Why (So many) Parties? The Logic of Party Formation in Senegal

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Why (So many) Parties? The Logic of Party Formation in Senegal

A dissertation presented

by

Catherine Lena Kelly

to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

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Why (So many) Parties? The Logic of Party Formation in Senegal

Abstract

Political parties proliferated in Senegal and other competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa. This dissertation examines the causes and consequences of that proliferation. Why do so many politicians create their own parties in this context and what are the consequences of party proliferation for opposition party behavior and presidential turnover?

The dissertation addresses these questions with original data collected over sixteen months of fieldwork in Senegal, including over one hundred interviews, material from party archives, local press clippings, political biographies, and data on elections and party behavior.

Party formation, strategy, and competition are shaped by the “uneven playing field,” a hallmark of competitive authoritarian regimes that entails systematic, deep advantages for the ruling party in terms of access to political finance, media, and the state. Focused on Senegal, a critical case of party proliferation, the dissertation traces how the uneven playing field not only empowers the president to create incentives for proliferation; it also renders life in the opposition so difficult that many politicians form parties to negotiate their way into the state. A significant subset of Senegalese party leaders is primarily concerned not with competing in elections; they focus instead on patronage negotiation, which does not necessarily entail vote-seeking. Moreover, because most party leaders minimize their involvement in elections that are difficult to win, they rarely function as the consistent opposition parties that bolster liberal democracy. Party leaders rarely possess the endowments that foster such behavior—namely, prior experience as high-level state administrators and access to international private financing. Finally, in the absence of consistent opposition parties, ex-regime insiders often constitute the president’s most
serious electoral challengers. Insider opposition candidates’ previous access to the state provides opportunities for political advancement that outsiders lack.
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION

I – The Party-Building Puzzle in Africa

Since the beginning of Africa’s “democratic experiments” (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997) in the early 1990s, the number of legally registered political parties in many countries has multiplied. Proliferation varies in degree, but is common across countries (Figure 1). 1 Those countries have now had more than a quarter-century of experience with multiparty competition. Yet by 2010, Cameroon had over 250 registered parties, Madagascar had over 150, and Mozambique, Malawi, and Kenya approximately 50. 2 Burkina Faso had over 100, as did Benin and Mali. 3 Party formation has accelerated, challenging existing theories that predict declines in registered parties after founding elections (Caramani 2004, Kollmann & Chibber 1998). By their logic, parties that do not initially perform well in elections should either disappear or fuse with other, more successful parties.

1 The data are limited to these countries, which are now competitive authoritarian regimes or were at some point over the last twenty years, largely because they are the only countries in the regime category for which time-series party registration statistics were available via government websites, newspapers, or secondary publications.


3 Benin and Mali began the multiparty period as competitive authoritarian regimes but later democratized. In Mali’s case, the democracy subsequently collapsed in the 2011 coup.
Senegal is a critical case of party proliferation. By the year 2010, it had 174 registered parties, a number that has tripled over the last decade. As is the case across Africa, conventionally cited factors, like ideological preferences, formal electoral rules, and social cleavages, are not highly correlated with the number of parties (Hartmann 2010, LeBas 2011, Manning 2005, Van de Walle & Butler 1999). However, Senegal also began holding multiparty elections under universal suffrage in 1978, more than a decade earlier than most other African countries (Diop 2011). In this sense, it is the place where we would least expect proliferation to persist and most expect the party system to have consolidated. Why, then, do so many politicians found parties in Senegal, and why do others choose not to create them? What are the implications of proliferation for opposition party behavior and presidential turnover?

These questions apply not just to Senegal, but to other African countries. As in Senegal, most places with party proliferation began experiencing it under a competitive authoritarian regime, in which presidents and politicians made decisions about party-building that reflected neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian constraints on their political behavior. Proliferation is important to understand because of its potentially adverse consequences for democratization. In research based on Western experiences, parties are critical components of democracy because they aggregate and represent citizens’ broad-based interests, and thereby empower citizens to hold public officials accountable (Aldrich 1995, Key 1964, Lipset 2000, Schattschneider 1942, Stokes 1999). Yet the African parties that have emerged through proliferation are often personalistic organizations that stand for parochial interests rather than

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4 This has also been argued in the study of Latin American party systems with respect to electoral rules and social cleavages. See Mainwarin g (1999) and Mustillo (2009), among others.
5 Competitive authoritarianism thus shapes political competition in ways that make it less overtly repressive and fraudulent than in autocracies, but less free and fair than in democracies.
The central argument is that many Senegalese parties are formed for negotiating access to the state rather than for winning elections. Because a significant subset of parties is formed primarily for negotiating patronage, they rarely become the consistent, long-term opposition.

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6 For these reasons, proliferation has also become a policy concern. Legislators from African countries in the International Organization of Francophonie (OIF) consider proliferation a serious social problem because of the parochial nature of many parties (Abdrahman 2001) and some of Senegal’s leading scholars question whether multipartism is “little more than an instrument for holding democracy captive” (Diaw & Diouf 1998: 113). In the view of the parliamentarians, “the lack of national importance of these parties [resulting from proliferation] is linked to the motivations for their creation, motivations that are explained by the structure of our societies,” especially “the attachment to territory and the importance of family in society” (Abdrahman 2001: 273).
organizations purported to bolster democracy and accountability. These realities contrast with canonical accounts of political parties, which depict them as teams of ambitious politicians who pool resources and coordinate competition for elected office, and who remain outside of government to critique it if they do not win (Aldrich 1995, Downs 1957, Duverger 1963, Ostrogorski 1956). Because parties are often created for different, non-electoral reasons in competitive authoritarian regimes, they do not always oppose incumbents in the ways expected by theories based on liberal democracies.

An uneven playing field, a hallmark of competitive authoritarianism, not only empowers the president to create incentives for proliferation if he so chooses; it also renders survival in the opposition so financially difficult that many politicians are constrained – or even motivated – to form parties that are primarily patronage-oriented, rather than primarily election-oriented. When the ruling party enjoys the systematic and deep advantages relative to the opposition in terms of “access to state institutions, resources, and the media” (Levitsky & Way 2010a) and when most opposition parties must collaborate with the president at some point in order to survive, then the parties that emerge are likely to be more consistently state-oriented and less consistently election-oriented than theories based on liberal democracies would predict. Party creation becomes not just a tool for the few, lucky politicians with the capacity to attract the financial and human capital necessary to win elections; it also constitutes an outlet for less prosperous politicians who lack these resources to lobby for a piece of the state pie. However, few parties adopt consistent opposition strategies. Few party leaders have the resources to become serious enough competitors with the president for it to be worth bearing the costs of running regularly as an opponent in elections in hope of defeating him in the long run.

Unevenness prevails through three channels: first, “state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends;” second, “the incumbent party is systematically favored at the expense of the opposition;” and third, “the opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped” (Levitsky & Way 2010a: 58).
The remainder of the introduction discusses the research in greater depth. Section 2 presents the dissertation’s arguments and contributions to knowledge about party-building and democratization. Section 3 situates Senegal as a case of competitive authoritarian party-building. Section 4 provides an overview of the research design and methodology.

II- The Arguments

Focused on Senegal at the end of the Abdou Diouf presidency (1981-2000) and throughout the Abdoulaye Wade presidency (2000-2012), the dissertation analyzes several patterns of African party behavior that have not been fully theorized: party creation as a form of patronage negotiation; the paucity of parties that consistently oppose the government; and the fact that regime insiders tend to be the president’s most threatening electoral challengers.

The dissertation contends that party-building in Senegal from the late 1990s through the 2012 presidential elections was shaped by the unique incentives for party formation and strategy that competitive authoritarianism fostered. Competitive authoritarian regimes emerged after the end of the Cold War, when “the disappearance of competing Western security interests…brought a sharp increase in external democratizing pressure” and made African leaders more vulnerable to domestically-rooted popular protests for political reform (Bratton & Van de Walle 1992, Levitsky & Way 2010b: 236). Beyond its usefulness for understanding political dynamics within Senegal, the influence of competitive authoritarianism on party-building is worth analyzing due to the sheer number of African countries that have fallen into the competitive authoritarian category since the start of “democratic experiments.” Of the 47 countries that

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8 Presidents, who had extensive and relatively unchecked control over state resources (Bayart 1993, Van de Walle 2003, Prempeh 2003), could often temper the transition, moving their country towards but not to democracy. The intertwining of the African state with the ruling party in much of Africa only reinforces the uneven playing field.
Bratton & Van de Walle (1997) trace in their study of post-Cold War democratization, 39 were not full-fledged democracies in 2010.\textsuperscript{9} To boot, sub-Saharan Africa contained 14 of the 35 countries that constituted competitive authoritarian regimes in the early 1990s (Levitsky & Way 2010b). By 2012, 20 African countries were in Freedom House’s “partly free” category, which signals the presence of many aspects of the uneven playing field.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Party Creation for Non-Electoral Purposes}

The dissertation first documents the prominence of one kind of party we observe in Senegal that existing theories of parties in democracies do not: parties with leaders who are neither election-oriented, nor policy-oriented promoters of particular ideologies or special interests. Although Senegal has some parties that compete in elections and attempt to forge stable constituencies, party creation is more often an expedient way to access state resources than a means of regular electoral contestation. Most contemporary Senegalese politicians form parties in order to negotiate their way into power, often minimizing regular involvement in elections and negotiating non-elected posts and other patronage. They seek co-optation into an oversized ruling coalition, which the president builds despite the ruling party’s command of a legislative majority on its own.

This proliferation of such parties contrasts with the fundamentally election-oriented organizations depicted in much of the literature on party development, generally based on the

\textsuperscript{9} There are several viable ways to measure democracy. For the cursory glance provided here, data from Freedom House’s 2011 Freedom in the World report were used. Eight African countries of the 47 that Bratton & Van de Walle studied were “free.”

\textsuperscript{10} Theories of party-building have focused on accounting for party formation and strategy in non-democracies but often group together hybrid regimes and autocracies (Mainwaring 2003, Gandhi & Reuter 2013) or hybrid regimes and new democracies (Riedl 2013). There is little reference to the mechanics of party formation and strategy in competitive authoritarian regimes specifically, despite a productive literature on African parties more generally (Arriola 2012, Bleck & Van de Walle 2011, Elischer 2012, Ferree 2010, LeBas 2006, 2011, Riedl & Lupu 2013).
experiences of Western countries that developed relatively institutionalized party systems.\textsuperscript{11} Downs (1957) holds that parties originate out of ambitious politicians’ need to pool their resources and form teams to facilitate winning elected office; politicians create parties in order to better organize election campaigns, develop linkages to constituents to increase the likelihood of re-election, and aggregate preferences to propose legislation in a timely manner (Aldrich 1995, Duverger 1954, Key 1964).\textsuperscript{12} Senegal, in contrast, has a significant subset of parties that are not formed by leaders to participate regularly in elections and do not function accordingly.

In particular, the concept of the uneven playing field helps us to understand why politicians would form parties that are not election-oriented but would nevertheless find them worthwhile vehicles for participation in politics. Presidents in this context can weaken their political competition by depriving opponents of state resources, controlling the media to hinder opposition coverage and access, and overseeing the politicized application of the law (Levitsky & Way 2010b: 9-12). Responding to extreme incumbency advantages, Senegalese politicians often create parties to negotiate their way into non-elected posts and to access other patronage that the president distributes, while minimizing involvement in elections that are costly to contest independently. This patronage-oriented party formation contrasts with the election-oriented organizations comprised of teams of ambitious politicians that the literature depicts.

This argument builds upon findings from two bodies of research. First, it lends further credence to the claim that party behavior in non-democracies is not always vote-maximizing (Levitsky & Way 2010b, Mainwaring 2003). In Senegal, the opposition’s disadvantages on the

\textsuperscript{11} Levitsky, Loxton & Van Dyck (n.d.) point out the correlation between the West’s political and economic development sequences and the emergence of relatively institutionalized party systems.

\textsuperscript{12} Nor, however, do most Senegalese parties emerge for the reasons that they do in dominant-party autocracies, where the only politicians who defect from the ruling party are radical ideologues who are willing to bear the costs of never winning elections in exchange for expressing their oppositional stance (Greene 2007).
uneven playing field make it more difficult to win votes without access to the state than in democracies. This sometimes encourages party leaders to make more niche appeals to certain voters, or even to engage in patronage-oriented behavior that is not especially concerned with attracting votes. Second, the dissertation supplements the insight that politics in poor democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes is driven by politicians’ desire to access the state (Butler & Van de Walle 1999, Van de Walle 2007). However, the argument is new in its contention that some people form parties as a means of securing such access. This tendency increased in Senegal under Wade, who (unlike Diouf) led a ruling party that could not by itself mobilize future presidential majorities and thus had more incentive to promote proliferation as a way of encouraging defections from major opposition parties.

Furthermore, the analysis concerns the total number of registered parties, thereby departing from most political science studies, which focus on the effective number of parties competing in elections or holding seats in parliament (Brambor et al. 2007, Cox 1997, Kuenzi & Lambright 2001, Mozaffar, Scarritt & Galaich 2003). The effective number of parties is measured with an index that weights the amount of the vote each party garnered in an election, or

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13 President Diouf (1981-2000) faced different electoral imperatives than Wade (2000-2012). Throughout Diouf’s tenure, the PS’ share of the vote in national elections declined, and by 1998 was hovering around 50%. With the ruling party itself, along with just a few allied parties and support movements, Diouf could reasonably hope to mobilize a presidential majority. He focused solely on co-opting major opposition parties into enlarged presidential majority governments in between national elections in order to tempt them to collaborate in these elections and in order to weaken their image as committed opponents. In contrast, Wade came to power with the PDS winning just 30% of the vote on its own (based on the first round of the 2000 race). Wade’s victory in the runoff resulted from his alliance with other parties. Wade thus had to build and maintain alliances to mobilize future presidential majorities with relative certainty. He strategized differently than Diouf: while seeking to bring major opposition parties into his governments, he also encouraged ex-PS cadres to join the PDS and cultivated an oversized coalition of many small parties that splintered from more major opposition parties or originated from civil society.

14 As discussed in Chapter 3, both Senegalese presidents created incentives for party formation, although the number of party leaders actually obtaining state rewards after creating them was decidedly higher under Wade than under Diouf. Both presidents were passive enablers of proliferation, choosing never to use their legislative majorities to amend the 1981 Political Parties Law, which sets a low administrative barrier to party formation. However, Wade more overtly used the state to reinforce incentives for proliferation. In the early 2000s, he established the Coalition Around the President in the 21st Century (Cap 21), an expansive institution through which almost any party leader could access regularized streams of small-scale patronage in exchange for long-term loyalty to Wade.
by the percentage of seats won in parliament (Laasko & Taagepera 1979). However, the measure masks the variation that exists in the number and the electoral weight of parties in the system (Bogaards 2008: 186). Thus, in Senegal, the total number of parties and the effective number of parties do not capture the same features of party politics. We know this because the acceleration in the number of legally registered parties has not been accompanied by a constant upward trend in the effective number of parties; instead, the effective number has fluctuated across elections.16

In addition, and more crucially for the dissertation, the measure does not account for parties that do not run in elections, even if they influence politics and government in other ways. In Senegal and other African party systems in particular, it is important to account for the formation of all kinds of parties because political ambition is often channeled through small, personalistic organizations in addition to electorally powerful ones (Manning 2005, Van de Walle & Butler 1999, Van de Walle 2007). For several reasons, this feature of African party systems makes studying the total number of parties useful in ways that studying the effective number of parties is not.

First, since these smaller parties are not election-oriented but remain active in politics even if they do not contest or win elections, they are likely to represent ambition for something other than elected office. Focusing on the effective number of parties does not help us understand how all kinds of politicians seek to relate to the state through parties, or more broadly how lobbying and patronage distribution work. Yet it is precisely these dynamics that we must study in order to understand why party formation is a popular strategy for political ascension in

15 For instance, “in Africa, anything from one to more than three effective parliamentary parties may indicate a dominant party system” (Bogaards 2008: 188).

16 After the adoption of a democratic electoral code in 1992, these fluctuations stayed within the range of 2 and 3 for six elections, and only surpassed the 1-3 zone indicative of a dominant party system in the 2012 presidential race.
Senegal, and why presidents respond to party proliferation by managing it rather than suppressing it altogether.

Moreover, any snapshot of the Senegalese party system that the effective number of parties can provide is quite limited because the party system is so fluid (Resnick 2012). Examining the motivations of all kinds of party leaders is important because a few leaders of parties that do not affect measures of Senegal’s effective number of parties have become major players. The party of current president Macky Sall is young; it quickly became one of the top five parties in Senegal after its founding. A variety of parties that have participated only once in elections – and that did not necessarily even perform well – have leaders who have been appointed into the government. The president’s interest and willingness to entertain these party leaders’ claims on the state indicate that much of the interesting political action in Senegal occurs outside of the domain of established major parties.

Finally, the effective number of parties does not capture the discontinuities across time in the identities of the ruling party’s electoral challengers. These actors often change from election to election: only a handful of parties run repeatedly on their labels in national elections, and some of the most formidable challengers to the president and the ruling party emerge out of nowhere, winning major offices before developing an organizational structure.

Focusing instead on the total number of legally recognized parties allows us to examine the full range of partisan actors: those that become major players and those that do not. By abandoning the premise that parties are election-oriented and inductively studying what creating a party signifies about the founder’s political goals both within and outside of the electoral sphere, there emerges a more complete and accurate picture of how patronage distribution,
political bargaining, and politicians’ engagement with the state work in Senegal – whether these things occur through or outside of elections.

**Party Strategies as Collaboration, not Opposition**

The largely patronage-oriented logics of party formation and proliferation affect long-term party behavior. Opposition parties are generally characterized as vehicles for voicing alternatives to the ideas and policies that incumbents propose, serving as counterweights to the ruling party and fostering accountability and government responsiveness (Grzymala-Busse 2007, Rosenblum 2010). Whether or not they are always capable of coalescing against incumbents, opposition parties are expected to rival those in government and “present a viable alternative to the political status quo” (Arriola 2012: 5, LeBas 2011). But in Senegal, where various party founders are more often concerned with negotiating patronage than with winning office, parties rarely oppose the ruling party consistently over time. Instead, they tend to collaborate with the president and access the resources they need to survive, despite the fact that their participation in the ruling coalition is not necessary for forming a government or for the ruling party to build a legislative majority. Collaboration ranges from tactical alliances, which entail serving in the ruling coalition or the government between but not always during national elections, to longer term co-optation, which involves participation in the ruling coalition both during and between elections. This variation results from presidents’ attempts to fragment the opposition in order to facilitate their hold on power. Although presidents are most concerned with neutralizing the opposition parties that are most electorally threatening, the leaders of such parties often have the goals, resource endowments, and vote-mobilizing capacity to resist these attempts at co-optation, or to minimize the amount of time that they collaborate. Presidents thus do not always target just
the leaders of such parties for co-optation; given the difficulty of co-opting these party leaders permanently, presidents may also have incentives to cultivate the support of smaller, more parochial parties to expand their support base.

The dissertation demonstrates that party founders’ decisions to pursue consistent opposition are shaped by the degree and type of resources they possess to overcome structural disadvantages on the uneven playing field. Party leaders rarely possess the endowments that together foster consistent opposition strategies – namely, prior experience as either high-level state administrators or national-level civil society figures, and access to private financing that is independent from the state. Although the president tries to co-opt politicians with a variety of endowments, only those with both state experience and international private financing choose to resist the constant opportunities for government collaboration that presidents provide. For party leaders with both endowments, the prize of the presidency is so large, and their potential to win it is serious enough, that consistent opposition is an attractive long-term strategy. Their experience as state administrators or major civil society figures allows them to market themselves as viable replacements to incumbents. Their access to independent private financing enables them to compete for the highest offices using the clientelist strategies expected of major candidates. Overall, this story builds on accounts of short-term party strategy, which reveal the importance of private capital for opposition but overlook the role that international private

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17 The president’s strategic interaction with party leaders also shapes long-term strategies. Chapter 4 describes President Wade’s power retention strategy in the party sphere, taking it as given in order to focus on explaining variation in the behaviors of non-ruling parties and their leaders. In a nutshell, presidents seek to fragment and destabilize the opposition in order to ensure their re-election. But presidents in competitive authoritarian regimes are constrained in their ability to use repression to this end; instead, they tend to use inducements to lure opponents into collaborative relationships. Ideally, the president would permanently co-opt the leaders of the parties that are most electorally threatening to the ruling party’s future dominance. However, the president’s efforts in reality are not always successful. Although Wade prioritized targeting for co-optation the parties that exhibit the most promising vote-mobilizing capacity, it is precisely the parties with such capacity whose leaders often have at least some financing and experience. This makes them both potentially powerful negotiators with the president, as well as his most potentially damaging electoral adversaries if they refuse co-optation. Party leaders with different goals, resource endowments, and vote-mobilizing capabilities thus react differently to the president’s co-optation strategy.
financing in particular – and such financing in conjunction with a party leader’s state or civil society experience – plays in fostering long-term opposition (Arriola 2012).

**Regime Insiders Induce Turnover**

These findings raise an additional question: if consistent opposition strategies are rare and the uneven playing field helps presidents shape the party system in ways that bolster his chances of re-election, then why did Senegal have presidential turnovers in 2000 and 2012? The occurrence of turnover in Senegal is not surprising, for it is by definition difficult but possible under competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way 2010b). In fact, Africanist scholarship has already identified several factors that have increased the prospects of turnover across countries, many with competitive authoritarian regimes. However, little research accounts for who the agents of turnover are and how their behavior brings it about.

The dissertation thus seeks to explain the sources of a distinctive, underlying facet of competition: the fact that regime insiders (Pinkston 2013), defined as politicians who have accessed state resources through ministerial appointments, are the president’s most serious electoral challengers. Insiders were the best-performing opponents in all of Senegal’s last four elections (1993, 2000, 2007, 2012). However, their sources of advantage over outsider opposition candidates – regardless of whether turnover results from such advantage – have not been fully explained. Following Way (2005), the dissertation demonstrates that insiders in Senegal have been prime contenders for the presidency because their recent access to the state

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19 Thus, their presence in these races cannot be the causes of turnover, since only two (2000, 2012) actually resulted in incumbents losing power.
enables them to amass both the baseline level of financial capital and the political credibility as statesmen that they need to attract significant blocs of supporters on the uneven playing field (Way 2005a, 2010). The logistical and financial difficulty of adopting strategies of consistent opposition on the uneven playing field, as well as the weakness of ruling parties in Senegal, gives insiders the capacity and means to out-perform outsiders as challengers in presidential elections.

III. Senegal as a Case

Few would dispute that among Africa’s competitive authoritarian regimes, Senegal is closer to meeting the procedural minimum standards for democracy than many of its counterparts (e.g., Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Zimbabwe). In this sense, it is it is a critical case of competitive authoritarian party-building in Africa. It is also a least-likely case of proliferation more specifically.21

A Critical Case of Party-Building under Competitive Authoritarianism

As a case of competitive authoritarianism, Senegal exhibits fewer autocratic attributes and more democratic attributes than many of its counterparts. It is one of the competitive authoritarian regimes most likely to exhibit patterns of party-building that are common in democracies. The puzzle to be solved is that it does not and is instead characterized by the proliferation of primarily patronage-oriented parties, as well as the rarity of parties that consistently oppose incumbents.

20 Per Levitsky & Way (2013), ruling party weakness refers to parties whose main source of cohesion is patronage, rather than upon “the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict” that characterized the origins of ruling parties in certain other African countries (869).

21 The terminology for the case studies is based on Levy (2008) and Gerring (2007).
Senegal was a competitive authoritarian regime during the Diouf and Wade presidencies, despite the fact that it has long been considered one of Africa’s democratic success stories. Senegal had early and peaceful experiences with competitive elections, which began in 1978. In 1992, Senegal adopted sweeping changes to its electoral code that fostered free elections. Yet by a procedural minimum definition that takes government abuses seriously, Senegal was competitive authoritarian throughout 1993-2012. Procedural minimum democracy requires both free and fair elections and the respect of civil liberties (Dahl 1971). A third element, the absence of an uneven playing field, is constitutive of these conditions obtaining (Levitsky & Way 2010b). Senegal fluctuated in the degree to which politics was undemocratic. There was modest progression towards democracy under Diouf (Villalón 1994), whereas Wade’s presidency brought several regressions (Dahou & Foucher 2004, Kelly 2012, Mbow 2008).

Under Diouf, competitive authoritarian abuses lingered even as Senegal made some significant democratizing reforms. First of all, Senegal remained a “quasi-democracy” (Villalón 1994) because elections were not always fair, even if they were free as of 1993. Consensually elaborated by government and opposition leaders, the 1992 electoral code established a secret ballot, expanded voting rights to the diaspora and 18-to-21-year-olds, required the use of ballot

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22 Since Senegal generally held competitive, multiparty elections from 1978 onward, it was a democracy by minimalist electoral standards (Przeworski 1999, Schumpeter 1942). For this reason, many early analyses called Senegal a democracy. However, elections were not always free and fair. Villalón (1994) cites Cruise O’Brien (1978), and Fatton (1987) as analysts who label Senegal a democracy, even before the 1992 reforms.

23 Dahl (1971) provides eight criteria: “freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference” (3). This essentially boils down to free and fair multiparty competition, the protection of civil liberties, and mechanisms for democratic accountability. For further discussion, see Collier & Levitsky (1997).

24 Although not explicitly a part of the procedural minimum requirements for democracy as articulated by Dahl (1971), the uneven playing field helps us take abuses seriously and carefully consider the aspects of politics that “are implicitly understood to be part of the overall meaning and…are viewed as necessary for competitive elections to take place” (Levitsky & Way 2010b: 6).
boxes and indelible ink for the vote, allowed party representatives to be present at the polls, guaranteed equal media access to all candidates, and established a national ballot-counting commission, among other reforms (Fall 2012, Kanté 1994, Villalón 1994). Yet the “the political playing field was not entirely level in that the PS retained control over the state apparatus that legislated, administered, and adjudicated the electoral process” (Beck 2008: 64). Moreover, suspicions of electoral fraud continued after the code’s passage, not only in the 1993 elections but also in the 1996 local race (Villalón 1994, Fall 2011). Difficulties related to the prevention of fraud persisted as the ruling PS stalled negotiations with the opposition for a more independent electoral commission, the National Observatory of Elections (ONEL), which was established in 1998 (Creevey, Ngomo & Vengroff 2005, Fall 2011). In the same year, the High Council for Audiovisual Affairs (HCA) was established to ensure free and equal access to the state media (Diop 2011).

Under Wade, electoral integrity improved but the uneven playing field allowed the president to shape elections to his advantage. First, Senegal’s major opposition parties, which had run candidates in these elections, accused the ruling party of fraud after Wade’s re-election in 2007 (Diop 2011). Statistical tests developed to detect vote fraud suggest that the 2007 presidential election results were indeed doctored (Beber & Scacco 2012). The opposition called for an independent audit of the electoral register, which had been reconstructed between 2004

25 Villalón (1994) adopts a procedural minimum definition of democracy rather than an electoralist one and concludes that the 1993 presidential election, as well as the adoption of the new electoral code, was a “small step forward,” but not a “definitive transition from quasi-democracy to democracy” (192). Similarly, Gellar (2005) argues that “multiparty competition and free elections do not shore up democracy if the victors once in power are not committed to preserving public liberties and political competition” (175). Schaffer (1998) reports that even in 1993, “some opportunities for fraud remained, particularly in the issuance of fake voting ordinances, though not enough were distributed to alter the outcome of the contest” (119).


27 Negotiations began in 1997 but were somewhat drawn out (Creevey, Ngomo & Vengroff 2005: 485).
and 2007 in anticipation of biometric voter registration. Although the register had been audited internally, the government sought an independent audit after the opposition boycotted the 2007 National Assembly elections (Fall 2011). The boycott was also a response to Wade’s manipulation of the electoral calendar. He had postponed the 2007 National Assembly elections twice, formally for flood-related reasons and administrative concerns, and informally “so as to secure Wade’s re-election prior to the PDS primaries” (Dahou & Foucher 2009: 26, Fall 2011: 174, Mbow 2008).

In the domain of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association, violations of procedural minimum standards occurred under Diouf and even more significantly under Wade. Under Diouf, several major opponents were arrested and jailed when they protested about political issues. For instance, after the 1993 National Assembly elections, Moustapha Sy, the young leader of the Moustarchidine religious movement, was detained on vague charges of posing “threats to public order” (Quoted in Villalón & Kane 1998: 144). In 1994, “public meetings and rallies were regularly forbidden as the government sought to curtail the activities of both the opposition and the Moustarchidine movement” (150).

Under Wade, civil liberties were violated on several significant occasions, when journalists and opposition politicians were harassed by the government or were subject to the uneven application of the law (Dahou & Foucher 2009, Mbow 2008, Kelly 2012). Perhaps the most extreme case was the near-deadly attack on opposition party leader, Talla Sylla, by thugs allegedly employed by the PDS in 2003. After Sylla sought medical attention in France and returned to Senegal, the PDS used its legislative supermajority to pass the Ezzan Law, providing amnesty for all political crimes committed between 1983 and 2004 (Kelly 2012: 123). More “typical” violations of civil liberties included: President Wade’s use of the Division of Criminal
Investigation (DIC) as a “political force” to go after opposition politicians (Mbow 2008: 163), the harassment of journalists, and the administration’s violent suppression of pre-electoral protests by opposition parties in 2007, 2011, and 2012 (Diop 2013, Kelly 2012, Mbow 2008).

Moreover, freedom of the press was at times threatened under both presidents. Under Diouf as of 1993, equality of access to the state media was guaranteed during election campaigns, but access was skewed at other times (Kanté 1994). However, opposition access to private media outlets improved. By 1994, “the emergence of private FM radio stations...offered alternative and independent news coverage, information about public affairs, and political debates that reached the great majority of the Senegalese population” (Gellar 2005: 165).

Overall, media coverage remained skewed in favor of the ruling party even after alternance (Diop 2013, Gellar 2005). As the private media continued to expand under Wade, the regime censored controversial political writing, intermittently shut down private newspapers and radio stations, and harassed journalists (Havard 2004, Loum 2013, Mbow 2008, Paye 2013). In general, “troublemaking politicians, public figures, and journalists [were] subjected to unexpectedly high levels of pressure by the Wade government through a range of legal measures such as temporary closure of newspapers, suing for libel or for threatening the security of the state (according to Article 80 of the Penal Code) and police investigations” (Dahou & Foucher 2009: 28).

For example, “prominent opposition leaders such as Amath Dansokho of the Independence and Labor Party and Jean-Paul Dias of the Gainde Centrist Bloc were interrogated by the Division of Criminal Investigation (DIC), a secret police force that Wade used primarily for political intimidation. Police arrested Yankhoba Diattara, Idrissa Seck’s political assistant, in late 2005 for trying to rally citizens against the president during his visit to Seck’s stronghold, the city of Thiès” (Kelly 2012: 123).

For instance, “In 2007, “security forces, especially the DIC, [harassed] journalists and a member of RADDHO [Senegal’s African Assembly for Human Rights],” a prominent NGO in Dakar. In 2006 and 2007 alone, there were a number of major violations: The DIC beat two journalists who had published speculations about the president’s ‘nighttime whereabouts’; police arrested one journalist who wrote about Senegal’s high cost of living and another who wrote about Wade buying a limousine; and the state shut down a newspaper that published stories about the involvement of Karim Wade, the president’s son, in corruption scandals.” (Kelly 2012: 124).
Finally, an uneven playing field was a constant feature of Senegalese politics during both presidencies. Access to state resources were so skewed in favor of the ruling party that many opposition parties had trouble surviving without collaborating with the president. Each president enjoyed discretionary powers to create and destroy government institutions that he could pack with sympathizers, thereby multiplying his allies’ advantages and further weakening the opposition. For instance, when the PS began experiencing damaging defections at the end of the 1990s, Diouf used the ruling party’s supermajority in the National Assembly to create the Senate, a body that is two-thirds appointed, to distribute patronage to supporters and ensure PDS cohesion. Wade also revived the Senate after initially abolishing it at alternance, filling it and other newly created (and largely appointed) legislative institutions like the Economic and Social Council with PDS loyalists and allies (Dahou & Foucher 2009, Gellar 2005, Kelly 2012).

The judiciary was also a packable institution that skewed the playing field. It was “competent to rule on disputes concerning the conduct of elections,” but “showed little independence from the executive branch. In nearly every instance in which the opposition went to court before 2000…to contest alleged election irregularities, the courts invariably rejected these claims.”

Under Wade, it “remained subordinated to the president who nominated all judges and to the minister of justice who headed the legal system and who was responsible for taking the lead in prosecuting criminal cases” (Gellar 2005: 159). In particular, the Constitutional Council – whose five members the president appointed – was legally permitted to pronounce on the constitutionality of Wade’s controversial decision to run for a third term in 2012. The president determined the justices’ salaries and provided other coveted perks like 4x4 vehicles and gasoline,

30 Beck (2008) describes it as “a new political institution with little raison d’être other than the distribution of patronage posts to reinforce dwindling support among its ranks” (66).

31 Wade revived the Senate in 2007. In 2004, he created the Council for the Republic, “a purely consultative body with about one hundred councilors whose appointments are largely controlled by the President” (Dahou & Foucher 2009: 22). This was eventually replaced by the Economic and Social Council in 2008.
and the Council ruled in his favor (Kelly 2012: 123). Furthermore, Wade made the playing field uneven by using state resources to pay monthly salaries to parties that joined the PDS’ oversized ruling coalition, provide diplomatic passports to partisan allies, and expand the number of ministries in the government in order to distribute sinecures to a wider range of collaborators.

Based on these features of Senegalese politics, the dissertation finds that accounts deeming Senegal a “full-fledged democracy” (Gellar 2005: 156), a “democracy in consolidation” (Diop et al. 2000), and a “clientelist democracy” (Beck 2008) overlook abuses that subvert the essence of democracy itself. Although democracy is perhaps best conceived as a “process rather than an event” (Villalón 1994), Senegal between 1993 and 2012 was arguably in a competitive authoritarian stage of that process, despite its early transition to multiparty elections.

A Critical Case of Proliferation

Due to the sequencing of its political development, as well as the timing of its transition to multipartism, Senegal is also a least-likely case of proliferation. In early modern Europe and North America, the confluence of economic development with political liberalization, as well as the sequencing of this liberalization (namely, the advent of multiparty competition before the advent of universal suffrage), yielded well-institutionalized and consolidated party systems (Shefter 1977).

Unlike most of its African counterparts, Senegal followed the Western sequencing of political development. That is, Senegal had a century of multiparty competition among an exclusive elite before mass suffrage was extended. However, industrialization did not

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32 In institutionalized party systems, “patterns of party competition manifest regularity” (fostering stability); “parties have strong roots in society” (leading to consistent ideological stances); “the major political actors accord legitimacy to parties”; and “parties are not subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders, but possess an independent status and value of their own” (Mainwaring 1998: 68-69).
accompany these political changes. In 1848, the French colonial administration extended citizenship to all long-term residents of Senegal’s Four Communes, the urban communities of Dakar, Saint-Louis, Rufisque, and Gorée (LeVine 2004, Gellar 2005, Johnson 1971). These citizens had the right to vote in multiparty elections for the French National Assembly. Senegal thus had over a century of experience with competitive elections among a small urban elite before the extension of universal suffrage on the eve of decolonization, in 1956 (LeVine 2004, Morgenthau 1964). It began the contemporary, multiparty era with more established parties and subsequently developed a party system that is quite fluid, but still relatively more institutionalized than those of some of its African counterparts, according to conventional measures of the concept that capture the regularity of party competition, parties’ social rootedness, and parties’ lack of personalization (Kuenzi & Lambright 2001, Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 5, Riedl 2014). For these reasons, Senegal is one of the places where we would most expect party proliferation to give way to party system consolidation. It is where we

33 In the Four Communes during the 19th century, “the rapid expansion of the African electorate enabled Blaise Diagne, a Senegalese Black African, to be elected deputy in 1914, thus ending the domination of Senegalese politics by the French and métis elites who then constituted one-fifth of the total electorate.” Five percent of the population had these citizenship rights before World War II. Although competitive elections were confined to the Four Communes, plural associational life spread to the hinterlands before the advent of mass suffrage (Gellar 2005: 40).

34 Universal suffrage was extended in 1946 and reinforced in the 1956 Loi-cadre reform (LeVine 2004: 64, 68).

35 Senegal’s system is somewhat more institutionalized than those of Benin, Mali, or Zambia, for instance. However, as argued later, we must keep in mind that Senegal’s relatively well-institutionalized system is still fairly uninstitutionalized and fluid by global standards. Senegal’s party system has also de-institutionalized over time (Resnick 2012). Although it is a least-likely case of proliferation from the perspective of relative institutionalization within Africa, the present research on Senegal also illustrates from a more absolute perspective several ways in which party-building in fluid party systems looks different than party-building in the more institutionalized systems that emerged at other times and in other world regions.

36 This is not to say that institutionalized party systems are incompatible with the existence of hundreds of legally registered parties. France, for instance, has 283 registered parties, few of which actually run in national elections. However, the nature of proliferation is different in France, where a variety of the less institutionalized parties were founded by Members of Parliament from the country’s major parliamentary parties in order to raise additional funding for those parliamentary parties (Mayaudon 2010). They are not serving as direct vehicles for their leaders to access the state in the first place, as are many micro-parties in Senegal. The nature of the state in Africa, which compounds the effects of the uneven playing field on party politics in competitive authoritarian regimes, makes
would most expect politicians to be politically active within the ruling party or the existing opposition parties that already have social roots and compete in elections. The realities of proliferation in Senegal demand analysis since they belie such predictions.

Senegal is also a least-likely case of proliferation because it shifted to multiparty politics around a decade earlier than its counterparts involved in the “democratic experiments” of the early 1990s (Bratton & Van de Walle 1997). After independence in 1960, Senegal became a de facto one-party state under its first president, Leopold Sédar Senghor. However, in 1974, Abdoulaye Wade convinced the poet-president to let him create the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), a “party of contribution” to the ruling PS rather than an opposition party (Nzouankeu 1984). In 1976, Senghor inaugurated the “law of the three trends,” which allowed for three official, ideologically distinct political parties. Competitive elections began in 1978, and an unlimited number of parties was allowed as of 1981. Most other African countries did not reach these levels of political liberalization until the early 1990s. Given Senegal’s extra decade of multiparty competition, its party system has had more time to consolidate; it is the place where we would least expect parties to remain so numerous if proliferation is supposed to spike but then fall after founding elections. Overall, studying proliferation in this least-likely case will help us identify the sources and mechanisms of party formation and strategy that are potentially the most durable in Africa’s competitive authoritarian regimes.

Senegal’s “telephone booth parties” more theoretically compelling to study than those registered in the advanced industrial democracies, where being a party leader is not as likely to be an expression of demand for state support.

37 At the very least, we would expect the number of parties to plateau if leaders of electorally unsuccessful parties do not deregister them but instead abandon them to join more successful parties in future rounds of elections. However, the first interesting thing I learned from fieldwork was that I could indeed find most of these party leaders and they still spoke of their parties as useful political tools – found 41 of 46 and at least 43 of 46 are still active in politics. This suggests that people who legally register parties are not later abandoning them for greener electoral pastures and leaving the legal entities registered while they are in political practice empty shells.

38 The PS was the social democratic party, the PDS the liberal democratic party, and the African Independence Party (PAI) the country’s official Marxist party.
IV. Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation is based on original data collected during sixteen months of fieldwork in Senegal (2010-2012). It entailed gathering qualitative and quantitative information, from a rich set of primary and secondary sources, about party leaders’ backgrounds, political experiences, and resources, as well as parties’ purposes, behavior, and relationship to government and opposition. The data include over one hundred interviews, including over 60 party formation narratives collected from politicians who chose to form their own parties since 1998; accounts of party-building within five major parliamentary parties in three regional capitals; explanations of party decision-making about participation in various governments; and assessments of party politics by civil society leaders, private sector figures, intellectuals and local journalists. It also encompasses archival materials from parties, government documents about party registration and political appointments, election returns, and political biographies.

Perhaps the most central feature of the field materials is that they contain comprehensive information on all parties that formed within a particular time frame (1998-2003), unlike existing datasets that capture merely the performance of electoral coalitions or parliamentary parties. The dissertation’s original data facilitate descriptions of individual-level decision-making about party formation, as well as analysis of the sources of party behavior in Senegal’s competitive authoritarian context. The research also identifies how these patterns of party-building differ from those in democracies and generates hypotheses about why this is.

These field materials serve three purposes. The first is to produce an ethnographic study of why so many politicians create their own parties and what purposes they and other politicians see these organizations serving. The second is to draw descriptive conclusions about the sources
of party formation, party behavior, and presidential turnover. The third is to inductively generate causal hypotheses about party-building in Africa’s competitive authoritarian regimes through subnational, comparative case studies of politicians and parties.

The dissertation consists of five additional chapters. Chapter 2 fits the project and its claims into political science theories of party formation, party-building, and democratization. It describes how the dissertation builds on calls for a more elite-based and state-based approach to studying party politics in post-Third Wave regimes (Mainwaring 1999). This produces a more complete picture of how patronage distribution, political bargaining, and engagement with the state work in Senegal.

Chapter 3 describes patterns of party formation in Senegal and addresses the sources of party formation and party proliferation. It presents an in-depth account of the logics of party creation among a chronological subset of politicians who founded parties during the early stages of Senegal’s acceleration in party formation. Overall, the analysis draws upon a dataset constructed from primary source interviews, secondary source informants, local newspaper reports, party and government documents, and political biographies. Several vignettes of party creation are offered to illustrate the rarity of parties that regularly compete in national elections on Senegal’s uneven playing field. They are bolstered by analysis of the types and frequencies of new parties’ electoral activity and performance, as well as their leaders’ backgrounds and declared motivations.

The main focus of the primary source interviews was on all 46 people whose parties were registered between 1998 and 2003, the six years surrounding Senegal’s first presidential turnover in 2000, in order to capture both pre- and post-*alternance* logics of party formation. In the field,

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39 Large-n analysis of party formation in Senegal was not possible given the paucity of quantitative data; the Ministry of Interior keeps basic founder and party information in their official registry of organizations but all information on founders’ social and political trajectories I had to collect on my own.
I sought to locate each of the 46 founders, determine whether or not their party was still politically active, and administer a semi-structured interview with them. The interview questions solicited narratives about these individuals’ decision-making process related to party formation, as well as demographic and political information about founders themselves. Additional interviews were conducted with a snowball sample of 25 founders from before 1998 and after 2003. Interviews with other politicians, intellectuals, human rights advocates, trade unionists, and local journalists helped to verify information provided by founders. The total number of interviews is over one hundred.

Chapter 4 uses illustrative, comparative case studies to trace how party leaders’ experience and financing correspond to parties’ tendencies to engage in consistent opposition, tactical alliances, or full-fledged co-optation. Marshaling interviews, local newspaper coverage, party statistics on the retention of key staff, political biographies, and official party and coalition rosters, the chapter assesses the ways in which party leaders’ different combinations of endowments condition how they respond to the built-in incentives to collaborate with the president on the uneven playing field. It also describes patterns of party behavior within a larger subset of parties with new data that tracks party allegiances to the government or the opposition over all five national elections spanning the Wade presidency.

The data, which capture the coalition choices and electoral behavior of all 46 parties created 1998-2003, were collected during fieldwork interviews and verified when possible with coalition rosters solicited from party and coalition administrators. The analysis combines this information about party behavior over multiple elections with other data obtained through

40 For several politicians, who were either deceased or extremely difficult to meet, I interviewed a close colleague in the party or a family member in the party. Several founders were not trackable, but limited newspaper reporting provided partial information about them and their parties. No founders were entirely unidentifiable; all were active in Ministry of Interior meetings about the electoral code as late as 2004-06, or known by other Senegalese journalists or politicians.

interviews and newspaper research about each party leader’s prior state experience and potential sources of independent financing. Comparative case studies of parties with a range of these endowments are based on the interviews and on extensive newspaper research about the parties’ trajectories over time.

Chapter 5 first compares the political biographies and electoral performance of several insider and outsider presidential candidates in order to articulate why insiders can often compete more seriously with the incumbent and create real potential for turnover. Relying on local newspaper coverage of the campaigns, official reports about each election’s conduct, and secondary research, it then characterizes how structural and contingent factors related to insiders’ candidacy and behavior played out before Senegal’s last four presidential elections. The conditions in place before turnover (2000 and 2012) were different than those observed before races resulting in incumbent re-election (1993 and 2007). The analysis of insiders’ emergence and their subsequent oppositional behavior augments our understanding of electoral competition in the context of weak, patronage-based ruling parties.

Chapter 6 provides concluding insights on parties’ relationship to democratization in Africa’s and discusses where else it would be productive to explore the hypotheses developed in Senegal. By identifying the sources and consequences of party formation there, the dissertation provides empirical insight into some of the mechanisms governing proliferation, party strategy, and turnover. The Senegalese experience attests that patronage-oriented party formation, as well as the rarity of consistent oppositional behaviors, neither promote democratization nor structurally impede it. That is, party proliferation has not fostered the broad-based accessibility of politicians and the government to demands of ordinary citizens. However, the inability of political parties by themselves to address these demands created space for associations, “citizens’
movements,” and other civil society forces to work with certain parties to craft more participatory forms of citizen consultation. This has coincided with the rise of civil society figures as alternative candidates to those of conventional parties in elections (Fall 2011, Gellar 2013, Kelly 2013). Nevertheless, especially as of 2013, Senegal has undergone democratizing reforms that have reduced the scope of the uneven playing field, as well as general improvements (despite a few questionable setbacks) in the government’s respect for civil liberties. Although Senegal’s 2012 turnover did not immediately foster democratization, the extent to which the Sall administration will push the democratization process forward remains to be seen. Thus far, the departure from Wade’s competitive authoritarian practices has been significant enough for Freedom House to deem it “free” by criteria that include (but are not limited to) features procedural minimum definitions of democracy (Freedom House n.d.). Ultimately, then, some democratizing reforms have happened in Senegal in spite of party proliferation.

Ultimately, one of the most important possible implications of this study is that party leaders’ goals and parties’ functions fundamentally affect whether they can facilitate democratization and sustain political accountability. The long-term process of democratization in fluid party systems looks somewhat different than it did in the Western cases upon which classic theories of party-building rest. In Senegal, that is because the uneven playing field motivates politicians to create parties for different purposes – and these organizations and their leaders therefore behave differently – than their counterparts in today’s liberal democracies.

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42 See Chapter 5, section V for a more detailed discussion of democratizing reforms thus far under Sall. The most questionable action in the domain of civil liberties is perhaps the Sall administration’s recent denial of PDS militants the permission to hold a rally in front of party headquarters when Wade returned to Senegal in April 2014 for the first time since he lost the 2012 presidential election. See Bozonnet, Charlotte. “Abdoulaye Wade: ‘Mon retour est hautement politique,’” Le Monde, 21 April 2014, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2014/04/21/abdoulaye-wade-mon-retour-est-hautement-politique_4404704_3212.html (accessed 2 June 2014).

CHAPTER TWO – THEORIES OF PARTY-BUILDING: AFRICA, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM, AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

The dissertation’s arguments about party formation and behavior in Senegal expand upon insights from two literatures, one on competitive authoritarianism, and another on party-building and party functions in developing countries. The central argument is that many Senegalese parties are primarily concerned not with competing in elections, as most research on party-building assumes, but instead with *patronage negotiation*, which does not necessarily entail vote-seeking. It often involves contesting elections erratically at best while negotiating non-elected posts and material or financial benefits from the president. When parties are formed for negotiating access to the state rather than for winning elections, they rarely become the consistent, long-term opposition parties that bolster democracy. The uneven playing field, a hallmark of competitive authoritarianism, contributes to our understanding of why politicians would form parties that are not election-oriented but nevertheless find them worthwhile vehicles for political advancement. It also helps us account for proliferation, which theories of party-building in democracies and dominant-party autocracies do not predict. In turn, the nature of party formation in Senegal’s competitive authoritarian regime sheds further light on why the country has experienced two turnovers, despite the rarity of parties that pursue the consistent opposition strategies thought to fortify democracy and generate accountability through elections.

The rest of the chapter expands upon these arguments and their refinements to existing theory. Sections 2-4 situate the dissertation’s arguments about party formation, party strategies, and presidential turnover within the existing literature. They highlight where new insights from Senegal help us to refine theories of party-building in democracies and dominant-party autocracies; they also supplement the growing body of research on party-building in Africa.
II- Party Formation and Proliferation

There are several theories that predict the number of parties based on electoral rules and social cleavages, which in turn condition elites’ incentives to form parties. Based on the development experiences of Western countries that are now liberal democracies, that literature has been challenged by scholars of post-Third Wave transitions calling for further research on how elites and their use of the state shape party formation and strategy.

Existing Theories of Party Formation

The sources of party formation are often attributed to the historical context in which the party system developed (Shefter 1977, 1994). This literature is largely based on the experiences of early modern Europe and North America. In these countries, parties emerged when electoral competition was confined to a small elite. This competition began during industrialization, which created further pressure for mass suffrage. The confluence of economic and political development, as well as the sequencing of political changes (namely, the advent of multiparty competition before mass suffrage) yielded well-institutionalized party systems and liberal democratic regimes. Within these institutionalized party systems, research on formal institutions finds that the effective number of parties that emerge depends upon both election rules and the configuration of social cleavages representing broad-based conflicts that divide the electorate (Cox 1997, Duverger 1963, Lipset & Rokkan 1967).

Most African party systems developed from different historical sequences and in different political and economic contexts (Manning 2005). Industrialization did not accompany the advent of multiparty competition or mass suffrage. Moreover, in much of Africa, mass suffrage was externally imposed (by the colonizer) and multiparty competition was partially a
result of international donor pressures for competitive elections. This was the case even in Senegal, which unlike most of its African counterparts, fits the Western sequencing since it did have a century of multiparty competition among an exclusive elite before mass suffrage was extended. In Africa, the expansion of the suffrage and the transition to multiparty politics often fostered more fluid party systems than in the West. There has thus been active debate about the extent to which electoral rules and social cleavages are as relevant in Africa for explaining the number of parties as they are in the advanced industrial democracies. The most statistically sophisticated studies find that countries with first-past-the-post electoral systems and/or lower levels of ethnic fragmentation have fewer effective parties (Brambor et al. 2007, Mylonas & Roussias 2008; in dialogue with Mozaffar et al. 2003).

How do these theories play out in Senegal specifically? Electoral rules provide an incomplete account. Party registration laws have not changed since 1981, when President Diouf oversaw the passage of a law that created minimal legal barriers to party formation. To found a new party, one need only write party statutes, name the party’s Secretary General and other major leaders, and provide their biographical information and proof of citizenship. These formal rules did not stimulate much proliferation during the first decade of Diouf’s presidency, although party formation began to increase at the end of his rule. With the same party registration rules,

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1 See again Manning (2005). Bottom-up pressures for multiparty politics also existed. Popular protests in favor of multiparty reforms were common in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s (Bratton & Van de Walle 1992) and civil society successfully pressured presidents to discuss these reforms through National Conferences in several francophone African countries. However, these bottom-up initiatives were a function of the relative economic isolation and international pressures that African presidents felt after Western powers changed their terms of involvement with them at the end of the Cold War (Nwajiaku 1994, Levitsky & Way 2010b).

2 See LeBas (2011) for an excellent review.

3 Brambor et al. (2007) make the methodological point that Mozaffar et al. (2003) did not include the constitutive terms of the electoral institutions-ethnic fragmentation interaction term, which produces inaccurate results.
Wade oversaw acceleration in party creation (Creevey, Ngomo & Vengroff 2005, Hartman 2010).

Senegal’s mixed electoral system is also somewhat permissive of party formation. There are several sources of this permissiveness. First, after the opposition boycotted the 1990 local elections, Senegal’s political leaders agreed on a new electoral code allowing coalitions rather than just parties to compete in various races. This increased the ease with which small parties could pursue election-oriented goals even if they could not afford to run candidates on their own labels (Kanté 1994). Second, local election rules also changed in ways that lowered the barriers for small parties to win office, with the addition of a proportional representation component in 1996 (Vengroff & Ndiaye 1996, Mozaffar & Vengroff 2002). Since then, changes to the electoral code have gradually increased the percentage of seats allocated through a nationwide list with proportional representation (as opposed to district-wide races with plurality rules), which also effectively lowered the threshold for parties to participate in elections. However, these institutional explanations, which emphasize how electoral rules shape individual incentives to run for office, do not help us understand why some of the new parties that form do not compete for local or national office. While important, such formal changes in electoral rules are only part of the story behind proliferation.

Nor are social cleavage theories of party systems likely to explain why so many Senegalese politicians create parties (Manning 2005). The social cleavage approach is insufficient because it “is predicated on the idea that social identities such as class, religion,

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4 The election rules were flexible in favor of small, territorially limited parties in that they did not require parties to run candidates in district-wide races with plurality rules if they chose to run a national list of candidates.

5 The only comprehensive academic study of party regulation in Senegal during these periods concludes that informal institutions are more central to party formation, since “enforcement of formal rules needs both administrative capacities and the respect of the rule of law, both of which have been on the wane in Senegal over the last decade” (Hartman 2010: 782).
ethnicity, and region provide the basis for common interests and thereby create enduring partisan sympathies,” despite the fact that “in many new democracies…social classes are less organized and more fragmented than…in earlier democracies” (Mainwaring 1999: 22). Moreover, in Africa, “the modal party system that is emerging across much of the region is a system with a large dominant party surrounded by a bevy of small, highly volatile parties” and “these systems create disincentives for opposition party consolidation and incentives for individual ‘big men’ to maintain small, highly personalized parties or to join the winning party” (Van de Walle 2007: 61). Few of these individuals seek to mobilize a wide range of supporters across conflict lines that permeate Senegalese society. Although there is a salient urban-rural cleavage, it has not permitted party leaders to forge permanent bases of voters loyal to their organizations; even as the identity of the ruling party has changed, rural voters have always tended to support the ruling party, and urban voters have always been more accommodating to opposition parties (Koter 2013b). Moreover, ethnic, religious, and linguistic cleavages are of relatively low salience, and politicians do not generally rely on them to stake claims to particular voter bases (Cruise O’Brien 2003, Diouf 1994). 6 Many of Senegal’s parties are personalistic vehicles instead (Diop 2011, Manning 2005, Van de Walle & Butler 1999, Van de Walle 2007). They do not unite individuals with cross-cutting interests under a common banner and thus fail to restrain parochialism in the ways that were possible in the European context (Lipset & Rokkan 1967).

