Rhetoric and Reality in Study Abroad: The Aims of Overseas Study for U.S. Higher Education in the Twentieth Century

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Rhetoric and Reality in Study Abroad: The Aims of Overseas Study for U.S. Higher Education in the Twentieth Century

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ABSTRACT

Political and educational leaders today often praise the benefits of study abroad with lofty rhetoric by arguing that overseas study can provide American undergraduate students with a variety of beneficial outcomes such as personal growth, academic gains, professional skills, greater international awareness and cross-cultural understanding. Despite the rhetoric, a relatively small percentage of students participate in overseas study. In 2014, the Institute of International Education reported that 9% of American undergraduates study abroad before graduating. Beyond this, there is a lack of diversity in the students who do study abroad for credit. Although the number of white students enrolled in US higher education is approximately 60%, over 76% of the students who study abroad are white. This lack of diversity and the relatively low levels of participation in study abroad have prompted many proponents to call for new ways to expand this practice so that more undergraduate students benefit from overseas study.

This dissertation traces the historical development of study abroad programs for American undergraduate students in the twentieth century focusing on how advocates justified these programs and envisioned their ideal structures. By examining the visions and administrative solutions of study abroad advocates over the past century, this dissertation demonstrates how proponents gradually convinced colleges and universities to adopt these programs to the point that study abroad became a permanent, but highly selective, aspect of U.S. higher education. It also reveals how the discourse about study abroad changed at different points in the twentieth century to adapt to contemporary challenges. This history offers contemporary educators seeking to expand overseas study a deeper awareness of the need for clarity of objectives in study abroad programs. It argues that the rhetoric and the reality of study abroad practices should intersect in transparent ways that all interested stakeholders can understand. Finally, understanding how the roots of selectivity and elitism in study abroad were established to mitigate fears of unregulated growth and academic illegitimacy will help contemporary advocates think about ways to achieve greater access in education abroad while still maintaining institutional standards today.
INTRODUCTION

Rhetoric and Reality in Study Abroad: The Aims of Overseas Study for U.S. Higher Education in the Twentieth Century

On March 22, 2014, the First Lady of the United States, Michelle Obama, delivered a speech at the Stanford Center at Peking University in Beijing to an audience composed primarily of students. The Americans in attendance were studying abroad in China and the Chinese students had studied in the United States. Mrs. Obama’s speech was part of a weeklong spring tour of China to emphasize the benefits of international educational exchanges between the two nations.¹ In her remarks, the First Lady explained that she and her husband enjoyed spending time on official state visits talking to students in schools because relationships between nations were more than simply interactions between leaders and government officials. According to Mrs. Obama, the bonds between nations were "…about relationships between people, particularly young people."² The First Lady stressed the importance of study abroad not only for the educational and personal benefits to the students themselves, but also for the professional benefits of finding employment in an increasingly interconnected international economy. Beyond this, Mrs. Obama told the students that young people around the world, regardless of their nation of origin, would be called upon in the future to address pressing global issues such as climate change and nuclear disarmament. Mrs. Obama argued that the collective responsibility to address these shared global issues underscored the importance of overseas study as a means to develop harmony between people of different nations. She stated,

That’s why it is so important for young people like you to live and study in each other’s countries, because that’s how you develop that habit of cooperation. You do it by immersing yourself in one another’s culture, by learning each other’s stories, by getting past the stereotypes and misconceptions that too often divide us.... That’s how you come to understand how much we all share. That’s how you realize that we all have a stake in each other’s success.3

Mrs. Obama's message about the potential for study abroad to develop knowledge of other cultures in a way that builds a more collaborative world was not her only message that day.

During the speech, the First Lady also took the opportunity to lament the fact that only a small amount of American students participated in study abroad programs. Mrs. Obama explained that too few students were studying abroad. She said that some segments of the student body believed that overseas study had no utility for their lives. Mrs. Obama stated that these students believed that study abroad was something only available to wealthy students from highly selective universities. The First Lady recalled her own university experience and the challenges she faced as a first-generation student from a working-class family. As she explained, “…it never occurred to me to study abroad – never.”4 The First Lady expressed her empathy for students for whom study abroad was not even a pinpoint on the radar of possibility. She rejected the notion that study abroad should be an elite endeavor; instead, she explained that she and the President encouraged widespread participation in overseas study from students of all backgrounds. As she put it, “Our hope is to build connections between people of all races and socioeconomic backgrounds, because it is that diversity that truly will change the face of our relationships. So we believe that diversity makes our country vibrant and strong. And our study abroad programs should reflect the true spirit of America to the world.”5 Thus, the First Lady’s personal message of

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
encouraging diversity in study abroad was intertwined with her endorsement of the academic, professional, developmental and cross-national benefits of sending students overseas for study.

Mrs. Obama’s message was transmitted around the globe via the official White House website, news outlets, YouTube, Twitter, and other social media platforms. In an instant, her words travelled from Beijing to Buffalo and beyond. The rapid transmission of the First Lady’s message typifies the times we live in, where technology and communication have made the world feel smaller. Today, the idea of an interconnected world is constantly emphasized by the rapid spread of information; however, the world has been shrinking for some time and the challenges of today have deep roots in the past. The belief that overseas study for U.S. undergraduate students has the potential to enrich a student’s academic and personal undergraduate experience, and to diminish negative national stereotypes to develop goodwill between people of different nations is not new. Indeed, the rhetoric used by proponents of overseas study has a rich and complicated history in the twentieth century. Those who seek to support the First Lady’s call to increase access to study abroad can benefit from a deeper understanding of this history by knowing how this rhetoric informed the shape of study abroad programming at different periods of expansion for U.S. undergraduate overseas study.

This dissertation demonstrates the historical development of study abroad programs for American undergraduate students in the twentieth century focusing on how different advocates justified these programs and envisioned their ideal structures in ways that established overseas study as a relevant, yet small, aspect of U.S. undergraduate education. Since the University of Delaware introduced the first program in 1923, there have been multiple proponents of study abroad who have articulated their own rationales for advancing
the practice of sending U.S. undergraduate students overseas for academic credit. In general terms, these advocates can be categorized into the following three groups: faculty and administration, students and parents, and external proponents (this group includes, philanthropists, politicians, and other non-university officials who promoted or supported overseas study). At different points in time, the rhetoric of different groups had greater influence over others, but throughout the century these three groups have played a vital role in emphasizing the many different goals of overseas study in order to justify, institutionalize, expand and improve this educational endeavor.

This dissertation also tracks the four most enduring objectives for justifying overseas study for U.S. undergraduate students: academic, professional, developmental and cross-national.¹ As a testament to the persistence of these aims, echoes of each can be distinctly heard in the speech delivered by the First Lady in China in the spring of 2014. Although the broad aims have remained, the ways they have been conceived, articulated and transmitted have differed over the twentieth century. Additionally the relative influence of different aims on the

practice of study abroad has changed at different moments in time based on a variety of factors both outside and within colleges and universities in the United States. As with the First Lady's speech, the aims of study abroad have often been praised with lofty rhetoric and high expectations; however, the various goals of study abroad have not always translated into practice or been universally accepted by everyone in U.S. higher education. Beyond this, as pointed out by Mrs. Obama, study abroad remains a relatively elite endeavor that has been an option primarily for affluent, white students in selective colleges and universities.

This study also shows how the rhetoric of study abroad proponents transformed from describing overseas study as experimental in the 1920s to referring to it as one of the most desirable educational experiences for undergraduate students in the twenty-first century. In order for this transformation to occur, proponents first had to convince colleges and universities to accept study abroad programs by appealing to the needs of their students and home institutions. As new study abroad programs developed, proponents also had to find ways to legitimize overseas study to critics, and by the middle of the century advocates began emphasizing academics, control, and selectivity in their rhetoric to bolster the status of overseas study. By the last decades of the twentieth century, study abroad was a permanent fixture in U.S. higher education, but reformers began to criticize various aspects of the practice such as the lack of diversity in participation and destinations. These critics called for greater diversity in the types of students and the destinations. By the end of the twentieth century, many proponents were enthusiastically lobbying for federal policies to expand access to study abroad to as many students as possible. To date, there have been no comprehensive studies that outline this trajectory and show how U.S. study abroad proponents have envisioned and endorsed overseas study programs in the twentieth century in ways that established this endeavor as a permanent practice in American higher education.
This dissertation will rectify this gap in the research by tracing this process of gradual acceptance and expansion of study abroad by demonstrating how the discourse of overseas study advocates shifted over the twentieth century to adapt to the context of the times.

**Dissertation Outline and Research Questions**

This dissertation analyzes the rhetoric of proponents to shows the origins, expansion, and long-term development of undergraduate study abroad programs in U.S. higher education from the 1910s to 2010s. This time span is broken down into three periods: Conception and Justification (1910s-1945), Institutionalization and Attempts at Standardization (1946-1969), and Expansion and Reform (1970-2010s). These periods outline the progression of education abroad in the past one hundred years. On a micro level, the ways in which the various aims for study abroad were conceived and defined in each of these periods changed distinctly according to shifting global priorities for the individuals involved in creating, sponsoring or supporting study abroad programs. The rhetoric of proponents had to accommodate numerous unexpected developments in the actual practice of study abroad. There were several occasions in this history where proponents envisioned one set of outcomes for study abroad, but witnessed vastly different outcomes. The responses of these individual proponents to these surprise developments also influenced the shape and administration of study abroad programming. Additionally, institutional priorities

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of colleges, universities and other organizations that supported overseas study also played a decisive role in shaping programs in each of these periods. Finally, in each of these periods, macro level external events had an impact on programming. Of these macro events, global conflicts like World Wars and international terrorism have had a strong impact on study abroad in each of the stages of development.

In Part One (Chapters 1 and 2), Conception and Justification (1910s-1945), I demonstrate how corporate and cultural internationalism informed the belief that study abroad could mitigate world conflict and ease transnational flows of capital for the benefit of the United States. On one hand, cultural internationalists promoted the idea that by spending time in other nations with people of other cultures, individuals would gain deeper cultural awareness of each other in ways that would stimulate mutual understanding and international harmony. Corporate internationalists were also interested in international cohesiveness, but were motivated by a desire for peaceful relations between nations to stimulate global economic partnerships. These ideas of internationalism began to circulate with more intensity in the aftermath of the Great War as internationalists sought peaceful ways for individuals to overcome conflicts between nations. The internationalist ideologies that emerged following the First World War served as a backdrop for the overseas study experiments at colleges and universities in the 1920s. The University of Delaware introduced the junior year abroad during this period as the primary way for students to spend their third year of college in another country for U.S. university credit. This method of sending American undergraduates overseas for their entire third year in college to study language and culture became a paradigm for overseas study that remained throughout the century. The rhetoric used to promote these early programs often emphasized academic and professional aims, yet the student participants would return to the United States extolling the
developmental and cross-national benefits of their overseas experiences. Additionally, although the University of Delaware envisioned their Foreign Study Plan in France as a program that would bolster the professional aims of men, the program instead appealed to many women who would go on to become teachers. By the beginning of the Second World War, three-fourths of the participants on the Delaware program were women, and the institution had to appoint new Deans of Women to support the women abroad.

Part Two (Chapters 4 and 5), Institutionalization and Attempts at Standardization (1946-1969), focuses on how a burgeoning interest in expanding the international dimension of U.S. higher education, combined with growing student demand for travel, fueled a boom in overseas studies programs of different types and lengths. Following the Second World War, colleges and universities in the United States sought ways to engage in international affairs. Study abroad became a part of larger discussions about expanding the international dimension of U.S. higher education, but advocates never saw overseas study for undergraduates as a primary aspect of this process of expansion. Additionally, the role of the American student as a global ambassador became an important, but contentious, aspect of study abroad in this postwar period. In this period, many proponents focused on the mechanisms for administrating programs and they attempted to establish standards to legitimize study abroad that emphasized high academic standards, U.S. institutional control, and selectivity of students. This push for standards established a new type of rhetoric that helped to reinforce the elite nature of study abroad as a practice reserved for white and wealthy humanities students with outstanding academic qualities.

Finally, in Part Three (Chapters 5 and 6), Expansion and Reform (1970 to 2010s), I illustrate how global economic competition, U.S. national security concerns, and domestic discussions of multiculturalism influenced the discourse of study abroad. In this period,
proponents reignited interest in expanding study abroad to a wider group of participants and geographic destinations. Additionally, the end of the Cold War prompted many colleges and universities to rethink their policies regarding international engagement. Prior to the end of the twentieth century, reform-minded advocates of overseas study also began to recommend increased participation in study abroad for students of various academic majors and different ethnic/racial and socio-economic backgrounds. In many ways, these reformers had to counteract the unintended consequences of their peers’ attempts at standardization in the previous decades. Many of the principles of selectivity that proponents established in the 1960s had established a pattern of elitism in study abroad that worked against the new principles of inclusivity that reformers introduced in the late twentieth century. Some reformers began to discuss the importance of diversity in study abroad and sought ways to expand the aims of study abroad to incorporate the idea that overseas study could prepare students to interact with people of different cultures living within the United States.

Although many study abroad proponents had advocated these ideas in the 1990s, the push for national expansion of study abroad took on a new focus following September 11, 2001 when a cadre of external proponents pushed for an increase in federal funding for undergraduate study abroad programs.

This study is guided by the following questions. First, how did the dominant study abroad institutions in the twentieth century define the aims of overseas study for undergraduate students at different points in time? Second, what was the relative importance of each of the aims (academic, professional, developmental and cross-national) at different periods? Third, how has the rhetoric justifying study abroad been articulated and disseminated in various policy reports about study abroad, and how did the field of overseas study attempt to institutionalize these ideas into practice over time? Finally, what were the
dominant educational, social, or political ideologies that contributed to the conception and articulation of the various aims of study abroad?

**Description of Terms and Clarification of Aims**

Throughout this dissertation, I will employ the following terms synonymously: study abroad, overseas study, and education abroad. My research will demonstrate how the naming conventions to describe the practice of sending undergraduate students to other countries for official U.S. university credit has changed over the twentieth century. In the Interwar period, the phrase “junior year abroad” was most commonly used; however, the adjective used most often to describe the junior year abroad in those nascent years of the 1920s was “experimental.”

Once the experimental junior year abroad became more commonplace and programs began to expand in the period following World War II, professionals began referring to the endeavor as study abroad. For example, in the introduction to the 1962-1963 Edition of *A Guide to Study Abroad*, the then-Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson invoked the aim of cross-national understanding and the term “study abroad” when he wrote, “As I look ahead to the challenges confronting America, I would strongly urge our qualified young men and women to consider the prospect of some study abroad.”

Given the expansion of academic program options during this period, and the increasing number of Americans living and working abroad during the post World War II period, an additional term came in vogue at this time. As the seminal work, *The Overseas Americans*, explained in 1960, the term “overseas” became synonymous with abroad despite the geographical reality that not all international travel from the United States required crossing a body of water. Moreover, the

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authors explained, “...the English language seems to be poorly endowed with adjectives and adverbs describing the state of abroadness, so 'overseas' will have to do.” Finally, in 1993, the largest professional organization representing study abroad professionals published *NAFSA’s Guide to Education Abroad for Advisers and Administrators*. In the introduction, the authors made it clear that they would employ the term “education abroad” rather than “study abroad” in “...recognition of the earliest and broadest principles in the field, namely support for all varieties of living and learning abroad that have genuine and lasting educational value.” This evolution of nomenclature demonstrates how the idea of study abroad evolved in the different periods in this study. Finally, throughout this dissertation I will employ the terms exchange, educational exchange, student exchange, and student mobility to refer to the general case of two-way traffic in which American students were studying abroad and international students were studying in the United States. When using the term any of these terms, I refer to the two-way transmission of people; however, these two-way exchanges do not imply one-to-one reciprocity or formal educational arrangements. For example, throughout the twentieth century, in the exchange of students, far more international students have studied in the United States, than U.S. students have studied abroad.

Throughout the dissertation I refer to the four general objectives of study abroad: academic, professional, developmental and cross-national understanding. It is important to describe briefly in this introduction each of these rationales. First, the academic aim suggests that by studying abroad students will enhance their learning in ways that are instrumental to

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curricular goals and degree requirements. The academic rationale holds sway with faculty and administrative guardians of the curriculum since it appeals to the core curricular aims of higher education. Language acquisition is amongst the most common academic rationales for study abroad, but I consider any justification for overseas study that serves to bolster the student’s progress toward a degree as academic. Second, the professional aim for overseas study maintains that by studying abroad students will gain skills and experience that are conducive to future employment. Advocates of the professional rationale suggest that by spending time in another country, students will develop skills that are sought after by employers such as intercultural competency, knowledge of foreign languages, or understanding of world markets. There is also a developmental aim that contends that students will develop aspects of their personality and self-esteem by studying abroad. This aim suggests that the overseas experience will instill in students a newfound sense of confidence based on the experiences they have while living overseas in a formal setting. Finally, the cross-national understanding aim suggests that students who study abroad will develop a deeper understanding of the language and culture of their host nation that will lead to increased understanding and international goodwill. Proponents of this aim also suggest that by sending students abroad to study, this regular contact will diminish national stereotypes and animosity between people. These four aims encompass the most dominant objectives used to justify overseas study programs in U.S. higher education over the twentieth century.

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Before the First Lady of the United States concluded her speech with words of gratitude in English and Chinese to her student audience, Mrs. Obama expressed hope that students from all ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds would study abroad. She also shared her wish that students around the world would continue to teach one another so that
individuals within different nations would develop “bonds of friendship” that would “enrich our world for decades to come.” Her optimism in the potential for overseas study to bridge bonds between students around the world is another strong example of the high rhetoric used by study abroad advocates.

Just a few weeks before the First Lady made her remarks in China, the retired president of Dickinson College, William G. Durden, had a different message about study abroad. He told an audience of study abroad professionals in San Diego that, “Higher education in the United States is not prepared to lead the future of study abroad.” Durden claimed that administrators were ill-equipped to design programs to meet the needs of students who embraced “new globalism” and expected overseas study to address “…critical global challenges that they believe are shared by all peoples regardless of nationality or cultural origin.” Like Mrs. Obama, Durden saw the need for study abroad to prepare students from a variety of backgrounds to overcome collective global issues; however, the former university president was more pessimistic than the First Lady about the potential for current practices in higher education to meet these global demands. Durden's speech was a call to action for study abroad professionals to rethink their practice “radically” in ways that were mindful of these new transnational expectations that he called “new globalism.”

The First Lady's optimistic speech about the multiple benefits of overseas study and Durden's practical call for the retooling of programs represent different ends of the spectrum of discourse about study abroad. On one end, Michelle Obama’s words represent the many lofty expectations placed on overseas study, while Durden’s proclamations are an

12 Obama, "Remarks by the First Lady at Stanford Center at Peking University. March 22, 2014".
14 Ibid.
15 Durden, "Embracing the New Globalism: A Challenge to Rethink Study Abroad".
example of the day-today challenges to aligning education abroad with changing needs of students. The gap between the First Lady’s high expectations and Durden’s critical assessment of overseas study is a strong example of the long history of the rhetoric and reality of study abroad. Proponents of education abroad today who are faced with the task of converting the rhetoric of study abroad into reality will benefit from understanding how to bridge these two ends of the spectrum. This dissertation will consider this challenge by addressing the ways in which the rhetoric promoting study abroad has changed over the past century and adapted to meet the distinct needs of different periods of time. It will show how proponents of study abroad justified this endeavor in ways that led to its adoption as a permanent aspect of U.S. higher education. Finally, this dissertation will demonstrate lessons that can be learned from the interplay between the justifying rhetoric of study abroad and the corresponding practice.
CHAPTER 1: SYMPATHETIC KNOWLEDGE, INTERNATIONALISM, AND THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, 1910S – 1930S

Introduction

In the winter of 1928, a committee of faculty members from eight different U.S. colleges and universities composed a letter that endorsed one of the latest innovations in higher education, the junior year abroad. The Institute of International Education (IIE) sponsored the letter and sent it to French language faculty at colleges and universities throughout the United States to explain the benefits of sending U.S. undergraduate students overseas, under faculty supervision, for official American university credit. The committee explained that the University of Delaware and Smith College were the first two institutions that organized junior year abroad programs for undergraduate students, and that other U.S. institutions had permitted their students to enroll on these two programs for credit. The committee conveyed the “importance and value of a year of undergraduate study in France” to its audience by offering several justifying rationales that can be captured under the following broad categories: academic, professional, developmental and cross-national understanding. The committee expressed the academic justification by explaining that a student’s scholastic interests could be met by improving his language skills and preparing him for post-graduate studies. Students’ professional goals could also be reached by providing training for business or government services. The letter described the developmental aims of study abroad by writing that the junior year abroad would result in an

1 The committee was composed of French language faculty (names in parenthesis) from eight different U.S. institutions of higher education: Brown University (Horatio E. Smith), College of the City of New York (Charles A. Downer), Columbia University (Raymond Weeks), Cornell University (James F. Mason), Indiana University (Bert E. Young), Randolph-Macon Woman's College (Margaret E. N. Fraser), Vassar College (Florence D. White), and Wellesley College (Dorothy W. Dennis). "The Junior Year in France: An Open Letter to Teachers of French and College Faculties."
expanded “point of view” for the participating student that would “prove an enduring asset not only to him but to his college and the community at large.” Finally, the committee expressed the cross-national understanding aim by stating that study abroad would ultimately lead to, “…a significant advance in our sympathetic knowledge of another country that may well exert a real influence upon the attainment of mutual understanding and good will.”

From today’s perspective, this letter from 1928 is an intriguing launching point for a historical study of the rhetoric used by proponents of study abroad for a number of reasons. The earliest traces of the academic, professional, developmental and cross-national understanding aims of study abroad were present in the committee’s descriptions of the advantages of sending students on the junior year abroad. In their letter to convince French instructors to adopt the junior year abroad at their institutions, the committee put a spotlight on the potential for overseas study to benefit students in a number of areas. Although, the committee noted the academic, professional and developmental aims of overseas study, they paid particular attention to the cross-national understanding aim by suggesting that “sympathetic knowledge” and international understanding were the ultimate outgrowth of all the other benefits of study abroad.4

The emphasis on the cross-national understanding aim spoke to the core mission of the agency that sponsored the letter, the Institute of International Education. In fact, in order to encourage faculty to convince their students to pursue the junior year abroad, the committee concluded their appeal with a reminder that the IIE would be offering several scholarships

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 After listing the different aims and benefits of study abroad, the committee wrote, “Through all these things there will ultimately come a significant advance in our sympathetic knowledge of another country that may well exert a real influence upon the attainment of mutual understanding and good will.” Ibid.
of $300 exclusively for students on “organized and supervised” study abroad programs. The IIE played a central role in convening this committee, disseminating the letter, and acquiring the funds to support scholarships for some of these junior year abroad students. The content of this promotional letter therefore was of critical importance to the IIE, but there is little information in the letter on the origins or purposes of the IIE. A close study of the IIE is necessary since this organization has played an important role in the development and promotion of study abroad and has been an enduring organization promoting the international exchange of students and scholars to and from U.S. colleges and universities. The IIE thus represents one of the major external proponents of study abroad, but as will be shown in the next two chapters, the IIE did not begin as an institution that focused on promoting overseas study for undergraduates. This chapter will describe how the IIE came into being, explain the forces driving the Institute’s origins in the 1910s, and identify the key individuals involved in its foundation and early years. Understanding the ideas and people that helped to create the IIE will establish an important framework for understanding the rhetoric promoting the first study abroad programs. Additionally, this chapter demonstrates how the IIE carried out its mission in its early days and how it was received or rejected by different U.S. institutions of higher education.

**Internationalism and the Ideological Foundations Leading to the Establishment of the Institute of International Education (IIE)**

In 1917, Nicholas Murray Butler, the president of Columbia University and the Director of the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, invited Stephen Duggan, a political science professor at the College of the City of New York, to coordinate a conference to discuss the impending World War and

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5 Ibid.
For Duggan, the invitation to assemble a group of scholars to discuss the ways in which education could foster world peace was appealing because the themes of the conference proposed by Butler typified Duggan's educational vision. Duggan, who titled the first chapter of his autobiography, “The Making of an American Internationalist,” thought that Americans were “woefully ignorant” of international affairs, and he believed that this ignorance fueled xenophobia. According to Duggan, education was the only means to combat this problem and pave the way for world peace. The eventual title of the conference, “The Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, an Experiment in Education” further demonstrates this point. As indicated by the conference name, Duggan and Butler both had high hopes for the potential of education, but each had slightly different visions of internationalism. Nicholas Murray Butler and Stephen Duggan were the two individuals who typified the different ideological foundations of the IIE. On one hand Butler embraced the commercial elements of internationalism, which sought to support peaceful transactions between people of different nations for the benefit of global business endeavors. On the other hand Duggan espoused the cultural aspects of internationalism, which encouraged the exchange of people and ideas for deeper cross-national understanding. Together, their combined ways of thinking formed the basis for the IIE’s mission.

Stephen Duggan's conception of internationalism was closely aligned with what historian Akira Iriye has defined as “cultural internationalism.” According to Iriye, the people who held this worldview believed that a more peaceful world could be established,

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6 Today, the College of the City of New York is known as City College of New York (CCNY).
“...through the efforts of individuals and organizations across national boundaries to promote better understanding and to cooperate in collaborative enterprises.”

Prior to meeting Butler, Duggan exhibited this worldview of cultural internationalism by engaging with other influential, like-minded men in New York City to discuss international affairs. The core group came to call themselves the Foreign Policy Association and included Duggan, Paul Kellogg (editor of *The Survey Magazine*), Norman Hapgood (editor of *Harper's Weekly*), Charles A. Beard (professor of history at Columbia), Joseph Chamberlain (professor of public law at Columbia), and Charles Howland (a New York lawyer).

In the years leading up to the war, the group noted the tense mood in the city regarding the impending great European conflict, and they discussed the ways in which they could inform the public of international affairs and promote internationalism in the face of the Great War between nations. Collectively the group spread factual information about the European conflict to people in New York City who included both American citizens and European visitors.

Duggan's international relations work in this group was part of a larger phenomenon of emergent transnational activity by individuals from a variety of backgrounds. As Iriye explained,

A cultural definition of international relations developed with full force in the wake of World War I, when educators, intellectuals, artists, musicians, and many others cooperated across national boundaries to promote mutual understanding. They envisioned a world in which the exchange of students and scholars, collaborative intellectual enterprises, artistic exhibits, symposia on current affairs, and similar undertakings would take the place of arms races and military alliances as determinants of international affairs.

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Iriye's research highlights the range of individuals whose work embodied cultural internationalism at this time and emphasizes the role that individuals played in this transnational movement for mutual understanding and collaboration. For Duggan, cultural internationalism was an important intellectual foundation already in place by the time Butler invited him to collaborate, and this way of thinking would inform the actions of the City College political science professor for years to come.

Duggan accepted Butler’s request to organize the conference and the collaboration paved the way for the development of the IIE. The partnership between these two men also revealed the ideological variation between two overlapping but subtly different definitions of internationalism. While Duggan’s cross-national ideology was informed by cultural internationalism, Butler's notion of internationalism was based on slightly different principles that were concerned with establishing peaceful, legal relations between nations for the smooth transnational facilitation of business transactions. Years before his collaboration with Duggan, Butler described his vision of internationalism at the opening address of the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration in 1912,

The international mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world [emphasis mine].

To achieve the international mind, Butler argued that individuals should learn about other cultures “from their own point of view and by their own standards rather than by our own.” Thus, education for the sake of establishing sympathetic knowledge was a

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13 Ibid., p. 103-104.
fundamental aspect of Butler’s vision of the international mind; however, his internationalist ideology also considered the ultimate benefits of mutual goodwill in the name of successful, transnational, commercial and industrial partnerships. Historian Paul Kramer has called this corporate internationalism. According to Kramer, educators like Butler along with other businessmen and philanthropists advocated for world peace as a means of expanding American business interests in the world in the years following World War I.  

This corporate element of internationalism proved to be a very influential aspect of the years leading to the founding of the IIE and to the establishment of the first study abroad program at the University of Delaware, which will be described in detail in the next chapter.

Butler and Duggan were on different ends of the spectrum of internationalism, but the two men saw common ground in the potential of education to reduce misunderstandings between nations. Although Butler’s notion of the international mind emphasized the commercial benefits of internationalism, as the president of Columbia University and director of the Division of Intercourse and Education at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), Butler also understood the instrumental role of education in achieving his notion of the international mind. There were three divisions of the CEIP: The Division of Intercourse and Education, The Division of International Law, and The Division of Economics and History. The primary functions of Butler’s Division of Intercourse and Education included educating the public on the nature of war, international rights, and “To cultivate friendly feelings between the inhabitants of different countries, and to increase the knowledge and understanding of each other by several nations.”

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15 The Carnegie Endowment of International Peace was founding on December 14, 1910 by Andrew Carnegie with a $10,000,000 endowment. George Augustus Finch, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Summary of
the mission of educating the public seriously as evidenced by his words in 1913, “To promote the cause of international peace in a way that shall be lasting and effective means nothing less than to work for the intellectual and moral education of the public opinion and the world.”16 Thus, on this point, Butler and Stephen Duggan saw eye to eye. The benefits of education for establishing sympathetic knowledge of people in different nations for the cause of peace were important to both men. These overlapping but subtly different notions of internationalism laid the groundwork for the principles informing the IIE's mission.

_The Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, an Experiment in Education and a Proposal for an Institute of International Relations_

By the spring of 1917, the United States had entered the First World War and the hopes of internationalism overcoming national hostilities had faded; however, the conference still took place that summer from May 28th to June 1st at the Hotel Nassau at Long Beach on Long Island, New York.17 Participants at “The Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States: An Experiment in Education” included American scholars, legal experts, and journalists from newspapers and magazines in the United States and national (e.g. The Associated Press, The United Press) and international (The Russian Information Bureau and The Slav Press Bureau) wire services.18 Several of the participants also represented internationalist organizations devoted to peace and international diplomats, such as one Brazilian Ambassador, two representatives from the French High Commission,

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17 Duggan, _A Professor at Large_. p. 15
18 For an extensive list of newspapers, magazines and other members of the media in attendance see: _The Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, an Experiment in Education_, no.121. p. 10-13.
and ministers from Bolivia, China and Switzerland. The primary content of the conference focused on the ways in which the world could be reorganized on a peaceful basis following the War, and there was an emphasis on the need for democratic control of all future diplomatic relations in the interest of establishing long-term peace. Duggan concluded his official conference speech with the following remarks,

The country is now at war, and it is more important than ever that our people should have an understanding of the international situation, of the problems both internal and external of different nations...This is essential in order that our country may adopt a wise attitude toward the question of peace, and also the kind of world order under which we shall live after the war.

In this call for individuals in the United States to learn about other nations and world affairs, Duggan demonstrated his underlying belief that education could play a pivotal role in establishing a peaceful world order. In this way, Duggan's rhetoric displayed an incandescent hope in the potential of education to outshine the dark reality of the First Great War. Duggan’s enthusiasm from the conversations at the conference and his collaboration with Butler were significant outcomes of the days spent on Long Island that summer. The ideas coming from these sessions planted the seeds for establishing the mission of the IIE.

At the conference Duggan was devising a plan that would promote American education in international affairs through an agency that he called the Institute of International Relations. The primary function of this organization would be to help U.S. citizens develop a deeper understanding of other nations, and to enable other nations to gain “accurate knowledge of the United States, its people, institutions, and culture.” According

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19 The list of internationalist organizations included: The League to Enforce Peace, the World Court League, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the World Peace Foundation, the National Security League, the Women's Peace Party and the American Geographical Society. Ibid. p. 10-11.
20 An overview of the conference discussions can be found on: ibid. p. 19-43.
21 Ibid. p. 46.
to historian Stephen M. Halpern, Duggan imagined an institution with a permanent physical base, a reading library, and factual publications on international affairs by leading scholars, travellers, businessmen and other individuals informed about the world. The institute would organize study groups, publish a monthly journal, and provide syllabi with international content to colleges and universities. Additionally, the institute would advise teachers, students and scholars on exchange opportunities.  

At the conference, Duggan shared his vision for this Institute of International Relations with Butler in the hopes that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace would fund the new endeavor. Butler informed Duggan that, given the War in Europe, the timing was not right for the CEIP to accept such proposals.  

Immediately after the war ended on November 11, 1918, Duggan re-submitted his proposal on November 16th to Butler in the hopes of capitalizing on the internationalist spirit embodied by events like the conference. Duggan explained to Butler, “Unless some such central organization is founded, I feel that the interest and activity manifested by the group we have formed will be transient...” Duggan was eager to capitalize on the small but intensifying spirit of internationalism in the wake of the First World War, and he was not the only educator mindful of this climate of heightened international awareness.


During the summer of 1917, a group of representatives from fifteen U.S. universities and colleges agreed to establish The American University Union in Europe in order to meet

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24 "First Annual Report of the Director." p. 1
the needs of U.S. college men enlisted in war service in Europe.  

With support from the U.S. Secretary of War and U.S. ambassadors in Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, the Union established its headquarters in Paris at the Royal Palace Hotel and initially served as a refuge for American college men to gather with one another and experience surroundings resembling their home life in the United States. The Union was entirely financed by the membership dues paid by American colleges and universities. Over time, the Union expanded its operations to include placing American military men in French universities after the War concluded. In April 1919 at a meeting in New York City, the college and university representatives of the Union voted to, “...continue the Union as a bond between American and European universities.” The Union's activities expanded slightly to include: distinguished speakers who presented on a variety of topics in French; social gatherings for American students and their French acquaintances; lists of recommended French lodgings and teachers helpful for students upon arriving in Paris. Broadly, “The ideal of the Union stated in its largest terms is to be serviceable to that understanding and friendship between the United States and the nations of Europe on which the hopes of world peace and the salvation of civilization rest.” In this way, the American University Union became an outpost in Europe that embodied the aim of cross-national understanding.

In 1918, another group of leaders representing U.S. institutions of higher education and national educational associations held a series of meetings to determine how American educational institutions could support national wartime efforts in the United States. Initially known as the "Emergency Council on Education," the group established the following objectives:

27 Ibid. p. 499.
28 Ibid. p. 499.
To place the educational resources of the country more completely at the service of the National Government and its departments to the end that, through and understanding cooperation, the patriotic services of the public schools, colleges and universities may be augmented; that a continuous supply of educated men may be obtained; and that greater effectiveness in meeting educational programs arising during and following the war may be secured.  

Unlike Duggan’s work spreading information about international affairs, and the Union’s efforts as an American outpost in Europe, the early mission of the “Emergency Council on Education” was more closely aligned with fulfilling specific national needs of the United States government during the First World War. Thus, even though the Great War prompted the Council to consider international issues as they pertained to U.S. higher education, domestic matters of education were the focus for the new organization. The Council established its base of operations in Washington, D.C. and quickly began working with the U.S. federal government to assist U.S. national wartime efforts such as the preliminary training of ten thousand nurses and diplomatic missions to meet with European educational ministries.  

Before the first year of activity ended, the Council determined that some of their collaborative activities would benefit educators and the nation in times of peace as well; consequently, the organization changed its name to the American Council on Education (ACE).  

By the early 1920s, the ACE refined its mission, and began to describe its raison d’être as a “unifying agency” in American higher education that sought to drive the national discussion on higher education and collaborate on major policy issues at American colleges and universities.

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30 Ibid. p. 2.  
31 Ibid., p. 3.  
Despite the domestic focus, some of the early activities of the ACE were international. In particular, the subcommittee known as “The Committee on International Relations” engaged in work directly related to the emergent issue of international student mobility. The chairman on the Committee on International Relations, a Harvard professor of comparative literature, William H. Schofield sought support of the U.S. War Department to provide scholarships for wounded French soldiers from the Great War with sufficient knowledge of English to come to study at American colleges and universities. Although the U.S. War Department was not able to fund this endeavor, the subcommittee found support from the Association of American Colleges to place twenty-five French soldiers on U.S. college campuses. The Committee on International Relations also arranged for four Russian “young men of high promise” to study in the United States (two at Harvard; one at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and one at the Banking School of the National City Bank). Given the ongoing hostilities in Europe, Schofield made no mention of the Committee on International Relations' arrangements for U.S. students to study away from the United States; however, in his report at the December 1918 Meeting of the American Council on Education, Schofield explained that his subcommittee could engage in more “...important work in the way of the interchange of students with foreign lands...” if only more funding were available to them. In this request for funding, Schofield planted the early seeds of future two-way student mobility between the United States and other nations.

To obtain funding to fulfill the aims of his subcommittee at the ACE, Schofield submitted a proposal to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to secure financial

33 “Minutes of the Meeting on the American Council on Education”, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, December 3 and 6, 1918).
34 The Stand-by Russia Committee selected these students from a group of two hundred Russian students who applied to come to the United States. No details are given in the report on the application or if these students were working with their home government to apply. Ibid. p. 5.
support for establishing an “International Institute for Education” in New York City to serve as a central organization in the United States to handle the international exchange of students and scholars.\textsuperscript{36} Schofield's internationalist vision for this institute embodied the aim of cross-national understanding for education during his time. In his proposal, Schofield explained that education was the foundation for mutual cooperation in the world in the aftermath of the Great War. In a November 1918 article for \textit{The Educational Review}, the Harvard language professor maintained that education was the “watchword of the hour,” and that the people of the era were learning a new notion of patriotism that included a broader “obligation to humanity.”\textsuperscript{37} Despite heightened animosity between nations as a result of fervent feelings of nationalism in Europe, Schofield argued that education would enhance amity between individuals in different nations in the present and future. As he explained, “...the internationally minded students of one generation are the internationally minded teachers of the next; international intercourse is forwarded most enthusiastically by those who have enjoyed the benefits of it.”\textsuperscript{38} In Schofield's institute therefore, the aim of cross-national understanding would not only have an impact on the present, but through this process of today's students becoming tomorrow's teachers, the institute had the potential for long-term impact as well.

Schofield described his vision for the Institute as a central comprehensive organization that would engage in the following broad activities: information collection and dissemination (e.g. provide information for Americans about international educational institutions and provide individuals from other countries with information about U.S.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. p. 6
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. p 345.
institutions of learning, publish factual books and pamphlets on other nations to reduce prejudice; convening and research (e.g. organize conferences, establish international research collaborations between U.S. and international scholars, and organize the exchange of teachers and scholars between the U.S. and other nations); and student exchange (facilitate student exchanges to and from the United States to ensure that degree requirements were met, and secure funding for scholarships). According to Schofield, these activities were essential to support international collaboration between people,

Only if we give men and women of every state opportunities for enlightened travel, bring educated foreigners to discuss with educated Americans matters of common interest, and get honest information concerning one another…will rapid progress be made toward international friendship.

Schofield's rhetoric underscores his belief in the potential for overseas study to stimulate cross-national understanding in students. His proposal for a central international organization for education did not emphasize the commercial benefits of this new institute; instead, his proposal was undergirded with principles of cultural internationalism. Schofield emphasized the critical nature of individual exchanges, along with other educational components, to build bridges between people of different nations. The Endowment was slow to vote on providing funding for the ACE's proposal for an International Institute for Education. Moreover, if the CEIP provided financial support for Schofield's proposed institute, it would only be for an independent organization that was separate from ACE.

