Essays in Labor and Public Economics

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Essays in Labor and Public Economics

Abstract

This dissertation studies labor and public economics. Chapter 1 is titled “How Does Unemployment Affect Consumer Spending?” and is coauthored with Pascal Noel. We study the spending of unemployed individuals using anonymized data on 210,000 checking accounts that received a direct deposit of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Unemployment causes a large but short-lived drop in income, generating a need for liquidity. At onset of unemployment, monthly spending drops by 6%, and work-related expenses explain one-quarter of the drop. Spending declines by less than 1% with each additional month of UI receipt. When UI benefits are exhausted, spending falls sharply by 11%. Unemployment is a good setting to test alternative models of consumption because the change in income is large. We find that families do little self-insurance before or during unemployment, in the sense that spending is very sensitive to monthly income. We compare the spending data to three benchmark models; the drop in spending from UI onset through exhaustion fits the buffer stock model well, but spending falls much more than predicted by the permanent income model and much less than the hand-to-mouth model. We identify two failures of the buffer stock model relative to the data – it predicts higher assets at onset, and it predicts that spending will evolve smoothly around the largely predictable income drop at benefit exhaustion.

Chapter 2 is titled “The Incidence of Housing Voucher Generosity” and is coauthored with Rob Collinson. Most housing voucher recipients live in low-quality neighborhoods. We
study how changes in voucher generosity affect neighborhood poverty, unit-quality and rents using administrative data. We examine a policy making vouchers more generous across a metro area. This policy had no impact on neighborhood poverty, little impact on observed quality, and increased rents. A second policy, which indexed rent ceilings to neighborhood rents, led voucher recipients to move to higher quality neighborhoods with lower crime, poverty and unemployment. These results are consistent with a model where the first policy acts as an income effect and the second as a substitution effect.

Chapter 3 is titled “A Permutation Test for the Regression Kink Design” and is coauthored with Simon Jaeger. This chapter proposes a permutation test for the Regression Kink (RK) design—an increasingly popular empirical method for causal inference. Analogous to the Regression Discontinuity design, which evaluates discontinuous changes in the level of an outcome variable with respect to the running variable at a point at which the level of a policy changes, the RK design evaluates discontinuous changes in the slope of an outcome variable with respect to the running variable at a kink point at which the slope of a policy with respect to the running variable changes. Using simulation studies based on data from existing RK designs, we document empirically that the statistical significance of RK estimators based on conventional standard errors can be spurious. In the simulations, false positives arise as a consequence of nonlinearities in the underlying relationship between the outcome and the assignment variable. As a complement to standard RK inference, we propose that researchers construct a distribution of placebo estimates in regions with and without a policy kink and use this distribution to gauge statistical significance. Under the assumption that the location of the kink point is random, this permutation test has exact size in finite samples for testing a sharp null hypothesis of no effect of the policy on the outcome. We document using simulations that our method improves upon the size of standard approaches.
## Contents

Abstract ........................................ iii

Acknowledgments .................................. xiii

1. How Does Unemployment Affect Consumer Spending? ........................................ 1

1.1. Introduction\(^1\) ........................................ 1

1.2. Data and External Validity ........................................ 7

1.2.1. Finding UI Recipients and Building A Full View of Family Finances . 9

1.2.2. Estimating Income and Comparison to External Benchmarks . . . 10

1.2.3. Estimating Spending and Comparison to External Benchmarks . . . 12

1.2.4. External Validity – Geography, Age, and Checking Account Balances 16

1.2.5. Comparison Groups ........................................ 17

1.3. Onset of Unemployment ........................................ 19

1.3.1. Basic Facts About Onset ........................................ 20

1.3.2. Temporary Income Loss, Permanent Income Loss, or Work-Related Expenses? ........................................ 28

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\(^1\)This research was made possible by a data-use agreement between the authors and the JPMorgan Chase Institute (JPMCI), which has created anonymized data assets that are selectively available to be used for academic research. More information about JPMCI anonymized data assets and data privacy protocols are available at www.jpmorganchase.com/institute. All statistics from JPMCI data, including medians, reflect cells with at least 10 observations. The opinions expressed are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of JPMorgan Chase & Co. While working on this paper, Ganong and Noel were paid contractors of JPMCI.
List of Tables

1.1. Representativeness: Income in JPMCI Data Compared to External Benchmarks 13
1.2. Representativeness: Spending in JPMCI Data Compared to External Benchmarks 15
1.3. Representativeness: Assets in JPMCI Data Compared to External Benchmarks 18
1.4. Summary of Changes at Onset, During UI Receipt, and Benefit Exhaustion 25
1.5. Income and Spending at Onset of Unemployment 29
1.6. Spending Drop Compared to Prior Literature 38
1.7. Income and Spending for Families Who Exhaust UI Benefits 48
1.8. Model Parameters 55

2.1. Summary Statistics for Across-the-Board Rent Ceiling Changes 84
2.2. Effect of County/Metrowide Price Ceiling Increase on Prices and Quality 87
2.3. Effect of County/Metrowide Rent Ceiling Increase on Rents 89
2.4. Effect of County/Metrowide Price Ceiling Increase on Prices and Quality 94
2.5. Effect of Tilting Rent Ceilings to ZIP-level on Neighborhood Quality 99
2.6. Effect of Tilting Rent Ceilings to ZIP-level on Rents and Building Quality in Dallas 104
2.7. Comparison of Policies to Improve Neighborhood Quality 107

3.1. Simulation Study I: Asymptotic and Randomization Inference in Comparison 131
3.2. Simulation Study II: Type I and Type II Errors For Asymptotic and Randomization Inference in Comparison ........................................ 134

C.1. Overview of Existing RK Papers ........................................... 184
C.2. Simulation Study II: Type I and Type II Errors - Heteroskedastic Noise . . . 187
C.3. Simulation Study II: Type I and Type II Errors - t-distributed Noise . . . 188
C.4. Local Polynomials and Cubic Splines Simulation ......................... 190
List of Figures

1.1. Representativeness: Income and Asset Distribution ........................................ 11
1.2. Event Study: Income at UI Onset ................................................................. 21
1.3. Event Study: Spending at UI Onset ............................................................. 24
1.4. Spending If Stay Unemployed ..................................................................... 27
1.5. Interpreting Onset: Temporary Income Loss, Permanent Income Loss ........ 31
1.6. Interpreting Onset: Work-Related Expenses ............................................. 34
1.7. Spending Drop During Unemployment: Comparison to Prior Work ........... 39
1.8. Event Study For 3-Month Completed UI Spells: Heterogeneity By Assets ..... 42
1.9. UI Benefit Exhaustion .................................................................................. 45
1.10. Welfare Losses By Model ........................................................................ 51
1.11. Spending If Stay Unemployed – Models Vs. Data ...................................... 58
1.12. Matching Spending Drop at Exhaustion ..................................................... 63
2.1. Unit Availability and Rent Distribution ....................................................... 73
2.2. Event Study for Rebenchmarking ................................................................. 81
2.3. Impacts of Rebenchmarking: Rents and Quality ....................................... 86
2.4. Impacts of 40th → 50th Percentile FMRs: Rents and Quality .................... 95
2.5. Impact of Dallas “Tilting” on Rent Ceiling and Rents ................................. 97
2.6. Impacts of Dallas “Tilting” on Neighborhood Quality (Timeseries) ........... 100
2.7. Impacts of Dallas “Tilting” on Neighborhood Quality (Distribution) . . . . . 101

3.1. Piecewise Linear and Quadratic Simulated DGPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.2. RK Example: UI Benefits in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.3. RK Inference Example: UI Benefits in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.4. Conditional Mean Function for Simulation DGPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
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1. How Does Unemployment Affect Consumer Spending?

1.1. Introduction

Many Americans have little liquid assets, limited access to credit, and immediately spend a substantial fraction of tax rebates, suggesting that financial constraints would necessitate substantial spending reductions during unemployment. However, some mainstream economic models assume that individuals are able to smooth short-term income fluctuations. We analyze anonymized bank account data on the spending of families receiving unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to test between these competing views.

Bank account data offer a rich view of the financial lives of families who receive UI. We analyze anonymized data on monthly checking account inflows and outflows assembled by

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1This research was made possible by a data-use agreement between the authors and the JPMorgan Chase Institute (JPMCI), which has created anonymized data assets that are selectively available to be used for academic research. More information about JPMCI anonymized data assets and data privacy protocols are available at www.jpmorganchase.com/institute. All statistics from JPMCI data, including medians, reflect cells with at least 10 observations. The opinions expressed are those of the authors alone and do not represent the views of JPMorgan Chase & Co. While working on this paper, Ganong and Noel were paid contractors of JPMCI.

2Evidence for this view includes Parker et al. (2013), Shapiro and Slemrod (2009) and Angeletos et al. (2001).

3Shimer and Werning (2008) model optimal unemployment insurance under an assumption of perfect access to liquidity. Blundell et al. (2008) find in a model calibrated to annual US data that there is complete insurance of transitory shocks, except among families with permanently low income.
the JPMorgan Chase Institute (JPMCI). For the purposes of this research, we identify UI receipt through direct deposit of benefits. We build a dataset with two key advantages for studying spending during unemployment relative to surveys used in prior work.\(^4\) First, monthly bank account data enables us to trace out high-frequency drops and rebounds in spending at unemployment onset, re-employment and UI benefit exhaustion. Second, we can estimate the role of work-related expenses and how much spending drops on necessities.

Recipients of UI benefits tend to be middle-class families and the JPMCI sample looks similar to external benchmarks. Most states require UI claimants to have earnings in four of the five quarters prior to separation, meaning that low-income workers are often ineligible for benefits. Summary statistics on account holders in the JPMCI data are similar to external benchmarks for total family income, spending, debt payments, checking account balances and age.\(^5\)

The first half of our paper describes the economic lives of families receiving UI. We divide our empirical analysis into three sections: (1) the onset of UI, (2) spending for those re-employed while receiving UI and (3) spending for those who exhaust UI benefits.

Spending drops sharply at the onset of unemployment, and this drop is better explained by liquidity constraints than by a drop in permanent income or a drop in work-related expenses. We find that spending on nondurable goods and services drops by $160 (6\%) over the course of two months.\(^6\) Consistent with liquidity constraints, we show that states with lower UI benefits...
benefits have a larger drop in spending at onset. It is unlikely that permanent income can explain the drop at onset because the average lifetime income loss for UI recipients in the JPMCI data is only 14% of one year’s income. Finally, we define work-related expenses as those spending categories which decline at retirement for a sample of retirees with substantial liquid assets. Our definition, which includes food away from home and transportation, closely mirrors prior work by Aguiar and Hurst (2013). Work-related expenses drop more than other expenditure categories at onset. We estimate that the excess drop in this category explains about one-quarter of the total drop in spending at onset.

For UI recipients who are able to find work prior to exhaustion, spending remains depressed after re-employment as they rebuild their financial buffer. Prior work studying short-term unemployment using annual spending data assumed that spending recovered fully upon re-employment (Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis 2015). In fact, someone who is unemployed for three months has 6% lower spending during unemployment and 3% lower spending (relative to onset) after re-employment. Decreased spending after re-employment was misinterpreted as a drop during unemployment, leading researchers to overstate the drop in spending for the short-term unemployed by as much as factor of three. We provide new estimates of the spending drop for researchers calibrating optimal UI benefits in a Baily (1978)-Chetty (2006) framework and studying how unemployment affects output over the business cycle (e.g. Kaplan and Menzio (2015)).

Comparing spending of high- and low-asset families after re-employment provides further evidence for the central role of liquidity in explaining spending behavior. Some consumption models predict that families target a specific ratio of wealth to permanent income (Carroll 1997). To smooth an income shock of a fixed size, low-asset families need to draw down a

---

7Both in the JPMCI data, and in a representative sample using the SIPP, we find that average UI recipients experience a quick recovery in their labor income. Although a prior literature started by Jacobson et al. (1993b) which studied income paths of high-tenure workers separated in mass layoffs found large permanent income losses, there is less research about the experience of typical UI recipients.
larger fraction of their assets. We find empirically that spending remains depressed after re-employment for these low-asset families as they rebuild their buffers, consistent with the prediction of target ratio models.

As UI benefit exhaustion approaches, families who remain unemployed barely cut spending, but then cut spending by 11% in the month after benefits are exhausted. Benefit exhaustion offers a particularly powerful research design for studying excess sensitivity of spending to income because the drop in income is predictable, it contains little news about a jobseeker’s future income prospects and does not change the opportunity for home production. When benefits are exhausted, the average family loses about $1,000 of monthly income. In the same month, spending drops by $260 (11%). Grocery spending drops from $289 per month during UI receipt to $253 per month immediately after exhaustion. Although we do not have data on what types of foods people buy, analysis of food diaries by Aguiar and Hurst (2005) suggests that there is a substantial change in food quality.

We take these empirical facts – the large spending drop at onset, the slow decline during UI receipt, and the even larger spending drop at exhaustion and compare them to predictions from three benchmark models of consumption: a permanent income consumer, a buffer stock consumer and a hand-to-mouth consumer.

Unemployment is a particularly good setting for testing alternative models of consumption because it causes such a large change in family income. A literature starting with Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Mankiw (1985) and Cochrane (1989) has argued that because ignoring small price changes has a second-order impact on utility, a rule of thumb such as setting spending changes equal to income changes may be “near-rational.” More recently, many researchers have documented evidence of an immediate increase in spending in response to

\footnote{Family income drops by less than the amount of lost benefits because some UI recipients find work at the time of benefit exhaustion.}
tax rebates and similar one-time payments. Some authors have interpreted this as evidence of widespread liquidity constraints. Fuchs-Schuendeln and Hassan (2015) argue that the high sensitivity of income to tax rebates is not sufficient to reject the permanent income hypothesis, because the welfare cost is small of adopting rule of thumb behavior for tax rebates. They calculate that in 18 studies using micro evidence the cost of rule of thumb behavior is 5% or less of annual consumption. For someone who is unemployed and exhausts UI benefits, the comparable statistic is 20%. Because the stakes are higher for unemployment, near-rationality is less of a concern and the path of spending offers a more convincing test of alternative models of consumption.

We compare the path of spending during unemployment in the data to three benchmark models and find that the buffer stock model fits better than a permanent income model or a hand-to-mouth model. We calibrate a model of consumption and savings in the tradition of Deaton (1991), Aiyagari (1994), and Carroll (1997). In our model, the only income risk comes from unemployment. UI benefits expire after six months. The decline in spending from onset through exhaustion in the data is equal to the decline predicted by the buffer stock model when agents hold assets equal to 0.84 months of income at the start of unemployment.

However, the buffer stock model has two major failures – it predicts substantially more asset holdings at onset and it predicts that spending should be much smoother at benefit exhaustion. First, a key prediction of buffer stock models is that agents accumulate precautionary savings to self-insure against income risk. Our model, where unemployment is the only risk, predicts that agents should hold three times as much assets as they do in the data. Second,


10Models with realistic income processes predict asset holdings which are an order of magnitude larger (Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Laibson et al. (2015)).
models of forward-looking agents with exponential time preferences predict that spending should evolve smoothly in the face of predictable income changes. Even agents who have zero assets at onset will avoid spending all of their UI benefits in order to smooth the income drop at exhaustion. Two channels which could contribute to this sudden drop at exhaustion are over-optimistic beliefs about UI duration which update suddenly at exhaustion (Spinnewijn 2015) and inattention prior to benefit exhaustion (Reis 2006, Cochrane 1989, Kueng 2015).

To summarize, we find that families do relatively little self-insurance when unemployed as spending is quite sensitive to current monthly income. We built a new dataset to study the spending of unemployed families using anonymized bank account records from JPMCI. Using rich category-level expenditure data, we find that work-related expenses explain only a modest portion of the spending drop during unemployment. The overall path of spending for a seven-month unemployment spell is consistent with a buffer stock model where agents hold assets equal to less than one month of income at the onset of unemployment. Because unemployment is such a large shock to income, our finding that spending is highly sensitive to income overcomes the near-rationality critique applied to prior work. Finally, we document a puzzling drop in spending of 11% in the month UI benefits exhaust, suggesting that families do not prepare for benefit exhaustion.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the JPMCI data set and why it is suited for measuring how unemployment affects spending. Section 1.3 quantifies the drop in spending at the onset of unemployment and argues that liquidity constraints are a better explanation than permanent income loss or work-related expenses. Section 1.4 shows that families rebuild their liquid assets after re-employment, consistent with a target ratio. Section 1.5 shows that income and spending drop sharply at benefit exhaustion. Section 1.6 compares predictions from different consumption models to the data. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2. Data and External Validity

We construct a dataset suitable for studying unemployment and spending using JPMCI data from October 2012 to May 2015.\textsuperscript{11} We rely primarily on transaction-level checking account inflows, checking account outflows, and debit card spending, which have been categorized and aggregated to the monthly level. We also use four additional anonymized datasets from JPMCI: spending on Chase credit cards, credit bureau records for Chase credit card customers, estimates of annual income, and estimates of total liquid asset holdings.

Administrative spending data have four advantages over the survey datasets used to study spending during unemployment in prior work: comprehensiveness, sample size, detailed spending categories and monthly frequency.\textsuperscript{12} Many researchers have used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), but it suffers from an ambiguous reference period and until recently it only covered food expenditures.\textsuperscript{13} Changes in food expenditures are difficult to interpret around unemployment because of transitions to home production and because food may be a necessity good (Shimer and Werning 2007). Another data source is surveys which ask unemployed people how much they have cut spending since their job separation.

\textsuperscript{11}Following Aguiar and Hurst (2005), we use the word “spending” to describe a specific subset of checking account outflows in the JPMCI data. We reserve the word “consumption” for discussing models such as the permanent income consumer, the hand-to-mouth consumer, and the buffer stock consumer. In the context of evaluating these models, we assume that the spending in the data actually reflects monthly consumption. Also, for consistency with the prior literature, we use the letter $c$ in equations to describe the spending variable.

\textsuperscript{12}One exception to the widespread use of survey data to study spending during unemployment is recent work by Kolsrud et al. (2015a) which uses annual administrative data on income and asset holdings from Sweden to infer spending. The Kolsrud et al. (2015a) data are superior to the JPMCI data in that they capture asset holdings across all banks, while the JPMCI data have the advantages of a monthly frequency and detailed expenditure categories. One example of a survey with some data on income and spending at a monthly frequency is Hannagan and Morduch (2015).

\textsuperscript{13}Examples of papers studying the impact of unemployment on food expenditure in the PSID include Cochrane (1991), Gruber (1997), Stephens (2001), Chetty and Szeidl (2007), Saporta-Eksten (2014), Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2015) and Hendren (2015). The PSID asks about “usual” weekly expenditure on food at home and then about food away from home without prompting a frequency. Most analysts have interpreted this as referring to the prior year’s expenditure (Blundell et al. (2008), Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2015)).
Relative to this prior work, the JPMCI data cover all types of spending and a sample size of 235,000 UI recipients enables us to study subsamples such as benefit exhaustees or low-asset families re-employed after three months. With debit and credit card expenditure categories, we can estimate the role of work-related expenses and understand whether someone is cutting necessity goods when unemployed. Finally, we use the monthly frequency of the data to test predictions from different consumption models about how spending should change at re-employment and at UI exhaustion.

Families in the JPMCI dataset look similar to external benchmarks on family income, spending in certain categories, liquid assets and age. This representativeness is a strength of the JPMCI spending data in comparison with spending data from personal finance websites. For example, Kueng (2015) reports that median after-tax family income in Alaska in the personal finance website dataset was about 50% higher than for a representative sample. However, these personal finance websites have strengths relative to the JPMCI dataset, such as better coverage of asset holdings and families with multiple checking accounts. Another strength of the JPMCI data is the availability of anonymized information derived from credit bureau records, including all outstanding debts and delinquencies.

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14 Following Baker (2014), we assume the sample unit to be analogous to a “consumer unit” in the Consumer Expenditure Survey, a family in the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and a “primary economic unit” in the Survey of Consumer Finances. We refer to the sampling unit as a “family”, even though the family may have only one member.

15 Recent work using data from these websites includes Baker and Yannelis (2015), Gelman et al. (2015), Baugh et al. (2013), Kuchler (2014), and Kueng (2015). From a representativeness perspective, the best data source is administrative datasets on income and asset holding which cover all citizens like those used by Kolsrud et al. (2015a) and Kostøl and Mogstad (2015).
1.2.1. Finding UI Recipients and Building A Full View of Family Finances

We look at checking account transaction descriptions to tag UI payments received by direct deposit. Particular text descriptions are associated with electronic transfers from state UI agencies. The population-weighted average of state-level direct deposit adoption rates was 45% in 2012 (Saunders and McLaughlin (2013)).

One challenge for measuring a family’s spending is that some families have multiple checking accounts and we take three steps to achieve the best possible coverage of families’ spending. The McKinsey Consumer Financial Life Survey showed that 39% of banked families had multiple accounts in 2013 (Welander 2014). Of these families, 39% had an additional account at the their primary bank and 71% had an additional account at another bank. First, to address this concern, we study all of the checking accounts which each family has linked together (see Appendix A.1.1 for details). Second, we focus on families who use Chase as their primary bank. Most people “home” on a single credit or debit card for point-of-sale payments (Cohen and Rysman 2013, Shy 2013). Given that changing cards is easier than changing checking accounts, we believe that the same “homing” behavior exists for checking accounts and study accounts with at least five monthly outflows. Finally, sometimes two customers will form a family unit without linking their accounts. In our robustness checks, we study unlinked checking accounts which appear to reflect the same family.

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16 Altogether, we found transaction descriptions associated with 32 states. The bank has branches in 21 of these states.

17 In addition, as evidence for external validity, we estimate that the share of US families receiving UI via direct deposit is close to the share of families in the data. Across the US, an average of 2.9 million people received UI benefits each week in 2014. We estimate that in an average week in 2014, 1.0% of families in the US received UI benefits via direct deposit. In the bank data, the average monthly UI recipiency rate in 2014 was 0.8%.

18 How many payments make a checking account primary? We do not have the data to answer this question directly, but 94% of people with one checking account have at least five outflows per month according to the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice.
1.2.2. Estimating Income and Comparison to External Benchmarks

To construct economically meaningful measures of income, JPMCI has applied extensive logic to categorize checking account inflows into twenty-two groups. We organize inflows into four major groups: payroll paid using direct deposit (61% of inflows three months prior to onset of UI), government income (4%), transfers from outside savings and investment accounts ("dissaving", 10%) and other income (4%). Together, these categories cover 79% of total inflows and we place the remainder of inflows – which are largely made up of paper checks – into a residual category (21%).

Subjects in the JPMCI dataset who receive direct deposit of their UI benefits have similar incomes to a representative sample of UI recipients, suggesting that our analysis will have external validity for all UI recipients. In the SIPP, we construct the distribution of family income in the 12 months prior to UI receipt. In the JPMCI data, we use checking account inflows (except dissaving), rescaled into pre-tax dollars. Median family income is $61,000 using the SIPP and $54,000 using checking account income. Figure 1.1 shows that the income distribution of families receiving UI in the JPMCI data is broadly similar to the distribution for families receiving UI in the SIPP.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\)Appendix A.1.2 provides additional detail on the types of inflows observed in the JPMCI data. Appendix Table 1.1 shows additional summary statistics for each category. Measurement error is widespread and we winsorize all inflow variables at the 95th percentile.

\(^{20}\)The share of direct deposit labor income in inflows (67%) is a bit lower than our estimated external benchmarks (78%). We calculate the external benchmark estimate by multiplying labor income as a share of family income (91% prior to UI receipt in the SIPP) times fraction of payroll dollars distributed by direct deposit (86% in the SCF). Because some paper checks likely reflect transfers between different accounts, the true ratio of direct deposit labor income to total income likely exceeds 67%. Table 1.1 provides additional statistics on the income of UI recipients in the SIPP, with comparisons to the JPMCI data. See Rothstein and Valetta (2014) for additional details on income of UI recipients.
Figure 1.1.: Representativeness: Income and Asset Distribution

Notes: The top panel plots the distribution of pre-tax family income in the year prior to UI receipt in the 2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation and in the JPMCI data. The bottom panel plots the distribution of checking account balances for employed families in the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, employed families in the JPMCI data, and families three months before UI receipt in the JPMCI data.
Although bank account data may not provide a good window into spending for everyone, such data provide good coverage for UI recipients, because they tend to be in middle-class families. To be eligible for UI benefits, a claimant needs substantial work history in the prior year. Table 1.1 shows the impact of this requirement quantitatively using the SIPP. In the twelve months prior to unemployment, UI recipients had median monthly pre-tax family income of about $5,100 and a poverty rate of only 8%. While UI recipients are poorer than all employed people, they are higher-income and older than the general pool of unemployed people. Finally, we find using the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) that only 5% of employed families lack a bank account, suggesting that the vast majority of UI recipients have a bank account.

1.2.3. Estimating Spending and Comparison to External Benchmarks

Much as with income, checking account outflows can be hard to interpret and JPMCI has categorized them into thirty different groups. We organize outflows under four broad headings: spending on goods and services consumed immediately (54% of outflows), consumer debt payments (17%), unclassifiable payments (23%) and saving (6%).

Most of our analysis in this paper focuses on spending on goods and services consumed immediately. Our definition of spending has three components: (1) debit and credit card spending ($1484 monthly, 34% of total outflows), (2) cash withdrawals ($613, 14%) and (3) bill payments ($314, 7%). Note that this definition includes spending on Chase credit cards at the time goods are purchased, rather than when the credit card bill is paid, which may 

\[21\] Appendix A.1.2 provides additional detail on the content of each of these categories. We winsorize all inflow variables at the 95th percentile.
### Table 1.1.: Representativeness: Income in JPMCI Data Compared to External Benchmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dataset</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Median Age 21</th>
<th>Mean Monthly Family Inc</th>
<th>Mean Monthly Family Inc</th>
<th>Poverty Rate</th>
<th>Mean Earnings</th>
<th>Mean Earn</th>
<th>Mean Earn &gt; 0</th>
<th>Mean Others' Earn Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIPP</td>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>6029</td>
<td>7405</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>6866</td>
<td>3739</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>3126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPP</td>
<td>All Unemployed</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>4374</td>
<td>5596</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>5064</td>
<td>2042</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>3023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPP</td>
<td>Get UI</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>5106</td>
<td>6290</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>5750</td>
<td>3273</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>2477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPMCI</td>
<td>Get UI</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>4540</td>
<td>5445</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>3667</td>
<td>3667</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPMCI</td>
<td>Exhaust UI</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>4526</td>
<td>5414</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>3569</td>
<td>3569</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All income statistics are monthly, for the 12-month period prior to the onset of unemployment. SIPP The first three rows are from the Survey of Income and Program Participation panel (SIPP) and are inflated to 2014 $ using CPI-U. This survey covered years 2004-2007. "All unemployed" are people with a reported job separation followed by unemployment in the subsequent month. "Get UI" are people who report positive UI income. JPMCI data are for Oct 2012-May 2015. We define income as all inflows which are not explicitly categorized as dissaving and we rescale these inflows into pre-tax dollars. Earnings includes only labor income paid by direct deposit. About 86% of payroll dollars in the US are paid by direct deposit.
be months later.\textsuperscript{22} In addition, all credit and debit card transactions include a Merchant Category Code that enables us to test whether specific expenditure categories change in the way predicted by theories of home production (Aguiar and Hurst (2013)).

When we compare the JPMCI spending data to external benchmarks, we find under-coverage of total consumption using a “top-down” approach while we find better coverage of eight clearly-identified expenditure categories using a “bottom-up” approach. First, for the “top-down” approach, we focus on nondurable goods and services in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) and in the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE).\textsuperscript{23} We estimate that our spending measure is 94\% of the CEX benchmark and 44\% of the PCE benchmark. We believe that our true coverage of spending for UI recipients is somewhere between these two numbers: the CEX is too low because of underreporting and PCE is too high because it includes the consumption of very wealthy people who are not relevant for our study. Second, using a “bottom-up” approach, we compare spending on food away from home, food at home, fuel and utilities in Table 1.2. Estimated spending by families in the JPMCI sample is 119-144\% of the CEX benchmark and 62-95\% of the PCE benchmark. We similarly compare spending on mortgages, auto loans, credit card payments, and student loans; conditional on making a payment, mean outflows are 63-112\% of what is reported in the SCF by families making the same payments.
### Table 1.2: Representativeness: Spending in JPMCI Data Compared to External Benchmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>JPMCI Unadjusted Mean ($)</th>
<th>JPMCI Adj Factor</th>
<th>JPMCI Adjusted Mean ($)</th>
<th>External Benchmarks</th>
<th>CEX ($)</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>BEA ($)</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Headline**
| Nondurable Goods and Services | --                       | --               | 1797                    | 1912                | 0.94    | 4130  | 0.44    |
| **Specific Nondurables**
| Food At Home                  | 281                       | 0.59             | 478                     | 331                 | 1.44    | 580   | 0.82    |
| Fuel                          | 171                       | 0.59             | 291                     | 219                 | 1.33    | 471   | 0.62    |
| Utilities                     | --                        | --               | 371                     | 312                 | 1.19    | --    | --      |

**Debt Payments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JPMCI SCF ($)</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortgage</td>
<td>1536</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Loan</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Loan</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All spending estimates are monthly. For external benchmarks, we use published 2013 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis Table 2.3.5 for 2013 divided by 125 million consumer units, and 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) microdata for employed families. Estimates from JPMCI data use all families with at least five outflows per month in 2013.

a. **Headline** We exclude healthcare because checking account data miss lots of healthcare spending and utilities because the BEA does not report them separately.
b. **Specific Nondurables** To capture families' total spending on each category, we adjust food and fuel spending estimates upward by the ratio of Chase card spend to cash + debit card + all credit card spend (0.59). BEA reports food services together with accommodations, so the BEA estimate overstates true spending on food away from home.
c. **Debt Payments** We are only able to identify debt payments made by direct deposit for a small fraction of households. We compare the average payment made by households making any payment in the JPMCI data to comparable estimates in the SCF.
1.2.4. External Validity – Geography, Age, and Checking Account Balances

The JPMCI sample also looks broadly representative of US families in terms of geography, checking account balances and age, lending additional support to our argument for external validity. Chase has physical branches in 23 states, including the five most populous states in the US: California, Texas, Florida, New York and Illinois. We compare the age distribution of UI recipients in the JPMCI data to the SIPP in Appendix Figure 1.1 and find that these two distributions are closely aligned. Because we only observe the age of the primary account holder in the JPMCI data, we compare it to the age of the family head in the SIPP. UI recipients in the JPMCI data (mean age: 41.1) are slightly younger than UI recipients in the SIPP (mean age: 44.3).

To understand how representative the JPMCI sample is in terms of assets, we compared it to the SCF. We compared balances for employed families in the data to balances for employed families in “the checking account you use the most” in the SCF. Figure 1.1 shows that the distribution of balances is similar between the two samples. Table 1.3 reports summary statistics comparing the JPMCI and SCF samples. In the SCF, the median total liquid assets for an employed family is $4,900 and the median balance in a family’s primary checking account is $1,500. The difference in medians highlights a limitation of checking account data, which is that most liquid assets are held outside a family’s checking account. The median

---

22Mean monthly Chase credit card spend is $208. Because our sample screen requires five outflows in every month, our sample is skewed toward frequent debit card users and away from frequent credit card users.

23We exclude healthcare and pensions because employers often pay for these services directly. We exclude housing because we are unable to measure rent, which is typically paid using paper checks, and we exclude utilities because PCE combines housing and utility costs into a single category. For 2013, CEX estimated total mean monthly spending of $4,258 and PCE estimated $7,615. It is well known that CEX understates consumption expenditures. Passero et al. (2011) carefully crosswalk CEX and PCE expenditure categories and found the ratio of CEX to PCE was 0.60 across all categories and 0.77 across comparable categories. To ensure comparability with these external data sources, the statistics from the JPMCI data reported in this section are for all accounts with 5 monthly outflows, rather than just for UI recipients.
checking account balance in the data is $1,460, suggesting that on this dimension, families in
the JPMCI data are similar to a cross-section of US families. In the data, we see substantial
inflows from outside accounts during unemployment so even though we are unable to measure
total asset holdings reliably, we can measure the extent to which families draw down their
assets or draw on funds from informal insurance networks during unemployment.

1.2.5. Comparison Groups

To eliminate seasonality, inflation, secular trends, and business cycle fluctuations, all results
for income and spending are presented relative to a comparison group. In the JPMCI data,
there is an upward secular trend in spending of five percent per year and in labor income of six
percent per year. This increase is larger than can be explained by economic fundamentals
during this period. We believe that this trend reflects secular growth in the use of debit
cards, credit cards and ACH (Federal Reserve System 2013). We considered three different
comparison groups to address this issue: families which (1) received UI in at least one
month, (2) received direct deposit payroll in 21-31 of the 32 months in the sample and (3)
had annual income estimates between $30,000 and $80,000. All three groups have similar
means for checking account income and spending. More importantly, as shown in Appendix
Figure 1.2, all three groups have similar trends in spending. We chose the annual income
estimate sample as our control group and adjust income and spending using this formula:

\[ y_{it} = y_{it,\text{raw}} - \left( \bar{y}_{t}^{30K-80K} - \bar{y}_{30K-80K} \right) \]

where \( i \) is a family, \( t \) is a month, and \( y_{it,\text{raw}} \) are the original data. We create an adjusted
series \( y_{it} \) by subtracting a term equal to the mean for the control group in month \( t \) minus
the grand mean for the control group across all months in the sample. This modification
enables us to examine how income and spending of a family receiving UI change relative to
Table 1.3.: Representativeness: Assets in JPMCI Data Compared to External Benchmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Asset Balance</th>
<th>p10</th>
<th>p50</th>
<th>p90</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>All Employed</td>
<td>All Liquid Assets</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>54000</td>
<td>29952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCF</td>
<td>All Employed</td>
<td>Checking Account</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>4920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPMCI</td>
<td>All Employed</td>
<td>Checking Account</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1460</td>
<td>10940</td>
<td>5766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPMCI</td>
<td>Employed, Pre-UI Receipt</td>
<td>Checking Account</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>6820</td>
<td>3453</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table compares liquid assets in the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to families with primary accounts at JPMCI from October 2012 through May 2015. Liquid assets include checking and saving accounts, money market accounts, certificates of deposit, savings bonds, non-retirement mutual funds, stocks and bonds. When households have multiple checking accounts, the primary checking account is defined in the SCF as "the one you use the most." Employed is defined as $15,000 of annual pre-tax labor income in the SCF and $1,000 of monthly post-tax labor income in the bank.
1.3. Onset of Unemployment

In Section 1.3.1, we show that income and spending fall immediately at the onset of unemployment. Labor income falls prior to UI receipt, because there is a delay between job separation and arrival of the first UI check. Workers typically cannot file for benefits until they have separated from their job. State UI websites suggest that if everything goes smoothly, a worker will wait three to four weeks between filing her claim and receiving her first benefit check. In the two months before a worker first receives UI, her labor income paid by direct deposit falls by about $400. Spending on nondurable goods and services falls by $160, which is 6% of its pre-onset mean. The drop in spending does not reflect shifts to alternative payment channels. Families make up for lost income by drawing down their liquid assets rather than borrowing on their credit cards.