6 Nor do we observe many parties formed as unintended consequences of interest group alliances, which can in some cases mobilize a broad-based cleavage (whether confessional, sectoral or otherwise) that had previously been muted in the party sphere. Kalyvas’ (1996) account of confessional party formation in Europe illustrates how this kind of unintended cleavage mobilization can occur. In European countries where Christian Democratic parties were formed, the Catholic clergy formed an alliance with conservative party elites against leftists carrying out a liberal state-building project. The clergy was interested in using conservative party elites to help them resist the state’s anticlerical policy initiatives, and the conservative elites were interested in using the clergy to mobilize more voters in their favor. Although the members of this alliance did not intend for it to result in confessional party formation, Catholic church members mobilized by the interest group strategy of the clergy and the conservatives eventually took matters into their own hands. Parties mobilized along such broad cleavage lines are not the norm in Senegal. Senegal has one party that counts as confessional: the Movement for Social and Democratic Reform (MRDS), which promotes radical Islamic policies. Some members of religious elite families have created parties, but they are best classified as personalistic. The same goes for business leaders with parties.
Electoral rules and social cleavages are thought to have limited influence not only in Senegal and in African party systems, but also in post-Third Wave party systems more generally. Party-building in these fluid party systems is more “subject to elite and state shaping…from above” than the Western party systems that inspire classic theories (Mainwaring 1999: 55). Accordingly, in countries like Senegal, electoral rules and social cleavages may not be as central to explaining the number of parties. 7 Elites are less constrained by these institutional factors, and their use of the state to achieve their goals more centrally shape incentives for party formation. Two types of elite actors are important. Presidents have more room to use the state to create structural incentives for politicians to form parties (Mainwaring 1999, 2003). Political elites also have more “autonomy to switch parties, foster party mergers, and induce party schisms” (Mainwaring 1999: 56) than they did in early modern European and North America.

In Senegal, one of the many competitive authoritarian regimes that resulted from post-Third Wave transitions, the uneven playing field has both enabled presidents to encourage party formation when necessary, and influenced individual politicians’ logics of party creation and their parties’ fundamental purposes. More so than democratic presidents, competitive authoritarian presidents have the capacity to “use public resources to build parties and create an uneven playing field” (Mainwaring 1999: 56). More so than politicians in democracies, individuals in competitive authoritarian regimes who create parties make their decisions knowing the difficulties that they will have surviving outside of the state. On the whole, the parties that emerge are thus more likely to be state-oriented in the first place, and are more likely to minimize the time they spend in opposition before rallying behind the president, the gatekeeper.

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7 This insight also supplements the existing critique of studies that use cross-country regressions to estimate the influences of these factors. Some Africanists argue that “it is difficult to have great confidence in any of these findings, as the data covers a very short time span, includes a number of elections that probably should be excluded, and contains factual inaccuracies” (LeBas 2011: 30, citing Lindberg 2007: 219-221).
of state resources and privileges. In drawing out the logics of party formation that competitive authoritarianism provokes among politicians, we can further clarify the “dynamics of alliances, fusions, and fissions leading to the proliferation of parties and coalitions” on which there has been little research (Gazibo 2006: 16).

**Why Competitive Authoritarianism Encourages Proliferation**

To fully account for party formation in Senegal, we must recognize the different incentives for party creation that exist in non-democracies, specifically in competitive authoritarian regimes. Theories of party-building in democracies and autocracies do not predict proliferation. Nor do they account for one prominent kind of party we observe in Senegal: parties with leaders who are neither election-oriented, nor policy-oriented promoters of particular ideologies or special interests.

Parties are considered the building blocks of democracy and accountability, especially in institutionalized party systems (Aldrich 1995, Downs 1957, Levitsky, Loxton & Van Dyck n.d., Lipset 2000, Schattscheider 1942, Stokes 1999). Generally, research based on political development in such systems conceives of parties as primarily election-oriented, either as vote-maximizing entities (Aldrich 1995, Downs 1957) or as vehicles for pursuing an ideological platform that mobilizes a niche group of voters (Duverger 1954, Kitschelt 1989, Przeworski & Sprague 1986). However, in Africa’s generally more fluid systems, political parties do not always fulfill the functions that theories rooted in the Western, liberal democratic experience assign them (Manning 2005, Van de Walle & Butler 1999).

The first problematic premise is that parties are fundamentally composed of seekers of elected office, even if there are diverse reasons for party formation. Lipset (1964) describes the
“raison d’être” of parties as winning office (xx). Downs’ (1957) canonical account defines parties as organizations that ambitious politicians create to pool their resources and facilitate winning elected office. In early modern Europe and North America, politicians created parties to better organize election campaigns, develop linkages to constituents that facilitate re-election, and aggregate preferences to propose timely legislation (Aldrich 1995, Key 1964, Ostrogorski 1964). Since parties have a “primary purpose of winning control of the government,” patronage-seeking motivates party formation only insofar as it facilitates the future electoral success of the organization’s candidates (Hale 2006: 10, Sartori 1976, Schattschneider 1942).

For instance, office-seeking was the essential task propelling the first real party in the United States, which Martin Van Buren formed when he used promises of patronages to unite several state machines behind presidential candidate Andrew Jackson (Aldrich 1995). The deal fundamentally depended on the party’s candidates winning office in order to facilitate the rewards that Van Buren had promised. In this account, parties are “endogenous institutions” that politicians form and shape according to their problem-solving needs. However, the problems parties are purported to solve relate to winning office: namely, resolving disputes within groups of political hopefuls, mobilizing supporters, and presenting coherent platforms.

However, it is potentially problematic to assume that African parties are vote-maximizing, or even primarily election-oriented, since they are often “condemned to at most a handful of seats, [and] a minor role in any future legislature” (Van de Walle & Butler 1999: 22). In accounts based on the Western experience, there is minimal attention to the strategies of politicians who form parties but do not seek office on a regular basis, or at all. The lack of attention to this is of particular concern in Africa and other post-Third Wave regimes in which

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8 The team-building element of parties appears as early as Schumpeter (1942), who defines parties as “group[s] whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power” (283).
parties are often atomistic, personalized entities rather than team-oriented, mass organizations (Mainwaring 1999, Manning 2005).

Several major theories of party competition based on democracies are also based on the premise that parties form when there is space for them to develop ideologically or programmatically distinctive platforms as routes to electoral success (Downs 1957, Duverger 1963). Yet party formation in Africa does not depend solely upon these dynamics because most of the recent parties that have emerged are not ideologically or programmatically differentiated from one another. Party programs are key features of African politics, but “when parties discuss issues, they focus on establishing their own competence in an issue area, rather than claiming ownership of ideological space” (Bleck & Van de Walle 2011: 1125). Not all parties have specific policy proposals to implement (Diop 2011, Manning 2005, Marcus & Ratsimbaharison 2005, Pigeaud 2011, Van de Walle 2007). 9 For instance, in Senegal, Marxist ideology motivated formation of several parties after independence (LeVine 2004, Nzouankeu 1984). However, their ideological commitments have since waned. Although there is dimensionality according to parties’ historical commitment to various ideologies, most Senegalese parties today do not pursue political agendas, recruit members, or participate in governments based strictly – or even largely – upon these principles (Diop 2011).

A more relevant line of research on the Western democracies addresses the origins of patronage-based politics. The foremost studies of parties formed to access patronage through electoral contestation are focused on political machines, which emerged instead of programmatic parties when mass suffrage preceded the professionalization of the bureaucracy (Shefter 1977, 1994). For instance, American political machines founded by regime insiders with “internally mobilized parties” often flourished under these conditions (Shefter 1994: 15). Access to the state

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9 For a Senegal-specific example from the 1993 elections, see Kanté 1994.
was seminal to the machines’ emergence, but did not always guarantee their survival.

Programmatic parties with mass organizations tended to replace political machines when “externally mobilized parties” – formed by individuals outside of the government without access to the state – build up mass followings. The limited extent of party competition based on differentiable programs may indeed be driven by the importance of the state as a source of political capital in contemporary Africa. Yet especially in competitive authoritarian regimes like Senegal, where presidents are especially empowered to employ state institutions, resources, and the media that (within competitive electoral constraints) reinforce their power and limit the influence of opposition parties, the emergence of strong, externally mobilized parties is rare. Although a variety of such parties are formed, their growth into organizations that can maintain mass bases that seriously threaten incumbents is difficult. Instead, ruling party dominance – reinforced by the uneven playing field – encourages the formation of personalist parties that bargain for and live off of prebends but are not broad-based enough to become the patronage-based machines seen in the early modern European and North American examples. Theories of mass-based, patronage-oriented party machines thus do not provide insight into the more fragmented nature of patronage-based party formation in Senegal.

The literature on party formation under authoritarianism is not subject to all of the premises as the democracy literature, but it also cannot account for proliferation. Specifically, theories about party formation under dominant-party authoritarianism also fail to predict the extent of party formation experienced in Senegal. Most studies of parties and elections under authoritarianism highlight features of the regime type that discourage opposition in general,

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10 See Zolberg (1966) for further discussion of how externally mobilized organizations generate mass support. Shefter also find that programmatic politics can emerge when cleavages within the political class foster defections from within the ranks of patronage-based parties, forcing them to compete against one another for broad-based electoral support.
rather than party formation in particular. However, widespread party formation is not expected under authoritarianism for some of the same reasons that the opposition is weak in these regimes.

For one thing, in dominant-party autocracies, governments hold flawed elections in which the incumbent’s victory is practically a foregone conclusion (Greene 2007, Magaloni 2006). The government is often able to use electoral fraud and repression to shape election outcomes. Under such conditions, opposition parties do not have serious chances of displacing incumbents. Even when local and legislative races permit opposition figures to win elected offices, the number of offices and the margins of victory are monitored and limited by authorities (Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009, Magaloni 2006).

Second, authoritarian leaders have the repressive capacity to punish dissenters, which deters most opponents from forming associations. From Russia to Mexico, state repression against regime opponents greatly increases the cost of forming autonomous associations, including new parties (Fish 1995, Greene 2007:5). Most ambitious politicians, even if they have trouble advancing within the ruling party or disagree with the ruling party’s policies, are unlikely to join the opposition because of the “cost associated with targeted physical intimidation, beatings, or even killings of opposition activists that occur episodically in some (but not all) dominant party systems” (Greene 2007: 5).

Third, ruling party membership is required for patronage-oriented politicians to access wealth-generating reserve domains in the state economy (Greene 2007). For instance, authoritarian rule in Mexico’s dominant-party autocracy was based on leaders limiting privatization and maintaining a large public sector economy. By using state resources and sinecures available in the public sector to reinforce the ruling party’s expansive patronage networks, presidents preserve extreme incumbency advantages (6). The material costs of joining
the opposition – much less forming an opposition party – are significant. Opponents forgo the possibility of high-level government employment, as well as the access to “a stipend, kickbacks, or access to an old boys’ network of business contacts and favors” that ruling party politicians often receive in exchange for support (5). Because ruling parties provide mechanisms for providing these benefits while also adjudicating conflicts between elites for these rewards, they ensure that the authoritarian status quo persists, and that elites rarely defect to the opposition, much less form parties (Brownlee 2007).

The only explicit theory of opposition party formation under authoritarianism comes from Greene (2007), whose account of Mexico demonstrates how each of the above facets of dominant-party authoritarianism combine to temper party proliferation. Ultimately, opposition party formation is rare because only radical ideologues will be willing to bear the costs of never winning elections, never accessing patronage, and being potentially subject to violent reprisals – all in exchange for expressing their oppositional stance (Greene 2007). Much like theories of party formation in democracies, then, the theory of opposition party formation under dominant-party autocracy does not predict the kind of widespread party formation we see in Senegal. The patronage-seeking nature of many parties emerging from proliferation is especially striking relative to the autocracy literature’s emphasis on ruling party membership as the only path to accessing state resources. Thus, although Senegal was formerly a dominant-party autocracy under Senghor, much like the case that inspired these theories, it appears that politicians’ decisions about party creation are subject to different inducements and constraints.

Given the limits of these literatures, the dissertation analyzes how competitive authoritarianism shapes the logics of party formation differently than in democracies and autocracies. In order to understand the proliferation of parties that are neither vote-maximizing
nor ideologically distinctive in Senegal, we must take into account that parties are often created for different, non-electoral reasons under competitive authoritarianism. This regime type shapes political competition in ways that make it less overtly repressive and fraudulent than in autocracies, but less free and fair than in democracies. Unlike in autocracies, elections are competitive enough to constitute the main route to power; party politics is less overtly repressive and fraudulent, and a playing field, however skewed, exists. Yet unlike in democracies, incumbency advantage runs so deep that it qualifies as a systematic abuse of power. The “uneven playing field” that characterizes competitive authoritarianism entails systematic, immense ruling party advantages relative to the opposition in terms of “access to institutions, resources, and the media” (Levitsky & Way 2010a: 58). Presidents can deprive opponents of state resources, drive up the costs of opposition access to and coverage in the media, and oversee the politicized application of the law (Levitsky & Way 2010b: 9-12). These constraints within an electorally competitive environment critically shape the costs and benefits that politicians face when they form parties.

The uneven playing field renders survival in the opposition so financially difficult that many politicians are constrained – or even motivated – to form parties that are more consistently state-oriented and less consistently election-oriented than theories based on liberal democracies would predict. In particular, the uneven playing field intensifies incentives for both ambitious, career-oriented politicians and for rent-seeking elites to create parties to lobby the president for access to the state. Politicians may therefore form parties that are not election-oriented but still find them worthwhile vehicles for participating in politics outside of the electoral sphere in order to negotiate ways into the state.
Party Creators’ Non-electoral Goals

The dissertation’s central argument is that a significant subset of Senegalese parties is primarily concerned not with competing in elections, as most research on party-building assumes, but instead with patronage negotiation, which does not necessarily entail vote-seeking. That is, Senegal has several parties that compete in elections and attempt to forge stable constituencies among voters. However, party creation is more often a tool to lobby for state resources than it is a means of regular electoral contestation. Most contemporary Senegalese politicians form parties in order to negotiate their way into power with the president, often minimizing regular involvement in elections and negotiating non-elected posts and other patronage. When parties are formed for negotiating access to the state rather than for winning elections, they rarely become long-term opposition parties that remain consistently outside of the government to monitor and critique it. They instead often seek co-optation into an oversized ruling coalition, which the president builds despite the fact that the ruling party controls a legislative majority and does not need partisan allies to form a government. These state-oriented parties that negotiate with the government rather than oppose it do not fulfill the oppositional functions often considered critical for democratization.

Party formation is often a strategy for politicians to negotiate better treatment from the state for themselves and their small groups of followers. They are often the expression of a single politician’s ambition, whose organization consists of the politician’s family, friends, and neighbors who are socially and materially invested in his success. These followers seek economic advancement through the politician’s ability to access the state, whether through a plum job, material benefits he gets from the president’s entourage, or greater proximity to the ruling party’s network of cadres able to solve his followers’ personal problems. Since party
formation has always been administratively easy in Senegal, it has become a strategy for both rich and poor politicians to voice their particularistic demands.

Proliferation, then, is the result of individual politicians’ calculations about how best to ensure their access to the state while minimizing the amount of time and money that they must invest in running on their own label in elections in order to secure that access. However, proliferation is also limited by several factors. Politicians who lack linkages to the president are often more inclined to create parties than individuals who already have ties to him and therefore do not need to build public profiles, whether for patronage-seeking or oppositional purposes. In addition, party creation is only possible for politicians who have or can mobilize someone with the education and legal know-how to write the party statutes that are required for registration.

A variety of data suggest that politicians often form parties primarily to get the president’s attention and negotiate their way into power through him. The most telling evidence of the primacy of patronage negotiation over vote-maximization among many parties in the Senegalese system is that on the eve of the 2012 presidential elections, only 43 of the 174 registered parties had ever run for seats in the National Assembly or for the presidency. In other words, three-quarters of Senegal’s registered parties are not behaving in the ways that Downs (1957) would predict. Instead, parties are often politicians’ “shortcuts for obtaining a piece of the pie.”

The politicians who create parties are characterized as “impatient” to work in the state. Although many parties are “telephone booth parties” with few members, they are “springboards” to ensure that you are “visible to power” and that “that the president

11 Interview with Tamsir Jupiter Ndiaye, 1/18/12, Dakar.
12 Interview with Daouda Diedhiou, 2/5/12, Dakar.
13 Interview with Yaya Dia, 2/29/12, Dakar.
knows...that you exist.”

Party formation is a means through which their creators establish a “legacy” for themselves, and parties are bids of individuals to “strike a deal with those in power” and to “access rewards distributed by the PDS.”

Despite their often compact and shallow nature, informants very commonly describe these parties as creating a reputation for their leaders, who try to make people “believe that you have a big group behind you.”

Although there are multiple, layered logics for party formation, if we study the ways that party leaders and their organizations behave in their early days, we see that factors like ideology, programs, intraparty conflict, and status-related competition between politicians are contributing, though not central factors behind party creation.

Parties’ electoral activities soon after their formation also suggest that parties are often more patronage-oriented than they are election-oriented. Between 1998 and 2003, the initial years in which party formation accelerated in Senegal, 46 parties were registered and two-thirds of them eventually joined the presidential entourage, usually after contesting one election or less. Within the broader population as well, few parties run on their own label in more than one national election; most find their way into the oversized ruling coalition that President Wade built as part of his efforts to fragment major opposition parties and mobilize a future presidential majority with relative certainty. Wade’s particular strategy for maintaining power encouraged this widespread collaboration. Facilitated by the uneven playing field, Wade was able to

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14 Interview with Mounirou Sy, 3/22/12, Dakar.
15 Interview with Georges Nesta Diop, 3/22/12, Khar Yallah.
16 Interview with Abdoulaye Diallo, 3/21/12, Dakar.
17 Interview with El Hadji Momar Sambe, 11/8/11, Dakar.
18 Interview with Mousseyesse Niang, 17 February 2012, Dakar.
19 Interview with Georges Nesta Diop, 3/22/12, Khar Yallah.
construct the Coalition Around the President in the 21st Century (Cap21), an expansive institution through which almost any party leader could access regularized streams of small-scale patronage in exchange for long-term loyalty to Wade. Members of the Cap21 were virtually guaranteed a variety of benefits: modest monthly salaries, bags of rice on a per-month basis, regular meetings with a presidential intermediary, occasional opportunities to meet with the president in a group, funding to campaign for the president in their home villages, and proximity to agents of the state which is helpful for solving a variety of problems. At least 79 (45%) of parties have negotiated their way into President Wade’s graces through the Cap 21 in particular, and additional parties have pursued other kinds of collaborative relationships with the president and the ruling party. These behaviors further attest to the patronage negotiating function of parties outside of elections.

The Role of Presidential Initiative in Proliferation

The role of Wade’s Cap 21 in fostering party proliferation raises a larger question about the degree to which presidents shape politicians’ incentives for party formation in the first place. The uneven playing field and the presidential advantages that it reinforces is something that Senegalese politicians take into account when they consider creating their own parties. However, some presidents also actively employ their informal advantages on the uneven playing field to shape politicians’ incentives to form parties. In some cases, this provides additional impetus for politicians to form parties that collaborate with incumbents. Presidents Diouf and Wade could make several explicit choices about how to structure the party system. Both

20 The estimate is conservative because these 79 parties have all publicly negotiated their way into power, either by joining the Cap 21 (Wade’s club for smaller party leaders) or pursuing a bilateral alliance with the ruling party. Other party leaders may have negotiated more informal collaborations that we cannot detect by consulting coalition rosters and newspaper reports.
presidents were passive enablers of proliferation, choosing never to use their legislative majorities to amend the 1981 Political Parties Law that is permissive of party formation.

Moreover, they had formal and informal powers to shape the party system more actively. As elsewhere in Africa, in Senegal presidents have constitutional powers that are extremely strong and relatively unchecked (Van de Walle 2003). They also wield discretionary power over the public sector economy, limiting the extent to which opposition politicians have autonomous resources and capabilities to challenge incumbents (Arriola 2012). The uneven playing field gives presidents informal advantages over the opposition in addition to the sweeping formal powers they generally have in Africa (Levitsky & Way 2010b, Van de Walle 2003). Especially under competitive authoritarianism, which reinforces the relative poverty of parties that remain outside of the state, politicians must make decisions about party formation that factor in the difficulties of creating durable and consistent opposition parties. This may be one reason why so few new parties that emerge remain outside of the ruling entourage.

However, the two presidents headed ruling parties that faced different electoral imperatives, which affected whether they overtly encouraged proliferation on top of passively enabling it. Proliferation began unintentionally under Diouf in the late 1990s as politicians reacted to ruling party weakness, but Wade purposely fostered its continuation by establishing the Cap 21. Diouf did not use his control of the state to foster proliferation actively. Throughout his presidency (1981-2000), the ruling PS’s share of the vote in national elections declined, and by 1998 was hovering around 50%. With the ruling party itself, along with just a few allied parties and support movements, Diouf could reasonably hope to mobilize a presidential majority in future elections (Dahou & Foucher 2009). He focused on temporarily co-opting Senegal’s major opposition parties, bringing their leaders into his governments in order to weaken their
image as committed opponents (Diop & Diouf 1990, Diop et al. 2013). Yet he did not consistently encourage party creation or promote it as a way of further fragmenting the opposition.

Wade was more aggressive and overt than Diouf in his encouragement of party creation, which has coincided not with the initial spike in proliferation but with its continued acceleration. Electoral imperatives motivated Wade to use the state more overtly to encourage proliferation, mainly because he came to power with the PDS winning just 30% of the vote in the first round (and this was not on its own, but in alliance with leftist parties). The remainder of Wade’s presidential majority in 2000 resulted from his alliance with other opposition parties. Because the PDS did not on its own command over 50% of the vote, which is required to win presidential elections, Wade had to build bigger alliances to be able to mobilize future presidential majorities with relative certainty. He therefore strategized differently: while seeking to bring major opposition parties into his governments as Diouf had, Wade additionally cultivated an oversized coalition of many small parties that splintered from major opposition parties or originated in civil society. In creating the Cap 21 and soliciting the participation of opponents in his governments, President Wade incentivized elites outside of the ruling party to negotiate patronage from him in exchange for deserting the political opposition, whose relative strength Wade had to diminish in order to win re-election. That is, by providing these benefits on a consistent basis to a variety of politicians who joined the Cap 21 soon after founding parties, Wade provided inducements for the leaders of new parties to join the ruling coalition. At the same time, he motivated members of major, electorally relevant opposition parties with serious grievances to create their own organizations.
In sum, whether by directly shaping politicians’ incentives to form parties or by empowering presidents to do so, the uneven playing field reifies ruling party dominance, which motivates a variety of politicians to form new parties as tools for negotiating their way into the state. With or without the president’s use of the uneven playing field to actively encourage proliferation, politicians face “disincentives for opposition party consolidation” to the extent that “at least some politicians believe that maintaining an independent power base will improve the deal they can strike with the president” (Van de Walle 2007: 61). Because accessing patronage within the ruling party often requires politicians to fight costly and lengthy leadership battles in order to find a secure and prominent place within the party even on the local level, some politicians calculate that creating their own party is a more noticeable and expedient way to lobby for themselves and their followers.

III- The Nature of Opposition: Adversarial vs. Collaborative Party Behavior

Another notable characteristic of Senegalese parties is that most of them do not pursue consistent opposition, remaining in the opposition for multiple, national-level elections. Among the parties sampled for the study, collaboration with the government is more common than consistent opposition. Some party leaders seek to be co-opted into the presidential entourage in exchange for patronage (co-optation); other party leaders run against the ruling party in at least some elections but join the government in between elections (tactical alliances). Why have few Senegalese party leaders adopted strategies of consistent opposition and what characteristics enable and motivate them to behave this way?

The abundance of parties that are co-opted or that forge tactical alliances, as well as the rarity of consistent opposition parties, are common features of African politics. In Cameroon
and Gabon, a few parties like the Social Democratic Front (SDF) and the Union for Gabonese People (UPG) remained consistently in opposition. Most other party founders who begin in opposition are co-opted; take, for instance, Bello Bouba Maigari of the United National Democratic Party (UNDP) in Cameroon and Paul Mba Abessole of the National Woodcutters’ Rally – Rally for Gabon (RNB-RPG) in Gabon (Takougang 2004). Within Senegal, over 50 parties were in the president’s entourage, known as the *mouvance présidentielle*, by the 2007 elections and over 65 were in long-term alliances with the PDS by the 2012 election.²¹

Tactical alliances also occur in other competitive authoritarian regimes. For instance, Kenyan opponent Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) accepted a ministerial post in the government run by the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 2001 before leaving in 2002 to run against the KANU presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta (Howard & Roessler 2006, Levitsky & Way 2010b, Ndegwa 2003). In Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), Abdoulaye Bathily of the Democratic League (LD/MPT), and Amath Dansokho of the Independent Workers’ Party (PIT) accepted ministerial posts in the governments of President Abdou Diouf throughout the 1990s. They often left the Diouf government before legislative and presidential elections in order to run against him (Diop et al. 2000). After Senegal’s first *alternance* in 2000, party leaders as well-known as ex-PS minister Djibo Kâ of the Union for Democratic Renewal (URD) and leftist leader Landing Savané of And-Jef (AJ/PADS) ran on their own party labels in national elections but also forged long-term alliances with President Wade (Diop 2011, Niang 2004).

Africanist scholarship has identified the determinants of short-term party strategies, but it has not yet accounted for parties’ longer-term strategies, that is, party leaders’ series of decisions to oppose or collaborate with the president over the course of multiple national elections. There

are careful studies of the conditions under which opposition parties will coalesce in a particular election to oppose the president (Arriola 2012, Howard & Roessler 2006, Resnick 2012, Wahman 2012), but we lack an account of parties’ longer-term behavior over a series of consecutive elections. Not all of this long-term behavior is planned deliberately by party leaders at the birth of their organizations. Party leaders’ willingness and ability to select certain strategies are subject to significant resource constraints on the uneven playing field. In particular, long-term strategy is conditioned by presidents, who must fragment and destabilize the opposition in order to ensure their re-election. Nevertheless, party leaders’ goals, resources, and vote-mobilizing capabilities also affect the frequency and the degree to which they can resist the president’s offers. In this sense, the long-term behavior of parties remains strategic, even if it is constrained. Accordingly, we might ask: taking as given Wade’s strategies for attempting to co-opt and fragment parties in the system, what are the determinants of parties’ behavior over the longer term? Why did so few parties that began in opposition remain there throughout the five national elections spanning the Wade presidency (2000-2012)?

This section first reviews the determinants of short-term party strategies, then articulates the dissertation’s central argument and contributions about long-term party behavior.

**Existing Research on Party Strategies**

Most work on opposition in non-democracies has focused on the shorter-term aspects of party behavior, namely either: (1) the presence or absence of opposition coordination against

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22 As Chapter 4 covers, the core of the president’s survival strategy is to negotiate with the leaders of parties that are most threatening to the ruling coalition’s prospects to command future presidential and legislative majorities. He tries to use his advantageous access to state institutions, resources, and media to convince opponents to join the ruling coalition, where he can most effectively fragment their organizations. Although the president is not always successful in co-opting the most threatening parties, his goals and the resource distribution on the uneven playing field shape the costs and benefits of various strategies. This affects the motivations and capacities of various party leaders to select opposition strategies consistently.
incumbents in elections, or (2) the electoral coalition choices of parties in single contests (Arriola 2012, Galvan 2001, Gandhi & Reuter 2013, Howard & Roessler 2006, Ndegwa 2003, Smith 2001, Wahman 2012). These studies find that the private resource access of party leaders, as well as party ideology and party institutionalization, shape electoral coalition choices (Arriola 2012, Boone, Diop & Thioub 1998, Gandhi & Reuter 2013, Kuenzi & Lambright 2001, Rakner & Svasand 2002, Wahman 2011). These are major contributions to the literature on non-democratic oppositions. However, it is unclear whether these factors impact parties’ oppositional behavior across multiple elections in the same ways that they shape party leaders’ behavior in single elections. The dissertation examines and refines hypotheses that originated in the research on short-term strategies in order to explore the determinants of long-term strategies.

The first possibility is that highly institutionalized parties will more consistently oppose the ruling party because they have more stable bases of supporters than other parties. Institutionalized parties already have a label, a presence in voters’ minds, and a reputation for regular involvement in national elections (Mainwaring & Scully 1995, Kuenzi & Lambright 2001, Randall & Svasand 2002). Because institutionalized parties are well-known, they have electoral advantages in the opposition over parties that are still developing. This reputation makes them more likely to win when running in the opposition and also facilitates opposition coalitions, since a party’s “stable existence” also provides it “time to build a reputation for cooperation” and to serve as a focal point for opposition party coordination (Gandhi & Reuter 2013: 153).

However, most parties in Africa have not consistently participated in elections since their birth. Afrobarometer surveys also attest to the low levels of legitimacy that parties as a whole have in the eyes of the public—regardless of their age, regularity of participation, and territorial
implantation (Bleck & Van de Walle 2011, Rakner & Van de Walle 2009). In Senegal, many of the countries’ most institutionalized parties have joined the government on various occasions. This generalization encompasses, including leftist parties with long histories of underground contestation of authoritarianism before emerging in the earlier days of multipartism as well as parties that have more recently splintered from ruling parties with leaders and attempted to build roots across the country. Parties’ collaboration with the government, whether through tactical alliances or long-term co-optation, is exceedingly common even among these older and more socially rooted parties that are predicted to perform well in the opposition.

Party ideology is a second, common explanation for oppositional behavior. This hypothesis holds that parties with ideological or policy-based differences from the ruling party spend more consecutive elections in opposition than parties without such programmatic or ideological commitments. Several mechanisms could be in play. A coherent ideology can provide “starting capital” to party-builders (Hale 2006). Parties with it can remain in the opposition because the cultivation and retention of supporters that make the party electorally relevant during its initial development demand separation from the president’s party. However, to survive, parties that have ideological starting capital must expand their financial resources—and in some cases this requires forging alliances with the president. Somewhat differently, Hanson’s (2010) study of “post-imperial democracies” contends that ideological capital alone sustains particular parties’ long-term endurance in the opposition. In Mexico’s hegemonic party autocracy, major opposition parties were able to resist absorption into the ruling party because their voters wanted the “opportunity to express a deeply held programmatic or ideological belief that diverge[d] from the status quo” even if their leaders were excluded from patronage networks (Greene 2007: 60). In addition, cross-regional analysis of competitive authoritarian regimes
shows that parties with “distinctive policy agendas in relation to the incumbent government” are more likely to form opposition electoral coalitions (Wahman 2011: 655).

Yet in Africa’s neopatrimonial context, policy and ideology are not particularly relevant. Parties do not usually differentiate themselves along ideological or programmatic lines (Manning 2005, Van de Walle & Butler 1999). Within Senegal, the country’s first president, Leopold Senghor, sponsored the 1976 “law of the three trends,” which legally permitted the establishment of three ideologically distinct parties: the PS as the social-democratic trend of thought, the PDS as a liberal-democratic one, and the African Independence Party (PAI) as a Marxist line (Nzouankeu 1984). However, these parties that used to represent official ideologies have become patronage-based parties with relatively similar policy demands. Very few opposition parties distinguish themselves along ideological and policy lines, and instead compete to assert their competencies relative to others in key issue areas (Bleck & Van de Walle 2011).

A third set of scholars contend that organizational resources inherited from authoritarian rule affect the quality of opposition (Hale 2006, Koter 2013, LeBas 2011, Riedl 2013). Countries whose authoritarian leaders integrated local elites (like chiefs and marabouts) as well as corporatist organizations (like labor unions) into the ruling party, rather than repressing or replacing them, now have more durable opposition parties. The hypothesis that emerges for the study of party strategy is as follows: opposition parties whose leaders had such organizational linkages and used them to build parties under authoritarianism may be more likely to resist collaborating with the president in the multiparty period than parties without such organizational resources. Yet, as discussed below, Senegalese realities contradict this hypothesis.

LeBas (2011) focuses on the organizational capital that corporate institutions provide parties. In countries where authoritarian rulers chose not to suppress labor unions, the unions
later served as mobilizing structures for opposition parties. These parties were able to function as consistent opponents when leaders polarized conflict between their parties and the ruling coalition to make defection from the opposition costly. When applied to the outcomes of interest for the dissertation, this theory can also help to account for the consistent opposition strategy of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe, as well as the weak opposition parties in Kenya and Zambia that may be more prone to tactical alliances and co-optation. However, the explanation does not work as well in Senegal. Authoritarian president Leopold Senghor integrated labor unions into the ruling party, but unions have not been the basis of opposition party-building under multipartism. Subsequent presidents have disabled unions from potentially fostering strong parties capable of consistent opposition, via fragmentation of these organizations. President Wade has encouraged the fragmentation of unions, and Senegalese union leaders generally forbid party recruitment within the organization’s formal ranks. This fragmentation – which is common in much of francophone Africa (ILO 2010) - makes unions more costly for politicians to court for party-building. Multiple organizations must be won over and coordinated in order to generate the mass mobilization conducive to opposition. Therefore, unions in francophone Africa do not always evolve into the organizations with the greatest mobilizing potential for opposition parties.

Riedl (2013) analyzes how authoritarian strategies for incorporating a broader political elite into the government affects presidents’ present-day ability to shape the party system to his advantage. Local elites who had been incorporated into the authoritarian system supported presidents during the democratic transition, empowering them to shape the transition agenda to

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23 Interviews with Mody Guiro (leader of CNTS union), 8/6/12, Dakar; Cheikh Diop (leader of CNTS-FC union), 8/2/12, Dakar; Amadou Lamine Diouf (leader of CDSL union), 8/3/12.
benefit the ruling party. When incumbents “tightly control the democratic transition process,” they also “make rules to limit the extent of participation, and structure the public perception of competitive forces in the system. This leads to higher party system institutionalization,” including “a coherent and enduring anti-incumbent regime cleavage” around which opposition parties have the opportunity to rally and coordinate (12-13). Party strategies \textit{per se} are not Riedl’s focus, but the existence of such a cleavage posited in her theory would presumably facilitate consistent opposition for a variety of politicians. From this perspective, Senegalese parties exhibit more variation than expected in long-term strategy. Of the four countries featured in Riedl’s study, Ghana and Senegal both had strong authoritarians who incorporated local elites into the state after independence, and both have higher party system institutionalization than Benin and Zambia, where weak authoritarians did not as thoroughly incorporate local elites. However, few Ghanaian parties pursue tactical alliances or negotiate permanent co-optation into the president’s entourage, whereas in Senegal co-optation and tactical alliances are widespread and consistent opposition is rare. Despite authoritarian incorporation, in contemporary Senegal there is not as much of an “enduring anti-incumbent regime cleavage” as Riedl’s theory predicts (216). Major opposition leaders, including Abdoulaye Wade before 2000, have been willing to join the government, and ruling party elites like Macky Sall have been willing to exit and run against the president in the opposition when they encounter difficulties within the ruling party.

A final possibility is that party leaders’ resource access influences party strategy, with poorer parties exhibiting higher frequencies of cooperating with the ruling party and the government. This logic is based on Arriola’s (2012) study of opposition parties’ coalescence, which finds that it is more likely as privatization increases the availability of private credit, deprives presidents of “the capacity to command the political allegiance of business,” and
enables business to fund promising opponents (19). Were this hypothesis viable on the level of individual party strategies, we would see only the parties whose leaders have reliable access to private sector finance enduring outside of the ruling coalition.

While private financing is clearly an important influence on long-term party behavior in Senegal, it is not the only important determinant of strategy. The diffusion of private finance into a country’s economy does not guarantee that those who receive significant access to it will be politically motivated to use this finance for oppositional purposes rather than collaborative ones. Some independently wealthy politicians strike deals to work with the president. Furthermore, few opposition parties can rely on private resource flows to entirely replace the state support that presidents can withdraw if they become politically threatening. For instance, Abdoulaye Wade was an international consultant while in opposition, but still also relied on salaries from his law firm and professorship in Dakar, which Diouf eventually tried to block (Wade 2006). Thus, even in Senegal, which has undergone significant privatization (Arriola 2012, Boone, Diop & Thioub 1998), parties rarely follow consistent opposition strategies.

**Independent Financing and State Experience Matter Together**

Evidence from Senegal suggests that private resource access helps us explain variation in long-term strategy, but that it is not the whole story. Consistent opposition strategies are most often pursued by party leaders with access to a particular kind of private finance – internationally secured private finance that the president cannot manipulate – combined with state or civil society experience that he acquired before he created his own party. Party founders’ decisions to pursue consistent opposition are thus shaped by the degree and type of resources they possess to overcome structural disadvantages on the uneven playing field. Serious resource disparities
inhibit all but a few experienced and rich party leaders from developing the capacity to resist co-optation and to attract promising followings in the long run. Moreover, only the combination of both endowments provides party leaders with the resources and political potential sufficient for them to invest in running against incumbents consistently over time.

In this context, why do these two types of resources – experience and financing – matter? First, party leaders’ experience as state administrators allows them to market themselves as viable replacements to incumbent politicians. It provides party leaders with leadership roles allowing them to build constituencies of followers who can potentially mobilize behind them when they create parties. State experience indicates that a politician is familiar with the inner workings of the government and knows how to run the state. For instance, when ex-PS barons Moustapha Niasse and Djibo Kâ formed their own parties and ran for office, citizens already knew them from decades of ministerial and cabinet experience under President Diouf. Similarly, one reason that LD/MPT leaders remained in Diouf’s “enlarged presidential majority governments” in the mid-1990s was because party elites believed that their acquisition of state experience gave them skills that would increase the electorate’s esteem of the party (LD/MPT 1995: 24). Especially on the uneven playing field, party leaders who cannot signal administrative competence struggle to convince the electorate that they can count on better futures if they vote for them.

Civil society experience can serve as a substitute endowment for party leaders who lack state experience. Party founders who lead associations with broad-based urban constituencies can use the expertise they build from maintaining these organizations, as well as the social or political reforms they attempt to enact in that role, to make claims to political legitimacy. This is especially the case when these associations mobilize people spanning densely populated urban
areas whose capture is key to electoral success. One notable example is the trajectory of Talla Sylla. His party, Jëf-Jël, is an outgrowth of the Youth for Alternation (JPA) movement that he created in 1993 and popularized among urban Senegalese youth. These organizations were an outgrowth of the Senegalese student movement, which Sylla led in his hometown, Thiès, in the 1980s, and was bolstered by Sylla’s connections the student diaspora in France. Known also for his controversial, fiery manner of speaking about politics (FKA/CESTI 2001), Sylla has been able to capitalize upon his renown as an outspoken and powerful associational leader in the electoral sphere, where the party has consistently run against and criticized incumbents.24

Second, party leaders’ access to independent sources of private finance gives them the capacity to engage in clientelist political competition for the highest offices, which makes their investment in electoral competition potentially worthwhile.25 Independent sources of financing are often international, whether from private consulting or from the covert support of foreign politicians or the diaspora. For instance, Abdoulaye Wade contracted for the African Development Bank while in opposition; Moustapha Niasse jointly owns an international oil company; and foreign leaders like former presidents Omar Bongo (Gabon), Laurent Gbagbo (Cote d’Ivoire), and Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso) have allegedly funded Wade and current President Macky Sall when they were opponents (Wade 2006).26 These sources of independent financing are especially key on the uneven playing field, where the ruling party’s access to the state yields “hyper-incumbency advantage” and even rich challenger parties struggle to match

24 Sylla has consistently participated in legislative elections, in which the party runs on its own label. However, he does not always run in presidential races, but when the party participates at all, it is on its own label, as in 2007.

25 This argument is based on the premise that only party leaders who are committed to “throwing the president out” and believe that they have enough money to seriously attempt this are likely to consider pursuing a strategy of consistent opposition.

the president’s financial clout (Levitsky & Way 2010a). Running in national elections is costly and relying on state financing or domestic sources of private financing that the president has more power to disturb is precarious; formally, running entails tens of thousands of dollars in registration fees, and informally, politicians must distribute material benefits to Senegal’s largely clientelist electorate to have a chance of succeeding in races for the presidency or parliamentary seats. Without sources of independent financing, the president can use the state to block politicians’ access to money, which impedes their capacity for autonomous political activity, including consistent opposition.

Why do these resources matter together? Both resources function as potential bargaining chips for party leaders in negotiations with the president when he solicits collaboration; 27 but party leaders with different combinations of these endowments exhibit different preferences and capacities to resist collaboration. Although the president targets politicians with a variety of resource profiles for co-optation, 28 only those with both state experience and international private financing have enough serious electoral potential as presidential challengers to resist the constant opportunities that presidents provide for government collaboration. They have the state experience to rival the president’s competencies and the independent financing to launch a campaign that does not match the ruling party’s, but

27 Letting serious opponents into the government is politically risky for presidents; it gives adversaries state experience and name recognition among voters. However, there are also short-term benefits that can offset long-term costs. For instance, bringing electorally threatening opposition parties into the government gives presidents the opportunity to pit key elites within these parties against each other and foster party splits that diminish these organizations’ individual electoral clout. Chapter 4 traces how Wade poached major opposition party elites into his entourage after their organizations entered the government and how these parties’ participation in the government led to internal disputes about the distribution of spoils, ultimately weakening their organizations.

28 Chapter 4 presents more detailed evidence. However, Wade’s consistent calls for negotiations with electorally relevant party leaders like Djibo Kâ (URD), Moustapha Niassé (AFP), Ousmane Tanor Dieng (PS), Abdoulaye Bathily (LD), Amath Dansokho (PIT), and Landing Savane (AJ/PADS) suggest that he is interested in neutralizing their power. A cursory analysis of the members of Wade’s governments and ruling coalition also indicates that he welcomes a variety of politicians into the ruling coalition. Ministers themselves range from people like Djibo Kâ, with significant state experience, to people with fortunes based on international private financing like Abdourahim Agne, to others who come from distinguished elite families but lack both endowments, like Bacar Dia.
significantly challenges it on the uneven playing field. In these rare cases, party leaders know that they have serious enough potential to win the presidency, and that the prize of the presidency is so large that a consistent opposition strategy is desirable. However, strategies of consistent opposition are rare in Senegal because most party leaders lack one or both of the endowments and are better off investing their limited resources into collaborating with the president, through either temporary tactical alliances or more permanent co-optation into the ruling coalition.

This argument builds upon leading scholarship on party competition in Africa, which emphasizes the importance of private capital for opposition coalescence, but overlooks the role that international private financing in particular – and such financing in conjunction with a party leader’s state or civil society experience – plays in fostering the sustained oppositional behavior of particular parties (Arriola 2012, Boone, Diop & Thioub 1998). The reason that state access matters along with international private financing for consistent opposition is linked to the nature of the uneven playing field. Politicians who have enjoyed state access often benefit from additional opportunities to accumulate wealth relative to politicians with international private financing only, whether it is just through the official salary they receive as ministers or also through their linkages to private financiers whose support they cultivate during their service as ministers. 29 Politicians who have experience through service as prominent grassroots civil society figures rather than as ministers do not have as much access to additional political finance through their networks, but their renown within society still exposes them to important

29 These means of accumulating wealth and financing do not necessarily entail corruption. Corrupt fundraising through the abuse of one’s state office may also be part of the story in some cases, but detecting the degree and extent of such corruption is beyond the scope of the dissertation. It makes no explicit claim that corruption in necessary to access the international private financing that the argument deems key to oppositional behavior.
opportunities to gain the material and symbolic support of “opinion leaders” like marabouts, traditional leaders, business elites, and Senegalese in the diaspora.

The fact that independent sources of money matter for party behavior on the uneven playing field is unsurprising. However, the Senegalese experience reveals that state and civil society experience, along with such financing, critically enables individual politicians to establish the renown and the resources needed to compete seriously with incumbents. Although loans through commercial banks are an important route to this money (Arriola 2012), politicians with social networks they developed during their time in the state or through their activism in civil society can also more informally engage in private fundraising.

IV- Presidential Turnover and the Advantage of Regime Insiders

Despite the paucity of opposition parties that remain outside of government in the long run, Senegal has experienced two turnovers over the past fourteen years. However, it is former government collaborators, rather than the committed outsiders conventionally defined as the opposition, who oust the president. More generally, these “regime insiders” (Pinkston 2013) have instead been the incumbent’s most serious adversaries in Senegal’s last four presidential elections (1993, 2000, 2007, 2012), regardless of turnover. Regime insiders are defined here as politicians who have accepted ministerial appointments and accessed state resources – including salaries, media exposure, control over low-level state employment, and opportunities to network with domestic and international elites – before they leave the government to run for office in the opposition. They are operationalized here as politicians who have accessed state resources through ministerial appointments before forming their own parties. By these

30 Thus, their presence in these races cannot be the causes of turnover, since only two (2000, 2012) actually resulted in incumbents losing power.
standards, insiders include opposition party leaders who later collaborate with the ruling party in presidential majority governments, like Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS or Abdoulaye Bathily of the LD/MPT. Insiders also include politicians who have pursued their careers within the ruling party but eventually break away to create their own parties, like Moustapha Niasse of the AFP and Djibo Kâ of the URD during the Diouf presidency, as well as Idrissa Seck of Rewmi and Macky Sall of the APR during the Wade presidency. 31 Although not all insiders translate their opportunities to access the state into electoral performance that sidelines outsiders, insider advantage is a consistent aspect of presidential competition in Senegal. In 1993 and 2000, Wade was the front-running opposition candidate and each time left PS governments to campaign; in 2007, Wade’s ex-Prime Minister, Seck, was the second-place finisher; and in 2012, Seck’s successor as Prime Minister, Sall, defeated Wade.

Insider advantage is widespread in Africa. Michael Sata, the President of Zambia, had been in the ex-ruling party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and had been a minister before he created the Patriotic Front (PF). Before the PF won the presidency in 2011, it performed on par with opposition parties led by outsiders, including the United Party of National Development (UPND) of private sector businessmen Anderson Mazoka and Haikande Hichilema (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar 2010, Larmer & Fraser 2007, Resnick 2014, Simutanyi 2008). Insiders from authoritarian regimes who joined the opposition after the multiparty transition include Mwai Kibaki in Kenya, Bakili Muluzi in Malawi, and Mathieu Kérékou in Benin (Howard & Roessler 2006, Levitsky & Way 2010b, Pinkston 2013).

We know little about the sources of ex-regime insiders’ advantages as opposition candidates. This is because most research on African elections studies opposition parties and

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31 This is not an exhaustive list of regime insiders in contemporary Senegal, but these four individuals are relevant examples for the analysis that follows, so they are especially worthy of mention.
actors rooted outside of the state; they do not theoretically differentiate ex-insiders from outsiders. Therefore, this work does not fully account for the striking reality that often results from insider advantage: that former government collaborators, rather than committed outsiders, are the agents of the president’s defeat when turnover occurs, as well as the front-running opponents in elections that presidents win.

What are the sources of insider advantage in Senegal? Why did some elections with insider advantage result in turnover (2000, 2012), while others yielded incumbent re-election (1993, 2007)? This section first discusses the sources of insider advantage in Senegal and their relationship to existing theories. It then discusses the contingent factors related to insider advantage that map onto either turnover or the re-election of incumbents.

**Existing Research on Insider Advantage**

Only a few studies explicitly address the sources of insider advantage. Way (2005a, 2005b, 2010) was the first to document the phenomenon in post-communist authoritarian regimes. He finds that when ruling parties have weak mechanisms for preventing elite defection and also lack monopolistic control of the economy, then “prime ministers, close advisers, and other allies are often in a particularly good position to build up resources and (because of access to state media) popularity that can be used to challenge incumbent control” (Way 2005b: 236). Insiders who develop “autonomous patronage networks” are dangerous defectors from the president’s perspective (Way 2005a, 2005b: 236). The mechanisms of insider advantage are thus access to political financing and state media during a politician’s time in government.

Pinkston (2013) examines insider advantage on the sub-presidential level in Benin, a poor democracy. For parliamentary elections, she shows that politicians who eventually develop
autonomous political financing – deemed so key to opposition coalescence – can only obtain it after building clientelist networks in their communities and self-financing their initial rise to power. Because of economic barriers to self-financing, most politicians are regime insiders, meaning that they had access to the state as “state contractors or high-level government officials” before they entered politics in the first place (3). State access enables insider politicians to distribute enough patronage and gain enough electoral momentum to have hope of attracting private financiers in the first place. Money matters for political ascension, and state financing is the gateway to attracting backers with enough resources to threaten incumbents.

Beyond these studies, the role of insider advantage has not been explicitly analyzed in research on African elections. Most studies of opposition in Africa seek to explain opposition party strength or opposition coalescence. On the one hand, accounts of opposition party strength analyze actors and organizations operating outside of the state, and thereby look for opposition in the wrong place. On the other hand, research on opposition coalescence helps to explain when turnover happens, but does not distinguish insiders’ and outsiders’ roles in electoral competition.

Studies of opposition party strength pay minimal attention to the dynamics of insider advantage. The oversight is a function of their examination of actors and parties outside of the state as the main potential sources of opposition. Rakner & Van de Walle (2009) emphasize the importance of outsiders winning local office in order to build competitive, nationwide parties that can compete more effectively with incumbents. Similarly, LeBas (2011) describes the goal as explaining why “actors outside of the state” fall under the banner of a single, nationwide opposition party in some cases but not in others (43). This way of problematizing the emergence of strong opposition parties minimizes attention to insider behavior, even if in practice the analysis can account on the margins for party creation by insiders. Moreover, the nature of the
cases that she examines reinforces the focus on outsiders. The strong opposition party in LeBas’s study – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe – was led by an outsider. However, outsiders’ capacity to build strong parties there might also be a function of Zimbabwe’s history of violent liberation struggle (Levitsky & Way 2013). This history facilitated the present-day polarization of boundaries between ruling and opposition camps, thereby increasing the costs of insider defection and emergence in the opposition. In contrast, insiders have played key roles in Zambia and Kenya, the other two countries in the study, but the decisions of outsider and insider politicians are analyzed together because they are equivalent manifestations of opposition party fragmentation, the outcome of interest.

Another branch of Africanist scholarship explains when and why opposition parties coalesce around a single candidate to increase the likelihood of turnover (Arriola 2012, Howard & Roessler 2006, Resnick 2013, Van de Walle 2006, Wahman 2012). 32 Although opposition parties often “lack access to sufficient material resources to build a broad, nationwide political party that is capable of mounting an effective challenge to the incumbent’s hold on power,” turnover is plausible when rival opposition parties coordinate with each other, pooling resources behind a single candidate (Howard & Roessler 2006: 371). Coalescence itself depends on politicians’ perceived chances of winning, the economic climate, expectations about electoral transparency, the identities of other challengers, and the internal cohesion of various parties (Van de Walle 2006). Moreover, both opposition coalescence and turnover are more likely in open-seat presidential races (Cheeseman 2010), as well as when the privatization of the economy frees businessmen from reliance on the state for economic opportunities and allows them to finance attractive opposition candidates (Arriola 2012).

32 Opposition coalescence may increase the likelihood of turnover, but it is not sufficient. In Africa’s “electoral democracies” since 2000, “opposition coalitions rarely have defeated incumbent parties in either presidential or parliamentary elections” (Resnick 2013: 751).
Insiders contribute to opposition coalescence and have political profiles that are inherently attractive to potential financiers because of their state experience. Yet there has not been specific attention in this literature to the role of insiders in opposition coalescence. Focused on explaining why we get coalescence rather than who brings them about, this body of research is less concerned with theorizing potentially important distinctions between the resource profiles and the political behaviors of insiders versus outsiders. For instance, a commonly cited example of opposition coalescence is the 2002 turnover in Kenya’s presidential elections, which insiders won and other insiders facilitated. Former regime insider Raila Odinga was key to opposition coalescence because he agreed not to run for president in exchange for the promise of the Prime Ministerial post. This contributed to the defeat of the ruling party and the victory of the National African Rainbow Coalition (NARC) candidate and a less recent regime insider, Mwai Kibaki. Second, there is convincing evidence across several countries that the privatization of the state economy empowers business interests to finance the opposition candidates of their choice (rather than the ruling party by default), which in turn makes turnover more likely (Arriola 2012). However, the theory of pecuniary coalition-building ultimately explains variation in coalescence and turnover, regardless of who the specific agents of these outcomes are. What remains unexplained is why in Senegal it is always the presidential candidates who have negotiated access to the state who are incumbents’ greatest threats, regardless of turnover.

Sources of Insider Advantage

The study of insider advantage in Senegalese presidential elections is based on the fact that no opponents can completely overcome their resource deficiency relative to the president on the uneven playing field. However, insiders can often narrow the resource gap more
significantly than outsiders because they previously enjoyed significant access to the state. The trajectories and performance of insiders and outsiders in Senegal’s last four presidential races demonstrate that state access often provides *material* and *reputational* benefits to regime insiders. When they are ministers, insiders’ access to the state exposes them to career advancement opportunities that outsiders do not enjoy, including: control over patronage as a means to cultivate followers, government experience that fosters name recognition among voters, coverage in the media, and networking with domestic and international who are potential future sources of campaign financing. 33 The insiders who successfully exploit the opportunities that the state provides are more likely to be better than others at competing on the uneven playing field if they later run against the president. Although insider advantage does not cause turnover, the insiders who make the most of their access to the state gain both the financial capital and public reputations that bolster their chances of ousting incumbents.

Regime insiders’ access to the state through government experience is, first of all, financially useful. Ministers accumulate wealth and reputations as statesmen that better equip them to compete against the president later. For instance, Wade acknowledges that when the PDS left the government before the 1993 presidential elections, “in leaving power we were losing material resources…but also the respect given to a minister by the Territorial Administration” (Wade 2006: 221). 34 Whether it is before or after they enter the opposition, insiders can distribute the largesse that they acquire during their time in the state to symbolize their moral authority and their ability to provide material benefits to potential constituents (Banégas 2003, Nugent 2001).

33 Thus, state access may, but need not, entail corruption to benefit regime insiders in later bids for the presidency.

34 The PDS lost four such ministerial posts when it left Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority government that year.
In their capacity as ministers, regime insiders also control lower-level appointments within their ministerial domain (Arriola 2009). This gives insiders the chance to develop networks of clients whose government jobs depend on the insider’s status within the ruling coalition. Relative to outsiders, insiders therefore have greater chances of developing the clientelist networks needed to garner widespread voter support and catalyze the bandwagoning that characterizes successful “tipping games” in African elections (Van de Walle 2006). Some insiders leave the president’s entourage with significant blocs of cadres whose renewed employment depends on the insider’s future electoral success. This has been true especially for insiders who had careers in the ruling party; for instance, eleven ruling party Members of Parliament followed ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck out of the PDS (Diop 2011: 369).

