



# Violence & Misconstruction: Understanding Why CounterTerrorism Measures Are Failing - the Case of Pakistan

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Violence & Misconstruction: Understanding Why Counterterrorism  
Measures Are Failing – The Case of Pakistan.

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A Thesis in the Field of International Relations

for the Degree of

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## Abstract

For the past ten years, Pakistan has been implementing counterterrorism strategies to eradicate terrorism, yet cessation of violence has not been achieved. In this thesis I explore the reasons for failure of counterterrorism strategies. Scholars suggest that violence persists in a region if there is active and passive support for it from the surrounding population. I set out to test this claim by designing and conducting a questionnaire survey that measured whether there is active and passive support for terrorism in Pakistan, whether this support is the reason for failure of counterterrorism measures, and, if there is support for violence, is it due to anti American sentiments, particular theological motives or of the corrupt local government. I find that counterterrorism measures are failing because Pakistan is not acknowledging and addressing the real factors that have promoted violence at the first place. There is active and passive support for militants in Pakistan but this support is not motivated by religion alone, nor is it due to discrete anti-American sentiments. Instead, I contend that there is active and passive support for militants because many view Islam as an alternative to secularism and as a means of achieving a just and equitable economic and social order.

To my Father,  
who always encouraged me to pursue my dreams,  
and my husband,  
who constantly helps and supports me in everything I do.

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My work benefited immensely from the advice and information shared by Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, and Safdar Abbasi, Senator of Pakistan from 2006 – 2012. I also want to thank Dr. Doug Bond, lecturer at the Harvard Extension School, for his guidance on the statistical analysis for this study; Ibrahim Aslam, who went to government offices, educational institutions and senior political leaders in Pakistan to ensure that the surveys were filled out in a timely manner for this study; and the 400 respondents who took the time out to fill the surveys.

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## Chapter I: An Introduction and Overview

Ever since the US and NATO invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the socio-political and security situation in Pakistan has been in a constant state of flux. This instability paved the way for the violence plaguing Pakistan for the past 10 years. Though the government of Pakistan has been engaged in direct interventions against terrorists and the promotion of peaceful negotiations in different parts of the country, most of these efforts have resulted in further socio-political and economic chaos.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, today Pakistan looms large in the Western imagination as the epitome of a current security threat<sup>2</sup> — a politically unstable, nuclear-armed state, threatened by fanatical and bloodthirsty Islamic terrorists.<sup>3</sup> Policymakers and analysts in Pakistan are constantly debating proposals to address terrorism in the region, but most ongoing strategies are not yielding significant results.<sup>4</sup> This thesis is an effort to analyze some of the reasons that are constantly impeding the successful implementation of counterterrorism strategies.

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<sup>1</sup> Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 4.

<sup>2</sup> By “Western” or “West” I refer to United States and the group of countries rooted in Eastern & Western Europe (excluding Turkey and Russia).

<sup>3</sup> Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 5.

<sup>4</sup> The International Crisis Group (ICG) released a report on 22 July, 2015, *Revisiting Counterterrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls*, and states that despite the action plan to counter terror strategies, the Pakistani government has been unable, and in many cases unwilling, to curb the operation of violent jihadi groups.

Scholars such as Audrey K. Cronin suggest that counterterrorism strategies are hindered if the population of a nation supports it and states that successful implementation of counterterrorism strategies require marginalization of popular support for violence.<sup>5</sup> USA and Afghan authorities claim that militants in Pakistan have both active and passive support from the surrounding population.<sup>6</sup> The most commonly held assumption for militants support in Pakistan are a) civilians and government forces support Jihad<sup>7</sup>; b) it is an expression of anti-American sentiment;<sup>8</sup> and c) it is an expression of frustration with government corruption. I set out to test these assumptions and pursued my research by exploring the following questions.

Do militants in Pakistan have active and passive support from civilians and /or government officials?<sup>9</sup> If so, is that why counterterrorism strategies are failing? If militants have support from any of these sources, is that support due to theological

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<sup>5</sup> Audrey K. Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), 280-310.

<sup>6</sup> E. Kaplan and J. Bajoria “The ISIS and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations,” U.S. *Council on Foreign Affairs* 1-3 (2010). They suggest that elements within the Pakistan government are leaking vital information and supporting terrorist groups and their activities.

<sup>7</sup> For a detailed discussion see Shadi Hamid, “Resolving America’s Islamist Dilemma: Lessons from South and South East Asia,” The Century Foundation (2008), accessed July 28, 2015, [http://www.academia.edu/1919438/Resolving\\_Americas\\_Islamist\\_Dilemma\\_Lessons\\_from\\_South\\_and\\_South\\_East\\_Asia](http://www.academia.edu/1919438/Resolving_Americas_Islamist_Dilemma_Lessons_from_South_and_South_East_Asia).

<sup>8</sup> Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,” *International Security*, 3 vol 34 (2009) 79-118. They suggest Anti American sentiments as the reason for support for militants. Also see PR Chari’s “Combating Terrorism : Devising Cooperative Countermeasures” 445. Chari argues that a phobia exists in the Muslim world against the US and Israel.

<sup>9</sup> Government officials include; individuals serving the government, military and ISI, where ISI is the premier intelligence service of Pakistan, operationally responsible for providing critical national security and intelligence assessment to the Government of Pakistan and is the largest of the three intelligence services of Pakistan, the others being the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Military Intelligence (MI).

motives, anti-America sentiments, or dissatisfaction with the purportedly corrupt and unjust local government?

### Research Problem & Hypothesis

For the past decade, Pakistan has been implementing counterterrorism strategies to eradicate terrorism, yet none of these measures have resulted in cessation of violence. It is well established that any study of violence is based on two problems: the use of violence and the legitimization of violence. In the context of Pakistan, however, it seems that terrorists and the acts of terrorism are supported, either directly or indirectly, by a large swath of population, including those individuals who might be deemed as ‘model’ citizens. This enigma represents the foundation for this thesis.

My hypothesis is that ‘counterterrorism measures have failed in Pakistan because militants have active and passive support from the surrounding population, and any military or international action against terrorists is perceived by many in the population as a war against Islam rather than a war against terrorism’.

By active support I mean hiding members, raising money, providing other sustenance, and, especially, joining the organization. By passive support I refer to ignoring obvious signs of terrorist group activity, declining to cooperate with police investigations, sending money to organizations that act as fronts for the group, and expressing support for terrorist objectives. The inability on the part of the government to curb terrorism may be connected to both active and passive support, though government corruption and incompetence are also factors.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It dates at least as far back as the Sicarii in the first century.<sup>10</sup> It has been used as an approach by countless numbers of groups in various parts of the world to achieve a diverse range of objectives, yet contemporary terrorism is frequently characterized by terms such as Jihadism, fundamentalism, or Islamic extremism. This labeling is particularly visible in explanations of terrorism in Pakistan by Western political leaders, its media, and some academic scholars, who report acts of terrorism in Pakistan largely in terms of their roots in Islamic extremism and without reference to the particular political and historical context that give rise to extremist expression.<sup>11</sup> Such rhetoric has created enormous confusion, as it implies that somehow terrorism has emerged solely from Islamic teaching and that there is a strong and causal connection between being a believer of Islam and becoming a terrorist.<sup>12</sup>

Other eminent scholars also address issues of religion and terrorism but with a different interpretation. For example, scholars such as Martha Crenshaw,<sup>13</sup> Robert

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<sup>10</sup> Amy Zalman, "Sicarii: First Century Terrorist," *About News*, November 14<sup>th</sup> 2014, accessed December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2014, <http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/Sicarii.htm>. Amy highlights that Sicarii terrorism began as Jewish resistance to Roman rule in the region, which began in 40 BCE. Fifty-six years later, in 6 CE, Judea and two other districts were combined and put under the control of Roman rule in what would later be considered greater Syria.

<sup>11</sup> Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan* (New York: Routledge, 2013), ix-xi.

<sup>12</sup> Jereon Gunning and Richard Jackson, "What's so 'Religious' about Religious Terrorism," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 372 (2011): 369-388.

<sup>13</sup> Martha Crenshaw, "Cause of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399.

