It seems impossible to begin without a reference to Owen Lattimore. For the beginning student of the Chinese frontier, Lattimore is often still the first author we read. His early writings on Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang – all places he knew personally from extensive travel there in the 1920s and 1930s – give us a captivating glimpse of an Inner Asia that, in his day, remained as yet little changed from the late Qing. Laying out before us an extraordinary world both alluring and strange, Lattimore seems to be saying to the novice that, despite appearances, this is in fact a knowable world. Which it is.

Though today outdated in some respects, Lattimore’s writings continue to provide an intellectual context in which to think about on the frontier in general, both across a broad temporal sweep and in comparative terms. Indeed, as William Rowe has pointed out in a recent essay, Lattimore is one of the few Asianists of the 20th c. whose influence continues to be felt widely across all fields of history, in large measure because he pioneered an approach to the study of the frontier that went beyond national histories.¹ In that, and in his readiness to identify the actions of China-based states as “imperialist” in nature, he stands as the intellectual godfather of all historians of China who have sought to find ways to escape the deadening hand of doctrinaire nation-centered narratives and who look instead for the other histories that lie

¹ Noting that Lattimore anticipated many of the developments that constitute the theoretical underpinnings of the “global history” that has emerged in the last couple of decades, Rowe writes “[T]he fact is that Lattimore remains one of the very few historians of the non-Western world to have helped shape the larger historical discipline in the West to any degree whatsoever.” William T. Rowe, “Owen Lattimore, Asia, and Comparative History,” 782.
neglected along the geographical periphery of the modern Chinese state. This group includes not only those scholars who study the Inner Asian frontier – the area where Lattimore’s influence has been the greatest, and which will provide the focus of this essay – but also those who work on the maritime frontiers of the east and southeast coasts and on the mountainous highland frontiers of the southwest.

As Rowe reminds us, Lattimore was a man of the field, not of the archive. He was a Big Idea Hunter, always searching for deep structure and ultimate causes. His intimate knowledge of the people and landscapes of the frontier kept him from making easy assumptions and incautious generalizations, even if he sometimes lapses into what we might label essentialism, at least as regards China itself. In this respect, Lattimore’s intellectual profile differs from that of Joseph Fletcher, probably the other most influential American scholar of Chinese frontier studies in the 20th c. Fletcher’s name must be mentioned, not only because his contributions to the Cambridge History of China volumes laid the foundation of all subsequent work done on the Qing frontier (at least in the north and west), but also because, unlike Lattimore, Fletcher was as much at home in the archive as he was on the road, and possessed a formal training in history and language that Lattimore never had. Few of us born after 1930 had any hope of enjoying the same sorts of experiences as Lattimore and his intrepid wife, Eleanor: traipsing in the forests and rivers of northern Manchuria, traveling the high roads of Mongolia on ponies and camels, riding sledges through the Siberian snow to Turkestan. But we could aspire to the sort of preparation that Fletcher had received, even if, inevitably, we failed to match him in what we achieved. For this reason, Fletcher was a model as much as he was an inspiration for those entering the field in the later 20th century; Lattimore, on the other hand, was an oracle.

We know that as a rule Lattimore did not hold “book learning” or philological expertise
in high regard.² Be that as it may, he and Fletcher (who were friends³) clearly agreed upon the importance of writing history in such a way that it reached a broad audience and made connections to the wider world. Fletcher’s “airplane ride” was of course a famous illustration of what he called “integrative history.”⁴ One wonders if Fletcher would acknowledge that this was what Lattimore was doing when he wrote his well-known essay, “The Frontier in History,” or whether Fletcher would go along with Lattimore’s insistence in seeing world history in such strongly civilizational terms, perhaps the one dimension of his approach that seems least useful today. But at a minimum we can say that in setting out the development of China’s frontiers as a type against which other frontiers might be compared, Lattimore was operating according to the same basic assumptions as Fletcher, namely, that the history of China was by no means exceptional, that the study of the frontier provided a key to that history, and that anyone seeking

² As Rowe observes: “Positively glorying in the fact that he was not a trained historian, [Lattimore] scoffed throughout his life at both the textual scholarship and the topical specialization conventionally demanded by that discipline; with characteristic pugnacity, he equated overreliance on textual sources with giving in to ‘authoritarian attempts to control opinion’ rather than relying on his own rough-and-ready ‘commonsense kind of reasoning’.” Rowe, “Owen Lattimore,” 761 n1.

³ Despite Lattimore’s long residence in the United Kingdom after, the two men were on good terms. Fletcher hosted Lattimore at Harvard on at least one occasion in the early 1970s (Hodong Kim, personal communication), and among Lattimore’s papers at the Library of Congress are letters exchanged with Fletcher between 1966 and 1975.

to establish patterns and connections in world history would at least want to include China, if not in fact begin there.5

The title of the present essay, “The Frontier in Qing History,” is thus of course an hommage au maître. It does not attempt anything nearly so ambitious, however, as Lattimore in his famous 1955 paper, “The Frontier in History.” Its more modest goal is to briefly outline some of the ways in which research on the Inner Asian frontier occupies a place of special significance for Qing studies, and, conversely, to describe what I see to be the significance of the Qing for the study of the frontier in Chinese history. What I would like to argue is that the frontier story is essential to any account of China during the last three and a half centuries; not only it is one of the things that makes the Qing “Qing,” it is one of the things that has made China what it is today.