In addition, insiders can use the social networks they developed as statesmen to attract private political financing, using their renown to reach out to foreign heads of state, businessmen, and members of the diaspora they used to work with. For example, Djibo Kâ had contacts with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, before the 2000 elections when he was a newly minted opposition leader (Kâ 2005). Kâ’s prior service as Minister of Foreign Affairs had facilitated these connections. From his own prior service in that post, Moustapha Niasse, another insider candidate in the 2000 race, could attempt to leverage his relationships with King Hassan II of Morocco, Omar Bongo, and other leaders in the Persian Gulf (Coulibaly 1999: 164). Domestically, Idrissa Seck was able to develop close connections to Bara Tall, a businessman who later contributed to Seck’s 2007 presidential campaign.35

The media access that insiders enjoy while in state institutions also reinforces their advantages over outsiders. According to Wade, “our [the PDS’] time in government even enabled us to make ourselves better known through the use of radio and television” (Wade 2006: 221). Working in the government often gets ministers exposure in the media and helps them develop name recognition among voters. Their actual government experience, as well as the media’s documentation of it, allows them to build reputations as statesmen before leaving the government to run against the president. Senegalese newspapers discuss government activities in which ministers participate and often publish short biographies of newly appointed ministers, which is just one small example of beneficial media exposure.

Because they are often well-known before they even oppose the president, insiders also have the potential to garner significant media attention when they break away from the government to enter the opposition. This coverage feeds into the waves of popular sympathy that some insiders garner in the following presidential election. For example, the downfall of both of Wade’s ex-Prime Ministers within the ruling party was widely covered, as was the entry of Idrissa Seck and Macky Sall into the opposition. Both men went into their first presidential elections riding on waves of popular sympathy, largely due to citizens’ knowledge about the way that Wade had liquidated them and their reactions to what was often perceived as injustice.  

How Insider Advantage Can (Sometimes) Foster Turnover

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36 This “wave of sympathy” is mentioned in countless newspaper articles and interviews. See, for instance, Dia 2009, Gellar 2013. Diop (2011: 299) reports that many citizens “did not appreciate the incarceration that he was a victim of” at the hands of the president. Sall, who was ousted as President of the National Assembly due to the president’s controversial use of the law, remarked in retrospect, “what was done to me, many people found unjust. This martyrization [sic]…that I went through has really created strong grassroots support for me” (Bernicat, Marcia. “Senegal: Former Prime Minister Macky Sall,” 8 December 2008, released by Wikileaks 30 August 2011, 08DAKAR1401, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DAKAR1401.html (accessed 24 March 2014).
Only in some cases do insiders defeat the presidents that they oppose. As rare events, Senegal’s two turnovers in 2000 and 2012 appear to be a function not only of the largely structural factors cited in the literature, but also of contingent factors related to regime insiders’ choices about when they join the opposition and how they behave within it. Cross-national studies identify several structural factors that increase the chances of turnover in Africa (Cheeseman 2010, Gandhi & Reuter 2013, Howard & Roessler 2006, Van de Walle 2006), and some – like economic performance and opposition coalescence – apply to Senegal. However, contingencies that these theories neglect are also key to explaining the specific election outcomes, both the processes that lead to turnover and those resulting in incumbent re-election. The turnovers both occurred through a combination of conditions: prolonged uncertainty about succession within the ruling party that increases the chances of insider candidates attracting the support of former colleagues, as well as the leading insider’s resistance to the president’s attempts to collaborate with him as the campaign approaches. Analyzing how these dynamics of insider advantage played out before turnover occurred in 2000 and 2012 provides a more complete account of these events.

Prolonged uncertainty about succession within the ruling party refers to a pre-election context in which party members and the electorate know that the president’s leadership – of the ruling party and of the country – will end sometime in the cycle after the election that he is about to contest. Crises often result from prolonged uncertainty among ambitious elites about their

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37 These leading cross-national studies find that presidential resignation or death, opposition coalescence, and economic crisis increase the chances of turnover.

38 Operationally, an impending succession begins when the president explicitly guarantees the public that he will not run for president again after the election in question, and either states – or does not dispel a predominant expectation among the political elite – that he will not complete the term that he is seeking to win. Impending successions are thus identifiable in Senegal through press coverage of the president’s preparation for campaigns, party documents about candidacy, and secondary accounts of these processes by local experts who were closely following the president’s communications with the voting public.
place within the ruling party. Although the president has not yet retired, leadership disputes emerge and endure near the party’s summit. Elites who hope to succeed the president at an approaching but unspecified time in the future feel the need to position themselves in anticipation of the key moment. Within weak ruling parties in which the president relies primarily on patronage to resolve disputes, there are limited means available to appease all of these elites, whose chances of defection rise as the prolonged succession battle plays out.

Insiders’ resistance to reconciliation with the president is also important for turnover because it can help challengers to convince voters to bandwagon on their candidacy. The largely clientelist electorate will not risk voting for an opponent, who lacks access to the state, unless he signals not only his ability to run the state in ways that would materially benefit his followers, but also his intention to change the political status quo under the current president. Because of their prior association with the president and the government, insiders face the burden of proving that they are actually interested in displacing the president, rather than just using their candidacy to negotiate a position for themselves as the president’s new right-hand man.\(^\text{39}\) In this sense, insiders need to distance themselves from those in power. However, too much distancing can also be detrimental; insiders have advantages over outsider candidates because they have reputations as statesmen. They must ultimately show the public that their government experience makes them at least as capable as the president of running the country without appearing too self-interested in remaining close to the government they are opposing. In this context, negotiations with the president are a common element of Senegalese politics and are not always detrimental to candidates’ electoral success. However, the account suggests that negotiations – or at the very least, those occurring close to a presidential contest – damage the

\(^{39}\) As covered in Chapter 5, the president’s attempt to negotiate with insiders is operationalized as whether the president issues publicly known invitations for meetings to ex-regime insiders running in an upcoming election.
prospects of insider presidential candidates, such that the insider’s association with the president effectively discredits him as an alternative candidate in the eyes of the Senegalese electorate. For instance, Idrissa Seck’s attempts to reconcile with Wade before the 2007 campaign reduced his popularity and fostered speculations about how much he actually opposed Wade and the political status quo. His “back-and-forth negotiations to return to the PDS after forming his own political party, Rewmi, and running against Wade in 2007 undermined his credibility in the eyes of many Senegalese, who saw him as an opportunist” (Gellar 2013: 127).

V - Conclusion

This chapter has outlined why we might often expect politicians’ logics of party formation to be different under competitive authoritarianism than under democracy. It has also laid out how the proliferation of many primarily patronage-oriented parties in Senegal has been accompanied by a paucity of parties that consistently oppose the government, as well as presidential turnover that is catalyzed by regime insiders rather than weathered outsiders. The remainder of the dissertation analyzes the sources of these three patterns. Chapter 3 begins this by examining the sources of party formation and proliferation.

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40 Negotiations that occur when an election is not approaching may also reduce an insider’s appeal in future races. However, Chapter 5 focuses on the correlation between turnover and insiders’ refusal to negotiate within the year before the race in question. Further newspaper data collection would be necessary to identify all negotiations that occurred in non-election years and could constitute a future project.

41 A 7,000-person survey conducted by the private media outlet, rewmi.com, found that 55% of respondents disapproved of Seck after he began these talks (Samb, Serigne Saliou. “55% d’opinions défavorables. Idy paie la rançon de ses retrouvailles avec Wade,” L’Observateur, 25 January 2007, 5).

42 For instance, the president of the electoral committee of Rewmi in the Pata zone of the rural community of Niakhbar said, “I think that Idy disappointed us. We were on the ground. We fought for him. We took risks. People lost their [state] jobs because of him. He can’t just return to the PDS without warning us.” See Fall, Harouna. 2007. “Après l’annonce des Retrouvailles Wade-Idy. Le Point E assiégé par des militants de Rewmi en furie,” L’Observateur, 23 January 2007, 5.
CHAPTER THREE – PARTY FORMATION AND PROLIFERATION ON SENEGAL’S UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD

This chapter explains politicians’ logics of party formation in Senegal. Party proliferation occurred in Senegal over a decade earlier than it did for most other African countries, which underwent “democratic experiments” in the early 1990s (Bratton & Van de Wall 1997). In contrast, multiple parties were allowed as early as 1976 and a law allowing for an unlimited number of parties was established in 1981 (Diop 2011, FKA/CESTI 2001, Hartman 2010, Nzouankeu 1984). ¹ Given its extra decade of experience with multiparty politics relative to most other African countries, Senegal is a critical case in which to analyze the logics of party formation that undergird proliferation. It is where we would least expect proliferation to persist and most expect the party system to have consolidated. Nevertheless, the country had 174 registered parties by the year 2010, a number that has tripled over the last decade.

Why have so many politicians formed parties in Senegal? What are the logics of party formation that contribute to proliferation and what factors influence these logics? The chapter first argues that in contemporary Senegal, many party leaders are most concerned with patronage negotiation, which does not necessarily entail vote-seeking. The proportion of parties that become primarily election-oriented and attempt to forge stable constituencies among voters is low. Instead, forming a party often involves contesting elections erratically at best while negotiating non-elected posts and material or financial benefits from the president. The proliferation of primarily patronage-oriented parties contrasts with the fundamentally election-

¹ More specifically, Senegal’s first president, Leopold Senghor, permitted three official, ideologically distinct political parties as early as 1976, and the presidential successor that he designated, Abdou Diouf, passed a Political Parties Law allowing for an unlimited number of parties in 1981.
oriented organizations featured in much of the literature, based on the experiences of Western countries that then became liberal democracies.²

The existence of an uneven playing field, a hallmark of competitive authoritarian regimes, helps account for this kind of proliferation. It does this in two ways: by motivating politicians to refrain from regular electoral competition that is difficult and costly, as well as by enabling presidents to actively reward and perpetuate this patronage-oriented party formation if they so choose. Politicians who make decisions about creating parties in this context are aware of the extreme difficulties that they will have surviving outside of the state. Benefiting from hyper-incumbency advantages that entail skewed access to state resources, institutions, and the media, presidents can craft reward systems that encourage party proliferation. Overall, the parties that emerge are thus more likely to be patronage-oriented in the first place, gravitating their support towards the president, the major gatekeeper of state resources that are so scarce without linkage to him.

Section 1 describes the changes in patterns of party formation within Senegal throughout the multiparty period (1978-2012) and reviews several factors that influenced the degree of proliferation over time but cannot explain it all on their own. It then demonstrates that on Senegal’s uneven playing field, parties that never contest national elections or do so erratically are more common than parties that regularly contest them as classical accounts of parties would predict. Section 2 provides further evidence that a significant portion of parties are more primarily patronage-seeking than election-oriented, and argues that an uneven playing field encourages this by shaping the behavior of both presidents and other politicians. Section 3 reviews alternative explanations to the chapter’s argument that party creation is often primarily a

² See, for instance, Aldrich (1995) and Downs (1957).
tool for patronage negotiation. It evaluates several explanations often cited as impetus for party formation – including ideology, programmatic goals, intraparty conflict, and political status-seeking. Section 4 demonstrates one observable implication of the central argument, which is that if party formation is often about increasing one’s access to the state while minimizing involvement in elections, then individuals’ pre-existing ties to the president should be inversely related to their desire to form parties. Among the sample of party founders that are analyzed, only a minority of politicians with weak ties create parties without seeking to develop linkages to the president and ultimately oppose him. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the argument’s extensions.

I – Party Proliferation and Election-Oriented Party Formation

This section describes Senegal’s country-level patterns of proliferation and highlights two factors – perceptions of political opportunity and presidential initiative – that partially account for the recent acceleration in party formation. It demonstrates that most parties that emerge are not primarily election-oriented, which contradicts the definition of parties as teams of politicians vying for elected office. In Senegal, understanding proliferation thus requires analyzing why politicians would create parties if not to contest elections.

Party Proliferation in Senegal, 1981-2012

Party proliferation is a fairly recent phenomenon in Senegal. There was relatively little proliferation during Senegal’s first two decades of multiparty politics (the late 1970s – the late 1990s), but party formation accelerated from the late 1990s onward. Senegal made a gradual transition to multipartism from 1974-1981. The first president, Leopold Sédar Senghor, ran a de
facto single-party state until 1974, when he approved Abdoulaye Wade’s request to found the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and operate it as a “party of contribution” to the ruling Socialist Party (PS). In 1976, Senghor passed the “law of the three trends,” declaring the PS as Senegal’s official social-democratic party, the PDS the official liberal-democratic party, and the African Independence Party (PAI) as the state-approved Marxist current. Senghor’s successor, President Abdou Diouf, expanded citizens’ rights to create parties. The 1981 Political Parties Law ended direct state control over the number of parties, allowing for unlimited multiparty competition. By the end of 1981, there were fourteen registered political parties (Nzouankeu 1984). Many of these parties had been clandestine opponents during single-party authoritarianism under Senghor and already had members and ideological support bases.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the rate of party formation increased mildly. This challenges theories predicting spikes in party creation just before a country’s founding, multiparty elections, as well as subsequent declines in the number of parties, as those that did not perform well in initial elections disappear or fuse with other, more successful parties (Caramani 2004, Kollmann & Chibber 1998). In Senegal, a few (mostly leftist) parties fused or disappeared, but the overall number of registered parties increased as competition continued. By 1998, the number of parties had increased to 23, from 14 in 1981. Thus, party formation was more than just a temporary reaction to the new kinds of political opportunities that the regime transition brought.

Acceleration in party creation occurred in the late 1990s, around the 1998 legislative elections and after the 2000 presidential race that led to Senegal’s first turnover in 40 years. The number of parties more than doubled between 1998 and 2000 alone, the two years in the weakness of the ruling party was increasingly clear to both citizens and party elites. At the end
of 2000, just after alternance, there were 57 registered parties in Senegal (Diop 2011). By the time that Wade was re-elected president in 2007, the total number of parties in the country had surpassed 100 (Senegal Ministry of Interior 2010). After Macky Sall took office in 2012, there were over 200.  

**Contextual Factors that Partially Explain Proliferation**

There are two contextual factors that help to explain Senegal’s country-level patterns of party proliferation, but that cannot account for them entirely on their own. Initially, party formation accelerated in tandem with politicians’ perceptions of increased political opportunity. Proliferation may have resulted from Senegal’s macroeconomic difficulties creating patronage scarcity within the ruling party (Beck 2008), weakening it to such an extent that politicians gained a heightened sense of opportunity for turnover. Just as cascades of support for opposition presidential candidates are more likely in this context (Van de Walle 2006), so might party formation be more likely among politicians hoping to promote themselves under the new regime.

Senegal experienced a sudden increase in the number of parties as of 1998, at one such moment of economic difficulty and ruling party weakness. In the late 1990s, the ruling PS’ electoral hegemony was declining (Vengroff & Magala 2001). Until its defeat in 2000, the PS was able to mobilize presidential and legislative majorities on its own, but the margins by which it commanded such majorities was declining. The marabouts, Senegal’s Muslim religious leaders, had ceased to command their disciples to vote for the ruling party as they had in prior decades (Beck 2008, Koter 2013, Villalón 1995). The decline of the peanut economy and the long-term effects of structural adjustment had created economic grievances that fostered urban grievances.

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unrest and damaged Diouf’s popularity (Diop 2013). Moreover, the PS weakened after 1996, when President Diouf designated his chief of staff, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, as his successor within the PS and several major PS elites defected (Diop et al. 2000). The exits of Djibo Kâ in 1998 and Moustapha Niasse in 1999 enfeebled the PS, which barely commanded 50% of the vote in the 1998 National Assembly elections.

As politicians increasingly perceived that Diouf’s defeat was a serious possibility (Diop 2011), party creation became more popular, with rates of creation accelerating between 1998 and 2000 in particular. Alliances with Diouf were undesirable and it was wiser to position oneself to take advantage of the opportunities for leadership that would arise if change occurred. As Imam Mbaye Niang, the leader of the Movement for Social and Democratic Reform (MRDS) put it, as the 2000 elections approached, the PS “had started to be denounced by our compatriots” because “the cost of living was high.” Party formation allowed ambitious politicians to preserve the autonomy they would need in order to forge alliances with whoever ended up winning office.

However, patronage scarcity and ruling party weakness may not be the sole causes of proliferation, because the acceleration continued after Senegal’s presidential turnover in 2000. This was true before 2007, when Wade’s victory was not significantly in question (Diop 2011). These patterns do not rule out the possibility that Senegal’s alternance in 2000 generated permanent changes in popular perceptions of political opportunity, with politicians consistently perceiving higher chances of winning office after turnover. However, proliferation also occurred in countries like Burkina Faso and Cameroon, which have never experienced turnover and vary

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4 The 1996 Party Congress, at which President Diouf officially designated Tanor as his future successor and forbade factions, set the scene for the defections of a variety of ex-PS barons with significant clientelistic followings, who became increasingly sidelined within PS party institutions like the Political Bureau (Diop et al. 2000, Kâ 2005).

5 Interview with Imam Mbaye Niang, 1/9/12, Dakar.
in their presidents’ access to resource rents for patronage distribution. This suggests that proliferation is not just a function of political opportunity calculations.

The second factor is the power retention strategy of Abdoulaye Wade. Wade reinforced proliferation after he became president in 2000, using powers that were magnified on an uneven playing field to reward the creation of patronage-oriented parties that collaborated with him. Both President Diouf (1981-2000) and President Wade (2000-2012) passively enabled proliferation: neither used their party’s command of parliamentary majorities to amend the 1981 Political Parties Law, which sets low administrative barriers to party formation (Diagne 2000, Diop 2011, Fall 2011). However, Wade additionally chose to institutionalize the distribution of rewards to party leaders who joined the ruling coalition during the first few years of his presidency. Thus, compared to President Diouf (1981-2000), who did not do this, Wade more aggressively and overtly encouraged party formation for collaborative purposes.

Wade more actively fostered party formation to divide and rule. He took office with a ruling party that had not been able to mobilize a presidential majority on its own in the first round of the 2000 election that brought him to power. As president, Wade therefore faced pressure to fragment threatening opposition parties, while also building alliances with parties in order to mobilize future presidential majorities. To this end, Wade created the Coalition Around the President in the 21st Century (Cap 21), a club through which almost any party leader could access regularized streams of small-scale patronage in exchange for long-term loyalty to Wade. Members of the Cap 21 were guaranteed perks like monthly salaries of 300,000 FCFA ($150

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6 Under this law, parties are no different than other associations and must register with the Ministry of Interior. Registration does not require widespread popular support: founders provide biographical information about themselves and two other party officers, an address, party statutes, and minutes from the first meeting.

7 The PDS had won 30% of the vote in that round, and had unseated Diouf through the bandwagoning of other opposition parties.
USD), opportunities to meet in groups with the president himself and intermediaries, and funding to campaign for the president in their home areas. Some also traveled with the president on diplomatic passports\(^8\) and got visibility that some thought would facilitate state employment.

By providing these benefits on a consistent basis to a variety of politicians who joined the Cap 21 soon after founding parties, Wade’s reward system encouraged new party leaders to support the ruling coalition, while also tempting members of larger, pre-existing opposition parties to break away, create their own organizations, and support him.\(^9\) Even smaller parties were helpful for Wade to attract, since some were splinters from parliamentary opposition parties (Table 1). Of all 46 parties founded 1998-2003, 24 directly split from existing parties that had run in national elections at least once and 17 of them were eventually (if not immediately) co-opted by Wade.\(^10\) The defection of politicians who then created pro-Wade parties further fragmented the opposition relative to the ruling coalition.

**Table 1: Presidential Co-optation of New Parties, 1998-2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Origins</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Number Co-opted (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Split from electorally relevant opposition</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split from ruling party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Externally mobilized</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Author’s fieldwork interviews, coalition rosters, Senegalese national newspapers*

Despite its contribution to explaining why proliferation accelerated under Wade, presidential initiative also provides an incomplete account of the logics of party formation.

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\(^8\) This also allegedly included the non-enforcement of baggage checks when passport holders returned from abroad.

\(^9\) Although Wade attempted to co-opt a variety of Senegal’s parliamentary parties, these collaborations were often fleeting. A variety of parliamentary party leaders would abandon these alliances in time to run on their own in elections. Thus, the most loyal partisan allies were often parties led by politicians with smaller voter clienteles.

\(^10\) 20 split from parties that had run at least once in a presidential or legislative election; and twelve of the parties whose founders split from electorally relevant opposition parties *and* had been national-level leaders in them eventually joined the president’s camp.
Competitive authoritarianism shapes the behaviors of both presidents and other politicians in ways that together account not just for Senegal’s degree of proliferation and the type of parties that result from it. Under competitive authoritarianism, presidents who choose to encourage proliferation have unparalleled access to state institutions and resources to achieve their goals. However, beyond empowering the president to create incentives for proliferation, an uneven playing field also renders life in the opposition so difficult that many politicians are motivated to form parties to negotiate their way into the state through non-electoral channels, even if they do not initially create parties to access rewards through the Cap 21. The uneven playing field gives politicians some incentives to form patronage-oriented parties regardless of whether the president rewards it as systematically as Wade did.

The Paucity of Primarily Election-Oriented Parties

In order to understand proliferation more fully, we must account for the nature of the parties that politicians create and the goals that their leaders articulate. A closer look at the 46 parties registered during Senegal’s initial wave of proliferation (1998-2003) reveals a paucity of primarily election-oriented parties. Although the range includes those that consistently contest national elections, those that do sometimes, and others that never do, the proportion of parties that regularly contest national elections is low, contrary to the very definitions of parties in the canonical accounts of Downs (1957), Duverger (1963), and Schumpeter (1942). Instead, it is more common for parties to run in elections on a limited, unsystematic basis or for them not to contest national elections at all.  

11 This is tabulated by using election lists and secondary sources documenting all parties that ran on their own label in national elections since 1998.
Through interviews with party leaders and Senegalese political analysts, newspaper research on these parties, electoral coalition rosters, and national election data, we can classify the 46 parties into one of the three categories in Table 2. The most rare type – parties that regularly contest national elections on their own – have run candidates on their party’s label in at least all National Assembly elections held since the party’s birth, if not also in presidential contests. The Union for Democratic Renewal (URD) led by Kâ and the Alliance of Forces for Progress (AFP) led by Niasse are prime examples. The AFP ran in the opposition in all National Assembly and presidential elections throughout the Wade presidency, and the URD ran its own label in all National Assembly elections after the party’s birth.  

Table 2: Parties Running on their own Label in National Races, by Degree of Contestation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Contestation</th>
<th>Frequency of Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular contestation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited contestation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contestation</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Election lists printed for each national election; Kamara 2007.*

Parties that contest elections for a limited time on their own are more common in Senegal. These parties often contest elections soon after their founding, but do not do so regularly, or have leaders who only intend to do so temporarily. For instance, the African Renaissance Party (Parena) was founded by Marième Wone Ly just before the 2000 presidential elections, but it did not contest multiple national elections alone. Ly was the first woman to create her own party, leaving her position as the women’s wing leader in the Convention of

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12 Indeed, although Kâ negotiated patronage from President Wade in exchange for entering the ruling coalition and agreed to stand down in presidential elections as part of the deal, the URD continued to run in all legislative elections on its own label.
Democrats and Patriots (CDP/Garab gi), an established parliamentary party. She increased her name recognition by announcing her candidacy for president in 2000, yet withdrew before paying the fees to make her candidacy official. Parena then ran on its own label for the National Assembly in 2001. Ly had stated her intent to “contest the local elections, the legislatives, and why not the 2007 presidency if God is willing” (quoted in FKA/CESTI 2001: 156). However, after an unsuccessful bid for a parliamentary seat, Parena joined the presidential entourage in 2004 and never again ran independently.

Along similar lines, the Senegalese Liberal Party (PLS) was created to prove its leader’s electoral worth for a limited time. From its inception in 1998, Ousmane Ngom indicated that the PLS’s purpose was to negotiate his clientele’s re-entry into his party of origin, the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). Ngom had first been the PDS’s youth leader, later the party’s second-in-command, and also a National Assembly deputy and a minister in the 1990s. Ngom eventually protested his effective loss of influence within party by creating his own.\(^\text{13}\) The PLS ran in the 1999 Senatorial race and contested the 2001 National Assembly election.\(^\text{14}\) During the 2001 campaign, the PLS was in the opposition, yet Ngom attended private negotiations with Wade at the Presidential Palace. After winning a parliamentary seat in 2001, his negotiations intensified. By 2003, the PLS had effectively dismantled, fusing with the PDS.

There are also many parties that never contest national elections. There are two variants of this type of party: those that collaborate with the president and those whose leaders work with prominent opposition leaders. The Popular Front (FP) is an example of the former. Created by

\(^\text{13}\) They control within the PDS over the nomination process for the 1998 National Assembly elections

\(^\text{14}\) The Senatorial race was largely boycotted by opposition parties because of the controversy over the institution’s mostly appointed nature and its sudden creation that year. In between, Ngom supported Abdou Diouf in the 2000 presidential contest.
Bacar Dia, a physician from an elite Halpulaar family, the party was registered in 2003, after President Wade had been courting Dia for support for over a year, inviting him on official trips abroad and “convincing [him] to enter the government.” Despite a history of party membership, Dia had no high-level government experience. Nevertheless, Wade appointed him minister several times. Dia dissented with Wade’s attempts to foster a filial succession within the presidency and the PDS, as well as his push to amend the constitution to establish a vice-presidency and require a plurality rather than a majority for victory in presidential elections. Dia left Wade’s entourage to join the 2012 presidential campaign of Idrissa Seck.

The Senegalese Popular Bloc (BPS) is the second variant of parties that never contest national elections: it has never run on its own label in national races since its founding in 2000, but its leader, Souleymane Ndiaye “Brin,” has consistently endorsed Ousmane Tanor Dieng of the PS. A former leader of Senegal’s sports associations (navétanes) both nationally and in his hometown of Thiès, Brin was courted by the PS throughout the 1990s. Yet he resisted joining the PS and instead created a micro-party that “is not power-seeking” nationally and whose main goal is “the defense of ideas,” which does not require a mass following. Maintaining a micro-party has helped Brin avoid having to fight (and wait) to attain a prominent place within a large party hierarchy while benefiting from alliances with the PS on the local level. The party has also

15 Dia had been an employee of the state as the doctor-in-chief at Gaston Berger University (Senegal’s second largest university) and for the Senegalese Water Company (SDE).

16 Interview with Bacar Dia, 7/20/12, Saint-Louis.

17 In his youth, Dia had been in the leftist party, AJ/PADS, and as an adult he had been a founding member of the URD when Djibo Kâ left the ruling PS in 1998. Dia even wrote a tract promoting the idea of renewal that started the party (Dia 1999) but struck out on his own after the 2000 presidential elections.

18 Dia was appointed Minister of National, Regional, and International Parliamentary Relations; then Minister of Infrastructure, government spokesperson, and Minister of Communication during the 2007 presidential campaign.

19 After leaving the leftist party AJ/PADS, Brin even ran on the PS’ list in the 1996 local elections.

20 Interview with Souleymane Ndiaye, 1/23/12, Thiès.
advanced some non-electoral priorities, including “the quest for permanent political engagement in service of my country and its disadvantaged youth,” as well as “organizing marches, submitting petitions, and holding conferences.” Brin is representative of several party leaders with leftist roots who gain expressive benefits from being in the opposition, despite not seeking elected office or negotiating immediate access to the state.

The limited degree of electoral contestation that most parties pursue raises a question about the nature of proliferation: why do so many politicians create parties in Senegal if not to contest elections? The discourses of political elites and statistics about party behavior provide insight into why so many parties are formed. This chapter builds on research focused on the “local understanding and use” of electoral processes (Schaffer 1998: x, Comaroff & Comaroff 2012, Schatzberg 2001). In abandoning the premise that parties are election-oriented and inductively studying what creating a party signifies for various politicians, as well as the purposes that parties serve thereafter, we can identify other non-electoral logics of party formation in Senegal. This research thus helps to account for the abundance of one kind of party observed in Senegal that studies have thus far overlooked: parties with leaders who are neither regularly election-oriented, nor policy-oriented promoters of ideologies or special interests.

II- Patronage-Oriented Party Formation on an Uneven Playing Field

The chapter’s central argument is that a large subset of Senegalese parties is primarily concerned with patronage negotiation, which does not always entail vote-seeking on a sustained, national scale. For every registered party that competes in elections and attempts to forge stable constituencies, there are several others that engage in these activities erratically at best, yet do not disappear. Their leaders still find party formation worthwhile for other political activities,
like building a political profile to get the president’s attention and seeking non-elected posts and other patronage within the ruling entourage. The pursuit of patronage other than elected office therefore contributes to the proliferation that Senegal has recently experienced.

The proliferation of such parties contrasts with the fundamentally election-oriented organizations depicted in much of the literature on party development. Downs’ (1957) canonical account defines political parties as originating out of ambitious politicians’ need to pool their resources and form teams to facilitate the winning of elected office across the country. Politicians, it is held, create parties in order to better organize election campaigns, develop linkages to constituents to increase the likelihood of re-election, and aggregate preferences to propose legislation in a timely manner (Aldrich 1995, Duverger 1963, Key 1964, Ostrogorski 1956). They are “endogenous institutions” that politicians shape to their problem-solving needs, but the needs that most of the literature describes relate to electoral competition: namely, resolving disputes within groups of political hopefuls, mobilizing voter support, and presenting coherent policy or ideological platforms in order to attract these pools of voters and candidates in the first place (Aldrich 1995). Although some Senegalese parties certainly approximate these kinds of team-oriented organizations focused on maximizing the votes they can win in the next election, the parties that emerge in Senegal and other post-Third Wave regimes are often atomistic, personalized entities that are “condemned to at most a handful of seats, [and] a minor role in any future legislature” (Van de Walle & Butler 1999: 22).

Competitive authoritarianism fosters distinctive incentives for party formation that have, in turn, contributed to Senegal’s party proliferation. Unlike in autocracies, elections are competitive and the opposition can consider winning elections a difficult, but possible route to power. Leaders face domestic and international pressure to avoid using overt repression and
fraud to retain power. Yet unlike in democracies, incumbency advantage runs so deep that presidents can systematically abuse their control of the state for partisan ends. The existence of an uneven playing field in reinforces the inequalities that opponents already face in Africa’s strong presidential systems, in which the ruling party and the state are closely linked (Van de Walle 2003, Villalón & Huxtable 1998). In turn, when state resources are the main source of economic and social ascension, and presidents have limited capacities for fraud or repression but can manipulate the playing field to disable the opposition, then party formation for patronage-seeking purposes is common. It is even an attractive political strategy, especially for elites who lack strong linkages to the state.

Some of the most striking evidence about the relevance of patronage negotiation comes from tracing new parties’ activities and coalition trajectories in their earliest years of existence. This data was collected through interviews, government documents, newspapers, and archival research. Further evidence comes from interviews with party founders themselves. The main focus of the interviews was on all 46 people whose parties were registered 1998-2003. Basic demographic data on all 90 politicians who created parties from 1981-2007 indicate that the 46 featured party leaders are similar to the broader population of party founders in several ways. First, both the sample and the broader population of founders for which data are available contain politicians who are predominantly of the Wolof ethnicity. Although ethnic cleavages are not politicized in Senegal, the Wolof constitute the largest ethnic group in the country and for this reason the high frequency of Wolof party leaders is not particularly surprising (Diouf 1994). Second, most do not come from families that were of a lower caste within Senegal’s precolonial societies. In contemporary Senegal, casted individuals have ancestors who did not hail from
the families of freemen or slaves, but were instead griots, courtesans, or manual laborers (i.e., woodcutters, sculptors, jewelers, metalworkers, *et cetera*) (Gellar 2005: 20). As both samples reflect, politicians of casted origins continue to be less prominent in politics, either as party founders or local and national officeholders (Mbow 2000). Third, the majority of individuals in both the 1998-2003 sample and the 1981-2007 population hail from one of the five most electorally important areas of the country in terms of the percentage of the electorate represented. In both sets of party founders, Dakar and its suburbs are the most common place of residence (Table 3).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Leaders, 1981-2007</th>
<th>All Leaders, 1998-2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wolof ethnicity</strong></td>
<td>43% (39/90)</td>
<td>30% (14/46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not casted</strong></td>
<td>71% (64/90)</td>
<td>74% (34/46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>From Dakar</strong></td>
<td>42% (38/90)</td>
<td>26% (12/46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Additional political, economic, and social information was gathered about the 46 founders studied in depth. Modally, these 46 political party founders had previous experience in politics. 71% of founders belonged to another party before founding their own; of those who had previous party experience, 42% had been members of the PS before *alternance* and another

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21 For a good explanation of caste in Wolof society and in contemporary Senegal, see Gellar (2005: 17-22, 145-151). For a longer discussion of the contemporary political implications of precolonial caste systems, see Mbow (2000).

22 Because I could not find and personally interview some party founders in the sample, and because the interviewees did not always provide all of the relevant information, there is some missing data within this sample. The percentages I report are conservative, in that I always use the total number of founders I intended to gather this information from within the sample (46) as the denominator, rather than simply the total number of founders I studied. The footnotes that follow provide raw numbers in order to reflect the actual number of people coded.

23 33 of 43 founders whom I could code.
42% had been national-level staff in another party before founding their own organizations.\textsuperscript{24} 15% had been members without official responsibilities, and only one had founded a party before.\textsuperscript{25} Often, founders are high-profile figures within well-known political parties—usually one of the three parties that Senegal’s first president, Leopold Sédar Senghor, legalized near the end of authoritarianism in 1976.

These politicians tended to be well-educated, older men with a variety of occupations and financial resources. The average age of founders in the sample is 60; only one was female. Their modal level of education was a post-high school vocational diploma, which encompasses credentials like teacher certification diplomas, training to be a government administrator, correspondence courses, and formal training in journalism. People with higher education (bachelor’s, master’s, or doctorate) outnumber those with less education. In terms of occupation, founders are most often private sector businessmen or private consultants,\textsuperscript{26} followed by school teachers or inspectors.\textsuperscript{27}

24% of founders also developed constituencies within civil society organizations before converting them into political parties\textsuperscript{28}: the most notable examples include Abdou Latif Guèye, who had directed since 1982 the widely-known Senegalese non-governmental organization, Jamra, as well as Talla Sylla, whose Jef-Jël party grew out of the Youth for Turnover (JPA)

\textsuperscript{24} 14 of the 33 had been national-level PS staff, 14 had been national-level staff in another party.
\textsuperscript{25} 5 people had been without official responsibilities.
\textsuperscript{26} 24% of the sample according to the conservative estimate, or 11 of 43 founders whom I could code.
\textsuperscript{27} 20% of the sample according to the conservative estimate, or 9 of 43.
\textsuperscript{28} 11 of 45 founders coded on this dimension.
association he had been building since 1993. ²⁹ Others converted mutual aid associations, political “reflection groups,” and social movements into parties. ³⁰

**Party Formation as Patronage Negotiation**

There is much evidence that parties are often tools for negotiating patronage of the sort that does not hinge upon regularly contesting national elections. The most telling finding in this regard is that on the eve of the 2012 presidential elections, *only 43 of Senegal’s 174 registered parties had ever run for seats in the National Assembly* and 15 of these 43 only ran once in their lives. In other words, three-quarters of Senegal’s registered parties are not behaving in the ways that classical theorists of parties like Downs (1957) would predict. The number of parties that consistently run on their own labels and on multiple occasions in national elections is even lower. Of the parties founded between 1998 and 2003, only 16 of 46 ran for these national offices at least once, and just 12 ran on their own label in national elections more than once.

Moreover, although some of the sampled parties hold office on the local level, ³¹ the benefits of holding local office are peripheral considerations for party leaders relative to the other perks that they can obtain through party creation. There are two reasons for this. First, parties have a low amount of power; most parties in the sample did not control more than a dozen posts

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²⁹ Interview with Ndiaga Sylla, 3/21/12, Dakar.

³⁰ Interview with Aliou Seck, 7/3/12, Diourbel; Interview with Amadou Moctar Ndiaye, 7/20/12, Louga; Interview with Samba Dioulédé Thiam, 11/22/11, Dakar; Interview with Djibril Mbaye, 2/28/12, Dakar; Interview with Moustapha Fall “Ché,” 4/10/12, Kaolack, among others.

³¹ The exact numbers are not something I currently have. I have spent quite a bit of time and money with Senegalese research assistants trying to get local coalition composition disaggregated by party, and to determine which party each of the thousands of municipal counselors belong to. Often, it is not possible to infer from election results where a particular party ran for office or won candidates because coalitions are popular, results are reported on the coalition level, and coalition composition varies across local units (*communes d’arrondissements, communes, and communautés rurales*). With a bigger research budget, this data may be easier to obtain, but for the dissertation, I have had to settle for information about the party affiliation of mayors/rural community presidents (rather than the party affiliation of all regular municipal counselors).
on the local level. Second, parties are quite limited in the scope of power that they help their leaders wield. Senegal’s mayors and presidents of rural communities are chosen according to majority rule by the members of the council of any given locality, and many leaders of registered parties do not even reach this echelon of local power. For instance, in the 1996 local elections, the ruling PS controlled nearly all mayorships and rural council presidencies. By 2002, in the first local races under Wade, a wider range of parties gained access to mayorships and rural council presidencies, but the ruling PDS continued to dominate these posts, commanding 58% and 55% of them respectively. Although parties may give their leaders bargaining power within local electoral coalitions, the evidence may instead indicate something more extreme: that politicians do not create parties primarily to win elected offices, and that politicians are benefitting from having their own parties in primarily non-electoral ways.

Furthermore, regardless of their initial participation in elections, around two-thirds of the party leaders in the 1998-2003 sample moved into – or immediately joined – the president’s ruling coalition after their birth. Part of this is a function of the incentives for coalition-building in Senegal’s electoral system and to constant increases in the administrative costs of running a party ticket. But the bulk of the coalescence occurring is with the ruling party rather than with opposition parties. Such rallying around the president is striking in the context of the country’s strong presidential system as well because coalition-building is not institutionally necessary for

32 Moreover, not all leaders could readily provide precise statistics on the location and number of posts controlled. This lack of recall in and of itself suggests that local office-holding is not one of the most key elements of certain parties’ existence and survival. The most well-known example of a new party’s success in such a broad-based, election-oriented endeavor comes from the Assembly of Senegalese Greens (RES-Les Verts). Ousmane Sow Huchard, the party’s founder, built a grassroots party organization that largely recruited civil society figures to run for elected office in various localities in the 2002 and 2009 municipal elections. RES-Les Verts won 57 municipal counselorships in 2002, and 89 in 2009 (Interview with Huchard, 1/28/12, Dakar). Huchard was a member of a prominent civil society organization, the Forum Civil, before creating his party. This facilitated the grassroots, civil society-oriented strategy that served RES-Les Verts so well in local elections. Moreover, the party is one of the few that stands for a specific, highly differentiated programmatic platform, which may also have contributed to its relative success as a team-oriented, electorally competitive party.
the formation of a government or the construction of a legislative majority. Yet many of these Senegalese parties’ alliances with incumbents last across several elections. Among all 174 parties founded by 2010, the best conservative estimate is that 45% (at least 79) have negotiated their way into the president’s graces in return for perks that he can provide through the state. The estimate is conservative because these 79 parties have all publicly negotiated their way into power, either by joining the Cap 21 (Wade’s club for smaller party leaders) or pursuing a bilateral alliance with the ruling party. Other party leaders may have negotiated more informal collaborations that we cannot detect by consulting coalition rosters and newspaper reports.

A cursory look at the sources of party splits in Senegal also suggests that some of the immediate benefits to party creation come from patronage that founders can extract by joining the president’s ruling entourage. Especially since Wade took over in 2000, parties have split as a result of what was overtly an internal debate between leading staff members about whether to keep the party in the opposition or to integrate the ruling coalition and collaborate with the president. For example, the URD/FAL split from the URD when Djibo Kâ chose to negotiate with Abdou Diouf between the two rounds of the 2000 election and ultimately went against Abdoulaye Wade in the historic runoff. The very name of the party reflects the patronage-oriented source of the conflict; FAL signals that the members of URD/FAL distinguish themselves from Djibo Kâ’s URD on the bases of their membership in the coalition that Wade ran in 2000 and named the Front for Change (FAL). 33 The URD/FAL bandwagoned with Wade in exchange for a ministerial post in the first Wade government; Kâ also chose his electoral coalition based on state-oriented negotiations with President Diouf (Niang 2004).

Other party splits occurred after a party had entered into a tactical alliance with the Wade government; patronage unrelated to elected office was again at stake. These splits were a direct

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33 Interview with Blaise Ndiaye, 3/15/12, Dakar.
product of debates among parties’ top staff members about whether to continue accessing state resources that collaboration guaranteed them. Mbaye Diack, the former third-in-command of one of Senegal’s oldest leftist parties, the Democratic League (LD/MPT), did not receive one of the three ministerial posts that Wade offered the LD in his government during the first five years of his rule. But when LD leader Abdoulaye Bathily and the LD Political Bureau decided to leave the Wade government, Wade offered Diack an appointment as Adjunct Secretary General of the Presidency and he formed a new party, the Union of Patriotic Forces (UFPE), in order to stay (Diop 2011). Similar dynamics rippled through And-Jêf (AJ), another quintessential leftist party with electoral ambitions. Landing Savané, AJ president, had refused to join Diouf’s governments, but served as minister in Wade’s government throughout all seven years of his first term, as did several other AJ national-level staff who received appointments. When AJ left the government in 2007, Mamadou Diop Decroix, AJ’s second-in-command, stayed, claiming the AJ party label for him and his supporters, just as Savané did with the AJ wing that was in the opposition (Decroix 2007).

Parties with less well-known leaders, which are not as likely to negotiate their way into high-level, non-elected posts, can form parties to strike profitable deals with the president for smaller-scale patronage. This was more common under Wade than under Diouf. One hallmark of Wade’s rule was his maintenance of an oversized coalition of party allies who received varying levels of patronage in exchange for their collaboration with the ruling entourage. In the early 2000s, Wade established the Coalition Around the President in the 21st Century (Cap 21), a club that eventually became an expansive institution through which almost any party leader could access regularized streams of small-scale patronage in exchange for long-term loyalty to Wade and the PDS. Members of the Cap 21 were guaranteed weekly meetings with an
intermediary appointed by the president; monthly salaries of 300,000 FCFA ($150 USD); opportunities to meet in groups with the president himself; funding to campaign for the president in their home areas and to develop their images as networked politicians; and possibilities to enter the president’s broader social network, which provided party leaders and their small groups of followers the social capital to solve personal problems that require access to the state. Some also traveled with the president, received diplomatic passports, and retained visibility to the administration that some believed increased their chances of gaining state employment. Because people can ensure that they “have rice and 250,000 FCFA per month” if they are willing to join the ruling coalition after creating their organizations, party formation is “alimentary,” providing “shortcuts” to wealth or business success and allowing individuals to “approach Wade to receive money.” These “parties of negotiation” with the government are “portals of entry” into the president’s orbit and “shortcuts for obtaining a piece of the pie.” For instance, two anonymous informants indicated that they founded parties after Abdoulaye Wade won in order to join the ruling camp and help the president govern despite the difficulties he faced within the PDS, as well as an association leader who said that he formed a party in order to “access the rewards distributed by the PDS” after fighting for years outside of party politics to improve working conditions.

Although many of the organizations that participate in the Cap 21 are actually “telephone booth parties,” meaning that they have small bases of voter support and little capacity to win

34 This also allegedly included the lack of baggage checks when diplomatic passport holders return from abroad.
35 Interview with Mamour Cissé, 5/2/12, Dakar.
36 Interview with Mbaye Diouf, 3/3/12, Dakar; Interview with Mamour Cissé, op. cit.
37 Interview with Tamsir Jupiter Ndiaye, 1/18/12, Dakar.
38 Interview with Mousseyesse Niang, 2/17/12, Dakar.
elections, they are still viewed as fostering a “legacy” for their creators. Party creation contributes to patronage negotiation by helping lesser-known politicians build reputations in the public sphere. Generally, party formation involves some pomp and circumstance, as “one leaves a[n existing] party with one’s followers in order to come together in rallies [around the new party leader] that strongly resemble enthronement ceremonies.” Politicians can often use party formation as a reason to present their biographies and announce their political opinions in Senegalese national newspapers. Developing a public profile, some politicians think, gives them “a possibility to be named to posts and directorships.” They do this by “displaying themselves” through the announcement of their party to the media and by being “small parties that make noise,” which sets them up to “strike a deal with those in power.” Through their announcements of party formation, politicians attempt to make the president “believe that you have a big group behind you,” and that they are viable interlocutors.

Only some party leaders build organizations that actually make them into viable interlocutors. However, even for politicians who do not attain this goal, having a party can be lucrative during election campaigns even if the party does not run any candidates. Several interviewees mention that party founders can bandwagon with the president or with rich opposition candidates in major elections and secure material benefits without making more than

39 Interview with Abdoulaye Diallo, 3/21/12, Dakar.
41 Interview with Tamsir Jupiter Ndiaye, op cit, Interview with Amadou Mayoro Fall, 4/22/12, Thiès.
42 Interview with El Hadji Momar Sambe, 11/8/11.
43 Interview with Ibrahima Diongue, op. cit.
44 Interview with El Hadji Momar Sambe, op.cit.
45 Interview with Georges Nesta Diop, 3/22/12, Khar Yallah.
minimal commitments to their own party’s investment in electoral competition. This is because major candidates may fund the leaders of small parties to campaign for them in their native localities. This allows party founders to exert material and moral clout within their communities in the name of the president, while their party gains renown for having served as the ruling coalition’s intermediary.  

Moreover, the leaders of some telephone booth parties seek to be co-opted into bigger coalitions and parties. Yet they do not always have to win or even contest elections in order to meet their fundamental goals. Politicians may create parties “to get themselves behind someone who has the possibility of winning” not necessarily because they seek elected office themselves, but instead because they are “impatient” to become cadres in the state. This suggests that some of Senegal’s party proliferation is a function of politicians’ pursuit of non-elected office or other forms of patronage that are not directly tied to vote mobilization.

However, it is not just the leaders of telephone booth parties who extract patronage from the president. Patronage negotiation was also a key activity of other party leaders who had run in one or multiple national elections. Possibly the most forthcoming about his party serving as a means for negotiating his way into power was Ousmane Ngom, who left the PDS in 1998 to form the PLS, successfully contested legislative elections, and negotiated his way back into the ruling party in 2003, after which he served as minister in all of Wade’s subsequent governments. Other politicians from the earlier vignettes who ended up being more patronage-oriented than election-oriented include Marième Ly and Bacar Dia. After initially running in a national

46 Interview with Mame Comba Diop, 3/5/12, Dakar. Interview with El Hadji Hamidou Diallo, 7/10/10, Dakar. Diallo recounts that he received this kind of support from one of Wade’s rivals, Idrissa Seck.

47 Interview with Diallo Diop, 7/30/10, Dakar.

48 Interview with Daouda Diedhiou, 2/5/12, Dakar.
election, Ly formed a local electoral coalition with several new party leaders, all of whom joined Wade’s entourage within the first five years of their existence. Ly initially gained a technical counselor post in the administration when she joined the entourage in 2004, and was appointed Senator in 2007 during her long allegiance to the ruling entourage. Dia, who did not even contest an election with his party, had an even more illustrious government career in multiple ministries. Patronage negotiation was also something that election-oriented party leaders like Djibo Kâ did from early on in their party’s lives. The URD focused immediately on vying for power through elections because “the participation in the elections of May 1998 was needed to evaluate, concretely and politically, the pertinence of the ideas and the vision that the Renouveau [informal faction within the PS] embodied” (Kâ 2005: 233). However, Kâ also negotiated with presidential candidates for patronage in exchange for his support as early as the 2000 elections, when he spoke about these issues with both Wade and Diouf before the runoff. Thus, less than two years after leaving the PS – ostensibly for its lack of internal democracy and its rejection of the Renouveau’s right to exist – Kâ was striking deals with his former leader (Niang 2004). The patronage negotiation continued under Wade, bearing material fruit for Kâ from 2004-2012.

IV – Other Possible Sources of Party Formation

Politicians also allude to several alternative logics of party creation, which feature factors like ideology, programmatic goals, intraparty conflict, and political status-seeking. However, these logics themselves are shaped by dynamics of patronage negotiation; they are not sufficient on their own to explain the extent of Senegal’s proliferation. This section uses evidence from

49 Interview with Marième Wone Ly, 2/17/12, Dakar; Interview with Aloise Gorgui Dione, 6/5/12, Dakar; Senate of Senegal 2012.

50 Interview with Bacar Dia, 7/1/12, Saint-Louis.
interviews and information about party behavior to analyze the relevance of these explanations over the chapter’s emphasis on patronage negotiation. It shows that certain party leaders behave in ways consistent with these alternative logics, which is not surprising given the wide range of parties in Senegal and the possibly that multiple logics are simultaneously in play. Yet it also reveals that if we study the ways that party leaders and their organizations behave in their earliest stages of existence, there is reason to believe that these alternative factors are not the most central drivers of party formation.

Ideology is one factor that could drive party creation. For instance, Samba Diouloé Thiam, who had belonged to the Senegalese Workers Party (PIT) – one of Senegal’s oldest leftist parties – said that he founded the Party of Renaissance and Citizenship (PRC) because he wanted to engage in politics in a way that was “based either on ideas or ideology.” He wanted to create a “new kind of leftist party” that did not forsake its ideals in service of accessing power. 51 Similarly, Ousmane Guèye claimed to work with the humanist movement in Italy to found Senegal’s Humanist Party (PH), which espouses a specific set of internationally-endorsed ideals. 52 An Islamic Reformist imam, Mbaye Niang, who still gives sermons weekly at the Airport Mosque in Yoff, declared that he founded the Movement for Reform and Democracy in Senegal (MRDS) to promote the implementation of Islamic law and education systems. 53

However, as one skeptical marabout declared: “there cannot possibly be 160 different ideologies in Senegal!” 54 If ideology motivated most politicians forming parties, then we would expect most parties to articulate specific, differentiable platforms and to ally with other actors

51 Interview with Samba Diouloé Thiam, 11/22/11, Dakar.
52 Interview with Ousmane Guèye, 2/28/12, Parcelles.
53 Interview with Mbaye Niang, 1/9/12, Dakar.
54 Anonymous interview, 1/5/12.
sharing their commitments. This has not been the case in Senegal: most parties do not articulate particularly well-defined ideologies. Leaders often categorize their as “leftist,” “liberal,” or “neutral,” but these categories are not the basis of these party leaders’ subsequent coalition choices. Even the Senegalese parties that used to more accurately represent particular ideologies during authoritarianism under Senghor have become more pragmatic, patronage-oriented parties, in the sense that former Marxist parties have joined PS and PDS governments and retain at best a small old guard committed to the parties’ original ideological principles (Diop 2011).

Programmatic goals are another motivation for party formation that interviewees mentioned. For example, Doudou Ndoye, an ex-minister from the PS government, an ex-founding member of the PDS, and a renowned lawyer hailing from Dakar’s well-respected ethnic Lébou community, told me that he founded the Union for the Republic (UPR) party in 2000 to fight against President Wade’s proposed amendments to the Senegalese constitution, which were implemented in 2001. According to the brother of the deceased Abdou Latif Guèye, who had been prominent Muslim NGO leader before founding the Assembly of Senegalese Democrats (RDS) in 2000, Guèye sought build an organization that could coalesce with the ruling party in elections in order to pass a drug enforcement law that he had been advocating for years. Patriotic Action for Liberation (APL) is a party founded by Moustapha Fall “Ché,” a Kaolack native known for leftist activism in the authoritarian period. The first newspaper reports on the APL depicted Fall and his followers going door to door to denounce “the skyrocketing of prices,

55 In the interview, he recounted that when he heard of the 2001 constitutional reform, “I saw the proposed amendment and I said that he [Wade] will be a dictator, so I created a party to fight against that.” Interview with Doudou Ndoye, 3/3/12, Dakar.

56 Interview with Mame Mactar Gueye, 8/17/10, Dakar.
the exorbitant cost of living, inflation, unemployment, and dictatorship” in anticipation of the 2002 local election campaign. 57

Were programmatic reforms the main impetus for party creation, then we would see most politicians actively pursuing clear and specific policy goals. Although some Senegalese politicians fit this description, many of them do not. First of all, most politicians who express dissatisfaction with the status quo do not propose specific reforms and instead express generalized displeasure with corruption or mismanagement of governance. For instance, prominent Dakar businessman, Mamour Cissé, talked about founding the Social Democratic Party (PSD/Jant bi) because “since the 1980s there ha[d] been no development policy in Senegal” and he wanted to “pose the problems of the hour” to the government. Marième Wane Ly founded the Party of the African Renaissance (Parena) with the hope of “improving the living conditions of the people.” 58 Ex-police officer, Amadou Moctar Ndiaye, related similar motivations in Louga, where he declared that he created the Assembly for Unity and Peace (RUP) in order to assure that people get “the vital minimum to live.” 59 Abdourahim Agne, ex-PS spokesman who founded the Reform Party (PR) in 2001, claimed that he founded his party in order to “engag[e] in politics in a different way” and break from PS practices of governance by running a “party of a new type” that would “rupture with the [prior] political party system.” 60

Second, rarely did these parties appear to actively pursue, much less achieve, their stated goals. For instance, Doudou Ndoye of the UPR says that he formed the party to contest the 2001

58 Interview with Marième Wane Ly, 2/17/12, Dakar.
59 Interview with Amadou Moctar Ndiaye, 7/20/12, Louga.
60 Interview with Abdourahim Agne, May 2012, Dakar; Interview with anonymous, 6/5/12, Dakar.
constitution that Wade passed, but years later, he attempted to fuse his party with the PDS despite the fact that Wade clearly had no intention of changing it back. One exception to this trend is Abdou Latif Guèye, who was able to pass the drug trafficking law that his party was promoting. However, this kind of programmatic focus is rare among contemporary Senegalese parties; many politicians who speak of their parties as a means to a programmatic end eventually join the president’s entourage in exchange for non-elected posts, and they continue to support the ruling entourage even when the programmatic issue that they claim to promote is not resolved later on. More broadly, programmatic platforms in Senegal – as in a variety of African countries - are not often differentiable, with many parties claiming to stand for similar issues – like less corruption, lower food prices, or higher standards of living (Manning 2005, Van de Walle & Butler 1999).

A third possibility is that party creation results from the lack of internal democracy within Senegalese parties. This can foster intraparty conflicts about elites’ positioning within the hierarchy and battles about political status among politicians. Party formation is thereby a tool for those who need to protest their exclusion from positions of power within another party or defend their honor or importance after experiencing personal difficulties with other politicians in a previous party. Among the ex-PS founders, Djibo Kâ and Moustapha Niasse both left the PS in response to Diouf’s unilateral designation of Ousmane Tanor Dieng as his successor (Diop et al. 2000), and regional-level notable Mbaye-Jacques Diop did the same in 2000, when the PS

61 He achieved this through painstaking efforts, by allying the RDS with the PDS in the 2001 legislative elections, getting elected to the National Assembly on the ruling party list, and using the relatively non-partisan nature of the law to build a parliamentary coalition for it.