Pape,<sup>14</sup> Bruce Hoffman,<sup>15</sup> and Critical Terrorism studies (CTS)<sup>16</sup> scholars contest the claim that contemporary terrorism is religiously motivated. They rightly illustrate that defining terrorists simply as mentally unbalanced extremists, misguided followers of religious leaders, or cowardly evil criminals does detract from gaining a better understanding of the underlying causes that motivate individuals and groups to resort to violence. They maintain that terrorism is a rational strategic choice that is used to attain political goals. The problem I see with their approach is that these scholars maintain a wall of separation between religion/ cultural influences and one's political behavior, and thus wrongly imply that religion and religious influences somehow are completely separate from the public 'secular' world.<sup>17</sup>

Drawing on existing literature and observational data, I argue that both approaches (one that maintains that religion is the culprit behind all violent acts and the second that maintains a wall of separation between the 'secular' and the 'religious' world) fail to represent a more complex understanding of the forces that converge to create the conditions that have given rise to violent extremism in Pakistan. A critical factor in that convergence is religion, but not as an isolated factor that functions

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<sup>14</sup> Robert Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (2003): 343-360.

<sup>15</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

<sup>16</sup> Critical Terrorism studies is a new sub-discipline of Terrorism studies. It applies a critical theory approach rooted in counter-hegemonic and politically progressive critical theory to the study of terrorism. CTS seeks to understand terrorism as a social construction, which is a linguistic term or label that is applied to acts through a range of political, legal, and academic processes.

<sup>17</sup> Timothy Samuel Shah, Alferd Stephan, and Monica Duffy Toft, *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.

independently from other influences. I will introduce and employ a more integrated understanding of violence that contemporary international relations scholars are just beginning to adopt, to explain that counterterrorism measures are failing because Pakistan is not acknowledging and addressing the real factors that have promoted violence at the first place. There is active and passive support for militants in Pakistan from both civilians and government. This support is not motivated by religion alone, nor is it due to discrete anti-American sentiments. Instead, I contend that there is active and passive support for militants because many view Islam as an alternative to secularism and as a means of achieving a just and equitable economic and social order. From this perspective, antiterrorist activities are often perceived as an attack on Islam itself.

### Research Method

I have tackled the subject from both a historical and real-time perspective. The subject matter changes on a daily basis thus I have limited myself to data available until December, 2013. To explain the increase and persistence of violence in Pakistan, I use Johan Galtung's three pronged typology of violence (Structural-Cultural-Direct) as it not only provides a very helpful vehicle to explicate the confluence of malleable factors that promote violence, but also sheds light on the aspects that give credibility and legitimacy to militants justification of violence. In order to test the hypothesis that the failure of counterterrorism is attributable to active and passive support from Pakistani society, I developed a questionnaire after having in-depth discussions with Hussain Haqqani, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, Naheed Khan, Political secretary to former



Prime Minister Benazir Butto and Safdar Ali Abbasi, ex-Pakistani senator and the central leader of the Pakistan People's Party. The questionnaire results are narrated in Chapter 3 and the detailed data gathered can be provided upon request. Structured random sampling was used and a total of 500 questionnaires were answered. In addition, the senior members of the Pakistan Peace Collective (PPC) — a project of the Information Ministry of Pakistan funded by the British High Commission, have provided enormous insight on sources of passive and active support of terrorists and extremists in Pakistan.

### Research Objective

My objective is to share my findings with western academia, media<sup>18</sup> and policy makers in Pakistan to help them comprehend that eradicating violence in the region requires counterterrorism strategies that take into account all factors that have promoted violence in Pakistan. In countering terror, it is a gross error to overlook history and ignore the grievances of the dissenting group. Denial of injustice and the tendency to respond to terror with repression only seems to worsen the situation. In addition, there is a need to recognize the importance of religious literacy and adopt measures to eradicate the sectarianism and the promotion of particular religious worldviews that are being manifested, though often unintentionally, across schools in Pakistan. In this thesis, not only will I emphasize that multiple legitimate perspectives exist for a particular religion,

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<sup>18</sup> By Western Media I mean media outlets in America and Eastern and Western Europe (excluding Turkey and Russia). Western media is mainly characterized by freedom of the press, significant amount of its news coverage is focused on various issues related to human rights, freedom, and democracy. Western media in general are considered to be more reliable than domestic Pakistani media outlets.

but will also illustrate how and why a certain theological assertion becomes more prominent than others in relationship to specific issues in a particular social/ historical context. What are the converging factors that have lent social credibility and influence to a particular theological assertion in Pakistan? How have these factors and theological assertions paved the way for active and passive support for militants? I feel that once policy makers can fully comprehend the confluence of factors that are promoting support for terrorism, they can design effective policies aimed at mitigating violence in the region. Given my hypothesis and research questions this thesis is divided into five substantive chapters. The next section will provide a brief overview of the chapters and the arguments presented.

### An Overview of the Thesis

In this thesis I seek to comprehend the reasons for failure of counterterrorism measures in Pakistan, thus the current chapter (chapter I –Introduction and Overview) is a conceptual chapter where I present the issues I see with the current delineations of terrorist and terrorism, introduce my hypothesis, give an overview of the research methodology and state the objectives of the study.

Chapter II – Literature review: I start by narrating the limitations of the current scholarly work on terrorism, give a brief history of terrorism in Pakistan and present a summary of the secondary data available on support for terrorism in Pakistan.

Chapter III – Research framework and Findings: In this chapter I introduce the three-pronged typology of violence (Structural-Cultural-Direct) by Johan Galtung, and

then illustrate the rise and persistence of violence in Pakistan through Galtung's violence triangle. My main argument is that structural violence perpetuated by the State of Pakistan led to direct violence and direct violence is legitimized/ justified via cultural violence.

Chapter IV – Hypothesis Testing: This is the qualitative section of the thesis. I first explain the research instrument (questionnaire- see annexure 1 for sample questionnaire) used to test the hypothesis. The questionnaire is divided into four parts. Part 1 is designed to gain insight on the active support for violence. Part 2 is designed to gain insight on the passive support for violence. Part 3 also focuses on active support for violence but it specifically includes questions to analyze the type of financial support individuals might be consciously or unconsciously providing to militants. Part 4 is designed to probe the reasons for active and passive support for violence. In the later part of the chapter, I list the main findings of the data collected.

Chapter V – Discussion: In this chapter, I present the results of the statistical analysis that supports my hypothesis. I was able to find a strong statistical relationship between individuals who passively support violence and are against counterterrorism measures as they perceive militants as Muslims. In addition, the analysis also indicated that a higher percentage of individuals from the government tend to show passive support for violence compared to civilians. When comparing cities, individuals from Lahore showed higher passive support for militants compared to those from Islamabad and Karachi.

Chapter VI – Conclusion & Recommendation.

## Chapter II: Literature Review

Terrorism is a complex issue and any attempt to understand terrorism must necessarily examine its myriad manifestations, multiple dynamics, causes, and complex consequences. Analysis based on monolithic visions and hopelessly naïve assumptions that violence is only perpetuated by non-state actors and the state is always the victim has restricted and confined the term. One of the most striking features of the current discourse on terrorism is that, despite massive proliferation of scholarly work on terrorism, a comprehensive globally acceptable definition fails to emerge. The vagueness, and the consequent inconsistent application of the term, has direct implications for countries like Pakistan where terrorism has resulted from a combination of global and internal factors.

Currently there are two dominating schools of thought that tend to explain the rise of terrorism. The first school of thought attributes terrorism to ‘religious extremism’ and suggests that religious belief is the main motivation behind terrorist acts. This approach is particularly discernible in explanations of terrorism in Pakistan, where terrorism is characterized by terms such as Jihadism, fundamentalism, or Islamic extremism. Western political leaders, Western media, and some academic scholars report acts of terrorism in Pakistan largely in terms of its roots in Islamic extremism and without reference to the particular political and historical context that give rise to extremist

expressions.<sup>19</sup> For instance, writing in the *Washington Post*, conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer asserted: “It is a simple and undeniable fact that the violent purveyors of monotheistic religion today are self-proclaimed warriors for Islam who shout ‘God is great’ as they slit the throats of infidels such as those of the flight crews on Sept. 11, 2001—and are then celebrated as heroes and martyrs.”<sup>20</sup> Scholars such as Bruce Hoffman, who support this approach, tend to maintain that terrorism is caused by religious extremism and fanaticism, and argue that religious actors<sup>21</sup> make irrational, faith-based choices in pursuit of their goals.<sup>22</sup> The Western media also constantly promotes the idea that religion and terror are strongly associated and often depict terrorists as delusional religious fundamentalists, hopelessly brainwashed and out of touch with reality.<sup>23</sup> However, the picture that is emerging from recent research is far different. For example, Berrebi has shown that Palestinian suicide bombers have above average education and are economically better off than the general population.<sup>24</sup> In

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<sup>19</sup> Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan* (New York: Routledge, 2013), ix – xi.

