Supranational Union and New Medievalism: Forging a New Scottish State

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Supranational Union and New Medievalism: Forging a New Scottish State

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A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

Harvard University

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Abstract

This study aims to understand why the Scottish National Party (SNP) accelerated to prominence after the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following question: To what extent does the European Union (EU) influence the Scottish independence movement and does this trend support the theory of New Medievalism? Data drawn from interviews with members of the 4th Scottish Parliament, comments made by former First Minister Alex Salmond, and scientific polling tend to show that the EU’s increasing institutional powers have facilitated the modern Scottish independence movement’s growth by mitigating the Scottish people’s fears of independence from the UK. However, the data also demonstrates that the SNP’s election victory in 2011 was not just an indication of Scottish nationalism, but was a result of the SNP’s competence in government. This investigation concludes that as the EU centralizes power in supranational bodies, the process of New Medievalism is working its course by dissolving Westphalian nation states. This process is revealed in the rise of the modern Scottish nationalist movement as well as other subnational independence movements in EU member states. The culmination of this movement was the rise of the SNP and the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.
# Table of Contents

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................ .1

II. New Medievalism: Foundational Study ................................................................. 8
   Introduction .................................................................................................................. 8
   The Regional Integration of States ............................................................................ 12
   The Disintegration of States .................................................................................... 12
   The Restoration of Private International Violence .............................................. 14
   Transnational Organizations ................................................................................... 15
   The Technological Unification of the World ......................................................... 16
   Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 17

III. Scotland: Historical Background .......................................................................... 21
   History Prior to Acts of Union (1707) ................................................................... 21
   Prehistory to the End of Roman Influence (6,500 B.C. – 410 A.D.) .................... 21
   Origins of the Kingdom of Scotland (410 A.D. – 1707 A.D.) ............................... 22
   Acts of Union (1707) ............................................................................................... 25
   Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 26

IV. European Union: Supranational Challenge to Nation States ............................... 27
   Historical Background of the European Union ....................................................... 27
   The United Kingdom and the European Union ....................................................... 29
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scotland and Statehood</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stirings of Independence (1853–1967)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Rise of the SNP (1967–2015)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Analysis</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Interviews</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Green Party</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Labour Party</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Liberal Democrats Party</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish National Party</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 92
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 97
Chapter I

Introduction

“Should auld acquaintance be forgot,
    And never brought to mind?
Should auld acquaintance be forgot,
    And auld lang syne!
For auld lang syne, my dear,
    For auld lang syne.
We’ll take a cup o’ kindness yet,
    For auld lang syne.”¹

Every New Year’s, at the stroke of midnight, millions of people begin to sing *Auld Lang Syne*, the famous words penned by Scotland’s national poet Robert Burns. The Scots phrase “auld lang syne” may be loosely translated as “long, long ago,” and the poem questions forgetting that which occurred in the past. Can one truly forget his past? The Scotland of today cannot be separated from the Scotland of yesteryear because the events of the history still impact Scotland’s culture, language, and unique cultural and political development. The history and development of European integration is important to understand the development of modern Scottish nationalism and Scotland’s move toward revived statehood.

Scholars usually date European or Western civilization as emerging about 700–800 A.D. during the reign of Charlemagne, and the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire. From 1500 to the mid-twentieth century, European nations conquered and colonized most of the known world. Only China, Russia, Japan, and Ethiopia were able to withstand this onslaught. Besides colonialism, Europe presented to the world the

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European-defined international system. Hedley Bull, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford, argues that an international system is formed “[w]hen two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of the whole.” An international society, however, exists only when nations in an international system have “common interests and common values,” “conceive of themselves to be bound by common set of rules,” “share in the working of common institutions,” and “have a common culture or civilization.” Bull argues that while there is a prevailing international system, there is not an international society. However, nations in Europe have enough shared interests, rules, values, and cultural norms for an international society to exist.

During the European Middle Ages, there was a kind of universal political organization in Europe. The Roman Catholic Church and Holy Roman Empire, Pope and Emperor, shared authority with their vassals and bishops below. No single entity was sovereign, and all shared power. However, after the Peace of Westphalia, the nation-states of Europe became independently sovereign. There would be no hegemon, Pope or Emperor, above any other ruler, which resulted in the traditional balance of power approach to international relations. This Westphalian system of sovereignty reigned undisputed in Europe until the twentieth century and the formation of the ECSC, EEC, and the EU. These institutions brought the notions of territorial integrity and independent sovereignty into doubt. Instead, “a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty” began to dominate.\(^2\)


\(^3\) Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 245.
The beginnings of Europe’s international society are found in the Peace of Westphalia. The sixteenth-century Roman Catholic Church was rife with internal disputes, leading to the Protestant Reformation, and the rejection of papal authority by many northern European nobles. For 150 years the politics of Europe was focused on intracivilizational disputes between these factions. Conflicts included the Thirty Years War⁴ (1616–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire, and the Eighty Years War (1569–1648) between Spain and the Netherlands. In 1648 the great powers of Europe, fatigued by incessant war, signed a treaty at Westphalia, Germany, that ushered in a new system of international relations. The Peace of Westphalia marked an end of “Habsburg pretentions to universal monarchy,”⁵ and inaugurated the principle of strict territorial integrity. The Westphalian system has dominated international affairs since 1648, but is being eroded with the creation of new forms of sovereignty and ways of relating among nation states. These new forms of sovereignty have their roots in the ideological revolutions of the twentieth century and the reorientation of international relations, first along ideological and now cultural boundaries.

In 1917 the communist Russian Revolution shook the world. Though Marxism is a European philosophy, it did not take root in Europe. Instead, it was imported and adapted by the likes of Lenin, Mao, and Ho to challenge the West, and to assert their autonomy. From the end of World War II (1939–1945), the communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, asserted this cause, namely to challenge Western power through communist revolution. This period is referred to as the Cold War. The Cold War

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⁴ The Thirty Years’ War resulted in an estimated 8 million casualties (including civilian deaths).

(1947–1991) lasted until the Soviet Union succumbed to internal decay and eventually collapsed. A realignment of power began in the vacuum of post-Soviet hegemony.

In 1994, the West’s primary entity in Europe, the EU, resumed its expansion and admitted Austria, Finland, and Sweden;® Eastern European nations generally drifted toward each other, forming an Orthodox bloc centered on Russia. The EU was a direct product of World War II. In the aftermath of the war, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill called for a “United States of Europe.” In 1951 French politicians Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, and German leader Konrad Adenauer formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was formed to limit the industrial capacity of Germany by uniting German and French coal and steel production. In theory this condominium would prohibit Germany from conducting future wars of conquest.

The ECSC was the “auspicious start of a successful strategy that Europe would employ over the next six decades, using incremental steps of engagement to foster multilateralism and consensus building between nations.” The signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 “extended this strategic pathway via the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC).” A European Parliament was formed in 1979, and in 1993 the Maastricht Treaty went into effect among EEC nations, inaugurating a new supranational body known as the EU. By 2012 the total number of EU member states was twenty-seven, including many eastern European nations.®


® Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 163.

® Steven Hill, Europe’s Promise (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 17.

® Hill, Europe’s Promise, 17.
The greatest growth of the EU coincided with the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Soviet Union marked a time of flux where nations were divided and became new or resurrected states. Examples of national dissolution in the wake of the end of the Cold War include the breakup of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The former became the Czech and Slovak republics that joined the EU, while the latter fragmented into many smaller states.\textsuperscript{10} Regional secession movements also grew in popularity, such as Italy’s Lega Nord; Spain’s Basque and Catalonian separatists; Irish republicans; and Scottish, Breton, Corsican, Sardinian, and Flemish nationalists. Some argued that as Europe grew closer via the EU, member states were fracturing, and the Westphalian system of nation states was being replaced by a new paradigm.

In the New Medievalism paradigm, nation states share power over their citizens and their loyalties with regional and supranational authorities, and also with subnational entities. This renders the traditional Westphalian system obsolete in that sovereign states govern in other nations via a supranational institution. In modern Europe this function is fulfilled by the EU, which conglomerates EU member states’ powers and redistributes them. The EU’s structure is different from a European federation in that each EU member state retains sovereignty and diplomatic status.\textsuperscript{11} Bull, who first wrote about a New Medievalism, argues against the realist notion that nation states are the only actors in the anarchy of international relations. He also argues against utopian notions of global governance and harmony. Instead Bull posits that entities outside of nation states not play a substantial role in international affairs. He also argues that there is an international society in Europe.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Slovenia

\textsuperscript{11} Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}, 255.

\textsuperscript{12} UN, NATO, EU, OPEC, AU, CIS, ASEAN, etc.
Regarding the expansion of the EEC and EU, Bull argues that there could be a disintegration of the European nation state:

If [the EEC or EU] were to advance far enough toward sovereign statehood both in terms of accepted doctrine and in terms of their command of force and human loyalties, to cast doubt upon the sovereignty of existing states, and yet at the same time were to stop short of claiming that same sovereignty for themselves, the situation might arise in which the institution of sovereignty itself might go into decline. We cannot ignore this possibility, any more than we can dismiss the possibility that sovereignty will be undermined by regional supranational institutions…Perhaps the time is ripe for the enunciation of new concepts of universal political organization which would show how Wales, the United Kingdom, and the European Community, could each have some world political status while none laid claim to exclusive sovereignty.13

The same rationale may be applied to Scotland, as Bull did to Wales. Recently, this nation has been moving toward full independence from the UK, or at least a highly devolved state within the UK’s constitutional framework, a movement that culminated in the unsuccessful 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Despite the result of the referendum, for the past five decades Scotland has been moving further and further away from its current status as a constituent country of the UK and toward becoming an independent sovereign entity within the EU. Bull would attribute this trend to Europe’s New Medievalism, as seen in the EU’s institutionalization.


establishment of the Scottish Parliament (1999), election of a majority SNP Scottish Parliament (2011), third Scotland Act (2012), and its culmination in the Scottish independence referendum (2014). In each of these instances, as the UK moved closer toward the EU, Scotland made further steps toward independence. This relationship must be studied closely and investigated to show the full implications of the EU’s interactions with the UK and other member states.

There is a complex interrelationship between Scotland and the UK, the UK and the EU, Scotland and the EU, and the EU with the wider world. While Scotland rejected full independence from the UK, one must consider the reasons why it moved rapidly toward this goal. In considering the data analyzed so far, it seems that Scotland’s move toward independence is related to the growth of the EU as explained by Bull’s theory of New Medievalism. I will argue that New Medievalism has allowed for the growth of nationalist movements across Europe and the devolution of subnational polities. We may see the rebirth of the Kingdom of Bavaria or a renewed Republic of Venice. Addressing this issue one must look at the development of modern European nation states and how well their constituent parts are integrated into the whole. Perhaps regions of Europe that were previously sovereign have been so well integrated into their modern states that they will not be able to exert sovereignty again. In this vein, it may be the case that Scotland has not reached full integration with the UK, and thus has the possibility of becoming independent once again.
Chapter II

New Medievalism: Foundational Study

I have introduced the hypothetical relationship between the rise of the supranational entity known as the EU and the rise of subnational independence movements in its member states. The paradigm of New Medievalism provides a workable theory to explain this relationship.

Introduction

“New Medievalism” is a term used by Hedley Bull in his seminal work *The Anarchical State* to describe the erosion of state sovereignty resulting in an international system in which overlapping and coordinate bodies exercise sovereignty over a geographical area. I will examine the nature of the system of New Medievalism, the features or trends that precipitate the development of such a paradigm, and the prospect of such a system developing in Western Europe.

In the medieval world, all power was theocratic in nature. While it may be difficult to imagine a return to the medieval religious polity, Bull notes that it is not far fetched to see a secular alternative arise in its place and exercise similar hegemony:

It is also conceivable that sovereign states might disappear and be replaced not by a world government but by a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organization that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages. In that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope.
and (in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor above. The universal political order of Western Christendom represents an alternative to the system of states, which does not yet embody universal government.\textsuperscript{14}

In today’s world, nation states share their sovereignty with different actors in the same way that medieval states shared their sovereignty with different “associations.” If these states share authority with supranational and subnational entities to the extent that the concept of state sovereignty is moot, then a New Medievalism can be said to have arisen.

The New Medievalism paradigm may be a superior political organizational path to the Westphalian system of state sovereignty in that it provides a mechanism to stave off conflicts between state powers by providing a system of interconnected and overlapping authorities that share sovereignty. Zielonka argues:

New medievalism would not eliminate conflicts between European states, but conflicts would likely to be primarily about exclusion from the European core and abuse of agreed procedures, rather than borders and territorial gains. We would observe fierce, but institutionalized collective bargaining, rather than balance of power politics . . . .\textsuperscript{15}

The New Medievalism paradigm might also prove to be as unstable as the current regime because it cannot guarantee stability. Bull contends that if the New Medievalism paradigm “were anything like the precedent of Western Christendom, it would contain more ubiquitous and contentious violence and insecurity than does the modern state system.”\textsuperscript{16} Given this odious pronouncement, Bull admits that any future system of world order will not be identical to those that precede it due to its unique features and context.

\textsuperscript{14} Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}, 245.


\textsuperscript{16} Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}, 247.
That being said, future systems of organization will take creative notes from previous systems.

The system of international organization that has prevailed since the Peace of Westphalia is now undergoing a process of rapid transformation. Nation states are moving toward increased central guidance and increased roles for supranational organizations and non-territorial entities, which resemble the modalities of the medieval period. As the world became more integrated, “the nation state and the other structures and institutions of the modern era started to fray around the edges . . .” prompting discussion of New Medievalism.17

The paradigm of New Medievalism is most often discussed within the context of European integration. John Rapley states:

> [A]s the growing influence of the [EU] and its forerunners, the devolution of state powers to regional governments, and the rise of assertive municipalities led some to proclaim a return to Europe’s medieval past, with its overlapping loyalties and coexisting local and transnational entities.18

Zielonka argues further: “The EU will get closer to the medieval paradigm that foresees overlapping authority, multiple loyalties, fuzzy borders, and a duality of competing universal claims.”19

In modern Europe authority and loyalties are spread across a multiplicity of sovereignties, organizations and institutions. “Key [EU] institutions are not just in Brussels, but also in Frankfurt, Strasbourg, Vienna, London, Luxembourg, Parma, and

17 Zielonka, Disintegration Theory, 56.


19 Zielonka, Disintegration Theory, 56.
Copenhagen.”  Each European state has different and overlapping allegiances. For example:

[N]on-EU states such as Norway and Iceland are part of Schengen, while EU states like Bulgaria and the United Kingdom are not. . . . Political loyalties are multiple and split. For instance, Catalonia falls under the jurisdiction of Madrid, Barcelona, Frankfurt, or Brussels, depending on the issue.  

Modern Europe has become a “system of polycentric authority, plural allegiances, asymmetrical suzerainties, and anomalous enclaves that reminds one of medieval times.”

While supranational organizations like the EU tend to support the notion of a New Medievalism, what is necessary to support such a contention is a demonstration of a loss of sovereignty from the nation state to supranational organization that makes state sovereignty “unreal, and to deprive the concept of sovereignty of its utility and viability.” Bull describes five features of the “contemporary world that provide prima facie evidence of such a trend.” These five features are: 1) the regional integration of states; 2) the disintegration of states; 3) the restoration of private international violence; 4) transnational organizations; and 5) the technological unification of the world.

I will provide a basic summary of all five features. However, this investigation will be concerned primarily with the first and second features and will provide evidence for them in the data analysis portion of this thesis. These five features are better thought

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20 Zielonka, *Disintegration Theory*, 56.
21 Zielonka, *Disintegration Theory*, 56.
22 Zielonka, *Disintegration Theory*, 56.
of as legal factors rather than legal elements of a case for New Medievalism. While they all may be sufficient, they are not necessary for the paradigm’s existence, hence this investigation will not examine the third, fourth, or fifth feature in detail.