Two Proposals for an Institute of International Education

Nicholas Murray Butler's role in modifying these proposals injected the corporate internationalist line of thinking into an amalgam of both plans. By the winter of 1918, Butler

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39 Ibid. p. 348-349.
40 Ibid. p. 345.
had seen both Duggan’s and Schofield’s proposals and had introduced the two
internationalist professors by asking Schofield to include Duggan on ACE's Committee on
International Educational Relations.\textsuperscript{42} Butler drafted his own proposals for an international
institute that built on his assessment of the best aspects of Duggan's and Schofield's plans.
Butler submitted a “Plan A” and “Plan B” to the executive board at the Carnegie
Foundation for a final decision on the financial support of a new institute of international
education. “Plan A” was very specific in its scope and focused its activities to the realm of
education, while “Plan B” was “much broader than the narrowly educational one.”\textsuperscript{43}
Although both proposals aimed at promoting educational exchanges between students,
teachers, and researchers between the United States and other nations, Butler’s Plan B also
included plans for exchanges, “…in the fields of commerce, industry, finance and technical
skills.”\textsuperscript{44} On February 1, 1919, the executive committee of the Carnegie Foundation,
including Henry S. Pritchett (President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching, 1906-1930) and Elihu Root (President of the Endowment for International Peace,
1910-1925), selected and approved Butler’s Plan B proposal and the Institute of
International Relations came into being with Stephen Duggan named as the Institute’s first
director. Root believed that the name was not “educational enough,” and convinced Duggan
to change the Institute’s moniker to the Institute of International Education.\textsuperscript{45}

Butler’s decision to include commercial exchanges into his Plan B proposal for the IIE,
and the Carnegie Foundation’s decision to fund Plan B underscored the influence of
corporate internationalism. Whereas both Duggan and Schofield's proposals represented

\textsuperscript{42} Halpern, "The Institute of International Education: A History," p. 40-44.
\textsuperscript{43} Original from letter written by Nicholas Butler to James Bertram (Secretary of the Carnegie Corporation) on
December 9, 1918, cited in ibid. p. 45.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p. 45.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. p. 46-47.
similar visions for a central institution that embodied the principles of cultural internationalism, they lacked the commercial potential for these myriad international endeavors. Butler’s inclusion of commerce and industry exchanges in the affairs of the IIE was his nod to solidifying business relationships in Europe with the potential for providing future flows of capital across the Atlantic. This decision to include commercial exchanges must have appealed to members of the CEIP executive committee who cast the final vote since they ultimately approved Plan B. Thus, the early mandate of the IIE was grounded in a combination of cultural and corporate internationalist thinking that appealed to Butler, Duggan and the executive committee at the CEIP.

**IIE’s Internationalist Efforts in the 1920 and 1930s**

In the 1920s and 1930s, the IIE’s first director, Stephen Duggan, established the parameters for operation and the guiding philosophy of the Institute in ways that emphasized the rhetoric of cross-national understanding through education. For example, at the New England Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools Meeting on December 3, 1920, Duggan said,

'[The Institute’s] general aim is to develop international good will by means of educational agencies and to act as a clearing house of information and advice for Americans concerning things educational in foreign countries and for foreigners concerning things educational in the United States.'

In this same speech, Duggan emphasized the role the Institute would play in facilitating the exchange of faculty and students between the United States and other nations. Given the recent Great War, Duggan mentioned that European nations were not able to send many professors to the United States; however, since European institutions of higher learning were eager to welcome American faculty, the Institute would pay travel expenses for U.S.

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professors on sabbatical leave interested in teaching abroad. On the subject of students, Duggan explained that the Institute had compiled bountiful information on student exchange opportunities and fellowships for study in the United States, and for American students to study in other countries. Beyond student and faculty exchanges, Duggan explained that the collective efforts of the Institute would help Americans understand the problems of other nations, and for the people of other countries to understand issues facing the United States. The Institute would accomplish this endeavor in part through publications, and also by establishing International Relations Clubs at 80 colleges and universities in the United States where teachers and students could study “international problems.”\(^{47}\) In the first annual report of the IIE, Duggan reiterated this mission and again described the “general aim” of the Institute “to develop international goodwill by means of educational agencies.”\(^{48}\) Duggan’s consistent message of education providing sympathetic knowledge in the interest of international goodwill established a powerful rhetoric for articulating the aim of cross-national understanding that became a strong part of the justifications for exchange in the Interwar Period.

As these examples demonstrate, Duggan articulated the primary aim of the IIE as fostering sympathetic knowledge and mutual understanding between nations by the exchange of information, students, scholars, and researchers. With regard to the ways in which students could be impacted by education and travel, Duggan wrote that after an overseas experience, “...the exchange scholarship holder usually returns to his own country not only with a fair understanding of the civilization of the people among whom he has

\(^{47}\) Ibid. p. 642.

sojourned but with a real admiration for them.”  In Duggan's efforts to promote the IIE to prominent leaders in higher education, he used similar language. For example, on May 20, 1919 Duggan wrote to Abbott Lawrence Lowell asking the Harvard president to serve on an administrative oversight board of the IIE. Duggan included a brief description of the IIE in an enclosed attachment to his letter to Lowell, which explained that the Institute was recently founded in New York, “In order to develop mutually helpful relations between the United States and foreign countries through educational agencies...” Thus, during the embryonic years of the IIE, Duggan emphasized the aim of cross-national understanding of the Institute in his promotional rhetoric; however, since the Institute was still in its developmental stages, the main activities of the IIE were largely promotional. Finally, although educational exchange for the sake of instilling sympathetic knowledge in students was mentioned, there were few details on the direction of exchange, the types of programs available, or the sources of funding for such programs.

Beyond generally supporting student exchange as it pertained to the mission of the IIE, Duggan spent a portion of his time communicating with professors at universities in the United States and abroad to encourage faculty mobility. The motivations for faculty mobility were also informed by Duggan's brand of cultural internationalism. Duggan brought professors from Europe to speak at American universities, and he recruited scholars from American universities to lecture overseas. In the IIE annual reports and monthly bulletins, the Institute published a list of available international faculty to lecture at American institutions of higher learning. The Institute also sought temporary international placements

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49 Duggan, A Professor at Large, p. 52.
or lecture tours for professors from the United States. For example, a Teachers College professor named Paul Monroe lectured in Chinese universities on education, while Dana C. Munro of Princeton lectured at Turkish institutions of higher learning on history. Reflecting on the early years of these faculty exchanges, Duggan declared these activities a, “great success,” and he continued, “The American scholars, who were usually well known in foreign universities which they visited, received a most cordial welcome and unquestionably left behind a more favorable impression as to the standards of American scholarship than had previously prevailed.”

Like the motivation of cross-national understanding for student exchanges, the transnational activities involving faculty also sought to instill sympathetic knowledge and favorable opinions of Americans in people of other nations and vice versa for those Americans who hosted scholars from abroad on their U.S. campuses.

Not everyone was fully convinced of the potential of the IIE. Although A. Lawrence Lowell accepted Duggan's proposal to serve on the Institute's advisory council, the Harvard president had concerns about the IIE. As a representative of Harvard on the Board of Trustees for the American University Union in Europe, Lowell had already established a connection to an entity that engaged in overseas work in higher education. He felt that any central organization that represented U.S. postsecondary institutions on an international stage should have complete representation from U.S. colleges and universities; however, the IIE did not have such representation in its bylaws.

Additionally, in the summer of 1919, Lowell conveyed a message to the ACE president Donald Cowling that the trustees of the

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51 A Professor at Large. p. 66.
American University Union doubted the wisdom of continuing educational partnerships in Europe in the aftermath of the Great War. Based on these statements by the Union, a shadow of doubt developed in Lowell’s mind regarding future international collaboration in higher education between institutions in the United States and other European nations. In the same letter, Lowell expressed his bleak forecast on the potential of international education in general, “I doubt very much whether the field for international education will prove anything like as large and fruitful as some people suppose.”53 Lowell was also skeptical of the merits of the exchange of scholars and students. On February 25, 1920, Stephen Duggan sent a letter to Lowell announcing the availability of visiting scholars from France to visit the Harvard campus. Lowell scribbled a handwritten note that he attached to the letter from Duggan that read:

It does not seem true that these visiting lecturers are any real value to us, or that itertant foreign lecturers are good for higher education in this country. They are at each place too short a time to be really valuable. I do not much like the idea that everybody must go in for a thing because everybody else does. A.L.L. 54

Lowell was not one to follow others easily; instead, by the 1920s, he was known for his leadership in areas such as initiating curricular reforms at Harvard to establish concentrations and distribution requirements for students for the first time.55

The Harvard president was not completely averse to student exchanges; instead, he expressed some enthusiasm about exchange, but he was suspicious of an exchange scholarship from Italy proposed by Duggan. “...much as I like our students study abroad,

and members of different European countries study with us. I feel that a better selection is made when students go away from home not on account of a fellowship, but because they are eager to get something at a particular institution."\(^{56}\) Lowell’s stance on study abroad was a testament to the ad hoc nature of overseas study at the time and to his emphasis on the scholarly purposes of undergraduate education. First, Lowell’s position on study abroad was an indication of his preference for a type of overseas study that had been more popular in the 19th century when independent students travelled abroad for specific knowledge or degrees not available in the United States.\(^{57}\) Next, as Julie Reuben has shown, Lowell “…equated serious scholarship with independent work in a particular field of study.”\(^{58}\) In this sense, Lowell emphasized the academic aspects of undergraduate learning in ways that had previously been associated with graduate education so the notion of international fellowship would have been lower on his list of objectives for overseas study. Lowell’s opinions were also significant in this period since he was a prominent academic leader in U.S. higher education at the time and influential in various national committees. Lowell was not alone in his reticence to fully accept the IIE’s purpose and functions.

University of Chicago President, Harry Pratt Judson, was concerned about the IIE for a different reason. Judson had learned from Butler that the IIE’s exchange activities with students and professors would only occupy a small portion of the IIE’s overall operations, “perhaps not over 2%.”\(^{59}\) Given the minimal “educational aspect[s]” of the IIE, Judson


\(^{57}\) See for example, Sandra Singer, Adventures Abroad: North American Women at German-Speaking Universities, 1868-1915 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003).


believed that the ACE should distance itself from the newly formed Institute with the exception of partnerships by joint committees in specific areas of overlapping interest. In a response to Pratt's concern over the limited educational activity of the IIE, the president of the ACE, Donald Cowling expressed his surprise that Butler had suggested such a low percentage of educational work. Cowling explained that of the seven “lines of undertaking” of the IIE, the only item beyond the realm of education stated that the Institute would “...cooperate with other agencies in the field of science, art, finance, labor and journalism...” Here, Judson's reticence to fully endorse the ACE's backing may have stemmed from the combination of the Institute’s minimal educational relevance and external influences from beyond higher learning. Like Lowell, Judson was president at an esteemed American institution of higher learning, so his thoughts on the Institute are important. Both Judson and Lowell embody the reticence of certain institutions of the time to embrace the brand of internationalism championed by the IIE.

Despite the hesitation of leaders like Lowell and Judson, Duggan continued to promote the Institute of International Education and advocate with the rhetoric of cross-national understanding. Even with its focus on promoting the role of educational exchange activities toward fostering sympathetic knowledge and international goodwill, a line of corporate influence remained present in the affairs of the IIE throughout the 1920s. Specifically, in 1928, the IIE established the “Work Student Program” where 150 recently graduated students from several countries in Europe were carefully selected and placed in American businesses to study U.S. systems of management and production. The IIE worked


with the U.S. government to secure special visas for these students, while the American businesses paid the visiting workers a normal salary. The program was cancelled just two years later as a result of the Great Depression.\textsuperscript{61} Paul Kramer has noted that the IIE typified corporate internationalism in the interwar period, and that the Institute’s work during the 1920s and 1930s helped make the United States the "magnetic hub" for international students.\textsuperscript{62} This work on facilitating incoming international students to the United States largely overshadowed the work of sending students abroad and set the tone for the IIE for many years to come. In addition to these activities, Duggan also spent his early years as director securing funding for the IIE to continue its work.\textsuperscript{63}

For the first few years of operations for the IIE, the ACE, the Union, and other higher education organizations all engaged in various similar transnational endeavors. In 1926, David Allan Robertson, director of The American Council on Education (ACE), reported that there were 115 agencies and organizations in the United States that worked with a range of international educational enterprises. Robertson described robust American “intellectual centers” in Berlin, Geneva, London, Paris and Prague, and advocated for the development of new centers in Europe (in Madrid, Warsaw, Vienna or Copenhagen), the “Far East” (in Beijing or Shanghai), Latin America (Mexico City or Buenos Aires) and the Middle East (in Egypt).\textsuperscript{64} Robertson suggested that the American Council on Education and the Institute of


\textsuperscript{62} Kramer, "Is the World Our Campus? International Students and U.S. Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century." p. 788-789. The focus of Kramer’s article is on incoming international students to the United States. In particular, he shows how the United States became the “magnetic hub” for student migration during the interwar period. It grew from 9 colleges receiving approximately 600 students in the early 1900s to over 450 colleges hosting 10,000 international students by 1930. p. 791.

\textsuperscript{63} For more on the IIE’s early years and the search for funding, see: Bu, Making the World Like Us: Education, Cultural Expansion, and the American Century. Chapter 2. “Cultural Internationalism: Educational Exchange and Cultural Understanding for World Peace.”

\textsuperscript{64} David Allan Robertson, "International Education Relations," \textit{The Educational Record} 7, no. 1 (1926). p. 50.
International Education should collaborate to find funding for the establishment of these new educational centers. Continuing the collaboration that had begun before the creation of the IIE, when Duggan and Schofield met at Nicholas M. Butler’s suggestion, the ACE and the IIE often worked together at this time. In fact, the Carnegie Corporation and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial provided grants to the IIE and ACE for similar purposes. Like the IIE, the ACE administered scholarships to support international educational opportunities for scholars and students. As stated in the 1926 issue of *School and Society*, donors “entrusted” the American Council on Education with $7,000 in scholarships in order to, “…increase understanding and friendship among nations through encouragement of gifted American college and university students to pursue a part of their education in universities of other countries.” The redundancy in international activities by the ACE and the IIE ultimately led to a division of priorities for these two organizations. In 1927, the IIE and the ACE agreed to move the administration of all international educational activities to the IIE and all domestic educational affairs to the ACE. In practice this meant that the IIE would: oversee the exchange of scholars and students, provide policy advice to institutions regarding international matters, disseminate information on international activities of U.S. colleges and universities, and correspond with institutions of higher education in the U.S. and abroad regarding potential partnerships. By the end of the 1920s, the IIE emerged as the central administrative organization for international exchange activities for American higher education.

67 Liping Bu notes that before 1927, the main funding organizations for the IIE, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, and the Carnegie Corporation had split their donations for international activities between the American Council on Education (ACE) and the IIE. In 1927, the IIE was designated to take over all international activities, and the ACE to handle all domestic endeavors. In 1927, both funding agencies
Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, the Great War prompted a flurry of activity around international engagement in U.S. higher education. A number of individuals forged organizations to consider and facilitate the place of American colleges and universities in international relations. The American Council on Education, the American University Union in Europe, and the Institute of International Education were all established during, or immediately following, the First World War. By the end of the 1920s, the IIE had established itself as an institution that emphasized the rhetoric of cross-national understanding, but it was not involved in creating its own overseas studies program for U.S. undergraduates. Like the two men who combined to secure funding to establish the Institute, the IIE was formed under the guiding principles of Duggan's brand of cultural internationalism and Butler's notion of corporate internationalism. In the early days of the IIE, the Institute operated at the intersection of these two strands of internationalism and spent much of its time attempting to convince U.S. colleges and universities of the benefits of its mission of international understanding through educational exchange. Although some institutions of higher learning accepted the principles and programs of the IIE, there were others like Harvard and the University of Chicago that remained skeptical. These two institutions in particular worried that the educational benefits of international exchange were not sufficiently present in the IIE’s vision. Even with resistance from some individuals who questioned the IIE, the climate in the 1920s was ripe for U.S. colleges and universities to explore new programs that incorporated the aim of cross-national understanding in education. The new organizations that developed in the wake of the First World War like the

increased their funding to the IIE to handle the additional responsibilities absorbed from the ACE’s former international portfolio. Ibid. p. 65.
ACE and IIE demonstrated the burgeoning interest in finding ways for U.S. postsecondary institutions to engage in the world. Given this interest, how did specific institutions of higher learning establish their own programs, and what rhetoric and unexpected challenges did the proponents at these colleges face in creating the first overseas study programs? The next chapter considers these questions by examining the pioneering study abroad experiments at the University of Delaware and Smith College.
CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENTS IN THE JUNIOR YEAR ABROAD
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE AND SMITH
COLLEGE: 1920S - 1945

Introduction

In 1926, the director of the Institute of International Education, Stephen Duggan, proclaimed that the junior year abroad was one of “the most striking developments in international education” of the year.1 The next year, the IIE began to administer fellowships for American undergraduate students to study abroad. These announcements marked a change in attitude for Duggan, because prior to 1926 he had been skeptical of sending American undergraduates abroad. Even though the IIE director was hopeful that student exchanges would lead to deeper understanding of different world cultures, thereby improving international relations between people of all nations, he was reticent to endorse overseas study for younger Americans. As he explained,

The young usually differ from older people in not yet having fixed ideas which are difficult to change. I decided that exchanges should be limited to students who had already secured their national education, that is, had their baccalaureate degree. I did not want any American exchange students to become denationalized or expatriates. If they were thoroughly grounded in their own civilization and culture they should absorb the best in a foreign system…I am a strong advocate of students going abroad to study only for graduate work.2

Duggan’s words reflected his ideas about the impressionable nature of young people, and the transformative potential of education, but also about his uncertainty with regard to the role sympathetic knowledge could play in undergraduate students. Duggan believed that the American system of undergraduate education provided the youth with sufficient training and

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2 Duggan, A Professor at Large. p. 49.
national indoctrination to prevent them from becoming swayed by other national contexts or somehow contaminated by the ideas present in foreign curriculums. Duggan’s worries about undergraduate students becoming “denationalized” while living abroad were at odds with his enthusiasm about the benefits of mutual exchanges between nations. His change in attitude in the 1920s elicits an important question. Namely, what prompted Duggan to ultimately lead the IIE to begin promoting and facilitating the dissemination of major scholarships for undergraduate study abroad in 1926? A careful study of the new undergraduate experiments in structured, faculty-led, overseas studies programs at The University of Delaware and Smith College sheds light on this question, and illustrates how institutional proponents justified study abroad in the 1920s and 1930s and how parents and students envisioned these programs. The rhetoric of students was especially influential in shaping these programs as they developed into the 1940s.

The University of Delaware and Smith College created the first university organized junior year abroad programs for American undergraduate students. Prior to the twentieth century, study abroad for college-aged students was an ad hoc affair by individuals who sought overseas study for a variety of different, primarily professional, reasons. When the University of Delaware and later Smith College introduced organized, faculty-led, study abroad programs for their undergraduate students, the term often used to describe these programs was “experimental.” As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Interwar Period was an ideal environment for international experiments. The internationalist rhetoric of the period influenced the study abroad experiments at the University of Delaware and Smith College in different ways, but the specific needs of these two institutions also informed the ways in which these programs were justified. At the University of Delaware, needs for funding and institutional recognition encouraged a corporate internationalist agenda that
focused on the professional benefits of study abroad. At Smith College, the need to protect women and preserve the College's academic prestige diminished the rhetoric of cross-national understanding and amplified the academic benefits of overseas study. Despite the differences in priorities for both institutions, the reports from students on both of these programs demonstrated deeper sympathetic knowledge of their host nation. The careful administrative and academic structures of both study abroad programs helped establish the learning environment necessary for students to achieve cross-national understanding. Ultimately, this manifestation of cross-national understanding in students compelled the IIE to endorse this method of undergraduate study abroad.

**Study Abroad Experiments at The University of Delaware and Smith College**

*The University of Delaware: Foreign Study Plan*

In 1920, a young assistant professor of French at the University of Delaware named Raymond Watson Kirkbride approached his university president Walter Hullihen (1920—1944) with plan to send students abroad for credit under faculty supervision. Kirkbride was an American soldier during World War I who stayed in France after the Armistice of November 11, 1918 on a program developed at the University of Paris in partnership with the U.S. Army. The special program recruited local families to host American soldiers who were waiting to return to the United States, while the University of Paris provided language and culture classes for Americans based on their language level. Students with limited knowledge of French took special courses designed for them, and content courses were offered to the advanced students on French literature, history and art. Between January and June 1919, approximately 5,000 Americans took courses at French universities on these
As a participant on one of these programs, Kirkbride lived with a French family and enrolled in classes. Upon returning from France, the University of Delaware hired Kirkbride to teach French.

Kirkbride developed a “Foreign Study Plan” for students at the University of Delaware that he often referred to as an “experiment.” According to this plan, a French teacher from the University of Delaware faculty would lead a group of qualified third-year students to France to stay with carefully selected host families and study in a French institution of higher learning for one academic year. Students would only be accepted if they had high academic standing and sufficient French language credit (at least three years). Before enrolling at the French institution during the French academic year, the students would experience a period of intensive language instruction in the first thirteen weeks of the program in a city like Nancy, France to get adjusted to living abroad. The language instruction would prepare students for their full academic-year at the University of Paris, where they would participate in special courses designed for them by the Sorbonne. In Paris, students would live with families, take courses during the week, and participate on educational excursions on the weekends to cultural and historical landmarks in and around the city. The American faculty member would accompany the students, supervise the excursions, oversee the language instruction, and maintain the academic integrity of the program. Upon returning to the

3 As Whitney Walton has found, by the late nineteenth century, French officials were concerned about limited number of students travelling to study at French universities. As a result of this concern, French education ministers implemented several reforms to lure foreign students to study in France. These reforms extended into the 20th century and included: establishing degree plans specifically for foreigners, increasing publicity to the U.S. with detailed information about the course offerings at French universities, providing improved housing, and offering special language instruction for non-French speakers. Walton, Internationalism, National Identities, and Study Abroad: France and the United States, 1890-1970. p. 26-29, and 33.

4 For a full outline of the plan, see Kirkbride, Raymond, “Sketch of Foreign Study Plan” and “One-Year Undergraduate Foreign Study and Travel” in letter from Raymond Kirkbride to Walter Hullihen (Newark, DE, Jan 17, 1921) copies found in letter from Hullihen to Odell: Walter Hullihen, "March 20, 1922 Letter from Walter Hullihen to Joseph Odell," in 33/0/2, Operations files 1922-1948, AR 45, Folder 2 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1922). p. 1 of enclosure. The term "Delaware Experiment" is explicitly used on page 3 of the "Sketch of Foreign Study Plan."
United States, American students would receive full credit for their overseas studies at the Sorbonne. Overall, the Foreign Study Plan sought to, improve “international understanding” in the students, increase American “effectiveness/efficiency” in foreign trade, “broaden American vision of world affairs,” and finally to “stimulate” and “liberalize” American college education.⁵

The academic, professional, developmental and cross-national aims of study abroad were all mentioned in some way in Kirkbride’s Foreign Study Plan. First, the Foreign Study Plan emphasized academic aims by explaining that the first “benefit” to the student for this year of study abroad was that, “He will really speak French, as he never could learn to speak it in this country.”⁶ Next, the developmental and cross-national aims of study abroad were both mentioned, but these aspects were not emphasized. In the proposal, Kirkbride twice referred to the objective of the plan to increase “international understanding” in students, but did not offer any additional details as to what this meant.⁷ In a January 17, 1921 presentation to the Department of Modern Languages, Kirkbride elaborated on the developmental benefits of study abroad for students on this program, when he explained that students would return from their studies in France, to complete their baccalaureate on the University of Delaware campus, “...with an increased maturity of judgment and of intellectual power that could hardly be attained in so short a time in any other way.”⁸ The proposal also described how students would not only learn to speak and understand French, but they would also gain important knowledge about aspects of French culture such as literature and history. This “broadening experience” would in turn help the student “...gain a

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⁵ Raymond Kirkbride, “Sketch of Foreign Study Plan,” Letter from Raymond Kirkbride to Walter Hullihen (Newark, DE, Jan 17, 1921) copies found in letter from Hullihen to Odel: ibid. p. 1 of enclosure.
⁶ Raymond Kirkbride, “One-Year Undergraduate Foreign Study and Travel: Presentation of subject by Department of Modern Languages,” Jan. 17, 1921. Copy found in letter from Hullihen to Odel. Ibid. p. 5.
⁷ Ibid. p. 1 and p. 3
⁸ Ibid. p. 5.
new conception of what is going on overseas. France and Europe will not seem so remote, and he [the student] will have a sounder appreciation of the foreign questions which are of so great importance in the world's history today.” The developmental and cross-national understanding aims were elements of this plan, but they were secondary to the proposal’s professional aspects.

Above all other aims, Kirkbride put a spotlight on the professional potential of study abroad. The proposal stressed the manner in which the male participants would familiarize themselves with French language, culture, markets, and politics in ways that would set them up for professional success. As Kirkbride explained, the first aim of the Foreign Study Plan was to establish, “A great reservoir of college trained men fit for use by business, trade, industry, commerce, and the government, for work abroad or other work that involves knowledge of the language and customs of other countries.” According to the proposal, study abroad students could make valuable business connections while living abroad, and would develop, “…some knowledge of the French market conditions thru having seen them, and some acquaintance with prominent men of France thru having met them.”

Moreover, Kirkbride outlined the potential for future employment of study abroad participants in specific American companies including, Wanamaker's, Macy's, Gillette Safety Razor, Eastman Kodak, Singer Sewing Machine, and Waterman Fountain Pens. He also described other, more general professional opportunities at steamship companies, tourist agencies, banking houses and in government service, “…as consuls, commercial attaches,

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9 Ibid. p. 5.
special agents, and investigators.”

On the surface, this emphasis on the commercial boons of study abroad reflected the professional aims of overseas study, but this commercial focus also exemplified the type of corporate internationalism advocated by people like Nicholas Murray Butler. At the University of Delaware, the individual who incorporated this ideology into his thinking most transparently was university president, Walter Hullihen.

Hullihen was interested in the Foreign Study Plan for two important reasons. First, the plan had the potential of increasing the status of the University. Second, it could improve the commercial influence of the United States in the world. As Hullihen wrote in 1922 to Joseph Odell, the director of a philanthropic organization called the Service Citizens of Delaware:

The [Foreign Study] plan appeals to me—and I have given it much thought—chiefly because it seems to offer a possible solution to what I conceive to be one of the chief obstacles to this country’s gaining its proper place in the commerce of the world. I am keenly alive to the credit which will attach to the University for its pioneer work in launching the enterprise, if it proves a success and is widely adopted... These comments demonstrated Hullihen’s interest in the business aims of the program, and his recognition of the potential for the plan to enhance the University of Delaware’s reputation. In this way, Hullihen saw the professional aims outlined in Kirkbride's plan under the framework of corporate internationalism. Like Nicholas Murray Butler and other corporate internationalists, Hullihen associated the possible benefits of study abroad with the business needs of the United States.

At the institutional level, when Kirkbride submitted the plan to Hullihen in 1921, the University was in a moment of transition, growth, and budding prestige. By that year,  

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12 In this section on the potential benefits for participants on this program, Kirkbride did mention the cultural knowledge to be gained, but he did not emphasize this in his text. Instead, he spent more time describing the business potential of such a program at the companies mentioned above and at travel related agencies. Ibid. p. 5.

13 Pierre DuPont established the Service Citizens of Delaware in 1918. Letter from Walter Hullihen to Joseph Odell, March 20, 1922. Ibid.
Hullihen had already made several significant changes including joining the men’s and women’s colleges into one institution, receiving accreditation, changing the name of the school to the “University of Delaware,” and engaging in a massive fundraising campaign to build a modern library for the campus in Newark. Collectively, these changes enhanced the prestige of the University of Delaware within the state at a time when American colleges and universities were increasingly becoming arbiters of social mobility. In Delaware, the University’s growth appealed to local businessmen. Most importantly, Hullihen’s changes strengthened the new University’s relationship with Pierre S. du Pont. Born in Wilmington, Du Pont had become the president of his family’s Du Pont Company in 1915 and had taken a philanthropic interest in the growth of Delaware College since 1916.

Enhancing the institutional prestige of the University of Delaware and establishing the Foreign Study Plan were dependent on the financial support of du Pont. Even before the University of Delaware board of regents approved Kirkbride’s “Foreign Study Plan” in the spring of 1922, Hullihen and Kirkbride were worried about financing their study abroad program. There was a proposal to save money by not sending Kirkbride to supervise the students in France; instead, there was a recommendation to send a different faculty member with a lower pay grade. This was avoided when the University agreed to pay Kirkbride’s teaching salary, and a grant from the philanthropic organization started by du Pont, the Service Citizens of Delaware, funded Kirkbride’s travel and living expenses. Du Pont was a

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14 For more on Hullihen’s achievements at the University of Delaware see: John A. Munroe, *The University of Delaware: A History* (Newark, Del.: The University, 1986). Chapter 8, “Walter Hullihen and the University.”
16 For Du Pont’s budding relationship with the University of Delaware see: Munroe, *The University of Delaware: A History*, p. 215–220.
major proponent the Foreign Study Plan, and was largely responsible for funding it in its first years. Du Pont’s financial involvement was necessary for the short-term survival of the Foreign Study Plan, but in order for the study abroad program to be viable for a longer period, Hullihen had to explore revenue streams beyond local philanthropy.

To disseminate study abroad to a wider audience, the University of Delaware promoted the Foreign Study Plan using rhetoric that suggested the plan would benefit the entire nation. After the plan was approved, university administrators began sharing the details with newspapers and prominent leaders throughout the country. On June 13, 1922, the Wilmington Morning News reported on the commencement address at the University of Delaware, where Wisconsin Senator Irvin L. Lenroot spoke about the Foreign Study Plan,

> It is one of the most progressive steps ever made in the history of education, and while only an experiment inasmuch as it has never been tried, there can be little or no doubt as to the success that it will attain. To the University of Delaware will go the credit for that step, and to the University of Delaware will the United States owe a standing debt of gratitude for such a gigantic step in the education of the coming generations of American citizens.  

Senator Lenroot’s high praise spoke directly to the aim of cross-national understanding of study abroad by suggesting that this “experiment” would ultimately benefit the U.S. as a whole. In the shadow of the “greatest war of history,” Lenroot encouraged UD graduates to enter industrial and diplomatic jobs in the professional world with the idea of service to mankind in their minds, and to partake in world affairs because, “Whether we will or no [sic], the United States must take part in world affairs.”

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19 For additional detail on the types of activities funded by Du Pont, see: Pierre S. duPont, "Letter from Pierre S. Du Pont to Walter Hullihen, July 11, 1923," in Walter Hullihen Papers 1922—23, Box 316 (University of Delaware Archives, 1923).

20 Irvin L. Lenroot, "’Lenroot Predicts Disaster Unless Laws Are Upheld,’” the Wilmington Morning News June 13, 1922,” in 33/0/1, Box A, AR 42, Vol. 1 Foreign Study Plan (France) Clippings 1922—1929 (Newark: University of Delaware Archives, 1922).

21 Ibid.
professional service with the aim of cross-national understanding by invoking the corporate internationalist ideal of shrinking the world by means of commerce.

In the local and national press, Hullihen touted the aims of the Foreign Study Plan with an emphasis on the professional benefits. As quoted in the *New York Times* in 1923,

The need of America for men who have had such training as this plan proposes was strikingly illustrated by a statement made by Mr. Hoover only a few days before the plan was brought to his attention. He said that he knew of no greater need of the United States at this very time than that of 5,000 young men with training which would fit them for positions with firms engaged in foreign commerce.\(^{22}\)

In the same *New York Times* article, Hullihen described the shortcomings of other, unnamed, national fellowships geared toward “scientific investigators, scholars, and teachers...” by explaining that these foreign exchange programs were only available to a “limited number” of students.\(^{23}\) Instead, Hullihen explained, “Our plan aims to reach a different type, the type of man who is going into business, the type that embraces two thirds of our college graduates today.”\(^{24}\) Here again the point regarding the professional aims of study abroad was undergirded by corporate internationalist sentiments: the graduates of the Foreign Study Plan would acquire knowledge of another nation in a way that would help the students find suitable employment and would help the United States gain a stronger footing in international markets. Hullihen’s stated aims underscored the professional benefits of overseas study in way that differed from the earlier traditions of study abroad that focused on individual scholarly pursuits. Thus, unlike men like Harvard president Abbot Lawrence Lowell who stressed the academic benefits of overseas study, Hullihen was advancing a new vision for study abroad that emphasized these professional aims.

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\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.
Administrators of the Foreign Study Plan had to be mindful of growth and changing gender dynamics in the first decade of the program. First, by the end of the 1920s, the participants on the Foreign Study Plan had grown from eight in the inaugural year of 1923 to sixty-seven students in 1929. The growth of the program was seen as a benefit since it brought revenue to help sustain the Foreign Study Plan. In addition to the funding from du Pont, the program also benefited financially from increased enrollments from non-University of Delaware students. In 1923, the program was only open to University of Delaware students, but in subsequent years, the University opened the Foreign Study Plan to students from any American institution of higher learning. By 1927, students from over twenty different American colleges and universities had studied abroad under the University of Delaware’s Foreign Study Plan. From the University of Montana in the west, to the University of Florida in the South, to several private liberal arts colleges in the Northeast, the widespread appeal of the Foreign Study Plan was evident in the growing numbers of applicants from around the United States. In the 1930s, the University extended its plan to

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25 According to an anonymous document titled, “Junior Year Abroad France,” the number of students on the Foreign Study Plan were as follows: 8 in 1923—24; 5 in 1924—25; 14 in 1925—26; 45 in 1926—27; 44 in 1927—28; 67 in 1928—29; 67 in 1929—30; (March 6, 1945). “Junior Year Abroad France,” in 33/0/5 Misc Historic Material, Box 24, AR 68 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1945). It should be noted that William Kirkbride died in 1929 of an illness he contracted in 1928.

26 Hullihen reported that at least one student from each of the following institutions had attended a University of Delaware program, and each of these higher education institutions granted official credit for the time their students spent abroad: Amherst, Boston University, Brown University, Colgate, Colorado College, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth, Delaware, Dickinson, University of Florida, Hamilton, Hood, Mt. Holyoke, University of Iowa, University of Indiana, Kenyon, Knox, Lafayette, Miami University, University of Minnesota, University of Montana, College of the City of New York, New York University, New Jersey College for Women, Olivet, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburg, Principia Junior, Randolph-Macon College for Women, Rutgers, Sacred Heart, Syracuse, Vassar, Wellesley, Western College for Women, Western Reserve, Westminster, Wheaton, Williams. Walter Hullihen, "Present Status of the 'Junior Year Abroad,'" The French Review 1, no. 2 (1928). p. 28 – 29.
Germany and sent 21 students from fourteen different colleges and universities abroad in the 1932/33 academic year.27

As the number of students on the Foreign Study Plan grew steadily from 1920 to 1939, there was a notable trend with regard to the gender of the participants. What began in 1923 as a program of only men had changed to a co-educational program in the second year when the UD administrators accepted one woman.28 By the beginning of World War II, three-fourths of the students on the program were women.29 The reasons for the increasing number of women on this program have not been fully explored in the study abroad literature; however, Whitney Walton posits that women sought study abroad experiences in France for both the professional benefits of learning French and the opportunity for enriched cultural capital associated with deeper knowledge of French culture.30 Like their male counterparts, many women saw the Foreign Study Plan as an opportunity to enhance their foreign language skills in ways that would enhance their professional opportunities. Although their rationales for studying abroad were similar, the experiences of men and women differed, and, in many cases, gender played an important part in shaping the experiences of the women on the program.31

For the administrators at the University of Delaware who envisioned study abroad as an experiment for men, the increasing presence of women on the Foreign Study Plan presented administrative challenges that underscored beliefs about women at the time.

27 The Munich program only lasted until 1934 due to ongoing political tensions there. Francis Millet Rogers, American Juniors on the Left Bank; an Appreciation of the Junior Year in France (Sweet Briar, Va.: Sweet Briar College, 1958). p. 12.
28 "Foreign Study Reports," in 33/0/2, Operations files 1922-1948, AR 45, Box 1, Folder 2 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1927-1948).
29 C. Robert Pace, The Junior Year in France; an Evaluation of the University of Delaware-Sweet Briar College Program (Syracuse: Published for Sweet Briar College by Syracuse University Press, 1959). p. 16.
31 Ibid.
Raymond Kirkbride was open to the idea of study abroad for women before considering the administrative challenges. In 1922, Kirkbride responded to a question from Winifred J. Robinson, the Dean of Women from the Women's College at the University of Delaware, regarding the possibility of women participating on the Foreign Study Plan. Kirkbride wrote, “Personally I feel that the opportunity is almost as valuable to the girls as to the boys and I see nothing to hinder the girls from being permitted to take advantage of this Plan.” As more women began to participate on the Foreign Study Plan, the administrative challenge of upholding the social norms for women weighed on Kirkbride's mind. Although Kirkbride believed that the men and women on the program should have the same language experiences, he suggested that women could have the option to take literature, history and art courses in the place of the economics courses offered to men. Kirkbride insisted however that the option be left with the “girls.” In 1924, Kirkbride again wrote to Robinson to express his belief that, in theory, the same arrangements with regard to living conditions, studies, special lessons, and program activities should be made for the men and women of the Foreign Study Plan; however, in the “actual application” of the program, the need for chaperonage for women was a great challenge. With only a few women on the Plan, Kirkbride thought he would be able to provide the oversight, but with increasing numbers of women participants, he called upon the dean of the Women's College to appoint a faculty member to join the group and serve as a chaperone for the women. Throughout the 1920s additional support and rules would be added to tend to the oversight of the women on the

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32 Raymond Kirkbride, "Letter from Raymond Kirkbride to Winifred J. Robinson. September 26, 1922.,” in 33/0/2, Operations files 1922-1948, AR 45, Box 1, Folder 1 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1922).  
33 "Letter from Raymond Kirkbride to Winifred J. Robinson. November 30, 1922,” in 33/0/2, Operations files 1922-1948, AR 45, Box 1, Folder 1 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1922).  
34 "Letter from Raymond Kirkbride to Winifred J. Robinson. April 28, 1924.,” in 33/0/2, Operations files 1922-1948, AR 45, Box 1, Folder 1 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1924).
By 1930, worries about the number of women on the UD program surfaced in private conversations between faculty. For example, in a review of the 1929-1930 Foreign Study Plan group, Edwin C. Byam, the faculty director of the University of Delaware Foreign Study Committee, wrote:

You will note in Section 5 that I expect the group to be more disproportioned than ever with respect to sex; thirteen men and fifty-five women. This situation is most deplorable and threatens I fear to result before long in an entirely feminine representation, but what is to be done?  

There are no records suggesting why more men were not attracted to the Plan, nor is there indication of further action on behalf of the University of Delaware administration with regard to shrinking this gender gap; however, subsequent records of the Foreign Study Plan show that the gap between men and women studying abroad persisted. The new rules and staff added to support women on the program also became a permanent fixture of the Foreign Study Plan.

The growth of the University of Delaware “experiment” from the 1920s to the 1940s demonstrates the complex interplay between rhetoric and reality in study abroad and the ways in which study abroad developed in unexpected ways. First, on a local level, by highlighting the Foreign Study Plan’s potential to enhance the prestige of the University of Delaware to local businessmen like Pierre du Pont, Hullihen and Kirkbride were able to secure funding to set the foundations for the experiment. DuPont was a local business icon who also had a global outlook as a result of his commercial success. Kirkbride’s emphasis on the professional aims of study abroad, and Hullihen’s stress on the potential for prestige were both successful rhetorical strategies for launching and funding the plan. On a national

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level, it is unclear if Hullihen’s plan to promote the Foreign Study Plan to a national audience by highlighting the corporate internationalist aims of study abroad was fully successful. On one hand, the program attracted many students from around the United States to participate in study abroad. Yet, Hullihen envisioned a cadre of men enrolling on the program who would become the next cohort of graduates capable of understanding world markets in ways that would enhance the place of the United States in the world. Instead, by the beginning of the Second World War, three out of every four students on the plan was a woman. Although proponents of the Foreign Study Plan had not planned for the large number of women who enrolled on the program, their ability to adapt the administrative elements of the program to meet the needs of women helped ensure its growth. In this way, in practice, administrators at the University of Delaware were able to recruit a larger number of external students to allow the program to remain financially viable even if the reality of their enrollments did not match their original aspirations. Opening the Foreign Study Plan to students from around the country and to men and women did more than establish financial stability. It demonstrated that faculty-led study abroad programs for undergraduate students were a viable option for American higher education.

