Iran's Situations: Military Violence, Protests, and Group Dynamics

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Iran’s Situations: Military Violence, Protests, and Group Dynamics

A dissertation presented

by

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to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of
Political Science

Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

May 2014
Iran’s Situations: Military Violence, Protests, and Group Dynamics

Abstract

Iran is a country with a rich history of successful social movements and not so successful ones. The two most recent ones—1979 and 2009—set up a very unique puzzle that sheds some light not only on the factors of micro-variation (in levels of violence against protesters) within states over time, but also on the factors that drive variation within a protest wave—factors that are related to the design of a state’s security system (for example, multiple security force actors that provide options for protest policing). Explaining variation across and within these two cases requires that we think about the ensuing potential for violent conflict as inter-group related. In order to predict violence on protesters in Iran, it is necessary to measure the level of representativeness in the military organization, which I disaggregate at the level of the security force actor (Basij/IRGC/Artesh), and consider this in relation to the composition of the protesting crowd. The more representative a security force body within the military, the less likely is the outbreak of violence in any given protest event if that body is involved. This is because representative entities are less likely to view crowds as part of a threatening other.
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Acknowledgments

Many thanks to my committee members: Beth Simmons, Muhammet Bas, and Steve Rosen. Beth, thank you so much for your encouragement and guidance during this process. Muhammet, I’ve always left meetings with you optimistic about my work, and what I can accomplish. Steve, thank you for pushing me to be better—it is reflected in my work. I’m grateful to you all.

I’m also grateful to friends and family for their support. You have been there through thick and thin.

Thanks to IQSS, the Weatherhead Center, the Tobin Institute, and GSAS for the support. It has been crucial.
Introduction

How do quasi-democratic states design security institutions that are capable of violence against unarmed citizens who are protesting? The most effective design is one that exploits a significant social cleavage in society. Even a quick analysis of the Arab Spring demonstrates this point. This revolutionary wave of demonstrations that swept through the Middle East from 2010-2012 (some argue is still ongoing) changed the political landscape in the region. The cause of the dissatisfaction stemmed from something very basic: inequality. Whether this was inequality because of the concentration of money or power does not really matter—the causes were many, and they were all interrelated. What is significant is the mobilization of people that ended up changing the structure of politics. In some cases, the people succeeded. In other cases, they did not. The most glaring difference among all these cases is the response of the state’s security apparatus to the protests. Some militaries were willing to shoot, and others were not.
Syria’s and Tunisia’s uprisings started off in similar ways: mass street protests against the governments. However, the most significant difference between Tunisia and Syria was the nature of the state’s response via its military and security apparatus. In Tunisia, the military refused to fire on protesters, standing back and allowing the movement there to be successful. This did not happen in Syria, where the military responded with violence very early in the crisis (March 2011).

This pattern extends to most countries during the Arab Spring. The ones in which the military refused to fire on protesters saw transitions (the success of which remains to be seen in many cases): Tunisia and Egypt. In a similar vein, the ones in which significant government concessions were made, which peacefully suppressed protests, ended up being countries with representative militaries (Jordan, Oman). The countries with unrepresentative militaries that were willing to fire on protesters were those that either fell into civil war or teetered on the edge of civil war (Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya).

The Arab Spring created a flurry of scholarly research on regime cohesion, durability, and military defection. Researchers were eager to fill the gap on civil-military relations in the Arab World. Many attempted to explain the variation during the
Arab Spring, and they were successful to a certain extent. The focus on macro-level variables like food prices (Lagi et al. 2011), climate change (Slaughter, Werrell, and Femia 2013), ethnic representativeness (Droz-Vincent 2011), economic penetration (Springborg 2011), institutionalization (Bellin 2012), coup-proofing (Makara 2013), and regime legitimacy (Barany 2011) has been fruitful. These factors have provided a framework within which to partially understand the inter-state variation in military behavior during periods of mass protest.

However, these macro-level variables fail to explain intra-state variation, particularly between periods of time during which they do not change. This includes not only the short periods of time between protest waves within a country, but also the day to day variation that occurs within a protest wave. This variation is puzzling because we might expect similar outcomes in similar situations if we only consider the macro-variables. For example, why the same military organization that might be willing to fire on crowds that are big and threatening falls apart in the face of different protests a few years later is problematic for these variables. There is a need to look beyond just the security force actor and its relationship to the state. It is important to also consider the relationship the military has with society as well as
the ideological foundations of the state system.

To understand intra-state variation, both across protest waves and within protest waves, we have to assess the actors within a protest event and their relationships to each other. These micro-level variables affect the probability of violence at the level of each protest event. Chapter 1 lays out the theoretical framework of this project. Here, I claim that representativeness affects the likelihood of military violence during protest movements. More representative militaries are less likely to inflict violence on protesters because they are less likely to view crowds as a threatening “other.” This is particularly true if the protesting crowd is broad, composed of more than one subgroup of society.

Furthermore, an additional contribution of my theory is to disaggregate the military organization, recognizing that states design their security apparatus’ with both internal and external threats in mind. This can be clearly seen in Iran today. The Iranian security apparatus is comprised of three entities: the regular Artesh, the IRGC, and the Basij. Representativeness varies across these three bodies. To the extent that the Basij is the most unrepresentative entity within the Iranian security apparatus, and given paramilitary characteristics that condition the effect of group cohesiveness
in a perverse way, I expect the worst forms of violence to occur when the Basij is present at a protest event.

Chapter 2 considers alternative explanations for the likelihood of military violence during a protest event. This chapter looks at three alternative explanations. All three are rationalist, but the third is also realist to the extent that it traces the source of variation in the levels of international pressure between 1979 and 2009 to realpolitik concerns (or lack thereof). The first alternative assesses the role of professionalization through a rationalist framework. This version of a rationalist argument focuses on the costs of engaging in high intensity coercion by the military. The main factor in the “utility function" is the concern for survival. The alternative (i.e., what the cost of engaging in high intensity coercion is compared against) is what life would look like for the military as an institution after the potential fall of the current regime. Is the military institutionalized enough to survive beyond the collapse of any given regime? The second alternative is also rationalist, but the focus is on incentives at an elite level. The alternative “strategy" depends on the possibility of material gain under a different regime. In this scenario, a military elite is comparing his access to resources under two different conditions—one that may extend the length of his time horizon
(assuming no change in the discount factor), thereby fostering “loyalty” to the current regime. Finally, the third alternative explanation discusses the role of international pressure on domestic politics. Is is possible that the pull (or lack thereof) of material and security ties with a powerful nation—the U.S.—is driving the military’s use of violence against protesters? Though my approach is socio-psychological, and this chapter hints at the merits of such an approach given the problems with the dominant approaches, I do not claim that other methods or perspectives have no merit. I believe that my framework can work alongside a rationalist one, since multiple motivations can co-exist, leading to the same outcome.

Chapter 3 examines the Iranian Revolution using the theoretical framework. The main thrust of this chapter is to set up a puzzle that highlights intra-state variation across protest waves, even though variation during the Revolution itself is also considered. The Iranian military under the Shah responded forcefully, cohesively, and violently against a series of large protests that broke out during 1963. However, despite expectations to the contrary (and holding many variables fixed), it fell apart in 1979. I draw on two interviews with high ranking officials in the Shah’s cabinet and the opposition, as well as primary and secondary sources. I argue that the represen-
tative nature of the Iranian Armed Forces at the time did not facilitate the use of violence against protesters because members of the military organization identified with protesters who were perceived to be part of the in-group. This chapter is also historically focused in order to provide the context for the theory.

Chapter 4 looks at the Green Revolution under the current regime in Iran. Why was the Islamic Regime able to crush protests using the armed forces in 2009 while the Shah failed to do so in 1979? By highlighting, politically and ideologically, the role of Iran’s religious rural population, the security apparatus exploits a key cleavage in Iranian society: the urban/rural divide. Representativeness along this cleavage is the right context in the Iranian case—ignoring this element means that we would miss much of the interesting variation present throughout the Iranian security system. This chapter uses an original dataset on protest events during 2009-2012 to look at the effect of representativeness on the use of lethal force against protesters. As opposed to the previous chapter, the main contribution of this chapter is its focus on intra-state variation within a protest wave. I also draw on interviews with two former Basijis to highlight the mechanisms of the theoretical framework.

Why the focus on Iran in this work? First, testing this theory requires a focused
approach. Choosing one country permits a comprehensive analysis of all the cultural, historical, societal, and political factors that impact the theoretical framework. Second, Iran makes sense given my language skills and network connections. Some of the interviews were conducted in Farsi, and it was helpful to have a sense of the language for the media materials. Most importantly, the comparison between the 1979 case and the 2009 case is a useful one for many reasons, especially methodologically. Many of the background variables can be held constant or fixed, allowing for a rigorous analysis when it comes to determining which factors may have actually caused a difference in outcome.

Given the most relevant factors, it would have been reasonable to expect a similar outcome across both cases. There were four important factors that were constant in 1979 and 2009. First, both movements occurred in the context of a serious economic downturn and high levels of political and economic dissatisfaction. The oil boom of the 1970s produced an alarming increase in inflation and growing inequality. Economic austerity measures to fight inflation in 1977 ended up disproportionately affecting poor and unskilled labor (Graham 1980). By 1978, Iran’s economy was in shambles, and people from all levels of society (including the middle class) were dis-
satisfied because of unmet political and economic expectations. Similarly, the global recession in 2009 as well as strengthened international sanctions deeply affected Iran’s already ailing economy. The steep decline of Iran’s oil revenues in 2009 led to rising unemployment, runaway inflation and a stagnating GDP (Douthat 2009). Furthermore, after four years of the ultraconservative Ahmadinejad government (and eight years of a “reformist” president who delivered no political changes), Iranian domestic political support was at an all time low (Sigarchi 2008).

Secondly, the scopes of both movements were comparable. 2009 was the biggest and most threatening display of civil dissatisfaction since 2009. Hundreds of thousands of protesters poured into the streets by mid-June. The regime had never witnessed such numbers; in fact, the last time numbers like this had turned out had been in support of the current regime in 1979. Furthermore, demonstrators were chanting phrases such as “Down with the dictator,” “Death to the dictator,” “Death to Khamenei” (Cohen 2009). This was the first time in the history of the regime that protesters had ever so directly threatened the Supreme Leader. Given the scope and intent of crowds during the Green Revolution, the level of threat perceived by the state in 1979 and 2009 is comparable.
Thirdly, if assessed compositionally, the Iranian Armed Forces in 1979 and 2009 were essentially identical. Both had recruitment strategies based on universal conscription, which meant similar levels of representativeness. Furthermore, the state’s capacity for repression was also comparable across the two cases. Iran, in the modern era, has always been a strong, centralized state with a massive security apparatus (Wright 2010). In fact, the Iranian government’s capacity to protect itself in 1979 had never been higher: SAVAK had just emerged victorious after defeating both of the major urban guerrilla groups seeking to topple the state, and military spending was at an all time high (Looney 1998).

However, the outcomes of the two cases could not be more different. In 1979, the Shah’s security apparatus fell apart in the face of mounting protests, and he was forced to flee the country. In 2010, after months of demonstrations, the Islamic Regime’s security apparatus emerged victorious as hundreds of thousands of equally dissatisfied citizens gave up, despite having been willing to bear enormous costs at the start of the movement. How I explain this puzzle in the following chapters highlights the three broad contributions of this work. First, on a conceptual level, this framework broadens our understanding of actors. In the case of the use of force, it
disaggregates the military in order to reveal the agency of state design. For example, under the Islamic Regime, the state designed a security system with multiple actors, all with varying levels of representativeness. In the case of the protesting group, the framework encourages a more general understanding of groups that goes beyond ethnicity. Second, the main argument blends together literature in two different fields (political sociology and social psychology), and applies it to a topic in civil-military relations. Finally, by focusing on intra-state variation, this project emphasizes the military-society relationship—one that has received little attention, but is starting to get more (see Barak and David 2010).
1 Theoretical Framework

1.1 Introduction

When will a military organization inflict violence on protesters and when will it not? Secondly, how do we define the military in the context of a state’s security apparatus, particularly when threats are equally distributed domestically and internationally? The military’s decision has important implications for the level of violence against protesters as well as the possibility of civil war on the one hand and movement success on the other. In some cases, mass protests lead to major regime transitions (for example, Egypt 2011); however, in other cases, we observe severe internal violence, leading to civil war. In the case of civil war, we have seen examples of a potentially different model of civil war onset (Syria 2011, Algeria 1991).

In short, I claim that representativeness in the military affects the likelihood of
military violence during protest movements. More representative militaries are less likely to inflict violence on protesters because they are less likely to view crowds as a threatening “other.” This is particularly true if the protesting crowd is broad, composed of more than one subgroup of society.

Furthermore, an additional contribution of my theory is to disaggregate the military organization, recognizing that states design their security apparatus’ with both internal and external threats in mind. This is clear in the design of Iran’s current security apparatus. The Iranian Armed Forces today are structured in a way that can manage both mass internal threats (like threatening social movements) and external ones (from regional powers). There are three security actors within the Iranian Armed Forces—the Basij, the IRGC, and the regular military. Each security actor has a different focus and function, which corresponds, I argue in an intentional way, with its composition—i.e., how representative each entity is.

Thus, an implication of my argument is that certain entities within a security apparatus, dependent on the extent to which they are or are not representative, may be prone to particularly perverse forms of violence against protesters. To the extent that paramilitaries are less representative, and given that they are also usually more
ideological and less professionalized, I expect the worst outcomes of violence when it comes to their protest policing strategies. This can be clearly seen in the case of the Basij. The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia established in 1979 as a formal body in the Armed Forces. It is also the most unrepresentative, ideologically motivated entity in the Iranian Armed Forces. During the Green Revolution in 2009, Basijis were responsible for the worst kinds of violence against protesters. Their methods included sexual violence and strategies specifically intended to cause public terror because of their perversity (for example, wearing plainclothes and walking amidst protesting crowds in order to stab protesters unexpectedly).

This chapter lays out the theoretical framework in greater detail. It explains how representativeness in the military affects the likelihood of military violence, and why a greater degree of unrepresentativeness (especially in paramilitary branches of the Armed Forces) leads to a higher likelihood of military violence on protesters. The mechanisms I put forward to explain this relationship between representativeness and military violence are psychological. Representative militaries are less threatened by broad protests because they are less able to view crowds as a threatening other. At the heart of my theory is the notion that “us versus them” distinctions play a critical
role in justifying violence, particularly in the context of power asymmetries—i.e., violence against the unarmed citizens of one’s own country. The value added of my psychological approach over a more rationalist framework is the topic of the next chapter, in which I consider alternative explanations of the phenomenon I am trying to explain.

1.2 Linking Representativeness to Military Violence

During Protests: Us Versus Them Distinctions

Why are more representative military forces less likely to inflict violence on protesters? This section discusses the mechanism linking representativeness to military violence during protests. Here, I explain why I would expect more representative bodies in the military to be less likely to inflict violence on protest crowds. The mechanism draws on theories and concepts in social psychology. The next chapter explains the value-added of a psychological approach over alternative explanations, showing that there are still gaps in understanding despite the prevalence of more rational theories, which certainly play a role as well.
I discuss measurement and operationalization later in this chapter; however, it is important to note a couple of things about the dependent and independent variables before I get into a discussion of the theory. The dependent variable in this study is military violence. I define military violence as high intensity coercion against protesters by actors or entities within the armed forces. High intensity coercion, which I consider in great depth later, is measured through the use of violent strategies and tactics of protest policing that are intended to promote fear and dissuade further protesters. The independent variable in this study is representativeness in the military: the extent to which the military reflects the various groups in society. Traditionally, representativeness has been defined ethnically and in a certain structural way, namely with respect to differences between services (i.e., representativeness in the army versus the navy versus the air force) or ranks (i.e., representativeness in the officer corps versus the rank and file). My contribution to the discussion on representativeness in the military is twofold. First, I argue that representativeness as a concept must be more contextualized—ethnicity is not a significant cleavage in every country. Second, I argue that representativeness must be broadened to include the possibility of variation across entities within a military organization—entities that
include parallel military institutions and paramilitaries.

Now, I can move on to discuss the actual theory. I begin by framing my psychological approach, which leads to the significance of the “us versus them” mechanism at the heart of the theory. This psychological approach begins with the assumption that group identification forms a basis for justifying violence in a highly motivated setting. However, it is important to justify this assumption. The context within which high intensity coercion during a protest event is required is one that is highly motivated because it causes extreme cognitive dissonance. A motivated setting in psychology is a context within which individuals must unconsciously fit their processing of information to beliefs that suit some end or goal, otherwise there is unresolved anxiety (Festinger 1957; Lerner 1978; Colm 2001).

So, what exactly are the conflicting beliefs and who holds them? In this context, the holders of the beliefs are the security force agents, from either the regular military, a parallel military institution, or a paramilitary unit/militia. Unlike regular police forces, members of the Armed Forces, regardless of the orientation of any specific agency (for example, the Basij is primarily focused on managing internal threat, though it was a critical element of Iran’s defense during the Iran-Iraq War), have a
stake in the national interest or the defense of the country and its citizens against some overarching, more ideologically defined threat. This belief system—i.e., the idea that citizens must be protected—coupled with the highly asymmetric nature of protest policing, which involves the use of force against unarmed citizens who are (usually) peacefully mobilizing, leads to a highly charged, cognitively dissonant context.

How can dissonance in such a context be resolved? Social psychology points to group identification as an important part of how humans rationalize violence in dissonant settings, which is why my theory focuses on the causal power of representativeness and us versus them distinctions. In fact, the significance of group identification as the basis of conflict in society has been a major topic of study in social psychology. Social Identity Theory—first posited by Henri Tajfel (1972, 1974)—suggests that humans are naturally disposed to forming and joining groups. Furthermore, threat perception at a basic, cognitive level is linked to group identification; out-group members are inherently more threatening, and in-group members receive preferential treatment. Any subsequent violence is, therefore, inter-group related—justified because an out-group individual is easily categorized, blamed, or seen as threatening (therefore, violence manifests as a form of defense and dissonance is resolved). In
short, when it comes to legitimizing and inflicting violence, group identity is a sig-
nificant, universal variable: all humans form groups, and it is in our disposition to
justify the resulting violence as an extension of that identification (Sherif et al. 1961;
Tajfel 1982a; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Bar-Tal 2007; Bar-Tal 1989; Brubaker et al.
Leidner 2012; Milgram 1964).

As a quick summary of this section so far, I have framed my approach by showing
that it makes sense to consider a psychological argument to explain variation in
military violence because the context within which it takes place is highly motivated
(or dissonant). Thus, we might expect group identification to play a role because,
based on extensive literature in social psychology, the principle way humans resolve
dissonance in settings that involve violence is by justifying the need for it through us
versus them distinctions—i.e., the out-group "deserves" the violence in some way or for
some reason. In sum, I have shown why the context in which high intensity coercion is
needed might be a source of cognitive dissonance, and I have demonstrated the validity
of my approach—in such a context, scholars of social psychology would expect group
identification to play a role in reducing cognitive dissonance and inducing violence.
The question is how? What are the specific conditions that increase or decrease the likelihood of violence?

Us versus them distinctions induce violence because they allow individuals in one group to justify violence against another group through the use of stereotypes or other kinds of biases related to threat perception. The stronger this “us versus them” distinction becomes, the more likely is violence. When the military is more representative, members are less likely to view crowds as a threatening other because the distinction between us versus them is not as strong. On the other hand, as the military becomes less representative, group-based differences are magnified as the distance and distinction between crowds and the military expands. This is because members of less representative entities tend to identify with one social category as opposed to multiple categories. For example, given the homogenous nature of the Basij, Basijis have one strong social identity that overrides all other ones—this stems from the unrepresentative nature of the organization. Identifying strongly with one social category (as opposed to multiple) has been shown to enhance us versus them distinctions, leading to a higher likelihood of stereotyping and violence against out-group members (Hall and Crisp 2005).
So far, I have argued that group identification, which is more prevalent or stronger in unrepresentative militaries, makes (military) violence more likely against protesters. However, how do we know which groups matter? It is not enough that objective group differences exist. The same groups that coexist peacefully in one country at a particular point in time may turn on each other violently in other contexts (Posner 2004). This is precisely why representativeness, as I argue earlier, must be understood in the context of a longer political, cultural, and social timeline. In Iran, focusing on ethnicity (which varies greatly in the Iranian context), would not get a researcher much causal leverage when it comes to explaining political violence; however, realizing that urban/rural divisions, which are situated in the long-standing alliance between the clergy and the countryside, are at the heart of the Iranian political process would get the researcher much further. The existence of groups does not necessitate violence, but it is true that violence, at a systemic or institutionalized level, is the result of group-based differences being made salient. In the Iranian case, the group-based differences we care about are urban/rural (religious/secular) for reasons that are described in Chapter 4 and 5. This is how representativeness in the military organization is primarily assessed.
To directly test this “us versus them mechanism,” I would need to survey a representative sample of members in each of the military units I assess in the case studies. Based on this information, I could find out with what group or groups these individuals identified, and, most importantly, how they perceived the crowds during the protest periods—was it the case that members of more unrepresentative bodies viewed crowds as part of an “other?” Unfortunately, getting access to this kind of information is next to impossible. Iran guards this information, and it would be dangerous to attempt to conduct a survey of this nature in the country. However, the question is still an important and interesting one. It is possible to indirectly test the “us versus them” mechanism by applying a related concept, and looking for evidence that supports those expectations.

The related concept that can be applied, which gets at the us versus them distinction, is Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). As an overview, before I get into the details of this concept, a quick summary of how I apply this concept would be helpful. FAE is a universal cognitive bias that is about how humans attribute cause to behavior. It turns out that humans attribute cause based on group identification. Members of an in-group are more likely to view each other’s demands and actions as
legitimate and non-threatening; the opposite is true for members of the out-group. Since I am unable to do an actual survey, I can look for evidence of the expectations of FAE bearing out instead. Thus, if I find evidence of unrepresentative militaries viewing protesters and their demands as illegitimate, extreme, and/or threatening (and the opposite case for representative militaries), then I can argue that there is some support for the assertion that us versus them distinctions play a role in the likelihood of violence against protesters. Otherwise put, if we assume FAE is valid, then we know that members of the in-group tend to view members of the out-group differently—i.e., see them as more threatening and/or illegitimate. Using this logic, I can look for evidence of how members of the military perceive protesters and their demands. Based on this perception, I can make a claim about the extent to which different militaries may consider protesters part of an out-group (or not, depending on representativeness).

How does FAE actually work? Why is it that humans attribute cause differently based on group identification? An FAE occurs when an individual ascribes meaning and cause to another person’s actions and behavior based on that person’s disposition rather than on his or her situation (Gilbert and Malone 1995; Kazdin 2000; Reeder
A common example is the judgment by one person that another person must be speeding on the road because he or she is careless or “crazy.” Blame is rarely attributed to an individual’s situation—perhaps the speedy driver was rushing because she was late for an important exam. An extension of this concept is that individuals are more likely to judge in-group members favorably—the motivations for an in-group member’s behavior are more likely to be attributed to his or her situation by another member (Pettigrew 1979; Betancourt 1979). An application of this concept to a protest situation leads to the expectation that representative militaries are more likely to view the demands of the opposition as less threatening and more legitimate because such a group is perceived to be part of the “us.” In certain contexts, a representative military judges the opposition’s demands more favorably; the situation plays some role in explaining these demands for the military (i.e., there is a rationale or some legitimate cause of dissatisfaction), and these claims are perceived to be more justified. On the other hand, unrepresentative militaries should view protesters and their demands as illegitimate, extreme, and/or threatening. If this is the case, then there is some support for the argument that unrepresentative militaries are more likely to view protest crowds as part of an out-group, an “other.”
To summarize, I am testing the argument that representative militaries are more likely to view crowds as part of the “us” by seeing if the expectations of FAE, given this, bear out. Knowing that, based on FAE, members of the in-group judge each other’s actions more favorably (as if they are legitimate or warranted, and not threatening), we can say that, if representative militaries are truly more likely than unrepresentative militaries to perceive crowds as part of the in-group, then they should also be more likely to view protesters and their demands more favorably. It is the latter that I am able to assess in the following chapters, as well as some partial evidence that members of unrepresentative entities within the military identify most strongly with one social identity.

A final aspect of the theory to discuss here is the context within which it is more likely that a representative military will not inflict violence on crowds. The “us versus them” mechanism suggests that certain types of contexts may be more conducive in this regard. These contexts are ones in which representative militaries feel like crowds cannot be singularly defined and/or represent society more broadly. We can imagine

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1There is research that suggests that singularly defined crowds may be more likely to be fired upon. In this case, a singularly defined crowd is one that is composed of one subgroup of society. Social categorization—classifying others into broad groupings—is a useful shortcut for navigating the social world and thus saving processing resources (i.e., mental energy. See Fiske and Taylor 1991; Hamilton 1979; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2001). However, as Crisp and Hall (2005) note, the cognitive efficacy of social categorization comes with some drawbacks: it is the mental prerequisite
how these contexts make it more likely that a representative military, with members that identify with multiple groups, would view crowds as part of the “us." Thus, crowds that are broad, composed of more than one subgroup in society, are more likely to be perceived as representative of society, which, for representative militaries, makes this kind of crowd part of the “us." For unrepresentative militaries, this is not the case because the “us" is differently defined. Members of unrepresentative militaries tend to identify very strongly with a singular, narrowly defined group. This connection to an in-group that is also narrowly defined is stronger—everyone else, no matter how broad, is seen as belonging to an out-group.

for intergroup bias and stereotyping, which leads to intergroup conflict (see also Heilman 1995; Bodenhausen 1992; Macrae, Stangor, and Milne 1994; Oakes and Turner 1990; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Doise 1978; Tajfel 1969; Maass and Schaller 1989). Research has shown that intergroup dichotomy worsens these effects, and that generating alternative or multiple social classifications reduces intergroup bias (Crisp and Hall 2005; Crisp et al. 2001; Crisp et al. 2006; Hewstone, Turner, and Kenworthy 2007; Monteiro, Guerra, and Rebelo 2009). In particular, two experiments (Hall and Crisp 2005) found that considering multiple criteria for social categorization can reduce intergroup bias, whereas focusing on a single, narrow criteria increases the odds of violent conflict as a result of stereotyping (see also Levine and Campbell 1972; Doise 1978). Thus, when a protesting group can be easily classified or defined in a narrow sense (for example, a group of “students" or a group of "workers"), there is a higher chance the perverted dichotomous, relational aspects of the situation will lead to intergroup bias and violence; the distinct cognitive dichotomy into “us" and “them" is easier
1.2.1 On Groups in the Crowd

Groups play a central role in my theory. It is important to clarify the scope conditions and assumptions I make about what I believe constitutes a “group,” as well as how I categorize the protest crowd in a protest event. As I mentioned above, there is a specific context within which a representative military is least likely to use force against protesters. This is when the protest crowd is “broad.” This section clarifies what I mean by that, giving some examples from the Iranian cases. I am sticking to the Iranian cases here because my definition of groups is contextual. I believe that there is more causal leverage when a scholar knows the political and historical path of a country; this is how groups can be categorized in the framework I identify below. Without knowledge of a country’s social history, it would be necessary to take a more strict or narrow approach regarding the definition of groups—i.e., picking something like ethnicity as the dominant group identification. However, I have a broad definition of groups, which goes beyond ethnicity.

Groups are the atomic elements of a social (and political) system, and such a system allocates power over a territory and people that is backed by a corresponding
security apparatus (Rummel 1976). The salience of these groups, since it is true that given this broad definition anything could be classified as a group, depends on two forms of capital—economic and symbolic—which I draw on to categorize the composition of protesters into two groups (broad versus narrow).

