The “Narrow Road” and the Ethics of Language Use in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*

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I begin this exploration of characteristically *Iliadic* and *Odyssean* attitudes toward the traditional language in which these poems are composed by treading again a well-rutted path in the field of mid-20th century Homeric studies. In formulating his radical revision of the aesthetics of Homeric poetry, Milman Parry took as one of his guiding principles Heinrich Düntzer’s notion of a contradiction between the compositional utility of the fixed epithet and its semantic value: if an epithet could be shown to have been selected on the basis of its utility in versification—and Parry’s detailed examinations of extensive and economical systems of noun-epithet formulae were aimed in part at demonstrating this point—then it would be proven by that very fact that the epithet’s meaning was irrelevant to its selection.1 Moreover, Parry asserted that the success of poetry composed in such a manner would depend on a corresponding indifference on the part of the audience, an indifference that must be, by his reasoning, categorical and absolute.2

Perhaps no element of Parry’s argumentation encountered so much resistance as this insistence on an absolute insensitivity to the relation between the fixed epithet and its immediate context. It is in fact difficult to imagine that a verbal art of any kind could prove so insensitive to its raw material. Accordingly, there has been no shortage of attempts since Parry to establish the meaningfulness of Homeric epithets, both in themselves and in relation to their contexts.3 The most successful of these attempts confront head-on the compositional factors at the center of Parry’s analysis. Gregory Machacek, for example, points out that,

1. See M. Parry (1971), 124-26, with reference to Düntzer (1872). Parry’s other purpose in describing formulaic systems was to demonstrate that these systems must be traditional.

2. Cf. M. Parry (1971), 141: ‘The truth is that the proofs already given do not allow of any exceptions. They all bear witness to so strong, and so habitual, an indifference in Homer’s audience to any possible particularized meaning [of the “ornamental” or “fixed” epithet] that it could not be overcome, no matter how perfectly matched the idea of the epithet and the meaning of the sentence’. These remarks pertain strictly to the ‘ornamental’ or ‘fixed’ epithet. Parry recognized also the possibility of a ‘particularized’ epithet, but he maintained that an epithet must always be one or the other, and that the distinction, which may be unclear to the modern reader, would have been immediately clear to an ancient audience (M. Parry [1971], 156).
while the choice of a given noun-epithet formula appears, from one point of view, to be determined strictly by the metrical position it occupies, one must always keep in mind that the traditional poet is not simply confronted by a sequence of metrical *sedes* that present themselves independently of his design; through the selection of alternative phrases, he controls where metrical units begin and end.\(^4\) The poet thus has the ability to choose a particular formula by selecting others to accommodate it. Machacek goes on to describe a number of instances in which particular formulas appear to have been selected (or avoided) in order to create a particular effect in context. Nevertheless, he notes, ‘in order to facilitate just a single phrase appropriate to the context in which it appears, the poet might have to sing several lines in which he uses formulas precisely as Parry argued they are always used: without regard to immediate context’.\(^5\) And, while the poet thereby gains a degree of freedom, ‘it must be admitted that that freedom is fairly limited’.\(^6\)

There are, of course, a number of cases in which we observe in the Homeric poems epithets so at odds with their contexts that every critic must accept a certain degree of contextual indifference. Frederick Combellack cited as examples garments that are (`brilliant’) even when they are in need of washing (*Od*. 6.74), and the description of Aphrodite as (`laughter-loving’) even at a moment of distress (*Il*. 5.375).\(^7\) Parry, following Düntzer, drew attention to such examples, but in explaining the manner in which even a modern reader ‘acquires an insensibility to any possible particularized meaning of the epithet’, he stressed much more the many cases—by far the majority—in which the epithet simply has no discernible relation to its context.\(^8\) It is interesting that Parry speaks here of a reader’s understanding: it may be that at this stage in his research his thinking was still too

\(^3\) See, e.g., Vivante (1982) and Sale (1996), who argue that the epithets are meaningful, albeit used most often without any regard for context; and Austin (1975), 11-80, and Sacks (1989), who argue for various kinds of context-sensitivity. Whallon (1961) seeks to demonstrate for various epithets either a general or contextual relevance. More recently, see the discussion of Friedrich (2007), 83-128.

\(^4\) Machacek (1994). See also Visser (1988) and Bakker and Fabb ricotti (1991), who stress the flexibility in versification provided by metrically variable ‘ peripheral’ elements.

\(^5\) Machacek (1994), 329.

\(^6\) Machacek (1994), 333.

\(^7\) Combellack (1982), 361.
much shaped by his experience of Homeric poetry as a written text. One may easily enough imagine how a performer might impress upon his audience the meaningfulness of an epithet they might otherwise be inclined to understand as merely ‘ornamental’. He might, for example, use some special intonation, or manipulation of rhythm or melody, to lay added stress on a word. Albert Lord—who, unlike Parry, was able to make full use of the results of their fieldwork in the former Yugoslavia—recognized that the singers he encountered insisted on the meaningfulness of the epithets they used. He reconciled Parry’s notion of indifference with the singers’ commitment to the meaningfulness of their language as follows:

I am sure that the essential idea of the formula is what is in the mind of the singer, almost as a reflex action in rapid composition, as he makes his song. Hence it could, I believe, be truly stated that the formula not only is stripped to its essential idea in the mind of the composing singer, but also is denied some of the possibilities of aesthetic reference in context... Nevertheless, the tradition, what we might term the intuitions of singers as a group and as individuals who are preserving the inherited stories from the past—the tradition cannot be said to ignore the epithet, to consider it as mere decoration or even to consider it as mere metrical convenience. The tradition feels a sense of meaning in the epithet, and thus a special meaning is imparted to the noun and to the formula. Of course every adjective and epithet can be said to do this, but I am not thinking in this case about the surface denotative meaning of the adjective, but rather of the traditional meaning, and I would even prefer to call it the traditionally intuitive meaning.

Lord’s ‘traditionally intuitive meaning’ is very close to what John Miles Foley referred to as the ‘immanence’ of traditional poetry. It could be said that this kind of meaning is the necessary guarantee that allows the epithet to be used in a wide variety of contexts, sometimes in apparent contradiction with its denotative meaning. On this view, the epithet is a kind of currency, a token that is able to circulate widely and serve in a variety of contexts because its value is guaranteed by the system as a whole.

Studies demonstrating a significant relationship between some Homeric epithets and their contexts, of which Machacek’s is an excellent example, indicate that the traditional language

8 M. Parry (1971), 126-27 (quotation from p. 127); discussion of ‘illogical’ epithets (generally explained by Alexandrian critics in terms of the referent’s qualities ‘in general’ or ‘by nature’ rather than on that particular occasion) on pp. 120-24.

9 For a discussion of ways in which intonation and manipulation of melody and rhythm can contribute to the meaning of performed poetry (in this case, a Bosniac epic song), see Bonifazi and Elmer (2012).


of Homeric poetry can at times exhibit a meaningfulness that exceeds even Lord’s ‘traditionally intuitive meaning’. Such pregnant uses of epithets have the effect of reasserting the fundamental appropriateness of their denotations. To continue the currency metaphor, it is as if the value of the word in question were being confirmed by a reminder that the epithet can ultimately be redeemed for its full semantic content. In a few instances, we also observe the reverse procedure: the meaningfulness of an epithet is underscored by drawing attention to an apparent contradiction between its meaning and the context of its use or potential use. An example occurs in Book 18 of the *Iliad*. Hektor notes that certain epithets of Troy are no longer applicable in the present circumstances:

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Before, all mortal men used to call Priam’s city
‘rich-in-gold, rich-in-bronze’;
but now the beautiful riches of her households have perished,
and many possessions to Phrygia and lovely Maionia
go to be sold, ever since Zeus became hostile.
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(II. 18.288-292)

The phrase singled out by Hektor, the formula , is not used of Troy elsewhere in our *Iliad*. We have no way of knowing whether epic poems unknown to us did in fact use the phrase in reference to Troy, but Hektor represents the formula as being a traditional way of describing the city (note the iterative imperfect ).

His point is that present circumstances have rendered these epithets inappropriate—but not, therefore, invalid or meaningless. On the contrary, from his point of view, Troy’s present situation is an anomaly, an aberration. The inapplicability of these epithets, which designate Troy’s essence (Troy is not Troy without its fabled wealth), is an index of how far out of control things have

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12. The formula occurs only one other time in the Homeric poems: at II. 10.315 it refers (in the nominative) to the Trojan Dolon, whose encounter with Odysseus and Diomedes I discuss below. West (1988), 156, notes that the asyndetic pairing of compound adjectives with the same initial element is a very ancient poetic device (for similar examples in Homer, see II. 5.613 and 9.154 [=9.296]). It is conceivable that Hektor’s remark draws attention to a divergence between the way Troy is described in the *Iliad* and the way the city was described in other traditions.
gotten. Hektor makes this remark while asserting a strategy that, he hopes, will restore Troy to its former prosperity—thereby restoring to Troy’s epithets the plenitude of their meaning.

