The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference

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Susanna Siegel

1. Introduction

Suppose you are looking for your keys. You check your pocket, then a table by the door, and you finally notice them sitting next to a pile of mail. "These are my keys," you say. Clearly the word "these" refers to your keys. But on what does this fact supervene? Which conditions are such that, necessarily, if they obtain, then your use of 'these' has the referent it does?

An informative answer to this question would include mention of two different sorts of facts. First, it would include the fact that you were speaking in English, and that in English, 'these' does not pick out anything independently of a particular occasion of use. Second, it would include facts about which features of that occasion give your use of the demonstrative its reference. It is controversial just which features these are, but some candidates are the following: your referential intentions, gestures of pointing, facts about conversational salience, or some combination of the above.

In this paper, I take for granted the facts about when a speaker is speaking in English and that in English, 'these', 'that' and 'this' are context-dependent expressions. (And I take for granted the analogous facts about other languages and their speakers.) Taking these things for granted, I offer an account of which features of the context fix demonstrative reference.

On my account, the speaker's perceptual states are crucial to demonstrative reference-fixing. In the most basic uses of demonstratives, I argue, the speaker perceives what she demonstratively refers to, and the reference of her use of a demonstrative is fixed by a perceptually anchored referential intention. Along with *intentionists* about demonstrative ref-

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erence, then, I hold that speaker intentions of some variety fix demonstrative reference. Unlike traditional intentionism, however, my version is limited to a certain class of uses of demonstratives. I argue that in these uses, the speaker's referential intentions fix demonstrative reference, and that in the formation of these intentions, perceptual states play a crucial role. To distinguish my view from other views which give speaker intentions a special role in demonstrative reference-fixing, I call my view "Limited Intentionism."

A word about terminology. I will speak throughout of *uses* of demonstratives as referring. What a use of a demonstrative refers to is conceptually distinct from what a speaker refers to by the use of a demonstrative on a particular occasion. It is a conceptual possibility with demonstratives, as with other expressions, that a speaker may be mistaken about what the semantic reference of her use of a demonstrative is.[1, 2]

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[1]Nothing I say in speaking of uses of demonstratives as referring commits me to one side or the other in the debate about whether it is expressions-in-contexts or events of utterance in which expressions are used that are the bearers of propositional content. (Kaplan, in his 1989, pp. 522, 546, argues that the former notion is required to give a model-theoretic semantics for languages including demonstratives. Israel and Perry [1996] and Garcia-Carpintero [1998] argue for a use-based approach.)

[2]According to some ways of drawing the semantics/pragmatics distinction, uses of demonstratives have no semantic reference at all. On one such view of the distinction, semantic interpretations of utterances result from the conventional meanings of linguistic expressions, rules of composition, and the values of uses of *automatic* indexicals (this terminology is from J. Perry 1997). Automatic indexicals include 'I', 'today', and 'tomorrow'. They do not require extra supplement from the context, in contrast with both bare demonstratives (which are at issue in this paper), and complex demonstratives (which are not at issue in this paper). Interpretations of utterances are pragmatic, according to this view, if they result from the sort of contextual supplementation that speaker intentions are suited to provide. A proponent of this construal of the semantics/pragmatics distinction is Kent Bach, who allows that uses of the first-person pronoun have semantic reference, but denies that uses of demonstratives (both bare and com-

To say what motivates Limited Intentionism, we must consider the class of uses of demonstratives to which this account is limited. Call a *Basic Case of demonstrative reference* a case which meets the following three conditions. Where *S* is a speaker who uses a demonstrative expression *D*, and succeeds in referring, by her use of *D*, to an object *x*:

(a)   *S* perceives *x*;
(b)   *S* intends to refer to *x* by using *D*;
(c)   The intention described in (b) is anchored by *S*'s perception of *x*.

The claim that an occurrence of demonstrative reference is a Basic Case leaves open whether speaker intentions help fix demonstrative reference. A Basic Case of demonstrative reference is, by definition, a case in which the speaker has a certain kind of referential intention—namely, a perceptually anchored one. But it is not by definition a case in which the use of a demonstrative refers to what it does *because* the speaker has this intention. I will argue later that this is in

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plex) do. (See his 1987, ch. 9. Bach's is not the only construal of the semantics/pragmatics distinction that prohibits uses of demonstratives from having semantic reference; another view of the distinction that prohibits this is discussed in J. Stanley and J. King MS.)

In this paper, I will assume that there is no principled distinction between automatic indexicals and bare demonstratives that makes uses of the former but not the latter have semantic values.

One further warning. Once views of the semantics/pragmatics distinction of the sort just mentioned are set aside, there is no special reason to doubt that speaker intentions of a certain kind can have semantic significance. The fact that speaker-reference—which is undoubtedly a creature of pragmatics on *any* way of drawing the distinction with semantics—is determined by speaker intentions should not be confused with the claim that *any* reference relation determined by speaker intentions is thereby something other than semantic reference.

fact so; but it is not part of the definition of Basic Cases that it is so.[3]

Two clarifications are in order about the intention that figures in Basic Cases.

First, having a perceptually anchored intention does not preclude having addressee-directed intentions as well. Indeed, normally, speakers will have such intentions as well—for instance, speakers will intend that their addressee take an object *o* to be what the speaker is referring to.

Second, the notion of semantic reference does not figure in the content of the perceptually anchored intention. Rather, the intention in question is an intention to refer to an object *o* by using a demonstrative. Whether an object *o* ends up being the semantic referent of the use of the demonstrative is what is at issue between Limited Intentionism and its opponents. Limited Intentionism predicts that if a speaker uses a demonstrative and conditions (a)–(c) are met, then the speaker's use of the demonstrative refers to the object of her perceptually anchored intention.

The idea that a referential intention can be "anchored by" perception needs explaining. We can illustrate the idea with an example:

> *Example 1.* You see a single set of keys in front of you, which you take to be yours. You say, "These are mine," intending to refer, by your use of 'these', to the keys you see in front of you.

Contrast this example with another:

> *Example 2.* You are looking straight at your keys, but you don't recognize them. Not only do you not recognize the keys you see; you believe that your keys are behind you. You point behind you, saying "These are my keys," and intending by the use of 'these' to refer to your keys.

In Example 2, your referential intention is not anchored by a perception of your keys. You do perceive your keys. And you intend to refer to your keys. But your referential intention is not anchored by your perception of what you intend to refer to. This is the intuitive distinction that underlies the idea that referential intentions can be anchored by perception. There is a clear sense in which in Example 1, but not in Example 2, it is in virtue of your perceiving your keys that you are in a position to refer to them. In Example 2, you are in a position to refer to your keys, but not in virtue of perceiving them right then (nor even, perhaps, in virtue of perceiving them at some time in the past).

The contrast between these two examples illustrates perceptual anchoring. The illustration is just that: an illustration. It does not specify the role of perception in the anchoring of referential intentions, let alone explain how such anchoring occurs. These are substantial questions for the philosophy of perception, worthy of separate discussion; they will not be pursued here.

Limited Intentionism is an account of what establishes demonstrative reference that is limited to Basic Cases. What motivates giving an account that is limited in this way?