<sup>20</sup> Charles Krauthammer, “Tolerance: A two-Way Street,” *Washington Post*, September 22, 2006, accessed September 9, 2015, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/21/AR2006092101513.html>.

<sup>21</sup> Includes everything from heads of Mosques, religious councils to violent organizations such as Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami, Harkatul Mujahideen, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamatud Daawa, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jamiatul Mujahideen, Al-Badar Mujahideen, Hizbut Tehrir, Jamiatul Ansar and Lashkar-e-Islam.

<sup>22</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 2-21

<sup>23</sup> Richard Sosisa,b and Candace S. Alcottab “Militants and Martyrs: Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion and Terrorism,” Department of Sociology and Anthropology Hebrew University of Jerusalem Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, 91905 Israel.

<sup>24</sup> Claude Berrebi, “Evidence about the link between education, poverty, and terrorism among Palestinians,” *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* (2003) 30: accessed July 8, 2015,

addition, the problem with this approach is that it ignores the simple fact that religion never functions in isolation from other social, political, and economic factors. This failure of social science is similar to the manner in which leaders in Washington often describe all violent actions against the United States as terrorism, and all violent and genocidal actions committed by the United States or its allies as self-defense.<sup>25</sup> Labeling a particular group as ‘Islamic terrorists’ encourages researchers to focus solely on a narrow understanding of the group’s religious aspects while ignoring other economic, cultural, and political dynamics.<sup>26</sup> Attributing terrorism to ‘Islam’ is to overlook the state terrorism unleashed upon Palestine by Israel and against Muslims in Gujrat in 2002 and on Kashmir by the Indian state. Scholars such as Chari present US and India as the victim and Muslims as militants without showing both sides of the picture and blame the entire Muslim communities and their faith for terror without any fine distinctions.<sup>27</sup> Such essentialism can only be explained as racist and a clear case in which intellectual discourse seems to follow rather than interrogate the hegemonic discourse on terrorism.<sup>28</sup>

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<http://public-policy.huji.ac.il/upload/segel/ClaudeBerrebi/EvidenceAbouttheLinkBetweenEducation.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> Rohini Hensman, 2001. “Only Alternative to Global Terror: Father, Son and Holy War”. *Economic and Political Weekly* 36 (44). *Economic and Political Weekly*: 4184–89. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4411324>. Hensman explains how the US and terrorist groups shift their definitions of terrorism based on who is the victim and who is the perpetrator.

<sup>26</sup> Jackson et al., *Terrorism: A Critical Introduction*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 159.

<sup>27</sup> See Sridhar K. Khatri and Gert W. Kueck, *Terrorism in South Asia: Impacts on Development and Democratic Process* (Colombo: RCSS, 2003), chapter 25 P.R. Chari “Combating Terrorism: Devising Cooperative Countermeasures,” 438.

<sup>28</sup> Rohini Saigol, *The State and the Limits of Counter-Terrorism: The Case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka*, (Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan 2006).

Thus the category of Islamic terrorism is inaccurate, highly misleading, and analytically unhelpful.

The second dominant school of thought suggests that terrorism is a rational strategic choice that is used to attain certain political and/or economic goals and completely refute the claim that terrorism is religiously motivated. For example, scholars such as Martha Crenshaw,<sup>29</sup> Robert Pape,<sup>30</sup> and Critical Terrorism studies (CTS)<sup>31</sup> scholars, including Richard Jackson and Eamon Murphy, propose that defining terrorists simply and naively as mentally unbalanced extremists, misguided followers of religious leaders, or cowardly evil criminals does nothing to help us understand the underlying causes that motivate individuals and groups to resort to violence. These scholars advocate that terrorism is a rational strategic choice that is used to attain certain political goals.

The problem with their approach is that these scholars maintain a wall of separation between religious influences and political behavior, and thus, wrongly imply that religion and religious influences somehow are completely separate from the ‘secular’ and ‘political’ world.<sup>32</sup> Scholars such as Juergensmeyer who promote this approach

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<sup>29</sup> Martha Crenshaw, “Cause of Terrorism,” *Comparative Politics*, 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399.

<sup>30</sup> Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review*, 97, no. 3 (2003): 343-360.

<sup>31</sup> Critical Terrorism studies is a new sub-discipline of Terrorism studies. It applies a critical theory approach rooted in counter-hegemonic and politically progressive critical theory to the study of terrorism. CTS seeks to understand terrorism as a social construction, which is a linguistic term or label that is applied to acts through a range of political, legal, and academic processes.

<sup>32</sup> Timothy Samuel Shah, et al., *Rethinking Religion and World Affairs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.

maintain that religion should not be mixed with other worldly affairs because doing so leads to dangerous, fanatical, and uniquely explosive results such as authoritarianism, prejudice towards people who belong to other religions (or no religion at all), and violence.<sup>33</sup> In my view, these scholars make the mistake of oversimplification by associating secularism with modernity and religion with ignorance. This oversimplification makes it impossible to address the intricate ways that religion influences world affairs and thus prevent us from understanding the contemporary human affairs across the full spectrum of endeavors in local, national and global arenas.<sup>34</sup> In addition, when religion is viewed as essentially negative, it becomes difficult to think constructively about how religion might make positive contributions to contemporary politics by, for example, helping to overcome political and social conflict, cultivating self-critical and self-correcting forms of solidarity, pursuing more just laws and political institutions, and building sustainable conditions of peace.<sup>35</sup>

### The Roots of Terrorism in Pakistan

The roots of terrorism in Pakistan can be traced back to the 1980 Russian Afghan war, which twisted Pakistan's social fabric and political system. The encouragement and

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<sup>33</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), 26-44.

<sup>34</sup> Diane L. Moore, "Our Method," Harvard Divinity School, (2015), accessed July 8, 2015, [http://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/files/hds-rlp/files/our\\_method.pdf](http://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/files/hds-rlp/files/our_method.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> Atalia Omer and Jason A. Springs, *Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook* (California: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 5-6.



support of militant organizations by the government of Pakistan and Western powers attracted recruits from all over the globe who came to fight a (religious) war against the communist Soviet Union. During the war, huge quantities of arms and ammunition were stored in Pakistan. After the war, these arms were used by the militant groups in sectarian, tribal, and political violence in Pakistan. Soon after the evacuation of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and its collapse, the international community pulled back its support from the militant groups and these rebels started to fight against each other to gain land and power. Groups that had money, weapons, and political influence in the region started to move outside the border areas of Afghanistan and swiftly spread throughout Pakistan.<sup>36</sup>

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attack, the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and the subsequent collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan, other groups such as Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and their foreign affiliates—such as groups of Chechens, Uzbeks and Tajiks—sought refuge in the Pakistani tribal belt (Federally administrated tribal Area-FATA) and started organizing their resistance to NATO forces in Afghanistan from safe sanctuaries. The socio-economic and politico-religious complexion of Pakistan’s tribal region favored these militants, who were welcomed by the local Pashtuns as per the Pushtunwali code of giving sanctuary (nanawatay) and protection against one’s enemies.<sup>37</sup> The lack of presence of the Pakistani

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<sup>36</sup> Syed Fida Hassan Shah, “The Cost of Militancy,” *The News International*, February 24, 2013, accessed February 10, 2015, <http://jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2013-weekly/nos-24-02-2013/pol1.htm#8>.

<sup>37</sup> An ancient and chivalrous “code of honor” associated with Pashtuns. It is a social, cultural, and quasi-legal code, guiding, governing, and shaping both individual and communal conduct. One of its

state in the area (in accordance with an arrangement with various tribes and jirgas since 1947) and the ill-equipped Frontier Military Corps enabled a huge inflow of militants into FATA and various parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK, previously known as North-West Frontier province). Militants in bordering areas of Pakistan laid low for a couple of years but revived themselves slowly in 2003, after the United States had diverted most of its resources and energy towards Iraq. From then on, the Taliban picked their battles intelligently, made strategic alliances, and began to regain momentum. Consequently, their support networks and organizational strength increased in the tribal territories, and they emerged stronger than before under the banner of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007.<sup>38</sup>

Violence in Pakistan has been on the rise ever since 2007. Terrorist groups have targeted political leaders, the military, police, tribal leaders, minority religious sects, and schools, but the ferocity of this direct violence doesn't seem to end. In the last decade (2001–2011), 36,495 lives have been lost and 27,985 people have been injured as a result of 3,482 bomb blasts and 281 suicide attacks, as shown in Table 1.<sup>39</sup> In addition, in countering terrorism, 3,733 security personnel and 21,067 terrorists have been killed as

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primary features is nanawatay (sanctuary): protection given to a person who requests it against one's enemies. Any visitor to the area in a difficult situation can ask for sanctuary after telling that he or she meant no harm to the people of the area. That person is protected at all costs and under any circumstances.

