The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933

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Accessibility
The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933

A dissertation presented
by
Eric Tanner Schluessel
to
The Committee on History and East Asian Languages
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The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933

Abstract

This dissertation concerns the ways in which a Chinese civilizing project intervened powerfully in cultural and social change in the Muslim-majority region of Xinjiang from the 1870s through the 1930s. I demonstrate that the efforts of officials following an ideology of domination and transformation rooted in the Chinese Classics changed the ways that people associated with each other and defined themselves and how Muslims understood their place in history and in global space. Chinese power is central to the history of modern Xinjiang and to the Uyghur people, not only because the Chinese center has dominated the area as a periphery, but because of the ways in which that power intervened in society and culture on the local level.

The processes and ramifications of the Chinese government in late-Qing and early Republican Xinjiang demonstrates strong parallels with colonialism in the context of European empire. This dissertation does not focus on the question of typology, however, but instead draws on methods from colonial history to explore the dynamics of a linguistically and religiously heterogeneous society. In order to do so, I draw on local archival documents in Chinese and Turkic and place them into dialogue with the broader Turkic-language textual record. This dissertation thus proceeds from the inception of the ideology that drove the civilizing project, through its social ramifications, to the innovations that emerged in Islamicate literature and history in Xinjiang in this period.
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Needless to say, none of this would be possible without my parents, Richard Schluessel and Cynthia Conti, and my brother Edmund. Thank you.
**Introduction**

In 1755, the forces of the great Qing empire (1636-1911) swept westward from central China across the steppe towards a final victory over the Junghar Mongols.¹ Their achievement ushered in almost a century of Qing domination over a vast and diverse Central Asian realm stretching from Tibet in the south to the Altai Mountains in the north. This region came to be known in Chinese as Xinjiang, literally the “new territory” (Manchu incipalice jecen). Within Xinjiang, most people’s lives continued with minimal interference from the government in Beijing and the Manchu aristocracy that ruled the empire. Instead, the Turpic-speaking Muslims of Xinjiang’s South, known today as Uyghurs, lived under the indirect rule of the region’s military governor through local Muslim lords. This situation lasted until 1864. That year, in the last of a series of major internal wars that fractured the Qing empire, Xinjiang’s Muslims rose up. They killed, expelled, or forcibly converted Han Chinese, Manchus, and other non-Muslim soldiers and merchants and razed their settlements.

In April 1877, Chinese armies marched again across the dry and lonely grasslands. Half of them had spent over a decade on the road, and they were far from their humid, verdant, mountainous homes in southern China. These were not the Inner

¹ These events mentioned in these first few pages are described in detail in Peter Perdue, *China Marches West: the Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005) and in Hodong Kim, *Holy War in China: the Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864-1877* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 159-178. I refer the reader to Kim’s comprehensive account for background on the Muslim uprisings and other events directly preceding those described in this study.

Chinese will be transliterated according to the Pinyin system. I will reproduce Chinese characters when it is necessary to the argument. Chaghatay or Eastern Turki will be transliterated in the main text roughly according to the system used by the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, while footnotes use a similar system that I adopt in *The World as Seen from Yarkand: Ghulām Muḥammad Khān’s 1920s Chronicle* Mā Tībayniñ wāqī’ asī, (Tokyo: NIHU Program Islamic Area Studies, 2014). Manchu transliterations follow the Möllendorff system.
Asian hereditary military forces who had taken Jungharia a century before. These soldiers belonged to a new kind of army, a provincial militia strengthened by modern weaponry and training, by a common local identity, and by an ideology that demanded the expansion of Chinese civilization into the periphery. In 1864, their leader Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) had received an imperial mandate to retake the territories of China’s Northwest that were lost in the Muslim uprisings. Since then, his soldiers of the Xiang Army had marched from Hunan province, northwest across China and into what Chinese commonly called “beyond the Pass” (kouwai). Until the outbreak of violence between Muslims and Han Chinese, Han had gone beyond the Pass into exile, to trade, or to serve as soldiers, but only rarely to settle down. What lay beyond the Pass, in the eyes of the Xiang Army, was both an imperial territory to be regained and a lawless wilderness waiting to be civilized. This time, the Han came to Xinjiang to transform it.

That April, Zuo’s armies, freshly rested from their slow battle across Northern Xinjiang, converged on the eastern oasis stronghold of Turpan. Not far to the southwest, the emir of Kashgar Ya’qūb Beg (1820-1877) had taken up a forward position in a palace in Korla. There he hoped either to hold out against the advancing Chinese armies or to submit to the Qing peacefully. Originally, the Khan of Khoqand in Central Asia had sent Ya’qūb Beg to support a Khoqandi takeover of Kashgar, then consumed in chaos. Instead, over the course of a decade, the volatile and ambitious Ya’qūb Beg brought all of the South and much of the North under his own control, mainly through conquest. As of April 1877, there was a chance for his fledgling state to remain independent with the support of the British and Russian empires, who sought a buffer and a puppet. However, one night in May, Ya’qūb Beg flew into a rage at an old companion and beat him to
death. Moments later, he apparently suffered a brain aneurism and died. While Yaʿqūb Beg’s death was kept a secret, his sons and allies contested to succeed him. Their resistance to the Chinese forces fell apart in the ensuing chaos, and Zuo’s commanders swept across Southern Xinjiang in a matter of months.

As the Chinese vanguard advanced and the rearguard of Yaʿqūb Beg’s forces retreated, the twisting wind of war snatched people up and threw them into new and unfamiliar circumstances. Loss and displacement became themes of life in Xinjiang for decades after. Before the armies of Zuo Zongtang fled those of the warlords called the Two Tigers, Bai Yanhu and Yu Shaohu. The Two Tigers and their armies were Hui, Chinese-speaking Muslims. (Nearly half of Zuo’s army was similarly comprised of Hui recruited in Gansu.) Somewhere among them, a woman surnamed Wei, her husband Ma Zhenghai, and their children were fleeing in the disorderly retreat west. When their leaders turned south to make for Kashgar, the family was separated. Wei shì and Ma Zhenghai would not see each other again for ten years. They were not alone: unknown thousands were resettled or remarried, adopted or sold. As the Xiang Army advanced, Han Chinese came beyond the Pass in search of lost parents whose skeletons were scattered on anonymous ground.

Meanwhile, in the oasis of Turpan, a young man named Obulmahdī was complaining about his wife. Obulmahdī wrote in a variety of Turkic fairly close to Modern Uyghur, which I will call “Turki,” following the common practice of the time.

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2 GX 13.4 “鎮迪道札飭提拿潛逃之妾魏氏” in QXDX, vol. 29, 89-91. The table of contents gives the date as GX 13.r4.28 and Wei’s surname as Zhao.

3 IVR RAN B 779 Uşbu őtkân zamanida Mullā Obulmahdī degân bir adamnîn beşidin őtkân ișnîn bayānidurlar.
(A modern observer would probably identify Obulmahdī as belonging to the Uyghur ethnic group of Turkic-speaking Muslims, but he would have called himself *musulmān* “Muslim.” To avoid confusion, I will refer to Turkic-speaking Muslims such as Obulmahdī also as Turki.) Obulmahdī was the youngest son of a well-to-do family that fell on hard times following the death of his parents. In January 1877, his older brothers bore the responsibility of marrying off their spoiled younger sibling, who was making life in their shared courtyard intolerable. Obulmahdī’s brothers arranged a marriage with a woman from a poor family and a distant village whom he considered very unattractive. Three months after their wedding, as Obulmahdī contemplated divorce, the Xiang Army entered the Turpan oasis, and husband and wife grudgingly fled together into the hills to avoid the ensuing fighting and looting. Weeks later, when they returned home, all that was left of their courtyard house was a single mud brick wall. Then Obulmahdī’s wife became pregnant with his son. Doomed to life together, they eked out a living selling handicrafts and foraged fodder to the Chinese soldiers.

This dissertation is the story of 1877’s aftermath for people like Obulmahdī, Wei *shi*, and the Han who went beyond the Pass to reclaim what they lost. While they struggled to survive and improve their lots, a new kind of government shaped their world in important ways: the same community of Han Chinese officers from the area around Changsha, Hunan, including their affines and friends, dominated the Xinjiang government into the first decade of the twentieth century and remained influential through at least the 1920s. They pursued a project of social transformation that can accurately be described as “colonial,” although it descended in its intellectual and institutional dimensions from a uniquely Chinese tradition. Shortly after the Hunanese
faded from power, the Qing fell, but the pattern of state-society relations that emerged under their regime persisted under weak provincial governments through the events of 1933 and 1934, when a revolution and an invasion established the Soviet Union as Xinjiang’s powerful new hegemon.

While the reconquest ended a decade of violence between Han, Hui, and Turki, the ways in which the commanders of these Chinese armies attempted to remake Xinjiang also brought about significant ruptures in people’s lives. Displacement in space and society resulted not only from traumatic mass violence, but also from the imposition of Chinese norms and institutions. At the same time, these symbolic and institutional resources provided Turki and others with powerful new means to negotiate and articulate their relationships, both individual and familial and between groups, in the context of the new social and economic circumstances of the post-reconquest period. That process of intercultural communication and appropriation brought about a realignment of Turkic Muslim representations of history, cosmology, and political legitimacy. This dissertation argues that Xinjiang’s reconstruction transformed its society and culture in ways that persisted long after the fall of the Qing.

As such, this dissertation sits in a peculiar intellectual space just emerging in the field of late imperial and modern Chinese history. Over the course of the twentieth century, several scholars advanced studies of the Xinjiang reconquests, though these touched only lightly on their aftermath, the region’s “reconstruction” (shanhou 善後).4

That work was advanced at a time when, at least among scholars writing in English, the history of the Qing still appeared primarily to be the history of Han Chinese struggling against the Manchu yoke and eventually adapting to the technological advances of the modern world. On the background of Zuo Zongtang’s shipyard at Fuzhou, or the myriad changes that Euro-American imperialism brought to China’s coast, the reconquest of Xinjiang appeared mainly as a victory for Hunan’s modern provincial army, harbinger of a confident new China. At the same time, it was difficult to reconcile the “conservative” nature of Zuo’s project there, which embraced Neo-Confucian ideas of social and cultural transformation, with the instrumental embrace of modernization elsewhere. With the advent of scholarship on the Qing that emphasized instead the dynasty’s imperial character and ethnic diversity, and so privileged the perspectives of non-Han, attention turned to Xinjiang in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the Inner Asian character of Manchu dominance was more readily apparent. Such an approach challenged and complemented longstanding narratives of Qing Sinicization, of the Manchu rulers’ supposedly inevitable and near-total acculturation to Han Chinese norms. Yet Xinjiang in the late Qing, the period of Han dominance and the active Sinicization of the region’s Muslims, does not fit easily into this “New Qing History” framework. Nor

Fields both cite Dju, as well as a much older history that similarly focused on the figure of Zuo Zongtang (W. L. Bales, Tso Tsung't'ang: Soldier and Statesman of Old China [Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Limited, 1937].) Bales in his preface notes Zuo’s relative obscurity after his death, as well as the apparent paradox of Zuo’s philosophical conservatism and his patronage of technological modernization. I direct the reader to Bales’ work for an account of the reconquest, as Bales, a military historian, provides rich detail and useful diagrams.

5 A number of excellent works address the history of Xinjiang between Qing empire and Central Asia in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, notably Peter Perdue, China Marches West; James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Laura J. Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760-1860 (Boston: Brill, 2005); Onuma Takahiro. Shin to Chūō Ajia sōgen: yūbokumin no sekai kara teikoku no henkyō e. Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2014.
does working strictly from Turic- or Manchu-language sources in this period provide a very complete picture of events. In this dissertation, I attempt to push past the emphasis on Sinicization and modernization or on Inner Asian empire and instead draw on both traditions to address the emergence of Chinese colonialism within the Qing empire.

I. Xinjiang

Xinjiang is a vast and diverse region. It is comprised of a several great basins ringed with mountains that bridge China’s arid Northwest, the steppes of Kazakhstan and Mongolia, the oasis valleys of Central Asia, the treacherous route to Kashmir over the Pamir Mountains, and Tibet over the Kunlun Mountains to the south. Before its defeat at the hands of the Qing, the Junghar Mongol state dominated the grasslands of the North and the fertile Ili Valley to the west. It also ruled over the South, comprised of a vast desert ringed with oases. The Qing had similarly begun as an Inner Asian state ruled by the Aisin Gioro clan of Manchus. When the Qing came into possession of Xinjiang’s South, they continued to govern it indirectly as the Junghars had, now through Turki begs, or “lords.” The eastern oases of Turpan and Qumul (Chinese Hami) were ruled by Turko-Mongol princes, while the chief Qing authority in the region remained the military governor at Ili, or “Ili general.”

In 1877, with its reconquest by the Chinese armies, Xinjiang ceased to be an Inner Asian territory of a Manchu empire. Instead, the Han Chinese commanders set about remaking the Muslim society of the oases, in which hardly any Chinese-speakers or non-Muslims lived, according to their ideal vision of provincial society in Inner China. In this dissertation, I will demonstrate both that critical elements of what we think of as modern
Xinjiang emerged first during the reconstruction. Other phenomena that historical scholarship has not previously noted were also central to its formation.

In particular, the articulation of a trans-local Turkic Muslim communal identity similar in boundaries and content to modern Uyghur national identity was informed in important ways by the reconstruction period. Turkic Muslims used several different names to refer to their broader imagined community, which was distinguished by language, creed, and a myth of common descent. If we look at those names, however, we are reminded that this articulation of groupness did not conform to the conventions of modern national identity: when Turkic Muslims called themselves musulmān, meaning “Muslim,” they were distinguishing themselves from the Chinese-speaking Hui (or “Dungans”) with whom they had waged bitter and bloody conflicts during the 1860s and 1870s. The reconstruction period deepened this division, as Turki and Hui came to occupy different structural positions in society, in part because of their different linguistic toolkits. The articulation of this identity continued to depend on the identification of Turki as “true Muslims,” hence the name musulmān, and the Hui as apostates. However, linguistic difference became just as useful a shibboleth for distinguishing Turki and Hui.

On the whole, Turkic Muslim identity was constructed with reference to imperial power: some Muslims incorporated themselves more closely into an ancient family tree that naturalized their place in the empire, while others adopted a Chinese term to refer to

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themselves (*chantou*), and still others derided them for their association with the Chinese. I will explore the ways in which creedal identities and linguistic repertoires informed changing articulations of groupness and subjecthood.\(^7\)

While we are familiar today with ongoing Uyghur resistance to the Chinese state in Xinjiang, a region which has maintained more or less the same borders since 1881, we ought not read contemporary ethnic politics into historical conflicts. I will demonstrate that, while the civilizing project that the Han Chinese-dominated regime pursued in late-Qing Xinjiang does bear peculiar resemblances to current policy, nevertheless, it was motivated by a radically different worldview. The largely Hunanese officials who governed Xinjiang in the late Qing did not express any developmentalist ideology, nor any strong desire to maximize the exploitation of the region’s natural resources for the good of the broader polity. Instead, they subscribed to a missionary ideology rooted in the “statecraft” *jingshi* school’s reading of the Chinese Classics.

Similarly, where Muslims resisted Chinese power, they generally did so for ideological and political reasons that reflected their understandings of subjecthood and imperial power, rather than as members of a nation. Turkic Muslim violence against the

\(^7\) My approach to ethnicity and identity draws heavily on critiques by Rogers Brubaker (*Ethnicity Without Groups* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004], 28-63; *Grounds for Difference* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015], 87) and Frederick Cooper (*Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005], 59-90, 59-65). Brubaker and Cooper both hold that the category of “identity,” which has since the 1990s been at the center of research on Xinjiang, has become nebulous through overuse, and that the field of identity studies has proceeded from a fundamentally modern perspective in which ethnonationalism is normative and pervasive. Brubaker (2015) points at avenues for salvaging the concept, particularly by considering the relationship between religion, language, and ethnicity as “deeply taken-for-granted and embodied identifications.” For example, while being “Chinese” is constantly under negotiation and sustained by performance, people identifying as such understand Chineseness to be in some way natural.
state followed a pattern familiar from China proper: the sovereign was thought to guarantee certain protections for his subjects. When those protections were not enacted, Muslims protested the tyranny of local officials, as opposed to the justice and legitimacy of the emperor. Such phenomena are familiar in part because Turki swiftly learned under the provincial system to appropriate the “language” of Chinese power for their own purposes. Between the instrumental manipulation of the symbolic vocabularies of Chinese government and the sincere acceptance of that government’s legitimacy, Turki adopted some things into their own cultural toolkits and adapted local inflections of Islamicate culture to make a Central Asian Muslim worldview function in a Chinese context. Grievances came to be articulated as violations of that imagination of the imperial order.

The contemporary imagination might see Xinjiang as a great arena in which two ethnic monoliths, Han and Uyghur, square off in a contest of sovereignty and autonomy, and at a certain level of analysis, this vision would not be far from the truth. However, this dissertation attends to Xinjiang during a critical stage of the region’s history, when the articulation of such large-scale collective identities was still inchoate, as a diverse collection of local sociopolitical arrangements that formed under a set of common pressures and in broadly similar cultural contexts. Outside of certain cosmopolitan elite circles, Han, Turki, and others did not engage in political action on the part of a “nation” during this period. Rather, the period ended in a flurry of nationalist action. In 1933,

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Turkic nationalists opened a new era of plentiful print media and centralized control of cultural production. Their efforts have helped to obscure historical narratives that do not fit into the grand history of national progress and oppression. This dissertation is an effort to recover modes of interaction and identification before the hegemony of nationalism in Xinjiang.

II. Xinjiang in Qing Empire

The pre-national history of Xinjiang society and culture, much like similar histories across the colonial world, is also the history of imperial domination. It is now generally accepted that the Qing was a territorially large, multi-ethnic state led by an aristocratic family supported by a range of governing institutions that varied significantly from one region to another. Outside of Mainland China, it is common practice to characterize the Qing on this basis as an empire not unlike those of Russia, America, Spain, and others. However, the practices of Qing empire varied over time and space, from one borderland to another and over nearly three centuries of territorial expansion and contraction and the integration of different subject groups, so it is necessary to make clear what we mean by “empire” in a given moment and place.

In the Inner Asian territories of Manchuria and Mongolia, from early in their development, the Qing maintained institutions of law and government that were distinct from those of China proper, which was governed according to a provincial system.

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10 Thum, Sacred Routes, 182-184.

11 While scholars have referred to Chinese empires for centuries, the “New Qing History” has taken up “empire” as a central problematic. Examples of this subfield have become too numerous to list, but on the question of empire see especially James Millward et al., eds. New Qing Imperial History: the Making of Inner Asian Empire at Chengde, (New York: Routledge, 2004); Perdue, China Marches West.
adapted from the Ming (1368-1644). When Xinjiang was appended to the empire, its
government and legal system were modeled after those of Mongolia. All of these Inner
Asian territories were administered through the Lifanyuan, a special organ of the
metropolitan government that was originally created for managing the Qing’s Mongol
subjects. Han Chinese settlement was discouraged. Inner Asia was thus very different
from China’s far South, including southern Hunan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Taiwan, where
shifting lines of Han Chinese settlement brought Han directly into contact with non-Han
peoples, who were incorporated in ad hoc ways into the provincial system. Techniques
for managing this encounter shifted according to local politics, and special systems of law
and government emerged from negotiations between groups. We can therefore speak of
two models of Qing empire: in the Inner Asian model, the Qing reserved bounded
territories and special administrative systems for different subject peoples. In the
Southern model, local Han officials responded flexibly to problems that emerged on the
frontier through conflict and negotiation with non-Han people.

The Qing empire also changed over time, and Xinjiang’s transformation from
territory to province was part of a broader change in the empire in the nineteenth century.
Lauren Benton makes a useful distinction between strong empires, which maintain their
subject groups’ difference through legal and other kinds of pluralism, and weak empires,
in which state actors attempt to consolidate the empire by homogenizing people and

12 Donald S. Sutton, “Violence and Ethnicity on a Qing Colonial Frontier: Customary and Statutory Law in
Jodi L. Weinstein, Empire and Identity in Guizhou: Local Resistance to Qing Expansion (Seattle:
A shift from the “strong” to “weak” pattern took place during China’s mid-nineteenth-century civil wars, when the Taiping (1850-1864), Nien (1851-1868), Panthay (1856-1873), and Muslim (1862-1977) conflicts engulfed a vast swath of the empire in violence that also threatened the dynasty’s very existence. Provincial Han Chinese elites, rather than the traditional Inner Asian banner military or Han Green Standard forces, successfully ended the wars with their own regional, modernized armies. The reward for many of their leaders was influence at the highest levels of government. This new class of Han officials began creating new provinces in border areas, including Taiwan and Xinjiang, and set the empire on a stop-and-start path to political reform and technological modernization.

When we view this broader process of change from the perspective of Xinjiang, as we will in this dissertation, it resembles contemporary changes in other empires. As I will discuss in Chapter One, the officials who ruled Xinjiang for three decades beginning in 1877 were part of the larger community of provincial elites who took responsibility for central China’s reconquest and “reconstruction” (shanhou). They brought their experiences of the post-Taiping to bear on their reconstruction of the Northwest following the Muslim uprisings. Near the heart of their common toolkit of government was a firm belief in widespread moral education as the foundation of social stability. This stance is reminiscent of the new faith in pedagogy, “a belief that truths, one recognized as such, had only to be learned and applied,” that Jürgen Osterhammel identifies as a

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common trait of European empires in the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{15} As in European colonies, while missionaries had previously worked transform society in ways that were nominally independent from the state, now such activity became the purview of the government. Where reconstruction through education as seen from China proper might appear to us simply as a conservative revival, or even a simple restoration of antebellum institutions, in Xinjiang, where most people were linguistically and culturally very different from Han Chinese, the nature of reconstruction as a civilizing project will become clear. (See the next section.)

A shift in the vision of Qing empire becomes apparent: before the mid-nineteenth century, pluralism reigned. After it, large sections of the empire were under the control of men who advanced a pro-Han Chinese or even a covertly anti-Manchu project of reform. They not only shifted the locus of sovereignty away from the court, but also pursued the wider transformation of the empire’s subjects according to a sino-normative project of pedagogy. By “sino-normativity” I mean a sociopolitical stance that promotes an explicit or commonsensical idea of essential Chineseness. It corresponds in its political and intellectualarticulations to what Mary Wright defined as “Chinese conservatism”: a stance “aimed at the preservation of the Confucian, rationalist, gentry, and nonfeudal strains of pre-Taiping and pre-Opium War Chinese society.”\textsuperscript{16} Wright identified the heart of “true conservatism” in terms of dedication to a set of abstract social norms embodied by the “rites,” “rituals,” or “relations” thought to be passed down from Confucius’ time – the \textit{li}. In the Xinjiang case, as I will show, administrators and ordinary Chinese had


\textsuperscript{16} Wright, \textit{Last Stand}, 1-3.
sometimes conflicting views of what that ideal society and its rites and relations involved and what made them normatively “Chinese.” What remained constant, however, was the idea that Muslim social relations deviated from the norm and had to be corrected to follow *li*, so that provincial government could be constituted from the ground up, and the region would become a stable and self-sustaining agricultural society. Obviously, the politics of the empire could not be broken into simple dichotomies, and the Manchu-centered and sino-normative models of government coexisted. Nevertheless, this simple typology provides context for understanding the role of Xinjiang in the broader history of the late Qing and the transition to modern China as a political unit and ideological construct.

**III. The Colonial Process**

In 1877, the leaders of the Xiang Army began to shift Xinjiang from the Inner Asian model towards the sino-normative ideals of government. Soon, however, they found their ideals unworkable and adopted strategies from the Southern model. As I will show, systems of domination, sociopolitical organizations, and processes of territorial acquisition emerged from this transition that can accurately be characterized as “colonial.” However, I realize that the word “colonial” invokes a broad range of denotations and connotations. For example, in regard to the ideal typology outlined above, in which I distinguished empires that maintain difference from those that homogenize, historians of the Qing have referred to both of these models as “colonial” without much consistency. I will first review their positions on colonialism in the Qing empire, and then explain what I mean by “colonialism” and why I use the term in this
way. Ultimately, I believe that colonialism, when used with rigor, provides both a useful set of tools for comparison and, thanks to the efforts to colonial historians, an enlightening research methodology for studying societies such as Xinjiang’s.

Some scholars consider the separateness that obtained through the mid-nineteenth century to be “colonial.” There has been some effort to bring the Qing into comparative context with “other colonial empires,” but these have generally operated at a high level of abstraction. Oft-cited papers by Peter Perdue and Nicola Di Cosmo make comparisons between the Qing and certain European empires, but reduce to the observation that the Qing and European maritime empires both made use of different kinds of indirect rule in their expansion into new territories. However, there is nothing inherently “colonial” about heteronomy (a situation in which rulers and subjects differ in ethnicity) or about indirect rule. “Imperialism” readily describes the Qing management of diverse subject groups. Nevertheless, both Perdue and Di Cosmo are writing about the formal institutional configurations that obtained in Qing government with regard to the northern and western border regions prior to the Muslim Uprisings. Their arguments do not touch on the situation after the mid-nineteenth century, when the difference between the two periods is brought into relief, nor about the other models of imperialism operative in the Qing in other spaces or on other levels of analysis.

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Polemics surrounding Chinese rule in Xinjiang during the period under examination complicate the typology. No less an authority than the British representative at Kashgar George Macartney addressed the Central Asian Society on this topic on 10 March 1909.\textsuperscript{19} For the benefit of his fellow “rulers of Asiatics,”\textsuperscript{20} he brought Xinjiang not so much into comparison as into contrast with Russian Turkestan, British India, and French Indochina. Macartney saw parallels between the highly diverse responsibilities of British administrators in India, particularly deputy commissioners, and of their Chinese counterparts, the magistrates. He cited “the natural docility of the governed race,” which surely brought to mind paternalistic justifications for European dominance over others.\textsuperscript{21} Macartney’s basic characterization was not uncommon among his contemporaries, who often wrote about the Turki as simple people meant to be ruled. Chinese rule over Xinjiang, according to Macartney, was not unlike the ideology of European imperialism: it was not undertaken for “self-aggrandizement,” but rather for the defense of China and benefit of its Turki subjects under “the moral equipment of a superior order.”\textsuperscript{22} Nevertheless, Macartney’s “colony” was long gone – he referred not to the Xinjiang he knew, but to the earlier period of dominance.\textsuperscript{23} Instead, he argued that provincial Xinjiang was peaceful because of the inevitable attraction of Chinese culture for an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Macartney, “Eastern Turkestan,” 19.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Macartney, “Eastern Turkestan,” 11. He also called Turkic Muslims “a docile and easily managed people.” (12)
\item \textsuperscript{22} Macartney, “Eastern Turkestan,” 14.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Macartney, “Eastern Turkestan,” 9. “[I]nstead of the country being treated as a colony, it has been formed into a province of the Empire.”
\end{itemize}
inferior people and a paternalistic style of government, which ensured that “order is seldom troubled by the lower classes, dumb even under oppression.” The same year that Macartney addressed his audience on Xinjiang as a colony, so was the term “colony” first used by a Chinese official in Xinjiang. Financial Commissioner Wang Shu’nan (1851-1936), who considered himself a cosmopolitan thinker, understood Xinjiang as a colony (Chinese zhimin di) similar to British South Africa. Wang, whom we will discuss again in Chapter One, saw in Xinjiang’s heteronomy an imperfect colonial system, and so encouraged his government to embrace colonialism and exploitation on the European model. Similarly, Wen-chang Chu in his 1966 study of the Northwest campaign, described the establishment of the provincial system in Xinjiang as “the end of Sinkiang as a colony reserved for Manchus [and] Manchu exploitation.” Given that the region actually experienced little economic extraction in the first century of Qing rule, it is unclear just what was being “exploited.” Nevertheless, each of these positions is basically similar to Perdue and di Cosmo’s in that it understands colonialism as being primarily a process of exploitation. They are dissimilar in that they were all advanced essentially for polemical or illustrative purposes, rather than in pursuit of analytical precision.

Since the 1990s, many scholars in the China field have concluded that “colonialism” primarily entails a process of settlement. This appears to be consonant with the modern Chinese term for “colony,” loaned from a Japanese neologism, which literally


25 The fullest expression of Wang’s vision, to which I will return, appears in a memorial penned by Governor Lian-kui, who cites Wang and clearly reproduces his complicated ideas and references to Western sociology. (Memorial. No date. Rescript XT 1.4.24 [=11 June 1909]. Reproduced in Xuebu guanbao Issue 92 [8 July 1909].)

means “place where people are settled” (zhimin di). James Millward uses “colonialism” to refer simply to Han Chinese settlement but barely returns to the theme, wisely realizing that his sources “allow the subaltern little room to speak.” Donald Sutton characterizes Qing rule in the Miao regions as “colonial” in the sense that Han settlement resulted in a pair of different legal systems, the native of which was the object of a state effort of cooption. We might call this simply “legal pluralism” in Benton’s usage as described above. Laura Hostetler is more concerned with the technologies of colonialism, particularly the drive to map and survey that characterized some European empires, and then mainly in the twentieth century. I am skeptical that Qing expansion ever became as obsessed with total knowledge and categorization as did the classic example of British empire in India. Hostetler’s definition of “colonialism” is centered once again in Han Chinese settlement in border regions: “As territory was being colonized, ‘colonial’ seems a reasonable adjective to describe the Qing.” Such a definition is circular, but it speaks to a scholarly consensus: settlement, in the China field, is clearly the condition that distinguishes “colonialism” from “imperialism.” Of course, this is contrary to Perdue and Di Cosmo’s definitions of “colonialism,” which rely on the denial of settlement. Moreover, near the center of Michael Adas’ critique of their search for “colonialism” in Qing China is the lack of a parallel process of settlement in contemporaneous European

27 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 17.


empires.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, while Qing historians are interested in settlement as colonialism, there is a noted lack of engagement with the more precise category of “settler colonialism.” Thus, much of the problem of defining Xinjiang’s “colonial” character appears to stem from the polysemy of the word “colony” and its rough equivalents in various languages. Rather than taking the term “colonialism” seriously as a process, scholars, especially in China, have largely been content to make broad typological gestures.

In this light, the term “colonialism” ought to serve a primarily heuristic function as an invitation to argument. Emma Teng rightly points out the ambiguity of the term “colonialism” and its distinction from “imperialism” in the broader historical field.\textsuperscript{32} Teng approaches the intertwined processes of Han Chinese settlement and representations of the Other in the context of Taiwan in order to open a comparativist dialogue. The point is not to label and classify, but to destabilize historical and theoretical assumptions about typology and so open up new avenues of inquiry. We must root further comparisons more firmly in this ambiguous, process-oriented space – to orient ourselves away from the “imminent logic of colonial history” as expressed in political proclamations and elite representations and toward the ways in which people lived in and engaged with the

\textsuperscript{31} Michael Adas, “Imperialism and Colonialism,” 373.

\textsuperscript{32} Teng, \textit{Taiwan’s Imagined Geography}, 8-12, 256-258: “I would argue that it is in imperialism/colonialism as a cultural process that we can begin to find the common ground on which ‘European imperialism(s)’ and ‘Qing imperialism’ can be discussed. This is not to deny the historical specificity of Qing imperialism. Nor is it a plea for a return to general, universal theories of imperialism. Rather, it is an attempt to extend the ground on which particular, historical, and localized accounts of imperialisms and colonialisms can be delineated. It is my attempt to initiate a dialogue where there has been none.”
systems of domination, sociopolitical organizations, and processes of territorial acquisition that comprise colonial-like systems.\(^{33}\)

Once we have worked through these details, the Xinjiang case will point to the colonial character of the Chinese civilizing project. In other words, we will find that the Qing was “colonial” in a certain way at a particular time, but not how we might expect. The Xiang Army leaders who ruled Xinjiang, I will argue, engaged in what Stevan Harrell has characterized as a “Confucian civilizing project.” A civilizing project is an unequal interaction between different peoples in which members of one group see themselves as “central” and the other “peripheral.” On that basis, the “central” people dominate the “peripheral” others in order to make those others more like themselves.\(^{34}\) In this case, the project at the center of Xinjiang’s government was rooted in the statecraft discourse of *li* described above and so involved the reformation of Muslim society, and in particular the family, along sino-normative lines. Where similar policies applied in the center and the periphery under the general banner of “reconstruction,” we will see that their effects in Xinjiang resulted in the engendering of larger-group identities among Turkic Muslims, Hui, and Han alike.\(^{35}\)

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33 Osterhammel, *Colonialism*, 4; Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 17, 23-26.

34 Stevan Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Project and the Reaction to Them" in Stevan Harrell, ed., *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 3-36, 3-8, 27. Harrell himself notes that his conception of the Confucian civilizing project requires further exploration. This dissertation is an opportunity to investigate this idea.

35 Once again, there is a clear division between the Inner Asian model of Qing rule and the Southern model, which after 1877 was extended to Xinjiang: as Mark Elliott points out, among Inner Asian peoples, other institutions, such as the banner system, produced group identities that appear in some way “ethnic.” (Elliott, *The Manchu Way*, 33.)
those directly externally to Chinese and directed internally to other Turkic Muslims, reflected the priorities and institutions of the civilizing project.

**IV. Sources and Methodology**

I will return to the question of typology in the conclusion. For now, I will indicate certain methodological contributions of colonial history and how they are useful for exploring particular problems in the social and cultural history of Xinjiang.

The state of research on Xinjiang in the late Qing and early Republic is somewhat disjointed. Previous scholarship has focused overwhelmingly on high politics, including policy directives articulated at the center of government and the jockeying for power between Chinese and Muslim elites.\(^{36}\) Recent work drawing on an older tradition of ethnography analyzes pervasive modes of association and identification in Turkic Muslim society.\(^{37}\) Until recently, a dearth of available sources for local history has made it difficult to bring these two levels together into a common framework of analysis, such as by addressing receptions of and reactions to policy and the broader state-society relationship.

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In order to explore that relationship, I approach newly-opened local archival, memoir, and other manuscript sources in Chinese, Turkic, and other languages through the lens of “everyday politics.” The term refers to all of the stuff of politics – “the debates, conflicts, decisions, and cooperation among individuals, groups, and organizations regarding the control, allocation, and use of resources and the values and ideas underlying those activities” – as it plays out in a cultural and social context. In short, I prioritize the voices of ordinary people, as far as these can be excavated from the archive. The usefulness of this approach is that it takes people’s relationships and struggles seriously without reducing them to epiphenomena of larger-scale conflicts. The study of everyday politics in Xinjiang mitigates the tendency to contextualize conflict in the region in terms of a priori ethnonational categories.

Locating ordinary people’s voices requires a critical reading of the archive, not as a repository of social facts, but as a space in which people represented themselves and each other according to their understandings of legitimate discourses and narratives. I follow Ann Stoler’s analysis of the colonial archive as a text in which power relations were inscribed. Reading archival documents as inscriptions of social phenomena does not mean they were fictions, but rather that the documents therein were themselves involved in the creation of relationships. Work in Chinese legal history influenced by the “law and literature” school provides useful context for understanding the norms and


tropes of this space in the Chinese context. Thomas Welsford has similarly commented on the need to read Islamic documents from Central Asia in both “evocative” and “antiphonal” manners to tease out patterns of representation and patterns of social and economic change. In Chapter Two, I discuss in greater detail how to read Xinjiang’s local archives, and problems of translation and representation will reappear throughout the dissertation thereafter. The goal of this reading is not to provide a total picture of Xinjiang society, but more to excavate the tensions and conflicts around which people negotiated their individual and communal relationships.

Chapters Two through Five are based in large part on the local archive of Turpan. An estimated 58,000 documents from the Qing-era archive have been published in facsimile. At the time of writing, 7,748 documents from the Republican-era archive have been made available as high-quality digital reproductions online. Only a few years ago heavy restrictions on archival access meant that local historians of Xinjiang had to depend on higher-level documents in distant archives, edited collections that present very partial pictures of the region’s history, and heavily biased accounts from foreign travelers. Now it seems we stand on an embarrassment of riches. This dissertation makes


42 *Qingdai Xinjiang Dang’an Xuanji* [A Selection of Qing Dynasty Xinjiang Archival Documents] (Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 2012). (Henceforth QXDX.)

43 “Zhongguo dang’an” [Chinese archives], online at archives.gov.cn.
use of perhaps 3-4,000 documents from the “punishments” (xing) and “rites” (li) sections of the Turpan archive, meaning there is much more work to be done.

Chapters Six and Seven turn more sharply to the Turkic-language archive. This is comprised mainly of manuscript sources from Southern Xinjiang, particularly Kashgar and Yarkand, with a minority of texts coming from Ili and Turpan. I draw deeply on Mullā Mūsā Sayrāmî’s (1836-1916) Tāriḵ-i Amniyya (1901) and Tāriḵ-i Ḥamīdī (1908). Sayrāmî’s work is not only a chronicle of the nineteenth century, it is also a repository of local culture and a polemical work that argues for a particular interpretation of Qing power. Bringing together sources from places as disparate as Turpan and Kashgar presents certain challenges for analysis, as these two places are separated by a distance of about 1,300 kilometers. Nevertheless, there are several reasons to consider them together: first of all, Turkic Muslims had much in common culturally across Central Asia, as these areas were connected by spoken Turkic languages that were largely mutually intelligible, a common Persianate high culture, and networks of trade and migration. As others have argued, and as I will further illustrate, the Muslims of Xinjiang also shared a common experience of Qing rule that from the mid-eighteenth century brought them together into not just a political unit, but a regional network of travel, and especially pilgrimage, that engendered a common identity. This was especially true of

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44 In the course of preparing this dissertation, I have worked closely with several manuscripts of Sayrāmî’s histories. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to two of them here. Following Hodong Kim’s convention (Holy War in China, 194-195), I will use certain shorthands for each manuscript when necessary: TH/Beijing: Mullā Mūsā b. Mullā Ḥsā Sayrāmī, Tāriḵ-i Ḥamīdī, MS 1911, reproduced in Miao Pusheng, ed., Xibei shaoshu minzu wenzi wenxian (Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2006). TH/Jarring: Lund University Library, Jarring Prov. 163, Tāriḵ-i Ḥamīdī.

45 This is the basic thesis of Thum, Sacred Routes, although Thum deemphasizes the influence of Chinese rule in the Qing period.
the greater region of Southern Xinjiang, which included the whole territory from Kashgar to Turpan. Although Turpan was formally part of a “Northern” unit of administration, after 1877, it was brought under a common set of policies with Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu, Kucha, and the whole Turkic-majority South. I believe that the Turkic manuscripts of Kashgaria reflect phenomena that were common across the whole “Muslim region” (Hui bu).

I read these texts as an archive of perspectives that attests to transculturation. “Transculturation,” as Fernando Ortiz and Mary Pratt defined it, indicates the selective appropriation of the forms and symbolic vocabularies of a dominant culture for meaning-making and invention by those outside of it.\(^{46}\) My approach to these works is therefore partly philological, in that works such as histories must be placed in the broader context of Persianate high culture, and partly anthropological, as I read them as expressions of broader changes in conceptions of history, cosmology, and the self.

In summary: the was something colonial about living in Xinjiang in the late Qing and the early Republic, and there is something very Chinese about colonialism generally. In other words, many scholars and commentators have characterized Xinjiang’s relationship to the Chinese core as being in some way “colonial.” In this dissertation, I take this typological characterization seriously and so bring the methods and perspectives of colonial history to bear on life and government in the region. This methodological approach explores tensions in everyday life in a region where governing and subject groups were distinguished by language, creed, place of origin, and class. Rather than take a high-level typological approach to comparative institutions of government, I work

through the state-society relationship as it manifested on the ground and so refine the typology of colonialism to include its late-imperial Chinese forms. The dissertation thus addresses two levels of colonial experience: 1. elite formulations of institutions for governing internal Others and their implementation 2. colonial subjects’ social and cultural interpretations of and responses to that project. By putting these two levels of analysis into dialogue, I demonstrate how they shaped each other, and how the Xinjiang case contributes to our broader understanding of what colonialism is and how it emerges.

V. Chapter Outline

The dissertation is divided roughly into three parts.

The first concerns the articulation and implementation of a colonial ideology centered around the transformation of Xinjiang into a province. In Chapter One, I trace the intellectual origins of a civilizing project within the community of “statecraft” jingshi scholars. Chapter Two narrates the attempt to implement government in Xinjiang along the ideal lines of the civilizing project and its complications, namely the emergence of a class of Turkic Muslim interpreters.

The second part describes how the civilizing project shaped the tensions that emerged in Xinjiang society and the altered parameters of both Chinese and Muslim discourses surrounding difference and inter-group conflict. Chapter Three argues that the Chinese attempt to enforce sino-normative familial relationships among Muslims intersected with socioeconomic inequality and preexisting Turki marriage practices in complicated ways, such that sexuality became a major point of contestation between Chinese, Hui, and Turki. Chapter Four argues that the common attempt across different
groups to recover the past following the trauma of the uprisings and reconquest encouraged people to represent the remains of deceased relatives not merely as family members, but as abstract ancestors of an imagined community. Similarly, Chapter Five argues that local contestation over sacred spaces was part of a broader project of territorialization through temple building whereby Chinese elites sought to remake Xinjiang not only as a province in political terms, but as a spiritual entity, and to inscribe their vision of the Tang on the landscape at the expense of Muslim and even other pre-uprisings Chinese institutions.

The third part demonstrates that pre-uprisings Qing empire and post-uprisings Chinese rule both affected Turkic Muslim ideas of political legitimacy, history, and geography and ultimately of subjecthood. Chapter Six argues that the institutional and symbolic formation of government in these two periods introduced new dimensions to the Perso-Islamic discourse of justice, such that Qing rule became legitimate. Chapter Seven argues similarly, that the Turkic Muslim experience of the Qing is reflected in local inflections of sacred history and geography, such that Turki membership in the empire was licensed by a myth of common descent.
Colonialism is not merely a system of domination of one cultural dissimilar party by another, but an ideological formation. Colonial ideology typically draws on broader discourses and forms of knowledge to present this relationship as natural or even necessary. In reality, it does not happen that the dominating party advances a single, coherent ideology that then colonizes everyday life, gets into the consciousness of all people, and so transforms their relationships precisely along those lines, although that may be its goal. Rather, colonialism takes place in a cultural context rich with vocabularies of difference and domination that are constantly under negotiation among unequal parties. We may speak for example of the language of savagery and civilization in British imperialism, and consequently of the savagery with which the colonialists attempted to “civilize” the colonized – so discourse informs and justifies practices, which even become inscribed in law. Ideology serves to cover up the range of ad hoc institutions of domination and deny their historical reasons for being, so that gradual or nearly accidental expansion gains a sense of inevitability, or a colony founded through violence for the purposes of bald economic exploitation is subsumed later into a civilizing mission ordained by God.

Nevertheless, colonialism is not necessarily informed by a coherent theory of civilization. When White settlers forced Aboriginal people in Australia or Mexico to accept a European language and manners and Christian religion, they seem to have had only a very vague, subjective sense of what it meant to behave correctly and how this

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behavior might transform the human soul. If they cared little about the souls of their victims, or denied that the Other could even possess one, they failed nevertheless to advance a rational argument for the need to force complicity. It took until the early nineteenth century for civilizing missions already well underway to gain the support of a new faith in pedagogy – “a belief that truths, one recognized as such, had only to be learned and applied” – and even then, the relationship between education and civilization was largely implicit.48 Rather, regimes of violence had a great deal to do with a common sensibility or “logic” of domination that manifested across imperial space in the control not just of “the native,” but also “the poor,” “the insane,” and “the criminal.” A colonizer does not necessarily have a manual for oppression – rather, ideology as articulated by state actors intersects in messy ways with a variety of ideas of difference present in the broader culture. In the colonial environment, vertical hierarchies of difference – for example, class – tend to fuse with geographical imaginaries that place the periphery and its people firmly into a realm of savagery that calls out for civilizing influence and of historical imaginaries that conceive of such peoples’ backwardness in theological or pseudoscientific developmental terms.

All of these elements are present in the Xinjiang case, although in different proportions. Much of the administration on the provincial and local levels operated not according to any comprehensive manual of administration specific to the region – one was never produced, nor I believe even conceived of – but according instead to officials’ sensibilities, their training and backgrounds, and the textual resources available to them. Critically, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, the officials who governed Xinjiang from

1877 to the end of the Qing principally came from a single social group defined by common origin and experience. Moreover, this group shared a common ideology of domination that articulated very clearly what “civilization” meant – literally, a process of “transformation by teaching” (jiaohua). This concept came from a specific variety of Confucian thought that drew on two millennia of debate. That is, by the mid-eighteenth century, there existed in Chinese thought a well-established conception both of the elite’s responsibility and means for the moral rectification of the lower classes and of non-Han border peoples, which was conceived of in terms of a teacher-student relationship of guidance and coaching in ritual comportment and the mastery of elite linguistic culture. Essentially, to civilize was to bring someone to embody what a certain community considered the “principle” (li) of culture (wen) through ritual and linguistic performance. More narrowly, the Xinjiang administrative elite did not conceive of a mind-body dichotomy, as Westerners did in their treatment of clothing, speech, comportment, and the colonial soul, but rather of “cultivating the self” to be in co-resonance with a well-ordered world. Rather, they held that recognition and practice of rites (li), especially Sino-normative family relationships, would transform the qi of people and place and so bring order to it. I will unpack this dense, over-signified theory below.

This chapter argues that the geographical and historical imaginaries of the late-Qing regime, which resemble colonialism in other contexts, derived from the statecraft (jingshi) intellectual tradition as it emerged in Hunan. It was intimately tied in discourse and in content to the relationships between a specific intellectual community centered on the Neo-Confucian academies of Changsha, their evolution through the early nineteenth century, and the mode of their rise to prominence during the Taiping era. The Hunanese
civilizing project in Xinjiang greatly resembles in its fundamental principles and vision the Neo-Confucian official activism of the eighteenth century, combined in the early nineteenth century with a new theory of chaos and cultural order. The study of frontier geography within the Evidential Scholarship (kaozheng) tradition was simultaneously profoundly influential on the key actors in the Hunanese push to the Northwest, but as this tightly-knit network of intellectuals took its vision into the frontier itself, it changed in turn with their experiences in Shaanxi and Gansu. Officers in the Xiang Army settled in Xinjiang with a distinct set of priorities for the sociopolitical order, but these changed again in the regional context as its members settled in. What we find in Xinjiang, then, is a uniquely Chinese genealogy of colonial-like ideology, one that left vitally important traces in the region’s society and culture, even after the introduction of a globalized discourse of progress and empire in the last years of the Qing.

While statecraft thought has received significant attention in the literature, scholars last produced extensive treatments of statecraft’s relationship with the project to transform Xinjiang in the 1970s. At that time, Zuo Zongtang himself was the natural focus of research, as his collected works, and those of his deputy Liu Jintang, were very nearly the only available sources. Since then, the scholarly understanding of this branch

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49 Nailene Chou, whose 1976 dissertation remains a classic of the field, argued that the intersection of frontier studies literature and the social milieu of Hunanese Statecraft had a profound influence of the conception of Xinjiang’s provincial government. (Chou, “Frontier Studies”) Lanny Fields wrote in 1978 about the movement of the Statecraft group into the Northwest and the relevance of that tradition to government, particularly through the education and later agency of Zuo Zongtang. (Fields, Tso Tsung-t’ang and the Muslims) Both were written a decade after Wen Djang Chu’s comprehensive study of the Hunan Army’s march across China. (Chu, The Moslem Rebellion) All of these works address very straightforwardly some specific aspects of the relationship between statecraft thought and the “practical” plan to transform and govern Xinjiang. On statecraft, see also William Rowe (Saving the World) and Stephen Platt (Provincial Patriots: the Hunanese and Modern China, [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007]).
of the statecraft movement has evolved, notably with Wang Jiping and Zhao Weixi’s work on the Xiang Army as a distinct social and intellectual community in the Changsha area of Hunan and the Northwest.\(^{50}\) (Their force was named the “Xiang Army” to refer specifically to Hunan province, known as “Xiang” for the Xiang River.) We have also come to understand that ritual and law were just as vital to imperial government as the military or bureaucracy were. While this chapter will focus on policy-makers in the Xinjiang government, it does so with special attention to the broader theories that informed their work and the ways in which their relationships formed through interaction with those ideas. This chapter will demonstrate that the Hunanese project as articulated by its leadership was not rooted in a theory of ethnic difference, was not proto-nationalist, and was not simply a general ideology held commonly across China. Instead, I argue that it was a culturalist, traditionalist colonial-like civilizing project, significant ideas of which were peculiar to the Changsha clique. Hunanese colonialism was definitely centered around a common faith in pedagogy, but in place of a universal theory of development such as one usually finds in the European case in the nineteenth century, it advanced instead a theory of the inherent ability of people to transform either into civilized people or into savages.

I. The Prehistory of Hunanese Colonialism

In order to understand how the Hunanese governed Xinjiang and why, we must begin with an intellectual heritage reaching back centuries into the Neo-Confucian

tradition. The Changsha statecraft group of the early nineteenth century drew on this heritage in specific ways. I will sketch out the salient ideas here with the goal of reorienting the study of late-Qing Xinjiang through the specific ideas of the civilizing mission that its ruling parties adopted. In short, the community of scholarship surrounding Zuo Zongtang drew its fundamental principles and vision from the Neo-Confucian official activism of the eighteenth century as exemplified by Chen Hongmou (1696-1771), but it then incorporated the revival of Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) and his theory of chaos and cultural order. Scholars have already established the following: Ming statecraft thought was a branch of Neo-Confucianism focused on finding practical solutions for problems of government. Following the Qing conquest, their ideas retreated from government into the sphere of elite activism until statecraft officials like Chen Hongmou used their positions to experiment with statecraft ideas. Chen himself contributed greatly to the revival of statecraft at Changsha’s Yuelu Academy, which only a few decades later became the crucible of conservative reform through such people as Zeng Guofan, Guo Songtao, and Zuo Zongtang. All of these future leaders formed their solidarities both through a network of familial, teacher-student, and classmate relationships, as well as their common participation in the project to revive the writings

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51 Statecraft has been defined in many different ways, but most scholars assert the centrality of “practical” measures in statecraft thought and practice. We must remember, however, that “practical” does not refer so much to an ideal positivistic realism as it does those things that appear possible through the lens of Neo-Confucian moralism and cosmology. See: Benjamin Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology*, 53-54; Joshua A. Fogel, *Politics and Sinology: the Case of Naitō Konan (1866-1934)*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 60; Chang Hao, “On the Ch’ing-shih Ideal in Neo-Confucianism” in *Ch’ing-shih wen-t’i* 3:1 (November 1974), 36-61, 42-43; Rowe, *Saving the World*, 2-4, 448-455.

of the anti-Manchu scholar Wang Fuzhi. Because Wang was the central influence on this group, and because scholars have emphasized Wang’s role in the formation of Qing-era Chinese elite ideology, I will begin with him.

Several scholars have erroneously identified Wang Fuzhi as a “racialist” or “proto-nationalist.” Anglophone and Chinese scholarship alike has seen in his anti-Manchuism an articulation of biologically determined differences that imply a need to keep Han people wholly separate from non-Han. However, this analysis, which was most recently advanced with direct reference to Wang Fuzhi’s own writing in the 1960s, depends both on an insufficient typology of ideas of difference and on a very selective reading of Wang’s extensive corpus, often through acts of wishful translation. Zuo Zongtang, along with such influential figures as Zeng Guofan, Guo Songtao, and other students and teachers at Changsha’s Yuelu Academy all helped edit writings by Wang that have been trumpeted as chief exemplars of his racialism. Nevertheless, I do not find these passages’ influence in statecraft writings after him, certainly not in the way that modern scholars have interpreted them.

If I were to let the scholarly assertion of Wang’s “racialism” go unaddressed, the reader might receive the impression that the Xiang Army was motivated by ideological racialism or racism, when in fact the main influence on their thought was nearer to Confucian culturalism. The problem arose initially from “national essence” (guocui 国粹) thinkers of the late Qing and Republic, who saw in a few very selective and decontextualized passages of Wang’s works evidence for a tradition of nationalism long

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before the modern era.  

Étienne Balázs, in his excursus of Wang’s philosophy, noted the difficulty of reconciling this view with Wang’s overwhelmingly culturalist views and general critique of Confucians’ “illusions.” Yet Balázs, in a lecture given in 1963, seized upon Wang’s use of the word *zulei* 族類, which has a modern connotation of “race,” suggesting that this might indeed indicate a seed of future nationalism. If read in context, Wang’s use of *zulei* has a much more ambiguous meaning pointing to classes of people and things alike, but in this single case Wang did happen to mean “Han Chinese,” whom he meant to establish themselves in political independence against the Manchus.

Paul Vierheller, writing in Germany in the late 1960s, expanded on Balázs’ comment with a dissertation that interpreted a very narrow selection of Wang’s writings through an idiosyncratic theory of “nationalism.” Vierheller’s “nationalism” is simply group consciousness, constituted over and against an Other and through the articulation of a common moral orientation, and so it lacks many of the features the scholars later considered central to nationalism, such as the articulation of a myth of common origin or a relationship with the social and cultural ramifications of industrial or capitalist development. Vierheller’s argument for Wang’s “nationalism” relies on the selection of individual items of vocabulary from Wang’s work that all point to “groups” or “families” in the premodern context of Chinese philosophical writing, but that, when read through the Japanese-influenced language of twentieth-century nationalism appear to signify

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54 Fa-ti Fan, “Nature and Nation in Chinese Political Thought.”


bounded ethnic or national groups, for example zu 祖 “lineage, clan,” later “ethnic group.” Frank Dikötter, in his influential The Discourse of Race in Modern China, cites Vierheller, and then lists various terms in order to cast Wang as a “biological determinist” and originator, by weird analogy to the story of Abraham, of a Chinese idea of “race.”

Prasenjit Duara cited Dikötter in turn. Related chains of mistranslation and wishful thinking bind similarly influential scholars to this implicit association of Wang with an inchoate notion of “race.” Notably, Liang Qichao says nothing about Wang’s supposed racialism, but agrees with the bulk of Balázs’ assessment. Nor have any of these “racialisms” attributed to Wang Fuzhi approached a modern definition of the term: the theory that immutable and inborn cultural and psychological characteristics correspond to a set of human types defined by physical difference.

If we read those specific passages in context, and if we look at Wang Fuzhi’s corpus as a whole, we find that he is not so innovative. Rather, Wang upholds a

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57 Dikötter, The Discourse of Race in Modern China, 29; Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, 75.

58 Perdue (“Nature and Nurture,” 254-255) takes advantage of another scholar’s mistranslation of qi 氣 as “clime” to imply, but not support through evidence, Wang’s identity as a biological determinist in the modern European mode.

Mi-chu Wiens (“Anti-Manchu Thought during the Qing” in Papers on China 22A [1969]) produced a somewhat subtler analysis. Even Wiens worked in no small part from Derk Bodde (“Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy” in Arthur F. Wright, ed., Studies in Chinese Thought, [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953], 19-80), and Bodde again from Xi Wenfu. (Chuanshan zhexue, [Shanghai, 1936])


Chinese scholars have recently worked to clarify Wang Fuzhi’s position, as the general consensus there has arisen that Wang was a sort of proto-“great Han chauvanist.” (Chen Lixiang, “Wang Chuanshan yi-xia guan bianzheng – yi li yi fen shu bian bie ren yu qin yu yi-xia wei shijiao” in Huaihua xueyuan xuebao 28:1 [January 2009], 29-32). This topic deserves treatment in a separate article.

60 Comments here are based on: Wang Fuzhi, Chuanshan quanshu, (Changsha: Yuelu Chubanshe, 1988), v. 4, 4, 657, 1,437-1,438; v. 12, 534.
fundamental principle of Confucian thought: ritual and comportment (\textit{li}) and matter-and-energy (\textit{qi}) are in a mutually constitutive relationship. That is, a person is not a “barbarian” by virtue of parentage – at no point does Wang make such a claim – but becomes a barbarian by failing to observe the normative set of behaviors and relationships associated with China proper. Wang goes a step further: he describes at length how the North of China, once the seat of civilization because of the Northerners’ observance of ritual norms, lost its status to the South, which became in his view the center of Chinese culture. Incidentally, the South includes Wang’s native Hunan. This change occurred, he argues, because Northerners ceased to observe ritual norms following the Mongol conquest and so fell into barbarism. Conversely, a place that is not presently “civilized” may become so if its people practice the rites.

How, then, are we to interpret the few passages that speak of the people of the world in terms of “clans” (\textit{zu} 族) or “types” (\textit{lei} 類)?\textsuperscript{61} Of the passages that scholars cite to demonstrate Wang’s racialism, I can find only one example where he unambiguously refers to the people of China (\textit{Huaxia} 華夏) as a “clan,” and that because they, by preserving proper ritual comportment and familial relations, maintain the emanation Wang calls the “Yellow Center” (\textit{huang zhong} 黃中). In every other case, Wang writes mainly about “types” of people in terms of scholars, whose duty it is to maintain the rites among the class of ordinary people, just as ordinary people are tasked with ordering the class of material things.\textsuperscript{62} Where he makes a statement to the effect that it is righteous to

\textsuperscript{61} This is the particular concern of Duara, who follows Dikötter, who in turn cites Vierheller (\textit{Nation und Elite}, 11-12, 26-27, 30).

\textsuperscript{62} Wang Fuzhi, \textit{Chuanshan quanshu}, vol. 12, 519.
dominate barbarians, he states that “Occupying their territory and thereby substituting for their customs the virtue of our letters and teachings, as well as confiscating their property and thereby increasing our own people’s provisions is called ‘righteous.’” The need to dominate the barbarians is justified by the barbarians’ failure to practice the rites. It thus makes sense that, in a noted passage, Wang is not arguing for the absolute separation of groups of people from another. Actually, if the whole context is taken into account, he argues for clear distinctions between civilization and barbarism, and for isolating barbarians themselves so that they may be transformed. To quote On-cho Ng, there is “a religious tone to [Wang’s] sense of history, a sense of ultimacy achieved once upon a time” in his depiction of the ideal past of civilization and the possibility of reviving it through the spreading of universal truths, even to the point of transforming barbarians with ritual. As the Hunanese statecraft group interpreted it, his message was the classic call to the civilizing mission, “a self-given assignment to transmit one’s norms and institutions to others, sometimes by exerting pressure of varying degrees of intensity.”

The means of exerting such pressure were already part of the statecraft repertoire. Ideally, Neo-Confucians would revive a society in which virtuous men educated women,

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65 Wang, “Historicism,” 572. To quote Wang: “This [the rites] is the norm of Heaven and the propriety of Earth. It is what makes people different from beasts, the Middle Kingdom different from barbarians, and the gentleman different from the savage (yeren). It fosters their essence (qi) and substance (ti). It exerts a subtle influence on vulgar, licentious, and rude essence without them even knowing.” (Chuanshan quanshu, v. 4, 1,437-1,438) “是天之經,地之義,人之所以異於禽獸,中國之所以異於夷狄,君子之所以異於野人,而養其氣體,使椎鄙淫冶驅戾之氣潛移默化,而不自知。”

children, and barbarians in local charitable schools called *yixue* 義學 or *yishu* 義塾 without the assistance of the government. Chen Hongmou appropriated the idea of these nominally organic institutions and established thousands of them as government-run schools in Yunnan. After the Qing conquest, statecraft had retreated from political involvement, but in the eighteenth century, the porous southern frontier provided a space to experiment with social reform by educating the internal Other, the non-Han people of the South who nevertheless lived in Chinese territory. Chen not only provides a prime example of statecraft activism through civilization, literally “transformation-by-education” (*jiaohua*), he was actually a key member in the intellectual lineage of Zuo Zongtang and the Xiang Army leadership.

Nevertheless, it took one more element to turn statecraft thinkers’ attention away from the open South and towards the bounded, non-Chinese space of the North, where institutional differences and the official closure of Mongolia, Manchuria, and Turkestan to Han Chinese prevented the sort of gradual transformation through education that Chen tried to effect in the South. The Jahāngīr crisis of the 1820s, which threatened Qing sovereignty over Eastern Turkestan, spurred the court in Beijing to solicit new ideas on frontier policy from a number of recognized experts already holding official positions. Chief proposals included further restricting Han Chinese settlement, as it was believed that uncultured Han and barbaric non-Han would simply corrupt each other further, and

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68 This division between North and West on the one hand and South and East on the other has been sketched out before in Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration,” 293-294.

measures to make frontier garrisons more self-sufficient. These ideas were rejected, but Beijing kept looking for solutions.

At the same time, Xinjiang was a main site for exile, which brought many officials and other scholars to the borderlands. Their time in exile inspired innovations in frontier scholarship as Chinese scholar-officials drew on their experiences of regions that were otherwise closed to them. Indeed, Lin Zexu (1785-1850), following his exile to Ili, introduced ideas about law into statecraft and directly to Zuo Zongtang that were powerfully influential in the later administration. I will discuss these in a later chapter.

Meanwhile, statecraft thinkers such as Wei Yuan and Gong Zizhen proposed large-scale colonization: contrary to the idea that lower-class Han and barbarian non-Han would further debase each other, these men came to believe that they could have a mutually civilizing effect. Zuo took up their ideas as early as 1833, including a long-term plan for Xinjiang provincehood. He held that the system as it stood was untenable, as the general in Ili required support from the Central Plains. Military or exile agricultural colonies (tun) were a means to stability, but not its ultimate solution, which was independent provincehood. We see here echoes of the Statecraft ideal: if the institutions of good government in China proper were only established, then stability and self-sufficiency would naturally follow. Yet those institutions implied a systematic transformation of the population, as well, into morally upright people who would intuitively understand how good government worked, eventually weaning local society

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70 See Waley-Cohen, *Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang.*

71 Chou, “Frontier Studies,” 139. For an 1833 poem expressing Zuo’s stance, see 《癸巳燕臺襍感八首》in *Zuo Wenxiang Gong shiji*, (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), 2a.
off of higher administration entirely. Millward identifies in Zuo’s generation of the Statecraft school a new “expansionism” as exemplified by Wei Yuan: “To call in Chinese people (*huamin*) and turn this rich loam into China proper (*neidi*) would greatly ease the exercise of our authority and greatly increase our profit.”

This was the ideology of the men who led the Xiang Army across China proper and later into the Northwest. Yet, it was not limited to the elite stratum of Yuelu Academy graduates who rose to prominence in the mid-nineteenth century. Following Wang Jiping, Zhao Weixi, and Stephen Platt, we may productively think of the Xiang Army as the result of the transposition of local social and affinal networks from the area around Changsha into the rigorous hierarchy of a popular army modeled on the pattern of a local, gentry-led militia. People came into the army by invitation and the approval of commanders, following which they pledged to adhere to a distinct code of ethics and behavior derived from statecraft thought. Moreover, as I will discuss in detail below, the membership of the Xiang Army was bound together by the common worship of Dingxiang Wang, the city god of Shanhua County, whose effigy they carried on campaign all over the empire. The Xiang Army under Zeng Guofan was motivated first by orders to reclaim territory from the barbaric Taiping and return it to civilization. Later, under the leadership of Zuo Zongtang, this became a mission to retake the Northwest and transform it according to the ideals of China proper. I now turn to the march into the Northwest.

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72 Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 244.

II. A Community and an Ideology

The rest of this chapter analyzes the Xiang Army not as a strategic body, nor as a unified political force, but as a community. By “community,” I mean a largely face-to-face group of people who shared a common set of rituals, who were bound together through a multiplicity of relationships, and who worked actively to maintain the boundedness of their group through recruitment, gifts of status, and marriage ties. This community, constituted by common origins, experiences, and ideology, effectively ruled Xinjiang until 1905. During that time, its policies changed, first building on the experience of reconstruction in Gansu, and then in response to the difficulties of governing the borderland beyond. Its successors in the administration radically reoriented the polity, but it is through their struggles that the factionalism of the Xinjiang government really becomes clear. I sustain this argument as best as the evidence allows into the Republican era.

I take this prosopographical approach in reaction to histories of Xinjiang that overwhelmingly rely on documents produced and often edited by provincial governors. It is insufficient to focus on the policies generated in Dihua as the governors presented them to higher-ups. As any historian of China knows, a memorial is a political document: it may present true things, but it does so according to the rules of the genre, which include depicting the memorialist in a positive light. Because Beijing relied on memorials to understand the situation in a given region and react to it, memorialists could obscure or confabulate in order to achieve a desired result. For these reasons, relying on memorials

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74 For a useful discussion of theories of community, see Bellér-Hann, *Community Matters*, 9-10, 15-16.
written by governors, or on collections of those memorials selected by an editor in order to praise or honor that individual, puts the historian in danger of writing propaganda.

In order to consider what social and intellectual phenomena might be significant to the administration of Xinjiang apart from the “ethnic” backgrounds of its highest leaders, I surveyed biographical data from several hundred officials serving in late-Qing Xinjiang. Sources include archival documents concerning appointments and potted biographies in local gazetteers. When these biographies were compiled into a database and a table of appointments, clear patterns emerged that attested to the presence of cliques within the Xinjiang administration. Conflicts between them, which I will trace through the rest of this chapter, in turn were tied to the evolution of policy and of local government.75

Unfortunately, outside of Turpan, data is only available for officials who held at least the rank of county or prefectural secretary (jingli), correspondence secretary (zhaomo), sub-director of schools (xundao), warden (limu, dianshi), or registrar (zhubu). Data is only consistently reliable for those holding a magisterial rank, including second-class sub-prefects (tongpan), sub-district magistrates (xunjian), and assistant district magistrates (xiancheng). These latter officials, although not of an equal rank with a county magistrate (zhixian), first-class sub-prefect (tongzhi), department magistrate (zhizhou), or prefect (zhifu), nevertheless effectively managed the affairs of a prescribed geographical area and those who lived in it with minimal interference from their superiors — until something went wrong, of course. The appointments and movements of

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75 For reasons of space, I have not cited every single archival document here. Please refer instead to the Appendix for the collected biographies of late-Qing Xinjiang officials who are mentioned in this dissertation, each of which includes references to relevant sources.
magistrate-level officials are one key to understanding politics and society in late-Qing Xinjiang. Nor should we ignore those officials who held similar ranks but remained in Dihua on temporary or permanent service at the pleasure of provincial officials, usually in the treasury. Positions as military-administrative circuit intendants (bingbeidao) went to trusted officials close to the provincial center, as their offices were run in practice on the model of the early reconstruction agencies and carried on the responsibility of Xinjiang’s ongoing agricultural transformation. They were often steps on the staircase to executive power.

Apart from a handful of notable exceptions, few of these officials left behind a literary legacy beyond their official reports. For this reason, their motivations and personal relations are often obscure. Nevertheless, from the scraps of narratives in the archive emerge families, alliances based on common origin, experience, and interest, and rivalries that exacted retribution for both ideological and fiscal offenses. As we will see, it was not “the Chinese” who ruled Xinjiang. Rather, it was a series of factions that organized themselves around certain interests and became dominant in different areas.

III. The Xiang Army in the Northwest

Most histories of the Xiang Army end with the departure of Zeng Guofan from its leadership in 1864 following the victory over the Taiping. In fact, though the army grew smaller as a force, the central clique maintained, renewed, and strengthened its boundedness and the centrality of its common rituals and ideology as it marched out of

76 Stephen Platt (Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom. [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012], 357) is among the scholars who present 1864 as the end of the army.
Hunan under Zuo Zongtang.\textsuperscript{77} This core group of Zuo loyalists, then usually called the “Old Xiang Army” (lao Xiangjun), had its own trajectory of intellectual and institutional development.\textsuperscript{78} In Shaanxi and Gansu, this new Xiang Army clique developed a set of measures for the reconstruction of predominantly Muslim areas through moral transformation. It must be emphasized that, in the Northwest, the Hunanese Statecraft project became increasingly independent of the central authority of the Qing empire. Often, even though the court rejected Zuo Zongtang’s plans, he and the Xiang Army clique implemented them nevertheless.\textsuperscript{79} This makes it exceptionally difficult to write the history of the Northwestern reconstruction from the perspective of central archival documents, which tell us relatively little about how things played out on the ground. Instead, following Zhao, we must look at collections of writings by the members of the clique and local sources that address what was established and carried out beyond Beijing’s sight. The Xiang Army clique certainly transformed during the march Northwest, and particularly during the long occupation of Gansu, during which the pattern of distinction between Hunanese and Muslims that persisted in Xinjiang first appeared.

First, Zuo Zongtang’s individual relationships with an older generation of Northwest specialists contributed in thought and practice to the Xiang Army’s activities


\textsuperscript{78} There is some confusion about nomenclature. Officially, Zuo’s army as it left Hunan was the Chu Army (Chujun). Later on, it was regularly called the Hunan Army (Xiangjun), just as Zeng’s force had been. I use “Hunan Army” because the vast majority of the sources for this work exclusively use that name exclusively.

\textsuperscript{79} Zhao Weixi provides one important example of Zuo’s defiance (or duplicitousness) towards the court in the resettlement of Muslims in Gansu (\textit{Xiangjun jituan}, 112).
there. Lin Zexu in particular lent Zuo his experiences drawn from the journey into and out of exile in Ili. The two met in 1849 at Hu Linyi’s urging, as Hu hoped that Lin could draw Zuo from scholarly seclusion into the anti-Taiping campaign. Instead, they discussed their shared interests in Xinjiang and irrigation at length, and Lin presented Zuo with all that he had collected on the region. The influence of Lin’s thought on Zuo’s agricultural scheme is well-documented – he was fascinated with karez, the underground water channels of Turpan, and both were inclined to see the potential to irrigate the desert through the quintessentially Chinese art of water management. I will return to Lin’s profound influence on Xinjiang’s legal system in Chapter Five. Zuo had already read extensively in the geographical and memoir writings of another exile whom he met in the 1830s, Xu Song (1781-1848). Wang Boxin (1799-1873), who worked with both Lin and Zuo, advised him extensively on military strategy. Zuo took an important lesson from them: when the Xiang Army came to the far Northwest, it would need to establish military agricultural colonies. The idea of a military colony (tun) had been around in some form since the Han dynasty, when it was a means for garrison soldiers to be self-sufficient, notably during Han Wudi’s (r. 156-87 BCE) campaigns. In its latter-day form, the tun was a general form of state-directed resettlement. Exiles were sent to work on military tun, particularly in pre-Uprising Xinjiang. The Statecraft group reinterpreted tun as a means of ordering the world, and we can see this idea in Nayanceng’s policies in the

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Tarim Basin. As of 1832, Zuo was already a proponent of military colonies as a means to feed an army on a long march into the notorious barren Northwest.\(^{81}\)

By the 1860s, they became for him a new kind of logic for the long-term reconstruction of the Northwest – not only were soldiers to support themselves on \textit{tun}, but so were ordinary subjects or commoners (\textit{min}). In a pair of memorials in 1867 and 1868, Zuo laid out his understanding of the causes of unrest in the region and their solutions: the lack of a Confucian gentry, he wrote, meant that militias had been poorly organized and unable to combat the uprising or command the respect of local people.\(^{82}\) In the future, a native military force on the model of the Xiang Army, formed from militias but trained and equipped with modern weapons and methods, would be necessary. They were to be under the command of local gentry, the emergence of which required education, and that meant establishing schools. Immediately after the Gansu campaign ended, Zuo had a printing house in Hubei produce woodblock editions of the Classics and basic textbooks. These were distributed to a series of institutions across Shaanxi and Gansu that Zuo called “charitable schools” (\textit{yixue} or \textit{yishu}), as in Chen Hongmou’s project.\(^{83}\) The term evoked the local institutions that gentry established in their home villages, and Zuo established them alongside state-run “academies” (\textit{shuyuan 腳院}), themselves modeled on organic centers of learning. In this plan and this terminology we see again an echo of Chen Hongmou, who used the same name for his popular schools, as

\(^{81}\) Chou, “Frontier Studies,” 125. Fields [\textit{Tso Tsung-t’ang and the Muslims}, 43] states that Zuo had encouraged Hunan Governor Luo Bingzhang to (1793-1867) to resettle the Miao in \textit{tun} during the uprisings of the 1850s. Despite checking Fields’ references, I cannot locate his source for this assertion.

\(^{82}\) Chou, “Frontier Studies,” 135.

\(^{83}\) Zhao Weixi, \textit{Xiangjun jituan}, 83-89, 203.
a powerful official with military and political authority appropriated the idea of charity, ultimately with the same goal of universal transformation through education, or “civilization.”

Zuo stated explicitly that it was possible to civilize the Chinese-speaking Muslims – “this is not a difference of nature,” he wrote, “but a difference of teaching” (ci fei xing zhi yi, jiao zhi yi ye 此非性之益教之益也). He drew at length on Wang Fuzhi’s discussion of nature and nurture to argue that the “people of Arabia” were not barbarians by birth, but because they had learned Islam, itself a “teaching” analogous but inferior to Neo-Confucianism. If the Muslims could be brought closer to Neo-Confucian ideas, then their familial relations would all begin to follow those of China.

Zuo’s model for the moral transformation of Gansu was Tao Mo (1835-1902), later governor of Xinjiang but then only a country magistrate. Tao vigorously promoted a model of legal marriage rooted in the Statecraft reading of the Book of Rites. In order to induce a popular educational transformation beyond the classroom, Zuo also introduced the “village compact” (xiangyue 鄉約) system, according to which proclamations would regularly be read out to local subjects by carefully-selected readers. In both Xinjiang and Gansu, these readers themselves came to be called xiangyue, which I fill henceforth translate as “village headman.” Leadership could thus distribute socio-moral lessons

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84 Rowe, Saving the World.

85 Recorded in Gansu xin tongzhi, j. 35, 書院.

86 Zhao Weixi, Xiangjun jituan, 341-345.

87 He Rong, “Shi lun Yang Zengxin shiqi Xinjiang xiangyue de tedian” in Xinjiang daxue xuebao (zhexue renwen shehui kexue ban) 36:3 (May 2008), 67-70; Zhao Weixi, Xiangjun jituan, 345.
down to the village level through hierarchical oral transmission. The compact system had its roots in the thought of Zhu Xi and other Southern Song Neo-Confucians, who advanced it as a voluntarist, organic alternative to centralized government. Like the “charitable schools,” Zuo appropriated the village compact instead as a top-down means to transform society. This exact same system was reused in Xinjiang’s reconstruction.

Zuo’s relationship with Muslims and Islam solidified during the Gansu campaign. Zuo probably would not have succeeding in retaking Gansu without the local commander Dong Fuxiang (1839-1908), a former rebel leader. Although Dong himself was not a Muslim, he brought perhaps 40,000 mostly Hui soldiers into the Xiang Army-led force. While Zuo’s soldiers established military farms, he proposed the large-scale removal of Muslims from the central road through the Gansu Corridor. The Court twice rebuffed him: “Muslims,” they reminded Zuo, “likewise live in their own place and eat its produce. How can they lack natural goodness?” Zuo was instructed not to differentiate between Han and Hui, but only between “the good and the bad.” Their rescripts presented a message of imperial universalism, which many Muslims took up in Xinjiang in the years that followed: everyone was equally a subject of the Qing emperor, or at the very least, both Hui and Han were expected to live under the counties-and-prefectures system.

88 Rowe, Saving the World, 390-392; Zhao Weixi, Xiangjun jitian, 343.
89 Fields, Tso Tsung-t’ang and the Muslims, 81-82. Zhao Weixi (Xiangjun jitian, 23) has “200,000”; this is surely an error.
90 Chu, The Moslem Rebellion, 149-161; Zhao Weixi, Xiangjun jitian, 110-114, 366; Fields, Tso Tsung-t’ang and the Muslims, 85; TZ 9.7.18 “收撫回民安插耕墾片” in Zuo Wenxiang Gong Quanj, j. 36, 38a-39b.
91 “原以回民同係食毛踐土之人；豈無天良？”
Zuo was aware of the history of Muslim service in government, but he held that his proposal responded appropriately to the on-the-ground realities of the Northwest:

> The way to deal with the Muslims is not like the way we dealt with the Taiping and Nien. … They have accumulated deep enmities with the Han. Their marriage customs differ, their temperaments differ, and when they see each other, murderous intent immediately arises, which is very difficult to get under control. Moreover, their races (zhongzu 種族) are distantly separated, so they differ even in appearance. … Furthermore, I fear that Han subjects’ response will redouble the enmity.\(^{92}\)

Zuo’s plan removed Muslims and Chinese from their shared settlements with the goal of preventing popular violence. He was responding in part to the concerns of the Chinese gentry, many of whom had already taken over property seized from the Muslims. Under pressure from the governor of Shaanxi, Zuo forbade Muslims who had come in from Shaanxi to return home, but instead settled them along with local Muslims on remote settlements away from Han, over their own objections.\(^{93}\) There they were confined and organized into the decimal hierarchies of the baojia mutual-security system. A Muslim could only leave one of the new settlements after applying for and receiving special permission from the magistrate through the local hundred-head.

Zuo’s paternal attitude towards both the Muslims and non-Muslims of Gansu reflects officials’ general idea that subjects needed to be controlled and educated, and we should not read too strong a racialist attitude into it. Zuo was concerned, explicitly at least, more with differences in “teaching,” or what a modern analyst would call

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\(^{92}\) “辦回之道, 與辦髮逆、捻逆不同。… 其與漢民積仇既深；婚姻不同，氣類各別，彼此相見，輒起殺機，斷難孚治。又種族攸分，狀貌亦異雜。… 又畏漢民之報復尋仇。”

\(^{93}\) Fields, *Tso Tsung-t’ang and the Muslims*, 85.
sectarianism. He was especially fearful of members of the New Teaching (Xin jiao or Khufiyya), the Sufi movement that had fueled an uprising in the eighteenth century.\(^{94}\) He understood it to be a “heterodox teaching” (xiejiao) akin to the White Lotus in China Proper, while he saw the Old Teaching (Lao jiao or Jahriyya) as “orthodox” Islam.\(^{95}\) Zuo explained that this Old Teaching, having come from Muḥammad via the Hui scholar Liu Zhi (ca. 1660-ca. 1739), was actually “similar to Confucianism” (si Ru 似儒), and so the Qing had readily accepted its adherents into the bureaucracy. What was dangerous about the New Teaching, in Zuo’s view, was that “their claim to be spirits [in the manner of a possessed shaman], nonsense about fortune and misfortune, and crafty ways are enough to hoodwink ignorant Muslims into serving them as part of a great rebellion.”\(^{96}\) His characterization drew on tropes of Buddhist-inspired rebellions from China proper, not on New Teaching practice, but it was effective in drawing the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in Chinese terms. Thus, as with heterodox sects in China proper, banning the New Teaching and allowing Muslims to publicly renounce it was the key to the long-term stability of Gansu.

Meanwhile, the Xiang Army measured mosques. If a mosque did not meet specific physical guidelines set out by Zuo himself, for example if it were taller than the city wall or failed to possess a Chinese-style spirit tablet for Muḥammad, it could be torn down. Mosques in the new settlements were to be built instead according to the plan of a

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\(^{95}\) TZ 10.4.8 “請禁絶回民新教折” in Zuo Wenxiang Gong quanji, j. 38, 62a-66a.

\(^{96}\) “其自託神靈，妄言禍福，行為詭辟，足以誘惑愚回俾令甘心役使同陷大逆。”
Chinese temple. The Gansu regime of the Xiang Army was thus dedicated not to eliminating Islam altogether, but to showing Muslims where and how they ought to be Muslim, and thus gradually bringing them into the civilized Confucian whole. Zuo himself promoted the establishment of provincial examinations in Gansu intended to draw Muslims into the civil service and so integrate them with the Chinese elite. This system built in turn on the new academies. In areas under Zuo’s control, in spite of contrary orders from Beijing, Old Teaching adherents were favored over New Teaching in the exams. It thus appears that, while the Manchu court continued to follow an imperial ideology according to which subject groups were separate, the Xiang Army pursued a colonial-like strategy of dividing and isolating Muslims, civilizing those they believed to be more assimilable, and turning them gradually against those who seemed to be less so.

Zuo’s policy towards Muslims shows echoes of Nayanceng and Yan Ruyi, of Chen Hongmou, and of Wang Fuzhi. Like Nayanceng and Yan, the army, which now also occupied the civilian administration, decided who belonged to which groups and settled them accordingly. The goal was first to ease social unrest, but then to transform the isolated communities through moral instruction. We may recall Wang’s declaration that it is righteous to occupy the lands of the barbarians and replace their customs with rituals in accordance with moral principle. At the same time, Wang held that civilization was not in fact the sole province of the people of China (Zhongxia), but could emerge elsewhere, and in differing – if inferior – forms. Thus could Zuo instruct the Muslims on how to be both “civilized” and Muslim by combining Confucian ritualism with Islamic sacred spaces.
Another possible antecedent for Zuo’s plan is Lu Yao’s (1723-1785) “On Enlightening the Muslims.”97 Lu criticizes the Qianlong-era legal distinction between ordinary subjects and Muslims as an impediment to the integration of Muslims into the moral order. He argues that the law has produced an artificial distinction between Chinese and Muslims by encouraging Muslims to hide from registrations and avoid the law. Instead, Lu proposes a solution modeled on that of an unnamed and possibly mythical governor who organized the Hui into the baojia 保甲 mutual-security system. Doing so brought the Muslims into the state. The governor then established seven “charitable schools” in order to enlighten the Muslims, who studied the Classics. Eventually, Lu says, the Muslims brought out the hidden Islamic scriptures and burned them publicly.

The composition of the Xiang Army force also changed significantly during this period, as the central force became more thoroughly Hunanese, while a new majority of soldiers were drawn from the Muslim population. As a result, this army on the move gradually evolved into the structure of a civilian and military government that would occupy and rule the Northwest. In 1866, Zuo Zongtang assumed command of the remains of the Xiang Army. In Hankou, he gathered thirty-one battalions of soldiers connected to him directly or indirectly through ties of common descent, place of origin, or experience: his own four battalions of infantry and cavalry, called the Army of Chu (Chu jun); ten more battalions led by Hunanese from Ningxiang County; two led by a commander about whom little is known; seven under Liu Dian of Ningxiang (1819-1878); three from

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97 Lu Yao, “Lun Huimin qi” in He Changling, Jingshi wenbian, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992), j. 69, 10b-11a.
Baling County; and finally eight under Guangdong Provincial Commander-in-Chief Gao
Liasheng, who was actually also from Ningxiang. All of these commanders had served
with Zuo for several years in the fighting against the Taiping. When this force reached
Shaanxi, it gained further forces under Wei Guangtao, from Shaoyang; Ma Deshun, an
old Xiang Army commander who was now returning to the campaign; Chong-zhi (d.
1899), who brought cavalry and hydraulic engineers from Jilin; and Wu Shimai (1811-
1870) of Baling. These incorporated parts of the Hunan forces under Zeng Guofan that
had been made independent during the Nien campaigns but now rejoined Zuo: one, Liu
Songshan (1833-1870) of Xiangxiang County led the Old Xiang Army. These entered
Zuo’s inner circle, along with the only non-Hunanese force, Huang Ding’s 500-soldiers
Sichuan Army (Shu jun). A clear pattern was emerging. The Xiang Army recruited
almost exclusively from the core areas of Northern Hunan around Changsha. It was led
by a small cohort of men from the same county who were all around the same age,
including Zuo, born in 1812. They had all fought the Taiping, and then the Nien, and now
with a force of 40,000, they were going to the Northwest.

This pattern persisted during the occupation of Shaanxi and Gansu as the Xiang
Army prepared to push further northwest. After Dong Fuxiang doubled the size of the
army, further Muslim forces under Ma Zhan’ao joined, and they later proved critical in
the conquest and occupation of Xinjiang. Zuo, however, was not satisfied with relying
on local armies, and so in 1870 he recruited two more battalions from Yongding and

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98 Zhao Weixi, Xiangjun jitian, 13-19.
99 Fields, Tso Tsung-t’ang and the Muslims, 81-82.
Ningxiang, Hunan, or about 2,500 soldiers. Another 1,200 came from Hunan to Gansu in 1873 to replace those who had died on campaign. These men were not merely reinforcements: they were brought into the Xiang Army from places where the army already had established networks. Therefore, it appears that the original recruiting methods, which had depended on members mobilizing family, classmate, and other personal networks, persisted in the Northwest. So did the membership requirements. The Xiang Army had always possessed a code of conduct, and current members could vouch for new recruits’ ability to hold to it.

Other bonds helped to hold the army together. Among the data concerning future Xinjiang civil officials alone, several family units are apparent from combinations of surnames, generation names, and common places of origin: Liu Zhaosong and Liu Zhaomei, both from Changsha, for example, were almost certainly brothers or cousins, as were Liu Zhaotong and Liu Zhaodong of Wujin, Jiangsu. The same was true of Wang Tingxiang (b. 1840) and Wang Tingzan (b. 1845) of Xiangyin, who both joined the army in Gansu and later finished their careers in Xinjiang. Luo Zhengxiang’s (1848-1902) brother Xianjue followed him into the Northwest, while Huang Guangda (ca. 1845-1901), like Liu Jintang, replaced his father Huang Wanyou as commander when he died in battle in 1870. Many years later, in 1906, Xiang Army veteran Yi Shaochang (b. 1845, Changsha) was cashiered along with his son Cixian, who held a minor magisterial position in Gansu. Changsha co-locals, and then all of the army’s soldiers, were bound together by their common worship of the deity Dingxiang Wang, the city god of

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100 Zhao Weixi, *Xiangjun jituan*, 24-25.