Browning and Crossley (2001) describe three reasons why spending may fall at the start of an unemployment spell – a temporary income loss, a permanent income loss and a decrease in work-related expenses – and Section 1.3.2 argues that the temporary income loss appears to be the most important explanation. First, in an attempt to isolate the role of temporary income, we show that spending drops more at onset in states where income drops more. Second, to understand the role of permanent income losses, we examine the path of family income in the wake of a UI spell and find that by 24 months after onset it has recovered to 95% of its pre-onset level and is on an upward trend. This finding may seem surprising in light of prior work by Jacobson et al. (1993b), but is largely attributable to the fact that we

\[\text{https://labor.ny.gov/directdeposit/directdepositfaq.shtm#DD5}\]
study all UI recipients whereas prior work has focused on high tenure workers who separate in mass layoffs. Finally, we use category-level spending changes at retirement to construct an estimate of work-related spending. We find that an excess drop in work-related expenses can explain 26-37% of the total drop in expenditure at onset.

1.3.1. Basic Facts About Onset

1.3.1.1. Spending Drops by $160 (6%)

Labor income falls sharply at the start of an unemployment spell and UI benefits make up for much of the immediate drop in income. The top panel of Figure 1.2 shows the path of labor income and UI for a family that receives UI benefits for exactly one month. Labor income starts to decline two months before UI benefits are received and continues to decline through the month in which UI benefits are received. Because labor income drops before UI benefits arrive, the two-month period with the largest decline in income is from three months before UI receipt to one month before UI receipt. Throughout Section 1.3, this is the two-month window that we study. Because these UI recipients claimed only one month of benefits, they likely found a job during that month and labor income recovers over the subsequent two months.

We construct an aggregate series of income during unemployment and it shows a sharp decline at onset followed by modest declines through the second month in which UI checks are received in the bottom panel of Figure 1.2. Prior to onset, all future UI recipients are
Figure 1.2.: Event Study: Income at UI Onset

Notes: The top panel shows the path of labor income for families that receive UI benefits in exactly one month. Direct deposit labor income declines in the three months leading up to UI receipt. The bottom panel plots average labor and UI income for the sample of agents who stay unemployed. In months $t = \{-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0\}$, this includes everyone who receives UI at date 0. In month $t = 1$, this includes only families who continue to receive UI and excludes families who received their last UI check in month 0. In month $t = 2$, this excludes families who received their last UI check in month 0 or month 1, and so on. Mean labor income is positive during UI receipt because sometimes other family members continue to receive labor income. These estimates are relative to a control group described in Section 1.2.5.
included in the sample. Once UI benefits begin, each point is estimated as

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta y_t &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in UI \; \text{duration} > t} y_{i,t} - y_{i,t-1} \\
\bar{y}_t &= \Delta y_t + \bar{y}_{t-1}
\end{align*}
\]

where \(i\) is a family, \(t\) is months since UI receipt began, \(y\) is income and \(n\) is the number of observations with duration > \(t\). This restriction means that in months \(t = \{-5, -4, -3, -2, -1\}\) prior to UI receipt, every future UI recipient is included in the sample. In month \(t = 0\), everyone who gets UI through month 1 is included in the sample. In month \(t = 1\), everyone who gets UI through month 2 is included in the sample, and so on.

From four months prior to onset to two months after onset, UI recipients’ monthly labor income drops by $1,950. Average monthly UI benefits are $1,300 and an apparent replacement rate of 66% seems unusually large, given that average UI pre-tax replacement rates are around 45% in the US. Differences in the tax treatment of payroll and UI benefits can explain some of the gap. If a paycheck already has a 7.65% payroll deduction and 15% income tax withheld, a $1,950 post-tax paycheck corresponds to a $2,400 pre-tax paycheck. Because about 86% of payroll dollars are distributed by direct deposit, the observed drop in payroll is consistent with an average pre-tax replacement rate of 47%. Because of paper checks and the pre-tax to post-tax distinction, the drop in direct deposit family income from three months before UI to the first month in which UI is received is only about $600 per month in the data.\(^{25}\)

Spending drops immediately before the start of a UI spell. Figure 1.3 shows event studies of spending for people who receive UI for different numbers of months. For recipients of all durations, spending falls in the month before UI receipt begins, which coincides with

\(^{25}\)Adding in payroll paid via paper check increases the estimated income drop to about $800.
the start of unemployment, as discussed above. The vertical dashed lines in Figure 1.3 indicate the last month in which UI was received for the bolded data series. For short-duration UI recipients, spending jumps up at the end of a UI spell, although to less than its pre-unemployment level. This spending pattern is consistent with families drawing down savings at the start of an unemployment spell and then building up a buffer stock after the return to work. We explore the recovery in spending further in Section 1.4.

What exactly is captured by the drop in spending from three months before UI receipt to one month before UI receipt? With \( i \) indexing families, \( t \) indexing time, and \( \text{Post}_{it} \) as a dummy for one month before UI receipt, we estimate \( \hat{\beta} \) using the equation

\[
c_{it} = \alpha + \beta \text{Post}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}
\]

and report the results in Table 1.4. Conceptually, this drop in spending reflects three distinct economic channels: (1) the direct loss in income from \( t = 3 \) to \( t = 1 \), (2) the news gained from \( t = 3 \) to \( t = 1 \) about the path of future income, and (3) the drop in work-related expenses, if the worker has stopped working between \( t = 3 \) and \( t = 1 \). For equation 1.3 to capture the causal impact of the three channels, we need to assume that \( E(\varepsilon_{it}|\text{Post}_{it}) = 0 \), which means that the timing of UI receipt is not correlated with something else that might affect spending directly. Because the start dates of UI spells are highly idiosyncratic, this orthogonality restriction seems plausible.

We construct an aggregate series of spending during unemployment and it shows a sharp decline at onset followed by modest declines in subsequent months. The top panel of Figure 1.4 plots spending separately for each duration group from Figure 1.3. Each series terminates before the last month of UI receipt, which is when spending recovers for short-duration UI recipients. The bottom panel of Figure 1.4 plots a composite series of spending while
Notes: The top-left panel shows the average path of spending for families that receive UI benefits in exactly one month. The gray dashed vertical line indicates the last month in which UI benefits were received. The subsequent panels plot the path of spending for families that received UI for 2, 3, 4, and 5 months. The last panel plots spending for families that received UI for 6 months and exhausted benefits. These estimates are relative to a control group described in Section 1.2.5.
### Table 1.4: Summary of Changes at Onset, During UI Receipt, and Benefit Exhaustion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Checking Account: Income and Spending</th>
<th>Pre-Onset Mean</th>
<th>Two-Month Drop at Onset (t = -3 to t = -1)&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Monthly Drop During UI &lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Two-Month Drop at Exhaustion &lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income (% of Pre-Onset Mean)</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ($)</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td>-401</td>
<td>-73</td>
<td>-802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Inflows ($)</td>
<td>5822</td>
<td>-216</td>
<td>-136</td>
<td>-452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on Nondurables (% of Pre-Onset Mean)</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending on Nondurables ($)</td>
<td>2644</td>
<td>-161</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Outflows ($)</td>
<td>5739</td>
<td>-205</td>
<td>-89</td>
<td>-351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Checking Account: Asset Flows

| Net Dissaving from External Accts ($) | 210         | 38         | 14         | 97       |
| (2)                                  | (1)         | (5)        |            |          |
| Balance Pre - Balance Post ($)       | -16         | 16         | 30         | 93       |
| (Outflows - Inflows)                 | (4)         | (1)        | (10)       |          |

### Chase Credit Cards<sup>d</sup>

| Revolving Balance ($)                | 2288        | -3         | 8          | 56       |
| (5)                                  | (2)         | (13)       |            |          |
| New Charges ($)                      | 208         | -10.1      | 0.4        | -0.7     |
| (0.9)                                | (0.3)       | (2.3)      |            |          |

### Credit Bureau Records

| All Credit Cards -- Balance ($)       | 6883        | 36         | 31         | 66       |
| (9)                                  | (4)         | (24)       |            |          |

### Notes:
- Standard errors are shown in parentheses underneath regression coefficients.
- **Changes at the onset of unemployment.** We define this as from three months before the first UI payment to one month before the first UI payment. Each observation is a family.
- **Monthly changes while receiving UI.** Each observation is a family-month. Standard errors in this column are clustered at the family level.
- **Changes at the exhaustion of UI benefits.** We define this as from one month before the last UI payment to one month after the last UI payment for benefit exhaustees. Sample is exhaustees eligible for 26 weeks of benefits or less. Each observation is a family.
- **Credit card balance variables capture stocks rather than flows.** For example, a $36 increase in credit card balance at onset corresponds to spending $18 extra on the card each month.
unemployed on the basis of this changing sample using the same methodology as in equation 1.1. Equation 1.2 is modified to $ar{c}_t = \frac{1}{c_{base}} (\Delta c_t + \bar{c}_{t-1})$, where $c_{base}$ is mean spending before UI onset. The small vertical bars around each point indicate the 95% confidence interval for $\Delta c_t$. In this composite spending series, spending drops by about 6% at the onset of unemployment (from $t = -3$ to $t = -1$) and then falls by less than 1% per month in subsequent months.

The drop in spending at onset is substantial relative to the drop in income. To facilitate comparisons of magnitudes, we summarize the drops in income and spending with regressions in Table 1.4. Labor income paid by direct deposit drops by $400 from $t = -3$ to $t = -1$. Spending on goods and services consumed immediately – which is only 58% of non-saving outflows – falls by $160$, or about 16% of the drop in income. In Appendix A.2.1, we document that the shift in spending appears to reflect a true drop in family-wide spending rather than a shift in spending to alternative payment channels and that our results for this sample are likely to have external validity for other UI recipients.

1.3.1.2. Decomposition – What Kinds of Spending Drop At Onset? How Is Consumption Smoothing Financed?

Families are able to protect their most important commitments and cut spending most on expenses which might have been related to work. Table 1.5 shows the drop in spending at onset for several selected categories. Student loans, cash withdrawals, food away from home, and auto expenses all drop sharply.\(^{26}\) If the family owned a car with average gas mileage, the

\(^{26}\)The drop in the fraction of families making student loan payments could reflect debtors becoming delinquent or obtaining deferments on the basis of their unemployment. We believe that it likely reflects delinquency because it takes substantial time to apply for deferment (and related options such as Income-Based Repayment) and debtors are advised to keep making payments until they obtain a deferment.
Note: The top panel plots the same spending series as Figure 1.3, zoomed in from five months prior to UI onset until one before UI benefits are terminated. The bottom panel shows the composite path of spending for families who remain unemployed using the data in the top panel using the same methodology as in Figure 1.2. The vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals for the change from the prior month. These estimates are relative to a control group described in Section 1.2.5.
drop in auto expenditures corresponds to driving about 200 fewer miles per month. Notably, mortgage payments are stable at the onset of unemployment.\footnote{Our findings here differ from Gelman et al. (2015), who find that some federal workers delayed mortgage payments during the government shutdown of 2012. However, that shutdown was expected to end in a matter of weeks, meaning that mortgage payment delay carried little financial risk. In contrast, unemployment is of uncertain duration, and so mortgage payment delay carries more serious risks.}

To the extent that families smooth their consumption, they do so mostly by drawing down liquid assets. Table 1.4 indicates that families increase inbound transfers from savings, money market accounts, investment accounts and checking accounts and cut outbound transfers to the same types of accounts.\footnote{We do not know whether the source accounts were owned by the owners of the checking account, or if these are transfers from family members or friends in response to unemployment.} Although we are only able to categorize electronic transfers, we believe that families also use paper checks to implement these types of transfers. Table 1.5 shows that paper check inflows rise during unemployment, even though paper checks from labor income almost surely fell. We find little evidence of actual smoothing on credit cards – the monthly increase in balances across all cards is equal to about 10% of the drop in spending and spending on Chase credit cards falls at onset. See Appendix A.2.1 for additional credit outcomes.\footnote{Herkenhoff et al. (2015) document that families in MSAs with high housing prices instrumented using land unavailability have more access to credit and longer nonemployment durations. This seems to conflict with our findings that average credit utilization is stable during an unemployment spell. One possible reconciliation is that there is some other feature of these MSAs such as higher wages or different skill mix which can explain the differences in nonemployment durations. Another is that increased access to credit affects search behavior even though little of that credit is used in practice.}

\section*{1.3.2. Temporary Income Loss, Permanent Income Loss, or Work-Related Expenses?}

\subsection*{1.3.2.1. Spending Drops Most In States Where Income Drops Most}

States that pay higher UI benefits show smaller drops in spending at onset, consistent with an important role for temporary income losses. The top panel of Figure 1.5 plots the change
Table 1.5.: Income and Spending at Onset of Unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre: 3 Months Before First UI Check</th>
<th>Post: 1 Month Before First UI Check</th>
<th>% Change (2)/(1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Total Inflows</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Direct Deposit</td>
<td>2708</td>
<td>2205</td>
<td>-18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt: IRS, SS, DI, SSI</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Checks</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>1044</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissaving</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Total Outflows</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card: Work-Related</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>-9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card: Non-Work-Related</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>-5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Withdrawal</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>-8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Bills</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card Bills</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installment Debt</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Checks</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. Selected Categories Ranked By Size of Drop</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Student Loan Pay</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>-16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Away From Home</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>-11.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>-10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Medical Copay (Non-Rx)</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>-8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Flights, Hotels</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>-8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>-5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food At Home</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Auto Loan Pay</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecom</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Entertainment</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Credit Card Pay</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Mortgage Pay</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: n=208,162. The top two panels presents a decomposition of the change in inflows and outflows at onset. To make this decomposition less sensitive to outliers, we drop observations with inflows above the 95th percentile in the pre or post period for panel A and outflows above the 95th percentile for panel B. In panel C, we winsorize each continuous outcome variable at the 95th percentile.
in spending at onset against the change in income at onset for the sixteen largest states in the data, which have at least 3,000 UI recipients. There are many complex rules which affect UI benefit levels and we summarize them by measuring the drop in the sum of labor income plus UI benefits at onset. Our estimated income drop measure accords with outside measures of UI benefit levels; Louisiana, Florida and Arizona are among the five states in the US with the lowest maximum UI benefit levels and New Jersey and Washington are among the three states in the US with the highest maximum benefit levels. States with large income drops also have large spending drops. The slope of the best fit line is 0.23. If we predict out of sample what would the spending drop be in a state which had no income drop at all, we estimate a drop in spending of $75. In other words, of the $160 drop in spending at onset, this exercise implies that the majority of the drop in spending is attributable to a temporary income drop rather than lost permanent income or a drop in work-related expenses.

1.3.2.2. Family Income Recovers Quickly

The bottom panel of Figure 1.5 shows that family labor income recovers to about 90% of its pre-spell level within 24 months and continues to trend upwards, suggesting that unemployment for this sample may not reflect a large shock to permanent income.30 This finding may be surprising to readers familiar with Jacobson et al. (1993b), where mass layoffs of high-tenure workers cause long-term earnings losses of 30%.31 Intuitively, high-tenure workers who separate in a mass layoff are the most likely of any worker to be adversely affected by a separation. Our paper, in contrast, focuses on typical UI recipients, who may not have been part of a mass layoff and may not have had high tenure at their firm. We have compared the path of earnings around UI receipt in the data to a sample in the SIPP,

30To be precise, income recovers in 24 months to 90% of the value of a control group. In the raw data, incomes for both UI recipients and the control group are trending up.
31Similar results are present in Couch and Placzek (2010), Wachter et al. (2009), Davis and von Wachter (2011), and Jarosch (2015).
Note: The top panel plots the change in income and the change in spending at onset for the sixteen largest states in the JPMCI sample. States where families have a bigger drop in income at onset also have a bigger drop in spending at onset. The bottom panel plots the change in labor income and government transfers (UI, SSA, DI and tax refunds) for all UI recipients, relative to the first month in which they received a UI check. Transfers fall and labor income rises each month as people find employment. These estimates are relative to a control group described in Section 1.2.5.
which also shows a similarly rapid recovery in family earnings.\textsuperscript{32} Consistent with the view that the high-tenure mass-allow selection criteria induce larger earnings losses, we find using the SIPP that earnings losses are larger for high tenure workers and involuntary separations than for all UI spells.

Other government transfers provide additional insurance and, together with the recovery in labor income, family-level insurance is nearly complete. Average monthly government transfers – which include Social Security for the elderly, Disability Insurance, and tax refunds – rise from $196 per month prior to UI receipt to $345 per month two years after UI receipt. This increase is concentrated in payments to workers age 59 or older from the Social Security Administration, so we believe that this is driven by people retiring. By month 24, labor income plus government benefits are equal to 95\% of their pre-onset level and are trending upwards.

1.3.2.3. Work-Related Expenses Explain 26-37\% of Total Drop At Onset

A person without a job may use her time and money differently, even without any change in family income. A series of papers by Aguiar and Hurst (2005, 2013) has argued that the drop in expenditure at retirement reflects a shift to home production, rather than a failure of consumption smoothing. Non-employment may enable someone to avoid work-related expenses (e.g. fuel to drive to work) and offers an increase in leisure time, with

\textsuperscript{32}Appendix Figure 1.4 compares the monthly path of earnings in the JPMCI data and in the 2004 SIPP. We use the 2004 SIPP rather than the 2008 SIPP because long follow-up horizons in the 2008 SIPP are available only for people who separated at the start of the Great Recession and therefore faced unusually bad job opportunities. This is consistent with findings in Jacobson et al. (1993a) that income for UI recipients recovers after six years to its level immediately prior to separation. Another strand of the literature focuses on displaced workers in surveys such as the PSID and the Current Population Survey (CPS), and does find evidence of persistent earnings losses (Stephens (2001), Farber (2015)). Understanding why the SIPP and administrative records deliver different results from the PSID and CPS is a valuable area for future work. See Appendix A.2.3 for additional discussion.
possible substitution to home production (e.g. cooking at home instead of eating out) and increased time spent shopping for low prices (Aguiar and Hurst (2007)). To assess the empirical relevance of these arguments for unemployment, we first categorize expenditures by whether they decline at retirement and then examine the drop in spending for these retirement-sensitive categories at the onset of unemployment.

We use changes in spending at retirement to identify which expenditure categories are sensitive to labor force status. We identify retirement transitions using people ages 62 to 70 who started receiving Social Security, and had liquid assets above $100,000, suggesting that they should be relatively able to smooth their consumption at retirement. The top panel of Figure 1.6 plots the change in expenditure for 16 merchant categories at retirement and unemployment. The darkness of a each bar is proportional to dollar spending on the category. Some of the merchant categories which drop the most during unemployment are Auto, Food Away From Home, Flights/Hotels, and Department Stores. This aligns well with Aguiar and Hurst (2013)'s findings that Food Away From Home, Transportation, and Clothing decline in the cross-section with age in the CEX. We estimate that work-related expenditures account for 41% of our spending measure.\(^{33}\)

The spending drop at the onset of unemployment is concentrated in work-related expenses, consistent with the predictions of Aguiar and Hurst (2013). The bottom panel of Figure 1.6 plots the three components of our headline spending measure – work-related expenses on debit or credit cards, other spending on debit and credit cards, and cash withdrawals and bills. While other categories fall by about 5%, work-related expenses fall by 9%.

We estimate that the excess drop in work-related expenses can account for 26-37% of the

33 Work-related card expenditures are 29% of total spending on nondurable goods and services. If we assume that cash withdrawals are allocated proportionally to the same categories as card expenditures, then work-related expenditures are 41% of total spending. For comparison, Aguiar and Hurst (2013) estimate that work-related expenses are 31% of nondurable expenditures.
Note: The top panel compares the change in spending at retirement to the change in spending at the onset of unemployment for debit and credit card expenditures in 16 different merchant groups. Darker bars indicate larger spending categories. We classify expenditure groups with drops greater than 6% at retirement (to the left of the vertical line) as “work related.” The bottom panel re-constructs the composite spending series while unemployed from Figure 4 separately for card work-related expenditures (29% of pre-onset spending), card non-work-related expenditures (33%) and cash withdrawals and bills (38%). In Section 1.3.2.3, we estimate that 22-31% of the drop in spending at onset is attributable to the excess drop in work-related expenditures. These estimates are relative to a control group described in Section 1.2.5.
total drop in spending at onset, by comparing the actual drop in work-related expenses to two counterfactuals with no change in labor force status. The causal impact of interest is how spending would have changed if someone switched from working to not working and began receiving a monthly government income payment of equal value. One way to calculate this is to take the actual drop in work-related spending at onset and subtract a counterfactual for how much work expenditures would have changed given a $500 change in income and no change in work status. One counterfactual comes from using the drop in non-work-related expenses at onset, which implies a $43 fixed cost of working. Another counterfactual comes from multiplying the marginal propensity to consume out of work-related expenses at benefit exhaustion (8 cents for each dollar of lost income) by the drop in income at onset, which implies a $59 fixed cost of working.

1.4. Spending Remains Depressed After Re-employment

In this section, we study the path of spending for workers who find jobs prior to exhausting UI benefits. As already shown in Figure 1.3, spending recovers slowly upon re-employment. This slow recovery is consistent with a model where agents who have depleted their buffer stock during unemployment rebuild it after they find a job. First, in Section 1.4.1 we show that this slow recovery after re-employment led to an upward bias in prior estimates of the spending drop during unemployment. We also discuss how our findings might be used by economists studying optimal UI formulas and models of the business cycle. Second, in Section 1.4.2, we show that the slow recovery in spending is concentrated among families

\[^{34}\text{Baker and Yannelis (2015) estimate the role of work-related expenses using federal government furloughs. They find an estimate larger than ours, but with a confidence interval which contains our point estimate.}\]
who had little assets at onset. This evidence is consistent with a central role for liquidity in explaining spending fluctuations during unemployment and in particular with models which predict that agents have a target ratio of wealth to income.

1.4.1. Prior Literature Overstated Spending Drop During Unemployment

A key challenge for prior studies of unemployment was the absence of reliable high-frequency expenditure data. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2015) (henceforth CRK) use annual spending data in the CEX to estimate the spending drop during unemployment. Without higher-frequency data on spending, analysts typically assumed that monthly spending took two values, $c^e$ when employed and $c^u$ when unemployed. For example, if someone was unemployed for 1 month and spent 3% less annually, the CRK-KLNS method would estimate a drop in spending of 36% during unemployment. Formally, with $\bar{c}^e$ as the pre-unemployment sample mean, and $c_{i,D}$ as the annual spending of someone unemployed for $D$ months, this methodology would estimate the average drop during unemployment as

$$\frac{c^u}{c^e} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i \in u} \sum_{D \in \{1...12\}} \frac{c_{i,D}/c^e}{D/12}$$ (1.4)

Families engage in substantial smoothing within the year of an unemployment spell and methodologies which neglect this overstate the drop in spending during unemployment. The top panel of Figure 7 plots the average monthly spending of a family with a completed UI duration of three months. Average spending during unemployment was 6% lower than the pre-onset mean while receiving UI, and 2.5% lower than the pre-onset mean in the subsequent 9 months. The light blue arrows indicate the estimated spending drop using

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35Although the CEX has quarterly spending data, it only has employment information on an annual basis.
equation 1.4; an analyst using this equation would have estimated a drop in spending of 13% during unemployment. The bottom panel repeats the exercise separately for families of different UI durations and shows that the bias is substantial at short durations. Table 1.6 reports the drop in spending at onset for various categories as well as the drop estimated from implementing equation 1.4. The drop at onset is 6% for all nondurables and 6% for food. Applying equation 1.4 in the data, we estimate drops of 20% and 9% respectively.

Suitably adjusted, our estimates are broadly in line with prior work using survey data. CRK estimate that spending on nondurables drops by 13% in the CEX and spending on food in the PSID drops by 8%. Replicating their methodology in the data yields a 16% drop in nondurables and a 10% drop in food expenditures. Browning and Crossley (2001) study a survey which asked UI recipients after six months how much their monthly expenditure had fallen since the time of their job separation. The mean drop in spending was 14%, which is a bit larger than our estimate of a 10% drop from onset to six months later.

There are two distinct research literatures which are interested in the drop in spending during unemployment – economists evaluating optimal UI using the Baily (1978)-Chetty (2006) formula and economists building models of the business cycle. Substituting our estimates of the spending drop during unemployment for CRK’s and subtracting the fixed cost of work shrinks the estimated gap in marginal utilities between the employed and unemployed states, lowering the apparent benefits of UI. However, a dynamic model which incorporated decreased spending after re-employment would offset this to some extent. We

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36 Table 2 in their paper reports a drop in nondurables spending in the CEX of 23% and of food spending in the PSID of 14% for a family transitioning from all its adult members being employed to all its members being unemployed. Separated workers are responsible on average for 57% of family earnings (Table 1.1), so we adjust the CRK estimate to 13% for nondurables and 8% for food respectively. Finally, because CRK are interested in the average spending of an unemployed family relative to an employed family, we weight each family’s estimated spending drop using equation 1.4 by its duration of UI receipt.

37 However, this method of estimating spending drops may be biased upward due to telescoping, where respondents accidentally include expenditures prior to the sample reference period, as discussed in Browning et al. (2014).
Table 1.6.: Spending Drop Compared to Prior Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Onset Mean</th>
<th>Onset(^a) (t=-1)</th>
<th>While Receiving UI(^b) (t=-1,0,...,10)</th>
<th>Annual(^c) (t=-1,0,...,10)</th>
<th>CRK Replication(^d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Total Nondurables (i + ii + iii)</td>
<td>2683</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
<td>-7.4%</td>
<td>-7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Work-Related</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>-8.7%</td>
<td>-10.3%</td>
<td>-8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Non-Work-Related</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>-5.3%</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Cash and Bills</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td>-4.8%</td>
<td>-7.7%</td>
<td>-7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Food(^e)</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>-6.3%</td>
<td>-5.3%</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table computes the spending drop for various time horizons and various spending concepts. Our preferred estimate for calibrating the Baily-Chetty formula is 7.4% (row a, column 3). In each column, we compute Loss/Spend-3. Time subscripts are relative to the first month of UI receipt and T is the last month of UI receipt.

a. Loss = Spend\(_1\) - Spend\(_3\).
b. Loss = Mean(Spend\(_1\),Spend\(_0\),...Spend\(_T\)) - Spend\(_3\).
c. Loss = Mean(Spend\(_1\),Spend\(_0\),...Spend\(_{10}\)) - Spend\(_3\).
d. Loss = (Mean(Spend\(_1\),Spend\(_0\),...Spend\(_{10}\)) - Spend\(_3\))/(T/12). This is the calculation done by Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2015) and is described in detail in Section 4.
e. Gruber (1997) estimates an annual drop in food spending of 5.9%. Our comparable estimate is 4.0%.
Figure 1.7.: Spending Drop During Unemployment: Comparison to Prior Work

Note: The top panel plots the path of spending for families that received UI for exactly three months with navy blue circles. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2015) (CRK) analyze annual spending data and assume spending drops only during unemployment. The light blue arrows depict their calculation methodology applied to the data. This overstates the true drop in spending because families engage in smoothing from month to month. The bottom panel shows: (1) the annual drop in spending in the 12 months following onset in orange (2) the calculated drop in spending during unemployment using the CRK methodology in blue and (3) the monthly drop in spending at onset in green.
leave a formal reevaluation of the Baily-Chetty formula to future work. Separately, for business cycle modelers who are interested in how unemployment affects output through product demand, the relevant statistic is probably the annual spending decrease associated with an unemployment spell, rather than the drop in spending during unemployment (CRK, Kaplan and Menzio (2015)).

1.4.2. Low-Asset Families Have a Slower Spending Recovery

A broad class of consumption models predict that agents will have a “target ratio” of wealth to permanent income, but this prediction is not a feature of the permanent income model or the hand-to-mouth model. By target ratio, we mean that when wealth is below this level, agents will consume less until their wealth returns to this level. Examples of models with this property include Carroll (1997), Laibson et al. (2015), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), and Kaplan and Violante (2014). In a permanent income model, in contrast, agents consume the annuity value of their wealth each period and so their consumption is insensitive to small wealth fluctuations. In a hand-to-mouth model, by definition, consumption is insensitive to wealth.

For an income shock of a fixed size, families with little initial assets need to draw down a larger share of their assets in order to achieve the same amount of consumption smoothing. Then, having drawn down assets to weather the income shock, models with a target ratio, and sufficient curvature of utility around that target ratio, predict that spending will remain depressed longer for families with little initial assets. We test this prediction by studying high-, medium- and low-asset families that receive UI for exactly three months.\footnote{We stratify families using JPMorgan Chase’s internal estimate of a family’s total liquid assets – across all financial institutions. These estimates are based on a wide variety of data sources which update at different frequencies and are suitable for examining heterogeneity in long-run asset holdings, but not for understanding}
The low-asset group uses up a larger share of its assets and recovers spending more slowly, which is consistent with target ratio behavior. On the basis of the gap between the drop in spending and the drop in income, we estimate that high-asset families use up 0.46 months of assets (which is 15% of the median total liquid assets within this group), while low-asset families use up 0.27 months of assets (which is 97% of the median total liquid assets within this group). The bottom panel of Figure 1.8 shows spending recovers quickly for the high-asset group and more slowly for the low-asset group. Quantitatively, after re-employment, high-asset families cut spending enough to rebuild 0.11 months of lost income, while low-asset families cut spending enough to rebuild 0.43 months of lost income. Understanding the source of heterogeneity in asset holdings would be useful to interpret our findings in this section further. Low-asset groups could have lower optimal target ratios because of different time preferences or different income risk profiles or they could simply have experienced a series of negative income shocks.

### 1.5. UI Benefit Exhaustion

UI benefit exhaustion provides an informative test of theories of consumption behavior because exhaustion causes no change to opportunities for home production and no change to labor market productivity. The change in income at benefit exhaustion is large, with month-to-month changes in total liquid assets. Formally, UI recipients are required to search for jobs and so UI recipients might have more time for home production after benefit exhaustion. However, our understanding is that these search requirements are rarely
Figure 1.8.: Event Study For 3-Month Completed UI Spells: Heterogeneity By Assets

Note: The top panel plots the path of income for families with completed UI spells of three months, stratified by asset terciles. The vertical dashed gray line indicates the last month in which UI benefits were received. Families in these three groups with completed UI spells of three months have relatively similar paths of income. The bottom panel plots the path of spending by asset group. Families with little assets at onset have a much slower recovery in spending. These estimates are relative to a control group described in Section 1.2.5.
$1,350 of lost benefits, and is predictable. With a monthly job-finding rate of 25%, the probability of exhaustion is 75% one month before, 56% two months before, and so on.\footnote{To study the experience of typical UI recipients, our analysis studies people who exhausted benefits in February 2014 or later. These people were eligible for at most 26 weeks of benefits. Some states had lower potential benefit durations: Kansas (20 weeks), Michigan (20 weeks), Florida (16 weeks) and Georgia (18 weeks).} What should happen to spending at exhaustion? A liquidity-constrained consumer with no assets at the onset of unemployment may cut spending gradually, but will have no excess drop in the month in which she exhausts benefits (Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010), Section 3.2). We formalize this prediction in the model.

In practice, we find that spending drops sharply by $259 in the month benefits are exhausted. Spending drops when benefits are exhausted, so it drops sooner in Florida, which offers at most 16 weeks of benefits, than it does in most states, where benefits last for 26 weeks. Spending drops across a wide variety of categories, including food at home, retail purchases, entertainment and medical copays. To the extent that families are able to smooth this income shock, they do so by drawing down their liquid assets. Such a discontinuous drop is quite surprising and we explore possible explanations in the model section.

1.5.1. Income Drops Sharply at Exhaustion

The exhaustion of UI benefits causes a substantial negative loss in monthly family income, as shown in the top panel of Figure 1.9.\footnote{We define exhaustees as families who received UI benefits equal to the maximum number of allowed weeks in each state, with a window of two weeks to allow for administrative noise. Some UI recipients (perhaps 20%) with limited earnings histories are eligible for less than the maximum duration of benefits and we are unable to identify these exhaustees. To adjust for differences in benefit duration across states, we organize our plots in this section around the month in which the last UI check was received for benefit exhaustees. Appendix Figure 1.6 shows an event study of UI benefits for exhaustees for the six largest states in the JPMCI sample – the shorter duration of UI benefits for Florida and Michigan is clearly evident.} Lost UI benefits were about $1,350 per month, or
37% of median income prior to onset. Labor income rises by about $400 and other income rises by $50 per month, so the drop in monthly family income is about $900. Labor income rises at exhaustion for three reasons: (1) some UI recipients would have found jobs even if benefits continued, (2) other family members may increase their labor supply (Cullen and Gruber (2000), Stephens (2002), Rothstein and Valetta (2014), Blundell et al. (2015)), and (3) search effort and job-finding rates are higher at benefit exhaustion (Katz and Meyer (1990), Schmieder et al. (2012), Card et al. (2007), Krueger and Mueller (2010), DellaVigna et al. (2014)).

