-elite conflict along national lines. As Egyptian membership of the exclusive sporting clubs expanded, British race stewards sought to reassert their authority in the colonial enclave via the racetrack.

I begin with an exploration of repeated scandals, on and off the course, which played out on the pages of the international press and were ruminated over in Cairo’s clubs, taverns, and cafes. How did the racing community and its supporters within the elite manage the response to accusations of criminal activity? I establish that gambling on horse racing spilled out of the Turf Club and the tracks onto the streets of Cairo in the form of illegal turf agencies. Despite its public fight against the influence of gaming when operated by non-elite actors, the state became knowingly complicit in legal and illegal gaming schemes. This section reveals that high-ranking officials, both Egyptian and British, openly acknowledged repeated violations of the gambling law by the racing community. I argue that self-regulation, whereby privileged elites were trusted by the state to manage their own affairs, proved to be a chimera. The racing community

386 Dirks has analyzed the ways in which scandalous behavior by the British colonizers in India spurred British rulers to focus on controlling the behavior of the colonized Indians. This section invokes analogous themes whereby the Egyptian state could not regulate, or was not willing to do so, the behavior of British and Egyptian elites. Nicholas Dirks, The scandal of empire: India and the creation of imperial Britain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006)
proved incapable and unwilling to police the behavior of any of its members or its support staff. To further illustrate the inability of elites connected to racing to control the behavior of their small community, I detail how the small group of professionals associated with racing, trainers and jockeys, became known for their drunkenness and loutish behavior. Despite the proven inability of the elite to self-police, the racing community still enjoyed the state-sanctioned monopoly on gambling, which demonstrates the inherent inequality of the political system under imperial occupation.

In the expansion of racing's popularity, the unfamiliar faces thronged the grandstand, and the formerly insular ranks of the owners were not unanimous in welcoming these new race fans. The new popularity of races was accompanied by a reassertion of authority by British members and racing officials. Pushed aside from their place of prominence and finding few friends among the new leadership of the racing Clubs, indignant Egyptian notables and owners complained about the state of racing and turned inward in a valorization of their own traditions. With royal encouragement, the quasi-independent Egyptian state invested in developing national stables, and the Egypt-bred, pure Arabian was raised up as a point of national pride. But not all Egyptians shared the royal passion for horse breeding, government patronage of Arabians and gambling on horses met with stern criticism from conservative Egyptians, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood.

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387 The nationalization of horse breeds, particularly English thoroughbreds, has been deconstructed by Huggins. Mike Huggins, *Horseracing and the British 1919-1939* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004)
Taking the Khedive out of the Khedivial Sporting Club: Word War I

As discussed in Chapter 2, the declaration of war by the Ottoman Empire on November 11, 1914 forced the British to define finally the position of Egypt within the imperial order. With British troops thick on the ground, Great Britain severed Egypt’s symbolic ties with the Ottoman Empire and declared Egypt an official part of the British Empire as a protectorate as an 'independent' sultanate on December 18, 1914. In light of the Khedive's perceived anti-British attitudes and accusations of collusion with German authorities in league with the Young Turks, Kitchener forced Abbas Hilmi II to abdicate power in favor of his uncle, Hussein, who was named Sultan. Exiled from Egypt, the eponymous patron of the Khedivial Sporting Club lost his throne and his racecourse.388 The club was renamed as Gezira Sporting Club, a more neutral name referring to the name of island on which the club stood. With the loss of two titans of racing in the race-loving British consul Gorst and the Egyptian Khedive Abbas Hilmi, British officers assumed authority over the races. Rule by this insular officer corps was to short-lived, however, as the coming war washed away the old order on the track.

Over the course of World War I, tens of thousands of British imperial troops from across the British Isles, rowdy Australians and New Zealanders, and South Asians

388 In his popular history, Peter Mansfield wrote of Kitchener’s policies towards Egyptian membership in the K.S.C.: “He did take fairly ruthless action to force the Egyptian members to resign from the famous Gezira Club, but this was not out of any belief in social ‘apartheid’ but because of complaints that members of the Khedive’s circle were using the club to express anti-British opinions.” It is unclear what sources Mansfield used in making claims about ejecting all Egyptians from the K.S.C., but it is clear that Egyptian nobility were members before, during, and after Kitchener’s time in Egypt. Peter Mansfield, The British in Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 195.
came to Cairo. The massive influx of soldiers with money in their pockets filled the cashboxes of operators of places of diversion, including the races and betting shops. The martial roots of horsemanship took center stage as an entirely new field of horses, trainers, and riders entered the race lists. While the British troops differed in custom, class, religion, and country of origin, they were all familiar with horse racing. The newly arrived officers quickly took to the institution of weekly races as an opportunity to display their prowess in horsemanship and alacrity with betting lines. However, these new arrivals had different attitudes to Egyptian participation in the races and overturned the established protocols of behavior on the racetrack and in the grandstand. With martial law in effect across Egypt, the military element came to dominate life within the sporting club in an unprecedented fashion.

Despite its popularity among the troops, racing was not immune from the pressures of war. Several weeks after the successful defense of the Suez Canal against Ottoman forces in February 1915, wounded and newly arrived troops thronged Cairo. Space was at a premium. Already several hotels had been converted to military use as hospitals or accommodation. From March 1915, the racecourse in Heliopolis was allocated to the East Lancashire Brigade.389 The loss of the second track in the suburbs restored the monopoly on racing to the Gezira Club. With only one racetrack to serve the heavily expanded customer base of racing fans, the Gezira Club stood to make considerable profits. Martin Briggs, who was stationed in Cairo for six months in 1917,

observed differences in leisure patterns among the soldiers: "the favourite for officers is the Gezireh Sporting Club...while other ranks mainly patronise the Ezbekiyeh Gardens with their fine trees, restaurants, band, and Y.M.C.A."\textsuperscript{390} Large numbers of enlisted men elected to explore the sights and attractions of downtown Cairo with its hotels, bars, and brothels. As most of the regular military men were not from the elite, they were not passionate about the sportive diversions available at the Gezira Club, namely golf, tennis, polo, and a genteel club-life. The rank-and-file filled their leisure hours with carousing and playing tourist away from the eyes of their superiors. Yet on race days, the enlisted men joined the officers in the grandstand to gamble and cheer side by side. For the men of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division camped atop the racecourse in Heliopolis, "the race meetings at Gezireh Island provided many dinners at the Continental and Shepheard's for the winners."\textsuperscript{391} For the lucky winners, gambling on horses opened doors to socializing at expensive locales and partaking in conspicuous consumption. The field of horses and jockeys swelled, as the numbers in the grandstands and on the bookies' tickets rose ever higher. 

In the face of such diversity and overwhelming numbers at the races, the authority of the classification committee of the Jockey Club eroded. The new arrivals in the British military had the benefit of numbers and began to organize races as they saw fit. The influx of so many new horses owned by strangers to Cairo threw the old classification system into chaos and shattered the intimate world of race horning of

\textsuperscript{390} Martin Briggs, \textit{Through Egypt in war-time} (London: T. F. Unwin, 1918), 26.
\textsuperscript{391} Gibbon, \textit{The 42nd (East Lancashire) Division}, 11.
Gorst and Abbas Hilmi II. Though the Jockey Club reigned, it no longer ruled racing in Egypt. The swollen market for betting on horses supported more bookmakers, who operated outside the control of the police or the club authorities. Higher stakes invited meant greater temptation for the dishonest: cheating, that bane of fair play which plagued other forms of gambling in Cairo, had finally come to the racecourse. The classification system became corrupt: those responsible for classification were imbricated with the business side of racing and thus lost their independence and impartiality.\textsuperscript{392} Suspicions and disputes over classification threatened to destroy the tranquility and profitability of the races. Without reform, horse racing in Egypt risked degenerating into yet another crooked game of chance where the unaware lost their money on fixed contests.

Recognizing the impotency of the sitting Jockey Club, British officers took the momentous decision to reorganize the Jockey Club in the final year of the Great War. At a meeting of race stewards and members of the Gezireh and Heliopolis clubs, it was agreed to re-establish the authority of the Jockey Club. These officers sought to resume control over the races and classification of horses as they had done in prewar days, and they sought the approval of the British high command for their power play. In a letter dated August 10, 1918 from Brigadier General Sir George Macauley to the British High Commissioner, General Reginald Wingate, Macauley proposed to "reconstitute" the Jockey Club with the supreme British military officer to serve as Vice-Patron. In a nod

to the fiction of Egyptian authority, the Sultan would be invited to serve as patron and Prince Omar Toussoun as President. The authority of the current Jockey Club had waned considerably under the pressures of the war: General Macauley observed "The present position of the Jockey Club when any club can disregard its decision is of course unsatisfactory." In his reply, High Commissioner Wingate noted that from what he had heard about the state of racing in Egypt, a reorganization of the Jockey Club would be "very desirable." Macauley's solution was simple: "The first thing is to get the Jockey Club made all powerful, there is so much money in racing now that a very much stronger control is needed over many things connected with it." Macauley's logic is telling: the increase in the stakes necessitated responsible guidance. Shortly after word of Macauley's plans spread, a representative of G.H.Q. paid him a visit and warned off his plans. The relationship between the powers of the British occupation and the Egyptian political class was already strained under pressures of the war and the uncertain future of the country.

As divisions arose between the British and Egyptian supporters of the horse racing, the races added to the growing alienation between Egyptian nationalists and notables. The popularity of the races with the Egyptian nobility and their familiarity with the race set did not escape the notice of nationalists in 1919. The disconnect between the lives of the Egyptian nobility and the masses was made evident in a

393 "Copy of a letter from General Sir George Macauley to the High Commissioner; dated Cairo 10/8/18" in FO 141/786. National Archives, London.
395 Ibid.
critique leveled at the Egyptian elite by a nationalist group, the Urgent Committee. During the agitation to boycott the Milner commission, secret and largely anonymous groups, such as the infamous Black Hand, threatened violence against Egyptians who met with the British. 396 Like many ardent nationalists, the Urgent Committee rejected any cooperation with the Milner Mission, which arrived in Cairo in December 1919 to investigate the disturbances. In a declaration entitled “Our British Enemies and Ourselves Concerning Milner’s Proclamation,” the Urgent Committee singled out those Egyptians who collaborated and socialized with the British imperialists. The Urgent Committee rhetorically questioned the Egyptian elite as to why they had not secured independence from imperial rule:

Is it because you are more honest than they, or is it because of cold-bloodedness and inactivity on your part, or because you are occupied with amusements, games, cotton trading, Bourse, and horse-races? 397

The Egyptian 1919 revolution politicized public socialization with the British, including around the racetrack. With the rise of nationalism, the popular effort to separate Egypt from Great Britain politically carried over into an enforced social separation: those who continued to attend mixed events like the races ran the risk of being accused of collaboration.


Until the unrest of 1919, the microcosm of elite club life that revolved around horse racing had escaped popular censure. The failure of the horse-loving Egyptian notables to secure the demands of the nationalists made them vulnerable to criticism, and their passion for racing was an easy target. At such a time of heightened tensions, the nationalists condemned any interaction with agents of the British Empire. The races had long brought Egyptian elites into close contact with British imperialists, but the political realities of occupation upset the idyll of the racecourse. Once war came to Cairo, the sheer numbers of British officers at races reordered the delicate relationship between the occupiers and the occupied at the paddock as they had on a national level.

The Struggle to Restore Fair Play: State Regulation of Racing 1919-1922

Horse racing in Egypt at the end of the Great War reached new levels of popularity, especially with the British imperial soldiers. But the Jockey Club, which had organized races and served as the arbiters of horse classification in Cairo for decades, had lost control over the races. For the old guard who remembered the intimate days of prewar racing, there were too many races without clear controls on the rules of the track. Suggestions from the highest cadre of British officers to reconstitute the Jockey Club and restore the body to its former authority were rebuffed by British officials. For those concerned over racing ethics, the lack of a central authority to administer the races led to a noticeable and lamented decrease in the quality of competitions on the course. Greater interest in racing brought with it an increase in wagering, which in turn encouraged the unscrupulous. Betting scandals demanded
government intervention thereby ending decades of self-policing among the racing community.

The delayed demobilization of troops during the chaotic, violent period following the end of World War I added to tensions in the Egyptian capital. Despite increased security, the targeted assassinations of Egyptian politicians and British residents from 1919-1923 tainted the races with a pall of fear and unease. With violence in the streets, the race stewards were under added pressure to put on a good show, but they chose to emphasize quantity over quality. The race stewards no longer imposed strict limits as to who could participate in the races. With the experienced judges of the Jockey Club supplanted by men with different standards regarding the importance of lineage, the field of entrants expanded to include a wider variety of horses. *The Sphinx*, one of more popular English language weekly newspapers in Cairo, published a regular column on racing complete with picks from its anonymous racing-expert 'Sirdar.'

Remarking on the deterioration in the quality of the competition after a particularly poor race meeting, the racing columnist in *The Sphinx* declared “…it was palpable to the merest amateur that 20 per cent. of the Derby entrants could not hope to compete successfully, unless 20 per cent. of the other horses fell down.” Inequalities in prowess on the track reinforced the perception that classification standards had become less stringent following the war.

\[398\] Sirdar was the Ottoman name given to the British military commander in Egypt. The choice of the pseudonym “Sirdar” is telling for its invocation of the authority of the British officer corps.

Different understandings of what constituted fair play by challenged the orderly adherence to established rules on the track. For Sirdar and the racing set, the decline in the robustness of the mounts was matched by deterioration in the jockeys’ performance and allegations of cheating. The mixture of amateur and professional jockeys made for great disparities on the course. Amateurs did not always play by the rules as understood by members of long-standing, and complaints of poor form and “malicious and deliberate” closing in on other riders caused much consternation among bettors and spectators. Such behavior incensed the attendees, including the race correspondent for *The Sphinx*. Sirdar excoriated the ugliness on the track, writing:

> The prizes attending interference are too great for a brief suspension to prove a real deterrent. If an ordinary member of the public steals L.E. 100 or more from another, he has time to ruminate about it in jail. Interference is tantamount to theft, and the stewards should appraise it accordingly. They will have the public opinion strongly behind them.\(^{400}\)

Beyond approving non-competitive horses and inexperienced jockeys, the stewards culpability worsened by permitting the tainted results to stand. What had been the playground of elite hobbyists and a small pool of experienced jockeys and trainers had given way to amateurs who did not follow the rules of the club and course. The continued lack of authority by the Jockey Club stewards coupled with racing’s capitalization threatened the order of the track.

