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# Fiscal Discipline and the Cost of Public Debt Service: Some Estimates for OECD Countries 

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#### Abstract

We use a panel of 16 OECD countries over several decades to investigate the effects of government debts and deficits on long-term interest rates. In simple static specifications, a one-percentage-point increase in the primary deficit relative to GDP increases contemporaneous long-term interest rates by about 10 basis points. In a vector autoregression (VAR), the same shock leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years. The effect of debt on interest rates is non-linear: only for countries with above-average levels of debt does an increase in debt affect the interest rate. World fiscal policy is also important: an increase in total OECD-government borrowing increases each country's interest rates. However, domestic fiscal policy continues to affect domestic interest rates even after controlling for worldwide debts and deficits.


## 1 Introduction

After years of fiscal consolidation in the 1990s, governments of many OECD countries have pursued more expansionary fiscal policies. During the past 5 years (2002-06), the United States general government deficit averaged 4 percent of GDP, compared with a surplus of about $1 \frac{1}{2}$ percent in 2000 . Over the same period, Japan's deficit averaged $6 \frac{3}{4}$ percent of GDP, while Germany, France, and Italy each ran deficits averaging around $3 \frac{1}{2}$ percent of GDP, and the United Kingdom about 3 percent-all representing substantial easing in relation to the beginning of the decade. Of the seven major advanced economies, only Canada bucked the trend, moving from deficit into surplus (International Monetary Fund (2006)).

One of the main concerns raised by governments' increased fiscal laxity is its possible effect on long-term interest rates. In standard macroeconomic models, which assume some degree of short-run nominal stickiness, a weakening of the primary fiscal balance in the first instance contributes to aggregate demand ${ }^{1}$ and leads to an increase in nominal and real interest rates, whether it is assumed that the nominal money supply is given by policy (as in the textbook IS-LM model) or that the monetary authorities follow a Taylor-like rule for adjusting interest rates in response to changes in the output gap (Taylor 1993). While the immediate effect of fiscal expansion is on short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates would also be affected to the extent that deficits are persistent and price adjustment gradual.

Deficits and government debt may also affect real interest rates in the longer run through a number of channels. First, to the extent that a fiscal expansion crowds out private investment and results in a lower steady-state capital stock, it will be associated with a higher marginal product of capital and thus a higher real interest rate (Engen and Hubbard (2004)). ${ }^{2}$ This effect depends on the accumulation of past and expected future fiscal deficits; past deficits are reflected in the current stock of debt while present and (again, to the extent that deficits are persistent) future deficits are represented in the current primary balance. ${ }^{3}$

[^1]A second possible effect of fiscal policy on interest rates is via any default risk premium. Models of sovereign debt crises imply that default risk depends on the existing stock of debt relative to the debtor's income streams; the risk of default in the future in that case also depends on future primary balances that contribute to future debt levels. ${ }^{4}$

A third channel through which fiscal policy may affect nominal interest rates is via expected inflation and, in an open-economy context, currency depreciation. One class of models giving rise to such effects are the "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic" of Sargent and Wallace (1981) and the fiscal theory of the price level advanced by Woodford (1995). In an open-economy context, some second-generation models of currency crises imply that a large public debt makes the authorities less likely to be prepared to tighten monetary policy to maintain a fixed exchange rate (e.g. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)), thus increasing the probability that a crisis occurs; crisis probability is reflected in turn in the interest rate spread. In addition to interest rate spreads reflecting expectations of inflation and/or depreciation, there may be risk premia associated with inflation or exchange rate uncertainty as shown by Dai and Philippon (2005).

The effects of fiscal imbalances on interest rates have been the subject of an extensive but hitherto inconclusive empirical literature and estimates of the impact of debts and deficits on interest rates vary widely. ${ }^{5}$ However, almost all of this work is based on time series evidence from single countries, typically the US. This suggests that there may be significant benefits from bringing cross-country evidence to bear on this question. This is the goal of the present paper.

In this paper, we do not try to test different models nor to distinguish among the several channels through which fiscal policy affects interest rates. Instead, we provide empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates by estimating reduced-form regressions. We examine the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates

[^2]in a broad panel of 16 OECD countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2002 . The results indicate statistically and economically significant effects of fiscal imbalances on long-term interest rates. In our preferred specification, a one percentage point increase of the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 10 -basis-point rise in the nominal interest rate on 10 -year government bonds. The increase is larger when one also considers the effect that a positive shock to the primary deficit has on expected future fiscal policy and macro variables in the longrun: in a dynamic VAR a one percentage point increase in the primary deficit-toGDP ratio leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years.

In addition to the current deficit, it is important to examine the implications of changes in the stock of public debt. We find that the effect is non-linear and that the response of long-term interest rates is positive and statistically significant only when the stock of public debt is above a given threshold. While in a country with a debt-to GDP ratio of 119 per cent (Italy in 2002) a one-standard-deviation increase in government debt leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate on 10year government bonds of about 86 basis points, an increase by the same amount where the public debt-to-GDP ratio is 58 percent (the US in 2002) leads to a 10 basis points increase in the interest rate. ${ }^{6}$

We also find that a worsening of public finances abroad has an effect on national interest rates, which is evidence that OECD countries' financial markets are to some extent internationally integrated. However, the degree of globalization is far from complete: controlling for the average value of the primary deficit and public debt-to-GDP ratios across OECD countries, a shock to each country's primary balance still affects national long-term interest rates. ${ }^{7}$ In a similar vein, we investigate whether the impact of fiscal variables on interest rates is more severe in financially less developed countries, and we find some evidence to this effect.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the econometric technique used in the estimation. Section 3 investigates the relation between fiscal policy and long-term interest rates in static models, tackles causality, expands the empirical analysis of our benchmark specifications, checks the robustness of the results, and discusses the relationship of the results to existing literature. Section 4 presents estimates from dynamic VAR models. Section 5 concludes the paper.

[^3]
## 2 Data and Method

In this section we describe the data we use in the empirical analysis, discuss the choice of the variables of interest, and investigate the time-series properties of the variables.

The paper uses yearly data on OECD countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2002. The countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. All fiscal and macroeconomic data are from the OECD Economic Outlook n.73, June 2003. Data on interest rates on 3-month Treasury bills and on 10-year government bonds are from Global Financial Data; data on 10-year interest rates on swap contracts are from Bloomberg. Data on financial development are from the World Bank database on Financial Development and Structure. ${ }^{8}$

Since the objective is to isolate the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates, we use a long-term bond rate as the dependent variable. A long-term rate reflects market conditions, including inflationary expectations, in contrast to short-term rates which are heavily influenced by current monetary policy. We focus on the nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds (INT10Y) because OECD countries in the sample have been issuing this type of long-term bond for many years and, hence, long time-series of this variable are available. ${ }^{9}$

Our key indicators of the fiscal stance refer to the general government and are the primary deficit as a share of GDP $(P R D E F)$ and the public debt as a share of GDP (GDEBT1 or GDEBT2). We use the primary deficit, rather than the total deficit, because it strips out the direct effect of interest rates on expenditure, thus better capturing autonomous changes in fiscal policy. We use two measures of government debt, GDEBT1 or GDEBT2, which differ in the way in which the variable is deflated. $G D E B T 1$ is equal to the stock of public debt measured at the end of period $\mathrm{t}-1$ divided by the level of GDP in year $\mathrm{t}-1 . G D E B T 2$ is constructed following the approach in Levine et al (2000). It is a year-average debt stock (i.e. the average of the stock of public debt in year $t-1$ and in year $t$ divided by GDP in year t ) which insulates the debt ratio from within-year inflation.

Relative to most contributions in the literature our specification is slightly un-

[^4]usual, in that it includes both the deficit and the debt. ${ }^{10}$ Our reason for doing so is that, as discussed in the introduction, in theory the relationship between fiscal policy and interest rates may be mediated by either variable. Textbook IS-LM accounts tend to emphasize the deficit, while microfounded general equilibrium models tend to place more weight on the stock of debt. Furthermore, even if one were specifically interested in the effects of only one of these variables, it would still make sense to control for the other. For example, given the current stock of debt, including the deficit may help controlling for the expected future path of the debt itself. Finally, including both variables will allow us to study interactions among them. For example, some of our specifications are designed to assess whether the effect of deficits depends on the level of debt.

To achieve identification we mainly follow the well-worn path of adding relevant control variables. The chief concern, of course, is to hold monetary policy constant. To this end, in all our specifications we include the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills (INT3M) and the inflation rate (INFL). ${ }^{11}$ We also control for the GDP growth rate (GROWTH) and for global indicators of world fiscal imbalances. We typically also have a full set of country and year dummies. Finally, we use instrumental variables to allow for the possible endogeneity of fiscal policy associated with the government reaction function.

