



Reinventing the International Human Rights Regime: Evolution and Effectiveness of the UN Human Rights Council

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Reinventing the International Human Rights Regime: Evolution and Effectiveness
of the UN Human Rights Council

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A Thesis in the Field of Government for the
Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

The United Nations human rights regime was transformed into a new apparatus that received the approbation of the international community. The past United Nations human rights regime was seen as ineffective, divisive, politicized, and a protector of human rights violators rather than the victims of human rights abuses. This study examines the effectiveness of the new human rights apparatus, and whether the new human rights body has improved the conditions of human rights within the member-states of the new regime, throughout the different regions, and the effectiveness of 1503 resolutions aimed at gross violators. Statistical analyses were used for the purpose of determining the effectiveness of the regime using the political terror scale as a measure. Additionally, the effectiveness of the regime change was analyzed compared and contrasted between the two human rights bodies as well as examining other spurious factors for possible amelioration of human rights conditions. The conclusion demonstrated through statistical analyses whether human rights conditions assuaged after the regime change in the human rights protection bodies. Revealed within, a complex set of factors explaining improvement in human rights including membership in the human rights body, regional polity, and income levels. Moreover, statistical analyses ruled out a causal link between the issuance of resolutions by the new human rights regime and the assuagement of human rights conditions.

Dedication

To my family, friends, and professors/educators, whose wisdom, patience, and love have been my initiation as well as my north star upon the horizon.

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I.

Background of the Problem

The UN Commission on Human Rights faced serious credibility issues during the end of its tenure. The worst violators of human rights sat among the commission: Libya as chair of the commission, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe,¹ working to shield themselves from UN resolutions targeting the gross violations of human rights.

The International Human Rights Regime was reinvented by the approval of UN Resolution 60/251, which gave rise to the Human Rights Council to replace the defunct UN Commission on Human Rights.² The UN Commission on Human Rights was seen as ineffective, overly politicized, and lacking all credibility. Further, due to the amount of members on the Human Rights Commission who themselves were the worst violators of human rights, the Commission came to be described by Human Rights Watch as a club of abusers.³ Most of these countries have consistently been rated between levels 4 and 5 in the Political Terror Scale, which includes the following definition for categories 4- 5: the use of terror to the whole population, in which leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals in the

¹ Steven Seligman, "Politics and Principle at the UN Human rights Commission and Council 1992-2008," *Israel Affairs* 17 no. 4 (2011): 520-541.

² United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. Last modified April 3, 2006. Accessed July 27, 2013.

³ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 521.

case of category 5; and in the case of category 4 civil and political rights violations expanded to large numbers of the population: murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level, terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.⁴

Why would some of the worst violators of human rights seek to be on the commission, and why would they consistently get elected to the commission, while other states with a strong human rights record such as the United States not get elected? Scholars have pointed to the voting records of these human rights abusers on the commission and shown a shielding effort on the part of these states on the commission. To explain, states assist each other by voting to stop condemning country-specific resolutions targeting violators similar to the violating state.⁵ Thereby, the worst abusers on the Commission of Human Rights band together along with their respective regions to vote against resolutions that condemn their blatant human rights abuses, which is most likely the reason they sought election to the Commission, to undermine the values of human rights rather than uphold the principles laid out in international norms.

The hypotheses will be examined for supporting statistical evidence through the use of inferential statistical methodology. Also, these statistical methods will be using data from the Political Terror Scale to support or invalidate the null hypothesis. In order to determine whether the contention of the UNCHR has become a club of abusers, and whether or not the UNHRC has assuaged such concerns, this study will examine the overall mean political terror scores of the member states of the respective institutions and

⁴ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale." Last modified April 23, 2013. Accessed July 27, 2013. <http://www.politicalterror scale.org/index.php>.

⁵ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 533-534.

compare these mean institutional political terror scores to examine whether a statistical significant difference is present between these institutions using t-tests.

The broader significance would be that the change in the international human rights regime has resulted in some limited successes in reducing the overall amount of political terror in transitional governments, but result very little to no change in authoritarian regimes. Further, the change most likely to result is within the transitional regimes with increased democratization consistent to the constructivist premise of networked advocacy,⁶ and intrastate compliance.⁷ However, the realist premise of the use of force through interstate compliance from a UN Security Council resolution is more likely in the cases of authoritarian regimes.

The questions that remain are as follows. Whether compliance in the current regime would bring about effectiveness in ameliorating human rights abuses? What has been the compliance rate of resolutions accepted by the state under review in the current regime? What has been the compliance rate of UNHRC resolutions compared to UN Commission on Human Rights resolution? Has compliance rate of UNHRC resolutions brought about an effective change in human rights abuses as measured by any accepted measure of the Political Terror Scale or the Hathaway Torture Scale? Are NGOs being marginalized in the current regime in compared to the level of participation they enjoyed previously? Is the current process of dialogue effective in ameliorating human rights

⁶ Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 16-17.

⁷ Beth Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 125-127.

abuses compared to the confrontational country specific resolutions of the past? Has there been any substantial change in assuaging human rights abuses in targeted states?

Many of the authors who have examined the UNHRC focused on the structural change, the procedural standards, and the political dynamics of outcome through voting patterns, as well as the recommendations from the UPR. Although these studies have provided insight into evaluating the procedural performance of the UNHRC, there still remains inchoate whether any of these structural changes, procedural changes, and actions have assuaged human rights abuses on the targeted states through any quantitative measurements. Also, the question of the credibility of the UNHRC remains in question, whether the organization can be seen as authoritative when some of its members are considered the worst violators of human rights. These questions need to be embarked upon to inquire not only the effectiveness of the UN human rights apparatus, but continue work on eliminating the scourge of the worst atrocities inflicted upon humankind.

These questions will be examined in this study to test the effectiveness of the current human rights regime, and whether an interstate state compliance mechanism through international pressure or intrastate compliance through mass mobilization best explains the development, and effectiveness of the new human rights apparatus.

The thesis will be organized as follows. In the next portion of the thesis, I will present the literature review with the various perspectives on the issue. The third portion will present the hypotheses to be tested. Fourth, operational definitions will be established using the Political Terror Scale in measuring human rights compliance. The fifth portion of the paper will discuss the research methodologies used to establish the relationships between compliance, membership, regional influences, and regime change.

The sixth section will discuss the implications of the results found in the statistical models and focuses on regional analyses examining the influence of the region, and other controls. Finally, the seventh section will focus on the conclusion and discuss implications of the study.

II.

Review of the Literature

The International Human Rights Regime faced a paradigm shift with the approval of UN Resolution 60/251, which gave rise to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).⁸ As previously mentioned, The UN Commission on Human Rights lacked credibility due to the amount of members on the UNCHR, who themselves were the worst violators of human rights. Many of the members of the UNCHR had consistently been rated between levels 4 and 5 in the Political Terror Scale, which includes the following definition for categories 4- 5: the use of terror to the whole population, in which leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals in the case of category 5; and in the case of category 4 includes civil and political rights violations expanded to large numbers of the population: murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level, terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.⁹

⁸ United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. Last modified April 3, 2006. Accessed July 27, 2013.

⁹Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

When one reviews the past record of these violators of human rights, one has to inquire how these states were even elected to the Commission on Human Rights in the first place. However, the answer to the question of electing the worst abusers is found in the institutional framework of the Commission on Human Rights, which was a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC). The election to the Commission on Human Rights was done through the 54 members of the ECOSOC, which elected its members through regional slates rather than directly voting for individual states.¹⁰ Since many of the members of the ECOSOC council belonged to regions in the developing world, it voted based on regional preference, which included slates with the worst violators of human rights. To clarify, the regional composition of the 54 members of ECOSOC is as follows: 14 seats from the African region, 11 seats from the Asian region, 6 seats from the Eastern European region, 10 seats from the Latin American/Caribbean region, and 13 seats from the Western European and Other Group region. This composition meant that 41 seats out of the 54 seats in the UN Economic and Social Council were from the developing world, and would show preference to regional slates from the developing world during elections to the UN Commission on Human Rights.¹¹

The election of these belligerents of human rights norms called into questions any validity of protecting human rights and came to undermine the credibility of the international political body most visible in protecting human rights. As the former UN

¹⁰ Bertrand Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council* (New York: Routledge, 2011), chap. 120-130.

¹¹ Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council*, 120-130.

High Commissioner on Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan pointed out in his book on the UN Human Rights Council, the Commission on Human Rights was responsible for some remarkable achievements such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, Convention against Torture, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention against Genocide, and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination are just to name a few of the accomplishments of the Commission.¹²

However, due to the loss of credibility by the election of belligerents to the Commission, the need for reform was advocated by Secretary General Kofi Annan.¹³ In his address to the United Nations, “At Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All,” Kofi Annan called for the creation of a new human rights body with the credibility and impartiality to advocate for greater compliance of human rights standards: “I ask member states to create a new Council to fulfill one of the primary purposes of the Organization, which clearly now requires more effective operational structures – the promotion of human rights. This would replace the present Commission on Human Rights, whose capacity to perform its tasks has been undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. The Human Rights Council, I suggest,

¹² Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council*, 34-45.

¹³ Annan, Kofi. United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All. Accessed July 27, 2013.

should be smaller than the Commission, and elected directly by a two-thirds majority of this Assembly.”¹⁴

The hope of the international community was to have a human rights body that reviewed human rights in an objective universal manner, and avoid the politicization, that called into question the credibility of the past commission. To accomplish the task, structural changes were needed to select states that were committed to the principles of human rights. These goals were to be achieved by a changing of the electoral methodology, which included removing the main human rights body from the ECOSOC Council. The result would be to make the United Nations Human Rights Council either an equal organ of the United Nations itself or a subsidiary of the UN General Assembly, whereby election to the body would require adopting human rights commitments to serve on the UNHRC, and a majority vote of the General Assembly for each individual member rather than the election of regional slates.¹⁵

Moreover, gross violations of human rights commitments made by a member of the UNHRC would result in expulsion from the council with a two-thirds vote from the UN General Assembly¹⁶—such was the case with Libya during the mass killings in

¹⁴ Annan, *In Larger Freedom*.

¹⁵ United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. Last modified April 3, 2006. Accessed July 27, 2013.

¹⁶ United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251. Last modified April 3, 2006. Accessed July 27, 2013.

2011.¹⁷ Also, the UN opted for adopting a smaller Human Rights Council of 47 members rather than 53 members of the past commission, and making the council a subsidiary of the General Assembly. However, this option does not eliminate the possibility of upgrading the council to a full organ of the UN in the future.¹⁸ Further, the election of individual states must be representative geographically, allocating the following composition: 13 seats from the African region, 13 seats from the Asian region, 6 seats from the Eastern European region, 8 seats from the Latin American/Caribbean region, and 7 seats from the Western European and Other Group region.¹⁹

The result of the change in electing individual members by the full General Assembly was some improvement in removing belligerents from serving on the council, where as 28% of the members of the commission were violators of human rights, the council's membership in 2006 consisted of 20% of its members as violators of human rights. This fact was pointed out by the United States State Department in a congressional hearing which was titled: "UN Human Rights Council: Reform or Regression."²⁰ Also, the US Congressional committee noted another change was deterring belligerents to seek election to the Human Rights Council, and the failed election of Iran and Venezuela to

¹⁷ United Nations, General Assembly Suspends Libya From Human Rights Council. Last modified March 1, 2011. Accessed July 27, 2013.

¹⁸ Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council*, 34-45.

¹⁹ United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251.

²⁰ U.S. House of Representatives 109th Congress, Hearing before the subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and international operations of the committee on international relations. (2006). *The United Nations Human Rights Council: Reform or Regression?* (Serial No.109-221)U.S. Government Printing Office.

the UNHRC—even though Venezuela was subsequently elected and currently sits on the UNHRC—along with the ousting of Libya in 2011 from the UNHRC have been cited as successes in rebuilding the credibility of the Human Rights regime.²¹ But yet, when reviewing the Political Terror Scores of the current members of the council using the latest PTS scores of 2011, the results reflect a worsening of human rights abusers on the Human Rights Council consisting of 40% of the countries with a PTS score of 3 or higher. The worst abusers with a PTS score of 4 or higher compose 17% of the Human Rights Council, which seriously calls into question the credibility of the current UNHRC.²²

Moreover, the new council's objective to rebuild the credibility of the human rights regime has been criticized by the US in particular, along with other scholars whose works have focused on the different methodology the UNCHR employs to reach its goals. This methodology for rebuilding the human rights apparatus through the UNHRC consisted of a non-politicized, egalitarian forum in order to have states comply with the UNHRC's recommendations through a diplomatic dialogue between the council members offering recommendations and those states under review.²³ The UNHRC were

²¹ U.S. House of Representatives 109th Congress, Hearing before the subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and international operations of the committee on international relations. (2006). *The United Nations Human Rights Council: Reform or Regression?* (Serial No.109-221)U.S. Government Printing Office.

²² Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

²³ Elvira Redondo, The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the First Session, *Chinese Journal of International Law* 7, no. 3 (2008): 721-734.

to have the following mechanisms to achieve its mission: the Universal Periodic Review, UNHRC Resolutions, and Special Rapporteurs for fact-finding as well as monitoring.

Despite the change in methodology from the Commission to the Council, there still remains strong criticisms on the credibility of the council due to the politicization of resolutions targeting particular states—namely Israel—as well as calling into question whether the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) has turned into a self-congratulatory session rather than a serious review of the human rights violations. However, both criticisms and accolades to the UNCHR reflect a fundamental ideological perspective of the role of the council along with a theoretical systemic view of the international order.

Theories explaining the Role of the UNHRC and the International Order

There are different perspectives on the role of the UNHRC reflecting the lenses of the different IR theories: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The different perspectives have shaped the viewpoint of whether the current regime is able to bring about compliance. The realist framework purports an anarchic model due either to structural power distribution of the international order as advocated by Krasner or due to moral failure as advocated by Morgenthau. The realist perspective has a systemic viewpoint of state actors being the main actors seeking the acquisition of power.²⁴ The realist would view the development of the Human Rights Council as both irrelevant as it

²⁴ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 522-524.

does not pertain to the state acquiring additional power or resources. Moreover, the realist perspective stresses the importance of enforcement to assure compliance from state actors.

The mode of compliance for the realist is based on interstate compliance understood by the balance of power through the use of force or penalties to deter cheating or the circumventing of rules to achieve a state's interest. Therefore, since the United Nations Human Rights Council is based on a dialectic approach meant to be non-confrontational and non-coercive, the realist contention of non-compliance is presumed when a conflict between human rights and the state interest occurs, the former is pushed aside in favor of the state interest. Further, the realist perspective is useful in explaining politicization of the Human Rights Council through resolutions targeting the state of Israel by regional blocs in the council that are composed of states that align against Israel. The article by Steven Seligman, "Politics and Principle at the UN Human Rights Commission and Council (1992-2008),"²⁵ compares the former Commission on Human Rights to the current Human Rights Council through the use of resolutions to determine any variance in the stances of both panels.

The results of the study highlighted the surfeit resolutions aimed at Israel by the council, which amounted to 19 resolutions out of the total 41 resolutions issued by the council during that time period of 1992-2005.²⁶ Although the past Commission on Human Rights was critiqued for its politicization, when compared to the council on the

²⁵ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 520-541.

²⁶ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 535-538.

matter of Israel, it seems the politicization has increased with the Human Rights Council as Seligman points out.²⁷

Seligman tests both realist and liberal premises in his research by examining the voting patterns of countries on the Human Rights Council to determine whether the voting behavior is taking place based on common shared ideals or based on interests. The three contentions tested were the following: whether the democratic states were more likely to support a resolution of a specific state; whether differences existed between Western democracies and democracies of the developing world in terms of voting record on the council; and whether there existed differences in the voting record on the council between Western democracies and the developing world.

Seligman used an ANOVA test to be able to compare these variables and concluded that the developing democracies tended to vote based on regionalism rather than with a shared identity with the Western democracies.²⁸ Although the democracies did vote consistently together to support a resolution to target a specific state, the exception tended to be the Israeli case, in which the developing democracies voted in favor of resolutions targeting the state of Israel in contrast to the Western democracies.²⁹ The realist would contend that the developing countries voted based on state interests

²⁷ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 528-539.

²⁸ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 525-528.

²⁹ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 533-537.

rather than a shared identity with the democracies. However, the liberal or constructivist position would rebut that the developing countries may have a greater sense of regional identity rather than an institutional-political identity of democracy.³⁰

Rational Functionalism-Neo-Liberal Approach to the Human Rights Regime

Aside from the pure realist perspective exists the rational functionalist position—which serves as a middle ground between realism and liberalism—which believes the basic presence of anarchic international order, but attains some international organizations exist for the common interest in accordance with the theory of the firm, that actors come together to lower their transaction costs, and therefore have an interest in maintaining their alliances to lower their costs and overcome the collective goods dilemma.³¹ However, the rational functionalist maintains that interstate compliance is obtained through enforcement policies such as reciprocal penalties related to trade.³²

In contrast to the political perspective of the realist, the liberal perspective would contend that there are common universal ideals, norms, and domestic institutions that account for the actions of states: voting on the UNHCR and the compliance of treaties or

³⁰ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 537-539.

³¹ Robert Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring, 1982): 326-332.

³² Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 326-332.

obligations based on shared identities.³³ The liberal perspective views interaction between states through domestic actors within the state rather than just the systemic viewpoint of state actors by the realists. The democratic peace theory espoused first by Immanuel Kant and by later scholars hold that democracies are less likely to engage in conflict with other democracies due to internal institutions, which have normalized the countries to seek conflict resolution rather than engage in the use of force.³⁴ This theory has been tested through the use of dyadic models that have supported the contentions of the democratic peace theory in relation to democracies entering into conflict with other democracies.³⁵ Further, liberalism espouses universal values of human rights or natural rights which pertain to all cultures and societies.³⁶

Constructivist Approach to the Human Rights Regime

In contrast to the political perspective of the realist, the constructivist or formally the idealist perspective as founded by Alexander Wendt believe that norms and values whether in the international arena or domestically are constructed through the persuasion of dialogue based on their interest, in which actors engage in debate to accept certain

³³ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 520-541.

³⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*, 1795. (accessed July 27, 2013).

³⁵ Harald Mueller, and Jonas Wolff, Dyadic Democratic Peace Strikes Back: Reconstructing the Social Constructivist Approach After the Monadic Renaissance. *5th Pan-European International Relations Conference*. (2004). (accessed July 27, 2013).

³⁶ John Locke, *The Second Treatise on Civil Government*, 1690. (accessed July 27, 2013).

values reflecting this engagement.³⁷ The constructivist cycle consists of this aforementioned dialogue affecting the social norms or values that shape into a shared identity, which in turn actors or activists affect change in the institutions shaping societies.³⁸

Therefore, the constructivists argue that compliance of human rights comes from persuading through discourse by the different parties through an impartial forum to internalize the values by the state actors engaged in the dialogue.³⁹ However, the constructivist view of intrastate compliance has a bottom-up approach to state compliance with human rights obligations through domestic actors mobilizing to place political pressure on their regimes to comply with their agreed upon obligations. In this perspective, human rights activists on the domestic front play a pivotal role in treaty compliance, and begin a discourse of persuasion at the domestic level to bring about change in the societal norms and in domestic institutions.⁴⁰

Further, activists on the ground pressure for the ratification of treaties in order to lock-in rights on the domestic front and reset to the legislative agenda to address human

³⁷ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, no. 2 (1992): 403-407.

³⁸ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 403-407.

³⁹ Mathew Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations," *Alternatives: Global, Local, and Political* 35, no. 4 (2010): 456-459.

⁴⁰ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 149-155.

rights.⁴¹ Similarly, a comparative longitudinal study examining the incorporation of international norms, and treaty provisions into domestic constitutions as a means to guarantee civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights since 1789 showed that a significant amount of incorporation of these rights.⁴² Also, the number of rights incorporated increased into new constitutions drafted after an increase of new norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ICCPR, and the ICSECR as addressed by Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons.⁴³ Moreover, Sikkink advocates the boomerang effect, in which the Western democracies through the use of INGOs influenced domestic NGOs to pressure the government to accept reforms.⁴⁴ In the constructivists' view, the units of analysis tend to be domestic activists and NGOs advocating change at the grass-roots level.⁴⁵

The constructivist or formally the idealist perspective as founded by Alexander Wendt contend that norms and values whether in the international arena or domestically are constructed through the persuasion of dialogue based on their interest, in which actors

⁴¹ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 147-155.

⁴² Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Beth Simmons. Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights Practice, *Harvard International Law Journal* 54, no. 1 (2013): 91-93.

⁴³ Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons, "Getting to Rights," 91-93.

⁴⁴ Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, 16-17

⁴⁵ Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, 16-17.

engage in debate to accept certain values reflecting this engagement.⁴⁶ The constructivist cycle consists of this aforementioned dialogue affecting the social norms or values that shape into a shared identity, which in turn domestic actors or activists affect change in the internal institutions and laws of society.⁴⁷

Consequently, refuels the debate of interests, and values all over again. In the constructivist view espoused by Alexander Wendt, identities based on values is constructed through dialogue and persuasion, which leads to the internalization of values that set the norms that are complied with by actors—domestic or non-domestic—based on shared identity and values. Therefore, the constructivists argue that compliance of human rights comes from persuading through discourse by the different parties through an impartial forum to internalize the values by the state actors engaged in the dialogue.⁴⁸

The UNHRC has adopted this approach of dialogue in their Universal Periodic Review (UPR), but it focuses on interstate compliance through a top-down approach of socializing state actors in the UN to reset the domestic agenda of the state, and have these values trickle down to the rest of the population.

As previously mentioned, the constructivist viewpoint has allowed an iconoclastic approach of intrastate, rather than interstate, compliance as advocated by

⁴⁶ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 403-407.

⁴⁷ Wendt. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 403-407.

⁴⁸ Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction," 456-459.

scholar Beth Simmons, *Domestic Politics Theory of Treaty Compliance*.⁴⁹ The intrastate compliance views a bottom-up approach to state compliance in relation to human rights obligations. Examples have been cited by Beth Simmons' work, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, through case studies of treaty compliance examining the UN Convention against Torture (CAT) with Israel, where human rights activists accessed their domestic institutions such as the Israeli Supreme Court to issue a decision that Israel was in non-compliance with its treaty obligation in relation to the torture of detainees, which resulted in a national debate that led to greater compliance with the Convention against Torture in Israel.⁵⁰

Finally, the described actions involving the naming and shaming of regimes that are violators of human rights, which led to the UN Commission on Human Rights being criticized for being confrontational and politicized. This past behavior of the Commission to name and shame was seen as partial and unfair as states would attempt to use this mechanism to criticize their opponents to foment domestic dissent and shield their friends. In order to build the credibility of the UN human rights apparatus, the use of an impartial instrument that would review all countries equally was advocated, which led to the development of the Universal Periodic Review.

Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and Other Compliance Mechanisms of the UNHRC

⁴⁹ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 147-155.

⁵⁰ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 296-306.

Despite the lofty ideals and mandate that the UNHRC was founded upon, the UPR mechanism meant to implement this mandate was completely inchoate. Scholar Dominguez-Redondo examines the development of the Universal Periodic Review during the first session cites that the structural elements of the UPR were delegated to the UNHRC, and develops the following framework: an official human rights report about the state under review, a three-member panel working group or “troika” whose purpose is make recommendations, and a review by the plenary of the UNHRC to make recommendations and engage in a dialogue with the states under review to address concerns.⁵¹ The UNHRC working report consists of the following structure: a national report from the state under review consisting of a limited 20 pages, a report from the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights consisting of a limited 10 pages, and additional information provided by NGOs relating to the state under review.⁵² Once the working paper was submitted, the troika working group would have dialogue with state under review, and allow the targeted state to answer concerns, or respond to recommendations made by the working group. Additionally, other stakeholders have a chance to address the working group and include their input, but speakers are limited to a total of 45 speakers, and a limited speaking time of 2 minutes.⁵³

Although NGOs and other stakeholders get a limited time and a place on the agenda, Bertrand Ramcharan in his work on the UNHRC has severely critiqued the

⁵¹ Redondo, *The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council*, 721-734.

⁵² Redondo, *The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council*, 721-734.

⁵³ Redondo, *The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council*, 721-734.

current treatment of NGOs by the UNHRC process, and has accused the UNHRC of marginalizing the NGOs.⁵⁴ As Bertrand Ramcharan points out human rights were not a priority of the great powers following the post-war period as the United States had racial inequalities, the Soviet Union had gulags, and the Europeans were colonial powers, the NGOs were the true advocates in San Francisco during the creation of the United Nations, pressuring for the inclusion of human rights as a founding principle of the UN.⁵⁵ Moreover, the NGOs have played a significant role in monitoring and reporting human rights abuses to the media, governmental entities, and the public at-large.⁵⁶ The accusation of marginalization by Bertrand Ramcharan—a former UN High Commissioner of Human Rights—is a serious allegation calling into question the credibility of the UNHRC, and its intentions.⁵⁷ The questions that emerge from the claim are as follows: what was the true impact of the NGOs in the past Commission; has the advocacy of the NGOs diminished; has access decreased with the UNHRC compared to the Commission? These are questions that have been left unanswered, and need clarification.