Smith College: The Junior Year in France

Speaking to the annual meeting of the Association of State Universities in 1927, Walter Hullihen declared the experiment of the junior year abroad a great success, moreover, he explained that the program had “…won the approval of a large portion of those persons in the educational world who [had] investigated carefully the program that [was] being carried out…”37 In his speech, Hullihen mentioned that only one other institution, Smith

37 Hullihen, "Present Status of the 'Junior Year Abroad'." p. 37.
College in Massachusetts, had established its own study abroad program. As Hullihen explained, “…while a wide-spread interest in the Junior year in Europe has been aroused among colleges generally during the past four years, as far as I know the University of Delaware and Smith College are the only colleges that are sending organized, supervised groups to Europe (in both of these cases to France) for junior year study.”38 Like the University of Delaware, Smith College had its own unique set of institutional priorities that influenced the shape of its study abroad plan. At Smith College there were fewer worries about financing the program, or justifying its existence along corporate internationalist sentiments. The idea of utilizing a new study abroad experiment to promote institutional prestige was present at Smith, but this notion manifested itself in a different manner than at the University of Delaware. Namely, as an esteemed women’s college, Smith administrators were more concerned with upholding the appearance of prestige and supervision to concerned parents. In the rhetoric of administrators at Smith College then, proponents emphasized the academic aims of their study abroad program as well as the careful supervision of students.

Hélène Cattanès, a professor of French at Smith, created the program in response to parents’ requests. Before the program was introduced, parents came to Smith College faculty to petition for official credit for independent language studies conducted overseas (mostly in France) by their daughters. Since the college did not have a formal procedure for awarding foreign credit, Cattanès devised a plan wherein the college would organize and supervise the instruction of a group of Smith women in France. Cattanès approached Smith’s president, William Allan Neilson, with her proposal in 1924 and he encouraged her to submit it to a faculty committee review. According to the 1924/25 Smith College Annual Report, Cattanès

38 Ibid. p. 25.
“...was largely responsible for working out the details of the scheme.”  
In addition to outlining the academic aims of the program and coordinating the language teaching in two locations (the students began their program with an intensive language training in Grenoble, then proceeded to direct enroll in special classes at the Sorbonne), Cattanès also arranged the living quarters for all the students with French families. Cattanès proposed that the women on the Smith program would pay home school tuition and their own travel expenses. Smith students also would receive official Smith College course credit for their overseas studies. The faculty committee approved the proposal and the Smith Junior Year in France launched in the 1925/26 academic-year with Cattanès as the faculty leader. In the closing lines to his trustee’s report on the Junior Year in France plan, Neilson was optimistic about the future of organized study abroad programs for Smith College, “This year is necessarily experimental, but the plan is full of promise and capable of extension.” Thus, like the Delaware Foreign Study Plan, administrators at Smith emphasized the promising, yet experimental, nature of their Junior Year in France.

Principles of protection and prestige informed the design and promotion of the Smith Junior Year in France. By the time Cattanès approached Neilson with the proposal to send Smith students abroad, he had been president of the college for seven years and had overseen changes at the institution that were also attuned to these notions of prestige and protection, such as the construction of 10 new dormitories. The strict supervision provided by an esteemed faculty member like Cattanès must have appealed to Neilson for the same reasons that the new dormitories appealed to him. Like the new residence halls, Cattanès’s

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40 Ibid.
study abroad plan was outwardly bold and upheld institutional prestige, but it was attentive to the need to protect and supervise Smith students. On one hand, the upwardly mobile and dynamic student body would be drawn to the new overseas study program, and on the other, parents would be satisfied that their daughters were still under the watchful eye of the institution. In this way, Smith could convince concerned parents that their daughters would be well protected and observed by Smith College faculty, while the students would obtain valuable language skills and official college credit. In order to preserve these notions of prestige and protection, administrators at Smith emphasized the rhetoric of academics and protection in conveying the details of their new study abroad program.

There are many examples of how the rhetoric used to describe the Smith Junior Year in France showcased the oversight of students and the academic rigor of the program. An article from the February 26, 1925, *Smith College Weekly* mentioned the enthusiasm with which people in the United States and France received the Smith experiment, “The French government and French universities have offered their cooperation. Vassar is much interested and would like to join Smith. Already a number of students are making serious inquiries. If the experiment is successful there is no reason why the plan should not eventually be extended to other departments.” The article also made a point of mentioning that the students would be living with host families in France, but, “…will be in the charge of a member of the Smith College faculty.”

Neilson publically extolled the benefits of the experiment with specific attention to the instrumental academic aspect of improving French language skills from study in France, and his rhetoric distanced the program from associations with tourism. As he explained, “The comparative inefficiency of any method of trying to instruct students in a foreign language while they are living in a country where that

language is not generally spoken is the primary reason for the experiment which Smith College is trying this year.”\textsuperscript{43} In this sense, Neilson’s words highlighted the language aims of the experiment and served to diminish any notions of a grand tour.

In the year the program launched in 1925, 32 women were selected for their French language ability, high academic standing, and upstanding character. President Neilson also made a visit to France and expressed his strong support of the experiment. While in France, Neilson again emphasized the academic aspects of study abroad and stressed the rigor of the language training on Smith's program thereby underscoring the program's prestige. With regard to the type of women Smith had selected for the first group, Neilson said, “The girls who want to go to Paris because they have heard of Montmartre are not going with our group.”\textsuperscript{44} Thus, in public, Neilson made it clear that the women on the Smith Junior Year in France were selected for their academic qualities and not for any superficial interests. Neilson therefore presented the Junior Year in France as an exclusive academic experience, open only to French majors with great potential for language acquisition. Smith administrators made it clear that in order to participate on the program, the students had to be of the highest quality and capable of handling the intellectual rigors of life abroad.\textsuperscript{45} Once the Junior Year in France was up and running, the young women at Smith made great efforts to enroll in the program. Cattanès recalled receiving numerous applications for the Junior Year in France, and multiple requests from freshmen and sophomores about the best way to plan for acceptance to the overseas study program.\textsuperscript{46} These efforts of the students to enroll early, coupled with the public announcements by Smith College administrators, made it clear

\textsuperscript{43} "When the President Went to France," \textit{Smith Alumnae Quarterly} 17, no. 3 (May) (1926). p. 288.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p. 291,
\textsuperscript{45} See for example: "Trustees Approve Plan for Study in France." and "When the President Went to France."
\textsuperscript{46} Hélène Cattanès, "Twenty Five Years Ago: Thirty-Two Innocents Abroad," ibid.42, no. 2 (February) (1951).
to parents that the Junior Year in France was a suitable aspect of their daughters’ overall education at Smith.

Although the academic advantages of the program were clear, parents and faculty expressed ongoing concerns about the protection of the students who would attend Smith's Junior Year in France. Parents worried about sending young women to live in another country both for the dangers inherent in travel, but also for the social repercussions back home. As Cattanès wrote years after she had started the Smith Junior Year in France, “Objections were many. Of all places—to send nice young girls to wicked Paris! And wasn’t there great danger that these girls would lose their friends, if they went abroad, thereby sacrificing one of the great and lasting benefits of campus life?”47 These objections were indicative of a broader concern for the well being of the Smith women, and suggest that the people making these statements believed that it was Smith College’s responsibility to oversee the social and moral life of their students even when they were overseas. Some faculty members at a meeting of the Committee on Exchange of Students with Foreign Countries in 1924 voiced their worries for both the social and academic risks associated with such an experiment, “Some difficulty in faculty—Objections: Girls will be lonesome; will not return to graduate; credits for course in science not provided for…Courses at Sorbonne like extension courses…”48 Cattanès worked on two fronts to combat the skeptics. First, for those with academic concerns, she established a rigorous plan for language training. Next, for those with worries about the social and safety concerns regarding the women, she provided strict rules of conduct. The “social regulations” of the program were clear that,

47 Ibid. p. 74.
48 Miscellaneous typed report titled, “Cattanès for Mrs. Morrow.” (June 22, 1946). Although this report is from 1946 it referred to the notes Cattanès took in the first years of the Junior Year Abroad program. "Cattanès for Mrs. Morrow (June 22, 1946)," in Smith College Junior Year Abroad Records, ca. 1920- [on-going] (Northampton, MA: Smith College Archives, 1946).
In general every student of the College residing in France is required to conform to the College regulation and to the rules which commonly obtain in the society in which she is living. It is expected that she will behave in such a way that neither her manners nor her appearance will make her conspicuous. In situations not explicitly discussed a student should be guided by these principles. The Hostess or the Professor in charge should be consulted in cases of doubt.49

The remaining two pages of the rules for students included detailed information on everything from the 10:00 P.M. curfew, to rules about parties, chaperones, meals, health and safety. Cattanès had an eye for detail as she even included rules for the following miscellaneous aspects of daily student life,

Students may not own or use a victrola except with permission of the Hostess.
Pianos may be used only according to arrangements made with the Hostess.
Delivery of trunks will be at the expense of the students.
Students may not do laundering in their room.50

Cattanès also had to answer to skeptical French families who she negotiated with to secure family homestays for the Smith students. “French people don’t easily admit strangers into their private life,” wrote Cattanès, “Besides, they were afraid (American girls did not enjoy a good reputation) that different ways of behavior might bring unhappiness to all concerned.”51 Thus, unlike the University of Delaware, which had to accommodate its rules for women after increasing enrollments, Smith College had a plan in place from the outset to address these societal concerns.

The preoccupation with upholding societal conventions for women at Smith College helped reassure parents and provide structure for the women on the Junior Year in France. The reasons for tending to these elements of the program were important. As Whitney Walton has written, excessively strict rules of behavior for women may have been

50 Ibid.
51 "Twenty Five Years Ago: Thirty-Two Innocents Abroad." p. 74.
implemented on study abroad programs in order to mitigate French stereotypes about the “unrestrained and morally loose” nature of American women.\textsuperscript{52} Beyond this, parents in the United States worried about the safety of their daughters in France, and they sought reassurance from Smith administrators that their young women would be protected. Cattanès therefore served two masters. First, she settled the apprehensions of Smith parents by emphasizing academics and establishing strict rules for living. Second, she eased the fears of the nervous French hosts by assuring them that the American girls had been selected for their academic and moral standing. Moreover, she assured the French hosts that the women on the program would remain under strict supervision by an American faculty member throughout their stay in France. Cattanès’s attention to the prestige of the academics and the protection of the Smith women established the necessary environment for study abroad students to experience their time abroad in ways that supported various aims of overseas study. In this way again, parents proved to be an influential force in the program at Smith.

In addition, Cattanès’s focus on the academic and moral aspects of the program, along with her diligent planning and leadership were vital to the early success of Smith’s study abroad experiment. In the first ten years, the Smith College Junior Year in France sent over 300 students to France alone.\textsuperscript{53} In 1930, Smith created another Junior Year Abroad in Spain, and in 1931 the model was replicated in Italy. Neilson encouraged the development of each of these programs, and worked with the French, Spanish, and Italian institutions of higher education and governments to foster successful partnerships. In 1930, Spain awarded Neilson the Order of Alfonso XII with the Rank of Commander, and France bestowed La

\textsuperscript{53} Elizabeth Murphy, ”Ten Years Ago the Juniors Went to France,” Smith Alumnae Quarterly 26, no. 3 (May) (1935). p. 239.
Croix de Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur to Neilson in 1934. Symbolically, both awards demonstrated the ways in which France and Spain both valued Smith College's efforts at supporting educational exchange programs. Like the University of Delaware Foreign Study Plan, the Smith Junior Year in France was considered a successful experiment by the 1930s. At Smith, the Junior Year in France met the unique needs of Smith College constituents by providing moral oversight of the young women while abroad, and assuring parents that the courses would be rigorous and the students first-rate. The Junior Year in France then was not about extending cultural capital on a grand tour of Europe, but rather a new way of delivering high quality language training while also maintaining proper oversight for the College's women.

*Student Experiences and the Rhetoric of Cross-national Understanding on the Foreign Study Plan and Junior Year in France*

The rhetoric of student participants on both of these programs revealed enhanced personal development and a greater sense of international understanding in ways that the administrators at the University of Delaware and Smith College did not always emphasize in their rhetoric. In letters, articles, surveys, and reports, students often described an increase in their own development and their sympathetic knowledge of the people and cultures of France. Even though the institutional priorities of the Foreign Study Plan at the University of Delaware and the Smith College Junior Year in France were different, the undergraduates on both of these programs reported experiencing personal growth and deeper cultural sympathies toward France. Student reports suggest that this occurred, in large part, due to the careful planning by administrators at both U.S. institutions. As a result of their careful arrangements to provide faculty supervision, find suitable homestays, and maintain oversight

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54 Ibid. p. 239.
of the curriculum and much of the daily activities of their students, the U.S. administrators of these programs established the ideal conditions of support and structured independence necessary for the American students to foster their own personal development and cross-national understanding.

The reflections of students on both of these study abroad programs demonstrated that they were gaining valuable insights abroad that enhanced their personal development and piqued their international awareness in ways that embodied the aim of cross-national understanding. For example, University of Delaware student Katherine M. Pratt was struck by her thoughtlessness about the First World War prior to her study abroad experience, “You know, I think we do not quite appreciate the war. We have forgotten it too soon. I know that I never thought of it at all when I was home.” It was only after Pratt and her classmates took a tour of battlefields of Verdun, that she was confronted with the horrors of war, “One feels so queer walking over the fields. It is ten years since this dreadful war—yet one sees a shoe here, another there, a helmet yonder and even occasionally human bones. Oh, my dear, it is perfectly terrible.”

Smith student, Laura Brandt reflected on a visit she took with her classmates to the WWI Armistice Memorial in Compiègne. In a letter she wrote to her parents, Brandt referred to the 1918 memorial as a “most unpleasant,” flat grey stone that seemed ill suited to “cauterize” the wounds of war. “I'll admit that they were wounded for their own good,” Brandt wrote, “but afterwards that wound should be properly healed.”

On the eve of the Second World War, a Bryn Mawr College student on the University of Delaware Geneva Plan was similarly reflective. Louise B. Morley explained the

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55 Katherine M. Pratt, "Letter from Katherine M. Pratt," in 33/0/5 Misc Historic Material, Box 24, AR 68, Folder 539 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, n.d.).

56 Laura Lillian Brandt, "Letter from Laura Lillian Brandt to Parents, June 27, 1926," in Class of 1927, Records, SC Special Collections (Northampton, MA: Smith College Archives, 1926).
palpable tension in Europe had diminished the hope of peace and left many in a state of “disillusioned pessimism.” In this state of despair, Morley reflected on her vantage point as an American interloper and expressed a newfound appreciation of the “forlorn dispair [sic] of stateless refugees” and felt obliged to return to the United States “not disillusioned and pessimistic” about world affairs.57 These examples show how students personalized the reality of war, and developed their own thoughts on this catastrophic world event, by making meaning of their experiences in their letters home.

Students also reflected on their own identity as citizens of the United States in their writing. For example, as Laura Brandt approached the eve of her return to the United States, she felt immersed in French culture, comfortable about speaking the language, but unsure about her own ties to her native land.

Here I’ve been burying myself more thoroughly than ever in French—where all of the sudden it came over me that in a month, I’d be home!! I’ve never said anything to myself that was harder to grasp. Perhaps because, for the first time since I’ve been away, I’ve been completely cut off from everything American and not only have Jean and Nadine and their friends to talk French with but a whole crowd of other young people besides. It makes America seem very far off and unreal...It’s a very funny feeling. I’m apt to forget I’m Laura Brandt and begin to wonder just what sort of person is walking around loose and whether she has a family or a native land somewhere.58

Brandt’s comments demonstrate her personal development by showing how she was processing a myriad of thoughts and emotions after living in France for nearly one year. Her thoughtful reflections also typify the anxiety expressed by Stephen Duggan about younger students becoming denationalized. Brandt was aware of her distance from the United States and her new connection to France. Indeed, for many students on these programs, study

57 Louise B. Morley, "Letters from a Junior in Geneva (December 12, 1938)," in 33/0/1 AR 44, Records of Foreign Study Program Printed Material, Box C, Folder C-16 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1938).
58 Laura Lillian Brandt, "Letter from Laura Lillian Brandt to Parents, August 8, 1926," in Class of 1927, Records, SC Special Collections (Northampton, MA: Smith College Archives, 1926).
abroad came with a newfound sense of growth combined with a deeper affinity with their host country.

For many students personal development and cross-national understanding were intertwined. As a result of their time abroad, students developed personally and increased their sympathetic knowledge of France. Whitney Walton has described this transformation in students as a “...process of dismantling stereotypes, accepting and appreciating national differences, reassessing one’s national identity, and constructing a more cosmopolitan self.”\(^5\)

Moreover Walton has stressed how the cultural internationalism of these students “...entailed sufficient intellectual independence to question one’s own beliefs and value the beliefs and practices of another culture.”\(^6\)

Walton’s penetrating analysis of this process rightfully attributes the agency to the students for recognizing these cultural differences, and coming to their own understanding of internationalism; however, Walton is less attuned to the interplay between students and administrators that helped cultivate this independence and shape future programs. I suggest that student rhetoric from the early years helped the home administrators shape the development of study abroad in ways that were more in tune with student interests in personal development and cross-national understanding.

Indeed, many students understood that their home institutions played a part in enhancing their own personal development. For example, Jack Roads, made the following comments about the University of Delaware directors in an article he wrote for a Delta Upsilon fraternity publication, “Capable directors look out for your health, happiness and good conduct. They let nobody run amuck socially or fail academically. My lucky star was in


\(^6\) Ibid. p. 83.
the ascendant when I got to join the Delaware group, and I hope it never sets.”

61 Esther Dudley, a participant on the 1927/28 Smith College Junior Year in France wrote, “I feel that my Junior Year in France has meant more to me in personal development, broadening of outlook, and happy memories than any other year of my life. I realize, however, that its meaning was to a great extent enhanced by the other three years in Northampton.”

62 Administrators at the time also took note of the students’ comments. In his report on the progress of the study abroad experiment, Walter Hullihen reported that students experienced, “…a broadening of interests and outlook, contact with an atmosphere of cultural and aesthetic ideals quite new, very stimulating, and different from anything which they had previously known.”

63 Although administrators at the University of Delaware and Smith College did not emphasize the aims of cross-national understanding and personal development in their promotional rhetoric extensively, their practical attention to detail in creating these programs formed conditions ideal for establishing these aims in their students. The students in turn responded enthusiastically to these newfound notions.

In order to better understand the experiences of students, Smith College conducted a survey on the impact of study abroad. The survey, which appeared in a 1935 issue of Smith Alumnae Quarterly, asked alumnae how their junior year in France affected their attitudes towards domestic and world affairs. The terms used by most of the women echoed the statements of other students about expanded worldviews. For example, one alumna reported that study abroad brought her, “greater breadth, greater maturity of judgment and more

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61 Helen Roads, "Letter from Helen Roads (Mother of Jack Roads) to George E. Brinton (May 5, 1930)," in 33/0/5 Misc Historic Material, Box 24, AR 68, Folder 540 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1930).
62 Murphy, "Ten Years Ago the Juniors Went to France." p. 244.
63 Hullihen, "Present Status of the 'Junior Year Abroad'." p. 30.
tolerance.” Another student wrote, “I went a dyed-in-the-wool Republican and came back an internationalist.” Another explained,

The opinions of Mr. Average French Citizen that I heard discussed over the evening potage on the question of war debts, German rearmament and responsibility for the World War, and so forth are still bearing fruit. I like to think that I have a greater insight into the whys and wherefores of such events because of my Junior Year—and less bitterness.64

Upon Esther Lowell’s return to Smith for her senior year after a year in France, the Smith College Weekly interviewed her about her time abroad. When asked what a girl would need to succeed on the program, Lowell replied, “There is one thing absolutely necessary. The girl must be broadminded and must have a willingness to get the French point of view.”65 Like many of the other women on the Junior Year in France, Lowell had come away with more than an increased competence in a foreign language. She had come away from her year abroad with a broadened perspective on world affairs. Students on the University of Delaware Foreign Study Plan expressed similar sentiments. As just one example, after studying in France for eight months as part of the Foreign Study Plan, Louis Blum wrote,

One learns to see and to judge for one's self, to have broad ideas and tolerance; one understands his country better in light of the history and doings of another. I feel that I've acquired that much here already. The change in one's character is only visible to others, so that I'll let you judge when I come back.66

Statements like Blum’s were common and were often published in the school newspapers and official study abroad publications at Smith College and the University of Delaware. The divide between student experiences and promotional discourse from these programs is an early example of the potential for a break between rhetoric and reality in study abroad. These

64 Murphy, "Ten Years Ago the Juniors Went to France." p. 241.
65 "Junior Year in France Described by Senior," Smith College Weekly, April 25 1928.
66 Louis V. Blum, "Blum Gives Impressions of France; Foreign Study Student Writes to Review. February 26, 1929," in 33/0/1 Box A, AR 42, Vol. 1 Foreign Study Plan (France) Clippings 1922—1929 (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1929).
student commentaries reveal how students came away from their study abroad experiences emphasizing the developmental and cross-national understanding aspects of overseas study, yet neither Smith College nor the University of Delaware emphasized these elements of their programs.

The Institute of International Education's Reaction to these Study Abroad Experiments

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the IIE embodied a blend of corporate and cultural internationalism, and was initially reluctant to endorse study abroad for U.S. undergraduate students. The Foreign Study Plan and the Junior Year in France compelled the Institute of International Education to rethink its stance on study abroad for U.S. undergraduate students for two reasons. First, the Foreign Study Plan and the Junior Year in France addressed several of the administrative problems outlined by the IIE regarding American students who wanted to study abroad.67 Prior to these experiments, the IIE had articulated numerous challenges of sending American students abroad for the sake of acquiring sympathetic knowledge. Second, the expanded mindset of the students mentioned above embodied the cultural internationalist perspective advocated by Stephen Duggan. In other words, the numerous student reports demonstrated the potential of achieving the aim of cross-national understanding on these carefully designed programs.

67 According to IIE Annual reports, there were several obstacles to establishing "real educational value" in study abroad tours for American students. First, even if American students had the language abilities to understand the materials taught in non-English speaking European universities, the systems of instruction between national university systems were very different. In general, European universities required students to engage in a mode of independent research that American undergraduate students were not familiar with. Those differences in educational systems made Americans seem incapable of studying abroad. Additionally, English-speaking universities like Cambridge and Oxford did not welcome American students. In the 1920s, the IIE received requests from these English universities to limit the number of American undergraduate students who studied abroad to only the very best. Moreover, European universities were overcrowded in the years following the First World War. "Seventh Annual Report of the Director." p. 4.
These early experiments in study abroad also showed the IIE that undergraduate students could benefit from overseas study under certain conditions. Duggan was initially opposed to undergraduate study abroad because he feared that younger students would run the risk of becoming denationalized if they developed deep affinity for their host nations. The administrative structure for study abroad programs at these two institutions and the student reflections of their experiences abroad convinced Duggan that under certain conditions study abroad could be efficacious for undergraduates. In 1927, the IIE introduced scholarships for study abroad that reinforced these conditions.\(^68\) The first condition for an IIE scholarship to study abroad was that the student had to have excellent academic standing and the necessary language skills to survive the academic rigors of the host nation. Second, the home faculty needed to approve the curriculum of the host institution. Finally, and perhaps most critically, an American faculty member had to be present in the host nation to provide on-site supervision. As Duggan wrote, “…the supervision of a member of the faculty is almost indispensible…”\(^69\) The careful selection of students, rigorous curriculum design, and close faculty supervision were present in both the study abroad programs at Smith College and the University of Delaware. Based on his observations of these two programs, Duggan and the IIE created special fellowships to aid students who were academically qualified to study abroad but could not afford the travel and incidental expenses associated with an overseas educational experience.\(^70\) Thus, Duggan, who had been leery of sending undergraduates abroad, became convinced of the value of this

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\(^68\) Ibid.

\(^69\) Ibid. p. 6. It should be noted that Duggan made a point in his autobiography of mentioning a potential fourth factor that was instrumental to the success of the Junior Year Abroad program at the University of Delaware—the French educational authorities. See: Duggan, \textit{A Professor at Large}, p. 149.

\(^70\) In the report Duggan notes that Smith College and the University of Delaware charged home-school tuition for their programs. The travel and incidental expenses totaled $1,400. "Seventh Annual Report of the Director." p. 7.
bold experiment. As he wrote in 1927, “The Junior Year Abroad has passed out of the
experimental stage and has apparently become a permanent factor in international
education.”[71] In the same year, the IIE established a committee for the Junior Year Abroad
and continued to provide funding for undergraduate study abroad until the beginning of the
Second World War. By 1938, the Institute had awarded fellowships for 238 students to study
in Europe.[72]

While the IIE was not involved in actively assessing the academic or cross-cultural
impact of these programs, the Institute did conduct a survey in 1930 of the “Decade of
International Fellowship” that addressed some of the professional outcomes of study
abroad. One notable finding was that of the 245 students who completed questionnaires,
73% took positions in education (in either teaching, research, or administration), and only
5% listed their occupations as “industry or business.”[73] In this way, the hopes of the
 corporate internationalists like Walter Hullihen who saw these programs as avenues for
business exchange were not fully realized. Students did come away with tangible skills for
employment, like improved French, but rather than entering business, the students on these
programs returned to the United States to become teachers.

Conclusion

The experiments in study abroad at Smith College and the University of Delaware
have much in common. Broadly, both institutions sought ways to select the best students,
offer academically challenging programs, and provide faculty supervision and oversight of
the curriculum. In this sense they were selective and academically robust. Also, for most

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[71] Ibid. p. 8.
[72] It should be noted that most of the scholarships were to France. Halpern, ”The Institute of International
Education: A History.” p. 112.
[73] Theodosia Hewlett and Willard Connely, A Decade of International Fellowships: A Survey of the Impressions of
students, the careful planning of their study abroad programs aided their personal
development and established the ideal conditions for them to engage with their French
hosts. Students who participated on both programs adjusted to academic and domestic life
during their time abroad, and many of them came away with both improved language skills
and expanded worldviews. In this sense, student reflections echoed the sentiments of the
cultural internationalist aspect of the aim of cross-national understanding. Thus, by living
and interacting with their hosts, the students on these programs developed sympathetic
knowledge of another country in ways that may not have been possible by domestic study in
the United States. The students’ manifestation of cross-national understanding did not
correspond with the promotional rhetoric of the University of Delaware and Smith College,
since each institution stressed different objectives for study abroad in their discourse.

At the University of Delaware, administrators and faculty, who were eager to build the
reputation of a regional institution on a national level, were mindful of the university’s
mission to serve the needs of the state and therefore expressed the aims of the program with
strong professional and corporate internationalist overtones. The Delaware Foreign Study
Plan therefore promoted the potential benefits of study abroad for business and
employment for local participants from Delaware. In line with this, the external proponents
of this endeavor included politicians who touted the benefits of study abroad to American
education, and the local businessman, Pierre du Pont, whose financial contributions kept the
program afloat in the early years. Additionally, since the University of Delaware needed
tuition revenue to keep the program running, it opened the program to students throughout
the United States. This allowed the Delaware plan to survive financially, and it introduced
supervised, faculty-led, study abroad for undergraduates to a national audience. The
increasing number of women who enrolled on the program forced the administrators in
Newark to introduce new administrative components, such as rules and chaperones for women, to address larger societal concerns about women. In this way, the University of Delaware enhanced its prestige vis-à-vis other American institutions of higher education, and established a business model for future organized study abroad programs.

At Smith College the impetus for study abroad was different. There, a combination of factors prompted action. First, parents who were already sending their daughters abroad to study in France lobbied the French department to offer their children credit. These parental requests encouraged a Smith faculty member in the French department to devise a study abroad program. Next, the experienced president of Smith College experimented with overseas study with the understanding that the students would be well protected and the academic curriculum abroad would not compromise the prestige of the women's college. The dilemmas that many universities had at the time of providing moral instruction, faculty role models, and a protective community weighed heavily on the minds of administrators. Therefore, the faculty leader on the Smith program served an important function. Her presence allowed the women of Smith to leave the bucolic settings of Northampton for the cosmopolitan life of Paris. The American concerns about protecting women were compounded by French worries about stereotypical “loose” behavior by American women. As a result of these two fears, the Smith College program was not opened to outside students and the women were given strict instructions and norms of behavior. Additionally, at Smith College, parents were the primary external proponents of study abroad. Parents drove the need for overseas study as a way to give their daughters official credit for the type of language training that many were doing on their own. To satisfy parental concerns, Smith College representatives made a point of stressing the academic rigor of the program publicly.
Student rhetoric describing these two programs emphasized the ways in which they had achieved the cross-national understanding and developmental aims of overseas study. By the end of the 1930s, American study abroad students came away from their experiences with multiple benefits. Academic aims were met with improved language skills and this in turn led to careers in teaching for many of the alumni of these programs. Although the cross-national and developmental benefits of study abroad and the stated aims of the program administrators did not initially align completely, program leaders at Smith and the University of Delaware eventually touted these additional benefits as well in response to student comments. The enthusiastic student rhetoric encouraged administrators at these institutions to continue their plans for study abroad and to establish new programs in Europe right up until the Second World War. This growth demonstrated a commitment to the academic, professional, developmental and cross-national aims of study abroad. The Second World War however greatly diminished the hope of achieving the aim of cross-national understanding in study abroad. The belief that international conflict could be mitigated if study abroad students increased their sympathetic knowledge of other nations seemed deeply naïve in the face of brutal violence and nationalist bloodshed. World War II would halt study abroad programs in Europe in 1939 until hostilities concluded in 1945, yet the interest in study abroad continued during the war. Smith College introduced a junior year in Mexico in 1944. After the fighting in Europe ended, U.S. proponents of study abroad were eager to resume their programs, but they were about to enter a new landscape for U.S. higher education. In the years following the Second World War, proponents had to alter their justifications for study abroad to meet the changing times and study abroad had to compete with multiple other aspects of international engagement on U.S. college campuses. These strategies and new post WWII study abroad programs are the subject of the next chapters.

Introduction:

By 1945, the junior year abroad had shed its “experimental” moniker and become an accepted practice in U.S. higher education. Even though the Second World War brought an end to all junior year abroad activity in Europe in 1939, both Smith College and the University of Delaware re-opened their overseas study programs in Europe soon after the war ended. The University of Delaware resumed the Foreign Study Plan for the 1946/47 and 1947/48 academic years in Geneva, Switzerland; however, in December 1947 the administration at the University of Delaware determined that the Foreign Study Plan was not financially viable and they turned over operations of their overseas study program to Sweet Briar College in Virginia.1 Smith College staggered the openings for their programs. They moved the “Junior Year in France” program to Geneva in 1946/47, and reopened the Italy program in 1947. Smith also opened a Junior Year in Spain in 1947/48, and moved the France program back to Paris in 1949.2 Additionally, in 1947, Rosary College, a Catholic institution in Illinois, renewed a junior year abroad program they began in 1931 in Fribourg, Switzerland.3 By the middle of the 1950s there were at least 22 different junior year abroad programs with over 500 students, and by the 1959/60 academic year, there were over 50 programs, with approximately 1,500 U.S. students studying abroad for official university

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1 "Minutes of the Meeting of the Institute of International Education’s Advisory Committee on the Junior Year in France, (January 10, 1948).", in 33/0/3 AR 54 Records of Foreign Study, General Correspondence, Institute of International Education, 1927/28 to 1949, Box #10, Folder 100 "Institute of International Education, 1948" (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Archives, 1948). See Also” Rogers, American Juniors on the Left Bank; an Appreciation of the Junior Year in France, p. 30 - 31.
3 Rogers, American Juniors on the Left Bank; an Appreciation of the Junior Year in France, p. 11.
credit on year-long, semester, and summer programs of different types. In addition to the growing number of junior year abroad programs, student demand again proved to be a driving factor in developing other forms of study abroad. These new options included, organized summer school programs, short international seminars, study tours, and service/work camps. As William Hoffa has shown, students themselves also coordinated their own overseas experiences as well as stimulating much of the growth in study abroad in the 1950s and 1960s. The Institute of International Education had also grown since the 1920s and had begun administering the Fulbright exchange fellowship for the U.S. State Department in 1946. As a result of the Institute’s administrative expertise in fostering educational exchanges, the IIE had considerably increased its status and convening power vis-à-vis U.S. colleges and universities following the war. Noting the growth in study abroad, the IIE established a new “Special Committee on the Junior Year Abroad” in 1945 with representatives from many of the colleges and universities with these programs to promote the junior year abroad and respond to increasing demand. Despite the growth in overseas study programs in the decades following the war, study abroad was only a minor aspect of the international developments in U.S. higher education at this time.

The boom in study abroad programs coincided with a period of unprecedented growth for U.S. colleges and universities and bourgeoning partnerships between U.S. higher

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4 Freeman, Undergraduate Study Abroad, U.S. College-Sponsored Programs; Report of the Consultative Service on U.S. Undergraduate Study Abroad, p. 5.
6 For the student travel movement and the student demands for more study abroad options following World War II, see: Hoffa, A History of Us Study Abroad: Beginnings--1965, 1st. Chapter 4.
7 Liping Bu argues that the trio of the Ford Foundation, State Department, and the IIE “gave shape” to post World War II international exchanges because of the “financial power, the political leadership, and the professional expertise” of the three organizations respectively. Bu, Making the World Like Us: Education, Cultural Expansion, and the American Century, p. 186.
education and the U.S. government in many international endeavors.\textsuperscript{9} Campus enrollments swelled from just under 1.5 million in 1939/40 to 2.7 million in 1949/50.\textsuperscript{10} In addition to the growth in the number of students, the increasing ties between the U.S. federal government and American colleges and universities in the years following World War II marked a major change from interwar era postsecondary endeavors. Whereas the U.S. federal government had little interest, and played virtually no role, in the development or sponsorship of the junior year abroad programs of the 1920s, the U.S. State Department established a growing interest in student exchanges (especially at the graduate level) as a soft arm of diplomacy in the decades that followed.\textsuperscript{11} Foundations also played an increasingly large role in developing other international components of U.S. campus activities.

This chapter demonstrates how, within this environment of heightened interest in the international dimension of U.S. higher education, there were several individuals, agencies, and institutions of higher learning that began envisioning the role of U.S. postsecondary education in world affairs. Although the rhetoric of these individuals and agencies included discussions of study abroad, the topic of overseas study for undergraduates was only a minor aspect of the larger message of expanding the international


\textsuperscript{10} John Thelin notes that the growth continued: In 1960, the total enrollment was 3.6 million and in 1970 there were 7.9 million students on American university campuses. John R. Thelin, \textit{A History of American Higher Education} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). p. 261.

dimension of American colleges and universities. The people involved in these discussions, such as university faculty and administrators, as well as individuals affiliated with private organizations (like the ACE, CEIP, Ford Foundation, and IIE) began to convey a new line of rhetoric that emphasized the “international dimension” of U.S. higher education to benefit the institutions themselves and the nation as a whole. In these discussions, overseas study for undergraduates played a relatively minor role and more attention was given to research and university partnerships with federal development projects. Even as a marginal aspect of these discussions, student demand for travel forced proponents of study abroad to consider how to capitalize on the heightened period of international activity. Study abroad as a field was entering a more mature phase and the proponents shifted their rhetoric away from the justifying rationales that were more important in the 1920s and 1930s. The faculty members and administrators who developed their own study abroad programs also paid less attention to how undergraduate overseas study fit into the larger discussions about the international dimension and instead turned their attention to the administration and management of their own programs.


In the opening lines to the 1945 annual report of the IIE, Stephen Duggan wrote, “It is six years since this Institute has had any appreciable amount of educational relations with the countries of continental Europe. They have been years of horror for the countries overrun by the Nazis—years of hunger and cold, of devastation by marching armies and of destruction by bombing aircraft.” Yet, despite the years of darkness, Duggan emphasized the need to maintain student exchanges in the wake of the war under a new sense of urgency.

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that placed the United States in a position of power to renew educational exchanges to Europe. He noted how American technical expertise had increased during the war, and that other countries in the world would “naturally” want their citizens to learn from the United States to “facilitate the work of national reconstruction.” The IIE was not alone in demonstrating an interest in reigniting international exchange efforts and promoting American technical expertise following the war. Many colleges, universities, and large foundations in this period also began suggesting ways to amplify research, exchanges and other international aspects of U.S. higher education. The U.S. federal government also began to play an increasingly important role in intensifying the rhetoric and action around the international dimension of American colleges and universities. Indeed, the budding partnership between academia and the federal government transformed U.S. higher education in numerous ways and many scholars have documented the flurry of activity on different university campuses during the Cold War to advance knowledge in ways that served the United States government, altered academic disciplines, and enhanced university infrastructures. As David Engerman has shown however, the quest for knowledge to advance U.S. global power in American universities did not necessarily start because of (or during) the Cold War. Even before the Cold War then, colleges and universities had

\[13\] Ibid. p. 5.
multiple rationales for partnering with the U.S. federal government to augment their international dimensions.

Although the U.S. government’s impact on higher education in the middle of the twentieth century was profound, the direct impact on study abroad was minimal. Nancy Ruther’s work has demonstrated how, as a result of the highly differentiated and interdependent nature of the U.S. “system” of higher education, federal initiatives altered U.S. higher education policies very gradually over the second half of the twentieth century. Since each campus needed to establish its own rationale for accepting federal money or implementing new international projects or policies, institutions were slow to respond unless they witnessed other peer institutions finding success or they determined high degrees of compatibility or profitability for such policies at their own institutions. Moreover, although the federal government had a powerful impact on higher education over the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. government policies followed a pattern of focused action around “catalytic” moments followed by “years of small change.” Ruther points to Sputnik and the subsequent National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 as the classic example of this pattern. Although this influential federal presence did much to amplify campus international activities such as research and developmental partnerships, the U.S. government never made a concerted effort to assess or stimulate study abroad programming for American undergraduate students.

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17 Ruther describes “compatibility” as the extent to which a new policy is consistent with the norms, values, and goals of institution adopting it. “Profitability” refers to the degree of advantage of a new policy for the organization in a number of areas not necessarily related to financial gain, such as “time-savings, prestige, intellectual satisfaction, competitiveness or personal interest.” Ibid. p. 34.
18 Ibid. p. 49.
Given the U.S. government’s lack of attention to study abroad at the undergraduate student level, I contend that federal policy still had a consequential, if slightly contradictory, effect on overseas studies for undergraduates. On one hand, undergraduate study abroad programs benefited from the increased focus on world affairs since the attention of the U.S. government stimulated sustained discussions and far-reaching rhetoric that often encouraged university administrators to think broadly about the various international dimensions of their institutions, including study abroad. On the other hand, the federal government did not fund or emphasize study abroad for undergraduates in the same way that it sponsored university research projects, financial assistance for graduate students, and programs to work with universities that provided technical aid to developing countries.19 Therefore, although there was rhetorical support for undergraduate overseas study, study abroad programming did not develop in the same robust way as other partnerships of the period between U.S. institutions of postsecondary education and the federal government. Instead, without federal funding, input, or oversight, study abroad programs for undergraduate students developed in an independent, highly decentralized, and idiosyncratic manner that posed immediate administrative dilemmas for proponents.

Four different federal initiatives demonstrate the twofold effect on undergraduate study abroad described above: the Fulbright Act (1946), the National Defense Education Act (1958), The Peace Corps (1961) and the International Education Act (1966). First, William J. Fulbright, a freshman senator and former Rhodes Scholar from Arkansas, submitted a relatively innocuous bill to distribute profits from the sale of surplus U.S. war

items left abroad to fund exchange programs between the United States and other nations that would “…promote international goodwill.”\textsuperscript{20} Congress passed the act in 1946 under Harry S. Truman’s administration and they established a Board of Foreign Scholarships to oversee the selection of recipients of the fellowship.\textsuperscript{21} Early on, legislators made the decision to limit the outgoing American participants to graduate students, teachers, and scholars so that undergraduates were ineligible for the Fulbright exchange. Over the Fulbright program’s first 50 years, approximately 71,000 people (graduate students, scholars, and teachers) from 167 countries came to study in the United States, and 27,000 Americans went abroad.\textsuperscript{22} The Fulbright program raised awareness on U.S. university campuses about the benefits of student and faculty exchanges. It also emphasized the aim of cross-national understanding in a way that resonated with earlier culturally internationalist impulses that emphasized mutual goodwill between the people of different nations. Despite this increased spotlight on goodwill and exchange programs, the Fulbright program did not provide any programming or funding for undergraduate student exchanges.