Regional Integration of States

The EU provides the most salient depiction of the phenomenon of New Medievalism and the birth of supranational bodies that possess sovereignty alongside national and subnational entities. While “it is obvious that sovereign states are not the only important actors or agents in world politics,”25 the member states of the EU have not ceded full sovereignty to the EU. They maintain territorial integrity, but the EU members have gone further toward full regional integration than any other regional association.

The EU has not reached the stage where it can be called a state *per se*. However, a crucial test might be the “question whether national governments within the ‘community’ had the right, and, in terms of the force and the human loyalties at their command, the capacity, to secede.” The current status of the EU is one of “protracted uncertainty about the locus of sovereignty, it might be a small step to the situation of a ‘new medievalism,’ in which the concept of sovereignty is recognized to be irrelevant.”26

The Disintegration of States

Bull states: “Alongside the efforts of some states to integrate in regional units, we may set another tendency, which in the 1960s and 1970s has been more impressively, the tendency of existing states to show signs of disintegration.” New states are not the only


nations to see the trend of regional independence movements. Disintegrative “tendencies have also marked the recent history of an older ‘new’ state, Yugoslavia, and of such long-established nation states as Britain, France, Spain, [and] Belgium . . . .”

Like the integration of EU member states, the disintegration “would be theoretically important [to New Medievalism] only if it were to remain transfixed in an intermediate state.” Bull posits that if subnational entities advanced so far toward “sovereign statehood both in terms of accepted doctrine and in terms of their command of force and human loyalties, to cast doubt upon the sovereignty of existing states, yet at the same time were to stop short of claiming that same sovereignty for themselves,” the institution of state sovereignty might be said to have given way to New Medievalism.

Bull contends that time may be ripe for the development of new forms of international political organization where Scotland, the UK, and EU “could each have some world political status while none laid claim to exclusive sovereignty.” However, if a subnational entity such as Scotland simply becomes independent outside the framework of a larger entity such as the EU, it would simply confirm “the institution of the sovereign state” and would not bring a change in international order into question.

The Restoration of Private International Violence

A third factor that may point to the existence of the state system’s “transformation into a secular reincarnation of the medieval order is the resort to violence on an international scale by groups other than the state, and the assertion by them of a right to commit such violence.”32 This transformation differs from the state system’s assertion that only public authority may exercise force, and the only public authority thus authorized is the state. The United Nations, for example, has infringed the authority of states to exercise force, but it can be argued that the UN is merely “the agent of a group of states co-cooperating in the exercise of their established right to resort to force.”33 A more important example is the exercise of force by political groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization. These organizations’ right to exercise force has been “accepted as legitimate by a substantial proportion of international society.”34

The EU would most likely fall into the first category, although the EU is not merely the agent of states. It possesses a significant law-making capacity and has implemented the beginnings of formal military integration. With the development of the Eurocorps, a 6,000-strong military force that includes the Franco-German Brigade and the 18 EU Battle groups numbering 1,500 soldiers each, the EU can be said to possess the ability to exercise force within the boundaries of the EU and beyond. What remains to be seen is if the EU’s military forces are able to operate independently of the chain of command of the individual contributing member states thus providing further evidence for the erosion of state power.

Transnational Organizations

Transnational organizations such as the Roman Catholic Church, General Motors, or the World Bank are organizations that operate “across international boundaries, sometimes on a global scale, which seeks as far as possible to disregard these boundaries,” and that serve to “establish links between different national societies, or sections of these societies.” In Bull’s view, transnational corporations include nationally controlled organizations that operate in two or more states. “Thus the U.S. Air Force, which is national in control and in personnel, qualifies as a transnational organization, as does the World Bank, which is international in control and multinational in personnel.”

The growth of a transnational organization does not necessarily function in a zero-sum game with state sovereignty. On the contrary, states can explicitly endorse transnational organizations and determine that working with such institutions can be beneficial for the state. Additionally, transnational organizations need the peace provided by states to operate effectively; their survival is “conditional upon the decisions taken by states.”

In a certain sense, the EU can be considered to be a transnational organization since it knits the nations of Europe together through monetary, fiscal, legal, and increasingly military means. However, it has obtained enough institutional solidity and sovereignty to transcend such description. In its early incarnation as the EEC, the EU most likely fit within the definitional boundaries of a transnational organization. Presently, the EU can mandate policies to be implemented in member states, limit the

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power of states to act within certain policy areas such as fisheries, and possess an albeit limited military; due to these powers, it can no longer be limited to the description of a transnational organization.

The Technological Unification of the World

The demise of the Westphalian state system and the rise of potential successor systems such as New Medievalism are often based on the “consequence of the technological unification of the world . . . .”38 Despite the fact that the world has been brought closer together through technologies such as smart phones and systems such as the Internet, the interconnectivity does not create a “unity of outlook . . . .”39 Bull cites Igor Brzezinski to emphasize this discrepancy:

The paradox of our time is that humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented . . . . Humanity is becoming for integral and intimate even as the differences in the conditions of separate societies are widening. Under these circumstances proximity, instead of promoting unity, gives rise to tensions prompted by a new sense of global congestion.40

What the technological unification does not offer are the cements of human existence, namely values and interpersonal intimacy. A better description of the modern, technologically interconnected world is the “global city,” a “nervous, agitated, tense and fragmented web of interdependent relations better characterized by interaction than by intimacy.”41

38 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 263.
39 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 263.
41 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 263.
Conclusion

“The regional integration of states, their tendency to disintegration, the growth of private international violence, the role of transnational organizations, and the opportunities for regional and global integration provided by technological unification of the world...”\textsuperscript{42} are difficult features for the classical Westphalian system to justify based simply on the concept of the state system. As Bull notes, the Westphalian system has always had “anomalies” to explain away:

\begin{quote}
[T]he German Empire until 1871—a group of states whose sovereignty was theoretically limited; the Vatican until 1929—a state without territory; pirates—men without the protection of a state, whom all states were committed to treat as hostes humani generis; the British Commonwealth between 1919 and 1939—a group of states which denied that the principles of sovereignty operated \textit{inter se}; . . . the East India Company—corporations exercising the right of war and conquest; the Barbary Corsairs—as awkward for the theory as are the Palestinian guerrillas today.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

The Westphalian state system has remained the staple of international relations theory not due to its ability to explain every “anomaly” of international politics, but rather because it has proven to be a better theory than alternative proposals. However, a time may come when the state system’s deficiencies are so blatant that a new system is needed to take into account these discrepancies. Scholars, including Anthony Clark Arend, believe that “developments seem to be pointing toward the emergence of a neomedieval system.”\textsuperscript{44} First, Arend contends that while the UN continues to affirm the sovereign status of the nation state, it also confirms the existence and legitimacy of non-

\textsuperscript{42} Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}, 264.

\textsuperscript{43} Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society}, 265.

state actors. It has granted observer status to non-state actors such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the South West African Peoples Organization. The UN has dealt with groups such as the Kurds, Bosnian Serbs, and Shia Muslims in Iraq. Moreover, the very existence of the [UN] and the great host of other intergovernmental organizations supports a neomedieval understanding of the world. This is especially true as these organizations begin to be perceived not merely as representatives of states, but as another type of ‘independent’ actor in the system.”45

In addition to the independent existence of intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, Arend cites three factors to support that the trends of New Medievalism have progressed to the point that one could say the paradigm is actually in effect. First, the Cold War is over. The superpowers supported the state system, but once the Cold War ended the necessity of support the state system abated. Nations fragmented, such as Yugoslavia, yet the great powers did not intervene. Second, states are “becoming increasingly incapable of providing for the needs of their citizens as those citizens keep asking more and more from their states.” Private security forces are employed in the US and other nations to stand in the place of public police forces, and private military contractors are employed for war making. Finally, “states may already be losing some significance over the law-making process.” International crime syndicates are cited as an example of global lawlessness. In 1995 it was estimated that the Russian mafia controlled “35 percent of the commercial banks, 40 percent of the former State-owned industry, 35

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percent of the private enterprise—and as much as 60 percent of commerce and 80 percent of joint ventures with foreign firms.”\(^{46}\)

If Arend is correct in his assessment, these developments represent a massive challenge to the state system. He believes that despite the “persistence of the Westphalian state system for the past three hundred and fifty years” the future of that system “lies in the balance . . . . [A] host of trends point to the emergence of a very different kind of international system, a neomedieval system.” In this system the state would only be one type of actor amongst a myriad of other entities. Individual loyalties would be divided between multiple levels. In 1999 Arend contended “it would not be unreasonable to expect the emergence of such a system in the early part of the twenty-first century.”\(^{47}\)

The Westphalian system has not entirely given way to new arrangements but there are glimmers of change, especially when one considers the EU and the project of European integration. It is my opinion that the form of European international organization that has dominated since the Peace of Westphalia is beginning to undergo gradual transformation toward integration at the highest levels of governance, namely the EU, while experiencing disintegration at the lowest levels, \textit{videlicet} subnational regions in EU member states. The juxtaposed trend of supranational integration and subnational dissolution is reminiscent of the medieval feudal system aptly described as a New Medievalism.

I believe the growth of the modern Scottish independence movement provides an excellent case study of the paradigm of New Medievalism. The integration of European


nation states within the framework of the EU and the potential disintegration of EU member states such as the UK, Spain, Italy, and Belgium are two key factors in understanding the changes in universal political organization.

This investigation will attempt to understand these trends by evaluating the history of Scotland, the integration of the UK into the EU, and the growth of the modern Scottish independence movement. Investigations with members of the Scottish Parliament, as well as other data, provide evidence for the tension that the growth of the EU has caused in its member states and the possibility that a New Medievalism is replacing the Westphalian state system in Europe.
I previously considered the paradigm of New Medievalism and its possible use as an explanation of the rise of subnational independence movements in EU member states, such as the modern Scottish independence movement. Now I will consider the history of Scotland to provide further understanding of the foundation of this movement.

History Prior to Acts of Union (1707)

The history of Scotland prior to the Acts of Union, which unified Scotland’s own crown with the crown of England, is critical for comprehending the independent character of the Scottish people and their affinity for independence and self-determination apart from their southern neighbors. Scotland’s unique history provides insight into its politics.

Prehistory to the End of Roman Influence (6,500 B.C.–410 A.D.)

Humans have inhabited Scotland for at least 8,500 year; the earliest archeological evidence of human habitation dates from this period. The first stone structures date from approximately 6,500 B.C. when Neolithic farming brought permanent settlement to the British Isles. Megalithic construction, such as Stonehenge in England, began around 2,000 B.C. Celtic culture appeared in southern Scotland in approximately the eighth
century B.C., most likely through contact with Indo-European settlers rather than conquest. Scotland remained at the outskirts of the known world.48

It was during the time of the Greek exploration of the British Isles that Scotland first entered the historical record, sometime around 325 B.C.49 In 43 A.D. the Roman Empire launched a full-scale invasion of Great Britain establishing a foothold in southern England. By 71 A.D., Roman governor Quintus Petillius Cerialis launched an invasion of Scotland.50 Soon after Cerialis’ invasion, the Romans abandoned their gains in Scotland and retreated to northern England, building a line of fortifications now called Hadrian’s Wall to prevent the warring Scots from invading the Romans’ southern territory. The Romans tried to reinvade Scotland several times but by the time of the death of Emperor Septimus Severus in 210 A.D., Hadrian’s Wall was the final frontier of Roman Britain. Around 410 A.D., the Romans abandoned Britain altogether.51

Origins of the Kingdom of Scotland (410 A.D.–1707 A.D.)

At the end of Roman influence in Scotland, the Picts became the dominant group in northern Scotland while various Celtic tribes held sway in the Lowlands. During the fifth to eighth centuries, the Scottish tribes gradually were converted to Christianity. During this time, the Picts adopted Gaelic and customs and merged their crown with the

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50 Moffat, *Before Scotland*, 245.

Celts. In the 840s, Cináed mac Ailpín became the King of the Picts and established the House of Alpin, from which succeeding Scottish monarchs would claim descent.52

The reign of Constantine II brought about the founding of the Kingdom of Alba, the name given to the early Kingdom of Scotland to distinguish it from the later kingdom reestablished by Robert the Bruce. Constantine II brought Scottish Christianity into conformity with the Catholic Church.53 During the reign of Malcolm III (1058–1093), William the Conqueror began to raid Scotland. Malcolm eventually submitted to William’s authority, thereby laying the foundation for future claims of sovereignty by English monarchs.54

In 1286, the death of Alexander III and his heir left fourteen rival claimants to the throne of Scotland. To prevent civil war, the Scottish nobility asked Edward I, King of England, to arbitrate. In return for his services, Scotland would accept that the Kingdom of Scotland was under the feudal lordship of the Kingdom of England. In the end, Edward I named John Balliol as the King of Scotland. Edward used the arrangement to undermine Scottish independence and John’s authority. Subsequently, John Balliol entered into an alliance with France, the enemy of England, prompting Edward I to invade Scotland and depose King John.55

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52 A. O. Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, A.D. 500 to 1286 (Memphis: General Books, 2010), 395.

53 Alex Woolf, From Pictland to Alba 789 to 1070 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 128.

54 Alistair Duncan, Scotland, the Making of the Kingdom (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975), 120.

Following the deposition of John Balliol and the English invasion of Scotland, William Wallace, of the movie *Braveheart* fame, led a rebellion in the name of deposed King John and was appointed Guardian of Scotland. He was victorious in early engagements with the English but was eventually captured and executed for treason. Following Wallace’s death, Robert Bruce, the primary contender to the Scottish throne besides John Balliol, was appointed Co-Guardian of Scotland along with John Comyn. Bruce had Comyn executed and was subsequently excommunicated by the Pope for his crime. Despite the excommunication, however, Bruce was crowned king on March 25, 1306.

In 1314, Bruce defeated the English army at the Battle of Bannockburn and secured Scotland’s *de facto* independence from England. In 1320, the Pope rescinded his excommunication of Bruce and acknowledged Scotland’s independence from England, paving the way for Scotland to be recognized as an independent power by the kings of Europe. After Robert Bruce’s death, England invaded Scotland to restore the Balliol family to the Scottish throne, but was eventually unsuccessful. Robert I’s son-in-law, Robert II, founded the House of Stuart, which ruled Scotland for several hundred years and eventually became the royal house of England.

In 1603, James VI, King of Scotland, inherited the thrones of England and Ireland following the death of his cousin Elizabeth I of England, and became James I of England. Scotland and England remained distinct countries but were in a personal union due to their shared monarch. In 1688, James VII of Scotland (II of England) was deposed due to

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his Catholic religion and was replaced with the Protestant William of Orange and his wife Mary as co-monarchs of the kingdoms of Scotland and England. Many Scots resisted the Glorious Revolution and rebelled in a series of conflicts known as the Jacobite Uprisings. These rebellions were unsuccessful at reinstating the Stuarts to the throne.\textsuperscript{58}

Acts of Union (1707)

The death knell of the Kingdom of Scotland came in the aftermath of an enormous fiscal crisis caused by the failure of the Darien Scheme, an attempt by the Company of Scotland to found a colony in modern-day Panama.\textsuperscript{59} Due to the ensuing economic crisis, a political union with England became attractive to Scotland. It was hoped that the opening of England’s markets to Scottish cattle and linen would be a boon to Scotland’s stagnated economy. On July 22, 1706, after a series of negotiations, the Scottish and English commissioners came to terms about the union of the two kingdoms. The English and Scottish Parliaments passed bills approving the Treaty of Union, and on May 1, 1707, Scotland and England were united in the Kingdom of Great Britain. On that date the Scottish and English parliaments were united into the Parliament of Great Britain which would meet at Westminster in London.\textsuperscript{60}

The Kingdom of Great Britain lasted until 1801 when it merged with the Kingdom of Ireland to become the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. In 1922,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} J. D. Mackie and Bruce Lenman, \textit{A History of Scotland} (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 287-289.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Eric Richards, \textit{Britannia’s Children: Emigration from England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland Since 1600} (London: Hambledon & London, 2004), 79.
\end{itemize}
the southern five-sixths of Ireland seceded from the United Kingdom, which was consequently renamed the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), its present formal name. The UK is the world’s fifth-largest economy and is considered a great power, exerting influence around the globe economically, culturally, and militarily.

