Extensible Access Control with Authorization Contracts

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Extensible Access Control with Authorization Contracts

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Abstract

Existing programming language access control frameworks do not meet the needs of all software components. We propose an expressive framework for implementing access control monitors for components. The basis of the framework is a novel concept: the authority environment. An authority environment associates rights with an execution context. The building blocks of access control monitors in our framework are authorization contracts: software contracts that manage authority environments. We demonstrate the expressiveness of our framework by implementing a diverse set of existing access control mechanisms and writing custom access control monitors for three realistic case studies.

1. Introduction

An access control monitor mediates requests to call sensitive operations and allows each call if and only if the request possesses the necessary rights to call the operation. Broadly speaking, when an access control mechanism is presented with a call to a sensitive operation, it must be able to answer two questions. First, which rights are required for the call? And second, which rights does the request possess? The design of an access control mechanism specifies, implicitly or explicitly, the answers to these questions.

For example, Unix file permissions describe which users are allowed to call which operations on a file. The access control mechanism uses file permissions to determine what rights are necessary to call different sensitive operations. Each Unix process executes on behalf of a specific user, and a request to call an operation possesses the same rights as the user of the process that issues the request. Thus, file permissions answer the first question, and the rights of the user associated with a process answer the second question. Importantly, Unix associates users and processes in two different ways. By default, a new process runs on behalf of the same user as the process that spawned it. But a process can run on behalf of a different user if it runs an executable that has the setuid bit set. When a process invokes a setuid executable, the operating system launches a new process to run the executable and associates the new process with the user that owns the executable, rather than the user that invoked it. Hence, this feature creates services that provide restricted access to resources that an invoking user could not otherwise access.

Similar to operating systems, software components also need access control mechanisms to prevent unauthorized clients from calling sensitive operations while allowing authorized ones to do so. Thus, when responding to a request to call a sensitive operation, access control mechanisms for components must be able to answer the same two questions: which rights are necessary for the call and which rights the request possesses.

However, access control needs of components vary, and it is impossible to choose a single answer to these questions that satisfies all component authors. To make things worse, access control mechanisms for general purpose programming languages have made design choices that are not suitable for all application domains and are typically mutually incompatible. For example, Java stack inspection [42] determines the rights associated with a call site by walking the stack from the current stack frame. In contrast, object-capability languages (e.g., E [27] and Caja [28]) determine rights by the lexical structure of the program: a code may call operations on exactly those resources that are reachable from variables in the code’s text.

In this paper we propose a new, extensible access control framework that allows component authors to design access control monitors that suit their needs. The framework supports the design and implementation of many different novel and existing access control monitors for software components. Moreover, because different monitors are implemented using a common framework, different software components within the same application can use different access control mechanisms.

The framework builds on a novel concept: the authority environment. Just as each execution context has a variable environment that maps variable identifiers to values, each execution context has an authority environment that associates the context with its rights to call operations. The rights that a call to a sensitive operation possesses are those possessed by the authority environment of the call’s execution context.

This technical report expands [50] with additional examples and code listings, along with a formal definition and proof of complete monitoring for the contract system described in Section 3.1.
By analogy with dynamic and lexical scoping of variable environments, we identify two ways in which an execution context can receive authority:

1. **dynamically**, by inheriting the authority environment of the surrounding execution context, and

2. **lexically**, by capturing the authority environment of the execution context where it is defined.

Returning to the Unix file system example, a process receives authority dynamically when it inherits the user of the process that launched it. A process receives authority “lexically” when it runs a setuid executable.

Based on the correspondence with variable scoping, we define a framework for designing access control monitors as sets of monitor actions that manipulate authority environments (§3). We implement our framework as a library for Racket [17] without changes to the language’s runtime. We use higher-order contracts [16] to specify where an access control monitor should interpose on a program and how it should manage authority environments. Contracts are executable specifications attached to software components that support separation of concerns by removing defensive checks from code implementing functionality [24–26]. In the same way, our **authorization contracts** separate the task of access control from the program’s functionality.

The design of this framework presents four major contributions:

1. the introduction of **authority environments** as a unifying concept for access control mechanisms (§2),

2. the introduction of **context contracts** to check and enforce properties of execution contexts (§3.1),

3. a novel **authorization logic** for representing and querying authority in authority environments (§3.2), and

4. **authorization contracts** that specialize context contracts for managing authority environments and enforcing access control policies expressed in the logic (§3.3).

We have used the framework to implement diverse access control mechanisms: discretionary access control, stack inspection, history-based access control, and object-capabilities (§4). We demonstrate the practicality of our approach with three realistic case studies (§5).

### 2. Authority Environments

In this section, we introduce **authority environments** as a unifying concept for access control. First, we review the differences between lexical and dynamic scoping (§2.1). Then we describe the connection between lexical and dynamic scoping and access control (§2.2) and show how we can use scoping in the design of a framework for writing access control monitors (§2.3). Throughout, we use small examples in the Racket programming language [17].

#### 2.1 Lexical and Dynamic Scoping

The scope of a variable binding is the spatial and temporal part of the program in which it is visible. A common way to categorize strategies for assigning scopes to bindings is as either **lexical** or **dynamic**. Earlier work distinguishes between the **scope** of a binding, which describes where the binding is visible in the program text, and the **extent** of a binding, which describes when the binding is visible during execution. Dynamic scope often refers to bindings that have dynamic extent and “indefinite” scope. Here, we use dynamic scope to refer to bindings that have dynamic extent and lexical scope, also called “fluid” scope [18][26][27].

Under lexical scoping, a variable refers to the binding from its closest binder in the textual structure of the program. For example, in the Racket expression below, the variable x in function f refers to the binding in the outer-most let statement. The evaluation of this expression returns 0 since the inner-most let statement has no effect on the value x binds within f.

```racket
(let ([x 0])
  (let ([f (lambda () x)])
    (let ([x 42])
      (f))))
```

In a programming language with fluid scoping, programmers can instead associate a binding with the dynamic extent of an expression. That binding is visible to any code that runs in the dynamic extent of the expression. For example, the following Racket expression defines a new fluidly-scoped variable x with default value 0. The `parameterize` expression binds x to the value 42 in the dynamic extent of its body. The variable x in the body of f refers to the most recent binding rather than the closest one in the program text. Since f is invoked within the `parameterize` expression, the program evaluates to 42 instead of 0.

```racket
(let ([x (make-parameter 0)])
  (let ([f (lambda () (x))])
    (parameterize ([x 42])
      (f))))
```

Fluid scoping is a useful programming construct because it allows the context of an expression to communicate with its callees without explicitly threading arguments through the program. For example, a library function for printing may offer a parameter that determines the standard output file. Instead of threading that file as an argument through every function call leading to the `printf` routine, a client program can instead set the parameter once and all calls to `printf` in the body of the program see the client-specified file.

#### 2.2 Scoping for Access Control

This ability to pass contextual information from an execution context to an eventual callee closely matches the problem of correctly determining the authority of a request to call a sensitive operation. To demonstrate this relationship, consider the design of a web application with multiple users. A key component of this application is a login function that authenticates users and executes code on their behalf:
(define (login user guess onSucces)
  (if (check-password? user guess)
      (run-as-user user onSucces)
      (error "Wrong password!")))

This login function takes three arguments: the user attempting to authenticate, the password guess, and a callback onSucces to invoke with the user's rights if the password is correct. After checking the password, the login function changes the state of the program to indicate that the current user is now user and then calls onSucces.

The body of onSucces may attempt to access sensitive resources. For example, it may try to update a user's profile. To avoid an unauthorized update, the update-profile function checks whether the current user has sufficient rights:

(define (update-profile profileUser text)
  (if (can-update? currentUser profileUser)
      ...
      (error "Unauthorized!")))

Function can-update? compares the current user with the user who owns the profile to determine whether the update is authorized. This code thus implicitly uses the authority of its context, i.e., the current user, in much the same way that code accesses the dynamically scoped bindings from its context. By managing authority as an implicit context in this way, we can avoid modifying the code between the decision to run a computation with particular authority and the call to the sensitive operation. This has two advantages. First, threading authority explicitly through the program reduces extensibility, since third party code would need to be aware of and correctly handle authority explicitly. Second, if the code is untrustworthy, it might attempt to subvert the access control checks that protect the sensitive operation by fabricating its own authority.

Another requirement of the security of this application is that only code running with the authority of the main loop is allowed to switch users. According to the Principle of Least Privilege [33], we should further limit the code that is allowed to switch users to just the login function, and switch to an unprivileged user for the rest the program. Crucially, the body of the login function must still use the authority that was in its environment when it was created, i.e., the authority of the main loop. In a sense, for login, we wish to close over the authority of the main loop, in the same way that closures capture lexically scoped bindings.

To achieve this, we build on the analogy between scoping and access control and introduce the concept of an authority environment. An authority environment associates rights with an execution context, just as a variable environment associates bindings with an execution context. Just like variable environments, authority environments can be captured and associated with code, updated, and extended with new bindings for the dynamic extent of a computation. In this application, the authority environment of an execution context records the user on whose behalf the code executes. Section 2.3 shows how authority environments help enforce access control in our running example, including how to create a secure login function. Section 3 generalizes authority environments so that we can express a wide variety of access control mechanisms.

2.3 From Access Control to Authorization Contracts

Using the concept of an authority environment, we build an access control monitor that manipulates and inspects the authority environments of the example web application. The monitor consists of actions that describe how events in the execution of the application interact with its authority environment. We describe our framework for defining monitors in detail in Section 4. Here we explain only the features relevant to the example.

Figure 1 shows our example monitor. The monitor specifies three actions: setuid/c, chuser/c, and checkuser/c. Each action defines a higher-order function contract. When one of these contracts is attached to a function, the contract captures the current authority environment and associates it with the function. When the function is called, the contract has access to both the authority environment at the call site and the authority environment that it has captured. The monitor configures each action-contract with two hooks: #:on-create and #:on-apply. By changing these hooks, monitor designers can implement actions that implement different forms of “lexically” and dynamically scoped authority environments.

Action chuser/c is parameterized with an argument user that identifies the user whose authority should be used during the execution of the body of a contracted function. The #:on-apply hook for chuser/c ignores the authority it has closed over and sets the active principal to user for the dynamic extent of the body of the contracted function, but only...
In Racket, a keyword argument is a (possibly optional) argument passed by
without losing the ability to safely authenticate as a different
which must be a
The keyword argument
This revised implementation of
keyword instead of position. A keyword is a symbol starting with #:
user. In the original implementation,
atures the contract
for the dynamic extent of the function’s body.
Using the monitor, we can now reimplement the web application. First, we can replace code that defensively performs authorization checks with contracts that enforce authority requirements:

```
(define/contract
  (update-profile someUser text)
  ==>a ([user principal?] [text string?])
  #:auth (user) (checkuser/c user)
  any))
...)
```

This revised implementation of update-profile uses the
Racket form define/contract to attach a contract to the
update-profile function. This contract is a dependent contract [10] for a function. It says that update-profile takes two arguments: user, which must be a principal?, and text, which must be a string?. The keyword argument #:auth (user)(checkuser/c user) says that the authorization contract for this function depends on the user argument and attaches the contract (checkuser/c user) to the function. Finally, the range of this contract is any, making no requirements on the return values. The definition of the function can now elide the authorization check.

We also revise the implementation of login:

```
(define/contract
  (login user guess onSuccess)
  ==>a ([user principal?] [guess string?])
  [onSuccess (user) (chuser/c user)]
  #:auth () setuid/c any)
  (if (check-password? user guess)
    (onSuccess)
    (error "Wrong password"))
)
```

The keyword argument #:auth () setuid/c attaches the
setuid/c action to the login function, capturing the authority
of the program context where it is created. This allows the
login function to execute with the captured authority and thus
allows the application to switch to a less privileged principal
without losing the ability to safely authenticate as a different
user. In the original implementation, login uses a hand-rolled
function run-as-user to confine onSuccess within the author-

if the #:check holds, that is, the current-principal has au-
tority over user user. Otherwise, it raises a security violation
as a contract violation. Monitor action checkuser/c is also
parameterized with a user. Upon a call of its contracted func-
tion, it checks that the current-principal has authority over
user. If the check succeeds, the action does not change the
authority environment. If the check fails, the action raises a
security violation. The final monitor action, setuid/c, cre-
ates an authority closure: calling a function with this contract
changes the current principal in the authority environment to
the closed-over principal closure-principal for the dynamic
extent of the function’s body.

3. A Framework for Access Control

In this section, we present the general design of our frame-
work with a formal model. First, we show how we extend
existing higher-order function contracts to context contracts
that check and modify information about their execution
context (§3.1). Context contracts are expressive enough to
enforce a wide range of properties. However, this flexibil-
ity makes it difficult to use them to implement and reason
about access control. To free users from this burden, our
framework provides a specialized interface for defining au-
thorization contracts. The interface simplifies the definition
of context contracts for access control in two ways. First, it
specifies a common representation for authorization environ-
ments (§3.2). At the core of this representation is a novel
authorization logic that describes how authority captured in
a closure may be used. Second, it defines combinators for
building authorization contracts (§3.3). Authorization con-
tracts are specializations of context contracts that use the
authorization logic to succinctly describe how they manage
authority environments.

3.1 A Contract System with Context Contracts

We model higher-order contracts and context contracts as
extensions to an applied lambda calculus with modules and
parameters, which implement dynamic binding. Figure 2 de-
scribes the syntax of our model. Figure 3 gives the reduction
semantics of the model. Evaluation contexts that are not pre-
sented in Figure 2 are standard and enforce call-by-value,
left-to-right evaluation. The type system and the definition of
evaluation contexts are given in Appendix A. Though we omit
the extension for clarity, we have also extended the model
with first class continuations, following Takikawa et al. [39],
because our implementation language supports them and they
interact in interesting ways with our framework.

The semantics of common language features is standard.
Below, we explain the semantics of modules, parameters,
higher-order contracts, and context contracts.

3.1.1 Modules

A program p is a sequence of modules followed by a top-level
expression. A module simultaneously defines a collection of
values owned by a single component and a set of contracts
for those values. Each module

```
module ℓ exports x_{v_1} with x_{c_1} ... where y_1 = e_1,...
```
has a label $\ell$ and defines a set of values $y_1, \ldots$. Values within the module are visible only to subsequent modules in the program if they are exported. An export declaration $x_\ell$ with $x_{\ell_0}$ binds $x_{\ell_0}$ in the rest of the program to the value defined as $x_{\ell_0}$ in the $\text{where}$ clause, but only after attaching to it the contract defined as $x_{\ell_0}$ in the $\text{where}$ clause. Meta-function $\text{import}$, shown in Figure 3, substitutes occurrences of $x_\ell$ in the rest of the program with monitored values $\ell \text{mon}_k^\ell(c,v)$ that enforce the contract.

3.1.2 Higher-order Contracts

Term $\ell \text{mon}_k^\ell(c,v)$ attaches contract $c$ to value $v$ and monitors whether uses of $v$ satisfy the contract. Labels $j$, $k$, and $\ell$, identify, respectively, the module that imposed the contract, the module that provided the value, and the module that is the client of the value. The top-level expression of a program is identified by the distinguished label $\ell_0$. These labels are used to assign $\text{blame}$ when a contract is violated. The simplest contract is a flat contract $\ell \text{flat}(c,v)$ that takes a predicate $v$ as an argument. Flat contracts can be applied only to values of base types Int, Bool, and Unit. When the contract is attached to a value, the predicate is applied to the value. If the predicate returns true, the value passes to its context. Otherwise, the contract system stops the program and raises an error blaming the provider of the value.

Contract $\ell c : \tau \to (\ell c) c_r$ is a higher-order function contract. It specifies a contract $c_d$ for the domain of the function and a contract $c_c$ for the range of the function. In addition, it specifies a context contract $c_c$ for the function. Context contracts, novel to this work, are higher-order contracts that enforce restrictions on the execution context of function calls. They are described in detail below. Attaching contract $\ell c : \tau \to (\ell c) c_r$ to a function returns a new value that enforces contracts on the argument and results of the function and applies the context contract $c_c$.

Contract $\ell c : \tau \to (\ell c) c_r$ is an indy-dependent contract for higher-order functions. This contract corresponds to the $\to a$ contracts from Section 2. The contract is dependent since the contract uses the argument of a contracted function to choose a context contract for the function. Applying a function $v$ with this contract has four steps. First, the argument is wrapped with the contract for the domain, $c_d$. Second, the wrapped argument is passed to the function $\lambda x : \tau. c_r \ldots v$. In the store, if there is no such expression, the contract system stops the program and raises an error blaming the provider of the value. Parameters are first-class values that can be used to access and install dynamic bindings. Parameters implement fluid scope because access to their dynamic bindings is controlled lexically by access to the parameter itself. The expression $\ell \text{make-parameter} e$ creates a new parameter $p(r)$ with default value the result of $e$, where $r$ is a fresh tag uniquely identifying the parameter. The default value is recorded in the store $\sigma$. Term $\ell \text{paramize} p(r) = e_1$ in $e_2$ installs the result of $e_1$ as the new value of the parameter $p(r)$ for the dynamic extent of $e_2$. Accessing the value of a parameter with term $\ell p(r)$ returns the value of the closest enclosing parameterize $p(r)$ in the current evaluation context. If there is no such term, it returns the current value for $r$ in the store. Similarly, term $\ell p(r) := v$ mutates the current binding for the parameter, updating the parameter associated with either the closest enclosing parameterize $p(r)$ in the current evaluation context or the value for $r$ in the store, if there is no such expression.

The parameter contract $\ell \text{param}(c)$ is a higher-order contract that restricts uses of a parameter. A parameter $v$ reduces to a proxy $\ell \text{param}(c,v)$ that records the labels of the contract, provider, and client modules and intercepts uses of the parameter to enforce that values bound to the parameter meet contract $c$.

---

2 An indy-dependent contract is a dependent function contract that uses the "indy" strategy for blame assignment [9].
(module ℓ exports x₁ with xₑ₁... where y₁ = v₁,...,yₑ₁ = vₑ₁,...,yₑₘ = eₑ₁,...,yₑₙ = eₑₙ; p, σ)
→ (module ℓ exports x₁ with xₑ₁... where y₁ = v₁,...,yₑ₁ = vₑ₁,...,yₑₙ = eₑ₁,...,yₑₙ = eₑₙ; p, σ)

(module ℓ exports x₁ with xₑ₁... where x₁ = v₁,...,xₑₙ = eₑ₁,...,p, σ)
→ (import [ℓ,(x₁,...,xₙ),(v₁,...,vₙ),(c₁,...,cₙ),p], σ)

(E[|λ x : τ. e |] v, σ) → (E[|λ x : τ. e |] v, σ)
(E[λ x : τ. e] v, σ) → (E[|λ x : τ. e |] v, σ)
(E[let x = v in e] σ) → (E[|λ x : τ. e |] v, σ)
(E[if # then e₁ else e₂], σ) → (E[|λ x : τ. e |] v, σ)
(E[where e = guard₂ (((vₑ₁))(vₑ₂),vₑ₃,...,guard₂ (((vₑₙ))(vₑ₋ₖₙ),vₑ₋ₖₙ₋₁,...,vₑ₋ₖₙ₋₄,...,vₑ₋ₖ₉,...,vₑ₋₈,...,vₑ₋₇)) |] (eₚ(vₑ₊₃)), σ) → (E[|λ x : τ. e |] v, σ)
(E[where e = guard₂ (((vₑ₁))(vₑ₂),vₑ₃,...,guard₂ (((vₑₙ))(vₑ₋ₖₙ),vₑ₋ₖₙ₋₁,...,vₑ₋ₖₙ₋₄,...,vₑ₋ₖ₉,...,vₑ₋₈,...,vₑ₋₇)) |] (eₚ(vₑ₊₃)), σ) → (E[|λ x : τ. e |] v, σ)

...
3.1.4 Context Contracts

To track properties of execution contexts, context contracts use parameters to install and access relevant state. A context contract interposes on programs at two key times: when the contract is attached to a function and when the contracted function is applied. At both times, the contract can inspect the current values of parameters to check that the current environment is satisfactory, capture the current value for later use, or change the parameterization of a call to the contracted function.

A context contract

$$\text{ctx/ctx}((v_\text{c} \Rightarrow v_\text{p}_a \leftarrow v_{v_\text{a}}), \ldots, (v_\text{c} \Rightarrow v_\text{p}_a \leftarrow v_{v_\text{a}}), \ldots)$$

has four parts:
1. $$v_\text{c}$$, a predicate that checks whether the context is appropriate when the contract is attached.
2. $$(v_{g_c} \Rightarrow v_{p_c} \leftarrow v_{v_{c}}), \ldots$$, a list of guarded parameterizations, described below, to close over when the contract is attached,
3. $$v_\text{a}$$, a predicate that checks whether the context is appropriate when the contract function is called, and
4. $$(v_{g_a} \Rightarrow v_{p_a} \leftarrow v_{v_{a}}), \ldots$$, a list of guarded parameterizations to be installed around the body of the contracted function if the contract check succeeds.

The first two parts are evaluated when the contract is attached to a value. First, the predicate $$v_\text{c}$$ is executed to allow the contract to check the current context. If the predicate returns $$\#t$$, a contract error is raised blaming the client of the contract. Otherwise, each guarded parameterization $$(v_{g_a} \Rightarrow v_{p_a} \leftarrow v_{v_{a}})$$ from part 2 is evaluated in turn. Each guarded parameterization specifies a guard function $$v_{g_a}$$, a parameter $$v_{p_a}$$, and a value function $$v_{v_{a}}$$. If invoking the guard thunk $$v_{g_a}$$ returns $$\#t$$, the corresponding value thunk $$v_{v_{a}}$$ is executed to produce a new value. This value is “closed over” and re-installed for parameter $$v_{p_a}$$ when the contracted function is applied. The predicate $$v_\text{a}$$ and the remaining parameterizations are recorded in a proxy $$\text{ctx/ctx}$$.

The proxy enforces additional checks and parameterizations when the contracted function is called. First, the parameter values captured when the contract was attached are reinstalled. This gives the evaluation of the proxy and the function call access to some bindings from when the contract was attached, in addition to any bindings that are present in the current evaluation context. With these captured bindings in place, the proxy first evaluates the predicate $$v_\text{a}$$, which checks whether the current context is satisfactory. If the predicate returns $$\#f$$, a contract error is raised blaming the client $$\ell$$. Otherwise, the guarded parameterizations of the proxy are evaluated in a similar fashion as before. However, any new bindings are installed just for the dynamic extent of the contracted function’s call.

Figure 4 demonstrates context contracts with a small example. The example involves two context contracts, $$\text{outer/ctx}$$ and $$\text{inner/ctx}$$, that communicate via parameter $$p$$. The contracts ensure that function $$\text{inner}$$ can be applied only in the dynamic extent of the function returned by $$\text{outer}$$. Evaluating $$(\text{inner 42})$$ results in a contract error $$\text{error}^\text{top}$$ blaming the context that applied $$\text{inner}$$. Replacing this expression with $$(\text{outer inner 42})$$ evaluates to 42.

The ability to close over an environment is a key feature of authorization contracts. To see that context contracts can close over some part of the environment when a contract is applied, consider extending the example in Figure 4 with the contract $$\text{capture/ctx}$$ from Figure 5. This contract captures the value of parameter $$p$$ when the contract is applied, and reinstates that value for the dynamic extent of subsequent applications of the contracted value.

3.1.5 Complete Monitoring

Our contract system satisfies complete monitoring [9], an important correctness criterion for contract systems. Complete monitoring guarantees that a contract system correctly assigns blame to components that violate their contracts and, crucially, that the contract system can interpose on all uses of a value in a component that did not create that value. This property makes contracts suitable for interposing on programs to enforce access control policies. Moreover, because the interposition is local to individual components, an access control monitor can be installed around a component without a global enforcement mechanism or the cooperation of other components.
Put differently, complete monitoring guarantees that contracts can enforce the same set of properties as reference monitors: an arbitrary prefix-closed property of a sequence of events. For contracts, these events are the attachment of contracts to values and the use of contracted values. In contrast, for inline reference monitors built with aspects, this set of events is determined by the point-cuts selected by the policy. In either case, the programmer must correctly identify relevant events and specify the policy, but can assume the policy is enforced.

The formal definition and proof of complete monitoring for our contract system are given in Appendix B.

3.2 Representing Authority

In principle, a programmer can use context contracts to enforce arbitrary properties of execution contexts such as access control, but in practice this requires the careful design of an appropriate representation of the relevant information as an environment, i.e., a set of parameters. In particular, for access control this requires a representation of the authority of an execution context.

The authority of an execution context describes the rights it has to perform sensitive operations. In different access control mechanisms, the form and organization of these rights varies. For example, in a web application, a session executes on behalf of a particular user whose rights may change over time in accordance with the access control policies attached to the application’s resources. In the Java stack inspection framework, rights are sets of “permissions” possessed by activation records that can be queried with the checkPermission operation.

A common way to describe the structure of authority in an access control system involves a mapping from subjects (users, processes, or security domains) to access rights for objects (resources that require the protection of the access control system) [22]. In practice, subjects and objects may comprise the same entities, so we refer to both as security principals (or, simply, principals).

To build a framework that supports many different access control mechanisms, we need a general way to express and reason about principals, the authority of principals, and how principals delegate and restrict their authority. For this purpose, we use an authorization logic [2] based on the Flow-Limited Authorization Model (FLAM) [5]. We briefly describe our logic, highlighting where it differs from FLAM. In Section 3.3, we employ this logic to represent authority as a set of parameters that are managed by specialized context contracts, dubbed authorization contracts.

