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The crisis and beyond: Prospects for international economic cooperation

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Abstract:

An integrated world economy requires cooperation among major economic powers. Without determined cooperation among the principal powers, globalization is unlikely to survive the inevitable shocks to which it is subjected.

The world faces a difficult adjustment to reduce the macroeconomic imbalances that were a major cause of the current crisis. This means reducing the surpluses of the major surplus countries in East Asia and Europe, and reducing the deficits of the major deficit countries in North America and Europe. Both processes require substantial domestic economic changes; economies and people will be tempted to turn inward, and governments will be tempted to reduce the priority they give to their external ties. This increases the risks of a breakdown in international cooperation.

Historical precedent is instructive. During the interwar period, a global macroeconomic imbalance was a major cause of the eventual economic catastrophe. During the 1920s, Germany borrowed heavily from the United States. But when a crisis hit, it turned out that neither country was politically prepared to maintain cooperative policies. Americans, focused on domestic concerns, were unwilling to help work out a cooperative resolution of the crisis. Germany exploded into social and political unrest and ended up in the hands of rabid nationalists and protectionists. The problem was political: a lack of domestic support for the sacrifices necessary to maintain international cooperation.

As the crisis winds down and post-crisis adjustment begins, major governments will be challenged to work together to support a well-functioning international economy. They will need to address the concerns of constituents who will chafe at the economic changes forced upon them. Governments that can build domestic political support for international economic engagement will be in a stronger position to work to sustain an integrated global economy.
Introduction

The ongoing international economic crisis and its aftermath will have a profound impact on the politics of international economic relations. The crisis will change the ways in which major nations interact with the world economy, and with each other. The principal economic powers will find their interests, and their bargaining positions, altered by the changed environment. These changes are likely to affect the willingness and the ability of the great economic powers to collaborate in managing the international economy.

After the initial stabilization phase of crisis management ends, the world faces a difficult adjustment process to reduce or reverse the macroeconomic imbalances that were a major cause of the crisis. This adjustment requires a reduction in the surpluses of the major surplus countries, in East Asia and Europe; and a reduction in the deficits of the major deficit countries, in North America and Europe. Both processes require substantial domestic economic changes, which will occupy governments and peoples for years to come. There will be a natural tendency for economies and people to turn inward, and for governments to reduce the priority they give to their external ties. As they do so, there is a risk that they will slip toward a breakdown in international cooperation, and even toward open conflict. This makes it crucial to anticipate the challenges ahead, to analyze the politics and economics of these challenges, and to think about the sorts of measures that could help sustain and strengthen political support for an open world economy.

Understanding the crisis

Without an appropriate diagnosis of the problems that led to the crisis, neither a correct prescription nor an accurate prognosis are possible. The principal source of the tensions that erupted into the most serious financial crisis in 75 years was the global macroeconomic imbalances that had developed over the course of the previous decade. Among these imbalances, those associated with the United States were both largest and most important, so that understanding the causes, course, and effects of the American experience is crucial.

The United States is in the midst of a classic debt crisis, the result of a similarly classic capital flow cycle. From 2001 to 2007, the country borrowed between half a trillion and a trillion dollars a year from the rest of the world, about five trillion dollars in total.

As these five trillion dollars – roughly five percent of GDP a year – flooded into the economy, they had the typical effects of a large-scale capital inflow. Consumption exceeded output; investment exceeded savings; government spending exceeded revenue, and all on the basis of borrowing from abroad. The result was a massive expansion of consumption, especially because almost the entirety of the borrowing was done by the household sector or the government. The relative price effects of the capital inflow were also the typical ones: the prices of nontradables rose substantially relative to

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1 My emphasis on the macroeconomic-policy origins of the crisis is not meant to ignore or downplay the role of regulatory failures, or broader failures in financial markets. These certainly played a role, but in my view the macroeconomic imbalances were a crucial enabling or catalyzing force.

2 There are almost as many estimates of the net (and gross) capital inflows as there are ways to measure it; this is meant simply to be illustrative. There is little doubt, no matter how the flows are estimated or the stocks are valued, that the United States incurred a substantial additional debt to the rest of the world between 2001 and 2007.
tradables in a classic real appreciation. Between 2000 and 2007, while durables prices declined 13 percent, services prices rose 25 percent. This was especially evident in the most important nontradable sector, housing.

