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Abstract

This dissertation looks at migrant-background voters in Germany and the Netherlands to explain variations in descriptive representation in these two countries, and to find mechanisms which may explain the broad variations in descriptive representation seen throughout Europe. Open-list, preferential voting systems are examined and shown to provide methods by which migrant-background voters are able to coordinate on candidates from their origin group, increasing their success as candidates being elected to local and national legislatures. Additionally, the effect that initial successful candidates may have on later candidates from the same group is explored.

These effects are first examined in this dissertation by comparing across candidates within the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2012, validating earlier survey results suggesting that members of one’s own ethnic community can be a strong source of support for migrant-background candidates. Second, a comparison of city councils in Germany operating under different voting rules demonstrates find a significant, independent connection between the presence of preferential voting rules and the representation of immigrant minorities. A final comparison of candidates in two German cities before and after cumulative voting was implemented finds further connections between preferential voting and greater migrant representation, but also shows a number of potential confounding factors, such as the degree to which immigrant groups are formally organized, and finds political parties to be important mediators of these candidates’ success.
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Acknowledgments

This dissertation would not have been possible without a great deal of support from a very large number of people, and it is only though their continued support that it has made it to the final stages.

First, I wish to acknowledge the help and support of my dissertation committee: Jennifer Hochschild, Steve Levitsky, Torben Iversen, and most especially my chair, Peter Hall. They have been patient over the course of several years as the focus, cases, data, and pretty much everything but the title changed repeatedly, and as new details and questions emerged out of the soaking and poking process. They have seen far too many drafts, and made more useful comments than anyone should ever be asked to make, and yet they all remained helpful and supportive throughout.

I also especially wish to thank Daniel Ziblatt and Han Entzinger who adopted me and my project over the years, and helped me talk through a number of problems and come to find the eventual focus of my research. Years worth of conversations with Anouar El Haji, Floor Kellerman, and Thijs Kleinpaste have helped my thinking considerably, both for this dissertation and about politics, Europe, and life in general. Conversations and advice from a long list of colleagues helped contributed to the final result here: Irene Bloemraad, Klaus Boehnke, Jocelyne Cesari, Laurent Chambon, Grzegorz Ekiert, Philipp Genschel, Justin Gest, Sara Wallace Goodman, Catherine Kelly, Daniel Koss, Laure Michon, Jennifer Miller-Gonzalez, Ruxandra Paul, Lothar Probst, Robert Putnam, Hans Pruitt, Sander Quak, Karen Schönwälder, Melissa Siegel, Henning Schmitdke, Jean Tillie, Floris Vermeulen, Mary Waters, Anja Weiß, Nils Witte, Fatima Zibouh, and Linda Zuijderwijk.

Financial support for this dissertation was provided by the Minda de Gunzburg Center
for European Studies, the Krupp Foundation, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

There are a number of political actors and activists in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, Bremen, and Dortmund who I cannot thank here by name but for whose help I am deeply grateful, and I hope in the future to be able to thank them all again in person. This project additionally benefited from logistical support by a number of people who I also have never adequately thanked: Piet Burger, Werner Dressel, Nathalie Kroon, Letje Lips, Jolien Veensma, and Arndt Wonka, as well as Kirsten Bothe and the entire staff of the Starbucks on the Bremer Marktstraße. I also owe a great debt to the undergraduate teachers who set me on this course in the first place: Kevin Clarke, Gerald Gamm, Hein Goemans, Bonnie Meguid, Bing Powell, and Harold Stanley.

Lastly, a number of readers have helped me refine, rewrite, and rethink significant chunks of my dissertation. I wish to thank the attendees at the Comparative Workshop in the Harvard Department of Government, the Migration and Immigrant Incorporation Workshop in the Harvard Department of Sociology, and attendees at APSA 2011 and MPSA 2014 where parts of this dissertation have been presented, and I wish to especially thank Mindelyn Buford II, Verena Kroth, Paoa Montgomery, Ali Ramirez, and Kim Twist who have commented in great detail on sections of the dissertation writing, in addition to their broader comments.

Probably most importantly, I have benefited from a wonderful support system of families, without whom none of this would ever have been possible. I am inexpressibly thankful for my wife Allie, for Mom and Dad, and for Michele, Steve, Lori, Amanda, both Jeffs, and Shelby; and also for Norm, Barbara, Carolyn, Joel, Josie, and Chris who couldn’t see the end result. I love you all.
List of Frequently Used Political Party Abbreviations

**The Netherlands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christen-Democratisch Appèl</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Christen Unie</td>
<td>Christian Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Democraten 66</td>
<td>Democrats '66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>GroenLinks</td>
<td>GreenLeft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdD</td>
<td>Partij voor de Dieren</td>
<td>Party for the Animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid</td>
<td>Party for Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij</td>
<td>Reformed Political Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Socialistische Partij</td>
<td>Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie</td>
<td>People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Liberals)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Germany**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
<td>Free Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grüne</td>
<td>Bündnis 90/Die Grünen</td>
<td>Alliance '90/The Greens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linke</td>
<td>Die Linke</td>
<td>The Left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1 — Introduction and Literature Review

Immigration is a major social and political phenomenon that affects every country in the world to some degree, and most developed democracies to a very significant degree. As of 2013, a little over 3 percent¹ of the human population was living as an immigrant in a country other than the one where they were born. In some ways, this is not as much of a break with the past as is often imagined; the worldwide share of migrants was around 2.5 percent in 1960, and as Leo and Jan Lucassen (2011) point out, there are a number of cities like Amsterdam that have been struggling with immigration as a “new” phenomenon for almost 500 years. But countries such as Portugal that have been countries of emigration for generations have, in recent decades, become receiving countries of immigration, and foreign migrants to Amsterdam are no longer Belgians and Norwegians but post-colonial migrants, economic migrants from Latin America, Africa and Asia, in addition to refugees from conflicts around the world. Even a long history of immigration in countries like the United States and Australia has not kept immigration off the political agenda, as seen in the former case by the heated debate over (and eventual failure to pass the 113th Congress) of S. 744 in 2013-14.

Immigration in Western Europe has now also reached the point where new expansions of the electorate that follow immigration and naturalization are changing the way that politics works. This does not mean the end of immigration policy—questions of “whom should we let in?”—as a defining political issue in many countries, nor does it imply that the debates over integration and incorporation of migrant communities—questions of “what should we do to/for/on behalf of those we have let in?”—are the only, or even the most important, changes in contemporary European politics. Nonetheless, the changes are relatively new and

¹ Or about 320 million people, slightly more than the population of Brazil (Migration Policy Institute 2014)
increasingly visible. As Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain succinctly put it in their volume on the politics of immigration, “Immigrants are not only the objects of policy, but have become political actors who have had an impact on the process itself.” (1994, 8)

Immigration touches on a number of fundamental political questions, particularly in the developed democracies. Western European countries in particular have largely reached an inflection point where waves that peaked a few decades ago have naturalized, have raised a second and third generation, and are in a position where organized political action is no longer impractical (if by no means yet inevitable, either). As the citizenship of a democratic polity changes from one consisting of a single group to one that incorporates multiple groups, how will the actors in that democracy react? Will parties see the new citizens as competition, constituents, or simply as an undifferentiated mass, assimilating into the mainstream norm? Will the members of this new group take their place in political leadership, will they form a parallel society, or will they simply be excluded? Who can speak for these new actors in the existing system?

This dissertation looks at migrants into two European countries (Germany and the Netherlands), whose citizenship and naturalization policies in the last two decades went from ethnically-based and restrictive to more broadly accessible to migrants, as examples in which to explore the way that new dynamics of the immigration experience in Western democracies has interacted with questions of representation inside and outside the political parties. In these countries, an immigrant-background electorate has rapidly expanded from a nearly trivial fraction to a few percentage points, and is projected to continue to grow with the expansion of second and third generations (in addition to further waves of migration). The dissertation questions what is known about descriptive representation more generally, and it shows how the size and nature of the migrant-background community in Western Europe causes representation processes—and particularly the way that electoral institutions affect
representation outcomes—to work differently for this group than they often have for other minority groups. It also begins to explore some of the ways that political parties have entered into and affected representation, given the potential risks, benefits, and difficulties in expanding their own constituencies. In this first chapter, I survey the state of migration in Europe at the present moment, as well as what the political science literature has contributed so far to an understanding of migrants’ political incorporation. First, I briefly outline the nature of migration in Western Europe, and particularly in Germany and Netherlands. I then explore the immigrant incorporation and assimilation literature to see what past studies suggest that should be expected about the process of becoming part of a new polity. From there, I look at the state of the literature on descriptive representation, which although well-developed in general appears to have largely missed an account of migration. Lastly, a number of other literatures that claim to affect the political outcomes of immigrants (and those who oppose migrants and migration) are explored, particularly with regard to the parties.

1.1 Who Are the Current Migrants?

Contemporary migrants in Europe come from a number of sources. Earlier waves of migrants included post-colonial migrants, coming to (or returning home to) colonial powers as the era of decolonization ended, as well as a number of guest workers who helped Europe cover labor shortages that emerged following the manpower losses of the Second World War, especially in light of economic recovery that followed (see, for example, Castles 1986). Newer migrants also come in a number of ways, and current migrant flows to Europe include permanent economic migrants, internal EU migrants who travel freely back and forth for work and for lifestyle reasons, and refugees and asylum seekers from areas of conflict around the
globe. Different countries have received balances of these different migration types, and in some countries (such as Italy) debate centers on more recent arrivals, while in some countries post-colonial flows (France) or guest workers and their descendants (Germany) remain at the center of the debate.

After a long period of growth in most Western European countries (and in many other parts of the world), immigration in most countries slowed considerably during the global recession in the late 2000s, slowly increasing again in the immediate past few years. Immigration to Germany actually peaked shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990-1991, and the guest worker programs that brought the largest mass of foreign workers to Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and other nations were largely over by the mid-1970s. Legal immigration to the United States also peaked in the years 1990 and 1991, although undocumented or illegal migration has carried the total number of immigrants forward every year since then except for a few years during the worst of the 2007-2009 recession (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). Globally, the renewal of increased migration appears to be mixed, but economies like Germany that had recovered best seemed to be getting the greatest renewed migration flows, while countries like Greece and Ireland that had gone from net sending countries of migration to net receiving countries in the 2000s found themselves as primarily sending countries once again (OECD 2013).

There has also been a corresponding increase in the proportion of the electorate in Western European democracies that has a migration background. The exact size of this electorate is actually quite difficult to count, and there are few published estimates of the overall immigrant voting population, either in the individual countries or comparatively. Making analysis even more complicated, this outcome is dependent on citizenship policy, which, though usually slow to change, is something that nonetheless changes over time. Furthermore, it does so with some endogeneity in response to the number of migrants and
number of migrant voters as parties respond either to a larger number of potential voters within the immigrant community, a backlash that comes as a reaction to increased migration and increased naturalization, or both. At this time, most studies in this field (e.g., Dancygier & Saunders (2006)) simply report the size of the foreign-born population as a proxy for the potential immigrant vote. This works as a rough estimate, but it can mask differences between migrant groups in rates of naturalization. Karen Schönwälder (2009) has attempted to calculate the size of the immigrant-origin electorate in Germany—which she indicates will approach 12 percent by 2020—by correcting for available information on who naturalizes. However, these studies face a huge obstacle, especially in any comparative context, in that many European countries specifically do not collect data on ethnic and racial minorities. The stated reasons for each country’s decision on this tend to be somewhat idiosyncratic, but those countries which choose not to have often done so because of the way such statistics have been abused in the past, particularly by European countries either at home or in colonial empires (Seltzer & Anderson 2001)\(^2\). Even when these countries do collect data, there is considerable variation between contexts. While the Dutch data that will be used in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation allows us to break down populations by origin, immigrant generation, and citizenship status, data collected by the German government (as used in Chapters 5 and 6) only allows us to observe the migrant-background community as a total of all origin groups and all generations—although it does at least break this population’s numbers down into categories of citizens and non-citizens. Similar issues in other countries add an additional layer of difficulty to comparative analysis.

For the countries specific to this dissertation, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 and Table 1.1 provide rough illustrations of the overall migrant population in recent years. In the

\(^2\) There are some changes being considered in how countries collect data in regard to immigrant-background minorities, with pressure for more collection coming out of concerns about the ability to protect against discrimination in later generations, but also pressure in the opposite direction due to increasing concerns about data security (Simon 2011).
Netherlands, since the mid-1990s when specific data become available, the number of residents in each of the four largest migrant-background\(^3\) groups (Moroccans, Turks, Antilleans, and Surinamese) have increased at a relatively slow rate, while the number of migrants from other non-Western origins has increased more quickly.

**Figure 1.1: Total Number of Residents with Migration Background, by Group, Netherlands 1996-2014**

The official designation for migration-background citizens is effectively the same in both countries. In the Netherlands, the term *allochtoon.* is defined as a “Persoon van wie ten minste één ouder in het buitenland is geboren” (“person for whom at least one parent was born abroad.”), implying only the first and second generation, although separate statistics are also kept for third-generation allochtones. In Germany, the term *Migrationshintergrund* officially describes “alle nach 1949 auf das heutige Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Zugewanderten, sowie alle in Deutschland geborenen Ausländer und alle in Deutschland als Deutsche Geborenen mit zumindest einem zugewanderten oder als Ausländer in Deutschland geborenen Elternteil.” (“All those who have immigrated to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, as well as born in Germany as foreigners [foreign citizens] and all those born in Germany as Germans with at least immigrant parent or parent born as a foreigner [foreign citizen] in Germany”), per the Statistisches Bundesamt. The major difference between the two countries is the frequently-reported umbrella category in the Netherlands of “non-Western”. The term “non-western allochton” is used to indicate those groups who are the focus of most policy and public attention (see De Zwart 2012) and is defined as any allochton from Latin America, Africa, Asia, including Turkey but *excluding* Indonesia and Japan (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek).

\(^3\) The official designation for migration-background citizens is effectively the same in both countries. In the Netherlands, the term *allochtoon.* is defined as a “Persoon van wie ten minste één ouder in het buitenland is geboren” (“person for whom at least one parent was born abroad.”), implying only the first and second generation, although separate statistics are also kept for third-generation allochtones. In Germany, the term *Migrationshintergrund* officially describes “alle nach 1949 auf das heutige Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Zugewanderten, sowie alle in Deutschland geborenen Ausländer und alle in Deutschland als Deutsche Geborenen mit zumindest einem zugewanderten oder als Ausländer in Deutschland geborenen Elternteil.” (“All those who have immigrated to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, as well as born in Germany as foreigners [foreign citizens] and all those born in Germany as Germans with at least immigrant parent or parent born as a foreigner [foreign citizen] in Germany”), per the Statistisches Bundesamt. The major difference between the two countries is the frequently-reported umbrella category in the Netherlands of “non-Western”. The term “non-western allochton” is used to indicate those groups who are the focus of most policy and public attention (see De Zwart 2012) and is defined as any allochton from Latin America, Africa, Asia, including Turkey but *excluding* Indonesia and Japan (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek).
For Germany, fewer data points are available (and no official data for specific origin groups), but there is also a slow increase in the percentage of the population with a migration background over time. The largest waves of migrants to Germany in recent decades came in two particular periods, as shown in Figure 1.2 below. These two peaks were at the height of the guest worker program right around 1970 (dropping off sharply after the end of the Wirtschaftswunder and the oil crisis in the early 1970s), and around the collapse of the Soviet Union and reunification. At the start of the recent Eurozone crisis, migration dipped back to a net negative rate, but it appears to have recovered quickly as the German economy rebounded (and as other EU economies did not). Information about all residents with a migration background rather than simply arrivals and departures only goes back a few years, but it also shows a steady increase to nearly 20 percent in 2012.

**Figure 1.2: Total and Net Arrivals to Germany, 1950-2013**

![Graph showing total and net arrivals to Germany, 1950-2013.](source: Statistisches Bundesamt)

*Note: Data prior to 1990 represents West Germany only*
Table 1.1: Total Number of Residents with Migration Background, Germany, 2005-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>82.47</td>
<td>82.37</td>
<td>82.26</td>
<td>82.14</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>81.72</td>
<td>81.75</td>
<td>81.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population without Migration Background</td>
<td>67.13</td>
<td>67.23</td>
<td>66.85</td>
<td>66.57</td>
<td>65.86</td>
<td>65.97</td>
<td>65.79</td>
<td>65.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population with Migration Background</td>
<td>15.06</td>
<td>15.14</td>
<td>15.41</td>
<td>15.57</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.75</td>
<td>15.96</td>
<td>16.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with Migration Background</td>
<td>18.26</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.73</td>
<td>18.96</td>
<td>19.17</td>
<td>19.27</td>
<td>19.52</td>
<td>19.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2012

Note: Numbers reported in millions of people

Table 1.2 below shows these countries in comparison to other European countries. Unfortunately for easy comparisons, even the best comparative measures at this time rely on reporting from government agencies themselves, who may not be measuring the same phenomena, or who may be using inconsistent measures. The figures here compare the first immigrant generation, making the immigrant-background populations appear artificially a bit low in countries that have had long term settlement of migrants and/or a particularly large second generation.
Table 1.2: Foreign-born Populations in Absolute Numbers and Percentage of the Total Population, European OECD Members, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>970.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1169.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>434.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>358.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>218.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>183.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3824.8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6930.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>757.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>207.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4825.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>786.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>407.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>439.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5711</td>
<td>12.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>655.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1772.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4785</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD 2013

In both the academic and the legal context, there is often considerable disagreement about who counts as an “immigrant.” Is this a term that applies to the foreign-born, those who are yet to naturalize, or all those with migrant-origin? In the European context, for the most part, studies of incorporation have looked beyond just the first generation since their (grand)parents' status is assumed to have a significant, direct effect on their lives, too. The
defining lines between immigrants and their descendants on the one hand and those of native-descent are generally what Richard Alba has termed “bright” boundaries for the groups in question (2005)—clear, ascriptive, and publicly defined—and the unity of these generations as the recipients of specific treatment, based on their own or family's immigration history, makes it clear that there is a qualitative similarity between these groups. In other words, the fact that immigration descent seems to affect so many different outcomes in the second- and third-generation's lives, and because they are often treated in public and governmental discourse as *Ausländer, allochtonen*, or other ways as if their immigrant identity where somehow essential, it makes sense to study their political and social behavior—and political and social behavior targeted at them—as part of the process of immigration and incorporation, in addition to that of the first generation. As with any statistical decision about how to identify ethnic and racial minorities, the decision to measure those with a migration-background comes with risks of essentializing or reifying identities (Zuberi 2001, Simon 2011) Additionally, as time goes on, and as groups enter successive generations, this approach still leaves open the question of where to draw a line and eventually say that members of a group are no longer “migrants” (Bloemraad 2013). Nonetheless, the effect that having a migration background seems to have on the challenges faced by the European second generation (and beyond) would appear to justify trying to understand these generations as a distinct group in terms of how they affect politics, and how politics affects them.

While a number of related terms have entered the discourse, they too are often contested and are also tied into the specific discourse within a country or language; for example, Dutch borrows the more biological terms “autochtone” and “allochtone,” while Germans speak of “persons with a migration background.” The importance of religion, and particularly Islam, in both self-identity and in the way that identity is assigned by majority groups, also suggests that these communities will be regarded distinctly—across multiple
generations—for some time to come (Foner & Alba 2008). Furthermore, the unification of immigrant generations into a general category of “others” is something that has been largely supported by citizenship policy in (most) European countries, which has until recently tended to favor *ius sanguinus* conceptions of citizenship, leaving many native-born Europeans of immigrant stock to remain non-citizens.\(^4\) Insofar as possible, this dissertation uses the term most relevant to the specific context at hand, using the prevalent terms dominant in the national discourses (i.e., “allochtone” and “persons with a migration background”), and the phrases “(im)migrant-origin” or “(im)migrant-background,” in order to indicate that the population of interest for this research is understood to be both immigrants and their descendants.

### 1.2 Incorporation, Assimilation, and Identities

The concept of “incorporation” to describe the degree to which new members of a society adjusted to their new hosts became important in the academic discourse in the 1980s and 1990s as the idea of “assimilation” fell finally out of favor. This happened for a number of reasons. Academics have generally avoided the term for a long time, since the term carries strong normative assumptions; when assimilation is used as a measure of migrants’ process of adaptation to a society, it assumes a way of measuring progress before establishing that this is, in fact, “progress” or that the migrant group wants or should want to become like the native group. Alba and Nee (2003) point to a contemporary view in the literature of assimilation theory as “a form of ‘Eurocentric hegemony,’ a weapon of the majority for putting minorities at a disadvantage by forcing them to live by cultural standards that are not their own.”

\(^4\) For a complete overview of current laws and historical trends in naturalization policy, see Hochschild and Brown (2014)
own.” Beyond this, the concept reduces out some of the complexities that are necessary in understanding the way that immigrants and societies adapt to each other. Instead of having a single benchmark, the concept of incorporation allows for an “interactive process” where groups have a say (if a disadvantaged one) in the terms of adaptation that will be necessary (Zolberg & Woon 1999). Following Alba and Nee (2003), some measures of assimilation may be useful descriptively, but only in the context of how well society adapts in turn to migrants’ presence and other measures of success—or at least lack of social disadvantage—that might develop even as groups assert their distinctiveness. Political incorporation would seem to be possible, then, where there remain significant qualitative differences, so long as there are not significant differences in quality of life, representation, or power.

The phenomena that can be considered within the broader incorporation framework are frequently divided into political, social (or cultural), and economic aspects. For political incorporation, there remains some debate in the literature as to what should be considered the starting and ending points of any conceptual measure. In an assimilationist framework, a simple formulation might have been that political assimilation had been achieved when one’s immigrant status or background ceased to have any measurable effects on the type of political activity engaged in or the chances of success. Groups may be theoretically understood to be effectively incorporated, on the other hand, and still maintain a difference in political beliefs, style or goals—but this makes it more difficult to develop a specific or measurable standard of successful incorporation.

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5 The “classical” view of assimilation as a one-way process of immigrants becoming “American” is most associated with Milton Gordon (1964), which was probably the most definitive work to claim assimilation into mainstream, White American values both as an empirical reality and normative good. While avoiding normative claims, it parallels the assimilationist framework put forward by Rogers Brubaker (1992) and other scholars of the French citizenship regime, and both are contrasted with more ethnic understandings of nationality (e.g., Germany) where migrants would be unlikely to ever fully assimilate or even integrate. Gordon, as with Warner and Srole (1945) and many earlier American sociologists, may on the one hand assert the superiority of “WASP” values, but on the other hand tend to be quite optimistic about migrants’ abilities to conform.
1.3 Theories of Descriptive Representation

The question of what causes greater or smaller number of migrants and their descendants to be represented in parliaments and legislatures is part of a larger debate on descriptive representation. Should members of identifiable minority groups, including immigrants (but also including indigenous ethnic minorities, as well as non-ethnic groups such as women, Deaf people, or the LGBTQ communities), necessarily be represented by people who share this attribute with them? Hannah Pitkin’s (1967) elaboration on the idea of descriptive representation, which “depends on the representative’s characteristics, on what he is or is like, on being rather than doing something,” (p.61) continues to be seen as the starting point of modern political science discussions of representation. Although her ideas are themselves rooted in some of the early modern political philosophers (for example, Burke's understanding of a representative body as “the express image of the feelings of a nation”; cited in Pitkin 1967, 61), her classification into four ideal types of representation has largely set the modern contours of how to understand the broader concept. Descriptive representation, one of these ideal types, is seen by Pitkin as having several justifications—among others, as a way of providing justification for the rule of the few who do what the whole body politic would have done had it been able to make the decision, as a way of organizing each viewpoint into ideal types, and as a way of providing information about what “every worthwhile opinion” actually stands for.

It is the last of those senses that has served as the starting point for a long literature in political science on the question of whether descriptive representation is in itself important, or whether it has innate links to the effectiveness of policy or substantive representation. Pitkin was herself quite concerned about the substantive implications of the idea, which rest on an impossible-to-achieve ideal of perfect representation (1967, 86-87).
While some early empirical studies also questioned the benefits of this linkage (e.g., Swain 1993), more recent studies in American politics have generally found that there are distinct advantages to descriptive representation that spill over into substantive areas (see, for example, Williams 1998; Mansbridge 1999). For Mansbridge, in addition to some real psychological and social benefits to descriptive representation, political actors who share attributes with a disadvantaged community have a considerably easier time communicating with that group than actors who are not a part of the community; the greater the division between the two groups, the more likely descriptive representation will be necessary in order to foster any communication between the two (1999, 643). For Mansbridge, the presence of at least some significant degree of descriptive representation is necessary for any “adequate communication in contexts of mistrust.” (628). Later studies, such as Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (2004) have shown that descriptive representation, independent of the question of how well the representative actually stands for the community (which remains an elusive concept to study), does indeed have a positive effect on the knowledge about and attitudes toward government that members of these under-represented communities have. They found embers of minority groups in the United States and New Zealand to be more likely to turn out at elections when they were represented by a member of their own minority, and to be more likely to approve of government or make efforts to contact their representatives.

One of the more visible and straightforward ways of seeing incorporation is thus to look at levels of descriptive representation. That is to say, how many positions of influence are filled by people who are themselves members of a given community? Descriptive representation in legislative bodies has been one of the better-developed measures of political incorporation among migrant communities for a number of reasons—not the least of which being, admittedly, that it is one of the easiest to measure. Its importance comes with

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6 Or at least in certain, specific contexts (e.g., Cameron, Epstein & O'Halloran 1996).
several important caveats, however, including the fact that descriptive representation need
not necessarily imply actual, meaningful representation on issues of importance to the
community. Furthermore, it is difficult to tell simply from ethnic background whether a
candidate is nominated due to a party's sincere interest in representing a community, due to a
simple interest in gaining votes from other members of that community, or due to the
individual candidate's effectiveness as a politician simply trying to get themselves nominated
for office—or some combination of the three.

While the American literature has been positive about the importance of descriptive
representation, it should be pointed out that the results of comparative studies have been
mixed, and there is simply a smaller sample of studies in the European context on which to
draw. However, the inclusion of representation debates into the specific literature on
European migration is quite recent, largely because systematic representation of immigrant
minorities is itself a fairly recent phenomenon—and it would not have been expected before
at least some sizable community was established in these countries. Now that the proportion
of the populations in most European countries with a migration background has increased
dramatically—and most importantly because the proportion of these countries' citizens that
have a migration background has risen particularly in the last two decades—there should be
an increase in the number of representatives within parties and legislative bodies who
themselves have a migration background.

Bird, Saalfield and Wüst (2011) remains the only major cross-national study, and in
the end their conclusions are limited to observations of recruitment and electoral patterns
without much further exploration into the quality of representation. At the country-specific
level, Nixon (1998) found the role of of minority members of parliament (MPs) in the British
parliament to largely fill roles other than that of community representative, implying that
these MPs did not serve as mediating connections between their communities and
governmental power structures. However, Melissa Williams (1998), writing at roughly the same
time, found that these descriptive links were very important in the quality of representation
provided by representatives in the American context, and her findings are largely echoed in
contemporary times by a study of Congressional committee chairs and policy content by Ellis
and Wilson (2013). German studies have emerged to report levels of representation (e.g.,
Donovan 2007, Schönwälder, Sinanoglu & Volkert 2011), but there has been little done to
measure the causes of success or failure in terms of the level of descriptive representation
achieved.

In looking at party politics, descriptive representation can also be seen as a strategic
choice on the part of parties who are interested in reaching out to a new population. Parties
have a choice between programmatic and personal strategies when reaching out to a
particular constituency. The former involves parties taking (and publicizing) policy positions
and the latter involves reaching out directly to voters or to groups speaking on their behalf.
Descriptive representation can be an effective personal strategy for parties if immigrant
voters and their descendants are, ceteris paribus, more likely to vote for someone of the
same background. For the American case, at least, there is evidence for this in prior waves of
immigrants (Glazer & Moynihan 1963, Wolfinger 1964) and in the modern era (Barreto 2007,
Nuño 2007). Post-election surveys suggest this also holds true in Europe (e.g., van Heelsum &
Tillie 2006), but the evidence here is again limited.