62 Kâ mentions grievances about internal democracy in his autobiography, recounting that “in a document illustrative of the antidemocratic methods and practices that characterized the PS’ internal elections in 1994-5, the Renewal faction [which he headed] contacted the President of the Party, Abdou Diouf, asking him to arbitrate so that democracy and transparency could reign within the PS. Without success” (231). Moustapha Niasse told the
allegedly strong-armed other elites into leadership positions in his hometown, Rufisque (Diop 2008). Among ex-PDS elites, Ousmane Ngom, who was the second-in-command in the 1990s, framed his formation of the Senegalese Liberal Party (PLS) as a reaction to the “reshuffling of leadership positions, which [he] believed was an anti-democratic act” (Quoted in FKA/CESTI 2001: 136-137). Current president Macky Sall also denounced the PDS’ “monarchical devolution of power” when he was demoted within the ruling party and left to create the Alliance for the Republic (APR) (Sarr 2011).

Party creation was attractive to politicians decrying a lack of internal democracy within their existing organizations because the alternative – switching to another leader’s party – is perceived as futile for one’s career advancement. For instance, Bacar Dia created the FP upon leaving the URD because in all existing parties, “there would be a leader who had been there for 30 years” and he would have been “held back.” Similarly, Omar Thiam, an ex-PAI staff member, created his own party after losing controversial internal elections, because fighting his way back to the PAI leadership would have taken four to six years and “[he] needed to take a shortcut.” An ex-LD member explained that having his own party was necessary because otherwise “there was not a way to express yourself.”

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Senegalese newspaper *Sud Quotidien* soon after forming the AFP in July 1999 that his actions were motivated by succession issues, claiming, “My rupture with the PS is not a new development. It has existed since 1996, when I refused to participate in the congress without debates of 30 March 1996.” Moustapha Niasse, quoted in *Sud Quotidien*, July 1999.

63 Other ex-PS members echoed this reasoning. One claimed that he chose to found his own party rather than join another one because “all parties are similar, so to join another party…would entail pretty much the same practices that I left behind within the PS Interview with Abdourahim Agne, May 2012, Dakar.

64 Interview with Bacar Dia, 7/1/12 , Saint-Louis.

65 Interview with Omar Thiam, 3/5/12, Dakar.

66 Interview with Adama Kamara, 1/19/12, Pikine.
Another possibility is that politicians create parties not just due to the lack of internal democracy, but also due to the status disputes that play out underneath battles for positioning within party hierarchies. For instance, status logics were invoked by two men who had been elites in parliamentary parties, the Convention of Democrats and Patriots (CDP-Garab gi) and the Social Democratic Front (FSD/BJ). 67 Samir Abdourizk, a Rufisque-born citizen of Lebanese descent, founded the Citizens’ Democracy (DC) party in 2000 after leaving the CDP, around the same time that Abiboulaye Ndiaye, a school inspector from Saint-Louis, broke away from the FSD/BJ to create the Front for Social Reform (FSR/Laabal). According to Abdourizk, party formation was a means of asserting that other politicians could not “always profit from [him],” by relegating him to “playing a second-tier role” within their organizations; Ndiaye recounted that joining another party would not have accurately reflected his “level” because “if one is a party leader, one is a level above” being a staff member of someone else’s party. 68 Iba Der Thiam, the founder of the party that Abourizk left, also employs a status logic. 69 Thiam claims that he had to form his own party because the leaders of existing leftist parties, like Abdoulaye Bathily of the LD, had been his subordinates in the labor movement. 70 Along similar lines,

67 The CDP/Garab gi was created by the public intellectual, Iba Der Thiam, in 1992, soon after he lost his appointment as Minister of Education in the PS government. The FSD/BJ originated as a social movement for ensuring better upkeep and governance of Saint-Louis. It was founded in 1996 by Islamic intellectual Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye. His son, Cheikh Bamba Dièye, has run the party since his father’s death in 2002. Interview with Cheikh Bamba Dièye, 8/13/10, Saint-Louis.

68 Interview with Samir Abdourizk, 7/25/12, Dakar. Interview with Abiboulaye Ndiaye, 2/29/12, Dakar.

69 Involved in the PS government in the late 1970s as Diouf’s Minister of Education thanks to his involvement in the university community and his embeddedness in syndicalism, Thiam created the CDP in time to run for president in 1993, after the “blank year” (année blanche) at the University of Dakar and the post-election violence of 1988.

70 Interview with Iba Der Thiam, 8/7/10, Dakar.
Mbaye-Jacques Diop \(^{71}\) formed his own party, politely declining the invitation to join the Alliance of Forces for Progress (AFP) because it was led by Niasse, his junior in age. \(^{72}\)

Were status or internal democracy the most important factor behind party formation, then exit from the party would be relatively permanent, barring major rectifications to the rules for ascending the party hierarchy that sparked initial defections. But permanent exit – as envisioned in Hirschman’s (1970) concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty – is not common in Senegal, especially among people who leave the ruling party and its privileged access to state resources. Rather than using permanent exit from a party to express discontent about the internal procedures, party leaders who get into disputes with the ruling party in particular often attempt to use party formation to signal a temporary exit only. They use their exit to voice dissent about their ex-party’s treatment of them, but with the intention of negotiating their way back into that party. “Exit as voice” allows them to demonstrate their political worth, and negotiate terms of reconciliation and re-entry. \(^{73}\)

“Exit as voice” further attests to the importance of parties as tools for patronage negotiation. Both ex-PDS second-in-command from the early 1990s (Ousmane Ngom) and the second-in-command from the early 2000s (Idrissa Seck) pursued exit as voice strategies. Ngom, who “never imagined doing politics outside of the PDS,” negotiated his way back into the PDS after four years of opposition activity. He reintegrated the PDS in exchange for lucrative ministerial appointments, even though he never regained his prior post as second-in-command

\(^{71}\) Diop is an ex-regional staff member of the PS and one of the politicians who protested Senegal’s “Yes” vote to remain in the French empire in De Gaulle’s famous 1958 referendum within the African colonies.

\(^{72}\) He cited age hierarchies: “We take the liberty of assuming that Moustapha Niasse has not forgotten that he found Mbaye-Jacques Diop in the PS [when he joined]” (Diop 2008).

\(^{73}\) When this re-entry occurs, it is not generally back to the position that politicians lost within the party hierarchy, and that motivated defection and party creation in the first place.
(Quoted in FKA/CESTI 2001: 136-137). Omar Sarr, one of the ex-PDS National Assembly members who followed ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck out of the PDS and founded the Rewmi party also stated that Seck’s plan was always to reintegrate the PDS. Former party leaders who fused with the PDS, like Abdou Fall of the Convention for Senegalese Democrats (CDS), also talk of their organizations as “more a force for negotiation than a party.” The “exit as voice” phenomenon, along with the previous evidence that most party leaders in my sample negotiate their way into the state early on in the life of their parties, suggests that the desire for the patronage linked to accessing the state provide some of the status-seeking logics that Senegalese politicians express in their narratives of proliferation.

V – Presidential Linkage of Founders and Non-Founders

This section provides additional support for the chapter’s argument by examining one observable implication: if patronage negotiation is indeed often central to politicians’ motivations to form parties, then we should detect differences in the desires or abilities of founders and non-founders to negotiate with the president for access to the state. Specifically, individuals’ pre-existing ties to the president should be inversely related to their formation of parties. In this analysis, linkage is defined as a politician having firsthand, personalized contact with the president, contact that establishes a personal or professional rapport and facilitates future interactions with him and his entourage. We might imagine that politicians without social or political linkage to the president before party creation would be most interested in party

74 Interview with Omar Sarr, 7/21/10, Dakar.

75 Interview with Abdou Fall, 7/13/12, Dakar.

76 As mentioned subsequently, linkage is operationalized as whether a politician has met with the president one-on-one before 1998. The reasons are elaborated in the discussion of Figure 2.
creation, since it helps them to draw attention to themselves as potential allies and facilitate negotiations for access to the state. This is the case among the sample of politicians analyzed below. Moreover, of the party founders in the sample who lack linkage, only a minority of politicians without linkage create parties without seeking to collaborate with the president.

To investigate the argument’s observable implication about presidential linkage, we must compare party founders to a relevant subset of the Senegalese population that has not created parties, namely, other Senegalese politicians who are most likely to have considered creating a party but ultimately opted not to form one. Constructing such a sample is difficult, largely because party non-formation is not usually observable. Ultimately, a set of non-founders was selected based on three assumptions about who is likely to have considered founding a party.

First, it is assumed that between 1998 and 2010, the structural conditions fostering individuals’ incentives for (or against) party formation were similar. In addition to the diminished role of Senegal’s major marabouts in all of the elections within this time period, there rise of non-partisan “citizens’ movements” as grassroots political actors at the forefront of electoral politics had not yet reached its pinnacle (Gellar 2013). Non-founders from the years 2011 and beyond are excluded from the comparison here because especially as of 2011, Wade’s bid for a third presidential term catalyzed citizens’ large-scale disillusionment with political parties, creating newfound legitimacy for non-party organizations, especially citizens’ movements led by people interested in running for office (Gellar 2013). The risks and rewards to party formation in 2011 and beyond are thus not likely to be the same as those perceived by politicians in 1998-2010. Any conclusions drawn from the comparison are thus limited to a

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77 Ultimately, this assumption is necessary because to collect comprehensive data on all founders within a given period, I had to select a short window (1998-2003); yet to build a relatively balanced sample of founders, I had to gather the non-founders – who are harder to identify - from a longer time frame (1998-2010).
particular historical moment in Senegalese politics, albeit an important one (the lead-up to the
country’s first turnover and the first decade thereafter).

The second assumption is that a politician’s decision to found any kind of organization
requires evaluating the costs and benefits of running it in various forms, including as a political
party. This assumption is well-rooted in Senegal’s political history: the fiery and outspoken
Talla Sylla is the best-known example of someone who converted a social movement or civil
society group into a successful political party. Within the sample, eleven individuals were
previously leaders of associations and thus may have had to consider when—if at all—to convert
their social organizations into parties. Conversely, a variety of national-level civil society
leaders began their stint in politics by participating in leftist political parties, which they
eventually chose to desert in favor of careers in non-party spheres of the political arena. Given
these realities, the sample of non-founders includes the people who formed alternative coalitions
within their political parties, people who ran as independents or “rented” a party banner (instead
of founding their own) in the 2000 and 2007 presidential elections, and leaders of civil society
groups who chose not to pursue careers in party politics. 78

Third, it is assumed that party formation was likely to have been considered an option by
PS officials from the party’s top echelons who lost their positions at the last party congress
before the 1998 legislative elections, when the PS’ future dominance became doubtful. This kind
of defection is expected when dominant ruling parties experience declines in popularity due to
economic shocks and patronage scarcity (Beck 2008, Reuter & Gandhi 2011). As previously
mentioned, the PS’ weak hold on power was apparent by 1998, not only because of economic
hardships but also because of the PS’ controversial “congress without debates” of 1996, in which

78 The independents in presidential races were identified through election results and their biographical information
was taken from Fall 2007, as well as newspaper coverage about them.
Diouf had named Ousmane Tanor Dieng his successor within the party, much to the chagrin of the older generation of party elites (Diop et al. 2000). They are therefore likely to have considered founding parties then because of the uncertainty of the PS’ future dominance and because of the caliber of their careers within the party. The sample includes all thirteen members of the 1990 Political Bureau who were not renewed in 1996.  

The overall sample of 75 politicians that are analyzed here includes all 46 party founders (1998-2003) and 29 contemporary non-founders. Basing the selection of non-founders on these principles and on my own awareness of Senegalese politics is a pragmatic attempt to mitigate selection bias in constructing a representative sample of non-founders. Nevertheless, the caveats are significant: the sample is, of course, not random, nor does it in all likelihood represent the complete set of Senegalese political figures who met the three criteria to count as a non-founder in the 1998-2010 period. Thus the comparisons should be considered no more than an initial plausibility probe of the observable implication.

Figure 2 contrasts founders’ and non-founders’ profiles in terms of their linkage to the president, as well as on several additional aspects of their demographic, political, and economic backgrounds. The data were gathered through original interviews with founders and certain non-founders, as well as newspaper research and secondary sources on non-founders. Linkage to the president is operationalized as whether a politician had the opportunity to meet with the president one-on-one before 1998, when politicians in the sample began creating parties. The raw counts of how founders and non-founders scored on linkage, as well as other biographical characteristics potentially of interest, are presented in parentheses; the results of t-tests for differences in means are presented in the farthest right column. The differences in linkage

79 Biographical information about ex-PS Political Bureau members comes from Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006, as well as newspaper coverage of Political Bureau elections in 1990 and 1996.
between founders and non-founders are statistically significant. Founders in this sample generally have linkage to the president (before founding their parties) less often than non-founders did (before 1998). In addition, the group of founders and the group of non-founders are statistically similar in terms of the proportion exhibiting several characteristics: membership in an elite family (including religious elite families in particular), involvement in the private sector, prior experience as a minister, and age. However, the founders sampled are significantly less likely to come from a non-party organization in civil society and to have pursued higher education in France. This raises the possibility, to be explored in future research, that non-founders’ level of education and privilege push them to select out of party formation and into other forms of civil society involvement, regardless of their linkage to the president.

**Figure 2: Presidential Linkage and Backgrounds of Founders and Non-Founders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Founders</th>
<th>Founders</th>
<th>P-value of difference in means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential linkage</td>
<td>19 / 3 / 7 (65%)</td>
<td>13 / 23 / 10 (28%)</td>
<td>0.0001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite family</td>
<td>9 / 11 / 9 (38%)</td>
<td>18 / 19 / 9 (39%)</td>
<td>0.7968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious family</td>
<td>2 / 27 / 0 (7%)</td>
<td>6 / 38 / 2 (13%)</td>
<td>0.3740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>4 / 22 / 3 (24%)</td>
<td>7 / 37 / 2 (15%)</td>
<td>0.9544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-party organization</td>
<td>6 / 20 / 3 (21%)</td>
<td>4 / 40 / 3 (8%)</td>
<td>0.0087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former minister</td>
<td>8 / 21 / 0 (28%)</td>
<td>6 / 40 / 0 (13%)</td>
<td>0.1424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France educated</td>
<td>11 / 13 / 5 (38%)</td>
<td>8 / 29 / 9 (17%)</td>
<td>0.0470**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interviews provide further hypotheses about the ways in which individuals’ linkage to the president might shape their decisions about party formation or non-formation. What appears to distinguish founders from non-founders is the latter’s more consistent abilities to access the president because of existing social ties to him or key members of his entourage. Nearly all founders believed that they had cohesive (albeit often small) blocs of supporters, and that building a party around them could bolster their political reputation. For instance, Ousseynou Fall, son of a prominent Muslim leader, believed he had the Mouride electorate behind him; Ibrahima Masseck Diop, a descendant of Senegal’s colonial-era hero, Lat Dior, sought support from aristocratic families; and several Lébou intellectuals founded parties to defend the ethnic community’s interests. These individuals sought to gain political influence by heading a party organization and to gain the president’s attention by sparking public debates or engaging in contentious behavior, rather than to join an existing party and lobbying for state resources. Joining another politician’s party was less desirable because it required becoming a regular, “simple,” or “popular” member rather than a party leader who can act as a direct interlocutor for his own interests.

Conversely, non-founders were not usually concerned with getting the president’s attention in order to access state resources. There are several possible reasons. Many members of the 1990 PS Political Bureau who did not found parties after losing their spots in 1996 had already acquired presidential linkages through decades of work in the ruling PS. Nearly all had been Diouf’s ministers and did not need to found parties to propel careers that were already so

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80 Interviews with Fall, 6/11/12, Dakar; Diop, 5/3/12, Dakar; Omar Ndoye, 2/29/12, Dakar.
advanced; in addition, the 1996 congress did not foster worry about their careers because none of them had expected to succeed Diouf.  

Similarly, the leaders of Senegal’s prominent civil society groups, like the Civil Forum, the African Assembly of Human Rights (RADDHO), and the National Civil Society Consortium (CONGAD) had access to the president without forming parties. They collaborated with leftist political parties as students, but had left them and become major civil society figures by the late 1990s, when they gained presidential attention. President Diouf offered an ambassadorship to Professor Babacar Diop when “Buuba” became the CONGAD’s president in 1999. Moreover, Professor Penda Mbow—founding member of RADDHO who then founded the Citizenship Movement with her students in 2005—had previously (and briefly) been Minister of Culture in 2001 (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006).

Along related lines, Bara Tall, a private sector figure who did not form his own party but funded the Rewmi party of ex-Prime Minister, Idrissa Seck, had regular contact with Wade early on in the presidency. Wade strategically approached Tall in 2001 to include him in the Presidential Investment Council (CPI), a government institution managing Senegalese development projects. Tall’s prominence within the private sector provided him political opportunities without having to found a party. This held even when Tall clashed with Wade for refusing to help liquidate ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck. Imprisoned for what some believe was

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81 An additional factor that probably mattered was that these ex-national leaders were in their late seventies or eighties, and were not less concerned than younger politicians about the repercussions of losing their positions in the Political Bureau because of the succession dynamics playing out in the party.

82 Interview with Babacar Diop, op.cit.
political retribution, Tall created a citizen’s movement, Yemalé, to “resolve [his] personal problems” and constitute a non-partisan, “countervailing power” to the government. Among politicians who had linkage to the president, the individuals with ruptured relationships with the chief executive tended to form parties more often than individuals on good terms with him. The party founders who split from the PS after the 1996 congress, Djibo Kâ (URD) and Moustapha Niasse (AFP), used their newfound organizations as motors for their continued political ascension under Diouf. Niasse presented himself as a candidate in 2000 and bandwagoned with Wade, negotiating with the new president to maximize his role within the country’s new government. At the same moment of truth, Kâ used his party to negotiate a partnership with Diouf before the second round of the 2000 race, which involved a deal in which he would become Prime Minister – reunited and reconciled with his former boss – if Diouf won. The trajectory of Ousmane Ngom, the ex-PDS second-in-command, also fits this pattern.

In contrast, several non-founders did not experience such ruptures with Presidents Diouf and Wade. These non-founders were not in the top five of the ruling party hierarchies in question, but were important national-level party staff with regular and direct access to the chief executive. In this sense, the main distinction between them and party founders like Niasse, Kâ, and Ngom was the former actors’ good relationship with the president. For example, the youngest non-founders in the sample, who could have formed promising parties during Wade’s presidency but ultimately did not, achieved a high rank within the PDS during college. Two served as president of PDS youth and student associations, which won them seats in the party’s central decision-making body. This provided regular contact with President Wade well before they founded Waar wi, an alternative electoral coalition of PDS members that nevertheless competed with the PDS’ official candidates in the 2007 legislative elections. Previous

83 Interview with Bara Tall, 6/5/12, Dakar.
presidential linkage is one factor that could have led these youthful politicians to found a faction—rather than defecting to form a party—when they experienced intraparty conflicts. Because of their youth and inexperience, they were not as established as the PS barons, civil society leaders, and businessmen who chose not to found parties. But rather than trying to gain importance by declaring themselves party leaders, these youth sought to capitalize on their early success in the PDS and preserve their proximity to Wade. Resolving “not to commit political suicide,” they used the internal faction to express their discontent within the PDS. Because of their political rank within the party, faction leaders could land the presidential audiences necessary to extract patronage in exchange for reconciliation, which they achieved (along with ministerial influence) during the early years of Wade’s second term.

Ultimately, these examples support two explanations of the proposed negative relationship between presidential linkage and party formation. First, party formation is a way for politicians entirely lacking linkage to the president to increase their visibility in the political arena, lobby the president for influence, and to do so in the part of the political arena that is most closely linked to the president’s electoral preoccupations. Second, party formation is a tool for politicians with ruptured linkages to the president to display their ability to damage or threaten the ruling party’s vote-getting efficacy (whether in electoral or non-electoral ways). These propositions are particularly plausible given that many party founders lacked linkage to the president before creating their own parties, a significant amount of elite discourse about party formation suggests that it is about gaining access to the state, and nearly two-thirds of them eventually negotiated their way into power thereafter, as this chapter has covered.

However, this examination of party leaders’ linkage to the president and its relationship to party formation does not allow us to rule out an alternative, but observationally equivalent

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84 Interview with Ababacar Bâ, 11/12/11, Dakar.
possibility: that politicians without linkage to the president form their own parties with the initial intention of opposing the president, but that their leaders do not ultimately exhibit the will or the capacity to resist the president’s attempts to co-opt them. As subsequent chapters will show, there are several parties in the sample whose leaders do not have linkage to the president and have not focused on developing linkage thereafter (but they are a minority). There are also parties in the sample whose leaders initially lacked linkage to the president, adopted public discourses of opposition towards the president, and ultimately negotiated their way into the state after gaining the president’s attention in this way. Knowing just a politician’s initial presidential linkage on its own allows us neither to infer the initial intentions he has when he creates a party, nor to reliably predict the party’s subsequent membership in the ruling coalition or the opposition.

VI- Conclusion

By studying the logics of party formation among a full range of parties formed during Senegal’s initial acceleration in proliferation, the chapter is able to identify the extent to which party formation is more primarily patronage-oriented than it is election-oriented. Evidence from in-depth interviews with founders and the tracking of early party behavior among this chronological sample of parties then provides a more complete picture of how patronage distribution, political bargaining, and politicians’ lobbying of the state work, both through and outside of elections. The logics of party creation are multiple and layered, but they are distinctive under competitive authoritarianism relative to under democracy and autocracy, in which theories do not predict proliferation. The chapter’s overall lesson is that especially on an uneven playing field that makes survival in the opposition difficult without intermittent
collaboration with the president, the parties that emerge are more likely to be consistently state-oriented without regularly contesting elections. This research thus supplements the more general insight that politics in poor democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes are driven by politicians’ desire to access the state (Butler & Van de Walle 1999, Van de Walle 2007).

The patronage-oriented logics of party formation (in addition to, and sometimes as opposed to, the election-oriented logics) in Senegal affect long-term party behavior, the focus of Chapter 4. Opposition parties are generally considered vehicles for voicing alternatives to the ideas and policies that incumbents propose, serving as counterweights to the ruling party and fostering accountability and government responsiveness (Grzymala-Busse 2007, Rosenblum 2010). But in Senegal, where a significant subset of party founders is more patronage-oriented than election-oriented, parties rarely oppose the president and his government consistently over time. Instead, they collaborate with the president in various long-term and short-term forms, despite the fact that such coalitions are not institutionally required to form a government or necessary to construct a legislative majority, which the ruling party controls on its own. Chapter 4 demonstrates that party founders’ decisions to pursue consistent opposition are shaped by the degree and type of resources that they possess to overcome structural disadvantages in elections on an uneven playing field. The consistent opposition considered so fundamental to democracy is rare because party leaders do not usually possess the endowments that together make a long-term investment in running constantly against the ruling party worthwhile: namely, experience as high-level administrators before creating a party, as well as financing independent of the state.
CHAPTER FOUR – NEGOTIATORS OR ADVERSARIES? TRACING THE SOURCES OF PARTY STRATEGY IN SENEGAL

I. Introduction

The existence of parties that are active in the opposition both during and between elections is a fundamental element of democracy. Opposition parties are generally thought to resist co-optation and refrain from collaborating with the ruling party when coalition-building is not institutionally necessary to form a government or to establish a legislative majority. They serve as counterweights to the ruling party by monitoring and critiquing its activities and “present a viable alternative to the political status quo” even if they cannot always organize broad-based coalescence against incumbents (Arriola 2012: 5, LeBas 2011). When they function this way, opposition parties are the linchpin of political accountability and state effectiveness (Grzymala-Busse 2007, Lipset 2000, Rosenblum 2010, Stepan 1990).

However, this kind of party behavior is rare among parties in several of Africa’s competitive authoritarian regimes, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, and Senegal (Diop 2006, Levitsky & Way 2010b). ¹ In Senegal, parties that collaborate with the ruling party, whether sporadically or permanently, are more common than parties that consistently oppose the government in consecutive national-level elections. Some party leaders seek to be co-opted into the presidential entourage in exchange for patronage; other party leaders run against the ruling party but join the government between elections. Over the five presidential and parliamentary elections spanning the Wade presidency (2000-2012), nearly two-thirds of the 46 parties of focus in this study either joined the president’s ruling coalition and remained there,

¹ There is similar evidence outside of Africa, namely in the Philippines (Montinola 1999).
or forged intermittent, tactical alliances with the ruling party. The ruling party controlled a legislative majority, so no party leader’s collaboration was required for institutional reasons (Diop 2011, Fall 2011, Kanté 1994). Why, then, have so few parties been consistently in the opposition? How has sustained opposition been possible among the few parties that exhibit this long-term behavior?

This chapter uses the Senegalese case to illustrate that an “uneven playing field” (Levitsky & Way 2010a), a key feature of competitive authoritarian regimes, made many party leaders less likely to engage in consistent, long-term opposition, and more prone to behave in less theorized ways. This can include collaborating with the president by fusing their parties with the ruling party, joining the president’s ruling coalition permanently, and forging more temporary alliances. Despite the uneven playing field, Senegal has several parties that have overcome structural disadvantages to pursuing consistent opposition. Two turnovers have also occurred despite the challenges of sustaining opposition under competitive authoritarianism. But generally, many politicians who create parties rely on them most centrally to negotiate their way into the state, while minimizing their long-term commitment to competing in elections that are difficult to win. Especially among the parties that are relatively more patronage-oriented than they are election-oriented, few are likely to adopt strategies of consistent opposition.

This chapter analyzes the sources of variation in long-term party strategies in Senegal during the Wade presidency (2000-2012). Party strategies are conceived of as party leaders’ series of decisions to oppose or collaborate with the president made over several national elections; party leaders are not assumed to deliberately plan these long-term behaviors when they

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2 This calculation comes from data collected on a sample of parties during fieldwork in Senegal. It is described and analyzed in greater detail in the sections to follow.

3 This spans all presidential and National Assembly elections starting with the 2000 presidential race that brought him to power through the 2012 election that ended his rule.
create their organizations. Their willingness and ability to select certain strategies are subject to significant resource constraints. Most notably, under Wade this included the president’s use of patronage to fragment and destabilize the opposition, which he needed to do in order to bolster his chances of re-election. However, within these constraints, party leaders vary in the courses of action that they select during elections. Their pursuit of consistent opposition is shaped by the degree and type of resource endowments they possess to overcome structural disadvantages on the uneven playing field.

Namely, party leaders’ prior experience as either high-level state administrators or prominent grassroots civil society figures before they created their own party, as well as their access to sources of private financing independent of the state, together facilitate their willingness and ability to compete with incumbents rather than to collaborate with them over time. First, party leaders’ experience as former state administrators or civil society figures allows them to market themselves as legitimate replacements to incumbent politicians. Second, their access to independent private financing (which is often international) empowers them to engage in clientelist competition. Only the few party leaders with high levels of both endowments resist collaborating with the ruling party and instead function as adversaries; they are the rare politicians with the resources and the political potential sufficient for them to invest in running against incumbents consistently over time. Party leaders lacking one or both endowments cannot develop the profiles and followings that level the playing field enough to seriously challenge the president. They instead negotiate with him, collaborating with the ruling party in hope of accessing endowments that they lack. These relationships hold most consistently among the parties with vote-mobilizing potential, meaning that their leaders ran on their own label in at least one of the first two national elections after their party’s birth.
This chapter traces how party leaders’ endowments and vote-mobilizing potential relate to the long-term electoral behavior of their parties, first among some of Senegal’s most historically relevant and electorally prominent parties, and then among all parties registered between 1998 and 2003. Section 2 describes the types and the frequencies of long-term strategies that we must account for in contemporary Senegal. Section 3 describes the origins of long-term party behavior, highlighting the key independent variables shaping strategy outcomes. It also marshals evidence from some of Senegal’s oldest parties to identify the mechanisms behind these patterns. Section 4 analyzes all parties founded 1998-2003, establishing how long-term party behaviors correlate with party leaders’ experience and financing (as well as their parties’ vote-mobilizing potential). In Section 5, case studies demonstrate in greater detail how these relationships work. Section 6 addresses the broader significance of these findings.

II. Types of Party Strategies

Party strategies can be classified into three distinct behaviors (Table 4). Consistent opposition entails party leaders refusing to collaborate with the president. Party leaders pursuing consistent opposition neither accept government appointments from the president nor campaign for the ruling coalition in elections. Instead, they continually serve in the political opposition outside of the state, providing themselves as alternative leaders and possibly articulating alternative visions of Senegalese politics and policy during and between elections. Over the course of multiple national elections, they stay outside of the government in order to monitor,

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4 Leadership here can mean that the party leader runs his own party in an election, or is one of the major contributors to a coalition running in an election.
critique, and be a counterweight to those in power.⁵ Consistent opposition thus conforms to Sartori’s (1966) conception of opposition as “the ensemble of partisan forces who seek to take power, produce critiques of the current government, and define alternative programs” (Diop 2013: 426) as well as Stepan’s (2007) criterion that it “resist integration into the regime” (662).

**Table 4: Visual Representations of Long-Term Party Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consistent opposition</th>
<th>Tactical Alliance</th>
<th>Co-optation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election n</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>After election n</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Election n+1</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>After election n+1</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X = in opposition  Y = in ruling coalition

In contrast, party leaders who pursue *tactical alliances* join the president’s government during at least part of their existence. They may oppose the ruling coalition during certain national elections, running candidates on their own label, but then support the ruling coalition in between elections; or even join the ruling coalition in certain elections while running in others. In Senegal, tactical alliances often entail party leaders joining “enlarged presidential majority governments” (under Diouf) or “ideational majority governments” (under Wade). In these contexts, presidents often solicit opposition party leaders’ participation by bilaterally negotiating

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⁵ In presidential systems in which the ruling party commands a legislative majority, like Senegal under Diouf and Wade, no coalitions are necessary for the government to form, so my definition of opposition parties does not allow for government alliances that we might consider part of “acceptable” opposition party behavior in either presidential or parliamentary systems in which no single party has the majority.
with them, giving them ministerial portfolios and directorships in exchange for their party’s support in certain elections. ⁶

Finally, *co-optation* entails campaigning for the president in national elections and supporting the ruling coalition between elections. Leaders who pursue this strategy often begin in the opposition, but soon get (or even seek to get) co-opted by the president, collaborating with the ruling coalition in all subsequent elections. In Senegal, this strategy was not possible for parties to follow until Abdoulaye Wade’s presidency (2000-2012), when party leaders had the option of joining the Coalition Around the Actions of the President of the Republic in the 21st Century (Cap 21). ⁷ Another (less common) variant of co-optation occurs when party leaders remain in opposition across all elections but rally around electorally threatening opposition figures, playing loyal supporting roles within their entourages. They essentially mimic the behavior of consistent opponents without trying to turn themselves into the electorally viable opposition candidates on the national level.

These strategies appear in several competitive authoritarian regimes. Co-optation is widespread. In Cameroon, President Biya has successfully co-opted most party founders who began in the opposition, including Bello Bouba Maigari of the United National Democratic Party (UNDP), a prominent opposition party that emerged along with the SDF at the transition to multiparty politics (Takougang 2004). In Gabon, by the mid-2000s, 29 of the 35 registered parties were in the president’s ruling coalition (Levitsky & Way 2010b: 265). Within Senegal, ⁶

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⁶ For the purposes of this chapter, co-optation refers to a party engaging in permanent, sustained collaboration with a particular politician’s coalition (most often the president’s) without that party itself running in elections. Co-optation is, by this definition, distinctive from tactical alliances, even though the president is often also attempting to co-opt the party leaders who ultimately escape permanent co-optation.

⁷ As described in previous chapters, this institution brought together a variety of small party leaders who were co-opted into the ruling coalition. Members were virtually guaranteed small-scale perks, including but not limited to a monthly salary of 300,000 FCFA, bags of rice, diplomatic passports, and access to a presidential intermediary and (occasionally) the president.
over 65 were in long-term alliances with the PDS by the 2012 election. Politicians like ex-minister and public intellectual, Iba Der Thiam, as well as ex-PS regional baron, Mbaye-Jacques Diop, even fused their parties with the PDS in the early 2000s.

Tactical alliances also occur in other competitive authoritarian regimes. Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in Kenya accepted a ministerial post in the government run by the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 2001 and then ran in 2002 against the KANU presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta (Howard & Roessler 2006, Levitsky & Way 2010b, Ndegwa 2003). In Senegal in the 1990s, several opposition parties joined the Diouf government between national elections and left to campaign on their own. Abdoulaye Wade of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), Abdoulaye Bathily of the Democratic League (LD/MPT), and Amath Dansokho of the Independent Workers’ Party (PIT) often left the Diouf government before legislative and presidential elections in order to run against him (Diop et al. 2000). After Wade became president, other party leaders like Djibo Kâ of the Union for Democratic Renewal (URD) and Landing Savané of And-Jef (AJ/PADS) ran on their own party labels in national elections but did so after having forged long-term alliances with President Wade (Diop 2011, Niang 2004).

The rest of the chapter analyzes the determinants of the distribution of these three kinds of long-term party behavior among a chronological sample of registered Senegalese parties. These 46 parties constitute all those created between 1998 and 2003. The analysis once again draws on information from interviews that solicited information about each party leader’s political and demographic background as well as his party’s electoral strategy choices over time, and the reasons behind his choice to oppose or collaborate with the government throughout the Wade presidency. This information indicates that in Senegal, consistent opposition is rare.

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Collaboration, which encompasses either tactical alliances or co-optation, predominates. Of the 46 parties founded 1998-2003, over two-thirds have leaders who eventually negotiated their way into the presidential entourage and generally remained there over the longer term thereafter. Only 28% of parties in this sample consistently refused to ally with the president both during and between elections across the five national elections analyzed, and only 9% of them pursued the strategy of consistent opposition rather than co-optation within an opposition coalition.

Among all 174 parties founded since Senegalese independence, my best conservative estimate is that around 45% (at least 79) have negotiated their way into the president’s entourage. This is a conservative estimate because these 79 parties all joined the Cap 21 or established a formalized, bilateral alliance with the ruling party; it is possible that other party leaders negotiated more informal collaborative deals with Wade that we cannot detect by consulting the coalition rosters that were available to construct the estimate.

Even among just the parties with vote-mobilizing potential, meaning that they contested one of the first two national elections after their birth, some form of collaboration was the norm. Only 16 of 46 sampled parties ran in one of the first two national elections held after their birth; only 12 ran in a second contest. Even fewer parties presented themselves in a longer string of elections, and just four entirely resisted the president’s efforts to draw them into the ruling coalition. This could be due in part to the incentives for coalition-building in Senegal’s electoral system, as well as to constant increases in the official costs of running on one’s own party label.

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9 12 of 43 for which complete data was available.

10 4 of 43 for which complete data was available.

11 Complete data on the coalition memberships of all 174 parties does not exist. To get statistics within my sample, I asked leaders in interviews for this information and compiled an original dataset. Elections databases report results on the party level if a party runs alone in an election, but do not report on coalition composition when parties run together, so this information is not available through existing sources.
in Senegal during the last two decades (Mozaffar & Vengroff 2002). But the fact that parties respond to these incentives by moving into the president’s ruling coalition rather than by coalescing with other opposition parties requires further explanation.

**III. Sources of Party Strategy**

The tendency towards government collaboration in turn diminishes the degree of coordinated electoral competition that the president faces from the opposition. But how does this collaboration come about? This section presents the chapter’s argument about experience and financing, reviews the mechanisms through which these factors shape strategy, and describes the argument’s premises about the president.

Figure 3 maps the relationships that this chapter detects within the sample and then illustrates. The central claim is that party leaders’ combinations of two endowments condition how they respond to the built-in incentives to collaborate with the president on the uneven playing field. The two endowments are party leaders’ prior experience as either high-level state administrators or prominent grassroots civil society figures, as well as their access to sources of independent private financing. The higher the levels of both experience and financing that a party leader has, they more he moves away from being a long-term collaborator with the president, to someone able to negotiate more contingent, tactical alliances with the ruling party, to a full-fledged adversary always opposing incumbents.

First, party leaders’ experience as former state administrators, or as the leaders of associations that have broad-based grassroots support, allows them to market themselves as knowledgeable and legitimate replacements to incumbents. Through these experiences, party
leaders occupied leadership positions that helped them cultivate the name recognition and the followers that are helpful for building parties. Ministerial experience helps party leaders build images as politicians who know how to run the state and are familiar with the inner workings of the government. Especially on the uneven playing field, party leaders who can point to their administrative competence have an easier time marketing themselves as reliable alternatives to incumbents and as the president’s serious potential adversaries. Alternatively, when party founders have headed associations with broad-based constituencies that are nationally known, they can use their record of leadership or activism in such organizations to bolster their legitimacy in the electoral arena.

Second, party leaders’ access to independent sources of private financing empowers them to engage in clientelist competition with the ruling party that characterizes electoral politics in

Figure 3: Factors Shaping Party Strategy over Time
much of Africa (Van de Walle 2007). Independent sources of financing are often international. Sometimes, party leaders have such sources from their private consulting with international organizations (like Wade’s consulting for the African Development Bank in the 1990s) or their own private sector business activity (like Moustapha Niasse’s involvement in several oil companies). Other times, they are alleged to receive the covert support of businessmen in the Senegalese diaspora or of foreign dignitaries (including several African and Middle Eastern presidents). Independent financing is especially useful for developing the capacity for consistent opposition because running in national elections, especially several consecutive ones, is costly. It is precarious to depend solely upon income derived from the state or upon domestic sources of private sector revenue. The president can use the state to block politicians’ access to money when they lack independent financing, and this impedes their capacity for political activities like sustained opposition.

Overall, party leaders with both endowments are more willing and able to compete with incumbents in national elections and to resist collaboration with them over the long term. It is more feasible and desirable for them to consistently oppose the president because they know that their combination of resources gives them a real chance of winning control over the state if they invest in adversarial competition. In contrast, party leaders with either experience or financing have some bargaining power with the president through their limited endowments. However, their deficiencies in one domain prevent them from developing the profile and the following of an electoral opponent who could seriously threaten the incumbent’s hold on power. These

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12 The caveat is that especially on an uneven playing field, the tipping point at which party leaders find it in their material interest to compete with the president rather than to negotiate with him is within the reach of so few.

13 Later discussions of mechanisms and particular party cases provide specific details. These means of accumulating wealth and financing do not necessarily entail corruption. Detecting the degree and scope of such corruption, if it is part of the story, is beyond the scope of the dissertation. The chapter makes no explicit claim that corruption is necessary for obtaining international private financing.
politicians can attempt to use their resources (with varying success) to bargain for a tactical alliance, or to coalesce with consistent opponents if not accommodated. These party leaders should therefore exhibit more variation in the strategies they choose, with some holding out to function as consistent opponents despite their resource deficiencies (if they derive expressive benefits from this electorally futile action), and others negotiating tactical alliances or long-term co-optation, depending on their personal situations, ideals, and idiosyncrasies. Finally, the founders with neither experience nor financing have the least bargaining power over the terms of their collaboration with other politicians, and should therefore most consistently end up in relationships of long-term co-optation.

As the chapter later demonstrates, these relationships are especially marked among parties with vote-mobilizing potential. Such parties are defined as those whose leaders begin developing a recognizable party label early in the organization’s life. They seek through their initial participation in elections to become visible and known to politicians and the electorate. Parties with vote-mobilizing potential are operationalized as those that have run their own candidates in one of the first two elections after their birth. This means that their leaders have paid the fees required to run candidates in at least one national race. They therefore have the potential to become serious electoral threats to the president if he does not neutralize their development. Indeed, it is among the parties with vote-mobilizing potential that the president’s effort to fragment the opposition is most important for his political survival. Although parties with vote-mobilizing potential are the president’s prime targets for co-optation, it is also precisely the parties with such potential whose leaders often have at least some

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14 Parties with vote-mobilizing potential – as well as those that have potential and have also exhibited some actual capacity in past races – are the president’s greatest (potential and actual) electoral threats. Parties with vote-mobilizing potential are not yet necessarily the most electorally threatening but their leaders’ will to run the party on its own in elections and their ability to pay the fees to run candidates make them potential future threats that the president must monitor and pre-emptively neutralize.
financing or experience. This makes them both potentially powerful negotiators of tactical alliances and potentially damaging electoral adversaries who might consider a consistent opposition strategy. Relative to parties without vote-mobilizing potential, they are thus more prone to variation in the strategies they pursue.

Among parties without vote-mobilizing potential, there is less variation in strategy. Parties with this resource profile generally become permanently co-opted instead of engaging in tactical alliances or consistent opposition. Co-optation is the norm but the type of co-optation (by the president versus by a prominent opposition leader with presidential ambitions) often depends upon the party leader’s prior affiliations. Party founders who had been involved in leftist politics before creating their own organizations were more drawn to the coalitions of prominent opposition leaders. This was because these party leaders’ personal connections were initially stronger with those leaders than with President Wade.

**Mechanisms Behind the Strategies**

The histories of several of Senegal’s most electorally prominent parties in the 1990s illuminate the potential mechanisms through which party leaders’ endowments of experience and financing might shape their strategies. The Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), led by Abdoulaye Wade, was the most prominent opposition party during the Diouf presidency. Although Wade himself was not a consistent opponent, the logic leading him to pursue tactical alliances with the PS during the Diouf presidency, which he delineates in his memoirs, illustrates the importance of state experience and autonomous financing for developing a capacity to oppose. Senegal’s three best-known leftist parties from the 1990s, the PIT, the LD/MPT, and

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15 Moreover, relative to other parties active at that time, these four have some combination of key archival documents, extensive media coverage of their internal politics, or detailed memoirs by their leaders that provide rare insight into how particular endowments influence decision-making about long-term party strategy.
AJ/PADS, resembled the PDS in that their leaders did not pursue consistent opposition strategies. Their leaders – Amath Dansokho, Abdoulaye Bathily, and Landing Savané – resembled Wade in that they lacked state experience when they initially created their own parties. Unlike Wade, they also lacked independent financing. Their statements in the mainstream press and in internal party reports on the costs and benefits of tactical alliances are helpful sources about the perceived importance of these endowments.

First, the case of the PDS provides insight into the mechanisms that make independent private financing a key determinant of parties’ strategies over time. In particular, the case of the PDS reveals why independent (often international) sources of private financing – rather than any domestic source – increases opposition party leaders’ negotiating power with the government, making them more likely to engage in tactical alliances than to accept co-optation or to pursue consistent opposition. During the Diouf presidency, Wade had some of the most promising sources of international private financing, despite lacking state experience. After spending less than a year in the PS in 1973, Wade began building the PDS, pursuing a party-building strategy that involved branching out into private sector consulting. While retaining his job as an economics professor at the University of Dakar, Wade also began contracting for the African Development Bank in Abidjan (Wade 2006: 120). He eventually moved into full-time international consulting for a variety of African leaders. By the 1990s, when Diouf was willing to extend him opportunities to collaborate with the ruling party, Wade had a stock of private wealth that could serve as a bargaining chip in any negotiations with the president for access to the state and setting him up to function as a figure around which the opposition could potentially rally on the uneven playing field. Wade declares: “I had earned quite a sum of money, and after...
buying villas and land in Dakar, I decided that I had enough left to devote myself to the essential task: doing right by Senegal” (Wade 2006: 123).

These resources made him one of Diouf’s prime targets for co-optation. During the 1988 social crisis, while Wade was still in prison in the aftermath of popular protests, Diouf contacted him about setting up government-opposition discussions of the electoral code that had motivated him to galvanize the protests in the first place (Mendy 1995). Diouf’s Prime Minister at the time, Jean Collin, was privately communicating with Wade as well, proposing that they amend the constitution and name him Vice President (Wade 2006: 218). Through these initial discussions, the president made overtures for the PDS and its allies to govern with the PS. The negotiations about the vice-presidency allegedly continued as the 1993 elections neared (Villalón 1994), and in the meantime, the PDS participated in several presidential majority governments.

Even with his independent wealth from international consulting, Wade found that “each time I went to elections, I spent everything I had, thinking that I would be elected that time…and then I would find myself short of money” when the incumbent won again (Wade 2006: 202). Aside from his international consulting career, Wade possessed other potential sources of political finance, but the Diouf government was more capable of disrupting his access to them. When Wade began consulting for the African Development Bank, the Senegalese government used the legal code to force him to choose between his two jobs in Senegal, one as a professor at the University of Dakar and another as a lawyer, thereby effectively reducing his sources of income to fund the PDS (Wade 2006: 122). In contrast, Wade’s private political financing from Gabonese President Omar Bongo and from the Senegalese cleric Serigne Cheikh Mbacké was not domestically regulated (Wade 2006: 202, 124-5). By this logic, parties without

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16 Wade refused because he wanted autonomy around 1993 elections. He said: “I rejected their proposals because…were were coming upon the 1993 elections and I wanted to be free” (Wade 2006: 218).
internationally secure private finance should be even more subject to the ebbs and flows of the uneven playing field than Wade’s PDS.

Second, several aspects of both the PDS’ and the leftist parties’ trajectories illustrate that consistent opposition is difficult to achieve when party leaders lack state experience. Wade’s memoirs indicate that he knew that acquiring state experience was necessary for the PDS to become a more viable opposition party in the long run. Wade ended the PDS’ first tactical alliance with the PS in 1992 – despite Diouf’s entreaties that he remain in the government – because Wade wanted to run for president in 1993 and needed to distance himself from the ruling party in time to launch a credible campaign. He acknowledged that this choice entailed a stark tradeoff in resources and party capabilities:

“…we knew that in leaving power we would lose some material means, as well as the stature accorded to a minister by the Territorial Administration. Our stint in the government also gave us the opportunity to make ourselves better known, through our use of the radio and television” (Wade 2006: 221).

They needed state experience to demonstrate their ability to run the country; they needed state resources to fortify the clientelist networks they were building for future elections; and they needed to join the government to increase their visibility to the public and advertise their newfound expertise.

Like Wade, leftist party elites also acquired their state experience through tactical alliances, thereby sacrificing their earlier commitments to the strategy of consistent opposition. The LD/MPT first forged tactical alliances when Diouf invited the party into the enlarged presidential majority governments of the 1990s. Bathily retrospectively notes that “a sophisticated sense of patriotism was required to enter the government [at the time], knowing full well the unpopular measures that it was going to pursue. We took huge risks” in pursuing the
tactical alliance (Sall 1998). Indeed, the party hoped to infuse a “new ethics of public administration” into the government, which they, along with Wade and Savané, later judged was not a feasible goal (LD/MPT 1995: 21). AJ/PADS, another leftist party founded by the statistician and former communist activist Landing Savané, categorically refused to forge tactical alliances with Diouf, rejecting the president’s overtures to serve as minister in PS governments on several occasions. As a supporter of Wade in the second round of the 2000 presidential race, Savané entered the first post-alternance government as Minister of Mines, Craft, and Industry (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). Much like for the LD/MPT, state experience for the AJ/PADS did not actually provide the party abundant opportunities to design programs and improve overall patterns of governance. Savané was wont to remind the press that

“AJ is not in power. We are associated with the management of government affairs. It’s the PDS that is currently in power. There is a president, and there is a party with a majority in the National Assembly. It’s not thanks to us that [the PDS] got this majority. So we cannot, if we are democrats, impose our [party] program on the government.”

State experience thus does not always bolster a party’s capacity to consistently oppose, whether by enabling their leaders to claim credit for original programmatic contributions to the government, or by improving the lives of ordinary Senegalese. Nevertheless, even when leaders like Moustapha Niasse of the AFP, who was Wade’s first Prime Minister, and Amath Dansokho of the PIT, who was briefly Minister of Labor, ended their collaboration after Wade broke programmatic promises he had made for their electoral support in 2000, Bathily and Savané, remained in government (Diop 2011). They acknowledged the ruling party’s governance


problems, but continued to seek state experience, with Savané claiming that “one can be among robbers without being a robber.”

Why was staying in the government worth the controversy and the effort, then? The archival evidence suggests that leftist party leaders believed that acquiring state experience would bolster their party elite’s capacity to become consistent opponents. It would permit party leaders to build reputations as competent high-level administrators that increase their name recognition throughout the country. For instance, the president of the LD/MPT, Abdoulaye Bathily, as well as Yéro Deh, became ministers in the second enlarged government of 1993 (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). When Diouf invited the LD into another new government in 1995, the party staff discussed the merits of continued involvement at the third party congress. LD politicians were aware of the reduction in party cohesion that their tactical alliance had created over the last four years; ideological hardliners in the LD were discontent with the party’s transition “from a class party to a mass party,” and were calling for abstention from the government and the “restoration of [the party’s prior] reputation for contestation.” However, the party’s more adaptive pragmatists were in favor of “continuing [the party’s] experience in government for strategic purposes” (LD/MPT 1995: 22). Despite the internal stress that the tactical alliance created for the party, LD elites ultimately concluded that acquiring state experience was a pressing necessity if the party hoped to win power through conventional opposition channels in future elections:

19 Aguibou Kane & Ibrahima Anne, “Landing Savané, leader d’AJ/PADS: ‘L’affaire Idrissa Seck est la plus obscure que je connaisse,’” Walfadjiri, 12 March 2002, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200703121285.html (accessed 4 June 2014). After the collapse of the original alternance government, Savane and his party remained in government but ran alone in the 2001 elections, forging a tactical alliance with the PDS thereafter. This alliance lasted through the 2007 presidential elections, when Savane was paradoxically a presidential candidate and a member of Wade’s government. A final tactical alliance occurred after the 2007 legislative elections, and lasted into 2010, when intraparty conflicts about an envelope of money that Wade provided the party in a private audience pitted Savane against his second-in-command, Mamadou Diop Decroix.
“It is by staying in the government that the LD/MPT will provide itself with the best chance of affirming itself as a significant political force and of effectively participating in the upcoming elections, which will be the most important ones yet for its leadership, including the 1998 legislative elections and the 2000 presidential race, which ought to foster the emergence of a new generation of leaders heading national institutions” (LD/MPT 1995: 23).

Aside from the financial benefits of retaining its two ministerial posts in the 1995 government, the LD was thereby “promoting [LD leaders’] potential for expertise, which generally improved popular appreciation of the party” (24). They calculated that by remaining in state administrative positions, their leaders would build the party’s capacity to oppose the ruling party, “profit[ing] from its presence in the government to prodigiously expand its national and international following and to thereby establish itself in the Senegalese collective consciousness” (23). 20

There is less evidence on what party leaders thought about the importance of civil society experience for consistent opposition. However, civil society experience theoretically has the potential to serve as a substitute endowment for party leaders who lack state experience. Party founders who lead associations with broad-based urban constituencies can use the expertise they build from maintaining these organizations to make claims to political legitimacy. This is especially the case when these associations mobilize people spanning densely populated urban areas whose capture is key to electoral success. 21 These leaders have a form of political capital that is similar to the kind wielded by party leaders with state experience. Both kinds of

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20 The PS relied on the same experiential logic when attempting to discredit rivals. In preparation for the same 1998 legislative and 2000 presidential elections in which the LD anticipated that its state experience would be key to the party’s future as a viable opposition party, PS president Ousmane Tanor Dieng reminded party members of their organization’s legitimacy by playing up most other parties’ lack of state experience. Addressing the PS Political Bureau, the party’s highest national-level institution, he stated that “in a world that is increasingly complex and full of uncertainty, any country that finds itself in inexperienced, unreflective, and agitated hands, is inevitably on the road to its demise.” Conseil National du Parti Socialiste, “Rapport de Monsieur Ousmane Tanor Dieng, Premier Secrétaire, 14 March 1998,” in Parti Socialiste Bureau Politique, Les actes du conseil national, April 1998.

21 Notable examples include Talla Sylla, whose Jëf-Jël party is an outgrowth of the Youth for Alternation (JPA) movement that he created in 1993 and popularized throughout the decade leading up to Abdoulaye Wade’s defeat of ex-President Abdou Diouf; and Abdou Latif Guèye, whose radical Islamic non-governmental organization, Jamra, was the basis of his legitimacy for the launch of his political party, the Senegalese Democratic Assembly (RDS) in 2000 and his subsequent bids for candidacy for the mayorship of Dakar.
experience provide party leaders with leadership roles allowing them to build constituencies of followers who could potentially mobilize behind them when they create political parties. This gives them some negotiating power as it relates to party strategy.

**The President’s Influence on Strategies**

This story is also based on the premise that presidents partially constrain the kinds of party strategies that leaders choose over time. Presidents seek to fragment and destabilize the most electorally threatening opposition parties in order to ensure their re-election. But presidents in competitive authoritarian regimes are constrained in their ability to use large-scale repression to this end; instead, they tend to use inducements (namely, access to state institutions and resources that give them deep advantages on the uneven playing field) to lure opponents into collaborative relationships. The core of the president’s survival strategy is thus to negotiate with the most electorally threatening opponents, convincing them to join the ruling coalition, where he can most effectively neutralize and fragment their organizations. At the same time, party leaders’ goals and capabilities mediate their reactions to the president’s attempts to co-opt their organizations. Although some of the parties constituting major threats to the president’s hegemony often have viable political ambitions and the short-term resources to resist, most still feel pressure to collaborate with the president temporarily in order to obtain the financial resources needed to sustain their oppositional activity.

The president’s strategic interaction with party leaders drives the process through which long-term patterns of party behavior are produced. The president is ideally seeking to permanently co-opt the leaders of the parties that are (or are likely to become) the most threatening to his ability to command future presidential and legislative majorities. For this
reason, he is interested in co-opting parliamentary party leaders and the leaders of new parties with the potential to become such entities. Although he prioritizes targeting for co-optation the parties with electoral relevance, it is precisely these parties whose leaders often have at least some financing or experience. This makes them both potentially powerful negotiators and potentially damaging electoral adversaries who are not easily brought into the ruling coalition on a permanent basis.

However, the president’s permanent co-optation efforts with these parties are not always successful. When the permanent neutralization of these key opponents is not possible, the president’s objective then becomes one of using patronage to temporarily divide and weaken his opponents. The tactical alliances that some party leaders negotiate still provide the president opportunities to reduce the prospects of those organizations’ future victories. Parties that developed images as opponents that then participate in the government through tactical alliances become more susceptible to internal divisions; the tactical alliance often underscores latent cleavages within the party between ideological hard-liners committed to non-cooperation with the incumbents that they are accustomed to critique and pragmatists interested in participating in policymaking in order to give the party wider appeal. Furthermore, party elites do not always agree on how long to stay in a tactical alliance once it is forged, or on which elites should benefit from the appointments that the president provides the party. When parties end the tactical alliance, the president has an additional opportunity to sow the seeds of fragmentation within the organization by offering certain party elites further patronage in exchange for joining the ruling party. If a party then joins the opposition after ending its tactical alliance with the president,

22 Good examples include the divisions that government collaboration created in Senegal’s older leftist parties, the LD/MPT and AJ/PADS (Diop 2011).
the Senegalese public can become cynical or confused about what the party stands for, given the swift changes in rhetoric that often accompany these behaviors.