As is often the case with a capital flow cycle of this type, the inflow created an economic expansion, then a boom, then a bubble. The bubble has now burst, and we are living with the effects of the downswing of the capital flow cycle.

Fortunately for the United States and the world, the debt crisis did not result in a “sudden stop” of lending to the United States, as it often does in developing countries. Instead, the central position of the United States and of the U.S. dollar has meant that the government has continued to be able to borrow from abroad. And this is a very good thing, as it has allowed fiscal and monetary policy to cushion the blow of a financial collapse of massive proportions.

Eventually the current, stabilization, phase of crisis management will fade, and the longer-term implications of the crisis will become clear. Governments face the challenge of overseeing the adjustments required to restore some semblance of equilibrium to the global macroeconomic imbalances that were a major source of the current crisis. What can we expect from those adjustments, and what might they imply about the future of an integrated international economy?

Lessons from theory and history

There are important historical precedents that can help us understand the strengths and weaknesses of crisis response in a globalized international economy. For decades before 1914, the world economy was very tightly tied together – on some measures, such as immigration and a monetary standard, the world was more tightly tied together than the contemporary international economy. And the pre-1914 world economy worked very well, providing rapid growth, the convergence of many poorer and middle-income societies with the industrialized world, and general macroeconomic stability. Yet it could not be restored after the interruption of World War One, despite many efforts to rebuild it (Frieden 2006).

An important global macroeconomic imbalance was in fact central to the dynamic of the interwar period, and turned out to be a major obstacle to attempts to sustain international economic openness. Over the course of the 1920s, one of the world’s leading industrial powers came to rely for its economic growth on borrowing, in particular on borrowing from a young and dynamic rising power. The first country, Germany, ran deficits for largely political reasons. Its weak governments had to pay reparations to the victorious belligerents, finance reconstruction, and satisfy massive social demands. So Germany borrowed very heavily from abroad, largely from the United States, and this borrowing helped fuel a consumption boom that, among other things, dampened some of the underlying social tensions that beset that country’s Weimar Republic. This was no small matter: without American financing to sustain the dynamism of the German economy, Weimar social and political instability might have caused serious problems for the rest of Europe.

Yet there was ambivalence on both sides of the relationship, both about the relationship itself and more broadly about the nature of their ties to the world economy. When a
crisis hit, things fell apart quickly. Although there were plenty of Americans willing to lend to Germany, the American public, in this heyday of American isolationism, rejected any official involvement of the United States in European political or economic affairs. The surplus country was thus unwilling to play a major role in working toward a cooperative resolution of the crisis, preferring to focus its attentions on its domestic concerns. For their part, the German people resented the subordinate position defeat had put them in, the reparations they were forced to pay, and the social disruptions caused by the settlement imposed upon them. And so the deficit debtor nation, faced with the imposition of major austerity measures, exploded into social and political unrest and ended up in the hands of rabid nationalists and protectionists.3

There was nothing technical, or purely economic, about the collapse that ensued. Rather, the principal problem – in particular in the two nations at the core of the crisis – was a lack of domestic political support for international economic engagement. Neither a United States dominated by isolationists, nor a Germany torn asunder by revanchist sentiment and labor-capital conflict, could muster any domestic enthusiasm for making further sacrifices to sustain an international economic order that was deeply unpopular at home.

The lessons from this experience accord with theoretically grounded analyses of international economic affairs. An integrated world economy requires purposeful cooperation among major economic powers. This is true in normal times, as cross-border economic relations need some political infrastructure to provide the kinds of stable expectations that governments supply and economic agents expect domestically. It is especially true in times of stress, for there is no global government capable of confronting a crisis – no lender of last resort, no counter-cyclical demand manager, no supplier of market-preserving public goods. Without determined cooperation among the principal powers, globalization is unlikely to survive the inevitable shocks to which it is subjected.

International economic cooperation requires, in turn, domestic political support for global economic engagement. If domestic publics, mass and special-interest, are unwilling to compromise their national goals for international achievements, cooperative policies will not emerge. Governments will not be willing, or able, to serve as constructive collaborators if their constituents do not evaluate the tradeoff between national and international concerns positively.

The point is not that nations in crisis collapse into evil predation and malicious provincialism. It is that governments faced with very difficult economic, social, and political conditions have as their first priority addressing the needs of their people. And meeting the immediate demands of an anxious populace can dictate policies that aim to ameliorate national conditions, even if this comes at the expense of neighbors and partners. This is the true threat the crisis poses for globalization – now as in the interwar period. It is not of a sudden plunge into trade wars, but of a gradual erosion of support for measures that require compromise with commercial and financial partners, a gradual decline in patterns of cooperation and collaboration.