2. Motivation

Limited Intentionism is motivated by two ideas: first, that perception is a means for anchoring uses of demonstratives

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[3]We can safely ignore the distinction between the notion that referential intention is a necessary and sufficient condition for demonstrative reference, on the one hand; and the notion that demonstrative reference to *x* occurs *because* of the speaker's referential intention, on the other.

to things; second, that the notion of "having something in mind" is underdefined.

Let me begin with the first idea: that perception can anchor uses of demonstratives to the things those uses refer to. We perceive facts about our surroundings by perceiving things; we can state facts about our surroundings by demonstratively referring to things. Perception can anchor uses of demonstratives to, say, a baby when it represents contrasts between the baby and its surroundings.

Sometimes, without perceiving any such contrast, one perceives the area where a thing is in plain view. Suppose, for instance, that *S* looks at a chameleon whose surfaces look exactly like those surrounding it. It is a matter of controversy whether in such a case *S* sees the chameleon or merely sees its surfaces.[4] Even if *S* does see the chameleon, however, *S*'s seeing it does not suffice to make it available to *S* as an object of demonstrative reference. In contrast, when one's perception of a thing does allow one to differentiate it from its surroundings, one can go on to refer to it demonstratively. This makes it plausible to suppose that it is a certain kind of perception—namely, perceptual differentiation of a thing from its surroundings—that makes demonstrative reference in those cases possible.

Going along with its suitability for securing demonstra-

tive reference, perception is also a means for making true a presupposition by the speaker that seems to be a necessary condition on the *felicity* (appropriateness)[5] of an assertive demonstrative utterance. It seems to be a necessary condition on the felicity of an assertive demonstrative utterance that the speaker presuppose that there is a distinct object (or area, or part of an object, or property) to which she is demonstratively referring. If a speaker felicitously uses a demonstrative and her use refers, then she has already, to some extent, differentiated it in thought. Consider an utterance in which the speaker does not differentiate any object in thought yet purports to refer by the use of a demonstrative. A blindfolded speaker, unsure of his exact surroundings, points and says "That is a man." Even if there were someone pointed to, the utterance would be infelicitous, since it is inappropriate to make an assertion without believing that it is (or is likely to be) true.[6] This suggests that such utterances are felicitous only if the speaker presupposes that there is a distinct object (or area, etc.) to which her use of the demonstrative refers. The most straightforward way to make such presuppositions true is to succeed in differentiating an object (area, etc) in thought. Perception is a means of doing that.

To be sure, such presuppositions are not always true. They are false when uses of demonstratives fail to refer because there is nothing there to refer to, as when the speaker is hallucinating. The motivation for Limited Intentionism is not the idea that perception is sufficient for establishing demonstrative reference, or even for anchoring thought to things. The motivation is rather that perception is a natural candidate for making felicitous uses of demonstratives that

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[4]It is controversial whether representing contrasts between an object *o* and its surroundings is a necessary condition for perceiving *o*. According to Fred Dretske (1969), visually differentiating *o* from its surroundings is necessary in order to see *o*. (Dretske makes an exception for portions of surfaces: one can see a portion of a wall of uniform color and texture, he says, even if nothing about that portion is distinctive.) Limited Intentionism is motivated by a weaker and far less controversial claim than Dretske's. What motivates Limited Intentionism is the idea that visual differentiation sometimes accompanies seeing. This claim is neutral on the question of whether there are kinds of seeing that don't involve visual differentiation (e.g., whether one sees the chameleon or merely sees its surfaces).

[5]Felicity is a pre-theoretical notion of appropriateness of utterance. In many (perhaps most) conversational contexts, Gricean maxims are the standard of appropriateness.

[6]Such an utterance violates a Gricean maxim of quality: do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. See Grice 1975, p. 152.

latch on to the things they refer to. It is prima facie plausible to think that the speaker's perceiving the referent of a use of a demonstrative plays a central role in making such uses refer as they do.

Besides the idea that perception can anchor demonstrative reference, Limited Intentionism has a second motivation: it makes the notion of having something in mind more specific. That this notion needs to be made more specific is evident from the debate about traditional intentionism—the view that in all cases demonstrative reference is fixed by the speaker's referential intentions.

A standard objection to traditional intentionism is that a speaker's use of a demonstrative can refer to something the speaker does not have in mind. This standard objection comes in two versions. The first version concerns Basic Cases of demonstrative reference; the second concerns non-Basic Cases. According to the first version, even in Basic Cases a demonstrative sometimes refers to an object that the speaker does not have in mind, so the facts about which object a speaker has in mind do not determine the facts about reference-fixing. The second version of the standard objection draws the same conclusion with respect to non-perceptually-anchored uses of demonstratives. From the claim that these uses sometimes refer to an object that the speaker does not have in mind, it concludes that perception does not fix demonstrative reference.

It is important to distinguish between these two versions of the standard objection. Only the version directed at Basic Cases threatens to refute Limited Intentionism. The type of example standardly taken to illustrate the irrelevance of speaker intentions to the facts about reference-fixing in Basic Cases, I argue, does not show the irrelevance of speaker intentions at all. Rather, it illustrates the possibility of having conflicting intentions to refer. Cases of speakers with conflicting referential intentions are not, as critics claim, coun-

terexamples to intentionism. Instead, examples of conflicting referential intentions merely pose a challenge to intentionists. These cases challenge intentionists to specify the content of the reference-fixing intentions, and thereby give a basis for predicting which referential intention fixes reference. The ordinary notion of having an object in mind is underdefined, and so a viable version of intentionism must appeal to a more specific notion. Indeed, since both sides of the debate about traditional intentionism make use of the underdefined notion of having something in mind, the debate as a whole cannot progress until this notion is made more specific. To the extent that Limited Intentionism offers a more specific notion of having something in mind, it moves the debate forward.

As for the version of the objection directed at non-Basic Cases, by contrast, the fan of Limited Intentionism is free to grant it. If Limited Intentionism is true, its truth does not necessarily shed light on what fixes demonstrative reference in non-Basic Cases. This is not an unfortunate limitation, but rather a virtue given the need to make the notion of having in mind more specific.

The rest of this paper will go as follows. In Section 3, I examine the first version of the standard objection to intentionism (I call this the *perceptual version*). In Section 4, I show how Limited Intentionism meets the challenge that this version of the objection poses. In Section 5, I justify giving an account of demonstrative reference-fixing that is limited to the Basic Cases. Finally, in Section 6, I defend Limited Intentionism against an alleged counterexample.

3. The Standard Objection to Intentionism:
The Perceptual Version

The standard objection to intentionism is that there are cases in which a speaker demonstratively refers to something that she does not have in mind or intend to refer to, and thus

speaker intentions do not fix demonstrative reference. In the perceptual version of this objection, the actual referent of the speaker's use of a demonstrative is something the speaker perceives.

Reimer and Wettstein both raise the standard objection to intentionism in its perceptual version. In each case, a speaker confuses the referent of her use of a demonstrative with another thing. I will argue that the speakers Reimer and Wettstein discuss have conflicting referential intentions, and that if intentionism has any hope of responding to the perceptual version of the standard objection, it must have a criterion that determines which of these conflicting intentions fixes reference.

Reimer's objection goes like this. According to intentionism, when a speaker succeeds in referring by the use of a demonstrative *D*, her use of *D* refers to what she intends to refer to by using *D*.[7] But in some cases, what the speaker intends to refer to is not the referent of her (otherwise successful) demonstrative utterance. So these intentions do not fix demonstrative reference.