Figure 6 presents the syntax of our logic. We assume an enumerable set of primitive principals $\mathcal{P}$. Primitive principals represent program entities that possess rights, such as users, modules, or activation records. We assume a most trusted principal $\top$ and a least trusted principal $\bot$. For principals $p$ and $q$, the conjunctive principal $p \land q$ is a principal with the authority of both $p$ and $q$. Similarly, the disjunctive principal $p \lor q$ has the authority of either $p$ or $q$.

If principal $p$ trusts principal $q$, we write $q \triangleright p$, and say that $q$ acts for $p$. The acts-for relation is reflexive and transitive, and induces a lattice structure over the set of principals, with conjunction as join, disjunction as meet, and $\top$ and $\bot$ as the top and bottom elements of the lattice.

Principals may assert the existence of trust relationships. A delegation $p \triangleright q @ r$ means that principal $r$ asserts that $p$ acts for $q$ (or, equivalently, that $q$ delegates its authority to $p$). Of course, whether a principal $s$ believes the assertion depends on whether $s$ trusts principal $r$. (We differ from FLAM in that we describe only the integrity of delegations, not their confidentiality.)

Judgment $D : r \vdash p \triangleright q$ denotes that given the set of delegations $D$, principal $r$ believes that principal $p$ acts for principal $q$. Intuitively, $r$ believes that $p$ acts for $q$ if that trust relationship can be derived using only delegations asserted by principals that $r$ trusts.

Figure 7 presents the inference rules for the judgment $D : r \vdash p \triangleright q$. Rules Bot, Top, Refl, Trans, Conj-Left, Conj-Right, Disj-Left, and Disj-Right are standard and provide the underlying lattice structure for the acts-for relation. Rule Del captures the intuition that principal $r$ trusts only delegations asserted by principals that it trusts, that is delegations $p \triangleright q @ s$ where $D : r \vdash s \triangleright r$.

We have three additional principal constructors. Principal $p \triangleright alpha$ is the projection of the authority of principal $p$ on dimension $alpha$. We use projections to limit or attenuate the authority of a principal, and to identify access rights. For example, $p \triangleright files$ may refer to principal $p$’s authority restricted to $p$’s rights to access the file system. Similarly, principal $p \triangleright obj \triangleright invoke$ (equivalently $p \triangleright invoke \triangleright obj$) might refer to the right to invoke a particular object belonging to principal $p$. Principal $p$ can grant this right to another principal $q$ by asserting a delegation: $q \triangleright p \triangleright obj \triangleright invoke @ p$.

We leave projection dimensions underspecified, and access control mechanisms can define their own dimensions. For any projection dimension $alpha$, principal $p$ acts for principal $p \triangleright alpha$, as captured in Rule Proj. Typically the converse does not hold, and so $p \triangleright alpha$ has strictly less authority than $p$.

Novel to this work, we introduce closure principals $c_p$ and $g_p$. Given a set of delegations $D$ and principal $p$,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primitives</th>
<th>$\mathcal{P} ::= a \mid b \mid \ldots$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Projection dimensions</td>
<td>$d ::= \alpha \mid \beta \mid \ldots$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principals</td>
<td>$p,q,r,s ::= \mathcal{P} \mid \top \mid \bot \mid p \land q \mid p \lor q$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegations</td>
<td>$A ::= p \triangleright p \triangleright p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation sets</td>
<td>$D ::= {A, A, \ldots}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 FLAM considers basis projections and ownership projections. The projections we use here are more general and have less structure than either. In addition to preserving the acts-for lattice, the only structure we impose is that projections are commutative: $p \triangleright alpha \triangleright beta \triangleright p \triangleright beta \triangleright alpha$. |
the left-closure principal \( \overleftarrow{p} \) represents \( p \) with all of the trust relationships derivable from \( D \) where \( p \) delegates its authority to other principals. The right-closure principal \( \overrightarrow{p} \) represents \( p \) with all of the trust relationships derivable from \( D \) where \( p \) acts for other principals. In our framework, delegations may change over time. Closure principals are useful because they allow us to capture trust relationships as they exist at particular moments in time. In particular, closure principals are a principled mechanism to describe how authority captured by a context contract should be combined with the current authority environment based on which parts of the closed over authority environment are trusted by principals in the current authority environment.

Rule closure-left shows that \( D; r \vdash p \overleftarrow{p} q \) holds when there is some principal \( s \) such that at the time of closure creation (i.e., with delegation set \( D' \)), \( s \) believed that \( p \) acted for \( q \) (premise \( D' ; s \vdash p \overrightarrow{q} q \)), and moreover, right now (i.e., with delegation set \( D \)) principal \( r \) trusts principal \( \overleftarrow{p} \) (premise \( D ; r \vdash p \overrightarrow{p} s \overrightarrow{r} \)). Typically, \( s \) and \( r \) are the same principal, meaning that \( r \) at-time-\( D \) trusts the decisions made by \( r \) at-time-\( D' \). Rule closure-right is similar and \( D; r \vdash p \overrightarrow{p} q \) holds when there is some principal \( s \) such that at the time the closure was taken \( s \) believed that \( p \) acted for \( q \) (premise \( D' ; s \vdash p \overrightarrow{q} q \)), and principal \( r \) trusts \( s \) at-time-\( D' \) (premise \( D ; r \vdash p \overrightarrow{p} s \overrightarrow{r} \)).

To query whether a particular set of delegations satisfies an acts-for relation, we use a proof search algorithm adapted from FLAM [5]. We give examples of using delegations to implement different authorization mechanisms in Section 4.

Based on this logic, we represent an authority environment as:

1. a principal, who is responsible for the current execution context, and
2. a delegation set, which records the current trust relationships between principals.

The latter has two sub-parts: a global, mutable delegation set, and a set of delegations that are in place only for a currently executing context.

### 3.3 Authorization Contracts

Using authority environments, we can now introduce authorization contracts. Authorization contracts specialize context contracts in two ways. First, they prevent interference from untrusted code by using parameters that the rest of the program does not have access to. Second, they use a high-level representation of authority environments rather than directly manipulating parameters. Authorization contracts provide a structured way to describe how the underlying context contracts should manipulate authority environments.

Authorization contracts are defined as monitor actions using the define-monitor form (\( \text{define-monitor} \)). In this section, we model a pared-down version of define-monitor as an extension to the language model from Section 3.1. Figure 8 displays the syntax of the extension. The extension introduces new types, constructors, and operations for principals, delegations, and delegations sets, including an expression that evaluates an acts-for judgment: \( c : e \vdash e \geq e \). The define-monitor form corresponds to the monitor \( (a \ldots) \) form that can appear in the where clause of a module definition in the extended model. Each \( a \) in monitor \( (a \ldots) \) is an action specification. An action specification \( \text{action} x(y : \tau, \ldots) \ (ce,ae) \) has a name \( x \), a set of arguments \( (y : \tau, \ldots) \), and two terms \( (ce \text{ and } ae) \) that define the action’s \( \# : \text{on-create} \) and \( \# : \text{on-apply} \) hooks.

The term for the \( \# : \text{on-create} \) hook has the form

\[
\]

and specifies what the authorization contract should do when the contract is applied to a value. In particular it describes how to modify each part of the authority environment. Its field check accepts an acts-for judgment. If this judgement does not hold, a contract error is raised blaming the client of the contract. Field add accepts a set of delegations to add to the global delegation set. Field remove accepts a set of delegations to remove from the global delegation set, if present. Field set-principal changes the current principal to the given principal. Fields closure-principal and closure-delegations accept a principal and a set of delegations, respectively, and record the principal and delegations for use upon a call to the contracted function. Terms in each of these six fields can access the pieces of the current authority environment using current-principal and current-delegations.
which specifies what the authorization contract should do to implement a variety of access control mechanisms (§4).

Figure 8. Syntax extensions for authorization contracts.

| $m$ ::= module $\ell$ exports $x$,... where $x = e$,... $\cdot$ monitor $(a,\ldots),x = e$... |
| $v$ ::= ... | $\top$ | $\bot$ | $P$ | $D$ | $v \vartriangleright v \circ v$ | $\{v,\ldots\}$ |
| $e$ ::= ... | new-principal | new-dimension | $e \vartriangleright e$ | $e ; e \vdash e$ | $e \Rightarrow e$ | $e \bowtie e$ | $\text{let } x \vartriangleright x \uplus x = e \in e$ |
| $\beta$ ::= ... | Prin | Dim | Del | DelSet |
| $a$ ::= action $x (y : \tau,\ldots)$ $(ce,ae)$ |
| $ce$ ::= check: $ce$ add: $ce$ remove: $ce$ set-principal?: $ce$ closure-principal: $ce$ closure-delegations: $ce$ |
| $ae$ ::= check: $ae$ add: $ae$ remove: $ae$ scope: $ae$ set-principal?: $ae$ principal: $ae$ set!-principal: $ae$ |
| $cee$ ::= $e$ | $\text{let } x = cee \in cee$ | current-principal | current-delegations |
| $ace$ ::= $e$ | $\text{let } x = ace \in ace$ | current-principal | current-delegations | closure-principal | closure-delegations |

The second term corresponds to the #:on-apply hook, which specifies what the authorization contract should do upon a call of the function. It has the form

$$\text{check: } cee \text{ add: } cee \text{ remove: } cee \text{ set-principal?: } cee \text{ closure-principal: } cee \text{ closure-delegations: } cee.$$

Similar to a $ce$ term, it allows the configuration of the contract’s behavior. As before, $\text{check}$ accepts an acts-for judgment and raises a contract error if it does not hold. Likewise, fields $\text{add}$ and $\text{remove}$ mutate the global delegation set, and field $\text{set-principal?}$ changes the current principal. The $\text{scope}$ field accepts a set of delegations, but this set is installed only for the dynamic extent of the current function call, rather than added to the global delegation set. The $\text{set-principal?}$ field requires a boolean value. If that value is $\#t$, the current authorization environment is extended with a principal for the dynamic extent of the function call. This (1) allows changing the principal visible within the extent of the function call and (2) prevents contracts that change the principal during the extent of the function call from modifying the principal of the enclosing context. In addition to accessing the current principal and delegations from the authority environment, the seven fields of an $ae$ term can access the principal and delegations closed over by the contract with terms $\text{closure-principal}$ and $\text{closure-delegations}$.

To give a detailed semantics for $\text{monitor}$ terms, we use a compilation function that replaces $\text{monitor}$ expressions with terms that explicitly construct context contracts. The compilation uses five parameters: one each for the current principal, global delegation set, and scoped delegation set, plus a pair to record the closed-over principal and delegations. Each $\text{monitor}$ term generates a fresh set of parameters, preventing separately defined monitors from interfering with each other. Each $\text{action}$ term compiles to a single context contract that closes over the fresh parameters. The full compilation function is listed in Appendix A along with typing judgments for authorization contracts and the semantics of expressions that operate on principals, dimensions, delegations, and delegation sets.

The hooks for defining actions are sufficiently flexible to implement a variety of access control mechanisms (§4). Here, we briefly describe some of the ways programmers can configure authorization contracts.

**Mutable Authority** Many access control mechanisms have a global policy that changes over time. For example, in discretionary access control, users can grant or revoke access to their resources. We can implement this with a contract that adds or removes (global) delegations.

**Dynamically-scoped Authority** An authority closure can inherit the authority environment from its calling context by ignoring the authority environment it closes over.

“Lexically”-scoped Authority An authority closure can isolate itself from the authority of its calling context by replacing the authority environment at a call site with the authority that it closes over.

Moreover, different access control mechanisms may require authorization contracts that blend these different strategies. For example, implementing setuid-like authority closures requires capturing the principal but not the delegations the closures close over. Otherwise, updates to the global, mutable discretionary access control policy would be forgotten when a setuid function runs.

4. Putting Authorization Contracts to Work

As evidence of the usefulness and expressiveness of the framework, we implemented a variety of existing access control mechanisms including discretionary access control, stack inspection [42], history-based access control [11], and object capabilities [27]. Before delving into the mechanisms, we further explain $\text{define-monitor}$, the main linguistic tool that our framework provides.

4.1 The $\text{define-monitor}$ Form

Figure 9 shows the complete syntax of $\text{define-monitor}$. It has two sections in addition to the $\text{action}$ section we have seen before: $\text{extra}$ and $\text{syntax}$. The first defines extra functions and contracts that the programmer wants to include in the interface of a monitor. These are usually contracts that combine two or more actions together or contracts that fix the arguments of an action. The $\text{syntax}$ section defines macros that
We extended the basic discretionary access control monitor make-object/c without modifying any delegations. Action wrapped function requires that the current principal at the make-user/c Action when defining a function. We give examples of definitions in the sections later. The monitor-interface and monitor-syntax-interface clauses specify which elements are available to users of the monitor. After defining a monitor monitor-name, a client can instantiate it with (run monitor-name). This creates a fresh monitor, i.e., one with a fresh authority environment and contracts.

The most complicated part of defining a monitor is writing the two hooks for each monitor action. To facilitate this, we provide two functions, do-create and do-apply, that simplify this process. Each function has optional keyword arguments corresponding to the fields of an action form in Section 3.3. The functions provide default values for any argument not specified. Thus, the programmer need only specify the results of the hooks they care about. For instance, the default value for the argument with keyword #:check seen in Figure 1 is an acts-for relation that is always true.

### 4.2 A Discretionary Access Control Monitor

In a discretionary access control system, individual users can choose what policy to enforce on objects they control. We extended the basic discretionary access control monitor from Figure 1 with additional contracts for marking functions as objects owned by individual users, and for granting or revoking the right to invoke these functions. The resulting monitor is shown in Figure 1 in Appendix C. It defines four actions: make-user/c, make-object/c, grant/c, and revoke/c. Action make-user/c creates an authority closure that captures a fresh principal representing a new user. Invoking the wrapped function requires that the current principal at the call site is authorized for the invoke projection of the new user’s authority, and switches to the new user’s principal without modifying any delegations. Action make-object/c creates a new projection of the current user’s authority, and requires that any context invoking the wrapped function has authority to use this projection of the user’s authority. Action grant/c takes two functions as arguments, one wrapped with a make-user/c authorization contract and one wrapped with a make-object/c contract. When a function wrapped with this contract is applied, the contract adds a new delegation that says the principal of the make-user/c closure acts for the principal of the make-object/c closure. This delegation is ignored if the current context has insufficient authority to delegate the object. Similarly, revoke/c takes a user and an object as arguments, and removes any delegation from the global delegation environment that grants the user right to invoke the object where the current principal acts for the principal that asserted the delegation.

### 4.3 A Stack Inspection Monitor

In stack inspection [42], code obtains permissions based on static properties such as the package it belongs to. At run time, code can choose to enable its static permissions making them eligible for satisfying an access control check. Before a sensitive operation, stack inspection checks for the presence of a particular permission by walking the run-time call stack until a frame from code that has enabled the permission is found. To prevent luring attacks [42], stack inspection additionally requires that all execution contexts between the enabled permission and the authorization check have the required static permission. Despite this protection, untrusted code may be able to influence the program even if its frames are no longer on the stack. As a result, modern adaptations of stack inspection provide additional support for capturing the permissions of the stack at some point in an execution and reinstating them for a later check.

Implementations of stack inspection provide the following primitives: checkPermission, which checks that a frame on the stack has the required permission enabled and that all intervening frames have the required static permission; doPrivileged, which enables the static permissions of the current code for its dynamic extent, possibly using captured permissions instead of the current permissions; and getPermissionContext, which captures the permissions of the stack at some point in an execution and reinstating them for a later check.

To realize stack inspection using authorization contracts, a monitor must provide (1) actions that implement these primitives and (2) a way to grant static permissions to code. To track which permissions are held by code on the stack, we use the authority environment to grant permissions to individual frames, each represented by a distinct principal. Each stack frame has three projections that are used to manage its authority. The static projection indicates the permissions granted to the code statically. The enable projection has the authority of the permissions enabled for this frame. The active projection represents permissions that would satisfy a privilege check. We say a

![Fig 9](image-url)
The right-closure principal on the right hand side of this delegation acts for all of the principals that closure-principal acted for when the closure was created.

The monitor must also provide (2) a way to grant static permissions to code. Because Racket does not have class-loading facilities that would allow permissions to be granted to code at load-time, we use macros to attach authorization contracts to code that should have static permissions. In particular, the monitor provides a new definition form define/rights in its syntax section. This form works like the define form,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(define/rights (read-file file) (filesys)} \\
\text{ (check-permission/c filesys)} \\
\text{ ...)} \\
\text{(define/rights (read-privileged file) (filesys)} \\
\text{ do-privileged/c} \\
\text{ (if (safe? file) (read-file file) #f))} \\
\text{(define/rights (malicious) (net)} \\
\text{ any/c} \\
\text{ (read-file "/etc/passwd"))}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 10. Using the stack inspection monitor

but takes two additional arguments: a set of permissions and a contract to apply to the definition. It defines a function wrapped with the given contract and a privileged/c contract. In addition, the macro define/rights coerces any function arguments or free-variables appearing in the body of the function to authority closures by applying an additional contract unprivileged/c, which is defined in the extra section of the monitor. Action unprivileged/c switches to the ⊥ principal for the dynamic extent of the closure it wraps, preventing any check-permission/c actions from succeeding. Thus, these contracts prevent functions that were not defined with define/rights from using code that requires permissions.

The complete implementation of the monitor is given in Figure 12 in Appendix C, and Figure 10 shows an example program using the stack inspection monitor. There are three functions defined using define/rights. Two of these functions are trusted to access the filesystem: read-file and read-privileged. However, read-file should not be used directly, so it checks that the filesys permission has been enabled by one of its callers. Function read-privileged enables the filesys permission, but only calls read-file if the file is safe to read. Function malicious does not have the filesys permission but attempts to read "/etc/passwd" anyway, so invoking this function results in a contract violation. The contract violation says that the stack frame corresponding to the call to read-file does not have the necessary permission filesys.

4.4 A History-Based Access Control Monitor

Abadi and Fournet [1] observe that stack inspection fails to protect against attacks where the influence of untrusted code is no longer apparent from the call stack. As a remedy, they propose history-based access control (HBAC). In HBAC, the rights of an execution context depend not just on the
rights of code currently on the execution stack, but also on the rights of all code that has previously been executed. HBAC has two primitives: grant and accept. grant has the same behavior as the do-privileged operator we implement for stack inspection. accept allows a component to take responsibility for code in its dynamic extent. After accept returns, it restores any privileges that were present before it was invoked.

Our implementation of a monitor for HBAC is very similar to the monitor for stack inspection, and is shown in Figure 13 in Appendix C. The primary difference between the two monitors is the definition of action privileged/c. In the HBAC monitor, in addition to initializing the three projections for the new frame, its #:on-apply event walks the call stack by reading the current delegations. For every frame on the call stack, it adds a disjunct with the callee’s static permissions to the delegation that granted permissions from that frame’s caller. For example, the delegation:

(⊩@ (▷ parent enable) (▷ grandparent active) grandparent)

is replaced with the delegation:

(⊩@ (▷ parent enable) (∨ (▷ grandparent active) (▷ callee static))
grandparent)

This means that future attempts to use the parent frame’s permissions will be restricted to whatever rights the callee had, unless the parent frame specifically vouches for an action by enabling its own permissions.

We define accept/c in the extra section. accept/c uses the accept-context/c action to create an authority closure around its continuation. When the function accept/c wraps returns, accept/c invokes this continuation, restoring the authority environment before the wrapped function was called.

4.5 An Object Capability Monitor

Authority closures are closely related to the idea of capabilities. A capability both designates a resource and confers the authority necessary to use it. An authority closure designates resources (those accessed by the wrapped function) and captures the authority that should be used to access those resources. Any code that can invoke an authority closure can exercise the authority of the closure, though that authority is attenuated by the functionality of the closure itself. For example, in our web application example, login is a capability that allows any code that invokes it to use the “root” user’s authority; however, the implementation of the login function ensures that this authority can be used only to switch to a different user after supplying the correct password.

In a memory-safe programming language, any reference to a value can be considered a capability that grants restricted access to some set of resources that can be accessed through it (by invoking or otherwise inspecting it). Object-capability languages like E, Joe-E, or Caja, embrace this fact as the basis of their security architecture. In an object-capability language, all sensitive resources are represented as objects. Access to these objects is controlled by structuring the language to limit the ways that objects acquire references to other objects:

1. by initial conditions: two objects may reference each other before a computation begins,
2. by parenthood: the creator of an object is initially the only object with a reference to it,
3. by endowment: an object can close over references to objects available in its parent’s environment, and
4. by introduction: an object can receive a references to other objects passed as arguments to its methods or returned from methods it invokes.

These restrictions are sometimes referred to as “capability safety” and are designed to support modular reasoning about security. For example, the restrictions above are sufficient to enforce the property that “only connectivity begets connectivity;” that is, two components may communicate or share references only via a capability shared by both components.

We built a monitor to enforce capability safety. This monitor, shown in Figure 14 in Appendix C, defines two actions. capability/c and unprivileged-capability/c, which is the same as the capability/c, but does not grant any initial authority. These actions enforce capability safety by creating a new principal for each capability and using delegations to specify when one capability has the authority to invoke another. Their #:on-create hooks handle parenthood and endowment and their #:on-apply hooks handle introduction. Parenthood amounts to a delegation:

(⊩@ (▷ parent caps) (▷ child invoke) child)

Similarly, endowment closes over the current authority of the parent and grants it to the child:

(⊩@ (▷ child caps)
(→ (▷ parent caps)
current-delegations)
parent)

We must also assert that the parent authorizes the use of its closed-over delegations for the rest of the execution:

(⊩@ (← parent current-delegations) parent parent)

Introduction is implemented by adding additional delegations granting callees authority over arguments they are passed, and vice versa for return values.

5. Case Studies

To evaluate the use of our framework in practical applications, we developed three case studies. The first adds simple
authorization contracts to the implementation of a card game to ensure that player’s moves affect only the parts of the game state they control. The second secures a plugin interface of the DrRacket development environment and demonstrates how the flexibility of the framework can support complex security mechanisms. The third, which mirrors the example from Section 2.2, replaces authorization checks in a web application with authorization contracts.

We evaluated the performance of our framework on each case study. The experiments were conducted on a MacBook Pro with a 2.6 GHz Intel Core i5 and 16GB of RAM running Mac OS X 10.11 and Racket 6.4.0.9. In the first two case studies, authorization contracts have significant impact on the performance of the benchmarks. However, both case studies are worst case scenarios: they have no existing code implementing access control (and so we are strictly adding functionality), and after adding contracts, they invoke many access control checks (tens of thousands in the case of the card game) while performing cheap operations. Moreover, in the DrRacket case study, the absolute overhead for each benchmark due to authorization contracts is less than 45ms, but the relative overhead is high since the baseline running time is less than 15ms. The third case study replaces existing access control checks with authorization contracts, with negligible impact on performance. Our implementation is a prototype, and we anticipate that optimizations in the implementation of our contracts can further reduce their overhead.

Preventing Cheating in a Card Game  We have used authorization contracts to enforce a security policy for a functional implementation of the card game Dominion. The exact rules of Dominion do not matter for our purpose, except that each player collects cards in a local deck and attempts to outscore the rest of the players by playing cards from their deck. During each turn, players can play cards from their deck to either purchase additional cards or attack other players, forcing them to discard some of their cards.

In this implementation, each player is a program that runs in its own process and responds automatically to messages from a central broker. The broker maintains the shared inventory of cards and a mirror of each player’s local deck. Players perform moves by sending messages to the broker describing the move.

To perform a move, the player sends a message to the broker identifying a card to play. In response, the broker updates its copy of the game state to reflect the move and, if the move involves an attack on another player, informs the other player of the attack. The other player then has an opportunity to defend by choosing which card to discard and the broker again updates the game state.

The broker represents the local deck of each player as an immutable record player and the state of the game as an immutable structure game that holds a list of player records. The first element in this list corresponds to the player who makes the next move. The broker is implemented as a core drive function that delegates to two functions: move and defend. Both functions perform functional updates to the relevant structures.

We enforce the policy that the broker only updates the current player’s deck or a defending player’s deck. The monitor that enforces this policy specifies three authorization contracts: deprivilege/c, which sets the principal for the dynamic extent of a function to ⊥; (switch-player/c name), which sets the principal for the dynamic extent of a function to the player with name name; and (check-player/c name), which checks before calling a function if the current principal is the player with name name.

To enforce the policy, we attach contract deprivilege/c to the function drive so that only authorized code can modify the game state during the game. The contract for the game structure, game/c, gives the accessor functions of each field of the player records in the game the contract (check-player/c name), where name is the name of the corresponding player. The contract for the move function is

$$\text{return} \{ \text{game} / \text{c} \} / \{ \text{turn} / \text{c} \} / \{ \text{play} / \text{c} \}$$

and it authorizes the move function to act on behalf of the current player, i.e., (first (game-players game)). The contract for defend is

$$\text{return} \{ \text{player} / \text{c} \} / \{ \text{defense} / \text{c} \}$$

which similarly allows the function to update the state of the player who was attacked.

We created 10 benchmarks for the Dominion case study that each consists of a simulated game with 2–7 players. Adding authorization contracts increases running time by 1.3–1.7× at both the median and 99th percentile.