3 Eichengreen 1992 is the classic survey of the interwar monetary and financial experience, while Clarke 1977 looks primarily at central bank cooperative efforts. Costigliola 1976 focuses on the American-German component of reconstruction. Ferguson and Temin 2003 analyze the currency crisis of 1931, while Balderston 2002 summarizes the more general German crisis and response.
The aftermath of the crisis and the willingness to cooperate

We are now in the early stages of reaction to the crisis – what would be considered, in the typical debt crisis, the stabilization phase, in which policy aims at limiting the immediate damage and avoiding too deep a decline. What comes next are the adjustment and reform stages, in which governments must address the policies that caused the crisis, and then the economic and political structures that led to those policies. What will these stages require from the major economic actors, and what does that imply for international economic cooperation?

The global macroeconomic imbalances discussed above played a central role in the crisis. Of particular importance were the current account deficits of some countries, which created the conditions for the bubbles which have now burst. Of course, these deficits could not have persisted without financing out of substantial current account surpluses, many of which are hard to explain on normal macroeconomic grounds. In any event, it is almost certain that neither deficits nor surpluses of the size we have seen in the past decade are likely to recur in the near future. These imbalances will of necessity have to be reduced.

The major deficit countries will no longer be able to rely on running massive current account deficits. This will especially be the case given the very large additional debt burdens their governments are taking on as they enact counter cyclical fiscal policies. The United States is likely to come out of the Bush Boom and Bust with a net external debt in excess of ten trillion dollars. Even if the private sector might be able to maintain access to external sources of capital, the public sector will spend most of the coming decade attempting to control and reduce the fiscal deficit. Governments in the former deficit economies – the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, many of the transition economies and emerging markets – will need to focus on the inevitable austerity measures they will have to implement. They had financed substantial portions of their consumption, investment, and government spending abroad; they will now have to reduce all three and/or increase output, spending, and government revenues.

The major surplus countries will also face significant adjustments. Even if they wanted to continue to run such substantial surpluses, and to sustain currency and other policies aimed at maintaining these surpluses, their previous markets will be reducing their demand for imports. And there will be pressures from the surplus countries to start realizing the earnings on their accumulated foreign assets. These pressures will come from private citizens and firms with assets abroad; they will also come from consumers whose purchasing power has been limited by reserve policies that keep exchange rates extremely weak.

In both instances, governments and societies are likely to turn inward to deal with the adjustments they face. The United States and other former deficit nations will have to

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4 For an analysis of the political economy of analogous processes in a previous round of debtor nations see Frieden 1991.

5 I do not mean to be too judgmental about the surpluses or the deficits. However, capital flows of the size and nature we have seen are difficult to justify in the context of normal rate-of-return considerations. It seems to me unquestionable that the imbalances were in very large part driven instead by macroeconomic policies, such as loose monetary and fiscal policy in the United States and attempts to avoid currency appreciation in China.
wrestle with stagnant or declining real wages and consumption in an atmosphere of
generalized austerity. This comes on the heels of decades of deterioration of their
income distribution. This trend has led to substantial public dissatisfaction and
resentment, but for the past decade and more the socio-political impact of deteriorating
income distribution has been cushioned by the consumption boom. Now that the
financial bases of this expansion in consumption are gone, there is the risk that latent
antagonisms will come to the fore.

There is little doubt that the United States (and other countries in similar position) faces
a very difficult next ten years. It will not be easy simultaneously to restore
macroeconomic balance, create the conditions for future growth, and maintain a
reasonable social consensus. Most of the government’s, and the society’s, efforts are
likely to be expended in this effort. And where international economic commitments
seem to come in conflict with these crucial domestic objectives, the domestic aims are
almost certain to predominate. This trend will be heightened by the fact that the country
has to radically trim its trade deficit, which will almost certainly lead to aggressive
measures against imports and to stimulate exports. All in all, American policy and
American politics are likely to be very self-absorbed; and when aimed at the foreign
sector, heavily oriented toward improving the country’s competitive position.