This example arguably exhibits a greater degree of self-consciousness about the nature of a formulaic style than any pregnant use of an epithet. Hektor’s statement not only stresses the meaningfulness of epithets; it also draws attention to the possibility, inherent in such a style, that discrepancies may arise between traditional language and the context of its use. My discussion will proceed, in the next section, by examining two further cases in the *Iliad* in which such a discrepancy is highlighted. These cases show a number of curious similarities that will prompt me to suggest that there is more at stake here than simply an awareness, on the part of the medium of Homeric poetry, of a problem that has exercised critics from antiquity to the present day (although this awareness is itself worth noting). I will eventually argue that we may observe in the ways in which Homeric poetry resolves this problem—the problem of the occasional discrepancy between a formulaic epithet and its immediate context—important differences between typically Iliadic and Odyssean attitudes toward the language of poetry (and toward language in general), and between the ethical commitments of those two traditions.

**The Narrow Road**

In *Iliad* Book 7, as he chastises the Achaean champions for failing to answer Hektor’s challenge, Nestor recounts the tale of an earlier contest between warriors, one that ought to have ended quite differently, if might alone had been the decisive factor. Embedded in his recollection of his own youthful encounter with the Arcadian Ereuthalion is the story of ‘glorious Areithoos, whom men and beautifully-belted women called by the *epiklesis*’—that is, the ‘epithet’—‘*koruntos* (‘mace-man’):
And Ereuthalion, a godlike man, came forward as their champion, bearing on his shoulders the arms of lord Areithoos, glorious Areithoos, whom men and beautifully-belted women used to call by the *epikl sis* ‘*korunt* s’, because he used to fight not with the bow or the long spear, but with an iron mace he used to break the battle-lines; Lykourgos slew him by stratagem—not at all by might—on a narrow road, where his iron mace helped not to ward off destruction, for Lykourgos first with his spear pierced him through the middle, and he was laid to the ground on his back; and Lykourgos despoiled him of the arms that brazen Ares had given him.

Once again, as in the case of Hektor’s remark about Troy’s vanished wealth, an iterative verb (['they used to call’]) implies that Areithoos’ sobriquet has the status of a formulaic expression. In the words of Gregory Nagy, ‘the poetry is actually referring to an epithet as an epithet’.\(^{13}\) Nestor’s characterization of the word as a conventional expression is to a certain extent confirmed by the poem itself when, at the beginning of Book 7, the narrator mentions ... (*mace-man Areithoos*, 7.9-10).\(^{14}\)

Nestor makes it clear, again by using iterative verbs ( , ), that Areithoos’ often-repeated epithet was motivated by his own repeated behavior: he was called ‘mace-man’ because he habitually fought with a mace. Nestor’s tale, however, highlights the

\(^{13}\) Nagy (1999 [1979]), 329 (§11n1). Note that the juxtaposition of this *epikl sis* with the epithets and nicely illustrates the distinction made by M. Parry (1971), 64, between ‘generic’ and ‘distinctive’ epithets.

\(^{14}\) Note, however, that the phrase is not a true noun-epithet formula, in Parry’s sense, since it extends across the verse-boundary. In spite of the fact that the epithet would seem to indicate that the same Areithoos is meant as the one mentioned later in the book by Nestor, ancient critics disputed whether this was chronologically possible. Various solutions were proposed: see the bT scholia at *Il.* 7.9, the A scholia at *Il.* 7.10, Porph. ad *Il.* 7.9, Eust. *Il.* 2.387.3-6 (van der Valk). There is reason to suspect that Nestor’s apparent reference to an established poetic convention evokes an independent Arcadian epic tradition, possibly centered on the figure of Lykourgos. Pausanias mentions a place called Phoizon on the road from Mantinea to Tegea, which, he tells us, locals consider to be the tomb ( ) of Areithoos (8.11.4; Pausanias clearly has in mind the story as related in the *Iliad*: cf. 8.4.10). Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen (RE, s.v. *Areithoos*) tentatively connected to this monument the Moleia, an Arcadian festival that, according to the scholia to the *Argonautica* of Apollonius of Rhodes (ad 1.164), was held in commemoration of Lykourgos’ slaying of Ereuthalion (either an error for ‘Areithoos’, as according to Hiller von Gaertringen and Carl Wendel, the editor of the scholia, or possibly a ‘genuine variant’, in the words of Nagy (1999 [1979]), 332, §12n14). The wording of the scholion ( ['Lykourgos is honored among the Arcadians’]) suggests that Lykourgos was worshipped as a cult hero. In the view of Scodel (2002), 152, Areithoos ‘is surely objectively traditional’. The Moleia would have provided a suitable context for the preservation of lore, possibly including epic poetry, about his death at the hands of Lykourgos.
The applicability of the epithet in general by exposing its momentary *inapplicability*, that is, by focusing on precisely that moment in Areithoos’ story when his characteristic epithet is contradicted by circumstances. But Areithoos does not for that reason cease to be the ‘mace-man’: on the contrary, the very fact that this seemingly invincible warrior meets his end when he is prevented from wielding his mace demonstrates that he is nothing but a ‘mace-man’. The exception in this case truly proves the rule: by failing to be a *mace-man*, Areithoos makes good his claim to the epithet. The contextual negation of the epithet’s significance confirms its meaningfulness.

It is not simply by accident that Areithoos finds himself disarmed and unable to make use of the prowess his epithet warrants. His adversary, Lykourgos, contrives the situation that leads to his demise. Nestor characterizes Lykourgos’ plan as a matter of *deception*, a signal that we are dealing here with an instance of the familiar Homeric theme of rivalry between a hero of *might* and a hero of *cunning intelligence*, archetypally represented by Akhilleus and Odysseus, respectively. Lykourgos is doubly identified as an exponent of *cunning intelligence*, both by the reference to *lypne* and by his name, which, signifying ‘he who wards off the wolf’, indicates one who possesses an affinity with lupine cunning.

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15. See Nagy (1999 [1979]), 45-49 and *passim*; see pp. 328-32 for discussion of the tale of Areithoos as an example of this theme. It is in fact precisely the presence of the /theme that permits us to understand the reason for the inclusion of the story of Areithoos and Lykourgos, a narrative that may at first appear only loosely connected to the main line of Nestor’s argument. The problem faced by the Achaeans when Hektor makes his challenge is that, in the absence of Akhilleus, they have no champion who can best Hektor purely on the basis of *might*. By beginning his speech with Akhilleus’ father, Peleus, whom he imagines grieving over the lack of an answerer to Hektor’s challenge, Nestor signals, subtly, that his entire speech is framed in terms of this problem. The tale of Areithoos and Ereuthalion suggests that one way of overcoming invincible *might* is by employing *cunning intelligence*. This is in fact precisely the strategy the Achaeans will adopt at the end of the book, when, on Nestor’s advice, they construct their defensive wall: Nestor’s plan is explicitly characterized as a (7.324; cf. Elmer [2013], 116, with n14). Hektor’s challenge, however, is met not by *cunning intelligence*, but by *might* as represented by Ajax, and the contest ends indecisively. We may compare the role of Ajax in Book 15, as analyzed by Petegorsky (1982), 187-88: when a hero to counter Hektor is sought, Ajax enters the battle (aided by the *of Hera’s seduction of Zeus*), but his success is short-lived; he himself recognizes that ‘the best is’, a recognition that points to Akhilleus as the only one capable of opposing Hektor. In glossing *cunning intelligence* as ‘cunning intelligence’, I am drawing on Detienne and Vernant (1991).

16. For the etymology, see Chantraine (2009), s.v. *lypne*. The same association between the wolf and *lypne* is detectable in the name of Odysseus’ grandfather, Autolykos (*lone wolf*), ‘who surpassed all men in trickery and oath-taking [i.e. perjury]’ (Od. 19.395-96), and in the wolf-skin worn by Dolon in the Doloneia (II. 10.334; I discuss this episode more fully below).
Areithoos likewise bears a name—meaning ‘swift with Ares’ or ‘swift in battle’—that, in addition to his characteristic method of fighting, underscores his connection to . Nagy has traced the widespread associations between swiftness and the brute force of ; one need only think of ‘swift-footed Akhilleus’ to grasp how fundamental this association is to the *Iliad*’s thematic matrix. Areithoos, the hero of , is thus overmastered by the deliberate contrivance of the hero of . Insofar as Lykourgos devises his plot in response to the peculiar strength encapsulated in his opponent’s epithet, his success depends upon his ability to recognize the meaning encoded in poetic diction—and to exploit the limitations such diction implies. The practiced by the hero of is, in this tale, a matter of inverting the value of a formulaic expression, of transforming what would normally be understood as a marker of excellence into an index of liability.

More concretely, of course, Lykourgos’ consists in the deliberate selection of a setting that neutralizes his opponent’s strengths—the ‘narrow road’ of line 143 ( ). Gaining the advantage by strategic exploitation of environmental circumstances is characteristic of a mode of fighting that is designated in Homeric poetry by the term (‘ambush’). Eustathius, in fact, describes the encounter precisely as a (2.387.1 van der Valk). Within the system of Homeric poetry, stands in explicit contrast to (‘open battle’), and the relationship between these two kinds of warfare can be described in terms of the contrast between and .

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17 Nagy (1999 [1979]), 326-30, with reference to Areithoos. Edwards (1985), 15, notes that ‘Akhilleus’ distinctive epithets are dominated by the notion of swiftness. He is , and . See also ibid. 19n9. In light of this association between speed of foot and , it is striking that the Odysseus of the *Odyssey*—the poem that spotlights his —insists that the footrace is the one form of athletic contest at which he fears being bested (*Od.* 8.230-33; I thank the anonymous referee for reminding me of this passage). In the *Iliad*, Odysseus is able to claim victory in a footrace—but only with the help of Athene; this episode, moreover, concludes with a direct comparison between Odysseus and Akhilleus that implies the superiority of the latter in terms of speed (*Il.* 23.791-92).