101 Memorial from Lian-kui dated GX 32.10.4, FHA 04-01-12-0652-048.
Changsha whose effigy the Xiang Army had carried on campaign all the way to Gansu, and would carry again into Xinjiang. I will return to the cult of Dingxiang Wang in Chapter Four. Meanwhile, some Xiang Army officers held formal ranks in the civil administration of Gansu, including those regions still not recovered from the uprising in Xinjiang. He Rujin (b. 1840), for example, held the rank of Suilai magistrate from 1872 through 1877, when there was no Qing presence there. During their time in Gansu, the Xiang Army was gradually turned from a mobile military force into a civilian government, with promises of actual positions in proportion to ranks achieved through battlefield promotions.

By 1877, the Xiang Army was comprised of two bodies of people: one was a nucleus of Hunanese co-locals who shared ideology, worship, and often family ties, as well as the common experience of fighting across the empire. These Hunanese had already begun to reproduce their community by recruiting from their home counties two thousand miles away. The other body was made up of local Muslims from Gansu, fighting men who had joined the Qing only when the failure of the Muslim uprisings of the Northwest seemed inevitable. In Xinjiang, while Xiang Army members generally had very little education of the kind one normally received in order to prepare for the examinations and a life in office, mostly held civilian ranks according to the promotions they had received for military service. Actually, the provincial administration had a surfeit of petty officials to fill its ranks and perform sundry functions in the capital and counties. While some remained in the army garrisons that dotted the region, most soldiers were still Hui, or at least from Gansu. The same was true of the Hunanese officials’ known servants, concubines, and clerks. Zuo’s policies for the control of Muslims in
Gansu had come to depend on the complicity of a body of loyal, armed locals, “good” Muslims who held what Zuo considered to be orthodox beliefs. Schematically, this configuration is reminiscent of colonial empires elsewhere, in which powerful minorities staffed the formal administration while controlling a culturally and linguistically distinct subject majority through the threat of force posed by armed people who were also culturally intermediate.¹⁰²

IV. Zuo’s Heirs and the Government of Xinjiang

While most histories emphasize the role of Zuo Zongtang in shaping policy in the Reconstruction period, Zuo actually only entered the territory of modern Xinjiang once. Real power resided in the hands of his chief lieutenant, Liu Jintang. Liu was the nephew of Zuo’s right-hand man and commander of the Old Xiang Army, Liu Songshan, who died in 1870 on campaign. From 1871, Liu was joined by a childhood friend, Luo Changhu (c. 1847-1883).¹⁰³ About Luo less is known, save that he had the attention of Zuo from an early age. Liu and Luo grew up in the same village, campaigned across China together, and retook the Tarim Basin in concert. Luo achieved the rank of brigade commander, and Zuo favored him for his intelligence and bravery, especially after Luo volunteered to lead a march beyond the Pass during a snowy winter. Later on, Liu, suffering from an old foot injury received during a mudslide in Gansu, sent Luo to command the siege of Opal, a town near Kashgar, in his stead. It is no wonder, then, that

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¹⁰³ GX 10.4.3, Liu Jintang, “奏為阿克蘇兵備道羅長祜立功後和勞病故，志節可傳，請准優卹建祠戰績宣付史館事” (FHA 04-01-16-0210-035).
the two conducted a running conversation about policy throughout and beyond the campaign.

While Zuo himself was not present, the clique that had formed around him held onto the reins of power in Xinjiang for a very long time. Liu Jintang was first the official in command of the reconstruction government and then governor through 1891. The financial commissioner, and for three years the acting governor, was Wei Guangtao, Wei Yuan’s nephew. Wei composed the unofficial history of the Northwest campaigns and considered it his duty to follow Zuo’s program closely. The next governor (1891-1895) was Tao Mo, who, as already noted, had been Zuo’s model official for the moral rectification of central Gansu. His successor Rao Yingqi of Hubei (1837-1903, g. 1895-1902) was Zuo’s secretary during the Northwestern campaign. Next was Pan Xiaosu (g. 1902-1905), a Changshanese who had served in the Xiang Army since 1861 and participated in the reconquest. Thus a single cohort of co-local men with a common ideology and experience held power in Dihua for the first twenty-eight years after the reconquest. For that matter, nearly all of the financial commissioners, their staff, and the judicial commissioners were from the Changsha area and belonged to the same clique. Of them, only two, Tao Mo (who once had a place at the Hanlin Academy) and Rao Yingqi (a juren), had taken the examinations at any level. As we will see in Chapter Three, advancement in Xinjiang had little to do with examinations, but everything to do with personal connections and military success. (See Table 1.1)

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104 Chou, “Frontier Studies,” 258.

105 Zhao Weixi, Xiangjun jituàn, 29.
Table 1.1: Highest-ranking officials in Xinjiang, 1877-1905

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liu Jintang</td>
<td>Xiangxiang, Hunan</td>
<td>1844-1894</td>
<td>led reconstruction 1878-1884; governor 1884-1891</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Guangtao</td>
<td>Shaoyang, Hunan</td>
<td>1837-1915</td>
<td>financial commissioner 1885-1891; temporary governor 1888-1891</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tao Mo</td>
<td>Xiushui, Jiangsu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dihua magistrate 1880-1882; governor 1891-1895</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rao Yingqi</td>
<td>Enshi, Hunan</td>
<td>1837-1903</td>
<td>financial commissioner 1891-1895, governor 1895-1902</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Xiaosu</td>
<td>Xiangxiang, Hunan</td>
<td></td>
<td>governor 1902-1905, financial commissioner 1898-1899, judicial commissioner 1897-1898, 1899-1900</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Yinsun</td>
<td>Yizheng, Jiangsu</td>
<td>1851-1921</td>
<td>financial commissioner 1904-1905; governor 1905-1906</td>
<td>Scholar-official</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ying-lin</td>
<td>Bordered Blue Manchu Banner</td>
<td>d.1903</td>
<td>judicial commissioner 1885-1886; Ili intendant 1888-1895, acting judicial commissioner 1896-1898; acting Ili intendant 1898-1899</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En-lun</td>
<td>Plain Red Manchu Banner</td>
<td></td>
<td>judicial commissioner 1885-1890</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Mingyu</td>
<td>Ningxiang, Hunan</td>
<td>b. 1830</td>
<td>Wensu prefect 1883-1887, Aksu intendant 1888-1890, acting judicial commissioner 1890-1892</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deng Yihuang</td>
<td>Changsha, Hunan</td>
<td>1850-1899?</td>
<td>financial commissioner’s clerk 1886-1889, acting Changji magistrate 1889-1890, Suiding xunjian 1891-1894, acting Turpan prefect 1899-1900</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.1 (continued): Highest-ranking officials in Xinjiang, 1877-1905

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiang Shixiu</td>
<td>Changsha, Hunan</td>
<td>b. 1854</td>
<td>financial commissioner’s clerk 1890-1894?, Maralbashi tongpan 1896-1899, Yengisar prefect 1899-1901, Kashgar prefect 1902-1905</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Cen</td>
<td>Xiangyin, Hunan</td>
<td></td>
<td>financial commissioner’s clerk 1894-1899</td>
<td>Xiang Army?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ding Zhenzhong</td>
<td>Luoshan, Henan</td>
<td></td>
<td>judicial commissioner 1894-1896, financial commissioner 1896-1898</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Erxun</td>
<td>Plain Blue Banner Hanjun</td>
<td></td>
<td>financial commissioner 1899</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Zisen</td>
<td>Xingguo, Hubei</td>
<td>b. 1843</td>
<td>judicial commissioner 1900-1902, acting financial commissioner 1902-1904</td>
<td>Xiang Army (under Zuo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wen-guang</td>
<td>Bordered Yellow Manchu Banner</td>
<td></td>
<td>financial commissioner 1900-1902</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gan Yaoxiang</td>
<td>Xiangyin, Hunan</td>
<td>b. 1853</td>
<td>financial commissioner’s clerk 1901-1906, Dihua prefect 1906-1907, Yarkand prefect 1907-1908</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qing-xiu</td>
<td>Bordered Red Manchu Banner</td>
<td>1843-1911</td>
<td>Ili prefect 1900-1902, 1904-1910, judicial commissioner 1902-1904</td>
<td>Translator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wen Lishan</td>
<td>Hengshan, Hunan</td>
<td>1845-1902</td>
<td>acting Bay magistrate 1892-1895, financial commissioner’s treasury keeper 1892-1896, Turpan prefect 1901-1903</td>
<td>Xiang Army (under Zuo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.1 (continued): Highest-ranking officials in Xinjiang, 1877-1905

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Dates</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Han Yaoguang</td>
<td>Huaining, Anhui</td>
<td>1852-1905</td>
<td>acting Pichan xunjian, Jimsar xiancheng 1892-1896, financial commissioner’s treasury keeper 1896-1899, Keriye magistrate 1899-1901, acting Keriye magistrate 1904-1905</td>
<td>Anhui Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liao Zhenyan</td>
<td>Ningxiang, Hunan</td>
<td>1901-1903</td>
<td>financial commissioner’s treasury keeper 1901-1903</td>
<td>Xiang Army?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Chengfan</td>
<td>Xiangxiang, Hunan</td>
<td>1904-1908</td>
<td>financial commissioner’s treasury keeper 1904-1908</td>
<td>Xiang Army?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Guangda</td>
<td>Xiangxiang, Hunan</td>
<td>ca. 1845-1901</td>
<td>Kashgar intendant 1884-1887, 1894-1901, Aksu intendant 1887-1888, judicial commissioner 1893-1894</td>
<td>Xiang Army</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The early governors held closely to Zuo’s philosophy in theory, if not entirely in practice. Chou has documented the various differences between the bureaucratic structure as Zuo had imagined it and how Liu actually implemented it. Nevertheless, their work remained doggedly focused on ritual rectification and the creation of an agricultural society. Liu was at the head of a network of Reconstruction and Pacification Agencies (fuji shanhou ju) headed by army officers, the organization of which mirrored the future province. The Agencies repeated the experiments of Gansu: they resettled Hui, Han, and Turki on tun, where they were meant to live in ideal nuclear families, sometimes with spouses chosen for them by the Agency. Resettled people received farming implements, seed, and livestock in the hopes that they would “reclaim” land – either

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106 Chou, “Frontier Studies,” 229-244.

107 For an overview of the provincial issue, see Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 131-158.
genuinely fallow fields or unworkable steppe and desert. The Agencies recruited local clerics to enforce familial ideals. Liu, following Zuo’s direction, established sixty “charitable schools” across the region to educate not just Turki, but also Hui and Han in Chinese language and the canon of Classics as Hunanese Statecraft understood them. I will discuss all of these matters at length in the rest of the work – here, I am only focused on the leadership and the lessons from Gansu they brought to bear on Xinjiang.

As provincehood drew nearer, however, the leadership became aware that local government was not remotely prepared for the transition. Xiang Army veterans did not necessarily make good administrators. Yang Peiyuan (d. 1879) had successfully been promoted to the rank of assistant magistrate for his service in the army, and in 1877 he was appointed the acting sub-district magistrate of Pichan, a small town some ways off the main road east of Turpan. Things went badly for him. One of his servants had gone around trying to extort money from the Turki, and Yang hurried through the dispute and botched the resolution. Whenever he went out on the streets, the Turki would gather around and laugh at him – clearly, he had swiftly lost their respect. Unable to do his duty, Yang requested to be removed from office, but the Turpan prefect denied him. Three months later, Yang hanged himself in his yamen. It was not until two months after that, when an officer came through on inspection, that the higher administration even learned of his death. Government had failed both at the local and at the regional level. Statecraft thought held that magistrates were fundamental to establishing the trust and respect of

108 This policy continued through the rest of the Qing. In one instance, Muslims involved in the 1895-1896 rising in Gansu were resettled near Lop Nor and maintained according to this plan. [Chou, “Frontier Studies,” 267.]

local people, and Zuo by this time was already emphasizing the need for local officials to resolve disputes in a consistent and satisfactory manner so as to secure that good will.\textsuperscript{110} The reconstruction government had failed both to recruit talented men and place them into appropriate positions and to maintain communication with the locality.

Reports such as these trickled in from all over Xinjiang – we will see more of them in subsequent chapters. Liu, panicked, sent memorials gently requesting to be relieved of his duties; after all, he had only been an army officer and never expected to spend much of his young career as governor of a vast and troublesome province.\textsuperscript{111} He was, by his own account, “without learning or skill” (\textit{bu xue wu shu} 不學無術), and he had never even taken the examinations. Liu’s appointment to direct reconstruction, he wrote, “was called a ‘temporary appointment,’ no more than an expedient act for the present situation. In all matters, I was only to try to bring Zuo Zongtang’s plans to realization, and after things had died down, I would hand over the position.”\textsuperscript{112} The court refused – nonsense, they replied, reconstruction was almost complete. Liu tried again in 1882, arguing that Xinjiang ought not be separated from Gansu into its own province. He proposed instead, along with Governor-General Tan Zhonglin (1822-1905, from Changsha), making it an appendage of Gansu, as Taiwan was to Fujian, with its own financial and judicial commissioners reporting to the governor in Lanzhou.\textsuperscript{113} That way,

\textsuperscript{110} Zhao Weixi, \textit{Xiangjun jituan}, 332.

\textsuperscript{111} GX 7.10.1 “籲懇收還成命另簡賢能接替摺” in \textit{Liu xiangqin gong zouzhe}, j. 3, 1a-3b.

\textsuperscript{112} 猶謂暫行署理，不過目前權宜之舉，一切事宜，惟有勉循左宗棠規劃成法，靜候交代。

\textsuperscript{113} GX 8.7.3 “新疆各道廳州縣請歸甘肅為一省摺” in \textit{Liu xiangqin gong zougao}, j. 3, 50a-53b; GX 8.4.5 “請給病假一月在營調理片” in \textit{Liu xiangqin gong zougao}, j. 3, 34a-34b.
he wrote, his own position could be eliminated, and he could finally return home to treat his chronic and debilitating foot pain. Zuo had proposed establishing a governor-general for Xinjiang in Dihua, and then a governor for Southern Xinjiang in Aksu; Liu proposed instead centering authority in Lanzhou. Beijing eventually accepted this part of the plan, but kept Liu in Dihua.

Then Liu’s colleague and confidante Luo Changhu died young while in office in Aksu in 1883. Liu sent a request to Beijing for Luo to receive his own shrine in Aksu, and in it he engaged in some ventriloquism. Liu quoted Luo, and while we can never know if he produced a faithful account of Luo’s words or simply used a dead man’s voice to put forth his own political program, we can read this passage as a critique of Xinjiang’s reconstruction:

The reason why the Muslim borderland has so many problems is that the officials are disorganized. In particular, the chiefs are too many, and the Turki character is thickheaded, so they get caught up in minutiae and miss what’s important. They don’t know the language or writing. We didn’t take advantage of founding this province to make a fresh start of it, so we couldn’t get it under control. So please sort through the hungry masses and pick out some talented and capable people. Fewer officials, lighter taxes – give the people a rest. Focus on farming and sericulture, to rectify their inclinations; encourage civilization, to straighten out their roots. Cultivate the interior, and then you can resist aggression from outside [i.e. Russia]. Our method of government must rest on ordering people.114

We see several echoes of Zuo’s ideas here: writing is the primary skill of self-cultivation, and local, self-sufficient farming is the root of a well-ordered society. “Talent” (cai) in

114 FHA 04-01-16-0210-035. “回疆績弊，在於差徭無制，尤在頭目太多，回性冥頑，逐末輕本，語言文字不通，非乘建置之始，改弦更張，無能為治；請沙汰穴沓，慎選賢能，清徭薄賦，與民休息；重農桑，以正其趨；興教化，以植其本；修內，乃可攘外。治法必賴治人。”
government would emerge organically and locally from education, or else from careful recruitment, but therein lay the rub. The Turki simply did not take to civilization as swiftly as Zuo had assumed they would. Instead of remaking Xinjiang, the Hunanese had tried to work with imperfect materials to create a functioning province. Liu (or Luo) echoed Statecraft sentiments when he suggested that the foundations still needed to be laid through civilization and agriculture for a well-ordered society. The court rejected Liu’s request for a shrine, and they ignored this subtle suggestion that provincehood still needed to be delayed.

Provincehood was, in fact, a general disaster. Local government was not prepared to handle the abolition of the beg system on any level. There were no household registrations, and thus no records to be used for taxation, and none of the new magistrates could speak any Turki. At first, it was unclear who exactly fell under the jurisdiction of the provincial system, and who under that of the Ili General or some other authority.115 Without the begs to serve as intermediaries, even routine tasks thus became complicated. The Hunanese leadership community’s reaction to the crisis represented their first major departure from Zuo’s thought, as they abandoned a strict focus on ritualism and cultural transformation in the agricultural context for an activist program that drew instead on the lessons of the South. The begs were rehired as clerks and runners in the yamens, and magistrates learned to accommodate local cultures and practices, much as they had

115 Ma Dazheng and Wu Fengpei, eds., Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian, (Wulumuqi: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1997), 287. This was particularly difficult given the delayed establishment of the counties-and-prefectures system in Ili. Liu Jintang GX 13.r4.13 “蒙部纏回改歸地方官管轄並改鑄關防片” in Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian (shang), 409-410.
among the Miao. In many places, the baojia system was implemented, as it had been in Yunnan decades before. Where in Yunnan baojia helped provide the social matrix for a large-scale uprising, in Xinjiang, it was one of several institutions that fused or stood opposed to the pre-established local order.

Results were mixed. In the Aksu circuit, the decimal system of baojia ran parallel to a pre-existing local hierarchy similarly based on units of tens and hundreds that originated in Turco-Mongol practice. In the Kashgar circuit, these systems seem rather to have fused. It was partly by design that the fusion would occur, in fact – Tao Mo in his 1900 memorial to expand the system made this parallel explicit. He further noted that most of the village headmen had been begs at one point, anyway, so the province might as well take advantage of the systems of authority already in place in the locality. Ultimately, the general situation of local government more closely resembled the experience of Yang Peiyuan in Pichan. Magistrates were often completely dependent on Turki staff to make their work possible.

Further exceptional practices were implemented in law and government as Han administrators grew increasingly frustrated. The most significant for the lives of the Xinjiang people was “execution on the spot” (jiudi zhengfa 就地正法), an innovation in

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116 Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian, 105-6; Zeng and Shen, Zhongguo jingying Xiyu shi, 364.

117 See Huang Bingkun, A-cheng xingge bing gao, reproduced in Zhongguo bianjiang xingji diaocha ji baogao shu deng bianwu ziliao congbian, chubian, (Xianggang: Fuchi shuyuan chubanshe youxian gongsi, 2009), vol. 39. I will return to the baojia system in local society in Chapter Two.

118 “Shufu xian yi qu san xiang liefang qian de fengjian jitu yu chengjian zuzhi” in Nanjiang nongcun shehui, (Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 2009), 192-197, 193.

the statecraft tradition. Normally, in any case of capital punishment, there was a statutory process of review according to which the emperor had to approve every case. Through the mid-nineteenth century, Qing emperors had occasionally permitted military officers to execute criminals on their own through a process called “requesting the kingly command to execute immediately” (gongqing wangming jixing zhengfa 恭請王命既行正法). This practice was applied with greater frequency in the Inner Asian borderlands, and it eventually became codified: people who had death sentences commuted to exile and either escaped along the way or from their penal farms were to be executed immediately without review. This punishment was carried out with especial frequency in Xinjiang. Commissioner Lin Zexu once sought immediate execution for the opium traders at Canton. While Lin was denied, following his subsequent exile to Ili, he wrote an essay claiming that Xinjiang officials had invented the practice of “requesting the kingly command to execute on the spot” (gongqing wangming jiudi zhengfa 恭請王命就地正法) as an expedient measure that saved local government time and resources. The essay circulated among the statecraft community of Hunan, and in 1853, during the Taiping war, Zeng Guofan took up “execution on the spot” as a means to conduct battlefield executions within the established legal system during a time of crisis. Zeng and several other provincial governors in his clique simultaneously requested blanket

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121 Zhang Shiming, “Qian-Jia shiqi gong qing wang ming qi pai xian xing chengfa zhi zhi de kuan chi” in Nei Menggu shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban) 39:4 (July 2009), 44-58.

permission to delegate execution to lower-level actors, including local gentry. “Execution on the spot” followed the Xiang Army all the way to Xinjiang, where it remained in place until the end of the Qing long after the state of crisis had passed. The governors of Xinjiang had the authority to execute whomever his inferiors argued was necessary to kill without reporting to Beijing. They renewed this power by memorial several times and deployed it seemingly interchangeably with statutory capital punishment and just as frequently. Liu Jintang’s memorials on execution on the spot were republished in future collections of statecraft writings, right alongside Lin Zexu’s and the intermediate proposal of Shaanxi governor Bian Baoquan (d. 1898). 123

While immediate execution became programmatic in Xinjiang, the Hunanese, like governors across China, framed its use in terms of “flexibility” (biantong 变通).

“Flexibility” suggested that any policy they recommended was a temporary measure and, as statecraft preferred, represented an adaptation to special circumstances on the local level. In Xinjiang, this included not only immediate execution, but also a set of special measures that kept personnel circulating within the Northwest, and Xinjiang in particular, in violation of the long-established rule of avoidance.124

All of this fell under the “Xinjiang Flexibility Plan” (Xinjiang biantong zhangcheng 新疆变通章程), which became a special set of rules of the region codified not in the formal law, but in palace memorials. Every time a governor proposed a

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123 Space does not permit a complete discussion of execution on the spot. I am conducting a separate research project on it.

124 Liu Jintang, GX 11.9.5 《籍隸甘肅人員準按序班毋庸迴避片》 in Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian (shang), 308-309.
“flexible” measure, it was framed as a necessity in the context of Xinjiang’s wildness, distance and difference from China proper, and hence ungovernability according to the ordinary provincial system, precisely opposite to Zuo Zongtang’s plan. There was thus a central contradiction in the way Xinjiang was governed, which reflects the logic of the civilizing mission elsewhere: the colonized, it was proposed, needed to be controlled through special measures until they could learn to conduct proper government themselves. That process of education of course had no defined endpoint.

In order to conceive of policy in the realm of chaos, governors sometimes used the Miao borderlands as an analogy for Turki policy and so brought their experience of the South directly to bear on Xinjiang. In 1881, Liu memorialized the court on his skepticism of the civilizing project. Although Xinjiang had been part of Qing territory for over a century, he wrote, they were even more difficult to govern than the Miao areas when they were conquered at the beginning of the Qianlong reign. To “transform the barbarians with Chinese ways” was “easier said than done.” Not unlike Luo Changhu, Liu argued for a devolution of authority over disputes to the Turki authorities.

This sentiment was echoed in the work of the only other Xinjiang governor to contribute to the Statecraft canon, Tao Mo. Chou has argued that Tao, from Jiangsu, was never quite as central to the Xiang Army clique as his predecessors. He had spent over a decade since his tenure in Gansu and Xinjiang in Zhili and Shaanxi. By the time he came into office in 1892, the Xiang Army clique had entrenched. Perhaps for lack of

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125 Liu Jintang, GX 7.4.10 《新疆命盜案件請暫行變通辦理摺》 in Liu xiangqin gong zougao, j. 2, 31a-34b.
confidence in their new leader, they memorialized to request that Liu be reinstated.\textsuperscript{127} Soon after, Tao himself requested dismissal.\textsuperscript{128} His given reason was his frustration with the British incursion into Kanjut, which it fell to the Xinjiang garrison soldiers to combat. As Tao was actually a tested and able administrator, it is unlikely that he was actually insufficient to the task, as he argued to the court. Rather, his difficulties sprang from the unreadiness or unwillingness of the army to follow his commands. The army was still in the majority staffed by Xiang Army veterans, now fifteen years out of combat, and with Dong Fuxiang’s Hui, who became increasingly independent as the occupying force around Yarkand and Khotan.\textsuperscript{129} Dong was the commander-in-chief of Kashgar, and thus of all forces in the southern part of the Tarim Basin, through Tao’s tenure, and it would have been his army that failed to rally.

Nevertheless, Tao spoke the language of Statecraft and of the South. When in 1892 his government perceived Han merchants to be exploiting the “ignorant” Turki through high-interest loans, he recommended importing laws from the Miao borderland that prevented such transactions with Miao chiefs.\textsuperscript{130} “The Turki only plans for present convenience,” Tao wrote, invoking a trope of Turki simplemindedness that was by then common in official and popular Han discourse: “He does not pay attention to future problems.” Beijing rejected Tao’s plan, but it points to several important phenomena of

\textsuperscript{127} C. P. Skrine and Pamela Nightingale, \textit{Macartney at Kashgar}, (London: Methuen, 1973), 70.

\textsuperscript{128} GX 18.11.17, Tao Mo, “自請罷斥折” in \textit{Tao Qinsu gong zouyi yigao}, Zhongguo shaoshu minzu guji jicheng (Hanwen ban), vol. 71, (Chengdu: Sichuan Minzu Chubanshe, 2002), j. 1, 19a-20b.


\textsuperscript{130} GX 18.3.8, Tao Mo, “漢人重利放債盤剝纏民” in \textit{GZD}, vol. 7, 35-36.
Xinjiang in the early 1890s: first, it became clear that Han merchant groups were increasingly establishing themselves as lenders all over Xinjiang, much as moneylenders from Shikarpur in Hindustan had established themselves across the Tarim Basin. Tao believed local officials were complicit, and evidence surfaced to support his suspicions. Statecraft officials who had once supported strict separation of groups, including Muslims from Han, and who had believed that roving Han were a chief agent of instability, eventually came to accept and encourage certain kinds of Han as partners in government.

In part, this was because of the longstanding presence of the Yangliuqing merchants, but Xinjiang officials also had to deal with the gradual retreat of the central state, and so they relied in various ways on private groups for financial stability. It had been agreed in 1884 that the province would receive an annual subsidy of 3,360,000 taels from China proper. While there was technically a land tax to supplement this, exceptions to the tax were very frequent, as access to water was unstable in arid areas, much of the land chosen for “reclamation” was unworkable, people tended to move away from their places of resettlement, and the system for reporting and remitting taxes was fraught with the usual problems of the imperial hierarchy. Merchants easily avoided the lijin tax, which provided almost no revenue whatsoever. Moreover, inflation all over the Qing was devaluing officials’ already meager salaries. As a result, many local officials turned to illegal land sales. Many areas along the banks of the Kashgar River, for example, were restricted from sale or farming, as agriculture could easily overwhelm the

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spring runoff and prevent the river from reaching settlement on its lower reaches.\footnote{MG 4.7 “批附[巴]楚縣知事盧殿魁詳文” [“Attached: Maralbashi County Magistrate Lu Diankui’s communiqué”] in SLI, 457-461. I will explore the conflict over Kashgar River water in Chapter Eight.}

Officials along the river, however, secretly sold the land to local Turki, a fact that was not revealed until after Xinhai. All over the province, merchants maintained native-place associations and temples that held their own land and endowments. It was possible for them to raise tens of thousands of taels in contributions in a short time, more than the \textit{lijin} tax brought in in a year.\footnote{Yuan Dahua, \textit{Xinjiang Yili luanshi benmo}, (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, n.d.), relates that Chinese merchants in Ili raised this amount very swiftly in order to combat the Brothers and Elders Society.} In short, merchant networks had significant cash on hand and a good logistical apparatus for the movement of goods when the provincial government simply did not.

Therefore, because it actually cost more to attempt to levy the \textit{lijin} than there was revenue from the tax, Tao Mo abolished it in 1893. His memorial on the topic was added to the Statecraft canon.\footnote{Tao Mo, “新疆巡撫陶覆陳自強大計摺” in Gan Han, \textit{Huangchao jingshi wen xin bian xin bian ji}, j. 1, 1a-1b.} Instead, he encouraged merchants to purchase government-owned grain at reduced cost and transport it across the desert in the government’s place.\footnote{GX 19.9.20, Tao Mo, “奏請折價辦理變賣草束摺,” NPM 408002824.} That would bring in revenue and take the burden off of the province to distribute grain, but it essentially put private interests in charge of a public duty. While Tao decried merchants’ exploitation of ordinary subjects, then, he still found them supremely useful, or at least admitted that they had become indispensable. By the end of the dynasty, official-merchant cooperative enterprises (\textit{guandu shangban}) became the norm in plans for Xinjiang’s fiscal revival. The \textit{Xinjiang tuzhi}, compiled in the last years before the
revolution, characterized the special role of merchants in opening up the province: “The Hunanese were the most successful in their military expedition, and they were greatly powerful. Of those who banded together with them to the exclusion of others, none compared to the Tianjines.”

Tao Mo had probably meant this to be a temporary measure, but by the end of his time in office, conditions had changed. Between 1895 and 1904, as the Qing struggled to pay the Sino-Japanese War indemnity, Xinjiang’s subsidy was reduced in practice to one-third of what it had been. Beijing instructed the already-impoveryed region to adopt austerity measures: reduce personnel and raise taxes. The new governor, Rao Yingqi, a Xiang Army veteran who had served in the region from the beginning, refused. He argued that Xinjiang was unable to dispense with the remnants of the Xiang Army, as there were effectively no local militias.

Before Tao came into office, the Xiang Army leadership had articulated a departure from imperial pluralism and towards a more essentialized vision of difference. Sometime during the years 1889-1891, Governor Liu, Financial Commissioner Wei Guangtao, and Dihua Prefect Huang Bingkun, along with Xu Dingfan and Li Chengxu, all of them Hunanese at the center of the Army and the provincial administration, collaborated to produce an account of Xinjiang’s reconquest and reconstruction. The *Account of Demarcating Xinjiang (Kanding Xinjiang ji)* was intended as a successor to

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136 *Xinjiang tuzhi*, j. 29. “湘人從征功最多，勢亦稱盛，朋黨比周，不後於津人。”


138 Wei Guangtao, *Kanding Xinjiang ji*, (Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2014) 11-15. The work was published in 1899 following further editing by Wei.
the Xiang Army clique’s earlier *Record of Pacifying Guanzhong and Eastern Gansu* (Pingding Guanlong jilüe), the compilation of which Wei Guangtao had also led, as well as a companion to Wei Yuan’s *Records of Imperial Military Activities* (Sheng wu ji). The *Records* begins as every previous history of Qing rule in Xinjiang had, with a series of citations of classical histories. Where imperial chronicles tended invoke the unity of imperial peoples, the Xiang Army clique’s *Account* presented instead a vision of irreconcilable difference. The introduction was presented by Li Youfen (1842-1907), a Statecraft adherent working as a prefect in Hunan. He attributes a quote to the *Han shu*:

“The boundaries of Heaven and Earth each describe a region; the (human) kinds are myriad and cannot be unified.”

The attribution is spurious. Li is actually quoting the statecraft scholar Hu Chengnuo (1607-1681), who invokes this passage in a broader argument about the persistent conflict between Han Chinese and their neighbors. This is a sensible choice for Li: his readers, if they adhered to statecraft, would probably have read Hu’s piece. Given the context of the passage, Hu is actually paraphrasing the Tang *Tongdian*, which records the relevant section of Ban Gu’s *Han shu* in its entry on Yarkand. However, his version significantly distorts Ban Gu’s text, which reads: “The many states of the Western Regions each have their ruler. Their soldiers are many, but weak and divided – there is nothing to unite them.”

Ban Gu’s point about the Han’s nomadic neighbors was that the Xiongnu traveled with their horses, and so their military

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140 *Han shu, zhuan, Xiyu zhuan, Xiyu zhuan xia* 68. (Ctext) 西域諸國，各有君長，兵眾分弱，無所統一。
was disorganized. Thus, “if we gain them, there is no advantage; if we discard them, there is no harm.”

Hu Chengnuo restates this to say, “Although they are Xiongnu, they cannot harm the Middle Kingdom. Although they are of the Middle Kingdom, they cannot be used to govern the Xiongnu.”

Hu’s argument is that campaigns against border peoples, and the Ming war with Qumul in particular, were a waste of resources. Like many of his contemporaries, Hu included a subtle message that his new Manchu rulers were basically different from the Han Chinese, but he admitted the possibility of sinification, without which military action brought inevitable disaster.

In contrast, Li saw one solution to the problem of unification of “barbarian” peoples that had persisted since the time of Qin Shihuang: Han Chinese people (Ch. Han ren) and Chinese government. Once again, Li is paraphrasing Hu Chengnuo, this time in Hu’s distortion of the Tang scholar Sun Qiao, who encouraged the military settlement of Sichuan through the system of military farming that had inspired Zuo Zongtang. Hu argued that historical precedent demonstrates the efficacy of humaneness and love, through the action of which there will be no need for contestation across the borders, and his overall argument criticizes the attempts of past dynasties to rule through force or appeasement. Li leaves out critical passages and presents only Hu’s sneering summary of Sun Qiao’s strategy, stripped of irony, slightly misquoted, and transposed from military farming to the civilian bureaucracy: “When Sun Qiao discourses on the border, he makes

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141 Hu Chengnuo, Du shu shuo, j. 4 xia. 匈奴能得其馬畜旃罽, 而不能統率與之進退。與漢隔絕, 道里又遠, 得之不為益, 棄之不為損。

142 雖屬匈奴，不能為中國害，雖屬中國，亦不克制匈奴......

143 于此见天心仁爱，中外若一，不使相侵暴也。
an argument for posting commanders (that is, Han people in prefectures and commanderies), and he makes an argument for controlling the enemy with soldiers (that is, Han people in border counties).”

Hu showed that this approach was doomed to fail. In reference to the same passage, Li concludes: “The means to pacify other peoples is in this. The means to defend against outer barbarians is in this. How could it be that this has not been more highly regarded?!”

He praises the establishment of a provincial administration in Xinjiang as a final means of control in a new age, when what failed in the past might work in the present. Li’s initial statement on the Account’s overall message is in complete harmony with Wei and his group’s framing of the provincial project. Wei also misquotes the Han shu’s brief description of the ancient thirty-six kingdoms of the Western Regions and adds a statement to the effect that Xinjiang’s myriad peoples were too diverse disorganized to be civilized.

Therefore, Li, whom Wei selected to write the introduction for his group’s history of Xinjiang’s reconstruction and represent the project to the reader, was the heir to a mixed intellectual heritage with a poor sense of its genealogy. He held both that Chinese and non-Chinese could not be reconciled, but nevertheless that the borderlands were part of Chinese patrimony, conceived of in terms of dynastic succession. It is unclear just what effect civilian government Li believes will bring to Xinjiang’s non-Chinese people,

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144 孫樵之論邊事，其言將帥（即漢人州郡）可任之說，其言士卒（即漢人邊縣）制敵之說。

145 所以綏服異族者在此，所以防禦外夷者在此，其所係顧不重哉！

146 Wei Guangtao, Kanding Xinjiang ji, 113.
because he writes only in terms of attack, control, and pacification – not of the moral transformation that Zuo had intended.

The Boxer indemnity and the subsequent further reduction in Xinjiang’s subsidy forced the hand of his successor, Pan Xiaosu, another Xiang Army member who had also spent his whole career in the Northwest. As Xinjiang could no longer pay its outsize force of garrison soldiers, in 1902, Pan disbanded half of them. He intended to reintroduce tuntian instead and so make the borderland garrison both hereditary and self-sufficient, but even this rather backward-looking plan could not be funded. Pan reintroduced the lijin, along with an increase in the land tax, but the system remained as inefficient and corrupt as it had been before. Meanwhile, Pan acted to reorganize the province and reduce the authority of the circuit intendants. In 1905, he established the General Office for Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (tun mu zongju) in Dihua.147 Since 1884, the circuit intendants of Kashgar, Aksu, Zhenxi (including Dihua), and Ili-Tarbaghatai had managed a broad portfolio of issue related to production and taxation. From 1905 onward, these duties were transferred to a parallel administration about which little is known. Two favored Xiang Army officials, Pan Zhen (1850-1926, from Dangtu, Anhui) and Liu Chengqing (1843-1910, from Xiangyin), were instead given control over the North and the South, respectively. Each had a staff of clerks who stationed themselves in each county and prefecture to manage the surveying and purchasing of land and livestock, planning for new irrigation works, and even the recruitment of militias in place of the intendants. Pan’s career had taken him all over Xinjiang, but he had spent nine years in Dihua, and now he would retain the post of Dihua Prefect while coordinating the

147 Memorial dated GX 30.12.17, Pan Xiaosu (FHA 04-01-16-0284-062).
taxes of the North. Liu similarly held positions in Jinghe, Qitai, Kucha, Dihua, and finally Turpan before being recalled to the capital for this special service. Unfortunately, records for their assistants are scanty, but those whose origins are known were all from Xiang Army strongholds. Pan Xiaosu clearly made this policy in order to gain more control over provincial finances. Why he needed to do so is not entirely clear. The intendants outside of Dihua at the time were well entrenched in their positions, but they were also part of the Xiang Army clique: Kashgar Intendant Yuan Hongyou (b. 1841) was the son of former Kashgar Intendant Yuan Yaoling (d. 1889).\textsuperscript{148} Ili-Tarbaghatai Intendant Qing-xiu (1843-1911), a former translator, had been in his position for many years and hardly held any other. Aksu Intendant Chen Chunzhi (1841-1904) had served under Zuo and Liu. With the exception of Chen Chunzhi, whom Pan Zhen himself replaced a few years later, all of them retained their positions until 1911 or 1912, far in excess of the usual term of office. Perhaps Pan, like Tao, found it difficult to retain control of his subordinates – perhaps the Xiang Army clique was fragmenting into sub-regional interests.

By the mid-1890s, the Xiang Army had indeed settled in to the point that their children began to marry each other. Records of marriage only appear in the official record when they caused difficulties for the bureaucracy, and this bureaucracy was disinclined to reveal its problems, so anecdotes are few. Nevertheless, it appears that Xiang Army officers began to contract betrothals when they were in Gansu. In 1903, it was found that Pan Xiaosu’s son Jinkun, a magistrate-in-waiting in Shaanxi, had been betrothed to the daughter of Khotan Prefect Liu Zhaosong (n.d., Xiangxiang), another Xiang Army veteran, in 1890. Liu was transferred to Gansu. That same year, it was

\textsuperscript{148} Memorial dated GX 24.11.26, Dong Fuxiang. (FHA 04-01-12-0587-144).
discovered that Yi Shousong (b. 1845, Xingguo, Hubei) was the brother-in-law of Judicial Commissioner Li Zisen (b. 1843, Xingguo, Hubei).\textsuperscript{149} Yi ended up in Shaanxi. Wang Buduan (b. 1859, Shanyang, Jiangsu) and Huang Bingkun (b. 1851, Changsha) both served under Zuo Zongtang, and their children married in 1904.\textsuperscript{150} It was probably no coincidence that they were both in Ili at the time, as Huang had served as the Ili prefect for many years. Huang was removed from his position as Ili-Tarbaghatai intendant, and Qing-xiu returned to office. Given that all of the recorded discoveries of marriage alliances within the Xiang Army happened in the space of a few years, and during a time of crisis in the government of the province, we could interpret them in political terms: the Shaanxi-Gansu Governor-General Song-fan (1837-1905, g. 1900-1905), a Manchu with no ties to the Northwest, may have been working to uproot the Xiang Army, as he finally did in 1905.

The era of Xiang Army dominance fostered the entrenchment and expansion of the Hunanese network. This happened in waves: the first generation of officials came beyond the Pass with Liu Jintang. They were Xiang Army veterans from the Taiping era, or else Hunanese who had been recruited during the Gansu reconstruction. The vast majority of them earned their positions through wartime promotions. The second generation was also recruited from Hunan in the first few years after the reconquest, 1878-1881. They universally purchased their positions and then moved directly from a county associated with the Xiang Army to Xinjiang. They were followed by a third

\textsuperscript{149} Memorial dated GX 29.3.4 (FHA 04-01-12-0625-065).

\textsuperscript{150} Memorial dated zhupi GX 30.1.26, Pan Xiaosu, “奏為待署伊犁府知府汪步端與現署伊塔道黃丙焜系屬兒女婚親，請旨變通辦理，免其迴避事” (FHA 04-01-13-0409-051) [= FHA 03-5962-048].
generation, recruited 1884-1890, most of whom had been in the army but were transferred directly from Gansu. The 1890s saw little recruitment from the outside – only a handful of new magisterial-level officials arrived in Xinjiang, and most of those were also Xiang Army veterans. It was not until 1904, after the abolition of the imperial examinations, that recruitment began again.

Because of a set of special regulations governing appointments in Xinjiang, it was very difficult for officials below the level of intendant to leave to the province. As nearly every memorial on appointments states, per an early memorial from Liu Jintang, when an office opened up in Northern Xinjiang, a replacement would be found according to the “Gansu Flexibility Plan” (Gansu biantong zhangcheng 甘肅變通章程), one of the direct predecessors of Xinjiang’s own “flexibility plan.” This stated that, first of all, qualified officeholders who had followed the army into the Northwest and thus become separated from the provinces where they were nominally waiting for a position could instead be retained in Gansu or Xinjiang by order of the governor. Liu Jintang and his successors used this rule extensively – a new arrival would have the usual one-year trial period, and then he would be entered into the cohort of Xinjiang magistrates-in-waiting. According to the Gansu plan, for all open appointments, personnel were to be selected from officials already employed in similar positions within the province. This meant that a magistrate somewhere in Xinjiang would be moved to an “appropriate” (xiangyi) location, often within the same circuit. As for the South, and for all newly-established offices, the “Jilin Flexibility Plan” (Jilin biantong zhangcheng) was employed. This brought personnel who

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151 Quoted relatively completely in Liu Jintang, FHA 04-01-01-0955-001, GX 12.7.16.
did not yet occupy an office into the system, after which they would be reappointed according to the Gansu plan. In theory, this would bring in talented people from outside, but in reality, it perpetuated the existing networks of patronage.

In 1884, with the establishment of provincehood, there was thus a sudden turnover in personnel, and the new magistrates were generally inexperienced, exacerbating the problems of local government. The longterm result of these regulations was that young office candidates who either entered with the Xiang Army or purchased their position in their home province would be recruited directly to Xinjiang, and then usually sent first to the South before cycling back into the central areas around Dihua, then out to Ili. Exceptions were made for the several “trouble spots” in the province. With the entrenchment of the Xiang Army clique, it also became difficult for officials to be promoted to offices appropriate to their ranks, especially as older officials remained in high office, and younger officials continued to benefit from frequent office purchase and ongoing promotions.

Officials in Xinjiang were constantly being promoted for their actual or alleged participation in military actions and reconstruction projects. During the Northwest campaign, Zuo developed a practice of promoting large sections of his army all at once. For example, Chen Mingyu (b. 1830, Ningxiang) entered the Xiang Army in 1854.\(^\text{152}\) He began as a stipendiary \((\text{linsheng 庠生})\), which is to say that he did well on the examinations and attained the rank of licentiate \((\text{xiucai 秀才})\), though he found no employment in civil office. Twelve battlefield promotions raised him directly through the

\(^{152}\) Memorial dated GX 13.2.17, Liu Jintang, “奏為署理阿克蘇道雷聲遠因病出缺委溫宿直隸州知州陳名鈺暫行兼護事” (FHA 03-5220-052).
civilian ranks until by the conquest of Xinjiang he was qualified for a position as a circuit intendant. Despite Chen’s lack of experience, he was immediately appointed to important offices and spent several years as the intendant of Aksu. Members of the second and third generations, who generally purchased their degrees, also benefited from the general promotions given to their fellows, even though they were often not even present for the action in question.

The irony of this period, as I will explore below, is that, while the officials in charge of Xinjiang expressed frustrations with governing according to their ideals, nevertheless, on a local level, government actually came to work well, although differently in different places, as magistrates learned to operate in those limited political environments. What the sources suggest is that, while Dihua struggled to implement policy, regional and local government fragmented: some areas remained closer to the Dihua administration, but they did so through direct and personal ties with higher officials. The Aksu circuit in particular maintained a relationship with the center. Other areas became nearly unreadable, as magistrates acted very independently, or rather according to the demands of the locality. In a sense, they succeeded in implementing an important part of the Statecraft ideal, namely the magistrate’s intimate relationship with his subjects, but they did not bring about a transformation of the region and its people.

V. The Fall of the Hunanese and Rise of the Modernists

Hunanese governors continued to rule in this manner, and they retrenched further in the mid-1890s when subsidies from China proper ended in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War. This state of affairs persisted until Governor Pan was cashiered on charges
of embezzlement.\textsuperscript{153} Waiting in the wings was, rather conveniently, Wu Yinsun, (1851-1921). Wu had held office before, notably as the judicial commissioner of Guangdong, but most of his career had been spent in the police training section of the Guangdong Military Academy. Wu suddenly found himself in 1904 transferred to Dihua, and then promoted the next year to acting governor. He immediately set about promoting the imperial program of reform under the New Policies, which had received mixed support in Xinjiang: the Old Turghut ruler Prince Palta, whose court was in Qarashahr, and the Ili General Ma-liang (g. 1901-1905, d. 1909) both embraced the program and submitted memorials offering advice on their design and implementation. The Hunanese, however, had resisted the programs for social reform, including the broad implementation of public education, claiming as they had in the face of every new policy that Xinjiang was too poor and remote to take on any further administrative burdens. In one important sense, they were not wrong – Xinjiang was broke, and provincehood had turned out to be impractical in many ways. Yet we can see in this resistance an interesting reversal: the Hunanese had once been the state-building activists, and the metropole satisfied to give them free rein. Now, Beijing wanted to implement reform, while that very same Hunanese elite, comprising a core of officers who had come west with Zuo and Liu and their later recruits, had become entrenched in the region and resisted the central government’s interventions.

It is hard to say whether the Hunanese regime in Xinjiang wound down in 1905 on account of political intrigue or natural causes. In that year, the average “old Xiang

\textsuperscript{153} Memorial dated XT 1.4.10, Cheng-xun, “奏為軍台廢員潘效蘇等呈繳台費依例釋回” (NPM 177921); \textit{Qing shilu}, GX 31.8.18.
Army” veteran was around sixty to eighty years of age. Several of the longest-serving and highest-ranking officials, such as Jiang Yupu (1825-1904), Rao Yingqi (1837-1903), Luo Enshou (1838-1904), Zhu Mianrong (1839-1903), Huang Guangda (ca. 1845-1901), Chen Xiluo (1845-1899), and Huang Yuan (1843-1902) had passed away all at once.

Lower-ranking officials, who had joined the army during the recruitment of reinforcement to Gansu, were already in their fifties. The generation of Hunanese after them, which rarely achieved magisterial rank in Xinjiang, also lacked the military experience that bound their superiors together. They, along with the Henanese, Gansunese, and Zhejiangese who made up the last cohort of Qing officials, had almost universally purchased their ranks, starting from nothing and buying their way directly to a low-level post in Xinjiang. It is possible that the Hunanese simply died off. They had taken the long road to Xinjiang, but this ultimately disconnected them from their support networks at home, and stranded them instead. For reasons I will discuss in the subsequent chapter, the cohesion and exclusivity of the Xinjiang administration was maintained by several centripetal forces, among them a set of rules for official appointments that effectively prevented them from leaving the region.

On the other hand, it is clear that Beijing wanted change. Shortly after Pan’s cashiering, the next appointee to the governorship was Lian-kui (b. 1849, g. 1905-1910), a Manchu official nearing the end of his career. Lian-kui had previously held high offices in Gansu, but he seems to have maintained little connection with the Hunanese. Beijing probably assigned him to the governorship in order to break the Hunanese monopoly on power, which by then was obvious, and insert instead their own Northwest expert.

Mannerheim describes the Governor, whom he met in 1907, as a rather ridiculous
character\textsuperscript{154}, and he seems to have held little conviction of his own: in Lian-kui’s memorials to the Court, more than one voice emerges, either in quotation or in paraphrase, as two contradictory plans and styles of reasoning were passed along to the capital.

One of this pair of voices belongs to Financial Commissioner Wang Shu’nan (1852-1938, in office 1906-1912). Wang, according to his autobiography, came from a long line of scholar-officials.\textsuperscript{155} He had been employed by Li Hongzhang (1823-1901) and by Zeng Guofan, and then moved on in 1895 to an appointment in Gansu. During a previous appointment as the magistrate of Qingshen County, Sichuan, Wang was repeatedly punished for accepting bribes, and he was again punished for corruption in Gansu.\textsuperscript{156} Rumors circulated during Wang’s tenure in Xinjiang that he was extracting large sums of money from the provincial treasury and that he needed the funds to support his aging mother in the East.\textsuperscript{157} Indeed, the allegations later proved to be true. Wang, for his part, considered himself a distinguished literatus: he left behind not only a revealing autobiography, but also a sizable collected works including several epigraphic, ethnographic, and even climatological studies.\textsuperscript{158} These studies found their way into the

\textsuperscript{154} Gustaf Mannerheim, \textit{Dagbok förd under min resa i Centralasian och Kina 1906-07-08} (Helsingfors: Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2010), 308.


\textsuperscript{156} Memorial dated XT 2.3.27 (NPM 186991).

\textsuperscript{157} Mannerheim, \textit{Dagbok}, 309. “In spite of being highly educated he is said to be one of the most ruthless when it comes to extorting money. The Chinese explain this by saying that he has a very old mother.”

\textsuperscript{158} Wang Shunan, \textit{Xila xue an}, (n.d.); Chŏn Pyŏng-hun, \textit{Jingshen zhexue tong bian} (Shanghai, 1920); Wang Shunan, “Hanguo Jin Zuitang xiansheng (Bingxun) Jingshen zhexue xin bian xu” in \textit{Taolu wenji}, 357-361; Mannerheim (\textit{Dagbok}, 309) notes receiving a six-volume work on geography from Wang with his personal imprint. It is more likely to have been Pei Jingfu’s \textit{He hai Kunlun lu} 河海崑崙錄. The final version of this work was published in four volumes, but Wang’s preface states that it comprises six. (Wang

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Xinjiang gazetteer, which was completed in Beijing under Wang’s supervision in 1923. Wang read widely, as attested by his collection of essays on Greek philosophy and by a preface composed for a work on comparative psychology by a Korean scholar of his acquaintance. He presented Mannerheim with a six-volume work on world geography, either of his own composition, as he claimed, or on behalf of his underling, Pei Jingfu, for whose memoirs Wang composed a preface. It is little wonder, then, that Wang looked down on Lian-kui and considered his superior to be a “muddle-headed, mediocre, worn-out imbecile” who was too easily swayed by the newly-appointed Education Commissioner.159

That Education Commissioner was Du Tong (1864-1929, in office 1906-1911). In 1905, when the Ministry of Education debated what type of men they would appoint as provincial education commissioners, they came to an impasse160: those in the Ministry who were committed to wholesale reform wanted to select dedicated educationalists with experience in the new methods of teaching. There were many such individuals, mostly from Tianjin, already working in the Ministry. The scholar-officials, naturally, preferred men like themselves, well versed in the Classics. A compromise was reached whereby academicians from the Hanlin Academy would be selected for the positions, but, before assuming their offices, they would be sent for several months to Japan. Du Tong, then, was an ideal choice: he was born to a scholarly family in Yangliuqing, where several of

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159 Wang Shunan, Taolu laoren sui nian lu, 71. “新撫聯魁昏庸疲懦，以興學事為提學使專政不敢過問，任其所為。”

the gentry had gained tremendous political leverage during the Boxer Uprising and used their influence to establish reformist schools.\textsuperscript{161} It is perhaps no coincidence that Xinjiang was, by 1906, greatly dominated by merchants from Yangliuqing.

The conflict between Wang and Du defined the policy not only of the last years of the Qing, but of the Republican era through 1928. We will revisit these men later, but for now suffice it to say that they were on opposite sides of the debate over what it meant to be a world power. Du Tong was deeply impressed with the Meiji Restoration and the long-term social and political effects of Japanese popular education and militarization. He wrote often of the nation as a body. It should come as no surprise, then, that he established hundreds of schools all over Xinjiang in a very short time, and that he abandoned the program of Confucian education for one of modern liberal arts and practical skills, including instruction through the medium of Turki. Wang Shu’nan saw Xinjiang not as an inseparable part of the national body, but as the Qing’s colony – indeed, he was the first to use the term “colony” in Chinese when referring to Xinjiang. Wang argued from a developmentalist perspective, rooted in his reading of Herbert Spencer, for gradually training the Turki in practical, modern industrial skills, depending on the resources available for exploitation in a given area.\textsuperscript{162} He too advocated abandoning Confucian education as a waste of funds, but also forgoing education for most Turki beyond these basic skills. They were, in his formulation, akin to the

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\textsuperscript{162} Wang Shu’nan’s position corresponds to that of one participant in a “dialogue” recorded in the \textit{Xinjiang tuzhi} (38: 7b).
\end{flushleft}
autochthones of South Africa or Indochina, while the Chinese were the “Whites.” His rhetoric is worth quoting here:

Today, the mixture of Xinjiang’s races, the vulgarity of their character – compared to the Interior, the difference is fivefold. It is just like when a person is a child, and they depend on their parents. … In the North, the Muslims are many, and the Han are few. The Muslims and Han are like fire and water, and the borderland is hard to transform. … As for the South, the Turki are relatively greater in number, and the stubbornness and ignorance of their character is relatively greater. Their language is different, their letters are different, their religion is different. Their food and drink, clothing, temperament, and sensual desires [shiyu 嗜欲], too, are different. As yet it is not easy to personally point to many among them who seek to master spoken and written Chinese. As yet it is not easy to personally point to many among them who seek to master spoken and written Chinese. To take these raw barbarians and confer civil liberties upon them … it will certainly be muddled and confused, and no one will know how it got that way. …

The old Hakim Beg chiefs of the Muslim borderlands [Southern Xinjiang] depended on the power of their offices to feed off the people like jackals and tigers. The former Governor Liu Jintang, when he was first establishing the province, clearly understood the disadvantages [of this system]. He memorialized on loosing the thin knots of language. Now, twenty years later, the people’s knowledge has not been opened up, there is no news of progress, and it is generally as it was before. As for the many tribes of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, who have fallen to living by herding and are nomads, lawless and wild in the extreme, it is even harder to say anything about them. Self-government [zizhi 自治] has such problems …

We find that every country of East and West, in governing their dependent territories, mostly use special methods, like Britain’s being towards India, France’s towards Annam. These are all autocracies. Britain’s colonial [zhimin 殖民] system is the most comprehensive. As books on the matter generally describe it, there are three kinds: The first is the colony led by the monarch. The second is the colony with
organs of representation but no responsible cabinet. The third is the colony with organs of representation and a responsible cabinet. The first and second are all implemented in places where Whites are few and natives are many. Both of these are so-called “colonies led by the monarch.” The third is the system of self-government. This is implemented in places where Whites are many and natives are few. This is the self-governing colony. Self-government is a special colonial system. Because the people who have moved [there] from the mother country are many, and the ability to self-govern depends primarily on the degree of civilization [wenming 文明], thus does the state grant the sovereignty of self-government. If one were suddenly to implement this in a place where the natives were many and Whites few, then the Whites would not be able to dominate the natives. There would certainly be an uprising that would smash the social order and disturb law and order.

Thus, in the sequence of the management of colonies, one must first use the system of the land led by the monarch, and then gradually achieve the system of self-government. Britain’s Australia, Canada, and Natal are like this. France early on brought its colonies into the system of democratic representation through a parliament. However, we must see that its colonies are of no great importance, and so they use this system. … In Southern Xinjiang, apart from junior-grade primary schools, we should establish more Chinese-language schools. We should wait until there gradually are more students who graduate from these schools and know Chinese language and Chinese writing. When it comes time for the second round of elections, we should examine the situation again and measuredly manage matters. From autocracy to self-government, from self-government to unity.  

163 Memorial dated zhupi XT 1.4.24, Lian-kui, reproduced in Xuebu guanbao 92 (8 July 1909). “今新疆之民種類之雜，品格之卑，較之內地，相去奚翅倍蓰，正如人當幼稚歲，宜受成於父母。… 北路，回多，漢少。而回漢素相水火，畛域難化。… 若南路纏民較多，其性之愚頑亦較甚。言語不同，文字不同，宗教不同，飲食、衣服、性情、嗜欲亦不同。求其能操漢語、識漢字者，已未易多親執[?]。此生獠野蠻而遞畀以民權 … 必冥然，而莫知其所以然之故。… 前之回疆阿奇木伯克頭目依附官勢魚肉同類等於豺虎。前撫臣劉錦棠置省之初洞悉其弊。奏請革除言之纖切。至今二十餘年，民智未開，進化無聞，略與前同。至哈薩克、布魯特諸部，落以游牧為業，遷徙靡常鄙野尤甚，更難與言。自治有此難 … 查：東西各國，治理屬地，多用特別之法。如英之於印度、法之於安南，皆為專制政體。而英之殖民地制度尤詳。且著約略言之，其種有三：第一為王領殖民地。第二具代表機關而未有責任內
Here at last we find true developmentalism and engagement with international imperialism and colonialism. Wang’s “civilization” here is not transformation-by-teaching (*jiaohua*), and indeed his approach was radically materialist compared to those of his predecessors. Rather, “civilization” (*wenming*) pointed to a vague notion of global hierarchies of cultural and social development. Let us return to our typology of colonial systems from the Introduction: Wang Shu’nan was explicitly arguing for the implementation of an autocratic crown colony with no organs of representation, and one that was directed at securing the dominance of a settler minority over an autochthonous majority, partly through the exploitation of the majority’s labor and their gradual “elevation.”

If Wang’s models for Xinjiang were the Natal, Australia, and Canada, at least as he understood them, then he was advocating establishing Xinjiang as a classic “exploitation colony,” combined with a degree of settlement. He regularly laid out plans for collaborations between officials and merchants in opening up new resources, such as gold, and promoting trade in leather and other goods between Xinjiang and China proper.164 Wang’s proposals prompted a number of other officials to form “official supervision and...
merchant management” (guandu shangban) enterprises, which were also becoming increasingly common in China proper: in 1907, Kashgar Intendant Yuan Hongyou began to work with merchants to exploit gold, iron, coal, and even petroleum in the southern Tarim Basin, though the project eventually failed.\(^{165}\) So did similar ventures in the far North, where Russian merchants were brought in to open and direct mining operations, and in Kashgaria.\(^ {166} \) The only successful operation was the opening of a leather factory in Ili, the first of its kind in Xinjiang, under the direction of the wealthy Musabay brothers from Artush.\(^ {167} \) The Musabays needed government assistance and funding simply to transport the components of their machines over the difficult roads to Ili and deal with a stubborn Russian administration. Wang even proposed developing new state monopolies on certain industries and encouraging the use of paper money that would supplant the bills already in circulation from the merchant houses.\(^ {168} \) Wang’s model for Xinjiang was state-driven capitalist development built on the backs of non-Han laborers, conceived of as more primitive than the Han and employed in agriculture or mining according to regional specializations, in order to enrich the greater empire. In short, Wang advocated exploitation colonialism.


\(^{166}\) Zhong Guangsheng and Sun Anfu, *Xinjiang zhi gao* [Draft gazetteer of Xinjiang], (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1967 [1928]), j. 2, 51a-52b.


\(^{168}\) Zeng and Shen, *Zhongguo jingying Xiyu shi*, 396.
The strange thing about Wang’s model was its combination of more direct colonial rule on the political level and a general retreat of the state on the social level. Statecraft thinkers had originally proposed the opposite – strengthening local society while loosening government control – but eventually came to instrumentalize the local, organic institutions they envisioned in order to build state capacity. I understand Wang’s proposal to be an admission of the decline of that capacity from the 1890s onward. The Hunanese experiment in transforming the borderlands had failed: Xinjiang was unable to raise the funds necessary to maintain the government there, in large part because “land reclamation” had failed to transform desert and steppe into lush, fertile fields, and so taxation in cash or kind was nearly impossible. After Lian-kui’s support for Du Tong’s activism, Governor Yuan Dahua (1851-1935, g. 1911-1912) fully embraced Wang’s program, and schools and other institutions of social transformation were immediately closed all over the province. In fact, when Yuan outlined three guiding policies for governing Xinjiang from then on, the very first was “colonization” (zhimin).\(^{169}\)

Perhaps Beijing was mistaken in appointing Wang Shu’nan – certainly, he was knowledgeable, but his approach to government was thoroughly at odds with Lian-kui and Du Tong, who supported the constitutional reforms. This strife at the heart of government was reflected in the networks of influence that Wang and Du both built in the administration. Rumors of Wang’s corruption eventually drew Beijing’s suspicion, and so the imperial censor Rui-xian was sent to investigate. He reported in 1910 that Wang was, indeed, corrupt on a vast scale.\(^{170}\) Rui-xian accused him of ignoring the constitutional

\(^{169}\) Zeng and Shen, Zhongguo jingying Xiyu shi, 364.

\(^{170}\) Memorial dated XT 2.3.27, Rui-xian, “新疆藩司王樹楠行貪鄙” (NPM 186991).
reforms, which was certainly true; of falsifying reports, which itself makes it difficult to know if this is true; and of opium addiction, which was probably true. Regardless of the details concerning Wang himself, Rui-xian identified a whole network of influence, the composition of which interests us here. (See Table 1.2)

Table 1.2: Officials accused of corruption in 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Cashiered</th>
<th>Accusation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wang Shu’nan</td>
<td>1851-1936</td>
<td>Xincheng, Zhili</td>
<td>Financial commissioner 1906-1912</td>
<td>1906-1912</td>
<td>Led network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gan Yaoxiang</td>
<td>b. 1853</td>
<td>Xiangyin, Hunan</td>
<td>Clerk to financial commissioner 1901-1906; Dihua prefect 1906-1907; Yarkand prefect 1907-1908</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Sought bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Wenlong</td>
<td>1871-1933</td>
<td>Baling, Hunan</td>
<td>Tarbaghatai prefect 1904-1907; Dihua prefect 1907-1910; Yarkand prefect 1910</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Sought bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Yingxuan</td>
<td>b. 1865</td>
<td>Gaolan, Gansu</td>
<td>Aksu circuit treasury keeper 1904-1908; acting Dihua magistrate; acting Dihua prefect 1908; Qarghiliq magistrate 1909-1911</td>
<td>1909-1911</td>
<td>Sought bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Zengxin</td>
<td>1867-1928</td>
<td>Mengzi, Yunnan</td>
<td>Aksu intendant 1909-1911; judicial commissioner 1911-1912</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Sought bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhou Shengchao</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>sub-magisterial position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sought bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Hualing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dihua magistrate 1910-1911</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sought bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Guangzhao</td>
<td>b. 1879</td>
<td>Liquan, Shaanxi</td>
<td>Ningyuan magistrate 1909-1910 (left on mourning before arriving in office)</td>
<td>1909-1910</td>
<td>Sought bribes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.2 (continued): Officials accused of corruption in 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Ca-</th>
<th>Accusation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pan Zhen</td>
<td>1850-1926</td>
<td>Dangtu, Anhui</td>
<td>Kucha prefect 1887-1889; Khotan prefect 1889-1890, 1897-1902; Yarkand prefect 1890-1896; Dihua prefect 1902-1906; supervisor of agriculture and animal husbandry for the North, 1904-?; temporary judicial commissioner 1905; Aksu intendant 1905-1909; Ili-Tarbaghatai intendant 1910-1912</td>
<td>Ca-</td>
<td>Bribed for office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Buduan</td>
<td>b. 1859</td>
<td>Shanyang, Jiangsu</td>
<td>Ningyuan magistrate 1898-1900; Ili prefect 1904-1907; Dihua prefect 1907-1908; appointed Kashgar prefect 1910</td>
<td>Ca-</td>
<td>1910 Bribed for office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Bingkun</td>
<td>b. 1854</td>
<td>Changsha, Hunan</td>
<td>Dihua magistrate 1900-1901, 1903-1904; Kucha prefect 1901-1902; Yengisar prefect 1902-1904, 1910-1911; acting Kashgar prefect 1908-1910 Ili prefect 1911</td>
<td>Ca-</td>
<td>Bribed for office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yi Rongding</td>
<td>b. 1862</td>
<td>Baling, Hunan</td>
<td>Turpan xunjian 1899-1905?; Keriye magistrate 1902-1903?; acting Yengisar prefect 1905-1907; Khotan prefect 1908-1911; Kashgar prefect 1911</td>
<td>Ca-</td>
<td>Bribed for office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

171 Pan Zhen had served loyally in Xinjiang since arriving in 1876, and he was well-regarded by his superiors. However, he eventually developed a crippling opium addiction, which, Rui-xian notes, contributed to his financial troubles. According to a secret investigation conducted in 1911, Pan successfully kicked his habit. (Memorial dated XT 3.7.2, Yuan Dahua?, “奏為署理伊塔道潘震煙癮已戒請旨簡放事” [FHA 03-7459-018].)
We might include Liu Chengqing, who was cashiered in 1906 after forty years of loyal service for being slow to implement the New Policies.\textsuperscript{172} This list of Wang’s associates displays four common characteristics: first, its members were all roughly the same age, and they belonged overwhelmingly to the second generation of Xinjiang officials, which had arrived in office after 1899. The outliers here are Pan Zhen, who apparently had personal motivations for his involvement, and Wang Bingkun, who had served under Zuo. Second, its members circulated between a small subset of position in Xinjiang: most went through Dihua, Yarkand (including Qarghiliq), Ningyuan, and Khotan (including Pichan). This may indicate that certain regions were now under the control of some clandestine clique, much as Changshanese had monopolized particular counties, and that those areas were centers of what Beijing understood to be corruption. Certainly, in the last years of the

\textsuperscript{172} Memorial dated GX 32.7.25, Lian-kui, (FHA 04-01-12-0651-080).
dynasty, appointments, promotions, and reappointments took place in Xinjiang with remarkable rapidity, as officials of lowly status swiftly purchased rank after rank and often spent only a year in a given office, barely enough time to move in and out. In one extreme case, there were four official magistrates in Dihua in 1911 alone.

Fourth, this list resembles that of the officials whom Du Tong had censured for failing to implement the reformist education plan.173 Actually, only two officials had made the cut, Yanqi Prefect Zhang Xian (1876-1912, from Wuwei, Gansu) and Peng Xuzhan (b. 1850, from Changsha). Zhang, like Du, was a particularly earnest young official and held a metropolitan degree, making him one of a couple of fourth-generation officials to have attained his office in the traditional meritocratic fashion. He received the support of Prince Palta for implementing modern education. Peng Xuzhan was the rare genuine technocrat in the Xinjiang government, an exceptionally capable administrator who joined the army in 1879, and then spent the late Qing and much of the early Republic being sent from one trouble spot to another. He will appear again in later chapters. Following the rest of Du’s 1908 inspection tour, he recommended the immediate cashiering of Yarkand Prefect Gan Yaoxiang, Yengisar Sub-Prefect Liu Jie (b. 1861, from Baling), Ningyuan Magistrate Li Fangxue (b. 1841, from Qiyang, Hunan), Fuyuan Magistrate Wang Maoxun (b. 1848, from Shanhua, Hunan), and Qumul Sub-Prefect An Yunsheng (b. 1844, from Wuwei, Gansu). All of them shared positions with the later “conspirators,” and with the exception of An Yunsheng, who was a later Xiang Army veteran, they belonged to the second generation of officeholders and received their positions through office purchase. I believe that Wang Shu’nan and Du Tong’s politics point to a genuine factionalism in the Xinjiang government,

173 Memorial dated (rescript) XT1.run2.12, Lian-kui, reproduced in Xuebu guanbao 83 (11 April 1909).
or more charitably to the persistence of distinct communities within and outside the administration.

Finally, this list of “corrupt” officials includes several of the central figures in the post-Xinhai Xinjiang government. Yang Zengxin was responsible for maintaining imperial power and combatting the uprisings led by the Brothers and Elders Society, and so he immediately rose after the revolution to the governorship. Zhu Ruichi was later Yang’s “model official” and died in office as the governor in 1934.\textsuperscript{174} Liu Wenlong remained a prominent figure in the Xinjiang government through 1933. Wang Buduan rose to the rank of Tarbaghatai Intendant, where he gradually grew more independent of Yang.\textsuperscript{175} Pan Zhen became the head of the provincial Ministry of Finance. Wang praised Yang extensively\textsuperscript{176}, and he even composed Yang’s epitaph, but his admiration did not come from afar, as Wang stayed on in Xinjiang to help Yang establish his government.\textsuperscript{177}

In many ways, Yang’s government was a realization of Wang’s ideas: Yang was an autocratic strongman, and he used military might to consolidate his control at the level of the circuit, yet under him the state retreated from the lower levels of society. By and large, it was not that Yang was, as he depicted himself, an enlightened Daoist ruler who let people do as they please – rather, as he indicates himself in a number of documents, the state capacity of his regime was very weak. Justin Jacobs, in his history of the Yang era,

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{174}] Jacobs, “Empire Besieged,” 129.
\item[\textsuperscript{175}] Jacobs, “Empire Besieged,” 136.
\item[\textsuperscript{176}] Jacobs, “Empire Besieged,” 80.
\item[\textsuperscript{177}] Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 甲229《楊增新信稿》1冊.
\end{itemize}
analyzes it as a period of contestation between sub-regional powers.¹⁷⁸ Yet the Tianjin merchant networks persisted, and exploitation continued, now through the revived power of the begs. Yang helped create the conditions for their persistence by retaining the late-Qing, pre-reform institutions of government established by the Xiang Army, minus the tools of official activism, such as the Confucian schools.

Meanwhile, the new administration had failed to dispose of the Hunanese. It is well established that the networks of the Xiang Army in China proper evolved in part into the revolutionary movements of the Brothers and Elders Society (Gelao hui), and this was the case in Xinjiang, as well.¹⁷⁹ The last generation of Hunanese to come to Xinjiang rarely achieved high office, but they did develop their relationships with fellow anti-Manchu activists in both the new, modern Ili Model Army and in the civilian government in Dihua and Kashgar. When the New Policies came into place, they brought with them a host of new positions in the reformed judicial system, the majority of which were quickly filled with Hunanese.¹⁸⁰ One fascinating pamphlet produced in Changsha memorializes the martyrs of the Xinhai Revolution in Xinjiang.¹⁸¹ The absolute majority of them are from the Changsha area, and their numbers include several ranking officials in the provincial

¹⁷⁸ Jacobs, “Empire Besieged,” 121.

¹⁷⁹ For an overview of the Xinhai Revolution in Xinjiang, see Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 164-167. The Hunanese presence is discussed in Wei Changhong, Xinhai geming zai Xinjiang, and is widely attested in primary documents.

¹⁸⁰ An extensive report on the students and faculty of the Xinjiang Upper-Level Police School reveals that nearly every enrollee was Hunanese, most of them over the age of thirty-two. This makes them contemporaries of the fourth generation of official recruitment. National Library of China 3120020033644, SS 49180, 《新疆高等巡警學堂文牘、章程》.

¹⁸¹ Gong Yuanji, Zhuidao Xinjiang shouyi lieshi jinian pin (Hunan Provincial Library, rare book collection), 21b-22a.
government. Fourth-generation Hunanese magistrates Wang Tingxiang, Zhou Jie, Ni Zhuo, Xu Dingming, Tan Chengfan, and He Jiadong are named among the editors and contributors – plainly, they would have been opposed to Wang and Yang’s pro-imperial stance. After Xinhai, groups of Hunanese revolutionaries persisted, particularly in the South, where Yang sent the Society leader Yang Zuanxu (1873-1956, from Echeng, Hubei) until finally banishing him.¹⁸² His fellows continued to assassinate former Qing officials and agitate for republicanism until frequent skirmishes with Yang’s provincial forces wiped them out.

By the 1920s, the Hunanese hold on Xinjiang’s politics was over. Nevertheless, their ideology and institutions profoundly shaped the region during the last period of government activism supported by real state capacity for intervention in society until the 1930s. As such, the project to transform Xinjiang and its people from a border region of Muslims into a province of subjects left a legacy in society and culture that lasted well into the Republican period, and in some cases into the 1950s. Their influence was profound not simply because they undertook a program of institution-building and social transformation during a period of devastation, but because their successor government under Yang Zengxin did nothing to weaken it. Rather, Yang permitted life, law, and politics in the counties, away from the capital, to continue as it had in the late Qing.

*VI. Conclusion*

¹⁸² On Yang Zuanxu and the Society, see Millward (*Eurasian Crossroads*, 165-169). Yang’s own writings on his time in Xinjiang can be found in Yang Zuanxu, *Xinjiang chuyi* (1915). The British consul at Kashgar frequently reported on the activities of the “Gamblers,” by which he indicated the Society. Cf. IOR L/P&S/10/330.
If we cease to look for nationalism and nations, and instead take people and their ideas on their own terms, then the way we frame this region’s history changes dramatically. In the foregoing, I have argued for a relationship between community and ideology, and for the distinct consequences of the peculiar policies that grew out of that social and intellectual milieu. Despite the difficulty of excavating a history of ideas from the writings they left behind, it is clear that the government of this period was not a matter of Chinese working in concert to colonize Turkic Muslims and others. Rather, it consisted first of a group of officials who shared a very specific background and thus a set of ideas about civilization and savagery that motivated their policies. We will see its echoes in subsequent chapters. As the Hunanese clique gradually settled into dominance, the challenges of governing brought them to alter their own ideas. Eventually, through both senescence and politics, the Hunanese were displaced by a small band of squabbling reformers whose ultimate legacy was the minimally capable government of the Yang era. This says little about how the vast majority of people in Xinjiang lived their lives during this period. The rest of this book is devoted instead to that question.

Nevertheless, we must have regard for the ideological formation of Xinjiang’s colonial-like government if we are to understand the everyday politics that drew on and affirmed it. The Hunanese regime was not racialist, at least not in its formulation and expression of policy. However, it advanced measures intended to bring about substantive, transformative change to the very minds of non-Han people. When it became apparent that the Statecraft dream would not come true in Xinjiang, the Hunanese-dominated government affirmed law and punishment as a central tool of its repertoire as it sought to keep Han and Turki from conflict and maintain social stability. Yet even this seemingly
more practical solution derived from their imaginary of chaos, in which they saw themselves as the men responsible for bringing about order.

While the Xiang Army clique failed to achieve Zuo’s plans, it did achieve a kind of state-building. We must remember that corruption is normative: what appeared to Beijing to be corruption in the form of lost revenue may have appeared to the people below the “translucent canopy” as good government that was responsive to local conditions. That was, after all, the classic problem of local government in China proper: the magistrate, tasked by Statecraft with moral transformation of his flock, in reality held a tenuous position between the demands of his superiors and those of his subjects. The Statecraft ethos informed what they did on that level, as well.

It took the reformists to introduce the international discourse of colonialism and imperialism into the government. Even then, their period of influence was so brief as to have left little trace on the region. Du Tong sought to elevate the Turki not as barbarians in need of civilization, but as members of a nascent constitutional monarchy ready to be brought into that imperial and pseudo-national community through education. Wang Shu’nan advanced the European model of exploitation as a means to paternalistically civilize the non-Han, but in a way that departed radically from the Statecraft tradition. Osterhammel has defined the “civilizing mission” of European empire in the nineteenth century as twofold: it relied, first, on a new confidence in pedagogy and, second, on the

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184 This is practically a truism in Qing history, but for an excellent exploration of the magistrate’s difficult position, see Linxia Liang, *Delivering Justice in Qing China: Civil Trials in the Magistrate’s Court*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
The formulation of universal models of progress. The former has been present in Chinese thought since antiquity, though the statecraft revival institutionalized it in a new way. The latter was only introduced at the very end of the Qing. Before that, the pedagogical project was informed instead by the cosmological relationship between behavior and substance, or ritual comportment and matter-and-energy, li and qi.

Therefore, although the Yang Zengxin era (1912-1928) has accurately been characterized as a revival or continuation of the imperial system, we must bear in mind that it was also altered significantly by Wang’s interpretation of how that system had operated. Wang and Yang’s Xinjiang was all but stateless. It combined the absolute authority of a strong governor with the brinkmanship of mostly independent local magistrates, and the rest was laissez faire. This was a political philosophy well-suited to the minimal state capacity of Yang’s regime, which found itself facing several armed and disobedient sub-regional powers. Such was the legacy of statecraft in Xinjiang.

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Chapter Two: Interpreters and Interpretation

When Chinese elites articulated their visions of Xinjiang’s new provincehood, they did so with a raft of assumptions, mainly unspoken, about what a province was. The statecraft thinkers who dreamed up the transformation of the Northwest had never gone into the details of how to run this new political entity. Fortunately for them, by the late nineteenth century, the Qing had evolved a semi-formal but clear model of state-society relations in a Chinese province. Two formal components were necessary, with a third, informal class between them: at the top was the stratum of local magistrates, and at the bottom their subjects. Ideally, these two groups would have been in direct contact, and the magistrates would have acted as “father-and-mother officials” (*fumuguan*). Even if that ideal had ever been realized, by the mid-nineteenth century, the capacity of magistrates to govern had been strained to its limits by population growth. As a result, local government came to rely on a middle tier of social organizations that handled dispute management and much of routine government. These organizations filled an “information gap” between state and society by providing local knowledge to the magistrate and investigating the circumstances of conflicts brought to the *yamen*. This gap became normative over the course of the nineteenth century, and by the time the Xiang Army went beyond the Pass into Xinjiang, it was an assumption of practical governance.

In Xinjiang, there was a tension between this practical approach and the civilizing project. Both models of state and society depended on intermediaries, but of very

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187 There is a rich literature on the emergence of brokerage in local society in the mid-Qing. A recent elucidation of this process in a specific local context can be found in Dykstra, “Complicated Matters.”.
different kinds: according to the Hunanese statecraft model, the state would train men to be moral leaders, and these men in turn would seed society with correct behavior and customs. While the goal of this model was to create an ideal society that would need little to no government, statecraft had long advanced a belief that moral bureaucrats, if given permission to act independently, would be the ideal agents to bring about such a society.\textsuperscript{188} Practical statecraft in the borderlands instead required technical skill, specifically the linguistic capacity to translate between Chinese and Turki. This demand appealed more to the realist model of mediation that Chinese officials knew from experience in China proper.

As I will argue in this chapter, official attempts to establish classes of loyal mediators failed time and again, leaving local society with the effects of several waves of partial state-making. First, the Hunanese attempted to create a class of ideologically-committed moral men by training Turki boys in Chinese language and the Classics – and instead left Xinjiang with a new elite of interpreters who held outsized influence in mediation. Next, they turned to Islamic authorities whom they had once spurned, now that those authorities had established their own parallel structures of authority. Later, there was a further attempt to organize society into mutual security units (baojia). The result was that, rather than a province, the Hunanese ruled over something like a colony, in which a variety of local authorities maintained imperial rule by translating between Chinese and Islamic languages and discourses and benefiting themselves in the process.

\textsuperscript{188} On this contradictory position, see James Polachek, ““Literati Groups and Literati Politics in Early Nineteenth-Century China” (PhD Dissertation, University of California - Berkeley, 1977), 18.
These “interpreters” (Turki *tuŋči* < Chinese *tongshi*) gained a malign reputation, as they became the gatekeepers of access to judicial and political power.

I. Creating an Interpreter Class

Before the Xiang Army had even arrived in Xinjiang, Zuo Zongtang had decided that Muslim authorities were untrustworthy. Instead, Zuo commanded the reconstruction agencies to establish a series of *yishu* across the region with the goal of training Turki boys in Chinese language and the Classics. He argued that there was a nearly insurmountable distance between Turki subjects and the officials who were meant to play a pastoral role in their lives. Qing magistrates, as “father-and-mother officials,” were meant to guide commoners towards moral behavior in order to maintain a peaceful society. While the Turki were agriculturalists and could potentially be made ordinary subjects, they had minimal knowledge of Chinese culture or language. In order to make the Turki “assimilate to our Chinese ways” (*tong wo Hua feng* 同我華風), the Xinjiang government would teach their children how to read and speak Chinese, dress them in Chinese clothes, and educate them in the Chinese canon.

Zuo was generally known for more materialistic solutions to reconstruction, and even in Gansu he had ordered projects to gradually industrialize the economy and exploit its resources more effectively. At the same time, the Xiang Army had resettled Hui away from the main highway and from Han, and Zuo had implemented rules restricting the size of mosques and some aspects of Muslim religious practice. In Xinjiang, the idealistic

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189 Schluessel, “Language and the State in Late Qing Xinjiang,” 153.

190 Zhao Weixi, *Xiangjun jituan*. 

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components of the Xiang Army’s reconstruction intersected with daunting linguistic, cultural, and social barriers. In the face of such difference, the reconstruction project as it had evolved in the Northwest turned mainly into a civilizing project to mitigate that difference. Civilizing projects tend to fail, but they have ramifications nevertheless. In the case of Xinjiang, the school project failed but not for the reasons one might expect: despite apparent support from the families of the students, assimilation failed because the schools themselves, prevailing social and economic conditions, and the technical needs of the government conspired to produce a profit motive that encouraged Turki to learn Chinese language, but not sino-normative moral ideology. In this section, I will outline the development of the schools and the purposes they served in local society, who supported them, what benefits and disadvantages people derived from them, and why the project ended.

One of the most striking things about the schools was their students, who tended to be labeled ‘‘Turki’’ (Chan) but listed under Chinese names. Certain Turki students are mentioned frequently in the archive, among them Yu Xueshi 魚學詩, Ai Xueshu 艾學書 (d. 1926), Xu Youcheng 許有成, Mi Jiashan 米家山, and Gui Xin 桂馨. James Millward has suggested that Ai’s Chinese name was a pun, “Loves to Read Books,” and that this naming pattern was typical. Slightly fewer than half of Turki students in Turpan had Chinese names that were merely phonetic transliterations of their own: Sa-ji-ti (Sajid) was the top student at the Lämchin school in 1892. He was joined by students like He

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191 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 143. Millward cites XUAR 15-11-309, dated GX 12.9.25. I have been unable to locate this document in the published Turpan archive despite best efforts.

Luoban (Qurban) and Ya-hu-bu (Yaʾqūb). Many students had mixed names, in which a Chinese surname stood phonetically for a Muslim name, while the rest carried an auspicious meaning. Sa Mingzhu 沙明珠 “Shining Pearl Sa” may have had the very common name Thābit, locally pronounced “Sawut” and transliterated with the character sa.¹⁹³ A Yingxuan 阿應選 “Takes-the-Exams A” belongs to the same category, as Ai Xueshu might – perhaps Ai’s name simply means “Aḥmad Studies-the-(Four)-Books.” Yet the majority gained all-new Chinese names, often with overtly Sinocentric meanings. The character hua “China” was very common: Hua Guo 華國 was literally named “China state.” The schoolmaster of Qarakhoja (Sanbao) wanted one of his Turki students to “treasure China,” and so gave him the name Hua Gui 華貴. Turpan Old City had classmates named Gao Hua 高華 “High China” and Hua Li 華理 “Principle of China.” Han wen 漢文 “Chinese writing” was a common character combination, as well. Most names were not so overt in their allusions. Students like Yu Xueshi and Xu Youcheng, listed in the records as “Turki,” were in the majority of young men with very ordinary Chinese names.

Turki did not necessarily find explicitly assimilatory acts odious. In Yarkand, the magistrate Peng Xuzhan (b. 1850) showed special attention to the schools and personally made sure the children were clothed in Chinese robes.¹⁹⁴ Yet Peng was an exceptionally popular magistrate, at least among the Turki, and was capable of working with local


¹⁹⁴ IOR L/P&S/7/202; Mannerheim, Dagbok, 85. A photograph of Peng in his yamen can also be found in Mannerheim’s journal. (127)
clerics. Rather, the Han of Yarkand despised him for “turning native.” During Peng’s tenure, he successfully resolved several days of violence that arose from conflicts between local Muslims and Hindu merchants over debt and the merchants’ sexual relationships with Turki women, two issues that also led to frequent violence between Turki and Han in Turpan. (See Chapter Three.) These clearly mattered to Muslims, while there are no known protests arising from the schools.

Of course, the yishu and their teachers were capable of doing real violence to their students. Provincial authorities ordered a secret investigation into an 1884 case in which a Turki boy named Hua Guo committed suicide. Hua Guo was enrolled at the eastern school in Ush, near Aksu. According to the report, the boy’s teacher had beaten him for failing to memorize the readings. Two days later, Hua Guo went into an empty room in the school’s rear courtyard and hanged himself. The school’s Turki custodian vouched for the connection between Hua’s treatment and his suicide. Not long thereafter, another report came from Guma, a town in southern Xinjiang on the road between Qarghiliq and Khotan. There, the same scenario had played out with an eighteen-sui Turki student named Guo Hulin. Liu first ordered Guo’s teacher expelled back to China proper, as the boy was over the age where his teacher was permitted to beat him. Hua Guo’s case, however, was sent back to the circuit to be reinvestigated, quietly, so as not to damage the process of introducing “Confucian customs” (Ru feng 儒風). As a result of the case, the province strictly banned beating students, showing that the government was aware of and responsive to the potential for popular discontent and harm to the civilizing project.

The early *ad hoc* organization of the school project opened it up to critique and attack in the realm of local politics. While officials appropriated *yishu* as a tool of politics and demanded their integration and supervision at the provincial level, they nevertheless expected magistrates to fund and operate the schools locally. In 1878, when the first schools were established in Turpan, the magistrate located a nearby patch of arable land and a *karez* in Yarghol (Ya’erhu) to act as their endowment.¹⁹⁶ Teachers received a monthly salary of eight taels, derived from rent on the land or *karez*, and two pecks of wheat harvested from the plot. This funding structure was difficult to enforce, in part because it relied on management by local Turki officials who had no investment in the project. The next year, the Toqsun instructor (Bai Zhenyu from Dali County, Shaanxi) petitioned the magistrate, furious. He wrote, “the wrapped-headed Muslims despise this culture of ours” (*Chanhui mianshi si wen* 纏回眄视斯文).*¹⁹⁷ According to Bai, a local *sumun* (Mongol “lieutenant,” a petty official position) had appropriated the grain from the school’s endowment lands and placed it in his own coffers. The *sumun* pointed out to him that the endowment had never been formalized, nor had the actually amount of grain that was to go to the school. From this point onward, the *yamen* took responsibility for directing income from the endowment into the schools,¹⁹⁸ although it continued to

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¹⁹⁶ GX 04.11.25 “吐魯番廳設義塾請塾師籌集修金柴糧之備查文” in *QXD*, vol. 28, 138-139. A *karez* is a special kind of irrigation system known mainly in Turpan in which water flows through an underground tunnel, thus escaping evaporation in the intensely hot sun.

