Identity and Policymaking: The Policy Impact of Gender Quota Laws

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Accessibility
Identity and Policymaking:
The Policy Impact of Gender Quota Laws

A Dissertation Presented by

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Identity and Policymaking: The Policy Impact of Gender Quota Laws

Abstract

Does politician identity matter to policy outcomes? Political scientists tend to be skeptical of the idea because of the strong role of electoral incentives. Yet the argument for greater diversity in public office often relies upon exactly this claim. To make progress on this question, my dissertation examines the political impact of gender quota laws, which require all parties to include a percentage of women in their candidate lists.

I argue that quotas help overcome a political market failure, whereby group interests are unlikely to be represented in politics if the group faces high barriers to entry and their interests lie off the main left-right (class-based) dimension in politics. Using survey data, I show that the largest gender gap in advanced democracies exists on maternal employment, and it cuts across partisan ties. I evaluate the argument using a mixed methods approach, combining statistical analysis of time series data with qualitative evidence from two matched pair case studies – Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy. After showing that quota laws are one of the most important determinants of women’s descriptive representation, I demonstrate that they also increase both party- and national-level attention to women’s preferences. Implementing a quota law increases coverage of women’s social policy concerns in manifestos, and raises public spending on child care, which encourages maternal employment. Evidence from case studies suggests that increased numbers of women and rising issue salience after a quota are both important mechanisms linking quotas to policy change.

Overall, the findings provide new insights about when and how politician identity is relevant to policies. Results point towards the importance of descriptive representation particularly when group demands are orthogonal to the left-right dimension. They highlight several ways that quotas, and increased numbers of women, can shift policies even in the context of strong parties.
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This book is for Orla. Having a child in the middle of working on this project made the topic a lot more real and intimate for me. She gives me so much joy, and I hope that we continue to make progress on questions of gender inequality for her and her generation.
A controversy that runs deep in the study of political representation, with roots as far back as
the earliest philosophers of democracy, is whether the identity of those who represent us matters
for policies. Political scientists tend to be skeptical of the idea that a group’s physical presence in
office – descriptive representation – is necessary for the substantive representation of their interests.
Perhaps the most influential theorist of representation, Hanna Pitkin, rejects the notion that there
is a link between representatives’ identity and actions (Pitkin 1967). Empirical political scientists
often assume that politicians or parties will have incentives to incorporate any electorally salient
issues into their platforms. In this view, the identity of individual representatives is irrelevant.

Yet the argument for diversity often relies upon ‘the politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995),
the notion that a group’s physical presence in office will lead to better outcomes for that group. In
the case of women, the idea is not that gender is prescriptive, but that women will be more likely
to represent women’s interests than men. Those who believe identity matters reject the notion that
politicians are simply responding to incentives; they believe that lived experiences affect how you
behave, and this is true of politicians as well. Identity conditions what you see as important, and
how you understand what your incentives are in the first place. One of the difficulties of adjudicating
in this debate is that changes in policy outcomes may arise not from more women in office, but from
something else that may cause both women’s representation and female-friendly policy change, such
as cultural shifts.

This book uses the rise of gender quota laws in advanced democracies to study the political
impact of representatives’ identity. Gender quota laws require all political parties to include a certain
percentage of women in their party lists, and they now exist in over fifty countries. They cause major transformations of the composition of those elected unmatched by changes in the electorate. Changes in public preferences are glacial, but, as I will show in Chapter 4, the effect of quotas on representation has been abrupt. Measuring policy change after a semi-exogenous quota ‘shock’ provides useful leverage for making causal inferences.

Quotas laws are controversial. The term ‘quota’ itself has a negative connotation in many societies, leading many advocates to use terms like ‘parity’ instead. Some proponents build the case for quotas on pure justice reasons – women make up half the population, so they should be equally represented in parliaments. Some claim that quotas are necessary for symbolic reasons, that the historical absence of women in political institutions may be associated with perceptions of women’s second-class citizenship and the notion that politics is a ‘male domain’. These approaches make no assertions about women having a different set of policy preferences or acting differently than men. Yet, in debates about quotas around the world, assumptions are often made about their impact on a set of ‘women’s issues’. Many believe that increased numbers of women will change politics for the better by addressing women’s specific policy interests. Some recent debates are illustrative.

In France, a quota law was adopted in 2000 requiring 50% of candidates to be women. The quota was controversial, only passing after many years of sustained advocacy from the Socialist Party and others (Murray 2012b). In the long debate about its merits many supporters connected the proposed quota law to the substantive representation of women’s interests. For instance, an op-ed in La Croix claims that, “It [the quota law] also will help to put on the political agenda some different issues. On unemployment, for example, we get measures to help men who are unemployed. If there were more women in the Assembly, they would remind them that the unemployment rate is higher for women than for men. For many problems, issues concerning women would thus be taken into account more easily.”¹ Former UDF (center-right) party secretary Anne-Marie Idrac supported the quota because, “some of the most important concerns of women have not seen access to the political world. Women care much more about their jobs, their children and everyday safety, the

¹“Pourquoi fallait-il inscrire la parité dans la Constitution?,” La Croix, 29 June 1999, translation by Google Translate.
environment, the reconciliation of working time and the family, solidarity between generations.”

In Poland, a quota law was passed in 2011, requiring 35% of candidates on party lists to be women. The original idea for the law came from the Congress of Women, a meeting of more than four thousand women from across Poland that took place in June 2009, and turned into a social movement. The group spearheaded a petition for gender parity in political representation, which was eventually signed by over 150,000 Poles (Kroliczek 2012). One of the primary advocates for the quota law was the former Head of the Social Policy Ministry from the Labour Union, Izabela Jaruga Nowacka. Jaruga Nowacka claimed, “if there will be no women in politics, women’s interests will never be taken into consideration” (TVN24 2009, as quoted in Kroliczek 2012, p. 24). Another quota supporter, Professor Magdaleny Srody, took this line of reasoning further, connecting the quota law to specific social policies for women: “the Sejm is such a black hole... it seems common sense that certain laws such as the nurseries and kindergartens should move at lightning speed, and here it turns out that they do not. For example a gambling law shall be passed at express rate but for nurseries and kindergartens it takes years.”

Ireland passed a quota law in 2012, requiring parties to include women as 30% of candidates or face major funding cuts. The law was informed by a report on women’s participation in politics published by the Justice Committee in 2009, which argues that, “women bring different life experiences, priorities, knowledge and a different style of decision-making” to politics. In an op-ed, first-time Fianna Fáil (centrist) candidate Laura Reid writes that she supports quotas and was motivated to run because, “It will only be when a large enough proportion of elected representatives are female that challenges, interests and life experiences applicable to women will properly gain a voice and be represented.”

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Italy has debated a quota law in parliament twice in recent years, in 2005-06 and 2014-15. In both cases women MPs campaigned to include a gender quota in changes to the electoral law. The 2005 proposal was not successful, but the more recent electoral reform includes a 50% quota for women. In the debate about the quota in parliament, several female representatives made the connection between the historical lack of women in politics and inequality in Italian society. Annalisa Pannarale, a representative from the left-wing SEL party, argued that the idea quotas discriminate unfairly is a fallacy:

It is not true that women in this country can show what is their value and what is their quality, because there are no tools to do so. This is a country that must constantly address the gender pay gap, which sees the salaries of women drop lower and lower, this is a country that sees women in increasingly precarious contracts, where half of women do not work... where you must choose between a reproductive path or the possibility of a career.\(^6\)

In the same debate, Paola Binetti, a representative from the Christian Democratic UDC party, suggested that persistent gender inequality is exactly why it’s so important to have women in positions of political power. She states:

The difficulty that women have balancing professional, or in this case political, engagement with family needs has been cited by many. But it is precisely for this reason that we want female presence at the highest decision-making levels; it is precisely for this reason that we hope that those policies for the family which have never been, come to be... there is a culture of thought and of difference that should be a positive enrichment for this parliament.\(^7\)

Finally, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) required a 40% gender quota for party lists in the 2015 national election. During the presentation of the new rules, the President of the CNE Tibisay Lucena explained that the quota was necessary because political parties were too often closed to women, and the major issues facing women stand above political differences. She said, “The political participation of women is what brings us together, but also the issues of sexual and reproductive rights, the right to life free from violence, domestic violence, sexual abuse,

\(^6\)Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea, Seduta 186 di lunedì 10 marzo 2014, author’s translation.

\(^7\)Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea, Seduta 186 di lunedì 10 marzo 2014, author’s translation.
harassment, use of women as a commodity to sell products, these are all issues that cut across social, educational, economic and political strata."8

These views are shared by the UN Committee established under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which states: “the concept of democracy will have real and dynamic meaning and lasting effect only when political decision-making is shared by women and men and takes equal account of the interests of both.”9 In summary, quotas are often viewed as a way to promote not only women’s inclusion but their political interests as well. Yet, we know very little about whether quotas lead to meaningful policy change for women. Along with the deeper theoretical question of whether identity matters, this book addresses a very practical policy question. Do increasingly popular quota laws facilitate women’s substantive representation, or are they just ‘window dressing’?

1.1 The Argument in Brief

This book is the first to examine the relationship between quota laws and policy outcomes across countries. In addition, I seek to identify the unique effects of identity by tracing the influence of quotas on politics. There is very little work of this nature, particularly in advanced democracies. A notable benchmark is Chattopadhyay & Duflo (2004), who use a unique institutional setup in India whereby certain seats are required to be randomly reserved for a woman. They find that quotas have altered policymaking in favor of women’s interests – specifically, more spending on water and roads. Findings have yet to be replicated in advanced democracies, where women have a different set of policy preferences and parties and their governments wield significant power. In this setting the conventional wisdom is that party preferences are unitary and decision-making highly institutionalized, casting doubt on the notion that individual politicians have sufficient agency to influence policy outcomes.

8“Chavistas y opositoras coinciden en apoyo a paridad de gÃľnero aprobada por el CNE,” Correo de Orinoco, 5 July 2015, translation by Google Translate.

In Chapter 2, I provide a broad theoretical framework for thinking about identity and policy change. The theory focuses on understanding *when* and *how* politician identity is relevant to policy outcomes. I argue that quotas help overcome a political market failure, whereby disadvantaged group interests are not represented in politics if they lie off the main left-right (class) dimension in politics. Disadvantaged groups like women face high barriers to entry in politics, and their interests are especially likely to be ignored if they lie off the main left-right dimension. This is because parties have little incentive to represent issues that detract from known positions or cross-cut their constituencies.

Work-family policies fit this criteria. Survey data show that perhaps the largest gender gap in preferences exists over the issue of maternal employment, and this gap cuts across party lines. The issue is also not clearly partisan; left parties have been criticized for their lack of attention to work-family policies, and right parties have been behind significant reforms in recent years. Parties often frame the issue differently – right parties might emphasize fertility or productivity while the left highlights gender equality – blurring the lines of issue ownership (when it is addressed at all). Quotas, and increased numbers of women in office, are one way of correcting this market failure and increasing the likelihood that the preferences of disadvantaged groups will be represented.

Additionally, Chapter 2 outlines a causal path linking quotas to policy outcomes that I further develop in subsequent empirical chapters addressing specific stages of the policymaking process. Building on insights from economic models of representation, recent empirical work in the field of identity and politics, and anecdotal evidence from contemporary political actors, I advance a causal story in which both electoral incentives and politician identity can matter to policy outcomes. Once the quota law is in place, I suggest that quota laws influence policymaking in two main ways: by increasing the number of political actors likely to care about and advocate for these issues (women), and by increasing the salience of women’s interests. First, quotas lead to increases in the numbers of women in office. After a quota law, an influx of women (especially a ‘critical mass’) could push the party towards their collective preferences on certain policies. Second, quotas increase the salience of gender-related issues, making it more likely that women’s interests will be prioritized in office. In other words, parties might have already shifted their positions to cater to women voters even
without a quota law in place. However, party position-taking is very different from governments actually putting the issue on the agenda. The institution of quotas could improve the substantive representation of women regardless of the number of women elected.

1.2 Methodology

Demonstrating that politician identity influences policy outcomes requires an empirical approach that can pull apart politician identity, cultural shifts, and structural and institutional factors such as women’s labor force participation and electoral rules. Moreover, any convincing explanation of policy change must be rooted in a solid understanding of the role of identity and processes of political decision-making at the internal party and national government levels. No single technique would be able to accomplish all of these objectives effectively. Therefore, this book takes a mixed methods approach, using both statistical tests and qualitative case studies. This two-pronged approach offers the advantage of incorporating both the rigor and generality of statistical work and the causal narrative of case-based analysis. Cross-national statistical analyses establish key correlations, and careful robustness checks provide leverage for the causal interpretation of results. Case studies assess the plausibility of observed statistical relationships between variables, and shed light on mechanisms.

This book uses a variety of statistical techniques to test theories about the influence of quotas on women’s descriptive representation and policy outcomes. The statistical analysis aims for breadth of coverage both in terms of time periods and the number of states included in analysis. The analysis includes over 30 years and 20 countries, with coverage varying by chapter according to data availability for the dependent variable and key covariates. Extending the range of relevant dependent and explanatory variables as much as possible increases confidence in model estimates and their potential generalizability. Large-N studies also have practical advantages, such as the ability to apply fixed effects and other advanced techniques. I should briefly mention here why I restrict the sample to advanced democracies. The main reason is that my theory is based on gender gaps in social policy preferences, which are well-established in advanced democracies but
not elsewhere. It is thus not clear that we should expect quotas, and politician identity, to influence similar policies (or, perhaps, any policies) in developing countries. This choice is explained in further detail in Chapter 2.

Statistical analysis establishes key associations between quotas and outcomes, but it cannot tell us much about the theorized causal chain linking the variables. This is particularly tricky because women’s political representation is both a key confounder, which ought to be included in models in order to account for general favorable trends towards women in politics, and a mechanism. Including both variables contemporaneously raises concerns about post-treatment bias. Therefore in statistical analysis of policy outcomes I include the lagged share of women in parliament as a covariate (just as I lag other covariates). Chapter 6 provides an initial statistical mediation test to explore the indirect effect of quotas through women’s representation. However, for the most part this book takes the approach of using case studies as the best way to disentangle the causal mechanisms at work.

Matched pair case studies compare countries, and parties within countries, in detail, checking the credibility of statistical results and examining how processes leading to policy change compare to the mechanisms laid out in the theory. Matched pair case selection accomplishes three key goals. First, ‘most similar’ cases can serve as mutual counterfactuals. They provide a framework for thinking about what would have happened, all else equal, if a key treatment variable had not occurred (Tarrow 2010). Second, matched pairs also unpack the process by which outcomes came about in each case (George & Bennett 2005; Tarrow 2010). This parallel process tracing provides important leverage for exploring causal mechanisms, which are often complex. For example, in Chapter 5 I separate the causal mechanism of women’s representation into the constituent parts of a ‘critical mass’ of women, women’s sections in the party, and women in leadership positions. For quantitative analysis, each of these proposed links would require operationalization (which is difficult conceptually – is there a hard threshold for a critical mass? – and for reasons of data availability) and estimates at each step of the chain.

Finally, statistical matching as a case selection method offers a transparent and principled
way to select cases when there are many relevant variables (Nielsen 2014). Many methodologists advocate matching as a viable way of selecting paired cases (Gerring 2006; Seawright & Gerring 2008; Nielsen 2014; Tarrow 2010), and although it is a relatively new technique a growing number of studies employ it (Madrigal, Alpízar & Schlüter 2011; Genovese, Wassmann & Schneider 2014; Glynn & Ichino 2014; Lyall 2014). Case selection involved two stages. First, I selected the ‘quota countries’ of Belgium and Portugal because these countries are of particular interest: in both a quota law led to increases in the percentage of women in office, but in very different contexts and time periods. I carried out fieldwork in these countries from September to December 2013, interviewing over forty legislators, party members, and political activists. The goal was to gain knowledge about (1) why quotas are adopted and (2) determinants of policy outcomes in key areas of interest to women, especially work-family policies, including the role of quotas. I then used the information gleaned about (1) to inform the book’s discussion of the causes of quota adoption (in Chapter 3), a vital first step in order to address endogeneity concerns regarding the effect of quotas.

Having established the key potential confounders, the second stage of case selection was to use this information in statistical matching to select pairs for Belgium and Portugal (detailed in Chapter 3). These pairs are similar in most respects, especially with regards to the determinants of adopting a quota law, except no quota law was adopted. The matched pairs are Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy. I conducted fieldwork in the ‘non-quota’ countries of Italy and Austria from February to May 2014, interviewing over thirty key political actors. These interviews focused on (2), exploring the determinants of policy changes in key areas for women, including the role of women politicians. However I also explored questions of why quota proposals had not been successful in these countries (the counterpart to (1), in non-quota countries). I used a non-random strategy to select interviewees, deliberately choosing subjects who could offer the best evidence about quota adoption and policymaking. This includes party leaders, cabinet members, and politicians and activists with a track record of work on work-family policies.
1.3 Plan of the Book

The rest of this book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the book’s theory of politician identity and policy change. While the discussion focuses on gender identity, the theory is developed to be broad enough to apply to any historically disadvantaged group. The key contribution is a new theoretical framework explaining how emerging policy demands interact with traditional (left-right) party competition and entrenched political institutions to result in varying levels of policy representation. Unlike previous work, which focuses on changing voter demands, it emphasizes the additional role of politician identity in policy change. I claim that quotas can be an important mechanism for political change in certain contexts, identified by interactions of group status and left-right party competition in the theoretical model. I provide initial evidence that supports my expectations about women’s policy demands and their relation to the standard left-right dimension in politics using survey data. The chapter then proposes two key mechanisms through which quotas specifically are linked to policy change for women – women’s representation and issue salience – to be further developed in subsequent chapters. To close, I clarify key assumptions, the scope of the project and expected external validity, and the main theoretical contributions to the literature.

Chapter 3 takes a step back and considers why some countries adopt quota laws and others do not. This is a critical step aimed at addressing endogeneity concerns before moving to the empirical analysis of quotas’ effects. The chapter gives a brief history of quota laws, their evolution and how they relate to other types of political gender quotas, before moving to a discussion of the causes of quota adoption. I focus on identifying potential confounding variables, building on secondary literature and evidence from fieldwork in two quota countries, Belgium and Portugal. The last section of the chapter employs these confounders as matching variables to select ‘most similar’ pairs for my case studies in a small-N statistical matching procedure. This sets the stage for subsequent empirical chapters that consider the effects of quotas on women’s descriptive (Chapter 4) and substantive representation (Chapters 5 and 6).
Chapter 4 confirms the assumption that quotas lead to more women in office, and it demonstrates that quota laws are more effective at increasing women’s descriptive representation than voluntary party quotas, which are also popular in advanced democracies. It also advances a new explanation for how quota laws work. The main argument is that quota laws have both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ effects – helping party leaders overcome local-level opposition and forcing skeptical parties to comply, respectively. They also tend to generate significant public support, creating a powerful ‘policy feedback effect’ not present with party quotas alone. Time series analysis of women’s descriptive representation is supplemented by synthetic control methods to establish the link between quotas and additional numbers of women across and within countries. Case studies of quota implementation in Belgium and Portugal help unpack the ‘black box’ of how different quota policies work in practice and provide initial support for each of the three mechanisms proposed.

Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the key question of this book: do quotas, and identity, matter to policy outcomes? These chapters provide the first cross-country evidence that quotas affect outcomes – both within parties (Chapter 5) and to actual spending decisions (Chapter 6). Chapter 5 explores the relationship between quotas and political party positions, using manifesto data. In this chapter I develop the theoretical mechanisms linking quotas to ‘policy change’ broadly considered (Chapter 2) for the specific context of intra-party decisionmaking. I suggest several ways these mechanisms are likely to operate in the context of party position taking, including: increased negotiating power for women within the party; greater numbers of women in leadership positions; increased strength of women’s sections; and policy feedback. Because party manifestos are not coded for specific policy issues such as work-family concerns, I examine party positions on welfare state expansion, an issue characterized by a significant gender gap in policy preferences (women preferring more spending compared to men), and environmental protection, an issue with no gender gap. In line with hypotheses I find that that passing a quota law coincides with increases in party attention to welfare state expansion, but not to environmental protection. Qualitative evidence of the evolution of party positions in far right parties in the matched pair of Belgium and Austria suggests that quotas led to a shift in the direction of work-family positions in particular, and women in leadership positions played key roles.
Chapter 6 tackles the question of whether quotas lead to real policy shifts. While the evidence from Chapter 5 is compelling, and the party position-taking stage an important part of the policymaking process, ultimately most people judge political representation by actual policy outputs. Could quotas be mere ‘window dressing’? The chapter continues the theoretical discussion about mechanisms from Chapter 5, proposing that women in leadership and issue salience will be especially important in the context of government actions. In a time series analysis of public spending data on work-family policies, it shows that quota laws lead to greater spending on child care, a policy that encourages maternal employment, and less spending on family allowances, which tend to discourage women from returning to paid work. Effects are larger in size in the context of countries with larger average gender gaps in policy preferences (e.g., France as opposed to Portugal). A matched pair case study of work-family policy evolution in Portugal and Italy sheds light on the mechanisms at work, indicating that the distinction between added numbers of women and issue salience might not be as sharp as theory suggests. Instead these mechanisms can overlap and interact, together shifting dynamics within the party and pushing party leaders to prioritize women’s concerns.

Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the argument and key findings of the book. I review the book’s main contributions to the literature, which include useful theoretical and practical policy implications. By providing new insights into when and how identity matters, the book demonstrates that descriptive representation may be more consequential than is often assumed, even in the context of strong parties and parliamentary democracies. The adoption of quota laws has practical policy implications for work-family and related issues – policies that affect all of us, not just women. Lastly, the theoretical framework proposed is broad enough to apply to other identity groups. It can help explain why certain policy demands are likely to be under-represented, and determine whether mechanisms to increase group representation in office might help. In closing, I speculate about several promising lines of future inquiry that will advance knowledge in the field.
2 | A Theory of Identity and Policy Change

This chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the book’s theory of politician identity and policy change. For the sake of this chapter I define ‘policy change’ broadly as the process of political decision-making leading to public policy outputs. In advanced democracies, this process involves an intricate chain of relevant ideas, institutions, and actors, from voters to representatives, parties, and governments (Sabatier & Weible 2014). In subsequent empirical chapters I apply the theory to two crucial stages of the process, party position taking and government action, further developing the link between quotas, identity, and policy change separately for each stage.

I begin by providing an overview of the causes and consequences of the political under-representation of disadvantaged groups, focusing on women. I claim that under-representation matters to policy outcomes because politicians are biased towards their own interests. I next address the question of why some group preferences remain largely off the political agenda, paying particular attention to how policy demands fit within traditional lines of party competition. I propose a broad theory of identity and policy representation which suggests that when new policy demands are orthogonal to the main left-right policy dimension, and the group demanding change faces high barriers to entry in politics, the result is a political market failure whereby interests are not represented. In this scenario, when parties have little incentive to represent group demands and groups lack the resources to form a new party, quotas can be a particularly important mechanism for the political expression of policy interests.
Having established the main argument, I provide initial evidence that supports my expectations about the distinct and orthogonal preferences of women. Using survey data, I show that women prefer more spending on a range of social policy issues compared to men, and women have particularly strong preferences for maternal employment. The gender gap for maternal employment cuts across parties – it persists among those who vote left and right – and gender is a larger determinant of preferences than partisanship for these issues. I then spell out the causal logic underlying the central argument, proposing two main mechanisms through which quotas lead to policy change in advanced democracies. These are: 1) added numbers give women within the party more leverage to push party leaders for change; and 2) quotas increase the salience of gender-related issues, making it more likely that they will be prioritized. In the final section I state the assumptions on which the book’s theory rests and discuss how the theory contributes to the existing literature on identity and politics, political parties, and public policy.

2.1 The Under-representation of Disadvantaged Groups

A wealth of empirical research has shown that certain disadvantaged groups face high barriers to running for office and winning (Rule 1987; Rule & Zimmerman 1994; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995; Banducci, Donovan & Karp 2004; Bird 2005; Besley, Pande & Rao 2005b). The labor market for politicians is mostly majority ethnic group, educated, wealthy men (Norris 1997). I focus on the case of women here, but many of the arguments that follow apply to other forms of identity, like race and social status. Women, and other disadvantaged groups, face bias in the candidate selection process which can prevent them from participating. This can be higher costs in running for office (such as comparative lack of time and financial resources) and/or discrimination in being selected (Lovenduski & Norris 1993; Fox & Lawless 2004; Lawless & Fox 2005; Anzia & Berry 2011). Discrimination need not be overt; party selectorates could avoid choosing women because they are, statistically speaking, less likely to invest in long, uninterrupted careers (what Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010) call ‘statistical discrimination’). Male party leaders also tend to prefer candidates like themselves (Niven 1998), and / or have few women in their professional networks (Kanter 1977;
Sanbonmatsu 2006; Fox & Lawless 2010; Crowder-Meyer 2013). Women are encouraged to run less often than men, which affects their political ambition (Fox & Lawless 2010). Research shows that women are just as likely to respond favorably to recruitment, but they are less likely to be recruited (Fulton et al. 2006; Fox & Lawless 2010).

As a result, in most democracies the share of women elected is much less than the share of women in the population. In 2015, women make up 23% of parliaments worldwide.\(^1\) However, in some countries the share of women in parliament nears parity – for example Sweden (44%) and Belgium (39%). A large body of comparative research suggests that the variation in women’s representation can be attributed to structural and institutional factors which can lower barriers to entry, especially women’s labor force participation and electoral rules (Norris 1985; Rule 1987; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008). These factors create incentives that lower the likelihood of discrimination and increase the supply of female candidates. According to Inglehart and Norris (2000), economic development and associated increases in women’s employment go hand in hand with the transformation of sex roles and attitudes towards women, and the break-up of traditional family units. As the service sector grows in more developed economies, and education for women improves, women are better able to compete with men for jobs. And as women gain entry into previously male-dominated labor markets (the ‘political pipeline’), they gain the experience and networks necessary to run for political office.

Electoral rules also affect the constraints and opportunities facing female candidates. In countries where electoral rules create incentives for programmatic parties, women fare better than they do in countries where the rules lead parties to focus on individual candidates. In personalistic, single-member district systems, seniority and long tenure are important candidate traits because of the focus on constituency service. Women are less likely to be able to credibly commit to these type of long-term, uninterrupted careers, making them less likely to put themselves forward and also to face discrimination in the selection process. In proportional systems with large districts or pooling across districts, it makes little sense to focus on narrow constituencies, and women are less likely to

\(^1\)IPU Women in National Parliaments Database, \texttt{www.ipu.org}, accessed 20 December 2015.
be at a disadvantage (Carey & Shugart 1995; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010).

The recent growth of gender quota provisions is another important determinant, particularly because quotas can help countries increase numbers of women despite ‘sticky’ structural and institutional constraints. They can be implemented even in majoritarian systems, and in contexts where women’s labor force participation lags. Previous literature suggests that quotas increase women’s representation (McAllister & Studlar 2002; Tripp & Kang 2008; Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010; Hughes 2011), but it is unclear which type of quota (party- or national-level) is more effective, or how quotas compare to other determinants. I return to these questions in Chapter 3, which also includes an extended discussion of explanations for women’s (lack of) descriptive representation.

In summary, existing literature suggests that the under-representation of women is due to supply-side problems that make women less likely to put themselves forward and be selected rather than a lack of voter demand. Voters typically do not have the opportunity to select a proportionate share of women, even though in advanced democracies the evidence shows that voters are not biased against women (Norris, Vallance & Lovenduski 1992; Matland & King 2002; Black & Erickson 2003; Lawless & Pearson 2008; Wauters, Weekers & Maddens 2010; Murray, Krook & Opello 2012). As Lawless states, “When women run, they win” (Lawless 2015, p. 353). In fact, some research shows that female voters have a baseline preference to vote for female candidates (Dolan 1998; Banducci & Karp 2000; Sanbonmatsu 2002), and that gender can even trump partisan identity in some instances (Brians 2005). In short, the demand for women candidates is present but there is a blockage in the supply.

2.2 Identity and Theories of Representation

The blockage in the supply of female candidates matters because growing evidence suggests that politicians are biased towards their own interests in policymaking. This runs counter to the conventional wisdom in political science. The spatial theory of party and voter behavior – originally made

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2Men have a similar (slightly lower) baseline preference to vote for men (Sanbonmatsu 2002); however, women are more likely than men to vote in advanced democracies (Pintor & Gratschew 2004).
famous by Downs (1957), but also at the heart of more recent work on parties (Enelow & Hinich 1984; Adams & Grofman 2005; Persson & Tabellini 2005; Meguid 2005) – says that rational parties choose policy positions to minimize the distance between themselves and voters. Existing theory would suggest that if women as a group have significant preferences that are not being represented, politicians or parties ought to move to capture that space in order to maximize their vote share, or a new candidate or party ought to spring up. The selection of candidates plays no role at all; men and women should be equally good at representing the interests of women voters. Thus, the identity of politicians ought to be irrelevant.

At the same time, mounting evidence casts doubt on the model of politics as a marketplace in which parties deliver policies in exchange for voters’ political support (Romer & Rosenthal 1979; Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr & Stewart III 2001; Gilens 2012). There seems to be significant ‘slippage’ in the principal-agent contract. For example, Gilens (2012) shows that policies in the United States are much more responsive to the preferences of the very wealthy than to middle- or low-income individuals (for a similar argument, see Hacker & Pierson 2011). Explanations for why this might be the case have led to new models of representation, including some that acknowledge the role of candidates’ personal preferences. In the citizen-candidate model voters vote for the candidates closest to their policy views. Individuals choose to run for office if the expected payoff is greater than the cost of running. Once elected, the candidate implements the policies of their own choosing, rather than responding to changing voter preferences (Osborne & Slivinski 1996; Besley & Coate 1997). This theory is supported by an emerging empirical literature which suggests that politician identity – from race (Canon 1999; Whitby 2000) and social class (Carnes 2012) down to learned behaviors like smoking – is relevant to policymaking at the highest level. For example, Burden (2007) shows that smokers are more likely to speak and vote against tobacco control measures. In the citizen-candidate model, if certain issues are important for women in particular, women ought to run for office in order to represent them.

The citizen-candidate model is valuable in that it dispenses with notion that motives of voters and candidates are distinct. It predicts that increases in women’s political representation will matter to policies if women have different preferences than men. However, the model leaves
significant room for doubt about its applicability to the context of policymaking in parliamentary settings. First, both versions of the model assume that anyone can run for office, and that an individual’s decision to run depends on the trade-off between a fixed cost of running for office and the benefits of doing so (the benefits of running vary between the two models). The possibility of certain individuals being systematically disadvantaged – that the cost is higher for some groups than others – is not discussed. Thus both of the dominant economic paradigms of representation, the traditional principal-agent model and the more recent citizen-candidate model, do not acknowledge the high barriers to entry that prevent many women, and other disadvantaged groups, from running for office and being selected as candidates. Because the labor market for politicians is inefficient in this sense, these models are not able to account for how demographic discrepancies between electorates and legislatures affect the substantive representation of different groups.

Second, the citizen-candidate model was developed for a framework in which “a single elected official makes policy choices in an atemporal world without political parties or interest groups” (Besley & Coate 1997, p. 106). It assumes that the policymaking process occurs mainly at the voting stage, neglecting to account for how identity may affect the multi-stage and complex agenda-setting process. Literature that employs the citizen-candidate model in the context of parliaments does so by assuming that parties can be thought of as citizen-candidates; i.e. party preferences are unitary (e.g., Iversen & Soskice 2006). Even when this assumption is relaxed, we are left without a description of how quotas and identity could affect important decisions throughout the policymaking process. In her work on political reservations for caste members in India, Pande assumes that parties have policy preferences but claims that identity can matter because, “parties cannot fully control candidate behavior after elections (for if they could, candidate identity would be irrelevant to the policy process)” (Pande 2003, p. 1133). Even if parties fully control candidate behavior (i.e. party discipline is very strict, as in many European parliamentary democracies), there is still the question of how party priorities are formed. As Bachrach and Baratz famously argued, values and biases shape the issues which enter the political arena in the first place (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962).

The third issue with regards to a straightforward application of the citizen-candidate model
is that it assumes politicians act only in their own interests. E.g., in Besley and Coate’s version: “The citizen who wins the election implements his preferred policy – promising anything else is not credible” (p. 88). This runs counter to the traditional notion of ‘representing’, and a wealth of empirical evidence suggests that politicians do feel responsibility to act for members of their social groups. For example, women representatives claim to think of themselves as representatives of women and to consider women as a constituency group with particular political concerns (Reingold, 1992; Childs, 2004a; Dodson, 2006). Broockman’s (2013) work on race and representation in the United States demonstrates that group representation can be altruistic (or at least not electorally motivated); black politicians are more responsive to black citizens even if they reside outside their constituency.

Anecdotal evidence supports the idea that women politicians feel a particular obligation to act for women as a group. In my interviews in Western Europe women MPs frequently claimed to think about how policies would impact women as a group, even in settings with strict party discipline. In Portugal, the conservative (PSD) MP Monica Ferro explained that she believes she brings a different perspective to her work on male-dominated committees,

I always think it’s relevant [gender]. I was filling in a question on European policy, and it was very interesting because at the end you had to identify yourself and you could choose if you were European, a woman, a Catholic, whatever. And I chose I’m a woman, I’m European, I’m Portuguese, and then at the end you had my age. So for me it’s very important. . . it’s because of the background experience that we have in building a family, in trying to conciliate work with family.3

The social democratic (Pd) Italian Senator Cecilia Guerra said that she and other women in parliament consult with women’s groups when planning policy reforms on certain issues:

Women in the parliament have many connections – not all of them, but there are many women in parliament who have connections with associations, civil society groups, women’s movements outside of parliament. So, we also gave these groups a kind of representation. In the debate about violence against women this came out strongly.4

3Monica Ferro, personal interview, 5 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
4Cecilia Guerra, personal interview, 9 April 2014, Rome, Italy.
Another example comes from my discussion with Austrian conservative (ÖVP) MP Claudia Durchschlag about how she got her start in politics:

If you see politics from outside, you will have a picture in your mind of many men and few women. And I started in the 1990s, and then it was a very strong picture I had in my mind. Therefore I thought I should do something for women too.5

In summary, the dominant economic models of representation make assumptions about the incentives of politicians and about the policymaking process that don’t seem to reflect the reality of representation in parliamentary democracies. As Williams (2012) states, “For empirical political science, if the evidence from ground-level actors contradicts key assumptions of our theoretical models, we must either provide a structural or system-level explanation of the gap, or we must revise our theories” (p. 798). The section below proposes a theory in which both electoral incentives and politician identity can matter to policy outcomes, in line with recent normative arguments. For example, Mansbridge argues that multiple models of representation exist at the same time; the desire to make good policy and to be re-elected are almost always mixed. Election must always be a proximate goal for policy-seeking candidates, and “It is hard to imagine a representative with no intrinsic motivation to work for the policies he or she thinks good for the polity and hard to imagine any constituent voting for a representative whose preferences the constituent thought were always induced” (Mansbridge 2009, 370). The theory below focuses on when and how identity can matter in parliamentary settings with strong parties.

2.3 Identity and Policy Change

The main focus of this book is the study of how quotas, and additional numbers of women in office, affect policymaking. Women’s concerns can be considered one of a set of new policy demands that have risen out of the transition to a service economy and changing values in post-industrial democracies. Some of these new demands have been incorporated into the political agenda – for example, ‘new left’ and ecological parties have gained power in many countries – but others have

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5Claudia Durchschlag, personal interview, 5 May 2014, Vienna, Austria.
not. Several authors note that there is a substantial (gendered) public demand for work-family policies that has not been met (Morgan 2013; Gingrich & Ansell 2015). This presents a puzzle: why are some new policy demands represented while others are not?

The Representation of Emerging Issues

The conventional starting point for thinking about policy representation is a one-dimensional spatial model in which the policy space is defined by the labor-capital conflict on economic issues. Traditional partisan politics theory holds that parties are representatives of social constituencies, broadly defined in terms of industrial classes. In Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) classic theory, economic cleavages between the working class and upper class / business provided a basic framework for party competition at the formation of many mass party systems. These cleavages became institutionalized (‘frozen’), with class remaining the most salient source of electoral competition until very recently. Importantly for women, when these cleavages were defined they were based on a full-time male ‘breadwinner’ model in which women stayed at home to look after the family. Thus, policies to support families were often tied to upholding the income of the male earner – for example, employment-based entitlement systems rather than individualized benefit systems and public care services (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002).

However, since the 1970s advanced democracies have transitioned into post-industrial societies. The growth of the service sector and entry of women into the labor force coincided with important cultural value changes emphasizing equality and individualization over materialist and security concerns (Inglehart 2008). Recently the notion that new issues are emerging and challenging traditional one-dimensional models of party competition has become an important topic in the literature on comparative welfare states (Kriesi 1998; Kitschelt 1994; Häusermann 2006, 2010; Beramendi et al. 2015). Class is still important (Allan & Scruggs 2004; Bartolini & Mair 2007;

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6Other salient divisions in society, such as religion or urban / rural, led non-economic cleavages to be more pronounced in some countries.

7Note that a ‘pure’ breadwinner model never existed; working class women often could not afford to stay out of the paid labor force (Pfau-Effinger 2004). However it described the reality for middle and upper working classes in many Western countries, and it was also aspirational (Lewis 1992).
Benoit, Laver et al. 2006), but economic interests have transformed and other issues gained prominence. Electoral constituencies and voter interests have changed over recent decades, with more high-skilled middle class voters voting left, and more working class voters voting for right-wing, anti-immigration parties.

So far, the literature has demonstrated the relevance of several cleavages other than (industrial) class alone, such as: environmentalism (Kitschelt 1988); anti-immigration (Bornschier 2010); labor market insiders and outsiders (Rueda 2005); and social and cultural professionals (Kriesi 1998). Crucially, gender has also become a relevant cleavage as the male breadwinner model became increasingly out of touch with new social structures and values – notably the rise of women’s employment, decline in marriage, and changing attitudes towards gender roles in society (Esping-Andersen 1999; Edlund & Pande 2002; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010).

How have parties responded to these emerging issues, particularly with regards to gender-related policies? Kitschelt’s (1994) model of intraparty politics is useful here because it provides a general framework explaining how parties form preferences. In this model, the substantive priorities of the party are influenced by the distribution of sentiments among political activists, which are in turn shaped by the broader political context (e.g., the party’s competitive position and institutional rules). The party’s own organizational rules also matter, because they influence the socialization and types of activists likely to join (‘selective recruitment’). They also determine how effectively activists can push for their policy concerns – i.e., bureaucratic mass parties are likely to strive to minimize party disunity, and parties with high leadership autonomy can rapidly adjust strategies.