Despite public concerns about the quality of the riding around the track, horse racing had become a big business that was no longer the sole purview of a limited

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number of British elites and Egyptian notables. The ebb and flow of the ante-post betting was the source of much conversation and speculation as bettors sought to turn the latest information regarding the field into profit at the bookmakers. The old guard of the racing world criticized the inexperienced bettors for investing significant amounts of time into making supposedly educated bets.401 As the amounts being wagered increased, more and more individuals became involved with the sport. Horse racing was by no means a sport accessible to all: only the wealthy could open and operate a racing stable. The costs were significant: purchasing the horse, paying for stable charges, training, and a jockey were beyond the means of most of Cairo’s population. Those of lesser means could pool their resources and jointly purchase horses. Owners could also purchase insurance policies for their horses to insulate themselves from potential losses if an animal was injured, fell ill, or had to be euthanized.402 The injection of ever rising amounts of capital into the formerly small world of club racing reshaped the economy of horse racing. The considerable sums involved in racing invited intervention by the government.

The Popularization of Betting on Racing and International Scandals

401 “...many of the best business men in Egypt are lovers of the royal sport of horse-racing. For perhaps two weeks in succession they see a certain horse running well. A big race is approaching. They hear, from friends who have inside knowledge, that this horse, in his training gallops, is making excellent time over the distance, is well, and is liking his work. They see the weight allotted by the handicapper, and they consider that, all circumstances considered, the horse has every chance of winning. Accordingly they invest their money on him for the race. There is no certainty that he will win, but the portents infer that he is the likely winner. If they would apply the same constructive consideration to the commercial future of this country, they would now be considering developments instead of allowing their organisation to remain stagnant.” The Sphinx, January 21, 1922, 378.

Standards on the race course were not the only arena where established social practices changed. Betting moved out of the rarefied airs of the Turf and Sporting Clubs and onto the streets of Cairo. Unlicensed betting shops thrived, and not all the new operators followed the same moral code of the old guard at the Club. The nineteenth-century ideal, whereby betting on horses was governed by gentleman's code of honor, gave way before economic interest. The evolution of gambling on horse racing in Cairo reflects similar patterns across the British Empire and in the United Kingdom. In Great Britain in nineteenth century, betting moved from gentlemanly wager to professional bookie, and gambling rose across classes.403 The elite wagered on track, while the lower classes off-track. In Cairo as elsewhere, the enormity of the stakes wagered at each race meeting tempted dishonest operators who took bets but did not pay the winners. As more off-track betting shops opened, competition for wagers drove agents to offer increasingly attractive odds. Knowledge of a horse's lineage and past performances did not shield the turf agent from the vicissitudes of chance. The turf agent could not control all the variables of a race to his advantage. When luck favored the bettor, those turf agencies who had been improvident in their determination of the odds suffered. If a turf agency refused to honor winning bets, the cheated bettor was left with little recourse. If the wronged bettors were of the martial sort, the situation invited violence. Not all those cheated by risk-taking turf agents

resorted to physical confrontation: some used the power of the press to make their claims.

In early 1922, a scandal about crooked gambling on horses in Cairo broke in the pages of the American weekly *The Sporting News*. The story spoke of “turf agencies” spreading across Cairo. The reaction of racing aficionados in Cairo was swift. *The Sphinx* quickly picked up the story and called for immediate government action. Even the mere accusation of dishonesty made in a foreign newspaper threatened the livelihood of everyone connected to racing in Egypt. A scandal of this magnitude threatened to tarnish the honor of the entire racing community, British and Egyptian alike. The speed and strength of the response in Egypt testified to the gravity of impugning the neutrality of the races. *The Sphinx* demanded an official investigation, while defending the right to gamble on horse racing. The journalists wanted betting off the streets and back into the Clubs, where wagering could be controlled and the profits steered towards the Club. *The Sphinx* argued that bookmakers should be allowed to operate freely on the premises of the racing clubs, only after payment of fees which would help the clubs struggling in the postwar economic difficulties. To ensure fair play, *The Sphinx* suggested that these onsite bookmakers should be required to deposit a ‘substantial sum’ with the club in an attempt to prevent ‘welshing,’ that ultimate betrayal of good form where the losing bookmaker refuses to pay out to winning

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Furthermore, official recognition by the government of specific firms would ensure, in Sirdar’s estimation, that the betting public would be able to distinguish reputable firms from those of lesser respectability.

**The Beginnings of State Regulation of Betting on Horses**

In a rare moment of legislative alacrity, the Egyptian government reacted to the scandal of turf agencies by enacting monopolistic regulation of sports betting. Following quite closely the suggestions of the wager-loving sportsmen of *The Sphinx*, the government responded by issuing law No. 4 in April 1922 and ministerial decree No. 10 in May 1922. The law opened strongly by banning all forms of wagering on sports, including horse racing and pigeon shooting. The law defined any sports betting infraction as a contravention, the least serious of legal criminal classifications. Anyone found gambling could be imprisoned up to a week and/or fined up to one hundred piastres. But in light of the scale of bets being placed on horse racing, a fine of up to one hundred piastres was comically low and not likely to deter bookmakers. The new law affected existing public establishment edicts, in which the Egyptian government furthered the self-policing responsibilities of licensed cafe, restaurant, and bar owners. Eager to impress upon owners of public establishments that the

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405 Ibid.
406 A copy of this ministerial decree can be found in the National Archives, London. FO 141/723. An earlier draft of the law from December 1921 can be found at Egyptian national archives, Cairo. Abdin Palace Archives. Ref. 539. Al-Islah al-ijtimayi, (Social Reform). 1913/4/24-1947/6/26.
407 Pigeon shooting had been a popular recreation, particularly among British officers and the considerable number of tourists who hunted birds while visiting Egypt. Gambling regularly accompanied pigeon shooting.
government would not tolerate any infringement of the new law, the government vowed to punish proprietors who allowed customers to gamble on sports within their businesses with fining and/or imprisonment. In the case of recidivist proprietors, the courts were free to close permanently the establishments. In a direct move against off-track turf agencies, the law stipulated that the intermediary bookmakers who thrived in Cairo would no longer be permitted.

Despite its fierce and unequivocal opening, the third clause of the law granted permission to existing associations and individuals already involved in sport wagering to continue their activities. However, this permission was not extended to all actors involved in betting. These "existing associations and individuals" were the bookmakers connected to the racing clubs, rather than the independent, off-track betting shops. The state criminalized a significant portion of the racing economy: no one could serve as an intermediary between the customer and the licensed bookmaker. The bookmakers in the clubs obtained special permission from the Minister of the Interior, who had complete discretion to grant or refuse a license. This schizophrenic stance towards sports betting reflected a continuity in official attitudes, whereby gambling was not to be tolerated unless the party was a trusted member of the socio-political establishment. The state’s endorsement of elite gaming and its criminalization of the popular public gambling codified privilege, but this legal distinction was open to contestation and manipulation.
Under the first law of licensed bookmaking, the state reasserted its status as the primary judge of public morality and couched its justifications for legalized sports gaming in moral terms. First, the law spelled out the various terms of the license. To ‘protect the masses from cheating and swindling,’ the permit to take bets on sports was not transferable to other activities. Applicants were required to specify exactly what type of sport book they wished to operate and clearly spell out the rules of the particular game or sport. In placing the rules of the game on file with the state, applicants ceded authority to the civilian administration to serve as the ultimate judge in case of dispute among participants in a game. The license was valid for two years and renewable, but the license was revocable, in cases related to ‘morality or public order.’

Having enshrined elite gambling, the law went on to delineate the costs of licensing. Those sportsbook agents who did receive a special license from the Minister of the Interior were required under the new law to set aside a portion of their winnings for charity and good works. Bookmakers who specialized in horse racing were to donate that portion “to teaching horse training, physical education, charitable works, the ambulance services, or social services.”408 Like the ethical math with the licensing of charitable lotteries, the government was willing to tolerate gambling on sports as long as the proceeds funded good works. The law did not stipulate the exact amount of the winnings that were to be earmarked for charitable works: it merely stated that a

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408 FO 141/723. National Archives, London.
percentage must be surrendered to the government for subsequent distribution among charities. The government wished to stymie gambling, but not eliminate the practice entirely. Placing a tax on bookmakers’ profits ensured that the state coffers received its tithe through the creation of mechanisms of oversight. Potential moral questions about the wisdom of legitimizing sports betting could be deflected in the name of charity.

The Introduction of the Pari-Mutuel Scheme

To distance itself further from the scandal of dishonest turf agencies while securing tax revenue, the Egyptian state went beyond licensing, adopting tactics that other states had followed in the wake of anti-gambling scandals. The government promoted a new system of wager management in Egypt that was already popular in Great Britain and on the continent: pari-mutuel. Pari-mutuel was touted as a more reliable betting regime and less prone to instability or manipulation. Under the old scheme of fixed-odds betting, the odds for a particular horse shifted constantly. This fluctuation of odds, coupled with rising competition among bookmakers, had a destabilizing effect on the entire betting market that had ended in scandal. Under pari-mutuel, pre-race odds were only fixed with the final bet, which allowed the bookmakers to adjust the odds in line with betting and insulate themselves from risk. In this system, all bets were pooled together before payout. The house took a fixed percentage from

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410 Pari-mutuel was invented by the famous Spanish gambler Oller in the 1860’s. He introduced the system into French racecourses, and the betting system quickly spread across Europe and throughout the empires. Pari-mutuel is still used today in United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.
the sum bets, and the remaining balance was distributed among the winners. In an ideal world, the system of pari-mutuel ensured the security of wagers, bookmakers' profits, and state revenue.

The first permutation of the pari-mutuel in Egypt saw the racing clubs deducting 15% of the gross bets. Of that amount, the Egyptian government took 9%, and the clubs received 6%. By agreeing to give the government sixty percent of all wagers on horses, the club stewards purchased a sanctioned monopoly, which at first glance, appeared to a good deal for all parties. But the licensing of club bookmakers did not eliminate problems within the racing community. Self-regulation among the clubs, the state's partner in the pari-mutuel scheme, would prove to be a chimera, and rumors of cheating and other malfeasance continued to disturb the course. Ostensibly a bulwark of respectability, the clubs tolerated repeated violations of the law by their employees and members.

**National Politics on the Racetrack and Challenges to British authority**

In 1928, a British observer of Anglo-Egyptian social interaction noted in the insularity of the British community in Cairo:

> When the day’s work was done, the Englishman retired to his exclusive recreations of polo, tennis, and golf, in which the Egyptian took not the slightest interest; and the former rather despised the latter for his negative attitude towards these forms of sport. It almost amounts to a national failing that we British find it difficult to live in sympathy with foreigners. We are bad ‘mixers,’ and we make little effort to improve in that respect. We take our sports and

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games with us wherever we go, and that forms the centre of our activity during our leisure hours.⁴¹²

While many elite Egyptians did not take much interest in some British sports and games that could be found at the sporting clubs, they did take great interest in racing.⁴¹³ After the dust settled from the 1919 revolution and Great Britain declared Egypt to be independent, the elites of Cairo resumed pursuing pleasure with great zeal. The racetrack at Heliopolis, which has been converted into a military camp, resumed its original function. Cairo under the monarchy changed at an accelerated pace. During the period 1917-1947, the population of Cairo increased from 790,000 to over two million. The number of British subjects paled proportionally to the Egyptian majority of the capital, particularly as the political relationship between Egypt and Great Britain continued to be negotiated towards the ultimate end of imperial occupation. Just as British imperialists doggedly defended their imperial rule over Egypt, so too did the British community in Cairo cling to their monopolization of authority in their centers of leisure. With the rise of the expanding Egyptian political and economic elite, the British colonial space increasingly became an Egyptian national space.

 Attempts to manage the democratization of inherently exclusionary institutions like the clubs mirror greater trends in the political relationship between colonizer and colonized. The British admitted increasing numbers of Egyptians to elite spaces only

⁴¹³ "Love of sport among the modern Egyptians is somewhat less noticeable, if we except horse-racing, which, affording opportunity for gambling, finds no lack of entries. The best spirit of sport is still found represented by the European—that is to say the British-element." Percy Martin, Egypt—old & new, a popular account of the land of the pharaohs from the traveller's and economist's point of view (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1923), 203.
reluctantly. Magda Baraka, in her work on the lives of upper-class Egyptians between the two world wars, has provided crucial data as to changing elite Egyptian membership in the sporting clubs. Baraka gained access to the previously private membership lists in the sporting clubs, which provided the first quantitative evidence of the scale of Egyptian membership in the British colonial edifice.414 As more British administrators left government service during the gradual shift to Egyptians in the bureaucracy, the clubs expanded its ranks to include Egyptian economic and political elites. Egyptians began to fill the membership lists of the British enclaves, which in turn brought changing modes of elite Egyptian public socialization. In the imperial period, only male Egyptian members attended the events of the Khedivial Sporting Club, a fact much commented upon by Western observers of Cairo’s elite social scene. In the interwar period, Egyptian women began to come to the club, but according to Baraka, Egyptian female members were limited to the royal family.415 While many aspects of the club adapted to reflect the changing political landscape of the country, the racetrack remained a colonial anachronism where British officers of the Jockey Club wielded their authority to defend their privileges and authority.

As the British were forced to cede a measure of political power to the Egyptians following independence, the British reasserted their authority in the community’s conclaves of leisure. This reactive dominance display spilled over into the world of racing. Egyptian racehorse owners with years of experience found themselves on the

414 Baraka found that the number of Egyptian members of the Gezira Club increased from 39 individuals in September 1933 to 98 in August 1938. Baraka, *The Egyptian upper class*, 190-1.
outside in the new power dynamic on the racecourse. The growing alienation between Egyptians and British members of the racing community manifested in several classification scandals, which coalesced along national and generational lines. With such growing alienation in sport dependent on inter-personal trust, established hierarchies and alliances fell away and were replaced by new boundaries and social dynamics. I explore several cases where Egyptians appealed to the British imperial administration to fulfill its publicly assumed role as arbiter of racing disputes. These disputes reveal how national politics divided the racing community, and analyzing these appeals to impartiality shows how profoundly colonial the order in Egypt remained despite independence.

As discussed in the previous chapter, pre-race classification of horses into the categories of pure thoroughbred, country-bred, or pure Arab ensured fairness on the course, but the judgment process was entirely subjective. The decline of the Jockey Club's authority over racing meant each racing club followed its own rules. The new British members of the Jockey Club no longer adhered to established traditions or respected long standing relationships to the detriment of Egyptian owners. In 1928, several complaints were lodged with the British Residency by Egyptian horse breeders who were dissatisfied with the decisions of the Jockey Club. This section investigates three such appeals from Egyptian breeders of racehorses to explore the politicized world of interwar Egypt. In these appeals to the highest British authority, the Egyptian racehorse owners complained of their maltreatment at the hands of the new generation
of British racing stewards. Examining the response of the British administration exposes the self-conscious duplicity of the imperial project.