Since the sample period covers a variety of exchange rate regimes-including the Bretton Woods system in the early part of the sample and Economic and Monetary Union among 11 European countries in the last two years - it will be desirable to allow for possible heteroscedasticity in the estimates, as well as checking for robustness of estimates across sub-samples. In section 3.4, we summarize results on the presence of structural breaks for the euro countries.

[^5]
### 2.1 Time Series Properties and Estimation Technique

The stationarity properties of nominal interest rates (on 10-year government bonds and 3-month Treasury bills), the inflation rate, and the primary balance and public debt as a share of GDP were examined using the unit root test for panel data proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2002). ${ }^{12}$ Table 1, part I, shows the results. While the evidence is against stationarity when we use the sample from 1960 till 2002 (Sample A, from now on), it is in favor of stationarity if we consider data from 1975 onwards (Sample B). This holds for all variables except for the two variables that measure the stock of public debt as a share of GDP, GDE BT 1 and GDEBT2. In fact, the test result does not allow us the reject the null hypothesis that $G D E B T 1$ is $I(1)$ in both samples, but it suggests that $G D E B T 2$ is a stationary variable in Sample A and Sample B. This mixed evidence on the order of integration of the series may well be due to the presence of structural breaks in the data around the oil-shock and to the inability of the test used to distinguish it from the presence of a unit-root. For this reason, we prefer not to choose any of the two types of results and we will estimate our specifications for both samples, using, in each case, the appropriate econometric technique.

For Sample A, we also test whether the nominal interest rate on 10 -year government bonds, the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills, the inflation rate, the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio, and the public debt-to-GDP ratio, as measured by $G D E B T 1$, are cointegrated using the tests suggested by Pedroni (1999) on the panel. The evidence allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the variables are not cointegrated (see Table 1, part II).

Hence, based on the results shown in Table 1, we estimate our models in levels. We always include country fixed effects, and linear and quadratic trends or year fixed effects. When Sample $A$ is used, we estimate the relation among the long-term interest rate, the short-term interest rate, the inflation rate and the fiscal policy variables by dynamic GLS, because OLS standard errors are not valid when variables are cointegrated. More precisely, in models using Sample A, we allow for heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation in the error term and include among the regressors the contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side variables. Both the autocorrelation coefficient and the coefficients of the contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side variables are allowed to be country-specific. ${ }^{13}$

[^6]When we use Sample $B$, models are estimated by OLS and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. OLS estimation in levels with country fixed effects (in addition to linear and quadratic trends or year fixed effects) yields consistent estimates since we have a panel with large T.

## 3 Static Estimates

### 3.1 Linear Specification

Table 2 columns 1-3 and 5-7 shows the results of multivariate regressions of the nominal interest rate on 10 -year government bonds, on the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills, the inflation rate, and the primary balance and public debt as a share of GDP. In columns 4 and 8 we also add the rate of growth of GDP among the rhs variables. The table shows that there is a positive relationship between the primary deficit as a share of GDP and the 10-year government bonds interest rate. Independently of the sample used and the control variables included in the estimation, the coefficient of the primary deficit is positive and statistically significant at the $5 \%$ level. The size of the coefficient, however, varies across specifications from 0.136 to 0.074 , implying that a one percentage point increase in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio is associated with an increase of the 10-year government bonds interest rate from a maximum of 13.6 basis points to a minimum of 7.4 basis points.

On the other hand, in all but one specification (Table 2, column 4), we do not find a positive and statistically significant relationship between long-term interest rates and the stock of public debt as a share of GDP. In one specification (Table 2, column 1) the coefficient of GDEBT1 is even negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a one percentage point increase in the stock of public debt as a share of GDP is associated with a decrease of one basis point of the 10 -year government bonds interest rate.

Note that all these results hold if we: (i) include the primary balance and the public debt variables one at a time in our regressions; (ii) cyclically adjust the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio to remove the effect of the business cycle, (iii) divide the stock of public debt by trend rather than actual GDP; (iv) use trend rather than actual inflation as a control variable. ${ }^{14}$
the coefficients of these variables to be country specific. Due to the number of observations required to estimate many country's specific coefficients, we follow Bandiera et al. (1999) in including only the contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side variables and allow for an $\operatorname{AR}(1)$ error term. Results are, however, very similar if one includes also one lag or one lead of the differences of the right-hand side variables among the regressors.
${ }^{14}$ To cyclically adjust the primary deficit, we follow the procedure of the OECD, also described in the Appendix of Alesina et al. (2002). We compute trend inflation using the Hodrick-Prescott

Finally, we have also split the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio into its components. Results (not shown but available upon request) show that both changes in primary expenditures and in tax revenues have statistically significant effects on long-term interest rates and the coefficients of the variables have the expected signs. When we decompose spending and revenues into their respective components, we find that long-term interest rates react to changes in the government wage bill, transfers and public investment and to changes in labor and business taxes. Instead, coefficients of government spending on goods and indirect taxes do not have statistically significant coefficients in our regressions. These results are consistent with the evidence in Ardagna (2004) who finds that large fiscal consolidations implemented by cutting sharply primary spending and, in particular, transfers and governments' wage bills, are associated with lower long-term interest rates and higher stock markets prices.

### 3.2 Non-linearities

We are not the first ones to find evidence of a negative relation between the stock of public debt and long-term interest rates. Caporale and Williams (2002) interpret a negative coefficient as due to a portfolio effect. When governments issue bonds and investors consider them of high quality, they switch into them from bad quality debt. The price of such bonds goes up and the yield decreases. The opposite occurs when investors believe that governments' bonds are risky and of low quality. More generally, a negative coefficient of the stock of public debt can be due to a liquidity effect: in countries with very low levels of public debt, government bonds can be less liquid and can be traded at higher transaction costs, pushing up interest rates. What all this suggests is that the relation between long-term interest rates and the stock of public debt can be non-linear and depend, for example, on the level of the debt. When the stock of debt is low, an increase in its level is associated with a fall in interest rates. However, when government debt reaches a given threshold, further increases are associated with higher interest rates.

Following this line of argument, we investigate the presence of nonlinearities in Table 3. Columns 1 and 5 of Table 3 introduce among the regressors of Table 2 the square terms of the primary deficit and of the public debt-to-GDP ratios. We find evidence of non-linearities in the deficit in Sample A but not in Sample B. Given that we tend to consider estimates from the latter sample more reliable because all variables included in the regression have the same order of integration, we do not
filter. We apply the filter to each country inflation rate using quarterly data and a value of $\lambda$ equal to 1600 . We then take the average over each year of the trend inflation generated with quarterly data. Quarterly data on each country inflation rate are from the OECD and are available on line at www.sourceoecd.org.
put too much emphasis on this result. ${ }^{15}$ On the other hand, we find strong evidence of non-linearity in the public debt in both samples. An increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio has a negative effect on long-term interest rates if the ratio is below $62.5 \%$ for the specification in column 1 and below $65.4 \%$ for the one in column 5 . The effect becomes positive when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above these thresholds values. Using the coefficients in column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of government debt-to-GDP (i.e. standard deviation of $G D E B T=0.26$ ) is associated with a decrease of the 10-year government bonds rate by 47 basis points when government debt is at its minimum value in sample (i.e. $G D E B T=0.12$ ) but with an increase by 114 basis points if the government debt is at its maximum value in sample (i.e. $G D E B T=1.41$ ). Results are virtually unchanged if we include the square terms of the primary deficit and of the public debt-to-GDP ratios one at a time.

Columns 2-4 and 6-8 check for non-linear variants to the simple quadratic term in columns 1 and 5 . In particular, the idea is to see whether the relation between long-term interest rates and fiscal variables changes above a threshold level of the fiscal variables. To this end, we define two dummy variables, $D 1$ and $D 2$, equal to one if the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio and, respectively, the public debt-to-GDP ratio are above their median values in the sample (and equal to zero otherwise). ${ }^{16}$ We then interact the dummy variables with the square of the difference between the primary deficit and its median value in the sample ( $P R D E F-P R D E F^{*}$ ), and the square of the difference between public debt and its median value in the sample ( $G D E B T-G D E B T^{*}$ ). These experiments confirm that there is a clear nonlinearity in the size of the debt, while - at least in Sample $B$ - the primary deficit continues to enter only linearly. Finally, in columns $3,4,7$, and 8 we check whether the effect of deficits depends on the level of debt and vice-versa. Results suggest that increases of the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio have a bigger and statistically significant effect (at the $10 \%$ level or better) on long-term interest rates when the public debt-to-GDP ratio is above its median value. Instead, we find evidence that the effect of public debt on interest rates depends on the level of the primary deficit in Sample A, but not in Sample B.