Much of the literature on emerging issues in the policy space fits with this model, demonstrating that the institutional and partisan environment matters to how well parties and states are able to modernize to meet the challenges of post-industrial society. For example, electoral constituency shifts mean that programmatic parties have had to re-conceptualize their core voters, and party systems that have shifted away from the ‘class-mass’ model have been more successful and piv-

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8Kitschelt does not define ‘activists’, but since they are individuals involved with strategic choices in the party I assume that backbenchers are part of this group, along with rank-and-file militants and ‘middle level’ regional party leaders.
oting to do this (Kitschelt 2000b). Multi-party systems are more compatible with the development of secondary cleavages, such as Christian democratic parties in Continental Europe (Van Kersbergen 2003), agrarian parties in Nordic countries (Manow 2009), and left-libertarian parties in e.g., the Netherlands and Austria (Kitschelt 1988). Another strand of literature shows that the emergence of new needs and values in society can lead to cross-class alliances, bringing together groups who support reforms for different reasons (Rueda 2005; Häusermann 2006). These coalitions are more easily forged in consensual democracies, as Häusermann (2010) demonstrates in the case of pension reform.

Regarding gender-related concerns, the major issue facing women in post-industrial societies is the question of how to reconcile increased labor force participation with continuing to do the bulk of care work within the family (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993). While some countries have initiated major reforms to address work-family issues, such as child care resources and parental leave, scholars also note that the pace of change has been very slow (Morgan 2013; Gingrich & Ansell 2015). The literature from political economy emphasizes internal shifts in party organizations (altering party platforms to appeal to dealigned female voters), as well as the institutional framework which helps or hinders new alliances (Häusermann 2006; Gingrich & Ansell 2015). Yet these arguments are somewhat unsatisfying, because they cannot explain why reforms in the work-family area have been relatively anemic compared to other policy areas, especially outside of Scandinavia. It is notable that explanations of Nordic generosity from the gender and politics literature stress the role of women’s political agency (Skeije 1993; Lambert 2008), as well as institutional factors. Morgan’s (2006; 2013) work on family policies in continental Europe, where women’s political representation has been much lower than the Nordic states, also suggests that politician identity has played an important role.

In summary, the literature from political economy and gender and politics both offer important insights for policy representation, but we would benefit from a theory that incorporates both structure and (gendered, raced, classed, etc.) agency. Overall the literature on emerging social needs remains inconclusive, because different studies focus on different policy areas separately, and most ignore the role of politician identity. This leaves an unresolved puzzle. If new needs and
values in society are emerging, which of these cleavages will become politically salient in a given context? Are structural and contextual explanations equally powerful across policy fields – and when might identity matter? The theory outlined below uses politician identity to make progress on these questions.

**Party Competition and Barriers to Entry**

The main argument goes as follows: the translation of policy demands into outcomes depends on how demands map onto traditional (class-based) political cleavages, and on whether the policy demand comes from groups that face high barriers to entry in politics. I take Kriesi’s (1998) work on the transformation of cleavage politics as a starting point, because it is one of the few to acknowledge the role of politicians. Kriesi claims that social divisions must be expressed in concrete, organizational terms in order for them to become a salient issue cleavage in politics (rather than just values and experiences among members of a social group). There has to be *political articulation* of new beliefs, and political actors are crucial in this process. He says:

> ...preferences in general, and values in particular, are not just the reflection of underlying structural patterns, but they are shaped by collective political actors, who selectively reinforce some preferences and ignore others in the process of the translation of social division into politics. (1998: p. 177)

This sentiment fits well with the emerging literature demonstrating that politicians are biased towards their own interests, discussed earlier. It is also implicit in Kitschelt’s (1994) model of intraparty politics, although he does not discuss identity specifically. In his model, the substance of party preferences is determined by the distribution of party activists (pragmatists, lobbyists, or ideologues), which is in turn affected by electoral laws, entry costs, and party recruitment practices (pp. 210 – 211). These variables are all likely to influence the proportion of women, and other historically disadvantaged groups, active in the party as well. They key point is that group identity could be another important determinant of party strategy and outcomes, along with the factors discussed above – context and institutions.
I understand political parties to have electoral incentives as well as commitments to ideology, and preferences that are not necessarily unitary or stable. Parties must also respond to the evolving preferences of activists within the party, and these preferences are influenced by identity. The theory proposed in this chapter integrates gendered – and raced, classed, etc. – political agency into existing arguments about the substance and flexibility of policies. I focus on the transformation in party strategies that results from shifts in the demographics of representatives. In line with previous work, in subsequent empirical chapters I control for different structural and institutional factors that may mediate this relationship.

The first fundamental question in the theory of policy representation is whether the group with new policy demands faces systemic barriers to entry in politics. Groups that do not face high barriers to entry have access to resources and opportunities that allow them to participate in politics, mobilize, and even form new political parties should existing parties not represent their views sufficiently. Groups that face high barriers to entry do not have the same means to put new issues on the political agenda. For example, forming new political parties requires even more effort and resources than participating in existing political parties and interest groups (Kitschelt 1988).

When historically disadvantaged groups become more equally represented in politics, we should expect to see policy change on the issues that these groups prioritize. The preferences of historically disadvantaged and dominant groups may not diverge on many issues; in this case, no policy change is expected. But when there are significant gaps in policy preferences, policy ought to shift in the direction of disadvantaged group interests after their numbers increase. For example, lower levels of income and education are associated with more support for redistribution (Svallfors 1997; Finseraas 2009; Rueda & Pontusson 2010; Lloren, Rosset & Wüest 2015). Immigrant groups prefer less-restrictionist immigration policies (Mughan & Paxton 2006; Scheve & Slaughter 2001). Women favor more spending on a range of social policies compared to men across advanced democracies, even controlling for class and party (Svallfors 1997; Edlund & Pande 2002; Huber & Stephens 2000; Lott & Kenny 1999; Iversen & Soskice 2001). As this chapter later illustrates, women are also far more supportive of maternal employment than men.
I expect the representation of disadvantaged groups to be especially likely to lead to policy change for issues that are orthogonal to the main left-right (economic) party dimension. This is because when issue demands coincide with existing party preferences, disadvantaged groups are more likely to find allies within the established political system to represent their interests. For these issues, political parties can be effective vehicles for the representation of new demands. However when new demands cut across political parties and split their constituencies, parties have little incentive to represent them. In this case, prioritizing new issues would likely cause further divisions within the party and electoral prospects may suffer (Ferrara & Weishaupt 2004; Parsons & Weber 2011). Additionally, parties cannot compete on all issues in every election. They are likely to accentuate those issues on which they have an advantage (‘issue ownership’), and ignore those which are perceived to be difficult or unimportant (Budge, Robertson & Hearl 1987).

Figure 2.1 cross-tabulates policy issues by the issue type (on main left-right dimension or not) and the status of the group demanding change (faces high barriers to entry or not). It yields four ideal-type policy representation alternatives, and highlights an example of each. The top-left cell represents the traditional one-dimensional model of the policy space, where the working class and wealthy diverge on economic interests. Mainstream parties have clear incentives to represent this issue, which has traditionally defined their ideological profiles. High-income individuals face particularly low barriers to entry in politics; increasingly elected officials tend to be drawn from white-collar professions and the business community (Pontusson 2015). Thus, high-income interests in keeping taxation and spending low are likely to be well-represented in politics.

The bottom-left cell represents emerging policy demands that coincide with the main left-right dimension in politics, but are supported by groups that face high barriers to entry in politics. An example is labor market ‘outsiders’ who demand low job security. Labor market outsiders are defined as those without secure employment – they are either unemployed or in precarious jobs – while ‘insiders’ benefit from highly protected jobs (Lindbeck & Snower 2001; Rueda 2005). The emergence of the insider-outsider distinction stems from labor market changes in post-industrial democracies, including widespread unemployment since the 1970s. Outsiders tend to be less politically active than insiders; arguments about the lack of resources and networks seem especially
### Figure 2.1: The Representation of Policy Demands

Notes: Cells show policy demands followed by the group demanding policy change in parentheses. The figure shows four ideal-type policy representation alternatives, and highlights an example of each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers to Entry</th>
<th>Issues well-represented</th>
<th>New parties emerge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low redistribution (High income)</td>
<td>Environment (Environmentalists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low job security (‘Outsiders’)</td>
<td>Work-family conciliation (Women)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The top-right cell represents the opposite scenario: emerging policy demands that do not coincide with the main left-right dimension in politics, but are supported by groups that face low barriers to entry in politics. An example is environmental concerns, one of the issues associated with rising post-materialist values in recent decades. Traditional parties have little incentive to represent issues that distract from class-based concerns, making it difficult for environmentalists to work within mainstream parties to push for their interests. As a result green parties emerged in the 1970s to represent these interests instead, using the mantra: ‘We are neither Left nor Right, we..."
are out in front’ (Dalton 2009). Importantly, environmentalists – mostly well-educated middle class – had the resources and opportunities necessary to form these new parties (Kitschelt 1988). Many mainstream parties only began to incorporate environmental concerns into their agendas after green parties became a significant threat – a trend that seems consistent with how parties are responding to the rise of anti-immigration parties as well (Meguid 2005; Norris 2005; Harmel & Svåsand 1997).

Over time, even if the niche party disappears, the new policy demand is likely to remain on the political agenda.

Finally, the bottom-right cell represents political market failure. By this I mean a salient political interest that is unlikely to be represented in the mainstream policy space, due to the principal-agent ‘slippage’ that occurs when disadvantaged groups are under-represented. In this scenario groups that face high barriers to entry in politics have policy concerns that lie off the main left-right dimension. The example of this is women’s interests in work-family conciliation policies like child care provision. As I will demonstrate later in this chapter, women are much more supportive of maternal employment than men. Like environmental issues, work-family policies might detract from traditional class-based concerns, so mainstream parties have little incentive to represent them. Moreover as I will show, the gender gap in preferences on maternal employment cuts across partisan identities, and so parties are even more likely to downplay the issue because it could exacerbate internal divisions.

We might think that left parties are associated with these issues, but in fact work-family policies are not clearly identifiable with either left or right wing parties. Ideologically the issue seems to be a fear that gender will compete with traditional class concerns, and left parties have been criticized for their indifference to problems facing working mothers (Perrigo 1996; Von Wahl 2006). The right is also not clearly opposed to spending on these policies; in fact, right parties have been influential in changing work-family policies in several cases, such as Germany and Austria’s recent reforms. In the United States, Democrat Hillary Clinton has made paid family leave a major platform in her 2016 campaign, but so has Republican hopeful Marco Rubio. Opposing parties often ground support for work-family policies in different normative frameworks – including fertility, economic productivity, and women’s equality – according to their broader policy goals.
(market- versus equality-oriented). This makes work-family policy amenable to to ‘ownership’ by either side. Finally, it is not clear that male party leaders on either side realize the electoral opportunities of work-family issues (Morgan 2013).

Why don’t women form parties to address these concerns, as environmentalists did? There are only a few examples of women’s parties in advanced democracies, none of which have been significant. First, women face high barriers to entry in politics, and forming a party is even more difficult than participating in the established party framework. But perhaps more importantly, on the whole women’s interests are heterogeneous. As the next section shows, on many issues men and women have the same interests, or women’s interests correspond to existing party ideologies. It is unclear that women’s preferences on the issue of maternal employment – as strong as they are – are enough to outweigh the numerous other issues which are well-represented in the established party system. This also explains why women don’t punish parties at the polls. When mainstream parties exclude niche issues from the agenda, and women are unlikely to form a niche party, there are few political alternatives. Thus, the gendered demand for work-family policies remains largely under-represented in politics. Another example of a new policy demand that falls in this space is labor market outsiders’ preferences for active and passive labor market policies. Neither the traditional left nor the right prefers to invest in these policies (putting them off the main left-right dimension), and so the issue is likely to remain off the political agenda (Rueda 2005).

Quotas, and increased numbers of women, are likely to influence all policies that women as a group prioritize (the bottom row in Figure 2.1). Adding more women to political parties gives them better opportunities to make their preferences part of mainstream party agendas. However, I expect quotas to be associated with larger changes to policies that are off the main left-dimension (bottom-right). This is because parties are unlikely to represent these interests at all, absent women’s representation. Quotas give women the numbers they need to make their concerns heard within the

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9One well-known example is Iceland, where the Women’s Alliance party entered parliament in the 1980s. At its highest point (1987) it gained 10% of seats in the parliament.

10Rueda (2005; 2006) shows that labor market policies are only likely to be represented when labor market insiders become more vulnerable to unemployment – i.e., the issue becomes salient to the traditional class-based constituencies in politics.
party and parliament. In Kriesi’s terms, having women political actors – who are biased just as men are – translates a social division into a political one. Quotas can be an important mechanism for the political expression of new policy demands when group preferences are orthogonal to mainstream party issues and the group lacks access to political power.

### 2.4 Gender Differences in Policy Preferences

In this section I provide initial evidence that supports my expectations about the preferences of women, and the alignment of women’s preferences to the main left-right policy dimension. There is no consensus in the literature on gender and politics about which policies should be identified as ‘women’s issues’. Definitions are based on a wide variety of criteria such as: feminist theory about rights and equality, women’s interest group demands, the specific salience of some issues to women’s bodies, and ‘traditional’ issues of the private sphere.\(^\text{11}\) I use survey data to define women’s issues, focusing on issues on which women and men have significantly different preferences. The advantage of using survey data is that it is more likely to identify ‘women’s issues’ that are inclusive of all women, rather than only feminists or women’s movements. I can distinguish whether gaps hold even across subgroups, e.g., ideological lines. A disadvantage is that it is difficult to measure the intensity of preferences using survey data. This seems like an acceptable trade-off given my interest in the saliency of policy issues to women across the political spectrum.

Women are not a monolithic group, but there is substantial evidence that women and men have different preferences on at least a subset of issues in advanced democracies. As previously discussed, the gender gap has shifted from right to left in recent decades; women are now more liberal and favor more government spending compared to men across advanced democracies. These gender gaps are thought to be very much related to the shift from industrial to post-industrial society. The modern gender gap might reflect the decline of marriage, rise of divorce, and corresponding higher rates of poverty for women over recent years, or women’s increasing labor force participation and

\(^{11}\)For a general overview, see “Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics: The Meaning and Measurement of Women’s Interests” in *Politics & Gender*, Volume 07, Issue 03, September 2011.
associated need for affordable care services. Both theories suggest that, due to historical discrimination and the structure of markets, women benefit more than men from government spending. These differences exist even within political parties; e.g., Poggione (2004) finds that women state legislators in the U.S. express significantly more liberal welfare policy preferences than men, and the difference is most profound among Republican women. However the literature does not tell us much about gendered preferences on specific policy issues.

In order to identify policy areas with the largest gender gaps in preferences, I analyzed survey data from three waves of the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Role of Government survey (1990, 1996 and 2006) and four waves of the ISSP’s Family and Changing Gender Roles survey (1988, 1994, 2002, 2012). The ISSP offers perhaps the best comparable data available on attitudes towards specific social policies. The Role of Government survey covers attitudes towards government spending in different areas, as well as attitudes towards the government’s broader role in society. The Family and Changing Gender Roles survey covers attitudes towards the employment of women and mothers. Figure 2.2 shows the average gap in preferences for each issue area across countries and over time. The horizontal bars represent the difference in percentages of women and men who agree with each statement (or disagree, when specified). The column on the right shows the average share of women who agree (disagree).

Across countries, the survey data confirms that women are more supportive of maternal employment and prefer greater spending on many social policies compared to men. The largest differences are in attitudes towards maternal employment, where there is an 8 to 9 percentage point gap between women and men. For example, on average 39% of women disagree that ‘a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’, compared to 30% of men. Similarly, 45% of women disagree that ‘a job is alright, but what women really want is home and children’, compared to 37% of men. The next-largest differences are in attitudes towards government intervention to control prices and provide jobs (women are more supportive, by 6 to 7 percentage points), and spending on health and old age pensions (5 to 6 percent more women agree compared to men). Chi-square tests find that these differences are all significant at conventional levels (p < 0.05) for each survey wave included here. Smaller differences exist on, for example, whether it should be
Figure 2.2: Average Country-Level Gender Gaps in Preferences

Notes: On the left, values are the average share of women who agree (disagree) minus the share of men who agree (disagree) with the statements listed on the lefthand side. On the right, values are the average share of women who agree (disagree) with the same statements. Data come from the ISSP Role of Government survey 1990, 1996, 2006 and the ISSP Changing Gender Roles survey 1994, 2002, and 2012. Average figures were first compiled for each survey wave, including all relevant countries, and then averaged over all available survey waves. Data is not weighted by country. The Role of Government surveys include the following number of countries: 7 (1990), 14 (1996), and 17 (2006). The Changing Gender Role surveys include the following number of countries: 14 (1994), 18 (2002), and 18 (2012).
the government’s responsibility to provide health care for the sick and a decent standard of living for the elderly, as well as spending on education. These differences are typically not statistically significant.

These figures are presented to give a broad sense of gendered policy preferences in Western advanced democracies. Of course, preferences within specific countries vary and the same gender gaps are not always significant at conventional levels. Similarly the figures do not provide information about trends over time, where considerable variation also occurs in some issue areas. For example, the gender gap in attitudes towards whether the government should reduce income differences between the rich and poor has been increasing over time (women becoming more and more supportive). That said, the largest gender gaps in preferences (maternal employment, government intervention and social spending) have been well-established since the earliest survey data analyzed. I discuss relevant country-level differences, including preferences within quota countries, in more detail below.

By far, the largest gender gap in preferences of any documented here is over the issue of maternal employment. Specifically, the statement ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’ is often used to assess attitudes towards maternal employment (e.g., Morgan 2013), which is directly relevant to work-family policies. Figure 2.3 summarizes the gender gap in preferences toward maternal employment by country. The average share of women who disagree with the statement is included in parentheses following the country name.

Looking at between-country variation, there are large gender gaps in Scandinavia and many ‘liberal’ welfare states such as Australia and the US. Continental Europe, including Germany, France, and the Netherlands, is characterized by more moderate gaps. In Southern Europe we see

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12 Unfortunately, survey data on preferences towards specific work-family policies across all countries of interest and over time do not exist – but see the gender gap in attitudes towards paid maternity leave in Figure 2.2.

13 In order to create a cross-national index I compiled the average gender gap for this question by country using eight different surveys from 1988 to 2012. Because not all countries of interest are included in the four waves of ISSP Family and Changing Gender Roles survey, I supplement it with three waves of the European Values Survey (1990, 1999, and 2008) and the Eurobarometer 65.1, from 2006. These surveys ask nearly identical questions. The ISSP and EVS both ask whether respondents agree or disagree with the statement: ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.’ The Eurobarometer asks whether respondents agree with the statement: ‘A pre-school child is more likely to suffer if his or her mother works.’
Figure 2.3: Average Gender Gaps in Preferences towards Maternal Employment

Notes: Values are the average share of women who disagree minus the share of men who disagree with the following statement: ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.’ The figure in parentheses after the country name on the left is the average share of women who disagree with the statement. Data come from the ISSP Changing Gender Roles survey 1988, 1994, 2002, and 2012; the European Values Survey 1990, 1999, 2008; and the Eurobarometer 65.1, from 2006. All available data are averaged for each country.
Figure 2.4: Average v Highly Educated Gender Gaps for Maternal Employment

Notes: Average (see Figure 2.3) compared to gender gaps in highly educated subgroup (2002 ISSP data). Figures are the share of women minus the share of men who disagree with the statement, ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.’ High education level is defined as some post-secondary education and above.
smaller gender gaps, but they have increased over time – a trend which applies to many countries listed here. For example, in the ‘quota country’ of Portugal the gender gap in preferences for maternal employment increased from 3% to 6% from 1990 to 1999 (EVS data). The trend for both men and women is toward more support for maternal employment over time, but women’s views seem to be changing at a faster rate. Overall, the gap in preferences in maternal employment is larger for the ‘quota countries’ of France and Belgium than for Portugal and Spain. Yet even in these countries it is still significant, particularly in recent years.

Figure 2.4 shows that the gender gap in preferences for maternal employment tends to increase at higher education levels. This signals that educated women, who are more likely to be in the workforce, even more strongly support maternal employment. Note that for the quota countries of Spain and Portugal, the gap increases significantly. Because women in parliament are likely to be higher status, well-educated individuals this is all the more reason to think that they will be likely to prioritize these issues in office – even in more conservative countries like Spain and Portugal.

Finally, distinct differences between men and women persist across ideological lines. Figure 2.5 shows the gender gap in preferences for maternal employment by party affiliation (2002). Respondents were asked which party they voted for in the last parliamentary election, and the figure shows the gender gap within the mainstream left and right party supporters in each country (for details see figure notes). It illustrates that the gender gap cuts across parties – the average gap within left parties is 11% compared to 9% for right parties.

So far, the survey data demonstrate that women and men have different preferences on a range of social policies, with women preferring more spending / government support compared to men, and that the gender gap is largest for the issue of maternal employment. The fact that gaps persist across party affiliation suggests that this issue does not align with the main left-right dimension in politics. Another way of investigating this question is to compare the significance of gender and partisan identity as determinants of policy preferences across a range of issues, controlling for other factors. We would expect partisan identity to be the strongest determinant of preferences for most issues related to social spending, even if gender matters as well. If women’s preferences for
Figure 2.5: Gender Gaps for Maternal Employment by Party Affiliation

Notes: Gender gaps by country-specific party affiliation (2002 ISSP data). Figures are the share of women minus the share of men who disagree with the statement, ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.’ Left and right parties: Australia (Labour, Liberal); Austria (SPOE, OEVP); Denmark (Social Democratic Party, Danish People’s Party); France (Socialist Party, RPR); Germany (SPD, CDU/CSU); Great Britain (Labour, Conservative); Netherlands (PvdA, VVD); New Zealand (Labour, National); Norway (Labour, Conservative); Spain (PSOE, PP); Sweden (Social Democrats, Moderate); Switzerland (Social Democratic Party, Swiss People’s Party); U.S. (Democrats, Republicans). Some countries not included due to missing data.
maternal employment are orthogonal to the left-right dimension, then gender ought to be a stronger
determinant of preferences on this issue than party affiliation.

I estimate probit models of policy preferences based on gender, party affiliation, and a
set of controls, using data from the ISSP’s 2006 Role of Government survey and 2002 Family
and Changing Gender Roles Survey.\textsuperscript{14} The dependent variable is a binary measure that takes
the value 1 if the respondent supports the policy provision, and 0 otherwise. Please see table
notes for survey question details. Female is also a binary variable equalling 1 if the respondent
is female, and 0 for male. Party affiliation is measured as binary variables for Left, Right, and
Center where 1 indicates the respondent reports to sympathize with this party, and 0 otherwise
(the category left out is ‘Don’t know’ and ‘No party preference’). The analysis includes a battery of
individual-level controls that have been shown to influence policy preferences: age, education, social
class (self-reported), supervisory position, self-employment, unemployment, part-time employment,
public sector employment, not in the labor force, retirement status, rural residence (Svallfors 1997;
Cusack, Iversen & Rehm 2006).

Because the coefficients of probit models have little substantive meaning in themselves, I
present the marginal effects in Table 2.1. The coefficients are the estimated marginal effect on the
probability of a respondent expressing support for the policy given a unit increase in the value of
the predictor variable (e.g., going from male to female gender), while holding all other variables at
their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals for the changes in probability are given in parentheses.

The results reveal empirical patterns consistent with the argument that gender preferences
for maternal employment are orthogonal to the main left-right dimension in politics. Left and
right party identification is a large and statistically significant determinant of preferences on social
policy outcomes. In line with conventional understanding of the policy space, left party affiliation
is linked to more support for spending and government intervention while right party affiliation is
associated with less support. For example, identifying with the left is associated with a 10% increase

\textsuperscript{14}These survey waves best correspond to the years quota laws were implemented. I also analyze data from the
1996 Role of Government and the 1994 Family and Changing Gender Roles surveys (before most quota laws were in
place), and my results do not change.
Table 2.1: Marginal Effects of Gender and Party on Policy Preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Provide a job</th>
<th>(2) More spending: health</th>
<th>(3) Reduce income differences</th>
<th>(4) More spending: education</th>
<th>(5) Pre-K child suffers (disagree)</th>
<th>(6) Housewife fulfilling (disagree)</th>
<th>(7) Pre-K mothers shld work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04, 0.08)</td>
<td>(0.04, 0.07)</td>
<td>(0.02, 0.05)</td>
<td>(-0.00, 0.03)</td>
<td>(0.08, 0.11)</td>
<td>(0.06, 0.09)</td>
<td>(0.05, 0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08, 0.12)</td>
<td>(0.02, 0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07, 0.11)</td>
<td>(0.03, 0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07, 0.10)</td>
<td>(0.04, 0.07)</td>
<td>(0.03, 0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Party</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.14, -0.09)</td>
<td>(-0.09, -0.04)</td>
<td>(-0.23, -0.19)</td>
<td>(-0.09, -0.04)</td>
<td>(0.01, 0.04)</td>
<td>(-0.02, 0.01)</td>
<td>(-0.04, -0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center Party</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.00, 0.05)</td>
<td>(-0.02, 0.01)</td>
<td>(-0.05, 0.00)</td>
<td>(-0.01, 0.04)</td>
<td>(-0.02, 0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01, 0.05)</td>
<td>(0.02, 0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>14,584</td>
<td>14,584</td>
<td>14,584</td>
<td>14,584</td>
<td>25,250</td>
<td>25,250</td>
<td>25,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis carried out using the Zelig package for R v 3.2.1. (Imai, King & Lau 2009). 95% confidence intervals for the changes in probability are given in parentheses.

Survey questions: (1) It should be the government’s responsibility to provide a job to everyone that wants one; (2) Government should spend more money: Health; (3) It should be the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor; (4) Government should spend more money: Education; (5) A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (disagree); (6) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (disagree); (7) Do you think that women should work outside the home when there is a child under school age.
in supporting the statement that ‘it should be the government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone that wants one’, while identifying with the right is associated with an 11% decrease in support (model 1). The first four models, which all deal with social policies, show this relationship of left and right identification linked to strong, opposite preferences. Identifying with the center is not a significant determinant of preferences. In line with the gender gaps shown earlier, female gender is associated with increased support for many social policies, even controlling for other factors correlated with gender. However the size of the ‘effect’ is typically not as large as that of left-right party affiliation. This suggests that partisan identity is a stronger determinant of policy preferences than gender for most social policy issues.

The last three models (5 - 7) address preferences for maternal employment. As expected, female gender is associated with large and significant increases in support for this issue, even controlling for party and other variables correlated with gender. For example, being a woman is associated with a 10% increase in disagreeing with the statement ‘a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’ (model 5). Compared to party affiliation, gender is a stronger determinant of preferences for all of the statements related to mothers working. Model 6 measures disagreement to the statement that being a housewife is just as rewarding as paid work, and model 7 asks whether women with children under school age should work outside the home (part- or full-time). Left party identification is also significant, but the size of coefficients is smaller than gender identity. Right and center party identification tend not to be significant determinants of preferences on maternal employment. While the left-right spectrum accurately predicts respondent support for social policy issues (and the direction of preferences), it is less successful at predicting preferences for maternal employment. Overall, the data presented here suggest that my policy representation model’s expectations about gender, party, and individual preferences are reasonable. Women have different preferences on a range of social policy issues, and particularly strong preferences for maternal employment which do not coincide with the main left-right dimension in politics.
### 2.5 Mechanisms: Identity and Policymaking Power

The discussion so far has emphasized the role of politician identity as a potential determinant of policy outcomes, but it has not explained how identity can influence change. This question is particularly important in the context of advanced democracies, where most countries that have passed a quota law are parliamentary systems. This is perhaps the ‘most difficult’ institutional setting because scholars have historically assumed that the primary mechanism of representation is the unitary political party (Sartori 1968; Barnes 1977; Dalton 1985; Esaiasson & Heidar 2000). Decision-making is highly institutionalized and party discipline strong, so individual politicians have less power to influence outcomes. In this section I build on literature from comparative party politics, gender and politics, and policy feedback to propose two main mechanisms through which quotas, and additional numbers of women in office, will lead to policy change. In subsequent chapters, I elaborate on how these mechanisms apply at different stages of the policymaking process – party positions and spending outcomes – and use case studies to explore their plausibility.

I expect that quotas will impact policymaking through two key mechanisms. The first is that added numbers of women have more leverage to push the party towards their collective preferences. The second is that quotas increase the salience of gender-related issues, making it more likely that they will be prioritized in office. Figure 2.6 illustrates the causal logic of these two mechanisms.

![Causal Logic Linking Quotas to Policy Change](image)

Figure 2.6: Causal Logic Linking Quotas to Policy Change

After a quota law, added numbers of women have more leverage to push the party towards their collective preferences. Parties today are not as unitary as once believed. Factions are commonplace in many party systems (Greene & Haber 2014; Harmel et al. 1995), and internal ideological
conflict can explain why parties might not shift policy positions to maximize the female vote share. For example, conservative Catholic factions might make parties more reluctant to adopt progressive initiatives with regards to gender and the family (Morgan 2006; Celis 2007). A ‘critical mass’ of women after a quota law could have more leverage to push the party to shift its positions (Kanter 1977). In a more gender-balanced environment (many scholars use the 30% female benchmark), women may be encouraged to speak out on behalf of women’ interests, and male majorities more likely to be open to their views.

There are many examples of parties changing their positions after successful lobbying by women in the party. For example, the women’s section of the Conservative Party in the U.K. successfully lobbied party leadership to emphasize education spending and child care packages in the 2001 electoral program (Lovenduski 2001). Similarly the women’s section of the Dutch Christian Democratic party “challenged the party’s longstanding traditionalism and favored measures that promoted women’s economic independence and greater choice in matters of child care and work” (Morgan 2006, p. 91). Finally, over time women are likely to advance to positions of power in the government and party leadership, and are then able to influence policies more directly.

The literature on policy feedback, the idea that past policies significantly effect future policy outcomes, suggests that policies send certain messages to the electorate and can shape attitudes and behavior (Campbell 2003, 2012a). In this case by raising the importance of gender equality to the national agenda quota laws lead the public to expect greater attention to women in politics. Irrespective of the numbers of women in office, parties might interpret the growing support for women in politics after a quota law as a cue to better represent women’s interests and claim credit with female constituents (Mayhew 1974). Quotas can put women’s political issues on the radar of male elites who may not have realized the importance of certain policies to women, even if the party had taken ‘women-friendly’ policy positions. As Laver says, “there is a clear distinction between a person’s position on an issue and how salient he or she feels this issue is” (Laver et al. 2003, p. 70). Parties that were openly opposed to the quota might feel an added incentive to highlight and/or develop their policy positions addressing women’s interests as a sort of defense mechanism, and so as to not appear outdated. Particularly when the policy space is constrained – as is the case for
public spending outcomes – it is the salience of the issue rather than the party’s position that often predicts policy change (Humphreys & Garry 2000).

Policy changes in the direction of women’s preferences could then have their own effects on future outcomes by creating new constituencies (e.g., users of public child care, women in the workforce), increasing demand further and setting in motion a chain of greater policy responsiveness on these issues. Of course, policies do not always produce positive feedback results, particularly if political institutions allow government actors to adopt policies contrary to the spirit of the law, or if key social groups do not have the capacity to defend it (Patashnik 2003, 2014). I explore these dynamics further in the empirical chapters.

2.6 Assumptions, Scope, and Contributions

Before moving to the empirical study, this section clarifies some of the assumptions that underlie the book’s model of policy change and indicates how it contributes to the existing literature on identity and politics.

Assumptions

As just laid out, the logic of policy change makes several assumptions about the relationship between gendered preferences, politician identity, and policymaking power. First, women elected to office are assumed to have the same general preferences as women in the population. Second, there is an assumption that the gender gaps in preferences I measure apply to women as group, which ignores potential intersections of gender and other forms of identity like race and class. Finally, the women elected to office as a result of a quota law are assumed to have power and agency equal to that of their peers; that is, the assumption is that they are not ‘tokens’ or otherwise less able politicians.

One potential concern is whether the attitudes of female politicians match up with those of women in the general public. Research from Sweden and the U.K. comparing elite and mass preferences finds that there is congruence between the preferences of female politicians and citizens
(Wängnerud 2000; Campbell, Childs & Lovenduski 2010). Campbell et al. (2010) conclude that in the U.K., “in terms of attitudes to traditional gender roles, on average men and women differ, and women representatives are more like women voters and male representatives are more like male voters” (p. 194). However, it is also true that women elected to parliament are likely to be more educated than average women in the population. In general I expect that this means women elected to parliament will be even more likely to prioritize women’s concerns. This is because progressive attitudes towards social spending and maternal employment are increasing with education, for men and women. However, this does raise concerns about whether quotas – and increased numbers of educated, professional, and most likely white women – can represent the interests of women ‘writ large’.

To measure gender gaps in preferences, I use a dichotomous variable of gender identity. However, I acknowledge that women are not a homogeneous group and that there might be important variations in preferences among women. I try to overcome some of these problems by testing whether gender differences in preferences persist even controlling for other social categories like age, class, and occupational status (see Table 2.1). My results suggest that more women than men, across a variety of subgroups, favor increases in social spending and support maternal employment. Because women and men have different preferences, increasing the number of women in parliament should increase the average presence of attitudes favorable to women’s preferences. Still, it is possible that gender gaps on specific policy questions, like support for family allowances, might not be consistent across different social groups (e.g., class). If this is the case we may see trade-offs emerging, where educated, professional women benefit at the expense of lower-income women. In the course of this book I avoid making essentialist claims about the preferences of all women by considering potential differences within relevant subgroups wherever possible.

Lastly, my theory of policy change expects that women elected due to a quota law will have sufficient power and agency within the party to advocate for their interests. Although the

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15The issue of politicians being more ‘extreme’ than those they represent has previously been explained as a form of strategic voting (Kedar 2005). Instead, I suggest that voters are unable to elect representatives like them on certain dimensions like education.
notion that quotas will lead to ‘token women’ or less qualified candidates is common, the empirical literature increasingly rejects these arguments. Quotas are not associated with lower candidate quality (Murray 2010b; O’Brien 2012b); in fact, ‘quota women’ have been found to be more qualified than their peers on several measures (Besley et al. 2013; Weeks & Baldez 2015). Another concern is that quotas could create ‘token women’ who are marginalized and play little role in the legislative process (Bauer & Britton 2006). Again most evidence suggests that this is not the case; women elected via quotas also do not seem to confront more obstacles than other women in the parliament as we would expect if these women were merely tokens (Zetterberg 2008; Devlin & Elgie 2008; Xydias 2009). One caveat is that quota women are more likely to be newcomers to national parliaments compared to their peers (Weeks & Baldez 2015), and for any newcomers it takes time to build up reputation and levels of seniority in the party. My model of policy change is sensitive to this. It predicts that women in parliament will lead to policy shifts primarily through the leverage that added numbers give female party members to lobby party leaders for change. In subsequent chapters I use case studies to investigate the plausibility of this mechanism, and I also explore whether quotas lead to more women in positions of power over time.

Scope

I focus on advanced democracies because my theory is based on gendered differences in social policy preferences, which are well-established in developed democracies but not elsewhere. There is a surprising lack of research on gender gaps in policy preferences across countries; for now, we know very little about which issues (if any) men and women disagree on in other social and political settings. Additionally in low income countries states often have insufficient capacity to provide or implement extensive welfare programs. Advanced democracies thus provide the best context for testing my theory. Limiting the sample to Western advanced democracies also allows me control for similar cultural shifts, which could be important given different factors are relevant for women’s political representation within different cultural contexts. For example, female labor force participation has been linked to women’s representation in advanced democracies but not agricultural economies, potentially because subsistence-level primary work is not likely to have an
empowering effect for women (Matland 1998; Kenworthy & Malami 1999). Finally, the assumption that female under-representation is about supply-side issues rather than a lack of voter demand may not be satisfied in developing countries (e.g., Inglehart & Norris 2003; Beaman et al. 2008).

I expect my argument of identity and policy change to hold in parliamentary systems where parties are strong. It could thus apply to many other countries outside of advanced democracies, provided significant gender gaps in policy preferences exist. The dynamics of party politics and policymaking in parliamentary and presidential systems vary considerably. In presidential / majoritarian systems parties are less disciplined, giving individual representatives more power to propose bills and affect the agenda (Shugart 1998; Carey 2007). In this context of weak parties the argument that quotas influence policy change through giving women more leverage within the party would not be appropriate. The stages of the policymaking process are different, and would require different approaches. For example, in parliamentary systems it is important to consider party-level policy change, e.g., manifesto promises, whereas in presidential / majoritarian systems bill proposals and roll call votes are likely more important.

Finally, it is worth noting that quotas and other mechanisms to increase numbers of women in politics are only one method of furthering women’s substantive interests. Social movements, transnational networks and policy diffusion, and macro-level variables like culture and socio-economic status are all important mechanisms that have been linked to change in the direction of women’s interests. In subsequent chapters I account for some of these variables as potential confounders of the relationship between quota adoption and policy change. Future research that compares the effects of quotas or women in parliament to these other factors directly could broaden the theory about identity and policy change, and make it more precise (Wängnerud 2009).

**Contributions to the Literature**

The book’s theory of identity and policy change produces several implications for the study of identity politics, political parties, and public policy. First, it shows that it is important to disaggregate policy demands based on whether groups demanding change face high barriers to entry in politics,
and whether the policy demand coincides with traditional lines of party competition. This conceptual framework links recent scholarship on identity politics to the standard spatial models of party and voter behavior from political economy. These theories seem to have diverging predictions. In spatial models rational parties are predicted to respond to voter preferences (Adams et al. 2004, 2006; McDonald & Budge 2005; Ezrow 2007), as well as environmental factors like economic conditions (Adams, Haupt & Stoll 2009; Haupt 2010; Burgoon 2012) and how the party did in the last election (Somer-Topcu 2009). Existing models largely disregard politician identity.

Yet the findings from the burgeoning literature on identity and policy suggest that politician identity, including gender and race, affects policy outcomes in favor of that group (Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2004; Ueda 2005; Svaleryd 2009; Rehavi 2007; Funk & Gathmann 2008; Washington 2008). This work typically uses the citizen-candidate framework, where political actors are endowed with the power to make certain policy choices with autonomy. The problem is that it downplays the role of political parties, which play an essential role in helping voters choose between many complex political choices and helping politicians coordinate over policy preferences once in office (Aldrich 1995; Kitschelt 2000). Neither spatial nor citizen-candidate models provide a satisfactory framework for understanding when politician identity is relevant to policy outcomes.

The theory presented in this chapter acknowledges the dominant role of parties, and also provides a framework for understanding which issues are likely to be influenced by politician identity. It draws attention to systemic bias in candidate selection procedures, which results in some groups facing high barriers to entry in politics, and the strong incentives of parties to downplay concerns that split their constituencies. I suggest that the interplay of group status and issue type determines whether and how identity matters to policies. In particular, the theory predicts that political market failure can occur for issues that are both off the main-left right dimension and supported by disadvantaged groups that lack access to office. It is likely that these issues will remain off the political agenda, and I use the example of women’s demands for work-family conciliation. In this context I argue that it is especially important to have women in office, and that quotas can be an important vehicle for achieving both descriptive representation and policy change. The general logic of this theory should apply in contexts other than women’s policy demands – for example,
whether the policy demands of immigrants or labor market ‘outsiders’ are addressed. It can also explain why politician identity has been found to matter for some policy issues but not others; e.g., maternity leave policies (Kittilson 2008) but not education spending (Rehavi 2007).