<sup>38</sup> Hassan Abbas, "Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan" *Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel* (2008): 1-4, accessed November 10, 2014, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CTC%20Sentinel%20-%20Profile%20of%20Tehrik-i-Taliban%20Pakistan.pdf>.

<sup>39</sup> M. S. A. Malik et al. "Identification of Risk Factors Generating Terrorism in Pakistan," *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2014): 537-556

shown in Table 2.<sup>40</sup> A cursory analysis of the Global Terrorism Database reveals that over the past decade, Pakistan has had the highest number of terrorism-related deaths in the world as shown in Table 3.<sup>41</sup> In fact, the death toll exceeds the combined terrorism-related deaths for both Europe and North America. The crackdown on terrorist organizations by the coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the porous border, has permitted the flow of terrorism and militancy from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The result is that Pakistan has become one of the most volatile countries in the world.<sup>42</sup> Most attacks took place in the city of Karachi, Peshawar, and Quetta with further significant activity in Bajaur, Dera Bugti (District), Khyber (District) and Mohmand.<sup>43</sup>

**Table 1.** State of suicide attacks, bomb blasts, and civilian casualties in last 10 years in Pakistan

Year	Number of suicide attacks	Number of bomb blasts	Killed	Injured
2000	1	84	79	316
2001	3	62	48	342
2002	1	35	62	277
2003	2	41	84	203
2004	7	137	332	1309
2005	4	246	293	784
2006	7	301	519	1116
2007	54	679	1796	4059
2008	59	600	2144	4919
2009	76	500	2614	6667
2010	49	473	2714	5780
2011	22	324	1010	2213
Total	281	3482	11695	27985

<sup>40</sup> Table 1 is taken from M. S. A. Malik et al. "Identification of Risk Factors Generating Terrorism in Pakistan," *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2014): 537-556.

<sup>41</sup> Table 2 is taken from Sultan Mehmood, "The Roots of Terrorism" *The Dawn*. September 29, 2013. <http://www.dawn.com/news/796177/the-roots-of-terrorism>.

<sup>42</sup> Table 3 is taken from Zachary Laub, "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists," *Council of Foreign Relations*, November 18, 2013. Accessed November 20, 2013.

<sup>43</sup> Institute for economics and peace, Global terrorism index – Capturing the impact of terrorism from 2002 – 2011," <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2012-Global-Terrorism-Index-Report.pdf>.

**Table 2.** State of military and terrorist fatalities in countering terrorism

Year	Military personnel	Terrorists
2003	24	25
2004	184	244
2005	81	137
2006	325	538
2007	597	1479
2008	654	3908
2009	991	8389
2010	469	5170
2011	408	1177
Total	3733	21,067

**Table 3.** State of other coalition forces' casualties in war against terrorism

Year	ALB	AUS	BE	CAN	CZ	DEN	EST	FIN	FRA	GEO	GER	HUN	ITA	JOR	LAT	LIT	NATO	NED	NZ	NOR	POL	POR	ROM	SK	SPA	SWE	TUR	UK	USA	Total	
2001	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	12
2002	0	1	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	49	70
2003	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	48	58
2004	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	52	60	
2005	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	18	2	0	1	99	131	
2006	0	0	0	36	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	39	98	191	
2007	0	3	0	30	1	6	2	1	3	0	7	0	2	0	0	0	0	8	0	2	1	1	1	1	4	0	0	42	117	232	
2008	0	3	0	32	2	13	1	0	11	0	3	2	2	0	1	1	0	6	0	0	7	0	3	0	2	0	0	51	155	295	
2009	0	4	1	32	0	7	4	0	11	0	7	0	9	1	2	0	0	3	0	1	8	0	3	0	1	0	2	108	317	521	
2010	0	10	0	16	0	9	1	0	16	5	9	2	12	0	0	0	0	4	1	5	6	0	6	0	4	3	0	103	499	711	
2011	0	11	0	4	2	3	1	1	26	5	7	3	8	1	0	0	6	0	4	1	13	0	2	0	4	0	0	46	418	566	
2012	1	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	7	0	0	5	0	0	0	2	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	44	310	402	
Total	1	39	1	158	5	42	9	2	86	17	53	7	47	2	3	1	8	25	11	10	35	2	19	1	34	5	14	438	2174	3249	

ALB: Albania, AUS: Australia, BE: Belgium, CAN: Canada, CZ: Czech Republic, DEN: Denmark, EST: Estonia, FIN: Finland, FRA: France, GEO: Georgia, GER: Germany, HUN: Hungary, ITA: Italy, JOR: Jordan, LAT: Latvia, LIT: Lithuania, NED: Netherlands, NZ: New Zealand, NOR: Norway, POL: Poland, POR: Portugal, ROM: Romania, SK: South Korea, SPA: Spain, SWE: Sweden, TUR: Turkey, UK: United Kingdom, USA: United States of America.

## Support for Terrorism in Pakistan

Suspicion of active support for militants in Pakistan started as early as 2002.

Many avowedly Islamist parties in Pakistan took positions that were explicitly tolerant of some forms of political violence. In fact, the ulema political parties associated with two of the most important traditions in Pakistan (Deobandism and Jamaat-e-Islami) have long had direct and indirect ties with an array of militant groups.<sup>44</sup> For example, the Deobandi ulema party, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami, has overlapping membership with militant groups that operate in Afghanistan and India and against religious minorities in Pakistan (e.g. the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistan Taliban, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi).<sup>45</sup> Jamaat-e-Islami, both a masalik and a political party, has long had direct ties with militant groups, such as Hizbol Mujahideen and al Badr that operate in Afghanistan and India.<sup>46</sup> Other leading political parties in Pakistan also tend to take a soft position on militants. For instance Imran Khan, the head of the Pakistan Tahreek-e-Insaf (the third most popular party in the region), has been openly condemning any military operations against Talibans and perceives the killing of Talibans by the Pakistan military as the slaying of Muslims.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Christine Fair et. al, "Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan," *Oxford Journals* (2012): 688- 720, doi: 10.1093/poq/nfs053.

<sup>45</sup> Christine Fair et. al, "Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan," *Oxford Journals* (2012): 688- 720, doi: 10.1093/poq/nfs053.

<sup>46</sup> Husain Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Hudson Institute (2005) 1:12-26.

<sup>47</sup> Aamer Riaz, "Is Imran Khan really Pro-Taliban?" *The Pakistan Tribune*, Oct 14, 2012, accessed September 25, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/451128/is-imran-khan-really-pro-taliban/>.

The Pakistan Peace Collective (PPC) and the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) have evidence that militants continue to have a strong support base in Pakistan. U.S. and Afghan authorities have claimed that elements within the Pakistan ISI were leaking vital information and supporting terrorist groups and their activities.<sup>48</sup>

In 2009, the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) conducted a study on 14 major militant groups (Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami, Harkatul Mujahideen, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamatud Daawa, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jamiatul Mujahideen, Al-Badar Mujahideen, Hizbut Tehrir, Jamiatul Ansar and Lashkar-e-Islam) in order to understand the level of financial support that these groups get. It concluded that these groups generate 55 to 65 percent of their funds from local sponsors.<sup>49</sup> Most of the time, these sponsors have no idea who they are actually funding. Organizations working as charities or madrassas collect donations from commercial centers and in door-to-door campaigns, ostensibly for charitable pursuits, but donate these to militant organizations. People respond generously to such drives, especially during Ramadan and the two Eid festivals. In addition to local support, militants also receive financial support from individuals abroad, including expatriate

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<sup>48</sup> E. Kaplan and J. Bajoria "The ISIS and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations," *U.S Council on Foreign Affairs*. (2010):1- 3.

<sup>49</sup> The estimates are based on claims made by militant organizations in their publications or during interviews.