The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) stimulated activity and attention around international affairs in U.S. higher education but had no direct impact on study abroad for undergraduate students. In the wake of the Soviet Union launching the first artificial satellite on October 4, 1957, the U.S. Congress passed the NDEA on September 2, 1958. The purpose of the act was, “To strengthen the national defense and to encourage and assist in the expansion and improvement of educational programs to meet critical national

\textsuperscript{21} The makeup of the board was intentionally broad and included current army generals, university administrators from institutions like Fisk University, Vassar College, and the Catholic University of America. University professors in engineering, the sciences and humanities were all selected to serve. The scholarship was administered by the IIE.
\textsuperscript{22} Hoffa, \textit{A History of Us Study Abroad: Beginnings–1965}, 1st. p. 114.
needs; and for other purposes." The NDEA included titles addressing international education in elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education, but Title VI, “Language Development,” had the strongest influence on the international dimension of U.S. colleges and universities. This section explained that an initial one-time allotment of $32 million federal dollars would go toward the establishment of area centers on U.S. campuses for teaching modern foreign language to meet the needs of the U.S. federal government, and to the creation of fellowships for people taking advanced language courses at the centers. In her review of the legislative testimony on the NDEA, Ellen McDonald Gumperz found that the House paid very little attention to the foreign language provisions of Title VI. The only provisions that created objections were those allocating funding for undergraduate scholarships for foreign language study. Ultimately, lawmakers in the House stripped undergraduate scholarships from the act. Instead, legislators included loans for undergraduates in the NDEA, but this money was not tied to foreign language training or overseas study. After the first five years, Title VI Area Studies centers became a significant factor at the universities where these centers developed. By 1961, there were over 40 centers at over 20 universities throughout the United States. The NDEA, and especially Title VI, set the dominant federal policy pattern in U.S. higher education for the remainder of the 1960s.

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24 Ibid. p. 1594.
research and the development of expertise of foreign languages and cultures, the NDEA stimulated the international dimension at several U.S. universities; however, there was limited attention to undergraduate studies, and no focus on, or funding for, study abroad.

Just as the NDEA amplified attention toward international activities in U.S. higher education, The Peace Corps stirred interest in international service for young Americans who had recently graduated from U.S. colleges and universities. As a presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy, announced his plans at the University of Michigan for a service program for American youth to travel abroad to developing nations to assist in community building projects to help uplift national conditions in various strategic international destinations.28

After he became president in 1961, Kennedy passed an executive order to establish the Peace Corps within the U.S. State Department. In Kennedy’s executive order, the mission of the Peace Corps was to assist people in other nations in need of aid, to promote better understanding of both Americans in the world, and of people in the nations served.29

Situated firmly in a Cold War context, the Peace Corps emphasized the rhetoric of cross-national understanding while it also demonstrated American technical knowhow and youthful potential vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and China. Undergraduates were not eligible for Peace Corps services but the Peace Corps training for new members took place on University campuses throughout the United States. By 1966, there were 15,000 Peace Corps volunteers working in various locals throughout the world. The Peace Corps had a definite political agenda, yet numerous young Americans with high hopes and energy flocked to join the organization both seeking adventure but also motivated by the internationalist rhetoric

of building mutual goodwill through cross-cultural interaction and in-country service.\textsuperscript{30} Since the Peace Corps recruited and trained on U.S. university campuses, this presence heightened the focus on international travel for young people, but it did not provide additional funding for formal study abroad opportunities for undergraduates.

Finally, the International Education Act (IEA) of 1966 (H.R. 14643) was another example of the familiar pattern of amplified interest in international affairs but it provided no financial support or directed initiatives for undergraduate study abroad. Unlike the Fulbright, the NDEA, and the Peace Corps however, the IEA included provisions for funding undergraduate education, with a particular focus on developing instruction for international studies.\textsuperscript{31} The House task force assembled for the IEA included several representatives from U.S. colleges and universities and associated organizations such as the American Council on Education, the American Association of Junior Colleges, and Education and World Affairs.\textsuperscript{32} Included in the task force report for the International Education Act were two reports on study abroad by Irwin Abrams and Stephen Freeman.\textsuperscript{33} These reports focused on undergraduate study abroad and assessed the state of the field in the 1960s. Additionally, the two reports described potential dilemmas of sending undergraduate students overseas to study. Finally, these reports briefly considered how study


\textsuperscript{31} Ellen Gumperz notes that the IEA planned to authorize grants for single institutions to enhance undergraduate education. Moreover, the act proposed the establishment of a National Advisory Committee on International Studies as a part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to offer suggestions for carrying out the provisions of the IEA. This committee was designed to include broad representation of higher education in the U.S. and of relevant “competent non-specialists.” Gumperz, \textit{Internationalizing American Higher Education: Innovation and Structural Change}, Project Title, Curriculum and Organization: Asian and African Studies. p. 65.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid. p. 67.

abroad fit into the larger fabric of international activities. On October 29, 1966, president Lyndon Baines Johnson signed the Act into law at Chulalongkorn University in Thailand; however, as a result of the escalating conflict in Vietnam, the House Appropriations Committee rejected the provision to fund the act. Subsequent efforts to fund the act failed and the IEA was never realized. Thus, like the examples mentioned above, the IEA stimulated the rhetoric around international affairs and higher education, but provided no funding or focused strategy to stimulate overseas study for undergraduates.

**Rationales and Strategies for Expanding the “International Dimension” of U.S. Higher Education in the 1950s and 1960s**

In this context of increasing U.S. federal activity around international matters and higher education, institutions of higher education and private organizations like the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Ford Foundation began sponsoring projects and publications that encouraged American colleges and universities to develop and organize their international activities, including study abroad for undergraduates. Proponents often justified the expansion of international endeavors in American higher education in the name of benefiting the United States, or for the purpose of upholding the academic mission of the sponsoring institution. In these discussions, study abroad never featured prominently. Instead, much of the attention of these private organizations in the 1950s and 1960s focused on why and how colleges and universities should expand other international aspects of U.S. higher education like research, graduate training, foreign student enrollments, or cross-national partnerships. These discussions therefore attempted to establish a more comprehensive vision for the discrete international endeavors on U.S. college and university

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campuses; however, in this vision, undergraduate overseas study occupied a small and somewhat marginal position.

In the immediate years following the Second World War, U.S. colleges and universities engaged in a range of international activities; however, on each campus, different departments and independent academic units led separate activities and referred to their international work in numerous ways. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, discussions about higher education used the following interchangeable terms to describe international work: world affairs, the international domain, international relations, international understanding, and an international dimension. This uncertainty around the term demonstrates the new status and energy around all manner of international endeavors in this period. Regardless of the term used to describe these activities, there was a general sense that there was little organization or coordination amongst the various international endeavors of U.S. university campuses. Beyond this, in most cases, institutions of higher learning maintained very little central administrative oversight over the myriad areas of international engagement. Howard E. Wilson, a professor of education and the assistant director of the office of education at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, summed up the state of affairs for higher education and international activities in 1951 when he wrote:

Universities’ stake in world affairs, and their present, somewhat scattered activities in the field, seem to thrust upon trustees, administrative offices, and faculties of American universities today the need for a careful and thorough analysis of the role of universities in world affairs….What seems needed is an over-all concept of the

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35 The term “international education” was used infrequently, and did not begin appearing with more frequency until the mid 1960s. For example in 1967, John T. Caldwell, Chancellor of North Carolina State University at Raleigh said “‘International education’ is in some respects an awkward phrase which connotes too many different activities, none of which is neatly described.” Cited in: Allan A. Michie, "Higher Education and World Affairs," in *Handbook of College and University Administration*, ed. Asa S. Knowles (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970). p. 3-142.
role of the university in world affairs and a basic policy for utilizing its resources in the widest possible fashion.\textsuperscript{36}

In a general sense, the scattered activities described by Wilson can be grouped into the following areas, \textit{curriculum and instruction}, \textit{student mobility}, \textit{knowledge production} (research for faculty and graduate students), \textit{outreach} (community/adult education), and \textit{university partnerships}.\textsuperscript{37} These are useful organizational categories to conceptualize the range of international work on university campuses in this period, but there was often overlap between activities that could be ascribed to different categories. For example, debates about curriculum and student mobility were not always separated. Additionally, the concerns about knowledge production often permeated several other aspects of university affairs such as outreach, university partnerships, and curriculum and instruction. Despite the overlap, each of the distinct categories described here was also substantial enough on its own to warrant significant and focused attention in the discussions and publications sponsored by private organizations in this period.

Although each of these categories were important areas of focus, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was more important for proponents of the international dimension to offer a compelling rationale for U.S. universities to engage in world affairs in a general sense. To this end, by the end of the 1940s, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and the American Council on Education (ACE) initiated a series of meetings and conferences with representatives from nine different universities to engage in an exploratory study of international activities on U.S. campuses. These meetings allowed interested parties to come together to articulate a shared vision for the international dimension of U.S. colleges


\textsuperscript{37} I offer these categories for organizational purposes.
and universities. Additionally, these meetings paved the way for a series of publications that assessed the state of international affairs in U.S. postsecondary education in the areas of curriculum and instruction, student/faculty mobility, knowledge production, outreach, and university partnerships and offered justifications and strategies for institutions of higher education to engage in this international work. As a result of these meetings, nine publications appeared over the next twelve years as part of a series titled, “Studies in Universities and World Affairs.” From the first publication in 1951 to the last in 1963, there was an evolution of thought concerning the idea of administrating world affairs in colleges and universities. What began as lofty call for universities to survey their international activities in order to engage in world affairs for the benefit of the United States, evolved into a set of recommendations for partnership and central, administrative oversight of various campus international endeavors. Amidst the transition from institutional inventories to entreaties for outside partnerships, study abroad programming rarely featured prominently.

In the first publication of the “Studies in Universities and World Affairs” series, titled *Universities and World Affairs*, Howard E. Wilson’s rhetoric emphasized the need for each U.S. institution of postsecondary education to engage in international activities for the collective benefit of the country. On a grand scale Wilson made the case that all universities

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38 In *The Journal of Higher Education*, Howard Lee Nostrand explained that the conference held June 19 to 22 in Estes Park, Colorado included representatives from colleges, universities, ACE, UNESCO, and many other private, governmental, and intergovernmental agencies. The conference in Colorado was funded by the Hazen Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver. Howard Lee Nostrand, “Colleges in World Affairs,” *The Journal of Higher Education* 20, no. 8 (1949). p.

had something at stake in world affairs and that the functions and purposes of these
institutions had to be mindful of the international dimension. Whether this work involved
curriculum and instruction, knowledge production, outreach, student mobility or
partnerships, Wilson believed that American universities had become, “…inextricably
involved in world affairs…” and that U.S. institutions had a major responsibility for
conceptualizing how these various activities should be coordinated on their campuses.
Wilson’s rhetoric underscored his belief in the capacity of U.S. colleges and universities to
serve the United States and the world. Although Wilson did not advocate for a central
authority to influence individual campuses to take unified action in regards to world affairs,
he felt that all institutions of higher learning shared a responsibility to oppose totalitarian
approaches to government and uphold the freedom to advance and disseminate knowledge.
As he put it, “All aspects of freedom of the mind, on which universities rest their
contribution to human development, are at issue in world affairs today. From that issue no
university can escape without deserting its own basic ethics.” Beyond this, Wilson argued
that since American universities had been partners with the U.S. government in the research
leading to the development of weapons of mass destruction like the atomic bomb, these
same institutions also had to also be “partners in the destruction of possible war” or in the
movement toward peace. In these ways, the Cold War context heavily influenced Wilson’s
rhetoric and outlook for U.S. higher education in the world.

Wilson knew that American colleges and universities were independent institutions
that acted on their own individual missions, but he believed that U.S. institutions could learn

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40 Wilson, *Universities and World Affairs*.
41 Ibid. p. 3.
42 Ibid. p. 6.
43 Ibid. p. 6.
from one another and that a pattern of best practices for international engagement would emerge from independent, systematic inquiry. To understand how a few universities were engaging in international work, eight U.S. colleges and universities (Colgate University, Columbia University, New Jersey State Teachers College at Trenton, the University of Denver, the University of Michigan, the University of Pittsburgh, Vassar College, and Yale University) appointed a representative from their own institution to conduct a survey of their international engagement in ten pre-determined areas during the winter of 1950-51. Although the findings drawn from the surveys and final report were broad and the conclusions were limited, the results of the study stimulated action and discussion as to why and how colleges and universities could incorporate the international dimension into campus life in a more robust way. Wilson drew four broad conclusions from the surveys. First, he concluded that all aspects of international relations should be a concern for every aspect of university life. Next, he argued that every institution surveyed was making great strides with their international work. Third, he found that institutions varied greatly in the ways they coordinated and administered their various international activities. Finally, there was much room for improvement in the administration of international affairs on all university campuses surveyed. Ultimately, Wilson’s conclusions were a launching point for inquiries into the international dimensions of American colleges and universities. As a reviewer of the report explained in the Annals of the American Academy, “…the report marks the beginning.

44 The ACE and CEIP established the following survey categories, “1) Instruction in World Affairs 2) International Relations in General Education 3) Specialized Training in International Relations 4) International Relations in Professional and Technical Education 5) Foreign Students in American Universities 6) American Students Abroad 7) Extracurricular Influences in Education for International Understanding 8) Off-Campus Services of Universities 9) Research in International Relations 10) Faculty Participation in International Relations). Ibid. p. 31.
The questions which remain are more challenging than those answered.” Just as *Universities and World Affairs* generated questions, it also left a blueprint for infusing world affairs into the regular activities of colleges and universities throughout the United States.

Wilson’s plan for transforming the international dimension of U.S. higher education was based on the principle that individual institutional inventories of various international campus activities would stimulate further action in other institutions. At first, the action would occur on an institutional level, as the colleges and universities themselves would change their international activities based on their internal assessments. Over time, Wilson envisioned that there would be wide-scale transformation of all of U.S. higher education. Wilson encouraged colleges and universities to chart their own courses of action in international affairs, and he was careful to avoid making prescriptions for uniform action across all U.S. colleges and universities since he argued that a distinguishing element of American higher education was academic and intellectual freedom. “It is only from the alertness and experience of individual campuses,” Wilson wrote, “that wisdom will emerge in determining the role of universities in world affairs.” Wilson understood that he had no central authority to challenge other U.S. colleges and universities to undertake their own inventories of world affairs activities; instead, he invoked a type of U.S. intellectual chauvinism that pitted U.S. post-secondary education against higher learning in totalitarian regimes. The collective action that Wilson hoped to emerge from various U.S. college and university inventories would have the potential to serve the world and bolster the status of American colleges and universities.

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Following the publication of *Universities and World Affairs* in 1951, sixty U.S. institutions of higher learning undertook their own self-inventories following the guidelines offered in Wilson’s report, and the American Council of Education published the results of many of these surveys in the remainder of the, “Studies in Universities and World Affairs” series. The majority of content in these studies focused on various aspects of curriculum and instruction, knowledge production, outreach, student mobility and institutional partnerships, but the authors of these reports paid very little attention to undergraduate overseas study.

The limited presence of study abroad in this series is an indication of the relatively low status of overseas study for undergraduates in these discussions of world affairs in U.S. higher education. For example in *Foreign Students and Higher Education in the United States* (1956), the discussions of student mobility centered on the experiences of foreign students on U.S. college and university campuses and on institutional polices and practices pertaining to these incoming students.\(^48\) Additionally, *The University, The Citizen, and World Affairs* (1956) addressed the topic of outreach by considering the role institutions could play in educating and supporting the common citizen in, “…his obligation to share the burden of his country’s participation in world affairs.”\(^49\) In 1957, the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver co-sponsored the publication of *Training of Specialists in International Relations*, which focused on knowledge production and graduate instruction at the M.A. and Ph.D. level at U.S. colleges and universities.\(^50\) This publication addressed overseas study, but only in the context of graduate students seeking expertise or training for specific knowledge. *International Relations in Institutions of Higher Education in the South* (1958) and *University Research on International Affairs* (1958) both emphasized knowledge production in developing the

\(^48\) Du Bois, *Foreign Students and Higher Education in the United States*.

\(^49\) Houle and Nelson, *The University, the Citizen, and World Affairs*, p. 2.

\(^50\) C. Dale Fuller, *Training of Specialists in International Relations* ibid. (1957).
international dimensions of higher education. The two publications that appeared in 1959, *World Affairs and the College Curriculum* and *American College Life as Education in World Outlook*, focused on curriculum and instruction in undergraduate education and on various aspects of college life and world affairs including study abroad. More than any of the other publications in this series, the two reports from 1959 saw undergraduate study abroad as a phenomenon worthy of examination in the context of the international dimension of U.S. higher education. The ways in which authors in these last two reports discussed study abroad will be explained below, but it should be noted that overseas study for undergraduate students occupied a very small space in the “Studies in World Affairs” series. Beyond the volumes in this series, in 1957 the Carnegie Corporation sponsored the research of multiple social scientists to produce several additional monographs that evaluated international programs at numerous U.S. institutions of higher education. With the exception of *From Main Street to the Left Bank* and *The Overseas Americans* (which both covered study abroad for undergraduate students at some length), most authors dedicated very little, if any, of their discussions to the topic of overseas study. Taken as a whole, the publications from the 1950s and 1960s demonstrate two important points. First, they illustrate the proliferation of activity in developing the international dimension of American colleges and universities in the post

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World War II decades. Second, they demonstrate the relative lack of importance of undergraduate study abroad as a major element of expanding world affairs in U.S. higher education in this period.

By the beginning of the 1960s, administrators and faculty had moved beyond creating inventories and conducting preliminary assessments of the various international activities of campuses around the United States. In their words and deeds, advocates had demonstrated how college and university campuses were expanding their international activities in the areas of curriculum and instruction, student mobility, knowledge production, outreach, and university partnerships. These international endeavors were often decentralized and not coordinated. On campuses throughout the United States, there were departments and units that excelled in various international practices, but they often worked separately from other offices on the same campus that were also involved in international work. Additionally, given the growing number of international activities on U.S. campuses, administrators increasingly saw a need for agencies outside of U.S. higher education to share the responsibility for engaging in world affairs in ways that would serve the needs of multiple constituents. Study abroad programming continued to be a marginal aspect of these conversations, but as student demand drove growth, the small cadre of study abroad proponents began to voice their concerns about unregulated growth and they too sought partnership and organization as a means to overcoming their own challenges. Thus, an important aspect of rhetoric that emerged in the 1960s was a more robust approach to engaging in world affairs on U.S. campuses that called for more outside partnerships and internal, administrative coordination.

By the end of the 1950s, advocates of international work in higher education saw a need to establish partnerships with outside public and private organizations with similar
international objectives. In 1959, for example, the Ford Foundation established a new committee of representatives from foundations, universities, government and business at the request of the U.S. Department of State to conduct another broad assessment of the international dimensions of U.S. universities. This committee published one report under the title *The University and World Affairs: Report of the Committee on the University and World Affairs.*

The report, commonly referred to as the “Morrill Report” after the name of the committee chair, James Lewis Morrill, argued that several distinct U.S. institutions outside the university ought to also contribute to enhancing a variety of aspects of World Affairs in post-secondary education. According to the Morrill Report, governments (state and local), foundations, and private enterprise all needed to play a role in making world affairs a higher priority in education and increasing resources for these endeavors. The rhetoric of the report emphasized the need for collaboration between higher education and outside institutions for the collective benefit of the nation.

Universities have a major role to play in world affairs, but they cannot play it alone. The application of the principles of free inquiry by the universities in the world arena requires a cooperative effort among all the relevant elements of each society—universities, government, business, the foundations—and among all the societies concerned.

The Morrill Report also called for the creation of a new independent organization to promote, strengthen, and assess the various educational needs in leadership and

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55 J.L. Morrill had been president of the University of Minnesota from 1945 to 1960. Stanford E. Lehmburg and Ann M. Plauf, *The University of Minnesota, 1943-2000* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). The other members of the Committee on the University and World Affairs included: Harold Boeschenstein, President, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation; Harvie Branscomb, Chancellor, Vanderbilt University; Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; J.W. Fulbright United States Senator; John W. Gardner, President, Carnegie Corporation of New York; Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, The University of California at Los Angeles; Philip D. Reed, Former Chairman of the Board, General Electric Company; Dean Rusk, President of the Rockefeller Foundation. Affairs, *The University and World Affairs: Report of the Committee on the University and World Affairs.*
56 *The University and World Affairs: Report of the Committee on the University and World Affairs.*
57 Ibid. p. 46.
administration in the arena of world affairs, while also serving as an advisory liaison between the federal government and colleges and universities in international matters. In conjunction with their recommendations for outside support, the Morrill Report also encouraged U.S. colleges and universities to continue to make their own thoughtful assessments of their role in these endeavors so as not to be unduly influenced by outside groups like the federal government. The Morrill Report was especially concerned that the federal government might demand too much of universities or that “the government might seek to turn universities into agents of foreign policy.”  

In general, the Morrill Report saw the task of expanding the international dimensions of colleges and universities in the 1960s as “formidable” and “demanding” because it called for institutions to offer “imaginative new approaches” to “serve the worldwide concerns of scholarship and nation.”

To address this “formidable” task, proponents in the 1960s called for centralized administration and long-term strategic direction of international endeavors on U.S. campuses. For example, the Morrill Report called for a central administrative unit that could focus on a “long-range, university-wide approach” to meet the “total complex of substantive activities and administrative arrangements in the international field.” Additionally, in the final publication of the “Studies in Universities and World Affairs” series, *American Higher Education and World Affairs*, Howard E. Wilson and his wife Florence H. Wilson co-authored a volume in 1963 that focused on institutional policies, administrative organization, and the roles, responsibilities, and limitations for U.S. colleges and universities in relation to world affairs. They encouraged each and every university to develop an “institutional structure,”

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58 Ibid. p. 83.  
59 Ibid. p. 15.  
60 Ibid. p. 34.  
in the form of a dedicated office or active committee, to oversee and coordinate the institution’s international undertakings. Finally, in 1962, Edward W. Weidner of Michigan State University also called for universities to consider institution-wide, long-term, approaches to the management of international activities. In his comprehensive study of the international endeavors of several U.S. universities called *The World Role of Universities* Weidner criticized the short-term, ad hoc nature of international endeavors.⁶² Weidner argued that U.S. universities had not developed long-term strategies in their overseas international engagement and instead, U.S. institutions of higher education, “…lacked a fundamental philosophy, a fundamental relevance to the university and its objectives.”⁶³ Given this rudderless agenda, Weidner encouraged colleges and universities to adopt long-term strategies and establish criteria for international engagement in ways that were relevant to the institution’s mission. Weidner maintained the position that, “No institution of higher learning can afford to be isolationist if it is to be true to its name as a university.”⁶⁴ With his call for U.S. universities to engage in international endeavors, Weidner emphasized thoughtful strategy, long-range planning, and specific and prioritized objectives at the institutional level.

These multiple calls for direction emphasize the pressure many universities were under to respond to federal and economic forces compelling international engagement. This response was not simply a matter of patriotism, but also a matter of patronage and long-term prosperity. As Rebecca Lowen has demonstrated, Stanford became a model for strategy and partnerships between research universities and federal sources of patronage. She explained

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⁶³ Ibid. p. 288.
⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 313.
that at Stanford, “A new set of values and relations were being institutionalized in the university at the close of World War II to enable the university to take advantage of an expected outpouring of patronage after the war.”\textsuperscript{65} Stanford transformed much of its internal administration to serve the needs of these patrons, and in a similar way, these calls for central coordination of international activities were also mindful of these important areas of collaboration. Thus, institutions of higher learning within the United States sought ways to bring order to the myriad of new international projects that adhered to university objectives in ways that could also support lucrative partnerships in the Cold War era.

Recommendations for outside help and centralized, long-term, campus-specific strategies for international affairs continued throughout the 1960s. In fact, as a result of the Morrill Report’s suggestion for the creation of an independent organization to advise and assess ongoing international endeavors, the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York funded the establishment of a private, non-profit organization called Education and World Affairs (EWA) in 1962.\textsuperscript{66} The EWA selected Carnegie Corporation officer William W. Marvel as the organization’s president, and the organization produced numerous reports throughout the 1960s. In 1965, Education and World Affairs published a report titled, *The University Looks Abroad: Approaches to World Affairs at Six American Universities.*\textsuperscript{67} Marvel concluded the report with a list of issues for every institution of higher education to consider in light of incorporating an international dimension into its ongoing

\textsuperscript{65} Lowen, *Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford*, p. 88.


\textsuperscript{67} The universities studied in the report were: Stanford University, Michigan State University, Tulane University, the University of Wisconsin, Cornell University, and Indiana University, Bloomington. Education and World Affairs, *The University Looks Abroad: Approaches to World Affairs at Six American Universities, a Report* (New York: Walker, 1965).
activities. The report acknowledged that because of the great diversity of institutional missions and types, “Each institution must arrive at its own objectives, its own commitments, its own policies, its own depth of immersion in the international field, its own organizational arrangements to achieve order in its international activities.” Like others, EWA advocated for international activities to be coordinated across the entire institution and to strive for goals in international education that were consistent with the aims of the university. To achieve these aims, EWA advocated for strong leadership; financial and intellectual commitment to international activities; constant feedback and program assessment; and a thoughtful approach to curriculum and instruction, student mobility, knowledge production, outreach, and university partnerships.

By 1970, these recommendations for central administrative organizations were often institutionalized in the form of a new campus unit often referred to as the international office. International offices attempted to bring administrative order to the disjointed chaos of different international campus activities that had blossomed over the 1950s and 1960s. Not every institution had an international office, and every office took a slightly different form. As the director of the office of publications for EWA put it in a chapter in the *Handbook of College and University Administration* in 1970, “Reflecting the diversity of U.S. higher education, each campus seems to have mirrored something of its own character in the type of structure it had devised to administer its international programs.” Thus, certain campuses had small single-staffed offices while others had larger units with larger staffs. On a national level, there was a rising need for professionals who worked exclusively in areas under the umbrella of world affairs. The foreign student advisor, for example began as a

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68 Ibid. p. 266.
part-time position taken up by faculty interested in serving the needs of their international students, but as the number of international students increased, so did the need for full-time professionals. In 1948, at the Conference on International Student Exchanges in Ann Arbor, Michigan, the National Association of Foreign Student Advisors was established to support the growing number of professionals who worked with international students.\textsuperscript{70} In its early years, NAFSA made a conscious decision to focus its activities on professionals who worked with foreign students; however, in 1963, the organization established a small sub-committee for administrators who specialized in preparing American undergraduate students for overseas study. Despite this sub-committee, as William Hoffa notes in his \textit{A History of U.S. Study Abroad}, from its inception until the 1970s, NAFSA did not make study abroad professionals “feel included” within the organization.\textsuperscript{71} The calls for central administration of international activities, partnerships, and long-term strategies were at least partially realized in the adoption of the international office and the development of professional organizations like NAFSA. These developments demonstrated the extent to which international activities at U.S. colleges and universities had blossomed to the point of necessitating an administrative unit on many campuses and a corresponding professional organization for individuals working in this domain. By the beginning of the 1970s it was also clear that study abroad occupied a small, but relatively unimportant place in these international developments in U.S. higher education.

\textbf{Growth from the Margins: Undergraduate Study Abroad Within the International Dimension of U.S. Higher Education}


\textsuperscript{71} Hoffa, \textit{A History of Us Study Abroad: Beginnings--1965}, 1st. p. 223.
Although study abroad was not a primary mechanism for enhancing the international capacity of American colleges and universities, student demand for travel stimulated growth in overseas study in ways that worried a small group of professionals. The small group of study abroad advocates feared that external commercial efforts to meet the student market for overseas travel ran the risk of undermining the legitimacy of overseas study. Although these proponents were mindful of the expanding international dimension of higher education in the larger sense, they concentrated their attention mostly on the pressing matters associated with growth. The general pattern of the discussions about undergraduate study abroad focused on: describing the many types of programs available and documenting the growing interest among students in study abroad; discussing the challenges of overseas study for administrators and students; and posing questions about topics such as the appropriate length of stay, student age to travel, destination, and level of immersion. Finally, as will be mentioned in greater detail in the next chapter, in light of the worries about unregulated growth, proponents endorsed rigorous academic rationales, careful U.S. institutional control, and strict rules for selecting students for overseas study.

Perhaps, since student demand drove much of the growth in study abroad, the tone of the rhetoric about overseas study in this period was one of cautious optimism in the potential of a burgeoning, yet somewhat haphazard, practice. As Howard E. Wilson explained in 1956, some of the on-campus study abroad programs that emerged from 1945 to 1955, which were led by faculty or university affiliated personnel, were financially mismanaged, left students stranded in Europe, or “…failed to achieve worthy educational results…” However] In spite of all these fumblings, false starts, and ludicrous and unwarranted enterprises, the full story of student travel in the postwar decade is an
encouraging one.”\textsuperscript{72} In a separate report on overseas campus activities, Education and World Affairs found that some administrators believed that study abroad could be an “integral part of an undergraduate education,” however others worried that overseas study programs were little more than touristic endeavors.\textsuperscript{73} Additionally, in the opening lines of its section on study abroad, the Morrill Report wrote, “There are risks in the growing enthusiasm for undergraduate academic programs abroad. If a student’s foreign experience has been badly articulated with the rest of his undergraduate work, he might better have stayed at home-or travelled as a tourist.”\textsuperscript{74} In a chapter on “Foreign Study at the Undergraduate Level” in a publication on \textit{America’s Emerging Role in Overseas Education} by Syracuse University, John Clarke Adams spoke about the “bewildering dissymmetry” between the educational quality of the “mushrooming” number of emerging study abroad programs.\textsuperscript{75} Adams observed that undergraduate study abroad programs had little consistency or uniformity. In an article appearing in \textit{The French Review} in 1966, language instructor Theodore Rupp expressed his apprehension about the “sudden proliferation” of “organized study abroad” programs and explained that the result of several years of “largely uncontrolled” growth was the development of some “good programs,” “…and, in the absence of any accrediting agency, a large number of shoddy ones, whose chief requirement for admission appears to be the ability to pay the cost.”\textsuperscript{76} In the absence of such a governing agency to overview the boom in dubious study abroad programs, Rupp encouraged institutions to consider their own evaluation criteria. Rupp’s worries about the lack of regulation, and the observations of

\textsuperscript{72} Wilson, \textit{American College Life as Education in World Outlook}. p. 150.
\textsuperscript{73} Affairs, \textit{The University Looks Abroad: Approaches to World Affairs at Six American Universities, a Report}. p. 274.
\textsuperscript{74} Affairs, \textit{The University and World Affairs: Report of the Committee on the University and World Affairs}. p. 19.
numerous others regarding the boom in study abroad, demonstrate the overriding concern about unhindered growth in undergraduate overseas study in the 1960s.

In response to the widespread fears that study abroad had grown out of control and that there were too many substandard non-university programs, the Carnegie Corporation of New York provided a grant to establish the Consultative Service on U.S. Undergraduate Study Abroad in 1963. The stated purpose of the Consultative Service was threefold. First, it aimed to serve as a national clearinghouse for information about study abroad, including articles, announcements, descriptions, or evaluations of any type of study abroad program available to undergraduates from the junior year abroad to summer study. Next, the service offered to publish information about the academic environment of other countries to inform U.S. students of “favorable or unfavorable” situations for undergraduate student learning. Finally, the Consultative Service provided advice for U.S. colleges and universities who were interested in establishing or reviewing their own study abroad programs. On the final point, the Consultative Service made it clear that it did not see itself as an “accrediting agency” but rather,

Through the publication of objective information, and the impartial search for definitions of what constitutes high quality in foreign study, the aim of the service is to assist and encourage the institutions themselves to work toward higher standards and greater effectiveness, through self evaluation and co-operation.  

In the same way then that the larger reports about world affairs and U.S. higher education encouraged each individual institution to evaluate its own needs and establish its own parameters for success, so too did the Consultative Service encourage colleges and universities to define their own objectives in study abroad. In this way, the Consultative Service could not provide the central regulation and oversight that many proponents sought

77 Freeman, Undergraduate Study Abroad, U.S. College-Sponsored Programs; Report of the Consultative Service on U.S. Undergraduate Study Abroad.
for overseas study programs; however, it did demonstrate the degree to which this issue of proliferation weighed on the minds of study abroad advocates.

**Conclusion**

Study abroad for undergraduate students was a part of the larger policy discussions about world affairs on U.S. university campuses, but was never a dominant area of focus. Perhaps, some of the reasons for the marginalization of undergraduate study abroad from the core discussions of international activity on university campuses can be found in Rebecca Lowen’s findings about the development of Stanford as a major research university during the Cold War. Lowen demonstrated how in its pursuit of patronage and partnerships with foundations and the federal government, Stanford focused on research and Ph.D. training. In this period, undergraduate students at Stanford became the “...neglected segment of the postwar university's population.”[78] In a similar way, in the larger discussions of the international dimension, undergraduate study abroad was never a dominant area of focus. Still, undergraduate student demand prompted growth in new study abroad programs in this period, but federal policy and amplified rhetoric around the international elements of U.S. higher education failed to provide funding or oversight for undergraduate study abroad. Despite the additional spotlight on study abroad during this period from discussions about increasing the international dimension of U.S. higher education, the larger focus for colleges, universities and the federal government was on research, graduate studies, creation of expert knowledge, and overseas aid projects for developing nations. All of these other areas of higher education siphoned away financial resources and focus on undergraduate study abroad. Advocates for study abroad thus had to face growth from the margins of these

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international discussions without the benefit of institutional administrative support or federal funding.

In the discussions about the emerging international dimension of U.S. higher education, the following process emerged. First, in the 1950s, there was a period of conducting surveys and mapping the terrain of international activity on U.S. university campuses. These inventories cataloged the areas of curriculum and instruction, student mobility, knowledge production, outreach, and university partnerships. These inventories demonstrated the extent to which universities had developed their myriad international activities especially in the areas of knowledge production and partnerships. Following a decade of inventories and assessment of international activities, administrators in U.S. higher education began to call for outside partnerships with private and public organizations to develop international capacity. The tenor of the discussions on the international activities of colleges and universities in the 1960s continued to be concerned with growing international engagements and federal involvement, but campus administrators also began to look beyond the ivory tower to private organizations and foundations for help in engaging in world affairs. To manage the new range of activities, proponents called for central coordination of all international endeavors on a campus under a single administrative unit. By the 1970s, several institutions had adopted international offices to fill this administrative need.

During these decades, study abroad emerged as a small and developing aspect of world affairs that existed on the periphery of college and university campuses. Although proponents of expanding international affairs at colleges and universities never considered study abroad as a major mechanism for achieving greater engagement, they often included overseas study as an area of potential in this domain. Within study abroad, student demand for travel continued to stimulate the addition of new programs in the 1950s and 1960s.
Given this expansion, the discussions about study abroad focused on the functional aspects of managing new and existing programs. Under these conditions of proliferation, consternation over growth, and minimal national interest, overseas study programs multiplied with multi-faceted aims. Throughout the 1960s, study abroad proponents worried about the inconsistent quality of these programs and their unregulated growth. The next chapter considers how study abroad proponents attempted to set standards for overseas study to mitigate the fears about growth by emphasizing academic rationales, institutional control, and the selectivity of students.
INTRODUCTION:

In this chapter, I demonstrate how study abroad proponents in the 1960s shifted their attention away from promotional rhetoric regarding the rationales of study abroad to focus on ways to legitimize overseas study in the face of unregulated growth and criticism. Despite study abroad’s position within the larger framework of international endeavors, proponents had established overseas study for undergraduates as a worthwhile endeavor on university campuses by the 1960s, so many of the challenges and issues they faced focused more on administration and less on justification. In this period study abroad advocates began to lobby for standards in overseas study based on three general principles: academic quality, student selectivity, and U.S. institutional control. These three principles influenced the shape of study abroad for the remainder of the century, but would have unintended consequences in the 1980s and 1990s. Before elaborating on these consequences, it is important to describe the push for standards. First, proponents amplified the need for clear academic objectives in study abroad to demonstrate that overseas study would not conflict with the educational missions of colleges and universities. Next, proponents reinforced the idea that study abroad was an elite endeavor by advocating for extreme selectivity of students for all programs. Third, advocates stressed the importance of U.S. institutional control over programs thereby establishing the ideal conditions for academic gains and the development of cross-national understanding. By invoking these three principles in their rhetoric, advocates aimed to bring order to the motley assortment of programs and to silence critics by emphasizing that study abroad was an elite academic endeavor that upheld the core educational objectives of
colleges and universities in the United States. In the process of suggesting standards, proponents solidified the place of study abroad in U.S. higher education and established the conditions necessary to maintain the development of study abroad in a way that aligned itself with the core academic aims of colleges and universities. Although most advocates focused on academic objectives in this period, the aim of cross-national understanding in study abroad did not completely vanish; instead, proponents debated about the controversial notion of the U.S. undergraduate student as a goodwill ambassador to the world. Although some individuals supported this idea as a means of promoting study abroad, others rejected the goodwill ambassador idea for fear that it would introduce propagandistic elements into the undergraduate student experience.

The Push for Standards: Academic Focus, Selectivity, and Control

Advocates for study abroad initiated a push for standards as a response to growth and to mounting criticisms of overseas study for undergraduates by educators at American and European universities. In an article that appeared in *The Journal of Education* in 1962, Paul Weaver noted that the critiques of study abroad in the 1960s had been echoing within academia for over a decade.\(^1\) Weaver noted the following broad criticisms of undergraduate overseas study. First, critics suggested that the activities of American students abroad often undermined the goal of cross-national understanding. Rather than stimulating mutual goodwill, the acts of certain American students abroad “decreased international understanding and stimulated resentment.”\(^2\) Weaver noted that, in extreme cases, the actions of young Americans who displayed arrogance and rude behavior undermined the goal of mutual understanding by agitating people in the host nation in ways that invoked the

\(^1\) Paul Weaver, "Study Abroad and General Education," *The Journal of General Education* 13, no. 4 (1962).
\(^2\) Ibid. p. 244.
archetypical “Ugly American.” Next, European host institutions complained that American students were not academically and culturally prepared to succeed in European institutions. These critiques suggested that American students did not have the language or disciplinary background in European history and culture to understand the coursework or communicate effectively. Moreover, European hosts claimed that American students were also not aware of the cultural subtleties of living in Europe and interacting with European people, and therefore they were prone to regular social faux pas leading to misunderstandings. In a retrospective analysis of American overseas study programs published by the Council on International Educational Exchange (CIEE) from 1987, John Bowman offered a series of popular criticisms from administration and faculty of U.S. colleges and universities in the 1960s. Bowman noted that on the administrative side, registrars were suspicious of accepting foreign credits, while academic deans were “reluctant” to provide credit for courses taken abroad, which were not under their oversight. Bowman explained that some faculty argued that instruction was better on the home campus than abroad. Finally, some language faculty were concerned about the declining number of students enrolled in language courses on campus due to an increase in taking language credits abroad. Thus, in broad terms, those who criticized study abroad questioned the preparation of students, the administrative hurdles of processing credits, the impact of missing students on the home campus, and the academic quality of programs.