[^7]
### 3.3 Instrumental Variables

Table 4 addresses the potential endogeneity between long-term interest rates and the public debt. A shock to the long-term interest rate can influence the stock of public debt by increasing interest expenses. ${ }^{17}$ Both to address this specific source of endogeneity, and to assuage concerns about additional omitted variables, in this table we estimate the models considering all the regressors as endogenous. For presentation reasons, we also show IV estimates for Sample A, but we focus on estimates for Sample B. In fact, based on the results in Table 1 on the time series properties of the data, IV estimates are correct only when Sample B is used. Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 present results for a just identified model where all variables are instrumented by their first lag. In columns 3 and 7, we instrument the rhs variables with their first and second lag, while in columns 4 and 8 we use only the second lag of the regressors and of the left-hand side variable as instruments. The estimates of the coefficients and their standard errors are very similar to the ones obtained when we estimate models by DGLS or OLS.

## 3.4 "World" fiscal policy

Another important issue to be examined is the impact of fiscal policy at the world level. If economies are open and fully integrated with no barriers to trade or capital mobility, if governments borrow in a common currency, and if governments' default risks are negligible, the real interest rate in each country should depend only on measures of worldwide aggregate fiscal policy, not on indicators of fiscal policy in an individual country. From the individual country's standpoint, fiscal expansion is reflected primarily in a widening of the external current account deficit and possibly a change in the exchange rate. In the simplest case, an individual country's fiscal policy affects the interest rates it faces only to the extent that it is affects the worldwide macroeconomic balance - i.e. it would be only the "world" primary deficit and "world" debt that matter. However, this simple theoretical result could break down for a number of reasons: for instance, if capital mobility is limited; if goods market mobility is limited (e.g. in cases in which exchange rate movements are associated with changes in the relative price of tradables); if current fiscal deficits are expected

[^8]to be financed partly through domestic inflation; or if the risk of government default is non-negligible.

It therefore seems desirable to examine empirically the hypothesis that an individual country's fiscal variables affects interest rates only to the extent that they influence "world" aggregate variables. To do this with the existing data set, we use average values across OECD countries of the right-hand side variables as a proxy for "world" variables. An obvious caveat is that the OECD is not, in fact, the world: it omits a sizable part of the world economy which may have substantial aggregate savings. At the same time, OECD aggregates do cover a substantial part of the world economy - and an even larger share of global financial markets.

We construct "world" variables for each regressor and introduce these "world" indices among the rhs variables. In columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 5, a "world" variable is equal to the weighted average of the variable across all countries in the sample. Weights are based on shares of real GDP measured in PPP terms. ${ }^{18}$ Note that the "world" variables constructed in this way have a common value across all countries in the panel. For this reason, year dummies cannot be included as controls in the empirical specifications in columns $1,2,5$, and 6 of Table 5 .

We estimate the models of Table 5, columns 1,2,5, and 6, including a common linear and quadratic trend among the regressors. Results are quite interesting. First, contrary to the evidence on short-term real interest rates in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), we find that both "world" fiscal policy variables and an individual country's fiscal variables matter for long-term interest rates. The magnitude of the coefficients of the "world" primary deficit and "world" public debt are sizeable. An increase by one percentage point of $W P R D E F$ leads to an increase in the interest rate of 10year government bonds from a minimum of 28 basis points to a maximum of 66 basis points, and an increase by the same amount of WGDEBT raises interest rates from a minimum of 3 basis points of a maximum of 21 basis points. The coefficients are statistically significant at conventional critical values. Importantly, however, the size and the significance of the coefficients of $P R D E F, G D E B T$, and $G D E B T^{2}$ are virtually unchanged from the evidence in the previous tables. Note also that results in Table 5 columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 do not change when we allow the linear and quadratic trend to be country specific. This implies that little if any of the impact of domestic deficits estimated in the panel regressions reported earlier is channelled via the world economy. ${ }^{19}$

[^9]An alternative formulation is to construct a "rest of the world" (ROW) average variables that complement the individual country variables. This permits us to include year fixed effects among the regressors and check that the evidence presented so far still holds. Results with this formulation are reported in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8. Consistently with our previous results, individual countries' changes in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio has always a positive and statistically significant effect on INT 10Y, while the effect of public debt is positive (negative) when public debt is above (below) a given threshold. As for the effect of the "world" policy indicators, the coefficient of the average value of the primary deficit is no longer significant, while the one of public debt is still positive and significant and its value ranges from 0.096 to 0.115 . In conclusion, we read the results in Table 5 as evidence in favor of the international financial integration among OECD countries and the possibility that fiscal shocks in one country influences interest rates in others. However, it seems that either the degree of integration is far from perfect, or that there is a non-negligible risk that deficits are reflected in expected inflation or default risk: changes in the domestic stance of fiscal policy still matter for domestic long-term interest rates beyond their effect on aggregate variables.

### 3.5 Financial Development

In this section we bring into the picture indicators of financial development. The rationale for this extension is twofold. First, financial development obviously potentially affects the level of interest rates, and if it is correlated with fiscal policy it may generate a bias in our coefficients. This suggests that it is worthwhile to include financial development as an additional control. Second, the degree of financial development may affect the responsiveness of interest rates to fiscal shocks. This suggests that it may be interesting to include interactions among the fiscal
countries influence national interest rates before 1999 but not after, (ii) measures of aggregate fiscal policy are the only ones that matter after 1999. To test (i) and (ii), we defined a dummy variable $P E M U$ equal to 1 after 1999 for the countries in our panel that adopted the euro (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands) and equal to zero otherwise. We interacted the variable $P E M U$ with the variables $P R D E F, G D E B T 1$ or $G D E B T 2$ and their square and with $W P R D E F$ and $W G D E B T$. We estimated columns 1 and 5 of Table 5 including these additional variables among the regressors. We also estimated these specifications eliminating the square of the variables. We did not find significant and robust evidence that suggests the presence of a structural break in the relative importance of national and world fiscal policy variables before and after 1999. However, we also think that our experiment is not conclusive. There are at least two caveats that one has to consider. First, the set of countries of the European Union that potentially could have adopted the euro is different from the one that ended up adopting the euro. Second, 1999 cannot be the right date to identify the break if, for example, financial markets anticipated the adoption of the euro.
variables and financial development. The range of financial development in this OECD sample is comparatively limited; but even within this set of developed countries, differences in the financial systems, and in the depth and liquidity of financial markets, can have important effects on the behavior of long-term interest rates.

We add among the regressors the variables used by Levine et al. (2000) to measure financial liberalization. Specifically, we use the variable LI QU I D LI AB I LIT I ES equal to the liquid liabilities of the financial system as a share of GDP, the variable PRIVATE CREDIT, equal to the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, and the indicator COMMERCI AL - CENTRAL BANK, equal to the ratio of commercial banks assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. In Table 6 we show the results obtained when we add the first of the three variables. An increase in financial liberalization leads to a decrease in the long-term interest rate and the coefficient of LIQUID LIABILIT IES is statistically significant at the $5 \%$ level. More to the point for our purposes, the effect of changes in the primary deficit and public debt-to-GDP ratio remains virtually unchanged. Results (not shown) are along the same line if we measure financial development with the variables PRIVATE CREDIT and COMMERCIAL - CENT RAL BANK.

More interesting results are obtained by adding interaction terms between the fiscal variables and financial development. Here, we find that the degree of financial development affects the responsiveness of interest rates to changes in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio: in more developed financial markets, increases in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio attenuate the surge in long-term interest rates. ${ }^{20}$

### 3.6 Alternative left-hand-side variables

We now discuss the results we obtain by using a variety of alternative left-hand-side variables.

We have re-estimated the relation between interest rates, the inflation rate, fiscal variables and GDP growth using real rather than nominal interest rates. Ideally, one would like to measure the long term real interest rate as the difference between the 10 -year nominal interest rate and expectations of inflation of the next ten years. Inflation's forecasts over such a long-term time period are not available for our panel of countries. We follow Orr et al. (1995) in proxying long-term inflation expectations by trend inflation. ${ }^{21}$ Our results (shown in Table 7) are very similar

[^10]relatively to the ones in the specifications using nominal interest rates.
Second, we use as the dependent variable the nominal yield spread of 10-year government bonds over 3-month Treasury bills. Once again, as Table 8 shows, our conclusions on the effect of fiscal policy on long-term interest rates are unaffected by this specification change. Third, we use as our left-hand side variable the longterm interest rate series published by the OECD, which is an average of the interest rates paid on long-term government bonds. Fourth, we look at the spread between domestic 10 year interest rates and German 10 year interest rates. Again results (not shown but available upon request) hold and they are consistent with the evidence in Bernoth et al. (2004). They find that debt and deficits affect the spread of yields at issue of the DM (Euro) and the dollar denominated bonds between the issuing country and Germany or the US and that these effects are also nonlinear.