⁵⁴ Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council*, 120-130.

⁵⁵ Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council*, 120-130.

⁵⁶ Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council*, 120-130.

⁵⁷ Ramcharan, *The UN Human Rights Council*, 120-130.

The Universal Periodic Review scrutinizes 48 countries each year, members of the UNHRC are reviewed within the first sessions, and members agree to additional human rights obligation as condition of membership.⁵⁸ The characterization by Dominguez-Redondo of the first session is optimistic, and marks the development of the UPR as an achievement in setting standards as well as a process for human rights compliance. This sense of enthusiasm is not isolated, there were high expectations of reform associated to the UNHRC from the celebratory self-congratulatory delegations at the UN General Assembly during the passing of Resolution 60/251, to articles such as Ladan Rahmani-Ocora's "Giving the Emperor Real Clothes: The UN Human Rights Council," which expected results from the structural reforms initiated by the UN:

"What a different institutional structure can do is establish processes, such as peer review, that will not allow political interests to take organs such as the Human Rights Council hostage. A new structure instituting universal peer review procedures, eliminating flaws such as the no-action motion, upgrading NGO participation, being in regular session throughout the year, and responding to urgent crises would be a major step against the intrusion of politicization and selectivity. However, the new body must inherit the lack of commitment and will power from the old CHR. Giving the emperor real new clothes will be the only befitting epitaph for the Commission on Human Rights."⁵⁹

However, there are lingering questions about the effectiveness of the UNHRC, and equating a change in process or standards to actual change in regime behavior by some of the worst violators of human rights seems difficult to realize without substantial evidence. Past studies by Seligman have examined the voting behavior of the UNHRC resolutions compared to the UN Commission on Human Rights resolutions, along with a

⁵⁸ Redondo, The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council, 721-734.

⁵⁹ Ladan Rahmani-Ocora, Giving the Emperor Real Clothes: The UN Human rights Council, *Global Governance* 12, no. 1 (2006): 15-20.

comparative of country-specific resolutions by the both entities.⁶⁰ Also, scholars McMahon and Ascherio examined the types and number of recommendations made and accepted by states under review, and revealed the types of resolutions that targeted states were willing to accept were the softer commitments in recommendation, which had a low cost association to the recommendation.⁶¹ This characterization of the categorical recommendations is congruent with the trend of legalization of international norms as cited by Finnemore and Troupe, which outline legalization through obligation, precision, and delegation of enforcement to a third party.⁶²

The UPR recommendations were divided into categories ranging from soft obligations with low precision of language to the highest category of 5, which included high obligations with high precision aligned with hard language and higher costs. The delegation of the enforcement of the recommendations would be mainly self-enforcing with oversight by the UNHRC. Since countries voluntarily agree to these recommendations, they usually adopt the lower cost recommendation. McMahon and Ascherio cite that recommendations made by regional partners to the state under review were more likely to be accepted, while recommendations by the Western democracies which tended to be stricter recommendations—50% of all the category 5

⁶⁰ Seligman, "Politics and Principle," 525-538.

⁶¹ Edward McMahon and Marta Ascherio, "A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council," *Global Governance* 18, no. 2 (2012): 240-241.

⁶² Martha Finnemore, and Stephen Toope, Alternatives to Legalization: Richer Views of Law and Politics, *International Organization* 55, no. 3 (2001): 743-758.

recommendations came from the western democracies—tended to be rejected by the targeted states.⁶³

McMahon inquires about the universality of human rights, and questions whether aberrant behavior to human rights by certain regions reflects a conflict of social values between the Western democracies and the developing world or particular regions.⁶⁴ McMahon investigates whether the contentions of Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, which contends a relativistic viewpoint, would explain the behavior of states or whether the universal approach of human rights values may be reconciled with cultural relativism.⁶⁵ McMahon and Ascherio cite a middle ground between two concepts with Peter Schwab and Adamantia Pollis building a bottom-up approach of universality through the global integration of cultural norms.⁶⁶

The results of the McMahon and Ascherio reveal the use of the UPR as a dialogue and as a mean of accepting recommendations. This dialogue fits into the concept of rhetorical action as it relates to the UPR was examined by Mathew Davies in the article, "Rhetorical Inaction? Compliance and the Human Rights Council of the United Nations."⁶⁷ To elaborate, Davies argues that the constructive dialogue in the UNHRC was

⁶³ McMahon, and Asherio, "A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights?," 231-248.

⁶⁴ McMahon, and Asherio, "A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights?," 231-248.

⁶⁵ McMahon, and Asherio, "A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights?," 231-248.

⁶⁶ McMahon, and Asherio, "A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights?," 231-248.

based on Habermasian dialogue, which builds a constructive dialogue among equals as a means to persuade actors into accepted norms or concepts through the strength of reason not might.⁶⁸

However, Mathew Davies acknowledges the point of Risse, in which dialogue among the actors is rarely amongst equals. Therefore, a middle position between rational choice and constructivist dialogue would be one of “Rhetorical Action.” Whereby, a hybrid of acknowledgement of power and interests among actors, but a de-politicization through the use of international organizations to engage in discourse to reach an agreement or acceptance of values.⁶⁹

For the purpose of achieving compliance—which was defined by Davies as the following: “Compliance refers to the phenomena of one actor coming alignment in behavioral practice with the standards and expectations of another, and in the coming discussion, when using the term compliance pressures I refer to those political practices instigated by actors that articulate the desire to influence others and promote those changes required bring coherence,” the assumption by Davies is that the aforementioned middle position by Risse, which had been adopted by the UNHRC is the best means to achieve compliance.⁷⁰ However, there is a lack of evidence to support such a contention.

⁶⁷ Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction?" 449-451.

⁶⁸ Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction?" 449-451.

⁶⁹ Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction?" 456-459 .

⁷⁰ Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction?" 459-461.

The reasoning for obtaining compliance by Davies assumes scope conditions by an authoritative figure, depoliticized and insulated condition, which Davies acknowledges the lack of any conditions by the UNHRC.⁷¹

Further, the dialogue of the UNHRC are self-congratulatory comments as member-states stack the speaker quota of 45 speakers with friendly backers, which undercuts any true dialogue between the parties.⁷² Moreover, the limited time placed for dialogue truly calls into question the effectiveness of the method; hence why Davies' titled his article "Rhetorical Inaction."⁷³

Despite the critiques to the UPR, some scholars such as Davies believe that constructive dialogue is the best means to bring about compliance. This supposition seems to be lacking in evidence, and there seems to be pending questions on the best means to bring about not only compliance but effectiveness as well. Further, compliance does not necessarily bring about effectiveness; states may comply to agree with the recommendations of UPR that are completely ineffective.

⁷¹ Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction?" 461-464

⁷² Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction?" 461-464.

⁷³ Davies, "Rhetorical Inaction?" 461-464.

III.

Hypotheses

The questions mentioned previously still remain unanswered by past literature: Whether compliance in the current regime would bring about effectiveness in ameliorating human rights abuses? What has been the compliance rate of resolutions accepted by the state under review in the current regime? What has been the compliance rate of UNHRC resolutions compared to UN Commission on Human Rights resolution? Has compliance rate of UNHRC resolutions brought about an effective change in human rights abuses as measured by any accepted measure of the Political Terror Scale or the Hathaway Torture Scale? Are NGOs being marginalized in the current regime in comparison to the level of participation they enjoyed previously? Is the current process of dialogue effective in ameliorating human rights abuses compared to the confrontational country specific resolutions of the past? Has there been any substantial change in assuaging human rights abuses in targeted states?

These questions lead to the following three hypotheses to focus and test the effectiveness of the current human rights regime, and whether an interstate state compliance mechanism through international pressure or intrastate compliance through mass mobilization best explains the development, and effectiveness of the new human rights apparatus.

The first hypothesis follows the premise on whether interstate pressure through the issuance of resolutions has any effect on the population.

- ⊙ H1: There is a negative/inverse relationship between UNHRC resolutions and a decrease in the Political Terror Scale.
- ⊙ Ho: There is no significant relationship between UNHRC resolutions and Political Terror Scale scores.

The second hypothesis concentrates on whether any significant change has taken place between the commission and the council for the purposes of testing the premise that the change in the international regime has resulted in a significant improvement in the Political Terror Scale:

- ⊙ H2: There is a significant difference in human rights compliance between UNHRC and UNCHR as measured by the Political Terror Scale.
- ⊙ Ho: There is no significant difference between human rights compliance of the UNCHR and the UNHRC as measured by the Political Terror Scale.

The third hypothesis concentrates on whether any significant change in human rights compliance by the member-states of the UN Human Rights Council since being elected in the human rights body. This question delves into the premise that the change in the international regime has resulted in greater credibility of the council as a paragon of human rights compliance:

- ⊙ H3: There is a significant difference in human rights compliance when serving on the UNCHR measured by the Political Terror Scale.

- ⦿ Ho: There is no significant difference between human rights compliance of members of the UNHRC as measured by the Political Terror Scale.

IV.

Operational Definitions

The dependent variables in this study would be both the effect of political terror on the population of the targeted state, and mass mobilizations occurring within the targeted state. The independent variables for this study are the resolutions issued by the UNCHR and the UNHRC along with accepted UPR recommendations.

The operational definition for the term “Political Terror” would be the same definition as used in the Political Terror Scale, which categorizes Political Terror as follows:

- ⦿ Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.⁷⁴
- ⦿ Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.⁷⁵
- ⦿ Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be

⁷⁴ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

⁷⁵ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.⁷⁶

- ⊙ Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.⁷⁷
- ⊙ Level 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.⁷⁸

Also, the term mass mobilization will be defined through the operational term of the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF):

“Social mobilization in UNICEF is a process that engages and motivates a wide range of partners and allies at national and local levels to raise awareness of and demand for a particular development objective through face-to-face dialogue. Members of institutions, community networks, civic and religious groups and others work in a coordinated way to reach specific groups of people for dialogue with planned messages. In other words,

⁷⁶ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

⁷⁷ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

⁷⁸ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

social mobilization seeks to facilitate change through a range of players engaged in interrelated and complementary efforts.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ UNICEF:United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, "Communication for Development." Last modified July 23, 2013. Accessed August 1, 2013.

V.

Research Design and Methodology

The research design for this study plans on executing a mixed-method approach relying on both quantitative and qualitative measures focusing on inferential statistics as well as case studies to achieve the objective of this study.

Data Collection

I will use institutional data from the United Nations to ascertain the nature and number of resolutions issued by the UN Human Rights Council. Further, I will be able to obtain the political terror scores from the Political Terror Scale website, which makes scores available up to 1976.

This study will be a longitudinal study examining the Political Terror Scores of all targeted states of the UNHRC in order to obtain the practical relationship of the resolutions to the actual behavior in respecting human rights of those regimes after the application of the resolution over an extended period of time. Since modification of behavior by government may take a large momentum in shifting policy, it may take a period of adjustment to actually measure a significant change in regime behavior. Therefore, political terror score data will be collected from the entire time period since 1976 to check for significant shifts in the Political Terror Scale.

Data Analysis

The political terror scores will be analyzed before and after the issuance of the resolutions by the UNCHR and the UNHRC to inquire for any significant change throughout the entire period of 1976 to the present. Therefore, the use of linear regressions will be used to analyze whether a causal relationship exists between the UNHRC resolutions and the Political Terror Scale scores after the issuance of resolutions of the targeted states to check for compliance as measured by the % change in the PTS.

The simplified version of the linear regression formula used for this research project is as follows:

$$R^2 = \frac{SSR}{SST} = \frac{\sum (\hat{y}_i - \bar{y})^2}{\sum (y_i - \bar{y})^2}$$

The linear regression will use the percentage change of the PTS scores of the countries from 2006 to 2012 as the dependent variable, and the issuance of a UN Human Rights Council Resolution as a dummy variable for the independent variable to determine whether any relationship exists between the UNHRC resolution and any change in the PTS of these targeted countries.

In order to compare and contrast the findings of the different institutions—UNCHR, and UNHRC—a simple t-test will be used to obtain the differences in effectiveness between the two institutions, the simplified version of the t-test formula will be used for this research. The mean PTS scores of the member states of the UNCHR per year will be averaged into an overall mean PTS score for the UNCHR and compared

similarly to the member states of the UNHRC. The t-test will provide whether any significant statistical differences exist in human rights compliance between the member states of these institutions.

The simplified version of the t-test formula used for this research is as follows:

$$t = \frac{\bar{X} - \mu}{\frac{s}{\sqrt{N}}}$$

Also, the use of qualitative case studies will be able to provide an in-depth analysis that will account for any significant relationships that reveal themselves that may explain compliance through any shift of regime behavior after the issuance of a UN resolution or UPR recommendation. Further, the case studies will analyze the role of regions and the issuance of UN Human Rights Council resolutions that may provide an explanation for compliance. Finally, the examination of UNHRC resolutions will be analyzed to determine the likelihood of the occurrence, and possible deterrence effects on other deviant behavior through case study analysis.

In addition, to ascertain whether the new regime has been able to change the hypocritical reputation of its predecessor and warranted the shift towards the UNHRC, a comparative perspective between the UNCHR and the UNHRC will be conducted. This comparative perspective will compare the mean PTS scores of the institutional members of the UNHRC and the UNCHR from each year starting in 2002 to 2012 to view for the purposes of determining whether the regime shift has resulted in ameliorating the PTS of member states elected to the UN human rights body. Further, a two means t-test will be conducted using the mean of the PTS scores of the UNHRC from 2007 to 2012, and the

mean Political Terror Scale scores of the UNCHR from 2002 to 2006 to determine if any statistical significance exists between the two bodies.

Finally, the membership of the UNHRC and the regions will be analyzed through regressions comparing the change of political terror as the dependent variable and the following independent variables: regional membership, time, membership composition of the UNHRC, polity scores for the region as measured by Freedom House,⁸⁰ and GDP per capita for the examined state and region as measured by the World Bank.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year. Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

⁸¹ World Bank, World Bank GDP per Capita. Accessed May 1, 2016.
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>.

VI:

Statistical Analysis

When examining the Political Terror Scores of the international community from 1977 to 2013, the aim was to uncover whether any differences existed in the mean of the PTS of the international community before and after the creation of the UN Human Rights Council. The two-mean t-test was conducted using the total mean scores of each year of the PTS from 1977 to 2005 for all measured states, which is 2.75, and the mean of the Political Terror scores of each year from 2006 to 2013 which was 2.58.⁸² The results are demonstrated in the data output in Table 1 of the appendices, in which a two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of all Political Terror Scale scores of each given year of all member-states of the United Nations during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the UNHRC (2007-2012).⁸³

There was a significant statistical difference with a p-score of 0.0047 between the mean score from 1977-2005 and the mean PTS score from 2006-2013 of the international community.⁸⁴ These scores examined all countries rated in the Political Terror Scale. Table 1 demonstrates the level of political terror globally has been assuaged during the time of human rights protection of the UNHRC, but it does not demonstrate whether the

⁸² Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

⁸³ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

⁸⁴ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

amelioration of this condition has been directly linked to the development of the UN Human Rights Council.

The use of further statistical tools was used to reveal whether the alleviation of PTS is due to a causal relationship existing with the UNHRC or other spurious factors. In order to ascertain whether a causal relationship exists between the significant percentage change in political terror scores of all states and the UNHRC through the issuance of resolutions by the council, linear regressions were conducted. Table 2 in the appendices shows the result of the linear regression analysis using the percentage change in the Political Terror Scale as the dependent variable and the issuance of UNHRC country specific resolutions using the former 1503 procedures as the independent dummy variable.

Table 2 shows there was no significant statistical evidence to support the contention of a causal relationship between UNHRC resolutions and a percentage change in the Political Terror Scale with a p-score of 0.08 above the 0.05 threshold.⁸⁵ Moreover, the lack of statistical significance of the model is supported by the high variance in the model.⁸⁶ The high residual sum of squares and the mean square of error further demonstrated the complete lack of causality between the issuance of UNHRC resolutions and the percentage changes in the political terror scores of the targeted state.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

⁸⁶ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

⁸⁷ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

Political Terror Scores of the Membership of the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council

In response to the criticism of the UN Commission on Human Rights being a club of abusers as stated by Kofi Annan's speech, "At Larger Freedom," the shift in the human rights regime was proposed in aiming to remove gross violators of human rights from the human rights body.⁸⁸ One of the aims of the new human rights body was to return the legitimacy of the human rights regime by eliminating the hypocrisy through the replacement of the past defunct commission with a council whose members would be an improvement in terms of human rights compliance.

When examining the premise that the shift of electing members of the human rights body from the UN Economic Social Council to the UN General Assembly will result in a human rights body whose members exhibit stronger human rights records, the PTS scores of the member states of the Commission and the Council were compared. Table 3 of the appendices shows a comparison using a simple two-mean t-test of the mean PTS score of all mean PTS scores for each given year of the member states composing the membership of the UN Commission of Human Rights from 2002 to 2006, and the membership of the UN Human Rights Council from 2007 to 2012.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Annan, In Larger Freedom, Accessed July 27, 2013.

⁸⁹ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

Table 3 in the appendices reveals the result of the two mean t-test exhibiting no statistical significant difference between the defunct Commission on Human Rights and the newly formed Human Rights Council. The p-score value is 0.0511, which is the borderline above the 0.05 p-value.⁹⁰

However, the UN Human Rights Council showed an improvement in the mean PTS scores of .22, but this improvement still remains within the confidence interval even if barely with the following interval: (-0.0016, .44).⁹¹ The question remains if the improvement reflects a general trend or a regression back into the mean. When examining this premise, the mean PTS scores of each year for the members of the Commission and the Council was graphed. Graph 1 in appendix 4 shows mean Political Terror Scale scores of member states of the UNCHR and UNHRC for each of the given years.⁹²

The mean PTS scores for the years that the UN Commission on Human Rights provided human rights protection show an increase of political terror in the years from 2002 to 2006.⁹³ In comparison, the subsequent years in which the UN Human Rights Council provided human rights protection began a downward trend from 2006 to 2007, but then levels off and stabilizes from 2008 to 2012. The mean scores of the Human Rights Council is congruent to the mean PTS scores for the Commission on Human

⁹⁰ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

⁹¹ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

⁹² Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

⁹³ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

Rights from 2003 to 2005.⁹⁴ However, additional data was needed to indicate whether this pattern is representative to a regression back to the mean or the beginning of a greater trend downward. It was unclear which regions of the world improved their human rights records as per the Political Terror Scale.

This premise was examined through regional case studies, which examined each region of the UN to understand the improvement of human rights in the overall trend of improving human rights record.

Political Terror Scores of the Membership of the United Nations Human Rights Council from 2006 to 2012

Although Table 3 showed an improvement in human rights compliance in the membership of the UNHRC compared to the defunct commission, there remains whether the improvement in political terror by the UNHRC was brought about due to membership. Therefore, regressions were used on all 59 member-states that consisted of the UNHRC membership from 2006 to 2012 to review for causal links between membership in the human rights body and an improvement in political terror as seen in Tables 10-63. Interestingly, 10 out of the 59 countries demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between membership on the UNHRC and a change in human rights compliance as measured by the political terror scores from 1976 to 2012. The ten countries that demonstrated this relationship are as follows: Algeria, Tunisia, France,

⁹⁴ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

Brazil, Mali, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, Uruguay, and Thailand. All showed an improvement in political terror on particular years of membership in the UNHRC except for Pakistan. However, the improvement was not consistent for all years of membership on the UNHRC, it was interesting that improvement occurred when the member states were elected or headed towards re-election on a given year onto the human rights body.

In the case of Algeria, there was a statistically significant relationship between improvement in political terror and membership in the UNHRC with a p-score values of 0.01 as demonstrated in Table 10, in the years of membership in 2006 in the first inaugural class of the UNHRC as well as a statistically significant relationship with a p-score value of 0.000 in regards to membership in the UNHRC in 2009 as Algeria had reached the end of the three-year term as a member-state of the council.

It is worth mentioning that when regressing control variables: regional membership, time, polity values and GDP per capita, Table 10 showed a statistically significant negative relationship with improvement of political terror scores of Algeria and time (p-score: 0.00), showing a statistical significant improvement in political terror from 1976 to 2012 . However, Table 10 simultaneously demonstrated a statistically significant positive relationship between an increase in Middle Eastern and North Africa regional GDP per capita income and political terror. As per capita income increased in the region, political terror in Algeria also increased with a p-score of 0.000.

In the case of Tunisia, there was a statistically significant negative relationship between political terror and membership in the UNHRC with a p-score values of 0.00 as demonstrated in Table 20, in the year 2010 and a p-value of 0.05 for the UNHRC

membership in 2011, which are the years following the end of Tunisia's term (2006-2009) on the council. Similar to Algeria, Tunisia shows a significant improvement in political terror towards the end of the three-year term as a member-state of the council.

It is worth mentioning that when regressing the following control variables: regional membership, time, polity values and GDP per capita, the results of table 20 showed a statistically significant negative relationship between the improvement of political terror scores of Tunisia and time (p-score: 0.00), showing a statistical significant improvement in political terror from 1976 to 2012. Additionally, the regression shows a negative relationship as well between political terror and Middle East and North Africa polity scores with a statistical significance of p-value 0.000, indicative of the diffusion of democratization in the region and in Tunisia following the Arab Spring.

Interestingly, Table 20, similar to the previous case—Algeria—simultaneously demonstrated a statistically significant positive relationship between an increase in GDP per capita income of Tunisia and political terror. As per capita income increased in Tunisia, political terror in Tunisia also increased with a p-score of 0.000, indicative that the previous autocratic regime in Tunisia may have translated stronger economic gains to militarization and repression.

In the case of France, there was a statistically significant negative relationship between political terror and membership in the UNHRC with a p-score value of 0.00 as demonstrated in Table 23, in the years of membership in 2007 and 2012 (p-value 0.03). These were the years that France (2007-2012) first served as a member of the UNHRC, and finished its tenure on the UNHRC. Additionally, a significant relationship arose with

a p-score value of 0.055 in regards to membership in the UNHRC in 2009 as France had reached the end of its first three-year term as a member-state of the council.

No other control variables showed statistically significant relationships: regional membership, time, polity values, and GDP per capita. Table 10 showed no statistically significant relationships between the control variables and the amelioration of political terror in France.

In the case of Brazil, there was a statistically significant negative relationship between political terror and membership in the UNHRC with a p-score value of 0.04 as demonstrated in Table 24, in the years of membership in 2012. Similar to the other case studies, there was a statistically significant improvement in human rights as Brazil had reached the end of its term as a member-state of the council, Brazil served on the UNHRC from 2007 to 2012.

When regressing control variables: regional membership, time, polity values, and GDP per capita, Table 24 showed no statistically significant relationships between improvement of political terror scores of Brazil and the control variables: time, regional membership, regional GDP per capita income.

In the case of Mali, there was a statistically significant relationship between political terror and membership in the UNHRC from 2006 to 2009, and then once more from 2011 to 2012 with a p-score value of 0.00 as demonstrated in Table 27. However, the relationship between political terror reversed directions at multiple points from the years of membership in 2008 and 2011 as there is an observed negative relationship. However, a positive relationship emerges between a worsening of political terror with the

membership composition of the UNHRC in the following years: 2006, 2007, and 2009. Interestingly enough, the years of amelioration of political terror connected with the membership of the UNHRC to Mali's first election as a member to the UNHRC in 2008, and sought re-election thereafter in 2011. Remarkably, the same has occurred with multiple states examined. The state's behavior improves in regards to human rights compliance as it reached the end of the three-year term as a member-state of the council.

Once again, when regressing control variables: regional membership, time, polity values, and GDP per capita, Table 27 showed no statistically significant relationships between improvement of political terror scores of Mali and the control variables: time, regional membership, regional GDP per capita income.

In the case of Pakistan, there was a statistically significant relationship between worsening of political terror and membership in the UNHRC with a p-score value of 0.02 as demonstrated in Table 28, in the years of membership in 2009. Pakistan served for two consecutive terms on the UNHRC from 2007 to 2012. However, the year of 2009 is the only statistically significant relationship that arose in the regression connected with the membership of the UNHRC, and it showed deterioration of human rights with an increase in political terror. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: regional membership, time, polity values, and GDP per capita.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, there was a statistically significant relationship between political terror and membership in the UNHRC with a p-score value of 0.03 as demonstrated in Table 35 in the year of 2007. In the same year, Saudi Arabia was first elected to the UNHRC, and served until 2012.

It is worth mentioning, when examining the regression control variables: regional membership, time, polity values, and GDP per capita, Table 35 showed a statistically significant positive relationship with the worsening of political terror scores of Saudi Arabia and per capita income. As per capita income for Saudi Arabia increased, political repression increased as well. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: regional membership, time, and polity values.