Alongside these efforts to create discord within electorally relevant parties, the president may also work to manufacture his own future presidential majorities by co-opting smaller parties without vote-mobilizing potential. These alliances usually constitute less risky patron-client relationships in which the president gives small-scale patronage to satellite party leaders in exchange for their long-standing commitment to campaign and mobilize smaller constituencies of voters in the name of the ruling coalition. Although the parties that capitulate to the president’s efforts to co-opt them permanently are not electorally weighty, they help the president bolster his public image. For a relatively small price, the president can mobilize them to speak out in favor of the government on a regular basis, flooding the public sphere with positive analyses of the ruling coalition.

Senegal’s two turnovers in 2000 and 2012 attest that these presidential tactics do not always work effectively. However, presidents try to deploy such strategies to ensure that party leaders who choose to consistently oppose the ruling coalition are relatively isolated in the political arena. When many parties are either born to be co-opted or lack the experience and

23 The premises about presidential strategy up to this point apply equally well to President Diouf as of the late 1980s and President Wade (2000-2012). The remaining premise best characterizes Senegal under Wade, after the end of the PS’ hegemonic party rule in 2000, when it lost power. In these elections, Abdoulaye Wade became president by building an opposition coalition in the second-round runoff to supplement the 30.2% of the vote that the PDS garnered on its own in the first round. Although the PDS maintained a majority in the National Assembly on its own, Wade was constantly seeking to ensure the support of enough parties in the non-parliamentary, ruling coalition to get re-elected in the future. Because Wade reneged on the promises he made to the parties that elected him in 2000, there was no stable coalition of major parties on which to rely for this. Hence the need to encourage tactical alliances and attempt co-optation while also building the Cap 21.

24 Discussing Wade’s attention to co-opting micro-parties, Senegalese political elites mentioned the “psychological effect” it can have on voters. The co-optation of party leaders into the Cap 21 (and the Cap 21’s visibility to the public) were purported to do significant work in this regard. Interviews with Abdou Lo, 3/12/12, Omar Sarr, 8/6/10.
financing needed to remain autonomous from the president in the long run, then consistent opposition parties have fewer potential coalition partners with whom to pool the vast amounts of money and legitimacy needed to function as serious electoral adversaries to the president. This has serious implications for turnover: given the paucity of parties that engage in sustained opposition to incumbents over several consecutive elections, it has been party leaders who have collaborated with the ruling coalition, or who have originated from within it, who have fostered Senegal’s presidential alternations in 2000 and 2012. Although turnover itself is not surprising under competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way 2010b), the fact that those who win office through turnover do not lead consistent opposition parties helps to account for how these alternations were possible on the uneven playing field even when it creates constraints that make some form of collaboration with the government necessary and desirable for most party leaders early on in the lives of their organizations.

**Historical Scope Conditions**

The argument best applies to Senegal after Diouf created opportunities for opposition party leaders to collaborate with the government. Opposition party leaders’ state experience and autonomous private financing were limited during the first decade of Abdou Diouf’s presidency (1981-2000). In the 1980s, all politicians were free to create parties, but opportunities for these parties to collaborate with the government were rare. During Diouf’s first decade at the helm, politicians within the PS could access opportunities to acquire state or civil society experience and autonomous private financing, but those outside of the PS were disadvantaged. This was largely because Diouf presided over a hegemonic party that had wide bases of clientelistic support and therefore needed to court no other parties in order to mobilize presidential and
legislative majorities (Diop & Diouf 1990, Beck 2008). A few public intellectuals without party affiliations, including the Professor Iba Der Thiam and the renowned lawyer, Doudou N'doye, were appointed as ministers to PS governments in the 1980s, and would later create their own parties. But no politicians who represented opposition parties at the time had opportunities to acquire high-level state experience. Moreover, associations with mobilizing potential were often absorbed or co-opted by the PS. Thus, at this time, virtually no opposition party leader possessed both the experience and financing hypothesized to foster consistent opposition. The parties that qualified as consistent opponents at the time were fulfilling these roles not by choice but by default, since President Diouf did not offer party leaders opportunities to pursue tactical alliances or long-term co-optation.

However, Diouf’s reliance on the hegemonic party alone to manufacture electoral majorities became less reliable as structural adjustment intensified, and economic crisis hit in the late 1980s. The 1988 presidential elections had been contentious because of the repressive and fraudulent practices of the PS state (Gellar 2005, Young & Kanté 1992). Opposition leaders like Wade had been imprisoned during post-election strikes in which they mobilized students and workers against the regime, protesting electoral fraud and calling for fundamental reforms to the electoral code. During this social crisis, the PS retained the legislative supermajority it had

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25 Thiam did this in 1992, after he was dismissed from his post as Minister of Education, and then ran for president in 1993. N’doye founded his own party in 2000, decades after serving as Minister of Justice.

26 Civil society experience was more possible to come by, but still somewhat dangerous and costly to acquire. For instance, Talla Sylla, whose Youth for Alternation movement later became the Jef Jel party, was active with this movement in the mid-1990s, but Sylla was imprisoned and questioned by the regime on several occasions as a result of his contentious behavior related to his social movement.

27 Djibo Ká’s autobiography provides a description of the social crisis of the time: “…The contested general elections of 1988, preceded by an electoral campaign that had been especially violent verbally, amplified by the television coverage, and notable for the entry of youth into the electoral arena; all of these aspects significantly reinforced the gravity of the atmosphere” (2005: 57). The 1987-88 school year had been cancelled due to strikes, which also contributed to the unrest.
always enjoyed, but Diouf began to extend opportunities – at least to certain opposition parties – to join a series of “enlarged presidential majority governments,” the first of which began in 1991 (Diop & Diouf 1990). Party leaders began to face choices about party strategy. Rather than becoming consistent opposition parties by default, or else being swallowed up by the hegemonic party, as in the early 1980s, some parties enjoyed the opportunity to pursue tactical alliances. Diouf took particular care to extend such opportunities to party leaders with vote-mobilizing potential, especially those who had headed the most popular coalition that ran against him in the 1988 presidential elections. These leaders included Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS, Abdoulaye Bathily of the LD/MPT, and Amath Dansokho of the PIT (Diop & Diouf 1990: 296).  

In the late 1980s and 1990s, these party leaders were cautiously willing to collaborate with the government, while eight other well-known opposition parties were hostile to the idea (Diop & Diouf 1990: 361).  

Throughout the 1990s, and especially under the presidency of Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012), party leaders’ experience and financing became more relevant determinants of party strategy. The distribution of these endowments became more widespread, spanning across politicians both inside and outside of the ruling party. It changed in tandem with the nature of the electoral game, which no longer entailed a hegemonic ruling party as of 2000. Wade came to power in an electoral context that forced him to extend a broader range of party leaders more extensive opportunities for collaboration. As the ruling party after *alternance*, the PDS commanded, at best, only one-third of the country’s electorate on its own.  

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28 Later in the 1990s, it also included the PDS/Renovation party, a splinter of Wade’s PDS.

29 The “group of eight” included AJ, LCT, MDP, PAI, PLP, UDP, OST.

30 Diop (2013) rightfully notes that before extending opportunities for long-term co-optation and tactical alliances to a wide range of parties, Wade encouraged individual defections of cadres from the PS. Lacking a large stock of cadres with governing experience, the PDS needed these “political nomads” (*transhumants*) to run the country. 

139
disproportionality of Senegal’s electoral rules still gave the PDS a legislative majority on its own, Wade constantly faced the need to cultivate enough party leaders as allies in order to mobilize the necessary votes to win upcoming presidential elections. The electoral strategies that party leaders could pursue expanded accordingly, with the Cap 21 and Wade’s constant calls for opposition participation in his governments creating new and more widespread opportunities for permanent co-optation and tactical alliances.

By the time Wade took over, more politicians with experience or financing had founded parties. Diouf had provided state experience to the members of several key opposition parties through the presidential majority governments of 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1998. Not only had leaders of the four opposition parties participating in these governments (PDS, LD/MPT, PIT, PDS/R) gained experience; several of the PDS elites who had served as ministers through the tactical alliances that Wade had forged with Diouf later broke away from the PDS to create their own parties. Moreover, several new opposition parties that could pose future electoral threats to Wade had emerged, led by politicians who had acquired state experience as ex-PS cadres.

Among the new party leaders emerging around alternance were “former Prime Ministers, a former President of the National Assembly, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, [and] a former Minister of State in charge of Services and Presidential Affairs” (O. Diop 2013: 431).

Furthermore, independent private financing became an increasingly relevant endowment by the end of the PS’ 40 years of hegemonic party rule. By this time, the Senegalese economy

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effectively. However, in 2000-2001, when Wade lost the support of the opposition parties he pacted with before the 2000 race – including the AFP, the RND, and the PIT – he needed to collaborate with other political parties to compensate for the electoral clout he lost from these allies, who had together commanded almost 20% of the vote in the 2000 elections. As Idrissa Seck, Wade’s Prime Minister at the time, acknowledged in 2004, “The purpose of a party is to expand and the Coalition for Alternance 2000 [Wade’s first-round coalition in the 2000 presidential elections] commanded only 30.2%. The 16.7% represented by the AFP have left [the government]. We needed to use transhumants to have a [prospective electoral] majority…” Abdou Latif Coulibaly, “Wade, Landing, Bathily: les dessous d’une scène de ménage,” Sud Quotidien, 31 March 2004, http://fr.allafrica.com.ezproxy1.hul.harvard.edu/stories/200403310713.html (accessed 4 June 2014).
had been privatized to a more significant extent than many other African countries with multiparty elections (Arriola 2012, Boone, Diop & Thioub 1998). By the late 1990s, “for local private business, liberalization of commerce ha[d] decisively expanded space for operation and possibilities for accumulation...[and] circumscribed the ability of state agents to mediate access to the commercial sector” (Boone, Diop & Thioub 1998: 72). At alternance, then, access to private credit was no longer concentrated solely among ruling party politicians. Party leaders with access to autonomous financing increased but remained relatively rare as privatization continued under Wade. Overall, as party leaders got a wider range of endowments, and as the president extended a greater range of opportunities for government collaboration to more party leaders, these endowments became more important, and their influence more feasible to trace.

**IV- Tracing the Influence of State Experience and Autonomous Private Finance**

This section analyzes the 46 parties founded 1998-2003 to illustrate the link between party strategies and party leaders’ endowments of experience and financing. The section begins by discussing the sampled parties in light of extant hypotheses about short-term strategy, which highlight the importance of private capital for opposition (Arriola 2012, Boone, Diop & Thioub 1998). It then demonstrates how party leaders’ resource endowments, political networks, and initial patterns of electoral participation interact to shape the longer-term series of strategic decisions they make across elections. The analysis suggests that consistent opposition is really enabled by a specific kind of private financing – namely, independent (and often international) private financing that the president cannot disrupt by politicizing domestic access to credit. Additionally, it emphasizes the importance of state and civil society experience for long-term strategy outcomes.
Data Codings and Sources

The data for the sample of 46 parties include information on each party’s electoral strategy over the course of five national elections during the Wade presidency, the nature of each party leader’s relationship to the president and the ruling party, and party leaders’ degree of access to international private financing, experience as state administrators, and experience in associations with widespread grassroots mobilizing power. Control variables include party leaders’ records of prior experience in other parties, their access to domestic sources of private financing, and their prior linkage to the Senegalese left. The operationalization of these variables is described below.

Each party’s strategy is classified based on its leaders’ electoral coalition choices across the five national elections that spanned Wade’s rule (the 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential races; the 2001 and 2007 National Assembly elections). Coalition rosters, official election results, newspaper coverage, and secondary sources are used to determine parties’ coalition choices in these races. 31 Parties’ electoral choices in the first round (not the runoffs) of the presidential elections are used. Aggregating these shorter-term strategy choices into a single classification (consistent opposition, tactical alliance, or permanent co-optation) allows us to identify which parties supported the ruling party across all five elections, which parties shifted their support

31 The choices usually correspond to parties’ prior membership in the extra-electoral coalitions that party leaders attempt to build between campaigns. In addition to the Cap 21, Wade maintained the Forever Sopi Alliance (Alliance Sopi pour Toujours) in between elections for party leaders who forged tactical alliances without joining the Cap 21. On the opposition front, coalitions between elections are more tenuous, but nevertheless color the way that parties market themselves in the political arena. In the early 2000s, the Permanent Cadre for Concertation (CPC) and the Movement for Citizenship and the Republic (MCR) were two groupings that developed into electoral coalitions for the 2002 local elections. The MCR, claimed to be a “third way” for parties that were neither in the ruling coalition, nor in the opposition CPC. But both the CPC and the MCR were replaced by proto-electoral coalitions as the 2007 presidential and legislative elections approached. The opposition coalitions included the G10, the Initiative for Citizenship and the Republic (ICR), and the Boost Senegal Front (Front Siggil Senegal). All parties in the sample that ever participated in the Cap 21 or the AST count as having pursued either the long-term co-optation or the tactical alliance strategy; only parties that have refrained from participating in these coalitions can be classified as consistent opponents.
from the opposition to the ruling party or vice versa over time, and which parties supported
opposition parties throughout the period of study. Generally, the direction of change is from the
opposition to the ruling party. Reversals are rare.

Specifically, party leaders who did not run in the ruling party’s coalition in all of the five
elections for which they existed are coded as pursuing consistent opposition. Parties with leaders
who joined the ruling coalition through a bilateral alliance with the PDS (rather than on the basis
of membership in the Cap 21) are coded as pursuing tactical alliances. After negotiating a
tactical alliance, party leaders may run on their own in National Assembly elections (but not
presidential elections), or they may run with the ruling coalition in all subsequent races,
depending on the terms of their agreement. Party leaders are coded as being co-opted when they
immediately or eventually join the ruling coalition on the basis of membership in the Cap 21
(rather than a bilateral alliance with the ruling party). Subsequently, these parties never run on
their own in national elections. The party leaders who consistently follow the same, major
opposition leader but never contest national elections on their own are also coded as co-opted.

Party leaders’ access to autonomous financing is more difficult to measure. The financial
resources of Senegalese political parties are not reliably documented, or even solicited from
party leaders by the government (Fall 2011). Furthermore, interviews and research in newspaper
archives reveal that party leaders themselves are major sources of party finance (Fall 2012: 223).
This study codes party leaders’ independent private financing based on qualitative assessments
of the party founders’ endowments that are limited in detail because of the sensitive nature of
this topic in Senegal. This yields a relatively conservative coding of people with independent
financing; politicians are not likely to reveal all of their sources of it or their degree of it,
especially illegal donations from abroad. Independent financing is operationalized to include
party leaders’ employment as international consultants in the private sector, party leaders’ ownership of international businesses, or their connections to close family members or friends with such resources. Party leaders who described having access to independent private financing in their interviews, who were regularly reported in the mainstream press as having these resources, or were known among political analysts to have them are coded as having independent financing. All other party leaders are coded as lacking independent financing.

A similar procedure applies to the operationalization of party leaders’ state and civil society experiences. Party leaders are coded as having experience when they have at least one of two ways to cultivate political followings. One is prior experience coordinating social movements or associations that have broad-based, nationwide constituencies. Party leaders who are known to have such experience, by some combination of their own discussion of it in an interview or through secondary biographical sources that the government, civil society, or newspapers publish about them, are coded accordingly. A second source of credibility comes from having been a government minister before founding their own parties. The measurement of party leaders’ state and civil society experience is relatively accurate, because there is official government and archival documentation of all politicians who have been ministers (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). In addition, experience is a less sensitive subject for party leaders.

In an alternative operationalization, party leaders are characterized as having either high, medium, or low levels of each endowment. Party leaders coded as having high levels of independent financing are reported to have large stocks (and sometimes continuous flows) of it.  

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32 Sometimes such consulting is for international organizations or international banks. Other times the kind of consulting is difficult to determine because it happens through politicians’ own private consultancies. Senegalese politicians like Robert Sagna and Cheikh Tidiane Gadio have their own firms, for instance.

33 The full roster for 1998-2012 is available through compilations of ministerial appointments and reshuffles (2007-2012) from the Official Journal of the Republic of Senegal, as well as the profiles of all ministers from independence through 2006 as reported in Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006.
It is difficult to put precise numbers to these large stocks, but all of the politicians in the “high” category are known to have made their fortunes through international careers, often in commerce. Those with medium financing have not built major international careers, but have social networks (including family ties or close friends) with access to international sources of financing. Party leaders in this category do not themselves have direct and immediate access to such financing. The flows of such financing from family and friends are not trackable, but public knowledge about the networks themselves comes from interviews, secondary sources, and newspaper research. Those with low levels of it are not known to have any access to international or domestic sources of income that the president cannot disrupt.

In addition, politicians who are coded as exhibiting high levels of state or civil society experience meet one of two criteria. They either had over five years of ministerial experience before founding their parties, or they were known for having built social movements with nationwide followings before founding their parties. Party leaders with medium experience served fewer years as ministers or ran civil society organizations that did not have as much nationwide mobilizing potential according to the Senegalese press and political biographies. Those with low experience lacked experiences as ministers or major association leaders.

Patterns in the Full Sample

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34 Table 8 (first section) provides five examples of people in this category. They include politicians who: have partial ownership in international oil companies, have worked in international maritime commerce, acquired international shipping companies, have consultancies in international cultural affairs (and have had successful world music careers), or have worked in New York law firms in the United States.

35 Table 8 (second section) lists several politicians in this category and they have included: a party leader from the religious elite family that runs the Mouride Sufi order (and that is commonly known to have international financial networks), a Salafist imam with connections and regular contact through his mosque with Islamic leaders abroad, a student leader purported to have financiers among Senegalese abroad whom he cultivated through his civic activism, and former minister who retains linkages with foreign leaders he met during his stint as Senegal’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The present analysis refines hypotheses from research focused on the determinants of short-term strategies, namely the presence or absence of opposition coordination in particular elections and the electoral coalition choices of parties in single elections (Arriola 2012, Gandhi & Reuter 2013, Howard & Roessler 2006). That research finds that the following factors shape party leaders’ short-term coalition choices: party institutionalization (Gandhi & Reuter 2013, Kuenzi & Lambright 2001, Randall & Svasand 2002, Wahman 2011), ideology (Greene 2007), access to private sector finance (Arriola 2012, Boone, Diop, & Thioub 1998, Van de Walle & Butler 1999), and access to organizational resources that facilitate mass party-building (Koter 2013a, LeBas 2011, Riedl 2013).

None of these factors alone accounts for variation in strategies over the long term. First of all, the 46 sampled parties are relatively similar in age, which holds constant this aspect of party institutionalization. The variation also cannot be about party ideology, given the weak ideological differentiation of parties in Senegal and elsewhere in Africa (Bleck & Van de Walle 2011, Diop 2011, Manning 2005). Furthermore, as Appendix 1 reports, there are statistically insignificant relationships between long-term strategies and party leaders’ prior experience as local and national staff members of these organizations. Two factors of interest, party leaders’ state or civil society experience, as well as parties’ vote-mobilizing potential are both positively correlated with long-term strategy in a statistically significant way. There is a less significant but positive link between strategy and a party leader’s access to private capital (whether independent or not), but no significant correlation with independent private financing in particular.

36 The distribution of party strategies is skewed in favor of long-term co-optation, rendering a low number of tactical alliances and consistent opposition strategies. Fisher’s exact tests are conducted on the data, since this test statistic accounts for the rarity of such strategies better than the more conventional Chi-squared statistic.
There are substantively significant relationships between party strategies on the one hand and vote-mobilizing potential, experience, and financing on the other. Table 5 displays the frequencies of each party’s strategic trajectory, subsetting the data according to party leaders’ combinations of endowments. The first pattern is that co-optation is the most widespread outcome among parties in all categories. All 21 (100%) of the sampled party leaders with neither experience nor financing were co-opted. Many of their parties are “telephone booth parties,” which are not electorally competitive on their own and most often join the Cap 21. Co-optation is also the most common trajectory for parties led by politicians with one or both endowments, but these party leaders exhibited more variation in their long-term strategies overall. Four of seven (57%) of party leaders with both endowments are co-opted over the long term, and around the same proportion of party leaders with one endowment were co-opted.

Table 5: Frequencies of Party Strategies by Experience and Independent Financing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Financing</th>
<th>Financing OR Experience</th>
<th>Financing AND Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consistent Opposition</strong> (5 total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Experience</td>
<td>0 (0%)*</td>
<td>3 (29%)*</td>
<td>2 (29%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(2)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical Alliance</strong> (3 total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Experience</td>
<td>0 (0%)*</td>
<td>2 (14%)*</td>
<td>1 (14%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(3)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-optation</strong>  (33 total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Experience</td>
<td>21 (100%)*</td>
<td>8 (57%)*</td>
<td>4 (57%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data (5 total)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the percentage of people adopting each strategy is calculated based on the total number of people with complete data available.

37 Vote-mobilizing potential is not perfectly correlated with leaders’ experience and financing. Parties with vote-mobilizing potential often, but do not always, have at least one of these two endowments. I constructed this measure by collection all of the lists of candidates released by parties and coalitions running in the 2001 and 2007 legislative elections, combining this with pre-existing lists of presidential candidates in 2000, 2007, and 2012.
Strategies of Parties with Vote-Mobilizing Potential

There are stronger relationships between party leaders’ endowments and party strategy when we control for their vote-mobilizing potential.\textsuperscript{38} Even within this subset of sixteen parties and their leaders, those with neither experience nor financing are most prone to co-optation (Table 6).\textsuperscript{39} Party leaders with one endowment but not the other choose a wider variety of strategies than leaders in other categories. Relative to party leaders with neither resource, they have more power to negotiate tactical alliances or to attempt consistent opposition. And relative to party leaders with both resources, they are more prone to collaborating with the president. They are less capable of resisting the pull of state resources that the president can offer his allies.

Table 6: Strategies by Endowment, among Parties with Vote-Mobilizing Potential

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Financing No Experience</th>
<th>Financing OR Experience</th>
<th>Financing AND Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Consistent Opposition (4 total)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Tactical Alliance (3 total)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Co-optation (9 total)</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (of 16)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{38} The only founder without vote-mobilizing potential according to the definition employed in this paper who pursued a tactical alliance is Abdourahim Agne of the Reform Party (PR). Although the PR did not run in the first presidential and legislative elections that occurred after its founding, I included the PR in the sample of party leaders with such capacity because he headed a major opposition coalition in local elections two years the PR’s birth.

\textsuperscript{39} Even if we employ a different dependent variable that is a more permissive measure, counting as consistent opponents the micro-parties that rally behind the consistent opponents with electoral clout, the percentage of elections in which a party joins the opposition throughout the Wade presidency, support for the ruling coalition remains more common than support for the opposition. Within the sample of 46 parties, only nine parties never support the ruling coalition; 29 always support the ruling coalition, and 43 support the ruling coalition at least once over the course of the five elections across which they are coded. If we collapse the categories, the same relationship holds: 16 parties support the opposition more often than the ruling coalition, whereas 26 support the ruling coalition more often than the opposition (See Appendix 3).
Further insight into these patterns comes from expanding the independent variables into measures of the degree of party leaders’ experience and financing. For instance, let us compare founders with high levels of both endowments, high levels of just one endowment, and high levels of neither (Table 7). Once again, there is more variation in the types of strategies that party leaders pursue as their number and degree of endowments increase. There is only one party founder with high levels of both experience and independent financing, and he pursued consistent opposition; politicians with high levels of either experience or financing were evenly dispersed across strategies; and most founders with high levels of neither were co-opted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Neither high</th>
<th>One high</th>
<th>Both high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consistent Opposition</strong> (4 total)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical Alliance</strong> (3 total)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Co-optation</strong> (9 total)</td>
<td>7 (78%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong> (of 16)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we hold independent financing constant at a high level, consistent opposition becomes popular as party leaders’ levels of experience increase (first division of Table 8). Reducing financing to a medium level, we find that changes in experience are less strongly correlated with consistent opposition, as expected. However, party leaders with higher experience are still more prone to either consistent opposition or tactical alliances than they are to co-optation (second division of Table 8). When financing is held constant at low levels, co-

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40 Appendix 2 displays the relationships between different degrees of experience and strategy, as well as the relationships between degrees of financing and strategy.
optation is most common among people who also lack any state or civil society experience.

Parties whose founders have medium levels of experience, as opposed to low levels, are more evenly dispersed in their choices of consistent opposition, tactical alliances, and co-optation (third division Table 8). Overall, these patterns suggest that it is especially at high levels of financing that increases in a party leader’s experience yield consistent opposition; at lower levels of financing, increases in experience instead just foster greater variance in the strategies pursued.

### Table 8: List of Parties by Levels of Each Endowment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Independent Financing</th>
<th>State or civil society Experience</th>
<th>Long-Term Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PR (Abdourahim Agne)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Tactical alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAS (Djibril Mbaye)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC (Mbaye-Jacques Diop)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES (Ousmane Sow Huchard)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium (civil society)</td>
<td>Consistent opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFP (Moustapha Niassse)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High (state)</td>
<td>Consistent opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRDS (Imam Mbaye Niang)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium (civil society)</td>
<td>Consistent opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC (Ousseynou Fall)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium (civil society)</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jéf-Jél (Talla Sylla)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High (civil society)</td>
<td>Consistent opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URD (Djibo Kâ)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High (state)</td>
<td>Tactical alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDFP (Aloise Gorgui Dione)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parena (Marième Wone Ly)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC (Samba Dioulédé Thiam)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDS/NJ (Oumar Hassimou Dia)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD/Jant bi (Manour Cissé)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium (civil society)</td>
<td>Tactical alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR (Doudou Ndoye)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium (state)</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLS (Ousmane Ngom)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium (state)</td>
<td>Co-optation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What shapes the long-term behaviors of parties without early vote-mobilizing potential?

The sampled parties in this category all engaged in co-optation. 41 Although there is no variation on the type of strategy that these micro-party leaders followed, there are two types of coalitions into which they seek co-optation. 21 parties followed the most predictable path of

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41 All six party leaders with at least one of the two relevant endowments pursue this strategy, along with the 16 founders who have neither resource.
allying with President Wade. Nine of the 30 parties consistently supported the coalitions of opposition politicians with roots in Senegal’s two former ruling parties, the PS and the PDS.42

The greatest difference between micro-party leaders who pursue long-term co-optation in the ruling coalition and those who seek it in the opposition is their historical involvement in leftist politics (Table 9). Party leaders who had previously belonged to one of Senegal’s three major leftist parties tended to seek long-term co-optation by major opposition figures rather than the president. And party leaders lacking a formative experience on the Senegalese left more consistently gravitated to the ruling coalition.43

Table 9: Leftist Experience and Type of Co-optation among Micro-Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leader has no leftist experience</th>
<th>Leftist experience</th>
<th>No data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-optation by Opposition Figure (9 total)</td>
<td>4 (21%)</td>
<td>5 (83%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-optation by President (15 total)</td>
<td>14 (73%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data (5 total)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (of 30)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These modern-day opposition figures are the ones whose behavior most resembles that of the old Senegalese left. Historically, the major leftist parties operated in secret under authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s, and remained outside of the government to critique it at

42 After his fall from grace within the PDS, Idrissa Seck constituted another major opponent who attracted the permanent loyalties of a few micro-parties. However, the two parties that consistently allied with him were led by men lacking the leftist backgrounds that the satellites of Niasse and Tanor share.

43 Within the ruling coalition, micro-party leaders less often have recent histories of serious involvement in leftist politics, and instead tend to have past experience (if any) in the PS, Djibo Kâ’s URD, or more recently founded parties that do not have extreme leftist origins, like the Convention of Democrats (CDP) of Professor Iba Der Thiam or the Front to Save Senegal (FSD/BJ) of Islamic intellectual Cheikh Bamba Dièye.
least until Diouf’s presidential majority governments in the 1990s. However, leftist linkage is, at best, one of several sources of these choices to seek co-optation into opposition coalitions rather than into the president’s entourage. Indeed, few parties rally around the PS president, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, or more extreme leftist leaders seeking office. Most micro-parties with leftist origins have been recruited to play long-term supporting roles in the coalitions of Moustapha Niasse of the AFP. Niasse is an ex-PS cadre and not a radical leftist, so it is unlikely that their strategies hinge upon ideology itself. The expressive benefit that they get from political participation, as well as personal connections that party leaders have forged with leaders like Niasse, is a more relevant factor.

Some micro-party leaders with leftist roots claim to gain expressive benefits from their political participation in the opposition, even if they are not seeking elected office or negotiating immediate access to patronage in their alliances. Souleymane Ndiaye Brin’s Senegalese People’s Bloc (BPS) is a prime example. Brin describes the party’s main goal as “the defense of ideas.” It is a tool of “political engagement for political engagement’s sake,” which entails “organizing marches, submitting petitions, and holding conferences.” Furthermore, the contemporary micro-party leaders who seek co-optation tend to express disdain for collaboration with the government. For instance, Adama Camara reports that the Party for Solidarity and Progress (PSP) does not ally with the ruling coalition because the party is social democratic, “emphasizes ethical behavior,” and is therefore not oriented towards wheeling and dealing with Wade’s liberal democratic government. The Action for Patriotic Liberation (APL) party of Moustapha Fall “Ché,” a splinter of the PIT, also denounces opposition leaders’ tactical alliances

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44 Interview with Moustapha Fall, 6/5/12, Kaolack.
45 Interview with Adama Camara, 1/19/12, Pikine.
with the government, but consistently aligns either with Niasse or Bathily, who has joined several governments but has been in opposition since 2005.  

In addition, micro-party leaders with roots in the Senegalese left may often be co-opted into the entourages of prominent opposition figures due to the personal connections they forged with them before these figures founded their own parties. For example, Mbaye Diouf of the FDP, who at one point sought to fuse his party with Niasse’s AFP but ultimately failed, has remained loyal to Niasse since the 2000 elections. Even when approached by Wade’s intermediaries to defect to the ruling coalition in the mid-2000s, he politely rejected their advances “for subjective and entirely personal reasons,” namely years of experience working with Niasse.  

Brin echoes this sentiment with regard to his relationship with PS president, Ousmane Tanor Dieng. The BPS followed the PS throughout the Wade era, because of “personal friendships.” Brin even hesitated to shift his loyalties to Niasse, whom he also considers an acceptable opposition leader, because he had not historically “forged a [political] path with him.” He could have “quickly become a [government appointee]” based on his linkages to PDS elites in the vibrant national and regional sports associations (navetanes) that they co-founded, but his party-based ties trumped those relationships.

Beyond shared visions about the importance of consistent opposition, money may matter on the margins. Niasse’s money provided further appeal to long-term co-optation in the opposition. Several sources claim that opposition leaders like Niasse, Tanor Dieng, and Idrissa Seck “financially maintain the smaller parties” that rally around them.

46 Interview with Souleymane Ndiaye, 1/23/12, Thiès.

47 Interview with Mbaye Diouf, 3/3/12, Dakar.

48 Interview with Mbaye Niang, 1/9/12, Dakar.
wealthy opposition candidates put money and vehicles at micro-party leaders’ disposal to campaign in their localities, where they can benefit from the materiel to build their own parties’ images. However, the choice of co-optation in the opposition cannot result from a solely material logic; the financial benefits that micro-parties get from this are not as abundant as those offered in the *mouvance présidentielle*.

We should exercise caution in drawing generalized conclusions about the relationship between endowments and strategies from this modest sample. However, these correlations illustrate the importance of testing these hypotheses on a larger scale if the relevant data become available elsewhere in Africa.

### V- Case Analysis

Table 10 lists the eight parties whose trajectories most compellingly demonstrate how experience and financing shape whether a politician negotiates or competes with the president and his ruling party, or whether he chooses a strategy of consistent opposition. Two parties were selected within each of the four possible categories of endowments in order to capture the strategic behaviors of a set of actors who represent the full range of variation on these independent variables. All but one, the Assembly for Unity and Peace (RUP), had vote-mobilizing potential. Of the sixteen parties in the sample with it, the seven discussed here were also selected based on the quality of archival and interview evidence available.

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Table 10: Varieties of Senegalese Parties Based on Endowments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No state / civil society experience</th>
<th>No independent financing</th>
<th>Independent financing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samba Dioullé Thiam (PRC)</td>
<td>Amadou Moctar Ndiaye (RUP)</td>
<td>Mbaye-Jacques Diop (PPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abdourahim Agne (PR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State / civil society experience</td>
<td>Djibo Kâ (URD)</td>
<td>Moustapha Niasse (AFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ousmane Ngom (PLS)</td>
<td>Talla Sylla (APJ/Jëf-Jël)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, these cases show that, on the one hand, as a founder’s level of each endowment increases, the more he has the potential to move from being a minor negotiator with the president who is prone to long-term co-optation, to being a tough negotiator about collaboration who is more capable of tactical alliances, to being an adversary who opposes incumbents full-time. On the other hand, the patronage that party founders receive from negotiations with the president does not always increase in correspondence with these endowments. Other factors, like founders’ prior party affiliations, their more generalized involvement in Senegal’s old left, and their personal idiosyncrasies, also play into the long-term behaviors that politicians exhibit.

The Contrasting Cases of the URD and AFP

We begin with a comparison of the Union for Democratic Renewal (URD) and the Alliance of Forces for Progress (AFP). For these two parties, data was collected not just on the experience and financing of party leaders, but also on the financial profiles of its most important party elites. The comparison of AFP and URD leaders, who had similar state experiences before creating parties, underscores one of the chapter’s fundamental points: that among parties whose founders have high levels of state experience, access to independent private financing facilitates consistent opposition. High levels of both experience and financing are more likely to foster this long-term behavior.
In terms of state experience, Kâ and Niasse pursued almost identical trajectories within the government and the PS when it ruled Senegal. Both launched their political careers in the PS, eventually serving as president of the Youth Movement of the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS), the PS’s precursor. As youth leaders, Kâ and Niasse also developed direct professional relationships with Senegal’s first president, Leopold Sédar Senghor. Niasse served as Senghor’s Chief of Staff at the same time that Kâ served as the Deputy Chief of Staff. Both men were appointed ministers in multiple governments of the second president, Abdou Diouf; in the 1980s and early 1990s, both belonged to the PS’ national-level leadership structure, the Political Bureau (BP). They have each been Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Education, among other key posts (Coulibaly 1999, Kâ 2005, Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006).

Their reasons for breaking away from the PS to found their own parties were also similar. Both ruptures occurred in the mid-1990s. As the clique of Diouf’s Chief of Staff, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, began exerting more influence within party ranks, he shifted the old guard out of the ministerial positions that they had held (Coulibaly 1999, Kâ 2005). In 1996, at the Party Congress known as the “congress without debates,” neither Kâ nor Niasse was named Diouf’s successor as party president (Diop et al. 2000). After factions were forbidden, first Kâ and then Niasse created their own parties, exiting the PS with significant followings. A few months before the 1998 National Assembly election, Kâ established the URD, teaming up to run a list of candidates with other notable opponents like Talla Sylla, the leader of a prominent youth movement that had recently become a party. On July 16, 1999, Niasse followed suit (Niang 2004). In a speech condemning the PS’ internal policies, entitled, “I choose hope,” Niasse signaled his permanent rupture with the ruling party, declaring that “ruptures are sometimes necessary when destiny calls. I am ready. I accept it…the path I will take in the upcoming
weeks will be permanent and will represent a great sacrifice in the interest of all the people, for upcoming and future [electoral] races” (Diouf 2000). 50 Two days later he officially announced the birth of the AFP.

Both men also had temporary access to domestic networks of private financing. Initially, as new party leaders, both Kâ and Niasse could draw upon accumulated income from their state experience as well as investments from friends to build their organizations across the country. Kâ’s coalition won eleven National Assembly seats during its first election in 1998, just three months after the URD was born, and the AFP won eleven seats in 2001, soon after Niasse took third in the 2000 presidential election, serving as “kingmaker” in Wade’s presidential runoff with Diouf (Diop et al. 2000).

Yet despite initial similarities in the speed of these party leaders’ rise and in their party-building tactics, the differences in the access to independent financing that Kâ and Niasse had eventually pushed their parties in contrasting strategic directions. Kâ has just as much state experience as Niasse (who is Kâ’s senior), but Niasse differed from Kâ in his access to independent sources of private financing through his ownership of an international oil company. Niasse and Kâ exhibited this difference in financing before creating their own parties, despite otherwise parallel (and interdependent) careers within the PS’s governments throughout the 1980s (when Niasse began investing in oil) and thereafter. Indeed, “Niasse has lived off of petrol subsidies since his first crossing of the desert in 1984. He maintains a high standard of living primarily thanks to revenues from [two] petrol company[ies]…Oryx and Itoc.” 51  Kâ, who

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was always following in Niasse’s political footsteps but was not as networked into the international business community, did not develop reliable sources of independent financing during his time in the PS. 52 Whether because of his seniority in the state administration (which may have given him access to different opportunities), his personality, or something else, Niasse developed an international private sector career that Kâ did not, which corresponds to Niasse’s consistent opposition to incumbents throughout Wade’s presidency (and Kâ’s negotiation of a tactical alliance with Wade instead).

The first major difference in the strategies of Kâ and Niasse was in the lead-up to the 2000 election. Kâ pursued a “chameleon’s strategy” before the runoff (Diop 2011: 231), negotiating with both Diouf and Wade for promises of future posts in exchange for his support (Niang 2004). Seeking to rise as high as possible within the candidates’ entourages while also trying to side with the potential winner, Kâ ultimately announced that the URD would support his former party boss, Abdou Diouf. Diouf had promised to make Kâ his Prime Minister if he won, whereas Wade had promised Niasse the same. Niasse, on the other hand, refused to entertain negotiations with Diouf and allied with the opponent, Wade, based on a common platform.53 He briefly served as the first Prime Minister after *alternance* under Wade, so even Niasse (who ended up consistently opposing Wade in all five elections) has a record of pro-

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52 This difference may not be random; Niasse may have initially gained access to international private financing in this way because of the timing of his ascension within the PS government and the opportunities for investment that he encountered through knowledge or connections he gained in this capacity, or it may also relate to his personality or some other quality unrelated to his trajectory as a statesman. However, I have encountered no sources that suggest that Niasse actively sought to block Kâ’s access to financing (or vice versa) before they created parties. However, Niasse did try to keep Kâ from getting international diplomatic jobs after they had both become party leaders in the late 1990s and 2000s (Coulibaly 1999). Ultimately, Niasse and Kâ were political competitors and any comparison of them is not perfectly controlled because their successes and failures were not entirely independent of each other’s.

53 They had agreed upon a platform calling for a parliamentary system, no individual accumulation of multiple political posts, the decentralization of executive power, the pursuit of audits, etc (Niang 2004:22).
government interactions. However, Niasse accepted the Prime Ministership after forging a programmatic pact in the runoff that was the basis of his participation (and later the catalyst of his exit from the government). This kind of behavior, while also collaborative, contrasts with the tactical alliances that Kâ forged with Wade in 2004, after having opposed him in the elections that occurred before he joined the government.

After the 2000 election, the strategic choices of Niasse and Kâ continued to diverge. After Diouf lost in 2000, Kâ had joined the opposition, and even called for the maintenance of a “credible opposition” that remained outside of the government. Yet when Wade asked the URD to join a “rally around the essential” with the PDS, Kâ negotiated a tactical alliance in exchange for patronage. The demands were purported to include a “super ministry of rural development,” which encompassed the sectors of agriculture, fishing, hydraulics, and livestock.

Later, news outlets reported that Kâ was asking Wade for the control of seven ministries:

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54 Niasse still counts as a consistent opponent because in all five elections the AFP ran on its own in the opposition, even though he had briefly been Prime Minister in between the 2000 presidential election and the 2001 National Assembly race. This was his only instance of collaborating with incumbents, and it was on the basis of a programmatic pact forged with Wade during the 2000 runoff. Niasse left the post when the programmatic pact was violated. This is a significantly different behavior than that of politicians who forge tactical alliances or seek permanent co-optation into the ruling coalition without conditions.

55 Niasse’s initial ability to access international private financing may have contributed to his ability to place third in the 2000 presidential elections. This is one reason that Wade was interested in making Niasse his Prime Minister in exchange for his support in the 2000 runoff against Diouf. Once Niasse accepted this offer and joined Wade’s camp, Kâ (as the fourth place finisher) was forced to choose between taking a lower rung in the future Wade government or taking Diouf’s promise of the Prime Ministership if he won. Kâ’s refusal to bandwagon with Wade ultimately led him to bargain with Diouf, the incumbent, who headed the very party he had left and seriously criticized two years before. This behavior was the first of several deviations from consistent opposition.


health, economic affairs, justice, education, information, infancy, and energy. Ultimately, Kâ remained one of Wade’s closest allies even through his loss in the 2012 elections. Kâ’s had the capacity to forge a tactical alliance that left the URD some electoral room for maneuver: he ran the URD on its own in the 2007 legislative elections but stood down from the 2007 presidential race according to the terms of his tactical alliance with Wade. This allowed the URD to maintain an autonomous support base, and thereby preserve a means of negotiation with Wade during their long collaboration. Without this proximity to the president, Kâ would have had few material resources to maintain the following he had amassed, given his state experience without independent financing.

Niasse, on the other hand, quickly left the Wade government and resisted several opportunities for collaboration thereafter. When he served briefly as Wade’s Prime Minister in 2000-2001, Niasse rebuffed Wade’s invitation to fuse the AFP with the PDS. After Niasse left the government when Wade broke several promises that had been in their pact before the 2000 runoff (Niang 2004), Niasse rejected the president’s offers to join the government on multiple occasions. After falling out with his Prime Minister Idrissa Seck in 2003, Wade invited several opposition party leaders into the government, including Niasse, Ousmane Tanor Dieng, and (later that year) Kâ. Niasse remarked to his followers, “we are in the opposition and we will


60 I do not code Niasse as forging a tactical alliance in this case because he received the post after being part of an electoral coalition that supported Wade, rather than negotiating this post after running against him in the latest election beforehand. Since Wade failed to deliver on the promises he campaigned on to win Niasse’s support, Niasse has publicly refused ministerial appointments.

stay there…we will pursue our battle so that a true, open, peaceful, solid democracy and the changes that it must still undergo are finally achieved” (Diop 2005). And in 2005, when Wade yet again proposed forming a government with opposition parties, Niasse declared that this kind of collaboration would not solve Senegal’s problems because Wade himself was the problem.

Ultimately, the cases of the URD and AFP illustrate that when party leaders have extensive experience in top state posts, they establish administrative expertise that gives them credibility among the voting public as viable alternative leaders of the country. Both Niasse and Kâ attracted followers who knew them from their time as ministers, who followed them out of the ruling party, and had faith in their leadership qualities. This is what enabled them to start building party structures outside of Dakar in their organizations’ early years. When such leaders also possess the financing that facilitates autonomy from the state, they are less dependent on the president for patronage and may therefore be more willing to resist collaboration with the ruling party over the long run.

This was the case even though Niasse, the party leader with both endowments, had access within the AFP to a smaller proportion of party elites with private sector income than Kâ did in the URD. In these two cases, it was party leaders’ personal resource profiles (rather than the resource profiles of the members in national-level party institutions) that corresponded more predictably to differences in their parties’ strategies. Data on the financial and sociological profiles of elites in the URD and the AFP come from rosters of each party’s highest national-level institution. In the URD, it is the Executive Political Direction (DPE); in the AFP, it is the

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64 Interview with Oumar Hassimou Dia, 5/3/12, Dakar; Interview with Babou Dieng, 5/11/12, Dakar.
Political Bureau (BP). The most relevant comparison is between the AFP’s first official BP of 37 elites, established in 2003, and the URD’s first official DPE of 48 elites, chosen in 2004.

Each party’s permanent secretary was asked to relay information about several factors that characterize the followers that Niasse and Kâ attracted during their parties’ early days. First, they indicated whether each institution member still belonged to the party after the presidential elections of 2012, as well as the year in which the relevant elites ended their participation. When possible, they also reported the party to which elites switched, if any. They indicated to the best of their knowledge which elites worked in the private sector.

Table 11 summarizes the financial profiles of AFP and URD party elites. Row a reports for each party the percentage of elites from the mid-2000s who were still party members after the 2012 presidential election. Row b provides the percentage of early elites who are known to have defected to the new ruling party, the Alliance for the Republic, as of July 2012. Row c gives the percentage of early elites who had private sector careers, and row d indicates what percentage of them remained in the party as of July 2012.

65 The URD had a provisional DPE until 2004, when the party had its first official congress. I studied both the 2000 provisional DPE and the 2004 DPE. The AFP had a provisional BP until 2003, a first official BP in 2003, and a second in 2011. The Permanent Secretary described in depth the four main investors from the provisional BP, but I do not have full documentation of this informal institution. In this study, I therefore analyze the complete data on the 2003 and 2011 BP members.

66 The operationalization of party elites with private sector careers is broad. It includes people with a range of careers and likely incomes, from lawyers and accountants who practice privately to petroleum engineers and people described as international businessmen. Private sector elites thus include people with domestic sources of private sector income as well as people with the international sources that are key for the chapter’s more central argument. Not all individuals with private sector careers are therefore major party financiers. However, focusing on this group of people allows us to track the trajectories of some of the party elites most likely to have at least some financial capabilities to contribute to the party’s financing when it considers running in elections.
Table 11: Profiles of National-Level Staff in AFP and URD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AFP (Niasse)</th>
<th>URD (Kâ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) % of the party’s</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early elites who</td>
<td>(33/37)</td>
<td>(25/48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are still in the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party after 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>presidential race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) % of party elites</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who left who</td>
<td>(1/4)</td>
<td>(8/21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>defected to APR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) % of the party’s</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early elites who</td>
<td>(11/37)</td>
<td>(19/48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>were in the private</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) % of party’s early</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elites who were in</td>
<td>(9/11)</td>
<td>(8/19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private sector and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>remained in party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Rosters of AFP Bureau Politique 2003, URD Direction Exécutif Politique 2004; Interviews with AFP and URD Permanent Secretaries

These data provide some initial support for a possibility worthy of further study: that the personal resources of Niasse and Kâ were more key influences on party strategies than was the collective resource profile of the elites who initially joined these parties’ highest institutions. Why might this be the case? First of all, the AFP had fewer total elites in the private sector, even though it was the party that ran in the opposition in all five elections under Wade. The AFP also had a lower proportion of national-level elites in the private sector than the URD, which ultimately negotiated a tactical alliance with Wade (row b). Although Niasse himself had international private financing that Kâ lacked, Niasse’s party was less populated by politicians engaged in private sector endeavors than Kâ’s URD. However, despite the AFP’s relative deficiency in private sector party elites, it was better than the URD at retaining all party elites (row a), including those engaged in private sector activities (row d). Niasse rejected several attempts by Wade to forge tactical alliances with the AFP between 2003 and 2012, leading the party down a difficult path of consistent opposition, yet 81% of the 2003 BP members were still...
in the AFP after the landmark 2012 elections, when Wade (and Niasse) lost and Macky Sall became president. Kâ, who attracted more private sector actors into the URD but personally lacked independent financing, was less successful at retaining such followers. By the time that the URD elected the 2004 DPE, Kâ had negotiated his way into Wade’s government. 67 His entry into the government correlates with a significant rise in the number of private sector actors in his top party staff (from 14% in the provisional DPE of 2000 to 40% in 2004). 68 However, the party membership of independently wealthy DPE members diminished after Wade lost in 2012. 11 of 25 staff of the 2004 DPE who left the party constituted 11 of the 19 politicians engaged in the private sector. The URD’s 52% overall retention rate for early DPE members is also significantly lower than the AFP’s. One possible explanation for this is that without independent sources of financing, Kâ attracted followers whose loyalty was partially based on his proximity to the president; when Wade lost and Kâ lacked connections to the new president, membership in the URD was potentially less attractive. In contrast, Niasse was able to attract a loyal party elite, possibly because his access to independent financing is well-known, but certainly not because he linked them immediately to the state through any collaboration with Wade. Although the data on the URD’s DPE and the AFP’s BP are not sufficient for us to draw definitive conclusions about the relevance of this interpretation, it does show that more private sector party elites from the URD defected to the new ruling party (Macky Sall’s APR) compared to those in the AFP (row b).

67 Kâ became Senegal’s Minister of the Environment and one of Kâ’s closest associates, Diegane Sène, became a delegate minister of education.

Individual Case Studies

Individual case studies also help to trace the ways that experience and financing influenced strategy across parties exhibiting a fuller range of variation on both endowments.

Leaders with neither Financing nor Experience

The majority of party leaders with neither financing nor experience were co-opted for many years into Wade’s entourage. Such founders, who were often major figures on the Senegalese left under authoritarianism or who came from families with traditional or religious authority, negotiated patronage with the president while in the Cap 21. However, most founders with neither endowment merely collected the small-scale benefits that the president uniformly provided members of the Cap 21. Rarely could party leaders lacking both endowments bargain with the president for more rewards in exchange for their continued support. To illustrate these points, the Assembly for Unity and Peace (RUP), a typical micro-party without vote-mobilizing potential that pursued long-term co-optation in the Cap 21, is presented as a baseline to contrast with the Party for Renaissance and Citizenship (PRC), led by an activist from Senegal’s old left, Samba Diouldé Thiam. Thiam was relatively powerless in modifying the terms of his collaboration with President Wade but did better than RUP leader, Amadou Moctar Ndiaye, thanks to what little bargaining power he derived from his political reputation and the PRC’s presence in the first legislative elections after the party’s founding.

The Assembly for Unity and Peace (RUP)

One of the micro-party leaders who joined the Cap 21 and remained in the ruling coalition throughout Wade’s presidency, Amadou Moctar Ndiaye created the RUP not only “to seek power” but also to speak out for those who do not have “the bare minimum to live,” like
himself and those in his neighborhood in Louga, one of Senegal’s regional capitals. As a retired policeman without high-level state or civil society experience before forming his party, Ndiaye also lacked autonomous financing. He joined the Cap 21, and although he got “moral satisfaction” from “speak[ing] the truth,” he “was not particularly listened to” within the institution. Ndiaye claims that the president promised him a government post in 2006, when he spoke out more critically than others about poverty in one of the Cap 21’s rare meetings with Wade. Ndiaye reports that he rejected the president’s offer to appoint him, but remained in the Cap 21 through Wade’s candidacy in the 2012 presidential elections “for loyalty reasons,” despite his disagreement with some of the president’s decisions. Regardless of the truth behind the claims, which are not verifiable, the narrative exemplifies how party leaders, even those with neither experience nor financing, believe that there is a chance that co-optation will enable them to access patronage beyond the small monthly salaries that all Cap 21 members get.

**Party for Renaissance and Citizenship (PRC)**

Samba Diouldé Thiam also lacked experience and financing (despite a long career in party politics), but gained further rewards during his co-optation in the Cap 21. Thiam created the Renaissance and Citizenship Party (PRC) in 2000, after decades of experience on the Senegalese left. However, he lacked experience and financing. Thiam had been a public high school teacher until 1970, when he became the full-time Permanent Secretary of the African Independence Party (PAI). He later served as the second-in-command in the PIT, an important PAI splinter. When the PIT forged a tactical alliance with President Abdou Diouf in 1991 and Thiam did not receive one of the party’s two ministerial posts, he left it too. This pattern of

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69 Interview with Amadou Moctar Ndiaye, 7/20/12, Louga.
gaining leadership experience within parties but not state experience repeated itself when Thiam later joined the URD/FAL party. After that, Thiam created the PRC.  

The PRC was with Wade until the 2012 presidential race. Thiam was successful in securing patronage beyond the Cap 21 in exchange for his loyalty. The PRC ran in the 2001 legislative elections without winning a seat in the National Assembly. His party gained a reputation for being one that “doesn’t count electorally but is paradoxically electoralist.” After the 2001 legislative race, Thiam was co-opted by Wade. Subsequently, Thiam joined the Cap 21 and remained in it during most of the presidency. He broke away only after the PDS succession crisis was in full swing in 2010, when Wade had decided to run for a third presidential term (despite the constitutional dubiousness of this act). Thiam thus supported Macky Sall in the 2012 presidential race, but remained in the ruling coalition until this watershed moment.  

Although Thiam was more successful in accessing presidential patronage than many of his counterparts lacking experience and financing, he still had relatively low leverage with the president regarding the terms of his collaboration. Initially, Thiam’s political reputation as a legend of the Senegalese left appears to have served him well in terms of his ability to fashion himself as a worthy interlocutor to the president. As early as 2000, he served for a few months as the President of the Administrative Council (PCA) of Senegal’s state newspaper, Le Soleil,

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73 Interview with Samba Diouldé Thiam, 11/22/11, Dakar.
and for a few months in 2001 as Minister of Planning. This is more than many of his counterparts lacking both endowments have achieved. However, Wade quickly swept Thiam aside. He only brought Thiam back in 2003, when the ruling coalition was electorally weaker and less popular. At that time, Thiam’s use of the Cap 21 to engage with Wade paid off. Wade re-named him PCA of the state newspaper, *Le Soleil*, and he remained there until 2007, when he was elected to the National Assembly on the PDS list.

Yet without experience and financing, Thiam’s political reputation as an old leftist was not especially helpful in enabling him to attach credible conditions to his loyalty to the ruling coalition. For instance, Thiam publicly postured about his loyalty as the 2007 legislative elections drew near. He announced that the Cap 21 would support Wade until the elections, but that “as the time approaches, we will see what each actor will do.” Although Thiam then criticized the Wade regime, he later held conferences praising the government. Ultimately, Thiam ran on the PDS’ list of legislative candidates. He did not follow through on his initial threat of striking out on his own or negotiating its entry into an alternative coalition.

Similarly, Thiam had little negotiating power when he disagreed with Wade’s attempt on June 23, 2011 to modify the Senegalese constitution. The amendment that Wade proposed would allow him to run for a third presidential term and to appoint a Vice-President, whom many suspected would be Wade’s son, Karim. As early as 2009, Thiam expressed his opposition to the


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proposed constitutional amendment, while asserting his loyalty to the ruling coalition. Yet by 2011, he was one of the only Members of Parliament in the PDS’s parliamentary group who opposed the amendment. Thiam escalated his criticism within the *mouvance présidentielle*. He asked: “What terrible menaces are weighing down on Senegal and the Senegalese, or on the president’s timeline, that justify the executive branch enriching itself further by adding the post of vice-president, which is just another means for the president to distribute patronage?”  