Reimer describes such a case:

> Suppose that I suddenly realize that I have left my keys on the desk in my (shared) office. I return to my office, where I find the desk occupied by my officemate. I then spot my keys, sitting there on the desk, alongside my officemate's keys. I then make a grab for my keys, saying *just as I mistakenly grab my officemate's keys*, "These are mine." [1991, p. 190]

[7]Reimer (1991) is attacking Kaplan's view in his 1989, according to which what he calls a "directing intention" fixes reference (p. 582). This view differs from the one Kaplan held in his 1978, according to which intentions do not fix reference. A directing intention to refer to something is an intention to refer to a thing on which one has focused one's attention. Kaplan, however, does not restrict the notion of directing intentions to those that are anchored by a perceptual link to the thing to which one intends to refer.

As Reimer describes the case, the speaker does not lack eye-hand coordination. She is not looking at her own keys while grabbing her officemate's; rather, she first sees her keys and then, without continuing to look at them, grabs the wrong set.[8] As Reimer construes it, the intentionist view predicts that the referent of "these" is the speaker's keys, since she intends to refer to them. But, she claims, the reference of "these" is clearly the set of keys that she grabs. And I think we should agree: the speaker refers to the keys she grabs. For, as Reimer says, it is appropriate for the officemate to reply, "No, you're wrong. Those are not your keys; they're mine." This reply would be both false and inappropriate if the speaker was originally referring to her own keys.

Reimer concludes, however, that what fixes the reference of the speaker's use of 'these' is her gesture of grabbing. She assumes that the sole candidate reference-fixers are these two: (1) the speaker's intention to refer to the keys which are hers, and which she rightly took to be hers when she saw them on the desk; and (2) the gesture of grabbing keys that are not hers. But Reimer overlooks a third type of candidate reference-fixer, which is also an intention: perceptually anchored intentions. In particular, Reimer overlooks a referential intention anchored by *tactile* experience. At the time of utterance, the referent of "these" is perceptually present to the speaker. She has a tactile experience of keys, and she judges (falsely) that the keys she is holding are the ones she saw on the desk. If she can judge that she is holding the keys on the basis of that tactile experience, then she can also form an intention to refer to those keys. And there is clearly

[8]If the speaker did lack eye-hand coordination—looking at her own keys while grabbing her officemate's—then the case would have the same structure as a type of case discussed later in this section, in which the speaker has *two* perceptually anchored referential intentions. There will be more on such cases shortly.

a sense in which the speaker intends to refer to keys that she is holding.

Once we consider the tactually anchored intention, we see that the claim that this intention fixes the reference of the speaker's use of 'these' makes the right prediction. In attacking a version of intentionism that does not specify which referential intention fixes reference, Reimer seems tacitly to assume that intentionism cannot adjudicate between conflicting referential intentions, such as those in the case she describes. Conflicting referential intentions would pose a problem for intentionism only if there were no systematic account of which intention plays the reference-fixing role. In the next section, I will give such an account. For the moment, the point is just that Reimer hasn't given a counterexample to intentionism; she has simply posed a challenge, a challenge to provide a criterion that says which one of a speaker's various intentions fixes demonstrative reference. There is a referential intention that could do the job; the challenge is to give a systematic theory that identifies that intention as the one that fixes reference. An adequate defense of intentionism must provide a criterion that the reference-fixing intention, but no other referential intention, will meet.

We can draw the same moral from an objection to intentionism raised by Howard Wettstein. Wettstein modifies a well-known example from Kripke[9] to criticize the standard version of intentionism about demonstrative reference:

> A speaker wishes to say something about a certain man, Jones, who he mistakenly thinks he sees off in the distance. Jones has recently had open-heart surgery and the speaker has heard that Jones has foolishly been ex-

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[9]The classic example of conflicting intentions to refer comes from Kripke's discussion in his 1979, section 3b, of Keith Donellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions.

> erting himself raking leaves. He says, pointing to the man who he takes to be Jones but is actually Smith, "That is a self-destructive man. He has been raking against his doctor's orders." [1984, p. 70]

According to Wettstein, the speaker has Jones in mind but nevertheless refers to Smith. So having Jones in mind does not fix the reference of "that," and thus, Wettstein concludes, intentionism is false.

Reimer's and Wettstein's problem cases have the same structure. Where S is the speaker and D is the demonstrative expression S uses:

(i)   There is an object x that appears to S to be at a certain location L.
(ii)   There is a y, $y \neq x$, such that S intends that her use of D refer to y.
(iii) S believes that y is at L.

To see that each of the problem cases has this structure, consider first Reimer's case: a speaker mistakenly grabs her officemate's set of keys and says, "These are mine." In this case, x is the set of keys the speaker is holding: the keys tactually appear to the speaker to be in her hand. And y is the speaker's own set of keys. S intends her use of 'these' to refer to her keys. She believes, falsely, that her own keys are the ones she has in her hand.

In Wettstein's case, x is the man the speaker sees: the man raking leaves visually appears to the speaker. And y is Jones. The speaker intends his use of 'that' to refer to Jones, and he falsely believes that the man he sees is Jones.

In both problem cases, the speaker has conflicting intentions to refer. Both Reimer and Wettstein overlook this fact. The trouble for intentionism is not, as Reimer's and Wettstein's descriptions of their cases suggest, that speakers

in the problem cases *lack* intentions to refer to the actual referent; it is rather that they have *too many* and *conflicting* intentions. Since this is the problem these cases pose, they challenge intentionism to provide a basis for determining which of the conflicting intentions to refer fixes reference. In the next section, I propose such a criterion, and I show that this criterion makes the right predictions in cases like Reimer's and Wettstein's.[10]

4. Limited Intentionism

Limited Intentionism is the following thesis.

LI.   If *x* perceptually appears to *S* then: *S*'s use of *D* refers to *x* iff *S* has a perceptually anchored intention to refer to *x* by her use of *D*.[11]

[10]I will be restricting attention to bare demonstratives and ignoring the role of predicates such as "man wearing a carnation" in fixing the reference of uses of demonstrative phrases such as "that man wearing a carnation." Whether such predicates help fix reference, and if so whether the entire predicate does, are issues that are too complex to discuss here. Although Limited Intentionism only applies to bare demonstratives, it does not rule out that the perceptual experience that anchors referential intentions regarding the use of bare demonstratives represents sortal properties.

[11]What if there is more than one object of a certain kind that appears to be at exactly the same location? It is controversial whether this can happen; a good candidate for a case in which it does happen, though, is one in which both a statue and the lump of clay that constitutes it (but is not identical with it) appear to a speaker to be at the same location. In many cases, knowledge common to the speaker and addressee restricts the kind of thing at the intended location that is demonstratively referred to. When no common knowledge does this, and it does not matter for the truth value of an utterance which thing at the location is referred to, we have what David Lewis (1993) calls "the problem of the many": neither semantics nor pragmatics decides which of the many is the referent, but the utterance has the same truth-value no matter which is selected.