¹⁹⁷ GX 5.2.1 “吐魯番廳為托克遜義塾經費之批文” in *QXD*, vol. 28, 142.

¹⁹⁸ GX 06.06.27 “吐魯番廳為辦義學延師籌款之札” in *QXD*, vol. 28, 159.
receive pressure from local sumun to put it under their control. As time went on and
the schools became an established institution, different communities came to draw on
them in varying ways.

Scholars have indicated that the yishu were established for the compulsory
education of elite Turki boys, but there is only circumstantial evidence to suggest that
it was limited to this class. Technically, the order from Liu Jintang establishing the
schools required “all” young Turki children should enter the schools. In practice, the
student population through the mid-1890s was roughly one-third Han, one-third Hui, and
one-third Turki, while the latter received particular attention. The few known records of
students’ parentage suggest that some of their ancestors had already crossed the cultural
divide. The families of the seven Turki boys in the Toqsun school in 1890 followed a
common pattern: their fathers had Turkic names, their grandfathers Chinese names, and
their great-grandfathers Chinese or Turkic. This reflects the fact that their fathers
would have come of age under Ya’qūb Beg, when having a Chinese name would have
been a disadvantage, while earlier generations could have held positions in the Qing
administration. Eight-sui Tokhti’s father was named Ka-mu-er, his grandfather Yinglian,
and his great-grandfather Kaiwen. Those of his classmate Sawut, also eight sui, were
Abdul, Youwen, and Qihou. Shi-du-er was descended from Ḥamīd, Chengji, and Daonan,


200 James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, “Political History and Strategies of Contro, 1884-1978” in S.

201 Quoted in GX 27.12.11 “鎮迪道就設立義塾讓纏民幼童入學學習漢文化事札吐魯番廳文” in QXDX,
vol. 32, 192-195.

while A-bu-tu came from Tokhti, Heguang, and Zhaorui. At the Lämchén school around the same period, fewer students were listed with Chinese-named grandparents, but those who did followed the same generational pattern. At least one student at Toqsun, Yu Xueshi, was the son of a former dorgha, which indicates both relatively high social status and some association with the Turpan Wang. At the same time, documents state that his sometime classmates Ai Xueshu and Gui Xin both came from poorer circumstances. Unfortunately, despite the profusion of records on the students themselves, information about their descent is otherwise lacking. It is entirely possible that the students or those around them created fictive ancestors.

Unlike residential schools in European empires, the yishu did not separate students from their families. As commands from Dihua reiterated, students’ attendance was construed as a responsibility to the state on the part of their families not unlike the military corvée of the Ming. Thus, fathers of absentee students could be brought before the yamen to be admonished by the magistrate. This suggests both that the students lived outside the schools or had significant freedom to move about and that families continued to play a role in their children’s lives. Sometimes families “hid” children who “fled” the schools. However, such situations did not warrant intervention by force to


204 GX 11.10.6 “吐魯番廳免究阿大烏納棄妻之批文” in QXDX, vol. 28, 449.

205 GX 14.11.05 “吐魯番廳札飭嚴管學童” in QXDX, vol. 29, 142.


drag the students back to school, but only a conference with the magistrate. Enrolment in a yishu was at least normatively an agreement between the state and a student’s father, and also that the state had no means to enforce this agreement, apparently not even the threat of violence or sanction.

Students were permitted leave to take care of sick family members or to support their parents. When the Tuyuq school was closed in 1890 for consistently poor teaching, its students were to be moved to the Lüchūn school thirty li away. As the Turki children were all very young, however – under seven sui – their parents successfully requested that the school be reopened so that they could stay close to their families. Actually, in Turpan, students’ families were rarely far away. Yu Xueshi’s father, A-ta-wu-la (ad-Dawlah?), sent him to the school to “grow up,” but soon he was crying and refusing to study. A-ta-wu-la had decided to divorce Yu’s mother. Yu’s situation prompted an intervention by the magistrate, who by some means convinced A-ta-wu-la to call off the divorce. That governmental power was brought to bear on a family conflict so that a Turki boy would focus on his studies suggests that the administration was genuinely invested in the students’ futures, at least as servants to the state. However, it also speaks to the Hunanese regime’s ultimate goal of seeding Muslim society with sino-normative familial relations. Chinese officials complained frequently that the Turki

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208 Undated report listing students in GX 21, spring (1895) in QXDX, vol. 36, 365-368.


had no understanding of lineage or ancestry, and that this damaged their ability to act morally.\textsuperscript{211} A student separated from his family would certainly be a poor Confucian.

In the longer term, students used their familiarity with Chinese to support their families. Extensive anecdotal and documentary evidence indicates that the arrival of tens of thousands of Xiang Army soldiers in Turpan in 1877 very suddenly reshaped the local economy: first, a sharp increase in grain prices intersected with the population displacement wrought by the Muslim Uprisings and the reconquest. (See Chapter Three.) Second, Chinese-speaking Turki were suddenly very much in demand and could profit significantly by working as intermediaries with the army and the provisional government. Simultaneously, other educated elites lost authority, as some who had collaborated with Yaʿqūb Beg’s regime had their property confiscated and the Hunanese worked to strip clerics of their authority. In the wake of this economic sea-change, the yishu could provide Turki families with access to a critical skill.

Archival documents show that the Turki students leveraged their linguistic and cultural knowledge in order to defend their families. While it appears that they only ever used their Chinese names when addressing the authorities, they nevertheless stood together with Muslim relatives and friends while representing them. Yu Xueshi and another Turki student from the Qarakhoja (Sanbao) school, Shi Min, found themselves on opposite sides of a conflict over an arranged marriage between their families.\textsuperscript{212} Shi

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\textsuperscript{211} The discourse was pervasive, but an especially rich example is found in \textit{Hetian zhilizhou xiangtuzhi} (in Ma Dazheng et al., eds., \textit{Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao} [Wulumuqi: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 2010], 384-401, 386, 397, 399), which characterizes Turki as being unable to comprehend filial piety because of their lack of surnames and strange marriage practices.

\textsuperscript{212} GX 21.5.13 “二堡戶民時敏控阿他五拉刁唆人口不安于室一案呈吐魯番廳文” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 30, 403-404.
Min’s uncle ‘Asad had been negotiating an engagement with Ruo-he-sha, who was the older sister of Yu Xueshi’s father A-ta-wu-la. Because Ruo-he-sha at the age of forty *sui* had had no children, ‘Asad discussed adoption with her. During the negotiations, however, ‘Asad took another, younger Turki wife. This precipitated a fight between the young woman and a jealous Ruo-he-sha. ‘Asad took A-ta-wu-la and Ruo-he-sha to the akhund’s court, where another fight broke out, ending in ‘Asad’s injury. Shi Min, as the member of the family with the best Chinese, then brought a suit to the *yamen* on his uncle’s behalf. Yu Xueshi handled the defense. Their education brought their families certain advantages in pursuing justice in multiple forums. This observation alone helps to account for the expansion of the Turpan Confucian schools despite their problems.

Benefits could also be more direct. A turning point in the theory and practice of the *yishu* came in 1882, when the provisional government, led by Liu Jintang, had become deeply worried about the region’s preparedness for provincehood. Following Zuo, Liu proposed that the Turki students could be the region’s salvation: if a student could speak Chinese well and demonstrate that he had read one book of the Classics, he proposed, then he should be granted the rank of student (*jiasheng 監生*) and appointed the beg of a town. The Board of Rites rejected his proposal, as it was out of accordance with the statutates governing ranks and appointments. Eventually, Liu and the provincial director of schools (*xuezheng 學正*) bargained Beijing down to a compromise: rather than force every student to go through the county and prefectural exams, some

\[213\] GX 12.8.18 “甘肅新疆巡撫劉錦棠奏為原保義塾學童遵照部議另行酌獎備取佾生事” (FHA 04-01-38-0167-025); GX 12.12.03 “鎮迪道札轉酌獎義塾學童” in *QXDX*, vol. 29, 56-57.
could be instead be rewarded with the title “ritual dancer” (yisheng 佾生) and its special duties. Liu Jintang approved the plan as an expedient means to integrate Turki with knowledge of Chinese into the administration. Previously, he wrote, the yishu had prioritized simply “Chinese dress and speaking Chinese language” (Han fu tong Hua yu 漢服同華語) in an effort to “bring this strange land and different people to assimilate to our Chinese customs” (shi shufang yizu tong wo Hua feng 使殊方異族同我華風). Yet, they had failed to teach them the Classics. Now it was time to follow the example of academies in China proper and recruit minor officials from the schools, even if they were only marginally competent. One or two from each school were to be sent to the office of the director of schools in Gansu to be trained as yisheng.

Following their selection, the yisheng went on to careers in local administration. The yisheng of the Lämchin school, Sa-ji-ti, was recruited as an apprentice to the Han doctors working to eradicate smallpox in Turpan.\footnote{Undated report listing students in GX 21, spring, in \textit{QDX}, vol. 36, 365-368.} This was done partly as a cost-saving measure, as it had been determined as early as 1886, five years after the smallpox inoculation program began in Turpan, that a locally-trained Turki could be paid half as much as a Han specialist from China proper to do the same job.\footnote{GX 11.1.22 “牛痘局申報選纏民子弟學種痘之情形” in \textit{QDX}, vol. 28, 404-405; GX 11.2.13 “吐魯番廳申報種牛痘情形” in \textit{QDX}, vol. 28, 406-407; GX 11.2.16 “吐魯番報冬季種牛痘數及劉錦堂批示” in \textit{QDX}, vol. 28, 408-409.} Previously, they had apprenticed ordinary Turki boys and trained them in pharmacology and techniques for
inoculation. Perhaps low pay for dangerous work was why Sa-ji-ti eventually left his apprenticeship and ran off.216

Other students received better incentives. In 1894, two top students, Ai Xueshu and Gui Xin, were granted adjacent parcels of land along the highway.217 This was a turn in both men’s fortunes, as both were described as lacking family support. Ai was moved from the New City school to the Old City school, where he could be available for his new job clerking in the rites section of the prefectural yamen.218 He was employed around the province as a tax collection supervisor, including a stint in Kucha in 1916, when he was sent to investigate water resources.219 In January 1921, we find Ai Xueshu serving as the acting magistrate in Yuli County (Lopnur)220, and then as the magistrate of Shawan County from 1923 onward. There is no mention of Ai’s ethnicity in these documents or any others after Xinhai – as far as the documentary record was concerned, he was simply a servant of the state. Gui Xin eventually became a village headman, and by 1929 had

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220 December 1920, “艾學書為和吉買提阿吉報稱阿不多色米子等換馬事給吐魯番縣的諮” XUAR Archive M16.004.YJ.2214.
joined the *yamen* himself.221 As of 1926, these men were still neighbors, along with several other *yishu* alumni.222 In 1922, Ai and his brother Abdul used his property and official connections to respond to Yang Zengxin’s degree encouraging private investment and open their own weaving factory.223 Ai engaged in an elaborate scheme to cheat his employees out of salary, dodged the lawsuit, and managed to leave his family a small fortune. While other *yishu* students did not do quite so well, many were employed as petty officials around Turpan into the 1930s: for example, Xu Youcheng was an interpreter who made himself indispensable in local mediation through 1928.224 The same was true of his classmate Tömür, who attained the rank in inspector and worked closely

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with Xu. While the yishu students’ families could not predict their sons’ long-term success, they did benefit from their skills. The students discussed here are the earliest recorded, and they entered the schools around 1885 – their families probably witnessed the success of the first cohorts beginning in 1877.

If Turki believed that the schools could provide advantages in the economy and in dealing with the authority, then it helps explain the persistence of the schools long after they lost support from the government. Fathers and brothers of the Turki students could petition to retain an effective instructor when his appointment expired and even protested the closure of a school when the province found its instructor inadequate. The schools are known to have survived in some form at least through 1919, when a Turki yishu graduate named ‘Abduwalī taught Han and Turki students at one in Kashgar. However, in 1896, in the Kashgar and Aksu Circuits, where the schools were dominated by Turki, each county was ordered to close all but two, leaving one “main school” (zheng shu 正塾) and one “auxiliary school” (fu shu 附塾). Turpan was included on account of its high number of Turki students. The plan also reduced teacher, custodial, and student salaries. Main school teachers, who usually taught Han and Hui, were paid twelve taels, while those at auxiliary schools, who taught Turki, were paid eight. We can attribute this policy in part to the sudden withdrawal by the Qing court of the significant subsidy provided to the Xinjiang government in the wake of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). In Turpan,


226 Törnquist, Kaschgar, 231.
eight schools were reduced to two, and top students were transferred to the Old City and Handun schools, which began training Turki students almost exclusively.\textsuperscript{227}

The closures were an attempt to maintain the training of Turki boys as the central mission of the schools. In reality, if the majority enrolment of non-Turki in the Turpan schools was representative of the whole region, the \textit{yishu} served mainly to provide Classical educations to Han and Hui. In 1889, top students from schools across Xinjiang were first sent to Dihua’s Boghda Academy (\textit{Boda shuyuan} 博達書院), about which little is otherwise known.\textsuperscript{228} The best of Toqsun were between the ages of nineteen and twenty-one \textit{sui}, had studied for at least seven years, and were all from elsewhere: one Han student was a migrant from Fenyang, Shanxi, and another from Dazhu, Sichuan. Their Hui colleague came from Xi’an. The fourth student to go to Dihua was listed as being from Fukang, just to the north of the capital, and appears to have moved around the province during his life. The government in Dihua recruited clerks and functionaries from the schools by means of an examination in the Classics.\textsuperscript{229} While Turki students did enter the exams, the most successful usually came from Han migrant or local Hui families.\textsuperscript{230}

\textsuperscript{227} GX 22.12.11 “吐魯番廳造報光緒二十二年冬季考取義塾生童正副額外課等及第姓名清冊底稿” in \textit{QXD\textit{X}}, vol. 31, 127-129; GX 25.06.22 “吐魯番廳造報光緒二十五年夏季考取義塾生徒姓名清冊底稿” in \textit{QXD\textit{X}}, vol. 31, 395-396; GX 27.02.20 “新疆布政使就批示原設老城漢敦義塾酌擬淘汰該設蒙館事札吐魯番廳文” in \textit{QXD\textit{X}}, vol. 32, 156-158; GX 22.06.27 “吐魯番廳造報光緒二十二年夏季考取各義塾生童正副額外課等及第姓名清冊底稿” in \textit{QXD\textit{X}}, vol. 31, 81-82.


\textsuperscript{229} GX 11.1.5 “劉錦堂准吐魯番八名優生另換試卷” in \textit{QXD\textit{X}}, vol. 28, 404.

\textsuperscript{230} GX 15.10.25 “吐魯番廳請省憲台派優秀塾師來托克遜執教之禀” in \textit{QXD\textit{X}}, vol. 29, 210-211.
In order to excel in the schools, it would appear, one already had to be engaged in the idea of the Chinese tradition more broadly. Later surveys of the schools bear this hypothesis out. Instructors consistently reported that their Turki students were making progress through the curriculum all the way to reading the most obscure and elevated books.\footnote{231 n.d. (ca. 1890) “連木沁義塾造報肄業織回學童姓名入學情況之清冊” in QXDX, vo. 36, 245-247.} By 1896, inspections of the schools had demonstrated that they failed in their central mission to inculcate Turki children with “the value of the Classics” (shi shu zhi gui 詩書之貴). They had failed to learn Sino-normative familial relations (lun 倫) – “you can lead the people to follow [the relations],” Governor Rao remarked, “but you cannot make them recognize [their value]” (min ke shi you zhi, bu ke shi zhi zhi 民可使由之，不可使知之). In 1899, the provincial government, realizing that Han and Hui had begun to establish their own private institutions that did not lead students directly into government, quickly segregated the schools, giving the main yishu to Chinese-speakers and the secondary one to Turki.

It is not surprising that Turki students were not invested in higher Confucian learning. Mastering Chinese was sufficient for a Turki man to increase his economic standing as a scribe, interpreter, or minor official, while spending laborious years delving into the Classics merely qualified him for higher office. New policies reflected Chinese officials’ realistic acceptance that the civilizing mission had not succeeded as they had intended. The Ush Subprefect Yi Shousong (b. 1845) had come up through the ranks of the Xiang Army and spent his whole official career in Xinjiang – but in 1901, he had had
Each governor in turn had continued the *yishu* policy, he wrote, but the only effect had been to produce cohorts of Turki boys with no skill but Chinese language and no guarantee of further employment. As a last-ditch effort to derive some benefit from the students, Yi advanced a plan, which Beijing eventually approved, to appoint them to preexisting positions within local society: the best students would be sent out to proclaim imperial edicts orally in the villages, as they were considered trustworthy. Others, however, would be community representatives (*aqsaqal* or *xiangyue*), irrigation chiefs (*mīrāb*), hundred-heads (*yūzbashi*), and ten-heads (*onbashi*). Since 1877, the magistrates had been approving these petty officials following elections by their communities, but now they were to be appointed directly. Gone was the pretense that the Turki students would realign society – now the government sought only to coopt its elites.

In 1901, Beijing propagated a raft of reform policies aimed at strengthening the country and its people in the face of increasing foreign competition. Among them was the integration of preexisting schools into an empire-wide public system. Xinjiang was wildly ill-equipped to comply with a policy that assumed a fairly high level of institutional development. Ultimately, its only three academies were converted into an upper school and two middle schools, while *yishu* were turned into elementary schools.

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In Xinjiang, at least, the curriculum changed not at all. Instead, the reforms presented local officials with an opportunity to do away with what they now considered the hopeless task of civilizing the Turki. The Turpan magistrate petitioned the governor with the complaint that, while Han and Hui students in the Old City were “striving to be the best” and memorizing the Classics, the Turki in Handun were simply learning to speak Chinese. They closed the Handun school entirely and instead employed three Turki who had good spoken Chinese (Hanyü) as language instructors at three elementary schools in Handun, Lükchün, and Toqsun. There, Turki would learn nothing but language for fixed three-year terms – after all, it was reasoned, they showed no interest in anything else.

The arc of the Confucian schools’ development follows that of the state-society relationship in late-Qing Xinjiang more generally. At first, the Xiang Army administration implemented a civilizing project to transform Muslim society, in part by replacing its preexisting elites with Sinicized locals. Turkic Muslims actually welcomed provincial rule in a number of fields, partly because it provided new strategic options such as alternative channels for seeking justice, as well as new opportunities for some. However, state commitments far exceeded state capacities. The large-scale conversion of Muslims into “subjects” was practically speaking impossible – instead, the state created


“half-civilized” intermediaries who could use the government to their own advantage. Rather than transforming Xinjiang from the ground up, officials contracted the kinds of *ad hoc* relationships with local organizations that were common in China proper. Gradually, the state retreated from Turki society, even as the Turki continued to draw on it, while turning instead to the assistance of Han social and commercial institutions. Where the final abandonment of the *yishu* was framed as giving up, in reality it reflected a realistic acceptance of the state-society relationship: the Turki took what they needed from the government, language proficiency and credentials that helped them access state power, and turned it to their own purposes.

**II. Muslim Authorities and Local Government**

Even traditional Muslim authorities became translators for local officials. In Eastern Turkestan, Islamic jurisprudents (*muftī*) and judges (*qāżī*) continued to play an important role in society after 1877, though the activities of the Islamic courts remain poorly-understood, owing to a lack of documentation.\(^{235}\) Professors (*mudarris*) and teachers (*mullā*) maintained Islamic educational institutions, both colleges (*madrasa*) and ordinary schools (*maktab*). Across the region, however, at the lowest levels of social organization, one would encounter two kinds of learned men: the irrigation master

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The term ākhūnd, by the late nineteenth century, came to be used as a generic title akin to “mister,” but it maintained something of its original meaning, “schoolmaster” or “tutor,” in indicating the male members of a community who could both read and write. (It was such a common term that, henceforth, I will simply write “akhund.”) Akhunds were grassroots ceremonialists, and they were indispensable at weddings, circumcisions, and funerals, where they would recite scripture and perform ceremonies. Akhunds also handled a broad range of written communication, such as writing contracts. At first, the Xiang Army was deeply suspicious of akhunds, but the Chinese authorities later came to rely on them.

The Chinese were suspicious of the akhunds for a number of reasons. First, Hui akhunds (Chinese ahong) were familiar from China proper, as well as from older accounts of Turkic Xinjiang. Akhunds appeared to be men who made their living by trading their knowledge of writing for money. While this was partly true, Confucians imagined that they did so strictly for personal profit, and that, since akhunds recited the Muslim scripture rather than the Chinese, they lacked the moral grounding that a Confucian official received during his education. For this reason, Zuo decided that the Northwest had been rebellious simply because it lacked Confucian gentry and possessed instead these corrupted petty clerics. Worse, the akhunds were accused of advancing a corrupt version of the law: “The Muslims have punishments, but no statutes or

\[236\] On the techniques, ubiquity, and social status of the mīrāb, see L. Wawryzn Golab, “A Study of Irrigation in East Turkestan” in *Anthropos* 46 (1951), 187-199.

\[237\] Qi Yunshi, *Xi chui zhu zhi ci*, (1893), 317;

\[238\] Chou, “Frontier Studies,” 135.
substatutes,” wrote Zuo’s clerk Xiao Xiong. “Everyone listens to the akhund, who from time to time reads the scripture to make a judgment.”\textsuperscript{239} In short, where statecraft imagined a paternalistic local society guided by moral men, akhunds represented a debased moral man: one who read the wrong books, practiced the wrong law, and wrote the wrong script for the wrong reasons. As such, the early Xiang Army administration forbade akhunds from engaging in legal disputes. They found it impossible to police the akhunds, however, unless someone informed the yamen that one was involved in a dispute. (For an extended example from 1879, see Chapter Three.)

Nevertheless, around the time that Xinjiang officials realized the failure of the school project, Islamic clerics began to reappear as intermediaries between local officials and Muslim subjects. Indeed, mullahs and akhunds quickly became essential to the operations of the yamen. The Turpan yamen, for example, listed not only a Turki interpreter (tongshi 通事) on its staff, but also a separate “Muslim-language translating mullah” (fanyi Huiwen maola 翻譯回文毛拉).\textsuperscript{240} Later, “official mullahs” (guan maola 官毛拉) appeared and stayed on the payroll.\textsuperscript{241}

These clerics could become intimately involved in the production of Qing propaganda and the promotion of li. In 1893, the Qing government propagated across the empire the Shunzhi emperor’s 1656 Moral Exhortations to the People (Yuzhi quanshan

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\item \textsuperscript{239} Xiao Xiong, Xi jiang za shu shi, 333-334. “回人有刑法而無律例，皆聽阿訇隨時看經定斷。”
\item \textsuperscript{240} cf. GX 12.6 “書辦卯（點名）簿” in Q\textit{XD}X, vol. 2, 33-35.
\item \textsuperscript{241} cf. GX 32.10.16 “吐魯番通事艾沙等人就懇請酌定羊肉油酒等商品價格事稟吐魯番廳文” in Q\textit{XD}X, vol. 88, 33-34.
\end{itemize}
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yaoyan). The goal appears to have been a popular revival of imperial ideology through the widespread reading and recitation of the text. In Xinjiang, of course, the Chinese version would have little effect on the Turkic-speaking population, and so Governor Tao Mo commissioned a Turki translation.\textsuperscript{242} Kashgar Intendant Li took up the task. He recruited Fušan, the son of the Ili Solon Camp adjutant Mandangga, who knew Turki well and had worked as a translator, to come to Kashgar and lead the effort. He was joined by Turki who worked in the yamen, including one Muḥammad Qāżī and one Țālib Mīrāb, as well as the secretary of the missionary Johannes Avetaranian, Mīrzā ʿAbd ul-Karīm.\textsuperscript{243} The work they produced was a remarkable improvement on the Li kitābi: first, it was translated from the Manchu, which seems to have facilitated the smooth transition between the languages, the syntaxes of which are very similar. Secondly, where the Li Kitābi had translated vocabulary using an awkward one-to-one correspondence, this new work, “The Khan’s Urgent Words, which (He) Composed and that Encourage One to Good Deeds” (Ḫānnīj tašīf qīlgān yakṣī isḵār rawāj berādurğan žurūr sözlārī) instead drew on the form and vocabulary of popular Islamic pamphlets (risāla) that circulated in the area. Such pamphlets presented apocryphal revelations of God, usually the legend of the transmission of a craft from God via Gabriel to one of the prophets, and then down to

\textsuperscript{242} On the printing, see Rian Thum, “The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History,” (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2010), 242. For a biography of an official involved in the printing, see National Library of China, putong guji 002300596 沈同芳 1910, “新疆特用道英吉沙爾直隸同知黃君傳.” There were several printings of the text, with minor variations. For a good example, see Staatsbibliothek Berlin, Hartmann Collection, Zu 8390.

the current members of a craft guild.\textsuperscript{244} The “Khan’s Urgent Words” similarly took the Chinese moral cosmology of Heaven, the Way, and of numinous response to human deeds and translated it into the language of popular Islamic morality. Where the first line of the \textit{Moral Exhortations} reads, “I believe that the Rule of Heaven is very good”\textsuperscript{245}, the Turki version immediately states, “I think that God the Highest’s rule is extremely good.” (\textit{Män fikir qilamän ke, Ḥudâ-ye taʿālaniñ qâ idasi nihâyat-i yahşi dur.}) This was not a mere transposition of God, here referred to as he was in the Islamic pamphlets, into the position of Heaven. Rather, throughout the work, the clerics shaped the Manchu text into a presentation of the Qing emperor as a prophet, someone who had directly received revelation from God and was meant to pass it on to his people on Earth. In Islamic theology, of course, Muḥammad is the seal of the prophets and represents the end of revelation until the end of the world – and yet Muslim petty officials collaborated to assert otherwise as part of a project to establish imperial moral ideology in society. Conversely, some Qing officials at least understood Turki to be an appropriate linguistic medium for the transmission of this ideology.\textsuperscript{246} The work was distributed to begs and mullahs, who were ordered to go to the villages and read it out loud to the common people.

\textsuperscript{244} For a comprehensive study of these manuals, see J. E. Dağyeli, “\textit{Gott liebt das Handwerk}”: Moral, Identität und religiöse Legitimierung in der mittelasiatischen Handwerks-risāla (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2011).

\textsuperscript{245} 朕維天道至善. “Bi gûnic, abkai doro ulesi sain.”

\textsuperscript{246} It is unclear whether or not the text, of which several thousand copies were made, gained much acceptance among Muslims. Apart from the copies held in Berlin, I have only found one scrap of the work, used as part of a book binding for a work of sacred history. (Jarring Prov. 435)
Although it is unclear when the practice began, magistrates also began to appoint akhunds alongside village heads and mīrābs, following their election by the notables of the village. Records concerning akhunds’ appointments begin to appear in the Turpan archive early in 1904, but they suggest that the magistrate had already been involved in approving them for some time. The first such document indicates that an area of three villages already possessed two akhunds, a “chief akhund” and a “second akhund,” but local Turki found this insufficient and wanted a third.247 Magistrate Wen Lishan approved the appointment of one Ḥājjī Yūsuf, who had already been elected, presumably according to the same process used to select irrigation chiefs and village heads. Yet, their formal role remained that of moral leaders in the community. Akhund were considered responsible for oversight of schools (xuetang) and mosques, as well as periodically delivering moral exhortations to the people.248 Closer to the city, they were associated with a specific mosque249, while others handled these duties in broader rural areas. This conception of the akhund clearly saw him as a kind of local scholar or gentry, and one petition from the Hui of Nanguan agrees: they asked to invite an akhund to come to the mosque in Nanguan and oversee jiaohua – “civilization.”250

At the same time, akhunds were bureaucratized as, once again, the Xinjiang regime took a nominally organic social phenomenon and integrated it into the official


248 Document dated GX 33.4.25 in QXDX vol. 33, 315; GX 33.4.26 “吐魯番廳飭尕四爾充任洋海阿洪之諭文” in QXDX vol. 33, 316.


governing apparatus. In 1905, the province issued a set of guidelines for preachers, akhunds, and behavior at mosques that reveal much about officials’ underlying attitudes and ideas concerning Islam and the socio-moral order:\(^\text{251}\):

One: Islam originates from Muḥammad. The classics he wrote have been recited down to the present day. You preachers and akhunds shall instruct people according to Muḥammad’s classics. It is not permitted to distinguish New and Old Teachings.

Two: if a mosque [daotang] has been destroyed, it is not permitted later to rebuild it and propagate heterodoxy in order to confuse people’s minds.

Three: people spreading the teaching from elsewhere are only permitted to stay for a few days, after which they must be ordered to leave. It is not permitted for them to stay long, nor to live inside the prayer hall.

Four: Hui people must all pray inside the prayer hall. It is not permitted to recite scripture elsewhere, whether in the street or in people’s homes.

Five: One must pray according to schedule at the prayer hall. When doing ablutions at the white book[?], it is not permitted to gather many people during the dark of night.

\(^\text{251}\) GX 30.11.2 “吐魯番廳頒示清真寺管理辦法六項令各掌教阿訇嚴格遵行之諭文” in QXDX, vol. 4, 356.
Six: Hui people … are not permitted to conceal guns or weapons.

These rules were distributed to the akhunds of Hui mosques across Turpan and all of Xinjiang. First of all, the very idea that the akhund of a mosque would receive and transmit these orders indicates that Chinese officials understood akhunds to have both a pastoral role and a formal political relationship with the magistrate. They were thus akin to village headmen – and yet there were also village headmen in the same communities. Second, we see the Xinjiang government explain to Muslims what they believe Islamic orthodoxy to be. Clearly, these rules were directed at Chinese-speaking Muslims, whom the administration believed to be easily radicalized by itinerant preachers from Gansu and Shaanxi. This leads to the third point: the Xinjiang government attempted to regulate Hui religious practice in order to prevent the violence they believed would erupt if a critical mass of them gathered for prayer. This represents a significant departure from Zuo Zongtang’s measuring of mosques in Gansu: in substance, Hui policy was still meant to isolate Muslims into patterns of live that would make them docile, but now their own clerics were meant to work for the state.

At this stage, there was a diversity of opinion among officials regarding Muslim clerics, as evidenced by the local gazetteers. Nearly every gazetteer describes the basic function of the akhund in local society, at minimum his task of presiding over funerals. Many still disregarded them as petty charlatans misleading the common people with heterodox teachings: he divorced couples with a single word at the slightest sign of conflict.252 Turki clerics could not be considered “scholars” (shi) – only men who had

252 Suilai xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 72-86., 77.
learned how to read scripture. 253 “What akhunds stress,” wrote one, “is only reciting scripture and doing worship. It is totally at odds with the object of Confucian teaching.” 254 Since an akhund’s word or seal was necessary for any marriage or contract, “so there are hardly any akhunds today who know the scriptures well. Not only are there those akhunds only in name, but even those who deceive people for personal gain. Ignorant people suffer their trickery.” 255 In some cases, these officials showed their prejudice, but they may also have reflected a certain social truth that Turki also recognized. An “akhund” in local parlance effectively indicated a man who, simply by virtue of his literacy, bore a nebulous kind of epistemic authority that usually manifested when people paid him to perform a ritual. He thus possessed a power to represent and proclaim social relations in a way that not everyone found trustworthy.

Yet several officials came to the akhunds’ defense: an akhund could be “akin to the teachers of the Classics in China proper” (ru neidi jingshi zhi lei), a ritualist who prayed on behalf of his community and gave them moral guidance. 256 He could be conceived of as the guardian of lifecycle rituals for a community of people who were not that different from the Han, and even possessed something analogous to gentry in their prayer leaders. 257 One writer even included mullahs, defined as “those who can read

253 Shaya xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 324-331, 325, 329. This statement is repeated in Jiashi xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 347-352, 349.

254 Hetian zhilizhou xiangtuzhi, 385. “阿訇所講求者，吟經禮拜而已，與儒教宗旨，格乎不入。”

255 Luopu xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 414-436, 422. “然今之阿洪通曉經典者絕少，不獨有名無實，甚且罔利營私，愚民甘受其欺，其迷惑有如此者。”

256 Dihua xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 14-22, 12.

257 Changji xian xiangtu tuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 51-69, 57-58.
Turki" (shi Chanwen zhe), alongside scholars in his calculations of professional populations. This is not to say that these writers were entirely sympathetic to Turkic Muslims. Rather, they understood the malleability of culture, thought, and practice – the susceptibility of qi to li. The Turpan Local Gazetteer summed it up: “Still they say they are ‘not of our kind’; yet they can comprehend our magnificent civilization, work in our fields, pay our taxes – these are barbarians, but they have entered China. How can we be prejudiced against them on account of the difference of their teaching?”

This shift in attitude among local administrators appeared shortly before directives from the provincial government intended to implement the New Policies reforms and more firmly penetrate society. In 1909, Turki were commanded to register their marriages with the yamen directly, thus circumventing the involvement of both village chiefs and akhunds. From this point onward, the fortunes of the akhunds followed the trajectories of state-society relations described in Chapter Two: when the late-Qing penetration of society failed, the Yuan and Yang regimes retreated and essentially ceased to monitor local clerics, permitting them instead to establish their own relationships with local officials in an ad hoc manner. In 1927, the issue surfaced again when the Yang government attempted to curtail the akhunds’ authority by limiting their

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258 Pishan xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 375-183, 377.

259 Tulufan zhiliting xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 126-136, 133. “亦謂彼即非我族類，但能通我聲教，服我田疇，輸將我賦稅，是夷狄也而進於中國矣，安得以其教之不同而歧視哉?” Xinjiang Yili fu Suiding xian xiangtuzhi (in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 196-205, 202) has an almost identical passage. I have not located a common source for their statements.

260 Document dated XT 1.3.10, QXDX vol. 34, 119, 141.
involvement in legal proceedings.\textsuperscript{261} The Jin government subsequently returned to the policies of the Hunanese era and tasked akhunds with promoting national education under threat of having their “qualifications revoked.”\textsuperscript{262}

The relationship between the Xinjiang government and Muslim clerics reflected Chinese officials’ ongoing attempts to identify analogues to the village-level moral leaders of China proper in order to advance a civilizing project that they themselves struggled to define and implement. While numerous proclamations and orders to the akhunds insisted that Turki be brought to understand \textit{li} and “ordinary human relations,” the state neglected to define precisely what they wanted done and how. Instead, they licensed local officials to police morality, and those officials in turn drew on their state-granted moral authority to advocate and represent. Their interests met those of the state in the effort to police boundaries between Han and Turki.

III. Baojia, Taxation, and Security

The Xiang Army initially intended to establish the local infrastructure of the provincial system in place of Islamic institutions. Specifically, they used the reconstruction agencies, and later local authorities, to implement the \textit{baojia} system of mutual security. \textit{Baojia}, in which households were organized into decimal units, had its origins in China proper as a means for local communities to self-govern while reporting to the state. In the early nineteenth century, concurrently with the strengthening of local

\textsuperscript{261} MG 16.8.24 “通令各屬整頓司法由” in Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 甲 229-1 Xinjiang difang baogao shu.

\textsuperscript{262} Xinjiang sheng zhengfu gongbao, 1 (April 1929), 90.
militias, *baojia* units also became tax-collecting entities. It was one of the many institutions within the strategic information gap, the one most familiar to Qing officials, and the one that had the broadest range of applications. Attempts to implement it in Xinjiang had different effects in different places and times. Because *baojia* was primarily a local institution, metropolitan and provincial documents tell us next to nothing about how it worked on the ground. A selection of case studies will show that this new institution interacted in both harmonious and disharmonious ways with preexisting structures of authority.

* *baojia* was in place before the Uprisings in the counties of Gansu’s Dihua Circuit. However, in 1878, the *baojia* system was obviously moribund. The Turpan Sub-Prefect He Binghui (1847-1880?, Ningxiang) and Dihua Intendant Zhou Chongfu (1840-1893, Lingling) proposed abolishing it in defiance of a general order from Shaanxi. They were blocked by Lei Shengyuan, Zuo’s choice to head reconstruction in Turpan. Lei argued that *baojia* would be necessary to protect merchants and dispatched personnel to oversee its implementation. Local magistrates were ordered to collect population records and distribute nameplates for each household. However, there are no further records of this otherwise pervasive institution in Turpan, or for that matter in the Dihua Circuit. Instead, as I will discuss below, Han merchant associations appear to have taken on the role of ensuring security and sharing information with officials alongside the village headmen.

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263 GX 4.8.25 “鎮迪道轉陝西道御史奏議就嚴申禁令飭行保甲章程事札吐魯番廳文” in *QXDX*, vol. 50, 385-386; GX 4.10.28 “吐魯番廳就飭辦理新舊保甲事務札賀巡檢文” in *QXDX*, vol. 50, 415-416.
Baojia reappeared instead in later attempts to deepen state penetration into local society for the purposes of revenue and resource extraction. In the 1890s, the Kashgar Circuit established baojia as an apparatus for collecting taxes. In the area of Kashgar itself, baojia fused with a preexisting Turko-Mongol decimal system of political organization. The functionaries of local administration at each level were the aqsaqals, literally “white-beards,” who at the lowest level were represented in the Chinese-language record as “village headmen” xiangyue or baozheng. Aqsaqals in Kashgar performed a range of duties, including contract enforcement. Their rank was roughly the same as that of an onbashi, or head of ten households, who in Kashgar usually became a shihuzhang or paizhang, the baojia system’s equivalent position. Aqsaqals and onbashis were not elected, but usually inherited their positions or were appointed by the yūzbashi “hundred-head.” Yuzbasis, of course, tended to become baihuzhang or jiazhang to the Qing, and so collected taxes from one hundred households and mobilized their members for labor. A yūzbashi could appoint village-level aqsaqals and were in turn appointed by mingbashis “thousand-heads,” whom the magistrate appointed following their nomination by local authorities, however construed. Mingbashis held extensively plenipotentiary power, at least by the Republican period. They not only appointed area-level (quji) aqsaqals, but also adjudicated disputes independently. At the base of this whole system stood the imams of each mosque, the community (ET top) around which formed a unit of taxation below the village. While the Qing government appears never to have created registers of land in Southern Xinjiang, such records were apparently held at

the local Islamic court, and on this basis the imams were instructed to collect a graduated tax called *choqabashi* or *tuz puli* “salt money.” This tax, so named because it nominally went to the “salt and vegetables” (Ch. *yancai*), or “salary,” of Qing officials, had actually been a major cause of the Muslim Uprisings.\(^{265}\) This basic configuration of local administration persisted even through the 1930s.

*Baojia’s* implementation in the Aksu Circuit did not go as smoothly.\(^{266}\) In 1895, Wensu Prefect Wang requested to follow the *baojia* plan then in place in Kashgar in his own area. His goal was to organize mining labor to extract coal from the nearby mountains so as to make up for the shortfall in remission from China proper with increased tax revenue. The survey of the coalfaces was completed under the new Acting Aksu Intendant Huang Bingkun. High-quality coal, he wrote, could be found barely a foot beneath the surface. Each county in Aksu was ordered to proceed with *baojia*. In Aksu, two villages within 100 *li* of the coalface were selected for organization, Ha-ha-mishi and Östäng Boyi. The two villages would share responsibility in annual rotation for three months of coal mining organized by their *baojia* heads (*baozhang*). Four Turki merchants were to be paid to transport the coal to the circuit’s towns and garrisons, where officials and commanders would purchase it at market price.

In practice, while the merchants were incentivized with transportation fees, the miners themselves had no reason to work. They were not paid, and they were farmers unaccustomed to mining. The intendant’s solution was to dispatch two Han to each mine.

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\(^{266}\) “阿城興革禀稿，光緒十九、二十兩年.”
to oversee the work, while each village would select a specific group of thirty-five
miners. The baojia head would form the third leg in a triangle of mutual responsibility. In
the meantime, the Turki merchants would be permitted to sell charcoal from wood
supplied by the villagers in place of coal. This looked to the Han officials like a
reasonable way to ensure that all of the parties involved somehow received their due
payment, except of course for the villagers, who still had no incentive to cooperate.
Intendant Huang was baffled – these Turki had been mining copper for generations, so
why should they have such difficulty mining coal? Each village was sent a monthly
subsidy of twenty taels to make up for lost farm labor.

By the spring of 1897, it had been realized that the coalfaces in Wensu were under
steep cliffs and that, when it rained, mudslides endangered the miners. A dozen miners
had been killed working a coalface in Bai. Officials advanced a series of increasingly
elaborate measures to overcome the logistical difficulties of mining and transporting the
coal, all of which required an investment of several hundred taels to be spent by the Han
overseers, in turn managed by a bazong. (The overseers had come from Gansu and so
may have been trained by Greek and German engineers in Zuo’s program to open
coalmines there.) Further developments revealed that the corvée obligations at the mines
were impoverishing local Turki, as the monthly subsidy was woefully insufficient for a
village of over 120 households. One destitute man collapsed in tears in front of the
magistrate saying he had not tasted meat in a year. The subsidy was increased, and the
state put further restrictions on corvée: no one in poverty, or who did not own livestock,
or who owned livestock but could not sell it would be obliged to mine.
Officials intervened still further into local structures of authority. First, all households were to receive placards in Turki designating their *baojia* status. In order to implement this plan, however, Turki leaders would have to be reorganized completely, as officials found the current state of things chaotic and unmanageable. Wensu’s hierarchy differed from Kashgar’s: the prefecture had four village headmen, twenty-nine *baojia* heads, 221 village chiefs (*cunzhang*), and thirteen *mīrābs*. All were to be replaced so as to avoid their direct collusion with the Turki runners and clerks at the *yamen*. This plan could not be implemented, of course, and was scrapped. In Turpan, at least, the magistrate almost never challenged appointments of such Turki officials once they had been nominated. Instead, the Aksu Circuit merely succeeded in handing a bundle of responsibilities to sub-magisterial authorities, including merchants and *baojia* heads, who then demanded payment for services that produced no known products or revenue.

At the same time, local merchants were refusing to circulate silver money, both because locals lacked confidence in the Qing administration’s coins stamped in Chinese and because it was difficult to trade for local products in large denominations. The copper coins stamped during the Yaʿqūb Beg period still circulated in their stead. Finally, the Aksu Circuit bowed to pressure from local merchants and hired Turki artisans from Kashgar to stamp its own copper coins with Turki inscriptions. Ultimately, villagers still suffered under corvée, while the government made no money from the effort, instead funneling cash to merchants in their preferred form. Given that this comedy of errors could have been stopped at any time, we must ask what motivated this plan: first, there was a real need for revenue. Second, *baojia* was part of a broader vision of how society ought to be organized, and so it fit into the civilizing project. Third, it is entirely likely
that the merchants who ultimately benefitted from this arrangement manipulated the 
yamen into providing more funds for logistics than necessary and essentially handing
them a monopoly on coalmines operated through corvée.

**IV. Merchant Associations and Representation**

Magistrates also came to rely on merchant groups for investigations in disputes
and cases, as they often did in China proper. While this seemed commonsensical, given
such groups’ role as a link between Chinese state and society, it gave merchants
exceptional control over processes of representation. For example, an account of the
apparent murder of a Chinese merchant in Di-hu, near Turpan, demonstrates the
elimination of ethnic diversity and of local ethnic politics from a crime report precisely
when the details of that report could have pointed to genuine sources of tension at the
local level.

An early report from the murder case describes the geography of Di-hu and the
neighborhood in which the crime took place. Di-hu was home to a group of Han Chinese
merchants from the town of Shangzhou, Shaanxi who had settled among the Turki and
Hui. Zha-yi-ti, a thirty-three year old local man, owned a set of houses, one of which he
rented out to Wang Dunzheng, who was one of the merchants. Next door lived Zha-yi-ti’s
father-in-law Imām and brother-in-law Tömür. On the other side was a Hubeinese, Mr.
Zhang. Zha-yi-ti often worked with a Hui man named Chang Zhi. A dozen other
Shangzhou men lived nearby, as did many more Turki.\(^\text{267}\) The picture is of a small

\(^{267}\) GX 16.9.3 “吐魯番廳為傳提底湖纏民札以提為夜晚起火燒死商人王敦正懇請查驗案到府人證訊問
事之傳票” in *QXDX*, vol. 58, 354; GX 16.9.4 “吐魯番廳勘查札以提為夜晚起火燒死商人王敦正案之驗
單” in *QXDX*, vol. 58, 355.
neighborhood in which Han, Turki, and Hui lived side-by-side, if not harmoniously then at least peacefully.

On 14 October 1890, Wang Dunzheng’s house burnt down with him inside. Zha-yi-ti was the first to report the incident to the village headman, a Turki named Ruo-mi-ya-si. He told a story that would warm a modern propagandist’s heart: that night, he and Chang Zhi had just returned home from delivering flower seeds to the city. Exhausted, Zha-yi-ti fell into bed, only to wake up and find Imām pounding at the door. Wang Dunzheng’s house was on fire. Zha-yi-ti and a Chinese merchant, Su “Laohan” Yuji, drew water from an underground irrigation channel to put the fire out, but they were too late to save Wang’s life.

The magistrate’s staff quickly simplified the reports, even as they produced a detailed account of Wang’s probable manner of death. Within a few days, clerks had reduced the geography of Zha-yi-ti’s compound, transforming it from a cluster of free-standing and connected houses inhabited by various people into a single courtyard, home to Zha-yi-ti and Wang only. Chang Zhi disappeared from the story.

Meanwhile, the investigation turned up nothing, while the yamen staff trimmed leads off of the narrative. The magistrate entrusted Wang Dunzheng’s nephew Wang Xiuzhi and Su Yuji, suddenly no longer a central witness, with carrying out the investigation. That the family and co-natives of the deceased received this mission, and


not the Turki village head or the *yamen’s* own police runners, speaks to the entrenchment of merchant communities and their special relationship with the state. Eventually, Wang and Su located a bloody hoe, apparently belonging to Zha-yi-ti, in Tömür’s house, and he was blamed for the death. Yet, no motive was ever established. Indeed, the initial description of Wang’s room and of his injured and charred body provides a simpler explanation: Wang died, or was knock unconscious, when a brick fell from his ceiling and struck him in the forehead. The fire burning in his hearth then set alight a bundle of cloth, the remains of which were found in the wreckage of his house.

The Han merchants who investigated the case had the motive and opportunity to frame a local Turki and seize his land. Zha-yi-ti, the magistrate, and the merchants were all aware of the local politics of ethnicity. The magistrate engaged in those politics to accomplish the investigation, yet his staff wrote the merchants out of later reports. The end product was a simple narrative about how a Turki man killed a Chinese man; the report provides little other detail, but otherwise conforms to the generic expectations that high-level officials had for crime narratives. Given the attitudes Han merchants expressed concerning Turki elsewhere in the documentary record, they probably had a vested interest in depicting Turki as morally and legally suspect. A successful conviction would also remove Zha-yi-ti and open up his property to sale or, in this case, occupation by the majority of tenants. The Shangzhou merchants could have immediately seized the compound for themselves.

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270 GX 16.11.20 “吐魯番廳訊認出已死王敦正器具案之訊單” in *QXDX*, vol. 58, 434; GX 16.11.20 “陝西商民王秀智等人為找出致已身死鐵坎土曼凶器事筆吐魯番廳文” in *QXDX*, vol. 58, 435.
Representation, in the context of the Qing judicial system, was powerful and potentially deadly. Moreover, those who controlled the process of representation made sure to eliminate evidence of their involvement. A murder case such as this one would have been vetted, according to statutory procedure in capital cases, at several levels. If a higher official found it to have been handled improperly, then there would be dire consequences for those involved, officials and commoners alike. It was thus in the magistrate’s interest to present the findings of biased intermediaries, such as the Shangzhou merchants, as legitimate and authoritative accounts of causality and culpability. We must read such documents as these very carefully if we are to excavate the motivations and actions of the people who did the work of government in local society.

V. Layers of Interpretation and Representation: a Case Study from the Turpan Yamen

By the 1890s, Turki texts increasingly mentioned the interpreters, and rarely in a positive light.\textsuperscript{271} Mullā Mūsā Sayrāmī (1836-1917) reflected this general dissatisfaction with interpreters when he wrote them into sacred history as a means of explaining the ongoing strife between the peoples of the Earth.\textsuperscript{272} Sayrāmī opens the \textit{Tārīkh-i Ḥamīdī}, his history of Xinjiang in the nineteenth century, with a narrative of the common descent of the Turks, Chinese, Russians, and others from the sons of Japheth, son of Noah (Yāfīth b. Nūḥ). While the story has a long genealogy in Islamicate culture, Sayrāmī adds his


\textsuperscript{272} TH/Jarring, 4r.
own twist: the brothers’ separation is explained through the differentiation of languages, which necessitated the emergence of *tungchi* in the ancient past. (See Chapter Seven.) In the mid-1920s, Ghulām Muḥammad Khan (n.d.) drew on Sayrāmī and described the interpreters as part of an evil plan to destroy Muslim society.²⁷³ Ghulām explains the fall of the Qing through the ascent of a false emperor to the throne in Beijing. The father of this young boy manipulated him into attacking Islam by establishing Confucian schools in Xinjiang. As a result, the Turki fell into the divided state of the sons of Noah: fathers and sons could only speak through a *tungchi*, and the children were meant to be made into Chinese. In Ghulām’s account, God refused to tolerate this offense against Muslims in Xinjiang and so cast the whole empire in contestation, bringing about the Xinhai Revolution.

Sayrāmī wrote the interpreters into sacred history, and Ghulām wrote them into the collapse of the Qing, because they had a twofold power that made them important and dangerous. First, interpreters made it possible to communicate across horizontal barriers between languages and cultures, but also across vertical barriers when people needed access to power. Second, they were capable of keeping people apart by refusing to interpret. Because languages do not map clearly onto each other, any act of interpretation possessed somewhere between total and zero faithfulness. That degree depended on the competence and intent of the interpreter, which naturally opened up significant space for distrust. Interpreters controlled the representational play that opened up in the strategic information gap.

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Because the magistrates brought the sensibilities and practices of government in China proper to their yamen in Xinjiang, investigations and prosecutions proceeded in a familiar way. However, because Xinjiang presented hyperbolic problems of translation and cultural interpretation relative to those found in China proper, the effects of procedure could be somewhat different. One murder committed between Turki in Bai in February 1886 was not memorialized for an imperial order until September 1890, nearly five years later. It was not an especially complicated case to resolve. However, the Bai county magistrate attempted to interrogate all of the concerned parties without the benefit of speaking Turki. This fact was not discovered until his superior, the Aksu Circuit Intendant, found the depositions to be inconsistent and ordered a second interrogation, which the magistrate again attempted to carry out without Turki, presumably through an interpreter or in Chinese. The intendant then called the magistrate to Aksu, and then performed the interrogations personally, this time with an interpreter.

The Bai magistrate had no employees who could properly conduct the interrogation because this incident occurred during the period of transition described above, when begs had been dismissed from office and the yamens had not yet reemployed them as sub-magisterial functionaries. One might further speculate that locals refused to cooperate with the magistrate in this matter. While most memorials note who it was that reported the crime to the magistrate, this memorial does not mention an informant, so it is possible that the yamen was not meant to know. Alternatively, the magistrate may simply have insisting on speaking to his witnesses in Chinese.

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274 GZD, vol. 4, 502-504.
Regardless, the problems in this case point to a systemic problem in local administration in provincial Xinjiang.

Once interpreters were involved, however, a different set of problems arose. A murder case from 1890 demonstrates that translation from Turki into Chinese was also a translation of complexity to simplicity in deference to narrative preferences that ultimately served both the magistrate and the Qing Code. Although this case involves a number of non-Chinese, phenomena familiar from the judicial system in China proper are readily apparent: first of all, the investigation, reporting, and handling of the murder all serve the needs of different communities and interests within the system. Second, the initial narratives elicited in interrogation are radically reshaped using familiar tropes of gender, making violence intelligible in terms of familiar categories of motive and action and reassigning blame to the deceased victim. Most significantly, perhaps, the depositions are translated from the “local dialect” – elsewhere a Sinic language, but here a radically different Turkic one – into Mandarin.

In the early 1840s, in the old Muslim city of Turpan, a girl named Ze-li Shāh was born.275 Eventually, she was married, and she had her first child, a boy named Sājid (Sa-ji-ti), around 1862. In 1869 followed a girl, Khazīmah (Hu-ze-ma), and in 1880 another boy, Sawut (Ch. Sa-wu-ti). Sometime in the 1880s, Ze-li Shāh’s husband died, leaving her and her oldest son to support the family. By the dawn of 1888, they were renting a house in the northeastern corner of the New City, previously constructed under Ya’qūb Beg, but now home to the Qing bureaucracy. Ze-li Shāh rented a house in a courtyard owned by a middle-aged Hui man named Ke Zhong, who lived in a neighboring

275 QXDX, vol. 58, 104.
courtyard. Ze-li Shāh and her family shared the courtyard with a Turki couple named Ya’qūb and ‘Ā’īshah who lived in the house just opposite theirs. Sājid had married and moved into his own home outside the city’s west gate, where he could easily get employment as an agricultural day laborer.

In the winter of 1888-1889, then, it was finally time for her daughter Khazīmah, now twenty years old, to marry. A fifteen-year-old young man named Wāṣil (Ch. Ga-sier) had moved into the New City from the village of Yarqhol (Ch. Ya-er-hu), to the west of Turpan near the ruins of the ancient city of Jiaohe. His mother was dead, his father remarried, and Wāṣil was on his own in Turpan, living as a hired laborer in the house of a Hui named He Laosi. Wāṣil saved up some money and arranged for a go-between to approach Ze-li Shāh for her daughter Khazīmah’s hand in marriage. In June 1889, Wāṣil and Khazīmah moved into a rented house adjacent to He’s and not far from her mother’s home.

The next year went badly for the young couple. Neither of their families was wealthy, but, according to oral testimony later provided to the authorities, Khazīmah greatly resented Wāṣil’s poverty. She made frequent visits to her mother’s house, where she would stay for days, angering her young husband. On March 27, 1890, Khazīmah came back to Wāṣil after one of these extended visits, but stayed with him only for one night. For the next two days, Wāṣil went nightly to Ze-li Shāh’s home to enjoin Khazīmah to move back in with him, but she refused both times. On 29 March, according

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276 It is precisely this kind of transliteration of Turki into Chinese that suggests the origins of late-Qing translation practice in Xinjiang in Qumul specifically. In the Qumul dialect, the usual Turki segment <w> is sounded as [g]. In transliterating Turki names across the province in this period, Turki [wa] is written as Chinese [ga] 美, as in the example at hand.
to witnesses, Khazīmah told Wāsil, “Since we got married, you haven’t gotten me any clothes. So, if you want me to go back with you, you’ll get me a few items of clothing!” Wāsil left wordlessly, dejected, and went home to stew.

Around midnight on March 30, Wāsil picked up a knife for cutting noodles and tied it into his belt. He walked over to Ze-li Shāh’s house again and shouted for Khazīmah. His mother-in-law opened up the gate, and he walked in, shouting that he wanted Khazīmah to go home with him. Khazīmah offered to leave first thing in the morning, and Ze-li Shāh tried to assuage him, saying it was late and getting later – she would send Khazīmah to him at dawn. Wāsil got angry, grabbed Khazīmah, and pulled her out the door, where she sat down on the ground just past the threshold and refused to move another inch, cursing Wāsil. Wāsil, seeing red, took out his knife and, as he later put it, “cut on her windpipe a little.” Khazīmah tried to protect herself and block his assault with the back of her right hand, where the knife left a shallow diagonal cut. Ze-li Shāh ran to protect her. From Wāsil’s perspective, it looked as though Ze-li Shāh was bowing, begging for him to stop. He stabbed her once on the top of the head. Ze-li Shāh’s ten-year-old son Sawut, who had been sound asleep, startled awake and ran to see what the commotion was about. By the time he reached the gate, however, Wāsil had escaped. Sawut ran screaming to the neighbors, who arrived just as Khazīmah struggled to say her last words.

Ze-li Shāh was senseless from grief and hoarse from crying, and at first Yaʿqūb and ʿĀʾiṣah could get no information from her or from Sawut. They moved Khazīmah’s body inside, wrapped it in a quilt, and placed it on the bed. They tended to Ze-li Shāh’s wounds until dawn, when they took Sawut to tell the landlord what had happened. Next,
they accompanied Sawut to see Sājid, who upon hearing the news of his sister’s murder immediately ran to be with his mother. Meanwhile, the landlord rushed alone to the yamen to file a report to the effect that, for reasons unknown, Wāsil had killed Khazīmah and wounded Ze-li Shāh. Prefect Fu Shoulin issued a summons and sent his police runners to apprehend Wāsil, whom they found easily at his rented house, and brought him in for questioning.277

Even though he was probably tortured, Wāsil did not recall where he disposed of the knife, how he got home, or even much about the murder.278 An official investigation, however, yielded the physical details of the crime. Qing criminal procedure required that the prefect himself act as detective in such a case, but Fu first dispatched runners to Ze-li Shāh’s house, where they made an account of all of the mortal and nonfatal wounds on her and Khazīmah’s bodies, noted bloodstains on the floor, and inventoried Khazīmah’s clothing. Fu made a visual inspection and confirmed their report.279

Procedure demanded that Khazīmah’s relatives, the landlord, and the neighbors be detained for questioning. Their depositions, given in Turkic and translated into Chinese, offer a glimpse both of personal narratives in the wake of a tragedy and also of the editorial process that turned a deposition into an account of adjudicated truth.280 The documents preserve the marginalia added by translators and clerks to the official Chinese-language versions before they were submitted to higher authorities, as well as

277 QXDX, vol. 58, 90.

278 QXDX, vol. 58, 104.


280 The depositions are clearly labeled as having been translated, presumably from Turki. Although I have located examples of original Turkic-language depositions, none are available from this case.
lines of ink scrawled over redacted text. Little Sawut’s testimony, the most heavily edited, speaks to the imagination a ten-year-old boy brought to the event, unsure of whether he ought to have seen the crime in progress or have played a more active role:

“I was fast asleep, and I don't know what happened. He took my elder sister and cut her to death. He also jabbed me and stabbed me, and he made a lot of noise, and my mother went to save her. I was startled awake, and I got up. My sister’s husband Wāṣil was holding the knife and doing the deed had already run off.”

The odd ordering and redaction of events suggests that an interpreter, perhaps along with a clerk, worked to translate Sawut’s oral testimony directly into Chinese.

Ze-li Shāh, as the key witness, had her testimony most heavily redacted so as to make her seem more reliable: “My daughter, because she was gravely wounded, passed away immediately. I got dizzy and fell to the ground, so I don't know how Wāṣil escaped,” her new testimony reads. Ya‘qūb and ‘Ā’ishah, who gave joint testimony, received extensive marginalia that completed their fragmentary account with quotations from other, early depositions. The way these oral depositions appear in Chinese suggests that the translations were produced simultaneously with the Turki originals, but also that they were edited afterward for consistency. Interestingly, Wāṣil’s deposition was edited the least, mostly to abridge his repetitive statements into terse formal language that more closely approximated Qing legalese; the other depositions were later altered again to correspond to his account.

As of late March, Wāṣil’s name appears on the registers of the Turpan Prefecture prison. According to one oral account dating from July 1891, the midpoint of Wāṣil’s depositions.
confinement, Turki knew the *yamen* prison in Turpan as the *gundakhāna* “fetters-house,” and understood it as a place where torture was meted out to detainees by means of implements that were standard issue in *yamens* across the empire but seemed strange in East Turkestan and for the most part could only be identified by their Chinese names.\(^{282}\)

Just like a *yamen* prison in China proper, the facilities in Xinjiang consisted of a pair of fortified huts, one to hold regular detainees and suspects in non-violent crimes and another for violent criminals. While the former was a cold, painful place to be, and release from it required a hefty bribe, the latter was a windowless, stinking chamber where prisoners sat around naked and tied to heavy logs with a hole in the mud for a latrine. Wāsil spent most of the next year in this second chamber, whence he was occasionally transported under guard to the office of the headman of Turpan New City to give further testimony.

The first time Wāsil returned to the New City, it was already June 1890, and Prefect Fu was rushing to meet the three-month time limit for investigating a case and reporting it to the governor and judicial commissioner.\(^{283}\) His report was intended to provide a summary of the case, the depositions extracted, and a proposed punishment according to the Qing Code. Yet, some departures from the first depositions immediately stand out: Khazīmah’s age is now given as fifteen, instead of twenty-one, making her slightly younger than Wāsil. Sawut, Ya’qūb, and ʿĀʿisha have been written out of the narrative entirely. Instead, the landlord Ke Zhong has taken on their role as the


\(^{283}\) *QXDX*, vol. 58, 264-266.
responsible adult: he heard yelling, ran over to find Khazīmah dead and Ze-li Shāh injured, and went the next day to inform Sājid and the headman in person. Prefect Fu effectively wrote out the most problematic witnesses, leaving only the murderer Wāsīl, Ze-li Shāh as the single eyewitness, and Ke Zhong as an acceptable intermediary with the Chinese officials. Ke Zhong’s involvement further establishes a social distance in the memorial between officials and their Turki subjects; it opens up an epistemic distance that justifies the prefect’s imperfect grasp of the details of the case, such as the whereabouts of the murder weapon, and allows him more freely to represent the narrative of the crime.

Further alterations to the depositions point to Fu’s strategic deployment of tropes common in Qing legal culture to establish more definitely the guilt or innocence of particular actors. The prefect manipulates the text to shift the blame onto the deceased Khazīmah, who can no longer speak for herself, and to minimize Wāsīl’s violent actions as the result of a “momentary” flash of anger. In Ze-li Shāh and Wāsīl’s depositions, the description of Khazīmah’s yelling at Wāsīl when she sits down outside the gate has changed: The simple ma “scolded” has been replaced with hanpo hunma “scolded shrewishly,” a phrase with distinctly misogynistic connotations. It seems unlikely that Khazīmah’s grieving mother would describe her as a “shrew,” and even Wāsīl had not used such language in his original deposition. Rather, this phrase was commonly deployed in legal arguments to shift the blame for a woman’s murder onto her own actions. The memorial also presents the cut on the back of Khazīmah’s hand as a mere “scratch.” Fu also added a new element of marital conflict to both Wāsīl and Ze-li Shāh’s

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284 Theiss, “Explaining the Shrew,” 44.
depositions: Khazīmah wanted to divorce Wāsil and marry another. Ze-li Shāh had enjoined her to be reasonable and spend more time with her husband, but Khazīmah repeated her wish to break up her family just before Wāsil killed her. From this point on, Khazīmah’s shrewishness and violations of family morality were represented in the official documentation as the motivations for the crime.

This institutionalized misogyny served to make violence intelligible to higher officials when they surveyed their crime reports for signs of broader trends in society. The ultimate purpose of all of these alterations was, first, to avoid oversight from above and, second, to minimize the impact of imperial justice in the subject community by strengthening the argument for leniency in punishing a criminal. Prefect Fu wanted to retain his position by minimizing the appearance of violence on the ground – though early the next year, he finally lost his commission following an armed uprising.\textsuperscript{285} At the same time, avoiding harsh punishments by minimizing the guilt of the convicted was a way to minimize state violence and, consequently, potentially violent reactions against imperial power on the part of the Turkic Muslims, who after all had only been “pacified” some fifteen years before.\textsuperscript{286}

On receiving Prefect Fu’s report, the judicial commissioner scolded him for losing the murder weapon, so Fu had Wāsil taken from prison into the interrogation chamber

\textsuperscript{285} GZD, vol. 7, 35-36.

\textsuperscript{286} A reader has suggested that these alterations might be due to certain biases among the plaintiffs and witnesses themselves. That seems very unlikely: first, it was not to the community’s benefit to release a known murderer back into it. Second, not a single person involved in the case had an apparent reason to support Wāsil, or even like him. Third, the entire editing process took place in the context of the \textit{yamen}, in Chinese, in the hands of Qing officials.
one last time. There, Fu wrote, Wāsil confessed to having forgotten the noodle-cutting knife at home in the first place. The sole eyewitness Ze-li Shāh, Fu reported, likewise clarified that Wāsil had arrived at her gate “empty-handed.” Fu suggested that Wāsil had only picked up the knife as an afterthought. Again, Fu was providing new evidence that emphasized Wāsil’s innocence and the spontaneity of his crime. In terms of the Code, Fu was presenting the crime not as “premeditated murder” (mousha 謀殺), but as the lesser offense of “murder with intent” (gusha 故殺).

The version of events sent to the emperor on December 13, 1890 presented just such a consistent, simple narrative, and one that was much transformed by the values that guided the judicial process: according to the official account, Khazīmah was the shrew, and Wāsil had killed her in a flash of rage. Wāsil, stated the memorial, was a farmer, rather than a laborer in He Laosi’s home, eliminating a Hui to simplify the narrative. Khazīmah had indeed gone home often and refused to stay in her husband’s house. On the night of 30 March, when Wāsil came to take her home, she had refused, and he had dragged her to the gate, where she sat on the ground and told him she wanted to marry someone else, another moral violation. In a flash of rage, he had killed her and wounded his mother-in-law, now depicted as a mere bystander. The governor, in his message, commented that Khazīmah’s extended visits home were indeed “inappropriate.” Ze-li Shāh’s stabbing was ruled a minor crime compared to Khazīmah’s murder. Wāsil was to

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287 QXDX, vol. 58, 271.


289 GZD, vol. 5, 733-734.
be punished as a man who beat his wife to death, sentenced to strangulation with the possibility of a pardon during the yearly autumn excises. It is unknown whether or not he was then pardoned in light of the magistrate’s argument for his relative innocence.

This sequence of events is formally similar at every step to the judicial procedure in China proper: Qing authorities in Turpan used the same forms for summonses and for depositions, the same formal language, and the same coroner’s reports as they did elsewhere. The Turki were now min, subjects of the Qing, and they were under the same criminal and procedural laws as any other min. Although the yamen functionaries who performed the investigation included Han Chinese, the documents they produced display neither overt bias against the Turki nor assumption of motives on the basis of ethnic difference. On the Turki side, the depositions, presented as original oral testimony but heavily edited in translation to conform to expectations, show at this stage no discussion of ethnicity, certainly not according to the categories that Qing administrators used to talk about Chinese, Turki, and Hui.

VI. Conclusion

The officials of Xinjiang’s new provincial administration arrived in a strange land, and they cast about for purchase, trying to find anyone who could serve as a legitimate, or at least effective, intermediary with local society. The interpreters began as moral men, but became functionaries; the akhunds as immoral men, who later served as communicators of imperial edicts concerning morality. Merchants, whom good Confucians traditionally despised, became vital to the state – or so officials thought. The Muslim merchants of Aksu derived wealth from a failed mining project, while Chinese
merchants in Turpan used their control over information to their own advantage, as well. While Chinese officials came to embrace these intermediaries, it was apparent to Muslim subjects that the interpreters’ power to represent was treacherous. Ironically, where the Han had initially perceived corruption in the akhunds and the potential for morality in the interpreters, by 1900, those perceptions were reversed: the akhunds became village-level leaders, and the interpreters a necessary nuisance.

Regardless of how their contemporaries judged them, these intermediaries were the face of government for the common people, and they mediated the voices of commoners for officials to hear. For this reason, a history of state and society in late-Qing and Republican Xinjiang will be greatly enriched by focusing on their actions and their linguistic and symbolic work. The political center only perceived what took place beyond its official walls through reports sent from local officials, who in turn relied on intermediaries. Whatever sources we have from that center ought to be read with regard to this process of interpretation and editing that produced them. Nor, obviously, do local documentary sources provide unmediated access to the truth of life in the villages. These must be read as products of translation and texts written for multiple audiences whose expectations were not always clear.

Local documents through their ambiguity speak to the complexity and contentiousness of the state-society relationship. By orienting our reading of the sources to the process that produced them, we disrupt the straightforward narrative of cultural and political oppression that has typified history writing on Xinjiang. Instead, we are presented with a more complex vision of local agency. It is precisely this contentious space that the rest of this dissertation will address, because it was the matrix in which
people represented themselves and others to power, and *vice versa*. The disputes that inform Chapters Three, Four, and Five all took place in the information gap between a largely Chinese administration and a majority-Muslim society. This space allowed the symbolic exchange between Chinese and Islamic linguistic and cultural realms that engendered the new cultural phenomena discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.
Chapter Three: Life Under Li

The explicit goal of the Xiang Army when it entered Xinjiang in 1877 was to remake Muslim families according to what they understood as Chinese norms. Imposing normative marriage relations in particular was meant to stimulate a ground-up transformation of Xinjiang’s society from one beset by immorality and sexual laxity, as they saw it, into one where orderly families would form the foundations for provincial government. This plan was very ambitious and idealistic. Moreover, the mechanisms that the provisional and provincial administrations used to impose sino-normative family relations intersected with two events that deeply affected the relationship between sexuality, power, and identity: first, the dissolution of families during the Muslim Uprisings and Reconquest created a large population of displaced people. We will see in the next chapter that people of relatively greater means and mobility struggled to reconstruct their lives following these events. Here, we are concerned with those people who had nowhere to flee, but instead became internally displaced. These people were severed from families and other support networks and instead looked for ways to survive. Second, the arrival of the Xiang Army threw the regional economy into further disarray. Xiang Army soldiers and merchants from both Hindustan and China proper were, in relative terms, wealthier than most locals, and they leveraged this difference to acquire human beings, especially women. As a result, domestic relationships that ranged from marriage to slavery became central to both practices and perceptions of power relations between communities. Tensions surrounding sexuality and power shaped the

290 Slavery in Xinjiang is known almost exclusively through the efforts of the British representative in Kashgar to abolish the trade in Hindustani slaves in 1895. See L. J. Newby, “Bondage on Qing China’s Northwestern Frontier” in Modern Asian Studies (April 2013), 1-27; Xu Jianying, “Qingmo Xinjiang Ying
emergence of ethnic identities. While literati sought to enforce normative marriage
customs among commoners everywhere in China, their civilizing project had the effect in
this peripheral area of putting sino-normative claims about refinement at the center of
tensions between culturally distant groups of people, contributing to ethnic
differentiation.²⁹¹

This was not an inevitable consequence of the civilizing project, but rather one
shaped by the specific social and economic circumstances of the late nineteenth century.
Marriages were destroyed by the Muslim Uprisings, which both separated families and
saw newly powerful Turki take displaced people into their households in various ways.
Marriages arranged by the Reconstruction Agencies similarly brought Muslims and non-
Muslims into the same households with the intention of civilizing both through the
supposed power of the husband-wife relationship to shape either member of it. Soldiers
and merchants, beginning with the earliest inroads made back into Xinjiang in 1875,
easily arranged “marriages” both with local women and with camp followers. While
these were usually depicted in documents in terms of normative marriage, women trying
to leave them described these servile and sexual arrangements in terms of concubinage.

As local women and families sought to sustain themselves in hard times through
marriage to these men, a general understanding emerged that Turki women were
generally sexually available. This perception was aided by a longstanding Eastern

²⁹¹ Harrell asserts that “[C]ivilizers of all sorts have seen peripheral peoples as both erotic and promiscuous
in their behavior, as being at a lower level of culture where they have not yet learned the proper civilized
morals of sexual repression and/or hypocrisy.” (“Introduction,” 10)
Turkestani practice of “temporary marriage” (*waqitliq toy*) that generally served to provide sojourning Muslims with a wife on a fixed-term contract. However, temporary marriage came to serve as a vehicle for non-Turki merchants to enter into short-term sexual relationships with Turki women. Temporary marriage generally comprises an ambiguous category of practice between normative understandings of “marriage” and “prostitution.” In this case, the sense that non-Muslims could effectively buy Turki women, incidentally offending the masculinities of Turki men, ethnicized the discourse around the practice and made it a flashpoint of conflict between communities.

This chapter deals extensively with relationships between men and women that were almost universally violent and exploitative. Because of the way people represented these relationships in the sources through moralistic euphemisms, the nature and extent of that violence is almost always implicit. For lack of an adequately descriptive typology, and because the terminology that people deployed to describe these relationships was itself interesting, I have chosen to preserve and translate very literally the language of the documents themselves. For example, I always translate Chinese *qi* 妻 as “wife.” While this term implies a normative, legal, and morally orthodox arrangement, I am fully cognizant of the fact that it euphemized a range of relationships, including those that a modern observer would construe as sexual slavery or prostitution. Similarly, Chinese *qie* 妾 is generally translated as “concubine,” and I have done the same.

Concubinage in traditional China was a legal, orthodox practice, although one that many

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292 My conception and treatment of marriage throughout this chapter is informed by Matthew Sommer’s work on sexuality and marriage in imperial China. (Matthew Sommer, *Sex, Law and Society in Late Imperial China* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000]; *Polyandry and Wife-Selling in Qing Dynasty China: Survival Strategies and Judicial Interventions* [Oakland: University of California Press, 2015].)
found morally ambiguous. In Xinjiang, people clearly used the word *qie* to point out the morally suspect qualities of certain relationships, which again ran the gamut from companionate marriages between consenting adults to a man’s ownership of a trafficked woman. In translation, normative Muslim marriages were represented using similar language: the primary wife was a *qi* “wife,” while all subsequent ones were referred to as *qie* “concubines.” Of course, when addressing the *yamen*, it would be unwise to point out that a Muslim man could legally marry several wives of nominally equal status through normative marriage, *nikāh*, implied in the verb *öylänmäk* “to marry.” Such multiple marriages were uncommon, however, and the Qing authorities found much more consternation from the high instance of serial marriage – also called *nikāh*, implying a lifelong contract between the partners. Turkic Muslims also practiced temporary marriage, which as elsewhere in the Islamic world opened up an ambiguous space between normative marriage and prostitution. While the Arabic term *mutʿa* was barely known in Xinjiang, temporary marriage could similarly stand for a broad range of sexual, companionate, economic, and powerful relationships. Of course, both Turki and Chinese-speakers had ways to refer explicitly to “prostitution,” but in the documents consulted for this study, this language was universally deployed in order to place blame on a woman for illicit sexual activity and seek her punishment.

As such, the very language of the sources describes a broad and ambiguous range of phenomena and attitudes. Methodologically, my approach is to read every document both for its politics of representation and for the situation it describes as far as I am able
to reconstruct it. My intention is not only to demonstrate that anxieties about sexual relationships were in a dialectical relationship with other social and economic tensions, but that elite-led efforts to transform Xinjiang’s people – from the Muslim Uprisings to Reconstruction to the nationalist revolution – as well as the everyday construction of firmer community boundaries came at the expense of women’s security and livelihoods.

I. Li and the Hunanese Civilizing Mission

We return first to the ideological formation of colonialism, but we begin this time with the categories of that ideology as they were interpreted in Turki discourse. By the late 1870s, it was rapidly becoming apparent to the Turki that the Chinese intended to rule Xinjiang using something called \( li \). \( Li \) was plainly a loanword from Chinese, but its definition was mysterious. As I will show below, Turkic Muslims interpreted \( li \) to mean something akin to a Chinese shariah, a member of a set of legal systems along with the Islamic and Russian. Yet, they referred to a term that we usually translate into English as “rites” or “ritual” – \( lǐ \). This ambiguity is key to understanding the Hunanese colonial project, for \( lǐ \) did not merely indicate “ritual” in the broad sociological sense.

Rather, \( lǐ \) indicates an intellectual, social, and political phenomenon with deep roots in Chinese tradition, a philosophically-informed system for the regulation of behavior. Angela Zito defines \( lǐ \) as “ways of being human that are considered necessary to the workings of the cosmos as well as its embedded social order, including everything

\[ \text{On methodology, see the Introduction, as well as Thomas Welsford, “The Rabbit, the Duck, and the Study of Central Asian Legal Documents” in Der Islam 88, 258-278.} \]

\[ \text{See, for example, the list of “shariah books” given in Jarring Prov. 207 I.48 “Gunahkär üçün hākimniñ jazā bärgäniniñ bayăni.”} \]
from how to dress to how to venerate ancestors.”

We may accurately describe _SERVER/dbimg/27aa7071.png as “legalistic” in the sense that it advanced a system of norms and relations in terms of general and abstract categories that demanded application to the messy realities of life.  

Lǐ described the world both as it could be and, in the eyes of the authorities who applied it to Xinjiang and its people, the world as it ought to be. They put the force of the state apparatus behind .SERVER/dbimg/27aa7071.png’s enforcement and distributed a code to explain it. It is no wonder the Turki identified it as “law.” It was, after all, the primary means by which the Hunanese believed they could transform Xinjiang into a Chinese province.

How did the Turki come to understand SERVER/dbimg/27aa7071.png “rites” as “law?” In Chinese, of course, this simple syllable could have been pronounced with several different tones, each distinguishing a different word: a falling tone would almost certainly have indicated a “substatute” of the Qing code, SERVER/dbimg/27aa7071.png 例. This explanation that the term  SERVER/dbimg/27aa7071.png meant “substatute” was appealing to some foreign observers with more knowledge of Turkic than of Chinese: Ney Elias, during a visit to Kashgar in the summer of 1879, described the strict sumptuary norms and rules of etiquette imposed by the Chinese authorities in order to clearly distinguish rank, category, and social class, including a ban on the facial veil. “[T]hose who attempt to adhere to the custom,” Elias reported, “are liable to have the veil torn from their faces by the first Chinese soldier who happens to pass, with the remark

295 Zito, Of Body and Brush, 59.
296 Pirie, The Anthropology of Law, 103-105, 156.
297 A note of clarification: “law” and “justice” were not commensurate in the Turki discourse. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the differences and of Turki understandings of “justice” ( ʿadālah).
298 IOR L/PS/7/23 pp. 1220-1232.
that the custom is not in accordance with the Chinese ‘li’ (or Code).” Elias displays his English understanding of law as a negotiation between a common code and local customs. However, nothing in the Qing Code prohibits the wearing of the veil, so what Elias probably heard was not *li* “substatute” but *lǐ* “rites.” “Rites” included sumptuary norms, which were indeed codified, at least for officials and the imperial household.

However, the term *lǐ* extended, as it had since Confucius’ time, to everyday, more or less ritualized interactions and appropriate comportment among people everywhere. A soldier, or a fairly independent governor such as Zuo Zongtang or Liu Jintang, could easily have imposed his own understanding of appropriateness.

In the later years of the Qing, E. Denison Ross recorded a Chinese proverb well-known among the Turki: “The *amban* no more fears the law [*lǐ*] than a duck fears the water.” Ross translated *li* as “law,” but he wrote it as *lǐ* 禮 “rites.” Clues indicate that

299 SOAS Archives PP MS 8 #57. As written:

Li  bu  fa  da  Rin  ,  ya  za  bu  fa  shui

Ross’ presentation of this proverb reflects the intuitions of his Turki informants. The phrase could be translated more literally, and following the syntax, as “Li does not fear an *amban*; a duck does not fear water.” Nevertheless, that is not what Ross’ informants told him. Moreover, the metaphor makes a better analogy if the duck is to the official as water is to the “law.”

I have been unable to locate a Chinese-language source for this expression. Ross’ own writing of Chinese, including miswriting of the elementary characters 不 and 水, suggests personal unfamiliarity with the language. The use of a nonstandard character for 禮 that combines a blocky seal script radical with a simplified phonetic part from grass script may indicate that the writer’s main contact with Chinese came from scribes at the *yamen*, who would have written 禮 similarly, as 礼, in draft documents.

The phonetic transcription of the saying also displays the educated Kashgari’s tendency to hypercorrect foreign words in writing by rendering [p] as ʃ. Eastern Turki (and Modern Uyghur) have no native [f] sound, replacing it instead with [p]. This results in some distortion of Arabic and Persian words written with ʃ, as in ʰaʃiːz > ʰapiːz. Those who were aware of the use of ʃ to write [p] tended to employ it with gusto, adding it to Persian words where it did not belong (e.g. ʰayghambar “prophet” > ʰayɣambar) or even Turki words where it had never belonged (e.g. ʰilip > ʰilif). In many vernacular manuscripts, ʃ completely replaces ʰ as the standard substitute for the fully-dotted Arabo-Persian ʰ, which is seen
Ross relied entirely on his Turki informants for interpretation. Similarly, the missionary and linguist Gustav Raquette – who was fluent in Turki but knew next to no Chinese – elaborates on *li* in his 1912 textbook. He provides the example phrase *Khiṭāyniq lisi* or *Khiṭāyniq liyi* “the law of the Chinese.”\(^{300}\) Raquette made his observation following several years of life in Xinjiang and building on the work of missionaries who had come before him, so it rests on extensive experience with the spoken language, suggesting that *li* retained a commonsensical meaning of “law.” Elias, Raquette, and Ross, as specialists in common speech rather than formal writing, were picking up on a term that circulated among local Muslims and had some clear relationship with Chinese power, but that, outside of the context of the Chinese language, carried significant referential ambiguity.

The manifestations of this mysterious *li* in text and practice provide further clues as to how Turki interpreted it and how the Hunanese meant it to be understood. Elias observed, as an example of *li*, a placard draped in white silk near a bridge some five or six miles outside of Yarkand, at which places the begs were required to dismount their horses and walk past. A guard enforced the rule.\(^ {301}\) This placard was doubtless a public display of the Kangxi emperor’s 1670 proclamation (*Shengyu shiliu tiao*), which Zuo

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^301^ This rule was apparently in force through the end of the Qing. See IOR L/P&S/10/241 File 895-6/1912. Qurban 'Alī Khālidī also records enforcement of this rule as one of the causes of the Muslim Uprisings in Ili. (*Tawārīkh-i Hamasa-ye Sharqī*, p. 101) Khālidī may have been stating a rule in place in pre-Uprising Ili or a reading of contemporary, objectionable post-Uprising rules into an earlier context.
Zongtang ordered in 1877 to be distributed across the region, just as he had in Gansu.302 The proclamation was to be posted along every highway and on the walls of every city, read out in every school, by every beg, and by every local chief. Zuo’s choice of this text is interesting in part because it outlines a sixteen-point exhortation for the common people to engage in certain practices with specified positive socio-moral effects. It blends common phrases both on codified law (fa per se) and on other topics: “bring peace to the village factions to put an end to lawsuits”; “expand schools to bring about scholarly study”; “explain the law to admonish the ignorant and stubborn”; “illuminate good manners to deepen good customs”; “end false accusations to bring about the good,” etc. This articulation of imperial ideology combined “substatutes” lì and “rites” lǐ in the same document. As we will see, there was no apparent contradiction from the official perspective.

The same year, the Chinese administration propagated an expanded and annotated version of the same text in Turki translation as the Li Kitābi “Book of Li.”303 Albert von le Coq and Nikolai Katanov both acquired prints of this work (now apparently lost), and, like Ross, Raquette, and Elias, both presumed it to be a partial translation of the Qing Code into Turki and therefore a “law book.”304 Later, a traveler from Syria made the

302 GX 7.4.10 “新疆命盜案件請暫行變通辦理摺” Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian (shang), # 66, pp. 58-59, also in Liu xiangqin gong zougao, j. 2:31a-34b. On the proclamation in Gansu, see Zhao Weixi, Xiangjun jituan, 88.

303 This Turki work is a translation of Shengyu shiliutiao fu lǔ yījie, reproduced in Zhang Yifan, ed., Zhongguo lǔxué wenxian, di si ji, (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2007).

304 Li kitābi, as Albert von le Coq, ed., “Das Li-Kitābi [The Li Kitābi]”, Körösi Csoma Archivum 1-6, pp. 439-480; Li kitābi, as Katanov, N., “Man’chzhursko-Kitaïskii ‘Li’ na Narechii Tiurkov Kitaiskago Turkestana [Manchu-Chinese ‘Li’ among the Turkic Dialects of Chinese Turkestan]”, Zapiski Vostochnago Otdeleniia Imperatorskago Russkago Arkeologicheskago Obshchestva 14 (1901), 32-75. Phonological evidence from the text, as well as its quick production, suggest that it was translated and carved onto wooden printing blocks in Qumul. Before 1884, one Niyāz was known as a skilled carver of Song-style
same interpretation from the perspective of an Ottoman Arab and translated the book into Arabic as the *Qānūn al-Ṣin* “canon law of China.”

The work, compiled in 1869 in Anhui, is more of a “rites book”: it illustrates the maxims in the edict through a series of parables concerning filial piety. Each is further illustrated by non-consecutive statutes concerning familial relations excerpted from the 1740 Qing Code. This commentary on the edict was explicitly meant to be read aloud by village headmen so that all common people would become familiar with the tenets of imperial ideology concerning the most basic and critical constituent of an orderly society, the family. The Turki translation is ungrammatical, inconsistent, and overly literal, so it is no wonder that the bulk of it made no impression on Turki discourse, much less on society. The translators appear further to have redacted the text in places to emphasize family relations over other matters discussed in the edict. When a village headman read out a phrase like *Li kitābi*, however, it would have been grammatically simple enough to send a clear message: this book contained a set of abstract rules that the new Chinese administration plainly found significant enough to propagate across the whole region. Moreover, those rules strictly concerned interpersonal relationships as embodied in the “five relations” (*wulun*), which have pride of place at the beginning of the work.

*Li* was an early transfer point for meanings from the statecraft civilizing mission to encounter evolving commonsense understandings of power. From the perspective of the Xiang Army, *li* was meant to colonize Muslim society and aid in its transformation by

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305 I owe this observation to David Brophy.
referring to a set of sino-normative relationships that people were meant to recognize as natural, once they perceived and practiced them. To Turki, it was an alien signifier that stood for the Chinese emperor’s command to place their families in order or risk punishment.