In the case of Thailand, there a variety of complex factors show mixed results in understanding political terror within. The regression demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between political terror and membership in the UNHRC with a p-score value of 0.00 as demonstrated in Table 62, in the year 2006. Unfortunately, the following year a reversal occurred, in which a statistically significant positive relationship between the worsening of political terror and the composition of membership on the UNHRC with a p-score of 0.01. Also, the examined control variables: regional membership, time, polity values, and GDP per capita in Table 62 showed a statistically significant negative relationship between the improvement of political terror scores and the polity of the Asia Pacific region. However, Table 62 simultaneously demonstrated a statistically significant positive relationship between an increase in GDP per capita income and political terror. As per capita income increased in Thailand, political terror increased as well. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: regional membership or time variables.

In the case of Mauritania, there was a statistically significant negative relationship indicating improvement in political terror and membership in the UNHRC with a p-score value of 0.02 as demonstrated in Table 45, in 2012, which was the last year in which

Mauritania served as a member-state of the council. All other years of membership on the council (2007-2012) showed no relationship with a change in political terror scores.

However, worth mentioning, when regressing control variables: regional membership, time, polity values, and GDP per capita, Table 45 showed a statistically significant negative relationship (p-value 0.02) between improvement of political terror scores and GDP per capita income of Mauritania. As per capita income increased in the region, political terror decreased. Also, Table 45 showed a statistically significant positive relationship between the worsening of political terror scores in Mauritania and time (p-score: 0.01), showing a statistical significant worsening in political terror from 1976 to 2012. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: regional membership or composition.

In the case of Uruguay, there was a statistically significant relationship between the worsening in political terror and membership in the UNHRC in 2006 (p-score 0.03). Nonetheless, a complete reversal occurs in 2008 (p-score 0.00) when a statistically significant negative relationship occurs between the improvement of political terror and the UNHRC membership composition, which includes for the first time the election of Uruguay as demonstrated in Table 49. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: regional membership, time, and polity values.

Political Terror Scores of the Membership of the North American Region

The North American region demonstrated an overall trend increase in the political terror scores from 1976 to 2012.⁹⁵ However, the most dramatic increase has occurred within the last decade despite the change in the human rights regime from the UN Commission on Human Rights to the UN Human Rights Council. Further, the net increase of the Political Terror Score in the region ranged from 100 to 150% during 2000 to 2012 as seen in Graph 2 in the appendices.⁹⁶

The region saw no issuances of resolutions against any of the countries in the region despite the dramatic increase of the political terror scores. To elaborate, the North American region was composed of the states of Canada and the United States. This increase in PTS scores in the North American region was overwhelming attributed to the United States, whose Political Terror scores rose from 1 to 3 following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the Invasion of Iraq.⁹⁷ The explanation for an increase of Political Terror to unprecedented levels for the United States, since the Political Terror Scale began recording its data, was due to a litany of reasons, many of which were expounded upon in the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review Working

⁹⁵ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

⁹⁶ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

⁹⁷ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

Group paper, which focused on the number of detainees and enhanced interrogations carried out during the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁹⁸

Moreover, a recent Universal Periodic Review Report of the Working Group by the UN Human Rights Council of the United States strongly recommended the creation of a new national human rights regime to the United States to assist in bringing the United States into compliance with human rights obligation.⁹⁹ Furthermore, the UPR Report of the Working Group of the UN Human Rights Council made a total of 228 recommendations to the United States on improving its human rights record.¹⁰⁰ Despite the number of recommendations given, and accepted by the United States, the Political Terror Scale score of the United States has remained unchanged since the issuance of the report. This fact of no change in the Political Terror Scale score lends support to the contention of no significant change between the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Commission on Human Rights. In the North American context, the PTS scores have worsened despite the recommendations of the UPR working group paper pressuring the United States to improve human rights conditions. Despite both members—Canada (2008-2011), and the United States (2011-2013)—of the region serving on the UN Human Rights Council, the region saw a worsening of political terror. In order to determine whether any explanatory variables existed in the worsening of political terror

⁹⁸ United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council (2011), *Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review United States of America* (A/HRC/16/11).

⁹⁹ United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council. (2011). *Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review United States of America* (A/HRC/16/11).

¹⁰⁰ United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council. (2011). *Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review United States of America* (A/HRC/16/11).

and the region, a regression analysis was conducted between the following variables: regional membership, as seen in Table 65.

The regression revealed that the mean political terror scores from 1976 to 2012 in the North American region had no relationship to UNHRC membership. Further, when examining for the following control variables: GDP per capita income for the North America, United States, and Canada, there was no statistical significant relationship.

However, when examining polity scores for the Americas through Freedom House, a statistically significant positive relationship emerged through an increase in political terror in the North America region and polity scores with a p-value of 0.02. As democratization increased throughout the entire Americas, political terror scores increased within North America. Additionally, when reviewing regressions for the United States and Canada, polity scores had no significant relationship with political terror scores for neither country composing the North American region. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: regional membership, time, and GDP per capita for North America.

Political Terror Scores of the Latin American Region

The Latin American/Caribbean region demonstrated an overall trend decrease in the political terror scores from 1976 to 2012 as seen in Graph 3 of the appendices.¹⁰¹ In the Latin American/Caribbean region, the human rights record is trending downward

¹⁰¹ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

demonstrating significant improvements in the region.¹⁰² However, the most dramatic decrease has occurred during the time period of 1979 to 1996, during the easing of Cold War tensions as the proxy wars in the region waned.¹⁰³ In this case, there was significant improvement to the human rights record during both UN human rights regimes.

During the period of the UN Commission on Human Rights from 1976 to 2006, there was a net decrease of 34% in the Political Terror Scale mean scores in the Latin American/Caribbean region. In comparison, during the time period of human rights protection being administered through the UN Human Rights Council from 2007 to 2012, the Latin American region saw an amelioration of human rights conditions with a net decrease of the Political Terror Scale as much as 17% in the mean scores of all measured states in the region. When comparing the two mean PTS scores of the member states in the Latin American region during the human rights regime protection of the UNCHR and the UNHRC, one finds a statistically significant difference.

Table 4 in the appendices used a two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of all Political Terror Scale scores of the member states composing the membership of the Latin American region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the

¹⁰² Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

¹⁰³ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

member states composing the membership of the Latin American region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).¹⁰⁴

Table 4 demonstrates a statistical significant difference between the mean PTS of the UNCHR and the mean PTS of the UNHRC in the region with a p-score of 0.0024.

¹⁰⁵However, the streaming of PTS scores demonstrated in Table 4 shows the decreasing trend of political terror even after the human rights regime change took place, which explains the improvement of the human rights record in both regimes.¹⁰⁶ The explanatory variable for understanding the decreasing Political Terror Scale scores still remains inchoate since there was improvement during both human rights regimes.

Also, the regressions examining the causal relationship between issued UNCHR and UNHRC resolutions have demonstrated no statistical relationship between the variables. When examining the region to clarify the spurious factors that may be assuaging the human rights conditions in the region, the democratization of the region during the end of the Cold War demonstrates one possible connection between the amelioration of human rights and the transition to democracy of many of the states of the Latin American/Caribbean region. The effects of the interstate mechanism of human rights compliance through either the UN Commission on Human Rights or the UN

¹⁰⁴ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁰⁵ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁰⁶ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

Human Rights Council remains without a causal link, and shows no relationship between the variables.

In order to determine whether any explanatory variables may be linked to a change in political terror and the region, a regression analysis was conducted between the following variables: regional membership, membership composition of the UNHRC, polity scores for the Americas region, GDP per capita for the Caribbean small states, GDP per capita for Latin American Caribbean region all incomes, and GDP per capita for Latin America Caribbean developing countries, as seen in Table 64. The regression resulted in a statistically significant positive relationship between rising Americas' polity scores and an increase in the political terror scores in the Latin American Caribbean region with a p-score of 0.01. As democratization as measured by the percent of free countries in the Americas region measured by Freedom House increased, the political terror in the Americas region increased as well as measured by yearly average during times of democratic transition. Although this Americas' polity region includes both South and North America as well, it may be distorting the political terror scores as the North American region saw an increase in political terror. It does show a connection between polity scores and political terror in the region, and the effects of domestic politics.

However, the effects of intrastate compliance for human rights as advanced by Simmons, Domestic Politics Theory of Treaty Compliance,¹⁰⁷ demonstrates evidence of the amelioration of human rights through domestic mobilizations to hold regimes

¹⁰⁷ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 147-155.

accountable to agree upon human rights obligations. Moreover, previous studies that have examined the Central American region focused on the incorporation of human rights instruments into the newly ratified constitutions as a lock-in mechanism to help to safeguard human rights.¹⁰⁸

When reviewing the process of incorporation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into state constitutions, research has supported the contention that newly democratized states aim to guarantee human rights to newly democratized states by incorporating human rights treaties and norms into newly ratified constitutions.¹⁰⁹ The purpose of constitutional incorporation goes beyond the reflection of the principles of the new democratic regime, but as a “lock-in” mechanism to prevent a remission into human rights abuses.¹¹⁰

Political Terror scores of the European Region

The European region demonstrated an overall trend decrease in the political terror scores from 1976 to 2012 in Graph 4 of the appendices.¹¹¹ However, the most dramatic increase has occurred with the end of the Cold War as a diffusion of human rights norms

¹⁰⁸ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 149-155.

¹⁰⁹ Elkins, Ginsburg, and Simmons, “Getting to Rights,” 91-93.

¹¹⁰ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 149-155.

¹¹¹ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

began to permeate into Central and Eastern Europe as the region democratized from Marxist-Leninist regimes following the fall of the Berlin Wall in the time period from 1988 to 1992.¹¹² Subsequently, the human rights record in the region suddenly relapsed into the political terror scores with a mean PTS score ranging from 1.5 to 2.5 during the time period of 1993 to 1996 reflecting the human rights atrocities committed during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.¹¹³

The region dramatically ameliorated human rights conditions as demonstrated in the Political Terror Scores from 1996 to 2012, once again decreasing their mean PTS scores for the region from 2.5 to 1.5 in the ordinal scale.¹¹⁴

This overall decreasing trend was achieved during the time periods of both human rights regimes: the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Council. Further, the Political Terror Scale scores in the region were assuaged by 40% during the examined time period.¹¹⁵ When examining both PTS score means of the UNCHR and UNHRC, we find there is a statistical significant difference between the means as demonstrated in Table 5 in the appendices, which examined a two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states

¹¹² Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹¹³ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹¹⁴ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹¹⁵ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

composing the membership of the European region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the European region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).¹¹⁶

The results of Table 5, in which the t-tests of two- sample means reveal there is a high statistical significant difference in the European regional PTS means during the time period of the UN Human Rights Council with a p-score of 0.00 compared to the mean PTS of member states of the region during the time of the UNCHR.¹¹⁷ However, the causal mechanism between the high reduction of political terror and the relationship with the UNHRC is unclear, during this time period as the regression data between the resolutions of the UNHRC and political terror have shown no statistical relationship. Similarly to the Latin American group, the European group underwent transformative change during the end of the Cold War, in which domestic mobilizations took place demanding compliance to human rights commitments made by the Marxist regimes, most notably in Czechoslovakia, where Vaclav Havel, and political dissidents of Charter 77 petitioned for such compliance.¹¹⁸ Similar types of mobilizations took place throughout the Eastern Europe and Central Europe: Hungary, East Germany, and Romania.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹¹⁷ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹¹⁸ Václav Havel and John Keane. *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985.

¹¹⁹ Havel, and Keane, *The Power of the Powerless*.

The comparison of PTS means between the UNCHR and the UNHRC when examining the trending patterns of PTS scores in the European region from 1976 to 2012, indicates political terror shifting in a mercurial pattern during the period of democratic transition, but steadily decreases after stabilization of the new democratic regimes.

In order to determine whether any explanatory variables may be linked to a change in political terror and the region, a regression analysis was conducted between the following variables: regional membership, membership composition of the UNHRC, polity scores for the Western European region, GDP per capita for the Euro Area states, GDP per capita for European Union, GDP per capita for Europe and Central Asia all incomes, and GDP per capita for Europe and Central Asia developing countries, as seen in Tables 10-71.

The regression resulted in a statistically significant relationship between changes in political terror scores and the membership of the UNHRC in the following years: 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010. Interestingly, the relationship between political terror and the UNHRC membership fluctuated as 2006 and 2009 saw a negative relationship with political terror improving, 2008 and 2010 presented a reversal as the relationship between the variables shifted into a positive relationship with the worsening of political terror being associated with the UNHRC membership.

Also, the regression revealed a strong statistical negative relationship when examining the significant improvement in political terror and the polity scores of Central and Eastern Europe (p-value 0.00) as these countries transitioned from communism into democracies. Further, the amelioration of political terror in the region was evidenced by

the time variable showing the strongest statistically significant relationship as time progressed with the improvement of human rights with a p-value of 0.000, and a coefficient of -29.41. Ironically, Western Europe polity showed the opposite relationship with the Europe and Central Asia region, as the regression revealed a statistically significant positive relationship between a slight increase in the political terror scores in the region and the polity scores of Western Europe with a coefficient of 0.007.

Additionally, the rising GDP per capita for Europe and Central Asia all incomes related to a slight increase in the political terror scores in the European and Central Asia region with a p-score of 0.04. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: regional membership, time, Western Europe Polity scores, Central and Eastern Europe Polity scores, GDP per capita for the Euro Area states, GDP per capita for European Union, GDP per capita for Europe and Central Asia all incomes, and GDP per capita for Europe and Central Asia developing countries.

Once again, the causal mechanism between the high reduction of political terror in the region and the relationship with the polity scores was supported. However, during this time period, regressions did not show a statistical significant relationship between the resolutions of the UNHRC membership and political terror.

Political Terror of the Middle Eastern and North African Region

The Middle East and North Africa region demonstrated no change in the political terror scores from 1976 to 2012 as seen in Graph 5 in the appendices.¹²⁰ The mean political terror scores in this region remained within the range of 3 to 3.5.¹²¹ This constant in the mean of political terror scale in the region has been maintained despite the change in the human rights regime from the UN Commission on Human Rights to the UN Human Rights Council. Further, the recalcitrant resistance to human rights norms in the region reflects the use of repression by the region's authoritarian regimes to maintain power.

According to Freedom House in 2015, out of the 21 countries of the Middle Eastern and North Africa region, which consist of 410 million inhabitants, only 5% can be considered free.¹²² Despite the optimism of the Arab Spring in 2011, and the hope of political reform aimed at respecting human rights, the region continues to struggle with human rights abuses and atrocities. There has been no substantial or statistical change in the political terror scores from 2011 to the present as demonstrated in the graph above.¹²³

Moreover, this region has seen countless resolutions, both country-specific and regional aimed at improving human rights conditions. However, the effectiveness of the resolutions if measured by an improvement in the political terror scale has been

¹²⁰ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

¹²¹ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

¹²² Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year. Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

¹²³ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

ineffective. The following data shows a t-test analysis of the mean score of PTS data for the UN Commission on Human Rights for the region from 1976 to 2006, and the mean score of PTS data for the UN Human Rights Council as seen in Table 6 in the appendices, in which a two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the Middle Eastern and North Africa region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the Middle Eastern and North Africa region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).¹²⁴

The result of the data demonstrates no statistical significant difference with a p-score of .4877, and the difference between the means of -0.05 is within the confidence interval of the t-test of -0.21 and 0.10.¹²⁵ The conclusion of the t-test is the failure to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two means of the PTS scores of both the UNCHR and the UNHRC. To summarize, the Political Terror Score in the region during the examined time period 1976-2012 remained the same despite changes in the human rights regime.

In order to determine whether any explanatory variables may be linked to political terror and the region, a regression analysis was conducted between political terror scores of the region as the dependent variable, and the following independent variables: regional membership, time, membership composition of the UNHRC, polity scores for the Middle

¹²⁴ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

¹²⁵ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

Eastern region, and GDP per capita for the Middle East and North Africa region all incomes as seen in Table 70. The regression resulted in a statistically significant negative relationship between rising Middle East and North Africa regional polity scores, and a decrease in the political terror scores of the region with a p-score of 0.02. As democratization of the region increased, the amount of political terror in region decreased during the examined period.

Also, the results of the regression revealed a statistically significant positive relationship between political terror scores of the region and the GDP per capita of the Middle East and North Africa all incomes measure. As income levels rose in the region, the amount of political terror increased as well. The latter results were consistent with other models examined from states consisting in the membership of the UNHRC residing within the region such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania; This consistency with the other model was not the case for following examined states within the region consisting of the UNHRC membership (2006-2012): Egypt, and Qatar as seen in Tables 20-70 in the appendices. This result indicates that economic growth as measured by GDP per capita in the MENA(all incomes category) empowers autocratic regimes to be more repressive as measured by the political terror scale.

Interestingly, this evidence supports contentions that the spread of democratization during the Arab Spring came to non-oil rich regimes within the region that were suffering from the economic recession, but the oil-rich autocratic regimes did

not have the economic dissent, and fueled complacency with the regime by oil proceeds that suppressed democratic mobilizations.¹²⁶

However, the time variable indicates the strongest statistical significant negative relationship that political terror has waned in the examined period as time progresses with a co-efficient of -30.56, and a p-value of 0.01. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: regional membership or UNHRC membership composition.

Political Terror scores of the East Asia Pacific

When examining the political terror scores as seen in Graph 6 of the appendices, the region exhibited the following changes.¹²⁷ The East Asia Pacific region ameliorated their mean political terror scores from 1976 to 2012, with reductions ranging from 3.58 to 2.15 of the mean score in the examined period.¹²⁸ This decrease in the mean PTS scores occurred mainly from 1976 to 1992.¹²⁹ Subsequently, from 1993 to 2012, the mean political terror scores in the region stabilized within the following range of 2.15-2.95.¹³⁰ Interestingly, the mean PTS scores in the region during the 1993 to 2012 period

¹²⁶ Fareed Zakaria, "Why Oil Prices Will Stay High." *Cable News Network*. Accessed January 15, 2012.

¹²⁷ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹²⁸ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹²⁹ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

¹³⁰ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

fluctuated quite often but stayed within the mentioned range, which was still well below the high of the late 1970s of 3.58.¹³¹

The highest decrease in the mean PTS scores occurred previous to the change in the human rights regime from the UN Commission on Human Rights to the UN Human Rights Council, which occurred in 2006.¹³² Further, the net decrease of the mean PTS score in the region ranged from 33% during the period of human rights protection of the UNCHR from 1976 to 2006.¹³³ In comparison to a net decrease of the mean PTS in the region, which ranged from 16% to 30% during the time period of 2006-2012 under the protection of the UNHRC.¹³⁴ To examine whether these changes were statistically significant, a t-test of the mean PTS scores of the region during the two periods of the UNCHR and the UNHRC was conducted. The results are as follows in Table 7 of the appendices, in which a two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the East Asia Pacific during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the East Asia Pacific during the UNHRC (2007-2012).

The data demonstrated there is a significant difference between the two mean PTS scores of the region between the periods of the UNCHR and the UNHRC with a p-score

¹³¹ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

¹³² Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

¹³³ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

¹³⁴ Political Terror Scale, Political Terror Scale.

of 0.056.¹³⁵ However, despite the p-score being above 0.05, a significant difference is still evidenced.¹³⁶ The alternative hypothesis of the mean PTS scores during the time periods of human rights protection of the UNCHR being higher than the mean PTS score during the UNHRC was confirmed with a p-score of 0.03, which demonstrates a statistically significant difference.¹³⁷

When examining Graph 6 in the appendices, it is clear that an amelioration of political terror has taken place.¹³⁸ However, the causal mechanism still remains elusive. When examining the political regimes in the region by examining the data by Freedom house (whose regional composition for the East Asia Pacific region is very similar to regional composition of the East Asia Pacific region in the Political Terror Scale), the following results appear: out of 45 countries in the Asia-Pacific region in 2015, and 4 billion inhabitants, 38% are considered to be free by Freedom House.¹³⁹

The spread of democratization may serve as an explanatory variable in understanding the assuagement of the political terror scores in the region as transitional regimes in the East Asia Pacific region further democratized. The Freedom House data

¹³⁵ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹³⁶ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹³⁷ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹³⁸ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹³⁹ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year. Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

for the same region in 1973 consisted of 31 countries in the region, and 29% was considered to be free.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, 11 countries of the 31 were considered to be partially, and another 11 out of the 31 countries in the region were not free in 1973.¹⁴¹ In comparison, the number of free countries in the region rose from 9 to 16, with the partially free countries also rose from 11 to 14, and the not free countries decreasing from 11 to 9 in the East Asia Pacific region during the time period being examined.¹⁴²

The changes in the political terror scores is not explained by the issuance of resolutions by the UN Human Rights Council as shown by regression analysis, but the significant changes of the mean political terror scores in the region demonstrated by the t-tests indicate a fundamental shift in regards to the respect of human rights by spurious factors such as the democratization of the region as demonstrated by Freedom House data.

In order to determine whether any explanatory variables may be linked to a change in political terror and the region, a regression analysis was conducted between the political terror as the dependent variable and the following independent variables: regional membership, membership composition of the UNHRC, polity scores for the Asia Pacific region, GDP per capita for the East Asia Pacific developing countries only, and

¹⁴⁰ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year. Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

¹⁴¹ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year. Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

¹⁴² Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year. Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

GDP per capita for East Asia Pacific region all incomes as seen in Table 66. The regression resulted in a statistically significant negative relationship between rising Asia Pacific polity scores, and a decrease in the political terror scores in the East Asia Pacific region with a co-efficient of -0.03 and a p-score of 0.01. Further, the time variable indicated a strong statistical significant negative relationship that political terror has waned in the examined period as time progresses with a co-efficient of -55.29, and a p-value of 0.000. Supporting the contentions that democratization of the region over time has been an explanatory factor in understanding the assuagement of political terror in the region. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: UNHRC membership composition(2006-2012), GDP per capita for the East Asia Pacific developing countries only, and GDP per capita for East Asia Pacific region all incomes.

Political Terror of the South Asia Region

The South Asia region demonstrated an overall trend increase in the political terror scores from 1976 to 2012 as seen in Graph 7 of the appendices.¹⁴³ However, the data in the graph does not indicate a significant change in the mean political terror scores in the decades examined despite the change in the human rights regime from the UN Commission on Human Rights to the UN Human Rights Council.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁴⁴ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

Further, the net increase of the Political Terror Score in the region ranged from 39% increase from 1976 to 2012.¹⁴⁵ A significant portion of the increase occurred during the transition from the UNCHR to the UNHRC in the international human rights regime. The t-test results to determine whether there was any significant statistical difference between the mean political terror scores in the region resulted as follows in Table 8 of the appendices, in which a two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the South Asia region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the South Asia region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).¹⁴⁶

There was a strong statistical significant difference in the mean political terror scores in the region between the UNCHR and the UNHRC with a p-score of 0.00 along with t-score of -3.90.¹⁴⁷ The results indicate that the mean political terror score in the region was significantly higher during the time period of human rights protection of the UNHRC compared to the UNCHR.

During this time period of 2001-2012, the region played a significant role in the US-led war on terror. The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces invaded Afghanistan, and carried out operations in Pakistan to dismantle extremist groups in the region along with the Taliban regime that supported the extremist

¹⁴⁵ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁴⁶ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁴⁷ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

networks. The political terror scores in these countries maintained a consistent political terror score of 5 beginning after 2005.¹⁴⁸ The political terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan increased during and after the transition in the human rights regime rather than assuaging.

Despite concentrated efforts to democratize Afghanistan by the international community led by the United States and NATO, Afghanistan remains the only country in the region with the Freedom House designation of “not free.”¹⁴⁹ In the 9 countries listed in the region by the Political Terror Scale (PTS), Freedom House has given a designation of “partial free” to 7 out of the 9 countries listed in the region by the PTS in 2015, and a one designation of “free” to the state of India in 2015.¹⁵⁰ The diffusion of human rights values along with compliance with UNHRC resolutions and human rights treaties may be partially explained by the factor that the region has lacked liberal strong democratic governance.

This previous contention of non-compliance with UNHRC resolutions may be seen by the regression analysis of the relationship between UNHRC issued resolutions and the mean political terror scores of all countries showed earlier in Table 2 of the appendices showed no causal link to the assuagement of human rights through UNHRC issued resolutions.¹⁵¹ For the purposes of human rights in the South Asian region, there

¹⁴⁸ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁴⁹ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year, Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

¹⁵⁰ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year, Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

seems to be no relationship between the change in the human rights regime and human rights compliance. At the very least there is a failure to reject the null hypothesis of no existing relationship between the UNHRC resolutions and mean political terror scores despite a statistical significant difference between the UNHRC and the UNCHR.¹⁵² Ironically, the significant difference that exists is that the human right compliance as measured by the Political Terror Scale in the region was significantly lower during the time period of human rights protection of the UNCHR, 1976 to 2006, and not under the UNHRC.¹⁵³

In order to determine whether any explanatory variables may be linked to a change in political terror and the region, a regression analysis was conducted between political terror as the dependent variable and the following independent variables: membership composition of the UNHRC, polity scores for the South Asia region, and GDP per capita for South Asia as seen in Table 67. The regression resulted in a statistically significant negative relationship between rising GDP per capita income of South Asia and a decrease in the political terror scores in the South Asia region with a coefficient of -0.007 and a p-score of 0.001. However, despite the positive effects of economic growth in parts of the region, the trend in the region has been the worsening of political terror from 1976 to 2012 as demonstrated by the time variable with a statistically significant positive relationship between the two variables with co-efficient of 75.93 and

¹⁵¹ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁵² Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁵³ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

a p-value of 0.000. No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: UNHRC membership composition (2006-2012) or South Asia polity scores.

