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Multilateral Machinations:
The Strategic Utility of African International Organizations in the
Pursuit of National Security Interests in West Africa and the Greater Horn

A dissertation presented
by
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to
The Department of African and African American Studies

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ABSTRACT  
Since the end of decolonization, African states have created a series of dense and overlapping international organizations (IOs) at both the continental (Organization of African Unity/African Union) and sub-regional (regional economic community, REC) levels of analysis, both of which broadly claim to fulfill similar mandates on a range of issues, including the provision of collective security. Given that every African state is embedded within at least two African IOs with similar mandates – which have generally been assumed to be important primarily for the accomplishment of collective goals – how, when, and why do individual African states understand when such IOs might be strategically useful for the pursuit of their individual security and foreign policy aims, especially as relates to national security interests? To answer this question, this dissertation creates a theory of how African states understand the strategic utility of African IOs in relation to the pursuits of their national security interests, which it tests against the historical record of actual state behavior in eight countries in a combination of West Africa and the Greater Horn. Ultimately, it shows that with the knowledge of four variables – a state’s international power projection capability; its location within regional and continental IO polarities; and the nature of the national security interest at hand – one can broadly predict when, why, and in which African IOs states will pursue their individual national security interests.
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INTRODUCTION

What is the foreign policymaking logic by which African states decide to pursue their national security interests in the context of African IOs, or, conversely, outside of them? In following Dunn’s (2013, xxx) advice of “taking African experiences seriously” and Bates’ suggestion of the utility of a framing story in the introduction of academic research (in Snyder 2007), the presentation of a fictionalized scenario is perhaps the best place to begin to understand the interests and intuition behind the project at hand. Imagine:

There exists a leader of an imaginary Sub-Saharan African country in the postcolonial international order. Though her state inevitably presents uniqueness, her outlook as the leader of an African state is remarkably similar to that of many other heads of state on her continent. Her country gained independence from a European power in the early 1960s, and since then her administration and those before it have been on the path to state consolidation, a process that has proven difficult. Her state’s ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity is high, while its ability to tax its citizens and provide services for them is rather low. Economically, the country continues to rely heavily on the export of agricultural goods and other primary commodities, and receives substantial aid from bilateral donors and international financial institutions to cover its balance of payment deficits. While there exists a small demographic of wealthy citizens, the majority of her populace lives in conditions that international financial institutions refer to as “low-income.” As a result, child mortality is high and
infectious diseases are common. The median age in her country is 18.6: the average citizen is moderately to very religious, and has not graduated from high school.

Security considerations – both internal and external – are a primary concern for the president and her administration. Domestically, her government faces various threats. On one hand, because her state has trouble projecting its power into the parts of the territory furthest from the capital, the rule of law in its hinterlands is low, and there thus exist various pockets of discontented citizens, some of which have formed into insurgent groups – most often based on ethnicity but also religion – who have vowed to overthrow her government. While the military is on alert for these rebels, given its own weakness, its triumph over domestic insurgencies is not assured. Threats emanate from sources outside of her country as well. The four countries that neighbor her vary in their relative wealth and power – some are stronger, others are weaker – yet all of them generally face the same constraints in state consolidation as her country: none of them have complete control over their territory or borders, and as such, are also home to some genre of insurgent group. While she has never officially gone to war against any of her neighbors, cross-border skirmishes involving rebels and suspected military personnel are not uncommon.

Despite the challenges she faces in managing the internal and external dimensions of security in her postcolonial African state, her administration is still determined to promote its viability and rights as a sovereign global state, particularly in the international sphere. International organizations (IOs) have served as a primary vehicle for that end. Regionally, her country is a member, along with all other local states, in the sub-regional economic community, which promotes not only trade, but more importantly, in the last several decades, has begun to take on important roles in
the promotion of collective security. Hers, like other African countries, is also a member of the African Union – formerly the Organization of African Unity - and the United Nations. Beyond the continent, her country retains its closest links – which vary in amicability depending on the situation – with its former colonial power. Other important ties include those with the United States, European states, and increasingly, countries in the BRICs.

At her morning briefing, the President learns from her Minister of Defense that a particularly troublesome minority ethnic insurgency within her country is making new threats to overthrow her regime and take control of the state: last night, its members killed seven national army personnel, and are allegedly on a march towards the capital, burning villages along the way, and recruiting other members of their ethnic group from within and outside of the state as they move to depose her. The group, which has long held bemoaned its perceived exclusion from the government, has also targeted pro-government civilians in neighboring states, a topic of concern for other heads of state in her region as well.

The leader and her administration must think quickly about the new threats posed by this group, and the options that they have available to deal with them. On one hand, the leader and her administration could well deploy the national military to halt the rebels’ march, as they approach the capital. However, as a member of not one, but two international organizations that have collective security mandates, other options exist. She might well find it a better strategy to ask for intervention from one of the two organizations, each of which can bring more resources to bear on the situation, but which also pose new threats to her, including potentially undermining her voice and agency in dealing with the insurgency.
The presentation of this situation leads us to our motivating question: When faced with this genre of security threat, by what logic does this leader – and others like her - find utility in addressing security threats through African IOs, and conversely, when does she find utility in circumventing them, either by acting unilaterally or by collaborating with others outside of African IOs? What logic underlies how this leader understands just what IOs at the local, sub-regional level or the continental, pan-African level, can and cannot help her achieve in the pursuit of her national security interests? Moreover, given the broadly similar mandates of the African Union and her regional communities, how does she understand whether to pursue national security interests in one, both, or neither organization? Finally, how does the nature of the threat itself inform her strategic approach to IOs? In short, as will be elucidated, the ways that African states understand the utility of African IOs in the pursuits of their national security interests are informed by four main variables: her state’s ability to project power internationally; where her state falls within distributions of power in the two primary IOs of which she is a member; and the nature of the national security interest itself.

The Puzzle

That global states hold memberships in a panoply of international organizations at all levels of analysis – global, continental, and local – is taken as a given. From the Organization of American States (OAS), to the European Union (EU), to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the institutionalization of globalism and regionalism has been on the rise since the close of World War II broadly, and since the end of the Cold War more
acutely. Today, no international state exists outside of the bounds of international organizations, with most belonging to numerous IOs at both the global and non-global levels (Alagappa 1995; Braveboy-Wagner Buzan and Waever 2003; Hamieri 2012; Hurell 1995; Kelly 2007).

Yet when it comes to Africa, states and their memberships in IOs are unique in one important, though understudied regard in that each state belongs to at least two African IOs: one, or more, at the sub-regional level (referred to hereafter as regional economic communities, or RECs1), and one at the continental level (first the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and then African Union (AU), hereafter collectively referred to as (O)AU2). Indeed, while other global states do exist in other overlapping “regional” organizations, the extent of institutionalization and centrality of the two-tiered African IO landscape is unmatched elsewhere in the world within a given continental schematic. Thus, a distinguishing feature of the African international relations landscape is “African states’ willingness to experiment with a variety of institutions” (Buzan and Waever 2004, 222) and the “multilayered security communities” (Franke 2008) that continental states have created.

What renders this two-tiered African IO membership schematic even more puzzling is the fact that African IOs at both the sub-regional and pan-African levels of

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1 The term “REC” is used throughout this dissertation to denote sub-regional African IOs. Two points should be mentioned. For one, while most policymakers on the continent use “REC” as a shorthand for any sub-regional organization, the African Union has designated eight RECs as being the primary RECs, with others simply being smaller sub-regional organizations. Thus, there is a distinct “REC” label that the vast majority of observers nevertheless use interchangeably. Second, the name “REC” is somewhat deceptive as it suggests the primacy of economic dimensions of these IOs. As is detailed in chapter 2, while many of these organizations did emerge primarily with economic integrative motives in mind, the vast majority have since morphed to hold at least as much focus on security as economics of other goals.

2 This dissertation employs the shorthand “(O)AU” in referring to the IOs that exist at the continental level. Indeed, while the two organizations do display some very real differences, in general they should be thought of as essentially the same organization with different mandates, that have remained, in essence, one organization throughout time.
analysis have broadly similar mandates, and thus exist to accomplish broadly similar goals. These include economic and political integration, information sharing, and the provision of collective security, among others. In short, the very strong degree of issue replication shared in the two tiers of African IOs is a perplexing reality, especially given the notably limited resources that African states possess in their abilities to carry out their diplomacies at all. Thus, the first part of our developing puzzle is this: why do African states find utility in belonging to at least two sets of African IOs with generally similar mandates, especially given states’ limited resources to pursue international statecraft in the first place?

The second component of our developing puzzle relates to the historical frames of understanding about the utilities of African IOs to their members; or put otherwise, what African states think that African IOs are “good for.” Two outlooks have prevailed in the academic literature about why African states think African IOs are useful: one perspective is rooted in a functionalist (liberal) vein, and the other is rooted in an identity-driven (constructivist) vein. Importantly, both put acute focus on African IOs’ utility in engendering collective outcomes for all members, a theme that, more broadly, has typified how scholars have historically thought about IOs in a more global sense (Simmons and Martin 2008, 193). The first of these strains of literature understands African states as having created African IOs – and then using them – in very functionalist ways, most acutely, to achieve collective outcomes in the pursuit of club goods as stated in their founding documents (Nweke 1987). These club goods are

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4 For more on the notion of functionalism in the design of regional organizations, see: Schimmelfennig 2007.
sundry, and include such aspirations as the promotion of collective security (Akokpari and Ancas 2014; Esmenjaud 2014a; Esmenjaud 2014b; Foltz 1983; Franke 2009; Hailu 2008; Makinda and Okumu 2008); pan-African democratization (Landsberg 2004; Makinda and Okumu 2008; Murithi 2012); continental economic growth (Adejumobi and Olukoshi 2008; Karbo 2014; Murithi 2012; Udombana 2002); and the improvement of African human security and human rights (Baimu and Sturman 2003; Dersso 2014; Kindiki 2003; Kioko 2003; Lotze 2014). Thus, when scholars have typically studied African IOs, they have historically been most specifically concerned with how the IOs themselves do and effectively function in the pursuit of their collective goals as stated in their founding documents. Put otherwise, many extant analyses of African IOs are approached via functiono-liberalist lenses of understanding.

A second historically prevailing approach towards how African states understand the strategic utility of African IOs is one of identity-driven constructivism. African IOs, especially at the Pan-African level, are viewed vis-à-vis a similarly collectivist lens, though one that is primarily concerned not with the bureaucratic, neo-functionalist achievement of specific, stated tasks (as discussed in the last perspective), but instead, as a promoters of collective African identities. While the existence of a primordial “African” political identity is an inherently fraught and debated - if not now mostly delegitimized - notion, African IOs have indeed historically within much academic and political science literature been associated with this pursuit. Rooted especially in mid-19th century and early 20th century strains of “black internationalism” (Delany 1852, Crumwell 1861; Blyden 1862; Horton 1867; Du Bois 1913, 1921, 1924; James 1936), “négrtiude” (Césaire 2001; Gonrtran-Damas 2001), and Pan-Africanism
(Kenyatta 1962; Nkrumah 1963, 1965, 1970; Nyerere 1968; Touré 2010), the early association of postcolonial African international organizations as being strategically useful for their abilities to promote for “in-group” goal achievement has endured – though less vehemently – in the postcolonial period. These interpretations have come in various forms, including hopes of African IOs as engendering the “African identity and personality” and the “construction of an African sociopsychological community” (Nweke 1987); discussions of IOs’ capacities to help engender a “Pan-African spirit” (Deist 2013; Asante 2003; Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014), and others who understand African IOs as embodying an institutionalization of distinctively “African mindset” about the conduct of international affairs (Tieku 2014; Henderson 1995; McDougal 2009). Outside of these contentiously-labeled “Afrocentric” outlooks, a softer version of the tendency to view African IOs as engendering a positive collectivist pan-African political identity amongst African states has been furthered by more contemporary strands of African IR research emanating from the 1990s and 2000s, which emphasize the roles that African IOs have played in facilitating what are assumed to be the non-bellicose nature of intra-African relations (Clarke 2013, 92; Jackson and Rosberg 1983; Herbst 2000; Buzan and Waever 2004) to the extent that some believe there to be a globally atypical “African interstate peace” (Lemke 2002). Moreover, the real prevalence of “pro-African bloc” behavior in global fora - in relation to the quest for an

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5 Despite the fact that it has always been forwarded within the Africanist IR literature that norms of non-intervention governed the relationships between African states, this was often not indeed the case. As Haggis (2009) writes: “During the Cold War, there were numerous cases in which African states used subversive tactics against other African states. For example, Congo-Brazzaville and the Malagasy Republic supported Katangese secessionists, and Arab countries in North Africa supported Eritrean secessionists. Similarly, Sudan worked to subvert Eritrea and Chad, Somalia labored to destabilize Ethiopia, Algeria strove to undermine Western Sahara, and Libya toiled to weaken Sudan, Western Sahara, and Chad. There were also instances in which African states intervened militarily in their neighbors. To name just a few, Tanzania launched a military incursion into Uganda in 1979, Libya intervened in Chad and Tunisia in the early 1980s, and Somalia intervened in Ethiopia in 1982.”
African UN Security Council seat, or collective bargaining in relation to WTO or climate change talks - gives anecdotal support for these interpretations of African IOs as a means for the expression of a group-based, pan-African position on international politics (Murithi 2012; Lee and Smith 2010).

While the notion that African IOs tend to be thought of only for their “collectivist” utility may seem anachronistic – it is – it nevertheless continues to be an approach advocated by some of the top African international relations scholars today. For his part, Thomas Tieku’s (2014, 16) ardent calls for such a collectivist interpretation bears quoting at length, as it personifies both historical and contemporary claims about the importance of the lens of collectivism in attempting to understand how African states view the importance of African IOs:

As many research works on personhood show, collectivism is the dominant worldview in Africa and any theory that neglects collectivist practices cannot account for African international relations. In African societies, and by extension Africa’s IR, actors such as persons and states are not independent entities: rather they are integral members of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity…. Indigenous African societies exhibit many features of collectivist cultures, as those who have studied the person in African societies have noted…. Remnants of collective cultural practices still dictate African politics in general, and interstate relations specifically. Unlike the individualist behavioral traits widely documented by IR scholars, many African state elites do not think of themselves as independent, atomistic, isolated, and abstract entities, or think that they just “have” relations with each other. Rather, they think they “are” relations.

The two foregoing collectivist approaches towards understanding how African states think about their IOs have engendered numerous problems. These approaches tend to assume that African states are atypically “non-rational” as compared to other
global states; that all African states have the same interests;\textsuperscript{6} that power differentials amongst states somehow become irrelevant in IOs; and that the pursuit of self-interest in statecraft is somehow “non-African.” Most broadly then, this focus on the utility of African IOs for the purposes of pursuing collective outcomes, has meant that what has been given short shrift is understanding how individual African states seek to leverage their memberships in African IOs of their own, self-interested pursuits of national foreign and grand strategic objectives. While the causes of the general aversion to apply realist modes of analysis to African IR is addressed more fully in chapter 1, for now, suffice it to say that realism has generally been an eschewed paradigm in African IR broadly, and in relation to the study of African IOs more specifically. In short, this dissertation argues that the functionalist (liberal) and identity-driven (constructivist) interpretations of the importance of African IOs have so thoroughly served as the core narratives of academic understandings of the importance of African IOs that they have marginalized other (broadly realist) perspectives about what strategic utility African states find in their memberships in IOs. Moreover, to the extent that self-interest in African IOs has been understudied, it is also the case that the implications of the unique two-tiered nature of African IO membership have not been clearly interrogated.

Thus, pulling together our two interrelated puzzles: a) African states’ existence in a two-tiered continental IO system with overlapping organizational mandates and members, and b) the understudied nature of African states’ realist aims in IOs, this dissertation asks this primary question: Given memberships in at least two IOs within

\textsuperscript{6}See for instance, Mill’s (2009) discussion on how the AU’s rejection of the ICC indictment of Omar al-Bashir was a masquerade presenting an assumed unified front of African national interests that acutely disguised their diversity.
similar goals, how do African states understand the strategic utility of African IOs when attempting to achieve their own, self-interested national security interests? Further, how do states think about the nature of these organizations differentially when they seek to achieve their own, self-interested goals?

**The Argument**

In the main, this dissertation argues that it is possible to locate African states’ understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs at the two tiers of analysis with the knowledge of four variables: the state’s international power projection capability; its location within the distributions of power and polarity within its primary REC and the (O)AU; and the nature of the national security interest to be addressed. The creation and subsequent testing of a theory using these four variables to show how African states think about the strategic utility of IOs is the ultimate project of this work.

Thus, this dissertation’s intellectual undercurrent is that while African states do indeed pursue neo-liberal (neo-functionalist) and constructivist (identity-driven) collective actions within their IOs, more typically, they approach IOs in deeply realist ways, and leverage for them through various strategies to achieve their varied individual national interests. In short then, this dissertation argues that realism - a paradigm long-eschewed in the study of African IR - offers sundry insights into the nature of African state foreign and security policy action in African IOs. More macroscopically then, this piece offers an unequivocal rebuttal to the historic tendencies to simply view African IOs being used first and foremost for states’ pursuits
of collectivist outcomes, and highlights the ways in which they have been used instead for self-interested pursuits.

**Methods**

This dissertation employs a mixed-methodological agenda to first create a theory and a set of hypotheses about how African states understand the strategic utility of African IOs, which it then tests against the historical record of actual state action to see if African countries of similar typologies do indeed show similar patterns of strategic thinking towards African IOs given broadly similar threat inputs. The process of analyzing strategic pursuits of foreign policy is riddled with difficulties. As is the case in the study of foreign policy generally, it is quite difficult – if not impossible – to observe firsthand what goes on behind the closed doors of international organizations. This tendency is particularly pronounced in Africa, where understanding policy and decision-making within African IOs is rendered especially challenging given these IOs’ generally closed nature. Combined with the general dearth of statistical evidence of any degree of depth - or accuracy - about the happenings within the African IOS, this dissertation is necessarily interpretative, inductive, and mostly qualitative. Thus, to the answer the question at hand, the dissertation first undertakes theory building and hypothesis generation (1), which it then tests using historical case studies of eight African countries' foreign policymaking tendencies in West Africa and the Greater Horn (2), which are corroborated by

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7 As IS9/2 (2015) has noted: “The African Union is also unique because it isn’t totally transparent. If you want to study the UN Security Council, you can look at the states’ voting records. But in the African Union, you can’t do that. They don’t vote on anything. It’s all about consensus, which means that they don’t even need a vote. You will never see the AU release a communiqué saying, ‘This bill failed to pass with a vote of 14 yeas and 40 neighs.’”
interviews (3), descriptive statistics (4), and framed within the language and tradition of IR and foreign policy analysis (5).

Method 1: Theory-Building and Theory Testing

The very broad strokes of the theory - elucidated completely in chapter 3 - are as follows. States in Africa can be divided into four general categories according to their international power projection capabilities (IV1): strong states; middles states; weak states; and peripheral states. Given these varying capabilities to project power internationally, African states find themselves playing different roles within the IOs in which they are embedded according to where within the hierarchy of power they find themselves within their primary REC (IV 2) and the (O)AU (IV3). Armed with this “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” regarding the nature of a new threat (IV4), our theory shows how it can (broadly) predict differing states’ outlooks on when states view African IOs to be of use to them in the pursuits of their national security interests.

Method 2: Historical Comparative Case Studies

Primarily, this dissertation employs a comparative case study approach, by investigating the foreign policymaking tendencies of eight African countries in relation to African IOs. In West Africa, it focuses on Nigeria (powerful); Senegal (middle); and Gambia and Benin (weak). In the Horn of Africa, it focuses on Ethiopia and Sudan (middle) and Eritrea and Djibouti (weak). It also gives brief mention to the fourth type of country, “peripheral,” though offers no cases thereon.
The use of case studies for this research was an intuitive approach. Not only do case studies allow for the comparison of national foreign policymaking strategies across space and time, they allow for the telling of a far richer story of the dynamics of foreign policymaking than an adherence to statistical analysis. Indeed, as many have made clear, the qualitative, case study method – despite its increasingly marginal space within political science – should be rightly thought of as a complementary strategy to larger “empirical” work (Gerring 2004; King et al. 1994).

In keeping with the best practices of case study employment, the election of the two regions of West African and the Horn of Africa was a methodologically conscious choice. First, the regions share similarities in their diversity: both have very strong states, as well as very weak ones. They are religiously and ethnically heterogeneous and both have histories of the institutionalization of international organizations. Moreover, to the extent that their regional IOs share similar mandates – and are thus broadly comparable – Buzan and Waever (2004) have referred to both West African and the Horn as being "proto-complexes" of security communities.

Not only is the study comparative across counties, but, moreover, comparative amongst leaders within countries. To this end, this dissertation seeks to challenge predominant discourses that African foreign policies are (mostly) exclusively underwritten by leaders by showing that, despite various changes in African leadership within countries, African states’ foreign policies and pursuits of national interests towards IOs broadly remain constant, given the constant nature of regional polarity. Put otherwise, since the primary variables affecting African state behavior in IOs do not change even while leaders do, African foreign policies towards IOs remain far more constant than might otherwise be assumed.
Thus, for the case studies that will be presented, I have conducted a wide-ranging reading of eight states’ foreign and security policy histories since independence - many of which I was unfamiliar with - and then tested the foregoing theory against the historical record. As will be shown, in more instances than not, African states did not elect to pursue national security interests through IOs. While this might be interpreted to show the relative unimportance of African IOs, this is the wrongheaded interpretation. Instead, it highlights the very specific circumstances in which IOs are deemed to be helpful, as opposed to serving as a wholesale indictment of the irrelevance of African IOs as such.

**Method 3: Interviews**

Over the course of four years (2012 to 2015) I conducted nearly 50 in-person interviews with various practitioners of African international relations, over the course of three separate trips to the home of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. These interviews were undertaken in June 2012, January 2014, and from September 2014 to April 2015. During this period, I also conducted numerous email, telephone, and Skype interviews. Interviews were conducted with representatives of each of the three IOs in question; with national-level representatives to these IOs; personnel from non-African countries that work with these IOs, especially those working in the African Union and the United Nations; and a variety of journalists, NGO workers, and academic experts on individual countries.

**Method 4: Descriptive Statistical Analysis**
Throughout the dissertation, I also present various descriptive statistics to demonstrate larger points. Namely, these are used to help identify states’ international power projection capabilities (in measuring determinants such as military spending, GDP, and population). Yet, at its core, this dissertation is qualitative in nature. Beyond the author's propensity for descriptive work, it is also the case that this project would have been impossible to complete if method had determined questions. As has been noted, statistics in African political science - outside, arguably economic and voting indicators - are notoriously scant, and when available, frequently unreliable. And indeed, even outside of the domain of African studies, the study of foreign policy itself remains almost exclusively a descriptive rather than quantitative exercise. Understanding what happened "behind closed doors" is a necessarily anthropocentric and interview-based exercise.

**Method 5: Framing from International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis**

As will be elucidated further in chapter 1, the primary approach undertaken to understanding the strategic approaches to African states’ use of IOs for national security interests is rooted in a discussion that attempts, in modest ways, to unify the historically distinct fields of international relations (IR) and foreign policy analysis (FPA). In following the work of others who have understood the imperative nature of understanding the interface between the international and domestic (Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988) this work seeks to show how varying locations within IOs’ polarities of power informs how states think about the strategic utility of them.

More specifically - and given the multi-variable domestic and international-level inputs in the production of African state action - this dissertation also pointedly
argues that the two connected though sometimes distinct traditions of international relations and foreign policy analysis must be employed in tandem to understand African strategic action in IOs. The polarities of power and resultant hierarchies that exist within African IOs (neo-realist IR’s source of action) in essence, “sets the stage of the possible” (or what Bruce Russet calls the “menu of choice”) for the ways in which African leaders (FPA’s source of action) can and cannot attempt to achieve their national security objectives. Put otherwise, though it is often leaders that have the greatest pull over the creation of foreign policy construction, their considerations about just what might be accomplished begin first and foremost with an assessment of their location within the regional and continental international organizational hierarchies and polarities of power in which they are embedded. Personal and/or national pursuits flow only after assessing these factors first. In short, this dissertation emphasizes that while it is typically the leader that makes African foreign policies, locations of power within organizations’ hierarchies and the nature of what needs to be accomplished inform the exact range of options of what policies are possible and prudent. Put otherwise: while African leaders may indeed be the “who” of foreign policymaking in Africa, when African IOs are the “where,” it is location within hierarchies and the nature of national security interests that determine the “what” of policy production.

**Definitions and Scope Conditions**

Understanding with some precision the lexicon that will be used throughout this dissertation is imperative. Given the motivating question at hand – “How do African states understand the strategic utility of African IOs at two levels of analysis in
the pursuit of their *national security interests*?" – at least two definitions should be forwarded upfront, and in relation to the phrases in italics. By “strategic utility,” this dissertation is simply referring to the strategic uses, or advantages, that African IOs can provide in the landscape of states’ foreign and security policy options. This wording, while drawn from game theory’s focus on improving actors’ “utility functions,” operates in a similar fashion, though in reference to the strategic outlooks on statecraft vis-à-vis other possible avenues for the pursuit of national policies. By “national security interest,” this dissertation is referring to a broad array of phenomena – ranging from “traditional” threats of physical violence to more non-traditional interests related to the promotion of reputation to avoid isolation – that African states view as being part and parcel of their national security.8

A number of caveats relating to scope conditions should be put in the open. First, while my focus is on African foreign policies, I do not claim or attempt to offer an explanation of African foreign policies *writ large*. To the contrary, my goal and claims are more modest: I only purport to explain the behavior of African states within the context of African IOs. While the discussions that I present in each constituent chapter offer a presentation of various African states’ foreign policy trajectories more macroscopically - and while insights about policy behavior derived from these

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8 To determine what countries in West Africa and the Horn have understood to be “national security interests” over time, I have relied on a variety of sources. Primarily, and when available, analyses are rooted in primary source documents from national governments: particularly, articulations of national security strategies. Second, and to lead to a more complete understanding of national interests, I have also relied on firsthand interviews with policymakers, current and former government personnel, and observers of African international relations whose occupation locations within the halls of power afford them keen insights. Third, I also rely on secondhand literature - from political science to history to anthropology - to gain a more complete picture of the range of states’ national security interests.
discussions are likely applicable in other domains of foreign policymaking inquiry - I purposely limit my scope conditions to a rather narrow field of focus.

Second, and even more specifically, I do not attempt to explain all African state strategic approaches to African IOs: rather, I am focused on the inherently security-related facets of such policies. To that end, strategies in relation to engagement in other spheres - particularly regional or pan-African economic integration - is outside of the scope of this work. While these themes are touched upon to varying degrees, questions of social, cultural, and to a lesser extent, economic integration are not the focus of this work.

Third, as Gerring (2004, 348) has written about the nature of intellectual pursuits, if the researcher must choose “between knowing more about less or less about more,” this dissertation is one that privileges the strategy of knowing less about more. The intent with this work was to be theoretically and analytically wide-ranging: by covering the foreign policies of eight countries, three IOs, and dozens of years of postcolonial history, this dissertation is necessarily very broad in scope. While by necessity it must forgo fine-grain detail in many discussions of otherwise germane topics, it is hoped that its breadth compensates for the moments in which detail is sacrificed in the service of a pursuing a wider-reaching project.

Finally, a note on language. While this dissertation purports to be one on “African” foreign and security policies in “African” international organizations, it is aware of the inherently contentious nature of such a distinction. To be clear, while we use the label “African” throughout this study, it is an inherently laden - and at times, fictive - term to describe a landmass whose people and politics exemplify a dizzying array of diversity. While profoundly interesting analyses of the significance and
fraught nature of employing “Africa” as a singular, unifying term are rife (Mazrui 2005; Mudimbe 1985; Appiah 1993; Said 2014) it is here used as colloquial shorthand, and its importance in signification should not be over-determined by the reader.

Contributions to the Literature

If it is not yet obvious, it should now be stated forthrightly that this dissertation is interdisciplinary in nature. To the extent that it fits into any disciplinary category, it primarily falls within the bounds of political science. Yet, it spans various intellectual interests across multiple academic disciplines, and in so doing touches upon issues of: international relations, foreign policy analysis, comparative politics, and military and security affairs (political science); the intellectual thought of the African Diaspora and post-independence diplomatic and foreign policy histories of numerous African states and their political institutions (African Studies); and contemporary real-world policy implications of foreign and security policymaking in national and IO contexts (public policy). Thus, this dissertation will optimistically make numerous contributions to various facets of literature within political science, African Studies, and public policy.

Political Science

At its core, this dissertation is working to fill a void in the rigorous study of African international relations. To be sure, while the continent has historically garnered considerable attention within political science’s sub-fields of comparative politics and political economy, much less has been written on African international relations. The most notable works include those on Africa's place within international
relations theory (Dunn and Shaw 2001; Brown and Harmon 2013) and descriptive elements of African international relations more generally (Adebajo and Scanlon 2007; Clapham 1996; Cornelissen et al. 2013; Murithi 2014; Taylor 2010). Moreover, while numerous books and articles have been written on the security architectures of the African Union (Engel and Porto 2010; Francis 2006; Franke 2008; Franke 2009; Makinda and Okumu 2007; Akokpari et. al 2009; Braveboy-Wagner 2009; Herbst 2007), ECOWAS (Adebajo 2008; Aning 2004; Obi 2012; Thies 2010), IGAD (Bereketeab 2012; Woodward 2013; Healy 2009; Kasaija 2013; Khadiagala 2009; Sherrif et al. 2015) and other sub-regional African IOs, these have tended to be more descriptive of the organizations themselves and have not been theoretically oriented.

In a more specific vein, this dissertation is working to incorporate Africa’s IOs as “legitimate” objects of study within the larger corpus of IR scholarship. For sundry reasons that will be explained in the next chapter, scholarship on the African Union is sparse, and indeed, “public information on the work of the OAU is relatively under-developed and few scholars and Africanists follow the work of the organization” (Packer and Rukare 2002, 365). Moreover, this dissertation is also optimistically important in that it investigates and lays the theoretical groundwork for a new series of questions in the realm of the study of international institutions: namely, how states approach similar though distinct IOs at the sub-global levels.⁹

⁹ More acutely, it will also add to the literatures on international institutions and collective security. This project contributes to the literature on collective security by eschewing the historical focus on the collective security alliances between rich, consolidated, Euro-American states, and instead, gives focus to international organizations and institutions that exists amongst less wealthy and less consolidated states in Sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically, it broadens the scope of the literature on collective security concerning the object of threat itself. That is, whereas collective security as typically conceived has considered entities external to the collective security institution as the primary threat to be countered (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991), in Sub-Saharan Africa, collective security institutions typically defend members against threats emanating from other member states.
A third, and interrelated contribution of this dissertation is to work - in a sense - to “simplify” the often messy landscape of African international relations for outside observers in its theoretical section, by highlighting useful categories of states, polarities and types of national security interests which can be usefully analytically leveraged even by those without a specialist’s knowledge of the region. By giving the non-expert observer of African international relations a mental shorthand by which to think about and analyze some 54 countries, it is thus making the study of African IR more accessible, while not eliding over important national differences between countries.

**African Studies**

This work also contributes, in some small ways, to pushing forward the field of African Studies. In some sense, this work is situated within a "postcolonial" or "Global South" theoretic camp, insofar as it is concerned with gaining analytical traction on the interactions of Africa’s non-Great Power states that frequently otherwise are overlooked in “dominant” modes of intellectual analysis (Dunn and Shaw 2001; Jones 2006; Shilliam 2012; Henderson 2013). In this vein, it contributes to the so-called tract of "Global South security studies" led by Ayoob (1995) but which has been augmented over the years (Braveboy-Wagner 2009; Neuman 1998; Thomas 2003) and been further buttressed by those considering African military affairs and political violence (Bates 2008; Dokken 2008; Hentz 2015; Reno 1999; Williams 2009; Williams 2011). Finally, it will also contribute to the so-called "small states” literature (Lee and Smith 2008; Lee and Smith 2010; Cooper and Shaw 2012; Hey 2003).

Another central component of part of this dissertation is related to emphasizing the notion of “African agency,” an increasingly central concern for scholars in African
Studies. By eschewing antecedent works that portray African states as non-rationally “collective” in their actions towards one another, this dissertation treats African states not as globally anomalous entities that defy standard patterns of behavior, but rather, approaches them as entities that hold equally shrewd notions of interest, agency, and action as non-African states. In showing how powerful states create, lead, and drive African IOs to pursuits of regional glory and hegemony (Nigeria and Ethiopia) while other states employ them as means to free-ride (Gambia), avoid global isolation (Sudan) gain greater agency in international negotiations (Benin), and galvanize domestic discourses for regime protection (Eritrea), this dissertation not only advocates for putting African IR on “equal footing,” but indeed, seeks to show how African IR offers insights into international relations more globally. Thus Africa is not just part of the heuristic, but offers insights into the nature of the heuristic itself.

Public Policy

Though this dissertation is not policy-oriented per se, its insights into micro-processes at play in the consideration of strategic interests of African states will optimistically aid policymakers within and outside the continent to improve the ways that African actors act in response to various types of insecurity. Discussions with policymakers within the UN, the African Union, and in Western and African governments have suggested that, from a policy perspective, clear understanding of just how African leaders and states understand the utility of IOs in their statist decisions remains virtually non-existent (IS10/2 2014; IS31 2015).
This dissertation is laid out into five primary sections, each comprised of constituent chapters. The first section, entitled “Background and Theory,” lays the intellectual basis for the rest of the dissertation. Chapter 1 deals with sorting out the analytical tools available for responding to our question of interest: therein, it introduces the reader to international relations theory (IR), foreign policy analysis (FPA), and elucidates the ways in which both fields of inquiry have historically approached the questions of African interstate actions. Ultimately, it argues that an integrated approach leveraging insights from both is necessary for the ensuing project. Chapter 2 is focused on the playing field of this work: African international organizations. As such, it introduces international organizations and how scholars from various intellectual traditions have interpreted their meanings and utilities to states. Thereafter, it presents overviews of African IOs specifically, first giving an overview of the broad African IO landscape before giving more detailed institutional histories of the four African IOs in question: the OAU, the AU, ECOWAS, and IGAD. Chapter 3 serves as the theory-building chapter, and elucidates in more detail the broad range of predictions about African state behavior that will be tested against historical realities in the subsequent state case study chapters.

The next four sections correspond to state typologies and each contains chapters on African state foreign policy strategic behavior in the context of African IOs. The second section focuses on “powerful” African states, and lays out predictions about their behavior in African IOs. This section contains only one – albeit lengthy – chapter, chapter 4, on Nigeria. The third section focuses on African middle states, and contains case study chapters on Ethiopia (chapter 5), Sudan (chapter 6), and Senegal (chapter 7). The fourth section focuses on “weak” states, and offers case studies on
Benin (chapter 8) and Gambia (chapter 9) in West Africa, and Djibouti (chapter 10) and Eritrea (chapter 11) in the Horn of Africa. A fifth section on “peripheral” states offers no case studies, but explains the nature of the typology, and why no case studies exist. A final section concludes and offers new directions for this body of research.

10 Notably, the fourth type of state, “peripheral states” is discussed, but precisely because these states have little engagement in IOs, no case studies are offered.
SECTION ONE:

BACKGROUND AND THEORY
CHAPTER ONE:

International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Africa: Evolutions, Divergences, Reconciliations

The core of this work asks: given their unique locations within two sets of African international organizations, how do African leaders think about such organizations’ utility as they attempt to pursue their own self-interested national security interests? In attempting to provide an answer to this question, one must begin to search his analytical toolbox. From it, he unearths two seemingly useful, and interrelated - though distinct - means by which to answer this question. These are the paradigms of international relations (IR) theory and foreign policy analysis (FPA). The analytical methods developed within each appear to offer leverage for the purposes of understanding how leaders of individual African states interpret - and thus approach - the myriad African international organizations of which they are members.

To provide a theoretical backdrop for the ensuing empirical chapters of this work, this chapter offers an overview of the two main schools of thought that it employs: IR theory and FPA. It shows not only how they have historically related to one another, but, more germanely, how both have approached the analysis of African international relations and foreign policymaking. While its intent is to lay the theoretical and purposive rebar for the remainder of the work, it also attempts to draw out new understandings of just how and why the use of both methods of analysis in conjunction is an imperative approach to the study of African behavior in continental IOs.
In proceeding, this chapter is broken down into three component parts. The first section offers an introduction to IR theory and FPA, giving acute attention to their historical “divide.” The second section then looks at how both traditions - IR and FPA - have approached the study of African international relations and foreign policy, respectively, to the extent that they have addressed questions about the continent at all. Finally, the third section advocates that to adequately address the question at hand, a combination of approaches from both IR and FPA is both possible and necessary. In advocating an “integrated levels of analysis approach,” it argues that by taking seriously the polarity-based (realist variants) of IR theory, and combining them with the personal and origins of foreign policy action as embedded within FPA, discerning and even broadly predicting African states’ strategic behavior in African IOs becomes possible.

An Introduction to International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis

The intuitive starting point for an academic investigation of how states approach IOs would seemingly begin and end with the sub-field of international relations. For the sake of expediency, this dissertation assumes that the reader has a thorough knowledge of the predominant variants of international relations theory especially those of (neo-) realism, (neo-) liberalism, constructivism, and other less common paradigms, including post-modernism, feminist international relations theory, and postcolonial international relations theory. Moreover, there is also some assumption of readers’ familiarity with the so-called “Great Debates” within the development of international relations theory, particularly the rise and fall of predominant paradigms and their methodological predispositions. While they will be referenced as orienting
paradigms throughout, it is also the case that this work is not one that seeks to exclusively pigeonhole the international relations of African states into one paradigm as being “right” or “wrong.” Instead, its goal is to show that African states exhibit tendencies from each of these intellectual paradigms at different times and in relation to different issue areas, but that more realist tendencies are most typical, despite historically having been overlooked by scholars. In short, while the variants of IR theory will be referenced frequently, they are invoked to show the diversity of actions that characterize African state behavior, rather than to militate for the appropriateness of just one paradigm’s exclusive applicability, even while a renewed focus on realism is an undergirding theme.

Yet the tools of international relations theory are not exclusively applicable for the enterprise at hand: instead, there is the need to add to more traditional modes of understanding insights from a less-commonly used paradigm, foreign policy analysis (FPA). Just what do we mean by “foreign policy?” As Carlsnaes (2002, 335) relays:

Foreign policies consist of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments, and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors - both governmental and non-governmental - which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy.

Put otherwise, Crab defines “foreign policy” as:

Reduced to its more fundamental ingredients, foreign policy consists of two elements: national objectives to be achieved and the means for achieving them. The interactions between national goals and the resources for attaining them are the perennial subject of statecraft. In its ingredients the foreign policy of all nations, great and small, is the same (in Abegunrin 2003, 4).

This dissertation relies, to a substantial degree, on the methods developed in FPA: yet, because the sub-field has fallen out of favor - and thus is not as widely
known or understood as IR - a very brief history is presented here. FPA was developed in the 1950s, and soon, three divergent approaches came to characterize FPA, each of which were closely associated with a hallmark book, a specific level of analysis, and an inter-related disciplinary or interdisciplinary methodological outlook. These included a focus on individuals (rooted in psychological and sociological studies); groups and bureaucratic politics (group-based analyses) and states (comparative foreign policy) (Smith et al. 2012, 4). The third of these, comparative foreign policy (CFP) holds particular methodological promise for this dissertation. Anchored by the work of James Rosneau, CFP holds a focus on “the relationship between genotypes of states and the sources of their foreign policies” (Smith et al. 2012, 4). Indeed, this dissertation draws directly from this tendency of CFP to create genotypes of states and draw conclusions about the nature of their international behaviors based on different genotypes’ commonalities, in the presentation of its theory, in chapter 3.

Levels of Analysis and the “Divide” Between IR and FPA

However, the selection of IR and FPA as the primary tools by which to assess our question seemingly has a downside: to date, the domains of IR and FPA remain largely separate analytical traditions. Where IR and FPA primarily differ is their approach to the question of levels of analysis. In short, “levels of analysis” refer to the specific types of agents or phenomena (independent variables), located at different “levels” of international society, whose actions are deemed to be the causes of other phenomena (dependent variables), in our case, international politics themselves. Levels of analysis range from the most macroscopic social forces – like the entire international system –
to the most microscopic – like the cognitive processes of individual leaders – such that, in theory, there are an infinite number of levels of analysis, according to the level of aggregation or disaggregation of social phenomena. Most typically, however, IR scholars have selected one of three levels of analysis – the individual, the state, or the international system of states – as the three primary levels of interrogation when attempting to understand the causes of international events (Warner 2016a).

In the broadest sense, the divide between the two traditions lies precisely in their approach to the question of levels of analysis: IR tends to focus on drivers of action that lie above the level of the state (anarchy, polarity, and balances of power), while FPA has developed to focus on all of the levels of analysis below the level of the state (leaders, preferences, civil society, and institutions) to explain international state actions. As Thies and Breuning (2012) write of this irony:

Foreign policy analysis and IR scholars operate within different analytical traditions. Whereas the former consider the individual to be the ‘ground’ of IR theory, the latter are more apt to proceed from a system-level orientation.

And as Houghton (2007, 25) elucidates further of the divide:

[T]he assumptions of FPA counter those of neorealism at almost every turn. For neo-realists, states are the primary actors, while for FPA scholars it is foreign policy elites; for neo-realists, states act on the basis of the rational calculation of self-interests, while in FPA elites act on the basis of their ‘definition of the situation’; foreign policy for the realist is best understood as the endless search for security in an anarchical world, while for the FPA scholar it is seen as a series of problem solving tasks; power is the currency of IR for the neorealist, while in FPA it is information; the anarchical structure of the international system determines the state’s behavior in neorealism, while that system is merely an arena for action in FPA; and policy prescriptions for the neorealist involve adapting to structures rationally, while compensating for misperception and organizational pathologies is the prescription offered by FPA.

In short, while both IR and FPA are concerned with international politics, most scholars assess that they talk past each other, particularly given their focus on their
divergent interpretations of how levels of analysis inform the sources of state action. Yet as will be shown, this dissertation argues that the explicit election of an integrated levels of analysis approach, which takes both seriously, is the most useful path for our purposes.

**Foreign Policymaking in Africa: Insights from FPA and IR**

Having outlined the contours of the emergence and research agendas of both FPA and IR and their divergent focuses on levels of analysis, our focus now turns back to their applications in any African context. How have observers of African foreign and security policies interpreted what levels of analysis are most salient in understanding international policy outcomes? More broadly, what is the state of the study of African foreign policy today?

Despite advances in the past decades, the study of African foreign policymaking remains generally anemic. While sundry examples of quality work can be cited to the contrary (Anglin et al. 1985; Dolan et al. 1980; Khadiagala and Lyon 2001; Shaw and Aluko 1984; Warner 2016b; Wright 1999) it is still the case that, as Wright (1999, 1) writes, “there have been relatively few studies of African foreign policy and even fewer in a comparative vein” and, writing in 1990, Shaw relayed that that comparative studies of African foreign policy remain “embryonic.” Various reasons account for the general dearth of studies on African foreign policy, including problems associated with data collection; the difficulty of locating a purely ‘foreign’ policy in many African states; an apathy of Western scholars towards African foreign policy generally; and trepidation by African scholars themselves about studying an off-limits subject (Wright 1999, 1). While underlying the macroscopic reality that the study of Africa
remains uncommon in the fields of FPA and IR, there has nevertheless been a sufficient amount of scholarship on the topic so as to give a conversation about its historiography some coherence.

For the purposes of presenting the breadth of hypotheses regarding how African foreign policies are made, this dissertation follows the lead of other scholars of FPA and IR who, for analytical utility, divide their theoretical analytics into a 2x2 matrix, focusing on the level of analysis and the rationales for behavior (Carlsnaes 2002; Jervis 1976; Wendt 1999). This dissertation both employs this matrix approach, but complicates it by sub-dividing the areas of action even further, as presented below in Figure 1.1. Ultimately, it follows Carlsnaes’ approach, of investigating the “epistemological concerns” (rationales) of foreign policymaking on the Y-axis, and the “ontological” (levels of analysis) concerns of African state behavior on the X-axis. Its primary deviation is that it subdivides the sources of state action in the vein of two strains of FPA (leader-centric and statist origins of foreign policy) and neo-realist IR (regional determinants of foreign policy and international, non-African sources of foreign policy), in what it terms “internal” and “external” sources of state action. When understanding the sub-statist factors that inform the nature of state action, the need to examine various levels of analysis remains paramount (Carlsnaes 2008; Singer 1961; Hudson 2005; Hudson 2014; Warner 2016a). Following are the various levels of analysis that are deemed to likely inform the nature of the states’ foreign policymaking tendencies:

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11 Or, as Carlsnaes (2002) articulates more eloquently, the dimensions of foreign policymaking fall on the spectrum of “ontological” concerns (the level of analysis, or what he calls “holism” versus “individualism”) and “epistemological” concerns (the underlying rationales for behavior, or what he calls “objectivist” versus “interpretivist” lines).
### Figure 1.1
Hypothesized Locations of African State Foreign and Security Policymaking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension 1: Level of Analysis</th>
<th>FPA</th>
<th>IR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Sources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State or Bureaucratic Level</td>
<td>5. State Interests/National Security</td>
<td>6a. Polarity (Regional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional and Pan-African Level</td>
<td>6b. Polarity (Pan-African)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global or Systemic Level</td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Polarity (Global):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Sources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension 2: Motivation</th>
<th>FPA</th>
<th>IR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realist</strong></td>
<td>2a. Leaders, Foreign Policy, and Regime Protection:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Materialist or Rationalist</strong></td>
<td>2b. Leaders, Foreign Policy and Economic Accumulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal</strong></td>
<td>4. Bureaucracy, Organizational, Decisionmaking:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivist</strong></td>
<td>5. Domestic Constituency and Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological or Constructivist</strong></td>
<td>2c. Leaders, Foreign Policy and Personal Relationships:</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Dimension 2: Motivation</th>
<th>FPA</th>
<th>IR</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal</strong></td>
<td>7. Collective Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constructivist</strong></td>
<td>8. Pan-Africanist Identity:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological or Constructivist</strong></td>
<td>11. Transnationalism and Diasporas:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Cognitive/Political Psychological Approaches to Foreign Policymaking

Some who have studied the origins of foreign policymaking globally have focused on understanding the internal cognitive and political processes that occur internal to leaders in their enactment of foreign policy. Herein, observers attempt to locate states’ foreign policy decisions by understanding how the effects of individual leaders’ process of cognition, understanding, emotions, memories, interpretations, histories, memories, and mental frames bear upon the decisions that they make (Hudson 2014, 34). Virtually no work has been done on this topic in Africa, at least to this author’s knowledge.\(^\text{12}\)

2. Leaders-Centric Approaches to Foreign Policymaking

The next most macroscopic level of analysis focuses on the leader: including his or her background, personal history of motivations and aversions, cultural origins, and approaches to social relations and nature of acquisition of power (Hudson 2014, 34). When discussing the nature of foreign policymaking in Africa, the leader-centric approach is indeed the most commonly adopted outlook, precisely because of the numerous instances in which the creation and enactment of statist foreign or security policy has been interpreted as little more than an effectuation of a personal policy. Put otherwise, historically, for the majority of African leaders and the states that they govern, foreign policy has been more or less “personal policy” aimed not at the pursuit of statist grand strategy, but instead, at the consolidation of power, protection of rulership, and enrichment of leaders. This section thus details what has historically

\(^{12}\)The closest approximation might be Cogley (2011), who has written about the political psychology of African leaders’ decisions to abdicate power, and has concluded that issues of self-esteem (not term maximization) underlie their strategic calculations.
been the most predominant means by which to understand African foreign policy construction, the leader-centric approach to understanding African foreign and security policymaking\(^\text{15}\) (Ayoob 1995; Clapham 1996; Dokken 2008, 62; IS40 2014; 2014; Khadiagala and Lyons 2001; Tavares 2011, 167; Wright 1999, 6; Zartman 2000, 148).

Before moving on to discuss the three sub-categories of leader-centric approaches to the study of African foreign policymaking, we turn to a slightly more in-depth overview of the nature of the international landscape and its strategic importance from “the perspective of those who must use foreign policy essentially as a means of trying to assure their own survival” (Clapham 1996, 6). Clapham (1996) has offered one of the most thorough discussions of how the nature of leadership in postcolonial African states has led foreign and security policy construction and effectuation to often be the exclusive domain of leaders, to the exclusion of other sub-national forms of decision-making. The primary means by which this co-optation has occurred has been through the pursuit of “monopoly statehood,” or the complete capture of the state apparatus by its top executive. Once assuming the executive, African leaders worked assiduously to command as much presence over the state and its institutions as possible, for the protection of their newfound positions.

One aspect of monopoly statehood that proved to be particularly easy to co-opt and valuable to oversee was that of foreign policymaking. Indeed, while foreign policies in many Western states are assumed to be constructed as per one of Allison’s (1999) three models - rational actor model, organizational model, or bureaucratic

\(^\text{15}\) Yet, Robert Putnam (1998) has astutely and correctly noted that the assumption that the executive can be considered a unified foreign policymaking entity is often incorrect.
politics model - in many postcolonial African states, the formulation of foreign policy has been simply another strategy to improve the utility function of leaders. This has been an especially pronounced tendency in postcolonial African states given their lack of state consolidation and the concurrent omnipresent threat environment, which included rival politicians and their followers, elements of the national military, non-co-ethnic groups within the country, belligerent neighboring states and imperialist global states. Thus, individual interests - not state interests – became the forces that drove and determined African foreign policymaking process. As Clapham (1996) explains, once leaders were assured that the international community had recognized them as rightful sovereigns:

They could start playing for real: they could use their role in the diplomatic game together with their internal resources, in order to help keep themselves in power, to extend their control over the national territory, and to extract resources from their domestic environment with which to strike further bargains on the international scene. They could well have general moral goals such as the economic development and national unity of their states, or the achievement of independence or majority rule for territories still under colonial or minority control, which their foreign and domestic economic policies were intended to achieve. They almost certainly had personal goals, such as glory or perhaps merely self-enrichment. But all of these depended on their ability to keep themselves going through the effective management of their external as well as their domestic environment. This was what foreign policy in African (and indeed most other) states was all about (Clapham 1996, 23).

In short, for many African leaders at the helm of foreign policy construction, "seamanship often mattered more than navigation: staying afloat was more important than going somewhere" (Clapham 1996, 5).

To that end, an enduring tendency in the study of African foreign policy has been the recognition of the profound extent to which African leaders have exerted power over the construction of their foreign policies. Indeed, for the long thrust of the history of analysis in African foreign policy, the fact that African leaders have been
unilaterally responsible for the construction and implementation of their states' foreign policies has been the prevailing approach to the analysis of the continent. As Khadiagala and Lyons (2001, 5) describe:

African foreign policy decision-making has always been the province of leading personalities. Foreign policy as the prerogative of presidents and prime ministers have dovetailed with the postcolonial patterns of domestic power consolidation...The charismatic leader became the source, site, and embodiment of foreign policy... From this perspective, foreign policymaking emerged as a tool for leaders to both disarm their political opponents and compensate for unpopular domestic beliefs.

There are at least three dimensions of “personalized” African foreign policies that bear interrogating, and which will be discussed below:

2a. Leaders, Foreign Policy, and Regime Protection

The first “motivation” behind the leader-centric approach to African foreign policy construction is for the purpose of ensuring regime survival. To be sure: the most abiding ways in which scholars have thought about the origins of African foreign policy is its role in the protection of African leaders’ regimes (Clapham 1996; Lemke 2002; Malaquias 1999; Victor 2010; Carter 2014; Ayoob 1995). In short, as Ayoob (1995) has described in detail, African leaders face what he refers to as “The Third World security predicament,” or the recognition “that in most postcolonial states, security is most fundamentally threatened not by external threats of aggressive armies, but by internal insurgencies made possible by the lack of state capture of peripheries.” African leaders’ perceptions of security then are not exclusively externally oriented, but more often, internally derived. Thus, dominion of foreign policymaking becomes a
tool by which to subvert would-be threats to power, not only from external forces, but also from within state borders.¹⁴

2b. Leaders, Foreign Policy, and Economic Accumulation

The second dimension of “personalized” African foreign policymaking that bears mentioning is its relation to the capability to further shore up domestic leverage by privatizing states’ foreign policies for personal enrichment. These critiques have been adopted in more contemporary fashion by scholars who have been quick to note the “privatization” or “personalization” of African leaders’ relations with the outside world for the purposes of individual resource extraction (Bayart 2000; Bayart and Hibou 1999; Reno 1998; Shaw 2013, 216).

2c. Leaders, Foreign Policy, and Personal Relationships

The third dimension of “personalized” African foreign policymaking relates to how African foreign policy decisions are influenced by ethnic, religious, or simple personal ties of leaders (Tavares 2011, 167). Put otherwise: with sometimes singular authority to dictate foreign policies, stochastic elements of personal friendship, enmity, familial relations, personal histories, ethnicity, religion, and even gender, can lead to sometimes unpredictable foreign policies. For instance, and as will be detailed subsequently, most analysts of Nigeria’s foreign and security policies agree that Ibrahim Babangida’s enthusiasm for a Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention into Liberia in 1990 was driven in no small part by his closeness with Liberian President

¹⁴ Indeed, it is precisely this lack of “internal stability/external vulnerability” that leads us to refer to “national security interests” in the course of this work.
Samuel Doe. For her part, Coleman (2007) has also gone to great length to describe the frequencies of what she calls “solidarity” deployments in Africa, wherein leaders send in troops to other countries for the purposes of supporting a close friend or ally.

In closing our discussion, we should be wary of over-ascribing the importance of the leader-centric narrative of African foreign and security policymaking. Indeed, despite its usefulness, this work contends that a strict and singular reliance on the “head-of-state-as-sole-foreign-policymaker” trope belies a diversity of sources for the creation of foreign policy from states of all levels, including ministries of foreign affairs (Nigeria); militaries (Nigeria and Eritrea); parties (Ethiopia and Gambia); cabinets (Benin); civil society (Nigeria and Benin); think tanks (Nigeria); the international community (Djibouti and Benin) and, most importantly, the neo-realist determinant of regional polarity, which are discussed next.

3. State Interests and Foreign Policymaking

Moving up another level of analysis, our investigation next turns to the pursuit of states’ interests in African foreign policymaking. Yet what do we mean by this? In discussing what is entailed in “states’ interests,” Gilpin (1981, 19) claims that states as such have no national interests, but rather “state interests,” which are simply the “aggregation of the bargained interests of the most powerful members of the ruling coalitions.” The translation of these bp (1961) asked: “Is there any difference between international relations and comparative foreign policy?”

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15 For instance, Wright (1999) cautions us similarly in this regard, and advocates looking away from leadership as a prime determinant of foreign policymaking.
In short, this dissertation argues that both traditions - of IR and FPA - must be employed in tandem through an integrated levels-of-analysis approach to understand how African states interpret the strategic utility of African IOs. Rather than assuming that one can understand African foreign policy simply by looking at one variable - at either the FPA “internal” or the IR “external” levels of analysis - the breadth of inputs should be taken into account in assessing how any given state will elect to approach a national security interest. Put otherwise, when faced with a national security threat, an African leader must assess a variety of phenomena in deciding how to respond, and what role African IOs should or should not play. These facets include: how the threat impacts his or her own personal interests (#2a, #2b, #2c); the extent to which the threat bears upon the state’s national security interests (#3); how much pushback he or she might encounter from domestic institutions (#4, #5) or non-statist transnational ones (#11). Thereafter, he must assess the external environment, including how much latitude he has vis-à-vis his neighbors and other continental actors at regional (#6a) and pan-African (#6b and #9) levels of analysis, including what pre-existing commitments - either formal security related (#7), identity-driven (#8), or within the context of globe international law (#10) - might impede the pursuit of his interests. Put otherwise, as the epicenter of the foreign policymaking process, African foreign policymakers (typically leaders, their cabinets, and sometimes ministries and/or defense establishments) rationally consider how both domestic and international landscapes in which they are situated bear upon their capacities to pursue foreign and security policies of their interests. Employing intellectual approaches that exclude some of these variables while prioritizing others misses the larger picture.
Thus, as we conclude this chapter, it should be emphasized that the approach taken in this dissertation of an integrated levels of analysis approach to African foreign is one that has been advocated before by other scholars. As Moravsick (1993, 6) notes, isolating just one level of analysis has its inherent shortcomings since “only a limited set of real world problems in international relations lend themselves to this sort of analysis.” More specifically, this tendency to seek to integrate various levels of analysis into understandings of international relations and foreign policymaking finds its genesis most broadly in the field of foreign policy analysis. One of the founders of the study of FPA, particularly the school of comparative foreign policy analysis, James Rosneau advocated approaching any policy choice from various levels of analysis. Smith et al. (2012) have detailed Rosneau’s call for the need to “provide a robust integrated analysis at several levels of analysis – from individual leaders to the international system – in understanding foreign policy” and his belief that “the best explanations would be multilevel and multi-causal, integrating information from a variety of social science knowledge systems.” During the same era as Rosneau, David Singer’s noted 1961 work further emphasized how, as Steven Smith puts it, “focusing on a certain level of analysis imposes a bias on the data and in this way evidence is theory dependent” (Singer 1961, Smith 1986).16

16 Since the early years of the establishment of the comparative foreign policy research agenda, various other authors have used integrated levels of analysis artfully in their work. Most notable was Graham Allison’s study of the Cuban Missile Crisis through the lenses of three levels of analysis, while Robert Putnam, Andrew Moravsick, and others have written on the utility of the “two-level game” of integrating domestic and international politics into explanations of international outcomes. Moravsick (1993, 6) argues that: “empirical studies formulated on a single level of analysis, international or domestic, are increasingly being supplanted by efforts to integrate the two.” Rooted in their historical antecedents, contemporary scholars of FPA continue to synthesize actions at various levels of international society and thus it is perhaps unsurprising that FPA in the post-Cold War retains, as Valerie Hudson (2012, 31) puts it, “a commitment to pursue multi-causal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis” (see: Smith et al. 2012; Hudson 2014; Neack 2014; Warner 2016a).
In short, given the breadth of inputs that bear upon how states think about the strategic utility of African IOs – elucidated more completely in theory chapter 3 – the imperative nature of the project of an integrated levels of analysis approach should become clear. Rather than assuming that the isolation of one level of analysis is sufficient to understand foreign policy outputs, the breadth of inputs should be systematically addressed. And, while this chapter has forwarded the “what” of the question at hand (foreign policy), the next chapter details the “where” (African international organizations).
The previous chapter articulated the ways in which the broader intellectual domains of the study of African international relations and foreign policymaking have developed, and the current states of debates within each field. The present chapter moves us even closer to our terrain of inquiry: African international organizations. In the main, this chapter has three principal components. The first component is an overview of African international organizations writ large. First, it presents the notion of “international organizations,” describes how they have been thought about differentially by scholars of international politics, and offers some broad themes about African IOs in general. The second section offers the institutional histories of the four African IOs under study: the OAU and its transition to the African Union at the pan-African level, and ECOWAS and IGAD at the subregional levels. It articulates how these IOs emerged and how their institutional mandates have evolved, especially in relation to security. The third section lays forth four assumptions about how African states think about the differing strategic utilities of these organizations as concerns their pursuits of individual national security interests.

**Defining International Organizations**

At its core, this work is an interrogation of the ways that African states think strategically about the role of African IOs in the context of their pursuit of national security interests. What precisely is an international organization? When referring to
international organizations, we will employ the definition provided by Nau (2009, 39), which states that international organizations are:

Set up by national governments in part to retain or assert control over transnational activities, and other interdependencies spawned by forces of change. Governments charge these institutions to serve their common interests, defined as areas where their national interests overlap...In some cases, these institutions make decisions and can undertake activities that compromise national interests or supersede them by defining and implementing broader global interests. To the extent that they are not completely under the control of national governments, they become quasi-independent actors in the international system.

Since the close of World War II, international organizations have proliferated not only at the global level, but also, throughout regions. Examples of global international organizations at the global level include the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the International Criminal Court (ICC) among others.Regionally, some of the most important IOs the aforementioned Organization of American States (OAS), The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Arab League (AL), the European Union (EU), and most germane for our purposes, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU). These organizations each have varying mandates spanning economic integration, the assurance of collective security, the promotion of democratization, and the fostering of improved relations between states. Moving closer to our topic at hand: what then is the role that IOs can play in the promotion of security, both collective and national, in an African context? The following gives a brief overview of the predominant variants of thinking of the possibilities and limits of IOs in the pursuit of national security. Scholars from the three predominant schools of IR theory have inherently different outlooks on this question.
First, (and intuitively) so-called (neo-)liberal institutionalists are eponymously committed to the notion that international organizations (and institutions) are ideal vehicles by which to promote collective state interests, not least the pursuit of security. Derived from post-World War II notions of Wilsonian "idealism" within international relations theory – preceded by Kantian notions of the "perpetual peace" (Kant 1795; Oneal and Russett 2001) – Doyle (1983) and Keohane (1984) are generally credited with the contemporary revival of neo-liberal institutionalist scholarship, showing how international institutions "provide a way to overcome problems of collective action, high transaction costs, and information deficiencies of asymmetries" (Martin and Simmons, 2001, 446).

In the briefest of summaries, neo-liberal institutionalists tend to understand IOs as being useful for the promotion of security both for the collective, and for the individual. Martin and Keohane (1995, 45) have made forceful claims for international institutions' abilities to compel cooperation via the provisions of coordination mechanisms, and Simmons and Martin (1998) have noted that, "by the mid-1980s explanations of international regimes became intertwined with explanations of international cooperation more generally." Moreover, the notion exists that while IOs can indeed work for the collective, these need not preclude their abilities to help individual states pursue their own interests: rather than security gains as being pursued only relative to the loss of others, the notion of absolute security gains

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1 It is important to make clear the distinction between an “international organization” and “international institution.” Whereas IOs contain a physical building, budget, and staff, international institutions are less tangible and are simply formal or informal agreements, or simply “sets of rules that govern international behavior” (Simmons and Martin 2008, 194). As Keohane has noted, “international organizations” are thus rightly considered a subcategory of the larger heading of “international institutions.”

2 Debates exist on whether IOs are independent actors or whether their actions are simply the sum of state interests (Coleman 2007, 59).
pervades many most neo-liberal institutionalists’ understandings of IOs' role in security provision.

Second, and conversely, neo-realists (and their sundry variants) are pessimistic about the ability of international organizations and institutions to serve as catalysts for genuine collective cooperation. Rather than serving as an effective means by which to help smaller and larger states pursue collective aims, international organizations and international institutions instead simply serve as new fora in which states pursue whatever goals remain in their national interests. Thus, in most neo-realists eyes, IOs may help promote collective security, but only when doing so in the interests of the IOs’ most powerful members.

No shortage of neo-realist skepticism exists regarding IOs' abilities to help states transcend traditional realpolitik interests. As the archetypal neo-realist, Mearsheimer (1994, 13) has elucidated the "false promises of international institutions," insisting that rather than promoting collective action, institutions are simply epiphenomenal and instead, "largely mirror the distribution of power in the system." Thucydidically, strong states pursue their interests in IOs and the weak suffer what they must. Moreover, to the extent that IOs simply serve as another playing field in which to carry out politics, Mearsheimer (1994) has argued that institutions “matter only in the margins” and “have minimal influence on state behavior.” Various other conceptions explaining why looking at IOs only for the pursuit of collective outcomes is misguided abound. For her part, Coleman (2007, 54) notes, “though international organizations are presumed to transcend the biased perspectives of individual member states through the aggregation…the pursuit of the narrow domestic interest is far from impossible.” And as Michael Walzer (in Coleman 2007, 54) notes “states don’t lose
their particularist character merely by acting together.” Taking a similar realpolitik approach to institutions, Stone (2011) has suggested that institutions are "equilibria outcomes" where the wishes of the strong — pursued via informal norms — are reconciled with the wishes of the weak — via invocation of formal rules.⁵

Third, constructivists by and large have only had marginal insights into international organizations' functions as relates to the nature of their ability to help states pursue national security interests. At the most macroscopic, Wendt (1999) has offered the foundational discussion on just how the notion of "anarchy" can be "filled" with varying meanings according to how one sees Oneself in relation to the Other: in Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian means, which transitively extends to IOs. For his part, and underlining the plasticity of IOs' conceptions to states, Johnston (2001) has considered international institutions as social environments that have the ability to change actors' preferences via persuasion, social influence, and reputational costs, thereby inducing cooperation, and therefore theoretically altering states' approaches to national or collective security. In short, in the vein of constructivism, IOs meanings, and importance to states' pursuits of national security interests are socially derived, mutually constitutive, and full of contingencies. Thus, constructivist insights lead to the recognition of the profound mutability of just how, why, and under what conditions states might find strategic utility in the context of IOs.

Facets of IOs in Africa

⁵ Others critiques of the benefits of IOs include those who have written about the pathologies of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 1999); why IOs fail and why they might have adverse effects on management (Gallarotti 1991); and why international institutions do not actually promote socialization in the way that constructivists predict (Shannon 2009).
Having laid out just what we mean in referring to IOs, we now turn to an investigation of African IOs. Prior to the delving directly into the histories of such IOs, we should review a few foundational aspects of African IOs more broadly.

**African IOs Facet #1: IOs Proliferate at the Pan-African and Sub-Regional Levels**

Perhaps the most fundamentally important recognition about IOs in Africa is that states within the continent are faced with the unique situation of belonging to *two* sets of IOs: those that the Pan-African level (the African Union), and the those at the sub-regional level (RECs). In no other world region do states belong to two subs-divided IOs in this fashion, particularly, with the expectation that these two sets of IOs rely on one another for their own operational survival.

At the top of this schematic is the pan-African African Union. Composed of 54 members (all of Africa except Morocco)⁴ the African Union is the preeminent African IO, given its long history (from 1963, as the Organization of African Unity), its ideological resonance as the institutional embodiment of Pan-Africanism, and its inclusion of all African states. At the sub-regional level, IOs with varying purposes proliferate. (For a comprehensive list of African IOs, see Appendix D). However, it should be broadly noted that there are two general sub-categories of sub-regional African IOs: regional economic communities (RECs) and other IOs that do not meet the criteria to be called RECs. This distinction of what entails a “REC” is one that has been bequeathed – ironically – by the African Union, and signals the relative “strength” of a given IO. The African Union has given eight African IOs the

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⁴ Morocco left the AU in 1984, because it claims the territory of Western Sahara as its own, which the (O)AU denies.
distinction of being “RECs,” as per Figure 2.1, many of which share members, as per Figure 2.2.

**Figure 2.1**
Officially Designated Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU (African Union)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>853,520,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA (Common Market for East and Southern Africa)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>406,102,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC (East African Community)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>124,858,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>121,245,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>300,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>187,969,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC (Southern African Development Community)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>233,944,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMA (Arab Maghreb Union)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>491,276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2.2**
African States’ Memberships in RECs
Indeed, one of the distinguishing features about African security is the extent to which security outcomes are embedded in a series of overlapping institutions, or what Franke (2008) calls Africa’s “multilayered security communities.” In short, IOs’ security mechanisms are located within the context of – not parallel to – similar mechanisms at the continental level. Based on the principles of subsidiarity, the assumed modo operandi of the contemporary African security landscape is that the African Union and the regional communities co-share the burdens of the provision of peace and security on the continent. Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa has set up a Russian-doll style collective security arrangement, with “regional security-management complexes nested within the context of a larger, aspiring continental security complex” (Keller 1997, 298). Moreover, the overlapping nature of states’ memberships in various IOs can lead to a sense of indeterminacy about the exact role of any REC to any one state. Indeed, while multiple memberships might be perceived as offering a greater diversity of protections, belonging to multiple IOs could also suggest that a state has no “true” allies, and thus might ironically ultimately need to fend for itself, despite its deep embeddedness within multiple institutional contexts.5

African IOs Facet #2: A Unique Vision of Collective Security

Another uniqueness of African IOs is that their understanding of what constitutes the notion of collective security is drastically different than the ways that

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5 This can create complexity in foreign policy decisionmaking for states with membership in multiple main RECs, such as Uganda, which is cited as being part of Central Africa, Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa (Buzan and Waever 2003, 232), and Mali, which has been labeled as being located “in the Sahel-Saharan region, at the crossroads of the Western, Northern, and Central sub-regions of Africa” (Esmenjaud 2014a, 174). Moreover, even in the context of officially delineated regional categorizations, some states cross boundaries. Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Tanzania, for instance, are members in both SADCBIRG and EASBRIG (Williams 2011, 163).
the notion is understood outside of the continent. In a good working definition, Russett et al. (2010) define collective security as "an arrangement in which all members of the international community agree to oppose together a threat to the security of any one of them. Yet, in the African context, just what does “African collective security” mean?\footnote{Esmenjaud (2014a, 176) has highlighted one of the conceptual dilemmas of defining precisely what “African collective security” actually is in asking: “Should it protect Africa against “neo-imperialist powers?” Should it be used as a peacekeeping tool in case of conflicts between African states? Or should it participate in the total liberation of Africa?”}

Collective security in Africa might be thought of as a “negative” collective security: rather than thinking about collective security as balancing against a threat external to the community, instead African collective security as embedded within IOs tends to focus on the threats posed by the IOs’ own weakest members. In short, African IOs’ visions of collective security focuses on protecting members from other members’ tendencies of weakness instead of focusing on the threats posed by non-members’ capabilities of power.\footnote{To the extent that African collective security in IOs extends beyond military threats to more “human security” focused interests, (Maru 2014b, 5) underlines this phenomenon in contrasting the AU’s collective security arrangement to that of NATO. While NATO’s vision of collective security is narrowly defined to military threats and international crisis situations, the African Union’s understanding of collective security is far more wide-ranging, encompassing aspects of governance and economic development, in addition to more traditional military and non-military security threats} And yet, even if African states’ perceptions of threats to collective security is somewhat unique, just when and why states elect to address these threats in IOs can be shown to follow patterns similar to other international organizations: that is, states will work to address collective security threats in IOs when it is in their own national interest to do so. As IS42 (2015) has articulated

When it comes to actual [AU] deployments, the necessity of the movement into the situation still comes down to what countries have an interest to want to become involved. Therefore, there is still a realist element involved in all African collective security initiatives. Since most of the missions that African countries might need to be involved in are stabilization and peacekeeping, it’s very serious. It’s a very big consideration because it’s dangerous and costly. Therefore, it is only the countries that have a very big stake that will actually go in.

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6 Esmenjaud (2014a, 176) has highlighted one of the conceptual dilemmas of defining precisely what “African collective security” actually is in asking: “Should it protect Africa against “neo-imperialist powers?” Should it be used as a peacekeeping tool in case of conflicts between African states? Or should it participate in the total liberation of Africa?”

7 To the extent that African collective security in IOs extends beyond military threats to more “human security” focused interests, (Maru 2014b, 5) underlines this phenomenon in contrasting the AU’s collective security arrangement to that of NATO. While NATO’s vision of collective security is narrowly defined to military threats and international crisis situations, the African Union’s understanding of collective security is far more wide-ranging, encompassing aspects of governance and economic development, in addition to more traditional military and non-military security threats
Thus, one of the overriding themes of this work is that although African states do in fact conceive of what constitutes a national security interest differently than other global states, in fact, their tendencies to work to address these threats – or not – within the context of IOs are just as realist as states in any other states in the world.

**African IOs Facet #3: Personal Contacts Override Institutionalization**

Another important facet regarding the operational culture of African IOs is that when business gets done, it tends to happen not through the formalized, bureaucratic channels of IOs, but rather, through personal connections between leaders (Gandois 2009, 113; IS7/1 2014; IS7/2 2015; IS17 2015). Far from happenstance, it will be shown to be the case that in each of the four IOs under investigation, the IOs’ creators designed them such that heads of state would be the primary constructors of policy, and that IOs parliaments or secretariats would not be able to function independent of states’ interests (Gandois 2009; Woodward 2013). The tendency for African leaders to make collective regional or continental foreign and security policy decisions amongst themselves informally has been particularly emphasized in the cases of West Africa (Gandois 2009; IS71 2014; Williams and Taylor 2008; Williams and Haacke 2008), Central Africa (IS17 2015), and in the Horn (Bereketeab 2012, 176-177; IS16 2015; Woodward 2013; IS36 2015).

The downside of the lack of institutionalization in African IOs is that they tend to have a poor track record of follow-through. Without well-functioning and independent

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8 The African Union is the general exception to this rule.

9 Moreover, personal relationships guided much of the geopolitics of West African regionalism during the early post-independence years especially in the Francophone space, underwritten by the fact that many Francophone leaders were all similarly educated at the elite French grandes écoles (Gandois 2009; Helibrunn 1999, 47).
secretariats, a cadre of competent technocrats, and ideological buy-in from many states, the extent to which they can accomplish their goals remains limited. One interviewee (IS24 2015) has asserted that:

African leaders are quick to propose new initiatives, but don’t actually follow through on them. For example, there are thousands of agreements in the AU that they’re kicking around about governance, and mediation, guidelines, and the environment, but they don’t implement any of them. The implementation of things is very poor in the African Union.