One popular left-hand-side variable in studies of the effect of fiscal variables is the yield spread of 10 -year government bonds over swap contracts with the same maturity and currency denomination. ${ }^{22}$ The rationale for this choice of dependent variable is that it measures the government's default risk. In Table 9, we show that fiscal policy also affects the 10 -year interest rate on swap contracts, which implies that fiscal policy shocks affect interest rates also on instruments not issued by the government. In fact, if we use as our left-hand side variable the spread of the 10-year government bond interest rate over the swap interest rate we find that the coefficients of $P R D E F$ and $G D E B T$ are not statistically significant. These results may suggest that the impact of fiscal policy on interest rates is not likely to be via default risk directly, but could be through expected inflation (which can also be triggered by an increase in sovereign default risk), or through the demand for loanable funds, both of which would be expected to affect the swap market in a similar way to the long-term bond market. ${ }^{23}$
then take the average over each year of the trend inflation generated with quarterly data and calculate the 10 -year real interest rate at a yearly frequency by subtracting the average of trend inflation to the nominal interest rate. We also start with quarterly data to compute the real 3-month interest rate as the difference between the nominal interest rate of 3-month Treasury bills and the ex-post inflation rate. We then average over the year the quarterly data.
${ }^{22}$ Swap contracts are agreements to exchange a flow of interest rates payments at a fixed rate for one at a floating rate. For papers that use the interest rate of swap contracts to measure governments' default risk see, for example, Afonso and Strauch (2003), Codogno et al. (2003), Favero et al. (1997), and Lemmen and Goodhart (1999).
${ }^{23}$ Data on swap contracts are not available before 1988 for countries in our sample. For this reason, we present only estimates with Sample B in Table 9.

### 3.7 Discussion

The results we have presented show a statistically significant positive linear relationship between the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio and the 10 -year government bond interest rate. Another key result is the evidence of non-linearity in the public debt-to-GDP ratio: increases in public debt have a statistically significant positive impact on long-term interest rates only in "high debt" countries.

It is useful to place these results in the context of existing empirical literature on the effect of fiscal policy on interest rates. This literature has yielded mixed results-with some studies reporting a significant effect of fiscal policy on interest rates while others find the estimated coefficients to be insignificant. As Gale and Orszag (2004) show, the results depend on specific features of individual studies, including the measures of fiscal policy and interest rates used and the method of controlling for monetary policy and business cycle conditions.

Both our qualitative and quantitative results are broadly consistent with existing literature for the US and the euro area. While our estimates of the effects of changes in the primary deficit on long-term interest rates are smaller than those reported in some previous studies, that is not surprising: ${ }^{24}$ as discussed by Gale and Orszag (2004), papers on the US that, like ours, use current fiscal policy variables (rather than projected variables) tend to find lower or insignificant coefficients: these measures understate the effects of fiscal variables on interest rates, as they do not fully incorporate market expectations about future fiscal policy.

In contrast, studies reporting a statistically significant positive relationship between fiscal policy and long-term interest rates for the US capture fiscal policy using measures of the projected, rather than actual, deficit and debt. For example, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002) show that a one-percentage point of GDP increase in the projected future deficit leads to an increase in the long-term interest rate relative to the short-term rate of between 53 and 60 basis points. Similar results are reported by Laubach (2003) and Egen and Hubbard (2004) on the basis of five-year-ahead projected deficits and five-year-ahead forward interest rates. ${ }^{25}$

Moreover, our finding that the effect of changes in public debt are smaller than those of changes in the primary deficit is similar to those reported in Laubach (2003) and Egen and Hubbard (2004). In our linear specifications, an increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio by 1 percentage point increases the 10 -year government bond

[^11]interest rate by at most 0.6 basis points (see Table 2 column 4). In the non-linear regressions (see, for example, Table 3 column 1), the effect of a one-percentagepoint increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio varies from a decrease of about 2.4 basis points if the government debt-to-GDP ratio is at its minimum value in sample (i.e. $G D E B T=0.12$ ) to an increase of 3.8 basis points if the government debt is at its maximum value in the sample (i.e. $G D E B T=1.41$ ). Those studies also argue that results on the deficit and debt are not mutually inconsistent, once the role of expectations is taken into account.

In the cross-country context, most studies have focused on the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates spreads (e.g. Bernoth et al. (2004), and Codogno et al. (2003)) and thus their results are more difficult to compare with ours. An exception is Faini (2006) who investigates the effects of changes in the primary deficit-toGDP ratio and public debt in the euro area. He finds that changes in the primary surplus in the euro area and at the individual country level are both important, with the former having a stronger effect: a $1 \%$ fall in the primary surplus in the euro area raises real long-term interest rates by about 41 basis points, while at the country level the effect of a change in the primary surplus is only 3 basis points; changes in the stock of public debt-to GDP ratio have no statistically significant effect at the country level but are statistically significant for the euro area as a whole; and changes to the stock of public debt are statistically significant in countries whose debt-to-GDP ratio is above $100 \%$. Although our estimates differ from Faini's, both because we look at a larger panel of countries and because we apply different econometric techniques, our results are in line with his in the following dimensions. First, we also find evidence of non-linearity in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Second, in our specifications, both "world" fiscal policy variables and an individual country's fiscal variables matter for long-term interest rates. While the magnitude of the coefficients of the "world" primary deficit and "world" public debt are sizeable in our specifications as well, our paper finds that individual countries' fiscal variables also play an important role.

## 4 Dynamic Estimates

So far, our analysis has not allowed for the fact that financial markets are forwardlooking and, hence, react not only to fiscal shocks in the current period, but also to the expectation of future fiscal policy. As Gale and Orszag (2002) note, studies that do not take expectations into account are biased toward finding no effect because they do not account for the fact the financial markets are forward-looking. Moreover, coefficients in tables shown so far do not capture the full impact of changes in fiscal policy on long-term interest rates, because we have not accounted for the
effects that fiscal variables have on long-term rates through their potential influence on the short-term rate, the inflation rate and the rate of growth of GDP.

In this section, we attempt to address these issues by estimating the relationship between long-term interest rates and fiscal policy variables using a vector autoregressive system. Papers that measures expectations through a vector autoregressive system using US data tend to find smaller and less robust effects than studies that include measures of forecasted fiscal variables from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Forecasts from a VAR are based only on past information on variables of the system, while forecasts from the CBO or the OMB also use other information as, for example, information on proposed changes in tax and spending legislation. To the best of our knowledge, long-horizon forecasts of future fiscal policy variables are not available for our large panels. For this reason, we cannot follow the approach by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) or Laubach (2003) and we account for expectations by estimating a VAR system. ${ }^{26}$

Our vector autoregressive system includes the 10-year government bonds interest rate, the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate, the inflation rate, the rate of growth of GDP, the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio and the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We set the lag length of the system to 2 and, following Alesina et al. (2002), we estimate the VAR on the entire panel. ${ }^{27}$ We then study the impulse response function of the long-term interest rate to a shock to the primary deficit or public debt at the time of the shock and in the following years. In order to obtain meaningful impulse responses of the long-term rate to the fiscal shock, we need innovations that are mutually orthogonal. The reduced form innovations are clearly correlated with each other and a shock to the primary deficit (public debt) is not really a shock to this variable but a linear combination of its structural shock and shocks of the other variables included in the system. To identify the structural primary deficit and public debt shocks, we use the Cholesky decomposition, and we orthogonalize the innovations in several ways to check that our results are not unduly sensitive to the order with which we choose variables to enter the system.

We consider two extreme cases. First, we assume that fiscal policy variables "come first", followed by the inflation rate, the rate of growth of GDP, the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate and the 10 -year government bonds interest rate (Table 10 , parts Ia and Ib). Second, we consider the case in which $I N T 3 M$ is ordered first, followed by $I N F L, G R O W T H, P R D E F, G D E B T$, and INT10Y (Table

[^12]10, parts IIa and IIb). Within each case, we consider both the sub-case with the primary deficit "coming before" public debt (Table 10 parts Ia and IIa) and the subcase with public debt "coming before" the primary deficit (Table 10 parts Ib and IIb ). We also checked (and confirm) that results are similar to the ones in Table 10 when we exchange the order of $I N F L$ and GROWTH. ${ }^{28}$

Table 10 displays the changes in the 10 -year government bond interest rate following a shock to the primary deficit and public debt by one percentage point, on impact and up to ten years, and the cumulative change after the first five and ten years.

A positive shock to the ratio of primary deficit-to-GDP leads to an increase in INT $10 Y$ of 7 basis points on impact, and to a cumulative increase of 66 and 146 basis points after five and ten years, respectively (see Part I of Table 10). The impact effect is very similar to the one we obtain in the static models, but since the effect persists over time, the cumulative response of the long-term interest rate after five and ten years is quite sizeable. This provides evidence in line with Feldstein (1986) who emphasizes the importance of considering expectations about the stance of future fiscal policy in measuring the effect of the government deficit on interest rates. The coefficients are statistically significant at the $5 \%$ level.