Defining the jecen

Perhaps the best place to begin is with the meanings of the term, “frontier” – a word that figures in the very title of this journal. In English, as is well known, the word comes from a Latin military term, fronteria, indicating a front line of soldiers. In this sense, fronteria should be contrasted to another Latin word, limes (pl. limites), originally a boundary in a field, or a fortified line guarding a marchland.6 The meaning of “frontier” as a line, or border, seems to

5 “For an extremely regular, strongly patterned record of the processes of specialization and their consequences in the shaping of frontiers, the history of China maybe taken as a standard – an experimental, not an absolute standard – for estimating relative frontier values in the history of other societies and other parts of the world.” Owen Lattimore, “The Frontier in History,” 472.

have entered English only in the 15th c., perhaps from French, to mean “a political barrier between states or peoples, often militarized.”\(^7\) In French, \textit{frontière} continues to have this meaning, like Italian \textit{fronterra}, German \textit{Grenze}, Russian \textit{гранич}, or Chinese \textit{jie 界}. In English, however, “frontier” has over time acquired a different sense, and for well over a century now has carried the meaning of a peripheral zone, an unexplored area or region, perhaps very large, giving it a sense more akin to later meanings of the Chinese word \textit{jiang 疆}.\(^8\) On this point, we may as well quote Lattimore, who played with both senses of the word: “The linear frontier as it is conventionally indicated on a map always proves, when studied on the ground, to be a zone rather than a line.”\(^9\) Comparing this view to that of Frederick Jackson Turner, whose interpretation of the frontier had a great influence upon Lattimore, one can not only see the effect


\(^8\) While the etymology of the word \textit{jiang} points to an original meaning of a boundary, by the late imperial period it is frequently employed to mean a frontier region.

\(^9\) Lattimore, “The Frontier In History,” pp. 469-70. It should be said that scholars by no means agree on the interpretation of the English words “frontier” and “border.” Though he allows that they may coexist, or transform from one to the other over time, Peter Sahlins clearly sees the two as distinctive kinds of spaces, whereas Diana Lary suggests that the difference between frontier and border is “not a hard and fast one,” and that border may be taken to mean, not a fixed line, but a “permeable, flexible, and interpenetrable” zone between two entities, a place of gradual transition. See Peter Sahlins, \textit{Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees}, 4; and Diana Lary, ed., \textit{The Chinese State at the Borders}, 5-6.
upon the latter’s thinking but also the moment (1893) at which the word “frontier” began to acquire this broader sense:

The American frontier is sharply distinguished from the European frontier – a fortified boundary line running through dense populations. The most significant thing about the American frontier is, that it lies at the hither edge of free land. In the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or more to the square mile. The term is an elastic one, and for our purposes does not need sharp definition. We shall consider the whole frontier belt, including the Indian country and the outer margin of the “settled area” of the census reports.¹⁰

Lattimore, of course, adopted none of Turner’s ideas about the frontier as a crucible of rugged individualism, democracy, and progress, nor did he espouse the celebratory tone of continual outward expansion of “civilization.” Quite the contrary: Lattimore saw the Inner Asian frontier much more from what Turner might have called (had he stopped to consider that such a thing existed) the “native” point of view – that is, a zone of contestation – which is one of the things that continues to make his analysis of the frontier so relevant.¹¹ Even if the word “frontier” is


¹¹ This is especially so in the mainland, where numerous articles on Lattimore have appeared in recent years. Cf. the comment by Fudan historian Yao Dali: “Many of the succinct and astute observations written down several decades ago by Lattimore remain a source of inspiration for creative reflection by those who today research the history of the Chinese frontier” (拉铁摩尔在数十年前写下的不少简明扼要而充满悟性的见解，至今仍是激励着中国边疆史地研究者
now largely being supplanted by “borderland,” it is hard to see how the difference between these terms in English can easily survive the translation into Chinese, or any other language, for that matter. Indeed, to the degree that “borderland” implies a colonial dynamic, this introduces a further complicating element, which as far as I am aware has yet to be adequately addressed.  

12 In their now-classic article, Adelman and Aron seek to differentiate “frontier” and “borderland” in an effort to avoid the problematic overtones of Turnerian triumphalism. Referencing the major revisions in US history led respectively by Bolton and Limerick, they argue that, “By frontier, we understand a meeting place of peoples in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined.” Borderlands, on the other hand, are formed around “the contested boundaries between colonial domains,” such that it is “the conflicts over borderlands [that] shaped the peculiar and contingent character of frontier relations.” Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 815-816. However useful this terminological distinction may be for the study of the American West, I do not know of an extended consideration of its applicability to the Inner Asian case. If we understand the frontier as a zone of interpenetration and interaction, then it would appear that the primary point of differentiation between frontier and borderland is the overlap, and contestation, of the claims of different political authorities qua colonial powers. Setting aside the question of whether the Inner Asian frontier actually lacks this aspect, the fact is that the same Chinese word, bianjiang, is used to translate both “frontier” and “borderland” in much contemporary scholarship.
To speak of the “native” viewpoint requires us to consider native terms. While grossly undertheorized, much has been written of Chinese-language terms such as *bianjiang* 边疆, but what of the Manchu word *jecen*? Since this word is necessarily part of the object of any study of the Qing frontier, it is perhaps justified to offer a short etymological and discursive parsing of this key term.