Second, the theory proposed here provides new insights into how identity is linked to change within the context of parliamentary democracies. Most of the literature on identity and policy outcomes studies the role of identity in majoritarian settings like the United States (e.g., Ueda 2005; Rehavi 2007; Washington 2008) or at the executive level rather than in parliaments (e.g., Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2004). In line with the contemporary political economy literature, I expect that the details of legislative structures are important for understanding policy change. In both majoritarian and executive contexts individual politicians are likely to have more power to influence policy change than in parliamentary democracies. I draw on the literature on intra-party negotiation and policy feedback to argue that both increased numbers of women in parliament and issue salience are likely to be important mechanisms for policy change in the parliamentary setting.

The following chapters build on these theoretical insights, using case studies to explore these and additional explanations, such as the relative size of gender gaps in preferences for policies. But first, I turn to the question of why study gender quota laws to test the theory developed here. The next chapter addresses the causes of quota laws themselves, making the case that quotas can provide unique causal leverage provided that we control for relevant potential confounders.
3 | Why Quotas?

Identity is difficult to study. Experts in causality often warn against making causal inferences on the basis of group identity because it is impossible to randomly assign (Gelman & Hill 2006; Winship & Morgan 1999). Studying the effects of women in politics is complicated because electorates that elect women likely differ from those that do not. Policy outcomes may arise not from more women in office, but from something else that may cause both women’s representation and female-friendly policy change, such as a cultural shift. To make progress on this question, I examine the impact of political gender quota laws. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, quotas lead to large increases in the numbers of women elected, and – unlike cultural change – these increases are often abrupt. Measuring changes in policy positions and outcomes following semi-exogenous quota ‘shocks’ allows me to test whether and how quotas affect the policymaking process. However in order to make causal claims, it is important to have a good understanding of the causes of quota adoption and how they relate to policy change. That is the goal of this chapter.

The following chapter gives a brief history of the rise of quota laws in advanced democracies, and discusses potential confounders of the relationship between quotas and policy change for women. I control for these variables in subsequent quantitative analysis. In the final section of this chapter I use these confounders to select most similar ‘matched pair’ qualitative case studies in a statistical matching procedure. The matching procedure successfully identifies paired cases for the ‘quota countries’ of Belgium and Portugal. These paired cases are similar on potential confounding variables, but did not have a quota law. Belgium is paired to Austria, and Portugal to Italy. Controlling for the relevant confounders allows me to make the claim that differences in the key
variable of interest, the quota law, are the cause of differences in the outcomes of the pairs. I draw on these case studies in subsequent empirical chapters.

### 3.1 The Rise of Quotas for Women in Politics

Over the past twenty years the use of gender quotas has increased dramatically. Three main types exist: 1) voluntary party provisions ("party quotas"), often included in party statutes; 2) laws that require all political parties to include a minimum percentage of women on their candidate lists ("quota laws"); and finally 3) laws that require women to be elected to certain positions, rather than only nominated ("political reservations"). While common in less democratic countries, political reservations for women do not exist in Western advanced democracies. This study focuses on quota laws as the main explanatory variable because they oblige all parties in a country to comply, and as I will demonstrate in Chapter 4 they tend to be more effective at increasing numbers of women in office than party quotas. I thus expect quota laws to have greater policy impact compared to party quotas. Over fifty countries have introduced electoral gender quota laws at the national level (see Table 3.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Adopted</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Threshold (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page

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1Italy’s quota was declared unconstitutional in 1995, but a 2003 constitutional reform removed these barriers. Another quota law was passed in 2015.

2Venezuela’s quota was repealed in 2000. In 2015 the electoral council (CNE) adopted new legislation requiring women make up at least 40% of candidate lists.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Adopted</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Threshold (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herz.</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>NA⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>20 - 50%⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Electoral Law</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³Colombia’s quota was declared unconstitutional in 2001, but 2003 legislation removed these constitutional barriers. Another law passed in 2011.

⁴Cape Verde’s electoral law includes a requirement for gender ‘balance’ in the candidate lists, but a percentage is not specified.

⁵Algeria’s law requires quotas of between 20% and 50% of the candidates for parliament to be women, depending on the number of seats in each electoral district.
Voluntary party quotas were the first type of quota provision to be implemented in advanced democracies, beginning in Norway in the 1970s. For the sake of the book, voluntary party quotas refer to measures adopted by the party requiring a minimum percentage of women in the candidates for national level legislative office. The Norwegian Socialist Left Party adopted a quota stipulating that 40% of parliamentary candidates be women in 1975 (Henig, 2002; Matland, 2005). Other parties in Norway quickly followed suit, and today all but the right wing Conservatives and Progress Party have established voluntary quota provisions (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005). The trend for voluntary party quotas spread quickly around Western Europe and other advanced democracies. Today, most of the countries in my dataset have had voluntary party quotas at some point since the 1970s, with the exceptions being Finland, Greece, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. For a complete list of political parties with voluntary quota provisions, please see Appendix 4A.

Parties set different thresholds for their quota provisions, and these have tended to increase over time, ranging from 12% (Party of the Catalan Socialists, from 1982 until 1987) to 50% or parity (e.g., Germany’s Party of Democratic Socialism since 1990). Implementation of these provisions also varies, with some parties seeming to take their own quota provisions more seriously than others. Because they are not bound by law, ultimately the extent to which parties comply with their own voluntary measures depends entirely on their disposition to do so.

Electoral quota laws began emerging in the 1990s. Figure 3.1 presents a timeline of quota laws in advanced democracies. The timeline indicates when quota laws were first implemented, i.e. the first election in which a quota was used. In my sample of advanced democracies, five countries have passed a quota law: Italy (since repealed), Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal. Other countries are debating or recently passed such a law for future elections. In Austria a law

6Parties have also adopted quotas for their internal organization, for local and regional candidate lists, and for European Parliament candidate lists. Because of my focus on the representation of women in national legislatures, I code for national level quota provisions only.
was proposed by the national parliament but failed to pass in 1999 (Köpl 2005). Ireland and Greece both passed a quota law in 2012, to apply from the next general election. Italy’s 2015 electoral law also includes a gender quota provision, to apply from 2016.

Figure 3.1: Timeline of Quota Law Implementation in Advanced Democracies (First Election in Use)

Notes: The figure shows the first year a quota law was used by each country. Regarding adoption of quota laws, Italy passed a quota law in 1993 (repealed by the Constitutional Court in 1995), followed by Belgium in 1994, France in 2000, Portugal in 2006 and Spain in 2007. Italy’s law was in effect only for the years 1994 and 1995.

Like party quotas, quota laws are characterized by varying thresholds and levels of compliance. While parties are technically obliged to comply with the law, different laws have different types of enforcement mechanisms – and some have none at all. In Belgium, non-compliance leads to rejection of the list by the public authorities, whereas in France the sanction for non-compliance is a financial penalty (Meier, 2004; Fréchette, Maniquet & Morelli, 2008). In addition, some quota laws have what are known as ‘placement mandates’ while others do not. Placement mandates require parties to put women in winnable positions on the party list, rather than placing placing female candidates on the bottom of the ballot where they have little chance of being elected. Using the same examples, from 2002 the Belgian quota law requires that the first two positions on electoral lists cannot be occupied by candidates of the same sex (Meier, 2004). France has no requirements about placement, because it is not possible to have such a rule in a single-member district electoral system. Because quota laws are imposed on some parties against their will, levels of compliance to quota laws may vary depending on the strength of the individual law. I come back to the question of whether the strength of quota laws and outcomes are related in detail in subsequent chapters.
3.2 The Causes of Quota Adoption: Potential Confounders

What are the causes of quota adoption, and how do these factors affect the probability of policy outcomes for women? By ‘policy outcomes for women’ I refer to policy changes in the direction of women’s interests. Recall that survey data on gender gaps in policy preferences (Chapter 2) show that women prefer more social spending in general, and especially more attention to work-family issues. In this section I focus on identifying the variables that might correlate with both quota adoption and social spending. A good understanding of potential confounders is critical for addressing endogeneity concerns that inevitably arise with a cross-national study of this type.

The following discussion is informed by secondary literature on quota adoption and welfare state expansion, and by evidence from fieldwork in two quota countries, Belgium and Portugal. I select these two countries because they are characterized by useful variation on dimensions of theoretical interest – in particular, the average gender gap in policy preferences and the length of time a quota law has been in place. In September – December 2013 I conducted approximately 40 interviews in these countries, with past and current party members and politicians, members of NGOs, government bodies, and political activists. This was the first stage of research in a ‘most similar systems’ design (Collier 1993), where countries with similar economic, social, and political contexts are chosen, particularly with regards to the determinants of my main explanatory variable, quota adoption. The purpose of the fieldwork was to gain knowledge about why certain countries adopt quota laws, and what effects these laws might have on policy outcomes.

I identify six potential confounders for matching: women in parliament, economic development, female labor force participation, Catholicism, proportional representation, and party quotas. I also discuss four other potential confounders which are not included in matching due to lack of relevance to these cases or data availability: left party power, women’s movements, international influence, and the strategic incentives of (male) party leaders. I discuss each of these in turn below.
Previous percentage of women in parliament

Perhaps the most important cause of adopting a quota law is low and stagnant levels of women’s representation. Most of the countries that have quota laws are characterized by small numbers of women in office before the law is passed (Spain is an exception). The motivation for adopting the law in the first place is overwhelmingly to increase women’s descriptive representation. However, not all countries with low levels of women in office go on to pass a quota law. For example, before Belgium introduced a quota law in 1995 the percentage of women stood at 9.5%, similar to the U.K. and Australia (both 9%), which have never passed a quota law. The under-representation of women in office signals a problem that could be addressed in various ways besides passing a quota law (e.g., awareness raising campaigns, internal political party recruiting or training, or internal political party quotas) and result in similar policy outcomes, making it particularly important to control for as a potential confounder. The share of women in parliament has also been linked to increases in overall levels of spending (Bolzendahl & Brooks 2007; Bolzendahl 2009), and spending on child care and parental leave (Bonoli & Reber 2010; Kittilson 2008).

In both Belgium and Portugal the majority of interviewees stated that the purpose of the law was to increase women’s representation, in order to achieve more equality with men. For example, when asked why he decided to propose the law in Belgium (along with Miet Smet), the former Minister of the Interior Louis Tobback replied:

“Well I am a Socialist as you probably know, and I saw simply the fact that the population was composed of 50.6% of women and 49.4% men, but in parliament and also on the local and provincial and the Flemish level, the assemblies and the representation was composed of 90% men, to qualify it simply.”  

In Portugal, an MP from the left-wing party Bloco Esquerda (BE) commented: “So we supported it in the first place, I believe we were even pioneers in the project, because we think that there must be a state guarantee that women – both genders, but in practice women – can be really

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7Louis Tobback, personal interview, 20 September 2013, Leuven, Belgium.
represented in the parliament.”

Augusto Santos Silva, a former MP and Minister for the Socialist party in Portugal (the other party supporting the quota legislation), explains further: “It was quite strange and absurd that the last locus of power not open to women [after the dictatorship ended] was in fact political power and political parties. So it was not hard to convince the members of the party that we needed to make a step forward, and that step forward had to have some administrative dimension.”

Gender equality was also the stated goal in the push for quotas at the international level. The former chair of the Committee for Equality in the Council of Europe, Regina Tavares da Silva, explained that the issue of parity was first discussed in the Council of Europe, and soon after the European Commission also took up the issue. In 1992 these discussions resulted in the first “European Summit of Women in Power”, where The Athens Declaration was issued. The declaration was signed by 20 women leaders, and was intended to respond to debates about women’s representation and provide a resource to support the case for women’s representation in member states. The document put the need for gender equality at center stage. For example, it states that, “Formal and informal equality between women and men is a fundamental human right. Women represent more than half the population. Equality requires parity in the representation and administration of Nations.” The declaration goes on to call for action: “We call upon all the political leadership at European and national level to accept the full consequences of the democratic idea on which their parties are built, in particular by ensuring balanced participation between women and men in positions of power, particularly political and administrative positions, through measures to raise awareness and through mechanisms.”

Finally the percentage of women in parliament is perhaps the best proxy available for attitudes towards women in politics (Norris 1985), a very difficult variable to measure. Survey data

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8 Luis Fazenda, personal interview, 5 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
9 Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
10 Regina Tavares da Silva, personal interview, 13 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
are only available for certain countries, with large gaps over time.\textsuperscript{12} If there were different trends in attitudes towards women in politics in quota- and non-quota countries before the introduction of quotas, this would pose serious problems for causal inference. Because including trends in attitudes directly is not possible, I use the share of women in parliament to control for the concern that attitudes towards women in politics, and policies that women prefer, were already changing before the quota law was passed. The next variables I consider address the question of why levels of women’s representation in political office were so low in the first place in ‘quota countries’, but not in others.

**Economic development and women’s employment**

Economic development and associated increases in female labor force participation could be associated with quota adoption through their link to increases in women’s representation (Matland 1998; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008; Tripp & Kang 2008). Many ‘quota countries’ suffer from low levels of female participation in the workforce – e.g., Italy and Spain. Even in Portugal, where the share of women in the labor force is relatively high, the historical lack of women in positions of power was cited as one of the reasons numbers of women in parliament remained low. Center-left (PS) party member Ana Coucello explains, “In the dictatorship there were practically only men in decision-making, so it was perceived like a man’s thing. . . nowadays even sometimes it’s difficult for women to speak in public, mainly in gatherings where men are in the vast majority.”\textsuperscript{13}

Female labor force participation might also be linked to quota adoption through its effect on voter attitudes. Some argue that quota laws are more likely to be adopted in egalitarian political cultures (Lovenduski & Norris, 1993). Female labor force participation has also been found to be an important determinant of female policy preferences (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2006), which could

\textsuperscript{12}The best survey question would probably be the following, from the World Values Survey: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.” This question is not available for most quota countries before 2010. I find similar problems with other survey questions.

\textsuperscript{13}Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
in turn affect policy outcomes. Both economic development and female employment are related to policy outcomes. For example, as incomes and government revenues increase, demand for public expenditure should also rise (Wagner’s Law). Workforce participation entitles some women to benefits that they would otherwise not be eligible for and increases their need for services to help balance work and family.

**Culture – history of Catholicism**

One of the most common explanations for low levels of women in office in my interviews was patriarchal culture. In Belgium the French politicians often spoke of ‘machiste’ (chauvinist or macho) attitudes, while in Portugal interviewees linked low representation directly to the country’s history of Catholicism and its promotion of traditional values. In fact, every country that has passed a quota law in Europe has a strong tradition of Catholicism, from France with 75% of the population Catholic as of 1980, to Spain with 96%. Of course it is very difficult to define and measure culture, and the history of Catholicism seems to be a stronger factor in Portugal than it was in Belgium. However, religion is perhaps the most common way of controlling for culture in the comparative literature, and it most likely correlates highly with other measures such as survey data. I use history of Catholicism as a proxy for conservative social pressure that may affect the likelihood of women’s under-representation, the need for quota legislation, and policy outcomes.

In Belgium, the leader of the French ecologist party explains why she came to support quota legislation:

> “You know at first before I became a Green personality I was against this type of policy. I thought we women have the same quality as men, and we don’t need this kind of help to get elected. And after that I engaged in politics and I discovered that it was not true, especially at the communal [local] level. It is quite difficult to find women at this level to get involved in politics. And if there are ‘machiste’ men... the fight is really hard at this level because everyone knows each other. So if we don’t do this kind of policy, women will not come naturally in the communal districts.”

A politician from the French Socialist party conveys the same sentiment discussing why

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14 Emily Hoyos, personal interview, 13 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
his party was initially divided on the issue of supporting a quota for women: “I think that in the party... you have of course a lot of men in the party who have a 'machiste' attitude, which for me is a contradiction. If you are Socialist or Social Democrat in Europe you have to be feminist.”

In Portugal, the following comment by a member of the center-right party (PSD) gives a good sense of the views I heard from many interviewees:

“Personally I am totally in favor of quota systems, especially for some countries that don’t have the historical background on the fight for women’s rights, and especially where is a general philosophy in a society that is not much in favor of equality of opportunities between women and men, which is the case in Portugal. Take the example of the Nordic countries, where in some countries like Sweden for example, they did not need the quota law because the political parties made an agreement between themselves, and so actually they respect the quota law without law. On the other hand you have some countries like Portugal where it is a patriarchal society, somehow still with traditional values, with the paterfamilias, the head of a family is a man and everybody has to obey and follow the orders of the leader.”

Moreover, in Portugal interviewees directly connect the persistence of traditional values and patriarchal culture to the Catholic church. The former leader of a feminist NGO involved in the campaign for gender quota legislation claims that women were under-represented in political office because, “the culture is very sexist and very misogynist to the protagonism of women and girls. And one of the dimensions of this is the church and religion, and it is a very important dimension, because Catholicism appeals to the value of the mother and the value of the virtue of women, but not the protagonism of women in public space.” Catholicism has also been linked to policy outcomes, including family policy and labor market outcomes for women (Castles, 1994). In Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology, Christian Democratic welfare states are characterized by Catholicism, as well as emphasis on the traditional male breadwinner family, low labor force participation for women, and relatively low provision of welfare state goods and services (Esping-Andersen, 1990a).

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15 Yvan Mayeur, personal interview, 17 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
16 José Mendes Bota, personal interview, 7 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
17 Maria Jose Magalhaes, personal interview, 8 November 2013, Porto, Portugal.
Electoral system

Although empirical studies have consistently shown that (especially closed list) proportional representation and large district magnitude are associated with higher levels of women in office (e.g., Norris 1985; Rule 1987; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010), most national quota laws have been implemented in countries with PR electoral systems. Quotas are thought to be more compatible with PR systems where the party presents a list of candidates than with majority systems with lower district magnitude (Matland, 2006). Belgium and Portugal both have systems of proportional representation; France is an exception to this rule. Recent research has shown that electoral rules also exert a strong effect on policy outcomes: majoritarian electoral systems are associated with smaller government spending and smaller welfare states compared to systems of proportional representation (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002; Persson & Tabellini 2005; Iversen & Soskice 2006).

Another factor that emerged in interviews was the idea (already apparent from previous comments) that it is harder to achieve gender balance when local party leaders control candidate selection. The Flemish Social Democrat Louis Tobback described what he termed an 'interesting phenomenon' in Belgium. When there was only one large electoral district as in elections for the European Parliament, the candidate lists were organized by national party bureaus, and he saw there was a more balanced representation. Tobback also brought up neighboring Holland, which has only one large district for national level politics, and said it was the same there. The problem, for him, “was in the first place on the local level, where the people in place didn’t want to depart and leave their places to women.” In Portugal also, the influence of local party structures is an important factor. Center-right (PSD) party member Teresa Morais says that the lists in her party are composed by proposals of the regional and local structures, but they are also overseen and sometimes changed by the national direction of the party, especially now with the quota law. This is the typical way candidate lists are composed for most parties in both Belgium and Portugal. Morais states, “I think that in some districts the situation [of women’s under-representation] would be worse if the national direction didn’t interfere. Because the local structures, I wouldn’t say every
one of them but some local structures, seem to have a lot of difficulty to find available women.”  

Unfortunately cross-national time-series data on candidate selection procedures are not available. Because of this I pay special attention to checking candidate selection procedures in the matched pairs for balance.

**Voluntary party quotas**

Finally party-level experience with voluntary gender quota provisions might also be linked to adoption of a quota law. Previous research posits a ‘contagion effect’ between party and national level quotas whereby existence of party-level legislation paves the way for the law (Meier 2004). In Belgium, the French Greens, Flemish Greens, Flemish Christian Democrats, French Christian Democrats, and Flemish Social Democrats all had voluntary quotas for electoral lists in their party statutes before the quota law was passed. When asked why a national law was passed, French Green party leader Emily Hoyos said, “Maybe it’s because we did it and it worked,” referring to her party’s internal quota. In Portugal, the Socialist party (PS) and left-wing BE both had internal quotas for women before the law was passed. Christian Democrat MP João Almeida explains that the parties then went on to support a national law because, “it was a matter of passing to the national agenda an issue that was in their own agenda within the parties. So the two parties have that obligation in their statutes and tried to pass it into law because they thought it was a good advancement in their gender agenda.”

In most cases internal party quota provisions are passed only after significant debate within the party. Having this discussion within the party could make members more likely to be unified in support for a national law. Parties also gain experience implementing the law and are able to see that it is effective (as in the quote from French Green party leader Emily Hoyos above), which increases their support. While some party-level experience with voluntary quotas seems to be an

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18 Teresa Morais, personal interview, 2 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
19 The Database of Political Institutions has a ‘select’ variable which in theory codes for this, but data are not available for the countries or years in my sample, aside from the United States.
20 João Almeida, personal interview, 20 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
important factor (in fact all countries that have adopted a quota law in Europe had some previous party quotas), if most of the parties have already set quotas for themselves it is likely that women’s numbers have increased as a result, and national legislation might be rendered unnecessary. I expect that voluntary party quotas are linked to policy outcomes mainly through the indirect mechanism of increased women’s representation.

To what extent can we treat party quotas and national quota laws as discrete variables? In many cases, use of party quotas preceded quota laws. However, not all countries that have party quotas go on to adopt quota laws. There is also considerable variation in the use of party quotas among countries that pass a quota law. The correlation between quota laws and party quotas is positive at 0.15, but low and not statistically significant. Thus I treat party and national quotas as distinct phenomena, and consider party quotas an important potential confounder in the relationship between quota laws and policy change.

Other potential confounding variables

I found the variables discussed above to be the most relevant and convincing causes of quota adoption from the literature and my field research in Belgium and Portugal. These are the variables I use for matching to select my case studies. In addition to these, previous literature suggests that several other variables might be important. I considered four additional variables for inclusion in the matching procedure: left party power, women’s movements, international influence, and the incentives of (male) political elites. While I would ideally like to match on other underlying country characteristics, a larger number of covariates will increase the distance between units in the covariate space, meaning matched pairs will be generally further apart. For this reason it can be detrimental to match on variables that are not confounders (Nielsen & Sheffield, 2012). The following discussion justifies leaving them out of the matching procedure, either because I do not find them to be important potential confounders within my set of cases, or because of data availability.

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21Point-biserial correlation carried out using Stata package pbis.
**Left party power**

Conventional wisdom holds that left parties are more ‘women-friendly’, and this implies that they may push through both quota reforms and women’s policy agendas. Commitment to sexual equality has been a longstanding element of socialist (and many other left parties’) ideology (Duverger 1955), while conservative parties tend to favor laissez-faire policies over concrete affirmative action measures. Left parties have also been linked to increases in social spending and feminist policies in particular (Huber & Stephens 2000; Allan & Scruggs 2004; Mazur 2002; O’Connor 1999).

However, within my sample of cases left partisanship is not a strong driver of quota reforms. In two countries, Spain and Portugal, the left-right divide regarding quotas is clearly discernable. The left pushed through quota legislation when it gained a majority in government (Verge 2012; Baum & Espirito-Santo 2012). Yet in France and Belgium, center-right parties were instrumental in proposing and supporting quota legislation. In both of these countries right-wing parties played key roles in passing quota reforms (Meier 2012; Murray 2012b). In the case of Italy as well a center-left coalition was responsible for the quota reform, including strong advocates from the Christian Democratic party (Palici di Suni 2012). Because the evidence that left party power explains quota adoption seems relatively weak, I do not include it in the matching procedure. I do control for left party power in the larger-N quantitative analysis.

**Women’s movements and women’s party sections**

Women’s groups are thought to be at the forefront of many quota reforms, either in the form of popular women’s movements or party-internal women’s sections (Kittilson 2006; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009). The case of Poland mentioned in the Introduction is a good example. It is very difficult to measure the presence or strength of women’s movements across countries over time. The best data available come from Htun and Weldon (2012), who compile measures of the strength and autonomy of feminist women’s movements over time in 70 countries. Their data show that there was no change in the strength or autonomy of women’s movements in Belgium, France, and
Portugal before a quota law was passed. In the remaining two ‘quota countries’, Italy and Spain, the strength of feminist women’s movements declined before the quota law passed (autonomy remained the same). Similarly, my interviews suggest little evidence that popular women’s movements were behind the push for quota laws, with the exception of France. Existing literature suggests that a popular parity movement was influential in coercing political actors in France to address the issue (Murray 2012b). However, overall the role of women’s sections within parties was considered to be much more important.

In Belgium, Flemish Christian Democrat Sabine de Bethune played a key role in the quota legislation when she worked in the cabinet of then-Minister for Labor and Employment, and Equality, Miet Smet. The legislation is commonly known as the Smet-Tobback Law, referring to the joint proposal of Christian Democrat Miet Smet and Social Democrat Louis Tobback. Smet and de Bethune were both members of the Christian Democrats’ women’s section, Women and Society (founded by Smet in 1973). De Bethune states, “We would not have succeeded if it weren’t for the women’s group in my party. This was the important factor.” 22 According to de Bethune, the women’s section led the campaign for quotas within the party and in the law.

In Portugal also the strength of women’s sections was clearly relevant. Sonia Fertuzinhos, Socialist party MP and the former President of the Socialist party’s women’s section at the time of the quota legislation, says of the law, “it was only possible, at that point [2006], because we had in our party a history of the Socialist women’s department that started before. Since the beginning, more organized or less, we always had a group of women inside the party that fought for this.” 23 Party member and political activist Ana Coucello confirms, “Sonia Fertuzinhos, she did a great job as president of the women’s department, so Sonia was also very, very crucial, very essential. She built a lot of constituencies among the women of the party for that.” 24

While I agree that women’s sections within political parties seem to be an important factor in quota adoption, I do not include it in the matching procedure for two reasons. First, we lack

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22 Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
23 Sonia Fertuzinhos, personal interview, 22 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
24 Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
data on the presence and strength of women’s sections across countries and political parties over
time. Currently no such dataset exists, and descriptions of women’s groups advocating for quota
legislation tend to come from quota countries only. Second, women’s sections are likely to be highly
correlated with voluntary party quotas, which I do include in the matching procedure. In her study
of ten Western European countries, Kittilson (2006) finds that women’s organizations have often
been instrumental in pushing for internal quotas within parties. In my fieldwork I found this to be
ture for most of the parties that passed voluntary quotas in Belgium and Portugal as well. Given
this link, I would expect voluntary quotas within the party to be a more powerful influence on quota
adoption than having a women’s section alone. This is because getting a quota passed in the party
likely indicates that the women’s organization is especially strong, and because having the debate
about quotas within the party ahead of any legislation tends to get all party members, rather than
only women, on board with supporting the principle of quotas.

International influence

Another explanation focuses on the role of international influence and transnational sharing. Quotas
have spread rapidly over a relatively short period of time, and some scholars point to the exchange
of information across national borders as a key reason (Krook, 2006, 2008). While I found this to be
ture for my cases, all influence was at the European or global level. In both Belgium and Portugal
the most important international influence cited was the Council of Europe and its initiatives
(discussed above).25 In the early 1990s, Council of Europe member states included all European
states in my sample, and others were granted observer status in 1995 (U.S.) and 1996 (Canada and
Japan). The only countries in my sample that were non-members are Australia and New Zealand.26
Other international influences cited were the European Commission, the European Women’s Lobby,
Socialist Women International, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women

25Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium; Anne-Marie Lizin, personal inter-
view, 9 September 2013, Brussels Belgium; José Mendes Bota, personal interview, 7 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal;
Regina Tavares da Silva, personal interview, 13 November 2013; Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013,
Lisbon, Portugal.

26http://www.coe.int/.
(CEDAW), and the Beijing Platform for Action.\textsuperscript{27} In short this explanation would seem to apply to most countries in my dataset, i.e. Europe, and is not able to clarify why why international influence leads to quota reforms in some countries but not others. Thus it is not included in the matching procedure here. In subsequent party-level analysis, I control for party family in order to account for the possibility that similar parties (e.g., socialist parties) might have close ties to each other across countries which affect the likelihood of quota adoption and outcomes.

**Incentives of (male) political elites**

Finally, another approach focuses on the role of (typically male) political elites and their reasons for supporting quota laws. After all in every case of quota adoption in Europe the leaders of supporting parties were male, and their support had to be crucial for getting the legislation on the agenda and passed into law. The role of then Socialist party leader and Prime Minister Jóse Sócrates was emphasized by many of my interviewees in Portugal, including the Socialist MEP Ana Gomes: “by the time the parity law was introduced by the PS they were still a very patriarchal party, but Sócrates saw this was a question of modernity and he pushed it. Look, in these things the leadership makes all the difference.”\textsuperscript{28} In Belgium, the Christian Democrat party leader and then Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene was in favor of the law, and used his position to influence other party leaders to support the law in parliament: “Dehaene had to invite the party presidents of different parties in the majority to ask them to get it through to the parliament, and only then was it accepted in the Council of Ministers.”\textsuperscript{29}

Previous literature suggests that elites might support quota laws for strategic reasons, such as gaining more control over their opponents within or outside the party (Panday, 2008; Krook, 2009), or as a way to demonstrate commitment to women without really intending to change the

\textsuperscript{27}Anne-Marie Lizin, personal interview, 9 September 2013, Brussels Belgium; Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal; Regina Tavares da Silva, personal interview, 13 November 2013; João Almeida, personal interview, 20 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal; Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal

\textsuperscript{28}Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.

\textsuperscript{29}Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Begium.
existing status quo (Htun & Jones, 2002; Bird, 2003). For example Baldez (2004) finds that in the context of electoral uncertainty party leaders will support gender quotas as a way of boosting support among women while also consolidating control over the nomination process. Elites might also have ideological motives; they might genuinely believe that gender equality is a matter of justice worth pursuing, even if it means some male politicians in the party lose their seats. This kind of variable – strategic or ideological motives of party leaders – would be very difficult to define and measure across countries for use in matching analysis, and for that reason it is not included here. However, I note that voluntary party quotas, which I do include in matching, are likely to be correlated with male party leader support for gender equality. I address this question in much more detail in Chapter 4, which uses detailed case studies of quota adoption and implementation in Belgium and Portugal to gain leverage on the role of elite incentives.

### 3.3 Case Study Matching Procedure

I use a statistical matching procedure to select two matched pair cases for qualitative research. Matching offers a transparent and principled way to select cases when there are many relevant variables. I select the ‘quota countries’ of Belgium and Portugal because these countries are of particular interest: in both a quota law led to increases in the percentage of women in office, but in very different contexts and time periods. Specifically, there is variation in the average size of the gender gap in policy preferences (women in Belgium tending to be more progressive), and in the length of time that a quota law has been in place. The following section provides further details about the matching procedure, including a discussion of similarities and differences between the matched pair countries and tables showing the data used.

I match on the six variables identified as potential confounders: percentage of women in parliament, percentage of population Catholic (1980), proportional representation, economic development (income per capita), women’s labor force participation, and percentage of parties with voluntary quotas (weighted by seat share in parliament).[^30] The matching procedure is carried

[^30]: Data on percentage of women in parliament, female labor force participation, and proportional representation...
out using the \texttt{MatchIt} package version 2.4-20 in \texttt{R} version 2.14.0. I conduct separate matching procedures for Belgium and Portugal, subsetting the data to countries with elections in the years including and immediately preceding the year in which a quota law was adopted for each case (1994 in Belgium and 2006 in Portugal). I include only one election-year per country.

I drop other 'quota countries' before matching. I use nearest neighbor, Mahalanobis matching. Nearest neighbor matching selects the single best control match for each 'treated' unit (i.e., Belgium and Portugal). Matching is done using a distance measure, and here the Mahalanobis option is used because it allows for continuous covariates (Ho et al. 2011). The match is selected based on Mahalanobis distance, a generalization of Euclidean distance that accounts for correlations between variables (Rubin 1973). Tables 3.2 and 3.3 at the end of this section present data used in the matching procedures. Matched pairs are in \textbf{bold}.

The matching procedure successfully identifies matches for both Belgium and Portugal. Belgium is matched to Austria, and Portugal is matched to Italy. Taking Belgium and Austria first, both are considered social democratic welfare states, and as Table 3.2 shows they had very similar levels of economic development and female labor force participation in this time period. Before the Belgian quota law both had relatively few women in office – although Belgium especially so (9%, compared to Austria’s 22%). The electoral systems in the two countries are similar, both having closed list PR systems with medium-sized districts (about 14 - 20 legislators elected per district on average) in the early 1990s. Both countries have a strong history of Catholicism, with 89% and 90% of the population identifying as Catholic in 1980 in Austria and Belgium respectively. Both also had political parties with voluntary quota laws, including the socialist SPÖ in Austria and the Flemish Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in Belgium. Finally, I note that Austria is one of the only advanced democracies where a quota law was proposed by the national parliament following the 1994 elections but failed to pass (in 1999) (Köpl, 2005). This suggests that it is a

come from the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version; income per capita comes from the U.N. World Development Indicators (2014); percentage of the population Catholic as of 1980 from (La Porta et al. 1999); and the share of parties with voluntary gender quotas comes from an original dataset (see Appendix 4A for details).

\footnote{After 1995 Belgium adopted several changes to increase the importance of preference votes, so it is now considered an open list system.}
particularly good counterfactual for the case of Belgium.

Portugal and Italy are Southern European countries with similarly low levels of women in office before the Portuguese quota law was adopted (21% and 10% respectively). The electoral systems at the time were similar, with both having closed list PR systems and multi-member districts. Catholicism is also very strong in both countries. The main left-wing parties in both countries had a voluntary party quota at the time (the DS in Italy and the PS in Portugal). The match is less close on the economy and women’s employment. Italy is a higher income country, but in Portugal a greater percentage of women are active in the labor market. However, since both of these factors are hypothesized to lead to greater levels of women’s representation and higher social spending, the bias from the mismatch ought to even out. I also note that the two countries’ economies are often compared due to high national budget deficits relative to GDP, and high, or rising, government debt levels (as in the derogatory ‘PIGS’ acronym).

Finally, I have extra confidence in this match because – as in the case of Austria – a quota law was proposed in Italy around the same time as in Portugal. Italy was on the verge of passing a national quota law in 2006, the same year that Portugal passed its quota law, but the proposal elapsed at the end of the legislature. In fact Italy is the only other advanced democracy in my sample besides Austria where a quota law was proposed in parliament but failed to pass.\textsuperscript{32} This suggests that the covariates I match on should be considered appropriate determinants of quota adoption, and lends extra confidence to the general matching procedure.

\textbf{Balance on other potential confounders}

First, I am concerned that my measure of electoral system, proportional representation, does not capture the degree of national party control in the candidate selection process. In Austria, as of 1989 the three main political parties (the Social Democratic Party, the Austrian People’s Party, and the Freedom Party of Austria) were all characterized by decentralized candidate selection procedures. In each of these parties the subnational units propose candidates which are subject to the national

\textsuperscript{32}Italy has since passed a quota law (2015), which comes into force in 2016.
organization’s approval (Bille 2001). This is similar to the way most political parties composed their party lists in Belgium at that time. In Italy, the electoral system has been through many changes. However before a quota law was passed in Portugal (in the early 00's), candidate selection in Italy was mostly decentralized. Lists were composed by sub-national units, with national level organs retaining the power to approve or reject candidates, in the main left parties (the Democratic Party of the Left and the Refounded Communists) and in most of the right-wing parties as well (Lega Nord, National Alliance). Exceptions were right-wing Forza Italia and centrist Christian Democrats (UDC). In these parties, the national party organization was the one to nominate the candidates, after consulting with the sub-national party (Calossi & Pizzimenti 2013). Still, the majority of parties gaining seats in the parliament selected their candidates in a decentralized procedure.

Turning to the other variables that have been cited as causes of quota adoption in the literature, we can see that both matches are European countries, and thus would have been subject to similar influence by the Council of Europe, European Commission, and other European-level and global organizations. Both Austria and Italy also have some political parties with established women’s sections, like their counterparts in Belgium and Portugal. In Austria both the Social Democratic party and the Austrian People’s Party have had a women’s section since 1945.\footnote{http://frauen.spoe.at/ueber-uns; http://www.frauenoffensive.at/service/geschichte-der-oesterreichischen-frauenbewegung.html; and see Kopl 2005.} In Italy the Democratic Party of the Left established a women’s section in the party in 1991 (Guadagnini 2005).
Table 3.2: Data for Matching: Belgium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>% Women in parliament</th>
<th>GNI per capita</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>Female labor force participation</th>
<th>% Catholic (1980)</th>
<th>Party quotas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>28,513</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.81</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>24,411</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.74</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>29,186</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42.81</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25,412</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44.74</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>38,630</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45.66</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25,295</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47.18</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>29,396</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>25,533</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43.77</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15,632</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37.25</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>38,706</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45.77</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20,952</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>32,574</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40.53</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>51,662</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36.14</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31,122</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.32</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>19,172</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43.53</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>47,290</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45.42</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>29,576</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47.98</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>48,306</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41.73</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32,791</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44.83</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3: Data for Matching: Portugal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>% Women in parliament</th>
<th>GNI per capita</th>
<th>PR</th>
<th>Female labor force participation</th>
<th>% Catholic (1980)</th>
<th>Party quotas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>17,994</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>46.75</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>32,379</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44.65</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>33,704</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46.61</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>48,209</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>47.33</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>34,774</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48.17</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>33,922</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45.18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>39,130</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45.97</td>
<td>13.1</td>
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3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed the historical development and causes of quota adoption in advanced democracies. The basic story is that quota laws are likely to emerge in countries with low levels of women’s representation (which is driven by cultural and economic factors), proportional electoral systems, and some experience with party-level quotas. I have argued that analysis of the effects of quotas on policies ought to pay special attention to six potential confounders that capture these dynamics. Some of these variables have been identified in the literature, and some derive from my qualitative research in the ‘quota countries’ of Belgium and Portugal. Accordingly, I then used these confounders to select ‘most similar’ pairs, countries which are alike to Belgium and Portugal but did not pass a quota law. This process results in two sets of matched pairs – Belgium and Austria, and Portugal and Italy. I conducted fieldwork in all four countries, and use the evidence to support quantitative findings and shed light on mechanisms in subsequent chapters.

I now turn to a series of empirical analyses. First, I validate the underlying assumption that quotas will lead to more women in office, and that this increase is often abrupt and large. The next chapter demonstrates that quota laws are important determinants of women’s descriptive representation (moreso that party quotas) and draws on case studies of quota implementation in Belgium and Portugal to explain why. Next, I carry out tests of the effects of quota laws on political party positions and spending outcomes related to women’s preferences.
The theory presented in Chapter 2 relies on a key assumption: that quota laws increase the numbers of women in office. It hypothesizes that in certain contexts (when a group lacks access to political power and its preferences are orthogonal to mainstream party issues), women and other disadvantaged groups can face a political market failure whereby their interests are not represented. Quotas are one way of correcting this market failure. The following chapter serves two purposes. First, it validates the assumption that quotas lead to more women in office, and it shows that these changes are often abrupt. This matters because dramatic increases in women’s representation constitute a ‘shock’ that helps isolate the effect of identity. Second, this chapter demonstrates that quota laws are more effective at increasing women’s descriptive representation than other types (specifically, party quotas), and contributes a new explanation for why this is the case. The results help us understand not only women’s representation, but also more generally how institutions like quotas can set in motion new dynamics that make the political process more inclusive.

