The Emergence of #Ilm al-Bayān: Classical Arabic Literary Theory in the Arabic East in the 7th/13th Century

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The Emergence of 'Ilm al-Bayān:
Classical Arabic Literary Theory in the
Arabic East in the 7th/13th Century

A dissertation presented
by
Avigail Noy
to
The Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
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The Emergence of ʿIlm al-Bayān:
Classical Arabic Literary Theory in the Arabic East in the 7th/13th Century

Abstract

This dissertation identifies a turning point in the development of literary theory as a discipline in the classical Arabic-Islamic world, starting in the Arabic East in the thirteenth century under the emerging framework of ʿilm al-bayān ‘the science of good style’. Treating a range of poetic, rhetorical, and literary-critical matters that had been studied under various disciplinary headings since the ninth century, the discipline was now consciously recognized as having an underlying theory and an established canon. I trace this development beginning with Dīyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1239) and follow its progression throughout Greater Syria and Egypt as late as the end of the fourteenth century, after the standard theory of rhetoric (ʿilm al-balāgha) emerged within the madrasa institution. I then analyze in depth one test case for literary-theoretical thinking in this time and place, namely, majāz ‘figurative language’. Although linguistic theories about majāz, inspired by Islamic legal theory, had become a hallmark of literary studies, I argue that literary scholars implicitly espoused a non-linguistic conception of the notion, akin to kadhib ‘lie’ (a term not used due to its negative theological connotations). My analysis demonstrates that despite tensions between being a science concerned with hermeneutics and one concerned with poetics, ʿilm al-bayān was essentially the latter.
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My parents have been my supporters from the very beginning. My father used to say I
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I thank, lastly, my dear husband and partner in this life, Aviad Tsherniak: for loving and supporting me through it all, for making me laugh when the going got tough, and for Ido.
Introduction

Classical Arabic literary theory\(^1\) has become a widely recognized field of modern scholarly research despite the most basic fact that a standard name for this ‘discipline’ is absent in the Arabic sources. In the high ʿAbbāsid era (roughly third/ninth to fifth/eleventh centuries), considered to be the formative age of literary theory, a variety of terms were used, notably naqd lit. ‘assaying’ (later ‘criticism’), faṣāḥa, balāgha (both) ‘eloquence’, al-‘ilm bi-l-shiʿr ‘the knowledge of poetry’, and bādī’ lit. ‘novel’ (later a collective noun for ‘literary devices’). The later, ubiquitous appellation of ‘ilm al-balāgha ‘the science of eloquence’ refers to the scholastic systematization of the discipline of ‘rhetoric’, an ancillary science to legal and religious education, beginning in the eighth/fourteenth century. The lack of a unified name in the early period certainly did not deter modern scholars from researching this multifaceted body of knowledge and from formulating its history and development, especially in the high ʿAbbāsid era. Similarly, the scholastic discipline of rhetoric – although far from being adequately studied – has been roughly charted in the literature and has been given an initial historical account beginning with Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sakkākī in the sixth/twelfth/seventh/thirteenth centuries.\(^2\)


The history of literary theory in between the ‘formative’ age and the ‘mature’ age of scholasticism, however, has yet to be written. Since the scholastic science of rhetoric has often been viewed by modern scholars as an ‘end result’ in Arabic literary theory, works that were written in sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries that did not exhibit these ‘end-result-tendencies’ – have usually been accorded a minor place in its history. We find this bias in the works of modern Western scholars and scholars from the Arab world alike. This dissertation looks at literary-critical works written in this ‘interim’ stage in a specific geographic area in order to bring to light the array of theoretical and critical possibilities that perhaps did not find their way into the ‘end-result’ of rhetorical studies, but are nevertheless crucial for our understanding of classical Arabic literary theory. Various aspects of such works have been, of course, touched upon in the literature, and none of the works are unknown to scholars (some perhaps little known), but studying them comprehensively as a unit yields insights that have hitherto escaped our attention. First and foremost among these is the recognition that a disciplinary crystallization was taking place at this time, to an extent that was unprecedented in the tradition of Arabic writings on the verbal arts.

The most prominent, and indeed well-known among these sixth/twelfth-seventh/thirteenth century literary scholars is the Syrian statesman and critic Dīyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239). His magnum opus, al-Mathal al-sāʾir fī adab al-kātib wa-l-shāʾir (‘The Current Saying: On the Knowhow of the Scribe and Poet’), acts as a focus of sorts in the dissertation, but by no means is it our primary aim of study. We are interested, rather, in researching his work in relation to other works written around the same time and – no less important – place, in order to determine whether the Mathal was a singular ‘event’ or rather part of a larger tradition. In
concentrating on the locality in which Դիյա’ դի-նա was writing – namely, Greater Syria\(^3\) and Egypt (the Arabic East) – we are guided in part by the scholar’s own statements in the *Mathal*, revealing his marked local patriotism. Doing so also serves as the first comprehensive implementation, in the field of literary theory, of the model advocated by Thomas Bauer for time- and place-specific research in Arabic literature.\(^4\)

Looking at Arabic literary theory by period and place is by no means new. Իհսան Քաբա’s second-to-last chapter in his *Տարիխ ալ-նագդ ալ-ադաբի ‘ինդա ալ-‘արաբ* deals with literary criticism in Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the sixth and seventh centuries AH.\(^5\) In the chapter, Դիյա’ դի-նա is given the most attention, roughly half of its thirty-odd pages, while the rest of the chapter is dedicated to five additional scholars, the work of one of whom is lost. Քաբա stresses the literary unity in the geographic area under discussion, a unity which according to him exhibited an eschewal of Greek influence and displayed a more ‘poetic’, ‘native-Arabic’ approach to criticism.\(^6\) Դիյա’ դի-նա’s explicit eschewal of Aristotelian poetics and rhetoric has become somewhat famous since its inclusion in Vicente Cantarino’s translations of select treatments of poetics.\(^7\) Քաբա further stresses Դիյա’ դի-նա’s prominent role in criticism; his novel approach to

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\(^3\) By Greater Syria I mean the most inclusive interpretation of this region, including northwestern Iraq and southern Anatolia, or the historical ազիրա. When I say above that Դիյա’ դի-նա – a scholar most associated with Mosul – is ‘Syrian’ I do have ‘Greater Syria’ in mind. (As we shall see, he did not identify himself as an “Iraqi.”)

\(^4\) Bauer, “In Search,” 144-45. He says: “Italians are completely satisfied with sorting their literature according to centuries” (ibid., 145). In dynastic terms (which is what Bauer prefers) our study would correspond to the late Այրաբ and early Մանլւկ period.


\(^6\) Ibid., 575-78.

\(^7\) *Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age: Selection of Texts Accompanied by a Preliminary Study*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, 192-93. This book was one of the first volumes in the series *Studies in Arabic Literature* (vol. 4), and it offered the English reader translations of an array of ‘classical’ (pre-Mamlûk) literary-critical works. Դիյա’ դի-նա was one of twelve theorists chosen for the collection.
poetic motifs (one that does not give preference to the temporal precedence of a motif); and his statistical approach to the evaluation of poets. The *lafẓ-*maʾnā pairing (form-content) together with the *shiʿr-*nathr pairing (poetry-prose) are the major topics discussed by Ṭāhir b. Ḥasan in his *Iyāʾ al-Dīn*.

In a survey of Arabic criticism in the “post-classical” era (i.e., ‘Abbāsid), William Smyth also assigns a rather prominent place for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. Smyth too situates Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn within a separate tradition, an “*adabī*” one. This is one out of five traditions in criticism that Smyth identifies between 1150 and 1850: applied criticism (= specific evaluations of poets), *adab* works (= [probably] anthologies on Arabic literary-linguistic *paideia*), *balāgha* (= scholastic rhetoric), *badīʿ* (= works concerned with rhetorical figures), and philosophical works (= works displaying Aristotelian influence). Smyth echoes Ṭāhir b. Ḥasan’s notion of the ‘poetic’ characteristic of the *adabī* works by claiming that the latter “focus on poetry, while *balāgha* works are more generally concerned with the semantics of language.” Smyth does not define what he means by *adab* works except that (1) they are at the heart of the critical tradition, and (2) they “provide the definition and discussion of most terms associated with poetry and Arabic style”.

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8 *Ṭārīkh*, 592-608.


10 Ibid., 394.

11 Ibid., 394-412. Two additional traditions are (1) commentaries on poetic illustrations (cited in famous critical works) or on whole poems, and (2) works on prosody. I say ‘minor’ because each is given a page-length description (ibid., 412-14).

12 Ibid., 394.

13 Ibid.
body of knowledge in the linguistic and literary field which comprises the genre of literature just mentioned [i.e., anecdotal and anthological literature meant to provide quotable material for the bel-esprit], but includes further ancillary disciplines like grammar etc."  

Smyth presents the main topics Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn deals with and elaborates specifically on the lafẓ-ma’nā issue and the shi’r-nathr issue (cf. ʿAbbās). More importantly, Smyth situates Ibn al-Athīr within the kuttāb (scribes) tradition of scholarly output. In addition, he introduces a scale that measures the authors’ interest in grammar in order to help classify “post-classical” works on criticism: Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn is located on a ‘higher’ end of this scale “since he places style firmly in a grammatical context.” (How precisely grammar figures into Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn’s work is not elaborated upon.)

Since Smyth is working within the paradigm of the “post-classical” framework, it is perhaps not surprising to find evaluations such as the following: “Ibn al-Athīr does not present very much on these topics that is new;” “Accordingly, Ibn al-Athīr does not create new topics or structure for critical discussion;” and so on. The language of stagnation seeps through in other modern works as well. According to Wolfhart Heinrichs, the works of Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn “show him as an independent mind who brings new life for a while to the already ossifying discipline of literary theory” (emphasis mine). In Geert Jan van Gelder’s words, “Ibn al-Athīr is one of the

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14 Wolfhart Heinrichs, “The Classification of the Sciences and the Consolidation of Philology in Classical Islam,” in Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A. MacDonald (eds.), *Centres of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995, 119-39, here: 120. It is not in fact clear how Smyth differentiates between the adab-strand and the all-badīʿ-strand; it seems that the only thing setting them apart is their form (the latter – essentially, a ‘list’). The works on single figures of speech or the badīʿiyya commentaries which Smyth includes as badīʿ (“Criticism,” 407) are, of course, more specialized.

15 Ibid., 401.

16 The harshest criticism of this approach (discernible throughout the volume in which Smyth’s survey appears) is Thomas Bauer’s review (2007).

17 (Both) Smyth, “Criticism,” 394. But then there is also this (ibid., 387): “The work of Ibn al-Athīr is perhaps the last greatest statement of critical sensibility in pre-modern Arabic literature.”

18 W.P. Heinrichs, “Ibn al-Athīr, Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn,” in Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of
last original authors in Arabic criticism, although his originality is not as great as he would have us believe […]” (emphasis mine). Describing Ǧīyāʾ al-Dīn as “last” in a line of original thinkers occurs elsewhere. Judging by Suzanne Stetkevych’s remarks in her seminal work on the ʿAbbāsid poet-anthologist Abū Tammām (d. 232/846), one could get the impression that no new major topic or method for critical discussion was set down after Ibn al-Muʿtazz (d. 296/908) and al-Ṣūlī (d. 335/946). By this logic, Arabic literary criticism ‘ended’ soon after it began! Obviously, then, using the quest for ‘new ideas/topics’ as an analytical modus operandi will not lead us very far. (The same would hold for researching, say, the history of modern linguistics.)

Scholars writing on literary theory in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries in Egypt and Syria have usually been described as lacking a “system” and being indifferent towards “theory.” This has been said with regards Ǧīyāʾ al-Dīn’s younger contemporary in Egypt, Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’ (d. 654/1256), whose presentation of his literary theory in the form of a list – his output is a listing of rhetorical figures – only enhances this impression. In a long line of thought stretching back to the period under examination, the scholarship of the likes of Ǧīyāʾ al-Dīn and

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21 Suzanne P. Stetkevych, Abū Tammām and the Poetics of the ʿAbbāsid Age, Leiden: Brill, 1991, 39 and 52 (respectively): “the major topics and prevailing method of the introductory section of the Akhḫār [= al-Ṣūlī’s work] set the pace which later critics were to follow, notably al-ʿĀmīḏī in the Muwāzanah and al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī in the Wasāṭah”; “At the outset it should be remarked that the selection of topics for critical treatment by al-ʿĀmīḏī, as well as the contents of the various sections, reflects the pervasive influence of the author’s predecessors, Ibn al-Muʿtazz and al-Ṣūlī.” Since Stetkevych goes on to analyze in depth both the works of al-ʿĀmīḏī and al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī, these statements should not be taken as a marker of her methodology. One should note that it is the work of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī in the fifth/eleventh century that is usually marked as the set-off point of ‘stagnation’ in Arabic literary theory (see, e.g., Shawqī ʿDayf, al-Naqḍ, [Cairo]: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1964, 96, 105).

Ibn Abī al-İṣba‘ is said to have formed a “Western” school of rhetoric, contrasted with the “Eastern” school of al-Abū Ya‘qūb Sakkākī (d. 626/1229), their contemporary in the Islamic East, which was more concerned with theory. (“West” here is west of Iran.) Already in the work of the historian-critic Ibn Khalđūn (d. 808/1406), a ‘Western’ school was differentiated by virtue of its occupation with badī‘ ‘literary devices’. Ibn Khalđūn distinguished between the Westerners (ahl al-maghāriba) and Easterners (ahl al-mashāriqa) by assigning the latter a more prominent interest in sharḥ ‘commentary’ and taʿlīm ‘scholasticism’ due to the deeper history of “civilization” (ʿumrān) in the Persian lands.23 Even earlier, the Egyptian Bahā‘ al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1372) assigned to the people of his land (ahl bilādinā; i.e., the Egyptian scholars) “sound [literary] taste and understanding” (al-dhawq al-salīm wal-fahm al-mustaqīm), whereas the Easterners (ahl bilād al-mashriq) were said to be taken by the rational sciences and logic.24 The idea of “sound taste” contrasting “[dry] scholasticism” (with a hint of Arabs-versus-Persians undertones) goes back to Diyā’ al-Dīn himself, in a prefatory passage on the virtues of his work. No mention of ‘East’ and ‘West’ is made, and since the contrast occurs in the form of apologetics, it points to a common topos of the time.25 Indeed, even the ultimate ‘scholasticist’

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25 Diyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, al-Mathal al-sāʿir fī adab al-kātib wa-l-shāʿir, 4 vols., Cairo: Maktabat Nahḍat Miṣr, 1959-196[5], 1: 38 (the passage is translated in Chapter 1), 2: 3-5 (another apologetic passage where it seems that he is making a claim against formal learning and for intuition alone when discussing the lack of relevance of Greek rhetoric and poetics to the study of “rhetorical themes (maʿānī),” but is in fact pointing instead to his own work which should be sufficient for the reader, wa-fī kitābī hādhā mā yughnīka wa-huwa kāfin). Some remarks that point to his preference for “Arabs” – at least in poetry – are treated in Part Two of the dissertation.
al-Sakkākī defers to the ultimate supremacy of *al-dhawq al-salīm.*

The East-West dichotomy persisted. Aḥmad Maṭlūb, in his 700-page study on al-Qazwīnī, devotes a brief subsection to the “two balāghī schools”: the “kalāmī” school in the East, made up of Iranian and Turkic scholars, and the “adabī” school in the Arab lands, namely Iraq, Syria and Egypt, one of the leading authorities of which is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (*aḥad aqṭāb hādhihi l-madrasa*). We find the same sentiment in Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām’s study of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, Ḥīfīn Muḥammad Sharaf’s study of Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’, and various prefaces to critical editions produced in the Arab world, a sentiment which later surfaces in the studies of Western scholars as well. If we recall, it was ʿAbbās’ very premise that Iraq, Syria and Egypt constituted an independent unit in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries. According to him, literary critics in Egypt and al-Shām (Greater Syria) eschewed, or even loathed any Greek notion of any field of knowledge, stating that this hostility may be some subconscious reaction to the crusades—an experience that those in the ‘East’ did not undergo.

Heinrichs reminds us, however, that Greek influence in Arabic literary theory was rare across the board, and the fact that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn even mentions ‘philosophizing’ literary notions is an


28 Here the divide is often termed ‘aqīlī/adabī rather than kalāmī/adabī. See Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn *Ibn al-Athīr wa-juhūduhū fi l-naqd wa-l-balāgha,* Alexandria: Munshaʿat al-Maʿārif, [1982? Originally published 1958], 312-53, esp. 324-29 (though he sometimes offers a more nuanced presentation than his remarks on p. 312 suggest); Ḥīfīn Muḥammad Sharaf, *Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ al-miṣrī bayna ʿulamāʾ al-balāgha,* [Cairo]: Maktabat Nahḍat Miṣr, [1961?], 364-83, esp. 372 (he then situates Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ within a more specific ‘Egyptian’ school, said to merge the two ‘tendencies’ and to serve as a model for the modern critic); Smyth, “Criticism,” 414-15 (with qualifications, see below); van Gelder, “ʿIbn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ.” As for the ‘obsession’ with *badīʿ,* Sallām draws a structural connection between the rhetorical embellishments and the visual artistic phenomenon of the arabesque ‘embellishments’, which flourished in the Ayyūbid court (*Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn,* 19-20).

29 ʿAbbās, *Ṭārīkh,* 575-56.
idiosyncrasy. Sallām would take this claim even further (see below).

Although explicit engagement with the Arabic commentaries on Aristotle’s *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* was rare in the works of Arabic literary theory ‘proper’ (those written in the Maghrib excluded), the so-called “aversion to (Greek) philosophy” in the Arabic East in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries is part of a more complex story. It is true that anti-philosophizing sentiment in ‘religious’ disciplines can be discerned during this period, but such sentiments were not limited to the Arabic-speaking lands. In fact, the influence of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) and falsafa in general only increased in the Arabic East during this time, as attested by a first-hand account of the prominent theologian and legal scholar living in Greater Syria and Egypt, Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233). According to him, “[t]he fascination of the people of our time and the scholars of our age in studying the sciences of the ancients and borrowing from old philosophers has increased, such that it led them away from studying [l]egal matters and religious issues,” to the point that one of them may “imagin[e] that he is one of the firmly-grounded philosophers [...] and fooled by the bombastic words and strange-sounding names that he hears, such as ‘hyle’, ‘element’ (*ūṣūqus*), ‘element’ (*ʿunṣur*), ‘matter’, ‘form’, ‘First Cause’, ‘Active Intellect’, Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Proclus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, etc.! The utmost of the most erudite among them is to have superficial knowledge of the words, instead of [knowing their] meanings.”

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31 For examples of theologians in the Islamic East rejecting the ‘philosophizing’ physics and metaphysics of Ibn Sīnā see Ayman Shihadeh, “From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī: 6th/12th Century Developments in Muslim Philosophical Theology,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), 141-79, esp. 151-56. Shihadeh refers to such scholars as “Ghazālian mutakallim[ūn]” (ibid., 161), because they followed the anti-falsafa approach of al-Ghazālī.

32 Ibid., 148. Shihadeh is quoting from al-Āmidī’s unpublished *Daqāʾ iq al-ḥaqāʾ iq*. I gather from the account above
describes an environment in which it was meaningful for scholars to portray themselves as being conversant with falsafa, even if by pretense. This, in turn, fueled some resentment against the ‘ancient’ sciences, but the resentment can only be understood in light of the increase in the prevalence of philosophical studies in this time and place. Given this environment, it is not surprising that someone like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, who probably knew al-Āmidī personally, would dabble – however superficially – in a work of philosophical poetics like that of Ibn Sīnā.

Smyth offers some qualifications for the East-West narrative, but for him they concern the ‘West’ alone, and only partially. He points to the variety of works produced in Syria and North Africa beyond the tradition of “badīʾ,” from the Hellenistic-inspired literary theory of the North African al-Qarṭājannī (d. 639/1242), to the Sakkākian-inspired work of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (a Syrian, d. 739/1338), to the study of ‘non-standard’ verse by Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. 750/1349). By Smyth’s account, however, someone like Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʾ would still fit the paradigm of the ‘West’ – even though, as we shall see, he is at times a close follower of Fakhr al-

that this state of affairs was common in oral exchanges (i.e., involving scholars he came into contact with), not just written ones. Shihadeh’s protagonists are otherwise from the eastern Islamic world (Bukhara, Samarqand, etc.).

33 This is nicely illustrated in the entry on the esteemed Shāfiʿī legal theorist and genius in philosophy and mathematics, Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn Yūnus (d. 639/1242, based in Mosul), in Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās, 8 vols., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977, 5: 311-18 (English: ‘Obituaries of Eminent Men and Reports of Contemporaries’). The Syrian/Iraqi Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) and his peers exceedingly admired Kamāl al-Dīn, to the point that Ibn Khallikān had to state that he was not engaging in mughālāt ‘exaggeration’ (ibid. 5: 314): Ḥanafīs flocked to study Ḥanafī law with him even though he was a Shāfiʿī; he taught Jews and Christians their own Scriptures; he was the only one who could understand the nomenclature of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī when the latter’s books first arrived in Mosul; he was the type of scholar that one did not ask who he had studied with and who his teachers were, fa-innahu akbar min dhālika (ibid.). And yet, several scholars in Ibn Khallikān’s vicinity doubted Kamāl al-Dīn’s religious commitment, and one can certainly detect that there was some resentment to logic and other rational sciences (ibid. 5: 313-14, 316-17).

34 We find his autograph on what was probably a very early work by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn; see fn. 508.

35 On Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s engagement with Ibn Sīnā see fn. 40 and §5.1, “Tawassuʾ (and the Influence of Ibn Sīnā).”

36 Smyth, “Criticism,” 415. With regards to the ‘East’, he says (ibid.): “Ibn Khaldūn’s characterization of the eastern part of the Islamic world is fairly accurate since the main authors in the balāgha tradition (i.e. al-Rāzī, al-Sakkākī and al-Taftazānī [sic]) all lived in central Asia.” Al-Qazwīnī, despite his name, is a Syrian and an Arab.
Dīn al-Rāzī (an ‘Easterner’, d. 606/1209) – and someone like the ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Zanjānī (active 660/1262) would fit the paradigm of the ‘East’ – even though, as we shall see, his adherence to al-Sakkākī is at times marginal in light of the more prominent interest he had in poetry and badī‘. Similarly, Sallām would have us treat the Syrian Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651/1253) along the lines of the ‘East’ – even though, as we shall see, he is at times better understood in light of views espoused by ḫiyā‘ al-Dīn in the ‘West’ than views espoused by al-Rāzī and al-Sakkākī in the ‘East’.

The underlying assumption enabling the discourse of an East-West dichotomy in Arabic literary theory has to do with the legacy of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081). Considered the greatest mind in Arabic literary-linguistic thinking, al-Jurjānī inspired the so-called theory-based method in the East, and thus anyone who did not follow his lead the way al-Sakkākī did had been commonly viewed as being ‘inconsistent’ at best, or ‘incorrect’ at worst. We often come across comments according to which the non-Sakkākian scholars are “wrong” or that they “confuse categories” (this is especially apparent in research coming out of the Arab world). And yet the tendency to take the Sakkākian views as a yardstick for ‘correctness’ has often been coupled with hailing the non-‘Eastern’ scholar (especially ḫiyā‘ al-Dīn) as having a ‘holistic’, ‘true’ approach to criticism. The tension – if not paradox – reaches a height with

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37 Sallām, ḫiyā‘ al-Dīn, 320-22. He also treats the Syrian al-Tanūkhī (fl. end of 7th/13th cent.) along the ‘eastern’ lines, not mentioning the fact that much of his work is a listing of badī‘.


39 Of the numerous examples we may cite Sallām, ḫiyā‘ al-Dīn, 199, 316, 377, 379; al-Shaykh, Dirāsāt, 17, 152-53, 156, 167, 271-72; and (though less apparent) Mūhammad Ṣūfīyya, al-Mabāḥith al-bayāniyya bayna Ibn al-Athīr wa-l-ʿAlawī, Tripoli, Libya: al-Munshaʿa al-ʿĀmma, 1984, 189-90. Sallām seems to be critical of the Ayyūbid period in general, making statements that echo similar attitudes towards the period of inḥittāt ‘decline’ after the high Ṣabbāṣid era.
Sallām, who on the one hand extols Diyā’ al-Dīn’s ‘Arabness’ in the field of criticism, but on the other hand identifies his most substantial achievements with notions associated with Greek thinking: mimesis (muḥākāt) and image-evocation (takhyīl)\(^\text{40}\). The fact of the matter remains that Diyā’ al-Dīn and others in his time and locale were lumped together in the category of “sixth/twelfth-seventh/thirteenth century Iraq-Syria-Egypt” (cf. ‘Abbās) simply based on what they were not—followers of al-Jurjānī—and not on what they were. This dissertation explores what they were.\(^\text{41}\)

Once we move away from anachronistic assumptions and take a serious look at the literary-theoretical works themselves, we find that grouping those works written in the Arabic East in the sixth/twelfth century together with the ones written in the seventh/thirteenth century

\(^{40}\) Sallām, *Diyā’ al-Dīn*, 178-83, 250-51, 384-85, 387. The first is, in Diyā’ al-Dīn’s words, ḥikāya or ḥikāyat al-ḥāl ‘imitation of a [real-life] situation’, and Sallām identifies it (although using the term muḥākāt) as a unique idea in ‘native’ Arabic literary theory (not knowing it is based on a brief account by Abū Hilāl al-‘Askari? See §4.1, fn. 517). Sallām does not think that Diyā’ al-Dīn was directly drawing on Aristotelian poetics here but rather that it was an outcome of some general awareness to some general Greek notions (ibid., 250). Sallām’s treatment of Diyā’ al-Dīn’s occasional comments on takhyīl somewhat anticipates Lara Harb’s *Poetic Marvels: Wonder and Aesthetic Experience in Medieval Arabic Literary Theory*, unpublished PhD dissertation, New York University, 2013. In the case of takhyīl, Diyā’ al-Dīn was usually drawing on al-Jurjānī (see §5.1). As we shall see, philosophical poetics and ‘native’ literary criticism sometimes reached similar results (cf. Harb’s findings on ‘wonder’). In general, with regards to the question of Greek influence, I follow the ‘doctrine’ of the so-called voie diffuse, which stipulates lines of influence via contact with scholars rather than direct textual engagement, or the voie érudite (adjusting Versteegh’s use to the later period, see C.H.M [Kees] Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking*, Studies in Semitic Languages and Linguistics, vol. 7. Leiden: Brill, 1977, 9, 178; this view is implicitly endorsed by Robert C. McKinney in *The Case of Rhyme versus Reason: Ibn al-Rūmī and his Poetics in Context*, Brill Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures, vol. 28, Leiden: Brill, 2004, 125-27). Such direct-but-indirect contact would be especially true for someone as famous and well-connected as Diyā’ al-Dīn. In the case of Ibn Sinā’s work, we have a near case of voie érudite since Diyā’ al-Dīn tells us explicitly that some mutafalsif made a comment to him about Ibn Sinā’s poetics and rhetoric and “a type of Greek poetry” (probably tragedy) and then got up and showed him the relevant passages from the Shīfā’. Diyā’ al-Dīn then remarks, in his comical-critical way, that once he saw it he found Ibn Sinā (or the book, per Cantarino) to be ignorant ([... wa-qāma [ba’d al-mutafalsifin] fa-aḥḍara Kitāba l-Shīfāʾi li-Abī Ṭaliyyin wa-waqqafanīʿalā mā dhakarahu fa-lammā waqaffu alayhi -stajhaltuhu; al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 5-6; Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 110; Cantarino, *Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age*, 193). Surely something of it must have stuck in Diyā’ al-Dīn’s mind! In any case, this is not the voie érudite that we find with al-Qartājānī, who cited Ibn Sinā verbatim (Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 155 fn. 1).

\(^{41}\) There are two dissertations on Diyā’ al-Dīn written in the UK in the late ‘70s and ‘80s which I have been unable to access. The first is by Muhammad ‘Abd ar-Rahmān al-Hadlāc: *Diyāʿ-ad-Dīn* [sic] *Ibn al-Athīr and His Contribution to the Science of Rhetoric*, University of Edinburgh, 1978. The second is by A.K.A.A. El-Salem (Abdul Karim El-Salem): *Rhetoric in al-Mathal al-Sāʾir: Ibn al-Athīr’s Contribution to `Iml al-Balāgha*, University of Cambridge, 1985. The latter is cited in Adrian Gully, *The Culture of Letter-Writing in Pre-Modern Islamic Society*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008, 139, 161, but otherwise I have not found any reference to them.
simply does not hold. This dissertation argues, rather, that starting in the seventh/thirteenth century scholars of literary theory increasingly viewed their efforts as part of a field of inquiry termed ‘ilm al-bayān, to a degree of disciplinary coherence that had not previously been seen. ‘Ilm al-bayān referred to the science of good style, or the science of eloquence, and was held as a rational science bound by rational rules. Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn is the first scholar that we know of to speak of the field in these terms. Unlike the later ‘ilm al-balāgha, the discipline of ‘ilm al-bayān was not a systemization of al-Jurjānī’s work, not because al-Jurjānī was unknown in the Arabic East during this time -- in fact, the name ‘ilm al-bayān probably derives from him -- but because scholars were not necessarily swept away by his ideas. This stands in opposition to modern, or even later medieval perceptions about the influence that al-Jurjānī or his redactors had on scholars who read him. The scope of study of ‘ilm al-bayān corresponded to the contents that one customarily comes across in the early writings on literary theory (that is, from the high ‘Abbāsid era). The innovation of ‘ilm al-bayān starting in the 1200s in the Arabic East was, rather, one of terminology and one of conception. On the level of terminology, this was the first time literary-theoretical scholars began using – increasingly and consistently – an agreed-upon heading for their scholarly affiliation. This heading was in turn back-projected to earlier works on literary theory that were seen as a canon in the field. On the level of conception, this was the first time scholars displayed increasing awareness, both within the field and outside of it, of the disciplinary coherence of ‘ilm al-bayān, and more specifically, of its scientific nature.

The disciplinary coherence of the newly formed ‘ilm al-bayān is examined in Part One of the dissertation. The purpose of Part One is to establish the historical fact of its emergence and consolidation as a cohesive field of inquiry in the Arabic East starting in the 1200s. For this purpose we look at the way Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn himself envisaged the field and its canon (Chapter 1), at
several works on the classification of the sciences as well as works on literary theory written in the century or so after Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn (Chapter 2), and we also take an aside to discuss early uses of bayān and ʿilm al-bayān prior to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn (Chapter 3). One of the main features of ʿilm al-bayān was its claim to being a theoretical science with a practical application, namely, the ability to compose (taʾlīf) verse and epistolary prose.42 The concern with the practical aspect of literary composition might undermine the declared theoretical underpinning of the discipline: strictly speaking, theory is the very negation of practice (Aristotle’s praxis). But for many of the authors we shall look at, the application of theoretical knowledge was inseparable from theory itself.

Even when we find attempts to distinguish between the two, like in the work of Ibn Khaldūn, vestiges of the theory-cum-practice approach are discernible (e.g., via the discussion of dhawq).

In Part Two we delve into some of the works on ʿilm al-bayān and their authors (Chapter 4), and hone in on one literary-theoretic topic – majāz ‘figurative43 language’ – to see how

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42 Literary composition as a topic of interest may be found in most of the earlier writings on literary theory, but without the claim to scientificity.

43 Using the English term “figurative” is not without problems. For one thing, it might give the impression that we are dealing only with visual images, figures and forms, to the exclusion of more ‘mental’ images: this is not my intention. Rather, I find that “figurative language” – more than, say, “tropical language” (a term that does denote non-visual images) – is the most common term in English that is contrasted with “literal language.” Moreover, “trope” in its wide sense implies a device like simile (Chris Baldick, “Trope,” The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, 4th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), and simile was not necessarily seen as majāz: in the later Arabic rhetorical tradition it was necessarily excluded from majāz. Trope in its narrow sense – “us[ing] a word or phrase in a sense other than what is proper to it” (from the Greek “turn”; T. Bahti and J.C. Mann, “Trope,” in Roland Greene et al. [eds.], The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 4th ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, 1463-64) – is not compatible with the notion of majāz that does include tashbīḥ. The other point to be made is that in contemporary scholarship we find devices like irony and rhetorical questions being treated as a form of “figurative” speech (e.g., Robert J. Fogelin, Figuratively Speaking, 2nd ed. revised, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 1-26), even though such cases would not count as majāz in the classical Arabic sources (close terms for irony are al-jidd yurād bih al-hazl or tahakkum). John Searle gives a more accurate picture when he juxtaposes literal utterances with (i) metaphorical utterances, (ii) ironical utterances, and (iii) indirect speech acts (also known as implicatures) (John R. Searle, “Metaphor,” in Patrick Hanks and Rachel Giora [eds.], Metaphor and Figurative Language, 6 vols., London: Routledge, 2012, 109-39, here: 118-19 [originally in Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 76-116]). According to this scheme, majāz would correspond to metaphorical language, but because classical Arabic sources identify the device ‘metaphor’ as one subtype of ‘metaphorical language’, the latter term has usually been avoided in modern scholarship (Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Metaphorologie-Traditionen im Klassischen Arabisch,” in S. Leder with H. Kilpatrick, B. Martel-Thoumian, H. Schönig [eds.], Studies in Arabic and Islam: Proceedings of the 19th Congress, Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, Halle 1998, Leuven, Belgium: U. Peeters, 2002,
disciplinary coherence plays out in thematic terms (Chapter 5). Majāz is a useful test-case for examining thematic coherence in ‘ilm al-bayān because we have a fair amount of knowledge about the early development of the concept as well as its eventual, supposedly ‘correct’ expression in the Sakkākian-inspired ‘ilm al-balāgha: pinpointing adherence to versus divergence from the Sakkākian model is, therefore, tenable.

But the significance of focusing on majāz goes beyond the historical question of ‘ilm al-bayān, for in many ways – to paraphrase %Dīn – it is at the heart of the literary-theoretical endeavor. Majāz is a key concept not only in classical Arabic literary theory, but also in legal theory, theology, lexicography and Sufi thought, and has attracted increasing attention in recent years, to the point that it has been identified as a major component in the “meaning” of Islam itself. Most of the focus has been on Islamic legal theory, a field of study that contains a lengthy prolegomenon on philosophical-linguistic matters, including the question of figurative language. Here scholars concentrated especially on the juristic understanding of the difference between what a text ‘says’ and what it ‘means’, and the resulting contribution of their research has been more to the question of lafẓ versus ma’nā (here: ‘plain wording’ versus

217-26, here: 217; cf. Shahab Ahmed below). Given sufficient clarifications (especially with regards to metonymy and simile), one would probably be justified in translating majāz as ‘metaphorical language’, but for our present study, the common “figurative language/speech” will do (see also W. Martin, “Metaphor,” The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 863-70, esp. 863: “Any attempt to define metaphor positively […] will inevitably apply to other tropes. Some critics accept this consequence and call all tropes metaphors.”).

44 Referring to a preliminary chapter on ḥaqīqa and majāz, he states (al-Mathal al-sā’ir 1: 105): “This section is a great important matter among the important matters of ‘ilm al-bayān; nay, it is ‘ilm al-bayān in its entirety” (wa-hādhā l-faṣil muhimmun kabīrun min muhimmāti ‘ilmī l-bayāni lā bal huwa ‘ilmu l-bayāni bi-ajma’īhi). See also von Grunebaum’s assessment in the opening of Chapter 1. %Dīn makes similar statements on the importance of other literary devices, and while this one seems more emphatic, I would not conclude that majāz is the most important topic in the field (see below).

Shahab Ahmed, *What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016, 386-97. Ahmed uses the less technical “metaphor,” which in English (and already ancient Greek?) can be a non-technical way of referring to figurative language in general. From his discussion and examples it is clear that he has the Arabic (or “Islamic”) term majāz in mind (e.g., p. 395, 396 fn. 195).
‘intended meaning’) than to the question of figurative language.\(^{46}\) This is attested, first and foremost, by the fact that *majāz* is rarely translated in these studies as ‘figurative language’.\(^{47}\) The reluctance to translate *majāz* as ‘figurative language’ has crossed over to studies on Arabic literary theory as well, the underlying reason being that we still do not quite know what *majāz* meant for the literary theorists.\(^{48}\) Our case study in Chapter 5 is meant to fill some of that void.

This dissertation makes no claim to treat every author writing on literary-theoretical matters in the Arabic East during the seventh/thirteenth century. We know, for instance, that some authors did not adhere to the new framework of *ʿilm al-bayān*, like al-Muẓaffar al-Ḥusaynī (d. 656/1258) and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 655 or 6/1257 or 8); both were Baghdadi scholars, and perhaps the prevalence of *ʿilm al-bayān* did not reach Baghdad in the mid-1200s.\(^{49}\) Furthermore,

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\(^{47}\) Vishanoff has “transgressive usage” (*Formation*, e.g., 21). Gleave, who in the index has “non-literal, diverted usage” (*IslamandLiteralism*, 211) and admits that “non-literal” as a translation is “uninformative” (p. 36), often leaves the term untranslated, but also speaks of “non-literal meaning” (emphasis mine; p. 10 fn. 20), which causes some confusion because *majāz* in the medieval sources commonly describes the expression itself (“X is majaz”; Gleave recognizes this point with regards to ḥaqīqa, p. 37). Ali is the only one who does not shy from “figurative use” (*MedievalIslamicPragmatics*, e.g., 73), but he provides many other nuances depending on the scholar he treats, thus also creating the impression that in legal theory majāz did not necessarily mean figurative language.

\(^{48}\) The two most recent examples are Key, *LinguisticFrameofMind*, who usually opts for “non-literal [language/expression]” (e.g., p. 26, 180), and Harb, *PoeticMarvels*, who uses “figurative language/speech” but often precedes it with a cautious “roughly” or “more or less corresponds to,” especially in the context of al-Jurjānī (e.g., p. 81, 87, 149, and esp. 201 fn. 645). This latter point accentuates the fact that scholars still do not quite know what al-Jurjānī meant by majaz, and we will attend to this question in Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

\(^{49}\) For Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd see Chapter 1 (§1.2). He approached the study of literary theory from the aspect of kitāba ‘scribal education’ (he was primarily a legal scholar). For al-Ḥusaynī, the field of study was poetry (shi‘r, qarīd). See al-Muẓaffar b. al-Faḍl al-ʿAlāwī (al-Ḥusaynī), *Naḍrat al-ihqrād fī nuṣrat al-qarīd*, ed. Nuhū ʿĀrif al-Ḥasan, Damascus: Majma’ al-Luḥa al-ʿArabiyya, 1976 (English: ‘TheBeautyofthePalmTreeSpadix:OntheTriumphofPoetry’). The Baghdadi al-Ṭūfī, whom we treat in Part Two, lived half a century later, which may explain his awareness of and adherence to *ʿilm al-bayān*.
in order to strengthen our findings, one would have to look for references to literary theory or the literary scholars in adjacent fields, like legal theory and grammar, as well as the biographical dictionaries, to see whether they coincide with ʿilm al-bayān and ʿulamāʾ al-bayān in the sense that we find them being used in literary theory proper and in works on the classification of the sciences. This falls outside the scope of our study and should be taken up in future research. 50

Likewise, in our discussion of majāz our purpose is to highlight its most distinctive features within the domain of literary theory, and at times this leads to a disproportionate treatment of one scholar over the other, or of one issue within majāz over the other. The number of pages we devote to any given scholar or topic does not necessarily reflect the prominence of that scholar or topic vis-à-vis the others, or the prominence that the scholar gave to that specific discussion; it reflects, rather, the usefulness of that specific discussion to our understanding of majāz. Indeed, our study might give the impression that majāz was the most important topic of discussion for the literary theorists: it was not (despite Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s comment above). Future research on the intricacies of other notions that were of paramount interest to literary theorists might show why some – like conciseness and prolixity (iğāz wa-iṭṭān) – would later find a prominent place in the Sakkākian tradition, while others – like paronomasia (tajnīs) – would not. 51

50 We cite one legal scholar, Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392), in §2.3. Ibn Khallikān speaks of ʿilm al-bayān as a discipline that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn studied during his early education (see §4.1), and the phrase seems to be recognized as a discipline heading outside the context of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. For but one example see Ibn Khallikān’s entry on Jaʿfar al-Barmakī (d. 187/803), where he cites ahl al-bayān – i.e., the scholars of ʿilm al-bayān – in reference to the literary device called “almond finger stuffing” (ḥashw al-lawzīnaj), a poetic practice in which a word or phrase is used as “padding” to fit the meter (Wafayāt 1: 330).

51 And here a distinction should be drawn between al-Sakkākī and al-Qazwīnī, because al-Qazwīnī later incorporated strictly ‘poetic’ topics like thematic transitions (takhallus) and literary influence (sariqāt), while the earlier al-Sakkākī did not. ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī actually treats tajnīs in the opening of his Asrār al-balāgha, and it was certainly of interest to Qurʾānic scholars (see, for instance, the discussion within baḍāʾiʿ al-Qurʾān “good Qurʾānic rhetorical figures” in the later Ahmad b. Muṣṭafā Ṭashkhoṣūzādā, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fi mawdūʿ at’al-ulūm, eds. Kāmil Bakrī and ‘Abd al-Wahhāb Abū al-Nūr, 3 vols., [Cairo]: Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadīthah, [1968], 2: 502-503 [English: ‘The Key for Happiness and the Light [leading to] Mastery: On the Subject-Matters of the Sciences’]). Another topic of interest might be change in word order (taqdim wa-taʾkhīr), an important issue within the Sakkākian tradition: Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn treats it at some length, but earlier literary theorists outside philology
Methodologically I follow Wolfhart Heinrichs and Dmitry Frolov in differentiating medieval scholars’ theoretical pronouncements from the shawāhid ‘illustrative examples’ they adduce, as an alternative or independent avenue to make an assessment of their views. Frolov remarks,

[P]oetic citations constitute the main bulk of any philological text, be it metrical or not (see, for instance, Kitāb al-badīʿ by Ibn al-Muʿtazz). Scarcity of verbal definitions and descriptions and abundance of poetic illustrations account for the importance of shawāhid as an alternative way of explicating a rule or a phenomenon. This means that nothing is accidental in the set of these illustrations.52

Heinrichs elaborates,

In this [majāz in Abū ʿUbayda] as in many other cases in literary theory and related fields it is important to keep the author’s theoretical pronouncements or hints at such apart from his shawāhid material as two independent avenues to an understanding of his ideas, the reason being that, especially in the early days of literary and hermeneutical studies, an author may have a correct feeling of phenomena belonging together without being able to express this feeling in adequate terminology.53

Adjusting this to the seventh/thirteenth century, when adequate terminology usually did exist, we can say that the theoretical portions of the text were often an expression of commonly held opinions by earlier scholars – what we may call ‘academic convention’ – to which the scholar at hand did not give much thought and, perhaps, did not necessarily

and Qur’ānic stylistics typically do not. Ḩanāb is used in a positive sense: knowing when it is meaningful to use more words ‘than necessary’.


53 Wolfhart Heinrichs, “On the Genesis of the haqīqa-majāz Dichotomy,” Studia Islamica 59 (1984), 111-40, here: 118 fn. 2. For an application of this method in another classical Arabic field, citing Heinrichs, see Almog Kasher, The Žarf in Medieval Arabic Grammatical Theory, PhD Dissertation, Bar Ilan University, 2006, 10 [in Hebrew]. Of course, the method can be applied when we have no theoretical pronouncements at all (or hardly at all) as we see, e.g., in van Gelder’s analysis of shawāhid patterning to make a case for the critics’ conception of ‘thematic unity’ (Beyond the Line, 196-98, 202-203), or in Hamori’s analysis of commentarial remarks on poetic and Qur’ānic verses to make a case for the scholars’ conception of links between textual units (Andras Hamori, “Some Schemes of Reading in al-Marzūqī, al-Iskāfī and Faḥr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,” in Sasson Somekh [ed.], Studies in Medieval Arabic and Hebrew Poetics [= Israel Oriental Studies 11], Leiden: Brill, 1991, 13-20).
endorse. Of course, theoretical pronouncements remain a necessary component of our analysis, but they must be verified against the *shawāhid* and ensuing commentary and against the categorization scheme of the work.
Part One: The Emergence of 'Ilm al-Bayān

Introduction

In his concise article on the notion of bayān lit. ‘clarity’ in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, G.E. von Grunebaum makes the following statement after discussing the development of the notion until the fifth/eleventh century:

> When Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1234) writes *al-Mathal al-Sā’ir fī Adab al-Kātib wa ‘l-Shā’ir* thinking on bayān has taken a new turn. To what extent it was Ibn al-Athīr himself who was responsible for this change we have no means of deciding. Ibn al-Athīr places [...] the ‘ilm al-bayān in the same relation to the composition of both poetry and prose as the science of the usūl al-fīkh [legal theory] to the individual judicial statutes or decisions, aḥkām.  

Von Grunebaum goes on to give a brief summary of the *Mathal*’s structure and contents, and adds:

> The heartpiece of the ‘ilm al-bayān is to Ibn al-Athīr the doctrine of ḥākīka and madjāz, the proper and the transferred use of words [...]  

Part One of the dissertation may be seen as an enlargement of von Grunebaum’s treatment of bayān, not so much in isolation, but rather in conjunction with ‘ilm: that is, ‘ilm al-bayān ‘the science of clarity’, or: ‘the science of clear expression’. We will investigate “[t]o what extent it was Ibn al-Athīr himself who was responsible for this change” in elevating the science to a highly theoretical one. We will also examine, perhaps more importantly, to what extent his attempts were successful in influencing later authors. (They were.) This part will show that ‘ilm

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55 Ibid.
al-bayān became a recognized field of inquiry at the turn of the seventh/thirteenth century and remained so until the fourteenth century (ca. 1200-1400), only to be trumped by the better-known and very different tradition of 'ilm al-balāgha ‘science of eloquence’, that is: standard rhetoric.

Part One is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 1 we will look closely into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr’s portrayal of ‘ilm al-bayān in his primary literary-critical works, al-Mathal al-sāʾir fī adab al-kātib wa-l-shāʾir (‘The Talk of the Town [lit. The Current Saying]: On the Knowhow of the Scribe and the Poet’) and his earlier-written ‘forerunner’, al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ṣināʿat al-manẓūm min al-kalām wa-l-manthūr (‘The Large Compilation: On the Craft of Versified and Unversified Speech’). We will compare the status Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn assigns to ‘ilm al-bayān with the status assigned, especially by al-Ghazālī, to other sciences regarded as highly theoretical, viz. logic and legal theory. We will also examine Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s attempts to form a canon of ‘ilm al-bayān. In Chapter 2 vestiges of this ‘ilm al-bayān in later sources will be examined. A case will be made for the consolidated notion of a literary-theoretical discipline, a development which did not characterize earlier literary-critical works (which I refer to as the early naqd works). Later works to be investigated include literary-critical and non-literary-critical works, primarily those dealing with the classification of the sciences. In Chapter 3 we will attend to notions of bayān prior to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, both as a larger notion of ‘expression’ and as a narrower notion related to eloquence studies.

If at all modern researchers attended to the phrase ‘ilm al-bayān they portrayed it as a synonym of the standard ‘ilm al-balāgha (Arthur Schaade, Ramzi Baalbaki, Joseph Lowry, Pierre Larcher).56 Others have recognized that ‘ilm al-bayān may denote literary theory as a

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56 A. Schaade, “Bayān,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, first edition: “‘Ilm al-bayān is often used synonymously with ‘Ilm al-Balāgha […] although strictly it only denotes a subsection of it.” See also §2.1 and the introduction to §2.3,
whole, including its early permutations; implicitly it is seen as one out of several common
designations for the field (von Grunebaum, Badawi Ṭabānā, Shawqi Ḍayf).

Of course, as a
subfield, 'ilm al-bayān has long been recognized to denote the study of imagery in the later 'ilm
al-balāgha (see Chapter 2). As of yet, however, the emergence of a science called 'ilm bayān in
the seventh/thirteenth century and its identification as a new generic development has gone in the
below. Baalbaki implicitly identifies “the discipline of bayān” more specifically with 'ilm maʿāni, the first
subsection of the standard 'ilm al-balāgha. But he also speaks of the discipline in more general terms and of a group
called “bayāniyya” as if they were in existence during the time Dīyāʾ al-Dīn. See Ramzi Baalbaki, “A 7th-8th
H. Century Controversy: Ibn al-Athir on Nahw and Bayān,” in Andrei A. Avram, Anca Foșcăneanu and George
esp. 86, 94-95, 97, 102-3. Ironically, he does recognize Dīyāʾ al-Dīn’s “conviction that the discipline which
examines ḥ*Mathāna a balāgha (i.e. bayān) is distinct from other disciplines” (p. 97, parentheses his), but he
interprets this as a break from the science of grammar rather than a new development within the Arabic literary-
critical tradition (naqd), a development that has nothing to do with grammar. (Notably, Baalbaki is a scholar of the
Arabic grammatical tradition.) Lowry, a scholar of Islamic legal theory, remarks enigmatically that “by the time we
are in a world of full-fledged books on *ṭusul al-fiqh [the books he treats range from the fourth/tenth to the
eighth/fourteenth centuries], the science of Arabic rhetoric, which has become highly evolved, comes to be denoted
as balāga, possibly ḥ*Māna a, but sometimes also as 'ilm al-bayān [...]”; see Lowry, “Preliminary Observations,” 510.

Apparently Lowry is referring to the standard 'ilm al-balāgha (“highly evolved”) rather than the early naqd works.
Pierre Larcher mentions Dīyāʾ al-Dīn’s use of ‘ilm al-bayān as referring to “the entirety” of rhetoric, but he presents
the contents of this discipline as if they are coextensive with those of al-Qazwīnî’s rhetoric. See Pierre Larcher,
“Arabic Linguistic Tradition II: Pragmatics,” in Jonathan Owens (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Arabic Linguistics,

57 Von Grunebaum states (“Bayān,” closing paragraph) with regards to a work wrongly attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) that the latter “still uses 'ilm al-bayān for rhetoric [literary theory] as a whole.” Ṭabānā also
sees ṣāhīna bayān in a reference to the study of the literary art in general (dirāsa al-fann al-adabî) and acknowledges that
it was sometimes called bādi`, ḥ*Māna a or balāgha; see Badawi Ṭabānā, al-Bayān al- arabî: dirāsa fī ṣāhīna al-
balāghihya 'inda al- arab wa-manāhijihā wa-maṣāḥihā al-kubrā, 6th ed., Cairo: Maktabat al-Anjilî al-
Miṣriyya, 1976, 15, 18 (English: ‘Arabic Rhetoric: A Study in the Development of the Arabs’ Rhetorical Thinking
and its Greater Methods and Sources’). See also Gully, Culture of Letter-Writing, 30, where Dīyāʾ al-Dīn’s 'ilm al-
bayān is glossed as “literary criticism in its broadest sense,” and George Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism in
Classical Islam and the Christian West, With Special Reference to Scholasticism, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1990, 141, 144, where 'ilm al-bayān is said to designate “rhetoric.” Ṭabānā is the only modern scholar to
author a book solely from the perspective of 'ilm al-bayān, beginning with the early meanings of bayān in the
third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries and ending with the tenets of the standard subfield within 'ilm al-balāgha. This
is his 'Ilm al-bayān: dirāsa tārkîhiyya fanniyya fī *ṭusul al-balāgha al-arabîyya, [Cairo]: Maktabat al-Anjilî al-
Ṭabānā too fails to recognize a new disciplinary development with the efforts of Dīyāʾ al-Dīn (he identifies the
latter’s 'ilm al-bayān with the epistolary art; p. 18). The only scholar to notice that later seventh/thirteenth century
writers who used the term 'ilm bayān to refer to “rhetorical studies” in general (maḥbîhih al-balāgha) were actually
following Dīyāʾ al-Dīn is Shawqi Ḍayf. This is mentioned in passing in his al-Balāgha: ṣāhīna wa-târkîh, Cairo:
Dâr al-Maʿārif, 1965, 317, 324 (English: ‘Rhetoric: Development and History’). It does not help that bayān in
Modern Standard Arabic simply means ‘rhetoric’ and is synonymous with balāgha (see fn. 229). We thus find many
uses of the word bayān in modern titles that refer simply to literary theory or ‘rhetoric’ in general (like Ṭabānā’s al-
Bayān al- arabî).
scholarship unnoticed. This is partly due to the fact that many medieval scholars themselves were oblivious to the matter.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{58} The clearest example is al-Šafaḍī (d. 764/1363) in his \textit{Nīṣrat al-thāʾir}, a ‘refutation’ of Diyā’ al-Dīn’s \textit{al-Mathal al-sāʾir}. At one point al-Šafaḍī notes that he does not know what Diyā’ al-Dīn meant by \textit{bayān}: for al-Šafaḍī it referred either to the sub-\textit{ilm al-bayān} or to \textit{ilm al-maʿānī} – both subfields of the standard \textit{ilm al-balāğha}. See Šalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybak al-Šafaḍī, \textit{Nīṣrat al-thāʾir ʿalā al-mathal al-sāʾir}, ed. Muḥammad ‘Alī Sulṭānī, Damascus: [Maṭbaʿat Khālid al-Ṭarābīshī, 1972], 78-82 (English: ‘Support of the Rebel against The Talk of the Town’ [Heinrichs’ translation in “Ibn al-Athīr,” 315]).
1.1. bi-manzikat usūl al-fiqh: The Discipline is Scientific

Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239) is the first author of an extant work who consciously attends to the notion of ‘ilm al-bayān.59 To be sure, he does not devote a chapter to the meaning of ‘ilm al-bayān in any of his works nor does he provide us with a clear definition. But the explicit representation of ‘ilm al-bayān as an independent and highly theoretical field in both his literary-theoretical works makes Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn a major figure in the notion’s development. While he is certainly not the first scholar to speak of the study of literary-theoretical matters in terms of a discipline or craft (ṣinā’a),60 he is the first to speak of it in terms of a ‘scientific’ undertaking.

After a brief invocatio opening his mature work, al-Mathal al-sāʾir, Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn states:

wa-ba’du fa-inna ‘ilma l-bayāni li-ta’līfi l-naẓmi wa-l-nathri bi-manzilati usūli l-fiqhi li-
la-hkāmi wa-adillati l-aḥkām

Let us proceed. The science of bayān (lit. ‘[verbal] clarity’) vis-à-vis the composition of verse and prose has the same status as [the science of] legal theory does vis-à-vis the legal rulings and the [textual] evidence of the legal rulings.61

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59 Sometimes this expression appears as ‘ilm al-bayān min al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha “ilm al-bayān, namely, eloquence”; see al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 119-20. But cf. ibid. 1: 39, where faṣāḥa-balāgha are said to be the (subject-) matter of the discipline (in the philosophical sense; see following fn.).

60 For a famous example which was translated in Cantarino, Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age, 152-54, see Ibn Sinān al-Khaṭṭābī, Sirr al-faṣāḥa, ed. ‘Abd al-Muta’al al-Sa’dī, Cairo: Muḥammad ‘Alī ʿAbd al-Mutaʿāl al-Aʿīdī, 1969, 82-84 (English: ‘The Secret of Eloquence’). Here al-Khaṭṭābī speaks of speech composition as a craft, and he enumerates the five elements that every craft is said to contain, as defined by the philosophers (ḥukāmāʾ): matter (e.g., “wood”), craftsman (e.g., “carpenter”), form (e.g., “square,” if a chair), instrument (e.g., “saw”), and purpose (e.g., “something to sit on”). Cf. al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 39. We will look at how other early scholars saw their disciplinary affiliation in §1.2. See also Ouyang, Literary Criticism, 166-99, 237-42.

What exactly is the analogy that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is making with legal theory? The interpretation differs depending on whether we lay the emphasis on the *aḥkām*, here: laws or legal rulings, or whether we lay it on *adillat al-aḥkām*, the legal sources or textual evidence for the legal rulings.

According to Wael Hallaq, “[…] the declared, and indeed main, purpose of Islamic legal theory was to formulate rulings (*aḥkām*) concerning cases whose solutions had not been explicitly stated in the first two material sources [i.e., the Qurʾān and prophetic *ḥadīth*].” But in a footnote Hallaq adds that “[a]nother important function of legal theory, one that is assumed and rarely articulated in works of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, is the justification and ‘re-enactment’ of the processes of legal reasoning behind existing rules.”

For al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) the very essence of ‘legal theory’ is the *adillat al-aḥkām* (*uṣūl al-fiqh* ‘ibāra ‘an adillat ḥadīhi al-aḥkām), implying the study of textual proofs regarding existing rulings; similarly, Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) states that the “foundations/roots of the law are the [textual] evidence of the law” (*fa-ammā uṣūl al-fiqh hiya adillat al-fiqh*).

This would suggest the reverse of Hallaq’s assessment: the assumed purpose of legal theory was to formulate rulings concerning new cases, whereas the declared purpose was to justify the process of legal reasoning. The shift in focus is from a primarily hermeneutical endeavor (*adillat al-aḥkām*) to a more practical endeavor guiding the jurist in producing *new* rulings (*aḥkām*). Going back to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s analogy, if we focus on

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the aḥkām, then the purpose of ʿilm al-bayān is to enable the composer to come up with new artistic speech just as the purpose of usūl al-fiqh is to enable the legal authority to derive new legal rulings. If we focus on adillat al-aḥkām, which implies existing laws rather than new ones, then the resulting analogy is: just as the interpretation of the textual sources of the law regarding known cases form the basis of legal theory, likewise the interpretation of existing verse and prose form the basis of ʿilm al-bayān. The difference is between a poetics and a hermeneutics.

The tension between a discipline aiming to enable the creation of new poems and letters and a discipline aiming to explain existing poems and letters is present throughout the works of ʿilm al-bayān under our examination. But the explicit reference that Diyāʾ al-Dīn makes here to ʿilm al-bayān as “composition” swings the pendulum towards a poetics.

It is well known that Diyāʾ al-Dīn saw himself primarily as a kātib ‘state secretary’ and a kātib’s educator (the term inshāʾ is not used), as evinced across his oeuvre (discussed in Part Two) and especially in his work on prosification, that is, forming new literary material from existing exemplars. Moreover, reference to taʾlīf and the muʾallif ‘composer’ are copious throughout the Mathal. At one point Diyāʾ al-Dīn even equates – seemingly inadvertently – the science of bayān with the craft of composing speech, be it verse or prose (ṣināʿat taʾlīf al-kalām min al-manẓūm wa-l-manthūr).