Securing a Plugin Interface  We wrote a monitor to protect DrRacket from malicious or buggy third-party key bindings. First, we explain aspects of DrRacket’s design related to key bindings. Keystrokes sent to DrRacket are dispatched as method calls to a text% object which encapsulates the state of the editor. This object has methods that access and modify parts of DrRacket. For instance, the get-text method returns the content of the editor, while the set-padding method changes the inset padding used to display the editor’s content. Each text% object has a keymap% object that stores
registered key bindings and maps sequences of keystrokes to the action they trigger. A keybinding action is an arbitrary Racket function of two arguments: the current text% object and an event% object, which describes the event that triggered the action. On startup, DrRacket populates its text% object’s key map with built-in key bindings. In addition, DrRacket registers user-defined key bindings from configuration files. Keybinding actions can inspect and modify almost any aspect of DrRacket through the text% object. This gives users a powerful interface for customizing DrRacket but makes key bindings a source of vulnerabilities. For instance, a key binding could accidentally erase the user’s code or snoop on the editing session.

Our monitor restricts which text% object methods a key-binding action can invoke. We group methods of text% that can access or modify similar parts of DrRacket. For instance, methods that write to the clipboard (e.g. cut and copy) belong to the same group while methods that change how DrRacket displays content (e.g. set-max-width and set-line-spacing) belong to a second group. Each group has a corresponding privilege that is required to invoke the group’s methods. For example, the privileges ReadClipboard and ChangeEditorView grant access to the methods mentioned above. Methods can belong to multiple groups. Access control checks around each method verify that the authority of a calling execution context has the necessary privileges.

In addition to methods that require specific privileges to invoke, text% has sensitive methods that should be invoked only by another method of the text% object. For example, the on-delete method should never be invoked directly as its correctness depends on DrRacket’s state. Instead, key bindings should invoke the delete method that subsequently calls on-delete. To support this use case, we require an additional privilege to call on-delete that is granted during the dynamic extent of delete.

The stack-inspection-like access control mechanism we have described so far is not sufficient. Some methods of text% install callbacks that are triggered by subsequent events. For example, add-undo registers a callback that runs when the user wishes to undo the action of a key binding. This callback should not run with the authority of its calling context, but instead should use the privileges of the action that created it. To achieve this, we create authority closures around any callbacks registered by an action.

Our monitor represents each privilege as a unique principal and represents sets of principals as conjunctions and disjunctions of principals. It defines three actions: check/c, enable/c, and closure/c. Upon an #:on-apply event, the first action consumes principal perms and checks if the current principal has permissions that imply perms. Then the action switches the current principal to a principal that only has permissions perms. When a function wrapped with enable/c is applied, it switches the current principal to a principal that has the same permissions as the current principal augmented with perms. The #:on-create event of the third action creates an authority closure. When the authority closure is applied, it installs the closed-over principal.

We use the actions of the monitor to define an authorization contract for the keybinding interface:

\[
\text{(#>a ([t text/c] [e (is-a?/c event%)])}
\text{#:auth () (check/c perms) any)}
\]

where perms is a principal which encodes the privileges we grant to the key binding and text/c is the object contract we define for the editor’s text% object. text/c applies a contract to each method of text% specifying whether the method enables some permission, requires some permissions, or creates an authority closure around one of its arguments. For example, text/c gives the method blink-caret the contract (check/c ChangeEditorView). In essence, text/c defines a security policy for the editor.

To assess the monitor’s performance, we ran a series of 30 benchmarks, adapted from DrRacket’s test suite, that simulate a sequence of keystrokes that trigger built-in key bindings. We ran these benchmarks with the monitor off and on. When the monitor is on, the prototype grants the minimum set of privileges necessary for each key binding. For each benchmark, we measured the time required to retrieve and execute each key binding. Our measurements show that the authority monitor increases median response time by 3–7× and increases response time at the 90th percentile by 3–5×. However, for an IDE, a response time fast enough for interactive use is more important. Our prototype achieves this goal with a maximum response time of 53ms.

**Authentication in a Web Application** The Racket package system allows users to discover and install packages from a public index service. Individual users can add new packages or update old ones by logging into the index service web application, which is implemented using the Racket web-server. Requests to add or modify packages are issued to the application as asynchronous http requests. The baseline implementation of the application uses macros to authenticate the user and perform any required access control checks before processing the request. For example, the jsonp/pkg/modify endpoint authenticates the current user and checks that they are an author of the package they are attempting to modify. This approach to access control is brittle, since it requires that the checks included for each endpoint accurately capture the privileges required when processing the response.

Using authorization contracts, we are able to separate the tasks of authentication and authorization in the index service web application. Rather than performing a different set of access control checks for each endpoint, all endpoints now simply invoke an authenticate function that checks whether the current session is valid and which user is logged in, then invokes a procedure to process the request, like the login function from Section 2. This allows the access control policies for sensitive operations like updating a package to be enforced by
adding authorization contracts that implement the necessary checks to the web application’s data model. There are two types of checks: \((\text{is-author/c pkg})\) which checks that the logged in user is an author of package \(\text{pkg}\), and \((\text{is-curateur/c})\) which checks whether the logged in user has “curator” status, which allows them to tag packages with information about their quality.

To evaluate the new implementation’s performance, we measured the latency of 1,000 repeated requests to modify a package record. Replacing inline checks with authorization contracts has minimal impact on performance. Median latency was 283ms for the baseline implementation versus 281ms with authorization contracts. At the 99th percentile, using authorization contracts latency was 338ms versus 330ms with the baseline implementation.

6. Related Work

The connection between scoping and access control has been implicit in prior work on security in programming languages but has never been a central concept for extensible access control. Morris’s seminal paper “Protection in Programming Languages” \([31]\) describes how lexical scope can be used to create security abstractions within a program. More recently, the object-capability paradigm has embraced lexical scope as an organizing security principle \([27]\). Wallach and Felten \([41]\) note that “in some ways, [stack inspection] resembles dynamic variables (where free variables are resolved from the caller’s environment rather than from the environment in which the function is defined).” Phung et al. \([32]\) use dynamic and lexical scoping to associate principals with executing code in order to correctly enforce security policies on programs that mix JavaScript and ActionScript code.

**Inlined Reference Monitors** An alternative approach to language-level access control is inlined reference monitoring. Reference monitors observe the actions taken by a system and intercede to prevent violations of a security policy \([3]\). They can enforce a large class of policies \([34]\). Inlined reference monitoring (IRM) weaves the implementation of a reference monitor into the program being monitored \([13]\). Many implementations of inlined reference monitoring rely on aspects to identify security relevant actions during program execution \([6,7,14,15,21]\). Policies supported by these tools typically focus on access patterns for sensitive resources. While policies supported by our framework can be encoded this way, as in Erlingsson and Schneider’s IRM implementation of Java stack inspection \([14]\), policies where the authority of code depends on application state require duplicating code.

A further disadvantage of IRMs is that they require a global transformation of the program to inline the security monitor. Because authorization contracts are applied at component boundaries, our framework requires only local modifications.

**Authorization Logics** Authorization logics give a formal language to express access control policies \([1]\). Authorization logics have been used to understand existing access control mechanisms, including Java stack inspection \([41]\), Aura \([20]\) and Fine \([38]\) implement access control using proof-carrying authentication, where proofs of formulas in an authorization logic are used as capabilities \([4]\). Our access control logic is inspired by the Flow-Limited Authorization Model \([5]\), which uses projections to describe attenuated authority without requiring additional constructs such as roles or groups.

**Contracts for Security** Previous work has used contracts to enforce limited access control policies. Moore et al. \([29]\) use contracts to constrain the use of capabilities in a secure shell scripting language. Dimoulas et al. \([10]\) use contracts to control the flow of capabilities between components in object-capability languages. Heidegger et al. \([19]\) use contracts to specify which fields of an object may be accessed by a component. However, each of these systems is specialized to enforce a specific type of access control policy. Disney et al. \([11]\) introduce temporal higher-order contracts that enforce that sequences of function calls and returns match a specification. Schollier et al.\([35]\)’s computational contracts \([35]\) can enforce a wide range of trace properties on programs. Unlike authorization contracts and temporal higher-order contracts, computational contracts use aspects to interpose on program events. Both of these systems support arbitrarily powerful monitors, but like inlined reference monitoring, provide limited support for writing complex access control policies like stack inspection or discretionary access control.

**Scoped Aspects for Security** Dutchyn et al. \([12]\) are the first to identify a connection between modular access control and the scoping of aspects that implement authorization checks. They introduce constructs for lexical and dynamic aspect scoping and use them to enforce a simple security policy similar to the one we enforce in \([2,3]\) with authorization contracts. With additional aspect scoping mechanisms, Toledo et al. \([40]\) implement a complete Java stack inspection mechanism in a modular fashion. The exact relation between the expressiveness of scoped aspects and that of authorization contracts is an open question. However, as our case studies and example access control mechanisms demonstrate, authorization contracts are powerful enough to enforce a variety of access control policy classes with a single domain-specific abstraction: authority environments. Doing the same with aspects, if possible, requires brittle and complex encodings in terms of general-purpose advice and aspect scoping.

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References


A. Details of Model

A.1 Evaluation Contexts

\[ E ::= [] \mid E \cdot E \mid v \cdot E \mid \text{let } x = E \text{ in } E \mid \text{if } E \text{ then } c \text{ else } e \mid E \oplus e \mid v \ominus E \mid E \leq e \mid v \leq E \]

\[ \text{make-parameter } E \mid ?E \mid E ::= e \mid p(r) ::= E \]

\[ \text{parameterize } E = e \text{ in } c \mid \text{parameterize } p(r) = E \text{ in } e \mid \text{parameterize } p(r) = v \text{ in } E \]

\[ \text{flat}(E) \mid \text{param}(c) \]

\[ \Gamma : \tau \rightarrow (E) e \mid c : \tau \rightarrow (E) e \mid c : \tau \rightarrow (E) \]

\[ \text{ctx}(E, c \rightarrow e) \mid \text{ctx}(E, c \rightarrow E) \]

\[ \Gamma : \tau \rightarrow \lambda x : \tau. e \mid \Gamma : \tau \rightarrow \lambda x : \tau. E \]

\[ \text{ctx}(E, (v \rightarrow v), \ldots, (E \rightarrow e), (e \rightarrow e - e), \ldots, (e \rightarrow e - e), \ldots) \]

\[ \text{ctx}(E, (v \rightarrow v), \ldots, (E \rightarrow E), (e \rightarrow e - e), \ldots, (e \rightarrow e - e), \ldots) \]

\[ \text{ctx}(E, (v \rightarrow v), \ldots, (E \rightarrow E), (e \rightarrow e - e), \ldots, (e \rightarrow e - e), \ldots) \]

\[ \text{ctx}(E, (v \rightarrow v), \ldots, (E \rightarrow E), (e \rightarrow e - e), \ldots, (e \rightarrow e - e), \ldots) \]

\[ \langle E, v, v, e, E \rangle \mid \langle E, v, v, e, E \rangle \mid \langle E, v, v, e, E \rangle \]

\[ \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x \text{ with } x, \ldots, \text{ where } x = v, \ldots, x = E, x = e, \ldots, p \]

A.2 Typing Judgments

\[ \Sigma \vdash p : \tau \]

\[ \emptyset; \Sigma \vdash m_1 : \Gamma_1 \ldots \Gamma_{n-1} ; \Sigma \vdash m_n : \Gamma_n \quad \Gamma_n ; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau \]

\[ \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash m : \Gamma' \]

\[ \emptyset; \Sigma \vdash e_1 : \tau_1 \ldots \{ y_1 : \tau_1, \ldots, y_{n-1} : \tau_{n-1} \}; \Sigma \vdash e_n : \tau_n \quad \Gamma' = \{ y_1 : \tau_1, \ldots, y_n : \tau_n \} \}

\[ \forall 1 \leq i \leq n'. \exists 1 \leq h \leq n. x_i \equiv y_h \wedge \tau_h \neq \tau \text{ ctc } \wedge \tau_h \neq \tau \text{ ctc } \}

\[ \forall 1 \leq i \leq n'. \exists 1 \leq h \leq n. x_i \equiv y_h \wedge \tau_h = \tau \text{ ctc } \]
A.3 Typing Judgments for Authorization Contract Extensions

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_1 : \text{Unit} \to \text{Bool} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_2 : \text{Unit} \to \text{Bool}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{\text{param}} : \text{Unit} \to \text{Bool} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{\text{c}_1} : \tau_{\text{c}_1} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{\text{c}_2} : \tau_{\text{c}_2}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{\text{var}} : \tau_{\text{a}_1} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{\text{var}_1} : \tau_{\text{a}_1} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{\text{var}_2} : \tau_{\text{a}_2}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{ctx}(e_1, (e_{\text{var}_1} \Rightarrow e_{\text{var}_1} \leftarrow e_{\text{var}_1}), \ldots, e_2, (e_{\text{var}_2} \Rightarrow e_{\text{var}_2} \leftarrow e_{\text{var}_2})) : \text{ctx}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{guard}(e_\text{param}, e, e_\text{f}) : \tau_d \to \tau_r$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{param} : \tau \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{f} : \tau_\text{d} \to \tau_r$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{install}(e_\text{var}_1, e, e_\text{f}) : \tau_d \to \tau_r$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \top : \text{Prin} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \bot : \text{Prin} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \emptyset : \text{Prin} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash D : \text{Dim} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{new-principal} : \text{Prin}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{p} : \text{Prin} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{d} : \text{Dim}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{new-dimension} : \text{Dim} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{fold}(e_\text{w}, e_\text{f}, e_\text{e}) : \tau$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{w} : \text{DelSet} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{e} : \text{DelSet}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{e} : \text{DelSet} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{f} : (\tau \to (\text{Del} \to \tau)) \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{e} : \text{Del}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{e} : \text{DelSet} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{f} : \text{Del} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{f} : \text{Del}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{let}(x_\text{d} \leftarrow e_\text{f}) : e_\text{f} : \tau$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{let}(x_\text{d} \leftarrow e_\text{f}) : e_\text{f} : \tau$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{add}(e_\text{f}, e_\text{d}) : e_\text{d} : \tau$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{remove}(e_\text{f}, e_\text{d}) : e_\text{d} : \tau$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{e} : \text{DelSet} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{f} : \text{Del} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{f} : \text{Del}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{e} : \text{DelSet} \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_\text{f} : \text{Del}$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{check}(e_\text{e} \text{add}: e_\text{c}_1 \text{add}: e_\text{c}_2 \text{remove}: e_\text{c}_3 \text{set!-principal}: e_\text{c}_4 \text{closure-principal}: e_\text{c}_5 \text{closure-delegations}: e_\text{c}_6)$$

$$\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{check}(e_\text{e} \text{add}: e_\text{c}_1 \text{add}: e_\text{c}_2 \text{remove}: e_\text{c}_3 \text{scope}: e_\text{c}_4 \text{set!-principal}: e_\text{c}_5 \text{principal}: e_\text{c}_6 \text{set!-principal}: e_\text{c}_7)$$
A.4 Compiling Authorization Contract Extensions

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{c}\ell; \tau & \quad \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{a}\ell; \tau \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{a}\ell; \tau_x & \quad \Gamma\{x \mapsto \tau_x\}; \Sigma \vdash \text{c}\ell; \tau \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{c}\ell; \tau_x & \quad \Gamma\{x \mapsto \tau_x\}; \Sigma \vdash \text{c}\ell; \tau
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{let} \; x = \text{a}\ell; \in \text{c}\ell; \tau
\]

\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{current-delegations} : \text{DelSet}
\]

\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{closure-principal} : \text{Prin}
\]

\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{closure-delegations} : \text{DelSet}
\]

\[
\text{compile} \, [\text{module} \ \ell \ \text{exports} \ x_1 \ \text{with} \ x_{c_1}, \ldots \ \text{where} \ y_1 = e_2, \ldots ; \ p] = \\
\text{compile-monitor} \, [\text{module} \ \ell \ \text{exports} \ x_1 \ \text{with} \ x_{c_1}, \ldots \ \text{where} \ y_1 = e_2, \ldots ; \ \text{compile}[p]]
\]

\[
\text{compile}[c] = c
\]

\[
\text{compile-monitor} \, [\text{module} \ \ell \ \text{exports} \ x_1 \ \text{with} \ x_{c_1}, \ldots \\
\text{where} \ y_1 = e_1, \ldots ; \ y_n = c_n,
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{monitor} & \left(\text{action} \ x_1 \ (y_1 : \tau_{y_1}, \ldots) \ (ce_1, ae_1), \ldots, \text{action} \ x_n \ (y_n : \tau_{y_n}, \ldots) \ (ce_n, ae_n))ight), \\
y_{n+1} = c_{n+1}, \ldots & ; y_m = c_m
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{module} \ \ell \ \text{exports} \ x_1 \ \text{with} \ x_{c_1}, \ldots \\
\text{where} \ y_1 = e_1, \ldots ; y_n = e_n,
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
p & = \text{make-parameter} \ T, \ d = \text{make-parameter} \ \ell, \ s = \text{make-parameter} \ \ell, \\
\text{cp} & = \text{make-parameter} \ T, \ \text{cd} = \text{make-parameter} \ \ell, \\
\text{curp} & = \text{make-parameter} \ T, \ \text{curd} = \text{make-parameter} \ \ell, \\
x_{a_1} & = \text{compile-action} \ (\text{action} \ x_1 \ (y_{a_1 : \tau_{y_{a_1}}, \ldots}) \ (ce_1, ae_1), \ldots, \text{action} \ x_n \ (y_n : \tau_{y_n}, \ldots) \ (ce_n, ae_n)), \\
\ldots & \\
x_{a_n} & = \text{compile-action} \ (\text{action} \ x_1 \ (y_{a_0 : \tau_{y_{a_0}}, \ldots}) \ (ce_n, ae_n), \ldots, \text{action} \ x_n \ (y_n : \tau_{y_n}, \ldots) \ (ce_n, ae_n)), \ y_{n+1} = c_{n+1}, \ldots ; y_m = c_m
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{where} \ p, d, s, \text{cp}, \text{cd}, \text{curp}, \text{curd} \ \text{are fresh}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ctx}/c & (\text{compile-cc}\_\text{check} \, [ce, p, d, s, \text{curp}, \text{curd}], \\
\text{compile-cc}\_\ell & (ce, \text{cp}, \text{curp}, \text{curd}], \\
\text{compile-cc}\_p & (ce, \text{cp}, \text{curp}, \text{curd}], \\
\text{compile-cc}\_ae & (ce, \text{cp}, \text{curp}, \text{curd}], \\
\text{compile-cc}\_ae & (ce, \text{cp}, \text{curp}, \text{curd}], \\
\text{compile-cc}\_ae & (ce, \text{cp}, \text{curp}, \text{curd}], \\
\text{compile-cc}\_ae & (ce, \text{cp}, \text{curp}, \text{curd}],
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{compile-ce}\_\text{check} \, [\text{check} : e_1 \ \text{add} : e_2 \ \text{remove} : e_3 \ \text{set!-principal} : e_4 \ \text{closure-principal} : e_5 \ \text{closure-delegations} : e_6, p, d, s, \text{curp}, \text{curd}] = \\
\lambda \_ : \text{Unit}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{let} \_ & = \text{curp} \mapsto \text{?p in} \\
\text{let} \_ & = \text{curd} \mapsto \text{?d} \cup \text{?s in} \\
\text{let} \ p_1 & \geq p_2 \ @ p_1 = \text{compile-cc}[e_1, \text{curp}, \text{curd}] \ \text{in} \\
\text{if} \ (\text{?curd}) : p_1 \geq p_2 \ & \text{then} \\
\text{let} \text{add} = \text{compile-cc}[e_2, \text{curp}, \text{curd}] \ & \text{in} \\
\text{let} \text{remove} = \text{compile-cc}[e_3, \text{curp}, \text{curd}] \ & \text{in} \\
\text{let} \text{setprin} = \text{compile-cc}[e_4, \text{curp}, \text{curd}] \ & \text{in} \\
\text{let} \_ & = d \mapsto (\text{?d} \cup \text{?add})/\text{remove in} \\
\text{let} \_ & = p \mapsto \text{setprin in} \\
\text{#1} & \text{else} \ \\
\text{compile-ce}\_p & [\text{check} : e_1 \ \text{add} : e_2 \ \text{remove} : e_3 \ \text{set!-principal} : e_4 \ \text{closure-principal} : e_5 \ \text{closure-delegations} : e_6, p, d, s, \text{curp}, \text{curd}] = \\
(\lambda \_ : \text{Unit} \ \#1) & \mapsto \text{cp} \left(\lambda \_ : \text{Unit} \ \text{compile-cc}[e_5, \text{curp}, \text{curd}]\right)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{compile-ce}\_a & [\text{check} : e_1 \ \text{add} : e_2 \ \text{remove} : e_3 \ \text{set!-principal} : e_4 \ \text{closure-principal} : e_5 \ \text{closure-delegations} : e_6, p, d, s, \text{curp}, \text{curd}] = \\
(\lambda \_ : \text{Unit} \ \#1) & \mapsto \text{cd} \left(\lambda \_ : \text{Unit} \ \text{compile-cc}[e_6, \text{curp}, \text{curd}]\right)
\end{align*}
\]
A.6 Reduction Semantics for Authorization Contract Extensions

\[ E ::= \ldots \mid E \vdash e \mid v \vdash c \mid E ; e \vdash e \vDash e \mid v ; v \vdash E \vDash e \mid v ; v \vdash v \vDash E \mid \{ E \} \mid E \cup e \mid v \cup E \mid E \setminus e \mid E \setminus v \mid E \]

A.5 Authorization Contract Extension Evaluation Contexts

\( \text{compile-ae} \text{e} \mid \text{check: e}_1 \mid \text{add: e}_2 \mid \text{remove: e}_3 \mid \text{scope: e}_4 \mid \text{set-principal?: e}_5 \mid \text{principal: e}_6 \mid \text{set!-principal: e}_7 \mid p, d, s, c, p, \text{curp, curd} \) \[
\lambda \_ : \text{Unit}.
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{let } &\_ = \text{curp} := ?p \text{ in} \\
\text{let } &\_ = \text{curd} := ?d \cup ?s \text{ in} \\
\text{let } &p_1 \triangleright p_2 \oslash p_3 = \text{compile-ae} \text{e}_1, \text{curp, curd, cp, cd} \text{ in} \\
\text{if } &\langle \text{curd} \rangle : p_3 \vdash p_1 \triangleright p_2 \text{ then} \\
\text{let } &\_ = \text{add} = \text{compile-ae} \text{e}_2, \text{curp, curd, cp, cd} \text{ in} \\
\text{let } &\_ = \text{remove} = \text{compile-ae} \text{e}_3, \text{curp, curd, cp, cd} \text{ in} \\
\text{let } &\_ = \text{setprin} = \text{compile-ae} \text{e}_7, \text{curp, curd, cp, cd} \text{ in} \\
\text{let } &\_ = d := ( ?d \cup \text{add} ) / \text{remove} \text{ in} \\
\text{let } &\_ = p := \text{setprin} \text{ in} \\
\end{align*}
\]

A.6 Reduction Semantics for Authorization Contract Extensions

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle E [\text{new-principal}], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [p], \sigma \rangle \text{ where } p \text{ is fresh} \\
\langle E [\text{new-dimension}], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [d], \sigma \rangle \text{ where } d \text{ is fresh} \\
\langle E [\{ p_1 \triangleright p_1 \oslash p_1, \ldots \}; p_0 \vdash p_0 \triangleright p_0], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [\#], \sigma \rangle \text{ if } \{ p_1 \triangleright p_1 \oslash p_1, \ldots \}; p_0 \triangleright p_0 \oslash p_0 \\
\langle E [\{ p_1 \triangleright p_1 \oslash p_1, \ldots \}; p_0 \vdash p_0 \triangleright p_0], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [\#], \sigma \rangle \text{ if } \{ p_1 \triangleright p_1 \oslash p_1, \ldots \}; p_0 \oslash p_0 \vdash p_0 \\
\langle E [\{ v_1, \ldots , v_{1n} \} \cup \{ v_{21}, \ldots , v_{2m} \}], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [\{ v_{31}, \ldots , v_{3k} \}], \sigma \rangle \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{where } &\{ v_{31}, \ldots , v_{3k} \} = \{ v_{11}, \ldots , v_{1n} \} \cup \{ v_{21}, \ldots , v_{2m} \} \\
\langle E [\{ v_{11}, \ldots , v_{1n} \} \setminus \{ v_{21}, \ldots , v_{2m} \}], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [\{ v_{31}, \ldots , v_{3k} \}], \sigma \rangle \\
\text{where } &\{ v_{31}, \ldots , v_{3k} \} = \{ v_{11}, \ldots , v_{1n} \} \setminus \{ v_{21}, \ldots , v_{2m} \} \\
\langle E [\{ v_{11}, \ldots , v_{1n} \} \setminus \{ v_{21}, \ldots , v_{2m} \}], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [\{ v_{31}, \ldots , v_{3k} \}], \sigma \rangle \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\langle E [\text{fold} \{ v \}; v], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [v], \sigma \rangle \\
\langle E [\text{fold} \{ v_1, v_2, \ldots \}; v_f v], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [\text{fold} \{ v_2, \ldots \}; v_f ((v_f v) v_1)], \sigma \rangle \\
\langle E [\text{let} x \geq x_0 \oslash x = v_s \geq v_l \oslash v_r \in e], \sigma \rangle &\rightarrow \langle E [v_s, v_r / x_0, x_0 \oslash x_0] e], \sigma \rangle \\
\end{align*}
\]
B. Proof of complete monitoring

This appendix demonstrates that CtxPCF satisfies complete monitoring. Complete monitoring states that a contract system correctly assigns blame to components that violate their contracts and, crucially, that the contract system can interpose on all uses of a value in a component that did not create that value. We follow Dimoulas et. al.'s standard techniques for stating and proving complete monitoring. The formalization has two key aspects:

1. We develop an independent mechanism to provide a ground truth for ownership of values. To accomplish this, we devise an annotated version of the CtxPCF semantics that has the same behavior, but also keeps track of ownership by annotating values as they flow from one component to another. To ensure that the annotated semantics is truly an independent system for tracking ownership, the semantic rules that implement contract boundaries do not modify ownership annotations on values that flow through contracts.