II. Fixing Families

Hunanese policies, which both imposed normative familial relations and decided what those relationships were, descended from statecraft thinkers’ anxieties surrounding both uprooted men and Muslims in China proper and the Northwest. The near-doubling of the population of China proper in the Qing led to a general disinherita"ce of unmarried young men, popularly called “bare sticks,” who were thought to (and often did) roam the countryside in violent bands. The Xiang Army, like the local militias upon which the army was based, included many of these “bare sticks” in its ranks, where they were kept in line through oaths, ties of friendship and co-locality, and promises of promotions and spoils of war. When it came time to demobilize, however, army leaders immediately depicted their former soldiers as obvious threats, just as other members of the community did back in Hunan and Hubei. 306 They ordered the men who won them the Northwest to be carefully monitored on the roads back to Hunan. At the same time, thousands of demobilized soldiers simply settled in Xinjiang, where they farmed, traded, and labored. Ironically, these “dangerous” men had been part of the plan all along – statecraft thinkers

from Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan onward had dreamed of simultaneously civilizing Xinjiang and taming the bare sticks of China proper by sending them to colonize the borderland.\textsuperscript{307} A bare stick and a Muslim woman could marry and, through their cultivation of the husband-and-wife relationship, each bring the other to conform to Chinese norms.

The same Lu Yao who influenced Zuo’s general conceptions of Muslim policy also powerfully influenced the Xiang Army’s approach to Sinicizing them. While Zuo never wrote of the need to exterminate Muslims or Islam, but only to uphold the “orthodox” Old Teaching over the “heterodox” New Teaching, his followers probably read Lu Yao’s statecraft essay on Muslims, their maintenance of difference, and how to end it\textsuperscript{308}:

The books they pass down of Arabia are a means to confuse people and cause them to treat each other with derision. They are unwilling to follow commands. So then, send down a clear order: make them bring in all of the books they keep and hand them over to be destroyed. Thus can their teaching be extinguished.

\textsuperscript{307} Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 138.

\textsuperscript{308}陆耀, “論回民啟” in Huangchao jingshi wenbian j. 69, 10b-11a.
One point is this: the Hui subjects’ matchmaking should all be unified with that of the commoners. We find: the Hui people entered China over 1,000 years ago. However, the marriage of men and women has not yet become like that common to China. As a result, the people of China despise how the barbarians disdain to associate. Hui people have likewise come to possess a self-segregating mindset. So they look askance on our China and do not desire to marry. … They simply stick stubbornly to their teachings.

Today, let us say we were to send down an order saying, “If a [Hui] woman marries among the common people, give her a wedding gift. If a [Hui] man marries a common woman, give him a sheep and alcohol. Within each jia, once there are five intermarried families, the county or prefecture will give the jia head a placard. Within each bao, once there are thirty intermarried families, the prefect will give the bao head a placard. Having this, they will receive rewards. Without it, they may not enjoy them.”

In this way, among relatives by marriage, first we would unify the harmonious qi. The children they bore will all be instilled with Chinese manners. After thirty years, we could totally transform the popular customs of the Muslim people.

Lu’s idea that the children of Hui-“commoner” marriages would be “instilled with Chinese manners” does suggest a racialist, or more correctly a biologically essentialist, understanding of culture. However, the essay itself is infused with statecraft’s emphasis on the transformability of people’s customs towards the norm through everyday ritual.

Lu’s essay also indicates that Han Chinese are the normative “commoners” of China, as he conflates his understanding of the good performance of subjecthood, as exemplified by the maintenance of family norms, with and a sense of alterity between the people of the Central Plains and the Muslims as “outsiders.” As in the case of the bare sticks, these Muslims could be transformed into good subjects by practicing Chinese rites. Already we see the dual identity of the civilizing project in the core and in the periphery.
From the very beginning, the institutions of reconstruction were tasked with transforming Muslim society by imposing these family norms. While there are no good statistics available on the people who were displaced by the Muslim Uprisings and reconquest, the numbers appear to have been substantial. Early estimates from the Xiang Army indicate massive depopulation, especially across the North, where many Chinese-majority settlements had been flattened. Pro-Yaʿqūb Beg chronicles mention several events in which his armies forcibly removed Hui and Han from their homes and brought them to the South. For example, ʿAshūr Ākhūnd records an incident in which, following the end of a six-month siege of the town of Toqsun near Turpan, the army forced hundreds of starving Hui to sell their belongings to pay for their own food, and then marched them away to strongholds in the Tarim Basin. After the Reconquest, the Reconstruction Agencies were tasked with resettlement in general, and the few available statistics point to another upheaval across the region. For example, in the small town of Dabancheng, near Turpan, the agencies resettled 1,200 people, providing each with grain and blankets.

During the Uprisings, many Turki families had taken in orphaned Han children and raised them as their own. These children remained part of the family either throughout their lives or until some other incident made their birth an issue. However, an 1877 order from Zuo, unrecorded in metropolitan documents but known in Xinjiang, commanded the Reconstruction Agencies to inspect Turki households for Han they had

309 Wei Guangtao, *Kanding Xinjiang ji.*

310 IVR RAN, C 759 “Amīr-i ʿala,” 74v-75v.

311 GX 7.8.7 “擒獲安夷監禁已久分別辦理摺” in *Liu xiangqing gong zougao*, j. 2, 72a-75a.
taken in and raised. It was not unheard of for Turki to take advantage of their new positions of power under the emirate to take Chinese or Hui as slaves, and this order was intended to bring these people back into the open. Some would have families to return to, or might be the last remaining member of a family line. Either way, maintaining the cohesion of genealogies and families was a top priority for the administration.

It was an opportunity for many. During the inspections, a Han woman from Gansu, Li shi, told the magistrate her story: early in the Muslim Uprisings, a Hui rebel killed her family and took her as a concubine. He took her with Bai Yanhu’s army beyond the Pass and settled in Dihua (Hongmiaozi), where the Xiang Army eventually executed him. The dead Hui rebel’s brother, Ma Fuyuan, compelled her to stay as his own concubine, and so she ran away to Turpan, where she begged for food until a Han officer named Yang San took her in, apparently into an informal domestic relationship. Ma Fuyuan countered with an accusation that Yang San had kidnapped his “wife” – not “concubine” – of twenty years or more – and not named Li shi, but Ma shi. Ma Fuyuan was found out, and Li shi won her freedom. Another man, this one named Qadir, was found to have held a Han woman as a slave. He claimed to have been “ordered” to marry her during his service to Ya’qūb Beg, and then to have taken in a young Chinese man as a “renter.” When both of them ran away in 1877, however, it was to beg the magistrate to remove them from the house. They claimed that, during the inspections, Qadir had forced

312 GX 03.09.23 “哈底兒控羅老十誘拐妻財及吐魯番廳批文” in Qingdai Xinjiang dang’an xuanji [=QXDX], vol. 28, 109; GX 03.09.23 “吐魯番廳轉霸作妾一案” in QXDX, vol. 28, 110.

313 GX 5.3.27 “吐魯番廳為楊三拐妻之批文” in QXDX, vol. 28, 150-151.

314 GX 5.4.26 “吐魯番廳為楊三拐婦案之批文” in QXDX, vol. 28, 153.
them to falsely represent themselves as a happily married couple renting a room from him, while in reality both were his slaves. The establishment of Qing military and political power in Turpan afforded all of these people a chance, even if they had not actually escaped domestic slavery, to seek better conditions by making a claim that the government would support.

The Refugees Agencies (nanmin ju) operating under the Reconstruction Agencies went about taking displaced people, marrying them to each other, and giving them plots of fallow land to undertake reclamation. “Zhao Guixi is now ordered to the yamen; he is ordered to be paired with a Han woman,” reads one brief document assigning a wife to a Chinese man.315 This was considered “adopting a refugee … as a wife” (shouyang nanmin ... yi zuo qishi 收養難民…以作妻室).316 Frequently, however, the agencies actually divided families, as displaced people could not verify their existing marriages and so were placed into new ones. In 1877, Wei shi, a Hui woman, had been on the run with her husband Ma Zhenghai and their children all the way from Shaanxi, where Ma was suspected of rebellion.317 They were headed to the Ili Valley and the stability afforded by the Russian occupation when, somewhere near Qumul, the family was separated. Wei shi found her brother-in-law Ma Caitong, and they traveled together to

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315 GX 04.07.06 “吐魯番廳准趙貴興領婦人一名之具結” in QXDX, vol. 28, 134. “具結結人，趙貴興，今領到大老爺案下，領得擇配漢婦一名，所領不虛，須至結者。” The magistrate responded, “Permitted to order.” 准領。

316 GX 03.07.24 “魏福道領養吳氏之具結” in QXDX, vol. 28, 105.

317 GX 13.4 “鎮迪道扎飭提拿潛逃之妾魏氏” in QXDX, vol. 29, 89-91. The catalogers appear to have misdated this document to GX 13.r4.28 and misread Wei’s surname as Zhao.
Kashgar, probably staying one step ahead of the advancing Xiang Army by moving with the emir’s retreating troops. There the Refugees Agency took her in and assigned her to a Han named Zeng Changming as his “concubine” (qie). It is unclear whether or not Wei shi agreed to the match, but she seems to have had little choice in the matter. The Agency granted them a plot of land in Aksu, where they farmed and raised two children alongside Wei shi and Ma Zhenghai’s own. Ten years later, when Ma Zhenghai finally tracked his wife down, half of China away from home, he and Wei shi wanted to be together. Zeng was furious and refused, so Ma sued him for “stealing his wife.” Wei shi testified on Ma’s behalf and reasoned that “A Muslim woman and a Chinese each follow different teachings.” She probably thought the magistrate would understand that it was natural for a Hui woman to be with a Hui man. Ultimately, however, the Xinjiang government enforced the principle of paternity: Zeng was to retain his children, and Ma his. The agents of the state were the ultimate father-mother officials, and they had arranged Wei shi’s new marriage. No one “stole” her, it was concluded, because the Refugees Agency had decided their pairing, and that arrangement was final. Regardless of her previous marriage, the magistrate added, time and the bonds of family life had confirmed the match – Zeng and Wei stayed married.

The Xinjiang government continued throughout the late Qing to resettle women who “did not keep the womanly way” (bu shou fu dao 不守婦道). However, as time went on and conditions changed, so did the implications of that phrase. Foucault once identified family norms as a primary site of biopolitics, a “dense transfer point for

318 Huizi furen yu Hanren, ben bu tong jiao. 回子婦人與漢人本不同教.
relations of power.\textsuperscript{319} To put it another way, some states have focused overwhelmingly on the family as a site of moral and social discipline. (Chinese thinkers seem to have understood the importance of biopolitics more than two thousand years earlier.) This makes the family, as Stoler argues for colonial cases globally, a proxy for other policies and anxieties.\textsuperscript{320} As a result, people encounter the state’s categories within the family.

It has been pointed out that the historiography of Xinjiang is overwhelmingly dominated by male perspectives\textsuperscript{321}, as well as idealistic concerns. What, then, of women’s lives when the family became a discursive site of discipline, moreover under conditions of pervasive violence? While I do not intend to impose Foucauldian categories, I do adopt Stoler’s methodology, using family and sexuality to tease out the critical faults and ambiguities that people negotiated in Xinjiang society. The cases discussed show that women did not necessarily accept the state’s categories, but actively contested them, though usually without success. The state was not so much concerned with ethnic difference as with the integrity of the family. Yet, as Harrell points out, it is not necessary for a civilizing project to intend to engender ethnicity in its objects – rather, the civilizer’s concerns leave a trace in the reaction of the civilized. In this case, the Hunanese were concerned to marry frontier people and maintain them in family units, and they saw women as instruments to this end – and so, women were at the epicenter of

\textsuperscript{319} Foucault, \textit{The History of Sexuality}, 103.


contestations between communities across this period. Moreover, discourses about women’s sexuality had real consequences for their lives.

III. Hard Times and Difficult Choices: Marrying Out

The Chinese ideal of “marriage” does not map directly, of course, onto Western bourgeois norms.\(^{322}\) The husband-wife relationship could, in practice, be a whole range of things, and women’s roles within and without the family varied. Nor did the elite sino-normative understanding of marriage square with the common sense of Xiang Army soldiers and merchants who made their way into Xinjiang in the immediate aftermath of the Muslim Uprisings. For them, “marriage” often meant the purchase of a young woman as a domestic servant and a sex partner. While the in-migrating Han men represented their relationships with women in terms of normative marriage, as we will see, the usual practice was to enter into an informal relationship with a camp follower, exchanging sex and servitude for shelter and protection. While the Xiang Army elites imposed sino-normative family structures, ordinary soldiers and merchants kidnapped and bought women.\(^{323}\)

When the Xiang Army garrisoned Turpan, it put tremendous pressure on an already strained economy. Turpan had a population of no more than 40,000,\(^ {324}\) all of

\(^{322}\) Scattered stories indicate that Xiang Army elites also engaged in the trade, but perhaps they were better at hiding their activities, or conducting them in seemingly legitimate ways. One story from Gansu states that Liu Jintang executed a Xining akhund who had taken part in the Muslim uprisings along with his whole family. The exception was one of the akhund’s wives, whom Liu gave to one of his secretaries, along with her baby. (Rev. G. G. Warren. "D'Ollone's Investigations on Chinese Moslems" in The New China Review 2:3 (June 1920), 267-289. Rev. G. G. Warren. "D'Ollone's Investigations on Chinese Moslems" in The New China Review 2:3 (June 1920), 267-289, 276.)

\(^{323}\) It would be possible to estimate the population of Turpan in 1877 through an extensive survey of its taxation and smallpox records, but I have not yet undertaken it. Meanwhile, this number is derived from
whom lived in one of the hottest deserts in the world, where farming depended on fickle mountain runoff that flowed through underground tunnels. The Xiang Army that went beyond the Pass consisted of some 60,000 soldiers,\textsuperscript{325} perhaps half of whom stayed in Turpan for a year or more. While the Xiang Army was meant to sustain itself by farming along the road, this was not possible in much of Xinjiang, so they relied on Tianjinese merchants to supply them with extra grain from China proper and Russia.\textsuperscript{326} Grain was already expensive in Northern Xinjiang, since an estimated two-thirds or three-quarters of all arable land had been abandoned.\textsuperscript{327} Despite the infusion of merchant grain, it immediately became more scarce.\textsuperscript{328} This appears to have been a problem across the region for the first few years, after which Qing officials implemented the system of granaries and price regulations known in China proper.\textsuperscript{329} In the meantime, merchants brought grain from China proper or Russia and sold it in Xinjiang at significant profit. Grain prices appear to have stabilized by 1893, when the province had to lower its own prices to match those of merchants.\textsuperscript{330} At the same time, the Xiang Army needed intermediaries with local society. Turki who knew Chinese suddenly found themselves

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\begin{itemize}
  \item two sources: Cao Jiguan, \textit{Xinjiang jianzhi zhi}, (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju), 1:7b-11b; \textit{Xinjiang tuzhi}, minzheng 4-5, 5b.
  \item Millward, \textit{Eurasian Crossroads}, 127.
  \item Fields, \textit{Tso}, 83.
  \item Wei Guangtao, \textit{Kanding Xinjiang ji}.
  \item Yi-xin, \textit{Qinding pingding Shan Gan Xinjiang Hui fei fanglüe}, j. 305, 4.
  \item Turki sources note the positive effects of grain price regulation. Jarring Prov. 177, 128a-128b; TH/Jarring, 120v-122v.
\end{itemize}
very gainfully employed, while literate men with purely Islamic educations lost their
status. While there are no reliable and detailed figures for this period, collected notes
from officials and local anecdotes, combined with the general displacement of people
around Xinjiang, indicate that society was in disarray and that people were searching for
means to survive.

One solution was to marry someone with money, usually a soldier. Han shi, a Hui
woman from Turpan, made this choice when her family was on the edge of starvation. First her husband was carried off by Yaʿqūb Beg’s army of local Muslims and
“Andijanis.” Like so many others separated during the Muslim Uprisings, she gave her
husband up for dead, or lost for good. She worked as best she could to keep her family
fed, until rising grain prices in 1878 made it nigh impossible. Han shi responded to these
worsening conditions by finding a new husband who could maintain her and by marrying
off a daughter. That her second husband, Li Chaorong, was Han mattered little – after all,
the Agencies were marrying Hui to Han. Like many demobilized soldiers, after arriving
in Turpan, he sought out some land to farm in one of the Northern, Chinese-majority
towns that the Muslim Uprisings had reduced to ruins and fallow land. Along the way,
her last child died, and the couple’s relations soured. When Han shi returned to Turpan to
stay with her son-in-law, her first husband returned. This happened with surprising
frequency to Hui couples separated in the Uprisings and Reconquest, I suspect because
preexisting Hui networks made it relatively easy for someone to navigate across the

331 IVR RAN, B 779 “Ušbu ötkän zamanida Mullā Obul mahdī degän bir adamnin beşidin ötkän išniŋ
bayānidurlar.”

332 GX 07.06 “吐魯番廳為回婦韓氏婚變之批文” in QXDX, vol. 28, 218.
region and locate a lost family member. The problem was, Han shi now had two husbands. According to her petition to the Turpan magistrate, she wanted to clear the air and receive permission from the magistrate to return to her first (Hui) husband. Unfortunately, cases like Han shi’s were universally returned to village headmen for mediation, so we cannot know how they were resolved.

Demobilized soldiers found it easy to find a wife on the new frontier. Most of the time, however, they did so through simple purchase by contract, which blurred the line between normative marriage and prostitution. In many disputes, one party accused another of kidnapping (guai 拐 or lu 擄) a woman. The accused would defend himself by arguing that he had in fact bought her (mai 買).\(^\text{333}\) In one early case, a pair of Hui soldiers from Shaanxi, Ma Jinfu and Yang Wushizi, took leave from Jin-shun’s army in 1875.\(^\text{334}\) They went ahead along the Hui-dominated trade routes into Xinjiang and settled in Jimsar to trade. There they married two Han women, Huang shi and Niu shi. In 1877, the couples moved to Turpan, where Ma moved in with a Sichuan Army commander and sold beef, while Yang rented a plot of land in Tuyuq. Both went for a few days to harvest Yang’s crop, and when they returned, they found that their wives and goods were gone. Some investigation found that a man living nearby named Yu Dabi had kidnapped both, selling one of the wives to another man while keeping the other for himself. When

\(^{333}\) See for example an 1877 case: GX 03.07.24 “吐魯番廳准蘇義等拐妻案具結存案” in QXDX, vol. 28, 104.

\(^{334}\) GX 03.08.21 “吐魯番廳余大必孀婦擄財案之批文” in QXDX, vol. 28, 105; GX 03.08.24 “吐魯番廳余大必霸女擄財案之批文” in QXDX, vol. 28, 105; GX 03.08.27 “總頭役已將余大必霸女擄財案人等傳喚之案” in QXDX, vol. 28, 106; GX 03.08 “馬金福告余大必霸女擄財之呈” in QXDX, vol. 28, 106-107.
confronted, Yu laughed at the men and told them, “those are women the soldiers have cast off” (ju xi bingyong yiqi funü 聚係兵勇遺棄婦女).

Yu was expressing a common sentiment that soldiers’ marriages were not normative marriages, but temporary arrangements for servitude and sex.³³⁵ Soldiers had gotten accustomed to such arrangements on the long march from Hunan. While good data is scant, several officers are known to have done so in Gansu. (See Chapter One.) An obscure rumor that Liu Jintang had forcibly taken a Hui concubine in Gansu seems more plausible in this light.³³⁶ Realistically, a soldier was not married in the sense of having had a match arranged by his family. Even after arriving in Xinjiang, he was likely to move around, not settle into a stable household. It is only relatively late in the historical record, around 1882, that we see Han soldiers use the words “bride price” (li yìn) to refer to the money given to a Han, Hui, or Turki woman’s family for her. Before then, their relationships were described strictly in terms of “purchase.”

Turki would not normally have understood marriage in such a way. According to Bellér-Hann, exchanges of gifts and cash in marriage in the Turki context cannot be read straightforwardly, or from an emic perspective, as purchase or the presentation of a “bride price.”³³⁷ Rather, toyluq, which Europeans have often translated as “bride price” but which might be more literally rendered as “the thing having to do with the marriage,” was a “flexible, elastic concept.” It pointed to a whole range of transactions between

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³³⁵ In one arrangement, a Han man in Fukang was technically married to his wife, but the circumstances of his death indicate that he prostituted her to local Han, who became affectionate for her and began to get jealous. (Memorial dated GX 18.04.02, in GZD, vol. 7, 58-59.)


³³⁷ Bellér-Hann, Community Matters, 246-256.
families, brides, and grooms, which could be normatively rendered in the language of purchase, but were more often one stage in a long series of symbolic exchanges in the building of community.

In the multiethnic society of Turpan in the late nineteenth century, however, it would appear that the nature of *toyluq* changed. Documents from Kashgaria and accounts of elite marriage in Qumul do, as Bellér-Hann points out, indicate that the exchange of goods, particularly livestock, clothing, and food was central to contracting a marriage between Turki. Documents from the South that I have found corroborate this assessment.\(^{338}\) In Turpan in the years after the reconquest, however, *toyluq* appears to have consisted more often of silver, although greater exchanges of goods appeared to remain the norm.\(^{339}\) Silver was the rule when a daughter married out. One document, for example, attest to the marriage of a Turki girl to a Hui akhund.\(^{340}\) Almost all of the witnesses are Hui, including one “Mūzāsā the Dungan.” While Turki families sought to maintain community with each other through ritual exchanges of goods over time, they may have seen marriages out to Hui and Han more as strategies for shorter-term financial stability or gain. Han Chinese could easily have interpreted a cash *toyluq* in terms of bride price, or else as the purchase of a woman’s body and labor.

*IV. Temporary Marriage and the Image of the Sexually Available Turki Woman*

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\(^{338}\) Turki document dated MG 16.10.10, Institute for Research on Islam in Xinjiang, Xinjiang Normal University.

\(^{339}\) In Khazīmah’s case, for example, her young husband’s inability to provide her with a promised *toyluq* of clothing was one source of friction in their marriage.

\(^{340}\) Untitled Turki document dated GX 17.11.10 in *QXDX* vol. 29, 415.
This ambiguity for Han between normative marriage and purchase of a concubine was complicated by a widespread local practice of temporary marriage (waqitliq toy). Temporary marriage was not known in Western Turkestan, but it was commonplace in Eastern Turkestan through the 1950s. There appears to have been little stigma attached to it. Like the mutʿa marriages permitted in Shiite jurisprudence, a temporary marriage was made between Muslims, usually a sojourning man and a local woman, according to a fixed-term contract and for the express purpose of companionship, domestic service, and sexual pleasure. While the practice is not discussed in the legal manuals known to have been used in the Kashgar Islamic court, clerics nevertheless were involved in composing and certifying the contracts. As in the Shiite case, temporary marriage also occupied an ambiguous space between normative marriage and prostitution. Nevertheless, as a category of normative marriage that functioned in a similar manner to nikāḥ, temporary marriage could be used to build relationships between local people and outsiders, as it provided a sojourner with a link to his host community. Temporary

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341 Beller-Hann, *Community Matters*, 266-273; Linda Benson, “A Much-Married Woman: Marriage & Divorce in Xinjiang 1850-1950” in *The Muslim World* LXXXIII, No. 3-4 (July-October 1993), 227-247; Linda Benson, “The Question of Women: Discovering Uyghur Women's History in Northwestern China” in *Oriental Archive* 79 (2011), 47-70. A 1958 research report from Ghulja appears to describe one instance of temporary marriage, (Weiwuer ze shehui lishi diaocha, 90) while the 1956 Kashgar report comments briefly on such “secret” marriages. (“Shule xian Tuo-gu-zha-ke qu si liu xiang diaocha cailiao” in, 1-12, 10.) One woman in the Kashgar village who was married thirty-three times may certainly have done so through temporary marriage.


343 I have made a study of the available manuscripts, but there is no room to discuss them at length here. Cf. Leiden Or. 26.684 Majmūʿ at al-Masāʿīl; Kashgar Museum 0105 Majmūʿ at al-Masāʿīl; Leiden Or. 26.667 Zubdatu l-masāʿīl wa l-ʿaqāʾid.

marriages appear to have been contracted among Turkic Muslims in part as a way to honor and welcome guests.

Han swiftly detected the presence of Turki temporary marriage, as well as the lack of stigma surrounding serial marriage. Bellér-Hann finds that, in contrast to Western Turkestan, a Turki widow or divorcee could actually be more highly valued than a first-time bride, especially if she had demonstrated an ability to reproduce.\textsuperscript{345} The Turpan archive frequently mentions individuals who had married more than once, but this was rarely more than incidental to any conflict. India Office records make the same comment, that Turki were accustomed to frequent remarriage.\textsuperscript{346} Men and women both appear to have remarried well into old age. A research team investigating a Kashgar village in 1956 found that 67% of all women in the village had been married more than twice.\textsuperscript{347}

While other statistical data is lacking, anecdotal evidence further suggests serial marriage was considered normal. To give one extended example, a man named Obulmahdi, who wrote an account of his life in Turpan from the 1850s through the 1910s, was married no fewer than four times in his life.\textsuperscript{348} The first marriage was arranged when he was seventeen years old, to a woman that he and his young friends found unattractive, as well as possibly ethnically unacceptable.\textsuperscript{349} His parents gave in to

\textsuperscript{345} Bellér-Hann, \textit{Community Matters}, 256-266.

\textsuperscript{346} IOR L/P&S/10/976.

\textsuperscript{347} “Shule xian Tuo-gu-zha-ke qu di liu xiang diaocha cailiao,” 10.

\textsuperscript{348} IVR RAN B 779, “Uşbu ötkän žamanida Mullā Obulmahlī deópez bir adamnin bešiđin ötkän išnix bayānidurlar,” 3a-7b, 12a-15a.

\textsuperscript{349} Obulmahdi relates that she turned out to be a “Sart girl.” By this time, the term “Sart,” which possessed a long and ambiguous history in Central Asian society, generally referred to a settled Turkic Muslim. (W. Barthold and M. E. Subtelny, “Sär” in P. Bearman et al., eds., \textit{Encyclopaedia of Islam}, Second Edition,
the young man, who refused the match. (Obulmahdi later considered himself to have acted in a spoiled manner.) They soon died, and his elder brothers found him a new wife. Obulmahdi did not care for his second wife, either, as she was unattractive and from a poor family. However, the Qing reconquest and the swift changes brought to the Turpan economy finally deprived him of alternate support networks. While Obulmahdi was considering divorcing her in any case, she unexpectedly became pregnant, and so they raised their son together. Between his demanding job and her apparently bottomless appetite – keeping in mind this is his narration, not hers – he divorced her after five years and left her their son. Obulmahdi found his next wife satisfying, as she was excellent at business. They had eight children together and were married twenty-seven years until she eventually passed away. Later, during harder times, his fourth marriage, around the age of fifty-two, was to a widow who brought two daughters of her own into his crowded house. None of this struck Obulmahdi as peculiar, nor would it have shocked his contemporaries.

Actually, what is striking about Obulmahdi’s account is the high degree to which his marriages were companionate. It is well-established that Turki women were relatively independent. A man could value his wife not only for her company, but also for her ability to contribute to the household economy. Even the investigators of the 1950s, who were inclined to overstate the social injustice of the “feudal” arranged marriages of Uyghur society, conceded that women could have a great deal of independence in

[Brill Online, 2014.) As Obulmahdi himself appears to have been just such a settled Turkic Muslim, I find it difficult to understand his objection.

350 On women’s economic life, see Bellér-Hann, Community Matters, 196-202.
choosing a partner and running a household. Women also frequently returned to their natal homes after marriage, although long stays appear to have made many husbands deeply resentful. Moreover, polygamy was rather less common than the investigators suggest. Several murder cases from the period involve jealousies between multiple wives, which the Chinese record describes not as equal wives, but rather as a “primary wife” and “concubine.” However, these cases appear to represent exceptional arrangements, rather than normative ones. In some of them, one wife becomes jealous because she feels abandoned by a husband who has taken up elsewhere with a second wife. This suggests that polygamy, while legal, was sometimes not a strategy to add to the primary household, but rather to escape it and start a new life without going through the appropriate procedure for divorce. Finally, households tended on the whole to be small, averaging three to four people, including children. This was both because families regularly divided their wealth between children, who were expected to start households of their own, and because short marriages produced smaller, more atomized families with fewer obligations to an extended family.

Han Chinese, however, depicted serial and temporary marriage as deeply immoral. For some, the apparent ease with which a husband or wife could give the other up was part of the Turkis’ idle, indolent character. Xiao Xiong, one of Zuo’s clerks, wrote poetry recording his observations of life across Xinjiang. He opined that Turki women were especially lascivious in the South, far from the civilizing influence of China.

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351 Many documents in the Qing metropolitan and local archives concern conflicts between husbands and wives arising from precisely this issue.

352 Xiao Xiong, *Xijiang za shu shi*, j. 3, 1a-1b, 8b.
proper as it was felt in Qumul, and this immorality drove them to prostitute themselves. This attitude was not limited to literature. Gazetteers commented regularly on what officials considered the debased family morals of the Turki. Officials complained about how the Turki lacked surnames – this was not only an administrative inconvenience, but a sign that they were incapable of maintaining lineages. In the most extreme formulations, Turki were said to lack any concept of filial piety. Turki, in this view, were flawed subjects, in that they were not family actors, and people without history, in that they lacked moral guidance from the past. Such an analysis of Turki society appears absurd, given the importance of veneration for the dead in local religious life and the range of children’s obligations to their parents. It would take until the very end of the Qing for a high official to note the significance that Turki placed on tombs.

That misperception of Turki immorality affected policy. In 1882, Liu Jintang received and later endorsed a report from Chen Mingyu, General Inspector of Reconstruction (zongcha shanhou shiyi). Chen confirmed that the key to the stability

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354 Wensu xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 258-265, 262; Shaya xian xiangtuzhi, 328; Hetian zhilizhou xiangtuzhi, 386, 397, 399; Shule fu xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 339-346, 342; Pishan xian xiangtuzhi, 377, ad nauseam.

355 A story about Turki sponsorship of tomb maintenance was part of Du Tong’s argument that the Turki possessed a spirit of generosity embodied in their veneration of ancestors. (XJTZ 38: 7b.)

of Xinjiang was the moral integration of the Turki. The core of morality, he argued, was
disciplining familial relationships and gradually altering customs under the strict
guidance of the distant sovereign. Liu circulated a proclamation that spoke against the
evil of mutual divorce, which was to be strictly prohibited and punished. He declared
temporary marriage to be an inversion of natural relations and source of chaos. Chen
missed the point – it was not temporary marriage itself that was to blame, but the ways in
which temporary marriage changed in the post-Reconquest socioeconomic context.

V. Trafficking Women

These perceptions were in dialogue with the very real consequences of the
economic disturbances of the Reconstruction period. In the North, trafficking in Turki
women became lucrative for those in positions of some power. Qing law considered
kidnapping and selling a woman to be an offense punishable with the relatively light
sentence of three years’ imprisonment. Perhaps because the risk if caught was so low,
such lawsuits were frequent in Turpan. As yamen employees were often involved, the
suits rarely made it through the whole investigatory process and seem instead to have
ended in mediation. In 1880, for example, two Turki runners working for the Pichan
magistrate were accused of kidnapping a young Turki woman and selling her to a Mr.
Li. According to her brother Sämät’s petition, the runners “saw my mother and thought

357 “倫紀為人道之首，風俗所必禁，王化所必嚴。”
358 Da Qing lüli (1899), ming li lü 41, tiaoli 21.
359 GX 6.5.10 “吐魯番廳控阿曾強賣人口之批文” in QXDX vol. 29, 178.
she was a displaced woman” (jian xiaode muqin shi nüliu 見小的母親是女流), and then forcibly carried off her daughter. Sämät, having returned from seasonal work cutting wood, failed to convince Mr. Li to return his wife, whom he had purchased from the runners. The situation was publicly known, as Mr. Li lived nearby, and it took a direct address to the magistrate for the woman’s family to seek justice. Sämät’s father was apparently dead, and it took his own return from seasonal work for the case even to reach the magistrate.

This was far from the only time that a Chinese man acquired a Turki woman by money or force in Turpan while her male relatives were away. Late one night in 1886, Bi-ya-zi was awakened by a banging on the door.\textsuperscript{360} A man named Zeng Yucheng burst in and demanded to marry her daughter. Her daughter already had a husband, who was away on business in Aksu. Bi-ya-zi’s daughter fought him, biting his hand and drawing blood, but he managed to knock her unconscious and carry her off. An investigation revealed the man to be Zeng Yucheng, a Han who claimed to have paid for the daughter several months beforehand. According to his claim, Bi-ya-zi had been prostituting her daughter while her husband was away, and Zeng had sent the money via a Hui go-between. He countersued Bi-ya-zi, but the magistrate sided with the woman and her daughter. The Hui go-between might have cheated Zeng out of his money, and Zeng acted on the idea that all Turki women were essentially sexually available for a price.

Regardless of what Zeng thought he had done to acquire Bi-ya-zi’s daughter, he still found it appropriate to demand her, forcibly take her away, and effectively imprison her in his home for several days.

It came down to this: Han men wanted wives, but lacked Han women; Turki were impoverished, and they increasingly sold their daughters for money. Interestingly, Hui began to dominate this trade as middlemen: they would act as translators for Han men, representing themselves as go-betweens for a marriage arrangement, while Turki knew them as pimps. Liu Yun, a young Shanxi Han sojourner in Qitai, claimed to have been drawn unwittingly into human trafficking.\footnote{GX 17.12.5 “劉雲控張十拐編婦女及吐魯番廳批文” in \textit{QDX}, vol. 30, 49; GX 18.7 “吾守馬拉控劉雲強迫女婚之狀呈” in \textit{QDX}, vol. 30, 13; GX 18.7 “馬越海控劉雲強迫女婚之狀呈” in \textit{QDX}, vol. 30, 14.} In 1889, he paid thirty taels to marry a twelve-sui Turki girl from Turpan named Ruo-zang-le, who came to live with him. This was a typical arrangement for a sojourner in a temporary marriage: the relationship was not companionate – rather, he effectively acquired a woman and placed her in bondage, first as a domestic servant, later as a sexual partner. In late 1892, Ruo-zang-le’s father Ablimit sued Liu Yun before the Qitai magistrate. Ablimit, who also went by “Black Hair” (Hei Maozi), claimed that Ruo-zang-le had a previous husband, and that Liu Yun had kidnapped her. Liu objected and pointed out that Ruo-zang-le was by then four months pregnant. Further investigation led to a settlement from the magistrate: Liu would pay twenty taels as a fine, and he would keep the baby once it was born, while Ruo-zang-le would return to her mysterious “previous husband.” Liu Yan, baffled by the situation but powerless to change it, later ran across Ruo-zang-le in the house of a Hui man, Zhang
Shi, in Sanbao, Turpan. He asked around and heard that Ablimit and Zhang Shi were known to be in cahoots kidnapping and selling wives.

Such arrangements could be conceived of on the Han side as a soldier’s marriage, and on the Turki side as a sojourner’s temporary marriage. It was rare that Muslim authorities explicitly intervened to prevent a match between Muslims and non-Muslims. Technically, there was no legal grounds on which to do so within the imperial system. However, the language of difference could be used to justify dissolving a marriage made out of economic need, as in the case of the Turki woman Nao-si-na-ran and her daughter Khushnān Khan.\footnote{GX 9.6.11 “吐魯番廳准腦斯納染與勝長發離異” in QXDX, vol. 28, 326-327; GX 9.6.14 “吐魯番廳巡撫為腦斯納染追要女兒情形之申及吐魯番廳批文” in QXDX, vol. 28, 327.} Nao-si-na-ran fell on hard times after the death of her husband left her with his debts, and so she married Khushnān Khan to the lender, a Han named Sheng Changfa. The King of Lūkchūn, in a rare performance of his power, actually intervened to separate the couple. He sent his interpreter Sawut to Sheng Changfa with sixty taels to clear Nao-si-na-ran’s debts and a message: find another wife. Meanwhile, the King of Lūkchūn had Khushnān Khan imprisoned in his palace. The official reason reported to Governor Liu was that “Chinese and Muslim teachings are incompatible” (Han Hui liang jiao bu he 漢回兩教不合) and so the couple would “each return to their religion” (ge gui ge jiao 各歸各教). However, that had not been a problem for the administration before, and as we have seen, Liu’s policies encouraged a degree of intermarriage. Now Liu approved of the king’s actions, perhaps because Liu wanted to maintain the petty ruler’s cooperation by granting him a degree of power, or perhaps out of the well-justified fear
that coercive marriages of this kind could lead to instability and violence. (The king, for his part, may simply have wanted Khushnān for himself.)

The ambiguity between normative marriage and prostitution on either side opened up a broad space for people to mobilize different meanings socially and in their appeals to power. The most thoroughly documented case of this in the Turpan archive must be that of Zhang Xi, a forty-five-sui demobilized Han soldier from Shaanxi who doggedly pursued a marriage with a very young Turki girl.\(^{363}\) Zhang Xi, by his own account, was getting on in years and wanted to have an heir before he died. He went through a Hui go-between to arrange a match with Aḥmad’s daughter Nurlan, who was only six sui. The Hui man, Jin Shaoyuan, lived with Aḥmad and served as his translator with Han Chinese. Zhang produced a sum for Nurlan’s “bride price,” offering cattle, grain, and either twenty-five, sixty-six, or a startling one hundred five taels. The amount he claimed to have paid changed throughout the dispute, suggesting that he was either making several offers or being disingenuous. Jin Shaoyuan produced a marriage contract in Turki witnessed by a dorgha and a local mullah. Somehow the deal fell through: Zhang claimed that Aḥmad had taken the bride price but had not turned over the girl.

What was Zhang trying to do? He had lived in Turpan long enough to know that Hui often served as go-betweens for Han to purchase young Turki women. Yet he

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described the arrangement as a normative “marriage” when making a plaint to the *yamen*. Zhang was trying to put pressure of Aḥmad to extract more money from him: across four different lawsuits, he escalated the price he claimed Aḥmad owed him. He was effectively threatening to expose Aḥmad and Jin Shaoyuan, whom understood to be selling a woman illegally. From Aḥmad’s perspective, however, this was an opportunity to marry off a young girl whose mother had died and whose presence was now a burden on the family. Zhang Xi produced anecdotal evidence to argue that Aḥmad had acted dishonestly and was simply using his daughter for money: this was just like two cases in Dihua he had heard about, wherein Turki deceived Han by taking the bride price and disappearing with the bride.

Interestingly, the magistrate kept rejecting Zhang’s claims. However, the situation was ugly, and Aḥmad tried to save face and keep the matter away from the *yamen*. Han, Hui, and Turki gathered for a feast at Ma Dai’s tavern with an official mullah and the *dorgha* present. Aḥmad explained that her daughter was afraid and refused the match, so he had withdrawn the offer. (After all, under Islamic law, a woman technically needs to be willing marry a man, never mind that Nurlan was too young to be considered capable of consent.) Aḥmad eventually apologized to Zhang and agreed verbally to go through with the match. However, Zhang sued him again with the same claim: he saw Nurlan at another Turki man’s house, which indicated to him that Aḥmad had “sold his daughter for a price” (*mai jia wei qi* 賣價為妻) while she was engaged to Zhang. Again he mentioned a mysterious Turki-language contract that never materialized before the magistrate, and again he claimed that Aḥmad owed him a sum of money, a plot of land, a
karez, some cows, and Nurlan. Under pressure from the magistrate, Zhang changed his demand to a small fortune in silver, which he did not receive.

Zhang Xi eventually exhausted his claims: first on the basis of morality – marriage as opposed to sale – and second on the basis of the law – selling women was illegal. He argued at last on ethnic grounds that Aḥmad had simply deceived him to avoid his daughter marrying a Han. There was no mechanism for the yamen to enforce ethnic harmony through forced marriage, except of course in the case of displaced women, and at this point, the magistrate refused to hear any more cases from him. As elsewhere in the Qing, contracts were the critical deciding factor in any domestic or commercial dispute, and ethnicity was not meant to matter.

However, Zhang Xi was appealing to the ways in which commoners understood Qing power in Xinjiang, as a force that was explicitly concerned with the boundaries between groups. The yamen staff, whether they meant to or not, deployed ethnic categories: nearly every actor in disputes recorded in the rites section of the yamen archive was marked Han, Hui, or Turki (chan), depending on whether or not they were Muslim (Hui and Turki) and whether or not they primarily spoke Chinese (Han and Hui). By contrast, in disputes over property or capital cases, which were recorded in the punishments section of the yamen archive, such categories were rarely marked. Rather, in property disputes, a person tended to appear simply as “commoner” (min), “military” (jun), or “outsider” (kemin). While ethnic categories were not germane to marriage cases from the yamen’s official perspective, nevertheless they were operative in the documentation and discussion of disputes related to family. As we will see, this was because people filing suits on these matters understood these categories to be salient for
two reasons: first, the animus for these disputes arose in part out of the fraught relationship between communities, according to which Chinese-speakers tended to be purchasers of Turki-speaking Muslim women. Second, while Turki had recourse to unofficial dispute resolution over domestic issues through local clerics, any dispute crossing communal boundaries could practically only be solved at the yamen.

**VI. Clerics and the Socio-Moral Order**

While people did have access to alternative channels of resolution and mediation through Islamic courts, it was despite the Xiang Army’s efforts to obtain a monopoly on domestic cases. Provincial authorities first tried to coopt local clerics, then undermined their authority, and then integrated them into local government. These shifts in policy were guided at times by ideological understandings of Islam and at times by realistic assessments of state capacity. The net result, however, was that the Hunanese handed significant moral authority and access to power to local actors. These clerics employed their advantages to bring their own battles in local society to the yamen’s attention.

At first, the Hunanese attempted to usurp the qadi’s legal authority by bringing marriage firmly into the yamen’s jurisdiction. A case from 1880 illustrates both the persistence of qadi courts as primary sites of mediation in family law and the administration’s intolerance of their role. On September 1, Taiji Ast of Lämchín reported to Turpan Magistrate Yang that Wāsīt, the son of Dorgha Thābit (Sawut) of Jubanqiri, had murdered his wife Tokhta Banu by slitting her throat with a knife.\(^\text{364}\) The original

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\(^\text{364}\) GX 6.7.27 “魯克沁台吉阿斯提就呈報連木沁纏民尕思易提殺死繼妻案情事禀吐魯番廳文” in QXDX vol. 51, 336.
report, written in Turki, is short and direct, while the subsequent investigation elicited a half-dozen depositions, which the yamen staff edited at length into a series of narratives meant to depict each actor in a certain light. For now, it is most important that the yamen staff’s investigations and representations were intended to establish first and foremost the character of each actor as a social being in terms of his or her familial relationships. Here is how.

Wāsīt, aged forty-four sui, was the oldest of three sons, the youngest being only 10 sui. This alone suggests that his father had several wives. In Wāsīt’s case, his father had previously arranged a marriage for him, but it ended, like Obulmahdi’s, in argument and divorce. Afterward, in the autumn of 1879, Thābit Dorgha married his son to Tokhta Banu, who was twenty-two sui and the daughter of a poor farmer and small trader named ʿAbdullah. As it turns out, this was already Tokhta Banu’s third marriage: a previous match ended when her husband left her, and the second in that husband’s death. Wāsīt and Tokhta Banu got along well until a poor harvest put a strain on their relationship. They argued frequently, and Wāsīt threatened divorce, so Tokhta Banu’s mother Mi-siruo took them to the local akhund’s office. The akhund was La-shi-er, a farmer from Chuwanqir (Qiu-wang-ke-er) who also read scripture. La-shi-er convinced both Wāsīt’s and Tokhta Banu’s mothers to talk to their children, but also sent a letter to the “chief


akhund’s office” (da a-hun chu 大阿渾處). The chief akhund told La-shi-er to resolve the conflict “according to the scripture” (zhao jing 照經): if the parties could be reunited, that was for the best – if not, they could divorce, but Wāsīt ought to apologize with the gift of a sheep. Soon after, Wāsīt may or may not have injured Mi-si-ruo in a fit of anger during an argument, cutting the mediation process short. This time, La-shi-er sent the case to the appointed village head. The investigation was inconclusive, but under the circumstances, La-shi-er Akhund approved a divorce. “I truly handled it according to the scripture,” he attested in his deposition, “and did not take bribes or deceive people.”

A couple of months later, as Tokhta Banu was preparing to marry another man, Wāsīt killed her. By the time the judicial process was over, the Turpan magistrate’s staff had crafted a report that emphasized the ongoing marital strife in Tokhta Banu’s household, including her mother’s alleged mental illness (fengbing 瘋病) and Tokhta Banu’s swift plans for remarriage, in order to construct a narrative that minimized Wāsīt’s own culpability.

Instead, Mi-si-ruo was blamed for improperly instructing her daughter and encouraging her to divorce Wāsīt, which supposedly drove him to rash action, leading to an “accidental” murder – Tokhta Banu, they decided, had moved her own neck against the knife pressed upon it.

The Xinjiang government was troubled by this case, not because of the marital violence itself. That could be explained away by the alleged immorality of Tokhta Banu and her family. What bothered them was La-shi-er Akhund’s extensive participation in

367 “小的實係照經辦理，並無受賄偏獲的事。”

368 GX 6.11.8 “吐魯番廳就請示可否為尕思易提殺死繼妻案結案文” in QYDX vol. 51, 399-400.
the mediation process. La-shi-er’s ruling, they argued, was out of accordance with the statutes (fei lü 非律) and contrary both to Wāsīt’s own wishes and to the principle of total spousal alienation (en duan yi jue 恩斷義絕). Wāsīt and Tokhta Banu should thus be treated as husband and wife for the purposes of the law (ying reng yi fu fu lun 應仍依夫婦論), not as divorcees, per the deponents’ testimonies. Moreover, they argued, it was Mi-si-ruo who had encouraged La-shi-er Akhund to divorce the couple, contrary to her daughter’s wishes. La-shi-er had usurped the authority to declare their divorce in any case. He was charged in accordance with the vague crime of “doing what ought not be done” and given a suspended sentence of eighty strokes of the heavy stick. In 1907, a higher-ranking cleric in Ili was similarly beaten and stripped of office after defying the yamen’s orders to restore a marriage.369

In some cases, the provincial government’s insistence on jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce worked before matters escalated to violence. In 1883, one local woman reported that her husband, a Kashgari who had married her during the Muslim Uprisings, had gone back to Kashgar five years before.370 This meant in Islamic terms that he abandoned her without support (nafaqa), which was grounds for her to divorce him. The akhunds refused, however, to permit it. Instead, she went to the magistrate, who approved.

369 IOR L/PS/7/207.

However, it was clear that the *yamen* could not actually license every marriage or divorce, while punishing clerics for creating and destroying families was not helping the effort to integrate the Turki into the future provincial order. Beginning in 1881, Xinjiang began confirming local officials specifically for the purpose of rectifying marriage customs. These functionaries were called or “*khaṭīb* village chiefs” (*hai-di-pu* or *hai-di-bu xiangyue*). They were first elected by the men in their communities and then confirmed by the magistrate. A *khaṭīb* is the cleric who reads the sermon (*khuṭba*) at the Friday prayer, while a village chief in China proper was a local official who would read out proclamations to villagers, thus serving as a personal link between imperial ideology and the local socio-moral order through oral performance. Chinese officials appear to have seen these roles as analogous. While the original order has been lost, its core concern was quoted in appointment papers: “Marriage by Turki customs is beyond the proper human relationships. They marry privately at a moment’s notice and just as quickly divorce and remarry. These sorts of obscene practices[?] are deeply despicable.”

The *khaṭīb* village chief was tasked, on the occasion of a marriage proposal, with ensuring that the bride and groom were a good astrological match and both willing to enter their partnership. Nor were they to permit a divorce without an investigation into circumstances.

The *khaṭīb* village chiefs seem to have had little effect in bringing Chinese marriage ideals into Turki life. Rather, the government’s efforts to integrate Muslim

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371 GX 6.2.3 “魯克沁台吉邁引為眾纏民公舉那斯爾定充當海底布鄉約事禀吐魯番監督府文” in *QXDY* vol. 1, 118; GX 6.2 “吐魯番監督府為由捏札海任勝金海底普鄉約事札該人文” in *QXDY* vol. 1, 139. “纏俗匹配，出於倫常之外，忽然私合為室，動撤析離另嫁，此等穢鄙情，殊堪痛恨。”
clerics into the government instead licensed a class of moral authorities who could “translate” popular concerns into state ideology and present that ideology to Muslim subjects. Akhunds and other clerics took advantage of this peculiar position to appropriate state power to their own ends.

VII. Mountain Spirits and Houses Along the Highway

Clerics learned to use the socio-moral regime to their advantage. As temporary marriage became ethnicized, it appeared instead as outright prostitution. Clerics sought to punish Turki women who had sex with Chinese men so as to maintain the boundaries around their communities. While they deployed moralistic language to extract positive results from the magistrate, the historical record indicates instead the powerful influence of exploitative economic relationships on Muslims’ carnal anxieties.

Without exception, the cases in the Turpan archive that explicitly address “prostitution” concern the maintenance of some kind of communal boundary. In all of these cases, the petitioner uses the word “prostitute” (chang娼, changji娼妓) to label a woman, or in Turki employs an appropriate and unambiguous euphemism (ex. andüňlik “disgusting deeds”). In only one case of “prostitution” do we see Han suing other Han, yet it is a lawsuit brought by one merchant community against another.372 Co-local origin, as I discussed in Chapters One and Two, was central to Han people’s articulations of belonging and groupness in Xinjiang. In this case, co-local identity was critical to maintaining a given community’s control over a key sector of the economy. One group

372 Document dated GX 05.03.25 in QXDX, vol. 28, 150; document dated GX 05.03.29 in QXDX, vol. 28, 152.
sued a member of another for prostitution, and she and her whole family were expelled. Given the shortage of marriageable Han women on the frontier, as well as the rarity of complaints against Chinese prostitutes, the logical conclusion to draw is that some merchants resented the encroachment of another group on trade in goods and in sex and found a useful pretext to secure the other group’s exile. Otherwise, the remaining cases of prostitution all concern the boundaries between Han and Turki.

Sexual relationships between Han and Turki were subject to the same slippage of categories between normative marriage and prostitution noted above. Given that Han-Turki “marriage” cases tended to make reference to contracts written out in Turkic, it appears that temporary marriage was the main way to constitute these relationships – yet this could lead to confusion. One Han village headman was scandalized to find a Turki prostitute at his gate one night, yelling that his grandson had promised to marry her. The magistrate refused to prosecute the grandson or the woman to save the headman’s reputation. The magistrate was skeptical about labeling her a “prostitute,” and she had violated no law. Thus, this ambiguity also meant that temporary wives and their families had little recourse to the judicial system when something went wrong: either their relations were marriages, and thus were the purview of village-level officials, or it was prostitution, and thus the women and their families could be found guilty of a serious crime.

This lack of oversight meant that conflicts involving temporary marriages could result in outrageous scandals before officials intervened. In one case, a Turki woman

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named Niyāz Khan had two daughters, Yin-hua “Silver Flower” and Gui-xiang “Osmanthus Fragance.”⁷³⁴ Their names thus followed the patterns seen among other sex workers in Turpan, though Niyāz Khan originally came from Kashgar with her sister Qiao-pa-kan. She married Yin-hua to a Han man, a former sub-lieutenant and now Confucian school teacher named Yang Qiting. When Yin-hua and Yang Qiting were together, Yin-hua unexpectedly died. Niyāz Khan and her sister sought money from Yang to make up for Yin-hua’s death, and apparently their loss of income, but they had no way of pressing their claim. Some months later, Niyāz Khan hired another Kashgari to help her exhume Yin-hua’s body from its grave outside the city walls, whence they brought it to Yang’s gate. They meant to incriminate Yang in her death, or else intimidate him into paying. Instead, they violated a statute in the Qing Code forbidding exhumation of corpses, and Yang took them before the yamen. The magistrate’s ruling reflects his recognition of the ugliness of the situation: Niyāz Khan was spared eighty lashes with the heavy stick, while her accomplice was only placed in the cangue. Both of them and Niyāz Khan’s family went sent back to Kashgar, and Yang was ordered to pay for their journey.

The names of the daughter of Niyāz Khan are interesting, as they are plainly given in Chinese and have no clear Turki equivalent. Actually, across prostitution cases, women’s names fall into a common pattern: groups of prostitutes are often represented as belonging to a real or fictive family unit. The older generation in this family universally are labeled with Turki names, while their daughters are almost always given Chinese

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names with an eroticizing or objectifying connotations: for example, one woman whom we will meet again below was called Ba-qian-wu “Eight Cash and Fifty.” Another went by Bai-hei-tang “White-and-Black Sugar.” The latter is probably a transliteration of the name Bakhta Khan, but the choice of characters is unique and, significantly, stable across the archival record. Bai-hei-tang is always given this name name in the archive, as Han and Hui usually were, while other Turki, including these women’s family members, frequently had their names re-transliterated. This suggests that Bai-hei-tang, including its written form, was the name by which she was known, like the Chinese names that other Turki took up for business purposes. The names of prostitutes and their family members also reflect the generational naming pattern found among the Turki students at the Confucian schools, whose grandfathers and great-grandfathers usually had Chinese names (without surnames), but whose fathers, who came of age in the Ya’qūb Beg era, went by Turki names. The name Bai-hei-tang “White-and-Black Sugar” may have indicated her origins as a mixed child of a Han man and her Turki mother. Children of Han-Turki unions often bore simple names like this without surnames: the Turki woman Ruwayda Khan, for example, had a daughter by her Han husband. They named her simply Tao-hua-er “Peach Blossom,” invoking youthful feminine beauty. We can hypothesize that the children of mixed unions sometimes entered the sex trade under these names.

Ruwayda Khan’s case illustrates the complexities of Turki-Han relationships in terms of the problems of definition and limits on state intervention. In 1881, Ruwayda

Khan (Yue-wei-ti Han, Re-wei-di Han), a widow with no remaining family, married Zhu Chunting, a Xiang Army soldier from Gansu. Within a year, she was pregnant, and Zhu returned to Gansu. According to a deposition taken from Zhu at the yamen in his native Ningzhou, he had been compelled to leave, and so entrusted his wife and unborn child to his friends Yao Zhengrong and Chen Desheng while he cared for his aging parents. Shortly after her daughter Tao-hua-er was born, Yao and Chen wrote to Zhu saying that she had committed adultery with another man. Zhu and his friends claimed that Zhu made an effort to return to Turpan, but could not. Zhu wrote to Yao and Chen with instructions to sell Ruwayda Khan. So, in 1885, Yao prepared to sell Ruwayda Khan and her daughter Tao-hua-er to Yang Bencheng, a older Han trader in Qarakhoja (Sanbao) who was also an associate of Zhang Xi. Yao and Chen found Yang through a pair of Hui go-betweens, who negotiated a steep bride price and a stipend for Tao-hua-er.

Ruwayda Khan was clearly unwilling to go through with the match. Her older brother Sabir heard that, when she learned she was to be remarried, she refused to eat for several days. When the Yang family came to fetch her, she swore she would rather die. Yao, Chen, the Hui go-betweens, and a pair of carters moved Ruwayda Khan and Tao-

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hua-er to a waystation along the highway, alleged tying her up and throwing her in the back of a cart. They refused to let Sabir visit her. When Ruwayda Khan eventually arrived at the Yang family’s house, according to Yang Bencheng, she claimed to be ill and unable to share a bed with him. Ten days later, he found her dead of opium poisoning. The Yangs kept her burial a secret until Sabir filed a suit with the magistrate over her death.

Governor Liu replied to a report on the apparent suicide by praising Ruwayda Khan’s willingness to sacrifice her life to maintain her chastity and faith to her husband. Liu was missing the point of the case, which involved several issues. Communication across the empire was necessary to establish the circumstances of her death. The identity and custody of Tao-hua-er remained a concern, as Yang had given her to the village headman for safekeeping, and the headman believed Yang was not planning to take her back. In any case, the only legal issue the magistrate could officially bring into consideration was a statute of the Qing Code forbidding people from selling off a woman over the age of eleven sui whom they had taken in. Eventually, all parties agreed that the marriage was just that, a normative husband-and-wife relationship, and the suit was dropped: Ruwayda Khan had killed herself, but only she was to blame.

Moreover, by 1881, it was already becoming apparent that Han-Turki unions were suspect because of the unequal economic relationships involved, and this was an obvious example of the problems that could arise. From a historical perspective, several questions arise that probably occurred to local authorities and other observers, as well: Did Zhu and Ruwayda Khan have a normative marriage, or a temporary marriage, or did Yao and Chen simply keep her in their household as a servant or prostitute? It may be impossible
to differentiate these categories clearly on the basis of the documentary evidence. Was Sabir simply trying to collect money from Ruwayda Khan’s death, and if so, did someone pay him off to settle the suit? Was he in fact her brother? He may have put forth a fictive family relationship in order to legitimize his demands. Given the circumstances of Turpan society in the decades following the Reconquest, the unequal social and economic relationship between Han and Turki would have made it nearly impossible for a man and woman from either group to actually have a normative husband-and-wife relationship. Regardless of what the underlying realities were in this case, the surrounding discourse suggests that Ruwayda Khan and Zhu Chunting’s marriage, and all that came after it, would have been interpreted in terms of exploitation.

Because of cases like Ruwayda Khan’s, Han-Turki sexual relationships became increasingly taboo among Turki, and that the perception of temporary marriage as prostitution was stronger when a woman crossed that communal boundary. Such women were not buried in the Muslim cemetery, but remained pariahs even in death.377 For the most part, this kind of policing of boundaries took place beyond the sight of the yamen. According to one Khwāja Näy Khan, whom Katanov interviewed in Lükchün in 1892, only the Hui maintained the sexual boundary around their community – they did not visit Han or Turki prostitutes, or vice versa – and the archival record confirms his assertion. Prostitution between Turki was tolerated, and apparently men visited such women frequently. Han prostitutes were much more expensive but available to Turki who could pay. Stigma emerged, however, when a Turki woman had sex with a Chinese man: “If one of the Chinese takes a local girl, she will be known as a whore,” explained Khwāja

Nāy Khan. “If someone who is a whore goes into a Chinese’s house, no one can stop her. A whore is a whore.” Crossing this boundary was tantamount to leaving the community, but this was something Turki felt unable to prevent. Women, at least in the eyes of this Turki man, were being lost to the Chinese: “There are also local whores who have come into the possession of Chinese and become Chinese. … The whores fear no one as they go over to the Chinese.” Where temporary marriage had once served, normatively at least, as a relatively non-stigmatizing contract between a local woman and a Muslim sojourner, now in Turpan it intersected with the division between Muslim and non-Muslim, Turki and Chinese. The Han tendency to take Turki women by force or by payment came to elicit strong resentment on the part of Turki men.

Because the Turpan archive was produced through a Qing administrative system that euphemized and suppressed knowledge of conflicts involving sex, it can be difficult to discern these dynamics clearly in the cases. In order to make sense of further cases, let us look at the South, where the India Office records produced by the British representative in Kashgar are much more candid.

Where the north of Xinjiang was dominated by Tianjinese merchant networks, which had a significant presence in the south, the area around the western rim of the Tarim Basin was dominated by Hindustani merchants. The majority were from Shikarpur in Sindh, today’s Pakistan, and were known mainly as moneylenders.378 The British representative, and later consul, complained of the frequency with which lawsuits involving their Hindustani subjects and local Turki came to their door, as the merchants,

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378 In one month, the consul dealt with 104 cases between Hindustani lenders and Turki debtors. (IOR L/P&S/10/825; IOR L/P&S/10/976; IOR L/P&S/7/203; IOR L/P&S/7/202.) Some local officials blamed the Turki for refusing to pay the moneylenders.
like the Chinese in the North, demanded very high interest on loans of money and goods. At least some of these debts ended with a merchant taking a local woman as a concubine rather in lieu of payment. At the same time, the mostly Hindu merchants, who generally spoke at least passable Turki, would take pseudonyms in order to blend into local society. Many put down roots in Kashgaria and maintained families locally or on either side of the Pamir Mountains. These Hindu moneylenders enjoyed the protection of British subjecthood, the economic advantages of mobility across imperial boundaries, and the benefit of status in local society – and now they became increasingly exploitative, even to the point of taking slaves. Turki reacted as best they were able given the minimal protections available to them through the government, which had allowed the merchants a great deal of latitude in their activities. An agreement between the British representative and the magistrates of Kashgar and Yarkand forbade Muslims from slaughtering cows within a certain radius of the Hindus’ residence, the serai. Thus made aware in a simplistic way of the Hindu veneration of cows, Turki would slaughter cattle and hang their skins on the doors of the Hindustani serai, or chase the merchants down the street, calling out, “Do you eat beef? DO YOU EAT BEEF?”

Matters came to a head in 1907, when a crowd of Turki and Afghan men entered the Hindu serai in Yarkand. They demanded that a cook named Ditta Ram and the Turki woman staying in his quarters be turned over to Muslim authorities. There appears in Kashgaria, as in Turpan, to have been a general distinction between “marriage” and “prostitution”: the latter involved a woman staying alone in her establishment, where she

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379 IOR L/P&S/7/202.
might receive multiple visitors in a day. Arrangements were not uncommon whereby both Chinese and Hindustanis cohabited with Turki women, and these were lawful. However, bringing such relationships out of the private realms of expatriate merchant communities into that of justice, either as served by an Islamic authority or by the crowd, had the effect of making them illicit and demanding censure. In this case, while the Hindus freely provided the Turki woman, their refusal to present Ditta Ram without a joint inquiry with the British representative precipitated several days of anti-Hindu violence that spread across the South. Other Hindu-Turki couples as far away as Poskam found themselves besieged in their homes, while calls came from qadis for such people to be stoned and beheaded.

The arguments that arose between Hindus and Muslims in Kashgaria were revealing: for a long time, Muslims had resisted the establishment of serais, explicitly stating fears that Hindu men would debauch their wives and daughters. During the incident at the serai, Hindu merchants countered the Muslims’ demands by proclaiming that Turki women were for sale at the right price: they said, “with money, the Hindus could debauch the daughters of Muhammadans not only in the Serai but in the mosque as well” or “do zan-bazi [P. “womanizing”] inside the mosque by tint of Yambus and Seers.” Whether a Hindu actually said this or a Muslim believed he had, the message

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380 IOR, L/P&S/10/825.
381 IOR, L/P&S/7/202.
382 IOR L/P&S/7/200.
was that Shikarpuri wealth was felt to threaten Turki community, or more specifically Turki masculinity.

Usually, it was local Islamic actors who called down the state to punish prostitutes, and they did so using coded language. In 1883, a group of akhunds from around Turpan first approached the magistrature with a petition. They were responding to an order from the *yamen*, the original text of which has been lost, though the Turki translation is quite vivid: “Until the bad women within this land are eliminated, trouble will come to it, plagues will enter it, rot will appear, insects will descend on the crops, hard winds will blow, and all this will come from the trouble of the bad women. By the imperial grace, you will eliminate these bad women.” The akhunds had gone out and written up a list of women to be punished for immoral behavior. They chose as their targets “degenerate Turki women” (*bu xiao zhi chan fu*) who had established themselves in brothels on the highway from China proper into Xinjiang. Khwāja Nāy Khan told Katanov that these women charged more for their services than streetwalkers, but this also meant that their trade was much more open, and so more easily assailed. According to the petition, some of the “bad women” living in Turpan Bazaar were part of a family: Mastūra was the wife of Jahān Bāqī and the daughter of the widow Anāl. Officials considered both women to be willingly engaged in sex work along with a third woman, Gūlūsh. In the end, however, they were not exactly punished: Mastūra and Jahān Bāqī were settled on a plot of land at the Number Six Karez in Lükhün, alongside Anāl and

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384 GX 8.9.19 “台吉艾不咱開列吐城娼妓名單及吐魯番廳之批語” in QXDX vol. 28, 268.

385 “Yurtñin ičidäki yaman mažlümnlarni yoqatmasa bolmağunčä, yurtğä bala kälmäk, wabä kirmäk, čikutkū [çiritkū?] paydä bolmaq, zirä atlağä pît tüşmäk, qattiğ boran bolmaq, yaman mažlümnlarnij kisâfatidin paydä bolur ikän. Iltifät bolsa, şundaq yaman mažlümni yoqatip berürär."
Gülüş, who were assigned Turki husbands. 386 The akhunds took the responsibility for locating appropriate land for these families to farm, along with the “men to look after these women” (şubu mażlûmlarni saqlağan ădamlar). “From now on,” they later reported, “they no longer join with good nor bad people, but go about doing business here.” 387 The state provided each with a stipend. There was a catch, however: a year later, Jahân Bāqī reported that Mastûra, having been sent to the court of the King of Lükchûn for detention before resettlement, had actually never been released to him. 388 We may recall Khusnân Khan’s case, where the king had seized her from her Han husband and brought her into the palace. In the interpretation of one Han official, the king was able to rectify corrupt women’s morals by putting them into the service of their betters. 389 While the magistrate promised to open an investigation, the results are unknown.

What we can discern from this case, however, when it is put into historical context, is the conflict and collusion of multiple interests: first, the provincial government wanted to rectify family relations and build a stable society. They did so in part by exiling prostitutes to Lop Nur and placing them into families. There are several cases of exile from Turpan, and in every one, it is a woman sent to Lop Nur, which appears to have been in part under the jurisdiction of the King of Lükchûn. When women settled there fell ill, it was his underlings who reported it, and he would write a request to the


387 “Bularmu mundin keyin yaman yaḥṣi kişigâ qoşulmay, şu yerđä yürüp, tijärat qiladurğan boldi.”

388 GX 10.3.9 “吐魯番廳同意領回姜八亥之妻的批文” in QYDX vol. 28, 362.

389 Xiao Xiong, Xijiang za shu shi, j. 3, 9a-9b.
magistrate to allow the woman to return home. Secondly, Muslim elites had learned how to invoke state power to police communal boundaries as they saw them. This skillful deployment of moralistic language succeeded in separating Turki women from Han men, and then placing them with Turki men. The petitioners, having been tasked with the implementation of family norms, would have been well aware that a successful complaint would result in exile.

What the state could not countenance was the idea that Han women were bringing about social disruption – it was as though, in their view, only Turki women could be morally corrupt. In 1887, a group of Muslim clerics sent a petition to the magistrate.

The Turki version read:

Petition from all of your underlings from Pichan, Liushi Hu, Er Gong, and San Gong:

Every spring, our runoff from the mountains comes in the fourth month. Now, however, it is the tenth of the fourth month. The water is still not coming from the mountains. We gathered the akhunds and went about everywhere, praying. The water still does not come. We asked very, very old people who have lived for a very long time, “Why should it be so?” They said, “If there is much prostitution in the land, the water won’t come.” We find: there are some bad women in this area. These women engage in

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390 Cf. GX 8.11.1 “吐魯番廳准呼拉一保外就送之具保” in QXDX, vol. 28, 379.


prostitution. They neither take their leave, nor go about peacefully doing their business, but always do bad things. Because of the badness of their acts, our water does not come. Bugs eat our crops, and the wind blows them away. We submit this petition on these matters.

As in the previous case and in the context of the riots in Kashgaria, the phrase “bad women” (yaman khatunlar) here is a euphemism for those Turki women who have sex with non-Chinese men. This is implied by the assertion that the prostitutes are somehow new, that they “do not take their leave” and thus come from elsewhere. The textual strategies of representation that the clerics used make this clear. First, in this initial Turki-language petition, we see an attempt by the clerics to appeal to their imagination of Chinese power. At this point in time, the Muslims of Turpan had been required to contribute money towards the building of a new city god temple, and the centrality of spirits to Chinese state-building had been impressed upon them. The ritual implied here is the use of a yada stone, a kind of magical focus for calling down rain. In the Chinese translation, this ritual and the presentation of the supernatural was further tailored for a Chinese audience:

The dorgha, mirab, and xiangyue of Pichan, Liushi Hu, Er Gong, and San Gong petition the magistrate [respected uncle]. We petition: the lands farmed by those households that we Muslim chiefs administer are all lacking water. Every year, they depend on mountain runoff to irrigate them. Before, mountain runoff always flowed down to irrigate the sprouts in the first ten days of the fourth month. This year, up until now, there has been no water at all.

We Muslim chiefs find: we asked old folks around here, who said that the reason that the mountain runoff still has not arrived is all because there are extremely many

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392 GX 13.3.8 “吐魯番廳曉諭建城隍廟及領隊大臣專祠集納銀兩” in QXDX, vol. 29, 71. Chinese and Muslims alike were meant to donate and to have their names inscribed at the temple, though Muslims were ordered not to be pressured into recording their names.
prostitutes here. Because they have offended local spirits, they have blocked up the mountain runoff so it does not flow. Right now, the sprouts are all dry. We Muslim chiefs jointly petition to ask the magistrate to forbid prostitution and clear the land, in order to receive the spirits’ manifest response and save the myriad people.

The key reframing comes with the deployment of “spirits.” Although ethnographers have documented local customs extensively, animistic beliefs in mountain spirits do not appear to be among them. Rather, this was an attempt to appeal to what they imagined as Chinese spirituality in order to ask for the expulsion of Chinese prostitutes. It did not work. The magistrate and his staff once again perceived the motives behind the petition in its social context. He replied,

Local prostitutes and itinerant whores all ought to be banished, to support the transformation of customs. As for the poor flow of mountain runoff, it is only that the weather has been cool lately, and the snows are not melting. What does this have to do with prostitution? What has been petitioned is truly fabricated nonsense.

In short, no action was to be taken. The magistrate rejected the notion that outsiders could cause spiritual instability, which in this context was simply a device for talking about a kind of social instability that could not yet be spoken of in the official context. It took repeated incidents of violence and disturbance for Xinjiang officials to acknowledge intercommunal sexual relations as a problem. Yet, even then, their response was to impose further restrictions on Turki women.

In 1896, when finally the frequency of conflicts over Turki-Han sexual relationships came to a head, the provincial government’s solution was even more exile

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393 Cf. Adili Apaer [Adil Ghappar Karezi], Weiwuerzu saman wenhua yicun diaocha, (Beijing: Minzu Chubanshe, 2010).
Financial Commissioner Rao Yingqi sent an order that “The Muslim masses shall immediately be put into order, which is to say made subjects” (Hui zhong ji jing shoufu, ji shu zimin 回眾既經收撫，即屬子民). Soldiers were expressly (though ineffectively) forbidden from taking Turki women by force, on pain of punishment through military law. Any women so affected were to be sent with their children to Lop Nur.

VIII. Conclusion

In Chapter Two, I argued that the Hunanese-led provincial government aimed at creating a certain kind of colonial subject: a family actor who, as an educated male, would lead his community into moral action. They brought the state apparatus to bear on women, as well, by placing them into normative familial relationships meant to rectify their characters. The widespread resettlement of displaced women intersected in a complex way with on-the-ground encounters between Turki, Han, and Hui, who engaged in a range of partnerships, from normative Islamic or Chinese marriages, to human trafficking and slavery, to temporary marriage and prostitution. Rather than address the economic causes of tensions surrounding sex between members of different communities, most administrators concluded once again that immorality was to blame. As Reconstruction dragged on, and the provincial government lost its capacity to intervene in local society, it did so more and more sporadically, regulating familial and sexual relations mostly when local actors called upon it to do so. Eventually, while practices

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such as exile to Lop Nur persisted, morality became a strictly local affair – even the widespread riots in Kashgaria were resolved not through any directive from Dihua, but through the brinkmanship of the local magistrate Peng Xuzhan.

Nevertheless, into the Republic, governors in Dihua asserted the immorality of Turki women as part of their diagnoses of Xinjiang’s problems. Yang Zengxin, who pledged neutrality with regard to local law and largely devolved power to the magistrates, intervened early on in Turki marriage practices. This served as a means for Yang to publicly assert his authority, though it likely had no real effect. Jin Shuren, during his drive for comprehensive reform, argued that prostitution was at the center of the failure of government. Loose women, he suggested, were attracted to the wealth of Dihua, but seduced the sons of prominent men into lives of debauchery – never mind widespread corruption and deeply-entrenched local interests.

To these proclamations we may add the centrality of women’s sexuality to stories surrounding the 1931 Qumul Uprising. Nationalist and Chinese historiographies both assert that the attempted rape of a young Turki woman sparked off the violence that led to the first East Turkestan Republic. The woman herself, Ayiskhan, told the story a little differently when someone finally bothered to interview her: the Qumul Uprising indeed

395 MG 4.9.11 “示禁纏女早婚文” “Forbidding Turki women to marry young” in Buguo zhai wendu, 2,566-2,570.
396 新疆省政府公報 5 (1930), 70-72.
397 Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 191-192; Khoja Sali and Ablimit Abdulla, “1931-yildiki Qumul Dehqlanlar Qozchilingining biwasitâ säwäpchisi Jang Gokhuning täqdiri hâqiqidâ täkshürûsh” in Qumul Shähûrinin Tarikh Materiyalliri 10, 184-210, 195-197. I am inclined to believe Ayiskhan’s account, not only because she was central to the events, but because it is so plainly different from all of the others: she uses no phraseology borrowed from official accounts, and instead explicitly corrects it on several points. On the economic origins of the rising, see Jacobs, “Empire Besieged,” 254-256.
began when a local Han tax collector pressured her father into letting him marry her. However, the tax collector, Zhang Guohu, was well known to her father, Sali, as they had worked together for years in the service of the King of Qumul, and Zhang was a frequent houseguest. Their relationship was by no means equal, but it was defined strictly by ethnic difference. Rather, Jin Shuren’s land reforms threatened the propertied class to which her father belonged, and Zhang’s advances served as a useful pretext to seize power from Dihua’s newly assertive intermediaries. The trope of revenge for the rape of a woman has remained part of the master narrative of Uyghur uprisings, yet it has been converted from a reflection of local tensions that played out through female sexuality into a metaphor for the oppression of a male-gendered nation through miscegenation.

When the revolution spread to Kashgar in 1933, nationalists and Islamists alike targeted “bad women.”398 A Swedish mission doctor, Maria Bergquist, documented the abuses that Kyrgyz and Turki forces heaped upon women without a male guardian. Unmarried women out on the street were considered fair game for soldiers, who married them by force. Similarly, some women who had converted to Christianity were hanged unless they agreed to be married to a Turkic Muslim man. While soldiers plundered the yamen and established new organs of government in them, so, too, did they take Han women by force.

In each major upheaval, from the Muslim Uprisings to the Reconquest to the revolution of 1933, the lines between communities sharpened as armed men imposed ideals of belonging on a heterogeneous population that often violated them. The character of that differentiation shifted along with the latent tensions in society. In the Muslim

398 Riksarkivet, Stockholm, SE/RA/730284/6/13/1, Maria Bergquist, diary, 1933.
Uprisings, Turki massacred Han or compelled them to convert, or sometimes took Han women into their homes by force as servants or wives. Subsequent conflicts with the Hui reified the Turki perception that Turki, as musulmān, were normative Muslims, while Hui were apostates. The return of the Han forced the classification and separation of Han and Turki, but the regime of li also placed Muslims and non-Muslims into the same households and provided the opportunity for Chinese-speaking Han and Hui to exploit displaced Turki women. Where previously temporary marriage served Turki by bringing profit from fixed-term sexual arrangements and community through the exchange of goods, temporary marriage between Turki and Han conducted through cash exchanges fed into a more clearly exploitative practice of trafficking. Among Turki, temporary marriage remained an acceptable norm, but marriage and sex across boundaries was a site of contestation over broader economic and political inequalities that helped to engender a stronger sense of ethnic difference.

As I argued in the previous chapter, the history of the Confucian schools is male-gendered: it is the story of elite young men, some of whom resented learning Chinese and the Classics. That later turned into a central narrative in the history of Uyghur nationalism, which emerged from the same elite stratum. While elite Xinjiang society has always been male-dominated, the effect of Alptekin’s story has been, in part, to shift attention further away from the role of women in the ongoing definition of community. Where women have appeared in this story, they have been nearly anonymous objects of male jealousy. If instead we begin, not from the emergence of Uyghur nationalism, but from the earliest days of Reconstruction, when identities were very much in flux, we find something very different: women’s sexuality was bound up in complex ways with
ongoing concerns about economic inequalities and religious and cultural difference. Women’s bodies were battlegrounds for other kinds of male elites, both the Chinese administrators who declared women to be at the epicenter of Xinjiang’s chronic political dysfunction and Muslim clerics who pushed back against the encroachment of Han into their communities. Later, this relationship was reinterpreted through modernist, nationalist frameworks that held the individual to be the metonym of the larger community, and control of carnal boundaries to be essential to its maintenance.

However, in the 1870s, there was already a seed of this idea: differences between Turki and Han became clearer in conflicts over where women belonged and who controlled their sexuality. In the Turpan archive, cases of this kind are concentrated in the first twenty years after the Reconquest. They were a product in large part of the chaos of Reconstruction, when people were displaced and local society and economy were in flux. In the following chapters, I will examine phenomena of a more stable time, when people in Xinjiang were working on not just recovering what they had lost, but building their communities and places that were significant to them.
Chapter Four: “Oh, the Chinese Bones!”

“In the third year of the Tongzhi emperor, the world fell apart.” So testified a Turki man named Mämät in a land dispute with a returning Han settler. He was referring to the outbreak of the Muslim uprisings across Xinjiang in 1864. Before that, Mämät wrote, “in the time of peace,” a Han had purchased a plot of land from him, which Mämät took back when Yang fled the violence. Mämät’s poetic phraseology pointed both to an event and to its multiple interpretations: instrumentally, a Turki petitioner seeking to contest a dispute over his plot of land would have presented himself as a loyal subject and the uprisings as a disruption in the imperial order. At the same time, Mämät’s formulation speaks to a common sense, expressed in texts in several of the languages then written in Xinjiang, that the events of 1864-1877 had engendered a traumatic break with the past.

To give one dramatic example, a Sibe chronicle of the period includes the following poem describing the aftermath:

The sun rises in the east and sets in the west.
A cold wind scatters bones; the yellowed leaves fall down.
Shields and spears rise up in profusion;
The wilderness in all directions fills up with dead corpses.
Ill omens fly through the air;
They hang people’s guts on branches of trees.

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400 “Yili shibian ji” in Tong Yuquan and Tong Keli, eds., Xibo zu minjian sancun Qing dai Man wen gudian wenxian (Wulumuqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2008), 45-96, 57.
Ghosts crying, phantoms wailing,
Dead souls everywhere encircling.

If we believe the available population figures and anecdotal accounts of the destruction, then the scale of violence and displacement becomes apparent.\(^{401}\) We have no good data on the pre-Uprisings population of the South, where Han Chinese were technically banned from settlement. However, local chronicles bragged of thousands of Chinese bodies piled up, and thousands more Han forcibly converted to Islam.\(^{402}\) Turning to the North, it is unclear how many of the 40,000 Qing soldiers stationed in Ili (including Han, Manchu, Solon, Sibe, and others) perished in the fighting, but travelers soon after described the near-total ruination of their administrative centers and residences.\(^{403}\) Where numbers are available, they indicate the almost total removal of Han Chinese. According to the most recent pre-Uprisings population data, dating to 1830, about 155,000 Han lived in the North. We may estimate the 1887 population of the entire province at around 1,400,000, of which only 66,000 were Han Chinese, the bulk of whom arrived as part of or alongside the 60,000-man-strong Xiang Army. It is still unclear just how many Han were left in Xinjiang after the uprisings, but it would appear that nearly all of them died or fled.\(^{404}\)

\(^{401}\) Millward, Beyond the Pass, 51, 271-272, fn. 21; Millward, Eurasian Crossroads, 121, 131-132, 135, 152-153.

\(^{402}\) See for example Hamada Masami, “L’Histoire de Hotan de Muḥammad Aʿlam (I), texte turque oriental édité, avec une introduction” Zinbun 15 (1979), 1-45, 9.

\(^{403}\) Henry Lansdell, Russian Central Asia, Including Kuldja, Bokhara, Khiva and Merv, (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, and Rivington, 1885), Vol. 1, 197, 200, 204.

\(^{404}\) The QXDX collection, I have recently discovered, reproduces tax registers from both the Tongzhi and Guangxu periods. It should be possible, on the basis of these records, to estimate the change in Han population across the uprisings.
In the meantime, pockets of resistance had held out, among them the eastern redoubt of Barköl (Balikun). The Han Chinese of Barköl resisted Muslim assault without aid for several years. One of their local leaders later described the years 1864-1866 as “when the Muslim fury burned its brightest, and fighting never ceased.” Yet the Barkölese representation of their recent past came to be subsumed in the Xiang Army’s narrative of the Uprisings as part of a broader story of upheaval and trauma that engulfed all of China, the Military Disaster (bingxian 兵燹). 

The Barkölese and the Hunanese chose two different ways to represent the violence of the Uprisings and Reconquest, and also to interpret it. They did so partly because their experiences simply differed, but also because narratives of the recent past enabled either group to make different claims to a heroic role in resistance to the Muslim uprisings. In the case of the Barkölese and the Hunanese, the former constituted a local community with roots primarily in nearby Gansu who held out despite the odds for the whole of the Uprisings period. Despite this heroic narrative, they struggled to have their experiences included in later histories and their war dead as martyrs in the Hunanese-led project of memorial. The Hunanese, for their part, depicted the reconquest of Xinjiang as part of the army’s long sweep across Qing territory. They were the heroes of this narrative, in which Xinjiang had been totally lost to Chinese. The presence of a holdout threatened the centrality of their agency in that story.

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405 GX 8.3.1 “神靈顯應懇賜匾額封號摺” in Liu xiangqin gong zouzhe, j. 3, 17a-20b. “回氛甚熾，斗粟萬錢。”

406 Tobie Meyer-Fong (What Remains, 62-63) vividly describes the conceptualization of the Taiping war as an apocalyptic event.
The master narrative for the Hunanese, the Barkölese, and others was one of traumatic violence, loss, and recovery. They contested the details of who had lost, and who was the agent of the subsequent recovery. Dominick LaCapra calls this phenomenon “traumatropism”: an event experienced as loss opens up a space for transformation, wherein the dead become martyrs, the mundane sacred or vice versa, and the event itself a historical moment of triumph or shame. This chapter is engaged with traumatropism in Reconstruction Xinjiang. I argue that discourses of loss and recovery surrounding the Uprisings provided a set of means for people to advance claims to place, property, and membership in families and communities. These claims centered around the practices of memorial and burial on multiple social levels, particularly of identifying the dead and working their individual obituaries into grander narratives of communal struggle, loss, and recovery. We will revisit the Barkölese and Hunanese in Chapter Five. For now, suffice it to say that the ways they represented the dead point to a broader negotiation between individual and collective subjecthoods.

That negotiation took place through the institutions of the reconstruction and provincial periods. These institutions and their personnel in turn brought tropes of trauma and recovery familiar from China proper to bear on the experience of violence in Xinjiang, specifically the emergent Qing discourse as it developed during and after the Taiping war. Turki used different frames from Islamicate culture and history to explain the violence. The Muslim uprisings thus served as a common limit event for different groups, a moment in historical memory when the world changed irrevocably, but which was construed in very different ways. Across groups, however, we find a common

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407 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, xiv.
concern with the physical remains of the dead, not just because these remains were present and visible, but because “the bodies of the dead function as politically fraught and emotionally meaningful symbols in the aftermath of political crises.” Xinjiang was caught up in a broader discourse of recovery playing out across post-Taiping China, and the region’s transformation became entangled with the empire-wide process of reconstruction.

I. Scattered Bones and Orphaned Children

The Han Chinese discussion of loss during and after the Muslim Uprisings played out mainly through stories and practices concerning the recovery of living family members cut off by the war or, failing that, of their remains. For more than a century, officials exiled to the region had provided images of Xinjiang by writing about their experiences in the borderlands. Such elites were outnumbered, however, by ordinary criminals sent permanently to Xinjiang, whose disappearance into the frontier must have affected their families, and by merchants who sojourned beyond the Pass for long periods, leaving their kin uncertain if they would ever return. In the early nineteenth century, gazetteers in the Northwest specifically acknowledged the chastity of widows who promised to wait until death for their husbands sojourning in Xinjiang. Once in a

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410 Wang Shengrong grew up without his father, grandfather, and brother, but finally located them in Xianfeng 10. (Guangxu 6 [1880] *Xinzhou zhi*, j. 33.) The stories of chaste widows from Fuping County,
while, a son might go beyond the Pass and reunite in tears with a long-lost father in Kashgar, but the majority waited. The Uprisings, with their total breakdown in communication between Central China and Xinjiang and the image of half an empire aflame, seemed to foreclose the possibility of reunion. That perception of loss, or rather the sense that loss took place both in individual families and to millions of families across the empire during the Military Disaster, opened up a space to frame it in terms of individual or communal subjecthoods.

Two accounts of what was ostensibly the same journey to recover lost remains point to the ways in which common descent and family property – or patrimony and territory – played out in the discursive and practical fields of death and memorial. One traveler in search of his father’s bones was Feng Junguang. Feng was a Cantonese scholar-official from a well-regarded family. In 1858, his father, an official named Feng Yuheng, was exiled to Ili as punishment for misuse of government funds. Junguang and his younger brother, presumably at great expense, accompanied their father all the way across the empire.⁴¹¹ They left him there in the company of a surprisingly large Cantonese community, including their maternal aunt Lu shi and her husband Yansheng, as well as the garrison commander Chang Xi, who was a second cousin. Theirs was a comfortable exile.

When the Muslim Uprisings broke out, the Feng clan rightly feared the worst. They would never see Yuheng alive again. In 1877, when news arrived of the pacification

Shaanxi, for example, paint a grimmer picture of the lives of those whose families were split apart by the quest for wealth along the western roads. (Guangxu 17 [1891] Fuping xian zhi gao, j. 9.)