I draw on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of capital to define these two categories (broad and narrow), particularly symbolic capital (prestige, attention, ideological significance. See Bourdieu 1977). Social groups are those arbitrary sets that comprise a particular social hierarchy (Tajfel 1970; Bordieu 1984); adopting this broad definition means that these groups can be ethnic, religious, sectarian, gender-based, class-based, or cultural. Bordieu defines social hierarchy as a space characterized by capital put to productive use (the more capital one has, the higher up one’s position). For Bordieu, there are four species of capital: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic (Bordieu 1980, 1979, 1977). This is why social hierarchy, in Bordieu’s work, is not a one-dimensional pyramid-like structure, but a system of cross-cutting, interrelated groups enclosed in multi-dimensional space.

To simplify this complex structure, I consider only two forms of capital: economic and symbolic. Thus, there are two dimensions that define a group’s placement in
social space. Economic capital is the most direct form of domination in society. It can take various forms—money, factories, stockpiles, shares, and so on (Bordieu 1984). Bordieu’s notion of symbolic capital is difficult to measure because it is based on perception (see Wacquant 2006); but, at its heart, acquiring symbolic capital is about the imposition of categories on groups in order to perpetuate the structures of action of the dominant (Bordieu 1977). In other words, a group with a lot of symbolic capital is critical to the legitimacy of the social and political order (i.e., the right to rule). Such a group has a high degree of ideological significance—ideology as the set of beliefs that justifies the allocation of power in the political system. For example, the rural population in Iran has symbolic capital because of its significance to the Islamic Regime’s ideological principles and salience as a religious identity.

The figure below demonstrates the difference between a “narrow” protesting group versus a “broad” one in the Iranian cases. A broad demonstration is any protesting group that is composed of more than one group in at least two of the four boxes. It is important to note that there is a numerical and categorical distinction between two types of “broad” protesting groups. A broad protest characterized by a coalition between two or more groups with little symbolic capital may have less of an effect
on military violence than one characterized by a horizontal coalition—two or more groups in which at least one of the groups has a lot of symbolic capital. Both types of broad protesting groups lessen the likelihood of military violence, but one with a horizontal coalition (so, at least one group from each column) is "broader" in a sense. Since there is more variation—in a way that accounts for a more significant group with high symbolic capital—it is even harder for the military to "other" a broad protest crowd characterized by a horizontal coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Capital</th>
<th>Symbolic Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low: Rural Population (1979), Labor (1979), Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: Rural Population (2009), Workers (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: Middle Class (2009), Urban Youth (2009), Women, Students (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low: Middle Class (1979), Urban Class (1979), Technocrats (1979), Professionals (1979), Merchant Middle Class (2009)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.1: Groups in Social Space: Iran 1979 and 2009
1.2.2 Assumptions, Causal Claim, and Scope Conditions

My theory about the effect of representativeness is causal. I am arguing that “us versus them” distinctions cause violence in some contexts and not in others. However, in some respects, my causal leverage is enhanced; whereas, in others, I have difficulty. On the one hand, the central part of the theory—that violence is more likely against an out-group—has been tested and studied to the point that there is not much debate left. Years of research have shown that strong group identification causes violence. However, it is the conditions under which this occurs that have led to debate. Obviously, groups exist everywhere and all the time; yet, violence ebbs and flows.

The area in which my story has difficulty with causal leverage is on this point of conditions. In an ideal laboratory experiment, I would be able to show that the conditions for violence during protest events exist in some cases, and not in others. And, I would be able to hold all other factors constant. So, I would be able to create two protest events in the same country at the same time. These protest events would be comprised of the same exact people (at the exact same time\textsuperscript{2}). They would be

\textsuperscript{2}A feat of wizardry.
demanding the exact same thing, and, let’s say, the crowd was composed of only students. I would send forces in to repress the crowds. These forces would have complete information about the composition of the crowds, demands...etc. The only thing that would be different would be the composition of the forces in the two hypothetical situations. In one case, I would have a representative military force; in the other, there would be an unrepresentative military force. I would expect violence in both hypothetical situations. Now, I would run the experiment again. This time, the only thing I would change would be to make the composition of the crowds broad—I would include various subgroups (maybe even a random sample from the distribution of all groups in society). My expectation would be to see violence in one case, and not in the other.

The above demonstrated both my causal logic and the limits of my claim. I am limited by many factors: the quality of my data, my smaller sample size, my inability to access thoughts in order to measure the perception of individual military members. However, what evidence I do have does point in the right direction. Furthermore, I use indirect methods to get at the causal mechanism—i.e., the use of another concept to test whether "us versus them" distinctions may be at work (see earlier). In short,
despite limitations, this project is about a causal relationship, and I demonstrate the
correlation using empirical methods, backed by qualitative historical and anecdotal
data that support the causal logic.

There are also several assumptions I make in this work. One of the assumptions
relates to the regime’s decision-making process in the context of protest events. I
have to assume that the regime observes a protest event before it decides to send
in troops. In other words, the regime has not already made the decision regarding
which entity to send in before it observes the crowds. This assumption is relevant to
the 2009 Iranian case because my argument rests on the claim that the government
faces a trade-off, and must decide which military entity to send in to repress crowds
(Basij/IRGC/Artesh). I show, in the chapter that analyzes the 2009 Green Revolu-
tion, that this decision is affected by the composition of the crowd in any particular
protest event. Thus, since cause must precede effect, it cannot be that the regime
has already made the decision before crowds actually form. I have no direct proof
or evidence that this assumption is valid. However, I suspect it is because of the
flexibility of the Iranian security apparatus; the decentralized nature of the Basij per-
mits the government to have a reactive strategy when it comes to mass-based threats
(see Golkar 2010). This is not to say that part of the decision-making process isn’t made ahead of time. Even if some decisions are made before crowds materialize, I would argue that they are made with an expectation about what sort of crowd to expect. Furthermore, given the flexibility I mentioned earlier, these decisions would be subject to change in the event of changes if expectations were not met.

Another assumption concerns the decision to inflict violence on the part of the individual. I talk about the military organization as a whole in this work; however, I have an aggregation problem when it comes to the question of who exactly is inflicting the violence and who is perceiving these group-based differences, which are at the heart of my theory’s mechanism. How psychological mechanisms aggregate up and lead to group behavior is an aspect of psychological research that is not well understood (Warneryd 1999), so I am in good company when it comes to this problem, which appears to be widespread. In my work, I do make an effort to disaggregate at the level of the security entity. Whereas most other works consider the military as a unitary actor, I break it up and look at the role of the elements (Basij/IRGC/Artesh) within the organization. Thus, the assumption I make is that group behavior (which is what I observe) does reflect any given individual’s thought process within that group.
Though this may not be true for every individual, it is safe to say that, on average, we can talk about individual motivations and group ones in the same vein; otherwise, at some critical point, the group’s behavior changes, and this can be observed.

The final assumption I make is that the regime’s decision to order troops to repress crowds either does not matter or reflects the level of violence. Ideally, it would be necessary to control for the government’s order to inflict violence being given to troops since the cause of what I am trying to explain is about “us versus them” distinctions in the context of a protest situation—the only two actors that should matter are the protesters and the forces sent in to repress them. The fact that the regime plays a role in ordering the violence should be measured because, in some cases, an order is not observed and there is violence (or not). Otherwise put, a lack of an observed order is sometimes followed by violence or lack thereof. In some cases, this can mean that, even if an order was given, there would be disobedience (so, the order was never given). In other cases, it might mean that an order was not necessary—for example, when the Basij is sent in to repress crowds, an order is implicit, but it is never made explicit by the regime. On top of this, measuring whether an explicit order was given is mired in difficulty. Even cases in which there was a formal trial to determine
whether an explicit order was given by the Head of State (for example, in the case of former President Mubarak), there is huge controversy regarding the validity of the sentence—much of it being due to politics. Thus, the difficulties of measuring whether an explicit order was given require that I think about the outcome of interest in this study in a particular way. Hence, the focus on military violence, as opposed to military disobedience. The distinction, ultimately, is not significant—though it might end up being so in a cross-national study.

By focusing on military violence as opposed to military disobedience in these two Iran cases, I have to assume that the regime’s decision to order troops to repress crowds doesn’t matter or that it reflects the level of violence. This assumption is not problematic for the two Iran cases based on historical evidence and the structure of the security apparatus. In 1979, it was clear that the Shah’s order would have been irrelevant. His generals informed him that, even if an order was given, the troops would not fire on crowds (Zabir 2011). The breakdown of the Iranian military in 1979 had everything to do with the dynamics between the protesters and the military and very little to do with any kind of order (or lack thereof) from above. In 2009, on the other hand, I assume that the underlying will of the regime was reflected in the
patterns of violence. Otherwise put, measuring an explicit regime order before each protest event is unnecessary because the need for an explicit order was negated by the design of the security apparatus, which was constructed in a way that ensured explicitness was not required (see earlier point about Basij).

Regarding scope conditions, my work is most applicable in certain types of polities: those “in the middle." Anocracies, or those countries that are neither autocratic nor democratic, are particularly prone to government repression according to the “murder in the middle" hypothesis. This theory asserts that in any kind of intermediate regime, given the young and untested institutional channels for voice, there is a tendency toward cycles of protest and violence (Regan and Henderson 2002) because opposition forces have no legitimate channels for dissent and incumbents feel threatened. In strong autocracies, elites have a secure grip on power and, generally, do not fear popular protest. This means that opposition remains silent, reluctant to challenge power in the first place (Fein 1995). Stable democracies, on the other hand, refrain from repression because of institutional channels that allow for dissent in a way that does not challenge the power and authority of the state (part of this is the regulated and consistent transitions in power based on voting. See Henderson 1991).
The low likelihood of repression based on these institutional and political factors means that the question of how representativeness affects the likelihood of violence against protesters is more relevant in certain contexts—i.e., “in the middle”—over others. The relative lack of dissent in strong autocracies and the institutionalized acceptance of it in stable democracies mean that the military is less likely to have a protest policing role. However, in the event that the military is called upon in these cases, the same argument about how representativeness affects violence should apply. This should be an area of further research, particularly with respect to whether there are differences across polities in the design and structure of state security systems.

1.3 An Implication of this Argument: Paramilitary Units in the Armed Forces

Here, I will make the case that, to the extent that the Basij is the most unrepresentative force in the Iranian Armed Forces, it is also the most homogenous and cohesive. There are two parts to this argument. First, by virtue of it being the most unrepresentative, it is the most homogenous, compositionally. Homogenous entities
tend to be more cohesive than heterogeneous ones. On top of this, there are characteristics that enhance cohesiveness, which are particular to paramilitaries (identified in the scholarship on these entities). These characteristics are the more ideological and informal nature of paramilitaries. This heightened group cohesiveness, which is the result of unrepresentativeness and characteristics particular to paramilitaries, has been shown to lead to perverse or violent outcomes in certain contexts. In Chapter 5, I focus on how these dynamics led to a style of Basiji protest policing that was the most severe and perverse.

The Basij, as the most unrepresentative unit in the Iranian Armed Forces, is the most homogenous one. It draws mostly from the rural and semi-rural areas of Iran, cashing in on the major social cleavage that divides the country. In this sense, it is unrepresentative, although it may actually be representative in terms of its representation of ethnic groups. From a unit perspective, this is also the case. The Basij is the most decentralized security force actor in Iran’s security system—each village has at least one Basij center, and these centers recruit from the areas around them. Thus, many Basij units are dominated by kinship ties as well as informal ones.

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3I do not have data for this. The point is more to emphasize the importance of identifying the correct divisions in any given society, as opposed to focusing on ethnicity alone.
like being from the same village.

In some ways, it is puzzling that the Basij would be responsible for the highest levels of abuse against protesters. In the civil war literature, high levels of abuse are exhibited by warring factions that are unable to police the behavior of their members because they are not homogenous (for example, they might be ethnically fragmented. See Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). However, the assumption of this argument is that elites would want to police the behavior of lower-level members. In certain contexts, like the Iranian one, policing of behavior is purposely avoided, which tends to be one of the benefits of less formal militia-like bodies to the state—the state can remain aloof (but more on this point a little later).

The case of the Basij problematizes this finding that links heterogeneity with the worst forms of violence. However, there is a debate on this point in the civil war literature, and so the findings of this project fall more in line with those who argue the opposite, which is that homogeneity and violence may be linked in a positive direction (Schneider 2009; Wood 2009). Indeed, this line of research argues that homogeneity can lead to greater cohesiveness, which is necessary for the types of severe violence that would otherwise be too brutal. According to this literature,
there are two conditions under which cohesiveness would have this impact on the
likelihood of violence, and both conditions are present in the case of the Basij—and,
perhaps in other cases involving paramilitary units because these conditions tend to
be characteristics of such entities. These conditions are ideological fervor (norms
and beliefs) and a unique hierarchical structure with clear authority, yet informality
vis-a-vis the relation to the state.

Scholars have made the case that ideology plays a heightened role in paramilitary
Paramilitaries tend to be more ideologically motivated. This can be due to a selection
issue, which results in ideologues or “true” believers joining (Kraska and Kappeler
1997; Lysaght 2002), or because of historical processes (Levitsky et al. 2012; Ugarriza
and Craig 2012). Historically, paramilitaries have formed during early periods of crisis
or contestation, especially because they are easier to form and, oftentimes, they can
be less institutionalized. This is particularly the case in armies with revolutionary
origins like the Iranian one today, the FLSN of Nicaragua, and the specialized and
paramilitary forces of the Soviet Union. The cohesion of these kinds of units is
enhanced by a shared ideology/identity (Huntington 1968; Walt 1996) that comes
out of a genuine sense of mission because actors become more willing to confront risk and undertake personal sacrifice (Walt 1996). Furthermore, revolutions and periods of crisis tend to divide societies, sharpening “us versus them” distinctions and strengthening in-group ties. Ideological fervor in such settings leads to concentrated rewards and costs (i.e., choices are framed morally, as are the costs and rewards)—internal opposition is seen as disloyalty and even treason and, thus, the costs of speaking out or refusing to carry out highly violent or perverse actions are extremely high (Lebas 2011; Levitsky et al. 2012). Furthermore, individual accountability in highly ideological settings is diminished as the responsibility for actions is diffused through strong group identification—this “loss of self” to the group is characteristic of settings dominated by extreme belief systems (Kelly and Kamermann 1998).

Paramilitaries also tend to be structured in a way that allows for an informal culture within a highly hierarchical setting. Secondary group cohesion, or identification with the armed group as a whole, is critical for a strong military hierarchy. Paramilitaries, especially to the extent that members have a strong belief system, which clearly justifies the position and strength of authority in the system, are security bodies that, like most military organizations, have a clear chain of command
and high levels of secondary group cohesion. When military superiors are seen as legitimate authorities, the likelihood of obedience even in the wielding of perverse violence is greatly increased (Wood 2009; Milgram 1974; Grossman 1996). However, what sets apart paramilitaries from regular military units? What explains the more extreme violence inflicted by the Basij on protesters during the Green Revolution compared to that by the IRGC?

Military hierarchy, especially a clear chain of command, is associated with a high degree of professionalization, which is not conducive to the development of strategies and tactics that are indiscriminate or particularly perverse (though they may be violent). In fact, for the types of strategies and tactics (especially when it comes to sexual violence) that are indiscriminate, perverse, and lead to the most terror—i.e., what is defined as high intensity coercion against one’s own citizens—there is a level of professionalization or closeness to the civilian government that would not be conducive mostly because it threatens the legitimacy of the state (Bellin 2004; 2012). Yet, at the same time, secondary group cohesion is critical because members must feel like they have to obey orders. Paramilitaries are unique in that they maintain an informal or semi-professional culture within a strict military hierarchy. Though paramilitaries
can be institutionalized as formal elements within a state's security apparatus (the Basij, for example), they fall short of having to embody all of the professional elements of a full military force. In fact, they permit a sense of agency for members, who can work toward a cause without feeling that they are fully constrained by “big brother" (i.e., the state) telling them what to do (Gibson 1994). Many scholars have studied the informal culture of paramilitaries, noting this unique dual tendency toward both hierarchy and unprofessionalism (Archer 1999; Gibson 1994; Knox 2002).

To summarize this section, I have made the case that, to the extent that paramilitaries are the most unrepresentative entities in a state’s security apparatus, we can expect there to be particularly perverse and extreme forms of violence used by them against citizens during protest movements. This is because more unrepresentative bodies tend to be more homogenous, which can be a source of cohesion among members. However, cohesion, in and of itself, does not lead to this extreme violence. There are conditions that facilitate the role of cohesion in the worst kinds of violence. These conditions happen to be characteristics of paramilitaries, which themselves not only enhance cohesiveness, but do so in a perverse way by creating the right kind of environment for the birth and development of extreme violence. Though there is
no comprehensive research on whether paramilitaries tend to be unrepresentative in general, there is evidence that suggests this might be the case (see Levitsky et al. 2012). This is a future area of research, which I discuss in the conclusion.

1.4 Representativeness in the Armed Forces: The Main Explanatory Variable

The standard understanding of representativeness in the civil-military literature discusses it as structural with two main components: composition and recruitment policy. In dealing with composition, proportionality is the key issue. Are certain ethnic groups underrepresented or excluded? As Petersen and Staniland (2008) point out, the military is not a unitary actor. There are divisions within the military, particularly between elites and lower-level members—for example, among the services (army, air force, and navy) or between the ranks and the officer corps. Thus, another dimension of compositional variation in representativeness is across these kinds of divisions. The Syrian Armed Forces are a perfect example of this kind of unrepresentativeness. Though Syria’s recruitment policy is imposed by the state from above
(universal conscription), there are differences in composition between the ranks and the officer corps because recruitment originates from sectarian circles within the officer corps.\footnote{Over 80 percent of all career officers in the Syrian Army are Alawites, who dominate the country’s political order.}

When it comes to recruitment policy, which is the second component, Petersen and Staniland (2008) are concerned with the type and amount of organizational effort involved in recruitment. They create a scale that is more generally focused on how recruitment happens—is it state-led or dominated by market forces?

However, in Iran’s case, the military’s structure is more complex than their composite scale (composition plus recruitment strategy) would allow. This is because representativeness varies across three different actors that are all part of the Armed Forces: the Basij, the IRGC, and the regular military (Artesh). All three entities do fall under the umbrella of the Armed Forces. Though Petersen and Staniland (2008) do consider variation in representativeness as a result of different recruitment policies at different levels of the military, this variation is limited to certain kinds of divisions, namely divisions among services (air, army, navy) and ranks (officer corps versus rank and file). Their conceptualization of representativeness does not consider how it might vary across separate bodies—parallel military institutions or paramilitaries—within
the Armed Forces in cases like the Iranian one today.

Furthermore, their conceptualization focuses on the role of ethnicity, which is not a key shaper of politics and security in Iran. This is true across other contexts, in which the salient cleavages in society are not ethnic, but are based on other group divisions. What is a salient division? This is a topic of huge debate in comparative politics, and it is very difficult to measure. In fact, not all scholars even agree on a single definition, let alone a precise way of measuring it (see Cederman and Girardin 2006; Wedeen 2002). In my work, I consider salient divisions from a historical and cultural perspective as those cleavages in society that have been most critical over time. In political science, the relative influence of different cleavages has been the topic of much research, particularly when it comes to the literature on voting. Lijpart (1975), Converse (1974), and Sartori (1969) have all discussed the multiplicity of cleavages, arguing that there is a hierarchy of cleavages in which certain cleavages may dominate others (and that this varies across societies). Though their conceptualization of what constitutes a dominant social cleavage (whether it is language, ethnicity, religion, or social class) depends on a particular cleavage’s effect on voting patterns, the broader idea in all these works is that a salient social division does not necessarily have to be
 ethnically defined—what matters is the political and historical context. My approach follows this contextual understanding of a salient division. In Chapter 4, I trace the development of a critical social alliance—the rural-clergy partnership—through Iran’s modern history starting in the late 19th century, arguing that this alliance led to significant social and political changes in the country. In fact, this partnership solidified the key salient division in Iran, which is urban/rural, by leading to the formation of security institutions in Iran today that exploit the urban/rural cleavage.

Returning to military representativeness, there are two things to highlight coming out of this discussion. First, that the salient divisions in society matter when it comes to representativeness because that is how we can understand what representative means in any given context. In many cases, it will be ethnic divisions that matter. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces are a perfect example of this. In Sri Lanka, the salient cleavages in society are ethnic, among the Tamils, Burghers, Moors, and the majority Sinhalese. However, the military is highly unrepresentative of the minority groups in society—by 1985, almost all enlisted personnel in the armed forces were Sinhalese. In other cases, like Iran, representativeness can only be assessed in the context of social class divisions—i.e., between the urban and rural populations. If we were to have a
strict understanding of representativeness as related to only ethnic groups, we would miss the variation present across the different security bodies in Iran’s Armed Forces.

Second, representativeness can vary within the Armed Forces in a third way that is not addressed in the literature. Depending on the nature of the entities that comprise a state’s armed forces, it is possible that recruitment strategies are different across these bodies. Thus, the functions of the three security force actors within the Iranian Armed Forces today determine respectively tailored recruitment strategies, which lead to different compositions in each actor. Whereas the function of the Artesh (regular military) is to protect the Iranian state from external threats, the function of the Basij is to protect the revolutionary regime from internal threats. The IRGC’s function is both; it operates as an externally oriented military, and a protector of the regime’s revolutionary ideals.
1.5 Military Violence During Protest Events: The Dependent Variable

There are three things to clarify in this section regarding the dependent variable. First, I will define what I mean by coercion as a form of protest policing by the state, giving background on how scholars have traditionally considered the role of violence during protests. Second, I will delineate the boundaries of “military” violence and explain why it is important to independently assess this separately from other forms of protest policing, which involve police or riot police. Third, I will overview how I am going to measure military violence. Measuring this concept involves some complications because of incomplete information since I rely on reports, which are subject to biases and don’t always have direct access to the events (particularly in countries like Iran where there is intense government censorship[	extsuperscript{5}]).

Traditionally, scholars have viewed protests as a key element of social movements, threatening the state’s authority over public order and, thus, eliciting a direct state

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[^5]: In 2009, the Iranian regime forced all international reporters to leave the country by June 20th, arguably right before the peak of the Green Revolution.
response on the street. A very important aspect of the state response to movements is the policing of protest—i.e., the handling of protest events, which can also be known as “repression” or “law and order” depending on the perspective (della Porta and Fillieule 2003; della Porta 1995). As della Porta and Fillieule (2003) note, researchers often consider the agents of the state (usually police) involved in protest policing as mere “arms of the state,” obediently following the orders of the government. Only recently has research begun to consider the discretion in behavior on the part of these state agents, justifying the study of these agents as specific actors with causal properties. It is with this background in mind that we can think about a typology of protest policing styles, thinking about explanations for variation in these styles by considering variables internal to the agent itself like organization and culture.

Della Porta and Fillieule (2003) develop this typology by combining the dimensions of the main classifications and typologies out there on protest policing tactics, strategies, and styles of control. Their meta-analysis yields 7 dimensions, which are singled out as most relevant: the degree of force used, the number of prohibited behaviors, the number of repressed groups, the agent’s respect of the law, the timing of the intervention, the degree of communication with the demonstrators, and the
degree of adaptability. The combination of these dimensions describes the protest policing style employed by the state’s security force actors at protest events. This can be boiled down to two main styles—one more opportunist, tolerant, selective, flexible, and “soft,” and the other repressive, diffuse, dissuasive, and “hard.”

It is the “hard” or “tough” style that I am concerned with in this project. The dependent variable is about the “tough” style, which usually implies the repression of a large number of protest groups and a wide range of protest activities via a massive use of force and/or illegal tactics (for example, the use of an agent provocateur or an undercover agent who instigates mob-like violence so that a tough style of protest policing appears justified). Scholars of comparative politics also look at this tough style of protest policing, putting it under the umbrella of high intensity coercion, “or highly visible acts of repression that target large numbers of people”—meant to cause fear and crush social movements (Levitsky and Way 2010: 57-9).

Traditionally, protest policing has been studied from a police-centric perspective. In other words, the police (or riot police) has been considered the principle enactor of the state’s protest policing strategies. However, in many cases, particularly in quasi-democracies, the military plays a greater (or equal) role within the country
suppressing internal threat than it does managing external threat. One aspect of the hybrid function of many militaries then is protest policing. In this project, military violence is the use of a “tough” style of protest policing by entities that fall under a country’s armed forces. These entities can be regular military units, parallel military institutions (like the IRGC in Iran), or paramilitary bodies.

Why the focus on militaries? The involvement of militaries in the suppression of protest events has been a topic that has not received much attention. However, more recently, as a result of the Arab Spring, there has been a flurry of research that looks at the nature of this involvement. The contribution of my work to this literature has been twofold. First, I consider intra-state variation in military violence, whereas most of the existing research focuses solely on inter-state variation. Second, this theoretical framework goes beyond an understanding of civil-military relations as defined by only the relationship between the government and the armed forces; it brings society back in by examining the effect of groups and cleavages on the military’s behavior. Furthermore, military violence (or lack thereof) during protests is the prerequisite for other outcomes of interest: civil war, revolutions, severe internal violence, or massive government concessions. In fact, when protests are the most
threatening, governments are faced with a need for the most intense forms of protest policing. These intense forms of protest policing (or high intensity coercion) usually involve an enhanced capacity for violence or terror (the promotion of fear through illegal tactics), which is less likely in most police forces. Such a capacity is most likely to be found in the military or military-like entities like militias or paramilitary units.

I discuss the measurement of this concept of military violence in each of the case studies in greater detail. A few points are worth mentioning here. As opposed to fixating on a specific indicator (like the precise number of deaths during a protest event), I measure specific tactics and strategies, which capture protest policing style. Though fatalities are usually the result of such high intensity tactics and strategies, and fatalities would be the easiest and most concrete way of measuring a “tough” protest policing style, focusing on just this would lead to massive under-measurement because of media censorship and issues of access. Thus, though I look for evidence of fatalities, operationalizing the dependent variable is more centered around identifying high intensity tactics employed by the military that would lead to fatalities.

For example, during the Green Revolution, though it was unclear how many people

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6 This is true, of course, only in certain types of political contexts. In fully developed democracies, protests, no matter how large they become, never pose as much of a “threat” to the government and/or the capacity for full-scale violence against citizens is not there.
may have been killed or seriously injured by the Basij in any given protest event, what usually became clear in reports were the tactics Basijis used, such as wearing plainclothes and stabbing protesters in order to create an environment of terror, thus dissuading others from coming out to join the protests.
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the rationalist and realist alternatives to my question about the differences in outcome between 1979 and 2009. By considering these alternatives, I hope to clarify the value-added of my socio-psychological approach. At the danger of giving the punchline away, the main benefit of my approach is that it does a better job explaining not just the variation that occurs within a state over time, but also the variation that occurs within a state during the same protest movement (i.e., from protest event to protest event). The alternatives I go through in this chapter all fail in this regard.

My approach does not necessarily mean that I am trying to bring down rationalism. As many scholars have noted, rationalism is inherently difficult to disprove. Some have claimed that it is not technically a theory because it is unfalsifiable (Boland 1981; Radnitzsky 1992 on economic imperialism; Winter 1964; Hodgson 2003) or in-
determinate (Elster 1989a)—anything can be presented as “rational.” Thus, in this chapter, I lay out some differences between my approach and a classically rationalist one, acknowledging the universality of rationalism and the losing battle that any scholar faces when trying to “disprove” the rational alternative. It is possible to set up a countless number of rationalist alternatives. What is going on between the ears is impossible to measure—not only for those forwarding a psychological approach, but also for those forwarding a rationalist one.