In the first example from Residency records, Sayed Bey Semaha, a seventy-five year old breeder from Samannoud in Gharbia Province, brought three horses before the classification committee at the Heliopolis racetrack in January 1928. The experienced Egyptian breeder was shocked when the committee declared his horses to be country-bred rather than Arabian. Sayed Bey Semaha had long bred Arabians and developed close ties with members of the British racing community. The rejection of Sayed Bey Semaha’s horse was effectively a rejection of the Egyptian breeder’s word and integrity. To right this wrong, Sayed Bey Semaha requested that the Residency adjudicate the dispute by involving another British subject who could vouch for Sayed Bey Semaha’s pedigree. A long-standing ally of Egyptian racing, Dr. A. E. Branch maintained his own stables and collaborated with members of the Egyptian royal family in breeding ventures. Dr. Branch had previously served on the classification committee at the racecourse, and Sayed Bey Semaha asked that the Residency force the Clubs to return Dr. Branch to his former position. Of Semaha's request, Residency records noted:

Mr. Branch’s opinion carried unique weight with Egyptians, but that the Committee as at present constituted, so far from enjoying their respect, was

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416 Prince Muhammad Ali singled out this collaboration for praise, noting: “Prince Kemal El Dine, who, as President of the Royal Agricultural Society, has carried on the good work and also reformed the stud, with the aid of Dr. Branch, so that we can proudly say that no other country can compare with Egypt in quality, quantity and pedigree.” Prince Mohamed Aly, *Breeding of Pure Bred Arab Horses* (Cairo: Paul Barbey’s Printing Office, 1935), 8-9. Forbis provided a brief biography of Dr. A. E. Branch, who was a veterinarian, graduate of the Royal College of Veterinary Medicine and Surgeons in Great Britain, and long-standing member of the Classification Committee. Forbis, *The Pure Arabian Horse*, 211-3.
positively harming British prestige since its ill-informed decisions (which he [Semaha] alleged to be frequent and notorious) were attributed to some dark British intention to debase horse-breeding in Egypt.\textsuperscript{417}

Harkening back to the language of the days of Cromer, the new generation of British officers on the Jockey Club strove to defend “British prestige.” The emboldened race stewards campaigned to exclude some Egyptians from these contests.

Sayed Bey Semaha was not the only Egyptian breeder who fell afoul of the new Jockey Club. In a similar complaint, Nasr Semada al-Tahawi of Abu Hammad in Sharqiyah Province, another Egyptian horse breeder with long-standing participation in Egyptian racing, had an Arabian horse rejected by the British officers of the Jockey Club. al-Tahawi called for the creation of a special committee headed by Dr. Branch, who "knows perfectly well the Tahawia Arab breeding," to investigate the Classification Committee.\textsuperscript{418} The Jockey Club demonstrated that it alone had the authority to determine the validity of a horse’s pedigree. Recognizing that the British community was not monolithic, the Egyptian owners appealed to Residency to intervene on their behalf and empower British individuals known to be friendly to Egyptians to take the place of the new stewards. However, the opinion of Branch's work on the classification committee was starkly divided along Egyptian and British lines.

\textsuperscript{417} FO 141/786 dated Jan. 28, 1928. National Archives, London.
\textsuperscript{418} "On 12th January, last, I presented 3 well bred Arab horses before the classification committee at Heliopolis. However to my greatest surprise those 3 pure bred Arabs were passed as countrybreds. Two of them were bred at my own stud at Abu-Hamad (Sharkieh), and the other one, I have imported form Arabia, a year ago, to serve as a stallion. For this Syrian Arab I produced the required papers of origin, duly signed by a well-known Bedwin (sic) chief, and certified by the respective governor of the province, as well as by the French Authorities. However I regret to say that the classification committee did not take any notice of this most important certificate. I am now at the age of 75 years, and have bred at my stud many famous Arab race horses...but this is the first time in my life that any of my horses have been classified as countrybred." FO 141/786 dated Feb. 6, 1928. National Archives, London.
In a third instance of classification outrage that was articulated in national terms, Abdel Mooti Hussein Bey, the ‘Umdah of the village of Sawālīh in Sharqiyyah Province, wrote a letter dated March 8, 1928 to the Eastern Secretary at the Residency in Cairo to complain of his "oppression" at the hands of the Jockey Club. Hussein Bey brought his Arabian, "Bovril," before the classification committee of the Jockey Club, who judged the horse to be Egyptian country-bred. Hussein Bey charged that certain individuals had provided the committee with "false evidence" about the lineage of Bovril because they themselves were race horse owners and "they dislike the progress and improvement of the Egyptian horse." Hussein Bey recounted his proof of Bovril’s pedigree: it had won first place in the provincial horse exposition in Zagazig in 1926 "under the presidency of Mr. Branch and the membership of Farid Bey the Director of Veterinary Department, four other Veterinary Doctors, Mohamed Bey Megally El Tahawi, Saadi Bey Bichara El Tahawi and others." Hussein Bey requested that the Residency order a re-examination of Bovril "after taking the evidence of the gentlemen mentioned above." Without the involvement of the British residency, the Egyptian owners had no authority over the powerful Jockey Club and the race stewards.

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420 Ibid.
421 Ibid.
422 A second letter from Hussein Bey, dated March 13, 1928, to the "Right Honourable High Commissioner Lord Lloyd," reiterated his case but in more flattering and obsequious tone. The letter began with "May it please Your Lordship to give the undersigned the liberty to bring before your Lordship's kind notice the following." The letter closed with "I, therefore, beg to request, if it might please Your Lordship, to kindly order the re-examination..." FO 141/786. National Archives, London.
Residency officials investigated the breeders’ complaints and contacted the Jockey Club for clarification. The response from the Secretary of the Jockey Club, Lt. Col. Ainswont, did not favor the offended Egyptian breeders. With Dr. Branch out, the classification committee was staffed by Army Veterinarian Major Macartney, Col. Milward, Judge Preston, General Spinks, R. J. Hughes, and "young Said Toussoun and Mr. Miller [who] do not, perhaps, cut much ice."\textsuperscript{423} As to the breeders’ request that Dr. Branch resume his work on the classification committee, the Secretary of the Jockey Club was firmly against the return of Branch, who earned a reputation for being "inclined always rather to favour the native breeder in widening the meshes of the net through which horses pass into the class of Pure Arabs" and being "responsible for a type called a 'Branch Arab.'"\textsuperscript{424} The atmosphere among the British colony had soured against those individuals thought to be overly friendly with Egyptians. The Jockey Club established new boundaries that excluded Egyptian standards and authority. As the architects of the racing world and holders of the stud book, the Jockey Club determined access to the racetracks as it had in done in the imperial period whereby a

\textsuperscript{423} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{424} The letter made reference to a 'Radio,' which Jockey Club official maintained had been incorrectly classified twice as an Arabian. According to the Jockey Club agent, this classification error had significant financial repercussions: as an Arabian, Radio was worth 1000L versus 40 as country-bred. To justify the re-classification as a country-bred rather than an Arabian, the Jockey Club official wrote that "Tahawis are suspected, almost to certainty, to have had an English stallion, if not two, in their stables for the Army at Tel-el-Kebir. If this strain cannot be concealed, their horses stand no chance of racing successfully." The Jockey Club official explained Egyptian breeders' support for Mr. Branch stemmed his propensity for 'confusing the breed.' Defending their stricter classification standards, the Jockey Club agent stated that "The Committee is, if anything, working to keep the class 'Arabs' for genuine Arabs, excluding Tahawias and suspect Cyprus-bred stock." dated April 3, 1928. FO 141/786. National Archives, London.
select group of British officers and administrators monopolized the Jockey Club and race management.

The Selective Monopoly: Hypocrisy, Complicity, and Failures of Self-Regulation

After negative coverage in the international and local press, horse racing in Egypt could little afford another scandal. Commenting on the hyper-sensitive atmosphere pervading the racing world, Sirdar of *The Sphinx* wrote,

> In many ways, Cairo is a small town. Particularly is this true to-day concerning the racing community. There is a small section—a very small percentage of the total population of the city—who take a vivid interest in the royal sport and, like all small communities, they are rather uncharitable in some of their remarks and suspicions.  

The size and zeal of the racing community amplified the severity of members' reactions to transgressive behavior, whether real or suspected. The legalization of sports betting by the Egyptian state entrusted much of the responsibility for management of racing and betting to the clubs. By encouraging the licensing system for off-site betting on horse-racing, the state continued to claim the role of arbiter of public morality. In its public justification for endorsing a monopoly on betting, the Egyptian state based its involvement by balancing the evil of gambling with the good of charitable giving. The state codified its good intentions to channel a portion of the wealth involved in horse race betting to worthy causes. The state created the licensing process by which it ensured that the control of racing and betting remained in the hands of the British

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officers and Egyptian elites. British administrators colluded with British racing elites to defend their monopolistic economic privileges under a moral patina where neither party fulfilled its public commitments. To explore how racing elites and their partners in the government defended their control over gambling, I examine two petitions that challenged the selective granting of betting licenses. In practice, neither the clubs nor the government could dissuade bettors from taking advantage of better betting terms outside legally approved pari-mutuel offices. I argue that not only did the clubs fail to police their employees and prevent members from illegal activities, but the state also did not fulfill its own legal obligations to manage and distribute gambling monies to moral causes.

In justifying granting monopolies on licensed sports gambling to the sporting clubs, the Egyptian state advertised its commitments to charitable work. Local charities, taking the official declaration at face value, sought to secure their portion of the gambling tax. In 1928, members of the Egyptian Red Crescent discussed fund-raising through gambling proceeds. The organization already had taken advantage of the legal allowance for charitable lotteries, and its members were eager to find additional sources of funding. The Red Crescent requested monies from the Ministry of the Interior from the fees and taxes paid by the licensed bookmakers. The government responded that after a study of available resources, it was unable to earmark any sport
gambling revenue for the Red Crescent.\textsuperscript{426} That an established and notable charity could not obtain even a minimal portion of the total revenue brought in by the bookmakers called into question the entire basis for legalized sport betting. Without references to studies detailing the financial management of interwar charities in Egypt, it is difficult to generalize from this one incident if the state habitually did not disperse its portion of betting monies. However, the Egyptian Red Crescent was a recognized and respected organization connected to an international network.\textsuperscript{427} The state’s refusal reflected a recalcitrance of the state to extend public funds for charitable endeavors.

The economic theory of managed gambling was tested further and found wanting once the global depression of 1929 struck Egypt. As the government fixed the percentage of income for Club bookmakers, the only way to meet operating costs and earn a profit was to increase the volume of bets. When the tide of bets ebbed, the pari-mutuel system collapsed. As went the macroeconomic situation in Egypt, so went betting on race horses.\textsuperscript{428} To the clubs, which had become reliant on the income from the races, this collapse was devastating. The clubs complained to the Egyptian

\textsuperscript{426} La Societe Nationale du Croissant Rouge Egyptien. Jami‘yāt Ijtima‘īyah. 204. Majlis al-Wuzara‘ archive at Dār al-Withā‘iq, Cairo, Egypt. The organization’s fund-raising lottery was also a topic of discussion.


\textsuperscript{428} “The extent of patronage bestowed upon the sport of racing by native sportsmen and the general public is dependent more or less upon the economic prosperity of the country; in other words, the failure or success of the cotton-growing season controls the situation. When prices are high and everyone has money to spend, the race-course, which is located at Giza, in the neighborhood of Cairo, is well attended during its two somewhat lengthy seasons; under less prosperous conditions the attendance is more or less confined to the officials, the military and the superior class of residents, the fellahin and trading classes being too impecunious or other wishes occupied to devote much attention to this form of amusement." Martin, \textit{Egypt - old & new}, 203.
government, who agreed to a modification of the \textit{pari-mutuel} rules. To entice gamblers, the deduction from the betting pool was reduced from 15\% to 11\%, meaning more money went to winners. The government agreed to let the clubs have the lion's share of the 11\%, with 10\% going to the club and a paltry 1\% to the government, but the clubs continued to press for a reduced tax burden. In 1932, the Egyptian government received 0.75\% of the total bets from racing at Cairo, or a minimum of ££.E. 75 per meeting, and 1\% without a minimum, from racing at Alexandria.\footnote{Letter from the European Department of the Ministry of the Interior to the First Secretary at The Residency dated February 29, 1932. FO 141/723. National Archives, London.} In effect, the Egyptian government abandoned its own reasoning for granting the monopoly to Club-run \textit{pari-mutuel} offices. The state no longer received its portion of betting monies, but continued to deny other bookmakers freedom to ply their trade. The preferential treatment given to the Clubs did not escape the notice of other operators in the racing community.

**Opposing the Monopoly: Bookmakers Petition the State**

State efforts to shield their monopoly did not pass untested. In January 1932, representatives of a turf agency, Epsom, penned a complaint to the Ministry of Interior over the refusal to grant a license for Cairo’s winter racing season.\footnote{This turf agency chose to name itself after one of the most famous British racing institutions. Founded in 1780 by the twelfth Earl of Derby, the annual Epsom Derby is the richest race held in the United Kingdom. The fame of this race popularized the word ‘derby’ in the English language. Epsom Downs racecourse is located in Epsom in Surrey.} The firm Epsom had worked with the Alexandria Sporting Club for years, a relationship through which Epsom obtained the license necessary to operate a sportsbook as per government
regulation. In his complaint, Epsom’s agent opened with a restatement of the existing laws on sports betting, but then moved to the realities of gambling on the streets of Cairo. The turf agent argued that the existing pari-mutuel offices were not sufficient to handle the betting traffic, the majority of which went to unlicensed bookmakers.

Continuing, the turf agent wrote that wherever horse racing existed, illegal gambling followed, and no state was capable of stopping it. Faced with the reality that illicit gambling continued despite official opprobrium, Epsom’s advocate maintained that the interests of his company and the state coincided. The turf agent claimed that licensed bookmakers actually benefited both the state and the people whereby the government received its share and customers could trust that their bets would be honored. As the state had defined the discursive terms by which gambling could be justified, aspirants to the world of gambling couched their appeals in that same language. In justifying his appeal to participate in wagering, Epsom’s representative employed the same logic as the state in its jurisdiction on gaming: licit gambling ensured order and profit. Epsom’s agent confronted the reality of gambling in Cairo and the state’s failure to control it, but this candor did not help his cause with British officials in the Ministry of the Interior.

To bolster the appeal of Epsom, employees of licensed turf agencies wrote a petition to the British Residency requesting that the government grant bookmaking licenses for work during Cairo’s winter racing season. This petition provides a window onto the working of licensed betting shops. The petition was signed by twelve men delegated by their colleagues, representing a total number of 186 employees listed by
The bookmakers included Greeks, Jews, Italians, Arabs, Turks, and Circassians. The diversity of the employees reflects the breadth of the customer base. As intermediaries for turf agencies, these men developed relationships with bettors from the various ethnic, religious, and socio-economic communities in Cairo and Alexandria. As purveyors of a service that relied on trust, bookmakers had a better chance of cultivating profitable relationships with customers who came from similar cultural backgrounds.