Increases in public debt, in general, lead to lower interest rates on impact and in a few years after the shock occurs. However, the effect becomes positive as time goes by and the cumulative response ten years after the shock is often positive and statistically significant. In line with the results from the static models, the magnitude of the effects is smaller than the one due to a change in the primary deficit. Finally, note that, while the response of INT $10 Y$ to a shock to the primary deficit is not unduly sensitive to the orthogonalization procedure, the coefficients of $G D E B T$ are quite different in size according to the strategy used to identify the structural shocks. This consideration calls for considerable caution in interpreting these dynamic results.

## 5 Conclusions

This paper has used cross-country empirical analysis to establish that fiscal deficits and the accumulated public debt affect interest rates. The effects are both statistically and economically significant, and they are robust to a variety of specifications. These effects are non-linear, becoming stronger as a country's debt grows and its fiscal balance becomes weaker. The dynamic analysis presented also shows that the long-run effects of sustained deficits are much larger than the immediate impact of

[^13]a one-time deficit. These results imply that the return to fiscal laxity that has taken place in several major industrial countries in recent years is potentially worrisome.

Fiscal policy has important effects at the worldwide level, but it also has important effects at the level of the individual country. These results suggest that, while each country's fiscal imbalance has its greatest impact at home, it is also a legitimate concern at the level of the world economy.

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Table 1: Panel Integration and Cointegration Tests

| Part I: Integration Tests ${ }^{1}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | INT10Y | INT3M | INFL | PRDEF | GDEBT1 | GDEBT2 |
| Sample 1960-2002 | 1.38 | -0.32 | -1.63 | -1.60 | 0.56 | $-3.34^{*}$ |
| Sample 1975-2002 | $-3.13^{*}$ | $-2.75^{*}$ | $-3.13^{*}$ | $-1.70^{*}$ | 1.92 | $-2.66^{*}$ |

## Part II: Cointegration Tests ${ }^{2}$

ADF t-test
Panel ADF
Sample 1960-2002 -3.67* -6.28*

Notes:

1. The panel integration tests are based are on Im, Pesaran and Shin (2000). The test is distributed $\mathrm{N}(0,1)$. The country-specific ADF test includes one-lag and a time trend. * indicates that the null-hypothesis that the time series is $\mathrm{I}(1)$ is rejected at the $5 \%$ level.
2. The ADF t-test is based on Pedroni (1997). The Panel ADF is based on Im, Pesaran and Shin (2000). Both tests are distributed N(0,1) and are one-sided: a level $a$ test of the null is rejected if the statistics in the table is $<\mathrm{z}_{\mathrm{a}}$ where $\mathrm{z}_{\mathrm{a}}$ is the $a$ standard normal quantile. ${ }^{*}$ indicates that the null-hypothesis that variables are not cointegrated is rejected at the $5 \%$ level. Cointegrating vector: INT10Y, INT3M, INFL, PRDEF, GDEBT
3. INT10Y = nominal interest rate of 10 -year government bonds; INT3M = nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills; INFL = inflation rate; PRDEF $=$ primary deficit as a share of GDP; GDEBT1 = stock of public debt measured at the end of period t-1 divided by the level of GDP in year t-1; GDBET2 = average of the stock of public debt in year $\mathrm{t}-1$ and in year t divided by GDP in year t .

Table 2: Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy - Linear specification

|  | Dep. var. INT10Y Sample 1960-2002 |  |  |  | Dep. var. INT10Y <br> Sample 1975-2002 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | DGLS | DGLS | DGLS | DGLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| INT3M | 0.629 | 0.524 | 0.389 | 0.390 | 0.647 | 0.521 | 0.436 | 0.443 |
|  | (29.48)** | (23.57)** | (13.34)** | (13.49)** | (25.03)** | (14.64)** | (11.74)** | (12.23)** |
| INFL | 0.127 | 0.120 | 0.128 | 0.141 | 0.146 | 0.149 | 0.160 | 0.168 |
|  | (5.57)** | (7.96)** | (5.93)** | (6.77)** | (5.53)** | (5.06)** | (6.36)** | (6.71)** |
| PRDEF | 0.128 | 0.113 | 0.106 | 0.101 | 0.136 | 0.109 | 0.074 | 0.081 |
|  | (4.79)** | $(5.37) * *$ | (5.05)** | $(5.06) * *$ | (5.90)** | (4.86)** | (3.79)** | (4.08)** |
| GDEBT | -0.010 | -0.005 | -0.0001 | 0.006 | 0.0001 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.005 |
|  | $(-2.64)^{* *}$ | (-1.53) | (-0.04) | (1.79)* | (0.04) | (0.87) | (0.66) | (1.48) |
| GROWTH |  |  |  | 0.143 |  |  |  | 0.082 |
|  |  |  |  | (5.42)** |  |  |  | $(2.81) * *$ |
| Country Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Trend and Trend ${ }^{2}$ | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
| Year Dummies | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Adjusted $\mathbf{R}^{2}$ |  |  |  |  | 0.90 | 0.92 | 0.94 | 0.94 |
| N. of obs. | 413 | 413 | 413 | 413 | 373 | 373 | 373 | 373 |

[^14] contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side variables. Columns 5-8 estimated by OLS and T-statistics are corrected for heterosckedasticity. See also notes to Table 1

Table 3: Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy - Nonlinearities

|  | Dep. var. INT10Y <br> Sample 1960-2002 |  |  |  | Dep. var. INT10Y <br> Sample 1975-2002 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | DGLS | DGLS | DGLS | DGLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS |
| INT3M | 0.387 | 0.391 | 0.384 | 0.374 | 0.449 | 0.450 | 0.444 | 0.457 |
|  | (14.55)** | (14.91)** | (14.29)** | (13.91)** | (12.58)** | (12.59)** | (12.43)** | (12.48)** |
| INFL | 0.156 | 0.168 | 0.161 | 0.189 | 0.173 | 0.171 | 0.174 | 0.168 |
|  | (7.49)** | (8.49)** | (8.31)** | $(9.59)^{* *}$ | (7.13)** | (6.92)** | (6.99)** | (6.74)** |
| PRDEF | 0.116 | 0.095 | 0.126 | 0.036 | 0.093 | 0.105 | 0.142 | 0.127 |
|  | (5.54)** | (3.43)** | (3.94)** | (1.19) | (4.38)** | (3.73)** | (4.00)** | (3.64)** |
| GDEBT | -0.030 | -0.007 | -0.009 | -0.004 | -0.017 | -0.001 | -0.004 | -0.002 |
|  | (-3.80)** | (-1.62) | (-2.15)** | (-1.07) | (-1.50) | (-0.29) | (-0.79) | (-0.33) |
| GROWTH | 0.124 | 0.139 | 0.127 | 0.156 | 0.087 | 0.086 | 0.088 | 0.087 |
|  | (4.75)** | (5.48)** | (5.20)** | (6.14)** | (2.86)** | (2.84)** | (2.91)** | (2.87)** |
| PRDEF ${ }^{2}$ | 0.813 |  |  |  | -0.140 |  |  |  |
|  | (2.55)** |  |  |  | (-0.37) |  |  |  |
| GDEBT $^{2}$ | 0.024 |  |  |  | 0.013 |  |  |  |
|  | (5.62)** |  |  |  | (1.99)** |  |  |  |
| (PRDEF- PRDEF $\left.{ }^{*}\right)^{2} *$ D1 |  | 0.950 | -1.303 | 1.328 |  | -0.454 | -1.802 | -0.615 |
|  |  | (2.10)** | (1.62) | (2.90)** |  | (-0.79) | (-1.57) | (-1.05) |
| $\left(\text { GDEBT- GDEBT }^{*}\right)^{2} * \mathbf{D} 2$ |  | 0.030 | 0.029 | 0.019 |  | 0.013 | 0.015 | 0.019 |
|  |  | (4.86)** | (5.31)** | (2.92)** |  | (1.65)* | (1.83)* | (2.18)** |
| $\left(\text { PRDEF- PRDEF }{ }^{*}\right)^{2} * \mathbf{D} 2$ |  |  | 1.980 |  |  |  | 1.234 |  |
|  |  |  | $(3.71)^{* *}$ |  |  |  | (1.65)* |  |
| $\left(\text { GDEBT- GDEBT }^{*}\right)^{2} *$ D1 |  |  |  | 0.029 |  |  |  | -0.013 |
|  |  |  |  | (3.43)** |  |  |  | (-1.29) |
| N. of obs. | 413 | 413 | 413 | 413 | 373 | 373 | 373 | 373 |