Another senior diplomat has alternatively relayed that:

The institutions in Africa at the state and regional level are immature, or developing. They don’t constrain or function. Instead, the power of individual actors is quite important when we see the AU being put into action (IS9/2 2015).

While some might suggest that the institutionalization of IOs and their decision making processes should theoretically be a goal, in fact, the lack of institutionalization of African IOs (especially RECs) gives them a tremendous degree of flexibility as regards decision-making. As will be detailed further, though underfunded, ad-hoc, and piecemeal in action, RECs also nevertheless have the advantage of being nimble, flexible, and adaptable in ways that larger IOs do not. For its part, the AU is indeed notable for its increased institutionalization over the past five or so years (IS38 2015).

African IOs Facet #4: A Shift from Economic Integration to Security and Democracy Promotion

Perhaps one of the more intriguing aspects of African international organizations is that they have universally shed their varied initial mandates as primarily economic organizations and are now, in most cases, largely multi-issue organizations, which seem to be converging towards broadly similar structures and
operational paradigms, most notably, with mandates of security.\textsuperscript{10} Put otherwise, to a certain degree, RECs are the result of a sort of path-dependent phenomenon in Africa, wherein all regions are, in essence, required to have some sort of REC. While Figure 2.3 shows the different original rationales undergirding states’ decisions to join RECs, the general tendency has been an underlying “requirement of the creation of the regional economic communities that has become a characteristic of the continent” (Bereketeab 2012, 188).\textsuperscript{11}

Figure 2.3
African States’ Initial Motivations for Joining a REC

\textsuperscript{10} More curious still is the fact that the IOs have come to serve at the forefront of the resolution of most of Africa’s problems - including the promotion of collective security, human rights, and democracy - have been borne of predecessors that were largely viewed to unsuccessful at their original mandates. As Gandois (2009, 31) wonders, “why entrust a politically sensitive mandate to a failing organization?” The shifts to homogenize nearly all of Africa’s post-independence IOs to include these new mandates beyond just economic integration were universal across the continent. As Gandois (2009, 31) notes, changes came in the form of both reformed institutions (secretariats) as well as reformed norms (including thinking on the right to intervention, human rights, and democracy).

\textsuperscript{11} The causes of this convergence of African IOs around similar issues are numerous. At least one hypothesis for this convergence of organizational culture at the sub-regional and pan-African level is the need for African states to conduct their affairs in and environment of interoperability. As with Henry Ford’s invention of interchangeable car parts, the convergence of IO forms and functions in Africa is precisely the result of the two-tiered nature of the IO landscape: African states have constructed a landscape of IO interoperability, wherein all sub-regional IOs need to be able to interact with the African Union, and with each other, leading to a convergence of structures, mandates, and activities. All states need to be able to “fit” within this extant structure as it coalesces further. Yet Zartman (2000, 148) offers another cogently succinct explanation, writing that, despite the fact Africa’s IOs were not originally created for the purposes of providing collective security, “conflict reduction became a necessary precondition for carrying out their other, primary business.”
African IOs Facet #5: Created in the Aftermath of Insecurity

One common theme in the life of African IOs is that they tend to arise in the aftermaths of insecurity. As will be discussed, the OAU was created due to fear about individual state security and the collective fears around extant colonialism, while Nigeria took the lead in fomenting ECOWAS after the insecurity it faced from France after its civil war in Biafra. IGADD (later, “IGAD”) was created after the massive environmental insecurity in the Horn of Africa, while another West African institution called ANAD (discussed later) was created to quell fears over rising tensions between Mali and Burkina Faso (Gandois 2009, 121).

More specifically, others have suggested that African states have historically tended to create international organizations and institutions as anti-imperial stopgap measures in the immediate aftermath of some perceived external aggression. Esmenjaud (2014a; 2014b) has fascinatingly elucidated the ways that African states have been quick to propose new mechanisms after threatening international events, only to have such institutions collapse once fears about the initial threat have subsided. This trend began in the 1960s and continued into 1970s, as discussions of an OAU Defence Force were reinvigorated within the organization when external threats demonstrated to African leaders their need for collective action.12 French and U.S.-backed interventions into the Shaba region of then-Zaire between 1977-78 raised African leaders’ fears of African militaries being used as proxies for the

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12 Most particularly, he notes that both ordinary and extraordinary meetings of the OAU’s Defence Commission were held in the aftermath of sovereignty-undermining occurrences from colonial powers, such as the Portuguese coup attempts against Guinea’s President Sékou Touré in 1969 and another instance of Portuguese aggression against Guinea-Bissau in 1974. In the aftermath of the first of these, the OAU’s Defence Commission convened in Addis Ababa to consider the inauguration of a wide-ranging Inter-African Defense System. The second instance of aggression was followed by the convening of the Defence Commission and the suggestion of the creation of an office of OAU military advisors (Esmenjaud 2014a, 175).
accomplishment of U.S. goals on the continent. More pressingly, a 1978 Franco-
African Summit – held in Paris, between France and some of its former colonies –
forwarded the notion of the development of a Franco-African intervention capability
on the continent, thus from the outside, implicitly inviting France to share in an even
greater role on the continent.\textsuperscript{13} So too was the reinvigoration of a Pan-African Defence
in the 1990s catalyzed by external events.\textsuperscript{14} This trend for African institutions to be
created after insecurity has been seen more contemporarily in the creation of the
African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC, discussed later)
which was made in response to the failures of the African Union to act in Mali in 2013,
and which was created in a moment of “humiliation,” in “a rather hasty and
emotionally-driven decision, taken without duly considering the many challenges
ahead” (Esmenjaud 2014a, 175). The implications of the creation of African IOs in the
aftermath of security has been that the initial conditions of fear that often lead to the
creation of IOs are a poor basis for the IOs’ long-term success.

African IOs Facet #6: The Troubled Notion of “Subsidiarity” in AU-REC

Relations

A final facet about African IOs that bears mentioning relates to the question of
subsidiarity between the AU and the RECs. In essence, though the AU has repeatedly
asserted its dominance over the RECs (especially as concerns issues of peace and

\textsuperscript{13} Esmenjaud claims that these dual events provoked “provoked an inflamed debate” at the OAU
summit in July 1978 about the renewed need for a Pan-African Defence Force, an idea that was later
officially endorsed by African heads of state at a July 1979 meeting in Monrovia, Liberia (Esmenjaud
2014a, 175-176).

\textsuperscript{14} During this period, both France and the US forwarded suggestions for crisis management initiatives:
the French plan was called “Recamp” and the US’ was named “The US African Crisis Response
Initiative.” After the suggestion of these, the Central Organ of the OAU convened and asserted its
leadership and sovereignty over the creation of such an effort.
security) in numerous documents that have been signed by members (AU 2002; AU 2003a; AU 2003b; AU 2008; Independent Panel of Experts 2013) in practice, the RECs often ignore or simply do not respect their theoretically subsidiary position (Ancas 2011; Ancas and Akokpari 2013; IS1/1 and IS2/1 2014; Maru 2014; IS24 2015; IS38 2015; CFR/ISS Conference 2014; IS16 2015; Williams 2014, 156; IS40 2014). Some have noted that despite the explicit agreements, actual peace and security decisions between the two are “completely ad hoc” (IS1/1 201; IS2/1 2014) and that “there is always a sort of competition…not amongst the regions, but between the regions and the AU. Each one wants to claim responsibility for the peace operations…the problem of subsidiarity is not really understood at the same level across the continent” (IS40 2014). A discussion by Engel and Portno (2014, 137-138) is worth sharing at length in this regard:

Indeed, the [African Union’s Peace and Security Council Protocol] points to a continental architecture not only in scope but more importantly to the inclusion of the RECs…as constituent parts in a relationship that is statutorily hierarchical, but in practice less so, where the PSC, AUC chairperson, and also the chief executives of the RECs and RMs are supposed to play a crucial role. These relations are often difficult and strained, based on different perspectives and interests as regards the situations on the ground, perceptions of the prime legitimacy as to intervention in Africa’s sub-regions, previous relations at chief executive levels, different degrees of institutionalization of the…RECs, and variations in political will of respective member states to develop this agenda further.

These somewhat undefined relations between the two sets of African IOs are indeed at the heart of some of our guiding questions related to states’ perceptions of the strategic utility of IOs. With a few general trends about how African IOs function, we now turn to (very brief) historical overviews of the IOs in question.

The Organization of African Unity (1963-2001)
Founding a Pan-African International Organization (1958 to 1963)

As it became clear that European colonialism in Africa was ending in the aftermath of World War II, African leaders rightly understood there to be no alternative form to political organization than the sovereign state. The lack of alternatives, combined with pressure from the USSR and the United States\(^\text{15}\) and the vision by other “Third World” leaders who viewed the state as “the very essence of modernity” ushered along former ethnic kingdoms-cum-colonies into the global system of states (Herbst 2000, 100; Bates 2009, 58).

Having accepted the state form in theory, leaders were then left to decide just what new African sovereignties would look like: by and large Africa leaders were in broad agreement that they would retain the boundaries established by the colonial powers. While not all pre-sovereignties accepted colonially demarcated borders – the Somali Republic being the prime example – in general, these borders were inherited with minimal resistance, as they afforded new leaders the much coveted windfall of internationally recognized juridical sovereignty. Thus, African states collectively agreed to retain colonially drawn borders,\(^\text{16}\) despite the inherent drawbacks of so doing.\(^\text{17}\)

But the new territories over which these leaders now claimed dominion were in almost all cases larger than the central government could realistically control. Thus

\(^{15}\) Bates (2009, 58) notes that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. were eager to see the dismantling of former European empires in Africa, and thus implicitly encouraged the genesis of the attendant African state. For the U.S., the impetus was the weakening of European capitalist competitors, and for the U.S.S.R., such a sea change facilitated the international spread of Communist ideals.

\(^{16}\) There were of course many African states that did not initially agree to unequivocal acceptance of colonially drawn borders. The starkest examples are Somalia, Togo, Ghana and Morocco (Touval 1972).

\(^{17}\) Consequently, by their mutual agreement to preserve colonially drawn borders, African leaders inherited massive tracts of land in countries like Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Sudan, and Chad, which, as Collier (2007, 57) states bluntly, were so large that they “should never have become countries.”
Jackson (1990, 27) has described (somewhat contentiously) that what ultimately arose in Africa during the early postcolonial period were “quasi-states”: entities which were recognized as legally sovereign by the *external* international community, but which lacked effective *internal* control. In short, because each state needed others to support its right to exist – and vice-versa – an early culture of amity, not enmity, arose in the conduct of African international relations. As Jackson and Rosberg (1982, 18-19) describe, African nations were forced to become dependent on the “external” system of African states in order to, “be assured of the recognition and respect for their sovereignty by neighboring states, as well as any other states in a position to undermine their control.” Indeed, given that they were created juridically, almost no African state could actually exert empirical sovereignty over the entirety of its territory. Instead, all had to collaborate together to ensure that none would breach the sovereignty of the others. This was to be accomplished through the creation of IOs.

Given the collective need for a supportive environment, attempts at the institutionalization of friendship and unity came to the fore almost immediately. As early as 1960, Nigeria’s first president, Nnamdi Azikiwe was already stating that:

> It is my belief that an African Leviathan must emerge ultimately: it may be in the form of an association of African states or in the form of a concert of African states; but my main point is that so long as the form of government is clearly understood and an efficient machinery for organization and administration is devised…to safeguard their existence by collective security…the dream of Pan-Africanism is destined to come true (in Mezu 1965, 44).

As two of Africa’s first independent states, Ghana (which gained independence in 1957) and Guinea (which gained independence in 1958) immediately formed a union; later, in 1960, Mali would join in the formation of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union. The purpose of this organization, which was also known briefly as the Union of African
States, was the creation of a common economic policy and unified form of diplomatic representation for the three states. Though this regional union would ultimately fail, it nevertheless served as the precursor to the Organization of African Unity, whose creation would dominate continental conversations for the next several years (Foltz 1983; Mezu 1965).

To this end, two competing groups came to the fore of African international relations, characterized in large part by their degree of unity with the former colonial powers. The more conservative of the two was the Brazzaville group, a collection of twelve former French colonies that first met in October 1960 in Cote d’Ivoire at the convening of Felix Houphet-Boigny. Among other goals, the Brazzaville group sought to maintain close links with the French metropole, which was concurrently courting closer ties with them, as well as to oppose the entrance of Communism into the African continent. Most importantly, the group believed that the future of African unity was necessarily defined by economic—not political—cooperation (Makinda and Okumu 2008; Foltz 1983).

The second and more radical group was the Casablanca group, which first met in 1961 at the invitation of Morocco. In opposition to the Brazzaville group, this coalition of states—which included Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Egypt and the Algerian provisional government—was explicit in its aversion to maintaining links with colonial administrations and held as one of its goals to “alter…the international status quo.” It was during the meeting of this second group that leaders’ apprehensions about the protection of their sovereignty most acutely came to the fore, particularly when Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, one of the most vocal supporters of a deeply integrationist (and thus radical) Pan-African project, advocated for a tight-knit political union,
which would see the relinquishment of individual state sovereignty to a federal African government akin to the U.S.A or U.S.S.R. Thereafter, Nkrumah envisioned a meeting of African heads of state that would draw up a constitution for the new union government, which would formulate, amongst other things, a united African foreign policy, defense policy, economic policy, and the creation of a single African citizenship. Because of his insistence on the handover of sovereignty to a supra-national government, Nkrumah won few supporters. At this juncture, it is worth noting that the Brazzaville and Casablanca groups largely represented the “left” and “right” wing elements of the continent respectively; what was left was to “capture the center,” or the states that remained unaligned on the path to the creation of a union government (Mezu 1965; Foltz 1983).

But the recognition of the benefits that a truly united African international front could provide led certain of these non-aligned states – like Nigeria, Togo and Liberia – to call a conference in Monrovia in May 1961 with the purpose of solidifying the blueprint for a continental organization. At this meeting, all independent African states sent representatives, except for the Casablanca five, the Sudanese government, which deferred its representation to Egypt and Morocco, and the competing Zairian governments of Stanleyville and Leopoldville, which the organizers judiciously decided not to invite. Though the meeting – and its subsequent iteration in Lagos the following year – have been described by some as having limited successes, the meeting’s primary accomplishment was the consensus of attendees for the need to create a pan-African organization, which, at its center, was intended to protect state sovereignty (Mezu 1965; Foltz 1983). The final document produced by the conference endorsed five principles, which would later serve as the basis for the OAU Charter. They included:
1. Absolute equality and sovereignty of African states
2. The right of each African state to exist and not to be annexed by another
3. Voluntary union of one state with another
4. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of African states
5. No state to harbor dissidents from another state

Best articulating the Monrovia group's outlook on integration was its sixth principle, which stated that “the unity that is aimed to be achieved at the moment is not the political integration of sovereign African states, but unity of aspirations and action considered from the point of view of African social solidarity and political identity.”

With a middle-of-the-road solution in hand, on May 25, 1963, in a meeting that has been called the “modern, post-colonial version of the Berlin Conference” (Selassie 1988, 61), African leaders cemented the friendship they needed for the endurance of their states by creating the Organization of African Unity. Outwardly decrying their mutual experiences of colonialism and promoting an ethos of Pan-African unity, internally, the OAU’s more important purpose was to protect borders via the assurance of interstate peace. To this end, the OAU’s Charter melded the dictates of non-intervention, non-interference, and a respect for state sovereignty with an emancipatory pro-African, anti-colonial rhetoric. A reference to the OAU’s Charter (OAU 1963) highlights the expedient marriage of the two concepts, in calling for:

1. The promotion of the unity and solidarity of African states;
2. The coordination and intensification of their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
3. The defense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African countries;
4. The eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa.

Given its deep roots in the Monrovia Declaration, it was unsurprising that the 1963 emergence of the Organization of African Unity had, at its center, the protection of state sovereignty. In the OAU’s Founding Charter, described by Foltz (1983) as “a
most conservative document,” the new organization’s thirty-one members enshrined in Article III the seven primary points for which the coalition was founded. These included the support of:

[The sovereign equality of all member states; non-interference into the internal affairs of member states; respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state; the peaceful settlement of disputes; unreserved condemnation of political assassination and subversive activities on the part of neighboring states; dedication to the emancipation of all African territories; and affirmation of the policy of non-alignment (OAU Charter 1963).

In short, the creation of the OAU and the installation of the principles of non-interference in the OAU Charter were intended to create a supportive intra-African system that would oblige all leaders to work for the protection of their neighbors’ right to exist. And though over the next several years, alternatives to the organization emerged for brief moments,\(^{18}\) none ever eventually held. Indeed, as Azikiwe had predicted, the OAU arguably became the continent’s very own “African Leviathan.”


But what effects did the OAU’s incredibly high degree of protection on state sovereignty have for the domestic and international politics of African states? The following sections outline the ways in which the specific sovereignty regime

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\(^{18}\) For a brief moment following the creation of the OAU, a rival organization emerged up to challenge its authority. In 1965, a new Joint African and Malagasy Organization – L’Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM) - was formed by the Francophone African states in response to what they viewed as the failures of the OAU. In Noukchoatt, Mauritania, on February 12, 1965 – thirteen French states along with Madagascar – formed the union so as to rectify what it deemed as other African states’ non-respect for the OAU Charter’s dictates. Specifically, the grouping held the belief that respect for sovereignty was an imperative and that the attempts at secession in Congo as well as the increasing countervailing forces on opposing side of the Cold War divide signaled “a permanent danger for the OAU’s existence and African countries’ independence.” However, the conference’s outcome indicated the member states agreed not to attend the upcoming OAU Summit in Accra, Ghana in protest of its perceived inefficiency. All did not agree however; on July 17, 1965, the President of Mauritania, Ould Daddah withdrew his country form membership of OCAM, given that he did want to be part of an organization that might undermine the OAU’s authority or otherwise derail its goals.
constructed by African leaders within the OAU impacted various facets of African foreign policymaking and other life, including: the preservation of overly-large, empirically insufficient states; the negative impacts on state-civil society relations; the difficulties of intervention and its effects on later iterations of the Pan-African organization; and the theoretical contradictions between African sovereignty global anarchy.

In short, the immediate dilemma created by the OAU was that African states did not actually view the organization as an entity to which they would ultimately cede sovereignty in the ways suggested by Kwame Nkrumah. Rather, leaders made a tacit agreement amongst themselves – as per the previous discussion of the Monrovia Declaration – that the OAU was to be employed instrumentally as Azikiwe’s African Leviathan to ensure that the intra-African order did not collapse; it was not an organization that they would allow to constrain their domestic or international actions. Showing fealty to the OAU meant venerating the principles of sovereignty protection, and thus ironically, fidelity to the supranational organization gave leaders more, not less, domestic policy-making elbowroom.\(^\text{19}\) Without delay, state membership in the OAU was recognized as a rhetorical commitment to collective African unity with a practical implication of sovereign solitude.

If states were not to render their sovereignty to the OAU in practical ways, they did, however, agree to a rhetorical normative commitment to pool sovereignty as a counter-hegemonic weight to oppose what they perceived as global and colonial

\(^{19}\) Discursive analyses of postcolonial leaders show this doublespeak to be widespread. As one of the most archetypal authoritarian personalities of postcolonial Africa, Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko frequently invoked his commitment to the OAU and its anti-colonial orientation while concurrently making it clear that, as he was the physical manifestation of the Zairian state, a relinquishment of sovereignty to any supranational organization was out of the question (Mobutu 1970, 50-54).
injustices. From the inception of the organization, it was ideologically oriented towards the emancipation of the “Third World” in general, and Africa’s extant White-rulled colonies in specific.\(^20\)

More acutely, early in the history of the OAU, African states used it as a focal point to collectively militate for the ridding of colonialism on the continent. Signatories to the OAU Charter thus bound themselves to the emancipation of colonially occupied territories, and in so doing, formed the Dar es Salaam-based Liberation Committee, responsible for maintaining contact with all of the continent’s independence movements. Concurrently, the Lusaka Manifesto put forth the OAU’s unofficial stance on African liberation, rejecting ‘reverse racialism’ and advocating the overthrow of White led regimes on the continent. Thus, to the extent that colonialism posed a national security threat to each individual state, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere warned, “No African state is secure in its independence, and no African can rest secure in his own status as a free citizen of the world while any Africans are held in colonial subjugation” (Clapham 2005, 111-113; Foltz 1983, 8).

If the collective action undertaken by the OAU was at the heart of the eventual ridding of colonialism on the continent, then its members’ collective inaction stood as the core cause for some of the most massive abuses of human rights and perpetrations of mass murder on the continent. As a result of the OAU’s ethos of "collective security as non-intervention," throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the African international

\(^{20}\) On the global scale, drawing inspiration from the post-World War II nonaligned movement – whose non-Sub-Saharan African participants included Egypt’s Gamal Nasser and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru – the OAU declared itself committed to the emergence of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which would set right the plethora of economic injustices perpetrated by the Global North. The founding of the Group of 77 as well as the African bloc in the United Nations put forward to the international community an outwardly unified African politic and a refusal to be drawn into either side of the bifurcated Cold War world order, at least in spirit (Foltz 1983; Spiegel et al. 2009, 29).
community stood idly by as leaders of new governments, ready to seek the rents of newfound sovereignty — what Bates (2008) calls "specialists in violence" — decimated populations for their own personal or statist interests. On one hand, the OAU frequently remained inert as states brutally repressed secessionist movements in regions like Katanga in Zaire (1967), Biafra in Nigeria (1967-1970), Casamance in Senegal (1960-today); and numerous irredentist movements in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.

Beyond just the non-acceptance of secessionist movements, the OAU was also rendered inert when state leaders enacted violence against their own populations for personal reasons of enrichment, power consolidation, or simply political or personal retribution. Thus, the OAU and the broader intra-African community were forced to bear silent witness when state leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Idi Amin of Uganda, Moussa Traouré of Mali, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan ravaged their populations of wealth, security and representative governance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this non-critical tendency of the OAU would come to serve as a primary guidepost for member states’ understanding of its strategic utility to them, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Yet, despite the fact that the OAU ended up promoting a deeply conservative vision of security, along the way, it did attempt to create numerous “genuine” attempts at collective security. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, various proposals emerged advocating the creation of a continental intervention force, such as Ghana’s calls for an African High Command (1963-1964), Sierra Leone’s call for an African Defense Organization (1965), Nigeria’s calls for an African Defense System (1970), or
proposals for an OAU Defense Force. While these early efforts at the establishment of a joint pan-African defense force gained little traction in the 1960s, they gained a renewed sense of purpose with Portugal’s invasion of Guinea in November 1970. Despite much discussion, however, none ultimately materialized (Esmenjaud 2014a; Esmenjaud 2014b; Nweke 1987).

Apart from plans for a joint military command, other would-be mechanisms for the OAU vision of collective security were dead before inception. This was especially true of the OAU’s paper tiger mediation dispute mechanism, the "Commission for Mediation, Arbitration, and Conciliation," (CMAC) which, as its name suggested, was intended to serve as the mediation arm of the OAU when disputes arose amongst Africa's new states. Ultimately, mediation efforts in the OAU came to be a highly ad hoc affair, and thus as Zartman (2000, 148) assesses:

There is no need to spend any time on the major African committee envisaged to reduce conflicts amongst states [CMAC]…Created by the OAU Charter, it never came into existence, since it conflicted with the rapidly-established characterizes of inter-African relations as the domain of heads of state.

Finally, before proceeding, it should also be made clear, that despite the proliferation of work in Africanist IR claiming a deeply peaceful state of relations amongst African states underwritten by the OAU’s ethos of nonintervention. In reality, the notion of African respect for non-intervention has been far less sacrosanct than has often been assumed. First, states leveraged rhetoric in line with the OAU’s normative underpinnings regarding international relations, even when they sought to undermine them. As a first example, as Haggis (2009) notes that when Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere sent his troops to Uganda in early 1979, it was under the pretext that Uganda had previously invaded in Tanzania. Thus, the breaking of norms of nonintervention
was undertaken with a rationale of self-defense, which was part and parcel of the new normative framework established by African leaders during this period. Second, Haggis underlines the fact that even when leaders did not have justifications such as self-defense to undergird their breaking of norms of non-intervention, they simply undertook sovereignty-non-respecting actions clandestinely, thus such norms were not nearly as revered as has been portrayed. Third, and running contrary to the conventional wisdom on African international relations, there were indeed leaders who were openly opposed to the norm of non-intervention. These included Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia, and Kenneth Kuanda of Zambia. Interestingly, as Haggis (2009, 69) notes, in an uncharacteristically liberal speech at the OAU, Nyerere openly criticized African leaders (tactically targeting Idi Amin specifically) for their adherence to the norm of non-intervention, saying:

> It is not surprising… that the whole of Africa cries out against the atrocities of the colonial and racist states. Individually as Africans, and through the OAU, we condemn the murderous acts of these regimes on every possible occasion and in every possible forum… But when massacres, oppression and torture are used against Africans in the independent states of Africa, there is no protest anywhere in Africa. There is silence even when such crimes are perpetrated by or with the connivance of African governments and the leaders of African states…the OAU never makes any protest or criticism at all. It is always silent… For on such matters the OAU acts like a trade union of the current Heads of State and Government, with solidarity reflected in silence if not in open support for each other... The reasons given by African leaders for their silence about these things is the non-interference clause in the OAU Charter... But why is it good for States to condemn apartheid and bad for them to condemn massacres, which are committed by independent African governments (quoted in Haggis, 2009, 62).


21 It is perhaps interesting that one of the three African leaders that was not openly worried about intervention (and thus reformation of state borders) was the president of Gambia, whose country is fully circumscribed within the bounds of Senegal.
While the 1960s and 1970s were unquestionably a dark period for the OAU, the 1980s and 1990s showed that while not taking any great leaps forward, the organization was nevertheless at least beginning to recognize the insufficiencies of the sovereignty regime that the OAU upheld. Institutionally, during the 1980s and 1990s, the OAU began to take steps to improve its own responses to collective security. Twice between 1980 and 1982, the OAU launched its first interventions into a member state in the case of Chad’s civil war. Both initiatives were widely viewed as having been failures, and led to a continued reluctance of the OAU to become involved in member states’ internal affairs (May and Massey 1998). This OAU tendency to remain on the sidelines as concerned security remained until 1993, when it created OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention (OAU 1993) which was its first collective security institution, and which would later serve as the basis of a more robust African Union.

Germanely, the end of the Cold War also impacted the functioning of the OAU in important ways. On one hand, it has been argued that the end of the Cold War created a security vacuum, with the Soviet Union pulling out of Africa out of necessity and the U.S. pulling out in the face of triumph. However, this U.S. retrenchment would be short-lived: as the new global hegemon, the US felt compelled to react in Somalia in 1992/1993 – a failure – and then remained inert in the face of the 1994 Rwandan genocide - also a failed move. Faced with this Catch-22 of needing to show global leadership but being aware of its limited capacity to effectuate much on-the-ground change, the U.S. and its global partners thus began to encourage the creation of African rapid reaction forces, the embodiment of the emerging ethos of “African solutions to African problems.” The two ultimately failed forces that came to be proposed were the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) in 1996 and its offspring,
the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1998. For its part, France proposed a similarly ill-fated African standby force called the Rénforcement de Capacités African de Maintien de Paix (RECAMP). None ever made it much beyond the planning phases (Berman and Sams 1998; Aning 2001; Franke 2008).

Importantly, these Western proposals served as catalysts for the OAU to take its own efforts at the creation of collective security initiatives more seriously. Indeed, many at both the OAU (and in sub-regional organizations, especially ECOWAS) were angered by Western efforts to engender a pan-African military force. Not only did such externally-imposed schemes to promote African security smack of long-derided neo-imperialism to African states, they also seemingly ignored African states’ own efforts at the promotion of collective security, not only in the form of the 1993 Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (OAU 1995), but also, the 1980-1982 Chad interventions and 1990 ECOMOG intervention in Liberia.22 Thus, in light of its pre-existing commitments towards forwarding collective security on one hand, and a perceived encroachment by the international community in sovereign affairs on the other, African leaders convened in Libya in 1999, and signed the Sirte Declaration, which would fundamentally transform the OAU into the African Union.

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22 As Nigeria’s then-Foreign Minister Tom Ikimi surmised that the ACRF and ACRI proposals were actually intended to “divide Africa and weaken its efforts to take care of its own security.” Moreover, he went on record as saying: “It is a matter for concern that every time Africa succeeds in formulating a common position on any critical issue, our external friends always manage to come up with an alternative solution...Now that we have succeeded in establishing a continental mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, we are being confronted with a proliferation of uncoordinated initiatives ostensibly designed to enhance our capacity in peace-support operations” (as quoted in Alden 2000, 364).
Though it had served as the African Leviathan since 1963, by the late 20th century, the OAU had been shown to be increasingly irrelevant: one on hand OAU had successfully achieved its overarching goal of liberating the last of the continent’s peoples from the throes of colonialism, yet its impotency and somewhat poor reputation globally had suggested that it was in dire need of reform on the other. Thus, the disbanding of the OAU was intended to re-formulate the body so as to better address the newly conceptualized problems facing the continent. Consequently, with the 2001 signing of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU 2001), which went into effect in 2002, the OAU ceased to exist, and the African Union was born.

With its creation, the AU was touted as an entirely new organization, and notably distinct from the OAU. While observers have questioned the degree of “newness” of the AU as compared to the OAU, its primary difference relates to the dual questions of peace and security. In opposition to the OAU’s commitment to “non-interference” in the internal affairs of states, the African Union’s stated policy has been one of “non-indifference” to the atrocities occurring within state borders to which the AU might serve as a mediating party (Mwanaswali 2008).

At the heart of the new AU is what is known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). At its core, APSA is Africa’s 21st century framework for the attainment of peace and security on the continent, and has arises primarily in response to the OAU’s historical inabilities to compel cooperation in instances of widespread violence (Akokpari et. al, 2009, Makinda and Okumu, 2007; Murithi, 2013). APSA’s

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25 Among other phenomena, analysts questioned the cause for the AU’s rapid creation; the reason for the lack of public knowledge about its genesis; its new stance on the prohibition of non-democratic transitions as enshrined in Article 4(p); and its elevation of Kiswahili to an official organizational language (Packer and Rukare 2002, 365; Tieku 2004, footnote 7; Udombana 2002, 1181; Williams 2007).
achievement is based at the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union in Addis Ababa, which, the 15-member AU PSC is to serve “as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflicts and crisis situations in Africa” (African Union 2003a). For its part, APSA is a wide-ranging framework for collective security, and includes mechanisms to anticipate and mitigate conflict, including: pre-conflict early warning systems; conflict monitoring mechanisms; a group of preeminent envoys called the Panel of the Wise; a rapid-deployment capability called the African Standby Force;24 as well as numerous post-conflict reconstruction programs. While investigating the specifics of APSA are outside of the scope of this dissertation, suffice it to say that APSA’s aims are wide-ranging.

Beyond the institutional frameworks created for the promotion of peace and security, just as important are the legal ones. Most notable in this regard is Article 4(h) of the AU’s Constitutive Act, which entered into force on May 26, 2001. In short, the 4(h) affirms:

The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (African Union 2002).

As Warner (2016a) writes:

Put simply, by signing onto the AU Constitutive Act, African Union members gave other constituent states the right to intervene in the affairs of other member states if the latters’ domestic politics looked to pose an imminent threat to collective African security, or, if governments failed elected to harm,

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24 Since the creation of the AU, there are four different models of military deployment that the AU can undertake: the AU-REC/RM model; the AU and troop contributing country (TCC) or police contributing country (PCC) models; the AY lead nation model; the AU authorized coalition.
rather than protect, their citizens. Possible scenarios for AU intervention then included state collapse and the spillover effects of refugees, crime, and transnational violence and arms, or, the perpetration of mass human rights abuses by individual state governments, which the new African Union pledged not to tolerate.

And yet, despite the new language allowing for AU intervention, as of early 2016, the AU has yet to invoke Article 4(h) for the auspices of an AU intervention, even in instances when it could have been used, such as violence in Darfur, Sudan, the collapse of Mali in 2012, the collapses of South Sudan and the Central African Republic in 2013, and ethnic violence in Burundi in 2015.

While this section has given a very brief overview of the emergence, history, and development of the OAU and the AU, some takeaways about the implications of their legacy and current incarnation, respectively, should be included here. Critiques of both the OAU and AU have been forthcoming. In general, the OAU has been frequently on the chopping block, and has been critiqued for: having experienced a failure in leadership (Selassie 1988); served as nothing more than a dictators’ club (Adejumobi and Olukoshi 2008, 9); and a central source of insecurity for continual populations, particularly in its actions in the face of violence (Haggis 2009). Other critiques leveled at the AU include its inability to self-fund; its lack of accountability to international funding partners; its lack of budget oversight; its poor planning; poor communication abilities (Schraeder and Roach 2012); lack of institutional buy-in from member states (Warner 2015); lack of consultation with members of civil society

25 For a comprehensive assessment of the full-breadth of pre-1994 documents relating to the OAU, see: Harris 1994.
26 In summarizing the OAU’s history - a successful battle against colonialism while a blatant disregard for human rights - IS39/1 2015 has summarized such a paradigm worked well for African leaders since they could be “externally progressive while being internally stagnant. Everyone could get around that.”
27 Interestingly, Schaefer and Roach (2012) surmise that perhaps one cause of the lack of transparency is the AU’s desire not to let the world know just what a large percentage of its budget is actually funded by outsiders.
the continued existence of stringent visa restrictions amongst counties; a lack of development to engender the pan-African “Afro” currency; and a general lethargy in responding to conflicts, despite the existence of mechanisms for that very purpose (Warner 2015).

Yet, both the OAU and the AU have occasionally been lauded for their successes, the OAU more modestly than the AU. For its part, the OAU’s mere creation at a moment of political upheaval is often looked to as a success in and of itself while its occasional success in mediation efforts and its fight against colonialism have been applauded (Selassie 1998; Foltz 1983). Moreover, and despite its myriad insufficiencies:

The OAU symbolizes a positive attack on the problem of intra-African cooperation, achieved through a tenuous compromise by shifting the focus of African diplomacy from divisive political and ideological issues to relatively noncontroversial economic, social, cultural, and technical fields in which African states share a common interests (Nweke 1987, 134).

For its part, the AU has been lauded for serving as a norm entrepreneur; for expressing African states’ positions moderately effectively in global fora; achieving gains in peace and security; and continuing to improve Africa’s position vis-à-vis the rest of the international community.

**Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**

The history of ECOWAS encompasses more than forty years of effort, and is best approached by dividing its existence into two eras: “the early years” (1975 to 1990)

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28 Damningly, Murithi (2012) surmises that indeed, “the vast majority of citizens across the continent do not know that the AU exists.”
In the following section, we recount a brief history of ECOWAS, through these two broader periods, with subdivisions – primarily relations to shifting understandings of security – within each. Importantly, while this section offers a broad overview of the creation of ECOWAS, what individual state interests entailed in its creation are detailed in individual case study chapters.

Creating a West African IO (1970-1975)

How “West Africa” was demarcated was not always intuitive, as Adedeji (2004, 22, 29) has elucidated. To be sure, what polities comprised the West African region in the post-independence period was always an inherently political question, and one that pre-regionalist analyses highlight displayed real-politk dimensions. Prior to the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, Senegal’s first president, Leopold Sédar Senghor advocated for ardently for “West Africa” to be comprised of the states ranging from Cape Verde on the Western border to Zaire (now DRC) on the east. This was done, as Adedeji (2004) relays, because of Senegal’s abiding fear (no doubt inspired by French suggestions) of Nigerian dominance of the region. By making Zaire part of West

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29 1990 is picked as the dividing line in the organization’s historiography not only because it marked the end of the Cold War, but also because 1990 was the date of ECOWAS’ first interstate intervention, ECOMOG I (or Operation Liberty) into Liberia, which is unquestionably the organization’s most important feat. Thus, the “early years” of ECOWAS are delineated as those in which it was founded, and which it acted primarily with the aims of being an economic integrator, whereas the “modern era” denotes the period after 1990 in which it became to be seen as primarily a conflict-response IO.

30 For more on how West Africa was definitely delineated in large guiding part by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, see: Adedeji 2004, 22.
Africa, Senegal was trying to spearhead a regional balancing schematic, which was not to come about.\footnote{Moreover, Adedeji, who was charged with spearheading the creation of ECOWAS inspired by his 1970 article laying out what such an organization might look like, relays that Senghor also wanted all West African citizens to become bilingual in French and English, which Adedeji relays was also rejected. As a result, Senghor was angered, and passed off the West African integration portfolio to a more junior member of the Senegalese foreign ministry (Adedeji 2004).}

Once just what states were to be included in “West Africa” was delineated, states were still faced with the challenge of putting a political plan into praxis, a goal exacerbated by lingering trepidation between Francophone and Anglophone states on one hand, and between richer and poorer states on the other. To that end, West African historiographies underline that the most important variable in the creation of ECOWAS was the 1972 initiative launched by Nigeria and Togo, which ultimately came to be adopted. In short, Adedeji relays that their joint commitment to the initiative was imperative as it demonstrated cooperation amongst the divides of the region, namely between a strong Anglophone state and a poorer Francophone state\footnote{For more on the creation of ECOWAS, see: Adedeji 2004; Gandois 2009, 100 – 110.} (Adedeji 2004, 28; Gandois 2009, 100-110).

ECOWAS was founded in 1975 with fifteen original member states, with the ECOWAS Charter – also known as the “Treaty of Lagos” – as its founding document. In very broad terms, the ECOWAS Charter (ECOWAS 1975, Article 2.1) articulates that:

\begin{quote}
It shall be the aim of the Community to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members, and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.
\end{quote}
In more colloquial terms, ECOWAS was intended to help reduce trade barriers, encourage the emergence of a West African monetary union, and generally encourage economic integration.\textsuperscript{33} Psychically, the creation of ECOWAS was intended to help “heal the rift” between the Francophone and Anglophone states that had long characterized relations since independence (Franke 2008, 64).

However, a brief peek behind the curtains of the ECOWAS Charter is also revelatory. First and most notably, the ECOWAS charter belied what would come to be its most important function later in its life: at the moment of its creation, the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) created \textit{no institutions} for the explicit protection of collective security (Gandois 2009, 114; Obi 2008; ECOWAS 1975). Second, many have noted that the ECOWAS charter was intentionally designed not to constrain individual leaders and their states, and thus, the ECOWAS treaty was formulated to “give little power to ECOWAS as an independent institution” (Gandois 2009, 113). These imperatives of the creation of intentionally weak IOs have become the hallmark of Africa IOs more generally, and will be shown to be the case not only in relation to ECOWAS but also IGAD. Third, it was also the case that ECOWAS treaty did not allow for the creation of an ECOWAS parliament, which would have allowed country delegates to convene to assert their states’ interests in ECOWAS. Instead, the lack of a parliament meant that at its founding – and beyond – policymaking would be the explicit provenance of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government.

\textsuperscript{33}To that end, Gandois (2009, 95) notes that ECOWAS was modeled on the Rome Treaty, which established the European Economic Community, thus emphasizing the exert to which diffusion of organizational models and IO purposes disseminate through the world.
Again, this tendency to reserve policymaking in IOs exclusively for leaders will also be shown to be the case in the creation of IGAD.

ECOWAS’ First Five Years: A Slow Start (1975 – 1980)

After achieving the hurdle of the creation of ECOWAS, enthusiasm for the organization dropped precipitously in the first five years. On one hand, the two Nigerian architects – General Gowon and Adebayo Adedeji – each moved out of the purview of ECOWAS. Second, the initial enthusiasm that accompanied its ideological creation was not met in actual contributions to the organization. Member states quickly went in arrears for their annual payments and there was a general low level of participation in the early meetings. Third, despite the creation of the organization, the fundamental geopolitical contours of the region had not undergone a stark revolution: the French countries (with the exception of loner Togo) continued to rely most heavily on France, while Nigeria sought to dominate and was locked in a low-level power struggle for regional leadership with Ghana, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire. (All of these phenomena are discussed in more detail later). Fourth, and perhaps most problematically, despite their individual low commitments to the organization – financial and otherwise – all countries still expected the organization to provide benefits. In short, ECOWAS quickly faced the problems of providing club goods while all members sought to free ride on others. Finally, the international community was less than enthusiastic about the creation of ECOWAS: non-member governments both

34 The ECOWAS treaty also excluded others in the policymaking realm, including non-ECOWAS states, civil society, and commercial interests (Gandois 2009, 113).
on an off the continent continued to engage offering financial assistance to West African countries bilaterally (Gandois 2009, 117-118).


ECOWAS began to develop its collective security frameworks earlier than any other African international organization, including the OAU. In 1978, ECOWAS added a “Protocol on Non-Aggression” to the ECOWAS treaty (ECOWAS 1978), which was followed by the 1981 “Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defense” (ECOWAS 1981). As its name suggests, the first of these two treaties laid the groundwork that established a means of non-aggression as the de facto status quo for intra-West African relations, and the commitment by all states to resolve their conflicts peacefully. The second of these was an even more tangible step towards the creation of a Deutschian “security community,” as it set out the three conditions under which ECOWAS member states would undertake joint military action in the event of insecurity. These included: any instance of aggression toward a member states, which would entail a threat against the community; a dispute between two member states; or in the event of any internal conflict which appeared to be supported by a non-ECOWAS member, and which looked to eminently threaten the community. Importantly, both treaties would be invoked for ECOWAS’ first intervention, the 1990 ECOMOG incursion into Liberia (Coleman 2007, 74; ECOWAS 1978; ECOWAS 1981; Franke 2008, 65; Obi 2008).

However, the creation of these ECOWAS mechanisms was not without problems: particularly, the divide between the Anglophone states – led by Nigeria – and the Francophone states – with substantial continued backing from France – nearly tore
ECOWAS apart before it had a chance to flourish. A brief note on the nature of the French presence in postcolonial Africa is here in order. In short, France has long been critiqued, since the moment of decolonization of its West African colonies, of maintaining an overly close relationship with its colonies, referred to in shorthand as “Françafrique.” In sum, Françafrique is the notion is that while African countries are legally independent, for much of the late 20th century, they remained beholden to “neo-colonial” French influence, and thus many Francophone African states’ foreign and domestic policies were simply French interests as expressed through African leaders (Verschave 2003). The existence of Françafrique had numerous implications on the nature of West African regionalism, much of which will be discussed throughout subsequent chapters of this dissertation (especially chapters 3, 6, 8, and 9). In short though, with West African independence, the stage was set for a formal power struggle between Nigeria and France that cemented a bilateral “West African Cold War” that would be waged between Nigeria and France for the next several decades, in which each would attempt to assert its rightful dominance in the region at the exclusion of the other power.

For now, the imperative recognition is simply that early in West Africa’s postcolonial history, France began to urge its former colonies in West Africa – which made up the majority of states there – to return to its security umbrella, rather than relying on the new-Nigerian led international order that was emerging under the auspices of ECOWAS. As soon as France began to see Nigeria taking the lead in regional integration in the early 1970s, it quickly set to work to form a rival West African regional security community, called the “Communauté de l’Afrique de l’Ouest” (CEAO) as well as a rival economic union, called the “Union Monétaire Ouest
Africaine” (UMOA) and its currency, the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine).\textsuperscript{35} Most importantly, the concurrent West African bloc also developed its own collective security schematic, known as the “Accord de Non-Aggression et Defense” (ANAD).\textsuperscript{36} In no unclear terms then, the concurrent all-Francophone financial and collective security arrangements engendered resentment by the Anglophone members of ECOWAS towards the Francophone members specifically, but also served to undermine the existence of a West African security community more broadly. Together, and as a result of these three forces – a pre-existing pact, fears of Nigeria, and French backing – the Francophone countries were reluctant to engage in a deeper form of regional security arrangement in the form of ECOWAS (Coleman 2007, 74; Franke 2007, 64-65; Gandois 2009, 120; Heilbrun 1999, 44-45; Osuntokun 2008). Thus, between 1980 and 1989, ECOWAS remained relatively quiet.\textsuperscript{37} Instead, it is generally recognized as a period during which West African states viewed ECOWAS as an instrumental organization for the pursuit of their individual interests, “expecting immediate benefits with little or no costs to themselves” (Gandois 2009, 111).

**ECOWAS and Forays With Interventions (1990 to 2000)**

While the first era of ECOWAS’ history was marked by a general inertia of a would-be economic integrating IO, the organization’s trajectory would go from paper

\textsuperscript{35} The pan-West African CFA allowed Francophone West African countries to peg their currency to the French franc. From its inception until 1995, the currency traded at 50 CFA to 1 French franc, but when its devaluation in 1994 made the rate 100 CFA to 1 franc, the assumed French benefits of the monetary union dissipated significantly (Heilbrunn 1999, 44-45).

\textsuperscript{36} Catalyzed by the need for conflict resolution between Mali and Burkina Faso in 1974, which the Francophone West African states took a lead in coordinating, ANAD was a created in 1977. ANAD was a Francophone West African regional defense and mediation pact, which also included a regional standby force (which ECOMOG would come to resemble in 1990).

\textsuperscript{37} The one exception is the coming into forces of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance, which, though created in 1981, did not come into being until 1986 (Franke 2008, 65).
tiger to African innovator with the 1990 ECOMOG intervention into Liberia. Accompanying this shift was a stark departure from its role as an economic integrating force to a collective security organization.

What led to this shift in mission? For one, a common explanation applied to African security affairs broadly is that the end of the Cold War led to a security vacuum that thus compelled African states to get serious about the provision of collective security. More specifically, Gandois (2009, 120) surmises that the end of the Cold War and the retrenchment of the superpowers gave “the regional states, and especially the hegemon [Nigeria] the breathing space needed to take the initiative.” Indeed, the most notable accomplishments of the 1990s were ECOWAS’ intervention into Liberia in the form of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990; the ECOWAS intervention into Sierra Leone (ECOMOG II) in 1997; and a mission to Guinea Bissau in 1999. The specifics of individual states’ national security interests in each of these conflicts are discussed in individual country chapters.

Outside of these interventions, ECOWAS during the 1990s also made strides, at least on paper, in the legal promotion of collective security. In light of the insufficiencies of the 1975 ECOWAS treaty to deal with issues of peace and security, ECOWAS convened a meeting in 1991, led by former Nigerian President, Yabku Gowon, to address these issues. Named the Committee of Eminent Persons, the group of governmental and non-governmental personalities coalesced to chart the course of ECOWAS’ future engagement in peace and security initiatives. The outcome of these meeting was the signing of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, also known as the Contonou Agreement, in 1993. The new treaty gave explicit mandates for ECOWAS’ commitment to democracy, and called for the creation of a regional peace and security
monitoring system, and, where appropriate, peacekeeping forces (ECOWAS 1993; Gandois 2009, 129). In 1999, ECOWAS deepened its collective security profile with the creation of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (ECOWAS 1999) an effort that most notably succeeded in integrating the former Francophone ANAD collective security framework into that of ECOWAS. Moreover, this treaty laid the basis for the creation of two West African joint military centers intended to train national officers for their participation in ECOMOG missions\(^{38}\) (Obi 2008; Aning 2004). Importantly, the 1999 treaty replaced the revised ECOWAS treaty of 1993 (Aning 2004).

A Renewed Focus on Good Governance (2000 to today)

If the 1990s were the decade of the ECOWAS peacekeeping mission, the 2000s have ostensibly been the decades of ECOWAS’ commitment to good governance. In 2001, ECOWAS adopted the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (ECOWAS 2001). In espousing a West African commitment to democracy, the 2001 Protocol includes a 12-point list of priorities to which members agree, including the promotion of separation of powers, the nature of civil military relations, and appropriate means of ascending to power (ECOWAS 2001; Haacke and Williams 2008).

Today, ECOWAS is viewed as being one of the most competent African IOs, if not the most competent. Several facets underlie this. First, ECOWAS is generally credited

\(^{38}\) These are the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana and the National Defence College in Abuja Nigeria.
with serving as the standard-bearer for African peacekeeping and reformulating long-held pan-African norms on intervention: many tend to think that the (O)AU has historically modeled itself more on ECOWAS than the other way around. Second, ECOWAS, under the backing of Nigeria, is comparatively well-funded and has even launched some of its own missions, with no outside funding, notably in the form of its security sector reform programs in Guinea-Bissau. Third, as the oldest regional economic community, ECOWAS is more institutionalized than many of the other RECs, thus lending it a degree of legitimacy not enjoyed by others (Haacke and Williams 2008, 220; IS15 2015; IS16 2015; IS7/2 2015; Wagner 2013; Warner 2016a).

Yet, for the achievements that it has made, ECOWAS still stands to be critiqued. Several downsides are noted. First, ECOWAS has failed to achieve much of its aspirations to catalyze a robust economic community (Adebajo 2008, 9, 19). Second, despite proclamations to the contrary, ECOWAS is still sometimes thought of as a “dictator’s club” that receives relatively little input from civil society, business, or other interests. To that end, Haacke and Williams (2008) suggest that to ECOWAS’ security culture is one that “actively promotes insecurity for their political opponents and many ordinary citizens” and, thus, “ECOWAS’... traditional emphasis on regime security has often come at the expense of human security concerns.” Third, it has often been noted that the organization is still beset by a general ethos of disorganization. As an observer writes of ECOWAS:

Many meetings are organized at the last minute, allowing no time for planning or preparation. These are not the only difficulties the Secretariat has to overcome: management and human resources in general are badly organized. A huge amount of documents regularly gets lost. There is a dire need to recognize the registry and the archival of documents, to reinforce the accounting unit and to establish a procurement unit. A few simple examples are telling: the library has no real systems of classification, and the ECOWAS email addresses and landlines rarely
function. Considering these important capacity problems, it is quite striking that ECOWAS has been able to implement so many of its security provisions (Gandois 2009, 140).

A fourth critique of ECOWAS is particularly germane: that it engages in collective security initiatives selectively, and with little discernible systemization (Obi 2008). Indeed, the specific causes of this lack of systematic approaches to collective security are discussed throughout the rest of this dissertation, and are best explained by the varying ways that individual member states leverage African IOs for the pursuit of their own national interests.

**Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD(D))**

The general nature of security relations in the Horn of Africa region is deeply contentious: the region is often considered to among the most conflict-ridden regions of the world, with security threats that are transnational, riven by proximity wars between local states and non-African states, and that bear upon certain centuries-old identity issues including ethnicity and religion (Berhanu 2013, 73; Tewedros and Lulie 2014). Even those familiar with the region might find statistics staggering: an estimated 33% of all global IDPs can be found in the Horn of Africa, and by some estimates, the Horn has seen more death and destruction than any other world region since the end of the Second World War (Berhanu 2013, 73). That a regional organization with at least some security components has been able to arise at all is, in some sense, miraculous.

**The Early Years: An Externally Created Environmental Organization in the Horn of Africa (1986 - 1990)**
The IGAD that the international community recognizes today was founded in 1986, but under a (slightly) different name: the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD). IGADD was founded after continuous spells of droughts in the region, including those of 1974 and 1984 (Bereketeab 2012; Tewedros and Lule 2014; Woodward 2013). While these crippling droughts made the collective vulnerabilities of individual countries in the region apparent, the rivalries of the Cold War, discussed soon, meant that regional cooperation in the Horn was a tenuous proposition. However, at the urging of the United Nations, in 1986, six states in the Greater Horn – Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda – agreed to form the organization that would help them find lasting solutions to issues associated with drought and desertification, which had come to serve as one of the region’s primary security threats. Importantly, not only was IGADD’s founding encouraged and facilitated by the UN, it was also nearly entirely funded by external, non-African actors, who would come to be known as the Friends of IGADD. Thus, at its very inception, “IGADD went operational with limited objectives and a high dependence on donors that would have serious implications for its independence” (Bereketeab 2012, 174).

The palpable rivalries of the Cold War served to temper expectations as to what IGADD might even theoretically accomplish at its very birth. On one hand stood the U.S.S.R-supported Marxist Derg military regime in regional powerhouse Ethiopia, while the majority of the other members in the Horn – especially Somalia and Sudan, but also Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda – were pro-American. Thus, as Woodward (2013, 141) notes, it was recognized that “any attempt at a regional organization [in the Horn] should be as non-political as possible.” To that end, coalescence around the
environment was viewed to be a sufficiently anodyne focal point. And so, despite their geopolitical differences, the Greater Horn’s states joined the UN-led organization not only because of the real threats posed by drought and desertification, but also, because the allure of generous Western aid loomed large (Woodward, 2013, 141). These initial lukewarm interests in joining the externally buttressed regional organization led to the tepid results that may have been anticipated. Given the nature of early power relations between members, IGADD members proposed projects to the UN and other funders which funders more often than not found to lacking substance and feasibility.

The End of the Cold War (1991 to 1996)

The end of the Cold War served to alter the contours of IGADD in various ways. For one, the end of the Cold War coincided with – if not compelled – the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in 1991; led to the overthrow the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia in 1991; and simultaneously, led to the emergence of the Horn’s newest state, Eritrea, which gained independence and joined IGADD in 1993. With the Horn of Africa’s regional landscape fundamentally reshaped at the dawn of the post-Cold War era, IGADD took on a new dimension of being an IO shared among newly friendly Ethiopia and Eritrea, existing outside of the constraints of the Somalian presence, and no longer riven by global ideological divides. Thus, these domestic and international shakeups changed the ethos of IGADD: with the new regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea being expected to help revitalize IGADD, the IO seemed poised to move beyond anodyne and apolitical agendas, and aspired to genuine and meaningful cooperation (Bereketeab 2012, 174).
With the recognition of the newfound possibilities of IGADD for genuine intra-regional cooperation, the organization began to take on newfound peace and security functions, as well as attempts at encouraging economic integration. In 1994, IGADD undertook its first attempts at mediating between Sudan and insurgent groups in southern Sudan. This action, in combination with the broader new ethos of possibility, led IGADD to convene an April 1995 extraordinary session in Addis Ababa to formally expand IGADD’s mandate beyond simply drought and decertification, to include progress towards the development of a genuine collective security community. Thus, in March 1996, leaders convened to sign the “Letter of Instrument to Amend the IGADD Agreement” which renamed IGADD the “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD 1996). This was followed by a November 1996 meeting in Djibouti City, where the heads of state officially expanded the organization’s mandate to include some security functions, even though the IO’s primary area of responsibility was to remain mitigating the impact of environmental threats (Bereketeab 2012, 174-175, 189; Woodward 2013, 142, 152; Murithi 2009).

IGAD’s most notable development in the pursuit of this regional security was the 2000 creation (and 2002 operationalization) of CEWARN, a Horn of Africa conflict monitoring organization. Based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, while CEWARN is ostensibly intended to promote Horn security broadly, CEWARN’s mandate has practically been whittled down to the point where it is only allowed to focus on anodyne, non-political issues, the likes of which typified the organization’s early efforts. Namely, CEWARN’s main activities relate to monitoring and conflict mitigation efforts related transnational conflicts between pastoral communities, to include: “Livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, smuggling and
illegal trade nomadic movements, refugees, land mines, and banditry” (Bereketeab 2012, 18039; IGAD 2000). The selection of pastoral rights as CEWARN’s main focus was strategic, and undertaken precisely because as a lower-level concern, they were considered to be an appropriate “trust-building entry point” for CEWARN members with historically varied degrees of animosity (Franke 2008, 191; Kasaija 2013). This limited CEWARN purview has theoretically broadened with a new CEWARN expansion in 2012, though has been less visible in practice (Kasaija 2013). Beyond the creation and expansion of CEWARN, the only real notable institutional development within IGAD has been its 2006 Capacity Program Against Terrorism (CPAT), intended to help member states collectively battle transnational terrorism, an effort that was ultimately phased out in 2010 and replaced by IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) (Bereketeab 2012 187; Woodward 2013).

IGAD as Collective Security Organization (2010 to Today)

Today, IGAD is looked at as a middling REC, but one that shows promise. On the plus side, observers have offered many areas of praise. For one, the fact that IGAD exists at all is viewed as an accomplishment in and of itself, given the historically poor relationships between its members. Second, others have lauded CEWARN as the most developed sub-regional early warning system in Africa (Franke 2008, 196; Kasaija 2013). Moreover, despite only middling degrees of successes, IGAD has indeed exerted efforts in mediation amongst its member states, most notably between Sudan and South Sudan, which culminated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), discussed in greater detail in chapter 6. And finally, some observers argue

39 For an extensive overview of the development of CEWARN, see: Franke 2008, 191-197.
forcefully that even despite its shortcomings, IGAD is the centerpiece for the promotion of peace and security in the Horn of Africa, and thus should be respected as such (IS42 2015; IS16 2015; Woodward 2013).

However, several critiques still remain. Among these, detractors have asserted that IGAD is not institutionalized (IS22 2015); that CEWARN’s focus on pastoral conflicts is far too narrow (Kasaija 2013); that IGAD does not deal with “tough” issues like the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict (Berhanu 2013) that its secretariat lacks technical expertise and know-how (Bereketeab 2012; Berhanu 2013, 90; Kasaija 2013; IS15 2015; Murithi 2009; Woodward 2013); that members outside of Ethiopia have not been willing to fund the organization (Woodward 2013, 149-152) that its subsequent preponderance of external, non-member funding compels it follow the agendas of international actors (Kasaija 2013; Woodward 2013, 153); that it has a very low public profile amongst members of civil society (Kasaija 2013; Woodward 2013, 153); that, overall, it is ineffective in actually promoting collective security (Kasaija 2013; Tewedros and Lulie 2014; Woodward 2013, 146-147); and that its reliance on exclusively open-source intelligence retards its collection abilities (Kasaija 2013).

More specifically, other three other critiques deserve mention. First, IGAD is often viewed as being an organization that is nearly exclusively ruled by heads of state (Murithi 2009). IGAD’s Secretariat, located in Djibouti City, is ostensibly the executive organ of IGAD. However, in practice, the IGAD secretariat’s activities are relegated to administrative and technical functions due to the inordinate amount of power given to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG). As its name suggests, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government is a meeting of the heads of state of the Horn of Africa. Although the Assembly was supposed to keep
heads of states *updated* on the work being undertaken by the IGAD secretariat, it has instead been the case that the meetings of the Assembly simply override an institutional autonomy that the IGAD secretariat has. As an employee of IGAD observes:

> IGAD was always an instrument for the heads of state. They purposefully left the secretariat very small, and it still a very small institution. For example, CEWARN still just mainly deals cattle. We’ve waited for years for this to improve, but they haven’t. IGAD was mostly used by heads of state to try out decision-making to then influences larger and large organization (IS16 2015).

To be sure, one of the most frequent critiques of IGAD is the over-concentration of power with Assembly (Bereketeab 2012, 176-177; IS16 2015; Woodward 2013; IS36 2015).

This concentration of power amongst heads of state has also led to a culture of consensus making amongst heads of state. This is an analogous situation to the operational culture of ECOWAS, less so in relation to the AU. While this allows for IGAD to theoretically remain nimble:

> The principle of consensus in reaching decisions...has its drawbacks: it confers excessive powers on the leaders of member states, connoting the supremacy of individual states when withholding consent. It may also lead to informal dealings concerning controversial issues thereby putting unnecessary stress on the regional organization. Above all, however, reaching consensus, in an environment characterized by personal conflicts and rivalries of leaders, would pose formidable challenges” (Bereketeab 2012, 177).

Moreover, IGAD’s over-emphasis on the nature of heads of state for the derivation of its operational culture has other drawbacks, including the fact that:

> This type of privileged membership [of heads of state and government] renders IGAD highly dependent on the good personal relationships of its members and leaders and may constrain its ability to engage in serious conflict resolution. If, for any reason, heads of state government deem it expedient to ignore IGAD’s collective efforts to resolve inter-state conflicts, the effort fails.... The structures and decision-making mechanisms that allow privilege to heads of states and governments render IGAD extremely volatile. This is because the personal
relations of leaders greatly affect the well being of the regional organization (Bereketeab 2012, 189).

Second, IGAD is also critiqued for being able to be manipulated for the pursuits of specific national interests by its constituent member states, especially Ethiopia. While this claim will be investigated more fully in chapter 5, suffice it to say IGAD’s reputation as a tool for the promotion of Ethiopian hegemony has had a negative impact on the organization’s ability to be perceived as impartial (Murithi 2009).

Third, and from its inception, IGAD(D) has often been critiqued of simply being an organization created by outsiders for their interests, and thus, its lack of organic origination means that the organization actually lacks a degree of necessity to its members. Put otherwise, IGAD has been thought of as the fulfillment of an agenda for the region imposed by the outside, and directed by regional actors within the Horn, notably, Ethiopia (Woodward 2013, 152). This suspicion has translated into ill will towards the organization, even by some of its members, especially Eritrea, as discussed in chapter 11.40

Assumptions Regarding Differential Meanings Between the African Union and the RECs in Members’ Pursuits of National Security Interests

Having laid out the broad historical contours of the African IOs at the heart of this work, our discussion on international organizations now turns to part one of our overall puzzle: how do African states think about the unique benefits provided by each set of IOs: the (O)AU on one hand, and ECOWAS and IGAD on the other? Indeed, this dissertation holds as one of its primary points of interrogation understanding how

40 Instances in which IGAD was perceived to be used as a Trojan horse for non-African countries to achieve specific foreign policy objectives included U.S. and European use of IGAD to help South Sudan secede in 2011; the U.S. allowance of Ethiopia to invade Somalia to oust the Unions of Islamic Court and pursue al-Shebab in 2006; and the general perception that IGAD has been a front for the U.S. War on Terror Islamic extremism in the Horn since 2001, as pursued by its main ally, Ethiopia.
states think strategically about African IOs generally, but, more specifically, how African leaders think about the relative benefits and drawbacks of the one IO over the other as they pursue their individual national security interests. Drawing on interviews with staff from the IOs, as well as policymakers, country representatives, and journalists working in and near these four IOs, this final section of this chapter details four assumptions about the ways that African states - in general - think about the relative strategic utility of the AU and the RECs differently. These assumptions, which are not hard and fast rules, are used for the derivation of hypotheses about state action within IOs in the next chapter.

Assumption #1: RECs Are Strategically More Important than the AU

In general, African states tend to put a much higher priority on their membership in their RECs over their membership to the AU, and thus, in general terms, give them higher priority in their strategic calculations than they do the AU (IS16 2015; IS37 2015; IS38 2015; IS17 2015; IS20 2015; IS21 2015; IS39/1 and IS39/2 2015; IS24 2015; Maru 2014). In emphasizing the tendency for states to try and localize their foreign and security policy pursuits first and foremost within their regions, IS37 (2015) has admonished that African states “don’t do zebra neck diplomacy: you don’t have your neck here and then try to eat there.” As an employee of ECOWAS has relayed:

African states know the importance of AU and RECs in their lives, but they think about them differently. The difference between the mood in the AU and ECOWAS is stark: the mood in ECOWAS is very close-knit. For example, in relation to Mali, West African heads of state held a conference at the airport, so that heads of state could fly in, meet, and then just fly out, because the issue was so important to them. This is quite different than states' commitment to the AU,
which is really pretty light. It shows the level of commitment to the RECs over the AU (IS7/2 2015).

As IS7/2 (2015) continued:

You get the impression that most countries are more committed to the RECS than the AU. They would rather come to the summit of the RECs than the AU....A lot of leaders come to the AU summit because citizens want to see their leaders there, but the leaders are somewhat indifferent. They don’t really care. There is a level of trust in the RECs that doesn’t exist in the AU....States think that level of achievement is higher in the RECS than a larger body like the AU.

Somewhat dismissive of the (O)AU as a location in which meaningful policies are pursued, IS21 (2015) has articulated, “I really don’t think that most African governments really think about their participation in the African Union as intending to actually achieve anything tangible. It’s really just about participating in the international sphere.”

Yet, what accounts for this general perception that the RECs are the preferable level at which to accomplish major policy goals? First, and most bluntly, states’ nearness to their RECs (in both physical and political proximity) means that at a psychic level, they have the confidence – based on past experiences – of their ability to influence their decisions. IS38 (2105) relays that “Because of the proximity of states to RECS, the impact of their influence is felt most strongly in relation to the region” while IS24 (2015) asserts that “since RECs are closer to home, those issues are going to be closer to their heart.” For his part, IS39/1 (2015) explained that, “For long-term sustainable issue, you use your REC. For the AU, you’re too far away to consider the organization to be reliable.”

Secondly, nearly all states, but especially the smallest ones, tend to view the AU as having too many members with too many varying interests, and thus, being simply too big to get anything accomplished. Writing in 1996, Clapham (116) and others had
realized the logistical problems posed by attempting to pursue interests in the context of the then-OAU: “One evident problem of the OAU was that an organization with over fifty members was too large and diverse to be able to meet many of the needs of its individual states. In practice, much African diplomacy was therefore conducted within the much more manageable framework of groups of neighboring states which had some affinity with one another.” The same trend persists today in the context of the AU, and is a centrally highlighted feature of its (general lack of) strategic importance for most African states. As IS24 (2015) has said: “You can’t have a meaningful conversation with 54 people together. But, when you have just fifteen [in a REC] it is a different story. With smaller groups, they get to know each other, they meet more frequently, they have more contact, and they talk about the same things.”

Finally, it is also the case that countries tend to value RECs over the AU given the generally close relations that exist between heads of states in RECs, which allows for the accomplishment of goals relatively quickly. Whereas heads of state do not always attend the meetings of the AU, heads of state are almost always in attendance at meetings of the RECs. Indeed, not only do heads of state meet, they meet often, informally, and quickly make decisions (IS7/1 2014; IS7/2 2015; IS17 2015). Conversely, because heads of state typically tend not to go to AU meetings – instead being represented by envoys – the creation of policy on the spot within the biannual AU summits is retarded by the fact that delegates must often check in with the capital

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41 Others have emphasized the issue of size as a primary impediment to states placing strategic importance on the AU. “Member countries prefer to rely on ECOWAS and ECCAS because the AU is too big” (IS7/2 2015). Another western diplomat who has spent considerable time in AU negotiations relayed: “My sense was that the states felt that they have more leverage within the REC because RECs are smaller – and particularly if the state was the regional hegemon. For instance, Nigeria basically determines the direction of ECOWAS...In ECCAS you have a couple of countries that have a heavy hand [in regional security affairs], because they know that their influence will be diluted once the AU comes in” (IS17 2015).
prior to taking any meaningful policy decisions within the organization. As one diplomat said, “In the RECs, because it’s a smaller group and a manageable size, with the leadership of heads of state all in one room, they can really get together and make serious, impactful decisions” (IS7/2 2015).

Thus, in general, it remains the case that AU tends not to be an overtly important part of most African states’ foreign and security policy strategies. As IS21 (2015) has said: “I can’t think of a given country trying to manipulate the African Union. It’s actually pretty impossible to really manipulate the entire organization because of its size, but countries do work to try to put their citizens within priority positions within the organization.” And, as (IS29/1 2015) relays: “The decisions made in both the AU and the RECs are determined by the amount of money given; so, small states still really don’t have much of a say, particularly when they aren’t willing and able to commit money and troops. Since most member states are small states, and don’t contribute much money, very few players in the AU actually have any say.” Driving home the point, IS16 (2015) has noted that powerful African states find great strategic utility in the RECs precisely because of their ability to dictate their policy contours in suggesting that, “Nigeria and South Africa use the RECs as their tools. And it is easier to use these RECs as their tools than to use the AU, since the AU requires greater coalition building. In the RECs, they can just call the shots.”

**Assumption #2: RECs Used for Intra-African Goals, AU Used for Extra-African Goals**

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42 It should be noted that not all African delegations have to check in with the capital prior to making decisions. Nevertheless, a sufficient number do such that numerous observers have noted that it serves to slow the pace of policymaking as compared to the presence of all heads of state at the REC summits.
In general, African states and policymakers tend to understand that the AU is a forum that is used to get things accomplished *outside* of the continent, whereas the RECs are the IOs that states must use if they want to accomplish things *within* their immediate regions (IS19/1 2015; IS39/1 2015; IS7/2 2015; IS17 2015). This general sentiment is intuitive, and builds on the previous discussion of Assumption 1. In short, RECs are used by African states to "get politics done" in their regions, while the AU is viewed as an intuitive stepping block for singular or collectives of African states to get the ear of the international community on issues affecting them. The AU is globally visible, whereas the RECs are often unknown outside of the African context (and oftentimes, even within it).

This general sentiment – that states take issues that affect them outside of the continent to the AU, and not to the RECs – has been a clear leitmotif in African states' foreign and security policymaking ethos since independence. As a REC representative to the African Union has relayed of this phenomenon, in no uncertain terms: "Whatever you want to achieve outside of Africa, you use the AU, and whatever you want to do regionally, you always try to accomplish through the REC" (IS19/2 2015). As another working in a similar capacity (IS7/2 2015) at the AU has relayed:

Though you see that most time countries would prefer to go to the RECs, there are certain issues that states think should be come to the AU. These issues include the International Criminal Court; the Ezulwini Consensus [around more UN seats for Africa in the UN Security Council]; climate change; and Ebola….States bring issues that truly are collective like these to the AU, but most other issues serve them more to go to the RECs.

**Assumption #3: RECS Approached Offensively, AU Approached Defensively**

One of the more interesting patterns of strategy that has come to light in the course of this research is that states tend to think of the RECs and AU differentially in
terms of "offensive" and "defensive" strategizing. Put simply, states play offense in the RECs to accomplish specific national security interests, whereas they play defense against the AU to make sure that it does not unnecessarily intervene in their domestic affairs. In short, and given the nature of nearness of leaders in the RECs and the general disengagement of leaders in the AU, the latter organization is understood to be an institution over which states and their leaders can individually exert very little control, as opposed to the RECs, in which even the smallest states can exert notable degrees of agency. This lack of preponderant agency for any leaders or state in the AU has led to the perception amongst many leaders and diplomats of it being an organization that, in the best-case scenario, leaves you alone, and potentially chastises your neighbor for its internal politics that might threaten you. In the worst-case scenario, the AU and its member states attempt to involve themselves in your domestic politics, and in the very worst-case scenario, threaten military intervention (as in the case of Burundi in December 2015) to rectify them. Thus, keeping the AU out of one's affairs - a strategy of an effective defense - is the best means to approach it. One Western diplomat (IS17 2015) who has worked extensively within the AU has articulated the situation as such:

I got the sense that there was a sort of code of conduct that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) would not be a place to pursue self-interests: efforts at self-interest were carefully masked behind the greater good. So, in the PSC, self-interest was mostly in the form of preventing action as opposed to taking action. Examples of these blocking tendencies included preventing intervention, mediators, election observers, and discussion of certain [sensitive] topics.

Conversely, the RECs are understood as organizations that can be guided, manipulated, or otherwise directed to pursue offensive strategies of statecraft. For example, chapter 4 shows how Nigeria has historically used ECOWAS to shape its
neighbors’ politics within its region, and chapter 5 details the similar, though less pronounced, tendencies of Ethiopia to do the same in IGAD.

Assumption #4: African Union is More Internationally “Legitimate” Than the RECs

The final assumption about the differences in meanings between the AU versus the RECs relates to the question of legitimacy from the global international community: when it comes to gaining acceptance for most security-related activities, the African Union rises above the RECs (IS24 2015; IS38 2015; IS41 2015). One of the primary means for legitimacy that the AU confers over the RECs relates to multilateral intervention. In short, though the RECs (especially ECOWAS and SADC) have historically been the primary legitimating mandating authorities for multilateral intervention forces, this is no longer the case: if states want to launch a multilateral intervention, it is increasingly the case that the only legitimate organization is the African Union (IS16 2015). Thus, in thinking strategically, when it comes to pursuing multilateral interventions that are considered “legitimate,” the AU offers distinct advantages that the RECs cannot. As IS38 (2015), a senior advisor at the African Union Peace and Security Council relays:

Increasingly, the AU is becoming the legitimate regional body for seeking forms of military deployments. And you see how states are increasingly using these to project their national or regional interests through the AU and the types of things that they propose…AU is now the gateways for multilateral engagement in Africa. States know that they need to act through it for legitimacy when it comes to peacekeeping.

45 For more on the question of “legitimacy” in African IR, see: Coleman 2007; Gebrewold 2014; Warner 2016b.
A second way in which the AU is considered more internationally legitimate as compared to the RECs relates to the question of funding. In short, the AU is almost exclusively looked to by the (non-African) international community as the entity through which funding for African peace and security initiatives should be funneled. While exceptions most certainly exist,\(^{44}\) in general, the AU has become the focal point for funding of the international community, especially related to peace and security efforts. As IS38 (2015) relays:

> International donors now trust the AU far more than they have. The turning point was Sudan and the financial mismanagement there. The EU now relies heavily on the integrity of the AU in its engagement multilaterally with the AU...AU Action in CAR was only taken was because of the EU...It was because the EU gave us a mandate that any moey needed to go through the AU, because it didn’t trust MICOPAX [a peacekeeping organ of ECCAS]. This shows how much the EU trusts the AU. But, the warm bodies on the ground were still from ECCAS and MICOPAX. The money just needed to go around ECCAS through to the AU.

Indeed, the extent to which the AU possesses special extra-African legitimacy powers over the RECs was also brought to light by IS24 (2015), who articulated succinctly that:

> If African states felt that they could resolve certain security issues at the level of the RECS, then they would... But, the issue is that the RECS can’t actually deal with anything on their own: they not only need legitimacy but they also need resources, and they need to get these from the international community...Moreover, there has been an evolution, wherein the RECS cannot legitimately act without the endorsement of the AU, and the AU can’t act without the approval from the UN.