18 Edwards (1985), 22. Edwards does not include Lykourgos’ attack in his catalogue of Iliadic , although he cites it as an example of the kind of of which is a ‘variety’ (19). I find no reason, however, not to count the story as a highly compressed instance of the theme. For discussions of this theme in the Homeric poems, see Edwards (1985), 15-41, and Dué and Ebbott (2010), 31-87.

The ‘narrow road’ that forms the centerpiece of Lykourgos’ stratagem may seem like an odd way of disabling Areithoos if indeed it is intended solely as a means of inhibiting the use of his preferred weapon. It would have to have been a very narrow road indeed to impede the swinging of a club. Lykourgos’ ploy becomes more intelligible, however, when we take into consideration the other component of Areithoos’, the speed signaled by his name. One of the ‘Cretan lies’ told by Odysseus in the Odyssey suggests that the need to counteract such speed may have been an established component of the theme: in Odyssey 13, the disguised Odysseus tells Athene that he fled Crete after ambushing and killing a son of Idomeneus named Orsilokhos:

swift-footed Orsilokhos, who in wide Crete surpassed hardy men in speed of foot . . .

While this fictional attack likewise takes place along a road (Od. 13.267-68), it is not specifically a narrow one; instead, it is the circumstance that the attack is made at night that negates the victim’s natural advantage. In the case of Areithoos, it may be implied that the narrowness of the road is intended to inhibit all of Areithoos’ movements—not just the motion of his mace-arm.

The most striking indicator that there is a connection to be made between the ‘narrow road’ motif and the need to counter an opponent’s greater speed is provided by an episode that

20. Pausanias reports that ‘the road becomes especially narrow’ (I.8.11.4) as it passes by the reputed tomb of Areithoos. The phrasing likely indicates that he has the Iliad passage in mind, but the ‘narrow road’ may have featured prominently in other lore surrounding Areithoos.

21. On this passage, see Edwards (1985), 33. It is striking that, as in the case of Areithoos, the victim of the ambush has both a significant name ( = ‘he who rouses the’) and a significant epithet (an epithet Orsilokhos shares with none other than Akhilleus). The meaningfulness of this epithet as applied to Orsilokhos is underscored in the relative clause. (For similar cases in which an epithet is elaborated on by a subsequent relative clause, see Kakridis [1949], 124-25.)

22. The story of another ‘mace-man’ is possibly relevant here. One of the brigands killed by Theseus on his way to Athens was a certain Periphetes, who, like Areithoos, was given the epithet because of the iron club he used as a weapon. According to Ps.-Apollodorus, Periphetes was lame (Bibl. 3.217). If this story is considered as a possible multiform of the tale of Lykourgos and Areithoos, it suggests that the motif of speed (or the negation of it) has an established place in the tradition.
includes the only other instance of the phrase in the Iliad: the chariot race of Book 23. The episode centers on the stratagem by which Antilokhos overcomes Menelaos’ superior horses, even though Antilokhos’ horses are recognized as the slowest of the five competing teams (Il. 309-10). As the contestants near the finish line, Antilokhos sees that the first prize is out of reach, but he perceives an opportunity to finish ahead of Menelaos in second place. He explains his plan to his horses, and immediately acts on it:

... But follow closely upon him and hasten as much as possible; I myself will think of a device to overtake him on a narrow road, nor will the opportunity escape me.’ So he spoke, and they, in awe of their master’s command, hurried on the more for a short time. And quickly, then, steadfast Antilokhos spotted a narrowing of the hollowed road.

Antilokhos attempts to overtake Menelaos as the road narrows; Menelaos, fearing a collision, reigns in his horses; and Antilokhos drives across the finish line in second place.

The episode is not a , but the name of its protagonist (Anti-lokhos, ‘he who is a match for the ’) indicates its affinity with the theme; so too does the recurrent emphasis on as the means by which an opponent’s superior strength may be overcome. The entire scene unfolds, in fact, as yet another example of the dramatization of the rivalry. Nestor, noting that Antilokhos is driving the weakest horses, counsels the use of , and delivers a short ‘sermon on the uses of ’. Antilokhos, as we have seen, speaks explicitly of his reliance on , on a ‘contrivance’ or ‘stratagem’. Menelaos emphasizes his own superiority in (23.578), while implying that Antilokhos has unduly exploited (‘trickery’, 23.585). The narrator, meanwhile, describes Antilokhos’ maneuver in phraseology that echoes the earlier description of Lykourgos’ tactics. There is, moreover,

23 . Richardson (1993), 209. The superiority of over is made explicit at 23.315, (‘a woodcutter achieves far greater success by than by ’).

24 . Compare 23.515, (‘overtaking Menelaos by cunning, not at all by speed’), with 7.142, (‘Lykourgos slew him by stratagem, not at all by might’).
another, crucial respect in which the episode recalls the tale of Areithoos: like the story of the
‘mace-man,’ the chariot race narrative draws attention to an apparent conflict between a
formulaic epithet and its context, precisely in order to underscore the meaningfulness of the
epithet.

As Menelaos slows his horses to avoid a crash, he calls out to Antilokhos:

‘Antilokhos, there is no man more calamitous than you.
Go to your ruin, since we Achaeans were wrong to call you...

(I. 23.439-40)

I will perhaps be accused of tendentiousness for rendering the infinitive with the
participle of the same verb, an epithet applied to a number of characters in the
Homeric corpus—most notably Telemakhos in the Odyssey—and often translated as
‘prudent’. Antilokhos is not a regular recipient of this epithet—although, as we shall see, he
does receive it in this episode, and the Neleids in general seem to enjoy a reputation as

25 In defense of my rendering, I note that, as in previous examples, an imperfect
verb makes it clear that Menelaos is speaking of a recurrent locution in the past: he
appears to be invoking a formulaic expression. The suspicion that we are meant to think of the
generic epithet is confirmed a short while later, when Menelaos himself employs
the participle in a remarkable way. As prizes are awarded, he lodges a complaint against
Antilokhos, beginning his speech thus:

‘Antilokhos, formerly , what have you done?’

(I. 23.570)

25 In the Odyssey, both Nestor (3.20) and his son Peisistratos (3.52; cf. 4.204-6) are
described as being . Discussing the application of the epithet to Antilokhos in
Iliad 23, Heath (2001), 136, writes that the ‘treatment of the adjective clearly reveals that the
poet is very much aware of the association of with the son of Nestor’. Antilokhos’ other epithets in the Iliad are as follows: in the nominative:
(‘son of great-hearted Nestor’, 17.653).
The phrase ‘formerly’ is, in essence, a negated or ‘bracketed’ epithet. Menelaos claims that, although Antilokhos has previously been called, his actions during the race have belied his claim to the epithet. Even more than simply drawing attention to a contradiction between the expression and the context of its use, Menelaos asserts that the context has rendered the word generally invalid as an epithet for Antilokhos.

But has it? Menelaos seems to understand the term as an indicator of prudence in a general sense, and on that score he may have a point: Antilokhos can certainly be accused of recklessness. Or else Menelaos may mean to highlight Antilokhos’ aggressiveness toward an older and socially superior man. As J. B. Hainsworth notes, is regularly ‘applied to youthful or subordinate characters who know their place’. The word’s primary associations, however, are with prudence as a speaker, as we may see from the fact that the epithet occurs most frequently in formulaic speech introductions, and from its frequent application to heralds and wise counselors. From this point of view, Menelaos’ complaint seems misplaced. Antilokhos’ exploitation of the ‘narrow road’ is not an adequate measure of his right to be called. It is only in the sequel to the race, the verbal dispute that develops between the two claimants of the second-place prize, that Antilokhos has the opportunity to prove the appropriateness of the epithet. By employing a deft verbal strategy—simultaneously expressing deference toward Menelaos and asserting his right to the disputed mare—Antilokhos manages to appease Menelaos and retain the prize. The narrator, as though answering Menelaos’ criticism, introduces this speech with a formula that now seems laden with significance:

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\text{Then Antilokhos addressed him in turn . . .}
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This is the only occurrence of this formula with Antilokhos as subject. No less an authority on the proper usage of Homeric diction than the narrator himself thus confirms Antilokhos’ title to the epithet 28.

Overall, the chariot race and its epilogue tend in precisely the same direction as the tale of Areithoos. Both episodes draw attention to a real or apparent contradiction between a formulaic epithet and the context of its application. In both cases, the contradiction arises because of the manipulation, by a representative of Lykourgos, of the special circumstances created by the constricted environment of a ‘narrow road’. And in both cases the meaningfulness and appropriateness of the epithet is ultimately reasserted. These passages display an awareness of the possibility that a formulaic style may give rise to certain interpretive tensions, as well as an anxiousness to resolve these tensions by establishing once and for all the meaningfulness of formulas. The language of the epic medium passes through the crucible of the ‘narrow road’ and emerges fully validated. 29

An Iliadic ethic of language use

The Iliadic determination to assert the meaningfulness of epic language in spite of the uncertainties introduced by contextual constraints or the maneuvers of Lykourgos is not an idle or secondary motif. It is intimately bound up with one of the Iliad’s central ethical commitments—if we may identify the poem’s ethical commitments with those of its hero, Akhilleus. In the Embassy of Book 9, which is arguably the pivot on which the whole poem turns, Akhilleus...
famously declares his determination to tolerate nothing less than the total transparency of
language:

As hateful to me as the gates of Hades is the man
who conceals one thing in his heart and declares another.  