He also spoke out about government corruption, declaring himself “a member of [the president’s] majority who is disappointed. Making nobodies ministers…is not a good signal to send if you want to show the Senegalese people that the government wants to work for them.” Finally, he signaled the possibility of ending his collaboration with Wade, challenging the validity of the very name of the ruling coalition that supported Wade between elections, the “Forever Sopi Alliance” (*Alliance Sopi pour Toujours*). By July 2010, Thiam and others had still been unable to sway the president in his decision to run for a third term, which led Thiam to declare publicly that “first of all, there is no such thing as an alliance forever…we are still in it [AST] but we are very critical of it.”  

The situation escalated when in 2011, Thiam’s PRC left the PDS’ parliamentary group in the National Assembly as it was “in the process of evaluating its relations with Wade.” Soon thereafter, the PRC joined the campaign of Macky Sall, Wade’s ex-Prime Minister.


Leaders with either Financing or Experience

The behavior of party leaders with either financing or experience, but not both, ranges the most widely. Politicians with one endowment have a tool with which to bargain with the president for favorable deals in exchange for collaboration, but generally their endowments are not sufficient to make consistent opposition a feasible long-term strategy. Although some such party leaders initially run against the ruling coalition, they are most often temporary opponents, using their initial positioning to negotiate collaboration with incumbents eventually.

Founders with higher levels of experience or financing are better equipped to use their limited endowments as bargaining chips in negotiations with the president and can sometimes forge tactical alliances in which their parties form bilateral relationships with the ruling party and sporadically renegotiate the terms of collaboration. Conversely, founders with lower levels of the one endowment they possess often remain dependent on the president’s goodwill to maintain their status within the ruling entourage. They do not always have enough clout to renegotiate the terms of their collaboration and are more prone to co-optation.

Party for Reform (PR)

Perhaps best known for his career as PS Spokesperson and the President of the National Assembly in the 1990s, Abdourahim Agne defected from the PS and created the Reform Party (PR) in 2001. He did this after losing the 2001 legislative elections, in which he had been a PS candidate in his home department, Matam. Before joining the PS in the early 1980s, Agne had built up independent private financing from international investments and company holdings acquired in the 1970s. Beginning his career in the international banking sector, as a founder of

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the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO), he bought the Maritime Industrial Society of the West Coast of Africa (SOMICOA), a shipping agency that works with international arms dealers, and later acquired shares in Simco, a public works company. As PS party spokesperson and President of the National Assembly in the 1990s, he had a high degree of public visibility. However, he never developed a reputation as a capable high-level bureaucrat since he never served as minister.

Agne’s financing facilitated his opposition to Wade during the PR’s first few years. The PR did not run on its own label in either of the first two national elections that occurred after its founding, but it had vote-mobilizing potential in other ways that got Wade’s attention. First, Agne had lost the legislative elections in his home department, Matam, before founding the PR, but had garnered 15,000 votes. Second, Agne headed and provided most of the financing for one of the three major coalitions in the 2002 local elections, the Movement for Renaissance and Citizenship (MCR). It won over 300 municipal and rural counselorships and ran candidate lists in all 60 communes and in around two-thirds of Senegal’s rural communities.

Agne’s financial resources later facilitated his negotiation of favorable terms of entry into the ruling coalition. When Agne initially established the MCR, the PR and its allies met in order “to reflect on whether or not to belong to the mouvance présidentielle,” but immediately announced their desire “to position [them]selves in a clear way in the republican opposition,

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aligned neither with the *mouvement présidentielle* to which it does not belong, nor to the radical opposition…with which it does not share the same political practices.”

But even as early as 2002, the party announced its willingness to ally with either the ruling or the opposition coalition in select local races. After Wade announced in October 2003 that he would be a candidate for the 2007 elections, Agne characterized the PR as “clearly, really, definitively an opposition party, but not a scorched earth [opposition] party.”

Agne did not hide his intention to run for president in 2007. His financial profile made the announcement of these ambitions a threat that President Wade took seriously. After the 2002 local elections, Agne continued to constitute a critical opponent. As late as April 2003, when President Wade issued a blanket invitation to all party leaders to join his “ideational majority government,” the PR – along with the other parties in the MCR – publicly announced its refusal to collaborate with the ruling party under such auspices. Agne critiqued the government on everything from the rise in peanut prices and electricity shortages to the regime’s handling of the crisis related to the Joola, the boat linking Dakar to Ziguinchor whose capsizing in 2002 caused casualties of almost Titanic-like proportions.

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However, without significant state experience, Agne had difficulty developing the reputation that he would need to attract an electoral majority in that race. Nevertheless, he had both the financial capacity and electoral clout to forge a tactical alliance. This happened after Wade sought to destabilize the PR and the MCR that Agne had built around it. Wade co-opted all of Agne’s colleagues with neither experience nor financing of their own.

In 2004, even after Wade had broken up the MCR, the PR was still “opposed to any grouping of any nature oriented around a person, in this case around the President of the Republic, with the purpose of sharing the material advantages that come with power, given that the country’s inhabitants are living in extreme poverty.” Wade then also employed intimidation and violence in order to deter his commitment to oppose. After holding a party rally in which he was quoted in the newspaper as having encouraged Senegalese citizens to follow the example of the Ukrainians fomenting the Orange Revolution, Agne was interrogated and imprisoned “for having called Senegalese to take to the streets to take down the president.”

Even after these difficulties, Agne remained in the conventional opposition. As the 2006
legislative\textsuperscript{96} and 2007 presidential elections approached, he called for opposition leader Amath Dansokho to lead a unified opposition coalition in the 2007 elections against Wade.\textsuperscript{97} “This unity of a single opposition list [in the 2006 legislative race] is the only tool that will enable the opposition to win these elections and, subsequently, defeat Abdoulaye Wade in the next presidential race,” he declared.\textsuperscript{98}

These declarations, backed up by Agne’s significant financial resources, gave his announcements more credibility than those made by party leaders with neither experience nor financing. However, in August 2006, just before the PR’s National Council meeting to plan for the upcoming elections, Agne had a private meeting with Wade at the Presidential Palace.\textsuperscript{99} The party spokesperson claimed that this meeting “[w]as not for us a shortcut into power,” but at the same time declared that the PR was “interested in developing a common platform of action for all of the lifeblood of the nation, leading to a unified government program.”\textsuperscript{100} Just before the party conference, Agne also announced that he would be ready to work with Wade if the right conditions were in place.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{96} The elections were scheduled for 2006, but the National Assembly adopted a law elongating the mandate of Members of Parliament that January. Citing extensive flooding in parts of the country that led to more expenditures in this area that were detracting from the elections budget, the Senegalese government then proposed combining the 2007 presidential and legislative races. Citing the need to update according to demographic changes the distribution of seats by province that the electoral system allocated to each department, the Assembly again passed legislation postponing the legislative elections until mid-2007, after the presidential race. See Fall 2011: 174-175.


Agne and Wade struck a deal, whose terms were never fully made public. However, the mainstream press confirmed that Agne agreed not to stand as a candidate in the 2007 presidential elections and not to run the PR on its own label in the legislative race. The press also alleged that Agne was offered a ministerial post, and that his party expected additional patronage and perks, in exchange for the PR’s electoral concessions. Agne never denied his interest in gaining state experience; before he was appointed Minister of Microfinance and Decentralized International Cooperation, he declared that “his party was naturally interested in ministerial posts, because they are interested in exercising power, just like any other party.”

The basis of this tactical alliance changed during Wade’s second term. It became more favorable to the PR as the PDS’ electorally relevant allies dwindled. After delivering votes to the ruling party in the Senatorial elections of 2007, a quasi-appointed institution, Wade appointed one PR elite to it. Agne remained minister, but shifted from Microfinance to Land and Rail Transport (in 2009) and Telecommunications (in 2010). Members of his party won seats in the National Assembly on the PDS list, and another prominent PR founder, Serigne Mbacké Ndiaye, became first the Administrative Council President of the National Agricultural Credit Accounts of Senegal.


104 2007 Senate Roster, Senate of Senegal, obtained in February 2012, Dakar.

However, Wade also used the tactical alliance to weaken the PR and make it dependent on him for survival. During the PR’s tactical alliance, several founding members of the PR eventually defected to the PDS. This included Ndiaye himself, who joined the PDS’ Directing Committee in mid-2010, while also serving as the official government spokesperson and the president’s counselor for political dialogue during the remainder of Wade’s term. 106 This, too, prevented the PR from growing back into a staunch opposition party.

Party for Progress and Citizenship (PPC)

From a traditional family of humble economic origins, Mbaye-Jacques Diop obtained the international private financing that made his fortune decades before he founded the PPC, when he was still working outside of politics as a maritime commerce expert. His financial clout always made him a powerful regional political figure within the PS, which he joined before Senegal’s independence from the French and left in 2000 (FKA/CESTI 2001). 107 However, Diop lacked state and civil society experience, largely because internal rivalries within the party kept him from becoming a minister (Diop 2008). However, in his hometown, Rufisque, Diop’s wealth and political pre-eminence allowed him to cultivate loyal clients. As mayor of Rufisque, from 1987-2002, Diop controlled one of the most weighty local electoral bases in Senegal by providing employment and mentoring to a variety of community members. 108 After leaving the PS to support the PDS between the first and second rounds of the 2000 presidential election, Diop flirted with the idea of joining the PDS or Niasse’s AFP, but ultimately created the Party

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108 Interview with Amadou Sène Niang, 10/26/11, Dakar.
for Citizenship and Progress (PPC) (Diop 2008). Diop ultimately negotiated his party’s fusion with the PDS, a form of long-term co-optation.

The trajectory of Mbaye-Jacques Diop suggests that tactical alliances like those of the PR are less possible when a founder’s stock of independent financing deteriorates. Retired from the private sector well before creating the PPC, Diop did not have continuous flows of such financing. Along with these limitations, Diop’s desire to acquire high-level state experience seems to have pushed him to stop opposing Wade. Bilateral discussions about the nature of the PPC’s collaboration with the PDS began after the PPC ran on its own label in the 2001 legislative elections, winning 18,500 votes and a seat in the National Assembly. The agreement to fuse came about in 2002 as the PDS and the Cap 21 (to which the PPC belonged) were fighting about nominations for the 2002 local elections. Diop at first reaffirmed his membership in the Cap 21 but advertised his will to run on a separate ticket for mayor of Rufisque if not nominated in 2002. Diop’s financial and political clout within that community made his threat a serious problem for the PDS. The mayorship of Rufisque thus became a central element of the negotiations that fostered the PPC’s fusion with the ruling party. Diop ultimately agreed to fuse the PPC before the 2002 elections and stood down in the race for mayor. He was appointed honorary deputy mayor, while gaining a seat in the PDS’ highest executive organ, the Directing Committee (Diop 2008). In addition, Diop was rumored to be expecting an appointment to the Ministry of Decentralization in exchange for the PPC’s fusion.

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109 Interview with Mbaye-Jacques Diop, 6/4/12, Rufisque.

However, Diop’s limited financing and his party’s vote-mobilizing capacity was not powerful enough to guarantee him this ministerial opportunity immediately. When no appointment materialized, Diop and his supporters from the ex-PPC, who were blocked from merging into local PDS structures, spent over a year lobbying for Diop’s promotion. The ex-spokesperson of the PPC reminded the public that “in a fusion, we join not only in order to give, but also to receive.” Diop’s lobbying eventually worked; from 2004-7, Wade made Diop President of the Republic’s Council for Economic and Social Affairs (CRAES).

This gradual rather than immediate recompense also characterized Agne’s relationship with Wade. The major difference is that Agne achieved this by forging a tactical alliance, while Diop instead relied on fusion, a form of co-optation that restricted his subsequent partisan autonomy from the president. Diop “regrets having fused with the PDS” because it reduced his political clout from what it would have been if he had retained the party. He ruminated: “I lost my liberty of expression, as well as [widespread political] esteem.” Indeed, Diop’s long-term co-optation lasted through Wade’s defeat in 2012, even after Diop stepped down from the


CRAES in 2007. Although Diop began to disagree with Wade in 2009 with the rise of Karim within the PDS, Karim, he only announced the rebirth of the PPC in the 2012 legislative elections, after Wade had dissolved the Cap 21 and “liberated” his partisan allies.

**Senegalese Liberal Party (PLS)**

The Senegalese Liberal Party (PLS) is led by Ousmane Ngom, who has state experience but no independent private financing. In this sense, Ngom is more like Djibo Kâ than like Agne and Diop. Kâ’s degree of state experience surpassed Ngom’s and the URD had greater electoral success than the PLS in its first legislative election. Yet ultimately both parties adopted collaborative rather than adversarial strategies. However, party leaders with lower levels of experience like Ngom did not generally seek to retain as much autonomy as Kâ did in his negotiations with Wade, which allowed him to replenish party coffers through a tactical alliance rather than a fusion.

A lawyer by training, Ngom had been a full-time PDS politician for many years before 1998, when he founded the PLS. Ngom had been a founding member and the leader of the party’s youth wing and became Wade’s second-in-command, leading him into ministerial service in the 1990s. In the enlarged presidential majority governments under Abdou Diouf, Ngom was first appointed Minister of Labor and Professional Training and later became Minister of Health and Social Action (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). However, Ngom lacked independent financing that could ensure his autonomy from the president and the state. This was never a

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problem for Ngom’s career when he was on good terms with Wade, but it was problematic when this relationship deteriorated and Wade became president.

Ngom left the PDS to create the PLS in April 1998, following a dispute about leadership in the highest echelons of the Directing Committee. Ngom, the second highest authority within the PDS, faced off with Idrissa Seck, the third highest-ranked party elite, during preparation for the 1998 legislative elections. His first problem stemmed from the fact that “nominally second-in-command of the party, he found himself trapped in a role with mostly political responsibilities, while Idrissa Seck found Wade attributing him all of the responsibilities for organizing and managing the party.” Ngom lost influence over the selection of the PDS’s 1998 legislative candidates. He accused Seck and his allies of “attempting to impose his will on the PDS,” and left the PDS after he failed to win a seat in the National Assembly. Before leaving, Ngom had been “especially concerned about the role [he and his followers] would play in the party and what their means of subsistence would be, given that Ngom was no longer a minister and had not been elected a Member of Parliament.” Wade allegedly offered Ngom the equivalent of an MP’s salary if he agreed to remain in the party, but he ultimately refused.

Ngom created the PLS with no intention of consistently opposing the PDS over the long term. Announcing the PLS’ birth, Ngom said that he had “never envisioned doing politics outside of the PDS” (Quoted in FKA/CESTI 2001: 156). Due to his veteran status within the PDS and his experience in government, Ngom had a considerable network of supporters who followed him out of the PDS. Five members of the Directing Committee and eleven members of the National Secretariat helped Ngom create the PLS, illustrate his importance to the PDS, and

negotiate his way back into the ruling party. However, without independent financing, Ngom had limited resources to sustain the PLS’ presence in elections over time. One way that Ngom dealt with this financial challenge was to run in the 1999 Senatorial race. It was boycotted by the majority of Senegalese parties, and he gained a salary from the seat he won. Ngom also reopened his law firm in downtown Dakar. Even as he criticized the PDS and opposed it in elections, he lobbied Wade for a reconciliation deal. For instance, the PLS sent a delegation to Wade’s sister’s funeral in 1998, and the PLS second-in-command, Marcel Bassène, publicly called for the PLS to reunite with the PDS. After Wade became president, Ngom continued to take such a stance. Ngom told the press that members of the PLS “are not engaged in frontal opposition,” but were “instead in favor of critically supporting certain governmental and presidential actions.”

Then, as the 2001 legislative elections approached, Ngom used his record of state experience and his limited resources to demonstrate the PLS’ vote-mobilizing potential. Yet even as the PLS faced the first opportunity to run on its own label and measure its representativeness among the Senegalese electorate, Ngom’s calls for negotiation continued. Wade had private audiences with Ngom on several occasions, and Ngom continued to court Wade through the press. Praising the alternation that he had not supported during his alliance with the PS, Ngom openly advocated for negotiations and collaborations with the ruling party.

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122 The PLS criticized the PDS’ way of implementing the liberal, price stabilization policies that Ngom and Wade both believed in, and Ngom also put pressure on Wade in the legal sphere, by taking on the prominent case of a national labor union that was suing the government.


He characterized his relationship with Wade as a “collaborative rapport between a politician and the president of his country…The challenge we now face is dealing with this rupture [between the PLS and the PDS] and to determine how we can arrive at some sort of complicity again.” Ngom painted himself as committed to collaboration “in the interest of Senegal.” The PLS ultimately won a seat in the National Assembly in 2001, increasing its power to negotiate fusion with the PDS.

However, the fusion did not occur until 2003. Talks intensified as the PDS’ alliances with major leftist parties like the LD/MPT and AJ/PADS deteriorated. The long-term nature of their loyalty to the ruling coalition was in question. Just before the fusion in April 2003, an anonymous PDS politician commented that “Ousmane [wa]s a good fit for the PDS, because things could go badly for us when our allies in the LD and the AJ become increasingly close to the opposition.”

Ngom’s ministerial experience also facilitated relatively favorable terms of fusion. The PDS had encountered difficulties at alternance in dealing with the shortage of individuals within the party who knew how to govern. Wade had initially compensated for his party’s deficiency by recruiting defectors from the PS into the PDS and then appointing them to key ministerial posts. However, the rise of these defectors (known as transhumants) to the detriment of PDS old guard fostered resentment within the party (Beck 2008). In this fragile context, Ngom’s state experience and his PDS origins were veritable bargaining chips in negotiations. Upon fusion,


126 Bacary Domingo Mane, “Commentaire du jour: au nom du ‘père’”, Sud Quotidien, 15 April 2003, http://fr.allafrica.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stories/200304150631.html (accessed 4 June 2014). Although the LD/MPT and AJ/PADS were still part of the ruling coalition and Wade’s governments at the time, they had been increasingly prone to criticize “the manner in which alternance was managed.”

Ngom immediately returned to the Directing Committee of the PDS. Within several months, Wade also appointed him the President’s Counselor for International Relations, equivalent to the rank of minister. By 2004, Ngom was appointed Minister of Trade, and soon shifted to Minister of the Interior (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). Throughout the many subsequent governments of Wade’s presidency, Ngom remained minister in various capacities.

**Leaders with both Experience and Financing**

Party leaders with both experience and financing tend to select consistent opposition strategies. However, aside from Moustapha Niasse, there is just one other party leader with some level of both endowments. Rarely do there emerge parties whose leaders have both the experience and financing that give them sufficient legitimacy and vote-mobilizing capacity to continually challenge incumbents. When they do, high levels of both endowments are needed to facilitate consistent opposition strategies that encompass participation in all national elections, rather than abstention from certain presidential contests.

**The Alliance for Justice (Jëf-Jël)**

Beyond Niasse, Talla Sylla of the Alliance for Justice (APJ/ Jëf-Jël) is the only founder in the sample with high levels of civil society experience and (allegedly) high levels of independent private financing. The trajectories of Niasse and Sylla demonstrate how high levels of both

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130 Sylla is coded, according to the rules previously outlined, as having medium levels of financing because he is alleged to have access to political financing through friends rather than directly.
endowments empower party leaders to function as the president’s adversaries, consistently running against him, even in the country’s presidential races, which entail the highest registration and campaign costs. With decades of experience in state administration from his time in the PS, and with a constant flow of private capital from his businesses abroad, Niasse has built one of the few parties in Senegal that has run on its own label in three consecutive presidential races, and that has commanded a significant proportion of the electorate on several occasions. Sylla’s combination of experience and possible flows of independent financing produced strategic behavior similar to that of Niasse. Jëf-Jël consistently opposed Wade during his presidency, running on its own label in nearly all of the national elections in which it participated, and in an opposition coalition if not on its own. Sylla’s endowments facilitated, albeit incompletely, his attempts to realize presidential ambitions. Too young to run for president in 2000, Sylla supported Wade. After running for president in 2007, but garnering less than 1% of the vote, Sylla reconsidered the nature of his consistent opposition strategy. He remained president of Jëf-Jël but began building alongside the party a “citizen’s movement,” Wallu Askanu Senegal. Although Sylla initially hoped to run for president with the Jëf-Jël label but to win votes by mobilizing non-partisan citizens through the Wallu movement, leadership quarrels within Jëf-Jël led him to abstain in the 2012 presidential race.

Jëf-Jël grew out of Youth for Turnover (JPA), a nationwide student movement that Sylla had started in the early 1990s as a graduate student in France, after he had already headed the Senegalese student union in his hometown, Thiès, an electorally important regional hub. Sylla gained significant civil society experience as the student movement became a powerful force in

131 As the third-place finisher in 2000, Niasse attracted 16% of the vote and was Wade’s kingmaker in the second round runoff against Diouf; although his degree of support dropped to 6% of the vote in 2007, he regained much of his momentum in 2012, when he won 13% of the vote and took third place yet again (Carr 2003).

132 Interview with Ndiaga Sylla, 8/2/12, Dakar.
Senegalese politics in the 1990s. JPA became an official political party, Jëf-Jël, in 1998 and gained renown when Sylla lent the party label to Djibo Kâ before his own party was registered (FKA/CESTI 2001). Sylla’s civil society experience gave him a reputation for political mobilization, which in turn gave Jëf-Jël credibility as an opposition force. He was widely known for his incendiary style of public speaking, often geared towards criticizing government corruption (Diop & Diouf 1990, FKA/CESTI 2001). As the “enfant terrible of Senegalese politics,” Sylla attracted a hard core of disaffected youth who represented a new generation of Senegalese voters. These idealists generally supported Sylla’s fiery criticisms of the Senegalese government and brought intrigue and dynamism to the party on the ground, so much so that Jëf-Jël won a seat in the 2001 National Assembly, and Sylla ran for mayor of Thiès in 2002.

With Sylla’s civil society experience came a considerable amount of alleged financial resources. As a student leader from an elite family in Thiès, Sylla had a wide social network. His student activism during doctoral studies in France and his connections to prominent opposition figures like Abdoulaye Wade were boons to this renown. However, the actual sources of the Jëf-Jël party’s financing are unknown. When Sylla returned to Senegal, he was unemployed (FKA/CESTI 2001) but was purported to have a “wide network of friends and possibly cash supporters throughout the [West African] region.” If indeed Jëf-Jël has sources of international private financing through Sylla’s friends abroad, rather than legitimate business

133 Interview with Ndiaga Sylla, 3/12/12, Dakar


ventures like those of Niasse, then it is unsurprising that Sylla has kept the party’s finances a secret, given that Senegalese law prohibits international fundraising (Fall 2011).  

Sylla’s sources of autonomous financing are not likely to have been as expansive as those that Niasse enjoyed. During the 2007 elections, for instance, American diplomats observed that Sylla barely had enough money to travel within Senegal during the campaign after paying the fee to run for president. Sylla’s trajectory thereby attests, on the one hand, to the fact that without copious amounts of independent financing, party leaders with significant civil society experience struggle to retain their popularity on the uneven playing field as consistent opponents. On the other hand, even with less financing than Niasse, Sylla became one of Senegal’s most controversial opposition party leaders, and one of those most committed (sometimes incomprehensibly) to opposition for the sake of opposition. For instance, Sylla resigned from Jëf-Jël’s seat in the National Assembly in 2001, claiming that members of the ruling party were not following institutional rules to debate the annual budget. Despite a cutting critique of the National Assembly, he allowed Moussa Tine, Jëf-Jël’s second-in-command, to replace him. He also used his combination of financing and civil society experience to continue mobilizing voters. During his 2002 mayoral campaign in Thiès, for instance, Sylla spoke provocatively

136 This is difficult to verify because the Senegalese government does not enforce rules requiring party leaders to declare their organizations’ sources of income each year.
137 Jacobs, op. cit.
138 Sylla specifically objected to the fact that he was allowed to take the floor to speak about certain clauses of the budget, but that PDS deputies pounded on the table to drown out his comments, thereby circumventing the open deliberations that were supposed to occur during the budget approval process.
about providing “a true alternative to [Senegal’s] stunted alternance,” all the while encouraging “citizen mobilization in order to save democracy.”  

Despite limited independent financing, Jëf-Jël regularly approached the press to launch provocative invective against the government. For instance, when Wade announced plans for a new international airport, Sylla declared:

“We are opposed to the shameful and disastrous policies that Abdoulaye Wade and his government are currently carrying out…to the incompetence of ministers who are so concerned about the subsistence challenges of the Senegalese that they go on vacation…to the lack of transparency that is a fundamental characteristic of how projects are managed in this country.”

Sylla persisted even after his provocative critiques were met with violence. In 2003, thugs allegedly hired by the PDS nearly killed Sylla one evening outside a Dakar restaurant. After rehabilitation in France, Sylla returned to the opposition, attacking the National Assembly’s passage of an amnesty law that prevented his charges from being investigated.

Sylla ultimately remained a consistent opponent, but did not sustain this oppositional activity on the presidential level. As Wade’s first term came to a close, Sylla met with him at the Presidential Palace and wrote extensively about the experience in the Senegalese press. Although he continued to criticize the president, calling for a new constitution reducing presidential powers, objecting to the postponement of the 2006 legislative elections, and supporting the citizen consultations for reform (Assises Nationales) that opposition forces initiated during Wade’s second term, Sylla’s initial relationship with Wade when Wade had been


in the opposition cast doubt for some on Sylla’s freedom from collusion with him. After running for president against Wade in 2007, Jëf-Jël remained a consistent opposition party on the legislative level and continued to critique the government through Wade’s loss in 2012.

**Outliers**

Two other parties are outliers in the sense that they exhibited consistent opposition without possessing both of the endowments hypothesized to foster it. They are the Senegalese Ecological Assembly – The Greens (RES-Les Verts), led by Ousmane Sow Huchard, and the Movement for Democratic and Social Reform (MRDS), created by Imam Mbaye Niang. In conjunction with Niasse and Sylla, their cases show that as parties’ levels of each endowment decrease, their ability to function as consistent opponents *on the presidential level* diminishes or even disappears. Both outlier parties had leaders who lacked sufficient experience and financing to challenge the president in elections on a regular basis; in fact, Huchard and Niang abstained from participating in presidential election campaigns altogether. But consistent opposition remained an attractive option to these party leaders, whose organizations each ran on their own in all legislative and local races. Unlike most Senegalese parties, The Greens and MRDS promoted specific, ideologically-motivated reforms that distinguished their parties from others in the system. The programmatic goals of these niche parties provided their leaders with an alternative motivation for consistent opposition that partially substituted for their deficiencies in either experience or financing, at least in legislative elections.

Senegalese Assembly of Ecologists – The Greens (RES-Les Verts)

Huchard scores relatively low on state/civil society experience. He founded The Greens in 1999, following an illustrious career in the arts sector and academia. Known as Solyea Mama, an internationally renowned musician in the 1970s, Huchard got a Ph.D. in sociocultural anthropology at Laval University in Canada before returning to Senegal for a career in international cultural consulting.\(^{143}\) Although he lacks experience being a minister, Huchard has served in lower-level state jobs.\(^{144}\) This record of service got him membership in Senegal’s Civil Forum, one of the country’s major transparency NGOs.\(^{145}\) However, unlike Sylla’s nationwide youth movement, this organization was not built to mobilize voters on a large scale.

Huchard has medium levels of autonomous private financing, which make him a significant electoral force in Senegal. Since the creation of RES-Les Verts, Huchard has also run an international consulting cabinet.\(^{146}\) This autonomous financing, along with the wealth that he accumulated from his musical career, facilitate his party’s consistent participation in Senegal’s legislative elections on their own label.\(^{147}\) In the party’s first National Assembly race in 2001, Huchard won a seat and the party came in eleventh place out of twenty-five contending lists. He

\(^{143}\) Interview with Ousmane Sow Huchard, 2/18/12, Dakar.


\(^{145}\) Interview with Huchard, op. cit.

\(^{146}\) Huchard consistently emphasizes in the press that he has modest means, but he is richer than most Senegalese, as well as a variety of party leaders. Nevertheless, he says that he and other party members finance the party’s activities. “We contribute quotas amongst ourselves. We also have friends who are greens but who don’t want to be politically active who accompany and support us materially, etc. Khoudia Diop, op. cit.

\(^{147}\) RES-Les Verts has also run alone in both local elections that have occurred since the party’s birth.
retained this seat in 2007, but abstained from running or joining any coalitions in the 2000, 2007, and 2012 presidential elections.

Although Huchard’s financing does not match the level that Niasse has, and although Huchard lacks both Niasse’s state experience and Sylla’s civil society experience, RES-Les Verts has a programmatic basis that has partially substituted for these deficiencies. The party itself is based on a tract that Huchard wrote about the principles underlying the green philosophy that he believes many Senegalese live already.\footnote{Interview with Huchard, \textit{op. cit.}} As the main face of the party, Huchard consistently advertises the party’s policy goals and its commitment to “eco-citizenship,” “active citizenship,” and “participatory democracy.”\footnote{Gabriel Barbier, “Ousmane Sow Huchard sur le différend Wade/Macky – ‘on doit s’employer à respecter l’équilibre des pouvoirs dans notre pays,’” \textit{Walfadjri}, 7 January 2008, \url{http://fr.allafrica.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stories/200801080304.html} (accessed 4 June 2014).} Wade did not adopt many explicitly eco-friendly policies during his presidency, so while RES-Les Verts remained committed to policy dialogue with the government, it sought to carve out a niche in the parliamentary opposition as a way to draw attention to the green cause. Huchard’s party has consistently advocated for audits of Senegal’s 2001 environmental code, audits of Senegal’s fishing agreements with international and industrial actors, the re-establishment of anti-tobacco laws and the establishment of an annual day without cars in Senegal, and investment in solar energy.\footnote{Khoudia Diop, \textit{op. cit.} Samba Oumar Fall, “RES - Les ‘Verts’ demandent la retablissement de la loi anti-tabac,” \textit{Le Soleil}, 1 June 2005, \url{http://fr.allafrica.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stories/200506020132.html} (accessed 4 June 2014). K Sene and AR Mbengue, “Ousmane Sow, ‘nous n’allons pas integrer de groupe parlementaire,’” \textit{Walfadjri}, 20 June 2007, \url{http://fr.allafrica.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stories/200706200196.html} (accessed 4 June 2014).} These platforms have been the impetus for The Greens to remain in the opposition.

Indeed, RES-Les Verts has consistently lobbied the government as a critical opposition party that keeps its distance from the president. Huchard relishes pointing out that he has never
been to the Presidential Palace for an audience with Wade and that he remains an independent in the National Assembly. In the 2007 National Assembly election, he campaigned on the basis that the green party Members of Parliament “w[ould] determine whether a law is good for bad from an ecological standpoint. Yet even when Huchard praised one Wade’s ex-Ministers of the Environment, Maimouna Sourang Ndir, for listening to his party’s proposals, and indicated that RES-Les Verts would “accompany” the Wade government when it chose to adopt sound environmental policies, he continued to criticize the deterioration of the environment since alternance. In this way, the commitment of RES-Les Verts members to implementing a specific reform program, combined with Huchard’s limited stock of independent private financing, appears to have deterred the party from collaborating with the ruling coalition, despite the fact that Huchard’s resource profile did not empower him to run against President Wade.

The Movement for Democratic and Social Reform (MRDS)

The MRDS, led by the prominent Dakar imam, Mbaye Niang, also has a distinctive programmatic focus and has pursued the same long-term strategy as RES-Les Verts. Niang does not appear to have major sources of independent financing. He studied in Arabic-speaking, Islamic schools in Senegal and then at the Civil Aviation School in Tunis, but is also fluent in French, Senegal’s administrative language. During his religious career, Niang was also a bureaucrat in the Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA).


153 Gabriel Barbier, op. cit. He lamented that “deforestation continues steadily, wood-burning stoves are destroying the last bit of clean air in our country, and trash is a constant presence in citizens’ lives. Our country does not recycle enough and the businesses that we call ‘the collective of major polluters’ continue to release toxic products into our waters.” See Mbagnick Kharachi Diagne, op. cit.
where he led the airport workers’ union. He has done “extensive networking in the religious community” in Africa and the Middle East, but these connections do not appear to facilitate his party’s electoral activity on the presidential level. Niang has never run in a presidential election even though he announced his intention to do so in 2007, before Wade pushed the National Assembly to increase the amount of money required to declare candidacy. Niang announced that the fee increases were prohibitive.

However, Niang has civil society experience as one of the country’s most outspoken imams ascribing to radical Islam. He already had this experience, as well as a widespread public image, before he founded the MRDS. This was not only because of his religious ideology, but also because he ran Dakar’s airport mosque, where to this day he preaches to a domestic and international crowd. He has been able to mobilize an initial group of followers within Senegal’s (relatively small) radical Muslim community. The support was sufficient for the MRDS to win seats in the National Assembly from the start of the party’s participation in elections. Niang took one seat at the National Assembly in 2001 and retained it in 2007. He has, like Huchard, insisted on remaining an independent Member of Parliament, joining neither the ruling party’s nor the opposition’s parliamentary group. After not participating, even within a coalition, in the 2000 and 2007 presidential races, the MRDS bucked this trend in 2012 when it joined the camp of current president Macky Sall.

Niang’s motivation for pursuing a consistent opposition strategy does not derive from his possession of both experience and financing at high levels. In combination with Niang’s

154 Interview with Mbaye Niang, 1/9/12, Dakar.

155 Jackson, op. cit.

mobilizing capacity as a national-level civil society figure, the programmatic nature of the MRDS’ political goals may have instead fostered the organization’s consistent opposition strategy. Yet many of the MRDS’ critiques go beyond simply challenging the extent to which Wade has effectively governed. The MRDS is a niche party that more specifically advocates for a “moralization” of politics, including further infusion of Islamic values and principles into Senegal’s social fabric. Niang has consistently criticized the relatively secular policies of successive Wade governments.

This ideologically-motivated advocacy for programmatic reforms allowed Niang’s MRDS to maintain a small but electorally significant set of followers committed to establishing Muslim legal code (sharia) within the Senegalese corpus of law, which would entail the reform of the French education system, French legal code, and secular constitution. The MRDS also appeals to this circle of dedicated followers through its calls for integrating Koranic schools, known as daaras, into the national education system, treating them just like French-speaking public schools. The MRDS has also pronounced on other social issues of the day, denouncing Western programming on Senegalese television and promoting the criminal penalties that Senegalese law imposes on homosexuals. Between his followers’ contributions and his

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157 Niang has done this, criticizing the quality of life under Wade, saying that “the large majority of Senegalese people are suffering more after alternance,” and claiming that Wade’s economic liberalism “has created nothing but failures that push young Senegalese today to make dangerous trips in fishing boats” in often fatal attempts to reach Europe. See APS, “Imam Mbaye Niang demande la moralization des chaînes de télévision,” 17 September 2007, http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200709171202.html (accessed 4 June 2014).


personal income as a National Assembly member, Niang regularly ran the MRDS in legislative elections and drew on his experience and renown to mobilize voters.

VI- Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that a rare set of Senegalese politicians, with state or civil society experience and independent private financing, was able to resist long-term collaboration with the president altogether. The evidence establishes the correlation between party leaders’ endowments and their parties’ long-term strategies. It also illustrates the mechanisms of the relationship between endowments and parties’ series of strategic choices over time. Overall, this work generates hypotheses worth testing in other countries that meet time- and regime-sensitive scope conditions.

One such scope condition is that state experience and autonomous private financing may not constitute the most salient sources of party strategy at times when politicians outside of the ruling party do not exhibit significant variation on these endowments. Within Senegal, these endowments only became worthy of systematic attention in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Second, vote-mobilizing potential, state or civil society experience, and independent private financing are most likely to be relevant sources of party strategy in competitive authoritarian regimes with an uneven playing field. The greater degree of incumbency advantage relative to democracy makes party leaders’ long-term investments in consistent electoral competition with the ruling party more risky under competitive authoritarianism. Not only does this drive up the amount of experience and financing necessary for parties to adopt consistent opposition; it also makes endowments like experience and financing powerful and multifaceted tools for most party leaders.

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leaders, who lack the high levels of both endowments conducive to sustained opposition. A few party leaders act upon their limited endowments but still attempt to function as adversaries seeking to replace incumbents. However, most party leaders respond by negotiating much-coveted access to patronage by collaborating with those in power.

However, these findings also raise an additional puzzle that the next chapter will attempt to solve in the Senegalese context. If politicians with both endowments are the regime’s most consistent opponents, and therefore the most promising for democratization and accountability in the liberal democratic sense, how do we explain the fact that they were not the ones who fostered Senegal’s two presidential turnovers? The next chapter, focused on explaining these turnovers, argues that the rarity of consistent opposition parties has not actually damaged prospects for turnover. However, it does seem to have shaped the ways that presidential defeat can occur. Namely, when consistent opposition parties are rare, “regime insiders” (Pinkston 2013) emerge as the president’s major electoral challengers more often than outside opponents. Both Abdoulaye Wade, who won against incumbent Abdou Diouf in 2000, and Macky Sall, who defeated Wade in 2012, had served in the governments of their adversaries before running against them.
CHAPTER FIVE – DEFEATING PRESIDENTS FROM WITHIN: REGIME INSIDERS AND TURNOVER IN SENEGAL

I- Introduction

In 2000, the PS experienced its first presidential defeat and Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS won the race. His victory occurred in the context of ordinary citizens’ economic malaise, the defection of several major ruling party elites, the electoral mobilization of youth on an unprecedented level, and the coalescence of the opposition behind a single candidate (Diop 2011, Foucher 2007, Galvan 2001, Ndiaye Diouf 2000). He campaigned on the same slogan that he had in the 1993 elections: sopi (“change” in Wolof, Senegal’s lingua franca). Senegalese voters re-elected Wade in 2007, based on the claim that he needed more time enact all of the reforms that he had promised citizens in 2000 (Galvan 2009, Resnick 2014). However, in 2012, slogans referring to the visible, major infrastructure projects that became the Wade administration’s hallmark, like “Mr. President, give us more” (Goorgui doli ŋu), and “Change: Still in Progress” (Le Sopi: Toujours en marche), did not prevent him from losing the presidential contest to one of his ex-Prime Ministers, Macky Sall, who headed the fledgling APR party. In March 2012, Wade passed on the torch to Sall, the very man who had run his successful re-election campaign in 2007 and who had, as Wade’s Prime Minister in 2004, predicted 50 years of PDS rule.  

The rise and decline of Wade’s rhetoric of sopi was swift, given the extent to which presidents benefit from the uneven playing field and have the chance to deprive opponents of the resources and wherewithal to win elections. Yet the fact that turnover itself occurred in Senegal is not surprising; it is by definition difficult but possible in competitive authoritarian regimes. What is more striking is that regardless of turnover, “regime insiders” have been the incumbent’s

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most serious challengers in the last four presidential elections (1993, 2000, 2007, 2012). Insiders are politicians who have accessed state resources – including salaries, media exposure, control over low-level state posts, and opportunities to network with key elites – as ministers in former governments before they emerge in the opposition to the president. Although insider advantage does not always ensure turnover, those who make the most of these advantages gain both the financial capital and the public reputations that make it possible to defeat incumbents. It results in a paradoxical political reality: former government collaborators, rather than the committed outsiders conventionally defined as the opposition, are the ones who unseat the president.

Insiders are not the causes of turnover, but they are the agents of it when it happens.

Africanist scholars have already identified several factors that increase the chances of turnover across countries, and several– including opposition coalescence and patronage scarcity in the ruling party – help account for those in Senegal. However, these theories neglect important contingencies that shaped the political context before alternance in 2000 and 2012 but were not key elements of it before incumbent victories in 1993 and 2007. Namely, before turnover, there was uncertainty about the timing of succession within the ruling party, and the leading insider candidate resisted the president’s attempts to negotiate collaboration or reconciliation with him close to the campaign.

Section 2 discusses the sources of insider advantage. It identifies various opportunities that insiders’ access to the state gives them to develop a competitive edge over other opposition candidates in presidential elections. Section 3 uses information about presidential candidates in Senegal’s last four elections to illustrate these mechanisms and to evaluate the extent to which insiders outperform outsiders in these contests. Section 4 discusses how turnover happened in 2000 and 2012 (but not in 1993 and 2007), tracing how uncertainty about the timing of
succession and insider candidates’ resistance to negotiating patronage played out during each campaign. It also applies cross-national theories of turnover to these specific outcomes and finds that some factors – such as opposition coalescence and economic performance – also heightened the chances of turnover in 2000 and 2012 relative to 1993 and 2007. Yet to fully account for these particular events in Senegal, we must also explain who ultimately fosters turnover and how both structure and contingency produce such outcomes. Section 5 addresses the implications of insider advantage for democratization. Section 6 concludes, discussing why insider advantage is likely to be greatest in countries with ruling parties dependent solely upon patronage for cohesion.

II- Sources of Insider Advantage

Regime insiders have been the president’s most serious threats in all of Senegal’s presidential elections since the adoption of a consensual, democratic electoral code in 1992. What gives some insider politicians the capacity to develop electoral advantages over outsiders? This section first defines and operationalizes insiders and then presents several mechanisms through which insider candidates in presidential elections have had the opportunity to develop higher levels of electoral competitiveness than contenders who are outsiders.

Defining and Operationalizing Insiders

The chapter defines insiders as politicians who have enjoyed access to the state by serving as a minister before they run for office in the opposition. By these standards, insiders can originate from internally or externally mobilized parties. That is, insiders could be party leaders who “occup[ied] leadership positions in the prevailing regime and who undertook to
mobilize and organize a popular following behind themselves,” or they could be opposition party leaders who temporally enter the government and collaborate with the president in their longer-term attempt to “bludgeon their way into the political system by mobilizing and organizing a mass constituency” (Shefter 1994: 5). Insiders can thus include opposition party leaders who eventually join presidential majority governments and work with the ruling party, like Abdoulaye Wade of the PDS or Abdoulaye Bathily of the LD/MPT. It also encompasses politicians who have pursued their careers within the ruling party but eventually break away to create their own parties. The latter category includes Moustapha Niasse of the AFP and Djibo Kâ of the URD during the time that the PS ruled Senegal and Idrissa Seck of Rewmi and Macky Sall of the APR during the Wade presidency.²

Insider advantage is widespread in Africa. In Zambia, the current president, Michael Sata, was a member of the ex-ruling party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and was a minister before he formed the Patriotic Front (PF) and ran against the MMD. In several elections before winning the 2011 presidential race, the PF performed as well as opposition parties led by outsiders, including the United Party of National Development (UPND) of private sector businessmen Anderson Mazoka and Haikande Hichilema (Cheeseman & Hinfelaar 2010, Larmer & Fraser 2007, Resnick 2014, Simutanyi 2008). Insiders from authoritarian regimes who re-emerged after the transition to multipartism include Mwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party (DP). He defeated President Moi in the 2002 elections as the candidate of the National African Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and had been minister in Moi’s government in the 1980s (Howard & Roessler 2006, Levitsky & Way 2010b). Similar examples can be found in Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, and Malawi.

² This is not an exhaustive list of regime insiders in contemporary Senegal, but these four individuals are relevant examples for the analysis that follows, so they are especially worthy of mention.
Insiders are operationalized as politicians who have accessed state resources through ministerial appointments any time since independence in 1960. Thinking of insider status as a permanent condition allows us to capture the behavior of all politicians who have at any time in their careers had the opportunity to build material and reputational advantages over politicians without access to the state. A long view makes sense given that several types of capital that insiders acquire through ministerial appointments do not deplete quickly over time, including the name recognition that they build up among the public through privileged media access and the contacts they make with domestic and international elites who are potential campaign financiers. Politicians are considered insiders during any presidential election that follows their decision to abandon their positions within the state in order to run against the president. Politicians who have not accessed the state at the ministerial level or have not accessed the state at all in their political careers do not count as outsiders.

**Mechanisms of Insider Advantage**

Insider advantage is consistent with theoretical expectations about African election campaigns, which are often characterized by competitive clientelism (Beck 2008, Van de Walle 2007). Presidential candidates vie for votes by distributing material benefits to individuals and communities, illustrating their capacity to provide for prospective constituents (Banégas 2003, Nugent 2001, Schaffer 1998). Citizens, especially those in rural areas, are “more susceptible to clientelism,” and are more likely to cast their votes for the candidate that their local leaders endorse (Koter 2013b: 653, Schaffer 1998). Thus, in the context of clientelism on the uneven playing field, the president has a clear advantage over opponents. However, among all types of opponents, ex-regime insiders may be best equipped to engage in large-scale vote-mobilizing
efforts, be they clientelist or populist, in order to pose significant electoral threats to the president. 3 They are more likely to be formidable challengers to the president because several have built up significant financial and political capital while in the state.

Insiders’ access to the state provides them with several types of opportunities to advance their political careers that outsiders do not enjoy. When they are ministers, insiders control patronage within their administrative domain and thus have a means to cultivate followers. They also gain government experience that helps them build an image and gain name recognition among voters in the media. Moreover, as ministers they have national political profiles, which can facilitate networking with elites – both domestic and international – who are potential sources of campaign financing. 4

First, as former ministers, regime insiders have accumulated wealth and reputations as statesmen that better equip them to compete against the president later. The most basic benefit that insiders have while serving as ministers is a state salary. Although state salaries are not sufficient to function as an insider candidate’s main source of political financing in a race against the president, they are sources of initial financial capital that politicians can invest into developing a political profile to facilitate future electoral success. At the same time, ministerial service gives politicians a visibility to the public that helps them gain name recognition among voters and to develop their profiles as statesmen who have the administrative capabilities to run a government. Signaling this competence while also developing a small stock of financial

3 In 2007, the Assises Nationales began under the leadership of the respected and long-retired politician, Amadou-Makhtar Mbow (Interview with Marie Ndella Ndiaye, 2/21/12, Dakar; Kelly 2012). Hundreds of party, union, and civil society organizations helped organize the Assises’ town hall meetings across Senegal, intended for citizens to “discuss solutions to urgent public-policy problems in a wide range of institutional, social, and economic domains” (Kelly 2012: 126) and to confront the country’s “multidimensional crisis” (Assises Nationales 2009). In 2009, the Assises commission released the “Charter of Democratic Governance,” as a synthesis of proposed reforms in six national languages. Members also traveled around Senegal to distribute the charter and educate citizens about holding politicians accountable for the reforms. The PDS was invited to participate but Wade refused.

4 Thus, state access may, but need not, entail corruption to benefit regime insiders in later bids for the presidency.
resources facilitates future political activity. For instance, Abdoulaye Wade acknowledges the dual importance of name recognition and state salaries. When the PDS left the government before the 1993 presidential elections, he found that “in leaving power we were losing material resources…but also the respect given to a minister by the Territorial Administration” (Wade 2006: 221).

Second, the media access that insiders enjoy during their time within these state institutions reinforces their advantages over outsiders. Working in the government often gets ministers exposure in the media and helps them develop name recognition among voters and among rich and powerful elites. Their actual government experience puts insiders in contact with different portions of the Senegalese populace, through meetings, speeches, and programming in various parts of the country. However, it is not just the experience itself, but also the media’s documentation of it, that allows them to build reputations as statesmen that end up serving them well if they later leave the government to run against the president. Wade’s memoirs also attest to this aspect of insider advantage, with him declaring that “our [the PDS’] time in government even enabled us to make ourselves better known through the use of radio and television” (Wade 2006: 221).

Third, insiders have the opportunity to cultivate followers through the distribution of patronage while they are ministers. In their capacity as ministers, regime insiders may also control lower-level appointments within their ministerial domain (Arriola 2009). This gives them the chance to develop networks of clients whose government jobs depend on the insider’s continued success within the ruling coalition. Relative to outsiders, insiders therefore have greater chances of developing the clientelist networks needed to garner widespread voter support.

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5 The PDS lost four such ministerial posts when it left Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority government that year.
and catalyze the bandwagoning that characterizes successful “tipping games” in African elections (Van de Walle 2006). Some insiders are able to leave the president’s entourage with significant blocs of cadres whose best prospects for employment or political ascension depend on the insider’s future electoral success. For instance, Wade’s ex-Prime Minister, Idrissa Seck, left the government to create his own party and was followed by a variety of PDS youth leaders, cadres, and Members of Parliament.

Finally, access to the state provides insiders the opportunity to network with domestic and international elites who are potential sources of political financing. Insiders can use the social networks they developed as statesmen to attract private political financing, using their renown to reach out to foreign heads of state, businessmen, and members of the diaspora they used to work with while in office. For example, as an insider candidate in 2012, ex-Prime Minister Macky Sall benefited from connections he had developed as a statesman to both foreign leaders and Senegalese abroad. Sall was well-known to other African presidents who were not friendly to Wade, including President Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire and President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, who were in contact with him during his preparations to campaign. After Sall created the APR and it was clear that he would run for president, he also requested an audience with President Omar Bongo of Gabon. The Senegalese government charged him with illegally soliciting international campaign funding but could not prove its case since Sall did not explicitly request political financing in the correspondence. From his time in the Wade administration, Sall also developed key contacts in the Senegalese diaspora who later proved essential to his presidential campaign. He initially met his main financier, Harouna Dia, through


Wade. Sall, who was Wade’s 2007 campaign director at the time, and Dia, who was the leader of the Senegalese diaspora in Burkina Faso where he was based as an international businessman, had to solve the problem of the PDS’ unpopularity there. 8

Not all insiders are likely to have equal opportunity to these benefits, and not all of them end up converting their access to opportunity within the state into better performance than outsiders in presidential races. Part of this variation depends on personal characteristics and idiosyncrasies. Another part is due to interdependence, meaning that the performance of any given insider also depends on that of other insiders running in the same contest. More high-performing insiders, like Wade, Seck, Sall, Niasse, and Kâ, limit the degree of success that other insider candidates can experience in various elections. Nevertheless, the insiders who do successfully exploit their access to the state to improve their political financing capabilities and their public image are better than outsiders at leveling the playing field in competition against the president when they defect. A variety of evidence from Senegal supports this generalization.

III- Insider Advantage in Senegal

Insider advantage has been a regular feature of presidential competition in Senegal since the early 1990s with the passage of a consensual, democratic electoral code. 9 Senegal’s regime


9 Opposition parties had been allowed to run in elections since 1978, but the passage of the 1992 code was a clear step forward. It “marked an important improvement over the past when the administration controlled the entire electoral process, discouraged the secret ballot, and excluded representatives of opposition parties from verifying the vote tally” (Gellar 2005: 81, Kanté 1994, Villalón 1994). The code was in part a legacy of the public reaction to the 1988 presidential contest, which was widely regarded as fraudulent (Beck 2008, Diaw & Diouf 1998). Diaw & Diouf (1998) say “the feeling was widely held that the PS had cheated at the expense of the PDS” (136). President Diouf refused to welcome international elections observers. When he declared victory, “the opposition vehemently challenged the official results and sparked a wave of social protests that plunged Senegal into the country’s most severe political crisis since the alleged coup attempt of 1962” (Villalón 1994: 164). Urban riots broke out, the
remained competitive authoritarian thereafter, but the code significantly leveled the playing field on matters of electoral procedure. Starting with the 1993 presidential election, there were guarantees of a secret ballot, voting rights for the diaspora and 18-to-21-year-olds, the use of ballot boxes and indelible ink during the vote, the presence of party representatives at the polls, equal access to the media, and a national ballot-counting commission, among other changes (Kanté 1994, Villalón 1994). In the presidential elections that followed in 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012, insiders performed better than outsiders. This section first demonstrates the degree to which insider advantage was a feature of these elections. It then discusses the kinds of insiders who consistently functioned as the front-running opposition candidates. Finally, it illustrates the mechanisms of insider advantage that are at work in Senegal by comparing a variety of insider and outsider candidates’ attempts to run for president.

The Performance of Insiders and Outsiders

Insider advantage is a common feature of presidential elections in contemporary Senegal. Election returns on the performance of all candidates who ran in each of the last four races help to demonstrate the prevalence of insider advantage in two ways. The first pattern is that, on average, insiders win higher percentages of the vote than outsiders (Table 1). The sample includes all politicians who ran in at least one of the 1993, 2000, 2007, and 2012 races, and the unit of analysis is the candidate-year. This means that the same politician can enter the sample multiple times if she competed in more than one race. Insiders had served in a ministerial post in the government before they ran for office and outsiders had not. The difference-in-means test government declared a state of emergency, and Wade and prominent youth leaders like Talla Sylla, were imprisoned (Beck 2008, Diaw & Diouf 1998, Diop & Diouf 1990, Villalón 2013, Young & Kanté 1992).

However, “the political playing field was not entirely level in that the PS retained control over the state apparatus that legislated, administered, and adjudicated the electoral process” (Beck 2008: 64).
was conducted on the averages of the percentage of the total vote share that insiders and outsiders won. It reveals that insiders performed significantly better than outsiders on average across these four elections.

**Table 12: Difference in the Electoral Performance of Insiders and Outsiders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Overall vote share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insiders</strong> (N=20)</td>
<td>9.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outsiders</strong> (N=21)</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This difference in means is statistically significant at the 99% level.

The second pattern is that insiders were a much greater proportion of the viable opposition candidates in all four races. Insider advantage is overwhelmingly apparent even when we generously define viable opposition candidates as politicians who win just 5% of the vote or higher (Table 13). Every single candidate since 1993 who received at least this much of the vote in presidential elections was an insider. No politician who counted as an outsider by these standards was a viable opposition candidate. Instead, in each election, the majority of opposition candidates scoring less than 5% were outsiders. Moreover, insider advantage remains a prevalent feature of the Senegalese political landscape even if we more restrictively operationalize the definition of insiders. The front-running opposition candidates in all four elections count as insiders even if we only label as insiders the politicians who have served as ministers within the last electoral cycle (i.e., after the prior presidential election). Some of the

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11 Even if we more restrictively operationalize insiders as candidates who have been ministers within the last electoral cycle (rather than as candidates who have ever been ministers), the difference in means is striking, with insiders (N=10) winning an average of 13.3% of the vote share and outsiders (N=31) winning an average of 0.24%. The difference is statistically significant at the 99% level.
third and fourth place finishers in these races remain insiders by these standards as well, \textsuperscript{12} and the proportion of candidates under the 5\% bar who are outsiders still surpasses that of insiders. \textsuperscript{13}

**Table 13: Insiders and Outsiders with more than 5\% of the Vote, 1993-2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Insiders over 5%</th>
<th>Outsiders over 5%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Wade</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Wade Niasse Kâ</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Seck Niasse Tanor Dieng</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Sall Niasse Tanor Dieng Seck</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Presidential election returns (Carr 2003), Ministerial rosters (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006)*

**Insiders as Opposition Front-Runners**

Although not all insiders in Senegal translate their opportunities to access the state into electoral performance that sidelines outsiders, insider advantage is significant enough that insiders have been the most serious opposition candidates in the last four presidential elections. Two kinds of insiders were the opposition front-runners on a regular basis. In 1993 and 2000, Abdoulaye Wade was the leading opposition candidate, each time leaving PS governments that his party had joined in order to campaign in the opposition during the races. In 2007 and 2012, prominent members of the ruling party itself broke away to become the president’s leading opponents. Wade’s ex-Prime Minister, Idrissa Seck was the second-place finisher in 2007; and

\textsuperscript{12} The insiders listed in Table 13 for 1993 and 2000 remain the same; for 2007, Seck and Niasse count as insiders but Tanor Dieng is an outsider; and for 2012, only Sall remains an insider. Thus there would be no outsiders with over 5\% in 1993 and 2000; one of three in 2007, and three of four in 2012.