Let us begin with the dictionaries. In her authoritative comparative dictionary of Tungusic languages, V. I. Tsintsius gives several original meanings of *jecen*: межа “boundary”; крепость “fortress”; защита “defense, shelter, protection”; ограда, стена “fence, wall”; рубеж, грань, граница “boundary, border.” In addition, she notes the existence of an attested Jurchen word, *jece*, which she defines as “border” (граничa) or “periphery” (окраина). So we can say with some confidence, first of all, that *jecen* is in fact a native Manchu word, and not a borrowing from Mongolian; and second, that its original sense was highly military in nature, very much along the lines of Latin *limites*.

Looking at dictionaries compiled on the basis of Qing-period usage, however, we can also see that the meaning of “defensive boundary” underwent significant expansion and adaptation after the 17th c. In his *Comprehensive Manchu-English Dictionary*, Jerry Norman gives “border, frontier” as the baseline definition of *jecen*. He gives other compounds as well:

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13 One place to start is Zhang Shiming and Gong Shengquan, “‘Bianjiang’ yici zai shijie zhuyao faxizhong de jingxiang: yige yuyuan jiaodu de kaocha,” especially pp. 3-5. Another is Fang Tie, “Gudai zhili bianjiang lilun yu shijian de yanjiu gouxiang.” Elsewhere, Fang has written that basic research on theoretical aspects of the frontier is notably behind the times. See Fang, “Shilun Zhongguo bianjiangxue de yanjiu fangfa,” 21.

14 V. I. Tsintsius, *Sravnitel’nyi slovar’ tunguso-man’chzhurskikh iazykov*. 
jecen akū “limitless,” jecen dalin “shoreline,” dubei jecen “outer limit, farthest boundary,” jase jecen “frontier, border region,” and oyonggo jecen “important border area.”

Hauer provides the same basic definitions as Norman (Begrenzung [“delimitation”], Grenze [“border”]), along with a few other uses, such as the translations of the five zones that formed part of the classical Chinese worldview: “zone of [royal] residence” (甸服, gemungge jecen), and “provincial zone” (候服, golonggo jecen). “zone of pacification” (綏服, bilungga jecen), harnessed zone (要服, siderilengge jecen), and “zone of wilderness” (荒服, lampangga jecen). Further clues are provided by Hu Zengyi, the author of the definitive Manchu-Chinese dictionary, who defines jecen in many different ways: bian 邊, bianyuan 邊緣, bianji 邊際, bianjie 邊界, bianjing 邊境, bianjiang 邊疆, biansai 邊塞, all of which are synonymous, or nearly so – but of course it is the “nearly so” that is troublesome. In addition, he provides a multitude of compounds drawn from his reading of original materials. These can be broken down into four basic families of meaning:

1. administrative boundary, whether provincial, national, or other,

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17 Hu Zengyi, *Xin Man-Han da cidian*.  
18 An additional compound, jalan jecen (= Ch shi jie 世界, “the world”), is obviously a calque from Chinese, and should be held apart.  
19 Cf. the following examples: adaki jecen 領疆 “adjacent border”; Šansi G’ansu i jecen 陝西甘肅地界 “border of Shaanxi and Gansu”; jecen obumbi 做為邊界 “make a boundary”; jecen i dolo/dorgi 境內 “within the borders”; jecen ci tucibumbi 出境 “to leave/cross the border”; jecen
2. a military line;20
3. the frontier generally;21

be dosimbi 入境 “to enter the border”; jecen [be] daba[na]mbi 越境 “to cross the border illicitly”; meni jecen i ergi karun be kadalara hafasa 我主管哨所官員 “the officials managing the guardpost on our side of the border”; juwe gurun i jecen i urse 兩國邊境之人 “people in the border area of the two countries.” To this may be added other uses: jorhon [jorgon sic] biyai ice duin de. jecen de isinjiha inenggi ci. Šandung ni golo de. amba nimanggi nimaraha, “On the fourth day of the twelfth month, from the day you arrived at the border, there was a big snow in Shandong province.” From Kangxi Manwen zhupi zouzhe 康熙滿文硃批奏摺 (hereafter KXMaZPZZ) no. 149, memorial of Foron, KX 28.12.9. This and other documents cited from these collections are held in the First Historical Archives, Beijing. It is perhaps worth pointing out also that in the Manchu version of the 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta, jecen is the word used to describe the border between Russia and China, seen in such phrases as juwe gurun i jecen i ba umesi oyanggo, “the border between the two countries is very important; juwe gurun i jecen hešen toktobuhandge, “establishing the boundaries of the two countries.” British Library OMS/Add. 18106, “Treaty Between China and Russia, 1727-28, in Manchu.”

20 Cf. the following examples: amban be hūlhai jecen de beye nikenjihe, “The official personally got up close to the bandits’ lines”; gabsihiyan be gaifi batai jecen de šuwe dosifi “taking the vanguard, he pushed straight into the enemy line.”