Several solutions to the problem of the many have been proposed. For example, one could exploit the technique of supervaluations developed by van Fraassen (1966) for the semantics of free logic. (See Fine 1975 for an applica-

Limited Intentionism is a controversial claim. In saying that demonstrative reference is fixed by speaker intentions, it opposes *contextualism*, which holds that demonstrative reference is fixed by publicly accessible cues embedded in the conversational context rather than by speaker intentions.[12] Unlike traditional intentionism, Limited Intentionism specifies the kind of intention that fixes reference: the perceptually anchored kind. Limited Intentionism thus gives a criterion that says which intention fixes reference when referential intentions conflict, as they do in Reimer's and Wettstein's cases.

Limited Intentionism is designed to be a view about demonstrative reference-fixing for Basic Cases, as these were defined in Section 1. We can see that the Basic Cases include cases like Reimer's and Wettstein's. A Basic Case, recall, is a use of a demonstrative *D* by a speaker *S* that refers to an object *x* under the following three conditions:

(a)   *S* perceives *x*;
(b)   *S* intends to refer to *x* by using *D*;
(c)   The intention described in (b) is anchored by *S*'s perception of *x*.[13]

tion of supervaluationist semantics to the problem of vagueness.) In a supervaluationist semantics, truth is replaced by super-truth, where an utterance is super-true iff it is true under all admissible ways of making the unmade semantic (or pragmatic) decision; it is super-false if it is false under all these ways; and super-truth rather than truth simpliciter is the goal of the utterance. For other proposed solutions to the problem of the many, see Lewis 1993.

[12]Defenses of contextualism include Biro 1982, Gauker 1994, McGinn 1981, and Wettstein 1984. Reimer (1992) defends a mixed view.

[13]One referee worried that the definitions of "Basic Case" and "Limited Intentionism" made LI trivial. "Any case to which LI does not apply," wrote the referee, elaborating the worry, "does not count as a Basic Case." I take the worry to be this: it ought to be conceptually possible for a detractor from LI to deny that LI "applies" to a given Basic Case of demonstrative reference; but the

Because Reimer's and Wettstein's speakers perceive what their uses of demonstratives refer to, they both meet condition (a). And both speakers intend to refer to x by their uses of a demonstrative, so both meet condition (b) as well. Moreover, the referential intentions these speakers have are perceptually anchored. In each case, the speaker's perception of x is not incidental to his or her intention to refer to x: Reimer's speaker does not just happen to be touching one of the sets of keys to which she intends to refer; rather, it is by holding the keys that she differentiates that set of keys from other things. Similarly, the fact that Wettstein's speaker sees the man raking leaves is not incidental to his intention to refer to that man; rather, it is by seeing that man that the speaker singles out one of the men as the man to whom he intends to refer. So both speakers meet condition (c) as well.

It is clear that Limited Intentionism makes the right prediction in Wettstein's case about which referential intention fixes reference. It predicts that the speaker's use of 'that' will refer to the man raking leaves, as that is the only thing about which the speaker has formed a perceptually anchored referential intention.

In Reimer's case, the prediction made by Limited Intentionism may seem less clear. Reimer's speaker has a tactu-

ally based intention to refer to the keys she is holding. But she also *saw* her own keys on the table, before she grabbed the wrong set. The fact that she saw her own keys suggests that in addition to the tactually anchored referential intention, the speaker has a visually anchored referential intention as well. And these would be conflicting intentions, each linked to a different set of keys. So how can Limited Intentionism rightly predict, in Reimer's case, that the speaker's use of the demonstrative refers to the keys she is holding rather than to the keys she saw?

Let us examine these two perceptual links more closely. At time 1, the speaker sees her keys. Then, at time 2, she attempts to grab them, and it is in this failed attempt that the demonstrative utterance occurs. By time 2, the speaker has ceased to look where she is grabbing, relying on visual memory to guide her grasping motion. Since it is at time 2 that the use of the demonstrative occurs, it is at time 2 that the speaker has all her referential intentions of the relevant sort.[14] In particular, it is at time 2 that the speaker has one referential intention that is anchored by a present perceptual link that is tactile, and a conflicting referential intention that is anchored by a past perceptual link, which is visual. In general, one can distinguish between a referential intention anchored to x entirely by current perceptual experience, on the one hand, and a referential intention anchored to x entirely by perceptual memory, without concurrent perceptual experience that is also linked to x, on the other.

To be sure, there could be a referential intention that is

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definitions in question rule this out. Given the definition of Basic Case and the statement of LI, LI is trivially true.

LI is a biconditional. I said earlier (in note 3, above) that I would ignore the difference between "iff" and "because". To be perfectly explicit, LI has the form: p iff and because q. Does the definition of "Basic Case" allow detractors from LI to grant that there is such a thing? Yes. This definition has the form of an existentially quantified conjunction: there is an object x such that: the speaker perceives x; the speaker has a perceptually anchored intention to refer to x; and x is the referent of the speaker's use of a demonstrative. As I argue in the text below, Reimer's key-grabbing case is a Basic Case. But of course Reimer denies that the key-grabber's use of 'these' refers to what it does *because* of her perceptually anchored intention. There is no conceptual error here.

[14]Don't confuse referential intentions with intentions to utter certain expressions. Only the former are relevant to the debate over intentionism. Referential intentions concern particular uses of expressions. There is no such a thing as a referential intention that a speaker has even though she has not uttered anything. Before she speaks, the speaker may intend to speak, and there may be particular expressions that she intends to use. But this is not the kind of referential intention at issue in the debate over intentionism about demonstrative reference.

neither anchored entirely by an ongoing perceptual experience nor anchored entirely by perceptual memory without concurrent anchoring experience but rather by a combination of both. Suppose you're in the woods, and all of the sudden you see and hear a short, quick rustling on the ground just to your left. A snake has slithered by, and you happened to be looking in its direction during the split-second that some parts of it were visible through the uneven ground-cover of pine needles and leaves. "Hey, that's a snake!", you say, and by the time you finish speaking it has vanished. In this case, during the time of utterance, your referential intention changes from being anchored by perceptual experience to being anchored by perceptual memory without concurrent anchoring perceptual experience. Reimer's case does not contain any such referential intention. It contains a referential intention anchored entirely by visual memory, on the one hand, and a referential intention anchored by current tactile experience, on the other.

The key distinction, then, is between a referential intention anchored to x by ongoing perceptual experience of x, on the one hand; and a referential intention anchored to x by perceptual memory without concurrent perceptual experience of x, on the other. This distinction provides the grounds for Limited Intentionism's prediction in Reimer's case. At the time of utterance, Reimer's speaker has no current perceptual link to her keys. A fortiori, she does not have multiple referential intentions *both* of which are anchored by current perceptual experience. Limited Intentionism predicts that the referential intention anchored by current perceptual experience is the one that fixes reference. To make the statement of Limited Intentionism fully explicit:

LI.   If x <u>is perceptually appearing</u> to S then: S's use of D refers to x iff S has a perceptually

anchored intention to refer to x by her use of D.

So far, I have used the expression "perceptually anchored referential intention" to talk about referential intentions that are anchored by *current* perceptual experience, and I've excluded from this category referential intentions that are anchored exclusively by perceptual memory. I will continue to talk this way in the rest of the discussion.[15]

Although Reimer's case does not contain conflicting perceptually anchored referential intentions of the type that fix reference, such conflicts are clearly possible. So let us consider how Limited Intentionism can treat those conflicts.