The ‘narrow road’ motif, with its anxiety over the meaningfulness of formulaic epithets, can
be understood as an echo of this commitment to transparency. Of course, there is a difference
between a contextually inappropriate epithet and the kind of concealment or outright
dishonesty that Akhilleus abhors. The possibility that the language of epic might at times be
used indifferently—that words might mean less than they appear to say—nevertheless
threatens to undermine the total transparency to which Akhilleus aspires.

It is essential to recognize the extent to which a determination to uphold the meaningfulness
and transparency of language structures the entire plot-arc of the Iliad. Ruth Scodel has
argued convincingly that the tragic turn in Akhilleus’ story—his decision to allow Patroklos
to enter the battle in his place—is the direct consequence of his resolve to abide by a promise
that he (mistakenly) believes has been conveyed to Agamemnon and the Achaeans leaders at
the conclusion of the Embassy. This is the promise that he will not return to the battlefield
until the fighting reaches his own ships, a promise that he made in response to Ajax, the third
of three ambassadors to plead with him, and that he explicitly directed the ambassadors to
report back to Agamemnon (Il. 9.644-55). Akhilleus is unaware that, in actuality, Odysseus
reported only his first response, which he gave in reply to Odysseus’ entreaty, and in which he
declared that he would sail for Phthia in the morning. From the Achaeans’ point of view, of
course, he has already falsified this declaration by remaining at Troy, but he does not realize

30 For the pivotal position of the Embassy in the poem’s economy, cf. Wilson (2002), 1: ‘Iliad Book 9 is widely regarded in contemporary Homeric scholarship as the interpretive key to the poem, the linchpin to its plot and tragic vision’.

31 Heiden (2009), 432-33, identifies ironies that ‘compromise’ Akhilleus’ claim to transparency, and that seem to him to be emblematic of certain tensions in Homeric criticism. These ironies—Akhilleus’ failure to achieve an ideal transparency—are, to my way of thinking, equally emblematic of tensions inherent in the formulaic style.

32 Scodel (1989), offering this description of Akhilleus’ character (94): ‘Achilles is committed to a straightforward relation between thought and word, word and action’.
this; instead, although he is prepared to relinquish his anger, he believes he cannot reenter the battle himself without contravening the message that he thinks has been transmitted to the Achaians (16.60-63). The essential connection between the Embassy and these later events is underscored by the fact that the fateful exchange in which Akhilleus explains his position to Patroklos and authorizes the latter to fight in his place is introduced by an echo of his earlier affirmation of the ethic of transparency. Akhilleus invites Patroklos to make the appeal that will ultimately lead to Patroklos’ own death with the words

(‘Speak plainly, do not conceal it in your mind, that we may both know’, 16.19).  

The events of the final third of the poem are therefore determined by Akhilleus’ absolute commitment to the transparency and meaningfulness of speech, much as are the events of the first third; for the plot developments leading up to the Embassy are similarly the result of Akhilleus’ decision to bind himself by his word. Athene, enjoining him in Book 1 to forego violence in his quarrel with Agamemnon, advises him instead to ‘reproach [Agamemnon] in words as to how it will be’ ( II. 1.211). The rather remarkable construction of the verb with a relative clause in the future tense—unique in the poem to my knowledge—indicates that Akhilleus’ ‘reproach’ will be meaningful to the extent that it dictates subsequent events.  

Akhilleus acts on this advice with a speech that is not only a masterpiece of blame—in the usual sense—but that also includes his great oath, which is not so much a declaration of his own intended course of action as a prediction of the situation that will confront the Achaians as a result. The awesome rhetoric with which he frames this oath—the description of the scepter, ‘which will  

33 Cramer (1976), 301-2, notes that Thetis addresses the same line to Akhilleus when she asks him to explain the cause of his grief in Book 1 (II. 1.363), and that she uses an abbreviated version ( , 18.74) when she asks him why he is weeping in Book 18 (18.73), after the death of Patroklos. The imperative to speak plainly thus punctuates the narrative at each of the plot’s major points of inflection.  

34 When is construed with a relative clause, the clause ordinarily summarizes the past or present actions that are being cited in reproach, as at II. 2.255-56.  

35 For blame-speech as a distinct genre that includes, see Martin (1989), 18 and 68-77. Akhilleus’ prediction of the future brings to mind Adam Parry’s remark (à propos of Akhilleus’ declaration, in his great speech in Book 9, that he will say ‘how things will be accomplished’ [ , II. 9.310]): ‘Such certainty is godlike’ (A. Parry [1956], 5n1).
never again sprout leaves or shoots’ (Il. 1.234-35), and so on—is yet another expression of the strength of his ethical commitment to the use of language that is consequential and fully freighted with meaning.

In Book 9, Akhilleus delivers his affirmation of the ethic of transparency in a context that seems designed to set up a contrast between this ethic and the very different one represented by his addressee, Odysseus. Indeed, Akhilleus’ words—‘hateful to me . . . is the man who conceals one thing in his heart and declares another’—seem to be directed specifically at Odysseus, who has omitted from his report of Agamemnon’s conciliatory offer its most invidious clause, the demand that Akhilleus should acknowledge his subordinate position (Il. 9.158-61). Strictly speaking, Akhilleus cannot know this, but it is difficult not to associate his reference to concealment with Odysseus’ striking reticence.36 His words ring even truer as a condemnation of Odysseus at the end of the episode, when Odysseus can once again be observed to be guilty of a significant omission. Yet Odysseus has good reasons for concealing things: his strategic acts of omission serve discernible diplomatic and political ends.37 His ethical commitments privilege the achievement of utilitarian goals at the expense of transparency in communication. Even more: Odysseus displays a positive readiness to cultivate a lack of transparency in order to benefit the interests he serves.

Book 9 thus unfolds as a kind of contest between two opposed figures representing two opposed ethical positions with regard to language use. Akhilleus, the archetypal hero of

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36 Cf. Whitman (1958), 192, Scodel (1989), 93, Donlan (1993), 166, Cairns (2011), 105-7. See also Elmer (2013), 95, on the way Akhilleus’ remark about the ‘gates of Hades’ echoes the very words omitted by Odysseus. Some commentators interpret Akhilleus’ remark as being directed toward Agamemnon, whose intention to consign him to a subordinate position he senses, notwithstanding Odysseus’s omission (cf. Heiden [2009], 433). This is an effective means of accounting for the passage in a psychologically realistic way, but the listener or reader is much more likely to think of Odysseus in connection with this remark, especially if he or she is familiar with the Odyssey. In that poem, Odysseus uses the same figure of speech to condemn liars, even as he lies about his own identity: ‘As hateful to me as the gates of Hades is the man who, yielding to poverty, utters falsehoods’, Od. 14.156-57; cf. Wilson [2002], 86). Odysseus is even instructed by Agamemnon in the Underworld to ‘say one thing and keep another hidden’ (Od. 11.443).

37 These are not far to seek in the case of the omission of Agamemnon’s demand for submission: Akhilleus obviously could not accept any offer of restitution that included such a demand. On Odysseus’ motivation for failing to report Akhilleus’ response to Ajax, see Scodel (1989), 96-8.
of communication. Odysseus, the hero of , exploits gaps and silences in an attempt to accomplish an objective—the reintegration of Akhilleus—that, if achieved on the terms proposed by Agamemnon, must be felt by Akhilleus himself as a defeat. There is a certain similarity here to the ‘narrow road’ motif, and more particularly to the tale of Areithoos, whose story recalls (or rather prefigures) that of Akhilleus with respect to more than just the speed signaled by his name. In both cases, the hero of , encountering an opponent whose works in part by disrupting the normal operation of language, is undone by remaining true to words that are somehow central to his heroic identity. Areithoos falls victim to the because he is constrained by his epithet as much as by the narrowness of the road. Akhilleus, although he manages to avoid Agamemnon’s ‘gift-attack’, nevertheless ultimately meets disaster—losing not only his closest companion, but also, ultimately, his own life—because he cannot deviate from his own stated positions. That is not to say that the tale of Areithoos (or, for that matter, the ‘narrow road’ motif more generally) is a direct commentary on the story of Akhilleus. It is, rather, a recapitulation of certain themes that lie at the heart of that story, above all a commitment to the proposition that words can and should be made to bear the full weight of their meanings.

The fact that Akhilleus, like Areithoos, ends up on the losing side of a contest with a representative of a very different view of words and their meaning should not be taken as in any way undermining the value of this commitment. On the contrary, the poem as a whole must be understood as on some level an endorsement of Akhilleus’ position, since it is precisely because of his loyalty to this position that he achieves the enshrined in the epic. To celebrate Akhilleus is to celebrate his unswerving allegiance to transparency. For this reason we are entitled to make a rough equivalence between Akhilleus’ ethical commitments—including what might be called the ‘Akhillean’ ethic of language use—and those of the Iliad. And yet the poem permits us glimpses of an alternative—an ‘Odyssean’ ethic—that cannot be simply rejected as invalid. After all, Akhilleus’ own protégé, Antilokhos, succeeds

38 For further discussion of this point, see Elmer (2013), 79-81.
by adopting an Odyssean strategy of ______ in the chariot race. And while Odysseus may seem to fare poorly in Book 9 by comparison with the moral and rhetorical force of Akhilleus’ great speech, the practical value of his mode of action is fully vindicated in those scenes in which he is able to operate on his own terms.