1.5.2. Spending Drops Sharply At Exhaustion

Spending drops by $22 per month in the months leading up to exhaustion and by $259 (11%) in the month after benefits are exhausted, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.9.\textsuperscript{42} The estimating equation for exhaustion is the same as the equation for onset: \( c_{it} = \alpha + \beta \text{Post}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \). The orthogonality restriction for this regression is \( E(\varepsilon_{it} | \text{Post}_{it}) = 0 \), which means that the timing of exhaustion is not correlated with something that might affect spending directly. Because the start dates of UI spells are highly idiosyncratic, exhaustion dates are also idiosyncratic and so this orthogonality restriction seems plausible. Note this restriction does not rule out extra job search at exhaustion or that exhaustion causes families to make new plans for their spending; this is part of the causal impact of exhaustion. In the rest of our analysis, to deal with time aggregation, we define the drop at exhaustion as the change in spending over a two-month window so that we can study all exhaustees.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42}Table 1.4 reports the percent change at exhaustion relative to the pre-onset mean, which is 10%. Here, we report the drop as a percent of the spending level prior to exhaustion, which is 11%.

\textsuperscript{43}One important technical wrinkle for estimating the spending drop at benefit exhaustion comes from time aggregation – we have monthly income and spending data, but benefits are paid on a weekly or biweekly basis. In our plots in Figure 1.9, we limited the sample to exhaustees who received their last UI check on the 25th of the month or later. These families have a sharp drop in UI income from one month to the next and also a sharp drop in spending. However, the monthly structure of the data means that UI benefits appear to phase out over two months for most families. Appendix Figure 1.7 shows that the magnitude of
Figure 1.9.: UI Benefit Exhaustion

Notes: The top panel plots UI benefits and labor income relative to benefit exhaustion. The bottom panel plots the change in income (labor income plus government transfers) and spending around benefit exhaustion. These estimates are relative to a control group described in Section 1.2.5.
The best evidence that the drop in spending at benefit exhaustion is caused directly by benefit exhaustion comes from differences across states. Appendix Figure 1.6 shows the path of spending over time for UI exhaustees for the six largest states in the data. Florida and Michigan offer maximum durations of UI benefits less than 26 weeks. Spending declines at the same time benefits are exhausted in these states, which is well before the time when spending declines in states that offer the traditional 26 weeks of benefits.

1.5.3. Decomposition – What Kinds of Spending Drop?

The drop in spending at benefit exhaustion appears to reflect a change in a family’s actual consumption bundle from the prior month, rather than simply a delay in purchases of durable goods or a decrease in payments on outstanding debts. The top half of Table 1.7 decomposes the drop in outflows into nine different categories. In a reversal of the patterns we documented at onset, non-work-related expenses on cards fall more than work-related expenses. The categories which drop most are food at home, retail purchases and the presence of any medical copay, as shown in Table 1.7. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) compare the diets of employed and unemployed people, controlling for a wide variety of observables, and report a similarly-sized gap in spending on food at home between the employed and unemployed (9-15%) to the drop we see at exhaustion. They estimate that unemployment causes a five percentage point increase in any hot dog consumption and a nine percentage point decrease in any fresh fruit consumption, suggesting that there is a substantial change in diet quality at exhaustion. In addition, the share of families with any entertainment expenditures, which was stable at onset, drops by about 10% at exhaustion.

At exhaustion, families appear to prioritize their most important financial commitments, the two-month spending drop for all UI exhaustees is very similar to the magnitude of the one-month drop for exhaustees who get their last check at the end of the month.
which show relatively small drops in spending. Table 1.7 shows that the drop in spending is smallest for utility payments, auto loans and mortgage payments. Delinquency measured in credit bureau records and credit scores are all relatively stable (Appendix Table 1.2). There is little evidence to suggest that benefit exhaustion does immediate damage to a family’s long-term financial health. The data are consistent with prior work on consumption commitments by Chetty and Szeidl (2007), where families cut spending on some flexible expenditure categories sharply to protect their long-run commitments.

To the extent agents smooth their spending at exhaustion, they do so by drawing down liquid assets. Dissaving inflows spike, as do paper checks, as shown in Table 1.7. Agents also draw down their checking account balance, as shown in Table 1.4. Again, we find only a modest increase in credit card borrowing; spending on Chase credit cards does not increase, and balances rise because families make smaller payments on their outstanding credit card debt.

1.6. Performance of Benchmark Consumption Models

In this section, we compare the actual path of spending during unemployment to benchmark models of consumption. First, in Section 1.6.1 we show that unemployment is a good way to test alternative consumption models, since unemployment is a large shock to income, implying that hand-to-mouth behavior cannot be consistent with near-rationality. Then, we describe the setup of our model in Section 1.6.2. To capture “buffer stock” consumers in the tradition of Deaton (1991), and Aiyagari (1994), we do not allow agents to borrow at all in our baseline parametrization. As an alternative scenario, to capture “permanent income” consumers in the spirit of Friedman (1957), Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), and

44The decline in the presence of medical copayments, however, could imply that families are delaying important health expenditures.
Table 1.7.: Income and Spending for Families Who Exhaust UI Benefits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre Onset</th>
<th>Pre Exhaustion</th>
<th>Post Exhaustion</th>
<th>% Change (3)/(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Total Inflows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Direct Deposit</td>
<td>4035</td>
<td>3631</td>
<td>3129</td>
<td>-13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt: IRS, SS, DI, SSI</td>
<td>2512</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>1087</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Checks</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1651</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>-82.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>930</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissaving</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Total Outflows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card: Work-Related</td>
<td>4033</td>
<td>3734</td>
<td>3401</td>
<td>-8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card: Non-Work-Related</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>-9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Withdrawal</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>-12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Bills</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>-16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card Bills</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>-7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installment Debt</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>-3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Checks</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>-4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Selected Categories Ranked By Size of Drop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food At Home</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>-12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>-12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Medical Copay (Non-Rx)</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>-11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Away From Home</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>-9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Entertainment</td>
<td>0.413</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>-8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Student Loan Pay</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>-9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Flights/Hotels</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>-7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecom</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>-7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Auto Loan Pay</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>-5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Mortgage Pay</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Credit Card Pay</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: n=32,753 families who exhausted UI benefits and had potential benefit duration of 26 weeks or fewer. Pre Onset is three months prior to first UI payment, Pre Exhaustion is the month before UI Exhaustion and Post Exhaustion is the month after UI exhaustion. The top two panels present a decomposition of the change in inflows and outflows at onset. To make this decomposition less sensitive to outliers, we drop observations with inflows above the 95th percentile in the pre or post period for panel A and outflows above the 95th percentile for panel B. In panel C, we winsorize each continuous outcome variable at the 95th percentile.
Hall (1978), we allow agents to borrow against their future income at interest rate $R$. The drop in spending from onset through exhaustion in the data matches the buffer stock model, assuming that agents start their unemployment spell with liquid assets equal to one month of income. Next, in Section 1.6.3, we show that the buffer stock model does a better job of fitting the data than either a permanent income model, or a hand-to-mouth model. Finally, in Section 1.6.4, we explore two major shortcomings of the buffer stock model relative to the data – it predicts substantially more asset holdings at onset and it predicts a much smoother path of spending around benefit exhaustion.

1.6.1. Why Unemployment is a Good Test of Alternative Consumption Models

Unemployment is a powerful setting for testing alternative consumption models, since it causes a large shock to income, implying that myopic behavior is not approximately rational using a welfare metric. A large literature uses the spending response to temporary income shocks such as tax rebates to test between models with and without liquidity constraints. Most papers in this literature consistently find a higher marginal propensity to consume (MPC) than would be predicted for a permanent income consumer without liquidity constraints. Many authors interpret these high MPCs as evidence in favor of buffer stock models. However, an alternative interpretation is that agents’ choices are consistent with near-rationality (Cochrane (1989)). Proponents of this view argue that the welfare costs of failing to smooth income shocks of the magnitude observed in the literature are quite small.

45In the “permanent income” models cited above, because agents can borrow against their future income, spending is insensitive to temporary income fluctuations. Not all models which allow agents to borrow against their future income have a low sensitivity of spending to current income (see Carroll (1997) for a counterexample), but our model does have this feature.

46Papers which use near-rationality to explain consumption fluctuations include Kueng (2015), Reis (2006) and Caballero (1995).
and that such small deviations from optimality are not sufficiently compelling evidence to reject the permanent income model.

Fuchs-Schuendeln and Hassan (2015) develop a framework to evaluate the near-rationality claim. For a given temporary income change, they calculate the welfare cost of behaving like a hand-to-mouth consumer and failing to adjust spending in order to perfectly smooth the shock. Specifically, consider an agent with regular monthly income $y$ who receives a one-time tax rebate of $x$. They calculate a measure of equivalent variation as the additional monthly income $v$ that a consumer would require to be indifferent between consuming all of the tax rebate $x$ in one month plus $v$ in every month over the year, and smoothing the tax rebate over one year. In other words, they find the $v$ which solves

$$
\underbrace{u(y + x + v) + 11 \cdot u(y + v) = 12 \cdot u(y + \frac{x}{12})}_{\text{MPC}=1},
$$

for CRRA utility with $\gamma = 2$, and they define $EV = \frac{v}{y}$. They perform this calculation for the income changes examined in 18 recent empirical papers in this literature. Their findings are shown in the green bars in Figure 10. They find that acting like a hand-to-mouth consumer who fails to smooth spending has a welfare loss smaller than losing 1% of monthly consumption over a year in most cases, and no more than 5% in any case. We perform the same calculation for the income loss associated with an unemployment spell which lasts at least six months, and show this as the orange bar in Figure 10. The welfare cost of failing to smooth the income loss associated with a UI spell terminating in exhaustion, and instead acting like a hand-to-mouth consumer, is equivalent to 20% of annual consumption.\footnote{Formally, we calculate this as the scalar $v$ in monthly consumption which solves $\sum_j w_j \sum_{t=1}^{15} \beta^t u(c_{t,j}^{PIH}) = \sum_j w_j \sum_{t=1}^{15} \beta^t u(c_{t,j}^{H2M} + v)$ where $j$ indexes different employment histories after benefit exhaustion and $w_j$ is the probability of each employment history.}

The large income change associated with unemployment also enables us to test theories of
Figure 1.10.: Welfare Losses By Model

\[ u( c_{\text{permanent-income-consumer}} ) - u( c_{\text{hand-to-mouth}} ) \]

CRRA Utility, gamma = 2, Source: Fuchs–Schundeln and Hassan 2015

Note: The green bars in the top panel show the welfare loss of failing to smooth consumption out of a temporary income change in 18 studies. Fuchs-Schundeln and Hassan (2015) calculate this as \( z \) that solves
\[ 12u(y + \frac{z}{12}) = 11u(y + z) + u(y + x + z). \]
The orange bar is our calculation of a comparable statistic for the income change associated with an unemployment spell of at least six months. The bottom panel shows the welfare gain or loss associated with consumption paths predicted by the hand-to-mouth, permanent-income-hypothesis, and buffer stock models relative to the spending path observed in the data.
excess sensitivity motivated by transaction costs. Kaplan and Violante (2014) build a model with a transaction cost of accessing an illiquid asset which offers higher returns than liquid asset holding. A key prediction of their model is that the excess sensitivity of spending to tax rebates is falling in rebate size: agents immediately consume 15% of a $500 rebate, but only immediately consume 3% of a $5,000 rebate, as shown in Kaplan and Violante’s Figure 8. The average UI spell entails an average loss of $8,500 of income. Because the size of the income loss is uncertain, the motive to liquidate at UI onset is even stronger than when the rebate size is known with certainty. As a result, the logic of the model suggests that Kaplan and Violante (2014) predict a withdrawal from the illiquid asset at the start of an unemployment spell, followed by relatively stable consumption during unemployment. However, we have not explicitly modeled the dynamics of when the agent would choose to pay the liquidation cost and this is a fruitful area for further research.

1.6.2. Model Setup

We calibrate a finite-horizon buffer stock model of consumption and savings. Agents have Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility, and choose their level of consumption each month, $c_t$, to maximize their expected discounted flow of lifetime utility. Agents earn a monthly return of $R$ on their beginning of month assets $a_t$. Income $z_t$ is risky because of unemployment; this risk is partially insured by unemployment benefits, which expire after six months. Employment follows a Markov process where agents transition between employment and unemployment. The agent’s problem in month $t$ can be written as
\[
\max_{\{c_t\}} \mathbb{E} \sum_{n=0}^{T-t} \beta^n u(c_{t+n})
\]
subject to \(c_t + a_{t+1} = Ra_t + z_t\)
\[c_t \geq 0\]
\[a_{t+1} \geq -b_t\]
\[Ra_T + z_T - c_T \geq 0\]

where \(\beta\) is the monthly discount factor, \(u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}\), \(z_t\) evolves according to transition matrix \(\Pi\), \(T\) is the number of months in the agent’s life, and \(b_t\) is the borrowing limit. The last inequality is a budget balance condition at the end of life.

To capture two different benchmark models of consumption, we consider two different asset constraints. First, to capture buffer stock consumers, we consider a case where agents cannot borrow \((b_t = 0 \ \forall t)\). Second, to capture permanent income consumers we allow agents to borrow against their future income at interest rate \(R\). A “natural borrowing constraint” (Aiyagari (1994)) arises because the agent must pay all her debts before death and have positive consumption in every period. Therefore, in any period the natural borrowing constraint is the present discounted value of the minimum possible future income flows, which are bounded below by the income value for an agent who has exhausted UI benefits.\(^{48}\)

Given an environment \(\{R, z, \Pi, b\}\) and preferences \(\{\beta, \gamma\}\), there is an optimal consumption path \(c^*_t(a, z)\) which satisfies

\[u'(c_t) = \max\{\beta R \mathbb{E}_t[u'(c_{t+1})], u'(Ra_t + z_t + b_t)\}\]

\(^{48}\)Formally, we set \(b_t = \sum_{s=0}^{T-t-1} \frac{z_{\min}}{R^s} (\frac{1}{R})^s\) where \(z_{\min}\) equals the income for an agent who has exhausted UI benefits.
We calibrate the model using the JPMCI data and the standard preference parameters summarized in Table 1.8.

- **Income** – We normalize income to 1.0 in the employed state. To match the data, we set income to 0.84 while receiving UI benefits and 0.53 after UI benefit exhaustion. Income does not fall to zero after exhaustion because our income concept includes labor income from all family members, non-labor income, and government transfers.

- **Transition Rates** – The transition rate from unemployment to employment is 25%, which matches the UI exit rate in the data. We do not observe job-finding after benefit exhaustion; we assume that it is 25% in all months except the month benefits are exhausted, when we set the job-finding rate to 30% to match evidence from Card et al. (2007). In a robustness check, we consider an alternative specification where the job-finding rate is permanently lower after exhaustion. We choose a separation rate to UI of 3.25% in order to match the 11.5% of families with an unemployed member during 2013 and 2014 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014).

- **Preferences and Environment** – For the preference parameters $\beta$ and $\gamma$ we choose standard values of 0.996 (translating to an annual discount rate of 5%) , and 2.0. We choose a monthly real interest rate of 0.25%, which translates to an annual interest rate of 3%. We consider a time horizon of 240 months, corresponding to a middle-aged worker with 20 years left in her career.

Given these parameter values, we solve the consumer’s problem numerically using the method of endogenous gridpoints suggested in Carroll (2006). This method returns optimal consumption $c_t^*(a_t, e_t)$ as a function of the agent’s beginning of month assets and their employment.
Table 1.8.: Model Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income $z_t$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemp $\leq$ 7 months</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemp $&gt; 7$ months</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transition Matrix $\Pi$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$u$</th>
<th>$e$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$e_i$</td>
<td>0.0325</td>
<td>0.9675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_{i, t \neq 7}$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u_{i, t=7}$</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Preferences & Environment

| | 
|---|---|
| N Months of Life | 240 |
| Monthly Discount Factor $\beta$ | 0.996 |
| Risk Aversion $\gamma$ | 2 |
| Monthly Interest Rate $R$ | 1.0025 |

Notes:

*Income*: $z$ includes UI benefits, labor income from other family members, and non-labor income. Levels calibrated to match JPMCI data.

*Transition Matrix*: Matches the transition rates in JPMCI data during employment and first six months of unemployment. Surge in job-finding at exhaustion matches Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007). Although UI benefits last six months, but because labor income declines prior to onset, as shown in Figure 1.2, we assume a seven-month duration.
status $e_t = \{E, U1, U2, U3, U4, U5, U6, U7, U8\}$, where $U8$ represents benefit exhaustion.\footnote{The combination of asset level and employment status determines beginning-of-period cash on hand $m_t = Ra_t + z_t(e)$, which is formally how the model is solved. In Section 1.3.1, we documented that the decline in family income occurs one month before UI receipt begins because of a time lag between job separation and the beginning of UI receipt. To match this feature of the data in the model, we assume that UI benefits actually last 7 months rather than six months.}

### 1.6.2.1. An Over-identification Test Using Liquid Asset Holdings

We choose the asset holdings at onset which best match the spending drop for an agent who cannot borrow and this comes very close to matching the actual liquid asset holdings in the data. An agent who becomes unemployed after $t = 0$ with assets $a_0$ and stays unemployed through benefit exhaustion sees a consumption drop of $\Delta c_{\text{model}}(a_0) \equiv c^s_{\text{post-exhaust}}(a^*_t(U8))/c^0_t(a_0, E)$. We choose $a^{\text{best-fit}}_0$ such that

$$\Delta c_{\text{model}}(a^{\text{best-fit}}_0) = c_{\text{data}}^\text{post-exhaust}/c_{\text{data}}^\text{pre-onset}.$$

Because our model has exactly one free parameter ($a^{\text{best-fit}}_0$) and we match one sample moment ($c_{\text{data}}^\text{post-exhaust}/c_{\text{data}}^\text{pre-onset}$), the model is exactly identified and we estimate assets at onset equal to 0.84 months of income. We do not observe total liquid asset holdings in the JPMCI data, so we estimate them using an adjustment factor from the SCF. Specifically, we estimate

$$a^{\text{data}}_0 = \frac{\text{(Total liquid assets)}_{\text{SCF}}}{\text{(Checking account balance)}_{\text{SCF}}} \cdot \frac{\text{(Checking account balance)}_{\text{Chase}}}{\text{(Pre unemployment monthly income)}_{\text{Chase}}} = 0.71,$$

This is very close to the 0.84 months which fits the spending drop from onset through exhaustion.\footnote{This is slightly smaller than the one month’s income worth of liquid asset holdings prior to unemployment estimated by Chetty (2008) in survey data.} There are many reasons that liquid assets held by agents at onset might not reflect the total amount of assets they might have available to help them smooth a large shock.
such as unemployment. For example, agents might receive transfers from their parents, or they might be able to sell consumer durables. Our results suggest that these channels are not quantitatively important channels for consumption smoothing.

1.6.3. Buffer Stock Fits the Data Better Than Alternative Models

We compare the path of consumption predicted by our buffer stock model to the path of spending observed in the data. To enable this comparison, we need to assume that the nondurables spending in the data is the same as consumption in the model.\(^{51}\) In our robustness checks, we examine total spending as well. The buffer stock model fits some aspects of the spending path during unemployment, as shown in the top panel of Figure 1.11. By construction, the buffer stock model matches the level of spending at onset and exhaustion. Not by construction, the buffer stock model matches the drop at the onset of unemployment. In the model, families cut spending additionally each month that they stay unemployed. This matches the data qualitatively – families in the data are cutting spending from months two through 5 – but not quantitatively, since the model predicts larger spending cuts while receiving UI and no excess drop in spending at benefit exhaustion. We focus on this failing of the model in Section 1.6.4.

Next, we show that the buffer stock model outperforms the permanent income benchmark and the hand-to-mouth benchmark using the Cochrane (1989)-Fuchs-Schundeln and Hassan

\(^{51}\)To ensure comparability between the model and the data, we make two adjustments to our prior data analysis. First, we analyze the subset of UI spells where potential benefit duration was 26 weeks at the start and end of UI receipt. Second, we adjust the spending series to reflect the spending of agents who remain unemployed after benefit exhaustion. In the data, we observe average spending in the month after benefit exhaustion for the unemployed and the re-employed together. We assume that spending is constant for the 30% of agents that are re-employed in the month of benefit exhaustion (as it is for agents who are re-employed after 3, 4, or 5 months of unemployment) and estimate the drop in spending for the unemployed alone as 1.43 times the drop for the pooled sample.
Figure 1.11.: Spending If Stay Unemployed – Models Vs. Data

Note: The top panel plots the path of spending predicted by the buffer-stock model against the path of spending observed in the data for families that exhaust UI benefits. The bottom panel plots the path of spending predicted by the buffer-stock, permanent income hypothesis (PIH), and hand-to-mouth (HTM) models described in the text.
(2015) welfare metric. As discussed above, we implement a permanent income benchmark by allowing the agent to borrow out of her future income. We also consider a hand-to-mouth agent who sets consumption equal to current income each period.\(^{52}\) We calculate \(v\), the increment to monthly spending needed to make the agent indifferent between her choices in the data and her predicted choices under the different benchmark models. This is given by a modified equation (1.5) where \(w_j\) reflects probabilities of different employment histories:

\[
\sum_j w_j \sum_{t=1}^{15} \beta^t u(c_{t,j}^{\text{model}}) = \sum_j w_j \sum_{t=1}^{15} u(c_{t,j}^{\text{data}} - v) \tag{1.6}
\]

We aggregate over all possible job-finding histories in the eight months after exhaustion.\(^{53}\) We find that the path of spending we observe in the data represents a 7% gain relative to the hand-to-mouth path, and a 13% loss relative to the smooth permanent income path, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.11. In contrast, the welfare loss of the deviations from the buffer-stock path shown in Figure 1.10 is about 1%. We interpret this as evidence in favor of the buffer-stock model with little assets at onset, relative to either of the alternatives considered here.

Two key lessons from the model are that we can fit the drop in spending from onset through exhaustion assuming families hold little liquid assets at onset, but that we cannot fit the monthly drop at exhaustion. These conclusions continue to hold under a number of alternative assumptions which we discuss in Appendix A.2.4 and show graphically in Appendix Figure 1.8.

\(^{52}\)This corresponds to a special case of the rule-of-thumb consumer in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), where \(c_t = \alpha z_t\), with \(\alpha = 1\). This model is commonly used in the public economics literature when studying unemployment. Examples include Mortensen (1977), Shimer and Werning (2007), Rothstein (2011), and Krueger and Mueller (2014).

\(^{53}\)For \(c_{t,j}^{\text{data}}\) we assume that the agent behaves optimally between exhaustion and re-employment according to the buffer-stock model given the assets they have left at this point, and then once re-employed, they adjust their spending such that they match the assets of buffer-stock agents by month 15.
Nevertheless, our conclusions are highly sensitive to assumptions about families’ assets prior to unemployment. In the bottom right panel of Appendix Figure 1.8 we show the model predictions assuming agents either have no assets, or have assets equal to one year’s worth of income. Agents with assets equal to one year’s worth of income smooth spending considerably throughout the spell, whereas agents with no assets cut their spending substantially more as the spell progresses.

1.6.4. Failings of the Buffer Stock Model

While the buffer-stock model does a reasonable job of matching the overall path of spending, it has two major failings relative to the data. First, it predicts substantially more asset holdings at onset. Second, it predicts that spending does not drop discontinuously at benefit exhaustion.

1.6.4.1. Failure 1: Agents Hold Too Little Liquid Assets at Onset

A key prediction of buffer stock models is that agents should accumulate precautionary savings to self-insure against income risk. In our model with only temporary income risk, we calculate that agents should hold liquid assets equal to about 2.4 months of income, which is three times the asset holdings which fit the spending drop from onset to exhaustion. Models with realistic income processes – including permanent income risk and retirement – predict much higher asset holdings. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate that an agent’s target buffer stock is about 12 months of assets early in life and rises to over 60 months as retirement approaches. Laibson et al. (2015) estimate a model where they match illiquid wealth holdings equal to 31 months of income.
Why might agents be holding so little liquid assets, even when this means that spending appears to be so sensitive to income? There are two broad classes of reasons why this might be the case. First, monthly spending on nondurable goods from bank accounts may not accurately capture fluctuations in consumption. Purely from a measurement perspective, this could arise if consumption rises through in-kind transfers or purchases made with cash not deposited in the bank account. Even if bank accounts accurately capture the goods a family purchases each month, even nondurables have a shelf life such that consumption flows are more stable than expenditures. Second, even if consumption does fluctuate from month to month, there are some preferences which can rationalize this behavior. With a low coefficient of risk aversion, a family could be very willing to substitute consumption across periods. A model with quasi-hyperbolic preferences such as Laibson (1997) predicts low liquid asset holdings from highly impatient consumers.

A related puzzle which merits further work is why agents do not seem to use the borrowing channels which are available to them. For example, we have documented almost no change in credit card borrowing during unemployment. The \textit{monthly} interest rate on credit cards is about 1\% in the UI recipient sample. And to the extent that agents can default on credit card debt if their income remains low as in Herkenhoff (2015), the argument for borrowing on credit cards while unemployed is even stronger.

1.6.4.2. Failure 2: Agents Cut Spending Too Slowly During UI Receipt and Too Much at Exhaustion

We have not been able to find a parametrization of our model in which agents have rational expectations which matches the very slow average monthly decline during UI receipt (0.6\% per month) and the 11\% drop in spending at benefit exhaustion. Two specific scenarios
shown in the top panels of Figure 12 help clarify why this pattern is difficult to model. First, we consider a scenario where agents have no assets two months prior to their unemployment spell. These agents cut spending rapidly at the start of an unemployment spell to the level of UI benefits. As the unemployment spell wears on, they cut spending further, below the level of UI benefits, in order to build a buffer which will help offset the income drop at benefit exhaustion. Second, we consider a scenario where agents have a 10% monthly discount rate (e.g. DellaVigna and Paserman (2005)). These agents draw down their assets at the start of an unemployment spell such that by month two, consumption is equal to the level of UI benefits. As exhaustion approaches, even these agents build a small buffer.

Benefit exhaustion does not appear to be associated with a permanent change in re-employment wages (von Wachter et al. (2015)) and this enables us to rule out certain theories about the drop at benefit exhaustion. First, if agents discretely received negative news about their productivity at benefit exhaustion, then we would expect re-employment wages to be permanently lower. Second, if agents were present-biased then they would face a liquidity shortfall in every month after benefit exhaustion and again we would expect permanently lower re-employment wages. If von Wachter et al. (2015)’s findings also hold in the US then our results are hard to reconcile with productivity updating or present-bias.

One simple deviation from rationality which can explain the drop at exhaustion is over-optimism about job-finding at the end of a UI spell combined with pessimism (or lack of effort) earlier on in the spell. Spinnewijn (2015) finds that on average unemployment spells last more than three times longer than workers expect at onset. Why might workers be over-optimistic and then cut their spending at exhaustion? One possibility is that if they searched little while receiving UI, they might have an inflated view of how easily they can get a job. When they raise their search effort at exhaustion and do not find a job, this leads them to update their beliefs about how quickly they can get a job. Another possibility is
Figure 1.12.: Matching Spending Drop at Exhaustion

Note: The top left panel plots the path of spending predicted by the buffer-stock model under different parameter assumptions: (1) the baseline set of assumptions, (2) an alternative where initial assets are set to zero, and (3) an alternative where initial assets are set to zero and the monthly discount factor is 0.9. The top right panel plots the path of assets under the same three sets of assumptions. The bottom left panel plots monthly job-finding expectations under the baseline assumptions (which match the data), and tweaked assumptions where agents believe their monthly job-finding probability is 10% in the first five months of unemployment, and jumps to 70% in the final month of benefits. The bottom right panel shows the path of spending in the data, the model under baseline job-finding beliefs, and the model under the tweaked job-finding beliefs plotted in the previous panel.
that they were expecting to be recalled to their previous job but this did not pan out (Katz and Meyer (1990)).

We find that we can match both the drop from onset to the last month of benefits and the drop at exhaustion if we assume that agents believe their job-finding rate is only 10% while receiving UI, but jumps dramatically to 70% in the last month of benefits. (Recall that in fact the job-finding rate is about 25% in most months of UI receipt and 30% in the month UI benefits are exhausted.) The path of consumption predicted by such a model is plotted by the yellow line in the bottom right panel of Figure 12. In this scenario, exhaustion without finding a job is much more unexpected than it is with accurate beliefs about job-finding probabilities. One month before exhaustion, families believe there is only a 30% chance of being unemployed at exhaustion. Two months before, the probability is 23%. Since the potential income drop associated with exhaustion is (erroneously) assumed to be a low-probability event, families rationally choose not to cut spending much in anticipation of this event.

Another possibility is that agents have correct beliefs about their job-finding probabilities, but are inattentive in their monthly consumption decisions. We showed in Section 1.6.3 that an agent whose optimal spending path followed a buffer stock model would incur little welfare loss from making the choices observed in the data. One example of a specific friction comes in a model developed by Reis (2006). In his model, agents rationally respond to the costs of processing information about their finances by infrequently updating their budgets, remaining inattentive between updating dates. Inattention among some agents during UI receipt, followed by attention from all agents at benefit exhaustion, might explain the patterns we see in the data. Estimating a model with inattention using these spending patterns is an interesting area for future research.
1.7. Conclusion

In this paper, using spending records from the JPMorgan Chase Institute, we built a dataset to study how unemployment affects spending. To summarize our results, we find that families do insufficient self-insurance, in the sense that spending is quite responsive to income. We document that unemployment causes a large but short-lived drop in income, generating a need for liquidity. Spending on nondurables falls by 6% at the onset of unemployment and work-related expenses explain about one-quarter of the drop in spending. People receiving UI keep their spending low after re-employment, perhaps in order to rebuild their financial buffer. For people who exhaust UI benefits, spending drops by an additional 11%.

We compare the path of spending in the data to three benchmark consumption models: buffer stock, permanent income and hand-to-mouth. Prior work on excess sensitivity of spending to income had been criticized on the grounds that the observed behavior was consistent with near-rationality; because unemployment is such a large shock to income, this criticism is less relevant for our work. The predictions of the buffer stock model are much closer to the data than the alternatives. However, there are two important failings of the buffer stock model: families in the data have less assets at onset than predicted by the model and spending drops much more in the data at exhaustion than predicted by the model.

We see at least three fruitful avenues for future work. First, we find that families act during unemployment as if they have little liquid assets and little access to credit. But we see in the data that these families have room to borrow on their credit cards and from surveys that these cash-poor families have substantial illiquid assets in housing and retirement accounts (Angeletos et al. (2001), Kaplan and Violante (2014)). Why do families not use these mechanisms to help smooth spending? And why do families not hold more of a liquid buffer stock against risks like unemployment and health shocks? Second, we documented a
sharp drop in spending at the exhaustion of UI benefits which is hard to fit into a model with forward-looking agents who have rational expectations about job finding. Future work should try to understand which theories of unemployment and/or consumption best explain this drop. Finally, we have focused in this paper entirely on a partial equilibrium model of unemployment and spending. Understanding the general equilibrium effects of spending by UI recipients is important for both models of optimal UI and models of the business cycle (Kekre (2015)).
2. The Incidence of Housing Voucher Generosity

2.1. Introduction

Who benefits from a change in housing voucher generosity? If tenants use their more generous voucher to lease a unit in a better neighborhood or a higher quality unit, then the incidence falls on tenants. If, on the other hand, landlords are able to raise rents without improving the quality of their unit, then the incidence falls on landlords. In this paper, we empirically estimate the incidence of changes in voucher generosity using natural experiments and administrative data on the universe of housing vouchers. We find that a policy of across-the-board increases in the rent ceiling increases voucher rents, with little impact on observed quality, but that a policy which incentivizes moves using ZIP code-specific rent ceilings is a cost-effective way to increase neighborhood quality.

Housing Choice Vouchers, formerly known as Section 8, paid rent subsidies for 2.2 million low-income families in 2015. Voucher recipients typically pay 30% of their income as rent and the government pays the rest, up to a rent ceiling which is usually set at the 40th percentile of metro area or countywide rents. We show empirically that a voucher covers the cost of 68% of units in a low-quality neighborhood, but only 15% of units in a high-quality
neighborhood. In principle, a voucher recipient could rent a unit of typical quality in a neighborhood where the median rent was at the 40th percentile of countywide rents or a unit of very high quality in a low-quality neighborhood.

In fact, housing voucher recipients seem to leave money on the table. They overwhelmingly live in low-quality neighborhoods and a majority lease units with rents below the rent ceiling. For example, voucher recipients in Dallas live on average in neighborhoods one standard deviation below the mean in terms of a neighborhood quality index (defined below). These neighborhoods offer limited economic opportunity (Chetty and Hendren, 2015). Moreover, several recent studies show that giving a family a housing voucher yields very little improvement in neighborhood quality as measured by poverty rates and crime rates.¹

There are a few reasons why it may be hard for a voucher recipient to find a unit in a good neighborhood. First, audit studies have found that landlords discriminate, refusing to rent to people with a voucher (Lawyers Committee for Better Housing Inc (2002); Perry (2009)). Second, many voucher recipients have high transportation costs; participants with cars in the Moving to Opportunity experiment seemed to move to and stay in higher-quality neighborhoods in terms of crime and school quality (Pendall et al. (2014)). Third, while a voucher can theoretically be used at any rental unit which meets some minimum standards, in practice they often are steered towards a short list of units by public housing authority (PHA) recommendations (Abt Associates (2001)).

In an environment where it is hard to find a good unit, it is theoretically ambiguous whether landlords or tenants benefit from an increase in the generosity of housing vouchers. In a world without frictions, more generous housing vouchers would benefit tenants through increased neighborhood quality and increased structure quality. However, housing is costly

¹Two studies with random assignment of housing vouchers a lottery in Chicago (Jacob et al. (2013)) and HUD’s Welfare to Work Voucher Experiment (Ericksen and Ross (2013), Patterson et al. (2004)). Two other studies which use matching methods are Carlson et al. (2012) and Susin (2002).
to search for, with prices that can be negotiated, and is indivisible. These features mean that an increase in housing voucher generosity may result in landlords raising rents without improving unit quality.