\textsuperscript{13} Candidates with under 5\% who were insiders would constitute the following proportions: 33\% (2/6) in 1993, 0\% (0/4) in 2000; 27\% (3/11) in 2007; and 13\% (1/8) in 2012.
Seck’s successor as Prime Minister, Macky Sall, defeated Wade in 2012. On the whole, insider candidates were more popular than outsider candidates as well.

**Wade in 1993 and 2000: The Opponent who Joined the Government**

In the 1993 presidential elections, President Diouf’s main challenger, Abdoulaye Wade, was an insider: although an opposition party leader, he had been a government minister until late 1992, when he left to contest the election. Wade was thus not an insider who originated from the ruling party itself. He had been Senegal’s most prominent opposition leader since 1974, when he convinced Senegal’s first president, Leopold Sédar Senghor, to let him create the PDS as a “party of contribution” (Diop 2011: 348, Nzouankeu 1984). Although it was Senegal’s most popular opposition party, the PDS was in this sense complicit with those in power and had been pragmatic about the existing regime since its birth.

Wade was not the only insider running the opposition in 1993, but he was by far the strongest performer. Diouf won in the first round, garnering 58.4% of the vote to Wade’s second-place finish with 32.0%. Despite the loss, Wade made significant inroads against the ruling party: Diouf’s score was the lowest of any Senegalese president since independence (Gellar 2005: 82), and for the first time, the PS lost in Dakar (Kanté 1994). The only other insider in the race was the Senegalese public intellectual, Iba Der Thiam, who had been the Minister of Education under Diouf in the late 1980s but lost his ministerial post in 1988 (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). He ran for president in 1993, just after creating his own party, the Convention for Democrats and Patriots (CDP-Garab gi), but he only garnered 1.6% of the vote. All other opposition candidates were either civil society figures or the leaders of leftist parties who had

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14 Senegal’s presidential elections occur within a two-round system, with the two highest-scoring candidates advancing to a second-round runoff election if no candidate wins at least 50% of the vote in the first round contest.
begun their political careers in the clandestine opposition to the PS under President Senghor. Abdoulaye Bathily of the Democratic League (LD/MPT), Landing Savané of And-Jef, Madior Diouf of the National Democratic Assembly (RND), and Babacar Niang of the Party of People’s Liberation (PLP) had never been ministers in the government. Each commanded no more than three percent of the vote on their own.

Wade, on the other hand, enjoyed widespread popularity after decades in opposition and over a year as minister in Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority government. Joining the government in April 1991 and leaving it several months to begin his 1993 campaign, Wade was able to attract unemployed urban youth frustrated with the high unemployment rates that had prevailed in Senegal under the 1985-1992 structural adjustment program (Gerard 1993, Diop 2006). However, young voters did not turn out in great numbers, and some had gravitated away from party politics and towards grassroots activism like Set Setal, “a movement dedicated to bringing physical, moral, and aesthetic order to a situation of urban disorder and the PS’ record of bad governance” (Diaw & Diouf 1998: 137, Gerard 1993, Villalón 1994). These tendencies among the young, urban voters to whom Wade was most appealing only reinforced President Diouf’s structural advantages in the election.

Wade was the opposition front-runner again in 2000, having served as minister along with several PDS colleagues in President Diouf’s 1995 and 1998 governments (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). However, unlike in 1993, several other ex-regime insiders were candidates alongside Wade. Within the PS, Diouf’s declaration that Ousmane Tanor Dieng would be his successor, as well as the rise of Dieng’s younger allies within party institutions as of 1996 coincided with the defection of two ex-ministers and ex-Political Bureau elites, Djibo Kâ and Moustapha Niasse
Both men created parties that immediately became serious competitors. They reduced PS support enough to facilitate a runoff, with Niasse taking 16% and Kâ just over 7%, while the PS scored just 41% in the first round. It was with the support of Niasse, the third-place finisher, that Wade won the runoff with 59% of the vote. The other remaining insider, Iba Der Thiam of the CDP, again scored less than 2% along with the outsider candidates, Ousseynou Fall, Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye, and Mademba Sock.

Wade was the most competitive opposition candidate in part because of the alliances he forged with other parties, many of which were led by insiders as well. The Coalition for Turnover (CA) that Wade led in the first round of 2000, and which brought him 31% of the vote, was the brainchild of both insiders and outsiders on the Senegalese left. In 1999, it was at the behest of Abdoulaye Bathily and Amath Dansokho, leaders of the LD/MPT and the PIT, that Wade returned from France to run for president. Both Bathily and Dansokho were insiders from their multi-year participation in Diouf’s enlarged governments during the 1990s. After Bathily ran for president in 1993, various leftist leaders – including Bathily himself, Dansokho, and Landing Savané of And-Jef (who remained an outsider throughout the Diouf presidency) – had concluded that reaching a runoff was not possible without opposition unity. They identified

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15 Both Kâ and Niasse had been ministers after Diouf won the 1993 presidency (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). Niasse was Minister of Foreign Affairs until he left the government in July 1998 and was appointed emissary of the UN Secretary General in the Democratic Republic of Congo; Kâ became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1991 and remained so for several months after the February 1993 elections, before taking over the Ministry of the Interior until he left the government in 1995.

16 Ousseynou Fall is the son of Cheikh Ibra Fall, the leader of the Baye Fall branch of Tidjani Islam in Senegal; before running for president in 2000, he was also a technical counselor (conseiller technique) in the Senegalese Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs (FKA/CESTI 2001, Interview with Fall, 3/3/12, Dakar). Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye is an Islamic intellectual, a civil administrator, and an architect with a local following in Saint-Louis who ran for president after creating a party out of the civic association that he founded for improving the city (FKA/CESTI 2001, Interview with Cheikh Bamba Dièye, 13 August 2010, Saint-Louis). Mademba Sock was the leader of the Single Union of Electrical Workers (SUTELEC), which coordinated major strikes in 1998. Sock had been imprisoned after the strikes and before he ran in 2000 by borrowing the label of a leftist party, the Assembly of African Workers/Senegal (RTA/S).
Wade as the most promising agent of turnover (Diop et al. 2000: 171). With the PDS and the support of these other prominent party leaders, Wade campaigned on the same themes as in 1993, cultivating an image that combined American-tinged charm with populist appeal. The innovative “blue marches” that Wade organized featured him driving slowly through Dakar’s disaffected suburban neighborhoods, playing pop and reggae music, sporting a suit of an American businessman on Wall Street and promising jobs to unemployed youth (Foucher 2007: 112).

**Idrissa Seck in 2007 and Macky Sall in 2012: Ruling Party Elites who Break Away**

In 2007, President Wade’s main opponent was a different kind of insider than he himself had been under Diouf. Idrissa Seck, who took second in the 2007 presidential contest, did not originate in the opposition. He did not become an insider by joining governments; instead, he had built his entire political career within the PDS and had been Wade’s Prime Minister before leaving the party to oppose him. As Prime Minister, Seck was subject to increasing speculation about his own presidential ambitions, as well as his ambitions to take over the PDS after Wade’s retirement (M.C. Diop 2006, 2013, O. Diop 2011, 2013). By “leaving the

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17 Seck had spent his entire political career in the PDS, and first served as minister in the enlarged presidential majority governments of the 1990s. After Wade was elected in 2000, Seck, who had already been working in the capacity of deputy secretary general of the PDS and had been Wade’s campaign director in 2000, also became the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs (Diop 2011: 351, 360). From 2002-2004, Seck was Prime Minister. Thus, in the 2007 elections, “the most vigorous opposition to those in power thus came from the ranks of the PDS, and essentially the Point E Boys within the PDS, youth who had rallied around Wade since his difficult time in the desert as an opponent.” This “relegated to second tier the classical opposition” of outsiders (Diop 2006: 119-120).

18 Several stories circulate about the source of Wade’s falling-out with Seck. Mbow (2008) reports that “it is rumored that much of the tension between the two men stems from Wade’s suspicion that the former prime minister served as a source for Latif Coulibaly [an investigative journalist who wrote a scathing critique of the first half of Wade’s first term], perhaps with the intention of setting Wade up to be overthrown by a coup” (164). Wikileaks reports US diplomatic conversations with informants indicating that Wade resented that Seck had, without Wade’s permission, inspected his medical records to see if he was fit to run for president in 2007. Diop (2006) also notes that Seck’s enemies in the PDS thus “developed an image of him as a ‘man in a hurry,’ determined to proceed with a ‘murder of the father’ [of the party, Wade]” (118).
president’s cabinet and becoming Prime Minister, in refusing to hide his ambitions, and in taking an autonomous attitude about his mentor and his mentor’s family, Idrissa Seck turned himself into a declared candidate for Wade’s succession,” which created uncertainty within the PDS (Diop 2006: 118). In January 2004, Seck even boldly declared in the press, “Yes, I want to succeed Wade. The first day after Wade, I want it to be Idy.” 19

Faced with rising tensions related to leadership disputes within the PDS, Wade ended Seck’s tenure as Prime Minister in 2004 and attempted to liquidate him politically. In protest, eleven PDS deputies in the National Assembly formed their own parliamentary group, which led the PDS Directing Committee to suspend Seck and the frondeurs in April 2005 (Diop 2011: 369). That year, the government charged Seck with mismanagement of 43 billion FCFA in public funds for the Chantiers de Thiès, a set of public infrastructure projects in Seck’s hometown (Diop 2011: 371, Mbow 2008). He spent over six months in prison before an acquittal (Galvan 2009). Cleared of the charges, which were widely viewed as a political maneuver, Seck then created his own party, Rewmi, in 2006 (Diop 2006, Gellar 2013). 20 21

Although Seck lost to Wade, garnering 15% in the first round to Wade’s 56%, 22 he was the best-performing opposition candidate. However, he was not the only insider. All candidates

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20 Although the Ministry of Interior initially denied its formal registration, several micro-parties founded by partisans of Seck were willing to lend their labels to Seck to run in 2007.

21 Gellar (2013) in particular notes that “Seck’s presidential ambitions also placed serious obstacles in the way of the President’s plan to position his son to succeed him. It was widely believed that Wade had tried to discredit Seck and get him out of the way by accusing him of stealing state funds. While in jail, Seck won the sympathy of many Senegalese who saw him as an innocent victim” (126).

22 Moustapha Niasse of the AFP had spent several years outside of Senegal before the 2007 race, which some attribute to his lackluster performance (Magrin 2007, Resnick 2014). The PS, led by Ousmane Tanor Dieng, was still recovering from its loss in 2000. After alternance, Wade lured PS elites into the PDS in exchange for patronage, thereby encouraging “political nomadism” (transhumance) (Galvan 2001, Diop 2011). For one thing,
who won more than 5% of the vote were insiders. Ousmane Tanor Dieng, the third place finisher who got 13%, had been Minister of Presidential Affairs for the PS in the 1990s before taking over the party from President Diouf. He and Moustapha Niasse, who took fourth place, both insisted on running in 2007, impeding the opposition’s stated goal of designating a single candidate (Diop 2011, Magrin 2007). However, eleven of the fifteen candidates scored less than 5% of the vote. Insiders from Senegal’s historically relevant leftist parties, including Bathily and Savané (who ran for president while retaining a ministerial post in Wade’s government), garnered just over 2% of the vote, while numerous outsider candidates did not even break 1%. These outsiders included Talla Sylla, a polemical ex-student leader who had turned his youth association for turnover into a political party before Wade came to power. They also included independent candidates like Mame Adama Guèye, a renowned lawyer and former president of the Senegal section of Transparency International who was the only one to declare his assets before the race (Diop 2011).

Wade’s re-election is attributed to several factors, including citizens’ willingness to give the president more time to keep campaign promises and their disillusionment with a variety of opposition party leaders (Diop 2011). Some of the disillusionment came from party leaders’ reactions to Wade when he attempted to bring several former insiders into his government before the 2007 elections, including Niasse and Seck. Although Niasse ultimately refused, he and other opposition leaders met with Wade at the Presidential Palace before the campaign. Both before and during the 2007 campaign, Seck was rumored to be negotiating his re-entry into the PDS and met with Wade privately on several occasions. Combined with the opposition’s fragmentation

Wade needed cadres with administrative experience to help him run the country. For another, he needed nomads and their clients because the PDS was not guaranteed to win a future presidential majority on its own, given that the party won only 30% of the vote in conjunction with the leftist parties in the CA during the first round in 2000.
due to conflicts between Niasse and Tanor Dieng, its leaders’ willingness to entertain talks with Wade may have also contributed to the ruling party’s victory.

In 2012, Wade’s ex-Prime Minister, Macky Sall, was the front-running opposition figure. Sall had replaced Seck in 2004 and was Prime Minister until 2007, when he was also Wade’s presidential campaign director. Because of his place within the state and the ruling party, Sall was a potential *dauphin* to President Wade; yet Sall knew that “the knives were out for me as soon as the [2007] elections were over.” The president had begun to more overtly pave the way for his son, Karim, to succeed him within the PDS and the presidency, giving him multiple ministerial posts, control over key infrastructural portfolios, and the leeway to cultivate an informal faction of young professionals (known as the *Génération du Concret*) who supported him (O. Diop 2011, M.C. Diop 2013). Sall’s difficulties began when, in his new capacities as the President of the National Assembly, he called Karim to account in front of parliament for his administration of projects when he had directed the National Agency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (ANOCI) (Diop 2011: 356, Diop 2013: 457). After Sall’s controversial action, the PDS Directing Committee met in November 2007 and changed the party’s institutional structure to eliminate Sall’s position of second-in-command. President Wade then exploited the PDS’s legislative majority to pass a bill reducing the term of the National

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23 In his youth, Sall briefly belonged to the leftist party AJ/PADS, but joined the PDS as early as the 1980s (Ndiaye 2012). In 2000, Wade appointed him Director General of the Senegalese Petroleum Company and a Special Counselor for Energy and Mines” after the 2000 alternance (Ndiaye 2012: 4-5). Between May 2001 and April 2004, he served first as Minister of Mining, Energy, and Hydraulics and then as Minister of the Interior and of Local Collectivities (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006).


25 Wade would henceforth have 17 national secretaries answering directly to him, without recourse to an intermediary like Sall. See Fall, Harouna. “Suppression du poste de No2 du PDS et eviction de Macky de l’Assemblée. 81 députés acquis à la cause et toutes les fédérations liberals en alerte,” *Le Quotidien*, 6 November 2007, 5.
Assembly president to a year. Moreover, the Directing Committee encouraged the proposal of a law that would reduce Sall’s mandate as President of the National Assembly from five years to one. The proposal to reduce the term of the National Assembly President eventually passed in November 2008. Sall resigned from all of his appointed and elected posts and founded his own party, the Alliance of the Republic (APR), before running against Wade in 2012.

Sall ultimately defeated Wade, first winning 27% to Wade’s 35% in the first round, but then rallying all other candidates behind him in the runoff to capture 66% of the vote. As in 2007, all opposition candidates who won more than 5% of the vote were insiders, but Sall was the most recent defector from the government among them. Moustapha Niassé, who took third, had not been in the government since 2001, when he had briefly served as Wade’s first Prime Minister; Ousmane Tanor Dieng, who took fourth, had never been in Wade’s governments but had significant experience from PS rule; and Idrissa Seck, who took fifth, had temporarily fused Rewmi with the PDS in 2009 but had not joined the government after he contested the 2007 elections. Other insiders and outsiders won smaller portions of the vote, no greater than 2%.

The 2012 election occurred in a context of increased citizen engagement, which worked to Sall’s advantage. President Wade formally declared his intentions to run for a third term in


May 2011. That June, he proposed an amendment to the constitution, which would have allowed the president to select a vice-presidential running mate (most likely Karim Wade) and to win elections with just 25% of the popular vote in the first round. The 2012 presidential campaign was profoundly shaped by mobilization against these institutional manipulations, as well as against the Constitutional Council’s later validation of Wade’s controversial third-term candidacy. In this polarized setting, Sall won the unified support of other insiders and outsiders in the opposition after he advanced to the runoff and (belatedly) endorsed the Assises Nationales. A programmatic feature of some opposition party campaigns since the 2009 local elections, the Assises process produced a set of proposed reforms developed through participatory town hall meetings led by a commission led by a long-retired and widely respected politician and supported by hundreds of party, union, and civil society groups.

### Mechanisms of Insider Advantage in Senegal

Each of the proposed mechanisms of insider advantage came into play at various times and for various presidential candidates during Senegal’s last four elections. Not all insiders developed the same degree of advantage over outsiders from their access to the state. However, insiders as a group generally benefited from opportunities to build financial capital, government experience, political followings, and name recognition among the public. Their access to these

28 He announced to the Senegalese press, “maa waxoon, waxeet,” (Wolof for “I take back what I said”), referencing prior promises not to run again (Kelly 2012).

29 A “Don’t Touch My Constitution!” movement, led by the president of Senegal’s African Assembly for Human Rights, organized popular protests in downtown Dakar, and these forces were joined by a youth social movement known as “Fed Up With It” (Y’en a marre) that was led by a journalist and several rappers opposed to the amendment. After experiencing violent repression at the hands of the Senegalese police during protests, these groups became the June 23 Movement (M23), a mobilizing force for certain opposition politicians and disaffected youth throughout the campaign. Sall rarely showed up to the M23 protests during the campaign, but his resources and momentum from his recent falling out with Wade bolstered his chances in 2012.

30 For more detailed studies of populist strategies in the context of clientelism in Africa, see Larmer & Fraser (2007), Resnick (2014), and Foucher (2007).
sources of advantage tends to correlate with better electoral performance than outsiders, as previously described.

**Name Recognition and State Salaries**

In several cases, ministerial service gave insiders the opportunity to gain name recognition among the public, as well as a state salary that could help them build initial financial capital to compete against the president later. This source of insider advantage was not just limited to Abdoulaye Wade, who acknowledged that the PDS benefitted from both of these opportunities when it joined the PS’ presidential majority governments in the 1990s. In a booklet explaining the LD/MPT’s participation in Diouf’s first enlarged presidential majority government, party elites also mention how their ministerial appointments “placed the party in a quite comfortable situation” (LD/MPT 1995: 21). The state salaries that ministerial posts bring these parties enable their leaders to develop profiles as statesmen, while also more pragmatically accessing financial capital needed to pay registration fees for the party to run candidates in future elections. Even insiders like Wade, who had private sector resources to draw upon from his work with the African Development Bank (BAD), had trouble raising enough funds to both run and campaign in these races. He commented that “each time I went to elections, I spent everything I had, thinking that I would be elected that time…and then I would find myself short of money” when the incumbent won again (Wade 2006: 202). Salaries thus constitute modest, albeit important, augmentations to insiders’ financing.

**Control over Patronage to Attract Followers**
Some regime insiders also capitalized on opportunities to use their high-level access to the state to develop networks of followers who later supported them in their bids for the presidency. The most accessible evidence from Senegal relates to insiders who have spent their careers in the ruling party. For instance, eleven PDS Members of Parliament followed ex-Prime Minister Idrissa Seck out of the PDS in 2005 (Diop 2011: 369). In addition, Seck had met and mentored people like Yankhoba Diattara, a young student leader at the University of Cheikh Anta Diop, from Seck’s hometown of Thiès. In the late 1990s, when Seck was a minister in one of Diouf’s governments, he took Diattara under his wing, providing him student housing and introducing him to other professionals, as he did for several other students from Thiès. Eventually, Seck recruited Diattara into the PDS youth wing, giving him opportunities to travel the country to build the party. Elected as Thiès’ municipal counselor in charge of international cooperation in 2002, when Seck became the mayor, Diattara traveled with him abroad. Because Seck had since his early ministerial days “always looked out for [him]” and was a powerful advocate for him both personally and professionally, Diattara followed him out of the PDS and formed a party, FIDEL, that Seck could use to run in elections when he initially had trouble registering Rewmi. Diattara’s defection from the PDS followed a relational logic: “I didn’t know Wade, I knew Idy.” 31 At the time, Diattara and other students who followed Seck were hopeful that they could return to the party, but their position depended on whether Seck gained control of it.

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31 Interview with Diattara, 4/22/12, Thiès.
Connections to Rich Elites

Several major insiders also rely on the social networks they developed to domestic and international elites while they were ministers in their search for political financing and support. For instance, both Djibo Kâ and Moustapha Niasse – insider candidates in the 2000 election – had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in former PS governments (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). During the campaign period, Kâ was in contact with wealthy foreign leaders who knew him already, including King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, and the President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso. There are rumors, which Kâ denies, that he visited these leaders and that they offered him money in exchange for supporting Abdou Diouf (Kâ 2005: 284). Kâ’s long record of ministerial service during PS rule made such allegations plausible, regardless of their truth. As another experienced, ex-PS statesman like Djibo Kâ, Moustapha Niasse had pre-existing relationships with King Hassan II of Morocco, Omar Bongo, and other leaders in the Persian Gulf (Coulibaly 1999: 164). Before he ran for president in 2000, he continued to cultivate his international diplomatic renown, serving as the UN Special Envoy for the Great Lakes. Given that accepting foreign campaign financing is illegal in Senegal, it is difficult to determine whether, how much, and how often insiders like Niasse exploit these kinds of ties.

There were further accusations of illicit financing through foreign donors when Macky Sall campaigned against Wade in 2012. The connections that Sall had built up with African leaders during his time in government were a source of contention with the Wade administration. Sall was allegedly in contact with presidents like Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d’Ivoire and Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, who were envious of Wade’s international diplomatic roles in Africa and the Middle East (Seck 2009). In addition, he corresponded with Omar Bongo of Gabon,
who had funded Wade when he was an opposition candidate in the 1990s (Wade 2006). The fact that the Senegalese police intercepted Sall’s written appeal to Bongo for an audience and then questioned him about illicitly financing his political career through such contacts also suggests that Wade took seriously Sall’s international network as a source of electoral advantage.

The network that Sall developed through his work in the government also put him in touch with businessmen in the Senegalese diaspora who ended up making major contributions to his 2012 campaign. In addition to meeting Harouna Dia through Wade as previously discussed, Macky Sall cultivated connections with Abdoulaye Sally Sall, a Senegalese businessman based in Gabon who had been his colleague in the PDS in the early 2000s (A.B. Diop 2013). By the time that Macky resigned from the Presidency of the National Assembly and was thrown out of the PDS in 2008, he had strong connections with Abdoulaye, who had serious capacity to mobilize votes in the diaspora and (to a lesser extent) in northern Senegal. Wade was aware of these affinities and put Abdoulaye Sall’s property, communications, and financial transactions under surveillance soon before Macky Sall was demoted (341).

On the domestic front as well, a variety of insiders were able to attract privately wealthy supporters to build their electoral momentum. Before Niasse ran in 2000, he convinced four privately wealthy professionals to help him build his party, assigning each of them regions of the country in which they were “responsible for bringing life to the party and attracting supporters.”

32 They included an architect who had built the West African Central Bank (BCEAO), a doctor with his own private practice in Dakar, a marabout with extensive and lucrative international

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32 Interview with Oumar Hassimou Dia, 5/3/12, Dakar. Interview with Babou Dieng, 5/11/12, Dakar.
connections in Africa and the Middle East, and an agricultural engineer. Along similar lines, before Idrissa Seck contested the 2007 election, he developed close connections as Prime Minister to Bara Tall, a major private sector businessman who later contributed to Seck’s 2007 presidential campaign, and who came from Seck’s hometown, Thiès. Initially appointed a member of the Council For Investment (CPI) designated to advise Wade on related issues, Tall was the Director-General and owner of Jean Lefèbre Senegal, a construction company worth several million dollars. As Prime Minister, Seck approved the attribution of a 14 million dollar contract for lighting in Thiès to Tall’s company, authorizing it in place of Senegal’s Minister of Finance. When Seck clashed with Wade in 2004, the fates of Seck and Tall became more closely tied. The president, who had unsuccessfully sought Tall’s assistance in fostering Seck’s political downfall, brought charges of corruption against Seck, questioning his legal authority to sign off on Tall’s contract and investigating Tall for price gouging. Seck’s liquidation thus entailed a corruption investigation that implicated both him and Tall and created the conditions for their political-financial alliance.

Some outsiders also had domestic and international networks to finance their political activities but did not tend to mobilize as much money or support as the insiders discussed above. For instance, Talla Sylla of the Jëf-Jël party ran for president in 2007 after his party had spent nearly a decade in the opposition without entering any government. Sylla was nevertheless a

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33 The four “contact group” leaders each came from a different part of Senegal and helped to fund the party-building process in their home regions and others nearby. The leaders are, respectively, Cheikh Ngom, Pape Camara, Serigne Mamoune Niasse, and Oumar Hassimou Dia.

34 Interview with Tall, 6/5/12, Dakar, Diouf 2005. Seck was charged with authorizing 40 billion CFA of contracts for infrastructure projects in anticipation of the 44th Independence Day celebration that was to take place in Thiès that year, claiming that the president had only authorized 25 billion CFA for these tasks. He claimed that the Prime Minister had been legally stripped of his ability to authorize contracts without the signature of the Minister of Finance just days before Sall approved Tall’s lighting contract. See Pauron, Michael. 2011. “Senegal : Bara Tall relaxé, et après?” Jeune Afrique 21 May 2011, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110521110246/ (accessed 17 May 2014); Seck, Cheikh Yerim. 2005. “Wade/Seck Règlement de comptes” Jeune Afrique 18 July 2005, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/LIN17075wadessetpmo0/ (accessed 17 May 2014).
well-known national political figure because of his long-standing involvement in Senegalese student movements at home and abroad when he himself had been a student in France, as well as his outspoken and sometimes incendiary criticisms of incumbents (Diagne 2000). Sylla had been too young to run for president in 2000 but contested the 2007 race as an outsider. Although unemployed, he had a “wide network of friends and possibly cash supporters throughout the [West African] region.”

If indeed Jëf-Jël has sources of international private financing through Sylla’s friends abroad, rather than legitimate business ventures like those of Niasse, then it is unsurprising that Sylla has kept the party’s finances a secret, given Senegal’s fundraising laws (Fall 2011). However, Sylla’s sources of autonomous financing are not likely to have been as expansive as those that Niasse and others enjoyed, and they did not foster a strong electoral performance. In 2007, the U.S. embassy’s election watchers observed that Sylla barely had enough money to travel within Senegal during the campaign after paying the fee to run for president. One possible explanation is that large-scale voter support and financing were arguably more difficult without access to the political and economic opportunities provided to insiders by the state.

*Advantageous Media Access*

The media access that insiders enjoy during their time within the state also reinforces their advantages over outsiders. Working in the government often gets ministers exposure in the media and helps them develop name recognition among voters and among rich and powerful

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36 This is difficult to verify because the Senegalese government does not enforce rules requiring party leaders to declare their organizations’ sources of income each year.

37 Jacobs, *op. cit.*
elites. Their actual government experience puts insiders in contact with different portions of the Senegalese populace, through meetings, speeches, and programming in various parts of the country. However, the media’s documentation of it also helps them build reputations as statesmen. For instance, Senegalese newspapers discuss government activities in which ministers participate and often publish short biographies of newly appointed ministers, which is just one small, initial part of their media exposure. Wade claimed that he could use the media to increase the public’s familiarity with the PDS while it was in Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority governments (Wade 2006), and the elites of other parties that joined these governments echo his assessments. The party leadership of the Democratic League (LD/MPT), which had several ministers in the Diouf government from 1993 to 1998, judged early on that joining the enlarged presidential majority government had “increased in a prodigious way [the party’s] domestic and international audience and thereby made an impact on the Senegalese collective consciousness” (LD/MPT 1995: 23).

Because they are often well-known before they even oppose the president, insiders also have the potential to garner significant media attention at the moment they break away from the government to enter the opposition. This coverage feeds into the waves of popular sympathy that some insiders benefit from in the first presidential elections they contest in the opposition. For example, the downfall within the ruling party of both of Wade’s ex-Prime Ministers, Idrissa Seck and Macky Sall, was widely covered, as was their entry into the opposition. Both men went into their first presidential elections riding on waves of popular sympathy, largely due to citizens’ knowledge about the way that Wade had liquidated them and their reactions to what was often perceived as injustice. 38 Similarly, the exits of Djibo Kâ and Moustapha Niasse from

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38 This “wave of sympathy” is mentioned in countless newspaper articles and interviews. See, for instance, Dia 2009, Gellar 2013. Diop (2011: 299) reports that many citizens “did not appreciate the incarceration that he was a
the PS in the late 1990s, as well as their preparations to contest the 2000 presidency as they unfolded, were prominent features of press coverage on politics at the time. Even the LD/MPT leaders, who left the Diouf government in 1993 after just over a year in government, found that their exit, accompanied by their criticism of the continuation of allegedly corrupt practices by PS officials in the administration, garnered media attention that was “an especially lucrative currency for reconquering oppositional bastions” within Senegal (LD/MPT 1995: 22). Not all publicity about insiders’ exit from the ruling coalition is positive for their political image, but the media sensations that these exits create in the mainstream press still provide politicians with exposure that outsiders struggle to get at all.

Outsiders also acknowledge the importance of “selling your image” in the media, but complain of unequal access. 39 As the leader of the Social Democratic Front (FSD/BJ), a party with its origins in local associations dedicated to improving life in the city of Saint Louis, Cheikh Bamba Dièye ran as an outsider presidential candidate in 2007, and 2012. His father, the Islamic intellectual Cheikh Abdoulaye Dièye, who founded the party in 1996, ran for president in 2000. Dièye the son recounts the difficulty of building his image without state access. When he took over the party after the death of his father in 2002, Dièye was “an unknown person” in the national political arena and struggled to attain public prominence beyond the local level. Because of the media’s skewed coverage of the opposition, he had to employ two alternative strategies to increase his recognition among the public: initially, he did door-to-door campaigning in various locales; later, when the party won a seat in the 2007 National Assembly, victim of” at the hands of the president. Sall, who was ousted as President of the National Assembly due to the president’s controversial use of the law, remarked in retrospect, “what was done to me, many people found unjust. This martyrization [sic]…that I went through has really created strong grassroots support for me.” See Bernicat, Marcia. “Senegal: Former Prime Minister Macky Sall,” 8 December 2008, released by Wikileaks 30 August 2011, 08DAKAR1401, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08DAKAR1401.html (accessed 24 March 2014).

39 Interview with Cheikh Bamba Dièye, 8/13/10, Saint-Louis.
he provoked media coverage by speaking out in debates about a variety of issues, including the budget. These issues, though, are not as extensively covered as the government programming and ruling coalition politics that motivate much reporting on insiders.

**Variation in Opportunity among Insiders**

However, not all insiders develop the same level of advantage. Rather than a certainty, advantage is a probabilistic feature of Senegalese politics that depends on insiders’ varying capacities to exploit the opportunities that they face with access to the state on the ministerial level. The first reason for the variation in insider advantage is that the performance of any given insider also depends on that of other insiders running in the same contest. More high-performing insiders, like Wade, Seck, Sall, Niasse, and Kâ, appear to have crowded out the market for insider candidates in various elections. Other insiders, who also had fewer resources and less popular appeal, scored on levels similar to many outsiders in Senegal.

Moreover, insiders vary in the degree of access to the opportunities that the state provides for developing advantages over outsiders. For instance, the historian and public intellectual, Iba Der Thiam, was President Diouf’s Minister of Education until shortly after Diouf won the 1988 presidential elections (Ndiaye & Ndiaye 2006). Because of this ministerial service after the 1988 race, Thiam was an insider in the 1993 race, which he contested with his new party, the Convention for Democrats and Patriots (CDP/Garab gi); he won less than 2% of the vote. Although Thiam was offered logistical support for the campaign from the Tidjani marabout El Hadj Malick Sy, ⁴⁰ he did not have particularly important constituencies that followed him out of the Diouf government, as Seck and Sall did, nor did Thiam appear to have the international financial connections that more electorally successful insiders had after their exits.

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⁴⁰ Interview with Thiam, 8/7/10, Dakar.
Similar generalizations can be made about Abdoulaye Bathily of the LD in 1993. His trajectory illustrates that some, but not all insiders are similarly capable of transforming their access to the state into an electoral advantage over outsiders. After running as an outsider in 1993, Bathily was Minister of the Environment for five years in President Diouf’s enlarged presidential majority government and spent another five years as minister under President Wade. Yet in 2007, when Bathily contested the presidency, he was still unable to command more than three percent of the vote, remaining at the same percentage of support as in 1993. Along the same lines, Cheikh Tidiane Gadio contested the 2012 race after serving nine years as Wade’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although he had the professional and international business connections that were key for campaign financing, he won just 1% of the vote, even less than several outsiders.

IV- Turnover in the Context of Insider Advantage

Ex-regime insiders were major opposition contenders in all of the last four presidential elections, but what makes it more likely that insiders will actually win these elections, as they did in 2000 and 2012? Several of the causal factors that these studies identify, including opposition coalescence and economic performance, help explain the structural basis of Senegal’s turnovers. However, because these studies are probabilistic assessments based on many, relatively independent, cross-national cases, they do not fully account for the four particular election outcomes of interest. Understanding these specific, interdependent events requires additional historical and contextual nuancing, including attention to the interaction of contingent and structural factors. This is especially key if we hope to understand the who and the how of turnover in addition to its causes. Nevertheless, the Africanist literature’s causal, cross-national
studies are useful because they highlight several factors that may have increased the baseline likelihood of turnover in Senegal in 2000 and 2012.

The first theory that applies to Senegal is that the formation of a unified opposition coalition causes turnover (Howard & Roessler 2006, Resnick 2013, Van de Walle 2006). Opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes often “lack access to sufficient material resources to build a broad, nationwide political party that is capable of mounting an effective challenge to the incumbent’s hold on power” (Howard & Roessler 2006: 371). But when rival opposition parties coordinate with each other, designating and pooling resources behind a single candidate, then turnover becomes more plausible.

This theory holds some weight in Senegal. Temporary, programmatic pacts between opposition parties were features of Senegal’s only two presidential runoffs, each of which led to turnover. Before the Diouf-Wade runoff in 2000, Wade negotiated an agreement about the policies he would implement in exchange for the electoral support of other opposition parties, supplementing these promises with ministerial appointments to his newfound allies (Niang 2004). A similar combination of patronage and programmatic dealings occurred in 2012 between Sall and other first-round presidential candidates. Before the runoff, Sall reluctantly endorsed the Assises Nationales reform proposals, while also striking patronage deals to secure the second-round support of the third and fourth place finishers who had campaigned on the Assises since local elections in 2009.

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41 Opposition coalescence may increase the likelihood of turnover, but it is not sufficient. In Africa’s “electoral democracies” since 2000, “opposition coalitions rarely have defeated incumbent parties in either presidential or parliamentary elections” (Resnick 2013: 751).

42 A commonly cited example is Kenya’s turnover in 2002, when President Moi of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) finished his second and last constitutionally mandated term, designating Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor. This sparked defections by other presidential hopefuls within the party, including Raila Odinga, who left KANU, formed his own party, and entered into a broad opposition coalition. By virtue of their collusion, and the willingness of presidential hopefuls like Odinga to refrain from running in exchange for the promise of the Prime Ministerial post, Mwai Kibaki of the National African Rainbow Coalition (NARC) defeated Kenyatta.
These programmatic pacts are a feature of the turnovers in 2000 and 2012 that was absent from the incumbent victories in 1993 and 2007. In 1993, just after the reform of the electoral code, “opposition unity [wa]s difficult to achieve because the small, underfunded splinter parties understandably wish to capitalize on the freedom and equal media access that mark campaign periods” (Kanté 1994: 102). In 2007, the opposition sought to designate a single candidate but Wade co-opted several opposition leaders and other major players like Niasse and Tanor Dieng both insisted on running (Diop 2011).

However, the relationship between opposition coalescence and turnover is potentially endogenous. That is, countries in which opposition coordination is structurally possible may already be more prone to turnover than countries without such structural possibilities, before coalescence even actually occurs to facilitate the outcome. Both coalescence and turnover may be caused by other factors that themselves foster opposition pacts and collaboration in a runoff. Coalescence might itself depend on the perceived chances of winning, the economic climate, expectations about electoral transparency, the identities of other challengers, and the internal cohesion of various parties (Van de Walle 2006).

This leads other scholars to consider less proximate factors. A second set of theories holds that poor economic performance often fosters elite defections from the ruling party (Gandhi & Reuter 2013, Haggard & Kaufman 1995, Howard & Roessler 2006). Poor performance, whether it entails swift declines in GDP growth or soaring inflation, reduces the degree of state resources that presidents control. When presidents have less patronage to distribute, they are less able to secure the loyalty of ruling party elites, who recalculate the costs and benefits of remaining in the organization versus jumping ship. Thus, “disgruntled party

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43 Elite defection is cited as a prerequisite for turnover in Senegal and other dominant-party systems, although not all studies relate it directly to economic decline as discussed here (Langston 2006, Magaloni 2006, Van de Walle 2006).
members defect in times of economic crisis in order to capitalize upon popular and elite discontent with the regime in the hope of successfully challenging the incumbent in elections” (Gandhi & Reuter 2013: 84). Poor economic performance also makes it more difficult for the incumbent regime…to rig an election, buy votes, co-opt opposition leaders, and employ the military and police to harass opposition voters and supporters” (Howard & Roessler 2006: 373).

However, it remains puzzling that neither the PS’ defeat in 2000 nor the PDS’ loss in 2012 occurred in the context of macroeconomic performance that was markedly worse than what prevailed around incumbent re-elections in 1993 and 2007. Figure 4 displays Senegal’s fluctuations in GDP growth and inflation, measures employed in the leading studies of economic decline and turnover. The first and third vertical lines from the left on each plot mark the 1993 and 2007 elections, which did not result in turnover, while the second and fourth vertical lines locate the 2000 and 2012 contests, in which incumbent presidents lost. Neither of these indicators fully accounts for the difference between turnover and incumbent re-election, because neither is systematically lower for races with turnover relative to races without it. Furthermore, turnovers were not preceded by any single directional trend in GDP growth or inflation that consistently differed from those leading up to incumbent victories.  

44 The economic context before presidential re-elections both in 1993 and 2007 entailed rising GDP growth, but growth was not consistently declining before both turnovers in 2000 and 2012; instead, growth declined in the lead-up to 2000 but not before 2012. Similarly, inflation was declining before turnovers, but was not always rising before presidential victories in 1993 and 2007; only in 2007 was this the case.
Moreover, citizens’ economic grievances were similar in content across elections despite their varied results. Under Diouf, grievances percolated over time. Before the 1993 presidential race, Senegal had completed with difficulty a structural adjustment program, but citizens engaged in relatively less contentious politics about the economy then than they did later.  

45 As he prepared for the 1993 campaign, Diouf “muffled” the failure of this program, which left Senegal in need of new policies “to reduce salaries and cut state expenditures” (Kanté 1994: 107). Diouf’s official campaign statement (profession de foi) touted the economic progress that Senegal had made under his watch, acknowledging the difficulties that many citizens faced, but ultimately asserting that the PS had managed the challenging economic situation (Diouf 1993). Wade criticized the failed structural adjustment program, yet neither candidate proposed specific policy fixes to rid citizens of economic malaise, and popular grievances, including “the deterioration of the
growing urban constituency of unemployed youth denounced their difficult economic conditions, but did not turn out to vote in 1993 as much as in 2000 (Gerard 1993, Kanté 1994, Villalón 1994). This quiescence contrasted with 2000, when “the upturn in the macroeconomy did not seem to have an impact on the micro-level, that is, on the living conditions of Senegalese” (Ndiaye Diouf 2000: 33). Wade again appealed to unemployed youth, this time more successfully (Diagne 2000: 20-21). However, survey research indicates that “economic conditions, and individual perceptions of them, are but one of many components” explaining the turnover (Vengroff & Magala 2001: 130).

Under Wade, grievances also motivated more contentious political behavior the longer they remained unaddressed. In 2007, social tensions remained high: “the cost of living rose, especially on key utilities such as electricity and water, and the number of urban poor only decreased marginally” despite his promises in 2000 to address unemployment issues (Resnick 2014: 113). Yet voters gave Wade more time to keep all of his campaign promises, especially because of the visible improvements in public infrastructure during his first term (Dahou & Foucher 2009, Diop 2011). Citizens had similar economic grievances in 2012: electricity shortages were common (EIU 2012) and food riots had broken out in 2008 but the government had not reformed the policies that had motivated the riots until 2011 (Resnick 2012: 630). Thus, before Senegal’s second turnover in 2012, the economic issues at stake were not new; however, civic activism was at an all-time high with the integration of the Assises Nationales into election campaigns and the grassroots activism of the M23.

Overall, it is clear that factors like opposition coalescence and poor economic performance increase the likelihood of turnover, and that they were probably in play in Senegal.
However, the micro-level dynamics of *who* the main actors behind turnover were and *how* the process played out are not specified by these theories focused on turnover’s fundamental causes. To fully account for Senegal’s specific election outcomes, we must also trace how the contingent features of insiders’ competition for the presidency map onto turnover and incumbent re-election. This is important for several reasons. First, because the analysis seeks to explain the outcomes of Senegal’s last four elections, a small set of specific events, contingency is bound to play a major role in addition to the structural factors that the political science literature identifies. Second, the four elections are not independent events; actors learn from prior strategic mistakes and successes that they and others have had, and voters use the past to judge the viability of particular candidates and the future chances of turnover. Studying the contingencies of Senegal’s four elections can help us identify the ways in which initial elections influenced the outcomes of subsequent ones. Finally, Senegal is in some ways a deviant case of turnover, which has historically been more likely in open-seat races than in races like 2000 and 2012, in which the president sought re-election (Cheeseman 2010, Howard & Roessler 2006).  

Accounting for the ways in which insiders join the opposition at a particular time and for how they subsequently choose to behave during their initial campaigns in the opposition adds to our knowledge of how turnover ultimately comes about.

**Contingent Factors and Turnover**

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46 Cheeseman (2010) identifies all presidential transfers of power from one party to another in Africa from 1990-2009 and finds that when we exclude founding multiparty elections from the sample, turnover is more common in open-seat races than in closed contests (142). The ruling party’s degree of incumbency advantage is reduced in elections occurring just after a succession because “the battle to select a new presidential candidate often results in a divided party unable to roll out a campaign” and “nonincumbent candidates cannot point to a record of accomplishments, and so their promises to key client groups are less credible” (143). However, Senegalese turnovers diverge from this pattern; both occurred when incumbent presidents were running for re-election.
Insiders’ presence in elections is not causally related to turnover since they were major contenders in all four of Senegal’s most recent presidential elections, which varied in their outcome. However, the conditions under which regime insiders leave the government and the ways that they then behave towards the president shaped the political context in which turnover was possible in Senegal. In particular, two things seemed to make the difference between turnover and incumbent re-election. When there was turnover in 2000 and 2012, regime insiders emerged before the election when there was uncertainty about the timing of succession within the ruling party, and they resisted the president’s attempts to negotiate collaboration or reconciliation with them close to the campaign.

Uncertainty about the timing of succession within the ruling party is the first characteristic of Senegal’s elections that end in turnover. The concept references a situation in which the president chooses to run for re-election and opts to do so when his retirement is concretely on the horizon, but he has not specified its timing. Operationally, a succession is impending when the president explicitly guarantees the public that he will not run for president again after the election in question, and either states (or does not refute the political elite’s widespread expectation) that he will not complete the term for which he seeks re-election. Ex-regime insiders may have greater chances of recruiting supporters from the ruling party during these impending successions, which can reduce ruling party cohesion. Crises within the ruling party are often intensified during impending successions because they prolong uncertainty among ambitious elites about their place within the ruling party. Leadership disputes emerge and endure near the party’s summit as elites anticipate the president’s retirement, despite his continued leadership in the organization. Battles of positioning are prolonged and have no

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47 Impending successions are thus identifiable in Senegal through press coverage of the president’s preparation for campaigns, party documents about candidacy, and secondary accounts of these processes by local experts who were closely following the president’s communications with the voting public.
certain endpoint given the president’s approaching but unspecified retirement. Elites face the prospect of engaging in internal battles of positioning, of uncertain length, in anticipation of the approaching but unspecified date of retirement. Within weak ruling parties in which the president relies primarily on patronage to resolve disputes, there are limited means available to appease these elites, whose chances of defection rise as the prolonged succession battle ensues.

Insiders’ resistance to reconciliation with the president is an important tool for them to convince voters to bandwagon on their candidacy. They risk losing credibility both if they distance themselves too much from the state and if they appear too collusive with the president. On the one hand, insider candidates must signal to voters that they represent a change from the *status quo* modes of governance under the current president. Only under these circumstances might Senegal’s largely clientelist voters risk bandwagoning on an opposition candidate who lacks access to the state rather than vote for the materially powerful incumbent. Because of their prior association with the president and the government, insiders face the burden of proving that they are actually interested in displacing the president rather than just using their candidacy to negotiate a position for themselves as the president’s new right-hand man. On the other hand, insiders must use their government experience to bolster their credibility as future heads of state. Insiders thus face the challenge of striking a delicate balance, distancing themselves from the incumbent but also reminding voters of their experience in the state and their proximity to power. To these ends, negotiations with the president are a common element of Senegalese politics and are not always detrimental to electoral success. However, negotiations appear to damage the prospects of insider presidential candidates only when they occur close to a presidential contest, such that the insider’s association with the president effectively discredits him as an alternative candidate in the eyes of the Senegalese electorate. This chapter’s indicator of resistance (or lack
thereof) to reconciliation is whether publicly known negotiations occurred between an insider and the president during an election year in which that insider is running against the president.

Figure 5 summarizes the relationships that are traced. The presence of regime insiders as opposition candidates is a background condition in all four elections in question. During the 1993 race, which resulted in incumbent re-election, the ruling party was not in the midst of uncertainty about the timing of succession. During the 2007 election, when President Wade was re-elected, there was such uncertainty about succession, but the front-running insider opposition candidate did not resist reconciliation with the president. Only in 2000 and 2012, when Senegal experienced turnover, were both features part of the electoral context.

**Figure 5: Features of Incumbent Re-election and Turnover in Senegal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Impending succession</th>
<th>Insider resistance</th>
<th>Turnover?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1993: Diouf is Re-elected – No Impending Succession and No Insider Resistance**

The 1993 elections lacked both of these contextual features and did not end in turnover. First, since there was no impending succession, the ruling party was not especially fragile. President Diouf initially went on French television to announce his candidacy for the race. Although he admitted that “he was reflecting about the succession” (Coulibaly 1999: 147) that was inevitable within the PS, given his advancing age, Diouf fostered no doubt that he would complete the 1993 term as president if he won the race. There was thus no impending crisis,
Despite the fact that Diouf had not designated his successor within the party, because the president’s time horizon was projected to last at least through the upcoming term.

Second, there was no insider candidate who resisted the president’s overtures to continue associating and collaborating with him. Wade was the only insider candidate running in these elections, and he was the front-running opposition leader. As such, the public eye was focused on him as he proved to be amenable to President Diouf’s overtures for collaboration before the presidential campaign. When Wade announced his candidacy, less than a year before the race, he and three other PDS members were still ministers in Senegal’s first enlarged presidential majority government.\textsuperscript{48} Even after announcing his candidacy, Wade remained in the government for several more months at President Diouf’s request before leaving to begin his campaign in the opposition. Moreover, Wade called for other parties to enter the government, saying that this would ensure that all candidates in the 1993 race had equal access to the state before the campaign.\textsuperscript{49}

By choosing not to resist such co-optation so close to the election and after he became a candidate, Wade did not send the electorate reliable signals that he would indeed bring the sopi (change) that he promised if they voted for him. For one thing, his statements about the terms of his involvement in the Diouf government blurred the distinction between his politics and those of the president. Wade expressed confidence in the PDS’ prospects to win the election, especially with the new electoral code. He encouraged citizens to separate PS-PDS relations from the personal relations between himself and Diouf, asserting that the PS and the PDS had never struck any deals, that he himself had nothing to do with the PS, and that he and Diouf had merely a


“gentleman’s agreement” for an “entente.” However, when Wade defended his call for another enlarged presidential majority government, he made clear that he and Diouf “plan[ned] on collaborating again after the election campaign, regardless of what transpired.” 50 There was, at least for some Senegalese voters, little reason for Senegalese voters to believe that electing Wade would in fact lead to a break with the PS governance practices that were associated with the daily difficulties they faced.

Moreover, Wade’s call for collaboration with Diouf and the PS sparked widespread disapproval among other opposition parties, precisely because of the confusing mix of governing party and opposition party roles that the PDS adopted soon before the 1993 elections. 51 Although Wade tried to justify his stance to the public, opposition leaders either criticized Wade for leaving the government when it was making improvements to the lives of Senegalese, 52 or else for entering the government without a clear programmatic goal, 53 or even worse, for “trying to have his cake and eat it too” by running for president while simultaneously advertising his openness to collaborating with the incumbent. 54

The consequences of Wade’s lack of resistance to a continued partnership with Diouf also became clear when the PDS did eventually leave the government in October 1992, just four months before the elections. Wade announced the PDS’ withdrawal, but did so reluctantly given

50 Fall, Cheikh Tidiane, Abdallah Faye & Modou Mamoune Faye. op. cit.


54 Samb, Pape Boubacar. “Abdou Fall (PLP), ‘On ne peut courir deux lièvres à la fois,’” Le Soleil, 19 October 1992, 6.
that the Diouf entourage had allegedly been discussing the possibility of creating a vice-presidency to offer to Wade, or at least of Wade and Diouf running on a joint ticket (Diop 1992).

55 He justified the PDS’ exit from the government in several ways, which were not always convincing to wary Senegalese voters, especially those in more urban and educated strata. On the personal front, Wade reported that the PDS ministers had been “marginalized” within the government ever since Wade declared his candidacy. 56 Before the exit, Wade had no longer been invited on Diouf’s international trips, the government had held “parallel ministerial council [meetings]” that excluded the PDS appointees, and the competencies attached to the ministries that the PDS controlled were being transferred to other parts of the administration under PS control (PDS Bureau Politique 1992: 3).

On the popular front, Wade declared that the PDS had left the government to more effectively help Senegalese citizens realize their desire for turnover. 57 He told the state newspaper, Le Soleil, that “there are two ways to work for Senegal [and] for a political party. One is to be in the government, and the other is to create conditions for turnover. I thought that the two could be reconciled.” 58 In his acceptance speech for the PDS presidential nomination in 1993, Wade also defended the party’s participation in the government, saying it was “to keep our country from descending into chaos and to do work that Senegalese people have generally appreciated.” In addition, he attempted to expose a principled logic behind his collaboration with Diouf, noting that “when we [the PDS ministers] encountered…everything that is decidedly

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57 Fall, Cheikh Tidiane, Abdallah Faye & Modou Mamoune Faye. ibid.

negative and impossible to change in the Socialists’ mentalities and practices, we came back to our natural milieu, the opposition, opposition for change, opposition for sopi’” (PDS Bureau Politique 1992: 4).

However, the Senegalese elections that resulted in turnover were not characterized by the presence of insiders who collaborated with the president during the campaign, because “there is…a skeptical element to much of Senegalese public opinion that assumes that campaign manoeuvring and protests by the opposition are little more than posturing to strengthen bargaining positions for the eventual distribution of the benefits of power” (Villalón 1994: 189). Wade does not appear to have inspired confidence that his candidacy stood for change rather than more of the same personal, patronage-oriented politics Wade and other opposition leaders criticized when evaluating PS rule. Accordingly, the opposition campaign that Wade waged in 1993 ultimately failed to prevent Diouf’s re-election, or even to induce a second-round runoff that created institutional pressures for opposition coalescence.

2000: A First Turnover - Impending Succession and Insider Resistance

In the 2000 elections, which ended in turnover, there was both uncertainty about the timing of succession and a resistant insider candidate. Diouf’s advancing age at first created uncertainty about his candidacy in 2000, and when he did declare his candidacy, he was not expected to complete his term if he won (Diop et al. 2000: 166). The impending succession followed on the heels of more general succession-related strife within the PS after Diouf named Tanor Dieng his future successor in the 1996 event that several party barons named the “congress without debates” (Kâ 2005). However, it was earlier, just after Diouf’s presidential victory in 1993 and upon the PS’ Central Committee called for an evaluation of the party’s
performance in the elections, that the “fracture lines” leading to insider defections “became apparent” (Coulibaly 1999: 148). It was allegedly during these discussions that Tanor Dieng’s possible succession was first suggested. 59 With Tanor Dieng definitively designated in 1996 as Diouf’s future “dauphin,” and with Diouf forbidding factions within the PS to contest this decision, succession-related defections began as early as 1998. Although everyone knew who Diouf’s successor would be, the timing of the succession remained undetermined in the 2000 pre-election context, which prolonged party elites’ uncertainty about their room for maneuver in the organization.

Wade, as the front-running insider, also made a cleaner break from his involvement with the government than he had as the 1993 campaign approached. The PDS had sent five ministers into the 1995 government, withdrew from it before the local elections in 1996, and re-entered the government in 1998, leaving two months before the legislative elections (Bathily 2008). 60 Yet before the 2000 race, Wade restricted his calls for collaboration with Diouf, making no such overtures the year before the presidential contest. The PDS’ last stint in the PS government prior to the 2000 race ended in March 1998, two months before the 1998 legislative elections. 61 Wade’s last public call for an enlarged presidential majority government was in October 1998, after he had formed a prospective alliance with Senegal’s major leftist parties, the Pôle de Gauche, for the 2000 race. 62 After other leaders in his pre-electoral coalition, the Pôle de

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59 Coulibaly (1999) reports that “certain Socialist militants were already proposing the end of Abdou Diouf’s daily management of the party...It was the then-mayor of Kaolack, Ibrahima Beye, who publicly and for the first time asked, in an official party meeting, that Ousmane Tanor Dieng be designated to direct the PS. This proposition was not just by chance. The Head of State had already told Tanor Dieng himself and Abdoulaye Diack of his intention to renounce his administration of the party” (149).