[^15]Table 4: Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy - Instrumental variables

|  | Dep. var. INT10Y Sample 1960-2002 |  |  |  | Dep. var. INT10Y Sample 1975-2002 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) |  | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV | IV |
| INT3M | $\begin{gathered} 0.352 \\ (4.42)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.391 \\ (4.92)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.356 \\ (4.58)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.621 \\ (3.62)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.349 \\ (4.63)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.387 \\ (4.89)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.327 \\ (5.16)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.539 \\ (3.72)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| INFL | $\begin{gathered} 0.308 \\ (4.48)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.310 \\ (4.80)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.303 \\ (4.82)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.288 \\ (2.22)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.320 \\ (4.65)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.321 \\ (4.87) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.279 \\ (4.79) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.292 \\ (2.46) * * \end{gathered}$ |
| PRDEF | $\begin{gathered} 0.049 \\ (1.91)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.107 \\ (3.68)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.071 \\ (2.76)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.158 \\ (2.87)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.070 \\ & (2.84)^{* *} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.108 \\ (3.86)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.068 \\ (2.90)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.161 \\ (2.87)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| GDEBT | $\begin{aligned} & 0.002 \\ & (0.41) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.043 \\ (-3.10)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.033 \\ (-2.30)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.070 \\ (-3.11)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.002 \\ & (0.45) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.035 \\ (-2.24)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.020 \\ & (-1.44) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.064 \\ (-2.61)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| GROWTH | $\begin{aligned} & -0.119 \\ & (-1.07) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.048 \\ & (-0.44) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.025 \\ & (-0.25) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.101 \\ & (0.41) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.082 \\ & (-0.74) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.043 \\ & (-0.38) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.055 \\ & (-0.62) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.229 \\ & (-0.86) \end{aligned}$ |
| PRDEF ${ }^{2}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -1.312 \\ & (-1.50) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.397 \\ & (-0.53) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -3.120 \\ & (-1.55) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -1.123 \\ & (-1.26) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.270 \\ & (0.38) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -3.261 \\ & (-1.30) \end{aligned}$ |
| GDEBT ${ }^{2}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.030 \\ (3.74)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (2.94)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.049 \\ (3.90)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.023 \\ (2.56)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.013 \\ (1.64)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.040 \\ (2.96)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| N. of obs. | 413 | 413 | 399 | 393 | 367 | 367 | 360 | 357 |

Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. Instruments in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 are first lag of rhs variables. Instruments in columns 3 and 7 are first and second lag of rhs variables. Instruments in columns 4 and 8 are second lag of the rhs and lhs variables. T-statistic in parenthesis. The values of the debt-to-GDP ratio above which an additional increase in the debt has a positive effect on interest rates are $71.7 \%, 68.7 \%, 71.4 \%$ in columns $2-4$, and $76.1 \%, 76.9 \%, 80 \%$ in columns $6-8$. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2 .

Table 5: World fiscal policy

|  | Dep. var. INT10Y- Sample 1960-2002 |  |  |  | Dep. var. INT10Y-Sample 1975-2002 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | DGLS | IV | DGLS | IV | OLS | IV | OLS | IV |
| INT3M | $\begin{gathered} 0.364 \\ (12.23)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.367 \\ (3.67)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.354 \\ (11.86)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.406 \\ (4.35)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.440 \\ (11.16)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.415 \\ (4.07)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.454 \\ (10.22)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.379 \\ (3.94)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| INFL | $\begin{gathered} 0.176 \\ (7.03)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.322 \\ (3.91)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.166 \\ (6.99)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.362 \\ (4.90)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.173 \\ (6.58)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.283 \\ (2.89)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.195 \\ (6.58)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.365 \\ (4.84)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| PRDEF | $\begin{gathered} 0.134 \\ (4.99)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.118 \\ (3.07)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.127 \\ (5.50)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.131 \\ (3.13)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.103 \\ (4.36)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.122 \\ & (3.57)^{* *} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.107 \\ (3.69)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.131 \\ (3.15)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| GDEBT | $\begin{gathered} -0.051 \\ (-5.66)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.052 \\ (-2.49)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.018 \\ (-2.15)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.031 \\ (-1.99)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.014 \\ & (-1.17) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.045 \\ (-2.34)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.016 \\ & (-1.35) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.030 \\ (-1.80)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| GROWTH | $\begin{gathered} 0.105 \\ (3.31)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.050 \\ & (-0.39) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.126 \\ (4.37)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.042 \\ & (-0.33) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.094 \\ (2.87)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.071 \\ & (-0.55) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.095 \\ (2.62)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.046 \\ & (-0.37) \end{aligned}$ |
| PRDEF ${ }^{2}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.105 \\ & (-0.28) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.142 \\ & (-1.05) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.068 \\ & (0.23) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.538 \\ & (-1.75) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.290 \\ & (-0.68) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.997 \\ & (-0.86) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.188 \\ & (-0.49) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.381 \\ & (-1.48) \end{aligned}$ |
| GDEBT $^{2}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.036 \\ (6.74)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.034 \\ (3.00)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ (5.41)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.029 \\ (3.24)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.012 \\ (1.68)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.028 \\ (2.60)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.017 \\ (2.42)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ (2.55)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| WINT3M | $\begin{gathered} 0.597 \\ (12.21) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.751 \\ & (1.63) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.429 \\ (-2.19)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.410 \\ & (0.76) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.547 \\ (7.80)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.982 \\ (2.12)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.309 \\ & (1.13) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.188 \\ & (0.33) \end{aligned}$ |
| WINFL | $\begin{aligned} & 0.066 \\ & (1.19) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.125 \\ & (-0.58) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.145 \\ & (0.86) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.493 \\ & (1.19) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.157 \\ & (-1.41) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.390 \\ (-2.47)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.286 \\ & (1.05) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.513 \\ & (0.98) \end{aligned}$ |
| WPRDEF | $\begin{gathered} 0.282 \\ (3.68)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.657 \\ (2.35)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.040 \\ & (-0.18) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.346 \\ & (0.89) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.405 \\ (6.70)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.566 \\ (2.60)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.079 \\ & (0.32) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.136 \\ & (0.36) \end{aligned}$ |
| WGDEBT | $\begin{aligned} & 0.031 \\ & (1.46) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.088 \\ (1.77)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.096 \\ (4.27)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.114 \\ (3.29)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.116 \\ (3.96)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.206 \\ (2.31)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.112 \\ (3.62)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.115 \\ (2.09)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| WGROWTH | $\begin{gathered} 0.244 \\ (3.30)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.554 \\ & (0.81) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.103 \\ & (-0.59) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.046 \\ & (0.07) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.118 \\ & (1.41) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.543 \\ & (1.01) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.074 \\ & (0.34) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.437 \\ & (-0.55) \end{aligned}$ |
| Trend and Trend ${ }^{2}$ | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No |
| Year Dummies | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| N. of obs. | 413 | 413 | 413 | 413 | 373 | 367 | 373 | 367 |

Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies included. T-statistic in parenthesis. In columns $1,2,5$, and 6 , a "W" variable is equal to the weighted average of the variable across all countries in the sample. In columns $3,4,7$, and 8 , a " $W$ " variable is equal to a weighted average of the variable across all countries in the sample except the value of the variable for country i. Weights are based on real GDP. Instruments in columns $2,4,6$, and 8 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2 and section 3.4

Table 6: Financial development

|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Dep. var. INT10Y } \\ & \text { Sample 1960-2002 } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | Dep. var. INT10Y <br> Sample 1975-2002 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | DGLS | IV | DGLS | IV | OLS | IV | OLS | IV |
| INT3M | $\begin{gathered} 0.368 \\ (13.00)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.371 \\ (3.90)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.406 \\ (15.01) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.376 \\ (3.95)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.436 \\ (10.89) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.400 \\ (4.41)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.438 \\ (11.63)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.386 \\ (4.14)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| INFL | $\begin{gathered} 0.162 \\ (7.23)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.297 \\ (3.64)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.135 \\ (5.83) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.275 \\ (3.30)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.169 \\ (5.87)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.332 \\ (3.70)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.163 \\ (5.62)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.365 \\ (3.92)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| PRDEF | $\begin{gathered} 0.150 \\ (6.35)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.126 \\ (3.92)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.319 \\ (5.87)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.318 \\ (4.08)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.129 \\ (5.36)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.150 \\ (4.86)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.253 \\ (4.02)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.285 \\ (3.66)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| GDEBT | $\begin{gathered} -0.024 \\ (-1.95)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.035 \\ (-1.66)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.039 \\ (-2.69) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.052 \\ (-2.41)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.025 \\ & (-1.61) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.059 \\ (-1.95)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.039 \\ (-2.12)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.063 \\ (-1.85)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| GROWTH | $\begin{gathered} 0.147 \\ (4.44)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.030 \\ & (-0.28) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.125 \\ (3.51)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.058 \\ & (-0.54) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.064 \\ (2.05)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.009 \\ & (0.07) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.054 \\ (1.83)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.006 \\ & (0.05) \end{aligned}$ |
| PRDEF ${ }^{2}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.573 \\ (1.70)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.232 \\ & (-1.30) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.248 \\ & (0.81) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.519 \\ (-1.65)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.344 \\ & (-0.91) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.115 \\ & (-1.21) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.433 \\ & (-1.10) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.371 \\ & (-1.46) \end{aligned}$ |
| GDEBT $^{2}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.022 \\ (2.31)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (1.87)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.020 \\ (2.26)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.026 \\ (1.94)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.015 \\ & (1.59) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.036 \\ (1.95)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.020 \\ (1.84)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.046 \\ (2.36)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| LIQUID LIABILITIES | $\begin{gathered} -0.012 \\ (-3.11)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.022 \\ (-3.51)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.033 \\ (-3.30)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.037 \\ (-3.05)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.022 \\ (-5.44)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.028 \\ (-4.79)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.030 \\ (-3.27)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.018 \\ & (-1.50) \end{aligned}$ |
| LIQUID LIABILITIES *PRDEFY |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.230 \\ (3.08)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.255 \\ (3.06)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.170 \\ (2.61)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.159 \\ (-1.90)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| LIQUID LIABILITIES |  |  | 0.021 | 0.017 |  |  | 0.010 | -0.008 |
| *GDEBTY |  |  | (1.98)** | (1.50) |  |  | (1.16) | (0.74) |
| N . of obs. | 317 | 317 | 317 | 317 | 280 | 275 | 280 | 275 |

[^16] Tables 1 and 2 .

