



The Year in Elections, 2015: The expert survey on perceptions of electoral integrity.

Citation

Norris, Pippa, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Alessandro Nai and Max Grömping. 2015. The Year in Elections, 2015: The expert survey on perceptions of electoral integrity. The Electoral Integrity Project.

Published Version

<https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/projects/expert-survey-2/the-year-in-elections-2015>

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The year in elections 2015

THE EXPERT SURVEY ON PERCEPTIONS OF
ELECTORAL INTEGRITY (PEI-4.0)


*Pippa Norris, Ferran Martínez i Coma,
Alessandro Nai, and Max Grömping*

February 2016

www.electoralintegrityproject.com



The Electoral Integrity Project
Why Elections Fail And What We Can Do About It



SUGGESTED CITATION:

Pippa Norris, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Alessandro Nai and Max Grömping.
February 2016. The Year in Elections,
2015. Sydney, University of Sydney.
www.electoralintegrityproject.com

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Cover photo:

Printed and bound in Sydney, Australia.

ISBN-13: 978-0-646-93478-5



Table of contents

SHORT VERSION



8

PREFACE

10

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

12

THE DESIGN OF THE SURVEY

18

MAIN RESULTS

40

KEY ELECTIONS 2015

58

ELECTIONS TO WATCH DURING 2016

72

TECHNICAL APPENDIX

92

FURTHER READING FROM EIP

96

CONTACT INFORMATION

98

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

100

REFERENCES

Table of contents

LONG VERSION

Preface	8
Executive Summary	10
Major findings	10
The design of the survey	12
The concept and evidence for electoral integrity	13
The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity expert survey	14
Election coverage	14
Experts	15
Confidence intervals	15
Time period	15
Reliability and validity tests	16
Download the PEI-4.0 dataset	17
Main Results	18
What explains the ratings?	23
Historical experience of democracy matters: Denmark and Canada	23
Poorly-ranked established democracies: the US and UK	24
Several third-wave democracies also scored well: Estonia, Poland and Benin	25
Notable gains in electoral integrity: Nigeria and Myanmar	26
Authoritarian states: Ethiopia, Burundi, Belarus and Haiti	26
Poverty, economic development, and electoral integrity	29
Power-sharing constitutions and electoral systems	29
Stages in the electoral cycle	31
Campaign finance	31
Election-related violence	33
Balanced and fair news media coverage	35
Restrictions on international and domestic election monitors	37

Key Elections 2015	40
Canada – Parliamentary election, 19 October 2015	41
United Kingdom – General Election, 7 May 2015	42
Myanmar (Burma) – Parliamentary election, 8 November 2015	43
Lesotho – Parliamentary election, 28 February 2015	46
Nigeria – General election, 28 March 2015	48
Singapore – Parliamentary election, 11 September 2015	50
Turkey – Parliamentary election, 7 June and 1 November 2015	52
Venezuela – Parliamentary election, 6 December 2015	54
Belarus – Presidential Election, 11 October 2015	56
Elections to watch during 2016	58
Australia – Federal Election, September/October 2016	59
Democratic Republic of the Congo – Presidential Election, November 2016	61
Dominican Republic – General Election, May 2016	62
Iran – Parliamentary Election, February 2016	63
Morocco – Parliamentary Election, October 2016	64
Peru – General Election, April 2016	65
Philippines – Presidential Election, May 2016	66
Russia – Parliamentary Election, September 2016	67
South Korea – Legislative Election, April 2016	68
Syria – Presidential Election, May 2016	69
United States – Presidential Election, November 2016	70
Technical Appendix: Performance indicators, methods and data	72
Table A1: PEI Survey Questions	76
Table A2: PEI Index Scores	78
Table A3: Elections surveyed in 2015	82
Table A4: PEI Scores for elections by all stages of the electoral cycle	84
Further reading from EIP	92
Books	93
Articles and Chapters	93
Reports	94
Data	95
Contact Information	96
Acknowledgments	98
References	100

Preface

This report compares the quality of elections around the world. The evidence gathered by the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) compares elections and any problems diagnosed across all eleven components of the electoral cycle. The full dataset allows comparison from mid-2012 to end-2015 in 180 nation-wide parliamentary and presidential contests held in 139 sovereign nations (excluding micro-states with populations below 100,000). Further publications have analyzed the data in more depth, including explaining the conceptual framework, testing the reliability and robustness of the data, and exploring the consequences for political legitimacy, public participation and regime transitions (see the list of suggested further readings, p. 92). This report and the data are designed to provide useful evidence for a wide range of scholars and policymakers, including for academic researchers and students, public officials in Electoral Management Bodies, election watch and human rights organizations, broadcasters and reporters covering elections, and agencies within the international community seeking to strengthen electoral integrity. Further evidence will continue to be gathered to evaluate national parliamentary and presidential elections in 2016 and beyond. Analysis and publications by the EIP team plan to focus on several specific issues, including the role of election management bodies, the impact of observers on electoral transparency, and the ways in which coercion and vote-buying

influence citizen activism and turnout, among other topics. The Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) is an independent non-profit scholarly research project based at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and the University of Sydney's Department of Government and International Relations, funded by the Australian Research Council and other bodies. The project is directed by Professor Pippa Norris. Dr. Alessandro Nai is EIP Project Manager, assisted by Lisa Fennis, Project Coordinator. The PEI program is managed by Dr. Ferran Martínez i Coma, with research assistance provided by Max Grömping. EIP is governed by an Advisory Board of distinguished scholars and practitioners. The Electoral Integrity Project is an independent academic body and the evaluations presented in the report are the assessments of the project alone –grounded in the evaluations of election experts surveyed in PEI. Nevertheless in its work, through a series of international workshops and conferences, the project collaborates closely with many professional associations and international agencies, including, the American Political Science Association (APSA), the Australian Political Studies Association (AusPSA), the Carter Center, Democracy International, the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Global Integrity, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), International IDEA, the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the Sunlight Foundation, the Organization of

American States, the OSCE/ODIHR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Association of Election Bodies, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), the European Platform for Democratic Elections (EPDE) and the World Values Survey. All details are available on the project website www.electoralintegrityproject.org. Comments and feedback are welcome. Any factual errors brought to our attention will be corrected in future releases of the dataset. In addition, it would be appreciated if copies of any related publications using the datasets could be sent to the project and if the original data source could be clearly acknowledged in citations. This project is an innovative addition to the battery of indicators available to assess problems of electoral integrity and it is hoped that this initiative proves valuable. There are also several opportunities to engage with the project at the University of Sydney through a series of international workshops, and conferences, with details available on the project website. All information is available via: www.electoralintegrityproject.com.

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Executive summary

PIPPA NORRIS, FERRAN MARTÍNEZ I COMA,
ALESSANDRO NAI AND MAX GRÖMPING

Elections around the world are often flawed by ballot box fraud, intimidation in polling places, and media coverage skewed towards the ruling party. Malpractices in contentious elections damage free and fair party competition, depress civic engagement, and erode faith in democratic procedures. This report by the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) seeks to document the quality of electoral integrity, monitor problems, and highlight successful advances. Based on a rolling survey collecting assessments from over 2,000 election

experts, the report covers 180 presidential and parliamentary national elections held from mid-2012 to end-2015 in 139 independent nation states. The report summarizes the key results overall, illustrated by specific contests held during 2015. Contests are rated using the 100-point Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index. Similar 100-point standardized scales are estimated for each of the eleven stages of the electoral cycle during the pre-election, campaign, and postelection periods.

MAJOR FINDINGS:

- In the global comparison, shown in Figure 4 (see p. 22), states in Sub-Saharan Africa displayed the worst record. In this region, the majority of countries in the survey were flagged as having 'low' levels of electoral integrity.
- The most problematic cases included failed elections in Equatorial Guinea (ranked 138th out of 139 countries worldwide), Burundi (137th), Djibouti (136th) and the Republic of Congo (133rd). Most notably, Ethiopia ranked last out of 139 countries worldwide, as its parliamentary election on 24 May

2015 saw all seats won by the ruling party following harassment of opposition parties, censorship of the media and repression of human rights.

- Other parts of the world where experts reported many problems include in the Middle East, where the majority of countries included in the survey held contests which were also categorized as 'very low' or 'low' integrity. The worst cases of failed elections in this region include Bahrain (ranked 122nd), Afghanistan (131st) and Syria (135th).
- The record of free and fair contests was generally



assessed more positively in the Americas, Central and Eastern Europe, and Asia-Pacific, although there were also some exceptional cases.

- This includes Haiti – the poorest economy in the region, where contests on 25 October 2015 were conducted in an atmosphere of chaos, violence and intimidation, with widespread complaints of fraud by party officials. The outcome has been stalemate and a leadership crisis deepening conflict and the risks of fragility.
- Post-Communist states display a varied record. Elections have been well-rated in several countries, including in Lithuania, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. These cases illustrate states which have overcome the legacy of living under Communism and rapidly established free and fair elections within recent decades. In the Baltics, for example, Estonia was ranked 7th highest among all 139 countries in the survey for the Parliamentary contests on 1 March 2015 which were well rated by experts.
- At the same time, among post-communist countries, the worst record of malpractices was recorded in Belarus (124th), Tajikistan (125th) and Azerbaijan (128th). In Belarus, for example, the elections on 11 October 2015 saw the return of President Lukashenko for his fifth term of office, despite criticism of the conduct of the elections by international observers.
- By contrast, Scandinavia and Western Europe scored most highly in electoral integrity, with twelve countries rated as ‘very high’ in electoral integrity and the remaining five as ‘high’.
- Although extensive experience of democratic elections usually strengthens electoral integrity, the performance of some long-established democracies was assessed relatively critically by experts. This includes the UK general election on 5

May 2015, which was less well rated than contests held in Scandinavia and Western Europe. The 2012 Presidential election and the 2014 Congressional elections in the United States also suffered from several problems, so that the US PEI score was rated the lowest of any long-established democracy.

- Many factors contribute towards flawed and failed elections, including structural constraints such as deep-rooted poverty and a legacy of conflict, the role of international leverage and linkage, such as development aid and membership of regional organizations, and institutional arrangements, such as the type of electoral system and the capacity of the electoral management body.
- The report highlights several major issues including election-related violence, the role of money in politics, the importance of balanced and fair campaign coverage in the news media, and the role of domestic and international observers.

We hope that this provides insights into the challenges facing electoral integrity around the globe and ways that the international community can respond when seeking to strengthen the quality of elections, human rights, and democratic governance.

The design of the survey

The Electoral Integrity Project
Why Elections Fail And What We Can Do About It



THE CONCEPT AND EVIDENCE FOR ELECTORAL INTEGRITY

This report focuses upon the concept and measurement of ‘electoral integrity’, which refers to how far the conduct of elections meets international standards and global norms. These standards have been endorsed in a series of authoritative conventions, treaties and guidelines by agencies of the international community, notably by decisions of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, by regional intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the African Union (AU), and by UN member states.¹ These standards apply universally to all countries throughout all stages of the electoral cycle, including in the pre-election, campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath.²

How do we know when elections meet these standards – or fail to do so? Contentious elections generate heated partisan disputes.³ Sore losers allege unfair practices, fraudulent results and stolen ballots, thereby stirring up peaceful or violent protests among their supporters.⁴ In response, government officials often respond by issuing statements defending fair processes and outcomes, although the credibility of these counter-claims may be in doubt. During the last decade, around 12 percent of all elections worldwide triggered opposition boycotts, 17 percent experienced post-election riots or protests, and 18 percent saw electoral violence involving at least one civilian fatality.⁵

To expand transparency and help adjudicate disputes, observer reports provide one source of invaluable in-depth insights and independent assessments into the quality of each election. The growth of rival monitoring organizations, however, means that observers disagree and reports diverge in their conclusions.⁶

Journalists and broadcasters highlight information about common problems observed on election day, like fraud and violence. But global news coverage remains uneven and slanted towards negative problems. It remains difficult to piece together news media accounts consistently across dozens of elections every year, and eyewitness journalism is restricted in the most repressive regimes like Malaysia and Syria. Moreover local reporters may be in the pocket of the ruling party.

This allows for more technical and illicit malpractices to go unreported. The proliferation of social media expands transparency but also the cacophony of claims. Similar problems are raised through analyzing court cases and legal prosecutions. More scientific tests associated with ‘electoral forensics’ are used to detect anomalies in the precinct-level results, but, although promising, statisticians have not yet reached a consensus on the best technical methods.⁷

THE PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY EXPERT SURVEY

What more systematic and reliable comparative evidence is available to provide comprehensive assessments of where contests around the world meet international standards of electoral integrity – and where they are deeply problematic? To measure the core concept, the Electoral Integrity Project conducts an expert rolling survey monitoring Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI). The cumulative results presented in this report (PEI-4.0) monitor the quality of 180 parliamentary and presidential national elections held in 139 independent nation-states worldwide from 1 July 2012 until 31 December 2015. During 2015, PEI covered 54 elections in 47 nations which held nation-wide parliamentary and presidential elections, excluding six micro-states. To operationalize the core notion, the survey asks experts to evaluate elections using 49 indicators,

grouped into eleven categories or stages reflecting the whole electoral cycle. Using a comprehensive instrument, listed in Table A1, experts assess whether national parliamentary and presidential contests in countries where they have proven expertise, meet international standards during the pre-election period, the campaign, polling day and its aftermath.


The overall PEI index is constructed by summing the 49 separate indicators for each election and for each country. The PEI Index is standardized to 100-points. Scores are then sub-divided into five categories from very low to very high integrity. Similarly, 100-point standardized indices are constructed for each of the eleven components of the electoral cycle. The technical appendix provides more details about the research design, performance indicators, sampling

methods, and data reliability tests for the study.

ELECTION COVERAGE

This report presents the results of the expert evaluations for all national parliamentary and presidential elections held in independent nation-states (with a population of more than 100,000) from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2015. We focus the detailed discussion of cases in the report upon elections held during 2015 and those forthcoming in 2016. In cases of simultaneous legislative and executive elections, the survey monitored the latter. In countries using two-round (run-off) majoritarian electoral systems, the survey assessed the final contest. Coverage of PEI-4.0 is mapped in Figure 2. The PEI-4.0 dataset currently covers 80 percent of all independent nation-states worldwide holding direct elections (i.e. 139 out of 173 nation-states).

FIGURE 1: THE ELECTORAL CYCLE



EXPERTS

Election experts are defined as political scientists (or other social scientists in a related discipline) who have demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country (such as through publications, membership of a relevant research group or network, or university employment). Around forty domestic and international experts were consulted about each election, with requests to participate sent to a total of 7,101 experts, producing an overall response rate of 29 percent. The rolling survey results presented in this report are drawn from the views of 2,080 election experts.

CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

This release of the dataset (PEI-4.0) includes all the earlier cases and expands the comparison by adding national elections held from 1 January to 31 December 2015 (see Table A3 on p. 82).


The rolling design of the dataset facilitates

comparisons over time within the same country: PEI-4.0 includes thirty-one countries with two successive elections, and five countries with three successive contests. Successive annual reports and updates of the dataset will include the forthcoming national elections, to broaden worldwide comparison worldwide and move towards global coverage.

TIME-PERIOD

When interpreting the results, it should be noted that modest differences in the PEI index are unlikely to be statistically significant at reasonable confidence intervals. It is more useful to focus on the range of indicators across the cycle and more substantial differences among elections or among countries. Confidence intervals are constructed at the 95 per cent interval for the summary PEI index, based on the number of experts who responded for each election and country. These are documented in Table A2 on p. 78 in the technical appendix.

FIGURE 2: MAP OF PEI COVERAGE



RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY TESTS


Can assessments by election experts be trusted? The PEI data has been tested and found to demonstrate high levels of internal reliability (consistency among experts), external reliability (when compared with equivalent independent indicators), and legitimacy (when expert judgments are compared with public assessments).⁸

One way to check the estimates is to compare the overall summary PEI Index with other comparable national assessments created by independent scholarly and think-tank research projects.

Correlations are not expected to be perfect, due to the use of different concepts, measures, and time-periods in each study. Nevertheless, the comparisons consistently demonstrate strong relationships at national level, lending confidence in the external reliability of our data, and thus on the validity of our measure of the concept.

Figure 3 compares the PEI-4.0 Index with assessments of the quality of electoral democracy, measured by the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem).⁹ The results display a remarkably strong and significant correlation ($R=.83^{***}$, $N127$).

FIGURE 3: COMPARING PEI AND V-DEM



Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI-4.0) expert survey, release 4.0; Electoral Democracy Index, V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v5 (www.v-dem.net); Regime type, Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org).

Nor is this an isolated finding. The PEI 4.0 summary Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index is also strongly correlated at national level with most other equivalent measures.¹⁰ This includes Cingranelli and Richards' index of electoral self-determination rights ($R=.63^{***}$, N137), the Economist Intelligence Unit measure of Electoral Processes and Pluralism ($R=.71^{***}$, N129), the Bertelsmann Transformation Index of Free and Fair Elections ($R=.64^{***}$, N98), and the Freedom House measure of Electoral Processes ($R=.75^{***}$, N137).¹¹ Other tests confirm the internal validity of our methods and the consistency of expert assessments.¹²

Therefore, the overall results are comparable with other standard measures. Unlike many other summary indices, however, the results of the PEI survey can also be broken down in far more granular detail to pinpoint specific weaknesses and strengths in each contest. For example, the data can be used to compare how elections rate across eleven stages of the electoral cycle, and across 49 indicators, such as in the processes of district gerrymandering, the opportunities that contests provide for women and minority candidates, the provision of equitable access to political finance, the fairness of electoral officials, and the occurrence of peaceful and violent

protests after the announcement of the results, and so on. This is essential for the correct diagnosis of any problems – and thus identifying the appropriate reforms needed to strengthen integrity.

To look in more detail, Table A4 at the end of the report presents the full results for each of the eleven stages of the electoral cycle for 180 elections from 2012-2015.

DOWNLOAD THE PEI-4.0 DATASET

All data is available for download at: <http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/PEI>. Data can be examined at the level of each country, each election, or for individual experts. Analysis can be conducted for the summary PEI index, the eleven components, or the 49 individual indicators. Those preferring alternative conceptualizations of the quality of elections have opportunities to aggregate the indicators in a different way – e.g. to weight certain aspects more strongly- and thereby create alternative measures. The Dataverse files allow users to generate analysis using the online data, as well as to download files in Stata, SPSS and tab-delimited formats (such as for Excel), and to find further technical details about the research design, code-book and questionnaire. Comments are welcome as feedback to improve the annual report and the PEI datasets.



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Main results

The Electoral Integrity Project
Why Elections Fail And What We Can Do About It



Direct elections are used today as the pathway to elected office in the lower house of parliament in 95 percent of all sovereign nation-states around the world (185 out of 193 states).¹³ During the late twentieth-century, popular contests have also proliferated for presidential, provincial, municipal and local office. Although potentially strengthening the voice of the people and the accountability of their leaders, challenges remain to strengthen electoral legitimacy and the quality of free and fair contests in all countries. Too often, multiple serious technical flaws and violations of political rights are reported. Laws ban opposition parties. Rival leaders are imprisoned. Voting rights are suppressed. Electoral registers are inaccurate. Ruling parties dominate the airwaves. Free speech is muzzled. Thugs threaten voters. Campaigns are awash with money. Ballot-stuffing fakes the count. Electoral officials favor the government. Dispute resolution mechanisms are broken.

These types of malpractices deepen public mistrust of electoral authorities, political parties and parliaments, which, in turn, affects citizen behavior by depressing voter turnout and catalyzing protest activism.¹⁴ Since elections are the heart of the representative process, flawed contests damage party competition, democratic governance, and fundamental human rights.¹⁵ But how common are these types of problems? Where do they arise?