Cases in which there are conflicting perceptually anchored referential intentions will have the following structure. The speaker simultaneously perceives different objects and forms multiple referential intentions concerning a single use of 'that'. Here is an example, similar to one discussed in another context by Sydney Shoemaker (1994, p. 83):

> *Multiple Perceptual Links*. You are a salesman in a tie store. By reaching past an opaque door into a display case, you put your hand on a blue silk tie. At the same time, another salesman is reaching through the cabinet and

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[15]There are borderline cases of perception: for instance, if one grabs an object while wearing very thick gloves or while one's hand is numb, does one tactually perceive via one's hand the object grabbed? This is a good candidate for being a borderline case of tactual perception. Accordingly, referential intentions formed on the strength of such perceptual or quasi-perceptual links to objects will be borderline cases of perceptually anchored intentions, and demonstrative reference in such cases would be a borderline case of a Basic Case. Limited Intentionism, however, is not committed to the view that such cases will also be borderline cases of demonstrative reference itself. For all Limited Intentionism says, some other sort of reference-securing relation could be at work such cases.

touching a red silk tie. Through the glass top of the cabinet, you can see the red tie being held by the other salesman, whose arm looks like yours. You mistake his hand for yours and you believe that you are the one touching the red tie. You say to a customer, who was looking in another direction for a red silk tie, "This one is red."

In this example, you are touching the blue tie while you are seeing the red tie, and you think that the tie you are seeing is the same as the tie you are touching. More exactly, you think that a single location is occupied by the red silk tie you are seeing and the silk tie (which is blue) that you are touching. There is no single tie that perceptually appears to you, to which a single referential intention is anchored.

It is controversial what status the use of the demonstrative has in such cases. There are three options: it refers to one of the candidate objects but not the other; it fails to refer altogether; or it refers to both objects.

Of these three options, the first is the weakest. We should not be misled by the fact that in our sample case of multiple perceptual links, only one of the ties is gestured at. For not only is the speaker confused (which suggests that his intentions are not fit to fix reference to one tie rather than another) but it would be easy to construct a case in which the speaker gestures at both ties yet takes himself to be gesturing only at one (which suggests that these too, like the speaker's intentions, are not fit to determine reference to one tie rather than the other).[16] The live options, then, are that there is reference failure or that the speaker somehow refers to both ties.

On the side of the reference-failure option, there is the

intuition that the speaker is too confused to have succeeded in referring to anything. Evans defends this option in his 1982, Chapter 5.

On the side of the option that the speaker refers to both ties, there is the intuition—call it the Truth Intuition—that he has said something true (namely, that the tie he is seeing is red). More generally, there is the point that confused speakers can have multiple links to multiple objects, where each link suffices for reference-fixing. Consider an analogous case involving ordinary proper names. You are talking to someone who asks you whether Billie is still in town. He has in mind his cousin Billie, who you mistakenly think is the same person as the Billie you met yesterday. You say, "I don't know whether Billie is still in town." You seem to say something meaningful. If you say something meaningful, then your use of 'Billie' must have a referent. Whatever theory of reference-fixing for names we select, it seems possible to spell out the details of the case in such a way that you have two links of the same sort, one to each of the two Billies.

How could the use of 'that' refer to both ties? It clearly can't be that the condition of both ties is relevant to a single set of truth-conditions. Whatever the speaker is saying, it is not that some sort of conglomerate entity consisting of both ties is red. Rather, the use of 'that', if it referred to both ties, would have *multiple reference*, and the utterance in which the use of the demonstrative occured—here, an utterance of 'this is red'—would have two sets of truth conditions.[17] If it has

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[16]For comparable discussion, see Devitt 1981, ch. 5, sec. 4.

[17]What I have called "multiple reference" is more typically (but I think less aptly) called "partial reference". This notion is discussed in Field 1973 and Devitt 1981, pp. 138ff. Note the difference between multiple reference and supervaluation. Supervaluation is an account of how an utterance can have some variety of truth-value when neither semantics nor pragmatics decides which of a range of objects is the referent of the problematic expression. In particular, if an utterance made while standing in multiple perceptual links is super-true, then it

two sets of truth-conditions, then there must be two links to two referents, and each by itself must be sufficient to fix reference.

Limited Intentionism can do justice either to the Truth Intuition (that our salesman has said something true) or to the Evansian intuition that the utterance lacks truth-value altogether. Given that Limited Intentionism is meant to be an illuminating account of reference-fixing, everything essential to the view is captured by both the original version:

LI. If x is perceptually appearing to S then: S's use of D refers to x iff S has a perceptually anchored intention to refer to x by her use of D

and by the Evansian version, which rules that in cases of multiple perceptual links to a single use of a demonstrative, there is reference failure:

LI'. If x is perceptually appearing to S then: S's use of D refers to x iff there is a unique x such

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is true no matter which perceptual link is taken to lead to the referent. This is clearly not the case in the example: the utterance of 'This is red' is true when the visual link is taken to be the link to the referent; but false when the tactile link is taken to do this job. Thus, according to a supervaluationst definition of truth, the utterance would lack a truth-value instead of possessing two, as on the partial reference account.

In the example given, the results delivered by a supervaluationist account accord with the views of some philosophers on multiple information links. For instance, according to Evans (1982), if a purported case of demonstrative reference involves multiple information links, what results is reference failure, hence lack of truth-value. But this coincidence of predictions does not survive if we change the example so that both perceptual links connect the speaker to something red. In that case, the utterance will count as super-true, whereas by Evans's lights, the use of the demonstrative will fail to refer.

that S has a perceptually anchored intention to refer to it by her use of D.

Suppose first that LI' is true. Then, in the case of Multiple Perceptual Links, the use of the demonstrative fails to refer, and so no question of reference-fixing arises at all. Hence LI' does not offer a false account of reference fixing for these cases.

Now suppose LI is true. The speaker's perceptual links are links to two different objects. Each link allows the speaker to form separate referential intentions, and these referential intentions are the kind that, according to LI, fix reference. LI says nothing about whether the utterance itself has two sets of truth-conditions. But given that there is no single set of truth conditions that depends on the condition of both ties, this seems to be the only option, if there are two referential intentions, each of which is the right kind to fix reference. When multiple perceptually anchored intentions are intentions to refer by a single use of a demonstrative, then LI predicts that there will be multiple reference, and the utterance will have two separate sets of truth-conditions.

Since both LI and LI' capture what is essential to Limited Intentionism—namely the role of perception in demonstrative reference—Limited Intentionism can do justice to either the view that there is reference failure or to the Truth Intuition. It does not matter for the plausibility of Limited Intentionism how the dispute between them is settled.

I have argued that in Basic Cases, intentionism is true: the reference of perceptual uses of demonstratives is fixed by a perceptually anchored referential intention. This view makes the right predictions in the problem cases. But what justifies having a theory of demonstrative reference-fixing that is limited to these perceptual uses? In the next section, I answer this question.