In general, the literature is not very clear about why quotas should matter. If parties concerned about gender equality have the votes to pass quota regulations, why do they not simply choose to select more women candidates? And would we not expect them to do so if there were no quotas, rendering the quota redundant? In Chapter 3, I addressed the causes of quota adoption in a comparative framework, identifying the key potential confounders of the relationship between quotas and policy change. However the question of why male party leaders would support quotas
remains. As one Portuguese legislator put it, “They [men] want to keep control of the power.”\footnote{Anonymous (PS MP), personal interview, 26 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.} It is not easy to measure the attitudes and motivations of political elites on this question; as I state in Chapter 3, such a variable would be very difficult to define and operationalize for use in quantitative analysis. In this chapter I use qualitative evidence from two case studies to shed light on how the incentives of male party elites relate to quotas. Detailed narratives of quota adoption and implementation in Belgium and Portugal provide new insights into why quotas are passed and how they work.

Related to this question, existing literature is unable to explain whether some types of quotas are more effective at increasing numbers of women than others. Quantitative analysis has been slow to differentiate between types of quota provisions. Studies tend to either group all quotas together or assess the effect of only one type. Some scholars believe that party quotas are more effective because they have been voluntarily adopted rather than imposed; others argue that national quota laws are more effective because they are less easy to ignore. This chapter addresses this gap by examining the relative importance of party and national level quota provisions in advanced democracies.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I build on the literature from gender and politics and endogenous institutions to propose a new theory for why quotas, and quota laws in particular, will increase numbers of women in office. I argue that quota laws have both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ effects – helping party leaders overcome local-level opposition and forcing skeptical parties to comply, respectively. They also tend to generate significant public support, creating a powerful ‘policy feedback effect’ not present with party quotas alone. To test my argument I compile a unique new measure of party quotas and use fixed effects regression to measure the impact of both types of quotas in 21 countries from 1975 to 2010. I find that both types of quotas improve women’s representation significantly, but quota laws are more effective than voluntary party quotas. I confirm my results using synthetic control methods, which estimate the causal effect of quota laws in individual countries. Case studies of quota implementation in Belgium and Portugal help unpack
the ‘black box’ of how different quota policies work and provide initial support for each of the three mechanisms I identify. I conclude with a discussion of implications for future research.

4.1 Theoretical Development

As discussed in Chapter 2, previous literature suggests that the most important determinants of variation in women’s representation in advanced democracies are structural factors, especially women’s labor force participation and electoral rules (Norris 1985; Rule 1987; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008). Yet the recent growth of party and national level gender quotas casts doubt on the continued importance of these traditional explanations in contemporary politics (Wängnerud 2009). Because quotas are such a new phenomenon, they have not been included as an explanatory variable in much of the previous literature on determinants of women’s representation. Studies assessing the impact of gender quotas are mostly single cases (e.g., Jones 1998; Baldez 2004; Meier 2004; Jones 2004; Schmidt & Saunders 2004; Davidson-Schmich 2006), and the few comparative studies that exist find mixed results.

This is likely because scholars define gender quotas differently, and often do not distinguish between party and national level quotas. Some focus on one type of quota only, while others use a broader definition of having any type of quota. Some scholars include reserved seats (which require women to be elected rather than only nominated) in their definition while others do not. Part of the reason for these many different approaches is data availability. Perhaps the most widely used data source is the website quotaproject.org, set up by International IDEA to provide information about different types of quota policies around the world. While it serves as a useful initial resource, it is not frequently updated, especially information on party quotas. Researchers who work on the database even warn against using it in scholarly work (Krook 2013).

The handful of studies that compare countries with and without quotas show mixed effects. Hughes (2009) finds no effects of national gender quotas, but Paxton, Painter and Hughes (2010) show that national level quotas (including reserved seats) increase women’s representation.
Considering party quotas, Studlar and McAllister (2002) find that they increase levels of representation, but are not nearly as influential as well-established determinants like electoral system. Finally, Kunovich and Paxton (2005) find no evidence that quotas (defined as either national or party level quotas) result in increases for women. However Tripp and Kang (2008) find the opposite: quotas (defined as having any type of quota, including reserved seats) are the single best predictor of women’s representation.

None of these studies include both party and national level quotas as separate variables. Thus far Hughes (2011) is the only study to do so, and finds that national level quotas increase women’s representation far more than party quotas or structural factors. However this study uses cross-sectional data, which has the limitation of capturing only one historical context rather than assessing changes over time, and there are measurement issues that could be improved. The variable for national gender quotas used includes both electoral quota laws and reserved seats for women, and the measure of party quotas is a dummy variable, coded 1 if one or more parties in the country use a voluntary gender quota, and 0 otherwise. Longitudinal studies are needed in order to better understand trends in women’s representation, and more precise measurements to gauge the relative effects of different types of quotas on women’s representation.

Building on this literature, I propose that both party and national level quotas will increase numbers of women in office. But this presents a puzzle, because if supporters of more gender equality in representation have the votes to adopt quotas, why do they not simply choose to nominate more women directly? One explanation, adapted from the literature on endogenous institutions, is that while a party may be ideologically committed to equality at the top it can face internal opposition at the local level. Previous studies have identified this issue, noting that national leaders are more concerned with women’s representation and equality than local or regional party branches (Matland & Studlar 1996; Hinojosa 2012). A quota can be a way to try force the hands of local party leaders, who typically have significant power over nominations. I refer to this mechanism as the ‘vertical effect’. Theoretically, both internal party quotas and national quota laws can help to overcome this problem. I thus hypothesize the following:
**Hypothesis 1:** _All else equal, both party quotas and the adoption of quota laws will increase rates of female representation in national parliaments._

Yet party and national quota provisions operate differently, so we should expect them to lead to different results. Party quotas are voluntary, and there are two potential explanations for adopting them: 1) ideological commitment to equality and women’s representation, and 2) strategic behavior, in hopes of electoral gain. First, presumably parties that are committed to equality for ideological reasons have a strong incentive to respect the rules they set for themselves. Yet, if parties are committed to women’s representation, why not choose the same number of women candidates directly? In other words, for a quota to be necessary in the first place there must be some resistance inside the party organization to nominating women. In particular, local level opposition to a party quota might render it ineffective even if party leadership is genuinely committed to equality.

This suggests that the ‘vertical effect’ might be more successful when reinforced by national legislation. The idea of national party leaders using institutional change to squash intra-party conflict has parallels in the literature on early democratization. In the case of Britain, Lizzeri and Persico (2004) argue that national political elites wanted more spending on public goods, but (corrupt) local opposition made it difficult to implement. National level politicians expanded the suffrage in order to shift power at the local level, because particularistic politics became less feasible with larger constituencies. Iversen and Soskice (2007) expand on their argument, suggesting that extending the franchise, as opposed to simply having a legislative majority, offers elites a long-term solution to the collective action problem posed by the political entrenchment of local elites. Similarly, quota laws could provide national political elites with a way of shifting power at the local level, towards the more diverse demographics they value.

The second scenario is more straightforward. Parties might also pass internal quotas for strategic reasons, to gain votes from those who support female candidates or egalitarian values. The party thus makes an ‘empty gesture’, intending to raise positive press without actually respecting the quota. Or, change in party leadership over time may impact the implementation of a quota; e.g.,
one faction controls the party and is pro-quota, then another faction takes control and is anti-quota but doesn’t want to repeal it for strategic reasons, so ignores it. In either case, the incentive for the party to comply is low.

How do national quota laws compare? Unlike party quotas, quota laws are imposed on all parties, and thus have greater potential impact. Parties may want to use a majority in the legislature to impose equality on other parties, again for ideological or strategic reasons. I will call this the ‘horizontal effect’, and it is only present in the context of quota laws. By forcing parties with few women in their ranks to promote female candidates, they place these parties at a competitive disadvantage. The flip side of this logic is that it alleviates the concerns parties considering party-internal quotas might have that they will put themselves at a disadvantage (at least initially). Importantly, the parties forced to comply are also likely to be the ones with the lowest levels of women in their ranks, meaning they have the biggest room for improvement. The horizontal effect gives quota laws an advantage over internal party mechanisms.

Finally, I propose that a third ‘policy feedback’ mechanism also makes quota laws more effective than party quotas. As argued in Chapter 2, quota legislation spurs public support that parties find hard to ignore, a pressure that is not present when quotas exist only at the party level. The importance of policy feedback – the idea that past policies significantly affect future policy outcomes – is well-established in the literature (for an overview, see Campbell 2012a). For example, the design of welfare policies shapes the attitudes and behavior of target constituencies, affecting participation in the political process, and, in turn, the outcomes of subsequent welfare policies (e.g., Campbell 2003). Policies send certain messages to the electorate, and in this case by raising the importance of gender equality to the national agenda quota laws lead the public to expect a greater role for women in politics.

Public pressure compels parties to comply with the spirit of law, even if it is possible to shirk by exploiting certain loopholes. For example, many scholars have discussed the case of France, where the quota law is considered weak. Initially many parties ignored the law (paying a fine instead), or placed women in unwinnable seats (Fréchette, Maniquet & Morelli 2008; Murray, Krook & Opello
Although the enforcement loopholes in France have not changed, in subsequent elections parties have put forward more female candidates, complying with the law to greater extent (Murray 2010a). In 2000, the percentage of women in parliament in France was 11%. As of January 2014 it has almost tripled to 27%. Why the change? The concept of parity, once deemed unconstitutional and the subject of hostile debate, now enjoys sustained support in public opinion polls (Murray 2012a). France is not a unique case; recent literature suggests that the degree to which parties will intentionally thwart a quota law declines over time (Paxton & Hughes 2015).

In summary, national legislation is more likely to disrupt local power monopolies compared to voluntary quotas, it obliges all parties to comply, and it also elevates the issue of women in politics to the national agenda, spurring a policy feedback loop that even reluctant parties find compelling. This leads me to expect the following:

**Hypothesis 2:** National quota laws will increase rates of female representation more than party quotas.

Finally, the case of France notwithstanding, the success of quota laws is likely to depend on their policy design. Previous research suggests that although even ‘weak’ quotas (as in France) lead to increases in women’s representation, higher thresholds, placement mandates, and strict enforcement mechanisms have been shown to enhance quota effectiveness (Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010; Paxton & Hughes 2015). Higher thresholds require a greater share of female candidates, placement mandates require women occupy certain seats on candidate lists, and strict enforcement mechanisms require parties to comply with the quota for the list to be accepted. Thus I expect:

**Hypothesis 3:** Quota laws with stronger rules (strict enforcement mechanisms, placement mandates, and higher thresholds) will increase rates of female representation more than laws without such provisions.
4.2 Data & Methods

I test this argument in three ways: a time-serial cross sectional analysis of 21 countries from 1975 to 2010, a synthetic control analysis of national quota laws in 5 democracies, and two case studies exploring causal mechanisms in Belgium and Portugal. First, I analyze women’s political representation over time using cross-national time-series data. In order to ascertain the importance of quota laws and party quotas for female representation, I estimate a model that controls for all other cross-national differences using country-specific intercepts (or fixed effects). However, regression suffers from well-known endogeneity issues, even when fixed effects are included as in this analysis (e.g., Angrist & Pischke 2008, 3.2). As a robustness check on results using regression analysis, I use synthetic control methods to estimate the effect of quota laws in individual countries. If results using synthetic control estimators are similar to regression results, this adds confidence to the strength of the findings. Lastly, I use case studies to explore the soundness of my arguments about the causal mechanisms linking different types of quotas to varying levels of effectiveness.

The dependent variable is the share of seats in national legislatures held by women in election years (observations are not retained through the inter-election period). Since quotas only came into existence in the 1970s and have become most popular in recent years, I begin the sample in 1975 and extend it to 2010. Data include 21 advanced democracies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The baseline regression model with country fixed effects can be written as:

\[ Y_{it} = \beta_1 Quota\ Law_{it} + \beta_2 Party\ Quota_{it} + \beta_3 Z_{it} + \alpha_i + \mu_{it} \]

where \( Y_{it} \) is the outcome of interest and measures women’s representation in country \( i \) in the election-year \( t \); \( Quota\ Law \) is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the implementation of a quota law.
and 0 otherwise, and $\beta_1$ is the coefficient for this key independent variable; $Party Quota$ is the share of parties with voluntary quotas, weighted by the parties’ share of seats in parliament, and $\beta_2$ is the coefficient for this key independent variable; $Z_{it}$ represents a vector of covariates, and $\beta_3$ the coefficients for these covariates; $\alpha_i$ is the country fixed effects; and $\mu_{it}$ is the error term. All models correct for first order (AR-1) serial correlation in the residuals. Original data on party quotas were compiled using secondary literature, party documents, and correspondence with political party representatives (see Appendix 4A for further details).

I control for standard determinants of women’s political representation, as discussed in Chapter 3. I focus only on time-varying confounders here, because all models include fixed effects which account for any time-invariant confounders. Specifically, the fixed effects account for proportional electoral system and culture (history of Catholicism), two variables that I link to both quota adoption and women’s representation in the earlier discussion. I control for: Female share of labor force, GDP per capita (year 2000 dollars), Left party power, EU membership, and Strength of women’s movement. I also include an interaction term to test the theory that the effect of female labor force participation is conditioned by different institutional settings (Programmatic parties), a key finding from Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008). Below I discuss each of the variables in turn.

As discussed in Chapter 3, economic development (measured as GDP per capita here) and associated increases in Female labor force participation have been linked to increases in women’s representation (Matland 1998; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008; Tripp & Kang 2008). The effect of female labor force participation has also been found to be conditional on the nature of the electoral system. Holding constant women’s employment, women are likely to do better in systems with Programmatic parties that reward loyalty and than personalistic parties that reward seniority (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008). Left party power has also been associated with gender equality (Duverger 1955), but the evidence on their link to women’s representation is mixed. Some studies showing a strong association between left party rule and women’s representation

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2This includes five countries which have passed a quota law: Italy, Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal

3The parameter ‘Programmatic Parties’ captures the effects of pooling and district size in an additive index, meant to gauge the extent to which the electoral system incentivizes candidate loyalty to the party’s platform (as opposed to candidate-oriented parties) (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008).
(Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987), but others find no link (Caul 2001; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008). Some authors allege that the role of left parties has been decreasing over time as parties from across the political spectrum increasingly nominate more women and pass voluntary quotas (Lovenduski & Norris 1993; Caul 1999; Tripp & Kang 2008).

Finally I control for two other variables that have not traditionally been included in studies of women’s representation, but are of particular concern as potential causes of quota adoption in recent times. Both of these variables encourage changing norms about women in politics in general, and so it is important to include them as potential confounders. First, popular Women’s movements are thought to drive many quota reforms (Kittilson 2006; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009). As discussed in Chapter 3, the best data we have on women’s movements come from Htun and Weldon (2012), who compile measures of the strength and autonomy of feminist women’s movements over time in 70 countries. Recall that their data show that in each of the quota countries in my sample, the strength and autonomy of women’s movements was either stable or declining before a quota law was adopted. Nonetheless I include women’s movements in the regression analysis here to control for the possibility that both quotas and women’s representation are correlated with women’s movements.

I also include EU membership as a measure of international influence. Again as discussed in Chapter 3, scholars point to international information sharing as a key factor in quota adoption (Krook 2006, 2008) – and in my cases, particularly at the European level. Two of the international influences most frequently cited in my interviews were the European Commission and Council of Europe. A general increase in advocacy and information sharing across European borders could also encourage higher levels of women’s representation even if quotas are not passed.

Summary statistics of all variables used in analysis are presented in Appendix 4B, along with details about data sources and operationalization. All covariates are expected to increase levels of female representation.

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4 Other international influences were either global, e.g. CEDAW, or party-level, e.g. Socialist Women International, and thus not possible to include in the current national level analysis. In the subsequent chapter on party positions I include party family as party-level control for international influence.
4.3 Time Series Analysis of Quotas and Women’s Representation

Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of women in parliament (lower house) across 22 democracies for 35 years, from 1975 to 2010. Women’s descriptive representation has increased dramatically since 1975 in countries both with and without quotas, but the figure shows some large cross-national differences. Note that the ordering of many countries has changed over the past ten to fifteen years. For example, as of 2000 the United States had a greater percentage of women in parliament than France or Italy, but as of 2010 it has fallen behind these countries. Portugal has also made a jump of nearly 10 points, placing it ahead of Canada and Great Britain. The trends suggest that there have been important changes over recent years worth further study.

The main results are presented in Model 1 of Table 4.1. Confirming Hypothesis 1, I find evidence that both types of quotas are important determinants of variation in female representation over time. All else equal, going from no quota law to having a quota law increases women’s representation by nearly 6%. Party quotas are also significant, although the size of their predicted effect depends on the share of parties that adopt them. The mean weighted share of parties with voluntary quotas has increased from 0.4% in the 1970s to 32% in the 2000s, or about 30 percentage points. All else equal, a 30% increase in the weighted share of parties with quotas is predicted to increase female representation by 2.7%. If we consider a larger increase in the share of relevant parties with quotas such as 50% (this is not unrealistic; for example in Norway the majority of parties have had quotas in recent times), then the predicted increase in female representation is 4.5%. If 100% of relevant parties were to pass voluntary gender quotas the increase in female representation is predicted to be 9% – even higher than the increase associated with quota laws. However, thus far no country has achieved this.\textsuperscript{5} This estimate does not seem like a relevant quantity of interest particularly because parties on the right are often ideologically opposed to the concept of quotas. Overall, the results suggest that the size of the increase associated with party quotas has been smaller than that of national quota laws, in line with Hypothesis 2.

\textsuperscript{5}Most country election-years are characterized by no relevant parties with gender quotas (57%). Of those that do have party quotas, only 10% of election-years have been characterized by more than 60% of parties with voluntary gender quotas. The maximum was Austria in 2002 at 90%.
Figure 4.1: Percentage of Women in Parliament in 21 Democracies, 1975–2010
Several control variables emerge as statistically significant. As expected, economic development and women’s labor force participation are both associated with increases in women’s representation. The increase associated with quota laws is similar to a 5% rise in female labor force participation, which is predicted to lead to a 6% increase in women’s representation. The interaction between female labor force participation and programmatic parties shows that, across countries, the rate of change in response to higher female labor force participation increases in systems with strong incentives for programmatic parties (the coefficient on female labor force participation rises from 1.03 to 1.37). EU membership is associated with a small (less than 2%) but statistically significant bump in representation. Contrary to expectations, the presence of strong and autonomous women’s movements tends to hinder women’s representation. While a full explanation is beyond the scope of this book, I note that this finding could reflect the nature of the data on women’s movements that is currently available – it is very broad, and does not specify what the goals of women’s movements are. However it does cast doubt on the role of women’s movements in successfully advocating for women’s representation in advanced democracies. Finally, note that the models show no evidence of an association between left party power and women’s representation.

The next three models (2-4) in Table 4.1 address questions about whether the specific rules of the quota provision – threshold, placement mandates, and enforcement mechanisms – matter. These models use the same previously described fixed effects specification. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, all three rules are associated with higher levels of women’s representation. Model 2 separates the quota variable into laws that require parties to comply with the law for the list to be accepted (Quota, strict sanctions, representing Spain and Belgium after a quota law was passed) and those that do not (Quota, weak sanctions). Results show that quotas with strict enforcement sanctions have larger effects on representation than those that do not. Women’s representation is expected to increase by 8% after a quota law requiring compliance for the list to be accepted is passed, whereas it is only be expected to increase by 3.6% if the penalties for compliance are weaker. However it is worth noting that quota laws lead to statistically significant increases in representation regardless of

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6I also ran models including a binary measure equaling 1 if the country had a neighboring country with a quota law and 0 otherwise, as an alternate measure of international influence. My results do not change.
Table 4.1: Quotas and women’s representation, 1975 – 2010

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<td>(0.11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (year 2000 dollars)</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party power</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.22)</td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td>(2.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female share of LF x Prog. parties</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s movements</td>
<td>-1.17**</td>
<td>-1.12**</td>
<td>-1.24**</td>
<td>-1.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU membership</td>
<td>1.72**</td>
<td>1.81**</td>
<td>1.87**</td>
<td>1.87**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-42.90***</td>
<td>-42.69***</td>
<td>-43.35***</td>
<td>-44.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.54)</td>
<td>(3.55)</td>
<td>(3.51)</td>
<td>(3.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Countries</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country fixed effects</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correction for AR-1</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis carried out using Stata version 14.1. Panel corrected standard errors are in parentheses. Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
enforcement, and a Wald test of the difference between quotas with and without strict compliance sanctions shows this difference is only borderline significant (P=0.10).

Model 3 separates the quota variable into laws that require women to make up a high threshold, 50% of the list (Quota, 50% threshold, representing France after it passed a quota law and Belgium from 2003), versus those that do not (Quota, < 50% threshold). The results show that quotas with higher thresholds are more effective at increasing numbers of women in office. A quota with 50% threshold is predicted to increase representation by 7% compared to 3.5% when a smaller percentage of women required. However, a Wald test finds that the difference between these coefficients is not statistically significant.

Model 4 tests the impact of placement mandates (when the law includes specific rules about the rank-ordering of candidates, represented by Quota, placement mandates). Of all the rules tested, we see the largest change in the size of predicted effects for countries with placement mandates (Italy, Portugal, and Belgium after 2002). A quota with placement mandates is predicted to increase representation by 9% compared to 2% when a no placement rules are included. A quota with no placement rules also drops below conventional levels of statistical significance. A Wald test finds that the difference between quotas with and without placement rules is significant at conventional levels (P=0.00). This suggests that placement rules are a particularly important aspect of quota policy design.

Results are robust to several sensitivity checks. First, to investigate the possibility that findings are driven by factors specific to a single country, I exclude one country at a time and re-estimate the specifications. While some countries are found to be more influential than others – e.g., estimates of the impact of quota laws decrease when Belgium is excluded – the estimates for quota law and party quota remain positive and significant upon elimination of any country from the sample. Second, results hold up to the inclusion of a linear time trend, which controls for spurious correlation between any pair of similarly trended dependent and independent variables. Finally, I take advantage of new synthetic control methods to estimate the causal effect of quota laws within individual countries. This is described in the section below.
4.4 Synthetic Control Methods Analysis of Quotas and Women’s Representation

Synthetic control methods approximate the most relevant characteristics of the treated unit (here, country that passes a quota law) prior to treatment by using a matching estimator that measures the quality of each other unit (countries without quota laws) as a control. The method uses a weighted average of the best control countries for each ‘treated’ country to come up with a synthetic version which does not undergo the treatment. The effect of a quota law on women’s representation can then be estimated as the difference in levels of women’s representation between a ‘treated’ (quota) country and its synthetic counterpart in the years after the quota law was implemented. This method has been used to estimate the effects of terrorist conflict in the Basque Country on the economy (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003), and the effects of a California tobacco control program on tobacco consumption (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2014), amongst others. It is well suited to measure the impact of national quota laws, which are either present or absent, but it cannot be applied to continuous variables like the party quota measure. I therefore focus on quota laws below.

Figure 4.2 displays trends in women’s representation over time for each country that adopted a quota law, before and after the law was implemented (dark solid line). Counterfactual values estimated using synthetic control methods (assuming no quota was introduced) are shown in dark dashed lines. Finally, the figure also shows predicted values for women’s representation based on Model 1 of Table 4.1, as well as ‘counterfactual’ predicted values where quotas are assumed not to have been introduced, using the same regression results (dark and light dotted lines). To save space I present all technical details in Appendix 4C. This includes tables showing the comparison of pre-treatment characteristics of quota countries and their synthetic versions, the weights of each control country composing synthetic countries, and placebo tests to assess the robustness of results.

Figure 4.2 shows that the counterfactuals produced from synthetic predictions (dark dashed line) are similar to the real trends (solid line) in women’s representation before a quota law was passed in most cases. The exceptions are Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy, where the synthetic
Figure 4.2: Trends in percentage of women in parliament: ‘treated’ (quota) countries vs. synthetic counterparts, and predicted values

Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown in Model 1 of Table 4.1. Synthetic counterfactuals are based on analysis conducted using Synth for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011.)
control method was not able to exactly reproduce the path of women’s representation before the
quota law. For Spain especially, it is likely that much of the post-quota gap between the real and
synthetic Spain is artificially created by the lack of fit, rather than by the effect of the quota law.
Accordingly I drop the case of Spain in further analysis, and interpret the results of the case of Italy
with caution. In the rest of the cases – Belgium, France, and Portugal – the synthetic control method
achieves a good fit between synthetic and real countries on pre-quota women’s representation.

In all countries, both counterfactuals predict levels of women’s representation to be lower
had a quota law not been adopted. Compared to the predicted values from regression (represented
by dark and light dotted lines), synthetic counterfactuals typically do a better job of simulating the
actual trend in women’s representation up until the quota law is passed. Immediately after the law’s
passage the two lines (actual and synthetic trends in representation) begin to diverge noticeably,
especially in Belgium and Portugal. While female representation in the synthetic versions continues
on its moderate upward trend, the real country trends experience a sharp uptake. The discrepancy
between these lines suggests a large positive effect of quota laws on female representation.

I estimate the effect of a quota law on women’s representation as the difference in levels of
women’s representation between a quota country and its synthetic counterpart after the quota law
was implemented. We can then compare this to the ‘effect’ of quota laws estimated by predicted
values with and without quota laws, using regression results. Table 4.2 summarizes these effects (in
bold). The table shows that effects estimated using synthetic counterfactuals are similar or larger
than those estimated using predicted values from regression results in every case but Italy, which
shows a positive but much smaller size effect. In fact the average effect estimated from synthetic
methods is larger than that from regression results, at 8.4 compared to 5.6. If I remove Italy from
the comparison (given the synthetic control method does not perform as successfully in Italy), the
average effect estimated from synthetic methods increases to 10.5 percentage points.

The most striking finding here is how much larger the effect of a quota law was in Belgium
than in other countries. After only two elections with a quota law, female representation is predicted
to have increased by more than 20%. This is likely due to the strength of Belgium’s law, a finding
Table 4.2: Estimated Effects of Quota Laws

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (year)</th>
<th>% women in parl</th>
<th>Synthetic counterfactual</th>
<th>Effect (difference)</th>
<th>Predicted vals (quota)</th>
<th>Predicted vals (no quota)</th>
<th>Effect (difference)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy (1994)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2003)</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2007)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (2009)</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown in Model 1 of Table 4.1. Synthetic counterfactuals are based on analysis conducted using Synth for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011).

that is also reflected in regression results. From 2002 Belgium’s law requires parties to nominate 50% women, the first two positions on the list must alternate by gender, and compliance is required for the list to be accepted. In France and Portugal compliance is not required for lists to be accepted (instead, parties face financial penalties). In Portugal the quota threshold is 33% with mandated gender alternation on the party lists, while France requires 50% but has no placement mandates. It is thus no surprise that these countries are characterized by smaller estimated effects than Belgium. Even so, these estimated effects are still larger than estimated effects of party quotas from the regression analysis. In Italy, the relatively small effect estimated is likely due to the quota law’s narrow application. The quota law applied only to the PR portion of the then-mixed electoral system, which made up just 25% of representatives. Overall these results suggest the strength of the law makes a large difference to expected effects, but effects are still sizable even in the context of weaker laws.

4.5 Causal Mechanisms: The Cases of Belgium and Portugal

The analysis so far has demonstrated that both quota laws and party quotas are associated with higher levels of female representation in political office, but quota laws are linked to greater increases than party quotas. The causal processes through which different types of quotas operate and lead to different results remains an open question. This section investigates the mechanisms linking different types of quotas to effects on women’s representation, giving empirical findings greater plausibility
and deepening our understanding of the way these provisions work in practice.

Three potential mechanisms proposed in the theoretical section could explain how quota laws lead to greater increases to women in parliament compared to party quotas. First, the ‘vertical effect’ suggests that quota laws are more effective tools to force local party leaders’ hands than voluntary party quotas. Second, they oblige even parties that are not committed to equality to place more women on their lists (‘horizontal effect’). Finally, the ‘policy feedback loop’ mechanism focuses on the public support and pressure that tends to build for quota laws over time. To investigate the relative importance of these mechanisms, I focus on the countries of Belgium and Portugal. As discussed in Chapter 3, these two countries were selected because they are characterized by useful variation on dimensions of theoretical interest: specifically, the cultural context (with women in Belgium tending to have more progressive attitudes) and length of time a quota law has been in place. Yet, in both of these countries quota laws have led to abrupt, large increases in the percentage of women in parliament (see Figure 4.2). Both countries also had a history of political party quotas, enabling me to compare the effects of voluntary party quotas and national quota laws within each country. This type of ‘most different’ approach relies on identifying cases where the main independent and dependent variables covary, while other plausible factors differ (Gerring 2006, p. 139). It is particularly well-suited to exploring causal mechanisms, complementing the quantitative analysis which establishes a causal relationship between quota laws and women’s representation. Cases that feature the relationship of interest between quota laws and women’s representation allow us to examine the functioning of mechanisms across theoretically interesting contexts.

To understand how quotas work in these countries, I draw on over forty interviews with past and current members of parliament and government, party members, and political activists conducted in Belgium and Portugal from September to December of 2013. I deliberately chose interview subjects that could offer the best evidence about quota adoption and implementation, such as party leaders, cabinet members, and politicians and activists with a track record of work on women’s political participation.
Belgium: ‘If we cannot change it in the party, we will change it in the law’

Political parties in Belgium were among the first to adopt internal quotas for women, and it was not only parties on the left. The Flemish Liberals (VLD) had quota provisions in place from 1985 until the party’s disbandment in 1993, and the Flemish Christian Democrats had them from 1975, although not at the federal level. The Greens and Social Democrats also had quotas in place from the early 1990s, amongst others. In most of these parties, however, quotas were not popular. Getting internal provisions passed involved long, difficult debates within the party. The Secretary-General of the Flemish Social Democrat’s women’s section (Zij-kant) Vera Claes explains, “There was a lot of opposition from the men. They didn’t recognize the use of it, or the democratic need.”

Even when internal provisions were successfully passed, women within the party noted that the changes made were not enough, and that they didn’t work well.

Flemish Christian Democrat Senator Sabine de Bethune recalled that in the early 1990s she campaigned, with the women’s section of her party, to increase the size of the quota within the party statutes. At the time 1/5 of local party list positions were reserved for women, and de Bethune pushed for this to be increased to 1/3. De Bethune recounts giving a speech to the party Congress in 1993 in support of this amendment and facing vocal opposition from male local party leaders, who controlled list selection and made up the majority of voters in the party Congress. Her amendment was rejected. De Bethune describes:

Then we [the women] all stood up and left the Congress, and they had to stop and the Congress was finished. It was on all the news, the main points of political news of the year – the great Congress for renewal of the party was broken, finished, because the women walked out. Many men left also, hundreds left the place. It was a very dramatic moment. The women then thought, if we cannot change the party, we will change it in the law.

De Bethune went on to help draft the text of the quota bill that became law in 1994, working in the Cabinet of then Minister of Labor, Employment, and Equal Opportunities Miet

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7 Vera Claes, personal interview, 10 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
8 Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
Smet, who co-sponsored the legislation. Support from male party leaders was crucial. The other co-sponsor of the law was Louis Tobback, a Flemish Social Democrat and then Minister of the Interior, and it was also backed by the Prime Minister, Jean-Luc Dehaene (a Christian Democrat). Dehaene personally met with relevant party presidents (those in the majority) to ask them to push the bill through parliament.9

Why would male party leaders favor quota legislation, given it could put their own political positions at risk? Party leaders saw the quota as a way to bring the party more in line with standards of democracy, and possibly increase their control over candidate selection at the same time. Tobback likened the legislation to women’s suffrage, noting his party had ‘comitted the stupidity’ of voting against the women’s vote in the 1940s and shouldn’t make the same mistake twice. He notes, “So there’s one thing that you can’t deny: if you don’t consider that women are more stupid than men or less qualified than men, and so on, then one has to conclude that there is something wrong in the composition of our political system.”10 Flemish Social Democrat MP Renaat Landuyt explained that the law was part of a wider movement to strengthen democracy in Belgium given the rise of extremist parties in the early 1990s. He says, “the atmosphere in these years was that there was an upcoming extremist party and there were difficulties in our democracy, and the reaction was that we have to get farther on with gender and race. And that’s the structural reason that we have had this legislation at that time.”11

Perhaps more cynically, the law gave national party leaders an excuse to exercise more control over candidate selection, shaping the party to their preferred – most electable – demographic make-up. Landuyt explains that party leaders used the law as “an argument to rearrange their own parties” in the face of a perceived democratic deficit and local party organizations unwilling to change. “The party leaders want to have a certain influence and they have more influence to make a law than to make the lists for the elections, so they used the law to have more power to make better

9Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
10Louis Tobback, personal interview, 20 September 2013, Leuven, Belgium.
11Renaat Landuyt, personal interview, 23 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
lists.”

This is in line with previous studies which have found that party leaders will support quota laws when they strengthen their power relative to individual candidates (Baldez 2004). Similarly in Lizzeri and Persico’s account of why elites extended the suffrage, national party leaders used an institutional reform (the suffrage) to force unwilling local party leaders to increase public goods provision, which national leaders saw as fundamental to democratic government.

Since the law passed de Bethune says that while the party’s general candidate selection process has not changed, more women are now recruited and come forward. Other members of parties that had internal quotas before the law agree: for example, Tobback explains that his party had to go out and actively recruit more women even when it was difficult. He says, “Even today at each local election when they compose their lists, you still encounter the local responsible people who say, ‘Well my list is almost complete, but finding women, to find women it’s... why did you vote for such a stupid law?”

These conversations suggest that dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of internal party quotas was one of the reasons the quota law was passed in the first place. However the main take-away here is that national elite consensus on women’s representation is not necessarily enough to overcome internal dissent.

In line with the expectations of quota law supporters, after the law was passed parties were obliged to comply in a way that they did not when the quota was merely self-imposed. Moreover, the law increased percentages of women in office for all parties. Why would those parties that did not support the quota law comply? Recall that in Belgium compliance is mandatory for the list to be accepted, although there are still certain loopholes parties can use to avoid complying with the spirit of the law. So while this makes the law likely to be effective, what is striking is that today every political party openly supports it. Take the far-right Vlaams Belang, which was staunchly opposed to the measure when it passed. Party leader Gerolf Annemans asserts:

I can say that the way women entered in politics was extremely affected by this measure, that is a fact that I cannot deny. So although we had attention for the female role before

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12 Renaat Landuyt, personal interview, 23 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
14 The main issue seems to be list placement, as men are still most often placed in the first position.
and for female spokeswomen even in a so-called far right movement like VB, I must admit as an older statesman that we would never have come so far as we have done had the law not imposed this quota.

When asked how his party changed in response, Annemans describes a ‘dramatic’ change in the way the party recruited politicians, actively looking for female candidates outside the normal party militant base. Since the quota law has been in place the social and political landscape in Belgium has changed, altering both public and elite perspectives on the role of women in politics. While it seems that women are driving this shift, even men agree that compliance with the quota is necessary lest their party look backward. The President of the Liberal party Open VLD, Gwendolyn Rutten, is personally in favor of quotas and describes how her party has gradually changed its views:

It’s [quotas] a debate you can’t win within my party. But over time, we’ve been arguing, we’ve been studying, and I’ve been telling them the way it works. It’s about when you have to choose people, people choose someone like them. . . So this legislation kind of pushes people to look for diversity in a way. And then you see that after a while it becomes normal and it’s kind of an advantage. 

Conservative (MR) party representative Viviane Teitelbaum explains that her party complies because, “I think it’s something that’s now trendy. Mentalities have changed, and I think people agree mostly that it’s important to have men and women. . . everyone [in the party] agrees now because it would look like we are sort of outdated if we didn’t.” This sentiment reflects Erzeel and Meier’s (2011) findings that right parties in Belgium are motivated to include more women on their lists to get rid of their image as a ‘macho’ or ‘traditional’ party. In summary, the Belgian quota law was effective because it forced all parties to change their recruitment practices and actively look for women, particularly local party leaders (horizontal and vertical effects), but also because parties that did not initially support it were influenced by growing public support for the concept (policy feedback loop).

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15Gerolf Annemans, personal interview, 9 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
16Gwendolyn Rutten, personal interview, 2 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
17Viviane Teitelbaum, personal interview, 23 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
Portugal: ‘it [the law] has had a very considerable effect in the right wing parties’

In Portugal, the debate about a quota law was a more partisan issue. The two main parties on the left, the Socialist party (PS) and the Left Bloc (BE) had both instituted quotas for women within their own party structures from the late 1990s. The newer, non-traditional left party the Left Bloc had quotas from its founding, with no great debate about it.\(^{18}\) In the PS conversely, women within the party struggled for many years to get a quota provision passed. Eventually in 1995 then party leader António Guterres imposed an internal quota, against the will of most of the party according to MP and former President of the PS women’s section Sónia Fertuzinhos. Fertuzinhos recalls that Guterres believed in this agenda: “he was influenced by women’s groups, and he gave them strength, supported them.”\(^{19}\) While the internal quota proved difficult to implement at first (“it had not really worked,” claimed PS MEP Ana Gomes\(^ {20}\)), by the mid-2000s things had changed. Fertuzinhos says that while the party was still patriarchal, the leadership – notably then-party leader José Sócrates – continued to push the issue as a question of democratic legitimacy.

By 2005, 29% of the PS party’s MPs were women, well above the self-imposed 25% party quota, and 50% of the Left Bloc’s MPs were women. The two left parties joined together in proposing a law that would extend their own gender quota agenda to the rest of the parties. The two main parties on the right, the Social Democrats (PSD) and Democratic and Social Center – People’s Party (CDS-PP) boasted a less-impressive 8% female MPs each at the time (Citizenship 2007). Why would these parties support national quota legislation, given their internal party quotas seemed to be relatively effective? As in the case of Belgium, supporters framed their case in terms of advancing democracy, in particular after the dictatorship when women’s roles in public life were severely restricted. Again, problems were seen to loom largest at the local level, where lists are prone to being “hijacked by local party leaders,” in the words of PS MEP Gomes.\(^ {21}\) One anonymous interview with a female socialist (PS) MP suggests that women pushed this agenda forward in order

\(^{18}\) Luis Fazenda, personal interview, 5 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
\(^{19}\) Sónia Fertuzinhos, personal interview, 22 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
\(^{20}\) Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
\(^{21}\) Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
to institutionalize quotas, perhaps to prevent future party leaders from reneging on the internal quota policy:

Men with power choose another man, like a mini-me, to say OK, after me, you are the person who will have the power. Like succession. The others, and women in particular, they can have some power but power with control. So this is not a formal issue, but it’s very informal and more difficult to fight against than formal issues, because formal we know the rules. And when you don’t know the rules it makes everything more difficult.22

Male party leaders of the PS might have also seen the quota legislation as a way to distinguish the party from competitors, gaining an electoral advantage. The law was packaged as part of a broader set of reforms to increase political participation and democracy, including a term limit measure for mayors. PS Minister Augusto Santos Silva says of the quota bill:

On one hand we could differentiate more the socialist party from the center-right party PSD that is very akin to the PS in terms of financial issues, European issues, defense, foreign affairs... so there, we could have a rather clear differentiation between left and right in Portugal. And on the other hand we could conquer some electorate, more urban and younger electorate, and of course the new professionals, more educated, young women, we could steal them from the new extreme left party that is called the Left Bloc (BE).23

Silva refers to the party’s initial strategy, before the BE joined them in supporting the concept. In 2006 the PS used its majority in parliament to push through the legislation without additional support. In the end, the BE declined to support the bill after sanctions for non-compliance were weakened.