The language of the bookmakers’ petition is worth examining. Calling upon the Residency's "spirit of high benevolence, equity, and justice," the turf agents opened with appeals to basic financial considerations. The bookmakers claimed that they had made their livelihood entirely from commissions taken on bets over the last ten years at licensed turf agencies. They bemoaned the denial of a license to operate in Cairo in the winter season, the most lucrative period of the year for betting shops, which meant the "deepest misery by depriving them of their livelihood." In light of the dire economic situation of the country following the global depression, these men noted that they could not find a new career outside the world of racing. The list of 186 employees enumerated the size of the family each individual supported, totaling over a thousand

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431 Of the twelve signatures on the first page of the petition, six were signed in Arabic. The petitioners represented themselves as employees of turf agencies. No reference was made to Epsom by name. That the petition was dated on June 25, 1932, a day after the letter from Epsom, is likely not a coincidence. FO 141/723. National Archives, London.

432 The list did not specify the origin of the employees. The listing of many Arab names, some of whom were likely Levantine and others Egyptian, undermines Keown-Boyd’s claim in July 1932 of official impotency: "Bookmakers are all foreign subjects and in present circumstances it is difficult to see how the law can be strengthened." FO 141/723. National Archives, London.

dependants. By denying the turf license to the bookmakers, the Egyptian government threatened to impoverish a sizeable number of subjects amidst a difficult economic period.

Beyond appealing to economic realities, the bookies' argumentation followed that of Epsom in questioning the Egyptian government's justifications for withholding licenses from turf agencies. The bookmakers noted that the denial "cannot be regarded as a safeguard to public morality, as the agencies are replaced in Cairo by pari-mutuel offices."434 Here, the intermediaries challenged the state on the crucial point: the state endorsed gambling on horse racing and legalized a monopoly it did not control. Any defense by the state that gambling on horses was immoral was regarded moot. Since the state had recognized bet-making as a legitimate, licensed trade, denying aspiring economic actors the right to pursue that trade violated the principle of free trade. The bookmakers maintained that refusing to license turf agencies only encouraged clandestine bookmakers, "against which the most zealous fight is ineffective."435 To soften the recognition that the government could not stop betting on horses, the bookmakers appealed to the financial interests of the state. The petitioners noted that these illegal agencies took money from both the government and the racing clubs. Without a license, the employees warned that their erstwhile clients would be "captured" by unscrupulous individuals with no respect for the law.

434 Ibid.
435 Ibid.
The internal communications from the British Residency in response to the petition of the turf agency and its employees evince the self-aware duplicity of the political class in dealing with elite gambling practices. The issue of gambling reform fell to Alexander Keown-Boyd, the Director General of the European Department in the Ministry of the Interior. To counter the claims of Epsom and the intermediaries about the state of gambling and governmental complicity in illegal activity, the British administrator inquired about the feasibility of enforcing the letter of the gambling law. Keown-Boyd approached the various powers in the racing world about the possibility of eliminating off-track turf agencies. The representative of the Owners Association, Prince Hassan Toussoun, reported that

the Owners would welcome the suppression of the Bookmakers, should it be found possible for the Government to stop entirely the activities of unlicensed bookmakers, as well as Licensed Agencies. He feared, however, it would be found impossible to stop Owners or the public betting with Bookmakers. The Owners declined to engage themselves to abstain from this form of betting.\footnote{Note on the bookmakers petition” was penned by Keown-Boyd on July 17, 1932.. FO 141/723. National Archives, London.}

The logic of Prince Toussoun’s argument exposes the double standard by which the elite operated. The owners agreed with the moral ideal of stopping all gambling both licensed and illicit, but only if the government could enforce such a ban. Knowing that the government could not do such a thing, Prince Toussoun freely admitted that his peers would continue to break the law. Prince Toussoun went on to explain the general preference among bettors and his elite peers for placing wagers with unlicensed, off-track bookmakers. Prince Toussoun informed Director General Keown-Boyd that
"betting with Bookmakers was more attractive than making bets on the Pari Mutuel; one of the Chief reasons being that bookmakers allowed credit." The extension of credit was crucial to the success of off-track betting, while further complicating the matter of collection of non-sanctioned bets. Yet, the essential danger of illegal sports betting remained, whereby neither party had recourse to official channels of redress in the case of non-payment. The extension of credit in an unregulated market further intensified the risk of gambling on horses.

After speaking with Prince Toussoun, Keown-Boyd circulated his opinion of the petitions from Epsom and the bookmakers among the Residency staff. Considering his response, Keown-Boyd found the turf agents' arguments to be "specious but unsound." Keown-Boyd repeated what had served as the official line of the government for decades: existing legislation was not harsh enough to deter bookmakers. He suggested that the list of employees be forwarded to the pari-mutuel offices where "a number of them if found of good character, could be taken on to work." The economic concerns of the bookmakers were of secondary importance to the government: the greater concern among administrative circles over racing centered upon securing revenue. To this end, Keown-Boyd referred other British officials to the work of his colleague in the Ministry of the Interior.

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437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
The Financial Secretary of Ministry of the Interior, Moise Dichy, provided a commentary on gambling that eschewed moral justifications for stopping the turf agencies.\textsuperscript{439} Violations of the sport betting law were not Dichy’s primary concern. Dichy was a Finance official: he approached the matter as an untapped revenue stream, writing “Apart from the confusion that arises from the fact that the three racing clubs do not all pursue the same system, it is a known fact that the clubs and the Government are losing much money through clandestine bookmaking.”\textsuperscript{440} Recognizing that neither prohibition nor licensing of sport betting had succeeded thus far, the Financial Secretary proposed a remedy that offered little in terms of new strategy. No help was coming from the Egyptian legislature in his opinion, leaving the police in the familiar position of impotence. Maintaining that a uniform code of behavior across all three racing club should be the first step, he advised that self-regulation of betting within the clubs was the way forward for the government and the racing community. Dichy’s strength rested with financial considerations: his policy recommendation advocated the status-quo as long as the state received its tithe. Off-betting betting would continue outside governmental control, and the clubs had already demonstrated their incapacity and unwillingness to stop members from gambling with unlicensed, illegal bookmakers.

\textsuperscript{439} As a high-ranking bureaucrat, Moise Dichy Bey also served on the Egyptian delegation to the Montreux Conference in 1936-7 to negotiate the end of the Capitulations. Gudrun Kramer, \textit{The Jews in modern Egypt, 1914-1952} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989), 46. Levana Zamir, \textit{The golden era of ‘The Jews of Egypt’ and the Mediterranean option for a united Middle East} (Haifa: University of Haifa Press, 2008), 34.

The leading lights of the clubs, however, were at least familiar to the state and could be called upon to pay their percentage.

Dichy pushed for granting the clubs the monopoly on wagers on horse racing through the expansion of club-run *pari-mutuel* offices in Cairo and Alexandria. Having taken the place of the turf agencies, approved bookies, in turn, would ensure that the state received its portion of gambling monies. Taking inspiration from the proliferation of off-track turf agencies, the memo argued for the extension of credit to select bettors by the betting offices of the clubs. In adopting the tactics of the turf agencies, Dichy pushed for the government to invest in gambling in hopes of securing the tax revenue that such establishments could generate. Dichy boasted that if his recommendations were followed, illegal off-track betting shops would disappear in five years and the clubs and the government would reap considerable profits.

**Would-be Monopolists: Failures of Self-Policing in Racing Clubs**

As the previous section illustrated, the state and the elite freely acknowledged that self-regulation among gamblers was a farce. In this section, I further reveal the fiction of the racing clubs officials as being capable of enforcing some measure of self-regulation. Allegations of cheating on the course, the most serious offense, were not unknown among the British community.\(^{441}\) Unlike crooked card games, roulette, or

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\(^{441}\) Keowyn-Boyd, in the July 17, 1932 reply to the bookies' petition, noted "The files of the Permits Department show amply the evils attached to the system of licensed bookmakers. It is unnecessary to enlarge on the dangers to which the system exposes Racing itself. We know of one case where a Jockey was bribed and we suspect others," FO 141/723. National Archives, London.
lotteries, fixing a horse race was both extremely difficult and risky. Fixing a race required interference with either the racehorse or the jockey prior to the race. Any suspicious action on the course immediately became a matter of public speculation, but the difficulty of proving premeditated misconduct hampered any post-race investigations. The immediate authorities were stewards of the suspect race, but their powers to enforce standards were not absolute. With the specter of cheating haunting the course, the dubious character of club personnel, particularly trainers and jockeys, threatened the reputation of the entire community.

With more individuals eager to enter into the world of race horse ownership, professional trainers were in high demand. Capable and reliable trainers, however, were always in short supply. In her history of her parents' horse farm in Egypt, Lady Wentworth explained that the best Arabian stock was shipped back to England because the local staff could not be trusted with the valuable mounts.\textsuperscript{442} Lady Wentworth described the failing of the Blunts' stable staff:

\begin{quote}
It was found impossible to breed such good stock in Egypt owing to the climate and the utter hopelessness of getting syces to give proper attention to the stock. Neglect during the summer months when the Blunts were away in England caused disastrous losses, and the stud remained limited to about fifty head...The Blunts tried various British managers in their absence, but drink and evil company proved the ruin of each in turn. Native apathy was a universal narcotic.\textsuperscript{443}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{442} Given that the finest Arabians had a far higher worth as breeding stock in the United Kingdom than in Egypt, Lady Wentworth's decision to blame local help to justify the financial decisions of her parents is an interesting case of revisionist family history.

\textsuperscript{443} Lady Anne Wentworth, \textit{The authentic Arabian horse and his descendants} (London: G. Allen & Unwin Limited, 1945), 149.
The lack of local Egyptian talent who met European standards of animal husbandry and were familiar with contemporary, scientific methods of breeding forced owners to rely on experienced trainers with reputations as problem drinkers. The Blunts were not alone in their frustration in employing talented stablemen with worrying patterns of excessive alcohol consumption. In his published works on Arabians, Prince Muhammad Ali took great pride in employing an exemplary horseman Abdallah, who originated from Mosul and came of age in the stables of Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Hamid II. After detailing the prowess of Abdallah, the Prince recounted a tale where a drunken Abdallah injured a prized young stallion by galloping over the chairs and benches in a local cafe. Such acts of alcohol-fueled exuberance were not atypical: the Prince continued, "Abdallah was always getting drunk; then I would send him back to his own country, Mosoul [sic], but after about a week I would miss him and telegraph to Aleppo to get him back." Drunkenness among horse trainers seems to have been the rule, rather than the exception. Egyptian racing was not unique in this: over-consumption of alcohol by trainers and jockeys was not uncommon in Great Britain. However, a drunken British jockey or trainer had much greater political import in an imperial setting like Cairo. Because of their abilities with horses and the absence of reliable alternatives, jockeys and trainers were able to indulge in behavior that crossed the line from acceptability to scandal.

The Case of Albert Matthews

Another example of transgressive behavior by a horse trainer that continued without intervention from the racing community can be found in the records of the British consular court in Cairo. On March 2, 1924, Albert Jeffrey Matthews, a 48-year-old horse trainer and former jockey originally from Bath, fell afoul of the Cairo police. Matthews was arrested for being drunk and disorderly at the Anglo-American Hospital in Giza and for conduct likely to breach the public peace. Matthews pled guilty to the charges in the British consular court. The judgment was lenient: a fine of £1 or one day in prison. Matthews pled poverty and took the day in prison. Once freed, Matthews returned to his old habits and haunts, but the severity of his addiction worsened. He was habitually drunk in the downtown bars, especially those frequented by British military, from whom Matthews persistently tried to cadge drinks. That Matthews chose to frequent bars where British soldiers were regular patrons was natural. Beyond the obvious cultural commonalities, Matthews could play upon his history as a former jockey and trainer to talk himself into a free drink. For those troops who wagered on racehorses, Matthews' insider knowledge, however muddled by drink, might yield some potentially profitable information. There were, however, limits to Matthews' charms and soldiers' patience.

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446 Matthews was not the first British jockey and trainer to appear before the consular court for drink-related problems. In 1896, a trainer/jockey was involved in a series of verbal clashes with Walker Bey. The first of several tense altercations occurred at Bodega, where Matthews regularly drank liquor in the company of another jockey, Shakir Effendi. FO 841/58. National Archives, London.

On June 2, 1924, the police arrested Matthews for a final time after observing him begging in a bar for an hour and a half. His overindulgence in alcohol, morally transgressive public comportment, and indigent status had resulted in too many complaints from "General Headquarters, Groppi’s, Shepherds [sic]," and "Soldiers using the bars in Esbekieh." Following his arrest, Bimbashi Bakery, Mamur Zapt of the Cairo City Police, labeled Matthews "hopeless," "disgusting," and "a disgrace to any

Figure 2: The Mug Shot of Albert Matthews

449 Typed note to H.B.M's Consul from Cairo City Police, dated June 2, 1924. FO 841/225. National Archives, London.
community." When brought before the British consular court, Matthews admitted his guilt once again. The judge sentenced him to one day in prison, after which Matthews had to "produce two sureties of £30 each + in default to be deported." Destitute and friendless, Matthews admitted to the court that he could not meet the terms, and the British judge ordered his immediate deportation. The final court records declared Matthews a *persona non grata*, or in official language of the court, "an undesirable person and that his continued presence in Egypt might lead to a breach of the Public peace." Deportation of "undesirables" was the last resort available to the Egyptian government when dealing with foreign nationals convicted of serious crimes. Matthews was deported for persisting in "lead[ing] a life of vagabond, being a habitual drunkard, not having any means of subsistence except by begging from various establishments." A second note to the Consul from Bimbashi Bakery reads: "I need hardly add that it is most desirable for Matthews to be got out of this country as quickly as possible, in view of his physical condition from continuous drinking." That a British subject had been reduced to such a deplorable state was a source of

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450 Ibid.
452 For legal precedence for the deportation of undesirables who threatened public order, the British court cited Article 81 of the Ottoman Order in Council 1910, Egypt Order in Council 1915, and Egypt (Amendment) Order in Council 1922.
454 Ibid.
455 Additional typed note to H.B.M's Consul from Cairo City Police, also dated June 2, 1924. FO 841/225. The Mamur Zapt also instructed the constable at the European Lock-up to allow unfettered access of the consular doctor, Dr. Madden, to Matthews.
embarrassment for British officials and the community at large. A poor representative of the English in Egypt, Matthews' presence threatened to undermine British presumptive claims to civilizational and moral superiority that undergirded their right to rule Egypt. The deportation of undesirable British subjects had been a topic of frequent communication between the Residency and police for several years. Following the end of World War I, the Residency and police debated how best to expedite the deportation of a number of British subjects engaged in suspected criminal behavior, mostly pimping. Bimbashi Baker, head of the Criminal Investigation Department, wrote in July 1921:

   Thus an Englishman who adopts questionable methods of obtaining his livelihood is, ipso facto, far more conspicuous than a member of any other Nationality. He becomes an object of gossip, particularly among the young effendis who spend their money in the night haunts. He is to Politicians a convenient illustration of the iniquity of the Protectorate.456

Even an alcoholic British horse trainer was subject to the nationalized politics of the imperial project. The speed of the legal proceedings against Matthews testifies to the seriousness of the case in the eyes of the British establishment.