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64 Al-Washy al-marqūm fī ḥall al-manẓūm, ed. Jamīl Saʿīd, [Baghdad]: al-Majmaʿ al-Ilmī al-ʿIrāqī, 1989 (English: ‘The Striped Embroidery on Turning Verse into Prose’ [Heinrichs’ translation in ‘Ibn al-Athīr,’ 315]). See Amidu Sanni’s study of this work, Arabic Theory of Prosification and Versification: On ḥall and naẓm in Arabic Theoretical Discourse, Beiruter Texte und Studien, Band 70, Beirut: Steiner, 1998. Many modern scholars who deal with Diyāʾ al-Dīn see him primarily in his capacity as a leading figure in epistolary composition. See for instance Gully, Culture of Letter-Writing, 30: “[I]n spite of the absence of the term inshāʾ in al-Maṭāl al-sāʾir, I am going to assume that for him [Ibn al-Athīr] the epistolary genre, eloquence and inshāʾ were inseparable components.” (It is here that Gully describes ʿilm al-bayān as “the branch of communication concerned with eloquence and clarity of expression, and, I suppose, the term in his [Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s] vocabulary for literary criticism in its broadest sense”; ibid., and see fn. 57 above.) We should mention that the art of letter-writing or secretaryship (kitāba) is recognized by Diyāʾ al-Dīn as just that: an art (fann), not a science (ʿilm) (e.g., al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 56), although one cannot be certain that this difference was at all significant for him. He adds that it takes many years to acquire this art; ibid., 64 (see also Part Two, §4.1).

65 One of the preliminary sections of the Mathal titled “on the tools of ʿilm al-bayān” (fī ālāt ʿilm al-bayān wa-adawāṭih; i.e., on the disciplines needed as prerequisites to ʿilm al-bayān) opens with the following statement:
It is clear that many of his discussions are directed toward *mu'allif al-kalām*, making ‘the composers of speech’ the audience for whom *ʿilm al-bayān* is intended. Indeed, in the entry on ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn in *The Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* Wolfhart Heinrichs parenthetically glosses *ʿilm al-bayān* as “a theory of literary composition.”

Brief as his declaration of the status of *ʿilm al-bayān* may be, ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn succinctly makes the case for a theoretical discipline – *ʿilm al-bayān* – with a practical application – producing literary speech. At the end of his lean preface, in which he states the work’s content, method and predecessors (see below), ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn reiterates more explicitly the practical application of *ʿilm al-bayān*: “For the purpose [of *ʿilm al-bayān*/his book on *ʿilm al-bayān*] is to achieve the instruction (taʿlīm) of the words (kalīm) with which necklaces are strung and gemmed [i.e., speech is composed] and minds are enchanted and beguiled.” Here one also finds the pedagogical import of *ʿilm al-bayān* in the term *taʿlīm* that enables the learner to compose speech. But the pedagogical aspect should not be overstated, as ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn alerts the reader in the following paragraph – the paragraph concluding the preface – that more beneficial than instruction is perfecting one’s ‘good ear’ (*dhawq*), that is, practicing and getting accustomed to

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“Know that craft of speech composition, be it verse or prose, requires many tools” (*al-Mathāl al-sāʿir* 1: 40). He thereby substituted the expression *ʿilm al-bayān* in the section’s title with “the craft of speech composition”.


67 Taking *kalām* in the phrase *taʿlīf al-kalām* as a shorthand for *kalām balīgh* ‘eloquent speech’, which could also be rendered as ‘literary speech’ or ‘artistic speech’ (in other words, it does not refer to ordinary speech). The latter two are given as translations for *kalām balīgh* by van Gelder in “Literary Criticism as Literature,” in Lale Behzadi and Vahid Behmardi (eds.), *The Weaving of Words: Approaches to Classical Arabic Prose*, Beirut: Orient Institut; Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2009, 55-75, here: 55.

68 The phrase *hādhā l-ʿilm*, referring to *ʿilm al-bayān*, appears in the preceding line (*al-Mathāl al-sāʿir* 1: 37.2).

69 *Al-Mathāl al-sāʿir* 1: 37-8. Minds are beguiled, or deceived (tukhḍāʿu), in the sense that false things can be presented as true, through such devices as *taḥsīn al-qābih* ‘beautifying the ugly’ and the like (see §5.1).

70 *Al-Mathāl al-sāʿir* 1: 38. By ‘paragraph’ I mean what I find to be a logical stopping point, which usually agrees with the editors’ paragraphing decisions.
(good) speech (qawāl). In fact, says Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, although the reader may find “a master” in his
book, the place where ‘ilm al-bayān really resides is with “the ruler of sound taste” (or ‘good
ear’). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn expounds this with an analogical metaphor, saying that he is preparing the
road for the reader just as the maker of a sword would put it in someone’s right hand: carrying
the blade does not mean facing battle, and by implication, having a built road does not mean
taking it. In other words, the burden to fully apply ‘ilm al-bayān falls on the reader.

The conflation of the ‘theoretical’ and the ‘practical’ recurs in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s remarks,
but even though modern scholars often emphasize his predilection for dhawq rather than taʿlīm
(see Introduction), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn often veers towards the theoretical. He explicitly attends to this
question at a later point in the Mathal and rules in favor of ‘theory’. Under the section on
elegance (fī al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha), he poses the following question: “Were the types of
elegance in ‘ilm al-bayān derived by induction from the poems of the Bedouin or by
speculation and the judgment of reason (bi-l-naẓar wa-qadiyyat al-‘aqīl)?” His reply is

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71 Ibid. As one might expect, much of the preface is written in effortless saj’ (I placed the mark “/” to indicate the end of a parallel member): wa-ʿlam ayyuhā l-nāẓiru fī kitāb anna madārā ‘ilmī l-bayānī’ ala ḥākimī l-dhawqī l-salīm / alladhi huwa anfā u min dhawqī l-taʿlīm / wa-hādhā l-kitābū wa-in kāna fīmā yulqīhī tayka ustādā / wa-
idhā saʾalta ʿammā yuntafaʿu bihi fī fannihi qīla laka hādhā l-ṣalīm / alladhi huwa anfā u min dhawqī l-taʿlīm / wa-hādhā l-kitābū wa-in kāna fīmā yulqīhī tayka ustādā / wa-
idhā saʾalta ʿammā yuntafaʿu bihi fī fannihi qīla hādhā l-ṣalīm / alladhi huwa anfā u min dhawqī l-taʿlīm / wa-hādhā l-kitābū wa-in kāna fīmā yulqīhī tayka ustādā / wa-
idhā saʾalta ʿammā yuntafaʿu bihi fī fannihi qīla. As van Gelder points out (“Literary Criticism as Literature,” 56): “Saj’ is
by no means a necessary component [of literary prose] but merely one of the numerous stylistic and rhetorical
devices that contribute to the literary character of a text, such as metaphor, simile, irony, allusion, forms of repetition
and parallelism and other figures, tropes and schemes, and fiction.” Indeed, what makes such passages by Ḍiyāʾ al-
Dīn “effortless” (see previous fn.) is exactly his employment of metaphors and analogies.

72 Ibid. (and notice the Old-Arabic-style construction “mathal [X] ka-[Y]” for ‘X is like Y’): wa-mā māthali fimā
mahhadtuhu laka min hādhā l-tairiq iillā ka-man ẓabā’a sayfan wa-wadā’ahū fi yaminihi li-tugātila bihi [...] fa-ina l-nsāl / ghayru mudbāsharati l-quitāl. As van Gelder points out (“Literary Criticism as Literature,” 56): “Saj’ is
by no means a necessary component [of literary prose] but merely one of the numerous stylistic and rhetorical
devices that contribute to the literary character of a text, such as metaphor, simile, irony, allusion, forms of repetition
and parallelism and other figures, tropes and schemes, and fiction.” Indeed, what makes such passages by Ḍiyāʾ al-
Dīn “effortless” (see previous fn.) is exactly his employment of metaphors and analogies.

73 al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 119. The section begins on 1: 112. Von Grunebaum mentions this issue in his article on
bayān as it appears in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s ‘refutation’, al-Falak al-dāʾir. My interpretation differs slightly because
Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s discussion includes dhawq in a place that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not include.

74 hal ukhidha ʿilmu l-bayānī min ʿurūbi l-bayānī wa-l-balāghati bi-l-istiqrāʾi min ashʿarī l-arabi am bi-l-naẓari
unequivocal (and fashioned in a manner reminiscent of a theologian’s argumentation): ʿilm al-bayān is not derived by induction; those who composed poems and sermons devised/invented (ibtadaʿū) the eloquence that they produced by speculation and judgment of reason. (Notice the confused conflation of ʿilm al-bayān and actual production; see below.) Had it been the case that they derived it by induction from the products of those who came before them, this would lead by finite regress (yatasalsalu) to the first person who could not have inferred it by induction but rather invented his eloquence. 75 The passage is meant to underscore the scientific method of ʿilm al-bayān: it implies that induction as a method is based upon naql or transmission of previous literary speech, whereas speculation as a method is based upon ‘aql or reason.

iyā ʿal-Dīn reinforces his claim in the following passage by way of comparison to the science of grammar. Whereas the science of bayān was derived (ustunbiṭa) by speculation and the judgment of reason, he says, grammar was handed down from the coiner of the language (wādiʿ) through tradition (taqlīd lit. ‘imitation’). The coiner could just as well have used the accusative ending for the subject of a verbal clause and the nominative for the direct object, ʿiyā ʿal-Dīn contends, but with ʿilm al-bayān one could not have substituted an ugly expression for a beautiful one. It is true, he continues, that once people heard that the fāʿil is marfūʿ and the mafʿūl is manṣūb, they derived evidence and reasoning for this – but this reasoning he calls “flimsy” (wāhiya). 76 This is not an attack on ʿilm al-naḥw, as some scholars of the Arabic

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75 Ibid. 1: 119.
76 Ibid. 1: 119-20. Cf. the nearly-proverbial “weaker than a grammarian’s argument” (adʿaf min ḥujjat al-naḥwī), taken from a line by Ibn Fāris describing the languid eyes of a Turkish girl (Geert Jan van Gelder, “Against the Arabic Grammarians: Some Poems,” in Bilal Orfali [ed.], In the Shadow of Arabic: The Centrality of Language to
grammatical tradition would have us think.\textsuperscript{77} It is true that Diyyāʿ al-Dīn did not spare his harsh criticism from grammarians (or philologists more broadly), but this has to do with their poetic opinions, not with the grammatical endeavor per se.\textsuperscript{78} The fact of the matter is that the so-called ‘anti-grammar’ passage is derived nearly verbatim from ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī,\textsuperscript{79} who was an illustrious grammarian, and we will discuss al-Jurjānī’s influence in more detail in Part Two. The purpose of the passage in question is merely to justify the perceived scientificity of ‘ilm al-bayān, and it suggests that ‘ilm al-bayān was not yet seen as a consolidated discipline.

The conflation we find in these passages between the ‘theoretical’ and the ‘practical’ is a


\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Al-Mathal al-sāʾir} 1: 40. See also Ignác Goldziher’s “[…] so kehrt sich Ibn al-ʿAṣır an mehreren Stellen seines Werkes gegen die Kompetenz der Philologen in Sachen des Geschmackes” (\textit{Abhandlungen zur arabischen Philologie}, 2 vols., Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1896, 1: 164). As we shall see in Part Two, there is a long history of literary critics censuring grammarians (or early philologists) for writing ill-suited \textit{diwān}-commentaries since they often limited their comments to difficult vocabulary and the syntax of a line, and often ‘missed’ the literary point of the poetic line. Ibn Jinnī’s commentary on the poetry of al-Mutanabbī is a prime case in point. Traditionally, many early philologists (some of whom were also famous grammarians) delved in matters of naqd – and it is this last aspect that Diyyāʿ al-Dīn, as well as critics referring to him, disapproved of. One example is Diyyāʿ al-Dīn’s annoyance with the “Baghdadi grammarian” Ibn al-Dahhān and “one of his Mosuli students” for degrading al-Mutanabbī: authors within the “scholars of bayān” and “the specialists among them,” he says, give al-Mutanabbī his full due! (\textit{wa-l-muṣannifū min ʿulamāʾi l-bayānī wa-l-muḥtasīna minhum yuʿālī l-Mutanabbīyya haqqahu mina l-fadīla); see al-Istidrāk fi al-akhdhār ‘alā maʿākhi wa-l-maʿānī al-Kindiyya min al-maʿānī al-Tū iyya, ed. Muhammad Zaghīlī Sallām, Alexandria: Munshaʿat al-Maʿārif, 2005, 27 (English: ‘The Rectification of the Critique of the Kindite [al-Mutanabbī’s] Borrowings from the Tāyīr’ [Abū Tammām’s] Motifs’ [Heinrichs’ translation, with modification, in “Ibn al-Athīr,” 315]).

result, first, of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s engagement with al-Jurjānī, who used the phrase ‘ʿilm al-bayān (albeit only one time) to simply mean ‘the knowledge of eloquence’ (see §3.2), and second, of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s labored, even contrived attempt to establish ‘ʿilm al-bayān as an independent, theoretical science. This strongly suggests that a field of knowledge called ‘ʿilm al-bayān was not quite recognized as an independent, ‘scientific’ discipline during Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s time. (That Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not coin the phrase is evident from the lack of any boastful comments which he surely would have made had he had coined it.) ‘Theory’ is given the upper hand if we go by his initial wording in the opening of the Mathal: ‘ʿilm al-bayān li-taʿlīf al-naẓm wa-l-nathr “the science of bayān for [the purpose of] composing verse and prose.”

The case for ‘theory’ is made more strongly in the work predating the Mathal, al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, which is generally regarded as a ‘trial-run’ for the former. The importance of the Jāmiʿ in our study could not be overstated: because its thematic framework coincides with that of the Mathal (as opposed to other works by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn), it is possible to isolate change from continuity in the development of his critical thinking. In the case of envisaging ‘ʿilm al-bayān we have a clear case of continuity. In the opening of his preface Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn states that the composition of eloquent/literary speech (taʿlīf al-kalām) can only be fathomed by studying ‘ʿilm al-bayān, “which is like a measure/scale (bi-manzilat al-mīzān) for this craft.” Once again, ‘ilm

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80 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 35, and above.


82 We are fortunate to have a similar case with Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’, who also authored two literary-critical works with more or less the same framework.

83 ammā baʿdu fa-lammā kāna taʿlīf l-kalāmī mimmā lā yūqafu ʿalā ghawrihi wa ʿalā bi-l-ristānī ʿalīmī l-bayānī -lladhī huwa l-ṣināʿat bi-manzilatī l-mīzān […] “Let us proceed. Since we cannot get to the bottom of literary composition nor can we fathom its true nature unless we study ‘ilm al-bayān, which is like a measure/scale for this craft […]”; al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fi sināʿat al-kalām 1956, 1.
al-bayān is seen as a theoretical science with a practical application in the form of literary composition. In a later section we find a discussion on eloquence (al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha), perhaps anticipating the passage in the Mathal, that claims that eloquence is derived by al-naẓar wa-qaḍīyyat al-‘aql. Here in the Jāmi’, the discussion is in the form of a quotation from “one of the authors among the scholars” (ba’ḍ al-muṣannifīn min al-‘ulamā’) – again probably al-Jurjānī – who stresses the need to exert contemplation (tadabbur), reflection (ta’ammul) and speculation (tafakkur) when studying the knowledge/science of eloquence.84 Here the editors of the Jāmi’, Jawād and Sa’īd, point to a specific passage in the Dalā’īl from which it was supposedly taken, though admittedly, it is far from a literal quotation.85 Either way, conceiving of eloquence and/or ‘ilm al-bayān as a knowledge/discipline requiring reflection and speculation – indeed, as a ‘rational’ affair – is consistent in both Ḩiyyā’ al-Dīn’s literary-theoretical works.

In order to contextualize the theoretical status that Ḩiyyā’ al-Dīn assigns to ‘ilm al-bayān, it may be useful to look at other sciences considered to hold a high theoretical status, specifically those that ‘ilm al-bayān are likened to: logic (see bi-manzilat al-mīzān in the Jāmi’) and legal theory (see bi-manzilat uṣūl al-fiqh in the Mathal). One scholar, whose work on logic and legal

84 fa-innaka idhā nazarta ilā hādhā l-‘ilmi l-sharṣīf -ḥuṣaja ‘inda dhālika ilā tāli maktīn wa-tadabbur / wa-kathrati ta’ammulūn wa-tafakkur; al-Jāmi’ al-kabīr, 76 (sa‘j reaching) marking is mine; the strange maktī might be a misreading of baḥth. The phrase hādhā l-‘ilm refers to al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha several lines earlier. Eloquence seems to be conceived as a ‘knowledge’ as it is used interchangeably in this passage with maʿrifā, but it could very well refer to an actual ‘science’.

85 Al-Jāmi’ al-kabīr, 76 fns. 2-3, 77 fn. 1. The passage is fairly distant from the wording found in the Dalā’īl, 37, and in the old edition, Kitāb Dalā’īl al-i-jāz fi ‘ilm al-ma’ānī, eds. Muḥammad ’Abduh and Muḥammad Maḥmūd al-Turkūzī al-Shināqī’s, overread and with footnotes by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Cairo: Matba’at al-Manār, [1912], 31 (English: ‘Intimations of [the Qur’ān’s] Inimitability’). The idea is taken up again elsewhere by al-Jurjānī, e.g. Dalā’īl (ed. Shākir), 395 – the passage that inspired Ḩiyyā’ al-Dīn’s comments in the Mathal – where al-Jurjānī states that knowledge of i rāb ‘inflection’ is not exerted by reflection (layṣa huwa minnā yustābahu bi-l-fiṭr). We should point out that Ḩiyyā’ al-Dīn often draws on and quotes from al-Jurjānī in passages that display meticulous sa‘j. As van Gelder tells us, “[t]he ideas proposed in these works [the two works of ’Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī] were no less novel than their style, which is essayistic, often passionate […] and when ’Abd al-Qāhir writes about poetic language and imagery his prose style is itself a quality […]” (Classical Arabic Literature: A Library of Arabic Literature Anthology, selected and translated by Geert Jan van Gelder, New York: New York University Press, 2013, 281). Ḩiyyā’ al-Dīn never quotes al-Jurjānī by name; rarely, as here, does he allude to him (ba’ḍ al-muṣannifīn).
theory became well known, and whom Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn mentions by name, is al-Ghazālī. In the following pages we will examine how al-Ghazālī viewed the disciplinary status of logic and legal theory in order to better understand Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s stance on ‘ilm al-bayān. Looking at al-Ghazālī’s works in this context does not imply that Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn necessarily read them, but as part of his cultural and intellectual life, we may surmise that he was aware of many of the ideas therein (especially the ‘superficial’ ones, like the status of a discipline vis-à-vis other disciplines). Alexander Treiger shows that al-Ghazālī displayed a constant preoccupation with the classification of the sciences across his scholarly writings. To me this indicates the degree to which a scholar could harness influence and authority by “redraw[ing] the map of the sciences.” Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s claim to authority is implicit both in his portrayal of the field he is writing in as scientific, and, as we shall see in §1.2, in his presentation of the canon of the field.

Let us begin with logic. Logic is often glossed as a mīzān, a measure or standard by which all other sciences – and (new) knowledge itself – are attained. Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn expressed explicit aversion to philosophical (Aristotelian) poetics, but this does not mean he did not accept

86 And see Introduction, fn. 40, on the difference between the voie diffuse and voie érudite.


88 Quote from ibid., 3. Al-Ghazālī redrew the map of the sciences “in order to make room for his new sciences, “the sciences of the hereafter,” at the expense of the traditional religious sciences […].”

a ‘de-foreignized’, ‘appropriated’ discipline like logic, especially after al-Ghazālī’s famous endorsement thereof (and probably well before that).\(^90\) In fact, as we have seen in the Introduction, the study of logic and the philosophical sciences in general increased in the Arabic East during Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s time. In the preface to Miʾyār al-ʾilm al-Ghazālī places logic (without using the term manaṭiq) implicitly within the rational sciences (al-ulūm al-nazariyya) and claims that the goal of the work is to make understood the ways of thought and speculation.\(^91\) He continues by saying that in order to reduce errors in reasoning he has organized his book “as a standard/criterion for speculation and reflection, as a measure/scale for investigation and contemplation, as a polisher of the mind and a sharpening of the faculty of thought and reason.”\(^92\) Ironically, the analogy that al-Ghazālī’s gives for the function of the discipline is to the philological sciences. According to him, the relation of the science of logic (or his book) to “those things that guide the minds” (? \(\text{adillat al-}ˈuqūl\)) is equivalent to the relation of prosody to poetry or grammar to correct inflection (\(iˈrāb\)): just as corrupt meter can only be known by the measure (\(mīzān\)) of prosody and corrupt inflection by the touchstone (\(miḥakk\)) of grammar – likewise correct and corrupt proof can only be distinguished by his book (or by the science of

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\(^90\) For al-Ghazālī’s endorsement of logic see, for instance, the first part of his \(uṣāl\) work, al-Muṣṭaṣfā, which is essentially an introduction to logic (that is, definition and proof [i.e., syllogism]); al-Muṣṭaṣfā 1: 35-87 (\(fī al-ḥadd\)), 88-175 (\(al-ḥurān\) [otherwise known as \(qiyās\) in logical works]). He refers to these preliminary sections as being part of \(madārik al-ˈuqūl\) “the rational sources of the intellect [?]” and says it is like the “[camel’s] extra-load (\(iˈlāwa\)) on \(ilm al-uṣāl\),” 1: 175. He then refers the readers wanting more information to his works related to his \(Miḥakk al-ʾazār\) and Miʾyār al-ʾilm. According to Shihadeh, al-Ghazālī’s introduction of logic to kalām was “by no means consistent or definitive, but pragmatic” (“From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī,” 148). Logic was endorsed even earlier by scholars supplanting common syllogistic premises with legal ones. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) and his al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-maṇṭiq is perhaps the best known. See Anwar G. Chejne, “Ibn Ḥazm of Cordova on Logic,” \(Journal of the American Oriental Society\) 104.1 (1984), 57-72, esp. 57, 61-63.

\(^91\) Al-Imām al-Ghazālī, \(Mantiq Tahāfut al-falāsifa al-musammā Miʾyār al-ʾilm\), ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1961, 59 (English: ‘The Logic [section of the work] Incoherence of the Philosophers called The Criterion of Knowledge’). According to Dunyā this work is originally one of the three parts of al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa, but this is a bit incongruent with al-Ghazālī’s citation of the Tahāfut in this work (Miʾyār, 60). I am not attending to al-Ghazālī’s other logical work, \(Miḥakk al-ʾazār\), since prefatory remarks on the status of the discipline are absent.

\(^92\) rattabnā hādhā l-kitāba miʾyār al-ʾazār wa-l-ʾibār / wa-mīzānan al-ʾibaḍthi wa-l-ʾifṭikār / wa-ṣayyqālan li-l-dhihn / wa-mishḥadhan li-quw wahāt l-fikri wa-l-ʾaqil (Miʾyār, 59).
logic). This was a common analogy, as it is also attested in the work of the literary critic Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (d. 466/1074) and in earlier works of the classification of the sciences.

As banal as these analogies may seem, they are quite telling of the apologetics surrounding ‘disciplines on the rise’. In the case of al-Ghazālī, prosody and grammar were long well-established disciplines that he could adduce as a justification for logic as a science qua science. In the case of Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn, logic and legal theory were well-established rational disciplines that he could adduce as a justification for ‘ilm al-bayān as a highly theoretical science. The need for ‘ilm al-bayān as a discipline qua discipline required less justification: topics included in ‘ilm al-bayān have been revered for centuries by critics, philologists and Qur’ānic literary scholars. But as opposed to logic and legal theory, these topics did not seem to be bound by ‘scientific rules’. It is the very idea that they were bound by scientific rules that Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn attempts to justify and demonstrate. One cannot fully appreciate his claim to scientificity unless one takes into account the increase in the study of falsafa that was taking place in the Arabic East during this time (see Introduction).

While we cannot say with certainty that Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn read al-Ghazālī’s purely logical works, in the case of legal theory we stand on firmer ground: Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn tells us so. Both in the Jāmiʿ and in the Mathal Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn recounts fourteen types of majāz, and in the latter work he

93 Miʿyār, 60, and see fn. 2 by the editor, who thinks that it may have been more appropriate to speak of hādhā al-ʿilm rather than hādhā al-kitāb.

94 Sirr al-fasāḥa, 85-86; Ouyang, Literary Criticism, 29-30. For al-Khafājī the analogue to good meter and correct grammar is the knowledge of eloquence (balāgha). He claims that even if one can distinguish between eloquent and non-eloquent speech, his book is still useful because it defines the reasons (ḥukm, ʿilal, wujūh, asbāb) for preferring one utterance over the other. Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn is clearly moving in a different direction by abandoning the analogy to prosody and grammar.

95 This will be discussed in more detail in §1.2. By Qur’ānic ‘literary’ scholars I mean people like Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) and his Taʾwīl mushkiṣ al-Qurʾān (‘Interpreting the [lexical/stylistic] Difficulties of the Qurʾān’): the approach to the topic comes more from a literary-linguistic point of view, although the dogmatic angle is not at all absent.
explicitly cites his source: “I was looking into one of the works of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, God have mercy upon him, which he authored on legal theory (ʿusūl al-fiqh), and I found that he mentioned literal and figurative speech and classified figurative speech into fourteen categories […]”\(^{96}\) The work cited does not seem to have survived.\(^{97}\) We shall look, then, into al-Ghazālī’s famous al-Mustasfā min ʿilm al-ʿusūl ‘The Best Pick in Legal Theory’ to get an idea of the ‘Ghazālian model’ that Diya’ al-Dīn was exposed to. We are not claiming that Diya’ al-Dīn necessarily read the Mustasfā but given al-Ghazālī’s influence, it is safe to assume he was well familiar with many of the ideas expressed therein. One specific legal issue will be addressed below. Another reason that makes the Mustasfā a good source for us to consult is that it lent itself to the layman. Evidence suggests that the Mustasfā was considered an elementary, rather than sophisticated, piece of legal scholarship.\(^{98}\)

Al-Ghazālī speaks in the preface to his Mustasfā of three disciplinary categories: (1) the purely rational (ʿaqlī maḥḍ), like arithmetic, geometry and astronomy; (2) the purely traditional (or transmission-based, naqlī maḥḍ), like hadīth and tafsīr ‘Qur’ānic commentary’; and (3) the one in which reason and tradition are combined (mā izdawaja fīhi al-ʿaql wa-l-samʿ), like legal theory.\(^{99}\) It is not clear where stylistics and literary theory (though non-existent at this point as a consolidated discipline) would fit in this scheme, but what is clear is this: the traditional sciences do not fare well. Engaging in the traditional sciences is (more) commonplace, says al-Ghazālī,

\(^{96}\) Al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 2: 88 ff; cf. al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 28-29. For al-Ghazālī, majāz was more narrowly a designation of various types of metonymies and dead metaphors.

\(^{97}\) This has been corroborated to me by Frank Griffel in a personal communication during the 222\(^{nd}\) meeting of the American Oriental Society in Boston, March 16-19, 2012.

\(^{98}\) This is based on a remark Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī made to students he encountered at Tūs, “You are wasting your lives reading Kitāb al-Mustasfā,” along with other criticisms he raised in his Munāẓarāt. See Robert Wisnovsky, “Towards a Genealogy of Avicennism,” Oriens 42 (2014), 323-63, here: 333 fn. 15.

\(^{99}\) Al-Mustasfā 1: 3-4. For a thorough account see Treiger, “Al-Ghazālī’s Classification of the Sciences,” 17-22.
since the young and the old have equal footing in it as memorization suffices for their attainment; there is no role for the mind/reason in them. Engaging in the rational sciences, on the other hand, may lead to reward in the afterlife. But as may be expected, the noblest type of science is the one that combines the rational with the traditional, like *usūl al-fiqh*. Given this account, it would seem that anyone familiar with this ‘model’ intending to anchor the subject matter he is writing on in ‘disciplinary’ terms would choose the more rational strain over the traditional one. I believe that Ğiyā’s analogies of *ilm al-bayān* to logic and especially to legal theory corroborate this view.

Al-Ghazālī did not conceive of legal theory primarily as a method to derive new legal rulings, as we have seen above. Rather, the denotation of the science called *usūl al-fiqh* according to al-Ghazālī’s prefatory remarks is the knowledge of establishing the evidence-sources of the law, the conditions of their soundness and the ways in which they demonstrate – so we assume – existing legal rulings (*wa-wujiḥ dalālatihā ‘alā l-ahkām*). As we have seen, this is what Wael Hallaq referred to as “the justification and ‘re-enactment’ of the processes of legal reasoning behind existing rules.” Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī also pays attention to new legal rulings via his treatment of the mujtahid (see below), and to a non-specialist like Ğiyā al-Dīn, the gist of the science was to create new legal rulings. This is facilitated by the way al-Ghazālī expounds on the meaning of *usūl al-fiqh* in terms derived from the root *th.m.r* ‘to bear

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100 *Al-Mustasfā* 1: 3-4. Later al-Ghazālī provides a two-fold classification, rational (*aqliyya*) and religious (*diniyya*), and legal theory is placed in the latter. It seems that this opposition has a more ‘ontological’ nature, as al-Ghazālī focuses on the difference between *usūl* and *kalām* ‘speculative theology’ from an ontological perspective (ibid. 1: 12-17). According to Louis Gardet, al-Ghazālī used the opposition al-ʿulūm al-*ʿaqliyya*-al-ʿulūm al-*sharʿiyya* wa-*diniyya* “freely” (“ʿAqliyyāt,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition). For a more nuanced account of al-Ghazālī’s views on the ranking of the sciences see Treiger, “Al-Ghazālī’s Classification of the Sciences.”

101 *Al-Mustasfā* 1: 11.

102 Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories*, 1-2, and above.
In al-Ghazālī’s scheme, the first principle of ḥukmān al-ṣīḥ addresses the ḥakām, usually in the more specific sense of ‘legal qualifications/statuses’ that are assigned to certain acts (traditionally five: obligatory, recommended, indifferent, reprehensible, forbidden). Al-Ghazālī refers to the ḥakām as al-thamara ‘fruit’ or al-thamara al-maf‘ūba ‘the sought-after fruit’. The second principle is the evidence for the law (adilla), or the prooftext, referred to as al-muthmir ‘the one[s] bearing fruit’; that is, the Qurʾān, ḥadīth and ijmāʿ. The third principle is the method of extracting the evidence (wujūh dalālat al-adilla) or al-istithmār ‘extracting fruit’. The fourth concerns the one deriving [new] legal rulings (mujtahid) or al-mustathmir ‘the one extracting the fruit’. The mustathmir is countered with the muqallid ‘imitator [i.e., one not deriving new legal rulings]’. The book is divided into four large sections called aqṭāb ‘poles’, each devoted to the four principles discussed. The section on ḥakām gives the impression that it is the existing rulings that are the topic of interest, but because it is couched in terms of ‘fruit’ and the process of its ‘production’ (the ‘extraction’, the one ‘extracting’, etc.), it is plain to see how this could be understood as something ‘new’. As a side-note we may add that al-Ghazālī’s use of istithmār reminds us of Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s discussion of īstikhrāj, the extraction or derivation of fresh images and ideas (maʿānī) from existing ones. It so happens that the vast majority of examples of invented images (maʿānī mukhtaraʿ or mubtadaʿ) that are said to be ‘extracted’

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103 The following is based on al-Mustasfā 1: 18-25. I am not claiming al-Ghazālī was the first or only scholar to do so; in fact, my aim is not to make any claims about uṣūl al-ṣīḥ. Rather, I am interested in looking at the discipline the way Diyāʾ al-Dīn and other non-specialists would have.

104 Ibid. 1: 19, 176 ff. This section also deals with the ḥākim ‘ruler’ (God), the ruled (or non-ruled, like the young or incompetent), the sphere of things ruled upon (actions not essences), and more.

105 Ibid. 1: 22-23, and vol. 2. Ijmāʿ refers to the unanimous agreement among religious authorities regarding a ruling.

106 Ibid. 1: 25, vol. 3 (for īstithmār), vol. 4 (for al-mustathmir).

107 Incidentally or not, Diyāʾ al-Dīn structures his Ījmāʿ around two large sections, called aqṭāb.

108 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 3-69. We will discuss some aspects of this topic in Part Two.
illustrate extraction from one of the legal adilla, namely, ḥadīth.\(^{109}\)

(Duration al-Dīn seems to have been influenced by specific legal notions as well, a fact which in turn reinforces our contention that his disciplinary vision for ḳilm al-bayān was inspired, directly or indirectly, by al-Ghazālī. Evidence of legal thinking associated with al-Ghazālī surfaces in Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s presentation of eloquence (specifically acoustic eloquence, ḥaṣāḥa) as a relational notion (āmr īḍāfī) rather than an absolute one.\(^{110}\) This is an opinion he espouses in the ḽāmi‘ and later forsakes entirely in the Mathal.\(^{111}\) Al-Ghazālī famously refuted the Muʿtazilī notion that human acts can be described as good (ḥasan) or bad (qabīḥ) in and of themselves, that is, that there is something inherent (waṣf dhātī) to the act determining its moral quality.\(^{112}\) Al-Ghazālī rather propounded the idea of ḥusn and qubh being two relational notions (āmrān īḍāfiyyān), as opposed to, say, the quality of blackness and whiteness.\(^{113}\) In the ḽāmi‘ Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn uses surprisingly identical terms to describe the quality of lexical-acoustic eloquence as a relational notion. In this he is refuting the words of his predecessor, Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (d. 466/1074), who by presenting the “conditions” of single-word eloquence essentially formulated it as an objective property that can be attained. (Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn is also following a line of thought

\(^{109}\) For derivations of istikhrāj (mustakhraj, istakhrajtu, etc.) see al-Mathal al-sā‘ir 2: 8, 18-19, 20, 35-36, 43-44, 55-56. In the last of these (p. 56) he lays out his method of istikhrāj from the Qur’ān and ḥadīth, but in his actual examples, the istikhrāj is primarily from ḥadīth. Sometimes mustanbaṭ is used (2: 33). The idea of image extraction is not elaborated upon in the ḽāmi‘; much of the corresponding chapter there on ma‘ānī was incorporated into the last section of the ma‘ānī discussion in the Mathal (al-Ḥāmi‘ al-kabīr, 68-72, al-Mathal al-sā‘ir 2: 63 ff).

\(^{110}\) Al-Ḥāmi‘ al-kabīr, 77-79. Ḥaṣāḥa refers here to the acoustic and lexical aspect of eloquence (faṣāḥa) rather than the more semantic one (balāgha) (ibid., 79-81). Another example of engagement with legal thinking comes up when Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn compares what he calls al-tarjīḥ bayna l-ma‘ānī l-tarjīḥ bayānī with the tarjīḥ fiqḥī (al-Mathal al-sā‘ir 1: 86-96, including “what the lawyers call maḥfūm al-khiṭāb”), a discussion that is later scathingly criticized by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd as being entirely useless and wrong (vol. 4 of al-Mathal al-sā‘ir, 72-76).

\(^{111}\) Al-Mathal al-sā‘ir 1: 218-24, esp. 222.

\(^{112}\) Al-Mustaṣfā 1: 178-94, esp. 180-82.

\(^{113}\) Ibid. 1: 181; also awṣaf īḍāfiyya, 1: 182-83.
expressed by al-Jurjânî; see Part Two.) Diyā’ al-Dīn relates as follows:

wa-‘lam aydan anna l-faṣāḥata amrun idāfiyyun ka-l-husni wa-l-qubhi wa-l-kalāmu l-faṣiḥu layya kalāman makhsūṣan bi-‘aynihi bal kullu man fahima kalāman wa-‘arafa hu fa-huwa faṣiḥun bi-l-nisbat ilayhi li-annahu ṭāhirun ‘indahu wa-wāḏiḥun ladayhi wa-mimmā yuqawwī hādhā l-qawla anna l-lafẓ -lladhī lā na’udduha naḥnu fī zamāninā hādhā faṣiḥan wa-nakrahuhu li-’adami -sti’mālihi wa-qarabatīhi kāna ‘inda man taqaddamanā min arbābi l-ta’īfī musta’malan fī zamānimhim muta’ārafan mushtahiran [...] wa-lawi -stu’mila fī zamāninā hādhā la-stunkira wa-stubshī’ā wa-ḥukima ‘alā qā’ilīhi bi-l-fahli wa-l-ta’assuf

Know also that [lexical-acoustic] eloquence is a relational notion like goodness [or: beauty] and badness [or: ugliness], for eloquent speech is not endowed [with qualities] in and of itself. Rather, anyone who understands a certain speech and approves of it, then it is eloquent in his view [lit. in ‘relation’ to him] because it is evident and clear for him. What strengthens this opinion is that words that we ourselves do not consider as eloquent in this day of ours and dislike due to their lack of usage and rareness – used to be in use, common and widespread during the time of the masters of composition who came before us [in their speech]. If it [such speech] were used in this day of ours it would be loathed and found repugnant, and its speaker would be deemed ignorant and deviating.¹¹⁴

Diyā’ al-Dīn abandons this view later on, probably in an attempt to implicitly refute the view held by al-Jurjânî, according to which eloquence has not to do with the single word. But since the terminology of a relational notion is not found in the work of al-Khafājī or al-Jurjânî, it attests to Diyā’ al-Dīn’s awareness of some peripheral legal thinking.

1.2. al-aʾimma al-mashhūrīna fīhi: The Discipline has a Canon

So far we have dealt with Diyā’ al-Dīn’s effort – almost forced effort – to establish a disciplinary framework to a science called ‘ilm al-bayān. I claim that by doing this he presented a consolidated notion of the field of stylistics and literary theory, one that was absent up until his

¹¹⁴ Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 77.
time. In fact, that such a notion was absent during the classical ʿAbbāsid era is one of Wen-chin Ouyang’s conclusions in her work on ‘classical’ Arabic literary criticism (third/ninth to fifth/eleventh century).\(^{115}\) To borrow her words, what Ṭiyāʿ al-Dīn did was exactly to provide “a cohesive vision of its [the field’s] function”\(^{116}\) by assigning it a rational status and aiming it at a practical purpose, namely the production of literary speech. But a unified vision of the discipline is not the only feature that Ouyang speaks of that was lacking in the early period. According to her, a second feature absent from the critical tradition was “a shared definition of an authoritative specialist.” The reason for this lay in the conflicting interests of different specialists engaging in the literary-critical endeavor: the transmitters and collectors of poetry, the religious scholars studying ʿiḍā (the inimitability of the Qurʾān), the secretaries (kuttāb) and the modern poets.\(^ {117}\) She sees the absence of these two features at the basis of the unsuccessful attempt “to establish poetic criticism as an independent and integral discipline of learning.”\(^ {118}\) In this section we will look at the second feature Ouyang recounts, namely, the establishment of an authority (or authorities), or what I shall also refer to as the establishment of a canon in the field.

After his brief declaration of the status of ʿilm al-bayān in the Mathal, Ṭiyāʿ al-Dīn goes on to provide a ‘canon’ of sorts for this science (fīhi, referring to ʿilm al-bayān). The canon

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\(^{115}\) Ouyang, *Literary Criticism*, esp. 204-209. One should keep in mind that she is looking especially into poetic criticism (ʿilm al-ṣāḥīʿ, al-ʿilm bi-l-ṣāḥīʿ and naqḍ al-ṣāḥīʿ) and not into general stylistics and literary theory. Thus, works on the stylistics of the Qurʾān, for instance, are not part of her purview. Nevertheless, I think her conclusions hold for the larger tradition of literary theory and criticism as well. What is more, her insights on what makes a scholarly tradition a coherent tradition are very useful for our purposes.

\(^{116}\) Ibid., 207.

\(^{117}\) Ibid. This will be discussed in more detail below. For historical and thematic accounts on the development of the literary-critical tradition see Heinrichs, “Nakd”; van Gelder’s introduction (“Exordium”) to Beyond the Line, 1-14; Thomas Bauer, “Arabische Kultur,” in Gert Ueding (ed.), *Rhetorik: Begriff, Geschichte, Internationalität*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2005, 283-300, esp. 285-91. The latter’s contribution lies mainly in treating the Standard Theory; for the early period he seems to rely heavily on Heinrichs’ Nakd entry (or idem, “Poetik”) without recognition.

\(^{118}\) Ouyang, *Literary Criticism*, 207.
comprises two works: *Kitāb al-Muwāzana* by Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥasan b. Bishr al-Āmīdī (d. 371/981) and *Sirr al-faṣāha* by Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh b. Sinān al-Khafājī (d. 466/1074). This would be a noteworthy endorsement on the part of Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn, considering that his canon was downsized from seven works in the *Jāmiʿ* to two in the *Mathal*, were it not for the fact that one of these – al-Khafājī’s work – is scathingly criticized at the outset. Although al-Āmīdī’s *Muwāzana* is generally lauded, one cannot escape the conclusion that Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn is trying to establish himself as the only real authority in ‘ilm al-bayān (perhaps as one would expect in a preface). But Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn gives us more evidence to strengthen this conclusion by presenting an approach to what we may call ‘scientific salafism’ in literary theory. This approach consists of identifying and defining literary devices (*ḍurūb* lit. ‘types/categories’ of ‘ilm al-bayān) from the primary sources to the apparent exclusion of intervening ‘middle-men’:

wa-kuntu ʿathartu ’alā ḍurūbin minhu fī ghuḍūni l-Qurʾānī l-karīmi wa-lam ajid aḥadan minman taqaddamanī taʿarraḍa li-dhikri shay in minhā

[…] wa-hadāni -llāhu li-btīdāʾ i ashyā’a lam takun min qablī mubtaḍa’atan wa-manaḥanī darajata l-ījtihādī -lītā’ lā takūnū aqwāluhā tābiʿatan wa-innāmah hiya muṭṭabā’atun wa-ḥadānī ḫaṭan darajata l-ijtihādi -llatī lā takūnū aqwāluhā tābiʿatan wa-ḥanī muṭṭabā’atun

I had discovered categories of it (‘ilm al-bayān) within the noble Qurʾān and did not see anyone of those who preceded me make mention of any of them.

[…] God guided me to the invention of things that were not before me invented and granted me a level of creative individual judgment (ījtihād) whose opinions do not

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119 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 35-36. He prefaces his endorsement with the words *wa-lam ajid mā yuntaṭa’u bihi fī dhālika illā […]* “The only beneficial [works] in that [*’ilm al-bayān*] are […]”

120 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 36. He claims that al-Khafājī paid too much attention to the discussion of sounds (*aṣwāt*, from an ontological point of view) and phonemes (*ḥurūf*), as well as properties of the single word (*al-lafẓa al-mufrada*). It is this latter criticism that ignited Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn’s advancement of the idea of lexical-acoustic eloquence being a relational notion.

121 *durūb kathīra minhu; al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 37. The suffixed pronoun -hu refers back to *’ilm al-bayān* appearing on p. 35 (and see editors’ fn. 1 on p. 37).
‘follow’ but are rather ‘followed’.\footnote{Ibid. 1: 37.}

The primary text Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn speaks of in this approach is the Qurʾān; technically, early poetry would fall into this category as well. We might remark that \textit{iḥtād} was a proverbial mark of Shāfiʿism, or at least that Shāfiʿī scholars had a reputation for avoiding taqlīd in their methodology of legal studies.\footnote{Ahmed El Shamsy, “Rethinking Taqlīd in the Early Shāfiʿī School,” \textit{Journal of the American Oriental Society} 128.1 (2008), 1-23, esp. 7, 11-12.} I cannot say whether Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s own Shāfiʿī affiliation has anything to do with his expressed method, but we increasingly find these type of pronouncements in later works of literary theory as well. In the \textit{Jāmiʿ} Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn gives a more detailed account of his method, which we shall come back to later.

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not ignore earlier scholarly sources. He remarks that in addition to the categories he singlehandedly extracted, he supplanted other categories recorded in the early works (\textit{ḍurūb ukhar mudawwwana fī al-kutub al-mutaqaddima}).\footnote{\textit{Al-Mathal al-sāʾ īr} 1: 37.} But as we have seen, besides al-Āmidī’s and al-Khafājī’s works, we do not know – at least at the outset – which works would fall into this category. A more clearly defined ‘canon’ in the field of \textit{ʿilm al-bayān} can be found in his early work, the \textit{Jāmiʿ}. There he invokes a list of five additional “famous masters in it [the discipline of \textit{ʿilm al-bayān}]” (\textit{al-aʾimma al-mashhūrūna fīhi}) and unnamed “others” whose works will be cited in his book.\footnote{\textit{Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr}, 2-3. To refer to these scholars he also uses \textit{ʿulamāʾ} and \textit{arbāb}.} The masters enumerated are (only names, no citation of works) Abū al-Ḥasan Ṭālib b. Ḥūna b. ʿIsā al-Rummānī (d. 384/994), Abū ʿUthmān al-Jāḥiz (d. 255/868 or 9), Qudāma b. Jaʿfar al-Kātim (d. \textit{ca.} 337/948), Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. after 400/1010) and Abū al-ʿAlāʾ.
Muḥammad b. Ghānim, known as al-Ghānimī (fl. 5th/11th century).\textsuperscript{126}

The works of these scholars, in addition to al-Āmidi’s and al-Khafājī’s, represent the wide range of what we may call the early naqd works.\textsuperscript{127} Al-Rummānī and his al-\textit{Nukat fī i’jāz al-Qur’ān}\textsuperscript{128} would represent the more exegetical strand of literary theory and the occupation with the inimitable character of the Qur’ān. Abū Hilāl al-‘Askarī mentions the knowledge of \textit{i’jāz} as one of the main goals of his work \textit{Kitāb al-Šīnā’atayn}, but he undoubtedly represents a more poetical strand of literary theory occupied with the ‘modern style’ of poetry known as \textit{badīʿ}.\textsuperscript{129} The works of Qudāma b. Ja’far and al-Khafājī, \textit{Naqd al-shīr} and \textit{Sīr al-faṣāḥa}, may reflect the imprint of logical thinking, or at least the attempt to structure the discussions of literary theory along logical lines (ontological in the case of al-Khafājī, beginning with the single sound and working his way up to conceptual thinking). More notably, they reflect the occupation of the \textit{kuttāb} with literary theory.\textsuperscript{130} Al-Āmidī too was a secretary, as well as an accomplished poet and trained grammarian, and his work \textit{al-Muwāzana bayna shīr Abī Tammām wa-l-Buḥturī} best represents ‘applied criticism’.\textsuperscript{131} His classicizing preferences perhaps also align him with the ‘philological’ strand of literary theory concerned with collecting and commenting on ancient

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{128} In what follows we are assuming which works of the mentioned ‘masters’ %Dīn was familiar with. In the case of al-Rummānī, it may well be the case that the main work he had in mind is the now lost \textit{Kitāb al-Bayān} (!); see Heinrichs, “Literary Theory,” 28 fn. 44 (citing Brockelmann).


\textsuperscript{130} Heinrichs, “Literary Theory,” 31; \textit{idem}, “\textit{Nakd},” under “The real founders of \textit{nakd}: the secretaries” and “Further systematical research.”

\textsuperscript{131} Heinrichs, “Literary Theory,” 31; \textit{idem}, “\textit{Nakd},” under “The controversy around Abū Tammām.”
poetry. Al-Jāḥīz’s al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn could reflect a pre-systematic stage of literary theory – it contains a plethora of material that would later find its way into the classical naqd works – but admittedly, is more appropriately part of the adab tradition (and according to some, Muʿtazilī philosophy). This leaves us with the otherwise unknown al-Ghānimī whose work appears to be non-extant.

Diyya’ al-Dīn back-projects ‘ilm al-bayān as the common heading to the endeavor of the scholars he cites despite the fact that such a heading was lacking. To be sure, the literary-critical topics analyzed in these books did indeed overlap but were never recognized as an agreed-upon scientific genre. If we look at the headings they themselves used, Al-Āmīdi’s ‘genre’ would probably best be defined as shīʿr or šināʾ at al-shīʿr (sometimes: al-ʿilm bi-l-shīʿr): poetry.

132 Heinrichs, “Literary Theory,” 30. Al-Āmīdi did not collect poetry and is not enumerated as part of the philological strand, which is the earliest and ‘rawest’ expression of literary theory. But in his lack of predilection for the bādīʿ style he definitely stands out among the other ‘masters’ mentioned by Diyya’ al-Dīn. Interestingly, according to al-Āmīdi (Heinrichs, “Naḳd,” under “The controversy around Abū Tammām”) the adherents of the ‘ancient’ style are the secretaries, Bedouins and ‘natural’ poets, whereas the adherents of the ‘modern’ style are the mannerist and philosophizing poets as well as ‘the people of conceits’ (ahl al-maʿānī). This does not reflect the bulk of literary-theoretical thinking, even during the classical ‘Abbāsid era, as is seen – first and foremost – by the bādīʿ predilection of the secretary and poet (and one-day caliph) Ibn al-Muṭazz.

133 For details see Chapter 3.

134 Brockelmann, Sezgin, Ziriklī and Kaḥbāla do not contain information on al-Ghānimī in their monumental reference works. A later “Ibn Ghānimī” (d. after 1258) is mentioned by Brockelmann (as well as Ziriklī and Kaḥbāla); see Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Leiden: Brill, 1943, 1949, 3 Supplemental vols., 1937-1942, Suppl. 3: 599 (henceforth GAL). The editors of the Jāmīʿ, however, cite information from al-Samāʿī’s (d. 562/1166) al-Anṣāb, its mukhtasar by Diyya’ al-Dīn’s brother, ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn al-Āthīr (d. 630/1233) and al-Bākharzī’s (d. 467/1075) Dumyat al-Qaṣr that provide us with the following: al-Ghānimī was a poet and an adīb from amongst the poets praising the Śaljūq vizier Nīzām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092); he is attributed to Herāt by his nisba and was active in the Eastern Islamic world. No dates of birth/death are given; no work on literary theory is cited (al-Jāmīʿ al-kabīr, 2 fn. 5).

135 Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥasan b. Bishr al-Āmīdī, al-Muwāzana bayna shīʿr Abī Tammām wa-l-Buḥtūrī, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Ḥamad Muḥārīb, Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1990, 1: 402-405 (English: ‘The Weighing of the Poetry of Abū Tammām [reflecting ‘modern’ poetical diction] and al-Buḥtūrī [Abū Tammām’s student, reflecting a ‘classicizing’ ancient Bedouin diction]’). In our terms the genre he is writing in could also be classified as poetic commentary, as he conducts his ‘balancing’, or comparison between the two poets line-by-line (or segment-by-segment), reminding us of a diwān commentary. The endeavors of the poetic commentators have usually not been considered part of the literary-theoretical tradition. But as Hamori shows, because their work was only explanatory and not prescriptive they often revealed “a careful reader’s perception in ways missing from the rhetoric [i.e., naqd] books.” See Andras Hamori, “Reading al-Mutanabbī’s Ode on the Siege of al-Ḥadāt,” in Wadād al-Qāḍī (ed.), Studia Arabica et Islamica: Festschrift für Ihsān ‘Abbās on his
Qudāma uses the classical naqd heading (here: the non-metaphorical ‘assaying’, the precursor for ‘criticism’), with the assessment of poetry in mind (al-‘īlm bi-l-shīʾr, ṣināʿat al-shīʾr). Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī uses the heading ‘eloquence’ or ‘the knowledge of eloquence’ (ʿīlm al-balaḏga wa-maʾrifat al-faṣāḥa) as well as ‘the craft of speech’ (ṣanʿat al-kalaḥ). Likewise does al-Khafājī (faṣāḥa; taʾlīf al-kalaḥ), who also speaks of ‘criticism’. Al-Rummānī’s work, although under the heading iʾjāz al-Qurʾān, is a study of balaḏga ‘eloquence’. The one heading missing from this range – one that became common indeed – is bāḍīʾ (originally: ‘new [style]’), here: ‘the study of literary devices’, starting with Ibn al-Muʿtazz (d. 296/908).

Sixtieth Birthday, [Beirut]: American University of Beirut, 1981, 195-206, esp. 199-200 and 203-205, here: 203. Smyth does include the genre of the commentary as part of ‘post-classical’ criticism but his treatment is very brief (“Criticalism,” 412-13). While al-ʿĀmīdī’s work deals with poetry in terms of poetic themes and poetic evaluation, it does not deal with poetics in the strict sense (i.e., the process of composition) such as we find in Ibn Ṭabāṭabāʾi’s (d. 322/934) Iyār al-shīʾr (‘The Criterion of Poetry’; see Heinrichs, “Nakd,” under “The real founders of nakd: the secretaries”).


ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Muʿtazz, Kitāb al-Bāḍīʾ, ed. Ignatius Kratchkovsky, London: Gibb Memorial, 1935. Later well-known examples are Usāma b. Munqidh’s (d. 584/1188) al-Bāḍīʾ fī naqd al-shīʾr and Ibn Abī l-ʿIṣbaʾiʾs (d. 654/1256) Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr. Bāḍīʾ as a heading is at times on par with ‘īlm al-bayān: Ibn al-Aṭhīr al-Ḥalabī attends to this question explicitly (see §2.3 below), and al-Zanjānī uses the heading bāḍīʾ in the Islamic East (see Part Two, §4.3).
heading ‘ilm al-bayān was not, or was little known, and perhaps al-Ghānimī used it.\(^{141}\) Shawqī Ḍayf thinks the term ‘ilm al-bayān was coined by Diyā’ al-Dīn, the word bayān itself borrowed from al-Jāḥīz.\(^{142}\) But if the combination of ‘ilm with bayān was new, we do not believe Diyā’ al-Dīn would have missed the opportunity to tell us so. What was new was the combination of giving ‘ilm al-bayān a ‘scientific’ disciplinary framework and assigning it a canon of previous non-‘ilm-al-bayān works.

One might ask at this point why the list of previous authorities “in the field” shrunk from seven in the Jāmi` to two in the Mathal. While professional reasons concerning the merit and relevance of the five omitted works could be cited, I am not convinced that such motives stood at the basis of this decision, especially because the omitted works are copiously referred to (or incorporated without acknowledgement) throughout the Mathal. What it may have more to do with is, again, Diyā’ al-Dīn’s attempt to establish himself as the only true authority in the field – and if not himself, then scholars in his locale. Proving this argument may be impossible, but the following could be presented as evidence for a very well-educated guess. Heinrichs alluded to this local patriotism when he observed Diyā’ al-Dīn’s “aesthetic preference for Syrian poetry of the ‘neo-classical’ kind.”\(^{143}\)

Diyā’ al-Dīn was a man of the Jazīra,\(^ {144}\) roughly the area covering northwestern Iraq,

\(^{141}\) Previous scholars like al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) and al-Rāżī (d. 606/1209) did use the heading ‘ilm al-bayān following ’Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, but according to Abu Deeb, the latter “does not […] use these phrases [‘ilm al-ma‘ānī and ‘ilm al-bayān] as technical terms […]” (K. Abu Deeb, “al-Djurjānī,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition [Supplement]). Al-Zamakhsharī used ‘ilm al-bayān in an ambiguous technical sense, and with al-Rāţī we seem to have a non-technical use, following al-Jurjānī. For discussion see §3.2.

\(^{142}\) Shawqī Dayf, al-Balāgha, 317, 324. For Dayf (and other scholars East and West) bayān is understood simply as a synonym for balāgha, ‘ilm al-bayān as a synonym for eloquence studies.

\(^{143}\) Heinrichs, “Ibn al-Athīr,” 315, and §4.1 for details.

\(^{144}\) And not just because of his nisba “al-Jazārī” (which refers to his place of birth). For his biography see §4.1.
northeastern Syria and southeastern Turkey. Born in Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar – present day Cizre in southeastern Turkey – the locale ʿDiyyāʾ al-Dīn was most probably associated with is Mosul in northwestern Iraq. His father was a prominent Mosuli statesman and was assigned to Cizre where he moved with his family. But it was only his early education that ʿDiyyāʾ al-Dīn received in Cizre, later moving back to Mosul and continuing the bulk of his education there. He did serve shortly under Saladin in Egypt during his early adulthood, but nearly all of his later posts as Ayyūbid and Zangid vizier/senior secretary were in modern-day Syria, northern Iraq and southern Turkey: Damascus, Aleppo and Salkhad (Ṣarkhad) in Syria; Irbil, Sinjar and Mosul in Iraq; Samsat (Sumaysāt) in Turkey. He died while on mission from the governor of Mosul to the capital Baghdad. The only locale in which he was said to have “settled” is Mosul.145 “Iraqi” would not fit his affiliation – this by ʿDiyyāʾ al-Dīn’s own account in the Mathal – as we find “Iraqis,” and specifically Baghdadis, singled out and disparaged as scholars.146 This may be a

145 Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt 5: 389-397, esp. 390-91, 396. The order of his locations was: Cizre, Mosul, Cairo, Damascus, Mosul, Cairo, Salkhad, Samsat, Aleppo, Mosul, Irbil, Sinjar, and finally, again, Mosul (Wafayāt 5: 390-91 and C. Cahen, “La Correspondance de ʿDiyyāʾ [sic] ad-Dīn ibn al-Athīr: Liste de lettres et textes de diplômes,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 14.1 [1952], 34-43). It is with regards to this last move to Mosul that Ibn Khallikān says that ʿDiyyāʾ al-Dīn took it as his home and settled (wa-tkakhadhabhā dāra Ḣaqamathī wa-staqrarrah; Wafayāt 5: 391). The information about his death in Baghdad Ibn Khallikān derives from Ibn al-Mustawfī’s (d. 637/1239) Tārīkh Irbil, seemingly from a volume that has not survived. A more exact date of death, according to Ibn Khallikān, was taken from Ibn al-Najjār al-Baghdādī’s (d. 643/1245) [Dhayl] Tārīkh Baghdād, from a volume which, too, has not survived. Notably, all later biographies of ʿDiyyāʾ al-Dīn are closely derived from the Wafayāt. See Part Two, §4.1.