21 Cf. the following examples: jase jecen 邊陲 邊疆 “border area”; jecen i ba 邊界 “frontier”; wargi jecen 西域 “western frontier”; ice jecen 新疆 “new frontier”; goro/goroki jecen 遠疆 “distant frontier”; lakcaha jecen 閉塞之地, 絕域之邊 “remote [lit. cut-off] frontier”; mederi
4. a particular frontier zone, especially one inhabited by a non-Han people.\textsuperscript{22}

My own search of Qing-era documents suggests that the last of these meanings could apply to parts of China itself. The quotation below is from a palace memorial of the Kangxi reign:

\begin{quote}
Si Ning, Liyang Jeo, Si An ci juwe minggan ba funceme giyalabuhabi. uttu be dahame.
\textit{ilan jecen} i cooha ci tulgiyen. dorgi ba i dzungdu. siyūn fu se. tidu. dzung bing guwan set fejergi moringga cooha be emu minggan ekiyeniyebuqi.\textsuperscript{23} (emphasis added)
\end{quote}

More than two thousand have already been seconded from Xining, Liangzhou, and Xi’an. Following this, apart from the soldiers of the \textbf{three frontiers}, a thousand mounted soldiers under the governors-general and governors, or under the military supervisors and provincial commanders of the interior provinces, have been used up.

To judge from the distinction drawn here between \textit{ilan jecen} (= Ch \textit{san jiang} 三疆, “three frontiers”) and \textit{dorgi ba} (= Ch \textit{neidi} 内地, “inner lands”) and from its use in other documents,\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{flushright}
\textit{jecen} 海疆 “maritime frontier”\textsuperscript{22}; \textit{jecen be bolgo obumbi} 靖邊 “pacify the border.” Another example, from the Qianlong era: \textit{jecen i hafan de inu sain niyalma bahaci ombi}, “It is important to select truly good men as frontier officials” (Qianlong Manwen zhupi zouzhe packet 72, memorial of Uhetu, QL3.4.9).
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. the following examples: \textit{Tanggū/Tubet jecen} 唐古特/土伯特邊境 “Tibetan border”; \textit{Miyoozi jecen i ba} 苗疆 “Miao frontier”; \textit{Oros jecen} 俄羅斯境 “Russian frontier”; \textit{Jun gar jecen} 準噶爾境 “Dzungar frontier”; \textit{Hoise jecen} 回疆 “Muslim frontier.”

\textsuperscript{23} KXMaZPZZ 355, memorial of Boji 博濟, KX 41.5.21.

\textsuperscript{24} “Si An i ba. wargi ergi ilan jecen be alihab. seremšeme tebuhe jakūn gūsai hafan. cooha holbobuhangge umesi oyonggo” (“Xi’an has supported the three western frontiers. Everything
the term *ilan jecen* seems to have been shorthand for the western border zone constituted by Xining, Gansu, and Ningxia. Much later, of course, the word is applied to the newly incorporated territories of Dzungaria and Kashgaria (i.e., Altishahr), called in Manchu *Ice toktobuha jecen*, “newly fixed (or “pacified”) frontier,” and in Chinese simply as “Xinjiang” 新疆, “new frontier,” in which phrase the notion of *jecen* as a region of some considerable size is quite unequivocally expressed.

In thinking about the many ways in which *jecen* was used in Manchu documents, not to speak of the nuances in the Chinese terms for “frontier,” what we find is that providing a single, neat definition is impossible. Its meanings – like the meanings of so many terms used in what might seem to us today “inconsistent” ways – obviously varied considerably, depending on context. It would appear that the meaning changed somewhat over time, acquiring more and more a sense akin to that of the English “frontier,” but this is a question that will require further research. Another question worth consideration is whether and how *jecen* differs in its meaning from the words used to express similar ideas in Chinese, especially when it comes to the translation in the Qing of documents originally in Manchu. Though I do not investigate this problem in the present essay, the question is important because it points to the issue of the distinctiveness of the Qing frontier, a problem to which I would now like to turn.

The Qing in Frontier History

Any discussion of the place of the frontier in Qing history leads us to recall Ping-ti Ho’s famous 1967 essay, in which he considered the larger significance of the Qing era for Chinese related to the Eight Banner officers and soldiers garrisoned [there] is of the utmost importance”). YZMaZPZZ 165, memorial of Jalangga, YZ7.11.22.
Many readers will be familiar with one of Ho’s main conclusions (repeated by Joseph Fletcher in his chapters for the *Cambridge History of China*), which is that the geographical framework of modern China was determined in the Qing, notably via the expansion, conquest, and consolidation of imperial territory on the frontier, particularly in Inner Asia, but also in Taiwan and in the southwest:

> [G]eographically China could never have reached its present dimensions without the laborious, painstaking, and skillful work of empire building carried out by Manchu rulers between 1600 and 1800. Since much of present-day China's impact on the outside world is due to its size and the location of its frontiers, the contribution of the Ch'ing period to the formation of modern China as a geographic and ethnic entity is of the greatest significance.

If it has taken some time to fully realize the implications of this conclusion – namely, that the history of the Qing periphery is no way peripheral to our understanding of the Chinese past (or present, for that matter), and that its frontier experience is what makes Qing history distinctive when compared to other eras of dynastic rule – doubtless this has much to do with the fact that for a very long time we lacked access to the primary sources necessary to undertake this research, and training in the relevant languages was also undervalued. Nonetheless, as the next section of

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25 Ping-ti Ho, “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History,” 189-195. In light of the discussion in the pages below of the “New Qing History,” it is worth noting that Ho’s essay appeared along with two others, by Harold Kahn and Jonathan Spence, as part of a forum on “New Views of Ch’ing History.” All three papers were originally presented at a panel at the 1966 AAS meeting in New York, sponsored by the Society for Ch’ing Studies.

26 Ho, “The Significance,” 189.
this essay will show, it seems now that we may be arriving at a point predicted nearly twenty years ago by James Millward, who wrote that while the implications of the territorial expansion under the Manchus had yet to be fully understood, a Qing-centered approach to policy and practice on the frontier would lead the field to realize “that the periphery can be central after all.”