Political Terror in the Sub-Saharan Africa Region

The Sub-Saharan African region demonstrated an overall trend increase in the political terror scores from 1976 to 2012 as seen in Graph 8 in the appendices.¹⁵⁴ The trend increase ranged from 2.57 to 3.22 within the last decade regardless of the transition of the human rights regime from the UN Commission on Human Rights to the UN Human Rights Council.¹⁵⁵ The Political Terror Scale composed the Sub-Saharan African region consisted of 48 countries,¹⁵⁶ The Freedom House index measure for the Sub-Saharan African region consisted only of 49 countries, in which it considered in 2015 as follows: in the 49 countries listed in the region by the Political Terror Scale (PTS), Freedom House gave a designation of “not free” to 21 out of the 49 countries, a designation of “partial free” to 18 out of the 49 countries listed in the region by the PTS in 2015, and a designation of “free” to 10 of the 49 countries in 2015.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

¹⁵⁵ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

¹⁵⁶ Political Terror Scale, “Political Terror Scale.”

¹⁵⁷ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year.

In comparison to the designation in 1976 that resulted in the following designations: Freedom House gave a designation of “not free” to 25 out of the 44 countries, a designation of “partial free” to 16 out of the 44 countries listed in the region by the PTS in 1976, and a designation of “free” to 3 of the 44 countries in 1976.¹⁵⁸ Overall, from 1976 to 2015 the region has proliferated the amount of democratic states from 3 to 10 as well as seen the number of partial free states in region increase from 16 to 18, which accounts for an increase in the percentage of the population considered to be free from 7% in 1976 to 20% in 2015.¹⁵⁹ Also, overall percentage of the population with the designation of “not free” has fallen to 43% of the region in 2015 compared to 57% in 1976.¹⁶⁰

However, the question remains whether the Political Terror Scale scores of the region was significantly ameliorated with the change in the human rights regime, and whether that change may be contributed to the resolutions by the human rights bodies or the diffusion of human rights ideals enforced by domestic politics of democratization as advocated by the Domestic Politics Theory of Treaty Compliance.¹⁶¹ The first question

¹⁵⁸ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year.

¹⁵⁹ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year.

¹⁶⁰ Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Regional Country Status Breakdown by Year. Freedom House. Accessed June 16, 2015.

¹⁶¹ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 149-155.

was examined through the use of t-tests measuring the mean PTS scores of the region from 1976 to 2006 during the time of human right protection of the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the mean PTS scores of the region from 2006 to 2012 after the transition to the UN Human Rights Council. The results of the t-test analysis were as demonstrated in Table 9 of the appendices, in which a two mean t-test of the comparative mean PTS scores of the mean each given year of the member states composing the membership of the Sub-Saharan region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the Sub-Saharan region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).¹⁶²

The t-test analysis indicates a slight statistical difference between the mean PTS scores in the region during the different human rights bodies with a p-score of 0.066, and t-score of -1.93, almost obtaining the p-score value of 0.05 or t-score value of -1.96.¹⁶³ However, the t-test scores collaborates the graph chart that the mean political terror scores in the region worsened over time despite the change in the human rights regime as well as the democratization of the region.

Once again, the regression analysis of the resolutions issued by the UN Human Rights council indicated no relationship between the issuance of resolutions and the political terror scores.¹⁶⁴ In the case of the Sub-Saharan African region, there is failure to

¹⁶² Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁶³ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

¹⁶⁴ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between the change in the human rights regime and political terror scores in the region.

In order to determine whether any explanatory variables may be linked to a change in political terror and the region, a regression analysis was conducted between political terror in the Sub-Saharan Africa region as the dependent variable and the following independent variables: regional membership, membership composition of the UNHRC, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, GDP per capita for the Sub-Saharan Africa region developing countries only, and GDP per capita for Sub-Saharan Africa region all incomes as seen in Table 69.

The regression resulted in a statistically significant negative relationship between rising GDP per capita income of Sub-Saharan Africa all incomes and a decrease in the political terror scores in the Sub-Saharan Africa region with a co-efficient of $-.38$ and a p-score of 0.03 . However, despite the positive effects of economic growth in the overall GDP per capita income for the entire region, the opposite is true between political terror and the GDP per capita for the developing countries of the Sub-Saharan Africa region.

The regression indicated a statistically significant positive relationship between the economic growth of the GDP per capita of the developing countries in the region and the worsening of political terror with a co-efficient of $-.3816$ and a p-value of 0.03 . No other variables showed any significant relationships within the model: UNHRC membership composition (2006-2012) or Sub-Saharan Africa polity scores.

Finally, no significant relationship was revealed between all political terror scores (1976-2012) from all countries of the international community measured through the Political Terror Scale as the dependent variable, and the following independent variables: regional composition of all regions, UN Human Rights Council membership composition, regional polity scores, and GDP per capita of regional membership being examined as seen in Tables 70-76 of the appendices. The use of all political terror scores (1976-2012) from all countries listed in the Political Terror Scale for the models in Tables 70-76 revealed a stronger R-squared values ranging from .20-.42 of the cases adding support to the null hypothesis indicating no relationship between the change of all political terror at-large with the aforementioned independent variables from tables 70-76 of the appendices.

VII: Conclusion

In summary, when the human rights paradigm shifted in 2005, the intention was to bring about a human rights regime that was seen as legitimate by the international community to permeate human rights norms through the use of constructive dialogue embodied through the use of the Universal Periodic Review, and the use of a confrontational resolution as a last resort. The resulting research aimed at analyzing whether the institutional changes undertaken by the international community yielded effective change as measured by the Political Terror Scale in both the UN human rights regime, and the member states. The result has shown that a statistical significant change exists between the composition of the mean political terror score of the members of the UNHRC and the UNCHR. The membership of the UNCHR human rights record as measured by the mean PTS score was significantly higher than the mean PTS score of the UNHRC. In this measure, the pivoting away from the reputation of hypocrisy that the former UN Commission on Human Rights found itself embroiled has been assuaged.

When it pertains to the goal of improving the reputation of the human rights regime, the transition to the UNHRC has yielded some success by elected membership of the UN Human Rights Council by the UN General Assembly rather than the UN Economic Social Council. The new UN Human Rights Council has managed to be composed by member states whose mean PTS scores are statistically significantly less than the previous commission as measured by t-tests.

A statistical significant difference exists between the mean PTS scores of all measured states globally by the Political Terror Scale during the time of human rights protection under the UNCHR compared to the UNHRC. Despite the significant decrease in political terror throughout the world after the transition to the UNHRC, the decline of political terror was occurring prior to the regime shift.

Moreover, the effectiveness of the human rights regime is called into serious question when reviewing the relationship between the issued resolutions of the UNHRC and Political Terror Scale. The use of regression analysis failed to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship existing between resolutions issued by the UNHRC and Political Terror Scale scores. The results of the regressions conclusively invalidated the alternative hypothesis of a negative relationship existing between the UNHRC resolutions and the PTS scores through an adjusted R-score of 0.014, the model showed a high residual error in the model of MSE of .238.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, there is no evidence to support any contention of a relationship between issued resolutions of the UNHRC and a change in the political terror scores.

The regressions analyzed of the human rights regime truly question the effectiveness of the regime. Without doubt, global human rights conditions have improved since 1976 as measured by the PTS, but whether the UNHRC played a significant role in this amelioration still remains inchoate. Until now, the role of UNHRC seems to have improved the quality of the membership of the UNHRC but not the effectiveness of the organization in resulting in any significant change in the states in question. Further, the regressions that examined the effects of UNHRC membership on

¹⁶⁵ Political Terror Scale, "Political Terror Scale."

political terror only revealed a statistically significant relationship with 10 out of the 59 states consisting of the membership of the UNHRC from 2006 to 2012. Moreover, the improvement in political terror most typically characterized the state behavior only during the beginning or end of the state's term of membership on the UNHRC. The implications of these findings are that member-states of the UNHRC modify behavior in order to achieve the state being elected or re-elected to the human rights body indicating that modification of state behavior was short-lived for political purposes.

Despite the laudable intentions of the framers of the human rights regime change, which changed the human rights paradigm in hopes of ameliorating human rights conditions, the current human rights regime has not been the cause of the assuagement of human rights abuses. Interestingly, the regional regression analysis indicated some factors that may present some possible solutions to the conundrum of ameliorated human rights conditions globally prior and post the human rights regime change. The result of the regional regressions indicated an amelioration of political terror connected with improving polity scores, democratization, and increased GDP per capita income. However, in particular cases, the rise in GDP per capita income led to the worsening of political terror.

The permeation of democratic regimes, rather than authoritarian regimes in the region had an observed role in the respect for human rights as indicated by Freedom House measures and the Political Terror Scale. Authoritarian regimes are less likely to respect human rights protections than democratic states. Further, the notion of inter-state enforcement through resolutions and dialogue to bring the most belligerent states into compliance has failed in authoritarian regimes. The diffusion of human rights norms

tends to resemble a self-declaration of democratic states, and human rights treaties as well as compliance resemble more reflection than diffusion of human rights norms by the international community.

However, evidence indicates these norms serve greater than mere reflection, but rather serve as a standard to hold states accountable on the basis of Domestic Politics Theory of Treaty Compliance, which contend that state obligations to human rights treaties and norms are enforced by domestic groups through mobilization and the internal political processes of the state.¹⁶⁶ Hence, it is more likely to occur in democratic and transitional democracies than authoritarian states—where dissent is severely repressed.¹⁶⁷ The regional analysis supported the premise that democratic regimes were more likely to comply with human rights norms as measured by the Political Terror Scale through lower PTS scores. Further, the regions with the lowest political terror and highest improvement in political terror were most likely democratic regimes or transitional regimes.

The irony of the human rights regime is that the belligerent states that are the worst abusers of human rights and that usually are the target of resolutions from the UNHRC are the states where the resolutions have the least effect. In states where resolutions would have a significant impact, the resolutions are not needed as the internal processes of the state pressure compliance with agreed upon human rights obligations. It seems that transitional democracies are the regime type that may be susceptible to both influence by the diffusion of human rights norms through treaties, recommendations, and

¹⁶⁶ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 149-155.

¹⁶⁷ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 149-155.

UNHRC resolutions as contended by the advocates of Domestic Politics Theory of Treaty Compliance.¹⁶⁸ However, the improved reputation of the member states that compose the UN Human Rights Council as measured by the PTS has not translated into improved conditions as measured by the regressions.

The international human rights regime has accomplished the permeation of human rights norms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into established treaties: ICCRP, ICESCR, CAT, CEDAW, CRC, and many more, which the regime monitors for compliance for some treaties. Also, the regime has evolved towards greater transparency by eliminating Libya from its membership, when the member-state considered being in belligerent status of meeting their human rights obligations. Human rights conditions are improving globally, but the improvement does not involve resolutions from the UN Human Rights Council.

¹⁶⁸ Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights*, 149-155.

VIII.

Research Limitations

The project was limited in the amount of data available in scores from Political Terror Scale from 1976 to 2012. No data from 1946 to 1976 was available nor were there any scores from 2013 to the present. Further, the amount of data available for the UN Human Rights Council was only from 2006 to 2012 compared to UN Commission on Human Rights, where data was available since 1976.

Further, the recommendations of the Universal Periodic Review were not analyzed to determine any causal relationship between accepted recommendations and the mean scores of Political Terror Scales, which may be examined in future research with regression analysis to help determine causality to political terror.

IX.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Table 1: Two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of all member-states of the United Nations during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the UNHRC (2007-2012)

```
. summ MEANPTSOVERALL20062013 MEANPTSOVERALL19772005
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
MEA-20062013	8	2.58	.1256981	2.44	2.8
MEA-19772005	30	2.755	.1047411	2.57	2.98

```
. ttesti 8 2.58 .125 30 2.755 .104, unequal
```

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]
x	8	2.58	.0441942	.125	2.475497 2.684503
y	30	2.755	.0189877	.104	2.716166 2.793834
combined	38	2.718158	.0209392	.1290778	2.675731 2.760585
diff		-.175	.0481005		-.2825595 -.0674405

```
diff = mean(x) - mean(y)          t = -3.6382
Ho: diff = 0                      Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 9.74269
```

```
Ha: diff < 0                      Ha: diff != 0                      Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0024                  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0047                  Pr(T > t) = 0.9976
```

Appendix 2. Table 2: Regression analysis between United Nations Human Rights Council
1503 Resolutions and the percentage change of political terror scores (2006-2012).

```
. reg changeinPTS UNHRCResolution
```

Source	SS	df	MS	
Model	.175841968	1	.175841968	Number of obs = 147
Residual	8.23664783	145	.056804468	F(1, 145) = 3.10
Total	8.4124898	146	.057619793	Prob > F = 0.0806

R-squared = 0.0209
Adj R-squared = 0.0142
Root MSE = .23834

changeinPTS	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
UNHRCResolution	.1081493	.0614687	1.76	0.081	-.013341	.2296397
_cons	-.0963846	.0209035	-4.61	0.000	-.1376996	-.0550696

Appendix 3. Table 3: Two mean t-test of the comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the UNHRC (2007-2012).

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
unchr	4	2.78	.0747217	.1494434	2.542202	3.017798
unhrc	6	2.56	.0409878	.1003992	2.454638	2.665362
combined	10	2.648	.0509422	.1610935	2.532761	2.763239
diff		.22	.0852252		-.0016286	.4416286


diff = mean(unchr) - mean(unhrc) t = 2.5814

Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 4.8154


Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9744 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0511 Pr(T > t) = 0.0256


Appendix 4. Graph 1: Mean Political Terror Scores of Member States of the UNCHR and UNHRC for the given year.




Appendix 5. Graph 2: North American region mean Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012



Appendix 6. Graph 3: Latin American region mean Political Terror Scale scores from 1977-2012



Appendix 9. Graph 4: European region mean Political Terror Scale scores from 1977-2012



Appendix 10. Table 5: Two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the European region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the European region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).

. ttesti 38 2.078 .2097 6 1.795 .1662, unequal


Two-sample t test with unequal variances

	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x	38	2.078	.0340178	.2097	2.009073	2.146927
y	6	1.795	.0678509	.1662	1.620584	1.969416
combined	44	2.039409	.0339456	.2251697	1.970951	2.107867
diff		.283	.0759009		.1070387	.4589613

diff = mean(x) - mean(y) t = 3.7285
 Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 7.76327

Ha: diff < 0	Ha: diff != 0	Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9969	Pr(T > t) = 0.0061	Pr(T > t) = 0.0031

Appendix 11. Graph 5: Middle Eastern and North Africa region mean Political Terror
Scale scores from 1977-2012



Appendix 12. Table 6: Two mean t-test of the comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the Middle Eastern and North Africa region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the Middle Eastern and North Africa region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).

```
. summ unchr unhrc
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
unchr	30	3.089667	.1697358	2.8	3.65
unhrc	6	3.143333	.1484138	3	3.35

```
. ttesti 30 3.09 0.17 6 3.14 .15, unequal
```


Two-sample t test with unequal variances

	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x	30	3.09	.0310376	.17	3.026521	3.153479
y	6	3.14	.0612372	.15	2.982585	3.297415
combined	36	3.098333	.0276472	.1658829	3.042207	3.15446
diff		-.05	.0686537		-.2089887	.1089887

```
diff = mean(x) - mean(y)                                t = -0.7283
Ho: diff = 0                                             Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 7.80999
```

```
Ha: diff < 0                                           Ha: diff != 0                                           Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.2438                                     Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4877                                   Pr(T > t) = 0.7562
```

Appendix 13. Graph 6: East Asia Pacific region mean Political Terror Scale scores from 1977-2012



Appendix 14. Table 7: Two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the East Asia Pacific during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the East Asia Pacific during the UNHRC (2007-2012).

```
. summ unchr unhrc
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
unchr	31	2.752581	.3175633	2.29	3.58
unhrc	6	2.51	.2342648	2.15	2.89

```
. ttesti 31 2.75 .32 6 2.51 .23, unequal
```


Two-sample t test with unequal variances

	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x	31	2.75	.0574737	.32	2.632623	2.867377
y	6	2.51	.0938971	.23	2.26863	2.75137
combined	37	2.711081	.0521753	.3173701	2.605265	2.816898
diff		.24	.1100904		-.0080893	.4880893

```
diff = mean(x) - mean(y)                                t = 2.1800
Ho: diff = 0                                             Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 9.23242
```

```
Ha: diff < 0                                           Ha: diff != 0                                           Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9718                                     Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0564                                   Pr(T > t) = 0.0282
```


Appendix 15. Graph 7: South Asian region mean Political Terror Scale scores from 1977-2012



Appendix 16. Table 8: Two mean t-test of the comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the South Asia region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the South Asia region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).

```
. summ unchr unhrc
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
unchr	30	3.482333	.2715306	3	4
unhrc	6	3.883333	.2185101	3.71	4.17

```
. ttesti 30 3.48 .27 6 3.88 .22, unequal
```


Two-sample t test with unequal variances

	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x	30	3.48	.049295	.27	3.37918	3.58082
y	6	3.88	.0898146	.22	3.649124	4.110876
combined	36	3.546667	.0500484	.3002903	3.445063	3.64827
diff		-.4	.1024532		-.6346116	-.1653884

```
diff = mean(x) - mean(y)                                t = -3.9042
Ho: diff = 0                                             Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 8.33571

Ha: diff < 0                                             Ha: diff != 0                                         Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0021                                       Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0042                               Pr(T > t) = 0.9979
```

Appendix 17. Graph 8: Sub-Saharan Africa region mean Political Terror Scale scores from 1977-2012



Appendix 18. Table 9: Two mean t-test of the Comparative mean PTS scores of the mean of each given year of the member states composing the membership of the Sub-Saharan region during the UNCHR (1976-2006) and the member states composing the membership of the Sub-Saharan region during the UNHRC (2007-2012).

```
. summ unchr unhrc
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
unchr	31	2.90871	.2597658	2.55	3.47
unhrc	6	3.031667	.0982683	2.95	3.22

```
. ttesti 31 2.91 .26 6 3.03 .10, unequal
```

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
x	31	2.91	.0466974	.26	2.814631	3.005369
y	6	3.03	.0408248	.1	2.925056	3.134944
combined	37	2.929459	.0401797	.2444034	2.847971	3.010948
diff		-.12	.0620267		-.2490943	.0090943

```
diff = mean(x) - mean(y)                                t = -1.9347
Ho: diff = 0                                             Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 20.729

Ha: diff < 0                                             Ha: diff != 0                                         Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0334                                       Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0668                               Pr(T > t) = 0.9666
```

Appendix 19. Table 10: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Algeria (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Middle Eastern North Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014).

```
. reg algeria r4 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 menapolity middleeastnorthafricaallincomele
note: r4 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	29
Model	27.3165127	10	2.73165127	F(10, 18)	=	4.38
Residual	11.2352114	18	.624178413	Prob > F	=	0.0032
				R-squared	=	0.7086
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5467
Total	38.5517241	28	1.37684729	Root MSE	=	.79005

algeria	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r4	0	(omitted)				
time1	-167.7015	58.18066	-2.88	0.010	-289.9345	-45.46847
HRC6	-3.884093	1.282669	-3.03	0.007	-6.578881	-1.189305
HRC7	.3330695	.9027489	0.37	0.716	-1.563536	2.229675
HRC8	2.363228	1.235637	1.91	0.072	-.2327493	4.959205
HRC9	-3.122129	1.194833	-2.61	0.018	-5.632381	-.6118772
HRC10	.5451685	.8857902	0.62	0.546	-1.315808	2.406145
HRC11	1.213353	1.27465	0.95	0.354	-1.464587	3.891293
HRC12	-1.521439	1.07072	-1.42	0.172	-3.770939	.7280612
menapolity	-.4192004	.5830585	-0.72	0.481	-1.644161	.8057599
middleeastnorthafricaallincomele	.0024546	.0005542	4.43	0.000	.0012903	.003619
_cons	337.4868	117.4047	2.87	0.010	90.82876	584.1448

Appendix 20. Table 11: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Argentina (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin American Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Argentina, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of the Latin American Caribbean developing countries.

```
. reg argentina r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity argentinal latinamericacaribbeanddevelopingo
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	35
				F(11, 23)	=	3.76
Model	23.5013102	11	2.13648274	Prob > F	=	0.0036
Residual	13.0701184	23	.568266017	R-squared	=	0.6426
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4717
Total	36.5714286	34	1.07563025	Root MSE	=	.75383

	argentina	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
	r3	0	(omitted)			
	time1	-222.8825	61.86546	-3.60	0.002	-350.8609 -94.90405
	HRC6	1.691447	1.099457	1.54	0.138	-.5829535 3.965847
	HRC7	-1.169803	.8661201	-1.35	0.190	-2.961509 .6219029
	HRC8	-.2432939	.7513073	-0.32	0.749	-1.797492 1.310904
	HRC9	.4389909	.8113303	0.54	0.594	-1.239374 2.117355
	HRC10	-1.050237	.773456	-1.36	0.188	-2.650253 .5497785
	HRC11	1.260014	.9111431	1.38	0.180	-.6248295 3.144857
	HRC12	-.3054528	.6880351	-0.44	0.661	-1.728762 1.117856
	AmerPolity	.1124508	.0416766	2.70	0.013	.0262362 .1986654
	argentinal	.000195	.000214	0.91	0.372	-.0002476 .0006376
	latinamericacaribbeanddevelopingo	.0020727	.0008369	2.48	0.021	.0003415 .003804
	_cons	436.5294	120.5273	3.62	0.001	187.1996 685.8593

Appendix 21. Table 12: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Czech Republic (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Time (1976-2012), ECA regional membership, United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the CEEU region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014).

```
. reg czechrepublic r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 CEEUPolity
note: HRC9 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	17
Model	2.83828613	8	.354785766	F(8, 8)	=	4.11
Residual	.691125635	8	.086390704	Prob > F	=	0.0310
				R-squared	=	0.8042
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6084
Total	3.52941176	16	.220588235	Root MSE	=	.29392

czechrepub-c	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	.1706475	1.13429	0.15	0.884	-2.44503 2.786326
time1	-108.8627	29.40763	-3.70	0.006	-176.6768 -41.04863
HRC6	.2596224	1.271824	0.20	0.843	-2.673209 3.192454
HRC7	-.5279703	.5045694	-1.05	0.326	-1.691509 .6355688
HRC8	-.179763	1.460985	-0.12	0.905	-3.548799 3.189273
HRC9	0 (omitted)				
HRC10	-.193692	1.51529	-0.13	0.901	-3.687956 3.300572
HRC11	0 (omitted)				
HRC12	.4354713	.431995	1.01	0.343	-.5607108 1.431653
CEEUPolity	-.0149542	.0379518	-0.39	0.704	-.1024712 .0725629
_cons	219.8738	58.86598	3.74	0.006	84.12864 355.619


```
. reg czechrepublic europeanunion1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	17
Model	2.04129386	1	2.04129386	F(1, 15)	=	20.58
Residual	1.4881179	15	.09920786	Prob > F	=	0.0004
				R-squared	=	0.5784
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5503
Total	3.52941176	16	.220588235	Root MSE	=	.31497

czechrepublic	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
europeanunion1	-.0000685	.0000151	-4.54	0.000	-.0001006 -.0000363
_cons	2.54332	.1997982	12.73	0.000	2.11746 2.969179


```
. reg czechrepublic czechrepublic1 europeanunion1 CEEUPolity wepolarity
note: CEEUPolity omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	7
Model	.806335973	3	.268778658	F(3, 3)	=	1.30
Residual	.622235455	3	.207411818	Prob > F	=	0.4182
				R-squared	=	0.5644
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1289
Total	1.42857143	6	.238095238	Root MSE	=	.45542

czechrepublic	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
czechrepublic1	.0002814	.0003806	0.74	0.513	-.0009297 .0014925
europeanunion1	-.0001718	.000202	-0.85	0.458	-.0008147 .0004711
CEEUPolity	0 (omitted)				
wepolarity	-.0988836	.0833699	-1.19	0.321	-.3642039 .1664366
_cons	12.01346	7.270131	1.65	0.197	-11.12334 35.15026

Appendix 22. Table 13: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Ecuador (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: LAC regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for Ecuador and the Latin American Caribbean all incomes.

```
. reg ecuador r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity ecuador1 latinamericacaribbeanallincomele
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	32
Model	5.68981757	11	.517256143	F(11, 20)	=	2.40
Residual	4.31018243	20	.215509122	Prob > F	=	0.0428
				R-squared	=	0.5690
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3319
Total	10	31	.322580645	Root MSE	=	.46423

ecuador	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r3	0	(omitted)				
time1	78.94672	38.81585	2.03	0.055	-2.021719	159.9152
HRC6	-.5441886	.6779898	-0.80	0.432	-1.958451	.8700733
HRC7	.057255	.5337512	0.11	0.916	-1.05613	1.17064
HRC8	-.6183365	.4658291	1.33	0.199	-.3533659	1.590039
HRC9	-.9135073	.5414185	-1.69	0.107	-2.042886	.2158719
HRC10	.3966802	.5570058	0.71	0.485	-.7652136	1.558574
HRC11	.4862717	.6165117	0.79	0.440	-.7997492	1.772293
HRC12	-.4182925	.4215986	-0.99	0.333	-1.297732	.4611467
AmerPolity	-.0118944	.0274972	-0.43	0.670	-.0692525	.0454636
ecuador1	-.0002199	.0002457	-0.89	0.381	-.0007324	.0002926
latinamericacaribbeanallincomele	-.0009031	.0004996	-1.81	0.086	-.0019452	.0001391
_cons	-152.2049	75.34586	-2.02	0.057	-309.3737	4.96378

Appendix 23. Table 14: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Finland (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: ECA regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western European region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for Finland, and the European Union.