146 Al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir 2: 59, referring to Ibn Aflaḥ al-Baghdādī’s Muqaddima which “the Iraqis pay [much] attention to, praise and eagerly apply themselves to (or: prostrate upon)” (wa-li-l-ʿirāqiyīna bihā [referring the book’s deliberations on eloquence] ināyatun wa-hum wāṣifūna lahā wa-mukibbūna ʿalayhā). ʿDiyyāʾ al-Dīn obviously excludes himself from the “Iraqis.” He then goes on to sharply criticize the quality of the work as a whole as being purely based on example, not explanation (e.g., “fasāḥa is like so-and-so’s saying […]”), followed by more specific criticism regarding Ibn al-Aflaḥ’s notion of newly-formed images (al-maʿānī al-mubtadaʿa a); al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir 2: 59-63. On Ibn Aflaḥ and his work see Geert Jan van Gelder, Two Arabic Treatises on Stylistics: al-Marghīnānī’s al-Mahāsin fi ʿl-naẓm wa-ʿl-nafr, and Ibn Aflaḥ’s Muqaddima, formerly ascribed to al-Marghīnānī, Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1987, 10-14, 26-41. (The recent edition, entitled al-Badiʾ, ed. Ibrāhīm Ṣāliḥ, Abu Dhabi: Dār al-Kutub al-Wataniyya, 2009, is unavailable to me.) For other denigrating references to “Iraqis” or “one of the Iraqis” see al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir 1: 69, 129 (but compare 3: 108, 215 where he offers praise). He also refers dismissively (al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir 2: 29) to the well-known Tadhkira of Ibn Ḥamdūn “the Baghdadi” (d. 562/1167) – a scholar who did not go by the nisba “al-Baghdādī”? See F. Rosenthal, “Ibn Ḥamdūn,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition.
sign of capital-periphery rivalry, similar to the better-known rivalry with Egypt and its most notable epistolographer, al-Qādī al-Fāḍil (d. 596/1200) – albeit one should keep in mind that by this point Baghdad had probably long lost its central prestige.\(^{147}\)

Of all the “famous masters in it [‘ilm al-bayān]” mentioned in the Jāmi‘, only two are associated with Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s locale, the two that made it into the Mathal.\(^{148}\) Beginning with Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī, one could find it perplexing that the work is so heavily criticized at the outset: why, then, would Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn endorse it in the first place as one of the two only books “beneficial in it [‘ilm al-bayān]”?\(^{149}\) The fifth/eleventh-century Ibn Sinān was a northern Syrian scholar and senior statesman, as well as a poet, born into a noble family in the province of Aleppo. He was the student of another famous Syrian, the poet Abū ʿAlā  al-Maʿarrī (d. 449/1057), whom he often mentions in his Sirr al-faṣāḥa.\(^{150}\) This strong geographic affinity with Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s locale could explain how Ibn Sinān’s work made it into the Mathal’s preface.

With Abū al-Qāsim al-Āmidī we have a different story. His work is highly praised by Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn at the outset (with no reservations), and Āmid – or Diarbakir, as it is currently known – is also located in the Jazīra area, in present day southern Turkey. The only caveat is that besides his namesake “al-Āmidī”, Abū al-Qāsim had no actual affiliation with Āmid! Born in Basra, he


\(^{148}\) Qudāma and al-Rummānī lived and worked in Baghdad; al-Jāḥiz in Basra and Baghdad; Abū Hilāl probably in Baghdad and Esfahān; al-Ghānimī in the Eastern Islamic world (al-Jāmi‘ al-kabīr, 2 fn. 5). For the first four see Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, qq.v.

\(^{149}\) fī dhālika; al-Mathal al-sā’ ir 1: 35, and above.

\(^{150}\) Al-Ṣaʿīd’s introduction to Sirr al-faṣāḥa, jīm-dāl; Heinrichs, “Nakd,” under “Further systematical research.” For references to his shaykh see, e.g., Sirr al-faṣāḥa, 61, 80, 128.
received much of his education in Baghdad and was associated with philologists and *kuttāb* there.  

Being further removed in time from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s lifetime than Ibn Sinān was, it could be the case that the life of the fourth/tenth century Abū al-Qāsim was less-known to him. But one cannot know for sure.

Besides the Jazīrite endorsement in the preface of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s later work and the mild hints of local patriotism in the work itself, we have the slightly later perspective of the Baghdadi Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 655 or 6/1257 or 8). By the latter’s own account, he read the *Mathal* while busy with his chancery duties in the beginning of Dhū al-Ḥijja 633/August 1236 and wrote a ‘refutation’ – or rather, a work pointing out argumentativeness, cantankerousness, self-boasting and belittling of past scholars in the *Mathal* – within a fortnight. This ignited a tradition of ‘refutations’ and ‘counter-refutations’ on the *Mathal*; again, not so much containing essential arguments but rather more nitpicking of usually-minor points, and finding fault in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s own oeuvre which he cited as exemplary *shawāhid*. What is interesting in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s account is that at one point he aims his words directly at the author of the *Mathal* and at the leaders (*ruʿasāʾ*, *akābir*) of his town, and Mosulites in general. Because it strengthens our hypothesis that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn fashioned his ‘canon’ of *ʿilm al-bayān* along locality lines, the following (highly stylized) passage from the preface of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s work merits quotation

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152 See the references to the “Iraqis” above, fn. 146.

153 *Al-Falak al-dāʾ ir ‘alā al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir* in volume 4 of al-Ḥūfī and Ṭābānī (eds.), *al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir*, 31-310, here: 31-35 (English: ‘The Revolving Sphere Crushing The Talk of the Town’ [Heinrichs’ translation in “Ibn al-Athīr,” 315]). This is three years before Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s death. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd recognizes Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn as “al-Mawṣilī” but gets his name a bit off: *Naṣīr al-Dīn* [instead of Naṣr Allāh Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn] b. *Muḥammad al-Mawṣilī* al-ma ruf bi-Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazīra* [sic] (al-Falak al-dāʾ ir, 31-32). Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd does offer some praise for the *Mathal*: its style (*inshāʾ uhu wa-ṣināʿ atuhu*; p. 32). For a brief biography of his life see editors’ introduction in *al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir* 4: 15-16. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd directs criticism against the *Mathal* also in his more famous work, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*, a commentary on the Shīʿī collection of sermons, narrations etc. attributed to ‘Alī. It is apparent that in this later work he devoted more thought to his criticism against some of the claims made by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, and not just against his haughtiness (probably owing to the fact that he spent more than fifteen days to write the *Sharḥ*!).
wa-minhâ anna jamâ’atan min akâbiri l-mawṣili qad ḥasuna zuannhum fi ĥâdhâ l-kitâbi jiddan wa-ta’asabû lahu ḥattâ faddalâhu ’alâ akthari l-kutubi l-musannafati fi ĥâdhâ l-fannî wa-awsâlû minhu nusakhân ma’dudatan ilâ madinati l-salâmi wa-ashâ āhu wa-tadâwalahu kathirin min ahlihâ

fa-‘taraḍtu ’alayhi bi-ĥâdhâ l-kitâbi wa-taqârrâbta bîhi ilâ l-khizânati l-sharîfati l-muqaddasati l-nabawiyyati l-imâmiyyati l-mustanṣiriyati ‘amara -lâhu ta’âlâ bi-’imâratihâ andiyata l-fadli wa-ribâ āhu / wa-ṭâlî bâqâ’i mâlikhâ yada l-‘îmi wa-bâ’ āhu / wa-ja’ala malâ i’katâ l-samâ’i анšârâhu wa-ashyâ āhu / kamâ ja’ala mulûka l-arîd’i a’wânu wa-atbâ’ āhu


Among them [the reasons that prompted me to write a ‘refutation’ of the work] is that a group of the leaders of Mosul had a very high opinion of this book [Dîyâ’ al-Dîn’s Mathâl] and clung enthusiastically to it to a point that they gave it preference over most of the books written in this field (fann); they sent several copies of it to Baghdad and made it known, and it circulated among many of its people.

So I raised objections against him with this book and with it gained access to the holy

154 Al-Falâk al-dâ’ir, 32-4. I have benefited from the editors’ footnotes. When applicable I added saj’ demarcations. The suffixed pronoun in wa-minhâ opening the passage is referring to [fa-ḥadānî ‘alâ...] umîr “things [that lead me to write the refutation]” (ibid., 32.6).
noble prophetic ('Abbāsid) caliphal library of the Mustanṣiriyya madrasa [founded in 631/1234 in Baghdad by the caliph al-Mustanṣir, r. 623-640/1226-1242], may God make the meeting places and quarters of erudition prosperous with its building, and may He prolong the hand and arm of knowledge with the longevity of its owner [i.e., the caliph], and make the angels of heaven his [the caliph’s] supporters and followers, just as He made the kings of the earth [i.e., the local sovereigns] his helpers and adherents.

The greater part of my intention in that [i.e., writing the ‘refutation’] is that the author of this book [the Mathal] and the leaders of his town may know that among the smallest servants of this noble dynasty [the ʿAbbāsids] – conceit is destructive and I am not informing about myself since there are many like me – are those who, if they speak in riddles they [nevertheless] make [their intended idea] known, and if they strike they slit [open the skin], and if they let fly their arrows they shoot dead on the spot, and if they scrape the scab [of a wound] they cause it to bleed. [I am doing this so that he and they may know] that Baghdad and the [community of the] Caliph are not devoid – as the Mosulis claim – of those who, if they are are challenged to stay ahead they leave [their opponents far behind], and if they are challenged to be outquickened they win with the best divining arrow [of the maysir], and if they deliver a sermon swords yield [to them] due to their skill, and if they write a chancery letter spears prostrate due to their skill, and if they want they can “teach people sorcery and that which was sent down upon the two angels of Babylon.” [I am doing this so that he and they may know] that among the

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155 J. Pedersen et al., “Madrasa,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, and Hansjörg Schmid, Die Madrasa des Kalifen Al-Mustansir in Baghdad: eine baugeschichtliche Untersuchung der ersten universalen Rechtshochschule des Islam, mit einer Abhandlung über den sogenannten Palast in der Zitadelle in Baghdad, Mainz am Rhein: Zabern, 1980. According to Schmid (p. 1) the madrasa was founded in 625/1227 and was the first to accommodate all four Sunnī schools of the law (on this last point see also Wilfred Madelung, “The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks,” in idem, Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam, London: Variorum Reprints, 1985, II, 109-68, here: 164). It is unlikely that it had a Shīʿī wing as well, and Imāmī here is probably just a reference to the ʿAbbāsids (Ibn Abī al-Ḥaḍīd’s Shīʿī inclinations can be seen from his Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha). The library was said to have held eighty thousand volumes; it was dispossessed during the Mongol invasion.

156 This is a typical modesty topos.

157 Ibn Abī al-Ḥaḍīd’s point here and in the following clauses is that even though he is merely one of the aṣāghir khawal al-dawla, he and others like him in Baghdad nevertheless excel in what they do: they are able to speak clearly even when delivering riddles (i.e., speak allusively), to inflict severe wounds even when they scratch, etc.

158 Not quite a word in English but neither is bāsara in Arabic (see editors’ note, al-Falak al-dāʿir, 33 fn. 5, who interpret it as ghālaba wa-sābaqa). A more accurate non-English word for būsira that would preserve the sense of form I basara would be “to be outfirsted.”

159 A reference to Hārūt and Mārūt in Qurʿān 2: 102, two angels who were allegedly banished from the heavens and
anonymous obscure people of its [Baghdad’s] subjects are those who, if they utter a [he-camel’s] bray it comes out sonorous and fluent,

and if they speak the parchments come to light by their suns [of eloquence],

and if they unsheathe the [sword-]edge of their pen the king says to the sword “go away for you are divorced!” And [if among Baghdad’s obscure people there are many who excel] how [much more so is that the case] with the gatekeepers of its [Baghdad’s] Ka’ba and those surrounding its noble threshold, the ‘stallions’ of eloquence who, if one of them runs in the race-track of good style (bayān) he puts to shame flashes of lightning and mocks the winds, and if he strikes enemies with a sharp tongue he cuts through the double-layered Salūqī coat of mail until the fire of the fire-fly is ignited in the sides of the blades [of the sword-like tongue]!

To recapitulate the main points in this passage: Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd acknowledges the great popularity of the Mathal among Mosuli leaders (probably leading scholars and kuttāb); he notes their claim to superiority (probably as kuttāb); and he upholds the Baghdadi supremacy in disclosed to humans the secrets of sorcery. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd is using this as an exaggeration of his abilities.

160 The faucial bags (shiqšiqa pl. shaqāqiq) are placed behind the palate of the he-camel and are inflated and blown out from the side of the mouth when the he-camel is excited; the shiqšiqa is an image of eloquence (Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 1955-1956, 1579). The verb hadara usually refers to a camel’s bray but hadarat shiqšiqa is an idiom meaning “his utterance was sonorous and fluent” (ibid., 1579, 2886). The phrase thus literally means, “when they bray [a camel’s bray] the faucial bags are in place for them.” Another possibility is that by using the verb qARRa Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd is making a play on words on the phrase qarrat ʿaynuhu ’he (lit. his eye) was delighted’, that is, ‘his shaqāqiq are delighted’ (though the preposition lahu is then less accounted for).

161 There is a play on words here since another meaning of mahāriq is ‘deserts’. The image of ‘suns’ in the context of eloquence is a fairly common one.

162 “Baghdad’s Ka’ba” is a reference to the caliph himself; the gatekeepers – to his kuttāb.

163 Fuhūl lit. ‘stallions’ in reference to poets is an old designation for the ‘masters of poetry’. For the profile of a fahl – typically a Jāhilī poet – according to al-Aṣma’ī (d. 213/828, other dates are also given) see Heinrichs, “Nakd,” under “Criticism of poetry among the philologists.”

164 A fast horse is often likened to a flash of lightning or to the wind. See Abū Hilāl al-’Askarī, Dīwān al-maʿānī, 2 vols. in 1, Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1352 [1933-34], 2: 107-108 (fī ṣiḥāf al-khayl).

165 The last clause is taken almost verbatim from a line by al-Nābigha (active 6th cent. CE) describing the swords of the Ghassānids (see al-Falak al-dāʾ ir, 34 n. 6). For a similar idea expressed by al-Kumayt (d. 126/743 or 4) see Lane, Lexicon, 498. Another translation could be: “until the fire of Ḫubāḥib (= Abū Ḫubāḥib, an allegedly niggardly man who never lighted but a faint fire for fear of attracting guests) is ignited…” (Lane, Lexicon, 497; al-Falak al-dāʾ ir, 34 fn. 6).
matters of good style as Baghdad houses the kuttāb of the caliph himself (Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd being one of them).

In the passage Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd alludes to a “field/art” (fann) to which the Mathal belongs: in light of the preceding points, it is probable that he is referring to the scribal arts. The fact that he does not mention ‘ilm al-bayān as a discipline-heading serves as additional proof that ‘ilm al-bayān was not a recognized field of study during the early 1200s.166 As mentioned above, we take the testimonial by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd as circumstantial evidence supporting what we believe to be Diyā’ al-Dīn’s intentions to establish himself and scholars in his locale – the Jazīra, or parts of Greater Syria – as authorities in the science called ‘ilm al-bayān.

Back in the Jāmi’, after specifying the ‘extended’ list of authorities in the field, Diyā’ al-Dīn expounds on his method and process of writing his work, which I have referred to above as scientific salafism. His description of the approach runs as follows:167 first he began reading the work of “the famous masters [of ‘ilm al-bayān]”; then, after some time not having consulted those works, he perused the holy Qur’ān and found interesting and subtle points “of this mode” (min hādhā al-naḥw, i.e. ‘ilm al-bayān); next he subjected those scholarly works to an investigation of the points that he had found in the Qur’ān, only to discover that they had overlooked them; then he scrutinized the Qur’ān more carefully and “extracted (istakhrajtu) from it at that point thirty categories (durūb) of ‘ilm al-bayān” which no other scholar had previously mentioned; next he began writing the book in order to benefit the “composer of speech [poetry and prose]”; finally, during the editing process (taḥqīq) he revisited the books of the

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166 See also al-Falak al-dā’ir, 39-40, where Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd makes mention of the knowledge/science of the poetic craft (‘ilm šinā’at al-shi’r, including rhyme and meter) and criticism (naqūd al-shi’r wa-l-kalām) but not ‘ilm al-bayān.

167 Al-Jāmi’ al-kabīr, 1-3, esp. 3, for which the following is a close summary.
aforementioned scholars, at which point new subtleties occurred to him, thus rarely did he leave their comments unchanged.

As we can see from this detailed account (the corresponding account in the Mathal runs much shorter), Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s approach relies heavily on his own personal judgment and ingenuity. But without consultation of previous authorities in the field the method is ineffective since it lacks a point of reference. By outlining his approach he both establishes former scholars as authorities in ʿilm al-bayān and establishes himself as their superior. This tendency is only reinforced in his later book, the Mathal, where the list of authorities drops to two and the emphasis lies solely on his ijtiḥād (see quoted passage above, p. 42).\footnote{In his later al-Washy al-marqūm he proclaims to follow the method of ijtiḥād rather than taqlīd, but here it is said in the context of ʿināʿat al-kitāba (see al-Washy al-marqūm, 46, 52, and 47 for a reference to his earlier written Mathal).}

**Summing Up**

Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn aligns both his literary-theoretical works with the scientific framework of ʿilm al-bayān, a disciplinary designation with little to no recognition at the turn of the seventh/thirteenth century. Inspired by the sciences of legal theory and logic, and especially by the work of al-Ghazālī, Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn makes a forced attempt to vouch for his subject matter’s scientificity in an endeavor to bind the ‘old’ stylistic discussions by rational, or scientific rules. This seems to be an innovation in literary theory. Whether Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn himself succeeds in living up to his declared intentions will be subject to scrutiny in subsequent chapters.

In his attempt to consolidate the field of literary theory Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn also presents the reader with a canon of sorts in the field by back-projecting previous works on criticism, eloquence, poetry and more under the heading of ʿilm al-bayān. In a progression from his earlier
to his later work, we see that the authorities he attempts to establish become limited to his locale, the Jazīra, and eventually to himself. Evidence from a contemporary ‘reply’ to Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s later work, written by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, reinforces this hypothesis.
Chapter 2: 
Evidence of ‘Ihm al-Bayān in Later Sources

Following Ouyang’s guidelines, we have looked at the two components found in Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s work that make a body of knowledge “an independent field of intellectual inquiry.” These are (1) a consolidated definition of the field, and (2) a shared definition of an authoritative specialist. But the conception of a literary-theoretical science called ‘ilm al-bayān as an independent field of study does not necessarily mean its historical success in view of later generations. After addressing the essence of ‘ilm al-bayān in Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s eyes, we shall now turn to the question of its existence, or in philosophical terms: after asking the mā ‘what (is it)’ we are now asking the hal ‘whether (it exists)’. Did there come to be a widely recognized discipline termed ‘ilm al-bayān that referred to an overall science of verbal arts following the endeavors of Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn? Or was ‘ilm al-bayān again one out of several viable options of approaching the field? If ‘ilm al-bayān did emerge as a consolidated discipline of literary theory, was Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn perceived as one of its authoritative specialists?

In what follows we shall attend to hitherto unnoticed traces of ‘ilm al-bayān found in later sources, bringing to light an independent science that seems to have existed throughout the 1200s and parts of the 1300s, only to be trumped by the later formalized ‘ilm al-balāgha lit. ‘the science of eloquence’, i.e. ‘scholastic rhetoric’ or the Standard Theory, as Bauer refers to it. Because the later sources we are looking at saw the field primarily through the prism of ‘ilm al-balāgha, we must rely on a close reading of several key passages that nevertheless display vestiges of the earlier ‘ilm al-bayān. The later hegemony of ‘ilm al-balāgha may explain why the

169 Ouyang, Literary Criticism, 204, 207, and above.

170 Standardtheorie; see Bauer, “Arabische Kultur,” Rhetorik, 291 ff.
existence of ʿilm al-bayān as a consolidated science has escaped the attention of modern scholars and many medieval scholars. The fact that the later sources we are looking at are cognizant of ʿilm al-balāgha makes the implied references to the earlier ʿilm al-bayān all the more telling. For anyone conducting future work on the Standard Theory, our findings also show that the development of ʿilm al-balāgha was not instantaneous, even after the appearance of staple works in the field such as those by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, known as Khaṭīb Dimashq ‘The Preacher of Damascus’ (d. 739/1338). We shall first examine works on the classification of the sciences, preceded by a prefatory word on the formalized ʿilm al-balāgha; we will then proceed to literary-theoretical works betraying evidence of our ʿilm al-bayān.

### 2.1. The Standard Theory

No one disputes that ʿilm al-balāgha was a consolidated discipline. It emerged in the eighth/fourteenth century as an aid to the education of the legal scholar in the madrasa and has been taught as such up until modern times. Its canon could not be clearer, with the works of al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229), Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm, and al-Qazwīnī, Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ, inspired by the ‘forefather’ ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081). The term ʿilm al-balāgha is

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171 We should keep in mind that the focus of this dissertation is on the central Arabic-speaking Islamic world. Despite his name, al-Qazwīnī had no apparent connection with Qazvin and was in fact of pure Arab descent. See W.P. Heinrichs, “al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī,” Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature 1: 439-40. (His forefathers may have settled in the East after the Islamic conquests and then fled due to the Mongol invasions, but there is no evidence of this in the biographies.)

al-Qazwīnī’s. By the time al-Sakkākī’s work became widely known in the central Arabic-speaking lands via al-Qazwīnī’s Talkhīṣ the term ‘ilm al-bayān came to denote the second subfield within the ‘new’ science of eloquence, the first subfield being ‘ilm al-maʾānī

~‘functional grammar’ or ‘semantics of syntax’ and the third ‘ilm al-badī’ ‘figures of speech’ or ‘rhetorical embellishments’. This latter ‘ilm al-bayān dealt more narrowly with imagery (our term) and with the foundational forms of figurative language (majāz). Indeed, in modern scholarship both West and East, the term ‘ilm al-bayān is associated almost entirely with the

173 Or more precisely, ‘ilm al-balāgha wa-tawābī‘uhā “the science of eloquence and its supplements”; Jalāl al-Dīn Muhammad b. ’Ābd al-Raḥmān al-Khaṭīb Al-Qazwīnī, Talkhīṣ al-miṣfāh fī al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān wa-l-badī: wa-bi-l-hāmish sharḥahu Mukhtāsar al-maʾānī li-Masʿūdī b. Abī ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī, [Cairo]: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1938, 6 (English: ‘The Epitome of the Key [al-Sakkākī’s Key to the Sciences] on maʾānī, bayān and badī’, along with its Commentary The Epitome of the maʾānī’); idem, al-Īdāh fī ‘ilm al-balāgah, ed. Muhammad ’Ābd al-Munʿim Khafājī, 2 vols. in 1, 4th ed., Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1975, 70 (English: ‘The Clarification in the Studies of Eloquence’). The ‘supplements’ are traditionally understood to be a reference to ‘ilm al-badī (see below), as in al-Taftāzānī’s take in Talkhīṣ, 6, but I take it to refer strictly to the appendices (mulḥaqāt) dealing with ‘plagiarism’ (sariqāṭ) and with ‘good structure’ (husn al-ibtidā’ wa-l-takhalluṣ wa-l-intihā’); see Talkhīṣ, 367-92 and al-Īdāh, 556-600 (the term mulḥaqāt appears in al-Īdāh, 556). The heading ‘ilm al-balāgha seems to have replaced ‘ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān, which was used by al-Sakkākī, but can also be seen in later works. One example is Jalāl al-Dīn ’Ābd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, Sharḥ Uqūd al-jumān fī ’ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1939 (English: ‘Commentary on The Pearl Necklaces on the study of maʾānī and bayān’). Al-Suyūṭī also preserves the heading ‘ilm al-bayān for the entire science, on which see §2.3 below.

174 For ‘ilm al-maʾānī ‘pragmatics’ could also be appropriate. Bonebakker (“al-Maʾānī wa ’l-Bayān”) translates ‘ilm al-maʾānī as “the theory of functional, appropriate style” or “semantics of syntax” (maʾānī being the maʾānī al-naḥw) and ‘ilm al-bayān as “science of figurative expression” or “science of exposition” following Mehren. Schaade and von Grunebaum (‘Balāgha’) render the scholastic ‘ilm al-bayān “modes of presentation.” Heinrichs (al-Sakkākī) renders it: “lit. ‘elucidating discourse’ = ‘indirect presentation by way of images’.” Going back to Bonebakker, he says that the terms maʾānī and bayān were used by al-Zamakhshārī in the Kashshāf and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāẓī in the Niḥāya “in too vague a way to justify any conclusions” (see Chapter 3). He adds that al-Sakkākī took ‘ilm al-bayān to be part of the study of ‘ilm al-maʾānī. With respect to badī’ Bonebakker says: “This section continues the older tradition of rhetorical studies initiated by Ibn al-Muʿtazz and Kuḍāma […]”, referring here to what we have called the early naqd works. For Bonebakker, a work such as the Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr of Ibn Abī al-Īṣābī (see §2.3) represents “handbooks by authors who followed the ‘older’ school.” Regarding the usual tripartite structure of ‘ilm al-balāgha one should note later, Persianate strands of this discipline that lacked the section on maʾānī but included a lengthy treatment of prosody and separate chapters on riddles/allusions and plagiarism. See de Tassy, Rhétorique, vi, who bases his work on the Ḥadāyyiq al-balāghat written in the eighteenth century by Mīr Shams al-Dīn Faqrī of Delhi.

175 ‘Imagery’ is an inexact term, for the ‘images’ here are not necessarily visual, as the term might suggest. ‘The study of tropes’ would also be an inaccurate designation for the standard ‘ilm al-bayān: while some tropes – indeed, the major ones (simile, metaphor, metonymy) – are treated in ‘ilm al-bayān, many tropes are treated in ‘ilm al-badī’. The fact that the meaning of bayān in the heading ‘ilm al-bayān is left undefined by the standard theorists is perplexing (and frustrating). Interestingly, a term that could be taken to denote ‘imagery’ or ‘images’ is maʾānī (as in the maʾānī we find in works like that of Abū Hilāl al-ʾAskarī).
narrower, highly specialized sub-science within the tripartite system of the Standard Theory. After preliminary ‘semantic’ discussions, *tashbīh* lit. ‘likening’ was the first category to be treated under the section of the standard *ʿilm al-bayān*; we may refer to it as a theory of comparison or similarity. This formed the basis for the second category, viz. *majāz* ‘figurative language’, which included metonymsies and synecdoches (*majāz mursal*) on one hand and a vast range of metaphors (*istiʿāra*) on the other. Finally, in the third category, various forms of periphrasis (*kināya*) were discussed. According to this scheme, and owing to the thought of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, neither *tashbīh* nor *kināya* were considered part of figurative language (*majāz*).

When dealing with the Standard Theory one must keep in mind its function and its place of instruction (the *madrasa*), two components which are intertwined. As Heinrichs remarks, “[…] the main goal of [scholastic] rhetoric is as a tool to understand the *i’djāz al-Ḵurʿān*.” This is in contrast to Bonebakker’s assessment, according to which “[i]t is conceivable that al-Sakkākī and al-Ḵazwīnī tried to programme the study of rhetoric in such a way that the reader

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176 Exceptions include scholars who recognize that ʿIyā ʿal-Dīn spoke of *ʿilm al-bayān* but saw it as another name for *ʿilm al-balāgha* (see Chapter 1, introduction).


179 Heinrichs, “Naḵd,” under “Philosophical poetics and the Maghribi ‘school.’”
would become familiar first with the elementary skills of composition, then with the characteristics of literature as a form of art, and finally with some stylistic devices used by accomplished poets and writers.”

In fact, the Standard Theory did not seem to be concerned with composition at all (perhaps only minimally). Even as the literature grew to unfathomable magnitudes of commentaries, supercommentaries and glosses, and may be seen as independent of the legal education, its essence nevertheless seems to concern a theory of language and philosophy of language in the analytical sense, which can be of relevance for the legal scholar. As a hermeneutics first and foremost, it has not to do with the practical aspect of composing poetry and ornate prose. We might point out that ‘ilm al-balāgha was not the only emerging science within the madrasa domain: to this we may add the science of semantics (‘ilm al-wad”) and the science of disputation (‘ilm al-munāẓara), two additional disciplines emerging in the eighth/fourteenth century as aids to religious training.

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180 Bonebakker, “al-Maʿānī wa ’l-Bayān.”

181 I say “seems” because a study of the later Standard Theory remains to be written (both in the synchronic and diachronic sense). Similar to later logical works (until recently), the later balāgha works are largely uncharted territory. One exception is the third part of Maṭlūb’s al-Qazwīnī wa-shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ, esp. 529-609. For a recent change in the logical sphere see Khaled El-Rouayheb, Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, Leiden: Brill, 2010. For a good start in Western scholarship in the field of ‘ilm al-maʿānī (but limited to al-Sakkākī) see Udo Gerald Simon, Mittelalterliche arabische Sprachbetrachtung zwischen Grammatik und Rhetorik: ‘ilm al-maʿānī bei as-Sakkākī, Heidelberg: Heidelberger Orientverlag, 1993. He starts with a short history of the field which includes the works of ʿAbd al-Qāhir, al-Zamakhsharī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (pp. 16-30) and includes a brief but useful list of later authors (pp. 31-33). An important contribution is Smyth, “Controversy in a Tradition of Commentary,” who outlines the major players in the field and their scholarly method.

2.2. *I*lm al-*Bayān* in Works on the Classification of the Sciences

Since the term ‘ilm al-bayān is associated almost entirely with the second sub-discipline of the Standard Theory, let us begin our investigation of works of the classification of the sciences with a much later one, written in the tenth/sixteenth century. In the work of the famous Ottoman Anatolian scholar Ṭashkōprūţāde (Ṭashkubrīzāda, d. 968/1560), Miftāḥ al-*saʿāda*, the definition of ‘ilm al-bayān replicates the one given by al-Qazwīnī – a definition replicated, in fact, in the vast majority of subsequent studies, including the modern *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (q.v. “al-Maʿānī wa ’l-Bayān”):

\[
\text{wa-huwa maʾrifatu īrādu l-maʿnā l-wāḥidi fi ṭuruqin mukhtalifatin fī wudūhi l-dalālati}
\]

It [*ilm al-bayān*] is the knowledge of expressing one and the same idea in ways differing in [their degree of] clear indication [to that idea.]

Surprisingly, Ṭashkōprūţāde does not provide the rubric ‘ilm al-*balāgha* as an independent science; he seems to be taking it for granted. What he does, rather, is treat ‘ilm al-*maʿānī*, ‘ilm al-*bayān* and ‘ilm al-*badīʿ* in succession, declaring that the three sciences cannot be

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183 Ṭashkōprūţāde, *Miftāḥ al-*saʿāda* 1: 201. See also Kātip Čelebi, *Kashf al-zunūn an asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn*, eds. Şerefettin Yaltukaya and Kılıslı Rifat Bilge, 2 vols., Beirut: Dār Iḥāya al-Tarāth al-ʿArabī, n.d. (reprint of the 1941-1955 Istanbul edition), 1: 259-60. On Ṭashkōprūţāde see Barbara Fleming, “Ṭashkōprūţāde,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. A more literal rendering of the passage would be: “It is the knowledge of delivering one meaning in ways different in clarity of indication”. The wording of al-Qazwīnī differs slightly (and my translation in the final square brackets above reflects it): *wa-huwa ʾilmun yuʿrafu bihi īrādu l-maʾnā l-wāḥidi bi-ṭuruqin mukhtalifatin fī wudūhi l-dalālati ḍayhi* (emphasis added); see *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*, 218, and al-ʿĪdāh, 326. My translation more closely reflects al-Taftāzānī’s understanding of al-Qazwīnī, which could be rendered: “[…] expressing any one idea in different ways according to various degrees of clear indication” (emphasis added); al-Taftāzānī, *Mukḥtasar al-*maʿānī* in *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*, 218-19. Bonebakker’s translation of al-Qazwīnī’s definition (“al-Maʿānī wa ’l-bayān”) runs as follows: “the science through which one knows how to express one and the same concept in ways which differ as to the degree of clarity achieved in indicating this concept.” For al-Sakkākī’s account of *ilm al-bayān*, which inspired that of al-Qazwīnī, see *Miftāḥ al-*ulūm*, 329-30. The knowledge of expressing one idea in differing ways is not equivalent to *taʿlīf* in the sense of composing epistolary prose and poetry.

184 For references to *ilm al-balāgha* see *Miftāḥ al-*saʿāda* 1: 200.5-6, 203.13. The reason for not providing the heading here seems to be the account given by Ibn al-Akfānī, whom he follows (see below).
detached from one another.\textsuperscript{185} It is for this reason that he waits until the end of his explication of ‘ilm al-bādī’ to specify the works that were written in all three funūn ‘branches’.\textsuperscript{186} As can be expected, al-Sakkākī is at the forefront of these authors. But at the end of each sub-science Ṭashköprüzāde does specify a scant number of works dealing solely with that specialized science. The single work said to deal with ‘ilm al-bayān is “al-Jāmi’ al-kabīr by Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī.”\textsuperscript{187} Incidentally, Ṭashköprüzāde is thinking of Diyā al-Dīn’s brother, the one who specialized in ‘ilm al-tafsīr ‘the science of Qur’ānic exegesis’ and authored the al-Tafsīr al-kabīr.\textsuperscript{188} Since the Jāmi’ by Ibn al-Athīr is not limited to the topics found in the scholastic ‘ilm al-bayān, I see its mention here as a vestige of the ‘old’ understanding of ‘ilm al-bayān as a supra-heading for stylistics and literary theory. To be sure, Ṭashköprüzāde’s account of ‘ilm al-bayān conforms to the standard rhetorical understanding of the term – and for our purposes it acts as a ‘control’ text – but the fact that he maintains an association between ‘ilm al-bayān and an “Ibn al-Athīr” serves as a first hint of the incongruence we find in later sources between ‘ilm al-bayān as a field within the

\textsuperscript{185} Miftāḥ al-saʿāda 1: 200.3e (fa-lammā lam yufrāz [‘ilm al-maʿānī] ‘ani l-bayānī wa-l-bādī’ […]).

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid. and 1: 202.5e. The list of these works is long indeed; see Miftāḥ al-saʿāda 1: 202-214 (usually commentaries and supercommentaries from the eighth/fourteenth century); it illustrates how much work still needs to be done in this later, philosophically-minded science.

\textsuperscript{187} But in the Hyderabad edition, both this work and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Nihāya are cited, just as we find in the earlier Ibn al-Akfānī (see below). See Ahmad b. Muṣṭafā Ṭashköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣḥāḥ al-siyāda fī mawdūʿ at al-ʿulūm, under the supervision of Sharafüddin Ahmed, 3 vols., Hyderabad: Dāʿirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1977, 1: 181. This may be an earlier version of Ṭashköprüzāde’s work.

Standard Theory and ‘ilm al-bayān as a supra-science.\(^{189}\)

In his account of the three sub-sciences of the science of eloquence Ţashkıprüzāde is highly indebted to the earlier Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 739/1348), a scholar from the Jazīra working in Mamlūk Egypt.\(^{190}\) In the latter’s small treatise on the classification of the sciences, Irshād al-qāṣid, he treats the sciences of al-maʿānī, al-bayān and al-badī‘ as three of the ten sub-sciences of ‘ilm al-adab ‘the science of philology’.\(^{191}\) Ibn al-Akfānī does not use the heading ‘ilm al-balāgha. In fact, he states that it is often the case that the topics of all three sciences are treated together (“with one another”) – that is, in a mixed manner that is not neatly divided into maʿānī, bayān and badī‘.\(^{192}\) By this Ibn al-Akfānī seems to be alluding to the ‘old’ naqd works, which would include works like _DYNAMIC Akfānī’ al-Dīn’s.

More revealing, however, of the tension between the ‘old’ understanding of stylistics/literary theory and the ‘new’ neatly-divided Standard Theory is the wording of his

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\(^{189}\) We might point out parenthetically that Ţashkıprüzāde reprents the discussion of maʿānī-bayān-badī‘ (though not in these terms) in his treatment of furūʿ ‘ilm al-tafsīr ‘the science of Qur’ānic commentary: specific studies’. Here Ţashkıprüzāde deals with the literary-linguistic themes more specifically: e.g., the types of predication, conciseness, metaphors, the various literary devices (termed here badā‘ iʿ al-Qurʾān), etc. (Miftāḥ al-saʿāda 2: 380-595 for the entire section on the furūʿ, and 450-510 for the topics that overlap with literary theory). Here Ţashkıprüzāde is not following Ibn al-Akfānī. The importance of literary theory to Qur’ānic studies is discussed in Part Two, §4.4 and especially §4.5. See also our discussion of Ibn Abī l-Iṣbaʾ in §2.3.

\(^{190}\) See J.J. Witkam, “Ibn al-Akfānī,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*, who states that the whole organizational scheme of *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* is based upon Ibn al-Akfānī’s work.


\(^{192}\) wa-kathāران mā tadhkara masāʾ ilū l-ʿulāmī l-thalāthatu baʿd al-dhū ḫaʾal maʿa baʿdīn, Dirshād al-qāṣid, 24.3-4 [441]. At the end of his synopsis of ʿilm al-badī‘ Ibn al-Akfānī does enumerate the works that comprise of all three sciences (wa-mīna 1-kutubī l-mushtamliyat ʿalā ilūmī l-maʿānī wa-l-bayānī wa-l-badī‘)…); see 24.5-4. He ends with a statement (24.2-15) on the highmost status that these (three) sciences hold, being as they are the means to understanding the Holy Scripture and the words of the Prophet – the two instances of inimitable eloquence (cf. what we said above about the function of the Standard Theory as a hermeneutical science).
synopsis of ‘ilm al-bayān itself. While the synopses of ‘ilm al-maʿānī and ‘ilm al-bādī’ correspond, more or less, to the later standard understanding thereof, ‘ilm al-bayān is explained in different terms:

al-qawlu fī l-bayāni wa-huwa ‘ilmun yuʿrafu fīhi aḥwālī l-aqāwīlī l-murakkabati l-maʾkhūdhati ʿani l-fusahāʾi wa-l-bulaghāʾi mina l-khuṭābi wa-l-rasāʾi ili wa-l-ashāʾīri min jihati balāghatiḥā wa-khuluwwiḥā ʿani l-lakāni wa-taʿdiyatiḥā l-maṭlūba bi-hā wāfayatan wa-manfaʿatuhu ḥusūlu l-malakāti ʿalā inshāʾī l-aqāwīlī l-madhkūrati bi-ḥasabi l-maʾlūfi minhā kāfyatan fī l-tajhīmi wa-l-tabyīni idhā uḏīfa dhālika ilā ʿabīn munqādin wa-dhihnīn waqqād

Bayān: It is a science in which one comes to know the patterns of the compound statements of sermons, letters and poems received from the verbally skillful and eloquent [people]. [One comes to know them] from the perspective of their eloquence, their lack of incorrect usage and their conveyance of what is desired by them in a complete manner. Its [the science’s] benefit attaining the habitual ability to compose the abovementioned statements according to what is customary among them [the statements], in a manner that adequately makes [the desired idea] understood and

193 The subject matter of maʿānī is the types of predication and its contextual aptness (ibid., 23-24 [442-441]). The subject matter of bādīʿ is the embellishments/ornamentation of speech (ibid., 24). In the realm of bādīʿ Ibn al-Akfānī’s account slightly departs from the standard understanding: he claims that what is investigated for the purpose of ‘beautification’ is the substances (mawādd) of the ‘poetic’ statements (“whether poetry or prose”). This could lead one to conclude that Ibn al-Akfānī had only the mental figures (or figures of thought) in mind, rather than the purely verbal, or aural figures. I am not certain of the meaning of mawādd here.

194 Following Bonebakker’s translation of aḥwāl in the definition of ‘ilm al-maʿānī given by al-Qazwīnī (“al-Maʿānī wa l-bayān”). Other possibilities for aḥwāl: cases; conditions; states; circumstances.

195 Other translations for aqāwīl could be “speech”, “sayings” or “utterances”. I opted for the more philosophical understanding of the term (cf. the aqāwīl shīʿīyya ‘poetic statements’ found in works of philosophical poetics) considering Ibn al-Akfānī’s background as a physician and, thus, his deep familiarity with philosophy. Indeed, the very writing of a work on the classification of the sciences is deeply rooted in philosophical tradition: first, the philosophical sciences are always accorded a high status in such works, and second, these works are typically written by philosophers (al-Fārābī [d. 339/950] and his ʿulūm al-ḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm are the prime example). Technically, the understanding of aqāwīl as ‘statements’ would preclude non-declarative sentences (that is, sentences with regards to which one cannot say if they are true or false, like interrogatives, exclamations and the like), but I do not think Ibn al-Akfānī has this exclusion in mind.

196 For each science Ibn al-Akfānī states (1) its “benefit” or “usefulness” (wa-manfaʿatuhu), and (2) which sciences are needed as a prerequisite to it (wa-yāḥtāju ilā).

197 Or: ‘habitus’. Malaka is usually taken to be an innate quality, but clearly here it is seen as a faculty that can be acquired; this agrees with ʿiyāʾ al-Dīn’s view of the nature of composition.
What is most striking about this account is that it bears no resemblance to the standard sub-science of imagery (cf. the Qazwīnian account of ‘ilm al-bayān, above.) The field of ‘ilm al-bayān as it is presented by Ibn al-Akfānī is much wider in scope, as it includes all artistic and eloquent speech (and not just the figurative ones), as they are found in poetry and in prose. It is, indeed, the most literary of the sciences subsumed under ‘ilm al-adab. What is more, emphasis is put on the production of literary, or eloquent speech, as we find in Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s delineation of the science (‘ilm al-bayān li-ta’lif al-naẓm wa-l-nathr.) One could thus be justified in translating ‘ilm al-bayān here as ‘the science of literary production’ (both in the passive and in the active sense).

Ibn al-Akfānī then specifies the prerequisites for ‘ilm al-bayān, namely lexicography, morphology, syntax and the memorization of eloquent statements (al-aqāwil al-faṣīha), the most useful and exalted of which is the Qur’ān. He ends by mentioning the works dedicated solely to ‘ilm al-bayān. These are “Kitāb Nihāyat al-i’jāz by al-Imām Fakhr al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb” and, as we find later in Ṭashköprüzāde, “al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr by Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazārī.” Whether Ibn al-Akfānī had our Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn in mind (rather than his brother) is

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198 Lit. ‘compliant nature’ (root *q.w.d*), but in conjunction with *ṭab* it carries a positive connotation. Another option is to read it as *mingād*, the intensive form *mifʿāl* of the adjective *nāqid*, hence: ‘highly critical nature’ – but this usage is unattested.

199 *Irshād al-qāṣīd*, 24 [441].

200 Or those primary literary devices that contain imagery: simile, metonymy, metaphor, periphrasis (*tashbīh, majāz, kināya*).

201 That is, the study of eloquent verbal products (passive) and developing the ability to produce them (active).

202 Ibid. The “i’jāz” is ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s *Dalāʾil al-i’jāz*; the work by al-Rāzī is an abridgement of both the *Dalāʾ il* and the *Asrār al-balāgha* (stated explicitly in *Nihāya*, ed. Amīn, 74-75). It is Fakhr al-Dīn’s father who was the preacher (*khaṭīb*) in their native town, Rayy; Fakhr al-Dīn was therefore known as Ibn al-Khaṭīb, not al-Khaṭīb. See C.G. Anawati, “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. The title *Nihāya al-i’jāz* is
unclear. Even if we are justified in presuming that the *Jāmiʿ* was correctly attributed to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, it does not answer the question of why it was the *Jāmiʿ* that was mentioned here rather than the *Mathal*. One possible explanation is that the *Mathal* was seen as a work in which “the topics of all three sciences are treated together” (see above), whereas the less known *Jāmiʿ* was not. This would mean that Ibn al-Akfānī had not actually seen the *Jāmiʿ* since it, too, treats “together” the topics later to be considered either *maʿānī*, *bayān* or *badīʿ*.

The most pressing point for our purposes is the memory of an overarching *ʿilm al-bayān* coextensive with the science delineated in the *Mathal* and the *Jāmiʿ*, and the identification of an “Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazari” with this development. The mention of al-Rāzī is also important. In his epitome of al-Jurfānī’s work, *Nihāyat al-ta’līz*, al-Rāzī speaks of *ʿilm al-bayān*, seemingly in a non-technical sense following al-Jurfānī (see §3.2), and his work influenced many subsequent scholars of literary theory (see §2.3 and Part Two). His inclusion here by Ibn al-Akfānī probably has to do with his reputation as a *muḥaqiq*, an independently-minded critical thinker (see §4.4). As we shall see, however, al-Rāzī’s work is by no means a study of literary composition, in the way that is outlined by Ibn al-Akfānī.

Terminologically, Ibn al-Akfānī uses *ʿilm al-bayān* in the context of the *maʿānī-bayān-badīʿ* triad, but content-wise he fills the term with the ‘old’ substance of an overarching discipline of verbal arts. In the famous *Muqaddima* by the North African historian and thinker Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) we find the opposite occurrence in play: the substance is the standardized tenets of *ʿilm al-balāgha* but the term used to identify them is probably an ellipsis for the full *Nihāyat al-ta’līz fī dirāyat al-iʿjāz*, rather than a mistake (Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’ refers to it as the *iʿjāz* of Ibn al-Khaṭīb, see §2.3).

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203 One argument in support of this presumption would be the geographical (Jazīra/Egypt) and chronological (about a century) affinity between Ibn al-Akfānī and Abnāʾ al-Athīr.
In other words, the name Ibn Khaldūn uses for what we know as the standardized science of eloquence is \textit{ilm al-bayān}. Here \textit{ilm al-bayān} is presented as the third of the four Arabic sciences (\textit{ulūm al-lisān al-ʿarabī}), the others being grammar, lexicography and \textit{ilm al-adab} (to be discussed shortly).\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Ism al-bayān} includes the three subtypes (\textit{sīf} pl. \textit{aṣnāf}) familiar to us from the Standard Theory, namely (1) functional grammar (or: contextual aptness, oddly termed \textit{ilm al-balāgha!}), (2) implied meaning (\textit{ilm al-bayān} – on this translation below), and (3) embellishments (\textit{ilm al-badī}).\textsuperscript{206} The reason given for naming the supra-heading \textit{“ilm al-bayān”} has, in fact, to do with the hypothesis \textit{ilm al-bayān} (al-\textit{sīf} al-thānī): according to Ibn Khaldūn, it was the first among the three to be discussed by the ‘ancients’ (al-\textit{aqdamīn}), so the ‘moderns’ named the discipline after it.\textsuperscript{207}


\textsuperscript{205} \textit{Muqaddima} 4: 1254 (Rosenthal has “sciences concerned with the Arabic language” for \textit{ulūm al-lisān al-ʿarabī}; Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 319). It should be noted that \textit{ilm al-naḥw} is not limited to syntax as one would gather from the discussion in \textit{Muqaddima} 4: 1254-58 dealing entirely with case endings. In his introductory words of \textit{ilm al-bayān} (4: 1263) Ibn Khaldūn does include \textit{abniyat al-kalimāt} within \textit{ilm al-naḥw}, that is, morphology.

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid. 4: 1263-64, and in slightly different terms 4: 1307-1308. According to Ibn Khaldūn the three-fold discipline is chronologically posterior to the science of syntax and the science of lexicography (4: 1263). For the use of (\textit{ilm}) al-balāgha in the sense of (what we know as) \textit{ilm al-maʿāni} see 4: 1264.8-6’, 1279.7 ff., 1280.12, 1287.3-4, 1291.1-2, 1293.6 ff., 1310.11-13, 1311.3-4 (Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 335 translates this as ‘the science of rhetoric’).

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Muqaddima} 4: 1265. This seems to be Ibn Khaldūn’s own interpretation. Though elsewhere he states (4: 1229) that the topics of (the supra) \textit{ilm al-bayān} were historically first scattered throughout the grammar books: but as is well known, figurative speech, similes and the like (=\textit{sīf} al-thānī) fell outside the purview of the grammarians. Regarding the ‘ancients’, Ibn Khaldūn does not mention any scholar by name but does say that once the topics had started to accumulate, \textit{Ja}’far b. Yahyā (the Barmakid?; cf. Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 336, fn. 1299), al-Jāḥiz, Qudāma and their like wrote deficient books on them (the topics of the supra \textit{ilm al-bayān}) until finally came al-Sakkākī and
Furthermore, 'ilm al-bayān is taken to be a highly theoretical science divorced from the art of speech production,\footnote{Ibid. 4: 1279.2-1\textsuperscript{c} (al-qawānīn al-'ilmīyya [...] -latī stanbatāhā ahuš šinā` ati l-lisānī), 1280.8 (al-qawānīn al-nahwīyya wa-l-bayānīyya), 1282.9 (al-qawānīn al-bayānīyya), 1293.5-4\textsuperscript{a} (qawānīn al-balāgha [...] 'ilmīyya wa-qiyyāsyya) (by balāgha he means here the standard 'ilm al-ma‘ānī, see above), 1294.1 (al-qawānīn al-'ilmīyya min al-arabiyya [synonymous with nahw] wa-l-bayān).} in contradistinction to the ‘incorporated’ view we saw in Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn and Ibn al-Akfānī. In fact, good speech composition (or: good style) is accorded independent status in Ibn Khaldūn’s scheme as it constitutes the object of the last of the four Arabic sciences, namely 'ilm al-adab. Thus 'ilm al-bayān is coupled with grammar with respect to its scientific methodology – they both contain qawānīn 'ilmīyya ‘theoretical/ scientific rules’ which are susceptible to qiyās ‘analogical reasoning’ – whereas 'ilm al-adab lacks such methodology.\footnote{Ibid. 4: 1267 ff., 1279 ff., 1293 ff.} The gist of 'ilm al-adab is to enable one to produce good poetry and good prose according to the ways of the ancient Arabs such that it exhibits the composer’s well-rounded education.\footnote{Ibid. 4: 1267 ff. Ibn Khaldūn admits that, unlike other sciences, 'ilm al-adab has no ‘subject-matter’ (mawdū‘); rather, its ‘fruit’ – to excel in the arts of prose and poetry – is identical with the science itself. Ibn Khaldūn tells us that according to his teachers, the foundational consideration[s] of the grammarian, the scholar of bayān [for discussion and translation of bayān see below] and the prosodist (“the art of speech composition is separated from the consideration[s] of the grammarian, the scholar of bayān [for discussion and translation of bayān see below] and the prosodist”); Muqaddima 4: 1294.7-6\textsuperscript{a} and fn. 1761 (the text is vocalized ta‘ālīf, in the plural form) / Rosenthal (trans.) 3: 380. See also Muqaddima 4: 1267 ff., 1279 ff., 1293 ff.} The only ‘methodology’ 'ilm al-adab has to offer is the memorization, or “implanting in the mind” of the “moldings/patterns” (asālīb, turned the discipline into its final, refined form (Muqaddima 4: 1265). 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī is not mentioned in this context but is mentioned earlier, alongside al-Sakkākī, as the essential founder (a term not used) of 'ilm al-bayān (Muqaddima 4: 1229 / Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 286, 534 [index]). Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr is not mentioned anywhere in the work (his brother, the historian ʿIzz al-Dīn, amply is; see Rosenthal [trans.], 3: index). Notably, the editor of the Muqaddima, ‘Alī ’Abd al-Wāḥid Wāfī, states that “in the past” (qdīman) the term bayān was used to comprise all three subfields (Muqaddima 4: 1229 fn. 1670).}

\footnote{Ibid. 4: 1279.2-1\textsuperscript{c} (al-qawānīn al-'ilmīyya [...] -latī stanbatāhā ahuš šinā` ati l-lisānī), 1280.8 (al-qawānīn al-nahwīyya wa-l-bayānīyya), 1282.9 (al-qawānīn al-bayānīyya), 1293.5-4\textsuperscript{a} (qawānīn al-balāgha [...] 'ilmīyya wa-qiyyāsyya) (by balāgha he means here the standard 'ilm al-ma‘ānī, see above), 1294.1 (al-qawānīn al-'ilmīyya min al-arabiyya [synonymous with nahw] wa-l-bayān).}
qawālib; cf. Ibn al-Akfānī’s ahwāl) of the ancient Arabic speech – that is, poetry and high prose – a process which cannot be set into rules and cannot be achieved by analogical reasoning.211

If ‘ilm al-bayān by Ibn Khaldūn reflects the Sakkākian strand of rhetoric studies, one should not be surprised, and would in fact expect to find it delineated as a science possessing qawānīn ‘ilmīyya. But the picture portrayed in the Muqaddima is more complex than that, as it betrays evidence of ‘our’ earlier ‘ilm al-bayān. This evidence is found in Ibn Khaldūn’s treatment of dhawq lit. ‘taste’, here: ‘linguistic aptitude’, a notion claimed to be under the scrutiny of the “scholars of bayān”!212 According to Ibn Khaldūn, it was in fact the bayān scholars who coined the term.213 Since the standard theorists rarely, if ever, spoke of dhawq, Ibn Khaldūn must have in mind here the ‘old’ stylisticians.214 Dhawq is portrayed here in remarkably similar terms to those of ‘ilm al-adab: it is described as the possession of the

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211 Ibid. 4: 1267, 1290-91, 1294. In all these sections Ibn Khaldūn repeats the notion of creating a sūra dhinniyya ‘mental form’ of those memorized patterns. In essence, it is a ‘mechanical’ process that has not to do with linguistic training or knowledge. The idea of ‘implanting’ such patterns in the mind is an old one and was used by al-Jāhib and Ibn Ṭabātabā. Al-Jāhib uses the image of setting up a nest in the heart, wherein eggs are laid which later hatch chickens that eventually learn to fly; for Ibn Ṭabātabā it is an ingot cast from various metals or a river made up of various streams (see Lidia Bettini, “On Lāfţ and Maʿnā Again: Some Aspects of Their Relationship According to the Balāġiyyūn,” in Giuliano Lancioni and Lidia Bettini [eds.], The Word in Arabic, Leiden: Brill, 2011, 109-43, here: 115). Although more attention is given to poetry, Ibn Khaldūn explicitly says that in speaking of qawālib he is referring to literary prose as well (Muqaddima 4: 1294.8). Ibn Khaldūn makes the same distinction of theoretical versus practical knowledge when he deals with the acquisition of ‘everyday’ (as opposed to literary) ancient Arabic: the ability to acquire the linguistic habit (malakat hādhā al-lisān) does not equal the knowledge of the rules and methods underlying that habit (e.g., 4: 1276-79). The idea of the acquisition of the ancient Arabic linguistic habit is almost indistinguishable from the notion of dhawq (see below).

212 Ibid. 4: 1279-82, under the title faṣl fī taṣfīr al-dhawq fī muṣṭalaḥ ahl al-bayān wa-tahqīq ma‘nā hu [...] “On the explanation of dhawq in the nomenclature of the scholars of bayān and the presentation of its real meaning [...]” (4: 1279). The opening statement of the section is: i‘lam anna lafţa l-dhawq yatadawaluhā l-mu’tanūna bi-ṣūra bi-ḥammā l-bayānī “Know that the word dhawq is in current use in the deliberations of those who devote their attention to the [various] branches of bayān” (4: 1279).

213 [...] ism al-dhawq alladhi iṣṭalaḥa ‘alayhi ahl šinā‘ at al-bayān; ibid. 4: 1280.5c.

214 Rosenthal even translates bayān here as ‘literary criticism’ and ahl al-bayān as ‘literary critics’ (Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 358, 360). Al-Sakkākī did talk of dhawq as a component to be revered in eloquence (Maṭlūb, al-Balāgha ḍinda al-Sakkākī, 184; Smyth, “Criticism,” 416), but he did not expound on its methods of attainment or its place in his system nor did he make extensive use of the notion.
linguistic habit (*malaka*) of the (ancient) Arabic speech exhibiting contextual aptness (*balāgha*);\(^{215}\) like *ʿilm al-adab*, it is attained only by continual practice, not by ‘theory’.\(^{216}\) Precisely because the notion of *dhawq* is portrayed as a ‘practical’ skill falling outside the ‘theoretical’ purview of *ʿilm al-bayān*, it is revealing to see how Ibn Khaldūn still sees it as part of the outlook of the *bayān* scholars. What we have here is a testament to the gradual development and change of perception towards *bayān* studies, *bayān* scholars and *bayān* scientificity. The preoccupation with a practical notion like *dhawq* by the *bayān* scholars diminishes the professed scientificity of the discipline, at least by Ibn Khaldūn’s own terms.\(^{217}\)

The tensions surrounding *ʿilm al-bayān* do not end with *dhawq*. The tenets themselves of Ibn Khaldūn’s *ʿilm al-bayān* do not entirely conform to the standard *ʿilm al-balāgha*. First we have the – admittedly less consequential – terminological inconsistencies: *ʿilm al-bayān* (Ibn Khaldūn) for *ʿilm al-balāgha* (standard); *ʿilm al-balāgha* (Ibn Khaldūn) for *ʿilm al-maʿānī* (standard). These terminological differences are actually sorted out in a later passage in the *Muqaddima* which seems to have been added after Ibn Khaldūn’s move to Egypt at the age of fifty.\(^{217}\) Second, and more importantly, the second subfield termed *ʿilm al-bayān* (the section on imagery) essentially lacks two of the paramount notions found in the Standard Theory: *majāz* ‘figurative speech’ and *tashbīh* ‘comparison; simile’.\(^{218}\)

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\(^{216}\) Ibid. 4: 1279.1-2e.

\(^{217}\) Ibid. 4: 1307-1309. On the ‘Egyptian edition’ of the *Muqaddima* see Rosenthal (trans.) 1: Translator’s Introduction, and below. In Wāfī’s edition, the entire section (*Muqaddima* 4: 1307-11) appears in square brackets which, in his notation, means that it appeared in two of the four manuscripts used in “the Paris edition” (Quatremère, 1858), as well as in one manuscript in the Taymūriyya library (see *Muqaddima* 4: 1307, 2: 669 fn. 900, and 698, fn. 944; Rosenthal [trans.] 1: lxxviii and c-ci).

\(^{218}\) *Majāz* appears once in this context: *Muqaddima* 4: 1307.2e, part of the later ‘Egyptian edition’. But cf. 4: 1264.6-7 where *ḥaqīqa* (the standard counterpart of *majāz*) is opposed with *istiʿāra*. An additional inconsistency vis-à-vis the Standard Theory is found in that same passage added later in Egypt, where he says (4: 1307.14) that the rules of
subfield called 'ilm al-bayān that Ibn Khaldūn knew of studied implied meaning, the main components of which were istiʿāra ‘metaphor’ and kināya ‘periphrasis’. There is no clear term used for ‘implied meaning’ but Ibn Khaldūn does speak of “meaning/intending” (conjugations of irāda) the lāzim ‘consequence’ or the malzūm ‘cause’ of the utterance. The discussion derives directly or indirectly from al-Sakkākī, but makes no reference to the all-important notion of majāz. Implied meaning is of two kinds: (1) intending the ‘consequence’ of the utterance (lāzim lit. “a thing [logically] following”) as in the case of metaphor (istiʿāra): “Zayd is a lion”→“Zayd is brave” (the second follows the first); and (2) intending the ‘cause’ of the utterance (malzūm lit. “a thing being [logically] followed [by something else]”) as in the case of periphrasis (kināya): “Zayd has many ashes [of the cooking pot]”←“Zayd is hospitable” (the second is logically followed by the first). Discussions on implied meaning did comprise the prefatory remarks to the standard sub-science of imagery (see §2.1). But when implied meaning becomes the focus of the entire subfield, as is the case with Ibn Khaldūn’s synopsis, it is my understanding that all utterances under investigation must be taken literally rather than figuratively, thus excluding grammar (al-qawānīn al-ʿarabiyya) are subsumed under the rules of ‘ilm al-maʿāni (or fann al-balāgha). He also disagrees with the ‘modern’ view that badīʿ was part of balāgha (the knowledge of contextual aptness; 4: 1310.10-14).