We develop a model to examine how the incidence of a change in housing voucher generosity depends on the ease with which voucher recipients can find units in good neighborhoods. The first policy lever we consider is an across-the-board increase in the rent ceiling across all neighborhoods. This acts like an income effect in a consumer demand model because voucher recipients can choose to allocate this increase to increasing the chance of finding a unit or to finding a unit in a better neighborhood. The second policy lever we consider is a “tilting” of the rent ceiling so that it is higher in high-quality neighborhoods and lower in low-quality neighborhoods, which acts like a substitution effect.

Using two natural experiments and a variety of quality measures, we show that across-the-board increases in the rent ceiling increase rental prices with a minimal impact on observed unit quality. In 2005, HUD revised county-level rent ceilings to correct for a decade of accumulated forecast error. We estimate that a $1 increase in the rent ceiling caused aggregate rents to rise by 46 cents, while hedonic unit quality rose by only 5 cents over the next six years. Our hedonic model includes both neighborhood quality – as measured by median tract rent – and physical structure quality – as measured by structure age and structure type. These empirical results could reflect unmeasured quality increases or landlords price discriminating. One piece of evidence consistent with the price discrimination story is when we include address fixed effects in an attempt to hold unit quality constant, we still find that rents increase. Nevertheless, our quality measures in this research design are quite limited, which motivates an alternative research design.

Using a second research design with richer unit quality measures, we also find that prices respond more than observed quality to an across-the-board increase in the rent ceiling. We
use a difference-in-difference strategy to examine a policy change in 2001 where HUD began setting rent ceilings on the basis of the 50th percentile of local rents rather than the 40th percentile. The advantage of this research design is that we can capture time-varying unit quality within an address using a 28-question HUD survey, with detail comparable to the American Housing Survey. We find that for each $1 increase in the rent ceiling, rents paid on voucher units rose by 47 cents, with no significant impact on observed unit quality. This is consistent with marginal changes in voucher generosity benefiting landlords who are price discriminating or benefiting tenants through increased in unobserved unit quality; our results do not speak to whether on average landlords receive more from vouchers or private tenants for the same unit.\(^2\)

Unlike across-the-board increases in the rent ceiling, we find from a third natural experiment that tilting the rent ceiling toward higher-quality neighborhoods raises neighborhood quality. Housing authorities in Dallas, Texas switched from a single metro-wide ceiling to ZIP-code-level ceilings in 2011, giving voucher recipients a stronger incentive to move to higher-quality neighborhoods. We construct a neighborhood quality index using the violent crime rate, test scores, the poverty rate, the unemployment rate and the share of children living with single mothers. A difference-in-difference design using neighboring Fort Worth, Texas as a comparison group shows that new leases signed after the policy were in tracts where quality was 0.23 standard deviations higher. This is a substantial improvement, comparable in magnitude to other randomized voucher interventions for public housing residents (Kling et al. (2005); Jacob et al. (2013)) and larger than interventions for unsubsidized tenants (Jacob and Ludwig (2012)) or across-the-board increases in housing voucher generosity.

\(^2\)We have deliberately chosen to focus on marginal changes rather than average differences, because the latter involves more significant empirical hurdles. Both the costs and benefits of renting to a voucher recipient relative to a private tenant are difficult to quantify. From conversations with practitioners, we learned that some landlords perceive voucher recipients to be more costly than other tenants due to the risk of damage to the unit, while other landlords prefer voucher recipients because the housing authority guarantees a steady stream of rental payments. See Table 6.7 in Olsen (2008) for a summary of older studies comparing differences in average costs and ORC/Macro (2001) for more recent evidence.
This policy appears to have been budget-neutral in Dallas. Absent any tenant behavioral response, this policy would have been cost-saving for the government, because rent increases in expensive ZIP codes were offset by larger decreases in low-cost ZIP codes and voucher recipients tend to live in inexpensive neighborhoods at baseline. Incorporating tenants’ improved neighborhood choices, the Dallas intervention had zero net cost to the government.

In this paper, we show empirically that an across-the-board increase in rent ceilings fails to raise neighborhood quality, but that a tilting of rent ceilings is successful. In our model, these two policies correspond to income and substitution effects respectively. For many consumer goods, economists think that substitution effects are larger than income effects. In the case where housing voucher recipients worry about their ability to find a unit, our model can explain three empirical facts: (1) why an across-the-board increase does not raise neighborhood quality (2) why tilting the rent ceiling does raise neighborhood quality and (3) why voucher recipients live in low-quality neighborhoods to begin with.

Section 2.2 describes the model, Section 2.3 reviews the program and data, Section 2.4 studies changes in county and metro-wide rent ceilings, Section 2.5 studies the Dallas ZIP code-level demonstration, and Section 2.6 concludes.

2.2. Summary of Model

We build a model to understand why voucher recipients leave money on the table and what policies benefit voucher recipients versus landlords. This model is in Appendix B.1 and here we provide a verbal summary. Our key assumption is that it is harder for a new voucher recipient to find a unit in a high-quality neighborhood than in a low-quality neighborhood, which is supported by several pieces of empirical evidence. First, because vouchers typically
pay a flat amount across a metro area, a voucher can cover the cost 68% of units in the lowest-rent neighborhoods but only 15% of units in higher-rent neighborhoods, as shown empirically in Figure 2.1. Second, once a tenant is issued a voucher, she typically has three months to use it or lose it. These challenges are exacerbated for reasons unique to housing voucher recipients such as discrimination and high transportation costs. Given these constraints, it is not surprising that roughly one-in-three families issued a voucher are unable to lease-up in the allotted time (Abt Associates (2001)).

Voucher recipients face a trade-off between finding a unit at all and finding a unit in a high-quality neighborhood. In the model, a larger fraction of units in low-quality neighborhoods have rent below the ceiling than units in high-quality neighborhoods, which generates a compensating differential. Because of this trade-off, voucher recipients choose to look in lower-quality neighborhoods than they otherwise would. We use the model to examine two policy levers.

The first policy lever we consider is an increase in the rent ceiling across all neighborhoods. Voucher recipients can choose to allocate this increase to increasing their chance of finding a unit or to finding a unit in a better neighborhood. If raising the matching probability is an attractive “good” for voucher recipients to “buy” then increasing the rent ceiling will do little to improve quality. Formally, this policy is like an income effect in a Marshallian consumer demand model – only through second-order terms does it increase chosen neighborhood quality. The second policy lever we consider is a “tilting” of the rent ceiling so that it is higher in high-quality neighborhoods and lower in low-quality neighborhoods. This acts like a substitution effect in a consumer demand model. Unlike the metro-wide increase in the price ceiling, tilting the rent ceiling causes a first-order improvement in the voucher recipient’s choice of optimal neighborhood quality.

Increasing the rent ceiling also raises the rent paid for voucher units. Voucher recipients
Figure 2.1.: Unit Availability and Rent Distribution

Notes: Each year, the federal government publishes “Fair Market Rents.” These are typically estimated as the 40th percentile of rent in a county for studios, 1 bedroom, 2 bedroom, 3 bedroom and 4 bedroom units. The top panel reports the census tract share of standard rental units with rents below the 40th percentile rent metro area rent by the ratio of the census tract rent to the metro area rent. Data is drawn from a special tabulation of the 2009-2013 ACS five-year estimate and FY2013 fair market rents.

The bottom panel plots rents and hedonic quality relative to the local rent ceiling. Of rent observations, 0.03% are left censored and 0.62% are right censored. Of quality observations, 1.8% are left censored and 0.58% are right censored. We report gross rent (contract rent + utilities) to facilitate comparison with the rent ceiling, which is set in terms of gross rent. In the rest of the paper, we use contract rent alone, to focus on landlord behavior. Notes: 2009 data, n=1.7 million.

Our methods for constructing hedonic quality are described in Appendix B.2.4.
typically pay 30% of their income in rent, meaning that they are less price-sensitive than private tenants. Within each level of neighborhood quality, we assume that there is an exogenous distribution of markups. Because voucher recipients are not price-sensitive, they are more willing to accept markups and average rents rise when the price ceiling rises, even within a neighborhood.\footnote{Rents may also rise if landlords \textit{deliberately} raise rents in response to changes in the rent ceiling, but this is outside of our model. Any attempt to price discriminate will be limited to the extent that the rent reasonableness process described in Section 2.3 is effective.}

As far as we know, our emphasis on the challenge of finding a suitable unit is new to the literature studying vouchers and does a better job of explaining this paper’s empirical findings than two existing benchmark models. In one benchmark model, people frictionlessly trade-off housing and non-housing consumption and housing vouchers introduce a kink into the budget constraint (Collinson et al. (2015)). This model predicts that housing voucher recipients should rent units with prices at least as high as the rent ceiling. In fact, 60 percent of housing voucher recipients rent units below the ceiling (Figure 2.1). Another explanation for why families with vouchers choose low-quality neighborhoods is preferences. For example, in Geyer (2011) and Galiani et al. (2015), voucher recipients have a preference for neighbors of the same race and also a preference for high-poverty neighborhoods.

Our model is better than a preference model at fitting our empirical findings for two reasons: neighborhood quality improves over time for voucher recipients and increases in across-the-board generosity have little impact on observed unit quality. First, the dynamic path of voucher recipients’ neighborhood choices is consistent with it being hard to find a good unit upon initial lease-up rather than a preference for low-quality neighborhoods. Eriksen and Ross (2013) document that in the Welfare to Work Voucher experiment, voucher recipients signed their first lease in neighborhoods of no better quality than their prior residence (as measured by poverty and employment rates); however, neighborhood quality improved
subsequently over the next four years. This is qualitatively consistent with a model where at first voucher recipients worry about finding a unit to lease and only then worry about neighborhood quality.\textsuperscript{4} A preference model with voucher recipients valuing structure over neighborhood quality predicts that voucher recipients in low-quality neighborhoods will live in high-quality units. However, as mentioned above, voucher recipients actually live in units with rents below the ceiling and as we document below, when there is an across-the-board increase in the rent ceiling, there is at most a modest improvement in observable structure quality.

\section*{2.3. Description of Housing Choice Vouchers and Data}

Housing Choice Vouchers use the private market to provide rental units for 2.3 million low-income households. There are four key actors in the voucher program: the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), local housing authorities, private landlords and tenants.

Each year, HUD announces “Fair Market Rents” (FMRs) for every metro- and county-bedroom pair in the US. The geographic level at which FMRs are set is usually the metropolitan area in urban places and the county in rural places. HUD typically sets FMRs at the 40th percentile of area-level gross rent (rent to landlord plus utility costs). We defer a discussion of how FMRs are updated until Section 2.4 where we describe the natural experiments which we exploit in two research designs.

The local housing authority chooses a local rent ceiling $\bar{r}$ (or “Payment Standard”) from

\textsuperscript{4}One interesting question is why voucher rents do not gradually asymptote to the rent ceiling as tenure rises. One possibility is that once a lease is signed in a bad neighborhood, inertia may lead some people not to move yet again to a better neighborhood.
90%-110% of the federally-set FMR (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2001)).\textsuperscript{5} Housing authorities are typically allocated a fixed budget for vouchers, and this budget does not vary with FMR changes (McCarty (2006)). When a housing authority increases its rent ceiling, it is able to finance fewer vouchers. Although an FMR increase \textit{allows} housing authorities to increase the rent ceiling, housing authorities may use their discretion to smooth out FMR changes. Local housing authorities are also responsible for finding eligible tenants. Housing assistance is frequently oversubscribed, so housing authorities ration vouchers using preferences or lotteries to select tenants from a pool of very low income applicants (Collinson et al. (2015)).\textsuperscript{6}

The tenant pays at least 30% of her income in rent and the housing authority pays the difference, up to the rent ceiling. For tenants renting units below the rent ceiling, when rents rise by $1, the housing authority pays an extra dollar and the tenant pays nothing. When tenants rent units with costs higher than the rent ceiling, they pay the difference out of pocket.\textsuperscript{7} To the extent that tenants who pay the final dollar out-of-pocket behave like price-sensitive private tenants, our rent estimates will understate the extent to which landlords raise prices when housing vouchers become more generous.\textsuperscript{8}

When a housing voucher recipient finds a suitable unit, she asks the housing authority to per-

\textsuperscript{5}Housing authorities may request higher or lower “exception” payment standards from HUD. Exception payment standards below 120% of FMR may be approved by HUD Field Offices, exception requests above 120% FMR require approval from the Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing.

\textsuperscript{6}In a 2012 HUD survey, housing authorities reported more than 4.9 million households on waitlists for housing vouchers. Though this count likely includes some duplicate due to households appearing on multiple housing authorities’ waitlists. (Collinson et al. (2015)). Among the 20 largest voucher-issuing housing authorities, 40 percent use a lottery-based system to select among eligible tenants.

\textsuperscript{7}There is debate within HUD over how common it is for tenants to pay the final dollar of rent. Our tabulation of the micro-data shows that 40% of voucher recipients have rents greater than the rent ceiling. However, we suspect that these estimates are inflated by measurement error in rents and in rent ceilings in the administrative records.

\textsuperscript{8}An earlier design of the housing voucher program, operated from 1983 until the early 2000s, eliminated this price insensitivity by offering tenants a fixed subsidy equal to the payment standard minus a fixed percentage of tenant’s adjusted income (Olsen 2003). In this design, payment standards were constrained to be less than the applicable FMR.
form an inspection to check that the unit is up to code and to check for “rent reasonableness”. The median housing authority rejects between one-quarter and one-half of units on the first inspection (Abt Associates (2001), Exhibit 3-5). Housing authorities have strong incentives to negotiate down rents, both because holding down per-unit rents enables them to serve more tenants and because they are reimbursed for administrative expenses on a per-unit basis. HUD routinely audits housing authorities’ leasing process, and rent reasonableness is consistently found to be one of the inspection categories with the highest compliance rates (ICF Macro (2009)). We conducted interviews with several experts to learn more about this process. One housing authority official described the following rent reasonableness process:

[we] contract with Go-Section-8 [a web portal] to identify comparables. Go-Section-8 has over 20,000 listings in our area... We enter information on bedrooms, size and age, and Go-Section-8 provides the three closest listings with similar characteristics... We select the median of the three listings and use that as the rent we could offer.

When landlords request rents above comparables, the housing authority will begin a negotiating process where they exchange rent offers with the landlord. One housing authority we interviewed required that landlords asking for rents above their comparables furnish “three current leases for unsubsidized tenants” in the building as evidence that the asking rent is in line with market rent.9

We analyze housing vouchers using a partial equilibrium framework and changes in voucher generosity are unlikely to have much impact on general equilibrium rents. Vouchers account for only 6% of the U.S. rental housing market. If average voucher rents in a tract rose by 30% (a change larger than any we observe in this paper), the average user cost of housing in the tract would rise by only 1.8%.10 We therefore find it unlikely that the policy variation we

---

9 Appendix Figure 2.2 shows empirically that rents are lower for units with lower hedonic quality.
10 Of course, there is some heterogeneity in the concentration of vouchers, but even relatively concentrated
study had substantial impacts on nonvoucher rents. However, we note that other researchers using other variation have found general equilibrium impacts of the housing voucher program (Susin (2002); Eriksen and Ross (2015)), and so we conduct robustness checks which examine how non-voucher rents change with a change in FMRs in Appendix Table 2.3.

We use a HUD internal administrative database called PIC which contains an anonymous household identifier, an anonymous address identifier, building covariates, contract rent received by landlord, and landlord identifier, on an annual basis beginning in 2002. The address identifier, coded as a 9-digit ZIP code, enables us to follow a single address over time if it has multiple voucher occupants. Appendix B.2.1 discusses sample construction.

2.4. Income Effects: Impact of Raising the Base Rent Ceiling

We estimate the causal effect of across-the-board rent ceiling changes on housing quality (unit and neighborhood) and voucher rents using two natural experiments. In Section 2.4.1, we study a 2005 change in FMRs due to availability of updated 2000 Decennial Census data. We examine this change using rich data on the universe of housing vouchers, which includes the ability to track households and addresses over time. Unfortunately, this database only came into widespread use in 2003. The advantage of this research design is that the it uses variation across all counties giving us enough statistical power to detect even small quality and rent responses. In Section 2.4.2, we study a 2001 change which raised FMRs from the 40th percentile to the 50th percentile of rents in 39 metro areas. We use a detailed HUD voucher households are still a small share of the market. For example, for a voucher household at the 90th percentile of the voucher concentration distribution, 9% of all units in its tract are vouchers.
survey, which was administered to voucher recipients on a widespread basis from 2000 to 2003 to evaluate the effects of this change on housing quality. The advantage of this research design is that the survey offers an in-depth look at unit quality, including quality attributes which might vary over time within the same unit. Across both research designs, we find similar results: raising the rent ceiling results in higher rents with little evidence of positive quality impacts.

2.4.1. Rebenchmarking of FMRs in 2005

For many years, data constraints meant that FMRs changed little in a typical year, punctuated by very large swings once every ten years, which offers useful variation for a quasi-experimental analysis. In most years, FMRs are updated using local CPI rental measures for 26 large metro areas and 10 regional Random Digit Dialing (RDD) surveys for the rest of the country. These estimates are very coarse; for example, they were a bit worse at predicting local rent changes than using a single national trend from 1997 to 2004. The availability of new decennial Census data results in a “rebenchmarking.” Because the local CPI and RDD estimates are so noisy, large swings in FMRs occurred from 1994 to 1996, when 1990 Census data were incorporated into FMRs, and again in 2005, when 2000 Census data were added in 2005.\footnote{See Appendix Figure 2.1 for a plot of changes in FMR by year as well as projected revisions under a counterfactual of a single national trend from 1997 to 2004.}

The 2005 rebenchmarking offers substantial variation in FMR changes, suitable for a quasi-experimental research design. As an example, we show FMR revisions for two-bedroom units in Eastern New England for 2003-2004 and for 2004-2005. From 2003 to 2004, FMRs rose by 5.5% in Eastern Massachusetts and rose by 1.6% in outlying areas. The next year shows large revisions, with Rhode Island experiencing 22% increases in 2-bedroom FMRs and Greater Boston experiencing 11% decreases. Figure 2.2 shows an event study of FMRs
for four groups of county-bed pairs, stratified by the size of their revision from 2004 to 2005. In nominal terms, the bottom quartile fell by 7%, while the top quartile rose by 24%. These four groups had similar trends in the six years after the revision, so we can study the rebenchmarking as a one-time, permanent change.\footnote{Throughout the paper, all regression specifications studying rent or hedonic quality use a log transformation. There is tremendous heterogeneity in FMR levels; in 2004, FMR levels for a 2-bedroom unit ranged from $370 in rural Alabama to $1800 in San Jose. Clearly, a $50 increase in the FMR would have a very different impact in percent terms in Alabama than in San Jose. Additional empirical details on our use of the rebenchmarking are provided in Appendix B.2.2.}

To clarify the sources of variation that we use for identification, we show that the rebenchmarking can be decomposed into three pieces: changes in nonvoucher rents, measurement error from annual updates, and measurement error in the Census. Define $\sigma_t$ as an annual estimate of the change in log rents based on a regional RDD or CPI survey from year $t-1$ to $t$.\footnote{The RDD and CPI surveys are used to produce adjustment factors which modify the base, not to provide a new estimate of the level.} Define $\exp(r_t + \varphi_t)$ as an observation from decennial Census data, where $\exp(r_t)$ is the true rent and $\exp(\varphi_t)$ is measurement error. We can use these definitions to write

$$
\log FMR_{2004} = \sum_{t=1991}^{2004} \sigma_t + r_{1990} + \varphi_{1990}, \quad \text{and} \quad \log FMR_{2005} = \sum_{t=2001}^{2005} \sigma_t + r_{2000} + \varphi_{2000}.
$$

Taking the difference gives

$$
\Delta FMR = \underbrace{r_{2000} - r_{1990}}_{\text{true rent change}} + \underbrace{\sigma_{2005} - \sum_{t=1990}^{1999} \sigma_t}_{\text{annual meas error}} + \underbrace{(\varphi_{2000} - \varphi_{1990})}_{\text{Census meas error}}
$$

Consistent with measurement error as a source of variation, places where FMRs drifted upward due to noise over the prior ten years were subject to downward revisions in 2005, and places where FMRs drifted downward due to noise were subject to upward revisions.

Suppose that outcomes $y$ such as unit and neighborhood quality or voucher rents may be affected by the rent ceiling $\bar{r}$ as well as contemporaneous shocks to supply and demand $\eta$, 

$$

\Delta FMR = \underbrace{r_{2000} - r_{1990}}_{\text{true rent change}} + \underbrace{\sigma_{2005} - \sum_{t=1990}^{1999} \sigma_t}_{\text{annual meas error}} + \underbrace{(\varphi_{2000} - \varphi_{1990})}_{\text{Census meas error}}
$$

Consistent with measurement error as a source of variation, places where FMRs drifted upward due to noise over the prior ten years were subject to downward revisions in 2005, and places where FMRs drifted downward due to noise were subject to upward revisions.

Suppose that outcomes $y$ such as unit and neighborhood quality or voucher rents may be affected by the rent ceiling $\bar{r}$ as well as contemporaneous shocks to supply and demand $\eta$, 

$$

\Delta FMR = \underbrace{r_{2000} - r_{1990}}_{\text{true rent change}} + \underbrace{\sigma_{2005} - \sum_{t=1990}^{1999} \sigma_t}_{\text{annual meas error}} + \underbrace{(\varphi_{2000} - \varphi_{1990})}_{\text{Census meas error}}
$$

Consistent with measurement error as a source of variation, places where FMRs drifted upward due to noise over the prior ten years were subject to downward revisions in 2005, and places where FMRs drifted downward due to noise were subject to upward revisions.
Notes: In 2005, the government made large revisions as part of a “rebenchmarking” to incorporate newly-available data from the 2000 Census. The top panel plots demeaned changes in the Fair Market Rent for four quartiles of county-bed observations, stratified by the change from 2004 to 2005. Local housing authorities administer the vouchers, and have discretion to set the local rent ceiling at 90%, 100% or 110% of Fair Market Rent. The bottom panel plots local rent ceilings, using the same grouping of county-beds as in the top panel. By 2010, for every $1 increase in the Fair Market Rent, local rent ceilings rose by 70 cents.
as expressed by the empirical model \( \Delta y = h(\bar{r}) - h(\bar{r}_{2004}) + \eta \). Our identifying assumption is the shocks after 2004 were orthogonal to the level of FMRs in 2005, conditional on their 2004 level.

**Identification Assumption in Rebenchmarking Research Design**

\[
\eta \perp FMR_{2005} | FMR_{2004}
\]

As detailed above, \( \Delta FMR \) consists of measurement error, which is by construction orthogonal to future trends, and the true nonvoucher rent change, \( r_{2000} - r_{1990} \). Note that this research design allows the rebenchmarking to bring rental rents closer in line with the level of market fundamentals. We require only that the change in FMR be uncorrelated with the subsequent shocks \( \eta \). Available empirical evidence supports this identification assumption. First, rents are about flat from 2002 to 2004, prior to the policy change. Second, contemporaneous changes in nonvoucher rents have no significant correlation with the FMR change.\(^{14}\)

### 2.4.1.1. Impacts on Housing Quality and Voucher Rents

First, we assess the effects of across-the-board rent ceiling changes on the housing quality and rents of all voucher holders. Our unit of analysis is the county-bed, summary statistics for our sample appear in Table 2.1. We present three measures of quality: median tract rent, tract

\(^{14}\)Appendix B.2.3 analyzes prior and contemporaneous changes in nonvoucher rents in more detail and Appendix Table 2.3 shows the relevant regression results.
poverty rates, and a measure of hedonic housing quality.\footnote{The tract rent measure is $\Delta y_{t,j} = \log(\text{tract rent}_{t,j}) - \log(\text{tract rent}_{2004,j})$, the difference in average median tract rent for vouchers in county-bed $j$ from year 2004 to year $t$. The census tract poverty rate is $\Delta y_{t,j} = \text{tract pov}_{t,j} - \text{tract pov}_{2004,j}$ where $\text{tract pov}_{t,j}$ is the average tract poverty rate of voucher holders in county-bed $j$.} To construct our hedonic quality measure, we run a hedonic regression in the American Community Survey using covariates for structure age, structure type (e.g. single-family, multi-family, or apartment building) and neighborhood rent. We then constructed our dependent variable quality measure $y_{j} = \hat{\beta}_{\text{hedonic}}(x_{t,j} - x_{2004,j})$ using covariates $x_{t,j}$ on structure type and median tract rent from the voucher data where $x_{t,j}$ is the unconditional average of $x$ in county-bed $j$, including units that newly entered and exited the sample.\footnote{We estimate our hedonic coefficients in the American Community Survey, where the smallest geographic units are Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) with about 150,000 residents. However, when predicting hedonic quality for voucher units, we use median tract rent (tracts have about 4,000 residents), which provides much more geographic detail than PUMAs. The results from our hedonic regression in the ACS appear in Appendix Table 2.1. More details on construction of the hedonic measure are provided in Appendix B.2.4.} Census tracts typically have 4,000 residents and 77\% of voucher moves cross tract boundaries, so this measure captures even very short-distance moves to higher-quality neighborhoods or higher-quality units within the same neighborhood.

We construct our voucher rent measure in a similar fashion as $\Delta y_{t,j} = r_{t,j} - r_{2004,j}$. We estimate our model using two stage least squares, because local housing authorities have some discretion in setting rent ceilings, as discussed in Section 2.3. Formally, we estimate a first stage:

\begin{equation}
\bar{r}_j = \alpha + \gamma FMR_{2005j} + FMR_{2004j} + \bar{r}_{2004j} + \varepsilon_j
\end{equation}

where the exogenous variation comes from $FMR$ in 2005, we control for $FMR$ in 2004, the rent ceiling $\bar{r}$ in 2004, and $\varepsilon$ is an error term.\footnote{The motivation for controlling for 2004 FMR is driven by the nature of our quasi-experimental variation. Prior to the FMR change, average rents across all units were \textit{rising} for places about to receive a downward revision and that rents were \textit{falling} for places about to be revised upward; this was likely because of mean...}
### Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Across-the-Board Rent Ceiling Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean (1)</th>
<th>S.D. (2)</th>
<th>Mean (3)</th>
<th>S.D. (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rebenchmarking -- National Sample</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher Characteristics</td>
<td>2004 (n = 1,578,124)</td>
<td>2010 (n=1,665,868)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract Rent</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility Allowance</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent Ceiling (Contract Rent + Utility)</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant Payment</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant HH Income (Annual)</td>
<td>9683</td>
<td>6358</td>
<td>11567</td>
<td>7347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share Moved</td>
<td>Nonattrit</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Tract Characteristics**<sup>b</sup> |          |          |          |          |
| Median Contract Rent (2005-2009)   | 473.70   | 196.26   | 479.55   | 197.97   |
| Share Voucher (2004)               | 0.021    | 0.024    | 0.019    | 0.022    |

| **County Characteristics**         |          |          |          |          |
| Fair Market Rent                   | 628      | 312      | 802      | 326      |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>40th -&gt; 50th Pctile FMRs -- National Sample</strong>&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Pre (n = 171,248)</th>
<th>Post (n = 285,279)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross Rent</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonic Quality (using 28 survey vars)</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair Market Rent</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

a. Voucher and tract characteristics are computed giving equal weight to each county-bed pair.
offset the immediate impact of FMR changes, but a $1 increase in the FMR from 2004 to 2005 corresponded to a 58 cent increase in the rent ceiling by 2010. It takes time for FMR changes to absorb into local policy, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2.2. We estimate our second stage:

\[
\Delta y_j = \alpha + \beta \hat{r}_j + FMR_{2004j} + \bar{r}_{2004j} + \eta_j
\] (2.2)

Table 2.2 columns (1)-(3) show the effects of a $1 change in the rent ceiling on neighborhood and housing quality. There is virtually no impact of raising the ceiling on observable quality. A $1 increase in the ceiling has no detectable impact on the neighborhood quality of voucher tenants, as measured by neighborhood rents (column 1) or poverty rates (column 3), and raises composite hedonic quality by a mere 5 cents. In contrasts, average rents by 46 cents in response to a $1 increase in the rent ceiling (Table 2.2, column 4). Figure 2.3 plots the year-by-year coefficients of the reduced form impact of the FMR change on rents, and shows rents rise steadily in response to the rent ceiling increase through the first four years after the re-benchmarking, while hedonic quality rises minimally throughout this period. Either tenants saw big increases in unobserved unit quality or landlords saw increases in profits of roughly 40 cents for each $1 change in the rent ceiling.

2.4.1.2. Impacts on Same-Address Voucher Rents

How much do landlords benefit from a $1 rent ceiling increase? To explore this question further we examine the effect of rent ceiling increase on voucher rents at a given address.
Figure 2.3: Impacts of Rebenchmarking: Rents and Quality

Estimate of \( \Delta S1 \) in FMR: Rent Ceiling and Rents on \( Y_t - Y_{2004} \)

Estimate of \( \Delta S1 \) in FMR: Rent Ceiling and Quality on \( Y_t - Y_{2004} \)

Notes: The top panel plots \( \beta \) coefficients using variation from the 2005 rebenchmarking. The rent ceiling series plots the \( \beta \) coefficients from the following regression: \( \bar{r}_t = \alpha + \beta FMR_{2005} + FMR_{2004} + \bar{r}_{2004} \). We plot a reduced form regression for rents and quality using the following equation \( \Delta y_{t,j} = \alpha + \beta FMR_{2005,j} + FMR_{2004,j} + \bar{r}_{2004,j} + \varepsilon_j \) to facilitate comparison between the rent ceiling and rents/quality response to a $1 increase in FMR. Hedonic quality is measured using number of bedrooms, structure type, structure age and median tract rent. Shaded area / dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Rental data from 2002 and 2003 are a test for pretrends, and the 2004-2005 first stage is used.
Table 2.2: Effect of County/Metrowide Price Ceiling Increase on Prices and Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hedonic Quality</th>
<th>Neighborhood Rent (1)</th>
<th>Unit and Neighborhood Poverty (2)</th>
<th>Neighborhood Poverty (3)</th>
<th>Voucher Rents (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y-Var</td>
<td>Log Median Tract Rent</td>
<td>Log Hedonic Quality Tract Poverty</td>
<td>Log Voucher Rent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IV Estimate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log Rent Ceiling 2010</th>
<th>0.0288</th>
<th>0.0467</th>
<th>-0.0000192</th>
<th>0.458</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0177)</td>
<td>(.0161)</td>
<td>(.000061)</td>
<td>(.0304)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**First Stage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log FMR 2005</th>
<th>0.580</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0372)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mean(Y)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Observation</th>
<th>6.107</th>
<th>7.136</th>
<th>0.162</th>
<th>6.130</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>12333</td>
<td>12333</td>
<td>12333</td>
<td>12333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table shows the quality and rent impacts of a countywide or metrowide increase in the rent ceiling using variation from the 2005 Fair Market Rent (FMR) rebenchmarking. Column (1)-(4) reports the results of estimating equation (2) from Section 4.1.1 on different dependent variables. Columns (1)-(3) report the effects of rent ceiling changes on changes to three housing quality measures for all voucher holders from 2004-2010. Hedonic quality in column (2) is based on structure age, structure type, number of bedrooms and median tract rent (see Appendix B.4 for details). Column (4) reports the effect of the rent ceiling change on changes in voucher rents from 2004-2010. Column (5) reports the first stage from estimating equation (1) in Section 4.1.1. The sample consists of all tenants where the unit is county-bed pairs. Standard errors are clustered at the FMR group level. See Section 4.1.1 for details.
One empirical strategy uses people who stayed at the same address throughout the sample period ("stayers"). A complementary strategy uses data on voucher recipients who moved into a unit previously occupied by another voucher recipient ("movers"). If time-varying unit quality is constant, then landlords are capturing any increase in rents we observe. This could arise through deliberate price discrimination, or, as in the model, through price-insensitive voucher recipients not avoiding units whose markups were rising due to random variation. This could also be explained by within-unit changes in quality.

Table 2.3 column (2) shows the results – a $1 change in the rent ceiling corresponded to a 9 cent increase in rents for stayers from 2004 to 2010. This estimate is economically quite small and statistically precise, with a standard error of three cents. The magnitude of the point estimate suggests that the “rent reasonableness” policy may be effective at regulating rent increases for incumbent tenants.

We also examine changes in rents for addresses which were occupied by different households before and after the rebenchmarking. We exploit the fact that about one-third of movers and new admits from 2005-2010 went to an address that was occupied by a different voucher recipient in 2003 or 2004. We calculate mean pre-2005 rent at every address (9 digit ZIP code-bedroom) and then merge this file with the addresses of voucher recipients in later years. Formally, we estimate equation 2.2 with \( \Delta y_{hij} = r_{2010,hi'} - r_{2004,hi} \) where \( i \) changes to \( i' \), to reflect a change in household, while address \( h \) is constant. For these movers, we find that a $1 increase in the rent ceiling caused rents to rise by 20 cents, as reported in Table 2.3 column (3). We believe that these estimates are slightly larger than the stayers estimates because of tenure discounts, where landlords are less likely to raise rents for a tenant renewing their lease.

We conduct several robustness checks to assess our result that landlords raise rents for
Table 2.3.: Effect of County/Metrowide Rent Ceiling Increase on Rents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Variation</th>
<th>Rebenchmarking of FMRs in 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same Address w/Same Voucher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>All Tenants&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**First Stage**

Y: ΔLog Rent Ceiling, 2004-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log FMR 2005</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.580</td>
<td>0.561</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IV Rent Estimate**

Y: ΔLog Voucher Rent, 2004-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ΔLog Rent Ceiling 2010</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.444</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit of Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,662,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>553,577</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table shows the rent impacts of a countywide or metrowide increase in the rent ceiling using variation from the 2005 Fair Market Rent (FMR) rebenchmarking. Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at FMR group level. See Section 4.1.2 for details.

a. Sample contains all tenants.
b. Sample contains households whose address (9-digit zip code) was unchanged from 2004 to 2010.
c. Sample contains addresses where a new voucher recipient arrived in 2005 or later and a different voucher recipient was observed in 2003 or 2004.
tenants at the exact same address. First, we add county fixed effects, so that identification comes only from within-county variation comparing the FMR change for 1-bedroom units to the FMR change for 4-bedroom units, and not at all from differences in secular trends across counties. Again, we find that a $1 increase in rent ceiling raises rents for stayers. Second, recall that most tenants pay 30% of their income as rent, but some paid 30% of their income plus the difference between the unit’s rent and the local rent ceiling. We build a sample of households which are very unlikely to be the residual payer in 2010 using baseline characteristics in 2004, and find a substantial increase in rents, combined with no change in tenant payments. Third, we attempt to test for kickbacks. While it would be easy for a mom-and-pop operation to give kickbacks, it would be much more difficult for a large business with accountants and auditors to do so. We think that kickbacks from landlords to voucher recipients are unlikely to explain the results, because we find substantial rent increases among these larger landlords.