To summarize the evidence, Figure 4 illustrates the contrasts in the overall 100-point PEI index for all the countries covered in the survey since 2012, divided by global region. The ranking and map (Figure 5) on the centerfold pages of this report offer a worldwide overview.

The comparisons highlight that Scandinavia and Western Europe are rated most highly in overall levels of electoral integrity, not surprisingly given the long history of democracy in the region. The

rankings in PEI worldwide are led by Scandinavian states -- Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden -- which also do well in most standard indices of the quality of democratic governance. At the same time, however, contrasts are observed in PEI-4.0 scores even among similar European Union member states and post-industrial societies; Mediterranean Europe usually performs less well than Northern Europe. The UK also scores exceptionally poorly compared with other European societies, with a PEI Index around 20 points less than the top ranking Scandinavian states, for several reasons discussed later in the report.

In the Americas, even wider disparities can be seen, contrasting the cases of Costa Rica, Uruguay and Canada, all well rated by experts, compared with the low ratings for Guatemala, Venezuela, Honduras and particularly Haiti, as highlighted further in the report. Overall the United States ranks 47 worldwide out of all 139 nations under comparison, based on the 2012 presidential and 2014 Congressional elections, the lowest score for any long-established democracy. In post-Communist Europe, the power-sharing democracies, smaller welfare states, and mid-level income economies in the Baltics and Central Europe often do well in the quality of their elections today, including Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, all scoring higher in the PEI Index than long-established majoritarian democracies such as India, the US, and UK. At the same time, Central Eurasia remains the home of several unreconstructed authoritarian states, which hold multi-party elections to legitimate ruling parties but with limited human rights, exemplified by the poor PEI scores observed in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Belarus. Asia-Pacific sees similar wide disparities, with the affluent post-industrial societies of Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and Japan heading the ratings, as well as Mongolia, which has made rapid progress in abandoning its Soviet past.

FIGURE 5: PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY 2012-2015







FIGURE 4: CHART COMPARING PEI-4.0 BY COUNTRY AND REGION

AFRICA			C&E EUROPE			AMERICAS		
Rank	Country	PEI index	Rank	Country	PEI index	Rank	Country	PEI index
27	Benin	69	7	Estonia	79	5	Costa Rica	80
42	Mauritius	64	11	Lithuania	77	17	Uruguay	75
43	Rwanda	64	14	Slovenia	77	18	Canada	75
44	South Africa	63	15	Czech Republic	76	30	Brazil	68
45	Lesotho	63	19	Poland	75	35	Chile	66
52	Namibia	60	20	Slovakia	74	37	Grenada	66
56	Cote d'Ivoire	59	24	Latvia	72	41	Argentina	64
57	Sao Tome & Princ.	58	34	Croatia	66	46	Barbados	62
58	Botswana	58	54	Georgia	59	47	United States	62
61	Ghana	57	59	Serbia	58	51	Panama	61
67	Sierra Leone	56	63	Moldova	57	53	Colombia	60
76	Guinea-Bissau	54	66	Bulgaria	56	60	Mexico	57
83	Burkina Faso	53	68	Hungary	56	69	Cuba	56
84	Nigeria	53	75	Albania	54	70	Bolivia	56
87	Mali	53	78	Kyrgyzstan	54	71	Paraguay	55
96	Comoros	50	88	Bosnia-Herzegovina	52	72	Ecuador	55
100	Malawi	48	90	Ukraine	51	79	El Salvador	54
102	Cameroon	46	93	Romania	51	82	Belize	53
105	Swaziland	45	95	Montenegro	50	85	Guyana	53
108	Zambia	44	99	Macedonia	48	92	Suriname	51
109	Mauritania	44	111	Armenia	43	98	Guatemala	48
110	Tanzania	43	113	Kazakhstan	43	104	Venezuela	45
112	Sudan	43	119	Uzbekistan	39	106	Honduras	45
116	Guinea	42	121	Turkmenistan	38	134	Haiti	28
117	Kenya	41	124	Belarus	36			
118	Madagascar	40	125	Tajikistan	36			
123	Togo	38	128	Azerbaijan	35			
127	Zimbabwe	35						
129	Angola	35						
130	Mozambique	35						
133	Congo, Rep.	31						
136	Djibouti	25						
137	Burundi	24						
138	Equatorial Guinea	23						
139	Ethiopia	22						
	Regional average	47		Regional average	56		Regional average	58
ASIA & PACIFIC			N&W EUROPE			MIDDLE EAST		
Rank	Country	PEI index	Rank	Country	PEI index	Rank	Country	PEI index
13	Republic of Korea	77	1	Denmark	86	21	Israel	73
16	New Zealand	75	2	Finland	86	32	Tunisia	67
26	Australia	70	3	Norway	83	49	Oman	61
29	Japan	68	4	Sweden	81	73	Kuwait	55
31	Tonga	68	6	Germany	80	74	Iran	54
40	Mongolia	64	8	Netherlands	79	101	Turkey	48
48	Micronesia	61	9	Switzerland	79	103	Jordan	46
50	Bhutan	61	10	Iceland	78	107	Iraq	44
55	India	59	12	Austria	77	115	Egypt	42
62	Solomon Islands	57	22	Cyprus	73	122	Bahrain	38
64	Maldives	57	23	Portugal	72	131	Afghanistan	33
65	Indonesia	57	25	Belgium	71	135	Syria	27
77	Myanmar	54	28	Spain	69			
80	Nepal	54	33	Italy	67			
81	Fiji	53	36	Greece	66			
86	Singapore	53	38	Malta	66			
89	Sri Lanka	52	39	UK	65			
91	Thailand	51						
94	Pakistan	50						
97	Philippines	48						
120	Bangladesh	38						
126	Malaysia	36						
132	Cambodia	32						
	Regional average	56		Regional average	75		Regional average	49

on 19 October 2015 for the Liberal Party under the leadership of Justin Trudeau. Disputes in the 2011 Canadian federal election had surrounded the misuse of 'robocalls'. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper had passed the controversial 'Fair Elections Act', a measure which sought to strengthen voter identification requirements, despite heated opposition claims that this would lead to voter suppression.¹⁸ The 2015 elections proved to be largely free of any major glitches, despite some room for minor improvements, according to international observers and news reports: "The 2015 parliamentary elections demonstrated the credibility of the election process in Canada....All OSCE/ODIHR EAM interlocutors expressed trust and confidence in the election administration's professional performance, impartiality and transparency.... The competitive and vibrant campaign was conducted with respect for the fundamental freedoms of expression, association and assembly."¹⁹ The Trudeau administration has promised to consider reform of the traditional Canadian majoritarian 'First-Past-the-Post' electoral system inherited from Westminster.

POORLY-RANKED ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES: THE US AND UK

At the same time, however, as Figure 4 illustrates, wide disparities in electoral integrity separate long-standing democracies. Thus while Denmark, Switzerland and Canada do well, according to the overall PEI index, the United States and UK have lower levels of electoral integrity.

The **United States**, based on the 2012 and the 2014 elections, ranked 47th among all 139 countries in PEI-4.0, achieving a score worse than all other established democracies. US elections got poor grades because experts expressed concern about the quality of the electoral laws, voter registration, the process of drawing district boundaries, as well as regulation of campaign finance. Voter

registration, in particular, has become increasingly polarized and litigious in the United States ever since the 2000 'Florida' debacle, generating growing controversy in state-houses and the courts.²⁰ New state regulations on voter registration have been implemented in around 30 states.²¹ America also suffers from exceptionally partisan and decentralized arrangements for electoral administration. These problems were addressed by the blue-ribbon bipartisan Presidential Commission on Electoral Administration which issued its report and recommendations in January 2014.²² Following major decisions by the Supreme Court deregulating campaign funding, the PEI evaluations suggest that the role of money in American politics deserves more detailed scrutiny.²³ In addition, the PEI experts singled out endemic problems of gerrymandering and the processes involved in drawing voting district boundaries. This left the US with the second-lowest score out of all countries in this particular PEI subdimension. Only Malaysia scored worst in that regard. It remains to be seen how experts assess the 2016 US presidential contest but the overall country ranking seems unlikely to improve given persistent problems of campaign funding, heated partisan polarization over registration and balloting procedures, claims of fraud in the Iowa GOP primaries, and an early primary campaign season characterized by the politics of personal attacks, dissatisfied voters, and populist appeals.

In the **United Kingdom**, the 7 May 2015 general election scored the worst of all Western European states, ranking only 39th out of all 139 countries worldwide in PEI-4.0. Despite considerable debate over electoral reform in recent decades, the electoral system for Westminster continues to use the plurality 'First-past-the-Post' formula with 650 single member constituencies. The system systematically penalizes geographically dispersed minor parties, with a mechanical 'winner's bonus' for the seats allocated to the party in first place.

As discussed later, majoritarian electoral systems generally score less well than proportional presentation in the PEI index. Polling day generated allegations of several technical problems (see UK, p. 42). Despite expectations of a close result and hung parliament, in fact election night saw the return of a Conservative government with a comfortable parliamentary majority, led by Prime Minister David Cameron. The Liberal Democrats and the Labour party performed poorly, while there were significant gains for the Scottish National Party. The government is in the process of implementing individual voter register, replacing a household-based system. The reform has been justified by ministers as a more secure system guarding against alleged voter fraud, although critics charge that this may discourage participation by several sectors of the electorate, such as students and ethnic minorities.²⁴

SEVERAL THIRD-WAVE DEMOCRACIES ALSO SCORED WELL: ESTONIA, POLAND AND BENIN

At the same time, however, although previous experience of democratic elections strengthens civic cultures and consolidates institutions, the historical legacy of the past does not determine fate. Many countries that only transitioned from autocracy in recent decades also score highly in the contemporary quality of their elections, according to experts. In 2015, this is exemplified by contests in Estonia (ranked 3rd last year), Poland (ranked 6th last year), and Benin (ranked 9th last year).

In the Baltics, Estonia was ranked 7th highest among all 139 countries in PEI-4.0. In 2015, parliamentary contests returned the Estonian Reform Party as the largest party. Like neighboring third wave democracies and smaller welfare states in the Baltics, Estonia has conducted well-ranked elections. Starting in 2005, it is notable that Estonia was also the first state worldwide to offer all eligible voters the possibility to vote via the Internet in all

national and municipal elections. In these elections, almost one third of all ballots (30.5 percent) were cast via the Internet. Estonia has pioneered a series of procedures designed to protect the security of Internet voting and despite some potential vulnerabilities, the OSCE observers expressed a high degree of trust in the overall reliability and security of this process.²⁵

Poland also performed well, according to experts, ranked 19th out of 139 countries in PEI-4.0. After a tight race the election was won on 10 May by President Andrezej Duda for the conservative Law and Justice party. As the observers concluded: “The elections were competitive and pluralistic, conducted with respect of fundamental principles for democratic elections in an atmosphere of freedom to campaign and on the basis of equal and fair treatment of contestants.”²⁶

Even more remarkably, one of the poorest societies on the poorest continent in the world, Benin, ranked 27th highest out of 139 countries in PEI-4.0, despite turbulent instability among neighboring states in Francophone West Africa. After gaining independence from France, Dahomey (renamed ‘Benin’ in 1975) experienced an army coup in 1963, and then saw political instability with half a dozen short-lived military and civilian regimes. Under pressures from the international community and the opposition movement, in 1990 the government agreed to a new power-sharing constitution and multiparty PR elections, with these changes approved in a popular referendum. For more than a decade now Benin has experienced a series of legislative and presidential elections which domestic and international observers have reported as free, peaceful, and fair, including the transition bringing the opposition party into power.²⁷ Today Benin is widely regarded as a successful African democracy with constitutional checks and balances, multiple parties, a high degree of judicial independence

and respect for human rights, and a lively partisan press which is often critical of the government. The country is categorized as 'free' by the 2015 Freedom House index, comparable to Argentina, Mexico, and Romania in its record of civil liberties and political rights.

In 2015, the Benin election was also well regarded by experts in the PEI survey. This assessment echoed the evaluation of civil society observers, who concluded: "Despite these socioeconomic and governance challenges in the country, the electoral environment during the period leading to the elections and the post-election period was largely calm and peaceful. Overall, political parties and candidates were given the opportunity to conduct campaign activities freely. Political parties and candidates exercised restraint and generally exhibited tolerant behavior and respect for one another. Campaigning was generally peaceful and open to political competition with isolated incidents of violence".²⁸

NOTABLE GAINS IN ELECTORAL INTEGRITY: NIGERIA AND MYANMAR

Noteworthy gains last year include the Nigerian elections on 28th March 2015 (see 'Nigeria' p. 48). Nigeria remains a hybrid regime, which has a checked history of veering erratically between autocracy and democracy, currently ranked in 2015 as 'partly free' by Freedom House.²⁹ Many contests have been marred by outbreaks of violent conflict, catalyzed by ongoing tensions between the Muslim north and Christian south. There were technical flaws but nevertheless the 2015 elections were celebrated as a relatively violence-free handover of power via the ballot box, following victory for President Muhammadu Buhari. EU observers considered the overall outcome of the elections as "peaceful and orderly (...) despite frustration and challenges caused by often late opening of polling sites, failing biometric voter verification, some regrettable violent

incidents, and re-polling on Sunday".³⁰ Nevertheless despite marked improvements, problems remain in the quality of Nigerian elections, so that the country was rated as 84th out of 139 countries in PEI-4.0.

Another historic example of important gains comes from Myanmar, where historic parliamentary contests on 8 November 2015 (see 'Myanmar, p. 43) signaled significant progress towards the end of military rule, following genuine competition, substantial seat gains for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), and important steps towards the liberalization of the country.³¹ Some major challenges remain, notably in the treatment of the rights of ethnic minorities, and there are many steps to take on the long pathway to reform and civilian control of the military. The election process could be made more transparent. Nevertheless, the contest illustrates the way that, where rulers are committed to reform, elections respecting international standards of integrity can provide an effective and relatively peaceful first step in the transition from authoritarianism. As the EU observer mission concluded: "The poll was well organized and voters had a real choice between different candidates. In the future, constitutional, legal and procedural improvements will be required for truly genuine elections".³² Overall the PEI evaluations echoed these sentiments, with Myanmar rated 77th out of 139 elections in PEI-4.0.

AUTHORITARIAN STATES: ETHIOPIA, BURUNDI, BELARUS AND HAITI

Unfortunately, however, many contests during 2015 were often accompanied by major flaws and procedural failures, especially common in authoritarian states, undermining international standards of human rights. Elections, although essential, are far from sufficient for democracy. Malpractices were widespread in cases exemplified by Ethiopia, Burundi, Haiti, and Belarus.

According to experts, Ethiopia's parliamentary

election on 24 May 2015 was the worst ranked election of all contests held in the 139 countries contained in the PEI-4.0. Ethiopia's ruling party, the People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), has governed Ethiopia for more than two decades. The party and its allies were declared by the government-controlled national election board to have won every single parliamentary seat in May's elections. Article 19, an international non-governmental organization focusing on the right to freedom of expression, reports that there are major restrictions on freedom of the press: Ethiopia is the second biggest jailer of journalists after its neighbor, Eritrea. Its broadcasting and telecommunications sectors are dominated by the state, and the minimal private media sector is heavily regulated and frequently censored.³³ Opposition parties that wanted to organise peaceful protests and rallies were arrested and harassed, their equipment confiscated and permits denied.³⁴ The opposition movement remains fragmented and weak, unable to forge a common platform. No invitation to the Carter Center or to European Union observer missions were sent. The EU noted that "previous reports of Election Observer Missions have not been accepted by Ethiopia, which calls into question the value of a further EOM this year".³⁵ The African Union appraised the electoral process and gave a more positive assessment, however, concluding that the parliamentary elections "were calm, peaceful, and credible as it provided an opportunity for the Ethiopian people to express their choices at the polls".³⁶ The international community has also not pressed strongly on electoral rights due to security concerns in the region arising from the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab.³⁷ As a result, far from using any aid conditionality, Ethiopia continues to receive more than \$3 billion a year from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two months after the elections, on 27 July, President Obama rewarded the country with the first-ever state visit to Ethiopia by a serving

US President.

Burundi was ranked the third worst of all 139 countries worldwide, according to experts in the PEI-4.0. The presidential election on 21 July 2015 was marred by weeks of violent protests against President Pierre Nkurunziza's attempt to win a third term in office, despite controversy over whether he was eligible to run again under the constitutional peace-settlement. Disputes reportedly triggered mass demonstrations and hundreds of deaths. On 13 May, a coup attempt was launched by elements in the military opposed to Nkurunziza's third term bid, but loyalist soldiers reasserted control by the next day. The night before polling day, there were reported sporadic blasts and gunshots. The election was boycotted by seventeen opposition parties and condemned by the international community as lacking the conditions to ensure it was fair.³⁸ The European Union suspended its mission because of concerns about the credibility of the electoral process.³⁹ The AU refused to send electoral observers for the first time in the organization's history.⁴⁰ The Catholic Church also stood down their election observer missions before Election Day. The US State Department concluded that the election lacked credibility since the legitimacy of the process "has been tainted by the government's harassment of opposition and civil society members, closing down of media outlets and political space, and intimidation of voters".⁴¹ The Burundi legislative elections on 29 June 2015 were almost as badly rated, ranked 5th worst ever in PEI-4.0

Haiti, the poorest country of the Western Hemisphere, held the first round of presidential elections and the second round of legislative contests on 25 October 2015. The elections were ranked worst in the Americas among all the countries in PEI-4.0. Elections had been delayed for more than three years, the country has not conducted a presidential election since 2010, and the president, Michel Martelly had disbanded parliament in January 2015 and begun governing by executive order.⁴² The former Prime Minister, Laurent Lamothe, resigned after the elections were not held as scheduled. For the first round of parliamentary elections in 9 August 2015, violence and intimidation were widespread before and during Election Day. Men armed with rocks and bottles attacked voters at polling stations in Port-au-Prince and about two dozen voting centers were forced to close.⁴³

There were complaints that hundreds of thousands

of party agents were permitted to vote in any polling station, without adequate accreditation checks against fraud, allowing duplicate voting. A government commission assigned to review the election examined a sample of the tally sheets and found that only 8 percent were free of errors. Thirty percent showed voters who did not appear on voter lists, and nearly half the sheets featured voters who presented an incorrect voter ID number.⁴⁴ For the second-round legislative elections, turnout dropped to only 18 percent.⁴⁵ The aftermath saw widespread claims of fraud and mass demonstrations. On January 18 2016, the second-placed presidential candidate, Jude Celestin, formally announced that he would not run, and opposition parties called for a boycott. The second round for the presidential contest, originally scheduled for December, was postponed in a leadership crisis, threatening political stability and violence. USAID has invested over \$1.5 billion in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake, including over

"MINUSTAH Assists Haiti During Senatorial" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by United Nations Photo



\$33m on the first round elections.⁴⁶

In **Belarus** (see 'Belarus, p. 56), ranked 124th worst among all 139 countries in PEI-4.0, the presidential elections saw the return of President Lukashenko, for his fifth successive term of office. Numerous malpractices undermined political rights and civil liberties and the president exerts absolute control, with appointment powers over all branches of government. International and domestic election observers were highly critical of the conduct of the elections, with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Belarus, Miklós Haraszti, stating: "The election process was orchestrated, and the result was pre-ordained. It could not be otherwise, given the 20 years of continuous suppression of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association, which are the preconditions for any credible competition".⁴⁷ Over successive contests, Belarus consistently scored poorly in failing to meet international standards of electoral integrity.

POVERTY, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY

What explains these results? In general, many of the worlds' low-income societies, like Haiti and Burundi, encounter serious problems in holding elections. Poor societies typically lack the resources and public sector capacity to manage peaceful and stable contests. As Figure 6 illustrates, a significant correlation links level of development (measured by per capita GDP in purchasing power parity) and the PEI levels of electoral integrity ($R=.54^{***}$, $N137$).