1.3.1 Factors affecting minorities in legislatures

There is no country in North America or Western Europe where the level of non-native
minority\textsuperscript{7} representation in the national legislature matches the level of immigrant or non-

\textsuperscript{7} This paper will intentionally avoid the issue of native minority representation, not because it is unimportant,
but because a largely separate literature has developed around these issues because of the different legal and
normative contexts surrounding native minorities in most country.
native minority. The share of parliament in these countries made up of either minorities or immigrants varies from a low of less than one-half of one percent in Italy to more than 15 percent in the United States (Brouard & Tiberj 2011). There exist countries (such as the Netherlands) where the gap has shrunk considerably, and at the same time, there are other countries (such as France) where the gap remains quite large—and may even be moving slightly backward (Brouard & Tiberj 2011, Bloemraad 2013). While there may not be a firm conclusion on the best explanations for variations in level of descriptive representation, some patterns appear to emerge.

First, the question of voting eligibility matters. It should not be surprising that there has been a larger disconnect between the numbers of immigrant representatives and the size of the overall migration-background community where a smaller proportion of the community is eligible to vote. This can be due to large-scale illegal immigration (as in the American case) or due to a difficult or exclusionary citizenship policy (as in Switzerland or in Germany prior to 1999). In either circumstance, the fact that large swaths of the immigrant population are ineligible to vote reduces the potential pool of immigrant politicians and, in turn, the overall electoral power of the immigrant community. That these sectors of the population cannot participate in electoral politics does not mean that they have no political power or organizational capacities (via labor unions, civic associations, protest movements, etc.), but the group’s capacity to become an electoral force is remains limited to the size of the voting-eligible population rather than the size of the immigrant community at large. In that context, for example, the 4.9 percent of the U.S. House and Senate of Hispanic background following the 2010 elections is rather divergent from the almost 16 percent of the population of Hispanic origin, but much closer to the estimated 6.8 percent of the voting population identified as Hispanic in that year.  

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8 Data from the 2009 American Community Survey. It should be noted that these percentages are for all Hispanic-origin residents and/or voters, not accounting for immigration status.
Another factor pointed to as likely affecting levels of minority representation is the nature of the electoral system. In general, the use of proportional representation and multi-member districts in a system have been shown to increase the probability that minorities, understood broadly, will be represented. There have been a few studies of how this relates specifically to immigrant populations in Europe (most comprehensively, Togeby 2008 on Denmark), but in comparative politics most of the literature that has focused on this problem has been oriented toward native minorities and underrepresented groups, rather than immigrant groups (e.g., Htun 2004, Krook & O'Brien 2010 in the gender politics literature, Horowitz 2003 in the institutional design literature, Welch 1990 & Bowler, Donovan & Brockington 2003 in the American politics literature). However, if minorities are highly concentrated geographically, there is the potential for them to reach majority status in a number of constituencies, such that a candidate from the relevant minority group could expect negligible negative discrimination and even some positive discriminatory effects from members of their own ethnic group. This last argument is important for Barbara Donovan (2007), who suggests that once migrant-background candidates started to run on the first ballot (majoritarian), rather than the second ballot (PR) in the states, geographic concentrations were sufficient to enable a number of politicians to finally enter the state legislature—and indeed, they were more likely to succeed via individual than via party mandates, in opposition to federal elections where they seemed to do better on the second ballot. Rafaela Dancygier (2014) finds something similar occurring in a growing number of parliamentary constituencies in the U.K. If parties are simply not making efforts to increase the number (and placement) of immigrant minorities on the ballot, or if there is uncertainty about how minorities might be able to use the electoral system to increase representation of their group, there may not be reason to expect much of a difference between either system (Togeby 2008). Michon and Tillie (2011) and Teney et al (2010), for example, find similar
enthusiasm for co-ethnic candidates in the Netherlands and Belgium, respectively, but only occasionally find this translated into increased representation.

If there are few specific studies of the phenomena, there are even fewer cross-national comparisons of minorities in parliaments, making broad comparative surveys difficult. The broadest attempt so far has been Irene Bloemraad’s (2013) representation index, comparing countries on a ratio of the proportion of minorities in the legislative body to the proportion of the population with a minorities in the overall population, for which she is able to report data for nine countries. But she is reliant on earlier studies, which each define the minority group of interest differently (e.g., all visible minorities in one case, specific migrant groups in another.) Apart from this, a few dual-country studies have shown the promise of comparing immigrants in parliament and in local government as an outcome, including among others Irene Bloemraad’s (2006) study of the United States and Canada and Romain Garbaye’s (2005) comparison of France and the United Kingdom, and the case analyses contained in Bird, Saalfeld and Wüst’s (2011) edited volume suggest a number of parallels but, being written separately by individual country experts, are not quite true comparative studies. In these studies, numbers of migrant-background representatives are shown to slowly increasing, efforts to increase descriptive representation are seen as coming sometimes from the grassroots (as in the U.K, Denmark and Norway) and sometimes from the party leaders reaching out to community organizations (as in France). Citizenship policy seems to be a structuring factor, with greater rates of citizenship and more inclusive policy leading to more opportunities to participate, but some indeterminacy over whether explicit multiculturalism as a policy is better or worse for facilitating immigrant’s incorporation.

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9 These countries are: Australia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and several of these for either multiple groups or time periods. All but the Netherlands, it should be mentioned, score poorly on this measure.
1.4 Parties and Immigration

In American politics, a large literature has shown the efforts taken by political parties to recruit immigrant voters (e.g., Gamm 1989, Erie 1990 for earlier periods; DeSipio 1996, Ramakrishnan 2005 for contemporary processes). However, the European historical experience has been drastically different. European countries were largely immigrant-sending nations rather than immigrant-receiving nations when suffrage was expanded around the turn of the last century, which is also the time when American immigrants were being won over to politics and to the political parties.

These efforts by parties to win voter loyalty have facilitated much of the political incorporation of immigrants. Where political parties have put less effort into immigrant outreach, incorporation has generally also faltered (Wong 2006). With this rise in political party recruitment came a rise in the number of “ethnic politicians,” or political leaders who had risen from within the immigrant communities. The success of these leaders varied. In some cases, single ethnic groups came to dominate politics to the exclusion of other groups. In other cases, groups formed coalitions against the native-born “WASPs,” and in yet other places immigrants struggled for years to gain a foothold in politics. Robert Dahl (1961) viewed this as a process that took several generations to accomplish, and which went hand-in-hand with other forms of incorporation. Later authors have explained variations in the success of these groups, either across cities or across ethnic groups, in terms of political opportunity structure and have pointed to the importance of political machines (Erie 1990). Ethnic coalitions within political machines were built into the fabric of most major American cities by the end of the 19th century, and though there were variations in their composition and power over time, they remained a powerful force in politics even after new arrivals were restricted by the 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts, well into the middle decades of the 20th
century. While not every group was represented as effectively by these machines as others (Irish immigrants being seen as the particular beneficiaries in most large cities), the machines became an important mediating point between sectors of the immigrant community and the political institutions of American society (Erie 1990, Krase & LaCerra 1991, Wong 2006).

The American context gives us some ideas about the possible contours of how European parties might reach out to migrants, but this process is still at a much earlier phase, and the unilateral success of left-leaning parties in reaching out to new immigrant groups has traditionally been seen as limiting the level of competition between parties for these votes. Left-wing parties—not limited to but especially including social democratic parties—have been seen as reaching out to these groups simply because parties see immigrants as members of the working-class and therefore the working-class party or parties and migrants would have the most obvious natural sympathies. As an underlying dynamic, this is probably not incorrect—economic issues are clearly important to most voters, the immigrant community is indeed more highly represented among the working classes, and so far it is indeed the social-democratic and other parties of the working-class left that have benefited the most. But while there is a correlation, there is a considerable amount of variation in this group's vote choice, and this simple story seems to ignore a number of the potential influences on voters' party choices.

1.4.1 Immigration and the Mainstream Left

In Europe, at least, this theoretical affinity does seem to be borne out by empirical evidence. Prior studies have shown that individuals with an immigration background are considerably more likely to vote for parties of the left than the general populace. In the U.K., Labour has consistently received greater than 2/3 of the vote of visible minorities over the
last few decades (Messina 2007). In Germany, Turkish-origin voters support the Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) at levels over 60 percent (Bird, Saalfeld & Wüst 2011). In the Netherlands, while there is some variation across immigrants of different national origin, the Dutch Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) has been the predominant choice of immigrant voters since at least the early 1980s. In the 2011 regional elections, PvdA support ranged from a low of 27 percent among Surinamese voters to a high of 68 percent among voters with a Moroccan background, as against 17 percent support from the overall electorate. When the other parties of the left and center-left are included (The GreenLeft, the Socialist Party, and the D66), vote share ranges from 62 percent among Surinamese to 94 percent among Moroccans, although these parties together received only slightly more than 40 percent of the overall vote. Furthermore, the only group which showed noticeably diminishing support for the PvdA in some previous elections—voters of Turkish origin—appears to have returned to the party in the last few years, and 57 percent of Turkish voters backed the party in the latest provincial elections (Michon, Tillie & van Heelsum 2007, FORUM 2011).

Where left-leaning parties are also traditionally more sympathetic to expansionary citizenship policies, and naturalized voters are more likely to vote for these parties, there might also be a cyclical dynamic that might cause shifts in either direction to help sustain themselves—moves toward a more liberal citizenship policy might increase the left-voting electorate that might support further such moves, and moves to the right might decrease the future size of such an electorate.¹⁰

However, parties of the left have also traditionally earned a large section of their support from the native-born working class, who are the most likely to see themselves in competition with immigrants for both market and government resources. A number have

¹⁰ A dynamic which is not dissimilar to that experienced during the general extension of suffrage in many of these same European countries.
studies have shown that a sizable portion of the growth in populist radical right movements in Europe has come from former supporters of parties of the left rather than from Conservative, Christian Democratic, or other parties of the right (Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Givens 2005). As predicted by Kitschelt and others at the inception of this literature, these former sources of support on the left have increasingly tended to be not only among the working class, but also young and male, the so-called “losers of globalization.” to use Kriesi et al’s (2006) term; the broader term “modernization losers” has also been used (e.g., Williams 2006). Social democratic parties have not had a uniform, programmatic response to this transition, although by the end of the first decade of the 2000s, a dominant discourse within many of these parties was that they had “not so much stood up to or ignored radical right wing populists as conceded too much to them in an often vain attempt to limit their appeal” (Bale et al, 2011).

Outside of a general movement toward the right, do working-class voters specifically oppose the entrance of new migrants? Existing research appears to show that they do, either for economic reasons (Scheve & Slaughter 2001, Mughan, Bean & McAllister 2003; Norris 2005) or for cultural reasons (Sides & Citrin 2007, Oesch 2008, Ceobanu & Escandell 2011), but it is not a simple fact that lacks exceptions or variations across the European cases. Perhaps more questionably, do voters with a migration background themselves actually support increased migration, and what type of integration measures do they favor? It is not unthinkable that working-class natives and migrants might disagree on how integration should proceed, but that both would favor “shutting the door” behind them.

There are some parallels here to the expansion to universal suffrage that occurred in

While not entirely refuting this, Bale et al do suggest that party leaders holding this view are overestimating the scale of their parties’ reaction, if not its direction.

And although highly-skilled workers have been seen as more uniformly supportive of pro-immigration policies (Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007, 2010), there are notable exceptions here too (see, for example, Helbling 2011).
most of Western Europe in the late 1800s and early 1900s. As documented by Przeworski and Sprague (1986) and Kalyvas (1996), the extension of voting rights to working-class and (in most places) female voters created not only opposition among those who feared they would lose power under the new system, but also a crisis within those parties who might otherwise assume that they had much to gain from the expanded votes. How could they reach out to this new class of citizens without losing the support of those who were already in their camp?

Apart from those issues pertaining directly to migration and integration, various groups’ preferences are likely to vary on economic and social issues, the more “traditional” questions of elections. If working-class natives and migrants occupy the same positions in the labor market, it might be expected that they would tend to agree on issues of welfare state expansion and contraction, job training programs, and educational reforms (particularly with regard to job training). Relatedly, in a scenario where there is wide variation within the group of native-born workers on a particular issue, one might expect to see variation with similar means and distributions among the migrant community. On other issues, there may be distinct sectional differences: working-class natives, for example, might be strongly in favor of society’s secularization but migrants might want the government to continue supporting and protecting religious institutions in society. While some parties may be able to frame different appeals to different groups simultaneously (see Miller 2013), this balancing act can be difficult depending on the structure of party competition in a given context.

Lastly, one party’s success in reaching migrant-background candidates could pressure other parties to be seen as making similar efforts. Parties may perceive that they could be stigmatized for providing insufficient numbers of candidates from a underrepresented group if other parties are emphasizing their own inclusion of these groups. This process has been documented within parties’ nomination of female candidates (beginning with Matland & Studlar 1995), including in the German context (Krook & O’Brien 2010). At this time, however,
there has not been confirmation of this effect on migrant-background candidates in Europe, and American literature on the topic has been affected by the polarization of racial and minority voting such that this sort of pressure across parties is specifically not predicted (Trounstine & Valdini 2008).

1.4.2 Immigration beyond the Mainstream Left

While the majority of the literature focused on the interaction between parties, migrants and immigration has been focused on social democratic parties and parties of the mainstream left, there also exists a more limited, but growing, literature on other party families.

Most of the radical right literature to date has taken the politics of the immigration issue seriously, but it, too, has largely ignored immigrants themselves as potential voters. Existing studies have tended to either focus on a spatial model which has opened up a new voting dimension (e.g., Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt 1994, 1995; Kriesi et al 2006, 2008; Norris 2005) or has focused on the socioeconomic causes of support for the “populist radical right” (e.g., Betz 1994; Golder 2003, Mudde 2007). A third, more recent literature has finally begun to emphasize the importance of institutional opportunities and mainstream party strategies for these new populist radical right movements to appear (van der Brug et al. 2005; Meguid 2005, 2008), but here, too, the emphasis has been on immigration as an issue rather than on immigrants as potential voters affecting party strategies.

The optimal response from Christian Democratic and other center-right parties is a bit unclear, and depends on the strategic threat perceived in parties of the radical right. For those who see the radical right drawing foremost from the center-right parties (e.g., Meguid 2008), it would be unlikely for these parties to take extensive outreach efforts that might
drive their electoral base to further support the more radical parties. On the other hand, if
the primary constituency for populist radical right movements comes from former supporters
of the left, the potential costs of such an outreach effort might be heavily mitigated—the
right might not feel that their voters will be as quick to abandon them to the radical right as
their opponents’ voters will be. One phenomenon that has been mentioned occasionally in the
German news and editorial press\textsuperscript{13}—but much less so in the academic literature—is the
potential for outreach by Christian Democratic parties to immigrants with a high degree of
religiosity. The underlying logic here is that new citizens, particularly Muslims, tend to be
more observant and active in religion, and may be natural allies of these parties against
secularizing forces. While their numbers appear to be few, there are a few prominent Muslim
members within CDU leadership (perhaps most notably Aygül Özkan, who served at the
ministerial level in Niedersachsen between 2010 and 2013) to provide at least anecdotal
support for this idea, and the establishment of the Deutsch-Türkisches Forum in the CDU has
been an attempt to give a clear and credible signal that the party is actively open to voters
with a Turkish background.\textsuperscript{14}

Green parties may be particularly interesting as they may be the least constrained in
terms of their programmatic stances on this issue. From an ideological standpoint, these
parties in Europe tend to be among the strongest in favor of expansive, rights-based
conceptions of citizenship and migration policies. Voters for these parties have tended not to
be drawn from the working-class, economic left, but rather better educated and socially
liberal voters (Dolezal 2010, Rüdig 2012). While they have been the most visibly “pro-
immigrant” parties in some regards, it is less clear that they are parties that provide any

\textsuperscript{13} See Sagener (2013) for a recent example from \textit{Die Zeit}.

\textsuperscript{14} The language this group uses is primarily in the \textit{Volkspartei} tradition, as in this example from the party’s mission
statement: “The CDU as a party of the people, that brings together diverse societal groups as a union, must
also open itself still further to the large group of Turkish-origin (\textit{türkistammigen}) people.” (DTF 2012, p. 9)
effective degree of substantive representation to migrant communities. On the one hand, it is possible that a pro-immigrant strategy is a way to appeal to native-born voters rather than to migrants themselves. This might come as a way to soften a party's image among moderate, majority-background voters (Fraga & Leal 2004) or as part of asserting assimilationist claims rather than exclusionary claims which appeal to conservative native-born voters but try to avoid alienating future voters who still in the process of acquiring citizenship (Miller 2013). Alternatively, it may be that a pro-immigrant stance is indeed the most salient issue to those with a migration background, such that policy disagreements on other issues are overshadowed by this primary, identity based issue.

1.5 Conclusion & Dissertation Outline

Several literatures thus create a framework for understanding the descriptive representation of immigrant-background voters. Descriptive representation is a crucial aspect, and a useful measure, of the degree to which migrants are incorporated into politics, and levels of representation are low but (unevenly) increasing across Europe. The American experience further shows that all parties should have rational incentives to court these voters, but so far, in most European countries, this group has been mobilized, if at all, by parties of the left—but there is some increasing movement toward broader outreach in the European context and, perhaps, some retrenchment in the American, and the populist right remains a potential confounder in terms of the immigration debate in both countries, though it is less clear their impact on minority representation.

What is lacking is a systematic explanation of why levels of representation are so uneven across countries. Why, exactly, are minority-background politicians more likely to achieve representation in the Netherlands or the U.S., and so much less likely in other places?
While it has not been examined with regard to the immigrant-background population, there is some suggestive evidence that electoral rules and other structural incentives may matter for other groups; can this be applied equally as well to European immigrants and their descendants as it can for women or for African-Americans?

In the next chapter, I put forward several potentially illustrative theories of political involvement and candidate recruitment. The foundations laid here in terms of descriptive representation will give us a number of theories to test, to better explain some of this variation and to think a bit more broadly about what it looks like for parties to try and recruit immigrant candidates, and for these candidates to be successful. These theories focus on two types of institution that appear to have the greatest impact on levels of descriptive representation: electoral rules and political parties.

The chapter that follows looks at how immigrant politics have played out in a specific city, Rotterdam in the Netherlands, to see how these processes of learning have taken place and to develop some potential ways to measure factors affecting migrant outreach. The case suggests that there should be variation across specific migration communities. Additionally, the presence of a preference voting mechanism has offered candidates with a migration background the opportunity to undertake more successful, more personalized campaigns. This provides individuals with a migration background the opportunity to develop personal connections with communities, and allows a new source of information to parties in the ways that migrants are able to successfully draw support.

Chapter 4 moves up to the national level, to look at Dutch elections as a whole, in order to confirm that voters with a migration background are actually receiving support from members of their own communities. It finds some support across all migrant groups for migrants in general, but finds in particular that Turkish candidates seem to be able to draw on support from other Turkish-background citizens, but that candidates from another large
group, Moroccan-background Dutch, do not seem to be able to do so systematically.

The following chapter crosses into Germany to test whether the presence of open-list systems really does make the important difference in descriptive representation that it would appear to in the Dutch case. The chapter examines city councils in the larger German cities, and by looking at the differences between cities that do or do not have open-list ballots, finds that this indeed appears to be a strong factor in the rate at which migrant-origin politicians serve on city councils, even controlling for the size of the migrant population (which, in fact appears to be a rather unimportant explanation for the variation.

Chapter 6 then looks at two cities where the voting system was changed prior to the 2011 election. Hamburg and Bremen, two of the German city-states, switched to a five-vote cumulative voting system from a partially-open-list and a strictly closed-list system, respectively. In both cases, the switch corresponded to greatly increased numbers of migrants on their city councils, but this vote can only be traced to support from the candidates’ own community in the Bremen case. The dissertation concludes with some directions for future research, building on the findings of the importance of the institutional effects observed.
Chapter 2 — Theories of Migrant Representation

In this chapter, I suggest that two categories of institutions are most important for understanding the variations in migrant-background representation. Understanding these categories also sheds light on the mechanisms by which individual candidates attain representation. The first of these is the electoral context; the rules under which elections are administered and votes are tallied. Because these institutional frameworks determine so much of the way in which polities “make votes count” (to borrow Gary Cox’ (1997) appropriate nuance), it should not be surprising that they have consequences for who actually takes office; I will suggest that these can be both intended and unintended. Political parties make up the second type of institution that I argue is critical to understanding migrant descriptive representation. As suggested in the previous chapter, there are rational incentives for almost all parties to expand the size of their electorate if they are able to do so. However, there are important limitations on how they might be able to make the necessary outreach, particularly insofar as the way they can learn effective strategies. The chapter below outlines the ways that electoral rules and process of learning within parties structure migrant-background candidates’ chances of success and the levels of descriptive representation achieved, which will be tested in the rest of the dissertation. It also pits these against a simpler, structural or demographic argument that representation might simply be increasing with levels of migrant-background voters in the electorate.

15 For the effect of both electoral rules and parties, a “rational-choice institutionalist” approach (see Hall & Taylor 1996) is emphasized but it is not intended as the only understanding of these mechanisms.
2.1 Electoral Rules

Assuming that elections are held freely and fairly, why are variations in electoral rules important for representation outcomes? A long literature in political science has established that these variations create corresponding variations in the way that voters are able to think about and express preference for the choices they are given. Voting rules have been shown to affect the incentives of parties to either move toward the political extremes or the center (Cox 1990), the degree to which voters can vote strategically (Cox 1997), the ease or difficulty of choosing non-status quo options (Tsebelis 2002), and more.\(^\text{16}\) There are also serious impacts on how the preferences and the quality of representation are measured—when votes are observed, it is not voters’ true and complete preferences that are observed, but “only that relative to the alternatives and in the given circumstances [their choice] seemed the most preferable.” (Powell 2000, 16)

One of the important distinctions to make between types of electoral systems is between those that emphasize individual candidates and those that emphasize parties or electoral coalitions. In terms of being able to observe voters’ preferences for candidates that share an origin or background (in this case, specifically those with a migration background), the first type of system should be expected to operate rather differently than the second, as the first allows individual voters a direct method of expressing their candidate-specific preferences, translating into greater success for the most-preferred candidate. While a preference for descriptive representation is not the only reason that a voter might opt for a specific candidate, this set of rules contains a mechanism by which that preference can figure directly into their vote decision. In cases where voters do not vote for specific candidates, voters can only punish or reward parties for the composition of their entire list.

The contrast between the two is often presented as a question of single-member

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\(^{16}\) See Boix (1999) for both an authoritative literature review and a theory of different systems’ historical origins.
districts versus proportional representation. The former is more candidate-focused, while the latter tends to be more party-focused, and it is associated with greater degrees of party discipline—giving the party rather than the voter a greater degree of input into the nature of the specific candidates (Hix 2004). Yet each may be better for descriptive representation under different circumstances. There is a tradition in political science of encouraging proportional representation in especially heterogeneous societies—most importantly by Arend Lijphart (1977)—as a way of allowing parties to effectively represent different interest groups in coalitions. This approach assumes, however, that balance among rather than within the parties will be most stable. It further assumes that each party can individually stand for a group needing representation. In a world viewed in terms of permanent cleavages (following Lipset & Rokkan (1967)), stability is easier to envision than in a polity where new cleavages are emerging. Where a new ethnic or minority group arises that remains unrepresented by the parties, it is much less clear whether Lijphart’s recommendations can apply effectively to balancing these new groups.

2.1.1 Electoral Rules, Preference Voting, and Women’s Representation

There are also types of proportional representation that also allow for greater input into the choice of candidate. These voting rules give voters the chance to cast preference votes for candidates on a party’s list, overriding the party’s nominations to some extent—although the required proportion of votes that a candidate must individually receive to be elected from lower on the party list can vary significantly between different countries. Nonetheless, candidates again become more important in these races, and they can be punished or rewarded for specific attributes.

Most of the work around open-list systems and their effects on representation has
come with regard to women’s representation, rather than on ethnic or migrant minorities. A number of earlier works, including Matland (1998) and Norris (2004) suggested that proportional representation and tighter party control over candidate nomination had been generally better for women’s chances of being nominated as candidates. However, this early optimism for closed-list systems has been tempered somewhat in light of more and more case studies, particularly ones comparing elections in developed and developing nations. As Matland (2005) points out, the effect of preference voting depends on how supportive the parties on the one hand and the voting public on the other are of female candidates. Closed-list systems seem to work well for women when the parties are particularly supportive of their ambitions at times when the public at large is not, since it would be expected that female candidates would not do well at the polls under these circumstances. In these cases, parties are acting with a “logic of inclusion” (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer 2012, p.15; see also Kittilson 2006) toward women (as one of many interest groups who ought to be represented) that outstrips the desires of the general public. One additional factor that may tend to influence these connections is a result of several interacting processes: where proportional representation exists, government policies will tend toward larger welfare states (Iversen & Soskice 2006) and women’s preferences on the welfare state have been moving toward the left in most contexts (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2006). There may therefore be a mutually reinforcing cycle in a number of countries between proportional representation, increasing women’s participation and representation, and an increasingly large welfare state (Rosenbluth, Salmond & Theis 2006).

For women in the German case, the argument against open-list systems seems to be

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17 If parties do not have strong incentives to include particular interest groups, then they may have a positive incentive to prefer open-list systems: “It is true, however, that open lists let the parties ‘off the hook’: they are not responsible for the final outcome. The final outcome rests with thousands of individual voters making individual decisions. If the sum of all those individual decisions is that women are voted down and out of parliament, the parties cannot be held responsible, as they cannot control how their supporters vote” (Matland 2005, 105)
In a comparative study of women’s representation across all municipal elections in Germany in the period 2004-2009, Raphael Magin (2011) found evidence of systematic discrimination against female candidates in open-list systems. This effect was not extremely large (female candidates received a vote share about 1.4 percentage points lower than they would have expected given all other factors), but did appear to be nearly universal (p.49).

In general, one might generalize that the effect of the electoral rule depends on whether voters are expected to have higher or lower preferences for voters of a specific group than the parties. If voters are biased against female or minority candidates, then greater voter input into candidate selection should be detrimental to their descriptive representation. If they are biased in their favor, or if it is thought that parties are discriminatory in some way, then open-list systems should increase their representation.

2.1.2. Representation and Coordination Problems

As mentioned above, these theories of electoral systems are relatively well established in certain contexts but as yet there have been few studies looking specifically at immigrant-background groups in Europe. In extending these ideas to these groups, I propose here one more factor that may further complicate the way that these rules affect representation outcomes—the size of the minority group seeking representation.

One of the major problems in selecting a candidate from among multiple options is successful coordination. As Cox (1997) points out, coordination problems are among the key organizing facts of representative democracy, and choices about when to coordinate (and when to risk a coordination failure) condition many political outcomes; incentives underlying these choices are in turn often structured by the rules of the electoral system. Coordination problems occur when actors making a strategic decision have incentives to coordinate on any
of several outcomes; coordination failures occur when actors face a sub-optimal equilibrium (due to mismatched incentives and/or lack of credible communication) where they cannot agree on which decision to jointly choose. In summarizing the dilemma that voters and candidates face, Cox writes: “Successful electoral coordination necessarily involves a reduction in the number of competitors; but such a reduction necessarily entails a selection of which competitors will survive, and this selection potentially has important policy effects.” (p.5).\(^{18}\)

In open-list systems, voters face an important coordination problem in selecting a candidate, particularly insofar as group representation is concerned. For immigrants seeking to elect either more candidates with an immigration background generally or more members of their specific origin group, there is a choice of whom to support that may make strategic voting difficult. In particular, votes in this type of system need to be effectively distributed (rather than pooled on a single candidate), and the potential for wasted votes occurs as voters give their preference votes to candidates whose election is already guaranteed either by their party list ranking or by the preference votes given them by other group members. This is effectively the same problem faced by women, as a voter wishing to see more women elected will have similar difficulty knowing how to cast their ballot in a way that will strategically improve the chances that more women will be elected. However, these two groups are vastly different in terms of size. Women make up, with some slight variation, 50 percent of the population while migrants in effectively all European contexts make up less than this, sometimes drastically so, especially if the focus is on specific origin groups rather than the entire migrant-background community. Furthermore, if women and migrants are both underrepresented, the problem is relatively worse for migrants. This means that migrant-background electorates simply have less raw voting power than women. But I argue

\(^{18}\) See both Cox (1997) and Carey (2000) for extensive reviews of coordination problems in political science.
that they also have an important advantage—the coordination problem that Cox describes is often effectively solved by the low number of relevant candidates on the ballot. How to strategically coordinate among the number of women on the ballot should be significantly harder than choosing between two or three candidates from one's own origin group. The number of competitors has already been reduced, not by competition, but by structural, population factors.