```
. reg finland r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 wepolity finland1 europeanunion1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	25
Model	1.91631898	12	.159693249	F(12, 12)	=	1.33
Residual	1.44368102	12	.120306751	Prob > F	=	0.3157
Total	3.36	24	.14	R-squared	=	0.5703
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1407
				Root MSE	=	.34685

finland	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r2	-.1660433	.3715971	0.45	0.663	-.6435972	.9756838
time1	-67.69	38.05182	-1.78	0.101	-150.5978	15.2178
HRC6	.0070258	.6090763	0.01	0.991	-1.320037	1.334089
HRC7	-.2785789	.4156752	-0.67	0.515	-1.184257	.6270996
HRC8	-.3764664	.6505377	0.58	0.573	-1.040934	1.793866
HRC9	-.5394673	.6119288	-0.88	0.395	-1.872746	.7938111
HRC10	.0152868	.435109	0.04	0.973	-.9327343	.9633079
HRC11	.1213461	.6159601	0.20	0.847	-1.220716	1.463408
HRC12	-.0126406	.5507407	-0.02	0.982	-1.212602	1.18732
wepolity	.0027883	.0362396	0.08	0.940	-.0761709	.0817476
finland1	-.0000104	.0000377	-0.28	0.787	-.0000925	.0000717
europeanunion1	.0000623	.0000606	1.03	0.325	-.0000698	.0001943
_cons	135.6865	74.78251	1.81	0.095	-27.25058	298.6236

Appendix 24. Table 15: Regression analysis between political terror scores of India (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: South Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for India.

```
. reg india r6 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity india1
note: r6 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	3.56382501	10	.356382501	F(10, 26)	=	0.92
Residual	10.1118507	26	.388917333	Prob > F	=	0.5334
				R-squared	=	0.2606
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.0238
Total	13.6756757	36	.37987988	Root MSE	=	.62363

india	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r6	0	(omitted)			
time1	37.39832	38.25308	0.98	0.337	-41.23201 116.0286
HRC6	-1.079109	.8855597	-1.22	0.234	-2.899402 .7411854
HRC7	.625739	.7476409	0.84	0.410	-.9110588 2.162537
HRC8	.3590241	.5831811	0.62	0.543	-.8397217 1.55777
HRC9	-.2319475	.6167647	-0.38	0.710	-1.499725 1.03583
HRC10	-.2270862	.6012052	-0.38	0.709	-1.462881 1.008709
HRC11	-.1778754	.72724	0.24	0.809	-1.316988 1.672739
HRC12	.0101432	.5617529	0.02	0.986	-1.144557 1.164843
AsiaPPolity	.0412425	.0324684	1.27	0.215	-.0254973 .1079824
india1	-.0010972	.0043804	-0.25	0.804	-.0101013 .007907
_cons	-72.09307	75.19335	-0.96	0.347	-226.6552 82.46907

Appendix 25. Table 16: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Indonesia (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: EAP regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for Indonesia.

```
. reg indonesia r1 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity indonesia1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	30
Model	5.12037182	11	.465488347	F(11, 18)	=	1.17
Residual	7.17962818	18	.398868232	Prob > F	=	0.3722
Total	12.3	29	.424137931	R-squared	=	0.4163
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0596
				Root MSE	=	.63156

indonesia	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r1	-.2284333	.7256197	-0.31	0.757	-1.752904 1.296037
time1	18.26455	99.25965	0.18	0.856	-190.2722 226.8013
HRC6	-1.214645	1.159175	-1.05	0.309	-3.649981 1.220691
HRC7	1.422014	.8045496	1.77	0.094	-.2682821 3.11231
HRC8	-1.013451	1.098445	-0.92	0.368	-3.321198 1.294296
HRC9	.6723161	1.020711	0.66	0.518	-1.472117 2.81675
HRC10	.765094	.7631223	1.00	0.329	-.8381664 2.368354
HRC11	-1.412038	1.216505	-1.16	0.261	-3.96782 1.143745
HRC12	.6251202	1.004665	0.62	0.542	-1.485602 2.735843
AsiaPPolity	.0130113	.0457392	0.28	0.779	-.0830832 .1091058
indonesia1	-.0012651	.002194	-0.58	0.571	-.0058745 .0033443
_cons	-32.4929	198.2109	-0.16	0.872	-448.9185 383.9327

Appendix 26. Table 17: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Philippines (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: EAP regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Philippines.

```
. reg philippines r1 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 philippines1 AsiaPPolity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	1.49654857	11	.13604987	F(11, 25)	=	0.71
Residual	4.7737217	25	.190948868	Prob > F	=	0.7159
				R-squared	=	0.2387
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.0963
Total	6.27027027	36	.174174174	Root MSE	=	.43698

philippines	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r1	-.4627281	.415408	-1.11	0.276	-1.318277 .3928206
time1	-27.97007	26.9192	-1.04	0.309	-83.4112 27.47106
HRC6	-.1782481	.6381075	-0.28	0.782	-1.492455 1.135959
HRC7	.6642597	.5311874	1.25	0.223	-.4297412 1.758261
HRC8	-.4633152	.4238005	-1.09	0.285	-1.336149 .4095182
HRC9	.4543304	.4477059	1.01	0.320	-.4677372 1.376398
HRC10	-.3504166	.42307	-0.83	0.415	-1.221746 .5209124
HRC11	.1776645	.5696799	0.31	0.758	-.9956133 1.350942
HRC12	-.0675776	.4188692	-0.16	0.873	-.9302549 .7950997
philippines1	.0002458	.0008819	0.28	0.783	-.0015705 .002062
AsiaPPolity	-.0085628	.0281609	-0.30	0.764	-.0665612 .0494357
_cons	60.09333	53.30905	1.13	0.270	-49.6987 169.8854

Appendix 27. Table 18: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Poland (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: ECA regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the CEEU region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Poland.

```
. reg poland r2 poland1 CEEUPolity time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12
note: r2 omitted because of collinearity
note: CEEUPolity omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC6 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC10 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	7
Model	1.40222941	5	.280445882	F(5, 1)	=	10.65
Residual	.026342017	1	.026342017	Prob > F	=	0.2284
				R-squared	=	0.9816
				Adj R-squared	=	0.8894
Total	1.42857143	6	.238095238	Root MSE	=	.1623

poland	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	0	(omitted)			
poland1	.0008665	.0003692	2.35	0.256	-.0038252 .0055582
CEEUPolity	0	(omitted)			
time1	-543.3651	133.7385	-4.06	0.154	-2242.674 1155.944
HRC6	0	(omitted)			
HRC7	0	(omitted)			
HRC8	-.6202639	.1951018	-3.18	0.194	-3.099268 1.85874
HRC9	-.2076114	.4260069	-0.49	0.711	-5.620543 5.20532
HRC10	0	(omitted)			
HRC11	0	(omitted)			
HRC12	.739515	.340644	2.17	0.275	-3.588777 5.067808
_cons	1090.607	267.7822	4.07	0.153	-2311.887 4493.102

Appendix 28. Table 19: Regression analysis between political terror scores of South Africa (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of South Africa.

```
. reg southafrica r7 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity southafrica1
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	7.52587448	10	.752587448	F(10, 26)	=	1.79
Residual	10.9065579	26	.419482998	Prob > F	=	0.1123
				R-squared	=	0.4083
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1807
Total	18.4324324	36	.512012012	Root MSE	=	.64768

southafrica	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r7	0	(omitted)			
time1	34.81533	41.15125	0.85	0.405	-49.77228 119.4029
HRC6	-1.595358	.8642347	-1.85	0.076	-3.371818 .1811017
HRC7	.9723792	.7236451	1.34	0.191	-.5150946 2.459853
HRC8	.2746354	.6072468	0.45	0.655	-.9735783 1.522849
HRC9	-.6727066	.6400056	-1.05	0.303	-1.988257 .6428437
HRC10	.2510455	.6323234	0.40	0.695	-1.048714 1.550805
HRC11	-.8974818	.7044657	-1.27	0.214	-.5505681 2.345532
HRC12	-.5917997	.5578611	-1.06	0.299	-1.7385 .5549003
ssapolity	.0369965	.0221457	1.67	0.107	-.0085247 .0825177
southafrica1	-.0002982	.0003747	-0.80	0.433	-.0010683 .0004719
_cons	-65.76747	81.34852	-0.81	0.426	-232.9817 101.4468

Appendix 29. Table 20: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Tunisia (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Middle Eastern North Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Middle Eastern North Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Tunisia.

```
. reg tunisia r4 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 menapolity tunisia1
note: r4 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	32
Model	4.04471536	10	.404471536	F(10, 21)	=	4.64
Residual	1.83028464	21	.087156411	Prob > F	=	0.0015
				R-squared	=	0.6885
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5401
Total	5.875	31	.189516129	Root MSE	=	.29522

tunisia	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r4	0	(omitted)			
time1	-140.1183	30.9932	-4.52	0.000	-204.5722 -75.66444
HRC6	-.1425083	.4930352	-0.29	0.775	-1.167831 .8828145
HRC7	-.2783972	.3383628	-0.82	0.420	-.9820611 .4252666
HRC8	-.0767612	.4678253	-0.16	0.871	-1.049657 .8961347
HRC9	-.3731406	.4723574	-0.79	0.438	-1.355462 .6091804
HRC10	1.252059	.3318483	3.77	0.001	.5619422 1.942175
HRC11	-.9902917	.475855	-2.08	0.050	-1.979886 -.0006972
HRC12	-.093104	.3997431	-0.23	0.818	-.9244153 .7382073
menapolity	-.8720581	.2169211	-4.02	0.001	-1.32317 -.420946
tunisia1	.0020684	.0004642	4.46	0.000	.001103 .0030337
_cons	285.4118	62.14193	4.59	0.000	156.1806 414.643

Appendix 30. Table 21: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Ghana (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Ghana.

```
. reg ghana r7 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity ghanal
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	34
Model	4.27013614	10	.427013614	F(10, 23)	=	1.07
Residual	9.17104033	23	.398740884	Prob > F	=	0.4218
				R-squared	=	0.3177
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0210
Total	13.4411765	33	.407308378	Root MSE	=	.63146

ghana	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r7	0	(omitted)			
time1	11.76392	28.60869	0.41	0.685	-47.41766 70.9455
HRC6	.8461249	.8444502	1.00	0.327	-.9007534 2.593003
HRC7	-.0953421	.7211824	-0.13	0.896	-1.587222 1.396537
HRC8	-.5757996	.6031061	-0.95	0.350	-1.82342 .6718205
HRC9	.0334425	.6256676	0.05	0.958	-1.260849 1.327735
HRC10	.6222024	.605866	1.03	0.315	-.6311268 1.875532
HRC11	-.4540438	.6877095	-0.66	0.516	-1.876679 .9685917
HRC12	-.0394839	.546685	-0.07	0.943	-1.170388 1.09142
ssapolity	.0094342	.0217837	0.43	0.669	-.0356289 .0544972
ghanal	-.0042123	.0038386	-1.10	0.284	-.012153 .0037284
_cons	-19.94187	56.14766	-0.36	0.726	-136.0921 96.20841

Appendix 31. Table 22: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Sri Lanka (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: South Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the South Asia region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Sri Lanka.

```
. reg srilanka r6 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity srilanka1
note: r6 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	16.1609011	10	1.61609011	F(10, 26)	=	2.31
Residual	18.1634232	26	.698593199	Prob > F	=	0.0419
				R-squared	=	0.4708
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2673
Total	34.3243243	36	.953453453	Root MSE	=	.83582

srilanka	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r6	0	(omitted)			
time1	56.25807	42.54169	1.32	0.198	-31.18762 143.7038
HRC6	-.7418081	1.235028	-0.60	0.553	-3.280444 1.796828
HRC7	-.4928799	1.003433	-0.49	0.627	-2.555465 1.569705
HRC8	.774741	.8327936	0.93	0.361	-.9370908 2.486573
HRC9	-.2073972	.8742789	-0.24	0.814	-2.004503 1.589709
HRC10	-.0803654	.8110734	-0.10	0.922	-1.747551 1.58682
HRC11	.5929578	.9913697	0.60	0.555	-1.444832 2.630747
HRC12	-.405224	.7680528	-0.53	0.602	-1.983979 1.173531
AsiaPPolity	.0784523	.038899	2.02	0.054	-.0015058 .1584104
srilanka1	.0010439	.0026181	0.40	0.693	-.0043378 .0064256
_cons	-111.4438	84.48628	-1.32	0.199	-285.1079 62.2202

Appendix 32. Table 23: Regression analysis between political terror scores of France (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: ECA regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of France.

```
. reg france r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 wepolity france1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	36
Model	2.46455447	11	.224050407	F(11, 24)	=	4.93
Residual	1.09100108	24	.045458378	Prob > F	=	0.0005
Total	3.55555556	35	.101587302	R-squared	=	0.6932
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5525
				Root MSE	=	.21321

france	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	.2261718	.1567904	1.44	0.162	-.0974277 .5497714
time1	-27.65004	15.73825	-1.76	0.092	-60.13219 4.83212
HRC6	.3503241	.3119859	1.12	0.273	-.2935831 .9942313
HRC7	-.9379159	.2396785	-3.91	0.001	-1.432588 -.4432438
HRC8	.422012	.2053945	2.05	0.051	-.0019015 .8459255
HRC9	-.4740206	.2352124	-2.02	0.055	-.9594751 .0114339
HRC10	.0449552	.2313876	0.19	0.848	-.4326054 .5225158
HRC11	-.3426445	.2507067	-1.37	0.184	-.8600777 .1747888
HRC12	.4203127	.1872609	2.24	0.034	.0338252 .8068001
wepolity	.0021599	.0026858	0.80	0.429	-.0033835 .0077032
france1	.000022	.00002	1.10	0.282	-.0000193 .0000633
_cons	56.58823	31.04823	1.82	0.081	-7.492173 120.6686

Appendix 33. Table 24: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Brazil (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin American Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Brazil.

```
. reg brazil r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity brazil1
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	6.70110503	10	.670110503	F(10, 26)	=	2.75
Residual	6.32592199	26	.243304692	Prob > F	=	0.0185
				R-squared	=	0.5144
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3276
Total	13.027027	36	.361861862	Root MSE	=	.49326

brazil	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3	0	(omitted)			
time1	24.70873	22.69019	1.09	0.286	-21.93161 71.34908
HRC6	-.9569282	.6914287	-1.38	0.178	-2.37818 .4643238
HRC7	1.08958	.5584199	1.95	0.062	-.0582681 2.237429
HRC8	.123647	.4916498	0.25	0.803	-.8869537 1.134248
HRC9	.5577772	.5316542	1.05	0.304	-.5350538 1.650608
HRC10	-.4812605	.477913	-1.01	0.323	-1.463625 .5011038
HRC11	1.051855	.5846436	1.80	0.084	-.1498968 2.253607
HRC12	-.9807463	.4634193	-2.12	0.044	-1.933318 -.0281743
AmerPolity	-.0057845	.0182645	-0.32	0.754	-.0433276 .0317587
brazil1	-.0000177	.0002332	-0.08	0.940	-.000497 .0004616
_cons	-45.16003	44.69603	-1.01	0.322	-137.034 46.71396

Appendix 34. Table 25: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Guatemala (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin American Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Guatemala.

```
. reg guatemala r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity guatemalal
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	25.8375136	10	2.58375136	F(10, 26)	=	8.57
Residual	7.83816206	26	.301467772	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.7672
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6777
Total	33.6756757	36	.935435435	Root MSE	=	.54906

guatemala	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3	0	(omitted)			
time1	-52.5728	20.94922	-2.51	0.019	-95.63455 -9.511049
HRC6	-.4695882	.7801265	-0.60	0.552	-2.073161 1.133985
HRC7	.0109721	.6132472	0.02	0.986	-1.249576 1.27152
HRC8	.0591302	.520008	0.11	0.910	-1.009762 1.128022
HRC9	-.0707432	.5801423	-0.12	0.904	-1.263243 1.121756
HRC10	.1864022	.5644098	0.33	0.744	-.9737588 1.346563
HRC11	.2350709	.6183356	0.38	0.707	-1.035936 1.506078
HRC12	-.2698061	.4870909	-0.55	0.584	-1.271036 .7314236
AmerPolity	-.0222978	.0191751	-1.16	0.255	-.0617127 .0171172
guatemalal	-.0010093	.0006625	-1.52	0.140	-.0023711 .0003525
_cons	110.7889	41.37336	2.68	0.013	25.74477 195.8331

Appendix 35. Table 26: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Japan (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: East Asia Pacific regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Japan.

```
. reg japan r1 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity japan1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	35
Model	1.62157716	11	.147416105	F(11, 23)	=	0.61
Residual	5.52127999	23	.240055652	Prob > F	=	0.7982
Total	7.14285714	34	.210084034	R-squared	=	0.2270
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.1427
				Root MSE	=	.48995

japan	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r1	-.2477675	.4596374	-0.54	0.595	-1.1986 .7030649
time1	33.23119	22.22489	1.50	0.148	-12.7445 79.20688
HRC6	.5412598	.7182895	0.75	0.459	-.9446353 2.027155
HRC7	-.4230323	.6007815	-0.70	0.488	-1.665843 .8197789
HRC8	-.1420276	.4767132	-0.30	0.768	-1.128184 .8441287
HRC9	.573497	.5653846	1.01	0.321	-.5960901 1.743084
HRC10	-.5507133	.5131139	-1.07	0.294	-1.61217 .5107437
HRC11	-.5972883	.6070296	-0.98	0.335	-1.853025 .6584481
HRC12	.6064504	.4476593	1.35	0.189	-.3196033 1.532504
AsiaPPolity	.0103259	.0321855	0.32	0.751	-.0562549 .0769067
japan1	-.0000301	.0000222	-1.35	0.189	-.0000762 .0000159
_cons	-64.77795	44.07547	-1.47	0.155	-155.955 26.3991

Appendix 36. Table 27: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Mali (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Mali.

```
. reg mali r7 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity mali1
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	24
Model	18.495778	10	1.8495778	F(10, 13)	=	9.76
Residual	2.4625553	13	.189427331	Prob > F	=	0.0002
				R-squared	=	0.8825
				Adj R-squared	=	0.7921
Total	20.9583333	23	.911231884	Root MSE	=	.43523

mali	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r7	0	(omitted)			
time1	-166.4155	41.96441	-3.97	0.002	-257.0741 -75.75688
HRC6	3.792348	.7421362	5.11	0.000	2.18906 5.395636
HRC7	1.356554	.5000856	2.71	0.018	.2761844 2.436923
HRC8	-4.92447	.775331	-6.35	0.000	-6.599471 -3.24947
HRC9	5.118979	.6654332	7.69	0.000	3.681398 6.55656
HRC10	-.4165531	.5066823	-0.82	0.426	-1.511174 .6780675
HRC11	-3.465053	.6932043	-5.00	0.000	-4.96263 -1.967476
HRC12	2.703304	.6201627	4.36	0.001	1.363524 4.043084
ssapolity	-.0791951	.0472226	-1.68	0.117	-.1812133 .022823
mali1	.0053726	.0029683	1.81	0.093	-.0010401 .0117853
_cons	334.8666	84.07916	3.98	0.002	153.2247 516.5086

Appendix 37. Table 28: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Pakistan (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: South Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the South Asia region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Pakistan.

```
. reg pakistan r6 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity pakistan1
note: r6 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	36
Model	8.46475167	10	.846475167	F(10, 25)	=	2.15
Residual	9.84080389	25	.393632156	Prob > F	=	0.0587
				R-squared	=	0.4624
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2474
Total	18.3055556	35	.523015873	Root MSE	=	.6274

pakistan	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r6	0	(omitted)			
time1	-66.94972	58.5821	-1.14	0.264	-187.6018 53.70237
HRC6	.1426709	.9118714	0.16	0.877	-1.735364 2.020705
HRC7	.7625758	.7653083	1.00	0.329	-.8136061 2.338758
HRC8	-1.060395	.5868615	-1.81	0.083	-2.269059 .1482688
HRC9	1.454725	.625523	2.33	0.028	.1664368 2.743014
HRC10	-1.274323	.7015725	-1.82	0.081	-2.719239 .1705929
HRC11	.2721624	.9106065	0.30	0.768	-1.603267 2.147592
HRC12	.1598382	.613776	0.26	0.797	-1.104257 1.423933
AsiaPPolity	.0092209	.0294702	0.31	0.757	-.051474 .0699158
pakistan1	.0084087	.004819	1.74	0.093	-.0015162 .0183337
_cons	134.9584	115.8539	1.16	0.255	-103.6471 373.564

Appendix 38. Table 29: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Peru (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin America Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Peru.

```
. reg peru r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity peru1
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	20.9700822	10	2.09700822	F(10, 26)	=	2.98
Residual	18.2731611	26	.702813888	Prob > F	=	0.0122
				R-squared	=	0.5344
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3553
Total	39.2432432	36	1.09009009	Root MSE	=	.83834

peru	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3	0	(omitted)			
time1	-72.4627	33.15016	-2.19	0.038	-140.6038 -4.321577
HRC6	-1.838817	1.18227	-1.56	0.132	-4.269007 .591373
HRC7	1.206328	1.05442	1.14	0.263	-.9610646 3.37372
HRC8	-.0030667	.82729	-0.00	0.997	-1.703586 1.697452
HRC9	.3653249	.8894186	0.41	0.685	-1.462901 2.193551
HRC10	-.3968906	.8127241	-0.49	0.629	-2.067469 1.273688
HRC11	.5475799	.9222204	0.59	0.558	-1.348071 2.443231
HRC12	-.0374578	.7438895	-0.05	0.960	-1.566545 1.491629
AmerPolity	-.0379656	.0439422	-0.86	0.395	-.1282901 .0523589
peru1	-.0001354	.0011378	-0.12	0.906	-.0024742 .0022033
_cons	150.3989	64.18005	2.34	0.027	18.47494 282.3229

Appendix 39. Table 30: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Romania (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the CEEU region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Romania.

```
. reg romania r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 CEEUPolity romania1
note: r2 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC9 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC10 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
note: CEEUPolity omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	10
Model	.941053483	5	.188210697	F(5, 4)	=	1.14
Residual	.658946517	4	.164736629	Prob > F	=	0.4615
				R-squared	=	0.5882
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0734
Total	1.6	9	.177777778	Root MSE	=	.40588

romania	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	0 (omitted)				
time1	-30.07934	68.07919	-0.44	0.681	-219.0975 158.9388
HRC6	.2184946	.6812074	0.32	0.764	-1.67284 2.10983
HRC7	0 (omitted)				
HRC8	.8396012	.9007557	0.93	0.404	-1.661298 3.3405
HRC9	0 (omitted)				
HRC10	0 (omitted)				
HRC11	0 (omitted)				
HRC12	-1.076597	.8262815	-1.30	0.263	-3.370722 1.217528
CEEUPolity	0 (omitted)				
romania1	.0004283	.0008381	0.51	0.636	-.0018986 .0027551
_cons	61.86924	137.4213	0.45	0.676	-319.6736 443.412

Appendix 40. Table 31: Regression analysis between political terror scores of South Korea (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: East Asia Pacific regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of South Korea.

```
. reg southkorearepublicofkorea r1 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity korearepl
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
				F(11, 25)	=	3.56
Model	9.20158033	11	.836507302	Prob > F	=	0.0041
Residual	5.87950076	25	.23518003	R-squared	=	0.6101
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4386
Total	15.0810811	36	.418918919	Root MSE	=	.48495

southkorea-a	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r1	.0489172	.4419558	0.11	0.913	-.8613078	.9591422
time1	-25.24237	18.60356	-1.36	0.187	-63.55711	13.07238
HRC6	.0717164	.7415312	0.10	0.924	-1.455496	1.598929
HRC7	.3205681	.5897006	0.54	0.592	-.893943	1.535079
HRC8	-.1744257	.4825111	-0.36	0.721	-1.168176	.8193246
HRC9	.4737746	.5288495	0.90	0.379	-.6154114	1.562961
HRC10	-.5460937	.4739426	-1.15	0.260	-1.522197	.4300094
HRC11	.1912527	.6204326	0.31	0.760	-1.086552	1.469058
HRC12	-.0793783	.4655242	-0.17	0.866	-.8793867	1.038143
AsiaPPolity	-.0085569	.0307689	-0.28	0.783	-.0719268	.0548129
korearepl	-.0000727	.0000584	-1.24	0.225	-.000193	.0000476
_cons	53.38082	37.10052	1.44	0.163	-23.02913	129.7908

Appendix 41. Table 32: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Ukraine (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the CEEU region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Ukraine.