2. The semantics of the annotated language are modified so that programs get stuck when a component accesses a "foreign" value, i.e., a value from another component that is not protected by the contract system. Using this annotated semantics, complete monitoring can be stated as a soundness property that states that well-formed programs (those whose initial ownership annotations agree with the placement of contracts in the surface program) do not get stuck because components access “foreign” values. Using a straightforward subject-reduction technique, we show that CtxPCF (and Ctrl+CtxPCF, its extension with first-class control operators) satisfies complete monitoring.

B.1 Surface CtxPCF

B.1.1 Surface Programs

\[ p ::= \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x \text{ with } \ldots \text{ where } x = e, \ldots \]
\[ m ::= x \mid v \mid e \mid \mu x : \tau \cdot e \mid \text{let } x = e \text{ in } e \mid \text{if } e \text{ then } e \text{ else } e \mid e \oplus e \mid e \leq e \]
\[ e ::= \text{make-parameter } e \mid \text{parameterize } e = e \text{ in } e \mid ?e \mid e ::= e \]
\[ e ::= \text{flat/(c)}(e) \mid \text{param/c}(e) \mid e : \tau \rightarrow (e) e \mid e : \tau \rightarrow_a (\lambda x : \tau . e) e \]
\[ e ::= \text{ctx/c}(e, e \Rightarrow e) \ldots e, (e \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e) \ldots \]
\[ v ::= () \mid n \mid \#t \mid \#f \mid \lambda x : \tau . e \mid c \]
\[ c ::= \text{flat/(c)}(v) \mid \text{param/c}(e) \mid e : \tau \rightarrow (e) c \mid e : \tau \rightarrow (\lambda x : \tau . e) c \]
\[ c ::= \text{ctx/c}(v, (v \Rightarrow v) \ldots v, (v \Rightarrow v \leftarrow v) \ldots) \]
\[ \tau ::= \beta \mid \tau \rightarrow \tau \mid \tau \text{ param} \mid \tau \text{ ctc} \mid \text{ctx ctc} \]
\[ \beta ::= \text{Unit} \mid \text{Int} \mid \text{Bool} \]

B.1.2 Well-typed Surface Programs

\[ \Gamma \vdash p : \tau \]

\[ \emptyset \vdash m_1 : \Gamma_1 \quad \ldots \quad \Gamma_{n-1} \vdash m_n : \Gamma_n \quad \Gamma_n \vdash e : \tau \]
\[ \Gamma \vdash m_1 \ldots m_n ; e : \tau \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash m \rightarrow \Gamma' \]

\[ \emptyset \vdash e_1 : \tau_1 \quad \ldots \quad \{ y_1 : \tau_1, \ldots, y_{n-1} : \tau_{n-1} \} \vdash e_n : \tau_n \quad \Gamma' = \{ y_1 : \tau_1, \ldots, y_n : \tau_n \} \cup \{ x_1, \ldots, x_{n'} \} \]
\[ \forall 1 \leq i \leq n', \exists 1 \leq h \leq n, x_i \equiv y_h \wedge \tau_h \neq \tau \text{ ctc} \wedge \tau_h \neq \text{ctx ctc} \quad \forall 1 \leq i \leq n', \exists 1 \leq h \leq n, x_i \equiv y_h \wedge \tau_h = \tau \text{ ctc} \]
\[ \Gamma \vdash \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1 \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots, x_n \text{ with } x_{c_{n'}} \text{ where } y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n \vdash \Gamma \cup \Gamma' \]
B.2 Annotated Surface CtxPCF

B.2.1 Annotated Surface Programs

\[ e ::= \ldots \mid \ell(x) \]

B.2.2 Additional Typing Rules for Annotated Surface Programs

\[
\Gamma \vdash e : \tau
\]
\[
\Gamma \vdash x : \tau \\
\Gamma \vdash \ell(x) : \tau
\]

B.2.3 Well-formed Annotated Surface Programs

\[
\ell_0 \vdash p
\]
\[
\emptyset \vdash m_1 \triangleright \Delta_1 \quad \ldots \quad \Delta_{n-1} \vdash m_n \triangleright \Delta_n \quad \Delta_n ; \ell_0 \vdash e
\]
\[
\ell_0 \vdash m_1 ; \ldots m_n ; e
\]
\[
\Delta \vdash m \triangleright \Delta'
\]
\[
\emptyset ; \ell \vdash e_1 \quad \ldots \quad \{y_1 : \ell, \ldots, y_{n-1} : \ell \} ; \ell \vdash e_n \quad \Gamma' = \{y_1 : \ell, \ldots, y_n : \ell\} \{x_1, \ldots, x_m\}
\]
\[
\Delta \vdash \text{module exports } x_1 \text{ with } x_{e_1}, \ldots, x_m \text{ with } x_{e_n}, \text{ where } y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n \triangleright \Delta \uplus \Delta'
\]
\[
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e
\]
\[
\Delta ; \ell \vdash () \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash n \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \#1 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \#2 \\
\Delta(x) = \ell \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash x \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_i, \quad i \in \{1, 2\}
\]
\[
\Delta ; \ell \vdash x \leq e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \quad \Delta \vdash \ell \vdash e \quad \Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \quad \Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \text{let } x = e_1 \text{ in } e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_i, \quad i \in \{1, 2\}
\]
\[
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \lambda x : \tau, e \\
\Delta \vdash \ell \vdash \ell \vdash e \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \ell \vdash e_1 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e
\]
\[
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \quad \Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_3 \\
\Delta (\ell) = \ell \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \quad \Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e
\]
\[
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \quad \Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \quad \Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e
\]
\[
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \text{make-parameter } e \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \text{parameterize } e = e_2 \text{ in } e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \text{flat/c(e)} \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash \text{param/c(e)}
\]
\[
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 ; \tau \rightarrow (\lambda x : \tau, e_2) e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_2 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash e_1 ; \tau \rightarrow (e_2) e_3 \\
\Delta ; \ell \vdash c_t/c(e_1, (e_{g_{p_1}} \Rightarrow e_{p_1}), \ldots, e_{2}, (e_{g_{a_1}} \Rightarrow e_{p_1} \leftarrow e_{v_{a_1}}), \ldots) \\
\Delta ; k \vdash x \\
\Delta ; k \vdash \ell(\ell(x))}

B.3 CtxPCF

B.3.1 Programs

\[ p ::= m ; p | e \]

\[ m ::= \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x \text{ with } x_1, \ldots \text{ where } x = e, \ldots \]

\[ e ::= v | e e | \mu x : \tau. e | \text{let } x = e \text{ in } e | \text{if } e \text{ then } e \text{ else } e | e @ e | e \leq e \]

\[ \text{make-parameter } e | \text{parameterize } e = e \text{ in } e | ? e | e ::= e \]

\[ \text{flat}/c(e) | \text{param}/c(e) | e : \tau \rightarrow (e) e | e : \tau \rightarrow_a (\lambda x : \tau. e) e \]

\[ \text{ctx}/c(e,(e \Rightarrow e) \ldots e,(e \Rightarrow e) \ldots) \]

\[ \ell \text{mon}_f^k(e,e) | \text{guard}_j (e,v,v,e) | \text{install}/p_j (v,e,e) | \text{check}_k^j (e,e) | \text{error}_j^k \]

\[ v ::= () | n | \# | \# | \lambda x : \tau. e | c | p(r) \]

\[ \ell \text{param}/p_j^k(c,v) | \ell \text{ctx}/p_j^k(v,v) | v,v,v,e \]

\[ c ::= \text{flat}/c(v) | \text{param}/c(e) | c : \tau \rightarrow (e) c | c : \tau \rightarrow_a (\lambda x : \tau. e) c \]

\[ \text{ctx}/c(v,(e \Rightarrow e) \ldots e,(e \Rightarrow e) \ldots) \]

\[ \tau ::= \beta | \tau \rightarrow \tau | \tau \text{ param } | \tau \text{ ctc } | \tau \text{ ctc } \]

\[ \beta ::= \text{Unit } | \text{Int } | \text{Bool } \]

B.3.2 Well-typed Programs

\[ \Sigma \vdash p : \tau \]

\[ \emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash m_1 \triangleright \Gamma_1 \ldots \Gamma_{n-1} ; \Sigma \vdash m_n \triangleright \Gamma_n \quad \Gamma_n ; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau \]

\[ \Gamma ; \Sigma \vdash m \triangleright \Gamma' \]

\[ \emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash e_1 : \tau_1 \ldots \{y_1 : \tau_1, \ldots, y_{n-1} : \tau_{n-1}\}; \Sigma \vdash e_n : \tau_n \quad \Gamma' = \{y_1 : \tau_1, \ldots, y_n : \tau_n\} \mid \{x_1, \ldots, x_{n'}\} \]

\[ \forall 1 \leq i \leq n', \exists 1 \leq h \leq n, x_i \equiv y_h \land \tau_h \neq \tau \text{ ctc } \land \tau_h \neq \text{ctx} \text{ ctc} \] 

\[ \Gamma ; \Sigma \vdash \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1 \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots, x_{c_{n'}} \text{ with } x_{c_{n'}} \text{ where } y_1 = \ell_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n \triangleright \Gamma \uplus \Gamma' \]

\[ \Gamma ; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau \]
\[
\begin{array}{c}
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash p(r) : \tau \text{ param} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau \text{ param} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_1 : \tau \text{ param} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_2 : \tau \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_1 : \tau_p \text{ param} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_2 : \tau_p \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_3 : \tau \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \beta \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{flat}(c) : \beta \text{ ctc} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{param}(c) : (\tau \text{ param}) \text{ ctc} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : (\text{typ} \rightarrow \tau_r) \text{ ctc} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_d : \tau_d \text{ ctc} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_r : \tau_r \text{ ctc} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_c : \text{ctx} \text{ ctc} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e \tau \rightarrow (e_c) \text{ ctc} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \text{Unit} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_1 : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_2 : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{g_1} : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{p_1} : \tau_{c_1} \text{ param} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{v_1} : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \tau_{c_1} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{g_2} : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{p_2} : \tau_{a_1} \text{ param} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{v_2} : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \tau_{a_1} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{g_3} : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{p_3} : \tau_{a_1} \text{ param} \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e_{v_3} : \text{Unit} \rightarrow \tau_{a_1} \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e = \text{mon}_{j}(e_1,e_2) : \tau \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e = \text{check}_{j}(e_1,e_2) : \tau \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e = \text{guard}_{j}(g,v_p,v_v,e_f) : \tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r \\
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e = \text{install}_{j}(v_p,v_v,e_f) : \tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r \\
\]
B.3.3 Evaluation Contexts

Note. Values $v$ appearing in evaluation contexts are closed terms.

$$E ::= [] | E e | v E | \text{let } x = E \text{ in } e | \text{if } E \text{ then } e \text{ else } e | E \oplus e | v \oplus E$$

$$E \leq e | v \leq E | \text{make-parameter } E | \text{?}E | E := e | p(r) := E$$

parameterize $E = e$ in $E$ | parameterize $p(r) = E$ in $E$ | parameterize $p(r) = v$ in $E$

flat/c$(E)$ | param/c$(E)$ | tag/c$(E)$

$E : \tau \rightarrow (e) e | c : \tau \rightarrow (E) e | c : \tau \rightarrow (e) E$

$E : \tau \rightarrow \lambda x : \tau. e | c : \tau \rightarrow \lambda x : \tau. e E$

ctx/c$(E)(e \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...,e(e \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...)$

ctx/c$(v,v,v,\ldots,v,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...)$

ctx/c$(v,v,v,\ldots,v,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...)$

ctx/c$(v,v,v,\ldots,v,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...)$

ctx/c$(v,v,v,\ldots,v,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...)$

ctx/c$(v,v,v,\ldots,v,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...,E \Rightarrow e \leftarrow e),...)$

$E \vdash \text{mon}^j_{\text{E}}(E,e) | \text{mon}^j_{\text{E}}(c,E) | \text{check}^j_{\text{E}}(E,e)$

$\text{guard}_{\text{E}}(E,v,v,e) | \text{install}_{\text{E}}(v,v,E) | \text{install}_{\text{E}}(v,v,v)$

$\text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x \ldots \text{ where } x = v, \ldots, x = E, x = e, \ldots, p$

B.3.4 Reduction Semantics

$\langle \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1 \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots \text{ where } y_1 = v_1, \ldots, y_n = v_n, y_{c_1} = e_1, \ldots, y_{c_m} = e_m; p, \sigma \rangle$

$\rightarrow \langle \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x \ldots \text{ with } x_{c_{11}}, \ldots \text{ where } y_{11} = v_{11}, \ldots, y_{n_{11}} = v_{n_{11}}, y_{c_{11}} = e_{11}, \ldots, y_{c_{m_{11}}} = e_{m_{11}}; p, \sigma \rangle$

$\langle \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1 \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots \text{ where } \ldots x_1 = v_1, \ldots, x_{c_1} = c_1, \ldots \text{ p, } \sigma \rangle$

$\rightarrow \langle \text{import}[\ell,(x_1,\ldots,x_n),(v_1,\ldots,v_n),(c_1,\ldots,c_n),p];\sigma \rangle$

$\langle E[(\lambda x : \tau. e) v], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[\{\cdot / x\}e], \sigma \rangle$

$\langle E[\mu x : \tau. e], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[\{\mu x : \tau. e / x\}e], \sigma \rangle$

$\langle E[\text{let } x = v \text{ in } e], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[\{v / x\}e], \sigma \rangle$

$\langle E[\text{if } \# \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[e_1], \sigma \rangle$

$\langle E[\text{if } \# \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[e_2], \sigma \rangle$

$\langle E[v_1 \oplus v_2], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[v], \sigma \rangle \text{ where } v = v_1 \oplus v_2$

$\langle E[v_1 \leq v_2], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[v], \sigma \rangle \text{ where } v = v_1 \leq v_2$

$\langle E[\text{make-parameter } v], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[p(r)], \sigma[r \mapsto v]] \rangle \text{ where } r \text{ is fresh in } \sigma$

$\langle E[?p(r)], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle v, \sigma \rangle \text{ where } \sigma(r) = v$ and $E$ does not contain parameterize $p(r) = v'$ in $E'$

$\langle E[\text{parameterize } p(r) = v \text{ in } E'[?r]], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[\text{parameterize } p(r) = v \text{ in } E'[v]], \sigma \rangle$

where $E'$ does not contain parameterize $p(r) = v'$ in $E''$

$\langle E[p(r) := v], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[\{\cdot\}], \sigma[r \mapsto v]] \rangle$ where $E$ does not contain parameterize $p(r) = v'$ in $E'$

$\langle E[\text{parameterize } p(r) = v \text{ in } E'[p(r) := v']], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[\text{parameterize } p(r) = v' \text{ in } E'[v']], \sigma \rangle$ where $E'$ does not contain parameterize $p(r) = v''$ in $E''$

$\langle E[\text{parameterize } p(r) = v \text{ in } v'], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[v'], \sigma \rangle$
\[
\langle E[\text{mon}_k^f(\text{flat/c}(v_c),v)],\sigma \rangle \quad \rightarrow \quad \langle E[\text{check}_k^f((v_c,v),v)],\sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E[\text{mon}_k^f(\text{param/c}(c,v)),\sigma] \quad \rightarrow \quad \langle E[\text{param/p}_k^f(c,v)],\sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E[\text{mon}_k^f(c_d : \tau \rightarrow (c_r,v)],\sigma \rangle \quad \rightarrow \quad \langle E[\text{mon}_k^f(c_r,v)f\text{mon}_k^f(c_d,x))]\rangle v),\sigma \rangle
\]
where \( x \) is fresh
\[
\langle E[\text{mon}_k^f(c_d : \tau \rightarrow \gamma \lambda x : \tau. e_c c_r,v)],\sigma \rangle \quad \rightarrow \quad \langle E[\lambda y : \tau_d. \text{mon}_k^f(\text{mon}_k^f(c_a,y)/x)e_c,\text{mon}_k^f(c_r,v)f\text{mon}_k^f(c_d,y))]\rangle,\sigma \rangle
\]
where \( y \) is fresh
\[
\langle E[\text{mon}_k^f(\text{ctx/c}(v_c,v_{c_{p_1}} \Rightarrow v_{c_{p_2}}, \ldots , v_{c_{p_n}} \Rightarrow v_{c_{r_1}}),v_\alpha(v_{a_{p_1}} \Rightarrow v_{a_{p_1}} \leftarrow v_{a_{r_1}}),\ldots )\rangle,\sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E[\text{check}_k^f((v_c(),e),\sigma)] \quad \rightarrow \quad \langle E[\text{install/p}_k^f(v_p(v_c()),e),f),\sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E[\text{parameterize} v_p = v \text{ in } v_f)],\sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E[\text{parameterize} v_p = k\text{mon}_k^f(c,v)],\sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E[\text{mon}_k^f(c,v_p) : = v)],\sigma \rangle \quad \rightarrow \quad \langle E[v_p := k\text{mon}_k^f(c,v)],\sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E[\text{check}_k^f(#1,v)],\sigma \rangle \quad \rightarrow \quad \langle E[\text{check}_k^f(#1,v)],\sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E[\text{error}_k^f],\sigma \rangle
\]

import \([k,(x_1,\ldots ,x_n),(v_1,\ldots ,v_n),(c_1,\ldots ,c_n),m_1;\ldots ;m_n;e] = \)
import \([k,(x_1,\ldots ,x_n),(v_1,\ldots ,v_n),(c_1,\ldots ,c_n),m_1];\]
\[
\ldots ;
\]
import \([k,(x_1,\ldots ,x_n),(v_1,\ldots ,v_n),(c_1,\ldots ,c_n),m_1]);
import \([k,(x_1,\ldots ,x_n),(v_1,\ldots ,v_n),(c_1,\ldots ,c_n),e]]
import \([k,(x_1,\ldots ,x_n),(v_1,\ldots ,v_n),(c_1,\ldots ,c_n),\text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_{v_1} \text{ with } x_{c_1},\ldots ,\text{where } y_{1} = e_{1},\ldots ,y_{n} = e_{n}]] = \)
module \( \ell \text{ exports } x_{v_1} \text{ with } x_{c_1},\ldots ,\text{where } y_{1} = \{k\text{mon}_k^f(c_1,v_1)/x_{v_1}\} e_{1},\ldots ,y_{n} = \{k\text{mon}_k^f(c_1,v_1)/x_{v_1}\} e_{n} \)
import \([k,(x_1,\ldots ,x_n),(v_1,\ldots ,v_n),(c_1,\ldots ,c_n),e] = \{k\text{mon}_k^f(c_1,v_1)/x_{v_1}\} e \)
### B.4 Annotated CtxPCF

#### B.4.1 Annotated CtxPCF Programs


e ::=  ... | \ell\langle\ell x\rangle | \ell e | \ell(\ell e) | [e]\ell

\nu ::=  ... | \ell v | \ell(\ell v)

\kc ::=  ... | \ell(\ell v) flat/c(v) ... | \ell(\ell v) param/c(c) ... | \ell(\ell c : \tau \rightarrow (c) c) ... |

| \ell(\ell c : \tau \rightarrow \lambda x : \tau. e) c ... | \ell(\ell e) ctx/c(v, (v \Rightarrow v) \ldots , (v \Leftarrow v) \ldots) ... |

| \ell(\ell flat/c(v)) ... | \ell(\ell ctx/c(v, (v \Rightarrow v) \ldots , (v \Leftarrow v) \ldots) ...)

#### B.4.2 Additional Typing Rules for Annotated CtxPCF Programs

\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau
\]

\[
\frac{}{\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash x : \tau} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash c : \tau} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \ell(\ell k x) : \tau} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \ell e : \tau} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \ell(\ell k e) : \tau} \quad \frac{}{\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash [e]\ell : \tau}
\]
B.4.3 Annotated Evaluation Contexts

Note We write \( \|\ell e\| \) to denote that the ownership annotations (if present) in \( e \) are consistent with ownership by \( \ell \). That is, either \( e \) has no ownership annotations or all ownership annotations in \( e \) have owner \( \ell \): \( \|\ell e\| = |\ell|\|e\| \ldots |\ell| \) where for all labels \( k \) and terms \( e', e \neq \|\ell e'\| \).

\[
E^\ell := F^\ell
\]
\[
E_0^\ell := F
\]
\[
F := [\cdot] \mid F \mid v F \mid \text{let } x = F \text{ in } e \mid \text{if } F \text{ then } e \text{ else } e \mid F \oplus e \mid v \oplus F
\]
\[
| \quad F \leq e \mid v \leq F \mid \text{make-parameter } F \mid \text{? } F \mid F := e \mid p(r) := F
\]
\[
\text{parameterize } F = e \text{ in } F \mid \text{parameterize } \|\ell p(r)\| = F \text{ in } e \mid \text{parameterize } \|\ell p(r)\| = v \text{ in } F
\]
\[
\text{flat}(c)(F) \mid \text{param}(c)(F) \mid F : \tau \rightarrow (e) e \mid c : \tau \rightarrow (F) e \mid c : \tau \rightarrow (v) F
\]
\[
\text{inst}(\beta_j(v,v,F)) \mid [F]^k
\]
\[
F^\ell := F^\ell e \mid v F^\ell \mid \text{let } x = F^\ell \text{ in } e \mid \text{if } F^\ell \text{ then } e \text{ else } e \mid F^\ell \oplus e \mid v \oplus F^\ell
\]
\[
| \quad F^\ell \leq e \mid v \leq F^\ell \mid \text{make-parameter } F^\ell \mid 2F^\ell \mid jB^\ell[F := e] \mid jB^\ell[p(r) := F]
\]
\[
| jB^\ell[F := e] \mid jB^\ell[p(r) := F^\ell] \mid \text{parameterize } F^\ell = e \text{ in } F \mid jB^\ell[\text{parameterize } \|\ell'' p(r)\| = F^\ell \text{ in } k' F^\ell[e]]
\]
\[
| jB^\ell[\text{parameterize } \|\ell'' p(r)\| = v \text{ in } k' F^\ell[e]] \mid jB^\ell[\text{parameterize } \|\ell' p(r)\| = F \text{ in } k' F^\ell[e]]
\]
\[
\text{flat}(c(F^\ell)) \mid \text{param}(c(F^\ell)) \mid F^\ell : \tau \rightarrow (e) e \mid c : \tau \rightarrow (F^\ell) e \mid c : \tau \rightarrow (v) F^\ell
\]
\[
\text{inst}(\beta_j(v,v,F)) \mid [F]^k
\]
\[
\ell B^k := \{k[;] \}
\]
\[
\ell B^l := \{l[;] \}
\]
B.4.4 Annotated Reduction Semantics

\[ \langle \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1, \ldots \text{ where } y_1 = v_1, \ldots, y_n = v_n, y_{c_1} = e_1, \ldots, y_{c_m} = e_m; p, \sigma \rangle \]
\[ \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} \langle \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1, \ldots \text{ where } y_1 = v_1, \ldots, y_n = v_n, y_{c_1} = \{v_{c_{y_1}}/y_{c_1}\}, y_{c_2} = e_2, \ldots, y_{c_m} = e_m; p, \sigma \rangle \]
\[ \langle \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_{c_1}, \ldots \text{ where } \ldots x_{c_1} = v_1, \ldots, x_{c_1} = c_1; p, \sigma \rangle \]
\[ \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} \langle \text{import}[\ell, x_{c_1}, v_1, c_1, \ldots, \text{import}[\ell, x_{c_n}, v_n, c_n, p]], \sigma \rangle \]

\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \text{ exports } \ell x : \tau \parallel e \parallel \ell v\parallel], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \text{ exports } \ell x : \tau \parallel e \parallel \ell v\parallel], \sigma) \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \mu x : \tau . e, \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \mu x : \tau . e, \sigma) \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \text{let } x = \|\ell v\| \text{ in } c], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell v\| \text{ in } c], \sigma) \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \text{if } \|\ell \#t\] then \(e_1\) else \(e_2\], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell e_1\], \sigma) \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \text{if } \|\ell \#f\] then \(e_1\) else \(e_2\], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell e_2\], \sigma) \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell f\parallel v\parallel], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell v\parallel], \sigma) \quad \text{where } v = \ell v_1 \lor \ell v_2 \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell f\parallel v\parallel], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell v\parallel], \sigma) \quad \text{where } v = v_1 \land \ell v_2 \]

\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \text{make-parameter } \|\ell v\parallel], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell (p(r))\parallel], \sigma) \quad \text{where } r \text{ is fresh in } \sigma \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell p(r)\parallel], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell v\parallel], \sigma) \quad \text{where } \sigma(r) = v \text{ and } E \text{ does not contain } \ell^k B^k[p(r)] = \ell^k v' \in k^2 B^k[E'] \]