This coordination problem helps explain one of the main assertions and theoretical contributions of this dissertation. Electoral rules will benefit different disadvantaged groups differently, and specifically, the kind of candidate-centered rules that have traditionally (and, I will find some evidence, still to this day) disadvantaged women may be beneficial to increasing immigrant minorities' descriptive representation.

One last assumption that should be made explicit is an expectation that members of migrant-origin groups will have a positive preference for voting for candidates of their own group. As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a reasonable amount of evidence for this from the American case but less so in the European context. Furthermore, most of this comes from attitudinal surveys, but there have been fewer—and fewer successful—attempts to measure these effects directly or with regard to preference votes. In later chapters, there will therefore be attempts to further establish that migrant-background voters in the two countries here examined do in fact have a greater propensity to vote for members of their own group (and that migrant-background voters owe some of their success to these voters).

2.2 Parties, Learning, and Positive Feedback

The literature reviewed in Chapter 1 shows that the immigration and party politics literature have developed a variety of approaches in an attempt to explain parties'
relationships to immigrant-background voters, but the vast majority of them focus on a specific set of rational incentives faced by the parties. It is possible that, instead of being (solely) limited by the issue space in which they must compete against other parties and by the issue positions taken by other parties in the same system, there are important institutional and technological limitations on the abilities of parties to adopt a perfectly optimal strategy. Parties may want to maximize votes,\textsuperscript{19} and they may be willing—in fact, eager—to adopt the strategies that would allow them to do so. But they may be unable to do so in some situations, either because they do not know how, or are restricted in some sense from undertaking the strategies that would let them maximize votes. In this way, “technology” is understood to broadly include problems with the “how-to” of campaigning and politicking. This definitely includes such issues as media outreach and the use of new media (social media, etc.). But these type of problems correspond with larger questions of having methods with which to conduct outreach. This problem is especially visible in the case of migrant-background voters, such that parties who have a rational interest in pursuing an outreach strategy (and are aware of this being an optimal, or at least a dominant, strategy), are unable to do so because of a lack of opportunity and/or a lack of knowledge.

I argue that an additional type of process might be at work in determining parties methods of deciding how they can and should run outreach campaigns aimed at migration-background voters. This process creates a set of increasing returns (in terms of earning a group’s votes and increasing a group’s identity with a party) that parties see from initial instances of successful outreach.

The process of increasing returns can best be seen as a kind of a generalized feedback loop or equilibrium that begins with the entrants of a small number of members of the targeted community. There is a somewhat universal nature to this view—barring unusual

\textsuperscript{19} Or seats, or resources, etc.
circumstances, parties will continue to do well in their outreach efforts if, and only if, they are able to make an initial, successful connection.

One of the greatest apparent difficulties that parties have in structuring any outreach effort is knowing which strategies, if any, will be successful in attracting voters from the migrant communities that they might target. At the most basic level, in order to adapt their political actions to the preferences, parties and politicians need to learn what these preferences are. There are some ways of doing this, such as polling, that might seem (relatively) easy, but it can be difficult for political actors to know the accuracy or uncertainty inherent in whichever methods translate a constituency's actual preferences into the information they see. This is particularly the case with small populations, such as the subset of voters with a migration background. Simply put, parties may or may not in any given case actually have a good idea of what these voters want, and this can have important political consequences.

Beyond simply learning voters' policy preferences, there are also a number of other relevant types of information flow, most importantly knowledge of how to carry out campaign actions. For example, national party organizations can develop some forms of strategy and provide this information to local organizations and individual activists. This takes place in internal documents and training manuals, via “boot camps” where activists are instructed in campaign techniques, through the participation of national campaign leaders in the activities of local organizations, and so on. There can also be internal learning processes, such that organizations learn how to run a campaign by doing what they did last time—theoretically learning from their past efforts what worked, and what did not. But the transmission of these knowledge flows will also vary in regard to a) what will work in practice and b) what the national parties actually want to have happen.
2.2.1 Individual Activists and the Value of Community Membership

The effect that individual activists from within the communities in question can have in mediating this process also remains under-studied. An interpretation of activists' roles as important does not require that these individuals bring in perfect information or have perfect connections to all potentially useful networks. However, it does assume—and I will argue with good reason—that the knowledge they bring is at least as accurate, if not better, than that possessed by non-members of the group in practically every individual case.

The specific knowledge that candidates of migrant origin bring has many facets to it, and it is rarely going to be the case that any specific candidate comes prepared with all of the different potential types of knowledge that a party would find useful in reaching out to a particular group. But each will likely add some significant amount of linguistic knowledge, familiarity with foreign-language media, networks and/or membership in organizations (church, mosque, social, activist, etc.) which contain large numbers of voters with a migration background, familiarity with networks in migrant communities irrespective of personal place in those networks, and so on. By looking at these various types of knowledge, one can eliminate an assumption that is sometimes made in the academic and popular literature as well as by the parties themselves; namely, that candidates need not see particular migrant group's identity as their primary identity in order to be a useful contact within that group. A number of different motivations can bring these activists to the party in the first place: ideological sympathies (a belief in social democracy, free markets, environmentalism, etc.); a belief that political activism can further their individual careers; incidental connections, friendships, and social opportunities that bring them to a political community (rather than an organization based on other specific interests); expectation of

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20 That is to say, an ascriptive member of the community will be more likely to know the important people in a community network in ways and with a degree of accuracy that an outsider might not, even if that individual is not actually themselves connected to these specific nodes in the network.
personal/clientelistic benefits, etc. A desire to represent one’s immigrant group is one of many important reasons that may bring individuals to politics, but it is not independently necessary for learning mechanisms to work with regard to that group.

For parties trying to determine strategies, there are types of knowledge these candidates and activists can bring that may exist separately from their degree of identification as a member of a particular group. Those individuals who associate themselves strongly with their group of origin, particularly insofar as they are highly connected within specifically ethnic- or migrant-origin networks, may bring a relatively higher level of knowledge about their specific community. This can be a difference in degree, in qualitative type, or both; in almost all cases, the knowledge and networks brought to parties by the participation of immigrant-origin activists is going to be greater—and usually very significantly so—than the knowledge about these communities that would be available to the parties without the participation of these individuals. This can open up new action repertoires for the party in some circumstances, and can also provide greater certainty in the efficacy (and best practices) of outreach actions already being used.

Given these aspects of the migrant communities and of potential political actors coming out of them, the following process can be predicted: The effect of the first person to cross over the party’s threshold is to increase the collective knowledge of the local party on where and whom to reach out to. This increase in knowledge effectively lowers the costs of an outreach effort while also increasing the probability of its success and the potential gains it can bring. It also increases the likelihood that yet another person from the relevant group will become active in the party, putting their own skills and knowledge to the party’s disposal. This may happen because of personal connections to the initial activist or directly from the efforts of the party, but the effect on the party’s knowledge and “toolkit” should be quite similar and both paths are likelier at this stage. Thus, while the speed of this process will
certainly vary, the entry of the first person sets up the potential for a positive feedback loop. Likewise, a party's early outreach efforts prior to their successful inclusion of migrant activists are more likely to fail as they will be more dependent on information via third-party sources and the knowledge of current, majority-group activists within the party.\textsuperscript{21}

One difficulty that this and similar projects must contend with is that outreach is a concept that is difficult to observe directly, even if the general theoretical understanding of the concept is clear, and it is one that consists of a number of partial-but-related aspects. These will include such factors as the amount of time that parties spend visiting organizations that represent their respective communities, the amount of campaign advertising that focuses on relevant groups, the number of publications produced by and meetings held by the parties on topics of specific interests to these communities, etc.

\textsuperscript{21} Or sometimes, as suggested by several of the interviews gathered for this project, an early strategy is arrived at by simple guessing—educated or otherwise. The effect is usually, and not surprisingly, underwhelming.
2.3 Demographics and the Structure of the Electorate

The overall distribution of immigrant populations is an additional factor that underlies the theories outlined above. Without some minimum level at which a given migrant-background population makes up either the overall population or the voting-eligible population in a given constituency, any representation of that community is unlikely. A larger group has more votes to cast, regardless of (and prior to) any way that these votes are tabulated. Given parties that seek to maximize their vote and/or their seat totals, it is reasonable to assume that the larger any group is, the more incentive parties have to reach out to its members. In many ways, the most basic representation hypothesis that can be made is that larger groups will be better represented; this serves as a null hypothesis for many theories of representation, and it makes sense to use it in this way in this dissertation. Prior to any of the theoretical assertions made above, the relative size of immigrant populations should be expected to correlate highly with these populations’ levels of descriptive representation in elected bodies. If this is not the case, it indicates that mediating factors such as electoral rules or group mobilization are relatively more important. The existence of such “representation indices” as Irene Bloemraad’s (2013), as described in the opening chapter, indicate that at the national level, at least, there has not been this direct correspondence between population size and levels of representation.

One problem with research in this field is that the exact size of this potential electorate can actually be quite difficult to count, given the differences across countries in the way that these measurements are taken and aggregated. This occurs both with regard to the origin of these populations and to the citizenship status held by members of these groups (see discussion in Chapter 1). Furthermore, this outcome is dependent on citizenship policy, which, as mentioned above, slowly change and may be somewhat endogenous to parties’
perceived costs or benefits from expanding the electorate through naturalized citizens. As citizenship is extended to a greater fraction of the population, more new citizens will find themselves able to exert influence at the ballot—though at this stage one is still a step away from saying that they will do so. In a few cases, non-citizen residents are allowed to vote in local election, which again changes the incentive structure with regard to whose votes might be available to be earned.

While quite a few representational studies have focused on the overall size of the migrant population (e.g., Dancygier & Saunders 2006). I will focus in this dissertation specifically on the size of the immigrant electorate, in keeping with more analytical research on party behavior. Following Karen Schönwälder (2009; 2013) and Koopmans, Michalowski, and Waibel (2012) this will be kept (roughly) to mean the number of legal-age, migrant-origin residents possessing German citizenship (alone or in combination), though as shown in the previous chapter, it remains challenging in many ways to measure this population precisely.

2.4 Goal of the Dissertation

This dissertation sets out to demonstrate several implications of the theories outlined above. Most important among these is the question of open-list proportional representation, and the ability of voters to cast preferential votes. Open-list systems and preferential voting are asserted to have an independent, positive effect on the representation of immigrant-background minorities in Germany and the Netherlands. Where these systems are not used, immigrant-background minorities do worse, and where they are adopted or expanded to systems such as cumulative voting, they do better. Furthermore, this success appears to be

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22 This can further be a source of national variation (with this option existing in all Scandinavian countries), of internal variation (most notably Switzerland, where this policy is decided by the local canton), and of similarity in some scenarios across otherwise divergent communities (as in the way that all EU members permit this to citizens of other member states).
attributable to voting support from within candidates’ own communities. This last point, however, comes with some important but interesting variations across the communities of interest. This is in contrast from the expectations that might be drawn directly from the gender politics literature, but in line with the coordination problems outlined above—and particularly so in light of some initial findings suggesting that there may indeed be institutions that advantage migrant groups while hurting women’s representation.

The question of how parties interact with these processes is also addressed, though with greater difficulty due to the difficulty in observable measures. Clustering in terms of the number of candidates that parties nominate hints at variation in overcoming the technological problems outlined above, and there are signs that the number of legislators elected follows a process of learning from initial successes.

Lastly, and importantly, while the underlying structure of the immigrant electorate does appear to affect representation in some ways, it is not nearly as strongly correlated as might be expected. Especially in Germany, the presence of migrant-background voters cannot be said to be the primary source of variation in the descriptive representation of immigrant groups. This dissertation finds that, while there remains a number of nuances and exceptions to the effects of electoral rules and party strategies, the null hypothesis that “demography is destiny” does not stand up, and simply watching settlement patterns and citizenship acquisition will tell us little about minorities’ ability to break into legislatures and other elected offices.
Chapter 3 - The Politics of Migration in Rotterdam

Rotterdam, like many large European cities, has received a large number of migrants in the past few decades. The complexity of the migrant community is greater than many other cities, however, in a number of ways. First, like Germany and the Scandinavian countries, there was a great deal of labor migration between the 1950s and the 1970s, mostly from two Muslim-majority countries: Morocco and Turkey. These workers remain a sizeable percentage of the population, particularly when added to the families who followed them in later decades, as well as the Dutch-born second- and third-generation. Additionally, like the United Kingdom and France, there has also been a large influx of post-colonial migration from the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname. Members of this group have a more uncertain status in their new homes, with lesser (or no) linguistic or religious difference, but whose different skin tone places them frequently in the role of “visible minority.” Dutch citizenship policy changes also complicate this, with the Netherlands first going from a quite restrictive *ius sanguinum* policy to a fairly liberal citizenship policy at the very end of the 20th century, followed by significant retrenchment in the 2000s (van Oers, de Hart & Groenendijk 2013). The large number of competitive political parties in the city also suggests a greater number of potential groups who might seek support from the migrant community, and there has been a presence in city government at several points of an explicitly immigration-skeptic, local (i.e., not present at the national-level) party. The combination of demographic factors common to a number of contexts with more unique institutional arrangements and patterns of party competition, makes Rotterdam a rather unique case. However, patterns that emerge under this level of complexity should be useful for developing hypotheses that can be tested in other contexts.
I conducted a number of interviews during the winter of 2011-2012 in order to establish some of the patterns by which parties recruited candidates or attempted outreach to these communities. The results of these interviews led to two tentative conclusions: first, that although the success of a populist right party (Leefbaar Rotterdam) led to increased polarization and feelings of ethnic tension in the city, there are ways in which national trends of voter de-alignment and increasing socioeconomic status among segments of the migrant population are visible to the actors in the system, affecting the way that they campaign and the way that they relate to voters between elections. The second is that significant differences exist across migrant groups, not just in the distribution of preferences or in their settlement patterns, but in the type of political organizing and activity that they are able to carry out.

3.1 History of Migration in Rotterdam and the Netherlands

The current wave of migration to Rotterdam began slowly in the 1960s with the arrival of guest workers from the Mediterranean regions of Europe and North Africa. The first groups came largely from Italy and Spain, while by 1970 two sources made up the majority of the flow of migrant workers coming into the Netherlands: Turkey and Morocco. National policies caused the numbers of incoming labor migrants to decline to almost zero in 1973, but in the decade prior to this a net of 48,000 Moroccans and 45,600 Turks had migrated and remained in the country. These populations continued to increase in coming years as family reunification policies were pursued, allowing families left behind to join the (almost entirely male) guest worker population. Not long after this, another large wave of migration began.

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23 Out of 55,900 total Moroccan arrivals and 60,600 total Turkish arrivals over the same time period—thus about 15 percent of Moroccan migrants and 25 percent of Turkish migrants had, in fact, returned in the short-term. (CBS Statline)
from the Dutch colony of Suriname. As Surinamese independence neared in 1975, more and more migrants made the transition, peaking with about 30,000 migrants (out of a new country with a population of only 400,000) in the year that independence was formalized, and continuing at a high rate until 1980, when visa restrictions were imposed and it became more difficult for those with Surinamese citizenship to gain or regain Dutch citizenship (van Niekerk 2004).

The first point of political contact for most of these migrants and especially for the guest workers from Morocco and Turkey were labor unions and labor activists. Where these workers had contact with native Dutch citizens, they were almost exclusively also workers. Because of this, the Dutch Labor Party (the PvdA) was the first party to have exposure to these populations. This occurred through the interactions of their members with guest workers and through initial claims made by migrants on the labor unions, who maintained close links with the PvdA. The nature of the guest-worker program did not make it clear at first that these new residents would ever become important or permanent political actors. Labor migration policies were written in ways that made it clear that these new migrants were meant to return home at the end of their stay (Vink 2007). While the conditions of arrival were different for the post-colonial Surinamese migrants, there was a similar skepticism by policymakers that the group had immigrated for the long term (van Amersfoort & van Niekerk 2006). Furthermore, few measures such as Dutch language courses were initially taken that would have enabled migrants' integration into the larger Dutch society.

Outside of the Labor party, two other groups attempted some outreach to these new arrivals. The first was the Communist Party in the Netherlands (CPN). Because of the working-class background of those being recruited to labor programs, a large number of those who were politically active before migrating were already members of Communist parties and movements in their countries of origin. These politicized workers were an obvious target for
the Dutch Communists—whose movement was largely founded and sustained in previous
generations by (German) immigrants—and often came to the party of their own volition.
However, while these connections were usually strong, the small number of migrants who
could be attracted to the CPN program kept this from growing beyond a few very committed
activists (Interview G1\textsuperscript{24}).

The other group which tended to reach out to migrants first were local religious
organizations. Without a nationally formulated policy on any assistance or social programs for
these groups, the gap was filled by local religious organizations which had traditionally been
the providers of social welfare via the “pillar” system,\textsuperscript{25} and these group moved in relatively
easily to fill these needs for the new arrivals. (Rath 2001, Uitermark 2012). For groups and
parties affiliated with left-wing Protestant movements such as the Political Party of Radicals
(PPR), there was a particular enthusiasm for this task as it combined traditional service
 provision with a mission to organize politically around social welfare needs (Interview G1). As
with the CPN, though, the small size of these parties hindered their efforts.\textsuperscript{26}

It was a PvdA government under Joop den Uyl that first initiated the restrictions on
further labor migration. This occurred in the context of the end of the “economic miracle”
that had buoyed Western Europe through the 1950s and the 1960s, and particularly due to the
Netherlands’ place alongside the United States as a primary target of the 1973 OPEC oil
embargo. Despite being the one who officially ended the guest-worker program, den Uyl was

\textsuperscript{24} Interviewees were offered anonymity, to be identified only by party affiliation and whether or not they held
office. They are referred to in this dissertation by the party with which they are affiliated (A = PvdA, D = D66, G
= GL) and a number corresponding to the order of their first appearance in this text.

\textsuperscript{25} A system in which Catholic, Protestant, Social and Liberal organizations co-existed in a way that was all-
encompassing and largely kept members of one “pillar” from interacting with members of others. This
extended to include, for example, Catholic newspapers, social clubs, labor unions, and schools, in addition to a
Catholic political party. See Lijphart (1968) for a complete description of the system as it existed in the
Netherlands.

\textsuperscript{26} The largest of these parties (the PPR) never gained more than 3.5 percent of the municipal election vote in
Rotterdam.
seen as a particular defender of the new arrivals who had already come to the Netherlands, and the PvdA continued to advocate for measures to improve the circumstances of those who had already arrived. For many in the first generation, these efforts were enough to cement a lifelong attachment to the party. One current PvdA officeholder in Rotterdam referred to her mother (a first-generation immigrant) as having a political philosophy of “Den Uyl, therefore the PvdA” (Interview A1).

At this early stage, there was no strongly institutionalized system for recruiting candidates from within the migrant communities. In general, without strong knowledge of what networks existed among these groups—and with locally based organizations only just beginning to form in these communities—there were few points of access available to the parties. An additional difficulty of this particular time was that the early 1970s was the period in which the traditional where the pillarized social system was going through its final, relatively sudden collapse. Traditional candidate recruitment systems for Catholic, Protestant, Socialist and other organizational networks were therefore also rapidly changing at this time. Throughout the 1980s, the parties largely overlooked migrant groups as a potential source of activists. In Rotterdam, the GreenLeft party presented itself as open to migrant-background politicians who might wish to seek office, but had few formal measures in place to actively seek these candidates out. The PvdA and the CDA, on the other hand, openly discussed the fact that they were lagging behind and were unsure of what to do, with an active recruitment strategy seen as the best way to quickly make connections to these communities and find out what, in fact, was going on (Interview A2). For the most part, other

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27 A 2009 editorial in Trouw summarizes the typical portrayal of Den Uyl among (current and former) PvdA supporters: “Many Dutch allochtones have not forgotten that the PvdA under the leadership of Joop den Uyl always pushed hard for the bettering of the position of migrants in Dutch society. This position had less to do with migrants as a specific group as with the ideas for which the PvdA under Den Uyl stood: solidarity with the weak in our society and equal rights and obligations for everyone. Entirely in the tradition of social democracy.” (Trouw 2009)

28 The GreenLeft emerged in 1990 out of a merger of the aforementioned CPN and PPR, as well as the Evangelical People's Party (a Christian, socialist party) and the Pacifist Socialist Party.
parties did not field candidates from a migration background in this period.

3.2 Migration Politics in Rotterdam and the Netherlands

Migration and integration as political issues remained at a relatively low salience for quite a long time. Looking back through most of the time when guest workers were arriving, and then into the era of family reunification, one finds little open, public discussion on the topic, either about the situation of these migrants or in terms of a negative reaction to their arrivals. Migration was largely seen as a technocratic issue, something that was undertaken for economic reasons and something that was largely left—to experts and administrators. A few incidents sent possible signals that there was growing discontent, or at least the potential for some discontent to build, on both sides of the equation. In 1972, there was a large demonstration which turned into rioting in the Afrikaanderwijk neighborhood in the southern part of Rotterdam, causing the local government there to take closer notice of the conditions of guest workers (Rath 2001). Then, two high profile train hijackings occurred in 1975 and in 1977, both carried out by activists from the Moluccan community, which were intended to send strong signals about discontent within this particular migrant group and which captured public attention. However, both of the hijackings were resolved via police actions rather than by specific negotiations with the communities—whose initial support for such actions also quickly died away (van Amersfoort 2004). Furthermore, the specific post-colonial nature of the Moluccan community led most political leaders and the public to view this discontent as group-specific rather than applying to migrants more generally. While some political leaders later indicated that they had seen these incidents as potential foreboding of what would happen if integration did not occur.

29 The Moluccan migrant community was made up to a great extent of former soldiers for the Dutch colonial army (KNIL), who had fought for the Dutch during and at the end of the colonial period.
successfully (notably, Ed van Thijn of the PvdA), there was little contemporary discussion within these terms (Uitermark 2012).

There are two major incidents which are seen as the major turning point in the national immigration debate. The first of these was a speech given by the then-leader of the VVD, Frits Bolkestein, in a speech to the Liberal International in Lucerne in September of 1991, a meeting whose larger topic was the future of the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union:

"In a few years' time The Netherlands will harbour some 400,000 Muslims. It is an influx such as we have never before had to absorb. Here I come to the theme of this congress. What should government policy be towards these people who come from a different culture and of whom many speak little or no Dutch. Our official policy used to be: 'Integration without prejudice to everyone's own identity.' It is now recognised that this slogan was a bit too easy. If everyone's cultural identity is allowed to persist unimpaired, integration will suffer." (Bolkestein 1991).

In the rest of the speech, he offered that liberal societies such as the Netherlands could and would have to accept the integration of foreigners, but that some aspects of Islam in particular posed a challenge to liberalism itself and were simply wrong on some issues in a way that Western societies had gotten it right. Prior to this point, there was something of a taboo against any speech in Dutch society that asserted Dutch cultural identity as potential superior in any way, as documented by Herman Vuijsje (1986) in interviews with sociologists and other researchers—although at least one recent study of changes in Dutch media coverage over time suggests that the number of people willing to go on the record in Vuijsje's work indicate that there were already considerable cracks in the "taboo" (Uitermark 2012). What is certain is that after Bolkestein's speech, candidates felt more secure in bringing up integration issues, particularly in the media, without the danger of being tied to the more clearly racist discourse of the Center Democratic Party, the only significant party that was avowedly anti-immigrant up to that point. (van Dijk 2011, Uitermark 2012). At around same
time, a new set of naturalization laws were passed which made it easier for migrants to apply for Dutch citizenship, and which increased the number of circumstances under which naturalized migrants could retain their old citizenship (which had previously been severely restricted, a circumstance that was especially problematic for Moroccan citizens who had no option to renounce their citizenship under Moroccan law).

While Bolkestein’s speech may have opened up the range of discourse possible, the salience of Islam and integration remained relatively low for another decade. In 2000, however, the issue resurfaced in several different ways. The first was an opinion article by Paul Scheffer, “Het Multiculturele Drama,” which touched off a large number of responses within the Dutch media upon its publication and again the next year after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Scheffer’s role as a prominent member of the PvdA, as well as aspects of his arguments claiming that current Dutch integration policies were harming not only natives, but also immigrants themselves, created an entry point for those on the left who had been harboring concerns about integration but felt that the responses after Bolkestein were still limited to the right and center-right. Most support among his claims was that integration was no longer something to be encouraged by government policy, but rather something that should be demanded from the migrants (Engebergesen 2003, Vasta 2007).

At around the same time, a new set of citizenship laws removed some of the ability to maintain dual citizenships and introduced for the first time integration expectations for those applying to become Dutch citizens. The latter of these included strict language exams and tests for both the knowledge and acceptance of Dutch cultural norms, although the content of these tests would be modified and debated over the next decade (van Oers, de Hart, & Groenendijk 2013).

Politics in Rotterdam, as well as the integration process of minorities, were affected by these developments insofar as they were part of the larger national conversation and
affected by larger national policies. The point at which migration and integration politics in Rotterdam noticeably started to diverge from other cities was with the quick rise of Pim Fortuyn. Fortuyn, a sociologist at Rotterdam's Erasmus University, was relatively well-known as a public intellectual and commentator on a number of topics through most of the 1980s and 1990s. His first entry into politics as a candidate for office, however, came in 2001 for the populist Leefbaar Nederland (Livable Netherlands) party, and although he was not a founding member, he joined in its early stages and was quickly elevated to the position of party's lead candidate for parliamentary elections that were to be held in May 2002. He was forced to resign his position a few months after his selection, following a February 2002 interview with the Volkskrant where, being asked where his alleged hatred of Islam came from, he replied “Ik haat de islam niet. Ik vind het een achterlijke cultuur” (I don't hate Islam. I find it to be a backward culture) (Poorthuis and Wansink 2002). While he was removed from the national party's list for fear that this statement had gone too far, he remained the lijsttrekker for the related-but-formally-independent Leefbaar Rotterdam, and led the months-old party to win 17 of the 45 seats on Rotterdam's city council in elections held the month following the interview. He also put together a new candidate list of his own (the Lijst Pim Fortuyn) for the May 2003 national parliamentary election. This party was also wildly successful at the polls, with elections being held only days after Fortuyn's assassination by a left-wing activist; whether the party was successful because of sympathy from the assassination or due to his effective campaigning (and already high levels of support) in the months leading up to the election continues to be debated in academic and popular literature and will always be difficult to untangle (Van Holstein and Irwin 2003, Bosman and d'Haenens 2008).

Although the success of Leefbaar Rotterdam meant the end of a hegemony that the PvdA had enjoyed since the end of the Second World War (including having an absolute majority of the City Council between 1974 and 1982, and being the senior partner in every
coalition from 1982 to 2002), support for the new party seemed to come from multiple sectors of society rather than exclusively at the expense of the PvdA. While the campaign had emphasized integration issues, and Fortuyn’s views on the subject had been his central message, in that first election in 2002 there was essentially no relationship, positive or negative, between the support for Leefbaar and the ethnic makeup of the neighborhoods. After four years on the City Council, this would change, and at the next election one could see a strong negative relationship between the number of allochtones\textsuperscript{30} in the neighborhood and the electoral success of Leefbaar Rotterdam. As the historian Els van den Bent described the 2002-2006 city council, “The sharp tone of the discussions leading up to the 2002 elections continued to dominate the relationship; searching for agreement gave way to polarization.” (van den Bent 2011, p. 54) This included the resignation of one Leefbaar alderman, Marco Pastors, after a newspaper interview containing a series of statements against Islam was seen as moving beyond acceptable discourse. By the end of this period, surveys taken of residents of Rotterdam found a population energized, activated, and significantly more proud of where they lived; less than a quarter of the population would have called themselves “proud” of being a Rotterdammer in 2002, while more than half would have done so in 2006. But this appears to have come at a cost: the same surveys found a fairly sharp decrease in the likelihood that Rotterdam residents with a migration background would feel themselves to be a part of the local community—but, importantly, these groups were also much more likely to report themselves as politically active and engaged in 2006 than they had been in 2002 (van den Bent 2011). These two processes together paint a picture of a migrant-background population that has been activated as a political community, but whose

\textsuperscript{30} Through this chapter and the one following, it will in places be necessary to use the term most commonly used in the Netherlands to denote migration background, “allochton,” a term not without detractors (e.g., De Zwart 2012) but nonetheless the term used in official statistics and the one which most closely matches the group of non-Western migrants as a whole whose interests and incorporation are the focus of this dissertation. See also Essed and Trienekens (2008) for a discussion of the terms “allochtone” and “autochtone” and their relation to race and ethnicity.
separation politically from the mainstream has been reinforced. In perhaps a somewhat flippant analysis, one of the major national newspapers referred to the municipal elections that year as the “black middle finger” (du Pré & Wagendorp, 2006). But later analyses did confirm that the PvdA’s reclaiming of its place as the largest party in 2006 was due at least in part to increased activity by allochtone voters (Uitermark & Duyvendak 2008).