Thus, whereas RECs used to be a legitimate mandating force for international peacekeeping missions on their own, states now must act through the African Union not only to get approval internationally, but also for the subsequent transmission of international resources.

\(^{44}\) For instance, Nordic countries tend to circumvent the AU, and directly fund IGAD.
Conclusion

This chapter has focused on offering an overview of African IOs. While it first laid out what exactly we mean in discussing IOs, and how different IR theoretical camps understand IOs’ role in individual and collective security provision, it then moved to examine the institutional histories of four African IOs – the OAU, the AU, ECOWAS, and IGAD – as pertains to their outlooks on security specifically, and their institutional developments broadly. Finally, it elucidated four assumptions regarding how African states think differentially about the strategic utility of one sort of African IO over the other. With some traces of meat on the theoretical bones of this dissertation, the next chapter turns to the provision of a more succinct theory to predict how African states of various types will understand just exactly what they can or cannot expect from African IOs as concerns their pursuits of their own national security interests.
CHAPTER THREE:

A Theory of the Strategic Utility of
African International Organizations
In the Pursuit of National Security Interests

The past two chapters have been a lead-up to the presentation of the theory that will be elucidated in this chapter. Chapter 1 offered a broad overview of how the sub-fields of IR and FPA have historically and contemporarily understood the most important inputs in the construction of African foreign and security policy formulation, elucidating the sundry levels of analysis – from individual cognition to global polarity – that inform its creation. Ultimately, it argued that an integrated levels of analysis approach – unifying the sub-statist forces of FPA and the supra-statist forces of IR – was the appropriate way to understand how African states understand the strategic utility of African IOs. If chapter 1 offered an explanation of the “who,” “what,” and “why” of this dissertation, chapter 2 offered the “where”: namely, it gave and overview of African international organizations’ internal landscapes and forwarded some insights into how states think about their strategic utility differently. Expanding on those two chapters, this chapter provides a succinct theoretical framework by which to anticipate African states’ perceptions of the strategic utility of IOs in their pursuits of their national security interests.

This chapter proceeds in two parts. The first section gives an overview of the dependent variable of this dissertation: states’ decisions to pursue their national security interests within African IOs. More acutely, it details multiple possible “ends” that states could have in electing to pursue their security interests in IOs, or
conversely, outside of them. Having delineated the explanandum, the second section goes into detail to present the operationalization of the theory, articulating the explanans. Relying on how African leaders use existing information about themselves and their locations within hierarchies of IO power, along with new information about the nature of threats and resultant national security interests, it derives a series of hypotheses about how various typologies of African states will understand the strategic utility of IOs. Once the theory is presented in this chapter, it is then tested against the historical record of actual state behavior in chapters 4-11.

**The Dependent Variables: The Pursuit of National Security Interests in IOs**

The dependent variables in this dissertation are states’ decisions to pursue national security interests in the context of African IOs. As a reminder: what exactly is a national security interest? In short, the term “national security interest” is a way to think about phenomena that threaten leaders and their states, but that need not necessarily emanate from outside the state. Whereas “national security” is typically conceptualized as occurring in relation to solely external forces, in much of sub-Saharan Africa, threats to the regime and/or state – or its national security interests – come from both inside and outside the state (Ayoob 1995; Ragu 2003; Neuman 1987). Thus, by looking only at the external facets of the threat environment, one misses the internal dynamics that are constituted and reconstituted as national security concerns. Drawing from work on "national interests" by Finnemore (1996) the term “national security interest” is useful in that elides over the increasingly artificial "internal security-external insecurity" dichotomy that has historically characterized both IR and FPA's approaches to security. By refocusing an understanding of states’ foreign
security interests as occurring in the same domain as their own domestic security interests, we gain a much more complete and accurate picture of the ways that statist “security” interests in Africa are actually perceived.

Defining the Dependent Variables

The subsequent theory is interested in two sets of dependent variables, for three in total. The first dependent variable is whether a state, when faced with a given national security threat, decides to address its national security interest in the context of an African IO at all. Thus, our first hypothesized dependent variable, HDV1, is a binary: 1 if the state is anticipated to address the national security interest within an IO, and 0 if it is not. The second and third hypothesized dependent variables, HDV2 and HDV3 are also each binary, and have values assuming that HDV1 = 1. Thus, assuming that a state will find strategic utility in pursuing a national security interest in IOs, HDV2 predicts whether it will pursue them in a REC (HDV2 = 1 if yes, 0 if no), or the (O)AU (HDV3 = 1 if yes, 0 if no). A simplification, in words, of our three DVs is: Given a state’s location within a specific typology, and when faced with a national security threat and resultant national security interest, does our theory predict that it will find strategic utility in addressing that threat in and African IO (1) or not (0) (HDV1)? If it is likely to find strategic utility in addressing the interest in and African IO (HDV1 = 1), which African IO, or combination of African IOs does it turn to: its primary REC (HDV2, 1 or 0) and/or the AU (HDV3 = 1 or 0)? Finally, it should be noted that in this nomenclature, HDV1 becomes an IV for HDV2 and HDV3: that is, the result of HDV1 determines possible outcomes for HDV2 and HDV3. If HDV1 = 0, then HDV2 and HDV3 are both null (Ø).
Hypothesized Dependent Variable 1 (HDV1): To Use African IOs or Not?

The first hypothesized dependent variable (HDV1) in the theory is whether or not a state will elect to address a national security interests through an African IO, given its knowledge of “Existing Information” (IV1, IV2, IV3) and “New Information” (IV4) about the national security interest at hand, facets discussed later. Thus, the first hypothesized dependent variable of interest is whether states elect to pursue goals through African IOs or not. The outcomes for DV1 are, again, binary (1 = YES, 0 = NO).

Conditions Under Which States Will Find Strategic Utility in African IOs, (HDV1 = 1, or “yes”)

For simplicity’s sake, this dissertation divides the rationales for why states will find strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1) into three broad IR theoretic strategic categories: realist interests (1A); liberal interests (1B); and constructivist interests (1C).

HDV1= 1A: YES, I have realist aims that an African IO will help me accomplish: In thinking through the potential strategic utility of African IOs in dealing with a national security interests, IOs can often be perceived of as being beneficial for three broad swathes of realist state interests: IOs a means of regime protection; IOs as instruments of state power; and IOs as a means of resource extraction. Each of these categories, and their sub-categories of state interests, are explained in the discussion of independent variable 4.
HDV1 = 1B: YES: I have **liberal** aims in relation to the threat that an African IO will help me accomplish: African states also think about African IOs as having broadly liberal benefits in their pursuits of national security interests: IOs as a means to pursue “genuine” collective security ends; or IOs as a means to legitimize the pursuit of their self-interested goals. Each of these categories, and their sub-categories of state interests, are explained in the discussion of independent variable 4.

HDV1 = 1C: YES: I have **constructivist** aims in relation to the threat that an IO will help me accomplish: Finally, African states also think about African IOs as having potential constructivist benefits including as a means of identity and reputation improvement, or as focal points for backlashing. Each of these categories, and their sub-categories of state interests, are explained in the discussion of independent variable 4.

**Conditions Under Which States Will Not Find Strategic Utility in African IOs (HDV1 = 0, or “no”)**

It should be made clear that in the pursuit of national security interests, it is often the case that African states *will find* to have strategic utility in addressing their national security interests (HDV1=0). Understanding the conditions under which this occurs is equally as important as understanding when our quantity of interest *does* show up. Indeed, an intuitive component of case study selection is that one must not select cases based on the dependent variable, which in this case, would be instances in which states *did pursue national security interests in the context of African IOs* (King et al. 1994). Put otherwise, a wrong approach to case study selection in this instance would be to investigate cases exclusively during which African states *did* use IOs to pursue
their national security interests. Rather, the inclusion of case studies was here based on
the selection of a number of countries in the two regions of interest – West Africa and
the Horn – and instances in which those subsets of countries faced national security
threats. Whether or not they elected to address those threats vis-à-vis IOs is the topic
of investigation, and as will be shown in the subsequent chapters, in many cases they
did not. Thus, following are the two broad conditions under which African states will
not elect to pursue national security interests through African IOs.

**HDV1 = 0A: NO, I plan on taking collaborative action outside of African**

**IOs.** Often, it is the case that African states will find benefits in collaborating with
other actors to address some sort of national security interest, though they find it more
strategically beneficial to undertake collaborative action outside the context of IOs. This
can be due to questions of necessity, degree of agency, alternative existing structures,
or nature of the issue. Such action can come in the forms of bilateral engagement with
powerful African actors (like Nigeria and Ethiopia), powerful non-African (like
France and the U.S.), and importantly, even in other non-African IOs (like the United
Nations).

**HDV1 = 0B: NO: I plan on taking unilateral action:**

It is also the case that African states will pursue their national security interests outside
of African IOs simply because the national security interest is so sensitive or important
that they can rely on themselves to combat the threat or pursue the interest. Potentially
bringing an issue to an IO where they lose any amount of control over their pursuit of
national interests is ruled out. As will be shown, this tendency to circumvent IOs is
pronounced for African states ranging from the most powerful to the least powerful.
Hypothesized Dependent Variables 2 (HDV2) and (HDV3): Which IO to Use?

The second and third hypothesized dependent variables (HDV2) and (HDV3) in the theory relate to the specific IO or combination of IOs that a given state will elect to pursue its given in interests within, assuming that it has decided that African IOs can offer it some sort of strategic utility (HDV1=1). Given that which IO(s) a state will find strategic utility in depend largely on IV1-IV4, discussions on rationales behind the selection of IOs are presented in the presentation of IV4.

The Theory: Independent Variables

The theory driving this dissertation is that a combination of four factors can help to explain why any given African state will elect to pursue its national security interests in the context of an African IO, or not. These are: the state’s international power projection capabilities (IV1); the nature of polarity in its primary REC (IV2), the nature of polarity in the (O)AU (IV3); and the nature of the national security interest itself (IV4). As will be further elucidated, by process tracing how African leaders would use their knowledge about “Existing Information” (IV1, IV2, IV3), combined with “New Information” (IV4), we can derive a set of hypotheses for all African states regarding their likely understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs.

In the next sections, I present my broader theory of African state foreign policy and national security decision-making as it pertains to African IOs. The introduction of the theory is a cumulative process. Thus, I present each of the four independent variables in sequential order, offering a discussion of its relevance for the broader project. By the conclusion of this section, the theory should be evident and clearly understood.
Independent Variable 1 (IV1): International Power Projection Capability

The first independent variable (IV1) is a state’s ability to project its power internationally, or what we refer to here as its "international projection capability." Needless to say, the African state has undergone a tremendous amount of scrutiny as regards its possibilities for power projection, both domestically and internationally. Dunn (2013, 46) has noted that, indeed, the African state has been labeled with more pejorative monikers than one cares to enumerate, including being “failed,” “lame,” “fictive,” weak,” ”collapsing,” “quasi,” “invented and imposed,” and many more. Indeed, given that numerous works have detailed the difficulties that African states face in projecting power domestically (Herbst 2005; Jackson and Rosberg 1983), it is perhaps unsurprising that the number of challenges posed when attempting to project power internationally are even greater. To be sure, while discussions of African agency in international affairs is an ever-evolving genre of literature (Brown and Harmon 2013; Shaw 2015), the majority of foreign policy literature still seems to be marked by recognition of the sundry “limits” faced by African foreign policymakers (Wright 1999, 2; Khadiagala and Lyons 2001). In short, international power projection remains a difficult task for most regimes, though distinct variations amongst states can indeed be evidenced.

The intuition behind the inclusion of this variable is rather straightforward: the extent to which any given African state can project power internationally is inherently tied to its self-perceived ability to deal with threats unilaterally or not. It is also

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45 African states’ abilities to project power internationally have been cited as an important feature of African foreign policymaking (Wright 1999, 10).
connected to the nature of the state’s role within its REC, and within the (O)AU. On one hand, if a state has a high international power projection capability, it might be less inclined to look to African IOs to address its national security interests, given that it can both address the threats alone, and it would prefer not be constrained by institutional choices that it might not like, yet it might also find the IO to be useful to legitimate whatever self-interested policies it wants to pursue. Conversely, if a state has low international power projection capabilities, it might be more inclined to turn to a African IOs to help it deal with threats, though on the other hand, might be wary of such IOs given it has comparatively little say within them. For the purposes of this dissertation, the first of four independent variables (IV1) will be a measure of states’ abilities to project power internationally, which will correspond with one of four state types: “powerful,” “middle,” “weak” and “peripheral.”

What informs our understandings of what makes a state “powerful” in its ability to project power internationally? For the purposes of this work, I will rely on three traditional metrics for international power projection capability – military spending, GDP, and population size – as a means to roughly delineate international power projection capabilities. Following are the distinctions of Africa’s states into the four analytical categories of “hegemons,” “middle states,” “weak states” and “peripheral states.” A brief discussion of each is presented below.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, “powerful status” is achieved only in relative terms: namely in this nomenclature, an African powerful state is a state that has a preponderance of international power projection capabilities in its region, as compared
with other states. In any given region, there can only be one powerful state. Observers of African international relations have often debated which states deserve the distinction of being called – if not “hegemonic” – then at least “powerful.” The most common shorthand refers to the “Big Five,” powerful African states: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa (Cilliers and Schunemann 2014), and in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia are typically included (Gebrewold 2014), though other suggestions have also been made. Yet most typically, observers tend to exclude Ethiopia, and agree that only two Sub-Saharan states consistently justify being called hegemons: South Africa and Nigeria (Buzan and Waever 2003, 249; Khadiagala and Lyons 2001, 9; Landsberg 2008; Tavares 2011; Wright 1999, 16).

Within our theory “middle states” are those states with some international power projection capabilities, but which are far less able to project than powerful states. In short, these are states, which, in some cases, could unilaterally address threats, and in other cases, could not. Concerning their prevalence: unlike “hegemons,” “middle states” exist in all regions in Africa. As such, middle states are an important lynchpin in the African international system: while their foreign and security policymaking decisions (especially in IOs) are frequently informed by the actions of hegemons and international great powers, given their greater numbers, their

46 A “powerful” state might also be thought of as broadly approaching the distinction of a “hegemonic” state. However, given the relativity of the term in an African context, avoiding “hegemon” seems to be wise.
47 Others have applied a “hegemonic” status to states that are more questionable. Some suggest that Ethiopia might be approaching such a status (Gebrewold 2014; Khadiagala and Lyons 2001, 9) while at the dawn of the millennium, others considered Kenya to be a likely hegemon (Wright 1999, 16). Prior to 2011, Libya would have registered as a preeminent force in Sub-Saharan Africa (Tieku 2004, Makinda and Okumu 2008, 29).
48 Of the two, South Africa is the most clearly hegemonic state (Hailu 2012, 128), despite various foreign policy maneuvers in the post-apartheid era in which it sought to downplay these tendencies (Michel 2014). Notably, South Africa is the only African state to have once had a nuclear weapon.
tendencies to pursue national security interests within African IOs are often necessary for the institution to function beyond just hegemonic pushes. Given their varying abilities to sometimes act unilaterally in response to threats, and other times not, middle states are arguably the most unpredictable African states as variations in their patterns of engagement in African IOs can be substantial (Babarinde 1999, 226). For our purposes, we see three middle states in West Africa and ECOWAS (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal), and four in the Horn and IGAD (Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda).

More than any other category, Africa is most characterized by “weak” states. It should also be noted at the outset that the distinction of “weak” state here should not be understood as states that are “on the brink of collapse,” or what are frequently referred to in popular culture as “failing,” “failed,” or the like. Rather, “weak” in this context simply refers to states that have little international power projection capacity. Weak states generally have minimal influence regionally, though their limits in the pursuit of statecraft typically have more to do with their “smallness” – in GDP, population, military, or even physical land size – than anything else. Importantly, in our nomenclature, “weak” states can actually be very centralized (like Eritrea or Gambia), but simply relatively marginal in the context of their respective IOs. For our purposes, we delineate eight weak states in West Africa and ECOWAS (Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Togo) and two weak states in IGAD (Djibouti and Eritrea).

A fourth category of states’ international power projection capabilities is what we refer to here as “peripheral states.” Two sub-categories exist in this distinction: “collapsed states” and “archipelagic states.” Respectively, states fall into this category
when they either cannot project power internationally (by virtue of being collapsed) or choose not to project power internationally (by virtue of unique geographic circumstances related to being an archipelagic state). For our purposes, two states in West Africa and ECOWAS garner the distinction of peripheral-collapsed (Liberia and Guinea Bissau) while one (Cape Verde) garners the distinction of peripheral-archipelago. In the Horn and IGAD, two states (South Sudan and Somalia) gain the distinction of peripheral-collapsed.

**Independent Variable 2 (IV2): Regional IO Power Distributions (The RECs)**

The second independent variable (IV2) at play is a state's location with its primary REC's regional power distribution. In Africa, this dissertation suggests that power distributions within any IO fits into one of four types of polarity: unipolar, bipolar, multipolar, or non-polar. Where, within these two sets of polarities – at the REC and (O)AU level – a state finds itself, will fundamentally inform outlooks on the strategic utility of African IOs.

As a starting point, it bears noting that one of the undergirding themes of this work is that hegemony, power, and influence, can and do exist below the systemic level. That is, though themes like “hegemony” are typically associated with a preponderance of power at the global level, pursuits of hegemony can also exist at other levels of international society, particularly, the region, and especially within regional and continental IOs. While most (neo-) realist accounts of international politics typically retain a narrow focus on explaining international outcomes by looking at preeminent states, hierarchies of states exist everywhere in the international system. Hans Morgenthau has noted that although traditional IR thinking has tended to focus on
systemic outcomes, the international system itself “is composed of a number of subsystems which...maintain within themselves a balance of power on their own” (Morgenthau 1948). Theoretically, Lemke (2002) exhorts us to modify Organski’s (1958) imaginary of the international system as pyramidal, with one or two hegemonic states at the top, states of mid-level power in the center, and the vast majority of weak states forming the base. Instead, Lemke (200, 49) asks that we:

[Begin] with the same diagrammatic depiction of the international system, but then [nest] smaller pyramids of power within the overall international power pyramid. These smaller pyramids represent local hierarchies of power within the international system. They are thus local/regional systems, or sub-hierarchies, of the overall international system or overall international power hierarchy.

Indeed, hierarchies of power exist outside of the systemic level, As Lemke (2002, 49) describes it:

In a similar structure to the overall international power hierarchy, each of these local [regional] hierarchies has a dominant local state supervising local relations, by establishing and striving to preserve a local status quo. Just as with the global system and the overall dominant state, local dominant states bother to create and defend the local status quo because they anticipate gains from doing so.

And to be sure, regions and their organizations as analytical constructs to understand international outcomes are arguably seeing resurgence generally, but also in relation to African international relations more specifically.49 By virtue of states’

49 Though works on regionalism were common in the 1950s and 1960s (Cantori and Spiegel 1970; Hellman 1969; Russett 1967) as result of the Cold War’s focus on area studies, a decline in the study of regions and regionalism marked most of the 1980s and 1990s, particularly as quantitative social science overtook descriptive work. A foundational work to reinvigorate the study of regions was Lake and Morgan’s assertion in 1997 that “the regional level stands on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states, and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs” (Lake and Morgan 1997). These calls by Lake and Morgan stood as a motivating call for the resurgence of work on regionalism, including not only Buzan and Waever’s (2003) work, but also notable works by: Solingen, (2001) who has written convincingly on domestic facets determining regional outlooks on security and economic affairs; Lemke (2002), who employed the region as an analytical tool to understand the outbreak and prevalence of war; Katzenstein (2005), who used the region to assess the United States’ post-Cold War hegemonic reach; and Acharya and Johnston (2011),
relative inability to project power across their internal territory (Herbst, 2005; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Reno 2001), the region, not the state, is (arguably) the more salient object of security studies, not least in Africa (Ayoob 1995; Buzan 1983; Buzan and Waever 2003; Dokken, 2008; Lake and Morgan, 1997; Starr and Most 1983; Wright 1999, 15). As Khadiagala and Lyons (2001, 2–3) write:

For a majority of weak African states, regions are sources of authoritative foreign policies, places where power is displayed and exerted. They are also the closest to and generally most salient threat to regime survival, thereby warranting particular attention. Through regional prisms we are able to illuminate the persistence of policy preoccupations such as economic integration and the emergence of new ones as intervention and peacebuilding.

How these polarities of power are expressed ECOWAS and IGAD is discussed subsequently.

**ECOWAS: A Unipolar IO**

As was previously articulated, Nigeria is the unquestioned powerhouse state in West Africa, and it has historically sought to use this pull over the workings of its REC, ECOWAS, which is here delineated as being unipolar. Indeed, as will be made more explicit in the Nigerian case study, chapter 4, Nigeria has shown it capacity for a unilateral pull over ECOWAS in numerous instances since the organization’s founding in 1975. As per Figures 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 below, Nigeria so clearly outstrips all of its neighbors in the three main facets of international power projection capability who have sought to understand rationales in regional institutional building and design across world regions.

However, some have suggested that reliance on regionalism in Africa poses its own dangers. In his study on the rationales leading to African IGO intervention - which concludes that all interventions are simply undertaking for national interest - Tavares (2011, 167) is decidedly skeptical of regional conflict management due its possibilities of manipulation by regional powers. For his part, Wright (1999, 16) notes, “regional leadership by a “hegemonic” power appears potentially dangerous…because of residual national jealousies and hostilities within the respective regions.”

For their part, Buzan and Waever (2005, 259) agree with this distinction of West Africa as unipolar.
(military spending, GDP, and population) that we have included graphs excluding Nigeria to allow for visualization of the “rest” of West Africa in Figures 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6. A related recognition is that although West Africa is a unipolar region, the historical French presence,\textsuperscript{52} and sub-sub-regional Francophone bloc of countries have historically collectively attempt to balance a low-level Nigerian attempt at sub-regional domination (IS37 2015).\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52} Despite Nigeria’s strength, nearly all observers of African international relations have noted France’s disproportionate presence in the region. While all former colonizers inevitably still retain certain links with their form Sub-Saharan African colonies, France’s presence remains “more consistent” than others, and its presence has had an indelible impact on the nature of foreign policy making in its former states (Buzan and Waever 2003, 232; Wright 1999, 3). From the moment of Nigeria’s creation, France’s presence in West Africa has been a primary foreign policy challenge for Nigeria. As the former colonial power of ten of West Africa’s fourteen states, Nigeria has always had to contend with France’s postcolonial presence, which has historically been Nigeria’s biggest threat in the region (Buzan and Waever 2003, 239, 250). As Adebajo (2000, 186) notes, “Nigeria’s leaders have historically considered their country to be the natural hegemon of West Africa, while the subregional Francophone states have looked to France for protections against a country that they regarded as a potential neighborhood bully” (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008).

\textsuperscript{53} This notion has been independently corroborated by a senior ECOWAS official (IS7/2 2015) who relayed that indeed: “In ECOWAS there is a general impression that Nigeria drives ECOWAS: it has the population, the money, it hosts the organization, etc. And so, to a certain extent, this is true. But, even with the might of Nigeria, the eight Francophone countries still have lots of sway, and keep one country from dominating. There is a small group of the Francophone countries that work together. They are organized and it gives them leverage. They talk to each other before the summits about what they want to accomplish. The Francophone states have the numbers….And though it seems like that undermines the unity of ECOWAS, the general approach [from the other ECOWAS Anglophone and Lusophone states] is ‘Ok, you have your subunits. Go ahead and do this if you want. Just please don’t allow it to undermine the integrity of the ECOWAS body’….So, while it may appear that Nigeria is driving it but there are other forces that undermine any tendency that Nigeria might have.
Figure 3.1
ECOWAS Members, Annual Military Spending (1988-2013, in millions USD)

Figure 3.2
ECOWAS Members Excluding Nigeria, Annual Military Spending (1988-2013, in millions USD)
Figure 3.3
ECOWAS Members, GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)
(1990-2014 in USD)

Figure 3.4
ECOWAS Members Excluding Nigeria, GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)
(1990-2011, in USD)
Figure 3.5
ECOWAS Members, Total Population
(1960-2014)

Figure 3.6
ECOWAS Member States, Excluding Nigeria, Total Population
(1960-2014)
IGAD: A Multipolar IO

In considering the presence of a multipolar region, one would be hard pressed to find a more fitting example than the Horn of Africa, which, despite having many pseudo-powerful middle states, lacks an undisputedly clear hegemon (Ali 2014). Indeed, IGAD’s polarity is characterized by the presence of four middle states: Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda. In short, as seen in Figures 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9, no country dominates in any single category of international power project, except perhaps Ethiopia in the area of population. And indeed, many observers have corroborated this perception of IGAD as a multipolar. As Wagner (2013) suggests, IGAD is “not often seen as having ‘regional power or polarity’ because of its varied and often disconnected or disjointed history, policies, and cultures,” and for his part, Clapham (2001) has described the Horn as a complex divided by a rivalry between Ethiopian and Sudanese hegemonic ambitions. Thus, as Ali (2014, 12) writes:

In the case of IGAD, the hegemonic role is much more contested than in ECOWAS or SADC, and is weakened by internal domestic conflicts and by other competing inter- and intra-regional interests. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya each project different dimensions of power and aspiration for leading the region. However, none of them is strong enough across the political, economic, and military spheres to project outright domination. Ethiopia had the considerable advantage of being the only state that bordered all of the other states in the region and that Kenya had to divide its attention between the Horn and East Africa while Sudan had to keep an eye on Egypt, Libya, and North Africa. Kenya was also more involved in the Sudan conflict, while Ethiopia took the lead in the Somali conflict. Sudan, despite its aspirations, was not heavily involved due to its internal conflicts (Darfur, South Sudan, and the Nuba mountains). Moreover, Sudan’s antagonistic relationship with some of the regional states and Western superpowers has weakened its influence in the regional organization.

And yet, despite the fact that polarity in IGAD is certainly multipolar, Ethiopia (chapter 5) is increasingly trying to prove itself as the region’s emerging hegemon.
Figure 3.7
IGAD Members, Annual Military Spending
(1988-2013, in millions USD)

Figure 3.8
IGAD Members, GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)
(1990-2014, in USD)
Three main reasons underlie the inclusion of RECs’ polarity as an independent variable in the prediction of strategic utility of IOs. First, states look to regional power distributions to get a sense of the likely efficacy of the REC. In regions where the REC is unipolar, states assume that a REC can be powerfully leveraged if a hegemon has interest in the REC’s production of a certain outcome. RECs, in unipolar or bipolar regions, are most likely to inspire confidence of being capable of achieving a specific outcome. Alternatively, in regions where no powerful state is present, RECs have a different character. When a region is marked by the presence of multiple middle power states – like in the Horn – RECs can have widely varying responses to any given issue and thus are less reliable. Finally, in regions where there is no hegemon and a number of weak and/or middle states, all states are likely to understand that in the event of a threat, REC’s actions will likely be minimal, if the REC acts at all.

Second, the nature of regional power distribution is important in that it helps foreign policymakers of member states gauge which other IO members, if any, they
might be able to free-ride upon in the face of a threat. The intuition is that in regions with a hegemon – those that are unipolar or bipolar - even if a state is threatened, if it calculates that the hegemon is also threatened, it might simply be able to rely on other actors within the IO, or outside of the IO.54

Finally, looking at polarity within regional IOs is useful in that it remains generally constant, and thus allows us to understand states’ foreign policymaking outlooks towards IOs in longitudinal ways. In short, it is quite difficult to radically alter polarities within IOs (barring, say, state collapse on one hand or the acquisition of a nuclear weapon on the other). The relatively stable nature of regional power distribution in RECs means that states’ understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs will tend to remain constant over time, thus serving as a useful heuristic to anticipate state behavior, even as regimes within countries rise and fall.


While the last section emphasized the generally unipolar nature of ECOWAS and the multipolar nature of IGAD, states’ location with the AU’s polarity (IV3) is also determinative of how they approach the organization specifically, and African IOs more broadly. Here, we assert that the African Union is indeed a non-polar IO: that is, with so many members, none of whom exerts a preponderance of power in any single category of military spending, GDP, or population, the AU is indeed a non-polar IO: no single state, or even combination of states can claim any degree of dominance.

54 The same is true in the southern African region, and, to a lesser extent, in East Africa. Conversely, in Central Africa, intuition suggests that if facing a threat, any given state, in assessing regional power distributions, will understand that neither the REC nor any other state will likely be of much assistance, and thus will likely turn instead to the African Union or external powers.
within the organization, precisely because of its massive membership size and lack of any institution allowing a veto, like the UN Security Council. Figures 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 underline this fact, emphasizing how, despite the existence of some powerful countries, no trends exist to allow one, two, or even three or four countries alone to be dominant. It is also important to note that, because every African state (except Morocco) is part of the AU, to a certain extent, IV3 becomes unimportant, since the effect that IV3 will have on every state is the same. However, far from irrelevant, this insight is central to this dissertation: underlining the extent to which no African state, even the most powerful, can expect to consistently be able to pursue national security interests through (O)AU is indeed instructive.

**Figure 3.10**
Figure 3.11
GDP in African Union (1990-2011, USD)

Figure 3.12
Having thus delineated the four types of African states (hegemonic, middle, weak, and peripheral) and the nature of polarity within the two RECs in question (IV2) and the (O)AU (IV3), our typologies of states become clearer. Together, these first three independent variables of the theory combine to determine what this theory refers to as “Existing Information,” or what states know about themselves, their capabilities, and the relative capabilities and constraints posed by attempting to work within IOs at the REC and (O)AU levels. This information is aggregated in Figure 3.13 below.

**Figure 3.13**
“Existing Information”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV1:</th>
<th>IV2: ECOWAS (Unipolar)</th>
<th>IV2: IGAD (Multipolar)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV1A: Powerful</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV1B: Middle</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV1D: Peripheral (Archipelagic)</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Ø</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV1D: Peripheral (Collapsed)</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau Liberia</td>
<td>South Sudan Somalia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Independent Variable #4 (IV4): National Security Interests

The fourth independent variable under consideration is the nature of the national security interest itself. While the previous three variables constitute what I call “Existing” Information,” assessments of the national security interest at hand (IV4) are the part of the theory referred to as “New Information.” In short, when faced with a new development that could be considered a “threat” or a “national security interest,” our theory suggests that leaders of states, armed with their “Existing Information,” make calculations in relation to “New Information” that will ultimately determine their perception of the strategic utility of IOs. For the purpose of this dissertation, we suggest that there are seven main types of national security interests that African states face. While others might exist, it seems to be the case that the vast majority of national security threats that states face fall into one of the below categories.

IV4A: Secessionist Insurgencies

It goes without saying that domestic insurgencies have historically been one of the primary threats that African states have faced. The first of these are domestic, secessionist-minded insurgencies: intuitively, these are groups that want to officially and legally break away from the parent state, in order to form their own independent polity. What is the perceived strategic utility of African IOs in addressing these? For one, African IOs – especially the African Union – can be used to delegitimize secessionist insurgencies as countervailing intra-African IR norms. Historically, both sets of IOs – both AU and sub-regional IOs – could theoretically be used to invoke norms of the inviolability of colonial borders, and thus delegitimize secessions
insurgencies. Moreover, IOs could theoretically intervene in the situation to put down the insurgency, if requested by the state. As will be shown, especially during the era of ironclad sovereignty of the OAU, leaders frequently found strategic utility in the OAU\textsuperscript{55} as a means to delegitimize secessionist insurgencies, but were sure never to allow it to get involved militarily.

IV4B: Non-Secessionist Insurgencies

A second type of national security threat is a second type of insurgency of the non-secessionist variety. In opposition to the above type, non-secessionist insurgencies do not seek a total break from the state, but may rather seek more equitable representation in government, better treatment, or a redistribution of the state’s resources in their favor. In dealing with non-secessionist insurgencies, African states could theoretically turn to either their REC or the AU to request internal intervention, mediation, or political delegitimizing of the threat. As will be shown, most often, African states of all typologies have generally preferred to circumvent African IOs when dealing with this genre of threat.

IV4C: Regime Security

One of the guiding principles of understanding the notion of “security” in the Global South is that in the vast majority of cases states most significant “threats” come from challenges to regime security (Ayoob 1995; Thomas 2003; Gandois 2009; Carter

\textsuperscript{55} Liberian President Samuel Doe called on ECOWAS heads of state to stop the rebellion of Taylor, invoking the language of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (1981), he claimed that Taylor’s rebellion threatened to dismantle the entire West African sub-region. He thus requested an ECOWAS mandated force to restore the peace (Coleman 2007, 75). Another example is Cameroon’s leveraging of the OAU’s discourse of the inviolability of colonially established borders in its fight with Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula, which it won in October 2002 after being referred to the International Court of Justice (Iliffe 2010, 22).
In attempting to protect regime security, African IOs theoretically have numerous uses. For one, African leaders can find African IOs useful as focal points for backlashing strategies, using them as ideological foils, to help foment domestic sympathies for nationalist sentiment at home, particularly in protecting the regime. The notion of using IOs as tools for “backlashing” is relatively simple: IOs can serve as representative of a certain larger socio-political philosophy, which states and their leaders can use as ideological, rhetorical, and/or political foils against which to pursue other alternative modes of development and politics. As will be discussed, Eritrea has been particularly prone to backlash against IOs of which it is a member. Beyond just backlashing against African IOs to protect regime security, states use IOs to backlash against other African states, African IOs global IOs that might threaten the security of the leader. (Moreover, non-statist groups also use African IOs as focal

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56 Numerous examples exist. For one, Chad backlashed against the AU, threatening to leave the organization if Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir was granted the chairmanship in 2007, as was assumed would be the case. Ultimately, the backlash worked: al-Bashir did not receive the chairmanship, which instead went to Ghana’s John Kufor. Second, Morocco has accused Algeria of “tarnishing its image” in the OAU and African Union, as Algeria supported the Sahrawi Democratic Republic as the legitimate government of Western Sahara (Bakr, forthcoming). Third, the late Meles Zenawi and Moammar Qaddafi were notorious rivals in the context of OAU politics: Qaddafi, was constantly envious of moving the (O)AU headquarters to Tripoli from Addis, and thus Zenawi was known to be the most vociferous anti-Qaddafi leader on the continent (Davison 2015).

57 In another instance of IOs backlashing against IOs, Mauritania withdrew its membership from ECOWAS in 2000 as a result of pressure from another African IO, the Arab-Maghreb Union. In 1999, Mauritania submitted a one-year to leave ECOWAS. Its reasoning was that it want to more acutely focus its foreign policy efforts on the North African Arab-Maghreb Union, which it viewed as a better forum to serve its interests. This move was particularly odd, given that membership in African IOs has never been an exclusive affair: having multiple memberships is indeed the norm, thus there would be no intuitive reason for this departure. “The Arab-Maghreb Union [that was bent on promoting the superiority of minority Arabs in Africa] finally succeeded in convincing Mauritania to pull out of ECOWAS in 1999” (AFROL News 2010; Panapress 2014). Mauritania has, as of 2014, been seeking to regain membership in ECOWAS. As Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghf, the former Mauritanian prime minister said in 2014, “Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghf we left ECOWAS but AMU has never existed beyond the official discourse” (Panapress 2014).

58 This was a notable strategy undertaken by pariah states and leaders like Robert Mugabe, who has unapologetically used the (O)AU to decry perceived Western imperialism; Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, who galvanized AU sentiment when he was accused by the ICC of inciting post-election violence in Kenya; and Omar al-Bashir, who also galvanized AU sentiment to reject his indictment by ICC for crimes in Darfur.
points against which to backlash\textsuperscript{59}). Of note, the tendency to backlash against African IOs is more pronounced for middle and weaker states, since they are the ones that tend not to be in control of the direction of IOs. Conversely, because powerful states, like Nigeria and South Africa have a substantial degree of agency within their RECs and to a lesser extent, the AU, backlashing against organizations that they control would make little sense.

A second means of using IOs to protect regime security is by committing troops to IO-sponsored peacekeeping missions. Both Lemke (2002) and Victor (2010) assert that African states commit troops to international peacekeeping operations (PKOs) as domestic diversionary tactics. On one hand, getting militaries outside of the country reduces the likelihood of their own overthrow,\textsuperscript{60} and creates a new domestic focal point – the international conflict – to preempt critique of domestic rule. On the other hand, committing peacekeeping troops can protect the regime from external critiques from the international community by making them “good” global citizens (Coleman 2007).\textsuperscript{61} Given that both the AU and RECs have deployed peacekeeping missions, both could theoretically be useful in this regard. Finally, African IOs can be used to protect the regime, by serving as sources of resource extraction to help protect the regime,

\textsuperscript{59} For instance, the al-Shabaab Islamist group has widely targeted both IGAD and the African Union as secularist institutions and has been particularly vehemently targeting soldiers of the latter in its fight for control of Somalia.

\textsuperscript{60} For instance, Adebajo (2002, 85) has suggested that one of numerous rationales that undergirded Babangida’s eagerness to keep Nigerian troops in ECOWAS’ mission in Liberia was due to his desire to create a domestic national guard, which was likely to be used for his personal protection, and thus, would work in the perpetuation of his regime. By keeping “regular” Nigerian military busy and out of the country, he would be able to facilitate the creation of what amounted to his own presidential guard.

\textsuperscript{61} However, it should also be noted that sending troops to African peacekeeping missions can actually also be looked at as inducing vulnerability from some African leaders. As IS40 (2015) has said: “There is the also the rumor that when soldiers return [home] they are difficult to control, because they have money. Thus, they don’t care about the commanders, and they don’t care about the civilians. They are undisciplined and difficult to be commanded, so they are looked at as being dangerous [by leaders].”
including as a way to improve national military capabilities and gain new equipment, as sources for neo-patrimonial activities.

**IV4D: Dangerous Neighbors**

Located in dangerous neighborhoods, another primary threat that African states face is intuitively, dangerous neighbors. In addressing these threats, African IOs theoretically have several uses. For one, they can be used in the traditional liberal vein

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62 Some have suggested that states commit peacekeepers to international missions to reap economic gain rewards such as better pay and more equipment from wealthier international contributing partners (Lemke 2002; Lule 2014; Tavares 2011, 166; Maru 2014; Victor 2010). For example, Franke and Ganzle (2012, footnote 29), relay: “Nigeria has used material and training originally provided for ECOWAS activities to fight rebels in the Niger Delta. Uganda has used troops trained and equipped through Western capacity building programs in its counterinsurgency campaigns against the Lord’s Resistance Army while Senegal has done likewise in its operations in the Casamance region.” For his part, IS40 (2014) has noted that Burundi’s participation in the AMISOM peacekeeping mission has allowed it to purchase helicopters for its own uses at home, while IS 31 (2015) has corroborated the assumption that Burundi’s eagerness to participate in peacekeeping operations comes from a need for regime security. Another way that African states can get gains from participating in African IOs - especially peacekeeping missions - is their receipt of training that helps them to develop their own militaries. Especially given the extent to which African peacekeeping operations are supported (financially and doctrinally) by Western donors, participation in African IOs can allow African countries to develop their militaries by learning and adhering to best international practices, some of which can then allow states to participate in UN peacekeeping missions (IS40 2014). Of note, one senior Western military official attached to the AU disagreed that much getting material inducements compelled African states to participate in peacekeeping operations. As he said: “All that they would really be able to bring home would be a few silly radios” (IS3 2014).

63 Another strategy for resource extraction from IOs occurs in using the IO’s expenses as a cover for personal gains, particularly for neo-patrimonial purposes. Indeed, one common critique of about African IOs is that country-level appointees are often not the most qualified persons for the job, but instead, are appointed for personal reason by the head of state. Reaping the benefits of travel, hotels, and generous per diems from both the host government and the IO, positions as IO representatives have been frequently as political concessions or favors for co-ethnics or friends (Gandois 2009, 138). Moreover, leaders can use the positions of power and leadership within IO’s peacekeeping missions as sources of patronage for contacts, as was the case for many of the senior leadership positions within ECOMOG, which Babangida granted to fervent loyalists within the military (Adebajo 2002, 246). It has been alleged that Babangida tried to cover up $250 to $500 million in oil profits from its sale of oil during the Gulf War by claiming it was spent on the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. Moreover, Nigerian journalists have also accused Babangida of personally profiting from the holding of the contracts to feed Nigerian soldiers during the ECOMOG deployment (Adebajo 2002, 85, 245). IS40 (2014) has given another anecdotal example of the extent to which soldiers themselves profit from participation in African IO’s peacekeeping missions: a certain neighborhood of Burundi’s capital of Bujumbura is named “Somalia” due to the fact that it is home to numerous houses that were paid for by the money that Burundian peacekeepers made in their participation in the AU-UN AMISOM mission.
of helping to facilitate collective security schemes: by facilitating burdening sharing,\textsuperscript{64} working towards a security culture,\textsuperscript{65} getting the appropriate international approval for interventions\textsuperscript{66} and serving as coordinating mechanisms to work through address

\textsuperscript{64} One liberal view of the role that international organizations can play is that they can help states pursue burden-sharing (Coleman 2007, 65; Keohane 1984). IOs are a useful in that they provide a forum to help coordinate efforts aimed at promoting mutually beneficial cooperation. And indeed, African states have often used IOs to help compel other African states to burden-share for the purposes of the achievement of collective security issues. Nigeria, for instance, is known to have used ECOWAS - among other reasons - to help compel burden-sharing for the ECOMOG 1

\textsuperscript{65} In short, a "security regime," as defined by Jervis (1983, 173) is "those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behavior by the belief that others will reciprocate." Indeed, despite the fact that African countries do indeed use African IOs instrumentally for their own self-interested pursuits, it remains the case that they serve highly important functions as relates to the assurance of collective security. First and foremost, given the deeply transnational nature of threats in Sub-Saharan Africa given the generally porous borders that characterize the continent, the need for such transnational cooperation is intuitive. Thus, the use of IOs, in many instances, can happen in a functionalist manner consistent with their stated purposes. For example, Adebajo (2002, 246, and throughout) has argued forcefully that, contrary to some observers' assertions, Nigeria's primary goal in assuming the lead of ECOMOG was actually to genuinely promote West African collective security, since ultimately, it spent far more on the IOs' peacekeeping mission than it gained. Importantly, from the point of view of the three state types just delineated, it is important to note the emergence of a security culture in the absence of a powerful state is difficult to imagine. Others interviewed corroborated the fact that far from IOs being used exclusively for self-interested purposes, members do in fact view them as important for the promotion of collective regional security (IS7/2 and IS19/1 2015; IS24 2015; IS42 2015).

\textsuperscript{66} Some authors suggest that states act through international organizations for the purposes of legitimating interventions. Put otherwise, states pursue actions that look like collective security efforts through international institutions because they adhere to the normative commitments within the international community that suggests that unilateral intervention is not acceptable. Put otherwise, the benefit of [an IO] mandate from the point of view of a state launching a peace enforcement operation is that it certifies an intervention as fulfilling an international interest and thus corresponds to the prevailing rules acknowledged by the international community." For her part, Coleman has artfully described that when it comes to peace enforcement activities, the primary utility of especially small IOs is a grantors of legitimacy. As she writes, the "benefit of [an IO] mandate from the point of view of a state launching a peace enforcement operation is that it certifies an intervention as fulfilling an international interest and thus corresponds to the prevailing rules acknowledged by the international community." (Coleman (2007, 54). Moreover, she articulates (57) the ways in which especially smaller IOs are leveraged by weaker states in the intentional system to of form what she calls a "legitimacy pyramid." As she describes it, a "legitimacy pyramid" occurs when states with little influence in the Security Council but desirous of launching a peace enforcement operation: "[States] scale the first rung by obtaining a mandate from a regional or even sub-regional organization, and then use that organization as a platform from which to lobby for endorsement by even larger international organizations, with the UN forming the apex of the pyramid. (In all three lead African case studies in her book, all lead African states do exactly this)." Or, as Coleman writes, some believe that: "Powerful states find [IOs] useful because and inexpensive masks for the exercise of their power. In this view, states operate through international organizations because they give a veneer of multilateralism to essentially self-interested endeavors, which is useful for minimizing the international affront caused by this exercise of power."
collective events, including transnational flows of refugees, arms, or disease.\textsuperscript{67} However, African IOs can also be used in a more realist vein: IOs’ most powerful states can use IOs as smokescreens for legitimacy in undertaking self-interested regional policies,\textsuperscript{68} while smaller states can use IOs as entities on which to free-ride\textsuperscript{69} when faced with dangerous neighbors.

**IV4E: Global/Non-African Actors**

For African states, non-local (or global) actors can also pose their own security risks. Particularly, individual global states – especially European powers during the colonial era and France in the postcolonial era – were viewed as threats to individual African states, while more contemporarily, global IOs like the ICC, WTO, or the IMF are viewed as threats. As will be shown, African states have found strategic utility in African IOs by seeking to mobilize their IOs to prevent the encroachment of what they deem to be their spheres of influence by outside forces. At the pan-African level, the

\textsuperscript{67} While this dissertation seeks to underline the under-investigated realist outlooks towards African IOs, it is also the case that they do use African IOs for the functionalist collective security purposes for which they were ostensibly created.

\textsuperscript{68} Others are far more skeptical of the view that IOs are somehow able to states’ interests, and instead, view them merely as “smokescreens” for states’ pursuits of national interests by other means (Coleman 2007, 58). Indeed, numerous authors have emphasized that contrary to prevailing assumptions about the “collective” nature of the ends meant to be achieved through African IOs, states simply use them for the pursuit of their own personal and national security interests (Babarinde 1999; Coleman, 67-70; IS40 2014; Tavares 2011, 167; Victor 2010) Far from suggesting that non-realist imperatives are irrelevant to African states’ strategic uses of African IOs, instead, we here argue simply that taking realist approaches to IOs is instructive. For as Tavares (2011, 166) writes of African states’ engagement in IOs’ peacekeeping operations: “In the decision-making process leading up to a [collective security] military deployment, decisions are more often taken in the national capitals than in the headquarters of regional organizations…in the majority of cases, national and individual interests, rather than any institutional principle, served as the basis for the interventions.”

\textsuperscript{69} “In inter-African relations, two’s a conflict, three is company, and fifty-odd is a crowd of freeriders” (Zartman 2002, 139). While Zartman’s assessment is hyperbolic to a point, it rings true when it comes to understanding the strategic logic of membership in African IOs, especially to smaller states. To be sure, the tendency for Africa’s smallest states to freeride on the collective benefits of IOs well noted. In words of Nau (2009, G-9), freeriders are "states that allow another to pay the cost of a particular transaction while at the same time receiving the benefits of that state’s actions." Yet some disagree that African states freeride in the context of IOs. One senior Western military official (IS3 2014) expressed strong disagreement that African states tend to freeride in IOs.
very raison d’être of the OAU was to galvanize African states to rid the continent of colonialism which it did during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, while at the sub-regional level, Nigeria has used ECOWAS to bulwark against France, and Sudan has successfully used both IOs to avoid isolation in the aftermath of Omar al-Bashir’s indictment by the ICC. Moreover, when dealing with threats from IOs, African states – from the largest to the smallest – have used IOs as a means to filter up issues to global fora, especially security-related concerns.\(^\text{70}\)

**IV4F: Economic Interests**

Another seemingly omnipresent threat for African states is that of economic insecurity. In the quest to address fluctuations in economic well-being, African IOs could theoretically be strategically useful in helping to encourage economic integration, providing loans to states, or serving as forums in which to lobby global organizations to filter up economic issues to global forums. However, in reality, as will shown in the subsequent case studies, the strategic utility of African IOs in practice is virtually non-existent.

\(^{70}\) Across all African state types, IOs are seen as a useful way to “filter up” issues to various levels of international society (IS28 2015; IS7/2 and IS19/1 2015). In short, these organizations are used as issue stepping stones of sorts. When an African state has a pressing issue that it needs to have addressed, at ever higher levels, it will typically (though not exclusively) first take that issue to the largest IO from which it believes it can get approval on that issue. (Thus, the smallest African states might begin with their sub-sub-regional organizations first; middle and powerful states might begin with their sub-regional IOs; and the most powerful countries like Nigeria and South Africa might go directly to the AU). By getting approval from collectives of African states at lower levels of international society and then bringing that approval to the next level of analysis of international society, African states have used IOs to filter up national interest to ever-higher IO levels that simple bilateral efforts could have never produced. This tendency to use IOs to “filter up” issues is a pronounced tendency that will be investigated in nearly every subsequent country case study.

\(^{71}\) Notably, African states collectively filtered up their concerns about the Rwandan genocide, and, through the leadership of the OAU and especially Tanzania, successfully brought the UN into the fold to initiate the Arusha Accords and the subsequent UN peacekeeping force (Zartman 2000, 147).
IV4G: Reputational Interests

A final national security interest relates not to material or physical threats to a state, but rather, to the importance of reputational interests, both personal and statist. For their part, African IOs are perceived to be strategically useful in numerous ways including creating and locking in regional hierarchies when IOs are founded, helping states to avoid international isolation, promoting leader’s visions of personal grandeur, filtering up reputational interests of both states and leaders, and as means by which to show the international community that a leader or a state is abiding by international law or norms.

The inclusion of “national security interests” (IV4) as a primary variable is important, in large part, because it is the most determinative aspect of how states will think about the strategic utility of African IOs in a given instance. While states’ calculations of “Existing Information” sets the stage for what might theoretically be possible, it is the “New Information” about the interests that causes the election of

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72 Another way to think about how African states strategically leverage IOS is for the preservation of regional and continental hierarchies: by founding IOs, states have been able to “lock in” certain modes of hierarchy that endure for decades, even after the IOs’ founding, in a strategy that Ikenberry (2001) (in Gandois) refers to as “binding.” As one looks at the founding of the United Nations’ Security Council and the immutability of its P-5, even more than seventy years after the end of World War II, the capacity for IOs to create, entrench, preserve, and protect international hierarchies is evident. For his part, “Gilpin has suggested that international organizations institutionalize hegemony: powerful states invent a set of international norms, rules and institutions that favor their interests and that other states become accustomed to obeying because they are backed by they might of the hegemon. This allows the hegemon to dominate world affairs without having to reassert its power every time other states face policy decisions. Institutions thus simply ensure more effective hegemonic control” (Coleman 2007, 69). In the creation of IOs, states that play a foundational role in their founding accrue posthumous benefits, especially as relates to the location of their secretariats. Indeed, nearly all African IOs that have been formed are based in their founding members’ strongest state, which continues to give prestige to that state for years after the IO has been created. Thus, Ethiopia hosts the (O)AU; Nigeria hosts ECOWAS, while the Nigeria’s co-founded in the ECOWAS project, Togo, was initially given the task of hosting ECOWAS’ Fund for Cooperation (Gandois 2009, 114).

73 For instance, Nigeria’s Obasanjo was well-known for trying to use both ECOWAS and the AU for his own personal ambitions to become the UN Secretary General (Ilife 2010, 222), while Nigerian President Abacha arguably used this gravitas within ECOWAS to help his friend, Liberian President Samuel Doe, remain in power.
specific decisions on DV1, and therefore, DV2 and DV3. Moreover, our distinction of states’ “national security interests in IOs” is important, because it helps not only to transcend the internal-external “national security divide” but also, allows for the incorporation of the breadth of inputs from all levels of analysis – from FPA to IR – as we consider outlooks towards IOs.

The Complete Theory:

Having elucidated the three DVs and the four IVs, the presentation of our theory is now complete. Two visualizations are below: the first is the theory presented blankly, without reference to any specific state type, and thus without hypotheses (Figure 3.14). The second (Figure 3.15) is a sample theory, showing how, assuming a specific combination of “Existing Information” when faced with “New Information” about the national security interest, our theory generates hypotheses about how these genres of states will understand the strategic utility of African IOs. For the purposes of demonstration, it shows hypotheses for the “Weak States in IGAD.”
**STATE HYPOTHESES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXISTING INFORMATION</th>
<th>NEW INFORMATION</th>
<th>PREDICTED STRATEGIC UTILITY OF AFRICAN IOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV1</td>
<td>IV2</td>
<td>IV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is my international power projection capability?</strong></td>
<td><strong>What is the polarity of my primary REC?</strong></td>
<td><strong>What is the primary nature of the national security interest?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: Powerful</td>
<td>A: Unipolar</td>
<td>A: Domestic Secessionist Insurgencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Middle</td>
<td>B: Bipolar</td>
<td>B: Domestic Non-Secessionist Insurgencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Weak</td>
<td>C: Multipolar</td>
<td>C: Regime Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Peripheral</td>
<td>D: Nonpolar</td>
<td>D: Dangerous Neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>E: Global/Non-African Actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>F: Economic Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>G: Reputational Interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If $HDV1 = 1$, then (1) or NO (0). If $HDV1 = 0$, then Ø (N/A).
### WEAK STATES IN IGAD HYPOTHESES (Djibouti and Eritrea)

**EXISTING INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV1</th>
<th>IV2</th>
<th>IV3</th>
<th>IV4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is my international power projection capability?</td>
<td>What is the polarity of my primary REC?</td>
<td>What is the polarity of the African Union?</td>
<td>What is the primary nature of the national security interest?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NEW INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDV1</th>
<th>HDV2</th>
<th>HDV3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will I pursue this national security interest in an African IO?</td>
<td>In my primary REC?</td>
<td>In the AU?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A: Powerful</th>
<th>A: Unipolar</th>
<th>A: Nonpolar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B: Middle</td>
<td>B: Bipolar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Weak</td>
<td>C: Multipolar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Peripheral</td>
<td>D: Nonpolar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Global/Non-African Actors</td>
<td>D: Dangerous Neighbors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F: Economic Interests</td>
<td>G: Reputational Interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Prediction for AFRICAN IOS**

- **IV1**: Powerful States
- **IV2**: Unipolar
- **IV3**: Nonpolar
- **IV4**: A: Domestic Insurgencies

**HDV1**: YES (1A): I have realist aims that an IO will help me accomplish
**HDV2**: NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action
**HDV3**: NO (0)
YES (1)

**Conclusion**

Our theory delineated, our discussion now turns to its applicability in eight country case studies. We first turn to Nigeria, in the next section, entitled “Powerful States and African IOs.”
SECTION TWO:

POWERFUL STATES AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFRICAN IOs

This chapter focuses on the strategic approaches to African IOs of what are referred to here as Africa’s “powerful” states. At the beginning of this conversation, it is imperative to recognize that, contrary to most discussions of power in international relations, “hegemony” can exist below the systemic level: that is, though hegemony is typically associated with a preponderance of power at the global level of analysis, it can also exist at other levels of international society, particularly the region. To the extent that powerful states can and do exist at the non-global level, observers of African international relations typically agree that only two states on the continent—Nigeria and South Africa—could potentially justify that moniker. To that end, in addition to having been referred to as “hegemons” (Bilal and Vanheukelom 2015, 12; Buzan and Waever 2003, 249; Gandois 2009, 42; Khadiagala and Lyons 2001, 9;
Tavares 2011; Wright 1999, 16) others have referred to both Nigeria and South Africa differentially as Africa’s “champions” (Wright 1999, 10); “local giants” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 232; Ajibewa 2006); and “local great powers” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 232). For our purposes, the primary powerful state that will be discussed is Nigeria.

Yet, just how do powerful states think about IOs? First, in general, it is the case that powerful African states (in a microcosm of the international sphere) will typically be at the center of the creation of African IOs. As per the assumptions of hegemonic stability theory, one expects the mobilization of resources necessary to create a transnational organization to necessarily emanate from a powerful member state. For Abbot and Snidal (1998, 8) international organizations are created by strong states for their own benefit, though they must carefully strategize how to elicit participation from weaker states. For his part, Robert Gilpin has suggested that powerful states create IOs to, as Coleman (2007, 69) interprets, “institutionalize hegemony,” in effect creating an institution that favors their interests and which allows their domination of affairs without the imperatives of reasserting preeminence every time a new situations arises. Most observers of African international organizations and international relations view IOs on the continent in similar terms, understanding that powerful states can use IOs to shape the contours and politics of their regional environments (Gandois 2009; Ali 2014).

In addition to creating African IOs, powerful African states have incentives to ensure their perpetuation and functioning, precisely because of the inordinate sway that they exert over them. Having established control of African IOs, it is typically the case that states tend to actively participate in them assuming that they maintain in control of them. To that end, typical behavior of powerful states in African IOs
includes seeking positions of leadership within the organization, paying a disproportionate share of its operating budget, hosting annual meetings, committing peacekeepers to missions (when appropriate). Indeed, as a result of having created such IOs, they can, if successful, continue to dictate the ways that such IOs function, well after their founding. As Abbot and Snidal (1998, 5) suggest: “Especially the powerful [member states] can limit the authority of IOs, interfere with their operations, ignore their mandates, or restructure and dissolve them (Abbott and Snidal 1998, 5). For their part, As Bilal and Vanheukelom (2015, 12) write of Africa’s powerful states:

Such hegemons can significantly drive and shape regional cooperation, and are often seen as gateways (for example for multinational investors) into the region. Yet, hegemons can also block or undermine efforts at cooperation and integration, or turn these exclusively to their own benefits. Such powerful actors may have more resources or capacities to pursue scenarios that either ignore the preferences and benefits of regional partner countries, or, alternatively, that push collective action by, for example, footing the bill for some of the costs of creating regional public goods.

And yet, even while Africa’s powerful states have the capacity to “run” their RECs according to their wishes, the extent to what they can and cannot do is constrained by both their needs to be perceived of a “legitimate” (a liberal attributes of hegemony) as well as their material capacities to actually move organizations (realist attributes of hegemony) (Gandois 2009, 1).

Importantly, just how powerful African states approach IOs is important for the rest of the members of the IO, as decisions of the powerful create ripple effects that bear upon all others’ actions. As concerns the general functioning of African IOs, powerful states’ decisions are the most important, how hegemons react to “threats” will inevitably inform how less powerful states act: local great powers are thought to give
coherence to regional security outcomes in ways that regions devoid of them do not
evidence (Buzan and Waever 2003, 232). Conversely, if and when IOs cease to serve
their interests, powerful African states have the most agency to act outside of them.
The prevalence of these sorts of behaviors in African IOs is viewed next in our
Nigerian case study.
CHAPTER FOUR: NIGERIA

Nigeria is the undisputed power player in West Africa. Its dominance – at least on paper – is unquestioned, and sobriquets of its dominance have been wide-ranging. Among them include references to it as West Africa’s “big brother”; “giant”; “godfather”; “superpower”; “brother’s keeper”; “the unrivaled superpower of West Africa” (Adebajo 2008, 15; Alao, 2006; Ajibewa 2008; Dokken 2008, 64). Ali Mazrui even once went so far as to suggest that, “Nigeria would probably be more influential than either Britain or France” (in Wright 1999, 16).

The following chapter investigates the ways that Nigeria has approached both the OAU and ECOWAS in the pursuit of its strategic interests since independence. In so doing, it traces – in strokes that are as broad yet comprehensible as possible – the history of Nigerian foreign policy through its various regimes. Therein, it pays particular attention to the roles of ECOWAS and the AU in Nigeria, when faced with a specific threat, the country has employed strategies to avail itself of these two organizations.

Nigeria Within the Theory

As has been elucidated, this theory categorizes Nigeria as a powerful state (IV1=A) in a unipolar REC (IV2=B), the non-polar AU (IV3 = A). As evidenced by Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, and Figure 4.3, Nigeria displays all of the attributes of a powerful state expected by realist international relations scholars: it is the unquestioned leader in
military spending, GDP, and population, alone trumping all other West African states combined.
In light of these forms of “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” (IV4) in the form of a national security interest, our theory predicts the following understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs for Nigeria. The accuracy of these predictions is tested in the subsequent case studies.

Figure 4.4
Hypothesized Nigerian Perceptions of the Strategic Utility of African IOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POWERFUL STATES in ECOWAS HYPOTHESES (Nigeria)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXISTING INFORMATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is my international power projection capability?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A: Powerful</td>
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<tr>
<td>B: Middle</td>
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<tr>
<td>C: Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Peripheral</td>
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<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
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A Broad Overview of Nigerian Foreign Policy

Quickly upon gaining its independence, Nigeria’s early leadership – under President Tafawa Balewa - began to show all the signs of a “typical” postcolonial African foreign policymaking process: with the creation and effectuation of the state’s foreign and security policies tightly concentrated in the hands of the executive. As was the case with the vast majority of Sub-Saharan Africa’s leaders, Balewa sought (and succeeded) in maintaining a tight control over Nigeria’s foreign policymaking processes.† To the extent that he held the control of Nigeria’s international relations squarely within his purview, Balewa concentrated all foreign policymaking power within the Office of the Prime Minister, most notably granting himself the Ministership of the External Affairs from 1960 to 1961 and 1964 to 1966, thus allowing the Balewa’s Office to “effectively superimpose itself over the Ministry of External Affairs” (Inamete 2001, 21-23).‡ Other would-be foreign policy decision-making structures were also sidelined. For instance, Balewa’s cabinet, rather than serving as a force of consultation, was “simply informed of the decisions of the president” (Inamete 2001, 24). To the extent that Balewa was interested in maintaining control over Nigeria’s foreign relations, he was able to accomplish this, and thus his personal outlooks on international affairs were easily translated into Nigeria’s foreign policy. With the lack of veto points in the Nigerian foreign policy making process, he was able to make “swift and sharp-edged decisions” (Inamete 2001, 25).

† Of note, however, is that despite the fact that Balewa was in control of the processes, his decisions were usually moderate, and reflected the fact that, while power was officially concentrated under his control, he was nevertheless far less powerful than has been suggested by Inamete (2001), due, not least of all, to the powerful pull of religious and regional leaders around the country who wielded substantial power themselves. Moreover, while Balewa was capable of enacting unilateral foreign policies, he was been critiqued as being overly conciliatory and prone to compromises (Gambari 2008, 63-66).

‡ Inamete (2001, 25) does note that to the extent that the Ministry of External Affairs was involved in Nigerian foreign policymaking, it was done to implement the policies that Balewa himself had created.
And, as was also typical for the vast majority of foreign policymaking bureaucracies throughout the continent, a lack of coordination and coherence marked the Balewa foreign policymaking era (Gambari 2008, 63).

Substantively, prior to Nigeria’s independence, Balewa articulated the facets that would come to serve as the enduring bases for Nigeria’s foreign policy. These included: the defense of Nigeria’s territorial sovereignty; respect for sovereignty of all other African states; its commitment to aid in the independence of other African states; “the promotion of the rights of all blacks and others” under colonial rule; the promotion of African unity; the promotion of world peace; and a commitment to non-alignment (Gambari 2008). Collectively, these early articulations about the nature of Nigerian foreign and security policy would be translated into what has come be known

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3 Balewa’s ability to monopolize Nigeria’s foreign policy was underwritten by several factors. Inamete (2001, 21) notes that he was able to accomplish this in no small part because of personal characteristics of being “conciliatory, moderate, calm, and placating” which it is suggested led his desire for tight control over foreign policy to be challenged by advisors. Moreover, it was also the case that Balewa filled various positions within his Cabinet and within the External Affairs Ministry (which he directed himself anyway) with diplomats and analysts who shared his worldview, and who crafted dispatches that affirmed - rather than challenged - his outlook on international affairs (Inamete 2001, 27), thus leading to the characterization of the Office of Prime Minister as being a “predominant political leader and a small number of mostly subordinate career bureaucrats who were a pliable staff group” (Inamete 2001, 38). Nor did Parliament have any chance to inform foreign policy (Inamete 2001, 35). Importantly, while Balewa’s Office managed the diplomatic facets of Nigeria’s foreign policy, it was the Ministry of Defense that was more fundamentally involved in the security dimensions (Inamete 2001, 29). It should be noted, however, that the tendency to concentrate power in the hands of the immediate post-independence leader was typical in many African countries. And indeed, despite the deeply personalized nature of foreign policy nature during the Balewa’s era, it was the case that it set the stage for a great and wider-ranging engagement of structures in the Nigerian foreign and security policymaking process in subsequent administrations.

4 As Idang (1973, quoted in Inamete 2001, 34) has noted, during the Balewa era, there was: "No attempt was made to devise an organizational arrangement for inter-ministerial coordination and cooperation. The cabinet, which could have performed this coordination function, was rendered powerless by the "great dominance" of the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa in the process of making foreign policy and by the widespread deference paid to his ability in foreign affairs."

5 In practice, Nigeria’s foreign policy under the leadership of Balewa is often characterized as being timid, cautious, overly-moderate, and while ostensibly non-aligned, praxeologically, pro-West. Though particularly in the ideologically-charged post-independence period, Balewa’s reasoned and calculated approach to African affairs meant that, despite the centrality of Africa generally, Balewa’s African policy was understood as being overly moderate, especially in relation to other more outspoken West African neighbors like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Cote d’Ivoire’s Houphe-Boigny (Inamete 2001, 22; Adebajo 2008, 8; Gambari 2008, 63).
as the guiding principles of Nigerian foreign and security policymaking: the pursuit of Pax-Nigeriana.

In essence, Pax-Nigeriana (or “Nigerian Peace”) is premised upon the notion that Nigeria is the rightful, intuitive, and undisputed hegemon of the West African subregion, and that by displaying leadership and exerting hegemony, it can, and should, provide security and prosperity not only for the region, but also for greater Sub-Saharan Africa. In short, Pax-Nigeriana is an unequivocal statement of Nigeria’s quest to become a hegemon - or regional power - and is a critical component of its foreign and security policy thinking (Adebajo 2008; Adebajo 2002; Adebajo and Mustapha 2008; Gandois 2009; Warner 2016b).

Coined by Nigerian foreign minister Bolaji Akinyemi in 1970 to describe Nigeria’s efforts in helping to establish the Organization of African Unity in 1963, Pax-Nigeriana has come to be used a shorthand for Nigerian military, government, and civil society members who share “a common belief in Nigeria’s ‘manifest destiny’ with special responsibilities to be a ‘big brother’ in West Africa.” To that end, Nigerian foreign policy and defense experts view their country as the giant of West Africa, in charge of managing, or at least, assisting, smaller and less capable neighbors, since they believe that Nigeria is “more experienced and thus responsible for protecting her younger siblings” (Adebajo 2008, 13). Observers of Nigeria have referred to the relationship between Nigeria and its neighbors as that of “Gulliver and the Lilliputians” (Adebajo and Mustapha 2008), while others have somewhat disparagingly characterized Nigeria’s neighbors in weak or diminutive terms. Some for instance, have referred to Benin as the “flea on Nigeria’s back” (Heilbrun 1999).
This notion of a Nigerian preeminence in West African – and indeed, in Pan-African – affairs has been a long-held aspiration. Since its inception as an independent state in 1960, various waves of Nigerian administrations – both military and civilian – have evoked *Pax-Nigeriana* as a guiding principle for the state’s overall grand strategy. Such a constant thread in Nigerian military and foreign policy has this idea been, that many scholars have noted that Nigerian foreign policy – in its pursuit of *Pax-Nigeriana* – has been more marked by continuity than change (Gambari 2008). To that end, Adebajo (2008) underlines that “the aspiration to continental leadership, manifest since independence in 1960, is central to understanding some principal features of Nigeria’s foreign policy,” including the breaking off of diplomatic relations with France in 1961, the creation of ECOWAS in 1975; the support of the frontline states against apartheid in South Africa; and leadership in various peacekeeping missions.” To the extent that Nigeria’s regional aims are deeply hegemonic, various authors have noted Nigeria’s self-comparisons to the United States’ presence in the Caribbean: indeed, *Pax-Nigeriana* is referred to as Nigeria’s version of the Monroe Doctrine (Adebajo 2008, 12). Interestingly, early calls for the intuitive nature and enactment of *Pax-Nigeriana* were rooted in culturally ascribed norms, or what Yoroms (1993, 85) has referred to as “the traditional African concept of collectivism.”

Importantly, the way that Nigerian military and diplomatic experts think about *Pax-Nigeriana* is organized around a rubric referred to as “the concentric circles of foreign policy.” As described by noted Nigerian international relations experts Adebajo (2008) and Gambari (2008), four circles characterize Nigerian grand strategy. From innermost to outermost, these include: Nigeria’s relationships with its immediate neighbors (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, and Sao
Tome and Principe); Nigeria’s relations within broader West Africa; Nigeria in Pan-African politics; and Nigeria’s standing in the world.

Given its unquestioned pursuit for regional and African dominance, and its longing for a legitimate place in global diplomatic spaces, Nigerian foreign and security policy has been noted by many observers as historically being well conceptualized, but poorly coordinated and effectuated. For his part, the mastermind behind ECOWAS, Ibrahim Gambari (2008, 60) has chided Nigeria for a lack of foreign policy coherence and “an absence of sustained unity or purpose abroad” while most discussions of Nigerian foreign and security policymaking emphasize similar points about the lack of foreign policy coordination (Fawole 2008, 108-109; Inamete 2001; Obi 2008). Despite its often-deep penetration into the inner-workings of ECOWAS, the lack of coordination has also been a touchstone of the Nigerian approach. In writing about the country’s West Africa policy, ECOWAS employee Said Adejumobi (2007, in Obi 2008) has relayed that:

Nigeria has fared poorly. It has not articulated its agenda and specific interests in the subregion clearly beyond the broad and vague foreign policy thrust according to which Africa and West Africa form the centerpiece of her foreign policy. As such, there is no systematic and coherent approach to addressing issues from Nigeria’s strategic foreign policy perspective.

More specifically, several features have been common across time, regime, and issue area in Nigeria’s foreign policy pursuits. First, Nigeria has historically held an abiding belief that having weak, unstable neighbors is going to retard its own dominance, thus working to make sure that they do not collapse has been a priority (Inamete 2001, 89-90; Fawole 2008. 106). Second, and relatedly, Nigeria has always held an ostensible commitment to what it refers to as “good neighborliness” (Abegunrin, 2011, 148).
Despite these drives, various scholars have noted that just what is meant by national interest, especially as concerns national security, has generally been left unspecified. Fawole (2008, 96) notes that despite the centrality of the military in Nigerian foreign policy “most discussions of Nigerian’s foreign policy only offer a casual treatment of national security” noting moreover that from Balewa’s original articulation of foreign policy priorities to the creation of the 1999 constitution, what is exactly entailed by Nigeria’s national security interests are unclear. Thus, he notes, each respective government has been left to interpret these questions on its own. Perhaps the lack of clarity on the nature of national security has come as a result of what a trepidation about what articulating actual threats would mean: naming the fact that certain religious and ethnic groups within the country have been some of the greatest threats to national security and stability (Fawole 2008, 102-104). These range from religious groups to “ethnic militias” like the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in the Niger Delta. For his part, Obi (2008) notes that:

Recently, Nigerian decision-makers have devoted greater attention to emerging transnational threats. These have been viewed largely through the tinted lenses of ‘state’ or ‘national security’ and made almost synonymous with transnational criminal activities. Specifically, transnational ‘crimes’ are said to include human trafficking, arms proliferation and trafficking, drug trafficking, advance fee fraud (in Nigerian parlance ‘419’ activities), other financial crimes, terrorism, cross-border armed robbery, and movement of refugees or ‘mobile fighters’.”

Yet, despite the lack of foreign policy coordination and clear articulations of just what constitutes a Nigerian national security outside of the broader rubric of Pax-Nigeriana, Nigerian foreign policy action has been noted as marked by a degree of consistency. Ibrahim Gambari (Gambari 2008 61 in Gulliver) has argued that indeed,
despite varying leaders, Nigeria’s foreign policy between 1960 and 1999 has been more marked by continuity than change. As he writes:

No Nigerian government – neither civilian nor military – has...deviated from [certain] cardinal principles (as articulated by Balewa in 1960). Indeed, Nigeria has a record of achievements and continuity comparable with countries with a longer history of conducting their own foreign policy.” Yet, this is not to suggest that Nigerian foreign policy has remained stagnant: while its broad principles have remained in tact, its leaders have adapted to changing international realities.

And, in the very broadest strokes, Obi (2008) describes the longue durée of Nigerian foreign policy as such:

Nigeria’s history as a postcolonial state and the pro-Western moorings of its foreign policy apparatus have ensured that apart from a brief period of oil-buoyed radical pan-Africanist posturing during the Murtala-Obasanjo military regime (1975 - 1978), the country’s diplomacy has been characterized by moderation, hinged upon national sovereignty and territorial integrity and development. Its multiethnic, federal character, as well as the central place of oil in its formal economy, has influenced the nature and substance of Nigeria’s diplomacy, which has in the main been the exclusive preserve of the dominant elite. This elite, partly hobbled by factional or militarized politics, has shored up its power base through exclusive access to lucrative niches in the economy and state institutions. As a result, perceptions of the national interest have been largely contingent upon the calculations of particular factions of the ruling elite, and an economy that has been largely dependent on oil and Western powers. Some important principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy have been ‘non-alignment, the legal equality of states, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, multilateralism, and the “Africa centerpiece” doctrine.’