**The ‘Odyssean’ ethic in the *Iliad***

In fact, Book 9, with its prominent display of Akhilleus’ commitment to transparency, is followed immediately by an episode that seems designed to showcase the ‘Odyssean’ ethic in action. The Doloneia of Book 10, describing a night raid conducted by Diomedes and Odysseus, gives the latter the opportunity to employ the full range of his ______. The controversy over the authenticity of this book is well known. Debate as to whether or not it ‘belongs’ in our *Iliad* extends back to antiquity.\(^\text{41}\) Many, perhaps most, contemporary Homerists reject it as un-Homeric. An often-noted redundancy—Books 9 and 10 appear to describe different ways of meeting the emergency presented by a single night—has led some to characterize the two books as alternatives.\(^\text{42}\) Without entering into this controversy in detail, I align myself with the minority of scholars who argue that Book 10 is an organic part of the *Iliad*’s design.\(^\text{43}\) In doing so, I propose to find in the apparent redundancy that has been observed in the juxtaposition of Books 9 and 10 precisely the same contrastive strategy that one observes in the juxtaposition of Akhilleus and Odysseus in Book 9. Book 10, in other words, expands on the contrast between the Akhillean and Odyssean ethics that is already adumbrated within Book 9. As a counterpoint to the latter’s forceful presentation of Akhilleus’ point of view, the Doloneia shows us an Odysseus who is more than willing to

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\(^\text{41}\) See the discussion of Dué and Ebbott (2010), 5-6, on the famous scholion at the beginning of Book 10 in the Codex Townleianus:

(‘they say that this rhapsody was composed separately by Homer and was not part of the *Iliad*, but was introduced into the poem’s arrangement by Peisistratos’).


\(^\text{43}\) For argumentation, see Petegorsky (1982), 175-259, and Dué and Ebbott (2010). Shewan (1911) attempted to refute the arguments leveled against the book by Analytic scholars.
take advantage of an ambiguous way of speaking—and ready to acknowledge the ethical complexity of his methods.

Broadly speaking, Book 10 is a greatly expanded instance of the theme. It recounts two parallel missions to reconnoiter the enemy’s camp, undertaken by Odysseus and Diomedes on one side, and on the other by the Trojan Dolon, who gives the episode the name assigned to it by ancient critics. After some introductory material, relating the recruiting of the spies, the narrative describes the capture, interrogation, and killing of Dolon by Odysseus and Diomedes, and then the killing of the just-arrived Trojan ally Rhesos, along with a number of his men, and the stealing of his horses.

The opposition between and resurfaces here in multiple ways. Although the character of Rhesos is relatively undeveloped in the Iliad, the broader tradition clearly identifies him as a figure of and a formidable force on the battlefield. His white horses are described by Dolon as ‘swift as the wind’ (Il. 10.437), an indication that they partake of the same kind of impetuous might as Menelaos’ team. The killing of Rhesos and the capture of his horses by stealth are therefore perfectly intelligible in terms of the / opposition. The encounter with Dolon is more complex. The name of this figure signals an affinity with (‘deception’), and by extension with . The wolf-skin he dons for his reconnaissance mission likewise assimilates him to the lupine Lykourgos. All of this is appropriate for a character who appears in the Iliad solely in the role of a nocturnal spy. Dolon does have, however, one quality that aligns him with those representatives of against whom the stratagems of the are typically directed: he is extraordinarily fast, to the extent that he earns what is otherwise, to use Parry’s terminology, a ‘distinctive’ epithet of Akhilleus, (‘swift-footed’, 10.316).

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44. See Dué and Ebbott (2010), 69-79.

45. The scholia report two alternative traditions: according to one, Rhesos fought for one day at Troy, and inflicted heavy losses on the Achaeans; according to the other, he would have become invincible ( ) if he and his horses had been able to drink the water of the Skamandros. For the text of the relevant scholia and discussion, see Dué and Ebbott (2010), 90-106.
As though anticipating that their foe might be possessed of some such physical advantage, Odysseus devises a plan aimed precisely at neutralizing swiftness when he senses Dolon’s approach. He instructs Diomedes:

\[
\begin{align*}
  &\text{‘Let us allow him first to proceed along the plain a little; then if we rush at him we might seize him swiftly. But if he should outpace us in speed of foot, drive him always away from the camp toward the ships, lunging at him with your spear, lest somehow he escape to the city.’} \\
  &\text{Speaking thus, they turned aside from the road, among the corpses. And Dolon ran swiftly past them in his heedlessness.}
\end{align*}
\]

\((Il. 10.344-50)\)

The trap for Dolon is laid along a road. While this is not specifically , nevertheless the by which Odysseus overcomes his opponent’s superior speed centers on the constricting of the space available for maneuvering. Odysseus instructs Diomedes, in effect, to narrow the road. In the execution of this plan, they ‘turn aside’ in a way that resembles Antilokhos’ swerving from the course in the chariot race. All this is to say that we are dealing here with a passage that is, if not strictly an instance of the ‘narrow road’ motif, certainly closely related.

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46 Cf. Dué and Ebbott (2010), 320; apart from this occurrence and the twenty-two occasions on which it is used of Akhilleus, the word is applied three times to horses (\(Il. 2.764, 17.614, 23.376\)) and once to the generic plural ‘horsemen’ (23.262). In the \textit{Odyssey}, the word is used only twice, both times of Akhilleus (11.471, 538). As Dué and Ebbott note, the epithet cannot but evoke Akhilleus. As in the case of Areithoos, the episode provides a kind of indirect commentary on the absence of Akhilleus (see above, n. 15). In pitting Odysseus against an adversary who recalls, in one respect at least, Akhilleus, the narrative ties into the broader theme of rivalry between Odysseus and Akhilleus (on which see Nagy [1999], 42-58). As argued by Petegorsky (1982), 175-254, Book 10 can be interpreted as a response to the challenge issued by Akhilleus in Book 9 at the end of his speech to Odysseus, in which he declares that the Achaeans should ‘devise another, better ’ (\(Il. 9.423\)), since their plan to coopt him has failed. Book 10 demonstrates what can be achieved by Odyssean in the absence of Akhilleus.

47  \(\text{‘they turned aside from the road, among the corpses’}, \text{\(Il. 10.346-50\)}\), compare \(\text{‘turning his horses, Antilokhos drove them off the road; turning aside a little, he pursued [Menelaos’], 23.423-24\). These two passages represent the only collocations of and in the \textit{Iliad}.\)
Once the trap is sprung and Dolon is in the hands of his captors, Odysseus directs his to a new end: the extraction of information from the Trojan spy. His cunning now focuses more squarely on linguistic snares, and he is quick to exploit a crucial ambiguity. When Dolon pleads for his life, offering a substantial ransom if he is spared, Odysseus offers words of seeming reassurance: ‘Take courage, and let not death weigh on your heart’ (II. 10.383). With this encouragement, Odysseus easily pumps Dolon for information on Hektor’s plans and the layout of the Trojan encampment, after which Diomedes kills the prisoner. Some commentators have accused Odysseus of lying outright, and find in this breach of a presumed heroic ethos evidence in favor of the view that the Doloneia is ‘un-Homeric’. Against this verdict one may insist not only that such a blanket notion of heroic ethics is suspect, but also, and perhaps more importantly, that Odysseus does not in fact lie. His carefully-worded reply to Dolon suggests that the latter’s life is secure without actually saying so. This is, it would seem, a textbook case of ‘concealing one thing in one’s heart and declaring another’—not a lie, but the cultivation of an ambiguity that disrupts the ideal transparency of speech. It is the putting into practice of the ‘Odyssean’ ethic of language use, with results that are obviously beneficial to the Achaeans.

Arguably the most revealing moment in Book 10, so far as this ethic is concerned, involves not Odysseus’ own use of language, but rather the restrictions he imposes on the kinds of language that may appropriately be used of him. Early in the episode, Diomedes, who has agreed to undertake the night mission, asks for another to accompany him; he selects Odysseus from among several volunteers on the grounds that he has just those qualities that are likely to ensure a successful ‘return’. As he puts it:

‘How, then, could I fail to think of godlike Odysseus, who is above others possessed of a daring heart and a courageous spirit in toils of all sorts, and Pallas Athene holds him dear. If he is my companion, even from blazing fire

(II. 10.243-47)

48. See, for example, Buchan (2004), 119-20 (quoted at Dué and Ebbott [2010], 34n5).
would we both return, since he especially knows how to use his intelligence.'

Odysseus responds to this encomium by protesting against the very act of evaluating his virtues and flaws:

Son of Tydeos, do not either praise me excessively or criticize me,
for you speak these things among the Argives, who know them well.
But let us go . . .