Conclusion

Scotland’s history provides an enormously beneficial context for understanding the modern Scottish independence movement. Its unique history and royal past, wars with England, and eventual dynastic and then political union with its southern neighbor have laid the groundwork for the growth of modern Scottish nationalism, the rise of the SNP to political power, and a sense of grievance directed toward England by many Scots. When understood alongside the history of the EU and the UK’s accession to the union, Scotland’s history becomes another factor in presenting a case for the paradigm of New Medievalism and the rebirth of pre-Westphalian systems of European organization.
Chapter IV
European Union: Supranational Challenge to Nation States

The centralization of the EU is challenging the modern nation states of Europe and is creating a new paradigm in which they function. I contend that one consequence of the rise of the EU is the growth of subnational independence movements such as in Scotland.

Historical Background of the European Union

In the aftermath of World War II, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill called for a “United States of Europe.” In response to his speech, the leaders of six European nations—Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands—signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951 to create the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC was founded to unite French and German war-making capabilities to prevent German aggression toward France. In 1958, the six founding nations met in Rome, Italy, and signed a treaty that reduced customs and proposed a common European market. This Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (EEC), the forbearer of the EU.61

On January 1, 1973, the EEC expanded for the first time, admitting Denmark, Ireland, and the UK, raising the number of member states to nine. The European Parliament increased its influence in European affairs, and in 1979, all EEC citizens were

able to directly elect their parliamentarians. In 1981, Greece became the tenth member, and Spain and Portugal followed five years later. In 1986, the Single European Act was signed. The act dealt with issues surrounding the free flow of trade in member states and created a single market. In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, leading to the reunification of Germany and the possibility of the EEC expanding into Eastern Europe.

In 1993, the EEC member states signed the Maastricht Treaty, the next major treaty after the Treaty of Rome, thereby creating the EU itself; its pillar system—the supranational pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar, and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar; and the common EU currency known as the euro. The Maastricht Treaty expanded the EEC to include diplomatic, military, and fiscal policy.

In 1995, the EU expanded to admit “three more new members, Austria, Finland and Sweden.” The EU’s common currency, the euro, went into effect on January 1, 1999, replacing the various individual currencies of EU member states. Ten new countries joined the EU in 2004, followed by two more in 2007, mostly territories in the former Eastern Bloc.

The third major treaty in the development of the EU is the Treaty of Lisbon, which was ratified by all EU member states before entering into force on December 1, 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon amended the treaties of Rome and Maastricht, but it is not really a treaty in its own right; rather, it is a set of amendments to the two previous treaties. Some of its significant amendments include elevating the European Central Bank to the level of an EU institution; for votes taken by the Council of Ministers, amending the requirement of unanimity to a qualified majority voting system (55% of member

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63 “The History of the European Union” website.
states who represent 65% of the EU population); and increasing the power of the EU Parliament to include dual legislative authority over most areas of EU policy.\textsuperscript{64} It also provides the EU with modern institutions and more efficient working methods.

The United Kingdom and the European Union

The UK has had a unique relationship with European integration since its inception. The UK did not join the EEC at the time of its inauguration, but later applied and was rejected for membership, applied again and was accepted, and as of this writing in 2016 is in the process of determining whether it will remain a EU member state. For the purposes of this investigation, a study of the history of the UK’s accession to European integration is critical to an understanding of the growth of Scottish independence movement. I contend that the UK move toward European integration alleviated Scottish nationalists’ fears of independence, thus opening the door to the possibility of a renewed Scottish state.

When the EEC was founded in 1958 the UK opted to remain outside the fold of European integration. However, in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis\textsuperscript{65} and the resulting decline of the British Empire, the UK changed its tune and began to seek \textit{rapprochement} with the EEC. In 1961, the UK formally applied for membership in the EEC and other European institutions. However, then French President Charles de Gaulle, who feared the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} “The History of the European Union” website.
\item \textsuperscript{65} “On October 29, 1956, Israeli armed forces pushed into Egypt toward the Suez Canal after Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) nationalized the canal in July of 1956, initiating the Suez Crisis. The Israelis soon were joined by French and British forces, which nearly brought the Soviet Union into the conflict, and damaged their relationships with the United States. In the end, the British, French, and Israeli governments withdrew their troops in late 1956 and early 1957.” For more information, see: <http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis>. Accessed March 10, 2016.
\end{itemize}
UK’s entry as a US scheme to coopt the sovereignty of European nation states, vetoed the UK’s application. In 1967, the UK reapplied for membership, and with a new French president in place, the UK’s application was forwarded to the EEC member states for negotiations. After several years of negotiations, the UK Parliament passed the European Communities Act (1972), which allowed the UK to incorporate EEC law into its legal cannon as well as prepare the way for a referendum whereby the British people could determine their nation’s membership in the EEC.66

In 1975, the UK held a post-legislation referendum to gauge support for the UK’s accession to the EEC. Predictably, support and opposition for membership fell along party lines—although in direct opposition to the support found today in the UK. The Labour Party was split in its opposition to the UK’s accession to the EEC, while the Conservative Party supported the measure. Many Labourites viewed the EEC as a capitalist scheme that would destroy British heavy industry. Following the vote, 67% of the electorate supported the referendum with over 65% turnout. The 1975 referendum was the first UK-wide referendum and remained the only one until the 2011 UK Alternative Vote referendum.

Since the UK joined the EEC in 1975, there have been large contingents of major UK political parties that oppose further integration into Europe. Other members of these parties support the withdrawal of the UK from the EU entirely. Minor parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) have made the UK’s withdrawal from the EU its preeminent political plank and have used growing “Euro-scepticism” in England to increase the party’s political base. In response to the advance of UKIP, Conservative

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Prime Minister David Cameron promised to hold an “in-out” referendum by 2017 if his party won the 2015 UK general election. Following Cameron’s electoral victory, he reiterated his commitment to a referendum to decide the UK’s membership in the EU, but as of this writing a referendum has yet to be scheduled.

Scotland and Statehood

The UK’s accession to the EEC and its current membership in the EU coincide with the growth of the modern Scottish independence movement. That movement’s origins predate the existence of the EEC or EU. However, this investigation contends that the rapid ascendance of the movement, culminating in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, was aided by the UK’s accession to the EU, which provided a safety net for a renewed Scottish state.

Stirrings of Independence (1853–1967)

The modern Scottish independence movement’s origins can be traced to the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights. It was the first organization to address the Highland Potato Famine and the left-wing revolutions that occurred in mainland Europe during the 1840s. It was founded with the support of the Conservative Party and dissolved in 1856. In 1885, the Scottish Office was reestablished and a Secretary for Scotland appointed as a result of comparisons being drawn between the Irish and Scottish Home Rule movements.67

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Unlike Ireland, twentieth-century Scotland never rebelled or fought a war of independence with the UK. Like Ireland, however, calls for Scottish home rule continued through World War I. In 1934, the National Party of Scotland (NPS) and the Scottish Party united to form the Scottish National Party (SNP). The SNP was the brainchild of NPS leader John MacCormick who desired a united front for the Scottish nationalist movement. The SNP did not immediately support outright independence but instead favored devolution and the establishment of a Scottish Assembly, due to the Scottish Party’s opposition to full independence. The SNP quickly changed course and adopted the NPS’ pro-independence stance despite MacCormick’s opposition to the measure. In 1942, MacCormick left the SNP and founded the Scottish Covenant Society to advocate Scottish Home Rule within the UK’s constitutional structure.\(^\text{68}\)

In 1949, MacCormick wrote the Scottish Covenant, a petition supporting home rule. An estimated two million people out of Scotland’s population of five million signed the Covenant, although the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal parties ignored the document. In possible response to the snub, Scottish nationalists removed the Stone of Destiny, a Scottish coronation item, from Westminster. The stone broke in two and was quickly returned to England until it reverted to Scottish ownership in 1996.\(^\text{69}\)

In 1956, the British Empire was dealt a fatal blow as a result of the Suez Crisis, which saw the US attain ascendency over the UK as global superpower. In the aftermath of the crisis, UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan addressed the rapid decline of the British Empire and the process of decolonization in his “Winds of Change” speech.

\(^{68}\) David Ross, *History of Scotland* (Glasgow: Geddes & Grosset, 2002), 31.

Following this address, the topic of Scottish independence became a mainstream talking point for the first time in centuries. Many Scots felt that the necessity of imperial unity was no longer indispensable; the Scottish Unionist Party began its long decline and the SNP began the road to ascendency.\textsuperscript{70}

Although the SNP won a seat in Parliament in 1945, the party’s popularity faded during the 1950s and 1960s. It was not until 1967 that the SNP began to become an electoral force when Winnie Ewing won the Hamilton by-election—the same year that the UK applied for membership in the EEC. She famously said, on the night of her victory, “Stop the world, Scotland wants to get on.” Her victory spurred the SNP to greater growth and many people joined the party as a result. In 1967, the SNP received over 200,000 votes in local races, thereby cementing the SNP as a major Scottish political party.\textsuperscript{71}


Winnie Ewing’s electoral victory caused alarm in the UK government. The year after the passage of the European Communities Act (1972), the UK government issued the Kilbrandon Report, which proposed the establishment of a devolved Scottish Assembly that would handle areas of government such as education, health, and legal services. It also established the framework by which a devolved Scottish Assembly could


\textsuperscript{71} Peter Barberis, \textit{Encyclopedia of British and Irish Political Organizations: Parties, Groups, and Movements of the Twentieth Century} (Leicester, UK: Pinter, 2000), 409.
be established, along with a decrease in the number of MPs that Scotland would send to Westminster.\textsuperscript{72}

The proposals in the Kilbrandon Report were put into effect in the first Scotland Act (1978). This act authorized the creation of a Scottish Assembly via a post-legislation referendum. The referendum not only required a simply majority for enactment, but a threshold of 40% of Scottish electors. The first Scottish devolution referendum was held in 1979. Fifty-one percent of voters supported the creation of a Scottish Assembly, but only 32.9% of registered voters took part in the referendum thus failing to meet the 40% threshold.\textsuperscript{73}

Following the 1979 UK general election, which saw a return of the Labour Party to prominence, many internal factions arose within the ranks of the SNP. These internal factions were banned at the 1982 SNP Convention. Also following the election, the Scottish Labour Party of 1976 (a breakaway faction from the larger Labour Party not to be confused with the modern Scottish Labour Party) collapsed and most of its members opted to join the SNP. This influx of Labourites drove the SNP to the left where its center of gravity still lies.\textsuperscript{74}

The SNP performed poorly in the 1983 and 1987 UK general elections, forcing a change in the party leadership. The left wing grew in prominence and committed the SNP to a left-of-center platform that would include calls for Scotland’s independence from the

\textsuperscript{72} Lindsay Paterson, A Diverse Assembly the Debate on a Scottish Parliament (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 17.


UK. It was at this crucial moment that the SNP adopted the motto “Independence in Europe,” a clear ideological move toward European integration. This move was made to counter unionist claims that the SNP was an isolationist party; instead the SNP committed that an independent Scotland would be a member of the European community.\textsuperscript{75}

The Glasgow Govan by-election of 1988 was a crucial moment in the history of the SNP and Scottish devolution. In that election, the SNP candidate handily defeated the Labour candidate by a huge margin in an area considered to be a Labourite stronghold. The Labour Party leadership in London worried that a full-scale electoral insurrection was taking place in Scotland. To counter the growth of the SNP, the Labour Party helped found the Scottish Constitutional Convention to establish a framework for devolution from the UK government to Scotland. Virtually every Scottish political party participated with the exception of the SNP, which boycotted the convention because it would not consider full independence as an option for Scotland’s future, and the Conservatives who view devolution as a threat to the union. The convention is considered a major step toward the creation of the Scottish Parliament.\textsuperscript{76}

As noted earlier, the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1993, creating the EU. In the following years, Scotland took major steps toward devolution and independence. A second Scottish devolution referendum was held in 1997. This pre-legislation referendum was held to gauge support for the creation of a Scottish Parliament, devolution of powers to the new parliament, and tax-levying capabilities. Turnout for the second devolution

\textsuperscript{75} Paterson, \textit{A Diverse Assembly}, 196.

referendum was over 60%, with 74.29% of voters agreeing that Scotland should have its own parliament and 63.48% voting to give the new parliament tax-varying power.\textsuperscript{77}

Following the 1997 referendum, the UK Parliament enacted the second Scotland Act (1998), which formally established the devolved Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament is a unicameral legislature with 129 members, 73 of whom represent individual constituencies, and the remainder elected through an additional member proportional representation system called the D’Hondt System. This is a method of allocating parliamentary seats based on the proportion of votes received by a particular party. In Scotland, voters choose not only their constituent representative, which are elected on a first-past-the-post basis, but also vote for a particular party’s regional list, which is allocated via the D’Hondt method. In May 1999, the first election of the Scottish Parliament took place five months after the euro was introduced as the EU’s currency.

The Labour Party entered into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats to form the first Scottish government. This arrangement continued during the second Scottish Parliament, causing the SNP to lose one-quarter of its seats. However, in 2007 the SNP won the most seats in parliament and formed a minority government with the confidence and support of the Scottish Greens. During this election, the SNP was widely considered competent in government and was rewarded with a landslide victory in 2011. The SNP won a total of 69 seats, an absolute majority, which was thought to be impossible due to the use of the D’Hondt additional member system.

The SNP promised in its 2011 election manifesto to hold an independence referendum in the second half of the parliamentary term. The SNP delayed the

\textsuperscript{77} BBC, “The Devolution Debate This Century.”
independence referendum in order to pass another Scotland Act and acquire more powers for the Scottish Parliament. The SNP’s goal was achieved with the passage of the third Scotland Act (2012), which amended the 1998 Scotland Act. Its provisions included the right to raise or lower the income tax, and legislate on issues such as guns, drugs, and driving. The third Scotland Act paved the way for the 2014 referendum by fulfilling the first of the SNP’s campaign promises.\footnote{Magnus Gardham, “Holyrood election 2011: Alex Salmond: Referendum on Scottish independence by 2015,” \textit{Daily Record}, May 1, 2011. Available from: <http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/holyrood-election-2011-alex-salmond-1101868#CIOA1u487AIPWIZG.97>. (Accessed March 10, 2016.)}

The culmination of the SNP’s long rise to power, beginning with the 1967 Hamilton by-election, was the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. The referendum was held on September 19, 2014, with 84.6% turnout—the highest in UK history. The referendum resulted in 55.3% of electors voting to remain with the UK and 44.7% voting to leave the UK.

Many major issues facing Scotland were debated during the lead-up to the referendum, one of which was the potential status of an independent Scotland in the EU. Supporters of independence contend that an independent Scotland would be a member of the EU by default under Article 48 of the EU treaties. Opponents cite Article 39, which mandates that new accessions to the EU be approved by all member states. EU Commissioner Jose Manuel Barosso agreed, stating that an independent Scotland would have to apply for EU membership.\footnote{Martin Currie, “Scottish Independence: Would Scotland be in the EU after a Yes vote?,” BBC Scotland, April 29, 2014. Available from: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-26173004>. (Accessed March 10, 2016.)} His position is likely derived from pressure applied by the Spanish government, which fears that an independent Scotland would fuel support...
for Catalanian and Basque desires for independence. One Spanish official quipped a few
days before the referendum: “It is crystal clear that any partner member-state that leaves
the member state is out of the [EU]. If they want to apply again, they would have to
follow the procedure of Article 49 of the treaties.”  