Perhaps it is wise, then, to first step back to consider a slightly different matter – not the significance of the frontier for the Qing, but the significance of the Qing for Chinese frontier history, and whether, or in what sense, we should even be thinking of it as “Chinese” frontier history at all.

This is clearly a sensitive question, since it touches directly on how one chooses to interpret the Qing imperial project: Was it, as has been suggested by some, the restoration of the classical ideal of “grand unity,” the dayitong 大一統, a gathering together of all of “all under Heaven,” tianxia 天下, in a culminating manifestation of the two-millennia-old Chinese imperial state? Was it rather the re-creation of a universal order along the lines of the Mongol empire, another yeke ulus? Or was it instead an early modern state in the mold of the Ottoman, Mughal, Safavid, and Romanov empires, all also sprawling continental domains encompassing an array of peoples, lands, languages, and faiths within the sovereignty of a single ruler, himself – like the Qing emperor – sometimes the representative of a minority group, as in the case of the Ottomans and Mughals? In other words, was the Qing a Chinese dynasty (chao 朝), was it a compound,

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27 James Millward, “New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier,” 129.

28 See, for example, Guo Chengkang, “Qingdai huangdi de Zhongguo guan,” 1-18.
pluralist Inner Asian state (gurun29), or was it an “empire” in a more universal sense?30 And how do we tell these apart?

Up to now, one way to do this has been to evaluate the things that the empire-builders themselves said about what they were doing on the frontier, since conquest – which of necessity happens at a distance from the center – is one of the areas where policies that are recognizably “imperial” are most in evidence.31 By this logic, in the Qing, if, as they sometimes did, ruling elites said that they believed they were restoring unity, then this meant they were operating according in a Chinese register. On the other hand, if they made references to Yuan-era precedents, or brought out symbols of Buddhist kingship, this meant they were thinking along different lines than those of orthodox succession (zhengtong 正統). How much attention ought we be paying to the rhetoric of Qing empire-builders, anyway? Not that what they thought they were doing is not important, but their view of the business of conquest and consolidation on the frontier was no less a matter of discursive window dressing than what participants in imperial projects in other parts of the world have said (or might say) to legitimate their actions. Mere antiquity of rhetoric, or invocation of hallowed claims to old territories, does not in itself make that rhetoric apolitical or in some special sense impartial or “true.” Tropes of imperial unity, say, or the transformative power of civilization, or of chakravartinhood are insistently political, even if people believed in them, as doubtless they did. That is what gives them their power. But the historian cannot settle for this alone.

29 The Manchu term gurun is as liable to at least as many varying meanings as jecen. See Mark Elliott, “Manchu (Re)Definitions of the Nation in the Early Qing.”

30 See Mark Elliott, “Chuantong Zhongguo shi yige diguo ma?”

We would be naïve indeed if we took Qing imperial discourse—which, it should be said, notably lacked any word that meant “empire”–at face value. One pitfall facing the historian who would go beyond Marxist-Leninist or standard nation-centered narratives to recover what was “imperial” about the Qing expansion into, or conquest of, the frontier is that she ends up simply repeating—and by repeating, reenacting on a certain level—the ideologies espoused by contemporary actors. Refreshing as these might be when put alongside older interpretations, we gain little, I would argue, by substituting an analysis based on 18th-c. notions of “impartial imperial benevolence toward all people” (or any other formulation) for 20th-c. ideas of “oppression by the landlord class” or “reunification of the great Chinese nation.” Such notions only help us understand at most one element of the center’s point of view. Even if we grant that the gradual extension of Qing power into Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan was part of a grand plan of imperial unification—and Matthew Mosca’s work cautions against doing so—32—from the point of view of those on the frontier, it hardly seems likely that a group such as the Dzungars would have welcomed such a spin on their incorporation into the empire of the Great Qing, at least not without many qualifications. We want to know how Ortai or Agüi or Fuk’anggan thought, but we do not want to limit ourselves to thinking like them. “What did the Qing elite say about the dynasty’s policies on the frontier?” is not the only question we should be posing; we also should be asking a corollary question, “What did frontier elites say about Qing policies? How did they view the imperial center?” Answering such questions is a vital step toward disrupting the monopoly of Sinocentric narratives. Not that Sinocentric narratives are not

32 “For most of the period studied in this book [18th-19th c.], Qing statesmen and scholars never conceived a comprehensive ‘grand strategy,’ even at the loosest and most abstract level.”

Matthew Mosca, *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy*, 11.
important – they most definitely are – but we must not mistake them for the sole, solitary interpretation of events.

Apart from its place within the long history of the Chinese frontier, then, what might be another useful framework for thinking about the frontier and the gathering of the Great Qing lands? Carolyn Cartier and Tim Oakes broached this issue recently when they observed that, “Problematizing the idea of territorial unification in China over the *longue durée*, and under the contemporary government of the People's Republic, prioritizes understanding the state through processes of geographical formation.” That is to say, to make sense of how China got to its present shape, it is essential to make clear just what was entailed in the exercise of sovereignty and to investigate the different means by which the spaces we call the frontiers of China, and the people living in them, were brought under the control of the imperial state, and how the process was carried out again in the 20th c. In short, it is essential to historicize the frontier and to approach the frontier enterprise as a case of state-led, pragmatically driven reterritorialization. In this project, elites from the imperial center collaborated with local elites on various peripheries, with varying degrees of success. To understand the sorts of processes that unfolded on the frontier, and to better position ourselves to parse the discursive construct of the frontier, we would be better off looking closely at the movement of populations, the creation of maps, the selection of administrative and military personnel, the conduct of negotiations with non-Han actors, the fate of captives, the creation of trade networks, the working of legal systems, and the spread of “frontier knowledge,” among other problems.