5. *Why not to expect a uniform account*
of demonstrative reference-fixing

According to Limited Intentionism, there is a very close relation between perceptual states, on the one hand, and the reference-fixing story for certain uses of demonstratives, on the other. Some philosophers object to the idea that there is any close relation between perception and demonstrative reference-fixing because they think that an account of reference-fixing for demonstrative expressions has to cover a very wide class of uses. For example, Colin McGinn says:

> Perception, it is true, is a generally good *guide* to deictic reference, because objects are apt to be in the places they seem to be and because we typically know the dispositions of objects around us by way of perception; but as soon as these generally applicable conditions break down, . . . it becomes clear that what makes for reference is some other mechanism—perception starts to look incidental. [1981, p. 163]

According to McGinn, the fact that we can demonstrate things that are not perceptually present counts against the idea that a correct reference-fixing account for uses of demonstratives in other cases invokes perception.[18]

We find a similar line of thought in Reimer's discussion of an example familiar from Kaplan, in which the speaker has no perceptual link to the picture at which she points (Reimer 1991, pp. 191-92). In the example, someone is pointing at a picture of Spiro Agnew, which is hanging on a wall behind him, where there used to be a picture of Rudolf

Carnap. The speaker, who cannot see the picture, says, "This is the most important philosopher of the twentieth century," intending to refer to the picture of Carnap.[19] This case is meant to elicit the intuition that what is said by the utterance is false, because "this" refers to the picture gestured toward (Agnew), rather than to the picture toward which the speaker intended to gesture (Carnap).

Because Reimer thinks there is a single phenomenon of demonstrative reference that does not vary according to whether the speaker is perceptually anchored to the referent, she takes it that the Carnap/Agnew case is relevant to evaluating any proposal about demonstrative reference-fixing.[20] Like McGinn, Reimer expects a uniform account of reference-fixing for all uses of demonstratives.

As it happens, many philosophers deny that the same factors secure reference of all demonstrative expressions, if 'that'-phrases (such as 'these keys') are included with bare demonstratives. One claim about 'that'-phrases, compatible with a variety of semantic theories that take 'that'-phrases to be referring expressions, is that a use of 'that *F*' refers to an object *o* only if *o* is *F*.[21] In contrast, bare demonstratives do

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[18]McGinn gives several examples of demonstrative reference to things unperceived by the speaker; one example is of an assembly line inspector whose job it is to say, of each car he deems roadworthy, "This car is roadworthy." Usually he looks at the car as it goes by, but on occasion he utters this sentence while pointing at the car but not looking at it or perceiving it in any other way (1981, pp. 161-62).

[19]Kaplan describes this case in his 1978, p. 30.

[20]Reimer says: "it is often just such 'atypical' cases which enable us to adjudicate between competing views which account equally well for all the 'typical' cases. Kaplan's [intentionist] view may fare as well with such 'typical' cases as some competing view which regards the demonstration as being crucial to the determination of the demonstratum. And yet Kaplan's view may (as we've just seen) give a much poorer showing than the competing view when it comes to dealing with certain 'atypical' cases. Other things being equal, the logical conclusion to draw is that the competing theory is the better of the two" (1991, p. 19).

[21]This claim is defended in Davies 1982, Borg 2000, Braun 1994, Recanati 1993, and Reimer 1998. Recently some philosophers have argued against the view that complex demonstratives are referring expressions at all: e.g., King (1999 and 2000, ch. 1); and Lepore and Ludwig (2000). (Lepore and Ludwig take their view that complex demonstratives are quantificational to be compati-

not have any such constraint on what uses of them can refer to. Even among demonstrative expressions, then, uniformity in reference-fixing is not expected.

In any case, reference-fixing for other referring expressions is not a uniform matter. Consider ordinary proper names. Is reference for all names secured by the same type of relation? No. Once Kripke discovered that ordinary proper names designate rigidly,[22] some philosophers, including Kripke, *argued* for something more controversial: that the reference of a proper name on an occasion of use is often fixed by some sort of causal chain of communication, linking a name to its bearer.[23] But even Kripke allows that there are some names whose reference is entirely fixed by a description—even after the name has been introduced. For example, this occurs when the London police use the name 'Jack the Ripper' to refer to the man, whoever he is, who committed all or most of a certain group of murders.[24] This

is not just a matter of introducing the name's referent. Since reference of descriptive names is determined differently from the way the reference of typical proper names is determined,[25] there is no uniform account of reference-fixing for ordinary proper names. Thus there is no perfectly general reason to think that we should take such an attitude toward each class of singular terms, a fortiori toward demonstrative expressions.[26]

Furthermore, intentionists have special reason to reject McGinn and Reimer's assumption that demonstrative refer-

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ble with a treatment of uses of bare demonstratives—'this', 'that' and their plurals—as referring.) Limited Intentionism takes no stand on the semantics or metasemantics of complex demonstratives. It is a view exclusively about uses of bare demonstratives.

[22]For discussion of Kripke's argument and its consequences, see section 4 of Stanley 1997.

[23]See Devitt 1981; Evans 1973; and Kripke 1980, pp. 94ff, where Kripke says (after noting that he does not purport to give necessary and sufficient conditions for a name to refer), "it's in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, going back to the referent itself, that we refer to a certain man." One way that a chain of communication could "go back to the referent itself" would be to go back to the original employment of the name, which had *its* reference fixed by description. Even then, although the reference of a name may initially be fixed by a description, it is not because speakers know which thing satisfies the description that the name refers to what it refers to.

[24]Kripke 1980, p. 79; cf. p. 94. Names like 'Jack the Ripper' function as what Evans calls "descriptive names" (1979; 1982, ch. 2, sec. 3). Kripke also gives an example of a name whose reference is *initially* fixed by a description: e.g., 'Neptune' was hypothesized to be the planet that causes certain perturba-

tions in the orbits of certain other planets (1980, p. 79, n. 33). According to Kripke's picture of how names refer, however, the description only fixed the reference initially; later, the name referred to Neptune because of a causal chain of communication.

[25]Even if you don't accept Kripke's causal story about how the reference of proper names is typically determined, it will still be true that descriptive names have their reference fixed differently from ordinary proper names. For on the most plausible developed alternative to Kripke's theory, it is not a single description which fixes the reference of ordinary proper names but a cluster of criteria of identification. Moreover, not all of the criteria need be descriptive. Besides descriptive criteria, the cluster could include deference to the ability of others to recognize the bearer of the name. See Dummett 1973, ch. 5, appendix.

[26]One might suggest an appeal to Kaplan's notion of character to defend the Uniformity Assumption, on the grounds that if two token expressions have the same character, then whatever determines the reference of the first expression must also determine the reference of the second. This suggestion, however, would be mistaken. The character of the deictic 'that' is not sensitive to the different ways in which context can determine content (which for Kaplan is itself a function from worlds to extensions) let alone reference. The character of an expression helps us state what semantic value an expression has on an occasion of use. But it does not tell us what the basis is for determining that semantic value. (In Kaplan's terms, the notion of character belongs to semantics rather than to metasemantics: see his 1989, p. 573). The basis for determining the semantic value of a deictic occurrence of 'that' in a context *A* could, for all its character tells us, differ from the basis for determining the semantic value of such an occurrence in context *B*. So this suggestion will not help the fan of the Uniformity Assumption.

ence-fixing will be uniform. Uniform intentionism faces difficulties that can be solved only by denying the assumption of uniformity. We can see this by examining two proposed accounts of uniform intentionism, both suggested (though neither endorsed) in remarks by Kent Bach to the effect that specifically referential intentions are communicative intentions.[27]

The following remarks of Bach's suggest that the specifically referential intention—that is, the one that determines what referent the use of the demonstrative will have—is a *part* of an intention to communicate with one's addressee:

> The relevant intention here, the specifically referential one, is part of a communicative intention. . . . As part of that intention, a referential intention isn't just any intention to refer to something one has in mind, but is the intention that one's audience identify, and take themselves to be intended to identify, a certain item as the referent by means of thinking of it in a certain identifiable way. [1992, 143]

Consider the view that the specifically referential intentions have as their content instances of INT-1:[28]

INT-1. that my use of D refer to x and that my addressees identify x in way W as the

referent of my use of D[29]

where the intention with instances of INT-1 as its content is *de re* with respect to x.[30] When joined with the assumption of uniformity in demonstrative reference, the view that referential intentions have content INT-1 has an implausible consequence. Consider a use of 'that ball' in an utterance of 'That ball is dirty', made by a (blindfolded) speaker who points at random and only accidentally ends up pointing at a ball. Even if the speaker intends that his addressees identify the referent (if there is one) of his use of 'that ball' by his gesture of pointing, he is not in a position to intend that his addressees identify a particular as the referent of that use. The proponent of the view that reference-fixing intentions have as their content instances of INT-1 would have to deny that reference is possible in this case: she would have to claim, that is, that no use of demonstratives that is inappropriate in this way can succeed in referring. And that seems hard to swallow. One can avoid this consequence and still maintain that intentions with content of the form INT-1 fix reference only if one denies that demonstrative reference-fixing is uniform and sets aside cases such as the one described for special treatment.

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[27]My concern is not with Bach's own view but with the prima facie plausible positions that his remarks suggest. The two versions of uniform intentionism I consider in this section would not be acceptable to Bach, who does not agree with two claims that each proposal presupposes: (1) that uses of demonstratives refer; (2) that such uses have a semantic reference. See his 1987, pp. 5-6 and ch. 9.

[28]As I am using the phrase, "specifically referential intention" means the same as "intention that fixes reference." This is not, however, how Bach uses this phrase.

[29]Given Bach's own views about what refers, he would deny that INT-1 was the content of *any* referential intention. Closer to Bach's view would be that INT-1' is sometimes the content of referential intentions:

INT-1'. that I refer to x by the use of D and that my addressees identify
   x in way W as the thing I refer to by that use.

[30]I am assuming that contents of intentions are propositions, and that a proposition expressed by a sentence of the form *a is F* is *de re* with respect to an object o just in case its truth or falsity with respect to world w depends on and only on whether *F* applies to o in w. (Bold italics indicate corner-quotes). It does not matter for our purposes what the truth-value of the proposition expressed by an instance of *a is F* is, with respect to worlds in which o (the referent of *a*) does not exist.

Furthermore, what made Reimer and Wettstein's cases challenging for traditional intentionism was precisely that the speaker conflated two things: in Reimer's case, the speaker's own keys and the keys she was holding; in Wettstein's case, Jones and the man raking leaves. Intentions that have instances of INT-1 as their contents do not distinguish between the intention that one's use of D refer to Jones and one's addressee's identify Jones in way W, on the one hand; and the intention that one's use of D refer to the man raking leaves and one's addressees identify the man raking leaves in way W. Such contents leave underdefined what it is to have *x* in mind. As a result, the view that they fix reference does not make a clear prediction as to what uses of demonstratives refer to in these cases of conflation.

This consequence seems to be avoided by replacing INT-1 with a schema for an intention that is not *de re* with respect to an intended referent. Other remarks of Bach's suggest a proposal along these lines. In discussing a case (of Reimer's) in which you intend to point at Fido but instead point at Spot and say "that dog is Fido," Bach claims that you, the speaker, have an intention "to refer to the dog that you are demonstrating" (p. 143). With respect to it, "you say what you intend to say in uttering 'That dog is Fido,' namely, that the dog you are pointing at is Fido."

Now, Bach stresses that pointing is not always necessary:

> If you utter 'that dog' and the dog you intend to be referring to is the only one around or is maximally salient in some way, you won't have to do anything more to enable your audience to identify it. Otherwise, you will need to point at it. In so doing, you will be intending to refer to the dog you are pointing at. But being pointed at is just one way of being salient, and like other ways, is not semantically significant. [1992, p. 145]

These remarks suggest the view that specifically referential intentions have as their contents instances of INT-2:

> INT-2.   that my use of D refer to the thing that is salient in way W, and that my addressees take my use of D to refer to the thing that is salient in way W.[31]

Some instances of INT-2 will have the content "that my use of D refer to the thing I am pointing at"; others will have the content "that my use of D refer to the conversationally salient F". Unlike the intentions with content INT-1, these intentions are only *de re* with respect to the way of thinking of an item. They are not *de re* with respect to any item which is to be thought of in way W.

Though INT-2 may seem to avoid the trouble with INT-1, it runs into a similar kind of trouble. Suppose that Jones is conversationally salient and two men raking leaves are visually salient. We would expect the speaker who conflates Jones with one of the men raking leaves to believe that there is a unique person who is both conversationally and visually salient. Being salient in both these ways would be way W in this case. The lesson here is that the notion of public salience is as underdefined as the notion of having something in mind. In order even to evaluate the proposal that the reference-fixing intentions have content INT-2, we have to make the ways of being salient more specific. Unless we specify this notion, the proposal will not make a clear prediction as to what the reference of the use of D is in the problem cases.

Neither of the Bach-inspired intentionist proposals stays true to the assumption of uniformity. Limited Intentionism is preferable, since it provides a principle with which to distinguish the reference-fixing referential intentions from the others.

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[31]For the same reasons that Bach would modify INT-1 along the lines of INT-1' (see note 29, above), he would modify INT-2 in the same way.

6. An Apparent Counterexample to Limited Intentionism

In this section, I consider and reply to an apparent counter-example to Limited Intentionism.

Consider the following scenario:

The Wayward Gesture. A speaker, focusing his visual attention on a ball that has bounced into the street, wants to tell his addressee to go pick it up. He points and says, "Go pick up that ball." But this speaker has extremely bad motor coordination, so that wherever he intends to point, he ends up pointing 90 degrees to the right. He does not know this about himself, however. As it happens, there is a ball in the direction in which he unwittingly points that is resting in a mud puddle.

The case of the wayward gesture poses a prima facie problem for Limited Intentionism.[32] Going by the cues in the context alone, many addressees would assume that the speaker intended to refer to the ball in the mud puddle, rather than to the ball in the street. Because this assumption would be a reasonable one, says the critic of Limited Intentionism, the speaker's use of the demonstrative has as its *semantic* reference the ball in the mud puddle, though it has as its *speaker* reference the ball in the street.[33] While Limited Intentionism makes the right prediction about speaker reference in this case, its prediction about semantic reference, says the critic, is false.

The critic has the primitive intuition that the use of 'that ball' refers to the ball in the mud puddle. Similar cases, however, may elicit different intuitions. Suppose a lecturer says "Look at this," using a laser pointer to indicate the spot on the screen where she wants her addressees to focus. Unbeknownst to her, however, glare from the sun is obscuring the laser point so that none of the addressees can see it. Instead, the glare makes it look to them as if the pointer is directed at a different place on the screen.