Since that time, there is a perception that political tempers have cooled somewhat. Leefbaar, which has continued to be successful but was not able to earn enough seats to negotiate its way into the governing coalition in either 2006 and 2010, has continued to make questions of integration an important part of its policies. But particularly following their governing experience of the 2002 to 2006 coalition, Leefbaar found that their differences with the parties of the left very often had more to do with emphasis and framing of issues, rather than preferred policies. Uitermark and Duyvendak (2008) found that for the most part, Leefbaar in government had expanded the community based programs that the PvdA had introduced in the decades prior, seeing the same policies that the left promoted as ways of emphasizing a social contract as ways in which they could emphasize a stronger sense of social control. These authors point to the Opzoomeren, a type of neighborhood cleanup and block party developed in the city, as an example of the type of event that could easily be presented in language that emphasized either social contract or social control. Leefbaar returned to the government in coalition with the D66 and the CDA after the 2014 municipal elections. The party currently includes a first-generation Moroccan-Dutch resident (and former PvdA supporter) Mo Anfal among its city councilors, who framed the PvdA as too dependent on migrant votes as well as less economically diverse than Leefbaar in interviews leading up to the election (Leefbaar Rotterdam 2014).
3.3 Makeup of the Current Migrant Community

As of 2010, Rotterdam had a population of 592,939, with fairly stable proportions of each origin group. The 5 largest migrant groups make up 174,847 of these residents (29.5 percent of the population, while there are 310,163 residents of native Dutch origin (52.3 percent). The five largest groups according to CBS data, in descending order, are Surinamers (56,232 residents), Turks (46,868), Moroccans (38,982), Antilleans (21,066), and Cape Verdeans (15,299).

The four largest groups here are the same as in the rest of the Netherlands, though in each of the major cities, the rank order changes slightly. The Cape Veredian community in the Netherlands, on the other hand, is largely centered in Rotterdam. There is a reasonably high correspondence between the neighborhoods in which these groups live—neighborhoods with high numbers of one group are in general have likely to have higher numbers of all the other groups. There are small but important variations, however. Delfshaven is the city district which has the highest proportion of Moroccans, Surinamese and Cape Verdeans, and it is the one region where non-Western allochtones make up an absolute majority of the population. Delfshaven and Feijenoord have the highest proportion of Muslim background immigrants, with the latter being the largest center of Turkish-origin settlement. Antilleaners are the most dispersed, but the Charlois district remains the largest center of settlement.

While citizenship data is not available for Rotterdam specifically, the following trends in citizenship exist for the Netherlands in general, as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below. Citizenship acquisition rates peaked around the time that citizenship policy was liberalized during the late 1990s, allowing for a larger number of guest workers and other postwar migrants to apply for naturalization. As policies again became somewhat more restrictive in the 2000s, these numbers declined, although a relatively steady set of continued
naturalizations has occurred since then, at around 30,000 new citizens per year nationally. Moroccans and Turks have made up the largest contingents of new Dutch citizens, with fairly large numbers of naturalizations among refugees and asylum seekers as well. These numbers also highlight a difference between some of the migrant communities, where some Surinamers and almost all Antilleans have held Dutch citizenship since birth, thus obviating the need to naturalize and making participation as a voter a legal possibility upon arrival.

Figure 3.1: Total Rates of Citizenship Acquisition, The Netherlands, 1985-2008

Source: European Union Observatory on Democracy, 2010
3.4 Polarization and Dealignment

Several changes have occurred in recent years in terms of the voting preferences of migrant groups. Two of these trends predominate, but are countervailing in many respects. The first of these is a tendency toward greater voter dealignment in the Netherlands. This has become a broad trend in Dutch politics, and elections in the Netherlands are seen as having become the most volatile in Europe over the course of the last 25 years (Mair 2008, van der Meer et al 2012). Newer voters in the immigrant second generation have thus been socialized into the context of much more volatile voting patterns, although it is unclear whether there
are generational differences in volatility in addition to the overall temporal increase (Dassonneville 2013, van der Meer et al 2012). Additionally, a degree of polarization caused by the elevation of integration issues to such a prominent place in Rotterdam politics has activated many voters who might not be as likely to participate for other reasons (viz., lower-income and lower-educated allochtone voters), and has drawn sharp lines between the PvdA and Leefbaar Rotterdam, the two largest parties, on policies and particularly on symbolic politics.

Looking at the voting data from the 2002, 2006, and 2010 municipal elections, the activating effects of polarization seem to be larger and more visible in the observed voting outcomes than just a broad movement away from the PvdA. The development of polarization in the way that the neighborhoods cast their votes can be observed. This data is aggregated at the neighborhood level (n=71), which obscures some of the nuance of individual voting choices. Nonetheless, there are very distinct changes over the course of these elections, and particularly for the two predominantly Muslim-origin subgroups. Table 3.1 below shows the results of a series of simple regressions (controlling at the neighborhood level for the youth proportion of the population and unemployment levels) giving the rough correspondence between proportions of the population from each of the five largest groups and the percentage of votes received by each of the major parties. In the 2002 election where Leefbaar first ran, there was certainly a correlation between immigrant populations and positive support for the PvdA and negative support for Leefbaar. But these were moderate correlations—about a half a point increase for the PvdA for every additional percentage point from a given population, and a negative correlation of roughly equal magnitude for Leefbaar Rotterdam; these effects did not achieve statistical significance for a number of the

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31 Although studies in other countries have generally found younger voters to show less consistent voting patterns (e.g., Schmitt-Beck, Weick, & Christoph 2006 in Germany, Kuhn 2009 in Switzerland, van der Brug 2010 across EU member states)
individual groups. This changes drastically in 2006. Particularly among the Turkish population, but also for every subgroup except for Antilleans there is a strong positive correlation. Every additional percentage of the population from either Turkish or Surinamese background meant more than an additional percentage point increase in PvdA support, and the difference was almost twice as large as Cape Verdean populations increased. The relationships were similarly negative toward Leefbaar Rotterdam. Neighborhoods with greater Moroccan concentration, already somewhat disposed against Leefbaar, increased their vote percentages for the PvdA as well. This difference appeared to maintain itself through the 2010 elections as well, with support for the GreenLeft also appearing to solidify in migrant-background neighborhoods, although to a lesser magnitude. The exception to this rule appears to be neighborhoods with large Antilleaner populations. These neighborhoods were associated with small or moderate effects in 2002, but with increasing levels of support for Leefbaar in 2006 and 2010. Settlement patterns for this group are the most different from the others, and while there is still a slight, positive relationship between the number of Antilleaners in a neighborhood and the total number of non-native residents, this correlation is weaker than for the other four large groups. From the aggregate data, it is difficult to tell whether there is support for Leefbaar coming directly from these groups, or if these correspond to native voters in these neighborhoods with large Antillean populations. Altogether it appears that polarization effects are stronger than any sum of individual-level effects corresponding with more independently-minded voters, at least in terms of the way that parties are drawing their support from the neighborhoods.
Table 3.1: Regression Coefficients, Migrant-Group Concentration on Percent of Party Vote Share Obtained by Each Party (Controlling for Age, Unemployment), Rotterdam City Council Elections 2002-2010

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Note: Results in italics not statistically significant at the p<.05 level

Source: Centrum voor Onderzoek and Statistiek Rotterdam (2010)

One of the easiest ways in which the simultaneous pressures for polarization and for more group-independent voting can be reconciled is to differentiate between participation in different levels of government. Do voters with a migration background behave differently in
An early study to suggest this was van Londen, Phalet & Hagendoorn (2007), who—in testing variations on Robert Putnam's (1993, 2000) theories of social capital—found that increased social capital, in several forms, was correlated with increased participation and interest at the local level but made little or no difference on activity at the national level. This differentiated effect—greater participation locally and no difference nationally—obtained whether or not individuals were involved in local-level organizations or in national-level associations; the authors claimed that this indicated that there was not some process in the national-level associations of “mere self-selection of those minorities who are better equipped to participate in the civil and political life of the receiving country.” (p. 1222)

Does this imply that there is less participation at the national level, or simply that it is uncorrelated with institutional life? Data collected by FORUM at exit polls indicates that participation is roughly equal at both levels—but this is in the context of an overall electorate that participates at much lower levels in regional elections. Turnout among migrant groups generally in Rotterdam was traditionally lower than among the general population, Turkish-origin voters have turned out at the same levels as native voters (around 50 percent) since 2002, as have Moroccan-origin voters since 2006 (FORUM 2010). At the national level, participation of both these groups has also reached similar levels, but here this is in the context of much higher overall participation across the Dutch electorate (around 80 percent in 2006 and 75 percent in 2010) (Parlementair Documentatie Centrum van de Universiteit Leiden).

If levels of participation are staying roughly the same, it is possible that there are different preferences between the national and local levels. Among those allochtones who participate at both levels, the polarization in Rotterdam might be causing them to feel that they have to support the PvdA in local politics, while they might still be voting their true
preferences at the national level. One member of the PvdA who had been active in the 2010 election campaign cited GL and SP voters as a very successful constituency for his appeals, as they felt that they had no choice but to support the PvdA if they wanted to counter Leefbaar’s influence in the city (Interview A4). Another PvdA local candidate with a migration background described the following scene at home:

“Now we have a third, sometimes already a 4th generation, that is emancipated. When I look at my children, my daughters...they are well-educated women, with a broad outlook on the world. So they say, "We will vote for you here in Rotterdam, mama, but [at the national level] I won’t vote for the PvdA." So they are loyal to me, they vote for me, but when it doesn’t have anything to do with me, then they choose their own way. Because they’re educated, and you see that by lots of younger people, they have an opinion...I hear them speak differently, and I see them differently.” (Interview A1)

Where polls have been conducted, there does appear to be evidence for this trend. A FORUM poll at the 2011 provincial elections found second-generation migrants from Turkish, Antillean and Surinamese backgrounds moving away somewhat from the PvdA and particularly toward the SP and the D66, although the largest difference in terms of magnitude was actually for second-generation Moroccans, who instead moved toward the PvdA.

More personalized campaigns might be another factor affecting the way that parties reach out to migrants. Parties trying to appeal on non-programmatic factors and making symbolic appeals may be at an advantage insofar as they can use aspects of their campaign to target specific types of voters. Individual candidates have stronger incentives to do this in electoral systems like Rotterdam, where a sufficient number of personal preference votes (voorkeurstemmen) can be sufficient to get a candidate elected. In the Rotterdam context, this type of campaigning is still developing—while the possibility of election through preference votes has been possible for several elections, the number of politicians who wage strongly personal campaigns to explicitly push themselves up the list appears to remain low. While interviewees from all parties suggested that the parties were supportive, in principle,
of this type of campaign, it would not be surprising if their fellow party members might be more reluctant to embrace this kind of campaign. The argument for these from the party's viewpoint is that these votes still count toward the overall apportionment of seats for the party and thus are good for the party if it brings in additional votes; the argument against them from the other members’ standpoint is that some types of politicians will be able to circumvent the system that the parties have in place for ranking candidates and for placing people at the place on the electoral list that they have earned through service to the party, seniority, or whatever other system of determination is used. Additionally, they may fear that the greater incentive to cultivate personal votes may lead to more corruption and less party discipline.32 Those interviewed agreed that the PvdA’s network of canvassers, poster hangers, and volunteers can be more easily adapted by the list candidates for their own purpose. One interviewee from the D66 even referred to candidates from his party (both migrant-background and non-migrant-background) who had left the party for the PvdA because they saw it as an easier venue for leveraging their personal networks (Interview D1).

Another related tension here is the question of how far parties see immigrant-background politicians as resources and how much they see them as politicians equal to other, native-background politicians. In the most instrumental form, parties can see immigrants’ identities simply as recruitment or campaign tools. One of the D66 politicians interviewed was at a meeting in his home district (deelgemeente) where a fellow native Dutch member of the party said, “Well, I put [Moroccan first name]33 on the list, he'll get me two extra seats on the council in [neighborhood].” (Interview D1)

The activists can also vary on the degree which they see their identity as an important part of their campaign. Interviewees saw several types of allochtone politician, and there

32 A real phenomenon, depicted by Shugart and Carey (1995) in a variety of contexts.

33 Identifiers omitted to protect interviewee's anonymity.
were two general ways in which migrant-background politicians approached their group identity: 1) as a representative, or someone whose political platform was based on representing the interests of their community 2) as someone who saw their identity as incidental, and specifically tried to position themselves as a politician just like any other politician.

The first of these categories is the type that conforms most to the expectations of descriptive representation—individuals from a group can articulate a group's needs, and their inclusion in the decision-making body ensures that these group interests are articulated in policy-making. In Rotterdam, the PvdA and the CDA were seen as the groups most associated with politicians of this type. For example, when A2 was first recruited by the PvdA in the early 1990s, they approached him with an explicit admission that they didn't understand his community's interests and wanted someone like him who knew what was going on in that community (Interview A2).

The second of these categories is a type that is also usually linked to the younger, more-educated voters that were seen as less tied to the PvdA and to the politics of the first generation. Candidates in the VVD and D66 were more frequently seen as being of this type, and in fact, it was seen as an important part of the D66 self-image and presentation to the public that this was the type of candidate that they could (and did) attract (Interview D1).

### 3.5 Differences between groups

Another important variation among communities, which has been suggested above, is the degree to which they have different approaches to the practice of politics. While integration as an issue might affect all groups in similar ways, the policy demands and preferences of groups might vary, as might the methods by which migrant groups organize.
One of the most important factors referred to by politicians was the presence of ethnic media. Turkish-language media in particular, and Surinamese media to a lesser extent, was seen as an important tool that could be used by individual candidates to stay in touch with their community. This could, and purportedly did, involve a mix of promoting one’s own political presence and also advocating for one’s party (Interview A4, D1) These channels were theoretically open to the parties directly, but in practice were seldom used by official party channels.

One last point worth emphasizing is the difference across groups insofar as the strength of organizations and associations within the community. Where parties might be uncertain about the coherence or diffusion of preferences and attitudes across a group—uncertain about what it is that groups actually want—parties seem to be more easily able to observe the strength of formal organizational life within the migrant communities. In this way, well-organized communities are easier to give attention to and to develop relationships with, while more poorly organized communities are harder, in a lot of ways, to get a grasp on or to find a point of entry with. In Rotterdam, the Turkish community was perceived as the most organized of the major migration groups, with interviewees pointing to them as the easiest to approach as a community in some sense. Candidates with a Turkish background were also seen as having an easier time making contacts within their community, and were more readily assumed to be in contact with their community.

One (native) activist did point to an additional useful point of comparison: in talking about group outreach, while there might be difficulties in reaching out to migrant groups as groups, this was not entirely unique to immigrant communities—the difficulties in finding someone to speak for, and to speak to, a given immigrant group often parallels the difficulties that parties have in finding representative female candidates, LGBTQ candidates, and so on (Interview D2).
3.6 Conclusions

What the Rotterdam case shows are a number of interesting, still-developing (and not entirely non-conflicting) trends. The increasing salience of the immigration issue would seem to have strengthened the PvdA's support among migrant-background voters, as a way to oppose a specific perceived threat—in tone, if not always in policy—from Leefbaar Rotterdam. But this increasing bloc voting is not even across origin groups, and seems to have been particularly significant among migrant groups coming from historically Muslim origin countries. Secondly, there are signs that this coherence is coming from the activation of less-involved voters, and that younger voters in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation are increasingly less tied to the PvdA in a way that older generations were. This effect may be masked by the rallying effect of opposition to Leefbaar, but there are signs that parties have noticed this trend (particularly parties like the GreenLeft and D66, which might stand to gain most from this dealignment).

There is also ability for candidates to reach out individually to voters, through personal campaigns (aided by the incentives of preference votes) seems to be a way that parties and politicians can reach out more successfully. But here, like in every other circumstance, much depends on differences between groups. I now turn to the overall Dutch elections to see whether the relationship between co-ethnic voting and migration-background candidates holds up in other contexts.
Chapter 4 — Migrant-Origin Candidates in the Tweede Kamer

The last chapter provided us with some rough contours from the example of Rotterdam of how parties think about migrant communities. There was a sense that parties and candidates who successfully reached out to groups could eventually gain their support at the voting booth. However, some groups were seen as easier to reach out to than others, and some parties saw different sectors of the electorate as particularly strong potential allies. Having candidates and activists from within the communities targeted seemed to be an important form of outreach, and there was some implication that personalized campaigns and candidate outreach had a particularly beneficial effect.

In this chapter, I move the level of examination upward to the Netherlands as a whole by studying the 2012 elections to the Tweede Kamer, the Dutch lower house of parliament and main legislative body. Is there a way to verify that personalized campaigns, and particularly by members of an immigrant group aimed at others of the same origin, are actually rewarded with votes? Is the assumption about in-group preferences outlined in Chapter 2—that there is indeed a preference for descriptive representation from within migrant-origin groups—justified by the evidence? I argue that, by examining the variation in preferential voting across districts in the Netherlands for candidates in the same election, it can be shown that there is at least tentative, positive evidence for the idea of migrant-background candidates gaining support from within their own groups. While surveys have suggested this, this data establishes more plausibly that these preferences are acted upon if and when voters are given an input mechanism into candidate selection via such mechanisms as preferential voting. It shows that individual voting behavior actually does match the preferences expressed to survey takers, and that there is some degree of co-ethnic support being expressed through
preference votes. This chapter also suggests another important factor effecting migrant-background representation: there is a relative homogeneity of support within a group for its own members, and there is not necessarily support coming from members of one migrant group for migrant-background candidates from other groups on the basis of their shared status as “immigrants.”

4.1 Elections to the Tweede Kamer in 2012

The Netherlands is a promising case in which to study the effects of other candidate- and district-level forms of variation while keeping open-list, preferential voting constant. It is also a case where there is a considerable amount of survey data on the voting preferences of migrant-background citizens. (Michon & Tillie 2003; Michon, Tillie & van Heelsum 2007; FORUM 2010, 2011, 2012). Additionally, there is some limited background data which suggest the plausibility of preference votes being distributed to fellow members of an immigrant community: van Heelsum and Tillie (2006) included questions about voting for one’s own ethnic group in exit polls after the 2006 elections to the Tweede Kamer. They found that respondents often claimed to have done so, but the responses came with a great deal of variation across groups and between cities, for which no particular pattern suggested itself.

There is also a general sense that the Netherlands has been one of the leaders in achieving relatively equitable rates of minority representation at the national level. In the election immediately prior to the one covered in this study, the number of members elected to the Tweede Kamer with a migration background increased from 12 to 16, out of the total 150 members. This meant that 10.7 percent of the membership in that legislative body was considered non-western allochtone. Compared to an overall Dutch population that was 11.2 percent non-western allochtone at that time, this is arguably one of the greatest levels of
parity seen among contemporary democracies (CBS StatLine, Brouard and Tiberj 2011).

The 2012 elections to the Tweede Kamer were held in the context of a fairly short-lived, only semi-formalized coalition agreement for the previous government, which collapsed during a fight over the depth of austerity measures to be taken in light of the Eurozone crisis. After the June 2010 elections, Mark Rutte of the VVD, a classical liberal party which had not previously taken first place in a parliamentary election, had been chosen as the formateur of the new government and ultimately as the new prime minister. Geert Wilders' PVV—understood by most observers as a clear example of a populist radical right party (see, for example, Art 2011, De Lange & Art 2011)—had gained 15 seats at the election, giving them 24 of the 150 seats in the Tweede Kamer, and there was general sentiment that they should not be entirely excluded from government. In the end, the VVD and center-right CDA formed the formal minority government, with the PVV as a supporting, but unofficial, member of the coalition.

Wilders led his party out of austerity talks in April of 2012, taking a stance that further budget cuts would not be acceptable. New elections were formally announced on April 27th and held on September 12th of that year. The VVD appeared to make its case for further austerity successfully, and they retained their first-place position while the PVV was seemingly punished (losing 9 seats) for ending the coalition (Erlanger 2012). Despite a good showing in terms of preference votes received, the number of members of the Tweede Kamer with an allochtone background actually dropped again to 12 in the 2012 election. After the election, the VVD and the center-left PvdA were able to form a majority coalition. As of November 14, 2014, a split within the PvdA caused two Turkish-background members of the Tweede Kamer to be expelled from the party, meaning that a separate parliamentary party

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34 The two members had, in the days leading up to their removal, refused to sign on to a statement criticizing specific Turkish-oriented organizations in the Netherlands, as put forth by Minister of Social Affairs Lodewijk Asscher (also of the PvdA).
(the *Groep Kuzu*/Öztürk) now exists solely consisting of two Turkish-background members.

In 2012, as in prior elections, the vast majority of voters cast their votes for the party by voting for the first candidate on the list (the *lijsttrekker*). These candidates received 82.1 percent of the votes at the district level, on average, in this election.\(^{35}\) The rest of the votes were distributed across other candidates on the list. There was some systematic variation with *lijsttrekkers* doing somewhat worse in larger cities and in the province of Limburg, a pattern that matches previous elections (Trouw 2012).

Under Dutch electoral law, the party lists are not completely open. While the list rankings for parties after the tabulation of preference votes (*voorkeurstemmen*) is a commonly reported statistic, preferential votes only affect the electoral outcomes if a candidate is able to receive at least 25 percent of the number of votes that he or she would need to earn a seat in their own right. This occurs with some regularity, but at a small scale; since the threshold was lowered to its current level of 25 percent of one seat in 1998, the number of candidates chosen by preferential vote has alternated between one and two in each election.\(^{36}\) Anecdotally, this is of interest for the question of descriptive representation, as the candidate chosen by this method in 2006 was herself of Turkish origin (Fatma Koşer Kaya), and a group-specific issue—in her case, a stance on whether the attacks on Armenians in the Ottoman Empire after 1915 should be labeled a "genocide"—was seen as the primary motivation for those who gave her their preference votes (du Pre 2006).

In any case, while the *lijsttrekkers* almost always receive a clear majority of votes, a large enough percentage of voters distribute their preference votes more broadly, with every candidate receiving at least some of these, that there is some observable information about

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\(^{35}\) Only one party's *lijsttrekker* came in anywhere other than first place at the electoral district level in 2012, and even then only in one district (Diedrik Samson, PvdA, District 11). Only once under the current electoral regime that has existed since 1918 has the *lijsttrekker* for any parliamentary party come in any place other than first at the national level (Mark Rutte, 2\textsuperscript{nd} place, VVD, 2006).

\(^{36}\) Pieter Omtzigt of the CDA was the only such candidate in 2012.
voters’ own preferences on and/or views about the submitted party lists.

4.2 Preference Votes

The high number of candidates from a migration background did successfully translate into a relatively higher number elected to the Tweede Kamer, keeping the Netherlands at a higher rate of descriptive representation compared to other European countries. But where did this support come from? Overall, there has been little focus on preference votes in the Dutch system despite the amount of information that they might provide, likely due to the low number of candidates who have actually used them to enter the Tweede Kamer. But these votes provide quite a bit of information about potential voter preferences and are a tool used by the electorate, for whatever set of motivations they may have at the time they cast their ballot (and which cannot be directly observed). Thus, despite the relative rarity of situations where preference votes affect the outcome of who gets elected, it is likely that these data contain a fairly strong signal of some of the factors motivating individual voters.

To date, the only in-depth Dutch study of these specific votes with regard to migrant-background politicians has been a short research memorandum published by the Amsterdam statistical office (Bureau Onderzoek & Statistiek Amsterdam 2013). Looking at the overall placement of candidates in 2012, and the fact that on average they tended to rise higher in the list (and do so to a greater degree than the average native Dutch candidate), this memo came to the conclusion that support via preference votes was indeed coming from the communities of the candidates’ own origin, and particularly in support from candidates’ home districts, which were mostly in the large cities where the migration-background population has been concentrated. This analysis did not, however, take into account many of the other factors which might be expected to affect candidates’ overall success, nor did it examine
results from all of the electoral districts in the Netherlands.

While preference vote totals for the Tweede Kamer election are not reported at the lowest possible geographic levels (neighborhood and city), vote totals aggregated within each of the 20 electoral districts in the Netherlands are available, giving us a rough measure of geographic variation of the individual list candidates' success. While this gives us a fairly rough understanding of regional differences, there is enough variation in voting patterns, the distribution of migration-background residents, and the makeup of the immigrant communities in each area to allow for at least some feasibility tests of what might be important factors in the success that these migration-background candidates saw.

4.3 Hypotheses

There are a few factors that could be affecting the success of specific candidates, and which might be open to examination. The most basic relationship that can be expected is direct, within-group support such that migrant background voters have preference for candidates with the same background, and that they cast their preference votes accordingly. From this, I generate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.1: Allochtone candidates will receive a greater number of preferential votes from areas with larger populations who themselves have migration backgrounds.

Hypothesis 4.2: Allochtone candidates will receive a greater number of preferential votes from areas with larger populations who share that candidate's specific migration background.

In other words, one might expect to see increased support for any migration background candidate in an area where the migrant community is large, and this effect might be magnified in areas where a candidate's own group is particularly large. Alternatively, if
there is evidence of the latter hypothesis, but not of the first, this might be taken to mean that there exists specific co-ethnic support, but not the larger propensity for migration-background voters to support migration background candidates in general.

Another source of variation that might be important is the importance of a candidate's home district. The literature suggests a fairly strong home-district effect, with candidates and especially with candidates lower down the list receiving more votes from areas where they are known and are more likely to have built some sort of local political network (Shugart, Valdini, & Suominen 2005; Tavits 2010). The benefits relative to the cost increase with the openness of the system, not entirely disappearing in closed-list systems, relatively strong in somewhat open systems like the Netherlands, and peaking as the potential to base election entirely on one's own personal vote is maximized under pure open-list systems (Shugart, Valdini, & Suominen 2005). The fact that each candidate's home residency is one of the few pieces of information about them which appears directly on ballots in the Netherlands should also magnify this effect. This should allow for further evidence for the positive effect on local candidates in their home regions, but more importantly, this should make it easier to disentangle local support from within-group support in terms of how much these affect migration-background candidates' support. Even if large numbers of the candidates' own ethnic groups are voting for them, it would be possible to mistake regional support for co-ethnic support if these candidates are recruited from districts where these populations are large; at least one study in the Irish context has shown regional support to be the better explanation in that particular context (Fanning, Howard & O’Boyle 2010).  

Hypothesis 4.3: Candidates will receive more preferential votes from their own home districts than from other parts of the country.

37 In fact, their study suggests that the more that the candidates of a non-Irish ethnicity could portray themselves as someone who had strongly rooted themselves in the local context and as a candidate who would serve as a representative of specifically local interests, the more successful they tended to be.
Hypothesis 4.1 (Refined): Allochtone candidates will receive a greater number of preferential votes from areas with larger populations who themselves have migration backgrounds, and this effect will apply even outside their home electoral district.

Hypothesis 4.2 (Refined): Allochtone candidates will receive a greater number of preferential votes from areas with larger populations who share that candidates specific migration background, and this effect will apply even outside their home electoral district.