⁴¹¹ Feng Junguang, 497, 502-506, 526-527.
of the North, Junguang’s uncle Peiqing was in Lanzhou. Peiqing was probably part of the Guangdong Army, given his place of origin and the large number of fellow Cantonese around him. Twenty years after the family had said goodbye to Yuheng, the lines of communication to Ili were open again, and suddenly letters could pass from one end of the empire to the other in the hands of the merchants of the Tianchengxiang, who handled the logistics for the Northwest campaign, and of any Chinese who could afford to leave Ili and travel home. In this case, the Feng clan had excellent connections in the administration, and Peiqing learned of Hengyu’s fate both from a traveling Cantonese and through another brother, who was sent ahead to Gucheng. As Peiqing traveled into Xinjiang and learned more, he sent letters back to Junguang: Yuheng died in August 1864, they said. He was buried in the cemetery at the Guangdong-Guangxi native-place association, of rather what remained of it. The next year, it was reported, the Muslims had taken the coffins for firewood, or to desecrate the cemetery. Many of the bodies had been moved, and the cemetery’s caretaker had fled to Jimsar and died years ago.

Yuheng’s bones, if they could be found, would be the Feng clan’s last physical link to pre-Uprising Ili. Chang Xi died early in 1865 during the siege of the city, and no one could say where he was buried. Hengyu’s concubine took poison, while his young daughter ran off into oblivion. A pair of nieces were seized by the Muslims, never to be seen again. The same was true for Lu shi and Yansheng – according to some, they fled Ili during the Uprisings and disappeared. Others said they killed themselves when the walls finally fell. Later, Peiqing learned that Yansheng had died with Chong Xi, as well as Yuheng’s son by his concubine, battling the Muslims at the Liangzhou native-place association, while Lu shi committed suicide out of loyalty to her husband. Of course,
these stories provided the dead with morally satisfactory ends that suited their entry into the annals of exemplary men and women. Whether they succeeded in their last moments in acting out such narratives, no one can say.

Feng Junuguang, now in the employ of Zeng Guofan, used his connections to secure a leave of absence and set out for Ili to find his father’s bones, along with his loyal servant Wang Zhensheng. Junuguang spent his idle hours reading. He found it relaxing: the Classics or the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* could give him an afternoon in quiet contemplation. Junuguang took little notice of his intended destination, save for those details necessary to secure his travel and safety. Rather, his diary makes it seem as though he floated across China in a bubble of literati culture. He consumed little of the “Western Regions” literature then so popular with travelers to the Northwest, except for during the weeks spent in Lanzhou waiting for his father’s casket, when he once verified the name of a local river.  

Junguang seems to have been preoccupied instead by the frequent letters from his uncle Peiqing, who wrote that Yuheng’s remains were found at last, scattered in the Guangdong-Guangxi cemetery. Peiqing had been stunned to find the whole cemetery in disarray, but, through prayer and divination, he recovered twenty-eight bones and placed them in an attractive little ossuary mode of Tianshan red pine. At this news, Junguang chastised himself for dereliction of his filial duty. He mourned for his father’s laughing face, twenty years gone. After a long and eager wait, Peiqing arrived in Gansu with Hengyu’s bones. Junguang brought his father home, and as he passed through Suzhou

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412 Feng Junuguang, 529.

413 Feng Junuguang, 526-527, 531.
and Lanzhou, high-ranking military commanders came out along the red willow road to pay their respects to the exile. This fact is curious, given that Yuheng had been exiled for committing a crime: it is possible that both Peiqing’s story of divination and Junguang’s memorial parade are fictions, tropes meant to bring a narrative of filiality to a satisfactory close. On the other hand, given Feng Junguang’s connections to Zeng Guofan and his father’s relatively comfortable exile, it is possible that the Xiang Army leadership really was uninvested in the Qing imperial project, and that they really did regard people like Yuheng as martyrs.

Junguang’s companion Wang Zhensheng left a diary of this journey as well. While Feng Junguang barely mentions his erstwhile clerk, Wang seems to have felt deeply about his connection to his mentor and about the significance of their quest. His account begins with a blunt statement: “I was orphaned at a young age.”⁴¹⁴ Wang lost his parents early in the Taiping war, and after the educated young man had wandered for years across a chaotic China and taken on various jobs in a half-dozen places, Feng took him under his wing. By Wang’s account, Feng was despondent at the news of his father’s fate and struggled for months to secure permission from his family and office to travel into the war zone, meeting resistance from friends who pled with him not to risk his life. At last, Wang and Feng tearfully agreed to undertake the journey together.

Unlike Feng, who was single-mindedly focused on his filial duty and sought escape from the journey in Classical literature, Wang spent his time on the road reading Evidentiary Learning texts and collections of poetry about Xinjiang.⁴¹⁵ Along the way, he

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⁴¹⁴ Wang Zhensheng, 1900, Xizheng riji, 219, 273-274.

composed eight *Xinjiang yongshi shi* “Elegies of Xinjiang” of his own. He wrote in the Evidentiary style, complete with extensive notes, to memorialize the deeds of the Xiang Army:

They feared not death on the sandy field, nor transformation into corpses;
They followed the army for 10,000 *li*, waiting long to return.
The spring winds in the willows on the road to the western Pass,
The autumn moon round as a lute playing songs above the redoubts…
An artful strike, a surprise at night, and the barbarians rode away –
Army drums boomed forth sad songs of Chu. Many of those soldiers who marched west were men of Chu (Hunan and Hubei).
I pity them: in that far-off land, the songs of home were distant.
To gamble it all for country and glory, they endured separation.416

Wang never entered Xinjiang – like earlier poets who wrote “shepherd’s songs” for a distant herdsman, he was engaging in a broader imagination of the borderlands.417 In Wang’s case, as was true for many who did live in Xinjiang, the history of the Northwest was now intimately tied to the heroic and ongoing struggles of the Xiang Army. Here, Wang invokes images that both tie Xinjiang to China proper and emphasize its alienness and distance: the men of Chu traveled far to the west and, as Zuo actually did, planted red willows along the way. The Xiang Army’s movements are inscribed on the landscape in a trail of trees that symbolize not just the marking of territory, but also the transformation

416 拚死沙場革裡屍
従軍萬里滯歸期
春風楊柳關西路
秋月琵琶塞上詩
刁鬥夜驚胡騎走
鼓鼙聲動楚歌悲 (西征將士多楚人)
可憐絕域鄉音渺
縱博封侯奈別離

417 I refer here to Qi Yunshi’s (1751-1815) *Xi chui zhu zhici* (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 2010).
of the land and its people at the very root. At the same time, Wang’s poem points back to Xiang Yu (232-202 BCE), a warlord from the ancient state of Chu, corresponding to today’s Hunan and Hubei. Xiang Yu was thought to have failed heroically in the final defence of his state against the emergent Han dynasty, with “songs of Chu on all sides” (si mian Chu ge 四面楚歌).

Simultaneously, their glory and service is contrasted with the irretrievable distance that most perceived the going “beyond the Pass” to symbolize. The fact that Feng was tied into a network of Cantonese and fellow officials that extended from one end of the Qing to the other gives the lie to that idea, as does the persistence for a century of long-distance trade networks from Shanxi all the way to Ili. For Wang Zhensheng, Xinjiang was ultimately the burial ground of faceless heroes. I am not psychologizing Wang – rather, I am arguing that he was part of a new generation of people whose experience of the tumultuous middle years of the nineteenth century engaged deeply in the politics of memorial. They wrote their own lives into a gigantic history of destruction and reconstruction, in which the Taiping served both as the central common experience and as the defining historical moment. All history involves selective forgetting, and in China in the 1870s, that included subsuming local and family tragedies into a broader narrative of suffering. Wang’s vision of Xinjiang’s recent history was thus a journey of recovery, not just of lost parents, but of lost patrimony.

Much as Lu shi and Yansheng’s stories reflected the moral priorities of an imperial elite, so did Wang’s story borrow from the tropes and master narratives that

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418 On the cultural legacy of the Taiping, see Meier-Fong, *What Remains*. 
defined a new era of imperial memory. Occasionally, such stories made it into local gazetteers back in China proper. Much like the stories that surrounded the Taiping and Nien wars, these expressed a widespread desire for closure following traumatic loss as much as they served to promote Confucian family morality. Indeed, we can already see in this literature the appropriation of the dead for narratives of national recovery and the assertion of what were then being construed as core moral values. According to one such narrative, Hui Sicong from Fuping County, Shaanxi, was small when his father Hui Dayou went to sojourn in Xinjiang. Sicong grew up during the Muslim Uprisings. He would ask his mother where his father was, and she would tell him “10,000 li away, and no one knows where he might be found.” Because the boy so longed for his father, he fell into incurable melancholia, crying and refusing food, until one day in 1884 a Fuping man happened to run into Dayou in the town of Daheyan. According to the gazetteer, when Sicong heard the news, he was torn. He could honor his mother’s love and concern, expressed as harsh criticism: “Daheyan may as well be in Heaven, and my boy hasn’t the wings to fly!” He could do what he knew to be his filial duty: “If he is on Earth, what reason is there that he can’t be reached?!” With a fortuneteller’s blessing, mother and son found an auspicious day for the westward journey to begin, and so Sicong traveled alone through the winter, ill-dressed to save money, over freezing mountain passes.

There is an element here of filial piety that recalls the stories of the Twenty-Four Filial Exemplars, in which young boys often endured the cold to spare their parents, lying on the ice to catch a fish or going without clothing to keep a cruel stepmother warm. Finally, when father and son were reunited, they immediately recognized each other, thus

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419 *Fuping xian zhi gao*, j. 9.
demonstrating natural recognition of the parent-child relationship. An elm tree now grows in Daheyan, says the gazetteer, named for Sicong the filial son – people from every community, Han and otherwise, all honor it and refuse to cut its branches. In the *Filial Exemplars*, cruel step-mothers witness the filiality of their abused sons, which transforms them into loving beings. Similarly, in this biography of a supposedly real filial exemplar, the tree stands as a beacon of true morality of the kind that everyone could understand: a Chinese or Confucian value was self-evident, even in the wild borderlands.420 Sicong and Dayou’s story is one of the recovery of territorial and familial integrity through a meritorious act of moral transformation.

Narratives such as these drew parallels between the process of imperial recovery following a mass trauma. Feng Junguang and Wang Zhengsheng’s diaries instead show how differently Han conceived of the reconquest of the Northwest – one was seemingly indifferent to the idea of collective loss and recovery, and the other fully engaged in it. In the everyday politics of post-Reconquest Xinjiang, people triangulated through this discursive space to represent themselves and make claims to lost people and lost property. They deployed narratives of individual or familial loss, but related them to collective experiences. They did so with varying degrees of sincerity and instrumentality, and here is where identity politics enters the picture.

On the ground in Turpan, the consequences of the uprisings for families played out in similar ways. As we saw in Chapter Three, violence and economic upheaval displaced a great number of people, especially poor Turki women, who often sought out stability and protection in a relationship with a Han man or in sex work, or else were

420 See the discussion of pedagogy and transformation-by-teaching (*jiaohua*) in Chapter Two.
forced into the same. Chinese names especially marked Turki as occupying a marginal social position: men as merchants or relatively willing objects of pedagogy, women as participants in or products of Turki-Han relationships, both as market actors. Now we will look at the inverse relationship. Sometimes Han Chinese were separated from their families and came to possess Muslim names and identities. In these cases, the state actually expressed no interest in “correcting” their identities – there was no apparent standard by which someone could be assigned to the category “Han,” “Turki,” or “Hui.” Instead, people mobilized the language of family relationships to assert their own or another person’s identity.

The disinheritance of a Han named Islâm demonstrates how people engaged in a family dispute could draw on broader categories of groupness to achieve their ends. Islâm appears here and there in the Turpan archives. He is listed as a “Turki commoner” (Chan min), “tax-paying commoner” (humin), or simply “commoner” (min). According to Islâm’s own account, however, in 1864 he was living as a six-sui-old Han boy in the village of Erbao when his whole family was slaughtered. A kind Turki man named Āşim took the child in and raised him as his own. When in 1877 the Xiang Army separated Han adoptees from Turki families, Islâm was nineteen sui and probably aware of his origins, but there was no need for him to leave home. He was simply known as

421 GX 5.1.19 “吐魯番廳屬民吉金昌為其呈控伊思觸木拐騙賬項案呈吐魯番廳之結案” in QXDX, vol. 51, 34; GX 17.8 “艾斯拉木為互控案之具結” in QXDX, vol. 29, 397. Neither of these cases is of any particular importance. In the former document, Islâm is simply ordered to bring a cow to his opponent in a lawsuit.

422 GX 27.10.5 “吐魯番府民以士拉木就控告托呼大阿洪霸業不分事呈吐魯番廳文” in QXDX, vol. 32, 187; GX 27.10.9 “吐魯番廳就辦理以士拉木就控告托呼大阿洪霸業不分一事呈員大爾瓜色杜拉等人文” in QXDX, vol. 32, 188.
“İslām the Turki” – until 1896, when ʿĀṣim died, and İslām’s adopted parents’ own son denied him his half of the inheritance. As far as the state was concerned, İslām’s ethnic identity was immaterial, and whether he was Han or Muslim awarded him no special legal benefits or disadvantages. Moreover, the familial unit was sacrosanct, and that included adoptive relationships. However, the Xiang Army had sent the people of Xinjiang mixed signals during the early years of reconstruction: on the one hand, they removed Han from Turki households, though it is unclear how they would have distinguished a Han child from a Turki. On the other hand, they permitted and encouraged the marriage of Turki and Hui women to Han men. From the Xiang Army’s perspective, both acts were attempts to enforce the patrilineal principle and maintain the integrity of families: Han in Turki households could be returned to their own families, ensuring continuity of the patriline, while marriages to Han could civilize Muslims and roving men alike. From the Turki perspective, however, in the Muslim uprisings, the lines between Chinese-speaking and non-Chinese-speaking and Muslim and non-Muslim had deepened through mobilization for violence. After that, it only seemed logical that the informal categories of Han, Hui, and Turki (chan) had sufficient legal status, or at least rhetorical force, to support a claim at the yamen.

Similarly, marriages conducted for instrumental purposes could be seen as opportunities to restore individuals’ membership in their natural communities. Liang Benkuan came to Xinjiang as a member of the Xiang Army, and in the spring of 1877, he settled in Turpan’s New City. How he acquired his home is unclear, but it had enough

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423 GX 5.3.22 “吐魯番廳為再嫁妻妾案之批文” in QXD, vol. 28, 148-149.
rooms that he could rent them out to other Chinese. Zhang Zhongyuan, his lodger from Shuntian, later told the magistrate that there had been a Turki woman named Ha-li-sa hanging around the place. Eventually, she told Liang that she and her husband Xia-zan-long had a girl at home of marrying age. This girl was special: she was a Han Chinese, whom they had taken in as a baby during the Uprisings. Like so many in Turpan, however, the family had fallen on hard times, and they had to cut their expenses and marry her off. Would Liang be interested in a Chinese concubine (qie)? Liang was enthusiastic. He was childless, far from home, and getting on in years. They agreed on a bride price of twenty taels, and the girl, who is nameless in the documentary record, moved in.

Within ten months, Liang Benkuan was transferred to Aksu. The girl moved back in with her adoptive family, whom Liang gave over two hundred taels to pay for her maintenance. In September 1878, he returned to Turpan, released from his duties and ready to go home in the spring, concubine in tow. The girl stayed with Liang in Turpan, but Ha-li-sa and Xia-zan-long were regular visitors, and they were very angry when Liang later carried out his plan to return to China proper. They demanded that Liang return the girl so that she could be married off to someone else. It is worth pausing to consider why the girl’s adoptive family demanded her back. As I discussed in Chapter Three, arrangements somewhere between concubinage, soldiers’ marriage, and temporary marriage were not uncommon in Xinjiang, and they were frequently a source of tension between different groups. Ha-li-sa and Xia-zan-long saw Liang as a sojourner in need of a temporary wife like so many other visitors, and the girl as a potential source of income.
The girl herself did not see it that way. Her statement against her adoptive parents has been recorded:

I am originally a Chinese! Because of the military chaos, I was captured (bei lu), and raised by you. But now I’ve been married to Mr. Liang for a few years. All of you depended on me to survive. I have already repaid the kindness you showed in raising me. I’ve already married a Chinese husband – I’ll never go back and marry a Turki! If you force me to return, then I’ll surely die!

The girl was aware of her marginal status and the advantages it brought to her adoptive family – perhaps they had married her off several times. Under the new legal regime, it would also be possible for her to confirm her status as a Han as opposed to a Turki. Ha-li-sa attempted to bring the case to the local sumun and kundu on the basis of her family being Turki. Liang Benkuan himself felt unable to act in the circumstances, and he supposedly left it up to the girl herself to decide her fate. However, Liang’s renter Zhang Zhongyuan pressed the case at the yamen on the girl’s behalf, arguing that she “was originally a Han person” (yuan xi Hanren).

Again, we can see the effects of the Xiang Army’s mixed signals: the attempt to separate Han from Turki households made it appear to Han and Turki alike that the government was interested in maintaining as strict separation of linguistically and religiously distinct people, and that a claim could be made on this basis. Zhang and the girl were not related, but he nevertheless pressed for her return to China proper and marriage to a Han man. It is impossible to know for sure if Zhang sincerely believed in his argument or if he made it instrumentally. However, this case demonstrates that Han

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424 姜云：我本漢人，因兵亂被擄，蒙你撫養，自嫁梁姓數載，你合家人口，均賴我身存活，撫養之恩，今已相報，現在已嫁漢夫，萬無回去再嫁纏民之理，若一定將我逼回，惟有一死。
Chinese believed that their government thought that large-scale ethnic categories were relevant. Zhang ought to have been able to argue this case on the basis of a marriage contract, but instead he invoked the separateness of peoples and the originality of the girl’s ethnicity. As in the case of Islām the Han, groupness trumped family ties.

The Muslim Uprisings opened up an opportunity both for the real reconfiguration of social relations and for people to talk about loss in a way that made the broader imagined community a surrogate for the lost family. This was true on multiple levels: while Feng Junguang only wanted to retrieve his father’s bones from Ili, someone like Wang Zhensheng could represent the dead of the uprisings, distant from his own experience, as anonymous sacrifices for the greater collective, in this case a trans-local Han identity. In Turpan, members of a post-uprisings society had experienced the violence themselves, and now the state provided categories of ethnicity that, while informal, appeared both to possess the authority and backing of government and to neatly capture the tripartite division that had emerged between Muslim and non-Muslim, Chinese-speaking and non-Chinese speaking. Personal and familial issues could be expressed in this more abstract language of difference, and doing so, it was thought, could bring the force of the law to bear on them.

II. Common Ancestors

Han commoners and officials understood the nature and consequences of the Muslim uprisings in terms of three interpenetrating discourses of loss and recovery. For the Qing government, the Muslim uprisings were part of the empire-wide Military Disaster, in which the collective Muslims killed bannermen and Han “commoners” (min).
Zuo Zongtang and the Xiang Army leadership distinguished Muslims according to sect: to them, there were heterodox Hui, orthodox Hui, and fundamentally peaceful, agricultural Turki who had been led astray by a foreign invader. However, ordinary Han who had lost family members or property in the uprisings tended to blame the Turki, since from their perspective the majority of violence was ultimately carried out by Turkic Muslims against Han Chinese. Han in pre-uprisings Xinjiang tended to be poor, far from their families, or both. In either case, Han did not intend to be buried in the borderlands, but to reunite someday with their families, or at least have their bones returned to be interred in their family tombs. The uprisings made reunions of this kind impossible by ending lives and scattering human remains. Afterward, when poor Han came to Xinjiang, they would attempt to recover their ancestors’ bones, or at least their claims to property – and the former could secure the latter. Fictional and abstract ancestors began to appear as ordinary people began to make broader claims on behalf not of their families, or their native places, but for all Han, Hui, or Turki. At the same time, young people separated from their families in the uprisings, particularly Han adopted into Turki families, began to “rediscover” their ethnicity as familial conflicts intersected with broader discourses of groupness. The entanglement of familial loss with ethnic identification is clearest from disputes over cemeteries. The local administration’s laxity when it came to the remains and ruins of the Uprisings rankled the feelings of Chinese merchants. For the most part, Chinese in Turpan associated with members of their native-place communities, and they articulated grievances in those terms. Ongoing conflicts over common burial grounds, however, served to sharpen the lines between Chinese and “chantou.”
The landscape of Turpan appears to have been dotted with the remains of the war dead. On December 3, 1878, a young boy named Mämät was gathering firewood from the cold ground of an orchard in the pilgrimage town of Tuyuq when he ran across a human head.\(^\text{425}\) When the authorities learned of it, they first tried to determine “whether the head was Han, Hui, or Turki,”\(^\text{426}\) but exposure had erased any obvious traces. We may ask what they expected to find. Evidentiary Learning provided a scholarly framework not just for studying the history of the region, but also for determining the physical characteristics of its peoples.\(^\text{427}\) Coroners’ manuals did not provide such information, but anyone with access to the discourse of Xinjiang would know that Turki men were meant to have deep-set eyes, beards, “high” noses, and shaved heads.

As it turned out, the head was attached to a body.\(^\text{428}\) Yang Peiyuan led the investigation, but he ran up against the same local resistance to authority that played a role in his eventual suicide. No one would cooperate, even or perhaps especially when it was found that the body still sported a long queue. While this merely indicated that the deceased had been a male Qing subject, Yang determined that he was a Han. Moreover, he had been executed: his hands were bound. He died not of the dozens of stab wounds that covered his body, but of a long, deep cut along the front of his throat. It was clear that the corpse dated from the Uprisings, but no one offered a memory or an explanation.

\(^{425}\) GX 4.11.10 “鲁克沁台吉迈引就吐峪沟格衣提葡萄园内由人头一具事禀吐鲁番厅文” in Q/XD, vol. 51, 31-32.

\(^{426}\) “是否漢、回、纏”

\(^{427}\) Teng, “Taiwan as a Living Museum,” 466.

\(^{428}\) Report dated GX 5.r3.26 in Q/XD, vol. 51, 86.
– not the Turki farmers, nor their Hui neighbor. The code of silence prevailed against the prerogatives of the Hunanese administration, which threatened to unearth a memory of the bloody conflict that had taken place when Māmāt was just an infant. His elders, though they held positions of authority as dorghas and mīrābs, consistently testified their ignorance. The Zhendi intendant decided to drop the investigation.

The intendant may have chosen to end the inquiry because of the number of claims to property made by newly-arrived Han. One of the earliest was filed by Luo Yang shi, a woman who claimed to have roots in Turpan.429 In 1864, she testified, her father’s landlord, Raḥīm, was among the Turki who killed her entire family. Now she had come to Turpan thirteen years later to argue that the massacre had prematurely ended their lease on Raḥīm’s vineyard. The case want sent back into mediation, where Raḥīm insisted that Luo Yang shi had no case, as the lease period was technically over. Besides which, Turki commoners had received amnesty. Ultimately, Luo Yang shi got nothing. That was the usual result in early cases of Han who returned to Turpan to claim property from Turki, which not incidentally were often remanded to the authority of local Turki organizations for mediation. However, the very same day, a Shaanxi man filed suit against a local Turki.430 The Han accused the Turki of having slaughtered all nine of his uncle’s family.


430 GX 3.6.14 “吐魯番廳屬戶民張貴書就控告纏民焦五提害命霸業案呈吐魯番廳文” in QXDX, vol. 50, 164; GX 3.6.25 “吐魯番廳屬纏民哈參木為張貴書控告纏民焦五提案申請保外候審呈吐魯番廳之保
in the Uprisings and stealing their land. Something like a body with a queue, if identified, would have bolstered such a claim significantly. As it stood, the Han migrant could only make the charge in an attempt to undermine the Turki landlord’s claim to have retained the land legally, but it worked – he won a long-term lease on half of the Turki’s vineyard.

There was a large cemetery outside the north gate of Lüchün where Han merchants had buried their dead many years before the Muslim uprisings. In 1878, right around the time the Eastern Mosque in Turpan was converted into a Chinese temple (see Chapter Five), dorgha Tayyip and mīrāb Emin leveled a section of the cemetery to build a new irrigation channel. The merchants were furious, but they were strangely impotent to stop them. Zuo Zongtang refused to intervene, probably because the dispute was regarded as a conflict over an ordinary parcel of land, which was soon sold for a handsome price. In the autumn of 1882, a group of merchants from several provinces took a complaint to the sub-district magistrate of Pichan, Xu Yangzhi, who was then on his way out of office. Xu resolved the dispute in favor of the Chinese – Tayyip and Emin were to rebuild the wall, as well as a ruined ossuary. However, a year later, nothing was ready, and the newly-elevated Lüchün Wang, Maḥmūd, did not bow so easily to Chinese demands. With Maḥmūd’s approval, the land was sold again, this time to a Turki interpreter.


431 QXDX, vol. 28, 326.
Early in 1884, a group of merchants from Shanxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei sent a joint petition on behalf of “the Han.” They channeled their fury into a clear statement of their beliefs regarding the Turki:

Ohh, the Chinese bones, how angry they are at the Turki! The Chinese spirits [shen], how frustrated with the Turki! Those who dig the Chinese graves, they anger the Chinese people! ... If our Emperor wishes to guide these people to transform into “Chinese” [hua Zhong], he must make these people walk within the law.

The royal code states that the digging of graves and destruction of temples is to be punished at one grade above that for “disrespecting one’s bodily inheritance and the country’s grace.” If you say that these Turki “are ignorant of the law,” then try asking them, what about Turki graves? Can Chinese people dig them up? What about Turki temples? Can Chinese people destroy them? If, when they are dug up or destroyed, they really have no emotional reaction at all, then that really means the Turki are ignorant of the “law!” This means the Turki can't be considered under the law!

First of all, this petition expresses the derision many Chinese merchants in Turpan held for the Turkic Muslims. The petitioners lampoon the primitivism with which Qing scholars rationalized imperial domination of “simple” border peoples, in Xinjiang as in

432 呜呼漢骨何讐何怨於纏回！漢神何尤何礙於纏回！掘漢塚者，怒漢人也！.......我皇上欲挈斯民於化中，必使斯民同遊於法內。

王章具在挖塚毀廟罪在不扲[?]身受國恩罪加一等。如謂纏回“愚不知法”，試問纏回之塚，漢人可得而掘乎？纏回之廟，漢人可得而毀乎？若掘之、毀之毫無怒慰，是真纏回不知法也！是纏回不可加以法也！(Petition dated GX 9.10.5 in QXDX, vol. 28, 325.)

Eventually, the Turki who had run the irrigation ditch through the cemetery were compelled to comply. (GX 10.2.16 “吐魯番廳飭魯克沁郡王等保護廟宇墓地之諭文” in QXDX, vol. 28, 401.) Lüchčin Wang Mahmūd ordered Turki to avoid the area, and a road originally planned to go through it was built around instead.
Taiwan. Officials often invoked Turki “ignorance” to justify special policies ranging from *yishu* education to immediate execution. However, for these merchants, Turkis’ apparently immoral behavior came from aggression, haughtiness, and an inability to process emotion (*qing*). If the Turki were merely too morally blind to understand the wrongness of their actions, that meant they were not even human. Therefore, the project of moral transformation was doomed, and with it the whole idea of Xinjiang’s provincehood! The merchants’ argument voices an over-the-top sense of frustration and urgency, and once again, it is impossible to distinguish sincerity from instrumentality. It is entirely possible that the Han were offended by a violation of their graves, but the “cemetery” could just as well have been a plot of valuable land that some groups meant to keep for themselves.

The important thing here is that the Han petitioned jointly as representatives of a number of different native-place associations on behalf of their broader group. These merchants expressed a sino-normative understanding of Qing subjecthood consonant with the efforts of the Xiang Army regime. They, as Han Chinese from China proper, considered themselves to be unmarked commoners because they embodied the moral dispositions and practices expected of *li*. There were Confucian schools and temples in Lükchün, the merchants noted, which were meant to bring *li* to the Turki and transform them, yet they continued to violate the sanctity of tombs and temples. In this sense, the Han merchants’ expression of Han identity fell somewhere between normative imperial subjecthood and ethnicity: on the one hand, they asserted their own superior understanding of *li*. On the other, they united their communities, which ordinarily

433 Teng, “Taiwan as a Living Museum,” 446.
competed with each other and had disparate geographical origins, under a common label that pointed to a common history (Han) in support of a claim to common ancestral land. Both positions were opposed to an Other, the Turki, marked as both morally inferior and more distant than the Han from the civilizing project.

Expressions of a common Han ethnicity in disputes over tomb sites were part of a broader trend of expressing a more abstract and general “Chinese” identity that appears to have been influenced in the Xinjiang case by the gradual march west. The only non-elite Xiang Army member known to have left a body of written work was Zhou Han (1841-1911), later famed in Hunan for his anti-foreign activism. Zhou was from Ningxiang County, and he joined the Xiang Army earlier, following first Liu Songshan and then Liu Jintang all the way into Xinjiang. He worked for Liu, and later for Kashgar Intendant Huang Guangda, but returned home in 1884 following a bout of illness. Back in Hunan, Zhou called himself “Zhou, Disciple of Confucius” (Zhou Kongtu), published many pamphlets, and spoke publicly about the need to defend an essentialized Chinese tradition against an international conspiracy of Western empires and Catholic agents. While Zhou appears not to have written about his time in Xinjiang, his vision of the Chinese tradition nevertheless bore the marks of his time with the army and in the Northwest: at the center of it were the family, reverence for the Qing emperor, and the equivalence and nativity of

434 Tulufan zhiliting xiangtu zhi, 511-513; Stephen Platt, Provincial Patriots, 64-66; Xiangjun, vol. 7, 383; Zhou Han, Guijiao gaisi [The Devil Teaching Must Die], (Beijing: Shuanghun shuwu, 1989); “Zhou Han yu fanyang zhanzheng” in Hunan wenshi ziliao 4 (1958), 37-54. Platt’s interpretation of Zhou’s Guijiao gaisi as a Hunanese nativist polemic baffles me. At no point in the text, written in very plain (and vulgar) baihua, does Zhou Han actually address the Hunanese, or about Hunan at all. Instead, he writes about “our China” (wo Zhongguo) and positions himself as a wise elder addressing a younger generation that has already forgotten the pain of the mid-nineteenth century: “You young people don’t understand what it was like to oppose the long-hairs [Taipings]!” (18, “你們年輕人不曉得長毛反的情形!”)
the “Three Teachings,” Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Zhou begins his history with the mythical kings Yao and Shun, who began a distinct lineage of culture heroes and moral teachers from Wen Wang to Confucius, whose tradition of “transformation through teaching” (jiaohua) the Qing emperors inherited and preserved. Zhou especially revered Kangxi’s 1670 proclamation, which Zuo had distributed across Xinjiang in 1877. All of these elements were present in the Xiang Army’s civilizing project in Xinjiang, except for the coequivalence of the Three Teachings. Zhou may have been influenced by the Tianjin merchants who traveled with and supplied the Xiang Army and established a near-monopoly in Xinjiang during reconstruction, as they were nearly all adherents of Zailiism or Three-in-One (sanjiao heyi), a syncretic religion that combined the traditions. Regardless of his beliefs, Zhou Han framed his message in terms of the national trauma of the Military Disaster, which subsumed his own experience into a narrative of empire-wide struggle to preserve Chinese families. His articulation of a myth of common moral descent and teaching for all Chinese in the wake of violence is consonant with the efforts of Han Chinese to establish their own nativity in Turpan through the bodies of pre-Uprisings ancestors.

Claiming that ancestors’ bodies rested beneath a plot of land became a trope in land disputes in Turpan, to the point that it was usually unclear whether or not human remains actually existed. In one unusually convoluted case in 1909, an elderly Turki man named Hai-er-lang sued the Hui Wang Wanfu for burying a Hui body in Hai-er-lang’s

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own ancestral graveyard.\textsuperscript{436} The \textit{yamen} dismissed Hai-er-lang as a liar after no body could be located. Nevertheless, Wang countersued with a demand that Hai-er-lang repair the walls on “his” cemetery.\textsuperscript{437} Apparently, Wang had not buried a Hui body in Hai-er-lang’s cemetery, but he did in fact tell local Turki that he had done so. Soon representatives from seventy local farming families sent a petition claiming that Hai-er-lang was actually guarding their joint cemetery, as most of the farmers had drifted off into the seasonal labor market elsewhere. The farmers complained belatedly about Wang’s alleged burial of an unknown Hui corpse. Matters became more complicated when the landlord Sulṭān Niyāz appeared and claimed to have hired Hai-er-lang to guard his ancestral cemetery. Sulṭān Niyāz complained to the \textit{yamen} that Hai-er-lang had flattened part of the cemetery and used the land to farm. If there was a cemetery, then to whom did it belong – Sulṭān Niyāz, Hai-er-lang, the farmers, or Wang Wanfu?

Eventually, Sub-District Magistrate Ye Yunxiang was sent to survey the cemetery together with Sulṭān Niyāz and his caretaker, Ga-si-lang. They could not confirm Wang Wanfu’s new claim that his paternal grandparents had been interred on the plot for some forty years or more, which would date their burial to before the Muslim Uprisings. If that was the case, however, there should have been no reason for Wang Wanfu to claim to have buried a new body, or for local Turki farmers to have been so confused at the

\textsuperscript{436} XT 1.2.8 “吐魯番廳審王萬福呈控海爾浪泡塌墳墓拋露骸骨一案原被告之訊單” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 34, 58.

\textsuperscript{437} XT 1.2.9 “票差” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 34, 60; XT 1.2.11 “海爾浪...訴呈” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 34, 65; XT 1.2.12 “阿不浪...稟” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 34, 66; XT 1.2.12 “王萬福覆呈” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 34, 67; XT 1.2.12 Testimony of 蘇唐牙思 and Ga-si-lang in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 34, 68; XT 1 r2.27 “王萬福控海爾浪抗不尊斷堵路阻行一案呈吐魯番廳文” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 34, 96; XT 1.2 “吐魯番廳巡檢葉芸香...詳文” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 34, 108-109.
presence of a Hui man, or for that matter for Wang Wanfu to have demolished a sizable section of the cemetery in order to build a path large enough for a cart to pass along it. Conversely, Hai-er-lang, as the steward of a cemetery, ought not to have dug an irrigation channel through it.

The circumstances of the case made it all but impossible to know if there was ever, in fact, a cemetery on the site. Wang claimed that Hai-er-lang’s irrigation had exposed and destroyed seven graves, but that the water had also destroyed their bones beyond recognition, so there was no evidence that there were even bodies under the ground. The farmers’ claim to their ancestral cemetery had no evidence to support it, either. Sulṭān Niyāz did claim that Ga-si-lang had tended a cemetery on his land for over forty years, matching Wang Wanfu’s claim in terms of time, but he did not support Wang’s claim to the land itself. The simplest interpretation of this case is that there was never any cemetery, or else there had been a cemetery, but the bodies there were destroyed. Tellingly, all of the land around the plot in question had recently been opened up to farming, so this multi-sided dispute was almost certainly a contest over arable land conducted instead through the proxy language of burial and ancestry. Ultimately, the magistrate ordered Wang to demolish the path he built, and Hai-er-lang his irrigation ditch, leaving the problem of ownership unresolved. The dispute appears to have been remanded several months later to a pair of local authorities, one Hui and one Turki.438

The relationship between settlement, belonging, and property was not lost on Turkic Muslims. Qurbān ʿAlī Khālidī begins his Tārīkh-i jarīda-ye jadīda with a ghost

story.\footnote{Qurbān ʿAlī Khālīdī, Tārikh-i Jarīda-ye Jadīda, 1889, 4; IVR RAN C 578, Qurbān ʿAlī Khālīdī, Tārikh-i Jarīda-ye Jadīda, 3a-5a.} There is a place, he tells us, between Tarbaghatai and Xīhu, and it is called Qarasun. There was once a beautiful Hui mosque there, but it was destroyed “in the time of tribulation” (balwā waqtinda), the Muslim Uprisings. Just southeast of that site, on the banks of a river, is a shrine called the Green Mosque, in reference to the Hui mosque. Before the Uprisings, that shrine had been topped with a dome and enclosed by walls, but by Khālīdī’s time, all that was left were the banners that Turki typically planted during their pilgrimages. Thanks to the little flags, people could tell that it was a holy place, but exactly who was meant to be buried there was a question whose answer was lost to history. Nevertheless, the saint himself had been seen, and this was how:

Once upon a time, a Chinese man settled near the tomb with his family. He planted an orchard and some crops on a plot given to him by the Xinjiang government. He had two sons, about five or six years old. One day, when they went to play by the river, they saw a man who wore a white turban on his head and a green garment on his body. (A Muslim hearing this story would know that the green garment symbolized descent from the Prophet and immediately marked the man as holy.) That man “drew water from a different stream” from the Chinese, a stream by the old Hui mosque. He carried his water over to the ruined tomb and disappeared.

The boys ran home to tell their father about the disappearing man. He did not believe them, but said, “It was just a passing chantou.”
His sons were not convinced. They went back to the river and saw the man a few more times. Eventually, their father grew suspicious and told them, “If you see him again, come tell me before he disappears.”

A few days later, the boys were playing on the riverbank when they saw the mysterious figure again. This time, they ran home quickly and got their father, who came just in time to witness the specter disappearing at the shrine.

“It’s the tomb of a chantou!” he exclaimed.

At their father’s urging, the boys went back a few times and played atop of the tomb. Soon, they fell very ill, and both boys died at once. Their mother, stricken with grief, said, “All our problems are from this tomb!” She went and defecated on it, and soon thereafter passed away, as well. (The euphemism for defecation in the Turki text is literally “made it impure,” implying rather strongly that the offence to the tomb and its occupant was not merely the act, but its spiritual effects.)

Even though the Chinese man’s wife and two children had all died, he got his spirits up and went to the Chinese magistrate (ḥākim), begging to be resettled on a different patch of land. When they asked him why, he told them the whole story about the shrine. The officials responded with an order: “Other people need a place to live, too! If you hadn’t gone to the shrine, this wouldn’t have happened.” He was refused resettlement.440

Khālidī reports that this story began to circulate among the Turki, and that, when he heard it, he approached some Chinese, who confirmed the account. Khālidī

440 The MS reads, “Other people need a place to live, too! If you don’t go to the tomb, there’ll be no danger. Therefore, no other land will be given to you.”
volunteered to find a superintendent (mutawallī) for a new waqf dedicated to the shrine, to build a dome atop it and offer prayers regularly to honor the saint within. A Hui official in Qarasun enthusiastically welcomes this proposal, but met some resistance from Turki, who claimed the whole story to be an invention of the infidels. They proposed to open the tomb and see who was actually inside – Muslim or not?

Khālidī reasoned to them that there were still traces of the old dome and walls still around the tomb, and the Chinese never put domes over their corpses – rather, the Chinese took the dead back to their homelands and buried them, or else cremated them in Xinjiang and sent the ashes, which was much cheaper. Moreover, the tomb was oriented properly to the qiblah. That alone should demonstrate that the entombed was a Muslim, he said, and if that didn’t satisfy their curiosity, they should send two brave men to wait forty days at the tomb for a vision from the saint, which would confirm his identity. No one volunteered, and that was that.

On the surface, the story is an allegory about communities and claims: who has a right to this land? The presence of a Turki sayyid in the tomb suggests that the land is originally Muslim, and so the shrine at its spiritual center ought to be maintained by an appropriate, wise, and faithful steward – Khālidī himself, of course. The Chinese family violates the tomb, though the officials are reasonable enough to know that it should at least be treated with respect, if not wholly avoided by non-Muslims. Khālidī deploys his powers of reason to present a moral message for a Turki living in Northern Xinjiang: one ought to recognize difference – that people draw water from different streams – and respect communal boundaries ordained by history and sacred authority. Moreover, the facticity of these differences and boundaries is established and can be investigated
rationally with reference to signs in the world and ultimately the authority of a licensed scholar. Khālidī wrote this work as a shrine guide that would lead the reader from his home in Tarbaghatai all the way to the Shrine of the Seven Sleepers in Turpan. The text narrates the pilgrimage journey and experience as Thum describes it: a series of stages and rituals, each of which invokes a module of history. This first story serves as a reminder of the importance of that relationship, perhaps especially in this new time, in the wake of chaos and destruction.

III. Memorial

No study of death and memory in imperial China is complete without some discussion of the politics of official memorial. Yet it is very difficult to locate sources on this phenomenon in late-Qing Xinjiang. Significant research has now been carried out on the Xiang Army, including the recent compilation of a large collection of documentary materials. Nevertheless, while Hunanese made great efforts to produce this narrative, they largely did so in gazetteers and monuments that were completed by the early 1870s. Record Praising the Loyal of Hunan (Ch. Hunan baozhong lu), which is the canonical source for the triumphs of Hunanese soldiers, was published in 1873. Therefore, these materials include the Gansu campaigns, but not the subsequent move into Xinjiang. There appears to be no more recent compilation of Xiang Army martyrs. Research on the creation of historical memory following the reconquest must therefore proceed in a more

441 The recent collection Xiangjun present ten volumes of reprinted materials and new research. Yet, it is limited by its sources, and its coverage essentially ends in 1873.

442 Guo Songtao, Hunan baozhong lu chu gao, TZ 12 [1873]. A thorough search of the National Palace Museum in Taipei and of the National Library of China in Beijing has turned up no further compilations of Hunan Army martyrs. The rare book room of the Xinjiang Regional Library was unfortunately and unexpectedly closed for renovations during my research visit to Ürümqi, but a return visit may yield local records of martyrs.
piecemeal fashion from scraps more than from the data offered readily and completely by official sources.

In the mid-nineteenth century, agency in the Qing practice of official memorial shifted from central authorities to provincial officials, much as political power did, and contributed to the articulation of large-scale collectivities in new ways.\(^{443}\) Over the first half of the century, war dead biographies had grown increasingly formulaic as the number of martyrs multiplied under the increasing influence of provincial elites, as opposed to metropolitan. Sites of death organized by province supplanted ethnic and native-place divisions that had previously been more salient, as we can see in a pre-Uprising collection of martyr biographies.\(^{444}\) While the Manifest Loyalty Shrines (zhaozhong ci) that recorded the names of the dead remained under the purview of the state, the actual enshrinement of martyrs was undertaken by local and translocal actors. As James Bonk depicts this change, it involved the flattening of identities and standardization of subjectivities, combined with the articulation of a common historical experience, that also typify nationalist ideology. Memorial became a cultural matrix for the articulation of collective subjectivities, once again somewhere between normative imperial subjecthood and an ethnonational imagination.


\(^{444}\) Zhaozhong ci liezhuan xubian. The vast majority of martyrs listed in this work died in battle at Kashgar in 1825. They are organized by native province.
We know that Zuo Zongtang and Liu Jintang conducted at least four different surveys of the Muslim Uprisings dead.\textsuperscript{445} The first three were undertaken from 1877 by the Gansu Reconstruction Agencies but ended when the agencies were closed in 1883. During this period, over 1,400 martyrs were counted. Efforts under Zuo in this regard appear even-handed, as local authorities, including the Ili General and each circuit intendant, were tasked with investigating each region’s martyrs. Progress was slow, however, and reports trickled in with perhaps one or two dozen war dead narratives in each.\textsuperscript{446} In 1885, Liu Jintang renewed the effort from Dihua, and within a year and a half, 4,206 new war dead were accounted for. It is unclear when the Xinjiang government ceased actively to count martyrs, but people occasionally submitted the names and stories of individuals they wanted to be remembered.

The memorial project could be redemptive: sixteen officers who had been cashiered in absentia had actually died defending Kashgar it to the death against the combatants in the uprisings.\textsuperscript{447} Investigations brought to light the stories of heroic women who had died in the Uprisings. Local gentry or relatives of the deceased generally submitted the stories, which tended to conform to generic expectations. For example, all of the women in the family of Suilai Magistrate Mao Yunru (d. 1862), who had stayed on

\textsuperscript{445} GX 12.9.18 Liu Jintang “烏魯木齊四次查明陳亡殉難官紳兵民請” in \textit{Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu huibian} (shang), 369-370.


\textsuperscript{447} Memorial dated GX ?, predating 1884, FHA 04-01-17-0180-014.
in Xinjiang, took poison together when the Muslims captured the town.\textsuperscript{448} Supposedly, two of Mao’s daughters had not yet succumbed to the poison and instead spent their last moments verbally abusing their attackers. Recovering the story of a lost family thus served two purposes: it provided some closure to remaining family members, such as Mao Yunru’s son, who was then serving in Shaanxi. It also demonstrated the virtuousness and defiance of (mostly Han) Qing victims of the Uprisings and so made martyrs out of the dead.

Yet, memorial was also very limiting. Out of the thousands of names recorded by the surveys, only a handful made it into local gazetteers. All of those were in turn inscribed into the lists of martyrs in the 1911 provincial gazetteer, and then into the imperial collection of exemplary biographies. The biographies include Xiang Army veterans almost exclusively. The section on esteemed military leaders in the provincial gazetteer jumps directly from a Manchu bannerman who died fighting the Junghars to Zhang Yao, the commander of the Guangdong Army who retook Southern Xinjiang under Zuo’s command\textsuperscript{449}, while the subsequent section on martyrs mostly duplicates that on military leaders. In total, only thirty-seven male Uprisings martyrs are counted at all, most of them from the Ili General’s command, and three female martyrs. The remainder of women recorded in the gazetteer were all chaste widows, none of them from the Uprisings period.

The dead of Barköl who held out against the rebels for over a decade are notable for their exclusion, as even those who held a military rank and died in the Uprisings were

\textsuperscript{448} Memorial dated GX 13.2.28, Liu Jintang, FHA 04-01-16-0222-045.

\textsuperscript{449} Xinjiang tuzhi, wugong 3, 8a-8b.
not recorded in the provincial gazetteers or even the imperial exemplary biographies. It was not for a lack of worthies, as the Barköl gazetteer lists several heroes: Chen Shengheng, a local garrison commander, trained militias and forged cannons.\textsuperscript{450} Guo Fengxian, a Fuping County merchant, moved to Barköl to be with his family. There he was granted an official rank and a peacock feather for his successes in battle, for which he was allowed to serve as a temporary county magistrate. Guo raised a militia against the Muslims and even led several expeditions to retake Qumul. Wang Shirong, a merchant from Qitai, stopped his cart in Barköl during the outbreak of the violence. When Wang learned from refugees that Qitai had fallen and his family killed, he put his entire livelihood into funding the local defense and Ürümchi Lieutenant-General Jinglian’s campaigns against the Muslims. Yet not a single of these local heroes made it into provincial or metropolitan lists of martyrs.

The exclusion of the Barkölse speaks to the Xiang Army’s broader production of a communal narrative of heroism in the \textit{Record of Pacifying Guanzhong and Eastern Gansu} and \textit{Account of Demarcating Xinjiang} (see Chapter One). Eventually, their identification as saviors of the Northwest found some purchase in popular culture, as well, including a fantastical novel about Zuo’s march to the West.\textsuperscript{451} Meanwhile, along the march across China, Zuo established a series of shrines to honor members of his command who died on the way west. Generally, each person received a shrine near where they had served and another back in Hunan. These shrines could gain a legendary quality,

\textsuperscript{450} Zhenxi ting xiangtu zhi, 114-115.

\textsuperscript{451} Anonymous, \textit{Zuo wenxiang gong zhengxi yanyi} [The Romance of Duke Zuo’s March into the West], published ca. 1904-1916.
and several were said to bear inscriptions carved by Zuo himself, although they were erected several years after his death.\(^{452}\) In Xinjiang, the Hunanese continued, as their counterparts did in China proper, to appropriate and remake the imperial institution of the Manifest Loyalty Shrine. Throughout the rest of the Qing, provincial heroes of the kind described above – pre-Uprisings Manchu officers and post-Uprising Xiang Army veterans – were worshipped in the Xinjiang Manifest Loyalty Shrine and at smaller sites across the region. I will expand on memorial shrines in Chapter Five.

\textit{IV. Conclusion}

It served the Hunanese to depict Xinjiang as a barren wasteland wiped totally free of the Han Chinese life that had existed before the Muslim Uprisings. On this blank canvas, they could paint themselves not only as the saviors of the borderland, but also the revivers of an ancient Chinese imperial glory dating not from the 1750s, but from the Han and Tang dynasties. I will explore this dynamic of ruins and recovery further in Chapter Five. For now, suffice it to say that Wang Zhensheng, the orphan companion of Feng Junguang, would have been pleased with this vision of a heroic group of military men who recovered imperial territory, becoming martyrs for China on the barren desert of the Western Regions. This vision of the Xiang Army stripped the flesh from their bones, leaving only anonymous skeletons to serve as symbols of the recovery of Chinese patrimony.

\(^{452}\) Such was the case for Gao Liansheng. Memorial dated GX 3.11.2 in \textit{Zuo wenxiang gong quanji}, j. 51, 38; \textit{Minguo Ningxiang xian zhi}, v. 2, 122-127.
Immediately after the conquest of Kashgar, the Xiang Army acted to erase the bodily presence of Yaʿqūb Beg himself. Muslim sources record how, following the Badawlat’s death on May 29, 1877, a panic ensued as the command structure of the state fell apart. The charisma of the leader was generally considered essential to any Central Asian Muslim state’s stability, with good reason: when an early rebel commander in Khotan had died in battle, for example, his family hid the body and replaced him with an imposter, lest his movement fragment, as it eventually did when his death was revealed. All the way back in China proper in 1864, following the death of Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan (1814-1864), Zeng Guofan’s army had retaken Nanjing. One of the Xiang Army’s first acts there had been to exhume Hong’s body and gather a crowd to watch them mutilate the remains and burnt them down to a pile of ash.

While the Xiang Army commanders in Kashgar made no report of the act to Beijing, Muslim sources relate that they did the same to Yaʿqūb Beg’s corpse. Ten days after the conquest of Kashgar, General Dong Fuxiang went in person up the road to the shrine of Āfāq Khwāja, where Yaʿqūb Beg was entombed. His soldiers found the

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453 A particularly vivid account of the confusion in Yaʿqūb Beg’s palace in Kucha was reported to a Russian official. “Ya qūb Beg wafāt taṗqāninij bayāni” [Narrative of the Death of Yaʾqūb Beg] in M. F. Grenard, trans., “Spécimens de la literature moderne du Turkestan Chinois” in Journal Asiatique (new series) 13 (1899), 304-346, 331-335.


455 Withers (“Heavenly Capital,” 238-239) follows Bland and Backhouse (China Under the Empress Dowager, 72-73), who mistranslate Zeng’s memorial as “After examining the body I beheaded it and then burnt it on a large bonfire.” It was not a beheading per se. The phrase is lushi 戮屍, literally to “kill the corpse” and often paired with xiaoshou 梟首 “to behead and display the head.” However, lushi actually indicates the public display and dismemberment of an enemy’s body in order to demonstrate to the masses that he or she is dead.

456 IVR RAN D 124 Jamīʿu ‘t-tawârīḥ, 351a.
emir’s grave, broke it open, and burned the body, scattering the ashes to the wind. “God knows why,” wrote Ḥājjī Yūsuf. Sayrāmī elaborates: Dong Fuxiang threatened the people of Kashgar to take him to the tomb.457 There, the Badawlat’s former officials stood helpless as Dong’s soldiers opened the grave, piled up firewood, and immolated the body. Sayrāmī, never one to shy away from historical parallels, relates how the Abbasid caliphs ordered the destruction of the Umayyad tombs in an effort to wipe out their legacy, but the Umayyads continued their lives in secret. Sayrāmī could be hinting that Yaʿqūb Beg’s legacy would live on, but his generally poor assessment of the Badawlat suggests otherwise. Rather, Sayrāmī draws a contrast: Abbasids and Umayyads once feuded for the caliphate, but now the Chinese were burning Yaʿqūb Beg’s body out of superstition. The Chinese, he relates, believe that the dead are reincarnated, and that burning the body of the deceased will prevent his or her soul from entering a new fetus. Sayrāmī was perceptive: whatever the Xiang Army’s motivations, the public destruction of an enemy’s corpse was a powerful symbol of the end of an old era and the beginning of a new order.

This high-level practice of political erasure through destruction of the body was on a continuum of symbolic practices with the mortuary politics that played out in Turpan. On both levels, we see a combination of instrumentality and sincerity in interactions with and imaginations of human remains. Bodies of family members could serve as evidence in a claim to property, but they also symbolized belonging and nativity. While contestation over tomb sites was very common in China proper, in the borderlands, it involved not only lineages and families, but also increasingly self-conscious ethnic groups. The traumatrophia of the Muslim Uprisings opened a space for lineage to be

457 TH/Beijing 304-306, TH/Jarring, 123r-123v.
transformed into ethnicity through the discourses of death and memorial, reified through disputes over property that implied claims of belonging. The same was true of orphans and adoptees, not just the Han named Islām and the unnamed “girl,” but also Wang Zhensheng. In the wake of the Muslim Uprisings, they sought to regain their parentage and establish their membership in both real and fictive families.

As we saw in the previous chapter, interethnic sexual relations encouraged people to police communal boundaries by using the moral discourse the state offered them. Here, tomb sites and family membership opened up another set of disputes in which the semi-formal ethnicity-like categories used at the yamen could be deployed in service of claims to belonging. These descriptors mapped onto the categories of practice that distinguished Han, Hui, and Turki (Chan). While there was no state-driven process to create ethnicity, the tools were there for people to appropriate: common languages and common religions still bound Turki to Hui and Hui to Han, but now straightforward labels pointed to three communities that could be distinguished by a sense of common descent and common place.
Chapter Five: Numinous Territoriality: Making Place, Claiming Space

So far, I have discussed *li* in sense of proper relationships and proper morality. These explicitly socio-moral meanings of *li* were central to the Xiang Army’s plan to transform Xinjiang into a province through a civilizing project, but they also enabled new modes of contestation in everyday politics. Here I will turn to another meaning of *li*: rituals and proper worship. I will draw on the scholarly literature concerning Chinese religion in order to elucidate how Han and Turki understood the role of Chinese veneration of deities in the making of provincial Xinjiang. I will argue that Han officials mobilized practices from official and popular religion in order to reterritorialize Xinjiang, not as an Inner Asian territory, but as an Inner Chinese province and as a Hunanese colony. Han commoners similarly used ritual and temple-building to claim places for themselves. While the latter was sometimes meant as aggressive expansion against Muslims, it nevertheless opened up spaces for spectacle that drew non-Han, as well. The ritual and spiritual transformation of Xinjiang thus had complications similar to those of the other components of the civilizing project: what was intended as wholesale transformation instead created new fields of contestation.

I. Numinous Territoriality

Ritual in the Chinese context can be analyzed ideologically – what people think ritual does – and anthropologically – what people do during ritual, and what ritual does to and for them. In this chapter, I will focus mainly on the ideology of ritual, partly because the historical record does not allow for a granular analysis of ritual practice or of belief, and partly because ideology strongly influenced Han actors’ mobilizations of ritual. In
China proper, statecraft thinkers and others tended to think of worship and deities on three levels: first, there was an understanding that deities and the imperial bureaucracy reflected each other.\(^{458}\) That is, the ranks and hierarchies of earthly government and the spirit world were meant not only to resemble each other, but to be mutually constitutive: a temporal ruler could enfeoff a deity, for example, while human petitions to a ghostly magistrate could receive an effective response. As such, the imperial cult was standardized and codified, and temples were built for certain deities uniformly across China proper. Officials performed sacrifices at these temples, and at designated mountain peaks, according to schedules approved by the Board of Rites in Beijing and recorded in the administrative statutes (*huidian*). Second, local deities were known to be worshipped in certain regions and understood as patron deities of particular groups of people. Where significant groups of people from one area moved into another, they would bring their deities with them.

Both of these levels were implicated in the numinous constitution of place: statecraft scholars held that places were the emanations or “doubles” (*fu*) of their patron deities.\(^ {459}\) The city gods (*chenghuang*) exemplify this belief in “doubling”: wherever there was a settlement, it had, by implication, a god, the identity of which might be

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revealed later on and confirmed by imperial fiat. In Neo-Confucian terms, that deity was the principle, and the city its emanation. In this sense, the statecraft understanding of local deities resembles folk theories of the Mongol cairn (*oboo*), all of which figure the cairn as a physical metaphorical reproduction of a place and event distant in space and time. Annual worship at the *oboo* and the accompanying festival are thought to invoke the protection of the mountain or spirit over the land surrounding and defined by the *oboo*. Similarly, the city god is invited to dwell within the temple, and through worship people maintain the stability of the city as the god’s emanation. Regional cults created place differently. These related communities of worshippers to localities through history in two ways: through historical texts that asserted the nativity or dominance of the deity, and by implications its worshippers, and through ritual processions and performances that reenacted that history. In simple and ideal terms, then, the imperial cult worked by vertically incorporating a hierarchy of deities, while regional cults horizontally incorporated communities through rituals and networks of pilgrimage.

I refer to the effort to claim and transform space through representations of deities and the supernatural as “numinous territoriality.” Numinous territoriality can be understood as a subset of the “production of space” in Lefebvre’s sense of an intellectual, political, and social process wherein theories, representations, and practices interact to realize abstract ideas of place in the physical landscape. “Territoriality” specifically refers to the projection of imagined shapes onto mappable spaces, which we tend to

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460 Újiyediin Chuluu and Kevin Stuart, “Rethinking the Mongol Oboo.”

identify with the emergence of the modern state and so of nationalism.\textsuperscript{462} In the case of Xinjiang in this period, the “nation” was only inchoate in the discourse of territorial recovery. If the Han Chinese were claiming territory for anything, it was for the empire and for their own co-local communities. The Xiang Army’s imperial project was, as I have argued, “sino-normative,” and so Xinjiang would be attached permanently to the empire not through local Muslims’ loyalty to the emperor, but through the region’s incorporation into the ritual systems of China proper. Similarly, what bound co-local communities together was not common ethnicity or nationhood, but common worship. For the Xiang Army especially, territorializing Xinjiang as part of China proper meant transplanting their patron deity and rooting his new identity in the desert soil. Thus, this mode of territoriality is not national, but “numinous,” having to do with gods and the spiritual. In this sense, it resembles both the creation of bounded spaces belonging to a broad imagined community and the extension of networks of worship across space on behalf of a fluid religious community. Xinjiang was made Chinese not by the creation of a national space, but by establishing new gods.

\textit{I. Ruins}

In order to understand how and why the Xiang Army reconstructed Xinjiang’s spiritual landscape as they did, we must return to the question of what the Hunanese believed had been lost. Certainly, they were surrounded by physical reminders of the violence of the uprisings. As the Xiang Army soldiers first made their way across Northern Xinjiang, they were struck in every place by ruins of former Chinese

\textsuperscript{462} Osterhammel, \textit{The Transformation of the World}, 107.
settlements. In August 1876, Ürümqi General Ying-han returned to the garrison town that had once been his official post. All that was left of the Chinese city, he reported, was a set of walls, while the Manchu garrison had been “flattened.” It took two months for him to reconstruct the events of the Uprising: in the summer of 1864, the Manchu city had held out under siege for eighty days. In the end, 20,000 were killed. Now, nearly all of the arable land was fallow and untended, save by two or three Hui farmers who had once come from China proper looking for a better life. Initial estimates indicated that up to three-quarters of arable land in the North had been abandoned. Stories of loss during the Muslim uprisings were common in the Han official culture of the reconstruction period. The author of the *Fuyuan County Gazetteer* wrote in 1907 about the ruins of the old settlement of Jimsar thirty li north of the county seat. In 1865, Jimsar resisted the first wave of Hui assault under the leadership of Manchu hero Kong Cai. While Kong escaped the second attack to fight for another decade, the city itself was ruined. The walls lay “shattered” on a lonely plain. Now, the *Gazetteer* tells us, “Peace has reigned for over twelve years, but the spirit of this place has been gravely injured. The wounds have not healed. It makes one sigh.” Other writers were less dramatic, even as they emphasized the total destruction of the former Chinese presence: Qitai “vanished from the face of the Earth” when the Muslims burnt it.

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463 *Qinding pingding Shan-Gan-Xinjiang huifei fanglüe*, j. 305, 2-4; j. 406, 4-5.

464 Wei Guangtao, *Kanding Xinjiang ji*.


466 *Qitai xian xiangtu zhi*, 2010 edition, 31) [1908].
Nevertheless, the official sense of trauma was more influenced by Qing antiquarianism than by the recent events. The erasure of structures attested to a final break with a history that could not be recovered, a negation of what Laura Newby has called “the literary conquest of Xinjiang” and James Millward the process of bringing Xinjiang “onto the map,” a kind of territorialization on paper that literati found especially significant.\footnote{467} Works of travel writing and evidentiary scholarship in the High Qing matched toponyms and features in the present with records of Han and Tang conquests. The literary conquest of Xinjiang sustained a geographical imaginary that made this strange region familiar, denied its present inhabitants the authority to speak about their own history by characterizing them as historical relics, and instead placed them and their homeland squarely within the imperial territorial inheritance.\footnote{468} For the most part, the vision of the past that evidential scholarship provided was comforting. Scholars and officials who went “beyond the Pass” often kept diaries of their journeys. While these diaries usually lacked contemporary ethnographic detail, travelers would often be familiar with the literature on the Western Regions and spend their time relating locations, peoples, and artifacts to the ancient past. Nearly every piece of geographical writing on Xinjiang included not only current toponyms, but lists of their predecessors drawn from official histories. After the Muslim Uprisings, however, it was difficult to

\footnote{467} Laura Newby, “The Literary Conquest of Xinjiang”; Millward, “Coming Onto the Map.”  

\footnote{468} Officials in the High Qing had experienced difficulty understanding the connection between Islam as practiced by Turkic Muslims and that of Chinese-speaking Muslims in China proper: local Islam appeared to some as a strange cult. Until the very late Qing, authors stubbornly refused to treat Islam as more than a local curiosity – some even repeated the same stories about Muḥammad and the early years of Islam over and over, as though hearing them for the first time. Pei Jingfu (He hai Kunlun lu, 182, 262, 360) is one of several examples.
relate an entry in the *New Tang History* to a concrete relic or ruin. The erasure of Han and Tang ruins attested to the final negation of the “literary conquest of Xinjiang.”

The sense of loss for a literatus when an artifact disappeared came to the surface in the compilation of the native-place gazetteers, which demanded that local historical sites be recorded. The *Fuyuan County Gazetteer* tells of a broken iron bell that disappeared from the old town of Jimsar during the years of chaos. In the days before the Uprising, it lay half-buried in the dirt, but the visible part showed a trace of the city built during the Tang: a reign name, “clear as day,” declared a Chinese presence dating from a golden age. “Afterward,” lamented the author, “it was probably broken up by the locals and tossed into the forge to make farm implements, melted down into nothing. There is no other trace of the past.” Writers blamed the Turki for looting Chinese relics, and while it is not untrue that Turki would take building materials and artifacts from ancient sites, account of lost ruins played into ideas of the Muslims’ avariciousness and lack of respect for history: “It is said that the Turki dig up antiquities from the city [of Luntai], and they break it up into fragments for the gold and silver.” The ancient Han and Tang sites that remained were spooky, but never threatening: northwest of Suilai, one could visit the ruins of a Tang-era temple. The walls had fallen, but five wooden idols remained, perhaps desiccated and preserved by the dry steppe winds. Or perhaps visitors merely took a more recent Mongol Buddhist temple to be an ancient Chinese structure.


471 *Suilai xian xiangtuzhi*, 80.
Regardless, “the old folks said,” on a quiet night you could still hear the sound of drums and bells within.

Tang artifacts resonated with Qing officials in no small part because they saw their community as continuing the successes of the dynastic past. Much as the Classically-educated British elite in India depicted themselves as Romans engaging in a revived imperial project,\(^{472}\) so did Chinese writings constantly invoke the conquests, generals, and garrisons of the Han and Tang. For one hyperbolic example of many, Yi Shousong (b. 1845, Xingguo, Hubei) wrote of his own arrival in Xinjiang in terms of the Han-era march into Loulan:\(^{473}\):

“Pichan (or Ancient Loulan)”

The clouds turn crow-black;
Silhouettes of mountain peaks sink into rosy red.
A warhorse whinnies to the waning moon;
The messenger fearfully brings news.
Barren sands drift near and far;
Crooked trees line the way west and east.
This ancient way to Loulan –
The Han once labored to open it up!


\(^{473}\) *Lidai Xiyu shi chao*, 219.

雲翻鴉陳黑
峰映落霞紅
征馬嘶殘月
行人怯曉風
荒沙迷遠近
村樹列西東
千古樓蘭道
曾勞漢使通
It was no coincidence that Zuo Zongtang, working from Gong Zizhen’s plan for Xinjiang, proposed names for counties that reflected those of Tang garrisons. His follower Xiao Xiong frequently made reference to the Tang in his notes on poems and borrowed obscure facts from Tang-era ethnography to explain what he saw in the present: under his brush, the Kyrgyz became the descendants of Tang tributary state of Jiankun, while Qumulese, he said, saw long braids as a sign of beauty because the Tang-era elite of Qiuci (actually far from Qumul) grew their hair out.

In the meantime, the leaders of the reconquering armies cherished the relics that they did find, as long as they dated to the Han or Tang. In 1876, General Jin-shun ran across a Tang-era stela dating to the year 640 atop a peak at Dawan in the hills between Qumul and Barköl. The inscription recorded the arrival of Tang general Jiang Xingben (d. 645) during a conflict with the king of Gaochang. Its content must have resonated with Jin-shun, who read it out loud as a demonstration that, contrary to rumor, he was in fact literate. In fact, it was not a wholly new discovery: the stela had attracted the attention of travelers for some time, and an earlier Qing official had incorporated it into a temple to Guandi. That temple was destroyed in the uprisings during the long siege of Barköl. In 1882, Barköl Imperial Agent Ming-chun (d. 1887) rebuilt the temple and


475 Xiao Xiong, Xijiang za shu shi, 2:39b-40a, 14a. The writing of Wang Shu’nan, the financial commissioner who first proposed a plan for Xinjiang influenced by European colonialism, provides a striking contrast. Wang emphasized the distinctiveness of the Han-Tang legacy for the Chinese, but excluded the Turki from it. (Xinjiang tuzhi, xuexiao 1, 1,387. “彼族來源與吾異。與之講吾之漢唐，猶吾人聽印度之古史，毫無感觸。” “The other kind’s origins are different from ours. To speak with them about our Han and Tang is like when our people listen to the ancient history of India: It is confusing and alien.”) Yet Wang was a prolific antiquarian who produced an entire book of inscriptions found in the region.

476 Pei Jingfu, He hai Kunlun lu, 256; Xiyu beiming lu, 451-453.
moved the stela inside. In 1901, a new inscription was made that explained the history of the place from the perspective of the post-uprisings Han official elite. This inscription provided a series of temporal signposts of significance to that elite: in the reign of Emperor Gaozu of Tang (r. 618-626); at the moment of the temple’s destruction in 1866; at Ming-chun’s arrival in “Yiwu,” which was the ancient name for Barköl; and at the new reconstruction in 1901. The pre-uprisings attention to the stela was ignored. While Guandi was actually not widely worshipped until the Ming, and did not even possess his title of di “emperor” until 1615, late-Qing writers came to believe that the “Guandi” temple had originally stood there in the Tang. The important thing was that Han officials used ruins, inscriptions, and temples to tie their own actions to those of ancient dynasties, rather than to the Qing.

In choosing to revive the Tang, the Hunanese buried the legacy even of the High Qing. We may take for example the system of temples constructed around the garrison at Ürümchi during the Qianlong and Jiaqing era, which the Xiang Army made no effort to revive. The pre-Uprising San zhou jilüe lists sixty-one different temples from this period. As with every county then under Gansu province, Dihua had a city god temple, or actually four. Two were maintained by native-place associations for Shanxi and Shaanxi, the provinces that then dominated trade with China proper, and two more belonged to the old Green Standard garrison town of Dihua and to the nearby walled banner garrison of Gongning, respectively. After the reconquest, an expensive engineering project consolidated the two walled towns into one, and naturally only the Dihua temple was


\[478\] San zhou jilüe, j. 2.
revived.\textsuperscript{479} The bannermen of Gongning maintained three temples to the Northern Emperor, the patron of Manchuria and Mongolia – one each for the Mongols and Manchus, and another on a peak to the north. All of these were gone for good after the Uprising, as were all but one of Dihua’s ten temples to Guandi, who had become at this point a patron of bannermen and a central figure in the imperial pantheon. In transforming the garrison towns of Dihua, Ürümchi, and Gongning into a provincial capital, the Xiang Army erased its banner identity, chose the name of the Han garrison (Dihua, meaning “civilizing the barbarians”), and turned the dual city form more common in the borderlands into a single-city complex like those of China proper.\textsuperscript{480} By 1890, however, funds for the rebuilding were drying up, and even the reconstruction of fortifications had to be abandoned.\textsuperscript{481}

For that matter, a whole network of imperial temples constructed across Xinjiang was lost and never rebuilt. The Ili General’s administration had handled sacrifices in the usual \textit{ad hoc} way, by establishing temples when and where it was deemed necessary, and only with the approval of Beijing. For example, in 1777, the Imperial Agent at Yarkand Gao-pu (d. 1778) wrote a lengthy memorial on the topic of the Yarkand River.\textsuperscript{482} It was deep and wide, he wrote, enough to be navigable, but could be very treacherous. It connected Yarkand with distant Aksu across the desert, irrigated farmers’ fields, and ten

\textsuperscript{479} Dihua xian xiangtu zhi, 2010 edition, 12.

\textsuperscript{480} Gaubatz, \textit{Beyond the Great Wall}, 72-74.

\textsuperscript{481} Rao Yingqi, GX 15.5.26 “又請修哈密等省城門戶片” in Gongzhong dang Guangxuchao zouzhe v. 4, 485.

\textsuperscript{482} Gao-pu, QL 42.10.4 “奏為撥款於葉爾羌河畔建蓋龍王廟宇，並請賜匾額事,” FHA 04-01-37-0036-001.
miles upriver, one could find excellent jade. Moreover, there was one particular crossing that connected the western Tarim Basin with an important garrison post to the east. The agent had to cross here twice a year to perform the rites at a temple to Guandi built there in 1756 at a garrison outpost. While in 1775 Gao-pu had been ordered to worship the river spirit and so appease it, he now proposed to build a proper Dragon King temple there – he proposed a site, a source for the necessary timber, and a plan to recruit Green Standard troops and local Muslims as laborers. In short, it was only with careful consideration and argument that this official could secure imperial approval to alter the sacred landscape of Xinjiang. Extensions of the imperial cult were generally associated with specific mountains or rivers. Otherwise, they were temples at Banner garrisons to Guandi or a small collection of other deities: the Fire God (Huoshen), Valiant General Liu (Liu mengjiang jun), and the Locust King (Bazha). Guandi was at the center of each temple system, which functioned as nodes in a region-wide network of sacrifices.

Engagement with ruins was part of Han officials’ self-fashioning as a community in a way that blurred distinctions among them. While the pre-Uprisings Han population of Xinjiang was largely from China’s inner Northwest (Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Gansu), that fact largely disappeared from the official record after 1877, much as the project of official memorial celebrated the Hunanese contributions to Xinjiang’s reclamation at the expense of others. Just as history writing is an act of selective forgetting, so was

485 Stoler, “Rethinking Colonial Categories,” 137.
reconstruction an act of selective “allowing to disappear.” To be sure, Wang Shu’nan’s compilation of Xinjiang inscriptions demonstrates that, despite official antiquarianism, the overwhelming majority of pre-Uprising epigraphy was lost forever. Nevertheless, the textual record that the Xiang Army had available to them would have indicated dozens, if not hundreds, of pre-uprisings Qing sites that they never mentioned or attempted to restore. Those sites were mostly temples built by the Qing empire that would have attested to the importance of the Manchu state and of the old military government at Ili, while others were temples constructed by Han settlers who worshipped their own regional gods. Ignoring those recent ruins and focusing on Han and Tang sites allowed Han officials to recall the uprisings as a moment of loss, but to relocate the object of that loss to the distant past, which they could represent as a shared Chinese patrimony. After all, the statecraft community of Changsha had learned from Wang Fuzhi that the Han and Tang represented the last flourishing of Chinese power before the essence of civilization retreated to the South. Finally, in the borderlands, the Hunanese could assert their roles as the guardians and revivers of the ancient tradition, not of Manchu imperial power.

II. Rebuilding

After 1877, this network was replaced with a hierarchy of temples that were organized in a wholly different way. During reconstruction, city god temples replaced Guandi temples as the nuclei of their local ritual systems. On a larger scale, the new Xinjiang province was to be constituted through a hierarchy of local deities. As of 1887,

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⁴⁸⁶ Xinjiang tuzhi, jinshi 1, jinshi 2.
the law required counties to possess certain temples: to Confucius, Guandi, and Wenchang; altars of grain, the gods, and the Husbandman; and a shrine to the Dragon King, who controlled water. Such temples were standard for any county in China proper, as specified by imperial law. However, constructing these temples entailed a significant investment of time, labor, and resources, and it should come as no surprise that the magistrates of each county, serving nearly alone as outsiders in Muslim-majority areas, often failed to rally the support necessary to construct them. When several new counties were established in 1902, many of the previously-mandated temples still had not been built, and a slimmer provincial budget meant that many temples were never built. The contrast with pre-uprisings temple-building is interesting: previously, imperial agents expanded the imperial cult into Xinjiang only gradually, particularly in the South, much as they only established new garrisons in the Tarim Basin when violence demanded it. After 1877, the Xiang Army took a totalizing, systematic approach to temple-building in an attempt to reterritorialize Xinjiang as a province.

Geomancy was another means to ensure the security and stability of the new provincial system. One of the first tasks of the reconstruction agency in Qumul was to add a small amount of height to a hill in order to properly align the New City, where Zuo’s camp had been. Dihua was from the beginning meant to be the new provincial

489 Hami zhiliting xiantuzhi, in Xinjiang xiantuzhi gao, 155-162, 158. For more detail, see Section V below.
capital, not only because it was in a particularly defensible and strategic location.\textsuperscript{490}

Rather, it was sited in an auspicious location along a river and between several peaks, each of which became the object of official worship. Every county seat received the same treatment, as the Hunanese chose hills, some of which were already worshipped under the Ili General, for veneration.

Not every story fit easily into the Hunanese project, which emphasized the total devastation of the Uprisings and privileged the specific contributions of the Xiang Army.

The city of Barkööl (Balikun) is located in the mountains of Eastern Xinjiang in an exceptionally defensible position. The Qing established it in 1716 as a garrison town and supply post, the last great redoubt before Qumul on the road to Gansu and China proper. Barkööl had actually repelled Ya‘qūb Beg’s forces and held out for years against repeated Muslim assault until the Xiang Army arrived. This fact is neatly absent from Hunanese accounts, and even the usually verbose Xiao Xiong only gives it as much mention as Barkööl’s produce.\textsuperscript{491} Nevertheless, their resistance made it into local legend as a miracle achieved with the aid of the city god, which Barkööl’s Chinese literati and gentry reported in 1882:

\begin{quote}
In Tongzhi 3, 4, and 5, when the Muslim fury burned its fiercest, people were dying in droves. Ürūmchi, Qitai, Gucheng, Turpan, and Qumul were all lost, one after the other. The grain ran out, and no aid came. The people of the city were eating each other. The villages all around were plundered and burnt away. The rebellious Muslims were then assaulting the lone city. Just when attack and defense hung in the balance, in the city, the officials, gentry, soldiers, and commoners all went to the temples of Guandi and all the gods to pray to them for their occult aid.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{490} Dihua xian xiangtuzhi, 10.

\textsuperscript{491} Xiao Xiong, Xiyu za shu shi, j. 2, 28b.
Immediately, the commanders of the hungry and worn-out soldiers and militia climbed upon the parapet to defend the city. They chased the bandits and defended without fear of death. After coming to the brink of danger many times, the bandits lost and fled. In the night, soldiers on patrol from time to time witnessed miraculous things: they heard the sound of cavalry charging forth, and saw a suit of armor dancing with a blade, standing erect upon the city wall.

On Tongzhi 4.6.9 (July 31, 1869), the bandits clambered like monkeys up the northeastern corner of the city walls. The vanguard had already reached the top when suddenly they were met with a ghostly general who held them at bay. The surprised bandits made quite a clamor. Our army’s fearless braves rushed forth to attack, and the bandits died in retreat. Barköl city was saved because of this. If not for the temples of Guandi and the gods, if not for the protection of the spirits, how could human effort have managed this?492

In the estimation of the Barköl literati and gentry, the sword-dancing suit of armor and ghostly general were the manifestations not only of Guandi, the God of War, but also of three deities more precious to the people of Barköl: their city god, who did not as yet possess a name or title; the Dragon King of nearby Pulei Lake; and General Yang Si (Yang Si jiangjun).493 This last spirit had his own peculiar history: originally, Yang Si

492 GX 8.3.1 “神靈顯應懇賜匾額封號摺” in Liu xiangqin gong zouzhe j. 3, 17a-20b.

“同治三四五等年回氛甚熾，斗粟萬錢，烏垣奇古吐哈各城相續不守。糧盡援絕。城閥民人相食。四鄉村堡，焚掠一空。逆回挾黨，時撲孤城，當攻守契緊時，在城官紳兵民等遂向關帝諸神廟禱求默佑。旋督同飢疲之官兵團丁登陴防守，隨賊所向拚死捍禦，屢瀕於危，賊卒以退，鎮城亦因之而安。向非武聖各廟，神靈護佑，人力何能逮此?”

493 Qing shilu, GX 8.3.21, j. 144 戎申.
was meant to be a young Hunanese warrior from Song-dynasty Changsha who had distinguished himself in battle, and who in death was called upon to aid irrigation and control floods. In the last years of the Ming, Hunanese migrants brought Yang Si into the loess plateau of Southern Shaanxi and Gansu, where over the course of the first half of the Qing he gained a new grandfatherly identity, as his cult diminished in Hunan. This latter Yang Si was the one worshipped in Barköl – Hunanese by origin, but Northwestern by identity, brought to the town by the Shaanxi traders who dominated it. The Hunanese of the Xiang Army held no reverence for Yang Si.

In response, Beijing decreed that each of Barköl’s temples for which honors had been requested would receive them, but in such a way that integrated each of them into the broader reconstruction project, rather than emphasizing their local identities. This request probably came from the Xinjiang provincial government, which passed the Barkôlese’s request up to the Board of Rites. The Guandi temple, dating to 1772, was now to bear the placard “brilliantly display sagely prowess” (bu zhao sheng wu). This inscription pointed back to a statement in the Book of Documents: “Our king of Shang brilliantly displayed his sagely prowess; for oppression he substituted his generous gentleness; and the millions of the people gave him their hearts.” There is a disjuncture here between the request presented by Barköl and the imperial response: they clearly stated the exceptional nature of their survival despite the lack of imperial support, while

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Beijing provided them with an inscription indicating instead the role of the army in “liberating” them. The words *sheng wu* may also point to the “sacred war,” the Qing’s mid-century battle for unity that Wei Yuan had characterized in those terms.\(^{496}\) The Dragon King temple would state “proudly announce repression” (*wei xuan shi e*), which pointed to an ancient and oft-repeated phrase dating at least to the *Zuo zhuan*: “repress robbers and oppressors” (*shi e kou nüe*), another declaration of imperial majesty. Yang Si’s temple received different treatment: his temple would read “the sea shrine shows posterity” (*hai ci biao shi*), an abbreviation of “we established a sea shrine to show posterity forever” (*li hai ci yi biao wan shi*). This is the concluding line of the text of a stela erected in Barköl in 137 CE to celebrate a Han victory at Dunhuang.\(^{497}\) After it was rediscovered in 1729, a general installed it in the Guandi temple. The text’s “sea shrine,” in the context of 1883, points back to the Dragon King temple. Yang Si’s temple thus received a dubious honor: its new placard mediated the relationship between the Han-era victory and the present reconquest. It had no relationship to the years-long struggle for Barköl. So, while the local literati had requested that the empire recognize the special achievements of Barköl, the Board of Rites instead reintegrated their remaining temples as monuments celebrating a narrative of territorial recovery wherein the empire appeared as the main actor, while the claim to the land and its subsequent loss dated back to antiquity. This decentered the temples’ special local significance and emphasized instead

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\(^{496}\) Wei Yuan, *Sheng wu ji* [Record of the Sacred War].

\(^{497}\) The stela is called the *Pei Cen jigong bei* “Stela Commemorating the Victory of Pei Cen.” (*Xiyu beiming lu*, 8-9.)
the narrative of imperial loss and recovery that tied the Han and Tang to the Xiang Army.\textsuperscript{498}

By 1908, the Barköl gazetteer no longer celebrated the spirits who had preserved them\textsuperscript{499}:

> When, fortunately, the Dynasty regained its power, and the great army marched to Barköl, they peered in the city and saw that it was weak ... and its people were poor, there was none who was not speechless at how strange this was. They thought, to hold out for ten years, they must have had the help of Heaven! They did not know that it was truly thanks to human effort.

The story advanced by the Barköl literati was completely inverted, and their local gods, as personifications of Barkölse heroism, abandoned for a celebration of the Xiang Army. Nor did the gazetteer list their temples, as the Chinese of Barköl had moved away, and there were few left to worship. Ultimately, reconstruction did not save Barköl, which had been a center of trade, but instead directed the merchant networks associated with the Xiang Army away from it. The army garrisoned itself not in Barköl’s redoubt, but in Qumul and Turpan. The Tianjin merchants who followed the army also established themselves in the new garrison towns, but avoided Barköl – perhaps they found no opportunity to expand among the Shaanxi and Shanxi merchants there, whom the Tianjinese eventually forced out of their dominant place in the regional trade. The Barköl gazetteer reads:

> It was from this point that the people began to scatter. The market streets turned to miserable alleys. Dozens of stores shut down their businesses. This used to be the “throat” of

\textsuperscript{498} Only Barköl’s city god, now named Lingji “swift aid,” was spared.

\textsuperscript{499} Zhenxi ting xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 97-125, 104.
the Northern Route; now it has become more a barren region of grassland.

It was not unheard of for gazetteers to express dissent rooted in local pride, but it was certainly rare in Xinjiang’s native-place gazetteers. Barköl’s is the only gazetteer that speaks of its reconstruction-era history in such an elegiac mode – and it was the only gazetteer produced by a Han group who had not benefitted from the reconquest. The polyphony in the Barköl gazetteer – a local sense of loss in the midst of imperial victory, coupled with a diminution of Barköl’s heroic past – reflects the refusal of higher officials to legitimize its history and their own dissatisfaction with Hunanese dominance, both of which were expressed through the numinous.

The Xiang Army strove to reconstruct Xinjiang not as an Inner Asian territory, but as a province, and not in a way that reflected the High Qing, but the distant imperial past. Doing so meant imposing a numinous order on the region, so that it would be constituted as a stable social and political entity through orthodox worship. The Xiang Army’s project did affect mosques, as I will discuss below, but that aspect of it never reached the Board of Rites and was poorly documented in general. However, their temple-building was mainly aimed at transforming the imperial sacred landscape of Xinjiang into a provincial and Han Chinese one. However, from the Xiang Army’s sino-normative perspective, “Chinese” meant the revival of the Han and Tang, and so other Han traditions were obscured in the production of a uniform numinous landscape.

III. Pacification
The Barkölese pressed their claims during a period of Hunanese numinous expansion. The Hunanese made their specific domination over Xinjiang clear through the nativization of their own patron god Dingxiang Wang, the King of Pacifying Hunan, and through the elevation of Zuo Zongtang and his clique from enshrined heroes to protecting spirits. They mobilized the techniques of regional cults in China proper to naturalize both the Hunanese presence and their own separation from their homeland in southern China. Xinjiang became a new dwelling for the god of the Xiang Army, and so both inextricably bound to and different from Hunan.

Dingxiang Wang’s story begins all the way back in Shanhua County, at the geographical and social heart of the Hunanese Statecraft community and of the Xiang Army clique. Apart from one Northern Song reference to a city god by this name in the vicinity of modern Changsha, however, the first surviving accounts of Dingxiang Wang date from the 1850s, when Dingxiang Wang was the City God of Shanhua County.500 The “Xiang” in his name refers to the Xiang River, which runs through Changsha and from which the Xiang Army derives its name, so it is possible that the numinous power of his early manifestations was tied to controlling these waters. While several legends of his mortal origins circulated in Hunan, each recorded tale holds that he was once a loyal county magistrate who gave his life for the people of Shanhua, and as such, there is little to distinguish them from the origin legends of city gods in general.501 Nor do they make any special mention of controlling the river or the apparently medieval origins of the cult.

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500 Tang Juan, 13. I was very fortunate in the course of research to come across this master’s thesis from Xinjiang University. The author draws on a wide variety of materials to present, I believe for the first time, a comprehensive history of Dingxiang Wang and his cult across China and in Xinjiang.

501 Tang Juan, 21.
Instead, they identify Dingxiang Wang as a Qing magistrate who ended plagues of locusts. It is in this nineteenth-century understanding of the deity that we must contextualize his spread into the Northwest.

Early records of the Shanhua temple have also been lost, but it is known that one was built in Changsha sometime in the Ming. It fell into disrepair until being rebuilt in 1782 with a broad, two-story stage in front. Dingxiang Wang’s temple sat at the base of a hill, on its north side, just below the city fortifications. There worshippers put on bimonthly performances before the city god’s effigy, both in order to please the deity and because such rituals brought their community together. On important festival days and on the god’s birthday, people would come into the city to burn incense and to carry the effigy of Dingxiang Wang along the river and through the major streets of the city.