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3 In a reference to the 1958 Eugene Burdick novel, *The Ugly American*, Weaver wrote, “None of us wishes to send a youthful edition of the Ugly American abroad.” Ibid.
4 Ibid. p. 245.
5 Bowman, “Educating American Undergraduates Abroad: The Development of Study Abroad Programs by American Colleges and Universities.”
6 Ibid. p. 10.
Clarity of Objectives and Academic Focus

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, there was little coordination between U.S. institutions of higher education about what types of objectives should be in place for study abroad in terms of the educational outcomes or institutional goals. Indeed, since study abroad programs emerged independently, there was little consensus in the objectives or academic focus of the myriad programs. In an attempt to guide future program designers, and to respond to criticism about the academics of overseas study, proponents in the late 1950s began assembling together to establish collective standards for the field. In these conversations, the discourse of administrators in higher education emphasized the critical importance of clear academic objectives for study abroad over all other objectives.

One of the first meetings to set standards took place in South Hadley, Massachusetts at Mount Holyoke College in January 1960. A committee of individuals from the Association of American Colleges, the Council on Student Travel, the Experiment in International Living and the Institute of International Education compiled a list of relevant participants to invite to the conference. The invitation to the meeting underscored the fears of illegitimacy and unrestrained growth. It urged conference participants “to provide long-needed guidance in an increasingly chaotic field,” because, “We run a serious risk that, through ignorance, misdirection, and sheer rapidity of growth, American education overseas may suffer serious harm in the very near future.”7 The attendees of the conference included representatives from colleges with long-running overseas study programs, members of the IIE and Council on the Junior Year Abroad, individuals from the Association of American Colleges, the Experiment in International Living and the Council on Student Travel, and representatives

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from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Several university presidents were in attendance and a small group of educators from abroad were also present. With funding from the Ford Foundation, the conference was held from January 14-16, 1960. The title of the conference, “Academic Programs Abroad: An exploration of their assets and liabilities” set the tone for the three-day proceedings.

Participants of the Mount Holyoke conference focused their work on identifying the major problems and primary benefits of semester- or year-length study abroad programs for undergraduates. Although the conference identified many problems with study abroad, the emerging theme of the conference and the principal concern of the Mount Holyoke Group was the varying level of academic consistency and the lack of educational objectives of the different programs. According to the group, “Many programs are not representative of serious higher education in the United States; some do not reflect the standards of the sponsoring American school; others approve and give academic credit for what is in effect an unsupervised Wanderjahr.” This statement demonstrated the concern of many who worried that offering academic credit for touristic wanderings would undermine the legitimacy of the entire overseas study endeavor. The conference attendees suggested that many of the problems with study abroad were often the result of a lack of explicit educational aims.

The attendees made several recommendations to improve overseas study

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10 The conference focused on credit-bearing programs only, and only “incidentally” considered summer programs. Ibid. p. 5.
11 Ibid. p. 7.
12 The proceedings for the conference highlighted 19 separate problem areas for undergraduate overseas study, but not all were directly related to academic objectives. The following is a summary of the problems identified at the conference: 1) lack of sufficient information about programs 2) false advertising of programs 3) duplication of programs 4) programs as faculty pet projects 5) Uneven curricula 6) appropriate program length and year of study 7) Location 8) overcrowding 9) inadequate overseas facilities 10) level of academic supervision 11) evaluation of foreign credentials 12) level of foreign language requirements for students 13)
for undergraduates, and they urged each and every institution to, “...define and state clearly its educational goals and objectives, the age levels it wishes to consider, the size of the program, the needs the program will serve, and how the program’s objectives are related to the objectives of the institution itself, and to the objectives of the host institution.”

Although there were few areas of agreement over how best to establish these educational objectives, the conference attendees were in accordance with their message of the need for clear academic objectives.

Study abroad advocates at the Mount Holyoke conference adopted a strategy to emphasize academic quality and educational objectives over all other aims of overseas study. In a general sense, the focus on academics diminished the rhetoric around cross-national understanding, but attendees did articulate a slightly expanded vision for cross-national understanding at the conference when they agreed that study abroad programs could “further national interest by producing a significant number of Americans with foreign area and language experience.”

Despite this slightly new vision for cross-national understanding, participants did not emphasize the role of study abroad in service to the nation, or as an instrument of international goodwill; instead, the conference proceedings indicated that, “Basically, the group agreed that academic programs may be valid and desirable both from the point of view of education per se and in fostering better international understanding and relations.”

In their recommendations for colleges and universities pursuing study abroad, the participants did not stress the aim of generating “international understanding;” rather, they focused on suggestions that considered the administration, leadership, logistics, 

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selection of students 14) selection of faculty leadership 15) commercial encroachment on programs 16) problems for students with readjustment to life in the United States 17) lack of scholarships 18) assessing levels of total immersion. 19) overall assessment and evaluation of program outcomes. Ibid. p. 12-16.

13 Ibid. p. 16.
14 Ibid. p. 21.
15 Ibid. p. 21.
assessment, and above all else, academics of study abroad programs. Given their fears of out-of-control growth, and the potential for academically anemic programs to torpedo the legitimacy of overseas study programs for undergraduates, the attendees at the conference adopted a strategy that emphasized the academic aspects of study abroad above the professional, developmental, or cross-national understanding aims. The strategy also helped defend against outside critics who suggested that instruction at home was better than abroad.

At the Mount Holyoke conference, attendees decided that there had been no strong conclusions from their discussions, and that further meetings were necessary to continue exploring the many challenges facing overseas study. In October 1960, the Association of American Colleges, the Council on Student Travel, the Experiment in International Living, and the Institute of International Education again invited higher education leaders to discuss the development of academic programs overseas. With funding from the Danforth Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Hazen Foundation and the Corning Glass Educational Foundation, nearly 500 educators convened to examine existing overseas studies programs, and provide guidance for those who sought to develop future programs. The National Conference on Undergraduate Study Abroad picked up where the Mount Holyoke conference left off in terms of establishing an educational priority for study abroad. In the first point of a twelve-point summary of the conference proceedings, Middlebury College president, Stephen A. Freeman, emphasized academic concerns above all others in study abroad by writing, “The conference has gone to the root of the matter in demanding first of all that each program clearly define its objectives. The first point of the conference

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16 For detailed list of other recommendations see: ibid. p. 16-20
achievements is the definition of the educational objective of every program.”¹⁷ Freeman stressed that each institution had to determine its own educational objectives, which could fall under broad categories such as “general education,” “intensive” language or cultural studies, or other “particular” aspects of the student’s field of studies. In each of these categories, the student’s academic goals and the goals of the program should be aligned with the institution. Freeman was also very explicit about separating the aim of cross-national understanding from the academic objectives of a program. He wrote, “International understanding as generally interpreted is an institutional and a national objective rather than an objective of the individual student.”¹⁸ In this way, the educators at this conference made a conscious effort to encourage each institution to clearly and specifically articulate the academic goals of each study abroad program.

Attendees also stressed the academic rationale of study abroad to legitimize study abroad. Conference participants were worried about the unregulated growth of new programs, and they felt a need to bolster the value of study abroad programs by emphasizing the importance of academics. In this push to establish legitimacy, the participants at these conferences underscored the need for academic objectives in all programs at the expense of other objectives of overseas study that might be deemed frivolous by critics. Conference attendees were clearly worried that there were too many unworthy or nebulous objectives for study abroad that were not tied to educational missions. Increasingly, study abroad programs were seen as added benefits for students or solutions to campus overcrowding. According to Stephen Freeman, the conference participants mentioned “many unworthy objectives” for study abroad including adding programs “because other colleges are doing it” or to “make

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 24.
room for students on the home campus.” Beyond the so-called “unworthy” objectives, Freeman also noted a concern about programs that offered “vague generalities covering the waterfront of everything that might be achieved in a foreign study program.” By calling for all U.S. institutions of higher education to tether their study abroad programs to a clear academic rationale, the conference participants believed this would diminish the negative impact of vague or unworthy goals and establish greater legitimacy.

Stephen Freeman offered an administrative solution for maintaining the academic integrity of study abroad that allowed individual student and institutional needs to be met by introducing the idea of special advisors for overseas study. In an article submitted to the Task Force on International Education for the International Education Act of 1966, Freeman emphasized that overseas study for undergraduate students was a “movement” with “great potential for good,” because, “The proper objectives are education in the deepest sense.” Still, given that there was a potential for unclear objectives to diminish the impact of overseas study, Freeman encouraged institutions to be aware of their academic objectives if they designed their own programs, and to be leery of commercial or dubious “travel-study” plans with ambiguous aims from outside groups. Freeman’s administrative solution to this problem was for each college and university to establish an advisory service with a new administrative position, the study abroad advisor. According to Freeman, the advisor would have influence with the university administration and faculty, and would have the training to assess the variety of new programs for students. Each student would be required to meet

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19 Ibid. p. 24.
22 Ibid. p. 387.
with an advisor prior to departing to assess the student’s academic needs, language qualifications, and practical concerns about the logistics of travel. In short, Freeman envisioned the study abroad advisor as the “official academic anchor at home, and the coordinator of the student’s reentry and reorientation after he returns [emphasis added].” In this way, Freeman advocated for the study abroad advisor to help maintain the academic focus of overseas study for undergraduate students.

Freeman’s suggestion for an academic anchor in the form of a study abroad advisor was partially informed by his fear of non-university, commercial organizations undermining the academic legitimacy of all study abroad programs. Freeman stressed that American colleges and universities had a responsibility to oversee and evaluate all of the credit-bearing overseas study programs. In this realm of responsibility, Freeman made a strong recommendation against any U.S. college or university providing credit for study abroad programs offered by commercial or private (non-university) organizations. These commercial organizations, according to Freeman, were not consistent in their quality in terms of their selection of students and instruction or services provided to students. Beyond this, Freeman worried that profit was a primary motivator for the basis of operation for these programs,

Some will accept enrollment from all comers, from high school students to middle-aged housewives, with no suggestion of selectivity except the payment of a fee. Most of them are primarily concerned with increasing their enrollment, because they make their money or balance their nonprofit budgets on the quantity, not the quality, of their operations.\textsuperscript{24}

Freeman’s rhetoric fell short of condemning all of these organizations, and he offered a caveat that some of these organizations were providing a legitimate service to students who

\begin{footnotes}
23 Ibid. p. 391.  
24 Ibid. p. 391. \end{footnotes}
could not qualify for college/university-sponsored study abroad programs. He also praised certain third-party organizations like the Experiment in International Living and the Council on Student Travel, both of which did not provide programs with the promise of U.S. academic credit. Rather than partnering with potentially dubious organizations, Freeman encouraged partnerships with other colleges and universities as had been done by the Great Lakes Colleges Association, the Indiana Colleges, the Associated Colleges of the Midwest, and the California and Minnesota State Colleges. Freeman was not alone in his fear of commercial agencies subverting the academic project of study abroad. As Irwin Abrams pointed out with regard to granting credit for short-term programs run by third-party travel agencies, “There is little question about the right of travel agencies to operate such tours; but the granting of academic credit for sightseeing can endanger the whole development of educational travel by throwing academic standards into question.” Both Abrams’s and Freeman’s positions against commercial organizations were strategies to uphold the academic integrity of university-led, study abroad programs.

Proponents of study abroad in the 1960s continued to mention the other aims of study abroad; however, they always returned to the primacy of academic objectives. At one of the three conferences on the role of undergraduate overseas study in higher education sponsored by the IIE and the Council on Student Travel in 1966, professor Ivan Stone, director of the World Affairs Center at Beloit College in Wisconsin, offered a list of non-academic objectives of study abroad. Some of these objectives of study abroad were, “to enlarge horizons,” “to prepare students to live in a smaller world,” and “to help the future leaders of American society to ‘understand the nature of the world and of the forces of work

in it.” Although these objectives were mentioned, the conference rapporteur noted that despite the relevance of these objectives, “All institutions concerned with Study Abroad place a very high value on the strictly academic aspects of their programs, for obviously, an academic institution must have academic aims as primary ones.” The challenge for proponents then was not only about establishing the importance of academic objectives, but about assessing academic success in relation to the other, less tangible, objectives of overseas study. As student evaluations presented at the 1966 conference indicated, several students indicated they had valuable total experiences abroad, but they “felt that from a strictly academic viewpoint they might have been better off at home.” Beyond this, many students reported that they did have academically enriching experiences in their host nation; however, since their overseas coursework was not compatible with their home curricula, they would not be able to apply their learning in a formal way to their degree. Other study abroad advocates also echoed these concerns. In their study of six different university approaches to international engagement, Education and World Affairs expressed their apprehension over the lack of assessment of study abroad,

Few universities seem to have systematically or purposefully studied the impact of their study programs abroad on courses and degrees—for instance, how many returning students change their majors because of exposure abroad, or continue into graduate work, or enter international services careers?

These complexities underscored the need for U.S. administrators not only to establish academic objectives, but also to introduce formal ways of assessing study abroad.

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27 Ibid. p. 4.
28 Ibid. p. 20.
The emphasis on the academic objectives in study abroad in the 1960s served the chief purpose of allowing proponents to advance overseas study programs in ways that would not seem contradictory to the educational objectives of higher education. By emphasizing the academic nature of study abroad programs, proponents could distance their own programs from the potentially threatening, commercial, study tours that were crowding the overseas study landscape. They could also justify their programs to faculty colleagues and upper administrators who saw overseas study as a frivolous activity that was ancillary to the core mission of higher education. Since U.S. higher education was defined by its institutional diversity and independent missions, the administrative innovation of a local study abroad advisor at each college or university provided a decentralized way for the academic and curricular alignment to be overseen at each institution. Even when proponents acknowledged other objectives of overseas study, they emphasized the need for clarity of academic goals in each program. Even if the means of evaluating these programs were meager, proponents continued to repeat the claims that academic goals took priority over other objectives.

**Prioritizing Selectivity**

In addition to establishing clear academic objectives for undergraduate overseas study programs, proponents also stressed exclusivity and finding the “right” students for overseas study programs. Just as academic clarity sought to silence critics and solidify legitimacy, the focus on student exclusivity for overseas study aimed to address concerns about the poor preparation of students. This focus on exclusivity coincided with discussions of academic excellence by emphasizing how only the best students should be selected for study abroad. These discussions of selectivity were not entirely distinct from similar concerns in the 1920s and 1930s since administrators at the University of Delaware and
Smith College also emphasized academic excellence and linguistic ability as key standards for their participants, but the discussions of selectivity in this period also placed a strong emphasis on personal maturity in ways that were not as prominent in previous decades. Additionally, as will be described below, this preoccupation with exclusivity also dovetailed with an increasingly contentious element of the cross-national understanding aim in this period, the U.S. student as global ambassador.

At the Mount Holyoke conference in 1960, attendees spent much of their time discussing student exclusivity in study abroad. There, participants agreed that the selection of student participants was an important area of concern that needed further attention. The Mount Holyoke conference members recommended that each institution should dictate the selection criteria for study abroad programs; however, at each institution, the selection process for overseas study should be, “over and above the screening required for usual freshman admission.” In this way, they recommended more stringent requirements for study abroad than even necessary for admission into their own institutions. Beyond this, conference participants worried that students would not have the necessary language skills needed for success, nor would they have the maturity for overseas study. Some faculty suggested that only students with certain majors would benefit from study abroad. For example, Dr. Eugene Adams of Colgate University suggested that overseas study programs were, “of doubtful value for students majoring in the physical sciences…” The Mount Holyoke conference only scratched the surface of the preoccupation with selectivity.

Other advocates of study abroad echoed the sentiments of the Mount Holyoke meetings. For example, in the small section on study abroad in the Morrill Report,

31 Ibid. p. 9.
the committee expressed cautious optimism in the potential for undergraduate study abroad; however, they added, “For highly proficient and seriously motivated students a well-managed academic program overseas can greatly increase their understanding of foreign societies and illuminate the whole undergraduate experience.”32 Thus, even though study abroad did not occupy an extensive portion of this report, the committee’s careful endorsement maintained that study abroad could add value to an undergraduate’s education provided the programs were “well-managed” and only attracted “seriously motivated students.” Additionally, at the National Conference on Undergraduate Study Abroad in Chicago, attendees stressed the importance of only sending the best students abroad, and they strongly discouraged the notion of complete inclusivity or compulsory study abroad for an entire class.33 As Stephen Freeman wrote in his conference notes, “As for criteria of selection: high character, emotional maturity, stability, seriousness of purpose, eagerness to work, dependability for coping with greater freedom and independence of a foreign campus—all these have been wisely mentioned.”34 At the same conference, a professor from the University of Geneva, Jacques Courvoisier, reiterated the critiques of other European hosts who complained that American students were poorly prepared to study in their nations. In Courvoisier’s critique, he also encouraged selectivity by urging American educators to screen students before sending them and to ensure that the students who did travel overseas were: prepared with the adequate language skills of the host nation and “committed to work” and not “come as a university tourist.”35 The reflections of selectivity at the 1966 study abroad conferences were much the same. As the proceedings noted,

34 Freeman as quoted in: ibid. p. 11.
35 Ibid. p. 4.
“There are certain personal qualities which most directors look for in candidates for the program. They like to see evidence of certain seriousness of purpose, a clear connection between the students academic program at home and his plans for work abroad, and a reasonable degree of social and emotional maturity.” These statements went beyond the academic selectivity that had been evident at the Mount Holyoke Conference, and added the elements of personal character and maturity. Collectively these ideas all illustrate the strong emphasis that many U.S. educators placed on selectivity for overseas study in the 1960s.

The rhetoric of selectivity in study abroad programing was apparent at institutions of different sizes. For instance, Ben Euwema wrote that “large” and “complex” institutions would have great difficulty in providing study abroad options relevant to each student’s academic plan; therefore, compulsory programs were “out of the question” at a large university, and a careful selection process was necessary. The issues of selectivity at small colleges developed in both typical and unique ways. For example, David F. Anthony, chairman of the International Studies Committee at Randolph-Macon Woman’s College in Ashland, Virginia, noted that sending students overseas was an idea that had potential; however, he echoed a sentiment shared by many administrators in higher education that revealed his belief that study abroad was an endeavor for only a select few students. Anthony wrote that study abroad was, “…clearly not the best thing for all.” Implicit in Anthony’s words was a worry that certain students did not have the necessary skills to reap the benefits of overseas study. This notion was informed by the belief that the students who would benefit from study abroad often displayed maturity that other students did not.

37 Ibid. p. 10.
Anthony had another worry about student selectivity that he argued was distinct to small colleges. For an institution the size of Randolph-Macon Women’s College (approximately 875 students), sending too many of these students abroad would deprive the home campus of valuable student leadership. As Anthony explained, “One side effect which may have been seldom noted is that students with excellent leadership ability are often inclined to study abroad during junior year because they have both the ability and leadership for it. The rising senior class thereby loses some of its best leadership potential…” Both of Anthony’s concerns underscored a belief that emphasized the elite nature of study abroad at institutions of different sizes. In this often-repeated rhetoric, program administrators emphasized that study abroad programs were only beneficial to certain students. Ben Euwema’s observations of comments from the 1966 study abroad conferences were similar to Anthony’s, “The absence from the campus of a considerable number of students, either a whole class or a carefully selected group of elite students, for an appreciable period of time, could seriously affect the home operation and even campus morale [emphasis added].” Euwema went on to add that at small colleges a critical mass of absent, elite, language students could sufficiently cripple a language department and prevent it from offering courses thereby diminishing faculty morale.

In their articles for the Task Force on International Education in 1966, both of the leading authorities on study abroad, Stephen A. Freeman and Irwin Abrams, expressed the need for exclusivity in study abroad; however, they offered different suggestions for selecting the right students. Freeman declared that each university had a “total” responsibility to properly prepare the “tens of thousands of American students interested in a period of study

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39 Ibid. p. 491.
abroad."\(^4\) In Freeman’s view, the study abroad advisor would help the student make thoughtful choices about which country to travel to, what programs fit within the student’s degree plan, what language requirements were necessary, and how long the student should spend abroad. Although Freeman’s suggestion of the study abroad advisor sought to serve a large number of students and therefore appeared more inclusive, the plan was also devised to save the U.S. institution from the disgrace of sending poor representatives of the United States. As Freeman explained, “We cannot allow an American student to wander blindly into a foreign educational system and discredit our own by his apparent awkwardness and stupidity.”\(^4\) Irwin Abrams was more explicit about his views regarding the selection of students. Abrams wrote that, beyond the obvious prerequisites for students interested in language programs, there was “general agreement” among U.S. administrators that study abroad “participants should be mature and stable, and some colleges specify that they should be qualified to be good ambassadors for their country.”\(^3\) As will be mentioned below, the notion of selectivity overlapped well with the idea that American students could serve as ambassadors for the United States. Unlike Freeman, who proposed an administrative solution to selectivity in the study abroad advisor, Abrams did not come forward with an explicit recommendation. He did note that U.S. administrators had no viable way of determining if a student’s success at home would translate to success abroad. Moreover, he explained, “tests have not yet been devised that can confidently predict good performance under conditions of cross-cultural impact.”\(^4\) Despite having different ideas about how to

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\(^4\) Freeman, "Undergraduate Study Abroad." p. 390.
\(^4\) Ibid. p. 390.
\(^3\) Irwin Abrams, "U.S. Students Abroad," ibid. p. 378.
\(^4\) Ibid. p. 378.
achieve selectivity in study abroad, both Freeman and Abrams reiterated the sentiments of their peers on the need for exclusivity in overseas study for undergraduates.

The rhetoric of elitism in study abroad was pervasive in other arenas where overseas study for undergraduates was discussed. In the meager body of research about study abroad available in the period, the notion of selectivity manifested in different ways. For example in 1958, the president of Sweet Briar College, Anne Gary Pannell commissioned two studies to evaluate the Sweet Briar College Junior Year Abroad by Harvard language professor Francis M. Rogers, and by an educational psychologist from Syracuse University, Robert C. Pace. Pace surveyed 500 people who had studied abroad at either the University of Delaware or the Sweet Briar College junior year in France program from 1923 to 1952 to evaluate various aspects of the program including: quality of housing, teaching, and logistical arrangements; career outcomes; learning outcomes; and life-long demonstration of deeper international understanding. With regard to selectivity, Pace found that the majority of the junior year abroad participants in his study were from families whose economic status was in the $10,000 to $15,000 range. Although the economic status of this group did not differ from the control group, the economic status of the study abroad group was a clear illustration of the elite nature of the students. According to a report from the 1960 U.S.

45 Before the end of the 1950s, there were very few formal assessments of study abroad programs to determine their efficacy. One notable exception to this was a survey (mentioned in Chapter 2 of this dissertation) conducted in 1930 by the IIE. This survey focused on the experiences and employment outcomes of IIE fellowship recipients, including some junior year abroad students, from the 1920s. Hewlett and Connelly, A Decade of International Fellowships: A Survey of the Impressions of American and Foreign Ex-Fellows.

46 Rogers, American Juniors on the Left Bank; an Appreciation of the Junior Year in France. Pace, The Junior Year in France; an Evaluation of the University of Delaware-Sweet Briar College Program.

47 Pace determined that his sample captured roughly 1 out of every 3 students who had studied abroad over the junior year abroad’s thirty-year history. The Junior Year in France; an Evaluation of the University of Delaware-Sweet Briar College Program, p. 8.

48 Ibid. 15.

49 To establish a baseline for his questionnaire about the development of international understanding, Pace surveyed a group of similar students who did not study abroad from the 14 colleges who had sent the most
Bureau of the Census, the median family income in 1958 was $5,100. In his assessment of the same program, Francis Rogers reflected on Pace’s study and asked, “Is the JYF [Junior Year in France] a club for children of the rich?” The high percentage of affluent students on study abroad programs worried Rogers, and so did their institutional affiliations. He noted that of the 806 students who participated on a junior year abroad program on the Sweet Briar plan from 1948/49 to 1957/58, 92 were from Yale, 58 from Mount Holyoke, and 52 from Vassar; however, only 9 were from the University of Wisconsin and 2 from the University of Michigan. Rogers noted that there were some scholarships for the junior year abroad, including the $1,000 award offered by the IIE in the pre-war era, but he also explained that scholarships for the Sweet Briar College program ranged from a total of $1,675 in 1949/50 to a high of $20,770 in 1957/58. Indeed, by 1957/58 from a “fifth to a quarter” of the students on the Sweet Briar College program received some form of financial aid either from Sweet Briar College or from the student’s home institution. Thus, both Pace and Rogers demonstrated the degree to which the junior year abroad was a model of economic and institutional elitism.

In a different way, Edward J. Durnall also emphasized the rhetoric of selectivity in his evaluation of study abroad programs in 1967. Durnall surveyed 56 study abroad programs in 23 different cities. In addition to visiting each program and conducting students to the junior year in France during the post-war years (1948-49 to 1952-53). For more on the control group see: ibid. 9.


51 Rogers, American Juniors on the Left Bank; an Appreciation of the Junior Year in France. p. 25

52 Ibid. p. 25.

53 Rogers noted that the following institutions provided scholarships for the Sweet Briar College group: “Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Cornell, Dartmouth, Davidson, Douglass, Haverford, Mount Holyoke, Princeton, Russell Sage, Sweet Briar, Vassar, Wellesley, Wells, Wellesleyan, Western, Wheaton, and Yale.” Ibid. p. 26.

interviews with students, faculty, and staff, Durnall reviewed the curricula and printed materials for these programs. Durnall evaluated his qualitative evidence to determine the effectiveness of these programs by using part of the framework offered at the Mount Holyoke conference of 1960. Durnall found that, as a result of, “limited staffs, insufficient funds, and vague goals” many of the small U.S. college programs he observed were not successful at integrating academic learning experiences abroad with the U.S. campus curricula.\textsuperscript{55} This problem was compounded by the poor selection of students, whose lack of academic content or language abilities all contributed to a poor learning environment. Durnell explained that there were some institutions that had high standards of selectivity, “but others admitted almost any student with a C average who was not on disciplinary probation.”\textsuperscript{56} Durnall suggested that the pressures to recruit enough students to make a program financial viable were a major factor contributing to the diminishing quality of students. Durnall also argued that the diminished selectivity of students, and the poor quality of many study abroad programs was an indication that the self-regulation of study abroad programs by the institutions themselves was a failed system. Instead, he called for external regulators from regional accrediting agencies to step in and establish criteria for the assessment of undergraduate overseas studies programs. That Durnall used the poor student quality as one of the few examples of the failure of U.S. colleges and universities to self-regulate their programs is yet another indication of the high priority many people placed on student selectivity in study abroad in the 1960s.

\textit{The Pursuit of Ideal Institutional Control: Balancing Conditions for Academics and Cross-national Understanding}

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. p. 451.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. 452.
In addition to emphasizing academic objectives and student selectivity, proponents of overseas study were also concerned about finding the right amount of U.S. administrative control over study abroad programs. In looking at the many different types of study abroad programs that emerged in the post World War II era, advocates for overseas study suggested that the best programs were those where American institutions of higher education demonstrated the ideal amount of control over the design, support, and learning outcomes of the student experience abroad. These discussions suggested that in order for American students to benefit from the immersive experience of living in another country, there needed to be the right amount of deliberate, administrative structure established by U.S. institutions to foster the environment most conducive to academic and cultural acquisition. In this way, advocates did not completely abandon the aim of cross-national understanding in deference to the priority of academic aims in this period. In this pursuit of control, many proponents suggested that the model of the junior year abroad was the gold standard to achieve this balance between academic and cross-national understanding aims. Thus, in their quest for control, proponents sought ways to maintain the academic integrity of study abroad programs while also preserving an aspect of cross-national understanding.

John A. Garraty and Walter Adams best articulated the notion of ideal control in study abroad. In their 1958 study of the activities of U.S. professors and students in Europe, Garraty and Adams argued that all study abroad programs in Europe were designed to “bridge the gap” between U.S. and European systems of higher education to help the U.S. student adjust to life abroad and make the most of the overseas learning opportunities. The ideal situation would place the student in the position to benefit from the European environment and from American educational priorities. Based on their extensive interviews

57 Garraty and Adams, From Main Street to the Left Bank: Students and Scholars Abroad, p. 36.
and site-visits to U.S. programs in Europe, Garraty and Adams established a classification scheme for study abroad. This scheme emphasized striking the right balance between maintaining the ideal amount of control over programs and still allowing the student to experience the people, customs and culture of the host nation. In their scheme, the ideal amount of control would provide the student with a robust academic experience and an opportunity to develop cross-national understanding.

Garraty and Adams determined that all study abroad programs for American undergraduates fell into three general categories. Each of these categories was determined by the degree of administrative control and support of the home U.S. institution. The first was the one-to-one “inter-university student exchange,” where a very small number of students would be sent from a U.S. institution to study directly in a European university and vice versa. The amount of U.S. administrative support in this model was limited to an initial agreement between the U.S. and European institutions of higher learning. Besides the initial agreement between the two universities, the student received little support, and the U.S. institution had no control over the student’s academic experience. The next program type in this taxonomy was the “Junior Year” where an American university provided much more structure for the American student in Europe, but the American students still were able to live with host families, and study in classes with Europeans. Garraty and Adams did not apply the term ‘junior year’ strictly since they categorized programs that included sophomores and graduate students in this broad program type. These researchers defined the “junior year” model more by the amount of U.S. academic oversight than by the year in which the student studied. Finally, Garraty and Adams suggested the term “branch system”

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58 Ibid. p. 36.
59 Ibid. p. 38.
for those U.S. institutions that tightly controlled the curriculum and instruction of their study abroad programs in ways well beyond the “inter-university student exchange” and “junior year.” In the “branch system,” the U.S. university controlled the academic curriculum, provided the instruction in the form of American teachers, and taught in English. According to Garraty and Adams, the “branch system” was essentially an “…American school in a foreign land” that placed “…the smallest possible strain on the student’s ability to adjust…”60 In each of these three types then, the extent of the U.S. college or university’s control over the student’s cultural adjustment to life overseas moved from miniscule in the “inter-university student exchange” to dominant in the “branch system.”61

Underlying Garraty and Adams’ categorization scheme of U.S. study abroad programs was their assumption that some control and support was necessary by the home institution in order for the student to derive the most benefits from overseas study. Although, Garraty and Adams discussed the institutional and individual rationales for studying abroad, the authors were more concerned about the issue of control with their classification scheme. The two authors expressed a belief that the most important aspect of establishing a program was the home institution’s need for programs to provide enough structure to offer their students the necessary conditions for “serious intellectual work, work of a degree and amount at least equal to what is demanded of him on an American campus.”62 Garraty and Adams argued that some degree of assistance would benefit all students. As they explained, “While the best American undergraduates can profit from unassisted attendance at the European universities, it seems clear that the average-to-good

60 Ibid. p. 39.
61 According to Garraty and Adams, Johns Hopkins established the first branch campus at the University of Bolgna during the war for graduate students. Stanford created the first undergraduate branch campus in the summer of 1958 in Stuttgart, Germany. At these campuses, the curriculum, instructors, teaching style and students were all managed in the style of the home institution in the United States. Ibid. p. 39.
62 Ibid. p. 190.
student needs some sort of support and guidance and even the top-flight can benefit from
the same." Although the “branch system” provided extensive assistance to the student,
according to these researchers, this type of program went too far with its support because it
isolated U.S. students from their host nation. As Garraty and Adams explained,
“Unfortunately, the branch idea has not yet been adequately tested, but any branch has grave
inherent weakness to overcome. An American island in a foreign sea, it suffers the
disadvantage of insularity.” In the ideal middle of this spectrum of control and support was
the junior year model. As Garraty and Adams explained, the junior year abroad was a
compromise between full immersion (without support) and complete isolation (with total
support) that was worth endorsing. As they wrote, “The Junior Year movement is growing
and its growth should be encouraged.” Thus, although they found a range of academic
quality in the specific junior year programs they evaluated, Garraty and Adams argued that
the junior year model provided the right “balance” of administrative control and
independent immersion to provide students with the necessary conditions for learning.

The IIE also weighed in on the importance of U.S. institutional control for
preserving academic integrity and cross-national understanding. In 1957, the IIE surveyed all
American institutions of higher education to determine the total number of undergraduates
studying abroad in the 1956-57 school year. In the report, the Executive Vice President,

63 Ibid. p. 191.
64 Ibid. p. 191.
65 Ibid. p. 193.
66 In particular, Garraty and Adams suggested that the junior year abroad, despite its shortcomings, was an ideal
model for improved language skills. For more on language see
67 The IIE sent the survey to 1,298 U.S. institutions of higher education, and received 688 responses (291
institutions responded that they did not allow undergraduates to study abroad; 32 institutions did not allow
study abroad but were considering a change in the policy, and 365 institutions either allowed their students to
receive credit on approved programs, or sponsored their own form of overseas study. The IIE found that
2,530 undergraduate students studied abroad in the 1956-57 school year. Foreign Study for U.S. Undergraduates: A
Donald J. Shank, warned U.S. colleges and universities that establishing a program was a considerable challenge because, “An effective program requires careful advance study of all that is involved educationally, financially, and even politically.”68 With regard to the educational objectives, Shank wrote that “Foreign study for U.S. undergraduate should be honest education.”69 He encouraged institutions to ask questions like, “Is the conducted ‘grand tour’ to be accepted as a substitute for a year of undergraduate study? Or is undergraduate study overseas to be an organized part of the curriculum with advance preparation, substantive content and realistic evaluation of results.”70 Shank urged all institutions planning to design study abroad programs to consider these questions and to take full responsibility for the planning and administration of their overseas study plans. Although Shank did not explicitly endorse the junior year abroad as an ideal model for overseas study in the report, he was more forthcoming elsewhere. In the introduction to an evaluation of the University of Delaware/Sweet Briar College Junior Year Abroad programs published in 1958 by Robert Pace, Shank argued that the primary innovations of the junior year abroad were that it allowed American undergraduates to earn full-credit in a foreign university under the direct supervision of their home institution. This assessment was underscored by Shank’s underlying belief that the elements of direct supervision and full credit were, in his words, “significant” because they demonstrated the importance of U.S. university oversight over the academic and personal aspects of the program.71 In addition to the supervision and curricular oversight, Shank credited the junior year abroad for also introducing the practices of: the careful selection of students, educational counseling,

68 Ibid. p. 4.
69 Ibid. p. 5.
70 Ibid. p. 5.
71 Pace, The Junior Year in France; an Evaluation of the University of Delaware-Sweet Briar College Program. p. 3.
intensive language training, home residence programs with local families, and some registration in regular courses in foreign universities.72 As a result of this carefully orchestrated mix of control and structured independence, Shank wrote that the junior year abroad represented a “…new dimension in American education” that had the potential to “…enrich the total experience of United States undergraduates. Such programs can also improve the understanding of United States higher education in other countries, and contribute to better relations among all peoples.”73 Shank’s words evoked the aim of cross-national understanding, and he also made it clear that the junior year abroad allowed American students to maintain the academic integrity of their home university studies.

Throughout the 1960s there were other statements that emphasized the importance of U.S. administrative control over the conditions abroad to support undergraduate learning and cross-national understanding. For example, in 1960, in New Dimensions in Higher Education 6, Study Abroad, Irwin Abrams wrote on the benefits of the junior year abroad.74 Abrams explained that the junior year abroad model attempted to help the American student immerse herself in overseas study “without drowning” by preparing the student prior to departure and offering ongoing supervision in the host nation.75 Since the junior year abroad required students to demonstrate advanced language skills, the student could benefit from carefully designed courses especially for the student in the language of the host nation.76 Additionally, in 1966, French language professor, Theodore H. Rupp offered a set of guidelines for administrators seeking to evaluate their undergraduate study abroad programs.

72 Ibid. p. 3.
73 Ibid. p. 5.
74 Abrams, New Dimensions in Higher Education 6, Study Abroad.
75 Ibid. p. 7.
76 On the extreme end of Abrams' typology was the “study tour,” which Abrams described at best as “a creative variation of the traditional field trip” but at its worst, an endeavor that “might do some mischief.” Abrams noted that many educators were suspicious of these programs that were often run by for-profit, commercial, tour companies. Ibid. p. 13.
Among his list of recommendations, he placed the highest priority on the U.S. institution’s responsibility for overseeing the “academic program” of the overseas study plan with an emphasis on selecting the right balance of courses “advanced enough to be a challenge to the American students,” but “not considered beyond their capacities.” Additionally, Rupp noted, “contacts between the American students and the natives of the host county, whether in the residence or elsewhere, rarely occur spontaneously, but must be diligently cultivated.” Thus, like others, Rupp encouraged American institutions to take responsibility for the academic and cultural learning environment for American students and not leave these elements to chance. In these examples, proponents again sought to balance academic and cross-national understanding objectives by encouraging the home U.S. institutions to orchestrate careful control.

In these ways, there was a strong sense that administrators and leaders of study abroad programs from the United States could control enough of the conditions abroad to provide the ideal environment for students to generate positive academic experiences and develop cross-national understanding in ways not possible on campus in the United States. Ben Euwema articulated this notion clearly in the official proceedings for a series of three conferences on U.S. undergraduate study abroad programs from 1966. Euwema, an English professor and former Dean of the College of Liberal Arts from Pennsylvania State University, explained that study abroad programs should maintain the essence of both words, “study,” and “abroad.”

…no American college has a mandate to sponsor anything but an academic—that is to say, a ‘study’ program. If an American college wishes to enter the travel business, this is its own affair. However, it cannot very well argue that it is thereby fulfilling its proper function as an institution of higher learning…Furthermore, the student

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should be ‘abroad.’ There must be something about the student’s academic experience which does not duplicate his experiences at home. Somehow or other, the student must be brought face to face with a different culture, with new points of view, with an unfamiliar set of academic procedures and standards, and so on.⁷⁹

According to Euwema, the answer to what students ought to learn, and how their experiences could be supported and controlled by U.S. university administrators was up for debate by participants at the conferences. These participants agreed that achieving an ideal balance and designing a successful program was “fiendishly complex.”⁸⁰ Thus, there was a spectrum of control for study abroad programs where one end represented absolute freedom for the student akin to independent travel, and the other end represented complete control by the U.S. institution. In the 1950s and 1960s, most American academics were unwilling to uphold independent cultural immersion, or experiential learning as a credit-bearing activity and instead sought to strike a balance between immersion and the more traditional structures of U.S. higher education.⁸¹ The ideal spot in the middle was subject to the individual goals of the U.S. institution of higher learning. For many administrators, the level of control introduced by the junior year model was the embodiment of this ideal midpoint.

The (Ideal) American Student as Goodwill Ambassador

While the push for academic quality in study abroad left the aim of cross-national understanding in a secondary position, the quest for control provided space for American educators to balance both objectives. The importance of student selectivity coincided with the development of a revised, yet contentious, vision for the aim of cross-national

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⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 3.
understanding in study abroad—the U.S. student as global ambassador. During the 1950s and 1960s the aim of cross-national understanding developed beyond the corporate and cultural internationalist vision of the 1920s to include a political dimension with multiple components. External political forces, like the U.S. government compelled some administrators in U.S. higher education to incorporate the notion of the global ambassador into their overseas study programs in different ways. First, study abroad proponents sought to incorporate ideas from social science to enhance the relevance of this notion by suggesting that the achievement of this aim was an attainable skill that had academic and personal merit in the world. These administrators believed that this idea would elevate the status of study abroad by moving it past the sentimental feelings of internationalism into a more attainable objective suited for the post World War II era. Next, study abroad programs merged their emphasis on student exclusivity with the existing political ideas about the American student as a global ambassador. In this controversial strategy, study abroad programs continued to support the aim of cross-national understanding, but not as a programmatic element built into the curriculum. Instead, the objective of cross-national understanding would occur as a natural consequence of the recruitment of the high quality students selected for the programs. This idea of the global ambassador emphasized the rhetoric of exclusivity that permeated study abroad, but it was not universally accepted.

In the 1960s, the U.S. government continued to encourage young Americans to learn about the world to enhance international relations. Buoyed by the success of the Fulbright program, the U.S. federal government emphasized the role of the American abroad as an unofficial cultural ambassador for the nation. As a pamphlet commemorating the tenth anniversary of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 explained, “The student, the teacher, the scholar, the civic leader—all are proving potent
ambassadors in helping to build a better spirit of cooperation and understanding among our people and those of other countries on a person-to-person basis.” In 1962, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced another example of the American student as goodwill ambassador in an introduction to *A Guide to Study Abroad: University, Summer School, Tour and Work-and-Study Programs*. In his introduction, Johnson encouraged American undergraduate students to pursue overseas studies saying,

> The mutual exchange of students between nations is a vital part of any program to attain world peace through better understanding, to distribute technical knowledge from developed to underdeveloped countries, to share more equitably the world’s social and economic bounty, and to promote an exchange of information and ideas. These goals can be ignored only at our peril.