In this section, we used two empirical strategies to assess incidence with apparently disparate results — comparing total price increases to hedonic quality increases and controlling for quality with unit fixed effects — but this difference can likely be explained by some institutional details of the voucher program. In Section 2.4.1.1, we showed increases in rents for all addresses of 46 cents with just 5 cents in quality improvements for voucher holders. In contrast, Section 2.4.1.2, our findings from the two address fixed effects specifications suggest rent increases of 9-20 cents for each dollar increase in the rent ceiling. One possibility is that when a unit is leased to a voucher recipient for the first time that a landlord can justify a wide range of rents in the “rent reasonableness” process, but that once it has been leased then a PHA staff member will reject a large increase in rent for a unit where rent

---

18 Point estimates and standard errors are in Appendix Table 2.4.
19 We plot tenant payments to landlords and housing authority payments to landlords against the FMR change from rebenchmarking in Appendix Figure 2.3. Tenant payments are unresponsive to changes in FMR, while payments from the government to landlords rise substantially.
reasonableness was previously established.

2.4.2. 40th → 50th Percentile FMRs in 2001

A concern with the first research design is an inability to measure detailed elements of unit quality which might vary over time at the same address. In a different dataset, HUD measured quality in much more detail from 2000 to 2003. Using this dataset requires a different identification strategy based on a policy change in 2001, when HUD switched from setting FMRs at the 40th percentile of the local nonvoucher rent distribution to the 50th percentile in 39 MSAs. This policy was implemented not in response to recent housing market conditions, but rather with the explicit goal of “deconcentration” of vouchers from the lowest-quality neighborhoods.

From 2000 to 2003, HUD conducted a Customer Satisfaction Survey (CSS) of repeated cross-sections of about 100,000 voucher households. This survey included numerous questions on unit quality and came close to matching the level of detail in the American Housing Survey (AHS), which is the state-of-the-art data source on housing quality in the US. In particular, it asked many questions about unit attributes which could plausibly vary at the same address over time including: “How would you rate your satisfaction with your unit?”, “Has your heat broken down for more than 6 hours?”, “Does your unit have mildew, mold, or water

20The 39 metro areas were chosen on the basis of three factors, which are not obviously related to the trend in voucher rents or neighborhood quality:

- a size requirement (must contain at least 100 census tracts)
- an FMR neighborhood access measure – 70 percent or fewer census tracts with at least 10 two bedroom rental units are census tracts in which at least 30 percent of the two bedroom rental units have gross rents at or below the two bedroom FMR
- a high concentration of voucher holders in a limited number of census tracts – 25 percent or more of tenant-based voucher recipients reside in 5% of tracts with FMR area with largest number of participants

91
damage?” and “Have you spotted cockroaches in your home in the last week?” A full list of quality measures is in Appendix B.2.4. We transform these questions into a hedonic quality measure along with tract median rents from the 2000 Census. To compute hedonic quality, we identified the 26 questions on time-varying quality in the CSS which also appeared in the AHS.\(^{21}\) We ran a hedonic regression in the AHS using these 26 questions, building age, and building type and a measure of median neighborhood rent then used tenants’ responses in the CSS to predict hedonic quality.

We estimate the impacts of this policy change on Fair Market Rents, actual voucher rents and unit quality using a difference-in-difference model. Our estimation equations are

First Stage:  
\[
\tilde{r}_{ijt} = \alpha + \gamma 1(FMR = 50)_j Post_t + 1(FMR = 50)_j + Post_t + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (2.3)
\]

Second Stage:  
\[
y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta \tilde{r}_{ijt} + 1(FMR = 50)_j + Post_t + \eta_{ijt} \quad (2.4)
\]

Our identification condition is the standard difference-in-difference condition: \(E(\eta_{ijt} | 1(FMR = 50) \times Post) = 0\). Figure 2.4 shows the results visually and Table 2.4 Panel A shows regression results. Setting FMRs at the 50th percentile of the local nonvoucher rent distribution raised rent ceilings by an average of 11 percent. For every $1 increase in FMRs, rents rose by 47 cents (column 5) and composite hedonic quality rose by less than 5 cents (Table 2.4, panel A, column 3), with a standard error of 9 cents. The results from this analysis reinforce the conclusions from the prior section that increases in FMRs do not seem to improve quality.

\(^{21}\) Appendix Table 2.2 compares the predictive performance of our hedonic characteristics across data sets. In the AHS, the CSS variables perform nearly as well as the “kitchen sink” AHS model (R-squared 0.31 for CSS variables compared to 0.42 for the full AHS model).
We also estimate the average effect of the policy ($\delta$) in Table 2.4 panel B using:

$$y_{ijt} = \alpha + \delta 1(FMR = 50)_j \times Post_t + 1(FMR = 50)_j + Post_t + \eta_{ijt} \quad (2.5)$$

Moving from the 40th to 50th percentile FMR raises the rent ceiling by 11 percent with no measurable improvement in neighborhood quality, as measured by tract median rents and poverty rates, or in composite hedonic quality. We can reject improvements in the neighborhood poverty rates of voucher holders of more than a half a percentage point.

Our empirical results from two separate natural experiments which raised county and metro rent ceilings suggest that across-the-board changes in the ceiling act like an income effect doing little to improve either neighborhood or observed unit quality for voucher tenants while rents increase substantially.

2.5. Substitution Effects: Tilting the Rent Ceiling with ZIP-Level FMRs in Dallas

In contrast to the results in the previous section, we find that tilting the rent ceiling has a big impact on prices and quality. Following a court settlement, HUD replaced a single metro-wide FMR with ZIP code-level FMRs in early 2011. The demonstration caused sharp changes in local rent ceilings, ranging from a decrease of 20% to an increase of 30%, as shown in the top panel of Figure 2.5. In Section 2.5.1, we build a neighborhood quality index and document an improvement in quality of 0.23 standard deviations. In Section 2.5.2, we document that voucher rents and unit quality rose in ZIP codes where FMRs rose and fell in ZIP codes where FMRs fell. Finally, in Section 2.5.3, we establish that the
Table 2.4.: Effect of County/Metrowide Price Ceiling Increase on Prices and Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Variation</th>
<th>Rebenchmarking of FMRs in 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same Address w/Same Voucher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>All Tenants(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Stage</strong></td>
<td>Y: ΔLog Rent Ceiling, 2004-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log FMR 2005</td>
<td>0.580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV Rent Estimate</strong></td>
<td>Y: ΔLog Voucher Rent, 2004-2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔLog Rent Ceiling 2010</td>
<td>0.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of Observation</td>
<td>Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>1,662,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table shows the rent impacts of a countywide or metrowide increase in the rent ceiling using variation from the 2005 Fair Market Rent (FMR) rebenchmarking. Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at FMR group level. See Section 4.1.2 for details.

a. Sample contains all tenants.

b. Sample contains households whose address (9-digit zip code) was unchanged from 2004 to 2010.

c. Sample contains addresses where a new voucher recipient arrived in 2005 or later and a different voucher recipient was observed in 2003 or 2004.
Notes: The top panel shows an event study for changes in rent and quality around the introduction of 50th percentile FMRs in 2001. Hedonic quality is measured using number of bedrooms, structure type, structure age, median tract rent, and 26 survey questions about unit quality and maintenance. Shaded area / dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The bottom panel plots the same event study for changes in census tract poverty rates of voucher holders around the introduction of 50th percentile FMRs in 2001. Shaded area / dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. See notes to Table 4 for details.
effects on neighborhood quality are comparable to the results from more costly alternative interventions. Appendix B.2.5 contains added supplementary empirical details.

### 2.5.1. Impacts on Neighborhood Quality

We assemble data on five measures of neighborhood quality: poverty rate, 4th grade test scores at zoned school, unemployment rate, share of children in families with single mothers, and the violent crime rate. We compute a neighborhood quality index, which equally weights all five measures. Voucher recipients tend to live in lower-quality neighborhoods, often on the south side of the city.

To formally estimate the impact of the change to ZIP code-level FMRs, we use a simple difference-in-difference design with a comparison group of Fort Worth – a nearby city which continued to have a single metro-wide rent ceiling. The identifying assumption is that quality difference between Dallas voucher tenants and Fort Worth voucher tenants would have been stable absent the policy intervention. We estimate

\[ Y_{it} = \alpha + \delta_{Dallas_i}Post_t + Dallas_i + Post_t + \eta_{it} \]  \hspace{1cm} (2.6)

where \( i \) indexes households and \( t \) indexes years. The results are shown in Table 2.5, where \( \delta \) shows an intent-to-treat (ITT) improvement of 0.1 standard deviations in quality. This estimate is statistically precise, with a t-statistic greater than 3 using standard errors clustered at the tract level. Of course, neighborhood quality could only improve for tenants who moved. From 2010 to 2013, 44% of continuing voucher recipients moved units, so the impact

---

22 Poverty rate, unemployment, and share of kids in families with single mothers are ACS tract-level data from 2006 to 2010. Test scores are the percent of 4th grade students’ scoring proficient or higher on state exams in the 2008-2009 academic year at zoned school. Violent Crime is number of homicides, non-negligent manslaughter, robberies, and aggravated assaults per capita in 2010, and is calculated over the tract level for tracts in the city of Dallas, and at the jurisdiction level (city or county balance) for suburban voucher residents.

23 Each component is standardized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation over the Dallas metro area.
Figure 2.5.: Impact of Dallas “Tilting” on Rent Ceiling and Rents

Notes: In 2011, Dallas replaced a single, metro-wide FMR with ZIP code-level FMRs. The top panel shows that this policy raised rent ceilings in expensive neighborhoods and lowered rent ceilings in cheap neighborhoods. Dots reflect means for 20 quantiles of the ZIP code-level FMR distribution conditional on bedroom-year. We show data only for households which moved from 2010 to 2013. This bottom panel plots mean rents against the zip-code level FMR for movers from 2010-2013 at their 2010 and 2013 zip codes. Dots reflect means for 20 quantiles of the ZIP code-level FMR distribution conditional on bedroom-year in 2010 and in 2013. Rents were quite responsive to the new rent ceiling schedule.
estimate for treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) is 0.23 standard deviations.24

Table 2.5 also provides impacts separately for each of the five quality measures. We find small and statistically insignificant improvements of 0.09 SD in test scores at zoned schools and 0.05 SD in the rate of children living with single mothers. We find medium-sized improvements of 0.19 SD in the poverty rate and 0.21 in the unemployment rate. In Appendix Figure 2.4 we contrast these improvements in poverty reduction with our findings from both across-the-board policy changes. The largest improvements are in the violent crime rate, which improves by 0.33 SD. If these relative improvements reflect voucher recipients’ valuations, then it seems that voucher recipients prioritize getting away from high crime areas. This is consistent with evidence from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment, where treatment households chose tracts with much lower crime rates, less graffiti, and better police response when a call was made (Kling et al. (2005)).

The timing and distribution of neighborhood choices is consistent with attributing the results in Table 2.5 to the impact of the policy. Figure 2.6 shows that neighborhood quality moves in tandem for Dallas and Fort Worth through 2010; beginning in 2011, there is an immediate and sustained increase in Dallas which does not appear in Fort Worth. Figure 2.7 shows that the distribution of neighborhood qualities chosen by movers; movers after the policy change appear to have a broad-based monotonic shift away from lower-quality neighborhoods and to higher-quality quality neighborhoods. No such change is evident for the control group in
### Table 2.5: Effect of Tilting Rent Ceilings to ZIP-level on Neighborhood Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fort Worth (Control)</th>
<th>Dallas (Treatment)</th>
<th>Differences (ITT)</th>
<th>Diff-in-Diff (TOT)</th>
<th>St'dized Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>Pre</td>
<td>Post</td>
<td>(2)-(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.02098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Scores</td>
<td>-0.719</td>
<td>-0.707</td>
<td>-0.494</td>
<td>-0.445</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.081939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Mothers</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Crime</td>
<td>0.0067</td>
<td>0.0066</td>
<td>0.0151</td>
<td>0.0138</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0013</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.000)</td>
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<td>-0.0012</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nhood Index</td>
<td>-0.700</td>
<td>-0.684</td>
<td>-1.105</td>
<td>-0.986</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.118</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent (2010 $)</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-19</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-10</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.066)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table shows the neighborhood quality impact of moving from a single, metrowide FMR in Dallas to ZIP-level FMRs. See Section 5.1 for details.

a. Poverty rate, unemployment, and share of kids in families with single mothers are ACS tract-level data from 2006 to 2010.
b. Percent of 4th grade students’ scoring proficient or higher on state exams in the 2008-2009 academic year at zoned school. Proficiency rates are standardized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation over blockgroups in the Dallas metro area.
c. Violent Crime is number of homicides, nonnegligent manslaughter, robberies, and aggravated assaults per capita in 2010, and is calculated over the tract level for tracts in the city of Dallas, and at the jurisdiction level (city or county balance) for suburban voucher residents.
d. Index is an equally-weighted sum of the five measures, standardized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation.
e. Intent-to-Treat Estimates. Standard errors for Diff-in-Diff estimate in column (7) are clustered at the tract level are in parentheses.
f. Treatment-on-Treated Estimates. Column (7) divided by the fraction of Dallas tenants who moved to a new unit.
g. Standardized effect is Diff-in-Diff estimate with each measure re-oriented so that positive indicates an improvement, divided by standard deviation for all census tracts in the Dallas metro area.
Figure 2.6.: Impacts of Dallas “Tilting” on Neighborhood Quality (Timeseries)

Notes: In 2011, Dallas replaced a single, metro-wide FMR with ZIP code-level FMRs, raising rent ceilings in expensive neighborhoods and lowering rent ceilings in cheap neighborhoods. We construct a neighborhood quality index as an equally-weighted sum of tract-level poverty rate, test scores, unemployment rate, share of kids with single mothers, and violent crime rate. The index is normalized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation with respect to the entire Dallas metro area. The above figure plots the average neighborhood quality for movers in each year in the Dallas metro area and the Fort Worth metro area. The left vertical axis is the quality level of Fort Worth movers, the right vertical axis reports the quality level of Dallas Movers and both axes share the same scale.
Figure 2.7: Impacts of Dallas “Tilting” on Neighborhood Quality (Distribution)

Notes: The top panel shows the distribution of destination quality for people who moved from 2007 to 2010 (before the policy) and people who moved from 2010 to 2013 (after the policy). There is a broad-based improvement in destination quality in Dallas, with no change in nearby Fort Worth, which did not implement the policy.
2.5.2. Impacts on Voucher Rents and Building Quality

We examine the impacts of this policy change on building quality and voucher rents across all tenants, and separately for rents paid by stayers and for address with a voucher tenant change. The identifying assumption for this analysis is that the FMR change had no differential impact across zip codes on changes in nonvoucher rents from the base year (2010) to the most recent data available (2013):

**Identification Assumption in ZIP Code-Level Research Design**

\[ \eta \perp FMR \times Post | FMR \]

Because FMR in 2010 was constant across Dallas, using the 2011 FMR level as the regressor is the same as using the change from 2010 to 2011 as the regressor. With \( j \) indexing ZIP codes and \( Post_t \) as a dummy for 2013, we estimate

**First Stage:**

\[
\widetilde{p}_{ijt} = \alpha + \gamma FMR_j Post_t + FMR_j + b_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} 
\]

(2.7)

**Second Stage:**

\[
y_{ijt} = \alpha + \beta \widetilde{p}_{ijt} + FMR_j + b_{ijt} + \eta_{ijt} 
\]

(2.8)

24The court settlement which precipitated the policy change also funded voluntary mobility counseling, provided by Inclusive Communities Project, the organization which filed the lawsuit. There were 303 voucher households who already had conventional (non-Walker) vouchers in 2010 and took advantage of these counseling services by the end of 2012. Appendix Table 5 shows that households which received counseling showed dramatic improvements in neighborhood quality of 1.17 standard deviations. These large impacts may reflect self-selection or the causal impact of the intervention. If the quality improvement for these 303 households is entirely attributable to the causal impact of mobility counseling (and not to the ZIP code-level FMRs), then our estimates for the impact of ZIP code-level FMRs shrinks by about 20%.
Rents at the ZIP code-level were highly responsive to the policy change, as shown in Figure 2.5. Table 6 reports results from equations 2.7 and 2.8. Changes in FMRs are a strong predictor of changes in rent ceiling, with coefficients around 60 cents. We find that for every dollar increase (decrease) in FMR, rents for stayers rose (fell) by 13 cents. Among addresses where the tenants changed, we find a much stronger effect of 56 cents. Evidently, rent reasonableness is enforced much more seriously in Dallas for lease renewals than for new leases, even when the new leases occur at addresses previously occupied by other voucher tenants. Finally, looking across all tenants who moved, we find substantial rent increases in more expensive areas and rent decreases in cheaper areas; every $1 change in FMR was associated with a 62 cent change in rents. This could reflect changes in landlord pricing or unit quality.

Across Dallas average voucher rents were roughly constant (Table 2.5), but given the tendency of voucher recipients to live in low-quality neighborhoods, it is surprising that instituting ZIP code-level FMRs did not save money. Two statistical properties of the rent distribution in Dallas help to explain this. First, the share of renters is sharply declining in block group income, from 70% for the lowest-income neighborhoods to 10% for the highest-income neighborhoods. As a result, the median rent of all units in Dallas is substantially lower than the rent paid in a neighborhood of median quality. Second, the data suggest that there is a minimum cost to rental housing; median rents are the same in neighborhoods with a quality index of -4 and an index of -1. Finally, implementation costs were also minimal, at only about $10 per household.\footnote{Implementation cost estimate comes from correspondence with Matthew Hogan of Dallas Housing Authority, October 23, 2012.}

We also examine whether this change in the schedule led voucher recipients to move to higher-
Table 2.6.: Effect of Tilting Rent Ceilings to ZIP-level on Rents and Building Quality in Dallas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Variation</th>
<th>Set Fair Market Rent in Dallas Using ZIP-Level Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Same Address w/Same Voucher Tenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Stage</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log ZIP FMR×Post</td>
<td>0.572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV Rent Estimate</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log ZIP Rent Ceiling×Post</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV Quality Estimate</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log ZIP Rent Ceiling×Post</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Control for ZIP FMR: Yes, Yes, Yes
Indicators for Bedroom-Year: Yes, Yes, Yes

n: 21020, 18425, 17290

Notes: This table shows the rent and building quality impact of moving from a single, metro-wide FMR in Dallas to ZIP-level FMRs using a balanced panel of units in 2010 and 2013. The first panel shows the coefficient b from the first stage equation: Rent_Ceiling = a + b*FMR*post + FMR + e. The second and third panels show the coefficient b from the second stage equation y = a + b*Rent_Ceiling_hat*post + FMR + e where FMR*post is the instrument for Rent_Ceiling_hat*post. This coefficient is the treatment estimate for the effect of a $1 rent ceiling change on rents and unit quality. Column 1 sample uses observations where the tenant stayed in the same unit from 2010 to 2013. Column 2 sample analyzes addresses which had different voucher tenants in 2010 and 2013. Column 3 sample uses tenants who moved from 2010 to 2013. The hedonic quality measure in the bottom panel is the same ACS model used in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by ZIP (n=135 for stayers, 132 for movers). See Section 5.2 for details. See Appendix B.4 for details on hedonics.
quality buildings. We predict physical structure quality by applying the hedonic coefficients to data in Dallas on number of bedrooms, structure type, and structure age (but not building location). In 2010, voucher recipients who lived in higher-quality neighborhoods had lower structure quality, as would be expected given the existence of a single, metro-wide rent ceiling. We find that for every dollar change in the rent ceiling, structure quality for movers changed by 19 cents, as reported in Table 2.6. This may understate the true effect on unit quality - our hedonic measure doesn't capture unobserved quality changes to units (reductions or improvements). This measure also does not incorporate the improvements in neighborhood quality detailed in 2.5.1.

2.5.3. Comparing Policies to Improve Neighborhood Quality

The impact on neighborhood poverty rates for voucher recipients of the Dallas policy is substantial in comparison with the across-the-board increases studied in Section 2.4. We consider three scenarios: (1) a 10% increase in the rent ceiling, multiplied by the coefficient from the rebenchmarking estimate, (2) a shift of FMRs from the 40th to the 50th percentile, and (3) the Dallas policy. The rebenchmarking yields a precise zero, the shift to the 50th percentile yields an imprecise zero, and the Dallas policy yields an improvement which is statistically large and economically significant.27

We compare the neighborhood quality impacts in Dallas to other randomized housing interventions in Table 2.7. Voucher recipients’ access to areas with good schools and low crime has been a major focus of research in recent years (Lens et al. (2011); Horn et al. (2014)). Two prominent studies with random assignment of vouchers where the tract-level poverty rate and violent crime rate are available as outcome measures are the MTO experiment and voucher random assignment in Chicago (Jacob and Ludwig (2012), Jacob et al. (2013)). We

26 See Appendix B.2.4 for details.
27 The results are shown in a bar graph in Appendix Figure 2.4.
consider two types of policy interventions: giving a voucher to someone in public housing and giving a voucher to someone receiving no housing assistance. From largest to smallest, the improvements are largest for the MTO experimental group, who were required to move to low-poverty tracts, medium-sized for people leaving public housing with unrestricted vouchers and zero for unassisted tenants given unrestricted vouchers. The improvements for people leaving public housing are unusually large in part because recipients were leaving distressed public housing with a high concentration of poverty.

For each intervention, we construct a cost estimate and summary measure of the change in opportunity for a child affected by the policy. Chetty et al. (2014) document heterogeneity in intergenerational mobility across US commuting zones. Chetty and Hendren (2015) estimate that two-thirds of the cross-sectional variation is causal. We regress the predicted income rank of child whose parents are at the 10th percentile of the income distribution on local violent crime and poverty rates. To predict the causal impact of voucher interventions on children’s outcomes, we assume: (1) the child lived in the new location from birth to age 18 and (2) the cross-Commuting-Zone coefficients are accurate for the causal impacts of tract-level variation in neighborhood quality. The Chetty et al. (2014) results, combined with our assumptions, suggest that their children’s income rank at around age 30 would rise by 4.3 percentage points, so from the 39th percentile to the 43rd percentile. This improvement for Dallas is smaller than the predicted improvement for the MTO Experimental group (20 percentage points), but similar in magnitude to offering vouchers to public housing residents, and larger than offering vouchers to unassisted tenants. Offering vouchers, however, is very

---

28To be precise, across commuting zones \( j \) we regress \( E(rank|parentRank_j = 0) + 0.1 \times E(drank/dparentRank_j) = \alpha + \beta Crime_j + \delta Poverty_j \) and then predict the impact of an intervention as \( \Delta Rank = \frac{1}{2} \left(-21.8 \times \Delta Crime - 0.231 \times \Delta Poverty\right) \) where the crime rate is measured as violent crimes per 10,000 residents and poverty rate is the fraction of residents with incomes below the federal poverty line.

29This 20 percentage point prediction is if the policy moved children at birth and they stayed in the same neighborhood until age 18. In fact, the improvement neighborhood quality for the MTO experimental group decayed by about 80%, so the quality impact of MTO was smaller than the impact of the hypothetical policy considered here which permanently implemented voucher restrictions.
Table 2.7.: Comparison of Policies to Improve Neighborhood Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Measure</th>
<th>Poverty Rate Control</th>
<th>Treat</th>
<th>Violent Crime Rate Control</th>
<th>Treat</th>
<th>Annual Cost (2010 $)</th>
<th>Predicted Impact on Child Income Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voucher with ZIP-Level FMR vs. Metrowide FMR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilting Rent Ceiling (Dallas)</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>-$23</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher vs. Public Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving to Opportunity Experimental</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>$2,144</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving to Opportunity Section 8</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>$2,144</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lottery from Chicago Public Housing</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>$2,144</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher vs. No Voucher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lottery from Chicago Private Housing</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>$5,299</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: “Treat” is constructed as control mean plus impact estimate for Treatment-on-Treated. Poverty Rate and Violent Crimes per 10,000 residents are tract level data.

Cost Annual cost of Dallas program is from Table 5. Annual cost of a voucher subsidy is equal to 12 times contract rent plus utility allowance minus tenant contribution from Table 1. Annual cost of moving someone from public housing to a voucher is cost of voucher subsidy from Table 1 minus annual ongoing maintenance cost of a public housing unit (estimated as $3,155/year by Abt Associates, 2010).

Predicted Impact on Child Income Rank Chetty, Hendren, Kline and Saez (2014) document heterogeneity in intergenerational mobility across US commuting zones. Chetty and Hendren (2015) estimate that 2/3 of the cross-sectional variation is causal. We estimate the impact of the poverty rate and the violent crime rate on the income rank of a child whose parents are at the 10th percentile of the income distribution using their published data. Under the assumption that the cross-CZ coefficients are accurate for the causal impacts of tract-level variation in neighborhood quality, we can calculate the impact of each mobility policy on income of a child who experiences each policy at age 0 and stays in that location until age 18.

Sources for Poverty and Crime Impacts: Moving to Opportunity results from Table 2, Kling Ludwig and Katz (2005). Lottery from Chicago Public Housing from Table 2, Jacob, Ludwig, and Miller (2013). Lottery from Chicago Private Housing from Table V, Jacob and Ludwig (2012).
costly to unassisted renters, and more expensive than maintaining the existing public housing stock (Abt Associates (2010)). The Dallas ZIP-level FMRs, in contrast, appear to thus far have had no net cost to the government.

The neighborhood quality improvements here stand in sharp contrast to the county-level rent ceiling results in Section 2.4. However, our model offers a straightforward reconciliation. Across-the-board rent ceiling increases operate like an income effect, with a minimal impact on quality. Tilting the rent ceiling, however, operates like a substitution effect and tenants substitute to higher quality.

2.6. Conclusion

We examine how changes in housing voucher generosity affect voucher rents and unit quality. Across all units, a $1 increase in the rent ceiling raises rents by 46 cents; consistent with this policy change acting like an income effect, we find very small observed quality increases of around 5 cents. A tilting of the rent ceiling, which is equivalent to a substitution effect, increases neighborhood quality substantially. The latter policy, without any net cost to the government, appears to have raised a neighborhood quality index by 0.23 standard deviations.

A simple model built around an assumption that it is more difficult to find a unit in a high-quality neighborhood can explain our empirical findings, as well as why voucher recipients tend to live in low-quality neighborhoods. Although the tilting of the rent ceiling is highly cost-effective and voucher recipients move to better neighborhoods, the destination neighborhoods are still of a relatively low quality relative to the distribution for Dallas as a whole. Future research should seek to identify other barriers or preferences which affect the neighborhood quality of voucher recipients.
3. A Permutation Test for the Regression Kink Design

3.1. Introduction

We develop a permutation test for Regression Kink (RK) designs which rely on an identification principle analogous to the one underlying the better-known Regression Discontinuity (RD) designs. RD designs estimate the change in the level of an outcome $Y$ at the threshold level of the assignment variable $V$ at which the level of the policy changes discontinuously (see, e.g., Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). RK designs exploit discontinuous changes in the slope of a policy $B$ at a specific level of the assignment variable - the kink point $\bar{V}$ - and assess whether there is also a discontinuous change in the slope of the outcome variable. By comparing the ratio of the slope change in the outcome variable to the slope change in the policy variable at the kink point, the RK design recovers a causal effect of the policy on the outcome at the kink point. This is again analogous to RD designs which calculate the ratio of changes in the level of the outcome to the change in the level of treatment (or treatment probability) at the discontinuity. The parameter of interest that the slope change at the kink point identifies is the average effect of increasing the policy conditional on the level of the assignment variable at the kink point. Key identification and inference results for the RK design were derived in Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber (2010),
This article discusses a permutation test for the RK design, its underlying assumptions and implementation. For motivation, we begin by describing the regression kink design based on an example from a growing body of literature that implements the RK design to estimate the causal effect of unemployment benefits $B$ on an outcome $Y$ such as unemployment duration or employment (see, e.g., Britto, 2015, Card et al., 2015, Card et al., 2015, Kolsrud et al., 2015b, Kyyrä and Pesola, 2015, Landais, 2015, and Sovago, 2015). Even though crucial for policy design, the question of whether unemployed individuals stay out of work for longer if they receive more generous benefits is hard to address in the absence of a randomized experiment. RK studies of unemployment insurance aim to fill this gap by exploiting the fact that many unemployment insurance systems pay out benefits $B$ that rise linearly with income $V$ that an individual earned before becoming unemployed—up to a benefit cap $\bar{B}$ for individuals earning above a reference income $\bar{V}$, the kink point. In such a schedule, the slope between the policy variable $B$ (unemployment benefits) and the assignment variable $V$ (previous income) changes discontinuously at $\bar{V}$. To study the effect of benefits $B$ on unemployment duration, researchers estimate by how much the slope of the outcome variable $Y$—unemployment duration— with respect to the assignment variable changes discontinuously at such kink points. Intuitively, if unemployment benefits have no impact on unemployment duration, one would not expect to see discontinuous changes in the slope of unemployment duration $Y$ and previous income $V$ at a kink point $\bar{V}$. However, if unemployment benefits do deter individuals from finding employment, then one would expect discontinuous changes in the slope of unemployment duration with respect to previous income at kink points that depend on the strength of the causal effect of benefits $B$ on unemployment duration $Y$. Section 2 provides a more detailed review of the RK design and key identification results.

While the RK design has become increasingly popular, RK estimators as typically implemented may suffer from non-negligible misspecification bias and consequently too narrow
confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2014b). In most applications of the RK design, researchers use local linear or quadratic estimators to estimate the slope change at the kink (see overview of studies in Table in Appendix ) and choose bandwidths with the goal of minimizing mean squared error (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). In these specifications, misspecification bias can arise as a consequence of non-linearity in the conditional expectation function. To see how, consider Figure 3.1 which displays data with a piecewise linear data generating process (DGP) featuring a kink and a quadratic DGP with no kink. For both DGPs, local linear estimators that are common in the RK literature indicate statistically highly significant slope changes at the kink, even though the quadratic DGP does not feature a discontinuous slope change. Calonico et al. (2014b) prove that such misspecification bias is non-negligible with standard bandwidth selectors and leads to poor empirical coverage of the resulting confidence intervals. As a remedy, Calonico et al. (2014b) develop an alternative estimation and inference approach for RD and RK designs based on a bias-correction of the estimators and a new standard error estimator that reflects the bias correction.
Figure 3.1.: Piecewise Linear and Quadratic Simulated DGPs

Note: The data generating process (DGP) is either linear with a kink (blue dots) or quadratic (red diamonds) without a kink. We generate 1000 observations with a variance of 12 and plot the in bins based on the approach in Calonico et al. (2014a, 2015). We estimate a linear Regression Kink model with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The top panel shows the relationship between the outcome variable and the running variable for both the piecewise linear and the quadratic DGP. In the bottom left panel, we display the data for the piecewise linear DGP and add the predictions from a local linear model. The bottom right panel shows predictions from a linear RK model estimated on the quadratic DGP which features no kink. Significance levels are reported based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors following CLPW.
To provide a complement and robustness check to existing RK inference, we draw on randomization inference and propose a permutation test—treating the location of the kink point $\bar{V}$ as random—that has exact size in finite samples. The key assumption underlying our test is that the location of the policy kink point is randomly drawn from a set of potential kink locations. This assumption is rooted in a thought experiment in which the data are taken as given and only the location of the kink point $\bar{V}$ is thought of as a random variable. In many RK contexts, this assumption is appealing because the kink point’s location is typically not chosen based on features of the DGP or—as in the case of kinks in many unemployment insurance schedules—is determined as the outcome of a stochastic process (see Section 3). Under the null hypothesis that the policy has no effect on the outcome and the assumption that the location of the policy kink is randomly drawn from a specified support, the distribution of placebo estimates provides an exact null distribution for the test statistic at the policy kink. We prove that the permutation test controls size exactly in finite samples.

We simulate data to assess the performance of asymptotic and permutation test-based inference for linear and quadratic RK estimators based on data with linear and non-linear data-generating processes. These Monte Carlo simulations document that asymptotic p-values can be misleading in settings in which the relationship between the outcome and the assignment variable is non-linear; RK estimates are statistically significant using asymptotic methods even when the kink is fact zero. Our permutation test, in contrast, is robust to non-linearity and indicates no statistical significance in settings without a kink but detects actual non-zero kinks in the examples we study. A second simulation study additionally illustrates that the permutation test has exact size control in finite settings when the location of the kink point is in fact randomly drawn. We also document that asymptotic inference is reliable in settings in which the relationship between outcome and assignment variable is, in fact, linear or piece-wise linear. In the simulations, we also document examples of settings in which the permutation test fails to detect non-zero kinks. This can occur when
the relationship between the outcome and the assignment variable is sufficiently non-linear relative to the magnitude of the kink. Importantly, while the permutation test has low power in such settings, the permutation test still has exact size when the basic assumption that the location of the kink point can be thought of as a random variable holds.