The Taiping War transformed Dingxiang Wang from a local city god into a powerful symbol of regional resistance and the military success of a new generation of reformist elites. In 1852, the Taiping army assaulted Changsha for three months. The gentry gathered to worship the City God, recalling the stories of other legendary military victories aided by the spirit world. They carried the Shanhua city god’s effigy up the hill and placed it on a tower over the city gates, facing south to observe the battle. At that moment, according to the 1880 gazetteer, the Taiping soldiers scaling the walls were forced from them by great explosions, flying through the air like so many drops of rain – through numinous intervention, Changsha was saved! Early the next year, Governor Luo

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503 Tang Juan, 18.
Bingzhang memorialized to ask the emperor to grant an official title to the city god, and so he became known formally as the Ever-Protecting King of Pacifying Hunan (Yongzhen Dingxiang Wang). From this point onward, the figure of Dingxiang Wang became more closely tied to elite Hunanese identity and to the Xiang Army in particular. In 1857, Dingxiang Wang’s temple burned, leaving only the stage built for temple dramas, but his effigy was saved. In 1860, at the height of the Taiping War, not only was the Dingxiang Wang temple rebuilt through donations and greatly expanded, but, under the license of the court and probably through the patronage of Hunanese elites, shrines to him were constructed across the province.505

Stephen Platt has argued that a distinct Hunanese identity emerged during the Taiping period and was sustained by the interpersonal relationships and Statecraft political and moral ideology that constituted the Xiang Army. To these we may add common worship of Dingxiang Wang. Worship of the King continued well after the supposed “dissolution” of the Xiang Army, which after Zeng Guofan’s departure marched both northwest into Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang, and later eastward in 1885 during the Sino-French War and 1900 against the Boxers.506 “Whenever the Hunanese go to fight in other provinces,” declared a memorial in 1888, “they always carry with them an effigy of Dingxiang Wang … which they worship at [temples called] ‘the temporary royal residence.”’507 The Xiang Army under Zeng Guofan and later Zuo Zongtang indeed

505 Tang Juan, 14-15.
506 Tang Juan, 16.
did so – when the Hunanese went beyond the Pass, so did their god.\textsuperscript{508} As one literatus wrote early in the Republic, “The city god of our Changsha does not only orient inward, but can also orient outward. Not only does he stay in Hunan – he goes on campaign to other provinces, as well!”\textsuperscript{509} Nevertheless, Dingxiang Wang received no imperial honors for his efforts in the Northwest. Rather, his title came solely from the anti-Taiping war, and later from his aid in the battle with the French at Fuzhou in 1885, when the Hunanese bullets, it was said, fell like rain, and much farther into the French ranks than was humanly possible. Instead, Dingxiang Wang as he was manifested in Xinjiang was honored under a different name.

By the end of the Qing, most Xiang Army soldiers had returned home, and temples to Dingxiang Wang were found only in two places in imperial territory: Shanhua itself, and about two dozen towns and cities across Xinjiang. This is simply because the social matrix of the Xiang Army, as discussed in Chapter Two, traveled from Hunan across the Northwest. For a decade, as the campaign dragged on, Zuo Zongtang ordered the worship of Dingxiang Wang before every battle.\textsuperscript{510} Those soldiers who finished their term of service in Shaanxi or Gansu tended to return home, so perhaps there was no one to maintain the “temporary royal residences” there. In 1877, however, when the Xiang

\textsuperscript{508} This fact is noted both in a communique from the Board of Rites dated 1885 and in popular accounts (Tang Juan, 16).

\textsuperscript{509} Yi Baisha, \textit{Diwang chunqiu}, cited in Tang Juan, 16. “吾湘城隍菩萨不仅对内，且能对外，不仅在湘，且出征他省。”

Army entered Xinjiang carrying an effigy of Dingxiang Wang and swiftly took the whole region, it was the end of the road – after Kashgar, there was no more empire to reconquer. Many Hunanese settled permanently.

Worship of Dingxiang Wang in Xinjiang did not simply emerge from popular devotion. Rather, officials, soldiers, merchants, and commoners all collaborated to establish the dominance of Dingxiang Wang’s cult over those of other gods. The first temple to be built was probably in Qumul, the Xiang Army’s staging ground for the campaign, where it abutted the Hunanese-Hubeinese Native Place Association (liang Hu huigu) that maintained it at least into the late 1920s – or rather, the association was later built next to the temple.\(^{511}\) The association also rented space to the local tax bureau, and given the ubiquity and status of the Hunanese, we should not be surprised at this concentration of social, fiscal, and spiritual power in one place. Dihua hosted a variety of native-place associations, each with their sponsored temples and temple festivals. The most prominent of these was the Dingxiang Wang temple, again housed and maintained by the Hunanese-Hubeinese Association.\(^ {512}\) Naturally, there was a stage there that hosted a variety of dramatic performances. Other places explicitly recorded as Dingxiang Wang temples were found in Turpan’s Old (Chinese) City; in Gucheng, where the temple was constructed in 1903 with donations from resident merchants; Suilai and Suiding in the North; and Chaqiliq, in Aksu circuit.\(^ {513}\) All of these temples have since disappeared, just

\(^{511}\) Hami zhiliting xiangtuzhi, 147, 149; Sven Hedin, History of the Expedition, 228.

\(^{512}\) Zhongguo xiqu zhi, Xinjiang juan, 494.

\(^{513}\) Kataoka (291) lists each. For minimal details, see Tulufan zhiliting xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 133; Suilai xian xiangtuzhi, 80-81; Suqing xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 196-205, 203; Qitai xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 29-45, 40; Ruoqiang xian xiangtuzhi, in Xinjiang xiangtuzhi gao, 312-316, 314.
as the Dingxiang Wang temple in Changsha, despite the efforts of a devoted community to preserve it, was eventually destroyed by the fire of 1938 and the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.\textsuperscript{514}

One temple remained for some time, however, in Manas.\textsuperscript{515} Manas was the site of the Xiang Army’s final victory over Ya’qūb Beg’s forces in the North, and also formerly a major Chinese settlement and trading post. Before the army turned to enter the South, they established themselves for a time at Manas. According to an inscription made at the temple’s foundering in 1895, “Dingxiang Wang is the city god of Shanhua in Hunan. … The Hunanese ordered to battle in Xinjiang … pray to him from time to time."\textsuperscript{516} The Xiang Army settlers remained a distinct community in Manas and elsewhere, and one maintained by common worship, experience, and history. Eventually, some Hunanese decided to build this new “temporary royal residence” out of “contrition” for nearly twenty years of missed prayers and sacrifices. Local support was strong: Suilai County Magistrate Gao Jiesheng\textsuperscript{517} solicited funds and labor in the early spring, and on the summer solstice, the temple was already complete and ready for dedication.

\textsuperscript{514} I learned during a visit to Changsha in March 2015 that, until very recently, a small part of the Dingxiang Wang temple had been preserved in the back room of a local restaurant that came to stand on the site. The triangular piece of stone has now been removed, and it is not clear where it is now preserved. The area around the old temple is being redeveloped into a tourist site mimicking a street scene from old Changsha. While a city god temple is planned as part of the Disneyland-like neighborhood, Dingxiang Wang is not among the deities slated to be honored within.

\textsuperscript{515} Xiyu beiming lu, 496-497.

\textsuperscript{516} “定湘王為湖南善化城神靈 … 湘人之效命疆場者，莫不為位，以時祈禱。”

\textsuperscript{517} I have found no other information on Gao Jiesheng. The Suilai magistrate for this period is given in metropolitan records as Li Yuanlin (b. 1847, Pingjiang, Hunan). “Jiesheng” may have been the magistrate’s style name, in which case there are three possibilities: then-Ili Prefect Gao Jingchang (1851-1900, Shanhua), a Hunan Army veteran, may have served as acting magistrate, though this is unlikely given his superior rank; Gao Shengyue (b. 1858, Xiangyin) may have received an early temporary appointment,
The year 1895 aligns neatly both with the Qing metropole’s retreat from affairs in Xinjiang and with other efforts to establish Dingxiang Wang not just as a deity of the Hanunese, but as a local deity and protector of Xinjiang. It appears that, once the Hanunese were settled in the region for twenty years, they began to articulate a sense of belonging in the borderlands. As the Manas inscription verifies, Chinese in Northern Xinjiang tended to identify Dingxiang Wang explicitly by this name and as a Hanunese deity. For this reason, scholars have ignored the cult of Dingxiang Wang in the South, where this localization took place. The first step was to rename the deity to simply “local god” (fangshen), avoiding mention of the word xiang. “Local God” could be found worshipped in Wusu outside of Dihua; in Ningyuan in Ili; and in Kucha, Qarghiliq, and Khotan in the South.

Yet, traces of Hanunese origins remained. The Wensu County Gazetteer provides an alternative origin legend for Local God that ties him both to Hanun and to Xinjiang:

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518 For example, Kataoka Kazutada’s discussion of Chinese religion in Xinjiang in Shinchō Shinkyō consists only of a chart of temples and shrines named in late-Qing gazetteers. (291) Although Dingxiang Wang is also called Fangshen in these materials, his temples are listed separately according to these different names without acknowledgement of their relationship to each other.

519 Kataoka, 291. For details, see Hetian zhilizhou xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 394; Kuerkala Wusu zhiliting xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 170; Ningyuan xian xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 209; Kuche zhiliting xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 318; Yecheng xian xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 372. The Wusu temple dated to 1892, and Liu Mengjiang was worshipped there as well. The Ningyuan Local God temple is meant to date to 1884 – this may indicate that it was actually a different, pre-Uprising temple, or that the Hanunese established it there when they retook the region from Russia.

520 Wensu xian xiangtuzhi, 1908, 259. 方神廟在縣治城外東南，考方神事略，前和闐直隸州劉牧式南，曾得道光戊卒遺墨內載：神黃姓字定湘，籍隸湖南長沙縣，世居笠音寺側粟堤屋場，嘉慶六年五月初六日酉時生。道光初元與比鄰屈姓爭水，其兄憤激誤斃一命，公替兄直認不諱，坐罪，大吏廉得其情，遺戎甘肅。六年公換防喀什，時張格爾亂，堵堤淹城，公慨然泅入水中，堤決水退，闔城軍民盛慶再生，其慷慨赴義有如是者。生而正直，歿乃神明，凡疾病急難水火蟲荒，禱之者輒奇

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The Local God Temple is outside the east gate of the county seat. According to the Local God Biography, the former Khotan Prefect Liu Shinan once found it recorded in the Posthumous Record of the Garrison Soldiers of the Daoguang Era: "The god’s surname was Huang, and his style name [zi] was Dingxiang. He was from Changsha County, Hunan, and his family had lived for generations in Millet Dike Village beside the Liyin Temple. He was born in the early evening on Jiaqing 6.5.6 [16 June 1801]. In Daoguang 1 [1820], he fought with his neighbors over some water. His elder brother, in a fit of rage, accidentally killed someone. The god took his brother’s place in acknowledging the crime without concealing anything, accepting the punishment. The high official appreciated his honesty and affection [for his brother] and sent him as a garrison soldier to Gansu.

“In Daoguang 6 [1825], the god was transferred to Kashgar. At that time, it was the Jahāṅgīr uprising, and they had diked up the city, flooding it with water. The god generously swam into the water – he opened the dike, and the water rushed out. Soldiers and civilians alike in the besieged city celebrated their new lease on life. Thus he sacrificed himself. In life, he was upright; in death, he was made a deity. … His temples have spread across Xinjiang, and he is called the ‘Local God.’” ...

It was found that, if one is to make a man into a god, then he must be worthy to have an imperial stela recording his deeds, and then in the present day he may be offered ceremonial sacrifices. In Guangxu wuxu [1898], the officials of Southern Xinjiang memorialized requesting him to be sacrificed to ... and they attached a copy of his Biography to await his receipt of honors.

应，庙祀遍新疆，名曰方神者，盖本诗之来方礼祀也[?]. 查以人而神，必有碑事迹蹟，而後當代可列祀典例也。光緒戊戌南疆官吏以奏列祀典請，卒格於列，故附載事略以俟采風者。

521 I have yet to locate either of these works, despite extensive searching and consultation with specialists in Beijing, Taipei, Hunan, and Xinjiang. They may be fictive, or else, as one archivist at the First Historical Archive suggested, hidden in the not-yet-digitized archives of the Board of Rites. “Liu Shinan” could be either Liu Zhaonan (n.d., Guide, Gansu), who was Khotan prefect 1888-1891, or more likely Liu Jiade (b. 1838, Huoqiu, Anhui), a Hunan Army veteran, prefect 1895-1897.
Thus was Dingxiang Wang made both a Hunanese and a loyal servant of the empire in Xinjiang. The writer, Pan Zongyue (b. 1858, Ningxiang), was part of the Hunan clique and had come up through the Xiang Army as a young man fighting in Gansu. He implausibly claims that this humble villager had a “style name,” used for signing poetry and artistic prose, that just happened to be identical to the name of Dingxiang Wang and to mean “Pacifying Hunan.” This story about Jahangir flooding Kashgar does not seem to appear in any Chinese or Turki accounts. Rather, it should be read as following the poetics that govern origin stories: Huang Dingxiang was exiled after a dispute over water, in which he righteously stood by his brother – years later, he was involved in another aquatic conflict, in which he righteously assisted his commander. The first event prefigures the second. We can also see in Huang’s story an echo of many soldiers’ experiences in the Xiang Army: most had come from humble backgrounds and traversed the whole of China to defend their country. Perhaps this story first appeared among the soldiers as they marched west, anticipating battle in Kashgar, or after they found themselves living in a different kind of exile, far from home in an alien land with no means to return.

The Khotan gazetteer supports the effort to formally enfeoff Local God, which seems never to have happened: “the Local God’s temples and effigies are all over Southern Xinjiang. He is esteemed for warding off peril on the same day [that it appears]. It would appear he ought to be inducted into the Record of Sacrifices.”

In order to have a strong case at the Board of Rites, they would need not only legends, but also a

\[522^{\text{\footnote{“而方神廟貌偏南疆，推當日禦患之功，似在應升祀典之例。”}}}\]
demonstration of his efficacy. Another version of the legend, this one from Kucha, highlights the effort to make Dingxiang Wang appear as a naturally-occurring, popular deity drawn from local culture who was also responsive to sacrifice:

The Local God Shrine is north of the prefectural seat. We find that the god was originally from Shanhua, Hunan. His surname was Huang, and his name was Guifang. In the Daoguang reign, he was sent to Kashgar as an official, where he assisted the general in the “Black Water Encirclement.” The bandit Jahāngīr flooded the city, and in a panic, he alone, generously, and in righteous rage jumped off the city walls and into the water, pledging to sacrifice his life. In a flash, the water streamed out of the gap, opening the city without any other care. The people recognized his virtue and so sacrificed to him, and when they do pray, none is without a numinous response. All across the South, Chinese and Turki compete to burn incense to him.\textsuperscript{523}

Again, the author plays fast and loose with history in his construction of an origin legend – the Black Water Encirclement, also called the Tongguzluq War, actually took place in 1758 along the Qarasu River. More interesting is the assertion that Dingxiang Wang is already popular among the Turki, and had been since well before the Muslim Uprisings. As for Huang Guifang, I can find no record of him in pre-Uprising accounts, nor in the extensive compilation of Jahāngīr-era Qing war dead.\textsuperscript{524} Nevertheless, there was one well-regarded official with the exact same name in the Xinjiang administration in office.

\textsuperscript{523} \textit{Kuche zhilizhou xiangtuzhi}, 2010 edition, 318. “方神祠在州治北，考方神原湖南善化人，姓黃名桂芳，道光間官喀什，偏裨黑水之圍，張逆等灌城，急獨慨然忠義憤激，投城赴水誓以身殉，須臾下流缺口，開城保無虞，民德而祠祀之，輒祈禱無不靈驗。南路各城漢纏爭奉香火，地方官朔望行香，亦為民請命之意也。”

\textsuperscript{524} \textit{Zhaozhongci liezhuan xubian} (National Palace Museum, Taipei, 台北故宫博物院藏 033674-033793) includes the names of hundreds of martyrs in the war in and around Kashgar. Huang is simply not among them.
This army major from Yangzhou is singled out for singular praise for having moved to Xinjiang from afar and gaining respect and notoriety among the local people of Xinping County for planting trees and spreading grasses despite difficult planting conditions. Given that praise for this figure in 1908 comes from Hunanese officials working in Kucha County, of which Xinping was a part until its administrative separation in 1902, it is likely that they intended to honor their colleague Huang Guifang by writing him into the Dingxiang Wang or Local God legend.

When the Xiang Army entered Xinjiang, the Manas temple inscription tells us, so did “the King’s incense fire spread north and south of the Tianshan.” In China proper, spreading that fire and the smoke that rose from its incense was a means to establish a god in a new place. In Xinjiang, this mechanism of local religious contestation became a means to incorporate the new region into a greater numinous order patterned on the ideal structure of the empire and to establish Hunanese political dominance. It was precisely during this decade that the Hunanese and their allies began to settle in. We must understand this in the context of the metropole’s retreat from Xinjiang: fiscal support decreased sharply, first under the general economic pressures of the mid-1890s, exacerbated by the Sino-Japanese and Sino-French Wars, and then during the Boxer crisis. At the same time, the Xiang Army clique had now been entrenched in the region for about twenty years. While they requested the enfeoffment of Dingxiang Wang as the Local God, anchoring their community to the land, the Chinese in Xinjiang also began to recognize that they were isolated and easily threatened.

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526 Xiyu beiming lu, 496.
One important manifestation of this sense of predicament was the apotheosis of Zuo Zongtang. The Xiang Army had long drawn on the Taiping-era changes in memorial practices to erect “manifest loyalty” shrines to their own fallen heroes, and Zuo himself requested shrines to be built for deceased officers. (See Chapter Four.) Zuo and Liu were both enshrined as outstanding officials near their homes in Hunan, and small shrines to them sprang up all over Xinjiang. In the late 1890s, however, the Hunanese regard for Zuo transformed from memorializing a meritorious human being into worshipping him as a protecting spirit.

So the story goes: early in the morning on May 3, 1897, a blacksmith surnamed Zhu entered the compound of Governor Rao Yingqi. He went straight to Rao’s office, where the governor was surprised to see him.

“Zuo Zongtang is coming to Xinjiang with tens of thousands of soldiers to exterminate the bandits!” he cried. “Quickly, send a memorial to ask what’s happening!”

Rao was aware that Blacksmith Zhu had a reputation for excitability and delusion. He calmly explained to him that Zuo Zongtang’s campaigns were twenty years past. Why should he memorialize on it now?

“Just yesterday,” Zhu explained, “I went out through Jiayuguan to see for myself. Their banners cover the mountains, their soldiers strong and horses stout – I could not but report it.”

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Rao found this absurd, of course. Jiayuguan, “the Pass,” was a few weeks’ journey from Dihua, beyond Turpan, Barköl, Qumul, and the Orangutan Gorge. He dismissed Zhu’s report with a laugh.

Not long after, however, Rao found himself leading soldiers down that very road into battle. The Hehuang Uprising was underway in Gansu. The rebels were threatening to advance into Xinjiang, and so Rao went out to meet them in battle. From what Rao could tell, there was little fight in the rebels, but they would retreat at random, scattering into the mountains, which made them annoying to pursue. “With numinous assistance (ruo you shenzhu),” he wrote, when the rebels tried to bolt, the army could apprehend them in a day or so. Nevertheless, the effort was time-consuming, especially when they crossed back into Anxi or Dunhuang in Gansu.

According to Rao’s memorial, he had once heard Zuo himself say, “If, in his whole life, a poor provincial graduate should receive the favor of the dynasty and be enfeoffed and respected as a great person, what should that official then plan to do? He’s only mortal. He should thus repay the dynasty by dying and becoming a hungry ghost, killing bandits!” 528 By “provincial graduate,” Zuo meant himself, the man from Hunan who had never passed the metropolitan exams. For Rao, Zuo’s pledge of immortal loyalty to the dynasty invoked the experiences of two Tang military heroes, Wang Jun (653-792) and Zhu Ci (742-784), who had once battled Inner Asian forces. Those engagements had seen soldiers return from the dead to strike at the enemy again. Rao proposed that Zuo, who had died in 1885, be enlisted to the Qing cause once again. He invoked the support

528 “生平一窮舉人受國厚恩，封拜極人，臣復何所圖，惟生以身，報國死為厲鬼殺賊耳。”
of scholars and commoners and reported that they had already begun work on a new shrine to Zuo in Dihua. Rao only asked for imperial approval, which he received. The Dihua shrine was granted a placard calligraphed by Liu Jintang. Given that Liu passed away in 1894, he probably produced this during his tenure with the intention of enshrining Zuo sooner or later.

Zuo was enshrined not only in Dihua, but also less formally in settlements with a Hunan-Hubei native place association. His shrines tended to abut Dingxiang Wang temples. Sven Hedin visited one such shrine in 1927 or 1928:

There is in Hami [Qumul] a temple erected to the memory of Tso Tsung-t’ang. ...

One goes through gates between red-lacquered columns and under curved roofs, to stop, after crossing two courtyards, before the facade of the temple, the middle part of which is taken up by a room resembling a miniature stage. In the middle of this room stands a kind of box with a picture, scarcely more than a foot in height, of the general clad in a yellow robe and mandarin-cap. He wears black moustaches and has a determined look. In front is an incense-burner. A tablet bears all his titles of honour, while at the sides there are other tablets on which are inscribed the names of his army leaders. ...

Another temple in Hami is erected to the god of the province of Hunan [Dingxiang Wang], for Tso Tsung-t’ang and most of his generals were from Hunan.

Hedin observed correctly that Zuo was surrounded in death by his officers, as though they had entered a kind of *posse comitatus* on their way out to the Northwest, agreeing to

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529 Zhou Hong, “Wang Qing Minguo Xinjiang Han ren zhuti wenhua – Xinjiang Han ren shehui yanjiu zhi san” in *Yunnan shifan daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui kexue ban)* 46:3 (May 2014), 46-58, 52.

live and die as one. Indeed, Zuo was soon followed by Liu Jintang, who was enshrined in Dihua in 1895. Liu’s shrines tended to be next door to Zuo’s, as well. Wu Aizhen (Aitchen Wu) describes the scene at the temple complex of Dihua in the late 1920s, when the Dingxiang Wang temple was decorated with placards and full of swirling incense smoke. Nearby, Zuo’s shrine held two lifelike effigies of him and an adulatory poem. Liu’s smaller shrine held only his image, and his poem was simpler.\

Alongside Zuo’s statues, one would have found Xiang Army veterans and later garrison commanders such as Huang Wanpeng (1832-1898) and Tan Shanglian (1840-1890). Liu also had his appanage in the afterlife – his former subordinate Huang Guangda joined his shrine in 1903.

While Hunan people certainly faded from the political scene following Yang Zengxin’s rise to power, the continuity of Dingxiang Wang and the Zuo attests to the legacy of the Xiang Army’s project to transform Xinjiang and the longevity of their community. The 1920s, however, spelled the beginning of the end: Yang Zengxin, in a move that helped to secure his reputation as a tin-pot dictator, declared a new universalist religion called the “Teaching of Sacrificing to Heaven” (si tian jiao). Every county was ordered to erect a temple to Shangdi (“God”), usually replacing a preexisting Confucius

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531 Wu Aizhen, Xinjiang youji, 39.

532 Xiangjun vol. 10, 332; (Minguo) Ningxiang xiangzhi, gushi 10, xianmin 34, 4a-6b; Qing shi liezhuan, j. 61; Hunan sheng zhi, 468-469.

533 Xiangjun vol. 10, 336; Qing shi liezhuan, j. 60, Hunan sheng zhi, 502-503.

534 Wu Yinsun, GX 32.4.10 “奏為已故伊塔道調任西寧道英林政績卓著請准附祀事” FHA 04-01-12-0649-111.

temple. The manifest loyalty shrine in Dihua was moved inside the Shangdi temple. It is unclear exactly when the Hunanese retreated so fully from Xinjiang, but the chaos of the Warlord era must have made it difficult to conduct long-distance trade, and Yang’s actions against the Hunanese political community, along with the tariffs exacted on trade from China proper, would have discouraged them. The Dingxiang Wang temples fell into ruin. In 1930, Dihua’s shrine to Zuo was converted into a school.

IV. Mosques

Given that the Xiang Army had gone around Gansu measuring mosques, we might expect them to repeat the experiment in Xinjiang. Early on in the reconquest, both soldiers and commoners took the opportunity to loot and destroy mosques. Reports from Kashgaria in 1878 indicated that mosque destruction by Dong Fuxiang’s army was widespread – although his soldiers were in the majority Muslim, sectarian differences that intersected with the Turki-Hui conflict meant they were more than willing to raze Turki mosques. A festival mosque built in Yarkand under Ya’qūb Beg was targeted for particular destruction and taken apart brick by brick. Meanwhile, forced converts had taken the opportunity to renounce Islam. There was a general, chaotic kind of destruction, but I have found no records to indicate that it was systematic or directed on the provincial level. While the reformist education program of the last years of the Qing

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536 India Office records, L/P&S/7/20 pp. 181-186 (No 72, 1 September 1878); L/PS/7/23 pp. 1195-1196 (Leh Diary [16-30 September 1879] No. 500, 8 October 1879).

537 India Office records, L/P&S/7/20 pp. 313-315 (No 141 Confidential Newsletter from Yarkand: the encampment of Chinese troops in Kashgar 7 Sep 1878).

538 India Office record, L/P&S/7/20 pp.763-769 (No 247 Account of the capture of Kashgar by the Chinese in 1876-1877 21 Nov 1878).
established schools inside several temples, it avoided doing so in mosques.\textsuperscript{539} Instead, most of the conflicts over mosque spaces after the initial war took place strictly on the local level, though they were informed by official discourses.

After the initial period of destruction, Hunanese policy towards the Muslims bifurcated: Hui were subjected to regular inspections and close monitoring, while Turki were largely allowed to do as they pleased. This reflected in part a pair of beliefs about Chinese- and Turkic-speaking Muslims that had evolved during and after the Gansu campaign: for a long time in China, Hui were considered martial and violent, but now they also appeared especially susceptible to “radicalization,” as we might now call it, by New Teaching preachers. Turki, in contrast, were generally considered a docile, civilizable people. In the administration’s eyes, the Turki were peaceful farmers, which brought them closer to the statecraft social ideal, if only they could learn to adopt sino-normative marriage customs, and could be guided in their ignorance by a good magistrate. Qing authorities understood Turki violence to be not religious in nature, but political or social.

In contrast, state monitoring of Hui increased following a pair of uprisings in the 1890s, and it centered around their mosques. In 1896, a preacher from Gansu made his way to Ili, where he established an independent New Teaching mosque.\textsuperscript{540} Through the cooperation of local Hui elites, however, his plan for an uprising was foiled. The Hehuang Uprisings, however, brought a new wave of violence, if a small one, to

\textsuperscript{539} Xinjiang tuzhi, xuexiao 1-2 list the schools and their locations. See also Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{540} Tao Mo, GX 21.10.25 [11 December 1895] “奏請獎恤獲匪出力官紳折” in Qingdai Xinjiang xijian zoudu hui bian, 1,005-1,006. (See also Gongzhongdang Guangxuchao zouzhe vol. 9, 426-428.)
Xinjiang. The same gentry who had assisted the Ili authorities now turned rebel himself.\(^{541}\) (His sudden change of heart may have had as much to do with local politics hidden from the authorities as it did with the New Teaching.) Governor Rao reflected that “Among the Muslims (\textit{hui zu}) of Xinjiang, two kinds are most numerous: the Turki (\textit{Chan hui}) and the Chinese Hui (\textit{Han hui}). The Turki are simple, crude, and at peace with each other. As for the Hui, locals and outsiders live among each other, both good and bad, and they are also divided between the Old and New Teachings.” Meanwhile, Xiang Army veterans such as Pan Zhen were mobilized to hurry east and push the Hui away from the Pass. In Turpan, the magistrate was ordered to account for all Hui, their mosques, and their religious leaders.\(^{542}\) As \textit{yamen} functionaries went around to mosques, they distributed a notice (the text of which is sadly illegible), but also made note of each mosque’s exact position, proportions, and personnel:

\begin{quote}
The Lükchün Shaanxi mosque sits on a plot of land six \textit{fen} in size. It faces east. It has two main rooms, three side rooms, and four gates. To the east, it sits along the main road; to the west, Taiji’s land; to the south, Ma Bi’er’s land; to the north, the Shaanxi cemetery.

Notice received.

Akhund: Ba Wancheng  
\textit{Sheshou}: Yang Shiping  
\textit{Sheshou}: Ma Minghua
\end{quote}


\(^{542}\) GX 26 “吐魯番廳發各處掌教阿訇諭帖稿底” in \textit{QXDX} vol. 65, 134-138 [The table of contents for this volume lists the date at 25.8, but a simple reading of the text makes it plain that it postdates GX 26.1.1]; GX 25.8 “魯克沁眾回民就禮拜寺房舍阿訇數目等事呈吐魯番廳文” in \textit{QXDX}, vol. 65, 138-139.
New Hui arrivals from within the Pass were similarly tallied up with their names, ages, and places of origin.\(^{543}\) These records could be verified against reports from a checkpoint at the end of the Orangutan Pass.\(^{544}\) I can find no similar record of Turki mosques, nor of new Turki migrants, until 1918. In that year, Yang Zengxin made two new proclamations: first, in response to a complaint by a Turki in Aksu, clerics were thenceforth forbidden from preaching outside of their own mosques.\(^{545}\) Soon thereafter, Yang ordered a comprehensive survey of pious endowments and for the holdings of moribund waqfs to be distributed between mosques locally.\(^{546}\) I have no reason to believe either of these orders was successful, but they demonstrate that Yang at least attempted to perform authority over religious matters. Hui and Turki at this point rarely worshipped in the same mosques, in any case. The violence of the Uprisings had confirmed their separation. Such interventions as these on the part of provincial authorities were reactive, sporadic, and drew on ideas about Islam and Muslims that predated the reconquest of Xinjiang.

In contrast, local conflicts over mosques resembled those surrounding human remains in that participants played on high-level political discourses of subjection to achieve small victories. Even though Chinese settlers usually lost when they brought

\(^{543}\) GX 25.9.8 “吐魯番同知就將關內新來回民花名、年籍、丁口數目呈吐魯番廳文” in *QXDX* vol. 65, 149-150.


\(^{545}\) MG 7.8.22 “訓令各道尹禁阻發給阿洪諭帖文,” in *Buguozhai*, 2,694-2,696.

\(^{546}\) MG 7.11.14 “通令各縣調查道堂地基文” in *Buguozhai*, 2,703-2,704.
claims on Turki-owned land to the *yamen*, they found ways to claim space through religious practices, as in a longstanding dispute in Turpan. In 1868 and 1869, during the Ya’qūb Beg period, wealthy Turki in Turpan’s New City had collected funds to build a pair of mosques within the city walls.\(^{547}\) One, on the west side, was built by “merchants from the South” – possibly a euphemism for the Khoqandis – while the other, on the east side, was built by locals. In 1877, when the Xiang Army came to Turpan, the Chinese had no temple, while the Turki had two mosques.

It is at this point that the account varies significantly between sources. A 1913 case brought by the four chief akhunds of Turpan on behalf of the city’s people tells a compelling story: relations between the Chinese and Turki were initially very positive.\(^{548}\) In 1877, the Chinese merchants, under the leadership of the ubiquitous intermediary He Yuan, approached the Turki *sumul* head Ai-shi-la-er and asked to borrow the eastern mosque for a three-day ritual performance. Naturally, the Turki assented. The real dynamic of power in the first years of reconstruction would suggest that the Chinese demands were supported with the threat of violence, but this is not stated in any of the sources, regardless of how acrimonious the account might otherwise be. The Turki agreed to let the Chinese build a stage in front of the mosque and entertain guests in the courtyard. At the end of the festival, however, the Chinese refused to return the mosque, but instead put off vacating it for years, until they effectively took control. The drama

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\(^{547}\) GX 9.3.17 “阿洪鐵木爾等懇求重新修寺之呈及吐魯番廳批文,” in *QXDX*, vol. 28, 299.

\(^{548}\) MG 2.3.20, “海裡爾為占寺為廟事的公稟,” XUAR Archive M16.002.YJ.0081.
they performed was almost certainly meant to “consecrate” the mosque as a temple, but this might not have been clear to the Turki.

A petition from 1884 provided a different story. According to a joint petition by several local notables, in 1878, the Chinese of the New City had sent a request to the magistrate to turn the mosque into a temple. They reported that the mosque was too tall and wide, reflecting Zuo’s prohibitions on oversize mosques in Gansu. While the Turki sumul head was aware of the proposal, he did not even give his constituents a chance to deliberate on the matter, suggesting that he was in no position to contest his superiors’ decision. The magistrate could not be convinced to maintain the mosque. The circuit intendant himself approved the conversion. In the petition, the notables emphasize that they have been peaceful for six years, which indicates that they saw a connection between the reconquest and the occupation of the mosque space. They make no mention of a festival.

It was no coincidence that the Turki petitioned for the restoration of their mosque after two changes in political systems, first with the establishment of the province in 1884, and then again after the Xinhai Revolution. Either petition reflects a sensitivity to broader political discourses. In 1884, the notables insisted that “building a temple and putting up a mosque are both meritorious acts” and that “Han and Muslim [Hui] are both the country’s children – they are distinguished according to good and bad, not Han

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550 “修寺蓋廟均善事。”
This statement reflects Beijing’s reply to Zuo’s proposal that the Muslims of Gansu be separated from the Han, and indeed the orthodoxy of the Qing: Muslims were subjects of the empire like anyone else. Of course, the Hunanese now rejected that logic. Perhaps if the petitioner had written “Turki” (Chan) instead of “Muslim” (Hui), the latter implying Chinese Muslim, they would have received a better response. In 1913, the petitioner similarly reminded the magistrate, “Now the Republic has established a republican system, and the Five Races are one family.” In both cases, of course, they were mistaken. Local politics trumped official ideology.

The same was true of the general sorts of interactions that members of different communities had around sacred spaces. I have presented the preceding account because it is exceptionally complete and because it illustrates several of the broader themes I will now examine. However, it was just one of dozens of suits over mosques and pious endowments brought before the Turpan magistrate. I might point to another in 1900, in which several Turki were accused of tearing down part of a Hui mosque, but this case appears to have ended in a settlement outside the yamen. An ongoing case from around 1907 to 1909 concerned a dispute between Turki, including the superintendent of a shrine, over the disposition of some trees on its endowed land. It ended when the magistrate refused to keep investigating and sent the matter back to the village headman.

551 “漢民回民均國家赤子，分者良莠，不分漢回。”

552 “現在民國成立共和，五族一家。”


554 GX 33.2.20 “吐魯番戶民哈的爾就控告哎拉爾米拉甫恃強欺弱事呈吐魯番廳文,” in QXDX, vol. 33, 279; XT 1.3.9 “飭鄉約海五爾辦...之論文” in QXDX, vol. 34, 118.
From the perspective of the *yamen*, sacred matters were a local concern, even if they intersected with the broader project of temple-building. While commoners generally recognized the relationship of the state to religious practice, the Xiang Army remained ideologically committed to the idea that official activism would only guide and shape society, and so they did not adjudicate or thoroughly document such cases.

V. Drama

Therefore, the *yamen* was not the main place in which such conflicts were resolved, and the legal system was not the primary medium through which claims to sacred spaces could be made and disputed. In this final section, I will argue that Muslims participated in Chinese temples and ceremonies in various ways, and that such spaces and performances were central to the integration of Muslims into the Qing and Chinese social and political order, as well as a critical site of cultural contact.

Turki had long been familiar with certain aspects of Chinese popular culture. Drama was certainly the chief vehicle by which Chinese stories and values were communicated to ordinary people, and not only to Chinese. However, several factors mitigated against its inclusion in the documentary record: from 1808 onward, the Qing court forbade drama troupes from entering the region entirely. Thereafter, the Ili General was to report annually on whether or not such dangerous social elements were present.\(^{555}\) The general’s response was always in the negative, but an account by a local Turkic Muslim named “Hemer Waki” indicates the contrary – that even Turki attended, watched,

\(^{555}\) *Sa-ying-a, Xinjiang longdui zouyi*, 339-343.
and understood dramatic performances featuring bygone kings.\textsuperscript{556} Ji-yun (1724-1805) reported that a theater had been constructed at a Guandi temple in Ili as early as 1769, and perhaps this is where Hemer Waki saw the plays.\textsuperscript{557} Ili did not lack for entertainment, since wherever there were temples, there were temples festivals, and wherever there were markets, people moved and shared their songs. Gansu and Shaanxi traditions of folk song have been part of Sibe tradition in Ili long enough to demonstrate the influence of traveling troupes, which circulated through Chinese settlements along the trade routes to Central Asia.\textsuperscript{558}

The statecraft school developed around the same time a polemical stance against drama as a source of moral decay. It was not a tool that officials were meant to employ to educate the population. This stance, however, did not prevent stages, temple dramas, and performers from playing a central role in reconquest and reconstruction. The first stage was built at Qumul, where the Imperial Agent Ming-chun (d. 1887) established a new temple complex two miles north of the Chinese city, on a hillock with a good view, next to an artificial pond ringed with willow trees.\textsuperscript{559} Significant effort went into rectifying the site’s geomantic alignment. Contemporary and later descriptions of the site make it apparent that the Dragon King Temple there was meant as a place for recreation where scholars and officials might go for a picnic, much like the official gardens built in Dihua in 1885 that we now know as Ürümchi’s People’s Park. Ming-chun also had temples built

\textsuperscript{556} Radloff, Proben der Volklitteratur der Türkischen Stämme, v. 6, iv, 92-95.

\textsuperscript{557} Ji-yun, Yue wei cao tang biji j. 8, 10.

\textsuperscript{558} Rachel Harris, Singing the Village, 73-78.

\textsuperscript{559} Zhongguo xiqu zhi, 536; Hami zhiliting xiangtuzhi, 158.
for the worship of Guanyin and Niangniang, two popular deities whom commoners might visit to seek assistance with problems of fertility or to protect themselves from the still ever-present threat of smallpox, respectively. The 1908 gazetteer comments that the area, equipped with pavilions, became a popular place for people of various walks of life to enjoy the cool air.

What the official gazetteer does not mention is that the Dragon King Temple was built beside a stage. On that stage was inscribed a pair of verses copied from the stage at the Drawing Phoenix Pavilion (yin feng ting) of the Guandi Temple in Shaoshan, Xiangyin County, Hunan.\(^{560}\) Since a high proportion of Xiang Army officials came from Xiangyin, it should come as no surprise that they sought to recreate the famous sites of home on the distant frontier. Actually, dramatic performance spaces could be found all over Xinjiang wherever Han settled: in Fukang, the magistrate solicited donations from merchants to build a theater at the Guandi Temple.\(^{561}\) Barköl, by 1909, had eleven different temples, each with a theater.\(^{562}\) We should not be surprised that this ubiquitous part of Chinese life was also present in Xinjiang, but we must have some regard for its potential as a site of encounter between members of different communities. What happened in these spaces was rarely recorded, in part because the mixing of people in them was a sensitive topic. Nevertheless, photographs of Chinese temple festivals and drama performances in Xinjiang in this period consistently include attendees in a variety

\(^{560}\) Zhongguo xiqu zhi, Xinjiang juan, 536. The inscriptions as recorded in the gazetteer and the modern work on Xinjiang theater do not match exactly, but their differences clearly lie in misreadings of the phonetic parts of certain characters. Perhaps the original was not a good copy, but I suspect later editorial error.

\(^{561}\) Fukang xian xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 15.

\(^{562}\) Zhenxi ting xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 115-117.
of costume, suggesting that Han, Hui, and Turki, or at least people dressed and groomed in ways that indexed those identities, continued to mix at them.\textsuperscript{563}

Dramas were part of temples maintained by specific native-place groups. The festivals of Dihua ran according to a schedule, in which the Hunanese-Hubeinese Native-Place Association was responsible for two major yearly performances.\textsuperscript{564} They also claimed the first dedicated performance space in Dihua, the Huagu Garden (Ch. \textit{huagu xiuyuan}), which officials granted to Hunanese musicians who had once played for the Xiang Army.\textsuperscript{565} Yet temple festivals were not merely entertainment. Rather, the temple provided a space for people to collectively perform and recall common histories. Dramas were sacred as well as social.

For this reason, Muslim elites objected to Turki attendance at the spectacles. In \textit{ˈAbdulwāḥid Akhund}, writing in Kashgar about 1905-1910, expressed his disapproval at the attendance of his fellow Turki at Chinese temples.\textsuperscript{566} Of course, his observations suggest that he had visited many himself, as his descriptions of both common and official rituals are quite accurate, if brief. Indeed, the akhund demonstrates a rather thorough knowledge of the layout of the innermost chambers of a large Chinese temple in Kashgar,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{563} Most of these photographs or films were made by Westerners sojourning or living in Xinjiang. See Gunnar Jarring, “Culture Clash in Central Asia: Islamic Views on Chinese Theatre” \textit{Scripta Minora Regiae Societatis Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis} (1990-1991: 3); “John Törnquist’s East Turkistan Films,” The Swedish Mission Project, online at \url{https://archive.org/details/swedish-mission-project}; photographs by Helmut de Terra, American Geographical Society Library Digital Photo Archives, de000199 (online at \url{http://collections.lib.uwm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/agsphoto/id/8199/rec/47}) and de000196 (online at \url{http://collections.lib.uwm.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/agsphoto/id/8198/rec/71}).
\item \textsuperscript{564} \textit{Zhongguo xiqu zhi, Xinjiang juan}, 491.
\item \textsuperscript{565} \textit{Zhongguo xiqu zhi, Xinjiang juan}, 494.
\item \textsuperscript{566} Jarring Prov. 207, “Butlar üčün ta’ın qilingan öylärniň bayañi” and “Butlarniň bayañi”; Jarring, “Culture Clash.”
\end{itemize}
in which a large central statue was flanked by twenty or so pairs of lanterns. He describes one kind of temple as hosting effigies of emperors, empresses, and ministers, as well as highly-regarded officials. There the Chinese administrators celebrated imperial birthdays and anniversaries of ascensions to the throne, and dramatic performances depicting past emperors occurred three times every year. In another kind of temple, one could have one’s sins forgiven by kowtowing twice, burning red paper, and making a donation. In a third, there were graven images of human bodies with the heads of tigers, bears, monkeys, and cows. Perhaps ‘Abdulwaḥīd Akhund refers to the Cow King and Horse King temples maintained by commoners who worked with livestock, but he also asserts that these gods were thought to judge people in the afterlife. Finally, there were temples containing effigies of women and young children. Only women attended these, save for six days of performance at temple festivals every year in which deceased “bad women” were castigated. These were almost certainly temples to Guanyin. If ‘Abdulwāḥid’s experience is at all typical of Turki, then the ordinary Turkic Muslim would have been broadly familiar with a Chinese religious and moral world that celebrated a sacralized image of the emperor alongside officials, demons, and model women. The moral dimensions of Chinese religion were clear.

Moreover, the akhund was familiar with temple performances, which attracted Turki in droves. Not only was seating plentiful for drama at the temples in Kashgar, including special sections for women and children, people also built stalls from wood beside the stage where they could drink tea and watch. “Drama,” he explained, calling it

by its Chinese name *changchilä* (<Ch. *changxi*), “is something that has been a custom since ancient times among the idol-worshippers of the land of Khaqan [the Chinese emperor]. And it is like how the Muslim book-readers go about the marketplace, a custom like mullahs preaching.”\(^{568}\) He identifies two kinds of performance: in one, the deeds of past emperors are recounted – as in Hemer Waki’s account from Ghulja – and battles reenacted to the accompaniment of trumpets and cymbals. The other is full of love and poetry. Drama, to this akhund, had a clear religious and moral dimension – or else, preaching also served to entertain.

Some Chinese, for their part, saw an analogy to drama in the festivals of the Turkic Muslim calendar. It was apparent that song and dance performances fell on certain days in the Islamic year, just as temple festivals did. Chinese officials paid attention to the cycle of local religious practices, just as they would have in China proper, where their participation in ritual was a central part of the job. However, the general image of Turkic performances as depicted in the Chinese sources shows no awareness of the particular symbolic importance of ceremonies. Rather, song and dance were markers of Turkic exoticness or of their happiness as imperial subjects: Xiao Xiong wrote two years after the Reconquest about a garden in Korla where Turki danced and sang, and children in Confucian schools praised the “Han emperor.”\(^{569}\) For most officials, it was enough to know that, during some festivals, and especially in the middle of the yearly Ramadan fast, the Muslims could be especially “restless.”


\(^{569}\) *Lidai Xiyu shi chao*, 196-197, 213-214.
It was not strictly necessary for drama or rituals to be performed in a temple or a specifically sacred context – and here we rejoin the thread of numinous territoriality. The problem is that performance is rarely recorded in great detail, and temple records are totally lacking, so we must often infer from scraps: for example, on April 9, 1915, Cunningham Mather observed drama from Tianjin being performed in the Zhili cemetery in Dihua.\textsuperscript{570} This certainly had ritual significance, though I cannot locate any particular festival scheduled for that day. For the most part, of course, we only possess elite Muslim accounts of Chinese religious practice, and those writers were utterly scandalized.

ʿAbdulwaḥīd Akhund describes official worship at the “idol-temple” and the procession of the effigy of the city god around Kashgar:\textsuperscript{571}

When an official comes to kowtow at the idol-temple, the students at the two schools stand on either side. He conducts the rituals and tells them, “Lower your heads! Raise your heads! Sit! Stand!” Once a year, on festival days, they sacrifice four sheep and two good oxen. … And they place a few pieces of bread before the idol. They say, “Our idol has given these to us!” And the shaykh of the idol-temple takes them away and eats them.

… Sometimes, they carry the idol through the city streets, visiting each marketplace, and going all around the city. They have this stupid idea that it’s beneficial, that it keeps people from getting sick or the city from catching on fire.

\textsuperscript{570} SOAS Archives, Journal of Percy Cunningham Mather for 1915, entry dated 15 April 1915. The same day, he crossed a makeshift bridge made of coffin lids.

\textsuperscript{571} Jarring Prov. 207, “Butlarniŋ bayäni.”

Bir mašābdār but-ḥānāgā baš urğali kirsā, ikki maktabda oqydyrğan bala ikki yânida turup baš qoy baš kötār oltur qop dep rasımlarını etip turadur. Här yıldā bir nawbat ʿid künlärīdä butlaɾğa tört qoy obdan ikki buqa öltürüp qurbānlıq qiladur. … Wä hâm nacça qism aš-nânları butlarniŋ aldığa qoyup bizgä butlarımız yandurdı dep but-ḥānaniŋ sæhşi alıp čiqip yäydur.

… Baʿżī waqtıarda butnı şaharnıŋ koçalarıda kötürüp güzarları aylardurup şahar čɔrgülätip faʿıdalıq boladur, wä bâ-kassal bolmaydur, şahargä ot almadyur, dep bâṯil şiyâlları qiladur.
The students mentioned here are probably ritual dancers selected from the Confucian schools. Turki officials were obliged to take part in such ceremonies, as well: in Kashgar, the procession on the eve of Chinese New Year featured a large cow made of papier mâché constructed on the fifteenth month of the twelfth lunar year.\footnote{SOAS Archives PP MS 8 #57 E. Denison Ross, *Kashghar: Dialogues*. The work is a draft of a later Eastern Turki phrasebook, which did not include this section. (Ross and Wingate, *Dialogues*) 'Abdullah Poskamī also makes note of the New Year’s cow tradition. (*Kitabi Abdullah*, 147)} This “spring cow” (*chunniu*) tradition had been known across China since at least the Tang, but in Xinjiang it seems to have emerged as the main public celebration of the New Year. Per custom, the parade put the whole of local officialdom on display: first came a number of soldiers, and then the circuit intendant, who was carried in a sedan chair, followed by each of his subordinates, mounted on horseback in formal dress. All the way at the back were the Kashgari begs, obliged to participate in their official capacity and to show their support for the government. The procession passed by the fifteenth-century Id Gah or festival mosque at the heart of old Kashgar and ended in the village of Dawlat Bāgh, where the shrine of the Qarakhanid saint ʿAlī Arslan Khan (late 10 c.) is located.\footnote{The tomb was then a short distance outside of the old city of Kashgar, but it is now firmly within the modern city, just southeast of a new and rather swampy park, across from a convenience store, and behind a padlocked gate. It has been locked up and officially inaccessible even to the superintendent since 2007.} ʿAlī Arslan Khan was famed for his role in converting the region to Islam. There the Chinese would assault and then burn their paper cow. Each official was obliged to pick up a piece of the paper and burn it until there was nothing left. The route of the spring cow procession made a territorial statement: all of this area, even its most sacred Muslim sites, was part of the city of Kashgar, or rather Shule, to use the Tang-era name that the Hunanese revived for the Muslim City.
It was therefore not unusual to see a Muslim at a Chinese temple or festival. Yet it was clearly a sensitive point for many, and so we have few records of it. In 1887, for example, Turpan constructed a temple for its city god and shrines for two martyrs of the Muslim Uprisings, the garrison commander and the magistrate.\footnote{GX 13.3.8 “吐魯番廳曉諭建城隍廟及領隊大臣專祠集納銀兩” in \textit{QXDX} vol. 29, 71.} It was expected that all of Turpan’s notables, non-Muslim and Muslim alike, would be obliged to donate, but the government made an exception: if Muslims did not to be recorded as contributors, their names would not be carved on the dedication stela. To go to a Chinese temple was to participate in Chinese government, and while this could be advantageous, participation in ritual was also a dangerous violation of communal boundaries. I will close with a passage written in 1926 describing the fall of Ma Shaowu (1874-1937), the Hui leader who on behalf of Yang Zengxin expelled the tyrannical Ma Fuxing (1864-1924) from his rule in Kashgar. Ma Shaowu was successful, but not without damage to his soul incurred during a ritual that both secured his relationship with Yang and began his own precipitous fall into tyranny\footnote{TH/Jarring, 126b, 19-20; Schluessel, \textit{The World as Seen from Yarkand}, 6, 37.}:

\begin{quote}
“Are you a Dungan?” asked the General [Yang Zengxin].
“My mother and father are Dungan,” [Ma Shaowu] said.
“Will you go to the idol-temple?” asked the General.
“I will,” he said, and he went. He kowtowed before the officials in the idol-temple. He swore in the idol-temple to do no wrong. He went back with them, and he ate pork with the officials.
\end{quote}

The description of this ritual reflects Yang Zengxin’s requirement that all officials worship at a Shangdi temple on taking office. From a Turki perspective, however, this was not new, but a continuation of a Chinese official practice that took Muslims out of
their communities by forcing them to do forbidden things that appeared central to Han culture and to government: idol worship and the consumption of pork. As we have seen, it could be advantageous for a Muslim man to assert his loyalty to the state by engaging with official culture and rituals, yet, from the perspective of respected Muslim elites, it would place him in a class with uncultured commoners who flocked to the temple spectacles. For these reasons, while it would appear that these spaces were important for cultural encounter and for mediating the relationship between Muslims, Chinese, and the state, sources regarding them are very rare.

VI. Conclusion

Scholarship on Xinjiang in the late Qing, as I indicated in the introduction, has tended to focus on the material and institutional history of domination as construed through policy. At a higher level of analysis, scholars have perceived the role of Xinjiang and other borderlands in imagining a modern Chinese nation-state. Before the first decade of the twentieth century, however, it is difficult to understand the regional government’s actions in this period in terms of resource maximization or the articulation of a national body, both of which are considered hallmarks of European empires in the nineteenth century during their transition into polities centered around an ethnonational core with a sense of its own advancement along a developmental trajectory. Indeed, because of the Yang Zengxin and Jin Shuren regimes’ emphasis on maintaining imperial institutions and symbols, the nationalizing discourse of the Chinese core did not become pervasive beyond the region’s political core at least until the Soviet-dominated 1930s. In the absence of a nationalizing, developmentalist civilizing mission, I have chosen to
examine more closely the sino-normative civilizing mission of the Xiang Army as it emerged from statecraft thought and as they implemented it in Xinjiang.

A cornerstone of that mission was to transform not just the Muslims, but the region in which they lived, to make an Inner Asian territory into a Chinese province. The Xiang Army accomplished this not merely through an institutional shift in government, but by implementing a provincial numinous order through a comprehensive program of temple-building. The emanations of Xinjiang’s new gods were meant to constitute it as a Chinese place and integrate it into the imperial order, but in a way that it had not been before 1864. There was a contrast in the pre- and post-uprisings modes of numinous territoriality: the Ili General oversaw a few religious centers, and then an *ad hoc* network of temples that grew according to the need to appease certain spirits in places known by Inner Asian names. The provincial mode of numinous territoriality attempted to recreate the Han and Tang landscape through the total integration of a hierarchy of temples. While this failed on many levels, nevertheless, the imperial cult brought Turki and Hui into Han sacred spaces, or “idol-temples,” both as officials participating in worship and as spectators at dramas and festivals.

The nativization of Dingxiang Wang points to ambiguity of naïve or cynical mobilizations of the spiritual in service of Chinese government and Chineseness: the god’s biography was plainly fabricated, and yet those who reproduced it understood its importance for the legitimization of a Chinese, or more specifically a Hunanese, presence in Xinjiang. From the perspective of China proper, it was normal for a group of people to claim nativity in a new place through history and ritual, or the spread of a patron deity’s “incense.” Here, Dingxiang Wang stood for a simultaneous conquest and migration on a
much grander scale. The Hunanese in Xinjiang claimed a whole territory. Similarly, Han commoners could use temple-building as a mode of aggression against Muslims and a means to claim spaces for themselves. We have seen in previous chapters that Han, Hui, and Turki lived side-by-side in Turpan, though not always comfortably. Each group in its own way required shared spaces for worship, some of which were more suspect to the Chinese authorities than others, and others of which were imposed by a government that seemed overly concerned with constructing temples. People therefore perceived that claims made on that basis might have legitimacy in the eyes of officials. Nevertheless, because of the Xinjiang government’s insistence that temples and mosques were local issues, below even the purview of the magistrate, it is exceedingly difficult to excavate a clear picture of popular religious practice and what went on in sacred spaces.

In the next two chapters, we will shift focus to the effects of the statecraft civilizing mission in Turkic Muslim culture. Much of the cultural contact that informed these changes took place in the spaces described here and in the previous chapters: yamens, bedchambers, boundaries between cemeteries and farmland, but also festivals and dramatic performances. These encounters were taboo for the elite and literate members of one group or another, and so they have largely escaped the historical record, especially as it appears at the provincial and metropolitan levels. Rather, they are hinted at in the local archive, or railed against in a manuscript narrative. Somewhere in this matrix of encounter, in which people slipped between identities and mediated between cultural modes of representation, an image emerged not unlike the one that Hemer Waki witnessed at the drama in Ili: a just Chinese emperor, one who defended the shariah, and, without knowing it, may even have been a Muslim.
Chapter Six: The Great Khan in Beijing Brings Justice to the Muslim People

In Chapter Three, I discussed how it came to be that Turkic Muslims in late-Qing Xinjiang identified the Neo-Confucian system of normative relationships (li) as a Chinese version of sultanic law or the shariah. In the following, I will explore the centrality of related notions of “justice” (ʿadālah) to the Turki legitimization of Qing imperial power. In comparative terms, I will draw on Sally Merry’s argument that colonized people’s engagement with the dominant legal system provides regular opportunities for asymmetrical cultural encounter.\(^{576}\) The everyday experience of colonial law therefore shapes the behaviors and subjectivities, both because actors in the legal system expect certain outcomes from particular behaviors or representations, and because the performance and ascription of identities in that powerful, ritualized setting gives those identities meaning beyond the courtroom. That is to say, as we have seen in previous chapters, Turkic Muslims tried to manipulate the Qing legal process by deploying certain discourses. At the same time, the pursuit and outcomes of Qing justice granted the judicial system legitimacy in relation to the Turkic Muslim identity.

I argue that Muslims, in the absence of an imperial effort to produce an Islamic image of Qing sovereignty, produced such an image independently by combining elements of Perso-Islamic sacred kingship and their experience of judicial procedure in the imperial system. The emergent Turki discourse of ʿadālah was a means of making sense of Chinese power on multiple levels: in the earlier period of Qing rule, Muslim elites had encountered the emperor’s own ʿadālah through punishment and mercy doled

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out via a system of petitions and responses. After the Xiang Army’s reconquest of Xinjiang, officials and ordinary subjects alike struggled to make sense of the infidels’ victory over a resurgent Muslim power, and so they used the conceptual frameworks provided by the post-Mongol Perso-Islamic tradition to explain recent history. Simultaneously, the Qing judicial and administrative apparatus extended for the first time into local society, where the magistrate became the face of imperial power and the gateway to the petitioning system. In the absence of any Chinese term that mapped clearly onto the broader Islamic notion of ʿadālah (or indeed any Western notion of “justice”), Turki came to use ʿadālah to refer to the legitimate results of a process of inquiry and mediation licensed by the distant sovereign. The emperor of China came to be seen as a modern-day “Anushirvan,” a non-Muslim ruler but an exemplar of justice. This image persisted well into the 1920s along with the institutions of the imperial judicial system.

The notion of ʿadālah, or rather the relationship between ʿadālah and its opposite, zūlm “tyranny,” was at the center of the shifting Turkic Muslim conception of China and Chinese power from the medieval period through the early twentieth century, and this conception changed profoundly during the early period of Qing rule. In order to understand this shift, we must begin several centuries before the Qing conquests. While China and its emperor played an important role in literature, sacred history, and geography from the early days of Islam, and especially from the Mongol period onward,

577 In Chaghatay and Eastern Turki texts, Arabic ʿadālah was almost universally rendered as ʿadālat. This is true of Modern Uyghur today, in which the same word has evolved into ʿadalāt. I have maintained the Arabic form here because it is a term of art in scholarship in and about the Muslim world, and because the broader use of ʿadālah in that context is germane to the discussion here.
the imposition of Manchu rule, seen as Chinese rule, in the eighteenth century suddenly made that imagined Other real and present. The relationship of subjecthood between Turkic Muslim officials and commoners and the mysterious emperor could be explained through a fusion of this literature with high-ranking begs’ experiences of interaction with the state, which usually took place through the judicial system.

For a ruler to succeed in Central Asia, he would need to satisfy the conditions of the Perso-Islamic theory of kingship as it evolved in the post-Mongol era. Under the old “prophetic model” of Islamic rule, the caliph as the descendant of the Prophet’s tribe and successor to Muḥammad received legitimacy from God, but also from the community of believers, and he could further deputize temporal rulers. After the death of the caliph in Baghdad in 1258, the prophetic model could no longer function. Although others contended for the caliphate, it would be centuries before a ruler in the eastern Islamic world realistically needed to seek his approval. Instead, the “sacral model” of kingship emerged under the Turco-Mongol states. According to the sacral model, a ruler is himself appointed by God, who endows him with divine support and charisma. The king demonstrates and maintains this mandate of sovereignty (Ar. dawlah) through conquest and benevolent rule, combatting tyranny (Ar. zulm) while promoting justice (Ar.


579 Beginning with Suleiman I (r. 1520-1566), obviously, the Ottoman sultan claimed the title of caliph. However, even as Constantinople became a vital stop on the Hajj route for Central Asian pilgrims, and Sufi networks from the Eastern Islamic world maintained lodges in the Ottoman capital, the sultan nevertheless had little power to intervene in the region. The emirate of Ya’qūb Beg was to be the first time since the seventeenth century and the last time ever that the Ottomans successfully supported a Central Asian state.
ʿadālah). In this vision of rule, the just king is a distant and disinterested arbiter. He is not idle, nor does he intervene in society, save to promote the sharīʿah, God’s will on Earth. This was the central vocabulary of rulership in post-Mongol Central Asia.

The general political theory of post-Mongol Islamic Central Asia was expanded and refined in the Timurid and post-Timurid context. As A. Azfar Moin argues, the reign of Āmīr Tīmūr (1336-1405) marked the further movement of political discourse and theory away from scholastic writings and the scriptural tradition and towards an engagement with Sufism and with the popular messianism that dominated his time. After Timur, the memory of the “world-conqueror” and his biography continued to influence the way that rulers were legitimized: not as descendants of the Prophet’s family, nor merely as producers of justice, but as figures whose fates were determined by their repetitions of past actions in cyclical historical time marked by astrological events. Just as Timur was depicted as a repetition of the historical Alexander and Chinggis Khan, so were later rulers seen as repetitions of Timur. We will see in this chapter and the next how Eastern Turkestanis appropriated and inverted these images.

With this discussion of “justice,” I return to the problem of culturally-specific “law-like” concepts. There was no single word in the Chinese or Muslim discourses that mapped easily onto formal Continental or Anglo-American understandings of

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580 Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 175, states, “This role of arbiter, distant from the society for which it arbitrated, known to live largely for its own interest and not for any particular interest in society, was the role of the king. The king who fulfilled this role and saw that each interest got its due, but no more than its due, was ‘just.’”


582 Pirie, The Anthropology of Law. See the discussion of li in Chapter Three.
“justice,” or that corresponded to the word in translation. Where necessary, I will adopt well-established Weberian terminology and refer to “substantive justice” – the production of judicial outcomes that people perceive to be legitimate – and to “formal justice” – adherence to the expectations that people hold for the judicial process.\textsuperscript{583} I use these phrases as terms of analysis to refer to implicit expectations that people held for judicial systems. In the context of Chinese government, strict procedures were in place for investigating and prosecuting cases.\textsuperscript{584} Nevertheless, the perennial emphasis of the Qing judicial system was on substantive justice, particularly the maintenance of social stability, which itself was understood as a fundamental good. This was especially true in the nineteenth century, when magistrates struggled to handle increasingly large caseloads with fewer resources at their disposal. As the Turpan archives remind us, most disputes in Qing China were handled outside of the \textit{yamen} in mediation, where it was expected that local norms would guide a satisfactory resolution process. As we will see, this official Chinese notion of justice was in some ways in harmony with ‘\textit{adālah}, and in some ways not. As a result, Turkic Muslims gradually adapted the idea of justice to the conditions of Chinese government. 

\textit{I. The History of ‘Adālah in Eastern Turkestan Before the Muslim Uprisings}


The wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries encouraged elite Turki to make sense of their changing world with the textual resources available to them, especially the image of the just and millennial sovereign. Conflict between the rival Naqshbandī khwāja lineages, the Ishāqiyya and Āfāqiyya, changed regional politics forever. The fundamental structures of social and political life did not change immediately, but the factional struggle drew regional powers into a century-long war. The people of the Tarim Basin suddenly found themselves under the dominance of the Junghar Khanate, and then of the Qing empire. Across the region, Mongol rule appeared to Turki as a dark period of history, and the involvement of the Sufi khwājas in both its success and defeat was not easily explained. After all, Āfāq Khwāja (1626-1694) was known to have gone to Lhasa to recruit the aid of the Dalai Lama, which resulted in the entry of the Buddhist Junghar Mongols, who came to rule the Muslims and tax them heavily. This ended with the century-long periodic war with the Qing, followed by the deminse of the Junghar state in 1758.

After decades of dominance by a Buddhist Mongol empire, it was not terribly difficult for Muslim leaders in East Turkestan to reconcile themselves to distant, polycreedal Qing imperial rule. There are occasional scraps of text that point to covert

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585 Brophy (“The Junghar Mongol Legacy and the Language of Loyalty in Qing Xinjiang”) touches on the legitimization of the Sufis’ collaboration with the Mongols. For the history, see Perdue, China Marches West.

586 I have been asked why I use “polycreedal” rather than “multiconfessional.” The latter refers to the formal organization of multiple religions by the state, which supports or engages in each of them. This certainly was the case, for example, in the Russian Empire following the institutionalization of Islam under the Muftiāte. However, the Qing never adopted an “official religion” in the same way, and certainly did not produce bureaucratic organs for specific faiths apart from the imperial cult and patronage of Buddhism. “Polycreedal” merely means that the subjects of the empire held a variety of beliefs belonging to a range of differing traditions. Islam was not a “confession” of the Qing, but rather a “creed” to which many of its people adhered.
dissent in elite writing: Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī’s (active 18 c.) legal manual

Zubdatu ‘l-masā’il wa-‘l-‘aqā’id discusses the status of infidels at length, although he barely touches on the question of their rule, save to note, “This land is the House of Islam, not the House of War, and submitting to the infidel is done out of necessity.”

A wildly popular Iskandarnāma, or Alexander narrative, written in the early nineteenth century by Mullā Ṣādiq Yārkandī (n.d.) is based on ‘Alī Sher Nawā’ī’s (1441-1501) version but introduces a subtle variation that may be read as an anti-Qing message.

Nevertheless, no explicitly anti-Qing work is known from this time.

The most readily available resource for arguing the legitimacy of the emperor and of their own positions was the Persianate “mirrors for princes” literature, which directly and comprehensively addressed the proper comportment of the ideal ruler. One work of this kind dominated in Eastern Turkestan from the early eighteenth century through the late nineteenth, Mullā Muḥammad Tōmūr’s translation of Kamāladdīn Ḥusayn b. al-Bayhaqī Wa’iz Kashīfī Sabzawārī’s Akhlāq-i muḥsinī (“The Morals of the Beneficent”). The translation in question was commissioned for a hereditary beg in

587 Leiden Or. 26.670 Zubdatu ‘l-masā’il wa ‘l-‘aqā’id, 150. Bu diyār Dār al-Islāmdur, Dār al-Harb emās, wā kuffārlargā īṭā ‘a gilmag żarūrāt učindur. Leiden Or. 26.677, f. 100a, has instead: Bu diyār Dār al-Islāmdur, Dār al-Harb emās, wā īṭā at-i kuffār żarūrāt učun. This variant is probably due to miscopying, which is extensive in the heavily-corrected text. Alternatively, Leiden Or. 26.677 may have been a draft translation that was then edited into the other surviving versions.

588 In Nawā’ī’s Iskandarnāma, Alexander meets with the ruler of China, and they recognize each other as father and son, apparently sincerely. In Yārkandī’s version, both parties are deceiving each other: after the meeting, the ruler of China tells his ministers that, while China may be too weak to resist the world-conqueror now, they will eventually rally and rise up against foreign rule. Moreover, Alexander is seen as taking two Chinese wives, perhaps a reference to perennial Turki concerns over Qing officials’ and other visitors’ acquisition of temporary Muslim wives. (British Library OR 8164, ff. 56b-57a. The text is matched in Jarring Prov. 191. The surrounding text, but not the incident where the ruler of China assures his people, is reproduced in a Modern Uyghur edition of Zayit Akhun Pazilbay’s version: Zayit Akhun Pazilbay, Iskändärnāmā, Qurban Wāli, ed. [Beyjıng: Millätlär Nāşriyati, 1990], 87-102.)

589 Hofman (v. 4, 37-45) identifies three translations into Turkic from the Persian. Jarring Prov. 198 is an 1885-86 copy that claims to be Muḥammad Tōmūr’s translation (ff. 84b:13-85a:7). On this basis, I positively identified the identical – but fragmentary – late-nineteenth-century MS in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Kashgar during the reign of the Khwājas, and further copies were probably copied for beks.\(^{590}\) Of all of the qualities of a good ruler discussed in the text, “justice” stands out as the root of all good government and as the ruler’s ultimate act of piety.\(^{591}\) Being just is vastly more important for a ruler even than going on the Hajj, it argues, and justice is the source of sovereignty. The Sasanian ruler Anushirvan (or Khosrau I, 501-578), Kashifī reminds the reader through several anecdotes, was just and legitimate, even though he was not a Muslim. Anushirvan’s example would have been significant for Turki officials collaborating with an infidel ruler.

Instead, Turki histories began to associate the Qing emperors with the literary figure of the Khāqān-i Chīn. The Khāqān-i Chīn is the ruler of China in Firdausi’s \textit{Shāhnāma}, the great Persian epic, and in a number of other literary works that circulated widely in Xinjiang. It is peculiar that Turki made this association, as they did in written and in oral texts, given that they had such a range of vocabulary with which to refer to the Chinese sovereign. \textit{Ezen}, from Manchu \textit{ejen} “ruler, lord, emperor” had been common enough in diplomatic and bureaucratic texts.\(^{592}\) The simple phrase \textit{Khiṭāy pādishāhi} “padishah of Cathay” could be employed with the same degree of accuracy. By the

\footnote{590}{See for example the \textit{Qiṣasu ʿl-gharāyib} (Jarring Prov. 21, f. 35a), which states that ʿAzīz Wang Beg was the patron of the translation of the \textit{Tārīkh-i Rashīdī} into Turkic, as well as other works.}

\footnote{591}{XUAR Library 650000-1401-0004984 5-XTQ 62, ff. 20a-25a.}

\footnote{592}{Noda Jin and Onuma Takahiro (\textit{A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty}, [Tokyo: TIAS, 2010]) provide numerous examples.}
1860s, even the Khoqandi court referred to the Qing emperor as the *khāqān*.

The name Khāqān-i Chin probably became so common because the literary association made it clear that the emperor was distinctly Other: from the perspective of Kashgar, in literature and in life, the emperor was a distant, non-Muslim ruler of a powerful and wealthy realm in which intelligent people busied themselves with the production of finished goods. I will discuss the significance of the term *khāqān*, the image of China, and their deeper history in Islamic literature and geography further in Chapter Seven. For now, it suffices to say that the image of Anushirvan as a just but non-Muslim ruler to the east of the Persian world, at a time when Kashgar was at the eastern edge of it, was transposed a millennium later onto the image of the Khāqān-i Chin as a just but non-Muslim ruler to the east of Greater Persia, the boundaries of which now stretched to the borders of Inner China.

By the early nineteenth century, the Khāqān-i Chin could be conceived of as a distant and bureaucratic sovereign, but also as an epistolary sovereign who projected power through the writing, reading, and certifying of messages passed along the roads through the Gansu Corridor to and from the “country of Beijing” (*Bäjin iqlimi*) beyond. Muslims and others could attain routine justice with a properly-worded letter. This partly reflects the ideal distant sovereign of the Perso-Islamic sacral model of kingship, but it more strongly recalls the ways that Chinese drama and literature depicted the workings of imperial power. This image had more than a little basis in fact: I have described in

593 The Life of ʿAlimqul, p. 63.

594 “Hemer Waki,” who understood Chinese well, related the story of a Chinese drama orally to Radloff. (Radloff, *Proben der Volkliitteratur der Türkischen Stämme*, [St. Petersburg: Commissionäre der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1866-1907], v. 6, pp. iv, 92.) In this drama, which I have been unable to identify thus far, the emperor travels in secret among his people, righting economic wrongs.
previous chapters how in the late Qing ordinary Muslims learned that Chinese power could best be countenanced through the careful crafting of petitions and narratives. Yet the Muslim bureaucracy learned the same lesson in the decades after the initial Qing conquest. The 1845/46 Turkic translation of Mīrza Muḥammad Ḥaydar Dughlat’s (1499/1500-1551) Ṭārīkh-i Rashīdī includes a lengthy chronicle of the first decades of Qing rule. In one record, a beg violates the laws of the Khāqān-i Chīn. A higher-up writes a petition (Ar. ʿarāz) to the Khāqān, who upon reading it replies with an edict removing the beg from office. Official justice was administered in such cases as these through the Huijiang zeli (“Statutes of the Muslim Borderland”). These were a special set of laws, derived from the Menggu lüli (“Mongol Statutes”), that applied only in Xinjiang.

Sayrāmī records a similar account of imperial justice meant to date to the pre-Uprising period. In the 1840s, we are told, local Chinese and Turki officials in Xinjiang established a tax on salt without imperial sanction or knowledge. Previously, the emperor had ordered that only those taxes allowed by the sharīʿah could be levied from Muslims. Now, however, lower-level Turki officials collected this tax while under the impression that it had been authorized by the imperial court. Collection went on until about 1864, when officials in Beijing finally learned of the tax. A petty functionary

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595 Jalilov et al., eds., Addendum to Ṭārīkh-i Rashīdī, Translation and Annotation with Introduction and Indexes. (Tokyo: NIHU Program in Islamic Area Studies, 2008), p. 140. This translation is attributed to Muḥammad Niyāz Yārkandī, who produced it in 1845-46.

596 Wang Dongping, Qing dai Huijiang fālū zhidi, 31-42.

597 TH/Jarring.
named Mullā Ākhūnd Mīrzā was among those punished, in his case over the trifling sum of two copper coins. In his account, the Qing agents sent from Beijing discovered his innocence through assiduous investigation and eventually cleared his name:

In short, for the sake of two copper coins, or four pul, they brought us in for interrogation seven times. In the end, they asked me, “Did the mullah who recorded the four pul and collected the tax provide receipts?” “No, he did not provide receipts,” I said. “Then write down that ‘he did not provide receipts,’ stamp it with your chop, and put that in a report,” they said, and they took the report. After that, they wrote up the accounts and deposition they had taken from me and sent it in a report to the Great Khan along with an account of events.

The Great Khan decreed, “Understood. The officials governing my people have been misled. I, the Great Khan, sadly had no news of it. And so, I have removed Qing-hai, Man Daren, the hakim of Aqsu, and the hakim of Bay and Sayram, Chinese [Hitay] and local [yärlık] alike. I decree that they should never again involve themselves in official matters. If I examine the rules of the Lifan yuan, and consult its statues [lū ʾīn], it seems there is a statute specifying that such officials shall be exiled 5,000 lī. I am the Great Khan: I am a tall mountain, and my people like a tiny river. I have forgiven their crimes. Each of them shall go to their own places and act as commoners [fiqarācīlikni qilsun]. Another thing: I have recently ascended the throne. I have forgiven their crimes.”

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Mullā Ākhūnd Mīrzā’s account was given in Turki to another Turki; it was not tailored for Chinese or Qing consumption. It is reproduced in Sayrāmī’s Tārīkh-i Ḥamīdī, which, as I have argued elsewhere and will argue again below, is in part a polemic legitimizing Qing rule for a Turki audience. Moreover, it reflects the author’s familiarity with the procedural and diplomatic conventions of the Qing state. Officials in the pre-Uprising period served the empire through the Lifan yuan, and the investigation of such a crime would involve sequestering everyone involved for a long period of time and interrogating them until a consistent account could be produced. Mullā Ākhūnd Mīrzā’s account depicts a distant ruler who produces justice by receiving and responding to letters. He suggests that the emperor is “just” for four reasons: first, the Emperor receives and accepts his confession, confirming his narrative of events and claims of innocence. Second, the emperor is a jurisprudent who does not rule by will alone, but invokes the regulations of the metropolitan authority over Turki officials, the Lifan Yuan. Third, the emperor produces what his subject perceives to be justice, regardless of what the Code says, by assiduously pursuing the absolute truth of a relatively trivial matter. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the emperor prosecutes mid-level officials for implementing a tax beyond those demanded by Islamic law: he eliminates tyranny and produces justice by rectifying the sharīʿah. Mullā Ākhūnd Mīrzā praises the emperor, or “Great Khan,” for his “justice.”

This image of the emperor emerged under the peculiar conditions of Qing rule in Xinjiang. Although Banner officials including Manchus, Mongols, Chinese, and others were present across Xinjiang in the early nineteenth century, and Turki officials traveled

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599 Schluessel, The World as Seen from Yarkand.
to Beijing for audiences, Turki sources from the time do not express a detailed
knowledge of imperial geography or history. A travel narrative from the early nineteenth
century by Mîr Izzat Allah, an agent for British India, presents travel advice for the road
from Kashgar to Beijing and a smattering of Qing history. If what he presents is
correct, then his acquaintances Mullā Nazīr Muḥammad of Kashgar, who claimed to have
traveled to Beijing twice with Kashgar ḥākim beg Iskandar Beg Wang, and Ākhūnd
Ṭâhir of Turpan, who had gone once before, both possessed strange and, from a modern
perspective, inaccurate understandings of that history: that 1811 CE (1226 AH) was the
sixteenth year of the Jiaqing emperor is certainly correct. That Qianlong reigned for only
ten years, however, was not. Mullā Nazīr Muḥammad estimated that 1228 AH (1813 CE)
was about thirty years after the sixtieth year of “Ezen” Yongzheng, that being about 1198
AH (1783 CE), towards the end of Qianlong’s reign. Qianlong’s victory over the
Junghars and conquest of Kashgaria from the Khwājas in the 1750s is attributed to
Yongzheng. Although their knowledge of who was emperor when was unclear, Mîr Izzat
Allah’s informants probably did not misremember when major events had happened in
the recent past. Rather, Qing imperial power, filtered through multiple languages,
overlapping systems of government, and the distance from Kashgar to Beijing,
manifested itself in a nebulous way. Turki officials on the ground strove to make it
intelligible to themselves and to their people, and they could do so mainly by drawing on
the Perso-Islamic tradition.

600 Meer Izzut-Oollah, 30-32, 43-44.
601 For a discussion of the beg system and Qing indirect rule of Xinjiang in a contemporary source, see
I have so far argued that elite Turki writings during Qing rule as we know them reflected a combination of influences peculiar to the encounter between a Perso-Islamic theory of kingship and the realities of the imperial administration: the emperor was obviously the sovereign ruler of Eastern Turkestan. While the descendants of the old Khwāja families occasionally attempted to regain power in the region, the Qing military rebuffed them, and their supporters were removed. The begs were largely from Turpan, and they came from families that collaborated with the Qing, so they were simultaneously linguistically and culturally similar to their subjects and separated from them by their stronger ties to China proper. They were doubtless under pressure not only to present themselves well to the empire, which they could do in their written correspondence, but also to legitimize themselves locally. Through the earlier period of Qing rule, Turkic Muslim elites had access both to the broader discourse of political legitimacy available in post-Mongol Central Asia and to the specific experience of the empire. It was not difficult to fit the two together. The oases of Eastern Turkestan under the begs maintained a high level of independence, and collaboration with a non-Muslim imperial house could be legitimized through the language of justice.

II. ʿAdālah as Explanation

In the wake of the rise and fall of Yaʿqūb Beg’s emirate, Turkic Muslims were faced with a puzzle: in Xinjiang, a non-Muslim empire had been replaced by a Muslim state licensed by the Ottoman caliph, which fell in turn to the Chinese again. Superficially, that sequence of events defied the natural order of things, in which the boundaries of the abode of Islam only increased. In response to this puzzle, both elite and
non-elite Turki drew on the discourse of justice they had known in the pre-uprisings period, and then tied that notion of justice more closely to the everyday workings of the Qing judicial system.

There were strong parallels in the early post-Uprising years with popular ideas of legitimation in the Ottoman Empire, which relied on the image of a righteous sultan whose justice could be disrupted by corrupt advisors.\footnote{Darling, \textit{Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy}, 302.} That is, ordinary subjects were ideally capable of invoking sultanic justice, if only they could craft a petition in such a way as to bring their issue to the sultan’s own attention. In this way, the apparatus and principle of government could remain legitimate, even if its actors and intermediaries could be seen as illegitimate. The other half of this popular ideology was the set of ideas around the Circle of Justice: the sovereign depended on force of arms, which required money for upkeep, which in turn derived from cultivation by the peasants, whose livelihood was secured by the sovereign.\footnote{London, “The Circle of Justice,” 426. As London argues, the general idea of a “circle” and its component parts took several forms, but this ideal version suits the present case.} Given that the just sultan provided these things for his subjects, it was reasonable for him to levy taxes and to maintain a hierarchical social order. These concepts were active in Turki explanations of the fall and rise of Qing power.

Popular accounts and local histories of the Muslim uprisings produced during the event or in its immediate aftermath consistently shared the earlier elite understanding of the imperial sovereign as producer of justice. Here \textit{‘adālah} is meant in its sense of rulers’ faithfulness to God’s will on Earth. Qāsim Beg, a Taranchi Turki chronicler from Ili,
begins his narrative of the uprisings with a description of the prosperity his people experienced under the Qing emperors: 604

Under the earlier khans, Jiaqing and Qianlong, they brought men and women from the cities of Kashgar, Khotan, Yarkand, Aksu, Kucha, and Turpan in order to populate this place called Ghulja. They made them 6,000 Taranchi households, and gave them enough property for 6,000 people. Every year they paid their taxes to the 6,000 Manchu soldiers that the khan stationed in Ghulja. The Chinese grandees took very good care of these common [fuqarā] Taranchis. … And they appointed six akhunds: aʿlam, muftī, muḥtaṣib, khāṭīb, mutawallī, and qadi with the order to “Carry out the work of the shariah.” Thus the Taranchis served the Chinese and provided for them for a hundred years or more. During that time, Ghulja was settled, and the Taranchis became rich. … 605

The elements of the Circle of Justice are present in this description of Qing rule: the sovereign created a hierarchy of farmers and soldiers. While the Taranchi served the military, they did so in equal proportion to their abilities. Moreover, because the emperor protected the shariah, the Taranchi prospered in this well-ordered society. As in the account of false taxation and punishment above, the stability and justice of imperial rule is presented as a result of the Qing’s enforcement of Islamic law and institutions for its Muslim subjects. The author goes on to describe the outbreak of the Muslim uprisings as

604 IVR RAN B 4018 Ǧuljaniŋ wäqiʿ ātlariniŋ bayānī.

a consequence of corruption by local officials, rather than of poor government from the center, followed by the cutting off of communications between Ili and Beijing.

A ballad recorded in Ili in 1871 depicts the Qing state and the causes of the uprisings similarly. It invokes the other half of the ideal sovereign-subject relationship: the ability of ordinary Muslims to seek justice through petitioning. According to this account, a barrier in communication prevented the emperor from intervening on behalf of his subjects, and this helped precipitate the Muslim Uprising:606

Anciently the Chinese emperor [khāqān] ruled this Ili city; He opened up the book of justice, this first khan. He never did a tyrannical thing, but bestowed his grace and held to justice; They lived their lives in leisure, poor and rich alike. But there will never be another time like this!

The later generals and ambans destroyed the li607 and did as they pleased, Oppressed the common people, and abandoned justice. The Chinese [Hitāy] brought so many tyrannies upon us Muslims.

This poor folk went into servitude, driven from their land.

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Keyinki jānjūn ambān li buzup öz bilgānin ātti Ra’iyyat ke sitam āylāp ‘adālatlarni tark ātti. Ḥīṭāydin biz musulmanlarğa köp köp zulumlārını Bolup bečārā ẖalq čākər kirib yurtdīn tirāp kätti. Öydā olturalmas erdi heċ ādam-i imān āmdī.

Bulanıň hāl aňwäl ‘arž īyəməs uļulg ḥānğa; Barūrğa quwwati yoq ādamikim Čin hāqāngā. Ke yiğlāb ‘arž aňwäl munda qilsa jānjūn ambālğa Qilib qəhr ghaζəzəb soqqan sulap ul band-zindāŋa. Nā qattıq künläri kim tartzan erdi usbū jān āmdī!

607 On li (Ch. lǐ 礼) in Turki discourse, see Chapter Three.
Not a single man of faith could stay at home!

No petition of their condition reached that great khan;
There was no one who had the strength to go to the Chinese emperor.
So, weeping, they made a petition of their condition to the general and amban,
Who in their anger and fury beat them and locked them up in jail.
What hard days those people saw!

Petitioning, as in the Ottoman case, was understood as a means to invite the exercise of sultanic justice, here in the related sense of redress for social wrongs. According to the ideal of the Circle of Justice, the disruption of this relationship would shatter the whole political order. That is precisely the explanation for the Muslim Uprisings and the reconquest that we find in both popular and elite Turki sources. The ballad puts this in Perso-Islamic terms by invoking a comparison to Anushirvan – but this time, it is the Russian tsar who wields justice, rather than the Qing emperors:

In justice he does not compare, the Chinese ruler to this khan.
He has always gets news of how his poor people [fuqarā] are doing.
He keeps this land in tranquility, just like Anushirvan.
That is why we left Ili …

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608 Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, 284-292.

609 N. N. Pantusov, Obraztsy Taranchiskoi Narodnoi Literatury: Teksty i Perevody, (Kazan’: Tipo-Litografia Imperatorskago Universiteta, 1909), 146.

Elsewhere, Pantusov (Obraztsy, 49) collected a proverb that put it more bluntly:

When the ruler opens the hand of cruelty,
His subjects are sure to flee.
(That is to say, if a ruler is very tyrannical, then his subjects will reject him and flee to peaceful lands.)
Pādišāh sātim ilkin açar
Ri’ ayyatlar keyin qačar
(Ya’ nī pādišāh tola zālim bolsa, ri’ ayyatlar andin yūz öýrüp, amānīğer wilāyatlärgä qačarlar.)
According to this perspective, where the Qing emperors had been attentive to their subjects and dispensed justice, now the lines of communication were cut off. The tsar, however, was listening. The Muslim uprisings and the Taranchis’ subsequent change in allegiance are thus explained as a shift in the locus of just rule from Beijing to St. Petersburg.