Perhaps more so than any other country under investigation in this dissertation, Nigeria’s foreign policymaking process is informed by a more diverse cast of agents, a reality that has proven to be both a blessing and a curse. As will be evidenced in the subsequent case studies, one the most powerful forces in Nigerian foreign

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6 He attributes this to the country’s stable understanding of is national interests; the centralization of power within the federal government, especially over the course of decades of military rule; and the fact that foreign policy is generally not an election issue, which means that successive elite administrations face little pressure to change course from civil societies (Gambari, 2008, 78). Moreover, other constants within Nigeria seem to help with the establishment of continuity, including the tendency for the persistence of economic alignment with the West, as well as continued greed from Nigerian leaders (61).
policymaking has always been the executive, in whichever capacity – military or civilian – he has taken. While the influence of the executive is discussed further in each regime period under investigation, suffice it to say, military leaders have somewhat intuitively exerted a more tight-fisted influence over the foreign and security policies of their countries than their civilian counterparts\(^7\) (Abegunrin 2006b; Inamete 2001; Mustapha 2008).

Apart from the executive, the second-most powerful input into Nigerian foreign and security policymaking has been the military (Inamete 2001, 218). As will be shown, two periods of military rule (1966-1979 and 1983-1999) characterized much of Nigeria’s post-independence history, and thus serves as a cause and effect of the outstripped role that the Nigerian military plays in foreign policymaking arenas. As will be shown, military rulers themselves (especially Gowon, Babangida, and Abacha) were deeply involved in Nigerian foreign and security policymaking, and the military as a tool for the effectuation of grand strategic aims was particularly pronounced. Not only has the military been understood as a realist tool to evidence a show of force, but Nigeria’s location in an often-insecure neighborhood has meant that:

The very prominent and visible security/military components of Nigeria’s foreign policies have been due to how the foreign policy elites conceptualize the country’s foreign policy interests and goals. Nigeria often believes that weak and unstable countries (especially neighboring countries) often mean those countries are very dependent on non-African countries, and therefore constitute threats to Nigeria’s national and security interests. Thus, one major foreign policy goal of Nigeria has been a continual and consistent policy of helping neighboring countries and other African countries, that are experiencing serious instabilities and weak national foundations to be come more stable and strong (and thus also become less dependent on non-African countries. In turn, Nigeria itself becomes more secure, stable, and strong (Inamete 2001, 89).

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\(^7\) For an extensive overview of the actors involved in the Nigerian foreign and security policymaking processes, see: Abegunrin 2006b, 274; Inamete 2001.
As will be shown, Nigeria’s military has been useful insofar as it is a frequent contributor of peacekeepers to African Union and especially United Nations missions, a tactic that it has often undertaken to improve its reputation (Osuntokun 2008:142).

The role of civil society in the formation of Nigerian foreign policy has been assessed differently. On one hand, it has historically been the case that the modal Nigerian has not typically shown much interests in international affairs, that the importance of foreign policy in national elections has never had much prominence, and that perhaps unsurprisingly, Nigerian foreign policy has thus never benefited the average citizen (Gambari 2008, 60-78). On the other, while individual citizens (beyond the executive) may not play much of a role in the direction of foreign policy, intra-state ethno-linguistic affiliations do carry weight at least in the conceptualization of foreign affairs. Yet, the fractious nature of these ethno-regional blocs has often been critiqued as being at the heart of some of the inefficiencies of the Nigerian foreign policymaking apparatus.

Other inputs into the Nigerian foreign and security policymaking processes have been the more typical actors associated with FPA. These include the Nigerian parliament; the Ministry of External Affairs; the Ministry of Defense; and a well-

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8 Moreover, as Adebajo (2008, 16) has noted, “costly and ultimately domestically unpopular military interventions [in Liberia and Sierra Leone] could have probably only been sustained by military brass hats who were not accountable to the Nigerian electorate.”

9 Interestingly, transnational co-ethnic affiliations have been cited as having little salience for how Nigerian civil society thinks about international affairs. As Mustapha 2008, 50 notes: “There is no evidence of...an ethnic factor in Nigeria’s regional international relations. The Hausa in Nigeria do not politically identity with the Hausa in the Niger Republic....Similarly, we do not see the Bariba of west-central Nigeria or the Yoruba of the southeast seeking to make common cause with their co-ethnics in Benin Republic.”

10 Not least, Mustapha (2008 42) laments that: “Whereas countries such as Ghana, South Africa, and Senegal had a single dominant and cohesive national movement capable of establishing a hegemonic hold on the national imagination, Nigeria had a nationalist movement that fractured into three ethno-regional blocs. These blocs kept one eye on the British colonial authorities, and the other on their two competitors. As a consequence, Nigeria never produced a Kwame Nkrumah, a Nelson Mandela, or a Leopold Sédar Senghor.”
known, state-funded international affairs think tank, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (Abegunrin 2006b; Inamete 2001; Mustapha 2008). Finally, it should also be noted that perhaps more than in any other country, the role that oil has played in the effectuation of Nigeria’s foreign policy should not be overlooked. The Nigerian use of “oil diplomacy” over the decades, and how such a tactic has impacted its strategic outlooks in African IOs, is given acute attention in the upcoming case studies (Adebajo 2008, 8, 12; Fawole, 2008. 99; Abegunrin 1999, 167-181).

**National Security Interest #1: Defeating Biafran Rebels**

**The National Security Interest:**

Shortly after independence from Britain in 1960, Igbo General Johnson Ironsi (January 1966 to July 1966) overthrew Balewa to become the President of the country. Ethnic Igbos cheered Ironsi’s victory, while the rest of the population bristled. Later that year, anti-Igbo riots directed at Ironsi’s actions broke out in the northern part of the country, killing tens of thousands of Igbos and generating many more refugees. In July 1966, a northern elite collaborated to depose Ironsi, who was overthrown and replaced by Yakubu Gowon, who would serve as head of state from 1966 to 1975, a point in Nigeria’s historiography referred to as “the first period of military rule.”¹¹ For those in the southeast, Ironsi’s ouster was regarded as an anti-Igbo

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¹¹ The Gowon approach to foreign policy formulation was more liberal than Balewa’s in that he allowed other entities to engage in foreign and security policymaking. Unlike Balewa, he allowed the Ministry of External Affairs (which Balewa unilaterally controlled in the Office of the Prime Minister) to have substantial control over many aspects of Nigerian foreign and security policy, serving as “the lynchpin” and being “firmly in control of Nigeria’s foreign policy” (Inamete 2001, 49). Nevertheless - and of interest to this work - Gown retained primary control over certain international relations profiles within Nigerian foreign and security policies based on his interest for such issues. Thus, although the military stronghold in Lagos named Dodon Barrack from which he operated was largely divorced, Gowon
move intended to ensure the divvying of the region’s oil windfalls to others in the new Nigerian state. Igbos perceived the most acceptable recourse to this injustice to be a unilateral secession from the Nigerian state. The region declared its independence later that year under the name of the Republic of Biafra. A gruesome war followed between the Nigerian state and the breakaway republic (Akuchu 1977, 40; Cooper 2002, 1972-1973). As our first case study, just how then did Nigeria perceive the strategic utility of African IOs in dealing with this national security interest?

**Hypotheses:**

Our theory predicts that Nigeria (IV1=A, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a domestic secessionist insurgency (IV4=A), will find realist strategic utility (HDV1=1A) in its REC (HDV2=1) and the (O)AU (HDV3=1). However, because the period in question predates the creation of a REC, HDV2 is null (Ø).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

In general, our theory is correct. Far more so than in the Balewa era, the Organization of African Unity proved to be a fundamental component of Nigerian foreign and security policy, starting with the Biafra secession attempts. Throughout the war, which lasted from January 1966 to January 1970, Nigeria retained a newfound but abiding interest in the OAU, whose actions and reactions to its internal conflict, it came to understand could understood to have far reaching impacts on it national security (Akuchu 1977 40).
Nigeria played a foundational role in the founding of the OAU, serving to bridge the rapid-integrationist Brazzaville and the slow-integrationist Casablanca groups, along with Togo and Liberia, in the May 1961 meeting that ultimately reconciled these two sides. Yet, once it did emerge, Nigeria approached the OAU with some amount of trepidation. To this end, Nigeria’s early approach to understanding IOs was typical of most Sub-Saharan African countries: they were viewed to be potentially threatening to its newfound sovereignty, and thus should be approached with caution. One of the clearest examples of how Nigeria viewed with moderate suspicion the OAU, was its priority of undermining the creation of an OAU standing pan-African military high command. Forwarded at a meeting in Accra in 1963, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, put forward the plan for the Union Joint Services Supreme Military Command Headquarters. Intended to include ground, air, and maritime forces, the pan-African outfit was intended to be rapidly deployable in the event of a threat of Pan-African security interests, and would simultaneously (theoretically) create plans to liberate remaining white-held territories (Franke 2009, 54). Yet unequivocally, Nigeria voiced its strong disapproval of the proposal, citing the loss of sovereignty that states would experience, the allegedly prohibitive costs of erecting and maintaining such a force, and the lack of logistical components necessary for such a force, including deficiencies in manpower, logistics capabilities, force standardization issues, training, deployment, and the inherently politically-charged issue of which country would have the capacity to appoint the Supreme Commander. Due to Nigerian backing, the plan failed to gain traction in 1963, and again when it came up again for discussions in 1975 (Franke 2008, 54-55).
Thus, when the Nigerian civil war began in Biafra, that the OAU served Nigerian interests became imperative. On one hand, the OAU was deemed to useful insofar as its Charter (OAU 1963), its 1964 Cairo Declaration (OAU 1964), as well as its informal norms all forbade secessionist movements, and thus, instantly (legally) forbade the Biafran Republic’s emergence. On the other hand, the OAU was viewed as potentially threatening, and thus needed to be kept at an arm’s length. First, despite the juridical forbidding of secession, the OAU and member states could always collectively or individually reverse course. Since the OAU had the capacity to affirm or deny rights to secession to the breakaway Biafra region, Nigeria and Gowon needed to be sure that the OAU and individual member states had as little involvement as possible its war with Biafran separatists. Second, Nigeria also had a vested interest in mitigating sympathy for Biafra from its historical West African rival, France, who began offering Biafra assistance. Finally, it needed to convince the international community that the military tactics that it was employing to quell the Biafra uprising were not a violation of evolving global human rights standards (Inamete 2001,44-45).

Thus, one strategic calculation that Nigerian leaders made throughout the War in Biafra was how to mitigate the OAU’s acceptance of the Biafran secessions as legitimate. The first strategy that was undertaken was to ensure that it was kept off of the OAU’s agenda altogether. The OAU was immediately constrained by both lobbying efforts from the Nigerian government as well as the organization’s own language of non-intervention as contained in the Cairo Declaration of 1964 (OAU 1964). Additionally, OAU language on non-intervention left it with an inability to mediate between the Nigerian state and Biafran rebels during the first part of the conflict, from 1966 to 1967. While the OAU’s own language greatly inhibited the
organization’s response during the first phase of the conflict, simultaneously, Nigerian leaders themselves lobbied the OAU to keep the Biafra issue off the table. In invoking OAU rules of non-interference in member states’ affairs, Gowon wrote a letter to the OAU giving the organization official notification of the conflict, yet being explicit in his use of the OAU’s own language to constrain its involvement, writing, “I hardly need to add that any attempt at the [OAU’s] recognition of the so-called Republic of Biafra as a sovereign state will amount to interference in the internal affairs of my country and will be regarded as an unfriendly act” (in Akuchu 1977, 44). For his part, Obafemi Awolowo – the leader of the Yoruba western region who claimed that a Biafran secession would also entail a Yoruba secession – helped to ensure that, apart from passing remarks by Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie, nothing was said about the case of Biafra in the relatively young OAU. Thus, Nigeria succeeded in keeping the question of Biafra out of the OAU’s agenda for one year, from the conflict’s outbreak in January 1966 until an OAU meeting in 1967 (Akuchu 1977, 50).

Having succeeded in keeping the Biafra issue of the table for the first year, the conflict’s intensity ultimately kept it from being totally unaddressed by the OAU: the OAU’s first reactions took place at the fourth annual meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Kinshasa, the Congo on September 10, 1967. At that meeting, country delegates were split into two broad camps on the Biafra question: those recognizing the need for an independent Biafra and those who did not (Akuchu 1977, 50). Those in the pro-independence camp included Zambia, Tanzania, Gabon and Cote d’Ivoire, as well as the white-ruled southern African states of Rhodesia and South

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12 This tendency to “keep hot button topics off the table” is one powerful state approach to African IOs, which Nigeria especially has enacted through much of its history, including, more recently, in relation to Boko Haram.
Africa, though the latter two were not members of the OAU. All other African states – cognizant of the precedents that legitimizing secessionist movements could set – sided with Nigeria. In light of the violence in Biafra, those pro-Biafra leaders – including Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere – began advocating that the OAU take a mediating role in the conflict. But again, pressure from the Nigerian government strongly denounced the OAU’s action as a moderator, invoking the OAU’s own language on non-intervention.

Perhaps most cannily, with cards laid on the table, Nigeria subsequently undertook a campaign in crafting a continental logic whereby other African states’ advocacy for Biafran independence was equated to an intellectual alliance with neocolonial powers – especially France – which sought the same outcome. Thus, being pro-Biafra meant being pro-European, and thus inherently, anti-African. For their part, Biafrans desperately sought OAU intervention, but the forceful Nigerian demands of the OAU’s non-involvement led the Biafra’s Commissioner for Information to urge that Biafrans “not place any hopes in the negotiations of the OAU,” as its efforts had proven that “it is impotent and incapable of doing anything in the Nigeria-Biafra crisis” (in Akuchu 1977).

Indeed, despite this Biafran desire for an OAU intervention, the final document produced at the end of the September 1967 OAU summit deemed the resolution of the conflict an affair to be undertaken internally in Nigeria. The resultant OAU involvement was simply a consultative mission of six heads of state to Lagos to discuss

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15 As an indication that pro-secession came to imply existence as a colonially lackey, when Algerian leader Houari Boumediène inferred that the four pro-Biafran supporters were in collaboration with the former colonial powers, Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda stormed out of the meeting (Akuchu 1977, 51).
the issue with Gowon (Akuchu 1977, 53). And, after the final closure of debate in 1967, the OAU remained largely silent on the issue until the war ultimately came to a close on January 15, 1970. Nigeria remained intact, the OAU remained at bay. And, as will be shown subsequently, Nigerian recognition of its capacity to leverage the benefits of African IOs grew exponentially.

**National Interest #2: Pursuing Pax-Nigeriana Post-Biafra**

**The National Security Interest:**

In no uncertain terms, the aftermath of its experiences in Biafra fundamentally altered many Nigerian outlooks, including the nature of intra-ethnic relations, the role of the military and most notably, its foreign policy outlooks towards the wider African international community. Three primary lessons were learned. First, France’s presence in the West African subregion was representative of a competitive pole of power that was a prime security threat for Nigeria, evidenced especially by Paris’s support for the Biafran rebels. Second, and relatedly, Nigeria learned that it needed to devise some means by which to sway the sundry smaller Francophone countries in the region to fall under its leadership and security umbrella, and not that of Paris. And third, Nigeria’s experiences in blocking action from the OAU in the case of Biafra led it to gain a newfound appreciation for the extent to which African IOs were not simply

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14 Yet, on the part of those assessing the OUA’s approach to dealing with Biafran, some like Selassie (1988, 62) have praised the IO, stating that the OAU approach was “praiseworthy,” given that that “disputes were clear-cut and that that the debates focused and coherent. The OAU Principles inherent in the Cairo Resolution and the provisions of the OAU Charter (territorial integrity, unity, etc.) were applied with clarity and consistency.”

15 One notable impact of the Biafran war was a shift in the understanding to the role of the military in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Whereas, during the first years after independence, the Nigerian military has been used as a marching parade and symbol of national pride, there was “no expectation that the Nigerian military would ever be expected to fight foreign wars or defend the country against external attacks” (Fawole 2008, 97), this could no longer be taken as a given.
as supranational bodies that could threaten its newfound sovereignty, but indeed, could be manipulated for the purposes of statecraft. In short, Biafra highlighted Nigeria’s vulnerabilities as well as shone light on potential paths for how to address them (Obi 2008, IS38 2015).

To that end, the post-Biafran period was one in which Nigeria realized that it could and should shore up its reputation as a regional and pan-African hegemon, in its first concerted pursuit of the longer policy of *Pax-Nigeriana*. That is, while Nigeria had, prior to the 1970s *conceived* of itself as hegemon, its tangible attempts at the *actualization* of that role were few. And as will be shown subsequently, while Gowon inherited a generally timid, conservative, and ostensibly non-aligned (though practically pro-Western) foreign policy from the Balewa administration, his experience in the course of the war in Biafra fundamentally altered Nigeria’s foreign policy outlook to one that was “more activist, less naive” (Adebajo 2008, 8; Gambari 2008, 64).

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Nigeria (*IV1=A, IV2=A, IV3=A*), when faced with the prospect of pursuing a reputational interest (*IV4G*) will find constructivist strategic utility (*HDV1=1C*) in its REC (*HDV2=1*) and the (O)AU (*HDV3=1*).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Role of African IOs:**

In this instance, our theory is correct: in pursuing a policy of asserting itself as a rightful West African and pan-African hegemon, Nigeria found great strategic utility in both its (newly formed) REC, and the OAU. In the aftermath of the Biafran civil war, and with increased confidence derived from its ability to control in some ways the direction of the OAU’s policy, Nigeria’s desire to engender a local, West African organization for the same purpose grew as well. Gowon had long been interested in the
emergence of a West African international organization, primarily for its potential role in encouraging economic integration, and indeed, discussions about the utility of West African IO had been in circulation for years (Inamete 2001, 49, 55). Concurrently, in 1970, a Nigerian academic named Dr. Adebayo Adedeji published what could come to be a very well-known article in the *Journal of Modern African Studies* laying out the framework for a West African regional organization to help encourage trade relations and bridge historical and linguistic divides. This article would later serve as the blueprint for ECOWAS itself (Adedeji 1970; 2004, 28).\(^\text{16}\) Given his own interest in the creation of a West African IO, in 1972, Gowon hired Adedeji to serve as Nigeria’s Minister of Economic Development and Reconstruction, which included, among other responsibilities, the profile of policy management for regional cooperation (Adedeji 2004, 27). In 1972, under the leadership of Adedeji, Nigeria and Togo signed the agreement at the joint Nigeria-Togo ministerial consultation in Lagos in June 1972 to mutually serve as the founders of a new West African regional organization, which would officially come into existence three years later on 28 May, 1975, in the form of the Economic Community of West African States (Adedeji 2004, 28).

It should be noted that the founding of ECOWAS is recounted as a phenomenon that was possible in large part, because Gowon, Adedeji, and Nigeria had found the “right” West African partner in Togo’s president Gnassingbé Eyadéma and his counterpart to Adedeji, Togo’s Trade Minister, Henri Dogo. In short, Togo’s collaboration with Nigeria in the creation of ECOWAS was imperative, given regional

\[^{16}\text{For his part, Adebajo (2008, 8), describes that Adedeji’s ECOWAS plan viewed the creation of ECOWAS as a means to: }\]"pursue a leadership role, buy itself security, and expand its markets in West Africa, while reducing the dependence of its Francophone neighbors on France" and that the creation of ECOWAS intended to "reduce French influence in West Africa." France responded by encouraging Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to create the exclusively Francophone Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) (Adebajo 2000, 187).
fears about Nigeria’s hegemonic ambitions, as well as the lingering divides between Anglophone and Francophone West Africa. In short, the signing of the Nigeria-Togo agreement in 1972 for the basis of ECOWAS was possible because the collaboration between Nigeria and Togo bridged many of the most salient divides in the region, amongst powerful Nigeria and weaker Togo, and amongst Anglophone and Francophone states (Adedeji 2004, 28).

After the signing of the Nigeria and Togo agreement in 1972, delegates from the two countries canvassed other West African states to sign on to join on as well. Adedeji (2004, 28-29) recounts that on these visits, “we were well received in all countries we visited” and “in virtually every country, the responses to our proposals for a West African community were positive.” Yet, trepidation about Nigerian dominance still lingered. And while it was likely that all West African states felt as much to varying degrees, it was Senegal’s President Senghor whose stance on ECOWAS reflected that reality, and who sought, as a result of a feared Anglophone Nigerian dominance, the inclusion of Francophone Zaire in the regional block as a counterweight (Adedeji 2004).

To be sure, Nigeria had numerous national interests in the creation of ECOWAS. First, Nigeria has long viewed the fact that other unstable African countries surround it as a threat to its own security, especially given the porous nature of all countries’ borders. Second, and relatedly, Nigeria has viewed the presence of such weak neighbors as facilitating the entrance of other non-African powers, particularly France, into what it perceives to be its intended sphere of influence (Inamete 2001, 88-89). Third, Osuntokun (2008 149) relays that Nigeria was initially so interested in creating ECOWAS to “provide an institutional framework for
relations with its West African neighbors.” Thus Adedeji’s ECOWAS plan viewed the creation of ECOWAS as a means for Nigeria to: “pursue a leadership role, buy itself security, and expand its markets in West Africa, while reducing the dependence of its Francophone neighbors on France” (Adebajo 2008, 8).

Yet despite these benefits, Nigeria’s strategic approach to the creation of ECOWAS was not a unified one. Inamete (2001, 60-61) notes that within the Gowon government, different offices within the bureaucracy were split as to the potential benefits of joining ECOWAS. As Ojo (1990, quoted in Inamete 2001, 61) notes:

The office of the Head of State, the Federal Ministry of Economic Development, and the Federal Ministry of Defense were strongly for the creation of ECOWAS (due to the economic benefits of regional integration and greater regional and nation security they saw ECOWAS as engendering) with the extra-governmental enthusiastic support of Nigeria Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines, and Agriculture (which hoped to benefit from the larger ECOWAS market) while those opposing the creation of ECOWAS were the Federal Ministries of Trade and Industries (which though that ECOWAS would mean the economic drain of Nigeria by poorer members of ECOWAS and that the Nigerian economy was strong enough to develop and industrialize without the help of regional economic integration) and the Federal Ministry of External Affairs (which saw movements into Nigeria of citizens the ECOWAS countries that were former French colonies as posing national security risks for Nigeria).

Moreover, Nigerian academics at the moment of ECOWAS’ founding were skeptical of Nigeria’s ability to get ECOWAS to “move” in the way that would be beneficial to the country. A 1978 conference discussing Adedeji’s blueprint for ECOWAS resulted in one Dr. Idowu chastising the participants. As relayed by an observer of the conference:

17 France and Nigeria’s relationship has been rocky since Nigeria’s independence in 1960. As many Nigerian scholars have noted, Lagos (then the capital of Nigeria) cut off formal relations with France in 1961 in protest of Paris’s testing of nuclear weapons in the Sahara, and poor relations were exacerbated when France supported the Biafran separatists in 1967 to diminish Nigeria’s preeminence in the region; counteracted Nigerian interventions into Chad in 1981-1982; and supported Charles Taylor in Liberia, even as a Nigerian-led ECOMOG force was attempting to oust him (Adebajo 2008, 8; Clapham 1996, 121-125). Others have suggested that Nigerian peacekeeping in the region is simply “an Anglo-American plot to undermine French influence in the region” (Dokken 2008, 52).
Dr. Idowu disagreed with the optimistic tone of [Adedeji’s pro-ECOWAS] paper and felt there was absolutely no basis for this. He felt that there was no compelling fact that could make ECOWAS a success and that Nigeria had made a mistake in sponsoring the ECOWAS project. The basis of Idowu’s pessimism was what he saw as a clash of national interests of the key actors in ECOWAS: one example was the case of Senegal who wanted Zaire to join ECOWAS, so that Zaire could balance the weight of Nigeria” (In Udokang 1978, 80).

These critiques notwithstanding, in no uncertain terms, the creation and management of ECOWAS would initially and subsequently come to serve as the crown jewel in Nigeria’s foreign policymaking crown. The capacity of successive Nigerian regimes to understand its importance, and leverage it resultantly, made ECOWAS “Nigeria’s greatest foreign policy achievement” until 1990, the year at which it successfully mobilized an ECOWAS intervention into neighboring Liberia (Adebajo 2008, 11). ECOWAS’ importance lay in its many beneficial facets: its ability to encourage economic integration; to engender a culture of a nascent security community in the West African region, whose contours Nigeria could substantially manage and dictate; and to serve as a bulwark against an ever-threatening French presence.18

At the same time that Nigeria was spearheading the creation of ECOWAS, so too was it re-conceptualizing the role of the OAU in Nigerian grand strategy from an organization that could potentially undermined Nigeria’s strategic interests, to one that Nigeria came to see as capable of serving it own geostrategic interests. Most notably,

18 In short, after Nigeria was able to get ECOWAS up and running, the initial fervor for the ECOWAS project began to wane for several reasons. First, the two main Nigerian architects behind it were no longer on the scene: Gowon was deposed in August 1975, while Adedeji was tapped by the new UN Economic Commission for Africa to serve as its Secretary General, thus left the organization for which he had created the intellectual and practical blueprint (Gandois 2009, 114). Moreover, with the Francophone African leaders willing to leave the UDEAO to join ECOWAS, Nigeria no longer needed to “woo” them as aggressively as it had before given that their membership into ECOWAS was somewhat of a foregone conclusion. Third, Nigeria’s assertions of regional hegemony, which had to that point been underwritten by the global spike in oil prices began to suffer, and thus Nigeria’s leadership began to wane. Thus, many have critiqued the administrations of Mohammad/Obasanjo for not giving sufficient attention to ECOWAS (Gambari 2008, 65)
having understood its capacity to pull certain strings within the OAU in previous instances – forestalling the creation of unified African military command in 1963 and 1965, and preventing critique of its actions in Biafra from 1966 to 1970 – Nigerian confidence in its ability to fundamentally manage the affairs of the Organization grew greater. To that end, Gowon prioritized the role of the OAU in Nigeria’s affairs, becoming the chairman of the Organization in 1973 where his interests focused on the relationships between the world’s industrialized countries and those in the then-“Third World” (Inamete 2001, 49). Thus, in the post-Biafra era, Nigeria took on a new outlook towards the pan-African organization, and a period during which the “OAU [came] to serve as an instrument of Nigerian foreign policy” (Aluko, as quoted in Inamete 2001, 55).

Yet the lens of IOs was far from the only means of supporting the pursuit of Pax-Nigeriana during the 1970s. On equal footing with the creation of ECOWAS and intensified prioritization of the OAU – and combined by the intertwined needs to make amends with both its neighbors and the rest of the continental actors after the conclusion of the Biafran civil war – and with coffers awash from oil money, Nigeria began what has been called a policy of “spraying” its oil wealth to its neighbors. In short, at the close of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, global oil prices spiked, and crude oil producing countries like Nigeria saw tremendous financial windfalls as a result.

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19 Ironically, given its earlier forestallment of the development of a pan-African military force in the early 1960s, in the In 1970, Nigeria called for the creation at the OAU of an African Defense System, another iteration of a collective security mechanism. This new interest in the creation of a pan-African defense force came on the heels of its own Biafra War, during which postcolonial nonchalance about is inherit security in the face of comparatively weak neighbor states was fundamentally undercut with the tremendous French effort to support the pro-Biafra camp (For more, see: Esmenjaud 2014a; 2014b).

20 Moreover, the more centralized and assertive policy during the Gowon/Obasanjo era was reflective of the centralization of power within the federal government, which allowed both leader to be pulled in fewer directions by competing regional, ethnic, and religious constituencies.
Nigeria thus offered concessionary oil loans to West African regional states at very low prices, in a bid to ingratiate itself with its often-skeptical Francophone neighbors (Abegunrin 1999, 167-181; Adebajo 2008, 8-12; Fawole, 2008, 99; Gambari 2008, 59-60, 64; Gandois 2009, 106-107; Ojo 1980). These new aggressive overtures of friendship were underwritten almost exclusively, by a tremendous increase in Nigeria’s oil wealth. As Abegunrin (1999, 170) notes:

Throughout the 1970s, there was a very strong correlation between the domestic health and prosperity of the Nigerian economy and the conduct of foreign policy. The more affluent and self-reliant Nigeria was in the post independence years, the greater was the tendency to establish an assertive foreign policy based on the major principles and objectives on which all governments seem to agree. During the oil boom, which was linked primarily to increases in the price of crude oil and given the personal predispositions of individual foreign policymakers, petroleum resources and finance became the principle tools for achieving foreign policy goals that otherwise would not have been pursued by traditional diplomacy (Abegunrin 2001, 170).

Thus, beginning with the Gowon administration and continuing to those of Obasanjo, and Murtala (discussed subsequently), Nigeria saw its outsized economic position - particularly in relation to oil - as a means by which to execute its foreign and security policy goals. On the African side, it could win friends through “spraying” oil wealth. On the non-African side, when it came to extant Western powers on the continent, it could use its lucrative oil economy as a geostrategic tool to harm colonial interests.”

Apart from the material sources of the new aggressive Nigerian policy for hegemony, there was also a degree of showmanship in Nigeria’s 1970s foreign policy commitments to the pan-Africanist arena. Given Nigeria’s rising economic prominence underwritten by rising global oil prices, Gowon agreed to host the World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (put on by the Obasanjo administration) in 1977.

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21 To that end, the Muhammad/Obasanjo worked to nationalize British oil company Shell BP as a symbolic gesture to the British who were at that point waging war in Zimbabwe (Gambari 2008, 66).
Underlining the soft power component of Nigeria’s foreign policy, Abegunrin (170) notes that, “this particular event was staged to project the dynamic Pan-Africanism and black cultural renaissance of Nigerian foreign policy.”

In short, in the aftermath of the creation of ECOWAS, the leadership that Nigeria displayed in its creation gave credence to its pursuit for regional and pan-African leadership in the form of *Pax-Nigeriana*, and it came to “finally be accepted as a credible leader on African issues” (Adebajo 2008, 8). Therefore, it was ironically under the military leadership of Gowon that ECOWAS was laid. At first blush, the strategic interests of a military leader in *endangering* not just one, but *two* multilateral organizations might some antithetical: insulation, not greater integration should seemingly motivate international relations. Yet, for a self-consciously powerful state like Nigeria, the creation and support of such organizations was a boon, not a threat to its perceptions of national security. So long as its leaders could be assured, as they had been in relation to both the OAU and the ability to create ECOWAS, that they were able to dictate the pathways of the organizations, they could rest assured that the creation of ostensibly multilateral organizations would be a boon to their national strategic interests.

**National Security Interest #3: Eliminating Extant Colonialism**

In more on the nature of Nigeria’s showmanship as a Pan-African oil-producing nation during the 1970s, see Apter’s (2005) outstanding work on Nigeria’s hosting of the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in 1977.

Nigeria, which had played a fundamental role in creating ECOWAS, took the reigns in helping to further institutionalize it. Within Nigeria, the primary bodies responsible for managing Nigeria’s relationship with ECOWAS were the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Development, each of which “devoted a significant amount of their human and materials resources and time to ECOWAS” (Inamete 2001, 99).
In Nigerian historiography, the four years between 1975 and 1979 are referred to as the Muhammed/Obasanjo period. From July 1975 to February 1976, General Murtala Muhammed served as the head of state. Once he was assassinated in an attempted coup, General Olusegun Obasanjo, who had been his chief of staff, became the new head of state in Nigeria, serving from 1976 to 1979. During this Muhammed/Obasanjo period, Obasanjo’s policies were a direct reflection of his predecessor’s, thus giving coherence to the entire four-year period as a whole analytical unit.24

During this period – and buoyed by newfound leadership in ECOWAS, the OAU, and economically – Nigerian foreign policymakers took on a renewed vigor in their understandings of the threats posed by extant white-held colonies on the continent. As of January 1975, white-held Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Namibia, Equatorial Guinea, and Western Sahara had not yet gained independence. The Nigerian – and indeed pan-African – assumption that the presence of colonialism served as primary threat to national security was pervasive. Thus, the ridding of colonialism became a central strategic interest to Nigeria during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

24 In terms of Nigeria’s broader foreign policy, the Muhammad/Obasanjo era is noted as being an era of change in relation to orientations, production, output, and decision-making processes (Inamete 2001, 62). Most notably, General Mohammed was interested in the pursuit of actually pursing a genuine non-aligned policy that Nigeria had ostensibly been following (Gambari 2008, 65). Specifically, as Nigerian self-confidence as a regional and continental leader (buoyed by a robust global oil market) grew, so did its desire to assert itself in the face of colonial presence on the continent. Notably, whereas during the previous Gown era, the Ministry of External affairs was genially responsible for the creation and implementation of Nigerian foreign policy - barring projects related to Gowan’s personal interests - in the Muhammad/Obasanjo era, both were directly involved in foreign policymaking. Thus, the ruling body, the Supreme Military Council nearly always took precedence over most other foreign policymaking bodies, including the Federal Executive Council (Inamete 2001, 64, 65). Underlying the far more profound involvement in the creation of Nigerian foreign policy was the fact that Muhammad and Obasanjo both had an abiding interest in intentional affairs, thus leading them both to be “eager and able to be very involved in foreign affairs when [they] became head of state” (Inamete 2001, 71-72).
Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Nigeria (IV1=A, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing threats posed by global or non-African actors (IV4=E), will find liberal strategic utility (HDV1=1B) in its REC (HDV2 =1) and the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Role of African IOs:

In this instance, our theory is partially correct: while Nigeria did find strategic utility in OAU, it did not seem to find much use in ECOWAS. In its pursuit of helping to rid the continent of colonial rule, Nigeria found the greatest strategic utility in the role of the OAU. More specifically, Nigeria’s role in the OAU during the Obasanjo/Mohammed era was one of catalyzing the OAU’s anti-colonial sentiment though its own domestic recognition of southern African liberation movements. To that end, Nigeria’s decision to recognize the Moviemiento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA) as the sole legitimate government had what Gambari (2008 65) describes as being “instrumental in swaying OAU opinion” in the same direction. And in Zimbabwe, Nigeria’s decision to recognize Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF as the legitimate government of Zimbabwe had the same effect in galvanizing opinion in the OAU (Inamete 2001). Moreover, in the service of pursuing a genuinely non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War, Mohammed was noted for a fiery speech at the OAU in 1976 in which he admonished the West that Africa did not need its constant warnings about the Soviet-Cuban threat (Gambari 2008, 65). Indeed, the fight against
apartheid within the OAU was the primary issue to give coherence to Nigeria’s broader OAU policy (Abegunrin, 149).

Moreover, in the OAU, Nigeria was also a leading voice in the decolonization and antiapartheid movements, which found a platform through the OAU’s Liberation Committee. Shortly after the OAU had been founded, Nigeria – along with eight other African states – set up what was known as the “Committee of Nine,” which was later renamed the Committee for the Liberation of Africa. The goal of the committee was to help African states collectively work to expel the remaining colonial regimes and overturn white-dominated states. Within the OAU, a fund for the Committee for the Liberation of Africa was created, in which states were (ostensibly) required to give a certain percentage of their income. Among other tasks, the Liberation Committee intended to mobilize physical resources for anticolonial movement, offer tactical advice to such movements, and mobilize international solidarity in support of their aims.

While the OAU began to take an ever-greater role in Nigerian strategic interests, after Nigeria was able to get ECOWAS up and running, the initial fervor for the ECOWAS project began to wane for several reasons. First, the two main Nigerian architects behind it were no longer on the scene: Gowon was deposed in August 1975.

More acutely, the Muhammed/Obasanjo period was marked by a more aggressive Pan-Africanist and West-Africanist foreign policy, notably carried out through the respective organizations, the OAU and the nascent ECOWAS (Inamete 2001, 65). Various initiatives accompanied these changes. For one, the Muhammad/Obasanjo administration tasked Dr. Adebajo Adedeji - who had helped create the founding blueprints for the creation of ECOWAS - to chair a committee of academics, media and military members, to conduct a comprehensive review and overhaul of the Nigerian foreign policymaking apparatus (Inamete 2001, 76). That Adedeji, who had been at the helm of the West African-wide creation of ECOWAS, was picked to chair the committee to overhaul Nigeria’s foreign policy underscores the centrality of the organization to Nigerian interests. Yet some have instead referred to the Murtala/Obasanjo years derisively as a brief period of oil-buoyed radical pan-Africanist posturing that was otherwise aberrational in the longer thrust of Nigeria’s generally pro-Western stance (Obi 2008).

The other members were: Algeria, Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanganyika, Uganda, and United Arab Republic (a short-lived union between Egypt and Syria).
while Adedeji was tapped by the new UN Economic Commission for Africa to serve as its Secretary General, and thus left the organization for which he had created the intellectual and practical blueprint (Gandois 2009, 114). Moreover, with the Francophone African leaders willing to leave the UDEAO to join ECOWAS, Nigeria no longer needed to “woo” them as aggressively as it had before given that their membership into ECOWAS was somewhat of a foregone conclusion. Third, Nigeria’s assertions of regional hegemony, which had to that point been underwritten by the global spike in oil prices began to suffer, and thus Nigeria’s leadership began to wane. Thus, many have critiqued the administrations of Mohammad/Obasanjo for not giving sufficient attention to ECOWAS (Gambari 2008, 65).

National Interest #4: Revive the Domestic Economy

National Security Interest:

During the Nigeria’s second period of military rule – characterized primarily by the administrations of Abacha and Babangida, from (1983 to 1999 – Nigeria’s foreign policy orientation experienced a precipitous fall from grace. While the 1970s had been characterized by an ostentatious Nigerian generosity to neighbors through the aforementioned process of “spraying,” the collapse of global oil prices forced Nigeria to substantial curtail its attempts at its pursuit of Pax-Nigeriana, which meant, in no small part, being forced to fundamentally contravene its previous positions within ECOWAS. Thus, the early 1980s is characterized as having been marked by a new nationalistic turn in Nigeria foreign policy (Adebajo 2008, 11):

A hostile environment intensively dominated by the worldwide economic recession of the 1980s, the consequent adverse effects on Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings, rampant internal corruption, and excessive personalization
of decision making combined to weaken the thrust and effectiveness of Nigeria’s foreign policy. These circumstances caused Nigeria’s foreign policy to weaken and lose scope. Domestic political events that occurred in response to the new unipolar world dominated by the United States of America brought the Nigerian military leadership into conflict with a world that increasingly demanded democratic governance. In the ensuing conflict, the formulation and execution of foreign policy passed from (Abegunrin 2003, intro).

In the aftermath of the global oil boom in the 1970s, by the late 1980s, Nigeria’s external debt was mounting. Left with little other recourse, Babangida took out Nigeria’s first structural adjustment policy in 1986 (Adebajo 2008, 9), and despite this, economic conditions in the country continued to decline. For their parts, Buhari came to see a revivification of the domestic Nigerian economy as an essential (non-traditional) national security interest.

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Nigeria (IV1=A, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with an economic national security interest (IV4=F), will find no strategic utility in African IOs and will instead take collaborative action outside of IOs (IV4=0A, thus HDV2=∅ and HDV3=∅).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

In this instance, our theory is only partially correct. Although it is typically the case that African IOs have little actual strategic utility in relation to economic issues, in this instance, the OAU did come to be used to filter up issues to the global levels of analysis regarding African debt reduction.

While not a central part of Buhari’s strategy, the OAU was not completely absent from Nigeria’s strategic calculations. Indeed, Buhari was known for his newfound commitment to serving as the spokesman for all African countries in relation to the international financial institutions, from which many African countries were now
taking out structural adjustment policies. In short Buhari strategically levered the OAU for the strategy of issue enabling in relation to Africa’s economies generally, and Nigeria’s specifically. As Adebajo (2008, 9) relays “Lagos was instrumental in convening a second OAU Economic Summit in 1985, at which General Buhari called on international financial institutions to show greater understanding for Africa’s economic problems, and requested an increase in capital and financial resources from the West to Africa.”

Nigeria primarily worked to reduce its national debt through collectively lobbying through the OAU. At the July 1989 OAU summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Nigeria’s Chief of General Staff, Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, called for the cancelation of all official African debts and for more financial resources from donor countries. By 1990, Babangida was advocating a new “Marshall Plan” for Africa as reparations for centuries of slavery and colonialism by the West (Adebajo 2008. 10). Indeed:

Lagos promoted the strengthening of the OAU, organizing the organization’s first-ever economic Summit in 1980. The meeting agreed on the Lagos Plan of Action, which called for increased self-reliance on agriculture and industry, expansion of infrastructure, support for subregional economic groups, and the creation of an African Common Market by 2000 (extended since to 2025). Nigeria’s “economic diplomacy” during this period reflected the country’s continuing efforts to be a leading spokesman for Africa on economic issues. Lagos was instrumental in convening a second OAU economic summit in 1985, at which point General Buhari called on international financial institutions to show greater understanding for Africa’s economic problems and requested an increase in capital and financial resources from the West to Africa (Adebajo 2008, 9).

Outside of strict financial concerns, Babangida’s commitment to working through the OAU was on greatest display while he was the chairman of the OAU in 1991, when Nigeria hosted the hosted the 27th annual summit in its new capital Abuja.
Nigeria also played important leadership roles in the formation and signing of the treaty for the African Economic Community in June 1991, as well as in the establishment of a department for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in the OAU Secretariat.\(^2^8\)

Yet, while Nigeria was working assiduously to promote its interests in the OAU, it was seemingly abandoning any commitment it ever had to the spirit of West-Africanism in the context of ECOWAS. Perhaps the most emblematic example of Nigerian retrenchment from West Africa was its decision to expel approximately 3 million ECOWAS citizens from the country in 1983 and 1985, which it had deemed as “illegal aliens” in stark contravention to the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons (ECOWAS 1979) to which it was signatory (Adebajo 2008, 9). This aggressive retraction of its historical commitments to allow West African immigrants into Nigeria profoundly undermined Nigeria’s credibility to the West African region, enforcing its reputation as a fair-weather friend with little commitment to the IO beyond its own interests. Moreover, it served to severely undercut Nigeria’s reputational legitimacy, which it would work to re-establish not long after with its leadership role in the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia (Gambari 2008, 67).

\(^{27}\) Though perhaps bordering on hagiography, sundry Nigerian scholars have credited Babangida’s “diplomatic skills” within the OAU for the fact that a record 30 heads of state and 48 foreign ministers attended the OAU Summit that he chaired, in addition to the fact that at the same summit, African states signed a treaty establish an African Economic Community (Inamete 2001, 160, 188).

\(^{28}\) Nigeria also played a strong leadership role in the OAU on the topic of Western Sahara. Nigeria is also said to have “saved” the 20th OAU summit, which was divided on the issue of Western Sahara (Gambari 2008, 71). Nigeria is said to have served as an agenda-setter in the OAU during discussions about the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). Many Nigerian authors assert that Nigeria’s recognition of the SADR then set the stage for and the “OUA followed its lead in admitting the SADR as a full member country.”
National Security Interest #5: The Collapse of Liberia

National Security Interest

The Liberian civil war began in 1989, when Charles Taylor, a former government minister, invaded Liberia country from Cote d'Ivoire with members of the rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – and a second rebel and former soldier, leader Prince Johnson and his Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) – with the expressed goal of removing Liberia’s president, Samuel Doe, from power (Gandois 2009, 121-122; Adebajo 2002). Quickly, ECOWAS states began to see the conflict as more than a mere, self-contained civil war in Liberia, and interpreted it as an internationalized conflict that could pose a threat to the wider west African region. Moreover, two of West Africa’s most powerful countries – Nigeria and Ghana – quickly became worried about their own stability due to the fact that, despite not being contiguous to Liberia, their Anglophone nature and comparative economic opportunities would make them particularly susceptible to inflows of refugees fleeing the conflict. ECOWAS had little initial desire to intervene; responses were instead characterized by bilateral calls for peace and calm. However, when it became clear that these were not efficacious, the question of military intervention began to circulate (Gandois 2009, 122).

Hypothesis:

A multiplicity of national security interest might be imputed to Nigeria in relation to the collapse of Liberia. However, for the purposes of testing our hypothesis – and despite admonitions from Adebajo (2008b) about the oversimplification of Nigerian interests in the ECOMOG intervention – our theory interprets that that
Nigeria (IV1=1, IV2=1A, IV3=1), when faced with the prospect of addressing a
dangerous neighbor (IV4=1), will find realist strategic utility (HDV1=1A) in its REC
(HDV2 = 1) but not the (O)AU (HDV3=0).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Role of African IOs:

If Nigeria’s national security interests in Liberia’s civil war were perceived of as
the latter’s role as a dangerous neighbor, our theory holds rather tightly: in short,
through ECOWAS, Nigeria orchestrated an unprecedented intervention in the form of
the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
which, for sundry reasons, worked to support its national security interests.

Within these early discussions of how to deal with a disintegrating Liberia,
Nigeria was quick to leverage ECOWAS’ own legal documents as the basis of its
justification for intervention. Primarily, it leveraged ECOWAS’ 1979 Protocol on
Non-Aggression as well as its 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance (see chapter 2),
which allowed for ECOWAS intervention in member states’ affairs and officially
invoked Article 16 of the 1981 Protocol (Obi 2008; Franke 2008, 65). The issue of
military intervention was officially taken up at the 1990 ECOWAS Banjul Summit in
May 1990, led by ECOWAS Chairman Blaise Campoaré of Burkina Faso. Under
Nigerian leadership Babangida presented the plan for the ECOWAS Standing
Mediation Committee (SMC) composed of Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, and
Togo, to which would later be added Sierra Leone and Guinea between 1990 and
1994. In essence, Nigeria created the ad-hoc SMC body to get around the fact that
some ECOWAS states, particularly Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, did not want an
ECOWAS intervention in 1990 to oust Taylor. Yet, because the ECOWAS Treaty
demanded that the only intervention scenarios that could be undertaken had to be
done by consensus, ECOWAS had its hands tied. Thus, Nigeria created this institution in large part, to circumvent the official legal codes of ECOWAS, and create an informal peacekeeping mandating sub-body, which it would be able – theoretically – to mandate an intervention (Coleman 2007, 73-77).

In addition to the mere creation of the SMC to circumvent ECOWAS peacekeeping mandating rules, Nigeria also circumvented stated ECOWAS procedures regarding the nature of the composition of the force itself. In short the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Defense stated in Article 113 that any ECOWAS military intervention should necessarily be undertaken by what it called the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC), which was a drawn-up, standby military force composed of service members from all ECOWAS members. While the AAFC never existed in practice – due to the perpetual linger antipathies between Anglophone and Francophone states – when mandating ECOMOG, the Nigerian-led SMC did not even give a rhetorical nod to Article 113, and thus, the composition of ECOMOG was decidedly limited to the countries of the SMC in addition to non-SMC members (Anglophone) Sierra Leone and Guinea. Importantly, the most militarily powerful Francophone states – Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire – in addition to Burkina Faso, were not included in the force (ECOWAS 1981; Coleman 2007, 78-80).

The ECOWAS summit approved the creation of the SMC in May 1990, and the body held its first meeting between 5 and 20 July 1990, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, to discuss the options to deal with Liberia. Ultimately, it came to the conclusion that ECOWAS should call for a ceasefire between warring parties, which would be enforced by an ECOWAS contingent, which would then ultimately supervise and monitor Liberian elections in the aftermath of the conflict. Instantly, Taylor and the
NPFL rejected the ceasefire, sure of their impending victory over a hobbled government force that controlled around ten percent of the country. Thus, the intervention force came to be known as the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG, also known as “Operation Liberty” (Gandois 2009, 123), and as a result of the early rejection of the ceasefire, the ECOMOG mission went instantly – before it even began – from a peacekeeping mission to a peace enforcement mission (Coleman 2007, 76).

ECOMOG troops entered Liberia on 24 August 1990, and by October, had occupied much of Monrovia. Initially, and in the service of not corroborating rumors of a Nigerian unilateralism under the guise of ECOWAS multilateralism, Nigeria allowed control of ECOMOG to go to a Ghanaian General. However, this Nigerian “benevolence” changed when Liberian President Doe was captured by members of a splinter group from the NPFL (called the INPFL, International National Patriotic Front for Liberation) and assassinated while visiting the ECOMOG headquarters. In response, Nigeria ensured that the Ghanaian general was kicked out, and Abuja unabashedly took control over leadership for the remaining years of the mission (Alao 2006. 69; Coleman 2007, 76).

Nigerian dominance of ECOMOG was a defining feature of the mission. Swiftly, Nigeria took on the lion’s share of the operation: Nigeria provided the vast majority of military commanders for ECOMOG (Inamete 2001, 217) and at the height of the ECOMOG intervention in 1993, Nigeria had 12,000 troops in Liberia (Fawole 2008. 98). Official reports show that ECOMOG cost Nigeria approximately $8 29

29 For instance, when the field commander of ECOMOG, Major-General Rufus Kupolati, completed his tour of duty in 1991, he was replaced, not by another West African, but by another Nigerian, Major-General Ishaya Bakut (Inamete 2001, 217).
billion, though many have calculated that actual costs ran much higher (Alao 2006, 69). By the intervention’s end, Nigeria had contributed 80% of the troops and 90% of the funding for the operation (Adebajo and Rashid 2004, 293; Hailu 2012, 128).

For its part, the OAU under the leadership of Ahmed Salim Ahmed stayed engaged in the course of the development of ECOMOG, though had little strong role: it certainly played no real role in Nigeria’s interests in Liberia. While the OAU might have theoretically been considered a regional intervener and partner, by the early 1990s, its operational culture was still sufficiently rooted in the historical norms of non-intervention and it had not yet begun to move, in meaningful ways, towards the highly liberal stance that it has today, especially related to the inclusion of Article 4(h) (Gandois 2009, 125). Thus, to the extent that the OAU figured into Nigeria’s strategic calculations, it served primarily as a non-player: it would neither be appropriate to be used as a means to launch an intervention into Liberia, though neither would it critique a Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention, nor be overly-critical of a unilateral Nigerian intervention.

Reactions to the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention ranged from enthusiastic to outright hostile, depending on who was asked. At the most macroscopic level of analysis, the international community was pleased with Nigeria’s willingness to intervene, especially given that the prevailing powers, just on the heels of the close of the Cold War, had little energy or precedent for engaging troops in African peacekeeping missions. For its part, Nigeria saw lack of willingness by global powers to intervene as a challenge and an opportunity to show leadership. Thus, for the international community, Nigeria’s leadership was welcome, and for Nigeria, the inertia of the international community was a boon for its leadership credentials. Thus,
due its willingness to serve as an ideal global citizen, 1990 was a high point in Nigeria’s international profile (Abegunrin 2003, 134.)  

At the West African level, while most countries recognized the need for action in Liberia, historical regional trepidation about fears of Nigerian pursuits of hegemony begot a generally tepid reaction from most countries. Some ECOMOG members were openly critical of the ECOMOG intervention, with Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire ideologically opposed, and even going so far as to support the rebels (Ajibewa 2006, 95). Specific countries were also vocally displeased about the Nigerian strong-arm approach to ECOMOG. Cote d’Ivoire accused Nigeria of conducting air raids in its territory that killed Ivorian military and civilians, as well as large numbers of Liberian refugees. In addition to a lack of evidence that any Liberian rebels were to be found in the area that was bombed, Abidjan further asserted that “ECOMOG had exceeded its [mandated] right to defend itself when attacked” (Inamete 2001, 217). On the other, many complained of the poor behavior of Nigerian peacekeepers in Liberia (1990) who were so infamous for looting from those that they were supposed to protect that

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30 As has been noted, the deep ties between Liberia and the US led many Liberians to assume that the U.S. Would take an active role in the intervention which it declined to do, not least because of its attention on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Gandois 2009, 124). Other scholars who have spent time with former NPLF combatants have relayed that the perception among Liberians was that it was precisely because of U.S. pressure that that ECOWAS intervened (Thaler 2015, personal correspondence). Thus, the superpowers were “more willing to allow sub-regional hegemons to dictat[e] affairs in their respective regions” than ever before (Alao 2006. 77) and their departure gave Nigeria “more breathing room” to ask as a hegemon (Gandois 2009).

31 To that end, Hill (2009, 293) has detailed that the abuses of Nigerian peacekeepers can be broken down into five categories: “the rape and sexual abuse of women and children; the looting of private property; the summary execution of enemy fighters and their alleged civilian supporters; the unlawful detention of combatants and non-combatants alike, and; the failure to minimize civilian casualties during combat operations.”
“ECOMOG” came to be derisively known as meaning “Every car or movable object gone” (Hill 2009).32

More broadly, Nigeria’s eagerness to launch ECOMOG were read by its neighbors as its desire to assert its hegemonic credentials (Gebrewold 2014, 12; Obi 2008, 190) and exacerbated the region-wide fears about West Africa’s majority Francophone state being overwhelmed by Nigerian dominance with the support of other Anglophone neighbors Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. In short, the perception of ECOMOG I as being a primarily linguistically divided affair had resonance. On one hand, the ECOMOG interveners were primarily – though not exclusively33 – Anglophone. On the other, Taylor’s NPFL rebels operated in basis from Francophone Cote d’Ivoire, were supported by Francophone Burkina Faso, all while French firms continued to help facilitate exports from areas of Liberia occupied by the NPFL (Clapham 1996, 125).

For their part, average Nigerians generally remained unimpressed with the disposal of the country’s resources, through ECOWAS, to a failing neighbor state. As Abegunrin (2003, 136-137) relays: “Many Nigerians were hostile to the ECOMOG initiative, which they saw as an extension of Babangida’s personalization of the country’s foreign policy.” This was particularly the case given that the ECOMOG intervention, which some have distilled down to an act of friendship between two authoritarian leaders, cost the nation a billion dollars in oil reserve windfalls. Throughout the course of the ECOMOC intervention, at least six Nigerian civil

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32 Hill (2009), in conducting an analysis of the behavior of Nigerian peacekeepers in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, has hypothesized that the cause of Nigerian peacekeepers’ poor behavior abroad can be traced to the poor nature of civil-military relations domestically.

33 The non-Anglophone members of the ECOMOG I intervention were Mali, Guinea, and towards the operation’s end, Senegal.
society groups demanded Nigeria’s withdraw (Abegunrin 2003, 136-137; Gandois, 2009).

This piece has been clear to articulate that while it perceives Nigerian interests in the ECOMOG mission as being related to dealing with a dangerous neighbor (IV4=E), others have conceived of other aspects underlying Nigeria’s interests. In his sweeping history of the Liberian civil war, Adekeye Adebajo (2008b, 184) has offered a list of the four rationales that he believes to be most commonly cited for Nigeria’s intervention in Liberia. He cites: Babangida’s close relationship with Doe;\(^\text{34}\) the NPFL’s holding of Nigerian hostages; trepidation about what he calls “Libyan adventurism” in Liberia, and the resultant fear of an anti-Nigerian alliance led by Libya and Liberia, and including Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire;\(^\text{35}\) and fear about France’s potential to galvanize an anti-ECOMOG (and thus Nigerian) sentiment.\(^\text{36}\) He debunks these, and adds three more rationales for Nigerian interest: Nigeria’s pursuit of *Pax-Nigeriana*; Babangida’s desire to “make history” as a preeminent Nigerian leader; and the Nigerian desire to show that its army was able to enhance its global visibility and “prove its worth as a national and subregional asset.” For her part, Katarina Coleman has also offered an incredibly thorough interrogation of the

\(^{34}\) An overriding impetus for Nigeria’s heavy involvement in Liberia was the relationship between Nigerian President Babangida and threatened Liberian President Samuel Doe (Abegunrin, 155-156; Adebajo 2008, 184-185; Coleman 2007, 76). Various factors underwrote this friendship. Babangida’s friendship with Doe was dictated by Doe’s “authoritarianism, avariciousness, and egocentric foreign policy” (Abegunrin 2003, 156) To that end, it is perhaps unsurprising to learn that Babangida was directly involved in much of the foreign policy planning and decision-making in relation to Nigeria’s role in Liberia (Inamete 2001, 159).

\(^{35}\) See more about this potential alliance in Adebajo 2008b, 186.

\(^{36}\) Nigeria also leveraged its control over ECOWAS for the pursuit of external bulwarking, against two distinct forces. On one hand, Nigeria wanted to keep the superpowers - especially its historical regional rival, France - out of the Liberian conflict, in addition to the United States and Britain (Ajibewa 2006, 91). On the other hand, Nigeria helped to catalyze the ECOMOG intervention force to keep Qaddafi and Libya out of the regional politics, as the assumption in the region was long-held that he was interested in gaining a greater West African foothold (Fawole 2008, 101).
Nigerian rationales for standing up the ECOWAS ECOMOG mission, and cites, that the main reason for including ECOWAS in the intervention was for reputational legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, not burden-sharing\(^{37}\) or the adherence to international law.\(^{38}\) Instead, the decision to act through ECOWAS was due to Nigeria’s:

[C]onsistent preoccupation with the intervention’s international legitimacy, which it sought to bolster by placing the operation under ECOWAS auspices. Moreover, Nigeria incurred significant costs in this pursuit of international legitimacy, which were not balanced by and material benefits. Nigeria valued international legitimacy as a good in itself and adjusted its behavior in pursuit of that good.” (74).

Other suggestions about Nigeria’s national security interests for the ECOMOG intervention included: Babangida’s pursuit of reputational improvement in the eyes of the international community after years of poor human rights’ records,\(^{39}\) as a source for neo-patrimonial favors;\(^ {40}\) as a strategy for Babangida’s own personal enrichment,\(^ {41}\) as a

\(^{37}\) Coleman notes – arguably fallaciously – that Nigeria could not have turned to ECOWAS for the purposes of “burden-sharing” since ECOWAS had no standing army, had a limited annual budget composed of membership dues that it could not even convince members to pay, and had no expertise in peacekeeping. Nevertheless, one might imagine that despite a lack of available resources at ECOWAS’s disposal for burden-sharing, Nigeria still viewed the organization as one through which it could extract not-yet-committed resources from its members. Yet the fact that by June 1991, ECOWAS was $12.3 million in arrears - or, three times its annual operating budget – gives some credence to Coleman’s claims.

\(^{38}\) She argues that Nigeria did not use ECOMOG to adhere to international legal standards, since it informed the UN - which it should have done prior to the intervention as per UN’s Chapter VII which bequeaths to the UN the unique ability to launch peace operations - about ECOMOG’s intentions two days after it had launched (Coleman 2006, 77).

\(^{39}\) By working to stem a would-be region-wide crisis, it has been suggested that his hope was to rectify this poor image by showing himself as a humanitarian statesman (Gandois 2009, 127).

\(^{40}\) As Adebajo (2002, 246) writes of ECOMOG as a source of favors for the Babangida regime: “The position of ECOMOG commander was used by the Nigerian military leaders to reward loyal lieutenants. The first four Nigerian field commanders (Generals Dogonyaro, Kupolati, Bakut, and Olurin) were all trusted allies of the Nigerian head of state, General Babangida. The arrival of the fifth commander, General John Shagaya, marked the first and only time that a field commander did not enjoy the total support of his military superior. At the time of Shagaya’s appointment in September 1993, Nigeria had a weak interim government under Ernest Shonekon. The defense minister at the time, General Sani Abacha himself, sent Shagaya to Liberia to sideline his potential rival and then retired Shagaya from the army upon becoming head of state two months later. The appointment of the sixth Nigerian field commander, General Mark Inienger, restored the previous patter, with Inienger, an Abacha loyalist, going on to become the longest-serving ECOMOG commander.”
means to ensure domestic regime security within Nigeria,\textsuperscript{42} and the knowledge that a preoccupied post-Cold War global community would not shoulder any burden itself.\textsuperscript{43}

Thus, in the historiography of the ECOMOG intervention, ECOWAS and ECOMOG have more often than not been understood more as tools of the pursuit of a self-interested Nigerian foreign policy (Oyebode 2006; Mortimer 2000, 188; Obi 2008).\textsuperscript{44} ECOWAS was “simply a vehicle for the pursuit of Nigeria’s parochial interests in West Africa” and ECOMOG was “no more than an instrument of Nigeria’s domineering hegemonic foreign policy” (Adebajo 2008b, 189). Thus, during the administrations of Babangida and Abacha, ECOWAS “became an instrument by which Nigeria displayed power in the sub-region” (Oyebade 2006, 96).

\textbf{National Security Interest #6: The Ogoni Uprisings}

\textbf{National Security Interest:}

\textsuperscript{41} It has been alleged that Babangida tried to cover up $250 to $500 million in oil profits from its sale of oil during the Gulf War by claiming it was spent on the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. Moreover, Nigerian journalists have also accrued Babangida of personally profiting from the holding of the contracts to feed Nigerian soldiers during the ECOMOG deployment. Thus, it is widely believed that Babangida specifically and Nigeria’s military leaders more broadly profited handsomely from the country’s involvement in ECOMOG (Adebajo 2002, 85, 245).
\textsuperscript{42} Others have suggested that Nigeria’s deep involvement in ECOMOG had to do with protecting the regime from critiques outside the country by serving as a powerful Nigerian bargaining chip. Because Nigeria became the essentially backbone for ECOMOG, Babangida used Nigerian dominance as lever, threatening to pull out - thus assuredly throwing the region into chaos - if his regime remained ostracized (Adebajo 2002, 245).
\textsuperscript{43} For its part, the other would-be European interveners, France and the U.K. Were also more preoccupied with the new radical geopolitical shifts occurring in their own region, with an unraveling Yugoslavia and the herculean task of reunifying East and West Germany. And while France lacked the will to participate in an intervention, it did worry that a successful Nigerian-led intervention would unduly raise the Nigerian profile for legitimate leadership in the region (Gandois 2009, 125). Moreover, given the historical reluctance of the UN Security Council to engage in peacekeeping of the stalemate that it had experienced during the Cold War, its role as a robust deployer of peacekeeping missions had not yet begun.
\textsuperscript{44} In emphasizing the extent to which individual leadership interposed with IOs and foreign policy enactment, some have gone so far as to say that in Liberia: “Babangida single-handedly created a scenario in which to play a new set of rules of the game. First, he drew attention to the instability violence and cross-border conflicts in the continent in general, and West Africa in particular. Then he championed an ECOWAS committee to mediate disputes and conflicts, invoking the Mutual Defense Pact, thus lending political weight behind the organization” (Ajibewa 2006, 84).
As has been explicit thus far, oil has historically played a foundational role in all aspects of Nigerian statecraft, politics, and social relations. While approximately 85% of the Nigerian government’s revenue comes from the sale of oil, in the early 1990s, an insurgent group from the primary point of production of that oil – the Niger Delta – came to rise as the country’s primary national security interest. Composed of nine Nigerian states, forty ethnic groups, and some 27 million inhabitants as of 2007, the Niger Delta has one of the highest populations densities in the world (Ghavzvinian 2007, 18). The Delta had long been a hotbed for discontent: though the region’s oil the very lifeblood for the Nigerian state, local residents themselves saw virtually no benefits, with profits instead taken by multinational oil companies, with government ministries and bureaucrats skimming a substantial fee off the top. While local communities – especially youth – frequently attacked multinational oil installations, violence in the Delta was rarely severe enough to be viewed as a national security interest.

Discontent came to a head in 1992, with the emergence of a group of ethnic Ogoni, called the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, members of the relatively small ethnic group (comprising 500,000 members) had sent letters to their governor, that of River State, since the 1970s, requesting an equitable share of the oil windfalls, to no avail. Thus, in 1992, they delivered an ultimatum to Shell: that it offer Ogoni communities reparations for years of lost wages, or vacate Ogoniland. When Shell ignored the thirty-day ultimatum, Saro-Wiwa organized a peaceful protest of some 300,000 Ogoni and MOSOP community members. Despite the peaceful nature of protests, Shell and other oil companies were forced to halt production. This angered the Nigerian government,
which retaliated by sending in the national military to suppress the protests; for its part, the Nigerian parliament began to equate the MOSOP activists with Biafran secessionists, and banned the existence of the group (Ghavzvinian 2007, 27-30). Concurrently, Sani Abacha came to power in 1993, the second of the two leaders that Nigerian diplomatic historiography refers to as “the second period of Nigerian military rule.” 45 Indeed, as Alao (2006) notes, the “disruptions being caused in the oil-producing regions” were one of the top three national security threats for Abacha. 46

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Nigeria (IV1=A, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a domestic non-secessionist insurgency (IV4=B), will find no strategic utility in IOs, and will instead circumvent IOs to take unilateral action. (HDV1=0B, thus HDV2= and HDV3=).

The Strategic Utility of African IOs:

In this instance, the theory holds: Nigeria took (arguably needless harsh) unilateral action, outside of the context of IOs. In the aftermath of this action, it then worked assiduously to attempt to minimize any involvement, and especially critique, of these organizations within its internal affairs.

45 Falling in line with the general tendencies from Babangida, the foreign and security policies of Abacha were characterized by a blurred distinction between state interests and personal interests, with one set of interests often being inseparable from the other (Alao 2006, 64). Throughout his five-year tenure, Abacha’s foreign and security policymaking tendencies have been described as being in “chaos and disrepute” (Inamete 2001, xiii) and “incoherent, largely discredited, and ineffective” (Abegunrin 2003, 155). Yet, Sani Abacha’s rule, much like Babangida’s before him, was characterized by an increasing international isolationism due to his authoritarian tendencies, all while gaining some degree of admiration from his African counterparts for the roles that he would lead Nigeria to play in regional peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone, as will be shown below (Inamete 2001, 275). These small and rare victories notwithstanding, the period of Abacha’s rule is broadly characterized as a time of the further marginalization of Nigeria’s national image on the international stage.

46 He notes that the other two primary national security threats for Abacha were the impending tide of democratization, as well as the impact of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and the involvement of the international financial institutions on Nigeria’s well being (Alao 2006).
Soon after MOSOP emerged, Abacha sent the Nigerian military into Ogoniland, and by the end of 1993, hundreds of Ogoni – many presumed to be peaceful protestors – were killed. Tensions heightened when, in May 1995, four Ogoni tribal leaders were killed by a mob, which the Nigerian government claimed to Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP, but which most other accounts have cited as government sponsored inciters. The government arrested a group – including Saro-Wiwa – that could come to be known as the Ogoni Nine, on charges of murder, and was put to trial.

When it came to role of the OAU, Nigeria, wanted it to have no part in its internal goings-on. Yet, the international outrage over Abacha’s response to the otherwise peaceful Ogoni activists led South Africa under its new president Nelson Mandela, in 1995, to seek to mediate a solution for the Nigerian crisis. Though Abacha initially seemed open to the mediation from South Africa, things quickly turned sour. Abacha told Nelson Mandela’s envoys, Thabo Mbeki and Desmond Tutu, that he would grant the Ogoni and other anti-Shell activists leniency. Nevertheless, November 10, 1995, the Ogoni Nine were hanged from a gallows in Port Harcourt, to the horror of the international community. Abacha’s decision to hang the Ogoni Nine led Mandela to take personal offense. Thus, Mandela became Africa’s most outspoken critic of the Abacha regime, calling Abacha an “illegitimate barbaric, arrogant military dictatorship which has murdered activists and using a kangaroo court and false evidence” (Mandela in Abegunrin 2001, 150). As will be shown, the reputational impacts of this decision were far-reaching.

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47 As a result of the execution of the Ogoni Nine, British Prime Minister John Major suspended Nigeria’s membership in the Commonwealth (Ghavzvinian 2007, 29).
48 Outside of the Ogoni uprisings specifically, it came to Abacha’s general approach to African IOs, both the OAU and ECOWAS remained important to Nigerian foreign policy, though less so than in the Babangida era. As Abegunrin (2003, 147-148 writes): “In West Africa, ECOWAS remained the major
While Nigeria succeeded in generally keeping the OAU out of its internal affairs in relation to MOSOP, the early to mid-1990s were a period of policy turmoil for Nigeria in the IO: Nigeria would experience the starkest deviation in policy it had ever undertake in relation to its strategic positioning within the OAU. The collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa in many senses, threw into chaos to contours of the intra-African international relations order, crudely akin to the end of an African Cold War. With post-apartheid South Africa’s emergence, Nigeria needed a vast rethink of its positioning within the OAU. As should be recalled, Nigeria’s privileged place as an African leader had come, in no small part, from its leadership role in the pan-African anti-apartheid struggle. In the absence of such a struggle to lead “the only major issues that had given coherence to the country’s policies [towards the OAU] had had been removed.” Thus, with the end of apartheid in South Africa, Nigeria’s claims to need to show pan-African leadership in the pursuit of Pax-Nigeriana no longer had a raison d’être (Abegunrin 2001, 149). Thus despite the centrality of the OAU in Nigerian foreign and security policy thinking, in the post-apartheid era, the IO’s importance in Nigerian strategic thinking subsided. Thus, the post-1994 OAU was a bit of a stumbling block focus, but the Abacha regime was less active in the organization than the Babangida military government had been. One of the reasons for this was that the Francophone countries were more actively involved in the affairs of a parallel economic union, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UMEOA), formed in 1994 by the devaluation of the CFA franc. From that moment, Francophone heads of state rarely tented the annual summits of ECOWAS, which became an increasingly Anglophone affair. Second, most countries in West Africa were seriously affected by political instability and economic problems, and were therefore were preoccupied with domestic affairs. Nigeria was in the same situation, and in 1994 and 1995, Abacha did not attend ECOWAS summits and other important regional meeting because of the economic and political crises confronting him. However, he became the chairman of ECOWAS in 1996 and Nigeria once again seemed set to salvage the organization. This was part of Abacha’s isolationist and survivalist policy….ECOMOG remained the most important regional cooperative undertaking in which Nigeria was involved…Abacha considered pulling Nigeria out, because her involvement in this war so very unpopular at home. However, the international acclaim won by Nigeria’s involvement and leadership was seen as a god counterbalance to her isolationism and the condemnation of her military rulers dissuaded Abacha from pulling out. Outside ECOWAS, Nigeria maintained her shaky subregional superpower role despite increasing insolvency.”
for Nigerian foreign ad security policymakers: how was Africa’s would-be hegemon supposed to leverage the OAU for its benefit if the one issue that had given credence to its leadership had been “solved”?

National Security Interest #7: Restore the Battered Nigerian Image

National Security Interest:

Olusegun Obasanjo came to power in 1999 as the first democratically elected Nigerian leader in several decades. The state that Obasanjo had inherited was imperiled geopolitically, given that decades of military rule that had undercut Nigeria’s reputation for legitimate leadership. Thus, Obasanjo’s overriding goal was the restoration of Nigeria’s international image as a legitimate African leader.

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Nigeria (IV1=A, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of pursuing a reputational interest (IV4G) will find constructivist strategic utility (HDV1=1C) in its REC (HDV2=1) and the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Role of African IOs:

In general, our theory is partially correct: while Obasanjo did find strategic utility in the OAU and later the AU, to improve Nigeria's image, it did not find as much utility in ECOWAS. Soon after assuming the presidency, Obasanjo took a global goodwill tour to attempt to make global amends broadly, and to bring to light Nigeria’s severe indebtedness in specifically (Abegunrin 2006b, 266-267). This need to reduce Nigeria’s international debt burden as well as to restore years of a poor

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49 For more on Obasanjo’s campaigning for debt relief from the IFIs and Nigeria’s HIPC status, see Abegunrin 2006b, 267-270.
international reputation, coupled with Obasanjo’s “messiah complex” led to his strong commitment to the principles of democracy and democratization, and good governance within the context of the OAU, and eventually, the AU.

In understanding Obasanjo’s strategic approach to the OAU, it should be recalled that upon his assumption into office, a once-eager Nigeria had experienced years of stalled policy within the OAU. Beginning with the collapse of the coherence of Nigeria’s OAU policy with the end of apartheid in 1994; followed by its increasing global marginalization throughout 1995, 1996, and 1997 from the Ogoni Nine fallout; followed by the a year of virtually no OAU approach from the transitional Abubakar administration, Obasanjo inherited a more or less clean strategic slate when it came to Nigeria’s OAU outlook.

When the AU was founded, it was accompanied by a wide-ranging series of institutions called the African Peace and Security Architecture, which included, as its centerpiece, the African Peace and Security Council. For its part, Nigeria has served consecutively from 2004 to 2012 as one of four West African representatives (Williams 2012, 159). Also for note in the historiography of the transition of the OAU to the AU was the role that Obasanjo played in restructuring the OAU to the African Union (AU) in 2002, including the provision of progressive language on the right of intervention (Teiku 2004; Haggis 2009; Adebajo 2010). Given this leadership, Nigeria is indeed contemporarily known to be a “key player” in AU affairs (Gandois 2009, 42, 57) while, specifically in relation to its early peacekeeping efforts, others have rightly questioned whether Nigeria is “Africa’s new gendarme” (Adebajo 2000).

Whereas Obasanjo took a far more activist stance in the transformation of the OAU to the AU in the dual service of promoting himself and improving Nigeria’s
battered imaged, Nigeria’s understanding of the strategic importance of ECOWAS during the late 1990s and early 2000s waned. Coupled with the war fatigue of the Nigerian population from a decade of interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Alao (2006, 75) argues that upon taking the presidency, sub-regional politics was “not of immediate concern” to the Obasanjo administration and that “there was no significant amount of attention” paid to West African politics during Obasanjo’s first year in office. Obasanjo eventually resuscitated Nigeria’s activist stance within ECOWAS during 2000 and 2001, when he would regularly attend ECOWAS meetings, though his approach to West African international reactions was more muted than his predecessors (Alao 2006. 75). As Gandois (2009, 341-342) argues: “put parsimoniously, ECWOAS and SADC emerged as regional security organizations with a democracy mandate because the regional hegemon decided to use the existing regional organization to establish a mechanism addressing the challenges spurred by the end of the Cold War and by state weakness.”