Our permutation test builds on the principles of randomization inference, which has a long tradition in the statistics literature (Fisher, 1935; Lehmann and Stein, 1949; Welch and Gutierrez, 1988; Welch, 1990; Rosenbaum, 2001; Ho and Imai, 2006, see Rosenbaum, 2002, for an introduction) and has seen new interest in recent years from econometricians (see, for instance, Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004; Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005; Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 2009; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010; Abadie, Athey, Imbens, and Wooldridge, 2014; Cattaneo, Frandsen, and Titiunik, 2015). In particular, Cattaneo et al. (2015) develop a randomization inference approach for RD designs based on an interpretation of RD designs as local randomized experiments in a narrow window around the RD cutoff. While the procedure developed by Cattaneo et al. (2015) treats the locations of observations above and below the cutoff as random within a narrow window, our test offers a complementary approach by treating the location of the kink point (or cutoff) itself as random. In doing so, our approach generalizes a suggestion by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for the RD design, “testing for a zero effect in settings where it is known that the effect should be 0”, to the RK design by estimating slope changes in regions where there is no change in the slope of the policy (see also the placebo analyses in Engström et al. (2015)). We then use this distribution of placebo kink estimates to test a sharp null hypothesis of no effect of the policy on the outcome variable. Our paper builds on Calonico et al., 2014b in developing new methods to deal with misspecification bias in RK and RD designs. In related work, Landais (2015) proposes an alternative way of gauging the robustness in RK estimates by constructing difference-in-differences RK estimates which are based on the same kink point but using data from time periods with and without the presence of an actual policy kink.
Ando (2013) uses Monte Carlo simulations to argue that linear RK estimates are biased in the presence of plausible amounts of curvature.

3.2. Notation and Review

3.2.1. Identification in the Regression Kink Design

The following section reviews key results and notation for the RK design based on Card et al. (2015), also abbreviated as CLPW in the following, and illustrates the method based on RK designs aimed at estimating the causal effect of unemployment benefits $B$ on an outcome $Y$, e.g., unemployment duration, by exploiting kinks in the unemployment insurance schedule (see, e.g., Britto, 2015, Card et al., 2015, Card et al., 2015, Kolsrud et al., 2015b, Kyyrä and Pesola, 2015, Landais, 2015, and Sovago, 2015).

Formally, the outcome $Y$ - here thought of as unemployment duration - is modeled as

$$Y = y(B, V, U)$$

(3.1)

where $B$ denotes the policy variable, unemployment benefits, $V$ denotes a running variable, here thought of as previous labor income, which determines the assignment of $B$, and $U$ denotes an error term. The parameter of interest is the effect of the policy variable, $B$, on the outcome $Y$. Analogous to treatment effects for binary treatments, defined as $y(1, V, U) - y(0, V, U)$ in a potential outcomes framework, the treatment parameter that RK design intend to estimate is the marginal effect of increasing the level of the policy $B$ on the outcome $Y$. 
i.e.

\[
\frac{dy(B,V,U)}{dB} \tag{3.2}
\]

Integrating this marginal effect over the distribution of \( U \) conditional on \( B = b \) and \( V = v \) leads to the “treatment on the treated” parameter in Florens, Heckman, Meghir, and Vytlacil (2008):

\[
TT_{B=b,V=v} = \int \frac{\partial y(b,v,u)}{\partial b} dF_{U|B=b,V=v}(u) \tag{3.3}
\]

where \( F_{U|B=b,V=v} \) denotes the conditional c.d.f. of the error term \( U \). In the context of unemployment benefits, this corresponds to the average effect of marginally increasing unemployment benefits on unemployment duration for individuals with unemployment benefits \( B = b \) and previous income \( V = v \).

The key feature that RK designs exploit is a discrete slope change in the assignment mechanism of the policy. Let \( B = b(V) \) denote the policy function or, in the context of unemployment insurance, the benefit schedule. In many unemployment systems, benefits \( B \) rise linearly with the previous income \( V \) that an individual earned before becoming unemployed. A maximum level of benefits is also typically offered for individuals earning above a higher reference income \( \bar{V} \). This implies that the slope between the policy variable \( B \) (unemployment benefits) and the assignment variable \( V \) (previous income) changes discontinuously at \( \bar{V} \) when the previous income rises above the reference income. To illustrate, the upper panel of Figure 3.2 shows plots of unemployment benefits plotted against earnings in the previous year based on Austrian UI data (CLPW). The benefit schedule or policy function \( B = b(V) \) can be simply described as follows:
\[
\frac{\partial b(V)}{\partial v} = \begin{cases} 
\alpha_1 & , v < \bar{V} \\
\alpha_2 & , \bar{V} < v
\end{cases}
\] (3.4)

where \(\alpha_1 \neq \alpha_2\) and \(\lim_{v \to \bar{V}} db(v)/dv = \alpha_1\) and \(\lim_{v \to \bar{V}} db(v)/dv = \alpha_2\). Importantly, there is no variation in the policy \(B\) conditional on the assignment variable \(V\) so that the marginal effect of the policy on the outcome is not non-parametrically identified.

**Figure 3.2.**: RK Example: UI Benefits in Austria

![Graph of UI Benefits in Austria](image)

Notes: The figures are from Figure 3 and Figure 5 of Card et al. (2015). T-min refers to the earnings threshold at which benefits start to rise. Coefficients are from Table 3.1. Bins chosen based on the approach in Calonico et al. (2014a, 2015).

However, researchers can exploit the discrete change in the policy function \(b(V)\) at the kink point to identify the marginal effect of the policy. Intuitively, if unemployment benefits have
no impact on unemployment duration, one would not expect to see discontinuous changes in
the slope of unemployment duration and pre-unemployment income at kink points. However,
if unemployment benefits do deter individuals from going back to work, then one would
expect discontinuous changes in the slope of unemployment duration with respect to previous
income at kink points. At the kink, one would expect a positive slope change as individuals
above the reference income receive more generous benefits and consequently stay unemployed
for longer. To study the effect of benefits $B$ on unemployment duration, researchers can
then estimate by how much the slope of the outcome variable $Y$ — unemployment duration
— with respect to the assignment variable changes discontinuously at such kink points.
To illustrate, the lower panel in Figure 3.2 plots a measure of unemployment duration $Y$
against the running variable $V$, earnings in the previous year, again based on Austrian UI data (CLPW) documenting an apparent slope change at the kink point.

### 3.2.2. Estimation and Identification

The RK estimator, $\tau_{RK}$, is defined in the population as the change in the slope of the outcome variable at the kink point normalized by the slope change in the policy at the kink point:

$$\tau_{RK} \equiv \frac{\lim_{v \to v^-} dE(Y|V=v)/dv - \lim_{v \to v^+} dE(Y|V=v)/dv}{\lim_{v \to v^-} db(v)/dv - \lim_{v \to v^+} db(v)/dv}$$

(3.5)

In the example of unemployment benefits, the denominator of this expression, i.e. the
slope change in the policy variable at the reference income, corresponds to $\lim_{v \to v^-} dE(Y|V = v)/dv - \lim_{v \to v^+} dE(Y|V = v)/dv = \alpha_2 - \alpha_1$. This is analogous to the denominator in fuzzy RD designs which scales up the difference in the level of the outcome variable at the discontinuity
by the difference in the level of the treatment at the discontinuity.
Local polynomial regression techniques (Fan and Gijbels, 1996) are used for estimation of \( \tau_{RK} \). The data is split into two subsamples to the left and right of the kink point (denoted by + and -, respectively) and a local polynomial regression is estimated separately for each subsample. For the sharp RK design, in which the slope change in the policy at the kink point is known, this amounts to solving the following least squares problem in the sample:

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{\{\beta_j^+\}} & \sum_{i=1}^{N^-} \{Y_i^- - \sum_{j=0}^{p} \tilde{\beta}_j^- (V_i^-)^j\}^2 K \left( \frac{V_i^-}{h} \right) \\
\min_{\{\beta_j^-\}} & \sum_{i=1}^{N^+} \{Y_i^+ - \sum_{j=0}^{p} \tilde{\beta}_j^+ (V_i^+)^j\}^2 K \left( \frac{V_i^+}{h} \right) \\
\text{subject to} & \quad \tilde{\beta}_0^- = \tilde{\beta}_0^+ \\
\hat{\tau}_{RK}^p & \equiv \tilde{\beta}_1^+ - \tilde{\beta}_1^- \tag{3.6}
\end{align*}
\]

Here, \( p \) denotes the order of the polynomial, \( K \) the kernel function, and \( h \) the bandwidth used for estimation. In the literature, the bandwidth is typically chosen based on the formula in Fan and Gijbels, through cross-validation, or the procedure in Calonico et al. (2014b). The denominator of the left-hand side of equation X is identified as \( \hat{\beta}_1^+ - \hat{\beta}_1^- \). The papers in the RK literature have primarily adopted a uniform kernel as choice of \( K \) and overwhelming use local linear and quadratic specifications.

CLPW prove that this RK estimator in (3.5) identifies the “treatment on the treated” parameter in (3.3) (Florens et al., 2008) for individuals at the kink point under mild regularity conditions, in particular an assumption of smoothness of \( y \), so that:

\[
\tau_{RK} = \int \frac{\partial y(b,v,u)}{\partial b} dF_{U|B=b,V=v}(u). \tag{3.7}
\]
3.2.3. Asymptotic Bias

A potential problem of RK designs is that non-linearities of the conditional expectation function $E[Y|V = v]$ can generate bias in the estimator $\hat{\tau}_{RK}^P$. Panel 3 of Figure 3.1 illustrates the intuition of this result as curvature of the conditional expectation function generates bias of linear RK estimators. A formal argument supporting this intuition follows from Calonico et al. (2014b) who derive a general formula for the asymptotic bias of RK and RD estimators. Based on the general formula, the asymptotic misspecification bias of local linear RK estimators is shown to be proportional to $(m^{(2)}_+ + m^{(2)}_-)h$, which is the sum of second derivatives of the moment function and the bandwidth $h$. The terms $m^{(j)}_+$ and $m^{(j)}_-$ denote the limits of the $j^{th}$ derivative of $m(v) \equiv E[Y|V = v]$ from above and below at the kink. A similar expression can be derived for local quadratic estimators for which first-order bias is proportional to third-order terms of the conditional mean function. Calonico et al. (2014b) prove that such misspecification bias is non-negligible with standard bandwidth selectors and, as a consequence, leads to poor empirical coverage of the resulting confidence intervals.

3.3. A Permutation Test for the Regression Kink Design

3.3.1. The Thought Experiment

We propose a simple permutation test to assess the null hypothesis that treatment has no effect on the outcome of interest. At the core of our test is the assumption that the location of the policy kink can be considered as randomly drawn from a known set of placebo kink points—an assumption that needs to be evaluated in the context of the specific research
design under scrutiny. We describe a method for how researchers can estimate a distribution of placebo kink points in the context of unemployment insurance systems. In this interval, we can reassign the location of the kink and calculate RK estimates, $\hat{\tau}_{RK}$, at these placebo kinks. As discussed above, inference based on conventional robust standard errors can be misleading when non-linearity in the data biases RK estimates. By drawing on data away from the kink, this permutation test offers an exact finite sample inference procedure which researchers can use as an alternative. The test assesses the extremeness of the estimated change in the slope at the kink point relative to estimated slope changes at non-kink points under the null hypothesis that the policy does not affect the outcome.

The thought experiment underlying this permutation test (and randomization inference more generally) is different from the one underlying asymptotic inference. Whereas the idea underlying asymptotic inference is one of sampling observations from a large population, the thought experiment in randomization inference is based on a fixed population that the researcher observes in the data, with the realizations of the running variable $v$ and the outcome variable $y$, in which the assignment of treatment is sampled repeatedly. In the latter approach, treatment assignment is thought of as the random variable. Our test therefore does not treat the sample as being drawn from a (super) population for which we seek inference but rather takes the observed sample as given and tests hypotheses regarding this particular sample, treating the location of the policy kink as a random variable.

### 3.3.2. The Permutation Test Statistic

We let $y$ denote the vector of $y_i$ values, $v$ denote the vector of $v_i$ realizations and $k$ denote a potential kink point, with a policy kink featuring a discontinuous slope change in the policy or a placebo kink not featuring such a discontinuous slope change. The data are a vector of $n$
observations each with \((y_i, v_i, b(v_i))\) denoting outcome, running variable and policy variable: in the context of using the RK design to estimate the effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, these would correspond to unemployment duration, previous income, and unemployment benefits, respectively.

For notational tractability and expositional clarity, our exposition pertains to the linear RK model with a uniform kernel. This can be easily generalized to higher-order polynomials and other kernels. Define the matrix

\[
\mathbf{v}^k \equiv \tilde{\mathbf{v}}(k) \\
\equiv \begin{pmatrix}
1 & (v_1 - k) & (v_1 - k)1(v_1 \geq k) \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
1 & (v_n - k) & (v_n - k)1(v_n \geq k)
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

(3.8)

We define the test statistic for the slope change at the potential kink point \(k\) as

\[
T(\mathbf{v}, y, k) \equiv (0 \quad 0 \quad 1)' \left(\mathbf{v}^k' \mathbf{v}^k\right)^{-1} \mathbf{v}^k' y, \\
|v_i - k| \leq h(\mathbf{v}, y, k),
\]

(3.9)

where \(h(\mathbf{v}, y, k)\) denotes the bandwidth used for estimation. This test statistic corresponds to the reduced form of a linear RK estimator. At the true kink point, which we label \(k^*\), this estimator—scaled up by the slope change at the policy—identifies the causal effect of the policy on the “treated” \(\left.\int \frac{\partial g(b,v,a)}{\partial b} dF_{U\mid B=b(k^*),V=k^*,(u)}\right|_{B=b(k^*),V=k^*,(u)}\), under the assumptions laid out in CLPW. We can calculate the test statistic \(T(\mathbf{v}, y, k)\) at the true policy kink point \(k^*\), \(T(\mathbf{v}, y, k^*)\), and at other points \(k \in [v_{\text{min}}, v_{\text{max}}]\) in the range of \(v\).

**Modeling choices.** The test statistic used for the permutation test should correspond to
the RK estimator and preferred modeling choices, including bandwidth (or a bandwidth selection mechanism), polynomial order and bias-correction, implemented by the researcher for the RK estimator at the actual policy kink. The permutation test approach can be easily generalized to incorporate alternative RK estimators, polynomial orders, and bandwidth choices. The Monte Carlo studies we present in Section 4 provide some guidance for the modeling choices and suggest that estimators based on the procedure in Calonico et al. (2014b) perform relative to local polynomial estimators with bandwidth choice based on Fan and Gijbels (1996).

3.3.3. The Randomization Assumption

The core assumption underlying our permutation test is that the location of the policy kink point $k^*$ can be thought of as being randomly drawn:

Assumption: Random Kink Placement. $k^*$ is a realization of a random variable $K$ distributed according to a known distribution $P$.

The assumption that the policy kink location can be thought of a being randomly drawn is a strong one but natural in the context of many RK designs. Its plausibility needs to be evaluated in the context of a given research design. It would be violated if, for instance, policy-makers had chosen a kink location explicitly or implicitly in response to the shape of the conditional expectation function $E[Y|V]$, e.g., at a location where curvature is particularly high or low. We discuss several implementable strategies for researchers to identify $P$.

1. Estimation of stochastic process based on institutional features. In the example of estimating the causal effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration that we follow throughout the paper, researchers implementing the permutation test for the RK design can
exploit features of many unemployment insurance systems to directly estimate the distribution $P$. In many unemployment insurance systems, the location of the kink point—the earnings ceiling at which unemployment benefits are capped—is determined as a consequence of past aggregate wage growth in the economy. For instance, in Austria—the setting of the study by CLPW—the earnings ceiling in the unemployment insurance system changes as a function of aggregate wage growth from the third to the second previous calendar year ($\S$ 108 Allgemeines Sozialversicherungsgesetz). Therefore, past data on past wage growth can be used to directly estimate the properties of the stochastic process that determines the realization of $k^*$ in a given year.

2. **Documentary evidence on rule-making.** If directly estimating the stochastic process determining $k^*$ is infeasible, researchers can still proxy $P$ by drawing on information on the institutional environment of the relevant RK application. In the spirit of randomization inference, $K$ should correspond to the actual range of proposals for kinks that could have been adopted. If, for example, several policy proposals existed in a political debate regarding the choice of a reference income $\bar{V}$ in the example of unemployment insurance we discussed, researchers could use the discretized minimum range $[\underline{v}, \bar{v}]$ that includes all of these proposals. For instance, prior to switching to a system of automatic updates of the earnings ceiling based on aggregate wage growth in 1969, the German *Bundestag* adjusted the earnings ceiling in a discretionary fashion so that the minutes of plenary proceedings can be used to gauge the range of discussed proposals.

In addition, we also suggest that researchers implement the permutation test based on two additional benchmarks:

3. **Local randomization neighborhood (Cattaneo et al., 2015).** In the context of developing a randomization inference approach for the RD design treating observations-rather than the cutoff itself as in our approach—as randomly assigned, Cattaneo et al. (2015) design a data-driven procedure to select a window around an RD cutoff based on balance tests of pre-
treatment covariates in which treatment status is arguably as good as randomly assigned. A natural extension of their procedure is to treat the location of the cutoff or kink—rather than the observations—as randomly assigned within this window.

4. Range of available data. As a final benchmark, we suggest that researchers consider the whole range of available data \([v_{\text{min}}, v_{\text{max}}]\) and treat the empirical distribution of \(V\) as the distribution of \(K\). This follows the approach in Section 4 of Gelman and Imbens (2014) for selecting pseudo-thresholds in the context of evaluating RD designs.

3.3.4. Exact Size For Testing the Null Hypothesis of Policy Irrelevance

The goal of our permutation test is to assess whether the data reject the null hypothesis that the policy does not affect outcomes. We formalize this as a sharp null hypothesis where \(\mathcal{B}\) and \(\mathcal{V}\) denote the range of the policy and assignment variable, respectively:

\[
\text{Null Hypothesis: Policy Irrelevance.} \quad \text{The policy does not affect outcomes at any } v: \frac{dy(b,v,U)}{db} = 0, \quad \forall b \in \mathcal{B}, \forall v \in \mathcal{V}.
\]

Note that this hypothesis implies that in the range the policy is irrelevant: \(y(b_1, \bar{v}, U) = y(b_2, \bar{v}, U), \forall b_1, b_2 \in \mathcal{B}, \forall \bar{v} \in \mathcal{V}\). Under the \textit{Policy Irrelevance Hypothesis} and the \textit{Assumption of Random Kink Placement}, the distribution of kink estimates over \(P\) corresponds to the exact distribution of possible estimates which could have arisen had the policy kink been at a different location in the same dataset. Under these assumptions, we can construct an exact test following the logic of Fisher (1935) and Pitman (1937).
Proposition 1. Under the Null Hypothesis of Policy Irrelevance and the Random Kink Location assumption, there exists a test function $\phi(v, y, k)$ for significance level $\alpha$ which has an exact finite sample level of $\alpha$.

In Appendix, we follow the structure of a simple proof in Romano (1990) documenting that, under the Null Hypothesis of Policy Irrelevance and the Random Kink Location assumption, there exists a test function $\phi(v, y, k)$ for significance level $\alpha$ which has an exact finite sample level of $\alpha$.

Under the assumption of Random Kink Placement, the Null Hypothesis thus leads to a testable implication which can be assessed by measuring how unusual a given realization of the test statistic is at the policy kink. Analogous to the test outlined above, researchers can also calculate $p$-values for assessing the likelihood that the Null Hypothesis is true given the RK estimate at the policy kink $k^*$ and the distribution of placebo kink estimates. Suppose a researcher had calculated 1000 placebo kink estimates and the estimate at the policy kink $k^*$ were the $20^{\text{th}}$ lowest of these estimates. Then the two-sided $p$-value would be calculated to be 4% corresponding to twice the one-sided $p$-value of 2%. More generally, the two-sided $p$-value can be calculated as twice the minimum of the two one-sided $p$-values, i.e., the minimum of the fraction of placebo estimates—including the one at the actual policy kink $k^*$—that are no greater than or no smaller than the test statistic at the policy kink $k^*$.

3.4. Applications of the Permutation Test

3.4.1. Illustration of Permutation Test

We implement the permutation test for a Regression Kink design based on data simulated to match moments of the empirical distribution in the RK application in CLPW. As in the
example described in the previous sections, the research design aims to assess the effect of unemployment benefits of unemployment duration. The running variable can be thought of as base year income; the outcome variable as a measure of unemployment duration, the logarithm of the time until the next job. Recall that the right panel in Figure 3.2 was taken from CLPW and showed the local relationship between unemployment duration and base year income at the bottom kink.

**Figure 3.3.:** RK Inference Example: UI Benefits in Austria

Notes: Figures based on data from Card et al. (2015). The left panel is supplemental data shared with the authors by Andrea Weber showing the global relationship between the outcome variable and the running variable. We estimate a cubic spline based on these data and display the resulting regression function in maroon. The right figure shows the cumulative distribution functions of placebo RK estimates of the relationship between unemployment duration and previous earnings based on simulated data. The solid maroon line denotes the reduced form estimate of the slope change at \( x = -0.8 \), which corresponds to the “bottom kink” location in CLPW. The dashed vertical lines in maroon denote the 95% confidence interval.

For the purpose of implementing the permutation test, we draw on data on the global relationship between these two variables shown in the left panel of Figure 3.3. A red vertical line denotes the policy kink at which the slope between unemployment benefits and base year income changes. We estimate a cubic spline model on these data points—without allowing for a discrete slope change at the policy kink—and use the estimated parameters to simulate data on which we implement the permutation test.¹

¹The solid line in the left panel of Figure 3.3 shows the estimated conditional mean function. We simulate 2500 observations, assuming that \( x \) has a uniform distribution and that \( y = E(y|x) + \varepsilon \) where \( \varepsilon \sim N(0, 0.125) \) and \( E(y|x) \) is set using a cubic spline model.
Following the RK literature (e.g., CLPW), we use a standard RK estimator based on local linear regression with bandwidth choice as proposed in Fan and Gijbels’ (1996) and calculate robust standard errors.\(^2\) We estimate a positive, statistically significant slope change at the policy kink point \((p = 0.002)\) using asymptotic inference even though the data generating process—by our assumption—does not feature a discrete slope change at the policy kink point.

We then implement the permutation test by estimating slope changes at 91 equally spaced placebo kink points ranging from the 5th to the 95th percentile of the assignment variable. The c.d.f. of the resulting distribution of placebo RK estimates is shown in the right panel of Figure 3.3. The figure also shows the point estimate of the slope change at the actual policy kink and the corresponding confidence interval based on asymptotic inference in maroon. While standard inference procedures would have led the researcher to erroneously conclude that there had been a statistically significant slope change at the kink point, the permutation test leads to a \(p\)–value of 0.165. To be clear, this does not suggest that there is no discrete slope change in the data considered by CLPW; but rather that RK estimates with standard inference might lead a researcher to conclude that there is a discrete slope change when in fact the DGP is smooth.

### 3.4.2. Simulation Study I: Performance of Permutation Test

We now generalize our analysis and extend the permutation test to several other data-generating processes (DGPs). The conditional mean functions for these DGPs are displayed

\(^2\)Fan and Gijbels (1996) propose a “rule-of-thumb” bandwidth \(h = C_P \left[ \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(0)}{\{\hat{m}^{(p+1)}(0)\}^2 f(0)} \right]^{\frac{1}{3}} n^{-\frac{1}{6}}\) which is approximately MSE-optimal. We follow CLPW’s implementation of this bandwidth choice and estimate \(\hat{\sigma}^2(0)\) and \(\hat{m}^{(p+1)}(0)\) based on a global polynomial of the outcome on the assignment variable allowing for a kink at the threshold. The constants are \(C_1 = 2.35\) and \(C_2 = 3.93\) for the linear and quadratic case, respectively. We choose the order of the polynomial based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and estimate \(\hat{f}(0)\) based on a fourth order polynomial fitted to a histogram of the assignment variable.
in Figure 3.4.\textsuperscript{3} We have chosen several non-linear as well as piece-wise linear conditional mean functions. For each of these conditional mean functions, we simulate data with and without a kink at zero. DGP 1 is a linear function and piece-wise linear in the specification with a kink. DGPs 2 through 3 are based on combinations of trigonometric, polynomial and exponential functions functions with and without kinks. DGP 4 follows a sine function.

\textsuperscript{3}A full description of these processes can be found in the note of Table 3.1.
Figure 3.4.: Conditional Mean Function for Simulation DGPs

Note: To compare the performance of asymptotic and permutation-based methods, we analyze four different data-generating processes. They are:

\[
E(y|x) = \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{if } x < 0 \\
0.3 \sin(10(x - 0.25)) + 3(x - 1)^2, & \text{if } 0 \leq x \leq 0.5 \\
0.3(0.5 + |x|) \cos^2(5(x - 0.1)) - 5e^x, & \text{if } x > 0.5 \\
\end{cases}
\]

We add kinks with a slope change of 20 to these DGPs. The Figure displays the conditional mean function \(E(y|x)\) for each of these DGPs. To illustrate, we also show DGPs where a kink at \(x = 0\) (20\(\times\)1(\(x > 0\)) has been added. In Simulation Study I, the kink location is always at \(x = 0\), In Simulation Study II, we randomly draw kink locations on \([-1,1]\).
Table 3.1.: Simulation Study I: Asymptotic and Randomization Inference in Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DGP</th>
<th>Any Kink?</th>
<th>Local Linear</th>
<th></th>
<th>Local Quadratic</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Asymptotic</td>
<td>Permutation</td>
<td>Asymptotic</td>
<td>Permutation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No Kink</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td>0.846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No Kink</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>No Kink</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No Kink</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kink Present</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kink Present</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kink Present</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kink Present</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>&lt;0.001</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To compare the performance of asymptotic and permutation-based methods, we analyze the data-generating processes displayed in Figure 3.4. For every DGP, we randomly generate 2,500 observations with \( x \) is distributed uniformly on \([-2,2]\) and \( y = E(y|x) + \varepsilon \) with \( \varepsilon \sim N(0,0.25) \). We compute two-sided asymptotic p-values following CLPW and permutation-based p-values using the method described in Section 3.3 and the Fan and Gijbel’s bandwidth choice procedure. We analyze both local linear and local quadratic models.

For the case of simulated data without policy kinks, the results document that asymptotic inference leads to highly significant p-values of RK estimates for non-linear DGPs (DGPs 2-4). This holds true for both local linear and local quadratic estimators. In the case of a linear DGP, however, asymptotic inference does not lead to statistically significant, falsely-positive results (see DGP 1). This is in line with our argument—based on first-order asymptotic bias—that the unreliability of standard inference for RK estimators indeed stems from non-linearity in the relationship between the outcome and the running variable.

In contrast to asymptotic inference in the case of non-linear DGPs without kinks, the permutation test-based p-values are not statistically significant at conventional levels in any of these cases. This result holds for both linear and quadratic estimators.

When we simulate these exercise for DGPs with non-zero slope changes at \( x = 0 \), asymptotic inference does correctly indicate statistical significance. Importantly, the permutation test also detects these non-zero kinks and rejects the null hypothesis in three of four cases with
An exception that we deliberately designed to illustrate a setting in which the permutation test may not detect a non-zero kink is DGP 4 with an actual kink. Here, the permutation test - based on a linear specification - does not indicate statistical significance even though there is a notable, discrete slope change at \( x = 0 \). The distribution of placebo kink estimates is very dispersed as the DGP is highly non-linear in regions away from the kink but locally linear.\(^4\) The limits of the practical relevance of this example are, however, obvious: while in the simulation study, we have control over the data generating process, researchers who would want to argue against applying the permutation test in their RK application would need to make a compelling case that the conditional mean function is non-linear in large segments of their data but that local polynomial approaches are still powerful enough to detect discrete slope changes at specific kink points. More generally, this example serves to illustrate that the permutation test may not detect slope changes that are small relative to the overall non-linearity in the DGP.

### 3.4.3. Simulation Study II: Type I and Type II Errors

We generalize the analysis from the previous section to study type I and type II error rates for the different DGPs under study. To do so, we again generate 2,500 observations with the running variable uniformly distributed on the interval \([-2, 2]\). In addition, we now randomly draw a potential kink location \( k^* \) on the interval \([-1, 1]\). With probability \( p = 0.5 \), we then add an actual slope change component to the DGP at this potential kink location \( k^* \). With probability \( p = 0.5 \), we add no slope change at the kink location. This process is repeated for a total of 1000 times.\(^5\)

\(^4\)Note that the permutation test in the local quadratic specification does reject the null hypothesis in this case.

\(^5\)We require balance so that we have 500 DGPs with and 500 DGPs without a slope change at the randomly drawn kink point.
This setup allows us to study systematically in what fraction of cases the different estimators and inference methods detect a statistically significant slope change at the kink location when the slope does in fact not change discontinuously (type I error rate). In addition, we can also study in what fraction of cases the null hypothesis is not rejected when there is in fact a violation of the null hypothesis as there is a discontinuous slope change at the kink point (type II error rate). We show results for these simulations in Table 3.2.

Mirroring the results from simulation study I, we find that the standard inference methods applied in the RK literature do not control size well for non-linear DGPs and have a type I error rate that is much higher than the nominal level. This results holds for both linear and quadratic estimators. In contrast, this simulation illustrates the intuition that the permutation test has exact size in finite samples for testing a sharp null hypothesis of no effect when the assumption of random kink location holds. Based on 1000 simulations (500 with a non-zero kink, 500 without one), we find that the type I error rate is close to nominal (10%) in all cases.

We assess type II error rates in the bottom panel of Table 3.2 and find for the permutation test that the probability with which the null hypothesis is accepted when there is in fact a violation (a slope change of 20 at the kink point $k^*$) is less than 15% and 8% in three of four cases for linear and quadratic estimators, respectively. Note that in the case of DGP 4, which we included to demonstrate a setting in which the permutation test may not have enough power to detect slope changes as the overall non-linearity in the DGP is so high that the distribution of placebo estimates is very dispersed, the type II error rate is substantially higher at 76% and 92% for the linear and quadratic setup, respectively. However, a DGP with such extensive non-linearity may not be a good setting for a Regression Kink analysis.

---

6 In this exercise, we set the nominal size of the test at 10% such that when the null hypothesis is true it is rejected 10% of the time.

7 Standard inference leads to lower type II error rates which we also report for the sake of completeness. However, as standard inference has very poor size control the seemingly superior type II error rates do not make standard inference overall more compelling.
to begin with. While this demonstrates that the permutation test has low power when the DGP is very non-linear compared to the magnitude of the slope change, this simulation exercise also demonstrates that the permutation test has exact size control even in such a setting when the assumption that the location of the kink point was randomly drawn holds.

**Table 3.2.:** Simulation Study II: Type I and Type II Errors For Asymptotic and Randomization Inference in Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DGP</th>
<th>Local Linear</th>
<th></th>
<th>Local Quadratic</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asymptotic</td>
<td>Permutation</td>
<td>Asymptotic</td>
<td>Permutation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type I Error (No Kink)</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type II Error (Kink Present)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To compare the performance of asymptotic and permutation-based methods, we analyze the data-generating processes displayed in Figure 3.4. For every DGP, we randomly generate 2,500 observations with $x$ distributed uniformly on [-2,2] and $y = E(y|x) + \varepsilon$ with $\varepsilon \sim N(0,0.25)$. We randomly draw a kink location $k^*$ from [-1,1] and add a slope change component $(20x1(x > k^*))$ to the DGP with a probability of $p = 0.5$. This process is repeated for a total of 1,000 iterations. We set the nominal level of the test to 10%. The first four rows of the table report, for a given DGP and estimation method, the fraction of iterations in which asymptotic or permutation test-based inference reject the underlying null hypotheses at the 10% level. The last four rows report the fraction of iterations in which the null hypothesis was not rejected.

Finally, we analyze the robustness of these findings to different specifications for the error term. In the appendix, we repeat the exercise from this section and change the specification of the error term $\varepsilon$ in the simulation to either be heteroskedastic with $\varepsilon = (1 + |1 - x|)\varepsilon$ where $\varepsilon \sim N(0,0.25)$ or to have a t-distribution with 5 degrees of freedom which is a distribution with heavier tails. In both cases, we find the same pattern of results as in Table 3.2 which featured normally distributed error terms.
3.5. Conclusion

We have developed a permutation test for the regression kink design and document its performance compared to standard asymptotic inference. The thought experiment underlying our test differs from the one of standard asymptotic inference which has is based on the thought experiment of drawing observations from a large population so that standard errors reflect sampling uncertainty. Our test follows the randomization inference approach in taking the sample as given and takes the assignment of treatment, here the location of the kink point, as a random variable and thus the source of uncertainty. This approach is particularly appealing in the context of the recent rise in the use of administrative, population data for empirical research (see Chetty, 2012). When full population data are available the usual thought experiment of sampling from a population needs to appeal to a notion of a super-population from which the population data are drawn whereas randomization inference tests hypotheses pertaining the drawn sample and not a super-population. Finally, in the specific context of RK designs, our test can offer a complement to standard inference which will be more robust in the presence of non-linearity which is ubiquitous in many of the settings in which RK designs are applied. Based on the results of our simulation studies, we recommend that practitioners: (1) avoid using linear and quadratic RK estimators with FG bandwidth choice, (2) use the distribution of placebo estimates to assess whether they will have power to detect economically meaningful results in their context, (3) report p-values constructed by comparing their point estimate to the distribution of placebo estimates, and (4) use the robust procedure in Calonico et al. (2014b) as preferred procedure for estimating kinks.
Bibliography


Fritzdixon, K. and P. M. Skiba (2016). The consequences of online payday lending.


A. Appendix to Chapter 1
(Unemployment)

A.1. Data

A.1.1. Sample Construction, Subsamples, and Winsorization

Unit of Observation. The core unit of observation is a set of bank accounts linked around a single primary account owner in the JPMCI. Many of these accounts have secondary owners who can also access the account. Some accounts have two people who jointly own the account. Sometimes, members of a family will not administratively link their accounts together; we exploit this feature of the data in Section A.2.1 to understand how missing accounts affect our analysis.

Classifying Primary Accounts with UI Spells.

Errors in transaction classification lead to measurement error of UI receipt, so we developed three criteria to establish whether a UI spell is plausible. First, families must receive at least two UI payments. Second, the checks must have an amount and frequency which is reasonable given UI program rules – less than $3,000 per month and fewer than 6 checks per month. Third, months with UI payments must be contiguous and observed duration must be less than or equal to program rules on potential benefit duration. These restrictions serve to reduce measurement error due to erroneously classified non-UI transactions and provide a clear benefit exhaustion date, which is necessary for our analysis in Section 1.5. Of the roughly 1 million families with any potential UI receipt, 57% meet these criteria.