The final report on the case sheds more light on Matthews' struggles with addiction and his former life as a jockey and trainer. Following the order of deportation, the police searched for relatives back in England to help Matthews. The investigation discovered that Matthews' family had been repatriated on May 12, 1923

\[456 \text{ CO 323/867. National Archives, London.}\]
"at the expense of the Jockey Club of Egypt." Over a year passed between the departure of the Matthews family from Egypt and the trainer's deportation. Matthews lost all contact with his family in the interim and did not know their whereabouts. For the Jockey Club to pay for the passage back to England for the family of a former jockey and horse trainer indicates that Matthews had once served well, and made money for, elite members of the racing community. Whether an act of charity or pity, the men of the Jockey Club chose to intervene and protect the family of one of their own. Altruism aside, the Jockey Club made a calculated decision that avoided a larger potential scandal: a destitute British family reduced to begging or worse because an unemployed horse trainer had fallen to drink. Lest the Jockey Club's name be connected to such a public humiliation, the British racing establishment removed the greater threat to their organization. The Jockey Club's demonstrated inability to curtail Matthews' actions continued until the state stepped in to deal with their former employee. As the case of Matthews illustrates, problems of self-regulation among the clubs were not limited to mismanagement of wagers, but extended to the failure to ensure socially acceptable behavior by their employees. If the racing community could not control the behavior of an employee, they stood little chance of managing the choices of elite members.

Egyptian Royals Respond: State Breeding Programs and Prince Muhammad Ali

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457 REX versus ALBERT JEFFREY MATTHEWS Dossier no. 58 of 1924 Supreme Court, Cairo. June 7, 1924. FO 841/225. British Consular Court Records, National Archives, London.
This final section on racing investigates how members of the Egyptian nobility responded to the controversies of the racing world arising from commercialization and nationalization of racing. The complaints of Egyptian breeders reached beyond the Residency. The supposed degradation of racing became a common theme in Egyptian commentaries of the period. Pushed aside and increasingly isolated in the racing world, luminaries of the Egyptian horse community, members of the royal family in particular, turned inward to focus on their horse breeding programs. Official government histories of horse breeding programs and the memoirs of Prince Muhammad Ali offer insight into how racing exacerbated long-standing resentments and disagreements between Egyptian and British elites, and how in turn, nationalist struggles colored horse breeding in Egypt.

Throughout the British occupation, the men of the Egyptian royalty cultivated their passion for pure-bred Arab horses. Personal royal patronage and state support were united in improving horse stocks. Written in 1948 by Abdel Alim Ashoub, the director of the Breeding Section, History of the Royal Agricultural Society's Stud of Authentic Arabian Horses recounted in glowing terms the storied history of royal patronage of Arabians in Egypt while selectively ignoring, understating, or denigrating various aspects of the recent history of horse-breeding. Ashoub chronicled the basic facts of official horse breeding programs, but the official historian allowed the politics of the day to color his commentary, particularly when ascribing the motivations to his predecessors. In narrating the glorious history of the royal stud, Ashoub singled out
1914 as a marking a shift in Egyptian racing. Ashoub observed that "the experiment of crossing English horses with Arab mares was unsuccessful, for the offspring proved both vicious and ugly, and were very unpopular because the appearance of most of them was totally incompatible with Egyptian taste." It is no coincidence that the official history of the Egyptian government's horse program chose 1914 as the point of rupture after decades of mixing British and Egyptian traditions. The retrospective analysis of Egyptian-country bred horses as "vicious," "ugly," "unpopular," and "incompatible with Egyptian taste" could easily be applied to elite Egyptian attitudes towards the incursion of scores of imperial troops into their narrow world of racing pageantry during World War I and the subsequent power struggle at the clubs.

According to Ashoub, the royal stud became a distinctly Egyptian product as government breeding programs ceased to rely upon British thoroughbreds and stopped mixing Arabians with foreign horses. Ashoub maintained that importing Arabians from outside Egypt remained impossible, so the Breeding Section turned inwards for sources of pure Arabians. They relied on the descendants of the pure Nejd horses imported by Abbas I Pasha in 1852 that were found in the stables of late Khedive Abbas Pasha Hilmi II at Kubba, Prince Mohammed Ali at Manial, and Lady Anne Blunt at Ein Shams. 1919 was the last time horses were imported when the Breeding Section

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459 Ibid. Upon his death, Abbas Pasha left his horses to his son, Elhami Pasha, who did not share his family's passion for horses. That son sold Abbas Pasha's horses in 1860 or 1861, and the product of a dynasty passed to Ali Pasha Sherif, then a young Bey, who purchased four hundred Arabians. As the fortunes of Ali Pasha Sherif waned in the late 1890s, his horses were gradually sold off to buyers across
bought eighteen genuine Arabs from Lady Blunt's daughter, Lady Wentworth. Self-reliance based on conservation on the purity of the Arabian became the official policy of breeding at the Egyptian royal stud.

The Egyptian state invested considerable resources in its Arabian breeding program just as tensions in the racing world reached new levels. In 1928, construction work began on new, larger stables on fifty-five acres "north of Heliopolis and east of Ein Shams at about 20 kilometres from the heart of Cairo." The stock of the Breeding Section moved into the new stables and training paddocks in 1930. Using existing stocks freed the Breeding Section from the need to secure new horses from outside Egypt and proved so successful that surplus horses were sold annually to amateurs and breeders. Given the storied pedigree of the royal stables, the economic value of the few state-bred horses sold each year spurred on breeding efforts as did securing regional and international prestige. Establishing Egypt as the preeminent breeder of Arabians guided the breeding program. Ashoub acknowledged the drive to supplant rival royal stables: "The dearest wish of the Society is that some day in the near future, Egypt will displace Arabia as the source of the best and purest-bred Arab stock in the world, and also become the most important centre for the breeding of the Arab horse." To that end, the Section ushered in a strict breeding program.

the world, including Great Britain and the United States. Upon Ali Pasha's death in 1897, the stables were sold at public auction, and Lady Blunt bought many horses.

460 Ashoub, History of the Royal Agricultural Society's stud, 55.
Despite problems between the Egyptian and British racing community, ties were not cut completely. While British clannishness drove some Egyptian breeders and owners away from the Clubs, the allure of competition and financial rewards on the track ensured that the races never wanted for participants. Some of the offspring from the royal stock were leased out for racing, which brought in further income and accolades. As breeding and revenue increased, the Breeding Section sought to maximize its profits on the racetrack. According to Ashoub, the decision to Breeding Section was faced with question of deterioration of the bloodline through over-breeding from a limited gene pool. Ashoub wrote that the Breeding Section, displaying great caution and after exhaustive enquiry into pedigrees, chose some Arab horses that had had good racing careers in Egypt and were passed as Arabs by the Jockey Club, the only organisation to which all horses imported from the East, e.g., Syria, Iraq and Nejd, are submitted for classification.462

The recognition of the Jockey Club's status as the highest authority in recording the pedigrees of horses is particularly curious, given the demonstrated acrimony between Egyptian breeders and the British-dominated Jockey Club. The word of the Jockey Club likely carried weight internationally among horse owners and breeders, whereas the Breeding Section of the Royal Agricultural Society did not. Validation from the Jockey Club legitimized the royal stud before the global community of horse breeders, but reliance on British-style pedigrees for determining the worth of Arabians rankled notable Egyptian breeders. The choice to interbreed the royal stud with proven winners from the world of racing meant ever greater revenue for the Egyptian state.

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At the end of his life, Prince Muhammad Ali could boast of the greatest private stable of Arabians on the planet. He had inherited the horses of the late Khedive Abbas Hilmi II and helped establish the stud of the Royal Agricultural Society. Yet, the pillar of the racing community turned his back on the track and its grandstand. The great gambler had aged into the critical moralist, blasting the rude crowd who had driven him from the club. Prince Muhammad Ali wrote on his experiences as a breeder of Arabian horses, and he took advantage of the opportunity to settle accounts with the racing community in Egypt.\textsuperscript{463} Prince Muhammad Ali lambasted the current state of racing: "Glance at the champions of the past... Now look at the modern winner of races; look at his ears, the size of his head, the coarseness and vulgarity. Forget perfection and ideals of beauty, but win the race. Tragedy always sells well."\textsuperscript{464} Prince Muhammad Ali attacked the current state of racing in Egypt by couching his criticism in negative commentary on the quality of horses, but he could easily have been describing the crowds that flocked to the same race grounds where he had once been a major player.

As last chapter’s analysis of the Second Winter Race of the K.S.C. in 1900 noted, racing announcements were published prior to the races, listing the names of horses and their owners. These exclusive events had long attracted the social climbers, those

\textsuperscript{463} Originally written in English, the book was subsequently translated and printed in Arabic. In the preface, the Prince explained the impetus to write the book: "Being an Oriental, and having exhausted nearly all the literature which deals with the Arab horse, and having seen how often Europeans write inaccurately on this subject, I should like, before I die, to dedicate these notes to the horse lovers of the world. May they forgive my imperfect mastery of the English idiom." Aly, \textit{Breeding}, 4.

\textsuperscript{464} Aly, \textit{Breeding}, 34.
hungry to be seen or mingle with the rich and powerful. Prince Mohammad Ali offered a final lament over the "vulgarization" of horse racing in Cairo:

Lords and great men and even amateurs owned stables in the olden days in order to protect their country in times of war. Later the officers took up racing, sincerely and honestly, because they loved horses. Racing became the sport of honourable men. But modern racing serves two purposes only: an excuse for gambling and a huge golden opportunity for the social climber. Many a businessman has acquired a racing stable, full of horses but very little affection. His stable is merely a latchkey to open the social column of a newspaper or gain entrance to an exclusive club... take away social publicity and gambling and in a generation the thoroughbreds will be an interesting relic.465

Prince Muhammad Ali maintained that racing had fundamentally changed, as if the gambling and regular displays of economic and political power had never been at the core of races during the imperial period.

Prince Muhammad Ali directed much of his energy to critiquing those in the racehorse community who obsessed over pedigrees, namely the British members of the Jockey Club and the racing community writ large. Attacking the general fixation with pedigrees, he argued that certification of every single progenitor in the pedigree of a horse was an impossibility. Prince Muhammad Ali revealed that his family possessed documentation of the names and value of the famed stables of Abbas Pasha. Prince Muhammad Ali wrote passionately of the foolishness of slavish devotion to British customs of horse classification in a Middle Eastern context. The history of the Jockey Club in Great Britain and horse breeding differed to such a degree from Arab traditions

465 Ibid.
as to be nearly incomparable. The Prince reminded his readers that Arabians came from illiterate Arab horse breeders who relied entirely on oral traditions:

The pedigrees of my horses date back a hundred years, a phenomenal [sic] span for the East. In days gone by Arabs, being Nomads, had no pen and ink to record the pedigrees of their animals. The word of the chief was law. His statement that the horse was a pure-bred was as good as a written guarantee.466

The word of Arab chiefs was regularly accepted by eager foreign buyers, yet the word of Egyptian breeders did not satisfy the classification committee and the Jockey Club. He wrote at length of the negative effects that "civilization" had on Arab horse dealers.467 According to the Prince, the rise of a monetary economy and a regional market for horses encouraged dishonesty among impoverished Arab tribes, particularly in regards to the supposed pedigree of horses.

A year after the publication of his first work on Arabians Prince Muhammad Ali penned a second volume in a final salvo against his critics.468 Prince Muhammad Ali devoted most of his second treatise to replying to those conservative religious figures, such as al-Bannā, who condemned betting on horses. The Prince quoted at length

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466 Aly, Breeding, 20.
467 "Civilisation has made the horse a luxury. The Turks began to cross the Arab strains with European strains; they wanted bigger horses and so, in the time of Sultan Abdel-Hamid, Arab mares were served by English, German and Hungarian stallions. Later on the racing people of Egypt wanted to have faster horses, and they too began to breed English stallions, until they secretly produced Anglo-Arabs which they called pure Arabs. When our Arab dealers discovered this method they bought all the broken down English race horses in Egypt and took them to Syria, and some of the Syrian gentlemen, who raced in Egypt, took their English thoroughbreds over into the Lebanon and crossed them with Arab mares. It is extremely difficult to recognise these horses. The Arabs are born jugglers; they mark their horses with the different signs of the Arab tribes, usually by branding them, and this proves that they were bought from this tribe or that." Aly, Breeding, 21.
468 Volume II was printed in 1936. In the very brief preface, Prince Muhammad Ali explained his motivation to write a second treatise on Arabians: "Some of my friends found my first book too short."
several traditions of the Prophet that involved horse races and wagers among the young 

Muslim community. In line with his assumed role of the protector of an ancient 

tradition and bloodline, the Prince stressed that from the beginnings of Islamic history 
"racing has been known to the Arabs; but they had the selection and breeding of horses 
in view more than the actual sport of racing." Prince Muhammad Ali thus painted his 
withdrawal from the world of racing to focus on his breeding programs as a 
continuation of an ancient Arabo-Islamic tradition. However, such logic was 
unconvincing for moral purists: for all his citation of Islamic traditions and history, 
Prince Muhammad Ali could not divorce himself and the Egyptian elite as a whole 
from long-standing participation in lucrative gambling on horse races.

In examining the insular world of racing, I have explored how the British 
community that had been trusted to uphold the ideals of fair play proved to be no less 
susceptible to moral temptation than aficionados of less prestigious forms of 
entertainment. Self-regulation among the racing clubs broke down in face of increased 
commercialization. More participants brought ever larger sums could to be won from 
the bookie. The state intervened in racing, but did so in a manner that still privileged 
elite gambling practices in full knowledge that the racing community continued to 
patronize illegal off-track betting shops. Alongside these changes, Egyptian owners

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469 "Even as far back as the days of the Prophet racing was encouraged, and he himself kept racehorses; moreover, as we learn from Kadis Eben Omar, he betted on his own mares. The first races were in the year 4 of the Heigra [sic]." Prince Mohamed Aly, "The Arab: The Finest Horse in the World" in Sport in Egypt, ed. J. Wentworth Day, (London: Country Life, 1938), 5. Much of this article is a reproduction of his previous work Breeding Pure-Bred Arabs, including his story of the drunken horseman, Abdallah from Mosul. 