Thus, according to Qāsim Beg, when the Xianfeng emperor sat upon the throne,

The Taranchi begs became very tyrannical to the Taranchi. When their tyranny became too extreme, the Taranchis everywhere decided to prepare a letter to the [Ili] General. Many Taranchis went to the General’s yamen, and when they beat the General’s drum [to summon him], the General hurried to read their letter. Then he sent an investigator [tirgüci manşabdâr] to the Taranchis to question them, but this investigator had taken many bribes from the begs, and so he accused the Taranchis. He had them beaten a great deal with the light and heavy sticks, and some of them he exiled. He said nothing about the Taranchis’ complaints. The General and the grandees did not know if the people’s [fuqarā] petition was true or false, but because of what people said came to despise the Taranchis. They stopped looking after the people, and whatever they did, they did it according to the Taranchi begs’ advice. The Chinese grandees took money from these begs. The begs took the horses, camels, sheep, and cows that the common [fuqarā] Taranchis had earned.610

The emperor’s intermediaries in Xinjiang, according to this account, disrupted the petitioning process. Corruption worked from the ground up: at this point, it was not only

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610 aḫiri Šan Fūn Ḥanuŋ büyüzidā Tarančiniŋ begläri Tarančilarğa nihāyati zulmī qilip, bu begläriŋ zulmasi ḥaddidin aşqanda, hār yurtidin Tarančilar maşlahtašlāsip, jānǰůŋa käğâz râstlaŋ, köp Tarančilâr jānǰůŋ yâmüliga barip, jānǰûnîniŋ dûmbaŋini urğanda, jānǰûn bulâriŋ kâçaŋini aldurup körüp, andîn bu Tarančilarğa tirgüci bir maşşabdârîni iðârip soratqanda, bu tirgüci beglärdin köp yâmbû kûmûs pāra yâp, Tarančîlîriŋ günâhîlık qilip, falaq qamçîlîr bilân [3] köp urup, bir munçašini pâlap, Tarančîlîriŋ sözini söz qilmay, jānǰůŋ katta kîši fuqarâlîrîn jir‘îng râst-ğâliššini bilmû kîšîniŋ sözî bilân Tarančîlîri yaman körüþ qalip, heč waqt fuqarâlîrîn aḫwâlîğa qaramaydurûŋ bolûp, hâr iš qilsa, Tarančî begläriŋ maşlahtîcâ iš qıladurûŋ bolûp, bu beglärdin Ḥîtiyû çôŋlîrî pûl yâp, beglä fuqarâ Tarančîlîriŋ tâpqan aṯtiwâ qøy kalalarini qoymay alip, ...
the emperor who failed to receive the commoners’ plaint, but now the Ili General, the highest imperial official in the region and Beijing’s direct appointee. The just collection of taxes for the support of the military was replaced with the tyrannical appropriation of livestock, the people’s very livelihood. It would be possible to take Qāsim Beg’s narrative literally as a factual account of the origins of the Uprising, but two things lead me to read it instead as a politicized presentation of the past: first, Qāsim Beg’s vision of a golden age of imperial rule in Ili does not hold up to historical scrutiny. Second, stories like his were told and retold in the years that followed as Muslims tried to explain the multiple origins of the violence of the mid-nineteenth century, and then of the early twentieth, in different places and on different scales.

After 1877, it soon became apparent to Turki elites that there would be no restoration of the emirate that Yaʿqūb Beg had founded. In response, writers articulated theories of politics that drew both on the Perso-Islamic theory of legitimacy and on their experience of the Qing. Hodong Kim has pointed out the emergence in the immediate post-Uprising period of a discourse of fuqarāchiliq. The innovative term is derived from Arabic fuqarā “poor people,” and its suffixes give it the sense of “a stance in favor of the poor or ordinary people,” but also “the way of acting like a subject.” Fuqarāchiliq thus encapsulates both sides of the ideal subject-sovereign relationship. Sayrāmī, as I will discuss further below, used fuqarāchiliq as a measure of the emperor’s capability to govern. The resonance of fuqarāchiliq with the Chinese understanding of the relationship between ruler and subject is not coincidental. The Li Kitābi, a book of socio-moral exhortations described in Chapter Three, translated Chinese min “commoner” as
The 1893 translation of the Shunzhi Exhortations did the same: for example, Chinese “all of my [the emperor’s] people” fan wo renmin (Manchu yaya niyalma irgen) was rendered as jamî’ fuqarālar. This made fuqarā one of the few ideological terms that these two major works of propaganda translated consistently. The term fuqarā thus used a term from Arabic to invoke the normative relationship between ruler and subject both for officialdom and for common people. In turn, fuqarāchiliq became a critical tool for post-Uprisings chroniclers to critique the Ya’qūb Beg era and legitimize the Qing.

Many Muslim chroniclers during the uprisings were naturally optimistic about the prospects of Islamic rule. Initially, people had remained optimistic about the Qing, but this changed quickly: one of the earliest combatants in the uprisings around Kashgar was Siddīq Beg, a Qing official who was known as a loyal official in the service of the Chinese emperor. A sympathetic chronicler wrote that corrupt Turki officials misused the Qing and Islamic judicial systems to seize Siddīq Beg’s land, and so he had spent three days in seclusion preparing to wage holy war (ghāzā) to win it back and gain control of the Kashgar government. Initially, this account resembles Qāsim Beg’s, in that local corruption appears to have disrupted the orderly functioning of justice. Suddenly, however, sides switched: Siddīq Beg made a divination by casting lots and addressed the

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612 For Turki text, see SBB Zu 8390, 4. For Chinese and Manchu, BnF Mandchou 27, *Quanshan yaoyan*, f. 4a.

613 British Library MSS Turki 3 “Ya’qūb Begdin ilgāri Kāśgārni aľgān Siddīq Begniŋ tažktērasi,” 1v. Özi Ḥāqāŋgā qaraŋan ’amalār manšabdār erdi.
fairies, “If this country belongs to the Emperor, then let them stay.” The lots told him Kashgar belonged to him, and so he raised an army. This story casts Şidqī Beg as a divinely-inspired holy warrior (ghāzī) who gradually became more fervent in his dedication to reestablishing the primacy of Islam in Eastern Turkestan. “I have cast off my clothes of ignorance,” he is said to have told his Hui opponents, “and donned the armor of Islam! In the presence of God, I have taken the Muslim [musulmānchiliq] road!”

As Hodong Kim has pointed out, however, a holy warrior was inferior to a just emir, and a just emir to a Makhdūmzāda, a descendant of the Sufi Shaykh Makhdūm-i ʿĀzam (d. 1542). While authors advanced different accounts of events, it was apparent to all of them that deadlock between the warring parties in Kashgar needed to be broken, and so one such Makhdūmzāda khwāja was invited from Khoqand. He was accompanied by Ya’qūb Beg, who swiftly seized power by force of arms, and then disposed of the khwāja. The Khoqandi emir ʿĀlim Qul had commanded them to share power, as Central Asian rulers had done for centuries, and Ya’qūb Beg’s betrayal signaled his disregard for legitimate power structures. For this reason, Ya’qūb Beg’s rule was always somewhat suspect, even as certain Khoqandi chroniclers strove to depict him in a positive light: Gharibī, a Khokandi eyewitness, boasts in verse of how Ya’qūb Beg’s army starved a city of Hui under siege for six months. When they finally surrendered, they then forced the

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614 British Library MSS Turki 3, 3r. Bu wilâyat Ḥāqānnîq yurtı bolsa, turgun.

615 British Library MSS Turki 3, 12r-12v. Màn jāhiliq libāsimni taʃläp, Islām silāhini kiydim! Az barā-ye ānd allāh musulmānchiliq yolini tuttum!

616 Kim, Holy War in China, 48-49.

617 IVR RAN C 759 Amīr-i ʿalā, 52b-53a, 74b.
emaciated, suffering people to purchase food with their remaining possessions before sending them on a forced march into corvée labor in Kashgaria. Such incidents for the Khoqandis demonstrated their leader’s military power against people they considered traitors to Islam, and thus showed signs of God’s favor. However, it was difficult to argue that such actions were “just.” They did not present Ya’qūb Beg as a legitimate ruler, only a warrior capable of seizing territory.

Indeed, in retrospect, writers found it easy to fault Ya’qūb Beg for his misguided attempts to expand his state. Although his rule became known as the “time of Islam,” even the meaning of the term grew tarnished through association with him. Sayrāmī, who draws much of his source material from the oral culture of Southern Xinjiang, explains that commoners under Ya’qūb Beg’s reign would amuse themselves by arguing over whether the Chinese were really going to return. He recounts a joke: during the first year of Ya’qūb Beg’s reign, a tired man went and sat among his fellows. They asked him why he groaned. He told them, “It’s been ‘Islam’ for a year and a half, now. Can we stand fourteen years of ‘Islam’?!’ Because it’s lasting so long, I’m exhausted!”618 Sayrāmī goes on to relate a story about finding a skeleton from a man dead of hunger. He then explicates further the theory of the rise and fall of rulers that operates in the text: prosperity for the common people is at the root of political legitimacy. While Sayrāmī elsewhere connects the rise and fall of the Qing to astrological phenomena, fuqarūchiliq is not cosmic or mystical, however, as in the Chinese idea of the Mandate of Heaven.

Rather, Sayrāmī is addressing the fissures that appear in a political system when one component of it ceases to operate as intended. In Sayrāmī’s account, Yaʿqūb Beg individually on several accounts, including his maintenance of an enormous harem of women and serving boys. Yaʿqūb Beg’s rule came to a poetic end when one night he flew into a rage and beat an old friend to death, and moments later passed away mysteriously. From Sayrāmī’s perspective, the Muslim ruler's arbitrariness, injustice, and disloyalty encouraged the myriad abuses of those he appointed to high office.

The Yaʿqūb Beg regime’s other impositions needled Xinjiang Muslims, as they infringed on local practices. Although Yaʿqūb Beg had pledged to return to an Islamic system of taxation, in reality taxes were heavily extractive. Where Kashgaris had long indulged in alcohol and tobacco, and women had gone without veils, now such perceived violations of Islamic morality were strictly policed and harshly punished by a special armed force. Moreover, a decade of constant warfare devastated the region and killed perhaps hundreds of thousands. Khoqandis now enjoyed rule over people who resented them as outsiders. The best that Sayrāmī can say about Yaʿqūb Beg is that he “overcame his lustful nature” to secure the protection of the caliph in Istanbul. Ultimately, depictions of the way Yaʿqūb Beg’s emirate ended divided writers between those who believed in his charisma as a holy warrior and those who believed he was merely a violent an uncontrollable man. What matters is that, while Uprisings-era writers sought ways to

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620 On society and economy under the emirate, see Kim, *Holy War in China*, 120-137.

legitimize these leaders without the discourse of justice, post-Uprisings writers turned to it as a means to explain their downfall and the return of the Qing.

Cynicism regarding political Islam contributed to Sayrāmî’s return to justice as a universal theory of politics and depiction of the Qing emperor as a “just king” in the Perso-Islamic tradition. Like Qāsim Beg, he asserts that the Qing emperors from Qianlong onward imposed only Islamic taxes on Muslims, both Turki in Xinjiang and Hui in Northwest China.622 This effectively established a precedent whereby the emperor would always protect Islamic beliefs and practices; according to a tradition related by Sayrāmî, this promised dated all the way back to the Tang dynasty. (See next chapter.) In Sayrāmî’s account, the Uprisings began in Gansu when local officials imposed new, non-Islamic taxes and insulted local Muslims by violating their mosque. Further to the west, the Turki dealt with corrupt local officials, like those described in the previous section, who were using their positions to extract money through false taxes, forcing people to pawn their belonging to Chinese merchants. Turki commoners’ petitions did not reach the emperor.

Sayrāmî, continuing his narrative, explains how imperial power fell not to another emperor, but to people of low station like Yaʿqūb Beg: “justice” (ʿadālah), he writes, is not merely the province of rulers and clerics, but a quality of sovereignty (dawlah) and obedience to God (ʿibādah) that ordinary people, even whole groups of people, can attain.623 Where Ibn Khaldūn argued that rulers like Amir Timur gained power over other rulers through superior justice, Sayrāmî does not limit this quality to those who have been

622 Sayrāmî 2007, 153-163.
623 Sayrāmî 2007, 163-164.
licensed to lead in some other way. Thus, in Sayrāmī’s account, it was possible first for a popular uprising to cast off imperial rule when its intermediaries were tyrannical, and then for an infidel power to crush an Islamic state when its ruler finally lost control of his lust for power and brutally murdered an old friend and companion. The Muslim Uprisings only ended, in Sayramī’s account, when a fortuneteller advised the Tongzhi emperor that he had to die in order for peace to be restored. Tongzhi tricked fate by walking alive into the imperial tombs outside of Beijing (in which Sayrāmī seems to have had a peculiar interest) and living out his days underground. Although the Empress Dowager Cixi ran the empire in place of Tongzhi’s successor, the young Guangxu, Sayrāmī writes, their rule produced justice again. Thus, in Sayrāmī’s account, did the Turki “cry out” for the emperor to return to Eastern Turkestan.

That Cixi’s regency could produce “justice,” as Turki saw it, speaks to the institutionalization of imperial government and Xinjiang Muslims’ increasing focus on formal law, or judicial procedure, in defining ʿadālah. It was not necessary for the emperor himself to be capable or in command. Sayrāmī relates that Guangxu, who actually ascended the throne at the age of three, attained his majority through a series of magical rituals, in which Heaven, Earth, his mother, and his officials each granted him two extra years of age until he instantly turned seven years old. This suggests that, while Turki elites understood the political realities of imperial rule, they nevertheless sought ways to legitimize it, in part by evoking the literary image of the Chinese emperor as the ruler of a land of magic and ritual. (See next chapter.)

624 Jarring Prov. 163, 127a.  
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While other writers advanced narratives similar to Sayrāmī’s, Qurban Ḍalī Khālidī of Tarbaghatai presents an interesting contrast. Khālidī describes how, in the years before the Uprising, a petition to the emperor in Beijing could bring imperial power to punish a tyrannical local official. The same official, however, had enough power to take revenge on his accusers. Khālidī is unwilling to point out systemic problems in the Qing administration, but he relates that people found Yaʿqūb Beg suspicious and tyrannical, as evidenced by his murder of his own son, his brutal disposal of his enemies, and ultimately his unwillingness to support the military garrisons that sustained his state.

While the reconquering Qing armies pardoned Muslims and gave them relief from famine, the emir realized he had lost their loyalty. Khālidī’s basic purpose in his world history is to demonstrate the power of reason and evidence to establish truth. While he and Sayrāmī share a common grounding in sacred history, he produces a very similar narrative without extensive reference to “justice.”

Sayrāmī’s work can be read not just as a history of the Uprisings, but as a cultural artifact of the time in which he wrote it, beginning around 1900. It was only in the post-uprisings period, under the provincial government, that commoners had the degree of access to the petitioning system that Sayrāmī and others read into the pre-uprisings environment. Fuqarāchiliq as an explanatory mechanism distinct from “justice” emerged out of the effort to explain the return of the Qing, the official ideology of which provided a language of subjecthood and sovereignty that emphasized the benevolence of the ruler and obedience of the common people. This ideology came to shape the expectations of

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626 Khālidī, Tawārīkh-i khamsa-ye sharqī, 101-102.

627 Khālidī, Tawārīkh-i khamsa-ye sharqī, 112-115, 117-121.
commoners in Xinjiang just as it did in China proper, and its effects are demonstrated in
the breach: those few recorded conflicts that erupted into mass violence often began with
disputes that Turki brought before the magistrate. When they did not feel that their plaints
had been addressed, or that justice had not been done, they sought to exact it themselves.
The narratives of the outbreak of the Muslim uprisings thus resembled narratives of
justice-seeking in the post-uprisings period.

III. Doing Justice

In order to illustrate the operation of the concept of “justice” and the judicial
system in Xinjiang society, I will first present a pair of cases in which the Chinese
government did not immediately produce “justice” for Turkic Muslims. In the following
section, I will approach the everyday production of substantive justice through the
provincial system. What emerges from these cases is the slippage in meaning between the
production of desire outcomes in individual cases and social justice for Muslims through
the defense of the shariah.

Despite all of the difficulties of the early post-uprisings period, Chinese
magistrates and their functionaries did often learn to act effectively in Muslim society.
While they almost never mentioned it in their reports, officials knew that to go to the
mosque was an effective means to demonstrate their respect for local religion. One
especially well-documented case of Chinese engagement with Islamic institutions is
Magistrate Peng’s resolution of the Turki-Hindu riots of 1906 and 1907. (See Chapter

628 Memorial dated GX 5.7.27 (FHA 04-01-16-0209-112). Non-Muslim officials in Tarbaghatai are noted
as having visited the local mosque, bowed to the qiblah, and addressed their Muslim subjects.
Three.) The riots began when a group of Turki and Afghan Muslims heard that a Hindu merchant had a Turki woman in his room at the serai. They spread quickly across Kashgaria, putting many local women and British Indian subjects in danger. Peng arrived in office just in time for the violence to begin.

So, on the afternoon of March 26, 1907, Magistrate Peng put on his best official clothes.\textsuperscript{629} Considerable preparation had been made for the afternoon’s events: first, the Yarkand yamen had donated five sheep and a great deal of rice, which were to be made into great iron cauldrons of pilaf and given out to the common people on the freshly-swept grounds of the Friday mosque. The previous night, Peng had sent a messenger to the qadis and ‘alam akhunds, who represented the Turki in the city. For weeks, tensions had been escalating, and the violence was on the brink of civil war. The lonely British consul Macartney was clearly impotent in this matter, and the Russian consul was happy to see his own imperial subjects from Central Asia stir up trouble among the Kashgaris. Yet Peng was “the father-and-mother official,” and it was his duty to maintain the peace.

At two o’clock, Peng arrived in the great yard of the Friday mosque. There had gathered a multitude of Turki, most local, some foreign, along with some Afghans, who always seemed to hang about the edges of things. Off to one side, he saw Macartney in his linen suit. Peng’s interpreter and his small coterie of secretaries, Chinese and local, waited as he paused at the door of the prayer hall, just before the carpets of the prayer hall, and kowtowed. The yard went quiet as the assembled Muslims watched Peng, some with approval, others with disgust.

\textsuperscript{629} IOR L/P&S/7/202.
Humbled, Peng stood and turned to the crowd. “This is a house of God,” he said, “and Muḥammad was a sage.” Unbeknownst to Peng, his interpreted rendered “sage” as “saint.” They were the same in Chinese (sheng), but the distinction in Turki was important.

“The Qur’ān is a holy book.” He said “classic” or “sutra” (jing), while the interpreter made the necessary corrections.

Peng continued. He had come to this mosque, he said, to ask God for his guidance in resolving the dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. After all this time, he had been unable to find a solution, and he blamed himself. Peng confessed to the Muslims in the yard that the people had put their trust in him in vain – because no matter what he did, while they professed the benevolence of their magistrate, he could not guide them, nor would they heed his counsel.

Peng began to cry so that the Muslims in the back of the yard could see his tears. He begged them to forgive the Hindus and each other, and to move past this angry conflict. If the people would not listen to their magistrate, he said, then Heaven would take his office from him, and he would leave for China proper again.

The black-robed magistrate raised his hand and gestured to Macartney. This man is a guest, he said, and famed for his justice. Peng would lead his people to the British consulate and beg Macartney to resolve the dispute. This was the first that Macartney, standing in the back, had heard of the plan.

Peng and Macartney were both surprised when a Russian subject called out, “He won’t punish the Hindus!” They were pleased in turn when the local Turki Sayyid Jalāl
Peshin snapped at the Andijani to shut up: the Russian consul was the one stirring up trouble, he said, so the Andijanis and Afghans could stay out of this!

The speech had already been a rhetorical coup for Peng: with the support of the Muslim clerics, he positioned himself as the legitimate leader of the people of Yarkand, who were distinguishing themselves from the troublesome Russian Turki and Afghans. All that was left was to tell the crowd that the matter now rested in Mr. Macartney’s hands, and they awaited whatever decision he should be pleased to make. In the manner of a Muslim ruler, Peng donated 20,000 tānggā for the maintenance of the mosque, and all of the assembled imams, qadis, and begs pledged their loyalty to him. By this time, dozens were in tears, but the crowd soon dispersed when the pilaf was gone.

Macartney was impressed. “By acting as he did,” he later reported to his superiors in India, “he has saved not only his own position, but also that of the Chinese in general.”

Macartney was also annoyed, but he resisted saying as much when Peng showed up to his office the next day with a coterie of “every body who is any body in Yarkand” in tow. The violence had to end: as they spoke, there was a Turki woman with her Hindu lover besieged in a house in Poskam. Another huddled in Qarqhiliq. So Macartney told his guests how flattered he was to receive them, and asked only for one thing: that the Muslims respect the Hindus’ religious sensibilities and cease slaughtering and selling cows outside of the Hindus’ serais.

The ʿalam akhund agreed to enforce the compromise, and Macartney went out to the yard to make his own speech, this one in Persian for the Hindustanis. He sacrificed several British subjects to Chinese law: three merchants were all to be beaten publicly, though the Muslims later put a stop to the punishment as a show of good faith. The
remaining Hindus were going to go straight to the Friday mosque, bow to it, say salām in a show of respect, and donate four taels to its upkeep. As the crowd dispersed, the resident Afghans and Bajauris voiced their appreciation: Khub ʿadālat shod, they said – “justice well done.”

Macartney interpreted the resolution of this conflict as Magistrate Peng’s victory. The incident is open to other interpretations: first, it is significant that Peng managed this feat just over a year after taking office on March 15, 1906. One of the greatest difficulties that magistrates faced in the immediate aftermath of the Uprisings was the lack of local scholars and gentry with whom to collaborate. However, thanks to thirty years of Chinese state-making in Yarkand, Peng was able to communicate with local yamen staff and Muslim authorities who had grown accustomed to imperial power. The bulk of the credit for resolving the Hindu-Muslim riots ought to go to Peng’s intermediaries. To push this argument further, Peng may have actually been useful to Muslim authorities in search of a means to defuse the situation. Regardless, the resolution of the Hindu-Turki riots presents a conjunction of a Muslim perception of justice as ʿadālah and a Chinese imperative to preserve social stability.

Other magistrates did not handle such situations as well as Peng. In one case from 1890, a group of Turki saw Turpan’s local government as obstructing justice and rose up against it. In the wake of the incident, higher officials agreed that the magistrate had failed to protect the commoners and so weakened society, leading to instability. Here emergent Turki understandings of the justice that the Chinese judicial system was meant to produce intersected with Chinese officials’ own ideological sense of justice. Muslim commoners had come to expect positive results from disputes with Han that they brought
to the *yamen*, and officials had learned to cultivate legitimacy and maintain social stability by favoring them. Before 1890, local officials in Turpan had pursued an intelligent strategy for defusing social tensions: when Han settlers or returnees made claims to land or water resources that competed with those of local Turki, the *yamen* and local mediators always favored the Turki, even when there was a contractual basis to favor the Han party.\(^{630}\)

The Turpan government failed, however, to protect Turki from Han merchants’ predatory lending. Normally, land disputes were remanded to mediation by village headmen and other petty officials who had a close relationship with local society, and the *yamen* often monitored the process and approved the results. The *yamen* handled debt differently: it rarely considered them beyond the initial complaint, but instead sent the conflict for mediation immediately, and ceased to monitor the outcomes. The village headmen who protected Turki in land disputes had little leverage over the merchants. Moreover, the *yamen* and wealthy Han merchant groups sometimes collaborated in investigations, suggesting that the magistrate would have little practical interest in constraining their activities. (See Chapter Two.) By the early 1890s, debt had become a

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\(^{630}\) See for example a dispute over a vineyard in 1877. A Han returnee made a claim to a vineyard he had rented before the uprisings, and he made a strong case that the contract ought to award him full control of the vineyard for the remainder of the period originally agreed upon. The *yamen* conducted an investigation, which prompted the disputants to engage in mediation with a minor Turki official. The Han returnee settled for renting a fraction of the original plot. (GX 3.6.14 “吐魯番廳屬戶民張貴書就控告織民焦五提害命霸業案呈吐魯番廳文” in *QXDX* vol. 50, 164; GX 3.6.27 “吐魯番廳屬戶民張貴書為其控告織民焦五提害命霸業案呈吐魯番廳之結案” in *QXDX* vol. 50, 170; GX 3.6.27 “吐魯番廳屬織民焦五提為戶民張貴書控告其害命霸業案呈吐魯番廳之結案” in *QXDX* vol. 50, 170). Other cases completely denied Han their claims.
major source of tensions between Han and Turki all across Xinjiang, as suggested by an increase in capital cases involving inter-ethnic violence in debt disputes.631

ʿAbdurrahīm’s uprising began at the Turpan yamen in 1889, when a Han village headman and a Chinese merchant brought him and several other Turki before the magistrate in a debt dispute.632 ʿAbdurrahīm and his fellow defendants returned to their home village of Yarghol (Yanghai) with an order to repay their debts, probably at rates they could not afford. A year later, the same men plotted to take their revenge in a scheme to rob the house of a different wealthy Chinese merchant. The same scenario was playing out elsewhere in Xinjiang: indebted Turki were brought before the yamen to repay their remaining marginal debts, incurred by taking high-interest loans from Han. They took matters into their own hands and raided the houses of the traders and moneylenders to whom they were indebted.633 In ‘Abdurrahīm’s case, the authorities got wind of his plan and attempted to apprehend him. ʿAbdurrahīm went into hiding, but they captured his brother and exiled him to Lop Nur. Despite the fact that his brother was in possession of forty taels of stolen silver, a very substantial amount, they permitted him to

631 Schluessel, “Muslims at the Yamen Gate.”

632 The incident is summarized in a palace memorial dated GX 17.4.24 in GZD, vol. 6, 228-229. Local documents provide a richer picture of the events, but I will only cite a few key documents here: GX 16.12.30 “洋海商民永盛源等人稟吐魯番廳文” in QXDX vol. 59, 21; warrant dated 17.1 in QXDX vol. 58, 50; GX 16.12.23 “魯克沁郡王瑪木提就呈報賊犯阿不都熱衣木等三十人攻打魯克沁城請趕緊發兵除賊事稟吐魯番廳文” in QXDX vol. 59, 18; GX 16.12.30 “連木沁、洋海商民們為公禀盜賊詐賄迫成巨爭端事稟吐魯番廳文” in QXDX vol. 59, 21; GX 17.2.22 “新疆補用道李，為飭洋海商民柯際唐控賊匪燒殺洋海漢民案，緝拿賊犯馬奴爾事，札吐魯番廳文” in QXDX vol. 59, 68. The Shanshan gazetteer records the incident in similar terms. (Shanshan xian xiangtuzhi, 2010 edition, 138-139.)

633 For example, a group of Turki in Keriya conspired to rid themselves of longstanding debts to a Han trader who had sold them cotton at a high markup. (Document dated GX 16.03.17 in GZD vol. 5, 209-210.)
keep the money, which suggests that the yamen was still pursuing a strategy of appeasement and mild sentencing for local Turki.

A month later, early in the winter of 1891, ʿAbdurrahim and seventeen others came out of hiding. First, they conducted a dawn raid on Lükchun, where they broke into the arsenal and stole guns and horses, then rode for Yarghol. There they killed at thirty-six Han, including the merchant who had initially taken ʿAbdurrahim to court, and burned down their houses. It took a month for the authorities to capture ʿAbdurrahim and his followers, most of whom were put to death immediately.

While the provincial government’s initial response was to order the criminals put to death, the governor and judicial commissioner then questioned why the uprising had broken out in the first place. Their suspicions were raised early on: while the magistrate’s runners were still pursuing ʿAbdurrahim’s party, a group of Chinese merchants from the area sent a petition to the magistrate that blamed corrupt yamen staff for the outbreak of violence.634 That claim did not ring true to officials, who noted the rebels’ involvement in the previous year’s debt dispute. Instead, the subsequent investigation, which lasted over a year, pinned responsibility squarely on corrupt collaboration between Han merchants and the local magistrate himself, who was stripped of his position. In a memorial to Beijing, Governor Tao Mo proposed extensive new restrictions on Han merchants’ lending to Turki.635 The Turki, he argued, were simple and pliable people unaccustomed

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635 GX 18.3.8 “奏為漢人重利放債盤剝纏民，請照內地民人與土司交往借債例一律治罪，以蘇民，因而除積弊恭摺仰祈聖鑒事” in GZD vol. 7, 35-36; GX 18.4 “鎮迪道札轉嚴禁漢民放債欺壓纏民” in QDX vol. 29, 438; GX 18.6.6 “馬木特禀呈清理漢纏相欠帳目” in QDX vol. 29, 444.
to usury, which after all is prohibited by Islam. Tao made an analogy between the Turki and the Miao of China’s far South. It was prohibited for Han to lend money to Miao chiefs, he argued, and it would be wise to grant all Turki the same status. The court in Beijing did not approve of granting a new legal status to Turki, but the provincial government implemented a program to clear Turki debt and prohibit future lending. While this program did not ultimately succeed, it demonstrates two key aspects of Xinjiang’s government in the early 1890s: first, the Hunanese experience of Southern non-Han peoples remained at the forefront of administrators’ minds. Second, they had lost faith in the civilizing project and returned to maintaining difference. From this perspective, “justice” no longer meant the creation of an ideal and harmonious society infused with Confucian moralism, but rather substantive justice prosecuted in ways that were specific to local conditions and that maintained a nonviolent order.

The preceding anecdotes illustrate cases in which the Chinese provincial judicial system served outcomes that Muslims construed as their communal interests, and outcomes that Chinese officials construed as Muslims’ communal interests, respectively. In either situation, both the conflicts themselves and their resolutions gave the lie to the pretense that Turkic Muslims could be brought to engage directly with the local government and judicial system through moral transformation. That is so say, Turki were not becoming “civilized” and assimilated into the Chinese whole – instead, officials learned to develop special rules for them, much as they had done in the Miao borderlands. In Yarkand, Magistrate Peng and local Muslim authorities used Muslim spaces and intermediaries to resolve a conflict in a way that put an Islamic face on Qing power. Following ʿAbdurrahīm’s uprising in Turpan, the provincial government found
ways to treat Turki differently under the law, ostensibly for their own protection. Special status, according to elite Turki writings, was what Muslims had wanted from the Qing all along, and now they received it again, not from the emperor in Beijing, but from provincial and local officials who adapted to the politics of the Muslim societies they governed.

**IV. ‘Adālah and Chinese Colonialism**

The preceding cases presented a central paradox of colonial law: the Han-dominated Xinjiang government made a claim to the universal legitimacy of the Qing legal system within the empire, and yet they only succeeded in extending this system, legitimizing it, and achieving its goal of social stability by recognizing exceptions within it.636 Ironically, the Xiang Army attempted to replace Qing imperial pluralism with a sinocentric vision of homogeneity, but in doing so came to articulate difference in sino-normative terms instead. Despite the intent to impose an explicitly non-Muslim legal order on a Muslim society, nevertheless, Muslims could construe the Qing legal system as legitimate because of its ability to produce everyday substantive justice. Muslim identity was constructed partly in relation to these ideologies and through these institutions.

Legal pluralism emerged through a haphazard process, and it was never formally recognized. During reconstruction, the Xiang Army regime attempted to impose the Qing judicial system wholesale on the Muslim society they ruled. They demanded full

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636 For a discussion of the creation of internal exceptions in the colonial process, see Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*. For a review of the cultural ramifications of exception, see Merry, “Law and Colonialism.”
jurisdiction of the magistrates over all marriages, divorces, and economic transactions conducted by contract. As I discussed in Chapter Two, it was now illegal for the local Muslim authorities who traditionally handled disputes do play this vital role in society. Nevertheless, it is clear that neither rule could be enforced, as the vast majority of surviving contracts bear no trace of review or approval by the yamen, and akhunds, qadis, and muftis maintained their role as mediators and legal authorities.

Indeed, Islamic law experienced a revival and institutional restructuring during the late Qing. In the pre-Uprisings period, local Islamic courts had decided everyday disputes while remanding violent criminals to the Qing authorities. Under Yaʿqūb Beg, judicial authorities were organized into a hierarchy controlled by the emir himself. Accounts from the period indicate that justice was prosecuted especially strictly and often immediately through the greatly expanded armed police force. With the arrival of the Xiang Army, the locus of temporal judicial authority in local society had simply shifted from the begs to the magistrates. The yamens, in need of translators and clerks, employed large numbers of minor scholars, including qadis, to carry out their tasks.

Gradually, the realities of local politics changed this relationship: first, Islamic authorities across Xinjiang reestablished their positions through formal “shariah courts” (mahkama-ye sharʾī), which are most clearly evidenced in Kashgar, Turpan, and Khotan. The term itself is interesting: a mahkama is simply a “court,” while the phrase

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638 Wang Dongping, Qingdai Xinjiang falü zhidu.

639 Hodong Kim, Holy War in China, 108.

640 The earliest document I have found relating to the Turpan court dates to 1880. (GX 6, Turki document in Qingdai Xinjiang dang’an xuanji, vol. 51, 364). Various other documents mention it. Wang Jianxin
“shariah court,” which we also find in other colonial contexts, is clearly meant
to differentiate it from the *yamen* as a site of litigation.\(^\text{641}\) These courts brought multiple
judges into a hierarchy under one roof, and they were capable of providing dispute
resolution in places where the magistrates simply lacked the personnel or the linguistic
and cultural knowledge necessary to intervene. Unfortunately, the documentary record
sheds little light on these courts, as their own records have been scattered. Chinese
documents almost never mention them, as non-imperial judicial systems were not meant
to exist, much less enjoy a relationship with the magistrate. Nevertheless, Turkic
Muslims had access to multiple systems for mediating and adjudicating disputes.\(^\text{642}\) For
many of them, the Qing system provided better results than the Islamic one. This is
implied by the hundreds of disputes that Turki brought to the Turpan *yamen* every year,
and to other *yamens* about which less information is available, on matters that would
ordinarily be handled by a Muslim judge or mediator, including property and marriage.

Despite what some analysts would depict as the Qing system’s “irrationality,” it
was nevertheless capable of protecting certain interests of Turkic Muslims, even over
those of Chinese immigrants. Throughout the Turpan archive, I have been unable to
identify clear and consistent evidence for judicial prejudice in favor of non-Muslims.

in *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*.

\(^\text{642}\) For details on Islamic courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms, see Béller-Hann, “Law and
Custom” and Sugawara, “Tradition and Adoption.”
Instead, in several property disputes wherein Chinese settlers laid claim to land held by Turki on the basis of pre-Uprisings contracts, the magistrate ruled strongly in favor of the Turki.\footnote{See for example GX 3.6.27 “吐魯番屬纏民焦五提為戶民張貴書控告其害命霸業案呈吐魯番廳之結案” in Qingdai Xinjiang dang’an xuanji, vol. 50, 170, and GX 3.6.14 “吐魯番屬戶民羅楊氏就控告纏民仁義木害命霸業案呈吐魯番廳文” in Qingdai Xinjiang dang’an xuanji, vol. 1, 163, as well as their associated documents.} This was true even when the land appeared to have been seized through violence. This was something the Islamic authorities realistically could not do: they could not defend Muslims against Chinese, nor would Chinese have any reason to seek redress through them.

While ‘adālah maintained its relationship to sovereignty on an ideological level, in the context of local politics, ‘adālah also came to point to satisfying results from the judicial process. While Chinese had no term for this, Muslims were nonetheless able to find the concept within the workings of the imperial judicial system. The epistemic challenge came from the Qing judicial system’s ability to produce what people regarded as substantive justice. One observer, himself a cleric, made the following observations of Islamic and Chinese law around 1905, which helps explain some of the choices people made:\footnote{Jarring Prov. 207 I.47, “Sorağniŋ bayāni.”}

If two complainants go to the court, and the qādlī and muftī take no bribes, but inquire according to the shariah book, then they will certainly inquire well. There will be no dissatisfaction. ... Both will be satisfied, announce that the shariah was not in their favor, and agree to the decision and leave. But if they take bribes ... it will be untrue. The untruth of it will be clear to everyone. But it’s very rare that they inquire truthfully. The muftī goes out to give an opinion. The muftī takes a quote from a decision in the books, writes it on a piece of paper, and gives them something that says “yes” or “no.” The qādlī makes a decision according to his opinion. If someone goes to the muftī and asks him to give him an opinion on a matter of theirs, he doesn’t ask if the person has evidence for what they’re saying. He gives an opinion based on the words coming out of his mouth. The muftī’s job is like the job of a dream interpreter. Someone went to a dream interpreter and said, “I had a dream. In the dream, blood ran from my nose.” “You have won great fortune!” he answered. Just then, someone else came and said, “Blood ran from my nose.” The dream interpreter told him, “You have lost great fortune!” The muftī also gives opinions based on what people say. But then there’s the “big interrogation.” This is in front of the ambans [Qing officials]. If the amban interrogates diligently, then he will interrogate well. But if the translators and begs don’t get their bribes, oftentimes they will mix things up and ignore what’s right.

The writer attacks Islamic legal authorities first for relying on oral evidence and second for their lack of diligence in addressing the facts of a case. This first complaint is striking because it so strongly contrasts with the picture of traditional Islamic justice: as early as the eighth century, oral testimony was considered to be stronger than written.645 This assumption has remained through the present day, when at least a metaphor of orality is

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necessary to establishing the truth of testimony. At the same time, a contrary conception of justice as the product of the careful investigation of signs, in the manner of a detective, has emerged in situations where qadis were obliged by their governments to engage more closely in the judicial process, including conducting inquiries. Here, the author comes down on the side of seeking truth from evidence and depicts Chinese justice as more effective in eliciting it and acting accordingly. Sayrāmī, in assessing the Qing emperor, similarly explains that the sovereign’s willingness to mobilize the whole political-judicial apparatus to conduct a thorough investigation is a sign of his ‘adālah.

Much as Sayrāmī judged rulers by their ‘adālah, so competing legal systems could be assessed in terms of their ability to provide justice on the ground through proper investigation. In this passage, the writer includes Qing law as well as Islamic:

If the punishment suits the guilty person’s crime, then people say the investigation was conducted with justice [‘adālat]. They won’t mock the official. But if the official gives out a penalty contrary to any of the law books, or gives no punishment, then they will mock him. This is because, in those books, there’s no “giving face.” If there were, they wouldn’t think the investigation was just. … If any

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648 TH/Beijing, 311-313.

649 Jarring Prov. 207 I.48, “Gunahkār ücün hākimniñ jazā bārgānidiniñ bayāni.”

Gunahkārnin gunāhīgā nuwāfiq sazā berilsā, ani ‘adālat bilān soralğan soraq derler. Ul waqt hākim ta’nagā nişāna bolmaslar. Āgār hākim madkūr kitāblarniq ħalāfida jazā bārsā, wā yā jazā bārmāsā, ta’ na nişānasi bolur. Ĕünk miadkūr kitāblardā yūz ḥāṭir albatta yoqdur. Āgār bar bolsa, ul soraqni ‘adālat demāslār. ... Hār soraq madkūr kitāblarniq taşığa čuqiq sorsa, albatta ‘adālat birlā bolmasdur. Balke rīswat iṣikini aṣipdur. Lekin tola ēdamlar Öz fa’idasini étap şar’ at kitāblaridin yūz āwirip şar’ atā barmaslar.

Hāqān manşabdārlari ba’zi soraqni özı sorap tūğütādūr. Ba’zi soraqni begļärğä berādūr. Ul waqt yūz ḥāṭir rīswa pārā arağā tūṣādūr. ... Akṣar ḥaqq soralmaqi mumkin emās.
investigation is carried out beyond those books, then of course it won’t be just. Maybe there was bribery involved. However, many people for their own benefit have turned away from the *shariah* books.

The emperor’s officials conduct some investigations themselves. Some they give to the begs. When that happens, there’s tons of favoritism and bribery. … For the most part, it won’t be possible to inquire into the truth.

Here, the onus is placed not on the mid-level officials who disrupted the emperor’s justice, but on the low-level *yamen* functionaries, who in reality handled most of the inquiry. Ordinary people feared these “*yamen* runners,” who were the “talons and teeth” of the Chinese administration in local society. The above passage, written in Kashgar, goes on to describe the range of punishments and torture implements that these runners could visit on their bodies. It reflects a similar list given in Turpan a decade before, where Katanov conducted a detailed interview concerning the procedures and consequences of approaching the *yamen* or being called to it for interrogation. Nevertheless, as the passage points out, Qing officials could be perceived as investigating cases according to formal procedure in order to produce a fair assessment. From this perspective, the textual basis of Qing law prevents it from corruption, much as the textual basis of Islamic law was generally believed to lend it ultimate authority.

From the 1870s, Qing justice began to fit into the quadripartite scheme of sacred lineage that popular Islamic manuals ascribed to various crafts. As in the craft guilds,

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652 Dağyeli, “*Gott liebt das Handwerk*.”
and as in the recitation of saint narratives at shrines, this idea of law tied it closely to an imagined textual tradition. It could make “law of the Chinese” out to be the “law of Moses”.653

Then God created four prophets and four books, which were sent to separate nations: the Bible, this is the law of the Russians; the Psalms of David, this is the law of the Qalmaq people; the Torah of Moses, this is the law of the people of China; the Furqan of Muḥammad, this is the law of the local people [of Xinjiang].

As I will show in the next chapter, sacred history was a powerful means to integrate the challenges of the present into a coherent worldview by locating its roots in the distant Islamic past. If a Turki rifleman could claim that his weapon was created by the archangel Jibrāʾīl at the request of God on behalf of Muḥammad, then certainly the Qalmaq Mongols might follow a law encoded in the Psalms, and Chinese law might descend from Mosaic. All four of these books, as found in Turki popular culture, were thought to from a common lineage of revelation. While shariah might be the perfect law of God based on his uncorrupted word, from this perspective, at least the Russians, Qalmaqs, and Chinese were something akin to “people of the book,” believers in an Abrahamic tradition of scriptural revelation. In another interpretation, Chinese law was one of four systems of justice operative in Xinjiang and its environs.654

Each kind of religious person has a shariah book. They are: the book of qanun [sultanic law], the book of Russian law, the book of the Lifan yuan, and the book of the shariah. Punishments to be given are specified in these books.


654 Jarring Prov. 207 I.48 “Gunahkār üçün ḥākimnin jazā bärgäninin jazāni” (“Discussion of the punishments given by the magistrate to criminals”), written in Kashgar around 1905-1910, states “Hār dindärnin ʃar’at kitābi bardur. Uļ kitāblarini: qanun kitābi, zokun kitābi, ʃan ʃaykin kitābi, ʃar’at kitābi. Madkūr kitāblurdā tohtalğan sazā ta ʃin qilingandur.”
If we presume that by qānūn the writer means the Ottoman sultanic law, then he is describing the coexistence of three imperial temporal systems, each of which functioned alongside shariah. Turki regarded Qing law as one potential avenue of redress for grievances that could not be worked out through the Islamic authorities, and they would have been aware that Russian law could work similarly, as demonstrated by disputes with the thousands of Russian subjects in residence.

There is a profound irony to the argument that the Qing system was capable of producing justice because its agents undertook investigations. As I demonstrated in Chapter Two, a murder case as presented to the Board of Punishments was the product of a long process of editing. In local disputes that came before the magistrate, parties were required to agree formally to an adjudicated truth. Final reports of capital crimes sent to Beijing rarely bore much of a resemblance to the initial depositions given by those involved, but a critical part of the judicial process was getting witnesses and the accused to agree to that same final narrative. While both Islamic and Chinese justice as it was known in Xinjiang involved crafting narratives in order to achieve a certain result, the sources show that many people perceived a difference: one could represent oneself to a qadi, while the magistrate could make representations on that person’s behalf.

In sum, the Perso-Islamic tradition furnished a conceptual vocabulary for understanding the interaction of law and justice in a Muslim society under non-Muslim rule. Sacred and temporal law coexisted in several Muslim states where temporal rulers both clashed and cooperated with the authority of jurisprudents and judges. In post-Mongol Central Asia, when rulers lacked other sources of authority, their ability to produce “justice” in the broader sense of an equitable sociopolitical order served to
legitimize them. In Xinjiang, this Islamic sense of “justice” merged peculiarly with Chinese law, which distinguished between “law” and “justice” very differently: while the *shariah*’s nearest equivalent appeared to be *lǐ*, the imperial judicial system was geared towards bringing about a kind of social stability that resembled the conditions of the Circle of Justice. It effectively served as *qānūn*, or sultanic law. In this light, it was not difficult for Muslims to connect the ability of the Qing magistrate to deliver fair solutions to conflicts in the name of the emperor with the legitimacy of the regime itself.

*IV. The Emperor’s Ghost*

The idea of the distant just emperor persisted after the Xinhai Revolution and into the 1920s, when the emperor in Beijing was no longer a political force. I will explore this idea in greater detail in the following chapter. For now, suffice it to say that the emperor had always been a ghost in Xinjiang. In the pre-uprisings period, Muslims had no direct interaction with the court, with the exception of those few officials who visited Beijing themselves, and even they seemed to have a vague sense of who their rulers were. Guangxu and Xuantong, the only sovereigns of the post-uprisings period, were both puppets with no real personal role in the running of the government. They were only known through the textual apparatus of the government: petitions went up into the bureaucracy, and decisions came down. The situation was much the same in the rest of the empire, but in Xinjiang, Perso-Islamic ideas of justice and legitimacy informed a peculiar interpretation of this relationship.

In many parts of China, and particularly the West, the Xinhai Revolution changed little in terms of local institutions while removing only the tenuous control of Beijing.
After 1911, Turki continued to petition the magistrate in the same way, using the same terminology they had beforehand. However, Yang Zengxin’s intentional withdrawal of Dihua from local affairs removed another layer of critical oversight while granting magistrates exceptional latitude in managing affairs, including justice. Yang wrote extensively on the need to segregate Muslim and Chinese judicial systems, as he insisted, following Wang Shu’nan, that the peoples were just too different in their customs.\footnote{Zhang, Xinjiang Fengbao, 835-837; MG 3.3.10 “電呈新疆審檢兩廳暫從緩設文” in BGZ 36-37; MG 6.3.3 “呈覆新疆緩設審檢兩廳理由文” in BGZ 194-202.}

When Yang received petitions from Muslims that appealed to his reputation for “justice,” he sent them back to the counties.\footnote{See for example MG 4.11.2 “附伽師縣紳民電禀” in SLI, 490-491) and MG 4.11.13 “指令伽師縣紳民電禀巴楚縣知事在伽師夏普托開渠窒礙文” in BGZ, 982-983.} However, as we have seen in previous chapters, forum-shopping between courts remained the norm.

The image of the Emperor of China as a just king had emerged in the gaps of the Qing judicial system, and now there was an ultimate gap: no more emperor sat on the throne. It was still possible to fill that space with imaginations of power. In 1927, Ghulām Muḥammad wrote a chronicle as a deliberate extension of Sayrāmī’s Tārikh-i Ḥamīdī into the post-Qing era.\footnote{For a detailed study of this text, see Schluessel, The World as Seen from Yarkand.} Following Sayrāmī, Ghulām Muḥammad explains the end of the Qing in terms of ’adālah: the story opens in Beijing in 1911, when a treacherous minister secretly placed a false heir upon the throne before killing the true emperor Guangxu and his loving “mother” Cixi. (Ghulām Muḥammad is unclear on dates – the Guangxu reign ended with his death in 1908. Cixi, who was not his mother but his great-aunt, is widely thought to have poisoned him.) According to this version of history, the
false emperor advanced a tyrannical policy whereby Turki children were forced to learn Chinese, separating them from their parents. God would not stand for this injustice, as it was a violation of the emperor’s ancient promise to protect Islam, and so caused the empire to fall into chaos. Throughout the ensuing chaos of revolution, a voice reappears in Ghulām Muḥammad’s narrative of the 1910s and 1920s: the Emperor in Beijing, apparently resurrected, tries to send just commands to Xinjiang in hopes of restoring order there. It was not until 1925 that he admitted, bluntly, “there is no khan.” After that, the ongoing civil war in the Republic and rise of the Salafis in Saudi Arabia, the reformists in Turkey, and the Bolsheviks in Russia all presaged for him the end of an era of imperial justice in which Islam as he knew it was protected in every empire. I will return to Ghulām Muḥammad’s vision of a world falling apart in the next chapter.

This image of the emperor as defender of the shariah and of justice depended not on any image propagated by the court in Beijing, nor even by the provincial government in Dihua, but on the evolving relationships between Han magistrates and Turki. By the late 1920s, the informal associations between Muslim legal authorities and magistrates in different localities had grown stronger, as either party depended on the other for access to political, legal, and economic resources. Muslims felt comfortable, as they had in the late Qing, approaching the magistrate with demands that he enforce their communal boundaries. (See Chapters Three through Five.)

Some entries in the Kashgar Swedish Mission Journal of 1928 describe a peculiar land dispute brought to the yamen, the outcome of which hinged on a man’s membership in the Islamic community. It happened that Turdi Akhund, an employee of the mission,

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658 Jarring Prov. 163, 130a; Schluessel, The World as Seen from Yarkand, 47.
had purchased a farm three years before in Saibagh in Yengisar.\textsuperscript{659} One Mullah Niyaz, from Saibagh but resident in Kashgar, filed a complaint with the Yengisar magistrate and the circuit intendant in Kashgar. They held that Turdi Akhund had given the land to the mission and that the sale was therefore invalid. The case continued:\textsuperscript{\textit{660}}

\begin{quote}
Turdi Akhund has now come back from Yengisar. The mandarin there has, by order of the intendant, ruled that the seller of Turdi Akhund’s farm in Saibagh shall buy it back. The sale must be completed in front of the mandarin. Although Heli refused to sell for as long as possible, he was forced to do so. The mandarin said that Turdi must give the farm back as long as he (Turdi) was in the employ of the mission. He also asked him if there were not civil or military officials or “bays” [rich men] to employ him, so that he would not have to work for the Swedes. Besides that, he said that, as long as Turdi were in the Mission’s employ, if he should buy any land, then the purchase would revert [back to the seller] if the people complained to the mandarin.

In the end, one of the men from Saibagh came and said that he had yet another petition to put before the mandarin. Turdi had said that he had perverted seven people in Saibagh and made them Christians. And now he besought the mandarin to set these seven right. The mandarin said the aforementioned should be set right by their parents, and if they would not listen to their parents, then the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{\textit{659}} Kashgar Mission Journal, April 11, 1928. The names of individuals involved in this case have been changed to obscure their identities.


“Till slut reste sig en av männena från Saibagh och sade, att han hade ännu en begäran att framföra till mandarinen. Heli hade sade han fördärvat 7 personer i Saibagh och gjort dem till kristna. Och nu bönföll han mandarinen, att han skulle föra dessa 7 tillrätt. Mandarinen sade, att den förvillade skulle tillrättavisas av sina föräldrar, bydde de ej föräldrarna, skulle den klagande och de andra ”aqsaqalarerna” i distriktet förmana dem. Lydde de inte dessa, skulle de anmäla dem för begen, och hörde de icke denne, skulle de föra dem till mandarinen, så skulle han själv tillrättavisas dem.”
complainant and the other aqsagals in the district should admonish them. If they would not obey this, then they should report them to the beg, and if they would not listen to him, then they should bring them before the mandarin, and he would set them right himself.

According to the interpretation of the missionary who recorded these details, the mandarin had clearly overstepped his authority in interfering with religious matters. Nevertheless, the ruling held, and the complainants felt licensed to violently attack the converts in Saibagh.

It is curious that a Chinese official would be called in to rule on a case of apostasy, and there are several ways to interpret this account. Firstly, the county magistrate and the circuit intendant were established by this time as potential sources of authority in disputes between Turki. One potential advantage of going before a Chinese official was the alienability of land in Chinese law: since the early Qing, greater pressures on land use had led to new institutions of land tenure, including one whereby land once sold could be purchased back by the seller at any time. Landowners often abused the system by demanding a tilled and planted field just before the harvest. In Xinjiang, the late Qing saw the spread of this and a variety of other institutions of land tenure that were unfamiliar to the region. The provisional sale of land was particularly strange, as this is prohibited under Islamic law.

We may also speculate that the Yengisar magistrate in question was defending his own interests in making this decision. Officially, from the late Qing onward, all contracts had to be signed before a magistrate. In this case, the land sale from three years before

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had not been witnessed. Most such contracts were not. Yet, this put the magistrate in a unique position to invalidate whichever such agreements he saw fit and to enforce the decision with punishment. Collusion with the plaintiffs could have led to the unusual and harsh decision, which not only reversed a land sale but abrogated the rights of the Christians in Saibagh.

The magistrate, in his ruling for social admonition, outlined a hierarchy of responsibility for the behavior of the individual. This reflects Confucian ideas of the individual as nested in several layers of social relationships, at the heart of which was the family: individual < parents < aqsaqal < beg < magistrate. This is more evidence to suggest that the pre-provincial order actually persisted in practice at least through the 1920s. It also indicates that the basic metaphors of government had not changed, and that the county magistrate still acted as a “father and mother official,” even after revolution and reform.

A period of negotiation followed in which the missionary Törnquist approached the circuit intendant for his opinion on the matter.\textsuperscript{662} The intendant supported the Yengisar magistrate in ordering the land to be sold back, as it had been used for missionary activity. However, he disagreed that any official could deny someone the right to trade land on the basis of their employment or that the Christians ought to be “admonished.” Furthermore, he said, the Christians’ right to religious freedom was to be respected. Later that month, however, when Törnquist attempted to press the matter further, the Intendant responded angrily.\textsuperscript{663} He wrote that the Swedes had, summarily,

\textsuperscript{662} Kashgar Mission Journal, 2 May 1928.

\textsuperscript{663} Kashgar Mission Journal, 25 May 1928.
overstepped their bounds as guests and violated Chinese sovereignty. The situation was entirely beyond their control.

A month later, news arrived of how the Turki Christians had gotten an audience with the intendant:664

The one who was behind it all is a Mullah Niyaz, who is from Saibagh but now works for the Muslim court in Kashgar. This Mullah Niyaz has long persisted in stirring the people of Saibagh up against the Christians. When he then got word that these Christians had complained (per the intendant’s advice), he took some mullahs with him, went to the intendant, and said that this new trial [over apostasy] was actually Turdi Akhund’s trial regarding the aforementioned farm in Saibagh. The intendant got angry and said to the mullahs that they should not interfere in this matter. And, as far as Turdi Akhund was concerned, he had as much right to buy and sell land as any other Chinese subject. ... The Christians have gotten back their contract.

The circuit intendant acted as a check on the authority of the county magistrate, but only for those who could successfully petition him. Conversely, we see here Mullah Niyaz, a member of Kashgar’s well-established Islamic court, travel to an adjacent region to approach a lower Chinese authority with what ought to have been a dispute for his own court. In this case, while the Kashgar court may have failed to enforce Mullah Niyaz’s own demands regarding Turdi Akhund’s apostasy, he correctly believed that a Chinese magistrate could enforce the boundaries of the religious community through the Confucian idea of social sanction and admonition. While the Yengisar magistrate’s ruling

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on apostasy was illegal, the mullah could then reframe the dispute in a way that might induce the desired response from the Chinese judicial system.

V. Conclusion

At the core of colonialism is a drive to produce sameness out of difference, a civilizing project. Paradoxically, the definition of that sameness depends on the simultaneous articulation of difference and its identification in the objects of the civilizing project. Colonial law consists of the institutions and systems of generalizing and abstract categories that the dominant party deploys in service of the civilizing project. In this sense, we have seen two varieties of colonial law operating in late-Qing Xinjiang: the codified moralism of li (see Chapter Three) and the adaptation of the Qing Code and its attendant systems of punishments. The former system provided a vocabulary of morality that Turki could use to serve their own claims, but its institutions were diffuse, and disputes framed in terms of li would be remanded back to local authorities outside of the yamen. (See Chapters Four and Five.) The formal system of Qing law, however, provided a set of institutions that brought Turki disputants and others into the yamen itself. There they encountered a formal system of law that was meant to produce consistent outcomes. Under the earlier Qing regime, Xinjiang had been administered under special legal codes. Now, in the hands of the Xiang Army, Qing law as it was in China proper became an instrument to bring Xinjiang to conform to Han norms.

Nevertheless, because of the de facto legal pluralism that obtained in late-Qing Xinjiang and the early Republic, and the systematicity of the Qing system that made it possible to approach with the expectation of certain outcomes, Turkic Muslims found
ways to engage with a legitimize Chinese law. The vocabulary for doing so in the Islamic idiom came out of a tradition of political theory that emphasized “justice” in a broader sense of social justice as defined by scripture, but that shifted more towards formal justice and procedure under Qing rule in the pre-uprisings period. The term ‘adālah came to stand for the positive outcomes of a textually-rooted legal system that was legitimized both by the presence of the Qing sovereign and by the conformance of his representatives to procedure. Positive outcomes could be conceived of in terms of their benefits for the individual participant in a case, or for the broader Muslim community. In this sense, a Muslim had a dual identity in the provincial judicial system: both a subject of the emperor, and thus nominally equal with any Han or Hui, or as a special category of people. Turki representations of Chinese law reflect this ambiguous membership in the empire, as they point to both the availability of multiple systems of law and what Muslims could imagine to be their common origins.
Chapter Seven: The Story of How, In the Beginning, the Emperor of China Became a Muslim

Over the course of the preceding chapters, I have argued that the institutions and ideology of the late-Qing Xinjiang regime and of the government that perpetuated them under the Republic provided the means for new imaginations of the individual and communal self in relation to imperial power. This was not the imagining of a national community in narrow modernist terms, but rather of an imperial subjecthood conceived of through the experience of a Chinese civilizing project that drew on Perso-Islamic symbolic vocabularies. There are critical differences: scholars have tended to think of nations as modern phenomena that emerge from the specific conditions of modernity, particularly the social displacement and leveling that came with industrial capitalism in Europe. Nor is it sufficient to “imagine a community” – a nation imaginary requires a particular medium of representation that divides the world of nations into discrete bodies travelling in homogeneous space. Later nationalisms have at times appeared “derivative,” because the people who advance them appropriate the master narrative of modernism for their own experiences distant from the centers of capitalist-industrial development. Nationalism would appear to some scholars to be a distinctly Western European phenomenon, one that signaled a clear break with the monarchism and Christendom of the pre-modern period, and that cannot be indigenous to other places. From this

665 The title for this chapter is taken directly from that the sixth section of the muqaddima of Sayrāmī’s Ṭārīkh-i Ḥamīdī, Hikāya-ye zamāna-ye awwalda Ḥāqān-i Čīn musulmān bolgāni, which I reference extensively here. (TH/Beijing, 67.)

perspective, nationalism in Xinjiang must be the gift of the Soviet and Chinese Communist programs to create ethnicity, or of cosmopolitan, modernizing reformists.

We know better. First, in terms of the narrow example of Xinjiang, several scholars have identified phenomena that date to the period before the ethnonym “Uyghur” was introduced that nonetheless seem to have informed a collective subjectivity that resembles modern Uyghur-ness in scope and content.667 Second, other nationalisms in East and Central Asia drew both on international modernisms and on more or less autochthonous articulations of groupness. The modern and pre-modern transform each other, until it is never clear if anyone is ever truly “modern.”668 Finally, theorists have taken the cue from specialists in non-European histories and worked to re-theorize the origins of national and national-like solidarities. A pair of Rogers Brubaker’s arguments in particular have influenced my reasoning very strongly: first that the process of identification is more fluid and a more interesting object of study than the static categories of identity, and second that there is significant interpenetration between groups defined by language, religion, and ethnicity.669 In a more constrained theory of nationalism, Anthony Smith has identified the imagination of a “covenant” as a critical juncture in the history of large-scale solidarities.670 Speaking specifically of the importance of Islam for the articulation of communal identities in Central Asia, Devin DeWeese has argued that conversion narratives serve as origin stories around which identities coalesce.671 Both of these notions will be important to the argument below.

667 Major works on the topic include Bellér-Hann, Community Matters; Brophy, “Tending to Unite”; Newby, “Us and Them”; and Thum, Sacred Routes.
668 Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation.
669 Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups; Brubaker, Grounds for Difference.
670 Smith, The Cultural Foundations, 77-78.
671 DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion, 516-521.
I argue here that Turkic Muslims through their encounter with Chinese power reimagined the origins of their community and its relationship with China and its emperor through the medium of Perso-Islamic sacred history, literature, and geography. This new conception emerged in stages that paralleled the changes in the idea of “justice”: before the eighteenth-century Qing conquest, there was a cultural tradition; in the following century, the reproduction of this tradition was affected indirectly by elites’ involvement with Qing power; and after 1877, Muslims altered it again in order to make sense of their changing world. What emerged was a historical imagination in which Turkic Muslims belonged in the legitimate Chinese imperial order because of an ancient covenant between an emperor and his Muslim subjects. Breaking that covenant was thought to bring disaster to Xinjiang, China, and the world.

I. In Search of the Emperor of China

Mullā Mūsā Sayrāmī in a pivotal chapter of his history recounts a legend of how ambassadors sent by the Prophet Muḥammad secretly converted the Emperor of China to Islam. It is fairly certain that this incident never actually occurred as Sayrāmī relates it, and so my task in this chapter is to explain how this story came about and why this esteemed historian chose to reproduce it in his history of the nineteenth century. Sayrāmī, who is usually exceptionally circumspect, lends credence to story and uses it to build a historical argument about the causes of the Muslim Uprisings. He constructed the story from a number of sources circulating in the broader oral and written culture, or else related it from someone who had. Ultimately, the idea that the emperor was a secret Muslim served a broader polemic about political legitimacy. In order to understand how
and why Sayrāmī reproduced this narrative, we must begin deep in Islamicate literary culture and trace the image of the Emperor of China, or Khāqān-i Chīn, across multiple routes through Asia. As it turns out, the image of the emperor and of the arrival of Islam in China traveled to Xinjiang along two different routes, much as Islam itself had done: one over land, through the Persianate world, and the other over the water and west from China proper with the Hui. These stories fused in the context of the post-reconquest experience of Qing rule.

Medieval Islamicate geography and literature developed differing images of the people and monarch of China. Hyunhee Park has described a brief florescence of contact in the ninth century, along with an increase in mutual knowledge of the Islamic and Sinitic worlds resulting from long-distance trade across the Indian Ocean. Muslim geographers in this period depicted the Chinese as “masters of crafts,” but not much else was said about them. This image persisted for some centuries, including in eleventh-century geographical writing, as oceanic trade came to be dominated by South Asian middlemen. China, its people, and its ruler remained a distant object that Muslim writers could use to reflect on theories of government, as in Al-Masʿūdī’s (c. 896-956) Murūj al-

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672 China historians may pause at the term “Islamicate.” The term originates with Marshall Hodgson’s monumental *Venture of Islam*, in which he uses the word “Islamicate” to refer to the “social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims.” (*Venture of Islam, Volume 1: Conscience and History in a World Civilisation* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961], 59.) We may speak for example of the Persian literary tradition as it evolved in the Islamic context as part of “Islamicate” culture. Indeed, Persian literature has become central to the culture of the Muslim world, even though little of it has any basis in Islamic scripture. (We might consider the usefulness of a term like “Confucianate” to describe the diversity of culture in and beyond the geographical boundaries of China that has emerged under the influence of the similar diverse traditions labeled “Confucian.”)

Someone like Maḥmūd Kāshgharī (1005-1102) was an obvious exception, as he lived close to the boundaries of Song China, yet studied in the centers of Islamic learning in the Middle East. We may attribute his more detailed geography of China, or at least division of its regions, both to the influence of Indian geography and to the proximity of the Song (960-1279). Effectively, ideas of China came to Muslims in two ways: down a literary channel in the western Islamic world, which had little direct contact with China, and through trade over land and sea in the eastern Islamic world. The latter corpus remains all but unexplored.

The “stories of the prophets” (qiṣaṣu ‘l-anbiyā’) literature comprises collections of legends drawn from Jewish, Syriac, and a range of other sources that supplement the Qur’ānic histories of the pre-Islamic prophets, Muḥammad, and his companions. One of the most popular stories in these collections describes the journey of Alexander the Great, or Dhū ‘l-Qarnayn, who in Islamic tradition is counted as a prophet, and who in some of the stories reaches China. China is depicted vaguely, and there is little to suggest that image of China in this literature was at all influenced by direct knowledge of the region. Nevertheless, China could spark the imagination, and Alexander’s journey thither has inspired Islamic rulers and statesmen for centuries. Abū Ḥanīfah al-Dīnāwārī (d. 894/5) in his early Shāhnāma (‘Book of Kings’) presents a story of apparent Syriac origin about Alexander disguising himself as a messenger so as to gain entry to the chambers of the Emperor of China and deceive him.675 Abū Ja’far Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s (839-

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923) Tārīkh al-rusul wa-ʾl-mulūk (“History of the Prophets and Kings”) repeats the story, while ibn al-Athīr takes al-Tabarī’s account and makes the Emperor of China into the messenger. The Alexander story appears again in Firdausi’s Shāhnāma, and journeys to the East became an object of interest for poets and storytellers thereafter. In Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī’s (1207-1273) Mathnawī, for example, a journey to the land of China serves as a Sufi metaphor for drawing nearer to God, told over a backdrop of exotic locations and carnal temptations.676

While for the Muslims of the West travel to China served as an exoticist narrative of discovery, for those of the East, reflecting on China as a geographical and political entity had more to do with explaining their own place in the world. This was especially important for the Hui. A major origin legend for the Hui emerged during the Ming, when educated Hui were finding a position for themselves and their community between participation in Sino-Islamic intellectual culture and careers in the government achieved through Confucian education.677 According to the Ming-era Huihui yuanlai (“The Origins of the Muslims”), the Tang emperor Taizong (r. 626-649), identified by the name “Tang Wang,” once dreamed of a collapsing roof beam, from which he was saved by a man wearing a green robe and a white turban, which traditionally identify the Prophet Muḥammad. Tang Wang’s counsellors advised him that the man was, indeed, Muḥammad, and this induced the emperor to send for him. Muḥammad instead


dispatched an embassy to China. Along the way, some of the ambassadors died, leaving behind their tombs as sites of veneration. We see here what Thum describes as the narrative logic of a saint’s story, as the foreign Muslim’s death in a new land naturalizes the presence of Islam there. When the ambassadors reached the court at Chang’an, a discussion took place that confirmed the compatibility of Islam and Confucianism. The 3,000 men who accompanied the embassy settled down with Chinese wives, giving rise to the Hui who a millennium later lived all over China. This legend legitimizes the Hui presence in China by presenting it as the result both of a journey commanded by the Prophet and of the good graces of the Chinese emperor, who permitted Islam to flourish. It says little about the Chinese themselves, but it indicates that the emperor, although an infidel, could nevertheless be a legitimate ruler over Muslims. The Hui legend was known to the Turki, though it may have seemed innovative to them in the late Qing.

We have now moved from geography in the western Islamic world through Persianate literature, and then skipped over to China in the Ming. We will return in the next section to the significance of both the generic division between geography and literature and of their subsequent interpenetration. Meanwhile, I will show that, during the Qing, the images of China in Western and Eastern Islamicate culture met in the Northwest, including both Gansu and Xinjiang. First of all, it has been recorded that in late-Qing Gansu, the arrival of Islam in China was at times ascribed not to the Prophet’s own ambassadors, but to Alexander the Great. Other significant details of the story align with the version recorded in the Huihui yuanlai, including the idea that Alexander’s

678 Thum, Sacred Routes, 99.

soldiers were the ancestors of the modern Hui. Sino-Muslims may have been influenced by new versions of the story of Alexander and the Emperor of China that emerged in Xinjiang, such as Yarkandī’s Iskandarnāma.

Stories such as these all played on ideas of the Emperor of China as a fabulously powerful ruler. The Šūfī poet Shāh Baba Mashrab (1657-1711) had once written of the Emperor of China (faghfūr) as an exceptionally wealthy individual, apparently invoking a familiar image for all of his readers. 680 This image could be inverted to humorous effect: in one story, a powerful padishah seeks out the Khāqān-i Chīn, expecting a paragon of power, wealth, and joy. 681 Instead, he finds a castrated, cuckolded, and despairing man of ignoble birth who must watch in daily humiliation as an African slave impregnates his wife. In this story, the Khāqān’s life up to his meeting with the padishah had proceeded as a parody of an Arabian Nights tale, and the padishah’s journey became likewise a parody of a Sufi journey. This is all to say that the image of the Emperor of China and the journey to seek him out as established in Persianate literature became a trope open to multiple interpretations, including interpenetration with the Alexander legend and the Hui origin myth concerning the arrival of Islam in China.

Sayrāmī’s account appears as a variation on the Hui myth with some important variations. 682 He situates it early in the Tārīkh-i Ḩamīdī in a chapter titled, “The Complete Account from Beginning to End of How Once Upon a Time the Emperor of

680 British Library OR 5333 Divan of Mashrab, 15a, 3.

681 This story is found in two versions that differ in phrasing and language, suggesting they were both recorded from oral recitations: Staatsbibliothek Berlin Ms. or.quart. 1294 and British Library India Office Islamic 4860/Mss Turki 17.

682 This story begins: Jarring Prov. 163, 26r; TH/Beijing, 67; and Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris: Collection Pelliot B 1740, 30r.
China Became a Muslim, How the Dungan People Settled in the Country of Beijing, the Origins of the Conflict Between the Chinese and Dungans, and How the State of the Emperor of China Declined and Fell.” Sayrāmī signals with his title that he will draw a direct connection between the manner in which Islam arrived in China, the contract between a Chinese sovereign and Muslim subjects that was established at that time, and the origins of the Muslim uprisings.

Once upon a time, Sayrāmī begins, there was a just and benevolent khan in the country of the Emperor of China. His name was Tang Wang Khan. One night, Tang Wang Khan had a dream in which a dragon entered his window and wrapped itself about a pillar, terrifying him. A man in a green robe with “a white thing wrapped around his head” appeared and split the dragon in two with his staff. The next morning, Tang Wang’s dream interpreters and ministers informed him that the man in the dream appeared to match the description of a man named Muḥammad, far to the west, who had taken up the mantle of prophethood. Tang Wang’s court packed a trove of Chinese treasures (silk, tea, and porcelain) to send to Muḥammad with an invitation to come to Beijing. Eventually, Muḥammad sent a magical letter in his stead – when the khan opened the letter, Muḥammad was to appear out of it. However, the messenger, deceived by Satan, opened the envelope prematurely and ruined the chance for Muḥammad to appear. The just Tang Wang spared the messenger’s life, but sent him back to Muḥammad again. This time, the Prophet’s ambassadors traveled with him, and some died along the way, leaving their shrines in Gansu. The Prophet’s soldiers who accompanied them, and their wives brought from Samarqand, became the ancestors of the modern Hui. (In exchange, Samarqand received eighty households of Chinese, who are
meant to have given rise to the “Chinese Qipchaqs!”) While Tang Wang Khan was disappointed that Muḥammad did not come, against the advice of half of his ministers and with the agreement of the other half, he converted in secret to Islam. Over time, the descendants of Tang Wang – who ruled China through the Qing – forgot their Islam. Nevertheless, they kept their ancestor’s promise to ensure that Muslims would always be ruled by shariah. Thus does Sayrāmī explain that the emperors of China entered into a covenant with their Muslim subjects.

This legend serves several purposes for Sayrāmī’s historical argument. The first is to provide an immediate cause for the outbreak of the Muslim uprisings: in Xining, he recounts, local officials and Han first violated the mosque of the local Hui population with pigs, and then imposed un-Islamic taxes. Local officials did the same in Xinjiang. (See Chapter Six.) In terms of the Perso-Islamic idea of sacral kingship, this was a betrayal of the sovereign-subject relationship and thus an act of tyranny. Yet Sayrāmī also had to account for the eventual return of Qing sovereignty to Xinjiang and for the involvement of many Muslim elites in the regional government. Not only was the Qing emperor just – this story made possible his eventual redemption and conversion to Islam. He is a Muslim, if not a complete one: according to the logic of the Central Asian conversion narrative, he has only undergone half of the dual conversion, having accepted Islam but not revealed this fact to his community.683 The Emperor of China’s story thus resembles the first half of the story of Tughluq Temūr Khan’s (1329/30-1363) dual conversion, which Sayrāmī recounts shortly beforehand. Perhaps, in Sayrāmī’s view, the

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Qing emperor awaited only the right Muslim to come to him and complete the conversion.

Presumably, such an interpretation was beneficial to Turki officials who collaborated with the regime, among whom we can probably count both Sayrāmī and Khālidī. Yet Sayrāmī claims to have drawn on oral and written sources from others, and most of the remainder of his historical assertions have identifiable sources. At the very least, elements of this conception of the Emperor were present in the broader culture. In Turki terms, the Emperor of China’s justice could be measured by his protection of the integrity and harmony of different constituent communities— that is, his ability to maintain the forms of Qing imperial rule. Qing empire was plural, and it appeared in multiple guises that could appeal to different communities: Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Buddhist, etc. Yet, the Qing court seems never to have crafted an image of itself for Muslim consumption. In Sayrāmī and other sources, we can discern an effort on the part of Muslims to produce that image themselves.

II. Sacred History and Subjecthood

684 Khālidī and Sayrāmī were both in their own ways peripheral figures, and their social positions seem to have influenced their perspectives. Sayrāmī’s frequent use of Chinese language without explanation, as though the reader could readily decode the representations of Mandarin sounds in Arabo-Persian script, indicates his familiarity both with spoken Chinese and with the workings of the administration. Khālidī was a Kazakh born in today’s Kazakhstan, and so was geographically and socially distant from his settled, Kashgari Turkic Muslim protagonists. His career sent him across much of Russian Central Asia, and later in Tarbaghatai put him into constant contact with both Russian and Chinese officials.

685 Several scholars mention this peculiar gap in Qing image-making. In Crossley’s interpretation, the presentation of the emperor in various guises was an expression of the universality of Qing sovereignty. (Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999]. Berger points to a similar multiplicity. (Patricia Berger, *Empire of Emptiness: Buddhist Art and Political Authority in Qing China* [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003].)
The story of the Muslim Emperor of China was only one of a group of stories that tied the Muslims of Eastern Turkestan to the fortunes of the sovereign in Beijing and the broader empire. According to Sayrāmī’s account, it was not just that the Emperor protected Muslims – God protected China, which had never been and could never be conquered.

At first blush, this assertion seems ridiculous, but Sayrāmī demonstrates that even the three great world conquerors could not gain victory over China. In his account, contrary to the assertions of most Qiṣṣaṣu ‘l-anbīyā’ and similar narratives, Iskandar attempted to conquer China, but failed. Sayrāmī’s source for this assertion was the Iskandarnāma of Yārkandī discussed above. Nor, according to Sayrāmī, could Chinggis Khan or his family conquer China.686 This assertion flies in the face of all of the world histories, local histories, and collections of strange stories known in Eastern Turkestan at the time, including one of Sayrāmī’s apparent source texts.687 He states that Chinggis, like Alexander, instead married a Chinese (Khiṭāy, not Chīn) princess. His readers could have known Rashīduddīn’s Jamī’u ‘t-tawārīkh, in which it is clearly stated that Chinggis Khan’s fourth wife, Gūnjū (< Ch. gongzhu “princess”) was the daughter of Altan Khan, ruler of the “Cathaians” or Khitans (Khiṭāy); nevertheless, along with Chīn and Māchīn, Khiṭāy was meant to be “destroyed” under Chinggis.688 Where Rashīduddīn had distinguished Khiṭāy from the southern Chinese Chīn, by the late nineteenth century the terms had been conflated in Turki. Nevertheless, Sayrāmī would have known better, and

686 Sayrāmī 2001, 49-59; Jarring Prov. 163, 3a-8a.
687 IVR RAN D 106 Qiṣṣaṣu ‘l-ǧarāyib, f. 22a. Muḥammad Nīyāz states that Chinggis Khan’s conquests were nearly as deadly as the Flood and included the land of China. Sayrāmī quotes Muḥammad Nīyāz extensively but contradicts him on this point.
688 Thackston, trans., 35, 148, 221.
his story seems to take advantage of semantic ambiguity. Lastly, Amīr Timur, upon directing his armies towards China, was struck dead by God’s will. This appears to be Sayrāmī’s own interpretation of Timur’s death on the eve of his China campaign.

In order to understand how and why Sayrāmī concluded that China was invincible, we must return again to the Tang, or rather its aftermath. From that time onward, Islamic geography and sacred history evolved differing accounts of the configuration and origins of the world’s diverse peoples. In both genres, China, its people, and its sovereign held ambiguous positions.

Khotan, following the collapse of the Tang dynasty (618-907), was one of several states to make a claim to Chineseness.689 The King of Khotan proclaimed himself to be simultaneously the Emperor of China, for which the Khotanese used the Indic term Chīn. Naturally, when the Qarakhanid Yūsuf Qādir Khan (r. 1026-1032) conquered Khotan in the name of Islam, he then claimed to be the “King of the East and of China” (mālik al-mashrīq wa-‘l-Chīn), where the “East” was Ferghana and Kashgar, and “China” meant Khotan.690 Arabic Chīn and Indic Chīn met in Eastern Turkestan in the first three decades of the arrival of Islam in the region. As Thum has demonstrated, much as in the rest of Central Asia, the time and place that Islam was brought by a semi-legendary Islamizer is of vital historical and communal significance to Turki. Yūsuf Qādir Khan’s tomb became an important shrine, and so a site of memory and pilgrimage where Muslims would go to hear the story of his conquest of Khotan. Curiously, he gradually gained another title in

689 Wen Xin, “King of Kings of China: Central Asian Political Imaginations after the Fall of the Tang (618-907)” MS, Harvard University.

690 Thum “Sacred Routes,” 23, fn. 23.
pseudo-Arabic: al-\textit{khāqān} ‘l-\textit{khāqān} “the \textit{khāqān} of \textit{khāqān}s,” which is apparently a direct translation of a Khotanese term.\footnote{Amanbek Jalilov, Kawahara Yayoi, Sawada Minoru, Shinnmen Yasushi, and Hori Sunao, eds., \textit{Tārīhi Rashīdī Turukugo yaku fuhen no kenkyū}, (Tokyo: NIHU Program in Islamic Area Studies, 2008), 137; Masʿūdī, \textit{Murūj al-dhahab}, 289; Wen, “The King of Kings,”} The combination of a place called \textit{Chīn} and a ruler called \textit{khāqān} is significant. As al-Masʿūdī in the tenth century also provided the formula al-\textit{khāqān} ‘l-khwāqīn as an ancient title of the Turkic kings, it is also possible that this known phrase was attributed to Yūsuf Qādir Khan, either at his time of later on.

Regardless of the title’s precise origins, Yūsuf Qādir Khan’s claim resonated with the contemporary Persianate literary and geographical imagination of the Far East. At this time, Chīn had not yet become a common toponym in Islamic geographical writing.\footnote{I previously discussed China in Islamic geography with an emphasis on Persian and Central Asian sources in Schlussel, \textit{The World as Seen from Yarkand}. For a more complete account of Medieval Islamic knowledge of China west of Persia with a focus on oceanic commerce, see Park, \textit{Mapping the Chinese and Islamic Worlds}.} Nevertheless, it was known from literature, not least from Firdausi’s (940-1020) contemporary \textit{Shāhnāma}, where the Khāqān-i Chīn plays a key role as the mysterious leader of a land of magic and ritual, located somewhere to the east and just beyond Khotan.\footnote{Given how much scholarship has discussed Chinese influences on illustrations in \textit{Shāhnāma} manuscripts, there is surprisingly little work on this particular character, ostensibly from “China,” in the text. For one episode involving him in English translation, see Firdawṣī, \textit{The Epic of the Kings: Shah-Nama, the National Epic of Persia}, Reuben Levy, trans., (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 295.} The anonymous Persian-language geographical work the \textit{Mujmal al-tawārīkh wa-‘l-qīṣās} (“Compendium of Histories and Stories”) dates to 1126, but its central narrative of the origin of peoples survived in written histories all the way to nineteenth-century Eastern Turkestan, as I will demonstrate below. The \textit{Mujmal} provides a list of

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titles of the rulers of various kingdoms of the East as of the twelfth century CE. One title is given for the pādishāh (“ruler”) of China (Chīn) – faghfūr – and another for the pādishāh of “Inner China” (Chīn-i Andarūn) – tughezghuz khāqān. In the Mujmal, the title khāqān is ascribed to the rulers of Inner China, the Khazars, Tibet, and the Russians (Rūs). As Tughezghuz indicates the Toqquz Oghuz Turkic confederation, it is readily apparent that khāqān was considered to be an Inner Asian title, one for rulers of Turan, the land beyond Iran but before China. Its association with the people or region of Chīn had not yet coalesced. Similarly, Maḥmūd Kāshgharī defines khāqān simply as a title given to Afrasiyāb, the Turanian sorcerer of literature, the descendants of whom are called khan. Chīn appears in his dictionary, as well, divided into three regions: upper, middle, and lower Chīn, variously labeled Tabghach; Khiṭāy or Chīn; and Barkan or Māchīn, respectively. The purpose of all this etymology will become clear shortly.

Soon thereafter, the semantic range of both Chīn and khāqān narrowed. The Mongol conquest not only brought Turkic Muslims into greater contact with Chinese and others, but made people more generally aware of where places were. Certainly the fact that the term khāqān resembled and has a common root with Mongol qağhan “great

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695 The term faghfūr or faghfūrchīn is thought to derive from an unattested Indo-Persian compound *bhaghaputra via Pahlavi bghpwrh “son of God” whence it was adopted by Muslim geographers to refer to the ruler of China (Ch. 天子 tiānzǐ “son of Heaven”). “Faghfūr” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, eds., (Brill Online), 2014.


khan” was not lost on them as first the Chinggisids themselves, and then centuries of princes who claimed descent from them, employed the term. Chinggisids, Timurids, and other rulers all sponsored editions of the Shāhnāma, as well, though these were not meant to be read by commoners. Instead, as Thum has argued, the Shāhnāma, which is known for its vastness, complexity, and inconsistency between editions, circulated in fragmentary and shifting forms throughout the Persianate cultural sphere. We cannot excavate its oral transmission, but it is clear that elements of the Shāhnāma made their way into Eastern Turkestani popular culture.698

Popular versions of the Shāhnāma presented not only the legendary history of Persian kings, but also borrowed elements of sacred history. By “sacred history,” I refer mainly to the stories of the pre-Islamic prophets, the life of Muḥammad, and the histories of the early Islamic period usually collected in the qiṣaṣu ‘l-anbiyā’ “stories of the prophets” literature. There are several major variants of this genre, which I will discuss below. While the Shāhnāma draws on sacred history, it does not present a complete narrative of the origins of the world’s peoples, or at least not one that Xinjiang Muslims seem to have found satisfying to explain the present state of their world. Nor, for that matter, does the Qurʾān. Geographies could refer to Ptolemaic ideas of “clime” to explain differences between people’s skin color or supposed intelligence, but these analyses lacked narrative. Rather, the stories of the prophets, along with commentaries on the holy book, presented stories that narrated the history of the world before the final revelation and through the lives of the Prophet and his early successors. The major qiṣaṣu ‘l-anbiyā’ works, each of which is meant to be traceable to a single author, tell slightly different

698 Thum, Sacred Routes, 20-23.
stories within the narrative of Noah (Nūh) and his family after the Flood. All of the peoples of the Earth who were significant enough to mentioned are shown to be the descendants of one of Noah’s sons Shem (Sām), Ham (Ḥām), or Japheth (Yāfīth).

Al-Tha’labī (d. 1036), writing in al-Andalus, relates this tradition:

Three were born to Noah: Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Shem is the father of the Arabs, Persians, and Byzantines; Ham is the father of the blacks; and Japheth is the father of the Turks and of Gog and Magog. …

When Noah and his offspring left the ark, he divided the Earth among his sons into three parts. ... He made Japheth's portion the area from Qaysūn and what lies beyond, up to the course of the east wind …

In short, the Turks share descent with Gog and Magog (Jūj and Ma’jūj), the monsters who live beyond the end of the world, sealed behind the Wall of Alexander. They are certainly somewhere to the east. While parallels with the nomadic peoples of Central Asia and beyond and with the Great Wall of China are tempting, this somewhat insulting tradition did not become popular in Eastern Turkestan. Nor does it explain something that would later be of great interest to Eastern Turkestanis: where did the Chinese come from?

Someone familiar with Eastern Turkic could more easily turn to the qīsās of Nāṣir al-Dīn b. Burhān al-Dīn al-Rabghūzī, known in its earliest form from a Khwarezmian Turkic manuscript dated to around 1310. In this early version – I will revisit this

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work’s later forms below – Rabghūzī quotes an eleventh-century qīsāṣ writer, Abū ʿIṣḥāq al-Nīshābūrī:

[Ham’s] offspring are the Indians, the Abyssinians and the Negroes; they are all his descendants. But the father of the Arabs and the Persians is Shem. Noah sent Ham to India, Shem to the land of Arabia and Iran, and Japheth to the land of Turkestan. All Turks are descendants of Japheth. Therefore the Turks are esteemed and respected.

A Turk might have been pleased by this esteem, yet there is still no answer as to the origins of the Chinese, nor for that matter of a great number of earthly peoples. It was to take four centuries before Eastern Turkestanī copyists corrected that fault by picking up a thread of argument presented in early geographical literature: the Persian geographer ibn Khurraḍādhbih (d. 911) was the first known to suggest in writing that the Chinese were the descendants of Japheth. Al-Masʿūdī’s Murūj al-dhahāb presents the same legend, but only in passing, and his imagined Chinese king contests it.701

The legend that eventually informed Sayrāmī’s account of the origins of the world’s peoples actually came originally from the Mujmal, the anonymous Persian-language work from the twelfth century that enumerated titles for Eastern rulers.702 The Mujmal tells us that Noah gave all of the lands east of the Amu Darya in Central Asia were given to his third son, Japheth. Japheth’s sons included not only Turk, the ancestors of the Turks, who was wise, true, and cultured, but Chīn, the ancestor of the Chinese, whom the Mujmal describes as intelligent and a skilled craftsman, and also Rūs, ancestor


702 Mujmal. I have lost the page numbers for the 1939 edition consulted here, but the legend is recorded in the section Bāb al-hādīʾ aṣr: andar-i nasab-i Turkān az har bātîn wa jîns wa zikr-i ışänd dar ḥudūd-i mašriq (“Chapter 11: On the Ancestry of the Turks of Every Kind and About Them in the Eastern Lands.”)
of the Russians, who is said to have been shameless and scheming. The other sons included Khazar, Saqlab, and Kamari. (Elsewhere, the *Mujmal* includes Gog and Magog.) Later writers, as we will see, added content to this basic narrative.