How should we interpret Odysseus’ curiously self-effacing remark, which is not necessarily the position we would expect to be taken by a Homeric hero? Since Diomedes, with his mention of and (‘intelligence’), has evoked precisely the kind of heroism that defines Odysseus’ role in the Odyssey, it is possible that Odysseus’ unwillingness to be so described is an expression of an Iliadic impulse to keep the Odyssey at arms length—Monro’s Law in reverse. If so, this distancing gesture can only hedge the more or less overtly Odyssean thematics of the episode as a whole. A second possibility is to interpret Odysseus’ remark in light of these thematics, by noting that his reluctance to be explicitly characterized corresponds to the Odyssey’s general strategy of indirection in naming and describing its central hero.

There are likely other ways of interpreting these lines, but in any case what is most striking is that Odysseus’ prohibition is directed specifically against ethical descriptions of his character. He resists the application of either praise or blame to his actions, suggesting instead that the Achaeans can and should come to their own conclusions. By extension, the audience member or reader of these lines is likewise challenged to formulate his or her own judgment of Odysseus’ character—and to recognize the ethical complexity of doing so. For, however else we might be inclined to interpret Odysseus’ remark, we must also admit that it implicitly

49 On the relation between and , see the essential work of Frame (1978). Diomedes’ mention of blazing fire may itself be an evocation of the Odyssey: the same phrase, occurs twice in that poem in close thematic connection with Odysseus’ return (Od. 19.39, 20.25), and in his interview with Penelope Odysseus adopts the pseudonym Aithon (‘burning/fiery one’, 19.183). Addressing Patroklos in Book 16, Akhilleus uses the phrase to designate the fire that threatens to deprive the Achaeans of their (Il. 16.81).

50 On the Odyssean character of Book 10, see Petegorsky (1982), 193-200.
acknowledges, even underscores, the difficulty of either straightforwardly praising or blaming him. Such a cautionary note is appropriately sounded at the beginning of an episode in which Odysseus’ actions—including his exploitation of linguistic ambiguity—are, to say the least, ethically questionable. The ‘Odyssean’ ethic, as dramatized in Book 10, would seem to include not only a willingness to exploit linguistic ambiguity but also a corresponding unwillingness to submit to direct assessment. In other words, the ethic, acknowledging its own ethical ambivalence, demands the cultivation of ambiguity both in its practice and in its evaluation. To adapt a remark made by Pindar in a context that is not without connection to the present discussion, ‘inflexible words’, can only do violence to a character as complex as that of Odysseus.  

The ‘Odyssean’ ethic and the Odyssey

are, of course, precisely what Akhilleus demands. I have argued that the Iliad largely endorses his position. To the extent that the poem privileges the Akhillean commitment to words of full and fixed meaning—and it might be said that the testing and validation of formulaic epithets we have observed in connection with the ‘narrow road’ motif is a manifestation of an Iliadic drive to ensure that the poem’s are in fact — Odysseus will always pose something of a challenge to Iliadic poetics. What, then, about Odysseus’ own poem? Can we detect in the Odyssey an attitude toward the use of language, and especially formulaic language, that somehow reflects the constantly-foregrounded of its protagonist?  

51. I refer here to the following statement from the final epode of Nemean 7: ‘my heart will never say that I have dragged Neoptolemos about with inflexible words’, 102-4). As David Bouvier pointed out in the discussion following a talk he delivered on the Odyssey’s oblique references to questionable aspects of Odysseus’ career (‘How Much Does the Odyssey Know about Odysseus’ Dark Side?: Odysseus’ “Hybris” in Demodokos’ Song’, Harvard University, April 15, 2014), these lines imply that the celebration in song of a Neoptolemos or an Odysseus (discussed by Pindar in lines 20-30, immediately prior to the first mention of Neoptolemos) require —verbal ‘versatility’—precisely because the deeds attributed to these figures can be ethically problematic. Bouvier’s paper stressed the widespread association between Odysseus and Neoptolemos in literature and art, especially with regard to atrocities committed during the sack of Troy.

52. A distinction between Iliadic and Odyssean poetics not unrelated to the one outlined here is suggested by de Jong (1994), who points out that the Odyssey’s thematization of hidden, secret thoughts stands in direct contrast to Akhilleus’ ideal of transparency (see esp.
I will limit myself here to the discussion of a single example that points in this direction; a complete examination of the question is beyond the scope of this paper. I have chosen my example—the application of the epithet (‘blameless’) to Aigisthos at Odyssey 1.29 ( ), which has been called ‘perhaps the most notoriously inappropriate Homeric adjective’—for two reasons. In the first place, this phrase has been one of the most visible touchstones in the debate over the meaningfulness of Homeric epithets. Anne Amory Parry adopted it as the title and centerpiece of her book-length rejoinder to Milman Parry. ‘Blameless Aigisthos’ thus brings me back to the problem with which I began this essay. At the same time, as I will argue, the phrase functions as an index of the ethical ambivalence of Odysseus even within his own epic. It therefore offers a convenient means of tracing within the Odyssey the same ethical ambiguity I have argued for in Iliad 10.

It may seem that I am now wandering off the ‘narrow road’ of my title; and indeed the ‘narrow road’ motif, as we have seen it in the Iliad, does not occur in the Odyssey. In his own epic, however, Odysseus in many ways comes into his own as the hero of the ‘narrow road’. He devises a way out of the narrow quarters of Polyphemos’ cave, and he charts a course through the (‘strait’) that divides Skylla from Kharybdis (Od. 12.234). He is the only one, among all his men, who passes successfully through all of the perils of the return journey. On Ithaca, the success of the he lays for the Suitors hinges on his ability to prevent his adversaries from gaining access to the exits. This restriction of spatial freedom, reminiscent of Odysseus’ plan for capturing Dolon and of Lykourgos’ tactics against Areithoos, is prefigured by the disguised Odysseus himself in these ominous words addressed to the Suitor Eurymakhos:

"‘If Odysseus should return and arrive in his native land, you would soon find these doors, wide though they be, narrow as you fled out through the doorway." (Od. 18.384-86)"

pp. 30 and 48).

53 . Quotation from Combellack (1982), 361.
Odysseus shows himself to be a master of Lykourgan strategy.\textsuperscript{55}

This brings me to ‘blameless’ ( \textit{Aigisthos} ). Milman Parry cited the application of this epithet to the seducer of Klytaimnestre and murderer of Agamemnon as a prime example of ‘the illogical uses of the epithet’, and thus as evidence for his claim that generic epithets were used with ‘indifference’ on the part of singers and audience members alike.\textsuperscript{56} Anne Amory Parry countered that the illogicality sensed by her father-in-law, and by a line of others stretching back to antiquity, is in fact only apparent, a misunderstanding arising from a misconception of the meaning of \textsuperscript{57} The word, she argues, does not mean ‘beyond reproach’ in the general or more narrowly ethical sense, but refers primarily to physical excellence, and so can be most often translated as ‘beautiful’\textsuperscript{58}. This is a meaning she finds as appropriate to Aigisthos as to the others to whom the word is applied. She readily acknowledges that ‘Homeric epithets are not ordinarily chosen for their special relevance to the immediate context’, but she argues vigorously against Parry’s notion of an indifference on the part of singer or hearer\textsuperscript{59}. And the debate has continued.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{55} Even Odysseus’ favored technique of exploiting the gap between appearance and reality has a certain kinship with Lykourgos’ victory over the ‘mace-man’. In the apparent contradiction between this epithet and its context there is a similar play between surface and depth: Areithoos seems not to be a ‘mace-man’ at this particular moment, but he is one in a truer and deeper sense.

\textsuperscript{56} Noting that \textit{\textit{Aigisthos}}, ‘which is used in Homer for 24 heroes, seems to fit 23 of them perfectly well, but raises a question in the case of the twenty-fourth’—Aigisthos—M. Parry (1971), 151, writes: ‘if [Homer] used the epithet \textit{Aigisthos} for Aegisthus with so little thought for the character of that villain, there is no reason to suppose he took any more thought for the character of Odysseus, of Alcinous, or of that Gorgythion who likewise enters the poem only to lose his life at the hands of Teucer’.

\textsuperscript{57} A. A. Parry (1973), Ebeling (1885), s.v. , surveys discussions of the problem from antiquity to his contemporaries.

\textsuperscript{58} A. A. Parry (1973), 148. As she notes on p. 156, Parry was anticipated in this conclusion by Hoffmann (1914). Parry rejects the traditional etymology deriving from , finding for this etymology ‘absolutely no convincing evidence in support, and considerable evidence against’ (159); but cf. Chantraine (2009), s.v. , and Lowenstam (1981), 45.

\textsuperscript{59} A. A. Parry (1973), 3; on the notion of ‘indifference’, see p. 161. As pointed out by Combellack (1977), 171, in spite of her acknowledgement that epithets are often used without regard for the specific context, Parry often argues as though some special relevance should be expected.

My interpretation will, in a sense, chart a middle way between Milman Parry and Anne Amory Parry by holding that an incongruous or ‘illogical’ epithet has been used deliberately in order to suggest a link between Aigisthos and Odysseus that might otherwise be obscured by the way that the story of Agamemnon’s homecoming is generally deployed in the *Odyssey*. The epithet is not, then, used ‘indifferently’, although, I argue, the intentional incongruity of *Odyssey* 1.29 reflects the real possibility that a formulaic style will occasionally give rise to such ‘indifferent’ usages. My claim is that, in a manner similar to what we have seen in connection with the *Iliad*’s ‘narrow roads’, the poetry is here harnessing a feature of its style self-consciously—not, as in the *Iliad*, in order to validate the essential meaningfulness of its formulaic language, but, on the contrary, so as to embrace the apparent contradiction as a sign of the ethical complexity of the actions the poem depicts. In other words, the propensity of a formulaic style to produce an occasional mismatch between an epithet and its context is here being put forward as an index of the Odyssean ethic, an ethic that, as I have argued, demands the cultivation of ambiguity in order to accommodate its inherent ambivalence.