Pakistanis.<sup>50</sup> Figure 1 summaries public support for domestic terrorism; it was formulated in December 2012 during a focus group effort from members of PPC and PIPS including Amir Rana, Athar Abbas (a two-star general and a former military spokesperson for the Pakistan Defense Forces who served as the Director General of Inter Services Public Relations from January 2008 to June 2012), and Tariq Pervaiz (served as head of the National Counter Terrorism Authority NACTA till July 2010).




Figure 1: Sources of Public Support for Domestic Terrorism in Pakistan (Pakistan Peace Collective December 2012).

<sup>50</sup> Amir Rana, "Financial Resources of Militant and Religious Organizations in Pakistan." Conflict and Peace Studies. no 3, (2009). 3-6

### Chapter III: Research Framework & Findings

I treat this subject from both historical and contemporary perspectives. The study design is both descriptive and empirical in nature, hence this chapter is divided into two sections. In Section I, I explain the rise and persistence of violence in Pakistan, using Johan Galtung's framework for violence. In Section II, I explain the research method used to test the hypothesis (that probes the reasons for failure of counterterrorism measures in Pakistan) and in the later part of the section illustrate my findings.

#### Johan Galtung: Forms of Violence and Peace

Johan Galtung, a Norwegian theorist, presented a framework referred to as the three-pronged typology of violence (Structural-Cultural-Direct). The framework explains how a confluence of malleable factors merge in particular cultural/historical moments to shape the conditions for the promotion of violence (and, by inference, peace) to function as normative.<sup>51</sup> I find this framework very helpful for comprehending the complex roles that religion and culture have played in Pakistan to legitimize violence. I briefly explain the framework, and then I use it to illustrate the rise and persistence of violence in Pakistan.

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<sup>51</sup> Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence" *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 3. (Aug, 1990), 291-305.



Galtung splits violence into three separate divisions, where all three divisions interact as a triad (as shown in Figure 2) and are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Let's look at each individual form of violence.




Figure 2: Galtung's Violence Triangle<sup>52</sup>

#### Direct violence

The first type of violence represents behaviors that serve to threaten life itself or to diminish one's capacity to meet basic human needs. It involves the use of physical force, like killing or torture, rape and sexual assault, and beatings. Verbal violence, like humiliation or put downs, is also becoming more widely recognized as direct violence. It should be noted here that even a threat to use force is also recognized as direct violence. Direct violence, both physical and verbal, is visible as behavior in Galtung's triangle.

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<sup>52</sup> Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence" *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 3. (Aug, 1990), 291-305.

## Structural violence

The second form of violence is almost always invisible; it is embedded in ubiquitous social structures and normalized by stable institutions and regular experience. It represents the systematic ways in which some groups are hindered from equal access to opportunities, goods, and services that enable the fulfillment of basic human needs. It is the injustice and exploitation built into a social system that generate wealth for the few and poverty for the many and stunt everyone's ability to develop their full humanity.<sup>53</sup> It includes favoring some classes, ethnicities, genders, and races over others, and institutionalizing unequal prospects for education, resources, and respect such as limited access to education or health care for marginalized groups. Structural violence forms the foundation of capitalism, patriarchy, and any system of domination.<sup>54</sup> Theories of structural violence explore how political, economic and cultural structures result in the occurrence of avoidable violence, most commonly seen as the deprivation of basic human needs. Structural theorists attempt to link personal suffering with political, social and cultural choices.

## Cultural violence

This form of violence in Galtung's typology represents those aspects of culture - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, and empirical and formal science

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<sup>53</sup> Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence" *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 3. (Aug, 1990), 291-305.

<sup>54</sup> William T. Hathaway, "Varieties of Violence: Structural, Cultural, and Direct," accessed February 25, 2015, <https://www.transcend.org/tms/2013/10/varieties-of-violence-structural-cultural-and-direct/>.

(logic, mathematics) – that make direct and structural violence seem ‘natural’ or ‘right’, or at least acceptable. For example, all cultures recognize that killing a person is murder, but killing tens, hundreds or thousands during a declared conflict is called ‘war’ or killing of innocent people by drone attacks is termed as ‘collateral damage’. Galtung’s understanding of cultural violence helps explain how prominent beliefs can become so embedded in a given culture that they are perceived as absolute and inevitable and are reproduced uncritically across generations. For example, religious beliefs are being used in Pakistan both to support direct violence (militants justify their actions through Islamic verses) and condemn direct violence (religious scholars present Islamic teachings to reject the justification given by terrorists). Diverse and conflicting religious influences are almost always present in a culture. Thus, it is almost impossible to comprehend cultural violence in a society without understanding the complex religious influences.<sup>55</sup>

The relationship between these three types of violence can then be considered by placing the three terms on each vertex of a triangle, as shown in Figure 2. The phenomenology of violence generates a wide variety of results, depending on the position of the triangle; it can take six positions, with each of the three vertices pointing upward or downward. The vertex or vertices on the top of the triangle represent the type of violence that is influencing the type (or types) of violence on the bottom. There are linkages and causal in all six directions. In Figure 2, the triangle stands on direct and structural violence and cultural violence becomes the source that acts as the legitimizer of both. If

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<sup>55</sup> Diane L. Moore, “Our Method,” *Harvard Divinity School* (2015), accessed July 8, 2015, [http://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/files/hds-rlp/files/our\\_method.pdf](http://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/files/hds-rlp/files/our_method.pdf).

we reposition the triangle to stand on direct violence head, then structural and cultural violence act as the sources of direct violence. I explain this vicious violence triangle in detail using the case of Pakistan.

### The Interrelation of Cultural, Direct & Structural Violence in Pakistan

In case of Pakistan, the Galtung triangle is standing on direct violence head and structural violence and cultural violence act as the sources see Figure 3. The prolonged corrupt bureaucratic system in Pakistan led individuals into seeing exploitation and repression by the system as normal and natural. This embedded structural violence promoted direct violence, and cultural violence, the religious and ideological principles on which militant organizations are formulated, gave militants credibility, legitimacy and the ability to justify the use of direct violence. In the rest of this chapter, I will illustrate this phenomenon in more detail.




Figure 3: Galtung’s Violence Triangle – A Case of Pakistan

## Structural & Direct Violence in Pakistan

*Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe.*

- Frederick Douglass (From Douglass' speech in 1886 on the 24th anniversary of Emancipation, Washington, D.C.)

Today every institution of Pakistan is entrenched with sectarianism, social injustice, corruption, and class tensions.<sup>56</sup> The government of Pakistan has long been marked by a lack of accountability. Power and expertise are highly concentrated and largely reside in nonelected institutions and their supporters.<sup>57</sup> Even after 68 years of independence, political parties in the country are still poorly evolved and tend to articulate goals that appeal to the aspirations of particular ethnic and religious groups.<sup>58</sup> Despite relatively impressive economic growth (currently about 4.2 percent a year), economic returns have been largely directed toward meeting defense, debt-servicing, and administrative costs while neglecting human development. Social services are poor and often funded through foreign aid. Today, approximately 17.2 percent of the population

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<sup>56</sup> Muhammad Nadeem Shah, "Evolution of Sectarianism in Pakistan: A Threat to the State and Society," *South Asian Studies*. 29, no.2 (2014): 441-459.

<sup>57</sup> Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 49.

<sup>58</sup> Peter Gizewski and Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Pakistan," (1996) accessed April 22, 2014, <http://www.homerdixon.com/projects/eps/pakistan/pak1.htm>.

live in absolute poverty<sup>59</sup>, infant mortality stands at 69 per thousand live births<sup>60</sup>, and 72 percent of the adult population aged 15 and over is illiterate.<sup>61</sup> Underlying the system's lack of political accountability and its developmental approach is a state structure deeply penetrated by powerful vested interests. Ownership of land and industry remains highly concentrated, and it lies mainly in the hands of the bureaucracy and its supporters.<sup>62</sup> Land grants, lucrative defense contracts, permits, loans, licenses, and jobs are awarded on the basis of personal contacts and the ability to perform political favors rather than on the basis of merit.<sup>63</sup> Over time, such practices have become accepted as necessary and inevitable ways of conducting business, both within and outside government.

The ethos of greed and an absence of civic-mindedness exacerbate regional, ethnic and class divisions within Pakistani society.<sup>64</sup> This promotes many forms of direct violence, including terrorism. The underlying assumption here is simple: violence breeds violence. Violence is needs deprivation; needs deprivation is serious; one reaction is

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<sup>59</sup> "UNDP Reports Pakistan Poverty Declined to 17%, Under Musharraf". Pakistan Daily. 7 September 2009. Retrieved 2012-03-12.