Given this, the value added of a psychological approach is that it does a better job explaining the subtle kinds of variation that occur when the researcher takes a magnifying glass and peers closely into a country. This variation occurs despite the constancy of variables traditionally regarded as rationalist ones. For example, in Iran, the same military organization that rapidly fell apart during the 1979 Iranian revolution was willing to fire on protesters during a wave of protests that occurred in 1963. There is no evidence to suggest that the state became weaker or that the military was less able to conduct a coercive strategic operation against protesters in 1979. In fact, the opposite is true in Iran; by 1979, at least on the surface, the military appeared stronger than ever. And, as I will discuss later, a traditional rationalist
take on the situation would struggle explaining why a military organization that was professionalized would choose to side against crowds in 1963.

This chapter looks at three alternative explanations. All three are rationalist, but the third is also realist to the extent that it traces the source of variation in the levels of international pressure between 1979 and 2009 to realpolitik concerns (or lack thereof). The first alternative assesses the role of professionalization through a rationalist framework. This version of a rationalist argument focuses on the costs of engaging in high intensity coercion by the military. The main factor in the “utility function” is the concern for survival. The alternative (i.e., what the cost of engaging in high intensity coercion is compared against) is what life would look like for the military as an institution after the potential fall of the current regime. Is the military institutionalized enough to survive beyond the collapse of any given regime? The second alternative is also rationalist, but the focus is on incentives at an elite level. The alternative “strategy” depends on the possibility of material gain under a different regime. In this scenario, a military elite is comparing his access to resources under two different conditions—one that may extend the length of his time horizon (assuming no change in the discount factor), thereby fostering “loyalty” to the current regime.
Finally, the third alternative explanation discusses the role of international pressure on domestic politics. Is it possible that the pull (or lack thereof) of material and security ties with a powerful nation—the U.S.—is driving the military’s use of violence against protesters?

**Alternative Explanation 1: Professionalization**

The first rationalist alternative explanation focuses on the (material) costs to the military of either obeying orders and inflicting violence on crowds or disobeying and facing the prospects of a regime transition. I put this alternative under the “professionalization” umbrella; however, I recognize that this umbrella is potentially wider than the rationalist frame would allow. Thus, before I specify how I am interpreting professionalism as a rationalist alternative explanation, I will give some background and problematize the concept in order to justify my decision with it.

Civil-military relations describe the relationship between society as a whole and the military organization established to protect it. It tends to focus on the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. The crucial debate within the early (and current) literature on civil-military relations centered
on the paradox of military power and the motivation for its restraint: society creates
an institution that specializes in violence, but then fears this very institution for that
reason (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960; Finer 1976; Perlmutter 1977; Dassel 1998 to
name just a few). Scholars approached the question of how to ensure civilian control
of the military (and, thus, avoid military intervention) from different, inter-related
perspectives (Desch 1999; Taylor 2003; Katzenstein 1996; Mendeloff 1994), yet the
concept of “professionalization” emerged as a significant variable, eventually carrying
with it a normative value—professionalization was something to which all militaries
should aspire.

For Huntington (1957), professionalization implies that the military subordinates
itself to civilian control voluntarily because members believe they have a “higher
calling” in the service of society. Professionalism is characterized by expertise, re-
sponsibility, and corporateness. All three characteristics, in particular the last two,
rely heavily on a sense of belonging to the group (Huntington 1957). Yet, for Hunt-
ington, a fully professionalized military is one that is politically sterile. This tension
between a strong sense of group identification and a lack of political interest led
some to critique Huntington’s conceptualization of professionalization. They argued
that there are elements of professionalization that actually encourage the military to get involved in civilian politics, thereby undermining the power and authority of the civilian government. Recognizing the role of politicization as an important, intervening variable, these scholars have emphasized how military organizations that look professional by most standards have still conducted coups, disobeyed civilian orders, and/or intervened in domestic politics (Feaver 1996; Finer 1976; Janowitz 1960; Abrahamsson 1972; Welch 1987; Rouquie 1982; Stepan 1971; Kooning 2003; Pickard 1988; Remmer 1989).

Given this problematization in the literature, a prediction for how professionalization should affect the likelihood of high intensity coercion by the military against protesters is difficult. On the one hand, if we take a strict interpretation of professionalization as the complete subordination of military will to civilian control, then we might expect that the more professionalized a military organization, the less likely we are to observe disobedience in the face of government orders to fire on crowds. On the other hand, a more commonly accepted expectation of professionalization (Levitsky et al. 2012; Bellin 2004) is that, in the context of mass-based threats, the military will abandon civilian leaders and choose not to suppress crowds because of
this overarching sense of “duty” or service to the national interest—highlighted by
the scholars who emphasize the role of politicization as an intervening variable.

Part of the reason for this uncertainty regarding prediction is that there is a lack of
clarity when it comes to how scholars measure the concept of professionalization. This
is evident in the scholarship. Bellin (2012) argues that the relative professionalization
of the Egyptian military explains why the military refused to inflict wide-scale violence
against protesters in 2011. Other scholars argue that the Egyptian military was
not professionalized, citing similar information that Bellin acknowledges, namely the
considerable corruption that characterized the Egyptian military (Springbord 1989;
Kassem 2004; Levitsky et al. 2012). Thus, despite a similar understanding of the
Egyptian military, scholars disagree about the level of professionalization in a well
studied case. In short, based on the literature, it is clear that there are different takes
on the concept of professionalization.

For the sake of clarity, I will focus on Bellin’s (2004; 2012) take on professional-
ization because it is the most clearly rationalist.\footnote{In some ways, it could be argued that the concept of professionalization is not entirely rationalist, given its focus on non-material and ideological motivations, especially in its original and earliest formulation. However, more recent work has highlighted a more rationalist understanding of the concept. For Bellin, the concepts of profes-}

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professionalization and institutionalization are tightly linked. Bellin (2004, 2012) analyzes the sources of regime stability and breakdown in the Middle East, finding that the army’s will to repress is a function of its institutionalization.

She argues that highly institutionalized military organizations in which “recruitment and promotion are based on performance rather than politics” are more likely to side with opposition movements and “jettison” an autocrat because they perceive the costs of engaging in high intensity coercion as too great (Bellin 2012: 133). In this case, military elites are able to “see life beyond the regime” because the military is conceived of as a separate institution, removed from the political processes significant to the fate of the government—i.e., there is a sense of belonging to a broader, national group. On the other hand, militaries that are organized along patrimonial lines are likely to remain loyal and carry out high intensity coercion—they are less “professionalized.” Where military officials are linked to “regime elites through bonds of blood or sect or ethnicity, where career advancement is governed by cronyism and political loyalty rather than merit...then the fate of the military’s leadership becomes intrinsically linked to the longevity of the regime” (Bellin 2012: 133). Otherwise put, the costs of engaging in high intensity coercion are lower than the costs associated
with a potential fallout from a change in leadership as a result of opposition success.

Her explanation is rationalist to the extent that it focuses on material costs and incentives for behavior. In this calculation, the assumption is that military members care about survival and resources over other non-material or ideological factors. In fact, it is on this point that Levitsky et al. (2012) criticize Bellin’s approach, making the case that ideology plays a role in solidifying us-them distinctions, which are critical when it comes to maintaining a will and capacity to repress. In some ways, this implies that Bellin has underestimated the real “costs” of repression—something more than concern for survival and resources may have to drive the kind of violence that is necessary during periods of intense repression.

How does professionalization fall short when it comes to explaining why the military did not repress crowds in 1979 but did so very successfully in 2009? In 1979, based on Bellin’s version of professionalization, Iran’s highly institutionalized military organization sided with the opposition movement, leading to the fall of the Shah. Her theory seems to explain the military’s behavior adequately, though the level of professionalization remains somewhat unclear—career advancement in the military under the Shah was partially driven by cronyism and political loyalty rather than merit.
On the other hand, the level of professionalization does not adequately explain the 2009 case. Iran’s current military organization is not any less professionalized than the Iranian military under the Shah, according to Bellin’s definition of institutionalization; yet, the outcome was very different in 2009—the military did successfully repress crowds in a campaign that lasted approximately eight months.

Even if we take a broader understanding of professionalization as it is understood (albeit nebulously) in the literature, professionalization does not do a very good job explaining intra-state variation. Cases of military violence vary even when the level of professionalization is held constant. For example, most would agree that Sri Lanka’s armed forces exhibit a high degree of civilian control (see Senaratne 2003). However, in 1983, the military was deployed to suppress anti-Tamil riots and failed to act; yet, in 1961 and throughout the late 1980s, it willingly suppressed Tamil civil-disobedience and insurrections. Alternatively, though the Egyptian military refused to inflict wide-scale violence on protesters during the 2011 protests in Cairo, it (or portions of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces) has not failed to act violently against demonstrations by Egypt’s minority groups (particularly, the Coptic population).

Similarly, in the Iranian cases, there is variation that occurs despite a constant
level of professionalization. An excellent example of this is the military’s harsh crackdown on large protest waves in 1963 versus the military breakdown in 1979. In the next section, I look at 1963 in greater detail, focusing on Bellin’s version of professionalization because it is the most clearly delineated, particularly with respect to its rationalist framework.

1963

In this section, I will compare the Shah’s harsh crackdown on protesters in 1963 to the lack of one in 1979. These two cases provide a useful comparison, especially as a test of the rationalist alternative explanation. As I mentioned earlier, there can be a countless number of rationalist alternatives. Therefore, I am being very specific about the ones I am considering. The next section, on the party centered approach, discusses a second type of rationalist alternative—one that is more focused on incentives at an elite level. Bellin’s rationalist alternative centers on costs, specifically costs that are tied to threats. The critical question for Bellin really is: how threatened does the military feel? Given a similar level of threat, a highly institutionalized military versus a less institutionalized military should act differently. Otherwise put, given a similar
level of threat across time between two social movements (in the same country),
the same military should take similar actions because the costs of engaging in high
intensity coercion against protesters are comparable. This set-up is precisely why
comparing 1963 to 1979 is informative for the rationalist case (or, more precisely, this
rationalist case).

As a summary, I will argue here that it is puzzling that the Iranian military
launched a wide-scale campaign of violent repression against the 1963 social move-
ment, given that it failed to do so in 1979. Both social movements were equally
threatening based on “rationalist” factors like the likelihood of success and the size
of the movements. The calculation of “costs” to repressing crowds, given the same
military organization, should have been similar; yet, despite this, the Iranian military
behaved differently in the two cases. The difference cannot be understood without the
consideration of another factor: the composition of crowds. The non-material factors
linked to group identification—namely, whether a crowd was part of the in-group or
the “other” group—mattered in 1963 and 1979.

The 1963 movement is known as the Qom Protests, even though the movement
spread to Tehran, Shiraz, Mashhad, and Varamin. The movement lasted from the
beginning of 1963 to the end of the summer, so it was roughly a few months shorter in
duration than the Iranian Revolution. The reason for its name is due to what sparked
the movement. The “White Revolution” of the Shah led to massive changes in Iranian
society throughout the 1940s and 1950s. These policies included land reform, extended
rights for both non-Muslims and women, and attempts to modernize the bureaucracy
and the educational system. Within a short period of time, a very strong opposition
to these programs formed in the clerical establishment in Qom, headed by Ayatollah
Khomeini. In early 1963, the Shah’s security forces entered Qom in retribution, killing
a young seminarian student, which launched a social movement that was, in many
ways, a precursor to the Iranian Revolution fifteen years later.

There are two protest events during 1963 that are particularly informative for
comparative purposes; however, it is important to note that, on a broader level, the
resilience with which the military clamped down on protests in 1963 stands in stark
contrast to the rapid breakdown of the military’s will to crush similarly sized crowds
in 1979. The first protest event is the one in Tehran on June 3, 1963, the day of
Ashura, which is a Shi’a holiday. This protest drew a crowd of more than 100,000
people, who were there to support a speech given by Khomeini (who was actually in
Qom, though the protest in Tehran drew a significantly larger crowd). The crowd was so large and broad, composed of multiple groups, including merchants, Khomeini supporters, and villagers, that the military was effectively “neutralized” (Poulson 2005). Though the military was mobilized on the streets in Tehran on that day, there were no deaths reported at this protest event—it seems that the military did not open fire on the protesters (Poulson 2005; Baqer 2000). This protest event turned out to be the exception rather than the rule during the Qom Protests. Most of the other protests were violently crushed by the military; most of these other protests also happened to be very narrowly composed of one group: the ultra-religious Khomeini supporters.

Just three days later, a very different story unraveled on the streets of Tehran. Shortly after his speech on the third, Khomeini was arrested and taken to Qasr Prison in Tehran. As news of this broke on the morning of the 5th, masses of protesters took to the streets in the capital city (and in some of the other major urban centers like Shiraz and Mashhad) for six consecutive days. The protest event on the 6th in Tehran was composed of “thousands,” and the protest group was described as composed of mainly Khomeini supporters—given the political context, this mostly likely meant
members of the religious class (though there is evidence that ultra-religious villagers were also involved in other protest events during this time). The *Chicago Tribune* called the opposition a “Moslem Sect” (*Chicago Tribune* 6/6/1963). The crowds were confronted by soldiers in combat gear who had been given shoot-to-kill orders (Baqer 2000; corroborated in *The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune*, and *The Sun*). It is unclear how many were injured or killed during this period of time, which was the most intense of the 1963 movement. At the (Tehran) June 6 event, it was reported that 86 were killed and 150 were injured (*The Washington Post* 6/7/1963), though I doubt the accuracy of this number because most secondary sources have claimed that a definitive number is not known (Poulson 2005; Baqer 2000). The point, however, is that the military did fire on protesters at this event (as well as others during the protest period).

November 5, 1978 is a good comparison to June 6, 1963. On November 5th, thousands of people also took to the streets of Tehran, protesting the Shah’s undemocratic regime. Like June 6, the protests on November 5th began peacefully and then turned violent in some parts of Tehran. Unlike June 6th, these protests were broad, composed of multiple groups in society, including the middle class, the merchants, and
the religious class (though the rioters toward the end of the day tended to be young teenage boys, see Kurzman 2005). The outcome of November 5th was also very different from June 6, 1963. The army did little to stop the riots, and did not open fire on protesters earlier in the day (Zabir 2011).

I have brought up three cases: 6/3/1963, 6/6/1963, and 11/5/1978. A comparison of these cases problematizes the rationalist perspective offered by Bellin. There are two broad factors to consider within her framework. The first is the issue of threat. All three crowds were similarly sized—in the thousands (on the large end). This implies that the military perceived the same level of threat in all three cases. However, this is only one measure for “threat,” which may not be comprehensive. Threat is also driven by a perception of the likelihood of success (i.e., did the military think the crowds might actually be able to threaten the regime and topple it), as well as protester violence. In this case, the first case on June 3, 1963 falls short. Protesters were not violent; demonstrators were described as peaceful, though chants called for the removal of the Shah (Poulson 2005). However, it is clear that, in both cases in 1963, the military took the threats very seriously. The Shah and his family were removed from Tehran and taken to a safe location (Chicago Tribune 6/6/1963). Based on
this and the fact that martial law was also declared in 1963, the perception that crowds may be successful in toppling the regime was comparable to November 5, 1978. By early December 1978, the threat level increased as it became clear to the military that the crowds were not going to be suppressed and the Shah’s concessions were not working; however, it is fair to say that threat perception based on the protesters’ likelihood of success in November 1978 was comparable to that in both cases during June 1963. Furthermore, at least in two of the cases (June 6, 1963 and November 5, 1978), the levels of protester violence were comparable. Both events started peacefully, and became violent in certain parts of Tehran as the day went on.

How about the state of the military organization between the protest movements? It is safe to assume that the military did not change much between June 3, 1963 and June 5, 1963. However, is it possible that the Iranian military became more institutionalized by 1978? If that was the case, then this rationalist alternative may explain the difference in outcome. Despite a similar level of threat in 1963 and 1978, was the Iranian military institutionalized enough by 1978 to view the costs of high intensity coercion as greater than the alternative, which was a new regime? Was it the case that the Iranian military in 1978 was professionalized to the point that it
sided with the opposition movement because it saw “life after the regime?” In some respects, the opposite is true. By 1978, the corruption and favoritism that determined career advancement were higher than ever before—the Shah had become increasingly paranoid about threats to his rule and had many safeguards in place to prevent a potential coup (Zabir 2011). But, overall, there were no significant changes to the structure of the military between these periods of time that suggested the Iranian military became somehow more professionalized or institutionalized, especially to the point at which it would matter in such a significant way.

Before ending this section, it is important to bring up an additional point that is related to military professionalization. Professionalization can also be about the levels of training in appropriate tactics (see Kamrava 2000 for good review). A professionalized military knows how to do its job. Unfortunately, this job does not involve protest policing. Thus, when a military is ordered to suppress protests, there may be a higher likelihood of violence simply because the military has not been trained to handle protesters without shooting. In fact, this lack of training in riot control tactics is often used to explain why poorly trained soldiers fire on crowds. Thus, perhaps

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2 Bellin’s argument about institutionalization is ultimately one about the structure of the military organization, which did not change significantly between 1963 and 1978.
variations in levels of riot control training and/or access to riot control equipment actually explain the outbreak of military violence during protests?

There is some merit to this argument. The lack of appropriate training and a shortage of riot control equipment (rubber bullets, helmets, batons...etc) were a contribution to the violence in 1979. Black Friday ended up the way it did, with massive violence against protesters that resulted in the deaths of dozens, partially because the military did not know how to manage protesters without firing into crowds. Many have noted that the Iranian military at the time was not trained to suppress protests using riot control methods (that are coercive, but usually not fatal). Furthermore, the Carter administration refused to sell riot control equipment to the regime—there was a shortage of batons, protective gear, and rubber bullets (Chehabi 2013). The question is: would effective training and equipment have made much of a difference, especially in the long-run? If the military had been trained and equipped appropriately, would we not observe an outbreak of violence?

In 1979, the answer is maybe. The counterfactual is hard to assess. It is possible that there may not have been fatalities on Black Friday had the military received riot control training and possessed the necessary equipment. On the other hand, the
Shah wanted a show of force on that day. Black Friday occurred immediately after the Shah declared a state of emergency. He had raised the stakes, putting his authority on the line by forbidding further protests. When people ignored his orders, it would have seemed weak not to respond forcefully. The Shah believed that a show of force would deter future protests. He had ordered the military to clamp down harshly on protesters knowing that deaths would result—he had full information regarding the lack of riot control training and equipment. The point of Black Friday was violence.

In fact, this is a general problem with the argument that a lack of riot control training/equipment is responsible for military violence; the assumption of this argument is that the regime would prefer no casualties. Militaries, in general, are not supposed to operate like police forces. Most countries have riot control police that serve that function. When the military is called upon to handle protesters, the expectation and intention is violence. In some cases, a regime might be interested in high intensity coercion with the real risk of fatalities. Why might there be a preference for fatal tactics and strategies? State terror includes harassment, spying, bans, arrests, torture, and mass (visible) killing by the government for the explicit purpose

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3There is not much variation across militaries when it comes to riot control training. So, this explanation is inherently hard to test.
of deterring future opposition (see Davenport 2007). In 2009, the Iranian regime was not interested in “safe” tactics of crowd control. There is no evidence that rubber bullets and helmets were in short supply. There is also no evidence that training in riot control policing was in short supply. Iran’s police is large and well-trained, and the IRGC engaged in riot control policing on many occasions, proving that elements within the IRGC had some familiarity with crowd control methods short of killing. In fact, there was an intentionality present in the regime’s strategy against protesters—what might be called state terror. The perversity of some of the tactics—particularly those that involved sexual violence and torture by the Basij—also proves that the regime would not have preferred other, less fatal methods of crowd control.

Finally, in a rationalist framework, the ratio of troops to rioters may matter, so it is important to briefly assess this. If military units are sent to suppress a crowd, and they are outnumbered and attacked, it is possible that they may use their weapons to avoid being overrun. I am unable to systematically test this in the empirical chapters because there is incomplete information regarding the number of troops that are sent in. However, in very large protests, we can assume that state forces are outnumbered by protesters (though the extent may vary). The ratio
between protesters and state forces alone does not predict the outbreak of violence, but perhaps protester violence is the missing link? When protests are large and state forces (we assume) are outnumbered, is it more likely that the military will respond with violence if protesters become violent? This sequencing of events—protesters in a large demonstration becoming violent first, followed by military violence—does seem to have some leverage, particularly in 1979 on Black Friday. Though accounts vary, there is some consensus that armed members hiding among the crowd began firing weapons first, killing several soldiers (though both sides have claimed that the other fired first. See Afkhami 2009.). The soldiers then began to fire wildly into the crowd because they felt threatened.

However, despite this partial support, the argument about the ratio of troops falls apart in 2009. It is widely accepted that the regime’s troops usually initiated first, and, in general, aside from barricades and rock throwing, protesters were peaceful, particularly in the beginning of the movement (Makhmalbaf 2009). At the peak of the movement, rioting did break out, but this occurred after sustained attacks by the Basij and other military forces (Majd 2010). In short, there was not a sense, based

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4There is variation in military violence, holding the size of the protesting crowd constant.
on everything I have read, that troops may have felt outnumbered or threatened by violent protesters who were attacking them. Iranian protesters during the Green Revolution were armed mostly with slogans and, at times, rocks, which they used defensively against (mostly) Basijis, who were out in incredibly large numbers with the explicit intention of harming and terrorizing people.

**Alternative Explanation 2: The Party Centered Approach**

A second rationalist alternative explanation emphasizes the role of parties and political institutions. Comparative scholars argue that single parties matter when it comes to explaining regime cohesion, which is a significant part of the authoritarian durability literature. Iran has been problematic for this literature, and the Arab Spring, particularly Egypt and Tunisia, has led to new work that has further problematized the scholarship on authoritarian durability (see Gause 2011 for a good review). Why is regime cohesion relevant to the discussion of why militaries inflict violence on protesters? According to Levitsky et al. (2012), inflicting violence on protesters—or high intensity coercion—requires an extraordinary level of regime co-
hesion\textsuperscript{5} because the ability to crush protests depends on the regime’s will or capacity to do so.

Barbara Geddes (1999) found that single party regimes were more cohesive and stable than military or personalistic dictatorships. Others went on to define further how single parties enhanced elite cohesion and led to coercive structures that were better able to manage mass-based threats (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012; Reuter and Remington 2009). In general, the party centered approach has been rationalist, focusing on how single parties create incentives for long-term loyalty. Otherwise put, in single party regimes, the military is more loyal because the benefit of crushing dissent is greater than the cost of failing, given some risk of failure, which is endogenous (the risk of failure decreases as loyalty to the regime increases). Why is the benefit of crushing dissent so much greater in single party regimes? Single party regimes pay off for members of the military in the long-run because they set up mechanisms that reward loyalty—“sticking” with the regime ensures that, in the end, members have access to the spoils of office. These spoils include future opportunities for career advancement and government resources (often for personal use). By

\textsuperscript{5}This is defined as the extent to which the regime elite has the stomach and capacity to defend the regime against threats, in this case mass-based ones.
lengthening actors’ time horizons and channeling elite ambitions, single party regimes create an environment that encourages actors to care about the regime’s future because doing so ensures their own future gain.

Brownlee (2007) identified Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party as a key source of regime cohesion and the absence of a ruling party as a key source of vulnerability for Iran. So, is it possible that a party centered approach actually explains the difference in outcome between 1979 and 2009 for Iran? Are militaries in single party regimes more likely to fire on protesters? It turns out that Brownlee’s predictions could not have been more wrong. A single party in the Egyptian case was not a key source of cohesion in 2011, and the absence of one in the Iranian case did not play a key role in the regime’s survival in 2009. Furthermore, the presence of a ruling party under the Shah did nothing to prevent or overcome the social movement that led to the 1979 Revolution.

It is important to note that the problem with the party centered approach is that it focuses too much on the elites and not enough on the coercive apparatus of the state.

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6In 1975, the Shah announced a single party system throughout the country. Prior to this point, there were two main parties, but he ordered these parties to dissolve and created a single party called Rastakhiz. Years later the Shah confessed in his memories that the abolishment of all political parties was a mistake that backfired.
(Levitsky et al. 2012). It is, at its heart, a theory about elite cohesion. It assumes that this high-level cohesion transfers down to the individuals agents—i.e., the bulk of the coercive apparatus—who actually inflict the violence. In fact, based on the 1979 Iran case, one factor this theory overlooks is the effect the coercive apparatus has on elite cohesion. Prior to 1978, the Shah’s regime, which operated with a single party, was cohesive—the mechanisms that regulated access to the spoils of public office and extended actors’ time horizons did provide incentives for long-term loyalty. Regime cohesion began to dissolve once it became clear to the Shah and his generals that the army rank and file would most probably fall apart if ordered to inflict wide scale violence upon protesters (Zabir 2012). On the other hand, in 2009, the election revealed a lack of regime cohesion, and this was, in part, due to the fact that the Islamic Regime does not have a single party system. However, despite this lack of elite cohesion, the coercive apparatus demonstrated a will and capacity to crush the opposition.

A further problem with the party-centered approach is that it does not account for the intra-state variation that occurs both within a protest movement (from protest event to protest event) and between protest movements in the same country. Even
though the party centered argument may not be meant to explain variation at the intra-state level, an argument that encompasses all levels of variation is superior to one that only applies to a broader level. Going small and trying to explain the intra-state variation is key to understanding the mechanisms that drive the outcome—in this case, violence by the military against protesters. An answer that holds up at the level of intra-state variation is probably more robust at the inter-state level as well—as we saw with the party-centered approach, it falls short at the inter-state level as well.

Levitsky et al. (2012) also critique the party-centered approach, arguing that it does not focus adequately on the state’s coercive apparatus, which is the main factor when it comes to explaining the likelihood of high intensity coercion. Their state-centered approach underscores a non-material basis for regime cohesion: revolutionary origins. They argue that “origins in a sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven struggle for power are a critical source of elite cohesion—and regime durability" (Levitsky et al. 2012: 9). Revolutionary origins enhance a regime’s repressive capacity by giving rise to large and highly disciplined coercive structures, creating a shared revolutionary ideology and identity, and polarizing societies (thus, sharpening “us-them"
distinctions and strengthening within-group ties). Though this approach comes the closest to providing a satisfying explanation for the inter-state variation in military violence, there are important gaps that need to be filled, namely at the intra-state level, which is overlooked by Levitsky et al. (2012). Their approach emphasizes several non-material mechanisms that are not adequately explored because they require further theorization. How do the dynamics of “us-them” distinctions matter in the context of a state’s security apparatus? By looking within a protest event, my approach contributes to the state-centered approach by clarifying how us-them distinctions matter in the context of the military organization and the protest event.

**Alternative Explanation 3: International Concerns**

Variations in levels of international pressure may have an impact on the willingness on the part of the state and the military to use force against protesters. Perhaps changes in the type and level of international pressure not to engage in violence against protesters were driving the difference between 1979 and 2009? Though it is true that the source of international pressure was different, perhaps more influential, in 1979 (due to realpolitik concerns), the marginal impact this had on the Shah’s
motivations seems to be limited. Furthermore, given the rise of social media in 2009, which increased the level of transparency, international pressure may not have been significantly less during the Green Revolution, though the source of it was different.

Some argue that the United States’ influence, as one of two major superpowers, loomed large under the Shah, even when it came to matters of internal security. With the end of WW2, the Soviet Union and the U.S. emerged as the two hegemonic powers, each eager to halt the other’s sway in key regions around the world. In fact, the Cold War was dominated by a balance of power, both globally and regionally, as great power politics and conflict played out in regions like the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa (Halliday 2005). The U.S. saw the Middle East as a key factor of national security, and believed that the USSR wanted more influence in the region for the same reasons. The Middle East held the key to the world’s most massive oil reserves, and it became increasingly clear that whoever controlled this region also controlled the global oil supply.