Yet it is also obvious that among the poorest countries, several cases – such as Benin, Lesotho and Micronesia – perform relatively well in the global comparison, according to the PEI Index. By contrast, as already discussed, several other low-income economies perform poorly in this regard – notably Ethiopia, Burundi and Haiti. Moreover, we have already noted how among affluent post-

industrial societies and Western democracies, elections in the United States and the UK are relatively poorly rated. In addition, one of the world's most affluent societies, Singapore, is a clear outlier, scoring only moderately in the PEI Index. Problems in district gerrymandering and rules benefitting the predominance of the ruling party limit the quality of electoral competition in this island-state.⁴⁸ Therefore although levels of economic development are usually significantly associated with the quality of free and fair contests, the relationship is far from deterministic.

POWER-SHARING CONSTITUTIONS AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS


Constitutional arrangements, including the adoption of power-sharing political institutions, also help to explain why some elections have greater integrity compared with others held in similar types of society within global regions. Power-sharing constitutions, with strong parliaments, multi-level governance, and independent judiciaries, provide important checks and balances. This usually prevents the abuse of power by the executive, including the temptation to put a thumb on the scales by amending the rules, by attempting to run for an unconstitutional third term, or by stacking the electoral management body. Power-sharing also builds greater trust in the electoral process amongst multiple stakeholders, including among election losers, avoiding the temptation to boycott the election or mobilize massive protests. By contrast majoritarian constitutions which concentrate power in the hands of the executive are often associated with worse levels of electoral integrity. The design of the electoral rules is particularly important. The evidence can be illustrated by comparing the PEI scores by the type of electoral system. As shown in Figure 7, in general countries using List Proportional Representation for the lower house of the national legislature scored 60 out of 100 on the PEI index, 11 points higher than countries using majoritarian electoral systems.

FIGURE 6: PEI & GDP



Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI-4.0) expert survey, release 4.0; GDP per Capita in purchasing power parity, World Bank Development Indicators (<http://databank.worldbank.org/>); Regime type, Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org).

FIGURE 7: PEI BY ELECTORAL SYSTEM



Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI-4.0) expert survey, release 4.0; Electoral System, International IDEA (<http://www.idea.int/esd/index.cfm>).

FIGURE 8: PEI DIMENSIONS





FIGURE 9: POLITICAL FINANCE – PUBLIC-EXPERT AGREEMENT



Source: The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI-4.0) expert survey, release 4.0; World Values Survey (WVS), 6th wave (www.worldvaluessurvey.org).

Overall, money is key for politics but its abuse is often clearly perceived as a problem.⁵³ Beyond specific scandals, some other factors may possibly drive these perceptions. One concerns the type of campaign finance regulation –such as the use of public subsidies, spending limits, donor caps and transparency requirements. Do we observe common regulatory frameworks in those countries that perform better (or worse)?⁵⁴ Furthermore, beyond the legal and regulatory provisions, we know little about the cultural norms surrounding clientelism and patronage politics, the acceptability of vote-buying practices, and the political use of bribery. This is important, as laws do not always lead to their expected results.⁵⁵ The level of corruption and economic inequality in a society are other explanations to consider when exploring how money in politics drives the integrity of elections.⁵⁶ To address these critical problems, the Electoral Integrity Project entered into a collaborative project with Global Integrity and the Sunlight Foundation to generate research, analysis and global norms that civic organizations, elected officials, regulators and the media can use to build more effective political financing regulations in any country.⁵⁷ More specifically, EIP focused on the challenges of regulating political finance around the world, including why it matters, why this regulation succeeds or fails, and what can be done to address these problems. EIP brought together a wide range of international scholars and practitioners with expertise in the area of political finance, producing a short executive report (2015) and, with Oxford University Press, an edited volume titled *Checkbook Elections: Political Finance in Comparative Perspective* (2016).

ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE

Another concern associated with the spread of contentious elections is the number of polls held in a pervasive climate of fraud, mistrust, and intolerance


that have ignited massive protests and violence.⁵⁸ Contentious elections raise red flags by potentially undermining democratic transitions in countries emerging from dictatorship, furthering instability and social tensions in fragile states, increasing uncertainty and risks for investors, and jeopardizing growth and development in low-income economies.

To compare some of the evidence more systematically, Figure 10 shows the indicators from PEI-4.0 where experts rated how far how far some voters ‘were threatened with violence at the polls’ (8-1 as an indicator of coercion) and how far elections ‘triggered violent protests’ (10-3 as an indicator of public anger and a backlash against the election).

The results confirm the problems in Burundi and Haiti, already described, were indeed some of the worst cases of conflict in the countries under comparison. Other problematic cases include Afghanistan (where instability and violence remains endemic and the legitimacy of the June 2014 Presidential election were undermined by claims of widespread fraud, vote-buying and ballot-stuffing) and also Thailand (where parliamentary elections in February 2014 saw street battles, some polling places closed, followed by the military coup d’état).

Legislative contests in Djibouti in February 2013 also saw outbreaks of conflict, where the long-standing ruler, President Ismail Omar Guelleh, is reported to repress and harass rights activists, journalists, and opposition leader, including 500 arrests in the elections which triggered an opposition boycott of parliament.⁵⁹ In Bangladesh, the January 2014 parliamentary elections also saw street fighting, low turnout (22 percent), and opposition boycotts protesting the victory for the ruling Awami League. At least 18 people were killed as police fired upon protestors and activists set fire to 100 polling stations. This reflects the tensions

FIGURE 10: ELECTORAL VIOLENCE



which have polarized politics in Bangladesh around the bitterly-divided rival leaders, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia.⁶⁰

Problems of electoral conflict arise from multiple causes, not least a legacy of deep-rooted violence and ethnic tensions which spills over into the campaign, heightened by partisan polarization and widespread poverty.⁶¹ Much concern has focused in Sub-Saharan Africa but in fact tensions have arisen at the polls in many parts of the world, especially in Asia, as illustrated

by the cases of Cambodia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Pakistan. Most importantly, there appears to be a curvilinear relationship between levels of autocracy-democracy and violent electoral protests, with the peak of conflict in hybrid regimes which are neither fully democratic (providing legitimate channels of legal redress) nor in the world's most repressive autocracies like Belarus and Iran (which repress opposition demonstrations). Hybrid states typically expand opportunities for protest activism and continue to be characterized by partisan polarization and instability.⁶²

BALANCED AND FAIR NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE

What is the role of news media systems in strengthening electoral integrity and democracy? By 'news media system', we mean all the communication outlets, including television and radio broadcasts, newspapers and magazines, as well as social media. One view suggests that through external diversity, a variety of media outlets presenting alternative viewpoints and perspectives, allows citizens to forge their opinions freely. Internal diversity means that media also present balanced information, such as stop-watch coverage of political parties.⁶³ In this sense, newspapers, television, radio and social media "are expected to provide sufficient and relevant political information so that citizens can hold their representatives to account and make informed choices".⁶⁴ Thus, "a country is democratic only to the extent that the media system, as well as elections, are structurally egalitarian and politically salient".⁶⁵ The diffusion of alternative political information about all candidates and parties within and across media outlets enhances the deliberative function of democracy, thus, this process works if the news media system is selfregulating, independent from political pressures, and inclusive of different opinions and standpoints.⁶⁶

An alternative model, however, suggests that by presenting partisan information and advocacy, the news media can serve to mobilize public opinion and civic engagement. There is still importance for external diversity, but each outlet can be closely aligned with a particular ideological or partisan perspective, such as in the US where Fox News is linked with a more conservative perspective while MSNBC is associated with a more liberal viewpoint. The imperative of pluralistic news media systems is fundamental for electoral integrity and democracy when it comes to campaign coverage – that is, the way traditional news media (TV and newspapers) present and diffuse information which is balanced

in the time or directional coverage of all candidates and parties prior, during and after electoral contests. The reality is often otherwise, however, where ruling parties gain predominant coverage, and the ideal of balanced information and fair coverage of political events is often more akin to a myth build upon stereotypes and wishful thinking.⁶⁷

The concept of balanced coverage is difficult to measure across countries. In the PEI data, however, two variables provide a measure of how experts assessed traditional news media balance in election coverage: 6-1 ('Newspapers provided balanced election news') and 6-2 ('TV news favored the governing party', reversed). Figure 11 plots the relationship between the two variables.

Intuitively, the two indicators of media impartiality should be strongly and positively correlated. This seems to be the case ($R=.54^{***}N139$) overall. Thus some cases in the lower left quadrant, such as Malaysia, perform very poorly in terms of media balance. In Malaysia, Federal elections for the lower house of Parliament were held on April 2013. The winner, the long-standing Barisan Nasional (National Front) had greater access to campaign media.⁶⁸ At the same time, Malaysian opposition parties historically lack access to government-controlled radio and television, official censorship is common, and many newspapers have close ties to the governing coalition, although new social media are challenging this predominance.⁶⁹

Unsurprisingly as well, several countries in the upper right quadrant, especially Western European and Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Norway, Finland, Germany and Switzerland, perform well in both dimensions, confirming the importance given in those countries to media independence, news impartiality and a more consensual decision-making culture. Switzerland, for example, experienced a profound change in the public sphere in the early 1970s, during which traditional media loosened

FIGURE 11: MEDIA



their ties to political parties and trade unions, resulting in a more pluralistic and diversified media marked. At the same time, however, media competition has been relatively low in Switzerland, with a few leading media corporations dominating the public sphere (e.g., SRG SSR Idée Suisse).⁷⁰ This creates a media culture characterized by pluralistic and independent outlets, facing a relatively low competition. When it comes to election coverage, our result show that Switzerland performed quite well in the last Federal election of October 2015.

The figure shows however that many countries do not conform to this overall pattern. On the one hand, in the lower right quadrant, in some established democracies such as the UK, Canada, Australia and Brazil, TV coverage of elections is substantially more balanced than newspapers.

On the other hand, several emerging African countries such as Namibia, South Africa, Malawi and Cote d'Ivoire seem to be characterized by more independent newspapers, but more biased TV coverage, as shown in the upper left quadrant.

How can we make sense of such discrepancies? One possible explanation relates to degree of regulation of different media outlets. Regulation of TV and radio content and broadcasting rules are common, on the grounds of spectrum scarcity. In the tradition of public sector broadcasters, television news has a duty to be balanced and fair in its treatment of political parties. Regulation and direct control over state broadcasters in authoritarian states is also often strong, based on the not uncommon perception that TV has the “power to enslave entire nations”.⁷¹ By contrast, newspaper markets are usually far less tightly regulated.

Several states enforce regulations aimed at curbing biases in party and campaigns coverage. In the UK, political broadcasting is heavily regulated by the authorities to ensure 'stop-watch' balance in the news and current affairs programs during election campaigns, but newspapers are highly partisan and largely unregulated. In Brazil, as well, candidates face a complex legal benchmark for political advertising on TV, based on an intricate scheduling system elaborated by the Superior Electoral Court which determines the day and time when advertisements can be shown.⁷² These regulations naturally create a fairer and more balanced TV coverage of elections, as reflected in Figure 11. Political coverage in the newspaper market is largely unregulated.

Secondly, the degree of competition may matter. Highly competitive commercial media market has been shown to decrease the quality of traditional content: when competition is extreme, journalists' commitment to quality news declines, as they are expected to follow low-cost strategies.⁷³

Finally, a third explanation relates to the type of regime in power and experience of democratization. This goes hand in hand with the development of a pluralistic public sphere, in which different views and opinions are represented. Traditionally, given the lower structural costs associated with newspaper than television ownership and publication, the print press been the logical gateway to express such plurality. This may help to explain why newspapers often perform better in terms of independent coverage than TV in authoritarian states.

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authoritarian states.

These patterns matter. Television is often more likely than other media to influence the opinions and attitudes of those who are less interested and engaged in politics.⁷⁴ If so, this effect is particularly malignant when TV coverage is biased. The decline in newspapers' perceived credibility, with the increasing diffusion of TV coverage of news,⁷⁵ provides additional reasons to be cautious about the future of fair, independent and balanced media in some states.

RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ELECTION MONITORS

Since the 1980s, election monitoring by international or domestic organizations has become widespread.⁷⁶ A number of international documents set the standards and code of conduct for both foreign and national election observers and call on governments to guarantee access for these watchdog groups.⁷⁷ Great hopes are placed in the potential of observers to deter election fraud or setting an agenda of electoral reform. Yet, in reality, monitors face restrictions in many places.

Existing research has suggested several reasons for the prevalence and level of access of international monitors. On the one hand, there might be 'top-down' factors driving the supply of election monitors and their degree of access. Governments may aspire to be accepted by their regional peers, and hence, monitors should be less restricted in regions with overall stronger democratic traditions.⁷⁸

At the same time, 'bottom-up' factors may also play an important role in explaining where monitors are restricted. Democratic aspirations among the population may drive the wish for transparent elections, leading to more demand for the creation of watchdog NGOs, or the call for international attention. This may create a heightened engagement of international monitoring groups in a 'boomerang effect'.⁸¹ On the other side of the coin are grievances. If elections work well, or citizens believe that

malpractices will be remedied by existing checks and balances of the courts or parliamentary oversight, the demand for the formation of monitoring NGOs will be low.⁸² Such demand-side factors may be more important for domestic than for international monitors. But even where grievances exist, limitations to associational rights and other civil liberties may limit political opportunities for watchdog NGOs and make their formation less likely or hinder their work.⁸³

Figure 12 plots PEI survey items 9-4 and 9-5 ('International/Domestic election monitors were restricted') on a scale of one to five, and countries are grouped by the overall integrity of their elections (Low; Medium; or High). The distribution shows a strong relationship between overall election quality and the ability of observers to operate there. The general pattern is that where elections have high integrity, domestic and international watchdogs are free to observe and report, while in low-integrity contests they are typically faced with harsh restrictions. Across all elections, the average scores on both survey items is 2.2 (out of five), suggesting that restrictions of election monitors is not among the worst problems of electoral integrity.

Unsurprisingly, PEI experts evaluated restrictions to both type of observers as unproblematic in high integrity contests, mostly concentrated in Western Europe and the OECD democracies in general. These countries are all tightly grouped in the bottom left corner of the graph, suggesting possible regional norm diffusion effects.

In contrast, the variability among countries with medium electoral integrity is much larger. It ranges from almost no restrictions in Albania, Ghana, or Moldova, with scores of about 1.5, to quite adverse environments for observers in Oman, Singapore, or Venezuela, with scores of about 3 on both variables. The latter countries may be less susceptible to the sticks and carrots of international aid, or shaming, since they have independent sources of economic growth and are less dependent on international legitimacy.

The span is even wider for low-integrity contests, with countries such as Malawi or Guatemala allowing observers almost free access despite running generally poor elections, whereas highly repressive countries such as Ethiopia, Belarus, or Equatorial Guinea severely penalize observers. Basically, domestic grievances are strong in all of these countries, due to seriously undermined electoral integrity. But while Malawi and Guatemala guarantee associational rights, the closed autocracies at the upper right corner of Figure 12 severely repress any form of civil society engagement. Domestic observers are routinely jailed, harassed, or denied access to polling places. Thus, grievances and political opportunities both seem to be important drivers of observer access.

An interesting outlier is Iran – a country in the mid-range of electoral integrity - where the PEI experts saw prohibitive restrictions against international monitors, but domestic watchdogs were much freer to operate. Due to its pariah status in the international community, no international aid spending provides supply-side factors for NGOs to monitor elections in the country.⁸⁴ More importantly, the legal framework does not provide for an accreditation process of international observers.⁸⁵ At the same time, while independent citizen groups are not allowed, the General Inspection Organization and the Guardian Council may field observers, providing at least a minimum of domestic oversight.⁸⁶ Given the regime's demonstrated ability to quell even large-scale contention about fraudulent elections in 2009 it might be more willing to grant some access to domestic rather than international observers.⁸⁷


Conversely, Kazakhstan – another outlier - severely represses domestic NGOs while allowing a degree of access to international watchdogs. This country – being part of the former Soviet space and a field of operations of the OSCE – is faced with stronger regional pressures to allow internationals access to the polls. However, by cracking down on domestic NGOs, the regime may try to deprive the foreign observers of their primary

information source and subsequently paint the election in a less critical light. In addition, the OSCE report on the 2015 election questioned the independence of a prominent observer group due to lack of transparency in its funding.⁸⁸ This suggests a strategy of closely managing some domestic observers and restricting independent ones.

Overall, both types of observers face the most adverse environment in countries where electoral contests have low integrity – incidentally the places where their work

may be most needed. On the other hand, observers enjoy a conducive environment in places where elections already have high integrity. Despite such open access, there are much fewer domestic election monitors active in these countries, simply because there are fewer grievances associated with poor electoral integrity.⁸⁹ Once more is known about both – the presence or absence of observers, and whether or not they are restricted – we can begin to unpack their possible impact.

FIGURE 12: MONITORS



Key Elections 2015

The following selected cases illustrate issues that were salient in elections last year.



CANADA – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, 19 OCTOBER 2015

The Canadian parliamentary elections of October 2015 ranked 20 out of all 180 elections covered thus far in PEI 4.0., and fifth for elections covered in 2015. It provided an example of a contest generally well administered around the whole electoral cycle.


The election produced an unexpected result, with voters putting an end to the Conservative prime ministership of Stephen Harper, in power since 2006. In 2015, Harper’s Conservative Party won only 99 seats in the House of Commons, 67 fewer than their previous electoral showing in 2011. The Liberal Party, under the leadership of Justin Trudeau, surged from third position in pre-election polls to achieve a surprising yet substantial majority on Election Day.⁹⁰ The Liberals gained control of 184 of the 338 seats in the Canadian lower house. The New Democratic Party finished third with 44 seats, followed by Bloc Québécois and The Green Party with 10 seats and one seat respectively. The result

points to a dramatic swing in public sentiment, given that there were only 34 Liberal seats in the previous parliament.

There were no major events in the election campaign; however, immigration and religion became central issues, with the Conservatives stooping to populist tactics such as stoking anti-Muslim sentiment. Harper reaffirmed his opposition to the wearing of the niqab in citizenship ceremonies. His government also promised to prioritize Syria’s religious minorities when processing refugee applications⁹¹ and announced that a police tipoff line would be set up for people to denounce “barbaric cultural practices” such as forced marriage.⁹² Trudeau’s Liberals promised the immediate processing and settlement of an additional 25,000 Syrian refugees, compared to Harper’s promise of 10,000 over four years.⁹³

The experts’ perception of electoral integrity (PEI) index rating was substantially higher than the

FIGURE 13: CANADA



global average. The PEI experts assessed the polls as above average in all but one sub-dimension of the electoral cycle. It received the third highest score out of all surveyed elections in the delimitation of voting district boundaries, surpassed only by Denmark. In addition, the political finance sub-dimension was assessed very favorably in sharp contrast to it being the most problematic aspect of elections in global comparison.

In contrast, as Figure 11 shows electoral laws and the processes related to voter registration were the areas where Canada’s electoral performance shows the greatest room for improvement. Both of these

scores possibly owe to apprehension generated by the Fair Elections Act.⁹⁴ Some observers feared the Act would reduce voter participation and make voting more difficult for students, First Nations Canadians and the homeless, because of new identification requirements.⁹⁵ In the end, most of these fears proved to be unfounded with voter participation jumping to 68.5 percent (a two-decade high) and First Nations voter turnout also increasing.⁹⁶ At least one analyst believed that the apprehension about new voting processes may have spurred Canadians to vote early, consequently increasing overall turnout.⁹⁷


UNITED KINGDOM – GENERAL ELECTION, 7 MAY 2015

In the United Kingdom, the 7 May 2015 general election scored the worst of all Western European states, ranking 39 out of all 139 countries worldwide in PEI-4.0. Despite considerable debate in recent decades over electoral reform, the electoral system for Westminster continues to use the plurality ‘First-

past-the-Post’ system with 650 single member constituencies.