**National Security Interest #8: Suppressing Boko Haram**

**National Security Interest:**

Since May 2011, the Islamist Boko Haram insurgency has killed some 19,000 persons, primarily in northeastern Nigeria, and, despite ebbs and flows in the group’s power, it remains solidly entrenched as of early 2016. Explicitly secessionist in nature, Boko Haram has arisen to re-install a version of the Islamic Sokoto caliphate in northeastern Nigeria that was destroyed and incorporated into the modern Nigerian state in 1903, Boko Haram is a militant arm that seeks to delegitimize the Nigerian
government and all Western influences within the country, including Western forms of
education, cultural practices, religions, and even populations whose beliefs do not
coincide with Boko Haram’s conservative interpretation of Islam. Particularly
troubling for Nigeria is that, while Boko Haram began as a homegrown insurgency, it
has since morphed into a decidedly transnational group, having launched attacks in
Nigeria’s neighbors Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, and also reportedly using spaces in
these countries as havens for its operations. What started as an isolated domestic
insurgency has since grown to become not only Nigeria’s main domestic problem, but
also, its main foreign and security policy preoccupation (Warner 2016b).

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Nigeria (IV1=A, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the
prospect of addressing a domestic secessionist insurgency (IV4=A), will find realist
strategic utility (HDV1=1) in IOs: not in its REC (HDV2 =0) but instead, in the
(O)AU (HDV3=1).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:

In this case, the theory is partially correct: Nigeria has not found any relevance
in its REC, it has actually working assiduously to avoid any involvement of the AU or
ECOWAS in the fight against Boko Haram, going to far – as will be discussed – to
give new security capabilities to smaller IO, over which it can maintain predominant
control. Nigeria’s general approach to keeping the AU and ECOWAS out of its fight
against Boko Haram were put front and center at the January 2015 semi-annual
meeting of the African Union. While Nigeria had historically worked assiduously to
keep the Boko Haram insurgency out of discussions at the AU in previous years, by
early 2015, the insurgency was so powerful that West African states, namely Ghana,
pressed it to be taken up. The outcome was that the AU pledged to commit an 8,700-
person force to be sent to the country.

Nigeria, which would have had its hegemonic credentials deeply undermined with
the entrance of a Pan-African force into its borders - a clear sign that it was impotent
in its own fight - quickly restructured the approved force from being a functionally AU
force to a regional force. At that point, one would have assumed that the peacekeeping
force would be based at ECOWAS, a more contemporary version of an ECOMOG
force. Yet, Nigeria’s insistence on maintaining control over is domestic security
landscape, in the vein of the hegemon it aspires to be, asserted that the new force
should be operated by the countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), a
regional grouping of countries that few outside of the region had ever heard of. With
its members of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, in addition to Benin, the LCBC
is now at the head of the fight against Boko Haram. To be sure, the deftness with
which the Nigerian policymaking establishment succeeded in wrangling the anti-Boko
Haram coalition away from not only the pan-African African Union (and potential
rivals like South Africa or Ethiopia), but even away from the West African ECOWAS
(and powerful member states like Ghana and Senegal), Nigeria’s distillation of the
force to be managed by a handful of four countries in addition to itself, is both a
remarkable grand strategic accomplishment and a rational policy choice.

Since the LCBC has taken on the fight against Boko Haram, Nigeria has been sure
to make sure that it stays firmly at the reigns of all of its activities. For instance, while
some members had suggested that leadership of the LCBC joint task force should
rotate amongst countries, Nigeria made sure that it alone would retain control of the
operation ("Buhari wants Nigeria to Lead, 2015), and appointed its own Major
General Illiya Abbah - a former commander of counterinsurgency efforts in the Niger Delta - to the position in July 2015 (Jeune Afrique 2015). Moreover, Nigeria also, in a strong-armed attempt to show that it was in the lead of neighbors, and not the other way around, forbid soldiers within the LCBC joint task force from crossing into Nigeria, a move that was just lifted in August of 2015. Yet, for its part, Chad has accused Nigeria of not cooperating with regional countries, undertaking its own operations, and consistently downplaying the regional threats posed by Boko Haram (Oladeji 2015).

A second contemporary instance in which Nigeria’s non-monopoly over its domestic security politics subverts its Pan-African leadership quest can be seen in relation to its reaction to the new AU-based rapid-response mechanism to stop conflict, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). ACIRC, which was proposed by South Africa in 2013, is intended to be a volunteer, multinational rapid-deployment force capable of quickly intervening in African member states in the likely event of state collapse and/or human rights abuses. Despite widespread continental support, however, Nigeria has declined to contribute to the initiative, a development that came as a surprise to many onlookers. Various observers have suggested that duplicity is at play. Officially, Nigeria has said that it is reluctant to commit because ACIRC is a duplication of pre-existing rapid-deployment mechanisms within the AU (namely, the African Standby Force (ASF)) (Warner 2015). While this is likely part of its rationale, others believe that in fact Nigeria is apprehensive about committing troops or materiel to pan-African conflicts, given that it desperately needs to use them first at home to fight Boko Haram (Du Plessis 2014). To support this claim, they point to the fact that Nigeria had to withdraw troops from the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MIUSMA) in order to redeploy its troops to fight Boko Haram within its own borders in Borno state (Campbell 2013).

More broadly, in response to the fight against Boko Haram, Nigeria has fallen back on some of the previously discussed strategies in relation to the (O)AU. For one, it continued to make sure that the Boko Haram insurgency was not discussed at the African Union (Williams 2011, 167), a goal that it was able to accomplish in no small part due the fact that, as of mid-2014, Nigeria was the only state on the continent to have served continuously on the AU Peace and Security Council since the body's creation, despite the fact that only 37 of 54 African states had served on the PSC at all (Williams 2014, 151).

**Conclusion**

Despite its drive for a *Pax-Nigeriana*, nearly all observers agree that Nigeria has yet to achieve that role (Adebajo 2008; Adebajo 2000; Buzan and Waever 2003, 55; Gambari 2008; Gebrewold 2014; Wright and Okolo 1999, 126-130). Why is this so? Many explanations have been forwarded to explain the incomplete achievement of *Pax-Nigeriana*, including the hijacking of the state apparatus by Nigerian elites; a non-cohesive domestic landscape; a lack of civil society interest; and a lack of regional legitimacy.

The first prominent explanation comes from those who have opined that the pursuit of *Pax-Nigeriana* has been retarded by the hijacking of the state apparatus by Nigerian elites Adebajo (2008) compares Nigeria to a potentially prosperous Gulliver, and Nigeria’s leaders as the Lilliputians, “whose petty ambitions and often inhumane
greed...have prevented a country of enormous potential from fulfilling its leadership aspirations and developmental potential.” A second line of reasoning suggests that Nigeria’s non-cohesive domestic social landscape has had deleterious impacts on the process of Nigerian policymaking (Mustapha 2008; Wright and Okolo 1999, 120). Given that loyalty typically tends to lie with ethnicity over nationality, the historical ethnic tensions in the country (exacerbated by colonialism, geography, and resource endowments) have created a fractured foreign policymaking apparatus, which Mustapha (2008) conjectures have led to suboptimal foreign policy and security outcomes.

A third explanation comes from those that believe that it is Nigerian civil society’s indifference towards the pursuit of *Pax-Nigeriana* that could be at the heart of the country’s inability to achieve it. Put in the broadest terms, it has rarely been the case that Nigerian foreign policymaking has served to benefit the modal Nigerian (Wright and Okolo 1999) and thus Nigerians have been historically opposed to the government’s eagerness to engage in peacekeeping (Hill 2009, 292).

That Nigeria is an unsuccessful would-be West African regional leader has been underlined in different ways by various observers. Buzan and Waever (2003, 204) have noted in the simplest terms about Nigerian leadership in West Africa that: “The paradox is that Nigeria is both the mainstay [of ECOWAS] and itself hanging in the brink of failure as a state.” And, as Adebajo (192) presciently wrote in 2000:

There are two paradoxes involved in Nigeria’s hegemonic quest in West Africa: First, while it lacks the military and economic resources to fulfill the role effectively, Nigeria still possesses more resources and capabilities than its neighbors, allowing it to project power in its subregion. Second, Nigeria’s greatest opportunity to dominate its subregion is occurring at a time of continuing political troubles and severe economic problems at home.
In discussing the likelihood of a regional security community coalescing in West Africa, Buzan and Waever (2003, 255) have noted that, “Although the West Africa[n region] is clearly unipolar, a Nigeria-centered order would have limited legitimacy.” Moreover, Nigerian policies of prevarication endure: despite its commitments to ECOWAS for the purposes of establishing its presence as the region’s legitimate unipole, “Nigeria’s security practice has not matched its rhetoric on addressing [West Africa’s] transnational security threats” (Obi 2008, 195). Writing more recently, Gebrewold (2014, 18) comes to a similar conclusion: “Nigeria…show[s] a considerable gap between [its] aspirations and [its] ability to act as [a] regional stabilizer, mainly due to a lack of legitimacy.”

As this chapter has shown, Nigeria, as West Africa’s most powerful states, has conceptualized its national security interests as being inherently bound up with the politics of both the OAU/AU as well as ECOWAS. A few lessons come to light. First, Nigeria takes an “offensive” approach to ECOWAS, attempting (and indeed succeeding) at fundamentally steering in its goals, operational culture, and security actions when they involve other neighboring states, but ensuring that it stays out of its own affairs. Second, there has been a feedback loop, in which a powerful member’s actions in the organization lead other members to seek a reformation of the organization. Indeed, in light of Nigerian foreign and security policy usages of ECOWAS via ECOMOG interventions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, Francophone member states urged and succeeded in creating ECOWAS’ nine-member

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50 And yet, even while Nigeria is ostensibly in command of ECOWAS, some have suggested that it could be doing even more: “In ECOWAS there is a general impression that Nigeria drives ECOWAS: it has the population, the money, it hosts the organization, etc. So, to a certain extent, this is true. But the average Nigerian in ECOWAS would say, in fact, we’re not driving it enough. We’re too benevolent, and not really pursuing our interests to the fullest extent possible in ECOWAS (IS7/2 2015).
Mediation and Security Council, which allows for allows the council to be come active when conflict emerges (Article 25) and authorizes all types of interventions (Article 10). Notably, the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council was expressly created to “curb the…instrumentalization of ECOWAS by Nigeria as a hegemonic power” (Wulf and Debiel 2009, 16). Third, to the extent that regional polarity and location within the regional hierarchy serves as the primary determinant of African foreign policy tendencies towards IOs, one sees a remarkable continuity in Nigerian strategy and approaches to ECOWAS, which have remained more or less consistent from 1975, despite changes in leaders and regime type. Finally, it should also be noted that numerous other national security interests were omitted in the course of the preceding discussion, simply by virtue of limitations in space. These include: Nigeria’s desire for a UN Security Council seat (1970s to today); Nigeria’s interests in the ECOMOG II intervention in Sierra Leone (1997); fighting the insurgent group, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) (2000s), and arguably, many others. In short, when put into our theory, it broadly – accurately – predicts how Nigeria understands the strategic utility of African IOs.
SECTION THREE:

MIDDLE STATES AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFRICAN IOs

As with the foregoing discussion of “powerful” states in Africa, it is also the case that “middle states” exist within a continental African context. In discussing African “middle states,” we are concerned with those countries that have some amount of international power projection capability that allows them to inform – to some substantial degree – regional security and political outcomes, but not so much that they can thoroughly dictate them. In other ways – especially in unipolar and bipolar African regions – middle states can be thought of as “spoiler” states whose actions presumably need to follow or inform those of the hegemonic states.

What are the general trends by which middle African states think about the strategic utility of African IOs? The first general theme in this discussion is that delineating trends amongst middle states is actually quite difficult. Attempts to locate a
consistent “middle state” outlook towards African IOs becomes challenging primarily because of the diversity of what constitutes a “middle state,” as well as what being a middle state means within the context of varying regional IO polarities. To that end, IO polarity resurfaces as a determining factor in strategic approaches to IOs. For instance, in a unipolar region, middle states might tend to be more skeptical of deep engagement within regional African IOs, precisely because of the fear of entrapment within a set of rules set by a hegemon. To that end, West Africa’s Francophone middle states like Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire have historically shown to be more open to engagement with non-African security institutions (especially those initiated by France) as a means to counteract Nigerian hegemony. Indeed:

African states were able to counteract the influence of would-be regional powers by looking instead to patrons outside the continent. For a small state, protection by a distant power was often less threatening than dependence on a large and potentially predatory neighbor (Clapham 1996, 121-122)

Conversely, states in multipolar regions like the Horn of Africa are far more likely to think of constructing foreign and security policies through the lens of IOs, precisely because as a middle state in a multipolar region, one has more agency to dictate desired outcomes. Yet, whereas sometimes middle states in unipolar African IOs might feel marginalized in IOs, in multipolar IOs, IOs can help to enable more than they constrain. As was articulated neatly by IS42 (2015):

When I think of what states can get out of IOs, I think of America in the United Nations. I always think about the UN as a constraint on their FP. However, for other countries, like the other Nordic nations, the UN is actually more beneficial than constraining. The same thing is true in Africa: for some countries, these IOs enable them to achieve more than they would have been able to otherwise, and in other instances, the organizations constrain what states are capable of doing. Nigeria is more constrained, whereas someone like Kenya is able to do

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1 For more on this, see the discussion of Senegal’s reaction following the ECOMOG I intervention in Liberia. See especially (Mortimer 2000, 203).
more than it would otherwise. For Kenya, they are enablers that allow them to play a larger role than their own.

Second, as we begin to discuss the relationship between middle African states and IOs, what begins to surface is the appearance of cracks in the ability of states to effectively forestall action IOs within the context of their domestic affairs. Whereas our examinations of Nigeria highlighted rather neatly the extent to which IOs’ actions around security have been construed as having no role or possibility to infringe upon the domestic actions of African states as they deal with domestic insurgencies, this is less and less the case for middle states, who, as a result of a lack of preponderance of power within said IOs, cannot dictate their actions as fully. The subsequent case study chapters show how three African middle states think through their strategic engagement with African IOs.
CHAPTER FIVE:

ETHIOPIA

As one of the oldest civilizations on earth, to attempt to discern the incipient stage of an Ethiopian (or Abyssinian) foreign and security policy genesis could be an effort in futility. The history of the lands and peoples that form the contemporary Ethiopian polity extended back to the first millennium before the Common Era (BCE), and included storied empires such as the Axumite Empire (100-940 CE), the Zagwe Dynasty (1137-1270) and the Solomonic Dynasty (1270-1974). Though the country existed in what where then individual ethnic kingdoms, the centralization of the state began with the unification of these disparate lands in 1889, by Menelik II.

Yet, for the purposes of the present work, the focus will remain on the foreign policy actions of the centralized Ethiopian state, which emerged with the ascension of Emperor Haile Selassie I (1930-1974), progressed through a period of military Marxist-Leninist rule under the Derg (1974-87) and Haile Mariam Mengistu (1987-1991), and continues today in the form of an essentially one-party state led by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), bent on reclaiming historic Ethiopian glory via a combination of the pursuit regional hegemony and break-neck, state-led economic growth. While each of these three regimes - the monarchy, the Marxist-Leninist military regimes, and the hegemony-seeking autocratic EPRDF - each maintained distinct foreign policy outlooks, a connective thread that ran through each in relation to the strategic role of IOs, was their trump
card: the existence of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) within the capital city, Addis Ababa. Other trends will also be highlighted.

**Ethiopia Within the Theory**

Within the theory, Ethiopia is classified as a middle power (IV1=B) in a multipolar regional REC (IV2=C) and a non-polar African Union (IV3=A). As per Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 below, Ethiopia indeed displays a great amount of realist-conceived agency within IGAD specifically, and the Horn more broadly as concerns military expenditures, GDP, and population. However, the presence of other states with similar capacities for international projection – especially Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda – all keep Ethiopia from assuming the mantel of “regional hegemon” that it desperately seeks.3

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2 Militarily, Ethiopia is also superior both within the region, and known for its capacities across the continent, where it stands as the third largest on the African continent. In terms of sheer numbers, best estimates suggest that Ethiopia’s ground and air capacities ranges from 200,000 to 250,000 (Tewedros and Lulie 2014). Most notably, Ethiopia’s military is unique on the continent in that its capabilities range from conventional warfare units to counter-insurgency operations, to, quite notably peacekeeping forces. To the point of the latter, Ethiopia is quick to remind the international community that it is the largest peacekeeping provider to African Union missions, as well as the largest African troop contributor to UN missions (?X). Beyond these attributes, the Ethiopia military notably controls an expansive arrange of factories and other business worth millions of dollars (Tewedros and Lulie 2014).

3 Indeed, Ethiopia is uniquely positioned - in literal and figurative senses - to serve as the regional hegemon in the Horn of Africa, given that it is the only country that borders all other countries in the Greater Horn - Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan - and thus, is literally in the center of the Horn and affected by the politics of each constituent member of the region.
Figure 5.1

Figure 5.2

Figure 5.3
Given this knowledge of “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” about the nature of national security interests, our theory predicts the following understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs:

**Figure 5.4**

**Hypothesized Ethiopian Perceptions of the Strategic Utility of African IOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIDDLE STATES in IGAD HYPOTHESES</th>
<th>(Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXISTING INFORMATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>NEW INFORMATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV1</td>
<td>IV2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is my international power projection capability?</strong></td>
<td><strong>What is the polarity of my primary REC?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: Powerful</td>
<td>A: Unipolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Middle</td>
<td>B: Bipolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Weak</td>
<td>C: Multipolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Peripheral</td>
<td>D: Nonpolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Global/Non-African Actors</td>
<td>YES (1B): I have liberal aims that an IO will help me accomplish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F: Economic Interests</td>
<td>NO (0A): I will take collaborative action outside of an IO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Reputational Interests</td>
<td>YES (1C): I have constructivist aims that an IO will help accomplish</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**An Overview of Ethiopian Foreign Policy**

The preeminent guiding principle of Ethiopian foreign and security policy has always been, somewhat ironically, that internal matters are always subsidiary to external concerns (National Security Strategy 2002; IS39/1, 2015; IS10/2, 2015). Put
otherwise, Ethiopia’s national security interests are premised around the enactment of a foreign policy only insofar as it allows for the insulation of the internal, namely, economic development, the perpetuation of regime security, and the unification of otherwise disparate ethnic groups from around its territory. For a country that has historically been deeply concerned with its internal politics, “it will obviously have the same degree of concern with its foreign policy” (IS10/2, 2015). Put simply, Ethiopia’s foreign policies are simply for made for the protection of domestic interests.  

Today, the clearest articulation of Ethiopia’s foreign and security policy is called the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS). Produced in 2002 in the aftermath of the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea, a review of the FANSPS, which continues to serve as the preeminent guiding document for Ethiopia’s foreign and security policies, is highly revelatory. Some of its more salient insights about Ethiopian foreign policy include:

Former governments pursued external relations and national security policies that disregarded internal problems that were fundamental to our national condition. (1) In this respect it is clear to see that our foreign relations and national security policy and strategy can only have relevance if it contributes to the fight against poverty and promotes speedy economic development, democracy and peace. Generally speaking, it could be said that the foreign relations and security policy implemented by former Ethiopian governments did not adequately take into account the impact that our internal problems and vulnerabilities had on our national security and our very survival (1).

Yet once Ethiopia moves beyond its own internal security landscape, like all other African countries, its primary considerations revolve around understanding and assessing its immediate neighbors. For obvious reasons, its first concern has, for

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4 Various interviewees interpreted Ethiopia’s regional priorities in different ways. One (IS10/2, 2015) assumed that: ”Ethiopia always starts the formulation of foreign policy by looking at the region around it. The order of priorities for Ethiopia is: Eritrea; S. Sudan; 3. Kenya and Djibouti.” Others have suggested that the order of Ethiopia’s foreign and security prioritizes are: Somali extremism; failed states broadly (South Sudan and Eritrea); and land routes and transportation (Davison and Fortin 2015).
decades, been managing its relationship with Eritrea (chapter 11). Thereafter, Ethiopian leaders have sought to take stock of the other would-be spoilers in the region, including Somalia, as well as Sudan (Chapter 7) and Djibouti (chapter 10). Ethiopia has historically maintained generally positive relations with Kenya and Uganda, and is attempting to understand its relationship with South Sudan beyond simply as an IGAD mediator.

When it comes to Ethiopian foreign and security policies towards African IOs, Ethiopia’s understanding of the strategic utility – and its resultant policymaking approaches – remain far more robust towards IGAD than towards the AU. Arguably the leading observer of Ethiopian foreign and security policy, Mehari Maru has argued in many fora that despite the strategic advantages that it could offer, Ethiopia has never leveraged the AU to its fullest extent. In relation to the AU:

Ethiopia lacks a self-contained comprehensive policy toward the AU that clearly articulates its national interest and how to strategically pursue these interests in the AU. Despite the absence of a full-fledged and self-contained policy, throughout the past five decades, Ethiopia’s commitment, overall direction and contributions have been that of continuity and consistency (Maru 2015).

And despite the clarity of purposes the FANPS attempts to give to Ethiopian foreign policy, Maru (2015) has also argued that one of FANPS’ main deficiencies is that it lacks a clearly articulated outlook on the role of the AU in its overall strategy. As he relays of Ethiopia’s “special responsibility” to the AU – given that Ethiopia plays host to the IO – the reality is that:

What constitutes “special responsibility,” however, has not been clearly defined. Despite being the seedbed for Pan Africanism, the principal force behind the establishment of the OAU, and the host of the AU for five decades, Ethiopia lacks a self-contained comprehensive policy toward the AU that clearly
articulates its national interests and how to strategically pursue them (Maru and Demissie, 2015).

When it comes to inputs into Ethiopia’s foreign policy, perhaps more so than in any other African country, political parties - especially the current EPRDF - have always played a strong role in the nature of Ethiopian foreign and security policymaking since the end of the Selassie monarchy in 1974. To be sure, this was not the case during the period of the Ethiopian monarchy. However, both during the era of the Derg and in the post-Derg EPRDF period, consultation within the party has been a hallmark of Ethiopian foreign and security policymaking, a trend that continues today (IS10/1, 2014; Davison and Fortin 2015). The core reason that the EPRDF is at the center of Ethiopian foreign and security policymaking is, as one observer has said bluntly, “the EPRDF stifles completion: it is by far the strongest institution in the country” (IS10/1 2014). And, as two top international journalists have relayed: “Officials always talk about a “party strategy…it’s like it’s on a golden scroll somewhere” (Fortin and Davison 2015). Others refer contemporarily to Hailemariam Desalegn and the “party’s powerful politburo,” who “cast their vision of a Great Ethiopia in terms of benign regional hegemony” (Verhoeven 2015). A byproduct of this outstripped role of the party in Ethiopian foreign policymaking is the fact given that foreign policy shifts are not as transparent as they are in other African countries - where one might simply regard a leader’s predilections - Ethiopian foreign and security policies are notoriously opaque, with Ethiopia have gained a reputation as one of the most

5 More specifically, since the end of the Derg regime (1991), former members of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) have dominated the EPRDF’s foreign policymaking apparatus. This is true in both the foreign policy and military policymaking realms.

6 An important point to note is that while the EPRDF is indeed an authoritarian party that stifles dissent, it remains the case that opposition parties are so underdeveloped so as to be functionally meaningless. This is the case, not least, because their proposed policy agendas rarely extend beyond “anti-EPRDF” (IS10/1 2014).
enigmatic countries on the continent (IS31 2015). Despite the centrality of the Derg and EPRDF parties, it is still the case that, as in other African countries, individual leaders have still had heavy influence in the conduct of Ethiopia’s foreign policy. This has been the case for all three periods of the Ethiopian polity - from Selassie, to Mariam, to various heads of state in the EPRDF regime, especially the late Meles Zenawi.

Another important input in the Ethiopian foreign and security policymaking process is the military. While the role of the military in Ethiopia’s pursuit of its national security interests can only be interrogated briefly, it is the case that within contemporary Ethiopian military policy creation, there are assumed to be just a handful of players whose outlooks inform the overall national strategy. These central figures include: General Getachew Assefa, the Chief of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and General Samora Yunis, the Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, and former TPLF fighter. Most germane to this work however is the third main military policymaker, Col. Gebre, who is “Ethiopia’s man in IGAD.”

Other factors that bear upon the nature of Ethiopian foreign policy construction include the role of the very vocal (and generally anti-EPRDF) diaspora and the role of religion, especially given Ethiopia’s deeply Orthodox Christian majorities. For its part,

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7 Of interest, one interviewee relayed that despite the very strong pull that Meles had in the creation of foreign and military power, since his death and the rise of Hailemariam Desalegn, the first two of these officers are really behind the creation of Ethiopia’s foreign and military policies. As she said: “I wouldn’t say [Desalegn] is a puppet of what these two, but he’s almost a puppet, and he is very easily persuaded to do what they want…If you want to understand what Ethiopia is doing in the military realm, understanding what these two guys are thinking is the key” (IS10/2 2014).

8 As one interviewer relayed, the fact that Gebre, who is only a Col, would retain such a high position within the Ethiopian military establishment is a result of the fact that, in the country, personality traits and personal connections often outweigh formalized ranks. As the informant asserted of this situation, some can be promoted “because someone is a good writer, speaks English well, is very capable, or has just known the commanding officer for a long time.”
Ethiopian civil society has virtually no say in the conduct of the country’s foreign and security policies. Its voice is left unheard in elections, and indeed, the modal Ethiopian is less concerned with foreign policy than she is with her daily life. As one Ethiopian schoolteacher relayed:

Most Ethiopians just don’t care about politics. They don’t talk about politics. It’s because they are just thinking about how to pay the bills. It’s very expensive, but they don’t care about politics. Some rich care about politics, but only because they just don’t want conflict. They want peace. So they don’t care. Also, most of the Ethiopians are connected to religion. People don’t care about the politics. This government gives the opportunity to practice their religion for free. And that’s all that people really care about (IS23 2015).

To drive home the point, IS39/1 (2015) explained that: “The Central Policy Bureau makes foreign policy. Civil society has no say in Ethiopian foreign policy. Though the EPRDF is a revolutionary party, civil society still doesn’t matter.”

What remains a constant in discussion of Ethiopian foreign policymaking, however, is that far more than other African states, its decisions seem to be well thought out, well considered, longer in duration, and deeply pragmatic (IS102 2014; Maru 2015). Ethiopia is known for its tendencies to pull case studies from various other countries – especially its role model, China – on how to encourage rapid economic development, even when these ideologies are not necessarily commensurate. Various observers have also underlined the consistency of purpose that Ethiopia has maintained in its foreign policy and national security outlooks on time on issues such as its relationship with Somalia, Sudan, and Islamic extremism (Yihun 2014).

**National Security Interest #1: Suppressing Ethno-Nationalist Insurgencies (The Monarchy)**

**National Security Interest:**
Haile Selassie served as the imperial monarch of Ethiopia from 1930 to 1974. Hailing from the longer line of the Solomonic Dynasty, Haile Selassie, was the 225th – and last - emperor of the kingdom from this lineage. By the time that Haile Selassie ascended the throne, the process of Ethiopian state consolidation was well underway, and indeed, generally successful. However, the process of state consolidation was far from complete: rule was assumed juridically, though often not in practice. Sundry ethnic breakaway groups existed through the country, and given the Emperor’s inability to project power completely across the country, success against these insurgent groups was far from assumed. This was particularly the case when it came to the would-be republic of Eritrea. Further consolidation of the state via the suppression of secessionist-minded insurgencies came to be an overriding concern for Selassie, especially as other African nations began to receive the formal independence that Ethiopia had enjoyed throughout its entire existence. The loss of Eritrea was especially troubling, given that by losing the area demarcated with the Eritrean secessionist claims, Ethiopia would lose access to the sea, which it ultimately would, thus rendering it the most populous country in the world without sea access.

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Ethiopia (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a domestic secessionist insurgency (IV4=A), will find realist strategic utility (HDV1=1) in IOs: not in its REC (HDV2 = 0 ) but in the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

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9 Not least of the reasons behind the success of the disparate kingdom consolidation was his predecessors' abilities to consolidate "hegemonic control founded on Orthodox Christianity, the hierarchical social structure of the northern Ethiopian plateau, the Amharic language, and deeply entrench notions of Ethiopian statehood" Clapham (2001).

10 For more on the strategic importance of Eritrea as providing port access to Ethiopia, see: Woodward 2013, 148-149.
National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:

In this instance, our theory is correct: in dealing with domestic secessionist, Haile Selassie’s regime found great strategic utility in the OAU. The Ethiopian monarchy under Haile Selassie leveraged the role of African IOs to its advantage, particularly in the course of state consolidation and the suppression of would-be secessionist insurgencies. Most acutely, Ethiopia used its unique continental reputation as having never been colonized to both attract the OAU, and then use the OAU for its strategic and national security advantages throughout the course of its history.

In no uncertain terms, Ethiopia and Haile Selassie were central to the founding of the OAU. As discussed previously, during the era of African decolonization in the 1960s, two groups broad groups had emerged on the question of African political unity: the Casablanca group, which favored rapid unity, and the Monrovia Group, which favored more gradual unity. When the two groups attempted to reach a settlement about the path forward, Selassie and Tafawa Balewa (Nigeria) served as the representatives from the Casablanca Group, meeting with Gamal Abdel Nassar (Egypt) and Sékou Touré (Guinea), with Selassie playing a “key role” in the negotiations that led to the creation of the OAU (Selassie 1988, 63). Indeed, Haile Selassie’s desire to portray himself as an elder statesman of African affairs led to his necessity of abandoning the notion of the Ethiopian exceptionalism as being non-African, to forwarding an Ethiopian identity as being quintessentially African (Selassie 1988).

Selassie invited all of the heads of state of new African countries to Addis Ababa, where they convened in on May 22, 1963, to consider what would ultimately become the Charter for the Organization of African Unity. Given his hosting of the conference, delegates elected Selassie to serve as the chairman of the summit. In that capacity, he
gave speeches emphasizing the need for the need for “a single African organization” that would “enable us to speak with one voice” and admonishing that “we cannot leave here without having created a single African organization...if we fail this, we will have shirked our responsibility to Africa (as quoted in Desta 2013, 74-75). After three days of debate and discussions, the delegates agreed to create the OAU and signed its Charter on May 25, 1963.

The delegates convened again in August of 1963 at the OUA’s first ordinary session, in Dakar, Senegal, a meeting during which one of the main agenda was where the OAU’s new headquarters should be located. Four countries offered to serve as the seat: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire. After failed attempts to come to a consensus, the matter was ultimately put up to a vote. The final tally saw Ethiopia receive 15 votes; Senegal receive 12; Zaire receive 1; and Nigeria receive zero. This Ethiopian victory was underwritten in no small part by both the previous Ethiopian hosting of the Charter meeting, as well as Selassie’s own personal role as statesman. The benefits of this one vote to locate the (O)AU within its borders would serve to help Ethiopia accrue sundry benefits for decades to come.

At the very moment of the creation of the OAU, many authors have suggested that Ethiopia under Selassie strategically leveraged the OAU to protect itself from the potential for an Eritrean breakaway, particularly in the large role that Selassie played in crafting the norms of African interstate relations within the organization (Selassie 1988, Wrong 2006; Clapham 2001). As will be discussed more fully in the Eritrea chapter, in 1952, the UN forcibly required Eritrea to join Ethiopia, and though the union was supposed to give Eritrea substantially autonomy, Ethiopia simply considered it another state. To ensure that it remained part of his country, Selassie and
Ethiopia were largely at the core of crafting the OAU’s early architecture for interstate relations, and was at the forefront of the moment to retain colonially created borders. Thus, as former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker has asserted: “The Latin doctrine of *uti posseditis* (‘boundaries shall stay as they are’) was very “Ethiopian in its conception” (as quoted in Wrong 2006, 205). And as Clapham 2001 (119) writes, the nature of the OAU’s norms on non-intervention “reflected the interests of the [Ethiopian] government.” The great irony of the situation was not lost on Eritreans: the very progenitors and advocates of the African notion of border inviolability, Ethiopia, were simultaneously ignoring the Italian drawn boundaries surrounding Eritrea, and instead incorporating it into Ethiopian territory (Wrong 2006, 206). Moreover, Ethiopia played a fundamental role in including the language on the sanctity of colonially drawn borders as enshrined in the 1964 Cairo Declaration, though it made sure to assert that Eritrea was conceived to be within its own borders before decrying the legitimacy of secessionsists. Thus, as Bereketeab (2015, 214) notes: “The paradox was that Ethiopia, a country that had escaped colonization, was permitted to play a considerable role in the shaping of the colonial borders regime of the OAU.”

Thereafter, Ethiopian strategically leveraged the OAU to ensure that it would face no censure from the move. Selassie used his prominence within the OAU – and the OAU’s location within Ethiopia – to present Ethiopia’s membership to the first assembly as being a state inherently – and thus unquestionably – containing the Eritrean polity (Selassie 1988). As Selassie 1988 (63) writes:

Six months before the founding conference of the OAU, and in tandem with the on-going negotiations for consensus noted above, the Emperor forcibly annexed Eritrea and incorporated it into his empire, in violation of U.N.
Resolution 90(V), which federated Eritrea with Ethiopia. He then presented a fait accompli of a "United Ethiopia" to the OAU summit, so that he could claim later that the decision regarding the colonially fixed boundaries was not applicable to Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Moreover, the location of the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa proved to offer other numerous benefits to Ethiopian rulers over the course of the next thirty years of the Eritrean independence movement, given that it effectively forestalled the Eritrean ability to appeal, physically, to the OAU for fear of arrest by Ethiopian authorities. Thus, the physical location of the OAU in Addis Ababa afforded Ethiopia "an incalculable advantage in its strategy to isolate…the Eritrean issue." Moreover, when other countries and leaders – such as Siakka Stevens of Sierra Leone and Jaffar Nimery of Sudan – outside of the OAU tried to help mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea, both Selassie and his successor, Haile Mengistu Mariam would emphasize that the issue was one that was internal to Ethiopia, and thus, in accordance with the OAU’s dictates, should be left to Ethiopian government alone to decide. To be sure, the invocation of the dictates of non-interference has been an enduring cornerstone of Ethiopian foreign policy, from Selassie to today (Selassie 1988, 65).

As time progressed, Ethiopia continued to ensure that while it remained active in the OAU in regards to other members’ affairs, the organization remained inert when it came to having any influence in Ethiopia’s domestic affairs. In instances when Ethiopia’s disputes came to the table – for instance a dispute over the Ogaden with Somalia, or Ethiopia’s alleged “extermination” of members of the Tigray ethnic group in Eritrea (Selassie 1988) – the OAU was rendered motionless, contributing nothing to the resolution of the issue, presumably due to Ethiopian rejection of interference.
Beyond just leveraging the creation of the OAU for statist strategic purposes, Selassie also understood the organization to be a vehicle for its own self-agrandisement.\(^{11}\) Throughout the course of the OAU’s early existence, Selassie and Ethiopia continued to play an active role in the organization, not least to shore up Ethiopian legitimacy internationally. To that end, one of the early successes of the organization was an OAU brokered mediation effort between Morocco and Algeria over a contested, in which Selassie and Modibo Keita of Mali served as official OAU envoys (Selassie 1988, 62). For its part, Ethiopia has enjoyed prolonged path dependent benefits of having had the OAU located within its borders. Primarily, it has enjoyed outsized benefits as an African diplomatic center, attracting the location of the UN’s primary African body, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) as a result of having housed the OAU prior. Moreover, even outside of the official O(AU) activities, Ethiopia’s pan-African profile as a legitimate mediator or otherwise legitimate player in African affairs had been cemented, and was seen in its enduring role as a mediator in non-O(AU) mediators in Sudan in the 1970s (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 85). Indeed, “Long before the invocation of ‘African solutions to African problems’ the conclave of Addis Ababa epitomized the spirit of indigenous problem solving. Emperor Haile Selassie’s stature in African politics have him the weight to intervene frequently when talks reached deadlocks” (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 85).\(^{12}\)

\(^{11}\) Selassie played an active role in the creation of the Organization of African Unity and had a uniquely storied place in the history of global Pan-African politics, not least due to the fact he was interpreted but the Rastafarian communities in Jamaica as having been their promised messiah on earth, leading the globe’s more powerful and independent black republic in global leadership.

\(^{12}\) To the extent that the founding of the OAU in Addis Ababa created enduring hierarchy that served to frustrate leaders of potentially ascendant African states for decades after, during his lifetime, Libyan Col. Muammar Qaddafi was openly engaged in a hostile relationship with Ethiopia, given that Qaddafi had long believed that the (O)AU headquarters should be located in Tripoli. To that end, it is rumored that prior to the semi-annual (O)AU Summits in Addis Ababa, Qaddafi would have his cohorts book
Yet Zewde (2002, 203) has suggested Selassie’s own desire for the pursuit of self-importance would lead him to remain ignorant of the growing cabal in the form of the Derg, which would overthrow him in 1974.

**National Security Interest #2: Suppressing Ethno-Nationalist Insurgencies (The Derg)**

In 1974, a group of junior military officers overthrew the long-standing Ethiopian monarchy and its leader incarnate, Haile Selassie. Known as the “Derg” (or “committee,” in Amharic), the group espoused a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Ethiopia was declared to be a communist state, and during the 13-year rule of the Derg in Ethiopia benefitted significantly from military, political, and economic assistance from both the USSR and Cuba. In the process of creating the new Marxist Ethiopia, the Derg instituted a one-party rule and limited dissent, especially fore bidding the existence of a free press (Tewedros and Lulie 2014; Verhoeven 2015; Zewde 2002).

As concerns Ethiopian foreign policy formulation during the era of the Derg, a few points should be made. First, though the Derg was, at its core, a Marxist-Leninist party, it never had the desire to “export the revolution beyond its borders.” Thus, while one might have expected a rise in Ethiopian militarism to mark its foreign policy, this tendency would not necessarily be forthcoming (Clapham 2001, 123). Second, and derived from a deeply thorough analysis of threat perception and foreign policy outcomes during the Derg regime, Yihun (2014) has suggested that all regional states in the Horn were viewed as threats to Mengistu, namely for their ability to thwart hundreds of hotel rooms across Addis Ababa, and then loudly complain to other visiting delegations that the city clearly lack the infrastructure to host such an important event, and then offered Tripoli as a viable alternative (Personal interview 2015).
Ethiopia’s handling of the Eritrea threat. Thus, Mengistu’s general outlook towards Ethiopia’s neighbors – Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti, though seemingly not Kenya – was that its security could only be assured in the event of their destabilization (Yihun 2014, 679.)

In the aftermath of the Derg’s overthrow of the long-standing Ethiopian monarchy, groups around the country – primarily ethnic in nature – came to rise to challenge the state’s authority. Primarily, three groups came to rise to challenge the Derg. First, was the Tigray Liberation Front (TPLF), which emerged in February 1975. Though the group had a “confused objectives:” on one hand, it wanted to create an autonomous and democratic Tigray region outside of the Derg’s control; on the other hand, it was ultimately the power-player in the ultimate integration with post-Derg state. The second ethno-liberation group emerge at the moment of the Derg’s ascension to power was the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which also advocated for Oromo ethnic secession from the Ethiopian state, and autonomy for itself. The third ethno-liberation group to emerge was the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) composed mostly of ethnic Somalis in the southeastern corner of the country, which was founded later in Derg’s reign, in 1984. Though somewhat similar to the TPLF and OLF, the ONLF was distinct insofar as it was inherently bound up in the national strategy of neighboring Somalia, whose irredentist impulse has long been one of its guiding priorities, as well as one of successive Ethiopian regimes’ primary

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15 As he writes “Ethiopia’s treatment of Somalia was therefore by no means unique but instead fitted into a wider pattern of foreign policy under the Derg.” (679).
preoccupations (Bereketeab 2013, 11; Tewedros and Lulie 2014\textsuperscript{14}; Clapham 2001, 120).

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Ethiopia (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a domestic secessionist insurgency (IV4=A), will find realist strategic utility (HDV1=1) in IOs: not in its REC (HDV2 = 0) but in the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

During the rule of the Derg, our theory fails to capture the dynamics of responses. In short, as far as this author could locate, the Derg-run Ethiopian foreign policy did little to leverage the OAU against the ethno-secessionist groups. Instead, the Ethiopian government’s primary responses to dealing with the groups were mainly to deal – often militarily – with those neighboring states – namely Somalia and Sudan – supporting those groups (Yihun 2014, 678). While the specific contours of these actions are somewhat outside the scope of this work, suffice it to say, the OAU was virtually never involved.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} Notably, throughout the course of the sundry ethno-insurgencies that have occurred in Ethiopia, its neighbors - particularly Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia - have always been eager to offer assistance to such groups. In the case of the ethno-secessionists fighting against the Derg, Sudan was well known for funding such groups (Tewedros and Lulie 2014), whereas, more contemporarily, Somalia is known to have offered funding for the supported for the ethnic Somali Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Eritrea has been willing to fund al-Shebab in Somalia.

\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, the national security imperatives presented by the ethno-secessionists was argued to have been most adeptly accomplished in the aftermath of the downfall of the Derg, and the creation of the country’s new constitution, which explicitly allowed for ethnic regional autonomy. The new Ethiopian National Charter created a new Ethiopian polity based on ethnic-based federal states, which was perceived to be a solution for the long-standing violence between ethnic groups that had come about in the process of Ethiopian state consolidation. Importantly, all major Ethiopian ethnic-insurgent movements - the TPLF, the OLF, and the ONLF - agreed to the Charter. While the move that was originally lauded by many in the international community, its inherent problems for the balkanization of political society came to the fore (Bereketeab 2013, 12-13).
National Security Interest #3: The 1998-2000 Border War with Eritrea

National Security Interest:

At the moment of Eritrea’s birth in 1991, there was no intuitive reason to predict that it would become one of Ethiopia’s largest national security concerns. To the contrary: the Ethiopia actively supported the emergence of Eritrea. As should be recalled, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) assisted the EPRDF of Ethiopia in overthrowing the Derg, thus undermining the sacrosanctity of Ethiopia’s borders as advocated by Haile Selassie. As is detailed more fully in the “Eritrea” chapter (chapter 11), the amity of relations between Ethiopia and early post-independence Eritrea was almost bafflingly profound: the two countries essentially had open borders; Eritrea adopted the Ethiopian currency the birr, with virtually no control over its own monetary policy; and the county exported an estimated 60% of its goods to Ethiopia. This friendship was put on display most profoundly with the signing of the 1993 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation (Ethiopia-Eritrea 1993; Mengisteab 2009, 57-58).

Yet by 1997, this friendship had soured, and between 1998 and 2000, a border war raged between Ethiopia and Eritrea. While the origins of the war were diverse, at the heart of the conflict was that each side laid claim to the Tigray-dominated area of Badme. While the issues had been addressed – insufficiently – for years prior, the impasse came to head when the EPRDF began resettling demobilized TPLF militants

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16 Various factors led to the war, including a poor choice by both countries to adopt and open-border system at Eritrea’s independence; dissent within Ethiopia about the Tigray relationship with Eritrea; a collapse of an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation; an inordinate Ethiopian pull over the Eritrean economy, both in terms of monetary policy, and trade; and the 1997 Eritrean decision to introduce its own currency, the nakfa (Mengisteab 2009, 58-60; Reid 2009a, 5).

17 For an extensive discussion on cartographic politics between the dispute that led to the 1998-2000 border war, see: Clapham 2001, 151; Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 231-234.
into farming land in the area, thus displacing Eritreans. A two-year long war was in the making.

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Ethiopia (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a dangerous neighbor (IV4=D), will find realist strategic utility (HDV1=1A) in its REC (HDV2=1) but not in the (O)AU (HDV3=0).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs**

In the case of the 1998-2000 border war, our theory only partially captures the dynamics of the conflict: Ethiopia indeed derived constructivist strategic utility from both IGAD and the (O)AU, leveraging its control of both organizations to allow it to both intimidate Eritrea from appealing to the OAU on one hand, and from obeying the subsequent demands for the war’s settlement on the other.

First shots were fired on May 6, 1998, when Ethiopian soldiers shot and killed four Eritrean border patrol guards, and on May 12, 1998, Eritrean forces pushed Ethiopian soldiers out of the Badme area. In the aftermath of the beginning of the May 1998 hostilities, Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers administered a decree that all Eritrean forces should leave the area, a call that Eritrea perceived as a call to war. Ethiopia soon bombed Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, a move that was then followed by Afwerki’s bombing of the Ethiopian city of Mekele, the capital of the Tigray state (Mengisteab 2009, 60; Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 250-256; Tewedros and Lulie 2014; Clapham 2001, 132-133).

Overall, the OAU would play no real role in Ethiopian strategic outlooks towards the conflict. On one hand, Maru (2015) has noted that “prior to [the 1998-2000 Eritrean] war, the OAU/AU was not a high priority for Ethiopia,” and thus, it
could scarcely leverage the OAU in the absence of clearly articulated post-Derg strategy.\textsuperscript{18} Yet, Ethiopia did benefit from the OAU in that its historical dominance of the organization was so great that Eritrea did not immediately appeal to the organization as soon as the Ethiopian soldiers fired on its border guards. In short, had Eritrea quickly appealed to the OAU it could have avoided the perception that it was the aggressor, not Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{19} Just why Eritrea did not appeal to the OAU will be discussed further in the Eritrea chapter (chapter 11), but in addition to the anti-OAU stance that Eritrea has historically espoused, the fact that the OAU had long been perceived as an Ethiopian organization for the simple fact that it is housed in Addis Ababa, no doubt contributed to the Eritrean perception that bringing qualms about Ethiopia to the organization would fall upon deaf ears. In short, despite not having an articulated OAU strategy, the simple benefits of hosting the OAU offered Ethiopia a diplomatic advantage, even when it was (arguably) the initial aggressor.

In hopes of resolving the escalating conflict after it began in early May 1998, the OAU, its member states, and various international observers worked to propose solutions. The first of these was a U.S.-Rwandan sponsored plan ultimately called for redeployment of troops to pre-May 6, 1998 positions and demarcation of boundaries derived from colonial treaties. Ethiopia accepted this plan, as it demanded an Eritrean withdraw, and a return to the status quo arrangement, with Ethiopia holding Badme. For its part, Eritrea rejected the plan, for precisely the same reason.\textsuperscript{20} The second

\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, Maru (2015) also notes that “even after the war, FANSPS continues to focus on avoiding diplomatic restrictions that emanates from the AU organs, instead of actively engaging with them. FANSPS has adopted a shortsighted policy position, focusing on responses to immediate threats, rather than on the long-term goals of placing Ethiopia’s leadership in the AU.”

\textsuperscript{19} Mengisteab and Yohannes (2005, 260) discuss the strategic failures of Eritrea’s decision not to go to the OAU regarding the question of the Ethiopian killing of its border guards on May 6, 1998.

\textsuperscript{20} For more on Eritrea’s reasons for rejecting the US-Rwanda plan, see: Bereketeab 2009, 109.
attempt at conciliation came in the form of the OAU’s “Framework, Modalities, and Technical Arrangements,” (OAU 1999). This was similar, but broader than the US-Rwanda effort, and called not only for a cease-fire and deployment of troops to pre-May 6, 1998 positions, but also the entrance of peacekeeping forces, called the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Moreover, it added that the demarcation of boundaries would be accomplished based on colonial treaties, but would be undertaken by a group of UN appointed experts (Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 236-237; Mengisteab 2009, 109-110; Reid 2009a;). Ultimately, both plans were rejected for reasons outside of the scope of this piece.21

After these two failed attempts at peace talks over the course of more than two years, “mutual exhaustion” and the loss of an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 soldiers led both Eritrea and Ethiopia to ultimately accept the Algiers Peace plan on December 12, 2000. Indeed, in reality, the Algiers agreement did not deviate markedly from the former attempts, in calling upon a neutral observer mission to be created to demarcate the correct borders between the two countries as per colonial treaties and within the context of germane international law (Mengisteab 2009, 60; Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 230-236; Tewedros and Lulie 2014; Clapham 2001, 132-133).

The outcome was a settlement that was determined by what was known as the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), a body that was created in the Algiers Agreement of June 2000, which brought the two-year war to an end. The mediation committee was to be composed of five members: two selected by each country, and a fifth selected from votes from the previous four. For their part, the UN,

21 For a better understanding of the reasons for the failure of the two peace plans, see: Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 237; Bereketeab 2009, 109-110.
US, EU, and, germanely, OAU were to be the guarantors that the EEBC’s ruling was upheld by both sides. Indeed, the EEBC’s legitimacy was to be derived from the fact that it was a global solution – with presumably impartial observers – for a local problem (Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 237).

The EEBC rendered its decision on the legitimate owner of Badme no April 13, 2002. Though initially both Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to its determinations, Ethiopia reversed its approval once the EEBC offered a clarification on the crux of the conflict – who owned Badme – which, it had decided was Eritrea. Ethiopia thereafter declared the ruling “totally illegal, unjust, and irresponsible” and demanded that the two countries re-enter into dialogue to reassess the EEBC’s ruling, a call that Eritrea rejected (Mengisteab 2009, 60-62; Mengisteab and Yohannes 2009, 237-238).

As of this writing in mid-2016, Ethiopia has yet to comply with the EEBC ruling, and still occupies Badme. At the heart of the matter, many have argued that Ethiopia’s ability to openly defy the EEBC’s mandate to return Badme to Eritrea has been underwritten by unequivocal support that the US has long offered to Ethiopia, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, and the Ethiopian willingness to serve as its foothold in the Horn (Mengisteab 2009). Yet it is also the case that Ethiopia’s place within African IOs has played no small part in its ability to defy these international rulings. As the lead state in IGAD, the host to the African Union, as well as the primary U.S. ally in the Horn, Ethiopia’s reaction to the Badme ruling has underlined its role in the region.

Interestingly, however, Eritrea offered a great amount of assistance to the US post-9/11, which the US ultimately rejected (Warner 2013). Specifically, Eritrea, said that it would allow the US to open a military base on its soil; would allow US ships to dock in it ports; and would allow the US to train in its mountains, which were very similar to the White Mountains of eastern Afghanistan (Mengisteab 2009, 63).
National Security Interest #4: Countering Islamic Extremism in Somalia

National Security Interest:

The fall of the Derg led to the emergence of what is, in essence, still a one-party state in Ethiopia. The downfall of the Derg was precipitated by a joint effort from multiple insurgent groups within Ethiopia: prime amongst these with the Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which was since become the ruling party. Within that group, the dominant sub-group was the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Beyond this, the overthrow of the Derg was also accomplished with the help of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPRDF).

In opposition to other chapters in this dissertation, the period from 1991 to present will not be sub-divided into categories of “regimes.” While there have been three prime ministers – Tamrat Laye (1991-1995) and Hailemariam Desalegn (2012 to present) – the era of the EPRDF has been singularly dominated by the party itself, and, more specifically its ideologue and longest serving head of state, Meles Zenawi (1995–2012). Throughout the era and through to today, the party has served as the strongest institution in the country, and, while various actors rotate in and out of the presidency and prime ministership, the construction of foreign and security policies in Ethiopia is such that the cogs of the machine are somewhat interchangeable: the party line and strategy towards Ethiopia’s external policies is exceptionally well-conceived, well-articulated, and in general, well-executed (IS31 2015; IS10/2 2014).²³

²³ The obvious outlier to the preceding statement detailing the decision to focus on the party’s national security interests - and not the regime’s - is perhaps a confusing choice given the centrality of the looming figure of Meles Zenawi, whose impact on Ethiopian politics has been profound. Yet, despite the cult of personality that Zenawi developed during his life, as well as posthumously, as concerns the formulation of Ethiopia’s foreign policy and the priorities it espouses, the centrality of the party means...
One of Ethiopia’s top foreign and national security priorities has historically been mitigating the vulnerabilities it has felt as a primarily Christian nation in the center of an (often highly unstable) Islamic neighborhood. As one security expert has assessed: “Within the security realm Ethiopia is in a bad neighborhood and they see threats everywhere they look around them” (IS31 2015). To that end, since Somalia’s independence in 1960, successive Ethiopian administrations have felt particularly vulnerable to the threat of the rise of Islamic extremism in the Horn of Africa broadly, but in Somalia in particular (Berhanu 2013; Yihun 2014; IS31 2015; (Bereketeab 2013, 11; Tewedros and Lulie 2014). Indeed, Somalia has historically posed a unique challenge to Ethiopian foreign and security policy aims, insofar as the county has, since its creation in 1960, outrightly rejected the international borders ascribed to it by the international community. Instead, it has viewed itself statist identity in a more traditionally nationalist vein of belonging to members of the broader Somali ethnic identity, who are spread not only through Somalia, but also reside in part of Kenya and Ethiopia. To that end, under the regime of Siad Barre (who ruled Somalia from 1969 to 1991), Somalia launched irredentist incursions into both Ethiopia and Kenya.

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that little has changed since his departure. As one anonymous senior Western diplomat based in Ethiopia has relayed of the continuity of the party since Meles’ passing, “EPRDF is the strongest institution in the country….Ethiopia still (in 2014) formulates policy in the same way that it did under Meles: he was more charismatic than Desalegn, but the party still formulates it policies in the same way” (IS10/2 2014)

24 Ethiopia’s top three threats are: Internal threats; Eritrea (which it views as an existential threat; Al-Shebab (IS31 2015). As another observer has said: “Ethiopia’s three main domestic fears are: 1) youth and 2) Muslims, and 3) Muslim youth (IS22 2015). Moreover, Ethiopia is uniquely vulnerable as a result of the number of its borders: it is the only country in the Horn that shares “long and porous” borders with all other counties on the Horn, including, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, South Sudan, Sudan, and Kenya, thus making it uniquely vulnerable to all of the region’s politics (Tewedros and Lulie 2014).

25 Notably, throughout the course of the sundry ethno-insurgencies that have occurred in Ethiopia, its neighbors - particularly Eritrea, Sudan, and Somalia - have always been eager to offer assistance to such groups. In the case of the ethno-secessionists fighting against the Derg, Sudan was well known for funding such groups (Tewedros and Lulie 2014), whereas, more contemporarily, Somalia is known to have offered funding for the supported for the ethnic Somali Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and Eritrea has been willing to fund al-Shebab in Somalia.
Thus, across time, Ethiopian regimes have long been “preoccupied with installing a friendly regime [in Somalia] which would not resurrect the Greater Somalia doctrine as a principle of state ideology” (Berhanu 2013, 82). So severe had the Somali threat become in Ethiopia that by 1977, Ethiopia had undertaken what previously been considered a “last resort” approach to Somalia, which Yihun (2014, 678) referred to as Mengistu’s perception that “Ethiopia saw safety only in the total disintegration of Somalia.”

While the collapse of Somalia in 1991 in and of itself posed problems for the conduct of Ethiopia’s foreign policy, the most pronounced instance of Ethiopian fears of and Islamist/Somalian pseudo-state was most evident in 2004, with the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), in southern Somalia. After years of lawlessness in the country, the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia had had moderate success in controlling much of Mogadishu, though in the southern parts of the country that remained beyond the reach of the pseudo-state, citizens had reverted to social organization via religious and cultural modes of governance. What arose as a centripetal force to unite those group was collection of Islamist teachers known as the Islamic Courts Union. Eventually, the ICU dissolved into factions, the most radical being an Islamist militant group known as al-Shebab.

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Ethiopia (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a dangerous neighbor (IV4=D), will find realist strategic utility (HDV1=1A) in its REC (HDV2=1) but not in the (O)AU (HDV3=0).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**
In this instance, our theory is generally correct: in dealing with Somalia, Ethiopia found tremendous strategic utility in IGAD, and generally little (if any) in the OAU. When it came the relations with the OAU, the new administration had a justifiably antagonistic view. In short, it was the OAU itself that had helped to delegitimize the insurgency that the EPLF and TPLF had waged against Mengistu’s regime. However, as time progressed, this outlook would change. This was due in no small part due to the somewhat radical restructuring of regional relations with the nearly simultaneous collapse of the as the Derg regime; the de facto independence of Eritrea; and the simultaneous collapse of Somalia. These changes fundamentally altered the contours of the region, not least, the role of IGAD in states’ political calculi, especially insofar as it helped to reiterate the salience of IGAD in the protection of collective security in the Horn of Africa (Redie 2012, 174).

In the course of countering the rise of radical Islam on the Horn, Ethiopia has relied heavily on the role of IGAD, primarily as a “legitimate” international cover to justify its pursuit of its self-interested national foreign and security objectives and as a means by which to “filter up” its foreign and security policy goals to the AU. Given the global exigency of solving the Somalia question, Ethiopia has, in essence, willingly taken up the global call for a local Horn actor to deal with Somalia, as doing so allows it to reshape the political and military contours of its region with both legitimacy and oftentimes, international financial support.

The history of Ethiopia’s role in using to IGAD and the AU to reshape Somalia might be said to begin in 2000, with a mediation effort called the Arta conference, hosted by Djibouti to help quell to conflict. While actors in the Horn and throughout the international community had held numerous other conferences to bring back
Somalia since 1991, the Djibouti conference was different in tactic than other attempts: actors in the talks could only participate as individuals – not as coalitions – which thus forestalled the previous tendency of warlords to thwart reconciliation efforts. The outcome of the Arta conference was positive and from it arose a charter for a new Somali parliament and a new, transitional government (TNG) (Samatar 2013; Bereketeab 2012, 183).

While Somalis themselves were pleased with the specter of ending a decade of war, Ethiopia found the new TNG that resulted from the Arta conference unacceptable. The underlying cause of this displeasure was that Ethiopia had long maintained a network of affiliates in Somalia sympathetic to its aims. These affiliates – which might also be called “warlords” – were among the very actors that had been intentionally excluded from the Arta conference. Thus, Ethiopia’s go-to insiders would not be part of the new Somali political dispensation (Samatar 2013).

Under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia began working to undo this development. He began a campaign to convince neighbors in the Horn that the Arta conference’s conclusion and resultant TNG was an insufficient solution to the Somalia question, precisely due to the lack of the presence of the warlords. Simultaneously, Zenawi assembled a group of his own Somali-based sympathizers, which he corralled into a formalized alliance called the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), which he claimed was simply an analogue to the new TNG, which had unrightfully usurped power of the country. The SRRC, he claimed was just as legitimate ruling coalition as the TNG (Samatar 2013).

Within this campaign, African IOs played a fundamental role for Ethiopia’s aims of dislodging of the TNG. In the pursuit of this goal, Meles went to both the African
Union and IGAD, lobbying both to initiate the process of a new conference that would be inclusive of all relevant actors, and would allow – as opposed the Arta conference – the inclusion of civil society actors and would result in a government formed around ethnic, or clan identity. Ultimately, Ethiopia’s pressure in IGAD was successful. IGAD, leading the charge and with support from the international community opened new peace conference in Eldoret, Kenya, in October 2002 and another in Nairobi, the latter of which resulted in a new charter for a Somali government that more adequately included the Ethiopian-backed warlords from SRR, called the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Murithi 2009b; Samatar 2013; Samatar 2007. 156). As Samatar (2007, 156) relays of the conference: “Ethiopia’s dominance was so complete that it was able to help appoint the president and nominate the Somali Prime Minister” while Murithi (2009b) notes that Ethiopia was largely seen as unilaterally undermining the Arta peace process.

Yet soon after the TFG came to power in 2004, its disintegration looked eminent, as infighting amongst warlords-cum-governors over who had rightful control over various areas of the country pulled at the seams of the nascent and tenuous government. With the centripetal forces pulling the center, local forms of governance came to rise, especially, in the south, via a ruling coalition known as the Union of Islamic Courts (IUCs). Based on the promotion of societal organization centered on religious tenants of Islam, the ICU generally won widespread support from war-weary Somalis.

The impotency of the TFG and the increasing power of the UIC called for action. For his part, the newly installed Somali president, Abdulhai Yusuf, asked IGAD for an intervention to help deal with the increasingly powerful UIC. IGAD acquiesced, and
agreed to formulate an IGAD Support Mission in January 2005. However, for numerous reasons – including a lack of political will and inadequate legal capabilities to launch such an intervention – it was not to come to fruition (Bereketeab 2012, 183; Murithi 2009b, 147-148). With the UIC’s growing success at managing the otherwise stateless south, by June 2006, it soon sent its armed wing to Mogadishu to take over the capital from the TFG, which it succeeded in doing that month. The IUC ousted the TFG from Mogadishu, which then fled to Baidoa (Murithi, 2009b; Samatar 2013).

While this move was again met with general enthusiasm by Somalis – excluding the warlords incumbent in the fraying TFG – the move caused trepidation for Ethiopia. Not only did the UIC existentially threaten its warlord proxies in the TFG, the UIC’s Islamist bent was emblematic of the very heart of Christian Ethiopia’s worries about irredentist expansion of its Muslim neighbor. Nor was the development of an unapologetically Islamist government acceptable to the United States, who sided with its main ally in the Horn in the War on Terror about the threats that UIC posed, not least because it was believed to harbor three terrorists who had taken part in the 1998 bombings against the US in Kenya and Tanzania (Samatar 2013). Ultimately, the US and Ethiopia would partner together – Ethiopia providing troops, US providing legitimacy – to oust the UIC in a campaign that began in December 2006, just months after the UIC had taken over Mogadishu (Samatar 2013; Samatar 2007).

Indeed, the intervention force that would go into Somalia was a unilateral Ethiopian one, outside of the bounds of IGAD, and supported, in large part, by the US. The first move was the US securing of UN Security Council Resolution 1725 in December 2006, which lifted an arms embargo on Somalia and allowed for an intervention into Somalia by IGAD troops (UNSC 1975 2006; Murithi 2009b;
Samatar 2007, 155). For its part, while the US was securing the necessary legitimacy in the UN, Ethiopia began preemptively undertaking troop movement – with U.S. logistical assistance – with Ethiopian troops entering Somalia, going to the TFG enclave of Baidoa, and sending troops to the Bay and Bakool regions. The largest build-up of Ethiopian troops in Baidoa began in October 2006, of a forces estimated to be as high as 12,000 troops (Samatar 2007). In response to this move, the UIC warned Ethiopia not to invade, declaring a jihad on it should it attempt to enter. This move proved to a self-fulfilling prophecy: the announcement of jihad was precisely the pretext that the Ethio-U.S. alliance needed to make the case that the UIC was a constituent part of the Global War on Terror (Samatar 2013; Samatar 2007, 156). By Christmas Day of 2006, Mogadishu had officially fallen to Ethiopia, in a decision to intervene that is still viewed with great contention (Samatar 2013). Despite this Ethiopian routing of the ICU, the group was ultimately replaced by the even more-radical head of the ICU, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in 2009, in, ironically, an IGAD-brokered peace process. For its part, Ethiopia withdrew from its occupation Mogadishu in 2009 (Bereketeab 2012, 184) and the African Union Mission to Somalia, AMISOM26 would takes up the mantel of the fight that same year27 (Woodward 2013, 146; Bereketeab 2012, 184).

In the course of the Ethiopian remaking of the Somali political landscape, IGAD and the African Union were imperative components of the Ethiopia’s grand strategic outlook, especially in the aftermath of the invasion: both were used as “issue-enablers”

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26 Interestingly, when the Ethiopian intervention brigade became AMISOM, Uganda - which does not even share a border with Somalia - became the lead state, especially in terms of troop contributions (Bereketeab 2012, 184).

27 Yet to the extent that Ethiopia demanded to remain in the lead of its own neighborhood, it remained reluctant to have Ethiopian troops reheated under the aegis of the AMISOM mission (IS10/2 2014).
to gain higher levels of legitimacy for the incursion. In short, Ethiopia intervened in Ethiopia prior to receiving any international mandate to do so: although the UN had allowed for an IGAD intervention (UNSC 1725), Ethiopia’s actions were decidedly unilateral, not in the context of IGAD. Thus, Ethiopia retroactively turned to IGAD to get the IO to support its intervention, and then transferred the issue to AU control thereafter. Perhaps even more revelatory, was Ethiopia’s ability to avoid having to endure any real censure for its actions, which often contravened precedents set by all three organizations. Second, UNSC Resolution 1725 explicitly stated that no country bordering Somalia should be part of the intervention, a fact that obviously overlooked the pre-existing Ethiopian troops stationed in Baidoa (UNSC 1725 2006; Samatar 2007, 155). The allowance of not only Ethiopian — but also Kenyan Djiboutian — involvement in the subsequent AU intervention clearly contravened that dictate. Finally, IGAD and the African Union demanded an Ethiopian troop withdraw to occur in 2009, with which Ethiopia did not comply (Samatar 2007, 155).

In short, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 was taken unilaterally, yet only after the fact became an IGAD/AU/UN sanctioned mission in the form of AMISOM. This decision itself is revelatory. Despite knowing such an intervention contravened international sovereignty norms, there was a tremendous degree of Ethiopian “bravado” and the intervention was undertaken because Addis Ababa knew that it could and would indeed get mandating authority post-hoc from the African IOs of which it was a member (Davison 2015). 28 In short, “Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in

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28 Davison (2015) lauds the shrewdness of the move: “What started as a self-interested, Ethiopian foreign policy initiative becomes seen as beneficent act to help save a collapsing country.”
2006 which was legitimized by IGAD was a clear indication of how IGAD could be used to serve narrow [national] interest” (Bereketeab 2012, 186).

While not only leveraging US international dominance to invade Somalia in 2006 to oust the ICU, Ethiopia continued to play its U.S. trump card in relation to its relationship with Eritrea. In essence, by asserting that Eritrea was transferring arms to al-Shebab militants, it was able to get the U.S. to label Eritrea a state sponsor of terrorism. Simultaneously – and concurrent with U.S. support – Ethiopia persuaded IGAD to also isolate Eritrea (also for its border war with Djibouti in 2008). Having received an IGAD censure of Eritrea, Asmara dropped out of IGAD in 2007, claiming the organization had become nothing more than an Ethiopian rubber stamp for policy. Yet the rebuke of Eritrea had not yet ended. Thereafter, Ethiopia took the censure package of Eritrea next to the AU – where it received approval – and then finally, to the United Nations, where it also gained approval. Thus, Ethiopia’s strategic leveraging of its relationships – especially with the U.S., IGAD, and the AU – led what would become and unprecedented global censure of Addis Ababa’s one time chief regional ally (Africa Report 2012; Bereketeab 2012, 185-186; Indeed, the extent to which Ethiopia has cultivated hegemony over the operation of IGAD is most acutely seen in the case of the organization’s (lack of an) approach to the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict:

The most glaring failure of IGAD regarding peace and security concerns the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. In spite of the fact that Article 18A on Conflict Resolution states that Member States shall “accept to deal with disputes between Member States within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional organizations” (IGAD 2006, 16) IGAD has not been able to do anything. IGAD has not been able to seriously, objectively, and neutrally discuss the issue in spite of the fact that the conflict has been described as the epicenter of most conflicts in the region. Strangely, the IGAD conflict resolution mechanism has not even been invoked. This is because IGAD lacks mechanisms that deal with
either intra-state or inter-state conflicts in its CEWARN protocol. Moreover, the most conspicuous factor of this negligence can be found in the fact that Ethiopia occupies a dominant position in the regional organization. Therefore, any discussion that would offend Ethiopia could not be entertained within IGAD (Bereketeab 2012, 185).

Currently, the state of affairs between Ethiopia and Eritrea is often described as one of “no peace, no war” (Fatew 2009). And though this section attempted to shed some light on the Ethiopian perceptions of the strategic utility of African IOs in dealing with the Eritrea threat, the Eritrea chapter offers a more in-depth (and unsurprisingly, opposite) understanding of these IOs.

**National Security Interest #5: The (Unarticulated) Rise of Pax-Ethiopiana**

**National Security Interest:**

Though it has never been articulated – at least to this author’s knowledge – another latent national security interest is the country’s pursuit of what might be called a “Pax-Ethiopiana” or a latent Ethiopian military, economic, and populational hegemony over the Horn of Africa. This pursuit of contemporary Pax-Ethiopiana in broader Horn affairs is premised upon the modern enactment of a historical sense of "Ethiopian exceptionalism"- or the pursuit of the restoration of Great Ethiopia. In a similar though distinct vein to Nigeria, Ethiopians as a citizenry tend to view themselves with a degree of exceptionalism, especially in relation to the rest of the continent (Redie 2012, 190; IS10/2 2014; Davison 2015; IS13 2015).

The underpinnings of Ethiopian exceptionalism are historical: namely, the fact that, but for a brief period of Italian occupation between 1936 and 1941, Ethiopia was never formally colonized by European powers, unlike the rest of the continent, with
the exception of Liberia and South Africa. Moreover, the deep historical legacies of Ethiopian culture – which, as detailed in the Rastafarian holy book, the Kebra Negast, trace Ethiopian monarchical lineages to Solomon and the Queen of Sheba – underscore Ethiopia’s place in the larger arc of global religious and social history. Indeed, to the extent that Ethiopian exceptionalism underpins a national and thus international ethos, Ethiopians frequently dismiss themselves as “African” and insist on their distinctness as “Habesha.” More contemporarily, Ethiopia’s self perception as a unique in the international sphere is derived from its breakneck economic growth since the early 2000s, leading it to rank second in the world in economic growth, only behind China. To the extent that Ethiopia views itself as exceptional in the international sphere, contemporary Ethiopian foreign policy is, to a large degree, rooted in a historical vision of Ethiopia’s own sense of grandeur in Africa and beyond, and thus, as one senior diplomat (IS31 2015) has described:

The Ethiopian worldview is that they come from this great, historic line of success: from the Abyssinians, derived from the Queen of Sheba and Solomon, and so on. In their minds, the current Ethiopian policy is really about “getting back to where we need to be,” and restoring former Ethiopian glory.

As Bereketeab (2012, 190) puts succinctly “Ethiopia has always been preoccupied with its own uniqueness.”

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Ethiopia (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a reputational national security interest (IV4=G), will find

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29 In assessing the extent to which Ethiopia’s non-colonized past informed its state development in the broader “post-colonial African era” Chan (1994) suggests that in the case of Ethiopia “even though it was never colonized in the ‘scramble for Africa,’ and was under Italian rule for only a brief period of five years, 1936-1941…even without colonization Ethiopia was nevertheless ‘created,’ ‘invented,’ or largely shaped as an dependent state but the same capitalist forces that used colonialism as an instrument against her neighbor.
constructivist strategic utility (HDV1=1C) in its REC (HDV2=1) and in the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

**Hypothesis Testing:**

In this instance, our theory is correct: within the pursuit of Ethiopia’s broader thrust for a *Pax-Ethiopiana*, both IGAD and the African Union play fundamental roles, as they always have. Indeed: in its broader quest for reputational grandeur, Ethiopia approaches both the African Union and IGAD in ways largely analogous to Nigeria’s approach to the AU and ECOWAS. On one hand, Ethiopia thinks of IGAD as a means by which to manage regional affairs, and to gain legitimacy for its actions. On the other though, while Ethiopia pursues its own national security interests in relation to other countries through IO, Ethiopia, like Nigeria, has foreclosed the possibility of allowing either IO to constrain its own actions in any meaningful ways. As Verhoeven (2015) states: “the contemporary pursuit of a “Great Ethiopia” is pursued in terms of terms of a benign regional hegemony: “What is good for Ethiopia is good for the Horn of Africa.”

As concerns the African Union, Ethiopia today accrues national security benefits in broadly similar ways as it always has, given the organization’s placement within its borders. Moreover, the location of the O(AU) within its Addis Ababa has afforded Ethiopia an outsized and privileged degree of legitimacy as a mediator in African conflicts, ranging as far back as its early attempts at non-IO attempts at resolving the north-south tensions in Sudan in 1972, when Nimery designated Ethiopia and Haile Selassie, as the primary mediators in its domestic conflict (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 85). Indeed, in the longer thrust of the relationship with the (O)AU, Maru (2015) articulates the benefits of playing host to the AU in that:
Ethiopia has always been home to the AU headquarters. This entails, in the wording of FANSPS, ‘a special responsibility.’ In this regard, the most substantive statement in FANSPS reads: “Ethiopia all along steadfastly championed the cause of Africa and Africans dating back to a time when it stood virtually alone.” There has never been a time when Ethiopian governments shied away from taking up their responsibilities towards Africa. It can also be said that there was hardly any occasion when Ethiopia was refused political and diplomatic support from Africa when it was needed. This emphasis on historical support of the OAU/AU to Ethiopia’s interests ensures AU’s continued and robust support to Ethiopia in the future.

While the roles that the OAU and early African Union played in early Ethiopian politics, perhaps the most trenchant example of Ethiopia’s use of the AU was under the leadership of Meles Zenawi. For Meles “The AU was a platform for prestige: first and foremost to Meles, then to Ethiopia” (Maru 2015). Yet an often under appreciated side to Meles’ strategic use of the African Union was the ways that he employed it for the dual purposes of issue filtering and reputation improving, particularly as related to Africa’s role in global climate negotiations. He was a vocal proponent of the need for Africa to address climate change, both within AU meetings, and as Pan-African voice at the Copenhagen and Durban climate summits, as well as in meetings of the G8 and G20 in Davos (Africa Report 2012). And yet, even in the aftermath of Meles’ death in 2012, observers note that “his energy and pragmatism are still very much engrained into Ethiopia's foreign policy” (Aganyfac 2015).