In the first election after the law was adopted (2009), the percentage of female MPs for the right wing PSD and CDS-PP parties shot up from 8% (each) to 28% and 19%, respectively. The percentage of female MPs elected from the PS held steady at 29%, while the percentage elected from the BE decreased (from 50% to 38%) (Santos & Amâncio 2012). In Portugal the greatest increases occurred in those parties that did not have previous party quotas, the parties on the right (horizontal effect). This is interesting considering that the penalty for non-compliance in Portugal

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22 Anonymous (PS MP), personal interview, 26 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
23 Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
is relatively weak – parties can pay a fine to avoid it. Given this, what explains the law’s success?

As in Belgium, members of right-wing parties now mostly support the quota law. When the legislation was passed there was an amendment included requiring that the law be re-assessed after five years. CDS-PP MP Teresa Caeiro, who was initially against the law, explains that the this never came to pass: “It didn’t occur to anybody to enter into a proposal of law to invert it. We [the CDS-PP] get along with it quite well. We’re pacified.”24 Female MPs of the conservative Social Democratic Party (PSD) are not only in favor, but say that they would go further. PSD MP Monica Ferro, elected in 2011, says, “I am totally in favor of a quota system. . . but I would go further because we have a 33% quota in the parliament but what you see in the parliament is that if a woman steps out, because she is elected to government, goes to a municipality, or decides to leave, it’s not mandatory that she’s replaced by another woman. So this actually means that you don’t have 33% women in parliament in Portugal.”25

Both main right wing parties say that candidate recruitment has changed since the quota law. Helder Amaral, MP for the CDS-PP, explains that his party complies, “Because I feel that the public opinion, they value that. When I was in charge of municipal elections I wanted every list to comply with the law.”26 A 2008 national survey confirms that a plurality of voters believe quotas are a necessary measure to increase women’s political presence (47% agree overall, 42% men versus 51% women; while only 20% of both sexes disagree with this idea) (Baum & Espírito-Santo 2012). As in Belgium, the selection process itself did not change for these parties, but they were obliged to look outside their normal recruitment base to find women. PSD MP José Mendes Bota explains how the law changed his party:

The [local] short committees that take decisions on the lists are the same as they were before. The only difference is that they have to follow the new rules. And the new rules tell them that they have to choose women for this and that position. But basically what was the biggest obstacle for women’s accession to power, it was that inside the parties, the committees that decide the candidates, they are controlled by men. That

24Teresa Caeiro, personal interview, 5 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
25Monica Ferro, personal interview, 5 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
26Helder Amaral, personal interview, 6 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
is the major problem, and it has always been the major problem. And that is why the legislation was important, because it forced those committees, controlled by men and many times composed only of men, and they were choosing who they wanted, and they were choosing men mainly before the law.27

The cases of Belgium and Portugal illustrate that forcing local leaders from all parties to comply, paired with the pressure of public opinion spurred by the law itself, led quota laws to be more effective than party quotas. While strong enforcement mechanisms may lead to greater increases for women (as the empirical evidence suggests in the case of Belgium), these case studies indicate that the strength of the law isn’t the whole story. The horizontal effect, in which quotas force even parties that are opposed to the measure to comply, is particularly strong in the case of Portugal, despite the law’s weak enforcement mechanisms. Even when compliance is not required for list acceptance, parties change their recruitment processes and nominate more women due to growing public pressure from policy feedback loops. I note the need for more data on this last mechanism in particular. My conversations in Belgium and Portugal suggest that the debate about the quota law itself leads to greater awareness and positive opinion towards such policies over time. An interesting avenue for future research would be to examine public opinion before and after a quota law was passed in one country but not another.

As recent work has emphasized (Falleti & Lynch 2009), whether these mechanisms are triggered likely depends on the context. Two conditions seem particularly important: local party power in the candidate selection process and previous use of party quotas. First, the cases of Belgium and Portugal both point the finger at (male) local party monopolies unwilling to change recruitment practices. When candidate selection is determined by primaries or national party leaders, quota laws may be less influential or not necessary in the first place. For example, Flemish Social Democrat Louis Tobback described what he termed an ‘interesting phenomenon’ in Belgium. When there is only one large electoral district as in elections for the European Parliament, the candidate lists are organized by national party bureaus, and there is more balanced representation. The problem, for him, “was in the first place on the local level, where the people in place didn’t want to depart and leave their places to women.” Secondly, case studies also suggest that a country might need to

27 José Mendes Bota, personal interview, 7 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal
'practice' with party quotas in order to build support for and pass quota laws in the first place; i.e. party quotas might be a necessary if not sufficient condition for effective quota laws.

These same contextual factors are common in advanced democracies and indeed many countries throughout the world, suggesting that the causal mechanisms identified here are portable and relevant to many potential scenarios. One or more parties has adopted a voluntary gender quota in at least sixty countries, and the number is growing (Dahlerup 2008). While systematic data on candidate selection methods across countries is not currently available, detailed studies from secondary literature find that local party selectorates have significant influence in many countries throughout the world – to name a few, Austria (Bille 2001), Italy (Calossi & Pizzimenti 2013), Chile and Mexico (Hinojosa 2012).

Finally, horizontal effects, vertical effects, and policy feedback loops are just some of the many potential mechanisms through which quotas might lead to increases in female representation. While these three factors stand out as crucial to the causal chain linking quotas to immediate gains in women’s representation, other mechanisms might well be at play over the long term. For example, greater numbers of women elected due to a quota law might spur a role model effect whereby young women are then more likely to aspire to and put themselves forward for political office. Similarly if the quota law applies to the local level (as it does in many countries), increases here could lead to more women in national parliaments over time, as women gain more experience with political roles.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the impact of newly popular party and national level quotas in Western advanced democracies. It finds that quotas are important tools that have influenced trends in women’s representation in recent years. Unlike previous studies, it is able to compare the effectiveness of party and national level quotas using new data on party quotas. The findings suggest that quota laws are more effective at increasing women’s representation than party quotas, although both make a significant difference. The results of analysis using synthetic control methods suggest that
strict enforcement mechanisms, the size of the quota, and especially placement mandates increase the law’s expected effects – but strong effects are seen even in the context of weaker quota laws. The policy implications of this are clear: for parties and governments looking to raise numbers of women in office, national quota legislation is more effective than voluntary party quotas, and strong rules, especially placement mandates, should be included in the law to achieve optimal results.

Structural and institutional factors like women’s employment and electoral rules are notoriously hard to change. The role of quotas may be to help countries achieve increases in women’s representation despite ‘sticky’ factors like women’s employment, electoral design, or conservative culture. Moreover, many countries still have relatively low levels of women’s representation despite theoretically ideal structural conditions. Take the case of Austria, which has a closed-list PR system with relatively high district magnitude, and high levels of female employment. These factors suggest it ought to have one of the highest levels of female representation, but in fact Austria ranks squarely in the middle of Western advanced democracies (30% women in parliament as of 1 November 2015). Quotas might prove a valuable tool to help countries like Austria overcome other unobservable and hard-to-change factors, such as culture, that might be stalling the growth of women’s representation.

The results help us understand not only women’s representation but more generally why institutions are more consequential than simple majorities, such as those responsible for passing a voluntary party quota. The mechanisms through which quota laws work – subverting local power monopolies across parties and policy feedback loops – shine a light on broader dynamics that can make the political process more inclusive. The findings add evidence supporting the idea that gender-related policies and institutions are not only outcomes in the political process, but also shape attitudes about women in politics, even within parties that were initially highly skeptical (Kittilson 2010). While this research focuses on gender, clearly other forms of identity from race to class to religion are relevant.

There is much room for future research on the long term impacts of different types of quotas. For example, how does the use of quotas affect the ability of women to reach the highest levels of office in the long run, such as cabinet positions or the executive? Another important series
of questions is how quotas affect outcomes beyond numbers, such as the substantive representation of women’s interests. In the next two chapters I turn to these questions, looking first at political party positions and then at budgetary outcomes related to women’s preferences.
Quotas increase numbers of women in office. The key question is, do they also increase attention to women’s substantive policy preferences? This chapter explores the effects of quotas on political party positions, an early but critical stage of the policymaking process. Decisions about party agendas are crucial because they set the bounds for future policy change. According to some theorists, agenda-setting is the most important measure of political power (Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Gaventa 1982). Just as they are under-represented in parliaments, women have traditionally been blocked from the upper echelons of party leadership, who typically take the final decisions about party positions (Rule 1994; Reynolds 1999; Kittilson 2006). Can quotas shift these dynamics and help put women’s issues on the agenda?

This chapter provides the first cross-country evidence that quotas affect party policy agendas. Previous literature suggests that environmental factors like public opinion, ideology, and organizational structure are the most important determinants of party positions. No study addresses the relationship between quotas and party positions across countries, despite their growing popularity and advocates’ claims that they will make a difference. Chapter 2 suggests that after a quota law we should expect change on issues characterized by a gap in preferences, especially if they are orthogonal to the main left-right party dimension. Accordingly, this chapter examines whether quotas lead to shifts in party positions related to welfare state expansion. This is a broad category, but it accurately describes the gender gaps on many social policy issues – such as health care and unem-
ployment – outlined in Chapter 2. The quantitative data do not allow me to distinguish individual policies within this category, such as work-family policies. However, evidence from a matched pair case study provides initial evidence supporting the claim that quotas matter especially for these orthogonal issues.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I draw on literature from political parties and gender and politics to develop a theory of quotas and policy change specific to intra-party decisionmaking. Recall that Chapter 2 highlights two mechanisms through which quotas are likely to influence policies: increased numbers of women and issue salience. I suggest several ways these mechanisms are likely to operate in the context of party position taking, including: increased negotiating power for women within the party; greater numbers of women in leadership positions; and the strategic incentives of party leaders. To test the link between quota laws and party positions I analyze party manifesto data for 22 countries from 1965 to 2011. I examine political party positions on welfare state expansion, an issue characterized by a gender gap in policy preferences (women preferring more spending compared to men), and environmental protection, an issue with no such gender gap in preferences. I find that passing a quota law coincides with increases in political party attention to welfare state expansion, but not to environmental protection. The effect is slightly larger for right-wing parties (but significant for both), and is also larger in size in when the quota law has strict enforcement mechanisms. A matched pair case study of far right parties in Belgium and Austria offers initial evidence about the content of policy change and causal mechanisms. I conclude with a summary and discussion of future research implications.

5.1 Theoretical Development

Party positions are set out in manifestos, the formal declaration of what the party will attempt to do if it is elected to government. The manifesto provides a program for the winning party to follow and be held accountable for once in office. Manifestos aren’t just ‘cheap talk’: while parties are not bound by the contents of the manifesto, generally behavior in office correlates with manifesto promises (Klingemann et al. 1994; Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006). Recent comparative work
has shown that variation in pledge fulfillment depends on the level of control parties have over government office and economic conditions. For example, single party governments are more likely to fulfill election pledges than many governing parties in multiparty coalitions. However even in coalition governments, parties in government typically fulfill at least half of their manifesto promises (Thomson et al. 2012). Party manifesto decisions are significant not just for the party’s electoral success, but because they dictate the topics of political debate in a society. Party positions thus have important implications for policy outcomes for women, and more broadly the size and shape of welfare states.

A recent study of manifesto ‘life cycles’ in Austria provides useful details about how the manifesto-writing process works, not just in Austria but for European parties in general. First, the party in central office and the party in public office make strategic decisions about the main campaign messages. Typically the party in central office coordinates the drafting process, asking those in public office – government ministers and the parliamentary party – to provide expert policy input. Then a task force drafts the manifesto around these issues, pulling content from other documents such as party programs, ministerial documents, and previous manifestos. Although many parties have close relationships with interest groups (e.g., the social democrats and the labor movement), these groups mostly play a marginal role in providing content for the manifesto. Party officials, and sometimes external consultants, review and comment on the manifesto, and it may be revised many times. The party leaders see the draft at a late stage, and may still change some details before a final vote, usually by the party executive committee. The entire process takes up to four months for the largest parties in Austria (Dolezal et al. 2012).

What determines policy change in the manifesto? Existing scholarship demonstrates that parties change their position in response to environmental factors, such as shifts in public opinion (Adams et al. 2004, 2006; McDonald & Budge 2005; Ezrow 2007), economic conditions (Adams, Haupt & Stoll 2009; Haupt 2010; Burgoon 2012), and how the party did in the last election (Somer-Topcu 2009). However not all parties respond to these conditions in the same way. Studies have shown that parties of the left have less ideological flexibility (they are more ‘policy-seeking’), and so are less responsive to both economic conditions and public opinion (Adams, Haupt & Stoll...
The party’s organizational structure also plays a role. Parties that are leadership-dominated tend to adjust their positions in line with the mean voter, while parties that are more open and encourage activist involvement in decision-making are more responsive to the preferences of their own rank-and-file (Schumacher, De Vries & Vis 2013).

Thus far, little research has focused on the impact of gender identity or quotas on party positions. This could be partially due to the fact that the empirical study of party positions is relatively new, and we are still building an understanding of the different factors that affect party calculus. None of the studies cited above includes gender as a category of analysis – e.g., women in the party, women in national parliaments, or female labor force participation. A notable exception is Kittilson (2011), who finds that the share of women and women’s organizations in the party are associated with increased attention to social justice issues, but not welfare or education, in party platforms. O’Brien (2012a) also addresses the issue of gender and policy representation, focusing on the conditions under which parties give attention to women and gender in the manifesto.

However, evidence from studies of legislative behavior suggests that the agenda-setting stage is particularly important for women policymakers. Previous research consistently finds that women raise new issues that are important to women as a group and show greater commitment to these issues in the policy process (e.g., through bill initiation and debate), even if they differ on the specific policy details (e.g., Skjeie 1991; Thomas 1994; Swers 2002; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Catalano 2009). The evidence on roll call voting and policy outcomes, where women (and men) are more constrained by party affiliation and institutional rules, is more mixed. For example, party is typically a larger determinant of roll-call votes than gender (Welch 1985; Burrell 1994; Vega & Firestone 1995; Shwindt-Bayer & Corbetta 2004). Women might be especially influential early on in the policymaking process, when decisions about whether certain issues reach the agenda at all are made.

Overall, research on the effect of women’s representation on party positions is at very early stage, but there is good reason to think that women’s presence makes a difference to at least a subset of issues. Unlike previous studies, the theory of quotas and policy change outlined in Chapter 2
suggests that quotas will lead to policy change for issues characterized by a gender gap in preferences, especially if these issues are off the main left-right party dimension. This is the main relationship I test in quantitative analysis. How exactly will quotas affect political party decisionmaking? In Chapter 2 I proposed two key mechanisms that link quotas to policy change, broadly considered. First, *increased numbers of women* in the party have greater leverage to pressure party leaders to shift the agenda in the direction of their collective interests, or to change it themselves when they become leaders. Second, quotas increase the *salience* of gender-related issues, making it more likely that they will be prioritized by party elites. This section applies the theory to the specific context of party position taking, outlining how increased numbers of women and salience might affect intra-party decisions. Building on Figure 2.6 in Chapter 2, Figure 5.1 illustrates the causal logic linking quotas to party position change. I provide evidence exploring the relative importance of these mechanisms in the qualitative case study.

![Figure 5.1: Causal Logic Linking Quotas to Party Position Change](image)

After a quota law an influx of women can push the party towards their collective preferences on certain policies. There are several ways that increased numbers of women might influence political
party positions. First, a ‘critical mass’ of women after a quota law could have more leverage within the party (Kanter 1977). In a gender-balanced environment, women may feel more comfortable expressing ‘gendered’ preferences, and men more likely to be receptive to their views. Mendelberg et al. (2013) find that as numbers of women increase so does their authority, and that with a critical mass women begin discussing different issues. Specifically, they bring up care responsibilities more often.

However, the concept of ‘critical mass’ has been challenged in the gender and politics literature (Crowley 2004; Childs & Krook 2006; Chaney 2012), with some scholars calling for a focus on ‘critical actors’ over ‘critical mass’ (Childs & Krook 2009; Krook 2015). This is to avoid essentialist portrayals of women and acknowledge the reality that not all women prioritize women’s concerns. In line with this argument, the second way that additional numbers of women could influence party positions is through their ascent to positions of power within the party. Over time quotas are likely to increase the number of female ministers and party leaders, who can then influence the content of the manifesto more directly. Of course, the concept of critical actors still requires an assumption that some women will work to bring about women-friendly policy change – and that these types of women will reach leadership roles. As such, the relationship between critical mass, critical actors, and policy impact seems an empirical question.

Finally, additional numbers of women may strengthen the negotiating power of women’s sections in the party. Many assume that party leaders alone wield power in European party systems, but parties today are not as unitary as once believed. As previously discussed, factions are commonplace in many contemporary party systems. Perhaps the best example of this is cross-class Christian Democratic parties, which bring together a range of economic interests, leading Manow and van Kersbergen (2009) to refer to them as ‘negotiating communities’. Women’s sections have been particularly successful at lobbying parties to change their positions in the past (Lovenduski 2001; Morgan 2006).

The second way in which quotas can influence intra-party decisions is through changes to expectations and norms about women in politics. The issue salience mechanism suggests that quota
policies increase public awareness and support for women in politics, and this then cues party elites to prioritize women’s concerns. Studies suggest that quotas attract media attention to (the lack of) women in politics (Sacchet 2008; Sénac-Slawinski 2008). Rather than being an ‘one-off’ change, quotas tend to highlight the issue of women in politics repeatedly at every subsequent election, with media coverage comparing how parties are faring (which aren’t complying?) and who the female candidates are. For example, Portugal passed a quota law in 2006. In the most recent 2015 federal election – the third since the quota law has been in place – national newspapers covered the share of female candidates and elected MPs, referencing the 2006 law specifically. Some of the headlines include “Men continue to dominate electoral lists. Only 25% of the 2015 heads of lists were women” (Espresso, 5 October 2015) and “History was made. One-third of the seats will be occupied by women” (Observador, 5 October 2015). Media also paid particular attention to whether specific parties complied with the quota requirements.\(^1\)

Initial evidence also suggests that quotas can lead the public to change their views about the role of women in politics, although I note the need for more research in this area, particularly comparative studies. In India, Beaman et al. (2008) find that quotas weaken negative stereotypes about women in public life, particularly among men. In Rwanda, Burnet (2011) shows that quotas lead to changes in the status of women and their role in society, again especially for men. These shifts in media attention and public attitudes are likely to affect the incentives and strategies of party leaders. Specifically, elites might use party positions to associate the party with women’s policy concerns in order to raise their visibility on these issues and claim credit from female constituents (Mayhew 1974). Less cynically, it is also possible that changing norms are internalized by party elites themselves, regardless of electoral incentives. Over time elites may come to accept the notion that a more balanced representation of gendered policy concerns is normatively appropriate, and shift party positions accordingly. Some of these party positions might result in actual policy changes (e.g., investment in public daycare), which in turn creates new constituencies and increases demand, raising the likelihood of further policy shifts (Skocpol 1995; Pierson 1993; Mettler 2002). In short,

\(^1\)Some examples are: “For the first time, the list of PSD / Azores has more women than men” (Publico, 16 June 2015), “List of PS in Santarem violates parity law” (Espresso, 28 August 2015), “Setúbal is the district with most women elected as heads of lists” (Espresso, 6 October 2015).
quotas might set in motion a self-reinforcing cascade of changes to media attention, public attitudes, and policy responses (policy feedback).

Which issues should we expect to change? First, my theory suggests that expectations about policy change should be guided by gender differences in policy preferences. Once the quota law is in place, we should expect to see change only on those issues men and women have different opinions on. In some contexts, male and female political preferences are indistinguishable. My initial hypothesis is that in this scenario, politician gender should not matter at all. I expect no change to party positions in issue areas on which men and women agree.

**Hypothesis 1:** The effect of quotas on party positions is conditional on the existence of significant differences in political preferences between men and women in the electorate. No change is expected on issues on which men and women agree.

However, Chapter 2 demonstrates that there are large gender gaps on many issues. Specifically, women prefer more social spending and government intervention on policies including health care, pensions, and maternal employment. The theory outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that quotas are likely to influence all policies that women as a group prioritize, but especially those that are off the main left-dimension, like maternal employment and associated work-family policies. I thus expect women’s preferences for greater attention to welfare policies to be reflected more accurately after a quota law is passed, particularly on issues related to maternal employment.

**Hypothesis 2:** Quotas will increase political party attention to issues that women prefer when gender differences in policy preferences exist. In advanced democracies, I expect parties to increase the attention they give to social policies, particularly those related to maternal employment.

Party ideology could also condition the effect of quota laws. Many left parties have adopted voluntary quota measures within the party (Caul 2001), and even without quotas left parties tend to
send higher percentages of women to parliament (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Caul 1999; Reynolds 1999; Kittilson 2006). It is no surprise, then, that quotas often lead to larger increases in numbers of women for right parties – as Chapter 4 shows for the recent case of Portugal. Parties that were openly opposed to the quota might feel an added incentive to highlight and/or develop their policy positions addressing women’s interests as a sort of defense mechanism, and so as to not appear outdated. Because of this I expect:

**Hypothesis 3:** Quota laws will have a larger effect on attention to social policy issues in right-wing parties than in left-wing parties.

Finally, the specific requirements of the quota law are likely to influence the size of its potential effects. As shown in Chapter 4, quotas with larger thresholds, placement mandates, and stricter enforcement mechanisms are likely to be more successful at increasing the numbers of women in office. Greater numbers of women in office are likely to increase the leverage women have to influence party leaders, and the salience of women’s issues to the public. I therefore expect the following:

**Hypothesis 4:** Quota laws with placement mandates, strict enforcement mechanisms, and high thresholds are likely to have a larger effect than laws that lack these provisions.

### 5.2 Data & Methods

I test this argument in two ways: a longitudinal analysis of 22 countries from 1965 to 2011, and a matched pair case study exploring the content of policy change and causal mechanisms. First, I analyze the link between quotas and party positions over time using cross-national time-series data. Second, I use a matched pair case study of far right parties in Belgium and Portugal to explore the content of policy change after a quota law, and the causal mechanisms linking quotas to shifts
in party positions. As I will explain in the next section, the quantitative data on political party positions does not distinguish among different types of welfare state expansion policies. This makes it suitable to test only the first part of Hypothesis 2, that quotas increase political party attention to social policies. Because of this I use qualitative evidence to test the second part of the hypothesis, that quotas lead to policy shifts especially for those issues that are off the main left-right agenda (maternal employment and associated work-family policies). Below I discuss the empirical strategy for quantitative analysis, and describe the data and relevant covariates.

Quota laws are not randomly assigned to countries. A major concern is that the effect is not causal and that something else, such as culture or attitudes towards women, is determining both adoption of a quota law and party positions on social policy. I deal with this concern in two ways. First, I identify and control for potential confounding variables, factors which could affect both the probability of quota adoption and party positions. By conditioning on these observed characteristics I ensure that the groups being compared are really comparable, and that quota legislation can be interpreted causally. I use an OLS model with lagged dependent variable, which controls for time-varying pre-treatment trends; i.e., if quota adoption is correlated with past party priorities. However, the OLS model cannot account for unobservable omitted variables, such as culture or machismo in political parties.

In order to control for a wider range of potential omitted variables I also estimate models that include party fixed effects (which in linear combination are equal to country fixed effects) and year fixed effects (which deal with trends over time e.g., political cycles). Fixed effects models control for any party or country-specific omitted variables (observable and unobservable) that are constant over time – a potentially large source of omitted variable bias. Results should be interpreted as within-unit changes in treatment, i.e., the link between quotas and policy change within quota countries. As with the difference-in-differences approach, the critical assumption is that there are no potential time-varying confounders that have not been accounted for in the analysis.

A benefit of estimating both the lagged dependent variable and the fixed effects specifications is that they can be interpreted to ‘bracket’ the true causal effect of the treatment variable (An-
grist & Pischke 2008, 245). The fixed effects estimator is based on the presumption of time-invariant omitted variables – unobserved party- and country-specific variables that determine assignment to treatment, e.g. culture or attitudes towards women. The assumption underlying the lagged dependent variable estimator is that the omitted variable bias arises not from a time-invariant factor but from time-varying pre-treatment trends (i.e., if adopting a quota law is correlated with past party positions, a lagged dependent variable). If the fixed effect assumption is correct but lagged dependent variable is used, estimates of a positive treatment effect tend to be too small, and vice versa if the lagged dependent variable assumption is right but fixed effects are estimated the effect will tend to be too large. Thus by reporting both lagged dependent variable and fixed effects results, I can obtain upper and lower bounds on the effects of quota laws (see also Guryan 2001, who uses this technique to analyze the effect of school desegregation on dropout rates).

I take several steps to ensure that findings are not the result of model misspecification. One potential concern is that unobserved election-specific factors may influence all parties’ policy positions in a given election, leading to correlated errors among the parties standing in that election. I use robust standard errors clustered by election to address this problem (Rogers 1994; Williams 2000). Another well-known problem for difference-in-differences style estimation using panel data with fixed effects is serially correlated errors. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004a) discuss this problem, which arises when the dependent variables are highly positively serially correlated, especially when working with long time series data. They show that in this case the standard deviation of the estimated treatment effects could be understated.

To deal with this I follow Bertrand et al.’s recommendation and ignore the time series information. The simplest way to do this would be to collapse the time series information into a ‘pre’- and ‘post’-period and study the impact of the quota law on policy positions on a two-period panel. However, this approach is possible only when the laws are created at the same time in all countries, which is not the case here. Following Bertrand et al. I slightly modify the simple aggregation technique in the following way: first, I regress policy positions on party fixed effects, year dummies, and all relevant covariates. Then I divide the residuals of the treatment countries only into two groups, residuals from before and after the laws, and run a simple regression of the
impact of quota laws on party priorities using this two-period panel of residuals. Bertrand et al. show that this procedure produces consistent standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan 2004a).

Data

I analyze party positions on welfare policies using party manifestos in 22 countries, from 1965 to 2011. The manifesto data come from the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR), which measures party positions on particular policy issues in the party’s election-year manifesto. MARPOR coders match up ‘quasi-sentences’ in the manifesto with a category of policy. One quasi-sentence is one statement or message – this can be a full sentence, a clause, or a bullet point. To account for the different length of party manifestos, each category is standardized by taking the total number of quasi-sentences coded in the same document as a base. The resulting percentage can be taken as a measure of the party’s policy priorities at the time of election (Budge 2001; Klingemann et al. N.d.; Volkens et al. N.d.). Manifestos are only coded in election years (observations are not retained through the inter-election period). Data analyses include 179 parties – every party listed in the MARPOR dataset for these countries and time period whose policy program was coded in at least two consecutive elections.

I operationalize the main dependent variable as the share of political party manifesto devoted to Welfare State Expansion. This is one of 56 policy categories coded in the MARPOR data. Welfare State Expansion includes favorable mentions of the need to introduce, maintain, or expand any social service or social security scheme (the category excludes education). While the category is very broad, it encompasses many of women’s policy priorities identified in the ISSP data;
notably, health care, child care and parental leave, pensions / retirement, unemployment benefits, and the government’s responsibility to provide decent housing and a decent standard of living for the unemployed (see Figure 2.2, Chapter 2). Although ideally I would like to assess how party positions on specific policies like health care or child care change over time, this is not possible with the existing data.

The mean value of *Welfare State Expansion* in the sample is 7.62, with standard deviation 6.09. An example of a quasi-sentence coding that falls under this category is, “During the next term Labour’s Working for Families package will be boosted to provide even more help for families raising children” (Labour Party, New Zealand, 2005 manifesto). According to my theory, we should expect political parties to increase the attention they devote to these issues after a quota law is passed.

In addition to the main dependent variable *Welfare State Expansion*, I also include the dependent variable *Environmental Protection* as a placebo test. This variable is included to test the theory that we should only see changes in party priorities after a quota law for issues that are characterized by a gender gap in policy preferences. The MARPOR data includes the following categories that are, on average, *not* characterized by a statistically significant gender gap in preferences: the environment, culture and the arts, and law enforcement (see Figure 2.2, Chapter 2). Of these, I select the environment because parties in Western advanced democracies on average pay more attention to issues of environmental protection in their party manifestos than the other issue areas: the mean percentage of manifesto devoted to environmental protection is 5.29, compared to 2.4 for law and order and 2.2 for culture and the arts. Compared to the other issue areas, the data on environmental protection is more likely to be consistent and relevant for a larger number of parties.

*Environmental Protection* includes mentions of the preservation of countryside, forests, etc.; general preservation of natural resources against selfish interests; proper use of national parks; soil banks, etc; environmental improvement. An example of a quasi-sentence coding that falls under this category is, “We need an energy revolution” (The Greens, 2008 manifesto, Austria). My theory predicts no change in party attention to this issue after a quota law is passed.
The key independent variable is *Quota Law*, operationalized as a dummy variable coded “1” for countries which have adopted a national quota law, after the law was implemented (including and after the first election in which the quota was in operation). In my dataset, five countries have passed a quota law: Italy (since repealed), Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal. Data include four post-quota elections in Belgium, two in France, and one each in Spain and Portugal. In the case of Italy, which adopted a gender quota law in 1993 and repealed it in 1995, 1994 is the only election coded for the quota.

**Covariates**

To specify the covariates to be used as controls, I consider how the adoption of quotas is related to well-established determinants of party positions. The key issue is whether adopting a quota causes parties to change their policy priorities, or there is something else that both contributes to a quota getting adopted and also causes a shift in policy priorities. I control for six variables potentially linked to both adopting quotas and party positions: PR Electoral System, % Women in Parliament, Female Labor Force Participation, Income per capita, Party Quota, and Party Family. The relationship between quota adoption and most of these variables is outlined in detail in Chapter 3. Below I briefly review how they could also be related to party positions.

First, research has shown that electoral rules also exert a strong effect on policy outcomes: majoritarian electoral systems are associated with smaller government spending and smaller welfare states compared to systems of proportional representation (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002; Persson & Tabellini 2005). The percentage of women in parliament could be related to policy outcomes either through the efforts of female politicians, or because it reflects attitudes towards women and equality, which are also likely correlated to policies. Economic development is also related to policy outcomes; for example, as incomes increase and government revenues increase, demand for public expenditure should also rise (Wagner’s Law). Workforce participation entitles some women to benefits that they would otherwise not be eligible for (e.g. health insurance). Finally, voluntary party quotas could be linked to party priorities through the mechanism of increased
women’s representation.

Another factor thought to be related to quota adoption is international policy diffusion. Similar parties might have close ties to each other across countries which affect both the likelihood of quota adoption and party positions. To control for this, I include a series of Party Family dummy variables coded by the Comparative Manifesto Project: Ecology Parties, Communist Parties, Social Democratic Parties, Liberal Parties, Christian Democratic Parties, Nationalist Parties, Agrarian Parties, Ethnic and Regional Parties, and Special Issue Parties. The party family variable also controls for ideological incentives for supporting quota laws, i.e. the potential role of left parties.

Additionally I control for a set of standard covariates from the literature on determinants of government spending which are not known to affect quota laws. These are included to increase the accuracy of model estimates. Given the close relationship between party positions and policy outcomes, I make the assumption that these factors are also closely correlated with determinants of party positions at the country level. The following national-level institutional and structural variables are commonly assumed to affect political decision-making on spending, redistribution, and/or partisanship: Presidentialism, Unionization, Inequality, Unemployment, % Population 65+.

I control for Effective number of parties in the system because previous evidence suggests that parties rarely cross over one another on the ideological spectrum (Adams 2001; Budge 1994), so as the number of parties increases it should become more difficult for parties to change their positions. I control for Total number of quasi-sentences in the party manifesto because the lengths of the coded manifestos vary significantly and, for example, very short manifestos written for snap elections may not include a broad range of policy positions. Finally I control for the Party vote change, the difference in the party’s percentage of the vote from the previous to the current election, because evidence suggests that parties change their positions based on the signal they receive from

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5 A number of studies have found that presidential regimes spend less (e.g., Persson & Tabellini 2005; Edwards & Thames 2007; Baldez & Carey 2001). Higher unionization is linked to greater political pressure for redistribution, according to power resource theory (e.g., Korpi 1978; Esping-Andersen 1990b). The median voter theorem proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981) predicts that as inequality increases so should redistribution; however, much of the subsequent literature on redistribution has found no relationship, or the opposite (Alesina & Rodrik 1991; Persson & Tabellini 1991). Higher unemployment is linked to greater redistribution, because countries have public unemployment insurance programs. Finally older populations are likely to prefer more government contribution to pensions, health, and other social spending.
the previous election (Somer-Topcu 2009). I lag all control variables by one year \((t-1)\) because they can be affected by the treatment and may induce post-treatment bias (King & Zeng 2006), and because of the time it takes parties to respond to political and economic developments.\(^6\) Appendix 5A shows the summary statistics for all parameters used in the analysis, and provides details about data sources.

### 5.3 Time Series Analysis of Quotas and Political Party Positions

Table 5.1 reports the results showing the effects of quota laws on political party positions towards welfare state expansion and environmental protection. Providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, the estimates imply that after a quota is adopted parties shift their positions on welfare state expansion, devoting a greater percentage of their manifesto to this issue compared to others. No consistent or significant association is found between quotas and environmental protection.

Model 1 presents the simple specification, including potential confounders and standard controls as well as the lagged dependent variable. The coefficient of 2.1 on Quota Law indicates that a one-unit change in Quota Law, i.e. going from not having a quota to adopting a quota, is associated with a 2.1 percentage point increase in party attention to welfare state expansion. For example, a party that spent 10% of its manifesto discussing welfare state expansion would be expected to spend 12.1% of its manifesto on welfare state expansion after a quota law is passed. Model 2 includes party and year fixed effects, and all time-varying potential confounders. This model controls for omitted variable bias both across time and political parties, and should be interpreted to estimate within-unit changes in treatment.

Again the coefficient of the indicator for quota law is positive and statistically significant. The association between quota laws and policy change increases in size to 4.58 when party and year fixed effects are included. Within parties in quota countries, adopting a quota law leads to about a 4.6 percentage point increase in party attention to welfare state expansion. A party that spent

\(^6\)Party-level variables are lagged by one election-year given the structure of that data.
10% of its manifesto discussing welfare state expansion before the law would be expected to spend 14.6% of its manifesto on welfare state expansion after a quota law is passed.\footnote{Models including only year and only party fixed effects (not included to save space) returned similar results, with quota laws associated with a significant increase in attention to welfare state expansion in the party manifesto.}

One potential concern is that some control variables are inconsistent or do not behave as expected. Specifically, the lagged percentage of women in parliament is not significant, and is negative in the fixed effects specification. It is difficult to interpret many of the control variables because they are correlated with the treatment variable. They are included in the analysis only to adjust for selection into treatment groups. The result for lagged percentage of women in parliament is likely a legacy of the fact that quota laws are often passed in countries with low levels of women’s representation. A simple bivariate regression shows that lagged percentage of women in parliament is negatively correlated with quota law. Alternative models where women’s representation is included as the main independent variable, and quota law is not included in the analysis, found that women’s representation is significantly associated with increases in party attention to welfare state expansion (both OLS and fixed effects specifications).

Models 3 and 4 show that results hold up to the simple aggregation procedure to deal with serial correlation. The coefficient for quota law is positive and statistically significant in the two-period panel regression of the residuals from the regression of quota law on all controls. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, in all models adopting a quota law is associated with increases in political party attention to welfare state expansion, and the estimates are statistically significant. Turning to environmental protection, Models 5 and 6 show that quota laws are not associated with party positions toward environmental protection. No specification shows a significant link (and because of this the simple aggregation models are unnecessary). Hypothesis 1 suggested that when male and female political preferences are virtually indistinguishable quota laws should not matter much, and the initial evidence here supports this argument.

Table 5.2 reports coefficient estimates for model specifications designed to evaluate the effects of quota laws for left- and right-wing parties. Models 1 and 2 of Table 5.2 estimate the fixed effects model previously specified (Model 2 of Table 5.1) for left-wing and right-wing parties. Model
Table 5.1: Determinants of Political Party Positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>Welfare State Expansion</th>
<th>Environmental Protection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) OLS + Fixed lagged DV Effects</td>
<td>(2) Linear regression of DV on controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota Law</td>
<td>2.11***</td>
<td>4.58***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR Electoral System</td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Labor Force Par.:{t-1}</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Parl.:{t-1}</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionization_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population 65+:{t-1}</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total quasi-sentences</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party vote change_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective no. of parties_{t-1}</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged DV</td>
<td>0.41***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>50.59***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.07)</td>
<td>(8.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>1225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party family controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party fixed effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis carried out using R version 3.2.1. Robust standard errors clustered around election are in parentheses. Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
1 includes parties identified by the MARPOR as members of the green, communist, or social-democratic party families. Model 2 includes parties classified as liberal, Christian democratic, conservative, nationalist, agrarian, or ethnic / regional. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, adopting a quota law is associated with larger increases in party attention to the welfare state for right parties than left parties, although the size of the difference is small (the coefficients are 4.64 and 3.49 respectively). Overall the key finding from these models is that quota laws affect policy priorities across parties. For both left and right parties quota laws lead to greater attention to welfare state expansion.
### Table 5.2: Results by Party Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable:</td>
<td>Welfare State Expansion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left parties</td>
<td>Right parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>only</td>
<td>only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota Law only</td>
<td>3.49***</td>
<td>4.64***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota $(t-1)$</td>
<td>-2.39**</td>
<td>2.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>☕ Labor Force Part. $(t-1)$</td>
<td>-0.48**</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% ☕ in Parl. $(t-1)$</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionization $(t-1)$</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality $(t-1)$</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita $(t-1)$</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment $(t-1)$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population 65+ $(t-1)$</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.77**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total quasi-sentences</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party vote change $(t-1)$</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective no. of parties $(t-1)$</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>59.31***</td>
<td>50.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.64)</td>
<td>(11.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered around election are in parentheses. Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
Finally, Table 5.3 addresses questions about whether the specific rules of the quota provision matter. These models also use the same previously described fixed effects specification. Model 1 of Table 5.3 separates the quota variable into laws that require parties to comply with the law for the list to be accepted (Quota, strict sanctions, representing Spain and Belgium after a quota law was passed) and those that do not (Quota, weak sanctions). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, results show that quotas with strict enforcement sanctions have larger effects on party positions than those that do not, and a Wald test of the difference between quotas with and without strict compliance sanctions shows this difference is significant (P=0.04). A party that spent 10% of its manifesto discussing welfare state expansion would be expected to spend 16.6% on this issue after a quota law requiring compliance for the list to be accepted is passed, whereas it would only be expected to spend 13.1% of the manifesto on welfare state expansion if the penalties for compliance are less strict.

Model 2 separates the quota variable into laws that require women to make up a high threshold, 50% of the list (Quota, 50% threshold, representing France after it passed a quota law and Belgium from 2007), versus those that do not (Quota, < 50% threshold). The results show that quota laws increase attention to welfare state expansion regardless of the threshold, but contrary to expectations requiring 50% of candidates to be women does not lead to a larger effect. The coefficients are 3.56 for a quota with 50% threshold and 5.06 with a smaller percentage of women required, although a Wald test finds that the difference between these coefficients is not statistically significant.