References to the story of Agamemnon’s murder by Aigisthos (not by Klytaimnestre, as Aiskhylos has it) recur throughout the *Odyssey*; almost always some direct connection is made to the ongoing story of Odysseus’ return. Telemakhos is advised by Athene/Mentes to take Orestes as his model in putting an end to the Suitors’ depredations (*Od.* 1.298-302); Nestor uses the story to warn Telemakhos not to stay too long away from home (3.313-16). In the Underworld, Agamemnon cites his own experiences as a cautionary example for Odysseus, who must not, he urges, declare himself openly on Ithaca (11.441-56). On Agamemnon’s view, what happened to him is justification for the adoption of what I have termed the ‘Odyssean’ ethic even in relation to Penelope: ‘speak not to her all that you have in mind’, he advises, ‘but say one thing and let another be hidden’ (*Od.* 11.442-3). Odysseus himself senses that he might have suffered Agamemnon’s fate, if not for the warning given him by Athene (13.383-85). Agamemnon’s reappearance in the Second Nekyia caps this series of references: the dead man draws a pointed contrast between the treachery of his own wife and Penelope’s virtue (24.194-202).
Each of these examples relies on an obvious set of parallels: Agamemnon corresponds to Odysseus, Orestes to Telemakhos, Klytaimnestre to Penelope, and Aigisthos to the Suitors. But the way in which the stories of Agamemnon and Odysseus ultimately diverge opens up the possibility of reconfiguring these parallels, at least in one respect. For Odysseus achieves his homecoming by following the example not of Agamemnon but of Aigisthos. Like Aigisthos—whose most frequent epithet, ('of deceitful'), identifies him as a figure of—Odysseus slaughters unsuspecting men at a feast. And as in the case of Aigisthos, many of the men he kills ought to be his ('near-and-dear ones'); some are possibly even kinsmen. Odysseus has evidently taken Agamemnon’s example to heart and decided that the best way to apply its lesson is to reconfigure his relationship to the paradigm. This reconfiguration is suggested also in the Second Nekyia by the tale of the suitor Amphimedon, who recounts the Suitors’ story from their perspective. In his telling, Odysseus bears a noticeable resemblance to Agamemnon’s treacherous cousin: he conspires with Penelope to bring about the Suitors’ destruction (Od. 24.167); Penelope, for her part, looks more and more like Klytaimnestre. In this way the Odyssey briefly permits an alternative view of Odysseus’ return to come to the fore, but quickly forces it again into the background by giving the last word to Agamemnon. The sharp distinction he makes between Penelope’s virtue—underscored by the epithet (24.194)—and Klytaimnestre’s wickedness not only encourages us to forget whatever shadows may be cast over Penelope’s

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61. Aigisthos: Od. 1.300, 3.198, 3.250, 3.308, 4.525. The only other figure to receive this epithet is—predictably—Klytaimnestre (11.422). It is significant that Aigisthos is explicitly said to have trapped Agamemnon by means of a (4.531): he is, in other words, a practitioner of an Odyssean mode of action.

62. There is a striking similarity here to the way that Akhilleus applies the tale of Meleagros to his situation in the Iliad. Phoinix offers the example of Meleagros to Akhilleus in Iliad 9 as a cautionary tale, warning him, as Agamemnon warns Odysseus, not to follow the example. Akhilleus responds by modeling his actions on the tale in an unexpected way: he resolves to refrain from fighting until the battle reaches his own tent. Odysseus similarly applies the lesson by modeling his actions on the paradigm in an unexpected way.

63. Cf. Danek (1998), 481-2. Note the emphasis on Penelope’s (‘deceit’) at Od. 24.128 (where she is presented as actively plotting death for the Suitors) and 141, and cf. 11.422 and 439 (with reference to Klytaimnestre’s ). To some, Amphimedon’s account has suggested the existence of an alternative version of the story, in which Odysseus and Penelope do conspire against the Suitors: see Kirk (1962), 245-47, and Austin (1975) 219, with n25. Others sense a kind of implicit conspiracy based on Penelope’s intuition that the beggar is Odysseus and entered into when Penelope proposes the contest of the bow in Book 19: see Amory (1963) and Austin (1975), 205-38 (esp. pp. 230-31).
reputation by Amphimedon’s account; it also distracts us from Odysseus and from the unsettling problem of the violence he perpetrates on Ithaca.

This violence is, of course, the great scandal of the Odyssey, and the poem goes to some lengths in order to excuse it. The story of the Companions, for example, seems framed in such a way as to license the destruction of the Suitors. In the proem, the narrator asserts that the Companions perished because of their own ‘wickedness’ in slaughtering the cattle of Helios, in spite of Odysseus’ best efforts to save them from destruction (Od. 1.6-9). The ‘wicked deeds’ of which the Suitors are so often accused similarly consist above all in the slaughter of animals to which they have no right. The theodicy put forward at the beginning of the poem by Zeus, who asserts that humans suffer evils ‘beyond their share’ because of their own (1.32-4)—Aigisthos being his prime example—provides a divine endorsement for the view that the fates that befall the Companions and the Suitors are entirely their own fault.

And yet there are good reasons to feel that, at least in the case of the Companions, Zeus’ theodicy and the frame provided by the narrator in the proem obscure some significant nuances. The Companions have no good choices: trapped on Thrinakie, they are faced with the alternatives of either starving to death or eating the forbidden cattle. Their failure to do what is ‘right’ seems to be a clear case of ‘moral luck’; one wonders if such a failure is fairly described as a matter of . Moreover, there are indications that Odysseus is not entirely free of responsibility for the Companions’ fate. After he has neutralized the threat posed by Kirke, Odysseus returns to those he has left behind at the ship to invite them to join

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64 On this central ethical problem, and the way it is handled obliquely by the poem, see Nagler (1990). On p. 347, Nagler identifies a hermeneutic principle that seems eminently relevant to my interpretation of Od. 1.29: ‘odities in the text often draw oblique but unmistakable attention to ethical contradictions’. (In a footnote, Nagler adds, without further development, that the story of Aigisthos and Agamemnon ‘stands in very much the same oblique relationship’ to the killing of the Suitors as does that of the Companions, which is Nagler’s primary object of interest in this article.)


66 On the question of ‘framing’ and its implications for judgments about the ethics of Odysseus’ actions, see now Burgess (2014).

67 For application of the concept of ‘moral luck’ to a variety of Greek literary and philosophical texts, see Nussbaum (2001 [1986]).
the others in Kirke’s house. Eurylokhos, suspecting a trap, urges them not to go, claiming that Odysseus is once again leading his men to their destruction, as he did when he brought them to Polyphemos’ cave. He even goes so far as to level the charge of against Odysseus himself (‘they, too, perished because of this man’s’), Od. 10.437). This accusation, which neatly reverses the narrator’s characterization of the story in the proem, is a highly compressed version of the kind of alternative history provided by Amphimedon in the Second Nekyia. Odysseus’ response is to consider, and apparently intend, violently suppressing this subversive voice by killing Eurylokhos—in fact, he contemplates beheading him—‘even though he was an especially close kinsman’ (, 10.441). (He is dissuaded from doing so by the other Companions.) Eurylokhos will later be the one who convinces the Companions to slaughter Helios’ cattle. While he cannot be said to be wholly innocent in this regard, it is clear that, on Thrinakie as on Kirke’s island, he has the best interests of the Companions at heart. And his charge against Odysseus carries some weight. Odysseus’ willingness to kill him, a kinsman, would only seem to demonstrate that Odysseus, too, can legitimately be accused of.

There are, then, reasons to doubt whether the Companions bear sole responsibility for their eventual destruction. And if on close inspection small cracks appear in the ethical framework erected by the narrator (and endorsed by Zeus) at the beginning of the poem, the whole structure that supports Odysseus’ killing of the Suitors is in danger of collapsing. The

68 . It is no coincidence that Eurylokhos singles out the Polyphemos episode. As many have noted, the actions of Odysseus and his men in Polyphemos’ cave bear a number of similarities to those of the Suitors on Ithaca. Odysseus is liable to the charge of to the extent that his actions converge with those of the Suitors.

69 . Cf. Nagler (1990), 346, who calls Eurylokhos’ accusation ‘a bitingly sarcastic revision of the proem’s language’. Nagler connects Eurylokhos’ charge to that of Epeithes, father of Antinoos, at Od. 24.426-39. Epeithes’ is another of the poem’s embedded alternative voices. On Epeithes and Eurylokhos, see also Burgess (2014), 346-7, who comments, ‘The poem in such passages goes out of its way to air anti-Odyssean charges that are essentially irrefutable’.