219 This is a paraphrase of ibid. 4: 1264.5-8: thumma qad yadullu bi-l-lafẓi wa-lā yurādu manṭūqahu wa-yurādū lāzimmuhu [...] fā-lā turīdu [...] wa-innamā turīdu [...] wa-qad turīdu bi-l-lafẓi l-murakkabī l-dalāīlata ʿalā malzūmihi [...] wa-turīdu bihi [...].


221 Muqaddima 4: 1264, 1307.3° ff.
the notion of *majāz*. The notion of *tashbīh* is not treated by Ibn Khaldūn and is only vaguely alluded to.\textsuperscript{222}

When dealing with the *Muqaddima* one must keep in mind that its contents reflect the knowledge prevalent in northwestern Africa in the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century. Most of the work was written in the Islamic West, and even after Ibn Khaldūn moved to the eastern Islamic world (Egypt) at the age of fifty he kept his later ‘editions’ of the *Muqaddima* more or less faithful to the early versions (that is, there were additions and corrections, but rarely did he rewrite previous expositions).\textsuperscript{223} This means that the knowledge of an overarching *ʿilm al-bayān* had been entrenched well before Ibn Khaldūn’s time, because the ideas he relays represented the perceived wisdom of his teachers and peers back West.\textsuperscript{224} The pervasiveness of the ‘old’ conception of *ʿilm al-bayān* comes across, first,

\textsuperscript{222} Even in the later passage that exhibits the ‘corrected’ appellations for the discipline and sub-disciplines, his single mention of *majāz* and allusion to *tashbīh* is not in line with the Standard Theory. He states: *thumma yantaqilu l-dhihnu ilā lāzimīhi [lāzim al-maʾnā] aw malzūmihi aw shibhihi fa-yakūnu fīha majāzān immā bi-sīʿāratin aw kināyatin* “The mind then goes to [a meaning] that follows it [viz. that follows the ‘first’ or ‘immediate’ meaning of the utterance] or [to a meaning] that is followed by it [i.e., is the cause of the first meaning] or [to a meaning of something] similar to it, in [either case of] which it is *majāz* ‘figurative speech’ either through metaphor or through periphrasis” (*Muqaddima* 4: 1307.2-3; emphasis added). The implication that *kināya* is also a type of *majāz* goes against the Standard Theory. The notion of *tashbīh* is less accounted for, but it seems that it too is part of *majāz*, another idea broadly rejected by the standard theorists. An alternative understanding of this passage would be to take *majāz* not as ‘figurative speech’ but as ‘implied speech’ (speech that is understood by *going beyond* what is uttered, but ‘what is uttered’ is to be taken literally): here, as well, it would diverge from the Standard Theory which spoke explicitly of non-literal speech.

\textsuperscript{223} This is the view espoused by Rosenthal. See Rosenthal (trans.) 1: Translator’s Introduction, esp. xxix, xliii, lx-lxi, lxvii-lxxi, lxxxviii and civ-cvii. According to him (1: cv-cvii), “[i]t would be wrong to consider the successive stages of the text of the *Muqaddima* as ‘recensions’ in the proper sense of the term. For instance, Ibn Khaldūn never changed the passages where he speaks of himself as still in the Maghrib. His additions and corrections were jotted down unsystematically in a long-drawn-out process, much as a modern author might add notes in the margins of his published works.” Rosenthal adds that Ibn Khaldūn did rectify obvious mistakes committed earlier. Wāfī, the editor of the *Muqaddima*, holds a different view: according to him (*Muqaddima* 1: 162-63 [editor’s introduction]), it is in fact impossible to distinguish between what Ibn Khaldūn wrote in the West and what he later changed in the East. This is unless there are clear contextual markers indicating the place or time of his statements (several examples are given by Wāfī in 1: 163-65).

\textsuperscript{224} “[…] we should perhaps be justified in assuming that practically every matter of detail found in the *Muqaddimah* was probably not original with Ibn Khaldūn, but had been previously expressed elsewhere.” Rosenthal (trans.) 1: lxxv; see also xliii. It may be added that Ibn Khaldūn exhibited marked local patriotism outwardly by dressing in the style of his native northwest African region after moving to Egypt (1: lxiv).
via the terminological vestige of *ʿilm al-bayān* as the signifier of scholastic rhetoric (though Ibn al-Akfānī too did not use the term *ʿilm al-balāgha*). Second, it comes across via the substantial vestiges we find in the understanding of *dhawq* as part of the discipline’s purview. Third, it comes across via the ‘professionalization’ of *ʿilm al-bayān* seen through such expressions containing the *nisba* form of *bayān* as *qawānīn bayāniyya* as well as occupation-headings like the *bayānī* (alongside the *nahwī* ‘grammian’ and *ʿarūḍī* ‘prosodist’) and *ahl al-bayān*.225 The phrases that are used to refer to this group of scholars in the context of the discussion of *dhawq* alone are *ahl al-bayān*, *ahl ṣināʿat al-bayān* “the people of the craft of *bayān*,” *al-muʿtanūn bi-funūn al-bayān* “those who devote their attention to the [various] branches of *bayān*,” *ahl al-qawānīn* […] *al-bayāniyya* “the people of the *bayānī* rules”, and *man yanẓurū fī hādhihi al-qawānīn al-bayāniyya* “those who study the rules of *bayān*”.226

The *bayānī* of Ibn Khaldūn did not exactly reflect the ‘new’ rhetorician, but it did not conform to the ‘old’ concept of the stylistician or literary theorist either. His treatment of *ʿilm al-bayān* shows us that the development of *ʿilm al-balāgha* was not uniform and clear-cut, nor was it all-sweeping, as one might gather from the ‘formal’ account of its development.227 It shows us that even as late as Ibn Khaldūn’s time its consolidation was far from complete and it highlights once more the lacuna in our understanding of the earlier *ʿilm al-bayān*. The conflation of *ʿilm al-adab* and *dhawq* may indicate that separating *ʿilm al-adab* from *ʿilm al-bayān* was Ibn Khaldūn’s own innovation, and that according to his

225 E.g., *Muqaddima* 4: 1294.6° (*bayānī*), 1279.4 and 1307.5 (*ahl al-bayān*), 1280.5° (*ahl ṣināʿat al-bayān*).

226 Ibid. 4: 1279.4, 1280.5°, 1279.6, 1280.8, 1282.9, respectively.

227 That is, the Jurjānī-Sakkākī-Qazwīnī-route that, in turn, changed the landscape of pre-modern Arabic literary-theoretical studies.
received wisdom, literary composition was part of ‘ilm al-bayān. Ibn Khaldūn does not mention (Duration) Ibn al-Athīr anywhere in his account. Indeed, this may be the only caveat in associating ‘ilm al-bayān directly with (Duration) al-Dīn’s efforts.

2.3. ‘Ilm al-Bayān in Literary-Theoretical Works

Relics of an overarching discipline called ‘ilm al-bayān can be seen not only in later works on the classification of the sciences or multi-thematic historical works but also in literary-theoretical works themselves. To be sure, many of the vestiges are terminological. It seems that very shortly after (Duration) al-Dīn’s time (mid-seventh/thirteenth century) the term ‘ilm al-bayān as a signifier for literary-theoretical studies and the expression ‘ulamā’ al-bayān as a signifier for its scholarly practitioners swept the critical landscape. In later centuries the term ‘ilm al-bayān became so prevalent that we even find it lexicalized in Hans Wehr’s dictionary as ‘rhetoric’. Indeed, the term is preserved with reference to the Standard Theory as well, as evinced in the works of Bahāʿ al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1372), al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), and al-Tahānawī (12th/18th cent.), among others.

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228 Rosenthal [trans.] 3: index.
As we saw above, the literary scholar writing closest in time to Diyā’ al-Dīn’s writing of the *Mathal* in the first third of the seventh/thirteenth century was Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, who completed his ‘response’ to the *Mathal* in 633/1236. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd did not pay any conscious attention to Diyā’ al-Dīn’s use of the term ‘ilm al-bayān. It either went unnoticed or it was interpreted as one out of several names for literary-theoretical studies. Judging by his preface (see §1.2), Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd interpreted the *Mathal* primarily as a work for kuttāb education. But he did quote the term ‘ilm al-bayān if it appeared in a passage he was criticizing. Such was the case in the passage in which Diyā’ al-Dīn claims that ‘ilm al-bayān is a rational science as opposed to the science of grammar. Sure enough, we find out in his reply that Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s grievance concerns solely the claims on grammar being a ‘traditional’ science. He ignores the claim on ‘ilm al-bayān, and this enforces our contention that Diyā’ al-Dīn’s generic innovation had gone by him unnoticed.

We have a different story with the slightly later writer Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’ (d. 654/1256), an Egyptian scholar and litterateur. Like Diyā’ al-Dīn, he authored two works on literary-critical matters, and like Diyā’ al-Dīn, he provides at the outset a list of authorities in the discipline he is writing in (though Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’’s lists are much longer indeed). But the change in framework we find between Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’’s first book and his second book is striking. While the first, more comprehensive work titled *Tahrīr al-tahbīr*, completed in

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640/1242 or 1243, is framed under the heading **badi‘** ‘rhetorical figures’, the second work titled **Badī‘ al-Qur’ān** is framed explicitly under the disciplinary terms of ‘**ilm al-bayān**’.232 It is not that Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ shows no disciplinary awareness in the **Taḥrīr**: he consciously chooses the term **badi‘** as the heading of the science he is writing in (**ḥādhā l-‘ilm**) and even differentiates between **badi‘** studies and studies concerned more broadly with eloquence (**balāgha, faṣāḥa**) or criticism (**naqd**).233 For him, the limits of **badi‘** are clear: he criticizes Usāma b. Munqidh (d. 584/1188) for including poetic faults (**‘uyūb**) and ‘plagiarism’ (**sariqāt**) in his book on **badi‘**, implying that they exceed its scope.234 Like Ḏiyā‘ al-Dīn, Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ is concerned with his active role in extracting (**istikhrāj, istinbāt**) new literary devices, which he identifies explicitly as rhetorical figures (Ḏiyā‘ al-Dīn did not use the terminology of **badi‘** here).235 There is little doubt that Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ envisages **badi‘** as the overarching frame for his work. In fact, in one of the manuscripts the title of the book

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232‘Abd al-ʿAzīm b. ‘Abd al-Wāḥīd Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘, **Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr fī ṣināʿat al-shīʿr wa-l-nathr wa-bayān i jāz al-Qurʾān**, ed. Ḥifnī Muḥammad Sharaf, Cairo: al-Majlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Shuʿāʾ al-Islāmiyya, Lajnat Ilḥām al-Turāth al-Islāmi, [1963], 83-87 (English: ‘Foolproofing the Foolproof Composition: On the Craft of Poetry and Prose and the Manifestation of the Qurʾān’s Inimitability’); idem, **Badī‘ al-Qurʾān**, ed. Ḥifnī Muḥammad Sharaf, [Cairo]: Maktatab Nahdāt Miṣr, 1957, 3-4 (English: ‘The Rhetorical Figures of the Qurʾān’). For the **Taḥrīr**’s time of composition see **Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr, 57, 67-69** (editor’s introduction). The **Badi‘** is also known under the title **al-Burḥān fī i jāz al-Qurʾān** and was later edited based on a newly discovered manuscript in Chester Beatty; see Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ al-Miṣrī, **al-Burḥān fī i jāz al-Qurʾān** aw **Badi‘ al-Qurʾān**, eds. ʿAlām Maṭlūb and Ḫadījā al-Ḥadīthī, Baghdad: al-Majmaʿ al-ʾIlmī, 2006. **Badi‘ al-Qurʾān** began as an appendix for another work written by Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘, **Bayān al-burḥān fī i jāz al-Qurʾān** (‘Manifestation of the Proof: On the Qurʾān’s inimitability’), described by him as “the task of his lifetime”; see **Badi‘ al-Qurʾān, 3, 15**. According to the Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīthī (al-Burḥān, 19), this work is identical to the **Taḥrīr**, but given Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘’s own reference to the **Taḥrīr** in the preface alongside the **Bayān al-burḥān** (see below), this seems unlikely.

233 **Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr, 87** (including the occurrence of **ḥādhā al-ʿilm**, referring to **al-badi‘** on pp. 83-87). More specifically that scholars usually refer to “such-and-such” a figure of speech or component of speech-beautification (**mahāsīn al-kalām**) as **badi‘** – except for those who write books on the sum total of eloquence (**majmūʿ al-balāgha**) or on revealing the true essence of eloquence (**kunh al-faṣāḥa**) or on criticism (**naqd**). These latter authors, he says, may refer to figures of speech however they may wish. He begins with an interesting history of **badi‘**-studies starting with Ibn al-Muʿtazz and Ḫudāmā, demonstrating how the term **badi‘** gained prevalence over **mahāsīn al-kalām** (ibid., 83 ff).

234 Ibid., 91.

235 Ibid., 94, and §1.2 above for Ḏiyā‘ al-Dīn’s discussion of **ḍūrūb** in this context.
appears explicitly as *Tahrīr al-tahbīr fī ʿilm al-badīʿ*. Finally, the long list of books he provides in his preface, about forty in number, are said either to be devoted to “this science” (*mā huwa munfarid bihi*, referring to *hādhā l-ʿilm*), meaning *badīʿ*, or to include it (*mā hādhā l-ʿilm aw baʿduhu dākhil fī baʿdihi*).\(^{237}\)

The preface to his later work, written in old-age,\(^{238}\) repeats many of the points discussed in the preface to the *Tahrīr*. Ibn Abī al-Īṣbaʿ’s point of interest is the categories of *badīʿ*, though this time only those rhetorical figures appearing in the Qurʾān (hence the title *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*).\(^{239}\) Here too he stresses his own *ijtihād* (our term) in extracting (*istikhrāj*, *istinbāṭ*) categories of *badīʿ*.\(^{240}\) Here too he provides a long list of works in the field, more than twice as long as his list in the *Tahrīr* and including almost all of those mentioned there.\(^{241}\) But “the field” with which these books are said to be either coextensive or wider in scope, in almost the exact wording as we find in the *Tahrīr*, is no longer identified as *badīʿ*.

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236 Ibid., 67 (editor’s introduction). This is the principal manuscript Sharaf relied on (MS Shahīd ‘Alī 2170 in Istanbul). Smyth (“Criticism,” 406) categorizes the *Tahrīr* under *badīʿ* studies.

237 *Tahrīr al-tahbīr*, 87. Works whose scope is wider than *badīʿ* range from the classical *al-Bayān wa-l-tahbīn* of al-Jāḥiẓ to the exegetical *al-Kashshāf* of al-Zamakhšārī to the commentary of *ḥadīth Umm Zar* by al-Qāḍī Ḥyād (d. 544/1149). Works whose scope is (probably in Ibn Abī al-Īṣbaʿ’s eyes) coextensive with *badīʿ* are those by Al-Āmīdī, Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskārī, Ibn Rashīq, and more. Diyā al-Din is also included. See *Tahrīr al-tahbīr*, 87-91. Such ‘inventories’ of bibliographical references were to become common; for the reading list that Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. 749/1348) provides see Muhsin J. al-Musawi, The Medieval Islamic Republic of Letters: Arabic Knowledge Construction, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015, 227, and the last four pages between p. 146 and p. 147. Al-Musawi draws a direct line of influence between Ibn Abī al-Īṣbaʿ and al-Ḥillī in the latter’s listing of a bibliography (ibid., 115), but others have done so as well (see the case of al-Subkī, below).

238 *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 4, where he refers to his *shaykhūkha*. On p. 15 he mentions his earlier written *Tahrīr al-tahbīr*.

239 Its reputation as a work dedicated solely to the devices in the Qurʾān continues well beyond Ibn Abī al-Īṣbaʿ’s time; ʿṬashkūprūżāde cites his book as a leading source under the chapter on *badāʾ iʾ al-Qurʾān* (*Miṭḥāḥ al-saʿāda*, eds. Bakrī and al-Nūrī, 2: 494, where we find the erroneous Abū al-Īṣbagh and Ibn Abī al-Īṣbagh, and *Miṭḥāḥ al-saʿāda*, Hyderabad ed., 2: 338, with the correct name).


241 Ibid., 3-13.
but rather as ‘ilm al-bayān.\(^{242}\) The authorities in the discipline are no longer referred to as authorities in badī‘ but rather as scholars, learned and eloquent men (‘ulamā‘, fudalā‘, bulaghā‘) in ‘ilm al-bayān.\(^{243}\) He occasionally refers to “scholars of ‘ilm al-bayān” throughout the work as well.\(^{244}\) It is clear that these scholars are identical to those he identified earlier as scholars in badī‘, even though his interest now is in Qur’ānic rhetorical figures. No special mention is made of Ḍiyā‘ al-Dīn; his work is cited as one out of many.\(^{245}\)

Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ is commonly portrayed in modern research as continuing ‘older’ traditions of rhetorical writings, where the various literary devices are presented as a list (otherwise known as works devoted to badī‘).\(^{246}\) But by no means should the mode of presentation affect our characterization of a work (cf. the case of medieval commentaries).

Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘’s Bāḍī‘ al-Qur‘ān, which like the Tahrīr is organized in list-form, is at times better understood in light of the emerging Standard Theory than it is in light of older writings because of the growing influence of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Especially in the case of majāz and isti‘āra, passages from al-Rāzī’s epitome of al-Urjānī’s oeuvre are cited explicitly and verbatim, and they contain such notions that were to become standard as

\(^{242}\) Ibid., 4. The phrase mā huwa munfarid bi-hādhā al-‘ilm wa-[…] mā hādhā al-‘ilm dākhil fī athnā‘ihi (line 5) refers to ‘ilm al-bayān (line 2).

\(^{243}\) Ibid.

\(^{244}\) Ibid., 26.1\(^{\text{a}}\) (al-muḥaqṭiqūn min ‘ilm al-bayān; context: the chapter on isti‘āra ‘metaphor’), 121.3 (‘ilm al-bayān; context: the technical [ṣinā‘] meaning of istithnā‘ ‘exception’), 178.15 (arbāb ‘ilm al-bayān; context: the chapter on majāz ‘figurative speech’).

\(^{245}\) Tahrīr al-tahbīr, 91; Bāḍī‘ al-Qur‘ān, 12. Only the Mathal is cited in the former; both the Mathal and al-Washy al-marqūm are cited in the latter.

\(^{246}\) Bonebakker, “al-Ma‘āní wa ’l-Bayān”; van Gelder, “Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘”; Smyth, “Criticism,” 405-406; Ḥifnī Muhammad Sharaf’s introductions to the Tahrīr and Bāḍī‘ al-Qur‘ān; and other scholars who espouse the view of a ‘Western’ school of literary criticism (see Introduction). One exception is al-Musawi (Islamic Republic of Letters, 219), who describes Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ as ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s “loyal Egyptian follower”! (no reference for this claim is cited). In al-Musawi’s understanding, rhetoric following al-Sakkākī has become part of “grammar in its broadest sense” (ibid.).
“single-term [or: predicate] majāz” (majāz fi al-muthbat) and “majāz on the level of predication” (majāz fi al-ithbāt; to be discussed in Chapter 5). Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ enumerates the work of al-Rāżī already in the preface to the Taḥrīr, but he does not yet incorporate his views therein (indeed, he may not have actually seen al-Rāżī’s work). More than that, Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ lists al-Jurjānī’s Asrār al-balāgha and Dalā’il al-i jāz already in the Taḥrīr (and later again in the Bādī’), but once again, there is no indication that he engaged with these works firsthand, especially given the fact that he possibly thought ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī was the earlier al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī (d. 392/1002), author of the Wasāṭa.

Because of some of the ‘standard’ leanings we find in the later Bādī’ al-Qur’ān, and due to its limited interest in literary devices in the Qur’ān, the question arises whether Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘’s disciplinary alignment with ‘ilm al-bayān has more to do with the influence of al-Rāżī and his preoccupation with the Qur’ān’s linguistic excellence than with Diyā’ al-Dīn and his preoccupation with literary composition. With regards to the rising popularity of the term ‘ilm al-bayān, the answer probably lies somewhere in the middle, even though al-Rāżī’s own use of ‘ilm al-bayān was only minimally technical (see §3.2). But with regards to the scope of the study of ‘ilm al-bayān, there is little doubt that it was wider than the study of Qur’ānic style, as the long list of works provided both in the Taḥrīr and Bādī’ al-

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247 Bādī’ al-Qur’ān, 17-19 and 176-78, for conspicuous citations of al-Rāżī and would-be standard notions.

248 Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr, 89-90; Bādī’ al-Qur’ān, 5. In both places al-Rāżī’s Nihāya is referred to as I jāz Ibn al-Khaṭīb.

249 Ibid. (for both works), and also Bādī’ al-Qur’ān, 178 (the sentence in parentheses where we come across kalām al-Qāḍī [al-Jurjānī] appears in the principal manuscript and in three out of the five remaining manuscripts that Sharaf relied on; in the manuscript used in the later edition, this sentence does not appear; al-Burhān, 243-44). In one instance al-Jurjānī’s name is cited in full, but this is probably a quotation from al-Rāżī. In the Taḥrīr, the Wasāṭa is not listed immediately after the Dalā’il and Asrār, suggesting that he saw the latter two in a separate context, probably the work of al-Rāżī, or that he recognized that they were different authors only to forget this in his old age (when he wrote Bādī’ al-Qur’ān).
Qurʾān cover the entire range of literary-theoretical studies. Al-Rāzī, on the other hand, is mainly concerned with logical-linguistic features of eloquence and his brief treatment of rhetorical devices is presented in the technical context of naẓm, a principle belonging to syntax.²⁵⁰

Besides Badīʿ al-Qurʾān by Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, several additional works written in the Arabic East in the seventh/thirteenth century purport to deal with ʿilm al-bayān. These are al-Tibyān fī ʿilm al-bayān by the Syrian Ibn al-Zamīlānī (d. 651/1253),²⁵¹ Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa by the Iranian turned Levantine Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. after 693/1294), Muqaddimat tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb by the Palestinian Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298),²⁵² al-Iksīr fī ʿilm al-tafsīr by the Iraqi Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316), and al-Aqsā al-qarīb by the Syrian Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Tanūkhī (fl. end of 7th/13th century).²⁵³ Most of these will form the focus of our analysis in Part Two; like Badīʿ al-Qurʾān, some of them deal specifically with Qurʾānic style. This has to do with the growing importance of the literary-theoretical inquiry within the Qurʾānic commentarial tradition, which was probably propelled by al-Zamakhshāri’s Kashshāf. But as we shall from our case study of majāz, the majority of these works display an unequivocal alignment with more literary-leaning notions.

²⁵⁰ Al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 277 ff., 285-97 (references are henceforth to the Amīn edition). As opposed to other discussions, “this category,” al-Rāzī says – referring to the literary devices – “has no rule that can be memorized” (thumma laysa li-hādhā l-bābī qānūnun yuḥfazu; ibid., 285, and cf. Ibn Khaldūn). We will look at the structure of the Nihāya as a comparison to Ibn al-Zamlakānī in Part Two, §4.2.

²⁵¹ Alongside his al-Burhān al-kāshīf ʿan i jāz al-Qurʾān and al-Mujīd fī i jāz al-Qurʾān al-majīd.

²⁵² Formerly known as [Kitāb] al-Fawā'id al-mushawwīq ilā ʿulām al-Qurʾān wa-ʿilm al-bayān and wrongly attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350).

²⁵³ Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Tanūkhī, al-Aqsā al-qarīb fī ʿilm al-bayān, [Cairo]: [Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda], 1327 [1909]. The work opens with a lengthy prolegomenon on logic (ibid., 2-32); after prefatory definitions of ‘eloquence’ and phonological and morphological discussions (pp. 32-40) begins the bulk of the work, which enumerates the literary devices (in al-Tanūkhī’s terms, maʿānī) that form the study of ʿilm al-bayān (p. 40 ff.). He refers explicitly to “that which has become customarily called ʿilm al-bayān” (ibid., 32), and references to this science heading abound in the work.
than with Qur’ānic-leaning ones. This suggests that despite the growing affinity between Arabic literary theory in the form of ‘ilm al-bayān and Qur’ānic exegesis, the former was still primarily concerned with literary composition, not with hermeneutics.

Evidence of a wide-ranging ‘ilm al-bayān can be found well into the eighth/fourteenth century, similar to what we encountered with Ibn al-Akfānī and Ibn Khaldūn. Bahā’ al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1372) living in Mamlūk Egypt is a case in point. His work, ‘Arūs al-afrāḥ, is an elaborate and dense commentary on al-Qazwīnī’s Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ and as such is in line with the Standard Theory. Subsequently, the science to which he attributes his book is ‘ilm al-balāgha, following al-Qazwīnī, and the strict tripartite structure of discipline is held throughout. And yet, the phrase ‘ilm al-bayān as a reference to the supra-science, rather than the second sub-science, crops up twice in his (fascinating) introduction to the work. In the first instance, al-Subkī explains why scholars from Egypt have concentrated – rather than on rational sciences and logic – on the sciences of lexicography, grammar, positive law, hadīth and Qur’ānic commentary: it is because these are the ‘outcome’ or ‘substance’ of ‘ilm al-bayān (one would expect here: ‘ilm al-balāgha). In the second instance, al-Subkī speaks of the scholarly merits of his father and the vastness of his knowledge: it is from him, says al-Subkī, that he picked up the study of

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255 ‘Arūs al-afrāḥ 1: 146.2-4 (al-’ulūm allatī hiya natīja aw mādda li-‘ilm al-bayān). He presents this claim to reinforce his conviction that the Egyptians mastered all matters concerning eloquence and style, as opposed to the ‘Easterners’.

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Interestingly, the expression ‘ulamā’ al-bayān, or ‘ulamā’ al-balāgha for that matter, does not appear as a common phrase in the work. It seems to be, in fact, quite rare. This is due to al-Subkī’s rigorous system of citation and referencing that would preclude him from attributing an opinion to such an unspecified group as “scholars of eloquence” (cf. modern scholarly guidelines of citation). Taking the chapter on tashbīḥ ‘comparison; simile’ as a case study, we find that the number of scholars he cites not only by name but also by work (if they authored more than one) is quite staggering. Specific opinions, and sometimes exact quotations, are attributed to over forty scholars (forty-two scholars, fifty works), among whom are literary theorists, grammarians, lexicographers and religious scholars (lawyers, theologians). The term al-bayāniyyūn appears once; it probably refers to scholars writing on topics that coincide with the standard sub-science ‘ilm al-bayān. The term ‘ulamā’ al-

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256 Ibid. 1: 156.7-8 (wa-huwa alladhī talagqaftu ‘anhu ‘ilm al-bayān). One should point out that in this instance the choice of ‘ilm al-bayān may have been prompted by his use of saj’, as the following parallel member ends with hisān. Other hints of ‘ilm al-bayān appear in several of the titles of the works al-Subkī consulted and cited in his preface. One example is a work by his teacher Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1348 or 9) titled al-Muqaddima fī ‘ilm al-bayān (ibid. 1: 160). The ‘reading list’ that al-Subkī provides is long indeed.

257 Ibid. 2: 148-234. The range of works exceeds that which is mentioned in the preface. Oft cited literary theorists are: ‘classical’ ones – Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1065; e.g. 2: 180.12, 197.6-7), “Abd al-Latif” al-Baghdādī (meaning Abū Tāhir, d. 1123, [not the thirteenth century philosopher since he quotes the Qawānīn [sic] al-balāgha]; e.g. 2: 165.6, 173.1-174.1, 185.8, 196.5, 232.6); ‘modern’ and/or ‘standard’ ones – al-Zanjānī (alive 660/1261 or 2; e.g. 2: 165.1°, 170.3°), al-Tanūkhī (fl. end of 7th/13th century; e.g. 2: 153.10, 166.4), al-Ṭibī (Sharaf al-Dīn, d. 743/1343; e.g. 2: 156.5°, 195.2,7) al-Khaṭībī (Shams al-Dīn al-Khalkhālī, d. ca. 745/1345; e.g. 2: 148.11, 163.9°, 224.9). This in addition to countless references to al-Amakhshārī, Fakhr al-Dīn, al-Sakkākī and al-Qazwīnī’s Īḍāh. If general scholarly groups are mentioned, they are non-literary theorists: ahl al-lugha ‘lexicographers’ (2: 163.1, 194.1°), al-qawm ‘people’ (referring here to theologians and philosophers, 2: 174.4°), al-mutakallimīn ‘theologians’ (2: 175.4), al-ḥukamā’ ‘philosophers’ (2: 175.5), al-baṣāriyyūn ‘the Baṣraṇ [grammarians]’ (2: 193.11), al-kūfiyyūn ‘the Kūfan [grammarians]’ (2: 194.1). Many of the individuals of these groups are subsequently mentioned explicitly. After discussing several opinions he may summarize what the ‘majority’ perceive (al-jumhūr, al-aktharīn; 2: 167.3°,7°, 191.9°).

258 ‘Arūs al-afrāḥ 2: 195.11. The context: al-Subkī asserts that the bayāniyyūn did not formulate precisely (lam yuḥarrir) the meanings of the various particles (or words) of comparison. (Al-Subkī dutifully fills the void.)
bayān appears once, within a quotation from al-Khaṭībī (a ‘standardist’, d. ca. 745/1345).²⁵⁹ The term ‘ilm al-bayān appears once, in reference to the standard sub-science.²⁶⁰ Given these findings it is all the more surprising to find terminological vestiges of the earlier, supra ‘ilm al-bayān in al-Subkī’s preface.²⁶¹

An eighth/fourteenth-century scholar whose work exhibits much more substantive evidence of our ‘ilm al-bayān is the prolific Yemeni scholar and ʿaydī imām al-Muʿayyad bi-Ilāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza al-ʿAlawī (d. 745 or 749/1344 or 1348). His work on ‘rhetoric’ titled al-Ṭirāz al-mutaḍādammin li-asrār al-balāgha wa-ʿulūm haqāʾiq al-iʿjāz is often linked in modern scholarship to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr.²⁶² The Ṣirāz is an intricately woven work with multi-layered chapters (sg. fann), sub-chapters (sg. bāb) and sub-sub-chapters (sg. qāʿida, baḥth, faṣl, qism and tanbīh, to name a few), often displaying recursive categories. Thus, it is not uncommon to find the same topic being treated in different levels of the Ṣirāz’s system and from different perspectives, one such case being ‘ilm al-bayān. While al-

²⁵⁹ Ibid. 2: 223.1. Al-Khaṭībī is, in turn, quoting al-Sakkākī and by ʿulamāʾ al-bayān he probably means the scholars writing on the standard sub-science. As strange as it may be to refer to scholars of only one sub-science, he is in fact following practice of al-Sakkākī, who himself referred to scholars working within each sub-science as distinct groups. See for instance ʿulamāʾ ʿilm al-maʿānī in al-Sakkākī, Miftāḥ, 199.4 and aṣḥāb ‘ilm al-bayān in Miftāḥ, 338.³⁵ (probably the place where al-Khaṭībī quotes from).

²⁶⁰ Ibid. 2: 150.⁸⁴.

²⁶¹ If we extrapolate our findings to later works of the Standard Theory, we may expect to find that the phrases ‘ilm al-bayān and ʿulamāʾ al-bayān are either absent altogether due to a robust methodology of citation or are a reference to the standard category dealing with imagery. This is besides the occasional prefatory occurrence of the phrase as a synonym of ‘ilm al-balāgha, as noted above, fn. 230.

'Alawī was very much aware of and working within the standard rhetorical tradition, the topic of his book is unequivocally 'ilm al-bayān. Deemed the centerpiece of the Arabic sciences (al-ʿulūm al-adabiyya), 'ilm al-bayān is not only repeatedly mentioned as the target discipline, its practitioners are also referred to throughout via the heading 'ulamāʾ al-bayān.

But al-'Alawī was not a ‘standard’ scholar of the Standard Theory. Because he derives his knowledge from four main works reflecting different traditions, only one of which linked to al-Sakkākī, the outcome is a very idiosyncratic approach to rhetorical studies. The four works dealing with 'ilm al-bayān (al-dawāwīn al-muʾallafa fīhi) that al-'Alawī says he consulted are al-Mathal al-sāʾir by Ibn al-Athīr, al-Tibyān by Ibn al-Zamlakānī, al-Nihāya by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Miṣbāḥ by Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik.

To untangle the meaning behind 'ilm al-bayān we must attend to each of the perspectives it is given in the Ṣirāz, depending on its position within his system. Even within one system, 'ilm al-bayān could refer either to the supra-heading or to the subfield on imagery, for which

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263 Examples of 'ilm al-bayān (sometimes 'ulūm al-bayān) from the beginning of the work are al-Ṣirāz 1: 2, 6, 8, 15-16, 27, 29, 31, 43. Instances of hādhā al-ʿilm “this science” referring back to 'ilm al-bayān are 1: 3, 4, 6.

264 Al-Ṣirāz 1: 2. The Arabic sciences, mentioned in 1: 20-23, are lexicography, syntax, morphology and bayān (we could also translate 'philological' for adabiyya). For 'ulamāʾ al-bayān see al-Ṣirāz 1: 8, 47 (alongside the usūliyyūn ‘legal theorists’), 83 (alongside 'ulamāʾ al-dīn ‘theologians’ and the usūliyyūn), and below. 'Ulamāʾ al-adab also occurs; see 1: 3. For al-bulaghāʾ and ahl al-faṣāḥa, by which he means eloquent people (not necessarily trained in eloquence studies) see 2: 45. For 'ulūm al-balāgha see, e.g., 2: 130, 232. Within the chapter on ittiḥāt a myriad of headings are used: 'ulūm al-balāgha (2: 131), 'ulūm al-bayān (2: 133), 'ulūm al-faṣāḥa (2: 134), and 'ilm al-maʿānī (2: 131), to which the topic of ittiḥāt (change in grammatical person, or deictic shifting) belongs.

265 The only ‘standardist’ is Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik (d. 686/1287). The names given by al-'Alawī differ slightly, but given the correct titles and the closeness to the authors’ names, there remains little doubt as to the identity of the works. See Širāz 1: 3-4; S.A. Bonebakker, “al-Maʿānī wa ’l-bayān” (following Maṭlūb). For me, the little doubt that remains concerns Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s al-Tibyān: on one hand, it inspired al-'Alawī’s discussion of dalālāt ifrādiyya ~‘the study of single-word signifiers’ and the intricate structure of his work, but on the other hand, the quotations on tashbīh supposedly taken from the Tibyān are incorrect since the Tibyān lacks a chapter on tashbīh (Ṣirāz 1: 262-63). For al-dawāwīn al-muʾallafa fīhi see al-Ṣirāz 1:3, referring to 'ilm al-bayān in 1:2.
he uses the term majāz.²⁶⁶ On the highest level we find 'ilm al-bayān (sometimes: 'ulūm al-bayān) as the subject matter of the work.²⁶⁷ But al-ʿAlawī also recognizes the terms 'ilm al-maʿānī or 'ilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān as names of the discipline. His solution: to interpret 'ilm al-maʿānī as the domain of eloquence on the level of words in combination (balāgha) and 'ilm al-bayān as the domain of eloquence on the level of words in isolation (faṣāḥa).²⁶⁸

We thus encounter 'ilm al-balāgha wa-l-faṣāḥa as synonymous with 'ilm al-bayān.²⁶⁹

On the second level we find 'ilm al-bayān as comprising the standard categories of imagery (by his account, all subsumed under majāz). This section opens the major portion of the work, followed by two sections said to be part of 'ilm al-maʿānī and a final section on 'ilm al-badi'.²⁷⁰ All three fields are subsumed under the supra-'ilm al-bayān with which al-ʿAlawī opened his work: he refers to 'ulamāʿ al-bayān whether discussing topics in 'ilm al-maʿānī, 'ilm al-bayān (standard) or 'ilm al-badi'.²⁷¹ On the third level he addresses the three

²⁶⁶ For instance, 'ilm al-bayān in al-Ṭirāz 1: 43 refers to the subfield, even though he is still dealing with the ‘preliminaries’ of the supra-'ilm al-bayān and has not yet begun the chapter on the sub-'ilm al-bayān. For the sub-'ilm al-bayān as synonymous with the study of majāz see ibid. 1: 43-44, 196-97. Regarding the controversy of whether or not lāshbīh is part of majāz al-ʿAlawī proposes, after deliberating the various views, that the whole question is pointless or simply ‘semantics!’ (wa-layṣa yataʿallaqu bihi kabīru fāʾidatin wa-yustaḥbar fī dhālīka lafzīyān fa-adalnā ʿanhu; ibid. 1: 266). We discuss this “pointless” question in length in Chapter 5.

²⁶⁷ In the flowery introduction, after stating that 'ilm al-bayān is the centerpiece of the Arabic sciences (“the leader of its soldiers” or “the black of its eyes”, ibid. 1: 2), al-ʿAlawī says that the intention of his work is to deal with “this science” (ibid. 1: 3), referring by this to 'ilm al-bayān mentioned in the previous paragraph.

²⁶⁸ Ibid. 1: 9-14. But his deliberations are not as clear-cut as one might expect: in ibid. 1: 12-13 he refers to 'ilm al-bayān as dealing with the substances of single words and combined words.

²⁶⁹ Ibid. 1: 11 and 22 are the clearest instances. In 1: 16 he speaks of 'ilm al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha as the subject-matter (mawdūʿ in the philosophical sense) of 'ilm al-bayān, as we saw in Diyaʾ al-Dīn’s work.

²⁷⁰ Ibid. 1: 196–2: 9. The major portion of the work comprises the second mega-chapter titled al-fann al-thānī min 'ulūm hadhā al-kitāb; it starts in ibid. 1: 183 and ends in 3: 212. The two chapters dealing with 'ilm al-maʿānī are dalalāt ifrādyya ~‘the study of single-word signifiers’ and murāʿāt al-ḥawāl al-taʿīf ~‘considerations in composition’ (on the latter see below).

²⁷¹ For 'ulamāʿ al-bayān under the chapter on majāz (=the standard 'ilm al-bayān) see ibid. 1: 198-9, 206, 250, 256, 260 (together with 'ulamāʿ al-balāgha), 368, 375, 426. For 'ulamāʿ al-bayān under the two chapters dealing with 'ilm al-maʿānī see 2: 19 (in the context of definiteness), 66-67 (fronting the direct object), 203 (affirming particles), 231 (purposeful prolixity). The phrase 'ulūm al-bayān itself appears within the discussions of 'ilm al-maʿānī, see 2:
subfields from the perspective of ʾiʿjāz al-Quḥān; this comprises the final portion of the work. He oddly repeats many of the topics discussed earlier, except for many ‘standard’ topics in ʾilm al-maʿānī which are presented for the first time. The categories expressed at this level are closest to those of the Standard Theory. Here ʾilm al-bayān is presented as a narrower science than ʾilm al-maʿānī and is presumably subsumed under it (following, indirectly, the view of al-Sakkākī).272

Like the account of Ibn Khaldūn, the work of Ḥamza al-ʿAlawī reflects a compound view of ʾilm al-bayān owing, probably, to its author’s relatively remote location in the Islamic world which may have impeded a more complete transmission of knowledge in this domain. More importantly, like Ibn Khaldūn al-ʿAlawī too displays hints of the major role literary composition (taʿlīf) plays in ʾilm al-bayān (Ibn Khaldūn implicitly, through his discussion of dhawq). In the Ẓirāz this takes the form of the second chapter dealing with the allegedly standard ʾilm al-maʿānī. The chapter, titled murāʿāt ahwāl al-taʿlīf —‘considerations in composition’, targets the “patterns of literary speech” (asālīb al-kalām) and includes topics such as good structure, (purposeful) prolixity, appropriate openings and good transitions.273 In these sections the perspective of the nāẓīm and nāthir are attended to, whether the intention is to compose a letter, a sermon, a book, a qaṣīda, or a note (ʔ, qirṭās).274 The wording murāʿāt ahwāl al-taʿlīf is derived from Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s Ṭibyān:

93 (sentence-elision), 176-77 (emphasis). For ʿulamāʾ al-bayān under ʾilm al-badi see 2: 354, 404, 3: 4, 84 (various figures of speech).


273 Ibid. 2: 221-353. Asālīb al-kalām occurs in 2: 222 (asālīb al-nazm wa-l-nathr in 2: 244). On kalām in this context as kalām bālīgh see above, fn. 67.

274 Ibid. 2: 222, 243-44.
for Ibn al-Zamlakānī *ta līf* means ‘composition’ in the semantic-syntactic sense of words in combination rather than in isolation, and the ensuing study is primarily syntactic (or functional-grammatical). But al-ʿAlawī creatively reworks its topics to fit many of the traditional topics dealing with literary composition.

As a final piece of evidence for the supra-ʿilm al-bayān in the sense that ʿDiyāʿ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr spoke of, we adduce the work of the early eighth/fourteenth-century Syrian-Egyptian Najm al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr al-Ḥalabī (d. 737/1336 or 737/1336 or 1300), which did not survive. This book reflects a tradition closest to that in which ʿDiyāʿ al-Dīn wrote – that of scribal education – and purports to belong to the discipline called ʿilm al-adab, here: ‘the science of [chancery] knowhow’, also referred to as ʿṣīnāʿat al-inshā‘ ‘the craft of [scribal] composition’. By Najm al-Dīn’s own admission,

[i]qtasartu minhu [al-kitāb alladhī allafahu wālidī]278 ‘alā dhikri yathāju ilayhi kātibu


277 For ʿilm al-adab see *Jawhār al-kanz*, 27.4; for ʿṣīnāʿat al-inshā‘ see ibid., 33.5. When speaking of scholars in the field he uses the phrase ʿulamā‘ hādhā l-fann (pp. 28-29), referring presumably to ʿilm al-adab. Later Najm al-Dīn directs his words to al-fālib al-adīb ‘the aspiring litterateur’ (p. 50), which for him is synonymous with the aspiring secretary (murīd ʿṣīnāʿat al-inshā‘, p. 614). Smyth (‘Criticism,’ 407) mentions the father’s work within the context of bādi‘ studies but seems to categorize it as a work of adab. Although Smyth derives his comments from the Jawhār he does not attend to the latter’s disciplinary affiliation.

278 Ibid., 27.
I limited [the book that my father authored] to mentioning the knowledges and merits that the chancery secretary needs in order to be considered a secretary.\textsuperscript{279}

The result is a work not unlike 'Um
dt al-kuttāb by Abū Ja'far al-Nahḥās (d. 338/950) or the chapters on kitāba and naqd al-shī‘r in the famous Mafātīḥ al-‘ulūm by al-Khuwārizmī (d. 387/997 or 98) or Mawādd al-bayān by ‘Alī b. Khalaf al-Kātib (fl. second half of 5\textsuperscript{th}/11\textsuperscript{th} cent.), excluding sections dealing with the conventions of administrative departments other than the chancery.\textsuperscript{280} The work is structured as an enumeration of badī‘ categories, not all of which are figures of speech.\textsuperscript{281} In fact, the last third of the work is dedicated to poetics in general. While Najm al-Dīn does not mention the standard rhetorical tradition, living in the time and place that he did he must have been aware of it.

What is striking about Najm al-Dīn’s account is that he attends to the disciplinary

\textsuperscript{279} Ibid., 28.

\textsuperscript{280} Abū Ja’far Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Nahḥās, 'Um

\textsuperscript{281} Najm al-Dīn refers to them all as anwā‘/aqsām al-badī‘ (Jawhār al-kanz, 49-50), but we also find anwā‘ al-bayān (p. 91) and anwā‘ al-badī‘ wa-l-bayān (p. 605, and below). Of the many categories which are not, strictly speaking, figures of speech we may cite transitions (takhallus, p. 157), predicates in noun-initial sentences (p. 277), first person singular (p. 309 [a very long chapter]), poetic rhymes (p. 410), and prosification of poetic and Qur’ānic verses (p. 607). The poetic sections are reminiscent of Ibn Rashīq’s al-‘Um
da fi maḥāsin al-shī‘r wa-ādābihi wa-naqdihi, and Najm al-Dīn quotes him. Most categories open with the formulaic: X = an yaf‘al al-mutakallim [kadhā wa-kadhā] “[category] X is when the speaker does [so and so].” The mutakallim here is the kātib.
The science of bayān in the craft of composition is equivalent to a measure/scale by which we may know which beautifying-elements of speech outweigh others, and a touchstone upon which if ideas are displayed, it is made manifest which are corrupt and which are sound. Anyone who examines the Book of God, may He be exalted, and the words of His prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, requires it [this science] […]

The science of bayān has no [essential] definition that we can mention, for none of the scholars of 'ilm al-bayān made any mention of a definition by which 'ilm al-bayān can be defined. Rather, they made it known by something other than [an essential] definition: the ‘matter’ [of the science] and [its] description [i.e., a non-essential definition].

282 Tropes such as these point to the growing importance of 'ilm al-bayān to Qur'ānic hermeneutics, as noted above, and I think it is a testament to Najm al-Dīn’s awareness of the emerging Standard Theory (or at least Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī).
As for the [subject-]matter of ʿilm al-bayān, it is the speech of the Bedouin and eloquence [of form and content] […] and the conditions inherently occurring in it (ahwāl ʿārida li-dhāthihi) that are examined, such as the beautifying-elements that [the Bedouin speech] is described with, to wit, the excellence and flawlessness of the words and the eloquence and mastery of the meanings.

As for the description of ʿilm al-bayān, the scholars of ʿilm al-bayān said: “If there is no definition that can be mentioned for this science, we must [provide] a description with which it can be identified.” […] So one of [the scholars of ʿilm al-bayān] said: “ʿilm al-bayān is a theoretical craft, the aim of which is to know the beautifying-elements of speech.” His saying “theoretical” is meant to exclude “practical” and his saying “the aim of which is to know the beautifying-elements of speech” is meant to exclude the science of grammar and the science of lexicography. For the aim of lexicography is to know the coined [meaning] of the single word and the aim of grammar is to know the speech’s right from wrong when speaking. The aim of this science is the correct knowledge of that [the beautifying-elements of speech].

Najm al-Dīn delineates ʿilm al-bayān as a strictly theoretical science, but one that is not at all similar to the Standard Theory – the supposedly ‘theoretical’ rhetorical science par excellence. The theoretical science of ʿilm al-bayān is situated, rather, within the “craft of composition” (ʿilm al-bayān fī ʿināʿat al-inshāʾ) and to a modern reader would seem far from theoretical. Najm al-Dīn himself seems to be struggling with this ‘scientific’ character of the field, as evinced by his repetitive statements on the fact that scholars have been unable to provide an essential definition (in the logical sense) for ʿilm al-bayān. He in fact continues by saying that distinguishing between ʿilm al-bayān and bādīʿ is often quite difficult. The scholars of the latter, however, are identified by him as ʿulamāʾ al-adab

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283 The meaning of ahwāl ʿārida li-dhāthihi is explained in Jawhar al-kanz, 47, with illustrations from grammar, medicine and legal theory. Despite its odd construction, it seems to refer to essential topics within a given field rather than non-essential accidents.

284 Ibid. 46-47.

285 Ibid., 48-49.
‘scholars of [scribal] knowhow’, whereas the scholars of the former are clearly termed ‘ulamā’ al-bayān ‘scholars of ‘ilm al-bayān’ (‘ulamā’ al-badī‘ does not occur).\textsuperscript{286} Since Najm al-Dīn is not quoting Ḏiyā’ al-Dīn verbatim (at least not from an extant work), one may assume that the perception of ‘ilm al-bayān as a theoretical, consolidated discipline gained traction throughout the seventh/thirteenth century. This theoretical discipline was independent of the development of what would become the Standard Theory.

**Summing Up**

The increasing hegemony of the standard rhetorical theory notwithstanding, we are able to identify traces of a widely-recognized discipline called ‘ilm al-bayān up until the late eighth/fourteenth century. A major differentiation point between this ‘ilm al-bayān and the Standard Theory lies in the function of literary production: the practical aspect of composing poetry and ornate prose was a hallmark of our ‘ilm al-bayān, whereas in the Standard Theory it was marginal. Any references to taʾlīf in this sense in the later works, be they works on the division of the sciences or on literary theoretical matters, are indicative of a science close to Ḏiyā’ al-Dīn’s ‘ilm al-bayān li-taʾlīf al-naẓm wa-l-nathr (Ibn al-Akfānī’s “attaining the habitual ability to compose [compound] statements [of sermons, letters and poems]”; Ibn Khaldūn’s presentation of dhawq within the purview of the scholars of bayān; al-‘Alawī’s reworking of murāʿāt aḥwāl al-taʾlīf from a grammatical interpretation to a literary-productional one; Najm al-Dīn’s ‘ilm al-bayān fī ṣīnā‘at al-inshā‘). The professed scientificity of the discipline called ‘ilm al-bayān was probably facilitated by the rise of the

\textsuperscript{286} For ‘ulamā’ al-adab see ibid., 48-49, 427, 431 (the last two: ahl al-adab, which may refer to litterateurs in general). For ‘ulamā’ al-bayān, cited in categories that exceed the standard sections on imagery (such as paronomasia and good openings), see ibid., 42-43, 60, 91, 101, 118, 218.
Standard Theory (Ibn Khaldūn), but vestiges of this recognition in a non-‘standard’-context can also be detected (Najm al-Dīn).

The unheeded distinction in later sources between the supra-ʿilm al-bayān as a science of style and the hypo-ʿilm al-bayān as the standard sub-science of imagery may explain why the generic innovation of the former went unnoticed in modern scholarship. Even within the heartland of standard-rhetoric territory, terminological vestiges of ʿilm al-bayān as the appellation of the supra-science may abide (e.g., al-Subkī).

The association of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr with the disciplinary consolidation of ʿilm al-bayān is not always attested in the sources. An important exception is Ibn al-Akfānī, who mentions the work of an “Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazari” as dealing solely with (the supposedly hypo-)ʿilm al-bayān. It is noteworthy that this association persists even in the late work of Ṭashköprüzāde, whose ʿilm al-bayān is an unequivocal reference to the standard subfield of imagery. Most compelling is the progression we find in the work of Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, a younger contemporary of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, from the disciplinary framework of bādīʿ in his first book to ʿilm al-bayān in his second. Even if not directly linked to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s efforts, this change in framework seems to have been meaningful rather than arbitrary, and it testifies to the rapid dissemination of ʿilm al-bayān as a new paradigm for literary-theoretical and literary-critical studies.
Chapter 3:

Bayān and ‘Ilm al-Bayān Prior to ATEGORYA’ al-Dīn

The purpose of this chapter is to strengthen our hypothesis that the disciplinary development of ‘ilm al-bayān in the seventh/thirteenth century is to be associated, on a terminological level, with the efforts of ATEGORYA’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr rather than with earlier instantiations of the term bayān or ‘ilm al-bayān. Two decades ago Heinrichs remarked that “the notion of bayān ‘clarity’, ‘distinctness’ [is] a notion that is not clear and distinct at all and in dire need of a monograph.”287 While advances in the study of bayān have been made since the publication of von Grunebaum’s article in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Heinrichs’ words still hold true today. The following will not fill the void – it is not intended as such – but it provides some further clarification on the understanding of the term in classical Arabic-Islamic writings.

Looking at the term bayān in earlier centuries, we shall differentiate between four strands of its meaning: the legal-hermeneutic, the philosophical, the philological and the scribal. What we have here is a case of “bi-genesis”: the legal and philosophical meanings of the term are derived from one lexical meaning of bayān, roughly ‘sign’/‘indication’, and the philological and scribal meaning of the term are derived from another lexical meaning of the word, namely, ‘eloquence’. Scholars espousing the legal-hermeneutic meaning(s) of bayān are al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204/820) and subsequent legal scholars; this has been recently studied by Joseph Lowry, James Montgomery and David Vishanoff. Scholars espousing the philosophical meaning are al-Ǧāḥiẓ (d. 255/868 or 9), Iṣḥāq b. Ibrāhīm Ibn Wahb al-Kātib (4th/10th cent.) and Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064); aspects of this have been studied by Montgomery and Lowry (though not in these terms), as well as others who have focused their study on al-Ǧāḥiẓ. The philological meaning of

bayān is less ‘technical’ and is set forth by Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) and in a slightly different instantiation, by al-Rummānī (d. 384/994). Finally, the scribal meaning of bayān is, too, less technical and comes across in works of secretaries like Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. after 400/1010) and ‘Alī b. Khalaf al-Kātib (fl. second half of 5th/11th cent.). Both the philological and the scribal meanings have not been attended to as such in modern research, probably because they are not technical terms per se. The philological meaning has been alluded to by Heinrichs and Montgomery; the scribal meaning by Sezgin.

As for the phrase ʿilm al-bayān in earlier centuries, it seems that the first scholar to have used it is none other than ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081). Following him were al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209). If at all any of them used it in a technical sense of a full-fledged discipline, it was al-Zamakhsharī.

Where ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī derived his understanding of ʿilm al-bayān from is unclear. It will be claimed that he was exposed to the phrase probably in the work of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (or non-extant sources quoting him), but he filled the term bayān itself with the non-technical meaning he was familiar with: the scribal one.

### 3.1. The Term bayān

Three different lexical meanings of bayān are attested in the dictionaries. The first, according to Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1311 or 2), is “that by means of which a thing is clarified/becomes clear, such as an indication or the like” / “an indication, or the like, by means of which a thing is clarified” (mā buyyina bihi l-shayʿu mina l-dalālati wa-ghayrihā). The second meaning is “clarity,” being the masdar ‘verbal noun’ of bāna “to be/become clear” (ittadāha).

Etymologically, the “clarity” of a thing is probably connected to what David Larsen has described as “the abstract ‘evidentness’ of a thing by virtue of its difference or separability from
its surroundings.” The third meaning is “eloquence” (al-faṣāha wa-l-lasan) or “clear expression with mental acuteness” (al-ifsāḥ maʿa dhakā) or “making manifest the intended [meaning] with the most eloquent expression” (izhār al-maqṣūd bi-ablagh lafẓ). Since form II bayyana is said to be both transitive (“to clarify”) and intransitive (“to be clear”), bayān is sometimes interpreted as a maṣdar of bayyana as well, i.e. either as “clarity” (intransitive) or “clarification” (transitive).

The three occurrences of bayān (as a noun) in the Qurʾān are in fact

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288 David Charles Larsen, Means of Intelligibility, PhD Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2007, 97-99, emphasis his (the title of the dissertation refers to al-Jāḥiz’s wasāʾ il al-bayān; see below). Larsen provides other cases in the Arabic language where the act of interpretation is predicated on distinguishability, like fasala and faraqa, comparing this to the Saussurian notion of “difference” within a system as a precondition for the production of meaning (pp. 98-101; he also compares this to Derrida’s discussion of the etymology of the Latin verb differre). If we adhere to Larsen’s etymology, the first and second meanings of bayān given by Ibn Manzūr are essentially the same. (Larsen cites Lane’s definition of bayān in full, parts of which rest on Ibn Manzūr’s deliberations.) Strictly speaking, however, the first and second meanings of bayān display different processes of semiosis: in the first case it is a “sign” that imparts knowledge about a thing (implying a mediation); in the second case it is the thing itself that imparts knowledge (about itself). This tension will be apparent when we discuss the philosophical sense of bayān.


290 Al-Tahānawī, Kashshaṭ 1: 207 (wa-bi-l-jumlati fa-huwa [bayān] immā maṣdaru bānā wa-huwa lāzīman wa-ma nāḥu l-zuhūru aw maṣdaru bayyana wa-huwa qad yakūnī lāzīman […] wa-qad yakūnī mutaʿaddīyan). Ibn Manzūr does not say so explicitly – for him the maṣdar of bayyana is tābīy or tīhāb – but by giving the first meaning of bayān as a type of dalāla ‘indication’ and by using the passive form II buyyina [bihi] to expound on it,
interpreted by medieval exegetes and modern translators as having a transitive sense: “This is an *exposition* for mankind, and a guidance, and an admonition” (Q 3:138 [*Āl ʿImrān*]); “The All-merciful has taught the Koran. He has created man and He has taught him the *Explanation*” (Q 55:1-4 [*al-Rāhmān*]); “Then ours it is to explain it” (Q 75:19 [*al-Qiyāma*]).

Even the most...
famous of these – *al-Raḥmān* • ṣallama l-ʿQurʿān • khalaqa l-ʿinsān • ṣallamahu l-bayān* (Q 55:1-4) – is interpreted by al-Zamakhsharī in clear transitive terms, viz. “clear speech” as “making plain/manifest that which is in the mind/heart”.  

Several occurrences of *bayān* in the prophetic tradition (*ḥadīth*) display a usage similar to that of the first lexical meaning of the word, viz. a type of proof or indication; in two cases *bayān* is connected with the third meaning of the word, viz. eloquence. Three occurrences of *bayān* in pre-Islamic poetry – two by Zuhayr (d. ca. 609), one by al-ʿAʾshā (d. ca. 7/629) – are rather scant and varied in meaning to merit a unified conclusion. In one instance it refers to a “sign” of a wound of the she-camel’s young calf (Zuhayr); in another it refers to the (generous) “giving” of the poet’s patron (Zuhayr); and yet in another it refers to “evidence/knowledge” that the poet has regarding his patron’s victorious battles. Besides the second occurrence, which is derived from

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292 *al-mantiqu l-faṣiḥu l-muʿribu ʿammā fī l-ṣamūr; al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf 4: 43.* This quality is said to differentiate Man from the rest of the animals (see also al-Rāzī and al-Bayḍāwī, cited in the previous footnote). A better understanding of the word *bayān* here is probably ‘the ability to discern’ (see al-Azhari’s entry in fn. 289, and some of the explanations in the Qur’ānic commentaries). This sense of *bayān* is common absent in the dictionaries (al-Azhari is an exception), but it connects *bayān* to the meaning of the root *b.y.n* in other Semitic languages and it better explains the nature of God’s teaching *bayān* (I hope to look at this question in a future study).


an obscure (read: old) meaning of abānā as aʿrāt ‘to give’. bayān seems to correspond most to the sense of dalāla (the first meaning recorded by Ibn Manṣūr).