The decision by Great Britain in the late 1960s to withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf and to grant independence to its ten protectorates on the Arabian Peninsula confronted the United States with a strategic dilemma. Since
U.S. troops were focused on Vietnam, the U.S. decided to build up the capabilities of its two closest allies in the region (not counting Israel): Iran and Saudi Arabia. As the “twin pillars” of U.S. policy, these two countries, with support from the U.S., would be able to protect the region from the spread of Soviet influence, and the U.S. would not be over-extended during the Cold War (Hooglund 1992). As a result of this close relationship, Iran received billions of dollars of military aid in the form of advanced arms, resources, and capital, becoming extremely dependent on not only U.S. money, but also U.S. expertise when it came to managing/operating the new technology (Hooglund 1992; Zabir 2011).

Within this context of a critical Cold War alliance and Iran’s dependence on the United States, some have argued that the Carter administration was responsible for the Shah’s unwillingness or inability to clamp down harshly on protesters, which led to the fall of the regime (see Milani 2008; Sabeti 2012; Evans 2014; Graham 1980). When Jimmy Carter became President in 1976, America was at the peak of a liberal wave of anti-Vietnam War emotion. Carter’s presidency was marked by a liberal foreign policy agenda; in fact, he said he would bring pressure on the Shah to make Iran more democratic (Milani 2008; Evans 2014). Carter created a special
Office of Human Rights after he was inaugurated in an effort to make American
foreign policy seem more benevolent. Portraying this image of the United States as
a benevolent superpower meant not being in alliances with authoritarian dictators
who had shoddy human rights records like the Shah. In fact, when Carter sent the
Shah “a polite reminder” of the importance of political rights and freedom, the Shah
felt pressured, and responded by granting amnesty to almost 400 political prisoners
and permitting the Red Cross to visit prisons (Abrahamian 1982). As this highlights,
there was no question that the United States’ opinions on Iranian domestic politics
mattered to the Shah.

By the time the Iranian Revolution was in full swing in the fall of 1978, it became
clear that the Shah’s soft policy toward the protesters was not working, and some
blamed the Carter administration’s influence for these policies (Pahlavi 2004; Sa-
beti in Milani 2008; Afkhami 2008; Amuzegar 1991). The Shah, on many occasions
throughout 1978, attempted to reason with protesters, appearing conciliatory and
even admitting faults. He also promised concessions and ordered the police not to
use deadly force, which was difficult because the Carter Administration had refused
to sell Iran protest policing gear, like tear gas and rubber bullets, for humanitarian
reasons. When Parviz Sabeti, a senior SAVAK official, gave him the names of 2000 protest leaders to arrest, the Shah ignored the advice, arresting only a small handful (Milani 2008). He also ordered arrested protesters to be tried in civilian rather than military courts (which would have been a much stronger deterrent), and fired high-ranking members of SAVAK for inappropriate behavior—probably because they were being too harsh (Amuzegar 1991).

On the flip side, in 2009, there was, arguably, less international pressure on Iran for its human rights. This may explain why the Islamic Regime was able to crush protests so harshly. Though it is true that there may have been some form of international pressure through various international organizations and international media (including social media), a realist perspective would discount the value of this type of pressure, arguing that it does not compare to actual material and security influence in the form of a major alliance with a superpower, especially during the Cold War.

So, is it true that the Shah’s hands were tied because of Iran’s close relationship with the United States and its liberal foreign policy agenda at the time? There are a number of issues with this claim, though I don’t doubt that the international context did have some effect. First, the negative view of the Shah as a dictator who would
have ordered troops to slaughter thousands of protesters has come into question with
the release of new information about SAVAK and the actual estimates of political
prisoners and torture victims. During the Iranian Revolution, the opposition claimed
that Iran had “hundreds of thousands of political prisoners,” and that countless thou-
sands had been killed and tortured to death. The actual number of political prisoners
(in total) was 4000, and the actual number of people executed for political crimes was
1,500 (Milani 2012). Indeed, the release of this new information has been part of a
revival of the Shah’s reputation, with new biographical work that has painted the
Shah and his regime in a different light—a less oppressive one.

These new works tend to suggest that he was a troubled leader who was, nonethe-
less, a true believer in the message he sold to the Iranian people, which was one of
greatness with him at the helm as a “father figure” to the nation—something his own
writings center on as well (Milani 2012; Pahlavi 1980, 1977; Sciolino 2000). Indeed,
after his exile, the Shah conceded that he had made mistakes during his reign, but
he was also very clear about his refusal to engage in full-scale violence against the
people he was charged to protect above all (see his last interview with Robert Frost
in 1979).
Ultimately, the problem with trying to figure out whether the Shah would have actually ordered a full-scale crackdown on protesters is that it is impossible to get into his head and identify his real motivations. Who is to say what actually motivated him? And, multiple motivations are possible in a complicated world. Nonetheless, there are some more objective reasons to believe that the Shah’s liberalization (or forced liberalization) as a result of U.S. influence was subject to re-assessment when his power was threatened. As Kurzman (2004) brings up, even at the height of the Shah’s relationship with Carter and the United States—when the Shah arrived in Washington DC in 1977 for a state visit—the liberals were in full retreat back in Iran. The regime’s partial tolerance of oppositional activity, called the “liberalization wave” (see Chehabi 2013), began in 1976, but had basically disappeared by the time the Shah walked into the White House in late 1977 (Kurzman 2004).

Furthermore, another challenge to the argument that the Carter Administration was responsible for the Shah’s unwillingness to use force against protesters is the problem of intra-state variation. This was present in 1979 and 2009, which problematizes the realist approach more generally as well. Arguably, international concerns and the structure of power in the international system do not shift between very
short periods of time, yet violence against crowds between protest events (in the same movement) does. A good example of this is the period of time around Black Friday, which ended in the deaths of 64 protesters after soldiers fired indiscriminately into crowds on September 9, 1978. Before he declared martial law on midnight of September 8, the Shah had adopted a soft line approach to protests (for the most part). For example, on September 7th, 500,000 protesters were allowed to take to the streets unharmed. Yet, two days later, Black Friday occurred, resulting in casualties on both sides. Just a few days after Black Friday, crowds were back on the streets, and the Shah was trying to appeal to protesters through negotiation and appeasement. The events of Black Friday prove that the Shah was not unwilling to use harsh force against protesters—he certainly did not give much thought to the Carter Administration’s human rights policies when he ordered the show of force on that day.

Lastly, though the nature of any kind of international pressure was different in 1979, it is hard to argue that there was no international concern or pressure in 2009. It is true that pressure from the Carter Administration may have been more “real” in the sense that it was tied to an alliance; however, we cannot discount the influence
of international media attention during 2009. While this influence may have been “softer,” there is evidence that international media attention matters to state leaders. The heightened level of transparency as a result of faster methods of information transmission over huge distances meant that mass killings were immediately visible and easier to confirm. During the Arab Spring, the role of the international media (particularly Al Jazeera) and newer forms of social media was well documented, as was the effect this media attention had on Arab leaders, even the ones who did decide to use harsh force against protesters (Lindsey 2013).

Others have argued that Iran’s harsh crackdown on protesters did have significant international costs for Iran’s leaders by affecting Iran’s influence in the region (Dabashi 2013). The Iranian Regime lost credibility in the eyes of many in the region. The 1979 Revolution had once been considered the paragon of non-violent success for Islamists in the region, but after the government’s violent response in 2009, Iran’s efforts to influence the Arab Spring and gain support in the region failed—even its branding of the Arab revolutions as an “Islamic Awakening” was outrightly rejected (Dabashi 2013).

In conclusion, it is important to clarify what a psychological approach does not
mean. It does not mean that I think governments are behaving without a strategy. It is true that the early work on political violence against civilians portrayed this kind of violence as irrational, random, or the result of ancient hatreds between ethnic groups. Most scholars today would agree that violence against citizens is instrumental, driven by specific motives, interests, and preferences (Valentino 2014). Though I agree with this in general, I also argue that these interests and preferences are constrained by non-material beliefs in some cases, maybe not all. This constraint becomes evident if we look at the design of state security systems. If political violence is to be understood as solely orchestrated by powerful actors seeking to achieve tangible objectives, then there should not be as much variation in the design of security systems across the world. However, what we see is a vast plethora of different structures and designs in many different types of situations. In fact, this is a gap in the literature on political violence, according to Valentino (2014). Scholars continue to disagree about the exact motives that drive violence against civilians, and the conditions under which extreme violence against civilians is likely.

The key to understanding these motives and the conditions is to go one step back, and consider how elites design security institutions. In the choices that are made are
the clues that may lead the researcher to a better understanding of both the motives and the conditions that facilitate the violence. My theory points to the significance of non-material interests—specifically, us versus them distinctions—as the basis for how the individual agents of the violence act.
3 | The Iranian Revolution: Representativeness in the Iranian Armed Forces and Violence against Protesters in 1979

3.1 Introduction

The Iranian Revolution in 1979 transformed the landscape of politics in the Middle East and the balance of power internationally. Over the course of a year, the Shah of Iran struggled to contain the forces that sought to topple his regime, as neighboring states peered into the crisis overtaking the country. After the outcome was finalized, and Ruhollah Khomeini stepped onto Iranian soil just two weeks after the Shah had fled the country, it became clear that the United States had lost its most significant ally in the region. The Islamic Republic "under the guidance of an extraordinary religious scholar from Qom" is the first and only of its kind (Benard and Zalmay 1984). Designed and produced to parallel the will of God on earth, the Iranian
regime today reflects the complexity of an intellectual process. Such a system, as I will show in the next chapter, possesses a great capacity for state terror against its own citizens.

This chapter, however, focuses on the Shah’s security institutions in order to show why the military fell apart during the 1979 Revolution and did not crack down on demonstrators during the wave of mass protests that swept the country from January 1978 to February 1979. This chapter begins by setting up the historical context for both 1979 and 2009. This context is relevant to both cases because of the groups involved in the political changes, particularly with respect to the critical social alliance between the clergy and the rural population, which forms the foundation of the Islamic Regime’s security apparatus. It is only through this context that, I argue, representativeness can be assessed—i.e., through a country’s social and political history. This historical section also describes the ideology through which the Shah legitimized his claim to rule and structured the security apparatus. The universality of a new “Persian” identity seeped into all aspects of the security apparatus, including the military organization. This is important because it gives a sense of how military members viewed their membership, which was tied to a nation (as opposed to a nar-
row group). This chapter then assesses protest events within the Iranian Revolution, finding that there was variation in the levels of violence dependent on the composition of crowds. Protest events with broadly defined crowds composed of more than one subgroup were less likely to turn violent. I end by assessing the possibility that SAVAK may have operated like a paramilitary organization. I conclude that SAVAK was not unrepresentative in composition, and did not possess the right kinds of characteristics that would lead to mass violence against protesters; these characteristics include a lack of ideological fervor and capacity.

3.1.1 Historical Context: Social Alliances, Ideology, and Iranian Universalism under the Shah

Security institutions under the Shah, in contrast to those of the Islamic Republic of Iran, lacked the capacity of a system designed to combat mass internal threat by failing to exploit a significant social cleavage. In fact, the opposite occurred. The Shah and his policies reinforced a social alliance that led to his demise and the rise of a new regime.

The Shah continued the work of his father, reinforcing the Iranian national iden-
tity. Through the process, he attempted to forge an identity that was inclusive and universal. However, he ended up alienating powerful social groups and imposing an alien culture—one tainted by its lack of originality. For many, this identity was simply not salient; it was a western identity, and one with no foundation. The Shah wanted to destroy cleavages; but, instead, he reinforced the one that would form the backbone of the current regime’s security apparatus: the rural/urban divide. Moreover, the system of beliefs intended to legitimize the Shah’s rule never resonated within the political system, particularly within the security apparatus. This was because these beliefs lacked a salient cultural dimension for a large portion of the population—unsurprisingly, those in rural areas, the lower class, and the religious elite. The Shah’s right to rule became increasingly linked to the West, and Westernization as an ideology was bound to fail in Iran.

By alienating important social groups and reinforcing alliances with deep historical significance, the Shah’s policies were increasingly contextualized as un-Islamic and un-Iranian; the term “Westernoxification” came to define the underlying ideology justifying his power (Keddie 2003). In addition, because the goal was to fashion a united, secular identity, a viable frame for legitimizing violence in the coercive
apparatus never emerged. The result was a security apparatus not structured to deal with mass internal threat.

First, the military organization was representative of Iranian society. In fact, one of the military's most critical functions was to aid in the nationalizing of the Iranian state by turning man into citizen (Katzman 1993). To that end, it reflected the Shah's vision of how national identity would map onto the national ideology in the security system very clearly. Second, military units were specialized and professionalized along Western lines not in terms of interest, but function. This reflected a set of beliefs intrinsic to the purpose of the Iranian state between 1926-1979—much of the right to rule on the part of the Pahlavi dynasty resided in the extent to which the Shah and his father before him “built” a nation by modernizing it. As it turned out, modernization, by the end of the 1970s, became synonymous with Westernization, as each policy designed to modernize aspects of Iranian politics, military, and society was viewed by those opposed to the Shah as an encroachment on a true, Islamic identity (Abrahamian 2008). Third, the security apparatus under the Shah, as a less fervent ideological setting, did not have the sorts of informal or militia-like coercive institutions that might have been more amenable to the use of severe violence against
crowds. SAVAK came closest to this kind of paramilitary style organization; however, as I show later, it did not possess the capacity for such violence.

The 1979 Revolution was characterized by a very broad alliance of social groups: intelligentsia, middle class, religious elite, workers, and rural/lower class members were all represented. Moreover, the protests were widespread and large, covering all regions of the country—major urban centers, small towns, and villages were affected. The nationalizing rationale of the Shah’s modernization program created a theoretical problem for security enforcers and the system: how to define those against the regime. It was easy when the “them” were foreigners, governments in neighboring states, or separatists in the border regions. Some of these people were not “Iranian,” and others were not “Iranian” yet—suppressing them, in the case of separatists, was part of the “nationalizing” agenda. Thus, forcing the Iranian national identity upon them was legitimate. However, when the threat came from a broad range of people, representative of each layer of Iranian society, identifying these people as the "them" became impossible within the security apparatus, especially given that members of the military viewed themselves as belonging to a broad, national group (the purpose of the Shah’s nationalizing agenda).
3.2 The Shah’s Security Apparatus in Context

The security system under the Shah, despite its capacity and breadth, did not have the right kind of muscle for dealing with mass internal threats. The Shah’s efforts to fortify the Iranian national identity ended up alienating important social groups and reinforcing cleavages, instead of uniting. Furthermore, the Shah was unable to construct a set of beliefs salient enough to justify his rule; secularism in Iran could not bear the pressures of a deep religiosity within most of the population, particularly in the rural areas. In short, there were fundamental problems in the political system when it came to legitimacy and national identity. These problems diminished the capacity of security institutions to deal with threats to the regime from below.

By all measures, the Shah’s security apparatus was extensive and highly capable. SAVAK—the Shah’s secret police—was established with the help of the CIA in 1957. SAVAK interrogators were sent abroad to receive scientific training in clean torture techniques (Rejali 2009). These were implemented effectively on thousands of dissidents. According to scholars, SAVAK was one of the best financed, most effective security and intelligence agencies in the region (Kurzman 2004; GlobalSecurity.org).
Legally, SAVAK operated its own prisons and had the authority to arrest and detain suspected persons indefinitely. There were few, if any, institutional checks. Formally a civilian institution, the agency had close ties to the military, but it was not really a paramilitary organization, though there was a unit in the third division that was highly weaponized. The military organization under the Shah was considered well-trained and well-equipped. Designed along American lines, the Iranian army was prepared to deal with external threats, emerging successful from a 1946 campaign in Azerbaijan to put down a Soviet-inspired separatist rebellion (Cordesman and Kleiber 2007). What was most surprising to scholars about the Iranian Revolution was precisely the strength of Iran’s security system under the Shah (Skocpol 1982). How could such a strong state fall apart in the face of mass protests?

The answer is that the Shah’s security system was representative—i.e., not structured in a way that would facilitate violence against a broad group of people rising up against the state in protest. Despite its access to resources, the authoritarian nature of the Shah’s rule, and the lack of institutional checks on its actions, the security apparatus did not engender the group-based factors that would enhance the potential for severe violence against citizens. Two of the biggest issues within the system were the
nationalizing, secular mission of the military, which inculcated a broad group identity (composed of cross-cutting ties—one could be a Kurd and “Iranian” at the same time) within the military organization, and the secular basis of the Shah’s claim to power, which reinforced a significant social alliance with a powerful historical foundation.

Mohammad Reza Shah continued the state-building enterprise of his father, Reza Shah. Both assumed a paternalistic role in relation to the state. During the period 1921-1941, Reza Shah embarked on a mission to centralize the power of the state. At the heart of this mission was an effort to forge a national identity heretofore non-existent (Cronin 1997). In 1935, the Iranian government requested those countries with which it had diplomatic relations to call Persia “Iran.” The official name change signaled two things. First, Reza Shah was eager to signify the Aryan race of his people (“Iran” is a cognate of “Aryan”), bringing the country closer to its European allies and aligning himself with the West. Second, changing the name of the country indicated the importance of the nationalizing mission. Iran has always been a country consisting of many diverse groups: Kurds, Turks, Lurs, Baluchi, and Persians. The new state identity in the early twentieth century deviated from the norm by emphasizing Iran’s pre-Islamic history and its ancient Persian culture. Farsi became the official language,
whereas, in the past, Turkic and Azerbaijani languages (among other dialects) were spoken in court. For the first time, a national anthem was created and it focused on the role of the Pahlavi king in restoring Iran’s ancient greatness (Price 2005). Reza Shah’s nationalizing mission, however, was not accepted by all. It was accompanied by an awakening of ethnic identities in different parts of the country, and these identities clashed with the new state identity imposed from above, particularly in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

Under Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979), this nationalizing mission continued. The new secular Iranian national identity was reinforced in three main ways, all of them focused on assimilating “others.” First, military service became mandatory for all young adult males. In the past, the military recruited from only certain parts of the country, leaving the southern regions and nomadic/tribal areas of Iran untouched. This meant major groups (Baluchis, for example) were left out of the military, while other groups, like the Azerbaijanis, were oversampled (Hickman 1982). Consequently, the armed forces, prior to the Pahlavi dynasty’s reign beginning in 1925, were not representative of society. Beginning in the 1920s, the military organization came to be seen by the monarchy as the main engine of state-building (Zabih 1988). The
government enforced conscription in every part of the country and, generally, at every social level. Lower civil servants, farmers, and ethnic tribal people constituted the draft’s pool, and better educated middle class members served at the upper echelons of the military organization, especially at the officer and command levels (Zabir 2012; Lenczowski 1978). The socialization of each adult male would begin at primary school and end at military school. To this end, one of the principle functions of the military under the Pahlavi regime was to disseminate and impose on the masses the regime’s ideology. Every male adult, particularly those whose claims for autonomy had been crushed under the first Shah (farmers, religious, and ethnic tribal people), was schooled to understand the greatness of the Persian people, the role of the Shah in bringing that grandeur back, and the secularism of the Iranian state.

The military also contributed to the regime’s program of national integration—the second way in which the Pahlavi regime forged the national identity by bringing in nomadic tribes and separatists. Reza Shah began this process in the 1920s and 30s, imposing mandatory military service on border tribes, which led to countless clashes between the new army and tribal forces throughout the two decades (Cronin 1997). This intensified after WW2 with the rise of the second Shah to power, particularly
in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Separatists in these regions wanted independence from Iran, and they saw an opening in the vacuum of power following the end of WW2. With American and British help, the Iranian army crushed separatist movements in these border regions during the 1940s, with the peak of fighting between 1944-46 (Elphinston 1946; Cronin 1997; Hassanpour 1994). For the Shah, national integration was critical to the formation and solidification of the national identity, since it meant "others"—those previously unmanaged and unaccountable to the state—were brought in. By extending a strong arm to sweep and transform all into citizens of the state, the Shah was putting ideology into practice; like his father before him, he was legitimizing his right to rule as a nation-builder—"the father of the state." Of course, this ideology was intrinsically and, at times, indistinguishably tied to a very specific notion of Iranian identity as inclusive, broad, and universal: everyone living in the territorial space of the country could be, and would be, an Iranian.

Third, despite the underlying theoretical belief that the imposition of the national identity was supposed to destroy cleavages and unite all Iranians, the Shah’s policies involved "othering" a very important and influential sector of Iranian society: the religious elite. The religious elite or ulama in Iran opposed the Shah’s modernization
policies because, to them, these policies were largely un-Islamic. They reflected a Western way of life, intended for the secular and modern. These policies included forbidding headscarves for women, requiring men and women to wear Western clothes in all public settings, and drastically lessening the role of religion in politics. In fact, much of the Shah’s new ideology reflected a return to an ancient pre-Islamic greatness that these religious elites viewed as blasphemous (Cronin 2010; Parsa 1994). From the Shah’s point of view, the ulama favored an inherently different (highly ideological) identity from the one defining his rule. Their attachment to an Islamic identity was in direct opposition to the national, secular identity. His suppression of this important group through various coercive strategies ranging from the extra-judicial to outright brute force (for example, in the infamous 1963 Qom massacre, which led to the Shah’s security forces killing seminarians in one of the holiest Shi’ite cities in the region; see Poulson 2005) led directly to his demise in 1979. It also set the stage for an important alliance between the ulama and the rural class—the two groups most adversely affected by the Shah’s economic and social policies.

The ideological component, which is inherently linked to this notion of Iranian identity under the Shah as universal and broad, was also problematic. It is ideology
that legitimizes the system and its power structure. In the Shah’s case, the set of beliefs justifying his rule was mainly personalistic. The Shah struggled with legitimacy as a result of his rise to power. His father, Reza Shah, was born in a village and rose through the ranks of the army. His claim to rule had been mythologically sullied: he was seen as a puppet King placed in the position by the British, and after he was removed from power by foreign forces, his son was placed on the throne by the Americans (see Afkhami 2009). Though the historical facts make this simple story of succession more complicated, for most Iranians, the myth of an illiterate King followed by an illegitimate heir persisted (to this day). Regardless of the objective truth of the matter, there is no doubt the Shah sought to build a system of beliefs legitimizing his rule that delved deep into Iran’s ancient history. By making a connection from the Pahlavi dynasty directly to the great kings of Persia’s pre-Islamic past, the Shah was deepening his right to the crown.

This connection, for the Shah, lay in Iran’s grandeur: in ancient times, Iran had been the greatest empire in the world, and the Shah saw himself as the man who would restore that greatness, “Being king over a mostly poor, ill, and insecure people was no honor...We must begin to prepare ourselves for that time [to become the greatest
civilization" (Shah at coronation in 1967, see Afkhami p. 248). Thus, restoring grandeur involved a massive program of modernization, which would become the Shah’s life work and legacy. Modernization implied centralization and strengthening of the state. To that end, tax revenues were increased and oil money expanded the state’s budget drastically. GDP doubled in six years from 1964-1970 (Firoozi 1974). The Shah bought billions of dollars worth of the latest weapons, often while they were still on the drawing board. Sophisticated foreign equipment drastically transformed the labor industry, as thousands of Western technicians and workers streamed in. The rate of Iran’s industrial growth from the 1960s until the mid-1970s was one of the highest in the world (Keddie 2003).

However, the Shah’s modernization plan—the mainstay of his plan to restore Iran’s grandeur—was flawed in the manner that it became conflated with Westernization. The Shah’s economic policies were preferential toward Western-style industries. Many foreign firms were involved in payoffs to individuals within the government and the monarchy. Foreign capital played a huge role in the development of the Iranian economy during the 60s and 70s because foreigners could legally own shares in Iranian industries. They were subject to few restrictions and could repatriate profits freely.
Government policies disadvantaged small crafts and industries, facilitating the kinds of large-scale and high tech productions that required a Western presence (Keddie 2003; Ansari 2007).

It is not surprising that income gaps widened in the 1960s and 1970s as a result of the Shah’s economic modernization policies (Keddie 2003). The Shah’s land reform measures, intended to abolish feudalism in the countryside, ended up worsening the plight of urban workers and the peasantry (Najmabadi 1987). By buying the land from wealthy landlords at what was considered a fair price and selling it to peasants at below the market rate, the Shah hoped to win over the rural poor. In fact, he alienated them further because the program was unrealistic and poorly designed. Less than half of the rural population received any land, and many of the people who did receive land did not receive enough to sustain themselves. These people ended up trading their land for a small value or opting into cooperatives with a low rate of return (Abrahamian 2008). Though land reform did have some positive effects, the heightened expectations and subsequent loss for many added to the sense of dissatisfaction with the Shah, particularly for the rural population. Furthermore, the program did not benefit village laborers—a large portion of the rural population, who
tended to be young males between the ages of 15-25. Some were forced to migrate to urban centers in order to look for work, and most became very resentful of the land reform program (Abrahamian 2008).

Public criticism of the program came primarily from landlords and the clergy. The clergy came predominantly from well established landowning families—the same ones most negatively effected by the government’s land buying program. Furthermore, the program undercut the influence of the clergy by inserting the power of the state into the rural areas of the country, especially in the realm of family law and custom. The clergy had traditionally enjoyed a powerful influence in the rural regions, and the land reform policies, along with other ones designed to modernize Iranian society (women’s rights, family planning, and education), diminished its strength. One of the ways the state was able to do this was by financially weakening the clerics: the rents from a large portion of villages—ones which helped finance the clerical establishment—became eligible for redistribution (Mackey 1996).

The Shah’s social policies, which grew out of his modernization program, served to further alienate the rural population and the clergy. The nature of these social policies solidified the frame through which these two important elements in Iranian
society related to each other. In short, restoring Iran’s grandeur—the central point of the Shah’s political ideology—and reinforcing the Iranian national identity were re-framed as “Westernoxification.” For example, didactic reforms in schools ensured that the nationalized curriculum prepared students for the modern world (Lenczowski 1999). Clerics argued that these reforms imposed Western ideas on students because the new curriculum was very similar to a European model. Part of this criticism was motivated by fears that the state’s interjection into a realm previously monopolized by the religious elite (education) would diminish the power of the clerical establishment. Similarly, efforts by the Shah to modernize Iran culturally—for example, through the passage of laws that forbade religious dress in public spaces—ended up targeting the rural population because people in the countryside were more traditional and offending the clerics, who happened to have the most influence over the rural population (Bill 1970). Thus, even though the Shah did not intend to isolate the rural population (in fact, his land reform plans were meant to empower farmers and peasants), the implications of modernization in the system meant that a sub-section of Iranian society (the religious institution) was marginalized, suffering directly from policies intended to weaken it, and another integral layer of the population (the rural) was
estranged, though not on purpose.

All this brought together a perfect storm of dissatisfied rural people—crushed by the social and political modernization policies of the Shah, which affected their purses and their traditional, religious sensibilities—and “othered" religious classes (from local mullahs to grand ayatollahs). The Shah deepened a powerful social alliance between the religious and the rural population, which presented the state with serious challenges; these challenges led directly to the Shah’s fall in 1979. Furthermore, the rural/religious alliance formed the basis of a new political and security system under Khomeini. As the next chapter will show, this relationship, by taking advantage of a major social cleavage, has strengthened Iran’s coercive institutions by facilitating the use of violence against citizens, particularly in the context of protest policing. What is special about the alliance is its deep roots, which is why “othering" the religious—because they preferred an Islamic identity and resented modernization—and alienating the rural population were such costly mistakes for the Shah. Their history of collaboration dated back to the late part of the 19th century under the Qajars (1795-1925). Moreover, under Reza Shah, the nationalization of opium, which hurt farmers and peasants, led to protests in rural areas organized by local and elite
religious leaders (Cronin 2010; Cronin 1997; Poulson 2005). There were many similar episodes throughout this earlier period, and, by the 1970s, it became clear that the alliance had re-emerged and was stronger than ever.