Model 3 tests the impact of placement mandates (when the law includes specific rules about the rank-ordering of candidates, represented by Quota, placement mandates). Again quota laws are shown to increase attention to the welfare state regardless of the rule, but contrary to expectations the effect is larger for those countries without placement mandates (France, Spain, and Belgium before 2002). However a Wald test of the difference between quotas with and without placement mandates finds that the difference between these two coefficients is not statistically significant. While Hypothesis 4 suggested that strict enforcement sanctions, larger thresholds, and placement mandates would all increase the effectiveness of quota laws, I find strong support only for the use
of sanctions. This result is somewhat puzzling, given that results from Chapter 4 suggest all three legal provisions lead to the election of more women. One interpretation is that, more than the other provisions, strict enforcement mechanisms oblige all parties to comply with the law – and perhaps this increases media attention and public awareness of the issue, encouraging parties to respond with position shifts. Although quota laws influence policy agendas regardless of their specific provisions, the impact is greatest when all parties are forced to adhere to the law.
Table 5.3: Results by Specific Provisions of Quota Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Welfare State Expansion</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions Threshold Placement Mandates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, strict sanctions</td>
<td>6.59***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, weak sanctions</td>
<td>3.07**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, 50% threshold</td>
<td>3.56***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, &lt; 50% threshold</td>
<td>5.06***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, placement mandates</td>
<td>3.97**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, no placement mandates</td>
<td>5.14***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\varphi) Labor Force Part. (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% (\varphi) in Parl. (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionization (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita (_{t-1})</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Population 65+ (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total quasi-sentences</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party vote change (_{t-1})</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective no. of parties (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>51.54***</td>
<td>51.24***</td>
<td>50.18***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.87)</td>
<td>(8.91)</td>
<td>(9.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>1225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party family controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered around election are in parentheses. Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
Robustness Checks

The results hold up to several robustness checks. First, in order to investigate the possibility that results are driven by factors specific to a single country, I exclude one quota country at a time and re-estimate the specifications. While some countries are found to be more influential than others – for example, estimates of the impact of quota law on welfare state expansion decrease when Belgium is excluded from the sample – the estimates for quota law remain positive and significant upon elimination of any country from the sample.

The potential endogeneity of quota reforms remains another concern. For example, parties might increase attention to women’s preferences in response to perceived need for a quota law, which might be greater for those parties that propose quota legislation in the first place (they are typically left wing and likely to focus more on welfare state expansion). To address this concern, I remove the political parties that were responsible for proposing quota laws from the dataset. These are: the Flemish Social Democrats (SPA) and the Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD & V) in Belgium, the Democratic Party of the Left in Italy, the Socialist Party in France, the Socialist Workers’ Party in Spain, and the Socialist Party in Portugal. Many of the parties that remain in the sample did not support a quota law and indeed campaigned and voted against it. I make the claim that because the quota law was imposed on these parties without their support, we can view it as an exogenous source of change in the political atmosphere and numbers of women required for the remaining parties. I re-estimate models using the new sample and find that results do not change; in fact, the size of effects is slightly larger when parties that proposed the quota law are excluded (e.g., the coefficient for quota law in the party and year fixed effects specification is 4.65 for this sample compared to 4.58 in the original sample). Overall, the results seem to be reasonably robust across a range of specifications and sample sets.
5.4 Case Study: The Far Right in Belgium and Austria

The analysis so far demonstrates that quota laws lead to greater party attention to issues related to welfare state expansion. Unfortunately, the manifesto data do not allow us to distinguish which issues specifically are driving the increase in attention to welfare state expansion. According to the theory proposed in Chapter 2, quotas ought to lead to policy change especially for those issues that are off the main left-right agenda, like work-family policies. This is because parties have little incentive to address issues that cross-cut their constituencies, potentially exacerbating internal divisions. Are these issues in fact driving the results here – for example, parental leave and child care? The purpose of this case study is to explore how individual parties respond to quota laws, and to shed light on the causal mechanisms at work. By investigating the policy responses of individual parties, this case study gives the empirical findings greater credibility and deepens our understanding of quotas’ political influence.

I focus on far right parties in Belgium, which passed a quota law in 1994, and Austria, which has no quota law. This is one of two ‘most similar’ matched pair case studies I conducted for the sake of this book project (see Chapter 3 for details about how cases were selected). In future work I plan to expand these case studies, using evidence from both matched pairs to assess arguments about the impact of quota laws on party positions and policy outcomes. For now I note that the case of Belgium is of particular interest for two main reasons. First, the quota law is considered very strong, with a 50% threshold, placement mandates, and strict enforcement mechanisms. It has been in place for nearly twenty years, allowing me to assess whether effects have increased over time. Second, the gender gap in preferences for maternal employment is relatively large in Belgium (9% on average), making it all the more likely that these issues will be prioritized after a quota law.

I concentrate on the far right because these parties tend to be the most opposed to quota laws. The quota can thus be seen as an exogenous change imposed on the party, strengthening the case that policy changes after the law are in fact due to the quota law and not incentives endogenous to the political party. I am also particularly interested in these parties because my theory expects
the most change in parties of the right, since they typically promote fewer women and have less egalitarian views compared to left parties. Comparing the far right after a quota law was passed in Belgium but not Austria thus constitutes a case characterized by multiple factors (strength of quota law, size of gender gap, far right parties) that make it most likely to fulfill theoretical predictions (Gerring 2007).

To understand how party positions changed after a quota law was imposed, I used Google Translate to translate and read every party manifesto for Belgium’s Vlaams Blok / Vlaams Belang (VB) and Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) for three elections before and after the law was implemented (i.e., I read a total of twelve manifestos). I also utilize interviews with current and former party members undertaken in 2013 and 2014, official party documents, newspaper coverage, and secondary literature describing policy change before and after a quota law was passed in Belgium but not Austria. Both parties are described as far-right and are known for their anti-immigration policies. They have also both been criticized for their conservative views towards women. While the percentage of women in parliament for Belgium’s VB increased after a quota law was implemented, from 0% in 1987 to 33% in 2016, the percentage of women in parliament for Austria’s FPÖ essentially stayed the same, at 17% in 1986 compared to 18% in 2016.

In general both parties’ manifestos initially pay little attention to social policies, with the exception of pensions. However Belgium’s VB gradually increases attention to several social policies after the quota law, including child care, parental leave, and elderly care. No such trend is apparent for Austria’s FPÖ. Please see Appendix 5B for a table summarizing social policy coverage in these manifestos over time. Of particular interest here, there is a striking shift in the content of work-family policies in Belgium’s VB after the law. Both parties initially advocate increases in family allowances and child benefits, promoting care for children within the family. The role of the mother as primary carer is stressed emphatically. For example, the FPÖ’s 1994 manifesto

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8Vlaams Blok was the direct predecessor of Vlaams Belang. The party was forced to change its name in 2004 after a Supreme Court ruling forbidding the party’s continued existence because of incitement to discrimination. The party moderated some of its most radical views, but the party leader made it clear that the party would fundamentally remain the same.

9Documents were translated using Google Translate.
states, “Kindergarten places are important, but do not replace the mother... The care of children and elderly in the family is usually better and cheaper than preschools and nursing homes” (p. 20). The VB’s 1995 manifesto conveys a similar theme, but ostracizes working women and feminism in particular:

We advocate a healthier balance between individual ambition, career opportunities, and financial independence, and also the irreplaceable tasks that women can fulfill as mothers and educators. We believe that the balance is broken. Here in a catastrophic way feminism has led to a one-sided, selfish and socially destructive mentality, in which the female nature is grossly misunderstood, and that leaves no place for children. . . . homemakers play a valuable role. No school, no kindergarten can replace the nurturing, protective and educational role of the family. (p. 20)

After the quota law is implemented, VB continues to push for increased benefits, but also discusses the need for development of affordable daycare centers with greater flexibility. In 1999, the manifesto is strikingly different:

The Vlaams Blok is in favor of a real choice between working at home and working outside the home. For the families who deliberately choose this second option, supportive policies should be developed.... The existing legislation on child care should be expanded and made more flexible. Also, the rates for low-income families should be reduced. (p. 77-78)

The VB continues to advocate for additional affordable and higher quality child care facilities in their 2003 and 2007 manifestos. The 2003 manifesto states, “The Vlaams Blok argues for a decent, affordable, and high quality child care,” (p. 9) and similarly in 2007, “Vlaams Belang supports the development of a harmonious combination of family and work. Here a good quality and affordable child care program is essential.” (p. 14). In contrast, the FPÖ does not mention public child care until the 2006 manifesto, when it suggests that public child care facilities must guarantee a high quality of educational care (p. 3). Instead the FPÖ advocate for additional family allowances (1999), tax reforms to benefit large families (2002 and 2006), and strengthening the family relationship through educational skills and support like counseling (2002). In summary, attitudes in the VB towards whether women should stay at home with children have shifted, while attitudes in the FPÖ remain the same.
Why did the VB shift its direction on these issues? The first proposed mechanism linking quotas to policy change is added numbers of women, who can impact party positions in three main ways: a ‘critical mass’, women’s sections, or reaching positions of leadership. The second proposed mechanism is that quotas lead to an increase in the salience of gender issues. Rising public awareness and media attention to women’s political issues spurs party leaders to prioritize issues that women prefer, and any policy changes serve to reinforce issue salience in a policy feedback effect.

An interview with the former party chairman of the VB Gerolf Annemans suggests that party change in Belgium’s far right was primarily due to the first mechanism, increases in the number of women. According to him, the debate about a quota law was in the papers but it wasn’t a popular issue at the time (“That was why we as a growing party at that time could afford our opposition without breaking our neck.”). However, it is worth noting that far right parties like the VB draw a disproportionate share of their electors from young men (Givens 2004). Compared to other parties, they might not be as susceptible to growing pressure to address gender equality issues. Interviews with members of more mainstream parties in Belgium suggest that elites have perceived a shift in the salience of women’s concerns. This is reflected in the case study in Chapter 4, e.g., the quotes from liberal and conservative party members Gwendolyn Rutten and Viviane Teitelbaum (p. 97-98). Another example comes from Flemish Socialist party member Vera Claes, who suggests that men who were able to pivot and address women’s concerns have benefited electorally:

There is less opposition against women, and women’s issues [after the quota], and also a lot of men have taken over these issues. I think about parental leave, work-life balance, positive action, violence against women, child care, these things are no longer women’s issues. And I think that men who were conscious of the fact of these issues and who started to promote and give attention to these issues, they found themselves in a favorable position towards women in fact.10

Instead, Annemans suggests that change within the far right was driven by women in the party, who represent certain points of view:

You must not as a man try to explain things that women can better explain. What should we do with children while mama is going to work? What should we do about

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10 Vera Claes, personal interview, 10 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
child care? . . . so talking about child care and designing child care should be done by women. This is not a matter of the party president designing an image for the party, women being more telegenic etc, but about letting things be done by those who do them the best. So for instance how could you talk about these things without a woman in the driver’s seat?¹¹

Annemans stops short of saying that the addition of more women in his party changed the party’s positions. At the same time, he makes the case that policies like child care are bigger issues for women than for men, and that it’s not credible to have a policy debate about them without women.

Neither the VB in Belgium or the FPÖ in Austria have a women’s section in the party, so in this case it is not a relevant explanation. This leaves the critical mass and women in leadership arguments. Although numbers of women in the party did increase significantly, I find little evidence that a critical mass of women worked together to negotiate for women’s interests within the party. Instead, women in leadership roles made substantial changes to party policy. Since the quota law was implemented, women have risen to top positions in Vlaams Belang, and they have also emphasized social policies that help women combine work and family.

Barbara Pas was first elected in 2007 and became parliamentary party leader in 2013, the first woman in her party to do so. When she took power she told the party that they could expect new issues on the agenda, in addition to the classic Flemish independence themes. In a May 2013 interview she explains, “Socio-economic issues in the first place. On June 2, our party is organizing a conference under the title ‘Social People’s Party’. We are in various working groups to prepare. The intention is that we tighten our social positions and put them more into the spotlight.”¹² The conference text stresses the need for affordable child care, linking it to women’s labor force participation specifically:

Child care for families with children is often a necessary condition for activation in the labor market. Employment is the best safeguard against poverty. Therefore Vlaams Belang wants to create a sufficient number of child care places in Flanders.¹³

¹¹Gerolf Annemans, personal interview, 9 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
Anke Van dermeersch is another female party leader outspoken on work-family issues. Van dermeersch was first elected to the Senate in 2003 and went on to be group leader in the Senate from 2011 to 2014 – again, the first woman in her party to hold this position. Both women have sponsored bills to extend maternity and parental leave, which is short in Belgium compared to many other European countries, and to better protect pregnant workers against discrimination. In a speech to a party conference in Antwerp in 2012, Van dermeersch draws from her own experiences to advocate for child care:

As a wife and mother of two young children, child care in my home town is very close to my heart. Far too few Antwerp families find a place in child care. The number of child care places in our city is well below the Flemish average. . . The Vlaams Belang would like more, cheaper and quality child care because your children are our future.  

How do these mechanisms apply in the shadow case of Austria? First, there is little evidence supporting an increased role for women in the party, since the share of women in parliament has not increased over the course of thirty years. Former FPÖ member Martina Schenk said that the negative atmosphere for women within the party contributed to her decision to leave and join another party on the right (she is currently an MP for Team Stronach). She says, “There was a feeling that women were. . . some people in the party were treating women in a way that was not equal to men, and they treated them in a different way. So this is one of the reasons I left.”

I also find little indication that increasing public pressure influenced the FPÖ’s positions, absent a quota law. In fact, in the 2000s the FPÖ was responsible for what many consider to be a step back in family policy, in terms of maternal employment. In 2000, FPÖ party member Herbert Haupt was appointed Minister of Social Services, with responsibility for women’s affairs. Haupt was responsible for proposing a new law establishing family allowances independently of the parental leave benefit. Previously, parental leave and family allowances had been linked together and aimed

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15 The highest proportion of women elected in FPÖ’s parliamentary party was 26%, in 2002. The lowest was 8%, in 2006. Overall, the average share of women elected since 1999 (when a quota was implemented in Belgium) is 18%, compared to 29% for Belgium’s VB.

16 Martina Schenk, personal interview, 7 May 2014, Vienna, Austria. Translation assistance by Denise Aichelburg, present at interview.
at supporting working mothers, i.e., compensating for lost wages while maintaining ties to the labor market. Since 2001, the Law on Child Care Allowance replaced this with a family allowance available to all parents regardless of whether they had previously worked. It also extended the length of time that the benefit can be claimed from two to three years (Pfeiffer 2005; Haussman & Sauer 2007). Haupt explained that the policy change was intended to stop the erosion of the traditional family, even claiming that public child care institutions contributed to increases in drug abuse and violence in society. According to Minister Haupt, mothers should stay home with children and only after several years take on at most a part-time job (FPÖ Minister Herbert Haupt, Nationalrat 2001, as cited in Haussman & Sauer 2007, p. 28).

In summary, the cases of the VB in Belgium and the FPÖ in Austria offer initial insight into how and why parties alter their policy positions after a quota law. The VB shifts its views towards more state provision of child care while the FPÖ maintains strong advocacy for care within the home. Evidence suggests that change within the VB was due mainly to women’s growing influence in the party, particularly as they gained access to top leadership posts. This finding confirms previous research suggesting that women are particularly influential at the agenda-setting stage. At the same time, it is worth noting that the unique context of far right parties might influence which causal mechanisms are triggered. Far right parties are typically opposed to organized women’s sections, while in many socialist parties they are well-established. When the structure of a women’s section already exists, women may find it easier to lobby party leadership for change, even without gaining access to leadership positions themselves. In addition, the gender gap in voting for far right parties is well-known – the majority of supporters are typically men – and so rising issue salience of gender equality issues may be less persuasive than in the typical party.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the impact of quota laws within parties in advanced industrial democracies. It finds that parties in countries with gender quota laws increase the attention they give to welfare state expansion, an issue on which women prefer more spending and government inter-

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vention than men. Gender quota laws increase coverage of welfare issues even after controlling for institutional and structural factors, party ideology, party and year effects, and a lagged dependent variable. Yet, consistent with hypotheses, gender quota laws only change political parties’ attention to issues on which men and women have different opinions; I find no evidence that quotas lead to changes on policies that are not characterized by a gender gap in preferences, such as environmental protection. The findings suggest that quota laws increase party attention to women’s preferences even in right-wing parties, many of which did not support the law. In fact, the size of the quota’s effect is greater among right parties. Finally, the design of the law matters, but only strict enforcement mechanisms. Quotas can have important implications for intra-party change even if they are comparatively ‘weak’ laws (i.e., lacking placement mandates or a 50% requirement).

A large literature in political economy has tried to identify the causes of inequality and differing levels of redistribution across countries. The results of this chapter imply that the identity of policymakers (here, gender identity) may be an important variable that has been largely unexplored. Men and women prioritize different issues. Quotas are one mechanism that can lead to greater substantive representation of women’s interests within political parties, particularly if interests are orthogonal to the standard class-based issue dimension. The case study suggests that change is mainly due to women’s growing influence within the party, particularly gaining access to leadership roles. However, male party elites also had to decide to listen, given that the party platforms were always approved by men. This suggests that quotas also had some role in changing attitudes, whether it be in the public mind, among male party leaders, or both. Do male party leaders listen because they perceive a shift in constituency support for these issues, or do they feel more comfortable addressing certain issues like care when women are around, as recent literature suggests (Murray 2014)? More research is needed to unpack the question of how quotas influence public and elite attitudes.

Agenda-setting is an important stage of the policymaking process. The results here suggest that quotas, and the presence of disadvantaged groups like women, can expand the scope of decision-making beyond standard issues of importance to dominant groups. Quotas are one way of shifting the distribution of power in politics. Yet the question of whether party positions translate into
national level policy outcomes remains. Particularly in parliamentary democracies with strong party discipline, individual legislators may have less influence on the later stages of the policymaking process. The next chapter turns to this question, exploring the effects of gender quotas on work-family spending outcomes.
Quotas and Policy Outcomes: Work-Family Spending

Do gender quotas matter to policy outcomes, or are they just ‘window dressing’? Chapter 5 provides evidence that quotas, and increased numbers of women in office, lead to shifts in policy priorities within parties. While party positions correlate with behavior in office, ultimately political representation is about policy choices. There are many different theories of what constitutes ‘good’ representation, but in the vast majority representatives are judged by their actions in the policy-making process (Mansbridge 2003).\(^1\) Party positions could be ‘cheap talk’, but spending decisions don’t lie.

In my interviews in Western Europe, many politicians claimed that quotas had made a difference to policies ‘for’ women. For example, Flemish Christian Democrat Senator Sabine de Bethune said:

My feeling is that more women in politics has broadened the political agenda, more things became politics. When I entered the political committee of my party, we were only three or four women in a committee of 60 people. Now we are more than half. When we tried to talk about child care, some men said what is this, etcetera – and now we change it. It is one of the biggest budget points. . . although maybe still not enough.\(^2\)

\(^1\) An exception is symbolic representation, in which representatives are assessed based on how their presence (typically as members of an under-represented group) affects public attitudes and behavior (Pitkin 1967).

\(^2\) Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
Yet, the argument that quotas will lead to policy change is controversial for a number of reasons. First, some question the notion that distinct ‘women's interests’ exist in the first place (Young 1997; Weldon 2002). Chapter 2 refutes this argument, showing that clear and persistent gender gaps exist over social policy preferences, especially issues to do with maternal employment. While intra-group differences certainly exist, on average women in advanced democracies share a clear set of concerns related to their historical, shared group experiences. Others argue that quotas give concessions in terms of numbers, but men still pick the candidates. The women elected could be family members or others easily controlled by the party – ‘tokens’ (Abou Zeid 2006; Bauer & Britton 2006). Finally there is a fear that quotas could lead to backlash, whereby resentful male politicians try to prevent ‘quota women’ from exercising political power (Hawkesworth 2003; Michelle Heath, Schwindt-Bayer & Taylor-Robinson 2005). In light of these concerns, can quotas provide access to the true halls of power in politics?

The chapter proceeds as follows. After reviewing the literature on social spending and identity and outcomes, I propose a theory of quotas and policy change specific to national level policy change. The main argument is that quotas will lead to policy change for work-family issues because they are characterized by a gender gap in preferences and are orthogonal to the mainstream policy dimension. Building on Chapter 5’s discussion of mechanisms, I suggest that women in leadership and issue salience will be especially important in the context of government actions. To test this argument I analyze public spending on work-family policies for 22 countries from 1980 to 2011. I find that implementing a quota law leads to greater spending on child care, a policy that encourages maternal employment, and less spending on family allowances, which tend to discourage women from returning to paid work. Effects are larger in size in the context of countries with larger average gender gaps in policy preferences (e.g., France as opposed to Portugal). A matched pair case study of work-family policy evolution in Portugal and Italy sheds light on the mechanisms linking quota laws to policy change. The chapter concludes by discussing implications for the broader welfare state literature and potential extensions of this work.
6.1 Theoretical Development

The extensive literature on redistribution and social spending points to several key determinants, including: inequality (Benabou 1996; Lindert 1996; Milanovic 2000; Moene & Wallerstein 2001), electoral institutions (Austen-Smith 2000; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002; Persson & Tabellini 2005; Iversen & Soskice 2006; Edwards & Thames 2007), partisanship (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990b; Klingemann et al. 1994; Huber & Stephens 2001; Korpi & Palme 2003), and skill specificity (Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice 2001; Iversen & Soskice 2001). The standard political economy literature addresses identity only insomuch as it relates to voters and their preferences. Ethnic and other forms of identity-based cleavage have been explored as potentially important determinants of policy choice (Roemer 1998; Austen-Smith & Wallerstein 2006; Scheve, Stasavage et al. 2006; Anesi & Donder 2009). For example, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that racial heterogeneity can explain much of the gap in welfare spending between the United States and Europe, because racial divisions distract from the traditionally key class divisions. Huber and Stephens (2000) show that women’s labor force participation is an important determinant of the expansion of social welfare services, and they argue that this is because women’s employment generates new demand for services such as caregiving. And Roemer (1998) proposes a model in which, if voters care deeply about some non-economic issue (like integration or religion), then they may not necessarily support a party which proposes the most economically rational policy for them. However, these studies do not apply the same logic to policymakers themselves.

There are good reasons to suspect that the identity of policymakers has important consequences for their choices in office – and, potentially, for policy outcomes. As discussed in Chapter 5, a substantial literature suggests that gender matters to legislative behavior, although the size of its effect and relative influence, compared to e.g. party ideology, is less clear. For example, party is typically a larger determinant of roll-call votes than gender in the United States (Welch 1985; Burrell 1994; Vega & Firestone 1995; Shwindt-Bayer & Corbetta 2004), and evidence that policy promotion translates into outcomes is rare, especially in parliamentary democracies. Rehavi (2007) finds that female U.S. state legislators invest more in health, but not on other spending areas.
widely associated with women such as education. Conversely, Ferriera and Gyourko (2011) find no evidence that the gender of U.S. mayors affects city spending outcomes. Other studies link women’s representation to higher spending on education and child care in Sweden (Svaleryd 2009) and the environment in Switzerland (Funk & Gathmann 2008).

These studies use micro-level data, most likely because the setup offers methodological advantages for making causal inferences – e.g., regression discontinuities based on extremely close elections where a woman opposed a man and ‘just won’. The downside of this is that findings may not be generalizable to important national level policy outcomes. Few scholars examine the link between gender identity and policy outcomes across countries. Most quantitative studies of social spending do not include gender in models of development over time. Still, the few studies that do find a relationship between women’s representation and spending levels, from overall spending (Bolzendahl & Brooks 2007; Bolzendahl 2009) to child care (Bonoli & Reber 2010) and defense (Koch & Fulton 2011). Looking at other types of policy outcomes (besides spending), O’Regan (2000) finds that higher shares of women in office are associated with stronger employment and wage protection and equal wage policies. Kittilson (2008) shows that women in parliament significantly influence the adoption and scope of maternity and child care leave policies. Overall, research on the effect of women’s representation on policy outcomes is at a relatively early stage compared to the decades of work on the impact of electoral systems, political parties, and even female labor force participation.

Thus far, no study addresses the relationship between gender quotas and policy outcomes across countries. The best evidence on the causal effect of quotas on policy outcomes comes from the case of India. India’s constitution was amended in 1992 to require that one-third of seats at the local level be randomly reserved for a woman. Research utilizing this natural experiment seems to confirm the theory that quotas alter policy outcomes: female leaders are more likely to adopt laws and invest in resources that women favor – specifically, water and roads (Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2003, 2004; Besley, Pande & Rao 2005a; Clots-Figueras 2011). However, this finding has yet to be replicated in advanced democracies, where women have a different set of policy preferences and the behavior of individual representatives tends to be more constrained by their parties. For example, studies of the effects of quota laws in Spain and Italy find no evidence that quotas have a significant
effect on the size or allocation of local-level government expenditures (Campa 2011; Rigon & Tanzi 2012).

The disparity in these findings may be due to differences between developing and developed countries, which differ in culture, socio-economic level, and type of political institutions. It is not clear that we should expect gender to operate in the same way across such divergent socio-political contexts. Moreover, they focus on different types of affirmative action laws (political reservations, which require a woman to be elected, versus gender quotas, which require women to be nominated rather but not necessarily elected), and different political positions (executive positions e.g. local mayor versus legislative bodies). My research contributes to the emerging identity politics literature by providing a comparative study of the effects of the same type of measure (national quota law) over similar units (political parties in advanced democracies). Comparative analysis allows us to explore whether the effects of quota laws ‘travel’ across political contexts, and how effects are mediated by political preferences in different societies. The theory of quotas and policy change outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that quotas will lead to policy change for issues characterized by a gender gap in preferences, especially if these issues are off the main left-right party dimension. This is the main relationship I test in quantitative analysis.

How exactly will quotas affect policymaking in the ‘most difficult’ scenario of parliamentary democracies? My starting point is the same two mechanisms proposed in Chapter 2: increased numbers of women and rising issue salience. In Chapter 5, I suggested several ways that these mechanisms could apply to the specific context of intra-party position taking. Here I argue that the same mechanisms apply within the context of governments, with a few key differences. Figure 6.1 illustrates the causal logic linking quotas to national level policy change. It shows the same main causal pathways detailed in Chapter 5, but those expected to be particularly important in the context of government actions are highlighted in bold. These are women in leadership positions and issue salience. Mechanisms expected to be less important in this context, compared to intra-party decision-making, are shown in light grey. These are critical mass and women’s sections. As in Chapter 5, I provide evidence exploring the relative importance of these mechanisms in the qualitative case study.
First, the role of increased numbers of women (a ‘critical mass’) in parliament is likely to be minimal. This is because policy in parliamentary democracies typically originates in the party leadership and the cabinet, rather than the legislature (Laver & Shepsle 1996; Strøm 2000; Martin 2004). I would expect women’s sections to be less powerful in the context of national level policy making than intra-party position taking for the same reason. Instead, increased women’s representation is more likely to influence policy outcomes if it translates into greater numbers of women in leadership positions, such as party leaders and cabinet members, as well. I focus mainly on women in the cabinet and party leadership here, because the number of women prime ministers and presidents is miniscule (Reynolds 1999; Jalalzai 2013). None of the countries that passed a quota law in my sample has subsequently had a female leader.

Government ministers, in particular, play a crucial role in shaping the policy agenda by determining the form and content of draft legislation within their portfolio area. At the same time, it is notoriously difficult to assess the relative weight of individual ministers in the development of policy (Blondel & Müller-Rommel 1993). Individual ministers differ in their ability and desire to shape
policy beyond their party leaders’ preferences (Indridason & Kam 2005; Dewan & Hortala-Vallve 2011). Alexiadou (2015) finds that certain types of cabinet ministers (‘partisans’ and ‘ideologues’) are more influential than others (‘loyalists’) in changing social welfare policy. Thus the background of female ministers and their allocation of ministries is likely to be especially important for this mechanism.

Second, rising issue salience might trigger policy response at the national level, even among parties who have already taken ‘women-friendly’ policy positions, such as left parties. In line with spatial models of party competition, parties might have already shifted their positions to cater to women voters without a quota law in place. This would explain Chapter 5’s finding that quotas lead to slightly less change to party positions among left parties compared to right parties. However, progress on party positions does not necessarily mean that left parties prioritize the issue in office. If quotas ramp up the importance of women’s policy concerns, party leaders are more likely to move to get these policies enacted in order to benefit electorally. And once policy attention to these issues increases, rival parties are likely to respond with policy shifts of their own (Adams & Somer-Topcu 2009; Lindvall & Rueda 2014; Williams, Seki & Whitten 2014).

Following on the movement of women voters from right to left in recent decades, women are often perceived to be ‘swing voters’ (Norris 1996; Carroll 2006; Campbell 2012b). Parties on the right, particularly Christian Democrat parties which once counted women as core voters (Inglehart & Norris 2000; Leonardi & Wertman 1989), might be triggered to compete with the left on women’s policy concerns if they perceive other parties encroaching on this space. Government actions are more visible than party positions, and the information and resources generated by these policies can affect the attitudes and decisions made by individuals in their everyday lives (Esping-Andersen 1990b; Pierson 1993). Quotas could spur a policy feedback effect whereby rising issue salience leads to policy change, these policy changes create new resources and incentives for women in the public to lobby for further change, and party elites are more and more likely to prioritize the issues.

This chapter focuses on policies related to maternal employment because it is both orthogonal to traditional party lines and characterized by a large gender gap in policy preferences.
Fortunately national level spending data allow me to analyze policies specifically related to maternal employment, which was not possible using party-level manifesto data. I expect changes to policies that either help or hinder women returning to paid work after a quota law is passed. I focus on three main ‘work-family’ policies: 1) public child care provision and 2) maternity and parental leave, both of which facilitate maternal employment, and 3) family allowances / child benefits, which tend to discourage maternal employment. 3 Below, I discuss the implications of different work-family policies for maternal employment and related hypotheses.

A substantial literature links generous public child care policies to the growth of maternal employment over recent decades (e.g., Lewis 1992; Attanasio, Low & Sanchez-Marcos 2008), and suggests that child care is a key determinant of cross-country differences in female labor force participation (Jaumotte 2003; Del Boca 2002; Del Boca et al. 2005). When the state is able to take on some of the caring responsibilities, mothers have more time to engage in paid labor. Some examples of public child care programs are municipal-run crèches collectives in France (public center-based care, beginning as young as 2 months) and Italy’s scuole dell’infanzia for 3 to 6 year-olds.

Maternity and parental leave policies have also been correlated with maternal employment, particularly if they are well-paid and include job protection (Rønsen & Sundström 1996; Bergemann & Riphahn 2011; Baker & Milligan 2008). Leave policies enable women and men to continue employment while temporarily giving priority to care responsibilities. For example, Switzerland offers mothers 14 weeks of maternity leave paid at 80 percent of earnings while in Austria up to 2 years can be taken, paid at various rates. Leave policies can be a double-edged sword; leave that is too short may not provide women with enough incentive to return to paid work, while leave that is too long may break women’s ties to the labor market (Baker & Milligan 2008; Dustmann & Schönberg 2012). Still, most of the literature considers leave policies to be a positive influence on women’s employment overall. Previous research has found that women in parliament are associated

3A fourth set of policies of interest are measures that enable part-time work, which is more attractive than full-time work for many mothers of young children (Morgan 2006, p.169). Because comparative data on part-time working policies is not currently available it is not included in analysis here.
with longer leave periods, and the assumption is that longer leaves enhance women’s work-family balance (Kittilson 2008). In line with this I assume that leave policies will facilitate women’s transition back to paid work. I expect:

**Hypothesis 1:** *Quota laws will lead to more spending on family policies that help mothers return to paid work; namely, child care and leave policies.*

Conversely, quota laws ought to lead to less spending on family policies that discourage women from returning to paid work, or do not prioritize it. Child benefits and family allowances enable mothers to stay at home as full-time caregivers, rather than supporting involvement in paid work. These programs are cash transfers to families with children, with payment levels that can vary with the age of the child and number of children, and are sometimes means tested. An example is the *allocations familiales* in Belgium, which provide monthly payments to the primary caregiver (typically mothers) up until the child is 18. Family allowances are also sometimes contingent on the family deciding not to use daycare (as in recent legislation in Germany, the so-called ‘stove premium’). Scholars argue that these types of programs lower incentives for women to work, and so often foster single-earner patterns that continue to support the male breadwinner model (Gornick, Meyers & Ross 1997; Gottfried & O’Reilly 2002; Naldini 2004). Thus I expect:

**Hypothesis 2:** *Quota laws will lead to less spending on family policies that do not encourage mothers to return to paid work; namely, child benefits and family allowances.*

Finally, the size of the gender gap on maternal employment varies across countries. As previously discussed, women in countries such as Italy and Portugal continue to hold more traditional views on maternal employment. Accordingly, I expect the impact of quota laws to be conditioned by the gender gap in policy preferences.
Hypothesis 3: The size of the effect of quota laws will be greater in countries where the gender gap in policy preferences is relatively large.

6.2 Data & Methods

To test these hypotheses, I analyze government spending on work-family policies for 22 countries from 1980 to 2011, using data from the OECD Social Expenditures Database. The main independent variable is Quota Law, a binary variable that equals 1 when a country has implemented a gender quota law and 0 otherwise. Ideally, in order to make causal inferences about the effect of a quota law on policy outcomes, a quota law would be randomly assigned to countries. Given that this is not possible, a concern is that the effect is not causal and something else such as culture or attitudes towards women could be determining both adoption of a quota law and policy outcomes.

I cannot fully resolve this problem, but I take several steps to alleviate concerns. First, I estimate models that include country and year fixed effects. Country fixed effects control for any country-specific omitted variables (observable and unobservable) that are constant over time, a potentially large source of omitted variable bias. Year fixed effects deal with group-invariant trends over time, e.g., global economic conditions. The two-way fixed effects design is a generalization of the difference-in-differences approach, where countries implementing a quota law are the ‘treated’, and those that do not are the ‘controls’. The specification compares average policy outcomes post-quota minus policy outcomes pre-quota in the treated countries to the change in policy outcomes in the control countries over the same period. Results should be interpreted as within-unit changes, i.e., the link between quotas and policy change within quota countries.

The critical identifying assumption in this approach is that there are no potential time-varying confounders that have not been accounted for in the analysis. To deal with this concern I carefully identify and control for potential confounding variables, factors which could affect both the probability of quota adoption and policy outcomes. Conditioning on these observed characteristics

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4These are the years covered by the OECD Social Expenditures Database as of April 2015.
helps ensure that the groups being compared are really comparable, and strengthens support for a causal interpretation of results.

The baseline model with country and year fixed effects can be written as:

\[ Y_{it} = \beta_1 Quota\ Law_{it} + \beta_2 Z_{it} + \alpha_i + \eta_t + \mu_{it} \]

where \( Y_{it} \) is the outcome of interest and measures work-family policy spending in country \( i \) in the year \( t \); \( Quota\ Law \) is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the implementation of a quota law and 0 otherwise, and \( \beta_1 \) is the coefficient for this main independent variable; \( Z_{it} \) represents a vector of covariates, and \( \beta_2 \) the coefficients for these covariates; \( \alpha_i \) and \( \eta_t \) are country and year fixed effects, respectively; and \( \mu_{it} \) is the error term. \( Quota\ Law \) is lagged by one year to acknowledge the time it takes to influence spending outcomes, and the other right-hand side variables are lagged by 2 years because they can be affected by the treatment and may induce post-treatment bias (King & Zeng 2006).

I take several steps to check that findings are not the result of model misspecification. A well-known problem with using panel data with fixed effects is serially correlated errors. Tests suggested by Wooldridge (2010) show AR(1) serial correlation is present in the data used here. To deal with this I follow Beck and Katz (1995) and correct for AR(1) serial correlation in the residuals by estimating Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors. Another concern with fixed effects models is that they tend to produce “false-positive” results at high rates (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan 2004b). In order to alleviate this concern I estimate a set of placebo regressions, which test the research design by examining whether “no effect” is observed when the date of quota implementation is moved back a number of years. In the following section I describe the data and relevant covariates.
Data

I analyze government spending on work-family policies in 22 countries, from 1980 to 2011.\textsuperscript{5} The OECD Social Expenditures Database measures overall government expenditures on family services, and it can be further divided to measure spending on: 1) family allowances; 2) child care and early childhood education systems, and; 3) maternity, paternity, and parental leave policies. Spending on family allowances refers to child-related cash transfers to families with children, with payment levels that in some countries vary with the age of the child, and sometimes are income tested.\textsuperscript{6} Spending on child care and early childhood education refers to public financial support for families with children participating in formal daycare services (e.g., creches and daycare centers for children under 3) and pre-school institutions (including kindergartens and daycare centers which usually provide an educational content for children ages 3 to 5).\textsuperscript{7}

Lastly, spending on maternity, paternity, and parental leave refers to public income support payments during periods of maternity, paternity, and parental leave. Maternity and paternity leave are defined as employment-protected leave of absence for employed mothers and fathers, respectively, at or around the time of childbirth or adoption in some countries. Parental leave is employment-protected leave of absence for employed parents, which is often supplementary to specific maternity and paternity leave periods.\textsuperscript{8} Data are measured as percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{9} The mean percent of GDP devoted to family policies in the sample overall is 1.96. Family allowances constitute most of this spending (mean = 0.92), followed by child care and early childhood education (mean = 0.49) and leave policies (mean = 0.24).

\textsuperscript{5}The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

\textsuperscript{6}“PF1.3: Family cash benefits.” OECD Family Database. Last updated 14/07/2014.

\textsuperscript{7}“PF3.1: Public spending on child care and early education.” OECD Family Database. Last updated 29/07/2013.

\textsuperscript{8}“PF2.1: Key characteristics of parental leave systems.” OECD Family Database. Last updated 01/05/2014.

\textsuperscript{9}Spending-to-GDP ratios are calculated by the OECD using their \textit{National Accounts} data (where GDP is recorded for the calendar year). The recording period for social expenditure data is typically the calendar year; in cases where the financial year recorded differs from the calendar year special adjustments for GDP are made. For full details see Adema, Fron & Ladaique 2011 p. 100.
The key independent variable is *Quota Law*, a binary variable coded 1 for the five countries which have implemented a quota law (including and after the first election in which the quota was in operation) and 0 otherwise. Appendix 6A shows summary statistics for all parameters used in the analysis, and provides details about data sources. To specify the covariates to be used as controls, I consider how the adoption of quotas is related to established determinants of work-family policies. The key issue is whether adopting a quota causes parties and governments to change their policy priorities, or there is something else that both contributes to a quota being adopted and also causes a shift in spending outcomes. I focus only on time-varying confounders here, because all models include fixed effects which account for any (observable or unobservable) time-invariant confounders.

I control for five variables potentially linked to both adopting quotas and family policy outcomes: % *Women in Parliament*, *Female Labor Force Participation*, *GDP per capita*, *Left Cabinet*, *Party Quota*, and *EU Membership*. These covariates are familiar to those used in previous analysis of quotas and party positions, and their potential link to quota adoption is outlined in detail in Chapter 3. Below I briefly review how they are also related to social policy outcomes.