Election day on 7 May 2015 generated allegations of several problems. Technical glitches were reported in Hackney and Dorset following problems with the electoral roll and distribution of cards for the incorrect polling station, blamed by officials

FIGURE 14: UK



on information technology and printing errors. Bournemouth council apologized after 100 people were unable to cast their vote in the local elections because an administrative blunder had led to the wrong ballot papers being issued. Earlier 250,000 ballot papers went missing after a printer's van was stolen in Eastbourne and Hastings. The Electoral Commission is investigated complaints that some overseas voters had not received their voting packs in time. The Guardian reported that Metropolitan police received 18 allegations of electoral fraud in the run up to polling day. In Tower Hamlets, the High Court suspended the Mayor, Lutfur Rahman, after he was found guilty of falsifying postal votes and putting undue pressure on voters at polling stations during the 2014 local and European elections. In Darlington, the BBC reported that the UKIP candidate's name was missing on ballot papers. Finally, the Telegraph reported that the Scottish Tory party leader tweeted claims of voter intimidation in Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale, with the allegations investigated by local police. None of these were major issues but they may have undermined faith in the electoral

process. When asked beforehand in the British Election Study, the majority of citizens expected that the election would be conducted fairly, but almost one fifth (18 percent) thought that it would be unfairly conducted.


The opinion polls consistently anticipated a close result on election night, fueling media speculation about a second successive coalition government and hung parliament as the most likely outcome. In the end, however, the polls were wrong, and the election saw the return of a Conservative government with 330 seats and a comfortable parliamentary majority, led by Prime Minister David Cameron. The Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party performed poorly, while there were significant gains for the Scottish National Party. The government has introduced individual voter register, replacing household registration, a reform justified by ministers as a more secure system guarding against alleged voter fraud, although critics charge that this may discourage participation by several sectors of the electorate, such as students and ethnic minorities.⁹⁸ The UK lowest ranked dimension is media.

MYANMAR (BURMA) – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, 8 NOVEMBER 2015

Myanmar's landmark election – the first broadly competitive in 25 years - took place on the 8th of November 2015. In the country's first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system the House of Nationalities' (Amyotha Hluttaw) 168 members are elected by absolute majority vote in single-member constituencies and 56 members that are appointed by the military. In the House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw), 330 members are elected by absolute majority vote in single-member constituencies and 110 members are appointed by the military to serve 5-year terms.⁹⁹

The country transitioned from a closed military dictatorship to a quasi-democratic form of government after nearly half century of direct military rule. The release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house confinement in 2010 and her election to parliament in 2012 changed the political status quo in Myanmar.¹⁰⁰ In a landslide, Aung San Suu Kyi's National League of Democracy (NLD) party won 348 of the 664 seats in the two houses of parliament surpassing the two-thirds seats needed for a majority, as constitution guarantees one quarter of all seats to army's nominees.¹⁰¹ Voter turnout was high with almost 70 percent of registered voters.¹⁰² For many - not only in the country's Burmese heartland, but also in its ethnic minority border regions – the polls

FIGURE 15: MYANMAR



a referendum on the decades of authoritarian rule.¹⁰³ Buddhist nationalism – flaming sectarian strife in the country¹⁰⁴ – did not resonate hugely with NLD supporters who instead picked up on Suu Kyi’s promise of change and her chastisement of military rule.¹⁰⁵ Ethnic-based parties performed poorly in most constituencies, with the exception of Shan and Rakhine states. Instead, voters also flocked to the NLD who enters parliament with a strong sense of a mandate to also represent ethnic minority interests.¹⁰⁶

The election marked the first time that outside foreign observers were allowed to monitor election campaigns, voting and the dispute resolution process.¹⁰⁷ More than 11,000 domestic observers and 1,000 international observers from numerous international organizations such as the European

Union, The Carter Center, or the Asian Network for free Elections (ANFREL) or ASEAN assessed the election positively.¹⁰⁸ The EU preliminary statement remarked that “observers reported very positively on the voting process in polling stations, with 95 percent rating the process as ‘good’ or ‘very good’”.¹⁰⁹ The PEI experts also saw Myanmar performing well (above the global average) in regards to procedures, voter registration, counting and results. Given the relative novelty of administering multi-party competitive elections, the favorable assessment of the electoral authorities (Myanmar: 69, global mean: 61) also came as a positive surprise.

Still, international observers had concerns about the abuses of Rohingya Muslims, according to the UN one of the most persecuted people in the world.¹¹⁰ The Carter Center noted that “five of the six

political parties fielding mostly Muslim candidates, including those representing Rohingya and Kaman, lost more than half of their candidates, and at least two Muslim independent candidates were disqualified".¹¹¹ During election campaigns, the UN warned of widespread intimidations by authorities, as dozens of candidates were disqualified from running and also ballots and names on electoral rolls were reported missing.¹¹² Other issues raised were the disenfranchisement of some 760,000 holders of temporary registration certificates, so-called "white cards".¹¹³ Simultaneously, ongoing fighting in some ethnic states has continued to present formidable challenges for some time.¹¹⁴

The domestic NGO People's Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE) voiced concern about the electoral legal framework, particularly the 25 percent reserved seats for the military.¹¹⁵ The PEI experts also picked up this problem; electoral laws scored lower than average (Myanmar: 43; global mean: 54). Furthermore, voter registration was singled out as particularly problematic, with the election ranking in the lowest quartile in the global

comparison of this sub-dimension (Myanmar: 30; global mean: 51). Despite technological solutions being used to create the electoral roll¹¹⁶, doubts about its completeness persisted.¹¹⁷ The PEI experts concurred by giving an average response of 4.2 and 3.9 (out of 5) respectively on the survey items "5-1 Some citizens were not listed in the register" and "4-2 The electoral register was inaccurate".

Myanmar's election was widely hailed by commentators as a leap forward in the democratization process.¹¹⁸ With the NLD's majority, reforms may ensue, providing space for more societal participation. But elections have also been characterized as a deliberate survival strategy of the highly professionalized military complex, seeking to institutionalize some mechanisms of power sharing among the ruling elite.¹¹⁹ While the elections were a successful test for newly built institutions, the country's transition is certainly impeded by the persistent power of the military, state-facilitated crony capitalism, and increasing sectarian divisions.¹²⁰

"2015-11-08 Rangun Polling Day IMG_0623" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Prachatai




LESOTHO – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, 28 FEBRUARY 2015

The 2015 legislative election in Lesotho stood out as a contest of high electoral integrity, despite the turbulent lead-up to it. In 2012, an election had produced the country’s first-ever coalition government.¹²¹ Three parties – Democratic Congress (DC), All Basotho Convention (ABC), and Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) – formed a minority government with ABC’s Thomas Thabane as Prime Minister. In March 2014, after power struggles between the leaders of coalition parties, Lesotho’s government started breaking apart.¹²² In response to a motion of no-confidence, Thabane suspended parliament, creating fears of political instability.¹²³ In August, members of the military reportedly attacked police headquarters in the capital Maseru¹²⁴ and encircled the Prime Minister’s palace.¹²⁵ Thabane fled to South Africa, alleging a coup d’etat had been

staged. The Prime Minister would eventually return to Lesotho in early September and South African Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, as facilitator for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), was able to somewhat reconcile the feuding political parties.¹²⁶ A security accord was signed¹²⁷, parliament reconvened on October 17¹²⁸ and all political parties agreed to hold early elections in February 2015.¹²⁹ Similar “invited interventions” by South Africa or the SADC had previously put Lesotho back on track for multiparty elections.¹³⁰ Yet, in a repeat of the 2012 polls, the elections again produced no outright winner and the government in Maseru is now made up of a coalition of seven parties.¹³¹ Democratic Congress leader Pakalitha Mosisili, who previously served as Prime Minister between 1998 and 2012, was sworn in on 17 March as the nation’s new PM.

FIGURE 16: LESOTHO



Given the tumultuous events that brought about the elections, and the pre-election mood of distrust and animosity amongst Lesotho's political leaders¹³², it came to some surprise that the polls themselves were viewed as largely peaceful and orderly by election monitors.¹³³ Commonwealth observers praised the elections for being inclusive, commended the professionalism and dedication of polling officials, highlighted the voter education efforts of religious and civil society leaders, and recognized the respectful and trustworthy behavior of political party agents at polling stations.¹³⁴ The SADC observer mission concluded that the polls were "peaceful, transparent, credible, free and fair, thus reflecting the will of the people of the Kingdom of Lesotho".¹³⁵

These comments align with Lesotho's score on the 2015 Perception of Electoral Integrity index. Overall, the 2015 PEI index positions this landlocked African nation at 63, slightly above the world average. It was the second highest score of any election in Africa in 2015, surpassed only by Benin, scoring

above average in almost all aspects of the electoral cycle. Lesotho's exemplary adherence to electoral procedures and its robust electoral laws are its strongest electoral assets. At the same time, some observers argue that the country's Mixed-Member Proportional electoral system causes structural instability and hung parliaments¹³⁶, although others credit it with mitigating some potential conflicts.¹³⁷

The overall high integrity of elections in Lesotho was weakened by its average performance in the areas of voter registration, campaign finance and campaign media access. The African Union made a number of recommendations for the improvement of future elections. They called for: more stringent media regulations; measures to promote full participation and representation of women, young people and people with a disability; greater distance between political and security forces; and constitutional reform.¹³⁸ Another weakness of elections in Lesotho remains low voter turnout – 47 percent in the 2015 election.¹³⁹

"Lesotho elections, 1 March 2015" (CC BY-ND 2.0) by GovernmentZA



NIGERIA – GENERAL ELECTION, 28 MARCH 2015


Nigeria’s Presidential Elections took place on 28 March 2015, after being postponed by six weeks because of security concerns. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) reasoned that the decision was taken to push back the election date after military advice indicated electoral security could not be guaranteed.¹⁴⁰ The postponement was heavily criticized by the opposition and civil society observers as a politically motivated collusion between military and the incumbent to give the ruling party more time to campaign and “play the money game”.¹⁴¹ Yet, ultimately, as the International Republican Institute remarked, the extra time proved valuable and allowed the distribution of “an extra 10 million PVCs [Permanent Voters Cards], taking the total distribution rate from 66.5 percent

before the postponement to 81.2 percent on the eve of the election”.¹⁴²

When elections did eventually take place, the people of the most populous nation in Africa elected representatives by simple majority vote in the 360 single-member constituencies of the House of Representatives and in the 109 multi-member constituencies of the Senate.¹⁴³ 14 candidates contested the presidency, needing either an absolute majority or at least 25 percent of the vote in two thirds of the states in order to be elected.¹⁴⁴

The fifth presidential race since the transition from military rule in 1999 was highly competitive and but marked by sporadic violence, with both the incumbent and the opposition reporting attacks and murders of their supporters.¹⁴⁵ The Boko Haram resurgence also threatened freedom of assembly.

FIGURE 17: NIGERIA



Media favouring the incumbent was a concern for observers, not being addressed by the regulatory body.¹⁴⁶ Although it was a mostly peaceful event, mob violence leading to injuries and death occurred in a number of states.¹⁴⁷

The main challenger for incumbent leader Goodluck Jonathan of the People's Democratic Party (PDC) was Muhammadu Buhari, leader of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and former military dictator. Buhari who put up a strong campaign centred on security, promising to crush the Boko Haram insurgency.¹⁴⁸ His support base lies in the largely Muslim north of the country, whereas Jonathan is most popular in the predominantly Christian south. The election results reflected the competitive promise of the pre-election period with Jonathan winning 15 states and the Federal Capital Territory and Buhari winning the remaining 21 states.¹⁴⁹ Some contestation ensued over fraudulent vote counts in certain southern states, "however no centralised systemic fraud was observed".¹⁵⁰ Quick count initiatives, such as the one by the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), helped increase public trust in the validity of results.¹⁵¹

The outcome was hailed as a triumph for Nigerian democracy.¹⁵² It was the first time a sitting president was ousted from power via democratic means and accepted the result. In an encouraging gesture of goodwill, Jonathan phoned Buhari to convey his "best wishes"¹⁵³ and urged his supporters to accept the result.¹⁵⁴

Nevertheless, significant room for improvement for future elections was also noted in other areas. Tighter media campaign regulations to avoid bias favouring incumbents, greater political participation for women, the need to better organise polling stations and voting equipment, and the efficient use of biometric identification were all earmarked for reform.¹⁵⁵ A statement from the African Union observation mission also highlighted the inability of INEC to effectively monitor the sources of political

party financing.¹⁵⁶ This picture is consistent with Nigeria's score in the overall PEI Index in which it was ranked slightly below the global average (Nigeria: 53; global mean: 56). Experts evaluated the political finance sub-section with a score of 20 (global mean: 36), putting Nigeria in the lowest ten elections of 2015 in that regard.

International electoral observation missions from the European Union and the Commonwealth both commended the INEC for its handling of the election overall, singling out the introduction of biometric identity cards as a particularly positive development.¹⁵⁷ Electronic voter card readers and other innovations were credited with making multiple voting, ballot-box stuffing and other election-day fraud largely unfeasible.

However, biometric technology was also criticized.¹⁵⁸ Indeed, the 'voting' sub-dimension – while one of the less problematic aspects of elections in global comparison – was ranked particularly poorly (Nigeria: 30; global mean: 54). Only nine out of the 180 elections covered in PEI 4.0 were ranked lower than Nigeria in that subdimension, indicating that there were significant problems with some fraudulent votes cast, voters being threatened with violence, or the timing and voting facilities simply being poorly managed.

Yet, despite these concerns, EU observers considered the overall outcome of the elections as "peaceful and orderly (...) despite frustration and challenges caused by often late opening of polling sites, failing biometric voter verification, some regrettable violent incidents, and re-polling on Sunday".¹⁵⁹ They commended the National Election Commission NEC efforts given the systemic challenges. PEI experts noted Nigeria's electoral legal framework and vote counting procedures.

SINGAPORE – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, 11 SEPTEMBER 2015

Singapore’s ruling party won the city-state’s election for the 12th consecutive time during its parliamentary election on September 11 2015. This was the People’s Action Party (PAP) most challenging election yet as Singapore is experiencing a weakening economy and opposition parties contested every parliamentary seat for the first time since Singapore’s independence in 1965.¹⁶⁰ In the Singaporean parliament, 76 members are directly elected by bloc vote in 16 multi-member constituencies and 13 are directly elected by simple majority vote in single member constituencies for a total of 89 seats in parliament.¹⁶¹


Lee Kuan Yew, who transformed the island into an economic powerhouse during his ruling, died in March 2015. His death sparked strong national pride among Singaporeans,¹⁶² and after celebrating

the 50th anniversary of Singapore’s independence, Lee’s son Prime Minister Lee Hsie Long called for early elections in what seemed a strategy to take advantage of patriotic feelings.¹⁶³

The election had only a stunning nine days of political campaigning - the shortest legally allowed by the election department. It saw a reinvigorated opposition that used social media to bring their message across to Singaporeans, rather than through state-controlled media outlets.¹⁶⁴

Despite the opposition’s gains in the 2011 polls – where PAP gained only 60.1 percent of the vote, its lowest percentage of support in history¹⁶⁵ - the ruling party secured a sweeping victory in 2015 with 83 of the 89 seats. Of the eight opposition political parties, only the Workers Party (WP) was able to obtain six seats in parliament.¹⁶⁶

FIGURE 18: SINGAPORE



Autocratic rule by an entrenched elite, rhetoric of government effectiveness and 'meritocracy', the ubiquitous influence of personal power networks, and economic favoritism of cronies have long been remarked upon as characteristic features of the 'Singapore model'.¹⁶⁷ The election result reinforced this half century dominance of the PAP in Singaporean politics.¹⁶⁸ The PEI experts gave Singapore a middling PEI Index of 53, just around the global average of 56, but far lower than any other country of comparable socio-economic development. Technical and administrative aspects of the elections worked well as expected, highlighted by above-average scores in the dimensions of electoral procedures (Singapore: 76; global mean: 66), or even more so voter registration (Singapore: 77; global mean: 51). Campaign finance was seen as being on par with the global average, reflecting the strict enforcement of existing political finance regulation, as well as the fact that the PAP as a 'cadre party' is relatively autonomous from private business interests, and intraparty competition is not commercialized.¹⁶⁹

Yet, aspects pertaining to a level playing field were evaluated far less positively. The country's electoral laws were seen as highly skewed in favor of the governing party and restricting citizens' rights (Singapore: 27; global mean: 54). The most negative

assessment regarded the delimitation of voting district boundaries (Singapore: 14; global mean: 53). Only two countries – the United States and Malaysia – scored worse in this dimension. The country fared very poorly on the category's items such as "boundaries discriminated against some parties", or "boundaries favored incumbents". Singapore's large multi-member districts deter electoral competition and increase the likelihood of super-majorities in the gerrymandered districts, leading to a large number of essentially uncontested seats.¹⁷⁰

Given the poor performance of its electoral institutions and the simultaneous erosion of the authoritarian developmental state's 'growth with equity' social compact¹⁷¹, Singapore is faced with new problems of legitimation. While a 'silent majority' wants the PAP in power¹⁷², an electorate keeping up high demand for effective policy and economic growth present challenges for both ruling party and opposition. The country relies on its goods and services from overseas. Singaporeans worry about being able to retire and are struggling with wages that have been devalued with the high cost of living¹⁷³ as well as a rising population triggered by immigration which has pushed the island's population up by over a million people since 2006 to a total of 5.4 million.¹⁷⁴

"The stage after the rally" (CC BY-ND 2.0) by gunman47




TURKEY – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, 7 JUNE AND 1 NOVEMBER 2015

Turkey voted twice in 2015, electing the 550 members of the Grand National Assembly through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms.¹⁷⁵ Driven by compulsory voting¹⁷⁶ and two high stakes races, both elections had high voter turnouts - 82 percent in June and 85 percent in the November polls.¹⁷⁷

The election of 7 June 2015 saw President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) fail to secure an overall majority in parliament for the first time since its creation in 2002. The election results ruined President Recep's plans to boost his office's powers, as he was seeking a two-thirds majority to turn Turkey into a presidential republic.¹⁷⁸ The AKP's strong grip on power and its widespread electoral support have

been characterized as evidence for an emerging hegemonic party.¹⁷⁹ Yet, amidst growing social polarization and fears of emergent authoritarianism the result challenged the AKP's single-party rule.¹⁸⁰ While still securing 40.9 percent of the vote, it lost 69 seats compared to the 2011 election. The Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) at the same time managed to surpass the extraordinary electoral threshold of 10 percent, leading to a political stalemate and hung parliament.¹⁸¹ Snap elections were hence called for the 1st of November. The November election brought back a victory for the AKP, increasing its vote almost nine points in 5 months, frustrating hopes of a fundamental change in the country's political trajectory.