3.3 1979 Revolution and the Security System

3.3.1 The Iranian Revolution and Social Movement Theory

My argument about the 1979 Revolution in Iran must first be situated in the landscape of the leading approaches to revolution in the social science literature. To be clear, I am not proposing an argument for why social movements emerge or even why they are successful. I have a far more narrow focus, and that is explaining the actions of the military during mass protests. Nonetheless, these actions are significant to the extent that they lead to other outcomes—one of them being successful regime transition. In the Iranian Revolution, the fact that the military fell apart and was, for the most part, unwilling to take violent action against protesters was one of the most significant causes of the movement’s success. In light of this, a brief overview of the theories of revolution and how my argument fits in with them is relevant.
It is, of course, impossible in a short space to do justice to the rich literature on revolutions. However, as an injustice, I divide this literature into two camps: those who emphasize structural factors (Moore 1966; Wolf 1969; Paige 1975; Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979) and those who emphasize cultural factors (Arjomand 1988; Skocpol 1982). Structural factors are those key elements such as the strength of the state (Skocpol), the commercialization of agriculture (Moore and Wolf), economic organization (Paige), and the mobilization of resources by challengers (Tilly). Cultural factors highlight the role of ideology in social revolutions. One of the best summaries of this approach comes from one of the principle actors himself: Ayatollah Khomeini, "They [the left] were not decisive for the victory...[The people who were killed by the thousands died] For Islam. The people fought for Islam" (in Foran 1994). The "value-relevance" or ideological significance of the revolution pushes back against the claim that ideational elements have only a small role defining the success of a social movement. Otherwise put, the structural versus cultural/constructivist debate places the agency of mobilization at different levels. For structuralists, the causes of movements and the reasons for their success lie in the slow-moving frameworks built by political, social, and economic systems. For culturalists, the real agency rests at a
much lower level; it is self-defined by the actors who comprise the system.

My theory, which is social-psychological at its core, is both structural and constructivist. I emphasize the importance of structure when it comes to designing institutions capable of dealing with threats from below. In this sense, the security apparatus or system figures prominently as a key element leading to a particular outcome, and the concept of state strength is highly relevant to the discussion. However, I also emphasize the role of identity in defining that strength, problematizing "strength" when it comes to using violence publicly during mass protests. In my theory, state strength is not solely a function of the quality or breadth of the system and its structure; it is also determined by the design choices of its actors, and these are based on ideological principles and social identification.

3.3.2 Patterns of Military Violence Over Time: 1979 in Context

The table below highlights the key protest events in Iran during the period from 1890-1979. The outcomes of these events reinforce my argument about the roles of representativeness in the military and crowd composition when it comes to the
outbreak of violence. I define violence, for the purposes of this table, as the use of coercive protest policing strategies by the military organization that resulted in at least one death. Data for this table was compiled from four main sources: three secondary sources\(^1\) and one primary source\(^2\).

The table identifies five key social/political movements in Iran’s history, beginning with the Qajars (see Poulson 2005; Cronin 1020; Foran 1994). The Qajar dynasty, a royal family of Turkic origin, ruled Iran from 1785 to 1925. Their rise to power involved a bloody effort to consolidate power across the country using the Qajar armies to eliminate rivals and massacre entire populations (Katouzian 2003). The Qajar military changed minimally throughout the Qajar reign, initially composed of a small number of Turkoman bodyguards and Georgian slaves with the informal backing of Turkic tribal forces. These informal ties with the Turkic tribes became more formalized, as the ruling elite pursued a policy of filling the military with fellow members of Turkic origin (Lapidus 2002). As a result, by the 1890s, the Qajar military was highly unrepresentative of the general population, composed predominantly of

\(^1\)Poulson (2005), Kurzman (2004), and Abrahamian (1982)

\(^2\)I searched through archives of the *New York Times* in ProQuest, using search options (“Iran," “Protest," “Demonstrat," “Rally”) that limited the number of articles returned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Social/Political Movement</th>
<th>Date of Rule</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qajar Dynasty</td>
<td>1785-1925</td>
<td>Ruled Iran from 1785 to 1925. Their rise to power involved a bloody effort to consolidate power across the country using the Qajar armies to eliminate rivals and massacre entire populations (Katouzian 2003). The Qajar military changed minimally throughout the Qajar reign, initially composed of a small number of Turkoman bodyguards and Georgian slaves with the informal backing of Turkic tribal forces. These informal ties with the Turkic tribes became more formalized, as the ruling elite pursued a policy of filling the military with fellow members of Turkic origin (Lapidus 2002). As a result, by the 1890s, the Qajar military was highly unrepresentative of the general population, composed predominantly of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Turkic groups and some mercenary units.

The first significant protest movement of the twentieth century in Iran occurred right before the turn of the century. The Tobacco Movement began in the rural parts of the country, and spread into the urban centers. It started when the Qajar shah granted a significant concession to a British company, resulting in losses to merchants and farmers. In this movement, religion played a major role in mobilizing people, marking a historically significant precedent for intervention by the Shi'i establishment in politics. Initially, small protests sprung up regionally; these tended to be composed of narrow-based ethnic groups. After the first year, protests became urbanized, larger and broad: workers, merchants, and the religious elite joined in (Moaddel 1994; Poulson 2005). However, the structure and composition of the Qajar army was such that, despite the broad nature of the protesting groups, violence was legitimized.

Though the Qajar shah was able to crush the movement, the state was left weakened, both morally and economically, by its concessions to the opposition. This led directly to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11, in which the shah was forced to establish a parliament and adopt a democratic constitution in the country for the first
time. For the most part, the protests that accompanied the constitutional movement were quite broad, involving merchants, intellectuals, and urban elite. Nonetheless, and for the same reasons stated above, the state’s response to these protests involved military violence (Bayat 1991).

The next three movements took place under Mohammad Reza Shah and a representative military. The 1940s and 50s saw a massive mobilization of the state and its security engine against its political enemies. Foremost among them was the leftist movement, which began with the communist Tudeh Party and culminated in the National Front, headed by Mohammad Mosaddegh. By the early 1960s, the Shah had virtually obliterated any formal, political opposition to the monarchy (Azimi 2004; Behrooz 2004). Most of this work was done extra-judicially through the state’s intelligence bureau, SAVAK, and was directed against mid- to upper level opposition leaders; however, when necessary, the military was called upon to repress crowds during protests. Generally, the protests were comprised of a narrow group—the politically marginalized, leftist opposition (Poulson 2005). In these cases, the military did not fail to act, and fatalities resulted. However, in line with my theory, when these protests were broad-based, there was no military violence against demonstra-
The Qom protests were a significant lead up to the 1979 Revolution, involving a profoundly respected religious institution of higher learning in the ancient city of Qom (Keddie 2003). The protests marked the beginnings of a critical mass of support around the figure of Ruhollah Khomeini. The protesters at Qom, who were Qom seminarians (ultra-religious elite), were calling for the removal of the Shah and the establishment of a new government that respected Islam. The dissent was a direct reaction against the secular, modernizing policies of the Shah, and the bloody, militarized government response only solidified Khomeini’s support among those with traditional, religious preferences, particularly in the rural areas (Moin 2000).

Finally, the 1979 Revolution, which is the focus of the next section, was successful, in large part, as a result of the breakdown of the state’s military apparatus. By late 1978, as national momentum gathered and crowds became larger and broad, the military organization was unable to control and deter protesters—in some cases, blatantly refusing to fire.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Event/Movement</th>
<th>City or Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Military Violence</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Composition of Crowd</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco Movement</td>
<td></td>
<td>1890 - 1892</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>UNREPRESENTATIVE</td>
<td>Narrow → Broad</td>
<td>Started locally, and then spread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Revolution</td>
<td></td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Regional governor uses troops to forcefully end merchant biases</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Esfahan</td>
<td>1905 - 1906</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Troops fire on crowds</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Merchants, workers, and religious elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Imperial army attempts to disperse large crowd by firing</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Religious elites, merchants, and intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1904, 1950s</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>REPRESENTATIVE</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Leftist movement, which is crushed by Shah; National Front’s Mosaddeq is elected Prime Minister and overthrown in a coup (1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Troops mobilized, but do not fire</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Thousands mobilized; Tudeh party members, merchants, and peasantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan Province</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Massacre of peasant activists and Tudeh party members at demonstration</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Azerbaijani minority group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan Province</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Army crushes unrest, and loots cities in the province</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Azerbaijani minority group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Security forces open fire on crowd</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Tudeh Party members (communist party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Bloody clashes between army and demonstrators</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Leftists (minority political opposition); National Front supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Bloody clashes between Tudeh communist supporters, National Front “thugs,” and military</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Tudeh Party members (communist party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Bloody clashes between army and student demonstrators on university campus. Became known as “Student Day”</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Students supporting National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Unclear army presence, but no military violence</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>National Front supporters and merchants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Armed forces open fire, killing one</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Teachers union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Paratroopers attack demonstrators</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Tehran University students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qom Protests</td>
<td>1962 - 1993</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>REPRESENTATIVE</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Protests established the importance and power of the Shi’a religious opposition, and Khomeini as a major political and religious leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qom</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Army attacks seminarians</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Religious elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qom</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Armed forces enter Qom and kill one seyyed</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Religious elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qom</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Martial law imposed; army enters and fires on crowd, killing unknown number of seminarians</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Religious elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran jirazai</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Protest group confronted by tanks and soldiers in combat gear. Whether tens or hundreds killed remains unclear, but machine guns were fired on crowds.</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Rural villagers march on Tehran, stopped at major bridge to city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Protest groups fired on by army in city</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Smaller groups of Khomeini supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1965 - 1999</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>REPRESENTATIVE</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Military falls apart in face of broad, mass protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Armed forces open fire on students</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Tehran University students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qam</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Army fires on Qam seminarians</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Religious elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tabriz</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Tanks and infantry repress crowds and restore order</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Azerbaijani minority group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>First signs that military is collapsing</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Middle class, workers, and students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Riot police presence; no military violence</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Coalition; 500,000 march</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Security forces shoot and kill dozens of protesters; martial law had just been imposed</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Coalition; hundreds of thousands in Jaleh Square on “Black Friday”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Military raids Tehran University</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Top general informs Shah that there is high probability troops will refuse to fire on crowds</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Coalition (workers, merchants, students, intellectuals, religious elites)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Muharram rallies turn bloody</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Ultra-religious (on a very sacred Shi’a holiday)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tehran</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Ashura march, over 10 million people. Resolution declaring Khomeini is the leader of the revolution is presented</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>Unclear, but very diverse group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.1: Intra-State Variation in Military Behavior: Significant Protest Events in Iran 1890-1979

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3.3.3 The Puzzle in 1979

It is puzzling that, just fifteen years before the start of the Iranian Revolution, the military had been used against demonstrators during a significant protest movement that lasted for more than a year in the religious city of Qom. Why would the military be willing to inflict violence on the protesters in Qom in the early 1960s, but not on protesters in Tehran (and elsewhere) in 1979? Arguably, the military was stronger than ever in 1978-79. Military spending had steadily increased throughout the decade, and the most significant combat operation involving Iranian troops took place between 1972-77 in Oman’s Dhofar province. In 1976, Iranian forces, relying on helicopter support, were deployed in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province to combat a separatist rebellion. By involving the Iranian military in regional battles of geo-strategic importance to the state, the Shah established Iran as the dominant regional military power (Country Studies 2013). With respect to spending, between 1953 and 1970, defense expenditures rose from $67 million to $844 million—a twelvefold increase. Between 1970 and 1977, they rose by almost the same proportion to $9,400 million (Looney 1988). Yet, despite its strength, the military fell apart in the face of
mass protests, unable to deter protesters from toppling the Shah’s regime.

The Crowds

When crowds are broad, composed of more than one subgroup of society, it is less likely that we will observe military violence. By 1979 in Iran, the revolutionary crowds were large, broad, and widespread. However, through 1977 and 1978, challenges to the Shah came from separate segments of the population that had not consolidated yet. This explains the early cases of military violence and brutality—protesting groups tended to be narrowly defined.

Figure 3.2: Groups and Social Space in Iran 1979
For example, the first round of anti-Shah demonstrations between October 1977-January 1978 occurred after the death of Khomeini’s son, Mostafa. Crowds during this period were composed mainly of Islamist students and religious leaders. As a result, this group was clearly demarcated as an "out-group," singularly definable and narrowly based (with low political representation and ideological significance to the Shah’s political and security system). This meant that violence against protesters during this time would be more likely because the group-based factors facilitating it existed. Unsurprisingly, the army was sent to disperse crowds on more than two occasions (at least two times in Qom), resulting in the death of several protesters (Kurzman 2004; Abrahamian 1982). By the summer of 1978, protests had sprouted in each major city (an average of 10,000 participants per protest event). By this time, a small minority of protesters included merchants and workers; however, for the most part, crowds were not broad, and the level of repression remained high (Kurzman 2004).

On September 7th (1978), the Shah declared martial law, and the next day is known as “Black Friday" because of the number of people killed by government security forces. This incident runs counter to my theory because, by this point, the middle
class (merchants, students, and workers) and the more affluent upper-middle bour-
geois in Tehran had joined the opposition (Kurzman 2004). The protesting group in
Tehran on September 8th (“Black Friday”) was very broad, composed of both mem-
bers with low and high symbolic capital (upper-middle class Tehran crowd: lawyers,
doctors, intellectuals. See Kurzman 2004). Nonetheless, the military used force to
 crush crowds, including tanks and helicopters; one European correspondent claimed
that the helicopters left a “carnage of destruction” (J. Gueyras in Abrahamian 1982;
p. 515). According to official estimates, 88 demonstrators were killed in Tehran
(Baghi 2003): 64 in Jaleh Square, and 24 in other parts of the capital.

Though this is problematic for my theory, part of the reason why military violence
occurred in this context was that the Shah had just declared martial law the day
before. Consequently, these protests were seen as a very obvious and direct challenge
to the regime (Regime/Military Insider, Interview 4/7/2014). Furthermore, there

was a belief that if the regime responded harshly this one time, there would be

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3This was based on a phone interview I conducted with a high ranking official in SAVAK at
the time. He now resides in the United States, and has retired from making public statements or
appearances, which is why I believe he wanted me not to identify him. He could credibly speak to this
matter because he had access to the types of resources, information, and personnel that would allow
him to make a valid judgment about the Shah’s perception of threat. His opinion is probably biased
by his elite position in the Shah’s regime—so, we might expect him to have a stake in presenting
the Shah in a favorable manner. However, based on his other opinions about the Shah, which were
not entirely favorable, I would argue that he is able to speak objectively and informatively about
the events that occurred during the Revolution
effective deterrence—i.e., the military would not have to use force again (see Ansari 2007). Thus, in some sense, this incident was an outlier. Moreover, there is evidence that the actual military violence took place in situations that reinforce my argument. Protesting crowds on the day were localized in different areas of Tehran. The worst clashes between the military and the people occurred in southern and eastern Tehran. In southern Tehran, crowds were comprised of working-class residents who engaged in violent, defiant acts against government security forces. In Jaleh Square (eastern Tehran), the protesting group was mainly composed of students who were staging a sit-in demonstration (Abrahamian 1982).

After “Black Friday,” the government’s response to protesters vacillated between the use of force and conciliatory measures. On the one hand, massive nationwide strikes involving blue- and white-collar workers had shut down most of Iran’s industries, affecting oil refineries, copper mines, industrial plants, the National Bank, high schools, customs, government ministries, post offices, and the bazaars. In an effort to end these strikes, the Shah promised higher wages and offered greater benefits. By November, it was clear that a coalition of different interests was represented in the protests that spread through all the major cities in Iran: Tehran, Mashhad, Tabriz,
Qazvin, Shiraz, and Isfahan. It also became obvious by this point that the army rank and file was unwilling to shoot down fellow citizens. Massive demonstrations were mostly peaceful. The military was sent in to crush only certain types of crowds (narrow ones): students at Tehran University on November 4th, ultra-religious fundamentalists between December 2nd and 4th during Muharram, high school students in Mashhad on December 4th (Abrahamian 1982). The events of November 4th are particularly interesting because of the military’s refusal, on the one hand, to shoot down demonstrators in Tehran proper—demonstrations that eventually turned into riots—and their willingness, on the same day, to raid Tehran University, killing dozens of students participating in peaceful demonstrations (Taheri 1983). The main difference between these two cases is the nature of the crowd in the first (broad) versus the second (narrow).

By the middle of December, all willingness on the part of Iran’s representative military to shoot down protesters had dissipated. Hundreds of soldiers had deserted, and other conscripts threatened to follow the orders of religious leaders instead of their commanding officers (Apple 1978). There were reports that troops in Qom had refused to fire on demonstrators, and that five hundred soldiers and twelve tanks in
Tabriz had joined the opposition (Branigin 1978). Marches were attracting millions of people in Isfahan, Hamadan, Mashhad, Arak, Tehran, and Tabriz. The Ashura march on December 11th attracted over two million people (Abrahamian 1982). The fact that there was no military violence signaled the government’s powerlessness in the face of broad protests—the security system was simply not structured to handle the situation. Protesters could not be seen as a threat—dangerous enough to fire on—because they were representative of society.

Figure 3 is a closer look at protest events during 1978. The Shah fled the country on January 16th, 1979, which functionally ended his rule. The table demonstrates intra-state variation within a protest wave: of the eleven events, there are six examples of military violence against protesters. Though this is not a random sample of all the protest events during the Iranian Revolution, it is representative of the most significant ones, and all (but one, “Black Friday”) fit the theory. There are two particular examples from this table that highlight the argument about the effect of protest group composition. I mentioned the events of November 4th earlier; how-

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4 Data for this was from three major sources, used in conjunction with each other: two secondary sources—Kurzman (2004) and Abrahamian (1982)—and one primary source, the New York Times. I searched for “Iran” during the period from 1/1/1978-12/31/1978, and was able to screen out irrelevant stories using the subject search option.
ever, in the same vein, on December 2nd, the military failed to act against a broad
protesting group in Tehran’s Shahyad Square, but did fire on religious students out-
side a mosque. Obviously, there may have been differences that might have affected
the decision to use violence; however, the most glaring distinction between the two
events on the same day is the composition of the crowds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest Event</th>
<th>Crowd Composition: Groups</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Military Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/9/78</td>
<td>Qom Seminarians</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/18/78</td>
<td>Azeris</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/20/78</td>
<td>Middle Class, workers, students</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/4/78</td>
<td>Coalition (unclear)</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/8/78</td>
<td>Coalition—women, students, merchants,</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>middle class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/78</td>
<td>Khomeini supporters</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/4/78</td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/4/78</td>
<td>Political activists, workers, women</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2/78</td>
<td>Coalition (unclear)</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/2/78</td>
<td>Religious students</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/78</td>
<td>Coalition (unclear)</td>
<td>Broad</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.3: A Closer Look at 1979 and the Significant Protest Events

The army rank and file had been trained to defend the country against foreign
eenemies and protect the state against separatists who sought to tear Iran apart. At
the same time, the ideological component of their training emphasized the greatness
of Persian culture and the unity necessary to achieve a “great civilization." Sectarian
interests were considered evil—the purpose of the state and its security system was
to fortify an inclusive national identity. Given this ideology, which was rigorously disseminated through the military, it was impossible for the military organization to look out at the large, broad crowds, and, in some way, justify killing people who were very much representative of the Iranian national community.

The Representativeness of the Military Organization

By all accounts, the Iranian military organization was compositionally representative of the various groups in society by 1979 (Zabih 1988). Reza Shah inherited an unrepresentative military from the Qajar Shah in 1926, and embarked on a mission to transform it into a professional force. One of the first controversial policies he enacted was universal conscription, which set off peasant protests throughout the country during the 30s and 40s (Cronin 1997). Universal conscription was a critical element in the Shah’s modernization and nationalization strategies, which began with consolidating power within Iranian territory. To this end, the military was the main engine of assimilation, bringing together Iran’s diverse groups under a common umbrella of national unity. There was no doubt that this process was painful; most groups resisted the imposition of a national identity via conscription in the military.
However, by the mid 1960s, the composition of the Iranian military mirrored that of society’s because conscripts were drawn representatively from throughout the country (Keddie 2003; Zabih 1988; Ward 2009; Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).

Measuring only the composition of the military organization does not give a complete sense of representativeness (Petersen and Staniland 2008). Some states in the Middle East have militaries that are compositionally representative or, at the least, not egregious in this respect; however, scholars would argue that these militaries are still unrepresentative. For example, Syria has a universal conscription policy, yet its military is hardly representative of the general population (Holliday 2013). Thus, assessing the structure of a military organization is also critical to determining representativeness. Military structure encompasses both the organization and ordering of a state’s armed forces as well as the ideological outlook that legitimizes this organization.

The military under the Shah was structurally balanced. No units within the army were favored either financially or politically because of their composition, and none were specialized in terms of group interest. The structure of Iran’s army at the time was functional—the Shah chose to focus on modernizing the military. To
this end, the armed forces were increasingly specialized at the level of their military branches: the navy, army, and air force were developed independently as functional units (Ward 2009; Cordesman 2005). The Shah did funnel more funding into the air force, enhancing capabilities (for example, supplementing F-5s with bigger F-4s) there; however, the differentiation and consequent (quasi-)asymmetric distribution of resources reflected strategic, functional concerns not group-based ones (Zabih 1988).

The decision to focus on the air force was driven by the Shah’s geo-strategic vision: he wished to make Iranian territory impenetrable to Soviet forces (Zabih 1988).

Thus, unlike other militaries in the region that drew uniformly from the population but were still unrepresentative, the Iranian military under the Shah was truly representative, both compositionally and structurally. Its organization did not reflect group identities or interests. This representativeness was for two reasons. Firstly, as a driver of state socialization, the military was designed to promote and diffuse the Iranian national identity. As a result, group loyalties were discouraged and actively destroyed. Secondly, the Shah’s ideological beliefs—the principle basis of his claim to power—stressed modernization as the only way Iran could re-achieve greatness. To this end, the Shah focused on modernizing the military, which was one of the most
important elements leading to the end goal (for the Shah, military superiority in
the region was the most significant component of “greatness.” See Lenczowski 1978).
Modernization eventually became synonymous with westernization, especially in the
military realm (Ward 2009). Western influence on the structure of the military in
Iran can be seen in three ways.

First, the Iranian military organization was basically designed along American
lines (Cordesman 2005). In terms of structure, both organizations were strikingly
similar, and this was purposeful. Iran was critical to America’s national security
policy in the region, particularly as an ally against Soviet interests in the north
(Halliday 2005). As a result, the United States played a huge role in enhancing the
capability of Iran’s armed forces: the Americanization of Iran’s military resulted in an
organization that depended on US technical assistance because it grew to look more
and more like the American military. Furthermore, the massive inflow of US arms and
the great shortage of skilled personnel in the Iranian economy meant that there was
high demand for US military advisers and trainers. By 1979, there were approximately
50,000 American personnel and their families involved in defense-related contracts
living in Iran (Zabih 1988).
Second, since Iran’s education institutions were not advanced or large enough to train sufficiently large numbers of Iranians in a short period of time, many students were sent abroad to train at military academies in the West, notably the United States (Cottrell 1978). This was a risk even the Shah acknowledged; exposure to Western democracies might lead to subversive actions once these men returned home (Chegnizadehn 1997). However, there were also benefits with regard to skills gained and socialization. These men came back with beliefs that reflected a Western-oriented ideology concerning the role of the military in politics. The internalization of such norms—namely, that a fully professionalized military is subservient to the demands of the state—pleased the Shah who was deeply concerned about the threat of military coups (Zabih 1988). More importantly, these effects (as well as the ones identified earlier on direct US assistance/military ties to Iran) enhance the third way in which Western influence was evident in the structure of the military under the Shah: Iran’s military was ideologically motivated by and focused on external threat.

The Iranian military under the Shah was not designed or organized as a provider of internal security and regime stability. The reason for this was no doubt connected to beliefs about what a modern, professionalized military was “supposed” to do: pro-
tect the state against foreign threat (see Shah’s speech in 1976 on Now Rouz)—for
the Shah, this was a Western model he wanted Iran to copy (Sazegara, Interview
3/11/2014[^5]). The focus on external threats meant that Iran was predominantly con-
cerned with projecting the state’s military power outward. One justification for the
massive build up of the Iranian military was the protection of the Persian Gulf in
view of the rising significance of oil exports and the threat of instability coming from
countries like Iraq. Moreover, Soviet ambitions in the north also became the source
of further concern as the Shah’s perception of Iran’s strategic position shifted to in-
clude Iran among the great players in the Cold War. This shift was encouraged by
the United States: a Congressional study noted that, “The military threats to Iran’s
security seem to be sufficiently real and diverse to enable the Shah to justify major
investments in military forces” (in Hickman 1982). As a result of this outward focus,
Iran’s military was simply unprepared to deal with internal security disturbances.

The weapons, training, strategy, and manpower for crowd control were unavailable,

[^5]: This was a phone interview I conducted with a former high-ranking member of the Islamic Regime, Mohsen Sazegara. He is a visiting fellow at the George W. Bush Institute in Dallas. He used to be deputy prime minister under the Mir-Hossein Mousavi government between 1981-1989 in Iran. He can speak credibly about the Revolution, SAVAK, and Khomeini because he was part of Khomeini’s inner circle prior to the ousting of the Shah in 1979. Furthermore, he was involved in protests as a student during the early part of the Revolution. His opinion might be biased by his experience with the regime after he clashed with the second Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. His reformist policies landed him in the notorious Evin Prison for a period of time before he was able to escape the country in 2003.
“Police clubs, twenty-five thousand canisters of tear gas, and other riot equipment were finally purchased from the United States in November [1978], but the delivery came too late to help" (Ward 2009; p.215).

In the lead up to the final collapse, advisors recommended that Khomeini avoid calling for a “jihad of protesters." As a grand ayatollah, this was within his purview—he could call upon the people to martyr themselves in the name of protecting what was divine. However, he was opposed to the bloodshed for multiple reasons—the most obvious being the loss of lives. However, his advisors also convinced him that it was unnecessary for more instrumental reasons. It turned out they were very right. Their belief was precisely that the military, which ended up being the only security force actor actually capable of repressing crowds, would fall apart because of its representativeness (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). In a significant speech on the eve of the revolution, Khomeini advised his millions of followers not to be afraid of the military. He told them to “notice that the soldiers of the army are from the nation" (Khomeini 1979). He asked that protesters invite soldiers to join them. The protesters seemed to pick up on that message very quickly. Soon, pictures of protesters handing flowers to soldiers (and soldiers accepting, placing the flowers in the barrels
of their guns) flooded the media, internationally and domestically (see Gheytanchi 2009; Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014; NYT 1/15/1979). Signs that addressed the soldiers as brothers became commonplace (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).

Eventually, there was a rift within the military. There was a common opinion among soldiers within all the branches of the Armed Forces that, if ordered, they wouldn’t obey, “Amongst us [mid-level officers], we talked to each other. If the chief commander orders us to go with a helicopter and kill people on the streets, then we promised we wouldn’t do it. We don’t kill our brothers and sisters” (Air Force pilot, Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). Because the military did not have protest policing gear—the type of defense equipment that does not kill—it was very clear that such an order would lead to many fatalities (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). In the end, the real collapse did start within the military organization. On the eve of February 1979, the technical side of the military within the Air Force turned on other members within a garrison located east of Tehran. Civilian protesters surrounded the base in order to protect these men from the guards of the Shah (a very small unit responsible for protecting the monarchy) who were sent to disarm the soldiers responsible for the crisis. By the time they got there, the base was fully under the control of the
protesters. It all happened so quickly because “the sentiment was shared by many” (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).