The Legal-Hermeneutic Sense(s) of Bayān

The first usage of bayān in a semi-technical sense comes, to the best of our knowledge, from Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfīʿī’s (d. 204/820) Risāla, a work that came to be seen as the foundational book in legal theory. Al-Shāfīʿī probably inspired the philosophical technical meaning of bayān as well, which is preserved in the work of al-Jāḥiz, but we shall treat it separately (see below). What exactly bayān refers to in al-Shāfīʿī’s Risāla has long been a topic of debate and has been recently addressed by James Montgomery, Joseph Lowry and David

Poets, New Edition and Concordance); Al-Mukhtar Kurayyim, al-Muʾjam al-mufahras li-alfāz al-shiʿr al-jāhilī wa-ma anāhi: ‘arabi-‘arabī, Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān Nāshirūn, 2010, 410 [index], 196, 233, 285 (English: ‘A Concordance and Dictionary of Pre-Islamic Poetry: Arabic-Arabic’). Case #1, line 17 of a Dāliyya by Zuhayr opening with ghashītu diyārān “I visited abodes…” praising Harim b. Sinān b. Abī Ḥarītha al-Murrī (d. ca. 608, a chief of the Banū Murra) reads: ḍādā’ at-fa-lam tughfar lahā khalawātuhā // fa-lāqat bayānī ‘inda ākhiri ma ḥadī [meter: tawīl] “She [the she-camel] neglected [her youngster] – her times of solitude were not forgiven – then, she came across a sign [of her calf’s wound, according to al-Shantamarī: “skin, traces of flesh, blood and the like”] where she last saw [him]”; see Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā, Shiʾr Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā ṣanaʾahu al-Aʿshā al-Shantamarī, ed. Fakhr al-Dīn Qabāwa, Aleppo: al-Maktaba al-ʿArabīyya, 1970, 179 (English: ‘The Poetry of Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā, arranged by al-Shantamarī [d. 476/1083 or 4]’)) (only the first part of the work contains al-Shantamarī’s commentary; the second part contains poems commented by the editor). Another version has fa-lam tughfar lahā ghafalātuhā “her acts of negligence with respect to her young one were not forgiven her” (Lane, Lexicon, 2273; translation his). Case #2, line 20 of a Nūmīyya by Zuhayr also praising Harim b. Sinān and opening with tabayyan khalīlī “Look, my friend…” reads (+ second hemistic of previous line): (iḍāmmama rislan ḥājati -bn Sinānī) wa-ḥājata ghayrī innāhu dhū mawāridin // wa-dhū maṣdarīn min nāʾilin wa-bayānī [meter: tawīl] “(Ibn Sinān guaranteed my need with gentleness) as well as the need of others; indeed he is one to whom [people] come [when it comes to] bestowing and giving”, Shiʾr Zuhayr, 291. This piece is not part of al-Shantamarī’s commentary; the editor glosses bayān as balāgha. Cf. Kurayyim, al-Muʾjam, 410, who claims that bayān in the poetry of Zuhayr means ‘eloquence’ (balāgha wa-faṣāha). Case #3, line 40 of a Rāʾiyya by al-Aʿshā dedicated to Hāwdha b. Abī al-Ḥanaflī (d. 9/630, a leader of the tribe Ḥanīfa b. Lujaym who were in conflict with the tribe of Tamīm) that opens with ghashīta li-laylā “You came to Laylā…” reads: fa-sāʾ il tamīman wa-indī l-bayānī // wa-in taktnūm Tajidīnī khabīrā [meter: mutaqārīb] “[addressing Hāwdha] Inquire Tamīm [about what you inflicted upon them] – I have the evidence/knowledge [of that]; [addressing Tamīm] and if you conceal [Hāwdha’s victory] I have knowledge [or: I will inform of it]”; see Maymūn b. Quṣays al-Aʾshā al-Kabīrī, Dīwān al-Aʾshā al-Kabīrī, commentary by Muḥammad Muḥammad ᴴusayn, 2nd ed., first published by Rudolf Geyer, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Sharqī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī, [1968], 129.

295 For this meaning see Ibn Manṣūr, Lisān al-ʿarab 1: 404, 2nd column, though bayān is not attested as a maṣdar of form IV abānā. But since all of bayyana, abānā, tabayyana and istabānā (forms II, IV, V and X) are said to be either transitive or intransitive and thus synonymous with bāna, I am allowing the poet (and myself) this license.

296 E.g., Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddima 3: 1030-31, as a later example.
Vishanoff. For Montgomery the central theme behind al-Shāfiʿī’s bayān is the Arabic language (‘arabiyya, the language of the ancient Arabs). According to him, “the discussion of the Arabic nature of the Qurʿān […] can hardly be distinguished from the discussion of bayān […] in Shāfiʿī’s own jurisprudential definitions,” and the notion of clarity is “virtually synonymous” with the ‘arabiyya.297 Montgomery gauges this understanding from al-Shāfiʿī’s various pronouncements regarding those to whom the Qurʾān was directed and in whose language it was revealed, and regarding the extensiveness (ittisāʿ) – Vishanoff would add, ambiguities – of the Arabic language.298

Lowry delves more deeply into al-Shāfiʿī’s conception of bayān. In his understanding, bayān refers to God’s communication of legal norms via the Qurʾān and/or the Sunna (the prophetic ḥadīth), as it represents, at the core, “a statement, communication, or address, from God, to someone, in the Arabic language” and “resembles the term ḥiṭāb in later usūl al-fiqh.”299 In his recent translation of al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla, Lowry renders bayān as “legislative statement.”300

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298 Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir, [Cairo]: [al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī], 1940, 21 para. 54 (annābayānunli-mankhitiba bihā mimman nazala l-Qurʾānu bi-līsānhī – on this sentence see below), 26 para. 74 (fa-kānabayyinain‘inda man khitiba bi-hādīhā l-āya), 40 para. 127 (anna jam’a kitābi-l-lāhi innamā nazala bi-līsānī l-ʿarab), 42 para. 138 (wa-līsānul-ʿarab awsa’ul-ālsinatimadhhaban) – to name a few prominent examples. Vishanoff is referring to various features of the Arabic language via the heading “ambiguities,” and thus to al-Shāfiʿī’s treatment of those features as “a hermeneutic of ambiguity.” See Vishanoff, Formation, 46-48, 50-61 (here: 46, 50).


According to Lowry, through postulating the mechanism of bayān al-Shāfiʿī is setting up a description of the law’s structure, or “architecture,” that “aims to demonstrate that the Qurʾān and the Sunna function together, in several different ways to express rules of law.”

Lowry takes the four, and later five, categories of bayān detailed by al-Shāfiʿī as a typology of textual combinations by which norms are “announced.” The combinations are: norms announced “by the Qurʾān alone, by the Qurʾān and the Sunna together, by the Sunna alone, or by inference [ijtihād] based on the Qurʾān and/or the Sunna.”

Lowry takes the four-fold set of categories and the subsequent discussion of five categories, to refer to the same essential combinations (Vishanoff will disagree, see below). Most importantly, Lowry identifies that by bayān al-Shāfiʿī does not mean a hierarchy of clarity, as do many of the later uṣūlīs, but merely a typology of clarity; al-Shāfiʿī’s bayān is structural whereas bayān according to most of the later legal theorists is qualitative. It is probably in this sense that Lowry describes al-Shāfiʿī’s bayān as being “mostly intransitive.”

Vishanoff pinpoints two senses of bayān in al-Shāfiʿī’s thinking rather than one, owing to the differences between the four-fold presentation of bayān and the later five-fold categorization. The first sense, expounded on by the four categories (Qurʾān[1]; Qurʾān-Sunna[2]; Sunna[3]; ijtihād[4]) is “to make known,” that is, the “four ways in which the Qurʾān reveals the law.” The

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301 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 48.

302 That bayān involves norms that are necessarily “announced,” “communicated” or “expressed” is something Lowry stresses (e.g. “Preliminary Observations,” 507-508, 525).

303 Lowry, “Preliminary Observations,” 508; idem, “Four Sources of Law,” 47-49.

304 Al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 21-22 (four categories), 26-40 (five categories).

305 For elaboration see “Preliminary Observations,” 514-24; idem, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 55-57.

second sense, expounded on by the five categories, is “to clarify” since those categories concern, according to Vishanoff, the “ways in which the Qur’an is clarified by other evidence” (a redundant confirmation on a Qur’anic text by another text[1]; an elaboration or modification by another text on a rather clear Qur’anic text[2]; an elaboration by another text on an undetailed Qur’anic text[3]; a prophetic report unrelated to any legal text in the Qur’an[4]; and natural evidence[5]). By identifying this second sense of bayān Vishanoff is narrowing the differences between al-Shāfi’ī’s bayān and later uṣūlīs’ use of the term.

We should pause at some of the wording al-Shāfi’ī employs here, because it lends itself to a dualism that also surfaces later in non-legal writings. Several uṣūlīs famously complain about al-Shāfi’ī’s prefatory passage on bayān as being either a poor definition of bayān or no definition at all, and I certainly cannot make better sense of it. First, the title al-Shāfi’ī gives to his treatment of the topic is not al-bayān or mā al-bayān “what is bayān,” as one might

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307 For the two senses see Vishanoff, *Formation*, 52; for the meaning of the five categories as a means by which “the Qur’an’s legal meaning can be ‘made clear’” see ibid., 42-43. According to Vishanoff, the ways in which the law is revealed ultimately go back to the Qur’an. We should mention that later in the *Risāla* (32-33 paras. 97-101), we find a further categorization of bayān into three categories (or ways, wujūh). Al-Shāfi’ī presents this in the context of category 4 in the five-fold categorization, and it is said with respect to al-farā’id al-manṣūṣa fī kitāb Allāh, which Lowry translates as “textually explicit obligations” (*The Epistle*, 27; no trace of fī kitāb Allāh). I am not sure how this categorization fits with the other ones. The categories here are: the Qur’an alone, the Qur’an with an elaboration by the prophetic Sunna, and the prophetic Sunna without a clear Qur’anic text. Here he does away with ijtihād. Once again, all three categories are reducible to the Qur’an (wa-kullu Shay’īn minhā bayānun fī kitāb Allāh “All of these are legislative statements in the Book of God”; *al-Risāla* 32 para. 97, 33 para. 101/Lowry [trans.], *The Epistle*, 27), adding credence to the understanding of bayān as being ultimately tied to the Qur’an. In this passage we find a hint of a qualitative sense of bayān, when al-Shāfi’ī speaks of some categories as being “of the utmost clarity” (ʿalā ghāyat al-bayān; *al-Risāla*, 32 paras. 98-99).


309 For recent translations of *al-Risāla*, 21, paras. 53-54, see Lowry (trans.), *The Epistle*, 15; Vishanoff, *Formation*, 39; Ahmed El Shamsy, *From Tradition to Law: The Origins and Early Development of the Shāfi’ī School of Law in Ninth-Century Egypt*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009, 59. One of the many textual problems in this passage has to do with the maʿānī (maʿānin) to which the resumptive pronouns in annahā and bihā refer in annahā bayānun li-man khāṭiba bihā (also the feminine marker in mutaqāribat al-istiwā'); this gives the impression that what is addressed to those to whom the Qur’an was revealed was the maʿānī of bayān, rendering the phrase annahā bayānun rather redundant. Vishanoff takes maʿānin to be a reference to the “types” of bayān; Lowry and El Shamsy ignore it, as they take the feminine resumptive pronoun as a reference to the masculine bayān or to the Qur’an.
expect, but rather kayfa al-bayān “how is bayān” or “the modalities of bayān.”\textsuperscript{310} We will return to this shortly. Once al-Shāfi‘ī goes on to enumerate the categories of bayān (four and later five), he elaborates on nearly all of them using conjugations of abāna ‘to make evident’, bayyana (do.) and dalla ‘to indicate’, the subject of these transitive verbs being God, the Prophet or natural signs. The very opening sentence of his presentation of the categories is fa-jimā‘u mā abāna - llāhu li-khalqihi [fī kitābihi] “The sum total of that which God made evident for His creation [in his Book…].”\textsuperscript{311} Considering the occurrences of such verbs, bayān is clearly a transitive notion in the lexical sense we have seen above, and Lowry even translates the verb abāna here as the “legislative statements that God has provided”.\textsuperscript{312} In this sense bayān refers to God’s pronouncements about the law, and kayfa al-bayān refers to ways in which God imparts knowledge about the law (even if it is mediated by the prophetic literature or by inference, it is ultimately based on Scripture). But at the same time, bayān also carries an intransitive sense and refers not to the communication of that legal knowledge, but to the legal knowledge itself: kayfa al-bayān would thus refer to the ways in which knowledge about the law comes about.\textsuperscript{313} In the

\textsuperscript{310} Al-Risāla, 21 (including wujūh in para. 55); Lowry (trans.), The Epistle, 15; M. Bernand, “Bayān selon les Uṣūliyyūn,” Arabica 42 (1995), 145-60, here: 150, 152.

\textsuperscript{311} Al-Risāla, 21 para. 55 (quoted above), 21 para. 56 (mā abānahu li-khalqihi nassan; ghayr dhālika mimmā bayyana nassan) [category one], 22 para. 57 (wa-bayyana […] ‘alā lisān nabiyyīhi) [category two], 23 para. 65 (fa-dallahum jalla thanā’uhu), 24 para. 68 (mimmā dallahum ‘alayhi) [category four], 28 para. 82 (fa-kānat al-dalāla fī hādhā [referring to a Qur’ānic verse]) [category one, second list], 29 para. 86 (atā kitābu ʿalā ‘alā l-bayān), para. 87 (fa-bayyana rasūlu -llāh […] wa-dalla ‘alā annahu), para. 88 (wa-dallat al-sunn; wa-dalla l-nabiyy; wa-dalla ‘alā annahu; dalla ‘alā annahu) [category two, second list], 31 para. 95 (thumma bayyana ‘alā lisān rasūlihi) [category three, second list], 32 para. 97 (wa-bayyana [Allāh]) para. 99 (fa-bayyana rasūl Allāh ‘an Allāh; Allāh an Allāh), 33 para. 100 (mā bayyana nassan nabiyyīhi) [category four, second list], 38 para. 116 (wa-abāna [Allāh] annahu) [category five, second list]. Even the categories which are not expounded on using these verbs contain other transitive verbs, like faraḍa ‘to impose’, which reveal the transitive notion behind bayān; see, e.g., al-Risāla, 22 para. 59 [category four, first list]: mā faraḍa Allāh ‘alā khalqihi al-ijtihād fī ṣalābihi “That [i.e., legal knowledge] which, in order for his people to obtain, God imposed inference.” Notice that all categories are reduced, again, to the Qur’ān (mā abāna Allāh li-khalqihi fī kitābihi).

\textsuperscript{312} Lowry (trans.), The Epistle, 15.

\textsuperscript{313} This is also evident from the phrase annahā bayānun li-man khūtiba bihā: “they [the cryptic maʾāni, see above] make things clear to those to whom they are addressed” (Vishanoff, Formation, 39), which could also mean “they
'transitive' reading the emphasis is more on the communication itself and its method (be it linguistic or not, explicit or not, etc.), and as such bayān can be translated as ‘divine communication [about the law]’. In the ‘intransitive’ reading, the emphasis is more on the content of communication, or the knowledge itself of the law, and as such bayān can be translated as ‘knowledge [about the law]’. To be sure, for al-Shāfiʿī the concept of bayān is rather consistent, and given the verbal use of abāna, bayyana, and dalla, its primary sense is transitive. The dualism of the term tells us not so much about al-Shāfiʿī’s thinking as it does about the inherent ambiguity of the term bayān itself (more on this below).

It is true that the categories of bayān here, that is, the “ways” in which the law is made known, are ultimately mediated by language, but I am not sure al-Shāfiʿī had this emphasis in mind. For him bayān is derived from the first lexical meaning of the word, namely, a type of ‘sign’ or ‘indication’ (mā buyyina bihi l-shay’u mina l-dalālati wa-ghayrihā; see above), and whether or not those signs are linguistic is, at the basis of al-Shāfiʿī’s conception of bayān, less relevant. Montgomery’s connection between bayān and the ‘arabiyya is interesting indeed – we will come across this in Ibn Fāris’ work – but such an identity is not set up by al-Shāfiʿī (he speaks of the language’s ambiguities and the necessity to master them, but in and of themselves, they are distinct from the notion of bayān).

As we move away from al-Shāfiʿī to later legal theorists we find that their conception of are clear to those to whom they are addressed,” making bayān synonymous with the following mutaqāribat al-istiwā’, which Vishanoff translates as “equivalent [in their clarity]” (brackets his) and could also be translated as “equally/easily plain/direct” (see also El Shamsy, From Tradition to Law, 59, on istiwā’).


315 In this sense, later usūlī interpretations of bayān as dalīl are not so disconnected from al-Shāfiʿī’s ideas (for bayān as dalīl see, e.g., Lowry, “Preliminary Observations,” 522).
bayān as a hermeneutical tool usually involves a clarificatory relationship between texts. According to many of the later usūlis, bayān refers to the ways in which one text makes another clearer with regards to legal norms, thus assigning the term a more pronounced qualitative sense. Lowry shows that bayān gradually came to refer to various levels of communicative clarity, shifting the emphasis to the role of the addressee, or recipient, in interpreting those levels. This process reflects what Lowry refers to as the “linguistic turn” in later legal thinking – essentially, the main concern of Vishanoff’s work.

The Philosophical Sense(s) of Bayān

The common denominator between the legal sense of bayān and the philosophical one is that both are derived from the first lexical meaning of the word, namely, a type of ‘sign’ by which a thing becomes known. But whereas the former is limited to knowledge about legal ‘things’, the latter is more general. We could nevertheless refer to both senses of bayān as ‘a mechanism of imparting knowledge’.

Abū ʿUthmān ‘Amr b. Baḥr al-Jāḥīz (d. 255/868 or 9) is the first author to leave us a written documentation of bayān in its philosophical sense in his famous ‘humanist’ masterpieces, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān ‘Books of Animals’ and al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn ‘Clear Expression/Elocution and Exposition’. Al-Jāḥīz’s notion of bayān has usually been interpreted as a theory of

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316 This is based on the views of al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980), Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), Ibn Ṭaḥhindī (d. 513/1119) and al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392) – all discussed by Lowry, “Preliminary Observations,” 514-24.


318 The verb ‘to impart [knowledge]’, unlike ‘to convey’ or ‘to communicate’, is etymologically connected to the notion of parting or dividing, and as such it evokes one of the main meanings of the root b.y.n, namely, ‘to part’. See Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿarab, 1: 403-406, and Larsen’s discussion of separability above.

319 Montgomery now prefers ‘The Book of Living’ for Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, following Saʿīd Manṣūr’s understanding of hayawān as equivalent to the meaning of the word in Q 29:64, “The next dwelling – it is living (hayawān; ‘life’ in Arberry’s renderring).” See Montgomery, In Praise of Books, 9-10. Lately, ‘The Book of Living Beings’ has
communication akin to modern semiotics. Scholars pursuing this line of thought have tended to investigate al-Jāhiz’s notion of *bayān* in isolation.

*Bayān* is in fact used in two senses by al-Jāhiz: the first is non-technical and implicit and refers to ‘clarity of expression’ (i.e., eloquence); the second is technical and explicit and refers to a philosophical mechanism of signification. What we are interested in here is the second use of the term, but a word should be said about the first. *Bayān* as ‘eloquence’ is most apparent in the opening of *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*: although lacking a clear preface, not to mention an explanation of the work’s title, al-Jāhiz does begin with a type of ‘definition’ of *bayān* by treating its primary antonym – befitting the famous adage *tu‘raf al-ashyā’ bi-aḍḍādiḥā* “things are known/defined by their opposites” – namely, ‘*iyy* ‘inarticulateness/linguistic ineptitude’ (or ḥaṣar ‘inability to express one’s mind’; one of the very definitions of ‘*iyy* given in the dictionaries is “the opposite of *bayān*”). It is clear that this unspoken sense of *bayān* is different from the explicit

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321 Montgomery and Lowry analyse al-Jāhiz’s *bayān* in more contextual terms, but mostly limited to al-Shāfī‘ī.

322 Abū ‘Uthmān Ṭarīq b. Bahr al-Jāhiz, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabayyn*, ed. ’Abd al-Salām Muhammad Hārūn, 4 vols., Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānājī, [1968], 1: 3-7, and more broadly 3-74. Al-Jāhiz treats a range of linguistic ‘ineptitudes’ in this long section, including speech impediments and consonant-mispronunciations, and a number of typical Jāhizian digressions, a long one of which is on poets who are also good orators (a talent he deems rare, p. 45). Ibn Manṣūr records al-Jawhari’s definition: *wa-l-‘iyyu khilāfū l-bayān* (*Lisān al-‘arab* 4: 3202, 2nd column). For a different, and
presentation of the notion in the following section titled ṣāḥb al-bayān.\textsuperscript{323} Bayān as `eloquence' serves as one of the main components of the `project' al-Jāḥiz is committed to, to wit: preserving (and promoting) the customs, codes and heritage of the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia, culminating in their linguistic excellence.\textsuperscript{324}

But the technical sense of bayān is first presented in his earlier work, the Ḥayawān, not in al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, and the two discussions of the notion are slightly different.\textsuperscript{325} The context of the first discussion of bayān is ḥikma, a term that usually denotes `divine wisdom' or `intelligent design' (also tadbīr), and is a philosophical principle that underlies the Ḥayawān, according to which “God's providence [or: design] can be seen in the lowliest creatures of His creation.”\textsuperscript{326} As it is presented in the passage in question, the meaning of ḥikma oscillates

detailed, presentation of the prefatory sections of al-Jāḥiz's work see Montgomery, “Al-Jāḥiz's al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn,” 115-22. According to him (p. 122), “the first section of Jāḥiz's Bayān [i.e., pp. 3-74] establishes the three principal domains in which the treatise will operate: the divine nature of bayān and its significance for mankind; Mu'tazilism as the bastion of the of the beliefs of the Community; the analysis and survey of linguistic ineptitude and speech defects as political, religious, moral and legal failings.”

\textsuperscript{323} Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn 1: 75 fn. 1, where Hārūn states that the heading appears in all but two manuscripts.


between ‘divine wisdom’ and ‘wisdom of worldly things’. Because all worldly things are a reflection of God, this distinction might be a moot one for al-Jāḥiz: ḥikma could refer, at the same time, both to Wisdom and to the manifestation of Wisdom (a primitive precursor to monism?).

Let us closely summarize the passage in question, which appears in the opening sections of the Ḥayawān dealing with the various divisions of creation. According to al-Jāḥiz, all things in the universe contain, or are themselves, ḥikma (wa-wajadnā l-ʿālam bi-mā fīhi ḥikmatan).

These worldly things “were created” as such (juʿila ḥikmatan), implicitly by God. There are two types of wisdom. The first type does not realize or understand wisdom (lā yaʿqilu l-ḥimka), presumably its own inherent wisdom, nor does it understand what follows from the wisdom (ʿāqibat al-ḥikma), presumably God’s existence and design. This type encompasses animals and inanimate beings, and al-Jāḥiz refers to it as the irrational (ghayr al-ʿāqil). The second type of wisdom understands wisdom and what follows from it; it encompasses Man, and al-Jāḥiz refers to it as the rational (al-ʿāqil). Both types of wisdom are the same in that they are an indication or a sign (dalāla, dalīl) that they themselves are ‘wisdom’.

Montgomery refers to dalīl in this context as a “probative sign,” implying that it is specifically a sign of divinity, and I follow


Montgomery renders ḥikma as “wisdom” or “instance of wisdom” (In Praise of Books, 435). Suleiman interprets ḥikma as “semantic import” or “meaning” and the worldly entities as “signifiers of meaning” (“Bayān as a Principle of Taxonomy,” 278, 280). I think ḥikma refers primarily to the ‘meaning’ of God (as the creator) and only secondarily to other types of meaning (like sickness, etc., that humans can infer from inanimate objects or situations; al-Jāḥiz, al-Ḥayawān 1: 34, and below).

Al-Ḥayawān 1: 33-35. For a most recent paraphrase see Montgomery, In Praise of Books, 435-36.

The resumptive pronoun in al-dalāla ʿalā annahu ḥikma refers to al-shayʾ al-ʿāqil wa-ghayr al-ʿāqil, that is, to the entities themselves – not, say, to God (al-Ḥayawān 1: 33). On the meaning of dalāla as dalīl see Lane, Lexicon, 901. Other options for dalīl: a thing that carries signification; signifier.

him by translating *dalīl* here as “a sign of *ḥikma.*” Al-Jāḥiz continues by saying that the two types of *ḥikma* differ in that the irrational being is a sign of *ḥikma* (*dalīl*) that cannot itself ‘seek indication’ or infer (*yastadillu*), whereas the rational being is a sign of *ḥikma* that can make inferences (*dalīl mustadillīl*). At this point the notion of *bayān* is introduced:

> thumma juʿila li-l-mustadillīl sababun yadullu bihi ʿalā wujūhi -ṣīdīlīhi wa-wujūhi mā nataja lahu l-ṣīdīlīhu wa-sammaw dhālīka bayānan

Then a means was made for the inferring being by which he could indicate/signify the various methods of his inference as well as the various results of his inference (lit. that which his inference brought forth), and that [the means, or faculty] was named *bayān.*

Al-Jāḥiz says that four types of “means of indication/signification” (*bayān*) were created (*juʿila*): speech, writing, calculating (with fingers), and gesturing. He then proceeds to argue, in some detail, that the non-inferring sign of wisdom (*al-dalīl alladhī lā yastadillu*) also has a “means of indication” (*bayān*) by the fact that it “enables the one seeking indication from it (*al-mustadilla min nafsihi*), and leads anyone who examines it (*kulla man fakkara fīhi*), to [gain] knowledge (*maʿrifa*) of the proof (*burhān*) that is reposited in it [in the irrational being], and of the indication [of wisdom] (*dalāla*) that it is filled with, and of the wondrous wisdom (*ʿajīb al-

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331 *Al-Ḥayawān* 1: 33.3-4. Suleiman describes this “means of generating and processing meaning” as “faculty-like” ("Bayān as a Principle of Taxonomy," 280). Behzadi presents it as an “access” (Zugang) to the signifiable world (*Sprache und Verstehen*, 58). Montgomery translates *bayān* as “clarity” and *dalāla* as “probative signs” (*In Praise of Books*, 435); here Montgomery recognizes a shift in focus between the presentation of *bayān* in the *Ḥayawān* and that in *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*. Following Montgomery, I am essentially disregarding the second instance of *wujūh* (in *wujūh mā nataja lahu l-ṣīdīlīl*) in my translation. Larsen discusses the possible indebtedness of this passage to Aristotle’s discussion of the sign/reference (*Means of Intelligibility*, 13-15, 102; his translation should be treated with caution).

332 *Al-Ḥayawān* 1: 33. For a detailed account of these categories see, e.g., Suleiman, “Bayān as a Principle of Taxonomy,” 281-86; Behzadi, *Sprache und Verstehen*, 62-77. Both scholars set it as their aim to situate al-Jāḥiz’s thought within modern theories of language and communication. To them we may add Skarżyńska-Bocheńska, who renders *bayān* directly as “communication”; see “Entre al-Gāḥiz et Bakhtine,” passim.

333 This is understood, first, by the *idāfa* construction implying possession, *bayān al-dalīl alladhī lā yastadillu* (*al-Ḥayawān* 1: 34), and later, by the specific remark that the inanimate object “shares with the living speaking (/rational) man in [having?] bayān” (*qad shāraka fī l-bayāni l-īnsāna al-ḥayyya l-nāṭiqā*; ibid. 1: 35).
In other words, bayān is not a means to signify meaning in general, but specifically the meaning of God’s existence and design (i.e., ḥikma). Al-Jāḥiẓ concedes that those who see bayān as containing five categories, to include the irrational entities, are correct as well.\(^{335}\)

Al-Jāḥiẓ provides several examples for irrational beings imparting knowledge that can be ‘deciphered’ by rational beings, but in my understanding, these are not meant as primary examples of bayān. Rather, they are adduced as analogies in order to prove that irrational beings can ‘speak’ – most specifically – of their wisdom. Al-Jāḥiẓ states that inanimate beings “speak insofar as they [offer] indication [of ḥikma] […] as if the design (tadbīr) and wisdom (ḥikma) within them are informers to those who seek information from them and speakers to those who ask them to speak back, just as (kamā) leanness and fading of color inform of illness, and just as fleshiness and brightness (of color) speak of good health” (emphasis added).\(^{336}\) In other words, just as leanness etc. can inform us of certain realities, likewise objects can inform us of the most basic reality – ‘wisdom’ – via bayān. Bayān is first and foremost a mechanism of imparting knowledge of ḥikma, not any knowledge.

I take the poetic examples that al-Jāḥiẓ then adduces in a similar vein of analogical proof, although I recognize that they can be, and have been read as examples of bayān par

\(^{334}\)Ibid. 1: 34.

\(^{335}\)Ibid. 1: 35. Al-Jāḥiẓ does not give a heading to this category as he later does in al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, but he mentions “the position of an object and its stature” (mawdūʿ al-jīm wa-nīṣbatuḥ; al-Ḥayawān 1: 35, and see below).

\(^{336}\)Ibid. 1: 34 (ja-l-ajṣāmu l-khursu l-šāmitatu nāṭiqatun min jihatī l-dalālāti […] ’alā anna -lladhi fīhā mina l-tadbīrī wa-l-ḥikmati muḥbirūn li-māni -stakhbarahu wa-nāṭiqun li-māni -stanṣaqqahu kamā khābbara l-huzālu wa-kusāfu l-lawni ’an sūʾi l-hāli wa-kamā yanṭiqu l-sīmanu wa-husnu l-nadratī ’an husnī l-hāli) (emphasis mine). If they had been meant as examples of bayān, I think the wording would be different.
The examples are interesting, because such cases would later come to be seen as _majāz_ (see Part Two), whereas for al-Jāḥiz and later Ibn Wahb al-Kātib, they are a reflection of true reality. The examples include provision-bags loaded on camels “giving praise” to the caliph (a line by the Umayyad poet Nuṣayb ‘al-Akbar’); eyes “informing” about that which is in the hearts (anonymous poetic line); a wolf “requesting [knowledge]” from the wind (a line by the _mukhādram_ poet al-‘Ukłī); feathers of a raven falling off piecemeal likened to a pair of shears because he “informs” [of separation] (a line by the Jāhilī poet ‘Antara); a land “replying” to an inquirer about [Him] who plowed [it for] its rivers, planted its trees and gathered its fruit (related in the _Qiṣṣa al-anbiyā_’ by al-Faḍl b. Ḫūsain Abān). In the last example we find the term _iʿtibār_ ‘a lesson to be derived’, which Ibn Wahb will later employ to express the imparting of knowledge by inanimate beings.

If in the context of the Ḥayawān, _bayān_ is not a means of signifying any meaning whatsoever but is a means of signifying specifically divine/worldly wisdom (ḥikma, tadbīr) – the focus of the notion shifts in the later _al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn_. This is because in the later work, al-Jāḥiz approaches the topic from the perspective of _bayān_ as ‘eloquence’ (see above), and because he is probably adjusting his presentation to the ideas laid out by al-Shāfiʿī, whom he alludes to by citing “one of the mighty man of words.” The chapter titled _bāb al-bayān_,

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337 See the modern studies cited above. Al-Jāḥiz himself and others following him would come to view such cases from the point of view of _bayān_.

338 Ibid. 1: 34-35.

339 _fa-in lam tujibka hiwāran ajābatka - tibāran_ “and if [the land] does not reply to you by conversation, it will reply to you as a lesson that can be derived” (ibid. 1: 35). For the meaning of _iʿtibār_ as “a lesson [ _ibra_ ] to be derived” see Ibn Manẓūr, _Lisān al-ʿarab_ 4: 2783, 2nd-3rd columns, 2782, 2nd column; Lane, _Lexicon_, 1937: “He took, or regarded, what he witnessed, or saw, or beheld, as an indication, or evidence, of what was concealed from him.”

340 _Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn_ 1: 75, where the chapter opens with _qāla ba ʿdu jahābidhati al-alfāzī wa-nuqqādi l-maʿānī_, El Shamsy, _From Tradition to Law_, 206.
appearing immediately after the work’s opening section, begins with the idea of making known ideas/meanings (maʿānī) which subsist in the hearts (lit. ‘breasts’) and minds of people, thus creating a direct link between the universal philosophical mechanism of bayān and the bayān pertaining solely to humans. Here too al-Jāḥiz presents bayān as a ‘sign’ and as a ‘means’, keeping in line with the primary lexical sense of the word: “A clear sign/indication (dalāla) of a hidden meaning – that is the bayān that you heard God Almighty speak in praise of […])”; “By whichever means you reach [a state of] making [something] understood and [by whichever means] you elucidate a meaning – that is bayān in that situation.”

Here dalāla is used in a general sense, devoid of the notion of ḥikma, and is now equivalent to bayān in that the categories, which were identified previously in the Ḥayawān as categories of bayān, are now presented as categories of al-dalālāt ‘alā l-maʿānī “significations of meanings/concepts,” whether verbal or not (min lafẓ wa-ghayr lafẓ). They are presented directly as being five-fold,

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341 al-maʿānī al-qāʿ ima fī ṣudūr al-nās al-mutaṣaawwara fī adḥānīhi [etc.]; al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn 1: 75. For a translation of the entire paragraph see Montgomery, “Al-Jāḥiz’s al-Bayān wa al-Ṭabyīn,” 126. He interprets (p. 127) this and other segments as a testament to the fact that ‘Jāḥiz’s system is a performative ethics, in which man’s character is defined through his actions and not through his intentions: his moral duty is to enable his companions to understand his intentions through endowing them with bayān” (see also Montgomery, In Praise of Books, 322). I do not see al-Jāḥiz’s discussions of (human) communication to pertain to ethics (by which Montgomery is following the famous claims made by Michael Carter on speech as action). If anything, a man cannot but help express his true nature by his speech, revealing a kind of ‘perceptional-relativism’: any situation can be perceived differently by different people depending on their status, profession, etc. This idea is developed by Montgomery in his later study of al-Bayān wa-l-tabīn via what he calls “the speech-nature insight.” Especially revealing are the examples al-Jāḥiz provides of those professionals who use technical vocabulary in their speech in non-professional settings because their perception of a situation is relative to their background. Montgomery does not use the term relativism in this context but does speak of ‘determinism’; he examines the issue in light of many later theological discussions on the topic. See James E. Montgomery, “Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiz, Kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabīn, 2.175-207, Part 1,” Middle Eastern Literatures 11.2 (2008), 169-91, esp. 171-74; idem, “Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiz, Kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabīn, 2.175-207, Part 4,” Middle Eastern Literatures 12.3 (2009), 213-32. On the ‘genre’ of literary speech put into the mouth of artisans and other tradesmen see Joseph Sadan, “Kings and Craftsman, A Pattern of Contrasts: On the History of a Mediaeval Arabic Humoristic Form,” Studia Islamica 56 (1982), 5-49 (Part I) and 62 (1985), 89-120 (Part II).

342 Al-Bayān wa-l-tabīn 1: 75.2-3⁴ (wa-l-dalālātā l-zāhiratu ‘alā l-maʾnā l-khaṣīyya huwa l-bayānu -lladhī samīʿa l-llāha ‘azza wa-jallā yamadahu […]); ibid. 1: 76.4-5 (fa-bi-ayyi shay’in balaghata l-ifhāma wa-awdhaṭa ‘ani l-maʾnā fīa-dhālika huwa l-bayānu fī dhālika l-mawdī’).
and *bayān* in turn is defined as that which reveals a meaning (*maʿnā*) to the listener.\textsuperscript{343}

Signification imparted by inanimate entities is termed *niṣba* ‘position’, a term that has been associated with the seventh Aristotelian category *to keisthai* already in the late third/ninth century scribal manual *al-Risāla al-ʿAdhraَ*.\textsuperscript{344} Referred to as *al-ḥāl al-dālla* “the indicative situation” and *al-ḥāl al-nāṭiga bi-ghayr al-lafẓ* “the non-verbal expressive situation,” this category is exemplified with many of the same examples that al-Jāḥiz adduced in his *Ḥayawān*\textsuperscript{345}.

Montgomery, and Lowry following him, contends that al-Jāḥiz’s theory of *bayān* is a reaction to, and engagement with, al-Shāfiʿī’s treatment of the notion.\textsuperscript{346} Ahmed El Shamsy has found a nearly verbatim account of parts of the passage we find in *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, put into the mouth of al-Shāfiʿī — “one of […] the mighty men of words” — by one of his students.\textsuperscript{347} The term *bayān* is not mentioned in this account: the five-fold categorization deals, as we find above,

\textsuperscript{343} *Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 76.


\textsuperscript{345} *Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 81-83. One of the additional examples al-Jāḥiz provides is “Alexander was more talkative yesterday than he is today, but he is more exhortative today than he was yesterday,” said upon the death of Alexander the Great. The standard idiom for this phenomenon became *lisān al-ḥāl*.


with al-dalālāt ‘alā l-maʿānī, and with the nature of words vis-à-vis ideas/concepts. This suggests that rather than being a reactionary response to al-Shāfiʿī, al-Jāḥiẓ’s account was an endorsement. Al-Jāḥiẓ repurposes the five-fold categorization of signification into a theory of bayān, which for al-Jāḥiẓ originally concerned the notion of ḥikma, but the terms he later uses in al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn are closer to the original wording used by al-Shāfiʿī. The theory of signification (al-dalālāt ‘alā l-maʿānī) that is attributed to al-Shāfiʿī is not equivalent to the theory of bayān that al-Shāfiʿī lays out in the Risāla, not least of which because the term bayān is absent from the former. Al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of signification revolves primarily around ‘human’ meanings; his theory of bayān in the Risāla is “nourished by and directed at legal speculation,”348 and has more to do with ‘divine’ meanings (regarding the law). Furthermore, al-Shāfiʿī’s project in the Risāla is deontological at its core – it does not concern absolute truths.349 Conversely, the work of al-Jāḥiẓ, especially the Hayawān in which the theory of bayān first appears, is first and foremost assertoric, dealing with the absolute truth that “everything in nature has a meaning and use, and […] everything proves the existence and wisdom of God.”350

For later generations the theory of al-dalālāt ‘alā l-maʿānī became inextricable from the theory of bayān, and it became associated almost entirely with al-Jāḥiẓ (not al-Shāfiʿī). In the century following al-Jāḥiẓ, Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Wahb al-Kātib (fl. 4th/10th century) authored a book devoted to aqsām al-bayān “the categories of bayān.”351 His conception of the notion,

348 A claim that Montgomery made with regards to al-Jāḥiẓ’s theorizing (“Speech and Nature, Part 4,” 224).
350 Pellat, “al-Jāḥiẓ,” 87. For Montgomery, al-Jāḥiẓ’s al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn deals with the “should be,” not with the “is”: “[al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn is] a riposte to, and engagement with Shāfiʿī’s salvationist deontology as encapsulated in the theory of bayān in the Risāla. For Jāḥiẓ presents an axiology – a theory of ultimate values – in which man’s reasoning intellect dominates: man has to decide how he should live” (Montgomery, “Al-Jāḥiẓ’s al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn,” 103).
according to von Grunebaum, “is very different, and both wider and narrower, than that which Djāḥīz endeavored to formulate.” Though unrelated this time to the notion of hikma, there is little doubt that Ibn Wahb’s bayān is inspired by the same philosophical-epistemological questions of meaning-production that we find in al-Shāfiʿī’s/al-Jāḥīz’s theory of al-dalālāt ‘alā l-maʿānī. Ibn Wahb’s conception of bayān is linked explicitly to al-Jāḥīz at the outset, as he states that the purpose of his work is to provide more information (but not too much) on the categories of bayān that al-Jāḥīz spoke of in his al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn. According to Ibn Wahb, bayān subsists in four loci which seem to be answering the question, “how does knowledge (of a thing) come about?” Each locus, in turn, forms a section in the book. Bayān is often inseparable from the very concept of ‘knowledge’.

The work opens with an aside on ‘reason’ (‘aql), a faculty which only man possesses, and its twofold division into ‘innate’ and ‘acquired’ (mawhūb, maksūb). From there he proceeds to the four modes of bayān (which we will keep in its most common literal translation for the sake of simplicity): (1) iʿtibār ‘a lesson [or: knowledge] that can be derived’: “the clarity of things in/by themselves for him who takes notice of them/takes them as a sign and seeks knowledge [or: signification] from them”; (2) iʿtiqād ‘[forming an] opinion/belief’: “the clarity that is

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352 Von Grunebaum, “Bayān.” He does not spell out the differences.

353 Al-Burhān, 51-52. It is not surprising, then, to find no trace of hikma, since Kitāb al-Hayawān is not mentioned.

354 Ibid., 54-59. The initial terms that he uses to describe ‘aql are similar to some of the explanations of bayān that we find in Qurʾānic exegetical literature (see fns. 291-92): that which enables humans to distinguish between good and bad.

355 Ibid., 60.2, 62.5, 73.3: bayān al-ashyāʾ bi-dhawāṭīhā li-man iʿtabara bihā wa-ṭalaba al-bayān minhā; al-ashyāʾ
achieved in the heart at [the time of] reflection and reasoning”; 356 (3) ʿibāra ‘[verbal] expression’: “clarity [achieved] by language/speech”; 357 (4) kitāb ‘writing’: “clarity [achieved] by writing; it is the one that reaches those who are far and absent.” 358 Ibn Wahb omits two communicative categories of bayān enumerated by al-Jāḥiẓ (calculating and gesturing) 359 but adds the category of ‘opinion formation’, which may come across as arbitrarily distinguishable from the first mode of bayān (clarity in “things in themselves”).

The topics treated within the first two modes – iʿtibār and iʿtiqād – are philosophical in nature, as they address logic (syllogism, definition, the Aristotelian categories, philosophical meanings of particles) and epistemology (types of reports, certainty versus belief versus probability, types of perception and levels of knowledge). 360 Under the mode of iʿtibār we find that some things (ashyā’) “have a clear/manifest bayān” while others have “a covert/inner” one (zāhir versus bāṭin, evoking Imāmī ideas). 361 What is probably meant here is that some things are known evidently while others are not. Ibn Wahb identifies the evident ones with things that can be known (udrika, tabayyun) by our perception and by our mind (e.g., the hotness of fire; universal truths like “the whole is greater than the part”). Conversely, in order to know (ʿilm) the covert/inner nature of things one must rely either on (1) syllogistic inference (qiyās) or (2) a

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356 Ibid., 60.3 (and 101 ff.): al-bayān alladhī yuḥṣalu (yahṣulu?) fī al-qalb ʿinda i māl al-fikr wa-l-lubb.
357 Ibid., 60.4: al-bayān bi-l-lisān; 111.3: al-bayān bi-l-qawl.
358 Ibid., 60.4-5 (and 313 ff.): al-bayān bi-l-kitāb wa-huwa alladhī yablughu man baʿuda wa-ghāba.
359 But gesturing is mentioned later on within the third category (ʿibāra), under the topic of wḥy ~‘non-verbal suggestion’ (ibid., 140-41).
360 Ibid., 73-108.
361 Ibid., 73.
report (khabar) or (3) probability and estimation (al-żann wa-l-takhmīn). Under the mode of iʿtiqād Ibn Wahb discusses knowledge (maʿrifā, ʿilm) that is undoubtedly true (ḥaqq), knowledge that requires proof (mushtabah) and knowledge that is undoubtedly false (bāṭil), all of which depend on the quality of the premises (either self-evident, disputed upon or evidently false). Of all four modes of bayān, iʿtiqād is given the shortest account, merely seven pages in the printed edition; adding to that the overlap in the treatment of knowledge-types, this would strengthen our assessment that iʿtiqād was not a well-thought-out category and, in many respects, is indistinguishable from iʿtibār.

Underʿibāra Ibn Wahb attends to speech characteristics that are common to all languages (mostly sentence-types: declarative/non-declarative) and those that are specific to the Arabic language (morphology, comparison, a range of implied speech, change in person/word order, the fundamentals of poetry, the fundamentals of prose, disputation, various speech

On the knowledge of evident things see ibid., 73. The verb udrika is used both for what is perceived by the senses and for what is known by the mind intuitively (tabayyun ‘perception’ is used for the former only). The noun ʿilm with regards to knowledge of covert things appears on the same page. For the treatment of qiyās, as well as definition, the Aristotelian categories and the philosophical meanings of particles, see ibid., 76-87. Ibn Wahb refers the reader who wishes to obtain further information to “the books written on logic” (al-kutub al-mawḍūʿa fi al-mantiq, p. 86; also p. 116). Khabar is of two kinds (pp. 88-91): certain (yaqīn) or uncertain (taṣḍīq; i.e., such that one must decide whether or not to believe). Reports evoking certainty are divided into (1) vastly authenticated ones (this includes ‘common knowledge’), (2) prophetic ones or (3) authoritatively authenticated ones (those that are widely transmitted by the khāṣṣa ‘[religious?] elite’ or ʿulamāʾ ‘scholars’). The first and third types are expounded upon using the term tawātur (p. 88, 90). Reports that one must decide whether or not to believe are those transmitted by single/a small number of persons (pp. 90-91, 97). As for the third category, ẓann ‘probability’, it can act as certain knowledge (yaqīn) for those who adhere to it (p. 91, 96-97). Examples include various divinations (especially augury based on flight of birds and the like, pp. 92-93) and the wise judgment of ʿAlī (to which he is ascribed the famous Solomonian ‘splitting of the baby’ story, pp. 95-96).

On the near-synonymity between bayān and maʿrifā/ʿilm here consider the following, opening the account on iʿtiqād: “We have said that when things are made clear to the minds by their own essences, and when their abstract qualities (? , maʿānī) and inner selves are interpreted to the hearts, then that which is discovered for he who takes notice of their true nature becomes knowledge and cognizance that are embedded in his soul. This bayān is of three types […]” (ibid., 101.3-5; emphasis added) – clearly bayān here can be interchangeable with maʿrifā wa-ʿilm (qaḍ qulnā inna l-ashyāʾa idhā buyyinat bi-dhawāṭīhā li-l-ʿaqlī wal-turjimat ʿan maʿānīhā [wa-bawāṭīnīhā, in one ms.] li-l-qulūbī šāra mā yankashifu li-l-mutilabayyinī min ḥaqiqatīhā maʿrišātan wa-ʿilmān markūzaynī fī nafsihi. wa-hāḍhā l-bayānu ʿalā thalāthati aḍrubīn […]).

Al-Burhān, 101-104. On the near-synonymity between bayān and maʿrifā/ʿilm here consider the following, opening the account on iʿtiqād: “We have said that when things are made clear to the minds by their own essences, and when their abstract qualities (? , maʿānī) and inner selves are interpreted to the hearts, then that which is discovered for he who takes notice of their true nature becomes knowledge and cognizance that are embedded in his soul. This bayān is of three types […]” (ibid., 101.3-5; emphasis added) – clearly bayān here can be interchangeable with maʿrifā wa-ʿilm (qaḍ qulnā inna l-ashyāʾa idhā buyyinat bi-dhawāṭīhā li-l-ʿaqlī wal-turjimat ʿan maʿānīhā [wa-bawāṭīnīhā, in one ms.] li-l-qulūbī šāra mā yankashifu li-l-mutilabayyinī min ḥaqiqatīhā maʿrišātan wa-ʿilmān markūzaynī fī nafsihi. wa-hāḍhā l-bayānu ʿalā thalāthati aḍrubīn […]).
categorizations such as jest/earnest and true/false, and more). Under kitāb Ibn Wahb treats the various types of civil positions in the government (sg. kātib) and their official duties. As with the case of iʿtibār, Ibn Wahb maintains the distinction between zāhir and bāṭin when dealing with 'ibāra and kitāb. In the former case he opens the discussion with implied speech (“that which requires interpretation”); in the latter case he closes the discussion with conventions of, what we may call, encryption. The zāhir / bāṭin dualism that characterizes the three major modes of bayān is probably inspired, as Pesach Shinar suggests, by his Imāmī leanings.

Because Ibn Wahb expounds upon the first two bayān modes using the derivations of 'ilm, idrāk, tabayyun and ma'rifa, we may conclude that bayān is very close in meaning to ‘knowledge’. But this near-synonymity is less borne out in the case of the third and fourth modes of bayān, namely ‘verbal expression’ and ‘writing’, where we find many of the common topics studied in early naqd works, in scribal literature and in adab anthologies. Indeed, this is where the bulk of the work lies. We are thus at a loss to find a unifying translation for bayān that would suit all four modes; ‘expression’ is perhaps the most inclusive, in the sense of ‘manifestation of an essence’.

The philosophical underpinnings of the notion of bayān espoused by al-Jāḥiẓ and Ibn Wahb receive further affirmation in the fifth/eleventh century by the Andalusian Ibn Ḥazm (d.

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365 Ibid., 111-22 (for ‘universal’ characteristics), 123-309 (for ‘Arabic’ characteristics; some of these are presented in Wolfhart Heinrichs, The Hand of the Northwind: Opinions on Metaphor and the Early Meaning of istiʿāra in Arabic Poetics, [Mainz]: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft; Wiesbaden: Steiner [im Komm.], 1971, 37).

366 Ibid., 313-438. This includes positions like the šāhīb al-shurṭa ~ ‘police chief’ (pp. 393-400) and the ḥājib ~ ‘chamberlain’ (pp. 420-25).

367 Al-Burhān, 111-12 (for the zāhir / bāṭin distinction within 'ibāra), 425-37 (for kitāba zāhira / bāṭina). Some types of bāṭin speech could correspond to modern notions of implicature (p. 111; e.g., when God says [Q 4:40] “Do what you will,” He is not literally authorizing man to do whatever he likes).

368 Shinar, “Ibn Wahb.” On the minor place the second mode (iʿtīqād) holds in Ibn Wahb’s system see above.

369 Ibid., 111-309 (for ‘ibāra); 313-438 (for kitāb).
456/1064), who prefaces his work on logic with an aside on bayān. How precisely bayān fits into the field of logic is not spelled out, but it seems to serve as an epistemological or even metaphysical foundation to the logical inquiry. According to Ibn Ḥazm, all things created by God may have four levels of bayān, which in this context could be interchanged – and later was interchanged – with wujūd ‘existence’. These levels (marātib, wujūh) are closely aligned with Ibn Wahb’s presentation, but in Ibn Ḥazm’s system they are presented as hierarchical prerequisites. As a hierarchy, they are evocative of Aristotle’s “spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds,” opening the De Interpretatione. The first level of bayān is the ‘real’ existence of a thing, “for if it is real (ḥaqq) then its being known/noticed (istibānathā) is possible, even if at that time there is no one in existence who seeks to know/take notice of it (mustabīn) […] since that which does not exist – there is no way to know/notice it (istibānatihi).” This first level is a prerequisite to the rest. The second level is “the knowledge/exitence (bayān) [of things] by/for him who seeks to know it (man istabānahā),” that is, mental existence. The third is vocal speech (presented in physiological terms). The fourth is agreed-upon signs: this includes writing systems, gestures,
and more.\footnote{Ibid., 96-97.}

In order to understand how bayān can stand both for the knowledge of a thing and for the existence of the thing itself, we might be reminded that classical Arabic-Islamic definitions of \textit{`ilm} sometimes depict “knowledge” as “the object known” (\textit{al-ma'\lūm}) or the object as it is known in the mind (\textit{al-mawjūd al-dhihnī}).\footnote{Franz Rosenthal, \textit{Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., with an Introduction by Dimitri Gutas, Leiden: Brill, 2007, 52-53 (definitions A-9, A-11). Rosenthal stresses, though, that “[i]t seems to have been considered an established fact that the object known (\textit{ma'\lūm}) is prior to knowledge” (ibid., 51). He translates \textit{al-mawjūd al-dhihnī} as “the mentally existing object.”} In Ibn Ḥazm’s account, the equivalence between bayān and a thing’s existence is most apparent in the first level of bayān. As for the equivalence between bayān and knowledge, which we already came across in the work of Ibn Wahb, here too common definitions of \textit{`ilm} are a telling source, as we find one strand of definitions in which \textit{`ilm} is understood in terms of “clear understanding” and “clarification” (\textit{bayyana, abāna, tabayyun}).\footnote{Ibid., 58. For a clear instance in Ibn Ḥazm’s account in which bayān stands for ‘knowledge’, consider the statement, \textit{fa-min dhālika mā yudriku l-\textit{\textit{a}mā bihā l-bayāna} “of it [non-verbal signs] is that through which the blind man perceives knowledge (bayān)” (\textit{al-Taqrīb}, 97.10-11).}

In Ibn Ḥazm’s and Ibn Wahb’s versions of bayān, more so than the one we find in al-Jāḥiz, bayān is not a “means” to knowing a thing as it is the knowledge itself of a thing, or even the thing itself (two sides of the same coin). To complicate matters further, Ibn Ḥazm uses bayān in other senses as well (we find this to a lesser extent in the work of Ibn Wahb\footnote{I found two cases of non-technical uses in Ibn Wahb’s \textit{Burhān}. In the first case, bayān refers to the clarity of the Qurʾān, which is said to have been brought down via the prophet Muhammad using the Arabic language (\textit{al-Burhān}, 112); bayān seems to be used synonymously with the Qurʾān. In the second instance, bayān is used to simply mean ‘eloquence’, or ‘good style’ (cf. the scribal meaning of bayān below), with regards to poetic components that can make a piece of poetry either praiseworthy or blameworthy (ibid., 175).}). Before speaking of the four levels of bayān, Ibn Ḥazm states that humans’ knowledge of “the names of things” (inspired by Q 2:31 “He taught Adam the names, all of them”) enables them “to express
[the nature of] all beings” (al-bayān ‘an jamīʿ al-mawjūdāt). Here bayān refers the human faculty of expression from a transitive perspective: it is not equivalent to the ‘existence’ of a thing in speech or writing (categories 3 and 4 in his theory of bayān). Furthermore, in the opening of the Taqrīb, bayān is invariably presented as a faculty specific to humans, whereas in the beginning of the bayān treatment several paragraphs later, bayān is presented as something common to all “things” (ashyāʾ) in the world. This tension between the human and universal aspects of bayān goes all the way back to al-Jāḥīz.

The Philological Sense(s) of Bayān

Montgomery interpreted al-Shāfīʿī’s conception of bayān as virtually synonymous with the features of the ‘arabiyya (the Arabic of the ancient Arabs), especially its ‘extensiveness’ (ittisāʿ). As we have seen, however, the textual evidence in the Risāla did not quite support this interpretation: while it is true that the law can only be known by the medium of language, in this case Arabic, along with its vastness and ambiguities, al-Shāfīʿī was not explicit in referring to it as bayān. Nearly two centuries after al-Shāfīʿī, Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) was. In his work al-Šāḥibī, dedicated to the study of lexicology or the theory of lexicography (uṣūl ‘ilm al-ʿarab ‘principles of the science of [the language of] the [ancient] Arabs’, as opposed to plain lexicography, the furūʿ), Ibn Fāris explicitly equates bayān with the vagaries of the Arabic language. He does so regardless of the legal aspect of the language as his main interest lies in

379 Al-Taqrīb, 94.8.
380 Ibid., 93.4°-94.6° (for the opening of the Taqrīb); 95.8° ff. (for the opening of the bayān treatment).
381 Montgomery, “Al-Jāḥīz’s al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn,” 105-106, and above.
philological inquiry (the study of language primarily from the perspective of the lexicon, morpho)phonology and idiomatic usage, less so syntax). His work seems to be a product of staunch anti-Shuʿūbī sentiment. Ibn Fāris is not working in isolation from the religious domain: he stresses the need of exegetes, legal scholars and ḥadīth scholars to master the usūl al-lugha, and he even uses bayān at one point as a technical term akin to the usage of the post-Shāfiʿī legal theorists. But his primary use of the term is unequivocally philological in nature, as we shall now see.

Bayān appears in one of the preliminary chapters of the work titled “On that the language of the [ancient] Arabs is the most distinguished and most extensive (awsaʿ).” According to Ibn Fāris, bayān is the utmost term that can be given to describe a language, and it was with this word that God chose to describe the Arabic language and distinguish it from all others. Bayān here is thus clearly derived from the third lexical meaning of the word (see Ibn Manẓūr above),

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Fāris,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition. The Šāhibī has been a primary source for the later famous philological work al-Muzhir by al-Suyūṭī (as evinced by El-Chouémi’s editorial notes). The term ‘lexicology’ is used by Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 45, to differentiate the study of the “principles” (usūl) of the lexicon from the the study of its individual cases (furūʿ), i.e. the meanings of words in the dictionaries. Ibn Fāris explains this difference between usūl and furūʿ in al-Šāhibī, 29-30 (I derive usūl ‘ilm al-arab from 29.10: inna li-‘ilmi l-’arabi aṣlan wa-farʿan “the science of [the language of] the Arabs has a foundation and a branch [i.e., a theoretical aspect and an ‘applied’ one concerning the single cases].”) He refers to this science also by the phrase usūl al-lugha ‘the foundations of the lexicon’ or: the theory of lexicography (al-Šāhibī, 64.8-9) and by the phrase fiqh al-lugha in the title.

383 For the call on “anyone who is connected in any way to the knowledge of the Qurʾān, the Sunna and the legal opinions (futuyā)” to master the foundations of lexicography see al-Šāhibī, 64-66 (he also adds syntax, ʿilm al-arabiyya, as an important prerequisite). For the use of bayān in the sense of a “clarification” of one Qurʾānic segment upon another see ibid., 240-42, especially the third category enumerated therein, which is also called jawābāt lit. ‘replies’. Ibn Fāris also has legal opinions of his own, stemming from his interpretation of certain lexicological questions (e.g., ibid., 196).

384 Al-Šāhibī, 40.3 (bāb al-qawl ʿalā anna lughat al-ʿarab afḍal al-lughāt wa-awsaʿuhā). The chapter runs up to p. 47. The ʿarab here refer to speakers of Old-Arabic dialects or Ur-Classical Arabic: speakers of Arabic dialects who lived in temporal and geographical proximity to the Prophet. In short I will refer to these speakers as ‘[ancient/pre-Islamic] Arabs’.

385 Ibid., 40.
namely, eloquence. Even the occurrence of the word in the famous Q 55: 3-4, *khalaqa l-insān ʿallamahu l-bayān*, is interpreted as something like “the unique eloquence of the Arabic language.”\(^{386}\) The fact that in this verse God gave precedence to (*qaddama*) *bayān* over His other creations (the celestial bodies specified in the following verse), and the fact that he reserved (*khaṣṣa*) it for Arabic, and Arabic alone, proves that other languages fall short of it and are lower in stature.\(^{387}\) Ibn Fāris acknowledges that there are levels (*marātib*) in *bayān*, and stresses their qualitative nature: merely making oneself understood, as the non-Arabic speaker or the dumb can (using gestures), is the lowest of *bayān* levels (*akhass marātib al-bayān*).\(^{388}\)

Since *bayān* goes beyond ‘intelligibility’ to mean a very specific kind of eloquence, what are the features that merit Arabic the *bayān* epithet? The first component Ibn Fāris mentions that differentiates Arabic from other languages is its *saʿa* ‘vastness’, by which he means the extensive amount of synonyms found in the language. An anonymous scholar is then cited as mentioning other features, such as metaphorical usage of words (*istiʿāra*), comparison/analogy (*?*, *tamthīl*), phonological metathesis / syntactic-semantic inversion (*qalb*), change in word order (*taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr*) “and other [instances] of the [linguistic] ways of the Arabs in the Qurʾān (*sunan al-ʿarab fī l-Qurʾān*).”\(^{389}\) But once again it is the *saʿa*, or *ittisā*’ – or *majāz* – which seems to be at the crux of the matter: the same unnamed scholar – who turns out to be Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) – says that the reason no one is able to translate the Qurʾān into other languages, as opposed to the other scriptures, is “because the the non-Arabs (or specifically Persians, *al-ʿajam*)

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386 Ibid., and see fn. 291 for common interpretations of the verse.