First, the % *Women in Parliament* has been linked to increases in spending on child care and parental leave (Bonoli & Reber 2010; Kittilson 2008). Economic development (measured as *GDP per capita*) and associated increases in *Female Labor Force Participation* are also related to policy outcomes; for example, as incomes and government revenues increase, demand for public expenditure should also rise (Wagner’s Law). Workforce participation entitles some women to benefits that they would otherwise not be eligible for and increases their need for services to help balance work and family. The variable *Left Cabinet* controls for the possibility that left-wing parties and governments push through both quota laws and women’s policy preferences. Left parties have also been linked to a range of feminist policy outcomes (Huber & Stephens 2000; Mazur 2002; O’Connor 1999). Left power is operationalized as the share of left cabinet seats rather than parliament seats because previous research identifies government partisanship as particularly important for social policy outcomes (e.g., Huber & Stephens 2000). I include the share of relevant parties with voluntary gender quotas (*Party Quota*) to control for concerns that internal party quotas are driving change both to national quota legislation and policy outcomes for women. I expect that voluntary party quotas could be linked
to policy outcomes mainly through the indirect mechanism of increased women’s representation. 

*EU Membership* is included as a control for international quota policy diffusion across Europe. EU membership may lead to convergence on higher family policy spending levels. The EU has issued directives on maternity and parental leave and advocates targets for child care provision, which continue to be monitored by the European Commission.$^{10}$

Additionally I control for a set of standard covariates from the literature on determinants of social policy spending which are not known to affect quota laws. These are included to increase the accuracy of model estimates. *Union Density* is linked to greater political pressure for redistribution according to power resource theory (e.g., Korpi 1978; Esping-Andersen 1990b), so perhaps we should expect greater spending on family policies where unions are stronger. Yet, traditionally male-dominated unions have often been hostile to feminist demands (Gelb 1989). Unions might support the interests of (male) low wage workers over gender equality in the labor market when the two are competing (Huber & Stephens 2001; Gelb 1989). Previous research finds that countries with high unionization are less likely to adopt leave policies (Kittilson 2008). I control for *Wage Bargaining Level* because centralized wage bargaining is strongly associated with generous welfare states (Hicks 1999; Swank 2002) and has been linked to gender egalitarian employment policies (O'Connor 1999). *Fertility Rate* is included because many family policies are only granted in connection with the birth of a child. Higher fertility rates suggest a greater need for work-family policy spending. Finally I include a measure of overall *Social Expenditures* as a percentage of GDP, because countries that spend more on social policies might also spend more on family policies as part of this general commitment.

6.3 Time Series Analysis of Quotas and Work-Family Policy Spending

Table 6.1 reports the results showing the effects of quota laws on work-family spending. All models include country and year fixed effects and (observable) time-varying potential confounders. As discussed, a fixed effects regression of this form estimates the effect of changes within countries over time in quota implementation on spending outcomes, while also partialing out any time-based shocks and trends common to all countries. Model 1 addresses overall spending on work-family policies, while Models 2, 3, and 4 address spending on family allowances, child care, and parental leave respectively. Model 3 (child care) includes a dummy variable which equals 1 for years 1998 and greater, because pre-primary education data from the OECD Education Database is included for the first time in this year.

Providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, the estimates suggest that after a quota is adopted governments spend more on child care and devote a smaller percentage of the budget to family allowances. No significant association is found between quotas and overall family spending, or (contrary to Hypothesis 1) spending on parental leave policies. Model 1 addresses overall spending on family policies. It shows that quota laws are associated with a decrease in family policy spending, but the link is not statistically significant. Model 2 examines spending on family allowances, and the coefficient for quota law is negative and statistically significant. Within countries, adopting a quota law leads to a 0.11 percentage point decrease in spending on family allowances. For example, a country that spent 1 percent of its GDP on family allowances before a quota law would be expected to spend 0.89 percent of its GDP on family allowances after a quota law is implemented. Model 3 shows that the opposite is true of child care spending: adopting a quota law is associated with a .06 percentage point increase in spending on child care policies.

The size of these predicted changes may not seem large, but it is significant. Table 6.2 shows real spending changes from before versus after a quota law in all five countries. Spending decreases are in *italics*. For a larger welfare state like France, the quota law translates into the
Table 6.1: Determinants of Family Policy Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Overall Policy Spending</th>
<th>(2) Family Allowances</th>
<th>(3) Child Care</th>
<th>(4) Parental Leave</th>
<th>(5) Family Allowances</th>
<th>(6) Child Care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota Law(_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.114**</td>
<td>0.059*</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota Law(_{(t-1)}) * Preference Gap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.024**</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women in Parliament(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor Force Part.(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Cabinet(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.000*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Density(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.013***</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td>-0.004**</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
<td>-0.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Bargaining Level(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.256***</td>
<td>0.091***</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.248***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Membership(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.209**</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.124**</td>
<td>-0.098**</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.124**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Expenditures(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.007**</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.426***</td>
<td>0.411**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>1.365***</td>
<td>-0.759***</td>
<td>-0.207</td>
<td>1.307***</td>
<td>-0.744***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.591)</td>
<td>(0.447)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis carried out using the panelAR package for R version 3.2.1. Prais-Winsten regressions, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
equivalent of $497 more on child care per child per year, and $307 less on family allowances. In a Mediterranean welfare state like Portugal the size of effects is smaller, at $26 more per child per year on child care and $131 less on family allowances. However it is worth keeping in mind that Portugal has a lower baseline of overall spending and a smaller share of that devoted to family policies. For example, in 2006 Portugal devoted 0.3% of GDP to child care to France’s 1.1%.

Table 6.2: Real Spending Changes in Quota Countries, After – Before Quota Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>△ Child Care</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% GDP</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>+0.20</td>
<td>+0.37</td>
<td>+0.10</td>
<td>+0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ per child</td>
<td>-$19</td>
<td>+$303</td>
<td>+$497</td>
<td>+$167</td>
<td>+$26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>△ Allowances</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% GDP</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>+0.04</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ per child</td>
<td>-$29</td>
<td>-$364</td>
<td>-$307</td>
<td>+$68</td>
<td>-$131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Spending decreases in italics. Change in share of GDP was calculated by subtracting the share of GDP spent on each policy in the first year before the quota law from the share spent in the most recent year for which data is available after a quota law was passed (2011). This was converted to real spending changes per child using GDP, current PPPs (USD) data from OECD National Accounts, and World Bank population data.

Quotas shift the composition, but not on the overall size, of work-family policy spending. This suggests that insofar as the budget is fixed, relative spending priorities favor investing in child care over family allowances after a quota law. It can be very unpopular and difficult to take away benefits once they are established (e.g., Pierson 2000). So why would women politicians want to decrease funding for family allowances? One explanation is that it’s more about prioritizing child care than reducing allowances. When faced with limited funding or spending cuts, female politicians might push for child care expansion even if it means cuts to family allowances, which compose the majority of the work-family policy budget for most countries. For example, in 2013 France announced cuts to its generous system of family allowances along with a goal of 100,000 new public child care places for children under three by 2017. The socialist Minister for Social Affairs Marisol Touraine spearheaded the policy changes, which were often discussed together as a tradeoff. She said in an interview, “A strong family policy today is one that creates child care places. It can
not be limited only to benefits.”¹¹ I come back to this point in the case study.

Model 4 shows a small negative association between quota laws and spending on leave policies, but it is not statistically significant. One potential concern with spending data on maternity and parental leave is that it is difficult to discern what type of leave policy governments are funding using aggregate spending data. It could be longer periods of low-paid leave, which are arguably bad for women’s employment, or shorter periods of high-paid leave, which are considered to be positive. As a check on this problem, I used the same baseline model to estimate the effect of a quota law on the total number of weeks and the wage replacement levels of maternity and parental leave, as measured by Gauthier and Bortnik’s Comparative Maternity, Parental and Child Care Leave and Benefits Database (models not included to save space) (Gauthier & Bortnik 2011). High wage replacement levels in particular are easy to interpret as beneficial for maternal employment. As in Model 4, no significant effects were found.

Why do quotas lead to more child care spending but not leave policy spending? One interpretation might be that, again, it’s about relative priorities given limited budgets. Child care is a bigger problem for many countries. While most countries have established paid leave policies (of various lengths), there are still large cross-country differences in the provision of public child care, especially for children under three (Commission 2013). If the budget, or women’s political power, is limited they might choose to support child care over other policies.

Several control variables emerge as statistically significant. Higher GDP per capita and the overall level of social expenditures are both associated with more spending on all work-family policies except for child care. The higher the birth rate, the greater the spending on child care and parental leave. Higher levels of unionization are associated with less overall spending on family policies. Finally, contrary to expectations membership in the EU hinders overall work-family policy spending, and spending on child care and parental leave.¹²

¹¹ Touraine : ‘Une politique familiale ne peut se limiter qu’à des allocations’,” Le JDD, 28 October 2014, translated by Google Translate.

¹² I also ran models including a control variable for Christian Democrat party power (share of cabinet seats Christian Democrat, lagged by 2 years), because previous research suggests that religious parties are particularly likely to influence work-family policies (e.g., Wennemo 1994; Morgan 2006). My main findings do not change.
One concern might be that the lagged percentage of women in parliament is not significant, a result that also appeared in the analysis of party positions in Chapter 5. As previously discussed this could be a legacy of the fact that quotas are often passed in countries with low levels of women’s representation. However, women’s representation is also a mechanism in the causal story linking quotas to outcomes. I further investigate the indirect effect of women’s representation on policy outcomes in Appendix 6B. The Appendix presents evidence suggesting that, in line with theory, the effect of a quota law is at least partially mediated by increased numbers of women in office.

Hypothesis 3 suggests that the size of the preference gap between men and women conditions the effect of a quota law, and that we should expect larger changes to policy outcomes in settings where the preference gap is relatively high. To test this I include the average Preference Gap as an interaction term with Quota Law. The Preference Gap variable is the same index of average country-level gender gaps in preferences for maternal employment shown in Figure 2.2 of Chapter 2. The interaction term tells us whether a quota law is accommodated or hindered in the context of different attitudes towards maternal employment. Models 5 and 6 (Table 6.1) shows that the attitudinal context does matter in this sense. The change in spending in response to a quota law is higher in countries with higher gender gaps. For example, in the regression on family allowances (Model 5), the coefficient on quota law decreases from -0.07 in a country with a small (3%) average gender gap in preferences to -0.24 in a country where the gap is much larger (10%). Similarly in the regression on child care spending (Model 6) the coefficient on quota rises from 0.03 in a country with a 3% average gender gap in preferences (e.g., Portugal) to 0.13 in a country with a 10% preference gap (e.g., Belgium).13

Figure 6.2 shows predicted spending on family allowances (on the left) and child care (right) as a function of quota law implementation and average preference gaps between men and women. At low levels of preference gaps, quota laws make only a small difference to spending outcomes. In both cases the predicted level of spending is not statistically different from zero when the preference gap is also zero. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, as the gap in preferences increases the variance in

13Tests of an interaction between quota law and preference gap in the regressions on overall spending (Model 1) and leave policies (Model 4) were not significant.
Family Allowances

Child Care

Figure 6.2: Predicted Change in Spending Outcomes as a Function of Quota Law and Preference Gap

Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown in Models 5 and 6 of Table 6.1. The units on the x-axis represent the average size of the gender gap in preferences towards maternal employment (all positive values showing that women are more in favor), and the units on the y-axis represent percentage point change in spending.

Finally, do the specific rules of quota laws – enforcement mechanisms, thresholds, and placement mandates – affect the relationship between quotas and policy change? While Chapter 4 finds that all three legal provisions are associated with the election of greater numbers of women, results from Chapter 5 suggest little support for a link between quota rules and party position change. The only provision linked to significantly larger effects on policy positions was strict enforcement mechanisms. This casts doubt on a priori reasons to expect some types of quotas to have larger impacts on spending, and so I explore the differences empirically in Appendix 6C. The Appendix suggests no consistent evidence that stronger quota rules make a difference to national level policy outcomes. However, I note that the relatively small sample size of national-level data available – particularly when we split quota laws into different types – could impede statistical significance, especially if effects are not very large or occur over time. Future research using more observations over longer periods of time after a quota law has been in place could shed more light on this question.
Robustness Checks

One concern with fixed effects models is that serial correlation in the dependent variable makes them more likely to produce ‘false-positive’ results (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan 2004b). Therefore, in addition to using an AR(1) process to control for autocorrelation in all models presented, I estimate a set of placebo regressions where the independent variable is a fake quota law, implemented some years prior to the date of the actual quota law. Since these laws are fictitious, ‘no effect’ ought to be observed. If the fake law is statistically significant, the main results from the actual quota laws are likely to be spurious. If the placebo tests are not significant, they provide additional support for the theory that it is the quota law, and not underlying differences among countries or some proximate event, that is responsible for changes in spending levels.

I use ten years prior to the actual quota implementation as the fake law implementation date. For example, a quota law was implemented in France from 2002 to 2011, so the placebo quota indicator will equal 1 from 1992 to 2001, and 0 otherwise. I run the placebo regressions for significant results, spending on family allowances and child care. Table 6.3 displays the results, which show small and statistically insignificant relationships between the fake quota law and policy outcomes in both models. These ‘no effect’ results are what we expect. I also ran placebo regressions where the date of the quota law was moved back by five and three years, respectively, and obtained the same null results (not shown to save space). The results suggest no evidence that estimated effects are an artifact of the fixed effects design, or that effects are driven by something idiosyncratic to this particular set of countries. Instead, effects are only observed after the quota law has been implemented. The lack of a systematic association between the fake quota law and policy outcomes is consistent with the causal interpretation of the main results.

According to my argument, quota laws should only affect spending on issues over which women and men disagree. To test this theory I run another set of placebo regressions on spending in areas not characterized by a significant gender gap in preferences. The issues with the smallest gender gaps in preferences are education spending and the government’s responsibility to provide a living standard for the elderly, financial help to university students, and health care for the sick.
Table 6.3: Placebo Test of Significant Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Child Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fake Quota Law_{(t-1)}</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women in Parliament_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor Force Part_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Cabinet_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Density_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>-0.008**</td>
<td>-0.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Bargaining Level_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Membership_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.118**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Expenditures_{(t-2)}</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-1997</td>
<td>0.444***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.362***</td>
<td>-0.748***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis carried out using the `panelAR` package for R version 3.2.1. Prais-Winsten regressions, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
(see Figure 2.2, Chapter 2). The majority of both men and women support spending / intervention on these issues, and differences are typically not statistically significant. However, the last of these (health care for the sick) is difficult to interpret given the large gender gap that exists on whether the government should spend more money on health care. Because of this, I focus on public expenditure on *Old Age Benefits* and *Education* here.$^{14}$

Models 1 and 2 of Table 6.4 report the results from models regressing public spending on old age benefits and education on quota laws. *EU Membership* is not included in Model 2 (Education) because there is not enough variation in the time period covered (1998 to 2010). Model 1 (Old Age Benefits) includes data from 1980 to 2011, like the main models shown in Table 6.1. Providing additional support for my argument, estimates show no significant association between quotas and spending in these areas. When male and female political preferences are virtually indistinguishable, as in old age benefits or spending on education, quota laws do not matter to spending outcomes.

$^{14}$Both variables measure public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. *Old Age Benefits* includes standard and early retirement pensions, and in-kind benefits including residential care and home-help services, while *Education* includes public expenditure on all levels except for pre-primary education. Data come from the OECD via the Comparative Welfare States Dataset 2014 (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014).
Table 6.4: Placebo Tests for Other Issue Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old Age</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Health Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td>Social Policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota Law(_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.231</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women in Parliament(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.025**</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.015**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor Force Part.(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.093***</td>
<td>0.116**</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Cabinet(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
<td>0.001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Quota(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Density(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Bargaining Level(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>-0.577*</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
<td>(0.393)</td>
<td>(0.685)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Membership(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>-0.161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Expenditures(_{(t-2)})</td>
<td>0.135***</td>
<td>0.080***</td>
<td>0.045**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.736*</td>
<td>-2.348</td>
<td>13.838</td>
<td>4.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.753)</td>
<td>(2.010)</td>
<td>(3.257)</td>
<td>(1.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis carried out using the `panelAR` package for R version 3.2.1. Prais-Winsten regressions, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
The theory also suggests that quota laws should be especially important for shifting orthogonal policies, those not aligned with the main left-right dimension in politics. To test this theory I run another set of regressions on spending in areas that are characterized by a gender gap in preferences, but also fall within the main the main left-right policy dimension. The dependent variables are public spending on *Overall Social Policies* and *Health Care*.\(^{15}\) These represent the policy areas with the next-largest gender gap in preferences, after maternal employment (see Figure 2.2, Chapter 2). Left-wing parties typically attach more importance to spending in these areas, and right-wing parties less (see Table 2.1, Chapter 2). *Overall Social Policies* also corresponds well to the party-level variable *Welfare State Expansion* from Chapter 5, which is associated with significant increases after a quota law.

Models 3 and 4 of Table 6.4 report the results from models regressing public spending on social policies and health care on quota laws. The estimates show no significant link between quotas and spending in these areas, providing additional evidence to support the credibility of the theoretical framework proposed in this book. Yet, this result is somewhat surprising given the fact that quotas are associated with an increase in party attention to welfare state expansion (Chapter 5). There are a couple of ways to interpret these results. First, it could be that quotas are effective at shifting *only* orthogonal issues, on which parties have not yet staked a claim. Perhaps the party-level results from Chapter 5 are driven by change on coverage of work-family issues. It is not possible to know for sure because the data do not allow us to distinguish between types of policies within the category of welfare state expansion. However the case study of Belgium and Austria does suggest that work-family policies in particular became a priority after a quota law, at least for far right parties. Another option is that quotas, and added numbers of women in parliament, could shift policies even on mainstream party issues like overall spending and health care, but it takes more time for shifts in party positions to translate into spending outcomes when parties are already committed to positions.

\(^{15}\)Both variables measure public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. *Overall Social Policies* measures total public social expenditure, while *Health Care* includes public expenditure on health care, both cash and in-kind benefits. Data come from the OECD via the Comparative Welfare States Dataset 2014 (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014).
Taken together, the models strongly support the importance of a quota law as one way of facilitating congruence between women’s policy preferences and outcomes. The implementation of a quota law is a statistically significant determinant of greater spending on child care, and less spending on family allowances. The fact that effects are different for different types of family policies is strong evidence that results are not driven by some broader process that increases both spending and adopting quotas simultaneously. The regression analysis also shows that the strength of a quota law is influenced by the specific cultural context. Greater rates of policy change are found in countries where the gap between women and men’s preferences on maternal employment is larger.

6.4 Causal Mechanisms: A Case Study of Portugal and Italy

The regression analysis suggests that quota laws are associated with changes in work-family policies in the direction of women’s interests, but it cannot tell us why. This section investigates the mechanisms linking quotas to policy change, giving empirical findings greater plausibility and deepening our understanding of quotas’ political influence. As discussed earlier in the chapter, two potential mechanisms could explain how quota laws lead to policy change. First, added numbers of women have more leverage within the party to negotiate and shift policies towards their collective preferences, especially if they reach positions of leadership such as the cabinet. Second, regardless of the number of women, the priorities of party leadership shift towards women’s preferences due to growing public support for quotas and associated gender-related issues.

To investigate the relative importance of these mechanisms, I focus on the countries of Portugal and Italy. This is one of two ‘most similar’ matched pair case studies conducted for the sake of this book project. Chapter 5 utilizes the other matched pair, Belgium and Austria, to investigate the impact of quotas on party-level position taking (see Chapter 3 for details about case selection). In future work I plan to expand these case studies, using evidence from both matched pairs to assess arguments about the impact of quota laws on party positions and policy outcomes. For now I note that the case of Portugal is of particular interest because it implemented a quota law very recently (2009). This allows me good access to politicians, party members, and activists who
have been active in politics over the recent time period. Portugal and Italy are also characterized by relatively small gender gaps in policy preferences on maternal employment, making it a ‘most difficult’ test for my argument (Gerring 2007).

To understand how work-family policies changed before and after a quota law was implemented in Portugal but not Italy, I use interviews with over thirty past and current members of parliament and government, party members, and political activists conducted from November 2013 to April 2014. I deliberately chose interview subjects that could offer the best evidence about policymaking, such as party leaders, cabinet members, and politicians and activists with a track record on work-family policies. I also analyze parliamentary debates, official party and government documents, and newspaper coverage from before and after the quota law was in place.16

The public in Portugal and Italy have similarly conservative views on maternal employment, and a relatively small gender gap in preferences on the issue. According to the 2008 European Values Study, 26.3% of Italian women disagreed that a preschool child with a working mother suffers, compared to 23.7% of men (a gap of 2.6%). In Portugal 31.9% of women disagree compared to 28.7% of men (gap of 3.2%). These gender gaps tend to increase at higher education and socio-economic levels; e.g., the gap rises to 7% in Portugal for those with at least some university education (see Figure 2.4, Chapter 2). Both countries were facing severe effects of the global economic crisis from 2008 onwards, including mandatory spending cuts in social policies. Yet, the two countries crafted very different solutions to work-family policy change. Overall, in line with the main findings from regression models, Portugal invested more in child care and cut spending on family allowances while Italy did the opposite. Table 6.5 summarizes key policy changes to family allowances and child care since a quota law was passed in Portugal (2009), with spending cuts in italics.

Portugal embarked upon a major program to build 400 new public child care facilities for children aged 0 to 3 and increased investment in the non-profit institutions (called IPSS) that run most day-care facilities. In 2009 state social support for IPSS rose to 1.2 billion euros, an increase of nearly 20% compared to 2008. Despite austerity measures requiring a reduction in

16Portuguese documents were translated using Google Translate. Italian documents were translated by the author.
Table 6.5: Summary of Family Policy Changes 2009 – 2015, Italy and Portugal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Allowances</th>
<th>Child Care</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Child Care</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase family allowances, extend to self-employed</td>
<td>Cut funding to regions for child care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lump sum grant for low-income families</td>
<td>(2009 onwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lump sum birth grant for baby products</td>
<td>Child care voucher (2013 onwards), capped at 20m per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lump sum birth grant of 960 euro (2015 - 2017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portugal</strong></td>
<td><strong>Program to build 400 new centers (2009 - 2011)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase family allowances by 25% for lowest income</td>
<td>Increase funding for third sector providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income families, 20% for single parents (2009)</td>
<td>(2009 onwards)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Eliminate 25% increase for lowest income families</td>
<td>Universal right to preschool age 5+ (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Cut allowances for top two income groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2010 onwards)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Public expenditures from 2010, this investment continued to increase year on year. Finally, the parliament passed legislation guaranteeing a place for all children as young as 4 in preschool. In Italy child care is handled by the regions, with the central government providing funding. Since 2008 governments severely cut regional transfers for social policies. The National Fund for Social Policies, the fund for regional social policies including child care, was cut from 656 million euros in 2008 to 179 million euros in 2011 – a decrease of 73 percent. The cuts have continued in recent years, with funding falling as low as 11 million euros in 2012 before rebounding slightly to 258 million euros in 2014. One exception to the Italian trend toward less spending on child care is the child care voucher introduced by Monti’s government in 2013. However, its impact is likely to be small because funds are capped at 20 million euros per year.\(^{17}\) Overall, since the crisis Portugal has increased spending on child care while Italy has made deep cuts.

Turning to family allowances, Portugal initially increased spending by 25% for the lowest income families and 20% for single parents. However in 2010, the 25% ‘bonus’ for low-income families was eliminated, as were all family allowances for the top two income categories – roughly 30% of beneficiaries. These cuts were estimated to save 250 million euros per year.\(^{18}\) No major reforms have been made in this area since 2010, despite the right – who opposed the cuts – coming to power. Italy,

\(^{17}\)Legge 92/2012: Disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita.

\(^{18}\)“Cortes no abono de família atingem 1,4 milhões de beneficiários,” *Economico*, 01/10/2010.
conversely, increased family allowances and extended them to self-employed individuals, provided a one-time lump sum bonus of up to 1000 euro for low-income families (2009), and provided a lump sum birth grant to help with the cost of diapers and formula (2009). Throughout the many leadership changes in Italian government since 2008, funding for family allowances has remained intact. In April of 2014, Prime Minister Renzi confirmed that ‘we will not touch family allowances’.\textsuperscript{19}

In addition, Renzi announced a new birth grant of 960 euro per year for three years for low-income families who have a child between 2015 and 2017. What explains these two countries’ very different approaches to work-family policies in the context of major budgetary constraints?

The first proposed mechanism linking quotas to policy change is women in parliament. My argument suggests additional numbers of women could impact policy in three main ways: a ‘critical mass’, women’s sections, or – what I suggest is the most probable – reaching positions of leadership. The quota law did result in an increase in the share of women in Portugal’s Assembleia da República – from 21% before the law to 27% after. Many of the politicians I spoke to believed that having significantly more women in office has influenced policies. For example PS MEP Ana Gomes says, “Since there is a critical mass, it’s made a difference. Some [issues] more than others, but, definitely it has made a difference. And it has brought many more women into helping determine policy, and therefore bringing their perspective, and being more visible as well.”\textsuperscript{20}

On the right, PSD MP Monica Ferro confirms, “Now you actually have women in parliament, and you have women pushing for certain number of public policies that I wouldn’t call a gender agenda, but women have been pushing certain areas that I think you wouldn’t have the same momentum if you didn’t have them.”\textsuperscript{21} However, there is little evidence that increased numbers of women (a critical mass) influenced work-family policy decisions through activity in the parliament. The changes that were made to spending were largely done via ‘decree laws’, which are issued by the government and do not go through parliament (Leston-Bandeira 2001).\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19}“Renzi accelera sul taglio dell’Irpef ‘E non toccheremo assegni familiari’.” \textit{La Stampa}, 14/4/2014.

\textsuperscript{20}Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.

\textsuperscript{21}Monica Ferro, personal interview, 5 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.

\textsuperscript{22}The two exceptions are the 2009 law guaranteeing universal access to preschool from the age of 5, a government bill which was approved by the majority in parliament (the PS, along with other left parties), and the 2015 law.
Perhaps increased numbers of women strengthen the power of organized women’s sections within parties. The PS is the only party in Portugal to have such a group, and they have not focused on work-family policies in recent times. In the years leading up to 2009 their main issues were: 1) the quota law, 2) a referendum on liberalizing abortion, and 3) a gender evaluation for all legislation (‘gender mainstreaming’). Since the law has been in place, the group has continued to focus on increasing women’s political participation, including extending the quota law to management positions in the civil service and the boards of state enterprises.\textsuperscript{23} They have also argued strongly for the spirit of the quota law to apply to the government as well. Right after the first election with a quota law in place, women within the PS women’s section publicly urged the Prime Minister to choose a more femininine government. The President of the PS women’s section Manuela Augusto was quoted in a prominent national newspaper saying, “An increase in the number of ministers is the logical step after the parity law.”\textsuperscript{24} Feminist activist and PS women’s section member Ana Coucello explains the motivation behind the lobbying: “I thought it was stupid to keep on knocking at the doors of ministers who were men and asking things like it was favors. It wasn’t favors, it was rights.”\textsuperscript{25}

It seems that their campaign worked; the share of women in the cabinet more than doubled, from 12\% to 29\%, despite the fact that the same party and Prime Minister remained in power before and after the election. While the women’s section did not lobby for work-family policies, they were influential in pushing for more women in positions of power who can make those decisions. This suggests that the mechanism of more women in parliament might not be easily separated into distinct categories. Did more women in the cabinet make a difference? For work-family policies it is particularly important to have a woman at the healm of the labor and social affairs portfolio – and amending this to guarantee a place to children as young as 4. The 2015 law was proposed by a group of center-right (PSD and CDS-PP) deputies and was approved unanimously. A large share of the bill’s sponsors (36\%) were women, but the spokesperson for the bill in the parliamentary debate was the male PSD parliamentary leader Luis Montenegro.


\textsuperscript{24}“Mulheres do PS querem um governo mais feminino,” Diario de Notícias, 19 October 2009.

\textsuperscript{25}Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
this was the case after the quota law. Helena André was appointed Minister of Labor and Social Solidarity in 2009. In 2011, with the change of government from left to right, the share of women in the cabinet fell to 17%, and this key ministry shifted back to a man.

How influential were André and other female ministers appointed after the quota law? One way to determine how influential ministers are likely to be is to consider their background (Alexiadou 2015). As an independent with technical expertise in her field (a former union leader and academic), André would likely have the will and capacity to promote policies that address issues of particular concern to her. One of these was reconciling work and family life, a topic she addressed from the trade union perspective since 1999.26

Another way of gaining leverage on this question is to look at whether policy enacted in this period goes above and beyond what is formally stated in the PS government program. Both the 2005 electoral manifesto and the 2009 government program call for additional investment in child care facilities and third-sector providers of child care. The party did not shift its position in these areas. Instead, the timing of policy implementation suggests that child care became a priority especially after the quota law was implemented in 2009, despite the fact that the country was facing major budget cuts. Minister André’s explanation of why the party continued to invest in child care despite the constraints imposed by the financial crisis was that it allowed women to better reconcile work and family responsibilities. In a June 2010 speech she says:

All this investment has enabled us to fill a deficiency, structural in our country, of places available in social facilities. . . This bet, as a measure to support families, not only enhances your quality of life, it promotes the reconciliation of personal, family and professional life, and it has allowed the integration of a large number of women in the labor market.27

Minister André was likely a key ally in prioritizing child care, but not the whole story. The second theorized mechanism linking quotas to policy change is an increase in the overall salience of

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gender issues. The idea is that the debate about the quota law, and the rising public awareness of women’s political issues, spurs party leaders to prioritize issues that women prefer. Indeed, Prime Minister Sócrates made child care a particular priority, stressing the importance of expanding the network of child care centers in public speeches and personally inaugurating multiple nurseries and kindergartens. He went so far as to call investment in child care the ‘great but silent reform’ of his administration.28 According to former minister Augusto Santos Silva the context of the quota law was relevant for these decisions. He recalls that after the quota law party priorities shifted:

The improvement of things associated not with the stereotype but with the real familial life and conciliation between private life and work, like kindergartens and improvement of elementary and preschools, all this social policy was indeed very influenced by this new affiliation of the [PS] party to gender-related issues.29

The feeling that gender-related issues increased in priority is shared by politicians across parties. Two-thirds of the politicians and activists I interviewed believed that the quota law had made a difference to policies, but not just because there were more women in office. As PS MEP Ana Gomes explains, the law created new gender awareness, not just for women but for men as well: “And let me tell you that our law is quite weak because the penalty that the parties pay is quite weak, but it was more the pressure, the political pressure, the sense that they would be singled out by the media and by other politicians if they would not minimally respect it.” The PSD (conservative) Minister Teresa Morais claims that this pressure has influenced the political agenda, “we have a bigger sense now of human rights, gender equality, and domestic violence, and I think that this new sensibility is a result of the law at least partly.”30

It is notable that work-family policy changes persist after the government changed from left to right in 2011; the quota wasn’t meaningful for left parties only. Right parties have not increased family allowances, despite having been against cuts at the time. In fact political actors on the right have started to explain decisions on work-family policies with specific reference to maternal employment. For example in a debate in parliament on March 1, 2012, PSD MP Nilza Sena says:

29Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
30Teresa Morais, personal interview, 2 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
It is not only through family allowances that we can support families! It is urgent to rethink the family and rethink it in the light of what are the new families, the dual career couple model. . . This Government has already begun to do so with the increase of 20,000 places in nurseries, taking advantage of facilities that were until then underutilized.

Note that spending priorities are discussed as a tradeoff between family allowances and child care, as in the earlier example of France. Again, the goal does not seem to be decreasing family allowances. Instead, the priority is ‘modernizing’ the system by investing in child care, even if it means less spending on family allowances. This shift in the direction of positions on the right is worth further investigation in order to tease out the key variables and incentives driving change. It could be attributable to the views of added numbers of women in the party, a normative shift in the mindsets of party leaders, or a policy feedback effect whereby the PS’ investment in child care created new resources and incentives for women to lobby for change.

What was the role of these potential mechanisms in the shadow case of Italy? First, despite having no quota law, there was a large increase in the numbers of women in office during this period with the election of a center-left alliance in 2013. The share of women in parliament rose from 21% to 31%. Prime Minister Letta also appointed more women than ever before (32%) to his 2013 cabinet, and this increased to 50% in Renzi’s 2014 center-left cabinet. However, there is little evidence that these demographic changes have translated into women successfully organizing for change within parties. This may be because much of the increase in women in parliament came from the Five Star Movement, a new anti-establishment party with little party discipline and thus little power to exert influence over policy making. The representation of women in right parties remains low.

Within the main left wing party, women in office do believe that maternal employment and child care are important – yet there has been little movement on these issues. For example, PD Senator Valeria Fedeli says, “It is clear that women show a greater interest in concrete, daily-life concerns. This is mainly due to the unequal, stereotype-based burden-sharing in Italian households, in which women are the primary carers, which makes it all the more urgent to address the problem
of services to families.” She goes on to lament that today the women’s section in her party is not very strong. This perceived lack of power is shared by the former Minister Elsa Fornero, who said, “It is true that women, those women in parliament, have different, let’s say objectives. They are more often involved in social policies. . . but my impression was that they were sort of second role, not first role. So the critical decisions were not taken by women but by men.” That said, many women were hopeful that Renzi’s gender-balanced cabinet could yet bring real policy change in the direction of women’s interests.

The issue salience explanation also receives little support. Unlike in Portugal, there has been no great emphasis on the need to support women’s employment. One exception was the 2014 cross-departmental working group formed by the Minister of Labor to address the issue of work-family conciliation. One of its three main areas of focus was child care facilities for children aged 0 to 3. However the working group did not survive the change in government in 2014. Deputy Minister of Labor Cecilia Guerra, who served on the working group, is cautiously optimistic about future change in this area. “The Renzi government has promised that not long from now there will be a proposal. We’ll see. . . we are not done yet with this question. We must do more here,” she says.

Explanations for policy changes in Portugal emphasize women’s employment and reconciliation between work and family. In Italy, parties stress the need to increase families’ economic resources and combat declining birth rates instead. For example, the one-time bonus for low-income families was designed to “support the purchasing power of families” (Pichetto Fratin (PdI), Report of the Senate hearing no. 132, January 26, 2009). The Ministry of Labor published a white paper in 2009 that clearly places fertility at the heart of family policies, rather than women’s employment. It blames Italy’s low birth rate for low productivity, but does not see women’s employment or child care as a solution to the problem:

31 Valeria Fedeli, email correspondence, 14 May 2014.
32 Elsa Fornero, personal interview, 27 March 2014, Rome, Italy.
33 Cecilia Guerra, personal interview, 9 April 2014, Rome, Italy.
The gap between the desire for motherhood and its realization is often attributed to the lack of child care or low rates of female employment. This may be true only partially. If you look at the percentage of births in the regions with the largest number of high-quality child care centers, there is no significant difference in the number of births. Even women’s employment does not seem a decisive element.\footnote{La vita buona nella societa attivá,” Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e della Politiche Sociali 2009, p. 24-25.}

The case of Italy is worth revisiting in the coming years, because, as mentioned in the Introduction, a quota provision was included in the 2015 electoral reform. From 2016 all parties are required to include 50% women on their party lists. This could provide a useful context for testing whether salience of women’s issues in politics increases after the law. Particularly if the share of women in government remains high, allowing us to hold this constant, this case could shed further light on the relative import of issue salience compared to increased numbers of women.

In summary, the evidence suggests that the main mechanisms linking quotas to work-family policy change in Portugal were women’s added leverage within the party, particularly within the women’s section of the PS, and an overall increase in the salience of women’s interests. Contrary to initial hypotheses, the women’s section was able to utilize the quota law successfully to secure significant change – a large increase in the number of women in the cabinet. The quota law also gave parties new incentives to address gender-related issues, a mandate that parties in Italy lacked. At the same time, there does not seem to be as sharp of a distinction between the increase of women elected and the behavior of party leaders as the theory presented in Figure 6.1 suggests. Female ministers, and notably Minister of Labor Helena André, likely played a role in prioritizing child care, but it is difficult to discern how much of the policy change was driven by women in leadership positions. Instead, it seems likely that quotas shift dynamics within the party in two ways: 1) providing women with leverage to push the party and hold leaders accountable for its positions, and 2) making party leaders more responsive to gender equality claims.

Finally, it is worth noting the relatively short period of time since a quota law was implemented in Portugal (six years). Other mechanisms might prove important over the long term. As women gain experience in office and build relationships they might be able to push for policy change in the parliament successfully. And as the numbers of women in parliament grow, the pool
of female candidates for cabinet positions will also naturally increase over time. Lastly, more and more women are likely to utilize child care services in Portugal following the increased investment in public care, and these women could form a strong lobby in support of further advancements, driving additional policy change (feedback effects).

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the effect of quota laws on work-family policies in advanced democracies. It finds that quota laws lead to more spending on child care and less on family allowances, changes that are in line with women’s greater preferences for maternal employment. The size of these effects is larger in countries with larger gaps in preferences (e.g., France), but still significant even for countries with relatively small gaps (e.g., Portugal). These policy changes are important in their own right, but also have implications for broader social welfare outcomes. There is much room for future research looking at related micro-level outcomes, where we may see trade-offs emerging. For example, are lower-income women better off, given quotas reduce spending on family allowances and child care provision is likely to still be limited? What about children? Maternal employment has been shown to be one of the main safeguards against child poverty (Lichter & Eggebeen 1994), but this assumes a high quality of care results from public investment.

Quota laws are often viewed with derision, as artificial and even undemocratic mechanisms of altering the composition of policymaking bodies. The results presented here suggest that quotas cannot be dismissed so easily. Even in the ‘most difficult’ institutional context of parliamentary democracies, quota laws lead to change in the direction of women’s aggregate preferences – and thus increase democratic responsiveness. However, the story is not as simple as a direct link between women’s descriptive and substantive representation, at least not in the short term. Instead, case studies suggest that quota laws are effective due to both increased leverage of women in the party and a new public awareness of gender issues that leads parties to prioritize women’s concerns. The findings add evidence suggesting that gender-related public policies could have their own effects on public attitudes, political elites, and the subsequent policymaking process (Pierson 1993; Campbell
2003). As Besley (2005b) has argued, political selection and the institutions that shape it deserve greater attention in the field of political economy. While the focus here has been gender, quotas also exist for other dimensions of identity such as ethnicity. There is much room for further studies along these lines.

The findings also point to fruitful new directions for models of welfare state development. The theory presented here suggests that mechanisms aimed at more equal representation like quotas are especially likely to shift outcomes on issues which are: 1) characterized by a gap in preferences between disadvantaged and dominant groups and 2) orthogonal to the main left-right party dimension. This framework can be used to identify and test other potential outcomes of interest – not only for women but for other identity groups as well. One promising issue area is violence against women, which is both relatively new to the political agenda and characterized by a gender gap in preferences, with women preferring to see tougher laws. Another example could be reparations for slavery in the U.S., which is not clearly partisan and characterized by significant gaps along racial lines, with Black Americans vastly more supportive.

A recent public debate about reparations is illustrative. In an opinion piece expressing his disappointment with the failure of the left to address racial issues like reparations, writer Ta-Nehisi Coates describes this as the ‘class first’ approach. Coates expresses frustration that Democratic hopeful Bernie Sanders opposes reparations as ‘too divisive’, claiming that candidates must look outside the mainstream (class-based) party orthodoxy in order to make progress on racial equality. The dynamics Coates describes fit well with the book’s theory of political market failure: a significant group interest that is not being addressed by mainstream parties, partially because it would split constituencies (black and white, here within the Democratic party). Future research might look for examples of quotas, affirmative action, or other mechanisms to increase the representation of ethnic minority groups in order to explore impacts beyond gender.