Regardless of the result of the referendum, what is certain is that modern calls for
Scottish independence have come a long way since their humble beginnings on the
fringes of the political landscape. What is also certain is that the supporters of
independence thought it wise to align their views with the prospect of Scotland being a
member of the EU; opponents to independence saw it fitting to state that an independent
Scotland would lie outside the mainstream of Europe. I believe—and the data collected
for this investigation demonstrates—that the EU plays an important role in alleviating
fears of independence for Scotland and other subnational entities in Europe,
subconsciously if not consciously.

The referendum’s failure was a blow to the Scottish independence movement, but I
do not believe it was a fatal blow. In the 2015 UK general election, the SNP rebounded
from the defeat of the independence referendum to make great gains in Westminster,
adding 50 MP seats in the UK Parliament for a total of 56 seats. Attributing this gain to
the Scottish people’s dissatisfaction with the result of the referendum is dubious; given
the SNP’s resilience in the face of defeat, competence in government and Scottish
nationalism are the more likely culprits.

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The history of the UK’s accession first to the EEC and then the EU coincides with the growth of Scotland’s modern independence movement. As the UK moved closer toward the EU, Scotland made further steps toward independence. This relationship must be studied closely and investigated to show the full implications of the EU’s interactions with the UK and other member states.

Data Analysis

I previously introduced the history of the UK’s integration into the EU as well as the rise of the SNP, the principle proponent of modern Scottish independence. I will now introduce data gathered from interviews with members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs), comments made by former First Minister Alex Salmond, and other sources.

Summary of Interviews

My thesis tests the hypothesis that the growth of the Scottish independence movement during the last five decades was aided by the UK’s accession to the EU. I contend that the EU’s increasing institutional powers have mitigated the Scottish people’s fear of independence from the UK, and thus have assisted the SNP in becoming the governing party in the Scottish Parliament. In turn, the institutionalization of the EU and the rise of subnational independence movements in EU member states are signs of New Medievalism.

The data collected for this thesis include interviews conducted with members of every political party represented in the 4th Scottish Parliament. The data generally support my contention that the EU has influenced the modern Scottish independence movement,
although there may not be a direct influence on the electorate’s voting patterns besides providing a context in which independence may be discussed.

I have arranged the interviews by party name in alphabetical order. In total, 16% of MSPs were interviewed (40% of total MSPs) by virtual representation through official spokespersons. On average, 45.5% of each party was interviewed, representing 57.26% of each party group.

I chose to use the opinions of the members of the 4th Scottish Parliament as evidence for the contentions presented in this case study due to their intimate connection with the Scottish Independence Act of 2013, which authorized the 2014 independence referendum. The 2011 election featured strong debate on the advantages and disadvantages of an independent Scotland. Consequently, the opinions of those who ran on a platform of Scottish independence or those who espoused continued union with the United Kingdom are of critical importance in understanding the context of the Scottish independence movement and its underpinnings, including the relationship of the EU to the movement.

Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party

The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, known colloquially as the Scottish Tories, is the major center-right party in the Scottish political spectrum. It occupies the ideological territory between the centrist Liberal Democrats and the far right.
Introduction

The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party was formed in 1965 when the Unionist Party merged with the Conservative Party of England and Wales, forming the UK Conservative Party. The Scottish Conservative Party is the UK’s Conservative Party branch in Scotland.

From 1912 to 1965 the Unionist Party, along with the smaller Liberal Unionist and National Liberal parties, caucused with the Conservative Party of England and Wales, and was the dominant Scottish political party. In 1955 the Unionist Party won 36 of the 71 Scottish seats in the UK Parliament. However, a year after that electoral success the UK became embroiled in the 1956 Suez Crisis. The humiliating outcome of the Suez Crisis was a symbolic expiration of the British Empire that saw the US assume the role of global hegemon. The concept of imperial unity, which had bolstered the Unionist Party, was now passé.

In the 1959 UK parliamentary elections, the Conservative Party gained seats overall, but four Unionist lost their seats in the Commons. In the 1964 election, the Unionist Party lost eight more seats in Westminster. The defeat of 1964 and the electoral reforms of 1965 ended the existence of an independent conservative force in Scotland. The Unionist Party merged into the Conservative Party of England and Wales and was officially renamed the Scottish Conservative Party. Further reforms in 1977 saw the financial, political, and logistical operations placed under the auspices of the London headquarters. Due to the merger, “[t]he Tories were to a large extent seen as primarily a party of the [UK], particularly of London, and very much a right-wing party.”

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81 Labour Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 17, 2012.
The Scottish Tories gradually declined from the 1960s onward, gaining some seats during Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s rise to the premiership in 1975 but losing them soon after. Many Scots viewed her premiership as “right wing and nasty.”


The decline in the prominence of Scottish Tories coincides with the rise of the Scottish National Party and the growth of the Scottish independence movement, which the Conservatives oppose. According to a MSP from the SNP the anti-independence campaign was lead by the Conservatives. Whether the decline of the Scottish Conservative Party will continue in post-referendum elections remains to be seen, however their current numerical standing lends credibility to the claim that the “Conservative Party is not an electoral force in Scotland at all . . . . [Scotland has] more giant pandas than Conservative MPs because [it] just got two of them from the Chinese. They are not a force, but are a minor party, just like the Liberal Democrats who were wiped out in [the 2011] Scottish elections . . . .”

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82 Scottish National Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.

83 Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.

84 Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.
Analysis

I interviewed two Scottish Conservative Party MSPs representing 13.3% of their party and 1% of the Scottish Parliament. Neither was a party leader, and neither had any authority to represent their fellow Tories. One was elected on the regional ballot, the other was elected for a constituency seat in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election. Both are from the south of Scotland, a traditionally conservative, Reformed Protestant region.

Both of these Tory MSPs specified that the principle arguments for independence being put forward by the SNP “are principally emotional . . . .”\(^{85}\) They indicated that the independence referendum was a “crusade for the people who want nationalism.”\(^{86}\) They suggested that the SNP and other supporters of Scottish independence backed up their emotional appeals with arguments that Scotland would be financially and economically better off if it were independent.\(^{87}\) The movement has nothing “to do with the economy other than the fact that the Labour government in Westminster left us a large deficit.”\(^{88}\)

These two Scottish Tories described some of the details surrounding the SNP’s claims about the economic benefits of independence. These descriptions revealed a cynicism regarding the SNP and other Scottish nationalists. One suggested:

> There is a lot of cloudiness to make the figures look like you want them, but what has become evident is that the economic arguments are based on a reasonable price for oil and gas and that Scotland gets the bulk of the UK’s oil and gas industry. All of which is open to debate . . . . [Scotland] doesn’t control any of [the UK’s oil reserves]. They are all controlled by

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85 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.

86 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.

87 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.

88 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.
the UK, but the bulk of the oil and gas resources are within Scottish waters and would be controlled by Scotland if it were independent.89

The Tories also suggest that the SNP is trying by make other economic claims, including issues that revolve around the traditional pillars of British unity, namely the pound sterling and the monarchy. When asked if Scotland will retain the pound or seek to adopt the euro, I was informed:

Alex Salmond [First Minister of Scotland] has decreed that [Scotland will retain the pound], and it would have to do so . . . . He’s also decreed that the Queen will remain the head of state. He’s come under a lot of pressure to ensure that we will remain a part of these institutions. It makes a lot of people wonder why we would want to be independent.90

In other words, “[the SNP is] trying to say, ‘Yes, we will be independent, but yes, we will still be British, still have the Queen, still use the pound.’”91

The two Scottish Tories were then asked to explain how the SNP was able to win such a massive landslide in the 2011 election. “The result of the last election took a lot of people by surprise, and a lot of people asked how the SNP garnered so many votes even with our two-vote system, which basically mitigates against any party getting a majority.”92 Since 1999 when a devolved Scottish Parliament was formed, the people of Scotland have become disillusioned with Labour and Liberal Democrats who formed the first two parliaments’ governing coalition. “People were looking for an alternative. The main alternative in Scotland is the SNP.”93

89 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
90 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
91 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.
92 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
93 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.
Both Tory MSPs admitted that there was a specific set of circumstances that allowed the SNP to take a majority of the seats in the Scottish Parliament. These circumstances mainly revolved around the minority government the SNP formed after the 2007 Scottish parliamentary election. The SNP ran an effective minority government and was perceived as capable:

They did a good job of the balancing act that minority governments need to conduct . . . . [The SNP had] a good front bench and governed well when they were competent in the minority government . . . and worked very, very well . . . . [T]hey had to lead with other parties . . . . We got a lot of our issue items passed into law like drug rehabilitation, a decrease in small business taxes.94

In 2011, at the end of the SNP’s four-year term in minority government, the major opposition to the SNP, the Labour Party, imploded as a result of a series of gaffes that one Tory noted “led people to think they are not sufficiently effective as an opposition at this time and vote for the SNP who are doing a good job in our devolved situation.”95 The other Tory said: “Then Westminster made a mess of the [economic] situation and people looked to Alex Salmond and the SNP as a way to show their discontent.”96

Both Tories suggested that a vote for the SNP did not translate to a vote for Scottish independence. One said: “Alex Salmond didn’t run for his own seat on an independence platform but instead asked to be given another chance as First Minister, and that’s what people did.”97 Both claimed to know many individuals who voted for the

94 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
95 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
96 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.
97 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.
SNP in 2011 but did not support independence. They voted for the SNP because they were “deemed to be safer hands and a party that was doing its best for Scotland . . . .”\(^98\)

When asked about the hypothesized relationship between the EU and the Scottish independence movement, both Scottish Tory MSPs agreed that the EU has little or no relationship with the modern Scottish independence movement. They based their conclusions on their perception of the rhetoric used by the SNP to promote the independence referendum. For example, one Tory stated that the SNP was “originally an anti-European party, and they changed about 20 years ago. One of their cries became ‘Independence within Europe.’”\(^99\) Echoing this statement, the other Tory stated that the EU is not a large motivation for the SNP:

‘Independence in Europe’ is a relatively new slogan of the last 10 to 15 years. Before that it was just ‘Independence.’ So whatever it takes, whether membership in the EU or alone, I think they’ll make whatever arguments they can. I think whichever argument they can draft for the moment they will . . . . [As circumstances change,] the SNP will try to make a European argument.\(^100\)

One of the Scottish Tories claimed that the EU does not play a major role in the rhetoric of the SNP or the broader independence movement:

If you’re suggesting that people are comfortable voting for SNP because if we were independent we would still come under the bosom of Europe, I don’t know if many people think that way. It isn’t a big factor . . . . I think it is pretty subconscious with the vast majority of the electorate. The fact that only 30% of people turn out to vote in European elections suggests that Europe is not greatly imbedded in the consciousness of the electorate.\(^101\)

\(^{98}\) Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.

\(^{99}\) Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.

\(^{100}\) Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.

\(^{101}\) Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
However, the same Tory admitted:

There is a bit of that argument used by the nationalists . . . So much of our policies now originate from EU directives. One of the arguments used constantly by nationalists is that if Scotland wants to influence policies it needs a seat at the top table in the EU. The counter argument is that we’re surely better off with the voting power that comes from being a part of the UK rather than the limited voting power we’d have as an independent country . . . . It may have some influence in some sectors such as the agricultural sector but it doesn’t resonate with the vast majority of the electorate.102

Both Scottish Tories rejected the idea that there is correlation between the rise of the SNP and the UK’s accession to the EU. One said:

There have been ups and downs for the SNP. There hasn’t been a steady growth of the SNP into their current majority. They had a huge setback in 1993 . . . . There’s a correlation there: as the [Scottish Socialist Party] grew the SNP declined. So I think it’s a false assertion to claim a relationship between the SNP and EU.103

The only difference between the two Scottish Tories interviewed rose around the issue of devolution and federalism. Both rejected independence, but one stated his support for federalism and increased devolution or “devo-plus,”

in which the basic principle is that the taxes raised for the budget in Scotland should remain in Scotland. This would make politicians accountable to the electorate rather than the moment where we rely on the handout from the UK government called the Barnett formula, which is a generous settlement, but is not properly accountable to the electorate sending us to Scottish Parliament.104

The Barnett formula is a method by which the UK Treasury automatically reapportions taxes from England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland to the respective countries in relation to the amount of taxes needed for public services.

102 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
103 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.
104 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.
The other Tory agreed that a federal system would work, but believes that the problem is that there is no appetite for it in England:

They don’t like regional assemblies and the like . . . . The difficulty is that Scotland’s size, about 5 million, is the same as many of England’s regions . . . . There isn’t the same nationalism in England as in Scotland . . . . I think they felt a closer affinity between being British than being English . . . . I think the calls for “devo-max” have muddied the water quite a bit and played into the SNP’s hands.105

Both Scottish Tories resist calls for Scottish independence and are split on the issue of further devolution to the Scottish government. Both rejected the claim that the EU plays a role in the decision making of the Scottish electorate or is responsible for the rise of the SNP. However, they admit that the SNP has used the EU to bolster their arguments for independence. In other words, the SNP uses the EU as an argument of convenience and a means to shore up their claims that Scotland would be better off as an independent nation. One Tory MSP provided a helpful analogy:

The analogy of the Olympics, which I use when children come to visit my office, is that there are events we do well at as individuals and others we do better at as a team and that’s the way I look at the UK. There are devolved issues that make sense to deal with here in Scotland, but then there are issues such as the economy where we’ve got the most successful single market in history. Some things are better dealt with at the UK level, others in Scotland. I’m proud to be Scottish and I’m proud to be British. I don’t for a minute entertain the idea that we’ll be better off independent. I also don’t claim we couldn’t be independent. My question is why on earth would we want to be?106

The other Tory MSP said: “I think most people are happy to be both [British and Scottish]. There is a strong Scottish tradition. My own Scottish heritage goes back to the

105 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012. Note: “Devo-max” (or maximal devolution) is a proposed system of full federalism in which Scotland would control all governmental services besides defense and the Foreign Office.

106 Conservative Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 27, 2012.
twelfth century and I’m proud of that. A lot of the reasons there’s a strong Scottish heritage. Independence won’t make that stronger. What will change? Not a lot.”

Conclusion

I interviewed two members of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. A unionist party, Scottish Tories reject any move toward Scottish independence. Both interviewees believe that the SNP’s calls for independence are based on nationalism, however, they admit that the SNP and other Scottish nationalists couch their emotional arguments in economic terms. Both Tories stated that the SNP governed well in a minority government and its competence catalyzed its electoral success in 2011. The interviewees reject any association between the EU and the Scottish independence movement. They suggest that the SNP will use the EU to bolster its cause if it helps obtain the final goal of an independent Scottish state. The only difference between the two Tories is one’s support for “devo max,” which is a federal UK, where Scotland controls most of its social services apart from foreign affairs and defense.

Scottish Green Party

The Scottish Green Party is a fully independent party that sits philosophically to the left of the Labour Party. It occupies the far left of the Scottish political spectrum, along with the Scottish Socialist and Communist parties.

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107 Conservative Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
Introduction

The Scottish Green Party was formed in 1990 when the UK Green Party split into separate entities representing each country in the UK. The separation of the party into three different entities was entirely cooperative and relied on the Green principle of decentralization.

Scottish Green members profess a commitment to “forming a sustainable society” and are guided by four interconnected principles: ecology, equality, radical democracy, and peace and nonviolence. These principles reflect the general principles of the Green movement and, according to Scottish Greens, present a holistic political philosophy that guides its policy initiatives. The principle of “radical democracy” offers insight into the Green’s general support for Scottish independence: “Politics is too often conducted in a polarized, confrontational atmosphere and in a situation remote from those that it affects. We must develop decentralized, participative systems that encourage individuals to control the decisions that affect their own lives.”