```

. reg ukraine ukraine1 r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 CEEUPolity
note: r2 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
note: CEEUPolity omitted because of collinearity

```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	10
Model	.257877922	5	.051575584	F(5, 4)	=	0.32
Residual	.642122078	4	.160530519	Prob > F	=	0.8777
Total	.9	9	.1	R-squared	=	0.2865
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.6053
				Root MSE	=	.40066

ukraine	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
ukraine1	.0005712	.0009356	0.61	0.574	-.0020263 .0031688
r2	0 (omitted)				
time1	-19.74888	74.23163	-0.27	0.803	-225.8489 186.3512
HRC6	.0865181	.4664236	0.19	0.862	-1.208481 1.381518
HRC7	0 (omitted)				
HRC10	-.4301546	.9158777	-0.47	0.663	-2.973039 2.11273
HRC11	0 (omitted)				
HRC12	.3904216	.6750431	0.58	0.594	-1.483798 2.264642
CEEUPolity	0 (omitted)				
_cons	41.75928	149.8333	0.28	0.794	-374.2447 457.7632

Appendix 42. Table 33: Regression analysis between political terror scores of the United Kingdom (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of the United Kingdom.

```
. reg unitedkingdom r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 wepolity unitedkingdom1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	36
Model	4.6106325	11	.419148409	F(11, 24)	=	2.31
Residual	4.36158972	24	.181732905	Prob > F	=	0.0422
				R-squared	=	0.5139
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2911
Total	8.97222222	35	.256349206	Root MSE	=	.4263

unitedkingdom	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	1.01148	.3348283	3.02	0.006	.320428 1.702531
time1	22.07667	28.46209	0.78	0.446	-36.6662 80.81955
HRC6	-.598237	.6380212	-0.94	0.358	-1.915048 .7185742
HRC7	.7259954	.494469	1.47	0.155	-.2945385 1.746529
HRC8	.3742054	.4219668	0.89	0.384	-.4966913 1.245102
HRC9	-.1607882	.4654728	-0.35	0.733	-1.121477 .7999004
HRC10	.1121213	.4255579	0.26	0.794	-.766187 .9904296
HRC11	.3796188	.48321	0.79	0.440	-.6176775 1.376915
HRC12	-.7229449	.3749233	-1.93	0.066	-1.496749 .0508588
wepolity	-.0120679	.0054154	-2.23	0.035	-.0232447 -.0008911
unitedkingdom1	-.0000728	.0000469	-1.55	0.133	-.0001695 .0000239
_cons	-41.22516	56.11963	-0.73	0.470	-157.0504 74.60006

Appendix 43. Table 34: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Senegal (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Senegal.

```
. reg senegal r7 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity senegall
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	28
Model	4.58495695	10	.458495695	F(10, 17)	=	1.27
Residual	6.12932877	17	.360548751	Prob > F	=	0.3187
				R-squared	=	0.4279
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0914
Total	10.7142857	27	.396825397	Root MSE	=	.60046

senegal	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r7	0	(omitted)			
time1	94.71871	36.17189	2.62	0.018	18.40269 171.0347
HRC6	.2345597	1.009356	0.23	0.819	-1.894996 2.364115
HRC7	-.0856344	.6706726	-0.13	0.900	-1.50063 1.329361
HRC8	-.6861308	.9834814	-0.70	0.495	-2.761095 1.388834
HRC9	.473546	.9137941	0.52	0.611	-1.454391 2.401483
HRC10	.3162119	.6610778	0.48	0.639	-1.07854 1.710964
HRC11	-.1671039	.934078	-0.18	0.860	-2.137836 1.803628
HRC12	.4265803	.8549671	0.50	0.624	-1.377243 2.230403
ssapolity	.1294743	.039144	3.31	0.004	.0468876 .2120609
senegall	.0015224	.0013666	1.11	0.281	-.0013608 .0044056
_cons	-189.103	72.45307	-2.61	0.018	-341.9656 -36.24039

Appendix 44. Table 35: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Saudi Arabia (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Middle Eastern and North Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Middle Eastern North Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Saudi Arabia.

```
. reg saudiarabia r4 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 menapolity saudiarabial
note: r4 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	29
Model	5.10185421	10	.510185421	F(10, 18)	=	3.41
Residual	2.69124924	18	.149513847	Prob > F	=	0.0114
				R-squared	=	0.6547
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4628
Total	7.79310345	28	.278325123	Root MSE	=	.38667

saudiarabia	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r4	0	(omitted)			
time1	9.533759	14.72139	0.65	0.525	-21.39473 40.46225
HRC6	.4247496	.6324017	0.67	0.510	-.9038772 1.753376
HRC7	-1.051777	.4455539	-2.36	0.030	-1.987851 -.1157029
HRC8	1.031624	.6012839	1.72	0.103	-.2316261 2.294875
HRC9	-.9457802	.5817972	-1.63	0.121	-2.168091 .2765304
HRC10	-.0749991	.4320253	-0.17	0.864	-.9826507 .8326524
HRC11	.6362753	.624425	1.02	0.322	-.6755929 1.948144
HRC12	-1.077508	.5228522	-2.06	0.054	-2.175979 .0209641
menapolity	-.1554391	.2839791	-0.55	0.591	-.7520571 .441179
saudiarabial	.0000466	.0000218	2.14	0.047	7.69e-07 .0000925
_cons	-15.11236	30.37046	-0.50	0.625	-78.91832 48.6936

Appendix 45. Table 36: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Azerbaijan (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia region, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the CEEU region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Azerbaijan.

```
. reg azerbaijan r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 CEEUPolity azerbaijan1
note: r2 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC6 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC10 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
note: CEEUPolity omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	7
Model	1.48391247	5	.296782495	F(5, 1)	=	1.29
Residual	.230373239	1	.230373239	Prob > F	=	0.5814
				R-squared	=	0.8656
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1937
Total	1.71428571	6	.285714286	Root MSE	=	.47997

azerbaijan	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	0 (omitted)				
time1	677.0203	464.0585	1.46	0.383	-5219.402 6573.442
HRC6	0 (omitted)				
HRC7	0 (omitted)				
HRC8	-.0058351	.7448026	-0.01	0.995	-9.46945 9.45778
HRC9	.4961212	1.48239	0.33	0.794	-18.33943 19.33167
HRC10	0 (omitted)				
HRC11	0 (omitted)				
HRC12	-.8810663	1.511712	-0.58	0.664	-20.08919 18.32706
CEEUPolity	0 (omitted)				
azerbaijan1	.0030987	.0020775	1.49	0.376	-.0232989 .0294963
_cons	-1359.546	933.6615	-1.46	0.383	-13222.84 10503.75

Appendix 46. Table 37: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Bangladesh (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: South Asia region, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the South Asia region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Bangladesh.

```
. reg bangladesh r6 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity bangladesh1
note: r6 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	3.86708566	10	.386708566	F(10, 26)	=	1.17
Residual	8.56534677	26	.329436414	Prob > F	=	0.3512
				R-squared	=	0.3110
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0461
Total	12.4324324	36	.345345345	Root MSE	=	.57397

bangladesh	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r6	0	(omitted)			
time1	15.91154	32.23776	0.49	0.626	-50.35411 82.1772
HRC6	-.813126	.9354647	-0.87	0.393	-2.736001 1.109749
HRC7	.9681061	.697672	1.39	0.177	-.4659793 2.402192
HRC8	.3283789	.5736325	0.57	0.572	-.8507394 1.507497
HRC9	-.253668	.6553971	-0.39	0.702	-1.600856 1.09352
HRC10	.2456763	.5534017	0.44	0.661	-.8918571 1.38321
HRC11	.9904704	.6709121	1.48	0.152	-.3886091 2.36955
HRC12	-.9609476	.5133493	-1.87	0.073	-2.016152 .0942571
AsiaPPolity	-.0501921	.0272167	-1.84	0.077	-.1061369 .0057528
bangladesh1	-.0027704	.0044031	-0.63	0.535	-.011821 .0062803
_cons	-26.1199	63.66772	-0.41	0.685	-156.9908 104.751

Appendix 47. Table 38: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Cameroon (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Cameroon.

```
. reg cameroon cameroon1 r7 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC10 HRC9 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	6.65019562	10	.665019562	F(10, 26)	=	1.20
Residual	14.3768314	26	.552955054	Prob > F	=	0.3341
				R-squared	=	0.3163
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0533
Total	21.027027	36	.584084084	Root MSE	=	.74361

cameroon	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
cameroon1	.0024942	.0009102	2.74	0.011	.0006233 .0043652
r7	0	(omitted)			
time1	-59.33118	26.33941	-2.25	0.033	-113.4726 -5.189747
HRC6	.3173408	1.005251	0.32	0.755	-1.748982 2.383664
HRC7	.4896728	.8261234	0.59	0.558	-1.208448 2.187794
HRC8	-.8849334	.7163506	-1.24	0.228	-2.357413 .5875463
HRC10	.5447809	.7225439	0.75	0.458	-.9404294 2.029991
HRC9	-.7762975	.7548531	-1.03	0.313	-1.7753252 2.32792
HRC11	-1.131364	.8022902	-1.41	0.170	-2.780495 .5177672
HRC12	.5758829	.6547674	0.88	0.387	-.7700108 1.921777
ssapolity	.0136034	.0271062	0.50	0.620	-.0421142 .0693209
_cons	119.5948	52.15443	2.29	0.030	12.38984 226.7998

Appendix 48. Table 39: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Canada (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: North America regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Canada.

```
. reg canada r5 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity canada1
note: r5 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	24
Model	.936770618	10	.093677062	F(10, 13)	=	1.36
Residual	.896562715	13	.068966363	Prob > F	=	0.2973
				R-squared	=	0.5110
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1348
Total	1.83333333	23	.079710145	Root MSE	=	.26261

canada	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r5	0	(omitted)			
time1	-34.57106	27.13885	-1.27	0.225	-93.20098 24.05885
HRC6	-.2052909	.4682957	-0.44	0.668	-1.216982 .8064003
HRC7	.0983846	.2994983	0.33	0.748	-.5486421 .7454114
HRC8	.6595148	.4333804	1.52	0.152	-.2767466 1.595776
HRC9	-.4961249	.42826	-1.16	0.268	-1.421324 .4290746
HRC10	-.058774	.4085472	-0.14	0.888	-.9413865 .8238386
HRC11	-.6078012	.4633374	-1.31	0.212	-.3931783 1.608781
HRC12	-.7732888	.3686374	-2.10	0.056	-1.569682 .0231039
AmerPolity	-.0063503	.0092759	-0.68	0.506	-.0263897 .0136891
canada1	.0000612	.0000384	1.59	0.136	-.0000219 .0001442
_cons	69.72661	53.96187	1.29	0.219	-46.85094 186.3041

Appendix 49. Table 40: Regression analysis between political terror scores of China (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: East Asia Pacific regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of China.

```
. reg china r1 HRC6 HRC7 time1 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity china1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	8.78415843	11	.798559857	F(11, 25)	=	2.14
Residual	9.32394968	25	.372957987	Prob > F	=	0.0558
				R-squared	=	0.4851
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2585
Total	18.1081081	36	.503003003	Root MSE	=	.6107

china	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r1	.1093048	.5713247	0.19	0.850	-1.06736 1.28597
HRC6	-.540233	.9913287	-0.54	0.591	-2.581913 1.501447
HRC7	.2531578	.7460979	0.34	0.737	-1.28346 1.789775
time1	44.98946	27.44914	1.64	0.114	-11.5431 101.522
HRC8	-.0581005	.629815	-0.09	0.927	-1.355229 1.239028
HRC9	-.3059592	.6948698	-0.44	0.663	-1.73707 1.125152
HRC10	-.4790374	.5945935	-0.81	0.428	-1.703626 .7455508
HRC11	1.087856	.8424436	1.29	0.208	-.6471896 2.822901
HRC12	-.1656043	.6535636	-0.25	0.802	-1.511644 1.180435
AsiaPPolity	.0032026	.0403979	0.08	0.937	-.0799983 .0864036
china1	-.00015	.0020471	-0.07	0.942	-.0043661 .0040661
_cons	-86.19631	54.83235	-1.57	0.129	-199.1256 26.73302

Appendix 50. Table 41: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Cuba (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin America Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Cuba.

```
. reg cuba r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity cubal caribbeansmallstates1 latinamericacaribbeanallincomele
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	27
Model	3.44688299	11	.313352999	F(11, 15)	=	3.85
Residual	1.21978367	15	.081318911	Prob > F	=	0.0086
				R-squared	=	0.7386
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5469
Total	4.66666667	26	.179487179	Root MSE	=	.28516

	cuba	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3		0	(omitted)			
time1		-3.662324	44.99452	-0.08	0.936	-99.56588 92.24123
HRC6		-.3977226	.3946462	-1.01	0.330	-1.238891 .4434458
HRC7		-.5038032	.3578112	1.41	0.180	-.2588532 1.26646
HRC8		-.0664711	.2706213	-0.25	0.809	-.6432866 .5103444
HRC10		.0247771	.3550445	0.07	0.945	-.7319823 .7815364
HRC11		.3014308	.4070539	0.74	0.470	-.5661841 1.169046
HRC12		-.1740329	.2850049	-0.61	0.551	-.7815064 .4334407
AmerPolity		-.0880251	.0238987	-3.68	0.002	-.1389641 -.0370862
cubal		.0001251	.0003649	0.34	0.736	-.0006526 .0009028
caribbeansmallstates1		.0002867	.000304	0.94	0.361	-.0003613 .0009347
latinamericacaribbeanallincomele		-.0008145	.0004797	-1.70	0.110	-.001837 .0002081
_cons		16.18794	87.98529	0.18	0.856	-171.3483 203.7241

Appendix 51. Table 42: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Germany (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Germany.

```
. reg germany r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC12 wepolarity germany1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	22
Model	4.27623028	10	.427623028	F(10, 11)	=	1.67
Residual	2.81467881	11	.255879892	Prob > F	=	0.2060
Total	7.09090909	21	.337662338	R-squared	=	0.6031
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2422
				Root MSE	=	.50585

germany	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	1.713739	.6083636	2.82	0.017	.3747401 3.052739
time1	-186.1718	96.56174	-1.93	0.080	-398.7027 26.35917
HRC6	.0351308	.8658088	0.04	0.968	-1.870501 1.940763
HRC7	-.7504545	.6360752	-1.18	0.263	-2.150447 .6495375
HRC8	.481922	.9671326	0.50	0.628	-1.646723 2.610566
HRC9	.5348983	1.063184	0.50	0.625	-1.805154 2.874951
HRC10	-2.023227	1.04735	-1.93	0.080	-4.328428 .2819745
HRC12	.5332866	.8444122	0.63	0.541	-1.325252 2.391825
wepolarity	.0136821	.0412031	0.33	0.746	-.0770052 .1043695
germany1	.0000209	.000054	0.39	0.706	-.000098 .0001397
_cons	371.6263	192.4768	1.93	0.080	-52.01227 795.265

Appendix 52. Table 43: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Jordan (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Middle Eastern and North Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Middle Eastern North Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Jordan.

```
. reg jordan r4 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 menapolity jordan1
note: r4 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	30
Model	3.59875723	10	.359875723	F(10, 19)	=	1.77
Residual	3.86790943	19	.203574181	Prob > F	=	0.1369
				R-squared	=	0.4820
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2093
Total	7.46666667	29	.257471264	Root MSE	=	.45119

jordan	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r4	0	(omitted)			
time1	31.91393	17.82018	1.79	0.089	-5.384138 69.21199
HRC6	.7898967	.7443049	1.06	0.302	-.7679514 2.347745
HRC7	-.8220064	.5130846	-1.60	0.126	-1.895905 .2518919
HRC8	.6383862	.7015109	0.91	0.374	-.8298931 2.106665
HRC9	-.5287521	.6866972	-0.77	0.451	-1.966026 .9085217
HRC10	-.6777878	.5133305	-1.32	0.202	-1.752201 .3966252
HRC11	1.43613	.7281949	1.97	0.063	-.0879998 2.960259
HRC12	-.8091911	.6081529	-1.33	0.199	-2.08207 .4636876
menapolity	.126062	.3021183	0.42	0.681	-.5062789 .7584029
jordan1	-.0002873	.0002097	-1.37	0.187	-.0007262 .0001516
_cons	-61.17795	36.32462	-1.68	0.109	-137.2063 14.85035

Appendix 53. Table 44: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Malaysia (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: East Asia Pacific regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Malaysia.

```
. reg malaysia r1 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity malaysia1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	36
Model	4.50177437	11	.409252215	F(11, 24)	=	1.54
Residual	6.38711452	24	.266129772	Prob > F	=	0.1823
				R-squared	=	0.4134
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1446
Total	10.8888889	35	.311111111	Root MSE	=	.51588

malaysia	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r1	-.2066285	.4585236	-0.45	0.656	-1.152975	.7397176
time1	-44.24406	30.20814	-1.46	0.156	-106.5906	18.10247
HRC6	.0792492	.8095065	0.10	0.923	-1.59149	1.749988
HRC7	.5268882	.630332	0.84	0.411	-.7740531	1.82783
HRC8	-.7484973	.5200415	-1.44	0.163	-1.82181	.3248156
HRC9	.9126902	.5446883	1.68	0.107	-.2114911	2.036872
HRC10	-.6004978	.497989	-1.21	0.240	-1.628297	.427301
HRC11	.1578855	.7040163	0.22	0.824	-1.295133	1.610904
HRC12	-.0043455	.5314884	-0.01	0.994	-1.101284	1.092593
AsiaPPolity	-.0600206	.0328739	-1.83	0.080	-.1278691	.0078279
malaysia1	.0001259	.0002546	0.49	0.625	-.0003995	.0006514
_cons	92.98724	60.12118	1.55	0.135	-31.09678	217.0713

Appendix 54. Table 45: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Mauritania (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Middle Eastern and North Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Middle Eastern North Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Mauritania.

```
. reg mauritania r4 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 menapolity mauritania1
note: r4 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	35
				F(10, 24)	=	2.32
Model	6.97202202	10	.697202202	Prob > F	=	0.0441
Residual	7.19940655	24	.299975273	R-squared	=	0.4920
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2803
Total	14.1714286	34	.416806723	Root MSE	=	.5477

mauritania	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r4	0	(omitted)			
time1	115.7847	45.43857	2.55	0.018	22.00411 209.5653
HRC6	.1463337	.7411664	0.20	0.845	-1.383359 1.676026
HRC7	1.206067	.6676034	1.81	0.083	-.1717985 2.583933
HRC8	-.5552428	.5119743	-1.08	0.289	-1.611906 .5014203
HRC9	.5865622	.5464915	1.07	0.294	-.5413408 1.714465
HRC10	-.1882087	.5641552	-0.33	0.742	-1.352568 .9761504
HRC11	1.241287	.7155336	1.73	0.096	-.2355018 2.718076
HRC12	-1.391712	.5390408	-2.58	0.016	-2.504238 -.2791863
menapolity	.0828861	.36944	0.22	0.824	-.6796007 .8453728
mauritania1	-.0055516	.0023832	-2.33	0.029	-.0104702 -.0006329
_cons	-226.8276	91.00308	-2.49	0.020	-414.6487 -39.00649

Appendix 55. Table 46: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Mexico (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin America Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Mexico.

```
. reg mexico r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity mexico1
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	7.13773133	10	.713773133	F(10, 26)	=	6.25
Residual	2.97037678	26	.114245261	Prob > F	=	0.0001
				R-squared	=	0.7061
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5931
Total	10.1081081	36	.280780781	Root MSE	=	.338

mexico	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3	0	(omitted)			
time1	3.596755	12.0509	0.30	0.768	-21.17423 28.36774
HRC6	-.1300005	.4760823	-0.27	0.787	-1.108602 .8486006
HRC7	-.0714677	.3770792	-0.19	0.851	-.846565 .7036297
HRC8	.2785634	.3227031	0.86	0.396	-.3847624 .9418892
HRC9	-.0958577	.3545945	-0.27	0.789	-.8247372 .6330217
HRC10	.1202139	.3340044	0.36	0.722	-.5663421 .8067698
HRC11	-.3829359	.3718156	-1.03	0.313	-.381342 1.147214
HRC12	-.5622331	.3037355	-1.85	0.076	-1.18657 .0621043
AmerPolity	-.0616435	.0137287	-4.49	0.000	-.0898632 -.0334237
mexico1	-.0000769	.000118	-0.65	0.521	-.0003195 .0001657
_cons	.1149725	23.73377	0.00	0.996	-48.6705 48.90045

Appendix 56. Table 47: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Nigeria (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Nigeria.

```
. reg nigeria r7 nigerial time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	35
Model	17.7557129	10	1.77557129	F(10, 24)	=	4.35
Residual	9.78714423	24	.407797676	Prob > F	=	0.0015
				R-squared	=	0.6447
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4966
Total	27.5428571	34	.810084034	Root MSE	=	.63859

nigeria	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r7	0	(omitted)			
nigerial	.0001936	.0006628	0.29	0.773	-.0011744 .0015616
time1	64.64843	16.46183	3.93	0.001	30.67289 98.62397
HRC6	-.0351293	.8712222	-0.04	0.968	-1.833244 1.762985
HRC7	.0022731	.7119423	0.00	0.997	-1.467104 1.47165
HRC8	.4351738	.602165	0.72	0.477	-.8076338 1.677981
HRC9	-.1202936	.6309099	-0.19	0.850	-1.422428 1.181841
HRC10	-.3210592	.6137281	-0.52	0.606	-1.587732 .9456134
HRC11	.2541667	.6895987	0.37	0.716	-1.169095 1.677429
HRC12	-.2465758	.5517126	-0.45	0.659	-1.385255 .8921032
ssapolity	.0024286	.0230168	0.11	0.917	-.0450758 .049933
_cons	-125.9369	32.97761	-3.82	0.001	-193.9994 -57.87449

Appendix 57. Table 48: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Switzerland (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Switzerland.

```
. reg switzerland r2 time1 switzerland1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 wepolity
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	26
Model	4.13700353	10	.413700353	F(10, 15)	=	2.81
Residual	2.20915031	15	.147276687	Prob > F	=	0.0348
				R-squared	=	0.6519
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4198
Total	6.34615385	25	.253846154	Root MSE	=	.38377

switzerland	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r2	1.170762	.3726928	3.14	0.007	.3763862	1.965138
time1	-51.87953	29.95179	-1.73	0.104	-115.7203	11.96119
switzerland1	-3.22e-06	.0000213	-0.15	0.882	-.0000485	.0000421
HRC6	.0937409	.6708975	0.14	0.891	-1.336243	1.523725
HRC7	0	(omitted)				
HRC8	.2296058	.5414421	0.42	0.678	-.9244507	1.383662
HRC9	-.3511366	.5524757	-0.64	0.535	-1.528711	.8264374
HRC10	-.1333001	.5292559	0.25	0.805	-.9947821	1.261382
HRC11	-.1514853	.6410376	-0.24	0.816	-1.517825	1.214854
HRC12	-.740697	.485076	-1.53	0.148	-1.774612	.2932179
wepolity	.0087794	.0050069	1.75	0.100	-.0018926	.0194513
_cons	103.9442	59.10938	1.76	0.099	-22.04448	229.9328

Appendix 58. Table 49: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Uruguay (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin American Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Uruguay.