FIGURE 19: TURKEY



Despite stark differences in the political outcome, the integrity of both elections varied only slightly. The PEI experts gave the June election an overall PEI Index of 45, while they rated the November polls with a PEI Index of 47 (compared to the global average of 56). These middling to low scores reflect continued issues in Turkish electoral politics, which are characterized by high polarization and widespread incident of negative campaigning.¹⁸² The media dimension of the PEI was evaluated poorly with a score of 25 and 28 respectively (global mean: 47), including problems such as news favoring the governing party or unequal access to political broadcasting. In addition, campaign finance received low marks of 24 and 26 (global mean: 37). In fact, some scholarly studies have previously suggested that more than one-third of the Turkish electorate is targeted for vote-buying.¹⁸³

PEI experts agreed that electoral laws are a particularly problematic area in Turkey, with both contests scoring less than 30 (global mean: 54). This is even more relevant as there was a drop of more than 20 points compared with the 2014 presidential election. The country has the world's highest election threshold, barring from the legislature any party that does not register at least 10 percent of the popular vote. This regulation was meant to promote efficiency in governance and lawmaking; however international observers have previously stated that

the 10 percent threshold limits pluralism. Reports made by the Parliament Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) have recommended the threshold to be lowered.¹⁸⁴ The PEI experts strongly agreed that electoral laws are unfair to small parties (4.9 and 4.6 on a 1-5 scale where 5 indicates strong agreement) and agreed that electoral laws favored the governing party (4.17 and 4.15).¹⁸⁵

Another notable difference between the two elections was the degree of violence targeting the left and Kurdish community. In July in a town called Suruc near the Syrian border a suicide bomber killed at least 30 people¹⁸⁶ and in October just a few weeks before the election during a peace rally more than 100 civilians were killed in Ankara.¹⁸⁷ Simultaneously, the government escalated once again its war against the Kurdish nationalist PKK (Kurdistan Workers' party).¹⁸⁸ The PACE and OSCE/ODIHR observer mission characterized the June election as highly participatory.¹⁸⁹ In contrast, the mission's November election report criticized the climate of violence and fear that preceded the vote. They stated that the insecure environment, arrests of opposition activists and media bias by the national broadcaster TRT have made the political campaign unfair.¹⁹⁰

"Ballots and boxes, Ankara, 1 Nov. 2015" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by oscepa



VENEZUELA – PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, 6 DECEMBER 2015


Venezuela held its much-anticipated parliamentary election on 6 December 2015. The results marked a setback for the leftist chavista movement founded by President Chavez in 1999.¹⁹¹ This election was marked by the country’s rough economic situation due to the fall in oil prices and inflation running at almost 200 percent a year. There were shortages of basic products, including food and medicines.¹⁹² The country also experienced high rates of crime: Caracas, the capital, was ranked in the top three among the most dangerous cities in the world, with 134 homicides per 100,000 residents.¹⁹³

Members of Venezuela’s unicameral National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional) are elected to serve

5-year terms partly by simple majority (113 seats), and partly by proportional representation (51 seats), while 3 seats are reserved for indigenous peoples.¹⁹⁴ Voter turnout in the 2015 contest was 73.7 percent or 14,385 million out of 19,504 million registered voters.¹⁹⁵ The results showed the opposition led by the United Opposition parties (Mesa de la Unidad Democratica - MUD) regaining control of the legislative power by winning 65.2 percent of the vote and a total of 109 seats in the National Assembly. This is the first time in 17 years of socialist government where the opposition has obtained a majority. This was a significant win for the opposition against President Maduro who obtained 32.9 percent of the vote and 55 total seats.

¹⁹⁶

FIGURE 20: VENEZUELA



Maduro – having lost control of the parliament – claimed that fraud, vote buying and polling booth capture facilitated the opposition victory.¹⁹⁷ The Supreme Court accepted a challenge of the results.¹⁹⁸ One major issue leading up to the election was the government and the National Electoral Council (CNE) refusal to invite international observers such as the OAS or EU to the parliamentary election. Instead, the government insisted on bringing electoral “accompaniments”. President Maduro allowed the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) to “accompany” the election. UNASUR, cannot make value judgment on the elections of its constituent states.¹⁹⁹ For this election, however, the head of UNASUR, Ernesto Samper, praised Venezuela for organizing the most efficient and transparent elections observed by the bloc of South American countries.²⁰⁰ In the past UNASUR missions have endorsed the CNE’s management of elections and reports have been secret or confidential.²⁰⁰ For this election, several member states of UNASUR insisted on a more impartial form of observation. This led to clashes among Venezuelan authorities and disagreements among UNASUR member states.²⁰¹ This was a continuation of the trend to undermine credible election monitoring by international and citizen observers, which has been noted since at least 2008.²⁰² Existing domestic monitoring efforts

have faced serious institutional constraints, limiting their ability to render accurate evaluations of elections or engage in broader advocacy efforts.²⁰³

Talks of the ‘end of Chavism’²⁰⁴ obscured the fact that the Venezuelan election performed poorly in all stages of the electoral cycle according to PEI experts, with an overall PEI Index of only 42 (global mean: 56). This was a significant decline from the score of 54 in the 2012 parliamentary election, but roughly on par with the 2013 presidential contest (PEI Index of 40). Overall, this election ranked 144 out of 180 elections covered in PEI 4.0. Only party registration and results announcement were on par with the global average. However, experts agreed that the most relevant problems related to electoral laws (Venezuela: 35; global mean: 54), media (Venezuela: 33; global mean: 47) and political finance (Venezuela: 23; global mean: 37). State employees and public funds are used for political campaigning by governing parties,²⁰⁵ which is reflected by an overwhelmingly negative score of 4.5 (out of 5) on the PEI survey item: “Some states resources were improperly used for campaigning”. At the same time, a score of 1.5 out of 5 on the item “Parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising” shows serious distortions in regards to campaign media.

“US-VENEZUELA-ELECTIONS” (CC BY-NC 2.0) by Globovisión



BELARUS – PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, 11 OCTOBER 2015


Belarus will be under the rule of Alexander Lukashenko for another five-year term after he was elected president for a fifth time. Since gaining control in 1994 Lukashenko has established himself firmly in the country’s highest political office, altering the constitution in 2004 to abolish the two-term limit on the presidency.²⁰⁵ The president is elected via an absolute majority vote and 50 percent of the population must participate in the elections for them to be valid.²⁰⁶ In the most recent election, held on 11 October 2015, voter turnout was 86.7 percent²⁰⁷, well and truly surpassing the legal limit. The man George Bush’s administration once named “Europe’s last dictator” received a record 83.5 percent of the vote.²⁰⁸

The second-placed candidate, Tatiana Korotkevich, only achieved 4.4 percent.²⁰⁹ Part of the lack of opposition support could be due to the absence of long-term opposition figures who were not allowed to stand.²¹⁰ Prominent leaders are routinely jailed or exiled, and social movements who mobilize for post-election protests are routinely repressed.²¹¹ This has left the Belarusian opposition fragmented.²¹²

Lukashenko’s election campaign was focused on international issues, rather than domestic economic turmoil, also portraying himself as a peacemaker between Europe and Russia.²¹³ ‘Stability’, compared with neighboring Ukraine, is something Lukashenko regards as a major achievement.²¹⁴ Voters were presented with very little choice between candidates, since only one candidate was openly critical of Lukashenko and this was largely on socio-economic grounds.²¹⁵

The PEI experts evaluated the 2015 presidential election in the lowest quarter of contests, with an overall PEI Index of 41. It scored below the global average in all but one PEI sub-dimension. While the experts saw the 2015 contest more positively compared with the legislative elections of 2012 in all stages of the electoral cycle (except voter registration), the 2015 election still scored low on electoral laws (score of 30), campaign finance (27), and media (27). The integrity of media coverage was ranked in the lowest ten percent of all elections covered thus far in PEI 4.0. Tight control over the media also shapes public perceptions of the

FIGURE 21: BELARUS



fairness of the polls.²¹⁶ Furthermore, Belarus ranked exceptionally poor in the 'count' sub-dimension (Belarus: 34, global mean: 69). In this category – a rather unproblematic one in global comparison – the Belarusian contest received the third lowest score of all elections held in 2015. Among other things, this category includes items on the access of domestic and international observers, on whether ballot boxes were secure or whether votes were counted fairly.

In concurrence, international and domestic election observers were highly critical of the conduct of the elections, with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Belarus, Miklós Haraszti, stating: “The election process was orchestrated, and the result was pre-ordained. It could not be otherwise, given the 20 years of continuous suppression of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association, which are the preconditions for any credible competition”.²¹⁷ Other international bodies have been similarly scathing, with the OSCE noting: “Significant problems, particularly during the counting and tabulation, undermined the integrity of the election”.²¹⁸ Three domestic observer groups also challenged the validity of the

results citing evidence of voter-turnout and results manipulation.²¹⁹ Additionally, domestic human rights observers condemned unequal media access for candidates, voter coercion, the improper use of state resources by the incumbent, and the lack of access for observers to some election processes.²²⁰

Despite what was an overwhelmingly negative appraisal of the electoral event, some rays of hope shone through. Six political prisoners were released in the run up to the elections²²¹ and the OSCE expected that this would mark the end of this kind of political persecution in Belarus.²²² Another positive development was the appearance of the first-ever female presidential candidate.²²³ Candidates were also offered equal and free access to state-owned media; however it was noted that Lukashenko was by far the most visible candidate.²²⁴ In contrast with the 2010 elections the 2015 presidential contest did not cause violent contention, a development praised by the UN.²²⁵ In addition to this, the delimitation of voting district boundaries was singled out as a rather non-problematic issue by the PEI experts (Belarus: 58, global mean: 52) and the PEI Index for the 2015 elections was higher compared to the 2012 legislative elections (32).

“A man votes at a polling station in Mins” (CC BY-SA 2.0) by oscepa



Elections to watch during 2016

*The following cases are ordered
alphabetically.*

AUSTRALIA – FEDERAL ELECTION, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2016

Australian politics is at a crossroad. In September last year, Malcolm Turnbull became PM after an internal Liberal Party leadership spill in which he deposed former leader Tony Abbott. Perhaps ironically, the same fate had befallen Turnbull in 2009 when the Liberal-National Coalition was in opposition: Abbott staged a coup and won the party leadership taking his party to electoral victory in 2013.²²⁶ The Turnbull-Abbot carousel is indicative of a broader instability in Australian party leadership, as the Labor party faced a virtually identical situation while holding the federal executive in the previous term. All in all, executive powers at the federal level have changed hands five times in the past five years (Kevin Rudd, Julia Gillard, Kevin Rudd, Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull). And this takes into account only successful leadership spills: Both Abbott and Gillard faced, over the past three years,

several failed attempts to remove them from party leadership.²²⁷

The next elections are a chance for Mr. Turnbull to gain popular legitimacy for his policies, decidedly more centrist, socially liberal and inclusive than those of his predecessor, and to cement his position as Liberal leader. Polls suggest that the Coalition is likely to hold on to power and that Turnbull is much preferred over Labor's Bill Shorten for the top job.²²⁸

Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has said that elections can be expected around September or October 2016 but no date has yet been determined.²²⁹ In the last federal elections in 2013, The Australian Electoral Commission lost 1,375 votes²³⁰ from the Western Australian senate vote count, leading to a re-run of senate elections in that state at a cost of around \$20 million.²³¹ There was significant political and public outcry after the event, leading to the resignation of AEC commissioner Ed Killesteyn and

"Australian Parliament House, Canberra (#" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Christopher Chan



AEC state manager Peter Kramer.²³²

It will also be interesting to see whether minor parties continue to be influential in the Senate. In 2013, the Australian Motoring Enthusiast Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and Family First all won a single senate seat and mining magnate Clive Palmer's Palmer United Party won three. Two of Palmer's senators have since defected and are now sitting as independents. There have been calls for reform of the preferential voting system that led to the election of these minor parties (especially the LDP, AMEP and FF).²³⁵ Currently, preferences in senate voting are largely determined by political parties, because of the burdensome task of numbering 90 percent of the ballot boxes (there were 110 in New South Wales) in senate voting. This leads to most voters choosing to mark '1' next to the political party of their choice, in what is called above-the-line voting, and then letting the party determine preferences. No reform has been implemented and so this somewhat antidemocratic practice of deferring to political parties to determine your vote seems likely to continue.

Also on the spotlight of the political agenda are three popular referenda (plebiscites) on rather controversial issues: same-sex marriage, the abandon of the Monarchy system towards a Republic, and substantive recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders people in the Constitution. Although not directly related to the upcoming federal election, discussions about those issues are likely to set the agenda, increase the polarization of the party system, and eventually shape electoral dynamics.



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO – PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 2016

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces another difficult electoral contest on November 2016. The current president, Joseph Kabila has been president since 2001 and he inherited the position after his father Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated in 2001.²³⁶ Kabila, who during the past years faced continuous military tensions in eastern Congo and internal rebel forces allegedly supported by neighboring Uganda and Rwanda, was elected for two consecutive terms in 2006 and 2011.²³⁷ The DRC's semi-presidential system creates a situation in which, although the PM (currently Mr. Augustin Matata Ponyo) and the legislature superintend much of the legislative work, the President holds significant powers to influence lawmaking processes, both indirectly and formally through constitutional conventions.

In January 2015 the Congolese people protested, which resulted in the death of at least 40 people²³⁸, demanding Kabila respects democracy and the constitution by stepping down as president in 2016. Such events are expected to happen again in 2016 as opposition parties have vowed to hold demonstrations in order to mount pressure

on President Kabila to step down once his terms expires. Kabila has also been accused of trying to amend the constitution to extend his presidential term.²³⁹

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has not had a peaceful transfer of power in over 55 years of independence.²⁴⁰ Civil wars have resulted in 6 million deaths and destroyed the country's infrastructure. Unemployment is high with 64 percent of people living below the \$ 1.25 per day international poverty line.²⁴¹ The DRC experiences conflict, insecurity, sexual and gender violence on a daily basis.²⁴²

Governmental authorities have previously stated that the 2016 elections may be delayed for up to four years, creating uncertainty around whether the election will happen.²⁴³ Moreover, the DRC government prepared an election calendar in January 2015 showing that revision of the voter register would take up to 16 months and might cost \$290 million dollars.²⁴⁴

This election is not only important for the Congolese people but will also have global repercussions as the DRC has untapped mineral resources worth 24 trillion dollars, vital to global industries.²⁴⁵

"Long Queues Characterize Congolese Elect" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by United Nations Photo





DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – GENERAL ELECTION, MAY 2016

General elections will be held in the Dominican Republic on 15 May 2016. It will be the first time since 1994 that all public authorities will be elected at the same time: presidential, congressional and municipal. It will also be the first time in the Dominican Republic's tormented electoral history²⁴⁶ that all authorities will be elected directly by the people.²⁴⁷ The election will count for the first time with an automated system employed by the EMB, which will replace manual counting ballots.²⁴⁸

Dominican Republic President Danilo Medina will be eligible to run for the 2016 election under a constitutional change approved by the nation's lower congressional chamber in June 2015.²⁴⁹ The modified constitution allows for two consecutive presidential terms and limits presidents to a total of eight years. The previous constitution prohibited consecutive terms, as a President had to wait four years before seeking reelection.²⁵⁰

In 2014, President Medina's popularity grew faster than any other in Latin America, as the economy expanded with 7.3 percent.²⁵¹ The Dominican Republic is a \$66 billion economy that has grown at an average rate of 5.8 percent from 2005–2015, the second highest growth rate in Latin America, after Panama.²⁵² Medina's popularity was reflected in the polls from January 2016. According to recent SIN-Mark Penn survey results, Medina, running for the Dominican Republic's ruling party (PLD), could be reelected by more than 30 points over his opposition rival Luis Abinader, from the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM).²⁵³ Another polling company, Pollster Asisa Research, also predicted that Medina's PLD party would win with 54.8 percent of the vote against Luis Abinader with 38.6 percent of the vote.²⁵⁴ However, Medina has been criticized for changing migration and citizenship laws, which stripped thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent of their citizenship.²⁵⁵

IRAN - PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, FEBRUARY 2016

The Iranian people voted in February 2016, in the first joint election of the 290-seat parliament, known in Iran as the Islamic Consultative Assembly (also called Iranian Majlis, or People's House), and the Assembly of Experts, the body that chooses the Islamic Republic's supreme leader.²⁵⁶

Some journalists doubted the fairness of the elections, with questions arising over the "arbitrary" exclusion of potential candidates.²⁵⁷ The Guardian Council (a 12-member panel of Islamic jurists²⁵⁸) approved only 166 of the 801 candidates who applied to run for the Assembly of Experts.²⁵⁹ This followed after the same council had disqualified all but around 4,700 out of more than 12,000 potential parliamentary candidates.²⁶⁰ A similar situation in 2012 led to a parliamentary election boycott by reformist parties²⁶¹; however, one prominent reformist leader ruled out this tactic for the 2016 elections.²⁶¹

Some believe the vote was a referendum on the future

direction of the revolution.²⁶² This is because of the great potential for change that would be generated by a win by progressives in either the parliament and or the Assembly of Experts.²⁶³ The power shift in parliament may give moderate President Hassan Rouhani more scope to push through reforms, such as the codification of political crimes and a prohibition on the policing of religious adherence, changes which have both been previously blocked by his more conservative political opponents.²⁶³

Rouhani has achieved a lot in the international sphere since wresting the presidency away from hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He recently secured a groundbreaking nuclear deal with world powers, an achievement that may have had hardliners sensing the winds of change.²⁶⁵ The agreement may improve Iran's economic situation through lifting crippling economic sanctions.²⁶⁶ In the wake of the nuclear deal, Rouhani toured Europe to sign multi-million dollar trade deals and even met with the Pope, a sign of increasing international engagement.²⁶⁷

"Iran election protest 092309, UN, NYC" (CC BY 2.0) by bettyx1138



MOROCCO - PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION OCTOBER 2016

Parliamentary elections in Morocco will be held on 7 of October 2016. Moroccans will elect 395 seats in the House of Representatives, with 305 from multi-member constituencies and 90 from a single nationwide constituency of which 60 seats are reserved for women and 30 for men under the age of 40.²⁷⁰

This will be Morocco's second Parliamentary election since King Mohamed VI announced a series of reforms in early 2011 as a response to widespread protests²⁷¹ demanding greater power sharing and an end to corruption in the country. The 2011 reform aimed to transform Morocco into a constitutional monarchy and it was the first time that citizens themselves encouraged substantial reforms in the country.²⁷² The new constitution expands the power of the parliament and curbs most but not all of the powers of King Mohammed, who still retains the ultimate authority²⁷³, having the ability to

dissolve parliament and remaining commander in chief of the armed forces.²⁷⁴ Several studies show that the majority of Moroccans do not perceive the parliament as an efficient institution, and that a strong tendency towards political abstention exists among Moroccans. The electoral system does not favor the emergence of a strong parliamentary majority. An example of this is the 2011 election, where the Islamist Justice and Development party (PJD) had to negotiate with ideologically different parties to be able to form a majority in parliament.²⁷⁵

The last parliamentary election took place in November 2011 and saw the PJD win and become the first Islamist party to lead a government. Analysts believe that the PJD could win a second term in the 2016 election.²⁷⁶ However, current austerity measures might affect PJD Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane's popularity. Benkirane's government may also face pressures as agricultural output is expected to drop and GDP is only expected to grow by 3 percent in 2016.²⁷⁷

"Avenue Muhammad V" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by khowaga1





"Election Fervor" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Cocoabiscuit

PERU – GENERAL ELECTION, APRIL 2016

Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, is positioned as the favorite candidate to win the presidential elections scheduled for April 10, 2016. On this date, Peruvians will go to the polls to elect a new President and Representatives to the 130-seat Congress for the period of 2016-2021.²⁷⁸ Members are elected in 25 multi-member constituencies and the voting system uses proportional representation with closed party lists.²⁷⁹ Incumbent President Ollanta Humala is ineligible to run due to constitutional limits.²⁸⁰ If none of the presidential candidates exceeds more than 50 percent of the vote then a second round of elections will be carried out in June 2016.²⁸¹