\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle B^k[k\parallel\ell\parallel p(r)] = \|\ell v\parallel] \in k^2 B^k[E\langle \ell \rangle k\parallel\ell\parallel p(r)]\parallel]), \sigma) \]
\[ \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle B^k[k\parallel\ell\parallel p(r)] = \|\ell v\parallel] \in k^2 B^k[E\langle \ell \rangle k\parallel\ell\parallel p(r)]\parallel]), \sigma) \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle B^k[k\parallel\ell\parallel p(r)] = \|\ell v\parallel] \in k^2 B^k[E\langle \ell \rangle k\parallel\ell\parallel p(r)]\parallel]), \sigma) \]
\[ \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle B^k[k\parallel\ell\parallel p(r)] = \|\ell v\parallel] \in k^2 B^k[E\langle \ell \rangle k\parallel\ell\parallel p(r)]\parallel]), \sigma) \]

\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell\parallel f\parallel c_d] : \tau \to (c_e) c_t\parallel], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell\parallel f\parallel c_d] \parallel c_e\parallel], \sigma) \]
\[ \quad \text{where } x \text{ is fresh} \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell\parallel f\parallel c_d] : \tau \to (c_e) c_t\parallel], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell\parallel f\parallel c_d] \parallel c_e\parallel], \sigma) \]
\[ \quad \text{where } y \text{ is fresh} \]
\[ (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell\parallel f\parallel c_d] : \tau \to (c_e) c_t\parallel], \sigma) \xrightarrow{\text{ann}} (E\langle \ell \rangle \|\ell\parallel f\parallel c_d] \parallel c_e\parallel], \sigma) \]
\[ \quad \text{where } e = \text{guard}(v_{c_s}())_j, v_{c_p_1}, v_{c_{v_1}}, \ldots \text{guard}(v_{c_f}())_j, v_{c_p_n}, v_{c_{v_n}}, \ell \text{ctx/p}^k(v_{a_1}(v_{a_1} \Rightarrow v_{a_{p_1}} \Leftarrow v_{a_{v_1}}), \ldots v)) \]
\[
\begin{align*}
&\langle E^f([\ell^t\vartriangleright\text{ctx/p}]^j_k (v_a, (v_a \Rightarrow v_{a_1}, \ldots, (v_a \Rightarrow v_{a_n} \leftarrow v_{a_n}, v_f)) \| v)], \sigma) \\
&\quad \rightarrow \text{ann} \quad \langle E^f([\text{check}^j_j ((v_a ()), e) \| v)], \sigma) \\
&\quad \quad \quad \text{where } e = \text{guard}_j (v_{a_{g_1}} ()), v_{a_{p_1}}, v_{a_{u_1}}, \ldots, \text{guard}_j ((v_a ()), v_{a_{p_n}}, v_{a_{u_n}}, v_f))
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\langle E^f[\text{guard}_j ([\ell^t\#][[v_p, v_v, e_f]]), \sigma] \rightarrow \text{ann} \quad \langle E^f[e_f], \sigma) \\
&\langle E^f[\text{guard}_j ([\ell^t\#][[v_p, v_v, e_f]]), \sigma] \rightarrow \text{ann} \quad \langle E^f[\text{install/p}_j (v_p, (v_v ()), e_f)], \sigma) \\
&\langle E^f([\ell^t\text{install/p}_j (v_p, v_v, v_f)] \| v)], \sigma) \rightarrow \text{ann} \quad \langle E^f[\ell^t' \text{parameterize } v_p = v_v \text{ in } j^t' (v_f)], \sigma) \\
&\langle E^f[\ell^t' \text{param/p}_j^k (c, v_p)] \| ]], \sigma) \rightarrow \text{ann} \quad \langle E^f[\ell^t' \text{param/p}_j^k (c, v_p)], \sigma) \\
&\langle E^f[\ell^t' \text{param/p}_j^k (c, v_p)] = \text{v in } E^f[\ell^t' \text{param/p}_j^k (c, v_p)], \sigma)
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
&\langle E^f[\ell^t' \text{param/p}_j^k (c, v_p)] \quad \rightarrow \text{ann} \quad \langle E^f[\ell^t' \text{param/p}_j^k (c, v_p)], \sigma) \\
&\langle E^f[\text{check}^j_j ([\ell^t\#][[e]]), \sigma) \quad \rightarrow \text{ann} \quad \langle E^f[e], \sigma) \\
&\langle E^f[\text{check}^j_j ([\ell^t\#][[e]]), \sigma) \quad \rightarrow \text{ann} \quad \langle \text{error}_k, \sigma)
\end{align*}
\]

import \[k.(x_1, \ldots, x_n),(v_1, \ldots, v_n),(c_1, \ldots, c_n),m_1;\ldots;m_n;\| e] = \]
import \[k.(x_1, \ldots, x_n),(v_1, \ldots, v_n),(c_1, \ldots, c_n),m_1;\ldots;\| e] 
\ldots; 
import \[k.(x_1, \ldots, x_n),(v_1, \ldots, v_n),(c_1, \ldots, c_n),m_1;\ldots;\| e] 
import \[k.(x_1, \ldots, x_n),(v_1, \ldots, v_n),(c_1, \ldots, c_n),\| e] \quad \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_{e_1} \text{ with } x_{e_1}, \ldots \text{ where } y_1 = e_{c_1}, \ldots, y_n = e_{c_n} = \]
module \[\ell \text{ exports } x_{e_1} \text{ with } x_{e_1}, \ldots \text{ where } y_1 = e_{c_1}, \ldots, y_n = e_{c_n} = \]
\ldots; 
\quad y_n = e_{c_n} \}
import \[k.(x_1, \ldots, x_n),(v_1, \ldots, v_n),(c_1, \ldots, c_n),\| e] = \}
\]
### B.4.5 Well-formed Annotated Programs

\[
\ell_0; \Pi \models p
\]

\[\emptyset; \Pi \models m_1 \triangleright \Delta_1 \quad \ldots \quad \Delta_{n-1}; \Pi \models m_n \triangleright \Delta_n \quad \Delta_n; \ell_0 \models e\]

\[
\ell_0; \Pi \models m_1 \ldots m_n; e
\]

\[\Delta; \Pi \models m \triangleright \Delta'\]

\[\emptyset; \Pi; \ell \models e_1 \quad \ldots \quad \{y_1 : \ell, \ldots, y_{n-1} : \ell\}; \Pi; \ell \models e_n \quad \Gamma' = \{y_1 : \ell, \ldots, y_n : \ell\} [x_1, \ldots, x_{n}]\]

\[\Delta; \Pi \models \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1 \text{ with } x_c_1, \ldots, x_{c_n}, \text{ where } y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n \triangleright \Delta \sqcup \Delta'\]

\[\Delta; \Pi; \ell \models e\]
\[\Delta; \Pi; \{k\}; \{\ell\}; j \triangleright e \quad \Delta; \Pi; k \vdash v \quad \Delta; \Pi; j \triangleright v_a \quad \Delta; \Pi; j \triangleright v_{a_1} \quad \Delta; \Pi; j \triangleright v_{a_1} \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_f \]

\[\Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash ^{\text{param/p}_j}(c, v) \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash ^{\text{ctx/p}_j}(v_a, (v_{a_p} \Rightarrow v_{a_s}) \ldots (v_{a_p} \Rightarrow v_{a_s}), v_f) \]

\[\Delta; \Pi; j \vdash v_p \quad \Delta; \Pi; j \vdash e_v \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash e_f \quad \Delta; \Pi; k \vdash x \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash e \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash ^{\ell}(\{x\}) \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash ^{\ell}(c, e) \]

\[c \neq ^{\ell}(\text{ctx/c}(e_1, e_{g_1} \Rightarrow e_{v_1}), \ldots, e_2, (e_{g_2} \Rightarrow e_{v_2}), \ldots)) \quad \Delta; \Pi; \{k\}; \{\ell\}; j \triangleright c \quad \Delta; \Pi; k \vdash c \]

\[c \equiv ^{\ell}(\text{ctx/c}(e_1, e_{g_1} \Rightarrow e_{v_1}), \ldots, e_2, (e_{g_2} \Rightarrow e_{v_2}), \ldots)) \quad \Delta; \Pi; \{k\}; \{\ell\}; j \triangleright c \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash e \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash ^{\ell}(c, e) \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash ^{\ell}(c, e) \quad \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{error}^\ell \]

\[\Delta; \Pi \vdash \sigma \]

\[\text{dom}(\Pi) = \text{dom}(\sigma) \quad \forall p \in \text{dom}(\sigma), \Delta; \Pi; (p) \vdash \sigma(p) \quad \Delta; \Pi \vdash \sigma \]

\[\Delta; \Pi; k; \ell; j \triangleright c \]

\[\Delta; \Pi; j \vdash e \quad \bar{k} \subseteq k \quad \bar{\ell} = \bar{k} \cup \bar{\ell} \quad \Delta; \Pi; \bar{k}; \bar{\ell}; j \triangleright c \]

\[\Delta; \Pi; \bar{k}; \bar{\ell}; j \triangleright \|\|^{\ell}(\text{flat/c}(e))\|^{\ell} \quad \Delta; \Pi; \bar{k}; \bar{\ell}; j \triangleright \|\|^{\ell}(\text{param/c}(\|\|^{\ell}(e)))\|^{\ell} \quad \Delta; \Pi; \bar{k}; \bar{\ell}; j \triangleright e_1 \quad \Delta; \Pi; \bar{k}; \bar{\ell}; j \triangleright e_2 \quad \Delta; \Pi; \bar{k}; \bar{\ell}; j \triangleright \text{ctc}_3 \]

\[\Delta; \Pi; j \vdash \|\|^{\ell}(\text{ctx/c}(e_1, e_{g_1} \Rightarrow e_{v_1}), \ldots, e_2, (e_{g_2} \Rightarrow e_{v_2}), \ldots)) \|^{\ell} \quad \Delta; \Pi; j \vdash \|\|^{\ell}(\text{ctx/c}(e_1, e_{g_1} \Rightarrow e_{v_1}), \ldots, e_2, (e_{g_2} \Rightarrow e_{v_2}), \ldots)) \|^{\ell} \]
B.5 Metatheory of CtxPCF

Theorem 1 (Type Soundness for Surface CtxPCF). For all programs \( p \) of Surface CtxPCF such that \( \vdash p : \tau \)

- \( (p, \varnothing) \rightarrow *v, \sigma \) or;
- \( (p, \varnothing) \rightarrow *\text{error}^j, \sigma \) or;
- \( (p, \varnothing) \rightarrow *\langle p', \sigma \rangle \) and there exist \( p'' \) such that \( p' \rightarrow p'' \).

Proof. Direct consequence of Lemmas 1 and 2.

Lemma 1 (Type Progress for CtxPCF Terms). If \( \Sigma \vdash p : \tau \), then either \( p \) is a value \( v \), \( p \) is \( \text{error}^j \), or for all \( \sigma \) such that \( \varnothing; \Sigma \vdash \sigma \), there exist \( p' \) and \( \sigma' \) such that \( (p, \sigma) \rightarrow (p', \sigma') \).

Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on \( p \) using Lemmas 3, 4, and 5.

Lemma 2 (Type Preservation for CtxPCF Terms). If \( \Sigma \vdash p : \tau ; \varnothing; \Sigma \vdash \sigma \), and \( (p, \sigma) \rightarrow (p', \sigma') \), then either there exists \( \Sigma' \supseteq \Sigma \) such that \( \Sigma' \vdash p' : \tau \) and \( \Gamma; \Sigma' \vdash \sigma' \), or \( p' = \text{error}^j \).


Lemma 3 (Unique decomposition for CtxPCF). For all well-typed programs \( p \) such that \( p \neq v \), \( p \neq \text{error}^j \), and \( p \neq \text{module} \ f \ exports \ x_0, \ldots \ where \ y_1 = e_1, \ldots ; y_n = e_n \), \( p' \), there are unique \( e' \), and \( E \) such that \( p = E[e'] \) and \( e' \) is one of the following:

- \( v_0 \ v_1 \)
- \( \mu x : \tau. \ e_0 \)
- \( \text{let} x = v_0 \ \text{in} \ e_1 \)
- \( \text{if} v_0 \ \text{then} \ e_1 \ \text{else} \ e_2 \)
- \( v_0 \od v_1 \)
- \( v_0 \leq v_1 \)
- \( \text{make-parameter} \ v_0 \)
- \( \text{parameterize} \ v_0 = v_1 \ \text{in} \ e_2 \) where \( v_0 \neq p(r) \)
- \( \text{parameterize} p(r) = v_1 \ \text{in} \ v_2 \)
- \( ?v_0 \)
- \( v_0 := v_1 \)
- \( \text{if} \ v_0 \ \text{then} \ e_0 \ \text{else} \ e_1 \)
- \( \text{check}^j (v_0, e_1) \)
- \( \text{guard}^j (v_0, v_p, v_k, e_f) \)

Proof. By induction on the size of \( p \).

Lemma 4 (Well-typed evaluation context plugs for CtxPCF). If \( \Sigma \vdash E[e] : \tau ; \varnothing; \Pi \vdash e' : \tau' \), and \( \varnothing; \Pi \vdash e' : \tau' \) then \( \Sigma \vdash E[e'] : \tau \).

Proof. Induction on \( E \).

Lemma 5 (Type focusing for CtxPCF). If \( \Sigma \vdash E[e] : \tau \) then \( \varnothing; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau' \) for some \( \tau' \).

Proof. Induction on \( E \).

Theorem 2 (Type Soundness for Annotated Surface CtxPCF). For all programs \( p \) of Annotated Surface CtxPCF such that \( \vdash p : \tau \)

- \( (p, \varnothing) \rightarrow *_\text{ann}(v, \sigma) \) or;
- \( (p, \varnothing) \rightarrow *_\text{ann}(\text{error}^j, \sigma) \) or;
- \( (p, \varnothing) \rightarrow *_\text{ann}(\langle p', \sigma \rangle) \) and there exist \( p'' \) such that \( p' \rightarrow p'' \).

Proof. Direct consequence of Lemmas 6 and 7.

Lemma 6 (Type Progress for Annotated CtxPCF Terms). If \( \Sigma \vdash p : \tau \), then either \( p \) is a value \( v \), \( p \) is \( \text{error}^j \), or for all \( \sigma \) such that \( \varnothing; \Sigma \vdash \sigma \), there exist \( p' \) and \( \sigma' \) such that \( (p, \sigma) \rightarrow (p', \sigma') \).

Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on \( p \) using Lemmas 8, 9, and 10.
Lemma 7 (Type Preservation for Annotated CtxPCF Terms). If $\Sigma \vdash p : \tau; \varnothing; \sigma \vdash \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma' \rangle$, then either there exists $\Sigma' \supseteq \Sigma$ such that $\Sigma' \vdash p' : \tau$ and $\varnothing; \Sigma' \vdash \sigma'$, or $p' = \text{error}_j$. 


Lemma 8 (Unique decomposition for Annotated CtxPCF). For all well-typed programs $p$ such that $p \neq v$, $p \neq \text{error}_j$, and $p \neq \text{module } \ell$ exports $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, where $y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_m = e_n, \ldots, p'$, there are unique $e', \ell'$, and $E^{\ell'}$ such that $p = E^{\ell'}[e']$ and $e'$ is one of the following:

1. $v_0 v_1$
2. $\mu x : \tau, v_0$
3. $\text{let } x = v_0 \text{ in } e_1$
4. if $v_0$ then $e_1$ else $e_2$
5. $v_0 \oplus v_1$
6. $v_0 \leq v_1$
7. $\text{make-parameter } v_0$
8. $\ell B^{\ell'}[\text{parameterize } v_0 = v_1 \text{ in } \beta' B^{\beta'}[v_2]]$ where $v_0 \neq \|\ell\ p(r)\|$
9. $\ell B^{\ell'}[\text{parameterize } \|\ell\ p(r)\| = v_1 \text{ in } \beta' B^{\beta'}[v_2]]$
10. $?_0$
11. $\ell B^{\ell'}[v_0 := v_1]$
12. $\ell \text{ mon}_j (v_0, e_1)$
13. $\text{check}^{\beta}(v_0, e_1)$
14. $\text{guard}^{\ell}(v_g,v_p,v_e,e_f)$


Lemma 9 (Well-typed evaluation context plugs for Annotated CtxPCF). If $\Sigma \vdash E^{\beta}[e] : \tau; \varnothing; \Pi \vdash e : \tau'$, and $\varnothing; \Pi \vdash e' : \tau'$ then $\Sigma \vdash E^{\beta}[e'] : \tau$.

Proof. Induction on $E^{\beta}$.

Lemma 10 (Type focusing for Annotated CtxPCF). If $\Sigma \vdash E^{\beta}[e] : \tau$ then $\varnothing; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau'$ for some $\tau'$.

Proof. Induction on $E^{\beta}$.

Theorem 3 (Annotation transparency). The following statements hold for Surface CtxPCF:

1. Let $e$ be a well-typed and well-formed Annotated Surface CtxPCF program: $\vdash p : \tau$ and $\ell_0 \vdash p$. Let $\bar{p}$ be the Surface CtxPCF expression that is like $p$ but without annotations. If $(p, \varnothing) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (p', \sigma)$, then $(\bar{p}, \varnothing) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (\bar{p}', \sigma)$, where $\bar{p}'$ is the CtxPCF program that is like $p'$ but without annotations.

2. Let $\bar{p}$ be a well-typed Surface CtxPCF program: $\vdash \bar{p} : \tau$. Then there exists some Annotated Surface CtxPCF program $p$ such that $\vdash p : \tau$ and $\ell_0 \vdash p$. Furthermore, if $(\bar{p}, \varnothing) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (\bar{p}', \sigma)$, then $(p, \varnothing) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (p', \sigma)$ for some $p'$, where $p'$ is the CtxPCF program that is like $p'$ but without annotations.

Proof. By a straightforward lock-step bi-simulation between the two reduction steps using the obvious annotation erasure function to relate the corresponding configurations in each step. For the second point of the Theorem, we construct $p$ from $\bar{p}$ by adding to each imported variable in a term of $\bar{p}$ the appropriate annotation.

Definition 1 (Complete monitoring). CtxPCF is a complete monitor if any only if for all $p$ such that $\vdash p_0 : \tau$ and $\ell_0 \vdash p$,

- $(p_0, \varnothing) \rightarrow^{*}_{\text{ann}} (v, \sigma)$, or
- for all $p_1$ and $\sigma_1$ such that $(p_0, \varnothing) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (p_1, \sigma_1)$, there exists $p_2$ and $\sigma_2$ such that $(p_1, \sigma_1) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (p_2, \sigma_2)$, or
- $(p_0, \varnothing) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (p_1, \sigma_1) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (\text{error}_j', \sigma_2)$, and $p_1$ is of the form $E^{\ell'}[\ell \text{ mon}_j^\beta (\text{ann} \phi_\ell)]$ and for all such terms $p_1$, $v = \|^k\v'$ and $k \in \ell'$.
- $(p_0, \varnothing) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (p_1, \sigma_1) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}^{*} (\text{error}_j', \sigma_2)$ and $p_1$ is of the form

$$E^{\ell'}[\ell \text{ mon}_j^\beta (\text{ann} \phi_\ell)]$$

and for all such terms $p_1, \ell, k \in \ell'$.

Theorem 4. CtxPCF is a complete monitor.
Proof. As a direct consequence of Lemmas 5, 7, 11 and 12 we have that for all programs \( p_0 \) such that \( \vdash p_0 : \tau \) and \( \ell_0 \models p_0 \), either

- \( \langle p_0, \varnothing \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}} (v, \sigma) \), or
- for all \( p_1 \) and \( \sigma_1 \) such that \( \langle p_0, \varnothing \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}} (p_1, \sigma_1) \) there exists \( p_2 \) and \( \sigma_2 \) such that \( \langle p_1, \sigma_1 \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}} (p_2, \sigma_2) \), or
- \( \langle p_0, \varnothing \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}} (\text{error}_j^k, \sigma_2) \).

In the last case, since \( \ell_0 \models p_0 \), we know that \( \text{error}_j^k \) does not appear in \( p_0 \). Therefore it must have been introduced by a reduction. In particular, it must have been the result of the reduction \( \langle E'[\text{check}^k(\langle \#! \|.e \rangle), \sigma_2] \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}} (\text{error}_j^k, \sigma_2) \). Again, since \( \ell_0 \models p_0 \), \( \text{check}^k(\langle \#! \|.e \rangle) \) must not occur in \( p_0 \). Hence it must be the result of a reduction. There are three rules that introduce checks:

1. \( \langle E'[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma] \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}} (E'[\text{check}^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma]) \). In this case, we can deduce

   \[
   \langle p_0, \varnothing \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}}(E'[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma])
   \]

   By Lemma 12, we can deduce that for some \( \Pi \) such that \( \varnothing; \Pi \models \sigma_1, \ell_0; \Pi \models E'[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma] \). By Lemma 13, we derive \( \varnothing; \Pi \models \ell \models \text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma \), and thus by well-formedness that \( k \in \bar{k} \).

2. \( \langle E'[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma] \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}} (E'[\text{check}^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma]) \) where

   \[
   c = \text{ctx/c}(v_c, (e_1 \Rightarrow v_{c_1}), \ldots (e_n \Rightarrow v_{c_n})), v_a = (v_{a_1} \Rightarrow v_{a_1}, \ldots) \quad \text{and} \quad e = \text{guard}_j((v_{a_1} \Rightarrow v_{a_1}), v_{c_1}, \ldots) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{guard}_j((v_{a_2} \Rightarrow v_{a_2}), v_{c_2}, \ldots).
   \]

   In this case, we can deduce

   \[
   \langle p_0, \varnothing \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}}(E'[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma])
   \]

   By Lemma 12, we can deduce that for some \( \Pi \) such that \( \varnothing; \Pi \models \sigma_1, \ell_0; \Pi \models E'[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma] \). By Lemma 13, we derive \( \varnothing; \Pi \models \ell \models \text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma \), and thus by well-formedness that \( \ell \in \bar{\ell} \).

3. \( \langle E'[\text{ctx/pk}(v_a, (e_1 \Rightarrow v_{a_1}), \ldots (e_n \Rightarrow v_{a_n})) \| v], \sigma] \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}} (E'[\text{check}^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma]) \) where \( c = \text{ctx/c}(v_{c_1}, (e_1 \Rightarrow v_{c_1}), \ldots (e_n \Rightarrow v_{c_n})), v_a = (v_{a_1} \Rightarrow v_{a_1}, \ldots) \) and \( e = \text{guard}_j((v_{c_1} \Rightarrow v_{c_1}), v_{c_1}, \ldots) \). In this case, we can deduce a longer series of reductions

   \[
   \langle p_0, \varnothing \rangle \rightarrow \ast_{\text{ann}}(E'[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma])
   \]

   By Lemma 12, we can deduce that for some \( \Pi \) such that \( \varnothing; \Pi \models \sigma_1, \ell_0; \Pi \models E'[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma] \). By Lemma 13, we derive \( \varnothing; \Pi \models \ell \models \text{mon}_j^k(\langle \#! \|.\|v \rangle), \sigma \), and thus by well-formedness that \( \ell \in \bar{\ell} \).
Lemma 11 (Progress). For all programs $p$, stores $\sigma$, store typings $\Sigma$, and store labelings $\Pi$ such that

- $\Sigma \vdash p : \tau$,
- $\emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash \sigma$, and
- $e_0 ; \Pi \vdash p$,
then either

- $p = v$,
- $p = \text{error}_j$, or
- $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (p', \sigma')$.

Proof. From Lemma 8 we know that there either $p = v$, $p = \text{error}_j$, or there exist $\ell$, $\ell'$, and $E^{\ell'}$ such that $p = E^{\ell'}[e^*]$. The first two cases are immediate. If $p = \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_{v_1} \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots, x_{c_t} \text{ where } y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n ; p'$, or there exist $\ell$, $\ell'$, and $E^{\ell'}$ such that $p = E^{\ell'}[e^*]$. The first two cases are immediate. If $p = \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_{v_1} \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots, x_{c_t} \text{ where } y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n ; p'$, or there exist $\ell$, $\ell'$, and $E^{\ell'}$ such that $p = E^{\ell'}[e^*]$. The first two cases are immediate. If $p = \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_{v_1} \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots, x_{c_t} \text{ where } y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n ; p'$, or there exist $\ell$, $\ell'$, and $E^{\ell'}$ such that $p = E^{\ell'}[e^*]$. The first two cases are immediate. If $p = \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_{v_1} \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots, x_{c_t} \text{ where } y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n ; p'$, or there exist $\ell$, $\ell'$, and $E^{\ell'}$ such that $p = E^{\ell'}[e^*]$. The first two cases are immediate.
6. \( v_0 \leq v_1 \): Similar to the case \( v_0 \oplus v_1 \).

7. make-parameter \( v_0 \): Since \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \text{make-parameter } v_0 \), it must be the case that \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash v_0 \) and thus \( v_0 = \|\ell^* v_0\| \) for some \( \ell^* \). Then by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have \( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell [\ell^* p(r)], \sigma[r \mapsto v_0] \rangle \), where \( p \) is fresh.

8. \( \ell B^k[\text{parameterize }] v_0 = v_1 \in J^\ell B^j[v_2] \) where \( v_0 \neq \|\ell^* p(r)\| \): By assumption, we have \( \Sigma \vdash E^\ell [\ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] v_0 = v_1 \in J^\ell B^j[v_2]] : \tau \) and thus by Lemma 10 that \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash e^\ell [\text{parameterize }] v_0 = v_1 \in J^\ell B^j[v_2] : \tau^* \) for some \( \tau^* \). Further discriminating by \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash e^\ell [\text{parameterize }] v_0 = v_1 \in J^\ell B^j[v_2] \) we have that \( \ell = j = \ell^* \), \( j^* = k \), \( v_0 = \|\ell^* v_0\| \) and \( v_1 = \|\ell^* v_1\| \) for some \( k \). Further, since \( v_0 \neq \|\ell^* p(r)\| \), it must be the case that \( v_0 = k^\ell [\text{parameterize }] (c, v_0) \). Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have that \( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell [\ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] v_0 = \ell^* v_0], \sigma \rangle \).