```
. reg uruguay r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity uruguay1
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	34
Model	56.4336506	10	5.64336506	F(10, 23)	=	17.71
Residual	7.3310553	23	.318741535	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.8850
				Adj R-squared	=	0.8350
Total	63.7647059	33	1.93226381	Root MSE	=	.56457

uruguay	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3	0	(omitted)			
time1	-120.7203	20.67056	-5.84	0.000	-163.4806 -77.96001
HRC6	1.783136	.7962138	2.24	0.035	.1360423 3.43023
HRC7	.1004508	.6455309	0.16	0.878	-1.234932 1.435833
HRC8	-1.675812	.5574237	-3.01	0.006	-2.828931 -.5226932
HRC9	.8233569	.6263938	1.31	0.202	-.4724375 2.119151
HRC10	.2313358	.5858396	0.39	0.697	-.9805658 1.443237
HRC11	-.7647743	.6506744	-1.18	0.252	-2.110797 .5812483
HRC12	.5051347	.5040363	1.00	0.327	-.5375438 1.547813
AmerPolity	.0584787	.0287363	2.04	0.054	-.0009669 .1179242
uruguay1	.0003544	.000229	1.55	0.135	-.0001193 .0008282
_cons	238.792	40.24031	5.93	0.000	155.5486 322.0354

Appendix 59. Table 50: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Angola (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Angola.

```
. reg angola r7 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity angolal
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC9 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC10 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	12
				F(6, 5)	=	1.61
Model	3.07263851	6	.512106418	Prob > F	=	0.3098
Residual	1.59402816	5	.318805632	R-squared	=	0.6584
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2485
Total	4.66666667	11	.424242424	Root MSE	=	.56463

angola	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r7	0	(omitted)				
time1	-170.8379	76.61969	-2.23	0.076	-367.7951	26.11925
HRC6	.1729027	.9131999	0.19	0.857	-2.174552	2.520358
HRC7	0	(omitted)				
HRC8	-.3598159	1.069848	-0.34	0.750	-3.109949	2.390317
HRC9	0	(omitted)				
HRC10	0	(omitted)				
HRC11	0	(omitted)				
HRC12	.8227021	.8919352	0.92	0.399	-1.47009	3.115494
ssapolity	.0647391	.1430681	0.45	0.670	-.3030293	.4325074
angolal	-.0009213	.0009734	-0.95	0.387	-.0034236	.0015809
_cons	346.2183	153.2984	2.26	0.073	-47.8479	740.2845

Appendix 60. Table 51: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Bolivia (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin American Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Bolivia.

```
. reg bolivia r3 time1 AmerPolity HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 bolivial
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	10.8658013	9	1.20731125	F(9, 27)	=	2.03
Residual	16.0531176	27	.594559912	Prob > F	=	0.0749
				R-squared	=	0.4036
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2049
Total	26.9189189	36	.747747748	Root MSE	=	.77108

bolivia	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3	0	(omitted)			
time1	-25.68109	26.40903	-0.97	0.339	-79.86795 28.50577
AmerPolity	.0147405	.0229816	0.64	0.527	-.032414 .0618949
HRC6	-.7675041	.8931234	-0.86	0.398	-2.600042 1.065034
HRC7	.6696595	.8591301	0.78	0.442	-1.09313 2.432449
HRC8	-.6976249	.576465	-1.21	0.237	-1.880433 .4851836
HRC10	.2670966	.7114865	0.38	0.710	-1.192753 1.726946
HRC11	-.8809903	.8185625	-1.08	0.291	-2.560542 .7985613
HRC12	.6891028	.6068668	1.14	0.266	-.556085 1.934291
bolivial	-.0004221	.0009555	-0.44	0.662	-.0023826 .0015385
_cons	53.325	52.66295	1.01	0.320	-54.73045 161.3805

Appendix 61. Table 52: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Egypt (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Middle Eastern and North Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Middle Eastern North Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Egypt.

```
. reg egypt r4 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 menapolity egyptarabrepl
note: r4 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	32
Model	4.23349006	10	.423349006	F(10, 21)	=	2.38
Residual	3.73525994	21	.177869521	Prob > F	=	0.0452
				R-squared	=	0.5313
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3081
Total	7.96875	31	.257056452	Root MSE	=	.42175

egypt	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r4	0	(omitted)			
time1	54.76249	43.47103	1.26	0.222	-35.64046 145.1654
HRC6	-.3772144	.7140147	-0.53	0.603	-1.862089 1.10766
HRC7	-.7580902	.4876674	-1.55	0.135	-1.77225 .2560697
HRC8	1.243654	.6906403	1.80	0.086	-.1926108 2.67992
HRC9	-.4792433	.65366	-0.73	0.472	-1.838604 .880117
HRC10	-.7531081	.4724184	-1.59	0.126	-1.735556 .2293398
HRC11	1.264799	.7644187	1.65	0.113	-.324897 2.854494
HRC12	-1.000416	.6725879	-1.49	0.152	-2.399139 .398307
menapolity	-.0673203	.2804525	-0.24	0.813	-.6505531 .5159125
egyptarabrepl	-.0009456	.0015689	-0.60	0.553	-.0042084 .0023172
_cons	-104.9478	86.5468	-1.21	0.239	-284.9318 75.03609

Appendix 62. Table 53: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Italy (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Italy.

```
. reg italy r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 wepolity italy1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	35
Model	2.61823231	11	.238021119	F(11, 23)	=	1.33
Residual	4.12462484	23	.179331515	Prob > F	=	0.2718
				R-squared	=	0.3883
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0957
Total	6.74285714	34	.198319328	Root MSE	=	.42348

italy	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	.1623567	.3445506	0.47	0.642	-.5504005 .8751139
time1	10.70447	26.26315	0.41	0.687	-43.62499 65.03393
HRC6	-.6197912	.6289802	-0.99	0.335	-1.920936 .6813534
HRC7	.4324923	.4779755	0.90	0.375	-.5562754 1.42126
HRC8	-.2344853	.4022279	-0.58	0.566	-1.066557 .5975865
HRC9	-.4544321	.4655711	-0.98	0.339	-1.417539 .5086751
HRC10	.4113702	.4649963	0.88	0.385	-.5505479 1.373288
HRC11	.0497556	.492297	0.10	0.920	-.9686383 1.06815
HRC12	-.3419222	.3671587	-0.93	0.361	-1.101448 .4176033
wepolity	.0068105	.0053145	1.28	0.213	-.0041833 .0178043
italy1	-.0000252	.0000409	-0.62	0.544	-.0001098 .0000595
_cons	-19.73856	51.80129	-0.38	0.707	-126.8977 87.42057

Appendix 63. Table 54: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Nicaragua (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin American Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Nicaragua.

```
. reg nicaragua r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity nicaragua1
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	34
Model	17.6820869	10	1.76820869	F(10, 23)	=	3.72
Residual	10.9355602	23	.475459138	Prob > F	=	0.0044
				R-squared	=	0.6179
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4517
Total	28.6176471	33	.867201426	Root MSE	=	.68954

nicaragua	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r3	0	(omitted)				
time1	-81.53288	18.74586	-4.35	0.000	-120.3116	-42.75411
HRC6	.6151552	.9824126	0.63	0.537	-1.41712	2.64743
HRC7	.0698432	.784676	0.09	0.930	-1.553383	1.693069
HRC8	-.6499027	.6678803	-0.97	0.341	-2.031518	.7317129
HRC9	1.00005	.773017	1.29	0.209	-.5990573	2.599158
HRC10	-.4678891	.7726945	-0.61	0.551	-2.066329	1.130551
HRC11	-.7117499	.7925181	-0.90	0.378	-2.351198	.9276986
HRC12	-.8242739	.6131215	-1.34	0.192	-.4440646	2.092612
AmerPolity	-.0117565	.0217725	-0.54	0.594	-.0567963	.0332833
nicaragua1	.0007673	.0006527	1.18	0.252	-.0005828	.0021175
_cons	165.6655	38.03008	4.36	0.000	86.99425	244.3367

Appendix 64. Table 55: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Qatar (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Middle Eastern North Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Middle Eastern North Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Qatar.

```
. reg qatar r4 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 menapolity qatar1
note: r4 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC9 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	19
				F(9, 9)	=	1.29
Model	2.49071711	9	.276746345	Prob > F	=	0.3552
Residual	1.93033552	9	.214481725	R-squared	=	0.5634
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1268
Total	4.42105263	18	.245614035	Root MSE	=	.46312

qatar	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r4	0	(omitted)			
time1	-29.2429	30.62886	-0.95	0.365	-98.5302 40.04441
HRC6	1.082937	.9622101	1.13	0.290	-1.093734 3.259607
HRC7	-1.444283	.6658955	-2.17	0.058	-2.950644 .0620771
HRC8	.7643614	.5631106	1.36	0.208	-.5094834 2.038206
HRC9	0	(omitted)			
HRC10	-.4941153	.8141293	-0.61	0.559	-2.335804 1.347573
HRC11	.944728	.941853	1.00	0.342	-1.185891 3.075347
HRC12	-.9652522	.6732153	-1.43	0.185	-2.488171 .5576667
menapolity	-.9505998	.6013271	-1.58	0.148	-2.310896 .4096966
qatar1	.0000395	.0000357	1.11	0.298	-.0000413 .0001202
_cons	64.45352	62.73348	1.03	0.331	-77.45947 206.3665

Appendix 65. Table 56: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Chile (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin American Caribbean regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Chile.

```
. reg chile r3 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity chile1
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	37.6322395	10	3.76322395	F(10, 26)	=	14.74
Residual	6.63803074	26	.255308875	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.8501
				Adj R-squared	=	0.7924
Total	44.2702703	36	1.22972973	Root MSE	=	.50528

chile	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3	0	(omitted)			
time1	-108.4595	16.74866	-6.48	0.000	-142.8868 -74.03212
HRC6	.3637198	.7240986	0.50	0.620	-1.124686 1.852126
HRC7	.1087567	.5645066	0.19	0.849	-1.051603 1.269117
HRC8	.1329771	.4832826	0.28	0.785	-.8604245 1.126379
HRC9	.2174709	.5305695	0.41	0.685	-.8731304 1.308072
HRC10	-.3087337	.4895418	-0.63	0.534	-1.315001 .6975339
HRC11	.099746	.5826879	0.17	0.865	-1.097986 1.297478
HRC12	-.0374432	.4639847	-0.08	0.936	-.9911773 .916291
AmerPolity	.014142	.0251315	0.56	0.578	-.0375164 .0658005
chile1	.0002631	.0002565	1.03	0.314	-.0002642 .0007905
_cons	217.6247	32.68606	6.66	0.000	150.4375 284.8119

Appendix 66. Table 57: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Slovakia (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Slovakia.

```
. reg slovakia r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 CEEUPolity slovakrepublic1
note: r2 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC6 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC10 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
note: CEEUPolity omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	7
Model	1.41670166	5	.283340333	F(5, 1)	=	23.87
Residual	.011869765	1	.011869765	Prob > F	=	0.1541
				R-squared	=	0.9917
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9501
Total	1.42857143	6	.238095238	Root MSE	=	.10895

slovakia	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	0 (omitted)				
time1	-601.4445	100.8759	-5.96	0.106	-1883.194 680.3054
HRC6	0 (omitted)				
HRC7	0 (omitted)				
HRC8	-.5429063	.1304524	-4.16	0.150	-2.200461 1.114648
HRC9	-.7093457	.2731992	-2.60	0.234	-4.180671 2.761979
HRC10	0 (omitted)				
HRC11	0 (omitted)				
HRC12	.8569276	.2182676	3.93	0.159	-1.916425 3.63028
CEEUPolity	0 (omitted)				
slovakrepublic1	.0006827	.0001862	3.67	0.170	-.0016834 .0030487
_cons	1207.258	202.0643	5.97	0.106	-1360.212 3774.728

Appendix 67. Table 58: Regression analysis between political terror scores of United States (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: North American regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of the United States.

```
. reg unitedstates r5 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity unitedstates1
note: r5 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	22.352071	10	2.2352071	F(10, 26)	=	14.24
Residual	4.08036143	26	.156936978	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.8456
				Adj R-squared	=	0.7863
Total	26.4324324	36	.734234234	Root MSE	=	.39615

unitedstates	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r5	0	(omitted)				
time1	-86.44493	32.43026	-2.67	0.013	-153.1063	-19.78357
HRC6	-.5822753	.5860915	-0.99	0.330	-1.787004	.6224531
HRC7	.7537241	.4473526	1.68	0.104	-.1658224	1.673271
HRC8	.2139932	.3825237	0.56	0.581	-.5722956	1.000282
HRC9	.573347	.4172977	1.37	0.181	-.2844207	1.431115
HRC10	-.8461965	.3839347	-2.20	0.037	-1.635385	-.0570074
HRC11	.9392194	.4627577	2.03	0.053	-.0119926	1.890431
HRC12	-.5577256	.3688431	-1.51	0.143	-1.315893	.2004422
AmerPolity	.014572	.0120633	1.21	0.238	-.0102246	.0393686
unitedstates1	.0002009	.0000399	5.03	0.000	.0001188	.000283
_cons	170.3937	64.32353	2.65	0.014	38.17477	302.6126

Appendix 68. Table 59: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Hungary (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the CEEU region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Hungary.

```
. reg hungary r2 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 CEEUPolity hungary1
note: r2 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC8 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC9 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC10 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
note: CEEUPolity omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	6
Model	.825767994	4	.206441998	F(4, 1)	=	27.29
Residual	.00756534	1	.00756534	Prob > F	=	0.1425
				R-squared	=	0.9909
				Adj R-squared	=	0.9546
Total	.833333333	5	.166666667	Root MSE	=	.08698

hungary	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
r2	0	(omitted)				
time1	-2956.897	580.8734	-5.09	0.123	-10337.59	4423.8
HRC6	-1.687977	.2614756	-6.46	0.098	-5.010339	1.634385
HRC7	0	(omitted)				
HRC8	0	(omitted)				
HRC9	0	(omitted)				
HRC10	0	(omitted)				
HRC11	0	(omitted)				
HRC12	4.28175	.7194551	5.95	0.106	-4.859794	13.42329
CEEUPolity	0	(omitted)				
hungary1	.0095366	.0020493	4.65	0.135	-.0165016	.0355749
_cons	5904.691	1159.028	5.09	0.123	-8822.16	20631.54

Appendix 69. Table 60: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Belgium (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Belgium.

```
. reg belgium r2 time1 belgium1 wepolity HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12
note: HRC7 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC9 omitted because of collinearity
note: HRC11 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	15
Model	2.74115261	8	.342644076	F(8, 6)	=	2.39
Residual	.858847389	6	.143141232	Prob > F	=	0.1518
				R-squared	=	0.7614
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4433
Total	3.6	14	.257142857	Root MSE	=	.37834

belgium	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	.9500821	.5046991	1.88	0.109	-.2848721 2.185036
time1	-45.37413	157.0156	-0.29	0.782	-429.5774 338.8291
belgium1	6.33e-06	.0000916	0.07	0.947	-.0002179 .0002305
wepolity	-.0557004	.031436	-1.77	0.127	-.1326214 .0212207
HRC6	-.5076696	.6222094	-0.82	0.446	-2.030161 1.014822
HRC7	0	(omitted)			
HRC8	.3685544	.4974856	0.74	0.487	-.848749 1.585858
HRC9	0	(omitted)			
HRC10	-.5619853	.8324817	-0.68	0.525	-2.598995 1.475024
HRC11	0	(omitted)			
HRC12	-.3438236	.66025	-0.52	0.621	-1.959397 1.27175
_cons	96.94167	312.6626	0.31	0.767	-668.1162 861.9995

Appendix 70. Table 61: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Spain (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Spain.

```
. reg spain r2 timel spain1 wepolity HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	36
Model	4.7484461	11	.431676918	F(11, 24)	=	1.86
Residual	5.55710946	24	.231546227	Prob > F	=	0.0979
				R-squared	=	0.4608
				Adj R-squared	=	0.2136
Total	10.3055556	35	.294444444	Root MSE	=	.48119

spain	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r2	1.025045	.3625559	2.83	0.009	.2767665 1.773324
timel	-54.25449	27.95646	-1.94	0.064	-111.9538 3.444816
spain1	.0000555	.0000574	0.97	0.343	-.000063 .0001741
wepolity	-.0004642	.005971	-0.08	0.939	-.0127878 .0118594
HRC6	-.6829278	.7015973	-0.97	0.340	-2.130953 .7650978
HRC7	.4394825	.5559847	0.79	0.437	-.7080136 1.586979
HRC8	.3381406	.4752468	0.71	0.484	-.6427207 1.319002
HRC9	-.5898919	.530195	-1.11	0.277	-1.684161 .5043769
HRC10	.2309196	.491179	0.47	0.643	-.782824 1.244663
HRC11	.114538	.5285589	0.22	0.830	-.976354 1.20543
HRC12	-.3233466	.4166099	-0.78	0.445	-1.183187 .536494
_cons	109.727	55.15272	1.99	0.058	-4.102621 223.5566

Appendix 71. Table 62: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Thailand (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: East Asia Pacific regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Thailand.

```
. reg thailand r1 time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 thailand1 AsiaPPolity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	36
Model	12.4576656	11	1.13251506	F(11, 24)	=	3.66
Residual	7.43122327	24	.309634303	Prob > F	=	0.0038
				R-squared	=	0.6264
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4551
Total	19.8888889	35	.568253968	Root MSE	=	.55645

thailand	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r1	-.5759512	.5013476	-1.15	0.262	-1.610682 .4587794
time1	-85.81961	23.62274	-3.63	0.001	-134.5746 -37.06467
HRC6	-2.463972	.8573353	-2.87	0.008	-4.233425 -.6945185
HRC7	2.443734	.6764114	3.61	0.001	1.04769 3.839779
HRC8	-.5038636	.5543239	-0.91	0.372	-1.647932 .6402047
HRC9	-.1316251	.6010088	-0.22	0.828	-1.372046 1.108796
HRC10	.1400089	.5398569	0.26	0.798	-.974201 1.254219
HRC11	.7956228	.7215382	1.10	0.281	-.6935588 2.284804
HRC12	-.4308526	.5385459	-0.80	0.432	-1.542357 .6806516
thailand1	-.0008114	.0003121	2.60	0.016	.0001672 .0014556
AsiaPPolity	-.0739301	.0353468	-2.09	0.047	-.1468823 -.0009779
_cons	176.5944	47.1207	3.75	0.001	79.34209 273.8468

Appendix 72. Table 63: Regression analysis between political terror scores of Uganda (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership, Time (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) of Uganda.

```
. reg uganda r7 time1 ugandal HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	9.25614157	10	.925614157	F(10, 26)	=	4.38
Residual	5.50061518	26	.211562122	Prob > F	=	0.0012
				R-squared	=	0.6272
				Adj R-squared	=	0.4839
Total	14.7567568	36	.40990991	Root MSE	=	.45996

uganda	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r7	0	(omitted)			
time1	-58.65485	12.06713	-4.86	0.000	-83.45919 -33.85051
ugandal	.0001135	.0014055	0.08	0.936	-.0027756 .0030025
HRC6	.3354402	.6238929	0.54	0.595	-.9469899 1.61787
HRC7	-1.044082	.522178	-2.00	0.056	-2.117434 .0292702
HRC8	.6437206	.4345977	1.48	0.151	-.2496078 1.537049
HRC9	-.3633118	.4547516	-0.80	0.432	-1.298067 .5714434
HRC10	-.1781117	.4413923	-0.40	0.690	-1.085407 .7291831
HRC11	.4058694	.4971967	0.82	0.422	-.616133 1.427872
HRC12	-.3812484	.3958658	-0.96	0.344	-1.194962 .4324653
ssapolity	-.0391908	.0156574	-2.50	0.019	-.071375 -.0070065
_cons	121.4773	24.01243	5.06	0.000	72.11905 170.8356

Appendix 73. Table 64: Regression analysis between mean political terror scores of the Latin American Caribbean region (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: member-states within the LAC region (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region of Freedom House, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Caribbean small states, Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Latin American Caribbean developing countries, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Latin American Caribbean region all incomes.

```
. reg lac r3 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity caribbeansmallstates1 latinamericacaribbeandevolvingo latinamericacaribbeanall
> incomele
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	4.34539104	11	.395035549	F(11, 25)	=	8.15
Residual	1.21230081	25	.048492032	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.7819
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6859
Total	5.55769185	36	.154380329	Root MSE	=	.22021

lac	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r3	0	(omitted)			
HRC6	.5573936	.3119947	1.79	0.086	-.0851714 1.199959
HRC7	-.3852256	.2534382	-1.52	0.141	-.9071913 .1367401
HRC8	-.0651801	.2088981	-0.31	0.758	-.4954139 .3650537
HRC9	-.025224	.2302004	-0.11	0.914	-.4993306 .4488826
HRC10	.0919551	.2206672	0.42	0.680	-.3625176 .5464277
HRC11	-.169161	.2478189	-0.68	0.501	-.6795536 .3412317
HRC12	.1153231	.1985323	0.58	0.567	-.2935618 .524208
AmerPolity	.0294136	.011287	2.61	0.015	.0061676 .0526595
caribbeansmallstates1	-.0004966	.0001419	-3.50	0.002	-.0007888 -.0002044
latinamericacaribbeandevolvingo	-.0005219	.0007856	-0.66	0.513	-.0021399 .0010961
latinamericacaribbeanallincomele	.0008395	.0007858	1.07	0.296	-.0007788 .0024578
_cons	1.314048	.8189634	1.60	0.121	-.3726389 3.000735

Appendix 74. Table 65: Regression analysis between mean political terror scores of the North American Caribbean region (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: member-states within the North American region (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region of Freedom House, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for North America, Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the United States, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for Canada.

```
. reg na r5 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AmerPolity canada1 northamerical unitedstates1
note: r5 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
				F(11, 25)	=	7.83
Model	11.7082557	11	1.06438688	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	3.39985245	25	.135994098	R-squared	=	0.7750
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6759
Total	15.1081081	36	.41966967	Root MSE	=	.36877

na	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r5	0	(omitted)			
HRC6	.5101687	.6310878	0.81	0.426	-.7895809 1.809918
HRC7	-.0812691	.4958887	-0.16	0.871	-1.102571 .9400328
HRC8	-.0137526	.3661581	-0.04	0.970	-.7678693 .7403642
HRC9	.5214698	.3863276	1.35	0.189	-.2741868 1.317126
HRC10	-.2903333	.3690486	-0.79	0.439	-1.050403 .4697366
HRC11	-.1201612	.5720487	-0.21	0.835	-1.298318 1.057995
HRC12	.165456	.4743567	0.35	0.730	-.8114999 1.142412
AmerPolity	.0374382	.0153064	2.45	0.022	.0059141 .0689624
canada1	.0124949	.0064212	1.95	0.063	-.0007298 .0257195
northamerical	-.1273554	.0653396	-1.95	0.063	-.2619247 .0072139
unitedstates1	.1148762	.0588905	1.95	0.062	-.006411 .2361634
_cons	-1.434444	.8583361	-1.67	0.107	-3.20222 .3333328

Appendix 75. Table 66: Regression analysis between mean political terror scores of the East Asia Pacific region (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: East Asia Pacific and Pacific regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region of Freedom House, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for Micronesia, Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the East Asia Pacific developing countries, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the East Asia Pacific region all incomes.

```
. reg eap time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity eastasiapacificdevelop
> ingonly1 eastasiapacificallincomelevels1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
				F(11, 25)	=	7.42
Model	2.75217174	11	.250197431	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	.843439155	25	.033737566	R-squared	=	0.7654
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6622
Total	3.5956109	36	.09987808	Root MSE	=	.18368

eap	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
time1	-55.2877	9.700415	-5.70	0.000	-75.26608	-35.30932
HRC6	-.4216773	.2988368	-1.41	0.171	-1.037143	.1937886
HRC7	.2809582	.2314454	1.21	0.236	-.1957125	.7576289
HRC8	-.0946348	.190501	-0.50	0.624	-.486979	.2977094
HRC9	-.2026241	.2010257	-1.01	0.323	-.6166442	.211396
HRC10	.0862557	.1822354	0.47	0.640	-.2890652	.4615766
HRC11	.2424421	.268779	0.90	0.376	-.3111186	.7960028
HRC12	-.1331198	.217067	-0.61	0.545	-.5801778	.3139381
AsiaPPolity	-.0284287	.0118023	-2.41	0.024	-.0527361	-.0041214
eastasiapacificdeve~1	.0003526	.0009807	0.36	0.722	-.0016672	.0023724
eastasiapacificalli~1	.0001816	.0001721	1.06	0.301	-.0001729	.0005361
_cons	113.7399	19.30494	5.89	0.000	73.98068	153.4992

Appendix 76. Table 67: Regression analysis between mean political terror scores of the South Asia region (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: South Asia regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia and Pacific region of Freedom House, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for South Asia.