Johnson’s words exemplified one way that the aim of cross-national understanding was expressed in this period as a benefit to the United States. In this politicization of the aim of cross-national understanding, American students were expected to serve the world by being exemplars of U.S. technical and political power. Moreover, the Vice President’s introduction epitomized the ways in which the aim of cross-national understanding changed in the post World War II period.

The Vice President’s depiction of the cross-national aim was evocative of the internationalist sentiments for study abroad from the 1920s; however, Johnson’s words were firmly situated in the new post World War II geopolitical context where the United States played a much more prominent role in the world. The United States had emerged from the war as a global power and students had to be aware of that new status in multiple ways. As

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Johnson explained, “In our position of world leadership, we need citizens with a knowledge of foreign countries and fluency in other languages to administer and carry on our global commitments.” In this way, Johnson’s emphasis on the aim of cross-national understanding and the important role of the U.S. student ambassador was filtered through a new lens of American global power. Since the United States was heavily involved in world affairs, isolationism was no longer an option and the objective of study abroad to achieve mutual goodwill between individuals in different nations had to be cast in a different light. As Johnson put it, by studying abroad, students would be better prepared to serve the United States in order to, “…communicate effectively and advantageously with other countries, and to interpret our policies and programs directly to those with whom we deal. In short, we must speak to other peoples in their tongues and within their own terms.”

Johnson’s rhetoric demonstrated the pertinence of the aim of cross-national understanding to the U.S. government. This differed from the 1920s when the U.S. government was not as involved with the early junior year abroad programs at the University of Delaware and Smith College. The advocates of cross-national understanding in the 1920s hoped study abroad would help ease world tensions for the benefit of cross-national understanding or to enhance corporate flows of capital, but in this new vision, American students were expected to be the emissaries of U.S. political power in the world.

Some proponents of study abroad were also aware of this rhetoric and some attempted to engage with this message in order to uphold less political ideals of international understanding. One strategy to endorse this objective of study abroad was to align the aim of cross-national understanding with emerging ideas about cross-cultural empathy that were

84 Ibid. p. 10.
85 Ibid. p. 10.
employed by the Peace Corps in their training materials. In their influential study, *The Overseas Americans* (1960), on hundreds of U.S. citizens living abroad on five continents, Syracuse University faculty Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams studied the challenges and elements necessary for the success of Americans working abroad. Based on their interviews, five general categories emerged that were conducive to effective overseas performance: technical skill, belief in mission, cultural empathy, a sense of politics, and organization ability. In this thematic list, “cultural empathy” typified the aim of cross-national understanding often advocated by study abroad proponents in the 1950s and 1960s. Put simply, Cleveland, Mangone, and Adams wrote, “Cultural empathy is the skill to understand the inner logic and coherence of other ways of life, plus the restraint not to judge them as bad because they are different from one’s own ways.” Thus, cultural empathy was essential for any American with aspirations for successful overseas performance.

According to these researchers, cultural empathy was a skill that could be learned. In order for Americans to learn this skill, they needed to develop an understanding of both their own and their host culture. Cleveland, Mangone, and Adams offered the example of conceptions of time where they suggested that the United States and the West stood in stark contrast to “Oriental societies” in the East because the Western ideas of time were rigid and inflexible, whereas those in the East were more fluid. Using time as their example, the researchers suggested that the American abroad would need to learn how to adjust her

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87 Ibid. p. 124.

88 Ibid. p. 136.

89 Ibid. p. 140.
response to time based on their host country environment. As they wrote, the American’s behavior and attitudes with regard to time “will not require as much adjustment in Italy as in Burma”; however, a certain kind of adjustment would be appropriate in either national context. Based on their assessment, Cleveland, Mangone and Adams concluded that overseas immersive living experience was essential for the development of cultural empathy; therefore, a major expansion of study abroad was needed. As the authors explained, “It should be a live option for every student at a reputable American college to study abroad for at least one semester under competent supervision and conditions that immerse him in an alien culture.” This radical call for total expansion went against the trend of selectivity in part because of the authors’ stance on the importance of Americans abroad serving the needs of the United States, but this recommendation did not abandon the need for ideal conditions and careful supervision. Although Cleveland, Mangone and Adams were in the minority in terms of calling for compulsory study abroad for all U.S. students, they were not alone in their assessment that students could develop cross-national understanding in a way that did not undermine the academic objectives of higher education.

One of the core subjects of inquiry examined in Robert Pace’s survey of the University of Delaware / Sweet Briar College study abroad students was an assessment of the degree to which the junior year in France helped students achieve the aim of cross-national understanding. As Pace explained, the important objectives of the Junior Year in France program included the development of “more active international understanding,” and “that of fostering a world-mindedness in the sense of a greater friendliness to foreigners and a more genuine tolerance of diversity and other cultures, including a recognition of the

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91 Ibid. p. 141.
92 Ibid. p. 296.
contribution which other cultures have made to America and the world.” Pace was interested in knowing if international understanding would manifest itself in the ideology and behavior of study abroad alumni after graduation. The questions pertaining to this idea included, “Do these former students show any continuing interest in foreign affairs and foreign culture? Do they exhibit a greater friendliness to people who are different from themselves? Are they doing anything to further international understanding in their local communities?”

Pace drew several conclusions from his comparisons between the junior year in France students and their contemporaries in the control group who did not study abroad. At least two of these findings enforced the belief that by studying abroad students could develop their understanding of other cultures in a way that would lead to a greater state of international mindedness. First, Pace found that students who studied abroad were more “more fully aware of significant intercultural contributions to life in the twentieth century” than those who did not. To determine this, Pace asked students to write the names of individuals who had made significant contributions in the past 30 to 40 years in several “broad fields of human endeavor” that ranged from the arts to the sciences. Pace found that students who studied abroad not only listed more names in their responses for each category than the students who did not, but the junior year in France students also listed more names of non-American contributors to human endeavor than their counterparts. Pace reported that 30% of the pre-war group, 21% of the post-war group, and 17% of the control

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93 Pace, The Junior Year in France; an Evaluation of the University of Delaware-Sweet Briar College Program. p. 10.
94 Ibid. p. 7.
95 Ibid. p. 65.
96 The “seven broad fields of human endeavor” were 1. dance, music, painting, architecture, 2. poetry, novel, drama, motion picture, 3. philosophy, theology, 4. psychology, education, 5. physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, 6. Transportation, communication, production, distribution, 7. law, administration, management, production, distribution. Ibid. p. 34-35.
group, were able to both write the names of contributors in all seven categories and include the name of foreign contributors in each category. Moreover, Pace wrote, “Foreign names accounted for half or more of all names in the answers of 77 per cent of the Sweet Briar group, 65 per cent of the Delaware group, and 49 per cent of the Control group.” In this way, the students who had studied abroad responded in ways that demonstrated a greater awareness of the contributions of non-Americans to a range of human endeavors in the past 30 years.

Next, Pace also found that study abroad students were more likely than their non-study abroad peers to engage in activities that reflected “the betterment of international understanding.” These activities included: keeping informed of world affairs by watching the news, reading books, or listening to radio; communicating with friends, speaking publicly, or writing about international relations. In all but two of the nine different activities, the junior year abroad group engaged in international endeavors at a higher level than the control group. Pace wrote, “Both the Sweet Briar and Delaware groups are, without question, more active participants in the sort of activities tested by this scale than those college graduates who did not have the Junior Year in France experience.” Finally, Pace’s study demonstrated that students who had participated in the junior year in France were “more inclined to endorse policies which promote the freer exchange of ideas, goods and people among countries” than their peers who had not studied abroad. In response to Pace’s study, and based on his own assessment, Francis Rogers described the junior year abroad, as “an ideal educational device” that was “vital to these United States and to.

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97 See “Table 5: Contributions, Ratio of Fields” p. 37, and “Chart 5: Contributions, Per cent in which foreign names account for half or more of all names,” p. 40. Quote on page. 39. In ibid.
98 Ibid. p. 43.
99 Ibid. p. 45.
100 Ibid. p. 65.
humanity today as it was in the interwar period.”

Moreover, Rogers declared that, the junior year abroad had some shortcomings; however, it had made, “a noteworthy contribution toward international understanding.” Together with the Cleveland, Mangone and Adams study, Pace’s findings on the junior year abroad attempted to elevate the objective of study abroad to achieve deeper cross-national understanding to a more legitimate level by using viable research methods of the time.

Some proponents of study abroad embraced the idea of the student serving as goodwill ambassador for the United States. These overseas study advocates were mindful of the geopolitical status of the United States and therefore encouraged students to prepare for this element of study abroad. For many proponents, the idea of the student as ambassador was reinforced by the dominant notion of selectivity in study abroad. The belief that only the best, most mature, and well-educated students should enroll in study abroad programs coincided with the belief that these same elite students should serve as ambassadors to represent the United States in the world. The elite students would build their cultural capital, and their sympathetic understanding of the world in ways that would enhance their educational experiences, but only if the students themselves were worthy for the experience.

In the same 1962-63 guide to study abroad, with the introduction by Lyndon Baines Johnson, John A. Garraty and Walter Adams provided a wealth of information to American students seeking to spend time overseas. Advice on how to be a global ambassador was a large part of the message to these students. In their advice to students about pre-departure, Garraty and Adams warned students that they should prepare themselves with information about their host destination, as well as detailed information about the United States. As they

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101 Rogers, American Juniors on the Left Bank; an Appreciation of the Junior Year in France. p. 8.
102 Ibid. p. 8.
explained, if the study abroad student is “uninformed about Spain, for instance, the
Spaniards will think he has been poorly educated. But if he cannot answer questions about
his own country, they will write him off as a complete idiot.” The pressure then on the
American student to prepare herself with knowledge about the United States was high in
large part due to the status of the United States in the world.

Garraty and Adams were clear about warning students to prepare themselves
because the authors believed the students would be called upon to defend the United States.

The Communists are bombarding people all over the world with criticism of
American policies. Americans abroad are expected to be able to answer these
charges….The American who is planning to study abroad must realize that he is—as
the State Department tells him when he applies for a passport—an ambassador of
his country. He has plenty of ‘home-work’ to attend to before departure if he is
going to be a good emissary.

This study abroad guide thus stressed the message of preparation to its students. Beyond
questions of U.S. foreign policy, the guide encouraged students to be ready to answer
questions about the “American Way of Life” from the trivial aspects of Hollywood cinema
and television to profound matters relating to race relations in the United States. “Even
friendly foreigners,” the guide warned students, “will want to know why prejudice against
Negroes exists in the United States.” The guide encouraged students to consider carefully
their responses and to avoid reactions that would “…point angrily to prejudices of their
own.” Related to this, given the potential challenges faced by American students in
representing the United States abroad, the warnings offered by the IIE’s consultative service
on U.S. study abroad in 1964 are also relevant. In discussing the importance of selecting the
right students for the variety of cultural experiences to be had overseas, the consultative

104 Ibid. p. 240.
105 Ibid. p. 240.
service suggested that the student abroad would be challenged on numerous levels; therefore, “He must have qualities of character that will respond to the greatly increased challenge. He must have more maturity than that which the home institution calls upon.”

Thus, in order to meet the demands of the global ambassador as described by Garraty and Adams, the principles of selectivity were heightened. This type of study abroad advice demonstrates the priority placed by some proponents of undergraduate overseas study on preparing every student to be a representative of the United States.

The idea of the U.S. student as global ambassador was not universally accepted. For example, in the official printed report of the 1960 Chicago conference, titled, “Transplanted Students, A Report of the National Conference on Undergraduate Study Abroad,” the rapporteur noted that “The conferees agreed that national goals and policies should not be advanced overseas by expecting transplanted students to proselytize actively for these policies; but that each student should seek consciously in his behavior to represent appropriately the national ideals.” The attendees were distancing themselves from officially encouraging U.S. students to be spokespersons of American policy. Instead, there was a different tactic that encouraged each individual student to behave in a way that would represent the United States in a positive light. The shift was subtle but important. Students would still have the capacity to serve as representatives but they would do so on their own merit and by their own behavior—not by their knowledge of U.S. policy or as part of an official objective of the study abroad program of their home institution.

Stephen A. Freeman supported developing international understanding in students, but he was against sending students abroad to represent the United States as unofficial

106 Freeman, Undergraduate Study Abroad, U.S. College-Sponsored Programs; Report of the Consultative Service on U.S. Undergraduate Study Abroad, p. 37.
political envoys. As Freeman put it, “International understanding” was a frequent rationale for study abroad but it was “a matter of much ambiguity and misconception.”\textsuperscript{108} Freeman saw value in this aim of study abroad because it instilled in students a greater awareness of cultural differences through the personal experiences of living abroad. When programs were designed well, a student could benefit from developing “sympathetic understanding and appreciation of the people and the civilization of another country” in a way that would lead to greater tolerance and a deeper “understanding of the problems of the world.”\textsuperscript{109} Yet, Freeman also saw dangers in asking students to represent the United States. As he explained,

\begin{quote}
On the other hand, for undergraduate foreign-study programs, international understanding should not be interpreted to mean international relations or propaganda. There has been much ill-considered talk about the United States student as an ‘ambassador’ abroad. This is a dangerous concept and can lead the student into false notions about his role as a propagandist or defender of the United States.\textsuperscript{110}
\end{quote}

Freeman’s point about the potential for the U.S. undergraduate to be used as an instrument of propaganda was an important new nuance to the conception of the aim of cross-national understanding. In this sense, Freeman echoed the point made at the Chicago conference that stressed that the propagandist dimension of this aspect of study abroad should be best left to the priorities of the U.S. government. Moreover, at the 1966 conferences there was much debate about the role of the U.S. undergraduate student as global ambassador. According to the conference notes,

\begin{quote}
It was repeatedly emphasized at the workshops that nothing can possibly contribute more to making an American youngster feel self-conscious and awkward than the insistence of otherwise sensible persons that he serve as an unofficial ambassador of the United States. Diplomacy should be left to the diplomats, and our undergraduates abroad left merely to be themselves.\textsuperscript{111}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{108} Undergraduate Study Abroad, U.S. College-Sponsored Programs; Report of the Consultative Service on U.S. Undergraduate Study Abroad, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. p. 15.

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. p. 15.

\textsuperscript{111} Euwema, Undergraduates Overseas: A Look at U.S. Programs, p. 10.
Although the unsettled nature of the global student ambassador is a testament to the highly charged political nature of this idea, there were other reasons for this fissure. Namely, as more programs developed, there was more room for poor planning and potential to send students abroad without the necessary training to serve as ambassadors. Finally, since proponents of study abroad were so concerned with maintaining the legitimacy of overseas study in the face of growth and criticism, they had to manage the academic and cross-national objectives in ways that would maintain the integrity of the entire practice.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has illustrated how proponents of overseas study in the 1950s and 1960s sought to set standards to establish academic legitimacy for study abroad in American higher education by endorsing the principles of academics, selectivity, and control. By focusing their rhetoric on these aspects, advocates helped solidify the place of study abroad in U.S. higher education even if it remained a small element of the international dimension of American colleges and universities. The efforts of these proponents to standardize helped to institutionalize study abroad as more than an “experiment,” and the continued interest of the students also contributed to the development of the field. Proponents in this period also established a priority for models like the junior year abroad, which emphasized this triad of standards. The cross-national understanding aim of study abroad also underwent a transformation in this period, and emerged in part as the contentious notion of the student global ambassador. Although some proponents accepted this notion, others vehemently argued against it. The fracture, in many ways, came about as a result of the growth and increasing external interest in study abroad by external agents like the U.S. government. Throughout the 1960s, proponents disagreed about the idea of the student as global
ambassador. Much as Stephen Duggan had wondered in the 1920s about the stage of development of undergraduates and their levels of maturity for overseas study, opponents of the students as global ambassador worried that American undergraduate students were too young to serve—even unofficially—as representative for the United States. By the end of the 1960s, the priorities of students and faculty on U.S. campuses shifted to intense debates about domestic issues like civil rights and international matters like the war in Vietnam. By the 1970s, the intense discussions about amplifying the international dimension of U.S. colleges and universities had chilled and the struggling economy also had an impact on the development of new study abroad programs. The next chapter considers how proponents of study abroad withstood this lull in the 1970s and issued a new call for expanding education abroad for undergraduate students in the 1980s.

Introduction

In 1980, Clark Kerr, the former Chancellor of the University of California Berkeley, and former President of the University of California system, questioned why so few Americans were concerned with international affairs. He worried that the average college-educated American’s understanding of the world had diminished and that international programs in higher education had languished in the 1970s. Kerr hoped to reinvigorate the energy around the international dimension of U.S. higher education by encouraging American colleges and universities to commit to providing “more attention to global perspectives and languages in the development of the curriculum.”¹ He also called on the U.S. federal government to share the responsibility for enhancing a national commitment to international education. As others had done before him, Kerr linked the importance of international education to the individual and the nation, but his amplified rhetoric suggested a new outlook on the role of the U.S. university in the world. He explicitly associated American universities with the new, interconnected, global knowledge system that had emerged in the decades following World War II. As he wrote,

Higher education, among other important purposes, helps to prepare individuals and the nation for the future, and the future now holds more global and fewer strictly national dimensions. Higher education is also a central component of knowledge systems, and knowledge systems are now international; they even involve outer space.²

Beyond his plea for revisiting and recharging the international domain of American colleges and universities, Kerr demonstrated his understanding of an emerging relationship between

² Ibid. p. xxxviii.
higher education and the world. As he wrote, “Now, a new stage may be evolving in which
the university once again becomes part of world civilization rather than the servant of one
political entity alone.” Kerr’s words embodied an interest in revisiting the global dimensions
of U.S. colleges and universities, and reinforced an ideology of global interconnectivity that
he shared with many others in U.S. higher education at the time.4

Kerr was not alone in his desire to see U.S. higher education take on a revitalized
international dimension following a lull in activity. The 1970s was a brief period of
diminished rhetoric promoting international engagement in part due to economic
constraints, shifting political priorities in Washington, and different student interests that
diverted attention from study abroad. These factors contributed to a slight decline in the
number of American students studying abroad for credit in the 1970s. But in the final
decades of the twentieth century, there were new macro forces that compelled this change in
rhetoric. One of the primary forces behind this turning point was the changing political
economy, which emphasized global economic interconnectivity as a major boon for future
U.S. prosperity. In this changing context in the 1980s, many proponents of international
matters in higher education, including a new cadre of professionals specializing in study
abroad, tried to redirect the spotlight back toward world affairs at U.S. colleges and
universities. This final period of the twentieth century became a renaissance of rhetoric
around the international dimension of U.S. postsecondary education and demonstrated how

3 Ibid. p. xxxix.
4 As Christopher J. Lucas explained, in the 1970s, educators began encouraging a more global perspective in
university curricula, “…at a time when it had grown obvious that the nation’s destiny was linked inexorably
with the fate of other peoples around the world.” Christopher J. Lucas, American Higher Education: A History,
Nagai’s An Owl Before Dusk (1975) and Harlan Cleveland’s (1977) A Passion for Paradox both discussed the
interconnected nature of the world, and the role of education in this new interrelated environment. Michio
Nagai, An Owl before Dusk, ed. Education Carnegie Commission on Higher (Berkeley, Calif: Carnegie
most proponents considered study abroad a vital component of the revitalized vision of international education.

The rebirth of rhetoric and the new emphasis on undergraduate overseas study marked a new stage in the development of study abroad. This was a change from the 1950s and 1960s when study abroad was present but occupied a relatively low priority in the discussions of world affairs on U.S. college and university campuses. In the 1980s, proponents highlighted various objectives of overseas study in ways that corresponded with a larger milieu of reform emphasizing the benefits of international education for national prosperity and security. In general terms, the calls for reform claimed that Americans were woefully ignorant of international matters in ways that were detrimental to the future economic success and national security of the United States. Reformers argued that by enhancing college students’ understanding of other national cultures and languages, the United States would benefit in numerous ways. In response to these reform minded critiques, advocates of overseas study for undergraduate students amplified the rhetoric emphasizing the professional and cross-national understanding aims. These advocates of study abroad called on multiple parties (federal, state, local government, private industry, and institutions of higher education) to enhance the international aspects of U.S. higher education with overseas study for undergraduates as a major element. They argued that in order to benefit the future economic prosperity and national security of the United States, more American students needed to spend time overseas on formal undergraduate programs. This period is also notable because these advocates of study abroad included a growing class of professionals whose work focused exclusively on administering study abroad programs for undergraduate students. Although a small cadre of these specialists existed in the 1960s, this new batch of study abroad practitioners was larger and able to organize new professional
organizations dedicated to enhancing and evaluating the field. This new class of practitioners could serve as advocates and were in a unique position to evaluate study abroad at the institutional and national scales. Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, advocates shifted the thrust of the conversation around study abroad from fears of unregulated growth and lack of academic oversight to calls for dramatic expansion. This shift occurred because reformers found a way to incorporate study abroad into rhetoric suggesting that improved international education would benefit the national security and economic prosperity of the United States. In the 1980s then, the elitism that had dominated study abroad at mid-century was coming under fire, and some reformers began calling for increased diversity in study abroad participants and destinations.

**Prologue to Reform: Study Abroad in the 1970s**

Before considering the reform movement and the newfound prominence of study abroad in the 1980s, it is important to discuss the political and economic forces at play in the 1970s that diminished the attention given to study abroad. First, at the outset of the 1970s, federal support of international elements of post-secondary education was waning. One example of this was the Nixon administration’s attempt to cut funding for Title VI, which funded area studies centers. Title VI centers had increased steadily throughout the 1960s, and by 1970 there were over 100 Title VI area studies centers in the United States; however, the Nixon administration argued that federal funding was no longer necessary because the program had created a robust base of area specialists to serve as a foundation for area studies. The academic community rallied to combat these efforts and they garnered political support by both Henry Kissinger and Daniel Moynihan to encourage Nixon to change his

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mind. Eventually, the president backed down and did not seek reductions in funding. Although funding for undergraduate programs was introduced as part of the Title VI appropriations in 1976 with the new “Citizen Education” provision (Section 603), the funding was eliminated for this aspect of Title VI by 1980. When the Carter administration took office in 1976, advocates of study abroad were hopeful that his administration would support overseas studies in a more robust manner. In April 1978, Carter issued an executive order for a commission to consider how much attention should be focused on foreign language and international studies, and to assess the need for further training in these areas across all levels of education from primary to post-graduate. Carter’s commission on foreign language and area studies encouraged many in the field of international studies to believe that there would be enhancements to undergraduate international education in the coming years; however, there was no immediate impact from this report. One change during Carter’s administration that did pave the way for instant increased overseas study involved the Soviet Union. The Carter administration’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union allowed study abroad providers like the Council on International Education to run study abroad programs with the Soviet Union for American students during the summer throughout the 1970s; however, with the chilling of relations with the Soviets by the end of the decade, and the oil crisis and hostage situation in Iran, Carter’s attention to international education dwindled.

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6 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
The total number of students studying abroad seemed to decline over the 1970s. Prior to this decade, there was a steady increase in the number of students studying abroad, but based on the records kept by the IIE, this trend appeared to stall in the 1970s. In 1959/60 there were approximately 1,500 U.S. students studying abroad for credit on junior year, semester, or summer programs. By the end of the 1960s, in the 1969/70 academic year there were over 32,000 students studying abroad, but by 1978/79 that number had decreased to 24,886. There were some changes in data collection with the IIE Open Doors reporting in the 1970s that could explain this drop. First, in 1973 the Institute stopped surveying foreign institutions about the number of U.S. students enrolled abroad. Thus, from 1973 to 1977 there were no reports on American students abroad. In 1978 the IIE began asking U.S. institutions of higher education to report the number of students they were sending abroad on official programs. These new surveys of study abroad students only accounted for U.S. sponsored year-long programs and did not include students on direct exchanges, summer studies, or independent programs. In addition to the possible problems with the reporting of data, there were other factors in the 1970s that could have diminished study abroad participation. First, domestic issues demanded attention and diminished the focus on international matters. Indeed, by the beginning of the 1970s, student activism had prompted many institutions to focus their attention on campus matters. As Kenneth J. Rothwell reported in 1970 for the New England Center for Continuing Education, “There appears to be a growing need for the careful planning of future overseas study programs since the funds for this purpose have become increasingly scarce, and interest in such

10 Freeman, Undergraduate Study Abroad, U.S. College-Sponsored Programs; Report of the Consultative Service on U.S. Undergraduate Study Abroad, p. 5.
activities has been replaced by black studies, social studies, and environmental problems of the American economy and society.

Additionally, international programs on U.S. campuses faced numerous challenges at the beginning of the 1970s and the national support of these global initiatives abroad began to wane in part due to the mounting domestic concerns about poverty, urban decay and racial inequality in the United States.

Financial concerns also impeded further development of overseas study programs in the 1970s. John Keller and Maritheresa Frain suggest that the economic recession, prompted by the 1973 oil crisis, and the growing discontent with the U.S. presence in Vietnam created a unique mix of financial constraints and political cynicism that diminished enthusiasm around educational travel. American universities in this period had expanded their priorities and options for students over the 1960s, but in the face of economic instability, changing student demographics, and pressures to maintain their newly disparate endeavors, they were poorly equipped to handle shrinking revenues brought on by recession. As a result of the financial pressures of the 1970s some universities closed their study abroad programs. For example, many of the institutions that began programs in Latin America in the 1960s discontinued these by the mid 1970s. Additionally, in 1977 the City University of New York discontinued 10 study abroad programs due to funding problems, and the University of Pittsburg also cancelled programs in Europe due to financial constraints.

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15 Keller, "The Impact of Geo-Political Events, Globalization, and National Policies on Study Abroad Programming and Participation."


17 Bowman, "Educating American Undergraduates Abroad: The Development of Study Abroad Programs by American Colleges and Universities." p. 27.
Despite the cuts in programming and dwindling student participations rates in study abroad, a growing class of professionals began to mobilize during the 1970s to find ways to improve the practice. For example, from 1972 to 1977, CIEE sent four different teams of “experienced administrators” of study abroad programs to France, England, Germany and Spain to evaluate the academic quality of specific study abroad programs in each of these countries to improve practices in these locations.\(^{18}\) Also, in the winter of 1974 several groups co-sponsored a special seminar on work, study, and travel abroad in Chicago.\(^ {19}\) At the seminar, study abroad professionals led workshops designed to help study abroad advisors prepare students to: understand the difference between direct enrollment in foreign universities and participating in American-led programs; establish criteria to select an appropriate study abroad opportunity; determine the best avenues for finding financial aid for overseas study; and locate more details about programs abroad. Additionally, in 1975 NAFSA published *The Secussa [Section on U.S. Students Abroad] Sourcebook: A Guide for Advisors of U.S. Students Planning an Overseas Experience* in collaboration with professional representatives from 50 U.S. higher education institutions and the Experiment in International Living, CIEE, IIE, and the U.S. Office of Education. *The Sourcebook*, which came about as a result of a week-long workshop in Vermont in 1974, focused on multiple aspects of advising students including detailing the roles of advisors, explaining different program types to students, transferring credit, preparing students at pre-departure sessions, and helping students adjust to life in the U.S. after their return. In the preface to *The

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\(^{18}\) According to John Bowman, CIEE terminated these evaluations in 1977 due to the cost of travel and the administrative challenge of arranging the logistics of the visits. Ibid. p. 40.

Sourcebook, the editor Judy Frank wrote, “The Workshop and the Sourcebook are the first steps toward professionalizing the field of advising U.S. students who wish an overseas experience.” These examples demonstrate how, despite the drop in study abroad participation and the problems with the economy, the 1970s was a decade where study abroad practitioners made strides in organizing and professionalizing the field. Many of these professionals would play a part in revitalizing the rhetoric around overseas study in the 1980s.

Reform Rhetoric in International Education in the 1980s

The wave of educational reform in the 1980s reinvigorated new discussions of the international dimension of higher education that highlighted the benefits of study abroad to economic prosperity and national security. Many of the publications produced during this period of reform had an alarmist edge that stemmed from a tone set by president Ronald Reagan’s National Commission on Excellence in Education in its landmark publication, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform. As Jal Mehta has shown, A Nation at Risk had a seismic impact on American schooling by establishing standards-based reform policy on a large scale. Even though A Nation at Risk focused on K-12 education, the publication situated the status of learning for American children in an international context. The report asserted that a “rising tide of mediocrity” in U.S. schools was threatening American prosperity, security, civility, and the very future of the nation—especially in light of the fact that the achievement scores of school children in other countries were exceeding those of

American school children in numerous areas.\textsuperscript{23} The message in \textit{A Nation at Risk}, that reform was necessary to improve education in the United States to meet the newfound state of worldly competition, reverberated in reports on higher education throughout the 1980s and beyond.

In response to \textit{A Nation at Risk}, several proponents of international education issued their own vision for improving education by focusing on the international dimension. These new visions for international education were situated in the context of increasing economic globalization in the 1980s and therefore the rhetoric often emphasized U.S. national prosperity and security. For example, the National Advisory Board on International Education Programs submitted a report to the secretary of education in 1983 titled, \textit{Critical Needs in International Education: Recommendations for Action}, which emphasized American ignorance of foreign language and culture and called for extensive reforms to foreign language education in the interest of economic prosperity and national security.\textsuperscript{24}

Throughout the 1980s numerous other reports emphasized this message with similar rhetoric.\textsuperscript{25} These reports decried any form of American provincialism and instead suggested that the success of the nation rested on colleges and universities that were mindful of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{23} United States. National Commission on Excellence in, \textit{A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform.} p. 5.
\end{flushright}
economic success on a global stage. These reform-minded authors called on multiple parties at the federal, state, and local level to coordinate efforts to develop international studies in colleges and universities. Moreover, these authors proclaimed that institutions themselves needed to improve their international efforts including study abroad with a renewed attentiveness to national security and economic prosperity. Finally, these reformers echoed Clark Kerr’s statement highlighting the interconnectivity of the world with recognition of the emerging implications of globalization.


Large-scale Calls for Reform in International Education

In the general calls for reform in education, authors emphasized the importance of expanding the international dimension of U.S. higher education for the economic prosperity and national security benefits to the United States. The heightened rhetoric around these two areas reached a wide range of audiences. The emphasis on economic prosperity appealed to various public and private leaders who upheld the principles of neoliberalism and encouraged increased flows of capital in the global market. The message of national security reached the ears of many in the country who were still reeling from the hostage crisis in Iran, the end of the Vietnam War, or other recent geopolitical entanglements that demonstrated the deficiencies in international competence of many Americans. In this way, reformers found a receptive audience for their suggestions. Their rhetoric emphasized study abroad for undergraduates in ways not seen in the 1950s and 1960s. In these new calls for reform, authors suggested that undergraduate study abroad should serve as a prominent element of international education since it too had the potential to bolster national security and propel economic prosperity in the United States.
In their discussions, reformers often employed a tactic of emphasizing American ignorance of world affairs, and then suggesting that by overcoming this ignorance the United States would be in a better position in terms of national security and economic prosperity. For instance, in 1983, the National Advisory Board on International Education Programs submitted a response to *A Nation at Risk* to the Secretary of Education Terrel H. Bell that emphasized this rhetorical strategy. In short, the advisory board argued,

> National security and the economic well-being of the United States depend in no small measure on our ability to understand and communicate with other nations and peoples. Leadership of the free world requires that our citizens know about the culture, heritage, and social conditions of our friends and allies, as well as any potential adversary.  

With these lofty expectations tethered to the enhancement of international education, the advisory board urged the Secretary of Education to elevate the value of knowledge of foreign languages and cultures to a status alongside other fundamental components of a sound education in the United States. The rhetoric used to critique the American’s status of ignorance of world affairs vis-à-vis other nations was aggressive and foreboding, and the board highlighted that many Americans were unfamiliar with foreign languages and world affairs, with statements like, “Yet our knowledge and understanding of world events is woefully inadequate…The United States remains one of the few countries where students may graduate from a university without studying a foreign language throughout their formal education.” This, and other similar statements in this publication, emphasized that ignorance of foreign languages posed a serious risk to the United States in terms of national security and economic prosperity.

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26 *Critical Needs in International Education: Recommendations for Action: A Report to the Secretary of Education*, p. 3.
27 The advisory board listed 19 recommendations for the secretary of education to consider for the federal government for primary, secondary and postsecondary education. These are listed in: *ibid.* p. 9-11.
Other reformers suggested that international education was so vital to the future prosperity and security of the United States that the federal government had to take action to revitalize and centralize these efforts. For example, at the end of 1984, the Smithsonian Institution called on a group of education and foundation leaders to meet in Washington D.C. to envision a new “National Foundation for International Studies” based on the National Science Foundation. As a result of these meetings, the group enlisted Richard D. Lambert, a sociologist at the University of Pennsylvania, to create the report titled, *Points of Leverage: An Agenda for a National Foundation for International Studies*, based on the seminal 1945 publication, *Science: The Endless Frontier*. Although Lambert’s work did not result in a national agency for international studies, the rhetoric and dramatic call for action contained within *Points of Leverage* embodied the call for centralized federal action in international education. Additionally, in September of 1986, the ACE established the Commission on National Challenges in Higher Education to prepare the presidential candidates for the 1988 election with an agenda for postsecondary education in the United States. The report, titled *Memorandum to the 41st President of the United States*, began by informing the candidates that, above all else, post-secondary education could help the next president in “Preserving peace and security in an increasingly interdependent world; and Revitalizing the economy…”

Although the commission offered additional rationales for supporting higher education such as “…expanding educational opportunity; meeting essential human needs and improving the quality of life; and restoring respect for fundamental values and ethical behavior…” the

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commission prioritized security and prosperity in a way that emphasized the benefits of internationalizing to the next president.

In these calls for federal support, proponents argued that by sponsoring international education efforts, federal leadership could address several critical challenges to the United States. For example the proposed National Foundation for International Studies (NFIS) promised to address six core challenges: improving foreign language competencies; enhancing the capacity of U.S. businesses to be competitive in a global economy; developing and enhancing foreign affairs specialists in the U.S.; expanding international communication and gathering and analyzing information from abroad; creating sustainable relationships and opportunities for international travel for those interested in international studies; and “internationalizing the education of substantial portions of the successor generation.”31 The NFIS also promised to cater to the needs of the business community, promote national security, and provide central resources to inject undergraduate studies with more support to bolster the international dimension of U.S. higher education. In a similar way, the rhetoric of this ACE report underscored the value of education to the new president’s agenda and enforced the ideas that education could not neglect the international dimension. The committee encouraged a “renaissance of the partnership” between the president’s administration and leaders at U.S. colleges and universities in ways not seen since the end of the Second World War.32 The commission reminded the president-to-be of the role higher education had played in the second half of the twentieth century in developing an understanding in the American public of economic, defense, and foreign policy issues, and in preparing diplomats and experts in foreign and military affairs. As Clark Kerr had mentioned

32 American Council on Education, Memorandum to the 41st President of the United States. p. viii.
at the outset of the decade, the commission agreed that, despite the previous successful partnerships between the federal government and U.S. universities, many Americans in the 1980s were poorly prepared for living in an increasingly interconnected world. Thus, reformers emphasized the need for increased support at the federal level for enhancing the international dimension of U.S. higher education.

Unlike the discussions of the international dimension of U.S. higher education in the 1950s and 1960s, the rhetoric in the 1980s included study abroad in a more prominent position and encouraged expansion of this practice. For example, in their message to the next president, the ACE Commission put a spotlight on student exchanges when they argued that to overcome the collective deficiencies in knowledge, and to ensure a more peaceful and economically secure future for the United States, the next president should work with colleges and universities to, “…strengthen all fields of international study, encourage the teaching and study of foreign languages and cultures, and provide more opportunities for exchange of students and teachers between the United States and other countries.”

The proposed NFIS also aimed to amplify the role of U.S. study abroad internationalization efforts in a number of ways. First, Lambert argued for more federal funding and recalled that initial efforts at bolstering international education at the undergraduate level (e.g., The International Education Act and the Citizens’ Education Act of the National Defense Education Act, Title VI) were stymied by a lack of financial support. Next, beyond the limited resources for these acts, the decentralized nature of U.S. colleges and universities made central coordination of international curricula very difficult;

33 Ibid. p. 1.
34 Lambert described how the International Education Act passed but was never funded, and how the Citizens’ Education program provided grants to general education programs to “stimulate” the understanding of students and the public of other cultures for a brief period, but was eventually removed when Title VI was reconstituted as the Higher Education Act in 1980. Lambert, Points of Leverage: An Agenda for a National Foundation for International Studies. 134-135.
therefore, the NFIS would serve as a central hub of reform. As the proposal explained, “The Foundation should fund and direct an effort to develop evaluative criteria based on the national interest for international studies programs at the undergraduate level.” According to Lambert, international studies programs for undergraduates typically included work or study abroad programs, so he argued that these programs had to be examined so that the many experiments in international education and study abroad could be held to a national standard from which the best programs would serve as prototypes for future diffusion to other institutions. Finally, the NFIS offered a new vision for a national study abroad scholarship, by explaining that, “The Foundation should establish highly competitive fellowship programs for post-high school and post-collegiate periods of foreign sojourn.” These Foundation fellowships were envisioned as prestigious awards for elite students who demonstrated exceptional language abilities, and strong interest in a career in international affairs. The benefit to the nation of these awards would be a well-trained cadre of international experts, and “the cosmopolitanization of high-achievement members of the successor generation who, even if they did not become experts, would bring to their future occupations an international perspective that they would not otherwise have.” In this way, the vision for the National Foundation for International Studies Fellowships recalled the principles of elitism that proponents endorsed in the 1960s. Like those calls for selectivity, Lambert emphasized the need for exceptional qualities and leaderships in students in order to participate in his proposed national study abroad program.

The new status of study abroad in these visions for reform, and the lofty aims of federal partnership demonstrate the elevated vision these proponents had for overseas study

36 Ibid. p. 139.
37 Ibid. p. 139.
and international education. This concluding statement to the presidential candidates underscores the broad elevated vision for education:

You begin your presidency at a critical moment in the life of our country. The American people are entering a new century and a new world. Challenged as never before, will our people be prepared? We believe the answer must be yes. Working together, we are confident that you and we can serve the nation and fulfill the aspirations of the American people.\(^{38}\)

This closing sentiment epitomizes the lofty vision for education and the hopes to spark the languished partnerships between the U.S. federal government and institutions of higher education to rekindle the fire of the international dimension that had burned brighter in the 1950s and 1960s. Unlike the many publications from the 1950s and 1960s that minimized the impact of overseas study to the international dimension, these discussions included study abroad. Even if the NFIS echoed the elitist sentiments of the 1960s in its vision for a national study abroad fellowship, the inclusion of overseas study for undergraduates in this proposal demonstrated a change in the way overseas study was seen in this period. In the 1980s, study abroad had become one of the aspects of international education that could benefit the future of the United States. In these discussions, study abroad was seen as a specific avenue for the enhancement of the national security and economic prosperity of the United States. By calling for the highest levels of federal support, these calls for reform demonstrated the value of study abroad specifically and international education more broadly. This combination of amplified rhetoric and high aspirations for international education and study abroad continued throughout the decade.

\(^{38}\) American Council on Education, *Memorandum to the 41st President of the United States*. p. 11.
Reform in Study Abroad and the Increased Presence of Professionals

Just as there were national calls to centralize and enhance international education on a large scale, reformers in the 1980s also evaluated trends in study abroad and made general suggestions for change in overseas study for undergraduates. In these discussions, the voices of study abroad professionals were increasingly present and influential. Reformers, who often knew the field well based on first-hand experience, drew attention to the potential benefits of overseas study and the areas of weakness. For example, in 1988, the American Council on Education commissioned another report on the state of foreign language and international studies programs for U.S. undergraduate students called *International Studies and the Undergraduate.*

This publication focused exclusively on undergraduate higher education and examined the state of international studies at American colleges and universities in the late 1980s. Its goal was to provide recommendations for future higher education administrators to better prepare “this generation of students for the cosmopolitan environment that will face them.”