9. \( \ell B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in J^\ell B^j[v_2] \): Inverting \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash e^\ell [\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in J^\ell B^j[v_2] \) we have that \( \ell = j = \ell^* \), \( j^* = k \), \( v_0 = \|\ell^* v_0\| \), and \( v_2 = \|\ell^* v_2\| \). Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have that \( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell [\ell^* v_2], \sigma \rangle \).

10. \( ?v_0 \): By assumption, we have \( \Sigma \vdash E^\ell [?v_0] : \tau \) and thus by Lemma 10 that \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash ?v_0 \vdash \tau^* \) for some \( \tau^* \). Further, since \( \Sigma \vdash ?v_0 \vdash \tau^* \) for some \( \tau^* \). By inversion, it must be the case that \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash ?v_0 \vdash \tau^* \). This, combined with the fact that \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash ?v_0 \vdash \tau^* \) for some \( \tau^* \). In the first case, we must consider two possibilities: when \( E^\ell \) contains \( \ell B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]] \) for some \( k, k^2, k^3, \ell, \ell^2, \ell^3, \) and \( E^\ell \) that doesn’t contain another parameterize expression for \( p(r) \), and when \( E^\ell \) does not contain such a context. We consider each of these cases in turn:
(a) \( v_0 = \|\ell^* p(r)\| \) and \( E^\ell = E^\ell [\ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]]] \) where \( E^\ell \) contains no parameterize \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \|\ell^* p(r)\| \) gives \( \Pi(p) = \ell^* \). By assumption \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash E^\ell [\ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]]] \), we can again apply Lemma 13 to derive \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]] \). By the well-formedness rule for parameterize, \( \ell^* = \ell^* \) and since \( \Pi(p) = \ell^* \) it must be the case that \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \|\ell^* v\| \). Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have that
\( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell [\ell^* v], \sigma \rangle \).

(b) \( v_0 = \|\ell^* p(r)\| \) and \( E^\ell \neq E^\ell + \ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]] \): By the reduction semantics and Lemma 14, we have \( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} <E^\ell [\ell^* v], \sigma[v = \sigma(r)] \), where \( v = \sigma(r) \). It must be the case that \( \sigma \in \sigma \) since \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \|\ell^* v\| \) for some \( \tau^* \). \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \text{parameterize } (c, v_0) \). In the first case, we must consider two possibilities: when \( E^\ell \) contains \( \ell B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]] \) for some \( k, k^2, j, v, \) and \( E^\ell \) that doesn’t contain another parameterize expression for \( p(r) \), and when \( E^\ell \) does not contain such a context. We consider each of these cases in turn:
(a) \( v_0 = \|\ell^* p(r)\| \) and \( E^\ell = E^\ell + \ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]] \) where \( E^\ell \) contains no parameterize \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \|\ell^* p(r)\| \) gives \( \Pi(p) = \ell^* \). By assumption \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash E^\ell [\ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]]] \), we can again apply Lemma 13 to derive \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \ell^* B^k[\text{parameterize }] \|\ell^* p(r)\| = v_1 \in k^2 B^2 [E^\ell [?v_0]] \). By the well-formedness rule for parameterize, \( \ell^* = \ell^* \) and since \( \Pi(p) = \ell^* \) it must be the case that \( \varepsilon; \Pi: \ell^* \vdash \|\ell^* v\| \). Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have that
\( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell [\ell^* v], \sigma \rangle \).
14. $(\text{Preservation})$

- $\emptyset \vdash p \rightarrow \emptyset (p(r))$ and $E^{\sigma'} \neq E^{\sigma'}[t' B^{k}]$ parameterize $\|p(\emptyset')\| = v' \in k \cdot B^{j} [E^{\sigma'}[t' B^{k}] [v_0 := v_1]]$. By further applications of well-formedness, we can derive that $v_1 = [\|v'_1\|]$ for some $v'_1$ and $\ell' = \ell$. Thus by the reduction semantics and Lemma 14, we have $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^{\sigma'}[t' \emptyset, \sigma[r \mapsto v'_1]])$.

- $v_0 = [\|p(\emptyset')\|]$ by inverting $\emptyset; \Pi; \ell' \vdash E^{\sigma'}[v_0 := v_1]$ we derive $\ell' = \ell$. Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14, we have $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^{\sigma'}[t'' \emptyset, \sigma])$.

12. $\ell' \text{mon}_j (c_0, v_1)$: Deconstructing $c_0$ we consider seven cases (for simplicity, we reduce $\ell' \ldots |\ell' c| \ldots$ to $\|\ell' c\|$ since well-formedness will ensure it):

- $(\|\ell' \text{flat}(c(v_0))\|$: This case is a contradiction, since $\emptyset; \Pi; \ell' \vdash \ell' \text{mon}_j (\|\ell' \text{flat}(c(v_0))\|, v_1)$ requires $\emptyset; \Pi; j; \{k\}; \{\ell\} \vdash \|\ell' \text{flat}(c(v_0))\|$, which does not hold.

- $(\|\ell' \text{param}(c(v_0))\|$: Since $\emptyset; \Pi; \ell' \vdash \ell' \text{mon}_j (\|\ell' \text{param}(c(v_0))\|, v_1)$ we can deduce $\ell = \ell'$ and $\ell' = j$. Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^{\sigma'}[\ell' \text{param}(c(v_0)), v_1])$.

- $(\|\ell' \text{cd}(\tau_d \rightarrow (c_0, v_1))\|$: Since $\emptyset; \Pi; \ell' \vdash \ell' \text{mon}_j (\|\ell' \text{cd}(\tau_d \rightarrow (c_0, v_1))\|, v_1)$ we can deduce $\ell = \ell'$ and $\ell' = j$. Thus by the reduction relation and Lemma 14 we have $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^{\sigma'}[\ell' \text{cd}(\tau_d \rightarrow (c_0, v_1))]$.

- $(\|\ell' \text{ctx}(c(v_0))\|$: This case is a contradiction, since $\emptyset; \Pi; j; \{k\}; \{\ell\} \vdash \|\ell' \text{ctx}(c(v_0))\|$, which does not hold.

- $(\|\ell' \text{check}(c(v_0))\|$: Since $\emptyset; \Pi; j; \{k\}; \{\ell\} \vdash \|\ell' \text{check}(c(v_0))\|$, which does not hold.

- $(\|\ell' \text{flat}(c(v_0))\|$: This case is a contradiction, since $\emptyset; \Pi; \ell' \vdash \ell' \text{mon}_j (\|\ell' \text{flat}(c(v_0))\|, v_1)$ requires $\emptyset; \Pi; j; \{k\}; \{\ell\} \vdash \|\ell' \text{check}(c(v_0))\|$, which does not hold.

13. $\text{check}_j (v_0, e_1)$: By assumption, we have $\Sigma \vdash E^{\sigma'} [\text{check}_j (v_0, e_1)] : \tau$. By Lemma 10 we have $\emptyset; \Sigma \vdash \text{check}_j (v_0, e_1) : \tau'$. By inversion, $\emptyset; \Sigma \vdash v_0 : \text{Bool}$. This, combined with further decomposing $\emptyset; \Pi; \ell' \vdash \text{check}_j (v_0, e_1)$, is sufficient to derive that either $v_0 = [\|\#\|]$ or $v_0 = [\|\#\|]$. In the first case and appealing to Lemma 14 we have $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^{\sigma'}[e_1], v_1)$. In the latter, we have $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (\text{error}_j, \sigma)$.

14. $\text{guard}_j (v_0, v_p, v_e)$: By assumption, we have $\Sigma \vdash E^{\sigma'} [\text{guard}_j (v_0, v_p, v_e)] : \tau$. By Lemma 10 we have $\emptyset; \Sigma \vdash \text{guard}_j (v_0, v_p, v_e) : \tau'$. By inversion, $\emptyset; \Sigma \vdash v_0 : \text{Bool}$. This, combined with further decomposing $\emptyset; \Pi; \ell' \vdash \text{guard}_j (v_0, v_p, v_e)$, is sufficient to derive that either $v_0 = [\|\#\|]$ or $v_0 = [\|\#\|]$. Using Lemma 14, we can now construct reductions for each case. In the first, we have $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^{\sigma'}[e_1], v_1)$. In the latter, we have $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (\text{install}_j (v_0, v_p, v_e), \sigma)$.

**Lemma 12 (Preservation).** For all programs $p$, stores $\sigma$, store typings $\Sigma$, and store labelings $\Pi$ such that

- $\Sigma \vdash p : \tau$,
- $\emptyset; \Sigma \vdash \sigma$,
- $\ell_0; \Pi \vdash p$, and
- $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (p', \sigma')$,

there exists a store labeling $\Pi'$ such that

- $\Pi' \supseteq \Pi$,
- $\ell_0; \Pi' \vdash p'$.

**Proof.** By case analysis on the reduction $(p, \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (p', \sigma')$.
1. \(\langle\text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1 \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots \text{ where } y_1 = v_1, \ldots y_n = v_n; y_{e_1} = e_1; \ldots y_{e_m} = e_m; p, \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\)

\(\langle\text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_i \text{ with } x_{c_i}, \ldots \text{ where } y_1 = v_1, \ldots y_n = v_n; y_{e_1} = e_1; y_{e_2} = e_2; \ldots y_{e_m} = e_m; p, \sigma\rangle\): Let \(\Pi' = \Pi\). It suffices to show that given

: \(\Pi \vdash \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_i\), with \(x_{c_i}, \ldots \text{ where } x_1 = v_1, \ldots x_n = v_n, x_{e_1} = e_1, \ldots \Delta\),

: \(\Pi \vdash \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_i\), with \(x_{c_i}, \ldots \text{ where } y_1 = v_1, \ldots y_n = v_n; y_{e_1} = e_1; y_{e_2} = e_2; \ldots y_{e_m} = e_m \Delta\).

From the premise, we have that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_1, \ldots; y_1, \ldots, y_n = \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash v_n, \Pi; \ell \vdash e_1, \ldots; y_1, \ldots, y_n = \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash e_1, \ldots; y_1, \ldots, y_n, \ldots = \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash c_1, \ldots\). These suffice to show the desired result, except we must also show \(\{y_1, \ldots, y_n\} = \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash \{y_1, \ldots, y_n\}\).

2. \(\langle\text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_i \text{ with } x_{c_i}, \ldots \text{ where } \ldots x_{e_1} = v_1, \ldots x_{c_1} = c_1, \ldots, p', \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\)

\(\langle\text{import } \ell, (x_1, \ldots, x_n), (v_1, \ldots, v_n), (c_1, \ldots, c_n), p'\rangle\), \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_1, \ldots; y_1, \ldots, y_n = \ell\); \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash e_1, \ldots; y_1, \ldots, y_n = \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash c_1, \ldots\). By Lemma 13 and well-formedness, we have that \(\varnothing; \ell \vdash x \rightarrow \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash \varnothing\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash v\), so by Lemma 15 \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \{v_1, \ldots, v_n\}\).

3. \(\langle\text{E}'[\lambda x: \tau. e] \| \ell \rangle, \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell/v_1]e\rangle, \sigma\rangle\): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \{v_1\}/x\). By Lemma 13 and well-formedness, we have that \(\varnothing; \ell \vdash x \rightarrow \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash \varnothing\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash v\), so by Lemma 15 \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \{v\}/x\).

4. \(\langle\text{E}'[\mu x: \tau. e] \| \ell \rangle, \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell/\mu x: \tau. e]e\rangle, \sigma\rangle\): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \{\ell/\mu x: \tau. e\}/x\). By Lemma 13 and well-formedness, we have that \(\varnothing; \ell \vdash x \rightarrow \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash \varnothing\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash v\), so by Lemma 15 \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \{v\}/x\).

5. \(\langle\text{E}'[\text{let } x = \ell \| \ell \rangle, \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell/\ell]e\rangle, \sigma\rangle\): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell\). By Lemma 13 and well-formedness, we have that \(\varnothing; \ell \vdash x \rightarrow \ell\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash \varnothing\); \(\Pi; \ell \vdash v\), so by Lemma 15 \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell\).

6. \(\langle\text{E}'[\text{if } \ell \| \ell \rangle \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2], \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[e_1], \sigma\rangle\): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash e_1\), which holds by Lemma 14 and well-formedness.

7. \(\langle\text{E}'[\text{if } \ell \| \ell \rangle \text{ then } e_1 \text{ else } e_2], \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[e_2], \sigma\rangle\): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash e_2\), which holds by Lemma 14 and well-formedness.

8. \(\langle\text{E}'[\ell/v_1 \| \ell/v_2], \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell/v_1], \sigma\rangle\) where \(v = v_1 \| v_2\): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/v_1\). By the type system, \(v_1, v_2\), and \(v\) must be integers, so \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/v_1\) holds directly.

9. \(\langle\text{E}'[\ell/v_1 \leq \ell/v_2], \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell/v_1], \sigma\rangle\) where \(v = v_1 \leq v_2\): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/v_1\). \(v\) is either \# or \#, so \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/v_1\) holds directly.

10. \(\langle\text{E}'[\text{make-parameter } \ell/v_1], \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell/p(r)], \sigma[r \mapsto v]\rangle\) where \(r\) is fresh: Let \(\Pi' = \Pi[r \mapsto \ell]\). We must show that \(\ell_0; \Pi' \vdash E'[\ell/p(r)]\). Since by Lemma 16 \(\ell_0; \Pi' \vdash E'[\text{make-parameter } \ell/v]\), by Lemma 14 it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi' \vdash \ell/v\), which holds by inspection.

11. \(\langle\text{E}'[\ell/p(r)], \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell/v], \sigma\rangle\) where \(\sigma(r) = v\) and \(E\) does not contain parameterize \(\ell Bk[p(r)] = v'\) in \(E'\): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/v\). By Lemma 13 we have that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/p(r)\), so by inversion we can derive \(\Pi(r) = k\) and \(\varnothing; \Pi \vdash \sigma\). Combining these facts, we can derive \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/v\), which is sufficient to show \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/v\).

12. \(\langle\text{E}'[\ell Bk[\text{parameterize } \ell/k/p(r)]], \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell Bk[\text{parameterize } \ell/k/p(r)]], \sigma\rangle\) where \(\ell Bk[\text{parameterize } \ell/k/p(r)] = v'\) in \(k B'\ell E'[E'k/k]v\)): By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash k B'\ell[\text{parameterize } \ell/k/p(r)] = v'\) in \(k B'\ell E'[E'k/k]v\)). This can be shown by applying the well-formedness of parameterize using Lemma 14 to demonstrate that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/k/p(r)\) by showing that \(\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \ell/k\). By Lemma 13 we have that \(\varnothing; \Pi; k \vdash \ell/k/p(r)\), so by inversion we can derive \(\Pi(r) = k\) and \(\varnothing; \Pi \vdash \sigma\). Combining these facts, we can derive \(\varnothing; \Pi; k \vdash v\), which is sufficient to show \(\varnothing; \Pi; k \vdash v\).

13. \(\langle\text{E}'[\ell Bk[\ell/k/p(r)] = \ell/k/v], \sigma\rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}}\langle\text{E}'[\ell/v], \sigma[r \mapsto v]\rangle\) where \(\ell Bk[\ell/k/p(r)] = v'\) in \(k B'\ell E'[E'k/k]v\)): Let \(\Pi' = \Pi\). Then it suffices to show that \(\Pi(r) = k\), \(\varnothing; \Pi; k \vdash v\), and
(by Lemma 14) If \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash [t]() \). The last holds by inspection. \( \Pi(r) = k \) and \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash v \) hold by Lemma 13 and well-formedness or parameter assignment.

14. \( E^t_{\ell} B^k[p(r)] = \| k \| \parallel k_B^t[E^t_{\ell} B^k[p(r)] := \| k \| \parallel k_B^t[ E^t_{\ell} |[t()]|, \sigma] \) → ann

\( E^t_{\ell} B^k[p(r)] = \| k \| \parallel k_B^t[E^t_{\ell} |[t()]|, \sigma] \) where \( E^t_{\ell} \) does not contain \( E^t_{\ell} \). By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \| k \| \parallel k_B^t[E^t_{\ell} |[t()]|, \sigma] \). This holds by well-formedness of parameterized, coupled with an application of Lemma 14 to show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash E^t_{\ell} |[t()]| \) since \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash [t()] \).

15. \( E^t_{\ell} B^k[p(r)] = \| k \| \parallel k_B^t[v()] \) → ann

\( E^t_{\ell} [check^k_{\ell}(v(),v)] \). By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash [check^k_{\ell}(v(),v)] \), which follows from Lemma 13 and well-formedness.

16. \( E^t_{\ell} [\{(\parallel flat(c,v_c)\})_{\ell},\| k \| \parallel k_B^t[v()] \}, \sigma] \) → ann

\( E^t_{\ell} [\check{check}^k_{\ell}(v(),v)] \). By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{check}^k_{\ell}(v(),v) \), which requires that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash (\parallel flat(c,v_c)\})_{\ell} \) and \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash v \). By Lemma 10 we can deduce that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{check}^k_{\ell}(v(),v) \), which falls by Lemma 11.

17. \( E^t_{\ell} [\{(\parallel param/c(c,v)\})_{\ell},\| k \| \parallel k_B^t[v()] \}, \sigma] \) → ann

\( E^t_{\ell} [\check{param}^k_{\ell}(c,v)] \). By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{param}^k_{\ell}(c,v) \), which requires that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash (\parallel param/c(c,v)\})_{\ell} \) and \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash v \). By Lemma 10 we have that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash (\parallel param/c(c,v)\})_{\ell} \) and \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash v \). Thus by inversion we have \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash v \). Inverting the latter second time, we have that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{param}^k_{\ell}(c,v) \), which follows by Lemma 11.

18. \( E^t_{\ell} [\{(\parallel mon^k_{\ell}(c)\})_{\ell},\| k \| \parallel k_B^t[v()] \}, \sigma] \) → ann

\( E^t_{\ell} [\check{mon}^k_{\ell}(c)] \). By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{mon}^k_{\ell}(c) \), which requires that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash (\parallel mon^k_{\ell}(c)\})_{\ell} \) and \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash v \). By Lemma 10 we can deduce that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{mon}^k_{\ell}(c) \), which falls by Lemma 10.

19. \( E^t_{\ell} [\{(\parallel e\}_d : \tau \rightarrow (c_r,c_v,c_c,v_c)\})_{\ell},\| k \| \parallel k_B^t[v()] \}, \sigma] \) → ann

\( E^t_{\ell} [\check{e\}_d : \tau \rightarrow (c_r,c_v,c_c,v_c)] \). By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{e\}_d : \tau \rightarrow (c_r,c_v,c_c,v_c) \), which requires that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash (\parallel e\}_d : \tau \rightarrow (c_r,c_v,c_c,v_c)\})_{\ell} \) and \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash v \). By Lemma 10 and repeated inversions we can show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{e\}_d : \tau \rightarrow (c_r,c_v,c_c,v_c) \).

For the second, we must show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{e\}_d : \tau \rightarrow (c_r,c_v,c_c,v_c) \), which follows by Lemma 11.

20. \( E^t_{\ell} [\{(\parallel ctx/c(v_c)\})_{\ell},\| k \| \parallel k_B^t[v()] \}, \sigma] \) → ann

\( E^t_{\ell} [\check{ctx/c}(v_c)] \). By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{ctx/c}(v_c) \), which requires that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash (\parallel ctx/c(v_c)\})_{\ell} \) and \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash v \). By Lemma 10 and repeated inversions we can show that \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \check{ctx/c}(v_c) \).
Proof. Induction on $E^k$.

Lemma 13 (Label focusing for Annotated CtxPCF). If $\ell; \Pi \vdash E^k[e]$ then $\varnothing; \Pi \vdash e$.

Proof. Induction on $E^k$. 

Lemma 14 (Well-formedness rules for annotated CtxPCF). If $\ell; \Pi \vdash E^k[e]$ and $\varnothing; \Pi \vdash e'$ then $\ell; \Pi \vdash E^k[e']$.

Proof. Induction on $E^k$. 

and $\varnothing; \ell \vdash v$. The latter holds by Lemma 13 and well-formedness. The former requires further showing that $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v_a$, $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash \ell$, and $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash e$. This is straightforward, since we can derive $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v_a$, $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v_{a_1}$, $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v_{a_2}$, and $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_f$ by Lemma 13 and repeated applications of well-formedness.

22. $(E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^f[e], \sigma)$: By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash e$. This holds since by Lemma 13 and inversion $\varnothing; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f$, which requires that $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash e$.

23. $(E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^f[\text{install}_j (v_p, v), \varnothing, v, e, f], \sigma)$: By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{install}_p_j (v_p, v)$. By well-formedness, we must show that $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v_p$, $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v$, and $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash (v f v)$. By Lemma 13 and inversion we can derive $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{install}_p_j (v_p, v, v_f)$ and $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash v$. Inverting the former, we can further infer $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v_p$, $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v$, and $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_f$. All that remains to be show is $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash (v f v)$, which follows through a single application of the well-formedness rule for application.

24. $(E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma)$: By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$. The latter holds by Lemma 14 and inversion, we have $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$, which inverting again is sufficient to show the required well-formedness properties.

25. $(E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma)$: By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$. The latter holds by Lemma 13 and inversion, we must have $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$, which by the well-formedness rule for guard, we must show that $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v_p$, $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v$, and $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash (v f v)$. By Lemma 13 and inversion we can derive $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$ and $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash v$. Inverting the former, we can further infer $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v_p$, $\varnothing; \Pi; j \vdash v$, and $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_f$. All that remains to be show is $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash (v f v)$, which follows through a single application of the well-formedness rule for application.

26. $(E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma)$: By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$. Thus $c \neq \|_\ell \cdot \text{ctx}(v_{c_1} \leftarrow v_{c_1}), \ldots, v_{v_{v_n}}, v_{v_{a_1}} \leftarrow v_{a_1}, \ldots)$ and by the well-formedness rule for guards we must show that $\varnothing; \Pi; \ell \vdash (v f v)$, which can be shown using Lemma 13. For the third, we must first establish that $c \neq \|_\ell \cdot \text{ctx}(v_{c_1} \leftarrow v_{c_1}), \ldots, v_{v_{v_n}}, v_{v_{a_1}} \leftarrow v_{a_1}, \ldots)$, since by Lemma 10 and repeated inversions we can show that $\varnothing; \ell \vdash c : \tau$, and then by the remaining rule for monitor well-formedness, we simply must show that $\varnothing; \ell \vdash (v f v)$. Both facts follow from inverting $\varnothing; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$, which by the well-formedness rule for guard, we must show that $\varnothing; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$. By Lemma 13 and repeated inversions we can show that $\varnothing; \ell \vdash (v f v)$.

27. $(E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma)$: By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that $\varnothing; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$. By the well-formedness rule for guard, we must show that $\varnothing; \ell \vdash \text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f)$.

28. $(E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma)$: By Lemma 14 it suffices to show that $\varnothing; \ell \vdash (v f v)$. This follows from the fact that, by Lemma 13 and repeated inversions to demonstrate the necessary well-formedness judgments.

29. $(E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma) \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} (E^f[\text{guard}_j (\|_\ell) \cdot \varnothing, v, v, e, f], \sigma)$: Trivial.

□

Lemma 13 (Label focusing for Annotated CtxPCF). If $\ell; \Pi \vdash E^k[e]$ then $\varnothing; \Pi \vdash e$.

Proof. Induction on $E^k$.

Lemma 14 (Well-formedness rules for annotated CtxPCF). If $\ell; \Pi \vdash E^k[e]$ and $\varnothing; \Pi \vdash e'$ then $\ell; \Pi \vdash E^k[e']$.

Proof. Induction on $E^k$. 

□
Lemma 15 (Well-formed substitution for Annotated CtxPCF). If \( \Delta[x \mapsto \ell]; \Pi; \ell \vdash e_1 \) and \( \Delta; \ell \vdash e_2 \) then \( \Delta; \Pi; k \vdash \{^{e_2/x}\} e_1 \)

Proof. Mutual induction on well-formedness and well-formed contracts.

Lemma 16 (Weakening for Well-formedness for Annotated CtxPCF). If \( \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash e_1 \) and \( r \notin e_1 \), then \( \Delta; \Pi[r \mapsto k]; \ell \vdash e_1 \)

Proof. Mutual induction on well-formedness and well-formed contracts.

Lemma 17 (Weakening well-formed contracts for Annotated CtxPCF). If \( \Delta; \Pi; \vec{k}; \vec{\ell}; j \vdash c \), then \( \Delta; \Pi; k'_j; \ell'_j \vdash c \) for all \( \vec{k}' \) and \( \vec{\ell}' \) such that \( \vec{k} \subseteq k'_j \) and \( \vec{\ell} \subseteq \ell'_j \).

Proof. Induction on well-formed contracts.

Lemma 18 (Weakening label environments for well-formedness for Annotated CtxPCF). If \( \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash e \), then \( \Delta[x \mapsto \ell'] \vdash e \) for any \( x \) and \( \ell' \) such that \( x \) is not in the free variables of \( e \).

Proof. Mutual induction on well-formed contracts and well-formed expressions.