```
. reg sa time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity southasial
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
				F(10, 26)	=	2.66
Model	1.61479279	10	.161479279	Prob > F	=	0.0221
Residual	1.58028774	26	.060780298	R-squared	=	0.5054
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3152
Total	3.19508053	36	.088752237	Root MSE	=	.24654

sa	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
time1	75.93348	18.08176	4.20	0.000	38.76589	113.1011
HRC6	-.0536885	.3520325	-0.15	0.880	-.7773016	.6699247
HRC7	.05062	.2961131	0.17	0.866	-.5580493	.6592892
HRC8	-.0350036	.2314757	-0.15	0.881	-.5108087	.4408015
HRC9	.0943411	.244921	0.39	0.703	-.4091012	.5977833
HRC10	.1361368	.2381147	0.57	0.572	-.353315	.6255885
HRC11	-.0570297	.28924	-0.20	0.845	-.6515712	.5375117
HRC12	.0377145	.2232144	0.17	0.867	-.4211093	.4965383
AsiaPPolity	-.021086	.0128697	-1.64	0.113	-.04754	.0053681
southasial	-.0075744	.0020835	-3.64	0.001	-.0118571	-.0032917
_cons	-145.4389	35.51797	-4.09	0.000	-218.4472	-72.43069

Appendix 77. Table 68: Regression analysis between mean political terror scores of the Europe and Central Asia region (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western Europe region of Freedom House, polity scores for the CEEU region of Freedom House, and Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the European Union, Gross Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Euro Area, Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Europe and Central Asia region developing countries only, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Europe and Central Asia region all incomes.

```
. reg eca time1 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 weppolity CEEUPolity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	1.16319714	10	.116319714	F(10, 26)	=	8.45
Residual	.357873211	26	.013764354	Prob > F	=	0.0000
				R-squared	=	0.7647
				Adj R-squared	=	0.6742
Total	1.52107035	36	.042251954	Root MSE	=	.11732

eca	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
time1	-29.40791	5.172978	-5.68	0.000	-40.04112 -18.7747
HRC6	-.4386045	.159035	-2.76	0.011	-.7655057 -.1117033
HRC7	-.058006	.1306195	-0.44	0.661	-.3264982 .2104862
HRC8	.3397632	.1097846	3.09	0.005	.1140976 .5654287
HRC9	-.5222137	.11904	-4.39	0.000	-.7669039 -.2775235
HRC10	.3319595	.1162548	2.86	0.008	.0929943 .5709247
HRC11	-.1241206	.1262245	-0.98	0.335	-.3835788 .1353376
HRC12	.0128151	.1002091	0.13	0.899	-.1931677 .2187979
weppolity	.0072417	.0025538	2.84	0.009	.0019923 .0124912
CEEUPolity	-.0099685	.0029499	-3.38	0.002	-.0160322 -.0039048
_cons	60.36399	10.18305	5.93	0.000	39.43243 81.29555

Appendix 78. Table 69: Regression analysis between mean political terror scores of the Sub-Saharan Africa region (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan African regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region of Freedom House, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Sub-Saharan Africa region developing countries only, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Sub-Saharan Africa region all incomes.

```
. reg ssa r7 HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 ssapolity subsaharanafricadevelopingonly1 subsaharanafricaallincomelevels1
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	37
Model	1.43122217	10	.143122217	F(10, 26)	=	5.19
Residual	.717410566	26	.027592714	Prob > F	=	0.0003
				R-squared	=	0.6661
				Adj R-squared	=	0.5377
Total	2.14863273	36	.059684243	Root MSE	=	.16611

ssa	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r7	0	(omitted)			
HRC6	-.1047722	.2279243	-0.46	0.650	-.5732773 .3637328
HRC7	.0594233	.1849531	0.32	0.751	-.3207533 .4395999
HRC8	.0903802	.1566641	0.58	0.569	-.2316474 .4124079
HRC9	-.1131029	.1662801	-0.68	0.502	-.4548965 .2286908
HRC10	.0153713	.1616315	0.10	0.925	-.316867 .3476095
HRC11	-.1330557	.1817164	-0.73	0.471	-.5065791 .2404676
HRC12	-.0070917	.1453667	-0.05	0.961	-.3058973 .291714
ssapolity	-.0083783	.0056902	-1.47	0.153	-.0200747 .0033181
subsaharanafricadevelopingonly1	.3816083	.169901	2.25	0.033	.0323718 .7308448
subsaharanafricaallincomelevels1	-.3806423	.1698503	-2.24	0.034	-.7297747 -.0315099
_cons	2.730304	.1354303	20.16	0.000	2.451923 3.008685

Appendix 79. Table 70: Regression analysis between all political terror scores (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: East Asia Pacific regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia Pacific region of Freedom House, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the East Asia Pacific region developing countries only, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the East Asia Pacific region all incomes.

```
. reg PTS HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 r1 AsiaPPolity eastasiapacificdevelopingonly1 eastasiapacificallincomelevels1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	23
Model	6.58257896	11	.598416269	F(11, 11)	=	0.31
Residual	21.243508	11	1.931228	Prob > F	=	0.9678
				R-squared	=	0.2366
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.5269
Total	27.826087	22	1.26482213	Root MSE	=	1.3897

	PTS	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
	HRC6	1.442521	2.59712	0.56	0.590	-4.273703 7.158744
	HRC7	-1.228094	1.969862	-0.62	0.546	-5.563731 3.107543
	HRC8	-.2531317	1.647954	-0.15	0.881	-3.880253 3.373989
	HRC9	-.9654144	2.049053	-0.47	0.647	-5.475349 3.54452
	HRC10	1.437699	2.327303	0.62	0.549	-3.684662 6.560059
	HRC11	-.8096735	4.101687	-0.20	0.847	-9.837425 8.218078
	HRC12	-.0769427	3.159638	-0.02	0.981	-7.031259 6.877374
	r1	-.4148613	1.615403	-0.26	0.802	-3.970339 3.140617
	AsiaPPolity	.0683293	.1393781	0.49	0.634	-.2384398 .3750983
	eastasiapacificdevelopingonly1	-.0016812	.0109824	-0.15	0.881	-.0258532 .0224908
	eastasiapacificallincomelevels1	.0001324	.0018549	0.07	0.944	-.0039501 .0042149
	_cons	1.132067	4.669405	0.24	0.813	-9.145224 11.40936

Appendix 80. Table 71: Regression analysis between all political terror scores (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Europe and Central Asia regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Western European region of Freedom House, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Euro area, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the European Union.

```
. reg PTS HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 r2 wepolity euroareal europeanunion1
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	23
				F(11, 11)	=	0.73
Model	11.7350895	11	1.06682632	Prob > F	=	0.6952
Residual	16.0909974	11	1.46281795	R-squared	=	0.4217
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.1565
Total	27.826087	22	1.26482213	Root MSE	=	1.2095

PTS	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
HRC6	.9340996	1.990112	0.47	0.648	-3.446108	5.314307
HRC7	-1.846128	1.503763	-1.23	0.245	-5.155887	1.463632
HRC8	.5240849	1.447069	0.36	0.724	-2.660891	3.709061
HRC9	-1.403379	1.766878	-0.79	0.444	-5.292251	2.485494
HRC10	1.994969	2.040358	0.98	0.349	-2.495828	6.485766
HRC11	-1.971607	2.433719	-0.81	0.435	-7.328186	3.384972
HRC12	.5569823	1.681641	0.33	0.747	-3.144284	4.258249
r2	.4677632	1.111997	0.42	0.682	-1.979726	2.915252
wepolity	.0086075	.0147412	0.58	0.571	-.0238375	.0410526
euroareal	.0055147	.0029128	1.89	0.085	-.0008964	.0119258
europeanunion1	-.0067387	.0035369	-1.91	0.083	-.0145234	.0010461
_cons	3.739287	1.17007	3.20	0.009	1.163981	6.314593

Appendix 81. Table 72: Regression analysis between all political terror scores (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Latin American and Caribbean regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region of Freedom House, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Latin American and Caribbean region developing countries only, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Latin American and Caribbean region all incomes.

```
. reg PTS HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 r3 AmerPolity latinamericacaribbeanallincomele latina
> mericacaribbeandvelopingo
note: r3 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	23
				F(10, 12)	=	0.75
Model	10.6712934	10	1.06712934	Prob > F	=	0.6739
Residual	17.1547936	12	1.42956613	R-squared	=	0.3835
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.1303
Total	27.826087	22	1.26482213	Root MSE	=	1.1956

	PTS	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
	HRC6	-.7340776	2.135589	-0.34	0.737	-5.387127 3.918972
	HRC7	-.1237575	1.385951	-0.09	0.930	-3.143485 2.89597
	HRC8	-.0112493	1.393553	-0.01	0.994	-3.047541 3.025042
	HRC9	-1.732486	1.768166	-0.98	0.347	-5.584989 2.120018
	HRC10	2.215073	1.882956	1.18	0.262	-1.887537 6.317682
	HRC11	-1.063806	2.313621	-0.46	0.654	-6.104753 3.97714
	HRC12	.4187366	1.747339	0.24	0.815	-3.388387 4.22586
	r3	0	(omitted)			
	AmerPolity	-.0352927	.0633163	-0.56	0.587	-.173247 .1026616
	latinamericacaribbeanallincomele	.0106142	.0060078	1.77	0.103	-.0024756 .023704
	latinamericacaribbeandvelopingo	-.0120135	.006587	-1.82	0.093	-.0263653 .0023383
	_cons	4.880005	4.64876	1.05	0.315	-5.248772 15.00878

Appendix 82. Table 73: Regression analysis between all political terror scores (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Middle East and North Africa regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Middle East and North Africa region of Freedom House, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Middle East and North Africa region all incomes.

```
. reg PTS HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 r4 menapolity middleeastnorthafricaallincomele
note: HRC6 omitted because of collinearity
note: r4 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	18
Model	7.24013201	8	.905016502	F(8, 9)	=	0.61
Residual	13.259868	9	1.47331867	Prob > F	=	0.7481
				R-squared	=	0.3532
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.2218
Total	20.5	17	1.20588235	Root MSE	=	1.2138

PTS	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
HRC6	0	(omitted)			
HRC7	-.880447	1.41187	-0.62	0.548	-4.07432 2.313426
HRC8	2.203308	1.931532	1.14	0.283	-2.16612 6.572737
HRC9	-.0071338	1.826187	-0.00	0.997	-4.138256 4.123988
HRC10	-2.58291	2.71104	-0.95	0.366	-8.715709 3.549889
HRC11	.8065168	2.41457	0.33	0.746	-4.655621 6.268654
HRC12	-1.410962	1.755937	-0.80	0.442	-5.383167 2.561244
r4	0	(omitted)			
menapolity	.6283548	1.292651	0.49	0.639	-2.295824 3.552534
middleeastnorthafricaallincomele	-.0011299	.0007092	-1.59	0.146	-.0027342 .0004743
_cons	2.046066	6.265307	0.33	0.751	-12.12704 16.21918

Appendix 83. Table 74: Regression analysis between all political terror scores (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: North American regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Americas region of Freedom House, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the North American region all incomes.

```
. reg PTS HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 r5 AmerPolity northamerical
note: r5 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	23
Model	5.64500482	9	.627222757	F(9, 13)	=	0.37
Residual	22.1810821	13	1.70623709	Prob > F	=	0.9311
				R-squared	=	0.2029
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.3490
Total	27.826087	22	1.26482213	Root MSE	=	1.3062

PTS	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
HRC6	.7940009	2.136885	0.37	0.716	-3.822459 5.41046
HRC7	-.6787068	1.486321	-0.46	0.655	-3.889708 2.532295
HRC8	-.206669	1.52304	-0.14	0.894	-3.496997 3.083659
HRC9	-1.116168	1.897495	-0.59	0.566	-5.215456 2.98312
HRC10	1.277266	2.034653	0.63	0.541	-3.118334 5.672866
HRC11	-.0029538	2.471427	-0.00	0.999	-5.342146 5.336239
HRC12	-.5254503	1.823328	-0.29	0.778	-4.464511 3.41361
r5	0	(omitted)			
AmerPolity	.0068239	.0494305	0.14	0.892	-.0999642 .113612
northamerical	-.0000208	.0000495	-0.42	0.681	-.0001278 .0000861
_cons	2.964725	3.608124	0.82	0.426	-4.830153 10.7596

Appendix 84. Table 75: Regression analysis between all political terror scores of the South Asia region (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: South Asia regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Asia Pacific region of Freedom House, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the South Asia region all incomes.

```
. reg PTS r6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 AsiaPPolity southasial
note: r6 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	23
Model	5.69614078	8	.712017597	F(8, 14)	=	0.45
Residual	22.1299462	14	1.58071044	Prob > F	=	0.8707
				R-squared	=	0.2047
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.2497
Total	27.826087	22	1.26482213	Root MSE	=	1.2573

PTS	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
r6	0	(omitted)			
HRC7	-.5594992	1.271041	-0.44	0.667	-3.28561 2.166612
HRC8	.2270631	1.229768	0.18	0.856	-2.410526 2.864652
HRC9	-1.733788	1.35917	-1.28	0.223	-4.648917 1.18134
HRC10	1.4583	1.873567	0.78	0.449	-2.560102 5.476703
HRC11	-.236984	2.137697	-0.11	0.913	-4.821887 4.347919
HRC12	-.3455358	1.585516	-0.22	0.831	-3.746128 3.055057
AsiaPPolity	.028731	.0745837	0.39	0.706	-.1312351 .1886971
southasial	-.001222	.0043425	-0.28	0.783	-.0105357 .0080917
_cons	2.378434	3.525004	0.67	0.511	-5.181947 9.938815

Appendix 85. Table 76: Regression analysis between all political terror scores (1976-2012), and the following independent variables: Sub-Saharan Africa regional membership (1976-2012), United Nations Human Rights Council membership 2006-2012, polity scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa region of Freedom House, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Sub-Saharan Africa region developing countries only, and Domestic Product per Capita (1960-2014) for the Sub-Saharan Africa region all incomes.

```
. reg PTS HRC6 HRC7 HRC8 HRC9 HRC10 HRC11 HRC12 r7 subsaharanafricadevelopingonly1 subsaharanafricaal
> lincomelevels1 ssapolity
note: r7 omitted because of collinearity
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	23
				F(10, 12)	=	0.31
Model	5.72080203	10	.572080203	Prob > F	=	0.9634
Residual	22.1052849	12	1.84210708	R-squared	=	0.2056
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.4564
Total	27.826087	22	1.26482213	Root MSE	=	1.3572

	PTS	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
	HRC6	.7814888	2.365291	0.33	0.747	-4.372037 5.935014
	HRC7	-.7433863	1.56202	-0.48	0.643	-4.146735 2.659962
	HRC8	-.2009102	1.652595	-0.12	0.905	-3.801606 3.399786
	HRC9	-1.130332	1.986246	-0.57	0.580	-5.457991 3.197327
	HRC10	1.093283	2.198983	0.50	0.628	-3.697888 5.884455
	HRC11	.1990323	2.379346	0.08	0.935	-4.985118 5.383182
	HRC12	-.5811699	1.776306	-0.33	0.749	-4.451409 3.289069
	r7	0	(omitted)			
	subsaharanafricadevelopingonly1	.3670048	1.732774	0.21	0.836	-3.408385 4.142394
	subsaharanafricaallincomelevels1	-.3672264	1.731466	-0.21	0.836	-4.139766 3.405314
	ssapolity	.0214456	.0653907	0.33	0.749	-.1210285 .1639196
	_cons	2.999186	1.281419	2.34	0.037	.207214 5.791157

Appendix 86. Table 77: Codebook

Terms	Definitions
time	Years 1976-2012
afghanistan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
albania	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
algeria	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
angola	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
argentina	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
armenia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
australia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
austria	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
var10	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
azerbaijan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
bahamas	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
bahrain	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
bangladesh	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
barbados	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
belarus	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
belgium	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
belize	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
benin	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
bhutan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
bolivia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
bosniaandherzegovina	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
botswana	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
brazil	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
brunei	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
bulgaria	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
burkinafaso	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
burundi	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
cambodia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
cameroon	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
canada	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
capeverde	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
centralafricanrepublic	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
chad	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
chile	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
china	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
colombia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
comoros	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
congo	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
costarica	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
croatia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
cuba	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
cyprus	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
czechrepublic	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
czechoslovakia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012

demrepublicofthecongo	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
denmark	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
djibouti	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
dominicanrepublic	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
easttimorleste	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
ecuador	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
egypt	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
elsalvador	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
equatorialguinea	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
eritrea	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
estonia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
ethiopia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
fiji	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
finland	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
france	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
gabon	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
gambia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
georgia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
germany	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
germanyeast	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
germanywest	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
ghana	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
greece	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
grenada	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
guatemala	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
guinea	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
guineabissau	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
guyana	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
haiti	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
hamasgaza	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
honduras	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
hungary	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
iceland	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
india	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
indonesia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
iran	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
iraq	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
ireland	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
israelandoccupiedterritories	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
israeloccupiedterritoriesonly	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
israelpre1967borders	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
italy	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
ivorycoastcotedivoire	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
jamaica	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
japan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
jordan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
kazakhstan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
kenya	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
kosovo	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012

kuwait	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
kyrgyzrepublic	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
laos	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
latvia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
lebanon	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
lesotho	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
liberia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
libya	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
lithuania	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
luxembourg	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
macedonia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
madagascar	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
malawi	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
malaysia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
maldives	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
mali	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
malta	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
mauritania	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
mauritius	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
mexico	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
moldova	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
mongolia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
montenegro	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
morocco	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
mozambique	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
myanmar	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
namibia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
nepal	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
netherlands	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
newzealand	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
nicaragua	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
niger	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
nigeria	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
northkoreademocratcpeoplesrepubl	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
norway	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
oman	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
pakistan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
palestinianauthority	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
panama	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
papuanewguinea	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
paraguay	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
peru	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
philippines	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
poland	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
portugal	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
qatar	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
romania	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
russia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
rwanda	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012

samoa	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
saotomeandprincipe	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
saudiarabia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
senegal	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
serbia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
serbiaandmontenegro	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
seychelles	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
sierraleone	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
singapore	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
slovakia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
slovenia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
solomonislands	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
somalia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
southafrica	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
southkorearepublicofkorea	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
southsudan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
spain	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
srilanka	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
stlucia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
stvincentandthegrenadines	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
sudan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
suriname	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
swaziland	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
sweden	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
switzerland	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
syria	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
taiwan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
tajikistan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
tanzania	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
thailand	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
togo	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
trinidadandtobago	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
tunisia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
turkey	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
turkmenistan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
uganda	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
ukraine	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
unitedarabemirates	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
unitedkingdom	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
unitedstates	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
uruguay	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
ussr	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
uzbekistan	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
vanuatu	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
venezuela	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
vietnamsocialistrepublicof	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
yemen	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
yemennorth	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
yemensouth	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012

yugoslavia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
zambia	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
zimbabwe	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012
r1	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012 for Euroasian and Pacific Region
r2	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012 for Europe and Central Asia Region
r3	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012 for Latin American and Caribbean Region
r4	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012 for Middle East and North Africa Region
r5	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012 for North American Region
r6	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012 for South Asia Region
r7	Political Terror Scores from 1976-2012 for Sub-Saharan Africa Region
time1	1976-2012
HRC6	UN Human Rights Council Membership in 2006
HRC7	UN Human Rights Council Membership in 2007
HRC8	UN Human Rights Council Membership in 2008
HRC9	UN Human Rights Council Membership in 2009
HRC10	UN Human Rights Council Membership in 2010
HRC11	UN Human Rights Council Membership in 2011
HRC12	UN Human Rights Council Membership in 2012
AmerPolity	Freedom House Polity Scores for the Americas Region
AsiaPPolity	Freedom House Polity Scores for the Asia and Pacific Region
CEEUPolity	Freedom House Polity Scores for the Central Eurasian and Eastern Europe Region
menapolity	Freedom House Polity Scores for the Middle East and North Africa Region
ssapolity	Freedom House Polity Scores for the Sub-Saharan Africa Region
wepolity	Freedom House Polity Scores for the Western Europe Region
aruba1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
andorra1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
afghanistan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
angola1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
albania1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
arabworld1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
unitedarabemirates1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
argentina1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
armenia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
americansamoa1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
antiguaandbarbuda1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
australia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
austria1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
azerbaijan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
burundi1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
belgium1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
benin1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
burkinafaso1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
bangladesh1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
bulgaria1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
bahrain1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
bahamasthe1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
bosniaandherzegovina1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
belarus1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
belize1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita

bermuda1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
bolivia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
brazil1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
barbados1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
bruneidarussalam1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
bhutan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
botswana1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
centralfrafricanrepublic1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
canada1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
centraleuropeandthebaltics1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
switzerland1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
channelislands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
chile1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
china1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
cotedivoire1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
cameroon1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
congo1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
colombia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
comoros1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
caboverde1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
costarica1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
caribbeanislands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
cuba1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
curacao1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
caymanislands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
cyprus1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
czechrepublic1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
germany1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
djibouti1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
dominica1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
denmark1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
dominicanrepublic1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
algeria1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
eastasiapacificdevelopingonly1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
eastasiapacificallincomelevels1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
europcentralasiadevelopingonly1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
europcentralasiaallincomelevels	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
ecuador1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
egyptarabrep1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
euroarea1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
eritrea1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
spain1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
estonia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
ethiopia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
europeanunion1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
fragileandconflictaffectedsituat	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
finland1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
fiji1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
france1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita

faeroeislands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
micronesiafedsts1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
gabon1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
unitedkingdom1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
georgia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
ghana1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
guinea1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
gambiathe1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
guineabissau1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
equatorialguinea1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
greece1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
grenada1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
greenland1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
guatemala1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
guam1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
guyana1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
highincome1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
hongkongsarchina1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
honduras1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
heavilyindebtedpoorcountriestpc	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
croatia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
haiti1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
hungary1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
indonesia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
isleofman1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
india1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
notclassified	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
ireland1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
iranislamicrep1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
iraq1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
iceland1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
israel1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
italy1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
jamaica1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
jordan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
japan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
kazakhstan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
kenya1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
kyrgyzrepublic1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
cambodia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
kiribati1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
stkittsandnevis1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
korearep1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
kosovo1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
kuwait1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
latinamericacaribbeananddevelopingo	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
laopdr1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
lebanon1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
liberia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita

libya1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
stlucia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
latinamericacaribbeanallincomele	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
leastdevelopedcountriesunclassif	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
lowincome1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
liechtenstein1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
srilanka1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
lowermiddleincome1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
lowmiddleincome1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
lesotho1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
lithuania1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
luxembourg1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
latvia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
macaosarchina1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
stmartinfrenchpart1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
morocco1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
monaco1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
moldova1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
madagascar1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
maldives1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
middleeastnorthafricaallincomele	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
mexico1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
marshallislands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
middleincome	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
macedoniafyr1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
mali1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
malta1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
myanmar1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
middleeastnorthafricadevelopingo	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
montenegro1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
mongolia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
northernmarianaislands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
mozambique1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
mauritania1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
mauritius1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
malawi1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
malaysia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
northamerica1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
namibia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
newcaledonia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
niger1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
nigeria1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
nicaragua1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
netherlands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
highincomenonoecd1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
norway1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
nepal1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
newzealand1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
highincomeoecd1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita

oecdmembers1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
oman1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
othersmallstates1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
pakistan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
panama1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
peru1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
philippines1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
palau1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
papuanewguinea1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
poland1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
puertorico1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
koreademrep1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
portugal1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
paraguay1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
pacificislandsmallstates1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
frenchpolynesia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
qatar1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
romania1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
russianfederation1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
rwanda1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
southasia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
saudiarabia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
sudan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
senegal1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
singapore1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
solomonislands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
sierraleone1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
elsalvador1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
sanmarino1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
somalia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
serbia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
subsaharanafricadevelopingonly1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
southsudan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
subsaharanafricaallincomelevels1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
smallstates1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
saotomeandprincipe1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
suriname1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
slovakrepublic1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
slovenia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
sweden1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
swaziland1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
sintmaartendutchpart1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
seychelles1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
syrianarabrepublic1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
turksandcaicosislands1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
chad1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
togo1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
thailand1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
tajikistan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita

turkmenistan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
timorleste1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
tonga1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
trinidadandtobago1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
tunisia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
turkey1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
tuvalu1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
tanzania1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
uganda1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
ukraine1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
uppermiddleincome1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
uruguay1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
unitedstates1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
uzbekistan1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
stvincentandthegrenadines1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
venezuelarb1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
virginislandsus1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
vietnam1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
vanuatu1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
westbankandgaza1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
world1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
samoa1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
yemenrep1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
southafrica1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
congodemrep1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
zambia1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
zimbabwe1	Gross Domestic Product per Capita
yearlyaveragepts	Yearly Mean Political Terror Scores for members of the UNCHR and UNHRC 2003-2012
percentchangefrompreviousyear	Yearly Percentage Change in Political Terror Scores for members of the UNCHR and UNHRC 2003-2012
PostColdWarECA	Europe and Central Asia Political Terror Scores from 1989-2012
CEEUPolityPostColdWar	Central Eurasian and Eastern Europe Political Terror Scores from 1989-2012
PTS	All Political Terror Scores 1976-2012 for All Countries

X.

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