SAVAK

Informal and/or formal paramilitary institutions are better suited to carry out acts of asymmetric violence against groups because they tend to be very cohesive and more ideological (White 2007; Mueller 2000; Valentino 2004). Paramilitary organizations, to the extent that they are the most unrepresentative entities within the armed forces, also have characteristics—a highly ideological setting and an informal culture—that enhance their cohesiveness in particularly pernicious ways, leading to a greater capacity for mass violence (in the most perverse form—including sexual violence). The security apparatus in Iran under the Shah lacked a formal and/or informal paramilitary or coercive institution capable of crushing mass internal unrest. This was yet another way in which the security system was not designed or structured inwardly—the Shah was focused on projecting might outward.

The Shah’s strategy for maintaining power within the country essentially rested on a theory of deterrence, with minimal use of the military when necessary. SAVAK—
the Shah’s secret police—was a very effective intelligency agency, which navigated the world of information, honing in on individuals capable of politically organizing mass protests (Kurzman 2004). This method deterred and even anticipated unrest before it could actually materialize. For example, the Shah’s political opponents (represented by the National Front) were functionally destroyed by the end of the 1950s—SAVAK identified and either killed or imprisoned each important member of the organization at the individual level, thereby neutralizing the threat of mass domestic unrest (Siavoshi 1990). The few instances of mass political protest that did occur in the 1950s tended to be defined by narrow, leftist crowds; in these situations, the military was able to legitimize violence against the protesters, and did fire on crowds (Saze-gara, Interview 3/11/2014). What the security apparatus was not prepared for and did not anticipate was the bottom-up nature of the 1979 movement. This was evident in the lack of the system’s readiness to manage the crowds.

It is perhaps a useful exercise to examine the counterfactual in this case: what would have happened had there been a formal and/or informal paramilitary institution intended to deal specifically with internal unrest?  

6 The two possible candidates for a potential paramilitary institution were the Government Gendarmerie and the Persian Cossack Division. The Gendarmerie was established by the Second Majles in 1912 as an internal military force intended to impose order, collect taxes, and safeguard internal
counterfactual precisely because the justification for the existence of such an institution would not be possible in the state system under the Shah. However, we can imagine the outcome in any case. Because the set of beliefs justifying the power structure of the state emphasized unity over division and the salient identity within this system was inclusive, the basic function of such a force would be thwarted by its composition. In such a situation, despite dynamics that might encourage violent actions against the out-group, a basic distinction between in-group versus out-group would still need to be made. In the Shah’s system, such a distinction was ideologically problematic: the members of a hypothetical paramilitary institution would be representative of society.

SAVAK’s purpose and culture grew out of its experience with urban guerrilla warfare during the 1960s and 1970s. As Mohsen Sazegara, an Iranian pro-democracy activist who helped create the IRGC (and then fled the country because he was imprisoned for his reformist ideas), told me in an interview, “SAVAK destroyed both of the main urban guerrilla groups [Fedayan-e Khalq and the Mojahedin-e Khalq] by 1978, trade. The Persian Cossack Division emerged under the Qajar Shah in 1878 after he visited Russia and signed a contract for the dispatch of Cossack officers and non-commissioned officers to form a regiment in Iran to serve as a royal guard. Reza Shah eventually merged both units into the Iranian National Army, and created a police force to deal with domestic crimes (though domestic policing institutions were not equipped or trained to respond to mass protests. Cronin 1997).
so they thought there was no other opposition" (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).

Thus, SAVAK was more professionalized and institutionalized than its counterpart in Iran today, the Basij. In fact, it is perhaps fairer to compare SAVAK to the IRGC—there was no organization like the Basij in Iran under the Shah. Though SAVAK did manage internal security, it was weaponized and institutionalized like a conventional army because the threat with which it was concerned possessed weapons and could be clearly distinguished from a civilian (i.e., an urban guerrilla soldier). In short, SAVAK’s function was not managing mass protest; there was no division within SAVAK that had been trained or equipped with the kinds of weapons, tactics, and strategies that could suppress large crowds (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).

Moreover, SAVAK was small; it only had approximately 5000 members (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014; Regime/Military Insider, Interview 4/7/2014) compared to the one million members of the Basij (see Aryan 2008, though estimates are rough because intelligence is limited). SAVAK was also representative (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014); it was not composed in a way that reinforced any of the major divisions in Iranian society, particularly the most salient one: the urban/rural divide. SAVAK members were recruited from the (representative) army based on merit and loyalty.

Second, SAVAK could hardly be described as highly ideological. SAVAK was a centralized state institution concerned with intelligence gathering, for the most part. In this sense, it was concerned with maintaining the power of the regime against threat, but this was defined without a strict set of beliefs relating to the legitimacy of the throne. The organization had six divisions—divisions one, two, four, and five were focused on espionage, counter-intelligence, technical support (for example, bugging), and monitoring SAVAK members, respectively. The sixth division was in charge of administration and financial affairs. It was the third division that handled internal security; for the most part, this was a weaponized unit that fought the urban guerrilla groups (Regime/Military Insider, Interview 4/7/2014). However, it was also responsible for targeting individuals and elite groups and arresting/torturing political activists (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). According to Sazegara, SAVAK suffered, “a difficulty of understanding....[SAVAK] lacked good analysts to understand the trends in society” (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014). With respect to the events

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7For example, on the birthday of Mossadeq in the summer of 1978, SAVAK organized a band of members dressed like rural folk to attack a high level group of political activists who were travelling to a village in Karaj where Mossadeq was born. This was an attempt to protest the Shah’s dictatorship, since Mossadeq was considered a symbol of democracy; however, the SAVAK attack left many high profile activists battered (Sazegara, Interview 3/11/2014).
leading up to the 1979 Revolution, SAVAK lacked the structural capacity and ideological fervor needed for it to play a major role in stopping the tide of dissent that eventually swept the nation. In short, SAVAK was not unrepresentative in a way that exploited a major divide in society. Furthermore, because it was not really a paramilitary institution, the conditions that would facilitate perverse violence—namely, an informal culture with a lower degree of professionalization and a highly ideological outlook—did not exist.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter addresses the events of 1979 in Iran from a different perspective. Though many have studied this revolution, they have missed the relevance of group-based factors to the breakdown of the state. Common explanations for the uprising’s success include economic factors (Kurzman 2004; Keddie 2003), international factors (Del Gludice 2008), and domestic political ones (Abrahamian 1982). Though I do not discount any of these ideas—in fact, I think they are all relevant—none study the revolution within a system of ideas, power, and relationships among agents of the state and the people. My work considers the structure of the security apparatus not
in isolation but within the ideological framework through which power is legitimized for the state and its people. I find that the Shah’s particular set of beliefs upon which his power was legitimized led to a security apparatus devoid of the kinds of factors that would facilitate and justify violence against protesters.

The next chapter discusses the Green Revolution in 2009, making the case that it is possible to compare 2009 to 1979. Many relevant factors are consistent across both cases: economic, domestic, and international ones. However, the outcomes were very different. The Green Revolution started in the summer of 2009; by February 2010, it had run its course, and not much had changed politically for Iran. In fact, the government clamped down harder. In the next chapter, I look at the political and security system in Iran post-1979, which created a different set of factors that was far more conducive to violence.
4 | The Green Revolution: Representativeness in the Iranian Armed Forces and Violence against Protesters in 2009

4.1 Introduction

“You define yourself by your enemies, and those were the superpowers back then. ... But now [the Basij] are fighting young people who put gel in their hair. That’s the enemy. So it’s demeaning, and not at all elevating for their self-image." - Anonymous (in Peterson 2003)

The 2009 Iranian election protests began on the night of June 12, following the announcement that incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had won nearly sixty percent of the electorate. Protesters rallied in the streets, calling on the Supreme Leader to issue a recount. There were irregularities in several districts, in which
Ahmadinejad had won 100% of the vote. What followed was the biggest and most threatening display of civil dissatisfaction in Iran since the 1979 Revolution, which led to the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. There was no question why the regime felt threatened. Iran’s politics since the 18th century has centered on social movements in a way that is unique in the region. There has always been a sense in Iranian politics that change comes forcefully from below (Tobacco Protests 1890-92; The Constitutional Revolution 1905-05; Iranian Revolution 1978-79), and the Islamic Regime felt this threat—the possibility of change—more than they ever had before during this time.

The wave of protest events carried on for approximately seven months, albeit discontinuously. There were peaks of activity that occurred in September (Quds Day), November (religious holidays), and December (Student’s Day). By the end of June 2009, however, it became clear that the protests were about more than just a recount. Protesters viewed their activities as contributing to a larger social movement, which was about changing politics in Iran at a fundamental level. For the first time in the history of the Islamic Regime, people chanted, “Death to the Supreme Leader.” In one broad vocal stroke, these people signaled to the government that they were no
longer afraid to voice publicly their disillusionment with the ideological underpinnings of the system. What was so threatening about this particular chant? The Supreme Leader was supposed to be infallible. The legitimacy of Iran’s entire political system rested on the belief that this man represented God’s will on earth.

This chapter works in tandem with the previous chapter on the 1979 Revolution. In both cases, the Iranian state (under the Shah in 1979 and the Islamic Republic in 2009) perceived an equal level of existential threat from below. In the 1979 case, the regime crumbled in the face of broad protests. In this case, despite broad crowds, the Islamic Regime was able to effectively suppress the movement by February 2010. Many factors—like the most important economic and social ones (an ailing economy and high levels of social/political dissatisfaction)—are constant across the two cases, but there is one clear difference, which is, arguably, the most critical element of movement success (see Katz 2004): the state’s response. Iran in 1979 was, by most measures, a strong state with strong security institutions. However, as I argued in the previous chapter, Iran’s security system was designed in a way that emphasized unity and nationalism. There was no informal or formal security body within this system that was structured unrepresentatively—i.e., took advantage of a major social
cleavage. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic’s security institutions are designed along a major fault line: the urban/rural divide. This divide in Iranian society is fundamental, long-standing, and bolstered by the religious ideology legitimizing the entire political and security system—the rural population tends to be more religious and traditional.

The 2009 Iran case is relevant to my theory because it presents a hard case for my thesis. Iran’s regular military units are representative, and the election protests that began in June 2009 were largely broad-based with support from different social groups. However, the government was still able to violently clamp down on protesters. Nonetheless, upon closer inspection, this case provides an interesting context within which to test other implications of my theory. First, the 2009 case problematizes my claims by highlighting the role of an intervening variable: the state. If the argument about the effectiveness of unrepresentatively structured security institutions is true, then states may anticipate problems, and design bodies intended to deal with specific types of opposition groups (i.e., broad-based) should the need arise. Thus, state agency in the design of a security system can affect the ultimate outcome.

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Perhaps these states were predisposed (for other, unobserved reasons) to use coercive methods of protest policing.
However, it is still possible to test mechanisms because state agency in this regard leads to the creation of multiple agents, which can vary along the dimension of representativeness. This is true in the 2009 Iran case; there are three different security actors (Basij, Revolutionary Guard, Military), and each agent has a different level of representativeness.

The main argument of this chapter exploits the variation across Iran’s three different security actors to show that representativeness affects the state’s decisions when it comes to choosing which agent to send in to control crowds on any particular day. The first section outlines the theory and hypotheses as they pertain to Iran in 2009. As a result of dynamics particular to the Basij—both in terms of its unrepresentativeness and paramilitary features—I expect a positive correlation between Basij violence and broad-based protesting groups. Otherwise put, the state is more likely to send in Basij forces when the opposition is broad. The opposite is true for the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), which is relatively more representative. I expect a negative correlation between IRGC violence and broad-based protesting groups—the IRGC is more likely to be sent in to handle narrowly composed protest events. The military is the most representative body in the state’s security apparatus. As a result, I expect
there to be a low likelihood of violence; if any does occur, it should only be in the
context of narrow-based protesting groups.

Section 2 describes the data collection process and methods, presenting descriptive
statistics for many of the key variables. In this section, I highlight the main contribu-
tion of my work, which is to analyze variation in the state’s response to protests at the
micro-level. In this way, I am able to pick up variation that occurs within a country
during a short period of time, and hold constant other relevant political and social
factors. The focus on differences in outcome at such a fine grained level allows me to
make a case for the importance of group-based factors when it comes to explaining
violence—in short, that violence is group-based and relational. Section 3 presents my
main findings, which prove my hypotheses, albeit partially. I have limited support
for the first hypothesis on the likelihood of Basij violence against protesters. Finally,
I discuss mechanisms in the fourth section by drawing on interviews and secondary
literature to show that the perceptions of individuals within the Basij, IRGC, and
military varied.
4.2 Basij, Revolutionary Guard, and Military; Three Actors, Three Predictions

My theory about military violence draws on social psychology literature to make an argument about the actions of the military when it comes to repressing protest movements. However, for this particular chapter on Iran, the measurable outcome is not simply military violence per se; my argument extends to paramilitary groups as well: the Basij. The Basij is a paramilitary volunteer militia established in 1979 by order of the Islamic Revolution’s leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The force consists of young Iranians who have volunteered, often in exchange for official benefits. The function of the Basij is to maintain internal security—they are charged with the task of protecting the ideals of the Revolution from domestic political and social threat. Structurally, the Basij is quasi-decentralized, and forms the fifth branch of the Revolutionary Guard. As a result, it operates like a network of small groups with a hierarchical leadership structure (Alfoneh 2008).

Given its ideological basis, it is not surprising the Basij is selective in its recruiting. The Basij uses informal and formal means to attract voluntary recruits to fill its ranks.
One of the main incentives for joining the Basij is material motivation (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). The government chooses to focus on rural areas for recruitment because people in these areas are poor and tend to be more religious than those in Iran’s urban centers (Golkar 2011). Thus, the regime’s security apparatus exploits a major historical cleavage in Iranian society in order to fill the ranks of the organization. The Basij has roots in Iran’s countryside from both a structural and economic perspective. The Construction Basij Organization (CBO) is one of the main economic arms of the organization. Its purpose is to build popular rural support for the Basij and the government both with respect to recruitment and political support. Under the Hejrat Plan of the CBO, Basijis in the provinces are sent to nearby villages to help with small projects such as building mosques, harvesting,

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2These are pseudonyms to protect the identity of two former members of the Basij. Both lived in Tehran during the time that the election protests broke out in 2009. I met them through the Iranian refugee community, which is based in the L.A. area. We were connected to this community through my aunt, who was also forced to flee Iran in 2010 for political reasons. My family has also been working with UNHCR in Ankara on some cases for friends, so both interviewees in this chapter occurred as a direct result of that and my aunt’s situation. I have guaranteed their anonymity for obvious reasons relating to their personal security, but also because their involvement in the Basij is not public knowledge to most people even in that community. “Ali” was a low ranking active member of the Basij in Tehran, whereas “Mohsen” claimed to be a higher-ranking active member (also in Tehran). Mohsen was originally from a small village in Golestan province, so he was able to speak to the dynamics of the Basij in the countryside as well. Ali and Mohsen did not know each other in Iran, but met in Ankara in 2010. Obviously, these two interviews may not be representative because I was only able to speak to two people, and these former members are biased in their opinions because they left Iran for political reasons. However, anecdotally, they are able to reinforce beliefs about the IRGC and the Basij that are held by scholars who study current events in Iran (for example, Ali Alfoneh). This leads me to think that, in general, they are valid sources.
renovating schools, and planting trees (Basij Quarterly 1994). The Basij Cooperative Foundation, established in 1992 to provide welfare support to Basijis, is the other economic arm of the organization. Through the BCF, the Basij has virtual control over Iran’s agro-industry (Golkar 2011; Basij Quarterly 1994; Sobeh-e Sadegh Weekly 3/15/2004), which bolsters its strong presence in the countryside. Furthermore, the Basij Housing Institution hands out free or exceedingly cheap land to Basijis in rural areas for residential and commercial purposes (Golkar 2011).

Structurally, the Basij’s primary apparatus for recruitment is through the various Basij branches. As of 2011, there are seventeen different Basij suborganizations and 40,000 Basij bases (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). As a point of comparison, the IRGC is much more centralized with only 31 command bases; as I will discuss below, this means it has a mixed recruitment strategy. The large number of bases allows the Basij to focus on recruiting members from rural areas throughout the country (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013; Sepah News 12/25/2009). Motivations for membership are financial, ideological, and educational (Basijis are given preferred enrollment at universities<sup>3</sup>); however, by far, the most important motivation for poor people

<sup>3</sup>Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013
living in rural areas is a combination of economic and ideological ones (Golkar 2011).

The Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is a branch of Iran’s military distinct from Iran’s main military units. It was founded after the Iranian Revolution with the purpose of protecting the country’s Islamic system (Payam-e Enqelab 7/25/1981). Some consider the IRGC to be a military within a military (or a parallel military institution), since part of the impetus for its creation was to create a force that would act as a buffer against the Army. The IRGC is a combined arms force meaning it includes ground, aerospace, and naval forces. Its expanded social, political, and economic role under
Figure 4.2: An image from a Basij militia parade. Credit to Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA)
President Ahmadinejad between 2005-2013 has led many analysts to argue that this branch of the Armed Forces is the most critical and influential actor in Iran’s security apparatus (Safshekan and Sabet 2010; Samuel 2012).

In 2007, the IRGC underwent a massive reorganization. First, it was restructured to become less centralized and more focused on the provinces (Mardomsalari 7/27/2008). Second, the Basij was merged into the IRGC as a specialized, distinct unit. The reason for this readjustment, according to the IRGC leadership, was to promote harmony; since the Basij and the IRGC share the same organizational goals, merging the two makes sense because the regime can increase efficiency (Hamshari 9/25/2007). In fact, since 2007, the IRGC’s structure has borrowed heavily from the Basij’s, particularly to the extent that compositional strategies have exploited regional differences. In 2008, Ali Jafari, the seventh Commander in Chief of the IRGC, introduced the “Mosaic Doctrine,” which altered the command structure of the organization, though it still remains a centralized entity. The doctrine divided the IRGC into thirty one commands—one for each province, and two for Tehran (Alfoneh 2013). The new provincial basis of IRGC units is meant to focus recruitment at the local level, so that IRGC members can be recruited more easily from the ranks of the

Nonetheless, there are compositional differences between the IRGC and the Basij. The Basij draws predominantly from the rural population, whereas the Revolutionary Guard also selects from the regular army units. According to a former Basiji, though the IRGC is becoming increasingly more like the Basij in its recruitment strategy, its more conventional role as a deterrent force against external threat in the region means that it still draws on the resources and personnel of Iran’s main military units, which are representative (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). Unlike the Basij, the IRGC has substantial influence over Iran’s military doctrine, and how the state defines its regional security and national interests (Wehrey et al. 2009). Thus, the IRGC is a mix, in terms of function and composition—it selects from members of the regular armed forces and the Basij (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013;

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4The IRGC selects from conscripts in the regular armed forces based on merit and ideological fervor (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Alfoneh 2011). As a result of superior pay and brighter career prospects in the IRGC compared to the Army, the Army tends to get the “second-best recruits”
Alfoneh 2013). The precise ratio is unclear, so it is difficult to say what IRGC representativeness is like in exact terms. However, given the IRGC’s mixed recruitment strategy and restructuring, it is fair to say that its composition falls somewhere in the middle between the representative Army and the unrepresentative Basij.

Figure 4.3: IRGC sergeants armed with KLS (AKM) assault rifles. Credit to Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA)

The Iranian Army (or the regular military) has been called the Middle East’s most powerful military (not including Israel’s Defense Forces). It is strictly an outwardly
oriented military in the sense that the main focus is on defense against external threat (Cordesman 2010). Iran has mandatory military service for men (or universal conscription), which starts at the age of 18. Consequently, Iran’s regular military is representative of society (Schahgaldian 1987; Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Through an analysis of each actor’s recruitment strategy and organizational structure, I find that Iran’s three security force actors within the Armed Forces vary in their representativeness: the Army is the most representative entity, followed by the IRGC, and then the Basij, which is highly unrepresentative. Within the Iranian context, representativeness is defined along a cultural cleavage: the urban/rural divide. This cultural divide is the most significant one in Iranian society for historical, economic, political, and religious reasons. Chapter three discusses these reasons in great depth; however, for the purposes of this chapter, it is important to note that religiosity shifts at this dividing line in Iran—the rural population is significantly more Islamic than the secular urbanites are.

To explain and predict variation in the state’s response to the election protests in 2009, it is necessary to understand the group-based factors that legitimize violence.\footnote{I also consider evidence from interviews and the secondary literature.}
Figure 4.4: Representativeness and Security Force Actors

and, therefore, enhance the likelihood that it will occur. First, the plots below show the patterns of violence from an actor-based perspective. In the first figure, we can see that between 2009-2012, the Basij and Revolutionary Guard were employed roughly the same number of times by the state: the Basij used violence against protesters in 32 protest events, and the Revolutionary Guard did so in 34. The military, unlike in 1979, was not the principle player; it mobilized only 8 times between 2009-2012, and did not inflict violence in any of these cases. The second figure below represents the use of security force actors over time. This plot shows clearly the variation between 2009-2012 with peaks of activity during the period from June 2009 to March 2010.
The state tended to rely more on Basij forces in the beginning, though this switched in the summer of 2010; from this point on, the state favored Revolutionary Guard forces. This plot is evidence that the government’s strong show of force in the ten month period between June 2009-March 2010 did deter future protest waves—the frequency of protest events decreased after March 2010.

Figure 4.5: State’s Use of Security Force Actor, 2009-2012
A closer look at protests during the critical period between June 2009-March 2010 further delineates the variation in the state's use of force (see Figure 7). Not only does the frequency with which the state responds with violence toward protesters change, so does the state’s choice of whom to send in; though the Basij is favored for the most part, there are times during which the Revolutionary Guard is used just as much, if not more: August 2009, November 2009, January-March 2010. This variation is again supported in Figure 8. The second and third bars, which also represent this critical period, show the shift in the government’s preferences with regard to its choice of
security actor. The Basij is favored in the aggregate (i.e., used more in total during this ten month period), but the Revolutionary Guard comprises a greater relative proportion in the latter half. Interestingly, protests during the latter half of this ten month period tended to be less broad on average—there were more protests that were narrowly defined. As I will discuss in depth later, this fits well with the broader pattern that is evident in the dataset; the regime prefers to call on the Basij when crowds are broad.

![A Deeper Look: Iranian Protests and Security Actors Jun09-Mar10](image)

**Figure 4.7: Variation Over Time, June 2009-March 2010**

After an examination of the three relevant security actors and the nature of the variation, it is possible to generate hypotheses based on the theory outlined in Chapter 162.
Figure 4.8: Variation Over Time, All Protests 2009-2012

1. The dependent variable for this case study is the use of violence against protesters between 2009-2012, with a special focus on the election protests (or the Green Movement) during June 2009-February 2010. The contribution of this work, however, is to distinguish among security actors when it comes to the use of force. Thus, I am interested in the use of force by three agents: the Basij, the IRGC, and the regular military. All three actors are part of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The key independent variable is the composition of the protesting group at the level of the protest event. I categorize each protest event as “narrow" or “broad," depending on the groups involved. A narrow protest group is one that falls into one box.
of the 2X2 figure below. A broad protest group is comprised of at least two groups that fall into at least two of the boxes. Though there are many more groups that could be added to the figure, this particular set of groups was determined inductively from the data. If a particular social group was mentioned in the news sources, then I included it as a relevant group.

Some groups, like “women,” were put into more than one box. This is because “women” as a group cover the entire economic distribution (although an argument can be made that they only belong in one box since property rights favor men and women earn less on average); however, this group has very little symbolic capital. Women in Iran do not have the same standing as men in Iranian courts, and they certainly are not a salient identity in the set of beliefs justifying the allocation of power in the system (Afshar 1997). On the other hand, Iran’s rural population is the backbone of the regime’s political support and ideological foundation. It is because of rural dissatisfaction with the Shah that many argue the revolution in 1979 was successful. It is not surprising, then, that the government’s political legitimacy has been built in the countryside, where the source of the clergy’s power rests (Alfoneh 2007). Similarly, Iran’s merchant class is also significant to the regime because much
of the country’s business affairs is dominated by religious and security actors (in some cases, as a form of patronage). For example, the Revolutionary Guard is widely considered to be one of Iran’s most influential economic players (Bruno et al. 2013).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Capital</th>
<th>Symbolic Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women, Teachers, Nurses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural Population, Workers, &quot;Poor&quot; Villagers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Urban Youth, Students, Women, Middle Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Merchant Lower-Middle Class (&quot;Bazaaris&quot;)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.9: Groups in Social Space, Iran 2009

There are four hypotheses that emerge when the factors—representativeness of the Armed Forces, composition of the protesting group, and the existence of a paramilitary force—highlighted by the theoretical framework are considered.
There should be no significant difference with respect to the nature of the state’s response between “narrow” and “broad” protests

Although narrowly defined protesting groups are virtually always violently repressed and broadly defined ones are not, there should be no observable difference in the state’s response in this case. This is because the state has options in its choice of security service provider. It can choose to send in the “right” kind of security actor given the composition of the protest event; in order not to risk the chance of disobedience in the face of broad protests, the “right” kind of security force is one that is unrepresentative.

The Basij is more likely to be used by the government when the protesting group is broadly defined

The Basij is a well-financed, cohesive paramilitary unit within the Iranian security apparatus. To the extent that the Basij is the most unrepresentative entity within the Iranian armed forces, and given its highly ideological setting and informal culture (characteristics representative of most paramilitary or militia-like units), we would expect the highest likelihood of violence (and perverse violence) when the Basij is
involved as an actor in a protest event. The highly ideological nature and informal culture (within a strict hierarchical framework) of the Basij produce the conditions that allow for its cohesiveness to lead to particularly perverse forms of violence against threats to the state. These pathways are discussed in depth later, but they include factors like a heightened sense of anonymity, stereotyping, and responsibility diffusion/moral disengagement. Since broadly defined protests present the regime with the most difficulty given the more representative nature of the threat, the regime prefers to send in the Basij to do the dirty work in these cases because of the higher guarantee that orders will be followed.

The Revolutionary Guard is more likely to be used by the government when the protesting group is narrowly defined.

The Army is least likely to be used by the government; and, if it is, it will only be sent in to manage narrow protest groups.

The final two hypotheses describe the roles of the IRGC and the regular military in the context of protest policing. Even though Iran’s military is unrepresentatively structured, the Army (or Artesh) is representative in its composition because of uni-
versal conscription; however, the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij (which falls under the command of the IRGC) are units within the military that are favored by the government. Thus, because these units are formal structures within the military organization that are better financed, politically preferred, and better equipped, the military as a whole is unrepresentative, even if the Army is not. Moreover, the IRGC and Basij are unrepresentative compositionally—though this is more the case for the Basij, which is the most highly unrepresentative. As a result, assuming scarce resources, the government will prefer to use Basij forces when the protest group is broad to maximize the chance of success, but will opt to use the Revolutionary Guard when the protest group is narrow in order not to overwork or strain the Basij. I expect that the regular military (or Army) will be the least utilized security actor in the context of protest repression. Iran’s regular military is representative of society, and, as a result, unlikely to be effective against a broadly defined opposition.

4.3 Data Collection and Methods

In order to test these hypotheses, I collected data on protests events in Iran between Jan 2009 to August 2012. The main component of this data collection effort
involved putting together and reading through thousands of international and local
newswires. I was able to access these newswires through LexisNexis; they included

*Agence France Presse, Associated Press*[^6] IRIN Middle East Service, and Iran News,
among others.[^7] These local newswires range in terms of their independence from
the state—whereas IRIN, which is a service of the UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, is entirely unconnected to the Islamic Republic, *Mehr* and
*Fars* (FNA) are well-known semi-official news agencies with ties to the government.

According to *The Wall Street Journal*, FNA is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard
Corps (Farnaz 2010).