The Scottish Greens were benefitted by the creation of the Scottish Parliament and its adoption of the D’Hondt additional member system of proportional representation. Since the Greens did not win any constituent seats, they would be denied representation in the Scottish parliament. However, since they polled well on the regional list and achieved a level of representation.

In the first Scottish parliamentary election in 1999, the Scottish Greens won a single seat. In 2003, the Greens added six more MSPs for a total of seven seats. In 2007, 108

the Greens lost five seats. The Greens maintained those two seats in the Scottish Parliament during the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election.

Analysis

I interviewed the two Scottish Green Party members then serving in the Scottish Parliament, representing 100% of their party and 1% of the Scottish Parliament. One of the Greens is the current co-convener of the Scottish Green Party and thus has standing to represent the party. The other was the co-convenor of the Greens from 2007 to 2008. Both were elected on the regional ballot. Both hail from the south-central area of Scotland near Glasgow, a traditional Labour stronghold.

The Scottish Green MSPs hold conflicting views on the motivations for the Scottish independence movement and the rationales of those supporting it. The views of the current co-convener of the Scottish Greens is given weight as the view of the party itself. However, as this analysis reveals, there is a diversity of opinions in the ranks of the Greens. The co-convenor of the party stated that the “emotional/nationalistic motivations are primary for the majority of those who openly support independence both among MSPs and the public.” His opinion reflects the Green Party principle of “radical democracy” and the devolution of power to the lowest possible level “(i.e., decisions made close to those who they affect). He added that considering that “nobody seems to know what the economics of separation will be with any reasonable confidence. It’s hard to base support for either option on this.”

109 Scottish Green Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 1, 2012.
While the co-covenor of the party believes that the primary motivation for those supporting independence is emotion, his fellow partisan believes that emotion is not a large factor in the election. She claims that those who rely on emotional or nationalistic arguments are a minority on both sides of the debate. Instead, economics play the chief role: “It’s not is your support for the Saltire or Union Jack . . . . They’re thinking about the economy, what kind of taxation system, what kind of welfare system an independent Scotland will have. Communities, jobs, pensions.” She bases her argument on the opinion that “the UK has done a poor job in its free-market approach, and the financials problems in the recession, the dominant system has failed . . . . [Scotland] can do differently if we were independent. It’s not that we will have a smaller version of the same politics . . . . So even ‘no’ votes can be won over, not on national identity but policy.”

The co-convenor of the Greens provided a counter to his fellow Green’s argument by questioning the currency, banking, and economic policy that play the main role in the debate for or against Scottish independence. He believes that economic issues are the primary reason for those who live in certain regions of Scotland: “In terms of the political reaction to [the issues of fishing and petroleum] they are mostly focused on the northeast where those issues are a big part of the economy . . . . Obviously, fishing is a more geographically specific issue, and it’s around the northeast . . . .” Hence, while economics may be an important motivating factor for some areas of Scotland, it does not play the major role in the minds of the electorate.

110 Green Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 1, 2012.
111 Green Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 1, 2012.
112 Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.
The other Green Party MSP reiterated her opinion that the driving motivation for independence is primarily economic in focus, reinforcing the idea that Scottish Green Party members maintain a diversity of opinion within their ranks and between their two MSPs:

I think the issue driving independence has less to do with the national identity issue . . . . Instead it will be about a long list of practical questions about policy details and economic consequences. I think the people who will vote on those issues will be the ones that influence a relevant outcome . . . .113

The co-convenor of the Scottish Greens was asked to explain why the SNP garnered such a high percentage of the seats in the Scottish Parliament while polling showed that the majority of the Scottish people were skeptical about Scotland becoming independent. He acknowledged that the “many of the people who supported them come from their successful administration.” The SNP “survived a whole four-year term. They were competent and creative in the way they approached their role in the administration and a lot of people voted for them for this reason.”114

When asked to differentiate the Scottish Green’s stance on independence from the SNP stance, the nationalistic tone of the SNP came to the fore:

I think over recent years its become clear that the SNP have a very nationalist sort of thought on independence that will include Scotland being a member in the community of nations. I think they also believe we should have a stronger relationship with England and Wales for cultural reasons, but that relationship should be on equal terms, not necessarily in size, but in autonomy. It is not seen as hostile toward England, not anymore. It’s more about a respectful relationship between equally autonomous countries.115

113 Green Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 1, 2012.

114 Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.

115 Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.
Both Scottish Green MSPs acknowledged that the EU plays a limited role in enabling the move for Scottish independence. One said, “Certainly being part of the [EU] facilitates potential independence, as the common market will still exist. I’m not sure about the EU itself for the public. However, the government does frequently use the ‘own seat at the table’ argument.” The co-convenor of the Greens did not like to describe the EU as “facilitating the independence movement.” However, he admitted that it “provides a context for the discussion about the appropriate level of sovereignty and decision-making at each level of government.” He situated this comment within his belief in “radical democracy” and determining what the appropriate level of decision making should be. He added, “[D]evolution creates the conditions for an independence movement,” but would not say there is a deliberate program of facilitation.

He offered further comments on his views on Scottish independence, claiming that it would be feasible without the EU, comparing the Scottish independence movement to historic Irish nationalism. The process of Irish independence “began before there was an EU . . . [but] the conditions of Irish independence are very different to the conditions that gave rise to Scottish independence.” Having asserted that Scotland’s independence would be possible without the EU, he also stated that the deeper relationship with different structures of centralization and decentralized government in EU member states “are the two factors that mitigate in factor in the discussion on Scottish independence. It is not to say these are the only factors in the discussion but they mitigate in favor of the

116 Green Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 1, 2012.
117 Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.
118 Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.
discussion.” In other words, the EU provides the conditions in which the independence debate can successfully take place.\textsuperscript{119}

On the question of independence or further devolution, both Green MSPs agreed that Scotland should become independent or obtain further devolved powers. The co-convenor of the Greens said that the party regularly discusses this issue at their party conferences: “Every time these issues have been discussed, there’s been something like a 2 to 1 majority in favor of a policy about independence, sovereignty, self-governance . . . . [The Greens] aren’t a nationalist party. It is less about sovereignty or national identity. The genes of the Green movement are about decentralization . . . .”\textsuperscript{120} The former co-convenor of the Greens stated that she adheres to

the principle that devolving power to the lowest level is important and will lead to a more successful society. . . . [I]ndependence or further devolution in Scotland should not just mean power is devolved from London to be centralized in Edinburgh, [Scotland] should be empowering local authorities and smaller units of governance.\textsuperscript{121}

While the Greens support devolution of powers to the lowest possible level, their commitment to anti-nationalism lends support to the Green preference for “decision making to be brought to the lowest possible level but also lower than the Scottish level, to the local council level.” The Greens suggest:

Many members of the SNP came to support Scottish independence over issues such as nuclear weapons and a desire to have a different posture toward global affairs and economics. While there’s a healthy debate in the Green Party between those who favor or disfavor independence, there’s a

\textsuperscript{119} Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.

\textsuperscript{120} Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.

\textsuperscript{121} Green Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 1, 2012.
leaning toward those who support a ‘yes’ vote. [The Greens] are likely to continue that position with some refinements.\textsuperscript{122}

The Greens claim to be “the only political party that is willing to acknowledge that range of views.”\textsuperscript{123}

Conclusion

I interviewed the two members of the Scottish Green Party then serving in the Scottish Parliament. The Green Party believes in decentralization and hence generally supports Scottish independence although there is some dissent within their ranks. One interviewee believes that emotion is the basis of the independence movement; his colleague believes that economics are the primary driving force in the movement. The Greens, like the Tories, stated that the SNP governed well in a minority government, and its successful administration catalyzed its electoral success in 2011. Both Green Party interviewees accepted that the EU plays a limited role in facilitating the Scottish independence movement but differed as to the extent of the influence. On the question of independence, both Greens supported the move for Scotland to leave the UK. However, they also accept the concept of increased devolution as part of their general belief in decentralization—a hallmark of the wider Green Party movement.

Scottish Labour Party

Like the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, the Scottish Labour Party is a constituent unit of the UK Labour Party. The Scottish Labour Party is a major center-left

\textsuperscript{122} Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.

\textsuperscript{123} Green Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.
political party, along with the SNP and the more leftward members of the Scottish Liberal Democrats.

Introduction

The Labour Party was once the dominant Scottish political party and won the largest share of the Scottish votes in every UK general election from the 1960s when the Scottish Conservatives began their decline, to 2015 when the SNP took the largest share of the general election vote.

Scottish Labour was the largest party in the first two Scottish parliamentary elections. In the parliaments formed following both elections, Scottish Labour formed a coalition government with the Scottish Liberal Democrats. The Scottish Labour Party became the second largest party in both the 2007 and 2011 Scottish parliamentary elections. In the 2015 UK general election, Scottish Labour won only one seat in Westminster, the first time since 1959 that the Scottish Labour Party did not send the most Scottish MPs to the UK Parliament.

Analysis

I interviewed six Scottish Labour Party members then serving in the Scottish Parliament. One of the interviewees was the official spokesperson for the Scottish Labour Party on constitutional matters, “so [her] interview can be considered material from [the] entire party.”¹²⁴ For this reason, even though 16.2% of Labour MSPs were interviewed, 100% of their party was represented through this party official. The Labour interviewees

¹²⁴ Labour Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 17, 2012.
represented 5% of the Scottish Parliament in absolute terms, and 29% in terms of virtual representation.

The six Labour Party MSPs interviewed hail from diverse regions and were elected by both constituencies and regional lists. Two of the interviewees were elected from Glasgow: one by a constituency and the other on the regional list. Three interviewees were elected on the additional member list for the Northeast, South Scotland, and the Highland and Islands regional lists, respectively. A West Scotland constituency elected the Scottish Labour Party’s constitutional spokesperson. In short, a good range of Labour Party members were interviewed from varied regions, notwithstanding the entire party being represented by its spokesperson.

The Scottish Labour Party members, like the Conservatives, uniformly agreed that the Scottish independence movement was motivated primarily by nationalism and emotional sentiment. If economic or rational arguments were employed, the Labourites claimed, it was to shore up the weaknesses of the nationalistic sentiment. The Labour Party’s constitutional spokesperson stated, “I think it is undoubtedly nationalism because those who are arguing the case for nationalism are also those who have been arguing for independence for the past two years.”

Other Labour MSPs remarked that the SNP and other nationalists’ arguments “are mostly emotional,” and he has “difficulty seeing where there would be an economic benefit of Scotland going alone with issues such as fishing because the management of

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125 Labour Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 17, 2012.
those issues wouldn’t change as a part of Europe.”¹²⁶ One Labour MSP explained his bafflement with the rational arguments being put forward by the SNP:

> It is very emotional. About one-third of Scots support independence and about two-thirds are opposed. Those have made up their minds, committed nationalists; it’s absolutely an emotional decision. They’re struggling to find rational arguments to support their position. I’m intrigued by the lack of intellectual rigor in their economic rationale for independence or their opinion on membership in NATO, etc. They are emotional arguments *par excellence*, and I’m not surprised. I’m a Labour politician and my attachment to Labour politics is as much an emotional one as a rational one. I believe in social justice, fairness in our world. There are people who do well and those who are badly treated, so I understand why one should develop an emotional argument. But I am amazed, there’s a spectrum of emotion to reason, the SNP is working hard to develop a rational argument.¹²⁷

The Labour Party’s constitutional spokesperson put forward a more detailed explanation of the economic issues at play in the independence debate:

> We are net gainers because of the Barnett formula . . . . The Barnett formula . . . tries to ensure that all areas of the country get the money they need rather than they like. It takes into account education and healthcare, areas where Scotland places an emphasis . . . . [Independence is] not the best option for our country . . . .¹²⁸

The remaining Labourites echoed the sentiment of the Labour spokesperson. They uniformly denied that Scotland would derive any type of economic benefit from independence. The petroleum industry and fishing rights stood out as the main sources of arguments based on an economic narrative. While “it is fair to say that the nationalist movement in Scotland predated the discovery of oil and gas reserves in the North Sea . . . it is also true that there was an increase in support for Scottish independence after the

¹²⁶ Labour Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.

¹²⁷ Labour Party Member #4, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.

¹²⁸ Labour Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 17, 2012.
discovery of North Sea oil.”129 While the SNP’s “fundamental motivation is emotional, the arguments they marshal are economic because these are key for the electorate . . .” because “economic issue[s] [are] more important for the populous as whole. If they think it will benefit them financially, they are far more likely to vote for independence. The fact that the SNP have failed to make this case is crucial to their failure thus far to increase support for separation.”130

Additional comments by Labour MSPs highlight the importance of oil in the SNP’s economic arguments for Scottish independence: “The facts are clear and the issue revolves around the North Sea oil. If you take the North Sea oil and regard it as Scottish you can make an economic argument . . . Without oil, there isn’t much of a case.”131 These MSPs also suggested that the Scottish economy would suffer if Scotland became independent:

The Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank of Scotland would collapse. An independent Scotland couldn’t have bailed them out in the way that the UK government did . . . [I]f you place an undue emphasis on a finite resource like oil then you can argue that Scotland would do fine . . . I think most people taking a fair geographical divide would determine most of the oil to be in Scottish territorial waters. The oil would be Scotland’s oil but how long will it last? Forty years? That’s a short-term horizon to determine the whole fate of our country.132

Another interviewee said, “Scotland doesn’t have the population to attract industry. Scotland is not Ethiopia, but it is far from the large markets. . . .”133

129 Labour Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, September 25, 2012.
130 Labour Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, September 25, 2012.
131 Labour Party Member #4, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.
132 Labour Party Member #4, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.
133 Labour Party Member #5, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, September 12, 2014.
One Scottish Labour MSP from went further in describing some of the motivations for Scottish independence. When asked if he thought some among the SNP leadership hoped for independence so they could be the heads of government of a sovereign state, he balked at the statement, claiming “It’s the reverse.” He described Scottish politics as provincial:

A lot of the people driving Scottish nationalism have a very parochial view of life and the economy . . . . Their ambitions are not grand that any European institution would actually easily manage them . . . . There’s shallowness and a lack of rigor and careful awareness of things happening in Scotland. “We can do anything better here” is just daft. We have very bright people, but we have a lot of people who think they’re far more able than they actually are . . . . There’s no doubt that these things flatter the political ego and the national ego. They would probably make a lot of Scots proud. These things are quite symbolic and can have a resonance, but I don’t think they’re the driving factors. There’s a feeling in Scotland where people here feel overlooked and feel like the poor cousins compared to southern England. This is resentment that can be stoked by nationalism: “Why aren’t we on the Fisheries Committee? Why aren’t we on the Defense Committee? Why don’t we have a seat on the Commission?” These questions can get people’s dander up and then they tell them that if we’re independent we will get all these things . . . . Resistance is in our folklore, and when you think of yourself as a people who will not be treated poorly, or looked at as second class, and sometimes look for slights when they might not be there, you become quite feisty . . . .

While the previous statement may seem to be overtly antagonistic toward the SNP, the Labour Party MSPs admitted that the SNP “had some successes in the sense that they were an efficient party in bringing to light some of the issues Scotland was facing. They managed to talk about the issues people wanted to hear about. In both elections they’ve won, they spoke very little about independence . . . .” Independence was never

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134 Labour Party Member #4, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.