Alberto Fujimori was Peru's president from 1990 to 2000 and is now in prison convicted for a range of human rights crimes. His daughter is distancing herself from her father by promoting a more democratic and less authoritarian image. According to an Ipsos Poll made in January, 2016 Keiko Fujimori leads the polls with 33 percent of the vote.²⁸² In second place is Pedro Pablo Kuczynski,

a right wing economist and former Prime Minister who polled 13 percent and businessman Cesar Acuna who also obtained 13 percent. Ex-president Alan Garcia gathered 8 percent in the poll as the Peruvian Congress is currently investigating him in relation to the "narcoindultos"- the pardoning of hundreds of drug traffickers who are accused of having paid bribes during Garcia's presidency.²⁸³ All the polls forecast that the election will be decided in a June run-off seeing as no individual candidate is likely to achieve the 50 percent needed to win the first round. According to the poll, Fujimori would be considered as the winner of a 2nd round run-off election against Kuczynski, Acuna or Garcia.²⁸⁴

Peru's economy has delivered impressive levels of growth over the past decade, thanks to the booming commodity prices and rising levels of natural resource exports to China. Peru is also a leading exporter of copper, gold, silver and other metals, however one in three Peruvians still lives on less than US 3\$ a day and has no access to running water.²⁸⁵ In 2016, Peru's economic growth is likely to be affected by weak consumer spending.²⁸⁶

PHILIPPINES - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, MAY 2016

The sixth presidential election since the 1986 revolution that ended the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos will take place on 9 May 2016, when each Filipino will vote for a new president, vice president, 12 senators, one district representative, one party list representative and provincial/city/municipal officials.²⁸⁷ The president will be elected for a period of six years with no reelection as the constitution forbids it.²⁸⁸ The positions of President and Vice President are elected separately and winning candidates may come from different political parties.²⁸⁹

Philippines will use an automated voting technology²⁹⁰ for the third time, which electoral observers have praised because it is faster and provided more credible election results in 2010 and 2013.²⁹¹ However, there are still worries about the reliability of the digital software and the possible manipulation of results based on previous elections.²⁹²

Elections in the Philippines have a long history of violence and corruption. The worst incidence in recent times occurred in 2009, when 58 people mostly followers and family members of gubernatorial candidate Esmel Mangundatu were killed in the Maguindanao massacre to stop the registration of the political candidate.²⁹³

In recent years, under President Benigno Aquino III,

the country's GDP reached the highest levels in four decades. However poverty, corruption and crime remain Philippines biggest challenges. Many believe Aquino has been successful in moving the economy forward but the Philippines still faces unemployment and income inequality issues.²⁹⁴ Aquino has named Manuel "Mar" Roxas II as his successor, however Roxas is not as popular as Aquino's vice president Jejomar Binay. Binay belongs to one of the opposition's political parties and has faced trial for corruption allegations.²⁹⁵ Jejomar Binay was mayor of the city that hosts the country's financial center: Makati City. Binay is in favor of amending the economic provisions of the 1987 Constitution that restricts foreign ownership of land and corporations. Another prominent candidate is Mary "Grace Poe" Llamanzares who was recently disqualified by the electoral commission on December 2015. The commission said that Grace Poe is unable to run for presidency as she is not a "natural born Filipino", since she was abandoned as a baby and then adopted.²⁹⁶ She also fails to satisfy a 10-year residency requirement in the Philippines. She appealed the Comelec's decision at the Supreme Court and the case is currently unfolding.²⁹⁷ Another presidential hopeful, Rodrigo Duterte is gaining support in many regions and among Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW). He claims strong his achievement as an efficient public sector manager as current mayor of Davao.²⁹⁸ This election will be crucial as the next elected government could either maintain or deteriorate the efforts during Aquino's presidency.²⁹⁹

"Ballot Secrecy Folder" (CC BY-NC 2.0) by Daniel Y. Go



**BALLOT SECRECY
FOLDER**



"Kremlin" (CC BY 2.0) by larrywkoester

RUSSIA - PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, SEPTEMBER 2016

Russia's legislative election is due to be held on September 18th 2016, which would be three months earlier than usual.³⁰⁰ The change came after Russia's President Vladimir Putin signed a law that moves the 2016 Parliamentary election from December to September.³⁰¹ Another change includes how the Lower House will be chosen as now it will be directly elected, while previously it was based on how well each party did.³⁰² Government officials and supporters have stated that having Russia's parliamentary, regional and local elections on the same day will ensure that a new Duma is chosen before the budgets are passed in the fall, therefore making more sense to elect new lawmakers beforehand. Supporters have also argued that having the elections on the same day is more efficient.³⁰³

In 2011, the ruling party United Russia won 49 percent of the overall vote, granting it 238 seats in the lower house of the parliament.³⁰⁴ There were allegations of widespread fraud in the parliamentary election, which caused mass protests against voting fraud. More than 50,000 people gathered near the Kremlin to demand a re-run of 34 the parliamentary election.³⁰⁵ This was the biggest anti-government rally in Moscow since the fall of the Soviet Union and has posed the biggest public threat to Vladimir Putin's rule.³⁰⁶

In the 2016 election, 450 seats in the State Duma and the Federation Assembly will be up for grabs. Putin's personal ratings remain high, however some experts predict that the economic crisis might lead to difficulties. Experts suggest there is a serious risk of numerous protests becoming a reality before and after the election in September 2016³⁰⁷ and others are hopeful that 2016 will be an important year for Russia's opposition. In 2015 the opposition decided to unite in order to come with a unified list for the parliamentary election.³⁰⁸ Others believe that the opposition will not be able to mobilize its resources and that the change of date will likely affect the opposition. It is generally harder for political parties to reach voters during August, which happens to be the most popular vacation month in Russia.³⁰⁹

As happened for the last contests, the international community will closely scrutinize the forthcoming elections in Russia. The country faces serious allegations of widespread and endemic corruption at all levels of the political structure and administration. Furthermore, Russia has been constantly in the media spotlight over the past months for its increasing strategic role in Middle East (and especially in the war against Islamic State in Syria)³¹⁰, and for President Putin's alleged involvement in the murder of former KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006.³¹¹



"Korea_President_Park_Poland_President_Ko" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by KOREA.NET - Official page of the Republic of Korea

SOUTH KOREA – LEGISLATIVE ELECTION, APRIL 2016

The next legislative election in South Korea is set for 13 April 2016 and the conservative government of President Park Geun-hye could increase its majority.³¹² Since the election of Park in 2013, some commentators have criticized over the state of South Korean democracy because of government crackdowns on peaceful political protests³¹³, interference in the election process by the National Intelligence Service (NIS)³¹⁴, increased prosecution of critical journalists³¹⁵, an academic being charged with defamation³¹⁶, and the banning of the Unified Progressive Party.³¹⁷ The outlawing of the UPP was justified on the basis that the party's political ideology was pro-North Korea and therefore posed a threat to the South Korean government.³¹⁸ This was the first case of a political party being banned since democratisation.³¹⁹

President Park's Saenuri Party currently holds 156 of the 300 seats in parliament and is aiming to win 180 at the next election, enough to give it the power to pass laws unilaterally.³²⁰ This prospect is not impossible given that the traditional opposition party (formerly New Politics Alliance for Democracy)

recently split into the Minjoo Party of Korea and the People's Party, thus reducing the likelihood of a unified campaign that could challenge the government.³²¹ The unicameral South Korean Parliament is elected with a mixed system with 246 single member constituencies.³²² The remaining 54 MPs are elected via proportional representation through a closed list.³²³

The overall state of democracy and electoral integrity in South Korea is still held in high regard.³²⁴ Instances of state organs meddling in the election process, however, such as the NIS's dissemination of thousands of anti-opposition and pro-government propaganda messages in the lead-up to the 2012 elections, have undermined confidence in the neutrality of state government agencies.³²⁵ The jailing of Japanese reporter Tatsuya Kato, for allegedly defaming the president, has also lowered South Korea's standing in terms of freedom of expression.³²⁶ For these reasons it will be interesting to observe the conduct of the government and state organizations during the campaign period, and the reaction of the South Korean people when the time comes to vote.

SYRIA – PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, MAY 2016

More than 250,000 people have died in almost five years of civil war armed conflict in Syria, which has destabilized the Middle East and has forced more than 11 million of Syrians away from their homes.³²⁸ The conflict, which began as an anti-government protest in 2011, has also facilitated the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in the country.³²⁹

In 2014, the Syrian presidential election saw Bashar al-Assad win by a landslide victory with 88.7 percent of the vote³³⁰, which allows Assad to be Syria's president until 2021. Opponents of the Assad regime demised the 35 elections as fraudulent, as voting did not take place in areas controlled by the opposition, effectively excluding millions of voters.³³¹ In October, 2015 Assad stated that he was willing to run in an early presidential election and parliamentary elections, as well as discuss

constitutional changes, but only if terrorist groups were defeated before holding the elections.³³²

Since February 2016, the UN opened Syria peace talks in Geneva, with the purpose to end the Syrian conflict. The talks are part of a UN –backed up plan agreed in 2015 in Vienna that envisages negotiations to have a transitional government, a new constitution and elections within the next 18 months. However, representatives of the opposition have not attended the negotiations in Vienna, as there has not been an agreement reached in regards to aid entering towns surrounded by armed forces.³³³ The absence of key opposition members threatens to resolve the civil war, a conflict that has been ravaging the country for nearly five years.

The Syrian parliament four-year term is due to expire in May 2016.³³⁴ However, the precise date of the parliamentary election is yet to be confirmed.³³⁵

"Syria - Lest we forget massacre that hap" (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by Metrix X



UNITED STATES - PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 2016

After eight years in the Oval Office, President Barack Obama will step down. With election day set for November 8, candidates face a long slog before the culmination of the electoral process. Elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate will also be held on November 8 2016, along with gubernatorial elections. In the Democratic primaries, former First Lady and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton faced independent senator from Vermont, Bernie Sanders. On the Republican side, the front-runners are Florida senator Marco Rubio, Texas senator Ted Cruz, and celebrity business figure Donald Trump, who has been leading the polls.³²⁷

So far, and just before Super Tuesday, Hillary Clinton has secured victory in the states of South Carolina, Nevada and Iowa. Sanders obtained a majority in New Hampshire, which neighbors his home state of Vermont. In the Republican side, Donald Trump emerged victorious in Nevada, New Hampshire, South Carolina. Iowa was won by Ted Cruz.³²⁸

Campaign finance experts predicted that this could be the most expensive election in history. Spending is estimated to reach as much as \$5 billion, more than double the amount spent on 2012's campaigns.³²⁹ And this trend is unlikely to reverse anytime soon, especially given the major decisions by the Supreme Court deregulating campaign funding.³³⁰

"Corn Poll - 32/52" (CC BY 2.0) by Phil Roeder





"white house" (CC BY-SA 2.0) by ThatMattWade

The liberalization of campaign spending and the increased importance of “third-party advertising” (e.g., super PACS) is furthermore likely to increase the use of attack rhetoric and negative advertising³³¹, usually disliked by citizens potentially depressing turnout and trust in political elites.³³²

Some of the biggest issues in the campaign so far have been immigration, with Donald Trump controversially calling for a ban on all Muslims attempting to enter the US³³³, with Hillary Clinton making commitments to new restrictions on gun control,³³⁴ funding the Health Care Act, and the admission of Syrian refugees into the US.³³⁵

When it comes to the quality of previous elections, the US stands out relatively poorly compared with other established democracies. As we discussed in a previous report³³⁶, the 2014 Congressional election raised concerns about electoral laws, voter registration, the process of drawing district boundaries, as well as regulation of campaign finance. The US also suffers from exceptionally partisan and decentralized arrangements for electoral administration. The PEI data show that, comparing with all 180 elections held worldwide between July 2012 and December 2015, the US ranks 60th for the 2012 Presidential election and 65th for the 2014 legislative election. These are the lowest ranks among established Western democracies.

Technical Appendix: Performance indicators, methods and data



Aims: To start to gather new evidence, on 1st July 2012 the project launched an expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity. The design was developed in consultation with Professor Jorgen Elklit (Aarhus University) and Professor Andrew Reynolds (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill). The method of pooling expert knowledge has been used for years for measuring complex issues, such as to assess the risks of building nuclear plants, levels of corruption, and processes of democratization.

Global Coverage: The PEI survey of electoral integrity focuses upon independent nation-states around the world which have held direct (popular) elections for the national parliament or presidential elections. The criteria for inclusion are listed below. The elections analyzed in this report cover the period from 1 July 2012 to 31 December 2015. In total, PEI 4.0 covers 180 elections in 139 nations. For 2015, 54 elections were surveyed in 47 countries.³⁵¹

Criteria for inclusion in the survey	# Definition and source
Total number of independent nation-states	193 Membership of the United Nations
Excluded categories	
Micro-states	12 Population less than 100,000 in 2013, including Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Seychelles, and Tuvalu.
Without de jure direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature	5 Brunei Darussalam, China, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia
State has constitutional provisions for direct (popular) elections for the lower house of the national legislature, but none have been held since independence or within the last 30 years (de facto)	3 Eritrea, Somalia, and South Sudan
Sub-total of nation-states included in the survey	173 Sub-total of nation-states included in the survey
Covered to date in the PEI 4.0 dataset (from mid-2012 to end-2015)	139 88.4 percent of all the subtotal of nation-states containing 4.62bn people.

Respondents: For each country, the project identified around forty election experts, defined as a political scientist (or other social scientist in a related discipline) who had demonstrated knowledge of the electoral process in a particular country (such as through publications, membership of a relevant research group or network, or university employment). The selection sought a roughly 50:50 balance between international and domestic experts, the latter defined by location or citizenship. Experts were asked to complete an online survey. In total, 2080 completed responses were received in the survey, representing just under one third of the experts that the project contacted (29 percent).

Concepts: The idea of electoral integrity is defined by the project to refer to agreed international conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide through the election cycle, including during the pre-election period, the campaign, on polling day, and its aftermath.³⁵²

Measurement: To measure this concept, the PEI pilot survey questionnaire includes 49 items on electoral integrity (see Table A1) ranging over the whole electoral cycle. These items fell into eleven sequential subdimensions, as shown. Most attention in detecting fraud focuses upon the final stages of the voting process, such as the role of observers in preventing ballot-stuffing, vote-rigging and manipulated results. Drawing upon the notion of a 'menu of manipulation',³⁵³ however, the concept of an electoral cycle suggests that failure in even one step in the sequence, or one link in the chain, can undermine electoral integrity. The list of elections in the survey is presented in Table A2.

The electoral integrity items in the survey were recoded, where a higher score consistently represents a more positive evaluation. Missing data was estimated based on multiple imputation procedures of chained equations in groups

composing of the eleven sub-dimensions. The Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Index is then an additive function of the 49 imputed variables, standardized to 100-points. Sub-indices of the eleven subdimensions in the electoral cycle are summations of the imputed individual variables.³⁵⁴

Validity and reliability tests: The results of the pilot study, from the elections held in 2012, were tested for external validity (with independent sources of evidence), internal validity (consistency within the group of experts), and legitimacy (how far the results can be regarded as authoritative by stakeholders). The analysis, presented elsewhere, demonstrates substantial external validity for the PEI data when compared to many other expert datasets, as well as internal validity across the experts within the survey, and legitimacy as measured by levels of congruence between mass and expert opinions within each country.³⁵⁵

For external validity tests, the PEI Index in the fourth release was confirmed to be significantly correlated with other standard independent indicators contained in the 2015 version of the Quality of Government crossnational dataset, including the combined Freedom House/imputed Polity measure of democratization ($R=.77^{***}$, N125), the Economist Intelligence Unit measure of Electoral Processes and Pluralism ($R=.71^{***}$, N129), and the Cingranelli-Richards measure of Electoral Self-Determination rights ($R=.63^{**}$, N137).³⁵⁶

For internal validity purposes, several tests were run using OLS regression models to predict whether the PEI index varied significantly by several social and demographic characteristics of the experts, including sex, age, education, domestic and international institutional location, and familiarity with the election. In accordance with the findings from the previous versions, domestic experts and those reporting a higher level of familiarity with the

election were significantly more positive in their evaluations, but other social characteristics were not significant predictors of evaluations.

Codebook The PEI-4 Codebook provides detailed description of all variables and imputation procedures. A copy can be downloaded from the project website www.electoralintegrityproject.com

TABLE A1: PEI SURVEY QUESTIONS

	Sections	Performance indicators	Direction
PRE-ELECTION	1. Electoral laws	1-1 Electoral laws were unfair to smaller parties	N
		1-2 Electoral laws favored the governing party or parties	N
		1-3 Election laws restricted citizens' rights	N
	2. Electoral procedures	2-1 Elections were well managed	P
		2-2 Information about voting procedures was widely available	P
2-3 Election officials were fair		P	
2-4 Elections were conducted in accordance with the law		P	
3. Boundaries	3-1 Boundaries discriminated against some parties	N	
	3-2 Boundaries favored incumbents	N	
	3-3 Boundaries were impartial	P	
4. Voter registration	4-1 Some citizens were not listed in the register	N	
	4-2 The electoral register was inaccurate	N	
	4-3 Some ineligible electors were registered	N	
5. Party registration	5-1 Some opposition candidates were prevented from running	N	
	5-2 Women had equal opportunities to run for office	P	
	5-3 Ethnic and national minorities had equal opportunities to run for office	P	
	5-4 Only top party leaders selected candidates	N	
	5-5 Some parties/candidates were restricted from holding campaign rallies	N	
CAMPAIGN	6. Campaign media	6-1 Newspapers provided balanced election news	P
		6-2 TV news favored the governing party	N
		6-3 Parties/candidates had fair access to political broadcasts and advertising	P
		6-4 Journalists provided fair coverage of the elections	P
		6-5 Social media were used to expose electoral fraud	P
	7. Campaign finance	7-1 Parties/candidates had equitable access to public subsidies	P
		7-2 Parties/candidates had equitable access to political donations	P
		7-3 Parties/candidates publish transparent financial accounts	P
		7-4 Rich people buy elections	N
		7-5 Some states resources were improperly used for campaigning	N

	Sections	Performance indicators	Direction
ELECTION DAY	8. Voting process	8-1 Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls	N
		8-2 Some fraudulent votes were cast	N
		8-3 The process of voting was easy	P
		8-4 Voters were offered a genuine choice at the ballot box	P
		8-5 Postal ballots were available	P
		8-6 Special voting facilities were available for the disabled	P
		8-7 National citizens living abroad could vote	P
		8-8 Some form of internet voting was available	P
POST-ELECTION	9. Vote count	9-1 Ballot boxes were secure	P
		9-2 The results were announced without undue delay	P
		9-3 Votes were counted fairly	P
		9-4 International election monitors were restricted	N
		9-5 Domestic election monitors were restricted	N
	10. Post-election	10-1 Parties/candidates challenged the results	N
		10-2 The election led to peaceful protests	N
		10-3 The election triggered violent protests	N
		10-4 Any disputes were resolved through legal channels	P
	11. Electoral authorities	11-1 The election authorities were impartial	P
		11-2 The authorities distributed information to citizens	P
		11-3 The authorities allowed public scrutiny of their performance	P
11-4 The election authorities performed well		P	

Note: Direction of the original items P=positive, N=negative.

Source: Pippa Norris, Ferran Martínez i Coma, Max Grömping, and Alessandro Nai.
The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity: www.electoralintegrityproject.com.