Lemma 19 (Weakening label environments for well-formed contracts for Annotated CtxPCF). If \( \Delta; \Pi; k; \ell; j \vdash c \), then \( \Delta[x \mapsto \ell'] \vdash k; c \) for any \( x \) and \( \ell' \) such that \( x \) is not in the free variables of \( c \).

Proof. Mutual induction on well-formed contracts and well-formed expressions.

Lemma 20 (Well-formed imports for Annotated CtxPCF). If for \( \Delta = \{x_1 : \ell_1, \ldots, x_m : \ell_m\} : \Delta; \Pi \vdash m_1 \supseteq \Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_{n-1}; \Pi \vdash m_n \supseteq \Delta_n, \) and
\( \Delta_n; \Pi; \ell_0 \vdash e \), and also \( \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_1, \ldots, \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_m \) and \( \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash c_1, \ldots, \Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash v_m \), then \( \ell_0; \Pi \vdash \text{import}[[\ell, (x_1, \ldots, x_m), (v_1, \ldots, v_m), (c_1, \ldots, c_m), m_1 ; \ldots ; m_n ; e]] \).

Proof. Induction on the size of \( m_1 ; \ldots ; m_n ; e \).

B.6 Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF

B.6.1 Surface Programs

Note. The following extend the syntax of Surface CtxPCF.

\[
\begin{align*}
e & ::= \ldots \mid \text{make-tag} : (\tau \rightarrow \tau) \mid \text{reset e in e} \mid \text{shift e as x in e} \mid \text{tag}(e, e, e) \\
c & ::= \ldots \mid \text{tag}(c, c, c) \\
\tau & ::= \ldots \mid (\tau \rightarrow \tau) \text{ tag}
\end{align*}
\]

B.7 Well-typed Surface Programs

Note. The following extend the typing rules of Surface CtxPCF.

\[
\Gamma \vdash e : \tau
\]
\[ \Gamma \vdash \text{make-tag} : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r) \text{ tag} \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash e_t : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r) \text{ tag} \quad \Gamma \vdash e_v : \tau_r \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash \text{reset} e_t \text{ in } e_v : \tau_r \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash e_1 : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r) \text{ ctc} \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash e_2 : \tau_d \text{ ctc} \quad \Gamma \vdash e_3 : \tau_r \text{ ctc} \]

\[ \Gamma \vdash \text{tag/}(e_1, e_2, e_3) : ((\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r) \text{ tag}) \text{ ctc} \]
B.8 Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF

**Note.** The following extend the syntax and typing rules of Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF unless stated otherwise.

### B.8.1 Annotated Surface Programs

\[ e \ ::= \ldots | \ell \langle \ell x \rangle \]

### B.8.2 Additional Typing Rules for Annotated Surface Programs

\[
\begin{align*}
\Gamma \vdash e : \tau \\
\Gamma \vdash x : \tau \\
\Gamma \vdash \langle x \rangle : \tau \\
\end{align*}
\]

### B.8.3 Well-formed Annotated Surface Programs

**Note.** The following extend the well-formedness rules of Annotated Surface CtxPCF.

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta; \ell \vdash e \\
\Delta; \ell \vdash e \quad \Delta; \ell \vdash e_v \\
\Delta; \ell \vdash \text{make-tag} : \langle \tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r \rangle \\
\Delta; \ell \vdash \text{reset} e_i \text{ in } e_v \\
\Delta; \ell \vdash \text{shift } e_i \text{ as } x \text{ in } e_v \\
\Delta; \ell \vdash \text{tag/c} (e_1, e_2, e_3) \\
\end{align*}
\]
B.9 Ctrl+CtxPCF

B.9.1 Programs

Note. The following extend the syntax of CtxPCF.

\[ \begin{align*}
  e & ::= \ldots \mid \text{make-tag} : (\tau \to \tau) \mid \text{reset } e \text{ in } e \mid \text{shift } e \text{ as } x \text{ in } e \mid \text{tag/c}(e, e, e) \\
  v & ::= \ldots \mid t(t) : (\tau \to \tau) \mid \text{tag/p}^k(e, e, e) \\
  c & ::= \ldots \mid \text{tag/c}(c, c, c) \\
  \tau & ::= \ldots \mid (\tau \to \tau) \text{ tag}
\end{align*} \]

B.9.2 Well-typed Programs

Note. The following extend the typing rules of CtxPCF.

\[ \begin{align*}
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{make-tag} : (\tau_d \to \tau_r) : (\tau_d \to \tau_r) \text{ tag} \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{reset } e_t \text{ in } e_v : \tau_r \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{shift } e_t \text{ as } x \text{ in } e_v : \tau_r \\
  \Delta; \ell \vdash (\tau_d \to \tau_r) \text{ tag} \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash c_1 : (\tau_d \to \tau_r) \text{ ctc} \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash c_2 : \tau_d \text{ ctc} \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash c_3 : \tau_r \text{ ctc} \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash v : (\tau_d \to \tau_r) \text{ tag} \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{tag/p}^k(e_1, e_2, e_3, v) : (\tau_d \to \tau_r) \text{ tag} \\
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \text{tag/c}(e_1, e_2, e_3) : ((\tau_d \to \tau_r) \text{ tag}) \text{ ctc}
\end{align*} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
  \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \sigma \\
  \text{dom}(\Sigma) = \text{dom}(\sigma) \quad \forall r \in \text{dom}(\sigma), \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \Sigma(r) : \sigma(r) \\
  \forall t \in \text{dom}(\sigma), \Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \Sigma(t) : \text{Unit}
\end{align*} \]

B.9.3 Evaluation Contexts

Note. The following extend the evaluation contexts of CtxPCF.

\[ \begin{align*}
  E & ::= \ldots \mid \text{reset } E \text{ in } e \mid \text{reset } v \text{ in } E \mid \text{shift } E \text{ as } x \text{ in } e \\
  \quad \mid \text{tag/c}(E, e, e) \mid \text{tag/c}(c, E, e) \mid \text{tag/c}(c, c, E) \\
  \ell T^k & ::= [\cdot] \mid \text{tag/p}^\ell_j(e_1, e_2, e_3, \ell T^k)
\end{align*} \]
### B.9.4 Reduction Semantics

Note. The following extend the reduction rules of CtxPCF.

\[ \langle E[\text{make-tag} : (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2)], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[t(t) : (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2)], \sigma[t \mapsto ()] \rangle \text{ where } t \text{ is fresh in } \sigma \]

\[ \langle E[\text{reset } \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ in } v], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E[v], \sigma \rangle \]

\[ \langle E[\text{reset } \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ in } E'[\text{shift } \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ as } x \text{ in } e]], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E'[\text{reset } \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ in } \{v / x\} \text{e}], \sigma \rangle \]

where \( v_k = \lambda y : \tau_d. \text{reset } \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ in } E'[e_y] \)

and \( v' = \text{wrap}_1^+ \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], \text{wrap}_1^+ \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], v_k] \)

and \( e_y = \text{wrap}_2^+ \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], \text{wrap}_2^+ \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], y] \)

and \( e' = \text{wrap}_2^+ \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], \text{wrap}_2^+ \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], e] \)

and \( E' \) does not contain \( \text{reset } \ell \times T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \) in \( E'' \)

\[ \langle E'[\text{mon}_1^+(\text{tag/c}(c_1, c_2, c_3, v)), \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle E'[\text{tag/p}_1^+(c_1, c_2, c_3, v)], \sigma \rangle \]
B.10  Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF

Note. The following extend the syntax and typing rules of Ctrl+CtxPCF unless stated otherwise.

B.10.1  Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs

\[ e ::= \ldots | \ell(t(x)) | \ell(e) | \ell'(e) \]
\[ v ::= \ldots | \ell(v) | \ell'(v) \]
\[ c ::= \ldots | \ell(c) | \ell'(c) \]

B.10.2  Additional Typing Rules for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs

\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau
\]
\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \ell(t) : \tau
\]
\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \ell(e) : \tau
\]
\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash \ell'(e) : \tau
\]
\[
\Gamma; \Sigma \vdash [e] : \tau
\]

B.10.3  Annotated Evaluation Contexts

Note. The following extend the evaluation contexts of Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF.

\[
F ::= \ldots | \text{reset } F \text{ in } e | \text{reset } v \text{ in } F | \text{shift } F \text{ as } x \text{ in } e
\]
\[
F' ::= \ldots | \text{reset } F' \text{ in } e | \text{reset } v \text{ in } F | \text{shift } F' \text{ as } x \text{ in } e
\]
\[
\ell T_k ::= [\cdot] | \ell\tag/p_j^{e'}(c_1.c_2.c_3.||\ell' T_k ||)
\]

B.10.4  Annotated Reduction Semantics

Note. The following extend the reduction rules of Annotated CtxPCF.

\[
\langle E'[\text{make-tag}] : (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2) \rangle, \sigma \quad \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \quad \langle E'[\ell(t)] : (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2) \rangle, \sigma[t \mapsto ()] \text{ where } t \text{ is fresh } \sigma
\]
\[
\langle E'[\text{reset } T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] || \text{ in } v], \sigma \rangle \quad \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \quad \langle E'[v], \sigma \rangle
\]
\[
\langle E'[\text{reset } \ell T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] || \text{ as } x \text{ in } e \rangle, \sigma \quad \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \quad \langle E'[\text{reset } \ell T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ in } \{v/x\} e', \sigma \rangle
\]

where \( v_k = [\lambda y : \tau_d. \text{reset } \ell T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ in } E'[e_g] \)
and \( v' = \ell' \text{wrap}_k ||\ell' T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], \text{wrap}_k ||\ell T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], v_k ||\rangle \)
and \( e_g = \ell' \text{wrap}_k ||\ell' T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], \text{wrap}_k ||\ell T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], v_k \rangle \)
and \( e = \ell' \text{wrap}_k ||\ell' T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], \text{wrap}_k ||\ell T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], e ||\rangle \)
and \( \ell T_k \) does not contain \( \text{reset } ||\ell' T_k[t(t)] : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] || \text{ in } E'[e'] \)
\[
\langle E'[\text{mon}^{k}_j(\ell\tag/c(c_1.c_2.c_3)], v)], \sigma \rangle \quad \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \quad \langle E'[\ell\tag/p_j^{k}(c_1.c_2.c_3)], v], \sigma \rangle
Note. The following metafunction replaces that of Annotated CxPCF.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{obl}[[^\ell\text{flat/c}(v)||\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j]] &= \|[^\ell\text{flat/c}(v)||\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j]\\
\text{obl}[[^\ell\text{param/c}(c)||\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j]] &= \|[^\ell\text{param/c}(\text{obl}[c,\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j])||\\
\text{obl}[[^\ell\text{ctx/c}(v,(v \Rightarrow v \leftarrow v)\ldots,v,(v \Rightarrow v \leftarrow v)\ldots)||\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j]] &= \|[^\ell\text{ctx/c}(v,(v \Rightarrow v \leftarrow v)\ldots,v,(v \Rightarrow v \leftarrow v)\ldots)||\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j]\\
\text{obl}[[^\ell\text{tag/c}(c_1,c_2,c_3)||\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j]] &= \|[^\ell\text{tag/c}(\text{obl}[c_1,\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j],\text{obl}[c_2,\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j],\text{obl}[c_3,\vec{k},\vec{\ell},j])||
\end{align*}
\]
B.10.5 Well-formed Annotated Programs

Note. The following extend the well-formedness rules of Annotated CtxPCF.

\[
\Delta; \|; \ell \parallel e
\]

\[
\Delta; \|; e_1 \quad \Delta; \|; e_2 \quad \Delta; \|; e_1 \quad \Delta[x \mapsto \ell]; \|; e_2 \quad \Delta; \|; e_1 \quad \Delta; \|; \text{tag}(e_1, e_2, e_3)
\]

\[
\Delta; \|; \eta \quad \Delta; \|; \phi \quad \Delta; \|; p
\]

\[
\Delta; \parallel \mu \quad \Delta; \|; \nu
\]

\[
\Delta; \parallel \mu \quad \Delta; \|; \nu
\]

\[
\Delta; \|; \eta \quad \Delta; \|; \phi \quad \Delta; \|; \mu
\]

B.11 Metatheory of Ctrl+CtxPCF

Theorem 5 (Type Soundness for Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF). For all programs \( p \) of Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF such that \( \models p : \tau \)

\[
\times (p, \emptyset) \rightarrow \times (v, \sigma) \quad \text{or;}
\]

\[
\times (p, \emptyset) \rightarrow \times (\text{error}_j, \sigma) \quad \text{or;}
\]

\[
\times (p, \emptyset) \rightarrow \times (p', \sigma) \quad \text{where } p' = E[\text{shift}^{\ell'} \cdot T^{k'}[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)]] \quad \text{as } x \in e \quad \text{where } E \text{ does not contain}
\]

\[
\text{reset}^{\ell''} T^{k''}[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \quad \text{in } E' \quad \text{or;}
\]

\[
\times (p, \emptyset) \rightarrow \times (p', \sigma) \quad \text{and there exist } p'' \quad \text{such that } p' \rightarrow p''.
\]

Proof. Direct consequence of Theorems 21 and 22.

Lemma 21 (Type Progress for Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs). If \( \Sigma \models p : \tau, \text{ then either } p \text{ is a value } v, \text{ p is } \text{error}_j, p \text{ is}

\[
E[\text{shift}^{\ell'} T^{k'}[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)]] \quad \text{as } x \in e \quad \text{where } E \text{ does not contain } \text{reset}^{\ell''} T^{k''}[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \quad \text{in } E', \text{ or for all } \sigma \text{ such that}
\]

\[
\varnothing; \Sigma \models \sigma, \text{ there exist } p' \text{ and } \sigma' \text{ such that } (p, \sigma) \rightarrow (p', \sigma').
\]

Proof. By straight-forward case analysis on \( p \) using Lemmas 23, 24, and 25.

Lemma 22 (Type Preservation for Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs). If \( \Sigma \models p : \tau, \varnothing; \Sigma \models \sigma, \text{ and } (p, \sigma) \rightarrow (p', \sigma'), \text{ then either there exists}

\[
\Sigma' \supseteq \Sigma \text{ such that } \Sigma' \models p' : \tau \text{ and } \Gamma; \Sigma' \models \sigma', \text{ or } p' = \text{error}_j.
\]


Lemma 23 (Unique decomposition for Ctrl+CtxPCF Programs). For all well-typed programs \( p \) such that \( p \neq v, p \neq \text{error}_j \), and \( p \neq \text{module } \ell \text{ exports } x_1, \ldots, x_n \) \text{ with } \( y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n, \ldots, p' \), \text{ there are unique } e', \text{ and } E \text{ such that } p = E[e']

\[
\text{and } e' \text{ is one of the following:}
\]

1. one of the corresponding cases of the statement of Lemma 3
2. \text{make-tag} : (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2)
3. \text{reset}^{\ell'} T^{k'}[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \quad \text{in } v
4. \text{reset}^{\ell''} T^{k''}[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \quad \text{in } E'[\text{shift}^{\ell'} T^{k'}[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \quad \text{as } x \in e \quad \text{where } E' \text{ does not contain}
\]

\[
\text{reset}^{\ell''} T^{k''}[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \quad \text{in } E''
\]
5. \( \text{shift}^t \bar{\text{trans}}[\bar{t}(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \) as \( x \) in \( e \) where \( E \) does not contain \( \text{reset}^t \bar{\text{trans}}[\bar{t}(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \) in \( E' \)
6. \( \text{mon}^t_j \text{(tag/c)}(c_1, c_2, c_3, v) \)

\[ \text{Proof.} \] By induction on the size of \( p \).

Lemma 24 (Well-typed evaluation context plugs for Ctrl+CtxPCF). If \( \Sigma \vdash E[e] : \tau; \emptyset \vdash e : \tau' \), and \( \emptyset ; \Pi \vdash e' : \tau' \) then \( \Sigma \vdash E[e'] : \tau \).

\[ \text{Proof.} \] Induction on \( E \).

Lemma 25 (Type focusing for Ctrl+CtxPCF). If \( \Sigma \vdash E[e] : \tau \) then \( \emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau' \) for some \( \tau' \).

\[ \text{Proof.} \] Induction on \( E \).

Theorem 6 (Type Soundness for Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF). For all programs \( p \) of Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF such that \( \vdash p : \tau \)

\[ \begin{align*} &\cdot (p, \emptyset) \rightarrow \sigma_{\text{ann}} \langle v, \sigma \rangle \text{ or; } \\ &\cdot (p, \emptyset) \rightarrow \sigma_{\text{ann}} \langle \text{error}^k, \sigma \rangle \text{ or; } \\ &\cdot (p, \emptyset) \rightarrow \sigma_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma \rangle \text{ and there exist } p'' \text{ such that } p' \rightarrow p''. \end{align*} \]

\[ \text{Proof.} \] Direct consequence of Theorems 26 and 27.

Lemma 26 (Type Progress for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF Terms). If \( \Sigma \vdash p : \tau \), then either \( p \) is a value \( v \), \( p \) is \( \text{error}^k \), or \( p \) is \( \text{E}[\text{shift}^t \bar{\text{trans}}[\bar{t}(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ as } x \text{ in } e \] where \( E \) does not contain \( \text{reset}^t \bar{\text{trans}}[\bar{t}(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \) in \( E' \text{ or } \text{ for all } \sigma \text{ such that } \emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash \sigma \), there exist \( p' \text{ and } \sigma' \text{ such that } \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle p', \sigma' \rangle \).

\[ \text{Proof.} \] By straight-forward case analysis on \( p \) using Lemmas 28, 29, and 30.

Lemma 27 (Type Preservation for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF Terms). If \( \Sigma \vdash p : \tau \), \( \emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash \sigma \), and \( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma' \rangle \), then either there exists \( \Sigma' \supseteq \Sigma \) such that \( \Sigma' \vdash p' : \tau \) and \( \emptyset ; \Sigma' \vdash \sigma' \), or \( p' = \text{error}^k \).

\[ \text{Proof.} \] By straight-forward case analysis on the rules of the reduction semantics using Lemma 28 and Lemma 29.

Lemma 28 (Unique decomposition for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). For all well-typed programs \( p \) such that \( p \neq v \), \( p \neq \text{error}^k \), and \( p \neq \text{module} \ell \text{ exports } x_{v_1} \text{ with } x_{c_1}, \ldots \) where \( y_1 = e_1, \ldots, y_n = e_n \), \( p' \), there are unique \( \ell', \ell'' \), and \( E' \) such that \( p = \text{E}^{\ell'} \langle \ell' \rangle \) and \( \ell' \) is one of the following:

1. one of the corresponding cases of the statement of Lemma 8
2. make-tag : \((\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2)\)
3. reset \(\langle \ell' \bar{\text{trans}}^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)]\rangle \) in \( v \)
4. reset \(\langle \ell' \bar{\text{trans}}^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)]\rangle \) in \( E'[\text{shift}^t \bar{\text{trans}}^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \text{ as } x \text{ in } e \] where \( E \) does not contain \( \text{reset}^t \bar{\text{trans}}^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \) in \( E'' \text{ or } \text{ for all } \sigma \text{ such that } \emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash \sigma \), there exist \( p' \text{ and } \sigma' \text{ such that } \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle p', \sigma' \rangle \).
5. shift \(\langle \ell' \bar{\text{trans}}^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)]\rangle \) as \( x \text{ in } e \) where \( E \) does not contain \( \text{reset}^t \bar{\text{trans}}^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)] \) in \( E'' \text{ or } \text{ for all } \sigma \text{ such that } \emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash \sigma \), there exist \( p' \text{ and } \sigma' \text{ such that } \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow \langle p', \sigma' \rangle \).
6. \( \text{mon}^t_j \text{(tag/c)}(c_1, c_2, c_3, v) \)

\[ \text{Proof.} \] By induction on the size of \( p \).

Lemma 29 (Well-typed evaluation context plugs for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If \( \Sigma \vdash E[k][e] : \tau; \emptyset ; \Pi \vdash e : \tau' \), and \( \emptyset ; \Pi \vdash e' : \tau' \) then \( \Sigma \vdash E[k][e'] : \tau \).

\[ \text{Proof.} \] Induction on \( E[k] \).

Lemma 30 (Type focusing for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If \( \Sigma \vdash E[k][e] : \tau \) then \( \emptyset ; \Sigma \vdash e : \tau' \) for some \( \tau' \).

\[ \text{Proof.} \] Induction on \( E[k] \).

Theorem 7 (Annotation transparency). The following statements hold for Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF:
1. Let \( e \) be a well-typed and well-formed Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF program: \( \vdash p : \tau \) and \( \ell_0 \vdash p \). Let \( \bar{p} \) be the Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF expression that is like \( p \) but without annotations. If \( \langle p, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma \rangle \), then \( \langle \bar{p}, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle \bar{p}', \sigma \rangle \), where \( \bar{p}' \) is the Ctrl+CtxPCF program that is like \( p' \) but without annotations.

2. Let \( \bar{p} \) be a well-typed Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF program: \( \vdash \bar{p} : \tau \) and \( \ell_0 \vdash \bar{p} \). Then there exists some Annotated Surface Ctrl+CtxPCF program \( p \) such that \( \vdash p : \tau \) and \( \ell_0 \vdash p \). Furthermore, if \( \langle \bar{p}, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle \bar{p}', \sigma \rangle \), then \( \langle p, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma \rangle \) for some \( p' \), where \( \bar{p}' \) is the Ctrl+CtxPCF program that is like \( p' \) but without annotations.

Proof. By a straightforward lock-step bi-simulation between the two reduction steps using the obvious annotation erasure function to relate the corresponding configurations in each step. For the second point of the theorem’s statement, we construct \( p \) from \( \bar{p} \) by adding to each imported variable in a term of \( \bar{p} \) the appropriate annotation.

Definition 2 (Complete monitoring). Ctrl+CtxPCF is a complete monitor if any only if for all \( p \) such that \( \vdash p : \tau \) and \( \ell_0 \vdash p \), either

- \( \langle p_0, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle v, \sigma \rangle \), or
- \( \langle p, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma \rangle \) and \( p' = E^\ell[\text{shift } || e' || E^k[t] : \langle \tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r \rangle] \) as \( x \) in \( e \) where \( E^\ell \) does not contain \( \text{reset} \) or \( E^k \), or
- for all \( p_1 \) and \( \sigma_1 \) such that \( \langle p_0, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p_1, \sigma_1 \rangle \) there exists \( p_2 \) and \( \sigma_2 \) such that \( \langle p_1, \sigma_1 \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p_2, \sigma_2 \rangle \), or
- \( \langle p, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p_1, \sigma_1 \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma_2 \rangle \) and \( p' \) is of the form \( E^\ell[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \text{flat}(c) \rangle,v)] \) and for all such terms \( p_1, v = || k' \parallel || k \in \vec{k} \), or
- \( \langle p, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p_1, \sigma_1 \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle \text{error}_j^k, \sigma_2 \rangle \) and \( p_1 \) is of the form

\[
E^\ell[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \text{ctx}(c, v_{g_1} \Rightarrow v_{p_1}, v_{p_1} \leftarrow v_{v_1}), \ldots, v_{a_1}(v_{g_{a_1}} \Rightarrow v_{p_{a_1}}, v_{p_{a_1}} \leftarrow v_{v_{a_1}}), \ldots \rangle^\vec{k}), v)]
\]

and for all such terms \( p_1, \ell \in \vec{\ell} \).

Theorem 8. Ctrl+CtxPCF is a complete monitor.

Proof. As a direct consequence of Lemmas\( \{26,27,31,32\} \) we have that for all programs \( p_0 \) such that \( \vdash p_0 : \tau \) and \( \ell_0 \vdash p_0 \), either

- \( \langle p_0, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle v, \sigma \rangle \), or
- \( \langle p, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma \rangle \) and \( p' = E^\ell[\text{shift } || e' || E^k[t] : \langle \tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r \rangle] \) as \( x \) in \( e \) where \( E^\ell \) does not contain \( \text{reset} \) or \( E^k \), or
- for all \( p_1 \) and \( \sigma_1 \) such that \( \langle p_0, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p_1, \sigma_1 \rangle \) there exists \( p_2 \) and \( \sigma_2 \) such that \( \langle p_1, \sigma_1 \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p_2, \sigma_2 \rangle \), or
- \( \langle p, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle \text{error}_j^k, \sigma_2 \rangle \). In the last case, since \( \ell_0 \vdash p_0 \), we know that \( \text{error}_j^k \) does not appear in \( p_0 \). Therefore it must have been introduced by a reduction. In particular, it must have been the result of the reduction \( E^\ell[\text{check}_j^k(\langle \# || \rangle, e)], \sigma_2 \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle \text{error}_j^k, \sigma_2 \rangle \). Again, since \( \ell_0 \vdash p_0 \), \text{check}_j^k(\langle \# || \rangle, e) \) must not occur in \( p_0 \). Hence it must be the result of a reduction. There are three rules that introduce checks:

1. \( \langle E^\ell[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \text{flat}(c) \rangle,v)], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell[\text{check}_j^k((c, v), v)], \sigma \rangle \): In this case, we can deduce

\[
\langle p_0, \emptyset \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell[\text{check}_j^k((c, v), v)], \sigma \rangle
\]

- \( \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell[\text{check}_j^k((c, v), v)], \sigma_1 \rangle \)
- \( \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell[\text{check}_j^k((c, v), v)], \sigma_2 \rangle \)

By Lemma\( \{32\} \) we can deduce that for some \( \Pi \) such that \( \emptyset; \Pi \vdash \sigma_1, \ell_0; \Pi \vdash E^\ell[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \text{flat}(c) \rangle,v)]; \Pi \vdash E^\ell[\text{check}_j^k((c, v), v)], \sigma \rangle \) by well-formedness that \( k \in \vec{k} \).