<sup>60</sup> World Bank, 2013, [data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN)

<sup>61</sup> World Bank, *Trends in Developing Economies* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2012), 384.

<sup>62</sup> Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 142-145.

<sup>63</sup> Thomas F. Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, *Eco violence: Links Among Environment, Population and Security*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 152.

<sup>64</sup> Peter Gizewski and Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Pakistan," (1996) accessed April 22, 2014, <http://www.homerdixon.com/projects/eps/pakistan/pak1.htm>.

direct violence. But that is not the only reaction and certainly not the only response we are observing in Pakistan. There are feelings of hopelessness and deprivation present in all most all age groups. These feelings are manifested through aggression, apathy and withdrawal. For example, take the statement of a fourteen-year-old Pakistani boy named Shaheed (which in English means ‘martyr’), who desires to be recruited by Pakistani Taliban to become a terrorist:

On the Day of Judgment, my God will call me, my body will be put together and God will ask me: ‘Why did you do it?’ I will answer: ‘My Lord, only to make you happy. I have laid down my life to fight the infidels.’ Then God will look at my intention and see that it was to eradicate evil for Islam then I will be rewarded with paradise.<sup>65</sup>

Sadly, boys like Shaheed, who aspire to be recruited by terrorist organizations, are present today in all parts of Pakistan. Aspirations of Shaheed, to commit to violence even before he grows up, are not only a clear indication of active support for militants in Pakistan, but should also direct our attention to the reasons that lead a young boy to commit a divine mandate for destruction. Clearly this commitment to destruction cannot be attributed only to the constant social discrimination embedded in the society. The choice to become a terrorist requires a great deal of internal conviction, social acknowledgement, and stamp of approval from a legitimizing ideology or authority one respects (such as religious conviction).<sup>66</sup> Many activists like Shaheed strongly believe

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<sup>65</sup> Stated by Obaid-Chinoy, 2009 and referenced by Abrahms, Max. 2006. “Why Terrorism Does Not Work.” *International Security* 3, no. 2: 48.

<sup>66</sup> Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) 11-12.

that their communities are under attack and their acts are simply a response to the violence done against not only them but also against their religion (as can be depicted from Shaheed's narrative). It is for this reason that I feel the increased influence of Western culture (American in particular) and constant pressure to make Pakistan a more secular state act as the trigger. The apodictic link between a secular society and modernization (development and progress) can be perceived as a form of violence that challenges the ideological beliefs, including but not exclusively religious, of many in Pakistan. America and the West are perceived by many as the 'top dog' that controls the global economy and directs the actions of the government of Pakistan and other leading institutions. Those who carry out violent acts, and those who actively or passively support violence, often doing so in order to break free from Western hegemony, and thus the iron cage of socio-economic discrimination. Islam and an Islamic society represent for many an alternative to Western-style modernization. Therefore, I assert that for many it is not the religious dogma that is motivating individuals to support militants in Pakistan, but instead it is the view that Islam is an alternative to secularism as a means of achieving a just and equitable economic order.



## Chapter IV: Hypothesis Testing

In order to test my hypothesis, I have used a self-administered questionnaire as means to study and analyze whether there is patronage for militants from the general population of Pakistan, whether this support is the reason behind failure of counterterrorism measures, and whether being against counterterror measures is due to the perception that militants are Muslims. It is important to note here that a few of the questions in the questionnaire were inspired from the survey designed by Maria Sobolewska to study the support for terrorism among the British population in 2012.<sup>67</sup> The questionnaire consists of twenty-two questions: two demographic questions are for labeling variables, nineteen questions are based on an ordinal scale that measures the degree of support for militants, and one question is open-ended. To test the validity of the questionnaire, I did an initial pilot-test on fifteen respondents. Based on the result and feedback gathered, I changed the language of a few questions to improve the clarity of the questions, and not to elicit a different set of answers. The finalized questionnaire was then used to gather data and structured random sampling was used as the method. I personally travelled to Pakistan in mid-July, 2015 to be sure to gather the responses for the survey in a timely manner.

The survey was carried out from June 15<sup>th</sup> 2015 to September 15<sup>th</sup>, 2015. A total of 500 questionnaires were sent out, of which 250 were printed and given to individuals

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<sup>67</sup> Maria Sobolewska, "Measuring Support for Terrorism: A Survey Experiment and an Attempt at a Comparison" (paper presented at the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties conference, Oxford, September 2012).

to fill out manually. I later entered the responses into Survey Monkey myself and 250 responses were filled by respondents directly using the Survey Monkey link. Out of the total responses received, 155 were rejected because they were not fully completed by the respondents. It is assumed that the sample size (N=345) is representative of the population. The data was collected from three largest cities of Pakistan, which also represent the political hub of the three largest political parties in the country: Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore. Figure 4 below highlights the number of respondents for each city.




Figure 4 – Respondents City of Residence.

My focus was to get the feedback from the following two groups of respondents: civilians and government officials. Civilians include all respondents that are not in any way associated with the government or working in any of the government institutions. Government officials are all individual that are part of the government or working in any government institution. The percentage and number of respondents for each category is shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5 – Respondents Occupation.

The questionnaire was divided into four sections. The first part of the survey was aimed at attaining insight on the active supporters who strongly held the view that terrorist attacks are “right,” and that acts of direct violence on civilians, police officers, and government officials are justified. Individual data result of each of the seven question asked under Section 1 are attached in the appendix section of the thesis. Respondents were only given two response choices per question under this section, and on average 28.7 percent of the respondents indicated that violence is justified given certain circumstances. However, when respondents were asked directly about particular incidences of direct violence, and were given nuanced answer choices, very few respondents offered support for violence or terrorism. Active support for the motives of terrorists fell with more options, and could be a result of some respondents choosing a weaker lack of support option instead of not supporting violence. The individual data collected for each of the seven questions was merged together to analyze active support for violence in Pakistan.

Table 4 below presents the summary of count and percentage for the data.

Active support for violence	Count	Percent	Cumulative
Donot Support Violence	246	71.3%	71.3%
Active supporters of violen...	99	28.7%	100%
Total	345	100%	

Table 4: Summary of Active Support for Violence

Given the results from Table 4, I wanted to determine if individuals who actively support violence are against the counterterrorism measures taken by government of Pakistan. My null hypothesis was:

$H_0$ : There is in difference on the views on counterterrorism between those who actively support terrorism and those who do not support terrorism.

Active support for violence	Strongly agree with the attacks	Agree with the attacks	Not Sure	Against the attacks	Strongly against the attacks	Total
Actively support violence	7.2%	3.0%	5.4%	9.9%	3.9%	29.50%
Don't Support Violence	20.2%	13.9%	5.7%	18.4%	12.3%	70.50%
Total	27.40%	16.90%	11.10%	28.30%	16.30%	100%

Table 5: Active Support for Violence and Views on Counterterrorism Measures.

The percentage summary of the results is presented in Table 5. I ran both chi square and P value tests on the data, using the online-based software “Statwing” and kept the level of confidence at 95%. The P-value = 0.0124, and the Chi Square  $X^2 = 12.8$  (degrees of freedom = 4); the critical value at 0.05 comes to be 9.488. The results of both tests support rejecting the null hypothesis. There is a subtle, but statistically significant,

correlation between active support for violence and views on military action taken against terrorists. Among the individuals who actively support violence, a statistically lower percentage of them tend to agree with military action taken against terrorists. Among individuals that do not actively support violence, a statistically higher percentage of them agree with the military attacks against terrorists.

The second part of the questionnaire was designed to gain insight into the “passive” support for terrorism—to probe individuals who might sympathize with the motives of terrorists. Four questions were asked in this section. The individual data collected for each of the four questions was merged together to analyze passive support for violence in Pakistan. The Table 5 below presents the summary of count and percentage for the data.




Table 6: Summary of Passive Support for Violence

In order to analyze passive support, I took the data from the above table and tested to see whether individuals who passively support violence are against the counterterrorism measures taken by government of Pakistan. My null hypothesis was;

H<sub>0</sub>: There is no difference in the views on counter terrorism between those who passively support terrorism and those who do not support terrorism.