China, Germany, and other surplus countries will also of necessity refocus their
economic activity inward. They will find it more difficult to rely so heavily on exports as
an engine of economic growth. They will need to search for domestic sources of
demand. In the case of China (and many other East Asian countries), attempts to keep
the currency weak will face domestic and international political and economic obstacles.
Domestically, there will be political and economic pressure for consumption to rise,
which implies either a nominal appreciation or a real appreciation or both.
Internationally, there will be foreign hostility to weak-currency policies, and perhaps
even implicit or explicit attempts to counter them with corresponding weak-currency
policies. This risks 1930s-style competitive depreciations. It also risks spilling over into
trade disputes driven or exacerbated by currency misalignments.

As the former surplus countries transfer much of their energy home, some of their
enthusiasm for international commitments may wane. Less reliance on foreign markets,
and on foreign currency reserves, presumably means less concern about the letter and
spirit of international institutional commitments and other international economic
obligations.

The American component of this trend is likely to be particularly important. The
American need to reduce its current account deficit may translate into many sorts of

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6 The crisis has already dramatically reduced the country’s trade deficit, but it is almost certain this is a
temporary result of the compression of consumption; what I have in mind here is the longer-term need for the
trade deficit to be reduced.

7 Some suggest that China and other surplus countries will not in fact reorient their economies toward more
reliance on their domestic markets. I regard this as unlikely. For an assessment of the economic implications of
this reorientation, in particular in Asia, see Kuo and N’Diaye 2009a and b, and Prasad 2009. In any case,
continued reliance on trade surpluses might, in the final analysis, be even more likely to cause political conflict
with trading partners. It is also the case that an inward economic turn does not necessarily mean a turn toward
economic nationalism, but it certainly raises the danger of such a turn (by reducing its opportunity cost, for
example).

8 For one discussion see Frieden 2009.
pressures. One might be to weaken the dollar. Another might be to undertake vigorous efforts to open foreign markets, including by the sorts of unilateral trade measures that have been a source of such friction in the past (such as upper 301 cases). There may be heightened demands for import protection. By the same token, the country will emerge from the crisis with strong incentives to reduce the real burden of its very substantial external debt by way of modest inflation and currency depreciation. All of these are almost certain to exacerbate conflicts over commercial, financial, and currency policy with the country’s major partners.

The possibility of more conflictual policies toward commercial and financial partners is heightened to the extent that the principal domestic supporters of globalization emerge weakened from the crisis. This was much of the dynamic of the 1930s: as international trade and finance dried up, the economic agents most closely tied to the world economy (such as coffee in Brazil or banking in the UK) lost much of their domestic political clout. Today the major financial institutions, which had been among the most powerful supporters of international economic integration, are weakened or in disrepute almost everywhere. Potential counter weights to more nationalistic and inward-looking interests have become much lighter.⁹

All this runs in the direction of reducing the interests of major governments in international economic cooperation. It is not that the global economy will become irrelevant, for the depth and breadth of commercial and financial ties is extraordinary. It is, however, that the goals of major governments are likely to be more inward-looking than they have been. Their constituents will be more concerned about domestic matters, and less concerned about international ones, than they have in the recent past. This is likely to translate into a reduced willingness to make the difficult sacrifices and accept the daunting tradeoffs necessary to sustain international economic cooperation.

The new environment and the ability to cooperate

Even if major governments are able to rally domestic support for global engagement, the strategic environment within which they operate will have changed. One aspect of this is the potential de-linking of many national security and international economic goals. Another aspect is the toughened bargaining atmosphere, in which more governments may be tempted to adopt more uncompromising positions as they interact with others.

For most of the past sixty years, there has been a felicitous correspondence between the diplomatic and economic relations among the principal Western powers. In the aftermath of World War II, and as the Cold War progressed, there was a common interest in building stronger political and economic ties between North America, Western Europe, and Japan. This was particularly important in the domestic American context. It is not widely enough recognized how unpopular trade liberalization, and global economic engagement more generally, were in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s. It is almost certainly the case that American leadership in the world economy in this period depended in large part on the validity of the argument that the country could not expect to lead a Western diplomatic alliance if it excluded alliance members from access to American markets and American capital. The negative example of the

⁹ One such potential counter weight may be international corporations with global production networks, which have come to rely upon the free movement of goods and capital in their global sourcing.
interwar period helped point Americans away from a return to isolationism, but there was great popular ambivalence about economic openness. To the extent that policymakers could point to the nexus between national security concerns and foreign economic policy, a consensus in favor of both the Western alliance and international economic integration could be created and sustained.\(^\text{10}\)