470 Ibid.
and breeders faced new forms of exclusion that led them to valorize local traditions of horsemanship and view their participation in horse racing through a nationalist lens.

II. Casino-Style Gambling, Associational Life, and the Police

The last chapter demonstrated that through its 'quixotic' public war on illegal gaming establishments, the imperial government sought to shore up claims that the state took its moral responsibilities seriously by expanding its power over public space. Despite the best efforts of the police and the begrudging cooperation of the Greek government, the state failed to eradicate casino-style gaming prior to World War I. Independence did little to change the ability of the Egyptian government to prevent residents of Cairo from gambling on cards or other casino-style games. The core message of the official public line of the Egyptian state remained unchanged by independence: gambling was illegal in Egypt, but enforcement was problematic. Egyptian elite and middle class actors defied governmental efforts to use gambling as the means to control public space and behavior.

To examine how publicity affected state response to large scale casino project, I begin with the proposal from aspiring casino magnates who presented Egyptian officials with a series of tempting offers. I then consider how public condemnation of casino-style gambling pressured the Egyptian state to continue existing anti-gambling policies. Public pressure from conservative social forces ensured that Egyptian state officials upheld their opposition to large scale gambling on cards and roulette. While casino projects elicited strong responses from societal observers, private clubs where
members gambled freely proliferated. I detail how enterprising gamesmen followed
the example of elite residents in manipulating public establishment laws to escape state
control. The Cairo police continued their regular monitoring of public space in hopes of
deterring gambling on cards and similar games, but the market for wagering on cards
remained resilient.

**Opposition to Building New Casinos, 1919-1928**

The corruption and widespread cheating during the age of legal, organized
casino-style gaming left a lasting impression on Cairene society. Subsequent efforts to
bring back gaming, or even the consideration of such proposals, ignited much criticism
of the government. The moral panics played out on the pages of the press were
recapitulated in cafés and the halls of government. Observers of public life in Cairo
raised their voices in concern over the dissolution of vulnerable and impressionable
elements within Egyptian society, particularly the young, the poor, and the peasantry.
Moralizers agitated for a state response to the spread of gambling to preserve morality
and stem vice.

The durability of Cairene appetites for gambling attracted investors and casino
magnates, who hoped to secure legitimate footing in the lucrative Cairo market. In July
1923, a Mr. Moncharmont, the Director of Municipal Theaters in Lyon, wrote a letter to
the Egyptian Prime Minister in which he claimed to represent "a group interested in the
affairs of Egypt" that sought permission to open a casino with rooms devoted to
“baccarat, petits-chevaux, poker, etc” in Helwan. As an incentive for the government, Moncharmont offered to fund the repair of the railroad station at Helwan, the construction of macadamized roads, and the installation of electric lighting throughout the town. As the final enticement to the Egyptian authorities, Moncharmont offered to cede the entire casino to the Egyptian government after “some time.” If officials granted authorization, the state stood to benefit considerably from Moncharmont's organization.

Despite this generous proposition by which the Egyptian government would receive substantial investment in its infrastructure, the Ministry of Finance was unwilling to support the project. In a letter dated September 14, 1924, Ahmad Hishmat Pasha, the Minister of Finance, summarized the official response to the request. Hishmat questioned the sincerity of Moncharmont and his group's concern about the development of Helwan or Egypt generally. Hishmat alluded to the suspect morality of permitting public gambling in the country as a whole and pointed out the spurious wisdom of opening a casino so close to the capital. Hishmat averred that Moncharmont was concerned with gaming profits, not the welfare of Egyptians. As legal reasoning for his rejection of the French proposal, Hishmat cited the 1904 public establishment law

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471 al-Sharīkāt wa-al-Jam‘īyat: al-Nūwādī al-Adabiyyāt wa al-Riyyādiyyāt: m awdū‘āt mukhtalif 1886-1926, 177, 4b. Majlis al-Wuzarah archive at Dār al-Withā’iq, Cairo, Egypt. The agent of “un groupe s’interessant aux affaires d’Égypte,” Moncharmont, initially proposed to open casinos in both Helwan and Alexandria, but in a second letter to the Prime Minister, he withdrew his proposal for Alexandria and focused solely on the Helwan property.

472 As a member of the Wafdist cabinet, Ahmad Hishmat had served as the first Foreign Minister following Egyptian independence in 1923. He shifted to the Ministry of Finance in 1924.
that upheld the criminalization of casino-style gambling, Art. 316 of the Code Penal Mixte, and Art. 307 of the Code Penal Indigene, and “the entire case law of the courts of the country.” Following the lengthy citation of these legal precedents, Hishmat wrote:

> It follows that in authorizing or simply tolerating gambling in a public establishment, notwithstanding that this establishment would try to cover the irregularity of the situation by a system of name cards, subscriptions, or any other system of this kind, the Government would be accomplice to a violation of the Law.\(^{473}\)

In his denial of Moncharmont, Minister Hishmat acknowledged the Egyptian government's complicity in smaller scale gambling that occurred in private clubs. Hishmat Pasha recognized a fundamental moral quandary raised by public gaming: tolerance by the government of a legal duplicity whereby laws were only selectively enforced meant the state participated in collusion against itself. Though the Egyptian state criminalized gambling, it knowingly acquiesced to the illegal practices of the powerful. The efforts by Moncharmont and his associates to create a casino were not the last attempt to build a large scale public gaming operation, which forced the Egyptian state to confront its commitment to anti-gambling measures.

The publicity that surrounded any such capital-intensive development such as the Helwan casino project tested the government’s commitment to their own anti-gambling legislation. In the summer of 1928, the Egyptian press reported the efforts of a gambling consortium to create a pleasure center on the Egyptian coast. This proposed

development was not merely a local issue, but became a national topic that invited commentary on the morality of gaming and the responsibilities of the state. In July 1928, Hassan al-Bannā, the head of the Muslim Brothers, weighed in on the issue of gambling at a meeting at the association’s clubhouse. His lecture was subsequently published in a two-part article entitled “The Dangers of Gambling and the Fairuz Coast Project” in the magazine al-Fath. al-Bannā delivered this speech very early in his public political career. He had formally founded his movement in March 1928, only several months before this speech. The eloquence with which al-Bannā defended his moral beliefs presaged his successful as the leading moral critique of his day. al-Bannā’s reasoning as to the inherent immorality of gambling reflected the evolution of moral arguments in Egypt. Thirty years previously, Rashid Rida condemned gambling in a single paragraph in al-Manar, content that declaring games a chance a sin was sufficient to convince his readers. al-Bannā’s lecture ranged widely in his use of supporting evidence as to the inherent and eternal evil of gambling. The learned invocation of religious knowledge cemented the al-Bannā’s authority as a scholar and capable social critic, but he did not limit his argument to citation of Quranic verses or sayings of the prophet. Opening with a reference to modern psychologists, then quoting jahili and Abbassid poets, al-Bannā marshaled examples from Islamic patrimony alongside the latest scientific findings. al-Bannā cited medical opinions new and old. He quoted Galen on the heart, who warned against staying up late and little

sleep. Greek medicine in turn supported a saying of Prophet Muhammad to Ibn Umar on the same danger. Then al-Bannā referred to the work modern doctors as further evidence that gambling rather than sleeping was harmful. In a clear effort to attract as large an audience as possible, al-Bannā's argument ranged widely in a reflection of the complexity of moral decisions. Had he solely quoted religious texts, al-Bannā's speech would have limited his audience. Instead, in his weaving of historical literary sources with current socio-scientific findings, al-Bannā crafted a powerful sermon that appealed to logic and faith.

Not only the form but also the content of al-Bannā's argument merits close attention. al-Bannā organized his fivefold argument by addressing in turn the moral, health, financial, social, and religious dangers posed by gambling. al-Bannā spoke at length about the personality changes within the gambler. The winning gambler “puts his hand in the pocket of his friend, relative, or associate, and takes his money. Thus he is a thief and a monster: a thief because he takes what is not his without giving in return, and a monster because the sadness of others.”475 In al-Bannā's teleology, gambling led inexorably to an increase in laziness and dependence on luck, rather than self-reliance, activity, and honest work. Its worst excesses could even result in the suicides of ruined gamblers, of which al-Bannā had heard. More commonly, al-Bannā warned that gambling distracted from the performance of legitimate work, religious obligations, and daily acts of virtue, such as helping the sick, visiting friends, and

475 Ibid.
familial duties towards his wife and children. Gamblers quickly resorted to lying and theft to cover their losses, thus threatening public order. al-Bannā painted a convincing portrait of gambling as a particularly insidious form of corruption which, if not stopped, would end in the ruin of all of Egyptian society. The prohibition of casinos was a clear cut public issue: nominally, the views of the government and social activists aligned. If the government wavered in its commitments against gambling, social reformers were quick to admonish politicians who condoned games of chance.

The State Cannot be Omnipresent: Class Divisions and Selective State Intervention

Since the 1890s, the Egyptian state had spent decades trying to suppress gaming in private apartments in a very public war against immorality. The state repeatedly edited its law governing public establishments to combat public gaming. Prior to World War I, Cairo’s elites used the government’s definition of public to privatize spaces as national associations. Registering with the government as a private club conveyed a measure of impunity from police raids: the freedom to speak and act as one wished helped drive a remarkable rise in associational life in Cairo during the interwar period. This section explores how actors manipulated the state and the boundary between private and public. The inability of the police to limit the elements with the Cairene public’s right to free association at registered private clubs and the question of what constituted a legal public establishment remained a constant irritation to the Egyptian administration throughout the period under study.
Following independence, the number and variety of private clubs in Cairo increased dramatically. Lovers of sport established their own clubs where members could fence, swim, sail, play tennis, or engage in whatever athletic pastime they preferred. The various political parties formed clubs for their supporters. Members of certain professions and ethnic groups also came together to form their own social clubs. In keeping with the democratic nature of these clubs, members of new clubs could vote on whether gambling would be tolerated on club grounds. Some associations voted to ban explicitly gambling within club grounds. Though nominally forbidden until club rules and public ordinance, members of the Turf Club continued to wager on games of whist and billiards as they had always done. Some new clubs became infamous for the gambling among members, including members of the Egyptian royal family. The Royal Automobile Club of Egypt, founded in 1924 in the Abdeen district, attracted wealthy car owners, and the clubhouse gained a reputation as a place where risk-seeking members played poker and swapped information on race horses. The ability to organize and articulate legal arguments to privatize public space shielded the upper and middle classes from a measure of police scrutiny. The inability of the police to control behavior within these privatized spaces sparked attempts to extend the power of the state.

476 For example, the statutes of the club for Mutuelle des Employes de Banque et des administrations publiques et privees du Caire included: “Art. 6-Tous les jeux de hasard sont formellement prohibes dans le local de la Societe.” al-Sharikāt wa-al-Jamaʿiyāt: al-Nūwādī al-Adabiyah wa al-Riyādiyah: mawdūʿāt mukhtalīfah 1886-1926 (Companies and Associations: Literary and Athletic clubs: Different Subjects:), 177, 4b. Majlis al-Wuzaraʿ archive at Dār al-Withāʿiq, Cairo, Egypt.

477 Baraka, The Egyptian upper class, 190.
Complaints from the Cairo Police and the Creation of the Vice Squad

To explore the process by which the Egyptian state sought to challenge the boundaries of public and private space, I examine the observations and recommendations of the Cairo police. The front line of the Egyptian state’s war on gambling was manned by police officers, who spent hours gathering evidence against suspected gambling dens. The police were the first to notice the challenge to the anti-gambling laws posed by the freedom of association in private clubs. In 1925, the Cairo police formed a consultative committee to discuss problem areas that needed legislative redress, and the findings of the committee were in turn passed on to the Ministry of the Interior and the rest of the Egyptian government through the annual reports. From the onset of the consultation committee’s work, the police singled out the link between gambling and private clubs as a problem area. The 1926 annual report related,

Today anyone can open what they call a club just with informing police and submitting a copy of the charter. The police do not have the authority to refuse or inspect them, so most are gambling shops in what they call clubs and the only thing the police can do is collect evidence that the place is a public establishment operating without a license and individuals present in the club didn’t enter under the declared rules. The public establishment law needs work.478

The licensing of clubs made enforcement of anti-gambling laws nearly impossible: unlike the gambling clubs that operated illicitly under capitulatory privilege prior to World War I, these clubs were protected under Egyptian law, and agents of the Egyptian state could not gain access to these spaces.

The claim that the law governing public establishments had been perverted became a regular feature of police reports during the interwar period. In the introduction to the 1927 annual report, the head of Cairo’s police, Russell Pasha, renewed his condemnation of the so-called private clubs: “Due to the lack of necessary legislation, many betting shops under the name of clubs are starting up: these clubs are a great danger to the youth of the city and a source of constant income for their swindler owners.”479 In invoking the threat to the youth posed by these gambling clubs, Russell Pasha strove to push the legislators into action. In the annual report for 1930, a clearly frustrated Russell Pasha recapitulated lengthy quotes from his previous annual reports, emphasizing issues such as morality offenses, the need to reform the laws governing public establishments, and gambling halls masquerading as private clubs. Russell Pasha lamented that investigating transgressions against public morality, including gambling, which “consume 50% of the efforts and labor of police in the cities, and until now, no government has legislated a creation for the solution to them.”480 The enormity of the disciplining project of enforcing legislation on public morality dwarfed the available resources of Cairo’s police. In face of governmental failure to reform existing legislation on moral issues, Russell Pasha lamented: ‘How many times have I demanded the creation of a vice squad (maktab al-ādāb) or a team to battle vice?’481

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The police did not take the flaunting of gambling laws lightly and resented their own inability to determine the parameters of acceptable public behavior.

Since 1926, Russell Pasha had demanded that the government create a vice squad to oversee moral issues that threatened public order such as prostitution, gambling, and begging. After repeated calls for the desperate need for such a force, the creation of a vice squad finally was authorized on December 16, 1937. Until this point, the central government in Cairo had passed laws regulating gambling, expecting an already overtaxed police force to address the problem. The basic work of squad was fighting the owners of secret brothels, slavers, groups of thugs, and “those who abet corruption in public streets,” including secret presses and owners of gambling clubs. On April 7, 1938, the small force of police assigned to the office included an Egyptian constable, an officer, and six soldiers. The men were tasked with stopping professions deemed immoral by the state, which included even arresting beggars who collected cigarette butts. With a force dedicated to crimes of immorality, state prosecution of offenders outpaced previous police efforts. The annual number of gambling cases brought against operators of public establishments steadily increased.