Views on military action taken against terrorists						
Passive support for violence	Strongly agree with the attacks	Agree with the attacks	Not Sure	Against the attacks	Strongly against the attacks	Total
Passively support violence	↓ 7.5%	6.6%	5.1%	16.3%	↑ 12.0%	47.60%
Don't support violence	↑ 19.9%	10.2%	6.0%	12.0%	↓ 4.2%	52.40%
<b>Total</b>	<b>27.4%</b>	<b>16.9%</b>	<b>11.1%</b>	<b>28.3%</b>	<b>16.3%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 7: Passive Support for Violence and Views on Counterterrorism Measures.

The percentage summary of the results is presented in Table 7. I ran both chi square and P value tests on the data. P value = 0.00001 < 0.05. Chi Square  $X^2 = 35.2$  Degrees of freedom = 4 critical value at 0.05 comes to be 9.488

Based on the results of both tests we can reject the null hypothesis. There is a strong statistically significant relationship between passive support for violence and views on military action taken against terrorists. Among individuals who passively support violence, a statistically higher percentage of them tend to disagree with any military action taken against terrorists. Among individuals that do not passively support violence, a statistically higher percentage of them agree with the military attacks against terrorists.

The third part of the questionnaire was aimed at analyzing the type of financial support respondents might be consciously or unconsciously providing to the militants. Three direct questions were asked under this section that probed the way individuals give charity. 91percent of the respondents indicated that they give charity, however only about

34 percent knew exactly what their charity money was being used for. Although a more in-depth study is needed to assert a claim that charity given by 65 percent of the

Table 8: Passive Support for Violence, Views on counterterrorism measures and perceive

	Perceive Militants as Misguided Muslims				
Passive support & counterterrorism	Yes	No	Sometimes	Other	Total
Passively support violence and are against counter terrorism measures	↑ 86%	↓ 23.1%	↓ 33.3%	0.6%	100%
Don't support violence & support counter terrorism measures	↓ 14%	↑ 76.9%	↑ 66.7%	0.0%	100%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

militants as Misguided Muslims

population is being directly or indirectly used to fund terrorist organizations, the mere indication that 65 percent of the population is unaware of where their donation money is being spent is very alarming.

The last section of the questionnaire probed the reasons for supporting violence. Three questions were asked under this section to determine whether those who support violence, either actively or passively are against counterterrorism measures because they perceive militants as Muslims and perceive any direct action against militants as slaying of Muslims. I separately ran P-value and Chi Square test for both active and passive supporters for violence to analyze the below null hypotheses:

H<sub>0</sub>: Active supporters of violence are against counterterrorism measures because they view it as Anti-Muslim.

H<sub>0</sub>: Passive supporters of violence are against counterterrorism measures because they view it as Anti-Muslim.

For active supporters of violence, I was not able to find any statistically significant result, and I therefore failed to reject the null hypothesis. However, when it came to passive supporters, I was able to find a strong statistically significant relationship between those who passively supported violence, were against counter terrorism measures, and viewed militants as Muslims. The Table 8 below summaries the result.

I ran both chi square and P value test on the data.

P value = 0.00001 <0.05

Chi Square = 54.4 Degrees of freedom = 3 critical value at 0.05 comes to be 7.815.

The results of both test support rejecting the null hypothesis. There is a strong statistically significant relationship between passive support for violence, being against counterterrorism measures, and perceiving militants as misguided Muslims. Among individuals who passively support violence and are against counterterrorism measures, a statistically higher percentage of them tend to view militants as misguided Muslims. Among individuals that do not passively support violence and support counterterrorism measures, a statistically lower percentage of them tend to view militants as misguided Muslims.



## Chapter V: Discussion

Pakistan as a state has been under constant global pressure to end terrorism within and across its eastern and western borders for more than a decade. As a result, the country's government and military have implemented numerous counterterrorism strategies, but none of those strategies has resulted in a significant decrease of violence. I wanted to explore the reason behind that through this thesis. I started my research by gathering scholarly work pertaining to terrorism in Pakistan and found a major flaw with the current scholarly approaches that are used to explain terrorism. They either suggest that religion is the culprit behind all violent acts or completely disregard religion as the reason and suggest ideological and political reasons as the motive. I argue in this thesis that both these approaches tend to overlook the full confluence of malleable factors that have merged in Pakistan to shape the conditions for the promotion of violence. I used Johan Galtung's framework of violence to explain the factors that have shaped the conditions that have promoted violence in Pakistan. To understand the failure of counterterrorism in Pakistan I proposed the hypothesis that 'counterterrorism measures are failing in Pakistan because militants have active and passive support from the surrounding population and any military or international action against terrorists is perceived by many in the population as a war against Islam'. To test this, I designed a survey that was distributed among 500 respondents in Pakistan. Below I discuss the major findings from the survey.

### Active Support for Violence

The data gathered indicated that 28.7 percent of the population agrees with the direct actions taken by the militants in Pakistan. I was able to find a subtle statistical relationship between those who actively support violence and oppose counterterrorism measures. However, I was not able to find any statistically significant relationship between individuals who actively support violence and are against counterterrorism measures because they perceive militants as misguided Muslims.

### Passive Support for Violence

The data gathered indicated that 46.1 percent of the population sympathize or understand the direct actions taken by militants in Pakistan i.e. indicated passive support for violence. I was able to find a strong statistical relationship between individuals who passively support violence and those who are against counterterrorism measures. In addition, I found a statistically significant relationship between individuals who passively support violence and those who are against counterterrorism measures because they perceive militants as misguided Muslims. I further wanted to see if this statistically significant relationship holds for both civilians and government officials. Out of the total government officials that filled the questionnaire, 56 percent indicated passive support for terrorism (13.6 percent when the data result of both civilians and government individuals is summed up). In comparison, out of the total civilians who filled the questionnaire, 42.5 percent (32.2 percent when the data result of both civilians and government individuals is summed up) indicated passive support for terrorism. Looking at these numbers it can be said that even though passive support for violence exists in both groups, a higher

percentage of government officials tend to show passive support for violence (as shown in Table 9). These results are parallel to the constant claims by the USA and Afghan authorities that elements within the Pakistan government are leaking vital information and supporting terrorist groups and their activities.<sup>68</sup>

	Passive support for violence	Do not support violence	Total
<b>Civil</b>	32.2%	43.5%	75.70%
<b>Government</b>	13.6%	10.7%	24.30%
<b>Total</b>	45.90%	54.10%	100%

Table 9: Passive Support for Violence (Civilians vs Government Officials)

I also wanted to test and see if there is any difference in passive support for violence between the three cities from which the data was gathered. I found that residents of Lahore tend to show higher passive support for violence compared to residents of Islamabad and Karachi (see Table 10).

	Passive support for violence	Do not support violence	Total
<b>Islamabad</b>	↓ 19.1%	↑ 32.5%	51.60%
<b>Lahore</b>	↑ 18.5%	14.6%	33.10%
<b>Karachi</b>	8.7%	6.6%	15.20%
<b>Total</b>	46.30%	53.70%	100%

Table 10: Passive Support for Violence – Comparison of Cities (Lahore, Karachi & Islamabad)

<sup>68</sup> Eben Kaplan and Jayshree Bajoria “The ISIS and Terrorism: Behind the Accusations” *Council on Foreign Affairs*. (2010):1- 3.

My analysis confirmed the hypothesis. I was able to find a strong, statistically-significant relationship between those who passively support violence, perceive militants as misguided Muslims, and are against counterterrorism measures. This passive support for violence can also be verified by the open resentment to military action by lawyers, political parties, High court Bar Associations, and rights activists.<sup>69</sup>

I do want to point out here that I was personally extremely surprised by the results I received to the questions on perception of militants. A total of 64 percent of the respondents felt that individuals who carried out acts of direct violence are ‘misguided Muslims’ and the remaining 36 percent indicated that they were not Muslims. It is critical here to focus on the term ‘misguided Muslim’ as it reveals an important cultural aspect of the society—it highlights respondents deeply embedded religious and cultural beliefs (i.e. respondents feel that their theological assertions are the ‘true Islam’). Another thing that stood out in the survey result was the indication that majority of the population in Pakistan felt that their religion or religious values are under attack. Even though when respondents were directly asked if they felt that their religion is threatened by other religions or secular groups, 64 percent of the respondents said ‘no’, the responses to open ended questions suggest otherwise. These results highlight the increasing sectarian and religious conflicts in Pakistan’s society which unfortunately are the manifestation of the era of General Zia ul Haq (also termed as the era of Islamization of Pakistan). Under the

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<sup>69</sup> Rubina Saigol, *The State and the Limits of Counter Terrorism: The Case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka*, (Council of Social Sciences Pakistan, 2006), 19.

military rule of General Zia Ul Haq (1977-1988) Pakistan came to be defined in religious terms.<sup>70</sup> Since then Pakistan acquired a religious identity. This push towards Islamization influenced all sectors of the society including educational institutes, which over time led to proliferation of sectarianism and class differences. This phenomenon is also explained by Atalia Omer in her book *When Peace is Not Enough*, “Any nation that is defined through an exclusionary reliance on markers such as race, ethnicity and religion, is inherently discriminatory and thus fundamentally unjust.”<sup>71</sup>

In the last section of the questionnaire, I asked respondents to give their narrative on the reasons for rise of violence in Pakistan. While all listed social injustice, bureaucracy, corruption, income inequalities, high unemployment and poor social welfare system — many indicated it to be the outcome of giving in to U.S. dictates. There is general perception in Pakistan that government policies are dictated by the U.S. officials, and that the United States controls the global economy. This control of the global economy is termed as the outcome of modernization and the constant push towards secularization.