387 Ibid.

388 Ibid., 40-41.

389 Ibid., 41. On Ibn Fāris’s understanding of *istiʿāra* as “word-borrowing” see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 46. Notably, the *Ṣāḥibī* lacks a chapter on *tamthīl*, hence my hesitation in translating the term.
are not extensive in their idiomatic language (majāz) the way the Arabs are” (li-anna l-ʾajama lam tattasiʿ fī l-majāzi -ttisāʿ a l-ʿarab). Then Ibn Fāris goes on to provide an array of “untranslatable” phenomena unique to Arabic, ranging from idioms (e.g. nijāruhā nāruhā “every origin [of camels] has its mark” or yadʾ l-dahr lit. ‘until [the length of] the hand of time’: “never”) to phonological processes (mīʿād for *miwʿād ‘promise’ or yā Ḥāri for “O Ḥārith”) to the vastness of synonyms (one hundred and fifty names for ‘lion’ [some claim five hundred]; two hundred for ‘beard’; seventy for ‘stone’). By far the vast majority of examples adduced are idioms and other lexical ‘gems’, the last batch of which are given the title “words that glimmer in their [the Arabs’] speech like lanterns in the darkness” (this long list of examples is limited entirely to those whose root starts with the letter qāf! One is iqṭahafa ‘to drink [a beverage] till the very last drop’).

This is where the chapter on the superiority of Arabic ends, and along with it, any further mention of bayān in this sense. Bayān can thus hardly qualify as a full-fledged technical term in the foregoing context. We are nevertheless dwelling on it for two reasons: first, the unquestionable overlap between this term and the phrase sunan al-ʿarab, on which we will shortly elaborate; second, because this account may explain the appellation ‘ilm al-bayān in its ‘standard’ rhetorical sense, that is, the name for the standard theory of imagery found in the second subfield of ‘ilm al-balāgha. It is Heinrichs who tells us that “[t]he name [of the subfield

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391 For nijāruhā nāruhā see al-Ṣāhibī, 42.5 (including editor’s note) and Lane, Lexicon, 2769; it refers to external cues that may give evidence to hidden qualities. For yadʾ l-dahr see al-Ṣāhibī, 44.2 (and editor’s note). For the phonological processes see ibid., 43.3-12.

392 ibid., 46.3 ff. Ibn Fāris ends the chapter (47.1-2) by saying that he could have filled volumes upon volumes on the matter.
on imagery] has to do with the original function of similes and other figurative usages in the Koran”; perhaps it is Ibn Fāris’s account that stands at the basis of his assertion. If we recall Ibn Qutayba’s (quoted anonymously) elaboration on the virtue of Arabic – what Ibn Fāris called bayān – the first two instances of sunan al-ʿarab he mentioned dealt with figurative speech (isitʿāra and tamthīl), and the Arabs were said “to be extensive in their majāz.”

But for Ibn Fāris the host of phenomena within sunan al-ʿarab that merit Arabic the heading bayān go well beyond figurative speech and imagery, as we have seen, to include phonological and other lexical phenomenoa. What does the phrase sunan al-ʿarab, then, mean? Primarily it refers to “the ways in which the [pre-Islamic] Arabs talk.” After examples of “untranslatable” Qurʾānic verses are adduced, an interlocutor asks whether there are comparable examples fi sunan al-ʿarab wa-nuẓūmihā, which I take to mean “in the Arabs’ everyday speech and [sentence] structures,” that is, if there are comparable examples of untranslatable speech beyond the Qurʾān. Ibn Fāris replies that there are, and he provides some. Of course “Arabs’ ordinary way of talking” may appear in the Qurʾān, which explains the phrase sunan al-ʿarab fi

393 W.P. Heinrichs, “Rhetorical Figures,” 661. No further elaboration provided. The meaning of bayān in the standard ʿilm al-bayān remains unclear.

394 Though once again, one cannot be sure of what tamthīl denotes. Nevertheless, it is probably closer in meaning to figurative language than qalb or taqḍīm wa-taʾkhīr are.

395 Al-Ṣāhiḥī, 41. If nuẓūm is meant in the grammatical sense of “syntactic structures,” it is not unlike the later use of Ṿazm by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (see also the phrases nuẓūm kitāb Allāh and nuẓūm al-Qurʾān in ibid., 198.13, 243.1). The phrase sunan al-ʿarab probably differs from Sībawayhī’s ḥadd al-kalām or wajh al-kalām, which Aryeh Levin interprets as “the ordinary way of speech,” at least if we judge by Abū ʿUbayda’s (d. 210/825) contrast between the idioms found in the Arabs’ speech and wajh al-kalām ‘the [normal] way of speech’ (Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 129; for ḥadd/wajh al-kalām see Aryeh Levin, “Sībawayhī’s View of the Syntactical Structure of kāna waʾaxawātuhā,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 1 [1979], 185-213, here: 211, reprinted in Aryeh Levin, Arabic Linguistic Thought and Dialectology, Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1998, article V). Al-Thaʿālibī (d. 429/1038) uses the phrase sunan al-ʿarab in more or less the same way that Ibn Fāris does; see Abū Maṣṣūr ʿAbd Allāh b. Muhammad al-Thaʿālibī, Fiqh al-lugha wa-sirr al-ʿarabiyya, ed. Sulaymān Sulīm al-Bawwāb, Damascus: Dār al-Hikma, 1984, p. 341 ff. (part II of the work, passim).
al-Qurʾān (see above). In the preface Ibn Fāris claims that the inquiry into ʿushul al-lugha covers, besides the question of the origin of language, “the [linguistic] patterns of the Arabs’ in their discourse [synonymous with sunan al-ʿarab] and their [the patterns’] diversity in ordinary and non-ordinary [ways of speech]” (rusūm al-ʿarab fī mukhāṭabātihā wa-mā lahā min al-ifṭīnān taḥqīqan wa-majāzan). According to this statement, not only is “the Arabs’ ordinary way of talking” a major component of Ibn Fāris’s field of inquiry, but so is their idiomatic, or non-ordinary usage (majāz).

What majāz refers to here and its relation to sunan al-ʿarab is unclear, according to Heinrichs. Given its prominence in the preface, however, we may infer that majāz refers to a wide range of phenomena, probably even wider than the subcategories presented by Ibn Qutayba in his Taʾwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān, to include all “unnatural” ways of speech, similar to the old presentation of majāz by Abū ʿUbayda (d. 210/825). What is more, one is easily lead to infer

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397 Al-Ṣāhibī, 29.5-4e.

398 Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 45.

399 For Abū ʿUbayda’s understanding of the majāz phenomena as “cover[ing] any imaginable violation of the mirror character of language” see Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 122. Heinrichs adds (p. 123): “All these violations of the ‘natural’ sentence are permissible, only if they are idiomatic and acceptable to the native speakers of the language, the ʿarab.” Unlike Abū ʿUbayda, for Ibn Fāris majāz does not refer to the interpretation of the idiom but rather to the idiom itself; on the difference between the two see ibid., 123-28, 130, and Chapter 5 Preliminaries. For a general account of Abū ʿUbayda’s understanding of the Arabic language, which is quite similar to that of Ibn Fāris, see ibid., 129. For Ibn Qutayba’s account, who indeed puts more emphasis on figurative speech within majāz than Abū ʿUbayda does, see Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 31; idem, “Genesis,” 130-32. Both Abū ʿUbayda and Ibn Qutayba speak of the features of Arabic in a similar fashion to the way Ibn Fāris does, but the term bayān is not prominent therein (Ibn Qutayba uses it, for instance in Taʾwīl, 12, but only as one out of several words designating ‘eloquence’).
that the second half of Ibn Fāris’s work, following the chapter titled *sunan al-ʿarab fī ḥaqāʾiq al-ikalām wa-l-majāz* (~“the ways the Arabs talk, plainly and idiomatically”), falls entirely under the rubric of *majāz*. The category of *kaff* ‘suppression of the nominal predicate’, for instance, which is mentioned explicitly in the *ḥaqāʾiq* *majāz* chapter and is identified as *majāz*, appears only some sixty pages after that chapter. So do other categories, which we can infer to be part of *majāz*, like *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* (change in word order), *iʿāra* (lit. ‘lending’: analogy-based metaphor) or the first sub-category of *kināya* (here: euphemism).\(^{400}\) Regarding one later chapter, the *ṣhart* (conditional clauses), Ibn Fāris says unequivocally that there are conditionals that are non-literal (*majāz*) since they do not display a necessary apodosis.\(^{401}\) Even the category of *istiʿāra* (here: word-transfer), said explicitly to be part of *majāz*, appears after two phonological categories subsequent to the *ḥaqāʾiq* *majāz* chapter.\(^{402}\) Following this line of interpretation, and since we find intervening phonological and morphological categories up until many of those (presumably) *majāz* categories, we could conclude that *majāz* as ‘idiomatic usage’ may well occur on the level of the phoneme or morpheme and not just the lexeme or clause. *Majāz* would thus be one of the major, if not the major component in “the ways the Arabs talk” (*sunan al-ʿarab*), and therefore a prominent feature of *bayān*.\(^{403}\)

\(^{400}\) The chapter on *ḥaqīqa*/*ḥaqāʾiq* and *majāz* appears about mid-way into the work – *al-Ṣāhibī*, 196-201 – subsequent to the following mega-discussions: parts of speech; semantics of particles; and semantics of sentences (e.g., declarative versus non-declarative). *Kaff* is mentioned as a type of *majāz* in ibid., 197.1\(^{\circ}\), but the chapter devoted to it only appears on p. 256. For the chapters on *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* (which Ibn Qutayba considers *majāz*), *iʿāra* and *kināya* see ibid., 246-47, 257 and 260, respectively.

\(^{401}\) Ibid., 259-60.

\(^{402}\) Ibid., 204-205. More on Ibn Fāris’s view on *istiʿāra* can be found in Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 45-47.

\(^{403}\) One should, however, take into account the following counter-evidence: First, Ibn Fāris is not explicit in the categories that he considers to be *majāz*; only *tashbīḥ* (comparison), *istiʿāra* and *kaff* are explicitly pointed out to in the *ḥaqāʾiq* *majāz* chapter (*al-Ṣāhibī*, 197.1\(^{\circ}\). Several illustrations of *tashbīḥ* are provided but it is not accorded a separate chapter.) Second, in one statement Ibn Fāris actually differentiates between “these two categories” (i.e., the *ḥaqāʾiq* and the *majāz*) and “the categories of *sunan al-ʿarab* that will appear after these two which we will mention,” implying that those subsequent *sunan al-ʿarab* categories do not overlap with *majāz*. See ibid., 198.13-15:
To conclude thus far: *bayān* in Ibn Fāris’s notation refers to the special features of the Arabic language which render it unique; it is largely coextensive with “the ways the Arabs talk” (*sunan al-ʿarab*), and it is not fully used as a technical term. One major component of *sunan al-ʿarab* is their ‘idiomatic’ usage of the language, viz. *majāz*. *Majāz* here is not limited to figurative speech or imagery; if any of the subsequent theorists made the connection between *majāz* as ‘trope’ and *bayān* (cf. the Standard Theory), it was because they filled the term *majāz* with their later, narrower, understanding thereof. The meaning of *majāz* as idiomatic language will be studied in Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

A different instantiation of the philological sense of *bayān* can be found in the epistle on the inimitability of the Qurʾān, *al-Nukat fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, by the exegete and ‘philosophizing’ grammarian, the Muʿtazilī ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā al-Rummānī (d. 384/994).

404 Deviding his presentation of *balāgha* ‘eloquence’ into ten categories, al-Rummānī introduces *bayān* or ḥusn al-*bayān* ‘good [suggestive] expression’ as the last of the ten.

405 On his fame as an exegete in the biographical dictionaries see Bruce Fudge, “*Tadmīn*: The Notion of ‘Implication’ according to al-Rummānī,” in Beatrice Gruendler (ed.) with the assistance of Michael Cooperson, *Classical Arabic Humanities in Their Own Terms: Festschrift for Wolfhart Heinrichs on his 65th Birthday Presented by his Students and Colleagues*, Leiden: Brill, 2008, 468-92, here: 470. Carter describes the *Nukat* as a “full-blooded [Muʿtazilī] manifesto” as evinced, e.g., by the rejection of the *ṣarfa* notion ‘diverting [people from attempting to imitate the Qurʾān]’, or by the acknowledgment that the imitation of the Qurʾān is theoretically possible, or by the intent “to create a systematic justification of *taʾwīl* ['interpretation beyond the text’s face value’]). See M.G. Carter, “Linguistic Science and Orthodoxy in Conflict: The Case of Al-Rummānī,” *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* 1 (1984), 212-32, esp. 223-31, (quotations from and 223-24 and 228). Interestingly, Carter refers parenthetically to *bayān* as a property belonging to God (“the secrets of God’s *bayān*”; “God’s particular, Arabic *bayān*,” p. 231).

405 Al-Rummānī, *al-Nukat*, 70 (where the category is called ḥusn al-*bayān*), 98-99 (where the category is given the
Similar to Ibn Fāris’s use of the word, bayān here refers to a quality inherent in the (Arabic) language, and it too is coextensive with speech that is not direct or explicit (though not quite ‘idiomatic’ as we saw with Ibn Fāris): it refers primarily to speech that implies, or is suggestive of a semantic import not conveyed explicitly on its ‘surface level’. The entirety of examples adduced for ‘good suggestive expression’ are Qur’ānic, and the semantic import implicitly suggested therein informs, as Bruce Fudge has noted, “of the function, or speech act, of its utterance on the reader/auditor.” These functions, or rhetorical effects, range from taḥdīr ‘warning’ to waʿdiwaʿīd ‘promise/threat’ to taqrīʿ ‘admonition’ and many more. After each verse cited, al-Rummānī specifies the corresponding function (all in all nineteen verses/passages are cited, falling into ten ‘functional’ categories). To demonstrate al-Rummānī’s sense of bayān we may cite his first example: “The Qur’ān in its entirety is [conveyed] in the utmost good [suggestive] expression; among that is His saying, may He be exalted, They left how many gardens and fountains, sown fields, and how noble a station [Q 44:26]: this is an extraordinary [piece] of [suggestive] expression (bayān) that affirms a warning against the self-delusion that there will be a granted delay.”

406 Al-Nukat, 99-101. I am concluding that it is a property inherent in the language at large and not just in the Qur’ānic idiom from al-Rummānī’s prefacing words, wa-l-bayānu fī t-kalām […] “Bayān in speech is […]” rather than, say, wa-l-bayānu fī l-Qurʾān or wa-l-bayānu fī kalāmi -llāh. Technically speaking, and judging from his wording, bayān may very well be a universal linguistic property in al-Rummānī’s conception that is not limited to Arabic.

407 Fudge, “Taḍmīn,” 484, though Fudge uses this with regards to taḍmīn and not bayān (on the correspondence of the two see below). Using terminology evocative of Paul Grice’s theory of implicatures is not a bad idea in this case, especially since al-Rummānī’s examples are so aligned with Gricean pragmatics. Fudge refers explicitly to Grice and John Searle in ibid., 486.


409 wa-l-Qurʾānu kulluhu fī nihāyati ḥusni l-bayāni fa-mīn dhālika qawluhu taʿālā “kam tarakū min jannātin wa-'uyānin wa-zurū' in wa-makānin karīm” fa-hādhā bayānu fī t-taḥdīra mina l-īghtīrāri bi-l-imhāli; al-Nukat, 99. Also cited in Fudge, “Taḍmīn,” 485, with several other examples.
Before delving into the ‘best’ examples of bayān, al-Rummānī starts with a neutral explanation of it as a linguistic phenomenon in which a ‘thing’/‘notion’ (maʿnā) may be expressed (or: made known) either by using its designated name/noun (ism) or attribute/adjective (ṣifa), or by using a combination of words (taʿlīf) without reverting to its designated signifier. Illustrations of this last category are ghulāmu zaydīn ‘Zayd’s slave-boy’ and qātil ‘killer’. In the first case we have a combination of words indicating property (mulk), i.e. that the slave-boy belongs to Zayd, even though the designated word for ‘belonging’ is not used; this is referred to as dalālat al-taʿlīf ‘syntactic indication’. In the second case we have a morphological form indicating a slain person (maqtūl) and the act of killing (qatl), even though the designated words for those two notions are not used; this is referred to as dalālat al-ishtiqāq ‘morphological/derivational indication’. Since the bulk of the chapter is devoted to notions expressed not via their designated nouns/adjectives, we conclude that bayān and ḥusn al-bayān refer here primarily to implied, or suggested signification. This renders bayān virtually indistinguishable from the eighth category of balāgha expounded on by al-Rummānī, namely tadmīn ‘implication’ – a correspondence duly noted by Fudge. As Fudge has shown from fragments of al-Rummānī’s Tafsīr, each explanation of a verse is concluded with “and the verse implicitly contains” (wa-qaḍ taḍammanati l-ʿayatu) followed by its appropriate functional purpose (or semantic import), displaying identical categories to the ones we come across in the chapter on bayān in the Nukat.

Although bayān in al-Rummānī’s notation refers primarily to suggestive language, his chapter actually opens with the philosophical sense of the term (akin to al-Jāḥiẓ’s or Ibn Wahb’s

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410 Fudge, “Tadmīn,” 484-86.

411 Ibid., 481-83.
conception). What is more, several lines later we also come across the lexical meaning of bayān as, simply, ‘eloquence’. In other words, even within a brief account of bayān such as al-Rummānī’s, one could come across several senses the word. That the main sense of the word here concerns the function, or extralinguistic purpose of the phrase, is gleaned out of the examples adduced for bayān, which demonstrate entirely the ‘suggestive’ expressions, as shown above. This is corroborated by Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s treatment of bayān in his lexicographical work on semantically related notions. Here bayān is discussed in relation to the notion of fāʾida ‘communicative value [of an utterance]’ and al-Rummānī is quoted by name. This may suggest that al-Rummānī’s idea of bayān was much more ‘technical’ than the bayān Ibn Fāris espoused. Despite the differences between the two we are considering both part of the philological sense of bayān since they are presented as a phenomenon integral to the (Arabic) language that goes beyond mere ‘clarity of expression’, or ‘eloquence’, to reflect cases in which the meaning of an utterance does not directly, or ‘naturally’, correspond to its wording.

412 Al-Rummānī defines bayān as “the bringing-forth of [something] by which the distinction of a thing from another thing becomes/is made apparent in perception” (al-bayānu huwa l-iḥḍāru li-mā yazharu/yazharu bihi tamayyuzu l-shayʾi min ghayrihi fī l-idrāk); al-Nukat, 98.2 (taking idārik as a typo for idrāk [corrected in 2nd edition, 1968, p. 106]). This wording tallies well with the sense of bayān we are familiar with as ‘a means by which a thing is made known’; cf. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī’s citation of “ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā’s” definition of bayān as mā dhukira li-yuʿrafa bihi ghayruhu “that which is mentioned so that another thing may be known” (emphasis added); see al-Furūq fī al-lugha, ed. Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī fī Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 5th ed., Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1983, 52.6–7 (English: ‘[Semantic] Distinctions in the Lexicon’). Al-Rummānī then specifies the four categories of bayān as ‘speech’ (kalām), ‘situation’ (ḥāl, probably natural signs or signs by inanimate beings), ‘gesture’ (ishāra) and ‘[codified] sign’ (ʿalāma, probably writing); al-Nukat, 98.3. Meaningless speech – such as speech that is disordered (in the syntactic [?] sense) or impossible (in the logical sense) (al-kalām al-mukhalaṭ wa-l-muḥāl) – is not considered bayān since “the distinction of a thing from another thing is not made apparent” (ibid., 98.4-5).

413 Al-Nukat, 98.4 ff.

414 Al-Furūq, 52-53, and see fn. 412. Al-ʿAskarī only mentions the simple syntactic examples provided by al-Rummānī (like ghulāmu zaydin) without the more complex Qurʿānic instances revealing the functional import of a verse. For further definitions of bayān that al-ʿAskarī provides see al-Furūq, 53-54, where both the legal-hermeneutical and the philosophical senses of bayān are stressed.
The Scribal Sense of Bayān

Among the various senses of bayān we are attending to, the scribal sense of the term is the least technical. It seems to be a lexical development out of the third definition of the word by Ibn Manẓūr, viz. ‘eloquence’ – a narrowing down of its scope to signify specifically scribal eloquence, or ‘good written style’. This last phrase is inspired by Fuat Sezgin’s translation of a mid-fifth/eleventh century title intended for scribal education. Called Mawādd al-bayān and written by the FāṭimidʿAlī b. Khalaf al-Kātib (d. after 437/1045), the work aims at providing the essentials to the art of secretaryship (al-ṣināʿa al-kitābiyya) and is clearly not concerned with ‘eloquence’ in general nor with the philosophical concept of ‘imparting knowledge’ (or the other technical meanings of bayān).415 “The Elements [or Stuff] of Good Written Style” is thus an appropriate rendering of the title. The work joins a long tradition of manuals written for secretaries and was quoted widely in the famous mega-manual Subḥ al-aʿshā by al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/1418), an encyclopedic specimen of administrative literature.416

But scribal manuals have come a long way since the third/ninth-century Adab al-kātib by Ibn Qutayba, and the Mawādd undoubtedly reflects a later permutation of such works. Adab al-kātib is a prescriptive work of philology par excellence: its author is concerned with rectifying errors in the realm of the lexicon, phonology, morphology and orthography. Mastering such lexical distinctions as the ‘pregnancy’ of a mare versus that of a she-camel or a lioness was something to be expected of an aspiring ʿAbbāsid scribe, and was duly noted in Adab al-kātib. Likewise were chapters on correct orthography of alif al-waṣl, hypercorrections in the

415 For al-ṣināʿa al-kitābiyya see Mawādd, 4. The work does contain a chapter on bayān that is heavily influenced by al-Jāḥiz (ibid., 144-51), but this sense of the word is different from the work’s title and intent.

416 Ibid., editor’s introduction.
pronunciation of the glottal stop or the semantics of verb form *afʿala*. Gradually, however, the focus shifted from linguistic prescriptivism to *stylistic* prescriptivism, placing more emphasis on the content of a scribal epistle, especially its ornate prose and stylistic devices. This development may be linked to the rise of the ‘new’ poetic style, the *badī‘*, along with its heightened mannerism and the literature on poetic devices that grew around it. This in turn seems to have influenced the edifying literature on epistolary writing.

The (broad) shift in scribal educational literature from philology to style is nicely illustrated by comparing the fourth/tenth century work of Abū Jaʿfar al-Naḥḥās called *ʿUmdat al-kuttāb* (or *Ṣināʿat al-kuttāb*) with ‘Alī b. Khalaf’s work mentioned above, written the following century. Whereas al-Naḥḥās places most of his emphasis on correct orthography, correct titles and endings, appropriateness in addressing, correct morphology and the common scribal errors, ‘Alī b. Khalaf turns most of his attention to the figures of speech (under the heading of *badī‘*), including common errors therein, and intertextuality (literary influence and appropriate allusions). Since ‘Alī b. Khalaf is clearly interested in matters of style in the scribal arts but does not spell out the particular meaning of *bayān* in the title *Mawādd al-bayān*, we may say that

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418 On the growing importance of rhymed prose, literary tropes and literary allusions in the *risāla* genre in later centuries see Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, “The Essay and Debate (*al-risāla* and *al-munāẓara*),” in *Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period*, 134-44, here: 134-35, 137, and al-Musawi, “Pre-Modern Belletristic Prose,” 103, 107. Ibn Khaldūn objected to the “poetic styles” found in chanery correspondences (ibid., 108). One should keep in mind, however, that historically speaking it was probably the ‘new’ poetry that was influenced by oratory prose rather than the other way around; see Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Early Ornate Prose and the Rhetorization of Poetry in Arabic Literature,” in Frédérique Woerther (ed.), *Literary and Philosophical Rhetoric in the Greek, Syriac and Arabic Worlds*, Hildesheim: Olms, 2009, 215-34. McKinney shows how the poetry of Ibn al-Rūmī (d. ca. 1086) evolved in the direction of prose (*Rhyme versus Reason*, 293 ff.), but also treats the phenomenon of prose evolving in the direction of poetry (ibid., 311). In the *Mafāṭīḥ al-ʿulūm* of al-Khuwārizmī (d. 387/997 or 98), the “prosaic” literary devices (i.e., those used by the chancery scribes) and the poetic literary devices are still listed separately (*Mafāṭīḥ al-ʿulūm*, 72-79, 94-97; there is minimal overlap).

*bayān* as ‘good style’ is a non-technical use of the word. What differentiates this meaning of the word from the original lexical sense of ‘eloquence’ is, once again, the context in which it appears: works of scribal education.

Usage of the word *bayān* in the scribal sense seems scarce, but we can point to some specific occurrences. When we looked at Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s ‘refutation’ of Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s *Mathal* in Chapter 1, we saw that when he criticized the scholar-scribes of Mosul, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd spoke of Baghdadī scribes as “stallions of eloquence” (*fuḥūl al-balāgha*) who “run in the race-track of good style” (*idhā rakaḍa aḥaduhum fī ḥalbat al-bayān*). Here *bayān* and *balāgha* ‘eloquence’ appear in the very same sentence, suggesting they could have distinct meanings – *balāgha* referring to eloquence in general (oral and written) and *bayān* more specifically to good written style. Of course, the *bayān-balāgha* pair could be a mere stylistic variation. A more telling example appears in the *Ṣināʿatayn* of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī and is later quoted anonymously in Najm al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr’s *Jawhar al-kanz* (Abū Hilāl, too, is quoting from an unnamed source). Here we find the following account, opening the chapter on good openings (*mabādiʿ* in Abū Hilāl’s terms, *barāʾ at al-istihlāl* in Najm al-Dīn’s):

> qāla baʿḍu l-kuttābi aḥsinū maʿāshira l-kuttābi l-ibtidāʾīti fa-īnahunna dalāʾīlu l-bayān

One of the secretaries said: “O fellow secretaries, master [the skill of writing] openings, for they are the signs of good written style.”

Context would preclude taking *bayān* as a reference to the broader notion of ‘eloquence’ – whether oral or written – because the statement is specifically addressed to the secretaries, and the secretaries deal with the written word (as opposed to, say, the orators). Thus, ‘good written

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style’ is a more appropriate understanding of bayān here, one that demonstrates the lexical development of bayān from the more general meaning of ‘eloquence’.

3.2. The Phrase ‘Iłm al-Bayān

The term bayān appears in dictionaries and in a variety of scholarly works prior to Դիյա’ al-Dīn; this has facilitated our attempt to ascertain its origins and meanings. With the phrase ‘ilm al-bayān, however, we stand on less solid ground and find that tracing its history is trickier. The phrase seems to have appeared ex nihilo in the introduction to the work Dalā‘īl al-i’jāz by the great literary theorist (our term) ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081). The work itself was not written within the tradition of the early literary critics, but rather, as Margaret Larkin convincingly shows, as a polemic against Mu’tazilī and non-Mu’tazilī theologians of his day for their inept study of the Qur’ān’s inimitable style.⁴²² Al-Jurjānī’s intended audience of scholars outside the literary-critical tradition is something one should keep in mind when looking at his use of the phrase ‘ilm al-bayān.

In a preface that runs over sixty pages in the common printed edition,⁴²³ al-Jurjānī mentions the phrase fairly at the outset, following his extolment of knowledge (‘ilm) as a virtue above all virtues (faḍā il).⁴²⁴ Within this general domain of knowledge as a virtue, he asserts that

⁴²² Margaret Larkin, The Theology of Meaning: ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Discourse, American Oriental Series, vol. 79, New Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 1995, esp. pp. 14-23. Among the evidence she brings forth, Larkin highlights passages in which ‘Abd al-Qāhir tries to convince his audience to take up the (serious) study of poetry: such a defense would not have been needed had his listeners been literary theorists (including those with a bent towards i’jāz al-Qur’ān). That he directed his teachings towards Mu’tazilīs and Ash’arīs alike, though he himself was an Ash’arī, can be seen inter alia from his treatment of majāz (ibid., 99-100).

⁴²³ The editor Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir does not demarcate a preface in his appended table of contents; however, the wording of pp. 64-65 of the Dalā‘īl is emblematic of a closing of a preface (see Peter Freimark, Das Vorwort als literasche Form in der arabischen Literatur, Inaugural-Dissertation, Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster, 1967, 28).

⁴²⁴ Al-Jurjānī, Dalā‘īl, 5.
one cannot find a knowledge (lā tarā ʿilman) that “has a more solid root, more towering
branches, sweeter fruits, fresher water, nobler offspring/results, and a brighter lamp” than ʿilm
al-bayān. Because ʿilm al-bayān is seen as a type of faḍīla, it is clear that what al-Jurjānī has
in mind here is a mental capacity (knowledge) rather than a scholarly discipline. That the
phrase refers to ‘the knowledge of bayān’ and not to bayān as a discipline manifests itself in his
subsequent elaboration on the benefits of bayān. Here al-Jurjānī speaks of bayān as a synonym
of eloquence and verbal skill, and he describes it as a property that allows the tongue to “weave
embroidery, mould a piece of jewelry, articulate pearls, utter enchantment” and so forth, not
unlike descriptions we find in earlier works such as the Šināʿatayn of al-ʿAskarī. In later
passages within the long introduction, al-Jurjānī discusses faṣāha, balāgha, bayān and barāʿa
‘[verbal] skill’ all in the same breath. The phrase ʿilm al-bayān appears only once, in that
single occurrence in the Dalāʾ ilʾs preface.

Al-Jurjānī is not oblivious to the scholarly field of literary theory. He speaks (critically)
of previous scholars and their writings in the field to which he refers as ʿilm al-faṣāha, ʿilm al-
faṣāha wa-l-bayān or ʿilm al-balāgha. These are used interchangeably, and in some instances he
probably has the non-technical ‘knowledge of eloquence’ in mind (ʿilm al-faṣāha seems to be the

425  ḥumma innaka lā tarā ʿilman huwa arsakhu ašlan wa-absaqu farʾan wa-aḥlā janan wa-aʾdhabu wirdan wa-
akramu nitājan wa-anwaru sirājan min ʿilmi l-bayān (Dalāʾ ilʾ, 5.1-2e).

426 And see Larkin’s translation of bayān here as “expressive ability” (Theology, 20).

427 Dalāʾ ilʾ, 6; al-ʿAskarī, al-Šināʿatayn, 7-9 (where the phrase ʿilm al-balāgha is used in a non-technical sense). The
entire passage by al-Jurjānī is commonly replicated in later sources that rely directly or indirectly on the work of al-
Jurjānī; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Amlakānī, ayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Naqīb are a case in point (see Part
Two, Chapter 4).

428 Dalāʾ ilʾ, 34, 37, 43. See also his non-technical usage of ʿilm al-balāgha in al-Risāla al-Shāfiyya in Muḥammad
Khalaf Allāh and Muḥammad Zaghūl Sallām (eds.), Thalāth rasāʾil fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān li-l-Rummānī wa-l-Khaṭṭābī
most technical). In one reference in his Asrār al-balāgha, al-Jurjānī speaks of the scholars of the literary-theoretical field as al-‘ārifina bi-hādhā l-sha’ni a’ni ‘ilm l-khaṭābati wa-naqda l-shi’ri wa-lladhīna waḍa’ū l-kutuba fī aqsāmi l-bādī‘ “those who are knowledgeable in this issue, I mean the science of oratory and poetic criticism, and those who wrote books on categories of literary devices.” Al-Jurjānī is referring here to what we have called collectively the early naqd works, and they include treatments of the various figures of speech, especially those associated with the ‘modern’ Abbāsid poetic style. The phrase ‘ilm al-khaṭāba wa-naqda l-shi’r hints at earlier writings on the eloquence of preachers and the critical assessment of poetry, and it is probably meant to designate one scholarly endeavor (though possibly two: ‘ilm al-khaṭāba and naqd al-shi’r). The phrase ‘ilm al-bayān as a reference to a scientific field does not occur.

Modern scholars have recognized the non-technical character of the phrase ‘ilm al-bayān in al-Jurjānī’s work, and have agreed that disciplinary headings such as ‘ilm al-bayān and ‘ilm al-maʿānī are later ones. Nevertheless, it has become common to speak of the Asrār al-

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429 For ‘ilm al-balāgha see Dalā’īl, 174.3, 252.13-14; for and ‘ilm al-faṣāḥa see ibid., 12.9, 37.5, 455-56 (several occurrences, including one instance of ‘ilm al-faṣāḥa wa-l-bayān). In some cases the editor Shākir puts ‘ilm al-faṣāḥa within quotation marks, presumably those where the phrase refers to a scholarly discipline (I agree with his readings). I did not find any additional references to these phrases, nor to others like nuqqād, naqd al-shi’r, etc. Phrases such as ‘ulamāʾ al-bayān/balāgha/faṣāḥa do not occur. In al-Risālā al-shāfiyya, 107 ( Dalā’īl, 575), al-Jurjānī refers to those who have knowledge in the “states” (alhwāl) and “ranks” (marātib) of poets and orators, “and in ‘ilm al-adab in general” – probably a reference to the knowledge/science of lexicography, grammar, poetry and other philological endeavors (like prosody). For the understanding of philological sciences by fourth/tenth-century scholars – though the term adab is usually not used – see Heinrichs, “Classification of the Sciences.” The first list that we have that enumerates linguistic (philological) sciences under the technical heading al-‘ulām al-adabiyya is by the sixth/twelfth-century al-Zamakhsharī (ibid., 121, 138, and below). But even before that, Ibn Sinān al-Khaṭābī (fifth/eleventh century) makes a distinction between the ‘ulām adabiyya and the ‘ulām sharʿiyya (linguistic/religious sciences; Sirr al-faṣāḥa, 3).

430 It is less likely that al-Jurjānī is referring here to rhetoric in the Aristotelian philosophical sense, also termed khaṭāba.

431 Asrār, 368 (and 369 for the phrases aḥl al-khaṭābā wa-naqda al-shi’r and aḥl al-‘ilm bi-l-shi’r).

balāgha as treating imagery (= the later ʿilm al-bayān) and of the Dalāʿīl as treating the semantics of syntax (= the later ʿilm al-maʿānī), although al-Jurjānī himself claims no adherence to any discipline (and in any case, the Asrār deals with more than just imagery, as the Dalāʿīl deals with more than just semantics of syntax). In a recent study, Khalfallah Nejmeddine argues that al-Jurjānī explicitly sets out to establish a new discipline, according to him termed ʿilm al-maʿānī ‘the science of literary themes’ and aimed at exploring the relations between “ideas-themes” and “reason.”433 While Nejmeddine is correct to bring into focus al-Jurjānī’s understanding of literary maʿānī (as opposed to the maʿānī al-nahw), the two passages he relies on simply do not support a reading of ʿilm al-maʿānī as a discipline heading nor do they point to any explicit claim by the author to found a new science.434 In fact, any remarks hinting at al-Jurjānī’s own disciplinary affiliation lead to the science of grammar: beyond his concentration on naẓm ‘syntactic arrangement’ as a grammatical, and specifically syntactic principle,435 he states

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434 The passage that Khalfallah claims contains the phrase ʿilm al-maʿānī only has amr al-maʿānī (Asrār, 25, and correcting Khalfallah’s citation of p. 26; Théorie, 104 fn. 2, 105 fn. 2). Khalfallah himself translates that latter phrase as “l’État des maʿānī” (Théorie, 105). The passage that he claims contains an announcement by al-Jurjānī to establish a new science – “Dalāʿīl ilī,” (Théorie, 104) – is in fact p. 9 of al-Madkhal fi Dalāʿīl ilī al-iʿāz min ilmāʾ iḥī, several folios that Rashīd Riḍā (who oversaw the 1912 ʿAbduh edition) placed in the beginning of the Dalāʿīl, and which Shākir places outside the Dalāʿīl (see the title page following the Madkhal). The Madkhal ends with a poem written by al-Jurjānī, in which he summarizes the tenets of naẓm as a syntactic principle (hukm min al-nahw; al-Madkhal, 10.1). It reads like a didactic poem (despite the non-didactic meter, basīṭ). In line 2 – the line Khalfallah relies on – al-Jurjānī states, “The only way to prove a miracle in syntactic arrangement (naẓm) is through that which I set about to reveal” (mā min sabīlin ilā ithbāti muʿjizatin / fī l-naẓmī illā bi-mā asbaḥtu ubdīhī; al-Madkhal, 9). Khalfallah takes this line as proof of al-Jurjānī’s invention of the science, obviously following the comment made by Rashīd Riḍā, and reproduced in Shākir’s edition, wa-fī ḥādhā l-bayt taṣrīḥ aydan bi-annahu huwa al-wadī’ li-l-fann (al-Madkhal, 9 fn. 6), disclosing Riḍā’s own anachronistic understanding of al-Jurjānī’s work. (The ʿAbduh edition that I consult does not contain the Madkhal although it is specified in the table of contents.) It is true that al-Jurjānī is announcing that his work will reveal new insights on the topic (here: the inimitability of the Qurʾān, or “a miracle in syntactic arrangement”), but this type of declaration is a common topos in medieval prefaces.

435 On naẓm as a syntactic principle see Larkin, Theology, 50-54, and Harb, Poetic Marvels, 198-99, 213 ff., though they usually prefer to translate naẓm with the more softened “composition” or “sentence construction.” With regards to the role of grammar in al-Jurjānī’s thought, Larkin states, “… it is as if grammar [AN: specifically syntax] is a blueprint for the thinking of the originator of discourse.” The idea that semantic relations in a sentence are inextricably tied to syntactic relations (cf. Chomsky) has a long history in the study of grammar, where it is common to say that “syntax (lit. case/mood-endings) is that which distinguishes between meanings” (al-iʿrāb huwa al-fāriq
in the prefatory comments to *al-Risāla al-shāfīya* (on the inimitability of the Qur’ān) that in his discussions he “follows a path that resembles more the convention of the scholars of grammar (*‘ulamā’ al-‘arabīyya*) and goes more in their way.”  

After his own lifetime, we find references to al-Jurjānī as “the grammarian” (*al-naḥwī*), at the very least in the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (both in his legal theory and in his rhetoric). This does not mean that al-Jurjānī wrote his treatises/lectures on literary theory necessarily in his capacity as a grammarian – especially since they were meant for an audience of theologians (see above) – but it does point to an absence of a well-defined disciplinary home with which his endeavors may align. The tendency in the modern era to view al-Jurjānī’s work anachronistically as the founder of a discipline and as associated therefore with the Standard Theory probably goes back to the modernist reformer Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), who edited the *Asrār* and oversaw the edition of the *Dalāʾīl*. The titles of the works as

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wa-ḥadhawtu l-*kalāmā* hadhwan huwa bi-*urfī* *‘ulamāʾi* l-*‘arabīyyati* ashbahu wa-fī *ṯārīqihim* *adḥhabu* (*al-Risāla al-shāfīya*, 107 / *Dalāʾīl*, 575). Al-Jurjānī’s main grammatical work is the *Muḫtaṣād*, a ‘middle-sized’ commentary on Abū Hilāl al-ꜜFārisi’s *al-⟩ḏāḥ* (he also wrote a long and a short commentary on it), and he is also known for his *Miʿtāl ʿamīl* (see also Larkin, *Theology*, 1-3). On the phrase *‘ilm al-*arabīyya* as a reference to the science of grammar, and even more specifically to syntax, see for instance Ibn Fāris, *al-Ṣāhibī*, 66 (where it is equated with *i-rāḥ*), and the discussions of Ibn Khaldūn above (§2.2).

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E.g., Nihāya, 74; *al-Mahsūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 447. Ibn Khaldūn states that al-Jurjānī (along with al-Sakkākī) concentrated on topics that had been part of “the books of grammar” (*Muqaddima* 4: 1229). Al-Muṭṭarrazī’s (d. 610/1213) study of literary devices in the prolegomenon to his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī’s *Maqāmāt* also encorporates direct quotations from al-Jurjānī’s work, and one must suspect that it was due to al-Muṭṭarrazī’s endeavors as a grammarian that he was at all aware of al-Jurjānī’s efforts in literary theory. Al-Muṭṭarrazī (nicknamed “*ḥalīfāt al-Zamakhshārī*”) wrote a popular compendium on Arabic grammar called *al-Misbāḥ fi al-naḥw*, and it was based on three small monographs on grammar by al-Jurjānī himself (R. Sellheim, “al-Muṭṭarrazī,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, second edition). It should be noted here that in one instance al-Muṭṭarrazī uses the term *‘ulamāʾ al-bayān* in a direct quotation from al-Jurjānī, but the original passage does not contain that phrase (Nāšir b. ‘Abd al-Sayyid al-Muṭṭarrazī, *Ḥadhā sharḥ latīf li-Abī al-Muẓaffar Nāšir b. al-Muṭṭarrazī ‘alā al-Maḡmūṭ allātī ṣanṣā’ahā al-Imām jamāl al-⟩aṣr Abī al-Qāsim b. ‘Alī al-Ḥarīrī, [Tehran?: s.n.], 1272 [1856], f. 4r [which contains another use of the phrase *‘ulamāʾ al-bayān*, not as part of a quotation]; cf. *Dalāʾīl*, 66). One suspects the use of *‘ulamāʾ al-bayān* here is indebted to al-Zamakhshārī, especially since the phrase later appears in the context of *iḥtiṣāf* (f. 10r; “*Ṣāhib al-Kashshāf*” is cited explicitly in f. 15r). Al-Muṭṭarrazī elsewhere uses the headings *nuqqād al-⟩alām* and *ahl al-naqḍ* (f. 2v) as well as *bdāʾ* (f. 8r ff.), and al-Muṭṭarrazī indeed passed through Baghdad twice and had disputations with scholars there (Sellheim, “al-Muṭṭarrazī”), but it was in the year 601 AH, probably before the heading *‘ilm al-bayān* became in wide use.
they appear in these editions are *Asrār al-balāgha fī ʿilm al-bayān* and *Dalāʾ il al-iʾjāz fī ʿilm al-maʿānī*, respectively.\(^{438}\)

It must be pointed out that although the works of al-Jurjānī may have slowly gained traction after his lifetime, al-Jurjānī the man remained little known. In his early work, Ibn Abī al-Iṣba` cites “the *iʾjāz* of al-Jurjānī, called *Dalāʾ il al-iʾjāz*” as well as his *Asrār al-balāgha*, but he takes this al-Jurjānī to be the literary critic and chief judge of Rayy, al-Qādirī al-Jurjānī (d. 392/1002), author of the *Wasāṭa*.\(^{439}\) Even in Ibn Abī al-Iṣba`’s later work, *Badīʿ al-Qurʿān*, which aligns itself more closely with ‘standardist’ views, an (imagined) dispute between Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Jurjānī is presented as one between al-Rāzī and “the Qādirī”; this is even while we find one citation of al-Jurjānī’s name in full (“al-İmām al-`allāma ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī”).\(^{440}\) And yet, Ibn Abī al-Iṣba` lists the *Dalāʾ il* and *Asrār* among the works that are noteworthy of study in the field of *badīʿ*, later reformulated as ‘*ilm al-bayān*.

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\(^{438}\) *Asrār al-balāgha fī ʿilm al-bayān*, ed. Rashīd Riḍā, 4th ed., Cairo: Dār al-Manār, 1947 [originally published 1902]; *Dalāʾ il*, ed. ʿAbduh – although here the phrase *fī ʿilm al-maʿānī* appears within brackets. Kātip Çelebi (d. 1067/1657) in his massive bibliographic work also lists the *Asrār* and the *Dalāʾ il* as *Asrār al-balāgha fī al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* and *Dalāʾ il al-iʾjāz fī al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* (*Kashf al-zunūn* 1: 83, 759), but the latter phrases are probably descriptive and not part of the title: in the former case the phrase *fī al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* is printed in bold, as if part of the title, but in the latter it is not; also, Çelebi lists another work titled *Asrār al-balāgha* (not necessarily a work on literary theory) by the Andalusi-born Syrian-based physician and litterateur ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Jilyānī (d. 602/1206, whom Dīyāʾ al-Dīn alludes to in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 211), and obviously al-Jilyānī’s work is titled simply *Asrār al-balāgha* (corroborated by al-Jilyānī himself in ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Jilyānī, *Dīwān al-Mubahshirāt wa-l-qudsīyyāt*, ed. ʿAbd al-Jalīl Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Mahdī, Amman: Dār al-Bashīr, 1989, 151). Note that the *Dalāʾ il* is listed by Çelebi under the category ‘*ilm dalāʾ il al-iʾjāz* (it is the sole work mentioned therein). Before him Ibn Khalṣūn recognizes the indebtedness of the discipline of ‘*ilm al-bayān* to the works of al-Jurjānī and al-Sakkākī (*Muqaddima* 4: 1229), but he speaks of their works as being the roots/source (*uṣūl*) for ‘*ilm al-bayān*, not as part of a pre-existing ‘*ilm al-bayān* (see also al-Ṣafadī, *Nuṣra*, 281-82, who uses similar terms).

\(^{439}\) *Tahrīr al-tahhūr*, 89-90; *Badīʿ al-Qurʿān*, 5. Only in the latter work does Ibn Abī al-Iṣba` mention the three works – the *Dalāʾ il*, *Asrār* and *Wasāṭa* – in the same breadth, suggesting that in the earlier *Tahrīr* he may have still been unsure about the identity of the later al-Jurjānī.

\(^{440}\) *Badīʿ al-Qurʿān*, 177 (and see editor’s fn. 3 on), probably quoting the *Nihāya* – although in *Nihāya*, 172, wherefrom the quotation is taken, the text reads *qala al-shaykh al-imām*. Al-Jurjānī’s name appears in full most notably in the introduction to the *Nihāya* (p. 74). The “dispute” in question concerns the nature and definition of *majāz*: Ibn Abī al-Iṣba` is correct to call out al-Rāzī’s initial characterization of *majāz* as incompatible with al-Jurjānī’s notion of *majāz* *aqlī* (*majāz* on the level of predication, see Part Two), but al-Rāzī ultimately adheres to al-Jurjānī’s theories in full.
In the famous Qur'ānic commentary al-Kashshāf by al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), the phrase ʿilm al-bayān takes on a technical meaning, and along with it, ʿilm al-maʿānī. Heinrichs translates ʿilm al-maʿānī as “stylistics” and ʿilm al-bayān as “theory of tropical expressions,” as the terms are later understood in the Standard Theory. The fact of the matter is, however, that we do not know what al-Zamakhsharī had in mind when he used those disciplinary headings. In the preface to his Qur'ānic exegesis, al-Zamakhsharī states that the best equipped scholar to delve into ʿilm al-tafsīr – described by him as the most majestic of sciences (ʿulūm) – is not the leading lawyer, nor is it the leading theologian, hadīth expert, preacher, grammarian or lexicographer. Rather, he says, it is he who is proficient in “two sciences that are peculiar to the Qurʾān, and they are the science of maʿānī and the science of bayān.” He describes the process of becoming proficient in these fields as a long one, and as one that requires some knowledge of all disciplines (a common trope), within which he singles out grammar and the patterns (asālīb) of poetry and prose. Mention of these two disciplines is not restricted to his Qur'ānic commentary, and in the introduction to his work on prosody, al-Zamakhsharī lists ʿilm al-maʿānī and ʿilm al-bayān among the philological sciences (al-ʿulūm al-adabiyya), following syntax and preceding prosody. The terms appear in some of his other

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441 Among the works of al-Zamakhsharī, the Kashshāf famously contains strategies from the field of literary theory. His other works, like the dictionary Asās al-balāgha or the grammatical work al-Mufassal, are less relevant for our purposes. I did not yet consult his strict adab work, Rabīʿ al-abrār.

442 Heinrichs, “Classification of the Sciences,” 138.


444 Ibid. 1: 16-17.

works as well. But this too does not lead us to a closer understanding of the denotata of those terms.

In order to better grasp which topics belong specifically to 'ilm al-maʿānī and which topics to 'ilm al-bayān one would have to study the contexts of their occurrences within the Kashshāf. In his comprehensive study of al-Zamakhsharī's rhetoric in the Kashshāf, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Abū Mūsā devotes a careful account to this very question, and his results are inconclusive. He finds instances in which the phrase 'ilm al-maʿānī or 'ulamāʾ al-maʿānī points to the study of the semantic and/or pragmatic import of a sentence, inextricably linking it to the later understanding of 'ilm al-maʿānī as the study of syntactic structures vis-à-vis their situational functions. But the specific topics that al-Zamakhsharī addresses here do not always find their way into the later 'ilm al-maʿānī. One case involves taʿrīḍ —‘implicature’, that is, using a syntactic structure that suggests the intended meaning but is not explicit (later normally studied within the standard 'ilm al-bayān). Another case is of a much more poetic provenance, as it involves the question of using images in “correct” situations and addressing themes with what is deemed appropriate for the poetic purpose (gharaḍ), such as knowing the terms appropriate for praise (madḥ). This topic is sometimes subsumed within the later standard 'ilm al-badī’, but is sometimes absent from the Standard Theory altogether.

446 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Abū Mūsā, al-Balāgha al-Qur’ānīyya fi tafsīr al-Zamakhsharī wa-atharuhā fi l-dirāsāt al-balāghiyya, [Cairo:] Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabi, [1974?]. 199. Abū Mūsā cites his Aʿjab al-ʿajab (a commentary on al-Shanfarā’s Lāmiyyat al-ʿarab), the Muḥāṣṣal (grammar book), and his dīwān. To these we may add his dictionary: see Asās al-balāgha, 8. Abū Mūsā says he was hoping al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī in his commentary of the Kashshāf would explain these terms as they appear in the preface, but he does not. This too points to the idiosyncrasy of these phrases in al-Zamakhsharī’s work.


448 Ibid., 199-200.

449 Ibid., 201-202.
In the case of ʿilm al-bayān, Abū Mūsā’s discussion is much terser. He finds instances of ʿilm al-bayān that point to the study of imagery in the word of God, referencing takhyīl, tamthīl, tashbīh and kināya, but he also finds mention of ʿilm al-bayān within the context of syntactic arrangement (naẓm), pointing to a non-standard understanding of this field. The topic of al-faṣl wa-l-waṣl is a case in point: it studies how sentences connect syntactically to one another into a larger discourse and is later normally discussed under ʿilm al-maʿānī. Abū Mūsā states that al-Zamakhsharī’s use of ʿilm al-bayān as a reference to the study of imagery recurs in the Kashshāf. The only instance that Abū Mūsā singles out is al-Zamakhsharī’s comments on Q 34:67, “The earth together shall be His handful on the Day of Resurrection, and the heavens shall be rolled up in His right hand,” which is explained in terms of takhyīl, here: “a visualisation of an abstract notion such as God’s majesty and omnipotence.”\(^{450}\) Interestingly, it is with regards to this “category in ʿilm al-bayān” that al-Zamakhsharī speaks of such pictorial depictions as transcending the question of literal or figurative usage (“…without taking the ‘handful’ or the ‘right hand’ into the realm of the literal or that of the figurative”\(^{451}\)). From a ‘standard’ point of view, the study of ḥaqīqa and majāz was just about tantamount to ʿilm al-bayān as a whole, although one could argue that the treatment of tashbīh ‘comparison’ also transcends the discourse of ḥaqīqa/majāz. In any event, we cannot clearly define what al-Zamakhsharī meant by the headings ʿilm al-maʿānī and ʿilm al-bayān. In the case of ʿilm al-bayān, there is no hint of al-Jurjānī’s non-technical use of the phrase. In fact, in his exegesis al-Zamakhsharī makes only a

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\(^{451}\) Translated by Heinrichs in ibid., based on al-Kashshāf 3: 408-409.
single mention of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. It is noteworthy that the phrase ʿulamāʾ al-bayān occurs more frequently in the Kashshāf than the phrase ʿulamāʾ al-maʿānī, but in both cases it is less than a handful of times.

Almost a century later Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) writes an epitome of the Asrār and Dalāʾil and seems unaware of al-Zamakhsharī’s employment of ʿilm al-maʿānī and ʿilm al-bayān as discipline headings. Al-Rāzī’s own use of ʿilm al-bayān is only slightly more technical than the one by al-Jurjānī. He reproduces al-Jurjānī’s passage in which the phrase ʿilm al-bayān appears, and adds that it was the grammarian ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī who “extracted the principles and rules of this discipline,” thereby charging the term ʿilm with a more technical understanding of ‘discipline’. However, later on al-Rāzī refers to the discipline invariably as ʿilm al-faṣāḥa, and to balāgha ‘eloquence’ as a property rather than a discipline. I have not come across additional references to this field of inquiry or to its scholars (as a group) in the main body of al-Rāzī’s work. The scholar most cited – not surprisingly given the commentarial nature of the work – is “al-shaykh al-imām,” that is, al-Jurjānī himself. The Nihāya is thus not situated within any clearly defined scholarly field but is meant to deal, as its title suggests, with the properties of eloquence as they contribute to one’s understanding of the

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452 Al-Kashshāf 4: 11 (Q 50:39), where he mentions al-Imām ʿAbd al-Qāhir. I thank Matthew Keegan for this reference. I also searched a readable PDF version of the work, using the search words “ʿAbd al-Qāhir,” “al-Jurjānī,” “Abū Bakr,” “al-Imām,” “ʿAlī Allāma,” and “al-Naḥwī.”

453 Four instances for ʿulamāʾ al-bayān, one for ʿulamāʾ al-maʿānī.

454 Nihāya, 74 (al-imām majd al-islām ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-naḥwī al-Jurjānī […] istakhrajā usūl hādhā al-ʿilm wa-qawānīnahu […]).

455 Ibid., 82-84.

456 E.g., ibid., 321.

457 We do find references to former scholars, but al-Rāzī does not affiliate them with any group. See, e.g., ibid., 231, where al-Rummānī (“ʿAlī b. Īsā”) is quoted. He also references the ʿuqālāʾ ‘wise men’ (e.g., ibid., 233), presumably the theologians, and within the discussion of iʿjāz he cites al-Qādī ʿAbd al-Jabbār by name (ibid., 381).
Qur‘ān’s linguistic excellence. Al-Rāzī’s treatment of this topic should be viewed not only in
light of his activities as a theologian, but also in light of his work as an exegete.\footnote{For a recent study of al-Rāzī see Tariq Jaffār, Rāzī: Master of Qur‘ānic Interpretation and Theological Reasoning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 (not seen).} That he did
not recognize al-Zamakhsharī’s usage of ‘ilm al-ma‘ānī and ‘ilm al-bayān suggests that the
latter’s terms remained marginal in subsequent centuries, and there is a debate if even al-Sakkākī
was building on this usage when he spoke of ‘ilm al-ma‘ānī and ‘ilm al-bayān in the Miftāḥ.\footnote{Bonebakker, “al-Ma‘ānī wa ‘l-Bayān.” We mentioned above (fn. 437) one probable exception to the subsequent
marginality of al-Zamakhsharī’s discipline headings: we come across the phrase ‘ulamā‘ al-bayān in al-Muṭarrirī’s
introduction to his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī’s Maqāmāt, and this usage was most likely inspired by al-Zamakhsharī
(Sharḥ, f. 4r [two occurrences; the context is tamthīl ‘alā hadd al-isti‘ārā ‘metaphorical illustrative analogy’ and
kināya ‘periphrasis’]).}

**Summing Up**

DİYĀ’ AL-DĪN does not explain what he means by the phrase ‘ilm al-bayān nor does he claim
precedence for its usage. This would suggest that he was exposed to some use of the phrase, but
as of yet we have no textual evidence for a broad employment of the term in a disciplinary
context prior to his time. Al-Jurjānī’s single usage of the phrase was non-technical and was
hardly taken up by al-Rāzī; al-Zamakhsharī usage of ‘ilm al-bayān alongside ‘ilm al-ma‘ānī
remained idiosyncratic in his works, and it debatable if even al-Sakkākī was aware of, or was
building on it. DİYĀ’ AL-DĪN was well familiar with al-Zamakhsharī’s Qur‘ānic exegesis, as it was
an extremely popular work. But if he derived the phrase ‘ilm al-bayān from the Kashshāf, one
would expect to find some reference to ‘ilm al-ma‘ānī as well (and we do not). As we shall see in
Part Two, DİYĀ’ AL-DĪN engaged directly with the work of al-Jurjānī without explicitly
mentioning him. It is thus likely that he picked up on al-Jurjānī’s prefatory remark on ‘ilm al-
bayān. But whereas for al-Jurjānī the specific word bayān was synonymous with balāgha,
faṣāḥa, and barāʿa and meant ‘eloquence’ (the third lexical meaning of the word), for Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn bayān was probably associated with the lexical extension of the word as it was used in scribal circles, namely, ‘good written style’. There is no hint in the works of those preceding Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn of the theoretical status of ʿilm al-bayān as a distinct and ‘scientific’ discipline. As a disciplinary heading ʿilm al-bayān is best translated as “the science of good style.”

Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn did not partake in the philosophical – epistemological or metaphysical – discussions of bayān as a mechanism of imparting knowledge, nor did he engage in the legal manifestations of the term. He was likely familiar with the philological association of the “language of the ancient Arabs” with bayān, but this type of discourse was probably antiquated by Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn’s time.
Part Two: ‘Ilm al-bayān in the Seventh/Thirteenth Century

Introduction

Throughout the seventh/thirteenth century, scholars working in the field of literary theory in the Arabic East adhered to the disciplinary framework of ‘ilm al-bayān. In Part Two of the dissertation we will take a closer look at some of these works. At the macro level (Chapter 4), we will study the contexts of these works on ‘ilm al-bayān: their authors, scholarly affiliations, and the structuring of the material within ‘ilm al-bayān proper. At the micro level (Chapter 5), we will study the concept of majāz as a test case for literary-theoretical thinking during this period. The scholars we focus on are:Diyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239), Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651/1253), Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. after 693/1294, not to be confused with Fakhr al-Dīn), Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298), and Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316).