The security-economic connection is much more tenuous today. After the Cold War, there is far less perceived need for Western solidarity; China and Russia have joined the world’s capitalist economy. One set of American national security concerns focuses on Islamic extremism. The nation’s economic interests seem either unrelated or inimical to these concerns; some might argue that dependence on Middle Eastern oil may be particularly ill-advised in the new security environment.\(^\text{11}\) Another set of American national security concerns focuses on China. Again, American economic interests seem to many Americans to be at odds with its security goals. Reliance on Chinese imports, and Chinese capital, does not appear to be a sound basis upon which to prepare for potential conflicts with a rising Chinese power.

Whether these concerns about the contradiction between American security and economic goals are justified, it is certainly the case that it will be far more difficult to muster domestic political support inside the United States for globalization as part of a broad Western alliance-building strategy. America’s core foreign policy goals have seemed for many decades to be in line with its international economic goals; today and in the future that may not be so obvious. And similar things could be said about many of the other major powers.

In addition to the erosion of strong ties between security and economic relations, there is also likely to be an evolution in the potential bargaining power of the principal economies that could complicate international agreements. For the continuation and deepening of international cooperation – especially in difficult times – depends not only on the willingness of governments to entertain collaborative results, but on their ability to negotiate their way to such results.

Economic interdependence is often said to facilitate inter-governmental cooperation. This is not only because it creates interests in favor of cooperation, but also because it raises the costs of failing to cooperate, hence encouraging more accommodating negotiating positions. To the extent that countries place more stress on their domestic problems, and less on the foreign sector, they tend to harden their bargaining positions with their interlocutors.

Inasmuch as the aftermath of the crisis leads policy-makers to be more absorbed with domestic conditions, there will be an impact on the bargaining problems they will face with one another. A basic principle of bargaining is that the more attractive is the alternative to achieving an agreement, the harder it will be to make the agreement (this is the role of the “outside option” in bargaining power). And as national constituencies become more insistent on the urgent need to address domestic problems, policy-makers in many nations are likely to find themselves drawn toward unilateralism as an attractive

\(^{10}\) Fordham 1998 is an excellent analysis of how national-security and foreign economic policy concerns were brought together in the crafting of postwar American policy.

\(^{11}\) A potential national-security fear of the dangers of dependence on foreign oil may, however, mesh with environmental concerns.
alternative to the complexities, uncertainties, and potential sacrifices involved in working
toward greater international cooperation.

As governments of major countries turn inward to design and implement post-crisis
adjustments and reforms, they are likely to be less conciliatory, less willing to forgo
immediate national advantage for long-term global improvements. And this will make it
more difficult to find the common ground and feasible compromises necessary to permit
more international agreements. Not only, then, will major governments be less willing to
make compromises with their commercial and financial interlocutors, but they will be
less able to find a bargaining space that would make such compromises relatively easier
to achieve.

**Where there is hope**

This is not to imply that the coming decade will of necessity be one of dire austerity,
social unrest, and global conflicts. It is, instead, to attempt to identify the principal
sources of tensions that could undermine or block the reconstruction of a well-
functioning integrated international economy.

The first such source of tension will be the domestic constituents who will chafe at the
economic changes forced upon them. Former deficit countries will be driven to impose
austerity so as to restore macroeconomic balance, and this austerity will be socially
onerous and politically dangerous. Former surplus countries will have to refocus their
economic efforts on domestic demand, and the transition away from so heavy a reliance
on export growth will impose adjustment costs on many segments of the economy.
Policy-makers need to address these pressures effectively and judiciously, providing
enough of a safety net to help soften the opposition of affected and entrenched
interests, but also allowing necessary adjustments to take place.

At the international level, the preoccupation with domestic concerns risks diverting
national governments from their global obligations. The aftermath of the crisis will pull
governments away from commitments to international economic cooperation. It will also
push them toward harder, more intransigent, bargaining positions. All this risks starting
the world’s major governments toward a vicious circle, in which conflicts proliferate and
deepen as concern for national recovery mounts.

There is, however, nothing inevitable about greater conflict. If policy-makers can
accurately identify the sources and dimensions of pressures that push in the direction of
conflict, they can act to mitigate or counteract them. If they do so, they can help create a
self-reinforcing virtuous circle in which cooperative initiatives end up reinforcing rather
than undermining national attempts to achieve national goals.

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