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7 | Conclusions

This book started with stories about gender quota law debates in countries around the world: France, Poland, Ireland, Italy, and Venezuela. These accounts illustrate that arguments linking identity to policymaking are mainstream. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. In the past year alone, gender quota laws have been proposed in the parliaments or electoral commissions of Scotland, Luxembourg, Georgia, and Malawi. A research report on gender inequality in the U.K. also called for a gender quota law, spurring some prominent women MPs to agree with the proposal, although it has not been debated in parliament.\(^1\) Although they are less popular than gender quotas, quotas for ethnic minority groups exist in at least 28 countries (Bird 2014).

Looking beyond gender and ethnicity, there have been very few openly out LGBT representatives in national parliaments. Reynolds (2013) counts only 151 in the past 35 years, in a sample of 96 countries. Yet, evidence shows that LGBT representatives are correlated with advances in gay rights in their countries, states, and towns (Haider-Markel 2010; Reynolds 2013). The first report on the representation of transgender candidates and elected officials came out in 2015 (Casey & Re 2015). It finds that there are only twenty transgender individuals currently in office, and none of these at the national level. The report calls for greater presence of transgender people in public office in order to “give the community an authentic voice in political decision-making” (p. 3). The increasing recognition of the political under-representation of identity groups underscores the importance of answering the central questions that I have pursued in this book: when and how politician identity influences the policymaking process.

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\(^1\)"LSE study calls for gender quotas to place women in positions of power,” The Guardian, 12 October 2015.
7.1 Summarizing the Argument

The main argument of this book is that quotas resolve an inefficiency in the electoral market, whereby out-groups such as women are disadvantaged. Women face high barriers to entry in politics, due to both comparative lack of resources and bias in candidate selection procedures. This matters because politicians tend to be biased towards their own interests. The under-representation of women is especially detrimental to substantive representation when women’s policy demands are orthogonal to the main left-right (class-based) policy dimension. This is because existing parties have little incentive to represent new policy concerns if they split core constituencies or detract from known (‘owned’) policy positions. In this scenario, disadvantaged groups face a ‘political market failure’: traditional parties will avoid addressing the cross-cutting issue, and forming a new party is not a feasible option. Using survey data, I show that the largest gender gap in advanced democracies exists over the issue of maternal employment, and that the gap cuts across partisan identities.

The imposition of quotas corrects this market failure by increasing the likelihood that the preferences of disadvantaged groups will be represented. After a quota law, we should expect to see policy change in the direction of women’s preferences, especially for orthogonal issues like work-family policies. I propose two main mechanisms linking quotas to policy change in advanced democracies. They both heavily weight the importance of intra-party decision-making, given the strong role of parties in most of these countries. The first is that after a quota law, added numbers of women have more leverage to push the party towards their collective preferences. The second is that quotas lead to the increased salience of gender-related issues, and this cues party leaders to better represent women’s preferences – either to gain electoral advantage or because leaders shift their views about the normative value of balanced representation.

After showing that quota laws are one of the most important determinants of women’s descriptive representation, I examine their effects on policy outcomes. I look at two critical stages of the policymaking process, political party positions and public spending outcomes. Confirming hypotheses, I find that quotas laws increase party attention to women’s preferences in the manifesto.
Gender quota laws increase coverage of welfare state expansion – an issue women prefer more spending on compared to men – but are not linked to change in policy positions not characterized by a gender gap, such as environmental protection. The results hold up to several robustness checks, including ignoring time series information to address concerns about serially correlated errors and removing parties responsible for proposing quota laws to address endogeneity concerns. Interestingly, the size of effects is slightly larger among right parties, many of which did not support the law. This suggests that quotas could have the potential to more drastically alter the ideology of right parties compared to the left, which often devote significant attention to women’s issues already. Former Prime Minister of Australia Julia Gillard recently said that the conservative side of politics will always lag behind without a quota or target. She was referring to numbers of women in the party, but perhaps the sentiment applies to the representation of women’s policy interests as well.

I then demonstrate that quotas also shift government actions in the direction of women’s interests. Using public spending data I am able to explore the impacts of quotas on spending on specific social policies, which is not possible for party positions given current manifesto data coding. Specifically, this lets me test whether quotas matter especially for orthogonal issues like work-family policies. I find that implementing a quota law increases spending on child care, which encourages maternal employment, and decreases spending on family allowances, which tend to discourage maternal employment. The strength of a quota law is influenced by the specific cultural context, with larger policy shifts seen in countries where the gap between women and men’s preferences on maternal employment is also larger. The findings hold up to several robustness checks, including a set of placebo regressions which test the research design by examining whether “no effect” is observed when the date of quota implementation is moved back by a number of years. In another set of placebo tests I find no evidence of change to spending in areas where men and women tend to have similar policy preferences (old age benefits and education) or where issues fall within the bounds of the mainstream, left-right policy dimension (overall social spending and health care).

Evidence from qualitative case studies sheds light on the mechanisms linking quota laws to policy change. Not surprisingly for parliamentary democracies, the role of women in the parliament – for example, proposing legislation – is minimal. Instead, findings suggest that women in leadership positions can shift policies towards their preferences at early stages of the process (party position taking). Yet when it comes to prioritizing these issues in office, changes are driven by male party elites. Quotas raise gender equality to the national stage, cueing party leaders to respond or risk losing voter support. Still, my research does not support a sharp distinction between the number of women and behavior of party leaders. Instead, quotas shift party-internal dynamics, including providing women with leverage to monitor and hold the party accountable for its positions, especially if they are organized in women’s sections.

7.2 Contributions

The book’s findings are important for three main reasons. First, gender quotas are increasingly popular. Until now, we knew very little about their policy effects. In line with quota advocates, such as those quoted at the beginning of this book, this study confirms that quota laws can be an effective tool to increase the substantive representation of women’s interests. Quotas lead to a more inclusive democracy in this sense, and they are arguably more politically relevant than other ‘sticky’ factors that might empower women like culture or electoral system change. More broadly, the results add to mounting evidence suggesting that politician identity matters, even in the context of parliamentary democracies.

This book provides new insights into when identity is most likely to matter, and how women and other disadvantaged groups can influence policies. Descriptive representation is particularly important for those issues that are off the main left-right dimension in politics, because parties have little incentive to address cross-cutting demands that may split their constituencies. Up until now, most of the literature on identity and policies has come from majoritarian settings. This book expands the scope to parliamentary democracies, a context where individual politicians are typically assumed to have very little policymaking power. Drawing on the literature on intra-party politics,
I show that there are several ways that increased numbers of women can work within existing power structures to shift party priorities and government actions. But this is not the whole story. Gendered institutions like quotas can also have important effects on political outcomes in their own right by raising the salience of gender-related issues and cueing party leaders to prioritize them.

Second, the adoption of quota laws has practical policy implications, and the effects are not limited to women. Work-family policies are important for everyone. Overall spending on family issues is relatively low in advanced democracies. However it is on the rise, unlike many other social policies which are seeing stagnating or declining spending (Morgan 2013). As attitudes towards gender roles in society are changing with younger generations, and more women enter the workforce in developing countries, these policies will only become more critical. Maternal employment is also linked to other outcomes we care about like children’s well-being. There is much room for future work exploring the extent to which public spending increases associated with a quota law translate into improved welfare outcomes for women and children. An important element of any such research agenda must involve understanding how these policy shifts impact lower income and ethnic minority groups. Quotas tend to lead to the election of white, highly educated women (Hughes 2011), and it is important to recognize that there could be important ‘within group’ preferences that majority group women are not representing.

Finally, the theoretical framework proposed is broad enough to apply to the representation of other disadvantaged groups. It can help explain why certain policy demands of other groups such as LGBT people, immigrants, and labor market ‘outsiders’ are likely to be under-represented, and determine whether mechanisms to increase their representation in office might help. Some examples of disadvantaged group demands that fall under the category of orthogonal to the left-right dimension are: women’s support for tougher laws on violence against women, labor market outsiders’ preferences for active and passive labor market policies, Black Americans’ support for reparations, and, potentially, LGBT preferences for enhanced gay rights. These issues are likely to see increased policy attention with increasing descriptive representation of the relevant identity group. However, policy demands that fall squarely within the mainstream policy space are less likely to shift with added numbers of these groups in office. For example, immigrants prefer less
restrictionist immigration policies, but partisanship is also a strong predictor of preferences on this issue (Scheve & Slaughter 2001). Immigrants might find allies with left parties, who are more likely to have similar preferences, but they also face strong opposition from the right that is increasingly spilling over to the left as well (Alonso & da Fonseca 2012). Because parties have already staked out positions in this area, increasing immigrant representation is less likely to shift policies. There is much room for further thought experiments and studies along these lines.

### 7.3 Questions for Future Research

This book explains some important puzzles, but it also raises further research questions yet to be answered in the field of identity and politics. I discuss three of them briefly here: the effects of quotas on other types of representation, the role of women in leadership as a mechanism, and effects in other social and political contexts.

Substantive representation is only one way of measuring the effects of quotas and politician identity in politics. The key outcome variables I use – party positions and government spending – focus on the content and priority of different policy issues. Another way of looking at substantive representation is to consider how women affect the style of political decision-making. It has been claimed that women are more consensual in their approach to politics (Kathlene 1994; Rosenthal 1998; Childs 2004b) and more broadly the work environment (Eagly & Johnson 1990; Niederle & Vesterlund 2008; McKinsey 2008). For example, women in the U.S. Senate were widely credited with finding a bipartisan compromise to end the 2013 government shutdown. Studies have also suggested that increasing the numbers of women in a group makes not just women, but everyone in the group more inclusive and cooperative (Mendelberg, Karpowitz & Goedert 2013), and that greater diversity can have positive effects on the stability and performance of the group (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012; Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader 2003; Ararat, Aksu & Tansel Cetin 2010). Other studies suggest the opposite in terms of financial performance, for gender quotas for corporate boards in particular. Research from Scandinavia finds that quotas

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led to a decline in firm performance, at least in the short term (Matsa & Miller 2010; Ahern & Dittmar 2012). More research is needed in order to determine how quotas, and the abrupt entry of women, affects the style of political decision-making, and – probably relatedly – the stability and performance of parliaments.

Another line of research investigates the role of quotas in furthering women’s symbolic representation. The presence of women in parliaments could increase public awareness and attitudes related to gender equality, raise women’s political engagement and participation, and encourage young women to aspire to political careers (a ‘role model’ effect). It is hard to tease out the causal direction between attitudes and women in office, so the semi-exogenous implementation of a quota offers some useful leverage. The best evidence we have on the symbolic impacts of a gender quota comes from India, where Beaman et al. (2008) show that quotas reduce discrimination against female leaders among men. The qualitative evidence presented in this book suggests that elites perceive public opinion shifts after a quota law, but such a shift is not measured directly. Survey evidence comparing attitudes towards women in politics, and women’s political engagement and participation, before and after a quota law would help answer these questions.

We also know very little about whether quotas increase voter turnout, partially because most countries do not report turnout by gender. Evidence from the local level in Italy suggests that quotas can increase both turnout (especially for women) (De Paola, Scoppa & De Benedetto 2014) and the number of women running in future elections, once the quota is taken away (De Paola, Scoppa & Lombardo 2010). Research from India also finds that districts which previously had a quota in place elect more women (Bhavnani 2009). However in this Indian case it seems much of the effect is driven by women who had actually benefited from the quota, whereas in Italy effects are not driven by female incumbency. Further studies using national level and comparative data, if it is possible to collect, would help determine whether quotas can encourage women’s political engagement and ambition.

A second promising area for future research is the role of women in leadership positions as

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mechanism for policy change. In many of my fieldwork interviews, politicians told me that quotas for women in parliament weren’t enough. In order to make a real difference in policymaking, more women are needed in government roles where the crucial decisions are made. The case studies in this book suggest that women reaching positions of leadership within the party (Belgium), and in the cabinet (Portugal) played a role in shifting or implementing policy positions. But the relative influence of women in positions of power like the cabinet compared to party leaders is unclear. We also know very little about how robust the link between quotas and women in leadership positions is, including whether this relationship holds across countries or increases over time. The ‘glass ceiling’ for women has been well-documented. Are quotas for parliamentary seats enough to make progress on this? Future studies might assess whether quotas lead to more women in party leadership and cabinet positions, particularly portfolio positions related to gendered issue areas. The second stage will be to explore whether, and how, more women in leadership roles are associated with social policy outcomes.

Finally, this book focuses on advanced democracies primarily because the underlying theory is based on the existence of gender differences in policy preferences, which are well-established in advanced democracies. My work illustrates that the largest gender gaps in advanced democracies exist on the issue of maternal employment, where women are more supportive than men by nearly 10 percentage points. But we do not know how gender gaps in advanced democracies compare to the rest of the world, where quotas are also common. There is a surprising lack of data on gender – and other social group – differences in preferences across countries and over time. Questions about individual policy preferences are included in many cross-national surveys, but analysis of gender gaps on specific policy issues is rare. What issues do men and women disagree on in other parts of the world? How has this changed over time? Future research in this area could help us map the potential implications of quotas and other mechanisms that shape political selection worldwide.

It will also be important to consider how different political institutions could moderate the effects of quotas in other parts of the world. This book looks at quotas within parliamentary or semi-

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One exception is Gottlieb et al. (N.d.), who analyze gender gaps in Africa. They find gender differences in preferences are small, but significant for poverty and water related issues in particular.
presidential systems with strong parties. Looking outside advanced, parliamentary democracies can help us answer questions about whether quotas, and politician identity, lead to greater policy effects under certain institutional conditions. Perhaps quota laws, and increased numbers of women, will be even more successful at changing outcomes in majoritarian systems, where individual representatives from the governing party and opposition have more power to propose bills and affect the agenda directly.
Appendix

Appendix 4A: Description of data on political party gender quotas

Table A.1 presents a list of all political parties in 22 advanced democracies that have used a gender quota provision for elections to the national parliament. A party is coded as having a voluntary party quota if the party adopted a measure aiming for a certain percentage of women in the candidates for national level political office. Often these provisions are included in party statutes or other official party documents, although this is not always the case, and having a formal, written rule was not a requirement for a party to be coded as having a gender quota provision in this data. The year the quota was adopted is noted, as well as the percentage required, and the formal rule specifying a quota provision where relevant. Note that for the sake of this book the party quota variable is operationalized as the share of political parties with voluntary gender quota provisions, weighted by the parties' share of seats in parliament. Information about the quota size is thus not included in the measure.

Data were initially collected from secondary literature, typically single case studies of the relevant country. For those parties which were documented as currently having a quota provision in place, I then consulted party statutes and other relevant party documents (such as the party constitution or electoral rules) to confirm that the quota is still in place and that the size of the quota is correct. Where there were discrepancies among different data sources, I contacted the political party directly whenever possible. Sources are listed by country following Table A.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quota Size</th>
<th>Formal Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australian Labor Party (ALP)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Rule 10, Constitution (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 7.3, Party Statutes (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Flemish Liberals (VLD)</td>
<td>1985–1993</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flemish Greens (Agalev / Groen)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 20, Party Statutes (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flemish Social Democrats (SP / Sp.a)</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 55.1, Party Statutes (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP / CD&amp;V)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>50%²</td>
<td>General Assembly Instructions³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Greens (Ecolo)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 40, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French Social Democrats (PS)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 1.4.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>33%⁴</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Democratic Party (NDP)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Federal nomination rules (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Socialist People’s Party (SP)</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990³</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>The Greens</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 11.5, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SPD)</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) / The Left Party</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 8.2, Party Statutes (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (CDU)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Article 10.5, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Women’s List</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1998⁷</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Social Democratic Alliance</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 5.5, Party Selection Rules (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left-Green Movement</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Progressive Party</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Democratic Party (DS / PD)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page

¹The Flemish Liberals’ quota was cancelled when the party changed name and statutes (Meier 2004).

²The Flemish Christian Democrats decided on a gradual plan to reach 50% by using the following formula: x percent + (50 percent – x percent)/2, where x is the percentage of women on the lists at the previous election (Meier 2004).

³For each election, the General Assembly of the Flemish Christian Democrats approves a set of instructions for the committees who will form the candidate lists. The most recent instructions include a requirement for equal representation of women and men.

⁴The Liberal Party’s targets for women are not included in formal rules. They have been set under the leadership of Jean Chretien (starting with 1993 election), Paul Martin (elections of 2004 and 2006), Stephane Dion (federal election of 2008, and note that Dion increased the target to 1/3) and Micheal Ignatieff (election of 2011).

⁵The Danish Socialist People’s party abandoned candidate quotas for the federal parliament in 1990.

⁶Women were to be selected for 50% of winnable seats (40% in 2010), in a policy known as ‘all women shortlists’.

⁷The Women’s List was a feminist and all-female party in Iceland that existed until 1998, when it disbanded and merged with other political parties.
Table A.1 – continued from previous page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Year Adopted</th>
<th>Quota Size</th>
<th>Formal Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adopted</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 9.7, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 67.1, Party Statutes (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>(PCI)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 32.4, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Refoundation Party</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Article 82, Party Statutes (2001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Christian People's Party (CSV)</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Article 82, Party Statutes (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Greens</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 32.4, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Left</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 32.4, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Labour (PvdA)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Article 32.4, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T998</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 9.3, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GreenLeft</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 9.3, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Socialist Left Party (SV)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 3.2, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 8.10, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Center Party (Sp)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 5.1, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christian People's Party (KrF)</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 11, Party Statutes (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Party (V)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 11, Party Statutes (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Left Bloc (BE)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Article 19.5, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Party of Catalan Socialists (PSC)</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 28, Party Statutes (2011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Article 4.1, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Left (IU)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Article VII, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 75, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Appendix, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 75, Party Statutes (2013)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canarian Coalition (CC)</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 18, Party Statutes (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 3, Party Statutes (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Left Party (V)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>NA²</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Social Democratic Party (SAP)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SP)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>Article 4, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Article 4, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Article 4, Party Statutes (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8In 1991 the Communist Party of Italy evolved into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), with more radical party members forming the Communist Refoundation Party.

9From 1987 to 1999 the policy of Sweden’s Left Party was that the percentage of women in the lists should be the same as the percentage of women in the constituency.
List of Sources for Party Quotas Data

Australia


Austria


Belgium

Buijis, Nathalie, Cabinet of the President of the Senate, Sabine de Bethune. Email correspondence (re. quotas within the Flemish Christian Democrat party). January 30, 2014.


Canada


Pynenburg, Mary, President of the National Women’s Liberal Commission. Email correspondence. February 3, 2014.

Reid, Jordan. NDP National Organizer responsible for candidates and nominations. Email correspondence. February 5, 2014.

Denmark


Finland


France


Germany


Great Britain

Ashe, J.; Campbell, R.; Childs, S. Evans, E. 2010. “‘Stand by your man’: Women’s political recruitment at the 2010 UK general election.” British Politics 5: 455-480.


Squires, Judith. Gender quotas in Britain: a fast track to equality?. Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, 2004.

Greece


Iceland


Kristjánsson, Svanur. 2002. *Iceland: from party rule to pluralist political society*.


Ireland

Buckley, Fiona, Yvonne Galligan, and Claire McGing. “‘Someday Girls, Someday’: Legislating for Gender Quotas in the Republic of Ireland.” Available at SSRN 2236481 (2013).

Italy


Japan


Luxembourg


Muller, Marion. Parliamentary Attache, Dei Greng. Email correspondence. 11 – 12 February 2014.


The Netherlands

Gamri, Attiya. MP, PvdA party. Email correspondence. 6 February 2014.


New Zealand


Norway


Portugal


Spain


Sweden


Switzerland


Berger, Barbara, General Secretary of SP Frauen. Email Correspondence. Jan 30, 2014.

United States

### Appendix 4B: Summary statistics for Chapter 4

#### Table A.2: Summary Statistics, 21 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of women in parliament</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>12.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>CWS 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota law</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Own data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party quota</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>24.70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90.16</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Own data (Appendix 4A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female share of labor force</td>
<td>42.09</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>27.93</td>
<td>48.08</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (year 2000 dollars)</td>
<td>29.478</td>
<td>10.345</td>
<td>8.892</td>
<td>65.088</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left party power</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>CMP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic parties</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Iversen &amp; Rosenbluth 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s movements</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>Htun &amp; Weldon 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU membership</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>EU 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: CWS 2014 is the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014); OECD is the OECD ALFS summary tables (female annual labor force divided by total annual labor force), http://stats.oecd.org/; World Bank is the World Bank Development Indicators (Group 1978); CMP is the Comparative Manifesto Project (Vokens et al. 2012); EU 2015 is the list of EU member states available from the European Union, http://europa.eu (2015).

*Left party power* is the percentage of seats held by left parties, where left parties are those categorized as ecology, communist, or social democratic parties.

*Programmatic Parties* is an additive variable combining electoral district size and pooling of votes.

*Women’s movements* is coded on a scale of 0 – 3, where 0 indicates no feminist women’s movement and 3 a strong, autonomous feminist women’s movement. It is an additive variable combining Htun and Weldon’s (2012) ‘strength’ (0 – 2) and ‘autonomy’ (0 – 1) measures.
Appendix 4C: Technical details of analysis using synthetic control methods, Chapter 4

I construct synthetic control countries for Italy, Belgium, France, Portugal, and Spain using the Synth package for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011). The synthetic control countries are constructed as a weighted average of potential control countries, with weights chosen so that the resulting synthetic control country best replicates the values of predictors of female representation in the treated country before the quota law was passed. To produce the synthetic control countries I use predictor variables that are found to be highly significant in the previous regression analysis, namely: GDP, women’s labor force participation, programmatic parties, and party quotas. These variables are augmented by including the average percentage of women in parliament over several pre-treatment time periods. Other countries that pass a quota law during the same time period are dropped from the potential control donor pool. I also drop countries that are missing data during the relevant time period, as the method requires a balanced panel.

Note that because countries have elections at different times, time units are constructed using elections rather than years. For each treated country I identify the election immediately before a quota law was implemented (i.e., the quota law was passed by the government resulting from that election) and code it (t=5), and then order the elections before and after t=1, 2, etc. I follow the same procedure for all potential control countries, where the last election before a quota law was implemented in the treated country is coded t=5 and previous and subsequent elections are ordered accordingly. I repeat this procedure for each ‘treated’ (quota) country.

Table A.3 compares the pretreatment characteristics of the actual ‘treated’ (quota) countries with their synthetic versions, as well as the average of all potential controls in the donor pool for each country. We see that particularly for the pre-treatment average percentage of women in parliament variables, the synthetic control country provides a more suitable control than the average of all potential control countries, for every case shown. Prior to adopting a quota law, the percentage of women in parliament was lower in the countries that passed a quota law than in
the average of control countries, in every case. Compared to the average of all potential control countries, the synthetic control countries are able to better reproduce the values for the share of women in parliament prior to the passage of a quota law.

The synthetic control countries do not necessarily provide a closer fit to the real country for the other predictor variables included in matching (GDP per capita, programmatic parties, etc.). In fact, this turns out not to matter in terms of predicting the share of women in parliament. The synthetic control method is implemented by choosing a value \( V \) among all positive definite and diagonal matrices to minimize the mean squared prediction error of the percentage of women in parliament in the ‘treated’ country during the pre-quota period (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011). The resulting value of the diagonal element for all other variables except for the previous percentage of women in parliament variables turns out to be zero, or very close to zero, in most cases. This means that given the other variables included (lagged measures of the outcome variable) these other determinants have little substantial power predicting the percentage of women in parliament before a quota law is implemented. I experimented with a wide set of possible predictor variables, including instances where I included fewer lagged measures of women’s representation and in turn got better matches for other predictor variables, but this did not change the results substantively.\(^1\)

Table A.4 shows the weights of each control country composing each synthetic country. We see that France contributes 18%, Japan contributes 61%, and Sweden contributes 21% to the synthetic Italy; a zero weight is assigned to all the other control regions. Synthetic Belgium is composed of 71% Japan, 14% Denmark, 5% Australia, and small percentages of other countries. Synthetic France is made up of 89% Japan and 11% Finland. Synthetic Portugal is composed of 33% Australia, 27% Luxembourg, 24% United States, 16% Great Britain, and 1% New Zealand. Finally synthetic Spain is made up of 57% Great Britain, 27% Sweden, and 17% Austria.

\(^1\)Including fewer pre-treatment measures of women’s representation (i.e. using one variable to measure the average percentage of women in parliament over the whole pre-treatment time period, rather than several variables that measure it over several pre-treatment time periods) did not achieve as good of a fit on pre-treatment measures of the outcome variable for some countries, although several of the other predictor variables, e.g. female labor force participation or programmatic parties, achieved better matches between synthetic and control countries. However the results in terms of post-treatment trends did not change significantly. Because the goal is to construct a synthetic control unit as similar as possible to each of the treated units on pre-treatment values of the outcome variable for the elections preceding the quota law’s passage, I chose to include multiple lagged measures of the outcome variable.
## Table A.3 Percentage of women in parliament predictor means, by ‘treated’ country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real</td>
<td>Synthetic</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% women in parliament, 1 election prior</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>GDP per capita (year 2000 dollars)</td>
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<td>25822</td>
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<table>
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<td>Party quotas (% parties with quota law)</td>
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<td>23.1</td>
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<td>Female share of labor force</td>
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<td>45.57</td>
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Notes: All variables except percentage of women in parliament are averaged over the pre-treatment period. Synthetic control methods carried out using Synth for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011.)
Table A.4: Country weights used in constructing synthetic control countries

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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ‘NA’ indicates countries not included in the potential control country donor pool for that analysis. Countries were not included either because data were not available for the full time period of comparison, or the country passed a gender quota law during the time period of comparison. For example, because Belgium was the first to pass a quota law it is excluded from the donor pool of potential control countries for France and Portugal. Synthetic control countries were identified using Synth for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011).

In order to assess the robustness of the results (presented in the main text), I follow Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) and others in running placebo studies (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2010; Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan 2004b). The placebo studies answer the question of how often I would obtain results of this magnitude if I had chosen a country at random for the analysis instead of the ‘treated’ (quota) country. I apply the synthetic control method to countries that did not pass a quota law during the sample period, for each quota country and associated period studied. If the placebo studies create increases in magnitude similar to the ones estimated in the countries that passed a quota law, then the analysis would not provide significant evidence of a positive effect of a quota law on the percentage of women in parliament. If the placebo studies show that the increase estimated is relatively large compared to the change in countries that did not pass a quota law, then conversely the analysis shows significant evidence of a positive effect of quota laws on the percentage of women in parliament.

Figure A.1 shows the results of the placebo tests for each country. (Recall that the case

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2The placebo tests are done by iteratively applying the synthetic control method to every other country in the control donor pool, for each ‘treated’ (quota) country. For more, see Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010).
of Spain was dropped after the synthetic control method was unable to achieve a good fit of pretreatment trends.) The gray lines represent the change associated with each of the control country placebo tests, i.e. the difference in the percentage of women in parliament between each country in the donor pool and its synthetic version. The dark black line shows the increase in women in parliament estimated for the ‘treated’ (quota) country. As the figures show, the estimated increase for the quota countries is unusually large relative to the distribution of change in women in parliament for the other countries in the donor pool in most cases, but especially for Belgium. The positive effect for Belgium is the highest of all countries in its sample, and because the figure includes 17 countries, the probability of estimating an increase of this magnitude under a random permutation of the intervention is 6% (1/17) – a test level close to the 5% often used in conventional tests of statistical significance.

Turning to France, the positive effect is large relative to most other countries, but not the largest. Of the 14 countries included, 1 other shows at least as large of a positive effect as France, making the probability of estimating an increase of this magnitude randomly 14%. Considering Portugal, as in Belgium the positive effect observed is higher than all control countries except for one, and because the analysis includes 11 countries the probability of estimating an increase of this magnitude randomly is 18%. Finally considering Italy, the positive effect observed is higher than 8 out of 14 countries, making the probability of estimating an increase of this magnitude randomly 42%.
Figure A.1: Differences in percentage of women in parliament in ‘treated’ (quota) countries and differences in placebo test countries

Notes: All analyses were carried out using Synth for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011).
### Table A.5: Summary Statistics, 22 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Data source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare state expansion</td>
<td>7.62</td>
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<td>Environmental protection</td>
<td>5.29</td>
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<td>Party Quota(_{t-1})</td>
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<td>Labor Force Part.(_{t-1y})</td>
<td>41.36</td>
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<td>% (%) in Parl.(_{t-1y})</td>
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<td>12.17</td>
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<td>37.80</td>
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<td>10384</td>
<td>9271</td>
<td>59950</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Unemployment(_{t-1})</td>
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<td>4.35</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>% Population 65+(_{t-1})</td>
<td>13.72</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>20.48</td>
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<td>Total quasi-sentences</td>
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<td>9999</td>
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<td>MARPOR 2013</td>
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<td>Party vote change(_{t-1})</td>
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<td>4.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective no. of parties(_{t-1})</td>
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<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>CWS 2014</td>
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</table>

Notes: MARPOR 2013 is the Comparative Manifesto Project (Manifesto Project MRG/MARPOR/MARPOR) Version 2013b. CWS 2014 is the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version. SWIID is the Standardized World Income Inequality Database, version 4.0 (2013). UN WDI is the U.N. World Development Indicators (2014). Original data on party quotas were compiled using secondary literature, party documents, and correspondence with political party representatives (For further details, see Appendix 4A).
Appendix 5B: Comparison of Manifesto Social Policies

Table A.6 gives an overview of party attention to various social policy issues over time. I coded each manifesto for inclusion of content related to the ‘welfare state expansion’ sub-categories of health care, pensions / retirement, social housing, child care, parental leave, elderly care, and disability. This allows me to gain a better understanding of the range of policy issues the party addresses, before and after a quota law was implemented in Belgium (1999) but not Austria. A ✓ indicates that the policy issue was discussed in the manifesto.

Table A.6: Party Attention to Welfare State Expansion Issues

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Health Care</th>
<th>Pensions</th>
<th>Social Housing</th>
<th>Child Care</th>
<th>Parental Leave</th>
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<th>Disability</th>
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</table>

Notes: The table shows coverage of specific policy issues related to welfare state expansion in party manifestos for election years before and after a quota law was implemented in Belgium (1999). A ✓ indicates that the policy issue was discussed in the party manifesto.

Table A.6 shows that the most popular issue is pensions, which each party discusses in the party manifesto in every election year analyzed. Belgium’s VB also covers health care and disability in each of its manifestos. Elderly care and social housing are covered less frequently before the quota law was in place (in 2 and 1 out of 3 elections, respectively), and then addressed in every year afterwards. Child care and parental leave are only discussed as policy options after the law
was implemented; before, VB family policy focuses on family allowances and tax cuts.

Turning to Austria’s FPÖ we see less coverage in general of social policy issues. The only issue that gets consistent attention in the party manifesto is pensions. Disability and elderly care are addressed infrequently, with no noticeable increase over time, in contrast to health care which is covered only in the 2002 and 2006 elections. Public child care is only discussed in the 2006 manifesto, and parental leave is mentioned in three manifestos with no discernable trend over time. Finally social housing is only addressed in 2 elections before a quota law was implemented in Belgium (1990 and 1994). Overall, Belgium’s VB covers a broader range of social policies in its manifestos than Austria’s FPÖ, and the party has increased attention to child care, parental leave, elderly care, and social housing since a quota law has been in place.
Appendix 6A: Sources and Summary Statistics for Data Used in Analysis, Chapter 6

Table A.7: Summary Statistics, 22 Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Family Policy Spending</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>651</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Allowances</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>690</td>
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<td>Child Care</td>
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<td>2.01</td>
<td>638</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Old Age Benefits</td>
<td>6.76</td>
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<td>2.56</td>
<td>12.98</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>CWS 2014</td>
</tr>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>7.75</td>
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<td>CWS 2014</td>
</tr>
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<td>Quota Law(t-1)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>Own data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women in Parliament(t-2)</td>
<td>13.76</td>
<td>11.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>CWS 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita(t-2)</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>CWS 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor Force Part.(t-2)</td>
<td>39.74</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>17.86</td>
<td>48.70</td>
<td>704</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Left Cabinet(t-2)</td>
<td>34.14</td>
<td>39.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>CWS 2014</td>
</tr>
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<td>Party Quota(t-2)</td>
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<td>40.69</td>
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<td>87.44</td>
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<td>CWS 2014</td>
</tr>
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<td>Wage Bargaining Level(t-2)</td>
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<td>1.34</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>CWS 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate(t-2)</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>CFP 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Membership(t-2)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>EU 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Expenditures(t-2)</td>
<td>20.96</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>35.68</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>OECD SOCX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference Gap</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>14.96</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>Own data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
OECD SOCX is the OECD Social Expenditures Database, accessed in December 2014.
CWS 2014 is the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014).
CFP 2011 is the Comparative Family Policy Database, 2011 (3.0) version (Gauthier & Bortnik 2011).
EU 2015 is the list of EU member states available from the European Union on europa.eu (2015).
Original data on party quotas were compiled using secondary literature, party documents, and correspondence with political party representatives (For further details, see Appendix 4A).
Appendix 6B: Mediation Analysis:

Women’s Representation as a Mechanism

The baseline specifications in Chapter 6 (Table 6.1) present the overall effect of a quota law, controlling for potential confounders including the share of women in parliament. Women in parliament is included as a control because it is a good proxy for general taste or attitudes towards women in politics, a potentially important confounder. The results show that quota laws lead to change in spending priorities even controlling for trends in the share of women in parliament. However, as previously discussed there is good reason to believe that the share of women in parliament is also part of the causal chain linking quotas to policy outcomes. To investigate the indirect effect of increased women's representation due to a quota law, I follow Kenny and colleagues’ four steps for showing mediation effects (Baron & Kenny 1986; Judd & Kenny 1981, 2010). These can be summarized as: 1) Show that the causal variable is correlated with the outcome; 2) Show that the causal variable is correlated with the mediator; 3) Show that the mediator affects the outcome variable; and 4) For complete mediation, show that the effect of the causal variable on the outcome while controlling for the mediator is zero.

Recall that in the baseline specifications Quota Law is lagged by one year and all other covariates, including women’s representation, are lagged by two years, in order to alleviate concerns about post-treatment bias. In the following analysis of women's representation as a mechanism I use a measure of women in parliament that is contemporaneous with quota law implementation, i.e. lagged by only one year. Table A.8 presents the results, which are based on Model 3 of Table 6.1 (where the dependent variable is child care spending). All models include the full set of controls shown in Table 6.1 specifications (not shown to save space).

Model 1 shows that Quota Law has an overall effect on child care spending. Without women’s representation in the model, the size of the coefficient on Quota Law is 0.08, and is significant at conventional levels (p=0.04). Second, Model 2 shows that the causal variable of interest is correlated with the mediator: Quota Law is associated with 4.4 percentage point increase
Table A.8: Mediation Analysis of Women’s Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child Care</td>
<td>% Women in Parliament</td>
<td>Child Care</td>
<td>Child Care</td>
<td>Child Care</td>
<td>Child Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota Law(_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>4.4***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women in Parliament(_{(t-1)})</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota Law(_{(t-1)}) * Preference Gap</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women in Parliament(_{(t-1)}) * Preference Gap</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.24***</td>
<td>-28.32***</td>
<td>-1.07***</td>
<td>-1.08***</td>
<td>-1.19***</td>
<td>-1.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(5.76)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country fixed effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Prais-Winston regressions, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. All models include the full set of controls shown in Table 6.1 specifications (not shown to save space).

Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10

in women in parliament. Third, Model 3 shows that the mediator is associated with the outcome. Women’s representation is associated with a statistically significant increase in child care spending. For every 10% increase in women’s representation, there is a 0.10 percentage point increase in child care spending. Finally, to establish total mediation step 4 assesses the relationship between the causal variable and outcome when the mediator is included in the model. Model 4 shows that the effect of a quota law is significantly reduced when women’s representation is included in the model. Including women’s representation, the coefficient on $Quota Law$ decreases to 0.05 and is not significant ($p=0.18$). This suggests that the effect of a quota law is at least partially mediated by increased numbers of women in office.

As in the baseline results, Table A.8 shows that the effect of $Quota Law$ is conditional on the size of the gender preference gap. The interaction between $Quota Law$ and $Preference Gap$ is now significant at the 0.05 level (Model 5). Model 6 shows that the same is true of the interaction between $Preference Gap$ and the mediator $% Women in Parliament$. This is consistent with the logic of the argument about the size of the gender gap in preferences, i.e., greater numbers of
women in parliament should lead to policy change only on issues on which women and men have different preferences. The key take-aways here are that quotas work at least partially through the mechanism of women’s representation, and the positive result for child care spending is even stronger when models take this into account.
Appendix 6C: Quota Rules and Spending Outcomes

Table A.9 addresses questions about whether the specific rules of the quota provision matter for spending outcomes. These models use the same previously described fixed effects specifications shown in Models 2 and 3 of Table 6.1. All models include the full set of controls shown in Table 6.1 specifications (not shown to save space).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Family Allowances</td>
<td>Child Care</td>
<td></td>
<td>Family Allowances</td>
<td>Child Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, strict sanctions</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, weak sanctions</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, 50% threshold</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, placement mandates</td>
<td>1.29***</td>
<td>-0.75***</td>
<td>1.31***</td>
<td>-0.71***</td>
<td>1.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota, no placement mandates</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Analysis carried out using the panelAR package for R version 3.2.1. Prais-Winsten regressions, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10

Models 1 and 2 of Table A.9 separate the quota variable into laws that require parties to comply with the law for the list to be accepted (Quota, strict sanctions, representing Spain and Belgium after a quota law was passed) and those that do not (Quota, weak sanctions). The results suggest that quotas with strict enforcement rules have larger effects on family allowances spending than quotas without, but a Wald test finds that the difference between these coefficients is not statistically significant. Looking at child care (Model 2), the results suggest no difference between...
the outcomes for quotas with and without strict enforcement mechanisms.

Models 3 and 4 separate the quota variable into laws that require women to make up a high threshold, 50% of the list (Quota, 50% threshold, representing France after it passed a quota law and Belgium from 2007), versus those that do not (Quota, < 50% threshold). Again for the dependent variable of family allowances (Model 3) we see a larger effect for the stricter provision (50% threshold), but the difference between coefficients on different thresholds is not significant. For child care (Model 4), the results suggest a larger effect for quotas with a threshold under 50%, although again a Wald test of coefficients finds no statistically significant difference.

Models 5 and 6 test the impact of placement mandates (when the law includes specific rules about the rank-ordering of candidates, represented by Quota, placement mandates). The coefficients on placement rules are very similar for family allowances, suggesting that this provision does not condition spending in this area. In the area of child care spending larger effects are seen for quotas without placement mandates. However a Wald test of the difference between quotas with and without placement mandates finds that the difference between these two coefficients is not statistically significant.

In summary, the results here suggest no strong or consistent evidence that stronger quota laws lead to larger changes in spending on work-family policies. This finding is not very surprising given that results from Chapter 5 find little evidence of a relationship between quota provisions and party position change, with the exception of enforcement mechanisms. However, it is worth noting the smaller sample size of national-level data used here, compared to party-level data used in Chapter 5. It could be that the small sample size – particularly once we start dividing quota rules into different types – precludes statistical significance, especially if effects are not very large or occur over time. More observations over longer periods of time after a quota law has been in place would be helpful in making progress on this question in the future.
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