TABLE A2: PEI INDEX SCORES BY ELECTION,
INCLUDING CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

Election code	Election date	PEI index	PEI Index, low CI	PEI Index, high CI	PEI experts invited	PEI expert responses	PEI response rate
AFG_14062014_P2	14/06/14	33	29	37	42	6	14%
AGO_31082012_L1	31/08/12	35	28	42	37	11	30%
ALB_23062013_L1	23/06/13	54	51	58	81	19	23%
ARG_22112015_L1	22/11/15	63	60	66	45	21	47%
ARG_27102013_L1	27/10/13	66	63	68	46	16	35%
ARM_18022013_P1	18/02/13	43	37	50	34	11	32%
AUS_07092013_L1	07/09/13	70	66	74	42	16	38%
AUT_29092013_L1	29/09/13	77	73	81	35	16	46%
AZE_01112015_L1	01/11/15	29	28	31	40	7	18%
AZE_09102013_P1	09/10/13	41	36	46	36	10	28%
BDI_21072015_P1	21/07/15	22	18	25	44	3	7%
BDI_29062015_L1	29/06/15	27	22	32	41	8	20%
BEL_25052014_L1	25/05/14	71	67	76	38	12	32%
BEN_26042015_L1	26/04/15	69	62	76	35	4	11%
BFA_02122012_L1	02/12/12	41	40	43	38	3	8%
BFA_29112015_P2	29/11/15	65	62	68	39	9	23%
BGD_05012014_L1	05/01/14	38	32	45	33	16	48%
BGR_05102014_L1	05/10/14	63	56	70	40	12	30%
BGR_12052013_L1	12/05/13	50	45	55	39	20	51%
BHR_29112014_L2	29/11/14	38	29	47	36	6	17%
BIH_12102014_P1	12/10/14	52	46	58	40	9	23%
BLR_11102015_P1	11/10/15	41	35	46	41	11	27%
BLR_23092012_L1	23/09/12	32	27	37	40	7	18%
BLZ_04112015_L1	04/11/15	53	45	62	38	8	21%
BOL_12102014_P1	12/10/14	56	51	60	40	11	28%
BRA_26102014_P2	26/10/14	68	65	71	38	13	34%
BRB_21022013_L1	21/02/13	62	48	77	39	3	8%
BTN_13072013_L2	13/07/13	61	54	67	37	11	30%
BWA_24102014_L1	24/10/14	58	53	63	38	15	39%
CAN_19102015_L1	19/10/15	75	71	78	40	24	60%
CHE_18102015_L1	18/10/15	79	76	81	37	20	54%
CHL_15122013_P2	15/12/13	66	64	69	44	19	43%
CIV_25102015_P1	25/10/15	59	53	64	33	8	24%
CMR_30092013_L1	30/09/13	46	34	58	34	6	18%
COG_05082012_L2	05/08/12	31	19	44	34	3	9%
COL_09032014_L1	09/03/14	61	57	65	36	8	22%
COL_15062014_P2	15/06/14	58	56	60	42	7	17%
COM_22022015_L2	22/02/15	50	40	59	39	5	13%
CRI_06042014_P2	06/04/14	80	76	85	39	8	21%
CUB_03022013_L1	03/02/13	56	32	81	38	3	8%
CYP_24022013_P2	24/02/13	73	69	77	38	14	37%
CZE_13102012_S1	13/10/12	76	73	79	38	22	58%
CZE_25012013_P2	25/01/13	74	71	78	40	19	48%
CZE_25102013_L1	25/10/13	77	75	79	42	31	74%
DEU_22092013_L1	22/09/13	80	77	84	42	27	64%
DJI_22022013_L1	22/02/13	25	18	32	37	5	14%
DNK_18062015_L1	18/06/15	86	84	89	37	18	49%
DZA_17042014_P1	17/04/14	43	36	50	35	8	23%
ECU_17022013_P1	17/02/13	55	49	60	37	13	35%
EGY_02122015_L1	02/12/15	45	38	53	44	6	14%
EGY_26052014_P1	26/05/14	40	33	46	39	6	15%
ESP_20122015_L1	20/12/15	69	66	71	42	25	60%
EST_01032015_L1	01/03/15	79	75	82	36	18	50%
ETH_24052015_L1	24/05/15	22	18	27	47	19	40%
FIN_19042015_L1	19/04/15	86	84	88	38	16	42%

Election code	Election date	PEI index	PEI Index, low CI	PEI Index, high CI	PEI experts invited	PEI expert responses	PEI response rate
FJI_17092014_L1	17/09/14	53	48	59	40	17	43%
FSM_03032015_L1	03/03/15	60	57	63	40	4	10%
FSM_05032013_L1	05/03/13	63	59	66	40	4	10%
GBR_07052015_L1	07/05/15	65	60	70	36	10	28%
GEO_01102012_L1	01/10/12	54	48	59	48	8	17%
GEO_27102013_P1	27/10/13	64	61	68	44	9	20%
GHA_07122012_P1	07/12/12	57	52	62	35	14	40%
GIN_11102015_P1	11/10/15	41	34	48	38	8	21%
GIN_28092013_L1	28/09/13	43	35	52	36	4	11%
GNB_18052014_P2	18/05/14	54	49	60	42	8	19%
GNQ_26052013_L1	26/05/13	23	17	30	40	10	25%
GRC_20092015_L1	20/09/15	62	58	66	40	19	48%
GRC_25012015_L1	25/01/15	71	67	75	42	14	33%
GRD_19022013_L1	19/02/13	66	61	72	37	6	16%
GTM_25102015_P2	25/10/15	48	42	54	45	9	20%
GUY_11052015_L1	11/05/15	53	47	58	40	7	18%
HND_24112013_P1	24/11/13	45	32	59	37	5	14%
HRV_08112015_L1	08/11/15	68	63	73	37	12	32%
HRV_11012015_P2	11/01/15	65	58	72	40	7	18%
HTI_25102015_L2	25/10/15	28	25	31	45	7	16%
HUN_06042014_L1	06/04/14	56	51	61	36	16	44%
IDN_09042014_L1	09/04/14	53	48	59	36	14	39%
IDN_09072014_P1	09/07/14	60	56	64	40	12	30%
IND_12052014_L1	12/05/14	59	55	63	40	12	30%
IRN_14062013_P1	14/06/13	54	47	62	37	9	24%
IRQ_30042014_L1	30/04/14	44	40	48	37	9	24%
ISL_27042013_L1	27/04/13	78	74	83	36	16	44%
ISR_17032015_L1	17/03/15	72	68	77	43	14	33%
ISR_22012013_L1	22/01/13	74	68	81	38	12	32%
ITA_24022013_L1	24/02/13	67	64	69	41	18	44%
JOR_23012013_L1	23/01/13	46	41	51	35	12	34%
JPN_14122014_L1	14/12/14	71	65	76	38	12	32%
JPN_16122012_L1	16/12/12	67	63	72	40	15	38%
JPN_21072013_L1	21/07/13	67	61	72	39	12	31%
KAZ_26042015_P1	26/04/15	43	39	47	38	9	24%
KEN_04032013_P1	04/03/13	41	35	47	38	9	24%
KGZ_04102015_L1	04/10/15	54	47	61	40	7	18%
KHM_28072013_L1	28/07/13	32	26	38	38	15	39%
KOR_19122012_P1	19/12/12	77	74	80	34	8	24%
KWT_01122012_L1	01/12/12	51	45	56	37	9	24%
KWT_27072013_L1	27/07/13	59	53	64	38	6	16%
LKA_08012015_P1	08/01/15	51	44	57	42	10	24%
LKA_17082015_L1	17/08/15	53	50	55	33	6	18%
LSO_28022015_L1	28/02/15	63	57	69	38	11	29%
LTU_25052014_P2	25/05/14	82	78	86	42	8	19%
LTU_28102012_L2	28/10/12	73	69	76	36	11	31%
LVA_04102014_L1	04/10/14	72	68	75	40	16	40%
MDA_30112014_L1	30/11/14	57	52	62	36	9	25%
MDG_20122013_P2	20/12/13	40	36	43	43	16	37%
MDV_16112013_P2	16/11/13	54	42	67	36	5	14%
MDV_22032014_L1	22/03/14	59	52	67	37	5	14%
MEX_01072012_P1	01/07/12	62	57	68	40	14	35%
MEX_07062015_L1	07/06/15	52	47	58	45	22	49%
MKD_27042014_P2	27/04/14	48	39	57	32	9	28%
MLI_11082013_P2	11/08/13	53	47	58	41	11	27%
MLT_09032013_L1	09/03/13	66	62	69	32	10	31%
MMR_08112015_L1	08/11/15	54	50	58	39	16	41%
MNE_07042013_P1	07/04/13	38	31	46	35	7	20%

Election code	Election date	PEI index	PEI Index, low CI	PEI Index, high CI	PEI experts invited	PEI expert responses	PEI response rate
MNE_14102012_L1	14/10/12	61	47	75	35	3	9%
MNG_26062013_P1	26/06/13	64	58	71	36	9	25%
MOZ_15102014_P1	15/10/14	35	30	39	40	8	20%
MRT_21062014_P1	21/06/14	46	21	71	40	3	8%
MRT_21122013_L2	21/12/13	41	34	49	36	2	6%
MUS_10122014_L1	10/12/14	64	61	67	37	10	27%
MWI_20052014_P1	20/05/14	48	44	51	40	15	38%
MYS_05052013_L1	05/05/13	36	31	40	40	17	43%
NAM_28112014_P1	28/11/14	60	55	65	37	7	19%
NGA_28032015_L1	28/03/15	53	49	57	42	18	43%
NLD_12092012_L1	12/09/12	79	76	81	43	24	56%
NOR_09092013_L1	09/09/13	83	79	87	42	13	31%
NPL_19112013_L1	19/11/13	54	47	60	35	18	51%
NZL_20092014_L1	20/09/14	75	71	79	39	13	33%
OMN_25102015_L1	25/10/15	61	56	66	36	12	33%
PAK_11052013_L1	11/05/13	50	47	53	126	36	29%
PAN_04052014_P1	04/05/14	61	56	65	40	8	20%
PHL_13052013_L1	13/05/13	48	43	53	38	14	37%
POL_24052015_P2	24/05/15	74	70	78	37	16	43%
POL_25102015_L1	25/10/15	75	71	79	37	15	41%
PRT_04102015_L1	04/10/15	72	68	76	40	19	48%
PRY_21042013_P1	21/04/13	55	50	60	35	12	34%
ROU_09122012_L1	09/12/12	48	42	55	39	13	33%
ROU_16112014_P2	16/11/14	53	49	58	36	18	50%
RWA_16092013_L1	16/09/13	64	52	75	37	7	19%
SDN_13042015_P1	13/04/15	43	33	54	39	10	26%
SGP_11092015_L1	11/09/15	53	45	60	41	14	34%
SLB_19112014_L1	19/11/14	57	54	60	40	8	20%
SLE_17112012_P1	17/11/12	56	54	59	34	2	6%
SLV_01032015_L1	01/03/15	49	44	54	41	9	22%
SLV_09032014_P2	09/03/14	59	55	63	38	14	37%
SRB_16032014_L1	16/03/14	58	52	63	40	13	33%
STP_12102014_L1	12/10/14	58	52	65	38	5	13%
SUR_25052015_L1	25/05/15	51	47	55	40	13	33%
SVK_29032014_P2	29/03/14	74	70	78	38	12	32%
SVN_02122012_P2	02/12/12	75	68	81	37	11	30%
SVN_13072014_L1	13/07/14	79	73	84	40	7	18%
SWE_14092014_L1	14/09/14	81	78	84	40	21	53%
SWZ_20092013_L1	20/09/13	45	29	61	38	7	18%
SYR_03062014_P1	03/06/14	27	24	31	42	8	19%
TGO_25042015_P1	25/04/15	38	29	46	38	6	16%
TGO_25072013_L1	25/07/13	38	32	43	36	4	11%
THA_02022014_L1	02/02/14	51	46	56	40	15	38%
TJK_01032015_L1	01/03/15	36	31	40	42	8	19%
TJK_06112013_P1	06/11/13	37	31	43	34	8	24%
TKM_15122013_L1	15/12/13	38	28	48	41	8	20%
TON_27112014_L1	27/11/14	68	60	75	31	4	13%
TUN_21122014_P2	21/12/14	69	64	74	39	4	10%
TUN_26102014_L1	26/10/14	65	62	69	38	13	34%
TUR_01112015_L1	01/11/15	45	40	49	41	20	49%
TUR_07062015_L1	07/06/15	47	41	53	40	12	30%
TUR_10082014_P1	10/08/14	51	46	57	45	12	27%
TZA_25102015_P1	25/10/15	43	40	47	37	14	38%
UKR_25052014_P1	25/05/14	60	54	66	40	13	33%
UKR_26102014_L1	26/10/14	54	48	60	40	13	33%
UKR_28102012_L1	28/10/12	40	37	42	33	14	42%
URY_30112014_P2	30/11/14	75	73	78	38	16	42%
USA_04112014_L1	04/11/14	62	58	65	37	9	24%

Election code	Election date	PEI index	PEI Index, low CI	PEI Index, high CI	PEI experts invited	PEI expert responses	PEI response rate
USA_06112012_P1	06/11/12	63	59	67	38	15	39%
UZB_04012015_L2	04/01/15	39	33	45	40	5	13%
UZB_29032015_P1	29/03/15	40	28	51	44	12	27%
VEN_06122015_L1	06/12/15	42	36	48	46	22	48%
VEN_07102012_P1	07/10/12	54	45	63	38	11	29%
VEN_14042013_P1	14/04/13	40	30	49	38	14	37%
ZAF_07052014_L1	07/05/14	63	60	67	39	16	41%
ZMB_20012015_P1	20/01/15	44	39	48	38	9	24%
ZWE_31072013_L1	31/07/13	35	27	43	33	13	39%

Note: Values for the PEI scores are the imputed values (see the codebook).
Mean with 95% confidence intervals (2-tailed)

TABLE A3: ELECTIONS SURVEYED IN 2015

Country	Office	Election code	PEI Index
Denmark	Legislative	DNK_18062015_L1	86
Finland	Legislative	FIN_19042015_L1	86
Estonia	Legislative	EST_01032015_L1	79
Switzerland	Legislative	CHE_18102015_L1	79
Poland	Legislative	POL_25102015_L1	75
Canada	Legislative	CAN_19102015_L1	75
Poland	Presidential	POL_24052015_P2	74
Israel	Legislative	ISR_17032015_L1	72
Portugal	Legislative	PRT_04102015_L1	72
Greece	Legislative	GRC_25012015_L1	71
Benin	Legislative	BEN_26042015_L1	69
Spain	Legislative	ESP_20122015_L1	69
Croatia	Legislative	HRV_08112015_L1	68
Burkina Faso	Presidential	BFA_29112015_P2	65
Croatia	Presidential	HRV_11012015_P2	65
United Kingdom	Legislative	GBR_07052015_L1	65
Argentina	Legislative	ARG_22112015_L1	63
Lesotho	Legislative	LSO_28022015_L1	63
Greece	Legislative	GRC_20092015_L1	62
Oman	Legislative	OMN_25102015_L1	61
Micronesia	Legislative	FSM_03032015_L1	60
Cote d'Ivoire	Presidential	CIV_25102015_P1	59
Myanmar	Legislative	MMR_08112015_L1	54
Kyrgyzstan	Legislative	KGZ_04102015_L1	54
Belize	Legislative	BLZ_04112015_L1	53
Nigeria	Legislative	NGA_28032015_L1	53
Guyana	Legislative	GUY_11052015_L1	53
Singapore	Legislative	SGP_11092015_L1	53
Sri Lanka	Legislative	LKA_17082015_L1	53
Mexico	Legislative	MEX_07062015_L1	52
Suriname	Legislative	SUR_25052015_L1	51
Sri Lanka	Presidential	LKA_08012015_P1	51
Comoros	Legislative	COM_22022015_L2	50
El Salvador	Legislative	SLV_01032015_L1	49
Guatemala	Presidential	GTM_25102015_P2	48
Turkey	Legislative	TUR_07062015_L1	47
Egypt	Legislative	EGY_02122015_L1	45
Turkey	Presidential	TUR_01112015_L1	45
Zambia	Presidential	ZMB_20012015_P1	44
Tanzania	Presidential	TZA_25102015_P1	43
Sudan	Presidential	SDN_13042015_P1	43
Kazakhstan	Presidential	KAZ_26042015_P1	43
Venezuela	Legislative	VEN_06122015_L1	42
Guinea	Presidential	GIN_11102015_P1	41
Belarus	Presidential	BLR_11102015_P1	41
Uzbekistan	Presidential	UZB_29032015_P1	40
Uzbekistan	Legislative	UZB_04012015_L2	39
Togo	Presidential	TGO_25042015_P1	38
Tajikistan	Legislative	TJK_01032015_L1	36
Azerbaijan	Legislative	AZE_01112015_L1	29
Haiti	Legislative	HTI_25102015_L2	28
Burundi	Legislative	BDI_29062015_L1	27
Ethiopia	Legislative	ETH_24052015_L1	22
Burundi	Presidential	BDI_21072015_P1	22



TABLE A4: PEI SCORES FOR ELECTIONS BY ALL STAGES OF THE ELECTORAL CYCLE

Rank	Country	Election date	Off.	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral proced.	District bound.	Voter registr.	P & C registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
1	Denmark	18/6/2015	Leg	86	91	98	83	94	90	72	73	79	97	94	93
2	Finland	19/4/2015	Leg	86	80	98	71	95	93	70	70	83	99	96	96
3	Norway	9/9/2013	Leg	83	80	92	68	87	84	68	73	81	97	93	91
4	Lithuania	25/5/2014	Pres	82	92	91	71	76	85	67	74	79	94	91	86
5	Sweden	14/9/2014	Leg	81	79	90	78	89	80	61	66	80	93	88	94
6	Costa Rica	6/4/2014	Pres	80	80	97	58	76	79	56	64	82	99	94	97
7	Germany	22/9/2013	Leg	80	77	89	74	82	83	67	70	78	94	88	84
8	Slovenia	13/7/2014	Leg	79	78	78	67	93	77	68	69	80	94	76	87
9	Estonia	1/3/2015	Leg	79	75	84	67	88	76	68	58	89	87	86	82
10	Netherlands	12/9/2012	Leg	79	91	91	68	85	78	61	62	76	87	89	88
11	Switzerland	18/10/2015	Leg	79	77	89	71	89	81	63	41	82	93	93	91
12	Iceland	27/4/2013	Leg	78	70	94	58	88	81	65	60	82	91	87	83
13	Czech Republic	25/10/2013	Leg	77	85	90	73	87	77	58	55	72	93	89	87
14	Austria	29/9/2013	Leg	77	78	90	73	84	69	59	55	80	91	85	89
15	Rep. of Korea	19/12/2012	Pres	77	59	88	70	89	76	57	64	78	95	85	83
16	Czech Republic	13/10/2012	Leg	76	77	91	66	84	74	59	65	68	93	86	85
17	New Zealand	20/9/2014	Leg	75	71	95	65	55	83	55	55	79	87	89	88
18	Uruguay	30/11/2014	Pres	75	91	94	71	79	72	65	58	56	92	94	84
19	Poland	25/10/2015	Leg	75	79	87	77	78	74	51	63	74	87	85	82
20	Canada	19/10/2015	Leg	75	51	90	78	56	73	62	68	73	89	86	89
21	Slovenia	2/12/2012	Pres	75	69	88	62	88	70	50	57	80	92	80	86
22	Slovakia	29/3/2014	Pres	74	72	83	66	75	87	63	55	65	92	85	82
23	Israel	22/1/2013	Leg	74	79	94	62	78	75	66	62	56	89	86	89
24	Czech Republic	25/1/2013	Pres	74	80	75	73	92	82	53	57	68	92	80	77