A second component of the data collection involved scraping the archives of Pay-
vand News of Iran, which are online. Payvand is an Iranian-American news website,
based in California. It is an outlet that brings together many independent news
sources, including radio show transcripts, blogs, international/local newswires, and
analysis. What is particularly useful about this website is that it aggregates not
only English language sources, but also Persian ones. For example, Ettelaat—one

[^6]: Also, Associated Press Online and Associated Press Worldstream

[^7]: Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), Iranian Government News, Mehr News Agency, Voice of America (Persian), and FARS News Agency
such source—is a Persian Daily Newspaper published outside Iran. Another is Radio Zamaneh—an organization that provides a venue for citizen reporting and other non-traditional journalism. Both are good examples of local level, opposition news sources (and there are many more: Rooz Online, Radio Farda, Norouz, to name a few). I also considered the Persian-language press, based in Iran. This included the archives of the IRGC’s mouthpiece Payam-e Enqelab, Sobh-e Sadeq, and the current IRGC news outlet, Ansar News.

In all cases, I chose to cast a wide net and gather the data more broadly—pruning the data to include only relevant information came later. Research assistants used a coding instrument I developed to record information about the protest events after the relevant newswires were identified. This information included duration, number of participants, the composition of protesters, and state response (the presence of police/riot police/paramilitary/military and the use of violence). The end result

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8 For Payvand News of Iran, all articles tagged as “Politics” were downloaded. These were then further assessed, so that only those articles discussing specific protest events and government responses were kept. The search procedure in LexisNexis used the power search interface. The HLEAD option searched for the country name in the headline and lead paragraphs. After that, I used Boolean options to select additional terms—terms(protests and demonstrations). Only those which were ranked as above 75% with respect to relevance were kept. In the “Sources” field, I specified “Wire Service Stories,” and included the aforementioned international and local-level/regional newswires.

9 The final dataset only included those events with more than 100 participants.
was a database of major protest events in Iran between Jan 2009 - August 2012.10

These observations tend to be Tehran focused, but they also include some protest events in other regions, particularly other major urban centers like Mashhad, Shiraz, and Isfahan.

Research assistants were instructed to read through newswires carefully, paying attention to multiples pieces of information.11 The two most critical pieces of information were composition (the key explanatory variable) and violence (the dependent variable). In general, an effort was made to extrapolate, but leaving cells blank was encouraged if information was missing. Protesters were either classified as “Broad” (0) or “Narrow” (1). If a specific group (see Figure 4.9) comprised a majority of the protesting group, the protest event received a “1” on the composition variable.

The outcome variable (the use of coercion against protesters resulting in at least one fatality) was divided into three levels: Basij, Revolutionary Guard, and Military. These actors would have to be specifically mentioned in the newswire in order for the protest event to be given a “1” (i.e., observed violence) for any of the three outcome variables. Violent tactics include firing on protesters, using armored vehicles, riding

10See Appendix for descriptive statistics of the main variables
11Please see the Appendix for an example of the coding process for one protest event.
motorcycles into crowds, and utilizing other methods of coercive crowd control.\(^{12}\)

### 4.4 Quality and Coverage of Sources

The nature of my data is observational. Though there is a lot of information out there, not all of it is reliable or accurate. Because of this, my methods relied on cross-checking sources against each other. Though the Iran database may seem relatively small compared to other ones, I believe the quality of the information is better because the information for each protest event was usually corroborated by multiple sources, in particular Farsi-based ones.

This brings me to an important point regarding protest event data. With the advent of Twitter and other forms of social media, it is easier than ever for anyone to be a reporter of events. This is great because it means more information is recorded. However, there are also downsides because the legitimacy of sources comes

\(^{12}\)In order to ensure the validity and reliability of the coding process, I had two sets of research assistants. The main group was based in Cambridge, MA, and it was comprised of paid Harvard undergraduates. The second set was based in Fresno, CA, and it was comprised of unpaid high school students from my former high school. In exchange for two weeks of work (approximately 20 hours), I wrote my high school students recommendation letters for college, and they were able to list their experience researching for me on their resume. This second set of researchers were the robustness checkers of the first group, who were also told that their work would be checked. I believe this was a good method of keeping all research assistants focused and detail-oriented. In the end, there were some changes that I made based on differences between the first group of researchers (Cambridge) and the second group (Fresno); however, I found there to be a medium-high degree of inter-coder reliability based on my method.

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into question—it is simply impossible to validate all pieces of information, and large
gatherers of reports do not always cite where their information comes from. To man-
age this issue, I tried, whenever possible, to err on the side of caution and remove
observations with little information or uncertainty. For example, if an observation
only had information on a particular protest event’s location and number of people,
but was not confirmed and enhanced by another newswire or article, then I deleted
it. This does mean that my sample is biased in two major ways, and perhaps not
representative of the universe of cases.

First, dropping observations with limited or more questionable information means
that data tends to be focused on Tehran. In general, however, most of the activity
during the time was centered on Tehran and other large urban centers (like Mashhad).
Nonetheless, this leads to a second bias in my data: the source of state violence. My
theory hinges on being able to distinguish among state actors when it comes to
identifying the source of protest policing violence. My data underestimates Basiji
violence in two potential ways.

First, by focusing on Tehran and other major urban centers, it misses the violence
inflicted on protesters in smaller cities and villages. The Green Revolution was marked
by its nation-wide scope, and though activity was concentrated in the large cities, my data does not adequately represent protests outside Tehran, Mashhad, and Isfahan. It is likely that the bulk of protest policing in the smaller cities was carried out by the Basij, since the attention of the regime was on Tehran. This meant the IRGC and the Artesh were mobilized in Tehran and the other large urban centers, less so in the smaller cities. The Basij is also the largest and most rapid force in the state’s security apparatus. It is the most decentralized, with bases in every city and village throughout the country. For this reason, the regime is able to rely on the Basij not just in places like Tehran, but quite literally anywhere and everywhere.

Second, Basij violence is under-reported in newswires because it is also less detectable than the more standard protest policing methods of the IRGC and the regular military. For example, many protesters simply disappeared during the Green Revolution. These people were mostly likely beaten, put into the backs of unmarked cars, and taken to prisons where they were tortured and killed.\footnote{http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-jan-june11-iranianwomen_06-10/} According to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, rape and torture by the Basij was routinely practiced as a matter of policy to intimidate people from coming out to
protest again. According to *The Guardian*, thousands went missing after the Green Revolution, most probably killed in secret or not so secret prisons like Evin. This more informal, yet lethal strategy of protest policing should be part of my operationalization of military violence against protesters; however, it remains unmeasured because it is not picked up in newswires (at least systematically).

It is unclear how exactly this bias is affecting my results because I have no way of knowing what the crowds in these protests were like compositionally. Fortunately, there is no reason to believe that the reason for the missing information is correlated with crowd composition. Rather, it is a function of the undetectable nature of these more perverse strategies. Since I have no reason to think that newswires are systematically less likely to exclude information on Basij violence in narrowly composed protests, the best case scenario is that my results are underestimating the true effect of crowd composition on Basij violence.

It is important to discuss comparisons across different kinds of sources because I incorporated both international and “local” newswires. Given heavy censorship of the press in Iran, the local news I consider is mainly based in Los Angeles. I consider

this to be local in the sense that reports to these outlets (for example, Payvand or Ettelaat) do come from inside the country. Furthermore, the expatriate community in Los Angeles is deeply involved in Iranian politics; most of the opposition newspapers based in Los Angeles are read by Iranians in Iran because they are considered more accurate than sources within the country. I did make an effort to also collect data from sources within the country (for example, Mehr and Fars); however, the only ones that I had access to were government sponsored ones with clear biases against protesters.

Though these government approved news sources did identify protest events, and through this I was able to corroborate or confirm information like the number of protesters, the presence of police, the nature of protesters’ demands...etc., they did not include much on the state’s response, particularly if there was violence. This is because, until recently, the government has denied there was any state sanctioned violence during the election protests. It was only in January 2014 that a Basij Commander admitted there was *one* instance of the Basij firing on protesters. This unnamed Commander claimed the protesters were targeted because they were armed and dangerous to those around them. Furthermore, he denied any fatalities, saying
the Basijis aimed at the “troublemakers” from the waist down. Photographs and video footage indicate otherwise, as do reports in legitimate international newswires (see International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran).

Setting aside the government approved news sources, there were some general differences between the international and “local” sources that are worth noting. Sometimes I noticed that the opposition sources lacked information on the outcome of the protest events—for example, how many people were arrested or how the state responded to protesters. Nonetheless, these were still useful because I was able to cross-validate events and even add to them because there was a more detailed description of the nature of the crowd or the location of the event itself. The lack of a description of the outcome stemmed from the location of the reporter. If the reporter was identified by name and the location was in Iran, there was a tendency to avoid descriptions of the outcome. Fortunately, this wasn’t a common occurrence.

A second difference I noticed was the density of reports between peaks of protest activity. Whereas the international newswires were consistent in reporting events between peaks of activity, the opposition newswires were more clustered in their
approach. This probably stemmed from differences in access and reach, not to mention resources. Sources like the *Associated Press* have networks of reporters that monitor countries for newsworthy events in a consistent manner. Smaller mediums do not have this kind of capacity, and must rely on social media or contacts who are more informal. Overall, however, I would say that international and local sources were not too different, reflecting each other for the most part. This allowed me to cross-validate as many protest events as possible, adding information in some cases and confirming information in others.

The density of newswires did reflect major periods of protest (see Appendix). The number of protests during the Green Revolution ebbed and flowed, and this movement was reflected in the amount of news reported by international and local sources. There were three major peaks of activity during the Green Revolution: the initial outbreak in June, the Ashura Holiday in December (2009), and then in February (2010). These are clearly marked in the figure. This figure does not represent all newswires collected, but only the ones that were judged to be relevant. As mentioned earlier, the data collection method cast a wide net, relying on research assistants to not only code the relevant information from the newswires, but to also determine which newswires
contained information on protest events.

4.5 Results

Table 1 displays the results for the model testing the first hypothesis. The unit of analysis is the protest event, and there are 87 events in total during this 30 month period. There is no significant difference with respect to the nature of the state’s response between “narrow” and “broad” protests in this table. The dependent variable, for this model, is the use of violence against protesters on the part of the state. In other words, protest policing violence has not been disaggregated at the level of the security force actor. The lack of an observable difference in the state’s response is expected because the state has options in its choice of security service provider. The main conclusions of this chapter reassess violence by considering not just whether it happens, but also who inflicts it.

Control variables were included to capture the influence of other relevant factors. First, I included a measure for the size of the protesting crowd. This variable ranged from 1 to 6. The effect of a large crowd on the likelihood of state violence could

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16 The effect of a large crowd on the likelihood of state violence could
go either way. On the one hand, from a rational perspective, a large crowd should
deter state agents from firing. This is because the costs of doing so are higher if
there are more people who are dissatisfied. As an agent of the state, I would find
the likelihood of my own safety and the prospects of the state to be less favorable as
the size of the crowd increases. On the other hand, if my more social-psychological
approach is correct, a large crowd should seem more threatening to the regime and
the agents of the regime who have an ideological stake in the regime, not a sense of
belonging to society as a whole. In this case, for the unrepresentative Basij and IRGC,
a larger crowd should be seen as an even bigger out-group threat—the us versus them
distinction should become more salient as a large crowd signals greater threat. This
should manifest as a greater likelihood of violence as the size of the crowd increases,
especially on the part of the Basij.

The results are not conclusive, but they do seem to signal that my approach is
correct. The sign on this variable in Table 1 is positive, though it is not statistically
significant. In Table 2, the Basij is more likely to inflict violence on protesters as
the size of the crowd increases (this is statistically significant). Though this effect
disappears in Model 2 (Table 2), it is probably because some of the effect of the
variable is actually neutralized by the inclusion of a variable that measures threat perception. I discuss this variable in greater detail further down, but it is important to note that the sign on the threat variable is also positive, which reinforces the notion that it is picking up some of the effect of the protest crowd size variable. Lastly, in Model 5 (Table 2), the size of the crowd also has a positive effect on the Army’s presence at the protest event. It is important to make clear that the Army never actually inflicted violence on protesters, given any of the data that I collected. Thus, this effect on the Army, since the Army is representative, does not counter my claim about the implications for my theory if my social-psychological approach is correct.

I also included a lagged protest crowd size variable. I did this to take into account any trend based on the government’s expectation for the direction of the social movement in terms of its scope. In other words, it is possible the government is just choosing to send state security force actors in to manage crowds based on its perception of how the social movement is developing over time from prior beliefs. For example, if the regime looks at a previous protest event, and assumes the next one will be large and that the social movement is growing in strength, it might choose to send in the Basij or IRGC without considering the composition of the crowds, which
is what I am arguing. Thus, to account for this alternate possible consideration by the government, I am including a lagged protest crowd size variable to map out this possible trend. The results demonstrate, however, that the size of the previous protest event has no bearing on the regime’s decision to use force in any particular protest event.

Another control variable I include is one that measures protester violence on state agents. Violent acts include such actions as throwing rocks at state security force actors, hitting or storming police/Basij/IRGC, and attacking state agents in a mob-like manner. Based on newswires and other sources of news that I considered, it is very hard to determine who engaged in violence first. So, this variable is inherently flawed in that it may be picking up protesters’ responses to violence instead of their initial actions. Thus, forming expectations for how this protester violence variable might be affecting the likelihood of violence is problematic. Similarly, deriving an interpretation for this variable based on the results is similarly problematic. Nonetheless, I believe it is an important variable to include because, bracketing which actor (the people or the state) inflicted violence first, there should be an effect of the use of violent

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17This is a binary variable: protesters engaged in violent acts toward government security forces—“0” NO, “1” YES
methods by protesters on the use of violence by state actors against the protesters. I expect that this effect is positive—violence from protesters, whether it is reactive or active, should lead to a higher likelihood of violence from the state. The results in both tables bear this out. The Basij is more likely to use violence against crowds that are violent. In the Army’s case, the results are unclear because of the lack of enough data. The sign is negative but not statistically significant in the case of the IRGC (see Models 3 and 4 in Table 2). This is most likely the effect of a lack of instances during which protesters were violent and the IRGC used violence.

A fourth control variable I include is GDP in the previous year to model the effect of economic downturns. This does vary during the three year period, especially as a result of economic sanctions. The results are mixed, but in the right direction generally. As the economy worsens and GDP declines, state violence increases because, arguably, more people are dissatisfied with the state of the economy, leading to an increase in the number and scope of protest events. However, this result is only statistically significant in the case of the IRGC (Models 3 and 4, Table 2). A fifth control is state capacity, which is measured with the State Fragility Index (see Polity IV). This gets at the ability of the state to manage internal threats, and Iran’s SFI
score varies during this period of time. However, the variation is not great, and the only significant result is in Table 2 in the IRGC model. The expectation here is that a more fragile situation within a country should lead to a more serious response by the state to threats. It makes sense that there is a strong, positive effect of this variable on the likelihood of IRGC violence because the IRGC is a more militarized, more formal entity than the Basij within the Armed Forces—using the IRGC signals a more serious response by the regime.

A final control variable in the model is the use of police/riot police, which is a binary variable. I included this variable to model the sequential aspect of the regime’s protest policing strategy. It makes sense to imagine that the regime responds to the development of a protest event, first observing and then sending in a less costly non-military agent (the police or riot police) unless the level of threat is perceived to be high from the outset. The assumption here is that, if possible, the regime would try to prevent the loss of life; its military options (the Basij or the IRGC) tend to be more harsh and the likelihood of fatalities is higher. I would expect, given this,

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18 Iran’s SFI score is 14 in 2009. By 2010, it is 12 and doesn’t change. The higher the SFI score, the worse is the state’s capacity to handle internal threats.

19 “0” no police/riot police reported at protest event, “1” police/riot police reported to be present at protest event.
that there is a positive correlation between this variable and the likelihood of violence since, in most protest events in which the Basij or the IRGC are present, the police or riot police should also be present. Unfortunately, this relationship is only significant in Table 1, and not in any of the models in Table 2, though the sign is in the right direction.

Table 2 presents the main findings of this chapter, particularly with respect to the three main hypotheses (corresponding to the Basij, IRGC, and Military). The first column presents the results for the model testing the effect of protest group composition on Basij violence. In this model, only two variables (the size of the protesting crowd and protester violence) have any significant (positive) effect on the probability of Basij violence. However, including a variable that measures the level of threat perceived by the central government changes these results, showing that the hypothesis on the likelihood of Basij violence given broad crowds bears out (second column).

This proves the main conclusion of the threat perception school, which finds that the level of threat matters when it comes to predicting the government’s response.

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20THREAT is a binary variable that measures the perceived level of threat by the government. It is based on the demands of the protesters—if there is evidence that protesters were calling for a revolutionary change in the regime, then the event was given a “1.”
Table 4.1: State Violence on Protesters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VIOLENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crowd Composition</td>
<td>0.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.540)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of the Crowd</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.312)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protester Violence</td>
<td>1.227**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.557)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of the Crowd (lag)</td>
<td>-0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>0.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Presence</td>
<td>1.451**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-7.494**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
to citizen mobilization. This is particularly the case in quasi-democratic states (i.e., those “in the middle” \(^{21}\)) like Iran—ones in which there are some democratic institutions that foster citizen participation, but there is little capacity to fully permit peaceful civil resistance because protesting activities are perceived as threatening. Thus, the probability of violent outcomes or responses to “threatening” civil acts (like protests) increases as these acts are perceived to be more threatening to the central government.

Once the perceived level of threat is taken into account, the model shows that the Basij is more likely to be used by the government when the protesting group is broadly defined. Holding everything else fixed, the Basij is 74% more likely to be sent in and use violence against protesters when the protesting group is broad as opposed to narrow. Column three in Table 2 presents the results for the third hypothesis on the Revolutionary Guard. In short, there is strong evidence that suggests the Revolutionary Guard is more likely to be used by the government when the protesting group is narrowly defined.\(^{22}\) In fact, when the opposition is broadly defined, the Revolutionary Guard is five times less likely to be sent in and use violence against

\(^{21}\)For a good summary, see Pierskalla (2010)

\(^{22}\)Including the THREAT variable does not significantly affect the results. See column 4.
Table 4.2: Regression Results, Protests 2009-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basij (1)</th>
<th>IRGC (2)</th>
<th>Army (3)</th>
<th>Army (4)</th>
<th>Army (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crowd Composition</td>
<td>-0.568</td>
<td>-1.343*</td>
<td>1.793**</td>
<td>2.222**</td>
<td>149.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.604)</td>
<td>(0.708)</td>
<td>(0.842)</td>
<td>(0.948)</td>
<td>(21,249.880)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of the Crowd</td>
<td>0.551*</td>
<td>-0.426</td>
<td>-0.678</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>1.081**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.510)</td>
<td>(0.457)</td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
<td>(0.538)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protester Violence</td>
<td>1.749***</td>
<td>1.474**</td>
<td>-0.371</td>
<td>-0.249</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.621)</td>
<td>(0.659)</td>
<td>(0.663)</td>
<td>(0.680)</td>
<td>(1.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of the Crowd (lag)</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>-0.293</td>
<td>-0.339</td>
<td>-0.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.428)</td>
<td>(0.442)</td>
<td>(0.659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td>-0.008**</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(8.690)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity</td>
<td>1.466</td>
<td>2.200</td>
<td>8.107**</td>
<td>8.470**</td>
<td>-54.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.852)</td>
<td>(1.796)</td>
<td>(3.333)</td>
<td>(3.412)</td>
<td>(8,255.372)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Presence</td>
<td>1.299</td>
<td>1.335</td>
<td>-0.596</td>
<td>-0.347</td>
<td>25.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.833)</td>
<td>(0.900)</td>
<td>(1.123)</td>
<td>(1.200)</td>
<td>(50,461.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
<td>2.407**</td>
<td>-1.222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.961)</td>
<td>(0.986)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.312)</td>
<td>(5.567)</td>
<td>(7.626)</td>
<td>(7.811)</td>
<td>(53,320.670)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 87, 87, 56, 56, 87

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
protesters (holding all controls at their mean).

Finally, based on interviews and newswires, there is no indication that the military actually engaged violently with protesters. Moreover, the dataset only contains a few observations in which the military mobilized on the streets in the capital city. Therefore, the military is the least likely to be used of the three security actors. However, because of the limited data, the results of the logit regression do not pan out, and not much can be concluded statistically.

4.6 Us Versus Them Distinctions

Though I am not able to rigorously test the main mechanisms in this chapter, there is some evidence that these play a significant role when it comes to explaining military (and paramilitary) violence. There are three broad factors, which are outlined in Chapter 1, that underlie the results of this study. The first relates to the effects of the protesting crowd. Broader crowds present more of a threat because representative militaries are more likely to perceive them as part of the “us.” The less representative an entity within the armed forces, the easier the distinction between “us” versus “them,” even in the context of broad protests. This is because members
of unrepresentative military institutions tend to have one strong group identification; as a result, the definition of what constitutes an out-group is broader.

In the context of 2009, given the unrepresentative nature of the Iranian military, protesters were easily “othered.” Even though crowds tended to be broad in general, composed of many subgroups, there is evidence that the unrepresentative entities (the Basij and the IRGC) perceived those protesting as part of an out-group. I discuss perceptions within the Basij in great depth later; however, this section discusses the government’s framing of the protesters. I have not discussed the role of framing as it relates to my theory, but it suffices to say that, in this case, opinions coming from inside the clergy reflected the perceptions of those within the IRGC, given the extremely close relationship. The IRGC was created by the clerical establishment as a parallel military institution to protect the ideals of the religious revolution.

During the protest events of 2009, the clerical establishment framed protesters both narrowly and in a manner that highlighted threat—i.e., as an outgroup. Throughout what became known as the “Green Revolution,” clerics and security officials publicly asserted that the demonstrators were not representative of society, but rather reflected a small group of easily identifiable people. On June 19th, the Supreme Leader
spoke during religious services, saying the election was legitimate because turnout was so high—protesters were part of a small group of “unhappy” people (Khameini, Speech 6/19/2009). During Friday prayers, which were broadcast on television on June 26th, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami called for the execution of demonstrators, labeling them “people who wage war against God” (Khatami, Speech 6/26/2009). The most famous example of government framing comes from President Ahmadinejad (who was a former Basiji), who characterized protesters as “specks of dirt” during his victory rally directly following the election (Ahmadinejad, Speech 6/19/2009). Moreover, for months after the election, government officials continued to define protesters very narrowly either as a clearly defined political opposition (for example, as reformist politician Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s disgruntled supporters) or as marginalized, Western-leaning secularists (see Hashemi and Postel 2010). This occurred despite the fact that demonstrations were broad, and crowds were composed of many groups: merchants, professionals, students, and the middle class.

Similarly, security officials made an effort to marginalize the Green Revolution protesters, presenting them as threatening and their claims as illegitimate. For example, the Iranian intelligence chief alleged that “Zionist” forces were responsible for
the protests. Later, he added that the CIA was funding a small group of domestic secularists to topple the government (Slackman 2009). The attempt to marginalize the protesters also contextualizes Ahmadinejad’s characterization of those involved in the movement as “specks of dirt.”

The second factor underlying this study is the effect of security force representativeness on the willingness of security actors to inflict violence on protesters. Representative militaries are more likely to view protesters who reflect society more broadly as part of the “us” and not the “them.” On the other hand, unrepresentative militaries are able to make “us versus them” distinctions regardless of the nature of the protesting group because, in this case, the definition of what comprises the in-group is far more narrowly defined (i.e., composed of just one group).

These dynamics can be indirectly assessed through the application of a concept in social psychology: Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). Because an unrepresentative entity within the armed forces views a protesting crowd, regardless of its composition, as part of a more easily identified “other” group, according to FAE, such an entity should also see protesters’ demands as threatening, illegitimate, and extreme (including the crowd itself). An FAE occurs when an individual ascribes
meaning and cause to another person’s actions and behavior based on that person’s disposition rather than on his or her situation. An extension of this concept to group dynamics finds that individuals are more likely to judge in-group members favorably; the motivations of an in-group member are more likely to be attributed to his or her situation by another member. In the context of protests, this leads to the expectation that security actors may perceive some demands as more or less legitimate. Representative militaries are more likely to sympathize with a broad-based opposition because such a group may be perceived as part of the “us.” Otherwise put, such demands may not be seen as illegitimate or threatening. On the other hand, if it is true that unrepresentative militaries view crowds as part of an out-group, then crowds and their demands should be perceived negatively.

These mechanisms are present in the Basij, IRGC, and military members’ perceptions of protesters during this period of time. The Basij News Agency, which maintains a website to publicize news about ongoing activities, was very clear about its characterization of those protesting. According to a former Basiji (Tehran), BNA reflected the opinion that protesters were not “real” Iranians (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). At the same time that protesters were excluded from the in-group in
official online and print Basij publications, rural folk or "Roostahiye" were glorified as the most critical part of society, responsible for keeping the foundation “pure” because of their religious zeal. Thus, what was defined as the “us” depended heavily on a reaffirmation of what constituted the in-group—for the Basij, this was based on religiosity. Based on anecdotal evidence, those in rural areas perceived protesters as outsiders as well. This may reflect their pre-existing beliefs about the nature of urbanites, no doubt based on centuries of conflict between city dwellers and urban dwellers; however, it does seem that, during this period of protest, such beliefs were made more salient (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013; Sobh-e Sadegh 07/12/2013).

With respect to the perception of demands, the Basij reflects the government’s opinion of the protesters. Basij propaganda has emphasized the threatening nature of the protesters’ demands throughout 2009-2010, calling them “foreign” and “extreme” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). This was an effort to paint the protests as illegitimate and dangerous, therefore justifying the severity of the response against them. In short, the protesters’ grievances were easily downplayed by the Basij because protesters themselves were conceptualized to be outsiders. Furthermore, though the IRGC supported the Basij during this time, it was noticeably less vocal about
the protesters. Though there is little doubt the Revolutionary Guard harbored similar sentiments about the demands and nature of the protesters, given its relatively more representative composition, there is some evidence to suggest that there was less of a cohesive framing regarding who the protesters were and what they wanted. Its weekly magazine and website Sobh-e Sadegh condemned the protesting activities (Sobh-e Sadegh 06/20/2009) and reported the chaotic events taking place in major cities; however, it did not go as far as the Basij propaganda in its characterization of the events. 23

It is difficult to assess the mechanisms in the case of the military. This is because the military mobilized only eight times throughout the protest period, and there were no reported violent incidents involving (regular) military personnel. Theoretically, given the military’s representative composition, this should be the case—the lowest likelihood of violence against protesters. However, the small number of cases in the sample means that this proposition cannot be rigorously tested. Nonetheless, there was a widely shared sentiment within the Iranian security apparatus that the burden of providing internal security would fall mainly on the Basij and the IRGC (Ali, 

23This is based on the selections I viewed, which were not comprehensive, and also anecdotal evidence from interviews (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013)
Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). In fact, according to Katzman (1993), Iran’s security apparatus was structured to include two relatively homogenous security actors (compared to the military’s regular units)—Basij and IRGC—precisely because of the representative nature of the Armed Forces; Khomeini anticipated the need for a separate, less representative security provider. Furthermore, during the protest period, one trend emerged that highlighted the more inclusive nature of the relationship between regular military units and protesters; protesters gave troops that were mobilized flowers symbolizing peace, which were accepted (see for example, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=idvMwLbLw). As opposed to the relationship between the Basij and the protesters (and to a lesser degree, the IRGC/protesters), the one between the military and the protesters was marked by a sense of comradery and unity—“yekiboodan” or “oneness” (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013).