As in older naqd works, authors can reflect different tendencies in literary theory, or ‘ilm al-bayān in the context of seventh/thirteenth-century Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Diyā’ al-Dīn reflects the scribal and critical bent of ‘ilm al-bayān. We closely examine his works and place within the literary critical tradition. Ibn al-Zamlakānī builds on the thought of al-Jurjānī and his work reflects the influx of grammatical thinking (semantic-syntactic) into literary theory. Nevertheless, his conception of majāz is in line with older and contemporary views in literary theory proper. Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī reflects a poetic bent of ‘ilm al-bayān, being a poet himself and a product of Arabic-Persian poetical learning. Ibn al-Naqīb reflects exegetical leanings in ‘ilm al-bayān and the study of literary theory for the purpose of Qur’anic hermeneutics. Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī reflects similar tendencies. Al-Ṭūfī slightly exceeds our time frame by flowing into the eighth/fourteenth century, but the way he builds (explicitly) on the work of Diyā’ al-Dīn merits
his inclusion here. He is the only author whose conception of majāz is not in line with that of other scholars in the field. Hence, he is the exception that proves the rule.

Additional works that one might consider in studying 'ilm al-bayān in this time and place are those by Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ (d. 654/1256) and Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Tanūkhī (fl. end of 7th/13th century). We looked at Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ’s Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr and Badīʿ al-Qurʾān in Part One, and references will be made to them when needed in Part Two. Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ reflects scribal and critical tendencies in 'ilm al-bayān, as was the case with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. Al-Tanūkhī’s al-Aqṣā al-qarīb reflects the integration of logic into 'ilm al-bayān, although his work is essentially a study of literary devices.

Chapter 4 (“The Critical Landscape”) is meant, in many ways, to give context to the study of majāz in 'ilm al-bayān, which is our focus in Chapter 5 (“Majāz in Literary Theory Revisited”). The resulting contextualization forms an independent study on 'ilm al-bayān in the seventh/thirteenth century. If the reader so wishes, s/he may choose to follow the sections on each author in Chapter 4 with the respective treatment of majāz in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4:
The Critical Landscape

4.1. Divā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Thāthīr (d. 637/1239), al-Mathal, al-Jāmī’ and More

Abū al-Faṭḥ Naṣr Allāh b. Abī al-Karam Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm b. 'Abd al-Wāḥid al-Shaybānī, known as Ibn al-Thāthīr al-Jazarī and by his honorific name Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn, was a very well-known statesman, vizier, prose writer and critic working in the service of Ayyūbid and Zangid rulers. He was one of the three renowned Ibn al-Thāthīr brothers who left their mark on Arabic-Islamic scholarship. The nisba al-Jazarī refers to their place of birth, Jazīrat Ibn 'Umar (modern-day Cizre in southeast Turkey) in the historical Jazira region, where their father, a high official, was stationed by the Zangids of Mosul. All three brothers were known by the name of Ibn al-Thāthīr al-Jazarī. The eldest brother, Majd al-Dīn Abū al-Sa‘ādāt al-Mubārak (d. 606/1210), lived his entire adult life in Mosul and worked in the service of the Atabegs there.

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461 Ibn Khalilikān, Wafayāt 3: 348 (‘Izz al-Dīn), 4: 141 (Majd al-Dīn). This could explain the misattribution of al-Jāmī’ al-kabīr to Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s older brother, who was also a high official (and see next fn.). Ibn Khalilikān also refers to Jazīrat Ibn ‘Umar as Jazīrat Ibnay ‘Umar, an explanation of which is found in Wafayāt 3: 349-50.
As a scholar, he is best known for engaging with Qurʾān and hadīth, and he is also said to have written a work on the secretarial art. The middle brother, ʿIzz al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ＇Alī (d. 630/1233), was the famous chronicler of Zangid history and the writer of the monumental work of history, al-Kāmil (also partial to the Zangids), which is probably best known today due to its detailed account of the crusades. Beyond political affiliation, the strong ties the family had to the Jazīra region was also of a financial nature, as it owned real estate in Cizre and in Mosul and invested in commercial enterprises.

The youngest brother ʿIyāʾ al-Dīn was the most prominent of the three brothers in political terms, and also the one who attracted the most antagonism. The literary competition he had with his older contemporary, the famous Egyptian epistolographer al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil (d. 596/1200) was friendly enough, but as a statesman, he often found himself in dire straits. One would consider it a literary trope to portray a high official fleeing the city in a box or in disguise for fear of retribution, so it is quite telling that in Ibn Khallikān’s biographical entry ʿIyāʾ al-Dīn is reported to have done so twice! ʿIyāʾ al-Dīn’s own style in his scholarly writings reveals him to be of a somewhat arrogant nature, and this is reflected in the combative response to al-

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462 Ibid. 4: 141-42; Rosenthal, “Ibn al-Athīr”; see also Part One, fn. 188. Ibn Khallikān says (Wafayāt 4: 141) that “he has a small work on the secretarial craft” (wa-lahu kitābun latīfūn [in the sense of latīf al-hajm] fi jannī l-kitāba). This could be the source of the later attribution of ʿIyāʾ al-Dīn’s al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr to Majd al-Dīn. See also van Gelder, Beyond the Line, 146.


465 Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt 5: 396 (also Part One, fn. 147). The two served together under Saladin (Wafayāt 5: 390), ʿIyāʾ al-Dīn seemingly as his disciple (see below), and ʿIyāʾ al-Dīn wrote a risāla of condolence upon al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil’s death (Margoliouth, “Royal Correspondence,” 10-11).

466 Wafayāt 5: 390-91, the first time when fleeing Damascus after it had been taken from al-Malik al-Afdal (Saladin’s son), and the second time when fleeing Cairo after it was conquered by al-Malik al-ʿAdil (Saladin’s brother). According to Ibn Khallikān, ʿIyāʾ al-Dīn wrote a risāla on the second incident.
Mathal al-sāʾir by the Baghdadi caliphal chancery scribe Ibn Abī al-Ḥaḍīd (see Part One), as well as in other later accounts. Nevertheless, Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn was held in very high esteem: Ibn al-Mustawfī gave him excessive praise in his History of Irbil and Ibn Khallikān related the strong affection his own father had for Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn. (Ibn Khallikān regretted never having met Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn in person during his frequent visits from Irbil to Mosul.) This reverence is due, no doubt, to Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn’s fame as an epistolographer. Ibn Khallikān clearly admired his style, as he devoted considerable space in his biographical entry to citations from Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn’s letters, along with a commentary on the originality of certain images (sg. maʾnā). This was not meant so much as a critique as it was a literary exercise on behalf of Ibn Khallikān, who used it to show his own skill.

The biographical information surrounding Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn’s life comes largely from Ibn Khallikān’s (d. 681/1282) work. Two earlier accounts that Ibn Khallikān relies on – an entry in Ibn al-Mustawfī’s (d. 637/1239) Tārīkh Irbil and one in Ibn al-Najjār al-Baghdādi’s (d. 643/1245) Dhayl tārīkh Baghdād – did not survive, and the later biographies rely almost entirely

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467 Ibid., 391, 396 (he did meet his brother the historian, with whom he was extremely impressed; Wafayāt 3: 349). But al-Šafadī clearly disliked him, as is apparent both in his refutation of the Mathal and in the biography itself. In the latter (al-Wāfī 27: 35-36), he claims that people did not like Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn’s attacks on al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, on al-Ḥārīrī and especially on al-Mutanabbī. While it is true that Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn was especially critical of al-Ḥārīrī, it is not true that he did not hold them in high regard despite the occasional criticism. This is especially evident in the case of al-Mutanabbī, on whom Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn wrote an entire commentary, criticizing Ibn al-Dahhān’s claims about al-Mutanabbī’s many borrowings from Abū Tammām; this is Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn’s al-Istidrāk fī l-akhdḥ ‘alā l-maʾākhidh al-Kindiyya [referring to al-Mutanabbī] min al-maʾānī al-Ṭāʾiyya [referring to Abū Tammām]. Even in the case of al-Ḥārīrī, there is a recognition on the part of Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn of his talent (see below). Continuing on the point of rivalries: it has also been reported (Siyyar 16: 364, preceded by the qualifying wa-qīla) that Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn had a strife with his brother the historian (later this is mentioned as a fact, without wa-qīla in al-Wāfī 27: 34 and then again in Shadhārāt 5: 188, quoting [Ibn Khaldūn’s?] “al-ʾIbar”). This may have to do with the fact that ʿIzz al-Dīn did not make mention of Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn in his histories. Claude Cahen refutes that there was any rift between the two, based on Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn’s letters, in “La Correspondance,” 37. Ibn Khallikān makes no mention of the strife.

468 Wafayāt 5: 392-96.

469 For another example of this practice see ibid. 1: 330 (under the entry of Jaʾfar al-Barmakī).
on Ibn Khallikān. But we also have Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s own letters, both official and non-official, as a source for his biography, and Claude Cahen used many of them to reconstruct Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s life (sometimes at odds with the account found in Ibn Khallikān).

Serving briefly under Saladin in Egypt, Diyāʾ al-Dīn became the vizier of Saladin’s son, al-Malik al-Afḍal in Damascus in 589/1193. Diyāʾ al-Dīn followed al-Afḍal to Cairo, Samsat (Sumaysāṭ, southeastern Turkey) and Salkhad (Şarkhad, southern Syria), with an interval in which he was employed by the emir of Mosul Arslān Shāh. After al-Afḍal, Diyāʾ al-Dīn briefly joined al-Malik al-Zāhir Ghāzī (al-Afḍal’s brother) in Aleppo, and then moved to Mosul in 607/1211, followed by Irbil, Sinjar and finally Mosul again. It was in his final stage in Mosul, starting in 618/1221, that Diyāʾ al-Dīn became chief chancellor (kātib al-inshāʾ) of the Zangid ruler Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd and his atabeg at the time and later successor, Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’. Diyāʾ al-Dīn died in Baghdad in 637/1239 during a diplomatic mission on behalf of the Mosul governor.

Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s political allegiance to the region of Greater Syria and the Jazīra translated into literary and scholarly preferences as well. He showed a preference for literary critics from the region to the detriment of others (see Part One, §1.2) especially from central and southern

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470 Wafayāt, 396, for references to the two earlier works (Ibn Khallikān views Ibn al-Najjār, whose work he calls Tārīkh Baghbdād, as the more reliable one). For the later biographies see above, fn. 460. To get a sense of the historical distance from Ibn Khallikān: al-Dhahabī died in 748/1348, al-Ṣafadī died in 764/1363, al-Yāfī died in 768/1367, al-Suyūṭī died in 911/1505, and Ibn al-ʿImād died in 1089/1679.

471 For instance, Cahen finds (“La Correspondance,” 35) that Diyāʾ al-Dīn was associated with Saladin already in 583/1187 (587/1191 is recorded as the official start date), and that after al-Afḍal’s loss of Damascus, Diyāʾ al-Dīn fled to Mosul rather than Cairo (cf. Wafayāt 5: 390). For a modern edition of his collected letters (Ibn Khallikān speaks of several volumes of letters, and a one-volume collection of his best letters) see Rasāʾ il Ibn al-Athīr, ed. Anīs al-Maqdisī, Beirut: Dār al- IIm li-l-Malāyīn, 1959.

472 Wafayāt 5: 389-97; Cahen, “La Correspondance”; fn. 460 above. For a list of dignitaries to whom, and on behalf of whom, Diyāʾ al-Dīn wrote letters see Rasāʾ il Ibn al-Athīr, 7-8.
Iraq, which he associated with grammatical centers of learning. Furthermore, by all accounts he favored the ‘modern’ poets of Syria, like Dīk al-Jīn (d. ca. 245/849), Abū Tammām (d. 232/846), al-Buḥṭurī (d. 284/897), and al-Mutanabbī (d. 354/965), to the detriment of more Eastern poets, usually of Persian origin, like Abū Nuwās (d. ca. 198/813), Ibn al-Ḥajjāj (d. 391/1001), al-Shārīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1016) and Mihyār al-Daylāmī (d. 428/1037). Of course by Diyā’ al-Dīn’s time those favored poets were no longer ‘modern’, and he displays his own traditionalism especially when it comes to visual word play as seen in the *Maqāmāt* of al-Ḥarīrī (d. 516/1122) or in the tree-shaped poems of the Andalusi (turned Syrian) physician and litterateur al-Jīlānī (d. 602/1206). He also criticizes al-Ḥarīrī’s ‘redundant’ style of *saj*, which was supposedly also practiced by Ibn Nubātā (d. 374/984-5) in his sermons (the latter not quite ‘modern’!). He does recognize al-Ḥarīrī’s unique talent in writing *maqāmāt*, but says that this talent did not cross over to the epistolary art, and he describes al-Ḥarīrī’s attempt to become a state scribe in Baghdad as disastrous (perhaps a common trope).

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473 This is apparent, e.g., from *Al-İstidrāk*, 45-48.

474 *Al-İstidrāk*, 59, for a conversation he had with a Damascene friend on his choice of memorizing the *ghazal* of the latter poets versus the *ghazal* of Abū Tammām and al-Mutanabbi. Dīyā’ al-Dīn compiled a collection of poems by the Syrian poets, mentioned in Ibn Khallikān’s entry (see below). See also Heinrichs, “Ibn al-İthār,” 315. This is, of course, a general predilection: we find numerous places where the other poets’ material is praised.

475 *Al-Mathal al-sā’ir* 3: 210-11. With regards to the visual word plays of al-Ḥarīrī, Dīyā’ al-Dīn specifically refers to alternations between dotted (*mu jam*) and undotted (*muhmal*) letters or entire words. In the case of ‘Abd al-Mun‘im al-Jīlānī, whom Dīyā’ al-Dīn refers to as the *adīb* from *ahl al-maghrib* and not by name (it is understood that he met him personally), Dīyā’ al-Dīn concedes that there is some meaning (*ma‘nā*) in his poetry but that essentially it is “a kind of drivel (*hadhayān*)” (see also Ibn Khallikān, *Waṭayāt* 7: 50, where an esteemed *adīb* from “the West” mentions a literary session he attended in Mosul at Dīyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-İthār’s place). Dīyā’ al-Dīn is especially harsh on al-Ḥarīrī, situating his technique outside the boundaries of *‘ilm al-bayān*. He also criticizes al-Ḥarīrī on his ‘artificial’ use of *tawshīḥ*, a device which itself is rather artful (when every line of a poem can be disjointed at a certain point, leading to another poem with a different meter; *al-Mathal al-sā’ir* 3: 216-17).

476 Ibid. 1: 278. By *saj* here he is referring specifically to the use of parallel members. He equates this supposedly bad type of *saj* with mere verbiage (*tatwīl*), since the second parallel member is seen as a near-exact repetition of the first.

477 Ibid. 1: 41-43, 362 (where his prose is adduced), building on the common idea of professionalization (going back to al-Jāḥiẓ): that poets who are good, e.g., in *madīḥ* are not necessarily good in *ḥijā‘*; likewise is the case, he says,
Little is known about Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s education and teachers. Ibn Khallikān tells us that after his early years in Cizre, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn received his formative education in Mosul, where he studied the religious sciences and memorized the Qurʾān, much of the ḥadīth, and a fair share of grammar, lexicography and “’ilm al-bayān” (or, anachronistically, “’ilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān” in al-Ṣafādī’s terms).\footnote{Wafayāt 5: 389, al-Wāfī 27: 35. In the future, one might want to check how common the heading ’ilm al-bayān was in Ibn Khallikān’s work (we mentioned one case of ahl al-bayān in Wafayāt 1: 330).} By far the best known account comes from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn himself, who says in the opening of his work on prosification that he memorized the entire dīwāns of Abū Tammām, al-Buḥturī and al-Mutanabbī, a point which later biographers like to dwell on.\footnote{Al-Washy al-marqūm, 56; al-Istidrāk, 37 (Abū Tammām and al-Mutanabbī); al-Mathal al-sāʿir 1: 136-37; Wafayāt 5: 389; Siyar 16: 363; Mir ār al-jamān 4: 97-98; Bughya 2: 315 (a point al-Suyūṭī chooses to incorporate even though the entry is a mere paragraph long); Shadarāt 5: 188. Al-Ṣafādī, not surprisingly given his animosity toward Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, does not mention this fact.} A collection of poems that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn assembled, by Abū Tammām, al-Buḥturī, Dīk al-Jinn and al-Mutanabbī (all Syrian), is said to be a useful anthology to memorize.\footnote{Wafayāt 5: 392. The collection did not survive.} We also find out from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s own account that ’Abd al-Raḥīm b. ’Alī al-Baysānī – i.e., al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil – was a kind of mentor for him, exemplifying what he viewed as the correct approach to the scribal art.\footnote{Al-Wahsy al-marqūm, 54-55, 57.}

What characterizes the writing style of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is not so much its adabī inclinations (per modern scholars)\footnote{Primarily ’Abbās, Tārīkh al-naqd al-adabī, 575-78, and Smyth, “Criticism in the Post-Classical Period,” 394-401.} but rather its biographical-historical content. Whereas adab works are made up of numerous anecdotes that are of a literary nature, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s works are replete with the writer of prose. A similar claim was made against al-Hamadhānī; see Devin Stewart, “Professional Literary Mendicancy in the Letters and Maqāmāt of Badi’ al-Zamān al-Hamadhānī,” in Beatrice Gruendler and Louise Marlow (eds.), Writers and Rulers: Perspectives on their Relationship from Abbasid to Safavid Times, Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2004, 39-49, here: 39, 41. Famously, al-Jāḥiz himself could not hold his post as a kātib for more than three days (Pellat, “Al-Jāḥiz,” 80).
with personal stories, often preceded by a statement on the place and date in which they occurred. To my mind, this puts him in line with the biographical or historical work rather than the *adab* genre. To the personal accounts we may add the citation of personal letters as exemplary illustrations (*shawāhid*), all of which add up to a clear portrait of Diyarʾ al-Dīn’s personality. Thus we learn of interactions Diyarʾ al-Dīn had with laymen such as a Bedouin Nabatean, a Christian, a woman, and a soldier (primarily as troves for verbal pearls of wisdom), or with scholars such as Aristotelian philosophers (whom he thought were irrelevant for the purposes of literary theory) and legal scholars. Furthermore we learn that Diyarʾ al-Dīn may have had some knowledge of Syriac and Persian, as he speaks of beautiful instances of indirect speech found in the Christian scriptures and in Iranian lore. Elsewhere he cites a beautiful

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483 Representative examples are *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 100-105 (esp. 103), 229-30; *al-Istidrāk*, 45-46, 59-60; *al-Washy al-marqūm*, 54, 57. Compare this to the *adab* content in, e.g., *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 29; *al-Istidrāk*, 77.

484 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 100-105 (for the laymen), 1: 229-30 and 2: 5-6 (for the Aristotelian philosopher, as well as Ibn Sīnā), and 1: 60 (for the faqīḥ). Here we should reiterate that although he famously criticizes the Aristotelian strand of poetics and rhetoric, in no way did he object to the study of logic (see, e.g., ibid. 2: 115, and §1.1, where he modelsʿilm al-bayān on the theoretical status of logic). The passage in which Diyarʾ al-Dīn criticizes Ibn Sīnā’s dealings with Aristotelian rhetoric and poetics has become famous through its inclusion in Vicente Cantarino’s translated anthology of Arabic poetics; it is partially translated already in Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 110-11, and discussed in idem, “Naḵd.” In the passage Diyarʾ al-Dīn states that neither Ibn Sīnā nor even the Greeks themselves made use of such theories in composing their own poetry and ornate prose. The passage was recently translated and discussed in Pierre Larcher, “Rhetoriques “grecque” et “hellénisante” vues par Diyarʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿAḡīr (VIIe/XIIIe siècles),” *Quaderni di Studi Arabi*, N.S. 9 (2014), 115-30 (he is unaware of Cantarino). Like Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Ṭārīkh, 575-76), Larcher takes the passage as an attestation to the “permanence” of an anti-philosophical and anti-logical reaction, which I view as an anachronistic ‘Ibn Taymiyyan’ reading into earlier texts. If anything, I would emphasize the apologetic tone of this passage, as if Diyarʾ al-Dīn is attempting to ward off any potential claims that someone of his stature should be aware of Aristotelian rhetoric and poetics and should take them into account in his literary theory (see also Introduction, on the increase in interest in philosophy and the Greek sciences in the Arabic East during this time). Heinrichs says that we have no reason to believe Diyarʾ al-Dīn is speaking to an imaginary opponent here (*Arabische Dichtung*, 17), and see our discussion of *tawassuʿ* in §5.1. This suggests that some people in his scholarly circles were, in some form or another, engaging with those texts. Readings such as ʿAbbās’s and Larcher’s are reflective of the “marginality thesis” regarding the ‘extraneousness’ of philosophy in Islam, a thesis that has permeated the scholarly literature of Arabic and Islamic studies. A.I. Sabra calls attention to the falsity of this view in his “The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: A Preliminary Statement,” *History of Science* 25 (1987), 223-43, and it is discussed in detail in Ahmed, *What is Islam?*, 14-15 (and elsewhere).

485 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 75. The chapter deals with *kināya* (generally in his work: a single-word euphemistic metaphor, see §5.1) and *taʾrīḍ* (generally in his work: implicature). The only concrete example cited is the Iranian one: One of Khosrow’s emirs banished his wife because he learned that Khosrow had frequented her. After she informed the king, he called the emir and said, “I heard that you have a spring of sweet water but do not drink from
image he heard in Persian poetry.⁴⁸⁶ From an encounter he had with a Jew, we also learn that Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn was not oblivious to formal characteristics of the Hebrew language.⁴⁸⁷

**Scholarly Works**

All of Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s scholarly works are concerned with literary criticism and the secretarial art, including a collection of his letters. The best known scholarly work is the two-volume *al-Mathal al-sāʾir fī adab al-kātib wa-l-shāʾir* (‘The Current Saying on the Knowhow of the State Scribe and the Poet’), written by Cahen’s account around 608 AH.⁴⁸⁸ It created a stir already in Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s lifetime. According to the Baghdadi caliphal scribe Ibn Abī al-adīd, it was extremely popular especially among the Mosul scholars (see Part One), and it is the first work that the biographers credit Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn with. It was the target of several responses, both positive and negative, the best known being the rebuttals by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd and al-Ṣafādī.⁴⁸⁹ In Ibn

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⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 2: 33 (it sounds like he heard it directly in Persian: [...] *samī tu hādhā fī shiʿr al-furs li-baʿd shuʿarāʾihim*). The image in question is that when the sun shines on the white lotus (*nīlūfar*) its petals open, and when it disappears they close. Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn used it in a letter to describe someone’s handsome form, saying that even if he walks past a white lotus at night, its petals open. In a more famous passage closing the *Mathal* (4: 12), Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn also speaks of Persian poetry which is epic in nature, citing Ferdowsī’s *Shāhnāma*, in contradistinction to the Arabic poetic tradition.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.* 1: 267-68. Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn only mentions this Jew whom he met in Egypt (described as a leading scholar in his community) because “even he” thought that Arabic was the best language of all, as it eliminated by his account unnecessary elements found in older languages. The Jew gives as an example the Hebrew pattern of pōʾēl (transliterated as *fūʿīl* in Arabic) which was supposedly simplified in Arabic to *faʿal*. The word exemplifying this is *gōmēl* (transliterated as *kūmīl*), supposedly the precursor to the Arabic *jamal* ‘camel’. I am not sure what Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn/the Jew has in mind here – at first glance I thought this was a reference to the *gōmēl* prayer – but it could be that the Hebrew *gāmāl* ‘camel’ was pronounced at the time and in that locale as *gōmēl*, not unlike the shift we find in Yemeni Hebrew or in European Ashkenazi pronunciation *ā*→*ō* (*māqōm*→*mōqām*). However, we should keep in mind that Hebrew was used then as a written language and that if it was spoken, it was for liturgical purposes; this brings us back to the *gōmēl* prayer. *Wa-llāhu aʿlam.*

⁴⁸⁸ “La Correspondance,” 37, though I wish more evidence had been provided. Ibn Khallikān mentions that the work was in two volumes (*Wafayāt* 5: 391).

Khallikān’s words, it is the most comprehensive work on the secretarial art (fann al-kitāba). It clearly eclipsed the earlier version of the work, al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ṣināʿat al-manẓūm min al-kalām wa-l-amanṭūr (‘The Large Compilation on the Craft of Versified and Unversified Speech’), as the title does not appear in the biographies and is attributed, rather, to one of his brothers. There is little doubt that %Dīyā  al-Dīn authored the work. Also intended for the state scribe is %Dīyā  al-Dīn’s al-Washy al-marqūm fī ḥall al-manẓūm (‘The Striped Embroidery on Turning Verse into Prose’), on methods for incorporating poetic allusions into epistolary prose. This underscores the ‘subjugation’ of the poetic art to epistolography.

The work al-Miftāḥ al-munshā li-ḥadīqat al-inshā (‘The Erected Key for the Garden of Letter-Writing’) is a short manual for secretaries in the strict sense, and modern scholars have debated whether the attribution to %Dīyā  al-Dīn is correct. While it differs from %Dīyā  al-Dīn’s

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490 Wafayāt 5: 391 (“he [Dīyā’ al-Dīn] did not leave any component concerning the secretarial art unmentioned”).

491 Al-Subkī, ʿArūs al-afrāḥ 1: 159 attributes the Jāmiʿ to “his [Dīyā’ al-Dīn’s] brother”; Ẓashköprüfzāde in his Miṣṭāḥ al-saʿāda attributes it to the religious scholar Majd al-Dīn. We already mentioned above (fn. 462) that Ibn Khallikān credits Majd al-Dīn with a work on kitāba (no title given). According to Kâtip Çelebi (Kashf al-zunūn 1: 571), the Jāmiʿ was written by the middle brother, the historian, and the phrase ʿilm al-bayān is part of its title (al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ʿilm al-bayān).

492 Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, editors’ introduction, 39-40, who see the work as a muswadda for the Mathal. See also Sallām, Dīyā’ al-Dīn, 68-69. Besides the identical structure and, many times, contents, here too Dīyā’ al-Dīn gives his own letters (and even verse) as shawāhid, but at a substantially lower rate and in a more humble manner (e.g., al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 94-95. I am assuming these samples did not make it into the Mathal or his Rasāʾil collection because his later letters were better.) See also Muḥammad al-Ṭāhīr Ibn ʿĀshūr, “Nazra fī kitāb al-Jāmiʿ li-Ibn al-Ṭāhir,” Majallat Majmaʿ al-Lughah al-ʿArabiyya bi-Dimashq 31 (1961), 672–77, who argues that the Jāmiʿ is later than the Mathal (he lists eight arguments, all of which point to differences between the two works but not to chronological precedence). It might be added that ʿĀshūr sees (p. 674) the Jāmiʿ as the “theoretical” treatise akin to the works of al-Jurjānī and al-Sakkākī, and the Mathal as the “practical” one. Our analysis of Dīyā’ al-Dīn’s theory on majāz will clearly point to the Mathal as the more developed and later work of the two.

493 This includes Qurʾān and ḥadīth. A thorough study of this work is Amidu Sanni’s Arabic Theory of Prosification and Versification.

494 An explicit discussion on the supremacy of prose over poetry closes the Mathal (al-Mathal al-sāʾir 4: 4-12), and it has become well known through Cantarino, Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age, 191-98. As Smyth tells us regarding expressions of ‘superiority’, “for many authors criticism served as an apology for their own work” (“Criticism,” 416).

495 The work is intended for the apprentice; on the face of it, it bears little stylistic or thematic resemblance to Dīyā’
usual style – the didactic character of the genre demands, after all, a rather limited approach – it is not unlikely that he authored the work. This is borne out by an authoritative preface (formulaic, to be sure, but intended as a model for the apprentice), by the aggrandizement of the chancery among the state offices, by the intimate knowledge of writing conventions relative to Arab/Persian or Muslim/Non-Muslim scribes, and by certain thematic similarities.\footnote{496} His literary-critical work, \textit{al-Istidrāk fī al-akhdh ṣ ū al-maʾakhir ṣ iyya min al-maʾānī al-ṭāʾiyya} (‘The Rectification of the Critique of the Kindite Borrowings from the Ṭayyi`ite Motifs’), is a response to the work written by the Baghdadi grammarian Ibn al-Dahhān (d. 569/1174)\footnote{497} on the poetic borrowings of al-Mutanabbī from Abū Tammām. Preceded by a long theoretical introduction,\footnote{498} the work later lays out numerous additional cases not mentioned by Ibn al-Dahhān in which al-Mutanabbī borrowed images from Abū Tammām, and it specifies, when relevant, why al-Mutanabbī’s later iteration of the motif is in fact better. As a later work (it

\footnote{496} \textit{Al-Miftāḥ al-munshā}, 51-54, 61, 83-85. In terms of thematic similarities: (1) as in his other works, the author is committed to the differentiation between \textit{ta rāḍ} as (usually) implicature and \textit{kināya} as (at least here) a single-word alluding metaphor (p. 96); (2) here too he is committed to the unit of the \textit{sajʿa}, as he presents many of the rhetorical figures (whether sound or sense) in terms relative to the \textit{sajʿa} (pp. 91-92, 95, 100, 103). The \textit{sajʿa} is the single parallel member of a segment of rhymed prose and it is a unit of speech that he elaborates on in the \textit{Mathal} (see Devin Stewart, “\textit{Saj}’ in the Qur`ān: Prosody and structure,” \textit{Journal of Arabic Literature} 21 [1990], 101-139, here: 113 ff.); (3) he ends the work with a snippet of poetry segments, apparently meant to be memorized – this is in line with his view that memorization of poetry aids in the crafting of epistolary letters. Conversely, the \textit{shawāhid} that are adduced are often of ancient poetry. Again, this might be due to the genre that necessitates knowledge of the ancient Arab poetic way. One idiosyncrasy is that the section on rhetorical figures is presented primarily as a tool of the poetic art and only secondarily as relevant for the craft of prose (\textit{al-Miftāḥ al-munshā}, 53).

\footnote{497} According to Ibn Khallikān, \textit{Diyyāʾ} al-Dīn’s oldest brother Majd al-Dīn studied grammar from Ibn al-Dahhān (\textit{Wafayāṭ} 4: 141). The translation of the title is Heinrichs’.

\footnote{498} \textit{Al-Istidrāk}, 25-91, which amounts to about a third of the book (Sallām’s edition is less than 200 pages).
was written after the *Mathal*, it exhibits Dīyāʾ al-Dīn’s most mature form of poetic criticism and mastery of the poetic art.\textsuperscript{499} The work is a commentary both on al-Mutanabbi’s and on Abū Tammām’s imagery – the two seem to be his favorite poets\textsuperscript{500} – but in essence, it is a commentary on the very practice of borrowing images.\textsuperscript{501} By presenting many of the borrowings (\textit{maʾākhidh}) as an act of improving on earlier images, Dīyāʾ al-Dīn betrays his preference for later poets vis-à-vis the ancients, and implicitly, his preference for the scribal art, of which the entire essence is perfecting old motifs.\textsuperscript{502}

On the face of it, based on Dīyāʾ al-Dīn’s known titles, there is nothing hinting at his involvement with the development of ‘\textit{ilm al-bayān} as a theoretical discipline on the rise. The \textit{Jāmiʿ} was known under the title \textit{al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ʿilm al-bayān}, according to Kātip Çelebi,\textsuperscript{503} and it is probably due to this fact that later works on the classification of the sciences specify the \textit{Jāmiʿ} within the context of ‘\textit{ilm al-bayān} (see Part One, §2.2). The title and fame of the \textit{Mathal} rested primarily on its character as a resource for the state scribe, so it is not surprising that it did not find its way into the rubric of ‘\textit{ilm al-bayān} in those later works.

But we do have one work attributed to him that contains the phrase ‘\textit{ilm al-bayān} in the title: this is \textit{al-Burhān fī ʿilm al-bayān} (‘The Proof on the Science of Good Style’), mentioned by Brockelmann but not in the biographical sources.\textsuperscript{504} The manuscript of the work, housed in the

\textsuperscript{499} Ibid., 42, for a reference to the \textit{Mathal}.

\textsuperscript{500} While much of the introduction reads like a stark defense of al-Mutanabbi (against the view of Ibn al-Dahhān), Dīyāʾ al-Dīn does say at one point that he finds Abū Tammām to be \textit{ashʿar} “a better poet” than al-Mutanabbi and any other poet, “as [would] anyone having knowledge of ‘\textit{ilm al-bayān}” (\textit{al-Istidrāk}, 53, also 44).

\textsuperscript{501} See esp. ibid., 77 ff.

\textsuperscript{502} And see ibid., 80, where the method of deciding which poet or poetic line is better is said to be applicable to the scribal art.

\textsuperscript{503} \textit{Kashf al-zunūn} 1: 571.

\textsuperscript{504} \textit{GAL} 1: 358.
It is not clear how the work came to be known under two different titles; the fact that both are attributed to Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn potentially corroborates his authorship of the work. But the style and themes of the work differ markedly from those exhibited in Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn’s other works (much more so than al-Miftāh al-munshā, which had some hints of his style and themes). If al-Miftāh al-munshā was a beginner’s manual for the state scribe, the Burhān/ Kifāya is a beginner’s manual for the poet, an abridgment of Ibn Rashīq’s encyclopedic work on poetry and poetics, the ‘Umda. If Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn did write it, it must have been as an exercise in an early stage of his life, before his own thought on literary criticism developed. We mention

505 MS Wetzstein I 80; Wilhelm Ahlwardt, Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften, 10 vols., Hildesheim; New York: Georg Holms, 1980-1981 (reprint of the 1887 and 1889-1899 editions), 6: 393-94 (item no. 7248); Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, Kifāyat al-ṭālib fī naqd kalām al-shā’ir wa-l-kātib (‘A Primer [lit. what suffices for the student] on Criticizing the Speech of the Poet and the Scribe’), also ascribed to Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn and also unspecified in the biographies. It is not clear how the work came to be known under two different titles; the fact

506 One instance of thematic discrepancy is the following: in the discussion of indirect speech (ishāra) in the Burhān/Kifāya (Burhān f.96v, 97v; Kifāya, 173-76) there is no hint of his later asserted differentiation between kināya (one-word alluding metaphor, usually euphemism) and ta’rīf (implicature), a differentiation found even in the earlier Jāmî’ (156-57, 166-69). In terms of style: the work lacks any authoritative voice – indeed, any authorial voice at all.


508 This is one of the hypotheses posed by El Achèche, who does not settle the matter of attribution (“La Kifāyat al-ṭālib,” 187-88). Sallām mentions it, following Brockelmann and an early modern work on the history of Mosul (Ibn al-Athīr wa-juhāduhu fī l-naqd, 72, referring to Sūlaymān Śā’i gh’s Tarīkh al-Mawsīl). Smyth takes Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn’s authorship of the Kifāya for granted (“Criticisms in the Post-Classical Period,” 394). Further remarks on attribution: First, the copy that we have of the Burhān was written during Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn’s lifetime, as it contains in the title page an autograph of the legal theorist Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmīdī (d. 631/1233). The work was copied by the latter’s son, Yūsuf b. ‘Afi al-Āmīdī, who copied it “for himself” (katabahu li-nafsihi, f.1r; cf. Ahlwardt, Verzeichnis 6: 394, who mentions that it was copied in 650/1252, but I did not find this date). Given Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmīdī’s presence in Syria and Egypt and his association at times with Ayyūbid rulers (Bernard G. Weiss, “al-Āmīdī, Sayf al-Dīn,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three), it is not unlikely that he came across Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn in person. Second, Ibn Ma’ sūm ascribes the Kifāya to Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn in his comprehensive compilation on (non-standard) rhetoric, Anwār al-rabī’,
the *Burhān/Kifāya* here because it contains references to the scholarly group called ‘ulamāʾ al-bayān, so if the work was authored by Diyāʾ al-Dīn, the heading of the discipline had already been in use in his early days. Of course in the *Mathal* and *Jāmiʿ*, *ʿilm al-bayān* is a fait accompli, with references to the discipline heading and the scholarly group throughout.

This leads us to the major works that are of interest to us here, the *Mathal* and the *Jāmiʿ*. The two works are dedicated to the discipline called *ʿilm al-bayān*—in Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s understanding: ‘the science of good style’—which, according to him, is the theory behind literary composition (see Part One). The structure of both works broadly overlaps. The *Jāmiʿ* is divided into two large parts (sg. *quṭb*). The first deals with “general matters” such as prerequisite sciences, methods of learning the scribal art, a prolegomenon on ḥaqīqa and majāz, and phonological sections concerning the nature of the Arabic language. The second part deals with “particular matters” and is a study of the rhetorical devices (*aṣnāf ʿilm al-bayān*), concerned both with sense (*al-ṣināʿa al-maʿnawiyya*) and with sound (*al-ṣināʿa al-lafẓiyya*). In the *Mathal* Diyāʾ al-Dīn takes most of the “general matters” in the *Jāmiʿ* and turns them into a large prefatory section (*muqaddima*). The *muqaddima* contains several new chapters, e.g., a short one and assumes it was written after the *Mathal* (following him also the editors of the *Kifāya*: introduction, 25). This cannot be correct, but it may serve as additional evidence that the work was authored by Diyāʾ al-Dīn. Third, the work does contain themes that are consistent with Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s thought, such as the identification of *tashbiḥ* ‘comparison; simile’ as a type of majāz (*al-Burhān* f.86v; *Kifāya*, 157) but this cannot be taken in support of his authorship since already Ibn Rashīq and others viewed *tashbiḥ* as majāz (see §5.1). Also, we find that it is not Abū Tammām that is favored over other poets, as we did in the *Istidrāk*, but rather Ibn al-Rūmī (a non-Syrian) due to his invention of many motifs (*awlā bi-sm shāʾir li-kathrat ikhtirāʿihi*); Abū Tammām is presented as employing too many metaphors (*istiʿāra wa-badīʿ*) (*al-Burhān* f.70v-71r; *Kifāya*, 40-41). This is a direct quotation of Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan Ibn Rashīq, *al-ʿUmda fī maḥāsin al-shīʿr wa-ādābihi wa-naqdihi*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn Abī al-Ḥamād, 2 vols., 4th ed., Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1972, 1: 286, also 2: 238, 244-45 (English: ‘The Support on the Good Qualities of Poetry, its Customs and Evaluation’).

509 *Al-Burhān* f.70r; *Kifāya*, 40.

510 For a detailed account of their contents see Sallām, *Ibn al-Ἀṯīr wa-juḥūduḥu fī al-naqḍ*, 75-123.

511 Phonological discussions, both in the *Jāmiʿ* (pp. 33-63) and in the *Mathal* (1: 210-69) are found under the chapter dealing with single words (*al-alfāż al-mufrada / al-lafẓa al-mufrada*). The inclusion of phonology is inspired by Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (*Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, 13-21).
on the (philosophical) “subject-matter” of `ilm al-bayān (to wit: eloquence, al-faṣāha wa-l-balāgha), and a very long one on turning verse, as well as Qurʾān and ḥadīth citations, into artistic prose (i.e., ‘prosification’, later enlarged into a separate work, al-Washy al-marqūm). Following the Muqaddima are two large sections (sg. maqāla), the first on all matters concerning sound (al-ṣināʿa al-lafẓiyya). The phonological sections that appeared in the Jāmiʿ’s “general matters” are now situated here, as a preparation for the study of sajʿ ‘rhymed prose’ and other literary devices concerned with sound. Sajʿ plays an important role in Īyāʾ al-Dīn’s literary theory and analysis of Qurʾānic style. The second maqāla deals with all matters concerning sense (al-ṣināʿa al-maʿnawiyya), varying from metaphor to brevity, the stylistics of prepositions, literary borrowings (sariqāt), and more.

The section that opens the study on sense (al-ṣināʿa al-maʿnawiyya lit. ‘the mental craft’) is an enlargement of a four-page chapter in the Jāmiʿ dealing with the invention of motifs or images (maʿānī). It is often unclear where the boundaries are between this discussion and the one dealing with turning verse into prose (the long chapter appearing in the muqaddima, see above). Indeed both sections form a poetics of image-creation, which in turn form part of a poetics of letter-writing. Detailing the mechanism for creating new motifs, and following the

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512 Respectively: al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 39-40 (inspired by al-Khafājī – whose treatment is translated in Cantarino, Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age, 152-54) and 1: 125-209 (along with numerous examples from Īyāʾ al-Dīn’s own letters). For his statement on enlarging the section in the Mathal into an independent work, and in the process correcting errors he had made, see al-Washy al-marqūm, 47-48. Conversely, the Mathal contains two explicit references to the Washy (al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 161, 2: 36), indicating that he may have continued updating the Mathal later on in life or that he wrote the two concurrently.

513 This is roughly half of the first volume of the common printed edition, al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 210-414.


515 One should differentiate here Īyāʾ al-Dīn’s idea of maʿānī vis-à-vis al-Khafājī’s: for the latter, the realm of maʿānī was purely logical and had no place in it for language (Sirr al-faṣāha, 225-26), such that metaphor, for instance, was not treated under maʿānī but rather under al-alfāz al-μāʾalafa.

516 In both sections we find a reference to his al-Washy al-marqūm (al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 161, 2: 36).
lead of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn distinguishes between two kinds of motifs, namely, those that are not modeled upon previous motifs and those that are. Within the former, motifs can be invented in two ways. The first is creating a motif based on a new, real-life occurrence; it is an imitation (ḥikāya) of what is present before one’s eyes. It is on the basis of this passage that Sallām wonders about the influence of the Greek notion of muḥākāt ‘mimesis’ on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s thought, despite the latter’s explicit eschewal of Greek rhetoric and poetics. The second way of inventing motifs is presented as a much harder method, as it is in essence a creation of images ex nihilo. What ensues is a listing of poetic examples that contain supposedly truly invented images (Ar. ibdāʿ, mubtadaʿ, mukhtaraʿ). And yet when he moves on to adduce prose examples – all of which coming from his own oeuvre – many of the invented images are presented as an extraction (istungāṭ, istikhrāj) from earlier motifs, found primarily in hadīth. It is here where the discussion becomes indistinguishable from the notion of prosification (ḥall). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn equates the invention of motifs with the process of finding the unknown in algebraic equations; under the section on turning verse into prose, he presents it as analogous to an elixir in alchemy, in which a new metal is extracted. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn revisits some of these issues under the long

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519 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 20-58. It is noteworthy that the context in which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn revisits this issue is tashbīḥ (ibid. 2: 141-42), especially when we consider that mimesis was often translated as the hendiadys tashbīḥ wa-muḥākāt (cf. Ibn Rashīq, *al-ʿUmda* 2: 294, and our discussion of tashbīḥ below). See also the arguable identity between the kutub al-māʿānī (catalogues of images, like that of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī) and kutub al-tashbīḥāt (Beatrice Gruendler, “Motif vs. Genre: Reflections on the Diwān al-Maʿānī of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī,” in Thomas Bauer and Angelika Neuwirth [eds.], *Ghazal as World Literature I: Transformations of a Literary Genre*, Beirut: Ergon Verlag Würzburg in Kommission, 2005, 57-85, here: 60).

520 Ibid. 2: 32-58. While he is trying to create a model for the aspiring state scribe in creating new images, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also maintains that this skill is divinely inspired (fayḍ ilāḥī) and cannot be taught (2: 55).

521 Ibid. 1: 161.
chapter on poetic borrowings.\footnote{Ibid. 3: 218-92 (al-sariqāt al-shiʿīyya).}

\textit{Unacknowledged Engagement with ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī}

Some of Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s unique stances stem from his engagement with scholarly works that were not commonly used in literary theory up until his time, namely Ibn Jinnī’s (d. 392/1002) \textit{Khaṣāʾ iṣ}, al-Zamakhsharī’s (d. 538/1144) \textit{Kashshāf}, and ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081) \textit{Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz}. It is Ibn Jinnī’s deliberations about majāz that inspired Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s own theory on the matter in his later-written \textit{Mathal} (one could say he employed istikhrāj here!); this will be discussed below (§5.1).\footnote{Al-Rāzī also engaged with Ibn Jinnī’s view on majāz; \textit{al-Mahṣūl}, vol. 1 pt. 1, 468-71.} Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn also appropriated Ibn Jinnī’s discussions on \textit{shajāʿat al-ʿarabiyya} lit. ‘the boldness (or courage) of the Arabic language’, a reference to certain ‘irregular’ syntactic phenomena that are inherent in the language (some of which figured into the early grammatical-hermeneutical discussions of majāz in Abū ʿUbayda’s \textit{Majāz al-Qurʾān}; \textit{Mathal al-Qurʾān}).\footnote{Ibn Jinnī, \textit{al-Khaṣāʾ iṣ} 2: 360-441; \textit{al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr}, 98-122; \textit{al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir} 2: 170-91 (where the \textit{shajāʿat al-ʿarabiyya} is restricted to the phenomenon of \textit{iltifāt}, here: ‘change in grammatical person/tense’). Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn refers to the \textit{Khaṣāʾ iṣ} by name. According to 19th-century Butrus al-Bustānī, \textit{shajāʿat al-ʿarabiyya} was a reference to elision (\textit{hadhf}), according to some of the rhetoricians (Ar. \textit{ahl al-bayān}); Kitāb Muhīt al-muhīt ay gāmūs muṭawwal \textit{li-l-lugha al-ʿarabiyya}, Beirut: [s.n.], 1867-1870, 1055. For some of the overlap with Abū Ubayda’s categories, see those enumerated in John Wansbrough, “Majāz al-Qurʾān: Periphrastic Exegesis,” \textit{Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies} 2 (1970), 247-66, here: 248-54. For another discussion stemming from Ibn Jinnī, this time without acknowledgement, see \textit{al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir} 2: 67-69 (and editors’ footnotes). Ibn Jinnī himself states (\textit{Khaṣāʾ iṣ} 2: 446) that many instances of majāz are part of the phenomenon of \textit{shajāʿ at al-lugha}, such as elision, pleonasm, change in word order, change in grammatical gender or number (\textit{al-ḥaml ‘alā l-maʿnā}) and morphological irregularities (\textit{taḥrīf}). In Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s work \textit{shajāʿat al-ʿarabiyya} is restricted to syntactic irregularities.} Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn also appropriated Ibn Jinnī’s discussions on change in grammatical person (\textit{iltifāt} lit. ‘turning the face to [s.t. /s.o.]’) inspired Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s own take on the matter.\footnote{\textit{Al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir} 2: 171-73. For a comprehensive study of literary devices in the \textit{Mathal} (and to a lesser extent the \textit{Jāmiʿ}) that are indebted to al-Zamakhsharī see Abū Mūsā, \textit{al-Balāgha al-Qurʾānīyya fi tafsīr al-Zamakhsharī}, 539-87, 653-60.} Both scholars are mentioned by name.
Unnamed is ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, some of whose passages are quoted without acknowledgement. Whether Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn had direct access to his work is unclear, but evidence suggests that he did. The near-quotations are from Dalāʾ il il-i jāz, but influences from Asrār al-balāgha are also discernible (the latter will be discussed in §5.1). The passages in question concern the underlying argument made in the Dalāʾ il, namely that eloquence does not stem from a single word in isolation but rather from the position of that word within a construction (naẓm/tartīb per al-Jurjānī, tarkīb per Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn). Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn adopts this particular point but there is no discernible trace of al-Jurjānī’s resulting elaboration on the “imports of syntax” (maʿānī al-naḥw), which forms the heart of al-Jurjānī’s Dalāʾ il. Also, Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn derives only a partial notion of al-Jurjānī’s naẓm. Like al-Jurjānī, he adduces the Qurʾānic verse “And it was said, O earth, swallow your water, and O sky, abate (your rain); and the water was made to subside, the affair was accomplished, and [the ark] settled on [mount] al-Jūdī; and it was said,

526 Bonebakker points out that the Asrār and Dalāʾ il “were inaccessible to some scholars even in the Middle Ages” (Bonebakker, “al-Ḵazwīnī”); perhaps the accessibility to al-Jurjānī’s work was not so partial at this stage in this place (see also the work of Ibn al-Zamlakānī in §4.2). It is of note that the principal manuscript used by Hellmut Ritter in his edition of the Asrār was a copy completed in umādā II 660/May 1262 in Jabal al-Sālihiyya near Damascus (see Asrār, editor’s introduction, 25). Although this is some time after Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn’s death in 637/1239, it is an indication that it was known in the Arabic East before al-Qazwīnī. Nevertheless, al-Jurjānī’s works were definitely not widely known in this time and place.

527 Dalāʾ il, 43-48 (esp. 45-47, though the discussion runs until p. 65); al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 211-18 (esp. 211, 214); al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 64-67 (where al-Jurjānī’s claims are taken at face value). Al-Jurjānī is reacting to claims made, inter alia, by al-Jāhiz.

528 Al-Jurjānī states (Dalāʾ il, 100) that discussions on naẓm (earlier also referred to as tartīb and again later: ibid., 359 ff.) must precede discussions on metaphor (see also ibid., 393). As an example, he shows how the beauty of the famous Qurʾānic wa-shta’ala l-raʾsu shayban (Q 19:4) “[my] head is aflame with hoariness” has in fact to do with syntactic matters: predicating “aflame” of “head” rather than “hoariness” directly (similarly Q 54:12 wa-fajjarnā l-ʿarda ʿuyūnan “we made the earth gush forth springs”; Dalāʾ il, 102); or expressing the meaning of a possession when no syntactic possessive (iḏāfa) is uttered (“the head” instead of “my head”; ibid., 102). The grammatical underpinnings of al-Jurjānī’s theory of imagery deserve a separate study. Heinrichs translates maʿānī al-naḥw as “the meanings of syntactic relations” (“ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī,” Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature 1: 17; see also Abu Deeb, Al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Poetic Imagery, 43, 62).

529 I am deliberately translating this in the passive, rather than the usual translation “and the water subsided,” because al-Jurjānī explicitly refers to the passive construction of this and the following verb, as well as to other syntactic features (Dalāʾ il, 45-46; e.g., the added possessive pronoun ki to maʾakī, instead of iblaʾī l-māʾ, or the repetition of qīla at the end of the verse). Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn does not repeat any of these details.
Away with the unjust people,” in a paragraph that is almost identical to the one found in the Dalāʾīl. Then Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn repeats almost verbatim the idea that one word may be beautiful in one context but ugly in another (the phrase ayyuhā l-mutaʾammil is sometimes a giveaway for al-Jurjānī’s style). But the examples that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces are fundamentally different from the ones al-Jurjānī adduced, showing that he did not quite subscribe to the latter’s theory on the irrelevance of the single word in evaluating eloquence. The examples that al-Jurjānī brings forth involve an independent lexeme, always a noun. The examples reflect a classicizing approach on the part of al-Jurjānī, as the first involves the word al-akhdaʿ ‘neck vein’, said to be beautiful in a verse from the Ḥamāsa and in a verse by al-Buḥṭurī (a classicizing poet) but ugly in the verse of Abū Tammām, and in the second example, it is al-Mutanabbi’s use of the word shayʾ that is criticized vis-à-vis beautiful usages in early poetry. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn would hardly endorse these examples. The ones that he gives, however, do not involve independent nouns but rather dependent constituents, like a verb requiring a prepositional complement, or a prepositional phrase. Thus, the fault is explicitly said to lie in the tarkīb (like using a verb without its prepositional complement), missing the whole point al-Jurjānī was trying to make regarding the single word. It is ironic that at this point Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn boasts of his thinking and speculation in this subtle matter, “to which no other scholar before him attended.” (In their ‘reponses’, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd and al-Ṣafadī are silent on this matter.)

As it turns out, in the Mathal Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn holds the exact view that al-Jurjānī was trying

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530 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 214; Dalāʾīl, 45 (for both paragraphs). The editors of the Mathal point to this passage of the Dalāʾīl in their footnotes.


532 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 214-18, and 215 for the boasting (to which the editors respond, fn. 3, with an accusatory tone).
to refute, namely, that words can be beautiful in and of themselves and have not to do with their meaning. (He still agrees with al-Jurjānī regarding the importance of *tarkīb* in evaluating beautiful style.)

Đıyā’ al-Dīn claims that since words are made up of sounds, they either sound beautiful or they do not, just as the ear finds the tune of a string instrument beautiful and the sound of a donkey bray disagreeable, and just as the mouth finds the taste of honey sweet and that of the colocynth (*ḥanẓal*) bitter. Thus, it is not that one person would find a certain word ugly and another would find the very same word beautiful: the beauty of words is not a relational property (*idāfī*) but rather an inherent one (*dhawawī*, see the comparison to honey/colocynth, which all people find sweet/bitter). This is the opposite stance from the position he held in the *Jāmiʿ*, where the notion of acoustic eloquence (*faṣāḥa*) was said to be relational (see §1.1, p. 39). In the *Mathal* Đıyā’ al-Dīn holds the view that the single evaluator of the beauty of a word is the sense of hearing. In contrast, the entire project of the *Dalāʾ il* was to refute the idea that a word has a certain beauty: the beauty, rather, lies in its meaning (and its relation to the other constituents in the sentence). At one point al-Jurjānī added the stipulation, “unless you mean the composition of tunes, but that is not what we are dealing with at all” (see below).

Đıyā’ al-Dīn’s discussion, so it turns out, revolves precisely around the tune-like quality of single words, a topic that was irrelevant for al-Jurjānī. We might recall that in the *Jāmiʿ* Đıyā’ al-Dīn gave a direct quotation from “one of the authors among the scholars” (*baʿḍ al-muṣannifīn min al-

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533 Stated generally in ibid. 1: 116.

534 Ibid., 219, 221.

535 Ibid., 222.

536 *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 77.

537 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir* 1: 224.

538 *Dalāʾ il*, 395.
'ulamā’), claiming that in studying the meaning of eloquence one cannot remain on the level of general claims but must delve into the details and exert contemplation, reflection and speculation. It was here that ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn spoke of the relational nature of eloquence. The fact that this view was abandoned in the Mathal shows us that it was not due to his obliviousness to al-Jurjānī’s ideas, but rather due to a conscious departure from his stance. As proof for his claims, ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn provides three synonymous words, two of which are beautiful and one of which is not. The fact that all three indicate the intended meaning equally, he says, shows that eloquence goes back to the lafẓ rather than the maʿnā.

It is in this context that ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn then makes the comparison between the rational basis of eloquence (or ʿilm al-bayān) and the non-rational basis of grammar (or the science of grammar, see §1.1). There can be little doubt that this claim, too, has its origin in al-Jurjānī’s Dalāʾil. We might recall that ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn argues that the categories of grammar (aqsām al-nahw, referring specifically to case endings) were derived from the coiner of the language by imitation (or tradition, taqlīd), such that reason (ʿaql) would not reject it if the subject of a verb-initial sentence were assigned the accusative and the object were assigned the nominative. Compare this to al-Jurjānī’s,

[...] al-ʿilmūf al-ʿaqlī rābi mushtarakun bayna l-ʿarabi kullihim wa-laysa huwa mimmā yustanbani bi-l-fikī ri-yustanbi l-ʿarabi kullihim wa-laysa huwa mimmā yustanbani bi-l-fikī wa-yusta ʿālini bi-rwāyīyati fa-laysa aḥaduhum bi-anī l-rāba l-fāʿili l-rāba awwat l-mafʿūli l-naṣbu wa-l-muḍāfi ilayhi l-jarru bi-aʿlamu min ghayrihi wa-lā dhāka mimmā yaḥtājūna fīhi ilā ḥiddati dhihnīn wa-Quwwāti khāṭīrin

539 Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 76-77.
540 Al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir 1: 115 (acknowledged also in al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 64-65); cf. Dalāʾ il, 43-44, where excellence is attributed, rather, to the maʿnā.
541 Al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir 1: 119-20.
The knowledge of case endings is common to all Arabs and it is not something that is derived by contemplation or aided by reflection, for not one of them [the Arabs] is more knowledgeable than the other with respect to the fact that the case ending of the subject (in a verb-initial sentence) is nominative, or that of the object is accusative, and that of the second term of the construct is genitive: that is not something in which one needs a sharp intellect and an apt mind.\(^{542}\)

Then Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn goes on to say that this is not the case with the knowledge of eloquence (or the disciplinary ʿilm al-bayān),

\[li-annahu -stunbiṭa bi-l-nazari wa-qadīyyati l-ʿaqli min ghayri wāḍiʿi l-lughati wa-lam yuṣṭaqar fihi ilā l-tawqīfi minhu bal ukhidhat alfāẓun wa-maʿānin ʿalā hayʿatin makhṣūṣiyatin wa-ḥakama lahā l-ʿaqlu bi-maziyyatin mina l-ḥusni lā yushāʾrikuhā fihā ghayrarah fa-inna kullā ʿārifin fa-asrārī l-kalāmī min ayyi lughatin kānat mina l-lughāti ya lamu anna ikhrāja l-maʿānin fī alfāẓin ḥasanatin rāʾiqatin yaladhduḥuhā l-samʿu wa-lā yanbūʿ anhā l-ṭabʿu khayrun min ikhrājihā fī alfāẓin qabīḥatin mustakrahatin yanbūʿ anhā l-samʿu […]\]

because [eloquence/ʿilm al-bayān] was derived by speculation and the judgment of reason without [any influence from] the coiner of the language, and there is no need in this [process/ʿilm] for him (the coiner) to provide input. Rather, words and meanings were combined (?, ukhidhat) according to a particular form, and reason judged it to have an excellence in beauty which is not shared by any other (form). For every person knowledgeable in the mysteries of speech, no matter the language it is in, knows that uttering notions in beautiful clear words, which the ear finds delight in and natural disposition does not move away from, is better than uttering it in ugly loathed words, which the ear finds repugnant […]\(^{543}\)

Compare this to al-Jurfānī’s passage preceding the one just quoted,

\(^{542}\) Dalāʾil, 395. Al-Jurfānī goes on to say that what does require intellect is to identify the reason (“that which necessitates,” mā yūjibu, al-wasf al-mūjib) for placing a constituent (shayʾ) in the fāʿil position when it is done figuratively, alluding here to the notion of majāz huḵmī discussed in Dalāʾil, 293 (a notion not found in the work of Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn). The passage above is also translated and discussed in Harb, Poetic Marvels, 208 (citing also Dalāʾil, 98). Harb’s point is that in al-Jurfānī’s mind, eloquence is only truly achieved if there is some kind of reflection and thought on the part of the listener.