Table 7: Long-term real interest rates

|  | Dep. var. RINT10Y Sample 1960-2002 |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Dep. var. RINT10Y } \\ \text { Sample 1975-2002 } \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | DGLS | IV | DGLS | IV | OLS | IV | OLS | IV |
| RINT3M | $\begin{gathered} 0.418 \\ (19.21)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.702 \\ (6.82)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.399 \\ (13.74)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.635 \\ (5.51)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.370 \\ (11.16)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.659 \\ (8.33)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.348 \\ (7.67)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.502 \\ (6.50) * * \end{gathered}$ |
| PRDEF | $\begin{gathered} 0.108 \\ (4.09) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.139 \\ (3.27)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.115 \\ (4.42) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.128 \\ (2.78) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.074 \\ (3.12)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.105 \\ (2.71)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.072 \\ (2.99)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.088 \\ (2.19)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| GDEBT | $\begin{gathered} -0.030 \\ (-3.52)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.056 \\ (-2.64)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.034 \\ (-4.14)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.050 \\ (-2.23)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.024 \\ (-1.65)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.031 \\ (-1.83)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.023 \\ & (-1.56) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.017 \\ & (-1.01) \end{aligned}$ |
| GROWTH | $\begin{gathered} 0.068 \\ (2.35)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.256 \\ & (1.52) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.002 \\ & (-0.07) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.288 \\ (1.83)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.037 \\ & (1.19) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.120 \\ & (0.92) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.035 \\ & (1.07) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.159 \\ & (1.23) \end{aligned}$ |
| PRDEF ${ }^{2}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.573 \\ & (-1.54) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.370 \\ & (-1.45) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.692 \\ (-1.91)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.812 \\ & (-0.77) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.028 \\ (-1.73)^{*} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.158 \\ & (-1.20) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.951 \\ & (-1.52) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.017 \\ & (0.02) \end{aligned}$ |
| GDEBT ${ }^{\mathbf{2}}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.023 \\ (4.46)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.042 \\ (3.81)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.025 \\ (4.92)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.038 \\ (3.17) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (2.82)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.027 \\ (2.77) * * \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.023 \\ (2.64)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.018 \\ (1.75)^{*} \end{gathered}$ |
| INFL |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.049 \\ & (-1.69) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.094 \\ & (-1.16) \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.036 \\ & (-0.86) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.212 \\ (-2.73)^{* *} \end{gathered}$ |
| N. of obs. | 413 | 413 | 413 | 413 | 373 | 367 | 373 | 367 |

[^17]Table 8: The term-structure of interest rates

|  | Dep. var. (INT10Y-INT3M) Sample 1960-2002 |  |  |  | Dep. var. (INT10Y-INT3M)Sample 1975-2002 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|  | DGLS | IV | DGLS | IV | OLS | IV | OLS | IV |
| PRDEF | 0.159 | 0.152 | 0.142 | 0.151 | 0.108 | 0.141 | 0.108 | 0.142 |
|  | $(4.29) * *$ | (3.38)** | (3.78)** | (3.21)** | (3.33)** | (3.20)** | (3.28)** | (3.13)** |
| GDEBT | -0.068 | -0.067 | -0.068 | -0.066 | -0.029 | -0.049 | -0.029 | -0.050 |
|  | $(-5.04)^{* *}$ | (-4.50)** | $(-5.07) * *$ | (-4.46)** | (-1.91)* | $(-2.86) * *$ | (-1.90)* | (-2.84)** |
| GROWTH | 0.008 | -0.045 | 0.001 | -0.039 | 0.130 | -0.028 | 0.129 | -0.031 |
|  | (0.20) | (-0.31) | (0.03) | (-0.30) | (2.60)** | (-0.19) | (2.48)** | (-0.22) |
| PRDEF ${ }^{2}$ | -1.027 | -2.982 | -0.536 | -2.893 | -1.164 | -2.887 | -1.156 | -2.951 |
|  | (-1.90)* | (-2.50)** | (-0.97) | (-2.24)** | (-2.05)* | (-2.32)* | (-2.03)* | (-2.16)* |
| GDEBT $^{2}$ | 0.045 | 0.041 | 0.045 | 0.041 | 0.022 | 0.032 | 0.021 | 0.033 |
|  | (5.63)** | (4.72)** | (5.79)** | (4.41)** | (2.34)** | (3.08)** | (2.30)** | (2.84)** |
| INFL |  |  | -0.047 | -0.015 |  |  | -0.005 | 0.013 |
|  |  |  | (-1.51) | (-0.28) |  |  | (-0.16) | (0.19) |
| N. of obs. | 413 | 413 | 413 | 413 | 373 | 367 | 373 | 367 |

[^18]Table 9: Alternative left-hand side variables

|  | Sample 1975-2002 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Dep. var. SW10Y |  | Dep. var. (INT10Y-SW10Y) |  |
|  | OLS | IV | OLS | IV |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| INT3M | 0.393 | 0.292 | 0.018 | 0.074 |
|  | (9.76)** | (1.66) | (1.23) | (0.94) |
| INFL | 0.118 | 0.325 | 0.005 | -0.038 |
|  | (1.95)* | (1.19) | (0.20) | (0.32) |
| PRDEF | 0.099 | 0.129 | -0.004 | 0.020 |
|  | (4.49)** | (2.33)** | (-0.43) | (0.93) |
| GDEBT | -0.003 | 0.015 | 0.004 | 0.002 |
|  | (0.24) | (0.51) | (0.66) | (0.23) |
| GROWTH | 0.023 | -0.080 | 0.027 | 0.076 |
|  | (0.97) | (0.58) | (2.68)** | (1.46) |
| PRDEF ${ }^{2}$ | -0.282 | -0.653 | -0.045 | -0.394 |
|  | (0.91) | (0.73) | (-0.26) | (0.97) |
| GDEBT $^{2}$ | -0.005 | -0.012 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
|  | (-0.78) | (-1.04) | (0.30) | (0.06) |
| N. of obs. | 190 | 189 | 190 | 189 |

[^19]Table 10: Long-term interest rates and fiscal policy - Dynamic estimates

| Sample 1975-2002 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 0 year | 1 year | 2 years | 5 years | 10 years | Sum 0 to 5 years | Sum 0 to 10 years |
| Part Ia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PRDEF | 0.068** | 0.086** | 0.115** | 0.168** | 0.228** | 0.661** | 1.456** |
| GDEBT | $-0.038 * *$ | -0.091** | -0.098** | -0.036** | 0.06** | -0.364** | -0.151** |
| $\underline{\text { Part Ib }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PRDEF | 0.085** | 0.126** | 0.158** | 0.184** | 0.202** | 0.82** | 1.52** |
| GDEBT | -0.024** | -0.071** | -0.073** | -0.0073** | 0.092** | -0.235** | 0.089** |
| Part IIa |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PRDEF | 0.08** | 0.121** | 0.157** | 0.201** | 0.243** | 0.844** | 1.69** |
| GDEBT | -0.006** | -0.012** | -0.003** | 0.055** | 0.14** | 0.081** | 0.57** |
| Part IIb |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PRDEF | 0.082** | 0.124** | 0.158** | 0.184** | 0.201** | 0.819** | 1.52** |
| GDEBT | 0.006** | 0.007** | 0.021** | 0.083** | 0.17** | 0.21** | 0.80** |

Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT2. Country dummies and year dummies included. ** indicates that coefficient is inside the 95 percent confidence band. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Affiliations: Harvard University (Ardagna); London School of Economics, CEPR, and NBER (Caselli); IMF (Lane). We are grateful to Ignazio Angeloni, Pierluigi Balduzzi, Roel Beetsma, Dirk Krueger, Paolo Paesani, Fabio Schiantarelli, Ludger Schuknecht, Andrew Scott, Rolf Strauch, Jurgen von Hagen, one anonymous referee and to participants to the seminar at the European Central Bank Fiscal Policy Division, at the CEPR Conference Macroeconomic Policy Design for Monetary Union, and at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston for useful discussions and suggestions. Correspondence: Silvia Ardagna, Department of Economics, Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. Email: sardagna@fas.harvard.edu. Phone: 1-617-495-8823. Fax: 1-617-495-7730.