62 Diop, Abdou Salam, *ibid.*
Gauche, condemned this behavior, Wade appeased his allies and made no further public calls for collaboration.

When these overtures ended, Wade reinforced his separation from incumbents by publicly resisting an opportunity that the president extended for collaboration. Wade refused Diouf’s overtures for collaboration and denied all accusations of covert deal-making with the PS. In July 1999, Diouf invited all opposition party leaders to discuss the possibility of joining the PS in government. Speaking for Wade, the PDS’ second-in-command, Idrissa Seck, categorically refused. He replied, “We have not yet discussed the question with our allies in the Coalition for Turnover 2000. Nevertheless, I can tell you that in the PDS, we are not interested in this proposal. We will continue to fight for the transparency and regularity of the elections.” This categorical refusal to discuss collaboration with the PS distinguishes the PDS’ political behavior from the 1993 pre-electoral context. In 2000, Wade was more committed to resisting opportunities to collaborate with Diouf.

In the public sphere, Wade not only refused Diouf’s public overtures before the 2000 race but also denied all accusations of covert deal-making with Diouf. Nevertheless, Wade and the PDS did not escape accusations of covert collaboration with Diouf and the PS. Wade spent much of 1999 in France before returning for the 2000 presidential campaign. During the campaign, he was accused of having secret talks in France with Diouf about creating a vice-presidential post in which he would serve if Diouf won in 2000. Reinforcing the resistant stance that he was crafting publicly, Wade denied the charges, asserting that “until the next [2000] presidential election, I have nothing to discuss with Abdou Diouf.” He reminded the

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media that when he had been offered the vice-presidency in 1992, the PDS refused the offer, and he had respected the party’s wishes. He also tried to use his alliance with the Pôle de Gauche to underscore his commitment to resisting collaboration with Diouf:

“We can now say that the current outlook excludes any victory on the part of Abdou Diouf that would facilitate an alliance with him. Furthermore, I have committed myself to a coalition with parties that support my candidacy and may even have accords with certain candidates to bring them into my [future] government. How could it be that at the same time I would be considering rallying around Abdou Diouf tomorrow, unless I were suicidal?...That I would abandon everyone who supports me in order to go with Abdou Diouf? That makes no sense.”

Despite these speculations about secret collaboration with Diouf, in 2000, Wade ultimately crafted a more consistent image as a principled opponent by avoiding public displays of support for any form of collaboration with the PS and the president. Heightened fragmentation within the ruling party, along with Wade’s resistance to collaboration, facilitated the opposition coalescence around Wade that ultimately led to turnover.

2007: Wade is Re-elected - Impending Succession without Insider Resistance

The 2007 race, which did not result in turnover, exhibited one of the two contextual features that is conducive to turnover: uncertainty about the timing of succession within the ruling PDS. In 2007, Wade declared that it would be the last time for him to run for president. PDS elites therefore knew that a successor was on the verge of designation, but were not yet sure who that successor would be. Sall, Wade’s Prime Minister at the time, was obviously a candidate, and there were rumblings about the president’s ambitions for his son, Karim.


Although Seck had already fallen out of favor with Wade, the president had initiated negotiations with him during his time in prison that also raised the possibility that he would return to the PDS and take over the party (Diop 2009). Thus, before the 2007 elections, the impending succession underscored the fractured internal state of the ruling party, whose “unconsolidated ruling elite” had not sorted out their leadership disputes through internal elections since 1996.

Although the 2007 elections were characterized by an impending succession within the PDS, Seck did not resist Wade’s attempts to negotiate a reconciliation during the campaign period. The second contingency that correlates with turnover was thus not part of the 2007 pre-election context. “Idy” left the PDS riding on a wave of popular sympathy, largely due to the way that Wade had liquidated him. He capitalized on this sympathy by signaling clearly and early his intent to run for president in 2007. In September 2005, soon after Seck left prison, the Support Movement for Idrissa Seck (M-SIS) nominated him as a presidential candidate. Seck officially declared his candidacy on April 4, 2006. A talented orator and campaign strategist, he refashioned his political image to emphasize his unjust treatment in the hands of the president.

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67 Mane, Latir. “Macky Sall poignardé dans le dos. Idy consacré dauphin de Wade?” L’Observateur, 18 Jan 2007, 3. Mane reports that the impending succession within the PDS made Seck’s alleged negotiations with Wade while in prison particularly significant, since they occurred “at a moment when the debate about Wade’s successor seems on the horizon. And among Wade’s potential successors, the person who occupies the post just beneath him in the PDS is likely to be the winner. And Idy seems to be well on his way [to that].”

68 The interests within this elite were heterogeneous because the elite combined “an unsteady coalition of Wade loyalists, former PDS activists who had switched camp to the PS and later returned to join the alternance bandwagon, young party supporters mobilized for the 2000 elections, PS carpet-crossers, enterprising marabouts and seasoned politicians of the small allied parties” (Dahou & Foucher 2009: 26).

69 This “wave of sympathy” is mentioned in countless newspaper articles and interviews. See, for instance, Dia 2009, Gellar 2013. Diop (2011) reports that many citizens “did not appreciate the incarceration that he was a victim of” at the hands of the president (299).


Playing up Wade’s use of the state to foster his downfall, Seck wrote on his 2007 campaign website that “In th[e] new Senegal, I especially hope for an end to the use of our security forces and judicial powers for the settling of political disputes.” Underscoring his resilience in the face of such foul play, he claimed,

“I am, in effect, the only politician in the history of Senegal to have been the object of such a complete mobilization of the resources of the State over such a long period, accompanied by a campaign of planetary denigration, [and to emerge from it] without any damage to my honor.”

Nevertheless, Seck’s subsequent attempts to reconcile with President Wade before the 2007 campaign are purported to have damaged his electoral prospects. His willingness to negotiate with his former boss fostered speculations about how much he actually opposed Wade, as well as how much he really wanted to change the political status quo. There is not reliable and readily accessible public opinion data to track how these speculations mapped onto widespread political attitudes in this context of reconciliation, but informed accounts of the 2007 elections suggest that Seck’s combination of negotiations with and opposition to Wade had the effect of “isolating Seck from the rest of the opposition and fostering the public opinion that he was a leader who was unreliable about his engagements” (M.C. Diop 2013: 81). Several examples illustrate how this might have happened. First, while in prison, Idy was suspected of colluding with Wade to regain his position as successor within the PDS. Seck denied making any deals with Wade while in prison, but upon his release, the press buzzed with rumors that Idy had negotiated and

“demanded nothing less than promises that he would be the head of the PDS list in the 2007 legislative race, that his three ‘most loyal’ lieutenants would head the

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lists in Bambey, Diourbel, and Thiès, that he would become Prime Minister or President of the National Assembly, that Wade would retire in 2012, and that he would abandon any arrangement that would jeopardize his chances” (Diop 2009: 43).

Other accounts of this accord, known as the Protocol of Reubeuss, suggest that the two parties struck a long-term financial deal, with Wade providing Idy money to run in the 2007 presidential and legislative elections as well as the 2012 presidential elections. Seck denied these allegations, admitting that Wade approached him but claiming that he rejected such overtures (Diop 2009: 45).

Wade’s overtures for reconciliation with Seck continued as the 2007 campaign drew closer. As late as a month before the 2007 elections, Seck was attending midnight meetings with Wade at the presidential palace, ostensibly to find a way for him to return to the PDS and inherit the party. In January, Wade sent Mbaye-Jacques Diop, one of Senegal’s oldest politicians in the mouvance présidentielle, to Seck to propose reconciliation. When Seck responded negatively to Diop’s intercession between him and the President, the Tidjani marabout Abdoul Aziz Sy “Junior” convinced both parties to negotiate. This took place during three separate meetings at the Palace. After the first meeting, while Wade announced Seck’s return to the PDS, Seck

73 Reubeuss is the Dakar neighborhood that houses the prison to which Idy went.

74 Diop (2009) recounts that after winning the 2007 race, Wade showed the press a written agreement between himself and Seck, allegedly the result of a deal that Wade struck with Seck to tacitly provide him 14 billion FCFA to cover his 2007 legislative and 2012 presidential campaign expenses (49). Sarr 2011, which reports that 7 billion FCFA were exchanged in this deal (114).


remained silent on the issue. A 7,000-person survey conducted by the private media outlet, rewmi.com, found that 55% of respondents disapproved of Seck after he began these talks.

The second meeting fostered further speculations about Seck’s complicity with Wade, with reports that the two drew up a pact entailing “neutrality about the Wade succession” as well as “the establishment of a national unity government and a delay of the presidential elections,” which was legally possible according to Article 34 of the Senegalese Constitution if Seck withdrew his candidacy. The pact was also alleged to include clauses guaranteeing that Wade would “drop all charges against [Idy] in the Chantiers de Thiès affair.” Because the Prime Minister, Macky Sall, was out of the country during these negotiations, the deal-making also fomented further uncertainty about who would succeed Wade within the PDS.

Ultimately, Seck was unable to convert his insider advantages into a campaign that was forceful enough to foster turnover, despite his attempts both to justify his negotiations and to condemn Wade’s management of the government and the state. Before he began meeting Wade

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79 Samb, Serigne Saliou. “55% d’opinions défavorables. Idy paie la rançon de ses retrouvailles avec Wade,” L’Observateur, 25 January 2007, 5. Some in Thiès approved of the reconciliation, but others “saw nothing...other than a farce, an additional deal between the two politicians that was to the great detriment of citizens” (Diop, Ndatte. 2007. “Réactions à Thiès. Des relents de complot,” L’Observateur, 23 January 2007, 4). Another article reports that among the Rewmi party members gathered in front of Idy’s headquarters in the Point E neighborhood of Dakar, “the most shared sentiment was deception.” For instance, the president of the electoral committee of Rewmi in the Pata zone of the rural community of Niakhar said, “I think that Idy disappointed us. We were on the ground. We fought for him. We took risks. People lost their [state] jobs because of him. He can’t just return to the PDS without warning us” (quoted in Fall, Harouna. “Après l’annonce des Retrouvailles Wade-Idy. Le Point E assiégé par des militants de Rewmi en furie,” L’Observateur, 23 January 2007, 5).
at the Presidential Palace in January 2007, the Rewmi party released a statement comparing itself to the PDS. It indicated that

“politically, we do not share the same vision of change, whose meaning [Wade] has altered, nor do we share the same perception of the state, which he has effectively discredited. Ethically, we do not approve of his brutal and anti-democratic manner of settling disputes through aggression, imprisonment, and exclusion, and I approve even less of his familial way of managing national resources.”

During his visits to the Palace, Seck also denied allegations that he had negotiated a place in the state with Wade. Simultaneously, he issued public statements that he would run against Wade and support the opposition candidate who entered any runoff with the president. After the meetings, Seck intensified his speech, claiming that “Wade [wa]s a dangerous man for Senegal” and that he was in no way colluding with or indebted to him. Yet overall, “Idrissa Seck’s back-and-forth negotiations to return to the PDS after forming his own political party, Rewmi, and running against Wade in 2007 undermined his credibility in the eyes of many Senegalese, who saw him as an opportunist” (Gellar 2013: 127).

2012: A Second Turnover - Impending Succession and Insider Resistance

Both of the contingent factors that correspond to turnover in Senegal were present in the 2012 race. The first important feature of the political context was that Sall’s face-off with Wade for the presidency took place during prolonged uncertainty about the timing of succession within the PDS, a hangover from the 2007 pre-election context. Before the 2012 election, Wade’s

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82 “Le candidat Idy déroule son programme,” L’Observateur, 4 January 2007, 10.


changing humors about retirement reignited the uncertainty about succession that the PDS had already endured in the last electoral cycle. In 2007, he had promised that he would contest no further presidencies and had “publicly stated in December 2007 that the constitution constrained him from pursuing a third term” in office (Kelly 2012: 127). Even highly ranked elites believed this statement; as late as 2009, Macky Sall had remarked, “As for President Wade, I am not going to attack him personally since my fight in 2012 is not going to be against him, as I doubt he will be a candidate in the presidential elections.”

Wade thus surprised the country when he announced that he would run again in 2012. The motivations for this change of heart were purportedly functions of the president’s need to secure the political future of Karim, who had lost his bid for the mayorship of Dakar in the 2009 elections. A faction of Karim’s followers within the PDS known as the Generation du Concret – “a parallel-PDS intended to forge the path to power for Wade’s son” – had become increasingly prominent within the government and the party (A.B. Diop 2013: 340, O. Diop 2013). In the context of Karim’s rise, the uncertainty and controversy about the PDS’ future leadership was of heightened concern, both among party elites and the public, given President Wade’s age and the possibility that he might not complete the 2012 term were he to get re-elected. Wade was approximately 90 years old in 2012, and his “advanced age and his frequent promises that, if elected, he would not serve a full term, contributed to the omnipresent speculation about the possible father-son succession” (Koter 2013b: 673).

The impending succession created even greater stress and fostered an increasing number of defections within the ruling coalition as Wade’s filial succession plan became more

transparent. These patterns became acute in 2011, when Wade tried to use the PDS legislative majority to modify the constitution to allow him to win with only 25% of the vote and to designate a vice-presidential successor (Kelly 2012). The party and the public suspected that this successor would be Karim and the prospect of filial succession contributed to the mass mobilization against the constitutional amendment through the M23 (MC Diop 2013: 83-86). This, as well as the approval of Wade’s candidacy by the Constitutional Council in January 2012, made the ruling party increasingly vulnerable before the elections.

In this context, Sall showed unwavering resistance to reconciliation with President Wade. This was a clear, strategic departure from the tactics of his counterpart, Idrissa Seck, in 2007. After creating the APR, Sall immediately asserted that he had no interest in reconciliation with Wade. In one of his first press conferences as APR president, Sall distanced himself from the PDS and from Idrissa Seck, who had tried to negotiate his way back into the PDS after the 2007 elections, declaring, “I am not in the sphere of the liberal family…I do not want to extend the PDS; I am in a new, open situation…Our priority is the national implantation of the party.”

Much like Seck in 2007, Sall’s insider advantage was multiplied by the media attention that he got for his emergence in the opposition. Sall gained popular sympathy for the ways in which President Wade had liquidated him from the government. Sall remarked that “what was done to me, many people found unjust. This martyrization [sic]…that I went through has really created strong grassroots support for me.”

Building on popular sympathy, Sall presented himself as a

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86 For example, in their interviews, former ministers Bacar Dia and Samba Diouldé Thiam explained their eventual disagreement with Wade about these issues that led to their exit from the coalition in 2010 and 2011. Interview with Bacar Dia, 7/20/12, Saint-Louis; Interview with Samba Diouldé Thiam. 11/22/11, Dakar.

87 Mane, Latir. “Macky Sall, President APR/Yakaar, ‘Je ne suis pas dans une dynamique de famille libérale,’” L’Observateur, 2 December 2008, 5.

more upright alternative to Wade by calling for “a ‘restoration of republican dignity’” and by pitching the APR party as “hoping to restore the ethics, equity, probity, and dignity that had been brutalized by [Wade’s] liberal dynasty” (Sarr 2011: 171-172). Sall also promptly announced his intention to run against the PDS in the March 2009 local elections, in which the APR won hundreds of thousands of votes and the mayorship of his hometown, Fatick.

Capitalizing on this momentum, Sall maintained this strategy of resistance throughout the 2012 campaign. Wade on several occasions called for a reunification of the “liberal family,” reaching out to all ex-PDS elites who had founded opposition parties in order to bolster the certainty with which the PDS could mobilize a presidential majority. 89 On each occasion, Sall resisted Wade’s attempts to sully his image as a clear alternative leader. In January 2009, as Seck negotiated with Wade to return to the PDS, Sall announced that his own “return to the PDS [wa]s out of the question.” 90 Sall’s refusals continued, even after the Wade regime tried to block his international sources of financing. 91 After Wade convinced Seck to return to the PDS, Seck

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89 This was increasingly questionable as Karim Wade’s Génération du Concret movement gained importance within the party. After Karim lost the bid for mayor of Dakar in 2009, Wade appointed his son to multiple ministerial posts simultaneously. Concrétistes like Pape Samba Mboup, Abdoulaye Baldé, Souleymane Ndéné Ndiaye, and others took control of various key posts. The rise of Karim and his friends, most of whom had not been in the PDS for long, irritated the old guard and exacerbated internal quarrels about leadership positions within the party, which the 2009 local elections had already fostered. See Babou, Dame. “Elections locales et succession d’Abdoulaye Wade – De gros risques politiques pour les prétendants,” Sud Quotidien, 21 March 2009, http://fr.allafrica.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stories/200903230743.html (accessed 23 March 2014).


91 Sall started traveling Senegal and abroad immediately after creating the APR. In late 2008, Sall sent several of his closest allies to visit the Senegalese diaspora in Europe to tell his story. He followed up with a personal tour (Sarr 2011: 178). After the PDS in France defected to Sall, authorities confiscated his passport on his return to Dakar. Sall was accused of laundering money, as was Abdoulaye Sall, one of Macky Sall’s major financiers based in Gabon. See Kane, Bocar Alpha. “En visite à Paris. Wade reçoit en audience Amadou Ciré Sall et tente de faire revenir au bercail les libéraux de Paris,”” L’Observateur, 19 December 2008, 6; Mane, Latir. “14 des 21 membres
made public appeals to Sall to return to the party. In July 2009, one of Sall’s closest staff announced from Touba that a return to the PDS “[wa]s no longer foreseeable;” Sall himself stated that “the priority now is the APR’s massification with a view towards defeating the future liberal candidate [for president] in 2012.”

In September, Sall was solicited again but stayed true to his position, asserting that

“We cannot imagine any sort of discussion or contact of this nature…I could not involve myself in any dynamic of combination in order to find solutions to this crisis on the backs of Senegalese. However, I am available to study solutions for the country within the framework of a national dialogue.”

In November, the message remained the same:

“We must alternate turnover. We must rectify alternance to give birth to hope again…The order of the day is not my return to the PDS or anywhere else. The order of the day is elsewhere, to work to massify the APR which already has hundreds of thousands of sympathizers, adherents, and militants.”

The purported logic behind such refusals is that “if Macky Sall today chose to return to Wade, he would risk losing the sympathy of the Senegalese. Not to mention that a good number of [APR]
militants are not ready to follow Macky Sall into Wade’s new party.” 96 Wade became less aggressive with his overtures in the following years and Sall remained a clear alternative to Wade. In this sense, Sall appeared to have learned important strategic lessons about resistance and negotiation from the experience of his counterpart, Seck, in 2007. In this context, Senegal experienced its second turnover.

V - Insiders, Turnover, and Democratization

Turnover does not always yield democratization (Lindberg 2006, Wahman 2012). Regardless of whether insiders or outsiders are the agents of turnover, democratization is difficult when parties are weak and defection is not necessarily detrimental to elites’ careers. However, there are further reasons that insider-induced turnovers may be less promising for democracy than those fostered by outsiders. Given their prior involvement in non-democratic governments, insiders are part of the old regime and may not be the country’s most committed democrats if they are elected. Their ability to vie seriously for the presidency is often an indicator of weak opposition and a lack of outsiders capable of sustained competition against incumbents. In this context, insiders can often take control of regimes in which “much of the institutional architecture of competitive authoritarianism is left intact” (Levitsky & Way 2010b: 355), facilitating its continuation.

There are significant difficulties of democratization under these conditions. Although the making of committed democrats may occur in its most substantive ways outside of the government and the ruling party, this is exactly where it is most difficult for most ambitious politicians to sustain a presence if they are not extremely wealthy or extremely radical.

However, democratization is by no means impossible. Turnover may be more likely to bring gradual democratization when civil society activities facilitate both opposition parties’ ability to coordinate and citizens’ widespread, sustained mobilization for good governance (Kelly 2012). Democratization may become more likely if these factors lead to significant monitoring of the ruling coalition and create sufficient pressures for the president to limit his (formal and informal) manipulation of the uneven playing field.

The Senegalese cases illustrate the mixed record that insider-induced turnovers have for democratization. Namely, alternance in 2000 only led to a continuation of competitive authoritarianism, whereas the turnover in 2012 has thus far fostered democratizing reforms that have reduced the scope of the uneven playing field and led to Senegal’s “free” designation by Freedom House by the end of 2013 (Freedom House n.d.). However, somewhat surprisingly, it was Wade, the insider-turned-president who ran an opposition party while collaborating with the government, who oversaw more authoritarian backsliding than Sall, the ruling party loyalist who had never done politics outside of the ruling party before his downfall in the PDS. The Senegalese turnovers thus demonstrate that democratic reforms are possible but by no means certain when insiders constitute the president’s foremost opponents in elections.

Senegal’s first insider-driven turnover did not foster democratization. The 2000 alternation in power, which brought Wade into the presidency, was followed by the intensification of competitive authoritarian practices, including the creation of packable institutions, intermittent breaches of civil liberties, and an uneven playing field in elections (Kelly 2012, Levitsky & Way 2010b, Wahman 2012). The president gradually re-established packable institutions that he had originally abolished. This reified the opposition’s serious disadvantages on the uneven playing field. After abolishing the Senate through a constitutional
reform in 2001, in 2007 Wade brought back the institution, which has two-thirds of its members appointed by the president. He also brought back the Economic and Social Council in 2008, which also provided him with lucrative appointed posts to distribute to supporters of the ruling coalition (Kelly 2012). The judiciary remained packable by the president as well (Fall 2011). In particular, the Constitutional Council, whose five members were appointed, paid, and given additional perks by the president, was legally permitted to determine the constitutionality of Wade’s controversial candidacy for a third term in 2012 and ruled in his favor (Kelly 2012: 123).

In the domain of civil liberties, political associations were generally free to form and pursue activities. However, opposition politicians and journalists for independent media were at times harassed by the government or subject to the uneven application of the rule of law (Dahou & Foucher 2004, Mbow 2008, Kelly 2012). The president employed the Division of Criminal Investigation (DIC) as a “political force” to attack opponents (Mbow 2008) and pre-election protests were violently repressed in both 2007 and 2012 (Diop 2011, Kelly 2012). Private media outlets proliferated under Wade and opposition coverage in the media was more equitable and widespread than under Diouf, but the government’s regulation of it was not entirely democratic, either (Loum 2013, Paye 2013). Instead, “troublemaking politicians, public figures, and journalists [were] subjected to unexpectedly high levels of pressure by the Wade government through a range of legal measures such as temporary closure of newspapers, suing for libel or for threatening the security of the state (according to Article 80 of the Penal Code) and police investigations” (Dahou & Foucher 2009: 28). Although there was a peaceful transfer of power from Wade to his ex-protégé, Macky Sall, the 2012 campaign and the 2011 protests about Wade’s attempts to change the constitution were characterized by state repression, abuses of civil liberties, and harassment of opposition leaders.
Elections were free, but the uneven playing field limited their fairness. The president also used his formal powers to alter election dates for his personal benefit. By the time the National Assembly elections were held in June 2007, they had been postponed twice, formally for flood-related reasons and for external validation of the voter registry, and informally “so as to secure Wade’s re-election prior to the PDS primaries” that Wade had postponed (Dahou & Foucher 2009: 26, Fall 2011: 174, Mbow 2008). Even before the legislative race, the opposition had raised concerns about the validity of the electoral register. Although such concerns are sometimes raised as part of a political strategy to destabilize the ruling party’s international image, questions about the validity of the electoral register were so widespread after the 2007 presidential election that the major opposition parties boycotted the 2007 legislative elections (Diop 2011). They protested the fact that the register had been validated by domestic but not international authorities, a concern that Wade ultimately silenced by ensuring an independent audit in 2010 (Fall 2011: 203-205).

Although Senegal’s first turnover did not foster democratization, the extent to which its second insider-driven turnover will push the process forward remains to be seen. On the one hand, after Macky Sall became president in 2012, Senegal experienced political liberalization in several areas. Important democratizing reforms included the abolition of packable institutions that contributed to the uneven playing field. Specifically, Sall got rid of the Senate (two-thirds appointed) and the Economic and Social Council (entirely appointed). This reduced the number of state sinecures that he could rely on to build up ruling party advantage and rendered the playing field somewhat more even than it had been before. However, Sall retained the presidential powers to re-establish these institutions, just as Wade did when he initially abolished them after taking office in 2000. Sall has not tied his hands by reducing such powers.
In addition, elections have been more free and fair than they generally were under Wade. The 2012 National Assembly elections, which were held several months after Sall took office, were an improvement from their 2007 equivalent, which were boycotted by several major opposition parties (Diop 2011). They also did not involve state violence as seen during the 2012 presidential campaign under Wade’s watch (Kelly 2012, 2013).

Sall’s rule has also entailed more respect for freedom of assembly and freedom of the press than was common under Wade’s presidency. Reports of harassment of opposition leaders and journalists have not been as common as they were under Wade. However, excessively punitive libel laws remain on the books and have been used against journalists reporting on controversial political issues on several occasions, just as was the case under Wade (Freedom House 2013). Protests about the incarceration of the ex-president’s son, Karim Wade, on corruption charges, were allowed by the government.  

On the other hand, a serious exception to these democratic improvements was the Sall administration’s refusal to authorize the gathering of supporters in front of PDS headquarters when Abdoulaye Wade returned to Senegal in April 2014 for the first time since his defeat. Moreover, Sall retains the power to revive packable institutions, to clamp down on civil liberties, and to tilt the playing field in future national elections during his term. In sum, although Senegal’s longer run trajectory of democratization remains to be seen, Senegal’s second turnover has certainly fostered more serious democratic reforms than under Wade.

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Given their varying relationships to subsequent political reforms, insider-driven turnovers have ambivalent implications for democratization. Further research (and, in Senegal, more passage of time) will facilitate more precise conclusions. Existing research has not disaggregated the effects of turnovers induced by insiders and those brought about by outsiders. In Africa, it is found that turnovers narrow the gap between ruling party supporters and other citizens in terms of their trust in government institutions, confidence that politicians can be held accountable, satisfaction with democracy, and accordance of legitimacy to the state (Moehler & Lindberg 2009, Cho & Logan 2014). Yet there are no explicit studies of whether these effects are different in degree or direction after insider-driven turnovers rather than outsider-driven ones. The possibility warrants future research given that the rule of certain ex-regime insiders – like Wade in Senegal – did not foster broad, democratizing reforms (Kelly 2012, Mbow 2008).

Nevertheless, Senegal’s patterns of insider advantage and outsider marginalization appear to have left space for other parts of civil society to promote democratization. For instance,

“the rise of citizen movements in Senegal marks another step forward in the strengthening of Senegalese democracy from the bottom up. These movements both reflect and facilitate the spread of democratic norms that incorporate Senegalese traditions of solidarity, tolerance, and equitable sharing of public/community resources” (Gellar 2013: 148).

They have also been involved (along with many opposition parties) in the Assises Nationales, a participatory democratic exercise conducted in 2007-8. These organizations endorsed and facilitated the town hall meetings that the Assises commission conducted across Senegal, seeking citizens’ input about how to resolve the “multidimensional crisis” that Senegal was perceived to face at the time (Assises Nationales 2009, 2012). Movements like the M23 and Don’t Touch My Constitution, which formed in response to Wade’s attempt to run for a third term, along with the Assises, led to increased citizen mobilization during the 2012 presidential elections and created
more lasting constituencies for political, social, and economic reforms that Sall signed onto during his campaign against Wade in the runoff (Kelly 2012). Civil society has remained vibrant under Sall. In the 2012 National Assembly elections, several mainstream political parties lost ground and the leaders of these citizen movements, including religious figures and associational leaders, were voted into office at the expense of certain well-known political parties (Kelly 2013).

However, despite the increasing vibrance of Senegalese civil society, which has helped regime outsiders make their political voices heard, outsiders are not always seen as democrats. This is because of their unwillingness to cooperate with incumbents for the greater good. For instance, the rural Wolof concept of demokarassi is accommodating of opposition leaders like Wade joining the government and essentially becoming insiders, in order to be involved in running the state (Cruise O’Brien 2003). Demokarassi orients voters to choose their affiliations to parties and politicians through communitarian, consensus-based decision-making about who will promote collective welfare rather than through individualistic, majoritarian logics (Schaffer 1998). In essence, it privileges political decision-making that reinforces one’s social networks of family and friends, which can be at cross-purposes with individual preferences.

Ultimately, these alternative understandings of democracy have limitations within Senegalese society. Voters in urban areas, where the logic of demokarassi is less pervasive, are more wary of such negotiation (Coulibaly 1999, Cruise O’Brien 2003, Schaffer 1998). 99 Indeed, there is “a skeptical element to much of Senegalese public opinion that assumes that campaign

99 As he prepared for the 1993 campaign, Diouf “muffled” the failure of this program, which left Senegal in need of new policies “to reduce salaries and cut state expenditures” (Kanté 1994: 107). Diouf’s official campaign statement (profession de foi) touted the economic progress that Senegal had made under his watch, acknowledging the difficulties that many citizens faced, but ultimately asserting that the PS had managed the challenging economic situation (Diouf 1993). Wade criticized the failed structural adjustment program, yet neither candidate proposed specific policy fixes to rid citizens of economic malaise, and popular grievances, including “the deterioration of the educational system, the worsening of unemployment, health-care and public-health policy, the banking sector, and so on” were not central to the 1993 campaign (Gerard 1993: 110, Kanté 1994: 105, Villalón 1994).
maneuvering and protests by the opposition are little more than posturing to strengthen bargaining positions for the eventual distribution of the benefits of power” as well (Villalón 1994: 189). This way of thinking, also common in Senegal, does not necessarily privilege insider behavior over outsiders who refuse such negotiations. The prospects for democracy in Senegal and elsewhere in Africa may ultimately depend upon how the divergence in attitudes towards insiders develops, especially given the growing population of young, urban voters.

VI- Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the sources of insider advantage in all four of Senegal’s most recent presidential elections. In each race, front-running opposition candidates turned out to be regime insiders, who had recently gained access to the state through collaboration with the ruling party or prior membership in the ruling party. This access to the state equips regime insiders with opportunities to build up political advantages over outsiders. When they are ministers, insiders control patronage that allows them to build followings, get more coverage in the media, receive state salaries, and they are more able to network with domestic and international elites who can later constitute important sources of political financing.

The analysis shows that by co-opting opposition parties into oversized ruling coalitions, and by liquidating rivals within the ruling party through manipulations of the law, Senegalese presidents incubate potential opposition within the state’s ranks rather than outside of them. Especially when magnified by the uneven playing field, insider advantages make it difficult, even for democrats who wish to consistently oppose the incumbents that they challenge, to compete seriously for the presidency without collaborating with the government for financial and reputational reasons. The literature on opposition party strength and coalescence is thus looking
for opposition in the wrong place when it restricts its analysis to organizations and politicians located outside of the state.

However, only certain insiders end up *defeating* the president “from within.” Overall, factors like poor economic performance and opposition coalescence that are generally found to increase the likelihood of turnover appear to have shaped Senegal’s turnovers in 2000 and 2012. Yet the context in which insiders emerge from the presidential camp and the strategies they adopt toward their former allies also matter. Specific insider behaviors on both the supply side and the demand side correspond to different election outcomes. Turnover happened in Senegal when on the supply side, regime insiders ran in the opposition during an impending succession within the ruling party (which makes voter and elite loyalties to the ruling party more fluid), and when on the demand side, these insiders were willing to resist the president’s attempts to collaborate soon before the election campaign. Incumbents were re-elected when just one or neither of these things happened.

Chapters 3-5 have analyzed the sources of several elements of politics in Senegal’s fluid party system: the proliferation of legally registered parties, the rarity with which these parties adopt strategies of consistent opposition, and the occurrence of two turnovers over the last fourteen years despite the uneven playing field that gives incumbent presidents systematic, deep advantages over opponents. However, an important question remains. What does the Senegalese experience with turnover indicate more comparatively about party formation and party-building in Africa’s competitive authoritarian regimes? The dissertation’s conclusion places the empirical findings in Senegal into this broader context.
CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION

What does the Senegalese experience indicate more comparatively about party formation and behavior in Africa? This chapter briefly revisits the dissertation’s findings, characterizes the dissertation’s theoretical and methodological contributions, and discusses several hypotheses about the applications of the arguments elsewhere in Africa.

I – Overview of Findings

The dissertation yields several important findings, summarized as follows. First, party formation is often a means of patronage negotiation on Senegal’s uneven playing field. Most centrally, this research has shown that a considerable set of Senegalese parties is primarily concerned with patronage negotiation, which does not necessarily entail vote-seeking or regular contestation of elections on the party label. Some Senegalese parties consistently contest national elections, others do sometimes, and there are still others that never do. However, the proportion of parties that become primarily election-oriented and forge stable constituencies among voters is low. Instead, in contemporary Senegal, party creation is often a way to get the president’s attention and seek patronage that he distributes to his allies while minimizing investments in elections than it is a means of regular electoral contestation.

Beyond structuring the president’s choice to use party proliferation as a tool to fragment the opposition and reinforce his power, the uneven playing field helps to explain why politicians would form parties that are not primarily election-oriented, but might nevertheless find them worthwhile vehicles for participating in politics. Especially when incumbency advantage is so significant that it is imperative for many opposition politicians to collaborate with the president
intermittently in order to survive, then the parties that emerge are likely to be more consistently state-oriented and less consistently election-oriented than theories based on liberal democracies would predict. Party creation becomes not just a tool for the few, lucky politicians with the capacity to attract the financial and human capital necessary to win elections to challenge those in power; it also constitutes an outlet for less prosperous politicians who lack these resources to lobby for a piece of the state pie.

**Party strategies are constrained, often excluding consistent opposition.** Opposition parties are generally considered vehicles for voicing alternatives to the ideas and policies that incumbents propose, serving as counterweights to the ruling party and fostering accountability and government responsiveness (Grzymala-Busse 2007, Rosenblum 2010). But in Senegal, where a significant subset of party founders is more concerned with negotiating patronage than with winning office, parties rarely oppose the president in elections and his government consistently over time. During the Wade presidency (2000-2012), collaboration with the government – whether through short-term tactical alliances or long-term membership in the ruling entourage – was more common than consistent opposition to the government over multiple elections. Party founders’ decisions to pursue consistent opposition are shaped by the degree and type of resources that they possess to overcome structural disadvantages in electoral competition on the uneven playing field. The consistent opposition considered so fundamental to democracy is rare because party leaders do not usually possess the endowments that together make a long-term investment in running constantly against the ruling party worthwhile: namely, experience as either high-level administrators or national-level civil society figures before creating a party, as well as access to private financing that is independent of the state.
In this context, regime insiders have become the president’s most threatening political challengers. Although presidents attempt to shape the party system in ways that bolster their chances of re-election, turnover remains a distinct possibility even in competitive authoritarian regimes. Insiders were the best-performing opponents in all of Senegal’s last four elections (1993, 2000, 2007, 2012). This is the case because insiders have been able to convert their recent, high-level access to the state – something that outsiders lack – into a means of amassing both the baseline level of financial capital and the political credibility as statesmen that they need to attract significant blocs of supporters. Especially when the uneven playing field makes it logistically and financially difficult to adopt strategies of consistent opposition, and when ruling parties are weak due to a dependence on patronage for cohesion, insiders have more potential than outsiders to develop the capacity and means to out-perform outsiders as challengers in presidential elections. Despite the ubiquity of insider advantage in Senegal’s last four presidential elections, turnover occurred in two of them. Alternance in 2000 and 2012 was linked to two aspects of politics related to insiders’ emergence and behavior: an unresolved succession crisis in the ruling party that motivates insiders to defect, and the insider’s subsequent resistance to the president’s attempts to reconcile with him as the campaign approaches.

II – Theoretical Contributions

These conclusions about party-building in Senegal offer several refinements to the literature on competitive authoritarianism, party competition in post-Third Wave countries, and African opposition parties and elections.

The argument that party creation can be a tool for patronage negotiation builds upon research about clientelism. From studies of dominant-party autocracies to research on patronage
democracies, it is often held that ambitious politicians will join existing parties in order to access patronage (Chandra 2004, Greene 2007, Magaloni 2006, Scheiner 2006). Similarly, scholarship on strong presidencies and neopatrimonialism in Africa holds that multiparty politics is driven by the desires of politicians and voters to access the state (Butler & Van de Walle 1999, Van de Walle 2003, 2007). Neither literature has documented what the present study of Senegal has: the tendency of some politicians to form new parties in their efforts to access the state, as well as certain politicians’ use of not party membership, but of party creation (even if many of these parties are small) as a strategy for negotiating their way into power.

The study of Senegal also provides further evidence that a variety of politicians in post-Third Wave non-democracies are likely to deviate from strictly vote-seeking strategies because they are playing a “dual game,” which has a regime dimension in addition to an electoral one (Mainwaring 2003). Although the concept of the dual game developed from studies of the strategies of Christian Democratic parties in Latin America, it is applicable to African cases including Senegal. However, initial studies of the dual game often emphasized the oppositional aspects of the regime game, in which the elites within election-oriented, non-ruling parties took actions intended to discredit or reform the existing order; some of the Senegalese logics of party formation illustrate other, non-adversarial activities that the existence of a regime game might foster. Namely, the coexistence of an electoral game with a regime game in a country can, additionally, encompass the emergence of parties that are not primarily election-oriented and that support the government and legitimize the regime instead.

The research also broadens the current focus of the Africanist literature on opposition parties and elections. Opposition parties are generally viewed as vehicles for voicing alternatives to the ideas and policies that incumbents propose, which monitor and critique the ruling party.
Yet in Senegal, many of the non-ruling parties that are registered do not actually oppose incumbents consistently. In fact, across a variety of competitive authoritarian regimes, many opposition parties pursue “coalitional strategies” to collaborate with the president and access the resources they need to survive (Levitsky & Way 2010b: 30), even when such coalitions are not required to form a government or to help the ruling party build a legislative majority.

The demonstration that opposition parties do not always oppose is possible given the dissertation’s attention to long-term party strategies, that is, parties’ behavior across multiple elections. Scholars already recognize the importance of strong and institutionalized opposition parties (LeBas 2011, Rakner & Svasand 2002) which have – at least implicitly if not by definition – the commitment and capacity to engage in consistent, long-term opposition to the government. However, most research on opposition in non-democracies actually explains either opposition coalescence or the electoral coalition choices of parties in single contests (Arriola 2012, Galvan 2001, Gandhi & Reuter 2013, Howard & Roessler 2006, Ndegwa 2003, Smith 2001, Wahman 2012). Looking instead over the five national elections that spanned the Wade presidency (2000-2012), the present study finds that both party leaders’ financial capital and their leadership experiences as ministers shape the string of electoral strategy choices over time. This is not entirely different from the story about short-term strategies, which emphasizes the importance of private capital for opposition. However, that research does not consider how international private financing in particular – and such financing in conjunction with a party leader’s state experience – fosters more sustained opposition (Arriola 2012).

Another expansion of Africanist scholarship lies in the attention to the sources of insider advantage in presidential elections, as well as the conditions under which their emergence and behavior foster turnover. Although Africanist scholarship has already identified several factors
that have increased the prospects of turnover across countries, many with competitive authoritarian regimes, little research accounts for who the agents of turnover are and how their behavior brings it about. By tracing the behavior and performance of insiders and outsiders in Senegal’s last four presidential elections, the dissertation expands upon studies by Pinkston (2013) and Way (2005) showing that politicians’ access to the state before joining the opposition helps them attract the reputation and financial support of private backers that make them more likely to succeed. The study of Senegal illustrates the existence of these material and reputational benefits in an additional context. In particular, insiders’ prior access to the state gives them to distribute patronage and cultivate followings by hiring lower-level staff in their ministries, develop name recognition and their reputations as statesmen in the media, and build social networks with domestic and international elites to whom they can later appeal for political support. Although not all insiders seize these opportunities successfully, outsiders do not even get a chance to try. These advantages are especially beneficial when the uneven playing field creates barriers to effective opposition for all political challengers. They are worthy of further study.

III – Methodological Contributions

The dissertation employs an inductive method for studying party politics under competitive authoritarianism; it emphasizes interviews and qualitative data-gathering from the Senegalese government as well as a variety of local archives and secondary sources. By not assuming that parties are primarily election-oriented and using these sources to analyze their functions and track their leaders’ careers, the dissertation facilitates our understanding of what purpose creating a party serves in Senegalese society, and what messages Senegalese elites
believe they are sending about themselves when they form parties and steer them into the ruling entourage or the opposition. If replicated elsewhere, this kind of study – which resulted in new, fine-grained data about the party leaders behind a wide range of Senegalese parties – will facilitate cross-country comparisons of the micro-foundations of proliferation.

The focused study of all registered parties within a particular time frame has several benefits. One of the major challenges of studying parties in non-Western contexts is that “much of the classical literature [based on the Western experience] takes party-building for granted” (Levitsky, Loxton & Van Dyck n.d.: 3), leaving little room for scholars to problematize the very emergence of parties with territorial breadth and administrative depth, or the activities of parties that do not grow into these kinds of organizations. Sampling party leaders in a chronological bloc from the population of legally defined parties helps to address this potential bias in the type of parties that the literature often features. By abandoning the premise that parties are primarily election-oriented and collecting party formation narratives among this diverse set of founders, the research leaves room to study inductively what parties actually do, as well as how often and under what conditions the premises of the classical literature play out.

Tracking the birth and trajectories of all of the parties registered within a particular period exposes a wide range of partisan actors whose organizations are continuously active on Senegal’s uneven playing field, encompassing those that become major electoral rivals to the ruling party and those that do not. This facilitates discoveries about fundamental elements of Senegalese party politics: how certain parties become election-oriented entities while others erratically run in elections but regularly seek patronage; how party leaders’ different resource profiles map onto various strategic behaviors over time; and where on this spectrum we can locate those of the insiders who seriously challenge the president.
The dissertation’s approach to studying parties also has clear costs: perhaps the most serious downside of researching an understudied phenomenon, and doing so within one country, is that there are difficulties in determining the external applicability of the findings. Another considerable challenge to adopting this method of studying party formation and party behavior is the significant amount of fieldwork that it requires. However, without obtaining party registries, consulting local experts, tracking down party leaders, and documenting party behavior through interviews, electoral data collection, and research in party and newspaper archives, we risk obscuring the full range of logics behind party formation and dynamics of party behavior. Indeed, the greatest substantive benefits of the dissertation’s approach lie in this closeness to the ground, which is difficult to achieve in a multi-country study.

IV – Extensions of the Argument

To what extent can we shed light on the nature and purposes of parties elsewhere in Africa through the study of Senegal? Information about party proliferation is not systematically available across African countries, at least from afar. In addition, for many countries, we lack complete background information about party founders and systematic information about individual parties’ electoral coalitions. The latter can be especially difficult to disaggregate to the party level from the coalition level in francophone African systems.\(^1\) Gathering this information usually requires accessing party leaders themselves, if not at least accessing those with local knowledge about politics. Ultimately, interviews, careful analysis of politicians’ behavior as covered in the press, and the consultation of secondary sources by analysts on the ground – future work necessary for deeper cross-national comparisons – will enhance our ability

\(^1\) See Resnick (2013) for an example of the difficulty of getting comprehensive party-level data on electoral activities in francophone countries like Senegal.
to draw cross-national conclusions with confidence. However, what we do know about proliferation allows us to generate several hypotheses about whether and to what extent the party-building patterns that we see in Senegal are present elsewhere in Africa.

On Party Formation

General evidence that proliferation is common, and that parties are sometimes too small-scale to be consistently election-oriented, comes from legislators from African countries in the International Organization of Francophonie (OIF). They identify proliferation as a serious social problem because of the parochial nature of many parties, which is “linked to the motivations for their creation, motivations that are explained by the structure of our societies,” especially “the attachment to territory and the importance of family in society” (Abdrahman 2001: 273). In this sense, the dissertation supports the general assessment that “in Senegal as elsewhere in Africa, the proliferation of political parties suggests the existence of a fluid and unstable market in political goods where small-scale yet dynamic political entrepreneurs look to increase their market value in the eyes of bigger fish” (Dahou & Foucher 2009: 21).

There is also some evidence that parties are not always primarily election-oriented, whether in competitive authoritarian regimes like Cameroon or in poor democracies like Mali. In Cameroon, there were over 200 registered parties by the 2007 local and legislative elections, but only 33 contested the former and 45 the latter (Tandé 2009: 126); in fact, the low proportion of parties with an electoral orientation has characterized Cameroonian politics since the start of multiparty politics in 1990. President Biya is alleged to approach particular elites and ask them to create parties when he suspects that they will join his ruling coalition, which he rewards with patronage (Pigeaud 2011). Similarly, in Mali before the coup, there were well over one hundred
registered parties and “political fragmentation [wa]s strongly linked to the personality of leaders and splits often ar[o]se out of misunderstandings or discontent about the distribution of posts” (Baudais & Chauzal 2006: 66).² Office-seeking was not the only activity of these parties, given that in the 2009 local elections, only 69 of over 120 ran candidates (Mali MATCL 2011).

Generally, dominant party systems in Africa “create disincentives for opposition party consolidation” and “at least some politicians believe that maintaining an independent power base will improve the deal they can strike with the president” (Van de Walle 2007). However, the proportions of parties that are primarily patronage-oriented and primarily office-seeking, as well as their implications for democracy, are likely to vary across countries – and within countries across time – in response to several factors, perhaps the ways that the president uses an uneven playing field to reward the formation of different kinds of parties and the extent to which politicians have the resources to respond to opposition disadvantages in this context through regular electoral contestation versus other strategies.

Currently, what we know is that proliferation outside of Senegal is common across countries with a variety of electoral and economic conditions that might shape presidents’ power retention methods. We see proliferation in countries without dominant parties (Benin) and with dominant parties (Burkina Faso); in countries with primarily agricultural economies (Madagascar, Kenya) and with oil economies (Cameroon, Gabon). This raises several hypotheses. First, it could be that presidents with more patronage to distribute because of oil windfalls have more resources available to encourage proliferation (by rewarding politicians who create parties that then collaborate with the government). With more state resources to distribute to build political coalitions, presidents of countries with oil economies may be able to encourage

² Many split from the former ruling party, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), just as a variety of founders in Senegal were at some point officials within the PS.
proliferation without having to sacrifice their material capabilities to destabilize and fragment the opposition in other ways as well. On the other hand, encouraging proliferation may be a less important (and less necessary) tool for the leaders of oil-rich competitive authoritarian regimes than for the leaders of such countries with agricultural economies. Relative to presidents in Senegal, presidents in Cameroon and Gabon have more developed repressive tools for reinforcing their power; in such contexts, non-violent tactics of fragmenting the opposition (including the encouragement of party proliferation) may not be as effective as repressive alternatives.

Second, proliferation may be more likely in countries that lack ruling parties that were forged through liberation struggles. In competitive authoritarian regimes in which party identities grew out of organizations whose cohesion was forged through violent conflict, the post-conflict parties that form have less fluid boundaries than parties whose cohesion depends only upon patronage distribution (Levitsky & Way 2013). When instead patronage is the main source of party cohesion or disunity and party boundaries are not polarized, as is the case in Senegal, then party formation for patronage-seeking purposes may be relatively easier than in countries like Zimbabwe or Mozambique.

We must also consider the possibility that even if proliferation is common across countries, the kind of parties resulting from it could be different. While Cameroon and Senegal may look roughly equivalent according to the sheer number of parties registered, they may vary with respect to the reasons that politicians choose to create those organizations and with respect to the motivations that presidents have to accommodate their existence.

Finally, although the dissertation highlights several context-specific features of Senegalese politics that correlate with its recent party proliferation, some of these features are
generalizable to other African countries. Elite perceptions of increased political opportunity, which were induced by presidential turnover in turn-of-the-century Senegal and coincided with its initial takeoff in party formation, are likely to be features of party politics in other contexts as well. The same goes for presidential initiatives to foster proliferation, which in Senegal helped to explain the persistence of proliferation after 2000. Both an uneven playing field and the powerful presidency are common features of contemporary African politics. In the Senegalese context, they enabled President Wade to create and maintain the Cap 21. However, they might empower presidents faced with different electoral constraints to shape incentives for party formation in different ways.

On Party Strategies

Similar conditions may apply to the study of long-term party strategies. The aggregate behaviors that Senegalese parties have pursued – namely, consistent opposition, tactical alliances, and long-term co-optation – also appear in other African countries. Contemporary African countries with somewhat liberalized economies are those in which party leaders are most likely to exhibit interesting variation on financing (Arriola 2012), one of the study’s key independent variables. Within this group of countries, it would be most plausible to observe dynamics similar to Senegal’s in places with weak ruling parties reliant on patronage for cohesion and an uneven playing field. The lack of polarization of parties around histories of violent struggle may expand the range of long-term party behaviors that are viable in a country, and make shifts between the ruling entourage and the opposition moves that are possible and not necessarily disadvantageous. The ruling party’s basis for ensuring its members’ cohesion may also influence party leaders’ perceptions of their strategy choices: namely, politicians may be
more likely to perceive a dichotomous set of possible behaviors – either consistent opposition or long-term collaboration with the ruling party, with no changes over time allowed – in countries with strong ruling parties based on members’ shared ideology and historical struggle. Finally, we might most expect collaborative behaviors (like tactical alliances or long-term membership in the ruling entourage) to be more popular than adversarial behaviors (like consistent opposition) in competitive authoritarian regimes. The uneven playing field magnifies the degree of incumbency advantage to such an extent that even party leaders with significant experience or financing would not automatically consider investing these resources into a serious, long-term project of unseating the president and his ruling entourage.

Further cross-national study of the determinants of these behaviors will require fine-grained information on individuals and coalitions that are not featured in existing datasets on presidential and legislative elections in Africa (Carr 2003, Kollman et al. 2013, Nohlen et al. 1999). We would also need more comprehensive indications of coalition composition, and of systematic information about party leaders’ financial profiles, political careers, and demographic characteristics in other countries in order to compare them to Senegal.

**On Insider Advantage and Turnover**

Extensions of the argument about insider advantage in Senegal’s presidential elections are also likely to have these scope conditions. Insider advantages are likely to be relevant features of competition in other countries that have weak ruling parties. In Senegal, both the PS (in 1993 and 2000) and the PDS (in 2007 and 2012) were weak in that their cohesion depended upon the president’s ability to distribute patronage to its members. Cohesion did not hinge upon “the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent,
and ideologically-driven conflict” that characterized the origins of ruling parties in certain other African countries (Levitsky & Way 2013: 869). In places like Zimbabwe and Mozambique, the boundaries between parties are polarized and the costs of insider defections are higher. The electorate is less likely to shift their existing party allegiances in order to rally behind a regime insider who suddenly emerges on his own to challenge the president; polarized cleavages between the ruling party and existing opposition parties anchors the party loyalty of both voters and the insider politicians who might otherwise strike out on their own. ³ This means that politicians’ defection – even if it is in service of forming one’s own, new party as insiders often do – is a more contentious act than in countries with parties in which membership is more fluid since it depends largely on patronage distribution.

Insider advantage is also most plausible in competitive authoritarian regimes. The advantages that insiders are purported to enjoy due to their prior access to the state, including control over patronage jobs, privileged access to rich elites, and extra attention in the media, are greater handicaps to outsiders on the uneven playing field than they would be to outsiders in democracies, where their relative deprivation is less.

V- Conclusion

Overall, the dissertation has explained patterns of party formation and behavior that appeared under competitive authoritarianism, which existed under both Diouf and Wade. Yet after 2012, Senegal made further democratizing reforms. By the end of 2013, it was “free” according to Freedom House criteria, although it probably too early to tell whether the regime under Sall is fully democratic by procedural minimum standards that take abuses seriously

³ For example, LeBas (2006, 2011) shows that polarized cleavages increase the costs of defection from a party, because the barriers to entering the other major party are higher in an ideologically or historically polarized context.
In light of this development, the dissertation indicates that Senegal made this democratic progress despite conditions not deemed hospitable to Western models of competition and accountability, including party proliferation, the rarity of consistent opposition parties that remain outside of the government to critique it, and the tendency of ex-regime insiders rather than committed outsiders to induce turnover.

To a certain extent, these patterns challenge the relevance of the liberal democratic model for understanding party politics Senegal. In liberal democracies, which often have institutionalized party systems, parties facilitate the aggregation of citizens’ broad-based interests, provide political representation, and groom candidates for elected office. Parties are the organizations that empower citizens to increase government responsiveness and hold public officials accountable (Key 1964, Lipset 2000, Stokes 1999). Democracy is “unthinkable” (Schattschneider 1942: 1) and “unworkable” (Aldrich 1995) without parties when they serve these purposes. But in fluid party systems, including that of Senegal, parties do not always fulfill the functions that liberal democratic theories assign them (Manning 2005, Van de Walle & Butler 1999). They often function as personalistic vehicles for accessing state resources and do not develop ideological or programmatic brands that facilitate voters’ choices. As a result, the vertical accountability that parties are purported to facilitate may be subverted.

Indeed, there remain plenty of Senegalese who are skeptical that parties will ultimately drive further democratization. The historian Sémou Pathé Guèye captures such skepticism in his own assessment about the proliferation of “parties that have nothing but a name.” It contributes to the “degradation of pluralist democracy in the eyes of people who don’t feel [parties to be] useful in their everyday life” (2003: 181-2). The political scientist El Hadji Omar Diop (2011) documents the construction and destruction of the “myth of Senegalese democracy” in the
contemporary context of proliferation. These scholars highlight political problems that party proliferation either creates or exacerbates in their country. Ultimately, the solutions to these will depend on understanding the sources of such proliferation as well as the goals, resources, and experiences of the politicians who contribute to it.
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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Table Fisher’s Exact Tests for Long-Term Strategy and Several IVs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State/civil society experience</td>
<td>0.023**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private financing (international)</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote-mobilizing potential</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private financing (any kind)</td>
<td>0.072*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior party experience</td>
<td>0.315</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** indicates significance at 99% confidence level; ** indicates 95% level; * indicates 90% level

Appendix 2: Frequency of Party Strategies by Levels of Experience and Financing

First, let us compare party leaders with different degrees of state/civil society experience. A higher percentage of the party leaders with more experience adopt the consistent opposition strategy. Party founders with low experience almost always pursue long-term co-optation strategies and politicians with medium levels of experience are the most varied in the strategies that they choose. The same pattern characterizes the relationship between party leaders’ independent financing and strategy, but the positive correlation is less marked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low Experience</th>
<th>Medium Experience</th>
<th>High Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent Opposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4 total)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>2 (66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3 total)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3: Strategy Frequencies broken down by % elections a party runs in opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy Type</th>
<th>Low Financing</th>
<th>Medium Financing</th>
<th>High Financing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent Opposition</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Alliance</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-optation (9 total)</td>
<td>6 (75%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (of 16)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*indicates that for this category, there was missing data on the strategies that certain individuals pursued and that the percentage of people adopting each strategy is calculated based on the total number of people with complete data available.