Individual differences in relational motives interact with the political context to produce terrorism and terrorism-support

The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.

Citation

Published Version
doi:10.1017/S0140525X13003579

Accessed
July 26, 2018 11:25:31 PM EDT

Citable Link
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:14302019

Terms of Use
This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP

(Article begins on next page)
Individual differences in relational motives interact with the political context to produce terrorism and terrorism-support

Lotte Thomsen
University of Oslo, University of Copenhagen, Harvard University

Milan Obaidi
European University Institute, Harvard University

Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington
Harvard University

Nour Kteily
Harvard University

Jim Sidanius
Harvard University
LANKFORD

ADDRESSES:

Lotte Thomsen, Department of Psychology, University of Oslo, PO Box 1094 Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Norway. Phone +452530267. Email lotte.thomsen@psykologi.uio.no. URL: http://harvard.academia.edu/LotteThomsen

Milan Obaidi, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, William James Hall, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email Milan.Obaidi@eui.eu

Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, William James Hall, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email jsheehy@fas.harvard.edu, URL: http://harvard.academia.edu/JenniferSheehySkeffington

Nour Kteily, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, William James Hall, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email nkteily@fas.harvard.edu, URL: http://scholar.harvard.edu/nkteily/links/publications

Jim Sidanis, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, William James Hall, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email sidanis@wjh.harvard.edu URL: http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/sidaniu/lab/people/jim-sidanis
Abstract

The psychology of suicide terrorism involves more than simply the psychology of suicide. Individual differences in Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) interact with socio-structural, political context to produce support for group-based dominance among members of both dominant and subordinate groups. This may help explain why, in one specific context, some people commit and endorse terrorism, while others do not.
We agree with Lankford that one cannot understand suicide terrorism without considering individual factors as well as contextual ones, and must distinguish perpetrator from audience effects.

Nevertheless, while being willing to kill oneself is a necessary condition for carrying out suicide bombings, this need not imply that what really drives suicide bombers, rampage shooters and other self-destructive killers is simply suicidality proper, conveniently disguised as political terrorism in cultural and religious contexts that ban individual suicide. In the case studies he uses to make the latter point, Lankford not only seeks to estimate reliable predictors of suicide—such as prior suicide attempts, expressed death wishes, and debilitating depression—but also includes many “soft” risk factors such as the deaths of parents or siblings in childhood, unemployment, divorce due to infertility, and even disciplinary problems in school. Without knowing the base rates of both kinds of factors among the general population, it is impossible to evaluate the degree to which they lead people to commit suicide, let alone suicide terrorism, particularly when considered in the often war-torn, occupied settings from which Lankford draws many cases. Just as a suicidal mental condition is insufficient to drive suicide terrorism, so it may likely be unnecessary. The case of Anders Behring Breivik—who shot 77 teenagers at a political youth camp after seeking to blow up the Norwegian governmental building—demonstrates the uncertainty of clinical judgments based on interpretations of written or limited data records. Though Lankford concludes that Breivik was clearly suicidal because his writings named the plight of conservative
“brothers and sisters” being pushed toward suicide, and anticipated dying during his terror mission, a final forensic-psychiatric assessment, following extensive clinical interviews and 24-hour-observations, not only concluded that Breivik was not psychotic, but found absolutely no evidence that he was suicidal (NTB, 2012). Indeed, Breivik expressed fear of getting killed by the police upon being taken captive.

What clearly is necessary for committing any such acts of terrorism is the willingness to kill civilian others. We agree that this homicidal intent is likely fueled by rage and that cultural and ideological endorsement facilitates suicide terrorism. But both respond to the political reality in which a community finds itself. For instance, Pape (2005) argues that suicide terrorist attacks in Lebanon ebbed and flowed with the absence and presence of Israeli occupation (while suicidal intent presumably remained fairly stable). Dismissing this as simply about increased access to weapons and enemy targets ignores the role of the political context in fueling rage towards an enemy group—relationally motivated, moral outrage (Rai & Fiske, 2011) that they are subordinating, humiliating, discriminating, victimizing, persecuting, and killing us, or threatening to do so, culminating in the intended killing of perceived enemy civilians.