This case seems similar to the case of the Wayward Gesture: the addressees in both cases have justified but false beliefs about what the speaker intends to refer to. Suppose,

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[32]A similar objection would be a case of a "wayward predicate". Consider a speaker who misspeaks and says "That rabbit is fast" when she means to say "That squirrel is fast." She is seeing both a squirrel and a rabbit, and wishes to talk about the squirrel. If Limited Intentionism applies to uses of demonstrative phrases such as 'that rabbit', and if the use of that phrase in this case refers to the rabbit, then it would seem to prevent the predicate 'rabbit' from having any role in fixing the reference of uses of demonstrative phrases. Many philosophers find this implausible (e.g., Braun 1994, sec. 10).

I need not deny the intuition that in such a case, the semantic reference of the use of 'that rabbit' is the rabbit and not the squirrel. Even if this intuition is true, it does not threaten a Limited Intentionist treatment of demonstrative phrases of the form *that F*. The reason is that this is not a Basic Case of a use of a demonstrative. For a use of a demonstrative expression D to be a Basic Case, where the use of D refers to x, the speaker must have an intention to refer to x by the use of D. (This is condition [b] of the definition of "Basic Case".) The speaker in this case does not have any intention (a fortiori, any perceptually anchored one) to refer to the squirrel by the use of 'that rabbit'. In so far as the

speaker misspeaks, she does not have any referential intention with respect to the phrase 'that rabbit' at all. The fact that the use of the predicate is unintentional disqualifies the use of the demonstrative from being a Basic Case. (By contrast, an unintentional gesture does not disqualify the use of the demonstrative it accompanies from being a Basic Case.)

In a *willful* misuse of 'that rabbit' to refer to a squirrel, the speaker *would* intend that her use of that phrase refer to the squirrel. This, however, would be a non-standard, possibly degenerate case of communication. Whether there is such a thing as semantic reference in such cases, and if so, how it should be treated by semantic and metasemantic theories, are matters that deserve separate discussion.

[33]For more on the distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference, see Kripke 1979.

however, that we add to the laser-pointer case addressees who are sitting in a different part of the room and who can see the spot indicated by the laser-pointer. Some addressees are led to the justified false belief about what the speaker intends to talk about; others are not. The intuition that judgments of addressees in the former epistemic situation still trump the intentions of the speaker in determining demonstrative reference now seems much less firm. So intuitions about the strength of addressees' judgments about demonstrative reference vary across similar cases.

The instability of intuitions raises a methodological point. If primitive intuitions vary across similar cases, this diminishes the weight that we should give them on their own in assessing what uses of demonstratives refer to. Variation in primitive intuitions forces us to revert to theoretical reasons that could corroborate the intuitions.

The theory of semantic reference that best corroborates the critic's intuition in the Wayward Gesture case is the following: the semantic reference of a use of an expression is what a normal, rational addressee would take the use of the demonstrative to (semantically) refer to, without relying on background knowledge about the speaker, including knowledge of his idiosyncrasies, beliefs, intentions, deficits, confusions, etc.

How does this theory of semantic demonstrative reference corroborate the critics intuition in the case of the Wayward Gesture? Well, if, contra that intuition, the semantic reference of 'that ball' were the ball in the street, then to know what semantic reference the speaker's use of 'that ball' has, one would have to know special facts about the speaker. In particular, one would have to know that his gesture of pointing does not have its conventional meaning. But the addressees' judgments that guide semantic demonstrative reference, according to the theory, do not rely on any special

knowledge of this sort.

But any theory of semantic reference that relies on *the* judgment that reasonable addressees would make regarding demonstrative reference will run into sand, because such judgments can vary with the background beliefs of the addressee.[34] Consider once again Kaplan's case in which a speaker points behind him and says, "That is a picture of the best philosopher of the twentieth century." He thinks he is pointing at a picture of Rudolf Carnap, but in fact he is pointing at a picture of Spiro Agnew. What would a "normal" addressee take the use of 'that' to refer to? Well, that would depend on how much the addressee knew about the topic of the utterance. If the addressee knew that Spiro Agnew was not a philosopher at all, then he might, out of charity, take the speaker to be referring to some other picture just out of the addressee's sight but in the vicinity of the pointing. A reasonable addressee equally disposed to charity but lacking the relevant background knowledge would not draw this conclusion. Similarly, what a particular reasonable addressee takes a use of a demonstrative to refer to can depend on what parts of the scene are visible, as we've seen from the case of the laser pointer.[35] In general, what a particular ad-

[34]A similar problem will face the slightly more complicated proposal that a use of a demonstrative semantically refers to what standard, rational addressees would take the speaker to be *intending* to refer to by her use of that demonstrative.

[35]In discussing the laser pointer case, I've assumed that the objects of perception are public: that whenever there is a Basic Case of demonstrative reference, there is also something publicly perceivable to which the speaker is perceptually anchored. This is a substantive assumption in the philosophy of perception, though it is widely held. (Opponents of it include some sense-datum theorists, e.g., Price [1932], Robinson [1994], and Jackson [1977]; and Meinong [1904].) If a speaker could be perceptually anchored to a private object of hallucination (supposing there were such objects), then there could be Basic Cases

dressee takes a use of a demonstrative to refer to could depend on that addressee's beliefs (either beliefs about the topic or beliefs based on perception at the time of utterance).

To be sure, speakers in cases like the Wayward Gesture and the laser pointer should consider themselves to have misled their addressees. So long as no addressee is in a position to see the signal of the laser pointer, or more generally to perceive any of the cues the speaker uses to indicate which thing she is talking about, the utterance is inappropriate—just as it would be inappropriate for me to point to a set of keys you were asking about and say "These are them!" if, unbeknownst to me, you were blindfolded. Such gestures are inappropriate in that they obstruct the exchange of information between speaker and addressee.

But theories go too far if they make semantic demonstrative reference depend on what addressees take to be the referent. These theories misconstrue the importance of cues that indicate what the speaker intends to talk about. They will always face the same sort of objection: that semantic reference does not depend on the perspective of the addressee, whether it be a perceptual perspective or a set of background beliefs.[36] In contrast, the judgments that normal, rational addressees would make, even while disregarding any special knowledge about the speaker that they may have,

will vary from addressee to addressee. There is no such thing as *the* judgment of a normal, rational addressee to which such theories can appeal. So not only is the primitive intuition about the Wayward Gesture case unstable; in addition, the theories of semantic reference corroborating it are too implausible to threaten Limited Intentionism.

The central question about demonstrative utterances is how they can represent the world at all. It is not at all obvious how there can even be demonstrative reference. What could anchor a use of a word to a thing? An account of demonstrative reference would be an answer to this question. Limited Intentionism, though not a complete explanation, is a beginning. Like standard versions of intentionism, it pushes back a question about linguistic reference to a question about how mental states—in particular, referential intentions—can be directed toward objects. Unlike standard versions of intentionism, however, it says that the latter is a question about how perception anchors referential intentions to their objects. The rest of the story about demonstrative reference-fixing in Basic Cases awaits a satisfactory account of perceptual anchoring.[37]

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in which the speaker, and *only* the speaker, could perceive the intended referent. In such communicatively degenerate cases, it might be more plausible that semantic reference is something other than the intended reference. That there are such private objects of perception, however, is doubtful. For standard metaphysical worries about how there could be such objects, see Armstrong 1968, ch. 10, sec. 4, and Chisholm 1941.)

[36]As before, the same objection applies to the slightly more complicated proposal that a use of a demonstrative semantically refers to what standard, rational addressees would take the speaker to be *intending* to refer to by her use of that demonstrative.

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