135 Labour Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 17, 2012.
a part of the SNP manifesto put forward in the 2007 and 2011 elections, but “it became a little bit of an issue toward the end of the campaign” in 2011.136

There was a range of opinions in the Labour MSPs statements regarding the question of the EU’s relationship to the Scottish independence movement, most denying a link between the two. The Labour spokesperson rejected the notion that the Scottish independence movement “has anything do with the EU. There has been a nationalist movement in Scotland for a hundred years. If anything, the Scottish Parliament has been the one that’s brought it into focus.”137 While this may be the case, the spokesperson also alluded to the fact that the SNP used Scotland’s potential membership in the EU as a means to bolster its economic claims:

The premise the SNP is working under is that Scotland would not have to reapply for EU membership. Our understanding is we would, and the SNP is assuming a lot. Since the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, any nation applying for EU membership would also have to accept the euro, and we think that is a mistake. We have been asking the SNP to publish a legal opinion for some time, and they’re going to court to avoid having it published . . . . They’re asking Scotland to make a decision based on a legal opinion that no one can see.138

The Labour spokesperson, as well as other Labour MSPs, disputed the assertion that Scotland’s resources have been bartered away to the EU by the UK government:

[T]he UK doesn’t negotiate for Scotland; Scotland is a part of the UK. Some of those on the [EU] negotiating team were elected in Scotland and represent us. We also have members of the UK government, so it’s not as if someone else is negotiating for Scotland. Instead, the negotiation teams represent all the countries of the UK . . . . It is the UK government that leads those negotiations, but Scottish ministers are always involved. Scottish ministers are part of the Team GB at those talks, so it’s not a case

136 Labour Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 17, 2012.


of our rights being bartered away. We have an impact on those talks and have members as part of those talks.\textsuperscript{139}

Other members of the Labour Party shared their views on the relationship between the EU and the Scottish independence movement, stating that the SNP would still be seeking independence even if the EU did not exist:

Some people in the nationalist movement say ‘What’s the problem with being independent when you’re a part of Europe?’ The emotional part of the nationalist movement fails to remember we are a part of a global society. We are a part of the UK, but we have alliances with the EU, NATO, and other global bodies.\textsuperscript{140}

Another Labour MSP stated it in a different way:

The independence movement has nothing to do with the EU. The SNP just wants independence. Now SNP is peddling idea that they will get automatic membership in EU. I believe members of EU will want something in return. Scotland will have to give up more than benefits it. Larger EU countries will think there is greater administrative cost, process of application, etc, using the EU to convince people that everything is “hunky dory.” The SNP suggests membership in the EU is a foregone conclusion, but there’s no guarantee of EU membership.\textsuperscript{141}

Like the constitutional spokesperson, these two Labour MSPs denied a relationship between the EU and the Scottish independence movement. However, like the spokesperson, both agreed that the SNP uses the EU as a means to bolster the strength of its drive for independence.

While the majority of the Scottish Labour Party members, including the party representative, denied that the EU plays a role in the origins of the Scottish independence movement, one Labour MSP stood apart and categorically acknowledged the link: “There is no doubt that the rising importance of the EU helped nationalism. It’s interesting to

\textsuperscript{139} Labour Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy. Skype. July 17, 2012.

\textsuperscript{140} Labour Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.

\textsuperscript{141} Labour Party Member #5, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, September 12, 2014.
note the rise of nationalism across Europe.” He developed this argument by suggesting that “[t]he existence of a supranational body, a Europe-wide body, diminishes the importance of Westminster institutions and allows Scotland to be more assertive while allowing it to have that comfort blanket.” The security of the UK could be replaced with some of the economic security the EU provides such as the common market . . . . [T]here’s no doubt that one of the reasons we are seeing the rise of nationalism in Europe and in Scotland is the EU. There are no buts about it. It provides a sort of safety net, an economic and political safety net.142

He elaborated why he agrees with the “proposition . . . that the EU is behind the rise in nationalism and has allowed it to flourish . . . .” While Scottish nationalism, and nationalism in other European regions, has been allowed to flourish due to myriads of issues, “it is the safety of the variety of treaties and unions including NATO, the fact that we are not so vulnerable, and don’t feel under threat—these sorts of things have made people feel far more comfortable that we will live a peaceful life.” The EU’s defensive resources provide additional support for nascent independence movements; though the “Eurozone has dented confidence” in the EU.143

The dissenting Labour MSP believes that “[t]here is no doubt that the issue of the EU is key to this referendum.” The SNP has held that it is seeking “independence in Europe.” While the EU is more popular in Scotland than the rest of the UK, the MSP admitted:

The existence of the [EU] has made the case for separation more palatable to the electorate because voters think we can be ‘independent.’ But retaining the benefits of that kind of collaboration between nations is, I think, debatable and hard to judge . . . . It is clear that the majority of voters in the referendum see Scotland’s membership in the EU as

142 Labour Party Member #4, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.

143 Labour Party Member #4, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.
important in this decision, and the debate has been about what our status would be after a ‘yes’ vote.”

Notwithstanding his support for the contention that the EU has a direct relationship to the Scottish independence movement, the dissenting Labourite expressed his view that the EU damaged its credibility; thus, the role it played in assuaging fears of independence in the electorate had been minimized:

Given the current predicament of the euro, where once the existence of the EU might have helped ease fears over the consequences of independence, that no longer appears to be the case—although a recent debate over the uncertainty of Scotland’s future in Europe and a vote for separation from the rest of the UK has also damaged the SNP. Key to this is also the terms under which Scotland might re-enter the EU. It is likely Scotland would have to adopt the euro, which again is not popular currently, for obvious reasons. I do not believe a seat at the EU Commission is a big incentive for Scottish politicians or people in Scotland more widely. As a small state, we would in effect lose a great deal of influence rather than being within the UK as a major state in Europe.

The Labour MSPs were far more unified on the issue of Scottish independence than on the question of the EU’s relationship to the Scottish independence movement. The unanimity amongst the members of the Scottish Labour Party derives from its association, and funding by the London-based headquarters. The Scottish Labour Party spokesperson clearly stated her party’s position on independence:

There’s very little division on the issue. We think Scottish independence would be bad. Our leader made a statement that he’s too big of a patriot to seek independence. I think that’s the attitude most of us take. It would not be a good thing for Scotland and would not be good for the UK either. We’ve been a very successful union for the better part of 300 years, and

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144 Labour Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, September 25, 2012.

145 Labour Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, September 25, 2012.
we would like that to continue. We would like further devolution for Scotland and were the party that delivered that in the first place."

Other members of the Labour Party echoed the party spokesperson’s stance on independence damaging the power it has as part of the UK. One said, “No doubt the UK’s policies toward the EU damages that position, but I think being an independent country would damage it more.” Another said, “Independence is good if it allows you to grow. If independence is going to stop your ambitions, it is not worth it. In our case, independence will hinder growth and so I’m against it.”

The Labour Party was also the governing party that moved Scotland toward devolution under UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. When the Scottish Parliament opened in 1999, the Labour Party became the first party to form a government, albeit in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. The Labour MSPs still support devolution and believe “there will be further devolution of powers in Scotland . . .”

Conclusion

I interviewed the six members of the Scottish Labour Party then serving in the Scottish Parliament. One of the interviewees was the official spokesperson for the Scottish Labour Party on constitutional matters. The Labour Party is a unionist party and rejects calls for Scottish independence. It believes that the nationalists’ economic arguments for independence are baseless and are being used as a means to conceal

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146 Labour Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 17, 2012.
147 Labour Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.
148 Labour Party Member #5, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, September 12, 2014.
149 Labour Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, September 25, 2012.
emotional and nationalistic motives. Like the other parties of the Scottish Parliament, the members of the Labour Party accept that the SNP gained so much support in the 2011 election cycle because the SNP governed well in its minority administration. Most of the members of the Labour Party, including the constitutional spokesperson, rejected the notion that the EU played a role in the growth of the Scottish independence movement. However, one Labourite dissented and accepted the claim. The Labourites were unified in their rejection of Scottish independence and valued the status quo of the United Kingdom.

Scottish Liberal Democrats Party

The Scottish Liberal Democrats Party is the Scottish branch of the Liberal Democrats Party, a federated party with three constituent branches: Scotland, England, and Wales. The Scottish Liberal Democrats are a centrist party that stands in the middle of the Scottish political spectrum between the Labour and Conservative parties.

Introduction

The Scottish Liberal Democrats Party is founded on the principles of constitutionalism, social liberalism, and social democracy. The party was formed when the Scottish Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party merged on March 3, 1988. The Scottish parties merged the same day that the UK parties merged.

The Scottish Liberal Party was founded in 1859 and was the dominant political party in Victorian Scotland until the founding of the Labour and Unionist parties. It was a liberal party and supported the philosophy of classical liberalism. It won the majority of
Scotland’s seats in Westminster from the party’s founding in 1859 until 1910. By 1950, the Scottish Liberals only held one seat in Westminster; it regained some seats in succeeding UK general elections, but never regained its former glory.

The story of the Social Democrats also helps one understand the modern Liberal Democrats. The Social Democratic Party began when dissident Labourites, disaffected by the leftward swing of the Labour Party, broke away to form a new party in 1981. Several Labourite MSPs were dissatisfied with the Labour Party’s endorsement of nuclear disarmament and proposed withdrawal from the EEC. They also felt that Trotskyite infiltration has compromised the values and goals of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the members of the Labour Party in Westminster, and traditional Labour voters. They broke away from the Labour Party and founded a party based on the principles of social liberalism, social democracy, and centrist Labourite policies.

In the 1983 general election, the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party formed an electoral alliance and obtained 25% of the general vote, but only won 23 seats in Parliament. In the following years, the Social Democrat-Liberal ticket maintained its percentage of the popular vote but lost seats in Parliament. Following the 1987 UK general election, the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party held talks to formally unify their alliance. In 1988, the Liberal Democrat Party emerged, along with the Scottish Liberal Democrats, which was formed by the Scottish Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party members in Scotland.

The vast majority of the Scottish members of the Liberal Party and Social Democratic Party joined the new Scottish Liberal Democrats, even though some members of the Liberal and Social Democratic parties remained in their particular
factions for several years until the remnants collapsed into the new party. The newly minted Scottish Liberal Democrats participated in the Scottish Constitutional Convention and were a part of the first governing coalition of the Scottish Parliament with the Scottish Labour Party. The Scottish Liberal Democrats received 17 seats in the first two Scottish parliamentary elections, 16 seats in the third, and 5 seats in the fourth Scottish parliamentary elections.

Analysis

I interviewed three of the five, or 60%, of the Scottish Liberal Democrats elected in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election. These interviewees represented 2% of MSPs then serving in the Scottish Parliament. One interviewee was the former leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, who stepped down from office due to the loss of seats in the 2011 election. All three Scottish Liberal Democrats interviewed won their seats from individual constituencies and do not represent regions from the additional vote system. One of the Liberal Democrats represents a constituency from North East Scotland, while the remaining two represent Highland and Islands constituencies.

Like the Scottish Conservative and Labour parties, the Scottish Liberal Democrats are a unionist party and believe in a unified UK. The Liberal Democrats were unanimous in their understanding of the underpinnings of the Scottish independence movement, believing that the movement was motivated primarily by emotion and then backed by rationalistic arguments. These arguments change “depend[ing] what nationalist you speak to and what day of the week it is, which argument they forward for why Scotland should
split away from the UK. It is a heart issue, or an emotional rationale, rather than an economic analysis.”\(^{150}\)

The Liberal Democrats were asked what arguments the SNP put forward to shore up their emotional arguments for independence. One Liberal Democrat launched into some detail about the reasons why he believes SNP members have not given evidence to support their emotional arguments. In fact, he believed the SNP is losing those arguments as well:

We are in the middle of the Olympics and have had the Olympic torch going around, including in Scotland, where it was a major feature of the last couple months. And in addition to that it’s a jubilee year where the Queen of the whole UK has been on the throne since 1953, so arguments about splitting away from the UK and losing these things isn’t gaining any weight. The latest opinion polls of those who are against independence are gaining ground; so I don’t think it is an easy sell for them, I think.\(^{151}\)

Other Liberal Democrats brought up some of the SNP-led government’s proposals for an independent Scotland:

For example, the SNP now intend an independent Scotland to retain sterling as its currency. Yet they have failed to answer how it would benefit Scotland to have the Bank of England setting its interest rates and have even failed to ask the UK Government whether it would agree to being a part of the so called “sterling zone” currency union . . . . Questions about pensions, welfare, border controls, EU membership, NATO membership, defense and the security services, to name just a few, all remain unclear.\(^{152}\)

The Liberal Democrats were asked to explain why the SNP was able to garner such a large percentage of the vote in the 2011 Scottish parliamentary election given the fact that the SNP failed to answer how independence would benefit Scotland. The Liberal

\(^{150}\) Liberal Democrat #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.

\(^{151}\) Liberal Democrat #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.

\(^{152}\) Liberal Democrat #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 15, 2012.
Democrats explained: “There is a huge difference between people voting for independence and people voting for the SNP in a devolved election to Scotland’s parliament . . . . [P]eople vote differently in devolved elections for a government and splitting your country in half.”¹⁵³

Like the majority of the other unionists from the Conservatives and Labour parties, the Scottish Liberal Democrats were skeptical of any hypothesis that links the EU to the rise of the SNP and the growth of the Scottish independence movement. The Eurozone crisis, “[a]nd the thought that an independent Scotland would have to negotiate with the EU, including the same fiscal regime Spain, Portugal, and Greece are going through at the moment . . . [is] scary stuff,” as well as the proposition of convincing the Scottish people to join the Eurozone, makes independence a tough sell. For all the faults of the EU, the Liberal Democrats would “still rather be a bigger country in the EU than a smaller one . . . . The real power of the EU is found in the UK, France, Italy, and Germany. If Scotland suggests that it will be a power all of a sudden, that’s not real, it’s not realistic with the way the EU works . . . .”¹⁵⁴

The former leader of the Liberal Democrats argues for a “federal UK.” This means a structure across the UK that allows each constituent country to make the right decisions at the right level in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and you need a federal structure to do that most effectively . . . . [M]y party wants to see, a stronger Scotland within the UK . . . . I don’t favor independence. I don’t like nationalism as an entity. My history books tell me its something to be wary of, so I don’t support independence and think it would be very bad for Scotland.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Liberal Democrat #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
¹⁵⁴ Liberal Democrat #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
¹⁵⁵ Liberal Democrat #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 12, 2012.
The Scottish Liberal Democrats believe that Scotland could survive separation from the rest of the UK, but

Scotland’s best interests—and indeed those of the other countries in the United Kingdom—are served by remaining a strong member of one of the most successful unions ever. We can have the best of both worlds: a distinctive, responsive Scottish Parliament alongside the strength and security afforded by being part of the UK.156

The former leader of the party stated some “reasons why Scotland is better as part of the UK:

Scots save billions on the costs of their mortgages thanks to Britain’s AAA credit rating. The pensions of one million Scots are guaranteed by the UK welfare system. Scotland’s universities punch above their weight when it comes to winning research funding from UK sources. As part of the UK, we get a seat at the top table at the UN, we have a say in spending the world’s second largest aid budget, and we are represented by the world’s biggest diplomatic network.157

Instead of seeking independence, the Liberal Democrats want further devolution of power to the Scottish Parliament within the framework of the UK. “Home Rule for Scotland within the UK is [the Liberal Democrats’] priority for the future and it’s very different from independence. Independence is about taking Scotland out of the UK; Home Rule is about strengthening Scotland within the UK.”158

The party’s proposals call for maximal devolution, or “devo-max.”159 The “devo-max” proposal includes the launch of “a new Home Rule Commission to develop our vision for the future of devolution. The Commission, which is being chaired by Sir Menzies Campbell, is examining the case for federalism and the transfer of additional

powers to both the Scottish Parliament and local authorities.” It was mentioned that “the debate around [Scotland’s] constitutional future and where powers and responsibilities should rest is likely to be very different [in the Northern Islands] from that taking place in the central belt of Scotland.”\(^\text{160}\) Concerns in the Northern Islands include “the extent to which the current and previous SNP government has sought to centralize powers and decision making over recent years, including over policing, fire and rescue services, further education, economic development, to name but a few examples.” From the perspective of the Liberal Democrats, “[F]ederalism would offer Scotland the chance to have a greater say in the running of our [Scotland’s] affairs while retaining beneficial economic, cultural and social links with other areas of the UK . . . .”\(^\text{161}\)

Conclusion

I interviewed three of the five members of the Scottish Liberal Democrats then serving in the Scottish Parliament. One of the interviewees was the former parliamentary leader of the party.