The data collected by these agents detailing enforcement of the laws against gambling in public establishments during the period 1927-1946 reveals that while public casino-style gaming never reached endemic levels, the police were unable to eliminate gambling totally from public spaces. The number of cases each year prosecuted by the

police remained low in the 1930s, with spikes of police action in 1927-8 and during World War II. The upsurge in the number of cases brought against operators of public establishments, particularly unlicensed ones, during the hectic years of World War II recalls that axiom of world history: soldiers like to gamble. As with the previous chapter’s discussion of Cairo during World War I, more soldiers in the Egyptian capital stimulated a rise the market for gaming of all types. The tens of thousands of soldiers who passed through Cairo during the war against fascism were not subject to local criminal law as per article four of the convention signed on August 26, 1936 regarding immunities and privileges of British Forces in Egypt.\textsuperscript{483} The annual police reports divided gambling cases in public establishments into two categories: cases of gambling in licensed and unlicensed public establishments. As per the public establishment law of 1904, the punishment in both cases included fines and/or the permanent closure of the public establishment.

\textsuperscript{483}FO 841-561. “Cases against members of the British forces.” p. 3. Summary of British Consular court records from 1943.
### Table 14: Judgments against Public Establishments in Cairo for Gambling Offenses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gambling in licensed public establishments</th>
<th>Gambling in unlicensed public establishments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fine</td>
<td>Fine and Permanent Closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
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<td>1934</td>
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<td>1935</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
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<td>1945</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>0</td>
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</table>

Recorded cases against operators of public establishments reveal a number of patterns about the evolution of gambling practices in Cairo. Until 1940, the police were more likely to observe and prosecute gambling cases if the offense occurred in a licensed public establishment. Registration with the state as an officially licensed bar, cafe, or restaurant put an establishment on the government's map, which made policing easier. Rather than pursuing the permanent closure of the offending licensed locale, the Egyptian state generally dealt lightly with these legitimate businesses, and most

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484 This data has been collected from the Arabic versions of annual reports of the Cairo police for the period 1927-1946.
licensed operators charged with gambling were punished only with a fine. Given that an establishment could only be closed by the state after multiple infractions of the gambling law, the higher number of fines versus closure suggests that the threat of discovery by the state likely deterred cafe-owners from slipping into old habits. Opportunists who opened places of entertainment without completing the necessary paperwork had worse odds before the court than their licensed competition. The influx of soldiers with the intensification of military action in the 1940’s coincided with a spike in gambling in unlicensed venues.

I have shown how gambling shows the contestation over control over space and behavior. Even when presented with generous investment propositions, the Egyptian state maintained its stance against large casinos, which mollified conservative elements in society. Gamblers who enjoyed card games exploited loopholes in the law governing public establishments and pursued their pastimes freely in private clubs. Despite regular complaints from Russell Pasha in the Cairo police, the Egyptian state did not take action against private clubs to limit the rights of free association. Stymied in its struggle with associational life, the state also faltered in its enforcement efforts of both licensed and illicit gambling in public areas frequented by the non-elite urban population. The licensing regime of public establishments and private clubs, which relied upon both state supervision and self-regulation by proprietors, proved unsuccessful at eliminating gambling on cards. Equally unsuccessful was the threat of the state’s coercive power as a deterrent for unregulated and unlicensed gamesmen.
III. Choosing Bread over Heaven: The Poor, Lotteries, and Itinerant Salesmen

As the final section in the previous chapter demonstrated, the gambling practices of the urban poor of Cairo were not a priority for the British imperial state. Following Egyptian independence, the police took a greater interest in the leisure activities of the masses. Lotteries for charities grew in popularity, much to the chagrin of social conservatives and the police. Stymied in the fight against elite and middle-class gambling, police agents sought greater powers to bring their vision of order to the streets of Cairo, which entailed ending itinerant salesmen. I rely upon police records to explore how the Egyptian state attempted, and failed, to monitor and control the itinerant gamesman. Unlike the peasants or workers, itinerant peddlers and gamesmen were not the subject for large scale governmental reform.

Uneven economic growth displaced thousands from the countryside who came to work in the cities. As existing scholarship on working class history has shown, economic instability continued throughout the interwar period.485 Rising population coincided with steady decline in prices for agricultural commodities, which put severe strain on the labor market in Egypt.486 As unemployment grew, more of Cairo’s population was forced into the unlicensed, informal market for goods and services. The urban poor who worked as itinerant gamesmen or lottery salesmen were thrice-cursed:

living at the margins of the socio-economic system, excluded from associational life, and persecuted by the state, mobile gamesmen operated outside sanctioned behaviors and spaces. The sole method of obtaining recognition by state and society was through connections to philanthropic organizations.

The state recognized a small subset of itinerant gamesmen as legitimate participants in the urban economy: those lottery sellers connected to licensed charities. Philanthropic activity among Egyptians, particularly among women, grew significantly during the interwar years. Johnson and McIntosh periodized Egyptian women’s involvement with large-scale reform efforts, which expanded greatly following the return to parliamentary life after the autocratic rule of Ismail Sidqi. The Women’s Club of Cairo, founded in 1934, served the dual function as a venue for socialization and philanthropic organization. The vibrant charitable scene of interwar Egypt was funded by popular games of chance.

Lotteries proved to be extremely popular among charities, and the regular income from this popular form of gambling encouraged other civil associations to follow suit. The following chart details the number of registered charities that conducted lotteries and is based off data the Arabic version of the annual reports from the Cairo police for the period 1925-1946.

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487 Hussein noted that the Club “had been originally formed mainly to provide social entertainment for the Cairo women, with some minor philanthropic activities.” Aziza Hussein, “The Role of Women in Social Reform in Egypt,” *Middle East Journal* 7.4 (1953), 448. Amy J. Johnson and Scott David McIntosh “Empowering Women, Engendering Culture,” in *Re-envisioning Egypt 1919-1952* eds. Arthur Goldschmidt, Amy J. Johnson, and Barak A. Salmoni (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, c2005), 249-276.
Table 15: Number of Charitable Lotteries Registered with Cairo Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Lotteries</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>1926</td>
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<td>36</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of charities operating registered lotteries grew by roughly 25% over the twenty years under study, expanding from 33 in 1925 to 44 in 1946. The statistics confirm that lotteries were a proven method of raising capital from an expansive set of potential donors thanks to the low cost of tickets. Lottery sales funded a vibrant and active charitable scene in Cairo, and no doubt much good was done to serve the vulnerable. Orphans, widows, the infirm, and even beasts of burden were supported by monies earned by operating a game of chance. As the number of lotteries increased, demands on the state similarly grew.

Legislation allowed recognized charitable organizations to hold supervised lotteries as fund-raising projects; however, it was not clear initially which agency bore the responsibility for this supervision. The 1905 edict mandated that charities wishing to conduct lotteries register with the government, and the police were ultimately charged with ensuring that the lotteries were fair. The police, however, complained that such work posed yet another burden on an already overtaxed force and was not their responsibility. From 1926 until 1940, each annual report from the Cairo police included a section covering duties performed by the police that they believed fell outside their purview of fighting crime and maintaining public order. Under the section enumerating those tasks related to “Financial section and administration of the governorate,” the annual reports listed “distribution of tickets for charitable
organizations." The annual reports of the Cairo police did not offer alternative solutions as to which administrative branch of the Cairo governorate should be responsible for charitable lotteries. The precise protocol for the distribution of charitable lottery tickets is unclear, but the amount of work involved was evidently sufficient as to merit regular complaint over a fourteen year period.

**Itinerant Salesmen: Beggars, Vagrants, or Working Poor?**

Wandering gamesmen and lottery sellers did not attract concerted attention from the Cairo police prior to World War I. With little control from the state and a positive reception among customers in Cairo's public areas, itinerant sellers established themselves within the fabric of Cairene markets. Following independence, the police of Cairo strove to deracinate wandering salesmen, but with little success. A licensing system was proposed, but the manpower needed to observe and check the license of every itinerant salesman who touted the favorable odds of his lottery was too big of a project for the police. In this section, I explore how attempts to extend state power over the public markets of Cairo by analyzing the discursive engagement of the police with itinerant salesmen.

Russell Pasha first tackled the issue of itinerant salesmen at length in the 1926 police report. Russell reported that in February 1915, the Egyptian government issued a law governing wandering salesmen, but the edict remained unenforced until 1917 when the state turned its focus to poor relief. Following the armistice and the onset of public
unrest in 1919, the law on itinerant sellers was totally unenforced, further strengthening the argument introduced in the second chapter on temperance that in times of great political upheaval, moral issues like gambling were shunted aside in favor of more pressing matters. The Egyptian state confronted the issue of wandering salesmen following independence. In January 1924, the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior submitted a proposed law to the legislature, but the government failed to produce a new law. The existing law governing itinerant gamesmen defined them as vagrants, effectively denigrating their simple trade to the level of mendicants.

Like the legal definition of vagrants that placed beggars, cigarette pickets, and simple gamesmen in the same group, Russell Pasha’s treatment of wandering salesmen conflated the legitimate trader pushing carts laden with wares with the roaming gamer. Both groups were a security risk and nuisance in Russell Pasha’s eyes. Russell complained that these salesmen were working without a license and were stopped by the police only if they set up shop on prohibited roads. Russell sketched out his intra-ministerial vision for the new law of itinerant sellers that linked the powers of the police, traffic department, and Ministry of Health. Russell made four suggestions for inclusion in the new legislation: (1) limiting the number of licenses (2) restricting licenses to those born in Cairo and long-term residents (3) requiring salesmen to present a personal certificate of identity and photo (4) setting a minimum age of fourteen. 

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489 Ibid.
The recommendations of Russell Pasha were distributed through the halls of Egyptian government, and the politicians charged with producing legislation on moral issues weighed the advice of an experienced police officer with first-hand experience in the war on vice.

While the customers of Cairo’s cafes had become habituated to the convenience of roaming merchants, Russell Pasha disapproved at such forms of economic exchange. Russell sided with the merchant class against the poor, stating “The masses do not need wandering salesmen, as everything they sell can be bought at stores. Wandering sales is the pretext for vagabondry.” Russell took it upon himself to speak for the Egyptian masses while passing judgment upon an entire subset of the poor, whose numbers steadily expanded with urbanization. Russell expressed his unease that these sellers included large numbers of recent migrants from Upper Egypt who came to the capital in search of work. The following year, 1927, Russell began the annual police report with the issue of itinerant salesmen and his failure to secure the aforementioned reforms. The status quo reigned, and the police could stop wandering sellers from conducting business only on the streets with more traffic and modern transportation. In 1928, petty crime continued unabated, as the number of misdemeanors rose steadily. Russell Pasha complained that Cairo was awash in vice, as prostitutes, car thieves, robbers, itinerant salesmen, unlicensed lottery ticket sellers, purveyors of pornographic

490 Ibid.
pictures, and beggars all plied their trade in the streets of Cairo. Russell did not see the labors of the wandering salesmen or lottery tout as legitimate work, but as a source of immorality, crime, and idleness.

Exacerbated by the global economic crisis, crimes of immorality surged in the start of the 1930’s. Reacting to the inability of the police to stem the tide of crime in 1930, Russell Pasha’s twelfth introduction to the annual police reports was the longest of his career. Russell Pasha had become clearly exasperated with the failure of the Egyptian government to listen to his recommendations. Russell Pasha quoted himself, at length, from previous reports regarding what was wrong in Cairo and what must be done to tackle crime. Russell repeated his unmet demands from 1925, 1927, and 1929, including the need for new laws regarding itinerant salesmen. As in 1925, Cairo remained the center of crime in Egypt, particularly in the number of misdemeanors for minor offenses. Poor neighborhoods awash in petty crime were full of unemployed men of uncertain virtue (in the police’s estimation), ex-convicts on parole, and roaming tradesmen.

In a break from the 1926 report, Russell distinguished in 1930 between types of mobile salesmen, which he divided into two groups based on the ownership of a cart. Russell came late to the understanding of hierarchy among the poor: the capital

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493 Russell Pasha referenced the 1926 annual report of the Cairo police wherein in 1925 the total number of misdemeanor cases in Cairo comprised 42% of all misdemeanors in Egypt. Ibid.
required to purchase a cart or beast of burden was far beyond the means of the mobile lottery maker or simple gamesman. Whether pushing a cart or carrying their wares along the streets of downtown Cairo or its suburbs, these mobile sellers remained unregulated in the name of freedom of livelihood. Though his knowledge of the poor had deepened, and he recognized the reality that these nomadic men had established a market for their services, Russell Pasha remained unconvinced as to their necessity. Russell wrote in 1930, “itinerant salesmen have no use at all, and they are nothing but a reason for the overcrowding of sidewalks and streets. Thanks to their presence, vagabond youths are protected from arrest for vagrancy by the police.”

Russell Pasha wanted orderly streets with merchants in their stores, but Cairo’s markets had their own order that he and the police force were incapable of mastering. Russell effectively wrote off stopping the mobile gamers who wandered the cafes of Cairo, observing, “it is too late to address itinerants in cafes as they have buyers of pistachios and sticks.” The pistachio sellers that Rashid Rida had complained about thirty years ago in 1900 had established themselves as a permanent fixture in the urban fabric. The creation of the vice squad in 1937 was aimed, in part, at controlling the itinerant gamesman. Minor offenders, which likely included lottery ticket peddlers, were taken off the streets, sent to royal farms to work and received new clothes. Cairene society had come to accept, and even enjoy, certain forms of gambling in its public spaces.

494 Ibid.
Disapproving societal reactions among conservative Egyptian and Western to the poor, itinerant salesmen who thronged the streets with their wares and services mirrored state perceptions. The police regarded the mobile, unsupervised poor hustlers as a serious threat to public order. The difficult circumstances of these men with limited economic prospects or capital required them to walk the streets of Cairo every day, wandering the cafes and public spaces in search of a game, all while avoiding gaze of the searching agent of the state. Yet, the wandering salesmen did not operate in marginal physical settings. They encountered members of all classes in their perambulations among the cafes, markets, and streets of Cairo. Cairo annual police reports revealed that the size of police force routinely more than doubled during the night shift, suggesting that individuals who posed a perceived threat to public order, such as those engaged in illegal gambling, were far more active at night when detection was all the more difficult. The choices of the mobile gamesman can be read as a form of popular resistance to legal circumscription: these individuals defied state projects to define proper and moral employment. They rejected the moral proscriptions of the most conservative elements of Cairene society, including leading Muslim scholars and American missionaries, and sought out their livelihood by whatever means available and profitable. Labeled criminal threats to public order and subject to arrest if discovered in flagrant delecto or with gaming implements, the itinerant gamesmen of Cairo did not share the same moral vision of religious and security establishment. The
wandering purveyors of simple games of chance and lotteries put economic need before religious scruples and chose willingly to play a game or two.