Such political context effects may play a role even in cases of remote identification with group members suffering at times of conflict or oppression (Sheehy-Skeffington, 2009). For instance, we recently found that support for a variety of terrorism-related items among Muslim citizens living in Denmark, ranging from
general understanding of terrorism to personal willingness to use violence to
defend Islam, was predicted by perceptions of general Muslim suffering, and was
mediated by the anger this suffering evoked (Obaidi, Thomsen, & Sidanius, 2013).
These *victimization-by-proxy* effects were even stronger among Danish-born than
foreign—born Muslims (Sidanius, Levin, Obaidi, Pratto, & Thomsen, 2013), and held
even when controlling for the effects of personal experiences of discrimination, a
structural factor indicated in radicalization among British Muslims (Travis, 2008).

In understanding how individual factors play into these processes, such that some
people in a specific context endorse or commit acts of terrorism while others in the
same context do not, we must go beyond the biographical and psycho-pathological
to the relational and ideological/political. The degrees to which people like, want
and seek relationships that are communal, hierarchical, or egalitarian underpin
many psychological phenomena (Thomsen, 2010). One particularly potent
dimension of relational motives is social dominance orientation (SDO)—the
motivation to create and maintain between-group dominance hierarchies (Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Individuals high in SDO support hierarchical
intergroup structures, in which some groups dominate others, whereas individuals
low in SDO favor intergroup equality. These motives, and the cultural context that
embeds them, influence both the societal endorsement of suicide terrorism, and the
attitudes of those willing to commit it themselves. For instance, by looking at the
*negative* relationship between SDO and support for terrorism against the West
amongst Lebanese and Syrians, our work has demonstrated that *counter-dominance*
is an important ideological motivation undergirding support for terrorism against
dominant groups (Levin, Henry, Pratto, & Sidanius, 2003; Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005; Pratto, Sidanius, Bou-Zeinnedine, Kteily, & Levin, in press). Conversely, among members of dominant majority groups in the West, the desire for group-based dominance increases support for violence, wars of conquests, and terrorist acts in retaliation against a threatening group or country (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008; Ho, Sidanius, Pratto, Levin, Thomsen, Kteily, & Sheehy-Skeffington, 2012). Further supporting the crucial interaction of individual, relational motives and the structural context, the effect of group identification on terror support among subordinate groups (e.g. of Arab identification among Lebanese) is particularly strong among those who are low in SDO, whereas identification with dominant groups (e.g. national identification among Americans) particularly increases support for violence among those high in SDO (Levin et al, 2003; Kteily et al, 2013; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2013). Again, Breivik’s self-described radical identification with a Christian in-group and desire to preserve its dominance would fit this picture.

In sum, we concur that it is crucial to consider both the person and the situation in understanding suicide terrorism. Research and theory in the Social Dominance tradition explicates how individual differences in relational motives interact dynamically with the socio-structural context in shaping people’s attitudes towards actions of group-based violence. Just as social psychology involves more than just the situation, and individual differences more than just the psychopathological, so the psychology of suicide terrorism is more than simply the psychology of suicide.


References


relationship between empathic concern and social dominance orientation. 
Journal of Personality, 81, 313-323.

hate us so? Paper presented at the 36th Annuak Scientific Meeting of the 
International Society of Political Psychology, Herzliya, Israel.

University.

social dominance Orientation and right-wing authoritarianism fuel ethnic 
persecution of immigrants in fundamentally different ways. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1455-1464.

Thomsen, L., Green, E.G.T., & Sidanius, J. (2013). Religion Hi-jacked: SDO interacts 
with religious identification among Christians to predict willingness to persecute 

Travis, A. (2008). MI5 report challenges views on terrorism in Britain. Available at: 