The final factor underlying the results of this chapter is paramilitary effects. The Basij militia is an omnipresent feature of life in many Iranian cities. However, despite its reach and size, it operates in a militia-like manner. To the extent that it is the most unrepresentative element in the Iranian security apparatus, it is also the most cohesive. However, cohesiveness alone does not lead to perverse violence. The
conditions that facilitate violence are intrinsic to paramilitaries, and these work to strengthen the organizations’s cohesiveness in a particularly pernicious way, increasing the likelihood of not just violence, but other forms of more perverse violence. These conditions are the highly ideological context within which paramilitaries operate and also their unique mix of unprofessionalism (or a culture of informality with respect to training and tactics) and hierarchy (i.e., high secondary group cohesion, which means that commands are followed). The conditions facilitate the pathways to violence more generally: anonymity (through unprofessionalism), responsibility diffusion (through ideology and hierarchy), de-humanization/stereotyping (through homogeneity and ideology), and de-individuation (through ideology and unprofessionalism). The cohesiveness of the Basij, based on its unrepresentativeness and paramilitary characteristics, concentrates the rewards and costs of all actions, particularly when it comes to following the group through the pathways to violence aforementioned.

The ideological foundation of the Basij organization is based on a revolutionary doctrine that is both normatively and pragmatically motivated. From a normative perspective, this doctrine is ultra-conservative and religious—Basij members
view themselves as part of a mission to bring the commandments of God to society, “[and] create a pious society” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). In fact, their mission statement is to enforce the principle of Amr be Maruf va Nahy az Monkar (Golkar 2011). This translates to “commanding the right and forbidding the wrong.” As it was explained to me in an interview, members are socially rewarded or “lifted up” inter-subjectively—it is the extent of their selflessness in relation to this doctrine that matters. In other words, actions are judged by the group, not in accordance with a normal code of conduct (for example, “killing another human being is wrong”), but by the degree to which a member puts aside his own will (this is “selfless”) and submits to God’s authority, which is manifested—this step is critical—through a hierarchical divine structure as the will of the Supreme Leader (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Thus, “killing another human being is wrong” translates into “except when it isn’t wrong.” “Ideologically hot” conditions under which perversions like that become possible reinforce the cohesiveness of the group, as members become increasingly dependent on each other and their belief system for justification and legitimization.

Furthermore, in highly ideological settings, these social rewards are concentrated, and it is easier for groups to isolate themselves from external influences, which might
otherwise discourage extremist beliefs and actions (for a good summary of Groupthink mechanisms, see Janis 1972). This is certainly true in the case of the Basij, which has remained separate from mainstream politics in Iran, insulated against public criticism and not accountable to public opinion. Geographically, most Basij groups are located in rural areas, away from urban centers, which further isolates members and facilitates the perverse effects of group-based dynamics. The groups that do reside in urban centers are closely monitored; active members spend most of their time in the classroom learning about Islamic doctrine or at the centers surrounded by other members (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013; Ostovar 2013).

Pragmatically, the Basij has operated as if it has been in a “constant state of war” (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). The use of threat, historically, has been instrumental to the formation and cohesiveness of the organization. In the decade following the revolution and during the Iran-Iraq war, the main role of the Basij was recruiting, organizing, and deploying volunteers to the warfront. The full muscle of the organization was exerted against an outside threat, and this strengthened its raison d’etre. Following this, the regime used members as a morality police in place of the revolutionary committees (Golkar 2011). 1989 became a very important year for the Basij;
its purpose was redesigned by the Supreme Leader, who identified a new war that
was to be fought by the organization. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who became Supreme
Leader following Khomeini’s death in 1989, identified the organization’s most impor-
tant priority: “cultural invasion” by Iran’s enemies in the West was corroding Iran’s
cultural and moral landscape (Iranian News Memo, 07/13/1992). For the Basij, the
war was not over, and it was the organization’s mission to “move society to greater
spirituality” (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). This purpose reinforced the organization’s
cohesiveness by giving it an enemy; as a result, membership was strengthened by a
sense of threat.

Furthermore, tight familial and ideological connections bonded members, partic-
ularly at the elite level. This is true even today. The most critical criterion for
Basij membership is the religiosity of the member’s family. It is an honor for a Basij
member to claim that he comes from a “household of martyrs,” and this is a com-
monly held belief (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). In fact, the network of Basij
leadership (and sub-leadership) is primarily composed of prominent religious families
(Ostovar 2013). Though there is more variation at the lower levels, Basij members
are significantly more religious than the general population, and this sense of religious
fervor enhances the organization’s cohesiveness (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013; Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).

The interviews that I conducted in 2013 with two former Basij members gave me further anecdotal proof that “us versus them" mechanisms, exacerbated by the organization’s extreme level of unrepresentativeness and paramilitary style, were driving the Basij’s perverse and violent response to protesters during the Green Revolution. Compared to the IRGC and the Army, the Basij’s strategies and tactics of policing were far more perverse and violent. This is not to say that the policing methods utilized by the IRGC did not result in violent (and even fatal) outcomes; however, the tactics tended to be more standard—for example, the use of batons, water cannons, and shields. Moreover, there was no evidence that regular military units used any violent methods of protest policing during this period, even though they were reportedly mobilized during some of the bigger displays of dissatisfaction in the major cities.

On the other hand, the Basij had extremely violent, perverse strategies of control that they inflicted on protesters. These included using batons to rape prisoners who were arrested during the protests, cables that coiled and extended (if they attached
onto someone’s hand, they could do very serious damage. Ali, Interview 12/27/2013), and other forms of sexual violence (McDowall 2009). Both interviewees explained to me that the nature of clashes was unlike anything they had seen before, particularly with respect to the severity of state-sanctioned Basiji violence. There were orders from the top to “attack without restraint or mercy” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Protesters were considered to be in “disagreement” with the Supreme Leader; as a result, there was no difference between men, women, children, and the elderly. In both interviews, I listened to horror stories—the beating of old men, the striking of small children, and even a disregard for pregnant women in the crowd.

Exacerbated “us versus them” dynamics affected how Basij members viewed protesters and how they viewed themselves. It was the nature of these two perspectives that was responsible for the severity and perverseness of the Basij’s strategies.

4.6.1 To “Other” More Easily

Dynamics within the Basij, as the most unrepresentative element within the security apparatus, permitted members to “other” protesters more easily. Protesters’ demands were perceived to be extreme, threatening, and illegitimate—and, what is
critical is that social rewards within the membership encouraged such beliefs. These rewards were tied to the ideology underpinning the structure of the apparatus. Thus, members received status and backpatting, the more their actions and words reflected a set of beliefs transmitted from the top down. In this case, protesters were “meaningless” because their demands were “meaningless” (and vice versa. Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). What made their demands illegitimate in this way, and how was this considered threatening for members? There is evidence that the Supreme Leader had called the election for Ahmadinejad months before the actual election took place (Robinson 2009), invoking the *Velayat-e Faqih*, which gives the Supreme Leader the power and capacity to interpret the will of God (Alfoneh 2013). Because protesters were questioning the results of the election, which had been divinely determined and validated, their demands existed outside the *Velayat*—i.e., they had no meaning. These demands, therefore, seemed threatening because they were not about an issue; they were against the Supreme Leader, the ultimate guide who is never wrong (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013).

However, the first step before a judgment about demands is made requires a judgment about the individual. Dynamics within the Basij also encouraged the de-
humanization of protesters. This process reflected the same one described earlier for demands—social rewards, based on ideology, facilitated the perception that protesters were part of an “other” (a “lesser”). As one interviewee described, “Attacking people didn’t mean much” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Because protecting the will of the Velayat against threat was the “right” thing to do, protesters became undifferentiated—men, women, children, and the elderly were all the same. Members often talked about protesters as “agents” without will (particularly if the foreign plot frame was raised) or “dirt” in the context of the city’s westernized youth (considered corrupt, see Khatam 2010). Stereotyping was encouraged by members at all levels. At the beginning and end of the day, socializing and religious activities (which became conflated) emphasized the difference between protesters and real Iranians—protesters were stereotyped and clumped into one group: westernized urbanites (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).

4.6.2 The Reflection in the Mirror

“Us versus them” dynamics, bolstered by the homogeneity and paramilitary characteristics of the Basij, also encourage members to feel invincible in the face of threat,
and to de-individuate themselves, thereby diffusing moral responsibility (Janis 1972; Valentino 2005). This results in actions that are more likely to be violent and discriminatory. Many inside the Basij, particularly those responsible for protest policing, are often very young, between the ages of 15 to 21 (Ostovar 2013). Since they were brought into wealthier, urban neighborhoods within which they have very few friends or connections (Golkar 2011), they would spend time together at the Basij bases, forming even deeper social bonds with their small group of compatriots. Consequently, the “Basij” group identity became highly salient, leading to feelings of superiority and power over any individuals not within that membership, “When we came to the city [Tehran], it was very fun. We liked the power, and being in control over others. We felt very powerful because we could do what we wanted. We’d do it together and take care of each other” (Mohsen, 06/24/2013).

There were multiple aspects of deindividuation within the Basij organization. The ideological component encouraged members to give up their own will and submit to God’s will, which is represented divinely by the Supreme Leader. The Ayatollah Khamanei is the incarnation of the 12th Imam (the one who is supposed to return in the form of the Messiah), “Not far short of God” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).
When he stated that the advancement and development of Islam depended on Ahmadinejad maintaining power, “[Basij members] felt like their actions were justified by God” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). In fact, for 3-4 months before the election, members attended classes on Islamic ideology (Golkar 2011). Furthermore, the thought of speaking out against this authority seemed “horrifying” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013), particularly in a group as cohesive as the Basij unit. If issues did come up regarding the violence, superiors responded normatively, attesting how everything was for a good cause. If that did not work, religious leaders were consulted, “Everything was *Fath Al Moin*” or “Aid to Victory” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).

The pragmatic or political component facilitated the diffusion of moral responsibility through hierarchical structure. Clear hierarchical structure is not necessarily a bad thing; however, in the context of a highly homogenous or unrepresentative organization, it can facilitate pernicious violence by increasing the social costs of questioning authority. The organization of the Basij is precise and extremely organized, reflecting very clearly the ideological source of its power— all commanders report directly to the Supreme Leader, who issues commands directly back to them (Alfoneh 2013). The directness of this chain of command, particularly in its divine nature, magnified
the costs of going against the group’s will, “This is the belief. We had accepted the
Velayat ... everyone’s actions must follow. Outside of that did not exist. There was
no choice... It was requirement” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Thus, holding a
contradictory belief not only became “immoral,” it also made you an outsider. In a
cohesive, small Basij unit, this was unfathomable—extremely costly, given the years
of ideological training and social bonding, particularly when displaced and brought
to the big city. In fact, there was a very strong group identification because mem-
bers felt like they belonged to a “secret society” (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013).
The secretive nature of the organization—for example, knowing months before the
election who was “supposed” to win—further darkened members’ perspectives on the
protesters, who were all non-members. The privilege of belonging to an “in-group"
delineated and justified the very clear boundaries around anyone (or groups) on the
outside of that group who was threatening the political (and divine) order.

Thirdly, the organization emphasizes “sameness,” facilitating the role of anonymity
as a pathway to extreme violence. This is reinforced ideologically: members are called
“warriors of Islam,” with group prayer sessions that call for unity before expected
periods of harsh repression (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). This is also reinforced by the
group: members are encouraged to address each other as “brother” or “sister” (there is a division for women known as the Al-Zahra battalion. Ali, Interview 12/27/2013).

Lastly, structure highlights the interchangeability of Basijis, “Basijis from the areas around Tehran might be sent to Karaj, while Basijis from the areas around Karaj might be sent to Tehran” (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013). Though I cannot confirm that this precise exchange took place during the Green Revolution, exchanges like this certainly happened, particularly when it came to using Basijis from the rural areas in the cities. The Basij had a clear function, and individual agency was co-opted within this process when it became obvious that the local Basij in the urban centers were not performing well, “Heavy clashes were getting worse in the cities. [Commanders] couldn’t rely on local Basijis ... So, Basijis from the countryside were brought in” (Ali, Interview 12/27/2013).

Lastly, the “unprofessional” culture of the Basij, despite its formal, hierarchical structure, explains the nature of the strategies used against protesters. The Basij has long operated with near immunity from the state; there are many examples of judicial leniency and formal acquittals of Basijis implicated in serious crimes (Naji 2008). Sa’id Tajik, a Basij commander from Tehran, suggested in an April 2011
interview that the benefit of the organization to the state was precisely this capacity to operate outside the official chain of command (this is not to say that the Basij doesn’t have its own chain of command, which is explicit. See Amiri 2011). Of course, this distance from the state has also meant that, in some ways, Basijis operate like “thugs” because the organization is not institutionalized in the traditional sense (see Bellin 2004 on institutionalization; Interview, Sohayl in Ostovar 2013). The Basij’s unprofessional culture was responsible for the greater variation in its protest policing methods—Basijis were unquestionably more brutal, perverse, and extreme in their tactics.

The decentralized structure of the organization explains the stickiness of this culture. Though the state decided to integrate Basij forces into the IRGC in 2009, the basic shape of the organization—a decentralized network of small groups—has not changed. It is in this type of structure that the unprofessionalized nature of the organization can be maintained within a very strict, formal understanding of where authority is derived. One reason is that a decentralized network of small groups inhibits the kind of formal training that would lead to professionalization (see Huntington 1957). As one interviewee said, “Nobody had really trained us ... I don’t know
what we were" (Mohsen, Interview 06/24/2013). Second, when it comes to methods, there is more that is left to the discretion of lower level members in this kind of set-up; thus, more extreme, informal tactics are used (Mitchell 2004). One example of this is the tactic of urban camouflage—Basijis, dressed up as protesters, joined crowds and instigated fear through random acts of violence during the Green Revolution (for example, stabbing protesters in the back and arms, see Vermaat 2009). It was through these strategies that the state was able to create an environment of fear, which became very effective in suppressing crowds (see also Duvall and Stoll 1988); however, this is not a function that a more professionalized unit, like the IRGC, could fulfill by itself. Therefore, the state relied upon the Basij for its organizational capacity to produce certain kinds of tactics and strategies.
Conclusion

Representativeness in the military organization affects the likelihood of violence during protest events. Militaries that are representative are less likely to inflict violence upon protesters when crowds are broad because they are less likely to view crowds as a threatening other. “Us versus them” distinctions are a critical component of the decision and capacity to crack down on protesters. When these distinctions are easier to make, violence is easier to legitimize. In unrepresentative militaries, members identify themselves very strongly with one group, and are more likely to view crowds (even broad crowds) as part of an out-group. An extension of this argument to paramilitaries leads to the expectation that paramilitaries would be the agents of the worst kinds of atrocities against protesters—severe violence that includes even more perverse forms like sexual violence. To the extent that paramilitaries are the most unrepresentative entities in the armed forces, there are characteristics particular
to paramilitaries, like a highly ideological setting and a unique hierarchical structure that leaves room for an informal culture, that further enhance cohesiveness in ways that facilitate the pathways to extreme violence.

I established this conclusion through a comparison of two significant social movements in Iran: the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Green Revolution in 2009. In one case, the military fell apart and was unable to inflict violence on protesters. In the other case, in 2009, the military waged a sustained campaign of repression against protesters, ending with the collapse of the movement. Given the background variables, it is puzzling that the outcomes in the two cases were so different. Furthermore, the Shah’s regime had been very effective when it came to clamping down on protests in previous years, before the revolution in 1979. What was different about 1979? Alternatively, given how similar 2009 was to 1979, how did the Islamic Regime avoid the Shah’s fate?

Using historical data and an original dataset on protest events during the Green Revolution, I exploit the variation in military violence between protest events (so, at the intra-state level within a protest movement) to show that “us versus them” distinctions play a critical role. In fact, none of the other dominant approaches in the
field can account for this micro-variation—some fare better than others when it comes to macro-variation across countries. However, at the level of the protest event, there is no theory that can predict the variation in military violence; thus, one significant contribution of my work is that I develop a framework for a kind of variation that has been ignored and not studied.

What does this mean for theory? In general, my work calls for a more focused, detail-oriented approach to the study of protest policing. Since the Arab Spring, there has been a tremendous amount of good work on what accounted for the variation across states when it came to the decision to use force. Many of these works did focus on the role of the military, highlighting the significant effect military violence had on the success or failure of movements. In fact, this project began with the hope that it would be extended to other countries, specifically those involved in the Arab Spring. Applying my framework to these other countries would be fruitful in two main ways.

First, these countries would serve as out of sample tests for my theory. My theory is very much built on the knowledge and access to information I have with respect to the Iran case. In this sense, it is more of a theory-generating exercise than one of theory-testing. However, based on my knowledge of the Arab cases, I believe an
extension would be a perfect way to test whether the mechanism is valid in conditions that are slightly different. For example, in the Syrian case, the militia-like entity (comparable to the Basij) is the Shabiha. The Shabiha are large, decentralized groups of armed militia who are led by the Al-Assad family. The Syrian opposition has stated that the Shabiha are a tool of the regime for suppressing opposition. They played a critical role in the lead-up to the civil war, cracking down on protesters who dared to voice their opposition against Assad. The difference between the Shabiha and Basij is that the Basij is more institutionalized. The Basij organization is a formal entity within the Iranian security apparatus. The Shabiha are not institutionalized in this way, yet they play a very similar role. Thus, assessing how variation in the level of a paramilitary’s formal relationship to the state affects the type and likelihood of violence would be a future research question. There are plenty of similar entities across the Middle East, so focusing on this particular research agenda could lead to a database that does not currently exist.

Another implication of my work is that security actors should be disaggregated and studied in the context of larger historical and social processes. Protest policing has been mainly studied through the lens of one security force actor: the police. My
theory connects protest policing to the other literatures on regime transition and
civil war, arguing that the origins of these more significant political outcomes may be
tied to the decisions of the government when it comes to protest policing. The Arab
Spring is a perfect example of how the origins of severe violence, civil war, and regime
transition were rooted in the levels of military violence that occurred beforehand.
Based on these cases and the Iranian ones in this work, more focus should placed on
other actors involved in protest policing, specifically actors within the armed forces.
This bring me to the main point on disaggregation. The military must be broken down
into its component parts, particularly in anocracies, in which part of the military’s
function is to protect the state from internal threat. These component parts—i.e.,
paramilitary or other militia-like entities and parallel military institutions—may have
different functions in the context of different kinds of threats. My theory would
suggest that these functions may be correlated with representativeness across these
bodies.

This work has also clarified the concept of representativeness. By taking a histor-
ical and contextual approach vis-a-vis its disaggregation of the Iranian armed forces,
my argument has identified a kind of unrepresentativeness that has been missed in
the more traditional approach to the concept, which has been focused on ethnicity for the most part. The question is whether Iran is unusual in this sense. Is it simply the case that Iran is an outlier when it comes to social cleavages? This is a limitation of the work, in some ways. Whether the historical approach would be particularly insightful in other cases remains to be seen. However, countries like China in which other kinds of divisions have historically played a greater role in politics might be good candidates.

There are three broad areas for future research. Testing this theory in other cases, especially in different contexts in which critical factors may vary (like the distance between the paramilitary and the regime), is the primary area. Second, connecting military violence during protests to police violence in a more cohesive framework would prove fruitful. Though this work highlights the role of the military as a significant one, not much is said about the police’s role, which we might expect would impact the outcome of events. What is the connection between representativeness in the military and the strength of the police department? Furthermore, what is representativeness like in the police? Are certain police forces unrepresentative in certain ways? If there is variation across countries and within countries, then it is
possible that the regime’s decision to send in the military is likely affected by its beliefs about the capacity of the police. Third, as I mentioned earlier, research on paramilitaries, particularly with a focus on representativeness, is needed. To date, there is no database that identifies and measures the characteristics of paramilitary groups across the world.

In the Iran case, it seems like the design of the security apparatus reflected a level of agency on the part of the state. Given the multiple actors, all with varying levels of representativeness, an argument could be made about the state anticipating the need for a security force capable of inflicting severe violence on unarmed citizens engaged in demonstrations. The successful history of social movements in Iran since the 1800s taught the regime many lessons about the type of threat that would be the most dangerous. The political leaders of the regime came to power on the backs of protesters, and they are aware of their tremendous power.

However, if this is case, then why do some states fail? Why did the Shah not anticipate such a need and design his regime’s security apparatus with that in mind? Cases of successful revolutions, particularly in states that are not fully democratic, hint at the limitations of agency when it comes to designing institutions that are
capable of harsh repression. This is where I believe ideology plays a constraining role, limiting the options available and determining preferences in ways that are not necessarily universal—i.e., always concerned with a regime’s survival. Under the Shah, an unrepresentative military or military-like entity was simply not possible, given the set of beliefs that justified his claim to rule. These beliefs emphasized the universalism of a broad, national identity. Exploiting a social cleavage was not a possibility—it simply could not exist as a strategy for the state, no matter how effective this strategy might have been.

One of the more policy-oriented implications of this project is that the Iranian Regime would be extremely difficult to overthrow from within the country. The structure of the security apparatus is designed to handle broad, mass protests. What’s more, the alliance between the rural population and the religious class is deep. Since the structure of the security apparatus takes advantage of this alliance, it is incredibly robust to changes in other important factors like economic downturns or political dissatisfaction.

At the same time, the level of unemployment in the country is unsustainable, so an eventual crisis of some sort is only a matter of time. The regime has learned to
buy time by allowing some movement in the political system. This happened in the 1990s with the election of the “liberal” Mohammad Khatemi. However, he ended his term on a low note—none of the social, political, or economic reforms he had promised were delivered. The current president, Hassan Rouhani, is another attempt by the regime to move the government to the left. However, with the weakened state of the presidency and the political in-fighting, it is unlikely much will change. At the end of the day, elections in Iran are not free—not everyone can run as a candidate. Candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council, which is a 12-member council of high ranking clerics. These clerics are appointed by the Supreme Leader and the Head of the Judicial Power (who, in turn, is also appointed by the Supreme Leader. This is one way power always loops back to the Velayat in the Iranian political system).

What are policy suggestions for the United States given these findings? There are two options: military and non-military. The military option is problematic for a number of reasons, including the risk of U.S. fatalities. However, a non-military option like increased sanctions is not going to have the intended effects. These have already been tried, and it is clear that, though the government is weakened by them,
there is enough revenue coming in to support the security apparatus. Only when the rural population also turns on the regime would protests in the country actually work. This can only happen as the country prospers, and the rural areas modernize. I believe that political change, unless there is an external attack, will come gradually as all parts of Iran modernize and liberalize.

Protesters in 2009 were hoping for something big. Unfortunately, what they received was unfair. Hundreds were killed and injured. Thousands were arrested, and later disappeared. The mothers of these victims formed a group called, “Mothers of Laleh Park.” These women would meet on Saturdays in Laleh Park in Tehran. Their principal demand was government accountability for the deaths, arrests, and disappearances of their children. In 2011, at a meeting, these women were attacked by over 100 Basijis. They were forced into vans and arrested. Most have been released, but a few of the leaders have been sentenced to years in the notorious Evin Prison. These mothers symbolize the courage that is born out of desperation. They also demonstrate just how harsh the regime can be. Understanding the source of this tremendous capacity for perverse violence is the goal of this project. I hope that, in some way, I have been successful.
Figure A.1: Density of Newswires with Protest Events Over Time, 2009-2012
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables: Violence inflicted by Basij and IRGC, Military Presence, and Crowd Composition (principle explanatory variable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basij Violence</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC Violence</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Military Mobilization</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crowd Composition</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Basij Violence                    | The use of coercive protest policing strategies by the Basij that resulted in fatalities. This includes strategies like shooting into the crowd, beatings, rape, and arrests. | PARA = high intensity coercive tactics, including informal ones, used by the Basij.  
"0" NO ; "1" YES               |
| IRGC Violence                     | The use of coercive protest policing strategies by the IRGC that resulted in fatalities. This includes strategies like shooting into the crowd, beatings, rape, and arrests. | REVGUARD87 = high intensity coercive tactics, including informal ones, used by the IRGC.  
"0" NO ; "1" YES               |
| Military Mobilization             | The presence of the regular military (Artesh) at a protest event.                              | MILPRES = military presence or mobilization.  
"0" NO (if not mentioned, assume "0") ; "1" YES |
| Composition of the Crowd          | The estimation of a crowd as narrow or broad. A broad crowd is composed of more than one subgroup in society. | COMP = composition of the protesters.  
"0" BROAD ; "1" NARROW (if specific group—for example, women, students, ethnic groups, religious groups—mentioned; otherwise, assume "0"). |
| Size of the Crowd                 | The size of the protesting group(s) at the protest event.                                       | NUMB = number of participants.  
"1" 100-1,000 ; "2" 1,001-10,000 ; "3" 10,001-100,000 ; "4" 100,001-1,000,000 ; "5" 1,000,001-2,000,000 ; "6" over 2,000,000 |
| Protester Violence                | The use of violent strategies by protesters against agents of the state. Violent acts include such actions as throwing rocks at state security force actors, hitting or storming police/Basij/IRGC, and attacking state agents. | PROTVOl = protesters engaged in violent acts toward government security forces.  
"0" NO ; "1" YES               |
| GDP                               | GDP per capita in the previous year.                                                           | SFI (according to Polity IV). |
| State Capacity                    | State Fragility Index, see Polity IV. This indicator gets at the ability of the state to manage internal threats. |                              |
| Police Presence                   | The presence of police/riot police at a protest event.                                         | POLICE = presence of police or riot police.  
"0" NOT PRESENT ; "1" PRESENT. |
| Threat Perception                 | The perceived level of threat by the government, based on the demands of protesters.          | PROTTHREAT = threatening nature of the demands of protesters.  
"0" Slogans/chants were not calling for a revolutionary regime change ; "1" Slogans/chants were calling for a revolutionary regime change (for example, "Death to the Dictator" was a common one). |

Figure A.2: Variable Names and Definitions, Including Coding Instructions
Tens of thousands in Iran opposition rally: witnesses

06/16/2009
Agence France Presse - English

Tens of thousands of supporters of defeated Iranian presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi staged a protest rally in Tehran on Wednesday against the election results, witnesses said.

Iran’s state television also showed brief footage of the rally, a rare glimpse as
the station has mostly run shots of violence and vandalism which occurred during earlier protests.

Witnesses said the protesters, young and old, some with families, marched from central Tehran’s Haft-e Tir and were heading to Vali Asr square for what was billed as a “silent” demonstration.

Wearing green wrist- and head-bands in the colour of Mousavi’s campaign, the demonstrators, including office workers, carried placards accusing re-elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of having “stolen” their votes in Friday’s poll. Mousavi was not attending the march, which has been branded “illegal” by the Iranian authorities.

“Election is not selection,” one placard read, others said: “Don’t carry batons in the name of Islam and martyrs,” and “We keep silent so that bullets can be heard better,” witnesses told AFP.

The state television presenter said: “A group of Mr Mir Hossein Mousavi supporters held a rally today evening at Haft-e Tir square.”

The presenter also said the supporters were seen carrying banners backing their defeated candidate, while footage was shown of the marchers holding placards.

Since the election result was announced on Saturday, Tehran has been rocked by daily protests against Ahmadinejad, mainly carried out by supporters of Mousavi who says the election result had blatant “irregularities.”

Seven people have been reported killed and several more wounded during the protests. Iran has banned the foreign media from reporting on “unauthorised” events and rallies involving supporters of Mousavi.

Also, research assistants were encouraged to research further each protest event identified in the newswires (both the international and local ones). Additional information gleaned from this research was to be included and saved (sources that were consulted included CNN, MSNBC, and other broadcast media, particularly transcripts and videos). For example, RAs were able to view videos of many of the protest events on YouTube and through CNN iReport. The protest event coded below has video that is available on CNN iReport (see http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-273174).

Figure A.5: (Continued) Excerpts from Sources: An Example of the Coding of a Protest Event (see earlier figure)
Bibliography


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