There are a few other important factors that can be controlled for. As has been seen, the gender of a candidate may still have an important effect on their success. Furthermore, overall support for specific political parties in a given region need to be controlled for as a potential source of covariance. If parties of a particular type do better in urban areas where there are also high proportions of residents with migration backgrounds—and this pattern is borne out in Dutch politics as in many other countries—it may be more difficult to isolate the source of the effects. Lastly, if parties of the left give greater salience to issues of the quality, representation, and/or migration, this may be affecting vote patterns in ways that mask other factors' effects. There are two feasible ways to operationalize this. The first is to control for overall support (at the level of the electoral district) for parties of the left, who have tended to draw the most support from migrant groups and whose support might be spatially concentrated in the same locations as migrant-background voters. The second would be to control for the local popularity and success of the PVV, which has made opposition to migration and attention to the problems of integration the cornerstone of its own platforms. In this case, higher support for the PVV in the area might be expected to correlate with somewhat higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes in the overall electoral district.

Another major important factor is the ranking of candidates on the list. The data available here do not let us examine parties' selection processes, which will also have a major impact on candidate success. However, since I am here examining all of the candidates, nominated across several party lists, it is possible to control for the ranking which these
candidates were given by their parties. If there is still a noticeable increase in these candidates' support from areas with large numbers of other migrant-background residents while controlling for their place on the party lists, it implies that co-ethnic support is an important source of the preference votes that they receive, even given any potentially unmeasured, negative effects of having been given a lower list ranking by the party. As noted above, the lijsttrekker in every party receives such a disproportionate number of votes that it is necessary to include an additional dummy variable to control for this effect.

4.3 Candidates and Data

The data used to test these hypotheses comes from two sources published by national-level government agencies in the Netherlands. The electoral data is provided by the office of the Kiesraad (Electoral Council), and was published following the 2012 parliamentary elections, in the form of the official reports (proces-verbaal) that are conducted in each of the 20 electoral districts and then submitted to the central Kiesraad. This data gives us the total number of votes received for each electoral list, and for each candidate on that list individually, for each of the districts. All eleven parties which crossed the threshold for representation in the Tweede Kamer (two-thirds of one percent) were included in this analysis.38

38 In descending order of success: The People's Party For Freedom And Democracy (VVD), The Labor Party (PvdA), The Party For Freedom (PVV), The Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), The Socialist Party (SP), The Democrats 66 (D66), the GreenLeft (GL), The Christian Union (CU), The Reformed Party (SGP), The Party For The Animals (PvdD), and 50PLUS were included in the study.
Two of the parties (the Labor and Socialist Parties) chose to vary their lists slightly across electoral districts. This is allowed under Dutch electoral law, though it is infrequently used. It lets parties aggregate preference votes at the level of the electoral district, such that a much lower number of absolute votes is necessary to elect a candidate on the basis of preference votes. (The proportion remains the same, 25 percent of what it would take to earn a seat in one's own right, adjusted for the population of the electoral district.) Both parties that did so only varied a subset of candidates who were all at the very bottom of their...
Data on the districts themselves were provided by the Dutch Central Statistical Bureau (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), which collects and reports demographic data at the regional level, for all cities in the Netherlands. This includes information on the region of origin for all residents with a migration background, to a level of detail that allows us to control specifically for residents of Moroccan and Turkish-background specifically. Where this data was provided at the level of municipality, I then re-aggregated it at the level of each of the electoral districts.

Two minor anomalies in the data occurred, neither of which would be expected to have a major impact on the final results. First, a few very small municipalities in some of the less urbanized electoral districts had not reported population data to the Central Statistical Bureau, but in each case, these municipalities contributed no more than a few percent, so the percentages of total allochtones and those specifically of Moroccan and Turkish-background were calculated based on proportions in the remaining municipalities in these districts. The second issue is that the 20th electoral district, consisting of the Caribbean islands of Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba, is dramatically smaller than the other 19 districts, and consists of populations who do not easily fit into the allochtones vs. autochtones dichotomy used in the rest of the (continental European) Netherlands. For this reason, and with the understanding that the effects on final data would be minor, this district was excluded from any further data analysis.

Migrant populations are distributed in the Netherlands as seen in Table 4.2 below. As might be expected, the largest concentrations of these groups are in the four largest cities in the country (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and the Hague), but there are noticeable populations in other parts of the country, particularly in midsized cities like Eindhoven (in North-Brabant) and Nijmegen (in Gelderland). The distribution of specific groups also varies...
across the country and even within these larger cities. Moroccans are distinctly the largest
migrant group (and one that gets the most attention) in Amsterdam, while there are larger
Turkish populations in The Hague, Rotterdam, and in some of the other more industrial cities.

Table 4.2: Allochtone Residents as Percent of Population, per Electoral District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Number</th>
<th>Component regions</th>
<th>% Non-Western Allochtone</th>
<th>% Turkish</th>
<th>% Moroccan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Groningen</td>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Drenthe</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Overijsssel</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Flevoland</td>
<td>19.30</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gelderland 1</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gelderland 2</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>12.13</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>North Holland 1: City of Amsterdam</td>
<td>34.99</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>9.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>North Holland 2</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>North Holland 3</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>South Holland 1: City of The Hague</td>
<td>34.22</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>South Holland 2: City of Rotterdam</td>
<td>37.00</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>6.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>South Holland 3</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>South Holland 4</td>
<td>18.68</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Zeeland</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>North Brabant 1</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>North Brabant 2</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Limburg</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Bureau voor de Statistiek

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 list the candidates for the Tweede Kamer with Moroccan and Turkish
backgrounds who ran on the 11 major party lists in 2012, as identified in the above-mentioned
2013 report from the City of Amsterdam. It shows the position that each was placed on the
list, and indicates the general trajectory on the final list after preference votes were counted. Something that leaps out of the data is the fact that every single candidate with a Turkish background increased their position on their party's list. This result holds regardless of the party for whom they were running as a candidate. The picture is quite similar for candidates with a Moroccan origin, although there are two exceptions who lost rank positions on the party lists (the lone CDA and VVD candidates with this background); there are also a few candidates whose jumps were not particularly large in terms of the number of list places moved.
Table 4.3: Allochtone Candidates Nominated for Party Lists for the Tweede Kamer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>List Ranking</th>
<th>Ranking after Preference Votes</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>List Ranking</th>
<th>Ranking after Preference Votes</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish-origin candidates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Moroccan-origin candidates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadet Karabulut</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>Tofik Dibi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatma Koser-Kaya</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>D66</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>Wassila Hachchi</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>D66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huri Sahin</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>Hayat Barrahyun</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turan Yazir</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>Ahmed Marcouch</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gökhan Coban</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>D66</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>Salima Belhaj</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>D66</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelik Demir-Yücel</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>Mustafa Amhaouch</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunahan Kuzu</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>Malik Azmani</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebubekir Öztüre</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+27</td>
<td>Khadijah Arib</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selcuk Öztürk</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>+30</td>
<td>Mohamed Mohandis</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sultan Günal-Gezer</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>Ahmed Harika</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>GL</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasemin Cegerek</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td>Mohamed Allach</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>+33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasin Torunoglu</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurten Karisli</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>+34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emre Ünver</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>+16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bureau Statistiek en Onderzoek Amsterdam 2013; Kiesraad 2014

Note: Names in Italics were elected to the Tweede Kamer
Table 4.4: Allochtone Candidates Nominated Only in Specific Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Ranking at Nomination</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Districts where Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Said Afalah</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>SP</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>1-3, 9-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halima De Baedts-El Karouni</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasmina Haifi</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdelkader Salhi</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Parmaksiz</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamila Aanzi</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songül Mutluer</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Tekin</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ersan Taksin</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Baâdoud</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kiesraad 2014

Table 4.5 below shows the number of votes that each candidate got from each of the electoral districts. For all but one of the candidates, the greatest number of preference votes came from their home district, and the sole exception to this appeared at the very bottom of his party’s list. This could be for several reasons: it could be that candidates benefit from the same home-district advantage theorized above, indistinguishably from the ways that mainstream candidates do. It could also be that allochtone candidates are much more likely to be nominated from areas where the population has a greater proportion of people with a migration background. What I expect to find is that, when these two factors are simultaneously controlled for, both will appear to have an overlapping effect. Migrant-background candidates may be receiving support from members of their migrant group at the same time that they are receiving the benefits of being a local candidate. If this is the case, there should be positive, independent effects for both their status as the “hometown” candidate as well as in proportion to co-ethnic population.
Table 4.5: Absolute Preference Votes for Allochtone Candidates, By District

| Party | Rank | Name       | Home District | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
|-------|------|------------|---------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| PvdA  | 14   | Marcouch   | 9             | 189| 127| 119| 296| 477| 355| 602| 1589| 3123| 827| 598| 720| 894| 613| 688| 92 | 685| 570 | 720 | 5   |
| GL    | 15   | Beltaj     | 13            | 51 | 13 | 14 | 31 | 10 | 28 | 49 | 117 | 194 | 79 | 34 | 109 | 1145 | 191 | 150 | 7 | 47 | 49   | 27 | 0   |
| GL    | 16   | Amhauoch   | 19            | 5  | 4  | 6  | 18 | 16 | 9  | 36 | 46 | 37  | 12  | 3  | 16  | 12  | 23  | 30  | 38  | 15 | 85  | 1507 | 1   |
| GL    | 17   | Sahin      | 15            | 24 | 8  | 4  | 74 | 14 | 44 | 49 | 86  | 90  | 37 | 26 | 64  | 62  | 61  | 103 | 6  | 63  | 22  | 22 | 1   |
| VVD   | 18   | Azmani     | 4             | 19 | 31 | 25 | 974| 42 | 16 | 62 | 112 | 100 | 68 | 35 | 66  | 44  | 46  | 74  | 11 | 33  | 61  | 54 | 1   |
| CDA   | 19   | Yazir      | 13            | 22 | 4  | 11 | 164| 39 | 96 | 234| 260 | 325 | 141| 266| 266 | 1359 | 533 | 105 | 9 | 174 | 104 | 40 | 6   |
| D66   | 20   | Coban      | 8             | 13 | 6  | 10 | 74 | 12 | 62 | 201| 316 | 165 | 118| 114| 61  | 57  | 104 | 49  | 11 | 51  | 163 | 37 | 1   |
| PvdA  | 21   | Demir-Yücel| 4             | 168| 76 | 69 | 1942| 147| 271| 866| 669 | 716 | 426| 404| 558 | 352 | 449 | 188 | 85 | 475 | 390 | 152 | 0   |
| PvdA  | 22   | Kuzu       | 13            | 264| 60 | 39 | 1368| 269| 411| 1422| 1692| 1679| 903| 987| 2053 | 5262 | 3537 | 547 | 152 | 1324| 800 | 295 | 3   |
| PvdA  | 23   | Arif       | 9             | 85 | 58 | 49 | 148| 190| 155| 339| 942 | 1377| 470| 274| 472 | 490 | 330 | 388 | 27 | 305 | 271 | 255 | 0   |
| GL    | 24   | Harika     | 13            | 31 | 5  | 0  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 13 | 8  | 32  | 7  | 9  | 12  | 220 | 36  | 23  | 1  | 16  | 11  | 9  | 1   |
| PvdA  | 25   | Mohandis   | 15            | 34 | 63 | 18 | 65 | 147| 161| 182| 786 | 523 | 196| 79  | 449 | 641 | 294 | 1029 | 23 | 311 | 193 | 219 | 0   |
| CDA   | 26   | Öztüre     | 13            | 153| 8  | 6  | 432| 128| 140| 679 | 484 | 775| 165| 213| 392 | 889 | 679 | 73  | 33 | 261 | 318 | 175 | 0   |
| PvdA  | 27   | Öztürk     | 19            | 98 | 67 | 87 | 883| 124| 199| 585 | 734 | 766| 389| 391| 543 | 522 | 782 | 193 | 114 | 718 | 712 | 1924 | 0   |
| PvdA  | 28   | Günal-Gezer| 18            | 27 | 11 | 12 | 83 | 18 | 83 | 91 | 127 | 116 | 90 | 61 | 103 | 65  | 87  | 39  | 14 | 160 | 758 | 45 | 0   |
| PvdA  | 29   | Cegerek    | 7             | 16 | 14 | 19 | 446| 18 | 109| 1682| 120 | 313| 128| 129| 52  | 65  | 62  | 35  | 7  | 83  | 56  | 23 | 0   |
| PvdA  | 30   | Torunoglu  | 18            | 22 | 5  | 5  | 252| 29 | 73 | 133 | 102 | 128| 66 | 75 | 74  | 55  | 87  | 39  | 13 | 233 | 1826 | 59 | 1   |
| PvdA  | 31   | Karisli    | 13            | 56 | 39 | 13 | 522| 57 | 215| 364| 346 | 203| 234| 215| 688 | 941 | 574 | 216 | 36 | 137 | 210 | 175 | 0   |
| PvdA  | 32   | Ünver      | 9             | 13 | 8  | 10 | 84 | 42 | 34 | 79 | 89  | 811 | 179| 199| 100 | 101 | 104 | 24  | 16 | 48  | 66  | 7  | 2   |
| PvdA  | 33   | Allach     | 18            | 29 | 17 | 7  | 30 | 36 | 41 | 78 | 228*| 126 | 83 | 37 | 85  | 125 | 88  | 84  | 13 | 103 | 170 | 102 | 0   |

Note: Candidate's home districts are highlighted in bold; if the highest number of votes that a candidate received was from a district other than his/her home, an asterisk (*) appears by their vote total.

Source: Kiesraad 2014
To see which effects remain after controlling for alternate explanations and potential confounders, I then ran a series of linear regressions (with cluster-corrected standard errors to account for the same candidate running in multiple districts simultaneously), using the percentage of a party's preference votes given to each of the candidates in each of the electoral districts as the outcome variable. With 531 candidates for the 11 parliamentary parties, across the 19 electoral districts in the continental Netherlands—in addition to the small number of candidates who only stood in particular districts—this gives us 10,279 observations of total preference votes cast for an individual candidate in a specific district. The candidates' rank on the party list was logged to emphasize that the difference between 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 5\textsuperscript{th} place is more significant in terms of visibility, as well as likelihood of being elected off the party list, than is the distance between, for example, 73\textsuperscript{rd} and 75\textsuperscript{th} place as voters work their way down the list.

The vote share for specific parties in a given region is also included as a control factor; because these variables vary at the level of the electoral district and are constant for all candidates in a given electoral district, the resulting coefficients for these factors cannot be independently interpreted. The results reported below include a variable for the overall support for the three major parties of the left, as mentioned above. This support ranged from a little over 22 percent in District 11 (North Holland) to just under 51 percent in District 9 (Amsterdam). These regressions were run again with a measure for PVV support instead of left-party support as a robustness check; the effect on the coefficients for the variables of interest was trivial and thus are not reported for the sake of clarity.
### Table 4.6: Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Percent of a Party’s Preference Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lijsttrekker</td>
<td>78.034***</td>
<td>78.030***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged List Rank</td>
<td>−0.761***</td>
<td>−0.762***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s Home Seat</td>
<td>1.576***</td>
<td>1.580***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Left Parties</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
<td>−0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.373***</td>
<td>0.371***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allochtone Candidate</td>
<td>−0.177</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Non-Western Allochtones</td>
<td>−0.004**</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allochtone Candidate (+) % Non-Western Allochtones</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Candidate</td>
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<td>−0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Turkish</td>
<td>−0.017*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Candidate (+) % Turkish</td>
<td>0.221***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moroccan Candidate</td>
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<td>−0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Moroccan</td>
<td>−0.014*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan Candidate (+) % Moroccan</td>
<td>0.056</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.554***</td>
<td>2.563***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>10,260</td>
<td>10,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.973</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td>0.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F Statistic (df = 8; 10251)</td>
<td>46.390.730***</td>
<td>46.407.480***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
4.4 Results

The results seen here imply that there is a statistical relationship at the district level between migrant-background populations and success of migrant-background voters. The value of the coefficients reported in Table 4.6 is in terms of the percent of his/her specific party’s total votes that a candidate received.

The ranking that a candidate is assigned has a very strong effect, particularly if he or she had the top spot on the party list, as expected. Also as expected, candidates tended to do better in their own home districts, receiving an extra one-and-a-half percentage point boost in the share of their party’s preference votes that they received there.

The results for the groups of interest—candidates of Moroccan and Turkish background—were mixed, but in an interesting way. There was a small bump for allochtone candidates in general where there were high levels of non-western allochtones in the population, equal to about .03 percent of all the votes cast in an electoral district for every single percent increase in the total non-Western allochtone population. This result is statistically significant, and small but not entirely trivial. For example, this would translate to about 40 additional preference votes for each percentage of the population that has a non-western migration background for a candidate running for the PvdA in Amsterdam—which means about 1,400 additional preference votes in this particular district, given the size of the non-Western allochtone population in that district. (This is out of the 44,000 votes cast for PvdA candidates other than the lijstrekker, and takes into accounts the other potential covariates in the model). But for most parties and most districts, this would be rather smaller due to the relative size of the migrant-origin population, and the negative sign on the components of this interaction term also suggests that the true effect will be somewhat smaller.

For Moroccan-origin politicians, it is not even clear that this effect exists at all—there
is no evidence of a statistically significant relationship. For Turkish-background politicians, though, the effect is sizable. Each percentage point increase in the Turkish-origin population increases the percent of a party’s overall preference votes captured by a Turkish-background candidate by two-tenths of a percent (remembering again the large number of votes given to the *lijsttrekker*). In a similar scenario as mentioned above, this effect would scale up to something like 2,700 additional preference votes for a Turkish candidate in Amsterdam on the basis of their Turkish origin alone.

Of the two other major potential counfounders, gender seemed to have an impact while the overall ideological preference of an area did not seem to make a large difference. On the former point, female candidates appeared to get about a third of a percentage point more of the preference votes cast for their party than men in a similar situation—also a noticeable effect.

### 4.5 Conclusions

What does this evidence tell us? The fact that this data is aggregated at a relatively high level, and the single election from which this is drawn put some limits on how much inference can be drawn. However, even with these constraints, this analysis can be taken as support for the idea that if institutional structures such as open-list systems open up the opportunity for migration-background candidates to receive direct support from the voters, this support is indeed coming from their communities of origin.

Parliamentary candidates in the Netherlands definitely have something to gain from a preference voting system. No single migrant-background candidate was able to use the Dutch election rules to secure their own election to the Tweede Kamer through preferential voting in 2012. But in almost every case, the number of preference votes that a candidate would
have expected to receive based on other factors—including especially their ranking on the list that the parties provided—was lower than the number of votes that they were able to actually receive in the election. Almost every candidate of a migration background, and every single candidate with a Turkish background, moved up the list, and many of them moved quite a large number of places up the list. This is a fairly clear signal that these candidates are capable of attracting votes, and are potentially strong candidates who might even be able to bring in votes that the party would not be able to attract through any other type of candidate.

This does appear to be coming at least in part from co-ethnic support. But this support is not even across groups. The data about show some very tentative support for the idea that migration-background candidates can draw support from the general Dutch allochtone community, no evidence that the Moroccan background candidates are able to do so from members of the Moroccan origin community, but relatively clear evidence that Turkish candidates are doing disproportionately better in areas that have a larger populations with a Turkish background. It has been observed by several researchers that the Turkish community in the Netherlands is generally better organized (Vermeulen 2006, Michon & Vermeulen 2009, Uitermark 2012), and organized in qualitatively different ways (van Londen, Phalet, & Hagendoorn 2007) than most other migrant groups and the Netherlands. This suggests that if open-list systems are something which enables better descriptive representation, or at least opens up the potential for it, it must be seen as an opportunity that requires some form of action on behalf of the group participating. Small groups might be able to organize to elect their own candidates much more easily under an open-list system, but a lack of political organization may not lead to any positive outcomes regardless of the opportunity structure.
This chapter will focus on some of the institutional factors which may be affecting descriptive representation and party choices. Where the last chapter showed some initial evidence that migrant-background groups use preference voting as a way to push for greater levels of representation, I now examine the potential differences that come when the nature of this institution is varied across contexts. To do this, I use data on the largest cities in Germany, examining how many candidates with a migration background are elected to city councils in the major German cities. While there are some inherent limitations in the data, some of the most basic variations in electoral rules under proportional representation seem to have a noticeable impact on the election of candidates with a migration background.

5.1 Communal Elections in Germany

German cities hold communal elections on a regular basis, including for city councils that have relatively large numbers of seated members. Data from these elections provides us with a rich source of comparisons across city-level cases within the German context. A further useful aspect of these data is the state- and city-level variations in the electoral rules of interest—not drastically changing the format or nature of local politics, but allowing enough variation to examine a few potentially salient institutional variations.

Each of the municipalities in Germany is governed by a municipal council, with the exception of the three city-states (the state legislature serves as the effective city council in Berlin and Hamburg, and the city council in Bremen is simply the subset of the state legislature elected from the City of Bremen). Each of these city councils is currently

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39 Although Bremerhaven, the other of the two cities in the state of Bremen, does indeed elect a separate city
governed by laws and regulations outlined at the level of the Länder (states). While there is variation in the size of each council, at the level of basic electoral rules, competences, and organization, variation between the city councils does not occur within each state, but does exist across the states. Elections occur on a regular interval, rather than being called by the current government, and happen concurrently within each state every 5 years. The large and variable size of the city councils also makes them a promising place to study the effects of electoral institutions on descriptive representation. While representation at the national level might be an important symbol of parties’ commitment to promoting candidates with a particular background, the higher visibility (and greater perceived effect) may make national-level appointments more likely to draw criticism of tokenism than lower-profile, local-level appointments, which may only rarely be expected to have symbolic intent or effects beyond the particular city.

In an earlier study, Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert (2011) collected data on the number of representatives in the city councils of all German cities with a population greater than 100,000. However, this study was carried out with the intent of reaching out to representatives for the purposes of a survey, and, while the absolute numbers were reported, no further analysis was carried out on the causes and patterns of any variation that occurred in the number of migrant-background representatives between these cities. Because of the comprehensiveness of the data that they collected on representatives with migration backgrounds, including essentially every major city in Germany, this dataset allows for the comparison of descriptive representation outcomes across a number of variables of interest.

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40 Except in Bayern, where they occur every sixth year.

41 Schönwälder, Sinanoglu, and Volkert omitted the three city-states; three more cities were eliminated in the analysis due to data issues (explained below)—nonetheless, the sample retains 74 of the 80 largest cities in Germany.
One important limitation of this data is that, in order to make comparisons across states with elections occurring at different points in time, different elections and legislative periods have been collapsed into two panels in the original dataset, with the first battery of elections occurring between 2001 and 2006 and the second between 2006 and 2011. Since the structural variables such as electoral rules that are the focus of this chapter do not change over time, this is not a serious theoretical concern, but it does make it more difficult to account for any unusual events that may have occurred between the elections within a given battery and influenced the outcome of specific elections (the 2005 Clichy-sous-Bois riots in neighboring France, for example). Because their data is currently the only report with data across the states for multiple points in time, I retain their classification into the two time periods as given, but future studies including subsequent elections may be better able to control for any relevant, time-specific shocks. Table 5.1 below lists the information from Schönwälder’s study, with corrected population data from the 2011 German Census.

Table 5.1: Population, Size of Municipal Council, and Number of Migration-background Representatives for Largest German Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Population with Migration Background</th>
<th>% of Population with Migration Background and German Citizenship</th>
<th>Total Seats 2001</th>
<th>Representatives with a Migration Background 2001 Total Seats 2006</th>
<th>Representatives with a Migration Background 2006 Total Seats 2006</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freiburg (Breisgau)</td>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>219,665</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>Heidelberg</td>
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<td>145,642</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
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<td>Heilbronn</td>
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<td>44.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karlsruhe</td>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
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<td>30.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mannheim</td>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
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<tr>
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<th>% of Population with Migration Background and German Citizenship</th>
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<th>Representatives with a Migration Background 2001</th>
<th>Total Seats 2006</th>
<th>Representatives with a Migration Background 2006</th>
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<td>3</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>% of Population with Migration Background</td>
<td>% of Population with Migration Background and German Citizenship</td>
<td>Total Seats 2001</td>
<td>Representatives with a Migration Background 2001</td>
<td>Total Seats 2006</td>
<td>Representatives with a Migration Background 2006</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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</table>
There are a few figures that stand out in Table 5.1, such as the high absolute number of representatives with a migration background in Frankfurt, and the complete lack of such representation in Thüringen at either time period. However, a quick scan does not reveal any obvious regional patterns. Figure 5.1 below shows the overall distribution of seats held by migrant-background representatives, in terms of absolute numbers.
An additional advantage here, and which was unavailable to Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert at the time of their study, was the coordinated effort in the 2011 German census to create a standardized measure of populations with a migration background. Where the original study was unable to generate these numbers for 17 of the cities in question, and included an additional 8 based on their own estimates, Table 5.1 is able to give a standardized measurement of the percentage of each city’s population with a migration-background. Furthermore, data on the proportion of this sub-population with and without German citizenship was also made available for the first time in the 2011 census, allowing for

43 Based on the German government’s “one parent born a non-citizen” definition, outlined in Chapter 1.

44 These numbers are not time-variant, though, and measure proportions as of 2011. This may affect the magnitude of the estimates slightly, if there are large differences in the growth of migrant populations between cities in the short-term. But, as with the original study, there is a lack of standardized measures, (and frequently any measures at all) before this time, so this remains the best available estimate of cross-city variation in these populations.
an additional dimension to the analysis of these populations.

**Figure 5.2: Distribution of Cases, Percent of Population with Migration Background (with and without German Citizenship)**

![Histograms showing distribution of cases for population with migration background and with migration background and German citizenship.](image)

Source: Zensus 2011

In looking at the overall distribution of the migration populations in Figure 5.1, there are a moderate number of cities with very low immigrant background populations, but otherwise a fairly normal distribution of cases. The total population with some migration background ranges up to about 50 percent in the cities with the greatest concentrations, and up to about 30 percent of the population having both a migration background and also holding German citizenship. The mean proportion of the these cities' population with a migration background was 26.4 percent, and the mean proportion of migrant-background citizens was 15.3 percent.

For the 74 cities in the Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert data, the overall correlation between the total number of residents with a migration background and the number of those with both migration background and citizenship is relatively high ($\tau=0.72$).
The relationship is perhaps a bit weaker than one might hope for without a theoretical explanation for the variance, but the two are related enough to alleviate any immediate fears of confounders, particularly without any clear biases or radical outliers (see Figure 5.3). The appearance of a cluster of cities in the former East Germany, low on both measures, also jumps out as distinct group which may be affected by additional historical factors.
5.2 Factors contributing to descriptive representation

5.2.1 Demographics

The most straightforward potential factor that has been theorized to affect descriptive representation is simply the size of the population that is to be represented. Essentially, the greater the proportion of a population that belongs to any given subgroup, the greater the number of representatives belonging to that subgroup that should be elected. There is some *prima facie* sense to this: it would be surprising to find large numbers of city councilors with a migration background in Halle or Magdeburg in Sachsen-Anhalt, where only...
about 7 percent of the entire population comes from this background, while it would be equally surprising if there was not some representation from within this community in a city like Offenbach, where almost half of the city’s population has a migrant origin.

Several recent studies have pointed to this as the overwhelming predictor of descriptive representation within a given electoral body. While there may be reasons for a temporal lag between a growing community and the degree to which it is represented, one might still expect this to be the most important predictor of any variation between regions, as well as a predictor of any future level of representation. Rafaela Dancygier (2014) has written one of the most recent and most comprehensive arguments in favor of this view. Looking at the election of Muslim-origin candidates for city council positions in the United Kingdom, she finds that the demographic structures underlying each council district predict a much greater share of the variation than any institutional or socioeconomic factor, both in the nomination stage and also in the election stage. While certainly not making the simplified argument that “demography is destiny,” it comes closer to this argument than have other recent studies. A warning has been given by Eva Sobolewska (2013) that if this is indeed the case, and minority groups become concentrated in specific areas in ways that help ensure their representation, this may also incentivize non-minority politicians to limit the selection of migrant-background candidates to just those specific areas with concentrated migrant communities.

A first important test, then, will be to see if the hypothesis advanced by Dancygier and others holds true across constituencies. If demography really is an important underlying factor, there should be a very strong pattern of cities with large voting-eligible migrant populations having large number of representatives with a migration background.