This is not something that can be done as easily or equally well in all periods of history, but the Qing case, with ample documentation of all kinds, provides a fine opportunity to push

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33 Carolyn Cartier and Tim Oakes, “Vast Land of Borders.”
forward with such an agenda. Its proximity to the modern era and the birth of the Chinese republics, moreover, invests it with immediate relevance, as the energetic response to the New Qing History that has emerged in recent years attests. Thanks to new work on the political and ideological structures of Qing rule, it is now difficult to sustain the argument that imperial expansion—in the Qing, or indeed, at any time in the past, was a natural process that “just happened.” In this case, the iterative process of making and unmaking “China” over the centuries appears in a different light. One can see in this development the emergence of new approaches to the distinctive history of the Qing frontier.

The Frontier and the New Qing History

From the Han dynasty one, the frontier was obviously important to all unified Chinese states. What does it mean to say that it was distinctive in the Qing? Answers to this question have begun to emerge in the work that began to appeared in the late 1990s that goes under the name of the “New Qing History” (xin Qingshi 新清史). This school of analysis (if indeed it can be

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34 A summary of these responses is found in Dang, Meiguo Xin Qingshi sanshinian and in Ding and Elliott, “Ershiyi shiji.”

35 A similar point is elaborated in far greater detail by Ge Zhaoguang in his influential book, Zhaizi Zhongguo: chongjian youguan “Zhongguo” de lishi lunshu (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011).

36 The earliest introduction to the New Qing History is Joanna Waley-Cohen, “The New Qing History.” See also Kishimoto Mio, “The Ch’ing Dynasty and the East Asian World,” and, more recently, Laura Newby, “Pax Manjurica.” In Chinese, the literature on the New Qing History is now quite extensive. For a summary, see inter alia, Li Aiyong, “‘Xin Qingshi’ yu ‘Zhonghua
called a “school,” which is doubtful, given that some of those most closely associated with the New Qing History reject that association), places a strong value on the importance of non-Chinese language sources and a comparative approach to understanding the Qing empire. Emphasizing the fact that the Qing state was founded and ruled by a non-Han people with strong connections to Inner Asia, the New Qing History calls into question one of the central tenets of 20th-century Chinese historiography, namely, that the “secret” to Qing dynastic success lay in the near-complete absorption – or “Sinicization” – of the Manchus. Rather, the persistence of a separate Manchu identity through to the end of the dynasty, and the creation of a particular hybrid imperial style, are seen as having played a crucial role in sustaining the Qing socio-political order, both at the center and at the margins.37

One consequence of this shift of paradigm is the recognition by many scholars associated with the New Qing History of the existence of a distinctive historical identity and an orientation toward the frontier – most pronounced in the 17th and 18th centuries, altered somewhat in the 19th

diguo’ wenti: you yici chongji yu fanying?” and Dang Wei, Meiguo xin Qingshi sanshinian (1980-2010): jujue Hanzhongxin de Zhongguo shiguan de xingqi yu fazhan; see also the essays in volume 1 of Liu Fengyun et al., eds., Qingdai zhengzhi yu guojia rentong. For a response to critics, see Ding Yizhuang and Mark Elliott, “Ershiyi shiji ruhe shuxie Zhongguo lishi: Xin Qingshi de yingxiang yu huiying.”

37 Evelyn S. Rawski, “Reenvisioning the Qing: the Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History.” Rawski’s article drew a sharp response from Ping-ti Ho; see “In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’.” This “Great Sinicization Debate” provoked the initial interest in the New Qing History among mainland scholars.
that was, if not wholly free, then at least partly liberated, from the highly charged assumptions inherent in Chinese ideas of the “barbarian” and the whole weltanschauung encapsulated in the *Hua-Yi zhi bian* 華夷之辨. Permitted a greater flexibility of approach, the Manchu court adopted institutions and policies toward managing the frontier different from those of preceding regimes; in so doing, they effected a far greater measure of control, and a much more ambitious program of sovereignty, resulting in the successful incorporation of the territories of Inner Asia into the empire.\(^{38}\) Significantly, while the Chinese rhetoric of “grand unity” (*dayitong* 大一統)

was undeniably present in the Qing approach to governance (it runs throughout the *Dayi juemi lu*, for instance), the Manchus did not rule solely as Chinese, or so the argument goes. Rather, they developed different strategies of rule for the different parts of the realm that fell to them and were not bothered by inconsistencies or asymmetries. Indeed, the asymmetrical structure of


39 Cf. Waley-Cohen: “Central to this revised understanding is the new Qing history’s revelation that at the height of their power, the Qing regarded China not so much as the center of their empire, as only a part, albeit a very important part, of a much wider dominion that extended far into the Inner Asian territories of Mongolia, Tibet, the Northeast (today sometimes called Manchuria) and Xinjiang, or Chinese (Eastern) Turkestan.” “The New Qing History,” 194-195.
Qing empire helped make it what it was. In this respect, the Qing was much like other early modern empires, whether or not it was “early modern” itself.40