Today, in addition to its inherent connections to the African Union, Ethiopia is known in the organization for serving as its largest troop contributor around the continent. In short, Ethiopia, in the vein of Nigeria, has leveraged its booming domestic economy to grow its military by nearly half since 2005, which it uses to not only to protect its national security, but also, which it employs for prestige positions within AU peacekeeping operations (PKOs). To that end, as of late 2015, Ethiopia had
some 12,536 peacekeepers deployed in various peacekeeping missions around the country, of which 12,390 were troops, 133 were experts in missions, and 33 were police (Institute for Peace and Security Studies 2015). As one senior Western defense official has relayed: “Ethiopia’s contributions to PKOs come from the desire for international notoriety, for prestige, and also, the desire to get equipment. In the process, [Ethiopian soldiers] also become more professionalized” (IS31 2015).50 As she continued:

Ethiopia’s tendency to be at the forefront of African security affairs is on one hand, a pride issue, but it’s also a national security issue. There’s the international prestige issue. And then, there are some personal issues that we see between the top Ethiopian military and political officials…. Ethiopia has wanted to get more and more involved in global peacekeeping, UNDPKO says that a commander of a multinational force has to have a degree from prestigious war college (and not a subpar one, like Russia). Therefore, Ethiopia started eagerly trying to send its military folks to the US to get degrees so that they could more actively participate in peacekeeping.

Though perhaps even more important than the role that Ethiopia plays in the AU is the role that Ethiopia plays in IGAD: in essence, IGAD has is in general viewed by most observers of politics on the Horn to be simply a vehicle for the pursuit of Ethiopia’s self-interest in the context of its regional neighborhood (IS10/2 2014; IS36 2015; Redie 2012; 190-191; IS15 2015; Cilliers et al. 2015, 17). For most policy practitioners, IGAD is used by Ethiopia in the exact sort of ways predicted by neo-realist predictions: it pursues its own interests through the organization, which gives its actions a stamp of legitimacy. In Addis Ababa, the capital of African diplomacy, admonitions abound that “IGAD is just a multilateral front for Ethiopian foreign

50 Yet, some have suggested that the national security benefits that Ethiopia acquires as a result of housing the AU are not used to its fullest advantage, and that indeed, Ethiopia lacks a deeply strategic outlook towards the AU itself, suggesting that Ethiopia “has a lack of foresight on AU” and that it “Ethiopia is actually quite unambitious about its policy towards the AU” (IS39/1 2015).
policy enactment. Ethiopia pulls the strings,” (IS10/1 2014) while others notes that “You have to remember that IGAD is Ethiopia’s REC…they use IGAD to express themselves regionally more than the countries do while others note that IGAD is simply a “trojan horse” for Ethiopian interests.31

Evidence of Ethiopia’s de facto control over the organizations abounds. For one, many have noted IGAD’s shift to being an organization that was primarily devoted to security came about – not coincidentally – when Ethiopia took up the Chairmanship in 2008 (IS56 2015). More often though, observers note the fact that Ethiopia has served as the chair of IGAD every year since 2008 (Tewedros and Lulie 2014). At the heart of the continuous Ethiopian control of the organization is the fact that, as per its bylaws, IGAD is supposed to elect a new chairperson at each of its annual summits. As of 2016, the organization has still not yet held a summit since 2008 – when Ethiopia took chairmanship. In the absence of a summit, there has been no chance to elect a new chairperson. Yet beyond simply Ethiopian intransigence, other explanations have been offered. One anonymous employee of IGAD has relayed that, “There is a tacit agreement amongst members that Ethiopia always gets to be the chair.” As anecdotal evidence of Ethiopia’s control over the organization, when Sudan expressed interest in chairing the organization in 2011 – with the support of some other members – Ethiopia made what one observer called a “hullabaloo” and Sudan never got the chairmanship. Members familiar with the internal operational culture of IGAD also relay when “senior members of IGAD have complained that when they put proposals

31 This is true both in the case of the post-hoc IGAD approval of the unilateral Ethiopian intervention into Somalia in 2006, as well as the ability of the organization to help Ethiopia put punishing global sanctions on its rival, Eritrea (Bereketeab 2012, 189).
forward to improve the organization, they are frequently blocked by Ethiopia” (IS36 2015).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, to the extent that Ethiopia employs IGAD to shape the contours of its neighbors’ politics, it has forestalled the possibility of reciprocation: it works assiduously to ensure that IGAD has no chance to inform the nature of its own domestic politics. As IS31 (2015) has articulated: “If Ethiopia needs to, it will always act unilaterally, but these [RECS] are much more useful. Ethiopia definitely does not want assistance from other African states, and it would never let IGAD into its borders (IS10/2 2014). As another observer of Ethiopian foreign policy relayed: “Ethiopia participates in collective security institutions because it helps to advance Ethiopia’s national security interests…Ethiopia is willing to try to work within the AU, but if it gets in the way of Ethiopia’s operational objectives, they have no problem acting unilaterally (IS31 2015).

And yet, even though Ethiopia generally dominates IGAD, it cannot and does not unilaterally control it: instead, Uganda and Kenya are the other most important members of IGAD, and together with Ethiopia, form a troika of sorts to dictate its direction. Importantly, while each country uses the organization for its own pursuits – dominated by Ethiopia – they do all generally coalesce around support to Somalia and reaching an end to the South Sudanese civil war (IS15 2015). Yet, because Kenya and Uganda give priority to the EAC as their REC of choice – often competing with one another there – Ethiopia is generally left to pursue its own interests as it wishes without a real competitor therein (IS22 2015).
With such domination by Ethiopia, the legitimacy of IGAD itself has often been called into question. The extent to which Ethiopia dominates the organization has led Berekeeteab (2012, 190-191) to conclude that:

There are those who doubt IGAD’s regional nature. These critics see IGAD as comprising Ethiopia’s neighbors plus Uganda, the latter of which prefers to look south, Sudan which prefers to look north, and Ethiopia has always been preoccupied with its uniqueness… IGAD needs to move from being “a tool of implementation of the specific interests of certain dominant member states to popularly-based genuine regional organization.

However, others have suggested that Ethiopia is powerful enough regionally not to even need to leverage IGAD so instrumentally as many suggest. As one Western diplomat (IS22 2015) relayed,

Lots of people ask ‘Is IGAD really just a tool of Ethiopian foreign policy?’ And, in my mind, the answer is ‘no,’ but not from the angle that you might think. Basically I do not think that Ethiopia needs IGAD to achieve its goals. For the most part, it can already do what it wants in the region. Ethiopia’s foreign policy is created by a small group of TPLF members within the government; no one in the administration really seems to have any problem with what these guys say, and, in the region, what they say is generally accepted. More generally, the TPLF manages security in the regime….Therefore, Ethiopia does not need IGAD to do what it wants. Does it help Ethiopia to have an inclusive organization backing these decisions? Yes. But does it need the organization to do what it wants? No….I can see where IGAD could be conceived of as a tool of Ethiopian foreign policy: the headquarters are in Djibouti, but several offices are in Addis. But, is this just because the AU is here and it is easier for diplomats to come to Addis, or is it because Ethiopia is pulling the strings?

However, the pursuit of *Pax-Ethiopiana* via the strategic leveraging of African IOs has helped – though not entirely fulfilled – Ethiopia’s hope of fulfilling a Nigeria-type hegemonic role within the Horn. Several reasons underlie this fact, and indeed, converge in some ways but deviate in others from the Nigerian case study. On one hand, the liberal issue of the right to legitimate rule has often undercut Ethiopia’s credentials for the attainment of hegemonic status in its region, though less so than in the Nigerian case. Gebrewold (2014) has noted that Ethiopian leadership in the region
is of questionable legitimacy, while Bereketeab (2012, 191) gives a more prolonged assessment that suggests that both Ethiopia’s antagonistic posture towards its neighbors – especially Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia – in addition to what he perceives as a tendency to kowtow to U.S. security interests, has served to undermine the contemporary possibilities for genuine Ethiopian leadership in the region. Other perspectives on Ethiopian leadership in the region are that the country fails to prove itself as consistently dominant (IS41 2014), while others have countered the Bereketeab argument, suggesting that Kenya, not Ethiopia, is the real hegemon on the Horn of Africa, precisely because Ethiopia’s occasional intransigence against U.S. national security assistance have led the former to be knighted as a the prime regional partner over the latter, not least because of Kenya’s more open economy, better infrastructure, English language prevalence, and generally more cooperative attitude (IS18 and IS19 2015). Finally, others have critiqued Ethiopia’s ability to serve as a regional hegemon due to it inability to serve as an impartial mediator in any Horn-wide context, since it has interests wrapped up in every single one of its neighbor states’ affairs (Verhoeven 2014). Indeed, as (Bereketeab 2012, 191) articulates:

One of the fundamental conditions for establishing a functioning IGAD “would be the emergence of a benevolent hegemonic power that would transcend narrow national interests and possesses the capacity as well as the moral authority to enforce regional integration in the interest of all peoples of the region. So far, although Ethiopia could fulfill the demographic and military dominance of a hegemon, its involvement in conflict with its major neighbors - Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea - gas undermined its capacity to play that role. Advertently or inadvertently, Ethiopia is sabotaging its capacity for hegemonic stature by its aggressive inclinations towards its neighbors...Ethiopia is seen by many as representing global strategic interests rather than regional interests. The aggressiveness and complacency of successive Ethiopian leaders in relation to global geostrategic interests, especially US interests, hinders the emergence of
hegemon in the region. Coercive means of seeking hegemony betrays the very essence of moral authority of hegemony.

Conclusions

In the preceding discussion, it has become clear that as an aspiring (if not de facto) powerful state in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia consistently attempts to use both its overwhelming dominance in IGAD, as well as reputational benefits derived from hosting the (O)AU to its benefit. As one Ethiopian (IS39/1 2015) summed up the strategic difference between the AU and IGAD for Ethiopia:

For Ethiopia, IGAD is more relevant than the AU with the AU, Ethiopia wants the AU so that it can avoid roadblocks of what it wants to avoid doing domestically....[The AU] is not used to promote Ethiopia’s policy on an interest, say on Djibouti’s ports or Eritrea....This is different than IGAD.... Ethiopia wants a very robust IGAD that will protect it from any provocation –mutually assured destabilization from others in its region. Ethiopia thinks that it is on the right path and so it doesn’t want any of its neighbors to mess up what it’s doing. Basically, Ethiopia uses IGAD proactively. It uses the AU passively.

For his part, another expert (IS42 2015) relayed that:

For Ethiopia, IGAD and the AU is a tool to achieve their foreign policy.... Ethiopians are really one of the most realist powers I can think of, who live in a dangerous neighborhood, who need to manage, their neighborhood, and who need use IGAD to manage their environment. To that end, IGAD and AU are really just tools for the pursuit of Ethiopia’s foreign policy...For Ethiopia, IGAD is much easier t control than the AU. I think that the Ethiopia is very clever by using IGAD, and the AU is very careful not to interfere in Ethiopia’s affairs. Ethiopia uses its membership in IGAD to embed itself in a larger community, and this approach allows them to achieve what they want to do with larger credibility.

Interestingly, while Ethiopia has been shown to find great relevance in African IOs for the pursuit of its national security interests, as will be shown, another Horn of African middle state, Sudan, has had outlooks that deviate from our theory’s generally accurate predictions in this section.
CHAPTER SIX:

SUDAN

When it comes to its outlook on African international organizations, Sudan has found itself in a geographic situation which gives way to its harboring multiple allegiances split between the Horn, Central Africa, and to some extent, the Middle East. In the Horn, Sudan is often thought of as the most likely counterweight to Ethiopia (Clapham 2001, 121), and indeed, "wants to see itself as a regional leader and an economic leader" (IS13 2015). However, its ascent to prominence and legitimacy for leadership in the Horn region is tarnished by its poor reputation, which has been underwritten by nearly unending conflicts – both internal and external – since its founding. Nevertheless – and despite the aggressive Ethiopian dominance that characterizes the Horn – Sudan nevertheless is instructive in how middle states conceive of the strategic utility of IOs.

Sudan Within the Theory

Within the context of our theory, Sudan is classified as a middle state (IV1=A) in a multipolar REC (IV2=3) and the nonpolar African Union (IV3=A). Sudan is a powerful force within the IGAD region, serving as the region’s largest military spender and boasting its largest GDP. However, Sudan displays no outright dominance in these categories, and is balanced by other regional states in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and in some ways, South Sudan.
Figure 6.1
Sudan Military Spending in Context of IGAD Members, (1988-2013 average)

Figure 6.2
Sudan GDP in Context of IGAD Members, (2014, in 2011 USD)
(Excluding Eritrea and Somalia)

Figure 6.3
Sudan Population in Context of IGAD Members (2014)
Given this knowledge of “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” about the nature of national security interests, our theory predicts the following understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs:

**Figure 6.4**
Hypothesized Sudanese Perceptions of the Strategic Utility of African IOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIDDLE STATES in IGAD HYPOTHESES</th>
<th>EXISTING INFORMATION</th>
<th>NEW INFORMATION</th>
<th>PREDICTED STRATEGIC UTILITY OF AFRICAN IOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda)</td>
<td>IV1</td>
<td>IV2</td>
<td>IV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXISTING INFORMATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is my international power projection capability?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the polarity of my primary REC?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>What is the primary nature of the national security interest?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will I pursue this national security interest in an African IO? Why?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In my primary REC? In the AU?</td>
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</table>

| **NEW INFORMATION**                      |                      |                 |                |                         |      |      |      |
| A: Powerful                               | A: Unipolar           | A: Nonpolar     |                |                         |      |      |      |
| B: Middle                                | B: Bipolar            |                |                |                         |      |      |      |
| C: Weak                                  | C: Multipolar         |                |                |                         |      |      |      |
| D: Peripheral                            | D: Nonpolar           |                |                |                         |      |      |      |
| E: Global/Non-African Actors             |                      |                 |                |                         |      |      |      |
| F: Economic Interests                    |                      |                 |                |                         |      |      |      |
| G: Reputational Interests                |                      |                 |                |                         |      |      |      |

- YES (1A): I have realist aims that an IO will help me accomplish
- NO (0): I need to take unilateral action
- ☒ (N/A): I have liberal aims that an IO will help me accomplish
- ☒ (N/A): I will take collaborative action outside of an IO
- YES (1): I have constructivist aims that an IO will help accomplish
- NO (0A): I will take unilateral action
- NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action
- NO (0C): I need to take unilateral action
- YES (1): I have realist aims that an IO will help me accomplish

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An Overview of Sudanese Foreign Policy

The thrust of Sudanese foreign policy and national security interests is predicated on how its domestic conflict landscape informs what it deems to be its national security interests within and outside the county. Three main “fault lines” demarcate the internal conflict landscape of Sudan: the divide between north and south; the divide between Muslims and non-Muslims; and the divide between “Arabs” and “black” Africans. These sundry axes of conflict have often overlapped and diverged, and led to numerous multi-sited conflicts within Sudan since its independence, all of which have sometimes been contained within Sudan’s borders, but often, have also spilled out outside of them. Amongst other primarily internal conflicts that have informed Sudan’s perception of national security interests, are Sudan’s first civil war (1956-1972) and its second civil war (1982-2005), both against southern secessionists, as well as the war in Darfur (2003 to today). Externally, the rare tendency of such conflicts to remain exclusively contained within Sudan’s borders has meant that much of its foreign policy is premised upon dealing with the international repercussions that its internal politics wreak on neighbor, and more recently, the broader international community’s condemnation of its policies. Moreover, and as is a hallmark of national security interest pursuit in the Horn, relations with neighbors tend to exist in the realm of “double diplomacy”: a first set of formalized diplomatic relations that belie a second and far more dense network of (generally) covertly-funded proxy wars.

Like many other African countries, the major foreign and security policy input in Sudan has been the executive himself. This has most certainly been the case for

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32 No shortage of commentators has remarked on the “artificiality” of such divisions.
Sudan’s three (primary) leaders in the post-independence period: Jaffar al-Nimery (1969-1985); Sadiq el-Mahdi (1986-1989); and Omar al-Bashir (1989-today). Yet as much as Sudan’s leaders have called the shots when it comes to the formulation of the country’s foreign policies and demarcations of national security interests, the role of religion – and powerful non-elected religious leaders – has fundamentally informed the nature of Sudan’s foreign policies. Prime amongst these religious figures involved in the creation of Sudanese foreign policy is Hassan al-Turabi, a Sunni political and religious leader who was often assumed to be the actuarial power behind al-Bashir, between 1989 and 2001.33

**National Security Interest #1: Suppression of Secessionists in Southern Sudan**

National Security Interest:

From the very moment of independence, the threats posed by a possible secession of South Sudan loomed large. When Sudan gained independence in 1956 from a jointly-held British-Egyptian administration called the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, like most other African states, Sudan’s early leaders rightly viewed themselves as existing within a highly tenuous milieu of cultural, linguistic, and social diversity. One-third the size of the United States, Sudan’s leaders inherited a broad and largely arid country land that played host to some 600 ethnic groups and 400 languages. This diversity was immediately a cause for concern, especially as the new Sudanese constitution failed to address two of the main issues of the new Sudanese constitution.

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33 Indeed, Turabi was so fundamental in the construction of all facets of power under the reign of al-Bashir, that when asked why he hadn’t taken power instead of al-Bashir, Turabi replied: “Omar al-Bashir is me, even while I am sitting here at home, meaning that he represents my aspirations” (as quoted in Kibreab 2009, 83). In short, “for the theocratic government in Sudan, state and religion are inseparably interwoven, and it derives nearly all of its laws from Sharia” (Kibreab 2009, 84).
polity: whether the country should be an Islamist state (despite its significant Christian and non-Muslim populations in the south) and what the nature of power relations between the various administrative units in the country (in which southerners would prefer more autonomy from the Muslim capital of Khartoum, in the north). Despite early promises to create a federal system to allow southern political and thus religious autonomy, the government reneged on that promise, which set the wheels in motion for Sudan’s first civil war in which insurgents from the south, called Anya Nya, sought greater autonomy from the north in a conflict that would last from 1955 to 1972 in what is known historiographically as Sudan’s first civil war (Zapata 2011).

From the country’s very inception, insurgents advocating for the secession of southern Sudan served as a primary national security threat to Sudan, not only for the more intuitive reasons of the loss of territory and internal violence, but also due to the fact the loss of southern Sudan would reduce Sudan’s access to the Nile, in addition to threatening its profits from the oil-rich border town of Abyei (Saeed 2013). 34 Just how the Government of Sudan understood the strategic utility of African IOs in dealing with southern Sudanese secessionists over the course of nearly five decades, is detailed below.

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Sudan (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a secessionist insurgency (IV4=A), will realist strategic utility

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34 Moreover, the secession of southern Sudan would (and did) entail dealing with question of the oil rich region of Abyei. The loss of South Sudan would (and did) also have the effect of reducing the number of Sudan’s bordering states, from nine to seven, including the loss of borders with Kenya, Uganda, and DRC (though adding South Sudan itself) (Saeed 2013).
(HDV1=1A) not in its REC (HDV2 = 0) but in the (O)AU (HDV3=1). However, because the period in question predates the creation of a REC, HDV2 is null (Ø).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:

In this instance, our theory is generally incorrect: while Sudan did not utility in any African IO, even predicted utility in the OAU to delegitimize secessionist insurgencies. In response to the southern Sudanese insurgencies that began in the 1950s and continued through the official secession of South Sudan in July 2011, Sudan's strategic outlook on African IOs was to keep them at bay, and to deal with its internal politics internally. Sudan’s need to manage these insurgent groups was pursued nearly entirely outside of African IOs, yet often, its internal landscape became so embroiled that African IOs could not help but come involved in Sudan's politics, much to its chagrin.

During the first Sudanese civil war (1956-1972), Sudan was determined to fight against the Anya Nya secessionists alone, and had little interest in engaging the OAU. By 1969, Any Nya controlled most of southern Sudan, and by 1971, became part of what would later come to be the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), which itself would later become the ultimately successful Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The first Sudanese civil war was halted with the signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which granted the south substantial autonomy, and allowed for Abyei to vote on whether it would elect to stay in northern or southern Sudan (Zapata 2011). However, as far as this author could locate, evidence of the perception of Sudanese utility in the OAU does not exist, not
even in what would be an “expected” appeal to the OAU’s rules about the inviolability of colonially inherited borders.

The 1972 peace held, but only until 1983, which signaled the beginning of the second Sudanese civil war. Somewhat ironically, it is in this brief eleven-year ceasefire in which the greatest evidence exists regarding Sudan’s perceived utility of the OAU, which related to using the organization to help shore up needed diplomatic support in its proxy wars against regional neighbors. Most notably, during the era of the Derg in Ethiopia beginning in 1974, Nimery was known for supporting the Eritrean liberation movements, especially the EPLF, against the Derg. This was not necessarily due any engrained belief that such independence was somehow justified, but rather, simply because Sudan believed that such a secession would destabilize Ethiopia. To that end, in 1977, Nimery brought the question of Eritrean independence from Ethiopia to the OAU summit as presenting a national security concern for Sudan. For his part, Mengistu of Ethiopia retorted that Sudan was “meddling in Ethiopia’s affairs.” Yet, once Nimery became the chair of the OAU in 1978, he again asserted again that the Eritrean conflict in Ethiopia was a source of insecurity for Sudan (Kibreab 2009, 80).

Though numerous causes could be cited for the resumption of violence in 1983, at the heart of the renewed animosities was President Nimery’s decision to institute sharia law in the country, even for those in the Christian south. The reason for this move - antithetical as it may sounds - was to “take the wind out of the sails of all of the Sudanese Islamic movements (the Muslim Brothers, Mirghani, and Sadiq el Mahdi), in effect mollifying the threatening Islamist movements gaining momentum both within

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35 Fast-forward to the 21st century, and Eritrea has been a known funder of the Beja Congress and the SPLM (Healy 2007, 4).
and outside of the country. Among other tangible changes, the move to sharia law in Sudan saw the emergence of a penal code based on what are known as the “five canonical Islamic punishments,” in addition to a wider ranging Islamization of the entirety of the country’s political institutions (Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 79-83; Kibreab 2009, 81). This decision gave rise to what is known as the second Sudanese civil war, in which, akin to the first, southern Sudanese secessionist sought to break away from the Sudanese polity, as a result of the legal and political incommensurability of being forced to belong to an Islamist state (Kibreab 2009, 81; Zapata 2011).

IGAD, which had had no role in the resolution of the first Sudanese civil war (as it did not exist), eventually came to take on a prominent role in the resolution of the second Sudanese civil war. With IGAD a renewed entity after the end of the Cold War, it set to work to resolve what many members of its members viewed as the region’s most pressing conflicts. However, in the post-Cold War period, the OAU was the first African IO to get to begin to resolve the issue, including early mediations by Nigeria, and further mediations known as Abuja I and Abuja II, backed by the OAU. Ultimately, these failed. IGAD’s involvement first came in 1993, at the fourth annual IGAD summit, held in Addis with the heads of state of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda, under the mediation leadership of Daniel Arap Moi (Bereketeab 2012, 182).

While this meeting was one of the primary initiatives, the major IGAD accomplishment came in the form of the creation of the Declaration of Principles

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36 It should be recalled that at the end of the Cold War, IGAD was able to approach problems anew, on several fronts. For one, the downfall of the Derg ushered in the EDRF party in Ethiopia, which was friendly with the new EPLF regime in Eritrea. Moreover, the bifurcation of security alliances in the Horn (with the Derg supported by the USSR and Cuba, and others supported by the US) had fallen by the wayside.
(DoP) in 1994. Created, in large part, by Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, the DoP stated that South Sudan should be able to vote on a referendum for independence if Khartoum refused to allow it to exist outside of Muslim state, as had existed before the move to sharia law in 1983 (Declaration of Principles 1994). All members of IGAD agreed to this, except for Sudan (Woodward 2013, 142).\(^{37}\)

At this point, it should be noted that the DOP signaled a sea change on the question of secession and sovereignty. Whereas the historical OAU commitment to sovereignty would have intuitively banned such an outcome, IGAD led the way in helping to reset the continental norms of sovereignty, much in the same way the ECOWAS helped to restructure African norms on intervention with the 1990 ECOMOG intervention into Liberia. As Woodward (2013, 142) writes of the DoP:

> It was probably a solution that could only have come from the Horn, for ever since the foundation of the OAU in 1963, African states had rejected separation and wars had been fought to prevent it, as in Nigeria, Congo, Kinshasa, and Ethiopia itself. But after the fall of President Mengistu of Ethiopia in 1991, the idea of a referendum determining separation had been practiced in the case of Eritrea, with the agreement of the new government of Ethiopia from which it was hoping to secede. The same principle was now being put forward by IGAD, and accepted by its members with the exception of Sudan, where the government still hoped for outright victory in the South.

For its part, through much of the 1990s, the OAU was seemingly aloof to the north-south war in Sudan, and, as Bouvean described in 1997 (435-439), the “OAU’s present disposition toward Sudan’s gross human rights violations appears to be one of little concern.” By 1997, Sudan agreed to an IGAD-led Khartoum Peace Agreement - after a heavy battlefield loss – that in essence, broadly mimicked the early DoP.

\(^{37}\) Regionally, members of IGAD also had different outlooks. For their part, Ethiopia and Eritrea were opposed to the notion of South Sudanese secession, while Kenya and Uganda were pro-secession (Bereketeab 2012, 182).
The Khartoum Agreement ultimately proved flawed, and therefore, IGAD, with the U.S., Britain, and Norway (known as the Troika) decided to get involved and to help support IGAD’s mediation efforts. For its part, Kenya also tried to become a neutral mediator. With this renewed push, in 2002, IGAD-sponsored additional peace talks led to the signing of an additional protocol in Machakos, Kenya, on 20 July 2002 (Lobban 2010, 115; Murithi 2009; Woodward 2013). The definitive feather in IGAD’s cap was the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Finally, the years long stalemate ended in July 2011, when South Sudan became the world’s newest republic.

In short, throughout its dealing with South Sudan, Sudan perceived little strategic utility in the (O)AU or IGAD: to the contrary, IGAD was seen more as undermining Sudan’s interests than it was capable of supporting it, thus underling the extent to which, even a middle state in a multipolar region sometime receives the raw end of the deal as concerns its membership in African IOs.

National Security Interest #2: Managing the Darfur Conflict

National Security Interest:

Darfur, Sudan’s massive Western region is home to primarily black Africans who practice local religions that are often belittled by the mainly Muslim, Arab appearing political power players centered in Khartoum. As mentioned, these fault

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38 In retrospect, and despite heavy IGAD involvement, many agree that IGAD itself was not the exclusive catalyst for the success of the CPA. Indeed, while IGAD has been lauded for the “unity of purpose” of its member states, at least two other factors are also cited, including the goodwill between the Government of Sudan (especially the National Congress Party (NCP)) and the SPLA/SPLM, and the steadfast commitment to the mediation process by the US, and the international Friends of IGAD. Some have even claimed that, behind the scenes, the talks would have entirely collapsed without the support of the US Government (Bereketeab 2012, 182-183).
lines – of “Arab” vs. “black,” which broadly (but not neatly) coincide with another fault line - Muslim vs. Non-Muslim – were at play in the context of the Darfur crisis, which raged from 2003 to present. The Darfurians, who had long felt marginalized by government forces (due to religion and ethnic makeup, but also from a lack of assistance from the central state) finally translated their long-stranding grievances against Khartoum in attacks against symbols of the state, in 2003, under the banner of the Sudan Liberation Army in a move that served to threaten the Sudanese government (Keith 2007).

**Hypotheses:**

Our theory predicts that Sudan (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a non-secessionist insurgency (IV4=B), will find no strategic utility in African IOs, instead addressing the threat unilaterally (HDV1=0B, thus HDV2=Ø and HDV3 =Ø).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs**

In broad terms, our theory in this instance is correct: in its attempts to deal with the Darfur uprisings, the government of Sudan indeed found no strategic utility in IGAD, or the AU, and indeed, the latter was more often interpreted as being inimical to Sudanese interests than supporting them. In response to these early attacks from the SLA, the Sudanese government hired local armed "Arab" militias known as the "Jajaweed" to respond by launching counterattacks on the SPLA. The Janjaweed response seemed disproportionately: entire villages were burned, a new wave of refugees was created as thousands fled, and ultimately, thousands were killed (Keith 2007, 151; Murithi 2009).
As the situation in Darfur began to be referred to as a "genocide," IOs from the African and non-African international community began to take note. Most notably, while the UN was discussing possible military action, in May 2004, the African Union deployed a small mediation team to the region, which succeeded in negotiated a ceasefire though it collapsed almost immediately. This group then became the UN peacekeeping mission called the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Ultimately, AMIS troops remained in Sudan, and were eventually re-hatted under the joint UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Murithi 2009; Lobban 2010, 147).

Despite these early steps, the AU served as more of an annoyance to Bashir than anything else. While on one hand, he would have preferred to have the IO encroach within Sudan’s domestic affairs. On the other, he scarcely found it threatening. No leaders exerted pressure on Bashir, and even acquiesced to his wishes to hold an AU summit in Khartoum. Nor did Bashir find any incommensurability in his pursuit to attempt to gain the OAU chairmanship in 2006 and 2007, even as his country was being accused of genocide.\(^{39}\)

Whereas the African Union has historically been deeply engaged in the resolution of the Darfur conflict, IGAD ultimately never had any real role – either for the better, or worse – in the resolution of the Darfur conflict, and thus had no real strategic utility in Sudan’s eyes. For its part, while IGAD might have been a start for some sort of resolution to the conflict in Darfur, as Bereketeab (2012, 183) relays in no

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\(^{39}\) Interestingly, a concerted effort around anti-Bashir leaders in the AU came to emerge that feared what his election would signal to the world. While a group of countries - led by Chad, the country most affected by spillover from the violence - blocked his accession to the chairmanship in both 2006 and 2007, they were careful to divorce these actions from Darfur. Instead, they cited the fact the chairmanship was given to "to commemorate the historic independence of Ghana in 1957" and "had absolutely nothing to do with humiliating or rejecting Sudan" (as quoted in Keith 2007).
uncertain terms “the involvement of IGAD in the Darfur conflict has been non-existent.”

Several reasons account for this inaction. For one, the geography of the conflict – in western Sudan – has little effect on IGAD members, none of whom border the Darfur region. Second, and understudying the first reason, al-Bashir had been sure to avoid IGAD involvement in the conflict. Third, IGAD was simply not institutionally equipped to deal with the issues, since the CEWARN program’s mandate:

In Darfur there was a clearly deteriorating situation at the time that CEWARN was created, however the latter’s mandate restricted it to border areas between IGAD members and conflicts between pastoralists so that its mandate did not extend to Darfur. In addition, IGAD was excluded from any involvement in Darfur since the Sudanese government and international actors sought to keep separate the CPA [which IGAD had brokered] and the issue of Darfur [which was mostly unrelated]; instead it was the AU that tried initially to make its first foray into an ongoing conflict before calling on the UN for assistance [not surprising, since RECs tend not to do peacekeeping now], resulting in the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Woodward 2013, 147).

As he continues of the impotence of IGAD:

\[R\]estricted it to border areas between IGAD members and conflict between pastoralists so that its mandate did not extend into Darfur. In addition, IGAD was excluded from any involvement in Darfur since the Sudanese government and the international actors sought to keep separate the CPA and the issue of Darfur. Instead, it was the AU that tried initially to make the first foray into an ongoing conflict [of Darfur] before calling on the UN for assistance, resulting in the hybrid United Nations-African Mission in Darfur (Woodward 2013, 147).

**National Security Interest #3: Avoiding Isolation Post-ICC Indictment**

**National Security Interest:**

As the Darfur conflict raged on even, the violence had become so disconcerting – and Sudan so intransigent – that the International Criminal Court (ICC) took action. Citing the numbers of the conflict – between 200,000 and 400,000 dead, with 2.5
million displaced, the ICC indicted Bashir and his government on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in the Darfur region. The ICC released and arrest warrant for Bashir in July 2009, and a second – after the first was found to be lacking in sufficient evidence – in July 2010. Bashir’s indictment was the first for a head of state.

In the aftermath of the censure by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity committed in Darfur, Bashir became increasingly isolated not only in the broader the international community, but even amongst African states, which also began to view him as an aggressive and intransigent pariah. While not one to shy away from controversy, Bashir nevertheless needed to ensure that he did not remain completely isolated, thus avoiding international isolation by improving its international reputation, became a top priority for Sudan.

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Sudan (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a reputational national security interest (IV4=G), will find constructivist strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1C) in both its primary REC (HDV2=1) and the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:

In this case, our theory is correct. Whereas IGAD and the African Union had been viewed with derision during the height of the Darfur violence for their potential roles in critiquing the regime, once the International Criminal Court’s Indictment of Bashir occurred, the organizations took on a central place in the pursuit of his national

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40 For instance, in 2011, Kenya issued a court order to arrest Al-Bashir if he entered Kenyan territory, a threat that Sudan responded to by severing diplomatic relations with Kenya (Saeed 2013, 99).
security interests of avoiding total international isolation. To that end, Bashir artfully employed tactics of using both organizations for reputation improvement and issue enabling, as suggested by our theory.

As is typical of issue enabling, Sudan started its campaign to avoid isolation at the lowest IO rung: IGAD. There, Sudan succeeded in lobbying the organization to condemn his indictment. Although Keller 2004 (40-41) notes that “Sudan’s desire not to be seen as a pariah state led to its increased willingness to cooperate with IGAD in the early 2000s, its coup de grace was its ability to filter up its issue of condemning the ICC’s indictment of Bashir to the top levels of IGAD. These efforts culminated in a formal statement from the Executive Secretary of IGAD, Mahboub M. Maalim, which expressed IGAD’s:

[D]eep concern and disappointment with the action taken by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in indicting the President of Sudan H.E. Omar Hassan Al-Bashir,” decrying it as an “action [that] has no doubt put in danger the fragile peace effort underway between the Government of Sudan and the opposition groups in Darfur. Moreover, it will no doubt further exacerbate the humanitarian situation in Darfur (IGAD 2009).

Having secured IGAD’s condemnation, Sudan moved the issue of Bashir’s ICC indictment to the African Union. After numerous meetings with AU members holding both pro-ICC and anti-ICC opinions, ultimately Bashir succeeded in getting the African Union took a formally adopt an anti-ICC stance, thus supporting Bashir. In short, the African Union claimed that even as signatories to the ICC’s founding

41 For more on the very contentious question of the ICC’s inducement of Bashir within the African Union, see: Miller 2012.
42 Yet, for the international community, the very fact that leaders like Bashir can effectively leverage the AU for their own outright self-interested purposes decreases such IOs’ legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. As one anonymous researcher relayed: “The African Union bestows a tool upon African leaders against the international community. This is how Bashir tries to use it. And so, the more legitimacy the U.S. government gives to the AU, the more legitimacy it implicitly gives to the Bashirs of the world. This is no good” (IS13 2015).
document, the Rome Statute (ICC 2002). The concluding element of the African Union’s decision on the ICC indictment is so important that it is worth quoting at length. The African Union's statement relayed that it:

9. Deeply regrets that the request by the African Union to the UN Security Council to defer the proceedings initiated against President Bashir of The Sudan in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, has neither been heard nor acted upon, and in this regard reiterates its request to the UN Security Council;

10. Decides that in view of the fact that the request by the African Union has never been acted upon, the AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Omar El Bashir of The Sudan;

12. Underscores that the African Union and its Member States reserve the right to take any further decisions or measures that may be deemed necessary in order to preserve and safeguard the dignity, sovereignty and integrity of the continent.

In short, the African Union has contemporarily taken on a tenor that asserts that the ICC is unfairly targeting African heads of state for prosecution and is, in essence a racially and culturally-relativist Western hegemonic institution. This approach to the ICC was no doubt facilitated, in no small part, by al-Bashir, who found strategic utility in the AU in order to help him avoid international isolation. And yet, not all member states of the African Union were on board with Sudan's plan to leverage the AU as a tool to reduce its own isolation, and some have considered Sudan's move an overly divisive move (ICC Conference 2015; Mills 2012). For its part, Sudan's negative reputation for its role in Darfur itself bled into AU politics. For one, the AU has spent a considerable amount of time and diplomatic effort over the course of the past two decades, and thus, Sudan's international reputation as a potential leader in the intra-African order has undoubtedly been tarnished.
Indeed, numerous observers of African foreign policies have emphasized the extent to which Bashir's usage of African IOs – as a means of issue enabling and reputational improvement – have been effective, and serve as a useful stratagem for other potentially isolated African leaders. As Aganyfac (2015) reflected, "In the early 2000s Sudan was doing well, but it was weakened, because of the legitimacy lost in Darfur. Now, Sudan uses IGAD protect him. This is where Bashir finds comfort." And as an IGAD employee has articulated in an interview: “For Sudan, it has used IGAD to legitimize itself post-ostracization because of Darfur and the ICC indictment. It is really the only outlet that it can express itself. Primarily, IGAD is a body to express itself, and as a means to prove its reputation.”

**Conclusion**

As has been shown, Sudan is typical of a “middle state” in Africa when it comes to its outlooks on IOs. While on one hand, it is much more powerful than many states in its region, it nevertheless lacks the capacity to fully dictate the direction of the IOs in which it is a member. Thus, the strategic utility of IOs is highly contingent upon the issue area. In some instances, both IGAD and the AU have been shown to be more antithetical to Sudanese national security interests than supportive of them, as was the case in relation to the southern Sudan insurgency, as well as the war in Darfur. However, in the right contexts, these IOs still proved able to be successfully manipulated, especially in the instance of reputation improving.
CHAPTER SEVEN: SENEGAL

Senegal is a former Francophone colony on the West African coast, which occupies an important place in the African international hierarchy. While not necessarily the most powerful country, Senegal has held a position of symbolic importance, not least in serving as one of the most powerful Francophone African countries, amongst a slew of other former French colonies that have had decidedly less halcyon histories. To the end, one should rightly keep front and center the notion “Senegalese exception,” or the notion that by virtue of its history of generally democratic rule, stability, and positive relationships with both West African neighbors as well as the broader international community, Senegal has cemented itself as a unique, an often-celebrated, postcolonial African state (Chafer 2013, 5).

Senegal Within the Theory

Within our theory, Senegal is classified as a middle state (IV1=B) in a unipolar REC (IV2=A), and the nonpolar AU (IV3=A). As per the statistics below, Senegal shows that after Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, it has historically been the third-largest ECOWAS military spender since just before the end of the Cold War. In terms of GDP, Senegal is fourth in the ECOWAS region (behind Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana), and falls in middle of ECOWAS countries as concerns population size.
Figure 7.1
Senegal Military Spending in Context of ECOWAS Members, (1988-2013 average)

Figure 7.2
Senegal GDP in Context of ECOWAS Members, (2014, in 2011 USD)

Figure 7.3
Senegal Population in Context of ECOWAS Members (2014)
Given this knowledge of “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” about the nature of national security interests, our theory predicts the following understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs:

**Figure 7.4**
Hypothesized Nigerian Perceptions of the Strategic Utility of African IOs

### MIDDLE STATES IN ECOWAS HYPOTHESES
(Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXISTING INFORMATION</th>
<th>NEW INFORMATION</th>
<th>PREDICTED STRATEGIC UTILITY OF AFRICAN IOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV1</td>
<td>IV2</td>
<td>IV3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is my international power projection capability?</strong></td>
<td><strong>What is the polarity of my primary REC?</strong></td>
<td><strong>What is the polarity of the African Union?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: Powerful</td>
<td>A: Unipolar</td>
<td>A: Domestic Insurgencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Middle</td>
<td>B: Bipolar</td>
<td>B: Domestic Non-Secessionist Insurgencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Weak</td>
<td>C: Multipolar</td>
<td>C: Regime Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Peripheral</td>
<td>D: Nonpolar</td>
<td>D: Dangerous Neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Global/Non-African Actors</td>
<td></td>
<td>E: Global/Non-African Actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>F: Economic Interests</td>
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<td>G: Reputational Interests</td>
<td></td>
<td>G: Reputational Interests</td>
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**Table Format**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HDV1</th>
<th>HDV2</th>
<th>HDV3</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES (1A): I have realist aims that an IO will help me accomplish</td>
<td>NO (0)</td>
<td>YES (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action</td>
<td>⊗ (N/A)</td>
<td>⊗ (N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action</td>
<td>⊗ (N/A)</td>
<td>⊗ (N/A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>YES (1B): I have liberal aims that an IO will help me accomplish</td>
<td>YES (1)</td>
<td>NO (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES (1B): I have liberal aims that an IO will help me accomplish</td>
<td>YES (1)</td>
<td>YES (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO (0A): I will take collaborative action outside of an IO</td>
<td>⊗ (N/A)</td>
<td>⊗ (N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES (1C): I have constructivist aims that an IO will help accomplish</td>
<td>YES (1)</td>
<td>YES (1)</td>
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**An Overview of Senegalese Foreign Policy**

Since gaining its independence from France in 1960, Senegal has had four heads of state, each of which has, by and large, approached African IOs in a similar fashion.
These include Leopold Sédar Senghor (1960 to 1998); Abdou Diouf (1998 to 2000); Abdoulaye Wade (2000 to 2012); and Macky Sall (2012 to today). Senghor's early approach broadly set the tone for the conduct of a Senegalese foreign policy that would generally be run, in large part, from the purview of the executive. Throughout his tenure, Senghor's foreign policy is understood as being ardently pro-West, and especially, pro-French, given his historical linkages to the metropole. As was the case for many other Francophone African rulers throughout the 1960s and 1970s, maintenance of colonial linkages to France remained a lifeline, and whereas many other West African and Sub-Saharan African states were actively ready to court Soviet overtures during the Cold War, Senegal under Senghor was known for its much more staunch rejection of the U.S.S.R. and prioritization of links with Paris.

Involved in the creation of the OAU, Senghor was ostensibly a devoted Pan-Africanist, however, his foreign policy praxis bore out the fact that his commitments to those ideals were less sacrosanct than might be assumed (Arieff 2013). Of note, Senghor’s ardent pro-Western foreign policies gave pause to those in his geopolitical neighborhood, especially Gambia, which worried that “Senghor was so manifestly concerned with cementing the relationships of Francophone countries and attempting to advance their cause” that it inherently creating some degree of antipathy towards Anglophone countries (Touray 2000, 36). While Senghor began a generally pro-

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45 Senghor had been groomed by the French colonial elite, and attended school in Paris. Nevertheless, Senghor came to be a founding member of the negritude movement, which vaunted a sense of black transnationalism and identity in the face of French colonial presence. Senghor was fundamental in Senegal's independence movement given his intellectualism, which he later displayed in the form of his demonstrated erudition in poetry, writing, and perhaps most famously his mastery of the French language (Arieff 2013). Despite his intellect, Senghor was a leader of his era, and ran Senegal as a de-facto one party state via the ruling Partie Socialiste (PS) (Arieff 2013).
Western outlook of foreign policy, Diouf ultimately took up this mantle as well (Arieff 2013, 2; Chafer 2013, 5).

This somewhat narrowly pro-French, pro-West outlook that characterized Senegalese foreign policy for its first 40 years of independence came to change with election of Abdoulaye Wade in 2000. Whereas his predecessors had been staunchly socialist, Wade’s more liberal outlook – rooted in the campaign promise “\textit{\textit{sopi}}” or “\textit{\textit{change}}” – meant that he prioritized diversifying Senegal’s foreign relations to include more than just a French cornerstone (Chafer 2013, 5). This general opening to a non-exclusive French sphere of influence would continue with the 2012 election of Macky Sall. Yet, the importance of France in Senegal’s foreign relations remains strong: Dakar houses France’s largest African embassy, and Senegal typically send its most senior diplomats to France (Chafer 2013, 13).

More broadly and contemporarily, Arieff (201) assesses that:

\textit{Senegal is…diplomatically influential, particularly among Francophone African states, and its relatively well trained and disciplined military is active in international peacekeeping operations. The population is 94\% Muslim, and indigenous religious leaders are socially and economically influential. While ethnic and religious divisions exist, they play less of a role in Senegalese politics than in much of West Africa. Infrastructure investments, reforms, and donor assistance have provided the conditions for economic growth in recent years, but wealth creation has been concentrated in the capital, Dakar, and among political and economic elites (Arieff, 2013).}

And delving more thoroughly into the uniqueness of Senegalese policy broadly:

Scholars have historically sought to explain the formulation and implementation of African foreign poles by focusing on one of three sets of narrowly defined arguments: the continuation of “\textit{dependency}” relationships between the newly independent African states and their former colonial powers; the positions of African states within the larger geopolitical setting of the Cold War struggle; and the overriding importance of the personal whims of

\footnote{44 Tensions reached a head when Wade requested and received the recall of two French ambassadors for being overly critical of his administration, once in 2005 and another time in 2010 (Chafer 2013, 15).}
the authoritarian leaders - the so-called “big man” theory of foreign policy….Senegal’s foreign policy demonstrate[s] that these dependency Cold War, and personal-rule oriented explanations were at best exaggerations and at worst mere caricatures of more complex and dynamic foreign policy processes” (Schraeder 1999, 133).

**National Security Interest #1: Preventing the Secession of Casamance**

**National Security Interest:**

Located in the south of Senegal, the Casamance region bears a historical experience with marked divergences from the northern parts of the country. Just prior to the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference – during which major European powers arbitrarily divvied up the African continent – France petitioned Portugal and Britain to relinquish control of areas just south of French territory in an attempt to unify the Senegambian region under the French flag. Portugal accepted the French offer, bringing the Casamance region into French territory, but the British did not follow suit, leaving the small strip of land now known as the Gambia under British colonial administration. The move effectively cut the Senegalese region into two parts. In the decades of colonialism that followed, the French governed Casamance as a semi-autonomous region, further compounding ethnic, cultural, and political differences with the north and instilling a spirit of independence that would come to a head following the end of French colonial rule (Lambert 1998).

Because of its unique colonial experience, a certain demographic of prominent independence-era Casamancais politicians expected to enter the post-colonial era separate from the Senegalese nation. When it became clear that this would not be the case, namely because of the maintenance of colonial borders, these leaders began organizing a political call for the regional autonomy of Casamance. Thus, in the
aftermath of independence, Senghor, like most other African leaders, felt particularly insecure about the nature and durability of his state generally, and the Casamance region in specific. Thus, an early and overriding national security interest of Senegal was and has been ensuring the non-secession of Casamance (Lambert 1998).

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Senegal (IV1=B, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a secessionist insurgency (IV4=A), will realist strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1A) not in its primary REC (HDV2=1) but in the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:

As will be explained presently, our theory in this instance is correct: Senegal viewed the primary strategic utility of the (O)AU in its ability to delegitimize the Casamance secession, though ECOWAS had little utility for Senegal. In light of the early rumblings of a Casamance insurgency, Senegal, like other West African states that gained independence in the 1960s, came to quickly see the creation and management of regional IOs as imperative in the pursuit of national security interests. To that end, since its independence, Senegal has been one of the most active IO creators on the African continent. And, despite the fact that very few of these early Senegalese IOs has endured, it is nevertheless the case that gaining a retrospective understanding of how Senegal’s strategic outlook towards IOs developed is instructive.

As a middle state in the context of a newly uncertain African political order bifurcated by Nigerian dominance and lingering French presence in the early 1960s, Senegal found the creation of and membership within African IOs to be fundamentally
important to its survival. The first of the IOs that it worked to create was the 1959 Mali Federation. Founded as an independent union of Senegal and then-French Sudan (would-be Mali), the union was granted under French rule, but became an official union of the territories once the entity gained independence in June 1960. However, the union was to be short-lived, and collapsed by August of that same year. In 1968, Senegal was instrumental in creating another IO, called the Organization of Senegal River States with Guinea and Mali (Gandois 2009, 102; see also Yasane 1977). And as will be detailed in the next section, Senegal also created another IO with Gambia in 1981, in addition to generally fully participating in the context of numerous institutions – mostly financial – that France created for the management of its neo-colonial linkages with its former colonies during the 1960s and 1970s.

Yet, perhaps more important than its role in the creation of these relatively small "local" organizations, was the strategic utility that Senghor viewed in the creation of two of the IOs at hand: the African Union and ECOWAS. When it came to the creation of the OAU, Senghor, and Senegal, played a deeply important – if often underappreciated – role. As has been articulated, the “gradual unity” advocates of the Monrovia group and the “rapid unity” advocates of the Casablanca group had reached a standstill in the early 1960s that foreclosed much movement at all on the creation of a pan-African IO. For his part, Senghor is noted for having been a catalyst in the overcoming of that roadblock, working to bring together leaders from Nigeria, Togo, and Liberia, to come together in the all-inclusive Brazzaville Conference that would eventually come to engender the founding of the OAU (Foltz 1983, 5). Moreover, Senegal engaged in military deployments in the context of other OAU and ad hoc arrangements: in 1978, it sent troops in an ad-hoc mission to the Shaba province of
Zaire when a rebellion there overthrew the government, and in 1981, it sent troops to
the OAU’s first ill-fated mission in Chad (Mortimer 1996, 294).

Senegal also had a large role in the creation of ECOWAS, not least as a
counterweight to Nigerian dominance, on one hand, and French dominance, on the
other. As has been detailed, Senegal, along with Cote d’Ivoire, tried to get Zaire
included into ECOWAS so as to counterbalance Nigerian dominance (Gandois 2009,
114; Mortimer 1983).\(^{45}\) And, in an anecdotal example of how middle powers can use
IOs to constrain or contain hegemons is by seeking change the rules of the IOs
themselves to give hegemons comparatively less say. As will be discussed further,
many have interpreted the fervent advocacy by Senegal, Mali, and Burkina Faso to
transform the ECOWAS Secretariat into a Commission – complete with a president
and a deputy president – which was intended to constrain Nigeria’s pull over the
organization (Gandois 2009, 134).

Yet Senegal was also forced early on to serve as both a beneficiary of – and a
reactionary to – an often aggressive French play to retain presence in the region, as
Paris began to encourage its former colonies in West Africa – which made up the
majority of states there – to return to its security umbrella, rather than relying on the
new Nigerian led international order that was emerging under the auspices of
ECOWAS. As soon as France began to see Nigeria taking the lead in regional
integration in the early 1970s, it quickly set to work to form a rival West African
regional security community, called the “Communauté de l’Afrique de l’Ouest”
(CEAO) as well as rival economic union, called the “Union Monétaire Ouest

\(^{45}\) For a detailed conversation of Senegalese efforts in the creation of ECOWAS, see Adedeji 2004, 29.
Africaine” and its currency, the CFA (Communauté Financière Africaine.) 46 Most importantly, the concurrent Francophone West African bloc also developed its own collective security schematic, known as the “Accord de Non-Aggression et Defense” (abbreviated as ANAD). Catalyzed by the need for conflict resolution between Mali and Burkina Faso in 1974, which the Francophone West African states took a lead in coordinating ANAD was a created in 1977. In short, ANAD was a Francophone West African regional defense and mediation pact and also included a regional standby force (which ECOMOG would come to resemble in 1990). In no unclear terms then, the concurrent all-Francophone financial and collective security arrangements engendered resentment by the Anglophone members of ECOWAS towards the Francophone members, but more broadly, served to undermine the existence of a West African security community. Together, and as a result of these three forces – a pre-existing pact, fears of Nigeria, and French backing – the Francophone countries were reluctant to engage in a deeper form of regional security arrangement (Coleman 2007, 74; Franke 2007, 64-65; Gandois 2009, 120; Heilbrun 1999, 44-45; Osuntokun 2008).

Yet what exactly was the role of these two organizations in the prevention of the secession of Casamance? What had started as seemingly unthreatening regionalism in the post-independence period had some quickly escalated toward a fully developed separatist movement. From the beginning, the MFDC claimed that it represented a territorial struggle based on the autonomy it enjoyed from Senegal during colonial rule and, as a consequence, its distinct regional and political foundations that should have

46 The pan-West African CFA allowed former Francophone West African countries to peg their currency to the French franc. From its inception until 1995, the currency traded at 50 CFA to 1 French franc, but when devaluation in 1994 made the rate 100 CFA to 1 franc, the assumed French benefits of the monetary union dissipated significantly (Heilbrun 1999, 44-45).
afforded it legal independence. Cognizant of the OAU’s rules of the forbidding of secession (especially ethnic-secessions, which could serve to “balkanize” most of Africa’ ethnically heterogeneous states) Senegalese Dakar went to great lengths to paint the movement as a purely ethnic struggle, pitting the Jola of Casamance against the Wolof majority in the north. In adopting this approach, the Senegalese government won the support of the OAU, which since its formation had denounced the legitimacy of ethnically nationalist statehood. By portraying the MFDC as a Jola organization with the primary goal of creating a Jola state, the Senegalese government presented itself as defending the ethnic plurality of the Casamance region. The government line—that the “political status of the region cannot be determined by the cultural idiosyncrasies of one group”—fit squarely with OAU policy and delegitimized MFDC efforts in the eyes of the organization (Lambert 1998, 595-597).

For the next two decades, an organized political movement developed, but the continued drive for an independent Casamance was marked by little violence. However, by the early 1980s, Casamancais leaders faced the reality that Senegal deemed the economic price of losing Casamance too high to let the region go without a fight. (Unlike the northern parts of the country, Casamance sees higher rainfall and large amounts of fertile land, as well as a strong tourism market). Seeing the economic draw as an opportunity to galvanize the movement and gain leverage over the government position, the independence movement began attacking its own region, destroying tourist destinations and the agricultural industry. Fighting broke out in 1982, with the first violent attack undertaken by the Mouvement des Forces Democratique Casamancais (MFDC) the military wing of the independence
movement. Sustained insurgency would follow for the next 22 years, through 2004, and marked by sporadic spurts of violence, guerilla warfare, and terrorism.

Throughout this time, Senegal often invoked the founding principles of the OAU in defense of the continued unification of the country. It was then able to gain the support of the OAU to such an extent that it never became an important issue on the OAU’s agenda until the election of President Abdoulaye Wade in 2000, who had campaigned on the need to resolve the Casamance conflict and to begin rebuilding the economic benefits of the region. Shortly after his election, a political process began, ultimately supported by the African Union and the United Nations.  

In December 2004, the Senegalese government and the MFDC signed a peace agreement, following a political process supported by the African Union. While the deal included direct foreign aid and government investment in the region and increased political representation in the national government, talks of a referendum on autonomy were never seriously considered. And in late 2009, violent activity from factions of the MFDC that claim not to support the peace deal resumed, reigniting separatist sentiments and leaving the secession of Casamance again in question. As of this writing in mid-2016, the Casamance secession is a low-level insurgency, though rarely marked by violence. In sum, the (O)AU’s rules meant that that the organization allowed the conflict to continue for over two decades without taking a firm political stance. The OAU and then the AU, simply following the lead of the Senegalese government and thus had no independent capacity to serve as a mediator. In short, Senegal, like other African states facing insurgencies, did in fact strategically leverage

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the OAU’s language on non-secession, and, for the most part, allowed ECOWAS to play virtually no role in the conflict.

**National Security Interest #2: Collapse of Liberia, or Senegal’s Non-Interest**

**National Security Interest:**

As was already articulated in the Nigeria case study (chapter four), the collapse of Liberia in 1989 came to be understood as a West African region-wide security interest, even for countries that did not border Liberia (like Nigeria). Yet how pervasive were Senegalese national security interests in the conflict?

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Senegal (IV1=B, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a dangerous neighbor (IV4=D), will realist strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1A), in its primary REC (HDV2=1) but not in the (O)AU (HDV3=0).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

In this case our theory is broadly correct, but in an odd way: rather than Senegal viewing its REC as useful for realist purposes, Senegal used its participation in the ECMOG intervention to promote its liberal national security interests of promoting collective security in the West African region, thus bridging the divide between historically antagonistic Anglophone and Francophone divisions. Rather than needing to engage, Senegal got dragged into the conflict by the REC, thus showing the extent to which middle states in unipolar RECs sometimes cannot control their own actions with these multilateral IOs. Thus, the case of Senegal’s involvement in the ECOMOG I
intervention in Liberia is a story of non-interest, of the engagement of a state in an IO’s military operations, to some degree, against its wishes, but in the service of promoting the greater regional good.

As has been noted in the last chapter the ECOMOG intervention was a Nigerian-conceived and executed effort. For its part, Senegal’s entrance into ECOMOG came relatively late in the operation’s life and ended relatively soon, all between 1991 and 1993. To recall, when conflict in Liberia broke out, in 1989, members of ECOWAS formed the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in May, which held the goal of leading mediation efforts that might threaten West African peace. The five members were Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Mali, and Togo, and they met again in June of that year. Ultimately, the SMC surprised the region by announcing the ECOMOG intervention; the surprise came in the fact that besides Nigeria, few other states were in support of such action (Mortimer 1996, 293-294).

Ideological lines were drawn in the sand, largely mimicking linguistic differences. Nigeria rapidly assumed the role of the lead state, and other Anglophone members of the SMC, Gambia and Ghana agreed to participate in the intervention. In general, Francophone states expressed varying degrees and forms of opposition. The two Francophone members of the SMC – Mali and Togo – flatly refused to contribute. Francophone Burkina Faso vehemently denounced the intervention, and pledged to continue to support the rebel forces. Cote d’Ivoire also openly denounced the ECOMOG intervention plans not least because Houphet-Boigny was resentful of the fact that incumbent Liberian president Doe had killed his niece’s husband, former

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48 Ultimately, the SMC was replaced by a more “equitable” Committee of Five to take more seriously the opinions of Francophone states, led by Cote d’Ivoire (Mortimer 1996, 296).
Liberian president, William Tolbert, in 1980. Thus, Cote d’Ivoire, less openly than Burkina Faso, also supported the rebels, and allowed them to operate and launch attacks from inside its borers when the conflict began in 1989. Moreover, Cote d’Ivoire’s opposition to ECOMOG force resulted not only from the desire to see Taylor and the NPFL in power, but also, due to fears that Nigeria was attempting to over-extend its reach into Liberia, which not only bordered Cote d’Ivoire, but which it generally perceived to fall within its sphere of influence (Mortimer 1996, 295).49

For its part, Senegal’s initial reaction to initial SMC announcement was on the more moderate side of Francophone dissent. Primarily, Senegal registered its opposition not to the opposition per se, but rather, to the SMC’s lack of consultation with other ECOWAS members prior to the approval of the intervention (Mortimer 1996, 294-s295). Thought it was annoyed at the nature of the intervention decision, Senegal itself had no national interests in taking part of the intervention in Liberia. It shared no borders with Liberia, nor were there any Senegalese nationals stuck inside Liberia as was the case for Nigeria and Ghana, a fact that some have used to partially explain those states eagerness to intervene What then led to the Senegalese participation in a conflict in which it had real interests?

Senegalese participation in the ECOMOG I intervention came as a result of the lingering fear of *Pax-Nigeriana*, both within Senegal and throughout the region, not least in Liberia. For his part, Taylor claimed that a Nigerian-brokered peace deal would be unacceptable, but that he would allow a Senegalese brokered one. In short,

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49 A general sense of antipathy between Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria also existed due to the fact that Cote d’Ivoire was one of the few African countries that had recognized the breakaway Republic of Biafra, undergirded in no small part due to French goading to counter Nigerian regional hegemony that challenged its own.
Taylor was hedging his bets about the nature of regional polarity: if he were to assume the Liberian presidency (as he ultimately did) he did not want to be viewed as subordinate to Nigerian interests. Senegal was a safe “middle state” - competent but not imperialistic - and thus an acceptable lead state in which to lead negotiations (Mortimer 1996, 297-298).

Upon this suggestion, a “combination of domestic, regional, and extra-regional pressures began to push Diouf into joining ECOMOG” (Mortimer 1996, 296). In an odd confluence of events, Senegal assumed the Chairmanship of ECOWAS in 1991, right as the conflict was ramping up after the initial ECOMOG intervention in July 1990. Simultaneously, the US, also listening to what Mortimer (1996, 298) calls Taylor’s “anything-but-Nigeria” pleas, began to urge Diouf to send a Senegalese contingent, which it agreed to finance to a profound degree.

Senegal’s first 200 troops (of an estimated 1500 that it would contribute) deployed to Liberia in late October 1991, some fifteen months after the ECOMOG intervention had begun. Through April 1992, it continued to send more troops, stationed in Monrovia, which finally deployed to the western Grand Cape Mount region of Liberia, so as to form a buffer zone along the border with Sierra Leone. The death of six Senegalese soldiers in early 1992 had an important impact on domestic Senegalese opinion: those Senegalese who had been tepid to suspicious of Senegal’s involvement in ECOMOG became openly opposed to its involvement, and thus, the Senegalese soldiers left the mission and returned to ECOMOG headquarters in Monrovia instead (Mortimer 1996 300).

At this point, Diouf was caught between a rock and hard place. Neither his administration nor his public had much interest in continuing to stay involved in
Liberia. Nor was the rationale for Senegal’s original involvement – to facilitate a non-Nigerian peace process with Taylor – legitimate, since Taylor had proven that that assertion was simply a stall tactic to prolong the war. Yet, while Senegal may have wanted to leave, given that Diouf had been elected to serve as the Chairman of the OAU for the 1992-1993 term (beginning later in the year), he could scarcely pull out all Senegalese troops in the abandonment of ECOMOG, ECOWAS, and broader ideas about the commitment to promoting pan-African collective security. Underlining the importance of the role of African IOs in domestic politics, Mortimer has also assessed that Senegal’s impending plan to host the semi-annual OAU summit in Dakar later that year also “enabled the [Senegalese] public to perceive their leader as a major figure in African diplomacy” and thus complicated the possibility of unilateral Senegalese withdraw (Moritmer 300-301).

However, by 1993, Senegal had pulled out all of its soldiers from the ECOMOG I mission in Liberia. In the aftermath of the 1990 ECOMOG interventions, Senegal – along with Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso – were the main critics who openly criticized Nigerian dominance of the organization (Adebajo 2008, 14). This criticism would come to surface again in reaction to the ECOMOG II mission in Sierra Leone, just four year later. Indeed:

A primary factor permitting states like Senegal to register objections to ECOMOG II was the availability of other options. France, itself a rival for influence in the West African region...provided a potential alternative to ECOMOG with its RECAMP project. By the same token the US has” mounted another program called ACRI. “Senegal is among the state receiving assistance from both of them. Neither RECAMP or ACRI is explicitly directed against ECOMOG, but both provide additional resource for future defense and/or peacekeeping missions. In this way, they allow states to distance themselves from the need to turn to a regional hegemon” (Mortimer 2000, 205).
Senegal, in response to the Nigerian domination of ECOMOG I and II, was forceful in asserting leadership when ECOWAS decided to launch a peace mission in Guinea Bissau in March 1998. As Berman and Sams (1998, 7) relay:

The fear among ECOWAS member states that Nigeria has appropriated ECOMOG to further its own foreign policy agenda is widespread and justified. However, the fact that ECOWAS ministers designated the recent Senegalese-led military operation in Guinea Bissau as an ECOMOG force suggests that any country willing and able — not only Nigeria — can manipulate ECOMOG.

Thus, in very broad strokes, the history of Senegal’s involvement in ECOMOG I was more a quest to repair the strained Franco-Anglophone West African state divide that had characterized the ECOWAS intervention. Thus, when it comes to the ECOMOG I intervention, Senegal’s engagement with ECOWAS was to pursue what might be considered a “genuine” attempt at the creation and support of a West African collective security community. While it had no real national interests in the Liberian crisis per se it used its involvement in ECOMOG as a means to reconcile differences between Anglophone and Francophone states in the maintenance of the ECOMOG collective security community and to keep itself in the good graces of the international community and thus bolster its reputation.

**Conclusion**

In general, Senegal’s relationships with IOs might be said to be fairly typical of a middle state, despite its reputation of somehow being a Francophone exemplar. On one hand, as the case of the Casamance secession showed, Senegal artfully leveraged the non-secession dictates of the organization to its benefit. Yet, in the case of ECOWAS, though it had some degree of agency in helping to create the IO, it has
Indeed been stuck in the middle of the perpetual tug of war between Nigeria on one hand and France on the other. To that, it has been “pulled in” to ECOWAS’s activities, especially in the case of the ECOMOG I intervention, and has had to work to reassert itself against Nigerian dominance in the event of the second and third ECOWAS intervention. While Ethiopia, Senegal, and Sudan have given some insight into how middle states think about the strategic uses of our IOs, our focus now turns to the next category: weak states.
SECTION FOUR

WEAK STATES AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFRICAN IOs

In this chapter, we turn to the investigation of the foreign policy outlooks of states that have no reasonable expectation of movement towards the top of the regional hierarchy. And, despite the fact that these sets of states – which find themselves even at the bottom of the African international totem pole – are the most constrained in action, they nevertheless comprise the majority of African states in general. It should be noted again, and as early as possible, that the distinction of “weak” state here should not be understood as states that are “on the brink of collapse,” or what are frequently referred to in popular culture as “failing,” “failed,” or the like. Rather, “weak” in this instance simply refers to states that have little capacity to exert their foreign and security policies on a larger stage. Or, in the lexicon of this work, they are states that possess some of the lowest international power projection capacity, as detailed in the theory section of chapter 3.
Within international relations theory, when discussions of “small states” arise, historical orthodoxies have suggested that the smaller – in population, physical size, or domestic market – they are, the more vulnerable they are. This approach is logical. Small states are particularly vulnerable to shifts in international markets; typically have great dependence on external donors; have typically primary product or mono-product income production; and, given that many of the world’s smallest states are island or archipelago nations, face extreme vulnerability from environmental factors, including hurricanes, deforestation, and especially in the case of the low-lying Pacific archipelagos, the risk of being submerged through the process of global warming.¹

Resultantly, the orthodoxy goes, the smaller the state, the fewer foreign policy options it has. With limited means, the options for and avenues of action are abbreviated. And to a broad degree, this is true. As Heilbrun (1999, 44) has written "small states operate in a foreign policy environment marked by interdependence and vulnerability. Because their domestic economies produce only part of their needs, these states rely upon imported goods not available in their domestic markets....[states] in the developing world lack the flexibility needed to adjust prices to changes in their

¹ Yet more recent work has suggested that despite outward appearances of vulnerability, small states possess avenues of agency that belie what their material resources would suggest, typically centered on innovative approaches to the manipulation of their external environment. To the extent that contemporary thinking has turned towards and emphasis on understanding the creative approaches that the world’s smallest states take in crafting their foreign policies, Prasad (2012) has elucidated a fascinating list of what she terms “unorthodox development strategies.” Thus, for small states, viability can include such approaches to foreign policy sustainability as: “selling sovereignty” in terms of votes in international institutions; relying on remittances from the Diaspora; serving as off-shore banking centers; allowing the placement of Great Powers’ military bases on their soil; selling fishing rights; allowing foreign vessels to fly “flags of convenience” by registering their ships under smaller countries’ names; selling citizenship and passports, especially to wealthy businessmen; focusing on philately; sale of trust funds; sale of country codes and domain names register in country; satellite businesses; and the allowance of gambling, both physical and internet-based (Prasad 2013). Thus, as Shaw and Cooper (2012, 2) suggest, “what small states lack in structural clout they can make up through creative agency” and that that portrayal of the world’s smallest states as unambiguously weak and simply being acted upon need to be “balanced by attention towards the innovative character of small states.”
terms of trade.” Perhaps even more pessimistically, Wright has suggested that Africa’s very weakest states may have so little power to be able to make meaningful politics outside of their borders such that “weaker states have less scope beyond their regions and might become virtual non-players even inside their own regions” (Wright 1999, 8). As might be expected, Africa’s smallest and weakest states intuitively have the least amount of gravitas in African IOs.

What then are some trends around how Africa’s weak states think about the strategic utility of African IOs? The first general theme in weak state approaches to African IOs is that, given their generally limited agency to effectuate policy within them, such IOs can cause certain threats to smaller states that they do not pose to larger members. In short, the weakest African countries are more likely to be on the receiving end of African IOs’ policies, as opposed to at the forefront of creating them, and thus can feel a particular degree of vulnerability (IS39/2 2015). Small states can be threatened in African IOs because their typically smaller contributions lead them to have less clout, which can mean that they are more likely to be subject to IOs’ interventions or sanctions, or to have their interests ignored or otherwise undermined if they do not correspond with those of IOs’ most powerful states.

Yet, despite the fact that they remain generally marginal as compared to powerful or middle states, the second broad theme is that African IOs (and IOs more broadly) have historically had a particularly privileged role for such small states. Given such polities’ relatively constrained resource bases, IOs often help to facilitate weak states’ participation in economies of scale in a wide array of functional areas, including transportation, communication, development, environmental issues, and, most germanely, security (Shaw and Cooper 2013, 2). Moreover, weak states – the majority
of which have arisen in the post-World War II era precisely as a result of the deeply protective norms of juridical sovereignty – have had a deep reliance on international institutions as legal guardians of their very right to existence. Thus, the invocation of rules and norms of juridical sovereignty as stipulated by global institutions has been a noted commonality amongst the foreign policies of nearly all of the world’s smallest states (Hey 2003; Shaw and Cooper 2013, 5.) Finally, these states’ small sizes and seemingly anodyne role within the community can lead them to be seen as ideal mediators and impartial observers in the mediation of regional conflicts.2

A third theme to address is that rather than IOs being conceptualized exclusively as means by which the powerful control the weak, IOs can also be used in the opposite direction, as a means by which the weak African states attempt to control more powerful African states. In short, in a means of institutionalized “balancing” against a hegemon, smaller members can think of IOs as a means of what Gandois (2009) refers to as “regional entrapment,” or the constraining of a hegemon, via IO.3 In Africa, the creation of SADC is perhaps the best example of the balancing by weaker rates against a stronger one,4 while outside of the continent, Germany’s inclusion In the European Community was arguably underwritten by similar imperatives. Moreover, “from the point of view of weaker states in the region, [ECOWAS] is a way to control the unilateralism of Nigeria (and of Senegal)” (Gandois 2009).

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2 For instance, Gandois (2009, 127) has noted, Gambia’s leadership in the mediation efforts in ECOWAS’s Liberia efforts in 1990 were important precisely because it was a small, neutral country with no interests in the conflict, thus leading both sides to view it as a non-threatening and impartial observer whose decisions were not politically motivated.

3 To this end, of the most well-known examples of regional entrapment would be the inclusion of Germany in the European community.

4 South Africa’s preeminence in the region has been challenged notes that in particular, by Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe (Hailu (2012, 73)
A fourth theme of weak state outlooks towards African IOs is that, to a certain degree, it can also be said that Africa’s weakest “weak states” make their foreign policies towards IOs reactively, in relation to what the bigger powers in their region are doing. That is, their foreign policymaking autonomy is among the lowest in the world: whereas powerful African states are constrained by powerful Western countries, weak states are constrained not only globally powerful states but also, by the more powerful African ones. The extent to which small African states’ foreign policies can be considered “reactive” is manifest in various avenues of foreign policymaking.\(^5\)

A fifth theme in weak state approaches to African IOs runs counter to previous discussions, and suggests that precisely because of their limited resources, weak states are the most likely to try and pursue foreign policies of security through African IOs as it allows them to farm out otherwise expensive aspects of statehood. As Babarinde (1999, 226) writes, for the weakest states, “since they do not have the economic wherewithal and/or the population size to independently pursue a credible foreign policy they may find it in their interest to pursue some or all of their foreign policy through regionalism.” The rationale for a preponderance of action in IOs for small states should be intuitive. Not only does the pooling of resources allow for the accomplishment of agendas that they could not achieve otherwise, it also allows for the potential of freeriding. Existentially, some have suggested that collective action “has brought some visibility and the satisfaction of knowing that they mattered” (Babarinde 199, 228).

\(^5\) An ideal example of this is Eritrea, whose foreign policy decision-making is fundamentally informed by Ethiopia’s role in the region (Muller 2012, 459).
A sixth weak state strategy towards African IOs is for some weak states is to elect to subordinate – strategically – in the context of African IOs. The modes to do this are numerous, and can include following larger states’ desires for interventions, amendments to constitutions, or exchanging votes for money. As IS24 (2015) has noted: “especially for small counties in SADC, if a larger country [South Africa] tells them to do something for money, they’ll do it. There’s really no consistency.” On the hand, smaller African states have shown a tendency to seek to create alliances with larger states in the aftermaths of threats to national security.

And indeed, some very extreme genres of self-subornation also occur to non-African actors. While the election of a choice to “actively” self-subordinate to non-African states might seem antithetical at first blush – given histories of the long fight for independence – it has nevertheless been a pronounced tendency:

The leaders of small states, who regardless of domestic opposition, felt more vulnerable, and who in any event had little chance of becoming regional leaders in their own right, were more likely to opt for the client role than the leaders of large ones. The fact that the Francophone states of West Africa were all much smaller than the two larger Anglophone ones of Nigeria and Ghana can only have

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6 One of the seminal insights in the extant literature on African international relations has come from Francois Bayart’s (2000) recognition of African states as not having simply been the subject of exterior exploitation, but of African leaders having appropriated their continent’s dependence on external forces to their benefit. Bayart proposes understanding African nations’ relationships with the outside world in terms of “extraversion,” that is, the process of using dependence on an external environment as a means to gain some sort of valuable end. In calling for an understanding that marginalization and dependency can constitute a form of action, Bayart seeks to view African nations not as simply being exploited, but as using their dependency on the external community to their own benefit. Indeed, despite their unequal relationships with the rest of the world, Bayart (2000, 18) emphasizes that this “does not exclude the fact that Africa may have played an active role throughout this long process of reduction to a state of dependency.” For his part, Lake (2011) has also described the process whereby smaller states actively subordinate themselves to larger ones in hierarchical relationships.