The belief that U.S. society was no longer able to shrink from the events in the world infused the rhetoric of the evaluation, and the opening pages of the report set the tone with a familiar message of national security and prosperity. Beyond this message, this report revealed another line of thinking that suggested that international issues had local implications within the United States:

> Now so much of what we do and think is tied to events abroad that it would be foolish of us not to learn to cope with the global society in which we increasingly operate. The debates over competitiveness, disarmament, and trade deficits reflect our troubled efforts to cope. And in recent years the United States has lost its insularity in another respect: large streams of immigrants once again flow across our boundaries. And the melting pot has lost much of its power. The United States is becoming a multicultural society in which the world is in us, not some distinct

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40 Ibid. p. 167.
backdrop against which the American drama is played out.\textsuperscript{41}

This study also placed a high emphasis on the role of undergraduate study abroad programs in maintaining and expanding the international dimension of undergraduate studies, and offered both an evaluation and recommendations for improving practice.

The ACE evaluation of international education in the 1980s illustrated the extent to which study abroad had become more relevant to internationalization efforts. Richard Lambert led a team of ACE fellows and numerous American university administrators from around the country to assess the status of undergraduate foreign language and international studies education.\textsuperscript{42} The team evaluated a combination of nationally representative surveys conducted by ACE and specific assessments based on site visits to a number of different colleges and universities in the United States.\textsuperscript{43} Broadly, the study assessed four areas pertinent to this broad topic, “foreign language instruction,” “international studies courses and concentrations,” “institutional priorities and presidential commitment,” and “study abroad.”\textsuperscript{44} The report made specific observations in each of these domains and offered recommendations for long-term enhancement of undergraduate international studies. On the whole, Lambert and the team found that international education in colleges and universities in the United States was present to varying degrees throughout the country, but in need of central leadership and deeper strategies for more robust engagement in each of the areas of activity.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. p. 1.
\textsuperscript{42} For a list of participants see: ibid. p. xiv to xviii
\textsuperscript{43} The surveys included: a specific survey sent to every institution of higher education in the United States inquiring about international studies activities on campus (153 institutions responded); \textit{The American Freshman: National Norms for Fall 1986}; \textit{Campus Trends, 1986}; \textit{International Studies for Undergraduates, 1987: Operations and Opinions}. The site visits took place at over 40 different colleges located equally in four geographic locations in the United States (the Northeast, the Midwest, the South, and the Far West). The site visits took place at a mixture of different institutional types (public, private, liberal arts, technical, universities, colleges, HBCUs, and religious institutions). For more details see: ibid. p. 2-6.
\textsuperscript{44} For detailed findings on these four areas see chapter 6 in: ibid.
By the 1980s, overseas study had become a vital aspect of the international
dimension of U.S. higher education as illustrated by its prominent position in the ACE
report. For example, the opening to the chapter on study abroad began with the following,

For many people the most important component of international studies is study
abroad. Next only to foreign language instruction, which is found on almost every
campus, the opportunity for students to study in another country is the most
common feature of international studies. Indeed, many administrators, faculty, and
students thought this was all we were referring to when we raised the subject of
international studies.\textsuperscript{45}

Many of the interviewees in the report considered study abroad to be separate from other
aspects of international studies, and they suggested that overseas study seemed to have “a
life and logic of its own.”\textsuperscript{46} Lambert and the committee urged the myriad of professionals
involved in the many different types of study abroad programs throughout the United States
to consult one another to help coordinate a common effort and more “effectively” manage
overseas study for undergraduates.\textsuperscript{47} Moreover, the analysis of study abroad programs in the
report found the following. First, the scale of study abroad programs was “marvelously
productive, but almost unbelievably complex” and diverse (in terms of program types, size
and length).\textsuperscript{48} In this way, the standardization efforts of study abroad proponents in the
1960s had only been partially successful. The proponents from previous decades had done
enough to stave off criticisms and preserve the practice of sending undergraduate students
overseas for credit, but they had failed to bring order to the number and range of programs.

In the 1985/86 academic year, the Institute of International Education’s Open
Doors publication reported that 48,483 American college students were studying abroad for

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. p. 9.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. p. 9.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. p. 41.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid. p. 41.
credit from 709 different U.S. institutions of higher education.⁴⁹ The U.S. National Center for Education Statistics reported that in the fall of 1985 there were 10.6 million undergraduate students enrolled during in American degree-granting institutions.⁵⁰ The ACE report explained that the practice of sending American students abroad for year-long or shorter durations of study was unique to the United States since most other nations in the world who sent students abroad only did so in order for their students to enroll in full degree programs.⁵¹ The report also found that across U.S. higher education, there were differences in the patterns of participation in study abroad. In general, students at baccalaureate institutions (e.g. liberal arts colleges) studied abroad in greater numbers than at comprehensive universities or two-year colleges. This happened because highly selective liberal arts colleges often had curricula that encouraged broad learning and study abroad, whereas two-year community colleges had students who sought specific degrees that were instrumental to gaining skills for an occupation.⁵² Thus, beyond the different types of financial resources available to the students at these different types of institutions, there were also curricular reasons for the differences in participation. The patterns of high enrollment in private liberal arts colleges and limited participation by students in community colleges can be seen as another indication of the elite nature of study abroad.

The ACE committee also revealed a lack of diversity in study abroad students in their academic disciplines, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. In terms of majors,

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⁵¹ The one exception to this norm was a newly introduced program in Europe. In the report, Lambert noted that the European Economic Community had introduced a scheme to expand student exchanges between countries in Europe in 1987 called the European Action Schemes for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS). For more on ERASMUS see: International Studies and the Undergraduate. p. 13.
⁵² Ibid. p. 16.
most study abroad students were in the humanities or social sciences, and study abroad experiences were often isolated experiences for students who were not foreign language majors. That is, for the non-foreign language major, the time spent abroad was a one-off event that had little to do with the student’s other academic work on campus. A lack of finances was a primary obstacle for students participating in overseas study. Thus, as had been the case for many decades, study abroad continued to be reserved to wealthy students. Beyond this, the report found that Hispanics and black students participated in fewer numbers unless those same students belonged to middle or upper class families. Ultimately, despite the shortcomings, Lambert wrote that study abroad advocates in American higher education “had created a marvelously productive, but almost unbelievably complex, structure for the promotion and management of study abroad.”

In *International Studies and the Undergraduate*, Lambert and the committee made several recommendations regarding study abroad. First, despite the large number of students and the diversity of program options available, the committee found that approximately 5% of undergraduate students at four-year institutions were studying abroad. Given this low proportion of American students studying abroad, the committee recommended increased funding for institutions and for individual students to increase the total number of students going overseas as part of their undergraduate education. Next, the report called for targeted recruitment of under-represented students in terms of the student’s ethnic/racial status, major, or institutional type. This recommendation also called for an increase in funding to establish pilot programs to send a more “minorities” abroad, or to recruit students from

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53 Ibid. p. 40-41.
54 Ibid. p. 19.
55 Ibid. p. 41.
56 The committee reported that the percentage of students studying abroad was far lower if part-time students and community college students were included in the calculation. When all of these students were included, less than 1% of U.S. undergraduate students were studying abroad. Ibid. p. 11.
community colleges, or from majors like engineering, business, education, or nursing. The report encouraged institutions to end their fixation on Europe and to expand new study abroad programs to non-European countries such as the Soviet Union and China. Beyond the new program options in non-European destinations, the committee recommended that students participate in yearlong programs because, “A sojourn of a summer or even a single quarter or semester is rarely enough for a student to get the full benefit of overseas study.”

The committee called for more supervision of study abroad both in terms of integrating students’ overseas experience with the rest of their on campus studies, and in terms of coordinating purposes and program types across the various institutions in the United States that accepted study abroad for university credit. As the report explained, in study abroad there was, “so much overlap and confusion in the system, so much duplication, so many obvious gaps, so great a range in quality, that surely some overall planning and coordination is called for.”

Finally, Lambert noted that there was “a surprising lack of evaluative research on the academic content of study abroad and the substantive knowledge that students gain.” Accordingly, the committee recommended more and better evaluative studies on the benefits of study abroad. The findings and recommendations in this report were early acknowledgments of the lack of diversity in study abroad. These findings foreshadowed a larger agenda for increasing access that would emerge in a more robust manner in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Other evaluations of study abroad also sought to understand the patterns of practice and demonstrate potential areas of strength and weakness. For example, two other reports focused exclusively on study abroad and provided a critical look at the state of overseas

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57 Ibid. p. 161.
58 Ibid. p. 162.
59 Ibid. p. 162.
study at the end of the decade. One of these addressed the shortcomings of overseas study for undergraduates and also emphasized the critical nature of study abroad for national security and economic prosperity. The Council on International Educational Exchange (CIEE), which had been in existence since 1947 when it was known as the Council on Student Travel, released Educating for Global Competence: The Report of the Advisory Council for International Educational Exchange in 1988. In this publication, the CIEE advisory council echoed a familiar theme in the opening pages of its report by claiming that success for the United States in the interconnected world of business, diplomacy, manufacturing and scientific/technological advancement required a citizenry with deep knowledge of the world that was dependent on robust educational systems. The council warned that, “if we fail to internationalize sufficiently our educational institutions, including expansion of student opportunities for study and work abroad, we will irreversibly diminish the world status of the United States.”60 Thus, like the other reports in the 1980s, the rhetoric in this report sought to elevate the national relevance of study abroad by linking the national prosperity of the United States to enhancements in international education.

The advisory council made four general recommendations about how study abroad could play a vital role in this internationalization process by helping to overcome students’ current gaps in knowledge of foreign languages and cultures.61 First, the council recommended for American colleges and universities to increase the percentage of U.S.

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61 The advisory council included: Thomas A. Bartlett, Chancellor, University of Alabama; Alan Guskin, President, Antioch University; Richard D. Lambert, Director, National Foreign Language Center; Ambassador Arthur Lewis, Nord Resources Corporation; Hon. Leon Panetta, U.S. House of Representatives; Adele Simmons, President, Hampshire College; Hon. Frank A. Well, Chairman, Abacus and Associates. Ex-officio, Barbara B. Burn, Associate Provost for International Programs, University of Massachusetts (Chair of CIEE board); Ex-officio, Jack Egle, President-Executive Director, CIEE; Ex-officio, W. LaMarr Kopp, Deputy Vice President for International Programs, Pennsylvania State University. Ibid. p. v.
undergraduate students studying abroad from under 5% to 10% by 1995. Next, the council asked for an increased effort in the recruitment of “under-represented academic and social groups and students with potential leadership ability” to participate on overseas study programs.\[^{62}\] Third, the council called on institutions of higher education to develop and encourage study abroad programs in regions outside of the traditional Anglo-European settings that had dominated study abroad since the 1920s. Finally, the council recommended stronger advocacy and leadership for study abroad at the highest levels of institutional administration so that colleges and universities would respond in robust ways to developing international education policies and programs. These four recommendations represented some of the problems with study abroad at the end of the 1980s and demonstrate how some of the decisions that proponents made in the 1960s had stymied the development of overseas study for undergraduate students in later decades. Namely, the quest for selectivity had reinforced the elite nature of study abroad and set up patterns and practices to inhibit greater access to overseas study.

Another study, *Abroad and Beyond: Patterns in American Overseas Education*, took a wide look at the field of study abroad in 1988. In the 1980s, the Institute of International Education had enlisted economic historian Craufurd D. Goodwin and political scientist Michael Nacht to conduct multiple policy surveys of foreign students in the United States.\[^{63}\] In 1988, Goodwin and Nacht reviewed the other side of international student mobility by conducting interviews and observations at 40 study abroad program offices in the states of

\[^{62}\] Ibid. p. 5.
California, Illinois, Massachusetts and Texas. Given the range of universities surveyed in their study, Goodwin and Nacht made very few statements that could apply universally across all institutions they studied. One similarity across all institutions in the study was growth, “We encountered no institution at all where the numbers had declined, and there were many with a compound growth rate of 5-10 percent in a constant student population.” Unlike the 1970s, when there was a decline in study abroad participation, the 1980s had seen a steady increase in overseas study.

Beyond the growth, Goodwin and Nacht’s study demonstrated the great diversity of motivations for students in study abroad, and the variety of program types to suit their different needs. In student interviews, the goals for study abroad included the standard aims of academic, professional, developmental, and cross-national understanding. The goals for colleges and universities for sending students overseas also varied and included rationales such as, fulfillment of institutional mission, student recruitment, alignment with faculty entrepreneurial interests, revenue generation, inter-institutional collaboration, or response to government policy. Goodwin and Nacht observed that the specific rationale for study abroad, or the design of the program, often suited the needs of the specific institution at the time. In this sense, every institution adopted study abroad programs that were deemed beneficial to administrators and students on the home campus. This led to great variety in program types and objectives across the many colleges and universities in the United States that had study abroad options for their students. The seemingly unwieldy matrix of motivations and program types described by Goodwin and Nacht represented a more fully

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64 The authors note that they selected the four states for their great variety in geography, and that the selected institutions of different sizes and times, “from small liberal arts and two-year colleges to major research universities, public and private, rural and urban, rich and poor, committed to study abroad and largely oblivious to it.” Goodwin and Nacht, Abroad and Beyond: Patterns in American Overseas Education. p. vii.
65 Ibid. p. 1.
66 Ibid. Chapter 2.
developed outgrowth of the open and unregulated process that emerged in the 1960s.

Reflecting on this pattern, the authors of *Abroad and Beyond* wrote, “This posture of flexibility and openness to different ways of conducting overseas study appropriate for ever-changing objectives of the academic community seems the most sensible approach for institutions today.” As their comment indicated, Goodwin and Nacht believed this “flexibility” had become a strength for overseas study by the 1980s.

Although Goodwin and Nacht’s survey of study abroad programs did not offer explicit criticisms of any approach to overseas study, the authors did pose several questions for current administrators to consider in coordinating programs. Some of the questions about the length and timing of study abroad for a student’s career had persisted since the 1960s. There were also questions raised about whether or how to achieve reciprocity with incoming international students, and whether there should be more students studying outside of Europe. The question of the elite nature of study abroad also emerged in this study with more nuance than it had before. Goodwin and Nacht noted that study abroad had been accused of discriminatory and elitist features along four levels, “intellectual, economic, racial and/or ethnic, and by age, marital status and physical handicap.” Rather than address the degree to which various programs had been discriminatory, Goodwin and Nacht simply identified the potential for discrimination along any of these lines. They also warned that discrimination in study abroad often was perpetuated based on long-held patterns,

So long as programs are perceived to be designed and reserved for the unusually talented, wealthy, young, and white, these are the participants who will tend to apply. Moreover, because those with some international experience already are most likely to undertake study abroad, lack of this experience, like the cycle of poverty, becomes

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67 Ibid. p. 50.
68 Ibid. p. 73.
self-reinforcing. Extra efforts must be made, then, to restore the mix of the program.\textsuperscript{69}

For any institution to address these issues in the most effective way possible, Goodwin and Nacht recommended above everything else, strong central leadership to support the integration of study abroad to the educational process of the institution. Like \textit{Educating for Global Competence, Abroad and Beyond} was notable for bringing up questions about the elite nature of study abroad at a time when this aspect of overseas study was increasingly seen as detrimental to the success of the overall endeavor.

Since the 1970s, the growing cadre of practitioners specializing in overseas study advising and administration continued to expand. There voices were heard in many of the reports mentioned above, and they continued to organize in the 1980s in greater numbers. These professional groups of study abroad specialists also demonstrated how the field had progressed. The new professionals in the 1980s came from different backgrounds and international experiences. Whereas the previous generation of study abroad specialists from the 1960s may have been involved in World War II or postwar reconstruction efforts, the new administrators came from a number of different backgrounds including the Peace Corps.\textsuperscript{70} In addition to a growing cohort of professionals at distinct institutions of higher education, these individuals were also connecting on a national level through NAFSA, or other internationally focused professional organizations like the Association of International Education Administrators (AIEA)—which was founded in 1982 by administrators at the University of Texas and Vanderbilt University to discuss concerns with administering international education offices on campuses. Thus, as the practitioners in this field grew and

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. p. 78.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. p. 61.
sought to professionalize their efforts, their rhetoric was supplemented by action and internal reflection on the field.\textsuperscript{71}

**Conclusion**

Clark Kerr’s call for colleges and universities to revisit their commitment to the international dimension of higher education at the beginning of the 1980s did not go unheard. Throughout the decade, academics, policy makers, and professional administrators considered the ways to inject international education with a vitality that would shift this realm of postsecondary education from the margins to a position of greater prominence. Study abroad for undergraduate students played a major part of these discussions, and the number of undergraduate students spending time overseas for university credit also grew steadily—from 24,886 total students in 1978/79 to just over 70,000 in 1989/90.\textsuperscript{72} The rhetoric promoting overseas study in the final studies of the decade (Abroad and Beyond, Educating for Global Competence and International Studies and the Undergraduate) signaled a turning point in the history of study abroad. On one hand, these reports explained how integral study abroad had become to U.S. higher education. For example, many of the academics surveyed in International Studies and the Undergraduate considered study abroad to be the most important element of international studies. For many of the people surveyed, study abroad typified international education. Additionally, the Lambert report showed that on a global stage, the system of sending students overseas for a brief period of time during their undergraduate years was unique to the United States. In proposals for a central National Foundation of International Studies, Richard Lambert envisioned study abroad to be one


prominent aspect of his plan. By linking study abroad for undergraduate students with this
grand proposal, Lambert demonstrated the high profile that overseas study had achieved by
the 1980s. Beyond this, *Abroad and Beyond* emphasized that despite the diversity of individual
purposes and institutional agendas driving overseas study, the percentage of undergraduate
students studying abroad had grown even when overall student enrollment had remained
stagnant.

These reports chronicled many problems and shortcomings of study abroad in this
period. First, the de-centralized, diverse, and independent study abroad “system” had
developed in a way that was often deemed a separate educational experience that was
tangential to the core learning experiences of college. In line with this critique was the
frustration that study abroad was an extension of the Grand Tour that primarily benefited
humanities students seeking to enrich their knowledge of European cultures. As *Educating
For Global Competence* put it, this legacy was problematic because, “Now global competence
for our citizens requires us to expand study abroad into other areas: mathematics, science,
medicine, business and industry, technology, international affairs, economics and
education.”\(^3\) Moreover, the elite nature of study abroad had been upheld with such
consistency that overseas study had become a highly selective endeavor for the affluent with
little participation from older students, students with disabilities, students of color, or
students of low income. This lack of diversity was a pressing problem for each institution’s
new group of study abroad professionals to consider. These problems continued into the last
decade of the twentieth century and indeed into the twenty-first. The next chapter considers
how this rhetoric developed in the 1990s and first decade of 2000.

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\(^3\) "Educating for Global Competence: The Report of the Advisory Council for International Educational
CHAPTER 6: UNCERTAINTY, DIVERSITY, AND THE DOMESTIC BENEFITS OF STUDY ABROAD, 1990-2010

Introduction

While advocates for international education in the 1980s issued a clear clarion call for expanding the international dimension of American colleges and universities to benefit the economic prosperity and national security of the United States, proponents in the last decade of the twentieth century viewed the future with less clarity. They recognized the need for internationalization but were unsure how best to incorporate the various strands of international activity on campuses. They were leery of what the new global alliances in the post Cold War geopolitical landscape would mean to the role of American higher education in world affairs. Beyond this, on the domestic front, colleges and universities in the United States were caught up in ongoing debates about multiculturalism, affirmative action, and how best to incorporate greater and more diverse students into campus life. In light of these issues, overseas study advocates conveyed a sense of uncertainty in their writing in the 1990s along with a growing emphasis on the benefits of study abroad to domestic cross-cultural understanding. Proponents of overseas study for undergraduate students also began to increase their calls to increase participation in study abroad. Within these discussions, advocates called for an increase in the diversity of destinations, and types of students participating. In the midst of this rhetoric, the federal government implemented the David L. Boren National Security Exchange Program in 1991 and the Benjamin A. Gilman International Scholarship Program in 2001.¹ Both federal programs provided scholarships for undergraduate study abroad and both encouraged applicants from traditionally

underrepresented groups. Academics had mixed reactions to these programs, but the underlying aims of both federal initiatives demonstrated the new milieu of increased access and the higher national priority for undergraduate overseas study.


The study abroad policy literature from the turn of the millennium helped transition overseas study from the twentieth to the twenty-first century by maintaining the rhetoric of national security and economic prosperity, but also injecting a new emphasis on cross-national understanding for domestic benefits. Although this rhetoric was imbued with uncertainty about the future in the 1990s, the September 11, 2001 attacks invigorated the rhetoric and stimulated wider attention to the need for greater global awareness for security and greater understanding. *A National Mandate for Education Abroad: Getting on with the Task*, by the Council on International Educational Exchange, the Institute of International Education, and NAFSA ushered in this new body of study abroad policy literature in 1990.2 *A National Mandate* called for expanded growth and diversity in study abroad in order for all college-educated American students to be prepared for an interconnected world. In the same year, Barbara Burn wrote, *The Contribution of International Exchange to the International Education of Americans: Projections for the Year 2000.*3 Burn’s piece not only surveyed the trajectory of international higher education, but also speculated on the future. *International Education in the New Global Era: Proceedings of a National Policy Conference on the Higher Education Act, Title VI, and


In these calls for reform, authors emphasized rhetoric that began in the 1980s by highlighting the importance of international education and overseas study for the enhancement of national security and economic prosperity of the United States. Additionally, in light of the increasingly diverse nature of the United States by the end of the millennium, reformers in the 1990s turned their attention to how study abroad might also

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prepare students to live with others in America. A number of these publications argued that by sending students abroad from a variety of backgrounds, they would develop intercultural skills that would be helpful to their understanding of the increasingly multicultural nature of the United States. In this way, the belief that study abroad could benefit students by instilling in them knowledge about another national culture to generate cross-national understanding was turned inward. In other words, the rhetoric of these reformers stressed the message that by studying in a different country students could develop the skills necessary to know how to interact with people of different cultures living within the United States.

Uncertainty About Internationalization and the Post Cold War Geopolitical Landscape

The dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was a symbolic turning point signaling the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era in world politics that was not defined by the tensions between U.S. and Soviet Union. These changes in the world prompted many to speculate on the future of geopolitics as the traditional East and West divide was thrown into upheaval. An associate dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Allan E. Goodman, wrote, “The continuation of the process of such change and upheaval will have profound and largely unforeseeable consequences for the nature of international affairs.”8 In light of articulating the purposes and content of international education, many administrators and academics worried about these unforeseeable circumstances. In acknowledging that with the end of the Cold War there would be uncertainty in how the United States would interact with the world, educators had to rethink what international engagement meant on college and university campuses.

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Proponents generally agreed that U.S. higher education had no choice but to be more international in a comprehensive way. In this new push for more comprehensive internationalization, proponents argued that study abroad for undergraduate students ought to be a critical aspect of these changes.

In terms of administrating the range of international endeavors on college and university campuses in the United States, proponents expressed ambiguity about the mechanics of action, but had some consensus around centralization of activities. Several scholars began advocating for comprehensive internationalization of U.S. colleges and universities in the 1990s. At issue for many institutions was the challenge of integrating a wide swath of different disciplines and organizational units around the core purpose of addressing issues in the world. These calls for more expansive internationalization posed a challenge to many administrators. For example, in 1992, Harvard established the position of Associate Dean for International Affairs to address the institution’s needs for meeting the demands of globalization. The person in that newly appointed position, Joseph Nye, expressed the complicated ways in which world events were relevant to students and faculty at Harvard,

...both professors and students are feeling the same increase in the number of international issues affecting their daily lives. If you look at the issues in world politics, you can be worried about the drug trade, terrorism or a disease like AIDS. These are things that are having an impact on the United States that very often

Nye’s acknowledgement of the anxieties and aspirations stemming from global connections captures the ambiguous outlook for administrators of the time who were addressing internationalization at their institutions. The new Harvard administrator was not alone in considering ways to operationalize universities to meet the opportunities and threats of an interconnected world. Richard Lambert also addressed this challenge from the perspective of the curriculum. He argued that the defining characteristics for international education and study abroad that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s emphasized the development of a general “informational, cognitive and attitudinal transformation” in students that could develop their characters and instill sympathy of other cultures in them. In college and university curricula, this general form of international competence was conducive to students in liberal arts programs, but these general approaches were no longer as potent for the training of specialists. Specialists of the day required more specific task-oriented skills; therefore, “As international experience becomes more and more task-performance rather than character building in its objectives, a new notion of international competence is called for.” The challenge to adapting to a new globalized world was not limited to the United States. Academics in other nations also sought ways to internationalize their campuses, and they also asked questions about how best to move forward with plans for incorporating an international dimension into a variety of university activities. As Christopher Ball reflected

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12 Ibid. p. 323.
on higher education in the UK, “In brief, the nature of higher education is changing. Its essence is being redefined. The old certainties are being questioned. We are no longer sure what it is. Whatever it may be, I want to argue that in the future it must be international.”

Thus, many administrators in higher education in the 1990s were responsive to the external pressures to internationalize campuses, but they expressed great uncertainty about how best to achieve these aims.

In addition to the uncertainties about administering international changes to campuses, there were also many questions about what the global political landscape would look like, and how the post Cold War geopolitical landscape would influence higher education. Some, like Allan Goodman, expressed optimism that, despite the current uncertainty, education would play a pivotal role in shaping the future,

Whatever happens, education is at the core of the process because training a new generation of leaders is vital to the successful construction and maintenance of a new world order. U.S. universities will have to teach people about changing national conditions and international transformations at a time when no one thus far seems to have predicted current events or their rapid pace of development.

The Commission on International Education of the American Council on Education also demonstrated the anxiety of the times in their 1995 report, Educating Americans for a World in Flux: Ten Ground Rules for Internationalizing Higher Education. The report reiterated the claims from the 1980s that Americans were ill prepared to succeed in the world, but added, “The cold war is over. The domestic economy is global. The ‘melting pot’ is boiling over. Our world is in flux. The approach of the 21st century foreshadows not simply a new millennium,

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15 Educating Americans for a World in Flux: Ten Ground Rules for Internationalizing Higher Education.
but a completely new and different globe.”¹⁶ These authors argued that the lines between “foreign” and “domestic” were being blurred both because of improved telecommunications technologies and because interrelated global issues impacting the environment, economy, public health, human rights and national security were directly pertinent to Americans in the United States and abroad. In this new world of flux and interconnectivity, the commission urged U.S. colleges and universities to make several critical changes to enhance their international capacities.¹⁷

Reformers advocated for a more all-encompassing vision for the international dimension in American higher education that sought to pull the various and disconnected elements of international education from their isolated enclaves on (or off) campus to the center. Educating Americans for a World in Flux called for the entire educational experience to be “infused with some degree of intercultural competence” that included mandatory foreign language training, but also programs to help all students understand “how particular countries and geographic regions interact with the larger world.”¹⁸ Beyond this, and in addition to introducing international components to the traditional academic disciplines, these authors encouraged universities to introduce “problem-focused programs of study” that prompted students to explore lines of inquiry based on real world problems.¹⁹ By inculcating intercultural competencies in students and fostering understanding of real-world problems, colleges and universities would better prepare students to develop greater

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¹⁶ Ibid. p. 3.
¹⁷ The committee made ten recommendations: “(1) require that all graduates demonstrate competence in at least one foreign language; (2) encourage understanding of at least one other culture; (3) increase understanding of global systems; (4) revamp curricula to reflect the need for international understanding; (5) expand study abroad and internship opportunities for all students; (6) focus on faculty development and rewards; (7) examine the organizational needs of international education; (8) build consortia to enhance capabilities; (9) cooperate with institutions in other countries; and (10) work with local schools and communities.” Ibid. (abstract) n.p.
¹⁸ Ibid. p. 5.
¹⁹ Ibid. p. 6.
understanding of world cultures in ways that would also enhance understanding of the
diversity in the United States. As the report put it,

> By encouraging the learning of foreign languages; exposing students to diverse
cultures, art, and music; and explaining the roots and origins of ethnic and tribal
conflict, higher education can help students make connections between their
families’ origins, their experiences as immigrants, and their own cultural identities.\(^{20}\)

The authors of this report suggested that increasing study and internship opportunities
abroad to all students would serve this purpose well, stating, "The Commission is convinced
that study and internship abroad are among the most valuable educational experiences any
student can receive."\(^{21}\) The message in this report blurred the lines between the academic,
professional, developmental, and cross-national understanding aims of overseas study by
suggesting that study abroad could provide all of these benefits but the new development
was the suggestion that by studying abroad, students could better understand different
cultures within the United States. Thus, even with its underlying message of anxiety about
the new world, *Educating Americans for a World in Flux* articulated a strategy for students to
succeed both in the United States and in the changing world with enhanced intercultural
competence.

Other reformers also encouraged bolstering international competence in American
undergraduate students. For example, in Goodman’s book, *A Brief History of the Future: The
United States in a Changing World Order* (1993), the Georgetown University administrator also
encouraged enhancing the intercultural competency of American students. As he explained,
“…classroom lectures and their lessons should incorporate qualities of intercultural
sensitivity. All cultures respond to change differently. It is important to understand which

\(^{20}\) Ibid. p. 7.
\(^{21}\) Ibid. p. 11.
mixture of conditions and culture may lead to stress and conflict at the human as well as societal levels.”

For Goodman, an interdisciplinary approach to teaching world affairs would greatly increase international understanding and demonstrate to students the intricacies of living in an interconnected world. Additionally, in *The Contribution of International Exchange to the International Education of Americans: Projections for the Year 2000*, Barbara Burn (Director of the International Programs Office at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst) noted the rapid pace at which the world was developing at the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century and she also made projections and recommendations for enhancing international education by the year 2000. Like many in the 1990s, Burn recognized that the end of the Cold War signaled a turning point in international exchange programs. In this new context of post Cold War anxiety, international education was one key to addressing “…the major transnational problems which increasingly affect the well-being of the U.S. and threaten economic growth and political stability worldwide.” Increasing participation in study abroad for American students was another key to growth and stability. Burn was particularly mindful of the need for a greater cross-section of students participating in study abroad including students of different majors, racial, ethnic and socioeconomic groups. With regard to expansion, she encouraged colleges and universities to address the cost concerns affiliated with study abroad, and to integrate overseas study programs with home degree programs. She also urged institutions to recruit more committed faculty to advocate for study abroad and to help faculty find ways to incorporate their own research into their overseas study responsibilities. Finally, with regard to faculty, she thought that institutions

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24 Ibid. p. 23.
should reward scholarly productivity for a wider variety of overseas endeavors, including leading and administering study abroad programs for undergraduate students.\textsuperscript{25}

Although Burn recommended that institutions prioritize the expansion of international education and increase participation in study abroad, she also expressed her own trepidation about the future. In this way, she encouraged educators to think about where the pendulum on international studies could swing by the year 2000. She cautioned academic leaders to consider whether American involvement in the world would produce more nationalistic sentiments in the public that could develop anti-foreign sentiments that would diminish interest in international education. Moreover, with regard to incorporating a more diverse groups of students in international education she asked, “Will the greater attention and political and societal role which the growing domestic minorities within the U.S.—Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians—will demand and gain, deter or strengthen international and multicultural education in our increasingly diverse nation?”\textsuperscript{26} Burn therefore acknowledged the ambiguity of the coming years, but also expressed positive rhetoric about the benefits of international education. This message reiterated the rhetoric of others in this period and demonstrated how study abroad for undergraduates remained an important part of the discussion for the future. Beyond the importance of study abroad in these discussions, many of the authors of these reports saw a need to increase and diversify participation on these overseas study programs.

**Calls for Expansion, Diversity, and the Domestic Benefits of Overseas Study**

In the last decade of the twentieth century, study abroad reformers focused on expansion, diversity, and a modified aim of cross-national understanding. In terms of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[25] Ibid. p. 41.
\item[26] Ibid. p. 39–40.
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expansion, throughout the 1990s, advocates of international education continued the trend of the previous decade by calling for increased participation in study abroad programs across a wider geographic distribution in the world. Related to expansion, many reformers made explicit recommendations to increase the ethnic, racial, and socioeconomic diversity of the students participating on overseas study programs. Additionally, these advocates increasingly endorsed a new rationale for overseas study that built on the aim of cross-national understanding. This newly articulated benefit of study abroad emphasized the ways in which overseas study benefited students with the multicultural interactions they would encounter with increasing frequency within the United States. Although advocates continued to espouse the academic, developmental and professional aims of overseas study, they adapted the cross-national understanding aim to incorporate domestic understanding in a way not previously seen in study abroad rhetoric. In the 1920s and 1930s, advocates suggested that study abroad could prepare students to interact with people from different national cultures in a way that would foster amicable commercial, political, or cross-national relationships. In the 1960s, some proponents of study abroad advanced the idea that only the very best students could serve as goodwill ambassadors to represent the United States. These ambassadors in turn would serve as political representatives of the new American technical knowhow, but they had to also have a deep understanding of American politics to avoid spreading negative ideas about the country. In the 1990s, proponents of overseas study began to suggest that by studying abroad students would also be better prepared to interact with people of different cultures living within the United States. Federal initiatives, policy reports, and college and university programs outlined and attempted to foster this expanded rationale and increase the diversity of study abroad.
As Chapter 3 demonstrated, U.S. federal intervention into undergraduate international education had been minimal in the decades following the Second World War, but at the beginning of the 1990s, the federal government introduced a piece of legislation directly targeted towards undergraduate study abroad. In 1991, George H.W. Bush signed The National Security Education Act into law. An Oklahoma Senator named David Boren had spearheaded this initiative, which established a $150 million dollar international education trust fund that provided: “1) scholarships for undergraduate study abroad; 2) graduate foreign language and area studies fellowships; and 3) university grants to create or improve foreign language and area studies programs.” Shortly after it was passed, the name of the act changed to the David L. Boren National Security Education Program (NSEP).

The passage of the NSEP was notable for two reasons. First, NSEP indicated the growing prominence of study abroad for undergraduates in the eyes of high-ranking public officials like Boren. It demonstrated how the potential for study abroad to serve national needs was once again given some prominence in Washington. Next, both the support and the backlash in academia over NSEP showed how different groups within U.S. higher education viewed this award. Although some academics worried that the ties with the U.S. Department of Defense would put NSEP recipients in danger by suggesting that Americans abroad were somehow complicit with ill-received U.S. foreign policies, others saw the funding as a way to increase access to study abroad for students from groups who had previously not participated in overseas study.

Prior to the passage of the NSEP, Boren attempted to justify his rationale for the first fully funded federal international higher education act since the NDEA.\textsuperscript{28} He argued that the decline of the Soviet Union meant that the United States had to align its new foreign policy strategy with national economic interests. In this new mode of foreign engagement, Boren suggested that the economic and moral force of the United States would be more persuasive than the military might it had displayed in the previous decades. A vital component of this new strategy would be a smarter, more multilingual group of foreign specialists and trained college students. In \textit{The Washington Post}, Boren wrote, “We can’t compete if we can’t speak the world’s languages and don’t understand the world’s cultures. Our educational system is woefully insular.”\textsuperscript{29} For Boren, the development of study abroad for undergraduates would enhance their language abilities, and prepare them to understand cultures of the world in ways that would benefit the United States. The senator’s worries about America’s growing crisis of monolingualism reiterated a common refrain from other authors who had critiqued the decreasing number of American students with foreign language training.\textsuperscript{30} Boren envisioned a more robust and internationally competent intelligence community that would benefit from a larger pool of well-trained specialists with deeper knowledge of the world and better foreign language skills.\textsuperscript{31} Although Boren’s vision for a national scholarship program for undergraduate study abroad had been seen before


\textsuperscript{29}Boren, "...For a Model Nation." p. A23.


\textsuperscript{31}Boren, "The Intelligence Community: How Crucial?."
from others, the Oklahoma senator had the political dexterity to marshal the National Security Exchange Act through Congress.

In U.S. higher education, academics and administrators responded to the NSEP in different ways. The varied reaction to this federal program illustrated the uncertainty around the politicization of overseas study for undergraduates. Some scholars were deeply concerned about the funding. Specifically, as David Comp recently demonstrated in his dissertation on the NSEP service requirement, several university faculty and professional organizations were troubled by the direct connections with the NSEP and the Department of Defense.32 The U.S. Department of Defense was placed in charge of the administration of the program’s financial trust fund, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense was appointed chair of the program’s National Security Education Board.33 Additionally, the NSEP scholarship award stipulated that any student who received the award was required to perform some type of government service following graduation.34 Many of the higher education professional organizations that represented area studies faculty, such as the African Studies Association, Latin American Studies Association, Middle Eastern Studies Association of North America and the Association for Asian Studies, published their concerns in professional bulletins and sent their grievances about the NSEP to Senator Boren.35 At the core of their concerns was the fear that aligning academic funding so directly with the Department of Defense would jeopardize cooperation with overseas partners. Moreover, these direct ties to the Department of Defense would put those scholars and students studying abroad in great danger if they were in parts of the world where U.S. foreign policy was viewed in a negative light.

33 Ibid. p. 6.
34 Ibid.
light. Despite the concerns over the program, the NSEP continued to administer scholarships throughout the 1990s. After a change in leadership in the management of the program in 1993 following new Clinton appointments, some of the backlash diminished. Additionally, the NSEP board increased their outreach efforts to American colleges and universities to reduce tension. Moreover, the government changed the line of authority of the program to the Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Peacekeeping to avoid associations with the Department of Defense. As Theodore Vestal noted, this shift in reporting removed the NSEP from the intelligence part of the Department of Defense hierarchy and helped to reassure some academics that the program did not have underlying motivations related to defense.³⁶

There were also many individuals and groups in higher education who welcomed the funding. In 1994 the Association of American Universities endorsed the program by expressing a belief that the NSEP would make positive contributions to U.S. colleges and universities.³⁷ Some of the larger study abroad providers also expressed their enthusiasm for the federal funding. At the Council of International Educational Exchange, the field director of university programs, William Hoffa, noted how the federal funding was unique for targeting undergraduate students. Moreover, Hoffa noted, “…the money is not just for study abroad, but it's money to encourage students who haven't studied abroad to do so, and to encourage them toward destinations that are interesting, exciting, and in the national interest.”³⁸ Since the NSEP had a mandate to send a more representative base of Americans to areas of the world deemed to be in the national security interest of the United States,

those principles aligned with the goals of many in the study abroad community who were encouraging more diverse participation in study abroad in so-called non-traditional destinations (e.g. countries not in Europe). As the coordinator of study abroad programs at Spelman College, Margery A. Ganz, put it, “I think this [the NSEP] represents a real funding source for underrepresented groups.” In these ways, several proponents of study abroad expressed their hope that the NSEP could expand the base of study abroad students and extend the destinations for these students to study.

**Increasing Calls for Diversity in Undergraduate Study Abroad**

The desire to expand study abroad to a wider array of students from different ethnic/racial and socio-economic backgrounds was an important and growing aspect of the policy rhetoric in the 1990s that emerged from discussions in U.S. higher education about multiculturalism and rising costs of college education. American colleges and universities in the final years of the twentieth century were preoccupied with debates about cultural diversity, affirmative action, multiculturalism and the rising cost of higher education. As faculty sought ways to inject marginalized voices into the curriculum, administrators on campuses had to incorporate diverse new student populations into daily life by diminishing offensive speech but still providing space for discussion and interaction. Meanwhile declining state appropriations, increasing competition, and new enrollment management practices all played a part in escalating the cost of university education. This environment of rising costs and debates about diversity intersected with the appeals for increased

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39 Ibid.
international education and stimulated new discussions about how to increase access to study abroad for a wider array of students of different backgrounds.