**Hypothesis 5.1:** The larger the proportion of a city’s population that has a migration background, the greater the number of representatives on the city council that will have a migration background themselves.
On the surface, this seems to be the case in the German cities studied, but the effect is fairly weak—the relationship reaches statistical significance in a naïve regression, but not a great deal of substantive significance ($\tau = 0.185$ for the 2001-2006 elections and $0.198$ for 2006-2011; $\beta$ (percent of Population with Migration Background and German Citizenship) = $0.114$ for 2001-2006 and $0.167$ for 2006-2011). In other words, an increase of about 10 percentage points in the size of the migrant-background, German citizen community—about 1.5 standard deviations on that variable—is correlated with about one percentage point's worth of higher migrant-background representation in the city council in 2001-2006 and about one and a half percentage points in 2006-2011. This translates to a little more than a half-seat difference (on average) in the first period and a little more than one seat in the second. This is not a trivial correlation, but quite a bit less than might be expected (in councils with 40-90 seats) if electoral demographics are the primary driving factor. The 5 cities with the highest migrant-background populations are below the expected curve—particularly Heilbronn and Pforzheim, with no migrant-background representation in 2001-2006.\footnote{This is despite any apparent strong correlation with where there is a backlash from the radical right, which might be the most obvious alternative explanation. In 2005, the populist radical right NPD and Republikaner in the two cities polled a combined 3.2 percent (Heilbronn) and 2.5 percent (Pforzheim) of the vote, declining to 2.7 and 2.1, respectively, in 2009. This puts the two parties support slightly above the national average (2.2 percent in 2005 and 1.9 percent in 2009), but not seemingly enough to explain the complete lack of migrant representation.}

A similar test using the total population with a migration background indicates a slightly higher degree of statistical confidence but almost no change in the substantive strength of the relationship. These relationships can be viewed in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.
Figure 5.4: Proportion of Population with Migration Background and Citizenship Compared to Migration Background of City Council

Source: Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert 2011; Zensus 2011

Figure 5.5: Proportion of Population with any Migration Background Compared to Migration Background of City Council

Source: Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert 2011; Zensus 2011
If this pattern is real, but weak, will it weaken or strengthen when some of the other potential factors are taken into account? And why was the effect clearer in Dancygier’s account? One possible difference is the overwhelming structural difference between her case and the German case—the question of single-member districts versus proportional representation in apportioning seats.

If geographic concentration of migrant communities is critical to explaining representation in the United Kingdom example but is only one of many small contributors in the German case, a series of related hypotheses may come into play, the first of which is testable with the data here:

Hypothesis 5.1b: In a proportional representation system, the larger the proportion of a city’s population that has a migration background, the greater the number of representatives on the city council that will have a migration background themselves (a linear relationship)

Hypothesis 5.1c: In a system with single-member districts (or very low district magnitude), a large concentration of the population with a migration background is a necessary condition for descriptive representation of the group, and the relationship will be s-shaped (with very low-to-no representation prior to reaching the necessary concentration).

And indeed, this latter pattern does seem to fit the cases in her study. But does the former actually fit the German case, or will other factors prove more important?

5.2.2 Institutional Variables

Following the theories outlined in earlier chapters, there are two easily testable institutional rules that vary across the cities in question and that can be tested for their effects on representation. If increasing numbers of successful political actors are a “virtuous circle,” then success might be expected to beget further success. With only two time periods in the study, a longitudinal study of this is difficult with the data at hand (and indeed, the number of relevant elections with minority-background representatives is still low in just
about every European case, regardless of data availability—but this situation improves with each election cycle). Another factor, however, that might allow this process to take effect is the overall size of the city councils themselves.

The larger the council, the greater the absolute number of people who will be elected after an election, since there is a larger absolute number of seats which must be filled. Even if this process occurs randomly, the probability of any one person of a given population being selected for a seat increases, even as that population stays the same size, as the number of seats in the legislative body increases. While the probability of the binary outcome that any member will be elected increases, as does the expected average absolute number of representatives, it does not follow that the proportion of migrant-origin representatives will increase if there is no change in the factors affecting the probability of each candidate's being elected. If the increased size of the body is also connected with an increasing proportion of the body that comes from a migration background, there must be an additional factor causing the proportion to increase apart from the statistical processes. There must either be some confounding factor corresponding to the size of the assembly, or it must be that some members being elected increases the likelihood of others also being elected. I argue that it is the latter, more endogenous process.

This effect might make reasonable sense where it is assumed that the entry of the first person into an elected office is particularly difficult—where it is especially hard to be the one “breaking through” barriers to representation. This type of process has been cited in studies of women’s representation as a reason for “punctuated” increases in the number of women in legislatures (Kittilson 2006, Wängnerud 2009). An increase in the overall size of the council body may, therefore, increase the likelihood of that first entry, lowering the costs to entry for other members of that specific group. As mentioned in earlier chapters, there might also be implicit knowledge or networks that can be accessed by successful candidates which can then
be passed on to other members of the specific community. Having a representative “on the inside,” or with evidence of successful ways of mounting a campaign as a member of a migrant group, can give useful information to impart once the first successful election has happened. This type of implicit knowledge or the networks within the legislative body itself may previously have been inaccessible to members of this group.\footnote{Caul (2001) makes a related argument that parties which happened to have more female activists in the 1970s had a more powerful constituency able to push for even more female representatives in the 1980s and 1990s.}

Larger city councils should therefore allow for the entry of the greater absolute numbers of migrant-origin representatives, even if there is representation at roughly the same levels. However, if there is an independent effect of the presence of one migration-background member of a council, larger city councils should have higher \textit{proportions} of migrant-background members; if this theory is correct, the lower threshold needed for migrant-background candidates to get any single seat on the council will quickly lead to further members from the same background.

\textit{Hypothesis 5.2: A city council with a higher absolute number of seats will have a higher proportion of members with a migration background.}

A more important institutional factor, and one that can be explicitly tested in the German case, is the presence of preference voting or open lists. Within the study of immigrant representation, this has been identified as one of the aspects with the greatest potential for increasing the descriptive representation of minorities, both migrant and otherwise. For prospective candidates under these rules, winning a seat no longer requires coming in first. In every case, there is a certain number of individual preference votes that must be gained in order to be successfully elected. This number is highly variable, as it depends on the number of other specific candidates that are actively competing for preference votes and the overall success of the party on whose list the candidate appears. But in all cases, it seems to be the easiest possible configuration to mount a campaign.
specifically appealing to minority groups. This intuition was glimpsed in Chapter 3, and in Chapter 4 it was shown that in a case where these rules applied, it did indeed appear that minority-background candidates were able to use this system to increase their likelihood of election through personalized campaigns. But in these cases, the partially-open system used in Dutch elections was held constant. In the German case, several states use a closed-list or effective closed-list system, while a larger number use an open-list system, as well as two states (examined in Chapter 6) which use a cumulative voting system.

There have not been systematic studies of the effects of open-list systems within the German system, other than some passing observations that the lack of an open-list system may have been responsible for low levels of descriptive representation at the level of the Bundestag (e.g., Claro da Fonseca 2011). It is somewhat surprising that this has not been examined, considering that this is a factor that actually varies across the various Länder. The data set here provides a good opportunity to see whether there is any noticeable effect on the selection of migrant-background candidates to city councils in places where the law on local elections (Kommunalwahlrecht) mandates the use of closed list systems.

The theories outlined in chapter 2 suggest a coordination problem among voters seeking to use preference votes in a way to increase the descriptive representation of their group. However, in contrast to what the gender and women’s politics literature have found (that preference votes might decrease levels of representation), I expect to find the smaller size of migrant groups and the lower number of candidates from a migration background will make it much easier for voters to overcome these coordination problems and successfully elect members of their own group.

Hypothesis 5.3a: Cities which use open-list systems to elect candidates to city councils will have a higher proportion of councilors with a migration background.
Hypothesis 5.3b: Cities which use open-list systems to elect candidates to city councils will have a lower proportion of councilors with a migration background (as predicted by the gender politics literature).

5.2.3 Political Parties

A major potential confounding factor that might be expected to affect success of migration-background candidates is in the nature of party competition within a given electoral context, with certain parties potentially having a greater or lesser propensity to nominate migrant-background candidates.

Two parties in particular have been credited in the German case with reaching out specifically to minority background voters. The first is the SPD who, like social democratic parties in most European countries, was generally the first to establish links to incoming migrants. This came about through these parties' strong historical connections to the labor unions, who in turn were frequently the first and most significant point of contact between guest workers arriving in 1960s to 1970s (Donovan 2007). With the sole exception of the “returning' Aussiedler population from the former Soviet Union, German migrant groups still show a greater preference for social democratic parties with regard to the population at large (Wüst 2004, Donovan 2007). Earlier studies such as Donovan's indicate that socioeconomic variables independently account for some, but not all, of this preferential tendency. Therefore, even though the tendency for these groups to most strongly prefer such democratic parties has been in something of a decline in recent years (DTJ 2013),47 they would seem to remain a disproportionately stable constituency for the party.

Die Linke have also shown a particular tendency to reach out to voters with a migration background. When the party was founded in 2005 out of a merger of disaffected

47 And unfortunately for the SPD, this trend seems to have begun right around the time that naturalization requirements were relaxed in 1999/2000, paving the way for a greater voting power in the group.
members of the SPD into the PDS\(^{48}\), there was some concern about its ability to speak for citizens with migration background—at the time, there was not strong positive evidence of greater discrimination or feelings of hostility, but it was not clear that the large portion of the party that had come from the PDS, with the former East Germany as its source of strength, saw migration or integration as issues of particular salience. The election cycles since then have, however, showed a party that has sought to increase its general appeal to populations outside of its core constituency, and one that, for the most part, has been seen reaching out to migrant groups, as one among several potential strategies. After the 2013 federal elections, it was *Die Linke* whose parliamentary group had the highest proportion of members with a migration background—8 out of 64, or 12.5 percent (Wüst 2014)

The Greens have also been portrayed at times as party that has a particular affinity for migrant groups, citizens of migration background, and for issues of migration integration in general. This is not seen as necessarily resulting from a concern for potential constituencies so much as from a commitment to a left-libertarian ideology. Certainly the Greens have not shied away in some circumstances from nominating candidates with a clear migration background. In fact, the party was the first to appoint a German with a migration background (Cem Özdemir) to the position of of party chairman. Whether these tendencies put them at the forefront of efforts to achieve better descriptive representation is more questionable, however. Studies of immigrant candidates so far have tended to find the Greens lagging behind the SPD and *Die Linke* in many contexts, and especially so at the subnational level (Donovan 2007, Schönwälder 2011). Lastly, insofar as the Greens have pursued migration and integration as potential electoral strategies, there is evidence that this has happened—both in intent and in result—as a way of reaching out to native-born voters with left-libertarian

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\(^{48}\) *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (Party of Democratic Socialism), which itself was the legal successor to the SED (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*), the official Communist Party of the former East Germany.
preferences, rather than immigrants themselves. ⁴⁹

One other potential party-related effect is that the more successful non-mainstream parties are, the less likely it is that politicians with a migration background will be successful. This theory, first advanced by Leijenaar, Niemöller, and van der Kooij (1999) in the Netherlands, suggested that credited increasing party fractionalization (particularly due in the Dutch case to the rise of local lists independent of the party) with having a strongly negative influence on female candidates and candidates with a migration background. They put forward several reasons why this fractionalization would hurt these groups specifically, but Leijenaar, Niemöller, and van der Kooij viewed as especially critical the fact that the new independent lists tended to have fairly right-wing ideologies, and tended to draw their support from disaffected voters who previously supported Christian democratic or mainstream social democratic parties. This indicated the presence of a large protest vote and the presence of those most likely a fall in the category of the so-called "losers of globalization." These voters were therefore likely to skew male, native-born and working-class, and would be expected to be less likely to support minority and female candidates with their preference votes. Since the most stable and consistent small parties across Germany have been far-right parties like the NPD and Republikaner, Leijenaar, Niemöller, and van der Kooij’s theory is at least plausibly applicable in the German case, and a measure has been included to help test for a relationship between minor party success and migrant representation. Voting results at the city level for all the major parties were therefore included in the model tested below.⁵⁰ The five political parties included were those that tend to have enduring, widespread support across all states, considered the "major parties" in this circumstance, following general academic and journalistic practice. These are the SPD, CDU, FDP, Greens, and Die Linke.

⁴⁹ See Miller 2013 for a related argument about center-right parties.

⁵⁰ Data sources are list in Data Appendix A.
Because of the time period of the data at hand, though, the presence of Die Linke is somewhat problematic for methodological reasons. For the most part—for elections in 12 of the 13 states—the time periods assigned to each electoral cycle by Schönwälder mean that the first set of elections studied occurred prior to the foundation of the party, and the second set of elections occurred while the party was in existence and seriously contesting elections. This does mean, however, that the PDS as a precursor to Die Linke is counted in these data under the “other” category. While the PDS ran candidates in most of the former west German states, they were generally very unsuccessful there while they were simultaneously receiving on the order of 20 percent of the vote in the former east German states. Accounting for the east and west German difference in the statistical model will largely make up for this, but should be noted in any analysis of the results. Election results for the second cycle, where Die Linke was much more uniformly contesting across the country (while still doing better in the former East Germany, receiving more uniform results across the country), let us better account for this additional party. In the second cycle as well, it is much easier to generate a “other” category that is closer to measuring the exact phenomenon in question.

Hypothesis 5.4: Cities (and cycles) where the SPD received better results will have a higher proportion of city councilors with a migration background.

Hypothesis 5.5: Cities where Die Linke received better results in the 2006-2011 election cycle will have a higher proportion of city councilors with a migration background.

Hypothesis 5.6: Cities where parties other than the five major parties received better results will have a lower proportion of city councilors with a migration background.

5.3 Controls

As with many other studies of electoral behavior, the process examined here aggregates the actions of a number of individuals, each of whom has been shown to be
responding to a wide variety of factors in making their individual vote choice. Because of this, there is certainly the threat of a number of confounding variables that may not be theoretically central to this research but which may nonetheless have an impact on the outcomes of interest.

The most important variables that could affect any results are the overall size of the city for relevant electoral district, the overall levels of voter turnout, and the relative economic situation of the area. The overall size of the district or city could matter for two reasons. The first is an idea that larger cities, by virtue of being larger economic zones and having a greater absolute number of experiences, origins, and viewpoints end up being more "cosmopolitan," where prevailing international norms of diversity might be expected to be more prevalent. The second is that larger cities require larger networks to succeed, and provide fewer places at the top relative to the number of people in the constituency. Every politician in a larger city has a greater distance to go to reach the top—usually in the number of intermediate levels of government that they might need to pass through or to pass over, and always in the number of potential individual competitors for any position—and it might be assumed that a more professionalized, skillful political background is necessary to reach the same level of governance in a large city. This may or may not be mitigated by whether they are intervening levels of representation, such as neighborhood councils. I have included a measure of each city's total population, according to the 2011 German Census, in the models below.

Voter turnout is another factor that might seem to have considerable effect on voting outcomes, and here the mechanisms are even more unclear than for city size. Nonetheless, research has shown that voter turnout is in itself affected by several factors, and may in some way be indicators of the overall health, commitment, and vibrancy of a local political community. A measure of electoral turnout was therefore included here more as a way to
diagnose other, unseen confounding processes.\textsuperscript{51}

The economic situation of the relevant city is possibly the greatest potential covariate. One common line of research in immigrant politics has been the effect of economic variables on the participation of minorities, participation of native-born voters, and support for anti-immigrant parties. However, this is not a literature that necessarily has reached solid conclusions. Much of the early literature on the rise of the radical right in Europe (e.g., Kitschelt 1995) assumed that the most economically challenged areas would be the ones that gave the most support to these types of parties. Where this theory has held up—which has been in many, but certainly not all, cases—the effect that this would have on the representation of immigrant minorities is still unclear. Thus, while it is included as a credible potential confounder, it is included mostly to confirm whether or not a variable important for many political outcomes might be having larger, unanticipated effects on descriptive representation, and it is not included as part of a broader hypothesis. In order to have an approximate account of the overall economic situations, I have used average per capita income within the relevant municipality as a measure of overall economic strength.\textsuperscript{52}

A last factor to control for is the different institutional histories of the former East and West German states. Despite 25 years of reunification—and a great deal of mobility between the two regions—there remain significant differences in the political culture and attitudes of voters in each half of the country. In fact, even as economic differences have started to narrow, political views and behavior have been even slower to adjust (Alesina and Fuchs-

\textsuperscript{51} Data sources are list in Data Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{52} Unemployment has been a more commonly used statistic and may in fact be a slightly more theoretically sound measure of the presence of economic threat in a way that corresponds better with how the economy has been envisioned in the subliterature. Unfortunately, the German Labor Ministry does not make this information available at the level of the municipality or city prior to 2009, and there is too much variation within the Länder to use Land-level data as a meaningful proxy. Average income data is available for the relevant communities via collaborative efforts of the 13 regional statistical offices through the entire period of study, and so for each municipality in each election cycle, I have been able to use data for the specific year in which each election was conducted.
A dummy variable has been included to account for this.

5.4 Model

The data were examined using a simple, multi-variable ordinary least squares (OLS). The dependent variable used was the percentage of each city council (at each of the two given time periods) made up of representatives with a migration background. For clarity of comparison across the two election cycles—and to make sure that there was no clear, time specific variation—the analysis was conducted by treating each panel separately. Three smaller cities included in Schönwälder’s study (Bergisch Gladbach, Moers, and Siegen) were excluded on theoretical grounds because of the large nature of their relevant electoral district that includes significant non-urban areas, while two larger cities (Mannheim and Stuttgart) were dropped from the first panel due to a lack of publicly available data for the earliest election cycle.

5.5 Results

The primary purpose of this chapter was to check the standard, demographic hypothesis that descriptive representation, while lagging behind the proportional size of immigrant and migration background populations, was largely following on patterns of settlement against the set of structural and institutional hypotheses. What I find from testing

53 Although, interestingly, a preference for greater redistributive policies, already higher in the former East Germany, may actually be somewhat more robust to the presence of immigrants—not because of greater sympathies, but because of the greater strength of these preferences as a legacy of the GDR. (Stichtnoth 2012)

54 As a robustness check and to account for autocorrelation, a panel-based linear model was also run, which returned results nearly identical to those found by the simple OLS regressions.
the several hypotheses and several other potential confounders is that the demographic hypothesis is not supported, while both of the hypotheses about the level of electoral rules hold up—one with a fairly strong effect, the other with a more subdued effect. The results are shown in Tables 5.2 through 5.5.
Table 5.2: OLS Regression Results, 2001-2006 Election Cycle, All Migration-Background Residents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dependent variable: Percentage of City Council with a Migration Background</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Former East Germany</td>
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<td>(1.515)</td>
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<td>Total Population (x1000)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proportion of Population with Migration Background</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
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<td>Open List System</td>
<td>1.344**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Total Number of Seats in City Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income (in €1000)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Green Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<td>FDP Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<td>Non-Major Parties Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
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<tr>
<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>4.351*** (df = 7; 63)</td>
</tr>
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Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 5.3: OLS Regression Results, 2006-2011 Election Cycle, All Migration-Background Residents

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Dependent variable: Percentage of City Council with a Migration Background</th>
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<td>Proportion of Population with Migration Background</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open List System</td>
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<td>(0.987)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Number of Seats in City Council</td>
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<td>Per Capita Income (in € 1000)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
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<td>Turnout</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<td>Non-Major Parties Vote Share (in %)</td>
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<td>Residual Std. Error</td>
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<td>F Statistic</td>
<td>7.340*** (df = 7; 66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Table 5.4: OLS Regression Results, 2001-2006 Election Cycle, Only Migration-Background Residents with German Citizenship

| Dependent variable: Percentage of City Council with a Migration Background |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                             | (1)                         | (2)                         |
| Former East Germany         | $-3.304^{**}$               | $-4.726^{**}$               |
|                             | (1.126)                     | (2.352)                     |
| Total Population (x1000)    | 0.002                       | 0.001                       |
|                             | (0.002)                     | (0.002)                     |
| Proportion of Population with Migration Background and German Citizenship | $-0.005$                     | $-0.025$                     |
|                             | (0.075)                     | (0.088)                     |
| Open List System            | $1.567^{**}$                | $1.599^{**}$                |
|                             | (0.628)                     | (0.620)                     |
| Total Number of Seats in City Council | 0.053                      | 0.066$^*$                   |
|                             | (0.033)                     | (0.034)                     |
| Per Capita Income (in €1000) | $-0.042$                    | $-0.092$                    |
|                             | (0.158)                     | (0.183)                     |
| Turnout                     | $-0.051$                    | $-0.055$                    |
|                             | (0.050)                     | (0.056)                     |
| SPD Vote Share (in %)       | $-0.043$                    | $-0.068$                    |
|                             | (0.044)                     | (0.057)                     |
| Green Vote Share (in %)     | 0.031                       | (0.106)                     |
| CDU Vote Share (in %)       | $-0.013$                    | (0.050)                     |
| FDP Vote Share (in %)       | $-0.259^*$                  | (0.137)                     |
| Non-Major Parties Vote Share (in %) | 0.048                      | (0.045)                     |
| Constant                    | 1.661                       | 6.255                       |
|                             | (4.450)                     | (6.267)                     |

| Observations | 71                       | 71                       | 71                       |
| R²           | 0.301                    | 0.341                    | 0.369                    |
| Adjusted R²  | 0.223                    | 0.243                    | 0.254                    |
| Residual Std. Error | 2.015 (df = 63) | 2.018 (df = 61) | 2.007 (df = 50) |
| F Statistic  | 3.866*** (df = 7; 63) | 3.506*** (df = 9; 61) | 3.137*** (df = 11; 50) |

Note: $^*$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01
Table 5.5: OLS Regression Results, 2006-2011 Election Cycle, Only Migration-Background Residents with German Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Percentage of City Council with a Migration Background</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former East Germany</td>
<td>-5.187***</td>
<td>-10.501***</td>
<td>-8.221***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.805)</td>
<td>(2.811)</td>
<td>(3.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of Population with Migration Background and German Citizenship</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open List System</td>
<td>2.750***</td>
<td>3.192***</td>
<td>2.530*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.889)</td>
<td>(0.918)</td>
<td>(1.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Seats in City Council</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
<td>0.125***</td>
<td>0.093**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income (in €1000)</td>
<td>-0.157</td>
<td>-0.241</td>
<td>-0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>-0.00004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD Vote Share (in %)</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Vote Share (in %)</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU Vote Share (in %)</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP Vote Share (in %)</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Linke Vote Share (in %)</td>
<td>0.230*</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Major Parties Vote Share (in %)</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-1.749</td>
<td>5.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.070)</td>
<td>(5.387)</td>
<td>(7.333)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations                                          74        74        74
R²                                                  0.403      0.465      0.490
Adjusted R²                                           0.340      0.380      0.389
Residual Std. Error                                  2.881 (df = 66)  2.702 (df = 63)  2.771 (df = 61)
F Statistic                                          6.370*** (df = 7; 66)  5.468*** (df = 16; 63)  4.877*** (df = 12; 61)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
When the total migration population (rather than the potential migration background electorate, as described in Section 5.2) was used in the equations, the demographic effects did appear in one panel in the direction expected, with a non-trivial influence on the dependent variable of interest—the percentage of the City Council that had a migration background. This result was not present for the other panel, representing the earlier elections, nor was there a significant effect when the proportion of residents with both a migration background and citizenship were measured.

Open-list systems do seem to have a fairly strong impact on the representation of migrant-background voters, regardless of how the model is specified. This result was statistically significant in all instances. Furthermore, the size of the impact is enough to make a large difference in election outcomes. Depending on the model, the use of open-list systems led to an increase of between 2 and 3.5 percentage points in the dependent variable—which translates, on average, to about 1.5 to 3 more seats held by migrant-background representatives than would otherwise be predicted. This is a very strong relationship, given that the mean absolute number of seats across the cities held by migrant-background representatives was around 2 seats.

The overall size of the city council, expected to have a positive impact on descriptive representation, does indeed have a small-to-moderate sized, statistically significant impact in the expected direction. The mean city council in the sample had 59 members, ($\sigma \approx 12.5$), such that a 1 standard deviation increase in the size of the council was related to about a 1 percent increase in the proportion of the city council with a migration background, or a little less than one seat in absolute terms. The effect here was also slightly greater in the second time period in the study.

The effect of changes in the relative success of parties also does not have a large
impact on descriptive representation outcomes. Among the control variables, even accounting for (generally worse) economic conditions and (generally smaller) migrant-background populations, descriptive representation in the former east German states still seems to be drastically lower than would otherwise be predicted. None of the other control variables showed a consistent effect.

In summary, what should be taken away from these results is that even when looking at data with some potential flaws, there are institutional factors including electoral rules and size of the legislative body that are clearly having a meaningful effect on descriptive representation of immigrant minorities in the German cities. The importance of simple demographic factors, if by no means disproven, do not appear to have an obvious impact on the progress of furthering the descriptive representation of minorities.

5.6 Future Extensions

There are a number of directions in which this research could be extended. One theory that could not be tested as thoroughly here is the idea of feedback and learning. Finding that city councils are more diverse as their size increases is initially promising in this respect, especially where this remains significant even when controlling for the overall size of the migrant-background electorate. More data would need to be collected, however, to make this data more convincing; I here outline the ways that this framework could, with intensive data collection, be used to test more concretely whether initial successes in descriptive representation do seem to have an independent, additive effect on the likelihood of future successes.

First and most simply, the data can be expanded to smaller city councils, thus
expanding the overall range of potential independent variables. The benefits here would result from increasing the number and representativeness of observations. There are limitations on this, however; migrant-populations remain concentrated more heavily in larger cities, and while this could be controlled for in any model, adding large numbers of cities expected to have low values of both the variable of interest and the outcome of interest would tend toward a consistent and somewhat artificial increase in any measures of statistical confidence. Another problem is that German city councils tend, in general, to have large numbers of members at all levels.55

The second obvious extension would be to measure numbers and proportions of candidates with a migration background, not just those elected. This is exactly what will be done in the following chapter, in a closer examination of the cities of Hamburg and Bremen. In a large-cross sectional study, though, this could allow us to observe migrant-background politicians as they are first achieving some political success (or at least activism) without the screening mechanism of whether they have been elected—long periods of having migrant-background candidates who are unsuccessful might tend to challenge the mechanism proposed, even if there appears to be a quick breakthrough once these candidates start getting elected.

Lastly, and perhaps most illustrative for our point, would be to extend this dataset across time. Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert’s data provides us a useful time comparison, but more data points in time for each case will allow us to observe better any sort of feedback loop. If the election of the first migrant-background candidate (or the nomination thereof) does make parties more likely to nominate future candidates and makes those candidates more likely to run successful campaigns, there should be a different distribution of

55 Typical examples are the town of Petershagen, outside Hanover, which has 32 seats on the city council for its 25,000 residents, and Eisenberg, close to Jena in Thuringia, which has 24 seats for only 10,000 people.
the number of successful candidates (or nominees) than if there was no independent effect of
the initial candidates’ success. In the scenario where there was no learning effect, it is likely
that one would see a single-peaked distribution of the number of candidacies, while a
“feedback loop” would likely imply a bimodal distribution. The reason for this is that there
should be a very small number of cases with only one or two successful candidates at any
given time. Any city (or at least any party in a given city) where there were no migrant-
background representatives at time $t_0$ would be predicted to continue to have no
representatives, while any case where some single-migrant background representative was
elected at $t_0$ would expect to quickly approach the actual desired level of representation of
their group in $t_1$ and subsequent elections, as a result of that first candidate’s added
knowledge about effective outreach to that group. As noted above, this could also be checked
against candidate nominations, and not just candidates elected, to test whether learning
processes occur after the first nominees enter the process or whether there must first be
successful candidacies resulting in elected, migration-background representatives. If the
majority of city councils have either representation roughly equal to the migrant-background
group or have yet to elect their first representative, with only a few cases transitioning in the
middle at any given time, it would be suggestive of these first representatives’ independent
effect on later successes. Even better would be the ability to trace individual cities over
time. An initial glance at the data from the cases in this study leads to inconclusive results,
though, without a clear central tendency in the distribution of seats (as was seen in Figure
5.1)

The primary limitation on these further extensions is resources; these will involve
intense data collection as well as coding and cross-checking candidate’s migrant origins, but
while this will take a sustained data collection push (likely by multiple researchers), the
necessary data to complete these extensions is publicly available.