Now, it is one thing to point to the success of the Qing state on the frontier and another to say that it was because the Qing approached the frontier differently that it was successful, or that it was successful because the people in charge were themselves from the frontier. Perhaps they followed the same policies as the Ming, but just did a better job of executing them? (After all, in one form or another, a system of “tribute” relations remained in place for much of the Qing, even if it was not applied uniformly.) If the argument for the singularity of the Qing frontier is to be successfully put, it would seem to follow that the case must be made that a) Qing policies and institutions were indeed different from that of the Ming or other regimes and that b) the reason they were different was because the people in charge of developing those policies and institutions thought not strictly according to Chinese imperial precedents but were open to novel methods of governance based either on other biases traceable to the Inner Asian world or on a familiarity with local conditions based on intimate knowledge of the frontier.

In recent years, these and many other aspects of the Qing imperial imagination have attracted the attention of a younger generation of historians, whose work is just now beginning to be published; some is available as articles, but much of it remains in dissertation form. Broadly

40 Confirming Matthew Mosca’s argument that, “no political, cultural-ideological, or economic factor fundamentally divided the reasoning of Qing strategists from that of their peers in other contemporary Eurasian empires.” See Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy, 9.
speaking, the scholarship of this “New Qing History 2.0”\(^{41}\) is characterized by a deep immersion in Qing-era archives, including not only Chinese- and Manchu-language materials, but also those written in Mongolian, Tibetan, and Chaghatay. Consciously reflective of the theoretical and historiographical issues raised by the New Qing History – in particular those relating to the specificities of Manchu rule and its implications for modern Chinese history – this new work seeks to integrate the history of the Qing with broader trends in global history,\(^ {42}\) economic

\(^{41}\) Credit for this formulation goes to Liu Wenpeng of the Qing History Institute of Renmin University. See his comments at a talk presented by the author at Central Minzu University in Beijing in August 2013, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GQcDr7LzHSs.

history, environmental history, legal history, cultural studies, history of the book, art


history, population history, and history of science and medicine. This work is

46 Andrea Goldman, Opera and the City: The Politics of Culture in Beijing, 1770-1900 (Stanford University Press, 2012); Elena Chiu, “The Origins and Original Language of Manchu Bannermen Tales (zidishu),” CHINOPERL 30.1 (Jun 2011), 1–23 and Bannerman Tales (Zidishu): Manchu Storytelling and Cultural Hybridity in Late Imperial China (Harvard University Asia Center Press, forthcoming).


complemented by ongoing research by younger scholars writing in Japanese and Chinese, such as Sugiyama Kiyohiko, Cheng Zhi, Onuma Takahiro, Erdenchulu Khokhchahar, Qiu Yuanyuan, Lin Shixuan, Tsai Wei-chieh, and Zhao Huanxi, among others. While not all of this work is


necessarily focused on the frontier as such, the cumulative effect of this new wave of scholarship is the ineluctable reshaping of our overall understanding of Qing political, intellectual, cultural, linguistic, spatial, and social developments. The resulting transformation of the framework within which the history of Qing China is being written means the integration, to an unprecedented degree, of the people, languages, beliefs, and material culture of the imperial frontiers into the stories we tell.

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to consider the question of Qing frontier identity from an entirely different angle, that of subjective affect, which as yet has been little studied. For this, I turn to a poem from the middle of the 19th century, written by the bannerwoman Nasun Lan-bao (Na-xun Lan-bao 那遜蘭保) (1825-1873). Born in Khuree (Manchu Kuren, Chinese Ku-lun 庫倫, modern-day Ulan Bator), Lan-bao belonged to the Borjigit clan of the Khalkha Mongols. Her father, Dorje Wangchuk, was a minor official in the service of Tushiyetu khan, one of four khans descended from Dayan khan and the first Khalkha leader to come over to the Qing in 1686.

In 1828 Dorje Wangchuk was summoned to Beijing to serve in the imperial guard, and moved with his family to the capital, taking up residence with the family of his wife, of the Feimo clan.

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Wei-chieh, “Zhimin dang’an yu diguo xinggou: lun Qingchao Manwen zouzhezhong dui Taiwan shufan de biaoshu,” Taiwanshi yanjiu 15.3 (2008); and Zhao Huanxi, “Qingdai Beijing qimin fencheng er ju zhengce de shishi ji qi yingxiang,” Zhongguo lishi dili luncong (Jan 2013).

Dorje Wangchuk’s mother was Manchu, a grandniece of Qianlong, and one of his grandmothers was a grandniece of Kangxi. So Dorje Wangchuk, legally a Mongol and with a Tibetan name, was in fact more than half Manchu, but he was not a bannerman.
Lan-bao was then four sui. Raised by her Manchu grandmother, of the Wanyan clan, she spent the rest of her life in Beijing, eventually marrying a Manchu bannerman, an undistinguished member of the imperial clan. Her son, Shengyu (jinshi 1877), however, had a distinguished career, and published a compilation of his mother’s poems under the title Preserved Poems of the Hall of Fragrant Rue (Yunxiangguan yishi 蕃香館遺詩) in 1874.53

The following verse, written by Lan-bao to her brother when he took up an assignment to serve in Khuree, probably some time in the 1850s, is taken from that collection. It presents an unusual combination of longing and dread, pride and shame, lifting a veil on the complex identity of one individual, and simultaneously on the identity of the empire in which she lived.