We classify families who bank primarily with Chase as those with five outflows from their checking accounts each month. To be conservative, we select families who have five outflows in each of the three months prior to their UI spell, five monthly outflows during their UI spell, and five monthly outflows in each of the three months following their UI spell, if their UI spell ends before the end of the panel. This restriction also reduces sample size – of the 586,000 families with a UI spell, about 376,000 meet this primary account criteria. In our sample, this means that we also require the UI spell to be fifteen months or less. We are only able to compute the duration of UI spells which begin in November 2012 or later. Extended benefits which were legislated in response to the Great Recession expired in December 2013 and the last payments for these benefits were made in January 2014, which is why fifteen months is the maximum in the JPMCI data.
robustness analysis in Section A.2.1, we repeat our analysis dropping this sample criteria and also using subsamples which offer even better coverage of family finances, but come at the expense of studying a more highly-selected sample.

Finally, we study UI spells which start in January 2013 or later, so that we have at least three months of pre-UI data on each family. This screen brings us to our baseline analysis sample of about 235,000 families.

**Subsamples.** We use three subsamples of these data in our analysis:

- **While Unemployed** – In some places, we analyze the spending of families where a member is unemployed. Because spending jumps up in the month prior to the last UI check, if a family received benefits for $T$ months, we define this sample using months 0 to $T - 1$. Figures 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6 as well as Table 1.4 use this sample.

- **Exhausted Benefits** – We analyze the spending of exhaustees who had a potential benefit duration of 26 weeks or less, by focusing on UI recipients whose last UI check was paid in February 2014 or later. We measure duration in weeks as the date from the first UI check to the last UI check. Exhaustees are those who received benefits for a number of weeks equal to the current potential benefit duration in their state (usually 26 weeks, but lower in Florida, Michigan and Georgia), plus or minus two weeks for administrative error. We use this sample in Table 1.4, Table 1.7, Figure 1.9, Appendix Figure 1.6 and Appendix Figure 1.7.

- **26-Week Potential Benefit Duration** – In the model, we are specifically interested in the forward-looking behavior of a family eligible for 26 weeks of benefits. Here, we analyze UI recipients whose last UI check was paid in February 2014 or later and did not live in Florida, Michigan or Georgia.

**Winsorization** In general, we winsorize all variables at the 95th percentile of the set of observations with positive values. The one exception is in Table 1.5, 1.7 and Appendix Table 1.1 to preserve an additive decomposition across inflow and outflow categories, we instead drop families with inflows or outflows greater than the 95th percentile.
A.1.2. Categorizing Income and Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>JPMCI Category (Selected Examples)</th>
<th>% of Flows</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inflows</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Payroll, Direct Deposit²</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Income</td>
<td>Tax Refunds, Social Security (Old Age and Disability), Child Support, Unemployment Insurance, Veterans Benefits, Supplemental Security Income</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>Cash, Investment Income, Interest, Refunds</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>Paper Checks</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissaving</td>
<td>Transfers from Checking, Savings, Money Market, and Investment Accounts</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outflows</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debit Card</td>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Withdrawal</td>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Payments</td>
<td>Telecom Bill by ACH, Electric Bill by ACH, or Payment Method Used Primarily for Bills</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installment Debt</td>
<td>Mortgage, Home Equity, Auto Loan, Student Loan</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card Debt</td>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Checks</td>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>PayPal, Misc ACH, tax payments</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>Transfers to Money Market, Savings, and Investment Accounts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: % of flows measured for UI recipients three months prior to UI spell. This sample is defined in Section 1.2.1.

A.2. Unemployment Appendix: Robustness Checks

A.2.1. Empirics – Onset of Unemployment

The decline in spending at onset appears to reflect a true drop in family-wide spending rather than a shift in spending to alternative payment channels. First, as discussed in Section 1.2.1, 27% of families have checking accounts at multiple banks. One way to estimate if unemployment affects spending at outside checking accounts is to examine unlinked checking accounts within Chase for customers who share a last name and mailing address.³ This

³About 10% of families that receive UI have not linked all of their accounts together. At no point during this analysis did we see personally identifiable information. Rather, the dataset included a numeric identifier which grouped together unlinked accounts which had the same last name and street address.
could occur if, for example, two Chase customers formed a family unit without linking their accounts administratively. We find that spending in these unlinked accounts falls by $51 at the onset of unemployment. Because the spending drop is computed using a larger denominator, we now find a 6% drop at onset across all accounts in this subsample, rather than an 8% drop in only the linked accounts. Second, families could shift spending from the debit card linked to their checking account to a credit card which did not need to be paid immediately. Outstanding balances on all credit cards in the credit bureau records rise by $60 over a two-month period, so families either increase card spending or reduce card payments by $30 each month. It is unclear whether this reflects increased spending on credit cards or reduced payments on outstanding credit card debt. We estimate that the change in spending through alternative payment channels is $35 (27%*$51 + 72%*$30).4

Our results for the sample of families with direct deposit of UI and at least five outflows per month appear to have external validity for other UI recipients. One concern is that families who adopt direct deposit of UI will be more financially sophisticated and better at smoothing than the typical family. We analyze the drop in spending at onset for the five states in the data with the highest adoption rate of direct deposit of UI: Georgia, Ohio, New Jersey, Florida, and Utah. According to Saunders and McLaughlin (2013), at least 65% of UI claimants receive their benefits using direct deposit. In these states, the drop in spending at onset is 8%, which is close to our overall estimate of 6%.

A.2.2. Empirics – Benefit Exhaustion

We implement the same robustness checks for internal and external validity at exhaustion as we did at onset. The empirical strategies are described in detail in Section A.2.1 and here we review only the results. Spending out of unlinked accounts rises slightly at benefit exhaustion, by $48 per month. Because the spending drop is computed using a larger denominator, we now find an 8% drop at exhaustion across all accounts in this subsample, rather than an 14% drop in only the linked accounts. Remember that this modification applies to only the one-quarter of families with accounts at multiple banks, so the impact on our modification on our overall results is limited. Borrowing on Chase credit cards rises by about $30 per month (Table 1.2), which appears to be driven by decreased payments rather than substituting consumption to credit cards. Credit bureau records show no additional borrowing on non-Chase credit cards.

A.2.3. Empirics – Income Recovery Rates in Other Datasets

One area where the literature has not reached consensus is in understanding the path of earnings prior to a separation. Jacobson et al. (1993b) and Jacobson et al. (1993a) find that

4The Survey of Consumer Payment Choice estimated that 72% of people have at least one credit card.
mass layoff separators as well as UI recipients show declining wages in the years *prior* to separation. JLS argue that this reflects declining worker productivity as well as declining firm labor demand (e.g. overtime). The JPMCI data as well as our plots from the SIPP show roughly constant earnings prior to separation. Wachter et al. (2009) show sharply *rising* earnings in the years prior to separation. Understanding the reasons for these disparate trends is an important area for future work.

Our analysis uses the 2004-2007 SIPP panel, because the economic climate during this survey better reflects the labor market in 2013 and 2014 than the 2008-2012 SIPP panel. Earnings losses are deeper for UI recipients in the 2008 SIPP panel, where UI recipients searched for work in the midst of a severe recession.

One additional challenge for this exercise is estimating the earnings counterfactual in the absence of the UI separation. The analysis above has focused on whether earnings return to their pre-separation level. Some researchers have used workers who never separate as a control group. This choice seems problematic because UI recipients have lower labor income prior to separation and education than the typical employee and earnings rise faster over the lifecycle for employees with more education. Finding a suitable control group that matches UI recipients on observables seems necessary for accurately calculating a counterfactual.

**A.2.4. Model**

Below, we describe some alternative parameterizations of the model which do not change our substantive results. The results are shown graphically in Appendix Figure 1.8.

- Duration dependence in job-finding – We change the model by assuming that the job-finding rate falls permanently after exhaustion from 25% to 15%. With this change, we find that agents reduce their consumption slightly more during UI receipt to prepare for the possibility of longer unemployment.

- More expansive definition of spending – We consider an alternative expenditure series where we categorize all non-saving outflows as consumption. The path of spending using this definition is slightly smoother, with slightly smaller discrete drops at onset and exhaustion and a larger monthly drop as the spell progresses. In addition, in the two months prior to exhaustion there is a slight uptick in spending.

- Higher risk aversion to reflect consumption commitments – Chetty and Szeidl (2007) find that individuals with large consumption commitments effectively have larger risk aversion while unemployed. To allow for this case, we consider a case with coefficient of risk aversion $\gamma = 4$. As the figure shows, the risk aversion parameter has very little impact on the predicted consumption path.
Appendix Figure 1.1 – Representativeness: Age and Geography

Notes: The top panel plots the age of family head for UI recipients in the Survey of Income and Program Participation and in the bank data. The bottom panel shows the states in which the bank has a physical footprint based on ATM locations publicly posted on Chase.com.
Appendix Figure 1.2 – Calendar Month Adjustment Factors

Note: To eliminate seasonality, inflation, and upward secular trends related to increased use of electronic payment methods, all results for income and spending are presented relative to a comparison group. This figure shows the monthly dollar adjustments associated with three different comparison groups: families which (1) received UI in at least one month, (2) received direct deposit payroll in 21-31 of 32 months and (3) had third-party annual income estimates between $30,000 and $80,000. See Section 1.2.5 for details.
Appendix Figure 1.3 – Measuring Family-wide Spending With Unlinked Accounts

Note: About one-quarter of families have checking accounts at multiple banks. To understand how checking accounts outside the bank might bias our results, we study income and spending out of accounts which have not been linked together administratively, but have the same last name and address, suggesting that they belong to the same family.
Note: This figure compares mean monthly family labor income around a UI spell in the 2004 SIPP and in the bank data. The SIPP shows a smaller drop in income than the bank data. This may be attributable to “seam bias”, where respondents who were re-employed report having positive earnings in all four months about which they are surveyed, even though in fact they were earning less in prior months. We use the 2004 SIPP rather than the 2008 SIPP because long follow-up horizons in the 2008 SIPP are available only for people who separated at the start of the Great Recession and therefore faced unusually bad job opportunities.
Appendix Figure 1.5 – Income and Spending by UI Duration

Note: The top panel replicates the bottom panel of Figure 5, which estimated the labor income drop and recovery for all UI recipients, but stratifies families by completed UI duration. The bottom panel examines the path of spending for the same three groups.
Appendix Figure 1.6 – Event Study For Six Largest States

Note: The top panel plots the path of UI benefits for exhaustees in the six largest states in the data. Maximum benefit durations were shorter in Florida (16 weeks) and Michigan (20 weeks) than the 26 weeks of benefits available in most states. The bottom panel plots the path of spending for exhaustees in each of these six states.
Note: This figure compares the path of spending for UI exhaustees who received their last UI check on the 25th of the month or later to the path of spending for all UI exhaustees. The latter group appears to have benefits phase out over two months due to monthly time aggregation. The two-month magnitude of the spending drop is very similar for between the two groups.
APPENDIX FIGURE 1.8 – ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF THE BUFFER STOCK MODEL

Note: The top left panel plots the path of spending predicted by the buffer-stock model under baseline job-finding beliefs post-exhaustion (25%) and assuming that the job-finding rate permanently drops to 15% post-exhaustion. The top right panel plots the predicted income path by the buffer-stock model against the path of spending in the data measured as total outflows net of transfers to savings accounts. The bottom left panel is the same as the top right, but adds a line showing the predicted path of spending from the buffer-stock model assuming \( \gamma \), the coefficient of relative risk aversion, is equal to 4. The bottom right panel shows the path of spending in the data compared to the path predicted by the buffer-stock model assuming agents have different initial asset levels.
## Appendix Table 1.1 -- Summary Statistics Prior to Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean (1)</th>
<th>Median (2)</th>
<th>Std Dev (3)</th>
<th>Share &gt; 0 (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. Total Inflows</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Direct Deposit</td>
<td>2678</td>
<td>2160</td>
<td>2475</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt: IRS, SS, DI, SSI</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Checks</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Inflows</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissaving</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1079</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Total Outflows</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card: Drops at Retirement</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card: Stable at Retirement</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Withdrawal</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Bills</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Card Bills</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installment Debt</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Checks</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: n = 208,162. This table presents summary statistics on the analysis sample three months prior to the onset of UI. To make this decomposition less sensitive to outliers, we drop observations with inflows above the 95th percentile in the pre or post period for panel A and outflows above the 95th percentile for panel B. Medians are for data to the nearest $20 bin to prevent disclosure of individual observations.
Appendix Table 1.2 -- Additional Borrowing Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Onset</th>
<th>Two-Month Drop at Onset (t=-3 to t=-1)</th>
<th>Monthly Drop During UI</th>
<th>Two-Month Drop at Exhaustion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chase Credit Cards</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Limit ($)</td>
<td>11416</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credit Bureau Records</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Score</td>
<td>731.45</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Credit Cards -- Credit Limit ($)</td>
<td>38062</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Trades Delinquent 60+ Days</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>n</strong></td>
<td>79,782</td>
<td>241,378</td>
<td>13,138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

a. Changes at the onset of unemployment. We define this as from three months before the first UI payment to one month before the first UI payment. Each observation is a family.

b. Monthly changes while receiving UI. Each observation is a family-month. Standard errors in this column are clustered at the family level.

c. Changes at the exhaustion of UI benefits. We define this as from one month before the last UI payment to one month after the last UI payment for benefit exhaustees. Sample is exhaustees eligible for 26 weeks of benefits or less. Each observation is a family.
B. Appendix to Chapter 2 (Housing Vouchers)

B.1. Model

Finding an apartment is hard, especially for voucher recipients. We build a partial equilibrium directed search model with price posting to analyze the incidence of changes in voucher generosity. People issued a voucher choose a quality submarket in which to search for housing. Only some voucher recipients are able to find units because of search frictions. Higher quality units are more attractive, but it is harder to find a unit in a higher-quality submarket, generating a compensating differential (Rosen (1986)). We develop two propositions which examine how rent and quality change in response to an increase in the rent ceiling as well as a tilting of the rent ceiling with respect to neighborhood quality.

B.1.1. Environment

There is a continuum of neighborhoods with heterogeneous quality \( q \) where \( q \) is an observable, dollar-denominated index with positive measure for all \( q \geq q_{\text{min}} \).\(^1\) A subset of renters, too small to have any general equilibrium impact on rents, is offered a voucher.

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\(^1\)We define \( q \) as a neighborhood because definition best matches our empirical work for the natural experiment in Dallas. However, it is possible to also think of \( q \) as a summary measure of many different inputs to quality such as neighborhood, building type, and unit size, so long as the landlord cannot change the quality of her unit. This alternative definition of \( q \) generates an additional empirical prediction which is that across-the-board increases in voucher generosity may not have much impact on unit quality in the presence of search frictions.
Landlords There is a unit mass of landlords in each neighborhood \( q \) who each choose rent markups (or discounts) \( m \sim F \) with \( m \in [m_{low}, m_{high}] \). Assume that \( F \) is twice-differentiable with \( \frac{df(m)}{dm} < 0 \), so that \( \frac{f(\cdot)}{F(\cdot)} \) exhibits the monotone likelihood ratio property. Heterogeneity in \( m \) can be thought of as arising from differences in landlord’s outside options. When occupied, a landlord receives rent equal to the markup plus the base quality index \( m + q \), and when vacant, a landlord receives no rent.

Private Tenants Because this analysis is primarily focused on vouchers, we do not model private tenants’ choice of neighborhood. They are randomly matched to units in neighborhood \( q \) and have a dollar-denominated willingness to pay markups of \( \eta \sim G \), again arising from differences in outside options.

Voucher Recipients People who accept a voucher are not price sensitive so they will rent any unit which costs less than the rent ceiling. Voucher recipients consume one unit of housing. Voucher recipients choose a quality level \( q \) to maximize utility, subject to the constraint imposed by the rent ceiling \( \bar{r} \) in conjunction with landlord markups. Landlords have the policy:

Accept voucher if \( q + m < \bar{r}(q) \)

so the fraction of landlords in neighborhood \( q \) who will accept a voucher is \( F(\bar{r}(q) - q) \). Recipients solve:

\[
\max_q U(P(q), q) \quad \text{subject to } P(q) = F(\bar{r}(q) - q)
\]

Recipients maximize expected utility. Let \( V(q) \) (with \( V'(q) > 0 \) and \( V''(q) < 0 \)) denote the relative utility gain from finding a unit with quality \( q \) over remaining unmatched, which occurs with probability \( P(q) \). Finally, assume that the rent ceiling has a linear structure \( \bar{r} = r_{base} + cq \) with \( c \in [0, 1) \). The tenant’s problem can be rewritten as

\[
\max_q \frac{F(r_{base} + cq - q)}{V(q)}
\]

**B.1.2. Solution**

Voucher Tenants’ Quality Choices We solve the voucher recipient’s problem using the first
order condition:

\[(1 - c) = \frac{U_q}{U_P} = \frac{F(r_{\text{base}} + cq - q) V'(q)}{f(r_{\text{base}} + cq - q) V(q)}\]  

(B.1)

The solution \(q = q^*\) is unique.\(^2\)

Markups: Private tenants observe markup \(m\) and rent the unit if it is better than their outside option (i.e. the rent is lower than their willingness to pay): \(\eta - m > 0\). The share of the private tenant population that will accept an offer of \(m\) is \(G(m)\). Average transacted prices are

\[\mu_{\text{private}} = \int_{m_{low}}^{m_{high}} mG(m)f(m)dm/\left(\int_{m_{low}}^{m_{high}} G(m)f(m)dm\right) + q\]

Finally, we compute rents paid on behalf of voucher units in \(q\). Voucher tenants will accept any unit offered to them with rent less than \(\bar{r} - q\), so:

\[\mu_{\text{voucher}} = \int_{m_{low}}^{\bar{r} - q} mf(m)dm/\left(\int_{m_{low}}^{\bar{r} - q} f(m)dm\right) + q\]  

(B.2)

The average difference in rents between voucher and private units in neighborhood \(q\) is

\[\Delta(q) = \frac{\int_{m_{low}}^{\bar{r} - q} mf(m)dm}{\int_{m_{low}}^{\bar{r} - q} f(m)dm} - \frac{\int_{m_{low}}^{m_{high}} mG(m)f(m)dm}{\int_{m_{low}}^{m_{high}} G(m)f(m)dm}\]

Intuitively, the gap in average rents is larger when private tenants are more price sensitive (\(g(m)\) falls rapidly in \(m\)) and when the rent ceiling is higher.\(^3\)

\(^2\)This follows from the negative second-order condition in the maximand \(U_{qq} = (-1 + c)^2 \frac{df}{dq} V(q) + 2f(.)V'(q)(-1 + c) + F(.)V''(q) < 0\forall q\). The first term is negative because \(\frac{df}{dq}\) is negative by assumption, the second term is negative because \(c < 1\) and the third term is negative because \(V'' < 0\) by assumption.

\(^3\)Our model also implies that holding quality fixed, the average rent paid by a voucher recipient may be higher than the average rent paid by a private tenant, but we do not examine this empirically. See Table 6.7 in Olsen (2003) for a summary of older studies comparing differences in average costs and ORC/Macro (2001) for more recent evidence. From conversations with practitioners, we learned that some landlords perceive voucher recipients to be more costly than other tenants due to the risk of damage to the unit, while other landlords prefer voucher recipients because the housing authority guarantees a steady stream of rental payments. Both the costs and benefits of renting to a voucher recipient relative to a private tenant are difficult to quantify. For this reason, we focus instead on policy changes to the rent ceiling, rather than differences in average costs.
B.1.3. Comparative Statics

**Proposition 1** Within a neighborhood $q$, the average voucher rents rise when the rent ceiling rises.

$$\frac{\partial \mu_{\text{voucher}}}{\partial \tilde{r}} = [\tilde{r} - \bar{\mu}_{\text{voucher}}] \frac{f(\tilde{r} - q)}{\bar{F}(\tilde{r} - q)}$$

Proof: Differentiate equation B.2 with respect to $\tilde{r}$.

The size of the change in average voucher rents depends on how many landlords in $q$ are on the margin, with markups equal to $\tilde{r} - q$. This comparative static will understate the extent to which rents rise if landlords *deliberately* raise rents in response to changes in the rent ceiling. Any attempt to price discriminate will be limited to the extent that the rent reasonableness process described in Section 2.3 is effective.

Next, we analyze the impact on quality of raising $r_{\text{base}}$ versus the impact of raising $c$ (with a compensating change in $r_{\text{base}}$), which can be depicted visually as:

- **Across-the-board $\tilde{r}$ increase**
- **Tilting $\tilde{r}$**

Inside the model, these comparative statics correspond to an income effect and a substitution effect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>First-Order</th>
<th>Second-Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income Effect</td>
<td>$\propto$</td>
<td>$-(1 - c) \frac{\partial f(.)}{\partial r_{\text{base}}} V(.) + \frac{f(.) V'(.)}{U_{Pq}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution</td>
<td>$\propto$</td>
<td>$-(1 - c) \frac{\partial f(.)}{\partial r_{\text{base}}} V(.) q^* + \frac{f(.) V'(.) q^*}{U_{Pq}}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Proposition 2** Raising the rent ceiling in a search model affects quality chosen in the same
way that an income effect does in a consumer demand model. Tilting the rent ceiling in a
search model affects quality chosen in the same way as a substitution effect.

Proof: Differentiate equation B.1 with respect to $r_{\text{base}}$ and $c$.\(^4\)

Across-the-board increases are like an income effect in that voucher recipients may use the
funds for moves to a better neighborhood or improved matching probability in the previously-
chosen neighborhood. Raising the base rent ceiling raises quality, but only through second-
order terms $U_{PP}$ and $U_{Pq}$. Just as in a consumer demand problem where expanding a
household’s budget set will raise their consumption through diminishing marginal utility
of each good, quality here increases only through diminishing marginal utility of matching
probability and the complementarity between matching probability and unit quality. In
contrast, raising the subsidy for high-quality units also works through a first-order effect
$U_P$, whereby the penalty for moving to a higher-quality unit, which takes the form of a lower
matching probability, is diminished. This suggests that tilting the rent schedule may be
more effective at improving quality than raising the base rent ceiling.

B.1.4. Robustness

Two of the the simplifying assumptions in the baseline model are the use of a representative
agent and focusing on voucher units below the rent ceiling. Here, we show how the model
changes when we relax these assumptions. Our key conclusions remain unchanged. For
simplicity, we focus on the case where there is one constant rent ceiling $\bar{r}$ across a metro area,
rather than letting the rent ceiling vary with quality $q$.

B.1.4.1. Heterogeneity in Outside Options

Our baseline model examines a representative agent, while in fact voucher recipients choose a
wide variety of neighborhoods. Adding heterogeneity in a voucher recipient’s outside option

\(^4\)To see the exact analogy with for a model with labor and leisure, assume agent has utility $U(c, \ell)$ where $c$ is
consumption and $\ell$ is leisure. Assume $c = W(T - \ell) + Y$ where $W$ is the wage, time spent working is $T - \ell$
and $Y$ captures unearned income. This model has first-order condition of $-U_c(W(T - \ell^*(Z)) + Y, \ell^*(Z))(W +
U_{\ell}(W(T - \ell^*(Z)) + Y, \ell^*(Z))) = 0$ where $Z$ captures exogenous parameters $Y$ and $W$. Differentiation gives

| Income Effect $\frac{\partial r^*}{\partial Y}$ | $-U_c$ | $+WU_{cc} + U_{c\ell}$ |
| Substitution Effect $\frac{\partial r^*}{\partial W}$ | $-U_c$ | $[WU_{cc} + U_{c\ell}][T - \ell^*]$ |

This is formally isomorphic to the model above with $T - \ell = q$, $c = P$ and $W = -(1 - c)$.

165
generates heterogeneity in neighborhood choices. Voucher recipients with better outside options will search in better neighborhoods and their neighborhood choice will be more responsive to changes in the rent ceiling. Formally, let \( i \) index different individuals, and let \( q_i \) be individual \( i \)'s outside option. All individuals have utility over unit quality \( u(q) \), with \( u' > 0, u'' < 0 \). Now the tenant’s maximization problem and first order condition become:

\[
V_i = \max_q F(\bar{r} - q) V(q) + (1 - F(\bar{r} - q)) V(q_i)
\]

First Order Condition

\[
- f(\bar{r} - q_i^*) \left( V(q_i^*) - V(q_i) \right) + F(\bar{r} - q_i^*) V'(q_i^*) = 0
\]

Under the regularity condition already specified in Section B.1.1, there is a unique, global solution, with \( q_i^* > q_i \). Choosing to search in a higher quality neighborhood \( q \) means a decreased chance of matching. This is most painful for someone with low \( V(q_i) \) and so people with worse outside options use their voucher in worse neighborhoods. Differentiating with respect to \( \bar{r} \) and solving for \( \frac{\partial q_i^*}{\partial \bar{r}} \) gives

\[
\frac{\partial q_i^*}{\partial \bar{r}} \propto - \frac{\partial f(.)}{\partial \bar{r}} \left( V(q_i^*) - V(q_i) \right) + f(.) V'(q_i^*)
\]

These terms are the same as in the baseline model, except that the utility gain \( V(q^*) - V(q_i) \) now affects the responsiveness to a price ceiling increase, whereas in the baseline model \( V(q_i) \) was normalized to zero. People with a lot to lose from failing to find a unit with their voucher will be less responsive to the increase in the price ceiling.

B.1.4.2. Out-of-Pocket Payments for Expensive Housing

One important institutional feature of the housing voucher program which is omitted from the baseline model is that a voucher recipient can sometimes rent a unit above the rent ceiling. Adding this feature does not change the core results from the model: that the impact of a rent ceiling increase on neighborhood quality is blunted by search frictions and that increases in the price ceiling raise markups. In particular, if a voucher recipient new to the program finds a unit whose rental cost is greater than the rent ceiling but lower than the rent ceiling plus 10% of her income then she can choose to rent it and pay the difference between the rent ceiling and the unit’s rent out of pocket.\(^5\)

In the baseline model above with only housing consumption, voucher recipients solved:

\[
\max_q \int_{\eta_{\text{min}}}^{\bar{r}-q} V(q) dF(\eta)
\]

Now, redefining \( V \) to have two arguments, \( q \) for housing quality and \( c \) for non-housing

\(^5\)This rule does not apply to voucher recipients who are renewing their lease.
consumption, voucher recipients instead solve:

\[
\max_q \int_{\eta_{\min}}^{\bar{r}-q} V(q, 0.7y)dF(\eta) + \int_{\bar{r}-q}^{\bar{r}+0.1y-q} V(q, 0.7y - (\bar{r} - q))dF(\eta)
\]

where voucher recipients have non-housing consumption of at most 70% of their income \(y\).

The optimal choice of quality \(q^*\) is given by the first-order condition:

\[
F(\bar{r} + 0.1y - q^*)V_q - f(\bar{r} + 0.1y - q^*)V(\cdot) - \int_{\bar{r}-q^*}^{\bar{r}+0.1y-q^*} V_c dF(\eta) = 0
\]

choosing higher \(q\) improves quality... but risks not matching ...and lowers non-housing cons

Raising the rent ceiling affects quality through the same second-order terms as in the baseline, plus a new term which captures utility gain from reduced out-of-pocket payments for housing. Intuitively, the new term blunts the impact of the recent ceiling increase on housing quality because adding non-housing consumption to the model gives voucher recipients another “good” to buy other than housing quality. The comparative static of quality with respect to the price ceiling is:

\[
\frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \bar{r}} \propto -f(\cdot)V_q + \frac{\partial f(\cdot)}{\partial \bar{r}} V + \frac{d}{d\bar{r}} \left[ \int_{\bar{r}-q^*}^{\bar{r}+0.1y-q^*} V_c dF(\eta) \right]
\]

The new term \(\frac{d}{d\bar{r}} \left[ \int_{\bar{r}-q^*}^{\bar{r}+0.1y-q^*} V_c dF(\eta) \right]\) is most likely negative because its first and third components are negative and because the second term is small. Using the Leibniz rule, it is equal to

\[
\int_{\bar{r}-q^*}^{\bar{r}+0.1y-q^*} V_c (1 - \frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \bar{r}}) + V_{cq} \frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \bar{r}} dF(\eta) + [F(\bar{r} + 0.1y - q^*) - F(\bar{r} - q^*)]V_c(\cdot)(1 - \frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \bar{r}})
\]

The first term is negative under the assumption of diminishing marginal utility. The sign of the second term is ambiguous and depends on whether housing and non-housing consumption are complements or substitutes. Even in the case where they are complements, the term is still proportional to \(\frac{\partial q^*}{\partial \bar{r}}\), which we show empirically in the paper to be small. The third term is negative under our distributional assumption from the baseline model that \(F\) has decreasing mass further into the tail of markups.

Raising the rent ceiling affects prices entirely through changes in the set of units rented. Because there is no bargaining between landlords and tenants in this model, adding out-of-pocket tenant payments does not affect the economic conclusions from this comparative static.

\[
\frac{\partial \mu_{\text{voucher}}}{\partial \bar{r}} = [\bar{r} + 0.1y - \mu_{\text{voucher}}] \frac{f(\bar{r} + 0.1y - q)}{F(\bar{r} + 0.1y - q)}
\]
B.2. Data

B.2.1. Sample Construction

We use HUD’s “PIH Information Center” database, also known as PIC. In principle, every voucher is supposed to appear in PIC when admitted, when leaving the voucher program, for a regularly scheduled annual recertification, and for any unscheduled interim recertification due to, for example, a change in tenant payment or a move. Coverage is quite good for an administrative dataset with decentralized data entry; HUD estimates that in 2012, some record appeared in PIC for 91% of vouchers (Public and Indian Housing Delinquency Report (2012)). We construct years according to the federal government’s fiscal year (e.g. FY2012 starts in October 2011), since this is the calendar used for applying Fair Market Rent changes. We consider observations with non-missing rent, household id, address text, and lease date (also known as “effective date”). Addresses are standardized using HUD’s Geocoding Service Center, which uses Pitney and Bowes’ Core-1 Plus address-standardizing software. For each raw text address, this produces a cleaned text address, a 9-digit ZIP code and an 11-digit ZIP code. Within each household-year, we choose the observation with the most recent lease date and most recent server upload date. Our final step is to drop duplicate household-year observations, which amount to 2.3% of the sample and project-based vouchers, where the housing authority chooses the unit, rather than the tenant, which are less than 1% of the sample. This leaves us with a sample of about 1.6 million annual household records. Conditional on appearing in the sample in 2004, the probability of that household appearing in 2005 is 75%, and the probability of appearing in 2005, 2006, or 2007 is 84%, indicating that there often are substantial lags between appearances in PIC.

B.2.2. 2005 FMR Rebenchmarking

Constructing the FMR Cells: We use HUD’s published Fair Market Rent rates, with slight modifications (http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/fmr.html). Fair Market Rents are published on an annual basis corresponding to the federal fiscal year, so FY2005 rents were effective from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2005. FMR geographies are largely stable over time; HUD added 14 new city geographies in Virginia, and we code prior FMRs for these cities using the county-level FMRs. Our policy variation is at the county-bed cell level and measurement error \( \varphi_{2000} \neq \varphi_{1990} \) is larger for thinner cells. To maximize the variation in our instrument which can be attributed to measurement error, we weight each county-bed equally. In New England, FMRs are set by NECTAs, which cross county lines and we merge on FMRs to the appropriate sub-state geographies there. However, we weight each county-bed pair equally everywhere, including New England; were we to give equal weight to each geographic unit, then 1/3 of the sample weight would be in New England. Gordon (2004) and Suarez-Serrato and Wingender (2014) also use decennial Census rebenchmarkings as source of exogenous variation to examine the incidence of federal expenditures.

Sample Restrictions: The rebenchmarking resulted in large swings in local rents, and many housing authorities lobbied HUD for upward revisions to their local FMRs. In a revision to the 2005 FMRs, HUD accepted proposals from 14 counties. All documentation associated with the rebenchmarking is posted at http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/fmr/fmr2005r/index.html For these counties, we recode the FMR back to its pre-lobbying level. Coincident with the rebenchmarking, HUD administered Random Digit Dialing (RDD) surveys in 49 metropolitan areas. The results from these surveys, where available, superseded the results from the 2000 Census. Since these surveys were initiated and administered by HUD, we are less concerned about endogeneity of this data source, and we use the post-RDD FMRs for these areas. For these
areas, the orthogonality restriction is that rental market changes from 1990 to 2004 need to be uncorrelated with subsequent short-run changes \( E(\Delta r_{\text{Nonvoucher}}^{2004-t} | \Delta r_{\text{Nonvoucher}}^{1990-2004}) = 0 \). Finally we drop eight geographies, with specific reasons listed below.

Places Dropped – Reason

- Miami, FL, Honolulu, HI, Navarro County, TX, and Assumption Parish, LA – rebenchmark in 2004
- Okanogan County, WA – Lobbied for higher FMR in 2005, no counterfactual available
- Louisiana – Hurricane Katrina severely disturbed rental markets (among other things)
- Kalawao County, HI – No FMR published before 2005

Measuring the First Stage: The administrative data report the rent ceiling \( \bar{r} \) at the household level. Although much of our analysis limits the voucher sample in various ways (e.g. stayers, movers), we always compute \( \bar{r}_{jt} \) as the unconditional mean of all observations in a county-bed-year cell.

Trimming and Standard Errors: We winsorize county-by-bed FMR changes at the 1st and 99th percentile, so that our results will not be unduly influenced by outliers. While FMRs are published at the county-bed level, sometimes counties are grouped together for the purpose of setting a common FMR. Throughout our rebenchmarking analysis, we cluster our standard errors at the FMR group level (n=1,484).

B.2.3. Nonvoucher Rents and 2005 FMR Rebenchmarking

In Section 2.4.1, our key identification condition is

\[ \eta \perp FMR_{2005} | FMR_{2004} = 0 \]

Here we examine the correlation of the FMR change with contemporaneous changes in nonvoucher rents. Data availability make it difficult to measure nonvoucher rents at a high frequency and with a high degree of geographic specificity. (Recall that these difficulties are exactly what generated the policy variation we study here!) Using the notation developed in Section 2.4.1,

\[
Cov(\Delta \hat{r}_t, \Delta FMR) = Cov(r_t + \varepsilon_t - r_{2000} - \varepsilon_{2000}, \Delta FMR) = Var(\varepsilon_{2000}) < 0 \quad (B.3)
\]

Even if \( E(\Delta r_t | \Delta r_{t-1}) = 0 \), we estimate a negative covariance because of the negative auto-correlation of gains measured with error. Similarly, Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) calculate serial correlation in housing price changes and rent changes at five-year horizons and find negative serial correlation.