Information on candidates has been difficult to collect, and the data collected by Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert has been an important contribution to our studies. Few other such datasets have been collected, and those which have (i.e., Bird 2003 for Canada, the various contributors to Bird, Saalfield and Wust 2011, the data on the states of Bremen and Hamburg in this dissertation) have had to be generated manually, which can be greatly time-consuming and require deep knowledge of a specific case. This has made comparative analysis difficult, and indeed, the dataset here is one of the most ambitious in even allowing for cross-state comparison within the German case. However, the data generated by Rafaela Dancygier (2014) using the OnoMap software developed by University College London may well show a way forward for future research—this software allows for quite accurate identification of such aspects as national origin and religion based on first and last names, a process not without flaws but essentially identical to the process used by coders such as those mentioned above with deep case knowledge.
In previous chapters, electoral rules, particularly those affecting the choice of open-list systems, have been shown to have a considerable effect on the ability of minority background candidates to reach elected office. One problem that has not been eliminated so far, however, is the context under which these rules are adopted. Is the development of open-list systems more likely in places where there is some underlying tendency for more inclusive systems? If so, then it may not be the system itself which leads to greater representation; rather, some other factor (e.g., greater norms of equality, differences in the migrant-background population, etc.) might be said to have a causal effect on both the choice of an open-list system and on the higher levels of representation achieved under these systems. In order to examine more closely whether there is some causal effect of these open-list systems, as well as other electoral rules, on levels of descriptive representation, I now turn to two of the cities that were not included in our earlier survey of German municipalities. In these two cases, any bias that might have occurred in the selection of electoral systems can be controlled for by observing the shift between systems within the context of the same cities.

While the potential factors affecting minority representation are complex, both at the epiphenomenal level and in their actual causal processes, there are ways to get a glimpse at some of the partial effects of certain electoral institutions. This study looks at one particular electoral rule that allows voters to express their preferences not only for parties, but for multiple individual candidates, giving us at least the potential to observe how voters reward or punish voters with an apparent migration background. While this does not solve the
problem of whether minority candidates on a party list are better seen as the object of a party’s descriptive representation strategy or instead as independent political agents, it allows us to see past the nomination process and view the response that voters have to a given level of representation on a ballot.

In these two cities, Bremen and Hamburg, recent changes in voting laws give us a chance to examine the potential before and after the fact of a more inclusive law. At around the same time, these two cities implemented a new scheme of cumulative voting under the auspices of improving democracy. In surveys taken after the 2011 election, voters appeared somewhat mixed in their feelings about the new system, as well as in their views about whether it actually had turned out to be a more democratic system (Schäfer & Schoen 2013). The effect on participation appears to have been mixed, with a small increase in participation in Bremen and a small decrease in participation under the new system in Hamburg. Furthermore, the neighborhoods in both cities that had the lowest participation and were expected to benefit most from the new reform continued to see voter turnout at drastically lower levels than the rest of the city (Probst and Gattig 2012, Schäfer & Schoen 2013). Bremen saw an increase in turnout of about 7 percent on average against levels at the prior election, while Hamburg saw a decrease of about 8 percent, and these shifts were pretty evenly distributed across neighborhoods.
Figure 6.1: Turnout 2007 vs 2011: Bremen Neighborhoods

Source: Bremen Elections Office

Figure 6.2: Turnout 2008 vs 2011: Hamburg Neighborhoods

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Nord
6.1 Support for Candidates under Cumulative Voting

An effect that garnered less attention was the overall success of minority background candidates—not every single candidate from this group was successful in being elected, nor did all of them appear to benefit from the new system, but these candidates in general seemed to do better than ever before, with a number securing election and many of these earning their seats via preference votes rather than being selected via party lists. These aspects of the election are elaborated upon in detail below, and I find that minority-background candidates did seem to do particularly well under the new rules, but that the sources of the support that led to this outcome are easier to trace in the Bremen case than they are in Hamburg.

Candidate nomination is a multi-stage process under the *kumulieren und panaschieren* system, and from these data one cannot observe the earlier stage where the party chooses to nominate and rank candidates. However, since the effect that voters have on their eventual rank can be observed, it can be seen that candidates with a migration origin generally ended up at a higher place on the list ranking after preference votes were counted than they had been placed by the parties. There are two competing potential explanations for where the support is coming from. The first has been alluded to in previous chapters—co-ethnic support from other members of the candidate’s background group. A second potential source of support in terms of preference votes for these minority candidates might be more related to geography than to demographics, which was also discussed in Chapter 4. Neighborhood associations and *Beiräte* (neighborhood councils) are easier points of access for potential political activists, and it may be easier for those politicians with a migration background to get their start in local organizations. This is a more complicated source of support, and reflects a number of aspects of co-ethnic support, class, and the geographic realities of
campaigning. Local contexts may be more amenable to minority-background politicians because the constituencies contain more of their co-ethnics, or more people from a similar socioeconomic status. Neighborhoods may also be easier contexts in which to gain a foothold in politics simply because there are a greater number of lower-level opportunities and fewer votes needed in order to secure a seat.

Studies of political behavior frequently emphasize that it cannot be assumed that all voters are acting with perfect information or in particularly sophisticated ways. Informational shortcuts can be expected to have a great deal of influence in the way that ballots are cast. This has been recently pointed out in the specific context of the 2011 Hamburg election by Marcinkiewicz and Jankowski (2014), where the rankings that parties gave were shown to still have the most prominent effects on the number of votes received. People near the top of the ballot got consistently more votes than others, particularly at the very top.56

While ballot positioning might still be assumed to have a major effect, there was no control included for a candidate's last name in Marcinkiewicz and Jankowski's study, or any of the other recent studies on these elections, with the exception of Probst and Gattig's (2012) brief mention. Last names, like the age and address of candidates printed on the ballot, are a relatively accessible, easy informational cue for voters to determine a candidate's ethnicity (Byrne & Pueschel 1974, McDermott 1998, Matson & Fine 2006). The ability to count votes by neighborhood, however, gives us a way in which to examine the three different pathways by which the personal-mandate boost for migration background candidates could travel. While all of these factors might be in effect to some degree, it should be observable whether co-ethnic, majority, or neighborhood support was the primary pathway to electoral success for migrant-background candidates in the 2011 elections. I thus generate the following hypotheses:

56 And, to a lesser extent, the very last candidate who usually did much better than those immediately above him or her.
Hypothesis 6.1: If the personal votes for migration-background candidates come from their own home neighborhood, it would appear that neighbors and local organizing are the primary source of their support.

Hypothesis 6.2: If the personal votes for migration-background candidates come primarily, but evenly, from the most ethnically diverse neighborhoods, it would appear that migration-background voters are the primary source of support.

Hypothesis 6.3: If the personal votes for migration-background candidates come evenly from across the neighborhoods, it would appear that majority voters are the primary source of their support.

Another way to look at the relationship is to examine voting data, as the distribution of vote by candidate, by neighborhood is available for all candidates and parties in this election. As with any such aggregate voting study, ecological inference is a concern and these initial statistics should be taken with due caution. Nonetheless, it should show whether there are large patterns across neighborhoods into the distribution of personal votes.

6.2 The Change to Cumulative Voting

Three of Germany’s sixteen states are effectively city-states; large metropolitan areas that, both by virtue of their size and historical place in German unification, have retained the important powers of the federal state for themselves. In two of these states, Hamburg and Bremen, organizations calling for a “more democratic” approach to the electoral systems successfully pushed the states to change their voting mechanisms, which has been part of a larger trend toward a more “citizen-oriented” rather than “party-oriented” approach to local government in a majority of the German regions (Vetter 2009). Leading this campaign was a national advocacy group pushing for forms of direct democracy, Mehr Demokratie e.V. Under the new systems, voters would be able to distribute their votes between parties and between individual candidates. Candidate list rankings were not only now opened to voters\textsuperscript{57}, but

\textsuperscript{57} rather than requiring voters simply to vote on a closed, ranked list.
citizens were strongly encouraged to use the personal preference vote, and could do so even across party lines. The systems are not entirely identical between the two states, nor or are they entirely novel. A number of smaller German cities have unlimited *panaschieren* but a limited *kumulieren*: Each voter may only give a certain number of votes to one particular candidate (usually 3).

Experiments with variations on these voting systems in the U.S. have led to real, if relatively underwhelming, improvements in African-American and Latino representation for a number of reasons, among them continued difficulty in finding candidates (Brockington et al 1998, 1117-1118). Two large surveys of the German experience are themselves also mixed: Holtkamp et al (2009) refer to cumulative voting as “an attractive alternative,” (p. 21), yet they also warn that the power that parties have over nominations will limit any effects of the new voting system (p. 25). Prahl (2010) offers another relatively positive view of the system, at least where it overlaps with a liberal, urban culture. (p. 66). In regards to its effect on female representation, he warns that:

> Cumulative voting has the tendency to lead to in increase in the number of successful, female candidates who win mandates. However, one must absolutely not make the mistake of understanding the system as an instrument for the advancement of women. (p. 88)

Since the same system might be expected to have similar results for the representation of traditionally-underrepresented groups, I further account for the effects on female representatives in the Bremen 2011 electoral data, where (with thanks to Probst and Gatting (2012)) candidates have been coded for gender as well as for migration background.

The change to this new system in both cities, while it took several years and involved debate over the specific terms of the transition, was relatively free of large controversies, and while there appears to have been a general desire for “fairer” elections, there is little
evidence in the public debate from the run-up to these elections that other representational
goals (such as women or minorities) were playing a large part in the appeal. The organization
that led the initiative itself is also fairly broad and non-partisan, evoking a commitment to
direct democracy as its overarching and relatively singular ideological goal.58 This stands in
contrast to measures proposing to extend the franchise in local elections to resident non-
citizens, which have gained traction in both cities but have also seen considerable resistance
at the local level in addition to opposition from the German Constitutional Court. (Benhabib
2004, Beckman 2006). While it may not be possible, therefore, to make a strict assumption of
non-endogeneity, the adoption of these rules can largely be seen as independent decisions
which were not designed or intended to lead to specific changes in minority representation.
However, the transition to these systems at roughly the same time, in two of the more
ethnically diverse cities in Germany, gives us a chance to examine the effects on descriptive
representation when two cases transition from almost entirely party-oriented elections to
elections with a strong personal component.

6.2.1 Bremen

In Bremen, the new set of voting rules, known as *kumulieren und panaschieren*
(cumulative and mixed) was formally proposed in 2006 and went into effect ahead of the 2011
elections. The new voting system gives each voter a total of 5 independent votes that may be
distributed in any manner that the voter chooses, and each vote may be given to either an
individual candidate or to the overall party. A voter may thus choose to give all of his/her
votes to the Christian Democratic Union, to one specific CDU candidate, or to five different

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58 The organization’s Web site gives the following mission statement, which while perhaps somewhat anodyne
gives no strong reason to be taken at anything other than face value: “Direct democracy is our central concern.
Citizens must have the right to make their own decisions about important questions, should they wish to—in
communities, in the federal states, at the federal level, and in the EU. This is what we stand for.” (www.mehr-
demokratie.de)
CDU candidates. They may also give three votes to a CDU candidate and two votes to a Free Democratic Party Candidate to support a CDU/FDP coalition—or for that matter, to a Social Democratic Party Candidate simply because it's their sister-in-law or best friend and they wish to be able to claim that they have voted for them. In Bremen, as in Hamburg, there are no other constraints on the panaschieren.

The net result, as shown in Table 6.1, was 19 legislators, or about 23 percent of the total of 83 seated delegates, who owed their election to individual vote mandates. While selected to represent party lists, their place on the original party list would not have been enough to gain a seat in the Bürgerschaft without the number of preferential votes they received. Some of the shifts in list ordering, especially at the very top, were relatively minor: Ingelore Rosenkötter, for example, who fell from second place on the Social Democratic list to third place. Some of the shifts, however, were dramatic: Elombo Bolayela earned a seat and was in 6th place on the SPD list after the election, despite having been placed 41st on the pre-election party list.
Table 6.1: Candidates Elected to the Bremen Bürgerschaft by Personal Mandates Rather than Party Mandates, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Migrant-Background</th>
<th>List Position Gain</th>
<th>Final List Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Seyrek</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>+41</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elombo Bolayela</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>+35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aydin Gürlevik</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>+29</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renate Möbius</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+27</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arno Gottschalk</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claas Rohmeyer</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+22</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Kemal Öztürk</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>+21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigrid Grönert</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruken Aytas</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreas Kottisch</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manfred Opperman</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Erlanson</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cindi Tuncel</td>
<td>Linke</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Schierenbeck</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Hoppe</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erwin Knäpper</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Jägers</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulf Eversberg</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Schildt</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Looking at the list of those elected via personal mandates, two demographic facts jump out: about a third of the candidates (6 of 19) elected in this manner have an immigration background\textsuperscript{59}, slightly overrepresenting their population as a whole, while one fewer (5) delegate is female.\textsuperscript{60} This is a little bit higher than the proportion of Bremers with a

\textsuperscript{59} Bolayela, Seyrek, Gürlevik, Aytas, Öztürk, and Tuncel

\textsuperscript{60} Möbius, Aytas, Grönert, Hoppe, and Schierenbeck
migration background (28.2 percent in 2011) and significantly lower than the percentage of women in the Bremen population overall (51.2 percent).

On average, these immigrant-origin candidates finished the election a little over 6 places higher on the electoral list than where they started, an upward movement of about 11.5 percent of the total length of the list (when the length of the two district lists are averaged).

Table 6.2: Number of Migrant-background Candidates on Party Lists Moving Up or Down After Personal Votes, Bremen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th># Ascending</th>
<th># Not Moving</th>
<th># Descending</th>
<th>Average Size of Move</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+5.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linke</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Probst and Gatting 2012, Bremen Elections Office

In an interesting contrast, a majority of all female candidates dropped at least one place in the list rankings for each of the 4 major parties; for no major party did a majority of male candidates drop in the rankings. On average, women dropped by a little less than 2 places on their respective party lists, or about 3.5 percent of the potential distance down the list. Looking at how candidates did overall in terms of their movement up and down the list, women in general did have a downward trend on the lists, with a slightly higher density of candidates moving upward for men and a noticeably higher density of candidates moving downward among women. For female candidates as well, there appears to be a slightly larger bump at the extreme end, with several women moving drastically up the list while the median female candidate dropped a few places.
Figure 6.3: Distribution of Movement Up or Down Party Lists After Cumulative Voting, by Gender, Bremen 2011

Source: Probst and Gattig 2012; Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2011

Figure 6.4 below shows the overall relationship between the concentration of votes in a candidate’s neighborhood and their relative ascent or descent on the party list.61

---

61 Absolute changes in list ranking make for difficult comparisons, because each party submitted lists of different lengths, and the lists for each of the two electoral districts were also separate (and considerably shorter for Bremerhaven, which returns fewer representatives to the Bürgerschaft. Thus candidates moving up within the larger parties, which submitted longer lists, might appear to have made larger jumps simply as an artifact of the greater number of places between, say, the middle place on the list and the 25th percentile of the list rankings. The “Scaled Change” measure used below for the solves for some of this problem, where the scaled change for any candidate C is measured by: the distance in absolute places that a candidate traveled up or down the list divided by the total number of candidates on the list.
Figure 6.4: Effect of Neighborhood Concentration of Vote on List Ranking, Bremen 2011

ScaledChange = Ascent or descent on party list after personal votes, as percent of overall list length

Home = Votes from candidate's home neighborhood as a percent of all votes cast for that candidate

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2011

There is rather little correlation between candidates in general and their support from home neighborhoods. Figure 6.5 below breaks this out specifically for female candidates, while figure 6.6 shows the effect for the subset of candidates with a migration background.
Figure 6.5: Effect of Neighborhood Concentration of Vote on List Ranking (Female Candidates Only)

ScaledChange = Ascent or descent on the party list after personal votes, as a percent of the overall list length

Home = Votes from candidate's home neighborhood as a percent of all votes cast for that candidate

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2011
Figure 6.6: Effect of Neighborhood Concentration of Vote on List Ranking (Migration-Background Candidates Only), Bremen 2011

ScaledChange = Ascent or descent on party list after personal votes, as a percent of overall list length

Home = Votes from candidate’s home neighborhood as a percent of all votes cast for that candidate

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2011

While the intercepts are rather different (with most women losing places on the party lists and most migrant-background candidates gaining places), the correlation between overall success and the concentration of a candidate’s success in their home neighborhood appears to be relatively negative—those who relied on their home district for the most support were less successful, while those who had a broader geographic base of support appeared to do better. While the relationship is not overly strong, the negative correlation
here does at least suggest that it is not strong local support that has been responsible for minority-background candidate’s rise in party lists. Instead, it appears that the most successful candidates from within both the set of migrant-background candidates and the set of female candidates were ones able to position themselves as city-wide candidates.

To examine the idea that migrant-background voters might be the source of minority candidate’s success, the reliance on the most migrant-dense neighborhoods for votes can be compared with whether (and how far) these candidates ascended or descended their party’s list. Figure 6.7 below, which is based on the proportion of a candidate’s total votes which came from the six most heavily migrant populated districts in Bremen (out of 23 total neighborhoods), shows that hypothesis 6.2 above would seem to fit this pattern. Those candidates that relied more heavily on these six districts for their votes were generally more successful in ascending party lists and increasing their chance of entering the Bürgerschaft.
Figure 6.7: Relationship between Vote Concentration in Migrant-Dense Neighborhoods and Change in List Ranking (Migration-Background Candidates Only), Bremen 2011

ScaledChange = Ascent or descent on party list after personal votes, as a percent of overall list length

MigRatio = Votes from the six neighborhoods with the largest immigrant-background populations as a percent of all votes cast for that candidate

Source: Statistisches Landesamt Bremen 2011

The direction of the relationship here shows that candidates with greater concentrations of votes in immigrant-heavy neighborhoods did somewhat better than those whose votes were more distributed, and also seems to suggest that votes for migrant-background candidates were much more likely to come from those neighborhoods with a higher-than-average immigrant population than from other neighborhoods. Because this study is relying on aggregated data, the evidence is necessarily more suggestive than conclusive. Nevertheless, this makes the co-ethnic support hypothesis seem, at least more plausible on 140
the surface than either the idea of neighborhood organizing or the null theory that support for these candidates is coming evenly from across groups.

6.2.2 Hamburg

Hamburg, like Bremen, switched to a cumulative vote system in recent years, and has now held also held one election to the Bürgerschaft and the Bezirksversammlungen (District Assemblies) completely under the new kumulieren und panaschieren rules, as well as one more election partially under these rules. The rules operate slightly differently in the Hamburg context, however. An important difference is that voters are required to vote simultaneously on two ballots each for the overall city council and for local assemblies, which serve as parliament and administrative bodies for the cities’ districts. For the Bürgerschaft, the votes are aggregated both at the level of the electoral district (Wahlkreis) and also for a list that covers the entirety of Hamburg, with the Bürgerschaft made up of members selected at both levels. For the district assemblies, the aggregation also takes place twice, at the electoral district and for the entirety of the administrative district (Stadtsbezirk)—a process simplified by the fact that each administrative district aligns precisely with between one and four electoral districts.\(^{62}\) This also means that individual candidates can be, and frequently are, nominated on lists for both the city council and the district council simultaneously, and/or on both level of ballot for a given council.

In the 2008 elections, voters had a mix of closed- and open-list systems. Prior to this election, Hamburg had voted using an entirely closed-list system. As of 2008, the lists aggregated at the higher level for both the Bürgerschaft and the district assemblies were

\(^{62}\) For the one district where the electoral district and the administrative district are one and the same (Bergedorf, in the southeast corner of the city), elections to the district assembly is nonetheless conducted with a Bezirksliste and Wahlkreisliste, as in the other districts—although, not surprisingly, the lists of candidates submitted by the parties for the two are almost identical.
conducted entirely under closed-list rules, while voters were allowed to cast either a list vote or a personal vote for one of the candidates at the lower (Wahlkreis) level.

For 2011 full cumulative voting is in place, and barring new changes to the electoral laws, will be in place for subsequent elections. Under current law, there are once again seats apportioned at two levels for each council in each respective assembly (city and electoral district for the Bürgerschaft, and district and electoral district for the Bezirksversammlung). Each voter gets 5 votes for each, and every, level of seats. Hamburg voters thus cast 20 cumulative votes across four different lists. At each level, they are allowed to split their votes in any way that they choose, across parties or candidates or entirely for a single candidate. Examples of the differences in the ballot are given in Appendix B of this dissertation.

The party dynamics in the elections of 2008 and 2011 marked the seeming end of a slightly unusual period in the city’s political history. The SPD had been the largest and clearly dominant party from the end of the Second World War until the elections of 2001. In 2001, although they still gained a plurality of votes, they were excluded from the government when the CDU was able to form a coalition with a new populist right party. The Partei Rechtstaatlicher Offensive (translated sometimes as “Law and Order Offensive Party” and sometimes as “Rule of Law Offensive Party”, almost always referred to as the Schill-Partei after the party founder, Ronald Schill), which was founded only in 2000, was able to get 19.4 percent of the vote in 2001. This proved to be fairly unstable, and in 2003 Hamburg’s CDU mayor Ole von Beust removed Ronald Schill from his office as vice-mayor, effectively ending the coalition agreement. Schill responded to this by threatening to oust von Beust as a homosexual, but was further embarrassed when the mayor publicly aired these threats. Schill threatened to close down the party and flee to South America, a threat that was actually carried out (Schröder 2004), where he appears to have remained until returning in July 2014 for the taping of a new season of Big Brother. The Schill-Partei received less than half a percent of the votes in the 2004 election.

63 Schill responded to this by threatening to oust von Beust as a homosexual, but was further embarrassed when the mayor publicly aired these threats. Schill threatened to close down the party and flee to South America, a threat that was actual. carried out (Schröder 2004), where he appears to have remained until returning in July 2014 for the taping of a new season of Big Brother. The Schill-Partei received less than half a percent of the votes in the 2004 election.
did slightly better in these elections, but seems to have suffered from the national party's uncertainty about tolerating SPD-Linke coalitions, driving some voters to the Linke and scaring some centrist voters who might have feared such a coalition (Jou 2009). In February of 2011, following a breakdown of the CDU/Green coalition under newly appointed mayor Christoph Ahlhaus, the first elections under these rules went overwhelmingly to the SPD, who received a slim majority of the seats in the Bürgerschaft and came very close to receiving an absolutely majority of the votes cast. (48.4 percent of the vote translated into 62 of the 121 seats). This returned the proportion of votes for the SPD and CDU back to approximately their historic levels.

Hamburg has several advantages as a research case; first and foremost is the much larger number of candidates and candidacies, allowing, if nothing else, for more robust statistical tests. While the data made available by the State Statistical Office for Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein remains aggregated at the neighborhood level and not the individual level, which would allow for exactly the kind of inference that might be hoped for in studying political behavior, number of additional factors at the neighborhood level and for the candidates themselves can be controlled for. The disadvantage here is that no comprehensive list was maintained of the origin of all candidates, as Probst and Gatting 2012 did for the Bremen case, nor can this data be easily re-created from public records except by indirect methods such as name analysis. The Hürriyet newspaper did such an analysis for the 2011 election, but only for candidates of Turkish-origin. The following analysis for Hamburg will limit its scope to Turkish-background candidates because of this difficulty, where a reliable list can be coded from candidate's names, and where this group is the largest origin group and therefore still of substantive interest.

There are two sets of surveys conducted after the 2011 election which allow us to see voting preferences among Hamburger of both native and migrant origin. First is Mustafa
Acar’s (2012) post-election survey of Turkish-origin residents, in which the SPD are the preference of a near majority of this population.64 This applied about equally to both the subset of those Turkish-background residents with citizenship—and thus eligible to vote—and also to non-citizens. These data are shown in Table 6.3 below. The German Longitudinal Survey also polled voters at an even shorter time after the election, and asked both a party preference question and a question requiring them to recall how they had distributed their own cumulative votes on the two ballots for the city council. These data, shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 below, give us somewhat conflicting results. On the one hand, the two groups show little difference when compared side by side. The overall survey seems to show a disproportionately high level of identification with the Christian Democrats among both groups, though—again, both among migrant-background voters and among native-born voters. Given the poor election results for the CDU in that election, this is a highly unusual estimate. Identification with the Greens among both groups was a also bit higher than the vote total that year would have suggested, although the magnitude of the difference between self-reported identification and votes given is smaller in magnitude. In counting the mean number of votes, there was also relative parity between the two groups—migrant-background voters cast slightly more votes, on average, for the SPD than native-born voters, on both the city-wide and the electoral-district ballot. The FDP appeared to do slightly better among migrant-background candidates on the city-wide ballot, and the Greens slightly worse, but these differences were again small. The SPD had the advantage with migrant-background voters and native German voters, so it might not make sense to anticipate that differences in party preference were causing any difference in the candidates to whom voters were distributing their votes.

64 Worth noting is that Acar’s survey supports the idea that there is a significant demand for descriptive representation—when asked whom they would prefer as a Chancellor candidate, 56 percent of those Turks with German citizenship and about 40 percent of those with Turkish citizenship named Green party chairman (and second-generation Turkish-German) Cem Özdemir, levels around 20 and 15 percentage points (respectively) higher than each group’s preference for the Greens as a party.
Table 6.3: Party Preference/Identification, Hamburg 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>GLES - Migrant-background</th>
<th>GLES - Native-Born</th>
<th>Acar - German Citizens w/ Turkish Background</th>
<th>Acar - Turkish Citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>11.86%</td>
<td>11.48%</td>
<td>43.45%</td>
<td>48.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>11.86%</td>
<td>13.78%</td>
<td>36.12%</td>
<td>24.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linke</td>
<td>3.39%</td>
<td>6.68%</td>
<td>11.51%</td>
<td>10.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>39.98%</td>
<td>35.70%</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>5.08%</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No preference</td>
<td>25.42%</td>
<td>24.43%</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>15.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rattinger et al 2011; Acar 2012, p. 43, p.101

Table 6.4: Mean Number of Votes Given to Each Party, Hamburg 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>City-wide List</th>
<th>Electoral District List</th>
<th>City-wide List</th>
<th>Electoral District List</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrant-background Voters</td>
<td>Native Voters</td>
<td>Migrant-background Voters</td>
<td>Native Voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linke</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rattinger et al 2011

The next step is to examine the actual makeup of the candidates themselves. This is done by generating a list of all Turkish origin candidates for all of the five major parties which stood in the 2008 and 2011 elections. In the 2008 elections, 38 individuals with a Turkish

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65 This number was generated by the author's own count of surnames that fit typical Turkish last names, with individual cross-referencing for place of birth or publishing media in the Turkish language, where possible. The count for 2011 was checked against a list published in the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet (Hürriyet Avrupa, 2011). Both counts generated 71 names, with agreement in 69 cases. After cross-checking the names on which there was disagreement against any public records available, it was decided that the final data should include these,
background stood as candidates on one list, for at least one position, for either the Bürgerschaft or one of the Bezeriksversammlungen. Because candidates could be nominated multiple times and at multiple levels, these 38 candidates actually accounted for 47 of the approximately 2,500 total candidacies in that election, or about 2 percent. In the 2011 election, the number of candidates with a migration background increased, and dramatically so for some of the parties. There were 73 candidates of apparent Turkish background. Because candidates were able to run on multiple lists, these 73 candidates made up 105 of the 3,127 total places on party lists that were possible for the 5 major parties, just under 3.5 percent. The SPD and Linke accounted for most of these in 2008, with the Linke having the highest number of nominations and the SPD having the most individual candidates, and these two parties as well as the Greens accounted for most of the 2011 nominations (when the SPD had both the greatest number of nominations and candidates.

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The Hamburg Elections Office does not make public the full electoral lists for 2008, and higher-level lists were only published in the final official elections results (Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2008) for parties which got enough votes to earn seats off of those lists. These were published for 2011. Thus the author’s own count for these two total numbers is exact for 2011, but for 2008 is missing the FDP candidates for a number of regions where they were less successful.