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ The existing stock of debt may also influence aggregate demand via wealth effects on aggregate consumption.
    ${ }^{2}$ Such crowding out need not occur in case of Ricardian equivalence-which implies that a deficit-financed tax cut or increase in transfers would be matched by a corresponding increase in the present value of future taxes, with no effect on the time path of real private expenditure or, therefore, on equilibrium real interest rates or investment. While increased government expenditure on goods and services may still affect real interest rates, consumption, and investment, any such effect will be independent of whether that expenditure is financed by taxation or government borrowing. Deviations from Ricardian equivalence can occur for a number of reasons (Barro 1974), however, and an extensive empirical literature suggests that this hypothesis does not hold in practice.
    ${ }^{3}$ See Marcet and Scott (2001) for evidence that the US government debt's process is highly persistent.

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ See for instance Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003). More generally, the literature on the theory of sovereign debt (Eaton and Fernandez, 1995) analyzes the conditions under which debt will be repaid; in most models, the amount borrowed and the interest rate are determined endogenously as the solution to a repeated game, taking into account the possibility of repudiation (e.g. Eaton and Gersowitz 1981). Another possible channel by which primary balances and debt levels influence default probabilities is through signalling as in Drudi and Prati (2000).
    ${ }^{5}$ Coefficients of fiscal policy variables in interest rates regressions span from being positive and significant to being insignificant. In section 3.7, we relate our estimates to some of the existent empirical literature. For a more comprehensive, although still incomplete review, see Alesina et al. (1992), Barro (1987), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), Barth et al. (1991), Blanchard and Summers (1984), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002), Evans (1985) and (1987), Feldstein (1986), Friedman (2005), Gale and Orszag (2002) and (2004), Hoelscher (1986), Laubach (2003), Miller and Russek (1991) and (1996), Orr et al. (1995), Paesani et al. (2006), Perotti (2002), Plosser (1987), Reinhart and Sack (2000), and Tavares and Valkanov (2001).

[^3]:    ${ }^{6}$ Note, however, that the ratio of government debt-to-GDP has a standard deviation equal to 26 per cent, hence a one-standard-deviation increase in the public debt is quite a substantial change. The response of interest rates to a one percent change of the stock of public debt-to-GDP ratio would be really minimal, even in countries with extreme low or high values of public debt.
    ${ }^{7}$ Besides incomplete financial-market integration, differential government default risks may also explain this result.

[^4]:    ${ }^{8}$ The database is available on line at http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm.
    ${ }^{9}$ The results are robust if, instead, the long-term interest rate series from the OECD, which is an average of the interest rates of long-term bonds of different maturities, is used as the dependent variable. The results also stand up if the spread between the 10 -year government bonds interest rate and the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate is taken as the dependent variable, and if both rates are entered in real terms.

[^5]:    ${ }^{10}$ Faini (2006) and Bernoth et al. (2004) also follow a similar approach. Faini (2006) estimates the effect of changes to the cyclically adjusted primary surplus and to the stock of public debt on real interest rates in a panel of 11 EMU countries. Bernoth et al. (2004) include not only the debt-to-GDP ratio and the deficit-to-GDP ratio but also the ratio of government debt service to current government revenue among the variables that explain the yield at issue spreads between DM (or Euro) and US dollar denominated bonds issued by EU countries and Germany or the US respectively.
    ${ }^{11}$ In principle, this may lead us to underestimate the effect of fiscal shocks on interest rates, if such shocks impact the inflation rate and short-term rates directly or through the monetary authority's reaction function (see Canzoneri et al. (2002)). When we regress the three-month interest rate on our fiscal variables, however, we find no effect. Also, we show below that in a VAR that includes both short and long-term rates the impact effect of fiscal shocks on long-term rates is similar in magnitude to the one implied by the simple static regression that controls for short-term rates.

[^6]:    ${ }^{12}$ When the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was applied to data for each country, the results permitted rejection of the presence of a unit root for many, but not all, countries in the sample. The Im, Pesaran, and Shin test is preferred given the low power of the ADF in small samples and the desirability of adopting the same dynamic specification for the entire panel.
    ${ }^{13}$ Stock and Watson (1993), and Mark and Sul (2002) suggest including contemporaneous, leads and lags values of the differences of the right-hand side variables among the regressors and to allow

[^7]:    ${ }^{15}$ Tests results presented in section 2.1 suggested that all variables included in the specifications using Sample A, except GROWTH, are I(1) and cointegrated. GROWTH is, however, I(0).
    ${ }^{16}$ The median value of the primary deficit to GDP ratio is -0.001 in Sample $A$ and 0.001 in Sample B. The median value of the government debt to GDP ratio is 0.59 in Sample $A$ and 0.61 in Sample B.

[^8]:    ${ }^{17}$ In principle, the 10 -year interest rate can also affect the primary deficit by inducing policy makers to implement changes in their spending and tax revenues' programs. Note, however, that the budget for the current year is approved during the second half of the previous year and, even though additional measures can be taken during the course of the year, they usually become effective with some delay. Hence, the primary deficit is much less likely to be an endogenous variable than the stock of public debt. Furthermore, this type of endogeneity would likely bias our results towards finding lower coefficients, as - if anything - policymakers' response to higher rates will be to tighten the budget.

[^9]:    ${ }^{18}$ That is, we weight the value of the variable for country $i$ in year $t$ by the share of country $i$ ' s real GDP in the aggregate real GDP of the countries in the sample. The rationale for using PPP weights in this aggregation is that this measure best captures the macroeconomic impact of the government's revenues and expenditures.
    ${ }^{19}$ We also investigated the existence of structural breaks for euro countries in 1999. In particular, for the Euro-zone economies, one might expect that: (i) indicators of fiscal policy in individual

[^10]:    ${ }^{20}$ The estimated coefficients on $P R D E F$ in Table 6, equations (3), (4), (7), and (8), are larger than in the other regressions because part of the effect of $P R D E F$ is captured by the interactive term.
    ${ }^{21}$ As discussed in section 3.1, we compute trend inflation using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. We apply the filter to each country inflation rate using quarterly data and a value of $\lambda$ equal to 1600 . We

[^11]:    ${ }^{24}$ As discussed above, an increase in the primary deficit of 1 percent of GDP raises the 10 -year government bonds interest rate by 7.4 to 13.6 basis points (see Table 2).
    ${ }^{25}$ These results are also supported by VARs estimates. In fact, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) find that the ten year yield rises by 45 basis points on impact and by 40 basis points in the long run in response to an increase in public spending by one percent of GDP; Egen and Hubbard (2004) estimate that an increase in the projected federal deficit of 1 percent of GDP leads to an increase in the five year ahead real interest rate by 12 basis points.

[^12]:    ${ }^{26}$ Renhart and Sack (2000) use the budget surplus forecasted for the following year by the OECD from 1981 onwards. We are not aware of any study that uses panel data on OECD countries and includes 5-year ahead and/or 10-year ahead projections of the deficit and the public debt.
    ${ }^{27}$ To estimate the VAR, we demean the data from country and year averages to control for country and time fixed effects.

[^13]:    ${ }^{28}$ The use of yearly data prevents us from adopting the identification assumptions in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and Perotti (2002).

[^14]:    Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. GROWTH = real GDP growth rate. T-statistic in parenthesis. Columns 1-4 estimated by dynamic GLS, allowing for heterosckedasticity and country-specific first order autocorrelation coefficient in the error term, and including among the regressors country specific

[^15]:    Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. PREDEF*=Median PRDEF. GDEBT*=Median GDEBT. D1 $=1$ if PRDEF $>$ PRDEF*, 0 otherwise. D2 $=1$ if GDEBT>GDEBT*, 0 otherwise. T-statistic in parenthesis. In columns 1 and 5 , the values of the debt-to-GDP ratio above which an additional increase in the debt has a positive effect on interest rates are $62.5 \%$ and $65.4 \%$ respectively. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2 .

[^16]:    Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. T-statistic in parenthesis. LIQUID LIABILITIES $=$ (currency + demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial)/GDP. Instruments in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to

[^17]:    Notes: RINT10Y = real interest rate of 10-year government bonds; RINT3M = real interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills. GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. T-statistic in parenthesis. Instruments in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2.

[^18]:    Notes: GDEBT=GDEBT1 in columns 1-4, GDEBT=GDEBT2 in columns 5-8. Country dummies and year dummies included. T-statistic in parenthesis. Instruments in columns 2 ,
    4,6 and 8 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2

[^19]:    Notes:
    statistic in parenthesis. Instruments in columns 2 , and 4 are first lag of rhs variables. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2 .