7 Thus, Gambia sought to self-subordinate to Senegal after the (1981) coup attempt in the formation of the Senegambian Federation. Benin did the same in seeking to create a federation with Nigeria, and Togo warmed up to Nigeria for the purposes of subordinating itself to Nigeria in the aftermath of the 1963 assassination of President Olympus Sylvano in the face of assumed likely Ghanaian interference (Gandois 2009, 110). In the Horn of Africa, the process of self-subordination to regional hegemons also occurred. For instances, after gaining its independence in 1991, Eritrea largely subordinated itself and its security affairs to Ethiopia until new tensions arose years later, (Mengisteab 2009, 57).
encouraged the great majority of them to remain in close association with France. To be the client state of a major outside the continent was a way of protecting oneself against the ambitions of a regional leader within it (Clapham 1996, 64).

To the extent that African states self-subordinate their foreign policies to non-African states, the most common "subordinator" has historically been France, which has pursued, especially in the 20th century, a policy of Françafrique. To that end, Francois Bayart (1993) who argued as late as 1993, that in fact, Francophone African states actually have no foreign policy outside of French wishes. In what is likely the most extreme case of African self-subordination, one might look to the Comoros archipelago, where one island – Mayotte – has successfully “recolonized” itself by voting to leave the independent African nation and becoming a French protectorate (Warner 2009).

Of relevance to this section, especially in the case of Djibouti (chapter 10), more informal forms of security self-subordination among weak states are also common in the form of the allowance of the presence of foreign military bases. While not officially seeking to alter the legal basis of their states’ autonomy in the ways described above in the case of the Comoros Union, the allowance of substantial foreign military bases on African soil is nevertheless a de facto sign of self-subordination. And indeed, when looking at the presence of non-peacekeeping related foreign military bases in Africa, one sees clearly that the smaller and weaker the state, the more likely they are to have a foreign military presence. Examples of military bases in African states include: an attempted Chinese military base in the Seychelles; a new Chinese military base in Djibouti; and a joint US and French base in Djibouti. The prevalence of these tendencies is investigated in the subsequent four case study chapters.
CHAPTER EIGHT:

BENIN

As might be anticipated, major studies of Benin’s foreign and security policy formulation are not abundant. Yet, in piecing together disparate accounts and analyses of Benin’s statecraft, one is able to understand with some clarity the role the African IOs have played in its pursuit of its national security interests. As will be argued subsequently, Benin – and especially early Benin – typifies a self-subordinating state: one that is so small that it has little hope of even gaining prominence within its own African subregion to the extent that it actively attempts to “self-subordinate” its national security interests to, on one hand, non-African powers (in this case, France) or at other times, to powerful regional states (in this case, Nigeria), and yet at other times, forming smaller IOs with other non-powerful states, the vast majority of which have collapsed.  

Benin Within the Theory

Within the theory, Benin is categorized as a weak state (IV1=C), in a unipolar regional REC (IV2=A), and in the nonpolar AU (IV=A). As per the statistics on military spending, GDP, and populations within the ECOWAS region, these classifications seem to be intuitive.

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8 Importantly, it should be noted that some observers claim that Benin has more or less moved away from a purely self-subordinating posture to one that is indeed more actively engaged in regional politics, especially in the arena of regional conflict-resolution, thus implying activity in ECOWAS (Heilbrunn 1999, 44)
Figure 8.1
Benin Military Spending in Context of ECOWAS Members, (1988-2013 average)

Figure 8.2

Figure 8.3
Benin Population in Context of ECOWAS Members (2014)
Given this knowledge of “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” about the nature of national security interests, our theory predicts the following understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs:

**Figure 8.4**
Hypothesized Beninese Perceptions of the Strategic Utility of African IOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAK STATES IN ECOWAS HYPOTHESES</th>
<th>EXISTING INFORMATION</th>
<th>NEW INFORMATION</th>
<th>PREDICTED STRATEGIC UTILITY OF AFRICAN IOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>(Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo)</em></td>
<td><strong>IV1</strong></td>
<td><strong>IV2</strong></td>
<td><strong>IV3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is my international power projection capability?</strong></td>
<td><strong>A:</strong> Powerful</td>
<td><strong>B:</strong> Middle</td>
<td><strong>C:</strong> Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the polarity of my primary REC?</strong></td>
<td>A: Unipolar</td>
<td>B: Bipolar</td>
<td>C: Multipolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What is the primary nature of the national security interest?</strong></td>
<td>YES (1A): I have realist aims that an IO will help me accomplish</td>
<td>NO (0): I need to take unilateral action</td>
<td>NO (0): I need to take unilateral action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Will I pursue this national security interest in an African IO? Why?</strong></td>
<td>Yes (1A):</td>
<td>NO (0):</td>
<td>NO (0):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In my primary REC?</strong></td>
<td>NO (0)</td>
<td>YES (1):</td>
<td>NO (0):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In the AU?</strong></td>
<td>YES (1)</td>
<td>@ (N/A)</td>
<td>@ (N/A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**An Overview of Beninese Foreign Policy**

The few authors that have written about Beninese foreign policy divide its history into three periods. The first runs from its independence in 1960 to approximately 1974, and is described as a period during which chronic instability and multiple coups d’états characterized a domestic scene. During this time, Benin’s foreign policy was thus little
more than a stereotypical patron-client relationship with France. The second period of Benin’s foreign policy is the prolonged rule of Mathieu Kerekou (1975-1990) which saw Benin adopt an Afro-Marxist outlook on foreign policy, an anti-colonial stance which it had to delicately balance with its continued reliance on French assistance. The third period is the era of Nicéphore Soglo (1991-1996) while the fourth is the second era of Kerekou (1996-2006), and the fifth the era of Thomas Boni Yayi (2006-present). While the Beninese case study will be taken more quickly than others, it still serves as useful case study highlighting the relative unimportance of African IOs for some of Africa’s smallest and weakest states, whose foreign policies tend to circumvent IOs in the service of relying on much larger patrons of all stripes, primarily due to the fact that, unlike much larger players, they can scarcely be assured that their goals can be accomplished.

**National Security Interest #1: Seeking External Financing in the Face of Internal Insecurity**

**National Security Interest:**

The early years of Benin’ post-independence period were marked by chronic instability. At the heart of this instability was the Beninese military, which became a potent force in national politics, and was readily willing to oust any government that it did not like. Between 1963 and 1972, the country saw experienced six coup d’états, and multiple iterations of new constitutions. Thus, as Heilbrun (199, 46) writes, during this time, “without stability, the government of any given day could formulate no coherent foreign policy beyond seeking French assistance.” To the extent that it could be said to exist, Benin’s national security interest was the location of a source of

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external funding that could help to ensure the perpetuation of the nascent state apparatus.

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Benin (IV1=C, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing an economic national security interest (IV4=F), will find no strategic utility in African IOs, instead addressing the threat collaboratively outside of IOs (HDV1=0A, thus HDV2=∅ and HDV3 = ∅). Moreover, because the period in question predates the creation of a REC, HDV2 is null (∅).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

In this instance, our theory is correct: in Benin’s pursuit of economic stability, instead of turning to African IOs, in instead looked to an patron to economically support it. Given its general lack of foreign policymaking ability due to internal instability and need to extract resources from outside, early Benin typifies the self-subordinating state. First, it attempted to self-subordinate to France, and that early on, “Dahomey’s political class was compelled with disturbing regularity to pursue a foreign policy that consisted of little more than asking France for financial assistance to meet budgetary shortfalls” (Heilbrun 1999, 44). In short, especially given the tenuousness of the creation of the OAU, as well as the non-existence of ECOWAS, Benin had little other option in its early post-independence period than to turn to bilateral relationships. To that end, early Benin was buoyed nearly entirely by French concessions.

Nevertheless, despite the inutility of IOs for economic purposes, during the early days of independence, Benin was an avid creator and joiner of small West
African international organizations. In 1959, Benin created the "Entente Council" with Togo, Burkina Faso and Niger, intended to coordinate economic policies related to customs unions, communication networks, public administration and public works (Gandois 1009, 102). In the 1960s, Benin proposed a union between Togo, Nigeria, and itself, which Nigerian President Balewa ultimately rejected. So eager was its desire to self-subordinate that Nigeria that it proposed a similar merger with Nigeria in the 1970s, which this time, Nigerian President Obasanjo rejected (Osuntokun 2008. 147).

As concerns the OAU, Benin’s role within the formulation of the OAU has minimal – this author has found no documentation regarding any specific goals or plans – and given that ECOWAS was being developed mainly as a Nigerian and Togolese project, Benin had little opinion in the early days, other than to generally moderately follow the anti-Francophone sentiments underwritten by fears of Nigerian hegemony.

**National Security Interest #2: Protect Regime Between Pro-French and Anti-French Camps**

**National Security Interests:**

The entrance of Major Mathieu Kerekou to the presidency of Benin in 1972 would signal a long-awaited stretch of peace in the country, and was accompanied by a national ethos of a Marxist-Leninist political orientation. After launching the sixth successful coup d’état against a civilian government in 1972, Kerekou’s general political pathos was to “pander to a vitriolic and shrill left,” in the country, consisting of Benin’s noted intellectual class, which had found salience in the early 1970’s *tiers mondisme* intellectual paradigms (Heilbrun 1999, 46-47).
During the early 1970s, Beninese intellectuals had begun to critique the overly close relationship (perhaps the very essence of Françafrique) that post-independence Benin had developed with France during the pre-Kerekou years. As such, they called for a radical shift in Benin’s foreign policy, which was to entail a rupture of neo-colonial linkages with Paris in favor of a pro-“Third World,” non-aligned foreign policy based in Marxist-Leninist socialism (Heilbrun 1999, 47-48). Thus, in the vein of Gourevitch's (1978) "second image reversed," Beninese domestic politics of the 1970s and 1980s formed constituencies in relation to the perceived salience of international issue. Moreover, the move towards such anti-French rhetoric has was also viewed as being a way to ensure regime security, and had less to do with asserting new independence, and more to do with insulating those in Kerekou's military-led government from critiques about the need for democratization (Heilbrun 1999, 49). Yet simultaneously, Kerekou was well aware that despite idealistic fervor, Benin could scarcely survive in the absence of some larger patron, thus the total cutting off of French support would be disastrous. In short, one of Kerekou’s early national security interests was how to ensure his regime security from emergent anti-French, Afro-Marxist critics on left, with the necessity of retaining French support on the right.

**Hypotheses:**

Our theory predicts that Benin (IV1=C, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing regime security (IV4=C), will find no strategic utility in African IOs, instead addressing the unilaterally outside of IOs (HDV1=0B, thus HDV2=\emptyset and HDV3 =\emptyset).

**Hypothesis-Testing**

9 For more on this transition, see Heilbrun 1999, 47.
In broad strokes, our theory is correct: in protecting his regime from an increasingly radical leftist constituency, Kerekou seemingly saw little strategic utility in African IOs. Instead, as is typical for the construction of foreign policy for weak African weak states, figuring out the right modes for subordination – either to an outside non-African power, or perhaps to a powerful African state – was the very order of the day. Yet, as historically been the case, when weak African states seek to subordinate themselves, African IOs are most frequently not viewed as having much strategic utility, and instead, modes of subordination are accomplished outside IOs, in bilateral means.

A policy of testing the limits of French patronage ensued, entirely outside of the context of African IOs. Led by the calls of some the Marxist-minded foreign policy elites, Benin began to undertake incessant rhetorical jabs at France as a being a neo-colonial power, though simultaneously, continued to rely heavily on its handouts. Put otherwise, "While the government's one hand tested the limits of French patience, its other was begging for revenue transfers to enable its survival" (Heilbrun 1999, 50).” Thus, the general trend during this period was one of “double-speak” on the part of Benin's foreign policymaking elites, or what Bond (2004) has referred to in the South African case as the tendency to “talk left and walk right.” In describing this precarious balancing act, Heilbrun (1999, 46) writes:

[T]he foreign policy of Mathieu Kerekou's government reflected his efforts to subdue increasing pressure from [anti-French, Beninese] intellectuals, while trying to avoid any threats to French largesse. Benin's foreign policy was therefore a response to competing interests manifest in foreign pressures, domestic coalitions in society, and factions within the regime.
Though riddled by some amount of duplicity,\textsuperscript{10} the Benin-French relationship did indeed fray during the 1970s and 1980s, though as much from French agitation at Beninese petulance as from Beninese rejection of patrimonialism. Several factors led to the mutual rupture. For one, on January 16 1977, the famous French mercenary, Bob Denard, attempted (and failed) in a coup d'état against Kerekou, though the Beninese military chased Denard out of the country. Benin accused France (along with Senegal, Morocco, Togo, Gabon, and Cote d'Ivoire) for conspiring to oust his socialist regime with the intent to replace it by a French-friendly regime (Heilbrun 1999, 51). Also at the heart of the rupture was the ill thought-out decision by Benin to rapidly nationalize all banks and other privately held companies (many of which were French). Many of these new nationalized companies ended up, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the hands of Kerekou’s inner-circle, in a process of ensuring patrimonial support via national economic policy that was widespread in Africa in the 1970s (Bates 1981). While other African countries that had nationalized their industries, like Togo, had reimbursed individual owners, the radical intellectuals in Benin's foreign policymaking apparatus did not pursue such a policy, actions that "fundamentally shook Franco-Beninese relations" (Heilbrun 1999, 49).

This anti-French ethos reached a head by 1984, yet cracks in the edifice began show: by the mid-1980s, it had become clear that the Beninese distancing from France had caused the former's economy to move in retrograde. Moreover, while ascendancy of the Afro-Marxist paradigm found salience in a fervent domestic constituency, by the mid 1980s, such idealism meant little as the Kerekou regime "ceased to provide any

\textsuperscript{10} The shift towards socialism was not just nominal: the country changed its name to the "People's Republic of Benin" and hired East German advisors to create "cells" of the new "Parti Revolutionnaire du Peuples du Benin" throughout the country's rural and agricultural communities (Heilbrun 1999, 47).
public goods, including a coherent foreign policy" and thus, ultimately collapsed (Heilbrun 1999, 44). Thus, 1984 marked a turning point at which Kerekou instituted what Jouffey (1983, in Heilbrun 1999, 49) has called "le pragmatisme beninois" in an attempt to reconcile with Paris.

As part of its relationship with its French pseudo-patron, Benin also needed to approach how it handled its relationship with emerging ECOWAS very adroitly. Although Benin was actively engaged in the creation of ECOWAS (Heilbrun 1999, 47), it had to play a very delicate game: it needed to continue – despite Kerekou's rhetoric – to retain French patronage, while balancing its desire (and need) to become a genuine part of the coalescing West African community. For its part, France had actively come out to urge West African countries not to join ECOWAS, yet its main neighbor, Nigeria, was at the heart of the creation of the IO: As Osuntokun (2008, 149 writes):

When France noticed Nigeria's move towards regional integration, it quickly instigated the formation of the rival all-Francophone CEAO in 1973. France also encouraged the formation of the all-Francophone "Accord de non-aggression et assistance en maitere de defense (ANAD) in 1977, with a secretariat in Abidjan, CDI, to counter to ECOWAS protocols on Non-Aggression (1978) and Mutual Assistance in Defense Matters.....Benin was forced to maneuver between the Nigerian-led ECOWAS and the Francophone political and security organizations, as it needed the material support from both Lagos and Paris. This is why Benin did not become a signatory to the Abidjan Treaty of 1973 establishing the CEAO until 1988 (Osuntokun 2008, 149).

For its part, Benin, along with other Francophone West African countries, succeeded in playing their French backer against Nigerian interests, in essence using their collective status a bargaining chip against Nigeria. While Nigeria (and Togo) were courting members for ECOWAS, other Francophone state, like Benin, held back, and in forming a Francophone West African coalition, they hedged against
Nigerian hegemony in the creation of ECOWAS by agreeing to join only as long as Nigeria afforded them all "most favored nation status" in their trade relations. Given the imperative nature of having the Francophone West African states on board, Nigeria relented (Gandois 2009, 110).

And yet, to the extent that IOs figured into Kerekou’s desire to maintain regime security, some have noted that in more anodyne ways, ECOWAS did have a role. In short, especially at the moment of the creation of ECOWAS, Gandois (2009) notes that many leaders of small African countries joined because it would help them to stay in power. First, joining ECOWAS was an important assurance of regime security for leaders who had come to power through unconstitutional overthrows during the era preceding the creation of ECOWAS, such as Mathieu Kerekou of Benin (1972). Second, small, would-be pariah nations with unconstitutional leadership could not risk ostracizing themselves personally (or their countries geopolitically) by rejecting the formation of the larger West African Union.

**National Security Interest #3: The World Trade Organization’s Cotton Prices**

**National Security Interest:**

More contemporarily, one of Benin’s primary national security interests has continued to revolve around economic security, though now, this relates to the price of cotton. Accounting for an estimated 40% of its GDP and some 70% of its exports, the

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11 In short, in applying the logic of realist international relations theory, smaller states had two options once the wheels of the creation of ECOWAS had begun to turn. On one hand, they could seek to balance the hegemon (Nigeria) and the organization that it had began to underwrite, by collectively allying with one another and attempting to create an analogous or parallel organization. Or, on the other, they could bandwagon with the hegemon and simply fall under its security umbrella. Both options assured leaders who had assumed power through unconstitutional means some degree of external assistance in the event of an attempted coup, assuming that it was not orchestrated (as in the case of Denard) from the opposite pole of power.
price of cotton directly bears upon the well being of the Beninese state. Beginning in
the early-2000s, Benin, along with three other West African countries – Mali, Burkina
Faso, and Chad, which would come to be known as the “Cotton-4” in the World Trade
Organization – began to view the international community’s subsidization of cotton as
a threatening to their own domestic economies: with rich nations, like the U.S.,
offering domestic cotton farmers tremendous subsidies to grow the crop for export,
such wealthy countries were implicitly undermining the markets upon which these
countries survived by keeping the global price of cotton extremely low. To that end, in
2003, the C-4 described the wealthy countries’ cotton subsidies a “‘grave’ threat to
their national security” (Becker 2003; OECD 2006).

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Senegal (IV1=B, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the
prospect of addressing a dangerous neighbor (IV4=D), will liberal strategic utility in
African IOs (HDV1=1B), in its primary REC (HDV2=1) and in the (O)AU
(HDV3=1)

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs**

In this case, our theory is correct: in short, Benin – along with many other West
African states – found great utility in African IOs for addressing global threats
engendered by global cotton prices. Working first at the sub-regional (African) level,
Benin – along with Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali – formed a group within the WTO
known as the Cotton 4, or "C4.” After consultations amongst each other and with
support from international NGOs who affirmed the threats to the African countries’

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12 For a detailed overview of the history of the emergence of the cotton question in West Africa, see:
OECD 2006.
national security, the collective then took the issue to members’ sub-regional IOs for support. The C-4 introduced a plan to curb global subsidies for cotton in the 2003 WTO during the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, which would come to be known as the “cotton initiative” (ICTSD 2014).

Given African IOs’ known (general) efficacy in the ability to “issue-enable,” Benin, and the C-4 quickly understood the likely strategic utility of African IO. The first stop was ECOWAS. By April 23, 2003, ECOWAS held a ministerial meeting in Accra, Ghana to discuss the cotton initiative, as it was known. The outcomes of the meeting was an agreement by all ECOWAS members that they would support the initiative, with ECOWAS agreeing to help push the issue at the global level, and amongst smaller West African IOs (OECD 2006, 110).

The African Union was also a strategic boon. It also offered its endorsement of the plan in a June 2003 meeting of AU ministers on the island of Mauritius. Yet more significantly, on April 22, 2005, the C-4 countries submitted a proposal to the African Union (C-4 2005), to request its support for their initiative to collectively convince wealthy countries to reduce their subsidies. For its part, the outcome document from the AU’s trade ministers meeting in that same year offered unequivocal AU backing to the C-4, noting its “strong support to the proposal for a rapid, ambitious and specific solution to the cotton issue… proposed by the four West African cotton producing countries” and pledged to “provide technical and political backing to the C4 initiative, under the African Union” (African Union 2005b; OECD 2006, 110).
Though it is outside the scope of this work to detail every step of the negotiations, the broad contours of the issue entail a general standstill in negotiations. In short, the largest “breakthrough” in negotiations came in the form of the 2013 “Bali Ministerial Decision on Cotton,” in which countries agreed to “address cotton ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically, within the agriculture negotiations.” However, since then, little concrete progress has been made. Thus, though ECOWAS and the AU were viewed as having strategic utility for Benin and the C-4 ultimately, they have not been as effective as they would have hoped.

Conclusion

In broad strokes, Benin’s outlook on African IOs is one that places its general vulnerability at the forefront. Benin interestingly underlines two important points about how "self-subordinating" weak states think through IOs. First, African IOs themselves are often perceived to be rather strategically un-useful in the pursuit of patron-client relationships. In Benin's case, it has historically been far more intuitive to fully circumvent IOs and simply create modes of outright reliance on France, as was seen in the first and second case studies. Precisely because control of the IO is decidedly outside of Benin’s capabilities, working around IOs – rather than within them – for highly sensitive issues is viewed as imperative. Yet, the general antipathy towards African IOs falls by the wayside when it comes to the pursuit of collective interests at the global level: as was shown, when individual state interest

13 The largest “breakthrough” in negotiations came in the form of the 2013 “Bali Ministerial Decision on Cotton,” in which countries agreed to “address cotton ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically, within the agriculture negotiations.” However, since then, little concrete progress has been made.
coincide with regional interests – as in the case of the Cotton-4. African IOs are viewed as strategically very useful as means of collective bargaining, even for in the case of the IOs’ least powerful members.
CHAPTER NINE:

GAMBIA

Gambia gained its full independence in 1965, when, despite recommendations from the UN and the broader international community that it should join Senegal, which surrounds it, Gambia became a microstate under independent rule. The country’s 90 percent Muslim population (9% Christian, and 1% traditional worshipers) means that Islam, as in Senegal, has long served as a unifying force in the country. Simultaneously, Gambia’s ethnic diversity has rarely been the source of inter-ethnic fighting: though the country is dominated by the Mandinka (42%); Fula (18%); Wolof (16%), other ethnic groups including the Soninke, Serrer, Jola, Manjago, and Aku collectively comprise the remaining 24% (Saine 2010, 2, 3). As will be shown, its history of rule by only two leaders since its independence has facilitated a concentration of foreign policy making power in the executive, though, as will be highlighted further, Gambia has seen a surprisingly prominent place for the strategic utility of African IOs, certainly more so than its regional analogue, Benin, discussed in the previous chapter.

Gambia Within the Theory

In the context of our theory, Gambia is classified as a weak state (IV1=C) in a unipolar regional REC (IV2=A) and in the nonpolar AU (IV3=A). As per the statistics on military spending, GDP, and proportional population below, this classification seems to be intuitive.
Figure 9.1

Figure 9.2

Figure 9.3
Given this knowledge of “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” about the nature of national security interests, our theory predicts the following understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs:

**Figure 9.4**
Hypothesized Gambian Perceptions of the Strategic Utility of African IOs

**WEAK STATES IN ECOWAS HYPOTHESES**
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXISTING INFORMATION</th>
<th>NEW INFORMATION</th>
<th>PREDICTED STRATEGIC UTILITY OF AFRICAN IOS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV1</td>
<td>IV2</td>
<td>IV3</td>
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**What is my international power projection capability?**

- A: Powerful
  - A: Unipolar
  - A: Nonpolar

**What is the polarity of my primary REC?**

- B: Middle
  - B: Bipolar

**What is the primary nature of the African Union?**

- C: Weak
  - C: Multipolar

**What is the primary nature of the national security interest?**

- D: Peripheral
  - D: Nonpolar

**Will I pursue this national security interest in an African IO? Why?**

- E: Global/Non-African Actors
  - E: Dangerous Neighbors
  - E: Global/Non-African Actors

**In my primary REC?**

- F: Economic Interests
  - F: Reputational Interests

**In the AU?**

- G: Reputational Interests

**Table:**

- A: Powerful: YES (1A): I have realist aims that an IO will help me accomplish
- B: Middle: NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action
- C: Weak: NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action
- D: Peripheral: YES (1B): I have liberal aims that an IO will help me accomplish
- E: Global/Non-African Actors: YES (1B): I have liberal aims that an IO will help me accomplish
- F: Economic Interests: NO (0A): I will take collaborative action outside of an IO
- G: Reputational Interests: YES (1C): I have constructivist aims that an IO will help accomplish

**Scores:**

- NO (0)
- YES (1)
- (N/A)
An Overview of Gambian Foreign Policy

Contemporary Gambia is state characterized by an eager foreign policy which outstrips its small size, and which belies its limited internal resources and indeed, Gambia’s history of but two heads of state since its independence offers less variation of foreign policy change than other states (like Nigeria, for instance). Gambia’s first president, Dawda Jawara was a fixture in Gambian politics since the state's inception. One of a rare number of Gambians selected to gain college-level education, after having been schooled for some time Ghana, Jawara was awarded a scholarship to study veterinary medicine at the University of Glasgow, where he became interested in politics in the late 1940s, alongside other would-be post-colonial leaders, such as Guyana’s Prime Minister, Cheddi Jagan. Jawara returned home to Gambia in the 1950s, at which point his interest in politics, in addition to his cultivation of various contacts made as a result of serving as a traveling cattle veterinarian, led to his nomination as the secretary of the newly formed People’s Progressive Party (PPP).

After a vote in 1962, Gambia was granted full internal independence by Britain, but remained a part of the British Commonwealth: Jawara served as the Prime Minister as the head of Government, with Queen Elizabeth serving as the Commonwealth Head of State. After a previously failed attempt, in 1970, Gambians voted in a referendum to render the country a full republic: Jawara thus went from serving as the head of government to the President in the new republic. Thus, during his term as Gambia’s president – which lasted from 1970 to 1994 – Jawara was re-elected five times, in what were generally considered, from the outside, to be free and fair elections.
When discussing Jawara's foreign policy, his reign was vaunted internationally for its moderate nature, characterized by democratic credentials, respect for human rights, and free-market economy. However, behind this veneer, most have noted his decidedly authoritarian tendencies. The result of this moderate and largely neo-liberal approach to governance – especially while most other African countries during this era were not following such a model – garnered Jawara respect throughout the African and non-African international communities. Jawara generally boosted these credentials further by ensuring that Gambia actively involved in the creation of ECOWAS in 1975, and was otherwise known as a consensus-builder within the larger West Africa region (Adebajo 2000, 62; Gandois 2009 105; Saine 2010, 23). During Jawara's tenure between 1970 and 1994, Gambian foreign policy was dominated by two overriding objectives. The first was the maintenance of territorial sovereignty in response to a seemingly expansionist Senegalese impulse. The second was a foreign policy undergirded by the attraction of foreign capital not only to offset domestic deficits, but also to help enriched, and thus, entrench, the ruling PPP bureaucracy (Saine (2010, 106), similar to the previously discussed case study in Benin. Jawara's reign lasted until Gambia's current President, Yaya Jammeh, overthrew him in 1994. At the time of his deposition, he was the longest-serving president in Africa (Saine 2010, 1; Touray 2000).

This international renown, however, concealed what was, behind drawn curtains, a single-party, autocratic government dominated by Jawara's cult of personality (Saine 2010, 23). Saine (2010) has gone to great lengths to underline the contradictions inherent in classifying Jawara's rule to rule as "liberal", while Clapham (1996, 56) corroborates that, although opposition parties beyond Jawara's PPP were allowed in Gambia during Jawara's rule, they "never had any plausible prospect of winning." Growing resentment towards the singular statist capture - including the manipulation of foreign policy for the purposes of regime protection - resulted in the attempted 1981 coup against him. For instance, Saine (2010, 24) notes that sundry analysts of Gambian political economy refer to Jawara's rule as that of "democracy," derived from the Mandika meaning "power" or "force" combined with "democracy," thus suggesting a "forced or power-lade democracy."
As has been the case elsewhere, Yaya Jammeh’s presence in dictating the contours of Gambia’s politics extends into the foreign policy where as well. As relates to the formulation of Gambia’s foreign policy, Jammeh has always been firmly in control (Saine 2003, 118), and that notes, Jammeh has “singularly dominated The Gambia’s economic and political landscape” (Saine 2010, 3). In general, the historiography of Gambia’s foreign policy under Jammeh is broadly divided into two periods. The first is broadly the period between 1994 and 1999, which was a period of attempting to avoid international isolation and pariah status, namely by adopting surprising anti-Western policies that deviated starkly from Jawara (Saine 2003, 118). The second period, which was marked by a more aggressive and self-assured Gambian foreign policy which became marked by a proclivity towards serving as a West African mediator, ran from approximately 1999 to 2008, and was characterized by more active participation in West African regional affairs. Throughout both periods, Jammeh has had to balance the tendency to remain in the neoliberal good graces of the international financial institutions on one hand, while backlashing against them enough to simultaneously retain his "rogue" status that allowed him to cement his friendship with the likes of Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and Iraq (Saine 2010, 115).

Despite the seeming divergences in these two leaders’ general approaches to governance – Jawara as “democrat” and Jammeh as “autocrat” – their remarkably similar foreign policy predispositions underlines the theme of continuity in respect to the country’s approach to IOs (Saine 2010, 7).\(^\text{15}\) Moreover, it should be brought to

\(^{15}\) It can be said that through the course of its independence, Gambia has had three primary national security interests: attracting international capital for the support of the regime and the government; managing its relationship with Senegal and mitigating any potential threats from it; and ensuring regime survival (Saine 2010, 115).
light that Gambia’s foreign policy creation shares some commonalities with other small, African states. For one, in both eras, Jawara and Jammeh have been notably front and center in nearly every aspect of the foreign policymaking processes: “this has been true under both Jawara and Jammeh, who both put their personal imprint on Gambian foreign policy behavior.”

**National Security Interest #1: Avoiding Encroachment by Senegal**

**National Security Interest:**

As might be expected for a country surrounded on nearly all sides by its neighbor, Gambia has held managing its relationship with Senegal as a primary national security priority throughout its political life (APRC Strategy 2006; Saine 2010, 106; Touray 2000). In the immediate post-independence period, Gambia’s position as a microstate – and its needs to manage and mitigate that vulnerability – served as its primary national security interest. Because of the nature of the borders between Senegal and Gambia, both countries felt national security threats as a result of postcolonial cartography. For its part, Gambia, which was encompassed on nearly all sides by Senegal, intuitively felt under threat, particularly given its early lack of a national

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16 This ability to follow what could amount to a “personal” foreign policy agenda is exacerbated, especially in the case of The Gambia, by its general dearth of representations abroad: the fewer the number of embassies and consulates, the fewer the number of potential “deviations” that might exist at the personal autonomy level (Saine 2003, 131).

17 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Gambia’s 2006 national security strategy (APRC 2006) - though platitudinous elsewhere - give a great degree of priority to the discussion of the maintenance of good relations with “neighbors,” which in essence, means Senegal: “The APRC will continue to search and advocate strongly for peace, stability friendship and co-operation, and will always condemn military conflicts in the resolution of our differences particularly in our sub-region and Africa generally. The APRC will encourage the option for dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts and differences. We eschew the “beggar-my-neighbor” policy. We are committed to developing trade and cooperation between The Gambia and her neighbors on the one hand and among nations of the South on the other. Under the APRC, The Gambia will promote friendliness and maintain good neighborliness with all her neighbors.”
army. From the Senegalese perspective, the decision to allow Gambia to gain full independence posed its own challenges: not only did the location of the Gambia bisect Senegalese territory, thus posing inherent challenges over the projection of its territory (see: Herbst 2005) in the southern Casamance region, it also prohibited Senegalese use of the Gambian River. Moreover, the territorial sovereignty of Gambia meant that it could serve as a base “within” Senegalese territory to which anti-statist groups could flee (Touray 2000). Thus, how to survive when essentially embedded within a larger – potentially hostile – state began early Gambia’s primary national security interest.

**The Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Gambia (IV1=C, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a threatening neighbor (IV4=D), will liberal strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1B), in its primary REC (HDV2=1) and in the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

In general, out theory is correct: Gambia used African IOs – and indeed, IOs more generally – as entities whose rules it could appeal to as legitimators of its ability to survive via the emerging dictates of nonintervention and juridical sovereignty. Early in their postcolonial relationship, Touray (2000, 30) notes, to the extent that Senegal has always figured centrally in Gambia’s national security interests, there was a widely held assumption that “Gambia would only be viable in union with Senegal.” To that end, as Touray (2000, 30) articulates of Gambia’s early national security interests:

The [Gambia’s] security objectives were pursued on two fronts: closer to home, it was felt that good relations were essential for the country’s survival. Senegal’s role in The Gambia’s viability was seen to lie not in a merger of the two
countries, but in Dakar’s goodwill and willingness not only to respect The Gambia’s territorial integrity, but also to assume the country’s external security. While Gambia’s relationship with Senegal was thus generally in good stead for much of the 1960s, by the early 1970s, their relationship had reached a nadir, with each side considering the other as a national security threat: Jawara considered Senegal to be a threat to its potential territorial integrity, while Senegal considered Gambia – and its control over the Gambia River, as well as its tendencies to re-export goods – as a threat to its economic national security. With each side recognizing the need for rapprochement with the other as a means to ensuring its national security, a series of talks between 1975 and 1980 occurred, which in general, led to better relations (Touray 2000, 100). As will be discussed soon, by 1981, relations had improved to the point that the two created the Senegambian Confederation that year, as a means of assuring mutual security.

And though while the maintenance of bilateral relations with Senegal retained top priority for Gambia, African IOs did figure into Jawara’s plans for post-independence state consolidation to some degree. Because of its limited resources to expend on any sort of foreign policy pursuits beyond those with Senegal, Gambia’s outputs towards pursuing any sort of more diversified policy during the 1960s and 1970s was kept to a minimum. To overcome this vulnerability posed by being a microstate, Gambia turned to multilateral organizations, with memberships in the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and, germanely, the Organization of African Unity. As concerns the

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18 In terms of pursuing prestige and active participation in the OAU, Gambia’s early priorities related to Southern African issues, particularly Rhodesia. Moreover, Gambia actively worked within the OAU to attempt to mediate between Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah’s more activist, quick integration efforts, and its own, more notably pragmatic ones (Touray 2000). Indeed, throughout much of his tenure - and especially the later parts of it - Jawara was quick to play “elder statesman,” especially in the context of
strategic pursuits of national security in these IOs, Gambia not only garnered new contacts and proved itself of being a legitimate new postcolonial sovereignty, but, more importantly, as Touray (2000, 31) describes, participation in these organizations gave the micro-state the “physiological assurance about its juridical statehood” Jawara and Gambia desperately needed. Or, as Touray (2000, 44) has written, especially in the immediate postcolonial era, the joining of African IOS “is where the search for viability begins for small countries like The Gambia.\(^{19}\)

Yet, despite the fact that carrying out foreign policies primarily through IOs was preferable to maintaining numerous bilateral missions, it was nevertheless the case that of the Gambia, even meeting the minimum thresholds for acceptable membership became impossible. Amongst others, Touray (2000, 46) relays that for years, Gambia did not have enough financial capital to support a permanent mission at the United Nations from 1965 to 1970, nor was Gambia able to muster even the minimum necessary payment of .04 percent of the total UN membership budget, which was supposed to be the minimum threshold for very low income countries. Yet, despite these concessions, it was nevertheless the case that that minimum threshold put Gambia’s necessary payments to the UN at a higher per-capita ratio than existed for much higher income counties.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{19}\) For more on the strategic considerations of Gambia in the UN especially, see Touary 2000.  
\(^{20}\) Interestingly, one solution for the lack of a Gambian permanent mission was that Gambia attached its first secretary to the Senegalese mission (Touray 2000, 46). Conversely, Gambia was indeed able to get the OAU to lower its intended dues, which facilitated its more active participation, that organization. Germanely then, it is important to recognize that for some of the world’s smallest states, that IOS present a double-edged sword: while they can present an ideal source for the conduct of foreign policy, their are barriers to active participation that, even when offered concessions, some of the smallest states can fail to meet.
As time progressed, Gambia also began thinking about the nature of its potential participation in ECOWAS via a strategic lens. Despite initial trepidations, Gambia not only viewed ECOWAS as a likely motor for greater regional integration in the more traditional liberal sense, it also viewed its own, more narrow national security interests as being well served by joining the organization (Touray 2000, 95-98). When it came to Gambia’s early perceptions of ECOWAS:

Although the gains from ECOWAS remained removed in 1975, the organization had several features that endeared it to The Gambia. Of particular importance to The Gambia, was the Treaty for the Fund for Compensations, Cooperation, and Development, which sought to compensate those countries to which the implements of the Treaty provisions of might have adverse consequences. It was also meant to help the least developed members of the community, as the aims of the organization included harmonizing both their trade policies and levels of development. Besides, the sheer number of parties to the Treaty of Lagos implied that no single state would become dominant. The likelihood of this occurring in a union between two countries was the consideration that accounted for The Gambia’s resistance to economic and political union with Senegal until 1981 (Touray 2000).

Yet, where Gambia ran up against challenges within ECOWAS related to the fact that it preferred a gradualist approach to integration that contrasted, most notably, with the more activist integrationist aspirations of other regional states: not least the progenitors of ECOWAS, Nigeria and Togo, and especially, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah.  

When Jammeh assumed the presidency of Gambia in 1994, the issue of protection from Senegalese aggression also remained a top national security priority (Saine 2010, 112, 113). To assure the protection of Gambian national security against Senegal, like Jawara before him, Jammeh found little relevance in the utility of African IOs: when it came to protecting against existential threats of a theoretical full-on incorporation into Senegalese territory, direct bilateral engagement with Senegal was the order of the

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21 For more on Gambia’s approach to the creation of ECOWAS, see: Touray 2000, 95-98.
day. Upon his ascension to the presidency, Jammeh's direct, bilateral engagement with Senegalese President Abdou Diouf was strong. On September 22, 1994, Jammeh went to Senegal to meet with Diouf, who agreed to support the new regime given his cognizance of the role that Jammeh had played in Casamance, once of Senegal's own primary national security interests (Saine 2010, 108) (for more on this see, chapter six.). When Wade took the helm of Senegal in 2000, Jammeh also attempted to cement friendship with him, and while the two often hit rocky patches,\footnote{For instance, several bouts of tax hikes on imports from each side led to border closures and re-openings throughout 2006 (Saine 2010, 112).} hostilities were kept at bay so long as Jammeh reiterated that Gambia would not work to supply the MFDC rebels in the Casamance (Saine 2010, 112). Jammeh has also several times offered to mediate between Senegal and the MFDC forces (Saine 2010, 109).

When it has come to dealing with Senegalese threats, extant African IOs have played a virtually non-existent strategic role for Gambia, primarily because such existentially-related issues are too sensitive to be "farmed out" beyond bilateral negotiations. Especially when dealing with the enduring (theoretical) threat of Senegalese aggression, Gambia’s leaders have simply engaged with Senegal directly, and, while circumventing existing IOs, have at times, proposed and created new IOS – such as the Senegambian Union – none of which have yet to endure for the long-term.

**National Security Interest #2: Regime Security Post-1981 Coup**

**National Security Interest:**

Discontent with Jawara’s increasingly autocratic style of governance of Gambia began to rise in the 1970s. Sundry reasons were at the heart at this growing anger.
including the large swathes of disaffected urban youth of Banjul, frustration at the lack of ability to critique or enter into the government, in addition to a crippling drought. Acting on this discontent, a 12-member group called the National Revolutionary Council (NPC), led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang took advantage of Jawara’s trip to London. On 30 July, 1981, the group overran an army barracks in Bakau known as the Field Force Depot, and declared their intention to install a “dictatorship of the proletariat” (Arnold 2011; Saine 2003; Saine 2010).  

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Gambia (IV1=C, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing regime security (IV4=C), will find no strategic utility in African IOs, instead addressing the threat unilaterally (HDV1=0B, thus (HDV2=∅ and HDV3 =∅).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:

Within the scope of its predictions, our theory is correct, but with a caveat: In response to these attacks on his regime, as our theory predicts, Jawara found little relevance in the existing African IOs of ECOWAS and the (O)AU. However, Jawara did indeed leverage African IOs more broadly to protect his regime, though this came in relation to the formation of a new pseudo-IOs. In addressing the coup from London, the lack of strategic utility of either IO was somewhat intuitive. On one hand, Gambia might have attempted to appeal to ECOWAS member states for assistance. Yet, given that the organization had been founded only six years earlier (in 1975) and had yet to

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23 For a fascinating and detailed description of the emergence of radical youth-politics and a subsequent fine-grained overview of the coup attempt, see: Arnold 2011.
formulate its security protocols,\textsuperscript{24} there was no official regional body to which to appeal. For its part, the OAU was a foregone non-starter, as it had already determined that it would in no way work to intervene in the domestic affairs of states.

Thus, in the absence of a formalized avenue through an extant multilateral IO to offer assistance, Jawara appealed instead to its neighbor, Senegal in a bilateral response that circumvented African IOs. Determined not to relinquish power, on 31 July, Jawara flew from London to Dakar where, where he invoked a 1965 mutual defense agreement with Senegal. Together, the two countries attempted to negotiate with NPC in offering them an amnesty package, to no avail. On the same, day Senegalese troops were mobilized “remarkably quickly” and deployed from the Casamance region of Senegal to Banjul. In total, some 3,000 Senegalese troops (comprising approximately one-third of its entire standing army) was deployed to Gambia. Simultaneously, Jawara returned to the Gambia as the NPC was falling into disarray as some of its original backers – especially Libya’s Qaddafi – withdrew support. By August 6 1981 – one week after the coup had begun – Jawara was reinstalled.\textsuperscript{25} In thanks to the Senegalese army for its assistance, Jawara later offered $1 million USD in thanks (Arnold 2011).

The 1981 attempted coup was a watershed moment for Gambia, as it highlighted not only the Jawara regime’s extreme vulnerability, but also the extent to which it needed to rely on external actors for the assurance of that stability. Given its newfound recognition of the insecurity that it faced – and given the lack of any formalized

\textsuperscript{24} The most important of these security amendments to the ECOWAS charter, the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (ECOWAS 1981), would just come into effect the same year as the attempted coup. Thus, to the extent that it was ever appealed to by ECOWAS member states, it did not occur early in its legal existence.

\textsuperscript{25} Casualties on all sides remain debated. The Gambia army officially lost an estimated 500, and Senegal officially lost 50 (see: Arnold 2011; 2010, 24).
international institutions by which to support this – Gambia turned to Senegal, and in essence, sought to formally self-subordinate itself to Senegal in the formation of Senegambia Confederation. Put otherwise, the 1981 Gambian coup underlined the extreme degrees of vulnerability of Jawara's regime, and led to an internal decision that the only recourse to the prevention of future such attempted coups d'états was the farming out of some aspects of security responsibilities.

Thus, in December 1981, a mere five months after the attempted coup, Gambia and Senegal formed the Senegambia Union in a ceremony in Dakar. The degree of self-subordination to which Gambia acquiesced in the formation of the Senegambia Confederation was deep, profound, and exemplary of regime and a state that feared for their existence.\textsuperscript{26} Despite the fact that the creation of the new IO allowed each country to continue to retain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in praxis, Gambia had turned over its security – seemingly eagerly – to Senegal. The “Agreement Between The Republic of Gambia and the Republic of Senegal” (1981, Clause 2) details the agreements on broader levels of statecraft, to include: “the integration of the armed forces and of the security forces of the Republic of The Gambia and the Republic of Senegal, to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; the development of an economic and monetary union;” and “the coordination of policy in the field of external relations.” Yet, more specific language underlines the extent of Gambia subordination. Among other examples of Gambia acquiescence, include the arrangement whereby Senegal would always serve as the President, and The Gambia

\textsuperscript{26} Though the primary actions taken by Jawara to ensure national security were via the creation of a new IO, his regime also did undertake some domestic reforms as well. The former Field Force was dissolved, and replaced by a new army unit, and a new Ministry of the Interior was created to help Jawara deal with the post-coup security landscape (Touary 2000, 107).
would always be relegated to the Vice Presidential Role (Clause 6); and the granting of the [Senegalese] President (with agreement with the Gambian Vice President) to serve as the commander-and-chief of the joint military, as well as the primary architect for the defense and security policies of both members of the Confederation (Clauses 8 and 7) (Republic of Senegal and Republic of Gambia 1981).

Ultimately, from the perspective of Gambian leaders, the formation of the Senegambian Confederation was intended to serve as an immediate security community with Senegal, particularly given the strategic nature that Senegalese territory inherent plays within the calculus of any Gambian anti-government group. Having recognized its internal weaknesses, Banjul had “no choice other than to enter into external defense arrangements” (Touray 2000, 100). The entry into the Senegambian Confederation was thus a genre of detente in the eyes of Jawara.27 Put otherwise, the creation of the new Senegambia Union allowed Gambia to pursue liberal interests of participation in an African IO, while granting Senegal hierarchical authority over Gambia: a win-win situation for both. In short, and in no uncertain terms, the “coup alone was the direct cause of the decision to form a union with Senegal” – and not a broader process of integration that happened to coincide with the coup attempt – led to the creation of the Senegambian Confederation (Touray 2000, 110).

27 For its part, Senegal, under its newly elected President Abdou Diouf, was accepting of the arrangement. At the most macroscopic, Diouf hoped that the union would ultimately lead to a fuller political union with the Gambia, which would be beneficial for the pursuit of its own interests of maintaining more thorough control in its southern Casamance region, which Gambian territory bifurcates (see: Saine 2003, 119; Touray 2000, 100), but also for the hope that it would reduce Senegalese economic dependence on The Gambia. Diouf also anticipated greater access to Gambian coastal waters for its fishermen as one consequence of the Confederation.
Yet, the assumed benefits to be accrued in the Senegambian Union were not to come to fruition. For its part, Diouf needed to assurance that Senegal clearly dictated the contours of the relationship within the IO, thus refused to entertain Gambia’s later proposal for a rotating presidency (Saine 2003, 120; Touray 2000, 115). While some have argued that the Senegambian Confederation collapsed because it failed to serve Senegal’s security interests, others have suggested that its collapse was due to its inability to serve Gambia’s national security interests (Touray 2000, 100). Moreover, Senegal’s decision to withdraw its troops from the Gambia, in addition to Senegal’s frustration with the Gambia’s indifference towards granting it the economic concessions that it wanted, led Senegalese President Diouf to declare on nationally television address in September 1989 that the Confederation had largely been a failure, and thus, had outlived any national interests that Senegal could use to justify it. Thus, the Senegambian Confederation came to an official end in October 1981 (Touray 1981, 115).

The creation and dissolution of the Senegambian Confederation is also instructive in that it highlights a phenomenon that Esmenjaud (2014b) has rightly pointed out: that African states tend to create new IOs or other collective security arrangements in the aftermath of insecurity, which often cease to exist once the initial threats that led to their creation subside. To that end, the creation of the Senegambian Confederation fits

28 For more on the reluctance of powerful African states to relinquish control of the presidencies of IOS, see: Nigeria chapter on the LCBC force fighting Boko Haram.
29 Of note, Touray (2000, 118) has suggested that the cause of the collapse was caused by a degree of incommensurability of goals. For its part, The Gambia under Jawara primarily understood the Confederation as security-centered arrangement, wherein its security was farmed out to a larger, more powerful Senegal. However, though Dakar was willing to take on these security components of the relationship, its goals were less reputational, and more practical: it viewed the provision of security for the Gambia as a concession to allow it greater economic security vis-à-vis Banjul. When the latter was not forthcoming, Senegal declined to should the “lead state” role in the security arrangement.
this conceptualization neatly. On one hand, it had been critiqued as a shotgun alliance, or as a “marriage of convenience” given its rapid creation and the fact that it was seemingly not thoroughly well thought out (Saine 2010, 24). Moreover, the fact that it collapsed not even a decade into its existence, underlines the extent to which collective security IOs in Africa tend to be ephemeral in nature.

National Security Interest #3: Addressing the Collapse of Liberia

The National Security Interest:

While the collapse of Senegambian Confederation was complete by 1989, not more than a year later, so too was Liberia was in the throes of collapse in 1990. For its part, the wider West African region was generally in recognition that something needed to be done. Yet, for Jawara, the threat of Liberian collapse was a low-level, theoretical security threat. Yet, in 1990, Dawda Jawara served as the Chairman of ECOWAS, and thus, the story of the approval for the first ECOMOG intervention is one that implicated Jawara, and thus Gambia, implicitly.

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Gambia (IV1=C, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a dangerous neighbor (IV4=D), will liberal strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1B), in its primary REC (HDV2=1) though not in the (O)AU (HDV3=0).

National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:

As is broadly suggested by the hypothesis, it was indeed the case that in the face of a collapsed Liberia, the Gambian micro-state found “liberal” relevance in ECOWAS,
in that the IO allowed it to free-ride on other, more powerful states in its region – namely, Nigeria – to deal with an insurgency that could potentially destabilize the region. As has been discussed at length in the chapters on Nigeria (chapter 4) and Senegal (chapter 7), while some have interpreted the Nigeria-led ECOMOG I intervention as a fait accompli (Mortimer 1996) Adebajo (2002, 62-63) has consistently argued that the picture is far more complex, with other West African states having their own interests in the intervention, and not simply being swept along in the call to war by a bullying Nigerian hegemon. This more nuanced approach to the strategic pursuit of national security interests was also true for Gambia, where it was in Gambian national interest to allow Nigeria to substantially shoulder a costly intervention into Liberia. Far from being coerced into the acceptance of the Nigerian plan, Gambia strategically employed Nigeria’s interest in using ECOWAS as a legitimate intervener and free-ride on Nigeria’s efforts to achieve a resolution to the potentially regionally destabilizing conflict. As Adebajo (2002, 62) relays, Gambia had numerous interest of its own in a military solution in Liberia:

Among Taylors’ NPFL were individuals who had been involved in the unsuccessful Gambian coup in 1981, including its leader Samba Kukoi Sanyang. Burkina Faso, a chief supporter of the NPFL, was suspected of sheltering Gambian dissidents. And the 1981 coup had been sponsored by Libya, which had provided arms and training to the NPFL.

As has been noted in the Nigeria case study (chapter 4) West African states were deeply divided on the question of what should be done in Liberia, with different leaders and their countries falling on different sides of the debate. As the chair of ECOWAS during these discussions in 1989 and 1990, Jawara had a unique opportunity to pursue his personal and national interests in relation to Liberia by serving as the filter through which regional decisions were made. Especially later in his
regain, Jawara was known as a consummate consensus-builder within the West African region (Adebajo 2000, 62), a reputation that challenged him as he attempted to sell the Nigeria-led ECOMOG intervention in Liberia as the Chairman of ECOWAS in 1990. In reference to the 1990 ECOWAS intervention, he claimed “to have been advised that UN [mandating] approval was not necessary, and then retroactively argued (equally implausibly) that he had believed that a “good luck” letter from the UN Secretary-General had constituted authorization (Coleman 2007, 78). Throughout the early stages of the ECOMOG intervention, Jawara also took a prominent role in the leadership of ECOMOG’s ad-hoc Standing Mediation Committee. Moreover, it might be argued that Gambia’s smallness played an ideal position in that, as a small country with limited stake in the outcome, it served as an ideal mediator (Gandois 2009, 126). In short, Gambia viewed ECOWAS as strategically useful not only for Banjul’s ability to free-ride on it for security outcomes, but also, on a personal level for Jawara, for its ability to help facilitate a raising of his international profile.


National Security Interest:

When Jammeh overthrew Jawara, the move ended what was, to that point, the end of what was considered one of Africa's four democracies, which was, ironically, perceptually bolstered by Jawara's long rule (Saine 2003, 117). Given that the overthrow was perceived by the international community as an abrogation of liberalism, in the aftermath of the overthrow of Jawara, Gambia's financial flows from international donors quickly dried up, which rapidly became the primary national
security priority (Saine 2010, 107; Touray 2000, chapter 7). As Saine notes, even as of 2010 – a point at which Gambia was back in the pseudo-good graces of the international community – Gambia’s national budget was comprised of 80% international assistance (Saine 2010, 2). Moreover, given that the need for especially small states like Gambia to locate external sources of income for regime security, it should come as no surprise that for Gambia and Jammeh’s rule, the number one national security interest was to find new sources of income and to more broadly avoid international isolation.

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Gambia (IV1=C, IV2=A, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing economic national security interests (IV4=F), will find no strategic utility in African IOs, instead addressing the threat collaboratively outside of African IOs (HDV1=0A, thus HDV2=∅ and HDV3 = ∅).

**Strategic Utility of African IOS:**

In general, our theory holds: Jammeh and Gambia saw IOs as barely figuring into the pursuit of this national interest. It has historically been the case that African countries and their leaders see little strategic value in the actual ability of African IOs – besides perhaps issue enabling – to contribute to their pursuit of economic security. The general assumption is that African IOs’ economic utility lies in market integration, reducing price controls, and lowering tariffs. Given their generally materially poor status, they have little direct ability to replace the widespread loss of international revenues from non-African states: no equivalent combination of grants or lending would be possible at the OAU level, but especially, from the Nigerian-dominated ECOWAS level.
Instead of viewing African IOs as having a role in replacing the lost funds in the face of international censure for his military takeover, Jammeh understood the most effective strategy to be the cultivation of relationships leaders in bilateral means.\(^{30}\) African IOs were to be circumvented. To that end, Jammeh turned to Libya and the ever-benevolent Qaddafi, the latter of whom eager to gain increasing prominence in West Africa, was happy to oblige. Moreover, Jammeh dispatched missions to Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and himself personally traveled to Senegal in the quest for new sources of income (Saine 2010, 107). Especially, Jammeh was known for his proximity to Nigeria’s military dictator Sani Abacha:\(^ {31}\) not only were both considered to be “outcasts” by the international community (Saine 2010, 108) but Nigeria, being the West African hegemon, was the best partner to have in the region.\(^ {32}\)

Beyond this, Jammeh needed to reduce his perception as an international pariah. Again, the circumvention of African IOs was the order of the day, a tendency which our theory also generally predicts. In short, whereas the leaders of larger states – like Abacha in Nigeria, for instance – have often been adept at bolstering their international reputations through undertaking “valiant” policies within IOs, small states like Gambia – which can ill-afford to muster the economic or human capital needed “move” IOs – cannot.\(^ {33}\) Instead, given the material

\(^{30}\) While this intuitively occurred, from time to time at IO summits, IOs played an ancillary role in Gambia’s strategic pursuits in the first period of Jammeh’s rule.

\(^{31}\) For even more on the lack of engagement with African IOs for the purpose of gaining resources to support his regime, see detailed discussions in chapter 7 of Touray 2000.

\(^{32}\) Jammeh’s relationships with Abacha is an anecdotal example of a sort of “personal” self-subordination, ensuring that he had a powerful regional ally that he could leverage if he found himself in need of assistance.

\(^{33}\) To the limited extent that Gambia viewed the OAU as useful to pull itself out of isolation, its largest foreign policy success was the hosting the African Union’s semi-annual summit on 1 and 2 July 2006, in Banjul. That Jammeh had succeeded in attracting the most important pan-African event from Addis Ababa was a huge success, which “clearly enhanced President Jammeh’s standing internationally” in addition to helping bolster his domestic profile in the face of impending presidential elections later that
limits inherently imposed upon them in IOs, Africa’s smallest states have historically understood that the reputational improvement is instead best achieved from attaining positions of relative prominence within the contexts of “small” IOs, that few outside of the immediate region have knowledge of. Because these “small” IOs are local, have fewer veto points, and typically contain members of generally similar international power projection capabilities, they serve as ideal “first step” fora of the pursuit of much grander interests. For its part, having deemed both the OAU and ECOWAS likely to be use in countering international isolation, Gambia and Jammeh turned to Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), a nine-member Sahel-wide IO, which allowed the military man-turned-president the chance to host its 1997 meeting. While such a task would barely register as a foreign policy achievement for a neighbor like Nigeria, Ghana, or Senegal, for Jammeh, it was a figurative coup, since hosting the CILSS summit:

Accorded the new regime much needed recognition and prestige regionally. Serving as the CILSS chairman also gave Jammeh a forum to showcase his development projects, especially the newly refurbished airport and new television station, not to mention the triumphal July 22 Arch (Saine 2010, 109).

Bolstered by the prestige of the CILSS hosting within the region, Jammeh’s successfully further pulled itself out of isolation when it gained a UN Security Council seat. Having found a location of prominence on the global IO scene, Jammeh proved that he was generally the genre of autocrat that he had been assumed to be: he quickly vaunted the anti-Western stances of pariah states such as Cuba, Libya, Taiwan, and Cuba, the latter of which began sending Jammeh substantial assistance. This was

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year (Saine 2010, 113). In an additional anecdotal instance of Jammeh’s (arguably insufficient) attempt at bolster his reputation in the OAU occurred at the 31st OAU annual summit at which he - magnanimously! - offered to pay Gambia’s very overdue membership fees to increase the country’s profile within the organization (Saine 2010, 108).
followed by Iraq’s lobbying efforts to lift U.S.-backed sanctions against Jammeh. Nearly a decade later, in 2006, when Jammeh's regime began to face international isolation once again, it was quick to turn to global "rouge states" of Iran and Venezuela (Saine 2010, 110-115).\textsuperscript{34}

More contemporarily, Gambia’s strategic approach to IOs has been somewhat enigmatic given the somewhat surprising deftness with which the Gambian diplomatic corps engages with IOs. Saine (2003, 151) has noted Gambia’s “effective diplomatic corps” and has remarked that while in some senses it is anathema to a heavy-handed approach to the construction of foreign policy from the executive, on the other, Jammeh’s necessity of maintaining positive relations – a feat that resource-poor Gambia can only really afford to do vis-à-vis its participation in IOs – having a capable diplomatic corps that is actively involved – in the pursuit of regime and APRC interests – engaged in multilateral fora is imperative. Discussions with diplomats working in and around African IOs have emphasized the outstripped role that Gambia plays in African IOs. For her part, the a REC liaison to the African Union (IS7/2 2015) has emphasized Gambia's active engagement with the organization, while another anonymous Western diplomat (IS9/2 2015) who works closely with the African Union relayed:

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\textsuperscript{34} These efforts, coupled with an ostensible Jammeh victory in 2001 helped to keep him out of international isolation and signaled a newly successful "assertive" foreign policy that culminated with the resumption of World Bank lending to Gambia, which had been suspended for years prior. Only after he secured a subordinate position to global pariah states did Gambia’s foreign policy become more oriented towards its neighbors, as will be discussed in greater detail next. From 2002 to 2004, Gambia’s foreign policy was actively engaged in shoring up regional alliances. Abetted by the assistance of his foreign minister, Blaise Jagne, Jammeh traveled to states within the West African region and beyond (Saine 2010, 109-110). In what was to be a capstone to his climb out of isolation, Jammeh viewed ECOWAS to be useful when his nomination to serve as then next ECOWAS chairman - beginning in 2005 - was approved. This however, did not materialize.
In the African Union, you have to look at the degree of persuasiveness of individual leaders. People always say: aren’t the biggest players South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria, the most powerful? No. You know who the most powerful country in the AU Permanent Representatives Council is? Gambia… You know why? The Gambian representative is a genius: he is the only one in the AU who actually knows how to get anything done. He cares about his job, and Yaya Jammeh is very quick to make sure that he works to get Gambia’s point across there.

In summary, Jammeh's foreign policy has been "remarkably innovative and relatively effective in attracting needed funds from alternate sources abroad to support domestic programs” Saine (2010, 114). However, for the purposes of this dissertation, it bears underlining the fact that African IOs played only a limited role in this pursuit, and primarily as ways to bolster Jammeh's international image to global pariah states from whom he would later successfully attract rents.

**Conclusion**

Despite very different perceptions from abroad, both Jawara and Jammeh maintained remarkably similar foreign policies, primarily aimed at hedging against potential Senegalese encroachment, protecting the regime, and attracting international capital for domestic development (Saine 2010, 115). Interestingly, and despite the divergences in political outlooks between the two leaders, Gambia has also taken a generally consistent approach across the two regimes as it approaches African IOs. It has been acutely aware of the limits imposed upon it by virtue of its status as a micro-state, and thus has tended to engage in IOs sparingly when material resources are needed for engagement, but more actively when simply holding a chairmanship is the nature of engagement.
CHAPTER TEN:

DJIBOUTI

Djibouti, a small state of some 870,000 nestled in the Horn of Africa is superlative in its smallness: it is the smallest mainland African sovereignty by population. As part of the French Somaliland colony, established in 1883, by 1958, France granted Djiboutians a referendum vote for independence. Rejecting incorporation into the would-be state of Somalia, citizens instead voted to stay associated with France. However, by 1977, with a 98% vote, Djiboutians voted positively for another referendum vote freeing it from French control. However, early Djiboutian viability was far from assured: Djibouti had historically been a country dominated economically by subsistence nomads (Brass 2008, 524), which found itself in the middle of a Horn of Africa region marked by pseudo-powerful and mutually antagonistic neighbors. Thus, Djibouti was instantly tasked in having to pursue its national security and foreign policy interests in a troubled neighborhood with limited resources, a characterization of the Djibouti geopolitical worldview that endures today.

Djibouti Within the Theory

Within the theory, Djibouti is classified as a weak state (IV1=C) in a multipolar REC (IV2=C) and in the nonpolar AU (IV3=A). As per the statistics below, Eritrea is the weakest country in the Horn, beyond the collapsed – and thus peripheral – countries of Somalia and South Sudan.
Figure 10.1

Figure 10.2

Figure 10.3
Djibouti Population in Context of IGAD Members (2014)
Given this knowledge of “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” about the nature of national security interests, our theory predicts the following understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs:

**Figure 10.4**
Hypothesized Djiboutian Perceptions of the Strategic Utility of African IOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAK STATES IN IGAD HYPOTHESES</th>
<th>(Djibouti and Eritrea)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXISTING INFORMATION</strong></td>
<td><strong>NEW INFORMATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV1</td>
<td>IV2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**What is my international power projection capability?**

**What is the polarity of my primary REC?**

**What is the primary nature of the national security interest?**

**Will I pursue this national security interest in an African IO? Why?**

**In my primary REC?**

**In the AU?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXISTING INFORMATION</th>
<th>NEW INFORMATION</th>
<th>PREDICTED STRATEGIC UTILITY OF AFRICAN IOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: Powerful</td>
<td>A: Unipolar</td>
<td>A: Domestic Secessioneer Insurgencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A: Nonpolar</td>
<td>➔ YES (1A): I have realist aims that an IO will help me accomplish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ NO (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: Middle</td>
<td>B: Bipolar</td>
<td>B: Domestic Non-Secessioneer Insurgencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ ⊗ (N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: Weak</td>
<td>C: Multipolar</td>
<td>C: Regime Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ ⊗ (N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: Peripheral</td>
<td>D: Nonpolar</td>
<td>D: Dangerous Neighbors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ NO (0B): I need to take unilateral action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ ⊗ (N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: Global/Non-African Actors</td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ YES (1B): I have liberal aims that an IO will help me accomplish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ NO (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F: Economic Interests</td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ NO (0A): I will take collaborative action outside of an IO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ ⊗ (N/A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: Reputational Interests</td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ YES (1C): I have constructivist aims that an IO will help accomplish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➔ NO (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overview of Djiboutian Foreign Policy

As a small state in a troubled neighborhood, Djibouti’s foreign policy outlook is fundamentally shaped by its lack of resources. With a tiny population, virtually no arable land, no vegetation, no source of fresh water, scorching temperatures, and no mineral, oil, or other natural resources, Djibouti’s foreign policy outlook as inherently been one of needing to rely on external sources of income for survival.

Given these vulnerabilities, within the larger context of the Horn, Djibouti has attempted to fly under the radar in an otherwise tense region, and yet has typically found itself as an unwitting player caught up in the geopolitical struggles of its neighbors. Or, as Brass (2008, 525) refers to Djibouti’s place between Ethiopia and Somalia, the country has “alternated between buffer and pawn of these two larger neighbors.” Thus, Djibouti’s foreign policy decisions as being rooted in the “strategic distance,” that one anonymous author has used in reference to Tunisia’s foreign policy outlooks towards its much more powerful neighbors Libya, Algeria, and Egypt.

It might come as no surprise to learn that Djiboutian foreign policymaking has been more or less the exclusive provenance of the incumbent leader. Hassan Gouled Aptidon became the president of Djibouti in 1977 as the country gained independence from France. 35 Upon assuming the presidency, Aptidon took a strong-armed approach to governance. Aptidon’s ruling party, the People’s Rally for Progress (PRP) introduced legislation in 1981 that made it the only legal party, thus Aptidon’s rise to power came with a strong authoritarian predisposition: Djibouti has always been a

35 Aptidon’s ascent to power was predicated on his long history in Djiboutian independence politics: as an Issa and ethnic Somali, he had campaigned against the 1958 vote keeping Djibouti as a French protectorate, instead preferring to join the larger aspirational Somali irredentist national state (Mahadallah 2013).

36 This ban on multiparty-ism was revoked in 1992, when three new opposition parties came to rise.
one-party state, with the executive in power wielding nearly exclusive control. Foreign and national security policymaking decisions appear to have been made between the president and a small cabal of party-based advisors. Anecdotally, from 1977 to 1992, there Djibouti’s lack of a constitution mean that Aptidon ruled by decree.

As he began reaching old age, Aptidon handpicked his nephew, Ismail Omar Guelleh, to serve as his successor. With this backing Gulleh became the president in 1999, and was re-elected in 2005 and 2011, despite widespread reports of voting irregularities and intimidations. Guelleh’s dominance had indeed been complete: in 2005, for instance, Guelleh’s lack of a challenger led him to win 100% of the country’s votes for the presidency, and his PRP party won 100% of the seats in parliament (Mahadallah 2013, 58). As in other authoritarian states:

Power is extremely centralized in Djibouti, around the office and the person of the president, who makes many of Djibouti’s laws and policies through unilateral Presidential Decree…The other branches of government have extremely little say: the legislature is in session only two months of the year, during which time it acts primarily as a rubber stamp for the president…. Nor does the legislature have power to approve or refuse presidential appointments, and it is completely controlled by the ruling coalition of parties, leaving accountability low. Likewise, the judicial system is not independent of the president Rule of law is extremely weak, and the constitution is frequently disregarded: arrests are made without warrants, the presumption of innocence is neglected at trial, detainees and prisoners are beaten by security forces, freedom of speech and assembly are repressed, and intimidation tactics are common (FH 2006).

Moreover:

Real decisions are made informally by a small coterie around the president. Although Djibouti’s current president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, came to office in 1999, he served for twenty years as the Chief of Staff and head of state security forces for the first president, and his cabinet is nearly identical to that of his predecessor. Most of the members of his inner circle are also members of his ethnic clan, a subgroup of the majority Issa population. This group is disproportionately

37 Having previously served as his uncle’s chief of staff and head of security, in addition to being a trusted political advisor, Guelleh was not a risky choice.
favored in government, and has controlled the military, civil service, ruling party and security apparatus since independence (Brass 2008, 529-530).

**National Security Interest #1: Suppressing the FRUD Insurgency**

**National Security Interest:**

Since its founding, the primary Djiboutian national security imperative has been dealing with its ethnic insurgencies (Bereketeab 2013, 13; Berhanu 2013, 77). The country is divided, broadly, into three groups: the Issas, who were the most powerful clan with the country’s ethnic Somali community, and who have dominated the government and trade and the Afar, who have long been marginalized by the former. Together, while the two groups make up approximately 55% of Djibouti’s population, other small ethnic groups – including mostly Arab ethnicities Gudaboris, Issak, and Yemenis – make up the remaining portion, and third national group. Dealing with ethnic diversity and the challenges it could pose to the early Djiboutian state thus became a “main preoccupation of politicians” (Bezabeh 2011, 597; Bereketeab 2013, 12-14; Mahadallah 2013, 58-59; Brass 2008, 534; Schraeder 1993).

The roots and nature of the conflict between the groups relate to the outstripped power that the Issa maintained over the Afar. The Issa had historically maintained more robust economies and were better educated than the Afar, yet the Afar were the favored group by the French, primarily due to the fact that they sought to remain part of France, while the Issas sought secession and reunification with greater Somalia. For their part, Issas began movements towards independence from France beginning in 1948. And though France granted the territory self-governing rule in 1957, the majority of citizens (a combination of Europeans and Afars) voted to
remain part of France when the issue came to a vote in 1958.\textsuperscript{38} Independence-minded Issas were again thwarted in 1967 when a similar referendum for independence did not pass, with the only notable outcome the name of the territory being changed the French Territory of Issas and Afars (Djibouti History 2016).

The tide for independence finally spilled over in 1977 when the country became independent and changed its name to Djibouti; moreover, its ethnic tensions would become even more pronounced under the banner of an independent Djibouti. When independence did come, the historically pro-independence Issa assured their position as the dominant ethnicity in Djibouti by buying the vacated lands from Europeans, thereby entrenching themselves in political power (Berhanu 2013, 77; Brass 2008, 524; Djibouti History 2016; Kadamy 1996).

Indeed, the Issa advantage in Djibouti has thus endured since independence: both presidents – Aptidon and Guelleh – have both been Issa (Mahadallah 2013, 58-59.) Despite Aptidon’s early rhetoric vaunting “Djiboutian” national identity as an antidote to divisive ethnic identification (Bezabeh 2011) tensions between the majority Issa and the minority Afar ran high throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Afars and Arabs both became targets of the Issa majority, who talked of their expulsion, and at times, ethnic cleansing (Bezabeh 2011, 599).

The conflict came to a head in November 1991, when three Afar groups merged to form the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) in November 1991, (Bereketeab 2013, 14). While their qualms were with government domination, the insurgency was primarily governance and rights-related, not secessionist in nature.

\textsuperscript{38} However, there were widespread claims of vote rigging by the French, in addition to claims of forced expulsion of Issas.

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Djibouti (IV1=C, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a non-secessionist insurgency (IV4=B), will find no strategic utility in African IOs, instead addressing the collaboratively of African IOs (HDV1=0A, thus HDV2=∅ and HDV3 =∅).

Strategic Utility of African IOs:

As our theory suggests, Djibouti did in fact entirely circumvent African IOs, and instead, relied on a tactic of self-subordination – outside of the context of African IOs – to protect its national security interests. After the initial movements by the group in 1991 – which was abetted by increasing interest in young men joining the group, Aptidon began to “internationalize” the conflict by calling on Issas (and other ethnic Somali clans) outside of Djibouti, especially in Ethiopia and Somalia, to join the fight against the FRUD in a show of solidarity.39 Fascinatingly – and in line with the broader strategy of “selling sovereignty,” Aptidon also encouraged fighters to join his anti-FRUD campaign with the promises of granting them Djiboutian citizenship (Kadamy 1996, 517).

By 1992, FRUD controlled much of northern Djibouti, and it was strengthened that same year when former Prime Minister Ahmed Dini took command of the group. Fighting continued as Aptidon was re-elected in 1993, though the brunt of the

39 For their part, non-Issas, who themselves had been marginalized by Aptidon, had little interest in his call to arms (Kadamy 1996, 517).
hostilities came to a close when Aptidon and FRUD signed a peace agreement and subsequent power sharing agreement in 1994, which saw two former FRUD members appointed to Aptidon’s cabinet in 1995 (Djibouti History 2016).

In addition to these efforts to deal with the FRUD somewhat unilaterally, throughout its three-year fight with the FRUD, Djibouti relied on two sets of superior partners – France and Ethiopia – to help protect it. Soon after the group’s emergence, Djibouti invoked a long-standing defense pact with France. Though France refused to enter the conflict directly, it did agree to help support the humanitarian blockade to FRUD-controlled areas. Later, France would also offer support to Aptidon in geolocation of the FRUD forces, as well as assistance in force planning (Kadamy 1996, 518). For its part, Ethiopia also had interests in quickly putting down the Afar insurgency: given that Ethiopia’s Afar populations have often caused problems for the state, the fear of violent contagion also led it to support the same humanitarian blockade along its borders: both Ethiopia and Eritrea sent 1500 soldiers to the border areas. And while it was initially hostile to the FRUD, it remained engaged in the conflict in a mediatory role, primarily to avoid the perceptions domestically that it was anti-Afar (Kadamy 1996, 519). The next case study offers more in-depth analyses of the longer arc of Djiboutian self-subordination to these two powers, as well as to the United States.

And thus, when it came to dealing with the domestic FRUD insurgency, Djibouti could scarcely rely on the Organization of African Unity, or IGAD. On one hand, Djibouti has never had a very profound profile in the (O)AU: not only did its later independence mean that it had a shorter history with the organization than other, older states, as in the case of Gambia, a lack of material resources has mitigated its
potential for full participation. For its part, at the inception of the insurgency in 1991, IGAD was just reformed itself to take on a broader security mandate – shedding its more parochial focus on environmental issues – at the dawn of the post-Cold War era.  