First, we compare changes in voucher rents to changes in tract-level median rents published by the Census.\(^6\) Data at the tract level are available from the 2000 Census (Minnesota Population Center (2011)) and the 2005-2009 American Community Survey with a consistent geographic identifier. In regression form, with \( i \) indexing tracts and \( j \) indexing counties, we estimate

\[
r_{\text{Nonvoucher}}^{2005-2009,ij} - r_{\text{Nonvoucher}}^{2000-2009,ij} = \alpha + \beta_j \Delta FMR_j + \varepsilon_{ij}
\]

\(^6\)The Census estimates include voucher recipients themselves, making this an imperfect measure of nonvoucher rent changes. Internal HUD data indicate that subsidized households typically report their rental payment (30% of income) in the Census, rather than the total rent received by the landlord. This measurement error means that rent reports by voucher recipients are unlikely to change in response to changes in the FMR.
where $\Delta FMR_j$ is the average FMR change across bedroom sizes. We find that rent changes from 2000 onward are negatively correlated with FMR changes ($\beta_1 < 0$), as reported in reported in Appendix Table 3, column 2. This is consistent with measurement error, since $\Delta FMR_j$ is a function of the change in Census rents from 1990 to 2000, there is a mechanical negative correlation between FMR changes and Census rent changes from 2000 to a later date. This generates a sharp contrast – places with relative increases in voucher rents had relative decreases in nonvoucher rents. This mean reversion pattern is most pronounced in rural areas. When we limit the sample to counties with at least 100,000 residents, we find that $\beta_1$ is not statistically different from zero (column 4).7 Finally, we pool the observations in columns 1 and 2 to estimate $\Delta r_{ij}^{(Voucher,Nonvoucher)} = \alpha + \beta_1 \Delta FMR_j + \beta_2 \Delta FMR_j \times Voucher_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$ where $Voucher_{ij}$ is an indicator for whether the rental change is observed for voucher stayers or nonvouchers. Then, we compute the probability that we would observe data like this or more extreme, under the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal ($\beta_1 = \beta_2$), and find $p < 0.01$. Likewise, we find that the probability $\beta_1 = \beta_2$ for in the urban sample is very low.

Another source of data on nonvoucher rents comes from the ACS public use microdata. These data are preferable because they more closely correspond to the time horizon of interest (data observed in 2000 and annually from 2005 to 2009) and because they identify the number of bedrooms the unit has, rather than just the location, allowing us to exploit the county-by-bed variation in FMR changes. However, since this is a public use file, geographic identifiers are available only for units located in counties which have more than 100,000 residents. We find a strong negative coefficient from 2000 to 2005 (column 5), consistent with measurement error at the bedroom level within counties. Analyzing the correlation of rent changes from 2005 to 2009 with FMR changes, which is perhaps our strongest test of $E(\Delta r_{\text{Nonvoucher}}^{2004-t} | \Delta FMR) = 0$, we find a coefficient of 0.02, very close to zero, although the estimate is imprecise. These estimates offer a joint test of two distinct hypotheses: (1) selection – contemporaneous neighborhood trends were correlated with FMR changes and (2) general equilibrium spillovers – FMR changes causally affected nonvoucher rents. The data are not consistent with these hypotheses.

B.2.4. Hedonic Quality

We build our hedonic quality measure using regression coefficients from a model of rents in the ACS along with building age, structure type, number of bedrooms and median tract rent. For our hedonic measures in the analyses of the re-benchmarking change and the Dallas ZIP-level ceiling change, we use administrative data from our PIC database and coefficients from a model of rents in the 2005-2009 public use sample of the American Community Survey, inflated to 2009 $ (Ruggles et al. (2010)). The following unit covariates appear in both the Census and in PIC: Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), number of bedrooms, structure type, and structure age. The PIC file reports an exact building age, which we code into the 10 bins for structure age available in the ACS. The PIC file reports 6 different structure categories and the ACS has 10 categories. We crosswalk these categories as best as we can, as

---

7This is consistent with plausible parameterizations of a tract-level data-generating process. Suppose that tract-level rents follow an auto-regressive process, with $Y_j = \rho Y_{j-1} + \eta_j$. A regression of tract-level rent changes from 2000 to 2005-2009 on county-level FMR changes, which are effectively rent changes from 1990 to 2000, of the form $\Delta Y_j^{\text{tract}} = \alpha + \beta Y_{j,t-1} \text{county}^{\text{county}} + \epsilon_j$ would yield a biased estimate $\hat{\beta} - \beta = -\frac{\text{county}}{\text{n county}}^{\text{county}} (1 - \rho) \frac{\text{Var(}\eta)}{\text{Var(}\Delta Y_{j,t-1}^{\text{county}})}$. Analyzing tract-level rent changes indicates that $\text{Var(}\eta) \approx \text{Var(}\Delta Y_{j,t-1}^{\text{county}})$, $\rho = 0.88$. Tracts in counties with 40,000 units or more have small values of $\frac{\text{county}}{\text{n county}}$, such that $\hat{\beta} - \beta = -0.005$ and tracts in counties with less than 40,000 units have large $\frac{\text{county}}{\text{n county}}$, resulting in $\hat{\beta} - \beta = -0.070$.  

170
We have 710,957 observations of households with positive cash rent in the ACS. Unfortunately, we have no way to drop subsidized renters (13% of sample). This is an added source of measurement error. We estimate using least squares

\[ Rent_{ijklm} = \alpha + Bed_j + StrucType_k + Age_l + PUMA_m + \varepsilon_i \]  

where Bed_j is a set of indicators for 5 possible numbers of bedrooms, StrucType_k is a set of indicators for 6 possible structure types, Age_l is a set of indicators for 10 possible structure age bins, and PUMA_m is a set of indicators for 2,067 PUMAs. The results from this regression appear in Appendix Table 1. This regression computes a vector of hedonic coefficients \( \hat{\beta}_{\text{census}} \). This hedonic regression has substantial predictive power, with an R-squared of 0.48. We then apply the coefficients from this hedonic regression to the voucher covariates for bedrooms, structure type and building age to construct a measure of hedonic unit quality \( q_{\text{hedonic}} = \hat{\beta}_{\text{census}} x_{\text{voucher}} + r_{\text{tract}} \) where \( r_{\text{tract}} \) is the median tract rent. The standard deviation of actual rent is $497 and the standard deviation of predicted rent is $331. For our Dallas analysis in Table 6, where we are interested in only structure quality and not neighborhood quality, we instead compute \( q_{\text{hedonic}} = \hat{\beta}_{\text{census}} x_{\text{voucher}} \), omitting neighborhood quality. We compare the predictive power of these same covariates in the American Housing Survey against a benchmark “kitchen-sink” regression of all hedonic characteristics in the AHS (60+ variables) in Appendix Table 2. The ACS variables approximate the full model fairly well with an \( R^2 \) of 0.30 compared to 0.42 with the full model.

To evaluate the effect of the 40th to 50th percentile FMR policy change on housing quality we construct a quality measure with building age, structure type, number of bedrooms and median tract rent plus 26 questions from HUD’s Customer Satisfaction Survey (CSS) and hedonic coefficients from a model of rents in the 2011 American Housing Survey (AHS). We identify 26 quality measures which can be matched to variables in the AHS. These are:
• Building has working elevator
• Working cooktop/burners
• Unit lacks hot water
• Access to a laundry room
• Working outlets
• Unit has safe porch or balcony
• Working refrigerator
• Use oven to heat the unit
• Large open cracks
• Windows have broken glass
• Roof sagging, holes, or missing roofing
• Home has cockroaches
• Home has rodents

• Home cold for 24 hours or more
• Fuses blown or circuit breakers tripped regularly
• Heating break down for 6 hours or more
• Wiring metal coverings
• Water leaking inside
• Mildew, mold, or water damage
• Smell bad odor such as sewer, natural gas
• Large peeling paint
• Toilet not working for 6 hours or more
• Unsafe handrails, steps or stairs
• Electrical outlets/switches have cover plates
• Rate unit good
• Rate unit poor

We estimate the contribution of unit characteristics to rent using equation 13 where vector $s$ includes the 26 measures listed above along with the number of bedrooms, age of housing, structure type and is a set of indicators for the American Housing Survey “Zone” a coarser analog to ACS Public Use MicroData Areas (the coefficient on median Zone rents is approximately $1$). This regression produces a vector of coefficient $\hat{\gamma}$. We then construct our hedonic measure: $q^{\text{hedonic}}_{css} = \hat{\gamma}_{\text{AHS}} x_{css} + r_{\text{tract, voucher}}$. The CSS adds many more time-varying quality factors, together with the basic ACS variables this model achieves about 75 percent of the predictive performance of the full “kitchen-sink” AHS model (Appendix Table 2). We believe that our actual hedonic measure, which uses tract rent rather than PUMA or Zone rents, likely explains much more of the actual variation in cross-sectional rents than the AHS $R^2$ numbers suggest. Rents in the AHS appear to be substantially higher variance than voucher rents in the CSS. Impressively, our hedonic measures explain nearly 70 percent of the cross sectional variation in voucher rents in the CSS.

\[
Rent_{ijklm} = \pi + s_i \hat{\gamma} + \varepsilon_i \quad (B.5)
\]
B.2.5. Dallas ZIP-Level FMRs

*Constructing the Analysis Sample:* This Dallas “Small Area FMR Demonstration” applied to eight counties: Collin, Dallas, Delta, Denton, Ellis, Hunt, Kaufman, and Rockwall. Several housing authorities administer vouchers in these counties. Most adopted the new policy in December 2010, but the Dallas Housing Authority adopted the policy in March 2011. We use a balanced panel of all vouchers in these eight counties from 2010 to 2013 because beginning in 2009 the Dallas Housing Authority allocated many of its new vouchers to homeless individuals. These individuals also needed other non-housing services and are a very different population from standard voucher recipients.

*Constructing the Neighborhood Quality Measures:* Tract-level data on poverty rate, unemployment rate, and share with a bachelor’s degree are for 2006-2010 in the American Community Survey. Tract-level 2010 violent crime offense data was provided to HUD by the Dallas Police Department under a privacy certificate between HUD and Dallas (March 2012). Data on the percent of 4th grade students’ scoring proficient or higher on state exams in the 2008-2009 academic year was provided to HUD by the U.S. Department of Education. We map these scores to zoned schools at the block group level. “Single Mothers” is defined as share of own children under 18 living with a female householder and no husband present.
Notes: The top panel plots average Fair Market Rent (FMR) changes at the county-level within year-specific quartiles. The large swings in 1994-1996 and 2005 reflect decennial rebenchmarkings, when new Census data from 1990 and 2000 respectively were incorporated into the FMRs.

The bottom panel plots FMR changes for the same sample within quartiles defined over the 2004-2005 FMR change, as in Figure 2.1. The four groups exhibit similar trends in terms of changes prior to the rebenchmarking. There is some evidence of mean reversion: places which had higher revisions from 1997 to 2004 were revised downward in 2005. The dashed lines represent a counterfactual of what the magnitude of annual changes would have been if a single national index had been applied from 1997 through 2004, followed by an update which brought FMRs to observed 2005 levels. Observed revisions are larger than the counterfactual revisions, indicating substantial measurement error in intercensal FMR changes.
This figure plots conditional means of unit rent for twenty quantiles of hedonic quality. We include fixed effects for the number of bedrooms interacted with the county, because each voucher recipient’s number of bedrooms is fixed by family size and it is usually quite difficult to switch counties. We find that a $1 increase in hedonic quality is associated with a 36 cent increase in rents. This indicates that even for a fixed rent ceiling, the government paid less for lower-quality units.
APPENDIX FIGURE 2.3 – Who Pays When Rent Ceiling Increases?

Impact of Rebenchmarking on Payments to Landlords
Tenants at Same Address in 2004 and 2010 with High Propensity for Govt as Residual Payer Based on Baseline Covariates

Gov't Payment to Landlord
Tenant Payment to Landlord

n=120,000. Units on all axes are multiplied by 100.

Notes: This figure plots payments to landlords by tenants (red) and the housing authority (blue) by re-benchmarking change in FMR for households that are unlikely to be the residual payer at baseline (2004). To identify households that are unlikely to be the residual payer we examine the gap between gross rents and the payment standard and the number of bedrooms in 2004. We use voucher recipients with two or fewer bedrooms and a value of rent minus rent ceiling in the bottom three quintiles in 2004. The probability that these households have rent higher than the rent ceiling – and therefore pay more when the landlord raises the rent – is 11%. We estimate the effects of the re-benchmarking separately on tenant payments to landlords and government payments to landlords for these price insensitive tenants. Tenant payments are unresponsive to changes in FMR, while payments from the government to landlords rise substantially.
Notes: This figure plots the standardized impact of three policies on census tract poverty rates of voucher recipients: 1) a 10% increase in the rent ceiling using the 2005 re-benchmarking variation 2) the 40th → 50th percentile FMR change 3) Dallas ZIP Code-Level Rent ceiling. Positive standardized effects represent reductions in the tract poverty rate.
## Appendix Table 2.1: Hedonic Model (American Community Survey)

The table presents results from the hedonic regression of rents in the American Community Survey (2005-2009). Sample is restricted to units with cash rent and excludes non-standard housing structure types (boats, RVs etc). Dependent variable is cash rent in $2009. We estimate the model with PUMA fixed Effects. The Coefficient on PUMA rent is approximately 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACS</th>
<th>Coef</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Family Attached [Excluded]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Detached SF</td>
<td>49.44</td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 Unit Building</td>
<td>-64.90</td>
<td>(2.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 Units</td>
<td>-85.34</td>
<td>(2.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+ Units</td>
<td>-33.51</td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile home</td>
<td>-223.8</td>
<td>(2.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built in 2005 or Later [Excluded]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre 1940s</td>
<td>-286.8</td>
<td>(2.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>-310.5</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>-297.5</td>
<td>(2.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-70</td>
<td>-280.0</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>-250.9</td>
<td>(2.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-90</td>
<td>-194.8</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990's</td>
<td>-134.2</td>
<td>(2.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000's</td>
<td>-58.98</td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 or 1-Bed [Excluded]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Bed</td>
<td>146.3</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-Bed</td>
<td>254.7</td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-bed</td>
<td>-111.2</td>
<td>(3.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5+ Bed</td>
<td>512.4</td>
<td>(3.24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 710957
## Appendix Table 2.2: Hedonic Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>sd(rent)/mean(rent)</th>
<th>R² (In-Sample)</th>
<th>R² (Out of Sample)</th>
<th>Time-Varying</th>
<th>Time-Invariant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHS</td>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Unsub Rents</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHS</td>
<td>ACS+CSS</td>
<td>Unsub Rents</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>ACS+CSS+AHS</td>
<td>Unsub Rents</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Voucher Rents</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>Unsub Rents</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table compares the fit of hedonic regressions using three sets of variables: our hedonic measures in the ACS (structure type, age of building, number of bedrooms and PUMA/AHS Zone Fixed Effects); the 26 time-varying measures from HUD’s Customer Satisfaction Survey (CSS); and 69 total hedonic characteristics from the AHS. The AHS Sample uses the American Housing Survey 2011 micro data file. The CSS sample consists of respondents in years 2000 to 2003. The ACS Sample uses the 2005-2009 ACS PUMS file. The table report the R², as well as the an out-of-sample R² calculated over a held out random 50 percent sample.
### Appendix Table 2.3 - Placebo Tests with Nonvoucher Rents [Rebenchmarking]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Variation</th>
<th>Rebenchmarking of FMRs in 2005</th>
<th>Dep Var: Change in Log Rent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Voucher</td>
<td>Nonvoucher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Horizon</td>
<td>04-09</td>
<td>00-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Source</td>
<td>HUD Admin&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Tract&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔLog FMR, 2004-2005</td>
<td>0.0831</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0179)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voucher Coef ≠ Nonvoucher Coef</td>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>&lt;0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>365,667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table shows the correlation of the 2005 Fair Market Rent rebenchmarking with contemporaneous changes in nonvoucher rents. Regressions give equal weight to each county-bed pair. Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at FMR group level (n=1,484). See Appendix B.3 for discussion of these results.

- a. Voucher estimates in columns (1) and (3) are from HUD Admin data for stayers.
- b. Tract-level estimates in columns (2) and (4) use the change in log median rent from the 2000 Census to the 2005-2009 ACS.
- c. Change in log rent at the county-bed level constructed from public-use micro data. These data only identify counties with more than 100,000 people due to confidentiality restrictions.
### Appendix Table 2.4 - Robustness Checks for Voucher Prices [Rebenchmarking]

**Policy Variation: Rebenchmarking of FMRs in 2005**

\[ \beta \text{ from } \Delta \text{Rent, 2004-2010} = \alpha + \beta \times \Delta \text{Rent Ceiling, 2004-2010} + \eta \quad \text{(Second Stage)} \]

\[ \Delta \text{Rent Ceiling, 2004–2010} = \alpha + \gamma \times \Delta \text{FMR, 2004–2005} + \epsilon \quad \text{(First Stage)} \]

**Rent Baseline from Table 1**

- (1) \( \Delta \text{Rent winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile} \)
- Lived at same 9-digit zip in 2004 & 2010
- Weight each county-bed pair equally (n=290,731)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Variation: Rebenchmarking of FMRs in 2005</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rent Baseline from Table 1</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.0249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Add Controls**

- (2) Add County Fixed Effects
- Weight each county-bed pair equally (n=290,731)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Add Controls</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2) Add County Fixed Effects</td>
<td>0.0859</td>
<td>0.0348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- (3) IV for current price ceiling with 2005 FMR, controlling for 2004 price ceiling and FMR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsample</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(3) IV for current price ceiling with 2005 FMR, controlling for 2004 price ceiling and FMR</td>
<td>0.0871</td>
<td>0.0329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subsample**

- (4) Units unlikely to be paying final dollar (n=127,092)
- (5) Units with low kickback potential (Owner has at least 10 voucher units, n=109,075)
- (6) Units with above median concentration of voucher units (n=132,314)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsample</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4) Units unlikely to be paying final dollar (n=127,092)</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.0379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Units with low kickback potential (Owner has at least 10 voucher units, n=109,075)</td>
<td>0.0913</td>
<td>0.0473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Units with above median concentration of voucher units (n=132,314)</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.0434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Alternate Weights**

- (7) Weight every household equally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternate Weights</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(7) Weight every household equally</td>
<td>0.280</td>
<td>0.0606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Placebo Dependent Variable: Tenant Portion of Rent**

- (8) Units unlikely to be paying final dollar with nonmissing tenant income (n=126,146)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Placebo Dependent Variable: Tenant Portion of Rent</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(8) Units unlikely to be paying final dollar with nonmissing tenant income (n=126,146)</td>
<td>-0.0116</td>
<td>0.0404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** This table shows robustness checks for estimating the impact of a countywide increase in the rent ceiling on rents for stayers, using variation from the 2005 Fair Market Rent rebenchmarking. Each row shows coefficient and standard error from a separate regression. Standard errors shown in parentheses are clustered at FMR area level (n=1,484).

- a. Units unlikely to be paying the "final" dollar of rent in 2010 are those with two or fewer bedrooms and a value of rent minus rent ceiling in the bottom three quintiles in 2004. The probability that these households have rent higher than the rent ceiling -- and therefore pay more when the landlord raises the rent -- is 11%. 

181
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Before Move</th>
<th>After Move</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Total Movers</td>
<td>8189</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Movers With Mobility Counseling</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Movers Without Mobility Counseling</td>
<td>7886</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table decomposes the neighborhood quality improvement in Dallas for households which received vouchers in 2010 and moved by 2012 by receipt of voluntary mobility counseling. This counseling was offered to all voucher Data in row (1) are locations in 2010 and 2012 for all movers and come from HUD administrative records. Data in row (2) are locations immediately prior to and after moving and come from the Inclusive Communities Project, which provided the counseling. Data in row (3) are calculated as \( y_{\text{notCounseled}} = (y_{\text{all}} - \text{shareCounseled} \times y_{\text{counseled}})/(1-\text{shareCounseled}) \).
C. Appendix to Chapter 3

(Regression Kink)

This appendix reports additional tables and a proof of a proposition in Chapter 3.

C.1. Overview of Existing RK Papers

Table reported on next page.
Table C.1.: Overview of Existing RK Papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper:</th>
<th>Policy Variable</th>
<th>Outcome Variable</th>
<th>Preferred Polynomial/Estimation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ando (2013)</td>
<td>Federal Subsidy</td>
<td>Gov’t Expenditure</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blauin (2013)</td>
<td>Forced Labor</td>
<td>Interethnic Trust</td>
<td>Cubic/Quintic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Böckerman, Kanninen, and Suoniemi (2014)</td>
<td>Sickness Insurance</td>
<td>Duration of Sickness Absence</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bravo (2011)</td>
<td>Federal Subsidy</td>
<td>Local Revenue</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britto (2015)</td>
<td>UI benefits</td>
<td>Employment duration</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulman and Hoehy (2015)</td>
<td>Federal Tax Credits</td>
<td>College Attendance</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic/Cubic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card et al. (2015)</td>
<td>UI Benefits</td>
<td>Unemployment Duration</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahlberg, Mörk, Ratnes, and Ágren (2008)</td>
<td>Federal Grant</td>
<td>Delinquency</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobris and Skiba (2013)</td>
<td>Paycheck</td>
<td>Gov’t Expenditure</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobridge (2016)</td>
<td>Tax Refund</td>
<td>Loan Default</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dong (2016)</td>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>Investment, Cash Holding</td>
<td>Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engels et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Pension deductions</td>
<td>Food Expenditure</td>
<td>Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engström, Nordblom, Ohlsson, and Persson (2015)</td>
<td>Tax Liability</td>
<td>Labor supply</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pe and Hollingsworth (2012)</td>
<td>Retiremen</td>
<td>Tax Behavior</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidrmuc and Tena (2013)</td>
<td>Minimum Wage</td>
<td>Health Outcomes</td>
<td>Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fritzdixon and Skiba (2013)</td>
<td>Loan size</td>
<td>Employment Status</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garmann (2014)</td>
<td>Vote Share</td>
<td>Loan repayment</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanson (2012)</td>
<td>Loan Amount</td>
<td>Earnings</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang and Yang (2016)</td>
<td>Reemployment bonus</td>
<td>Interest Rates</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonas (2013)</td>
<td>Hours Worked</td>
<td>Labor supply</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kissin and Manela (2014)</td>
<td>Fees paid by banks</td>
<td>Leniency of regulation</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic/Cubic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolsrud (2013)</td>
<td>UI Benefits</td>
<td>Asset Accumulation</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolsrud et al. (2015b)</td>
<td>UI Benefits</td>
<td>Unemployment duration</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristensen, Pe, Bech, and Mainz (2015)</td>
<td>Reimbursement Rate</td>
<td>Hospital Process Quality</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic/Cubic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyvna and Pesola (2015)</td>
<td>UI benefits</td>
<td>Employment/earnings</td>
<td>qMLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landais (2015)</td>
<td>UI Benefits</td>
<td>Search Duration</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundqvist, Dahlberg, and Mörk (2014)</td>
<td>Federal Subsidy</td>
<td>Local Employment</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manoli and Turner (2014)</td>
<td>EITC</td>
<td>College Enrollment</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marx and Turner (2015)</td>
<td>College Subsidy</td>
<td>Student Loans</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messacar (2015)</td>
<td>Pension Plan</td>
<td>Retirement Saving</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nielsen, Sørensen, and Taber (2010)</td>
<td>College Subsidy</td>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peck (2014)</td>
<td>% Employees</td>
<td>Hiring</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scharlemann and Shore (2015)</td>
<td>Mortgage Balance Reduction</td>
<td>Mortgage Delinquency</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seim (2014)</td>
<td>Tax Liability</td>
<td>Wealth Accumulation</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simonen, Skipper, and Skipper (2016)</td>
<td>Drug Subsidy</td>
<td>Drug Expenditure</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sonago (2015)</td>
<td>UI benefits</td>
<td>Unemployment duration/re-employment job quality</td>
<td>Linear/Quadratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turner (2014)</td>
<td>College Subsidy</td>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td>Linear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wong (2013)</td>
<td>% Ethnic groups</td>
<td>Housing Prices</td>
<td>Quartic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C.2. Proof of Finite Sample Size of Permutation Test

**Proposition**: Under the Null Hypothesis of Policy Irrelevance and the Random Kink Location assumption, there exists a test function \( \phi(v, y, k) \) for significance level \( \alpha \) which has an exact finite sample level of \( \alpha \).

**Proof**: Let \( \tilde{K} \) denote the number of potential kink points \( k \) drawn according to distribution \( P \). For any data vector \( (v, y) \) let

\[
T^{(1)}(v, y) \leq T^{(2)}(v, y) \leq \ldots \leq T^{(\tilde{K})}(v, y)
\]

denote the kink estimates of \( T(v, y, k) \) ranked from smallest to largest.

For a given nominal level \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) and a two-sided test, we define the critical values \( \underline{c} \) and \( \bar{c} \) as

\[
\underline{c} = \left\lceil \frac{\alpha}{2} \tilde{K} \right\rceil \\
\text{and} \quad \bar{c} = \tilde{K} - \left\lceil \frac{\alpha}{2} \tilde{K} \right\rceil
\]

where \( \left\lceil \frac{\alpha}{2} \tilde{K} \right\rceil \) denotes the largest integer less than or equal to \( \frac{\alpha}{2} \tilde{K} \).

Let \( K^+(v, y) \) and \( K^-(v, y) \) denote the number of values \( T^{(j)}(v, y) \) \( (j = 1, \ldots, \tilde{K}) \) that are smaller than \( T^{(\underline{c})}(v, y) \) and greater than \( T^{(\bar{c})}(v, y) \), respectively, and let \( K^0(v, y) \) be the total number of values of \( T^{(j)}(v, y) \) \( (j = 1, \ldots, \tilde{K}) \) equal to \( T^{(\underline{c})}(v, y) \) or \( T^{(\bar{c})}(v, y) \).

Define

\[
a(v, y) = \frac{\alpha \tilde{K} - (K^+(v, y) + K^-(v, y))}{K^0(v, y)}
\]

as the rejection probability in the case of a tie.
We can define a permutation test function \( \phi(v, y, k) \) which determines the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis given a test statistic \( T(v, y, k) \):

\[
\phi(v, y, k) = \begin{cases} 
1 & , T(v, y, k) < T(\Omega)(v, y) \text{ or } T(v, y, k) > T(\bar{\Omega})(v, y) \\
\alpha(v, y) & , T(v, y, k) = T(\Omega)(v, y) \text{ or } T(v, y, k) = T(\bar{\Omega})(v, y) \\
0 & , T(\Omega)(v, y) < T(v, y, k) < T(\bar{\Omega})(v, y)
\end{cases}
\]

This implies that for any realization of \( (v, y) \) we have that:

\[
\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \phi(v, y, k) = K^+(v, y) + K^-(v, y) + \alpha(v, y) \cdot K^0(v, y) = \alpha \bar{K}.
\]

Note that under the Null Hypothesis of Policy Irrelevance, the distribution of \( (v, y) \) is invariant to the realized location of the kink point. This implies that the test statistic \( T(v, y, k) \) is also invariant to the realization of the kink point \( k^* \), since the test statistic depends on the policy variable only through its effect on the outcome. Taking expectations of the expressions above over the distribution of the location of kink points which we had denoted as \( P \), we thus have

\[
\alpha \bar{K} = E_P[\sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \phi(v, y, k)] = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} E_P[\phi(v, y, k)] = \bar{K} E_P[\phi(v, y, k)]
\]

Thus, it follows that \( E_P[\phi(v, y, k)] = \alpha \) proving that the exact finite sample level of the permutation test is \( \alpha \).
C.3. Extension of Simulation Study II: t-distributed Errors and Heteroskedasticity

Table C.2.: Simulation Study II: Type I and Type II Errors - Heteroskedastic Noise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DGP</th>
<th>Local Linear</th>
<th>Local Quadratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asymptotic</td>
<td>Permutation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type I Error (No Kink)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type II Error (Kink Present)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To compare the performance of asymptotic and permutation-based methods, we analyze the data-generating processes displayed in Figure 4. For every DGP, we randomly generate 2,500 observations with $x$ distributed uniformly on [-2,2] and $y = E(y|x) + \varepsilon$ where $\varepsilon = (1 + |1 - x|) \varepsilon$ with $\varepsilon \sim N(0,0.25)$. We randomly draw a kink location $k^*$ from [-1,1] and add a slope change component ($20x_1(x > k^*)$) to the DGP with a probability of $p = 0.5$. This process is repeated for a total of 1,000 iterations. We set the nominal level of the test to 10%. The first four rows of the Table report, for a given DGP and estimation method, the fraction of iterations in which asymptotic or permutation test-based inference reject the underlying null hypotheses at the 10% level. The last four rows report the fraction of iterations in which the null hypothesis was not rejected.
Table C.3.: Simulation Study II: Type I and Type II Errors - t-distributed Noise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DGP</th>
<th>Local Linear</th>
<th>Local Quadratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asymptotic</td>
<td>Permutation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type I Error</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(No Kink)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type II Error</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kink Present)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To compare the performance of asymptotic and permutation-based methods, we analyze the data-generating processes displayed in Figure 4. For every DGP, we randomly generate 2,500 observations with $x$ distributed uniformly on $[-2,2]$ and $y = E(y|x) + \epsilon$ with $\epsilon$ distributed according to a $t$-distribution with five degrees of freedom. We randomly draw a kink location $k^*$ from $[-1,1]$ and add a slope change component $(20rI(x > k^*))$ to the DGP with a probability of $p = 0.5$. This process is repeated for a total of 1,000 iterations. We set the nominal level of the test to 10%. The first four rows of the Table report, for a given DGP and estimation method, the fraction of iterations in which asymptotic or permutation test-based inference reject the underlying null hypotheses at the 10% level. The last four rows report the fraction of iterations in which the null hypothesis was not rejected.

C.4. Performance of Estimation Alternatives in Monte Carlo Simulation Study

To understand the coverage properties of different estimators for the RK model with standard inference procedures, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation study to assess the performance of local polynomial specifications with bandwidth choice based on Fan and Gijbels (1996) and recently proposed robust bias-corrected estimators (CCT). In addition, we assess the performance of modified cubic spline models (see Green and Silverman, 1994, for an introduction to cubic splines that we follow in this paragraph). Given a set of knots $\{t_j\}_{j=1}^n$ on an interval $[a, b]$, a cubic spline $g$ is a cubic polynomial on each of the intervals $(t_j, t_{j+1})$ for $j \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ and on $(a, t_1)$ and $(t_n, b)$ such that $g$ and its first and second derivatives are continuous at each $t_j$. Cubic splines are an attractive framework for estimation because they are
shown to be the solution to an optimal interpolation problem. More precisely, the solution to the problem of finding the smoothest function that interpolates point \((t_i, y_i)\) is a natural cubic spline. A cubic spline is a natural cubic spline if it is linear on the extreme intervals \([a, t_1]\) and \([t_n, b]\). We adjust the cubic splines framework so that it can be used for estimation of an RK model by placing a knot at 0 and additionally allowing for a change in the first and second derivative at this special knot. We choose the total number of equally-spaced knots based on a generalized cross-validation criterion (Wahba, 1990).

For the Monte Carlo study, we use the same DGPs as in the previous section (see Figure 4) and include a non-zero kink at \(x = 0\). For each of 250 draws, we compute an RK estimate and a 95% confidence interval using asymptotic heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors or CCT’s standard errors for their bias-corrected estimators. Coverage denotes the fraction of confidence intervals – for a given specification – that cover the true slope change of 20. Interval length is the average length of the confidence interval for a given estimation method.

Both linear and quadratic models have quite low empirical coverage of the true estimate when the DGP is non-linear. Coverage is better and close to nominal for the piece-wise linear model further supporting our conjecture that non-linearity is the underlying root cause for poor performance of local linear and quadratic models in some RK settings. Cubic specifications come close to attaining 95% nominal coverage. The model based on CCT’s bias-corrected estimator leads to larger intervals than both local polynomial estimators but has coverage that is close to nominal for DGPs 2 through 4 and a coverage of 1 in the case of the piece-wise linear DGP 1. The cubic spline model attains close to nominal coverage for DGPs 1, 2, and 4 and coverage of 84% for DGP 3. However, the interval length for the cubic spline specifications is substantially larger than that of CCT’s cubic estimator suggesting that the latter may be a more efficient estimator for RK setup. We conclude that in RK settings for these DGPs, cubic specifications based on CCT’s procedure are the preferred estimator.
Table C.4.: Local Polynomials and Cubic Splines Simulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DGP</th>
<th>Local Linear</th>
<th>Local Quadratic</th>
<th>CCT \textit{rdrobust}</th>
<th>Cubic Spline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cvg</td>
<td>Int Len</td>
<td>Cvg</td>
<td>Int Len</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To understand the coverage properties of different models used for RK estimation, we conduct a Monte Carlo exercise based on 250 iterations. We examine the four data-generating processes with true kinks described in Section 4.2 and examined in Table 2. We construct a single Monte Carlo iteration by drawing 10,000 observations with $y = E(y|x) + \epsilon$. We evaluate four different regression specifications for RK: the local linear and local quadratic specifications used in the prior table, the bias-corrected quadratic specification of CCT and a cubic spline model. The cubic spline model analyzes all the data using splines between equally-spaced knots, allowing for a discontinuous slope change at the policy kink. We choose the knot spacing based on a generalized cross-validation criterion (Wahba, 1990). At the optimal bandwidth, we compute an RK estimate and a 95% confidence interval using robust standard errors. Coverage denotes the fraction of confidence intervals - for a given specification - that cover the true slope change of 10. Interval length is the average length of the confidence interval for a given estimation method.