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This brings the total to 73 cases included.
Table 6.5: Number of Candidacies Held by Turkish-Migrant Candidates (Number of Distinct Candidates) Hamburg 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>CDU</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>Linke</th>
<th>SPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg 2008</td>
<td>7 (6)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>7 (5)</td>
<td>17 (13)</td>
<td>16 (14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein (2008)

Table 6.6: Number of Candidacies held by Turkish-Migrant Candidates (Number of Distinct Candidates) Hamburg 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>CDU</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>Green</th>
<th>Linke</th>
<th>SPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg 2011</td>
<td>12 (10)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>29 (16)</td>
<td>28 (16)</td>
<td>33 (21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein (2011)

Because the FDP nominated no Turkish-background candidates in 2008, and only nominated two candidates for three list positions across all of Hamburg in 2011, it is difficult to include them in these statistics. For the other four major parties, Turkish-background candidates almost always found themselves in a higher list position than where they were placed by the parties. In 2008, this magnitude of the change was greatest for migrant-background SPD candidates; in 2011, candidates running for the three left-leaning parties had the greatest increases in list rankings.

In 2008 (See Table 6.7), CDU candidates and SPD candidates ended up ranked approximately two places higher on party lists after preference votes were counted; for the CDU, this was largely driven by one very successful candidate (Julia Aydin in Hamburg-Mitte) who moved 15 places up the list on the basis of preference votes. This effect was much more evenly distributed across SPD candidates.

In 2011 SPD candidates with a migration-background increased an average of 3.7
places on the electoral list from where they were listed by the parties, Green candidates increased an average of 2.3 places, and candidates standing for Die Linke increased just shy of one full place on their respective list. As with the Bremen case, a better comparison is the change relative to the length of the party list on which the candidate ran. By this measure, Green candidates with a Turkish background benefited the most from personal votes, ending up on average at a point on the list 12.0 percent higher than they started, while Turkish-background candidates in the SPD moving up 9.4 percent of the lists' length and candidates for Die Linke moving up 7.2 percent of the distance. Christian Democratic candidates on average actually did move downward after personal votes were counted, although the magnitude of this shift was rather small (a descent of about 0.41 seats, or about 2.6 percent of the list length). There were also a few differences between Bürgerschaft and Bezirksversammlung lists, with Turkish-background Die Linke candidates doing rather better in the latter case and with SPD candidates from this group doing particularly well in Bürgerschaft lists.
Table 6.7: Number of Turkish-background Candidates on Party Lists Moving Up or Down After Personal Votes, Hamburg 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Bürgerschaft</th>
<th>Bezirksversammlungen</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nominated only for Landesliste</td>
<td>Ascending</td>
<td>Not Moving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linke</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 2008, parties could nominate candidates for the Landesliste/Bezirksliste, which did not allow personal votes, for the Wahlkreisliste at either level, which did, or both. Counts of candidates moving apply only to those who were on lists allowing for personal votes, while the number of candidates who were only nominated at the higher level lists appears in the initial column for each box.

Source: Statisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2008
Table 6.8: Number of Turkish-background Candidates on Party Lists Moving Up or Down After Personal Votes, Hamburg 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Bürgerschaft</th>
<th>Bezirksversammlungen</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ascending</td>
<td>Not Moving</td>
<td>Descending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linke</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 2011, all lists at all levels were open to personal cumulative votes. As in 2008, parties could nominate candidates at multiple levels.

Source: Statisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2011
As in the Bremen case, women seemed to suffer slightly when preference votes were counted. On the citywide list, the median female candidate from the 5 major parties ended up at a list position 3 places lower than where she was placed by the party. The median male candidate, however, ended up at the same place on the party list after preference votes where he had been placed in the party ranking. The density plot below shows the distribution of movements on the party list after preference votes were counted.

Figure 6.6: Distribution of Movement Up or Down Party Lists After Cumulative Voting, by Gender, Hamburg (Landesliste), 2011

When I control for other factors at the individual level and at the level of the district, does having a Turkish background actually seem to be helping candidates? In order to test this, I look at the results of personal votes to the Hamburg Bürgerschaft. Unfortunately, the number of preference votes cast were only reported at the electoral-district level in 2008, meaning that there is only one, electoral-district wide observation for each candidate’s votes.
However, in 2011, these votes were reported at one statistical level lower (at each of the 104 Stadtteile), thus allowing us to compare the success of each candidate across the several Stadtteile in which they appeared on the ballot. Important control factors, such as overall turnout, unemployment, and age distributions, are also available at the level of the Stadtteil.

30 of the 627 people nominated to the lists for the five major parties at the electoral district level in 2011 were of Turkish background. Breaking down the voting results into candidate-neighborhood units (i.e., how many personal votes did a candidate receive from any given neighborhood), it can be seen whether there was a tendency for these candidates to do better in neighborhoods with greater immigrant-background concentrations.

Table 6.9 below shows the results of that analysis, using a simple linear regression with clustered standard errors to adjust for the same candidate running in multiple districts simultaneously. The dependent variable here is the personal votes that a candidate received, measured as a percentage of the total number of votes that the candidates’ party received in a given district (to account for the different levels of overall support for each party). The primary candidate-level independent variable of interest was a candidate’s Turkish background, measured as binary dummy variable. At the district level, the primary variable of interest was the proportion of a district with a migration background. The Statistical Office for Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein does report data on overall population with a migration background at the level of Stadtteil in Hamburg, but does not break it down by origin group; the overall total here is used as the best available approximate estimate of the Turkish-background population.

To test for the effect of economic factors in the district, a measure for the unemployment rate in each district was also included. A dummy variable signifying whether the candidate was a member of the SPD was also included. Lastly, three interaction variables were included to test for different effects between Turkish-background candidates and
others. The first two were obtained by multiplying the value of the Turkish-background variable times the unemployment rate and the migrant-background population, such that the value of the interaction term was 0 for all candidates who did not have a Turkish background. The third was an additional dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the candidate had both a Turkish origin and was also an SPD candidate, and 0 otherwise.
Table 6.9: Effect of Personal and District-Level Variables on Personal Votes Received, Hamburg Bürgerschaft Elections 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Origin</strong></td>
<td>$-0.009^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.003$</td>
<td>$-0.005$</td>
<td>$-0.004^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.008^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.004$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spitzenkandidat</strong></td>
<td>$0.198^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.198^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.201^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.198^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.197^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.197^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Migrant in District</strong></td>
<td>$-0.00001$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.00000$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.00000$</td>
<td>$0.00001$</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00001)</td>
<td>(0.00001)</td>
<td>(0.00001)</td>
<td>(0.00001)</td>
<td>(0.00001)</td>
<td>(0.00001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Origin</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.0002^*$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Migrant in District</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment Rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.0001^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.0001^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00005)</td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Origin</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.001$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment Rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPD</strong></td>
<td>$-0.068^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.006^*$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkish Origin</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>$-0.025^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPD</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>$-0.061^*$</td>
<td>$-0.0004$</td>
<td>$-0.0002$</td>
<td>$0.001$</td>
<td>$-0.0001$</td>
<td>$0.001$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>0.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R^2</strong></td>
<td>0.950</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F Statistic</strong></td>
<td>2,270.533^{***} (df = 2; 98)</td>
<td>1,296.280^{***} (df = 4; 96)</td>
<td>1,366.931^{***} (df = 4; 96)</td>
<td>1,291.561^{***} (df = 4; 96)</td>
<td>1,352.504^{***} (df = 4; 96)</td>
<td>938.092^{***} (df = 6; 94)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Statisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein, 2011
In general, the co-ethnic focused patterns seen in Bremen do not appear to be present in Hamburg. Neither individual-level characteristics, nor the interaction of Turkish identity with neighborhood-level characteristics seemed to have a noticeable affect in any direction. Only one of the interaction terms achieved statistical significance, in just one of the models: Turkish-background candidates who were also on SPD lists did appeared to do moderately worse in terms of preference votes than might otherwise be expected.

I then broke out just the candidates who had a Turkish background, to see if either of the district-level variables of interest used above correlated with the candidates' success in certain districts over others.
Table 6.10: Effect of District-Level Variables on Sources of Turkish-origin Candidates’ Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of Party’s Overall Votes</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spitzenkandidat</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Migrant in District</td>
<td>0.0004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations | 71 | 71 |
R²         | 0.189 | 0.191 |
Adjusted R² | 0.181 | 0.180 |
F Statistic: 7.939*** (df = 2; 68) 5.266*** (df = 3; 67)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Again, the effects are too small to attribute any meaningful correlation to; there is a statistically significant, positive correlation between the overall migrant-background population and a greater number of preference votes, but the size of this effect is very small—just 0.04 percent of the votes a party received in the district in question, which translates into no more than a few votes. Furthermore, this effect disappears when the unemployment rate is included.

Thus, while it can be said that on average, Turkish-origin candidates ended up on a higher place on the lists than they were placed, and to a greater degree in the 2011 elections under cumulative voting, there does not appear to be sufficient evidence either for or against the claim support is coming from co-ethnics in the Hamburg case, as was suggested in the Bremen case (or in the Dutch parliamentary elections, in Chapter 4). Additionally, the
negative trend for female candidates held up for candidates here as it did in Bremen.

6.3 Conclusion

Where does this leave us? On the one hand, candidates with a migration background seem to benefit from the cumulative voting system. There were a greater number of migrant-background representatives in these state legislatures following the transition to cumulative voting (though this is in line with broader trends), and there was a definite tendency for these candidates to fare better after preference votes were cast than simply by their placement on the party lists. In Bremen, there was a general tendency for minority-background candidates to get more personal votes in neighborhoods with higher minority populations—though not necessarily the specific neighborhoods where they live. But where I was able to isolate some of the potential confounders in the Hamburg case, these candidate’s ascriptive identities did not appear to have an identifiable effect—at least not at the aggregate level. Secondly, while the differences in party preferences between migrant-background and non migrant-background candidates in these two cases might not be large, there do seem to be differences between parties in both how many candidates are nominated and the success of these candidates—with migrant-background CDU candidates being rarer, and not necessarily benefiting from the same upward pressures seen more generally.

This, combined with the generally downward pressure on women’s representation (particularly in the Bremen case) also provides tentative support for the idea that more open systems may not provide benefits for all underrepresented groups, but may be especially beneficial to migrant-background voters and representatives because of these group’s relatively small size, allowing voters to more easily coordinate on candidates from their own group.
There are several possibilities for future research to explore. First, the effects will be clearer following future elections under the new rules. While the report of Probst and Gattig (2012) was fairly optimistic on people's understanding of the new system after the first election, it may simply take time for people to adjust to the new rules and any effect may be amplified if migrant-background voters are successfully rallied to support candidates from their own groups—or they may be mitigated if the members of these communities most committed to “electing one of their own” were the ones most likely to vote and to take advantage of the system in its first instance.

A more pressing question is the nomination process for candidates of a minority background. Are parties systematically undervaluing their candidates, placing them lower on the list than native-born candidates who have equal (or even less) support within the community? What factors are affecting the positions on party lists that migrant-background politicians are being assigned in the first place? Understanding this process will require a much better, deep understanding of the mechanisms behind each party’s nominating process—and here, too, the question arises of whether strategies can be fully formed in the first iteration of the new rules.

Whether or not the transition to kumulieren und panaschieren rules will lead to more democratic outcomes in some broader sense will require a much broader analysis. However, it seems clear that there are potential group-specific benefits to be had, and evidence that they have been achieved in some cases—but not in all cases.
Chapter 7 — Conclusion

This dissertation set out to establish that certain institutions provided a window into the way in which parties were able to reach out to voters with migration backgrounds in Europe. It has shown that the process by which parties learn about how outreach can be conducted is a difficult and complicated one. It is hard for parties to learn how to access networks into which they have not been previously connected, and without specific knowledge of a group, it is hard to learn what their preferences are, what programmatic and policy issues members of the group want to have addressed, or to understand how certain types of symbolic politics will be received.

Migrant groups in the German and Dutch context have a few ways in which feedback can be given to the parties, which might in turn affect the way that parties conduct themselves. The type of electoral rules used, particularly the presence of open-list systems, was a factor that was shown to have an important impact on the way that minority outreach was conducted and the way that minority preferences were aggregated. Within systems where preference votes remain constant, demonstrated in the Dutch case in Chapter 4, there is support for minority candidates coming largely from the areas in which other members of the same migrant group are more heavily concentrated, and this effect might be stronger or weaker for any given group compared to other migrant communities in the same context. The assumption that voters from a specific origin group will tend to give preference votes disproportionately to members of their own group seems at least plausible, and fits with the aggregate-level data. Where there is variation in the presence of open-list systems, as seen in Chapter 5, those systems in which preference votes are allowed show a connection to higher rates of migrant-background representation at the city council level. Furthermore, this effect...
was relatively strong, and held up despite fairly large variations in the migrant-background populations in these cities—a factor that did not seem to independently affect the levels of descriptive representation achieved in these city councils. Lastly, in the two cases observed where a voting system was changed from a closed-list system to an open-list one, almost all migrant-background candidates seemed to benefit from preference votes under the new electoral rules, although this support was easier to trace back to neighborhoods with large migrant-origin populations in one city (Bremen) than it was in the other (Hamburg).

7.1 Future Research Directions - Germany and The Netherlands

An obvious next step to extend the findings on the German city councils is to be able to examine the specific party lists for each city, and balance the number of migrant-background candidates elected to the number that are nominated in the first place. Is there a general tendency across cities like that seen in Hamburg and Bremen, such that candidates tend to end up ranked more highly after preference votes are tabulated than they were on the list that the party presented to the voters? If so, it would provide further support for the causal process suggested in this dissertation: that migrant-background voters are indeed able to overcome the coordination problems inherent in strategic voting and pool their votes among candidates of their own background in ways that cause them to get into office more frequently. If this pattern is irregular, then there may be other factors in the nomination process or other aspects of politics that covary with the regions using preference votes.

This type of research, unfortunately, encounters some data limitations, as official ballots are not generally collected or made public for very long after elections, nor is there a federal office that collects these data from across the Länder. However, the fact that these lists are now published online ahead of elections should provide a good starting point for
collecting and coding local-level candidates moving forward. This collection can parallel
developments in the field measuring parliamentary and local representatives’ origins,
networks and communities—whether by the use of detailed and standardized hand-coding
processes (such as those developed by Karen Schönwälder) or more sophisticated machine-
coding processes (such as those developed by Rafaela Dancygier).

Having more time periods available to study will also allow for better tests of some of
the learning processes proposed and developed in this dissertation. The snapshot of elections
in the two batteries collected by Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert gives us a picture of
cities across the spectrum in terms of migrant-background representation. If there is an
independent, feedback effect from the entry of early migrant-background representatives,
however, there should be a specific, dynamic process observable across the various city
councils. The most difficult entry will be the first candidate, and there should therefore be a
number of cases without any immigration-background candidates. There should also be a
number of cases where representation levels are catching up to levels in the population
quickly, as information about how to conduct outreach (and how to get elected) diffuses
outward from the first successful candidate. Viewed over time, the data should have a
dynamic, pooling equilibrium such that individual cases either have no representation at all or
relatively proportional levels of representation—and cases that do transition should very
quickly break away from the first equilibrium and pass to the second over just a few election
cycles.

7.2 Future Research Directions - Comparative

The findings of this project also provide a clear opportunity to extend research
beyond just the two cases examined. While the particular dynamics of politics in these two
countries informed the data analyses, the broader theoretical points should extend to other migrant-receiving countries. The historical pattern of migration in each country is important for understanding the status of different migrant groups in terms of their origins, their current political status, and the degree to which they are organized and have a coherent identity as members of that particular group. However, the problem of incorporating large numbers of migrants into the political system remains relatively similar from an electoral standpoint across Europe.

On the questions of institutions, it has been shown that the electoral rules used to determine which specific candidates are elected will have an effect on the degree of descriptive representation that is actually achieved. Because of this, a number of other institutional aspects deserve closer examination. In closed-list systems, will candidates with a migration background continue to do more poorly, or will parties in closed-list systems elsewhere be more likely than the parties in these countries to place candidates at a ranking on party lists commensurate with the levels of support they might be able to generate if preference votes were used? In systems that use single-member districts, a different set of incentives does seem to be at play, and in these the logic underlying Dancygier (2014) seems to be more important—minority-background candidates do not need to simply bring in additional votes, but they need to be able to bring in enough votes to win a plurality in that district. This makes it unlikely that group coordination on a candidate will be enough for their election until (and unless) the concentration of members of that candidate’s group within a constituency begins to approach a plurality itself—making the chances for effective descriptive representation either somewhat unlikely, or contingent on high levels of geographic and political segregation (see Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004 on majority Hispanic districts in the US and Dancygier 2014 on majority Muslim districts in Britain; see also Canon 1999 for a review of the literature on African-American majority districts in the U.S.).
Under open-list proportional representation, however, the underlying logic of the coordination problem facing minorities seeking descriptive representation would seem to hold up beyond the cases studied here. In any situation where there are only a few candidates from a group, it is likely that they will have an easier time ensuring that votes cast strategically are effective in actually electing members of their own group; they should not face the problems that women might in being underrepresented in legislatures, even if they have equal numbers of candidates, due to the difficulty of coordinating or signaling an effective way for voters to cast their ballots strategically without wasting votes on those candidates likely to be successful regardless of preference votes. More comparative studies of other minority groups in other contexts, under open- and closed-list systems, should allow for a better understanding of how group size affects this coordination problem. It might also indicate whether there are inflection points beyond which greater representation on the ballot may stop translating into better representation in parliaments—which creates an interesting echo of an older literature on African-American politics in the U.S., which found that in the American case, there was a specific range of minority population proportion (usually in the 15-40 percent range) where electoral rules had a disproportionate impact on representation outcomes (e.g., Taebel 1978, Engstrom and McDonald 1981).

A major difficulty with comparative studies so far has been the limitations on candidate data, particularly across cases. However, as more countries and municipalities make information about candidates and party lists available freely online, and as mechanical coding mechanisms allow for dealing with greater number of cases—in addition to making it easier to study and understand party lists in places where the researcher may have narrower knowledge about the specifics of party history or may run into linguistic difficulties—it will be easier to coordinate cross-country comparisons using the frameworks for understanding co-ethnic voting and the differences in electoral rules developed in this dissertation.
Two more puzzles emerge from this dissertation that will deserve attention in the future. One is more of a question of political phenomena: Since migration-background voters are doing better under preference voting, and attract enough votes to move upward on party lists or to earn their own seats outright, why do parties place them so low on their lists to begin with? Are parties systematically undervaluing their migrant-background candidates, or is there some instrumental decision behind these candidates being placed lower on party lists. In Hamburg and Bremen, where local parties are dealing with preferential voting for the first time, the simplest response might be to ascribe this to the learning process: parties did not know that migrant-background candidates (or at least Turkish-background candidates in these particular cities) would be so successful, and have not had a chance to adapt their strategies. While there is not available data on the candidate rankings for all of the cities in Chapter 5 which could be compared to the two Hansestädte in Chapter 6, the fact that candidates are doing significantly better under preferential voting implies the same dynamic in states that have used preference voting for much longer. Further investigation is needed to confirm whether these increased rates of descriptive representation are due to the preference votes themselves or to higher rankings on party lists, but if the same dilemma emerges in these other states, it is harder to attribute to party ignorance and again raises the question: why are migrant-background candidates undervalued?

The second puzzle is beyond the scope of the analysis here, as it raises normative questions, but they are questions that can have considerable importance for political science. If one set of electoral rules (open-list PR) benefits immigrant minorities, while another (closed-list PR) benefits women as an underrepresented group, how should lawmakers balance these interests in selecting electoral rules? Who should have a better claim on representation, especially when the benefits come largely as unintended consequences? Hopefully, there are other mechanisms to increase both groups’ representation where it is lacking, but insofar as
electoral rules structure representation outcomes, it may always be to one deserving group's benefit and to another's disadvantage. Gains in descriptive representation do appear to be coming slowly to Europe's immigrant minorities, and these groups' abilities to support each other via the ballot box, but there are still many factors that can stand in the way of achieving equitable representation. The unintended consequences of electoral institutions are not the entire story, but they clearly do matter.
Appendices

Appendix A - Data Sources for German Elections

Local election data for German elections below the state level, at the level of district or city (Kreis or Kreisfreie Stadt) are not distributed at a central source, but are made publicly available either by the state government or by the specific local government.

Electoral Data for Chapter 5 was collected in June and July 2014 from the following government Web sites, listed by state and by agency providing the data. Of the cities studied in Schönwälder, Sinanoglu and Volkert (2011), data was unavailable only from the cities of Mannheim and Stuttgart for the 2004 communal election.

Baden-Württemberg:
City of Stuttgart: http://www.stuttgart.de/item/show/133642,
City of Heilbronn: https://www.heilbronn.de/bue_rat/wahlen/grw_2004/,
https://www.heilbronn.de/bue_rat/wahlen/gemeinderatswahl2009/
City of Heidelberg:
City of Freiburg im Breisgau: http://fritz.freiburg.de/wahl/gw09.htm,
http://fritz.freiburg.de/wahl/gw04.htm
City of Karlsruhe:
http://web1.karlsruhe.de/Stadtentwicklung/siska/wahlen/wahlen_gemeinderat.htm,
City of Mannheim:
https://www.mannheim.de/sites/default/files/page/7102/grw09_amtl_endergebnis.pdf,
City of Reutlingen: http://www.reutlingen.de/de/Rathaus+Service/Wahlen/Wahlergebnisse- vergangener-Wahlen/Wahlergebnisse-Kommunalwahl
City of Ulm:
http://www.ulm.de/politik_verwaltung/rathaus/ergebnisse.58434.3076,3571,3744,4323,3790,58434.htm

Bayern: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung
http://www.wahlen.bayern.de/kommunalwahlen/

Brandenburg: Statistik Berlin Brandenburg

Hessen: Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt
http://www.hsl.de/themenauswahl/wahlen/index.html

Niedersachsen: Niedersächsisches Landesamt für Statistik
http://www.nls.niedersachsen.de/KW2006/Auswahl_Kreiswahl.html

Mecklenburg-Vorpommern: Landeswahlleiterin Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
http://www.statistik-mv.de/cms2/STAM_prod/STAM/de/start/_Landeswahlleiter/Landeswahlleiter/kommunalwaehlen/index.jsp

Nordrhein-Westfalen: Landeswahlleiterin des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen

Rheinland-Pfalz: Rheinland-Pfalz Landeswahlleiter

Saarland: Landesamt für Zentrale Dienste - Statistisches Amt
Sachsen:

City of Dresden: http://www.dresden.de/de/02/060/01/c_15_ergebnisse_kommunalwahl.php

City of Leipzig: http://www.leipzig.de/buergerservice-und-verwaltung/wahlen-in-leipzig/wahlberichte/


Sachsen-Anhalt: Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen-Anhalt
http://www.stala.sachsen-anhalt.de/wahlen/kwkw/index.html

Schleswig-Holstein:


City of Kiel: https://www.kiel.de/rathaus/statistik/_dokumente/11._Wahlen.pdf

City of Lübeck:
http://www.luebeck.de/stadt_politik/rathaus/wahlen/kommunalwahl03/ergebnisse1.html

Thuringia:

City of Erfurt: http://www.erfurt.de/ef/de/rathaus/wahlen/kommunal/jahre/index.html

City of Jena: http://www.jena.de/statistik/wahl/start.php

Landeswahlleiter Thüringen:
http://www.wahlen.thueringen.de/kommunalwahlen/29428_2009_01.pdf
Appendix B - Sample Ballots, Hamburg 2008 and 2011

The following pages contain sample ballots from the 2008 and 2011 elections, showing the difference in the methods by which voters were able to cast their ballots. In 2008, voters cast different two different types of ballot, each at a different level of aggregation. both for the city council (Bürgerschaft) and for the district council (Bezirksversammlung). At the lowest level of aggregation - the electoral district (Wahlkreis), voters were allowed to cast 5 votes under cumulative voting rules, for both assemblies. At the higher level of aggregation for each assembly, voters cast a single vote for a closed party list. For the city council, there was a single list for the whole city; for the district councils, each council had a district-wide list.

A voter in 2008 would therefore be able to cast up to 5 votes for city council candidates on an Wahlkreis list, 5 votes for district council candidates on a Wahlkreis list, one vote for city-wide ciy council party list, and one vote for a district-wide district council list.

In 2011, the levels of aggregation remained the same, but all lists operated under cumulative voting rules. Thus a voter would have been able to distribute 5 votes to candidates as she wished on each of the four lists she received.

The city districts and electoral districts are organized as follows:

District 1: Hamburg-Mitte
  Electoral District 1: Hamburg-Mitte
  Electoral District 2: Billstedt-Wilhelmsburg-Finkenwerder
District 2: Altona
  Electoral District 3: Altona
  Electoral District 4: Blankenese
District 3: Eimsbüttel
  Electoral District 5: Rotherbaum-Harvestehude-Eimsbüttel-Ost
  Electoral District 6: Stellingen-Eimsbüttel-West
  Electoral District 7: Lokstedt-Niendorf-Schnelsen
District 4: Hamburg-Nord
The sample ballots on the following pages are from Electoral District 1, Hamburg-Mitte, and show the district council ballots for both the district list and the electoral district list, first in 2008, and then in 2011. The pages shown are the instructional pages for each, as well as the first page on which votes could be cast for that particular ballot. Voters are instructed that they have one vote in the first example, and that a ballot with more than 1 vote will be invalid. In the latter examples, voters are instructed: “you have 5 votes that you can assign as you wish.”
WAHL ZUR BEZIRKSVERSAMMLUNG
AM 24. FEBRUAR 2008

Stimmzettel für die BEZIRKSLISTEN
Hamburg-Mitte
Entscheiden Sie hiermit über die Mehrheitsverhältnisse in der Bezirksversammlung.

SIE HABEN HIERFÜR 1 STIMME.

SO GEHTS:
Kreuzen Sie eine Partei, eine Wählervereinigung oder eine Einzelperson an.

ACHTUNG: EIN STIMMZETTEL MIT MEHR ALS 1 KREUZ IST UNGÜLTIG!
Figure B2: Sample Ballot, Hamburg 2008, District Council, Wahlkreis List
WAHL ZUR
BEZIRKSVERSAMMLUNG
AM 20. FEBRUAR 2011

Stimmzettel für die
BEZIRKSLISTEN
Hamburg-Mitte
Entscheiden Sie durch Vergabe Ihrer 5 Stimmen auf eine oder mehrere der Parteien/Wahlvereinigungen darüber, wie viele Sitze diese Parteien/Wahlvereinigungen jeweils in der Bezirksversammlung erhalten.


Sie haben 5 Stimmen, die Sie beliebig vergeben können.

SO GEHTS:
Sie können alle Stimmen einer Person oder der Gesamtliste einer Partei/Wahlvereinigung geben:

oder Sie können Ihre Stimmen auf mehrere Personen und/oder Gesamtlisten verteilen, z.B.:

Geben Sie jede Ausschreibung möglich, solange Sie insgesamt nicht mehr als 5 Kreuze machen.

Achtung: Ein Stimmzettel mit mehr als 5 Kreuzen ist ungültig!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Kandidatin/Kandidat</th>
<th>Partei</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SPD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure B4: Sample Ballot, Hamburg 2011, District Council, Wahlkreis List

BEZIRKSWAHLKREIS 1
HAMBURG-MITTE

WAHL ZUR
BEZIRKSVERSAMMLUNG
AM 20. FEBRUAR 2011

Stimmzettel für die WAHLKREISLISTEN

Wählen Sie hiermit direkt Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten aus Ihrem Wahlkreis, die in die Bezirksversammlung Hamburg-Mitte einziehen sollen.

Sie haben 5 Stimmen, die Sie beliebig vergeben können.

SO GEHTS:
Sie können jede Stimme einer Person geben:

Oder Sie können Ihre Stimmen auf mehrere Personen vertei

Dabei ist jede Aufteilung möglich, solange Sie insgesamt nicht mehr als 5 Kreuze machen.

Achtung: Ein Stimmzettel mit mehr als 5 Kreuzen ist ungültig!
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