If we see these results in light of Galtung’s framework of violence explained in Chapter III, the enigma of the rise and persistence of violence in Pakistan then becomes quite clear. Structural violence perpetuated both by the State of Pakistan and the West (especially the U.S.) over time gave rise to feelings of hopelessness among the majority

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<sup>70</sup> Rubina Saigol, *The State and the Limits of Counter Terrorism: The Case of Pakistan and Sri Lanka*, (Council of Social Sciences Pakistan, 2006), 20.

<sup>71</sup> Atalia Omer, *When Peace Is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism, and Justice*, (University of Chicago Press, 2013), 3.

of the population and led to mass eruption of direct violence not just against the state actors (to fight injustice perpetrated by the state), but also between groups belonging to different religious sects (to defend the groups' particular theological assertions). Violence reproduced violence, and the violence of the oppressed came to even exceed the violence of the oppressor. Furthermore, these vicious acts of direct violence are justified through particular theological assertions that are indoctrinated into young individuals (not always intentionally) via madrassas and other educational sources.<sup>72</sup> Islam is presented as the solution to eliminate class inequality, discrimination, bureaucracy, and socio economic disparity, which are perceived as the manifestation of modern democracy and secularism. So if Islam is seen as an alternative to the modern state and a secular society as a way to achieve a more just and equitable economic order, then it can be argued that it is not religious dogma, but instead the ways of life that a religious perspective represents, that motivates support for militants in Pakistan. From this perspective, antiterrorist activities are often perceived as an attack on Islam itself.

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<sup>72</sup> Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, "Islam and the State: A Counter Narrative," *The News Pakistan*, January, 2015, accessed October, 2015, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-297690-Islam-and-the-State-A-Counter-Narrative>.

## Chapter VI: Conclusion & Recommendations

In exploring the causes and dynamics of terrorism and counterterrorism in Pakistan, I was able to illustrate that violence is not the monopoly of a particular group, whether religious, national, state, or non-state. Any group can resort to violence depending on the circumstances. The state is not always the victim of violence, but frequently also the perpetrator of violence, especially when it seeks to homogenize diverse identities into a monolithic one. Violence tends to reproduce violence. The violence of the oppressed comes to match or even exceed the violence of the oppressor. Thus the existing definitions of the word ‘terrorism’ are problematic, as they imply that acts of terrorism are carried out only by non-state actors and the state is always the victim i.e, any form of violence (even in self-defense) enacted by a non-state actor is defined as an act of terrorism and all extreme forms of violence committed by state are always legitimized (even if committed against noncombatant targets). These issues beg our attention to reconsider and redefine the current existing normative on terrorists and terrorism.

Pakistan so far has been addressing terrorism using force, but that has only served to exacerbate conflict, mainly because the real factors that have promoted conflict and thus violence have not been acknowledged and addressed. History has been overlooked, grievances of the dissenting group ignored, justice has been denied, and particular theological assertions have been promoted by the state. The direct violence that has been the result is not motivated by religion, per se, but by the view that Islam provides an

alternative means of achieving social justice. I conclude that there is a need for investigation into the causes of violence in Pakistan that focus on the underlying economic, political, and social problems (including particular religion indoctrination and religious intolerance) that lead individuals to pursue militant responses. Thus, to end terrorism in Pakistan, a more in-depth study of the country's history, culture and Islam is needed. As rightly pointed out by Anatol Lieven in his book *Pakistan: A Hard Country*, "The West needs to develop a much deeper knowledge of Pakistan, a much deeper stake in Pakistan, and a much more generous attitude towards helping Pakistan"<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A hard Country* (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 481.



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## Annexure 1

### Sample Questionnaire

#### Understanding Violence

This survey is being conducted for an academic research study at Harvard University. We are trying to understand the reaction of various sects in Pakistan towards violence. Your identity & responses will not be shared without your prior consent. Thank you for participating in our survey. Your feedback is important.

##### 1. Address

**Name**

**Occupation**

**City/Town**

**Email Address**

• \* 2. Your Religious Beliefs (Check one that applies)

Sunni

Shia

Ahmadi

Christian

Other (please specify)

3. Some people believe it is acceptable to use violence in an unjust and corrupt society.

Do you agree or disagree?

Agree

Disagree

Unsure

4. Do you agree that suicide bombing is justifiable in peri urban areas of Pakistan?

YES

NO

5. Do you think suicide bombing is justified to protest against the drone attacks in South & North Waziristan?

Justifiable

Unjustifiable

Unsure

6. Do you think suicide bombing is justified to protest against an unjust war/ American war?

Justifiable

Unjustifiable

Unsure

7. Do you think suicide bombing is justified to protest against the Pakistan's government institutions?

Justifiable

Unjustifiable

Unsure

8. What is your view of the attacks on the educational institutions of Pakistan?

Strongly against the attacks

Against the attacks

Not Sure

Agree with the attacks

Strongly agree with the attacks

9. What is your view of the attacks on the police force of Pakistan?

Strongly against the attacks

Against the attacks

Not Sure

Agree with the attacks

Strongly agree with the attacks

10. Do you feel that your religion (or religious belief) is threatened by other religious or secular groups that differ from your own?

Yes

No

11. Do you UNDERSTAND why some groups might attack individuals whose religious or secular beliefs differ from their own?

I do understand why some people might behave in that way

I do not understand why some people might behave in that way

Not sure

Please Explain your response

12. Do you think Pakistan can flourish as a secular state?

Yes

No

Please explain your response

13. Do you agree with the statement that "Pakistan is becoming a radical State"?

Yes

No

Please explain your response:

14. Whether or not you think that violence is justified, do you personally have any sympathy with those who carry out acts of direct violence?

Yes, a lot

Yes, a little

No, not at all.

No, not much

Not sure.

Please explain

15. Whether or not you have any sympathy with those who carry out suicide attacks, do you think you UNDERSTAND why some people might behave in that way?

I do understand why some people might behave in that way

I do not understand why some people might behave in that way

Not sure

Please explain

16. Do you think that individuals who carry out acts of violence in Pakistan are misguided Muslims?

Yes

No

Sometimes

Not sure

Other (please specify)

17. In your perspective what could be the reasons for terrorism in Pakistan? (Please circle all that you think apply)

Elements in the government support militants. (Dishonest and corrupt leadership)

Lack of effective implementation of counter terrorism strategies. (Poor standard of training and capability of National forces).

Poor judicial system.

Underprivileged State of Sovereignty.

Increasing number of madrasas in the country.



Role of external factors (including Saudi Arabia, Iran and USA). Other

(please specify)

18. What are your views on military action taken against individuals who resort to direct violence in Pakistan?

Strongly against the attacks

Against the attacks

Not Sure

Agree with the attacks

Strongly agree with the attacks

19. Do you give charity?

Yes

No

20. Please check the ways you use to give charity? Please check all that apply.

Annual Zakat deduction through your financial institution.

Giving charity to street beggars.

Mosque donations being collected by street hawkers.

Door-to-door donations collected by nonprofit organizations during Ramadan and Eid festivals. Other (please specify)

21. Do you know exactly where your charitable organization is using your donations?

Yes, all the time

Sometimes.

No.

Not sure.

22. Please suggest a few steps that in your perspective can help in eliminating violence in Pakistan.