The Liberal Democrats are a unionist party and rejects calls for Scottish independence. Like the Conservatives and Labourites, the Liberal Democrats believe that the nationalists’ economic arguments for independence are groundless; emotion is what drives the nationalists toward independence. When asked to explain why the SNP garnered such a large percentage of the vote the Liberal Democrats explained that voting for the SNP does not equate to voting for independence. The Liberal Democratic MSPs

\(^\text{160}\) Liberal Democrat #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 15, 2012.

\(^\text{161}\) Liberal Democrat #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, August 15, 2012.
rejected the notion that the EU played a role in the growth of the Scottish independence movement, and supported a federal UK, or the “devo-max” proposal. The Liberal Democrats commitment to federalism is reflected in their party structure, which is based on a federal model and includes separate parties for each constituent nation as well as a UK-wide party.

Scottish National Party

The Scottish National Party (SNP) is the largest political party in Scotland, replacing the Labour Party as Scotland’s governing party since the 2007 Scottish parliamentary election when the SNP formed a minority government with confidence and supply support given by the Greens. In 2011, the SNP won a majority of the seats in the Scottish Parliament despite the implementation of the D’Hondt system of proportional representation. In the 2015 UK general election, the SNP obtained 4.7% of the popular vote and 56 seats in Westminster—an increase of 50 MPs.

Analysis

I interviewed nine SNP MSPs serving in the Scottish Parliament, representing 13% of the party and 7% of the Scottish Parliament. None of the interviewees were leaders of the SNP, however, quotations from a speech given at College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, by former First Minister Alex Salmond, a self-described “committed European,”162 will be included in this data set. Individual constituencies elected six of the interviewees: two from North East Scotland, two from Lothian, one from Glasgow, and

one from Mid Scotland and Fife. Three interviewees were elected on regional ballots: two from South Scotland and one from Glasgow.

When I asked about the underlying impetus for the Scottish independence movement, the majority of the SNP MSPs agreed that the movement is motivated by both historic and economic argumentation with an emphasis on national identity. Historically, nationalism has been driven by national identity and cultural place; however, there has been a shift in recent years toward economic arguments. The MSPs acknowledged that there has been a change in focus to “economic issues because you can only go so far with national identity arguments . . . . If you can give an economic argument that would work as well.” In the words of one SNP MSP: “[T]he issue is beyond economic concerns. I’d rather be poor than live with my parents, but for most people we need to reassure them on the economic side, especially with the way banking is going on in the world.” Another MSP echoed this thought: “I will agree that people like myself are supporting independence whether we are better off than not, call it emotion or not.”

The SNP is a nationalist party and believes Scotland is “already a nation.” Thus, in the perception of SNP members, the current debate has less to do with nationhood than with statehood:

The people of Scotland look at what the SNP government has done for them and they see that [it has] done a better job for them than the rest of the UK. So therefore if Scotland can do a good job controlling health and

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163 Seven of the SMPs agreed: Scottish National Party Member #1, Scottish National Party Member #2, Scottish National Party Member #3, Scottish National Party Member #5, Scottish National Party Member #6, Scottish National Party Member #7, and Scottish National Party Member #8.

164 Scottish National Party Member #8, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.

165 Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.

166 Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.
education, [it] can similarly do a good job in dealing with Europe and the economy. Most people in Scotland already acknowledge that Scotland is already a nation. It is actually older than England in terms of tracing back its origins. It was a unified nation state and its nationhood was preserved in the Treaty of Union in 1707, which brought the two parliaments together.\textsuperscript{167}

The SNP wants “Scotland to have the normal station of a nation, and that means the powers of a nation . . . .” The party believes that the UK Parliament is dominated by “the southeast of England, [which] means that the parliament in Westminster can never represent the interests of Scotland properly.”\textsuperscript{168}

Another interviewee said: a “real drive comes from a period in British history where Scotland didn’t vote for a Conservative government, particularly Thatcher’s. . . .” Thatcher’s premiership “fueled a belief” that the UK’s government was not representative of the Scottish people. The existence of the Scottish Parliament shows that Scotland can govern itself.\textsuperscript{169} Another SNP said:

Ms. Thatcher, someone who wasn’t supportive of Scottish identity, was seen as undermining Scottish independence and institutions, so some of the areas that have been safeguarded under the Treaty of Union, such as education, churches, and law, these are the areas that have transmitted Scottish identity through the centuries.\textsuperscript{170}

Former First Minister Salmond credits the growth of the independence movement to nationalism but also economic self interest:

The main reason for seeking independence is a desire to gain the powers any normal nation has, the powers we need to build a fairer and more prosperous country . . . . But the contrast we now see—between playing a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{167} Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{169} Scottish National Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{170} Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
\end{itemize}
full and equal role in Europe as an independent state, or potentially leaving it against our will—is an important additional factor in the Scottish constitutional debate. It highlights a fundamental truth: that the best way to make a positive contribution is as an independent and equal partner to other nations.171

However, this nationalism is tempered by a strong European affinity: “Our civic nationalism promotes internationalism; our independence movement embraces interdependence. We seek sovereignty, knowing that we will then choose to share that sovereignty.”172

Other issues that foster a sense of national identity include the fact that Scotland retained its own legal and educational system, which are the bedrocks of any society. It’s maintained its own identity along with the elements that have bound Scots together . . . . [The Scots] feel like pioneers in television, roads, engineering developments such as the Sydney Bridge, because of the educational system, which is free. [They] attribute much of [their] success in these areas to [their] educational system. That has added to the sense of national identity.173

Another SNP member said: “The same language is spoken north and south of the border [with England]; [Scotland also has] the ancient languages of Gaelic and Scots, so language is not an important feature as it is in other countries such as Quebec, parts of Spain; the language question is not synonymous with a national question in Scotland.”174

While the vast majority of SNP MSPs agreed that nationalism was the prime mover of the modern Scottish independence movement, there were some dissenters. For one MSP,

171 Salmond, “Scotland’s Place in Europe.”

172 Salmond, “Scotland’s Place in Europe.”

173 Scottish National Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.

174 Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
It is about making the best decisions for Scotland, economic and social. If we have done well with the powers we have had, why wouldn’t we do well with more powers over the economy, defense, and social services? For me the “light bulb moment” was the Iraq War. I joined protests against the Iraq War as an 18 year old. Poll after poll showed the Scottish people opposed war and seeing how we were dragged into the conflict. Two million people marched in the streets of London. I’m not saying I will agree with everything done in our parliament, but at least it won’t be made at some distant seat of power.175

While this MSP differs from the majority of those interviewed from his party, he highlights an important fact: that while the SNP’s argument for independent nationalism may provide the context for independence, economics play an important role in convincing Scots of its viability.

The SNP MSPs put forth many different economic arguments to bolster calls for statehood. One of the primary economic arguments put forth by the SNP deals with the potential to develop Scotland’s vast petroleum resources. Scotland’s bridge to its economic potential “crystalized even more with the discovery of the oil and gas off the northeast of Scotland.” The issue facing Scotland under the status quo “means the revenue flows directly through the exchequer in London, so there’s a sense of grievance. [Scotland] would have used those funds in a different way.” The MSP suggested that Scotland would create “a fund to benefit the growth of Scotland’s economy. [There is also] the powerhouse of renewables and a diversity of technologies that Scotland has—hydro, wind, tidal. We would like to use those resources for the economy of Scotland.”176

Revenues derived from those oil reserves are an important part of the SNP’s argument for the economic benefits of independence. While massive oil reserves have

175 Scottish National Party Member #9, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 20, 2012.

176 Scottish National Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
been discovered off the coast of Aberdeen, Scotland “[has] not seen investment in infrastructure as elsewhere. And revenues from the oil make their way [to Scotland] . . . . Each Scot would be £510 better off last year . . . . Obviously, that’s money that could be invested in infrastructure.” Alex Salmond agrees: “We have more than 60% of the EU’s oil reserves, a quarter of its offshore wind and tidal power potential, and 10% of its wave power potential. Not bad for a country with 1% of the EU population.”

The SNP bases these statements on the assumption that the oil within Scottish territorial waters would automatically become Scotland’s resources. If the oil reserves within Scottish waters were repatriated, the SNP claims the “oil revenue should go to work for the people of Scotland instead going to Westminster.” One SNP MSP provided a figure to support this claim:

The UK government expected to get £9.4 billion of oil revenue. Instead they got over £15 billion in oil revenue from Scotland’s reserves because of the high price of oil. Then on top of that, the Scottish Parliament’s budget was cut by a billion pounds. So we brought in more than expected and yet our budget was cut by a billion pounds. [In other words], the Scottish revenues have been sent to London for many years.

Fishing rights are another issue used by the SNP to support its claim that Scotland would be financially better off if it was independent. Because fishing is not important to the UK economy but is important to Scotland, particularly the northeast, the SNP believes that “fishing has been sold short in terms of the EU.” This “short sale” is “not as simple as a straight barter . . . [but] is done in terms of packages. When the UK went into the EU, a whole package was being discussed. Thatcher got a rebate and other issues that

177 Scottish National Party Member #5, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.
178 Salmond, “Scotland’s Place in Europe.”
179 Scottish National Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.
benefitted the UK, but fishing would have been low on the list.” According to the former First Minister, “Scotland has one of the largest national shares of Europe’s total fishing grounds: twelve national fleets fish in our waters. Yet we have less formal say in fisheries policy than landlocked countries such as Austria and Slovakia!”

Another major economic issue that drew the ire of MSPs from the SNP was their concern that Scotland subsidizes the UK and contributes a proportionally greater share of taxes than it receives in return. Statistics from the Government Expenditures and Revenue Statistics (GERS) were provided as proof of this fact:

Scotland has 8.4% of the UK population but we contribute 9.6% of the revenue from taxation. In addition, this argument about welfare: we put in 9.6% of the taxes, but only get 9.3% back, so when it comes to welfare we are not subsidized by the UK at all. We are also the most prosperous part of the UK even when compared to London and the southeast.

To rub salt in the wound, a member of the SNP opined:

[T]hese resources are being used for consumption and not investment. The resources are not being distributed fairly, particularly in the southeast of England. I lived there for 14 years, so I saw quite clearly the difference between what happens there and in Scotland in terms of wealth distribution. I ran eight companies across Europe, which drew me toward the case for an independent Scotland. One company was in Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Italy, what have you. It is clear that Scotland has a much greater natural asset that could have been used to generate investment revenues.

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180 Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.
181 Salmond, “Scotland’s Place in Europe.”
182 Scottish National Party Member #9, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 20, 2012; Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
183 Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.
184 Scottish National Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
The differences in the political cultures of Scotland and England were also on display in the rationales for independence provided by the parliamentarians from the SNP. They believe

Scotland tends to be a more community-based, social democratic country. It is fair to say that there is less of a greed culture in Scotland, and there’s a sense of fairness in terms of how [Scotland] should distribute the wealth that [it] generate[s] . . . . [T]here is less of a sense of national identity [in England] than in Scotland.185

Scotland’s governing party also professes a belief in nuclear disarmament. An interviewee said: “Scotland is home to the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The submarines are based [in Scotland], and it’s very unpopular in Scotland because they’re very close to the center of the population near Glasgow.” If the SNP achieves independence, the nuclear base will be converted into “a conventional naval base.”186 The SNP is clear that it does not want nuclear weapons in Scotland: “Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Poland—none of these nations have a need for nuclear weapons. The UK has indicated in their defense reviews that they can’t come up with an empirical view of what their defense needs are.” Instead of relying on a nuclear deterrent, an independent Scotland governed by the SNP would look at how best to “protect the interest of Scotland and work with other free countries to make sure there’s no dominance by an aggressor.”187

Like the members of the Conservative, Labour, Green, and Liberal Democrat parties, the SNP members agreed that their party “polled more than all the unionist

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185 Scottish National Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
186 Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.
187 Scottish National Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
parties polled together”\(^{188}\) in the 2011 contest. Another suggested this was because the SNP government elected in 2007 was “considered to be competent, have a good record in government, and also gave benefits to the people of Scotland.”\(^{189}\) Said a third, “[In 2007] there were fears that the world would end if the SNP ran the government.” The SNP “did particularly well give difficult circumstances. People were asked to judge the success of the SNP and they were judged well. So there’s both an emotional and intellectual rationale for Scotland wanting to become independent.”\(^{190}\) A fourth said the SNP “studied things Obama did and things that were successful in America. . . . ‘Record, Team, and Vision’ [was the SNP] motto in three words.” In addition, the SNP had “a vision for Scotland” that included independence.\(^{191}\)

Some members of the SNP suggested that there were differences in what the Scottish electorate understood as independence, whether it meant full nationhood or merely an increase in the powers that Scotland has over its affairs. In terms of independence, “the vast majority of the Scottish people want their parliament to have substantially more power. They want our parliament to have power over welfare, all taxes, and economic policy. So if they’re not signed up for independence they may still want these powers. . . .”\(^{192}\)

SNP parliamentarians elaborated on the connection between their 2011 electoral success and their party’s call for Scotland’s independence. One SNP MSP categorically

\(^{188}\) Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.

\(^{189}\) Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.

\(^{190}\) Scottish National Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.

\(^{191}\) Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.

\(^{192}\) Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.
stated that the “SNP didn’t win a mandate for independence.” Rather, the SNP won a mandate to “hold a referendum in the autumn in 2014 . . . .” Others agreed that the “[p]eople voted for a SNP government that was committed to an independence referendum.” The SNP offered this proposal once it assumed the reins of government in 2007.

While certain SNP MSPs held a polarized view of the SNP’s electoral success, most were keen to take a nuanced position that acknowledged that the calls for independence were one of several motivating factors for the SNP’s electoral victory, along with the SNP’s competence in its minority government:

There were plenty of people who voted for the SNP in 2011 who openly said they don’t support independence. They were willing to give support to the SNP because of the SNP’s competence. The SNP delivered tax relief for local services, which is something that other parties said wasn’t possible. So uniquely, the SNP was seen as being able to keep its promises. We were able to give relief to small businesses and we did a lot of things such as free prescriptions . . . .

Crossover between parties also complicates the issue:

[T]here are other people who vote for the unionist parties, Labour and Conservative, who actually support independence . . . . Some people vote SNP and don’t want independence, and there are some who vote Labour and Conservative who do want independence . . . . A lot of people said to me that they voted for the SNP or me despite the fact they didn’t support independence. We made it very clear that we would have a separate referendum to decide independence.

193 Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
194 Scottish National Party Member #7, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 10, 2012.
195 Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
196 Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.
Another said: “[T]here are a lot of people who support independence but don’t vote for the SNP. They may vote Green, Scottish Socialist, or Solidarity. There are those who vote for Labour, Conservatives, or LibDems and they support independence.”

Most SNP MSPs interviewed agree that the EU played a role in the growth of the Scottish independence movement, including Salmond. Some also had nuanced perceptions, stating that the EU is “a part of the drive for independence, but it is just one more factor.” One SNP MSP rejected a connection between the EU and the Scottish independence movement. Those who agreed that the EU helps supporters of independence, acknowledged that it adds an element of certainty for small European countries and “some to the feasibility of becoming independent. For example, if the EU didn’t exist, a small country might not have the security it may need.” One MSP thinks there’s something in the statement that the EU has that effect and adds to the feasibility to the argument . . . I think that certainly plays a part, especially in the northeast of Scotland, where fisheries are. Even though Scotland has a voice in the EU, it certainly doesn’t have enough. Those in the fishing industry want more of a voice. Those in the cities, I think people here, I think people have less of an understanding of the relevance of the EU’s decisions, but those in rural areas in the northeast would be more incentivized by the EU and a vote for independence.