2. \( \langle E^\ell[\text{mon}_j^k(\langle \# || \rangle, v)], \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle E^\ell[\text{check}_j^k((c, v), e)], \sigma \rangle \) where

\[
c = \text{ctx}(c, v_{c_1} \Rightarrow v_{c_1}, \ldots, v_{p_2}, v_{p_2} \leftarrow v_{v_1}, v_{a_1}(v_{g_{a_1}} \Rightarrow v_{p_{a_1}}), v_{p_{a_1}} \leftarrow v_{v_{a_1}}), \ldots \rangle^\vec{k}, v)\]

and
where

Proof. From Lemma 28 we know that there either

\[ p_0, \varnothing \vdash \text{mon}^k_j(\|e\|_v,\sigma_1) \]
\[ \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} E^f[\text{check}_j(\langle v_e()\rangle),\sigma_1] \]
\[ \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} E^f[\text{check}_j(\langle \ell \#\rangle,e),\sigma_2] \]
\[ \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \text{error}_j,\sigma_2 \]

By Lemma 32, we can deduce that for some \( \Pi \) such that \( \varnothing; \Pi \vdash \sigma_1,\ell_0; \Pi \vdash E^f[\text{mon}^k_j(\|e\|_v,\sigma_1)] \). By Lemma 33 we derive \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \text{mon}^k_j(\|e\|_v,\sigma_1) \), and thus by well-formedness that \( \ell \in \ell \).

3. \( E^f[\|e\|_v,\sigma_1] \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} E^f[\text{check}_j(\langle v_e()\rangle,e),\sigma_1] \)

By Lemma 32, we can deduce that for some \( \Pi \) such that \( \varnothing; \Pi \vdash \sigma_1,\ell_0; \Pi \vdash E^f[\text{mon}^k_j(\|e\|_v,\sigma_1)] \). By Lemma 33 we derive \( \varnothing; \ell \vdash \text{mon}^k_j(\|e\|_v,\sigma_1) \), and thus by well-formedness that \( \ell \in \ell \).

Combining these three cases with the results above suffice to show that CtxPCF is a complete monitor.

Lemma 31 (Progress). For all programs \( p \), stores \( \sigma \), store typings \( \Sigma \), and store labelings \( \Pi \) such that

- \( \Sigma \vdash p : \tau \)
- \( \varnothing; \Pi \vdash \sigma \), and
- \( \ell_0; \Pi \vdash p \); then either
  - \( p = u \),
  - \( p = E^f[\text{shift} \|e\|_v,\tau] (t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)) \) as \( x \) in \( e \) where \( E^f \) does not contain \( \text{reset} \|e\|_v,\tau \) in \( E^f \), or
  - \( p = \text{error}_j^k \), or
  - \( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma' \rangle \).

Proof. From Lemma 28 we know that there either either \( p = v \), \( p = \text{error}_j^k \), or \( p = E^f[\text{shift} \|e\|_v,\tau] (t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)) \) as \( x \) in \( e \) where \( E^f \) does not contain \( \text{reset} \|e\|_v,\tau \) in \( E^f \), or

- \( p = \text{error}_j^k \), or
- \( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p', \sigma' \rangle \).

The first three cases are immediate. If \( p = \text{error}_j^k \), then by the reduction relation we have \( \langle p, \sigma \rangle \rightarrow_{\text{ann}} \langle p, \sigma \rangle \).

We only show here the redexes from the reduction rules of Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF that do not overlap with those of Annotated CtxPCF. The cases for the redexes from the rules that overlap with those of Annotated CtxPCF transfer to this proof after adjusting the proof text to refer to lemmas for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF instead of the corresponding ones for Annotated CtxPCF.
1. **make-tag**: \((\tau_1 \to \tau_2)\): By the reduction relation and Lemma 34 we get 
\(\langle E'[\text{make-tag}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2), \sigma \rangle \to_{ann} \langle E'[\text{tag}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2), \sigma[t \mapsto ()] \rangle\) where \(t\) is fresh \(\sigma\). Let \(\Pi' = \Pi[t \mapsto \ell]\). We must show that \(\Pi' ; \ell \vdash E'[\text{tag}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2)\). Since by Lemma 36, \(\Pi' ; \ell_0 \vdash E'[\text{make-tag}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2)\), by Lemma 34 it suffices to show that \(\Pi' ; \ell \vdash E'[\text{tag}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2)\), which holds by inspection.

2. **reset**: \(\langle E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r), \sigma \rangle \to_{ann} \langle E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r), \sigma[t \mapsto ()] \rangle\) where \(t\) is fresh \(\sigma\). Let \(\Pi' = \Pi[t \mapsto \ell]\). We must show that \(\Pi' ; \ell_0 \vdash E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r)\). Since by Lemma 36, \(\Pi' ; \ell_0 \vdash E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r)\), by Lemma 34 it suffices to show that \(\Pi' ; \ell \vdash E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r)\), which holds by inspection.

3. **reset**: \(\langle E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r), \sigma \rangle \to_{ann} \langle E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r), \sigma[t \mapsto ()] \rangle\) where \(t\) is fresh \(\sigma\). Let \(\Pi' = \Pi[t \mapsto \ell]\). We must show that \(\Pi' ; \ell_0 \vdash E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r)\). Since by Lemma 36, \(\Pi' ; \ell_0 \vdash E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r)\), by Lemma 34 it suffices to show that \(\Pi' ; \ell \vdash E'[\text{reset}] : (\tau_d \to \tau_r)\), which holds by inspection.

4. **mon**: \(\langle E'[\text{mon}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2), \sigma \rangle \to_{ann} \langle E'[\text{mon}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2), \sigma[t \mapsto ()] \rangle\) where \(t\) is fresh \(\sigma\). Let \(\Pi' = \Pi[t \mapsto \ell]\). We must show that \(\Pi' ; \ell_0 \vdash E'[\text{mon}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2)\). Since by Lemma 36, \(\Pi' ; \ell_0 \vdash E'[\text{mon}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2)\), by Lemma 34 it suffices to show that \(\Pi' ; \ell \vdash E'[\text{mon}] : (\tau_1 \to \tau_2)\), which holds by inspection.

**Lemma 32 (Preservation).** For all programs \(p\), stores \(\sigma\), store typings \(\Sigma\), and store labelings \(\Pi\) such that

- \(\Sigma \vdash p : \tau\)
- \(\Sigma ; \Pi \vdash \sigma\)
- \(\ell_0 ; \Pi \vdash p\), and
- \((p, \sigma) \to_{ann} (p', \sigma')\),

there exists a store labeling \(\Pi'\) such that

- \(\Pi' \supseteq \Pi\)
- \(\ell_0 ; \Pi \vdash p\)

**Proof.** By case analysis on the reduction \((p, \sigma) \to_{ann} (p', \sigma')\) (We only show here the reduction rules of Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF that do not overlap with those of Annotated CtxPCF. The cases for the rules that overlap with those of Annotated CtxPCF transfer to the proof text to refer to lemmas for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF instead of the corresponding ones for Annotated CtxPCF):
Lemma 34 (Well-formed evaluation context plugs for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If $\ell; \Pi \vdash E^k[e]$ and $\Pi; k \vdash e'$ then $\ell; \Pi \vdash E^k[e']$.

Proof. Induction on $E^k$.

Lemma 35 (Well-formed substitution for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If $\Delta[x \mapsto \ell]; \Pi; k \vdash e_1$ and $\Pi; \ell \vdash e_2$ then $\Delta; \Pi; k \vdash \{x \mapsto e_2\} e_1$.

Proof. Mutual induction on well-formedness and well-formed contracts.

Lemma 36 (Weakening for Well-formedness for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If $\Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash e$ and $t \not\in \Pi$, then $\Delta; \Pi[t \mapsto k]; \ell \vdash e$.

Proof. Mutual induction on well-formedness and well-formed contracts.

Lemma 37 (Weakening well-formed contracts for Annotated Ctrl+CtxPCF). If $\Delta; \Pi; k; \ell; j \vdash c$, then $\Delta; \Pi; k'; \ell'; \ell \vdash c$ for all $k'$ and $\ell'$ such that $k \subseteq k'$ and $\ell \subseteq \ell'$.

Proof. Induction on well-formed contracts.

Lemma 38 (Well-formed wrapping). Let $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ and $e$ such that $\Delta; \Pi; \ell \vdash e$. If $e' = \text{wrap}_i [\ell^k T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], \text{wrap}_i [\ell^k T^k[t(t) : (\tau_d \rightarrow \tau_r)], e]]$ then $\Delta; \Pi; \ell' \vdash e'$.

Proof. By lexicographic induction on the sizes of $\ell^k T^k$ and $\ell T^k$.
C. Example monitors

Note, in addition to the results that are described in Section 3.3, hooks may return an additional value add-lifetime specified using #:add-lifetime. This value is a set of delegations to be added to the global delegation set along with those of the add value. However, to control the size of the global delegation set, the library removes these delegations from the global delegation set when the garbage collector of Racket collects the wrapped function.

```
(define-monitor dac
  (monitor-interface make-object/c make-user/c grant/c revoke/c)
  (action
    [make-object/c (name setuser)
      #:on-create (do-create #:closure-principal (> current-principal (dim name)))
      #:on-apply (let ([owner (proj-principal closure-principal)]
                       [objdim (set-first (proj-dims closure-principal))])
        (do-apply #:check (> current-principal (> closure-principal objdim use)
                      (> closure-principal objdim use))
                #:set-principal (if setuser owner #f)))
    [make-user/c (name set-auth)
      #:on-create (let ([new-pcpl (pcpl name)])
        (do-create #:add-lifetime (list (> current-principal (> new-pcpl use invoke) @ new-pcpl))
                   #:closure-principal new-pcpl))
      #:on-apply (do-apply #:check (> current-principal (> closure-principal use invoke) closure-principal)
                           #:set!-principal (if set-auth closure-principal #f)
                           #:set-principal (if set-auth #f closure-principal)))
    [grant/c (object recipient)
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (let ([recipient-principal (recipient-principal recipient)]
                       [object-principal (object-principal object)])
        (do-apply #:add (list (make-lifetime (> recipient-principal object-principal) current-principal object)))
      )
    [revoke/c (object recipient)
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (let ([recipient-principal (> (recipient-principal recipient) use)]
                       [object-principal (object-principal object)])
        (define (equal? p) (equal? p recipient-principal))
        (define (matching-target? p) (equal? p object-principal))
        (define (to-remove delegations current)
          (filter (λ (d) (match d
            [(labeled (actsfor (> equal? recipient? 1) (> matching-target? r)) ll)
             #:when (acts-for? current ll 11) #t]
             [_ #f])))
          (do-apply #:remove (to-remove current-delegations current-principal)))
      )
    )
  )
  (define use (dim 'use))
  (define invoke (dim 'invoke))

  (define (recipient-principal recipient)
    (cdr (make-user/c-authority recipient)))

  (define (object-principal object)
    (cond
      [(make-user/c? object)
       (> (cdr (make-user/c-authority object)) invoke))
      [(make-object/c? object)
       (let* ([pcpl (cdr (make-object/c-authority object))]
             (> pcpl use)))]
    )

Figure 11. Discretionary Access Control Monitor
(define-monitor stack-inspection
  (monitor-interface make-permission permission? check-permission/c enable-permission/c
  do-privileged/c context/c unprivileged/c privileged/c coerce-to-unprivileged)
  (monitor-syntax-interface define/rights))

(action #:search (list use-static search-delegates-left)
  [check-permission/c (perm)
    #:on-create (do-create)
    #:on-apply
      (do-apply #:check (> @ (current-principal active) (> T perm) (> T perm)))
  ]
  [enable-permission/c (perm)
    #:on-create (do-create)
    #:on-apply
      (do-apply #:add (list (> @ (current-principal enable perm) (> current-principal static perm)
                     current-principal)))
  ]

[privileged/c (perms)
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply
    (do-apply #:add-scoped scoped-delegations #:set-principal callee)
]

[context/c
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply
    (do-apply #:add-scoped (list (> @ (current-principal enable) (> current-principal static)
                       current-principal)))
]

[unprivileged/c
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply
    (do-apply #:set-principal ⊥)
]

(extra
  (define active (dim 'active)) (define enable (dim 'enable))
  (define static (dim 'static))
  (define (use-static l r l1 ds)
    (if (and (not (proj? l))
             (match r []> top _ #t [ _ #f]))
      (> l (list->set (map (λ (p) (> T p)) perms))))
      (> l static)))

[define coerce-to-unprivileged
  (make-contract #:name "coerce-to-unprivileged"
    #:projection (λ (blame) (λ (val)
      (cond [(privileged/c? val) val]
             [unprivileged/c? val] val)
            [context/c? val] val)
            [(procedure? val) (((contract-projection unprivileged/c) blame) val)]
            [else val)])))

(syntax
  (make-define/contract/free-vars/contract define/auth/contract
    (membrane/c coerce-to-unprivileged coerce-to-unprivileged)
    (membrane/c coerce-to-unprivileged coerce-to-unprivileged)))

(define-syntax define/rights
  (make-set!-transformer
    (lambda (stx) (syntax-case stx (set!)
      [[set! binder e] (raise-syntax-error 'set! (format "cannot mutate ~a" 'define/right))]
      [(define/right head . args) (right (... ...)) ctc body (... ...)]
        #'(define/auth/contract (head . args) (and/c ctc (privileged/c (list right (... ...))))
            body (... ...))]
      [(define/right head (right (... ...)) ctc body)
        #'(define/auth head (and/c ctc (privileged/c (list right (... ...)))) body)]))))

Figure 12. Stack Inspection Monitor
(define-monitor history-based
(monitored-interface make-permission permission? check-permission/c grant/c accept/c
unprivileged/c privileged/c coerce-to-unprivileged/c

(monitor-syntax-interface define/rights)
(action #:search (list use-static search-delegates-left)
[check-permission/c (perm)
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply (do-apply #:check (λ (permission? (current-principal active)? (T perm) (T perm)))

[priviledge/c (perms)
#:on-create (do-create #:check (λ (current-principal? (T T)))
#:on-apply

(let* [(callee (pcpl (gensym 'frame))
[static-principal (normalize (disj (list->set (map (λ (p) (> T p)) perms))))]
[to-remove (filter (match-lambda
[[labeled (actsfor l r) ll] (and (and (equal? l (current-principal enable))
(not (equal? r (current-principal static))))
#t]
[_ #f])
(delegation-set->list current-delegations)))]
[to-add (cons (λ (callee enable) (> current-principal active) current-principal)
(map (match-lambda
[[labeled (actsfor l r) ll] (labeled (actsfor l (normalize (<> r (callee static)))) ll)]
)to-remove))]
[to-scpe (list (λ (callee enable) (> current-principal active) (> callee enable) (callee static))) callee))]]
(do-apply #:add-to-add to-remove #:add-scoped-to-scpe #:set-principal callee))]
[grant/c
#:on-create (do-create)
#:on-apply
(do-apply #:add-scoped (list (> (current-principal enable) (current-principal static)
current-principal)))]
[accept-context/c
#:on-create (do-create #:add-lifetime (list (> (-> T current-delegations) T T)))
#:on-apply (do-apply #:add (delegation-set->list current-delegations)
#:remove (delegation-set->list closure-delegations)
#:set-principal closure-principal)]
[unprivileged/c
#:on-create (do-create) #:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal ⊥)])
(extra
(define active (dim 'active))
(define enable (dim 'enable))
(define static (dim 'static))
(define (use-static l r ll ds)
(if (and (not (proj? l)) (match r [[(proj top _) #t] [_[ #f]]) (set (> l static)) (set)))]
(define (make-permission name (dim name)) (define (permission? val (dim? val))
(define accept/c
(make-contract #:name "accept/c"
#:projection (λ (blame) (λ (val))
(make-keyword-procedure
(λ (kwd-s kwd-args . other-args)
(call/cc (λ (k)
(let* ([cont (with-contract #:region expression accept/c #:result accept-context/c k)])
(call-with-values (λ () (keyword->list val kwd s kwd-args other-args)) cont)))))))))
(define coerce-to-unprivileged
(make-contract #:name "coerce-to-unprivileged"
#:projection (λ (blame) (λ (val))
(cond [(unprivileged/c? val) val]
[(privileged/c? val) val])
[[procedure? val] (((contract-projection unprivileged/c blame) val))
[else val])])))]
[syntax
(make-define/contract/free-vars/contract define/auth/contract
(membrane/c coerce-to-unprivileged coerce-to-unprivileged)
(membrane/c coerce-to-unprivileged coerce-to-unprivileged))
(define-syntax define/rights
(make-set!-transformer (λ (stx) (syntax-case stx (set!)
[[set! define/rights e] (raise-syntax-error 'set! (format "cannot mutate "a" 'define/rights))]
[[define/rights (head . args) (right (....)) ctc body] (....)]
'(define/auth/contract (head . args) (and/c ctc (privileged/c (list right (....)))))
body (....)]
'(define/rights head (right (....))) ctc body)
'(define/auth/contract (and/c ctc (privileged/c (list right (....)))) body)))]))

Figure 13. History-based Access Control Monitor
(define-monitor ocap
 (monitor-interface
  capability/c unprivileged-capability/c
  capability/c? unprivileged-capability/c?
  coerce-to-unprivileged-capability)
 (monitor-syntax-interface define/cap)
 (action #:search (list search-caps search-delegates-left)
  [capability/c
   #:on-create
   (let* ([child (pcpl (gensym 'capability))]
      [parent current-principal]
      [parenthood (⇒ @ (⇒ parent caps) (⇒ child invoke) @ child)]
      [endowment (⇒ @ (⇒ child caps) (⇒ (⇒ parent caps) current-delegations) parent)])
      (do-create #:add-lifetime (list parenthood endowment validity) #:closure-principal child))
   #:on-apply
   (let ([introductions
         (filter-map (λ (arg) (let ([arg-cap (cdr arg)])
                                  (⇒ @ (⇒ closure-principal caps) (⇒ arg-cap invoke) current-principal)))]
             closure-args)]
             [return-hook
              (λ (results)
               (let ([result-introductions
                      (map (λ (res) (make-lifetime (⇒ @ current-principal caps) (⇒ cdr res) invoke))
                         closure-principal (car res))]
                      (filter id results)))))
             (do-return #:add result-introductions)))]
   #:check (⇒ @ current-principal (⇒ closure-principal invoke) (⇒ closure-principal invoke))
   #:add-lifetime introductions #:set-principal closure-principal #:on-return return-hook)))]
 [unprivileged-capability/c
  #:on-create
  (let* ([child (pcpl (gensym 'unprivileged))]
         [parent current-principal]
         [parenthood (⇒ @ (⇒ parent caps) (⇒ child invoke) child)])
  (do-create #:add-lifetime (list parenthood) #:closure-principal child))
  #:on-apply
  (let ([introductions
         (filter-map (λ (arg) (let ([arg-cap (cdr arg)])
                                  (⇒ @ (⇒ closure-principal caps) (⇒ arg-cap invoke) current-principal)))]
             closure-args)]
             [return-hook
              (λ (results)
               (let ([result-introductions
                      (map (λ (res) (make-lifetime (⇒ @ current-principal caps) (⇒ cdr res) invoke))
                         closure-principal (car res))]
                      (filter id results)))))
             (do-return #:add result-introductions)))]
  #:check (⇒ @ current-principal (⇒ closure-principal invoke) (⇒ closure-principal invoke))
  #:add-lifetime introductions #:set-principal closure-principal #:on-return return-hook)))]
 (extra
  (define invoke (dim 'invoke)) (define caps (dim 'caps))
  (define (search-caps l r l1 ds) (if (pcpl? l) (set (> l caps)) (set)))
  (define coerce-to-unprivileged-capability
    (make-contract #:name "coerce-to-unprivileged-capability"
      #:projection (λ (blame) (λ (val)
                               (cond [[capability/c? val] val]
                                     [[unprivileged-capability/c? val] val]
                                     [[procedure? val] (((contract-projection unprivileged-capability/c) blame) val)]
                                     [else val])))))
 (syntax
  (define-syntax define/cap
    (make-set!-transformer (λ (stx) (syntax-case stx (set!)
                                      (set! binder e) (raise-syntax-error 'set! (format "cannot mutate ~a 'binder" binder))]
                                      ([binder head body0 body (... ...)]
                                       #'(define/contract head capability/c body0 body (... ...))))))))

Figure 14. Object-capabilities Monitor
---

**Figure 15.** Dominion Monitor

```scheme
(define-monitor driver-monitor
  (monitor-interface safe/c deprivilege/c switch-player/c check-player/c)

  (action #:search (list search-delegates-left)
    [safe/c
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal ⊤)]
    [deprivilege/c
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal ⊥)]
    [switch-player/c (name)
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (let ([pcpl (player->pcpl name)])
        (do-apply #:set-principal pcpl))]
    [check-player/c (name)
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (let ([pcpl (player->pcpl name)])
        (do-apply #:check (⇒ @ current-principal pcpl pcpl)))]

  (extra
    (define player-pcpls (make-weak-hash))
    (define (player->pcpl name)
      (hash-ref! player-pcpls name (thunk (pcpl name)))))

---

**Figure 16.** DrRacket Keybindings Monitor

```scheme
(define-monitor keybindings-monitor
  (monitor-interface make-permission permission? check-and-switch-permissions/c enable-permissions/c permissions-closure/c)

  (action #:search (list search-delegates-left)
    [check/c (perms)
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (do-apply #:check (⇒ @ current-principal pcpl pcpl)
        #:set-principal pcpl)]
    [enable/c (perms)
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal (∧ current-principal perms))]
    [closure/c
      #:on-create (do-create)
      #:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal closure-principal))]

  (extra
    (define (make-permission name) (pcpl name))
    (define permission? pcpl?)))
```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>add-canvas</td>
<td>(check/c UnSafe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add-undo</td>
<td>(-&gt; any/c closure/c any)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adjust-cursor</td>
<td>(check/c ChangeEditorView)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after-edit-sequence</td>
<td>(check/c InEditSequence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after-load-file</td>
<td>(check/c InLoadFile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after-save-file</td>
<td>(check/c InSaveFile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>auto-wrap</td>
<td>(check/c SetSoftlineBreaks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>begin-edit-sequence</td>
<td>(enable/c InEditSequence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>begin-write-header-footer-to-file</td>
<td>(check/c WriteFile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can-do-edit-operation?</td>
<td>(check/c InEditOperation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>can-load-file?</td>
<td>(check/c InLoadFile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>can-save-file?</td>
<td>(check/c InSaveFile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clear-undos</td>
<td>(check/c ClearHistory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>copy</td>
<td>(and/c (check/c WriteClipboard) (enable/c (~ WriteClipboard InCopy)))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>copy-self</td>
<td>(check/c Safe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>copy-self-to</td>
<td>(check/c GetEditorInfo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut</td>
<td>(check/c (~ Delete WriteClipboard))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dc-location-to-editor-location</td>
<td>(check/c Safe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>default-style-name</td>
<td>(check/c GetEditorInfo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paste</td>
<td>(and/c (check/c (~ ReadClipboard Insert)) (enable/c (~ ReadClipboard Insert InPaste)))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>move-position</td>
<td>(-&gt;a ([this any/c] [code symbol?]) ([extend? any/c] [kind symbol?] #:auth (extend?) (cond ([(and (not (unsupplied-arg? extend?)) extend?) (check/c (~ Select GetEditorInfo GetText SetInsertionPoint))) [else (check/c (~ GetEditorInfo GetText SetInsertionPoint)) any])])</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 17. The contract for DrRacket's object
(define-monitor pkg-monitor
  (monitor-interface is-author/c is-curator/c as-user/c grant-curator/c revoke-curator/c
   authority-closure/c deprivilege/c)

(action
  [is-author/c (pkg)]
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply
    (let* ([authors (string-split (hash-ref pkg 'author))]
          [authorpcpl (disj (list->set (map author->pcpl authors)))]
          (do-apply #:check (⪰ @ current-principal authorpcpl authorpcpl)))

  [is-curator/c]
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply (do-apply #:check (⪰ @ current-principal curator curator))

  [as-user/c (user)]
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply (do-apply #:check (⪰ @ current-principal (author->pcpl user) (author->pcpl user))
                      #:set-principal (author->pcpl user))

  [grant-curator/c (user)]
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply (do-apply #:add (list (⪰ @ (author->pcpl user) curator curator)))

  [revoke-curator/c (user)]
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply (do-apply #:remove (list (⪰ @ (author->pcpl user) curator curator)))

  [authority-closure/c]
  #:on-create (do-create #:closure-principal current-principal)
  #:on-apply (do-apply #:set-principal closure-principal)

  [deprivilege/c]
  #:on-create (do-create)
  #:on-apply (do-apply #:set!-principal unpriv))

(extra
  (define curator (pcpl 'curator))
  (define unpriv (pcpl 'unprivileged))
  (define pcpls (make-weak-hash))
  (define (author->pcpl author)
    (hash-ref! pcpls author (λ () (pcpl (string->symbol author))))))

Figure 18. Racket package index monitor

(provide
  (contract-out
    [authenticate (and/c
      authority-closure/c
      (operation symbol?)
      #:email [email string?]
      #:password [password string?]
      #:on-success [success (email) (→a (→a (→a (→a any)) any))] #:on-failure [failure (→ symbol? any)]])
     [result any/c]]))

Figure 19. The contract for the package index authenticate function