Those who advocated for increased access to study abroad articulated multiple rationales for their work in establishing a more diverse cohort of students. First, many acknowledged that in order for the percentage of total students studying abroad to increase, a much wider array of students enrolled in post-secondary education would need to participate. This meant there were calls for more institutions to send students and for there to be more students from within each college and university to participate. Several proponents justified adding more diverse students to overseas study because many of the world’s problems were interconnected. Therefore, the benefits of international education were no longer beneficial to a select few; instead, in the age of globalization, all American students would need to benefit from knowledge about the world. In turn, the diverse range of students who studied abroad would be able to serve a variety of needs as a result of the skills they gained abroad. Related to these discussions about increasing the diversity of students studying abroad, another area of discussion in this domain focused on addressing the more practical barriers to overseas study. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, the advocates worried about unregulated growth in study abroad in the 1960s encouraged academic focus, American institutional control, and high selectivity as standards for success. As diversity became an aspirational element of study abroad in the 1990s, new advocates for access had to overcome the paradigm of selectivity. Advocates for increased access to study abroad also argued that given the increasingly multicultural nature of the United States, students from a wide variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds should also study abroad. Intertwined with this notion was the idea that American students who participated on study abroad programs would develop their intercultural communication skills in ways that would not only benefit
them in their dealings with people from other countries, but also in interacting with people from other cultures within the United States. In this way, the rhetoric of cross-national understanding and access to study abroad intersected in many of these discussions.

Policy reports at the end of the millennium undergirded their calls for expanded access with the familiar rhetoric of security and prosperity.\textsuperscript{41} For example, in 1990, NAFSA: the Association of International Educators, issued a report on the state of study abroad called, \textit{A National Mandate for Education Abroad: Getting on with the Task}. Much like \textit{Educating for Global Competence}, \textit{A National Mandate} called on leaders in higher education to amplify study abroad efforts in order to meet the needs of an interconnected world in terms of business, diplomacy, science and technology and to diversify the student body abroad. As \textit{A National Mandate} put it, “By the year 2000 ten percent of American college and university students should have a significant educational experience abroad during their undergraduate years…”\textsuperscript{42} The authors of the report mentioned the need for colleges and universities to be mindful of ways to increase funding both for individual students and for institutions. The authors of \textit{Educating Americans for a World in Flux: Ten Ground Rules for Internationalizing Higher Education}, also argued for increased diversity in overseas study. They suggested that internships and study abroad would be most beneficial to the future of the United States if students from all backgrounds could participate. One suggestion for helping students from lower incomes was for universities to make it possible for students to use their financial aid for their overseas studies experiences. By the 1990s the average cost for study abroad (fees, housing, and travel) was almost double the average amount of tuition/housing for in-state


\textsuperscript{42} \textit{A National Mandate for Education Abroad: Getting on with the Task}. Report of the National Task Force on Undergraduate Education Abroad. p. 4.
tuition at public universities, and more than half the cost of average tuition/housing at private institutions.\textsuperscript{43} A National Mandate also underscored the importance of funding in strategies to increase study abroad options, by explaining that “expanded funding from both private and public sources” would be “essential” to expanding overseas study for undergraduates.\textsuperscript{44} Finally, A National Mandate articulated the importance of increasing the diversity in study abroad. They wrote, “As number and opportunities are expanded we urge that greater diversity be a major goal for all aspects of education abroad: greater diversity in participating students, in foreign locations, and in types of programs.”\textsuperscript{45} The high degree of selectivity that advocates so valued in the 1960s had narrowed the potential pool of applicants for study abroad and by the late 1980s and early 1990s administrators began to recognize this limitation of the rhetoric of selectivity. Thus, proponents of growth in overseas study had to devise ways to cultivate expansion in ways that would incorporate greater access to a larger cross-section of students.

The urgent need to expand international efforts and increase the diversity of participation on American university campuses continued in the 1990s in large part due to an increasing acknowledgement that the problems of the world were no longer distinguished by national boundaries. In a report from 1990 on the ways in which U.S. higher education had failed to fully integrate the international dimension into colleges and universities despite decades of attempts, Goodwin and Nacht argued that U.S. institutions of higher learning had to internationalize in a comprehensive manner. The level of internationalization necessary in the 1990s had to be more inclusive than before. In terms of overseas study, there needed to


\textsuperscript{44} A National Mandate for Education Abroad: Getting on with the Task. Report of the National Task Force on Undergraduate Education Abroad, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. p. 7.
be wide access because “Comprehension of foreign languages and cultural diversity must become not simply the province of a designated few but the responsibility of all.” Goodwin and Nacht’s suggestion for incorporating all students in study abroad efforts stemmed from their assertion that the international dimension of higher education was an issue of concern for all members of college and university communities. Barbara Burn advocated for increased access, but with a slightly different rationale. As she explained in her report,

> With the increasing cultural diversity within the United States, colleges and universities and funding agencies should give priority to enabling minority students (the underrepresented by ethnic, gender, and disciplinary criteria) to participate in study abroad, and in so doing to explore and reduce current deterrents, financial and otherwise. Burn also believed that study abroad would benefit all students by developing their cross-cultural skills. Burn saw study abroad as a means for students to develop competencies necessary for increasing understanding between different groups of people living within the United States. As she wrote, “The study abroad experience by developing these skills is important in preparing students to function effectively not only in the global village but also as members of the increasingly diverse American culture and people.” Thus, Burn argued that the cultural understanding that students obtained from studying abroad would be beneficial in a global and domestic context.

In practice, some professional administrators in study abroad actively sought means to increase the diversity of the student population. In 1991, the Council on International Educational Exchange’s 43rd International Conference on Educational Exchange discussed this topic extensively. The conference theme that year was “International Education:

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Broadening the Base of Participation.” Many of the conference presentations that year focused specifically on ways to increase the number of black American undergraduate students participating in overseas studies programs. A mix of university presidents, study abroad administrators and students discussed both the rationales and challenges for black students interested in studying abroad. The keynote that year, delivered by Spelman College president, Johnnetta Betsch Cole, outlined how study abroad had the potential to help mitigate various expressions of bigotry, but that there were many barriers in place to prevent African American students from participating.49

The four primary barriers to study abroad for African Americans could be expressed by the “Four Fs: Faculty and staff, Finances, Family and community, Fears.”50 Faculty could be a barrier because of their predilection to recruit only a selective body of students for overseas study. At predominately white institutions, Cole worried that faculty were not interested in or able to recruit black students. Beyond this, since faculty were often overburdened with a variety of responsibilities, recruitment of African American students was low on their list of priorities. Finances posed another challenge to study abroad for black students. Although not all black students were poor or on financial aid, “Black students are more than three times as likely as white students (38 percent vs. 13 percent) to come from families with incomes below $20,000.”51 Families, particularly parents, also undermined a black student’s ability to study abroad because of parental worries about health, safety, and

49 In her keynote address, Cole made the point that although she believed that the barriers to studying abroad that she described could apply to all minority students, she was most familiar with the African American students she knew at Spelman College. Johnnetta Betsch Cole, “Opening Address of the 43rd International Conference on Educational Exchange.” In, Black Students and Overseas Programs: Broadening the Base of Participation, Proceedings of Ciee 43rd International Conference on Educational Exchange: International Education: Broadening the Base of Participation (Charleston, South Carolina: Council on International Educational Exchange, 1991).
50 Ibid. p. 3.
51 Ibid. p. 3.
the impact of racism on their children abroad. Finally, the students own fears were the final obstacle for African American undergraduates. Like their concerned parents, black students also worried about the types of racism they might encounter overseas. As Cole explained, “The response of many of our students is that they know and on some level understand American racism, but why venture into foreign variations on that everyday theme?” Cole suggested that each of these obstacles could be overcome.

There were other issues and obstacles related to establishing a more diverse base of students, and incorporating multicultural aspects of the curriculum like race and gender into study abroad. First, from a data collection standpoint, there were no national records accounting for the race of students studying abroad until 1995. In response to requests from study abroad professionals, the IIE for the first time included a question for study abroad students about their race/ethnicity in their 1994/95 Open Doors survey. In that academic year, the IIE found that there were 76,302 total students abroad, of which 84% were White, 5% were Hispanic-American, 5% were Asian-American, 3% were Multiracial, 3% were African-American, and less than 1% were Native American. By comparison, the total fall enrollment at all U.S. colleges and universities in 1994 was 14,304,800, and 75% of these students were white, 11% Black, 8% Hispanic, 6% Asian or Pacific Islander and less than 1% Native American. The study abroad survey however relied on self-reported data, and since only 43% of the institutions in the United States collected this information about their students, the figures were not complete. In addition to the problems with data collection, the

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52 Ibid. p. 4.
growing body of research on study abroad paid little attention to the impact of a student’s race or gender on her study abroad experience. Researchers focused on the benefits of study abroad to language acquisition, and deeper cultural knowledge, but not on what role, if any, race played in motivations to go abroad or students’ experiences overseas. Alternatively, researchers considered the importance of linking outside classroom experiences to in-class study abroad curricula in order to foster more beneficial cultural awareness in participants.

The few researchers who did consider how race or gender played a part in shaping the experience of students abroad, found that most study abroad programs were not attuned to the unique experience of different students. Susan Talburt and Melissa Stewart considered the challenges faced by the only African American female student on a program in Spain who felt overly signaled out and sexualized by Spanish men. In light of this student’s experience as the only woman of color on her program, the authors argued that all students could benefit from more nuanced discussions of race, gender and the unique cultural context of overseas study, saying,

The different linguistic and cultural lessons and coping strategies that students can learn from how members of the host culture perceive and treat them—the lessons of the raced and gendered nature of study abroad—should form an integral part of the curriculum. Not only will this inclusion enable students marked by their race and

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gender to understand and deal with their positions, but it will invite all students to use race and gender as a fulcrum for cultural understanding.\textsuperscript{59}

The type of introspection and integration called for by Talburt and Stewart was lacking in many study abroad programs of the 1990s. Thus, despite the early calls for increasing diversity to harness the benefits of cross-national understanding, study abroad coordinators were finding it difficult to fully integrate these concepts into the day-to-day curricula of their programs.

The topic of increasing diversity and expanding the purpose of the cross-national aim of study abroad continued throughout the decade. Nearing the end of the 1990s a group of over 250 scholars, academic practitioners, policymakers, and foundation directors convened at the University of California, Los Angeles to consider national needs for international higher education at the graduate and undergraduate level. John N. Hawkins, Dean of International Studies and Overseas Programs at UCLA, wrote on the impetus for the meeting, “The end of the cold war, the globalization of the world economy, the resilience of nationalism, the multipolar nature of strategic concerns provide the context in which public and private organizations including universities are reconsidering their approach and commitment to international studies.”\textsuperscript{60} Just as others in the 1990s had situated international studies back in the context of the post Cold War era, participants at the meeting had a similar motivating drive for their discussions, but the group of participants at this meeting were unique in that they represented a wide cross-section of higher education institutions that were served by Title VI and Fulbright-Hays federal funding. The meeting’s proceedings, which were published under the title \textit{International Education in the New Global Era:}

\textsuperscript{59} "What's the Subject of Study Abroad?: Race, Gender, and "Living Culture"." p. 173.
Proceedings of a National Policy Conference on the Higher Education Act, Title VI, and Fulbright-Hays Programs, were aimed at reviewing federal programs impacting international higher education, and in shaping reauthorization proposals for the 105th U.S. Congress.\(^\text{61}\)

In articulating why international education at the undergraduate level should be considered a vital part of serving national needs, conference attendees demonstrated their collective vision for preserving the international dimension of undergraduate U.S. education for the twenty-first century, and expanding the utility of study abroad to include more relevance for domestic issues. Participants from a wide array of colleges and universities argued on the specific rationales for their institutions, but on a broad level, the group agreed that the basis for supporting international education at the undergraduate level should be expanded. Namely, conference participants argued that international education should provide undergraduate students with a foundation to understand national security issues involving diplomatic, intelligence and military matters in the world; issues involving global economic competitiveness; and multicultural matters at home that were interconnected with the larger world.\(^\text{62}\) The arguments for international education that incorporated national security and economic competitiveness had been relevant for many decades, and continued to have a place in higher education. However, participants at the conference contended that educators had not clearly articulated why international education could be important for the population at large within the United States. In this light, they suggested that “global literacy” should be a component of a wide variety of degree plans because this type of literacy would enable students to succeed in a number of fields. Beyond this, the participants stressed the

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\(^{61}\) Ibid. p. 13.

“importance of international education in increasing national capacity and skills to work in multicultural environments” within the United States. In this way, near the end of the century, international education at the undergraduate level could focus on ways to understand the interconnectivity of the world, which would ultimately benefit the many, multi-cultural, local communities within the United States.63

Rhetoric Reinvigorated: Early Twenty-first Century Action Following 9/11

Throughout this history, there has been a recurring pattern of global conflict stimulating rhetoric around study abroad. This pattern emerged again at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In the aftermath of the hijacking of three American commercial flights and the subsequent attacks on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001, proponents of international education re-introduced many of the ideas that had been percolating in the 1990s. In many ways, the tragic events of that autumn morning allowed proponents of international education to amplify the claims that they had been making since the 1990s with a renewed belief that they would have a more receptive audience under the new spotlight of national security. In light of the attacks, international educators reinvigorated their rhetoric and emphasized the need to prepare students to know about the world to address the challenges of living in an interconnected global community. Since many people saw September 11th as a tragic manifestation of globalization, addressing this point became essential for educators. Less than one year after September 11th, the American Council on Education issued a report calling for a comprehensive national policy on international education and declared, “Preserving freedom, security, and prosperity at home requires that Americans understand

63 Ibid. p. 153.
and adapt to a complex—and sometimes dangerous—world. Global peace and prosperity rest now more than ever on mutual understanding and productive engagement among all nations.” To foster this mutual understanding, ACE called on federal, state, local and business leaders to work with educators around three national policy objectives: “1. Produce international experts and knowledge to address national strategic needs. 2. Strengthen U.S. ability to solve global problems. 3. Develop a globally competent citizenry and workforce.”

Thus, the basic message was similar to the policy reports issued at the end of the previous century, but the spotlight was more intense.

Following September 11th, proponents of study abroad continued to advocate for the expansion of overseas study for undergraduates, but with increased vigor and potential for funding. NAFSA: The Association of International Educators, convened a Task Force on Education Abroad with former Secretary of Education, Richard W. Riley and former senator Paul Simon as co-chairs to secure funding for a large federal initiative sponsoring a major expansion of undergraduate study abroad. Simon, the driving force behind this post-9/11 study abroad initiative, invoked the memory of Abraham Lincoln in this endeavor. As Simon put it, Lincoln “had signed the controversial Morrill Act, the Land Grant College Act…It gave higher education a huge boost and can accurately be described as the GI Bill of the 19th century.” In a similar way, Simon believed that a Lincoln Fellowship for study abroad would have a profound impact on U.S. higher education in the twenty-first century. With a fellowship for 500,000 U.S. undergraduate students to study abroad for at least a summer with stipends not exceeding $7,000 a year, Simon believed that this $3.5 billion dollar per

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year investment would help Americans be more understanding of the world, “less likely to commit international blunders,” and more competitive in the arena of international trade.\textsuperscript{67} Simon and others in the task force used the report to call attention to the need for such a fellowship.

In the task force’s report, *Securing America’s Future: Global Education for a Global Age: Report on the Strategic Task Force on Education Abroad*, the rhetoric justifying this type of initiative was familiar to the policy reports from the late twentieth century. The task force first recalled the public inquiries by the U.S. federal government in the days following September 11\textsuperscript{th} for Americans who were fluent in Arabic, Farsi and Pashto. In *Securing America’s Future*, the task force described the ways in which cable news networks broadcasted these requests for area studies and language experts to the general public. The report saw this public admission of ignorance of the languages and cultures of the Middle East was seen as a damning indictment against U.S. education. *Securing America’s Future* noted that the extensive system of higher education in the United States had failed to provide its students with the foreign language skills critical to security. The NAFSA task force saw September 11\textsuperscript{th} as a new “Sputnik moment” for the federal government to respond to an international event in a way that would reinvigorate the international aspects of higher education.

Moreover, the report explained, “We are unnecessarily putting ourselves at risk because of our stubborn monolingualism and ignorance of the world. As strong as our country and economy are, we cannot remain prosperous and secure if we do not understand the words and actions of our international neighbors.”\textsuperscript{68} The report suggested that an increase in funding to support more study abroad programs for U.S. undergraduate students would go a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid. p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
long way to ameliorating the monolingual ailment so many Americans suffered from. Beyond helping to increase foreign language acquisition in students, funding to support study abroad programs would promote the following: understanding of people of other nationalities in ways that would foster goodwill between nations; improved American student understanding of global economic conditions; and enhanced personal growth in students by increasing understanding of what it meant to be American. The report also critiqued study abroad programs for sending predominantly white, wealthy, students abroad and “…failing to show the world the diversity of its population.” To overcome this shortcoming, the report called on colleges and universities to promote, ethnic, socioeconomic and gender diversity in study abroad. Essentially the calls for growth and diversity in Securing America's Future were similar to those seen at the end of the twentieth century in other policy reports, but the impact of September 11th amplified the political rhetoric and allowed the task force to more easily convey an immediate need for attention in ways not possible since the mid-century.

Paul Simon died following heart surgery in 2003, but the momentum behind his renewed call for expansion of study abroad continued in the years following his death. Even before Simon’s death, Congress had approved funding in 2003 for the establishment of a Bipartisan Presidential Commission on the Abraham Lincoln Study Abroad Fellowship Program. By 2005, the Commission, composed of leaders in business, higher education, and government, published their report, entitled Global Competence & National Needs: One Million

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69 Ibid. p. 6.  
70 Ibid. p. 10.  
The Commission kept true to Simon’s vision to expand the total number of students studying abroad. In short, they called for one million students to study abroad annually by the 2016-17 school year. As stated many times previously by policy reports calling for increased participation in overseas study by undergraduate students, the commission emphasized that, “Our national security and domestic prosperity depend upon a citizenry that understands America’s place in the world, the security challenges it faces, and the opportunities and perils confronting Americans around the world. Responding to these realities requires a massive increase in the global literacy of the typical college graduate.” In order to meet this goal, the 2005 commission requested federal funding of $50 million dollars annually for the first year of the program with escalating appropriations until 2011-12 when the total should be $125 million dollars. The majority of this money would be given directly to students in the form of scholarships, and institutions of higher learning would be called upon to democratize study abroad by making it available for more students from underrepresented backgrounds. For colleges or universities to receive any funding, they would be required to remove impediments for studying abroad for all students. Along these lines, the commission recommended that “diversity” be a “defining characteristic of the Lincoln Study Abroad Program” in the types of students served and the destinations of the programs. To achieve this task, the commission argued that federal support at the highest level would be necessary. From the Executive Office of the President into the houses of congress, the commission called on the support of those in Washington to find a proper

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73 Ibid. p. ix.
74 Ibid. p. 29.
75 Ibid. p. 27.
administrative home for the program with the prestige and political clout to achieve the program’s goal of one million students.

The Lincoln Commission’s recommendations never became a reality. In March of 2007, Democratic House Representative Tom Lantos and Republican Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen co-sponsored the newly named Senator Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation Act, which asked Congress for $80 million dollars annually for expanding the participation in study abroad. The bill explicitly aimed to raise the number of community college, low-income and underrepresented minority students in study abroad, and encouraged them to select destinations beyond Europe for study. The bill passed in the House and died in the Senate, but was reintroduced again by Senator Richard Durbin in 2009. This time, the bill died in committee in the Senate, leaving the aspirations for federal funding for another major study abroad initiative unfulfilled. The ultimate death of the Simon Act was caused in large part by the struggling U.S. economy in 2009. Senator Durbin has continued to advocate for study abroad and suggested in 2011 that he would reintroduce the act again in the near future. The Lincoln Commission and subsequent Simon Act was less of a watershed moment in ideology around study abroad than it was a natural progression of the ideas that came forth at the end of the twentieth century. The political push given to propel the Lincoln Commission following 9/11 was significant, but the ideas in the commission’s report were not new. Encouraging diversity and promoting study abroad for the benefit of the nation’s security, economic prosperity, and domestic multicultural tranquility had already

been established as priorities at the end of the century. In this way, the ideas put forth about study abroad in the early 2000s had roots in the twentieth century.

Conclusion

Since the renaissance of rhetoric around international education in the 1980s, institutions of higher education sought ways to incorporate the many tentacles of internationalization into the central administration of colleges and universities, but by the 1990s there were new concerns for leaders in higher education. With the growing uncertainty about the impact of globalization and increasingly diverse students attending colleges and universities, proponents of study abroad found the methods they had employed to promote overseas study for undergraduates in the 1960s had become anachronistic. By the 1990s, the elite nature of study abroad was a detriment to expanding participation and proved a challenge to those institutions seeking to increase the number of students of color or students of lesser financial resources. To overcome these barriers, advocates of study abroad called for greater diversity in participation. Beyond this, by the end of the twentieth century, the aim of cross-national understanding expanded. The belief that study abroad could benefit students by instilling in them knowledge about other cultures to promote amity between nations, incorporated the idea that study abroad could also serve students in their interactions with people of different cultures in the United States. These ideas carried over into the twenty-first century and were amplified following September 11th.
CHAPTER 7: LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE PRACTICE

Throughout the twentieth century, there have been numerous ways to justify overseas study for American students and many institutions have devised plans to send their students abroad for home university credit. Since the very first junior year abroad program at the University of Delaware in 1923 advocates have promoted different aims for overseas study with academic, professional, developmental, or cross-national understanding rationales in mind. At the national and institutional level, the goals and objectives for study abroad have not always aligned. For example, in national calls for expansion, proponents have often extolled the virtues of cross-national understanding for economic, political, or cultural purposes in ways that were proposed to benefit the United States, while institutions have advocated for the academic or professional benefits of study abroad. The agendas that have informed these various rationales have been shaped by different ideologies and historical contexts, such as the internationalism of the interwar period, the swelling international engagement of the U.S. in the post World War II era, and the anxious approach to globalization and multiculturalism in the late twentieth century. Major conflicts including World Wars and other events such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, have also influenced the rhetoric around overseas study. Beyond responding to war, in each of these periods, proponents of study abroad have attempted to advance or improve the practice in ways that lived up to their aspirations but also fit into the larger context of U.S. higher education. These proponents can be categorized into the following three groups: faculty and administration, students and parents, and external proponents. Complicating this dynamic have been the equally cacophonous and influential student voices who have approached
education abroad with their own variety of motivating rationales. Like the rhetoric of professional administrators and other proponents of overseas study, the undergraduate participant rhetoric has also influenced the long-term development of this aspect of U.S. higher education.

To the extent that study abroad is now a widely accepted practice for American colleges and universities, the rhetoric and efforts of all of these proponents throughout the twentieth century have been successful; however, if success is measured in proportional representation, then study abroad has a long way to go. In the most recent tally of U.S. students abroad, the IIE found that of the graduating class of students from the 2012/13 academic year, only 9% had studied abroad at some point in their undergraduate career. In the same academic year the majority of the 289,408 students who travelled overseas for credit were white (76.3%), and only 7.6% were Hispanic, 7.3% were Asian/Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 5.3% were African American, 3% were multiracial and 0.5% were Native American. Women made up 65% of the total number of students abroad. In the 2012/13 academic year, there were 20,642,800 students enrolled in U.S. degree-granting postsecondary institutions and 60% were white, 15% Black, 15% Hispanic, 6% Asian/Pacific Islander, 3% “Two or more races,” and 1% Native American (57% of the students were female). The Institute of International Education also ranks colleges and universities by participation rates and institutional type. In 2012/13 the IIE ranked doctorate institutions with the highest percentages of students studying abroad, and the top 25

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institutions did not include a single public university. Thus, although study abroad is a common feature offered to undergraduates at most U.S. colleges and universities, only a small percentage of these students ever participate in overseas studies programs, and the institutions with the highest participation rates tend to be private universities.

Beyond this issue of participation there are many critiques of education abroad today. Despite many positive assessments of study abroad by students and faculty, there are many who are critical of overseas study programs and they question the purposes, political agendas, and learning outcomes. There have also been concerns about the commercialization of overseas study in the twenty-first century and inquiries into the ethics of study abroad providers that offered institutions financial compensation in the form of subsidized travel for university officials, cash bonuses, and other perks in exchange for promoting certain third-party programs. Questions about academic integrity, political influence, and commercial chicanery are nothing new in education abroad. For practitioners interested in addressing some of the issues mentioned above, an understanding of the history of U.S. study abroad programs can offer a set of principles for contemporary practice based on past patterns of rhetoric and practice. This chapter briefly reviews the major findings and themes of this research and proposes a set of guidelines for advocates of study abroad to consider when creating, managing, selecting, or funding study abroad programs for their students.

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Summary and Findings

Throughout the twentieth century the discourse of study abroad advocates shifted to adapt to the context of the changing times and at many moments this rhetoric guided practice in ways that established overseas study as a permanent fixture in U.S. higher education. Proponents vocalized the high aims and the practical challenges of administering undergraduate study abroad programming throughout the century and demonstrated a capacity to adapt to the needs of different constituents. Additionally, the ways in which different advocates envisioned study abroad in different periods changed according to the political, economic, social, and educational priorities for the individuals involved in creating, sponsoring or supporting these programs. The result of this shifting rhetoric and multiple administrative priorities is a uniquely diverse set of programs that parallels U.S. higher education, which is distinctive for its varied assortment of institutional types. The long-term development of study abroad therefore followed a trajectory, which began with a focus on conceiving and justifying overseas study to a new audience in the 1920s. Following the Second World War, study abroad entered a new era of expansion and proponents focused less on the rhetoric of justification and more on administration and adopting standards. By the end of the 1970s, study abroad had become a permanent fixture at U.S. college and university campuses and numerous new full-time study abroad professionals began reassessing the practice and calling for reform in areas such as student access. These calls continued into the twenty-first century, and were amplified following September 11, 2001.

In the period of Conception and Justification, 1910-1945 (Ch. 1 & 2), the First World War stimulated many individuals and institutions in U.S. higher education to reconsider the place of American colleges and universities in the world. Two strands of internationalism (corporate and cultural) informed much of the thinking behind international
programs in this period. For example, at the first institution of higher education that introduced formal study abroad, the University of Delaware, proponents emphasized the various benefits of overseas study to a national audience with a decidedly commercial emphasis. Their rhetoric fell in line with the underling ideology of corporate internationalism, which encouraged cross-national understanding for the purpose of easing flows of capital and commerce around the world. Administrators at Smith College, the second college to establish study abroad programming, downplayed the commercial or cultural aspects of their program. Instead, Smith administrators stressed the prestigious academic benefits of learning French in France and the protective elements for the women of their program. Both of these institutions utilized similar models for overseas study that included: carefully selected courses and homestays, strict U.S. faculty on-site supervision; and a high degree of selectivity for undergraduates to spend their junior year in France.

Students were another important factor in shaping the rhetoric of these two programs. In particular, the students on both of these junior year abroad plans often expressed newly found worldviews and deeper appreciation for their host nation in ways that emphasized the cultural aspects of internationalism and the developmental and cross-national understanding aims of study abroad. In this way, the goals and objectives of the institutions did not fully align with student outcomes; yet, national organizations with internationalist missions, like the IIE, recognized these student commentaries and subsequently promoted the junior year abroad to a wider audience. Beyond the IIE, both Smith College and the University of Delaware recognized the impact of student discourse about their programs and the two institutions often highlighted the student voices in their school newspapers and other promotional publications. The students emphasized personal development and cultural internationalism in their reflections about the programs and this in
turn influenced how other students perceived these overseas study programs. Although the interwar promise of fostering goodwill between nations diminished as hostilities in Europe led to the Second World War, the enthusiasm behind study abroad remained despite the ongoing battles between nations.

In the period of Institutionalization and Attempts at Standardization, 1946-1969 (Ch. 3 & 4), the United States entered the world in a position of power, which had an impact on U.S. colleges and universities. The federal government, foundations, and educators were increasingly interested in expanding the international dimensions of U.S. higher education in the areas of curriculum and instruction, student mobility, knowledge production (research for faculty and graduate students), outreach (community/adult education), and university partnerships. Study abroad for undergraduates occupied only a small part of these discussions, and few academics considered overseas study for undergraduates to be a major mechanism for instilling an international dimension in higher education. Instead most administrators focused on research, graduate studies and international development work as primary avenues for increased international engagement. Despite its relatively minor position within the calls for expansion of international activities in this period, student interest in education abroad drove the demand for new programs. With this student demand, advocates of overseas study worried about upholding the academic aims of study abroad in the face of unregulated growth. In nationwide policy discussions about study abroad, proponents emphasized academic objectives, encouraged high selectivity and endorsed American institutional control of overseas study programs. They emphasized the selection of only the most capable, motivated and mature students with the strongest academic records. Proponents looked to the junior year abroad as an ideal model for overseas study because it provided robust academic experiences for an elite group of students in a way that the home
U.S. institution could control the learning experiences and set the conditions for ideal cultural interactions with people in the host nation. Additionally, the cross-national understanding aim took on additional purposes in this period in light of the new status of the United States in the world. Some proponents suggested that American students could serve as global ambassadors to represent the United States on their programs, while others simply wanted students to benefit from learning about other cultures. In these debates about global ambassadorship, the notion of selectivity and elitism in study abroad also played a prominent role. Many advocates suggested that only the best students should be selected for study abroad because they would need to represent the United States in the world. The rhetoric of this period reflected administrative concerns about unregulated growth and also reinforced the notion of elitism in study abroad by focusing on guiding principles of selectivity, home institutional control, and high academic standards.

Whereas the first two periods were moments of justification, institutionalization and attempts at standardization for study abroad, the final period focused on Expansion and Reform, 1970-2010s (Ch. 5 & 6). Proponents in this period included a growing number of full-time professionals who were actively mobilizing together to improve their practice and to improve different aspects of education abroad. Some of these proponents were anxious about the new global order in the post-Cold War era, and they sought ways to situate overseas study in this new global context. To promote overseas study in this period, proponents began to appeal to aspects of the practice that emphasized connections to global economic success and national security in urgent and pressing ways. Beyond this, reform-minded proponents of education abroad in this period sought to expand the benefits of overseas study to include inter-cultural domestic benefits. Namely, advocates suggested that by studying abroad students could develop the skills necessary to interact amicably with
people of different cultures living within the United States. The need to expand the aim of cross-national understanding to include domestic benefits, economic prosperity and national security coincided with scattered efforts to increase participation in study abroad and ongoing debates in the United States about multiculturalism. By the late 1980s, some reformers began to recognize how the policies of selectivity in the 1960s had established a pattern of elitism in study abroad. Most of the students who participated were white, affluent, and humanities majors. As educators and policy makers noted the lack of diversity in terms of the areas of study, ethnic, racial and socio-economic backgrounds of students, they began to push for access. Throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, proponents of study abroad encouraged increased participation and stressed the benefits study abroad to all students. In the twenty-first century, the events of September 11th shed a spotlight on the need for overseas study and advocates used this national platform to continue to lobby for federal funding for national study abroad programs in the early 2000s in ways that were never fully successful.

**From Rhetoric to Reality: Themes from this Study and Suggestions for Future Practice**

The high hopes and multiple aspirations that proponents have placed on education abroad throughout the twentieth century have fostered a thriving, yet selective, aspect of U.S. higher education. The broad themes that have emerged from this dissertation can serve as helpful guidelines for those practitioners seeking ways to increase access to overseas study today. Understanding how the discourse and practice of study abroad have shifted to meet the needs of different constituents in different time periods, and recognizing how certain rhetorical strategies have fostered selectivity in overseas study are both important for preserving and promoting overseas study for more undergraduates. In short, the themes are:
• The overlying aims of study abroad (academic, professional, developmental and cross-national understanding) are fluid and can incorporate political, economic, educational, personal or cultural overtones depending on the historical context.

• At the institutional and individual level, specific constituents (e.g. universities, faculty, administration, funders, students, politicians, etc.) conceive the aims of study abroad in distinct ways.

• Rhetoric can influence practice in both beneficial and detrimental ways.

• Aligning national aims with individual and institutional aspirations for undergraduate overseas study requires persistent interplay between local and national objectives.

These themes provide a basis for which proponents at the national and institutional level can benefit from lessons from the past to inform contemporary and future practice in study abroad.

First, this history has shown that the aims of study abroad are not universal. The objectives for study abroad can incorporate political, economic, educational, personal or cultural overtones depending on the historical context. In broad terms, throughout the twentieth century, proponents of overseas study have articulated various objectives for study abroad that have generally been contained to the academic, professional, developmental and cross-national understanding aims. However, within these categories, there has been room for growth and expansion of meaning over time. For example, the aim of cross-national understanding took on internationalist overtones in the 1920s, but even those broadly internationalist aims had degrees of nuance. The administrators at Delaware touted the professional and corporate internationalist aims of their Foreign Study Plan, while students came away from the program promoting cultural internationalist sentiments of deeper understanding of French people through their language and culture. In the 1950s and 1960s,
the aim of cross-national understanding incorporated the notion of the student as goodwill ambassador as the United States sought to expand its political influence in different parts of the world. More recently, in the 1980s and 1990s, the cross-national understanding benefits of overseas study were seen in light of multiculturalism within the U.S. Proponents argued that, just as study abroad could help students understand people of different nations, it could also benefit students by preparing them to interact with people of different cultures living within the United States. Thus, at several different points in the past, the broad objectives for study abroad have changed to fit the historical context.

Knowing that there are multiple rationales for overseas study at any given time is important, and it points to the need for clarity of objectives or flexibility for a given context. In other words, at the institutional level, it is vital for college, university, and third-party study abroad administrators to be thoughtful about how program goals are aligned with the needs of the day and to understand clearly which objectives are being promoted for a given context. Careful and clear articulation of the aims of study abroad programs is one important way to transmit the ideology behind specific programs to all relevant audiences, and to instill guiding principles that will not mislead potential students. One way to gauge the needs of the day in order to articulate objectives is by incorporating relevant research evidence on study abroad. On the other hand, at the national level, in efforts to promote study abroad to a larger audience, seek funding, or garner political support, it is more important to convey the fluid nature of the objectives of education abroad. Since history has shown that overseas study has the capacity to absorb multiple aspirations and objectives, when attempting to appeal to a wide audience, proponents can benefit from the expansive potential of study abroad. Rhetoric that endorses the broad claims of overseas study can help generate support of a larger array of interested parties.
Second, throughout the twentieth century, various constituents (e.g., faculty, administration, funders, students, politicians, etc.) have conceived the aims of study abroad in distinct ways. In the 1950s and 1960s when students were driving much of the growth in study abroad, faculty and professional staff were not necessarily mindful of student aims. Instead, study abroad administrators worried about the unregulated nature of growth and they developed ways to orient programs in ways that might better align with the academic missions of colleges and universities. In a wider sense, this study has shown how policy makers and funding agents at the national level, educators and administrators at the institutional level, and students at the individual level all have brought different perspectives and agendas to their understanding of study abroad. This complicated matrix of aims for education abroad has allowed for innovation in specific programs, such as the junior year abroad in the 1920s, but has opened the door for conflicting agendas too, as demonstrated by the fears of commercialism delegitimizing study abroad in the 1960s and early 2000s.

The importance of clarity, collaboration, and research are relevant to this theme. That is, despite the distinct aims of overseas study for individual constituents there are ways to manage these seemingly intractable objectives to meet the needs of various parties. At the national level, policy makers and foundations would be wise to be clear about their objectives for study abroad, and it is also necessary to be aware of distinct institutional approaches to the same goal. Continued collaboration with institutions and other interested parties in aligning missions will also be essential. At the institutional level, it would also behoove faculty and administrators to be aware of the distinction between institutional goals and student goals, but it would also be important to seek opportunities for mutual agreement over objectives. For example, there is a natural alignment between student academic goals to graduate on time and institutional goals to improve retention. Recent research on study
abroad students and graduation rates has demonstrated that overseas study does not necessarily reduce the time it takes for students to graduate. Moreover, in some cases, studying abroad was correlated with higher graduation rates for students of color and “at-risk” undergraduates. By utilizing this research to develop programs with the aim of meeting academic goals like timely graduation, institutions can align their program objectives with corresponding student goals. The importance of being attentive to student needs cannot be overstated. Throughout this history, students have often driven the growth and direction of the field. Thus, students have played an integral part in shaping overseas study. Students decide to study abroad for a variety of reasons; therefore, those who develop programs would be wise to recognize student interests and needs, while still remaining faithful to the integrity of their institutional missions. Gathering data and increasing the knowledge base in the field are also critical to this theme. Collecting sufficient and robust qualitative and quantitative data from students to assess the impact of program objectives is yet another way to achieve success in study abroad.

Third, this study has shown how rhetoric can influence practice in both beneficial and detrimental ways. The collective impact of the rhetoric of individuals and institutions in study abroad can have a long-term impact on practice. In many senses, this is a double-edged sword. On one hand, discourse around legitimizing study abroad in the 1950s and 1960s led to some positive developments in overseas study, which generated practices that benefited students over the long-term. For example, in the calls to standardize overseas study in the 1950s and 1960s, administrators shifted their attention to principles of high academic quality,
institutional control of programs, and selectivity. Emerging from these discussions were administrative innovations, like the university-based study abroad advisor, which proved to be a critical position that benefited institutions and students over time. In the 1980s and 1990s, the push by reformers to expand diversity in study abroad also extended its influence into the twenty-first century and became an integral part of the national calls for expansion by political leaders like Paul Simon. On the other hand, rhetoric also has the potential to diminish the benefits to students such as the discourse of exclusivity during the mid-century, which advocated for high selectivity in study abroad. The principles of selectivity and elitism established in the earliest junior year abroad programs and then reinforced in the 1960s, set the tone for elitism in overseas study that would ultimately hamper efforts at expansion and greater access at the end of the twentieth century.

The potential for rhetoric to have long-term impact is considerable, so building the professional and collective capacity of the field is another important aspiration. Throughout this history, proponents of study abroad have demonstrated a considerable capacity to mobilize around certain issues, and to have an impact. It would be beneficial to continue this collaboration and to encourage training and ongoing education of practitioners to foster judicious decision-making skills to inform policies and practices with long-range impact.

Finally, aligning national aims with individual and institutional aspirations for undergraduate overseas study requires persistent interplay between local and national objectives. The U.S. “system” of higher education is less a system and more an autonomous assortment of distinct institutions with varying goals and objectives. Study abroad has also developed in this independent and idiosyncratic manner to create a uniquely complex array of programs to fit the needs of a wide variety of objectives. Given this complicated collection of autonomous institutions operating to meet their own objectives, it is a
terrifically difficult task to align objectives along national, institutional and individual lines. This aspect of study abroad is both a boon and a challenge. One on hand, individual institutions can design programs with a specific goal in mind to great success, but when trying to create wider agreement on achieving the aim of increasing diversity, or large-scale growth, there are great difficulties due to conflicting conceptions of what study abroad should achieve. Still, coming together on a large scale has its benefits. When lobbying for funding, for example, a larger array of institutions and individuals behind a singular idea can have an impact. With this in mind, it is important for study abroad professionals to continue to work together at the national level to promote worthy objectives that meet the needs of many. In these persistent attempts to come together with the aim of aligning objectives, all parties must be mindful of articulating clear rationales, utilizing research, and cultivating collaboration.

On a final note, this history of promoting and advancing the practice of study abroad for American undergraduate students has shown extraordinary developments over the past ninety years. The efforts of faculty, administrators, students, foundations, government officials and a variety of proponents have combined to establish a unique and thriving aspect of undergraduate education in the United States. The days of the junior year abroad as the sole and selective means of sending undergraduates overseas for credit are long gone. Today, the options for overseas study are plentiful, and despite the challenges and shortcomings in the field, there is much potential. Whether the calls for expansion and increased access to overseas study will be realized, remains to be seen; however, given the strides that have been made in the twentieth century, there is great hope for the future of overseas study.
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