National Security Interest #2: Assuring Security in a Tenuous Region

National Security Interest:

While Djibouti has never been in the midst of a particularly halcyon region, the early 1990s signaled a string of insecurities. From the overthrow of the Derg in Ethiopia in 1991; to the subsequent collapse of Somalia in 1991; to the creation of Eritrea later that year; to the prolonged fighting in southern Sudan, to the transformed threats of al-Shebab and global piracy, Djibouti finds itself in a particularly volatile global neighborhood. The protection of its national security thus became top priority.

Hypothesis:

Our theory predicts that Djibouti (IV1=C, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing dangerous neighbors (IV4=D), will find no strategic utility in African IOs, instead addressing the threat collaboratively outside of African IOs (HDV1=0A, thus HDV2= and HDV3=).

The Strategic Role of African IOs:

In this instance, our theory is correct. In short, as a small state, Djibouti can hardly rely on either the overburdened African Union (in which it has virtually no visibility) or the Ethiopian-dominated, multipolar IGAD to protect its national

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40 Nevertheless IGAD has subsequently played an important role in helping Djibouti to maintain its national security, given the fact that IGAD’s CEWARN program has played had a central focus on managing transnational pastoralist insurgencies as its primary region-wide collective security activity.
security. Despite the vulnerability that Djibouti typifies, its reputation in the Horn is that of an anomaly, precisely for its relative stability and general dearth of interstate or intrastate conflicts. Indeed, despite the turmoil that has beset every one of its neighbors, Djibouti has largely avoided any such large-scale conflict. Thus, some observers have likened Djibouti to a “chihuahua among sleeping pit bulls” (Simpson 2010) and the “eye of the hurricane” of the Horn of Africa (Schraeder 1993). What then has accounted for the Horn’s seemingly most endangered state to remain its most insulated from conflict?

As is argued here, Djibouti’s relatively peaceful history is not the result of the collective security provided by African IOs, but rather, its ability to effectively leverage the one resource that it has its disposal: its geo-strategic location. Djibouti’s location is strategically important, both militarily and economically. Militarily, it serves as a Western foothold in a deeply tenuous region of geopolitical importance, while also providing proximate access to the nearby Arabian Peninsula. Economically, it is situated at the gateway to the Red Sea, linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. Moreover, it also plays an important function in linking the world to Africa’s second-largest country by population, Ethiopia, and allowing Ethiopia access to the sea. To that end, Brass (2008) has gone to great lengths to describe the ways in which Djiboutian geostrategic self-subordination to the outside countries (especially France, the US, and Ethiopia) constitutes a new version of the “resource curse,” with Djibouti’s prize geo-strategic location a resource that it has sold to more powerful forces in a process that has thereby fundamentally distorted nearly every aspect of its political life.
Djibouti is perhaps the archetypal case of an African country that has largely subordinated its foreign and security policymaking activities to other actors, namely, in “selling its sovereignty” (Lake 2011, Prasad 2012; Brass 2008). Indeed especially because of the very undiversified economy – a 2013 report showed 60% of Djiboutians are unemployed (Djibouti History 2016) – has led many non-Djiboutians in the region, like an anonymous Ethiopian, to assert that “In Djibouti they don’t work. They chew khat and tax bigger countries to use their port all day. They are lazy and smart” (IS2 2015). Indeed, allowing itself to be profoundly penetrated by external powers thus constituted a means of agency, rather than vulnerability. Three external actors are at the core of Djibouti’s self-subordination strategy: France, the U.S., and Ethiopia.

As might be assumed, Djibouti’s historic patron in the protection of its national security interests has been France. Prior to independence, France funded nearly the entirety of Djibouti’s domestic operational budget for both services and administration, spending around $60 million a year in Djibouti in 1974, just before it gained independence. Yet, given Djibouti’s tiny population, it had the highest per capita intake for French foreign spending. And indeed, even after the independence of Djibouti in 1977, Kadamy (1996, 512) notes that despite achieving independence “it did not change the fundamental relationship between the colonial power and its former colony….France lost little in the deal with its interests protected.” Outside of retaining a sometimes-heavy hand in the domestic politics of Djibouti, France’s military presence has been an imperative component of Djibouti’s financial, and indeed, existential livelihood. Not only does France spend an estimated $160 million per year in relation to its Camp Lemonier military base (in 2008), it also provides an additional
A newcomer to assisting Djibouti in its aspirations to self-subordinate its national security is the United States. The commencement of the US War on Terror beginning in September 2001 was a boon to Djibouti, both financially and in terms of the assurance of its own national security. Late in 2001, Djibouti offered land – free of charge – to the U.S. government in its War on Terror, and by 2002, German ships began patrolling Djiboutian waters in support of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan (Djibouti History 2016). Soon after, it began leasing part of the French Camp Lemonier base to the US at $30 million per year (Brass 2008, 526). To the extent that Djibouti has so thoroughly self-subordinated its national security to global great powers, it is now the likely home of a tripartite “scramble,” as China announced in late 2015 its intent to open a base in Djibouti. Interestingly, while Djibouti tries to assure its own security well outside of the context of African IOs, at least in the case of its self-subordination to the U.S. security umbrella, some commentators like Bereketeab (2012, 180) have suggested that Djibouti is undermining the broader project of IGAD integration, since the location of the U.S. base in Djibouti “increases the sense of insecurity in the region” given that the “involvement of AFRICOM in the security architecture of IGAD demonstrates the lack of sovereignty of IGAD while also complicating interstate relations in the region.”

The third actor to which Djibouti self-subordinates is Ethiopia, and it is in this context that African IOs play a role in the pursuit of Djiboutian national security interests. This history of (general) Djiboutian-Ethiopian amity has stretched back more than a century, when the Franco-Ethiopian railway (1907-1917) connected
Djibouti city to Addis Ababa, in an embroiled infrastructure project. Despite recently-revealed Ethiopian perceptions of fear of Djibouti during the era of the Derg regime (Yihun 2014, 679), Djibouti, especially under Guelleh, has found a stalwart ally in Ethiopia. Among other reasons for this friendship are that both countries share a mutual dislike of Eritrea; both countries have substantial populations of the ethnic Issa group, in addition to the fact that Guelleh himself was born in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia. More specifically, since the entrance of the EPRDF in Ethiopia in 1991, Djibouti has worked to secure its more localized national security interests through subordination to Ethiopia in the context of the Ethiopian-led security umbrella of IGAD.

To that end, one way Djibouti strategically employs IGAD is as a formalized means by which to self-subordinate to Ethiopia, and in so doing gain various concessions – namely security – from Addis Ababa. Indeed, although IGAD headquarters is located in Djibouti City, it is instead Ethiopia that is able to employ IGAD as a powerful tool in its arsenal of statecraft. This emerging incarnation of Pax-Ethiopiana (as discussed in chapter 5) is due in no small part that it has a staunch and consistent ally in the form of Djibouti, which virtually never “disobeys” its Ethiopian patron. A former diplomat (IS22 2015) has articulated, when it comes to Djibouti’s strategic interests in IGAD:

The most that you can about Djibouti is that it is a good ally for Ethiopia…If there is any potential disagreement [in the region] Djibouti will always side with Ethiopia, and among all the countries in the region, Djibouti’s relationship with Ethiopia is one that won’t be broken…Because of this, Djibouti is often referred to as ‘the tenth region of Ethiopia.’

And, as IS42 (2015) has relayed:

If IGAD didn’t exist, Djibouti would be much more a victim of circumstance than without it… Moreover, Djibouti is now getting support from a wide range of
multinational partners as a result of being part of AMISOM. Finally, it gets to be part of a good news story, which is new for it.

Moreover, Djibouti seems to simply be aloof when it comes to IGAD, with many observers noting the lack of utility that it seems to find. A Danish diplomat who works closely with the organization affirmed that he had never heard of Djibouti bringing an issue to IGAD (IS15 2015), while a current employee of IGAD relayed that:

No, Djibouti brings no issues to IGAD: it seems to do nothing. Perhaps it cares about pastoralism, but this is really minor. The Djibouti-Eritrea spat [which would be an intuitive issue] hasn’t even been discussed in IGAD. [After working there] I can’t recall in the past three years ever discussing a Djibouti issue (IS36 2015).

When it comes to the contemporary strategic importance of the AU to Djibouti, little evidence can be marshaled to suggest a meaningful role for their organization in Djibouti’s strategic calculations. While some examples of Djiboutian engagement with the organization exist – it deployed some 200 peacekeepers to support the AMISOM mission in Somalia in 2011 (Djibouti History 2016) – its small size, limited resources, and decidedly un-realist approach to statecraft has led it find little use in African multilateral institutions. Others have noted in assessing the region, that – somewhat akin to Gambia’s outstripped foreign policy influence – “Djibouti it is small, but it can harm” (IS40 2014).

**Conclusion**

As with other weak African states, this chapter has shown how Djibouti has rarely African IOs to be strategically useful as it pursues its national security interests. In relation to both internal and external national security interests, Djibouti has instead generally – if not entirely – circumvented IOs, and instead worked to ensure
that its security is farmed out to more powerful actors – both African and non-African – as it pursues its national security objectives.

CHAPTER ELEVEN:

ERITREA

Eritrea might rightly be thought of as superlative state in Sub-Saharan Africa, both for its relative infancy – having gained *de facto* independence 1991 and *de jure* independence in 1993 – and for is global reputation, marked most derisively back its nickname, as “Africa’s North Korea” (Muller 2012; Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 3; Warner 2013). In addition to these, Eritrea falls towards the very bottom, when it is not in the absolute bottom, of numerous most international development, democracy, and freedom indexes (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2015). In short, Eritrea is a highly secretive and closed society ruled as the exclusive dominion of its first and only president, Isias Afwerki, whose interpretation of the strategic utility of African IOs is more profound than might be expected, though in ways that have not yet been discussed thus far.

Eritrea Within the Theory

Within the context of our theory, Eritrea is classified as a weak state (IV1=C) in a multipolar REC (IV2=C) and in the nonpolar AU (IV3=A). Eritrea might superficially seem to warrant the distinction of a middle state in the region, though its
tenuous domestic politics, as well as its extreme isolation in the context of Horn politics relegate it to the status of a weak state.  

**Figure 11.1**

**Figure 11.2**

Given this knowledge of “Existing Information,” when faced with “New Information” about the nature of national security interests, our theory predicts the following understandings of the strategic utility of African IOs:

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41 While this dissertation labels Eritrea as weak state, in other senses, Eritrea is a very strong state. That is, it has a highly centralized bureaucracy and a strong military, and despite its lack of material capabilities, it does have a sense of hegemonic impulse in the Horn, seeking to engender a sense of a hegemonic presence in the region (Reid 2009a, 6).
Figure 11.3
Hypothesized Eritrean Perceptions of the Strategic Utility of African IOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXISTING INFORMATION</th>
<th>NEW INFORMATION</th>
<th>PREDICTED STRATEGIC UTILITY OF AFRICAN IOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV1</td>
<td>IV2</td>
<td>IV3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**What is my international power projection capability?**

- A: Powerful
  - A: Domestic
    - A: Unipolar
    - A: Nonpolar

**What is the polarity of my primary REC?**

- B: Middle
  - B: Domestic
    - B: Non-Secessionist
    - B: Bipolar

**What is the primary nature of the African Union?**

- C: Weak
  - C: Regime Security
    - C: Multipolar

**What is the primary nature of the national security interest?**

- D: Peripheral
  - D: Dangerous Neighbors

**Will I pursue this national security interest in an African IO? Why?**

- E: Global/Non-African Actors
  - E: Economic Interests
    - E: Reputational Interests

**In my primary REC?**

- F: Nonpolar

**In the AU?**

- G: Global/Non-African Actors

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**An Overview of Eritrean Foreign Policy**

Given Eritrea’s relative newness – having only been in existence for 23 years – discussions attempting to overly “historicize” Eritrea’s foreign policy seem to be ill-advised, given that its “historical” actions are arguably just as “contemporary” as they
are “historic.” Thus, though discussions in this section will offer overviews through different time periods in Eritrean foreign policy, they do so more in order to present a chronology of events, rather than to suggest some larger discontinuities and/or ruptures that have evolved over other discrete time periods.

With the relative continuity of Eritrea’s foreign and security policymaking in mind, what have been the general trends in Eritrea’s foreign policy in its post-independence period? More so than is possible to imagine with other countries, two distinct and opposed narratives about Eritrea’s foreign policymaking predilections have emerged in its historiography. Introduced in a conversation by Muller (2012), the foreign policy outlook of Eritrea can be thought of in two ways. On one hand, Eritrea can be conceived of as an illogical and unapologetic aggressor towards its neighbors, and simultaneously, intransigently self-righteous in relation with respect to the broader, non-African international community. The vilification of Eritrea even within its own neighborhood has been rife, and underwritten by its continual border skirmishes with neighbors; its poor human rights record; its deeply authoritarian and militaristic culture; and its aura of secrecy and lack of room for political dissent (Berhanu 2012; Warner 2013 705-708; Woodward 2013). To this end, Eritrea’s foreign and military policies in the Horn have been referred to as “cantankerous,” “confused,” “belligerent” schizophrenic,” “paranoid,” “feisty” and the wider regimes characterized as “unreliable and irresponsible,” a “political pariah”, and a “regional spoiler” (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2015, 8; Warner 2013, 705; Reid 2009b).

Yet, a viable though under appreciated alternative understanding of Eritrea’s foreign policy outlook is one that interprets the country as a jilted state, whose belligerence and antipathy towards the broader world is a more expected byproduct of
its continuous betrayal from the moment of its emergence until today (see: Wrong 2006; Muller 2012). Underlying this outlook is the fact that Eritrea has been victimized as a result of the international community’s general unflappably pro-Ethiopian outlook (Muller 2012). in addition to (somewhat weak) justifications that just like all other countries in the Greater Horn, “Eritrean foreign policy is a reflection of the region’s century old violent political environment characterized by mutual interference and proxy wars” (Cliffe 1999; Muller 2012; International Crisis Group 2010). Yet perhaps one of the most significant inputs to Eritrean foreign policy is a self-perception - and rhetorical commitment - to the notion that it is a misunderstood pariah state, unable to get a fair shake in the international political economy as a result of the fact that its main rival, Ethiopia, is an unquestioned darling of the most potent global players. As Healy (2007) writes:

Appreciating Eritrea’s sense of standing alone against a very powerful adversary offers a starting point for making sense of its foreign policy. Several factors propel Eritrea towards a policy of isolationism. Under pressure, the government has tended to turn inwards and draw on lessons from the past. Most of these lessons relate to military struggle and/or subversion of enemies through alignment with rebel groups. While this is common practice in the Horn of Africa, it remains outside the frame of normal interstate relations.

Whichever narrative one tends to find more salient – the “regional spoiler” or “betrayed nation” trope – what remains indisputable is the singularly unilateral pull that Afiwerki’s maintains over the creation and effectuation of Eritrea’s foreign and security policies. (Tronvoll and Meknonnen 2015; Warner 2013). To that end, Afiwerki has ensured that there is no civil-military divide; that dissent is limited; and has gone so far as to close down the country’s one university. Afiwerki’s primary means by which to ensure his unipolar power of the country is the construction of a

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42 For more on the state of existing knowledge on the Eritrean military, see: Warner 2013, 699-702.
national discourse that tells citizens that the country is under constant siege thus authoritarian rule is not only justified, but is imperative.

Resultantly, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Eritrean military has always had an outstripped role in the conduct and effectuation of foreign and security politics in the country. Military service is demanded, and citizens complain that conscriptions are brutal and often indefinite. As Warner (2013) has written:

Since Eritrea’s independence in 1994, Afwerki – trained in military tactics by China, his country’s principal military ally – has attempted to imbue within the country’s social fabric the notion that the territory is under constant threat, needs to be constantly vigilant, and must never fall into complacency that its battle has been won.

And, as the International Crisis Group (2010) asserts:

Eritrea is a highly militarized society shaped by war, run by warriors... The ethos of armed struggle permeates all aspects of public life, and the country has proved unable, as yet, to escape its violent past.” As such, even the most mundane aspects of everyday existence have come to be marked with a military outlook, and in the policymaking realm, this means that the prevailing assumption is that for every problem, there is a military solution.

Despite the formal existence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eritrea’s foreign policy is essentially made in the President’s Office, with little oversight from the National Assembly...Eritrea suffers from a weak, underdeveloped bureaucratic infrastructure, and foreign-policymaking is no exception (Mengisteab 2009, 49). More the results of this process are many:

The concentration of power in the presidency, together with the formulation of foreign policy, outside of the bureaucracy, exacerbates policy problems in several ways. First, it narrows the circle of those who influence it and thereby makes policy more susceptible to errors and to erratic changes. Secondly, over-centralization deprives policy-making of the rigorous scrutiny of options, and their implications that it is possible under a properly functioning bureaucratic infrastructure. Thirdly, over-centralization hampers the development of institutions throughout the government. Overcentralization of policymaking creates internal discontent and instability, which, in turn, are likely to create possibilities for external interference (Mengisteab 2009, 49).
Importantly, for Afiwerki, the process of Eritrean foreign policymaking has also been part and parcel of his quest for regime survival. In arguably the most cogent argument about the relationship between Eritrea’s external foreign policy predilections and the internal culture of the protection of regime security Tronvoll and Mekonnen (2014, 1) have made the forceful argument that Eritrea fits sociologist George Laswell’s (1937) definition of a “garrison state theory,” in which:

A military elite could rise to power in response to long-term international tension, under which condition freedom is curtailed while preparation for war becomes the dominant thrust of society…in the garrison state, the specialist in violence is at the helm, and organization economic and social life is systematically subordinated to the fighting forces. This means that the predominating influence is in the hands of men who specialize in violence.

Finally, it should be noted that various observers have cited the fact Eritrea simply lacks a degree of seriousness of purpose in the formulation of its foreign policymaking (Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 258). A consistent thread in the literature on Eritrean foreign policymaking is the lack of skill or deftness, with which Asmara has pursued its national interests in its neighborhood. Mengisteab (2009) has repeatedly emphasized a distinct lack of diplomatic skills in the broader governance ethos of the Eritrean state, while, in relation to Asmara’s foreign policymaking towards Sudan, Healy (2007, 4) notes that in many instances throughout its short history, “Eritrea’s foreign policy choices appeared not to have been effective in protecting national interests.” Whether that assessment proves to be true is the partial topic of the ensuing case studies.

**National Security Interest #1: Achieving Independence from Ethiopia**

**National Security Interest:**
The very bedrock upon which contemporary Eritrea’s foreign policy outlooks is based - especially as relates to African IOs – can be found in the larger historical arc of its fight for independence, which arguably began as early as the 1940s. Thus, the first Eritrean national security interest is an existential one: the fight for independence. Yet, due to the fact that that Eritrea was not actually a “state,” this national security must, to a certain extent, be viewed in the abstract. Nevertheless, it is highly informative for subsequent discussions.

The area that comprises modern-day Eritrea was colonized in the 1880s by Italy though was transferred to the British after their defeat of the Italians in 1941. In the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations came to administer all of Italy’s former colonies, including Eritrea. Collectively, the United Nations and the United States agreed – in line with the prevailing sentiments of the era – that Eritrea would be an unsustainably small country, and thus should be incorporated into Ethiopia, albeit as a semi-autonomous region in 1952. For his part, the Ethiopian monarch Haile Selassie – who had come from a lineage in Ethiopia marked by its ability to unite (conquer and control) disparate parts of the Ethiopian kingdom – moved to fully incorporate Eritrea into its borders, in essence ignoring the demands for autonomy by the UN, a feat that it accomplished, in making Eritrea its fourteenth region, by 1962 (Warner 2014; Reid 2009a).

Thus, the Eritrean struggle for independence began in earnest in the 1960s, with the broader Eritrean war for independence lasting from 1961 to 1991 (Tronvoll and Meknonnen 2014, 2). During this time, various anti-Ethiopian insurgency groups rose and fell. While delving into their individual evolutions is outside of the scope of this work, the two primary groups were the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM)
and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). From them sprang a third faction, the People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which was formed around the personality cult of Eritrea’s soon-to-be first president, Isaias Afwerki (Warner 2013). In total, the Eritrean War for independence led to the loss of an estimated 500,000 lives (Selassie 1988, 65).

While low-level insurgencies against Haile Selassie characterized the early Eritrean national secessionist movements, once the monarchy was overthrown by the Communist Derg regime in 1974, Eritrean nationalists were thwarted in their efforts due to the increased Soviet support for the Derg. This led to the necessity of an Eritrean retrenchment north, to the city of Nakfa (Reid 2009a, 4). Throughout the rule of the Derg, the EPLF gained increasing control of its territory, such that, by the time the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) overthrew the Derg in 1991, Afwerki and the EPLF took control of the city of Asmara, which would later become the capital city of Eritrea. Thus, “Eritrea’s” first national security interest was in fact, achieving statehood at all.

**Hypothesis:**

Given that “Eritrea” was not yet itself a state – and instead its main goal was to try and become a state – our theory makes no predictions.

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Role of African IOs:**

Following a transitional period between 1991 and 1993, and backed by acquiescence from the international community and Ethiopia itself, in 1993, Eritrea
held a referendum, during which time 99.8% of Eritreans voted for independence. Thus, in 1994, Eritrea officially became Africa's 53rd state (Warner 2014).

Eritrea initially had great hope for the strategic utility of the OAU in its fight for independence, yet this optimism was virtually never borne out by reality. In short, Eritrean independence groups worked assiduously to leverage the OAU’s discourses about self-determination, especially as encapsulated in the OAU Charter. Yet, as had been the case with all breakaway regions from the 1960s onward – Biafra, Katanga, Casamance, and southern Sudan – requests for independence fell on deaf ears in the OAU, precisely because the violated the bedrock dictates of the inviolability of colonial borders. And indeed, it bears stating forthrightly that that the OAU’s contradictory language espousing a right to self-determination on one hand, and the inviolability of state borders on the other hand, was – apart from its stance on non-interference – arguably its most enduring insufficiency. At the heart of the contradictory language was where the “self-determination” clause, whose interpretation took on meanings that the crafters of the OAU Charter in 1963 had not intended. As was en vogue in the era of the writing of the OAU Charter, the decolonization struggle meant that African calls for self-determination were premised upon the ousting of colonial powers from the continent, as a means of pan-African security. Yet, the language of “self-determination” in the OAU Charter came to be leveraged by independence-minded groups within new African states themselves, which contravened the original spirit of the law. Thus, throughout the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and 90s, various African secessionist

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43 For more detailed information on the nature of Eritrean independence, see: Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 3-8.
44 In the course of its fight against the Derg regime, the EPLF galvanized is base by leveraging a strategic rhetoric of marginalization by the international community broadly (Reid 2009a), but by the OAU specifically.
movements were thwarted, as status quo powers (African states) have ensured that the “inviolability of borders” clauses supersede any “right to self-determination” clauses.

Eritrean antipathy towards the OAU is long-standing and derivative of decades of perceptions that the organization is an institution that Ethiopia has successfully manipulated with the intention of Eritrean marginalization. As Bereketeab (2009, 119-120) relays:

Eritrea has never had a high opinion of the OAU/AU, perhaps for good reason. During the Eritrean liberation struggle, the OAU stood firmly on the side of Ethiopia, perceiving the Eritrean struggle as a separatist movement that was the seeking the destruction of a sovereign member state. When the war broke out in 1998, the OAU remained silent even on the deportation of Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descent and on the Ethiopian government’s violation of the diplomatic status of the Eritrean mission to the OAU in Addis Ababa. Although the OAU is one of the witnesses and guarantors of the Algiers Agreement, it has failed to criticize Ethiopia for its blatant violation of the agreement and for refusing implementation of the EEBC (Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission) verdict.

And:

As a result, the OAU and its successor the AU tend to be regarded by the Eritrean government as both impotent on and largely indifferent to issues affecting Eritrea. The reasons why the AU does not criticize Ethiopia are numerous. Some observers have commented on its high regard for Ethiopia, which is seen as in the “top rank” of African nation-states, on the facet that the AU’s headquarters and many international offices are in Addis Ababa, thus significantly raising the AU’s international standing.

**National Security Interest #2: Incorporation into the African International Community**

**National Security Interest:**

Having achieved its independence in 1993, throughout the rest of the 1990s, Eritrea was thus concerned with asserting itself internationally. As a new state, Eritrea needed to raise its international profile, and former rebel leaders needed to assure their
places as heads of a recognized international polity. This became Eritrea’s first postcolonial national security interest.

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Eritrea (IV1=C, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing a reputational national security interest (IV4=G), will constructivist strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1C), not in its primary REC (HDV2=0) though in the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

Indeed, the theory proves to here be mostly correct. In short, during the post-independence years, Eritrea attempted to play a “good neighbor” role in the region, and thus found participation in African IOs – especially the OAU – as an intuitive means to that end. Little evidence can be marshaled to show its role in IGAD. Surprising in retrospect, in the halcyon years of the immediate post-independence period, Eritrea’s foreign policy almost approached being overly-conciliatory with neighbors and the international community, and was premised upon maintaining good relations with those countries and individual actors who had supported its bid for independence. This meant maintaining excellent relations with Ethiopia and Sudan, and attempts at cultivating good relations with Uganda and Rwanda (Mengisteab 2009, 60). Moreover, Eritrea’s entrance on the scene was viewed by many as being a likely catalyst of improved regional integration, especially within IGAD (Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 4).\(^{45}\)

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45 And indeed, beyond simply membership in African IOs, Eritrea’s early years of independence were in fact characterized by a willingness to serve as a mediator in large Horn of Africa politics. Thus, its relationships with Ethiopia were generally good, and, in 1994, Afiwerki and Eritrea played a fundamental role in attempting to mediate a solution in the north-south conflict in Sudan, noting that: “Eritrea will provide any type of support for the people of Sudan. The sky is the limit…We believe that
To that end, gaining membership into African international organizations was important, and in 1993, it became a member of the OAU. Importantly, Eritrea and Afiwerki joined the OAU at a time when a wave of new leaders of (perceived) democracies proliferated, and thus Afiwerki and Eritrea’s entrance to the organization was interpreted as being part of an inaugural OAU cohort of a “new genre of African leader,” along with Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia (Mengisteab 2009, 61; Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 4).

The optimism about Eritrea’s potential place as a rising star was further underwritten by Eritrea’s own rather vehement perception of its own “Eritrean exceptionalism.”

However, Afiwerki’s first speech to the OAU would set the tone for how his country would ultimately interpret the OAU: as a duplicitous institutional traitor that had turned a blind eye to his country’s legitimate liberation struggle for years, but as an organization in whose membership sundry benefits could accrue. In his inaugural speech at the OAU headquarters in June 1993, Afiwerki minced no words. As Wrong (2006, 358) recounts of Afiwerki’s inaugural speech at the OAU:

—it’s an obligation on the part of Eritrea because the Sudanese people supported us in our struggle for independence” (Afiwerki in Iyob and Khadiagala 2006, 108).

46 At the moment of independence, hopes ran high both within Eritrea and outside of it that its independence was indicative of the start of a new generation of African leaders, given the EPLF’s broad-based support from the Eritrean population, as well as its commitments to the broader bundle of neoliberal priorities of the era, including a respect for human rights, a free market economy, and democracy leadership. Moreover, its history of democratic ideals - most notably, the proliferation of a number of political parties during that existed from the 1940s to the 1960s - as well as its small population, and declarations that it would pursue its own development agenda outside of the IFIs made the international community particularly optimistic for Eritrea’s evolution into a new type of African country (Mekonnen and Tronvoll 2015, 7-8; Mengisteab 2009, 48, 61).

47 Interestingly, the EPLF, during its early years, also forwarded the notion of an “Eritrean exceptionalism” - based on the presumed qualities of leadership, dedication, and other skills possessed by the EPLF members - which, interestingly, parallel the self-perceptions of far larger and more capable African states. There are also many more discussions about how the notion of a distinct Eritrean identity came to rise in the Italian colonial period, as a result of distinctions made between Eritreans and “greater Ethiopia;” the role that Eritreans were made to play in Italian-Ethiopian war; and the impact that being identified as “Eritrean” had on one’s prospects in the Ethio-Eritrean-based employment market” (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014 2-5).
Looking around a hall that held the likes of Zaire’s Mobutu Sese Seko, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, and Kenya’s Daniel Arab Moi, Isaias Afiwerki, president of Africa’s nest confessed his ‘boundless’ pleasure at being able to take his seat at the table. But his joy at ‘rejoining the family from which we have been left out for so long’ was not prompted by respect for an organization, which had betrayed its founding principles, he made clear. The OAU, he told a hushed hall, had failed to deliver on its brave pronouncements of human rights and economic development… ‘We have sought membership in the organization not because we have been impressed by its achievements, but, as a local proverb goes, in the spirit of familial obligation, because we are keenly aware what is ours.

More acutely, in the same speech, Afiwerki declared that the OAU had been “an utter failure for thirty years” (Afiwerki as quoted in Clapham 2001, 125). And, in discussing the broader arc of Eritrea’s outlook on IOs – discussed presently – Reid (2009a, 2) relays that Eritrea has long “railed against the UN, the OAU, and its successor, the AU.” In a strategic sense, Afiwerki’s speech was the first sign of a longer foreign policy goal: the backlash against the OAU for the purposes of domestic state consolidation.


**National Security Interest:**

Perhaps the most important hallmark of early 1990s Eritrean foreign policy was its decidedly pro-Ethiopian outlook: Afiwerki was outwardly friendly with Addis Ababa, not least because the country – and particularly the dominant Tigray TPLF members – had helped Eritrea to achieve its independence. Retrospectively, their relations were not just “warm” but perhaps verging on “incestuous:” indeed today, the extreme depth of their relationship is somewhat difficult to reconcile. Soon after independence, Eritrea sought to create a strategic alliance with Ethiopia that was profoundly deep, arguably – as has been done in the case of the three previous “weak”
states – to self-subordinate to a more powerful country. To that end, the Eritrea and Ethiopia maintained not just open borders with one another, but indeed were in the habit of “de-emphasizing if not disregarding the issue of boundaries.” Eritrea also adopted the Ethiopian currency, the birr, even when doing so meant leaving itself virtually no agency in the conduct of its own monetary policy. The depth of Eritrea’s friendship was most evident in the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in July 1993 (Mengisteab 2009, 57-58; Ethiopia and Eritrea 1993), which called for:

1. Preservation of the free flow of goods and services, capital and people,
2. Ethiopia’s continued free access to Eritrea’s seaports, paying for port services with its own currency, the birr,
3. Cooperation in monetary policy and continued use of the birr by both countries until Eritrea issued its own currency;
4. Harmonization of customs policies
5. Cooperation and consolation in foreign policy

Ultimately though, this overly close relationship with Ethiopia would engender serious problem once the relationship began to fray.

Despite high hopes for Eritrea, by the late 1990s, politics in Eritrea were beginning to come apart at the seams both internationally and domestically, both facets of which served to undermine the regime security of Afiwerki. The most prominent

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48 Eritrea eventually introduced its own currency, the nakfa, in October 1997, just as tensions with Ethiopia began to rise.
49 However, as is the case in much of the conduct of African international relations, Mengisteab (2009, 58) notes that the pacts of friendship were based on the interpersonal relationships between leaders and had little support within civil society.
50 Among other byproducts of this friendship was a “revitalization” of IGAD (for a brief period), buttressed by dyad of generally amicable relations between two member states, the likes of which had rarely been seen (Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 250).
51 It did not take long for the decision to nearly fully self-subordinate to Ethiopia to show its negative side effects. First, Eritrea so fully subordinated itself to Ethiopia such that Ethiopia was its economic lifeblood: as evidence in its trade numbers, between 1993 and 1997, Ethiopia was the destination for approximately 60% of Eritrea’s exports. Second, the focus on improving the strategic alliance with Ethiopia came at the expense of diversifying its other strategic alliances, a fact that would come back to haunt Eritrea. Third, and related to the question of border demarcation, Eritrea’s policy of open borders with Ethiopia left it vulnerable when non-Tigray members of Ethiopia began to protest to argue for greater strategic distance from Eritrea (Mengisteab 2009, 58). This was especially true of the southwestern Badme area, which would come to serve as an important strategic flashpoint between the two countries as the decade came to a close.
example of this the complete rupture was the 1998 border war of the town of Badme, the circumstances of which were detailed thoroughly in the Ethiopia chapter (five).

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Eritrea (IV1=C, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing dangerous neighbors (IV4=D), will constructivist strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1C), not in its primary REC (HDV2=0) but through in the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

In general, our theory is correct, though with a caveat: though Eritrea did indeed think that the OAU would be useful in its conflict with Ethiopia, though in reality, Eritrea learned that in fact, the OAU’s strategically utility in the pursuit of its interests was tempered by the extent to which Ethiopia could shade its outlooks. It did not seemingly find any utility in IGAD, given that, as a small state, it could do little to influence the direction of the organization, especially when its main adversary was the IO’s *de facto* leader.

From the outset of the conflict, Eritrea’s perception of the role that the (O)AU should play was clear: despite Asmara’s historically poor relationship with the organization, as a member, it should nevertheless have bee able to justifiably invoke the OAU’s resolution AGH/RES162, which sanctifies colonially drawn borders, and thus Badme should have been returned to Eritrea (Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005, 235). And while such invocations did occur, they were also forthcoming from the Ethiopian side, effectively canceling one another out.
An yet, throughout the course of the conflict, the OAU was an imperative player in attempts to broker a peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. As was detailed in the Ethiopia chapter, two peace plans were circulated, both supported in varying degrees by the OAU. The first, a U.S.-Rwanda deal was ultimately rejected, in the place of a second, OAU-sponsored deal. For its part, Eritrea viewed the OAU deal as what Reid (2009a, 5) describes as “an embarrassing climbdown.” Some observers of Eritrean foreign and security policy have also suggested that Eritrea made a critical misstep in not bringing the issue of the Ethiopian provocation in Badme on May 6, 1998 directly to the OAU, as doing so would have prevented the subsequent perception of Eritrea as being the aggressor state in the conflict (Mengisteab and Yohannes, 2005, 2006). Of course, given the anti-OAU position that Afwerki had neatly espoused prior to the conflict meant that a reliance on the OAU in the event of securing strategic interests might have been a foreclosed as a solution. Moreover, even after the EEBC issued a ruling in favor of Eritrea, Ethiopia openly flouted it, to virtually no international censure. This development in particular would solidify Eritrea’s perception that the global political arena was fundamentally rigged against it.

The result of this global back-turning on Eritrean interests has come to serve as a the bedrock for subsequent Eritrean foreign policy outlooks, which is to entrench the notion that the country is constantly on the brink of war and a martyred pariah state from a neoliberal, pro-Ethiopian world order. More succinctly, the 1998-2000 border is “still [as of 2015] being trotted out by the Eritrean government as an excuse to sustain a full war-footing mobilization” (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2015, 2). Thus, in the aftermath of the war, a defining feature of Eritrean foreign policy would be galvanized:
namely, the perception of the globally “pro-Ethiopian” outlook, which was, by virtue of their rivalry, obversely “anti-Eritrean.”

**National Security Interest #4: 2001 Civil Society Protest Protecting Regime Security**

National Security Interest:

Towards the end of the 1998-2000 border war, Eritrean civil society began to become increasingly hostile towards the Afiwerki regime. Along with fifteen top government officials (thus called the G-15), civil society protestors launched wide-scale protests that served as some of the most serious threats to the regime to date. Large swathes of society – from students to journalists to civil society activists – launched calls for a liberalization of Eritrean society, a greater respect for rule of law and political and civil rights, and a general demilitarization of Eritrean society. These protests, the likes of which had never been seen in Eritrea since independence, were perceived as a “serious and imminent threat” to the survival of the regime (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 2-3; 76-91; Reid 2009a, 6).

**Hypothesis:**

Our theory predicts that Eritrea (IV1=C, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of addressing regime security (IV4=D), will find no strategic utility in African IOs, instead addressing the threat unilaterally outside of African IOs (HDV1=0B, thus HDV2=⌀ and HDV3=⌀).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

In this instance, our theory is incorrect, but in an odd way. Indeed, Afiwerki
did indeed find some strategic utility in African IOs, but not for their capacities to help support him as such, but rather as nefarious entities that he could use to galvanize domestic opinion to help support the perpetuation of his rule.

In dealing with the protestors, Afwerki (somewhat intuitively) entirely circumenvented African IOs, and instead dealt with them, heavy-handedly, unilaterally. As protests began to grow, in January 201, Afierki set up a presidential commission on to investigate crimes of “sub-nationalism and “defeatism,” which accused some elements of Eritrean society to be plotting his overthrow in collusion with Ethiopia. Soon thereafter, Afwerki’s unilateral action took shape: government officials, journalists, and activists began to be summarily rounded up, detained, or even killed. Repeated requests for habeus corpus were ignored even as the international community – including the (O)AU and UN, who claimed that the detention of some members of the G-15 was illegal – sought to pressure the regime. In response to the censure from these organizations UN, Eritrea attempted to leverage the non-intervention rhetoric encapsulated in the OAU Charter as a justification for it actions.

Indeed, Eritrea responded in a rejoinder that the men were detained for:

Conspiring to overthrow the legitimate government of this country in violation of the relevant resolutions of the Organization of African Unity, colluding with hostile foreign powers with a view to compromising the sovereignty of the State, and undermining Eritrean national security and endangering Eritrean society and the general welfare of the people (UN High Commission on Human Rights 2003, paragraph 8).

Since then, the OAU and the African Union have requested in numerous instances for updates not the whereabouts and conditions of the detainees, to no avail (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2015, 84). And the transformation from the OAU to the African Union did little to alter deep-seated Eritrean antipathy towards the IO. Despite its obligations to
do so, Eritrea has never submitted any state party reports to the African Union’s African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. Nor has it allowed, as is mandated by its membership in the AU, Members front the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights to enter into its borders for the purposes of conducting fact-finding missions about the general state of human rights there (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2015, 42).

Once Afiwerki’s appeals to the OAU’s language were interpreted as having fallen on deaf ears, Afiwerki’s strategic calculations about the OAU shifted: rather than being an organization that could have some degree of utility to him in its expected form, Afiwerki has since found utility in the organization as a focal point against which to backlash. As should be clear, given Eritrean perceptions that IGAD is an Ethiopian-dominated organization, Afiwerki has used IGAD as a framing foil to promote the militarization of domestic society, and concomitantly, justify his need to remain at the helm of society. Put otherwise, the OAU – and IGAD – have come to be portrayed within Eritrean national discourse as villainous international institutions whose actions are determined and manipulated by the anti-Eritrean forces of the world, which begin with Ethiopia, and extend to its numerous powerful allies (especially the U.S.) around the world. To the extent that Eritrea employs a strategy of backlashing against African IOs a report from Chatham House (Healy 2007) notes that:

[D]iplomats of other nations, as well as officials of international organizations, were often mystified and eventually alienated by Eritrea’s unwillingness to play by the rules of the game. Eritrea’s high-handed rejection of senior international leaders, its refusal to meet mediators or to entertain dialogue with adversaries/enemies was not understood by diplomats who worked in institutions that did. The aversion to ‘diplomatic struggle’ appeared to be denying Eritrea one of the key advantages of its sovereign statehood.
National Security Interest #4: Avoiding International Isolation

National Security Interest:

In the aftermath of the 1998 border war, the censure by the UN, and its dismissal from IGAD, Eritrea was already well on its way to becoming Africa’s primary outcast. However, its belligerent foreign policy regionally exacerbated its isolation. Among other aggressive actions were Eritrea’s presumed funding of al-Shebab militants in Somalia, its border war with Djibouti; and its clashes with Sudan due to Eritrean funding of anti-government rebel groups. Thus, in addition to its decision to suspend its membership from IGAD in 2007 (discussed below) and being highly isolated from the AU, the UN Security Council officially sanctioned Eritrea in December 2009 and December 2011. Thus, today, Eritrea is marked by its “unparalleled international isolation” (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014), and although to some extent its intransigence against the international community is part and parcel Afiwerki’s approach to domestic governance, he has also been well aware that becoming too isolated is equally of danger. Thus, one of Eritrea’s more recent national security interests has been attempting to mitigate (in some small ways) its complete international isolation (Muller 2012).

Hypothesis:

52 At the heart of the Eritrean support for al-Shebab is its desire to undermine Ethiopia’s, international aims, in this case, the Ethiopian anti-al-Shebab contingent that it sent to the country in 2006 (Woodward 2013, 146). While Eritrea has indeed suffered international approbation as a result of these actions, it is generally believed that indeed, Eritrean support for the al-Shebab rebels worked to reverse gains that Ethiopia and the AU had been made against the group, not least by legitimizing al-Shebab’s cause throughout the broader Horn (Berhanu 2013, 82). And while there are some limits to Eritrean support for al-Shebab - it is thought to have stopped short of allowing members of the group physical refuge within Eritrean territory county (Berhanu 2013, 82) - Eritrea is broadly believed to be one of the group’s main supporters.

53 For more on the relationship between Eritrea and Sudan, see: Kibreab 2009.
Our theory predicts that Eritrea (IV1=C, IV2=C, IV3=A), when faced with the prospect of pursuing reputational national security (IV4=G), will find constructivist strategic utility in African IOs (HDV1=1C), not in its primary REC (HDV2=0) but through in the (O)AU (HDV3=1).

**National Security Interests and the Strategic Utility of African IOs:**

In this instance, our theory is generally incorrect: the extent to which Eritrea has been marginalized by the international community – justly or unjustly – means that it can scarcely appeal to any IO, even for purposes as anodyne as reputational improvement. For their part, Eritrea’s two-would-be African IOs, rather than helping it to avoid isolation, have more often than not been the very sources of initiating measures to isolate Eritrea. For its part, IGAD – pushed by Ethiopia – was the motor that got the AU, and eventually, the UN to sanction Eritrea. Indeed:

One unique feature of the UN sanctions against Eritrea is that that they were initiated by the African Union, which is historically known for its stringent opposition to UN sanctions targeting African countries. In the case of Eritrea, the AU acted in an unprecedented way...The first UN Resolution (1907) was initiated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. It was immediately backed by the AU before it was finally endorsed by the UN Security Council on 23 December 2009. It was described as the first ever to be formally initiated by the AU against one of its own member states, after the experience of apartheid in South Africa, thus becoming one of the most exceptional results in the history of the UN (Tronvoll and Mekonnen 2014, 182).

In light of the perception that these two IOs were working in tandem to undermine it, in 2007, Eritrea continued its policy of backlashing against the IOs by suspending its membership to IGAD, citing its disagreement with the IGAD (Ethiopian) approach to Somalia. In plainer terms, Eritrea was annoyed of the fact that IGAD had become a

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54 Notably, Eritrea “suspended” its membership from IGAD, and did not “withdraw” it. The distinction here relates to the ability to “un-suspend” membership versus needing to re-apply for membership to the organization as a whole.
“rubber stamp” for Ethiopian policy and that IGAD had become little more than a tool for the promotion of Ethiopian hegemonic pursuits (Bereketeab 2012, 176; Woodward 2013, 146). Despite this suspension, on 25 July 2011, Eritrea declared to IGAD that it would “reactivate” its membership. However, when its representative arrived at the IGAD Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa, he was told that he was not allowed to present, and thus was escorted from the meeting. Since then, Eritrea’s representatives have not been present in IGAD meetings (Andemariam 2015).

Given the perception that African IOs are entirely inimical to its interests Eritrea has necessarily circumvented them, and instead (occasionally) attempted to avoid total international isolation by attempting to ingratiate itself to world powers, though it rarely follows through on these commitments. For instance, early in the War on Terror, Eritrea offered to help serve as a U.S. ally, proclaiming on a visit to Washington in 2004 that it was a member of the “coalition of the willing,” and that Asmara’s military intelligence force was “ready to assist the United States in any way it can” (Warner 2013, 697). As Muller (2012) relays, “Eritrean foreign policy has a pragmatic component that has led to Eritrea actively trying to break its international isolation. Attempts have been made at behind-the-scenes rapprochement with the United States, thus far largely futile as both sides have shown little willingness to engage properly.”

**Conclusion**

Perhaps more than any other country under consideration in this dissertation, Eritrea tends to think of African IOs’ strategic utility in the defense of its national security interests in rather unique ways. On one hand, African IOs have historically
been perceived to be deeply threatening to Afiwerki and Eritrea, and simply manipulated by stronger African countries, notably, its rival, Ethiopia. This antipathy has led to virtual non-participation in much of the African international relations landscape. Yet, for all of the danger that African IOs pose for Eritrea, they do have an upside when it comes to the pursuit of Eritrea’s primary national security interest: the protection of Afiwerki’s regime. In short, Afiwerki has used both IGAD and the African Union as focal points for domestic discourses about the extent to which Eritrea is under threat by its neighbors and the wider international community, and, in the service, cultivating a culture of impending doom that underwrites its persistence as an African garrison state.
A final typology of African state that will be discussed ever so briefly are “peripheral states” or those states that view little strategic utility in African IOs. To recall, two types of peripheral states exist in Africa: peripheral archipelago states, and peripheral collapsed states. Precisely because states that fall into this category tend to find little strategic utility in African IOs, no case studies will be presented. However, we do discuss briefly their outlooks on Africa IOs.

Peripheral – Archipelagic States

By archipelagic states, are referring to those island nations, including Madagascar, the Comoros Union, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe. In short, the intuition is that all island states in Sub-Saharan Africa will have generally low participation in African IOs, given that by virtue of their...
non-contiguity, they are inherently insulated from at least some security threats, and will thus have lower levels of commitment. In their study on regional security complexes, Buzan and Waever have simply labeled such states as falling within the “unstructured” category (Buzan and Waever 2003, 230-231). African island states’ low participation in African IO has been a well-worn theme in many interviews (IS7/1 20014; IS7/2 2015).

Peripheral – Collapsed States

"Collapsed states," in the vernacular used here, refers to states that are colloquially known as “failed” states. They are states whose central governments fail to meet the minimum thresholds for numerous facets of statehood, including (but not limited to): the lack of Weberian monopoly on violence; the inability to effectively tax; the inability or disinterest in providing services for citizens; and the lack of a control of international borders.

For some of the most peripheral states in the world, it has been argued that they have no foreign policies at all. Thus, small African states, given their ad-hoc nature of its formulation, do not, in the definition provided by Walter Carlsnases (2008, 335), even actually conduct foreign policies at all (IS11 2014). The notion runs that certain small states are so resource-poor so as not to be able to effectively create and sustain a set foreign policy, not least in Africa’s international organizations. Particularly instructive was a conversation with IS24 2015, who relayed that:

Some African member states don’t seem to be guided by any great FP objectives when it comes to heir African IOs. I come about this conclusion anecdotally. I deal a lot with the [African Union’s] Peace and Security Council (PSC). If member states were going to get elected to PSC, you would think that they would view this akin to being on the UNSC. You would think that
they would be prioritizing the fact that they have this position to advance their FP objectives through this great opportunity that they have. For you as, an American, America is always on UNSC, so it’s not the same. But, when it comes to a country like Canada, [for which I was a diplomat for many years] we would devote years and years of resources to strategizing how we could leverage our presence on the UNSC to our advantage. For instance when New Zealand won a seat on the UNSC they created a new office in Addis (for the AU) even though it wasn’t necessary, just because they knew that Africa was important for discussions in the UNSC.

As he continued:

But, with members of AU PSC, you don’t get that impression. You get the impression that the quality of the people that they appoint means that they don’t really value the position very much. The representatives that they send often don’t seem prepared, or briefed, or to have any particular agenda when they come to the PSC. They don’t follow any coherent foreign policy strategy in the AU PSC.

Moreover, the lack of coordination at levels of multilateral policy is often poor:

For example, we’ve seen members who are part of the UNSC and PSC at the same time take contradictory stances on the same issue, which shows that they aren’t really following a set directive from the capital. This suggests that there is not a standard, set, foreign policy for these countries. Whereas in more liberal Western democracies, we would expect to see the pursuit of some goals in these organizations, it doesn’t seem to be the case in Africa: there doesn’t seem to be a clear guiding policy, even countries like SA and Nigeria, and you can only imagine the other smaller ones.

Their foreign policies are most characteristically formed in relation not to regional organizations, but instead to global international organizations who support them financially or in terms of the provision of security. These states include, in West Africa: Western Sahara, Guinea Bissau, and more recently in the wake of the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia. In the Horn, those rates include Somalia and South Sudan, while elsewhere in Africa, other states in this category might the said to include CAR and DRC: in short, where a UN peacekeeping presence exists, a state might be said to be reasonably “collapsed.”
Yet, and somewhat counter-intuitively, Babarinde (1999) has forwarded the notion that African states that lack a coherent set of foreign policy directives at home, can use their place within IOs as a substitute for the conduct of their foreign policies. Indeed, because of their limited resources, and given the fact that the “collapsed” states are the types of states that were themselves most likely to pose the greatest threats to regional or continent collective security, they might in essence, “sub-contact” out the responsibilities associated with being a member of the region or the content to IOs, thus “conducting” their foreign policies through regionalist outlets. As Babarinde (1999, 226) writes, for the weakest African states, “since they do not have the economic wherewithal and/or the population size to independently pursue a credible foreign policy they may find it in their interest to pursue some or all of their foreign policy through regionalism.” The rationale for a preponderance of action in IGOs for small states should be intuitive. Not only does the pooling of resources allow for the accomplishment of agendas that they could not achieve otherwise, it also allows for the potential of freeriding. Existentially, some have suggested that collective action “has brought some visibility and the satisfaction of knowing that they mattered” (Babarinde 199, 228).

Thus, when it comes to collapsed African states’ strategies towards African IOs, they tend to have little more than superficial plans towards them. Indeed, most often, collapsed states are beholden to African IOs for their own security, and as a cause and effect of this subordination, lack the resources or domestic stability to pursue foreign policies that are little more than nominal. Put otherwise, this category of African state is the source of insecurity for which the increasingly collectivized security orientation
of African IOs is aimed at addressing, not the genre of state that can hope to accomplish much through the IO.
CONCLUSION

To recall, the motivating puzzle and question of the dissertation was this: Since the end of decolonization, African states have created a series of dense and overlapping international organizations at both the continental (OAU/AU) and subregional (REC) levels of analysis, both of which broadly claim to fulfill similar mandates concerning the provision of collective security. Given that every African state is embedded within at least two African IOs – which have generally been assumed to be important for the accomplishment of collective goals – how, when, and why do individual African states understand when such IOs might be strategically useful for the pursuit of their individual security and foreign policy aims, especially as relates to their perceptions of national security interests?

To answer this question, this dissertation created a theory of how African states understand the strategic utility of African IOs in relation to the pursuits of their national security interests, which it tested against the historical record of actual state behavior in eight countries in a combination of West Africa and the Greater Horn. Ultimately, it has shown that with the knowledge of four variables – a state’s international power projection capability (IV1); its location within the polarities of its regional IO and the (O)AU (IV2) and (IV3), and the nature of the security interest at hand (IV4) – one can broadly predict when, why, and in which African IOs states will pursue their individual national security interests.
Assessing the Accuracy of the Theory

Figure 12.1 below offers an overview of the outcomes of the testing of our theory. Divided by country typology (IV1, IV2, and IV3), it first articulates the national security interest, delineates which type of national security interest it is (IV4), and then shows our hypothesized strategic utility of African IOs (HDV1, HDV2, HDV3), and the actual strategic utility of African IOs (ADV1, ADV2, ADV3). For simplicity, the ADVs are color-coded: when our original hypothesis was correct, the ADV is written in green. When it was incorrect, the actual strategic utility or non-utility of the IO is written in red.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>NSI #</th>
<th>National Security Interest</th>
<th>IV4</th>
<th>HDV1</th>
<th>HDV2</th>
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<th>ADV2</th>
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<td>(1C)</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<td>(1B)</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Revive the Domestic Economy</td>
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<td>(N/A)</td>
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<td>(1B)</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Figure 12.1
Hypothized and Actual Strategic Utility of African IOs
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<td><em>Ethiopia (Chapter 5) (IV1=B, IV2=C, IV3=A)</em></td>
<td>1 Supressing Ethno-Nationalist Insurgencies (The Monarchy)</td>
<td>YES (1A)</td>
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<td>3 Dealing with Eritrea #1: The 1998 - 2000 Border War</td>
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<td>5 The Unarticulated Rise of Pax-Ethiopiana</td>
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<td>1 Suppression of South Sudanese Insurgency</td>
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<td>3 Avoiding International Isolation Post-ICC Indictment</td>
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<td><em>Senegal (Chapter 7) (IV1=B, IV2=A, IV3=A)</em></td>
<td>1 Preventing the Secession of Casamance</td>
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<td>2 The Collapse of Liberia</td>
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<td><em>Benin (Chapter 8) (IV1=C IV2=A, IV3=A)</em></td>
<td>1 Seeking External Financing</td>
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<td>2 Protecting Regime Between Pro-French and Anti-French Camps</td>
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<td>3 The World Trade Organizations’ Cotton Prices</td>
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<td><em>Gambia (Chapter 9) (IV1=C IV2=A, IV3=A)</em></td>
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Figure 12.2 shows that, by and large, our theory does have a rather notable degree of predictive power. Of the 31 case studies selected, our theory correctly predicted all three DVs in 20 cases. Other times, it predicted some DVs correctly per case study, but not all. Instances in which it correctly predicted some, but not all, of the DVs occurred in 10 of the 31 cases. In only one instances did it fail to predict any of the relevant DVs.
Figure 12.2
Accuracy of Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All DVs Correctly Predicted</th>
<th>20 of 31 case studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some DVs Correctly Predicted</td>
<td>10 of 31 case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No DVs Correctly Predicted</td>
<td>1 of 31 case studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meriting further discussion is the instance in which the theory failed to predict any DVs correctly: Eritrea’s need to deal with civil society protests in 2001 (Eritrea, National Security Interest #4). To recall, in this instance, our theory predicted that Eritrea would find no strategic utility in IOs, and would deal with threats from civil society unilaterally. In reality, Eritrea did find strategic utility in IOs, but in a novel way. Eritrea used African IOs as focal points against which to backlash, in order to galvanize a domestic sentiment that valorized President Afiwerki’s dictatorial control of the country as a necessary means to address an anti-Eritrean international environment characterized by an Ethiopia-dominated African Union and IGAD. In short, our theory was entirely unable to predict a new and novel form of the strategic utility of African IOs. However, our theory has shown that by and large, it is at least a useful – if not entirely accurate – heuristic by which to anticipate African states’ outlooks on IOs otherwise.

Takeaways on the Strategic Utility of African IOs

Lessons on How Varying State Typologies Understand the Strategic Utility of IOs

As we conclude, what are some specific takeaways in relation to how specific state typologies think about the strategic utility of African IOs? As has been made clear, “powerful” African states (in our case, Nigeria) have historically viewed African IOs – both ECOWAS and the (O)AU – as fundamental components in how it approaches its
international statecraft. In good economic times, it has burnished its image as a rightful pan-
African leader (via its aspirations of Pax-Nigeriana) in the context of these organizations, and
proven itself adept at both strong-arming them into action (in the case of ECOWAS’
intervention into Liberia in 1990) or successfully preventing their involvement in its affairs
(in the cases of the Biafran secession and the current fight against Boko Haram). In short,
Nigeria has shown that powerful African states approach African IOs in highly realist ways
that fundamentally challenge notions that African IOs are primarily useful for collectivist
endeavors.

The foregoing discussion has emphasized the extent to which anticipating how
“middle” states understand the strategic utility of African IOs is rather challenging, precisely
because what it means to be a middle state varies so greatly: in unipolar regions, being a
middle state means being subordinate to a powerful state (like Senegal in ECOWAS), while
in a multipolar region, being a middle state can mean calling the shots in the regional IO at
some times (like Ethiopia), but not at others (Sudan). Put otherwise, middle state strategies
in IOs are far from fixed, and indeed, serve to emphasize the extent to which polarity within
IOs is a determinative facet of how states understand IOs’ strategic utilities.

Our discussion has also shown that in general, “weak” states tend to find less
strategic utility in African IOs than other types of states. Precisely because they are aware
that their lack of material capabilities can inhibit their ability to direct IOs in any
meaningful way, we tend to weak states pursue their national security interests outside of
African IOs. Particularly, our discussion has shown the tendency of Africa’s weakest states
to actively attempt to subordinate many of their security outcomes to more powerful actors,
either African (as in the case of Gambia towards Senegal and Djibouti and early Eritrea
towards Ethiopia) or to non-African actors (as in the case of Benin towards France and Djibouti towards a combination of France, the U.S., and increasingly perhaps, China).

Finally, our discussion included mention of “peripheral” states: those that are collapsed and those that are archipelagic nations. It emphasized, briefly, how these two genres of states tend not to have the will (in the case of archipelagic nations, like Cape Verde) or the ability (in the case of collapsed states, like Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Somalia, or South Sudan) to formulate any real policy in relation to African IOs. Indeed, for collapsed states, our discussion suggests that in many instances, they might be considered not to have any sort of foreign policy at all.

The Utility of Membership in Two African IOs

One of the driving questions of this dissertation was why African states would find strategic utility in belonging to two sets of African IOs that broadly seek to accomplish similar ends, especially given the limited material resources that individual states can devote to pursuing international diplomacy at all. Several reasons have been shown to be at the heart of this phenomenon. For one, African states find utility in belonging to two different sets of African IOs because the IOs allow them to accomplish different ends. While RECs are used to manage local and sub-regional politics, the AU is used to pursue external, non-African goals. The primary utility of the (O)AU in an intra-African sense has been shown to be its ability to help delegitimize secessionist movements. It has also been shown to be useful to address interests outside of the continent, as a genuine facilitator or collective action (against the ICC, in the case of Sudan, or in WTO cotton talks, in the case of Benin). Finally, the (O)AU has been useful to states insofar as it remains ideologically important for many states, while less so in a practical fashion, not least due to the
perception that it is too large to accomplish anything within. Yet apart from these instances, and as emphasized in chapter 2, the (O)AU is actually looked to as an IO to defend oneself against, rather than one in which to attempt to work offensively within.

In opposition, especially preeminent regional states tend to find great strategic utility in their RECs, which are the IOs where real intra-African politics tend to get made. The utility of the RECs over the (O)AU is underwritten due to the facts that: the politics of RECs are local and thus more meaningful to states; heads of state within RECs know each other and interact often; RECs have far fewer members than the (O)AU meaning that they are perceived – and often do – act and make decisions much more quickly; and RECs are viewed as being able to be “dominated” in some senses by regional powers (either powerful states in unipolar regions or middle states in multipolar ones) and given this option for agency in statecraft, they are viewed as more strategically useful on the whole.

**Other Takeaways**

**Re-Thinking the Role of Realist Analysis in African IR**

Importantly, African states have been shown throughout this dissertation to follow rather realist principles as they approach their IOs. Though they do often pursue “genuine” principles of collective security, IOs are still perceived *primarily* in relation to their ability to help states achieve their own, self-interest goals. While the historical tropes of viewing the strategic utility of African IOs to states as being rooted nearly exclusively in collectivist frames, indeed, African states understand their IOs in highly realist ways.

**Reconciling IR with FPA**
This dissertation has advocated the necessity of an integrated levels of analysis approach to African state foreign policymaking. To that it end, it has argued that only by integrating understandings of the sub-statist determinants of foreign policy, especially leaders and their outlooks (as inherent in FPA) with supra-statist forces of regional and pan-African IO polarity (as inherent in realist visions of IR), can we gain a full picture of how African states interpret the possibilities and constraints of their international environments. Optimistically, this advocacy for an integrated levels of analysis approach can be applied elsewhere outside of the bounds of this dissertation.

**Polarity and Consistency In Outlooks on Strategic Utility**

One aspect of this dissertation that seems to be particularly useful to bring to light is the fact if it is indeed the case – as it has been shown here – that locations within IOs’ polarities play a large role in determining how stats approaches their IOs, then the fact that states’ locations within these polarities are very stable inherently means that indeed, even despite changes in leadership, African states’ strategic outlooks on IOs will also presumably fluctuate very little over time. Put otherwise, even though this dissertation offered case studies of states’ approaches to African IOs ranging from the late 1950s to 2015, the theoretical underpinnings that led to hypothesized actions should seemingly be valid for decades to come, barring any radical changes in power distribution within the regions, and/or radical changes in the nature of the operational culture of IOs themselves. By looking at how polarity impacts foreign and security policy behavior, we have located a useful means by which to predict state actions in the long-term.

**Considering the Notion of “Postcolonial” IR**
One final implication of this study relates to the field conceived of as “postcolonial international relations.” As it concludes, this work suggests that for those Africanists interested in IR, the goal in moving forward should not be to militate for specificity and uniqueness of Africanist IR thinking and theorizing. Rather, they should recognize that, like all other states in the world, African states are inherently self-interested, security seeking, and as rationally motivated as any other global polities. That is, the ultimate step in the postcolonial IR literature should be to make itself obsolete, such that there is no longer the need to talk about “global IR” and “African IR” as distinct entities.

**Insufficiencies with the Project**

Despite its general successes, as this work comes to a conclusion, the author has recognized sundry insufficiencies in the foregoing analysis. Numerous critiques can and should be leveled. First, this analysis tends to treat African IOs as somewhat static in nature throughout history. That is, while it treats African policymaking towards African IOs as dynamic, it has tended to assume that the “playing field” of African IOs has remained a constant over time. This is of course, not the case, especially in relation in the shifts of the OAU to the AU. Yet how to rectify this insufficiency without becoming overly complicated seems challenging. Second, the impact of the type of governance on strategic outlooks was not necessarily parsed out as completely as it might have been. Indeed, though governance was often discussed in passing, it is nevertheless the case it was not treated as systematically as some might wish.

Third, it is recognized that the selection of what constitutes a “national security interest” is inherently subjective. While this work selected a number of national security interests as per historical records and conversations with policymakers prior to knowing the
extent to which they were or were not addressed within African IOs, many possible national security interests were ultimately not included in various chapters, more by virtue of space than by anything else. Finally, towards the end of completing this research, it became clear that a second West African “middle state” country should have been included as a point of comparison with Senegal, and in the vein of the comparative intra-regional case studies of Ethiopia and Sudan (as IGAD middle states), Benin and Gambia (as ECOWAS weak states) and Djibouti and Eritrea (as IGAD weak states). In the hopes that this project is publishable, I would add another case study in the form of either Ghana or Cote d’Ivoire.

**Future Avenues of Research**

Yet, this dissertation has also hopefully been shown to be far more successful in its goals than deficient in their achievement. As such, it will hopefully serve as the basis for new avenues of scholarship in African international relations and foreign policymaking, African security studies, and policy-relevant international relations scholarship more generally. The first avenue for continued research would include further developing the theory to include hypotheses about regions and states not included in this work: What are predictions for the strategic outlooks towards IOs in central Africa, whose REC, ECCAS, is generally thought to be non-polar? How do states in a non-polar REC and a non-polar (O)AU consider the strategic utility of IOs? Moreover, does South African-dominated southern Africa actually fulfill the hypotheses that were here generated for the West African cases? Given that South Africa actually fulfills the hegemonic role in the region more thoroughly than Nigeria does in West Africa, what are the implications for what it means to be a small or middle state in that region?
A second avenue of research would relate to the inclusion of further case studies on additional national security interests within given countries, in order to offer a deeper picture of individual states’ approaches. Indeed, as has been noted, this dissertation has elected to prioritize breadth over depth, though in its future iterations, locating newer case studies within countries, as well as delving deeper into case studies already included, would be judicious. The third avenue for future research might be the inclusion of hypotheses on smaller African IOs. While this dissertation focused on how states think strategically about some of the largest African IOs, future work in this vein would be wise to interrogate how states think about even smaller African IOs, including those that do not garner the distinction as "RECs." Such a move would be particularly important given that the smallest and weakest states – which were given comparatively less attention in this work – think of small African IOs more centrally than do larger African states.

***

This dissertation has offered a new heuristic by which to think about African international relations broadly, and more specifically, how African states conceive of the security-related strategic utility of the dense network of intra-African IOs that they have created since independence. In so doing, it has optimistically served to offer a work that is germane to more mainstream political scientists of IR, FPA, and IOs, as well as those working in the fields of African and/or postcolonial studies. Finally, its additional hope is that this dissertation will prove to be of use to those working in and in the proximity of African public policy and international relations “in the real world,” both on the continent and within non-African governments and IGOs.
As the 21st century progresses, global attention will remain firmly fixed on Africa. Where the continent’s 20th century experience was marked by entrenched colonization, decolonization, and the tenuous process of postcolonial state-building, today, Africa’s international organizations look to be a likely means by which lingering issues might be addressed. Whether African IOs will evolve into institutions that truly support the collective good, or whether they simply remain subject to the whims of individual members’ multilateral machinations, is yet to be seen.
WORKS CITED

Books


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**Book Chapters**


**Conferences**

(“Conference citations operate under Chatham House rules of citation with individual anonymity).”


**Datasets**


**Dissertations or Theses**


Journal Articles


Kant, Immanuel. 1795. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.”


Newspaper Articles


Other Manuscripts

Blyden, Edward. 1862. "The Call of Providence to the Descendants of Africa in America."
-----------. 1921. “To the World.”
-----------. 1924. “Africal"

Primary Source Documents from International Organizations


**ECOWAS**


**IGAD**
Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 2009. “Press Statement by the Executive Secretary of IGAD on the Indictment of the President of Sudan.” Djibouti City, Djibouti: IGAD.


Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 1996. “Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).” Djibouti City, Djibouti: IGAD.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 1994. “Declaration of Principles.” Nairobi, Kenya: IGAD. (Affirming that S. Sudan should be able to secede if Sudan was to be a Muslim state).

International Criminal Court


National and Bilateral Documents


United Nations


UN Resolutions


Interviews

48 Interviews conducted primarily in Addis Ababa Ethiopia (June 2012; January 2014; September 2014- April 2015).

Interview Subjects (IS) 1-42 are anonymous by request, and identified in text as (1S1, IS2, etc.)

Six others are cited by name.

When one person was interviewed more than once, the interview is noted as in IS4/1, IS4/2, IS4/3.....

Reports and Policy Briefs


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**Appendix A:**

**Chairpersons of the Organization of African Unity and African Union**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Term Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>30 January 2015- Incumbent</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz</td>
<td>30 January 2014- 30 January 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Hailemariam Desalegn</td>
<td>27 January 2013- 30 January 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Yayi Boni</td>
<td>29 January 2012- 27 January 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Teodoro Obiang Nguema</td>
<td>31 January 2011- 29 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Bingu wa Mutharika</td>
<td>31 January 2010- 31 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Muammar Gaddafi</td>
<td>2 February 2009- 31 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Jakaya Kikwete</td>
<td>31 January 2008- 2 February 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Joaquim Chissano</td>
<td>10 July 2003- 6 July 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Thabo Mbeki</td>
<td>9 July 2002- 10 July 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Levy Mwanawasa</td>
<td>2 January 2002- 9 July 2002</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Frederick Chiluba</td>
<td>9 July 2001- 2 January 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Gnassingbé Eyadéma</td>
<td>10 July 2000- 9 July 2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Abdelaziz Bouteflika</td>
<td>12 July 1999- 10 July 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Blaise Compaoré</td>
<td>2 June 1997- 8 June 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>2 June 1997- 8 June 1998</td>
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<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Paul Biya</td>
<td>8 July 1996- 2 June 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Meles Zenawi</td>
<td>26 June 1995- 8 July 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Hosni Mubarak</td>
<td>28 June 1993- 13 June 1994</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Ibrahim Babangida</td>
<td>3 June 1991- 29 June 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Yoweri Museveni</td>
<td>9 July 1990- 3 June 1991</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Hosni Mubarak</td>
<td>24 July 1989- 9 July 1990</td>
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<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Denis Sassou-Nguesso</td>
<td>28 July 1986- 27 July 1987</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Abdou Diouf</td>
<td>18 July 1985- 28 July 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Julius Nyerere</td>
<td>12 November 1984- 18 July 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Years</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Mengistu Haile Mariam</td>
<td>6 June 1983- 12 November 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Daniel arap Moi</td>
<td>24 June 1981- 6 June 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Siaka Stevens</td>
<td>1 July 1980- 24 June 1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Léopold Sédar Senghor</td>
<td>28 April 1980- 1 July 1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Gaafar Nimeiry</td>
<td>18 July 1978- 12 July 1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Omar Bongo</td>
<td>2 July 1977- 18 July 1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Seewoosagur Ramgoolam</td>
<td>2 July 1976- 2 July 1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Daniel arap Moi</td>
<td>24 June 1981- 6 June 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Siaka Stevens</td>
<td>1 July 1980- 24 June 1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Léopold Sédar Senghor</td>
<td>28 April 1980- 1 July 1980</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Gaafar Nimeiry</td>
<td>18 July 1978- 12 July 1979</td>
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<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Omar Bongo</td>
<td>2 July 1977- 18 July 1978</td>
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<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Seewoosagur Ramgoolam</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Idi Amin</td>
<td>28 July 1975- 2 July 1976</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Yakubu Gowon</td>
<td>27 May 1973- 12 June 1974</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Hassan II</td>
<td>12 June 1972- 27 May 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Moktar Ould Daddah</td>
<td>21 June 1971- 12 June 1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Kenneth Kaunda</td>
<td>1 September 1970- 21 June 1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Ahmadou Ahidjo</td>
<td>6 September 1969- 1 September 1970</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Houari Boumedienne</td>
<td>13 September 1968- 6 September 1969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo (Kinshasa)</td>
<td>Mobutu Sese Seko</td>
<td>11 September 1967- 13 September 1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Empire</td>
<td>Haile Selassie I</td>
<td>5 November 1966- 11 September 1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Joseph Arthur Ankrah</td>
<td>24 February 1966- 5 November 1966</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Kwame Nkrumah</td>
<td>21 October 1965- 24 February 1966</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Gamal Abdel Nasser</td>
<td>24 February 1966- 5 November 1966</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Empire</td>
<td>Haile Selassie</td>
<td>25 May 1965- 17 July 1964</td>
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## Appendix B:

Chairpersons of the African Union Commission

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Term Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma</td>
<td>15 October 2012 - Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Jean Ping</td>
<td>18 April 2008 - 15 October 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Alpha Oumar Konaré</td>
<td>16 September 2003 - 28 April 2008</td>
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<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Amara Essy</td>
<td>9 July 2002 - 16 September 2003 (interim)</td>
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**Appendix C:**

Chairpersons of ECOWAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Term Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Macky Sall</td>
<td>19 May 2015 – Present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Alassane Ouattara</td>
<td>17 February 2012 – 28 March 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Goodluck Jonathan</td>
<td>18 February 2010 – 17 February 2012</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Umaru Musa Yar’Adua</td>
<td>19 December 2008 – 18 February 2010</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
<td>Alpha Oumar Konaré</td>
<td>1999 - 21 December 2001</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
<td>Gnassingbé Eyadéma</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Nicéphore Soglo</td>
<td>1993-1994</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Abdou Diouf</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
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<td>Gambia</td>
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<td>Blaise Compaoré</td>
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<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Dadwa Jawara</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Muhammadu Buhari</td>
<td>1985- 27 August 1985</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Lansana Conté</td>
<td>1984-1985</td>
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<td>Ahmed Sékou Touré</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
<td>Mathieu Kérékou</td>
<td>1982-1983</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Siaka Stevens</td>
<td>1981-1982</td>
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<td>Léopold Sédar Senghor</td>
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<td>Olusegun Obasanjo</td>
<td>1978-1979</td>
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### Appendix D:

Historical List of African IOs and Select Institutions

<table>
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<th>Date Began</th>
<th>Date Dissolved</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>SACU: South African Customs Union</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>CFA: Communauté Financière Africa</td>
<td>West Africa-France</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Entente Council</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Mali Federation</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>BCEAO: Central Bank of West African States</td>
<td>West Africa-France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>AMU: African and Malagasy Union</td>
<td>Pan-African/France</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>LCBC: Lake Chad Basin Commission</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>MRU: Mano River Union</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Senegambia Union</td>
<td>West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1994 (becomes UMOEA)</td>
<td>UMOA: Union Monétaire de l'Ouest Africaine</td>
<td>West Africa-France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>UMOEA: Monetary and Economic Union of West Africa</td>
<td>West Africa-France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>BCEAO: Central Bank of West African States</td>
<td>West Africa-France</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>CILSS: Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) (In the Sahel)</td>
<td>West Africa (Sahel)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>IOC: Indian Ocean Commission</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Archipelagoes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1996 (becomes IGAD)</td>
<td>IGADD: Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>AMU: Arab Maghreb Union</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Eritrea Union</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>SADC: Southern African Development Community</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States</td>
<td>Central Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>COMESA: Common Market for East and Southern Africa</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>UMOEA: Monetary and Economic Union of West Africa</td>
<td>West Africa-France</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Organization/Conference</td>
<td>Region</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td><strong>CEN-SAD</strong>: Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
<td>West, Central, North, East</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td><strong>EAC</strong>: East African Community</td>
<td>East Africa</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td><strong>AU</strong>: African Union</td>
<td>Pan-African</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td><strong>ICGLR</strong>: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>Great Lakes</td>
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