These “Eastern” and “Western” Islamic views of China were briefly brought into contact during the period of Mongol domination in Eurasia, which permitted new intellectual exchanges across the continent, while at the same time the Mongol rulers articulated a new genealogical principle of legitimacy. People apart from members of the Prophet’s tribe had long ruled over Muslim states, but now in places like Ilkhanid Iran it was obvious not only that the Chinggisid rulers were infidels, but that members of their dynasty had killed the caliph himself in 1258, bringing to an end the institution that classically granted legitimacy to Muslim rulers.⁷⁰³ In its stead, Mongol rulers began a new royal tradition of legitimation through sacred history. Rashīd al-Dīn Ḥamadānī’s (1247-1318) world history, the *Jamīʿu ʿt-tawārīkh*, was influential in its presentation of the origins of the peoples of the East in a way that was favorable to his Mongol Ilkhanid patrons and also suggests a natural alliance between them and Muslim Turks.⁷⁰⁴ He makes the Mongols out to be two lateral branches of the Turkic family, descended from two uncles of Oghuz, an important Turkic progenitor. His genealogy of peoples broadly resembles that of the *Mujmal*, though it is much simpler. Japheth is here the “father of the Turks,” and not of monsters. Rashīd al-Dīn relates that Turks and Mongols debate the exactly how they descend from Japheth, and which of their legendary ancestors was his

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son. Yet, they agreed on common ancestry as licensed by the prophet Noah himself.

However, in Rashīd al-Dīn’s history, there is no Khāqān-i Chīn, only a qa’an ruling over the Mongols. Instead, he relies on a Chinese Buddhist chronicle to enumerate the past kings of China. This chronology, while comprehensive, is unexciting, and so has otherwise had little perceptible influence on Islamic ideas of China. Later dynasties continued to establish more-or-less fictitious genealogies that linked the ruler to Chinggis Khan and to Muḥammad, as did the Timurids.705

It is the Timurids that we begin to see the outlines of the Qing-era Eastern Turkestanian account of the origins of peoples in the legends that members the dynasty propagated to legitimize their rule. The third book of Khwāndamīr’s (1475-c. 1535) Ḥabīb al-siyār (“Companion of Biographies,” 1525) begins with the story of the origins of the peoples of the East.706 Khwāndamīr claims Rashīd al-Dīn as his source, relating that Japheth may have been Abulja Khan. However, in all other respects his account differs and follows instead the Mujmal, now revived for the first time in three centuries. Yet the narrative elaborates on the Mujmal in significant ways: Turk is “extremely intelligent, manly, polite, and wise,” the best of the sons of Japheth, who abandons wood and mud-brick houses for tents made of animal-skins and dispenses justice among his people. Rūs is mentioned as a mild-mannered brother, and Chīn as a clever and artistically-oriented father of a race of inventors and craftsmen, reflecting the old image of China from the Arabic geographies. Yet eventually war breaks out: brother Ghuzz,


father of “the worst of the Moghul tribes,” contests with Turk for control of the \textit{yada} rain-making stone. This stone, which is known even today as a part of Central Asian rainmaking rituals, is given a special origin in sacred history, as Noah requests the original stone from God, who has Gabriel (Jibra’il) carve the name of God upon it. Khwândamîr comments, “And still to this day strife and enmity rage between their offspring.” That is to say, the conflict that raged in Khwândamîr’s time between the Eastern Turkic Timurids and the Western Turkic Oghuz of the Ottoman Empire actually dated to the earliest days of peopling of the Earth. In the legends of the origins of peoples that later circulated in Eastern Turkestan, we will also see the use of sacred history to explain present conflict.

Ron Sela has further identified claims to Japhetic descent in Timur’s popular legendary biographies, in which Timur and Alexander are said to share this common ancestor.\textsuperscript{707} These works claimed to draw on the court chronicles, but then circulated in Central Asia mainly between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, when there was little further regard for Timur’s legacy. Only later did Central Asian Turco-Mongol dynasties once again integrate Timurid heritage into their official histories. The apocryphal Timur narratives maintained their popularity, and I have no doubt that later Eastern Turkestani historians read them. Nevertheless, I have not identified a passage from one of them in any of the reviewed manuscripts.

Other official chronicles that directly related to China also found their way into broader circulation during this period, yet still maintained their generic separation from legendary or sacred history. Ghiyâthuddîn Naqqâsh’s \textit{Rûznâma}, his account of an

\textsuperscript{707} Ron Sela, \textit{The Legendary Biographies of Tamerlane}, 17, 21-24.
embassy from the Timurid court of Baysunğur b. Shâhrūkh to the Ming capital of Beijing in 823/1420, is bereft of apparent expectations regarding the land he visits. Everything is new to him, and nothing reflects the stuff of sacred history or romance. The Rūznāma, under various other titles, became quite popular, being incorporated into a number of Persian- and, later, Turkic-language histories. While the Rūznāma appears in multiple manuscripts, the relationship between them is, in sum, difficult to establish without an earlier copy of the source text, which has been lost. We first find this account of China reproduced in the fourth volume of the Timurid court historian Ḥāfīz-i Abrū’s (d. 1430) Zubdatu ‘l-tawārīkh-i Baysunghūrī ("Baysunghuri Cream of Chronicles"), completed in 1425-26. In this work, China is indicated with Persian Khītāy, while the emperor is the pādishāh-i Khītāy. As Thackston notes, the term Chīn appears only once in the text.

Ghiyāthuddīn’s work was then incorporated by ’Abdurrazzaq Samarqandī (1413-1470) into a history of the world and of Timurid Herat, the Matlaʿ-ī saʿdāy wa majmaʿ-ī bahrayn ("Rising of the Two Stars and Meeting of the Two Seas"). Some version of

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811 Rashiduddin, Jamīʿu ‘l-tawārīkh, 280, fn. 8.

the text appeared then in Mīrkhwānd’s Rawżat al-safa` (Garden of Purity, before 1498), and then the Ḥabīb al-siyār of his son Khwāndamīr. At some point, this text entered the broader vernacular manuscript tradition, and it was copied in Eastern Turkestan through the early twentieth century, although more immediate sources of knowledge about China were certainly available. Yet it never seems to have influenced other depictions of China in Central Asia.

The Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556-1605) drew not only on his Timurid heritage, but on a further claim that he was descended from Japheth “the most just of Noah’s sons,” by way of his son Turk. The implication is that genealogy itself can confer rulership, or that justice is heritable. Oddly, the Akbarnāma that presents this legend does not provide a common genealogy for Turks and Hindustanis. This is in part because its account of sacred history is drawn from the Mujmal via Khwāndamīr’s Ḥabīb al-siyār. Several things connect the texts, including the Akbarnāma’s attribution of a special prayer for rain as Noah’s gift to Turk. The Mujmal specifically mentions the yada stone and the fratricidal war for its control that ensued, while the Akbarnāma keeps the relationship between brothers peaceful. The names of Japheth’s sons are identical to those in the Mujmal, however, and include Turk, Chīn, Khazan, Rūs, and several others. For the first time since the Mujmal, Turks and Chinese, as the sons of Chīn, are shown to have common descent.

Khivan ruler Abū ‘l-Ghāzī Bahadur Khan’s (1603-1663) *Shajārah-i Turk* repeats the legend, with some additions.²¹⁴ Shem is sent not to people the Arabs and Byzantines, but Iran, while Ham is sent only to Hindustan. Japheth’s family settles “the North” along the Volga and Ural Rivers. Only then does his son Turk migrate to Issiq Köl, where in the next generation they forget their original Islam. Moreover, Abū ‘l-Ghāzī has written his present geography into sacred history by emphasizing only regions proximate and important to him. Rūs and Chīn are among the sons of Japheth, as per the *Mujmal* story, but he makes the land of Chīn the homeland of the Tatars. That is, Abū ‘l-Ghāzī presents Islamic sacred history in order to explain his present surroundings, while greatly reducing the role of area beyond, including the Middle East. We have come very far from al-Tha’lābī’s Andalusian vision of the ancient world, in which the people of the land east of Iran are vaguely-conceived legends.

The endpoint of this process – or perhaps its reemergence in the historical record – is pseudo-Rabghūzī, an Eastern Turkestani product of the fusion of “stories of the prophets” and the Timurid rewriting of sacred history. Several “stories of the prophets” works are known from Eastern Turkestan and its immediate neighbors to the west, including both manuscripts and, by the 1850s, lithographed editions in the style of manuscripts. Gunnar Jarring has rightly characterized these works as some of the most widely-read in the Eastern Turkic world, and he identifies twenty-two different Xinjiang manuscripts in various foreign collections alone. To these we may add one edition known

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to the missionary George Hunter (1862-1946), who produced in 1916 a dual-language translation of some of the books in a version then circulating in Ürümchi\textsuperscript{715}, and a copy held in the National Library of India.\textsuperscript{716}

The known manuscripts can be divided into two groups. The first group is very small – it includes only two manuscripts, both of which were copied near Kashgar. The first is from the shrine of the caliph ハウス at Tongguzluq, and it was copied in 1793-94.\textsuperscript{717} According to one passage in the manuscript, the story of the Imam ハウス in this collection could be read at the shrine to honor and please him – we may recall Thum’s observation that a whole range of texts could be appropriated for recitation and worship at shrines. Another copy was made in the late nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{718} A significant portion of the Noah story is taken directly from the Khwarezmian Rabghūzī, including his quotations of Nishāpūrī and ibn ʿAbbās. However, the text proclaims itself to be not Rabghūzī, but a translation from Syriac and Persian by Mīr Khwānd, grandson of Khwāndamīr, which was then turned into Turki for popular consumption by translators at the Timurid court. I am suspicious of the attribution, as Mīr Khwānd probably did not know Syriac. There is a possibility that this qīṣā is in fact a Timurid work that drew on Rabghūzī, but I have found no text in Persian or Turkic that resembles it.


\textsuperscript{716} Indian National Library, Turkisch Acc. No. 919. I am grateful to Rian Thum for informing me of this MS.

\textsuperscript{717} Jarring Prov. 448.

\textsuperscript{718} Jarring Prov. 412.
I refer to the rest of manuscripts as “pseudo-Rabghūzī.” These claim to be the work of Nāsir al-Dīn Rabghūzī, the author of the 1310 Khwarezmian work I discussed above, but their contents are remarkably different from Rabghūzī’s text. Moreover, most of them claim explicitly to have been completed on precisely 20 Rabiʿ al-awwal 1190/6 October 1697, making them centuries too recent to be Rabghūzī’s. Later editions of the text are confused about its origins and indicate both that it was translated Arabic into Turki, and that it was taken directly from a Persian version. Again, after considerable searching, no Persian work nearly matches the content of this qišas, the contents of which are themselves highly variable. Some versions of the text include stories that are downright ribald – but some of those stories find their way into the later version of the “Mīr Khwānd” text, as well.

It is useful to return to the earliest known copy of pseudo-Rabghūzī, IVR RAN D 45. This was copied on 15 Jumada al-awwal 1165/1 April 1752 in Poskam, a town very near Kashgar, by Mullā ʿAbdalshukūr at the ʿAbdalšāfi Khwāja Madrasa. It actually begins with a story about the Imam Ḥusayn for whom the “Mīr Khwānd” text was copied. It quotes Mīr Khwānd’s famed Raużatu ʿl-ṣafā fī sīrat al-anbiyā, and it also mentions a certain Qišaš-i Ṭabghūzī, clearly a corruption of the origin of Rabghūzī’s nisba, Rabaṭ Ghūzī. This should be enough to establish that this lineage of stories of the prophets is not exactly Rabghūzī’s. In lieu of clear authorial identity, I dub it “pseudo-

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There is much to be said about pseudo-Rabghūzī, among which that the frame of the “stories of the prophets” serves as a vehicle for a broad range of narratives. It appears to have been a vernacular and popular version of the “stories of the prophets” and one that circulated relatively widely in Kashgaria.

It is also apparent that, by the 1890s, there was an effort underway to “reunite” the text with Rabghūzī. Lithographed editions from Tashkent combine the poems of Rabghūzī, which are not present in pseudo-Rabghūzī, with the structure and stories of pseudo-Rabghūzī, minus those tales that might seem morally objectionable. They even retain the date and introduction from pseudo-Rabghūzī. This lithograph is the basis of the PRC’s official edition published in Xinjiang today, with which most Uyghurs are familiar. Around the same time, one 1896 manuscript has had its date corrected in the margin to 753/1352, along with an attribution to Rabghūzī’s patron, suggesting that not only Central Asian printers were trying to purify Rabghūzī, although this note may have been added by a Muslim scholar in the Russian empire after it was “collected.”

Pseudo-Rabghūzī presents a narrative of communal origins that would have been familiar to Turki, at least in Kashgaria and apparently in the North, as well. In the 1752

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720 There is one other “stories of the prophets” MS in the Lund University Library that is fragmentary and highly aberrant. (Jarring Prov. 431) It dates from the early nineteenth century. It makes no claim to authorship and contains seventy chapters. This qīṣās opens with God’s creation of jinn and angels. Nevertheless, its Noah stories are mostly those found in pseudo-Rabghūzī, with a peculiar exception: here, all of the Turkic peoples are made the sons of Sam, including the Chinese (Khitāy), while Japheth is sent to populate Iran and the Persian-speaking cities of Central Asia. Ham, whose descendants are to be the slaves of Sam’s, gets Hindustan and its peoples. (f. 80a) I am unsure how to contextualize this seemingly unique work at this time.

721 Qīṣāṣu ‘l-anbiyā‘ (Tashkent, 1899).

722 Rabghuzi, Qīṣāṣul ānbiya, (Qāshqār: Qāshqār Uyghur Nāshriyati, 1999).

723 IVR RAN D 46.
edition, we see something like the pattern from the *Mujmal* emerge in the stories of the prophets, though the cast of characters is different: Japheth’s sons each settle in Andijan, Samarqand, Urgench, Kyrgyz, Qalmaq, Kazakh, Yarkand, Turpan, and Khiṭāy (China), naming places and peoples in the vicinity of Kashgar. Thus have the (North) Chinese joined the various Turkic peoples, while Bukhara is given to Sam as a Persian-speaking place, even as the Russians are left out. A political reading, following Abū ‘l-Ghāzi’s Turko-centric and presentist presentation of sacred history, could see the inclusion of China as a vote against the Junghars and their Tibetan allies, who are clearly descendants of Ham, in the Qing-Junghar war. By the 1864 edition, the phrasing has changed, but the only addition to the list is “Mongolia.” In the same vein, we may see the inclusion of Mongols as an acknowledgement of common membership in the empire, or just as likely an homage to the Turco-Mongol heritage of then-active Central Asian states. The 1896 edition has added Kashgar to the list of esteemed cities, while Yarkand is lost, reflecting the shift of the economic and cultural center of the Tarim Basin from Yarkand to Kashgar after the reconquest. It has also dropped Mongolia, while the “wicked” people of Ham now include *Farang* – the Franks of Europe. By 1913, right after the Xinhai Revolution, the Chinese have been dropped, which is surprising – perhaps the copyist was hopeful of liberation. Finally, a 1933 manuscript that is clearly in the same lineage as 1896 and 1913 gives all of the aforementioned people to the honored son Shem, along with both China and a unified “Turkestan,” while Japheth is sent to people the Arab and

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724 Jarring Prov. 242, f. 54b.

725 IVR RAN D 46, f. 75a.

726 Jarring Prov. 159, f. 40a.
Persian lands.\textsuperscript{727} This assertion flies in the face of Islamic tradition. Given the politicized environment of Kashgar in 1933, when Kyrgyz and Turki were killing each other in the streets, it strikes me both as a statement of political fact, in that China and Turkestan were each regions under their respective governments, and one of aspiration for genuine unity. The 1933 edition includes sections clearly copied from the Tashkent lithographs in order to “correct” the Eastern Turkestani pseudo-Rabghūzī, and yet the copyist added this innovation. Regardless of the potential reasons for the inclusion or exclusion of one people or another from the Japhetic heritage, it is clear that there are core peoples in the Kashgari Noah stories, and there are peripheral peoples whose membership may be contested. Whatever arrangement is put on the page is implicitly licensed by God and by the prophet Noah.

This is what makes Sayrāmī’s account of the origins of the peoples of the Earth so interesting.\textsuperscript{728} The very first chapter of Sayrāmī’s history, which is superficially a chronicle of the nineteenth century, is taken up with the narrative of Noah and his sons. The story for the most part resembles that advanced in the Akbarnāma, and parts of it are nearly identical to a partial story produced in the Qīṣāṣu ‘l-gharāyib wa ‘l-‘ajāyib (“Stories of the Strange and Wondrous”), compiled in 1851-52 by Muḥammad Niyāz b. Ghafūr Beg in Khotan.\textsuperscript{729} Nevertheless, Sayrāmī introduces several innovations into sacred history in order to explain his present. I have already mentioned how Sayrāmī

\textsuperscript{727} Jarring Prov. 262, f. 60a. Its inherited copyist’s errors place it firmly in this lineage.

\textsuperscript{728} TH/Beijing 10-23; TH/Jarring 3r-8v.

\textsuperscript{729} Jarring Prov. 21. Sayrāmī lists two sources for his work that I have been unable to locate and that might have served to carry these narratives up to his time: a Zubdat al-Aḥbār and something called simply Șahroḥīyya. (3a, 17-18) Neither the Zubdat al-Aḥbār of ʿAlī Mirzā Maftūn nor that of Sher Muḥammad Nadir appear to have contributed to Sayrāmī’s work.
inserts the translators (*tongshi, tongchì*) into the narrative to emphasize the division of the Japhetic peoples, particularly Chīn, Rus, and Turk. (See Chapter Two.) The list of peoples is longer than expected, as well: in one manuscript, the *Tārīkh-i Ḫamīdī* includes Cherkez (Caucasians) and Daghestan (Daghestanis) as brothers of Turk, and in place of Chīn provides a son named “Daching.” This name presumably comes from Chinese *Da Qing* “Great Qing.” Sayrāmī narrates the war of the *yada* stone and other conflicts between the various ill-tempered brothers, who deny each other land or hunt each other’s families, explaining, as Sayrāmī puts it, why certain peoples have been in conflict since time immemorial.

Genealogies are political. Here I have endeavored to show the ways in which they were political in Eastern Turkestan, how they came to be politicized, and what that meant for people who encountered them. In this case, a long tradition of state-sponsored histories of claiming descent from the sons of Noah drew on sacred history to legitimize rulers’ political authority and geopolitical circumstances. This tradition trickled into sacred history proper, when the enumeration of Noah’s grandsons expanded beyond broad regions of the world and grew more specific. We may see in this the effects that Thum has described of a government that does not particularly care to provide its subjects with an identity: where genealogy was the realm of court-sponsored works, in Kashgaria, it entered into the relative anarchy of vernacular manuscript culture. The “stories of the prophets” literature provided a means, if not to “imagine a community,” then certainly to tell a popular audience just who the various peoples of the Earth were

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TH/Beijing, 15.  
Thum, *Sacred Routes*, 157-159.
and what their relationships were meant to be. Sacred history explained the place of Turkic Muslims among the peoples and empires of Eurasia.

III. The Chantou of Khāqānistān

While the Turki reimagined China and its emperor through Islamic sacred history and so legitimized Qing sovereignty, they simultaneously drew on both Qing and Islamic symbolic vocabularies to represent their own subjecthood. The semi-formal labels for groups of people used at the yamen intersected with the commonsensical communal boundaries under negotiation in the everyday. Turki began to call themselves chantou, Chinese for “wrapped-head,” a term that later nationalists insisted was pejorative. At the same time, especially after the fall of the Qing, the idea of the sovereign as the once-literary khāqān gained some independence from the personage of the emperor, and the term khāqān drifted into demonym and toponym. What this indicates, I argue, is that Turkic Muslim communal subjectivity was defined in important ways by their relationship with imperial rule through its institutions of local government. That process engendered a distinct historical consciousness that positively valuated Qing rule.

Throughout the preceding chapters, I have translated as “Turki” the Chinese term chan, meaning “wrapped.” This is the first syllable of chantou Hui, “wrapped-headed Muslim,” and while this term had no statutory significance, nevertheless, its pervasive use at the yamen in reference to Turki-speaking Muslims lent it social reality. Thus we find it almost exclusively in vernacular and oral texts until the advent of print, when it becomes an object of nationalist derision. Some Turkic Muslims referred to themselves
by the Chinese term chantou as early as 1892. In this case, it appears to have been interchangeable with the term yärlık “local,” which similarly excluded Hui and Han. That made it roughly equivalent also to musulmān “Muslim,” the term that Turki used to point out that they were genuine Muslims, while Hui were not. While all three words had roughly the same range of reference, their valences and connotations were quite different. Chantou, or Turki čanto, did not have a religious meaning attached to it. For Katanov’s informants, it pointed not only to Turkic-speaking Muslims, but to customs associated with them, including styles of clothing.

While the referent of the term was clear, its connotations were ambiguous. Written sources indicate that chantou, if not exactly pejorative, indicated the perspective of the Han Chinese. That is, chantou was marked in Turki discourse as a term the Chinese used for the Turki. Khālidī voices an ignorant and dismissive Chinese by having him refer to the spirit of a shrine as “just a passing chantou.” Ṣoskamī, writing after Xinhai, uses the word in describing the Qing reconquest and the resulting profusion of officials marked by odd-sounding Chinese names. The early 1930s were a time of revelation for the demonym čanto. As Brophy has pointed out, the Qumul rebels referred to themselves and the nation they represented as the “chantou peoples,” apparently

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732 In the interviews conducted by Katanov in Turpan and Qumul in 1892 and 1893, informants regularly used this term to refer to Turkic Muslims in contrast to Hui and Chinese. (cf. Katanov and Menges, vol. 1, 48-50, vol. 2, 38-42.)

733 On chantou, “local,” and “Muslim,” see Brophy, “Tending to Unite,” 30-34, 376-377.

734 Khālidī, Tawārīḥ-i Jarīḍa-i Jadīda, 4.

735 Poskami, Kitābi Ābdullāh, 147-149.
pointing to all of the different groups whom the Chinese had so labeled. Yet at the same time the early nationalist poet Abdukhaliq Uyghur rejected the word as a pejorative label applied by the Chinese.

‘Abdullah Poskamī provides a clearer explication of the origins of chantou-ness in his observational quatrains. Poskamī uses the term chantou fairly frequently, and like Sayrāmī, it generally indexes the speech of a Chinese person referring to Turki. It further differentiates Eastern Turkestani Turki from Western Turkestani or “Andijan” Turki.

Towards the end of his work, however, the country poet relates being chantou to a specific set of behaviors that relate a Turki to the Chinese state:

736 Brophy, Tending to Unite, 33; Brophy, “The Qumul Rebels’ Appeal.”

737 Poskamī, Kitabi Abdullah, 149.

738 Poskamī, Kitabi Abdullah, 154-155, facsimile 284.

Brophy, Tending to Unite, 33; Brophy, “The Qumul Rebels’ Appeal.”

(Poskamī, Kitabi Abdullah, 149.)

(Poskamī, Kitabi Abdullah, 154-155, facsimile 284.)

(Poskamī, Kitabi Abdullah, 154-155, facsimile 284.)

(Poskamī, Kitabi Abdullah, 154-155, facsimile 284.)
The people saw a few schools in town and country; The akhunds who teach there, their mouths are full of phlegm and spit. These innocent young kids\(^{739}\) jumped like fleas to get an office. Some of them struck their teachers, dazed in their search for an office. These accursed students looked graceless to our eyes.

And some Chantous married and never professed their faith, Going about looking like Muslims, but not in their hearts. Mothers and fathers, elder brothers and teachers, masters and disciples separated And went about madly in the grip of avarice, forgetting their “Oh, Master!” [Sufi dhikr] Conquered, they became successors to a shariah-less order.\(^{740}\)

I was shocked – they cannot grasp that it is commanded to do ablutions once one is married\(^{741}\); “Muslim” does not suit them – they are animals! Farmland, orchard, house, and guesthouse, lovely saray or veranda – If you planted flowers there and forgot the commandments, they would be happy. They would clap the qadi in irons and celebrate!

In this world, there’s no more waiting-period between a bitch-woman’s divorce and remarriage, And if you dare speak of it, you’ll be scorned by the court of public opinion. Women have never been prophets, but members of the Muslim community, And it is a principle that they cannot hold an Islamic office. This is God’s command! Why are we questioning it now?

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Lekin ādamgā oňsha putlari ikki ača boldi.

\(^{739}\) Here, Ğoskami uses a dialect word to indicate “kids” (balayza). The term is a blend of Turki bala “child” and Chinese zi 子.

\(^{740}\) “Order” (fariqat) has a double meaning here. It means both a Sufi order and a way of doing things.

\(^{741}\) Ğoskami refers to a man’s obligation to do ablutions after having sex, presumably only once he is married.
With such women, and with their husbands, there is nothing licit; Their belief in man-and-wife is just a show. They get their way of being Muslim from their way of being Chantou.  
We compare them to donkeys and call them “jack and jenny,” But with two legs like humans!

To .Poskami, what made a Turki a Chantou as opposed to a proper musulman “Muslim?”
First, there was attendance at the Chinese schools. In .Poskami’s estimation, Turki who clamored for an official position were deluded fools who submitted to a plan to “make the people in Beijing-style mullahs” (Halayiqni Beyjinc Mullah Gildim). Here .Poskami corroborates Ghulam’s characterization of the Chinese schools as an attempt to separate families and otherwise disrupt the Islamic socio-moral order, as well as the idea that this action led to the fall of the Qing. (See Chapter Two.)

In .Poskami’s account, marriage and the family subsequently fell apart, as though changes in schooling and sexual relations were part of the same disruption of Islamic society. Here we see the impression left by the civilizing project of li. A Chantou does not respect traditional marriage or Islamic law, but instead turns increasingly to the Chinese, whose law serves their purposes differently. Implicitly, association with the administration, wherein a Turki would regularly encounter the label chan, affects their treatment of family matters. After all, as we have seen in Turpan, a Muslim could challenge the Islamic order and the decisions of Islamic officials at the yamen. Given

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742 Alternatively, we could translate this line as “They get (or learn) their Muslim-ness from their Chantouness.”

743 .Poskami, Kitabi Abdulla, 150.

744 On bringing petitions to the Chinese authorities, see .Poskami, Kitabi Abdulla, 153, facsimile 282; 160.
Poskamī’s depiction of Chantou men and women as lacking a sense of proper marriage, his sense of them also reflects the breakdown in sexual propriety associated with temporary marriage. For him, illicit sexual relations are an affront to the boundedness and integrity of the Muslim, and specifically Turki, community. (See Chapter Three.)

Finally, whereas normative Islamic practice in this period and place included shrine visitation and participation in Sufi rituals, the Chantou have ceased to engage with it. In short, Poskamī says that Chantou are Turki who have forgotten how to be Muslims. Instead, when they pretend to be Muslim (*musulmān*), they in fact act according to behaviors learned in the pursuit of personal benefit through association with the Chinese.

Similarly, Katanov’s informants in Turpan in 1893 seemed comfortable calling themselves Chantou, but their topics of conversation tended toward the illicit and toward matters concerning Chinese power. Poskamī would have called such men “Chantou” in order to denigrate them, but for many, the label was a natural index of being Turkic Muslim under Qing rule.

The last date mentioned in Poskamī’s *Kitāb-i ʿAbdullah* is 1933. Right around the same time, nationalist revolutionaries drew on sacred history to reject the *chantou* identity. On October 30, 1933, as fighting continued between Turks, Kyrgyz, and Hui, an editorial appeared in the official paper of the Turkist revolutionaries, *East Turkestan Life*, under the title “Are We Turks? Or Chantous?”

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745 “Biz Türkmu? Yā Čanto?” in *Sharqī Türkistān Hayātī*, No. 11.
The whole world knows that the people of Eastern Turkestan come from the revered and famous Greater Turk nation. There is no need to discuss this. Although this fact has become clearer and clearer, we have been given a named by the ignorant, bigoted Chinese peoples: chantou. …

Our country, our land, is Turk! Not chantou! … How did it come to be that the nation of Eastern Turkestan is not called by its own name, but chantou? It is said that chantou comes from the Chinese for “wrapping a turban around one’s head,” because the Chinese say chan to mean “wrapping,” and tou means “head,” so this means “people who wrap their heads.” Regardless, we are the children of Turk b. Yāfīth! Unlike those who have taken this name chantou that an alien nation has called us, we cannot discard the true name that our fathers have passed down to us for a thousand thousand years!

The author, probably the editor Qutlugh Shawqī (1876-1937), also invokes the Turks’ possible descent from Alexander the Great. His rage at the use of chantou points not only to its pervasiveness, but to its incompatibility with the Turkist vision of history. Chantou makes no claim to familial or historical origin – in its place, Shawqī appropriates sacred history and the story of Japhetic descent. As we have seen, Turki could mobilize the term Chan to make claims against members of other communities, and those claims could invoke ideas of common descent. (See Chapter Four.) However, from the perspective of ideological Turkism, chantou is anti-national: it is a misidentification of a group of people that denies them their heritage. In terms of the modernist character of nationalism, this essay comes from the same edition of the newspaper in which another anonymous

Yāfīt [Yafis] balalaridurmiz. Ğayr bir millatniň bizgä Čanto ismini taşıp alğanlariňa baqip, özimizniň miň miň yillardin tartip şänlik babalarimizdin mawrüş haziçiñi nümimizni taşlayalmaymiz.”
writer lambastes the Chinese schools, not for separating sons from fathers, as Ghulām put it, but for separating the Turks of Xinjiang from progress.

*Chantou* was a marker of Turkic Muslim subjechthood in the complex, locally variant system of Qing and Chinese rule. It was of a pair, as we will now see, with the way the Turki imagined the emperor and the place of Xinjiang within China. Administrators did not manufacture *chantou*-ness – rather, it emerged from the use of semi-formal categories in Muslims’ routine encounters with the provincial administration, which we have looked at in detail over the course of this work. Muslims could make many things of the name *chantou* and value it positively or negatively, but it always indicated a Turkic Muslim marked through some association with Chinese power.

The ambiguity of *chantou* pointed to a broader uncertainty about the relationship between the Turki and Chinese power, especially after Xinhai. Similarly, the Khāqān became not a sovereign, but an increasingly abstract idea. The judicial-bureaucratic apparatus of the Qing had always left open significant room for representational play in the strategic information gap, and the process of translation left room for reimagining the Qing in different ways. In the late Qing, many writers referred to China as *khāqān ičidā* “within Khāqān,” suggesting that the term was synonymous not with the emperor, but with the empire. The first appearance of this translation is actually in a Turki translation of a Chinese text (itself originally in English) on smallpox vaccination that the provincial government distributed in the 1880s. Someone fleeing into China was going “into the interior of Khāqān.” Similarly, some sources refer to the Qing as the *khāqān* and

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Han Chinese as *khāqānī*.748 This conception of China transformed again into *Khāqānistān* – “Khaqan-land,” like Afghanistan, Hindustan, or even *Orusistān* “Russia.”749 We see it again, and without special comment, in the schoolwork of children at the Swedish mission in Kashgar, where Rachel Wingate worked in the years 1924-1928.750 These maps were produced bilingually in Turki and Chinese by both Turki- and Chinese-speaking children, who also learned English at the school. In Chinese, the Republic is labeled “complete map of China” (Chinese *Zhongguo quantu*), and yet there is written above it in clear Arabo-Persian script, *Khāqānistān*. In the Perso-Islamic imagination, Turan, the land beyond Iran, has shifted eastward. As one informant told Rian Thum, “‘Turan’ means ‘Beijing.”’751

The map is a scrap, nestled between a hospital report and a recipe for almond buns. Such is the state of the archive of Xinjiang’s history in the early Republic. Nevertheless, we can look around the rest of the map to see how a child writing in Kashgar in the 1910s might have labeled his or her place in the Republic: Tibet is both (English) *Tibāt* and (Mandarin) *Xizang*; Hong Kong is (English) *Hūŋ Qūŋ* and (Mandarin) *Xianggang*; Korea is *Kūryā* and *Chaoxian*; Mongolia *Mongoliyā* and *Menggu*; and Manchuria both *Māńcūryā* and *dong san sheng* “the three (north)eastern provinces,” and so on. As such, it combines in nearly every case an Anglophone term, written in Turki, and a Chinese one. The exceptions are *Khāqānistān* and, of course,

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748 Jarring Prov. 207, I.49 Ölüm jazālarinin qasamlari.


750 Riksarkivet, Stockholm, file of Rachel O. Wingate.

751 Thum, *Sacred Routes*, 22.
Xinjiang, the name of which is written solely in Chinese (Xinjiang) and in Turki transliteration (Shīnjāŋ). The paradoxical coexistence of imperial institutions and values with a nominally republican government fostered a strange cultural effect. There was no more empire – instead, the Chinese people had declared a strange new era that, as far as the Turki knew, was called the Mingoy (< Chinese minguo), the “Republic.”

Names and images that blend Chinese and Turki indicate a process of identification that occurred beyond the refined texts of Muslim elites but in the context of interactions with Chinese power. The sense of one’s place in the world, both in the polity and in global geography, was based on a reading of the empire through Islamic sacred history, which intertwined with the trauma of the Muslim Uprisings and Ya’qūb Beg era to construct a post-imperial nostalgia for the Qing past and uncertainty about the present. Here we see an echo of colonial modernity, which comes in the course of the experience of domination to evaluate the imperial project positively. Nevertheless, before the Xinhai Revolution toppled the Qing, the Turki sense of their imperial past and colonial present was not explicitly progressive or positivistic, as we expect colonial modernity to be. Turki thinkers conceived of time in terms of sacred origins and eschatology. The Qing could be valued positively, but the terms of that evaluation ultimately pointed back into that same textual tradition.

This was the Turki Neue Zeit of the late Qing: plural and appreciative of the existence of various perspectives, aware of the breadth and diversity of the world, and able to justify the instruments of domination by the Other – yet fundamentally
pessimistic. This was an eschatological modernity, an understanding of time that explained the apparent newness of an era, which produced anxiety over the gradual break with a past order licensed by God. New time could be interpreted innovatively as a stage in a cycle of revelation and apocalypse. This interpretation was not fully developed in the late Qing. Soon after, however, it provided the symbolic vocabulary and narrative morphology that Turki brought to bear on the changing world of the turn of the last century.

The culture of warfare in late-Qing East Turkestan illustrates this apparent contradiction well: in the late 1860s, Yaʿqūb Beg recruited Afghan and Hindustani elite forces, who introduced modern arms and training to the rest of the army. Later, Ottoman officers joined them. At the same time, the men they trained in modern warfare carried with them little risālas, manuals granted to members of professional guilds that served both a moral didactic function and as a means to transmit the sacred history of the craft. These manuals provided sacred genealogies for the creation of the modern rifle and the knowledge of its proper use, beginning with the day the archangel Jibrāʾīl gave a heavenly stone to the prophet David, who forged it for Muḥammad into the first gun.

While the powerful introduced new regimes of knowledge and discipline, then, people made sense of them and of their own place in a changing world through the powerful narrative and symbolic tools offered by sacred history and the Sufi ṣarīqa.

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754 IVR RAN A 406 Risāla-ye pahlīwānčiliq, ff. 1a-3a; IVR RAN A 419 Risāla-ye milīṭq-andāz.
While this historical consciousness was diffuse in the broader culture, Sayrāmī and later Ghulām Muḥammad condensed it into their chronicles by drawing extensively on vernacular sources. Sayrāmī, for all of his justification of the Qing, was cautiously optimistic. His fundamental perspective on the Qing and on Eurasian empire, including his discussion of sacred history, was taken up later on by Ghulām Muḥammad. Ghulām Muḥammad took Sayrāmī’s assertion of the ancientness of the emperor’s line and blended it with a legend that apparently emerged in the Ming-Qing transition. A rare Persian source from Southeast Asia records a 1685 journey from India to China, during which the author, ibn Muḥammad Ibrāhīm (n.d.), holds a shipboard conversation with a Chinese fellow traveler concerning Chinese history. The Chinese man is meant to be the son of a Ming minister who escaped the Qing conquest and gradual advance, which pushed the Ming court into exile in the far South. Ibn Muḥammad dismisses the Chinese creation story as nonsense, and he instead presents one that is well-known to him:

> In the texts of history it is written that [Japheth] had a son named Chīn. It is perfectly clear that Chīn brought civilization to those empty regions and hence China derives its name from him. In fact, it was out of respect for his memory that the Chinese continued to bestow kingship on the descendants of Chīn. … Thus as the course of history advanced, one ruler after another ascended the royal throne and all along men from the noble line of Chīn held that high position.

The emperors of China were thus, from the time of the Flood, all direct descendants of Chīn, the son of Japheth, who was sent to populate the East. The only exception was Alexander, who upon his conquest of China established traditions that persisted across

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the ages, including a peculiar manner of dress. Ibn Muḥammad draws on the *Shāhnāma* story of Alexander’s encounter with the Emperor of China to set up the tragic fall of the Ming emperor: Alexander long ago advised his ancestor that “power is not based on idleness” – and yet, Chongzhen (r. 1627-1644) is shown to have given himself over to “feasting and pursuits of pleasure.” For this reason, he lost the reins of rulership, a merchant rose up to lead a rebellion, and Manchu armies appeared on his borders. In 1644, Chongzhen hanged himself under an old scholar tree on Coal Hill behind the Forbidden City, thus ending a line of legitimate kingship that extended back to the time of Noah. The Manchus imposed the tonsure – for all men, a shaved pate and a long queue – and a new way of dressing, and so disrupted the law of Alexander.

Ghulām Muḥammad shifts this moment of historical disaster from the end of the Ming to the end of the Qing. He asserts that 1911 was the year when the legitimate line of succession ended when Xuantong had no children, but instead adopted the son of a treacherous minister. The minister assassinated Xuantong, and so a false emperor ascended to the throne. Through him, his father visited tyranny upon the Muslims and so invited the wrath of God, who threw China into civil war. Yet, throughout the rest of his narrative, Ghulām maintains the voice of this just emperor, the *khāqān*, even through the violence of Xinjiang in the mid-1920s. In my interpretation, Ghulām expresses a longing for the stability of the imperial period, and of the age of Eurasian empires, when the Qing, Russian, and Ottoman imperial states all integrated diverse peoples under rulers whose primordial brotherhood was inscribed in sacred history. From this perspective, the Xinhai Revolution was the first in a series of disasters leading to the final sweeping-away

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756 Jarring Prov. 163, 124v-125r; Schluessel, *The World as Seen from Yarkand*, 29-32.
not just of the ancient line of Chīn, but of the geopolitical order licensed by Noah’s distribution of homelands to his sons. This order is replaced everywhere by modernizing movements, which Ghulām alternately labels “Christian” (naṣāra) or jadīdī, including the Bolsheviks, the Salafis, and the reformers in China proper. Ghulām interweaves these events his contemporary world with others from sacred history to suggest that this new era portends apocalyptic disaster.

Ghulām Muḥammad Khan’s work is a product of the encounter between a post-reconquest historical consciousness that had learned to make sense of Chinese rule within Manchu empire by legitimizing imperial power with a world that no longer tolerated empires. The specter of the Khan in Beijing stands as a beacon of hope for justice in an otherwise pessimistic narrative that, once it comes unmoored from empires across Asia, returns immediately to Sayrāmī’s technique of juxtaposition between sacred and recent history to present signs of an impending apocalypse. Modern time generally depends on the adjustment of eschatology to suit the needs of an idea of progress, a constant shifting of the horizon. In the East Turkestan case, however, Turki had pinned that same hope to a fixed transhistorical figure, a Khāqān-i Chīn with legendary origins and a modern presence. Turki appear to have experienced a broad cultural moment when a distinct New Time could be made comprehensible through a historical consciousness drawn from the popular culture of East Turkestan.

Sayrāmī and Ghulām draw on Islamic history to present a kind of “time-knot.”

Sayrāmī’s Tārikh-i Ḥamīdī juxtaposes events from sacred history and the early Islamic

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past: when Yaʿqūb Beg’s body is burnt, for example, he invokes the destruction of the Umayyad tombs. In Ghulām Muḥammad’s continuation of Sayrāmī’s work into the Republic period, as the world slips further into the post-imperial chaos of nationalism, Westernization, and Salafism, Ghulām draws the present and the ancient past ever closer together in a series of vignettes. The rise of the Saudis and their destruction of sacred sites around Mecca recalls to Ghulām the Day of the Elephant, when Mecca was besieged by the Negus of Ethiopia just before the Prophet was born. This vision of time drew both on Islamic notions of eschatology and on experiences of Qing empire in Central Asia, and while it was certainly pessimistic, it nevertheless represented an autochthonous strand of Islamicate culture that could countenance a changing world.

The loudest, best-funded and most heavily-armed voices in Xinjiang, and those who best understood the international rhetoric of the time, effectively drowned out this negotiation of new time with their programmatic modernisms and continue to do so today. From the 1910s onward, elite Turki began to adopt self-consciously modernist and nationalist ideologies borrowed from the Soviet Union, China, and, belatedly, the Ottoman Empire. Each of these had its place in the contestation over the future of Muslims in East Turkestan, yet each took as its point of departure a different valuation of the same series of traumas: Qing imperial rule, the Muslim Uprising, and the Chinese colonial rule that followed. In this last section, I will visit the elite ideologies that introduced a radically different notion of historical time.

The first East Turkestan Republic (1933-1934) was short-lived, but its intellectual leaders, apparently committed to the power of print, used the medium to make powerful

758 Schluessel, The World as Seen from Yarkand, 22.
statements about history and identity. The revolutionaries’ notions of the past, as expressed in the new newspapers they produced as didactic tools of modernization, inverted those of the ‘ulamā’ cited above. Where Muslim writers had seen the Junghar Mongols as infidels and oppressors, and the Qing as benevolent and just, the writers referred to the Junghar period as “protection” (ḥimāya) and Chinese dominance as “tyranny” (ẓulm). Many nationalists involved in the TIRET government had been influenced by the Ottoman intellectual Ziya Gökalp’s (1876-1924) romantic Turkism, which drew on then-popular racialist theories of human origins to assert that the Mongols – not the Chinese – were the Turks’ nearest relatives. From such a perspective, the Mongol legacy could only be positive.

Other revolutionaries were adherents of Jadidism as it had emerged among the Central Asian Muslims of the Russian Empire, and so they rejected much of Central Asian Islamic religious practice as innovation (bidʿa). Not unlike the Salafis whom Ghulām despised, they singled out shrine culture and Sufi asceticism as superstitions and causes for Muslim separation from an idealized pure Islam, and therefore an impediment to progress. The TIRET and its successor government in Kashgar under Maḥmūd Muḥīṭī (1887-1945) attempted the programmatic destruction of shrines and Sufi institutions in part as a means to secure control of the region’s pious endowments (awqāf). Thus were the physical monuments to the past to be torn up, and the texts that mediated the

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760 Papas, “Muslim Reformism,” 173.
relationship of the Turkic Muslim community to their history rewritten in the language of racialist primordialism and corporatist nationalism.

The whole sacred view of history was upended in the writings of politically dominant nationalists and later communist-aligned elites. While Ghulām Muḥammad’s characterization of the downfall of Ma Fuxing in Kashgar in 1926 tied the chaos in his contemporary Xinjiang to the tides of sacred history, in 1960, the son of Qutlugh Shawqi, Emir Hūsāyn Qutlugh Shawqiof, related the Commander Ma narrative again from a very different perspective. Shawqiof retains much of the structure and style of earlier chroniclers: prose passages narrating history are interspersed with verse, either drawn from local oral tradition or in imitation of it. However, Shawqiof begins his account with a discussion of the “feudal system” (feodalliqtūzūm) heavy with terminology borrowed from Russian and with commentary on the class system. This immediately positions the narrative within a Marxist historical framework, which is sustained throughout. In this retelling, Ma Fuxing becomes an agent of economic exploitation hiding behind a mask of Islam. Where Ghulām Muḥammad’s story had him defiled through a visit to the “idol-temple,” here Yang Zengxin corrupts Ma through “political education” in Dihua. The result is still tyranny, but here it is put in strictly economic terms: because of the exploitations of the upper strata of society, who extract money claiming that it will go to building mosques, “the workers” are forced to sell their children to Hindustani moneylenders simply to survive. Shawqiof’s conceptualization of “tyranny” (zulm) is divorced from its opposite in Islamic discourse of “justice” (ʿadālah), which we now

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761 Emir Hūsāyn Qutlugh Shawqiof, Zalim Ma Titäynning zulum dastanidin bir äslätmä, Xinjiang University Library MS.
know could be a property of Chinese rule. Rather, it is interpreted in Marxist terms of economic exploitation.

Similarly, the nationalist writers of the diaspora fully inverted Sayrāmī’s valuations of history. When Muḥammad Amīn Bughra (1901-1965) wrote his Sharqī Türkîstân ṭârîkhi (History of East Turkestan), he relied on a mixture of sources, including Rashiduddin’s Jamīʿu ‘t-tawārîkh, the Shajarah-i Turk, and an early lithograph of Sayrāmī’s Târîkh-i Amniyya, but also Western histories.762 Nevertheless, there is not a hint of sacred history in his account, no Noah or Japheth, nor the immaculate conception of Alanqoa. Even the rise of Islam and its arrival in Xinjiang are treated as simple facts. Without this basis for legitimization, all historical non-Turkic regimes in the region are treated as “occupations” (istīlā’) and “tyrannies” (ẓulm). Here, “tyranny” has transitioned fully into indicating any act that prevents the nation’s march towards progress and liberation.

To be Chantou meant to be Turkic-speaking, Muslim, and a subject of Chinese power. The imperial government in Beijing never intentionally propagated this category of identity. Rather, within the Qing, around the institutions that connected the Great Khan in Beijing and his Muslim subjects in Xinjiang, there grew a Han-dominated apparatus of government based on the provincial system of China proper. The term chantou still had no formal status in this system, but it was used frequently enough, and seemed clearly enough to indicate a linguistically and religiously distinct group on behalf of which claims could be made, that it gained salience in local government and society. Chantou

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marked a Turkic Muslim, or a musulmān, a normative Muslim from the Turki perspective, but in the context of imperial government. As I have argued in previous chapters, that position carried benefits and disadvantages, and both sides of that deal disturbed Muslim elites. By 1933, nationalists seized the system of cultural production and, for better or for worse, they papered over the ambiguity and complexity of that relationship in favor of a modernist narrative of stalled progress and national liberation.

IV. Conclusion

We have traveled a long way from the Tang dynasty and the early days Islam, when China was a distant image in the Muslim imagination, and yet it was in that time and the encounter between China and Islam that Sayrāmī chose to begin his story about the Muslim uprisings. That was, in his estimation, when the covenant between the emperor and his Muslim people was formed. Much as the Timurid chroniclers and their successors, including the pseudo-Rabghūzī tradition of Kashgaria, shifted the center of the Islamic world gradually eastward, now Sayrāmī represented China as being central to that experience. His text expresses the Chantou-Khāqān relationship of subject to sovereign that was being worked out among Xinjiang Muslims in the late Qing and under the empire’s legacy in the Republic. That relationship, as conceived of in Turkic Muslim culture, was most visible when people felt it had been violated: when before the Muslim uprisings officials broke the ancient covenant between the Qing emperor and his subjects by charging taxes contrary to Islam and violating the sanctity of Muslim sacred spaces, and when before the Xinhai Revolution they once again broke the protection of the shariah by imposing Confucian schools.
In Xinjiang, where colonial-like relations obtained between a Muslim-majority subject population and a Chinese-majority ruling community, the impression left in the Turkic Muslim consciousness by the civilizing project both resembled and differed that of colonized peoples elsewhere. The Xiang Army in the wake of the Muslim Uprisings intended to produce a province out of an imperial territory, and subjects out of Muslims, and those Muslims too realized that something had drastically changed. The Uprisings represented a traumatic break with the past, and with an imperial order that could never be recovered, as well as the failure of an Islamic state. This provided the opportunity for a new adaptation of autochthonous traditions of sacred history to fit the new sociopolitical configuration. After Xinhai, as Eurasian empires fell, the late-Qing Turkic Muslim vision of history provided a means to make sense of a world that then appeared to be changing on a more fundamental level.

Imperial subjecthood, however, was not based on any sense of temporal progress or retardation. The Xiang Army’s ideology had a religious character, and it demanded the conversion of Muslims into subjects. However, it did not place Muslims lower on a hierarchy of development, but rather into a peripheral position in a geographical vision of civilization. Chinese dominance in the imperial mode left its impression instead in the realm of everyday and communal justice as Muslims experienced it through institutions of local government and their symbolic relationship with the sovereign. Turki, as we have seen, made individual or familial claims to equal treatment before the law on the basis of subjecthood, but they did not pursue communal rights or claims, as in the provincial period there was no institutional basis on which to do so, nor an appropriate language for presenting them to power.
Conclusion

Over the course of decades of close contact, Chinese and Muslim authorities and subjects developed a range of working relationships that allowed each party to take advantage of the other’s familiar institutions and symbolic vocabularies. Through this routine exchange, people in Xinjiang worked out what Richard White called “middle grounds.” First, actors attempted to situate their own actions and motivations in the cultural vocabularies of others with whom they interacted. The Sino-Muslim cultural exchange took place on an uneven and asymmetrical field: Chinese held political, military, and economic power, but Muslims had the skills and knowledge necessary for the functioning of government. All sides appear to have agreed that government was a fundamental good as long as it provided justice, defined as the maintenance of the sociopolitical order in either Chinese or Islamic terms. In pursuit of justice and of personal and group advantage, Turki learned to “speak Chinese.” This process of learning did not take place between a single, region-wide group of Muslims with a unified leadership or representative organ and a powerful provincial government – instead, it was highly localized. It opened up a distinct kind of historical space, or rather a congeries of contiguous spaces wherein the same overall process of negotiation was inflected in various different ways.

From the perspective of a believer in the Xiang Army’s civilizing project as Zuo Zongtang once defined it, the transformation of Xinjiang was in some ways a failure and in others a success. The army’s original goal had been to seed Muslim society with sino-

normative values, namely the maintenance of familial relations on the model of an
imagined Confucian golden age. As the statecraft thinker and anti-Manchu resistance
fighter Huang Zongxi (1610-1695) once argued, the essence of that order was codified in
the *Rites of Zhou*, and the system of relationships and rituals described therein, the “law
of one family, not of a dynasty” (*yi jia zhi fa er fei tianxia zhi fa* 一家之法而非天下之
法) could engender a “spirit among men that went beyond the letter of the law” (*fa wai
zhi yi* 法外之意). In order to produce that society, the army trained linguistic and
cultural intermediaries who were meant to be those paternalistic moral guides for their
society. Instead, the interpreters became Confucians in pursuit of economic advantage,
and the Muslim familial order barely changed. Meanwhile, the army’s efforts to forcibly
resettle people into normative families, combined with their own soldiers’ and merchant
followers’ predation on local women, served to solidify further the boundaries between
Turki, Hui, and Han, even as women who were desperate for economic support or
otherwise marginal crossed those boundaries, earning the derision of Muslim and Chinese
elites alike. The civilizing project did not bring people together, but provided a range of
tools for working out conflicts in a society that became more fractured than it was before.
The numinous tools of Chinese-style territorialization did not bring Xinjiang into
provincial harmony, but instead allowed certain elites to force others out of recognition
and certain commoners to claim others’ sacred spaces.

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Nevertheless, the civilizing project did succeed in introducing Turkic Muslims to a political and judicial apparatus from which they could expect results. From the beginning, statecraft scholars held that good local government required a magistrate to establish gradually a sense of trust between officials and commoners. While Xinjiang’s Muslim society ultimately produced very few “scholars and gentry,” nevertheless, working relationships emerged between Han officials and local authorities, and Turki commoners could indeed take advantage of the yamen. Moreover, once Turki intermediaries were established in the provincial government, they had a need to justify their presence there. Muslim scholars understood that late-Qing Xinjiang was also exceptionally peaceful, at least in comparison to the years of violence that had come before. As in many places across China, the memory of death and disorder informed a new communal subjectivity: it was not enough that Han, Hui, and Turki had killed each other. Rather, the memory of the recent violence and the physical and social traces of it meant that people worked through the uprisings’ legacy for many years afterward. The legend of the Muslim emperor of China was important in this context: the uprisings made sense as the violation of a covenant made between a Chinese sovereign and his Muslim subjects, and the restoration of peace under the Qing as the return of justice under a ruler legitimized by genealogy and sacred history. Concepts such as justice and subjecthood (fuqarāchiliq) that Turki borrowed from the Perso-Islamic tradition but adapted in the Chinese context provided a unique way to make sense of the world, and for Muslims and Chinese to collaborate.

I have used the idea of “colonialism” to make both typological comparisons and methodological interventions.
Chinese power is central to the history of Xinjiang; the question is the nature of that power. Scholars in China and abroad have generally engaged with the “gigantic history” of Xinjiang, a history in which grand categories clash and all personal fortunes are inextricably bound up with those of the national community. Until recently, the available archive for Xinjiang’s history generally privileged elite voices, the writings of Chinese and Uyghur politicians who articulated their grievances and successes in gigantic terms. Mainland scholars and others tend to assert that Xinjiang is and always has been a “part of China,” and that efforts such as the Xiang Army’s served to “unite” (tongyi) the region with the transhistorical Chinese whole. Uyghur nationalists in the diaspora would obviously disagree and counter that a Chinese occupation denied an ethnically, linguistically, and religiously distinct people of their right to national self-determination.

Both of these narratives engage with history at the same level and emphasize the same set of events, though their interpretations and valuations of those events differ. Reality does not lie somewhere in the middle, in the grey between white and black; the way out of mutual contradiction, to find productive routes to truth, is to break the paradigm, to change the scope, level, and focus of historical inquiry. “Miniature” history as I have tried to pursue it here is a critical step to disrupting “gigantic” history.

“Colonialism,” conceived of as a process, provides categories of analysis and approaches that are useful for exploring power relations in a heterogeneous society. I have not deployed this term in order to provoke, or to assign political blame, but because it is genuinely theoretically and methodologically useful. Colonial and postcolonial

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history today encourages us to look for history in places we do not expect, to seek out voices that do not proclaim slogans from the top of the page, but that are muffled and indistinct in the middle of the text, the “subaltern.” I searched for sources that spoke to the everyday experience of Chinese rule on the part of people who otherwise have had no representation in scholarly history.

To that effort, and in a general spirit of contrariness, I began this inquiry with Katanov’s 1892 interviews in Turpan, where a local akhund told him about inter-ethnic prostitution, torture at the yamen, and cures for venereal diseases. There I was first struck that a Turkic Muslim would call himself and people like him chantou, deploying what I knew from today’s Xinjiang to be an ethnic slur. This pointed to a process of identification that engaged with Chinese power, even if people did not exactly accept it.

This dissertation was produced over the course of an effort to understand that perspective and experience, the life of a Turkic Muslim before Uyghurness, but after the arrival of Chinese power. As it turned out, the power relationship was more complicated than expected: it was not that “Chinese oppressed Uyghurs,” but that a very specific group of Han implemented a program of control, which people who spoke Turkic or Chinese, and who identified as Muslims or non-Muslims, engaged with in different ways and at various levels of society, politics, and culture. While I was initially agnostic of comparisons of the Xiang Army’s efforts to colonialism per se, colonial history as a field seemed like an appropriate framework for thinking about a set of phenomena: a group of ethnically distinct people came to dominate another group. The dominators attempted to transform those Others according to an ideology rooted both in scripture and in new normative moral ideals. This civilizing project had unforeseen ramifications, including
the emergence of culture-crossing intermediaries. Sexual relations between members of
different communities reflected and affected the way this heterogeneous society was
governed. People appropriated the civilizing project for their own purposes, both
cynically and naively, including the merchants who prospered even when their
government allies did not. The whole strange experience was reflected in new
articulations of history and identity. Late-Qing Xinjiang and its institutional continuation
in the Republic looked like colonialism, even if it had no roots in a “Western” intellectual
or practical genealogy.

Nevertheless, certain aspects of the Xiang Army’s civilizing project marked it as
peculiarly Chinese. The central pedagogical ideal expressed as jiaohua “transformation-
by-teaching” is as old as the Book of Rites (Li ji), Wang Fuzhi’s commentary on which
the statecraft movement especially revered:766

Therefore the instructive and transforming power of
ceremonies is subtle; they stop depravity before it has taken
form, causing men daily to move towards what is good, and
keep themselves farther apart from guilt, without being
themselves conscious of it. It was on this account that the
ancient kings set so high a value upon them.

Wang Fuzhi argued from this passage that the Manchus and others could be brought to
submit to the cultural essence of Chineseness, what he called in its cosmological
manifestation the “Yellow Center.”767 All that was needed was to make them conform to
the marriage and family customs of what the statecraft group came to imagine as a

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767 Wang Fuzhi, vol. 12, 519.
normative, original Chineseness. Yet in its original form, the Book of Rites passage appears as a positive statement of the nature of harmony between sovereign and subject. It came to inform a well-articulated theory of the analogous and cosmic relationship between one’s own self and body, family, and society.

In comparison, well-known European justifications for civilizing projects express an intuitive faith in a nebulous idea of progress with little apparent textual precedent. In 1835, Baron Macauley (1800-1859) articulated the need for a class of linguistic and cultural intermediaries not unlike the Turki interpreters, “a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.” Macauley intended that these men would infuse their own language with “terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature.” Colonial educators in British India believed that memorization of texts concerning “science” would have an effect not unlike memorizing the Classics. We can sense in the British case a fundamental drive to dominate the Other, whether a class subordinate or a colonial subaltern, by forcing that Other to conform to the dominator’s norms but forever remain inferior. In the Chinese case, the ideas of rites, civilization, and transformation by teaching was old enough that they had been applied as critiques of China’s non-Han Others many times. Nevertheless, in the mid-nineteenth century, anti-Manchuism and the resurgence of statecraft thought coincided with an empire-wide crisis to infuse these ideas with a drive to dominate similar to that expressed in British colonial ideology.

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768 Homi Bhabha provides an enlightening discussion of Macaulay and other like him who deployed the language of liberalism in service of colonial discipline. (“Of Mimicry and Man: the Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse” in October 28 (Spring 1984), 125-133.
It is because the Xiang Army attempted to enact Zuo Zongtang’s plan that Xinjiang after 1877 was very different from Xinjiang before 1864. Before, Turkic-speaking Muslims were under a system of indirect rule in a territory separate from China proper. While Han settlement pushed the borders of Gansu’s provincial system into the North, a fact that the Xiang Army later seemed to ignore, the basic mode of control remained ad hoc, fluid, and directed at the maintenance of military control over the Muslim-majority society. Such a mode of rule, in which multiple subject peoples are organized into discrete administrative units subordinate to the sovereign, is imperial. The Hunanese statecraft group characterized imperial rule as a waste of a barren, empty land in which their visions of a new society could be fulfilled. Their emphasis on the civilizing project in the transformation of Xinjiang and its people meant that their government possessed many of the features we associate with colonialism.

Its consequences for Xinjiang’s Islamicate culture and Muslim society also resembled those of colonialism elsewhere. Mary Pratt has characterized transculturation in Spanish-dominated Peru through the example of a chronicle written half in Spanish and half in Quechua by a half-Inca prince.\textsuperscript{769} Guaman Poma’s work puts Andean people at the center of the story of Christendom, not unlike the way in which Sayrāmī places Xinjiang into a vital position in the history of China. Colonized peoples around the world have dealt with a range of historical times that coexist, clash, and become entangled.

Imperial infrastructures change people’s patterns of movement and horizons of experience and expectation. So did the people of Eastern Turkestan, beginning in the late Qing, encounter Chinese and Russian calendars and views of time and space. However,

\textsuperscript{769} Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone.”
the Xiang Army did not impose an ideology of teleological or developmental progress on their subjects. Instead, their geography and chronology of the dynastic cycle and cosmological ebb and flow of Chinese civilization informed the encounter between two creeds, Islam as it was practiced in Eastern Turkestan and Confucianism as known to the intellectual elite of Changsha, Hunan.

That encounter and its effects in Turkic Muslim culture were shaped as much by institutions as by ideology. The civilizing project provided structure and a symbolic vocabulary for addressing imperial power, but it was the magistrate, the *yamen* staff, and the local subjects who interacted with them who truly shaped the experience of late-Qing and early Republican Chinese rule. The *yamen*, the same institution that created the local archive, also obscured the origins of the information it produced. The Turpan archive is polyphonic, and there is no single document that claims to express a singular “authentic” identity, only representations of subjectivities positioned strategically or naively between sets of expectations. Nevertheless, if we read this archive in the context of the broader Turkic-language textual record, then we find commonalities between scraps buried in the layers of the *yamen* documents and broader cultural phenomena being worked out in the Muslim society beyond the *yamen* walls.

All of the things that a sino-normative society was meant to have – family, lineage, tombs, sexual propriety – became notions that people in Xinjiang used not to transform themselves into ideal subjects, but to represent themselves to power-holders to achieve certain ends. Through encounters with local government, people learned to “speak Chinese.” This gradual mastery of rhetoric and semi-official categories of status and difference in turn affected Muslims’ own discourses of ethnicity and subjecthood.
Here we see the interplay between commonsensical constructions of subjectivity and inscriptions of identity in state codes and practices. In Xinjiang, however, being *chantou* was not determined by law, but by the semi-official practices that resembled law.

“Colonialism” did take place in Xinjiang, as a process of domination, civilization, political integration through state-building according to the norms of an idealized metropolitan society, and the subsequent reimagining of communal subjectivities. This was not Qing imperialism, but Chinese colonialism. These observations open up new avenues for exploration: where Europe was once hyperreal, now the experience of European colonialism has gained a similar status in histories of heteronomy and domination globally. However, if transformation-by-teaching can exist in non-Chinese empires, then we ought to pare down our models of civilizing missions and divorce them from emergent modernisms or nationalisms, or even from progress, and then from eschatology. Many of the phenomena we classically think of as “colonial” are actually capable of emerging under a range of conditions and from different cultural and institutional material.

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770 Banerjee, *Becoming Imperial Citizens*, 1-3.
Appendix: Short Biographies of Late-Qing Officials in Xinjiang Mentioned in the Text

Wang Bingkun 王炳坤 (1854-?) Changsha

For all of the documents that mention Wang, there is little information about him as a person. He was born in Changsha in 1854 and attained the lowly rank of student. He probably followed the same path to Xinjiang as many other Hunanese: he would have purchased several degrees from various offices across China, particularly those sold to raise funds for coastal defense, and thus elevated himself all the way from a no-degree nobody to a county magistrate-in-waiting. Personal connections in Changsha would have facilitated an appointment to Xinjiang-Gansu.

Wang was briefly the acting Dihua magistrate in 1900. By this time, Wang had proven himself as an official and could be appointed to a formal position: he was made department magistrate of Kucha and arrived in office on 13 November 1901, though he spent little time there. From 1902 through 1904, he was the first-class sub-prefect of Yengisar, where he presumably learned a great deal about local cotton agriculture. Wang technically held this post through 1906, when he was removed from office while working in Dihua. His removal coincides with the arrival of Governor Lian-kui, who may have been acting to break up the Hunan clique. Wang returned as the Dihua magistrate on 9 March 1907 and stayed in office for about a year until Zhang Yingxuan arrived to act in his place. Instead, Wang was sent to act as the Shule prefect, which position he held 19 July 1908 through most of 1910, before returning to Yengisar as an emergency replacement for Liu Chengqing, who had died en route.

Meanwhile, Wang Bingkun was named in Imperial Censor Rui-xian’s 6 May 1910 memorial on official corruption as a member of Provincial Treasurer Wang
Shu’nan’s circle of influence. He was accused of purchasing his position in Shule from the treasurer, and the charges stuck. This could explain Wang’s apparent inability to stay in most of his offices for very long. However, the Qing court never succeeded in prosecuting Wang Shu’nan’s circle before the Xinhai Revolution broke out. Wang Bingkun was appointed Prefect of Ili, and he probably did not arrive before the end of the empire. Following Xinhai, Wang retained his connections with the Wang Shu’nan-Yang Zengxin circle and secured high positions, including cotton commissioner.

Sources: FHA 09-01-03-0045-016; FHA 09-01-03-0045-023; FHA 04-01-13-0409-057; FHA 04-01-12-0683-001; FHA 04-01-12-0691-072; FHA 04-01-12-0659-140; FHA 04-01-12-0656-017; FHA 04-01-12-0687-142; FHA 03-5403-089 (GX 27.6.20 饒應祺《奏為委任劉兆松署理莎車直隸州直隸州知州等員缺事》); FHA 03-5393-025 (ZP GX 26.11.8 饒應祺《奏請以黃袁等員遞補英吉沙爾直隸州同知等員缺事》); NPM 186991 (XT 2.3.27 御史瑞賢《新疆藩司王樹楠素行貪鄙》)

Ren Zhaoguan 任兆觀 (1850-?) Kunming

Ren Zhaoguan was born in Kunming, Yunnan, in 1850 and attained the juren degree in 1870. He fought rebellions in Yunnan, including the Tujiao 土教. Eventually, he came into the service of Sheng-tai, whom he followed beyond the Pass ca. 1877. On GX 12.7.16, he was ordered to remain in Xinjiang-Gansu and await appointment. In 1890 (GX 16.3), he took office as the interim magistrate of Changji County for about a little over a year. His first permanent appointment was to Fukang, where he was first interim magistrate in 1893 (GX 19.10). After Tian Dingming died in Gansu on the way to take up
this office in the summer of 1895, Ren was promoted in his place early the next year (GX 20.1) and remained in Fukang until 1898. He was then appointed first-class sub-prefect of Ush, but before he could arrive, he received ill news from home and returned to Kunming to mourn for three years. GX 27.12.13, Ren returned and became the Suilai County magistrate, which post he held until his term expired in 1904. In 1909-1910, Ren briefly resurfaced in the historical record as the first-class sub-prefect of Tarbaghatai, but he quickly fell ill and had to be replaced. It is unclear whether or not Ren Zhaoguan died of this illness.

Sources: FHA 04-01-12-0624-002; FHA 04-01-13-0409-050; FHA 04-01-12-0644-013; FHA 04-01-12-0685-016; FHA 04-01-01-0955-001; FHA 03-5292-054 (GX 18.4.18 《奏為委任朱冕榮署理庫車直隸廳同知並飭令昌吉縣知縣李凌漢即赴本任事》); FHA 03-5366-054 (Z GX 24.10.14 饒應祺 《奏為委任高敬昌署理烏什直隸廳同知》); FHA 03-5414-049 (ZP GX 28.3.3 饒應祺 《奏為委任桂榮署理烏什直隸廳同知等員缺事》)

He Rujin 何如謹 (1840-?) Guanyang

He Rujin was born in Guanyang, Guangxi in 1840 and attained the juren degree in 1867. He tested as a Chinese-language copyist 漢贄錄 and worked in that capacity at the Military Archives Office 方略館. He soon entered the Army, probably at Zuo Zongtang’s request. Zuo appointed him the magistrate of Suilai (in absentia) in 1872 (TZ 11.4.10), which post he held until 1877 (GX 3.2), as well as a brief stint as the Dihua County magistrate, also in absentia. He Rujin was briefly the interim magistrate of
Changle County, Gansu, before he was sent to Taiwan, where he served as the magistrates of Shouning, Hengshou (interim), and Fuqing. He was selected for this job because of a previous familiarity with Fujian, perhaps dating to the mid-century wars.

Sources: FHA 04-01-12-0520-068; FHA 04-01-12-0548-106; FHA 04-01-13-0368-040; （光緒）台灣通志, p. 633.

**He Haitao 何海濤 (n.d.) Gansu**

He Haitao was a Gansunese, and as of 1910, he held only an Imperial College student’s rank. He was appointed at the first-class sub-prefect of Kucha, though it is unclear if he ever arrived in office.

Sources: Kataoka, “Shin-matsu shinkyōshō kan'in kō.”

**He Fuchang 何福閶 (or He Fulü 何福闕) (n.d.) Lingshi**

He Fuchang was born in Lingshi, Shanxi, and attained the rank of student of the Imperial College. He appears to have served as a clerk in Southern Xinjiang for some years in the later part of the provincial period. He temporarily held the post of Yengisar first-class sub-prefect in 1905, when prefect Zhou Kaishu was cashiered, and was appointed in the last days of the Qing administration as the warden of Khotan.

Sources: FHA 04-01-12-0643-085; Kataoka.
He Xiangkun 何象坤 (?-1904) Ningxia

He Xiangkun came from Ningxia and received his degree (which one is unclear) in the 1884 examinations. He attained the rank of county-magistrate-in-waiting, possibly from promotions through service in Xinjiang’s ongoing reconstruction, or through donation. He Xiangkun served briefly as the magistrate of Shanshan County in 1903 before dying of illness in 1904.

Sources: FHA 04-01-12-0626-060; FHA 04-01-13-0409-057; FHA 04-01-12-0626-060; (光緒)甘肅新通志, j. 39 (1909).

Yu Jiaxiang 余家驤 (n.d.)

Little is known about Yu Jiaxiang, save that he held the rank of second-class sub-prefect-in-waiting. He was the warden of Pichan until he was cashiered late in 1906.

Sources: FHA 04-01-12-0652-048; FHA 03-5470-028 (GX 32.10.4 聯魁 《奏為特參和闐直隸州知州劉兆松等員貪劣不職請旨懲處事》).

Yu Henian 余鶴年 (1866-?) Xingguo

Yu Henian was from Xingguo County in Wuchang, Hubei. He served in 1908-1909 as the interim county magistrate of Wensu.

Sources: FHA 09-01-03-0045-016; FHA 09-01-03-0045-023; FHA 04-01-12-0659-140.
Fu Zelin 傅澤霖 (n.d.)

Fu Zelin was first appointed the interim first-class sub-prefect of Jinghe, where he served 1896-1898. Fu then became the interim Wensu County magistrate 1904-1905, and immediately upon leaving office was briefly the temporary prefect of Wensu.

Sources: FHA 04-01-13-0409-054; FHA 04-01-12-0643-085; FHA 04-01-12-0645-152; FHA 03-5359-031 (GX 24.2.15 饒應祺《奏為以劉澄清准補精河直隸廳同知事》); FHA 04-01-13-0409-054 (GX 30 潘效蘇); FHA 03-5339-106 (GX 22.2.25 饒應祺《奏為委任傅澤霖署理精河直隸廳同知事》).

Fu Xuan 傅煊 (1840-1903) Anhua

Fu Xuan was born in Anhua, in Changsha Prefecture, Hunan in 1840. He was a first-class licentiate who in 1871 (TZ 10) went to Gansu to join the army. After various military successes, he was promoted to prefect. Following his purchase of a peacock feather, he was in 1895 ordered to stay in Xinjiang and await appointment. 1900-1903, he was the interim first-class sub-prefect of Jinghe and effectively held the office while Liu Chengqing was away. After that, Fu Xuan returned to the capital, where he died of illness on GX 33.5.23 while working at the provincial tax office.

Sources: FHA 04-01-12-0624-083; FHA 04-01-12-0656-017; FHA 04-01-12-0624-083 (GX 29.2.22 潘效蘇).

Liu Jie 劉傑 (1861-?) Baling
Liu Jie was born in Baling, Hunan in 1861, and so he was probably a later addition to the Hunan Army regime in Xinjiang. He temporarily and on short notice took up the office of Yengisar first-class sub-prefect in 1908, which suggests that he was a clerk or similar petty official in the Kashgar Circuit.

Sources: FHA 09-01-03-0045-016 GX 34.5 《為具奏光緒三十三年考核新疆府廳州縣事》; FHA 09-01-03-0045-023 XT 1.6.28 《為具奏光緒三十四年考核新疆府廳州縣事》.

**Liu Zhaosong 劉兆松 (n.d.) Xiangxiang**

Liu Zhaosong, of Xiangxiang, Hunan, was part of the Hunan Army when it entered Gansu. He held only the rank of student, but he seems to have been granted many promotions on the basis of his military accomplishments and connection with the Hunan clique. Liu was made Shufu County magistrate in 1894, and he was officially in this position until 1897. However, in 1893-1895, he was interim magistrate of Dihua County, which office he took up permanently the next year. He occupied it until 1899, and only formally left in 1902. In 1901, he was already in Yarkand for a brief stint as the first-class sub-prefect. He was transferred to the same position in Khotan in 1903. As it turns out, however, many years before, when the army was in Gansu, and Pan Xiaosu was its judicial commissioner, Liu Zhaosong had promised his daughter to Pan’s son Pan Jinkun. Pan Xiaosu was now the Kashgar circuit attendant, and so a conflict of interest would soon arise, now that Liu’s daughter was of marrying age. Thus he was meant to be
removed from office per the principle of avoidance. That never happened, though – instead, Liu was simply cashiered for corruption in 1906.

As to Liu’s daughter, presuming that the daughter was fifteen sui in 1903, that would mean she was born in 1889.

Sources: FHA 04-01-13-0409-047; FHA 04-01-12-0652-048; FHA 04-01-16-0284-062 (GX 30.12.17 潘效蘇); FHA 04-01-12-0624-084 (GX 29.2.22 潘效蘇); FHA 03-5305-053 (ZP GX 19.4.15 陶模 《奏為委任黃袁調署和闐直隸州知州，劉兆松署理迪化縣知縣事》); FHA 03-5403-089 (GX 27.6.20 饒應祺 《奏為委任劉兆松署理莎車直隸州直隸州知州等員缺事》); FHA 03-5470-028 (GX 32.10.4 聯魁 《奏為特參和闐直隸州知州劉兆松等員貪劣不職請旨懲處事》).

Liu Zhaotong 劉兆桐 (1858-?) Wujin

Liu Zhaotong of Wujin, Jiangsu, was born in 1858 and purchased the degree of accessory licentiate. 1908-1910, he was the first-class sub-prefect of Yengisar. He was probably Liu Zhaodong’s brother.

Sources: FHA 09-01-03-0045-016; FHA 09-01-03-0045-023; FHA 04-01-12-0659-140; Kataoka.

Liu Zhaomei 劉兆梅 (n.d.) Baling

Liu Zhaomei of Baling, Hunan attained the shengyuan degree in 1873 and the juren in 1877. He then became a second-class secretary at the Board of Revenue, but was
soon appointed as a department-magistrate-in-waiting in Gansu. He was appointed in
1882 as the Dihua Department magistrate, though he may never have taken up the post
formally. In 1885, Liu became the prefect of Yarkand Department, though he was
removed from this office the next year. He might never have been appointed again.

Sources: FHA 03-6017-062 (GX 8.9.22 劉錦堂 《奏為委令劉兆梅署理迪化州知州，
朱冕榮署理哈密通判》); (光緒)湖南通志, j. 136, 143 (1885); (光緒)巴陵縣志，
j. 25 (1891); FHA 03-5207-082 (GX 12.2.22 劉錦堂 《奏為委令劉嘉德署理莎車直隸
州知州並危兆麟署理英吉沙廳同知事》); FHA 04-01-16-0217-019 (GX 11.2.26 劉錦
堂).

Liu Zhaoding 劉兆棟 (n.d.) Wujin

Liu Zhaodong of Wujin, Jiangsu held the rank of a student of the Imperial
College. He was probably the brother of Liu Zhaotong. From 1899, he was the magistrate
of Bay County until he was cashiered in 1901.

Sources: FHA 04-01-13-0409-053; FHA 04-01-12-0652-048; FHA 04-01-12-0652-121;
FHA 04-01-12-0682-115; Kataoka; FHA 03-5470-028 (GX 32.10.4 聯魁 《奏為特參和
闖直隸州知州劉兆松等員貪劣不職請旨懲處處事》).

Liu Jiade 劉嘉德 (1838-?) Huoqiu
Liu Jiade was born in 1838 in Huoqiu, Anhui, and purchased a rank of accessory licentiate. His family suffered during the Taiping war: his elder sister found herself widowed without a son. Although she was praised in the local gazetteer for preserving her chastity, she hanged herself during the war in Xianfeng 3 rather than be taken alive.

Liu may have been rootless when, in 1876, he purchased the rank of double-moon assistant-district-magistrate-in-waiting and immediately entered the army in Gansu. In the spring of 1878, Liu was first appointed assistant district magistrate of Jimsar. However, he was soon promoted to magistrate for service in the Turpan campaign, and the next year found himself as the Qitai County magistrate. Liu immediately purchased his way to a first-class sub-prefecture. In the summer of 1881, Zuo again requested his promotion, this time to department magistrate for his service in the Five Pacifications of Xinjiang. In late 1882, he was appointed interim first-class sub-prefect of Turpan, where he served until early 1885. At the same time, the historical record indicates that he was the interim sub-prefect of Yengisar 1883-1886, which office he briefly had to reprise in 1887. In late 1883, he was made a prefect for Prior Service in the Defense and Reconstruction of Ürümqi. The next year, he was granted a peacock feather for Six Years of Xinjiang Border Defense. Liu Jiade was the Yarkand sub-prefect 1886-1890, and then again 1896-1901. He was Khotan sub-prefect 1895-1896. Finally he gained an office appropriate to his rank and served as prefect of Yanqi 1901-1904, from which position he was removed by edict at the age of 67 sui.

Sources: FHA 04-01-13-0341-002; FHA 04-01-13-0405-021; FHA 04-01-13-0409-061; FHA 04-01-13-0431-006; FHA 04-01-12-0539-093; FHA 04-01-13-0425-033; FHA 04-
In 1875, the honorary licentiate Ying-lin followed Liu Jintang beyond the Pass. He participated in the pacification of the North and South and stayed on for the early days of Reconstruction, during which he was involved in diplomacy with Russia and establishing the Confucian schools. Ying-lin was the acting Zhendi intendant 1885-1886. Ying-lin was posted to Ili in 1883, where he worked on surveying the border with Russia in Ili. In 1888, he was appointed intendant of Ili-Tarbaghatai. In 1896, he briefly, returned to a regular post as the Zhendi intendant, and then again 1897-1899. That year, Ying-lin was sent to Gansu to serve as the Xining intendant until his death.

Sources: FHA 04-01-16-0243-130; FHA 04-01-12-0649-111; Kataoka; XJTZ 27; GZDGX 7-574-577 GX 18.12.19.

En-lun 恩綸 (n.d.) Plain Red Manchu Banner

While the documents say little about En-lun, he held high positions in Xinjiang. He served as Zhendi intendant 1886-1890, during which time he briefly (six months in 1889)
filled in for the departing financial commissioner Wei Guangtao until Rao Yingqi’s arrival. All this was fitting for one of the few *jurenp in the government.

Sources: XJTZ 27; Kataoka.

**Chen Mingyu 陈名鋐 (b. 1830) Ningxiang**

Chen Mingyu was a stipendiary. He joined the Hunan Army in 1854. The next year, he joined in the fighting in Hunan, earning a promotion after the recapture of Dong’an, and then for the pacification campaigns in Jiangxi and Anhui. By 1862, he had earned a peacock feather and the fifth rank. Following further fighting in Henan in 1866, he gained a petty post in Anhui as a prefect-in-waiting. This increased to intendant-in-waiting the next year following the siege of a rebel stronghold in Shaanxi. After further fighting in Zhili and Shandong, in 1869, he received an imperial audience. At last, Chen took up a civil post as the acting prefect of Chizhou, Anhui 1871-1872. In 1875-1877, Chen returned to Anhui to mourn his father, after which he was a prefect-in-waiting in the provincial government. In 1880, he requested to return home, but instead was transferred to Gansu, where Liu Jintang memorialized to bring him into service in the Hunan Army. The Board of War approved his appointment in Gansu under Liu.

Chen soon moved from the military hierarchy into the civilian administration. Chen was first appointed as the acting Aksu intendant and Dihua prefect around 1883-1886, though it is unclear if he arrived in office. He was the Wensu prefect from 1883 until falling ill in 1887. The province kept him in the circuit as Aksu intendant 1887-1890, which as usual led to a position as acting judicial commissioner, which he held
1890-1892. During this time, he was apparently still preoccupied with the Aksu
intendantship.

Sources: Xiang jun v. 10, p. 383; Turpan gazetteer, 2010 edition, p. 386; FHA 04-01-13-
0537-037; FHA 04-01-16-0222-059; FHA 04-01-12-0543-034; Kataoka; FHA 03-5220-
052 (GX 13.2.17 劉錦堂 《奏為署理阿克蘇道雷聲遠因病出缺欽委溫宿直隸州知州
陳名鈺暫行兼護事》); FHA 03-5253-131 (GX 15.8.26 魏光濤 《奏請以陳希洛升補
溫宿直隸州知州事》); FHA 03-5308-095 (GX 19.6.24 陶模 《奏為委任黃丙焜署理
阿克蘇道，危兆麟署理迪化府知府事》); FHA 03-5192-038 (GX 10.12.20 劉錦堂
《呈請補溫宿直隸州知州等二缺員履歷單》); FHA 04-01-12-0531-140 (GX 10.12.20
劉錦堂); FHA 04-01-12-0544-029 (GX 14.12.18 劉錦堂); Zhao 386.

Deng Yihuang 鄧以潢 (1850-1899?) Changsha

Deng Yihuang, a xiucai, joined the Hunan Army around 1870 and served under
Zuo Zongtang. In 1874, he purchased the rank of licentiate in Gansu. In 1876, he was
promoted to assistant magistrate for the pacification of Gansu. Deng traveled with the
army into Xinjiang and was promoted to magistrate-in-waiting for the reconquest in
1880, then again to prefect-in-waiting in 1884 for six years of service. His position was
formally transferred to Xinjiang in 1886, after which he was promoted to department
magistrate for the campaign against “bandits” in Ili. During this time, he worked as a
clerk to the financial commission 1886-1889, and then as the acting Changji magistrate
1889-1890. Work on building Xinjiang’s cities earned him another promotion in 1890 to
prefect-in-waiting. Deng was appointed to Suiding as a sub-district magistrate 1891-
1894. He then purchased a blue plume, but then spent two years in mourning for his mother. He returned to Xinjiang in 1897 and served as the Turpan prefect from 1899. Deng died of illness on 24 January 1901.

Sources: FHA 04-01-13-0369-048; Kataoka; FHA 03-5256-063 (ZP GX 15.12.14 魏光濤 《奏為委署溫宿直隸州知州等處知州、知縣各員事》); FHA 03-5393-023 (GX 26.10.9 饒應祺 《奏請以吐魯番同知鄧以潢補授溫宿直隸州知州事》); FHA 03-5401-045 (GX 27.1.20 潘效蘇 《奏為溫宿直隸州知州鄧以潢病故請補事》); FHA 03-5407-015 (GX 27.5.2 吳部尚書 敬信 《奏為前遵議補授溫宿直隸州知州鄧以潢病故另行揀選事》); FHA 03-5264-043 (ZP GX 16.4.15 魏光濤 《奏為委任鄧以潢署理綏定縣知縣事》); FHA 03-5375-045 (GX 25.5.4 饒應祺 《奏為委任鄧以潢署理吐魯番直隸廳同知，並楊廷珍署理哈密直隸廳通判事》); NPM 408006384 GX 26.7.17 奏為溫宿直隸州知州出缺擬以聞端蘭 借補事; NPM 130896 Z GX 20.2.30 《奏請以雷銘三委署新疆綏定知縣》; Zhao 387.

**Jiang Shixiu 蒋士修 (b. 1854) Changsha**

Jiang Shixiu was a student. In 1878, he purchased a rank as an assistant district magistrate and joined the Hunan Army. Despite not participating in the Xinjiang campaign, he was promoted for it in 1880 to district magistrate, then again in 1881 to magistrate-in-waiting, and again in 1885, when he was granted a peacock feather. Jiang succeeded Deng Yihuang as clerk to the financial commissioner in 1891, but returned home to mourn his mother 1892-1894. During that time, he was promoted again twice,
now to prefect, for the Ili pacification and on the occasion of seven years of provincehood. He returned to Dihua, and then to Maralbashi, where he was second-class sub-prefect 1896-1899, and then Yengisar prefect 1899-1901.

Jiang finished his career as Kashgar prefect 1902-1905 before setting out for a long-delayed imperial audience. He fell ill on the journey, but reached Shandong in the spring of 1906. There he encountered a family member who informed him of the previous year’s flooding in Hunan, which had destroyed the family tombs. Jiang was approved for leave to repair them, but he managed to wait out the fall of the Qing and never returned to Xinjiang.

Sources: FHA 04-01-13-0407-021; FHA 04-01-12-0650-079; FHA 03-7441-003 (XT 1.3.8 聯魁 《奏請汪步端調補疏勒府知府事》); FHA 04-01-12-0625-006 (GX 29.3.4 潘效蘇); FHA 04-01-12-0627-070 (GX 29.5 潘效蘇 《奏為委任蔣士修署理新疆疏勒府知府等員缺事》 = FHA 03-5421-058); FHA 03-5502-041 (GX 34.4.7 湖廣總督趙爾巽 《奏為新疆疏勒府知府蔣士修因回籍修理祖墓請開缺事》); FHA 04-01-12-0636-072 (GX 30.5.12 潘效蘇); FHA 03-5380-155 (ZP GX 25.9.29 饒應祺 《奏為委任蔣士修署理英吉沙直隸廳同知事》); FHA 03-5412-023 (GX 28.1.24 饒應祺 《奏為委任蔣士修署理疏勒直隸州知州等是》); FHA 03-5339-107 (GX 22.2.25 饒應祺 《奏為委任譚傳科署理和闐直隸州知州等員缺事》); FHA 03-5393-025 (ZP GX 26.11.8 饒應祺 《奏請以黃袁等員遞補英吉沙爾直隸州同知等員缺事》).
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**Abbreviations**

- FHA: First Historical Archives
- GZD: Gongzhong dang Guangxu chao zouzhe
- IOR: British Library, India Office Records
- IVR RAN: Institut Vostochnix Rukopisei
- NPM: National Palace Museum
- QXDX: Qingdai Xinjiang dang’an xuanji
- SL1: Xinjiang shuili hui baogao shu, di yi qi
- XUAR Archive: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Archives

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