Rank	Country	Election date	Off.	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral proced.	District bound.	Voter registr.	P & C registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
25	Poland	24/4/2015	Pres	74	79	82	69	77	77	56	61	75	83	80	80
26	Cyprus	24/2/2013	Pres	73	83	87	65	75	71	57	51	71	87	88	80
27	Lithuania	28/10/2012	Leg	73	86	69	74	76	85	64	55	69	85	70	72
28	Israel	17/3/2015	Leg	72	74	89	61	79	77	50	61	58	92	88	84
29	Portugal	4/10/2015	Leg	72	71	85	65	46	72	58	59	73	90	84	80
30	Latvia	4/10/2014	Leg	72	72	83	70	67	72	60	56	69	88	77	78
31	Belgium	25/5/2014	Leg	71	66	81	60	76	73	64	64	67	79	79	77
32	Greece	25/1/2015	Leg	71	48	93	57	78	71	54	50	64	91	90	87
33	Japan	14/12/2014	Leg	71	67	86	53	77	75	57	63	64	77	86	78
34	Australia	7/9/2013	Leg	70	65	89	68	59	70	47	56	72	81	75	88
35	Tunisia	21/12/2014	Pres	69	78	86	75	54	75	53	47	67	86	62	86
36	Benin	26/4/2015	Leg	69	83	77	71	52	65	70	40	60	85	80	88
37	Spain	20/12/2015	Leg	69	37	83	54	76	73	48	52	66	91	93	82
38	Croatia	8/11/2015	Leg	68	60	80	55	57	68	53	58	63	88	87	77
39	Brazil	26/10/2014	Pres	68	74	87	69	75	62	48	38	66	91	64	82
40	Tonga	27/11/2014	Leg	68	73	67	72	58	75	56	47	69	85	64	78
41	Japan	16/12/2012	Leg	67	53	83	53	75	63	59	58	66	81	77	71
42	Japan	21/7/2013	Leg	67	51	89	46	71	66	50	54	66	86	76	74
43	Italy	24/2/2013	Leg	67	44	86	65	75	66	53	49	64	80	76	79
44	Chile	15/12/2013	Pres	66	54	89	54	54	65	53	48	53	89	90	88
45	Grenada	19/2/2013	Leg	66	63	93	54	55	80	41	22	58	92	93	88
46	Argentina	27/10/2013	Leg	66	70	83	60	65	70	55	41	62	78	77	69
47	Malta	9/3/2013	Leg	66	51	86	54	64	68	45	39	65	90	80	78
48	Tunisia	26/10/2014	Leg	65	75	75	66	44	73	59	45	59	79	81	70

Rank	Country	Election date	Off.	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral proced.	District bound.	Voter registr.	P & C registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
49	Burkina Faso	29/11/2015	Pres	65	74	86	65	51	53	67	44	46	85	81	83
50	Croatia	11/1/2015	Pres	65	64	77	51	55	64	47	60	63	80	79	72
51	United Kingdom	7/5/2015	Leg	65	37	85	43	62	65	39	57	71	85	73	79
52	Mongolia	26/6/2013	Pres	64	56	78	64	62	65	48	46	65	84	69	71
53	Georgia	27/10/2013	Pres	64	76	72	56	59	56	57	51	59	82	77	71
54	Mauritius	10/12/2014	Leg	64	64	90	52	72	60	47	32	58	87	77	78
55	Rwanda	16/9/2013	Leg	64	62	71	59	73	61	54	58	60	71	77	65
56	South Africa	7/5/2014	Leg	63	73	78	68	51	60	56	36	62	76	72	71
57	Argentina	22/11/2015	Leg	63	68	74	55	65	71	55	35	61	70	75	66
58	Lesotho	28/2/2015	Leg	63	80	82	70	48	59	47	38	55	78	76	77
59	Micronesia	5/3/2013	Leg	63	66	70	72	43	75	62	37	61	70	68	67
60	United States	6/11/2012	Pres	63	38	70	16	40	74	64	43	68	85	84	75
61	Bulgaria	5/10/2014	Leg	63	76	65	67	49	66	50	40	60	81	72	71
62	Barbados	21/2/2013	Leg	62	67	69	63	59	57	62	29	56	83	79	73
63	Mexico	1/7/2012	Pres	62	58	75	68	76	59	56	44	58	85	48	67
64	Greece	20/9/2015	Leg	62	44	88	50	57	59	47	39	56	84	85	75
65	United States	4/11/2014	Leg	62	31	75	11	35	80	69	47	67	76	77	72
66	Colombia	9/3/2014	Leg	61	67	71	68	48	72	57	42	41	79	71	77
67	Montenegro	14/10/2012	Leg	61	81	71	61	46	64	59	23	54	87	79	60
68	Oman	25/10/2015	Leg	61	52	79	51	59	58	55	41	62	74	79	59
69	Bhutan	13/9/2013	Leg	61	52	75	59	46	45	67	55	57	66	69	74
70	Panama	4/5/2014	Pres	61	55	78	55	65	64	54	24	63	75	64	71
71	Namibia	28/11/2014	Pres	60	67	62	70	53	70	52	34	56	64	80	68
72	Micronesia	3/3/2015	Leg	60	64	71	59	46	61	56	33	64	71	67	68

Rank	Country	Election date	Off.	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral proced.	District bound.	Voter registr.	P & C registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
73	Indonesia	9/7/2014	Pres	60	64	68	62	44	68	54	43	61	74	50	72
74	Ukraine	25/5/2014	Pres	60	70	70	57	41	63	57	41	50	70	78	71
75	Maldives	22/3/2014	Leg	59	60	75	47	49	57	58	48	60	63	76	56
76	El Salvador	9/3/2014	Pres	59	60	80	61	47	60	44	34	61	85	43	74
77	India	12/5/2014	Leg	59	72	72	58	40	57	55	32	54	72	67	76
78	Cote d'Ivoire	25/10/2015	Pres	59	68	73	41	57	67	46	33	53	77	71	64
79	Kuwait	27/7/2013	Leg	59	47	80	50	54	71	53	33	52	73	63	69
80	Colombia	15/6/2014	Pres	58	60	79	51	36	57	44	34	55	79	75	76
81	Sao Tome & Princ.	12/10/2014	Leg	58	73	80	60	51	68	43	29	45	72	72	72
82	Botswana	24/10/2014	Leg	58	37	83	48	57	67	36	17	61	76	77	74
83	Serbia	16/3/2014	Leg	58	54	74	56	39	57	36	35	57	79	80	68
84	Ghana	7/12/2012	Pres	57	77	62	57	48	73	55	32	48	80	45	61
85	Solomon Islands	19/11/2014	Leg	57	75	67	72	42	59	62	29	41	72	63	68
86	Moldova	30/11/2014	Leg	57	58	64	70	57	46	50	33	58	80	60	58
87	Sierra Leone	17/11/2012	Pres	56	67	79	41	65	63	30	33	55	62	64	72
88	Hungary	6/4/2014	Leg	56	30	70	30	68	58	32	38	65	81	73	58
89	Cuba	3/2/2013	Leg	56	29	77	41	72	60	40	39	52	66	87	56
90	Bolivia	12/10/2014	Pres	56	55	64	54	45	61	54	34	58	62	70	53
91	Paraguay	21/4/2013	Pres	55	63	70	57	45	54	40	25	51	74	79	57
92	Ecuador	17/2/2013	Pres	55	42	65	38	58	57	43	38	63	68	67	52
93	Iran	14/6/2013	Pres	54	34	73	49	63	21	56	45	58	63	80	59
94	Albania	23/6/2013	Leg	54	52	65	59	59	49	47	27	46	76	79	55
95	Guinea-Bissau	18/5/2014	Pres	54	63	67	52	50	55	55	31	50	66	57	59
96	Maldives	16/11/2013	Pres	54	58	64	60	45	61	47	32	53	68	65	48

Rank	Country	Election date	Off.	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral proced.	District bound.	Voter registr.	P & C registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
97	Myanmar	8/11/2015	Leg	54	43	72	54	30	40	49	34	55	74	69	69
98	Kyrgyzstan	4/10/2015	Leg	54	54	64	54	43	43	52	39	53	71	65	59
99	Venezuela	7/10/2012	Pres	54	48	61	51	59	67	29	22	60	69	79	49
100	Ukraine	26/10/2014	Leg	54	59	64	53	45	53	49	35	48	65	66	58
101	Georgia	1/10/2012	Leg	54	55	63	52	44	54	42	27	54	75	69	57
102	Nepal	19/11/2013	Leg	54	73	63	57	45	57	53	37	42	66	46	66
103	Romania	16/11/2014	Pres	53	40	54	55	29	66	40	43	46	80	72	56
104	Fiji	17/9/2014	Leg	53	30	73	50	60	49	37	32	63	65	59	63
105	Belize	4/11/2015	Leg	53	41	64	38	41	60	53	28	52	68	65	67
106	Indonesia	9/4/2014	Leg	53	58	57	65	38	62	53	23	52	63	57	63
107	Nigeria	17/3/2015	Leg	53	75	66	62	42	60	49	20	30	73	67	70
108	Guyana	11/5/2015	Leg	53	43	77	50	61	63	36	30	47	66	44	74
109	Singapore	11/9/2015	Leg	53	27	76	14	77	46	33	35	60	69	75	58
110	Mali	11/8/2013	Pres	53	62	62	50	25	51	53	39	45	69	67	59
111	Sri Lanka	17/8/2015	Leg	53	59	73	46	47	51	41	22	51	74	54	68
112	Bosnia-Herzegov.	12/10/2014	Pres	52	39	68	40	49	42	45	36	51	66	73	66
113	Mexico	7/6/2015	Leg	52	49	66	57	61	47	43	33	44	73	53	62
114	Turkey	10/8/2014	Pres	51	43	62	55	58	51	27	29	53	68	68	53
115	Thailand	2/2/2014	Leg	51	76	43	70	60	54	47	48	49	60	35	35
116	Suriname	25/5/2015	Leg	51	49	66	49	46	62	39	27	48	58	66	54
117	Sri Lanka	8/1/2015	Pres	51	57	68	51	49	46	35	28	46	63	61	67
118	Kuwait	1/12/2012	Leg	51	37	63	36	66	51	53	20	60	75	30	52
119	Bulgaria	12/5/2013	Leg	50	51	52	52	31	63	45	33	53	67	40	54
120	Pakistan	11/5/2013	Leg	50	68	57	50	54	38	59	36	37	62	45	60

Rank	Country	Election date	Off.	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral proced.	District bound.	Voter registr.	P & C registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
121	Comoros	22/2/2015	Leg	50	63	59	46	30	56	51	26	38	67	58	61
122	El Salvador	1/3/2015	Leg	49	53	44	59	52	60	49	37	47	49	54	42
123	Romania	9/12/2012	Leg	48	46	59	39	28	58	32	32	46	67	68	50
124	Philippines	13/5/2013	Leg	48	61	60	50	27	63	51	20	39	60	51	55
125	Guatemala	25/10/2015	Pres	48	46	62	61	32	38	41	20	36	76	63	67
126	Macedonia	27/4/2014	Pres	48	49	56	47	24	57	28	30	51	71	49	54
127	Malawi	20/5/2014	Pres	48	70	49	60	30	69	49	18	42	50	44	55
128	Turkey	7/6/2015	Leg	47	22	68	38	49	48	28	26	46	71	69	52
129	Cameroon	30/9/2013	Leg	46	47	59	38	41	49	39	22	38	67	52	63
130	Mauritania	21/6/2014	Pres	46	53	38	62	25	44	52	37	51	56	35	49
131	Jordan	23/1/2013	Leg	46	30	57	21	44	55	46	28	47	56	46	63
132	Egypt	2/12/2015	Leg	45	26	60	36	48	57	31	25	48	58	58	46
133	Swaziland	20/9/2013	Leg	45	22	64	30	48	32	47	36	45	62	56	49
134	Honduras	24/11/2013	Pres	45	38	51	47	38	60	36	29	46	68	30	46
135	Turkey	1/11/2015	Leg	45	28	60	47	52	43	25	24	44	61	68	45
136	Iraq	30/4/2014	Leg	44	44	53	39	39	45	46	18	48	51	53	46
137	Zambia	20/1/2015	Pres	44	53	54	61	31	48	30	27	32	58	55	50
138	Tanzania	25/10/2015	Pres	43	33	59	43	33	54	43	23	43	56	39	46
139	Armenia	18/2/2013	Pres	43	54	49	51	26	51	50	31	37	60	30	41
140	Guinea	28/9/2013	Leg	43	51	28	39	21	64	55	19	44	56	55	34
141	Sudan	13/4/2015	Pres	43	27	48	41	36	47	36	28	45	56	59	44
142	Kazakhstan	26/4/2015	Pres	43	29	48	42	51	34	27	32	49	58	61	40
143	Algeria	17/4/2014	Pres	43	25	48	42	42	36	44	26	52	59	49	35
144	Venezuela	6/12/2015	Leg	42	33	49	35	43	51	27	23	46	50	64	40

Rank	Country	Election date	Off.	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral proced.	District bound.	Voter registr.	P & C registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
145	Burkina Faso	2/12/2012	Leg	41	53	56	19	44	52	54	8	34	52	40	48
146	Mauritania	21/12/2013	Leg	41	50	56	29	23	40	48	22	39	44	46	56
147	Guinea	11/10/2015	Pres	41	40	46	42	27	47	39	25	38	59	41	45
148	Kenya	4/3/2013	Pres	41	71	31	51	17	57	62	19	33	36	55	27
149	Azerbaijan	9/10/2013	Pres	41	44	37	60	43	42	31	30	42	44	46	40
150	Belarus	11/10/2015	Pres	41	30	41	58	44	43	27	27	49	34	62	33
151	Ukraine	28/10/2012	Leg	40	38	42	47	33	41	39	23	52	39	40	39
152	Venezuela	14/4/2013	Pres	40	33	37	41	43	58	38	25	47	39	38	31
153	Madagascar	20/12/2013	Pres	40	36	41	34	17	48	44	20	36	58	44	49
154	Egypt	26/5/2014	Pres	40	29	50	45	32	23	30	23	49	52	57	41
155	Uzbekistan	29/3/2015	Pres	40	27	50	41	37	30	25	25	44	48	73	36
156	Uzbekistan	4/1/2015	Leg	39	27	54	54	39	32	27	20	44	44	67	24
157	Bangladesh	5/1/2014	Leg	38	42	46	41	45	38	49	23	27	50	40	36
158	Turkmenistan	15/12/2013	Leg	38	21	55	50	41	29	21	24	37	45	74	34
159	Montenegro	7/4/2013	Pres	38	48	46	55	22	56	29	21	43	41	31	27
160	Bahrain	29/11/2014	Leg	38	17	44	21	33	39	35	26	46	53	56	31
161	Togo	25/4/2015	Pres	38	43	43	26	27	51	49	28	36	38	33	32
162	Togo	25/7/2013	Leg	38	25	39	29	19	42	47	26	43	38	40	48
163	Tajikistan	6/11/2013	Pres	37	17	42	46	22	29	32	28	40	48	58	34
164	Tajikistan	1/2/2015	Leg	36	19	47	39	28	27	30	19	40	49	55	37
165	Malaysia	5/5/2013	Leg	36	16	43	10	22	48	22	21	57	44	42	32
166	Zimbabwe	31/7/2013	Leg	35	27	29	31	15	50	33	26	36	46	49	33
167	Angola	31/8/2012	Leg	35	28	37	45	21	46	31	22	36	36	44	35
168	Mozambique	15/10/2014	Pres	35	37	38	43	26	42	33	20	39	32	37	33

Rank	Country	Election date	Off.	PEI index	Electoral laws	Electoral proced.	District bound.	Voter registr.	P & C registr.	Media coverage	Campaign finance	Voting process	Vote count	Results	Electoral authorit.
169	Afghanistan	14/6/2014	Pres	33	49	24	50	20	32	61	24	30	24	26	27
170	Belarus	23/10/2012	Leg	32	15	36	48	45	32	24	22	42	23	52	16
171	Cambodia	28/7/2013	Leg	32	29	37	33	13	38	29	19	35	57	25	28
172	Congo, Rep.	5/8/2012	Leg	31	28	38	42	17	33	27	8	45	27	50	23
173	Azerbaijan	1/11/2015	Leg	29	26	24	29	38	34	16	9	39	36	56	12
174	Haiti	9/8/2015	Leg	28	41	14	45	18	43	55	7	14	38	21	22
175	Syria	3/6/2014	Pres	27	10	29	38	22	18	16	13	29	38	60	27
176	Burundi	29/6/2015	Leg	27	32	17	31	14	39	25	15	28	34	32	24
177	Djibouti	22/2/2013	Leg	25	18	24	48	26	20	26	16	29	23	33	20
178	Equatorial Guinea	26/5/2013	Leg	23	13	23	33	21	29	12	15	23	26	49	13
179	Ethiopia	24/5/2015	Leg	22	12	20	34	31	27	21	18	22	15	40	11
180	Burundi	21/7/2015	Pres	22	25	13	32	19	20	27	7	23	44	15	17

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





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ISBN-13: 978-0-646-95168-3

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This report summarizes the results of the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) expert survey. The report is based on an expert survey to over 2000 election experts in 180 elections for 139 countries from 1 July 2012 until 31 December 2015). This publication is part of the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP), a six-year research project generously funded by the Kathleen Fitzpatrick Australian Laureate awarded to Professor Pippa Norris by the Australian Research Council. Ferran Martínez i Coma is the manager of PEI expert survey, assisted by Max Grömping. Alessandro Nai is EIP Project Manager.

Special thanks go to Lisa Fennis, EIP Project Coordinator, for her invaluable contribution. The expert survey of Perceptions of Electoral Integrity could not have been assembled without the assistance of many research assistants at the University of Sydney, including Linda Palmer, Elena Escalante, David Coombs and Laura Ismay. In constructing the survey, the project also greatly benefitted from discussions with colleagues and visiting EIP fellows and interns in the University of Sydney's Department of Government and International Relations, including Andrea Abel van Es, Jeffrey Karp, Miguel Angel Lara Otaola, Carla Luis, Zaad Mahmood, Armen Mazmanyanyan, Marta Regalia, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Marcus Spittler and Elisabeth Young; from comments by colleagues at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and the Department of Government; from presentations at several international workshops, outreach events, and professional conferences; and from collaboration with Andrew Reynolds (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) and Jorgen Elklit (University of Aarhus). We want to mention the subnational PEI teams in Mexico with Irma Mendez and Nicolas Loza; Russia with Margarita Zavadskaya, Andrey Semenov, Professor Aleksei Gilev, and Dr. Vsevolod Bederson; India, with Lawrence Saez and Zaad Mahmood; and the UK with Alistair Clark and Toby James.

We want to thank the University of Sydney Department of Government and International Relations. We have benefited enormously from interacting, in particular, with Anika Gauja, Graeme Gill, Benjamin Goldsmith, Stewart Jackson, John Keane (and the Sydney Democracy Network), Rodney Smith, David Smith, Simon Tormey (Head of School), Ariadne Vromen, Colin Wight (Department Head) as well as Duncan Ivison, Deputy Vice Chancellor for Research.

We have also interacted and received invaluable feedback and support from practitioners in different venues, conferences, seminars, talks and events. We want to mention, in particular, Betilde Munoz-Pogossian, her successor, Gerardo de Icaza and Sara Nogera, from OAS; Annette Fath-Lihic and Seema Kiran Shah from International IDEA; Chad Vickery and Erica Shein at IFES; David Carroll at the Carter Center; Craig Jenness at USEAD; Niall McCann, Aleida Ferrerya and Lea Zoric at UNDP; Richard Lappin at the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; Uta Staschewski and Wolf Krug, from the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Kenya and South Africa, respectively; Sebastian Brack at the Kofi Annan Foundation; Olufunto Akinduro from EISA; Damaso Magbual from ANFREL and Stefanie Schiffer, from EPDE; Nathaniel Heller and his team at Global Integrity and Lisa Rosenberg and her team at the Sunlight Foundation.

We are also most grateful to all the experts who took time to participate in the survey, without whom this research, simply, would not have been possible.

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ISBN 978-0-646-95168-3



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