The fact that the Egyptian government continued to allow lotteries did not go unnoticed by moral critics. In the moral arithmetic of the British administrators of Egypt, a small evil could be tolerated provided that the proceeds of that act served the greater good, in this instance funding the amelioration of societal ills. These charitable, licensed lotteries coexisted with unregistered, illegal lotteries of uncertain fairness, as the lottery ticket sellers of all stripes continued to proclaim their prizes with gusto in the cafes and markets of Cairo. The religious condemnation of lotteries by conservatives and government repression did little to deter those who made their living selling lottery-tickets. Many sellers were likely aware of the sinful nature of their trade but continued to sin out of economic need. In September 1925, a correspondent for the Liberal-Constitutionalist newspaper, Kashkūl, encountered a lottery-ticket peddler while sitting at a coffee-shop in Cairo. This particular lottery-ticket purveyor proclaimed “Simon and Islam lottery!” After buying a ticket, the journalist was ordered by the lottery-seller, “Get that ticket away from me! The lottery’s name has upset the ministers and the ‘ulama, and now the country has fallen into a crisis that will end God only knows!” The Kashkūl correspondents jokingly commented that Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq, who had recently published the contentious Islam and the Roots of Governance (1925) and called for the separation of religion and politics, even influenced the lottery
makers. While the journalists were amused by the lottery seller’s antics, their humor belies a possible tragic scenario. If the lottery seller’s outrage was not feigned, then he continued to engage in economic behavior that he found to be morally reprehensible, but he was forced by need to persist in it despite his personal objections.

Muslim religious leaders were not alone in their condemnation of lotteries. Disapproving Protestant missionaries reported that young boys were selling lottery tickets in Cairo and offered photographic evidence as to the corruption of Egyptian society.

![Image of Egyptian Boys Selling Lottery Tickets](https://example.com/image.png)

Figure 3: Picture of Egyptian Boys Selling Lottery Tickets

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495 “al-Islām wa-al-Yānāṣīb,” Kashkūl, September 18, 1925.
496 Missionary Review of the World, October 1926, 783.
The picture accompanying the article shows two smiling boys holding what the author purported to be lottery tickets. The quality of the photo makes identification of the supposed lottery tickets impossible. It is noteworthy that Presbyterian missionaries shared a similar moral vision to conservative Muslims on the issue of lotteries. However, the degree of attention raised by Presbyterians in Egypt on the rising popularity of lotteries did not ever reach the level of temperance activities among the W.W.C.T.U. Protestant missionaries were swift to condemn lotteries regardless of the connection to charities. Their voice, however, was a minor one in the Egyptian public sphere.

Lotteries had become the most common form of gambling, yet the corresponding outcry by the moralists on lotteries in particular did not come. The Egyptian public accepted the presence of lotteries, both of the charitable and unregulated varieties. Shortly after the establishment of the vice squad, developments in state administration shuffled the vice squad from one governmental portfolio to another. The government sought to further centralize general reform efforts through the creation of Ministry of Social Affairs in August 1939: the vice squad was attached to new ministry though its work remained essentially the same. Issues of morality during the war years heightened in publicity due to a rise in conservative, reform-minded Egyptian political groups. As Rashid Rida and countless other reformers and publicists of social issues had done under other rulers, social critics sought to influence state efforts to monopolize the role of arbiter of morality through licensing and police raids.
Regulation of the lotteries was placed under the authority of Social Affairs: all charities were required to register with the new ministry. The police continued to assume responsibility for enforcement of the lottery law on the streets of Cairo. In May 1940, the vice squad was placed under the presidential office for vice, only to be transferred back to the Ministry of the Interior and police in November 1940. For a small force, the vice squad carried significant political weight that had serious ramifications for whatever larger government agency was willing to assume responsibility for the maintenance of public morality. Given the scope of its activities and the politically sensitive nature of public morality, the vice squad faced a near-impossible task. Failure to achieve results exposed the government to public censure. The newspaper of the Muslim Brothers lamented in 1942 that the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Social Affairs were collaborating on a revision of the laws governing gambling and clubs with the intention of bringing new legislation before the parliament. The newspaper of the Muslim Brothers avowed that the organization would only accept the total ban on gambling in all its forms.497

Unfortunately for the frustrated police and social reformers, Egyptians persisted in enjoying games of chance. 1944 and 1945 saw a significant number of illegal lottery tickets being sold in public, with 462 and 380 individuals arrested, most of whom were no doubt poor, wandering salesmen.498 The returns for the vice squad detailed the

number of cases brought against sellers of illicit lottery tickets, which regularly outstripped the number of cases against gambling dens by a factor of four.

**Conclusion**

In exploring societal and governmental responses to gambling in Egypt, this chapter reveals how agents of state power and moralizing critics shaped the battle for control of public behavior. This chapter has considered diverse forms of gambling and an array of gamblers and gamesmakers. Whatever the form of the game and the size of the wager, gambling was inherently a social activity whereby the gamers made wagers in full view: the public nature of the act of gambling invited criticism by those social entrepreneurs who by position or conviction assumed the role of arbiter of public morality. Moralists in the press and religious institutions did not waver in their opposition to games of chance. The failure of the Egyptian state and public moralists to dissuade Egyptians from gambling reveals the limits of moral authority to control the public, both in terms of physical spaces of the urban setting and individual choice.

Faced with continued evolution of public gambling, the Egyptian state had to adapt its techniques of coercion. Confronted with an enduring gap between legislation and enforcement, administrators and police officers railed against the lack of support from politicians. The bureaucracy and the executive branch of the Egyptian government demanded more funds and better laws from legislators to carry out the tasks assigned them, namely fighting vice and immorality. The enormity of policing all under the lottery law were grouped together with other contraventions, making determination of the number of lottery salesmen arrested each year prior to 1945 impossible.
the public establishments necessitated the development of a network of observation which was beyond the means of the Egyptian state. Regulation of gambling changed the use of public space through the expansion of the ability of the state to control the urban scene through inspections, licensing, and closure of offending locales. However, the coercive powers of the government did not deter legally recognized associations and businesses from engaging in extra-legal gambling. Self-regulation in the urban market for gambling proved to be a myth, as every class in Cairo defied state efforts to control their behavior. Elites at the racetrack, club members, and operators of a wide array of public establishments all easily found willing participants for various forms of wagering. Provided they gathered in licensed establishment, Egyptians had the right to associate freely. Elements in Cairene society refused to cease gambling despite criticism of leading intellectuals. Games of chance never disappeared from the streets of Cairo.
Conclusion

This dissertation has examined debates about public morality concerning the spread of alcohol consumption and gambling in Cairo from 1882-1949. This work has explored long standing themes in imperial history, including rivalries between European Powers, interaction between larger British imperial policies and local realities, local claimants to authority in the cultural politics of empire, and the rise of anti-colonial independence movements. I have shown that public spaces and cultural practices connected to alcohol and gambling expanded significantly under imperial rule and occupation. As those public spaces and practices became increasingly conspicuous on the urban landscape, debates about the morality of these sites and practices challenged the authority of the imperial and monarchial states. The struggle for authority over alcohol and gambling led to the politicization and inconsistent criminalization of public morality. However, the state never maintained a monopoly on moral authority: British imperialists and Egyptian politicians both came under criticism from a diverse group of actors who argued for political and social reform.

This work has shown that the struggle to control alcohol and gambling can be studied as an example of a failed disciplining project. Both the imperial and monarchical states were unable to control fully public economic activity and behavior tied to alcohol and gambling. The resiliency of these social issues testifies to the weaknesses of liberal imperial and monarchial states in Egypt. Despite their claims to moral and political authority, the imperial and monarchial states were never able to
enforce these claims or effectively exert power over the urban population. This work also provides a local articulation of the global social reform and anti-vice projects during the period. The international fight against slavery and narcotics succeeded in reducing, but not eliminating, these practices. Similarly, the selective regulation and prohibition of alcohol and gambling in Egypt never eliminated practices deemed illegal, and regulation proved to be too large of a project. This dissertation has explored the limits of liberal imperialism whereby the imposition of foreign rule had inherent and obvious contradictions. British imperialists championed free trade in Egypt, even when this policy came with social costs and engendered resistance. British imperialists were recalcitrant to intervene in potentially expensive and divisive cultural matters. The British promised material progress, order, and moral uplift, but the imperial state only got involved in projects connected to moral progress when pressed by British critics or if public order was threatened. Furthermore, this dissertation has revealed further the hypocrisy of the imperial project. Despite their clearly dominant position in Egypt vis-à-vis other imperial powers, the British imperial administrators chose not to impinge on capitulatory privileges and crafted policies that ensured their own pleasure would not be curtailed.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

This work has opened many doors into the social and political history of Egypt under British occupation, but there remains many other possible avenues of future
research. I examine first potential paths to expand the study of alcohol in Egypt and then turns to additional sites of inquiry in the history of gambling in Egypt.

**Economic History and The “Wet” Lobby**

Studies of the battle against temperance in the United States and Great Britain have described in great detail the ‘wet’ lobby, the political face of economic actors involved in the alcohol trade. Currently, this work only has had access to one side of the temperance story: those who sought to control or limit the flow of alcohol in Egypt. The next stage of research will pursue economic studies of alcohol importers, local purveyors of drink among the Greek community, and domestic producers.

From the beginning of the debate about the place of alcohol in occupied Egypt, state officials and temperance agents singled out the Greeks as the primary purveyors of alcohol. Official data from the census confirmed that the majority of Greek men living in Egypt worked in the food and drink industry, as grocers, caterers, restaurateurs, café operators, and tavern keepers. The Greek national archive in Athens, especially consular court records from Cairo, could provide invaluable sources. The archives of the Greek Chamber of Commerce in Cairo, which represented Greek economic interest since its founding in 1923, could also provide useful insight into the economic activities of the Greek community. As a significant economic interest, Greek

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drink sellers used their clout repeatedly to pressure their representatives in Athens protect their rights to pursue their livelihood despite local resistance. How did Greeks living in Egypt articulate their defense of free trade? Did they address local cultural animosity to their involvement in the alcohol trade? On the macro-level, analyzing the language of these appeals, whether as formal petitions or informal complaints, will further our understanding of alcohol as capitulatory issue between states and empires. Given the high number of Greeks involved in the drink trade, the consular court records also could contain information about those Greeks who afoul of the police. On the micro-level, examining consular court records will reveal everyday interaction and conflict.

Another future avenue of research into the pro-alcohol lobby will be through a business history of Egypt’s oldest extant alcohol producer, al-Ahram Brewery. The talented Egyptian amateur historian Samir Rifaat has sketched the broad outline of the company’s history, but there is no detailed study of the Brewery based on archival research. Vitalis explored joint ventures between multi-nationals and local capitalists: the dynamics of partnerships between Egyptians and foreigners could shed light on additional dimensions to the market for alcohol in Egypt. The Economic and Business History Research Center (EBHRC) at the American University in Cairo founded by Abdel-Aziz Ezz El-Arab and other leading scholars of economic history has

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admirably shown the strength of the field to explore socio-economic debates in the history of modern Egypt.503

Another aspect of business history that could provide useful insight into the changing place of alcohol in Egyptian society is through the study of advertising. The study of advertising in Egypt has been shown to be a fruitful site of inquiry. In his work on the Egyptian tobacco industry, Relli Schetcher has used rare and unique examples of advertising to explore larger questions of Egyptian identity and lifestyle.504 Nancy Reynolds has also demonstrated that advertising can provide a window in the contested politics of the market and gender debates.505 The analysis of alcohol companies’ printed attempts to attract new customers will reveal private efforts to influence popular attitudes towards alcohol.

Representations of Popular Culture: Film and Literature

This dissertation sought to situate the place of alcohol and gambling in Cairene society, but there remains several untraveled avenues to investigate Egyptians’

exposure to alcohol and gambling in their public lives. This dissertation has relied upon agents who sought to control the physical presence of these products and practices in order to understand popular perceptions of drinkers and gamblers. As noted above, the vast majority of these sources were condemnatory, and an examination of the fictional representation in literary and cinematic production could provide alternatives voices. The growth of the Egyptian film industry and its connections to the larger socio-political order have been studied by a number of scholars, including Walter Armbrust, Joel Gordon, and Viola Shafik.506 Scholars of interwar Egypt have made extensive use of literature in their studies of the intellectual and social history of the period.507 Egyptian authors, such as Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Naguib Mahfouz, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Yusuf Idris, and Waguih Ghali, all created characters that drank and gambled. What kind of characters drank and gambled? Were depictions of drinking and gambling universally condemnatory, or were these practices somehow glamorized? Given the relative silence of proponents of either alcohol or gambling, analyzing film and literary works could provide key insight into perceptions of these practices.

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506 Walter Armbrust, Mass mediations: new approaches to popular culture in the Middle East and beyond (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Walter Armbrust, Mass culture and modernism in Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Joel Gordon, Revolutionary melodrama: popular film and civic identity in Nasser’s Egypt (Chicago: Middle East Documentation Center, 2002); Viola Shafik, Popular Egyptian cinema: gender, class, and nation (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2007)

**Other games**

This dissertation considered the most popular forms of gambling in Cairo, namely horse racing, card games, and the lottery. However, British and Egyptian elites in Cairo patronized, encouraged, and enjoyed a variety of other leisure activities common to the United Kingdom and across the empire. Polo, pigeon shooting, billiards, golf, and tennis would be fruitful areas of inquiry to explore further the politics of the sporting clubs with their carefully managed processes of exclusion and inclusion. Pigeon shooting was particularly divisive, and records from the Egyptian National Archive detailing the financial management and membership lists of the Royal Shooting Club.

**Moving the story forward**

This dissertation ends its story with the demise of the capitulations, but alcohol and gambling did not lose their political meaning with the assumption of full Egyptian sovereignty. Following the war in Palestine and the withdrawal of British troops to the Canal Zone, the turbulent years of 1949-1951 saw regular incidents of violence, demonstrations, and boycotts of public establishments connected to alcohol and gambling. The political meaning of these spaces and practices changed dramatically as political instability and rising popular unrest grew. During the infamous Black Saturday of January 26, 1952, Egyptian mobs destroyed and burned the Turf Club, numerous Greek-owned taverns and wineshops, nightclubs, cinemas, and other
British/foreign-owned or frequented establishments. Nancy Reynolds and Anne-Claire Kerboeuf emphasized the linkage of Black Saturday with the larger decolonization process and the radicalization of nationalist elements. The choice to burn down public establishments linked to alcohol and gambling bears further analysis.

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