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197 Scottish National Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.
198 Scottish National Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
199 Scottish National Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.
200 Scottish National Party Member #9, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 20, 2012.
201 Scottish National Party Member #9, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 20, 2012.
He explains that power is shifting away from traditional global powers. If Scotland became independent it would “be further proof that the UK isn’t the power it thinks it is” and that “Scotland could play a pivotal role in the EU.”

Other SNP MSPs followed in this vein, stating that the EU greases the wheels because there are models you can look at showing Scotland as an independent country will have around five million people, which is quite small, bigger than Ireland, but the same size as Norway, Sweden, Denmark . . . . The EU fosters regional independence movements, for instance in Spain, where the most developed independence movement is in Catalonia. They have a very developed economy and identity, and of course they have a different language, and is a good example. Spain is a particularly centralized country.

While agreeing with the notion that the EU bolsters independence, one SNP MSP used the example of Spain in the opposite direction to portray it as a country that devolves power to its regions instead of being an example of centralization:

Instead of contrasting Scotland, I think Spain is a more flexible, quite asymmetric devolution that allows some regions to have more powers than others. Others like England and France are more centralized. . . . The existence of the EU is reassuring. I think a question would be to see what’s the reaction in other European countries with Scotland seceding. There are a number of other European countries with regions that would like more or complete independence, for example the Basque country or Catalonia. We need to work not only with Catalonia but Spain as well so they can be relaxed and not fear our independence.

The SNP used the slogan “independence in Europe” to overcome the fear some Scots had of independence. One MSP thought it might come down to an English imperial

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202 Scottish National Party Member #9, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 20, 2012.

203 Scottish National Party Member #8, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.

204 Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.
view of the world.\textsuperscript{205} In general, Scotland is more pro-EU than England and imperial dreams “have little allure now for Scotland . . . .”\textsuperscript{206} According to another SNP member:

The EU [is] preferable to the UK; it’s less centralized and more democratic. The larger countries don’t order around the smaller ones, while in the UK, England has 90\% of the votes. In the [US] you’ve got larger and smaller states that balance each other and don’t allow smaller states to be squashed. Similarly in Europe, you’ve got big states, such as Germany, France, and England, that can’t run over Denmark, Malta, and Monaco.\textsuperscript{207}

Another MSP believes that these smaller nations “operate in the EU on a level playing field with the UK . . . . [If Scotland] operated as an independent nation at the EU level it would serve Scotland well.” He continues his comparison by affirming that while some nations, such as Norway and Switzerland, decided to remain outside the EU and do quite well, Scotland “would be better off within the EU.”\textsuperscript{208} The Netherlands “have no problem in the EU, but they’re at the heart of Europe, and that’s where I’d like Scotland to be. However, there are people in the SNP who aren’t that keen about Europe.”\textsuperscript{209}

While the UK prepares for an in-out referendum on EU membership,

[\textit{there is virtually no support for [leaving the EU] in the Scottish Parliament . . . . In these circumstances, people in Scotland would almost certainly vote to stay in the EU—but the result for the UK as a whole is much more doubtful}. A YouGov poll . . . found that in Scotland, voters support staying in the EU by 2 to 1; elsewhere in the UK, there is almost a 50-50 split . . . . Therefore, the real risk to Scotland’s place in the EU is

\textsuperscript{205} Scottish National Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.

\textsuperscript{206} Salmond, “Scotland’s Place in Europe.”

\textsuperscript{207} Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.

\textsuperscript{208} Scottish National Party Member #5, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.

\textsuperscript{209} Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.
not the independence referendum in September [2014]. It’s the in-out referendum of 2017.\textsuperscript{210}

That referendum in 2017 is a greater risk because Scotland makes up just over 8% of the UK population.

One of the benefits of being a member state in the EU, from the perspective of some members of SNP, is that the “pooled sovereignty within the institutions of the EU means that becoming independent is not the scary prospect it would be if the UK had not already joined the EU.”\textsuperscript{211} Since the UK is a member of the EU, Scotland will not have customs posts at the border [with England] [nor would it] be disadvantaged in our trading relationship with our biggest trading partner, England. Now, both of those arguments are nonsensical in the context of the EU where we would be in one of the biggest trading blocs in the world. That gives the SNP an independence argument, and there’s both certainty and safety that wasn’t there. Because the UK is a member of the EU it is easier to make the case for Scottish independence, or a strong principled case for it.\textsuperscript{212}

The point of this MSP’s statement is that “Scotland’s independence in the context of the EU would mean having all the benefits of determining your own economic policy, welfare policy, without any of the disadvantages that would befall Scotland had the UK not joined the EU.” In the absence of the EU, Scotland would continue to trade with the rest of the UK, however,

\[\text{[t]he absence of that mechanism in the entity of the EU would have created uncertainty in the minds of sections of the Scottish electorate, which would have made them more fearful to take the next step. The fact that the EU exists makes it easier to transition from where [Scotland is to where it wants] to be in terms of independence.}\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{210} Salmond, “Scotland’s Place in Europe.”

\textsuperscript{211} Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.

\textsuperscript{212} Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.

\textsuperscript{213} Scottish National Party Member #3, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
Alex Salmond expands upon these points:

[Independence] allows Scotland to develop and pursue clear priorities, such as energy and climate change, the environment, agriculture, fisheries, research, digital technology and the creative industries. When we share the same objectives as the rest of the UK, we will work with them, but where we don’t, we will no longer be bound to a position that harms our interests. We will set our own priorities, build our own alliances, and put forward our own positive vision of Europe . . . . Not being at the top table in Europe has harmed Scotland’s interests for four decades. Within the UK, we are occasionally consulted. With independence, we would contribute as equals. And in contributing as equals, we would make proposals to address the democratic challenges that Europe faces today.  

For those SNP MSPs who see the EU as a catalyst or ballast for the Scottish independence movement, the EU is “a great support network, trading partners. For example, you don’t need a passport to cross borders . . . . Being a part of the EU makes it easier if you like to have independence . . . .” However, he cautioned to “not forget that many, many countries have broken away from the UK across the world, and they haven’t had an EU-like organization to be a member of.” These countries never tried to come back into the UK. That being said, “[y]ou only need to look at the number of new, small, independent European states that have evolved over the past 10 years and are flourishing as apart of the EU.”

Salmond drew a direct connection between the EU and the Scottish independence movement: “In many ways, in fact, Scottish independence is a cause that has been profoundly influenced and strengthened by the [EU]—an institution that enables countries of all sizes to contribute as equal partners, and is an enduring rebuke to any notion that independence might mean isolation . . . .” He emphasized that “European connections are an essential part of” who the Scottish people are, and that the Scots are

\[214\] Salmond, “Scotland’s Place in Europe.”

“comfortable with the idea of overlapping identities . . . .” To stress this point, Salmond used the national cloth of Scotland, the tartan, as an example of multiple threads of identity: “I like to think that Scottish identity is like the tartan. There are many colors, many threads, many strands to the Scottish tartan of identity.”

One of the SNP members who saw the independence movement as unconnected to the influence of the EU compared Norway to Scotland since both nations have “a lot of oil wealth and a large fishing sector.” Norway has chosen not to join the EU and has done well, thus supporting the notion that “you don’t have to be a part of a bigger entity to live. However, that being said, the EU has worked extremely well in many areas.”

One area where the UK’s membership in the EU has not benefitted Scotland is the area of fishing. Fishing is not an important industry to Scotland; thus, in the view of some SNP MSPs, the UK bartered away Scotland’s fishing rights. Having a seat at the “top table” of the EU would benefit an independent Scotland. However, the benefit of having a seat on the Commission and Council “doesn’t feature very high in the conversation about independence” and “the EU doesn’t have a good image [in Scotland].” It’s unclear if “saying to the people of Scotland that they’ll have 17 seats in the EU Parliament versus the 5 or so we currently have will make them say, ‘Let’s do it then!’”

The only SNP MSP who rejected a connection between the EU and the Scottish independence movement based his opinion on the fact that the “EU has a poor image in the UK in general.” He claims that this dissatisfaction is derived from the perception that

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216 Salmond, “Scotland’s Place in Europe.”

217 Scottish National Party Member #5, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 19, 2012.

218 Scottish National Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.
the EU “interferes with life and the UK’s legal processes . . . .” In his opinion, the SNP does not favor the EU, contrary to the statements of his co-partisans. Rather, an independent Scotland would have representation at the highest levels of the EU and more seats in the EU Parliament. In other words, Scotland has “different things that we want from the EU than England.”

For obvious reasons, the SNP was fairly uniform in its call for independence from the UK:

Technically, the term [the SNP prefers] is confederalism rather than federalism . . . (i.e., the real power is in the states and they delegate power to the center), whereas a federal system would have the real power in the center and the center would give power to the regional states . . . . On the whole the SNP is not in favor of a federalized Europe, but would like the real power to be held with the individual states.

The United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway (1814-1905) was offered as an example of how such a confederation could be structured. A SNP MSP proposes that “[t]here should be a council of the British Isles that will be effective discussing issues that affect the countries of the isles,” however “there should be a recognition that overall control of the resources we have should remain with the Scottish people.”

Conclusion

I interviewed nine members of the SNP sitting in the Scottish Parliament. None of the interviewees were leaders of the SNP, however, a speech given by former First

219 Scottish National Party Member #2, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 13, 2012.

220 Scottish National Party Member #6, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 18, 2012.

221 Scottish National Party Member #1, interviewed by Lance Kennedy, July 11, 2012.
Minister Alex Salmond was included due to its historic import and contextual significance.

Many members of the SNP readily admit that their support for independence is emotional and based on nationalistic sentiments. However, others provided economic evidence to support their claims that Scotland’s independence would be beneficial for its people. Perhaps the best example of the dual claims promulgated by the SNP is reflected in the speech given by Alex Salmond, which acknowledged the historic nationalism of Scotland while also accepting that independence would be economically beneficial. The members of the SNP took a nuanced view of the SNP’s 2011 electoral victory in which both the SNP’s competence in government and nationalistic sentiments propelled the party to a majority government.

Out of all the parties represented in Scotland’s parliament, the SNP was the most adamant in accepting that the EU plays a role in the growth and feasibility of the Scottish independence movement. Most SNP MSPs accepted this notion, although one MSP rejected it. Others believed the EU to be one of many factors in the growth of the independence movement.
Chapter V
Summary and Conclusions

This case study sought to answer the following question: To what extent does the EU influence the Scottish independence movement and does this trend support the theory of New Medievalism? This investigation concludes that while the EU centralizes power in supranational bodies, the process of New Medievalism is also working its course by dissolving Westphalian nation states. This process is revealed in the rise of the modern Scottish nationalist movement as well as other subnational independence movements in EU member states. The culmination of this movement was the rise of the SNP and the 2014 Scottish independence referendum.

The unique history of Scotland has created a foundation upon which the edifice of the modern Scottish independence movement is built. From Scotland’s early history at the outskirts of Europe as an independent kingdom, to subjugation by and wars of independence with England, to its eventual union with its southern neighbor—each has played a role in the growth of the modern Scottish independence movement and renewed calls for Scottish statehood.

In addition to Scotland’s own history, the record of the UK’s accession to the EU provides a unique window into the growth of modern Scottish nationalism. As the EEC and later EU coalesced, and the UK accessed as a member state, the Scottish independence movement took steps toward mainstream legitimacy. This study traced the movement’s growth through the history of the Scottish National Party—the principal
voice of Scottish nationalism and currently the most successful political party in Scotland.


The SNP accelerated to prominence after the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. This study presented evidence from interviews that represent the opinions of 40% of MSPs of the 4th Scottish Parliament, as well as comments provided by former First Minister Alex Salmond, which tend to show that the EU’s increasing institutional powers have facilitated the modern Scottish independence movement’s growth by mitigating the Scottish people’s fears of independence from the UK. The data also shows that the SNP’s electoral successes have as much to do with the SNP’s competence in government as the Scottish people’s nationalistic inclinations.

Independent polling data compiled by What Scotland Thinks, a non-partisan polling organization that aggregates scientific polls on attitudes relating to how Scotland should be governed, generally supports the notion that Scots are largely pro-EU and favor Scotland’s continued membership in the supranational organization. Some highlights of the polling conducted among Scottish respondents are given below:
• 88% of Scots hoped that the UK would remain in the EU to decrease its powers, increase its powers, or leave things as they are.\textsuperscript{222}

• 54% wanted an independent Scotland to stay in the EU; 29% thought it should not become a member, or should leave the union.\textsuperscript{223}

• 39% believed Scotland would remain a EU member state at the time of independence, 37% believed Scotland would leave the EU and renegotiate entry, and 13% believed Scotland would leave and not rejoin the union.\textsuperscript{224}

• 25% felt that Scotland would successfully negotiate EU membership by 2016, 11% believed Scotland would be fast-tracked for membership, 34% thought Scotland would have to go through the standard accession process, and 9% felt that Scotland would not join the EU.\textsuperscript{225}

• 41% agree that the EU has benefitted Scotland, whereas 29% feel Scotland has not been benefitted.\textsuperscript{226}


\textsuperscript{226} What Scotland Thinks, “Has Scotland Benefited or Not from Being a Member of the European Union?” Available from: <http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/has-scotland-benefited-or-not-from-being-a-member-of-the-european-union>. (Accessed March 11, 2016.)
• 45% of respondents thought it would be justifiable to hold a second independence referendum if Scotland were forced to leave the EU through a successful UK “in-out” referendum, 41% stated that Scotland should accept the UK-wide result.227

• 4% thought the euro was the best currency option for an independent Scotland. Almost 60% of respondents wanted to continue using the pound sterling as an independent Scotland’s currency.228

The polls aggregated by What Scotland Thinks reveal a general support amongst the Scottish people for the EU. While the respondents were not supportive of the euro, they supported the EU as an institution and want to remain a member of the supranational body, even if it meant leaving the UK as a result of the UK’s decision to leave the EU.

Scotland’s future is certain at the moment, as the populace rejected the independence referendum by a considerable margin. However, the referendum is only one chapter in the centuries-old drive for Scotland’s independence. The rise of the SNP, from the 1967 Hamilton-by-election to the 2014 referendum and 2015 UK general election, demonstrates an extremely successful campaign to break Scotland away from England and the other constituent countries of the UK. This most recent chapter was unsuccessful, but it demonstrates the great lengths the Scottish people are willing to go to embrace democracy and to peacefully accept the results of elections—even if those results are not necessarily the results many Scottish citizens had hoped for.

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I am reminded of the transformation of Scotland by a scene from the 1995 film *Braveheart*, which depicted the Battle of Sterling Bridge, a major engagement in the First War of Scottish Independence. Although the movie’s depiction of the thirteenth-century battle between the English and Scottish armies may be a mostly fictional rendition, the film reveals the deep and sometimes violent relationships between the countries of England and Scotland. In the scene, William Wallace speaks to the thousands of ranked soldiers facing him:

Aye, fight and you may die. Run, and you’ll live . . . at least a while. And dying in your beds, many years from now, would you be willing to trade all the days, from this day to that, for one chance, just one chance, to come back here and tell our enemies that they may take our lives, but they’ll never take our freedom! *Alba gu bràth.*

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229 *Braveheart* won five Academy Awards, including Best Picture, and Best Director, and was nominated for an additional five Oscars.

230 Scottish Gaelic: “Scotland forever”, or literally, “Scotland until judgment.”
Bibliography