70 . It is notable that the Odyssey assigns to Odysseus’ chief antagonist among the Companions a name (Eury-lokhos, ‘he of the wide’) that aligns him with Odysseus’ own mode of action. Odysseus’ chief antagonist among the Suitors, Antinoos, is likewise an exponent of : he proposes and leads the expedition to ambush Telemakhos, which is many times referred to as a (Od. 4.670 and 847, 13.425, 14.181, etc.).
Mnesterophonia proves that Odysseus’ thoughts of killing a kinsman were no idle fantasy: here is a man whose violence is readily directed against those who ought to be . Of course, Odysseus has suffered a grave offense, and his response is, to an extent, justified. One cannot help wondering, however, whether things might not more justly have turned out otherwise.

These reflections bring me back to ‘blameless’ Aigisthos. It can be said that he, too, has been gravely offended, and that his actions against a kinsman are, to an extent, justified. This argument was put forward by Frederick Combellack in an article that attempts to explain the apparent incongruity of *Od. 1.29* in terms of cultural norms: by killing Agamemnon, Aigisthos fulfilled his society’s expectation that he should exact vengeance for the crimes of Atreus; by this very act he set himself beyond reproach. This seems like an adequate description of what may reasonably be presumed to have been Aigisthos’ own perspective on his actions. And if the poem seems elsewhere to condemn those actions, we might be tempted to see in the of 1.29 an instance of what Don Fowler famously called ‘deviant focalisation’: in this incongruous epithet the poem encapsulates an alternative point of view on controversial events, much as it does by permitting Amphimedon and Eurylokhos to voice their perspectives.

Combellack’s argument relies in part on his earlier refutation of Amory Parry’s claim that , as applied to Aigisthos, means nothing more than ‘handsome’. This refutation is, in my view, correct, but one does not need to accept or reject any specific interpretation of the meaning of in order to perceive that the occurrence of the word at *Od. 1.29* forges a link between Aigisthos and Odysseus that unsettles the poem’s ethical framework. The word occurs a total of fifty times in the *Odyssey*. The person to whom the epithet is most frequently applied is (unsurprisingly) Odysseus, by a wide margin: he receives the epithet ten

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71 Combellack (1982). In an earlier review of A. A. Parry (1973), Combellack had declared himself in favor of the view that is simply ‘a lazy use of the formulary style’ ([1977], 168). In the later article, he readily admits that this explanation ‘may be right’ ([1982], 364).

72 Fowler (1990). Note that the metrically equivalent epithet (‘cowardly’), applied to Aigisthos at *Od. 3.310*, might easily have been used at 1.29.

73 Combellack (1977).
times, or fourteen, if we include the use of the word in reference to certain of his attributes. Otherwise,  is used no more than three times in connection with any given referent. The association of the word with Odysseus is especially pronounced in the second half of the poem: out of a total of twenty-four occurrences, nine are in direct reference to Odysseus, and two more to one of his attributes. Four of these belong to the same recurring, and highly marked, block of lines: an oath-taking formula repeatedly used by the disguised Odysseus to predict his return and the slaughter of the Suitors. At the very least, then, one can say that the description of Aigisthos as fosters an association with Odysseus that runs counter to the way in which the story of Agamemnon’s downfall is generally connected to Odysseus’ return. (Agamemnon is never so called.) There is no need to accept Combellack’s defense of the epithet in order to see that Aigisthos, like Odysseus, is attempting to return to his ancestral home and to recover property of which he has been deprived. It is surely no accident that the first narrative move after the proem is prompted by Zeus’ thinking of ‘blameless Aigisthos’. Athene’s reply to Zeus (1.45-62) suggests a contrast between Aigisthos and Odysseus—albeit in strikingly ambiguous terms. But the fact that it is the recollection of Aigisthos that sets Odysseus’ story in motion suggests that these two have more in common than may at first appear.

74 in reference to Odysseus: Od. 2.225, 14.159, 16.100, 17.156, 19.304, 19.456, 20.209, 20.231, 21.99, 21.325; cf. 9.414 (Odysseus’ [‘heart’]); and 14.508 (the tale [ ] he recounts for Eumaios). An additional two occurrences, which I have not included in my count of those that refer to Odysseus or his attributes, refer to the physical structure of his house (22.442, 22.459).

75 is used three times of Akhilleus (Od. 11.470, 11.551, 24.18), Antilokhos (4.187, 11.468, 24.16), and Penelope (13.42, 15.15, 24.194).

76 The repeated lines are: ‘Let Zeus first of all be witness, and the gods’ table of hospitality, / and the hearth of Odysseus, to which I have come’. See Od. 14.158-9, 17.155-6, 19.302-3, 20.230-1.

77 Athene does not directly contrast the two; she states that Aigisthos deserved his fate, and then laments the situation of Odysseus, accuses Zeus of having forgotten the sacrifices the latter offered at Troy, and asks Zeus why he is angry with him. The question is presumably rhetorical, but the famous paronomasia with which it is posed ( [‘why are you now so angry with him’, Od. 1.62], where the verb is clearly meant to be connected to Odysseus’ name) may prompt us to wonder whether Zeus has some reason to be angry. In any case, the most striking thing about Athene’s reply is that her remarks leave open the question of whether the charge of can be leveled against Odysseus.
I have argued for a range of connections between Aigisthos and Odysseus. Individually and collectively, these connections work to undermine the positive terms in which Odysseus’ actions vis-à-vis the Companions and the Suitors are generally represented. They suggest a degree of ambiguity that is not evident in the ethical framework set up by the proem and Zeus’ theodicy. The Companions and the Suitors undoubtedly bring on their destruction themselves, but Odysseus’ role in their demise is far from being unquestionably praiseworthy. There is much to admire in Odysseus’ actions, but much, too, to feel uncertain about. In this respect, the Odysseus of the *Odyssey* is very much like the Odysseus of the *Iliad*’s Doloneia. A reluctance either to praise him or to blame him—a reluctance voiced by Odysseus himself in the *Iliad*—seems in fact to be the appropriate response to a practitioner of a mode of action that involves ethical compromises and even contradictions.

The incongruous epithet at *Od.* 1.29 is, I have suggested, a token of the connections between Aigisthos and Odysseus. Its apparent inappropriateness functions also as a token of the ethical contradictions those connections imply. It is, in short, an index of the ‘Odyssean’ ethic. More than that, it is itself an instance of the ‘Odyssean’ ethic in practice, an example of the cultivation of ambiguity as the only adequate means of representing Odyssean action. This interpretation implies not only that the epithet is appropriate by virtue of its inappropriateness, but also that it has been deliberately selected. I hasten to add that what has been selected is nothing more than a traditional feature of the oral formulaic style, which occasionally gives rise to an epithet that appears to be in conflict with its context. At *Od.* 1.29
this traditional feature has been self-consciously exploited in order to encapsulate the poetics of an epic that celebrates an ethically complex figure.  

A few brief remarks by way of summary and conclusion. I have argued that we can discover in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* an awareness of a distinctive characteristic of an oral formulaic style. Both poems recognize the possibility that their formulas will be used in contexts to which they are not obviously appropriate. Parry argued that such contextually inappropriate uses of formulaic language are an indication of an ‘indifference’ on the part of performers and their audiences. There is a great deal of truth in this explanation (although I would prefer not to speak of ‘indifference’): at least at the level of the individual word, a formulaic style that has evolved to meet the needs of oral performance must be able to tolerate a certain looseness of fit with the broader context. But the users of such a style and their audiences must nevertheless remain committed to its overall adequacy as a communicative medium. Such a commitment is discernible in the passages I have examined, in which an awareness of a lack of fit between epithet and context is coupled with an effort to underscore the meaningfulness of the epithet—or, in the case of *Od.* 1.29, of the very lack of fit itself.

In their efforts to harness and make meaningful the propensity of a formulaic style to generate contextual incongruities, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* adopt divergent attitudes—at least in the examples considered here. The *Iliad* affirms that, in spite of any apparent contradiction, its words fundamentally mean what they say. Like Akhilleus himself, the poem promotes a view of (poetic) language as a system of , words of immutable meaning. The

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78 ‘Blameless Aigisthos’ is only a single example, and so an insufficient basis for constructing a global understanding of Odyssean poetics. I believe, however, that the example is emblematic of an attitude toward language that can be traced throughout the poem. The *Odyssey* is, after all, a narrative in which direct disclosure can have disastrous consequences, as Odysseus discovers after revealing his identity to Polyphemus. To take another example, one might find in the phrase  (‘glorious swineherd’) —another of the ‘illogical’ uses of epithets singled out by Parry ([1971], 151)—an indicator of ethical complexity similar to the one for which I have argued above. The epithet itself is fully validated by the narrative, which shows Eumaios to be valiant and courageous. Its juxtaposition with a marker of low social status, however, unsettles any easy assumptions about the ways in which ethical qualities map onto social class. We might say that it unsettles social class as a semiotic system. Ithaca is a world in which princely men like the Suitors turn out to be worthless, and slaves (and beggars) turn out to be heroes. (For a slightly different interpretation of the epithet, see Thalmann [1998], 90.)
Odyssey, by contrast, embraces contradiction as a way of capturing all sides of its central hero’s complex character, and as an expression of the Odyssean principle of ‘declaring one thing and concealing another in one’s heart’. Its words are capable of pointing an attentive listener or reader in a variety of directions. Perhaps the most interesting consequence of this difference is that the rhapsode performing the Iliad or the Odyssey comes to adopt the ethical position of the hero whose deeds he celebrates.

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