瀛俊二兄奉使庫倫，故吾家也，送行之日率成此詩

四歲來京師，卅載辭故鄉。故鄉在何所，塞北雲茫茫。

成古有遺譜，庫倫余故疆。彎弧十萬眾，天驕自古強。

夕宿便氈幕，朝餐甘湩漿。幸逢大一統，中外無邊防。

帶刀入宿衛，列爵襲冠裳。自笑閨閣質，早易時世妝。

無夢到鞍馬，有意工文章。綠窗事粉黛，紅燈勤縹緲。

華夷隔風氣，故國為殊方。問以啁哳語，遜謝稱全忘。

我兄承使命，將歸畫錦堂。乃作異域視，舉家心彷徨。

53 For this information on Nasun Lanbao, I rely on Du Jiaji, “Qingdai Mengguzu nüshiren Na-xun Lan-bao ji qi xiangguan wenti kaozheng.” Also Ding Yizhuang, Qingdai Menggu nüshiren Na-xun Lan-bao de shenshi yu xiezuo,” and Wilt Idema, “A Mongolian Li Qingzhao?” I am grateful to them for permission to quote from their work.
我獨有一言，臨行奉離觴。天子守四夷，原為捍要荒。

近聞頗柔懦，醇俗醨其常。所愧非男人，歸願無由償。

冀兄加振厲，舊業須重光。勿為兒女泣，相對徒悲傷。

A Poem Dashed Off the Day I Said Good-bye to My Second Elder Brother, Yingjun, Who Was Appointed to Kuren, Our Former Home

At the age of four I came here to the capital;
Thirty years I’ve been away from our old hometown.
Where is that hometown?
North of the passes, lost in the clouds.
We are descendants of Chinggis Khan,
So Kuren has long been our domain.

A hundred thousand who draw the bow—
Of old we are strong, the proud children of Tenggeri!
At night we sleep simply in felt tents;
For breakfast we’ll happily have frozen milk.

Today, we are fortunate to live in an age of imperial unity,
Where no borders divide within and without.

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54 This translation is based upon that in Idema, “A Mongolian Li Qingzhao?” with minor editing based on my reading of the original. My thanks to Ding Yizhuang for her contributions and guidance.
Carrying his sword, [our father] served in the guard,
And was ennobled with an inherited rank.
I’m just inner quarters’ material – it’s funny how
For so long now I have dressed fashionably.
I’ve never dreamed of riding a saddled horse,
All my ambition is focused on high literature.

By day I busy myself with cosmetics in my chamber,
And at night I devote myself to my books.
Chinese and Barbarian are distinguished by manner and style:
My old country is now an unfamiliar place to me.
When you speak to me in that chirruping language,
I have to confess I have forgotten it completely!

Now you have received this appointment,
And you will return home, covered in glory.
But we look upon the place as a strange land,
And the whole family is filled with fear.

As I offer you this parting drink, now that you are leaving,
The only thing I want to say to you is this:
The emperor rules the four barbarians,
Just so they may protect us against the wasteland beyond.
Recently, I hear, they are very docile and submissive,
And their honest customs are better than normal.

To my regret, I am not a man, so my desire
To go back there will never be fulfilled.
I hope that you, brother, will make an extra effort
To restore our inheritance to its former glory.
Let us not cry sentimental tears like women,
And vainly indulge in sadness and grief.

There is much to reflect on here as far as the interiorization of the frontier is concerned: the reference to imperial rule; the absence of borders dividing the center from the periphery; the distinction between Chinese (Hua) and Barbarian (Yi); Mongolia both as erstwhile home and at the same time as a “strange land,” its people speaking a “chirruping tongue” no longer intelligible to the author. And while there is something of the flavor of the Tang frontier poem about it – “the four barbarians . . . are very docile and submissive,” not to mention the typical “parting drink” farewell to one departing for distant lands – the dominant tone is marked by the author’s nostalgic pride in her frontier heritage (“We are descendants of Chinggis Khan . . . the proud children of Tenggeri”), combined with a poignant recognition of alienation from her roots in the steppe with its simple ways, where one sleeps in tents and awakes to a bowl of fresh milk.

To analyze this poem fully is not my purpose; rather, I offer it as evidence of the emergence of a distinctive Qing sensibility on the northern frontier. For surely this is a composition that could not possibly have been written under a native Chinese dynasty: no one associated with Ming (or Song) court culture would ever have composed a wistful verse in
Chinese about her “old home” in Mongolia. A Mongol poet (if there were one) living in China
in the Yuan might have waxed longingly about the lost pleasures of nomadic life, but he
probably would have been a man, and would probably not have been able to write in Chinese.

Lan-bao’s poem encourages us to think critically about the many different ways in which the
frontier territories of the Qing state were given a truly different meaning under Manchu rule, a
meaning that they would not have had under the Jin or Liao, when the southern lands remained
beyond their grasp.

Lan-bao’s words show that the frontier, as a site of empire-making in the Qing, was at
once familiar and alien, known and unknown. For her and for other members of the conquest
elite, regardless of gender, the frontier was a place of close personal identification, in which one
might both find oneself and lose oneself. As such, Lan-bao’s poem can be said to be a site of
empire-making itself – one reason why it is important for us as modern-day historians to take the
literary as well as the archival measure of the Qing frontier/jecen/bianjiang if we are to
incorporate its full range of meanings in our work and place it in proper context within the
stories of China and of empire that are now being written.