\(^{543}\) Al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 1: 120.
thumma innā naʾlamu anna l-maziyya l-maṭlūbata fi ġādhā l-bābī maziyyatun fīmā ṭarīquhu l-fikru wa-l-nāżaru min ghayri shubhatin wa-muḥālun an yakūna l-lafżu lāhu ṣifatun tustanbaṭu bi-l-fikri wa-yustaʾānu ’alayhā bi-l-rawiyyati -llāhumma illā an turīda ta līfa l-naghami wa-laysa dhālika mimmā nāḥnu fihi bi-sabīlīn

Then we know that the desired excellence in this domain is an excellence in [a matter] that is grasped through contemplation and speculation without a doubt, and it is impossible for a word to have a property that can be derived by speculation or be [determined] with the aid of reflection, unless you mean the composition of a tune, but that is not what we are dealing with at all.544

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn takes al-Jurjānī’s idea that in order to evaluate eloquence one must exert speculation, and he takes his idea that knowledge of case endings has not to do with speculation. He also agrees with al-Jurjānī that speculation does not determine the eloquence of single words, but whereas Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn concludes that the knowledge of single-word eloquence is intuitive and universal akin to the perception of beautiful tunes, for al-Jurjānī the single word is simply irrelevant.545

Al-Jurjānī’s idea of eloquence finds its way to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s epitome of the Asrār and Dalā’il, but the latter’s discussion is much more technical, with the use of such notions as dalāla waḍʿiyya/lafziyya ‘signification derived from [the sound of] a word coined in the lexicon’.546 It is clear that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not derive his passages from al-Rāzī but rather directly from the Dalā’il (or a source quoting the Dalā’il). This is significant for several reasons. First, it shows us that while al-Jurjānī’s work is usually thought to be inaccessible to medieval

544 Dalā’il, 395.
545 We should mention that the discussion in the Mathal appears in two places, (a) in one of the chapters of the long muqaddima titled fi l-faṣāha wa-l-balāgha (al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 112), and (b) in the opening of the section on al-ṣināʿa al-lafziyya, when discussing the euphonic character of the single word (ibid., 1: 210).
546 Nihāya, 87-117. The chapter that follows (ibid., 117-46) is on cases where eloquence is precisely due to the single word!
scholars, this is probably less true in the case of the Dalāʾīl. Second, and more importantly, it shows us that it was probably al-Jurjānī more than anyone else who inspired Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn to delineate his field in rational terms, and it was probably al-Jurjānī who prompted him to use the phrase ʿilm al-bayān as the heading for the discipline he was writing in (although al-Jurjānī used the term non-technically). And yet, the project that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn produced was markedly different from that of al-Jurjānī. This goes against the common narrative one finds in the history of Arabic literary theory, namely, that whoever came across al-Jurjānī’s work was swept away by his ideas. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn engaged with the periphery of al-Jurjānī’s theory (“where does eloquence lie”), first subscribing to it in his early Jāmiʿ (acknowledging the difficulty of determining eloquence based on the single word since it is a relational notion), and then rejecting it in the Mathal (in favor of the importance of sound in determining eloquence). As we shall see in our discussion of majāz, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also engaged with some of al-Jurjānī’s ideas found in the Asrār, but these did not constitute the heart of al-Jurjānī’s theories, and the two scholars arrive at very different conclusions regarding the nature of majāz.

The differences between al-Jurjānī’s views and the views of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn probably have to do with the fact that they approach a similar set of questions from different perspectives. In the passages we discuss above al-Jurjānī is primarily concerned with the way in which eloquence is achieved. What matters to him is the listener’s appreciation of literary speech, and he seeks to understand how (literary) language is processed. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is thinking of eloquence as a science. What matters to him is the critic’s evaluation of literary speech, and he seeks to define how literary language can be produced.

Bonebakker, “al-Ḵazwīnī.” As we shall see in §4.2, Ibn al-Zamlakānī is another scholar from the central Arabic-speaking lands who had direct access to al-Jurjānī’s Dalāʾīl.

Harb, Poetic Marvels, 208.
4.2. Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651/1253), al-Tibyān, al-Burhān and al-Mujīd

Kamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. ‘Abd al-Karīm b. Khalaf al-Zamlakānī, also known as Ibn Khaṭīb Zamlakā, was a Syrian Shāfīʾī scholar from Zamalkā (or Zamlukā; originally Zamalukā), in the agricultural plain of the Ghūṭa outside Damascus. The little we know of his life and work is associated solely with Syria, where he worked as a judge in Salkhad (Şarkhad, southern modern-day Syria), taught at a madrasa in Baalbek (modern-day Lebanon) and died in Damascus. He is portrayed in the biographies as having expertise in al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān, that is, the standard rhetorical tradition, but is mainly known as the grandfather of the influential Shāfīʾī scholar and religious leader in Syria, Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 727/1327). Our Ibn al-Zamlakānī also wrote poetry, a snippet of which has survived.549 Most of his works concern the style of the Qurʾān, first and foremost from a grammatical or functional-grammatical point of view, but he also wrote on pure grammar (a commentary on al-Zamakhsharīʾs Mufaṣṣal) and on creedal and legal issues.550

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The three works by Ibn al-Zamlakānī under consideration here are those that merited him knowledge of *al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, although no influence of al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229), or even Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), is apparent.\(^{551}\) Like Fakhr al-Dīn, Ibn al-Zamlakānī was a direct ‘redactor’ of Ṭabd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081) work, albeit unlike the former, Ibn al-Zamlakānī was solely aware of *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz* (and not *Asrār al-balāgha*), commonly described as the more grammatical of al-Jurjānī’s two literary-theoretical works.

We do not know how Ibn al-Zamlakānī became acquainted with al-Jurjānī’s work, which remained little known in the central Arabic-speaking lands until the time of al-Qazwīnī. Ibn al-Zamlakānī probably knew al-Jurjānī in his capacity as a grammarian (see his commentary on al-Zamakhsharī’s *Mufaṣṣal*): it seems that both al-Zamakhsharī and al-Muṭarrīzī (d. 610/1213), who wrote books on grammar, were aware of al-Jurjānī via this route as well.\(^{552}\) Another explanation is that a teacher from the East brought along with him the knowledge of al-Jurjānī, given the influx of Iranian and Turkic scholars into the Arabic East as the Mongols were making inroads into the eastern Islamic lands.\(^{553}\) But if this were the case, it does not explain why a close reading of Ṭabd al-Qāhir’s work in the Arabic East remained an isolated occurrence (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s

\(^{551}\) Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīthī surmise (*wa-aghlab al-zann; al-Tibyān*, 16) the opposite, that he benefited from both al-Rāzī’s *Nihāya* and from al-Sakkākī’s *Miftāḥ* (without any further evidence). There is one reference to al-Rāzī in the *Tibyān* with regards to the latter’s definition of the noun (*al-Tibyān*, 51), but it is more likely that Ibn al-Zamlakānī found this in another of al-Rāzī’s works, especially since the contested point is alluded to in *Nihāya*, 158-59. As we shall see, the structures of both works differ (although both add a section on rhetorical figures) and Ibn al-Zamlakānī seems to be completely unaware of al-Rāzī’s conception of majāz. A single additional reference to al-Rāzī in Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s *Burhān*, on the etymology of the word majāz, is in fact taken from the former’s work on legal theory. See *al-Burhān*, 99 and al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 396.

\(^{552}\) See fn. 437 on al-Muṭarrīzī’s digest of several of al-Jurjānī’s grammar books. Ibn al-Zamlakānī must have been aware of al-Zamakhsharī’s *Kashshāf* as well, but as we have noted, the latter only mentions al-Jurjānī there once (fn. 452).

\(^{553}\) On the migration of eastern Ḥanafī scholars due to this reason (among others) see Madelung, “The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks,” 141. Cf. Khaled El-Rouayheb’s contextualization of eleventh/seventeenth century intellectual history in the Ottoman Empire in his *Islamīc Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 13-59, 131-72. We have no knowledge of Ibn al-Zamlakānī himself traveling to the East nor do we know the identity of his teachers.

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engagement with al-Jurjānī was far too implicit). What is more, we would expect Ibn al-Zamlakānī to give more frequent mentions of al-Jurjānī by name. The fact that he rarely does so also underscores that al-Jurjānī was minimally known in this time and place. Given al-Jurjānī’s primary affiliation as a grammarian (§3.2), the grammar route is the most likely line of influence. It must be noted, however, that knowledge of al-Jurjānī was definitely on the rise in the Arabic East: the principal manuscript used by Ritter for his edition of al-Jurjānī’s Asrār al-balāgha was completed near Damascus in 660/1262, that is, not long after Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s death.

Of the three works by Ibn al-Zamlakānī, the best-known and apparently the first one written is al-Tibyān fī ʿilm al-bayān. The book, which the author completed on the 20th of Ramaḍān 637/April 21, 1240, reached a wide circulation fairly quickly, as it was met with a ‘rebuttal’ by the Andalusian Abū al-Muṭarrīf Ibn ʿAmīra (d. 658/1260) shortly thereafter (relatively speaking: less than twenty years). The Tibyān is dedicated to a Damascene vizier,

[554] As we shall see, explicit reference to al-Jurjānī is minimal and two of Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s three works are entirely devoid of any mention of him. Compare this to al-Sakkākī, for instance, who often makes mention of al-Imām ʿAbd al-Qāhir (e.g., Miṣṣāḥ, 371), and even more so Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who mentions al-Shaykh al-Imām on almost every page.

[555] Asrār, editor’s introduction, 25. Shākir in his edition of the Dalāʾil used a manuscript from mid-Rabīʿ al-Awwal 568/November 1172 as one of the two principal manuscripts; it was copied directly from a copy by Abū al-Qāhir himself and contains the latter’s own marginal notes. This suggests that the copy was from the Eastern Islamic world. The other principal manuscript has no date or indication of place. Shākir also consulted the Riḍā edition, which is based on three manuscripts, but we have no information about their provenance. Al-Jurjānī’s epistle on the inimitability of the Qurʾān, al-Risāla al-Shāfiya, is part of the 1172 copy.

[556] Muḥammad Ibn Sharīfa, who edited the ‘refutation’ of the Tibyān, relied on a manuscript of the Tibyān from the Escorial (MS Escorial 223, not used by Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīthī), and the above is based on his description of the colophon. See Abū al-Muṭarrīf Aḥmad b. ʿAmīra, al-Tanbīḥāt ʿalā mā fī l-Tibyān min al-tamwīḥāt, ed. Muḥammad Ibn Sharīfa, Casablanca: Maṭṭaʿat al-ajāḥal, 1991 [apparently a reprint of the edition written in the sixties] 14, 16 (and see p. 15 fn. 50, where Ibn Sharīfa states that he wrote the introduction before the edition of the Tibyān appeared) (English: ‘Notifications On What the Tibyān Contains of Falsifications’). The earliest manuscript of the Tibyān that Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīthī mention (though did not consult) is a Yale manuscript written in 641 AH (al-Tibyān, 20).
one Abū al-Ḥasan Ṭālī al-Amīn. The second work, *al-Burhān*, was completed in Dhū al-Ḥijja 645/April 1248 and appears to be an expansion of the *Tibyān*. The third work, *al-Mujīd*, is meant as an abridgement (*ikhtiṣār*) of the *Tibyān*, as explicitly stated by the author at the outset. The fact that Ibn al-Zamālānī wrote both a ‘long commentary’ and a ‘short commentary’ on the *Tibyān* also points to the popularity that this work gained during his lifetime. Only the *Tibyān* refers to ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī by name and presents itself as a reworking of his work. Readers familiar solely with the *Burhān* or *Mujīd* would potentially be oblivious to any link with a former luminary in the field of literary-theoretical studies. In fact, within the *Tibyān* itself, apart from the preface, al-Jurjānī is only mentioned twice.

There are slight variations in the structure of the three works at hand, but the nucleus is the same: (i) prefatory remarks on the nature and definitions of ‘*ʿilm al-bayān*; (ii) a section on studies at the level of single words (*al-dalālāt al-ifrādiyya* ‘single-word significations’), where a treatment of *majāz* can be found as well as properties of several words and parts of speech in different syntactic contexts (e.g., the function of a noun and verb as predicate, the functional meanings of lexemes such as *kull* ‘every; all’, *kāda* ‘to almost [do s.th.]’, and *inna* ‘indeed’); and (iii) a section on the patterns of words in combination (*murāʿāt al-taʾlīf* ‘regarding the

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557 *Al-Tibyān*, 32.

558 *Al-Burhān*, 318 (for the colophon), 325 (for another manuscript used). The author does not say that this is an expansion of the *Tibyān* – this is my own impression of the work, despite the fact that the structure differs at times. It is clear, though, that much of the contents of the *Tibyān* appear here with more details, and that other relevant chapters were added. In my mind, the section that was omitted – on rhetorical figures – does not impair the fact that the *Burhān* is a faithful extension of the *Tibyān*.

559 *Al-Mujīd*, 68.

560 *Al-Tibyān*, 30.

561 Ibid., 65, 126. The rest of the references cited on p. 216 are citations by the editors in the footnotes. This is not to say that Ibn al-Zamālānī did not give him his fair due: in the preface he introduces him as *al-imām al-ʿālim al-ḥabr al-nibrīr ʿalam al-muḥaqiqīn ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī raḥimahu -llāh*. 

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states/patterns of putting [words] together’), where a treatment of mostly\textsuperscript{562} grammatical, or functional grammatical topics can be found (e.g., change in word order, functions of the various categories of nominal sentences, the adjoining of sentences, and more).\textsuperscript{563} The *Tibyān* and the *Mujīd* also contain a section on rhetorical devices, conceived of as part of ‘īlm al-badī‘ (termed *fī ma‘rifat al-lafẓ wa-asmā‘ aṣnāfī fī ‘īlm al-badī‘ ‘on knowing the states/patterns of the wording and the names of its categories within the science of the figures of speech’). In addition, there is an appendix (*lawāḥiq*) in the *Tibyān* that discusses the way in which the Qur’ān’s eloquence makes it inimitable (not repeated in the *Mujīd*).

While the *Burhān* (the ‘long commentary’ of the *Tibyān*) adds many subsections to the nuclear structure laid out above – as well as an entire section on the Qur’ān’s inimitability – it omits the listing of rhetorical figures.\textsuperscript{564} Several chapters have been added to the section on grammatical considerations (‘words in combination’), among which are a handful of rhetorical figures,\textsuperscript{565} but the most discernible expansion is of the section on single words. In addition to addressing a wider variety of lexical items and their functions, we also find a prolegomenon on basic notions of expression, such as the modes of signification (speech, writing, gesturing, etc.), the reference of signification (a notion in the mind or an entity in reality), and more.\textsuperscript{566}

Furthermore, the section on *majāz* is now preceded by a treatment of metonymies (or *majāz*

\textsuperscript{562} And yet, it contains some sections that have not quite to do with grammar, like the section on conceptual comparisons termed *tamthīl*, not to be confused with *tamthīl* in the sense of metaphorical analogy, treated under section ii. See *al-Tibyān*, 108-109.

\textsuperscript{563} Respectively: *al-Tibyān*, 30-33, 37-48, 89-162; *al-Burhān*, 44-50, 105-24, (roughly) 199-301. In *al-Mujīd* this nucleus constitutes the entire work excluding the section on rhetorical figures (157 ff.). We might recall that al-‘Alawī in his *Tirāz* reworked the section on *murād ʿat al-fawāl al-taʿlīf* to fit *taʿlīf* in the sense of literary composition (§2.3).

\textsuperscript{564} *Al-Burhān*, 53-76 (the section on *i‘jāz al-Qur‘ān*).

\textsuperscript{565} Ibid., 310-15.

\textsuperscript{566} Ibid., 83-88.
ifrādī ‘single-word majāz’) and is appended by a chapter on tashbīḥ. The influence of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is perhaps more discernible in the Burhān than it is in the earlier Tibyān, even though this does not change Ibn al-Zamākānī’s basic presentation of majāz, which differs from that of al-Rāzī. The few rhetorical figures discussed in the Burhān are now imbedded – much like we find in al-Rāzī’s Nihāya – within other sections of the work. Unlike the Nihāya, and departing from the Tibyān, the illustrations given for these figures are almost entirely Qur’ānic. This situates the Burhān more firmly within the tradition of Qur’ānic stylistics, although in truth, already the Tibyān reflects this tendency. As Ibn al-Zamākānī states in the Tibyān, he limited the number of literary devices to twenty-six, since several have already been discussed under the first two sections (single words, words in combination). In this he implicitly acknowledges that some of his grammatical discussions (one might surmise: ījāz, ḥadhf) are treated as rhetorical devices by other scholars. It is thus less meaningful, to my mind, that the Burhān lacks a section devoted to rhetorical devices.

Since both al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Zamākānī are direct ‘redactors’ or ‘commentators’ of al-Jurjānī, a glance at al-Rāzī’s structuring of the latter’s work is in order. Al-Rāzī’s Nihāya is also predicated on the distinction between studies concerning single words (fī al-mufradāt, in al-Rāzī’s terms) and those concerning words in construction (fī al-naẓm lit. ‘stringing of pearls’). This is an interesting point of similarity, as it is not an obvious choice in structuring al-Jurjānī’s work, and it could point to Ibn al-Zamākānī’s familiarity with the Nihāya. Like the Tibyān and its follow-ups, grammatical topics are treated in the Nihāya within the section on naẓm, and

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567 Ibid., 102-104, 125-32. In fact, the discussion of tashbīḥ is done within the context of tamthīl, which constitutes the entirety of al-naw‘ al-thālith in ibid., 120-32.

568 One exception is al-Burhān, 314, under ilīfāt (change in grammatical person, or deictic shifting), where a threeline passage by Imru’ al-Qays is adduced.

569 Al-Tibyān, 166.
majāz and its categories are treated under the mufradāt, although they involve more than one word (a point which Ibn 'Amīra criticized Ibn al-Zamlakānī for!). But within the mufradāt, al-Rāzī makes a distinction between signification on the level of form (al-dalāla al-lafziyya) and significations on the level of meaning (al-dalālāt al-ma 'nawīyya), and it is here that the approach of Nihāya and that of the Tibyān (and its follow-ups) differ most. Under the dalāla lafziyya we find phonetic and phonological discussions leading to the figures of speech concerned with sound (like paronomasia, rhyming prose members, anticipation of the rhyme word at the beginning of the line). (Other figures of speech are treated under naẓm.) Under dalālāt ma 'nawīyya we find chapters on predication, verb complements, sentence types and definiteness, but more importantly, an extensive section on the ḥaqīqā-majāz dyad, on tashbīh ‘comparison/simile’ and on isti‘āra ‘metaphor’ (the section on kināya ‘periphrasis’ is brief). By contrast, Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s treatment of majāz is relatively brief, incongruent with al-Jurjānī’s theory (the latter repeated by al-Rāzī), and impervious to the question of tashbīh (although a separate treatment of it is added in the Burhān). Adding to the fact that Ibn al-Zamlakānī is unaware of al-Jurjānī’s Asrār (which was used by al-Rāzī), we can safely conclude that if he had any familiarity with the Nihāya, it was a vague one, and that any typological resemblance

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570 *Al-Tanbīhāt*, 55. Ibn al-Zamlakānī should have started, Ibn 'Amīra maintains, with metonymies (word not used) like ‘touching’ for ‘having intercourse’ etc. It is interesting that in the Burhān, this is exactly what Ibn al-Zamlakānī does (though probably not due to Ibn 'Amīra). We will discuss below why majāz is treated under the ‘single word’.

571 Nihāya, 113-46 (for considerations regarding the dalāla lafziyya, including figures of speech concerning sound); 283-97 (for figures of speech concerning sense, treated under naẓm). We are using the terms “concerning sound” and “concerning sense,” but al-Rāzī does not explicitly make this distinction. In fact, he does not even identify them as bādi‘. At one point he uses the term mahāsin ‘beauties’ (ibid., 122, or ḥusn in 284); elsewhere he speaks of wujūh ‘characteristics’ (ibid., 285) that cannot be set into a rule that can be memorized (thumma laya li-hādhā l-bābi qānīnun yuḥfaṣu fa-innahu yajī' u 'alā wujūhin shattā wa-naḥnu nushīru hunā ilā ba 'di l-wujūhi l-mu 'tabara; ibid., 285).

572 Ibn al-Zamlakānī does have a few comments on comparing two things to two other things, as a comment (tanbīh) following the discussion of the three majāz categories. He also discusses some questions of similarity as a side-note to isti‘āra.
between that and the work of Ibn al-Zamlakānī could be coincidental. It is plausible that after writing the *Tibyān*, he was further exposed to topics occurring in the *Nihāya*, but this did not change his basic outlook.

For Ibn al-Zamlakānī, ‘*ilm al-bayān* refers primarily to al-Jurjānī’s idea of *tawakhkhī maʿānī al-nahw fī al-tarkīb* lit. ‘aiming [one’s attention] at the semantic imports of syntax in a construction’, i.e. studying how divergent syntactic constructions convey different meanings. Lexicography and syntax (*‘ilmay al-lugha wa-l-iʿrab*), he says, should be prerequisites. The term ‘*ilm al-maʿānī* does not occur. The definition of ‘*ilm al-bayān* is later modified in the *Burhān* to include the study of *maʿānī al-majāz* lit. ‘the meanings of [utterances which] go beyond [the straightforward expression]’, and probably here, ‘the forms of figurative speech’.

An addition such as this to the definition of ‘*ilm al-bayān* could be an expression of ‘standardist’ influences, although of course, the standard ‘*ilm al-bayān* looks at topics beyond what is strictly viewed as *majāz* (to wit, *tashbīh* and *kināya*).

### 4.3. Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. after 693/1294), *Rawdat al-faṣāha*

Not much is known about Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Rāzī, a Ḥanafī and Ṣūfī scholar originally from Rayy who worked in Egypt, Syria and Turkey. According to one account, the lacuna surrounding his life – he is absent from the biographical dictionaries up until the seventeenth century – has to do with his relative brief presence in the Arabic speaking lands and

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574 *Al-Burhān*, 44: “As for its [*‘ilm al-bayān*] essence [i.e., definition], it is a science in which the forms (*maʿānī*) of figurative speech are known along with its various levels and the minding of the imports (*maʿānī*) of syntax within a construction.” I suspect that the phrase *maʿānī al-majāz* is used here to complement the phrase *maʿānī al-nahw*, but I do not think ‘meanings’ or ‘imports’ is an appropriate rendering of the former.
his ensuing move to Konya, where Turkish sources subsequently ignored him as well.\textsuperscript{575} But Zayn al-Dīn was famous in his lifetime, as he was a prolific writer and held several official positions (see below). Zayn al-Dīn wrote an abbreviation of al-Jawhari’s famous dictionary \textit{al-Ṣīhāḥ} (or \textit{al-Ṣaḥāḥ}), several exegetical works, both philologically and doctrinally oriented, collections on positive law (Ḥanafi) and prophetic sayings, a Ṣūfī commentary, two works on literary theory, a short catalogue of novel poetic images, and a commentary on al-Ḥarīrī’s (d. 516/1122) \textit{Maqāmāt}.\textsuperscript{576} Traditionally, his death year was set after 666/1276, but evidence from his literary-theoretical work suggests that he lived until the end of the seventh/thirteenth century (see below).

In light of his endeavors in lexicography, literary theory, poetic imagery and poetic (here:


\textsuperscript{576} For a detailed list of eleven works, including \textit{Rawdat al-faṣāḥa}, see Brockelmann, \textit{GAL} 1: 478 and Suppl. 1: 658-59; also al-Ziriklī, \textit{al-A’lam} 6: 279; \textit{Rawda}, 24-31; \textit{Kashf al-zunūn} (citations in previous footnote); Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. Abī al-Qādir al-Rāzī al-Hanafi, \textit{As’īlat al-Qur’ān al-majīd wa-aqībatuḥā}, ed. Ibrāhīm ‘Aṭwa ‘Iwād, Qum: Muḥammad Ṭalī al-Anṣārī, 1970 (originally Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Halabī, 1961), panj-shesh (al-Anṣārī’s introduction), alif-bā’ (‘Iwād’s introduction) (English: ‘Questions and Answers in the Noble Qur’ān’). In the preface to the \textit{As’īla} – a more doctrinally-oriented work – Zayn al-Dīn refers the reader (p. 1) to his more ‘philologically’ exegetical work, the one dedicated to \textit{wuḥū fī al-rāb} and \textit{al-ma’ānī} (here in the general sense of “meanings” – as in the old-fasioned verse-by-verse lexical and syntactic interpretation). This is probably his \textit{Gharīb al-Qur’ān} (wa-rattabat tarīb al-Jawhari [alphabetically according to last radical] ẓammah fīhi shay‘ an min al-rāb wa-l-ma’ānī; \textit{Kashf al-zunūn} 2: 1208 [in Ṭeṣlībī’s words the ma’ānī sound more aligned with the standard ʿilm al-ma’ānī]). Shu’la consulted one manuscript of Zayn al-Dīn’s commentary on the \textit{Maqāmāt}; he says that it contains many lexical and literary-critical explanations, as well as references to his work “\textit{Rawdat al-faṣāḥa} fi ʿilm al-bayān” (\textit{Rawda}, 29-30). Maghānī \textit{al-ma’ānī} is the work on novel poetic images, and it is probably identical to what Brockelmann lists as \textit{Mu’ānī al-ma’ānī} (\textit{GAL} 1: 478). Sallām believes it is equivalent to \textit{Kītab fī al-abyāt allašī yutamaṭhalu bīhā} (‘On Verses that People Cite as Examples’, manuscript form; \textit{Rawda}, 18), but Zayn al-Dīn explicitly refers to verses that are used as quotations and those that are not (Maghānī, 37), so this is perhaps a different work.
maqāma) commentary, his interest in philological and poetic studies could not be overstated. His published work on literary theory, Rawdat al-faṣāha (‘The Garden of Eloquence’), bears witness to his other literary-critical undertakings. First, Zayn al-Dīn refers to his now lost Dawḥat al-balāgha (‘The Great Tree of Eloquence’), which is a study on what he views as the three most important figures of speech – tashbīh, istiʿāra, and tawriya ‘double entendre’ – and their exemplifications in poetry and prose, ancient and modern, eastern and western. He adds that one of the leading poets in constructing beautiful metaphors, both in modern and ancient times, is the Andalusian Ibn Khafāja (d. 533/1138 or 1139), whose exemplar poetry abounds in the Dawḥa.  

Second, in the Rawḍa Zayn al-Dīn hints at his keen interest in the maqāmah. Although he does not refer explicitly to his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī’s Maqāmāt – perhaps it was written after the Rawḍa – the work is replete with an unusual number of illustrations from the maqāma genre, especially compared with other literary-theoretical works.  

Zayn al-Dīn also has a predilection for al-Qāḍī al-Arrajānī (d. 544/1149), whose poetry is the one most cited in his catalogue of

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577 Rawḍa, 88-89, 113, and editor’s introduction, 30-31. One wonders if the imagery of gardens and trees with relation to eloquence (rawḍat al-faṣāha, dawḥat al-balāgha) has anything to do with Ibn Khafāja’s often nature-centered poetry (on which see Magda M. al-Nowaihi, The Poetry of Ibn Khafājah: A Literary Analysis, Studies in Arabic Literature, vol. 16, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993, 14 ff. [quoting also Bürgel]). Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī uses the imagery of food to relate to good speech (adab in his words); see below.

578 Shu’la’s index only cites the first occurrence of each scholar/poet mentioned. For references to al-Ḥarīrī’s Maqāmāt (sometimes also to the commentary by al-Muṭṭarẓī [d. 610/1213]) see Rawḍa, 83, 116, 132, 135, 150, 155-57, 160-61, 166-67, 173, 178-79, 183, 185-86, 188, 190, 192, 195-97, 201-203, 205-207, 209, 215, 217-18, 225-26, 229-30, 235, 242-43, 245, 256, 258-60, 264, 266, 270, 276, 279, 295-96, 298-302, 306, 310. In the last instance (incidentally, the last literary device discussed), al-Ḥarīrī is mentioned under the topic of ihtidhā’, a type of literary influence (the term sariqāt is not used) in which one follows the style of another without taking his wording or motifs: al-Ḥarīrī is given as an example of “writing (wad)’ the maqāmāt due to [the influence of] Bāḍiʿ al-Zamān al-Hamadhānī” (Rawḍa, 310). As expected, many of the illustrations from al-Ḥarīrī have to do with figures of wording (like tajnīs, tasjīʿ), but by no means are they limited to them. The unusual dominance of shawāhid taken from al-Ḥarīrī should probably be understood in the context of al-Muṭṭarẓī, who prefaced his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī’s Maqāmāt with a prolegomenon on literary devices. Al-Muṭṭarẓī relies explicitly on ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī as he refers to him by name; al-Muṭṭarẓī, Sharḥ, f. 2r, 4r. In this sense it is also worthy to note that al-Zamakhshārī himself (another Easterner) wrote a maqāma collection, which according to Abū Mūsā was well-known (al-Balāgha al-Qurʿānīyya fi tafsīr al-Zamakhshārī, 55. It differs from al-Ḥarīrī’s model: see Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, Maqama: A History of a Genre, Diskurse der Arabistik 5, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002, 179 ff., but it does resemble the common maqāma model in its exhortatory character, on which see Ailin Qian, The Maqāmah as Prosimetrum: A Comparative Investigation of its Origin, Form and Structure, PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2012, 167-68).
exemplar images, far more than that of Abū Tammām or al-Mutanabbī, the common luminaries in poetic illustrations.⁵⁷⁹ According to Zayn al-Dīn, no other poet invented as many abstract comparisons (tashbīḥāt ṣaqliyya) as did al-Qāḍī al-Arrajānī.⁵⁸⁰

The Rawḍa also offers some biographical information on Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāżī. First, he was a poet himself and a writer of epistles (rasāʾil), samples of which are cited among the repertoire of shawāhid adduced (not unlike what we find with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr). All of his verses cited are in praise of rulers and high officials, and one of his prose samples describes a scene in a debate-majlis. The verses extol the sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir (II Yūṣuf b. Ḍazī, r. 634-58/1236-60 in Aleppo and 648-58/1250-60 in Damascus), the Aleppo vizier Muʾayyad al-Dīn al-Shaybānī (d. 658/1260), and the sultan al-Malik Najm al-Dīn (Ḡāzī II b. Qara Arslan, r. 693-712/1294-1312 in Mardin, southeast Turkey).⁵⁸¹ This suggests that Zayn al-Dīn held some

⁵⁷⁹ Maghānī, 121(compare 122 for Abū Tammām, 123 for Ibn al-Rūmī [d. 283/896] and 127 for al-Mutanabbī).


⁵⁸¹ Of the eighteen shawāhid of his own writing cited, the majority are poetic citations: six are in praise of al-Malik al-Nāṣir (Rawḍa, 73-74, 83, 137, 141, 290 – said to be recited in 650 AH, 292 – said to be recited in 645 AH), three are in praise of Muʾayyad al-Dīn (ibid., 143, 202, 204), three are in praise of Najm al-Dīn (ibid., 77, 145-46 [prose], 237), one is in praise of either the Ayyūbid or the Artuqid ruler (ibid., 137 [mawlānā al-sultān]), and one is unattributed (ibid., 283 – the line is nevertheless madhī). The epithet mawlānā precedes the mentioning of both sultans. They are mentioned both in all manuscripts used by Shuʿla; Muʾayyad al-Dīn is only mentioned in the “Timūrid manuscript,” probably the earliest of the manuscripts as it lacks several sections on poetic forms appearing at the end of the work (ibid., 292 fn. 2). Information on reign dates can be found in Clifford Edmund Bosworth, The New Islamic Dynasties, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 70-71, 195. For “al-Wazīr al-Qīfī” Muʾayyad al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Yūsuf, vizier of Aleppo and brother of the historian Jamāl al-Dīn and also vizier see Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḍḥmad al-Dhahabī, Tarīkh al-Islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr al-aʿlām, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmūrī, 52 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1988, 48: 335-36; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt, 6 (ed. S. Dedering, 1972): 172, 30 (eds. Benjamin Jokisch and Muḥammad al-Ḥujayrī, 2004): 38. For the prose segments of his own writing that Zayn al-Dīn adduces see Rawḍa, 102, 123, 146 (a description of one Badr al-Dīn in the majlis munāẓara), 147, 153. Dating the authorship of the Rawḍa is not straightforward. Since all references to the patrons indicate that they were in still rule (with phrases such as khallada Allāh dawlatahu, aʿzza Allāh ansārahu, etc.), one concludes that he wrote the work while in Aleppo and later updated it in Mardin, where he supposedly dedicated it to the Artuqid sultan Najm al-Dīn (this dedication according to the catalogue in Dār al-Kutub, Rawḍa, 18, 34). In one manuscript of the work (Rawḍa, 312) the copy date of Sunday, 5 Ramadan 634 is given (corresponding to May 9, 1237), that is, early in al-Malik al-Nāṣir’s rule. (It should be noted that the 5th of Ramadan 634 actually occurred on a Saturday.)
sort of official position in the Ayyūbid court in Aleppo and later in the Artuqid court in Mardin, or he at least enjoyed their patronage. It also suggests that he died after 693/1294, when Ghāzī II came into power, i.e., later than the commonly held date of 666/1276.582

The fact that Zayn al-Dīn was a poet himself may explain his emphatically ‘poetic’ outlook in his small work (mukhtaşar) under discussion, Rawḍat al-faşāha, one that lacks the Qur’ānic perspective that we find in other works on ‘ilm al-bayān.583 For Zayn al-Dīn, ‘ilm al-bayān is situated among the disciplines within ‘ilm al-adab or funūn al-adab (here: the Arabic sciences) and is seen as the most important of these. Several laudatory comments on ‘ilm al-bayān are taken verbatim (probably indirectly) from ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s Dalā’il, in a section where the latter praises ‘the knowledge of clear speech/eloquence’ (‘ilm al-bayān). Parts of this section find their way into the work of Ibn al-Zamilānī and Ibn al-Naqīb.584 Although Zayn al-Dīn admits that one (or some) contemporary scholar refers to the discipline as şinā’at al-badī‘ ‘the craft of rhetorical devices’, he usually refers to the practitioners of the science as ‘ulamā’ ‘ilm al-bayān and to the science itself as ‘ilm al-bayān, sometimes interchanging it with funūn al-balāgha or şanā’i’ al-badī‘.585 The work reads like a usual listing of literary devices,

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582 For the common dates see Shu’la, Rawḍa, 23; al-Ziriklī, al-A’lām 6: 279; van Gelder, “A Good Cause,” 230. Sallām prefers the death year 696 AH, without explanation (Maghānī, 30). Kātip Çelebi states that he died after 660/1262 (Kashf al-zunūn 1: 92) and yet his Gharīb al-Qurʾān is said to have been completed in 668/1269 (or 1270; ibid. 2: 1208). According to the catalogue in Dār al-Kutub (Rawḍa, 18 fn. 2, 34), Zayn al-Dīn wrote the Rawḍa in the name of the sultan Najm al-Dīn b. Qara Arslan Ghāzī II. According to Shu’la and others, the title ‘sultan’ was also given to members of Ottoman ruling families, so Ghāzī II was not ruler yet when Zayn al-Dīn dedicated his verse to him (Rawḍa, 22). The death date I settle on, after 693/1294, is close to Sallām’s unreferenced death year, which I suspect is correct (and wish he explained).

583 Though he does, of course, pay homage to the knowledge of the inimitability of the Qurʾān via ‘ilm al-bayān; Rawḍa, 55. For his self-description of the work as a mukhtašar see 55.2’, 231.

584 Rawḍa, 55 (laysa [...] fann arsakh aşlan wa-absaq far’an wa-aḥlā janan wa-a’dhab wirdan [...]}; Dalā’il, 5-6; al-Tibyān, 32; al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 72-73; and see section on Ibn al-Naqīb below.

and it is implicitly directed at the beginner poet or secretary as most devices are prefaced with the formulaic “that the poet or secretary do [such and such].”

Some sections in the Rawda deal exclusively with poetry, such as poetic forms that rely on visual word play or riddles (muwashshah, murabba’), poetic forms that combine Arabic and Persian verse (mulamma’, tarjama), and the topic of poetic influence (mā yaqa’ bayn al-shu’ārā’). As the foregoing terms show, it would seem that Zayn al-Dīn displays idiosyncratic terminology for certain rhetorical figures. However, since there are precedents for some of these terms in early Persian poetics – in the works of Rādūyānī (active 5th/11th cent.), Rashīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ (d. end of 6th/12th cent.), and Shams-i Qays (fl. first half of 7th/13th cent.) – Zayn al-Dīn’s efforts should be understood within the context of that tradition as well. Zayn al-Dīn

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586 Rawda, 293, 294, 296, 305, 307, respectively. The muwashshah and murabba’ here having nothing to do with the well-known strophic forms called muwashshah and murabba’. Muwashshah is the placing of letters or words in certain positions in the lines which ultimately make up the name of the mamdīh or an adage; the line Zayn al-Dīn adduces is Arabic but the segments make up an expression in Persian (ibid., 293). Murabba’ is a poem that can be read horizontally or vertically (ibid., 294). The two devices are to be understood in a Persian context. Yet a different meaning of form II w.sh.h in a poetic context is the device called tawshīh, which is when the beginning of a verse bears evidence for the listener to guess its final rhyme (Qudāma, Naqd, 96-97; al-ʿAskarī, al-Ṣīnāʾ atayn, 397-99), or according to a different meaning, when every line of a poem can be disjointed at a certain point, leading to another poem with a different meter (al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 3: 216-17). Shams-i Qays uses tawshīh/muwashshah as a cover term for various devices: (1) tawshīh: identical to the tawshīh mentioned by Diyāʾ al-Dīn; (2) muwashshah: identical to the muwashshah in the Rawda (but even more elaborate, and the resulting additions of segments yield sayings in Arabic!); (3) muwashshah: tree-shaped and other geometrically-shaped poems, which also contain an embedded line (visually); (4) tawshīh: poems in “chessboard” shape that can be read horizontally or vertically, seemingly identical to the murabba’ in the Rawda. See Shams-i Qays (Shams al-Dīn Muhammad b. Qays al-Rāzī), al-Muʾjam fi maʿāyīr ashʿār al-ʾajam, ed. Sirus Shamisa, Tehran: Firdaws, 1373 [1994 or 1995], 336-45 (English: ‘A Compendium of the Standards of Persian Poetry’; title translation by N. Chalisova, “Persian Rhetoric: Elm-e Badi’ and Elm-e Bayān,” in J.T.P de Bruijn [ed.], General Introduction to Persian Literature, London: I.B. Tauris, 2009, 139-71, here: 158). On mulamma’ see Nargis Virani, “Mulamma’ in Islamic Literatures,” in Beatrice Gruendler (ed.), with the Assistance of Michael Cooperson, Classical Arabic Humanities in Their Own Terms: Festschrift for Wolfhart Heinrichs on 65th Birthday Presented by his Students and Colleagues, Leiden: Brill, 2008, 291-324, esp. 292, where she says that this device is not found in Arabic literary criticism.

587 See also van Gelder, “A Good Cause,” 230 (where the term taʾkīd covers, inter alia, fantastic aetiology). Another instance may be the figure termed muʾammā: commonly denoting a poetic riddle (or enigmatic poem) both in the Arabic and in the Persian contexts, here the muʾammā refers specifically to a line that contains within it hints of the name of the patron or beloved (Rawda, 305). For the common Arabic understanding (and how it differs from lughz) see Erez Naaman, Literature and Literary People at the Court of al-Šāhīb Ḯn Ṭabābāʾ, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009, 103-105; for the common Persian understanding see Chalisova, “Persian Rhetoric,” 156-57.

588 Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Rādūyānī [sic], Tarjumān al-balāḡa, ed. Ahmed Ateş, Istanbul: İbrahim Horoz
quotes “al-Rashīd al-Watwāt” once, but in a section unrelated to the ‘Persian’ literary devices.\(^{589}\)

No special mention of Diyāʾ al-Dīn is made, but Zayn al-Dīn does cite al-Ghānimī, one of Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s sources.\(^{590}\) Similarly, no mention of ‘standardist’ scholars is made, though we do come across some terms and notions that are associated with the (eventual) standard tradition.

One scholar who is most probably the source of such would-be standard notions is ‘Īzz al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Zanjānī (active 660/1262), who spent most of his scholarly life in the Islamic East. The third part of al-Zanjānī’s literary theoretical work, Miʿyār al-nuẓẓār, displays several structural similarities with the Rawḍa, and it is probably al-Zanjānī who Zayn al-Dīn is referring to in using the term bādī’, since the former uses ‘ilm al-bādī’ as a cover term for “the two sciences of maʿānī and bayān” (an appellation found in al-Zamakhshāri and al-Sakkāki).\(^{591}\) The

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\(^{589}\) Rawḍa, 198, in the section on morphology-based paronomasia (ishtiqaq). Here both al-Muṭarrizī and al-Watwāt are quoted in succession, the first presumably from his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī’s maqāmah, and the second presumably from his Arabic work on poetics (now lost), since the Qurʾānic example he addsuces does not match any of the ones cited in the Hadāyiq (p. 237; but the argument is the same – namely, that ishtiqaq was considered by the specialists as a type of tajnīs). Zayn al-Dīn quotes al-Muṭarrizī on another occasion, also in the context of tajnīs (Rawḍa, 192-93).

\(^{590}\) Rawḍa, 144, 190. A sample of Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s prose is adduced (ibid., 134-35).

\(^{591}\) Abū l-Maʾālī Ḥabīb b. Ibrāhīm al-Kharājī al-Zanjānī, Miʿyār al-nuẓẓār fī ālām al-ashʿār, al-qism al-thālih fī l-bādī’, ed. ‘Abd al-Munʿim Sayyid ‘Abd al-Salām al-Ashqar, Cairo: Matbaa at al-Amānā, 1995, 3 (English: ‘A Standard for the Students of the Poetic Disciplines’). Here, too, remarks on the merit of the science are derived from Abī abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s famous passage (see above). Here, too, many illustrations are provided by al-Ḥarīrī and al-Qānūnī are provided. Al-Zanjānī is author of the more popular al-Taṣrīf al-ʿĪzzi (‘The Morphology [Book] of ‘Īzz al-Dīn’), on which many commentaries were written, the most famous of which is by al-Taftāzānī. See Wolfhart Heinrichs [signed “Eds.”], “al-Zanjānī,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition. Similar to Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī, also much of al-Zanjānī’s life is obscure, including his date of death. He spent some time in Mosul and the last part of his life in Baghdad, where he wrote the Taṣrīf, but most of his life was spent in various cities in the Islamic East (Brockelmann situates him within the scholars of Baghdad; GAL 1: 336-37, Suppl. 1: 497-98). According to al-Ashqar, he wrote the Miʿyār in Bukhara (Miʿyār, editor’s introduction, 33). This may explain al-Zanjānī’s unawareness of the
Miʿyar is devoted to the entirety of poetic disciplines, including metrics and rhyme, but the third part on rhetorical figures seems to have been a source Zayn al-Dīn was familiar with. Metaphor and figurative language are a case in point and will be discussed below. One last work worthy of mention within the ‘standard’-like sphere is al-Zamakhshārī’s Kashshāf, whose possible influence on Zayn al-Dīn’s study of metaphor will also be discussed below.

The Rawḍa opens with brief definitions of near-synonyms that mean ‘eloquence’: faṣāha, balāgha, bayān and ījāz (bayān is said to be close in meaning to faṣāha; balāgha is closely associated with ījāz). Then the ten most noble figures of speech are discussed (ashraf funūn al-balāgha). These are primarily devices concerned with sense: simile/comparison (tashbīh), metaphor (istiʿāra), double entendre (tawriya, also called īhām, takhyīl or mughālaṭa), appropriate complementing [of an image] (tanāsub), emphatic confirmation (taʿkīd, which includes the notion of fantastic aetiology, better known as ḥusn al-taʿlīl), embedded well-known poetic quotation (taḍmīn), and embedded quotation from the revelation (iqtibās). Some of the ten categories are devices concerned with sound: mirror sentences (ʿaks al-jumal), mirror words (qalb) and paronomasia (tajnīs). The remainder of the work is devoted to an array of additional literary devices, both concerned with sense (e.g. antithesis, taḍādd or muṭabaqa; exaggeration, al-ighrāq fī l-ṣifā) and concerned with sound or form (e.g., certain poetic forms called muwashshāḥ, murabbaʿ, musammaṭ and more).

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592 Rawḍa, 57-62. Under one of two ījāz types the example of wa-sʾali l-qarya “ask the city” is adduced (Q 18:82). Ibn al-Zamlakānī counted this as a case of metonymy.

593 Rawḍa, 63-193. Many of these ten categories are further divided into sub-categories (for some reason he refers to them as nine categories in ibid., 193).

594 Ibid., 194-312, and see our discussion of the Persian context, above.
in the book dealing with poetic forms and with poetic influence (mā yaqaʿ bayn al-shuʿʿarāʾ ~“that which is up for grabs for the poets”) was added by Zayn al-Dīn in a later iteration of the work.595 Interestingly, as a clearly poetic work directed at beginner writers of verse or prose, noteworthy is the absence of a chapter on majāz.

4.4. Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298), Introduction to Tafsīr

Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, known as “Ibn al-Naqīb the exegete,” was a Palestinian scholar with origins from Balkh who worked in Mamlūk Cairo and Jerusalem. He was born in Jerusalem, and after moving to Cairo he taught at several madrasas, among them the ʿĀshūriyya, and was associated with the al-Azhar mosque. According to the sources, he was a very well respected scholar and a prominent ūfī. The grammarian Abū ʿAbd Allāh Abū ayyān al-Andalusī (d. 745/1344) and the historian al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) were among his students. Ibn al-Naqīb is known for a single work, an extensive Qurānic commentary said to have combined the works of fifty exegetes and a variety of exegetical material. (It numbered eighty volumes according to one account; seventy according to another; yet ninety-nine according to a third.)596

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595 Ibid., 293-312, which is absent from the early Timūrid manuscript (see ibid., 292, and above). We should mention here a newer edition of the Rawḍa based on a much corrupted manuscript from Chester Beatty; the editor corrects its many errors. This manuscript is even later than the ones Shuʿla used for his edition, as the structure is more developed and additional ‘standard’ terms appear. For instance, all literary devices are numbered – fifty-four in all – and are presented at the outset by the author. Also, a brief note about the disagreement surrounding the definitions of maʿānī, bayān and hādiʿ is given, suggesting that he was now aware of the tripartite terms. Many of the shawāhid are different, including those of his own authoring. Less than a handful of illustrations of his own writing are now adduced and no patron is mentioned. See Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Rāzī, Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa, ed. Khalid ʿAbd al-Raʿūf al-Mabr, Amman: Dār al-Wāil, 2005.

While most of Ibn al-Naqīb’s voluminous tafsīr did not survive, we do have what is believed to be the introduction to that work, formerly known as al-Fawā’id al-mushawwiq ilā ‘ulām al-Qurʾān wa-‘ilm al-bayān and falsely attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350). This introduction is mentioned by Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344) in the preface to his Qur’ānic commentary al-Bahr al-muhīṭ as one of the two most comprehensive works in “‘ilm al-bayān wa-l-badī’,” the other being Ḥāzim al-Qartājānī’s (d. 684/1285) Minhāj al-bulaghā’.

According to Abū Ḥayyān, the work consisted of two volumes and was prefaced to Ibn al-Naqīb’s work on tafsīr. Zakariyya Saʿīd ʿAlī republished the Fawā’id as Muqaddimah tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb after examining a variety of idiosyncratic usages of rhetorical notions in Abū Ḥayyān’s tafsīr that correspond to usages in the alleged Fawā’id, and cross-referenced them with evidence from al-Suyūṭī’s (d. 911/1350) Sharḥ ‘uqūd al-jumān, a rhetorical work within the standard system. Together with evidence from the preface, which contains phraseology

597 See the work republished by Zakariyya Saʿīd ʿAlī in the previous footnote. According to ʿAlī, various sections of the tafsīr remain in manuscript form in Istanbul, Cairo, Rabat, Marrakesh, Tunis and Baghdad (Muqaddima, editor’s introduction, 37-38, and fn. 5 on pp. 38-39). The edition of the original Fawāʾid that I consulted is Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Kitāb al-Fawāʾid al-mushawwiq ilā ‘ulām al-Qurʾān wa-‘ilm al-bayān, Gujranwala: Dār Nashr al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1974 (which is a reprint of the 1909 Cairo edition, ed. Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn al-Nāṣrī).


599 Muqaddima, editor’s introduction, 21-29. ʿAlī also looked at al-Suyūṭī’s al-liqān fī ‘ulām al-Qurʾān for some of his corroborations. The idiosyncratic rhetorical usages include notions such as al-iḥtiyāj al-nazarī, talmīh, tawriyā, and more. Among the other evidence ʿAlī gives for the misattribution of the work to Ibn al-Qayyim and its identification as the introduction to Ibn al-Naqīb’s tafsīr, we may mention (i) none of the biographical entries acknowledge a work by Ibn al-Qayyim titled al-Fawāʿid (Muqaddima, editor’s introduction, 13-14); (ii) Ibn al-Qayyim – a Ḥanbalī – famously rejected the existence of majāz in language, let alone in the Qurʾān, and the alleged Fawāʿid acknowledges a haqqīqa-majāz dichotomy (ibid., 15-17); and (iii) there are respectful references in the work to al-Zamakhshārī, al-Rāzī and Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (whereas elsewhere Ibn al-Qayyim spoke of them unfavorably). It should be mentioned that ʿAlī republished the work under the title Muqaddimah tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb fī ‘ilm al-bayān wa-l-maʿānī wa-l-badī’ wa-iʿjāz al-Qurʾān, but we do not know the exact title of the work.
grounded in the Qur’anic commentary tradition, one is strongly inclined to accept the work as the introduction to Ibn al-Naqīb’s *tafsīr*.600

The subject matter of Ibn al-Naqīb’s *Muqaddima* is unequivocally *ʿilm al-bāyān*. Ibn al-Naqīb dedicates the work to this field and to the various manifestations of it (*ʿilm al-bāyān*) in the Qur’ān, closely aligning himself with the tradition of writings on *bādī’,* or the listing of literary devices.601 Indeed, the appellation of *ʿilm al-bāyān* covers the old *naẓ* and *bādī’* works, as the scholars of this science (*ʿulamāʾ ʿilm al-bāyān*) whose work Ibn al-Naqīb says to have consulted include the early Ibn al-Mu’tazz, Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥātimī (d. 388/998) and Abū Hilāl al-‘Askarī. But *ʿilm al-bāyān* is represented as a science alongside lexicography and grammar, which together with knowledge of the poems, sermons, letters, *rajaz*-metered verse and primitive rhymed prose of the Arabs, constitute the crux of identifying the Qur’ān’s merit.602 According to this account, *ʿilm al-bāyān* is an endeavor distinct from the examination of (*naẓara fī*) the Arabs’ literary repertoire, and is thus afforded a ‘scientific’ status. Recounting a motif we already encountered in the work of Ibn al-Amlakānī and *ayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī* (and originating from al-Urjānī), Ibn al-Naqīb states that no discipline in the Islamic sciences has been abandoned and forgotten like that of *ʿilm al-bāyān*.603 Other *ʿilm al-bāyān* sources Ibn al-Naqīb cites in his

600 Typical commentarial themes include the Qur’ānic “genres” (*amr-naḥy, wa’d-wa’īd, mawāʾīz, qiṣṣas,* etc.) and the unique idiom that makes it inimitable (*Muqaddima*, 6-11). Furthermore, at the end of the work the author provides definitions for the terms Qurʾān, sūra, āya, kalima and harf, a section “which should have been mentioned earlier in the beginning of the book” (ibid., 506).

601 *wa-sanūridu fi kitābinā hādhā usūlan mu’assalatan wa-fawā’ida mufaṣṣalatan min ʿilm l-bayānī wa-mā warada naẓīruhu fi l-Qurʾānī;* ibid., 12. References to *ʿilm al-bāyān* and *ʿulamāʾ/arbāb ʿilm al-bāyān* abound (*ulamāʾ hādhihi l-ṣīnā a also recurs). Examples are ibid., 15.2-3, 20.8, 21.1, 96.4 (*anwāʾ al-bāyān wa-aṣnāf al-bādī’*), 148.9, 166.12, 167.4 (*durūb ʿilm al-bāyān*), 325.3 (note typo), 380.4, 498.3.

602 *wa-innamā yaʿrifu fadla l-Qurʾānī man ʿaraṭa kalāma l-ʿarabī fa-ʿaraṭa ʿilmā l-lughāti wa-ʿilmā l-ʿarabīyyati wa-ʾilma l-bayānī wa-naẓarā fi ashārī l-ʿarabi wa-duḥābīhā wa-muqāwalātihā fi mawāṭīni -fīkhārihā wa-rasāʿ ilhā wa-arājīzihā wa-asjāʿ iḥā […]*; ibid., 12.

preface are the *Mathal* and *Jāmi‘* by ʿDiyā‘ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, *Kitāb al-Badī‘* of Usāma b. Munqidh (d. 584/1188), a work called *Nihāyat al-ta‘mīl fī kashf asrār al-tanzīl* by Ibn al-Zamlakānī (‘Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Anṣārī’), and a work called *al-Tafrīʿ fī ʿilm al-badīʿ* by Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘. The scholar most cited by name in Ibn al-Naqīb’s work is ʿiyā al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr. Others whose imprint in the work is visible are Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (his epitome of al-Urjānī’s works) and ʿĪzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Sulamī (his work on majāz). Their influence will be discussed under the deliberation of majāz.

Ibn al-Naqīb refers to *badī‘* as a science – ‘ʿilm – as well (although, as in the case of Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘, the phrase ‘ilm al-badī‘ does not occur). In an idiosyncratic usage, he claims that *badī‘* as a science refers to the figures of speech pertaining primarily to wording. Accordingly, what follows is a study of literary devices concerned with sound (*bimā yataʿallaqu bi-l-alfāẓ*), whereas the preceding literary devices were concerned with sense (*fīmā yataʿallaqu bi-l-maʿānī*). But even within the section on the aural literary devices, or the so-called study of *badī‘*, the scholarly group Ibn al-Naqīb defers to is ʿulamāʿ ʿilm al-bayān, revealing a de facto prevalence of the heading ‘ilm al-bayān as the framework of study.

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604 *Muqaddima*, 12-15. According to Zakariyyāʿ ʿAlī, the latter is equivalent to *Tahrīr al-taḥbīr*. The title by Ibn al-Zamlakānī is a work of *tafsīr* (ibid., editor’s introduction, 64); it is mentioned by Kātip Çelebi (ibid., 14, fn. 4). Two unknown works by al-Zanjānī (author of the *Miʿyār*) are also cited by Ibn al-Naqīb as sources (and cf. ibid., 14, fn. 3, and editor’s introduction, 60-62). It is noteworthy that Ibn al-Naqīb attributes both the *Jāmi‘* and the *Mathal* to the same person (cf. the common misattribution of the *Jāmi‘* to one of ʿDiyā‘ al-Dīn’s brothers, §4.1).

605 Ibid., 642-43.

606 The definition he provides runs as follows: *wa-l-badī‘u ʿilmun yubḥathu fihi ʿan aḥwāli l-laḥzī l-muʿallaḥī min ḥayṭhu l-yumkkīnu an yu tā bihi illā bi-ḥusnī -niṭāzīnīn “badī‘* is a science in which the states/patterns of words in composition [as opposed to words in isolation] are examined, such that they can only be uttered in a well-ordered fashion” (ibid., 451; *al-Fawā id*, 218). It may seem from this definition that the *laḥz* is a reference to the hypernym ‘word’, which includes both its wording and its meaning (cf. Ibn Sinā’s definition of speech as *al-laḥz al-muʿallaḥ*), but in fact, Ibn al-Naqīb is using *laḥz* here as a hyponym for ‘wording’.


608 E.g., ibid., 498, when discussing *tajnīs* ‘paronomasia’.
The *Muqaddima* is divided into three large sections: the first deals with *majāz* and comprises twenty-four categories; the second deals with conceptual figures of speech (*mā yataʾallaqu bi-l-maʿānī* or *balāgha*) and comprises eighty-four categories; the third deals with aural and rhythmical figures of speech (*mā yataʾallaqu bi-l-alfāẓ* or *faṣāḥa*, specifically identified as *badīʿ*) and comprises twenty-four categories. The figures of speech presented are not limited to those that occur in the Qurʾān (despite the author’s original intention), resulting in a collection not unlike other works on *badīʿ*. Preceding the first section are some prefatory definitions (of *balāgha*, *faṣāḥa*, *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*). Following the last section are several ‘appendices’ that include (i) key definitions of Qurʾānic terms (*Qurʾān*, *sūra*, *āya*, *kalima*, *ḥarf*), (ii) a presentation of the various views on the Qurʾān’s inimitability, and (iii) a brief enumeration of nearly a hundred and twenty categories of “[God’s] address” (*khīṭāb*) found in the Qurʾān. The latter enumeration of *khīṭāb* overlaps, to a certain degree, with *majāz* categories, but it is wider in scope. It is presented as a notion constituting all types of variation and ‘deviation’ in speech (*talwīn al-khīṭāb wa-maʿdūluhu*), with a focus on lexical ‘deviation’ (such as metonymies) and pragmatic ‘deviation’ (such as implicatures). Perhaps it is a testament to the early usage of *majāz* as encompassing all types of non-transparent idiomatic speech.

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609 *Muqaddima*, 17-176, 176-449, 451-505, respectively. Ibn al-Naṣīb states, in error, that the first section comprises eighty-four categories (p. 17), but later the correct number appears (p. 176). On the *balāgha*-faṣāḥa difference see ibid., 20, 451. The aural and rhythmical figures of speech are not devoid of ‘conceptual’ figures. For example, *fakk* (as opposed to *sabk*) refers to a ‘disconnection’ between one hemistich (or parallel member) and another, similar to a parenthetical comment (ibid., 467). Similarly, *al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd* ‘prosification and versification’ (ibid., 468) does not involve pure wording or rhythm.

610 Ibid., 19-25 (prefatory definitions), 506-10 (appended definition), 511-25 (*i jāz al-Qurʾān*), 526-34 (types of *khīṭāb*).

611 Some examples will be given below, §5.4.
Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān b. ‘Abd al-Qawī al-Ṯūfī was an Iraqi scholar from Ṣarṣar who worked primarily in Mamlūk Cairo. He was educated in Baghdad and later in Damascus, where he came in contact with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). Al-Ṯūfī wrote prolifically on a variety of themes, from law, exegesis, theology and interreligious polemics, to Ḥadīth and philology, including literary theory. He is an interesting character in the pre-modern scholarly tradition because he does not fit neatly into usual rubrics of identification: known primarily for his Ḥanbalī affiliation – his view on ṭaṣlaḥa ‘public interest’ being a contentious point – he was also seen as having Shīʿī leanings, an accusation which allegedly caused his imprisonment in Egypt. Prior to his imprisonment, al-Ṯūfī held teaching positions at the Maṇṣūriyya and Nāṣirīyya colleges. Of his notable edited works we may mention the *Commentary on the Christian Scriptures* (recently edited by Lejla Demiri), *Divine Intimations to Doctrinal Investigations* (published by Abū ʿĀṣim Ḥasan b. ‘Abbās b. Quṭb), and *The Banner of Exhilaration on the Science of Disputation* (edited by Wolfhart Heinrichs).

A common thread within al-Ṯūfī’s works is the centrality of Qurʿānic exegesis therein, though not couched in these terms. His *Iṣhārāt al-Ilāhiyya*, noted above, can be described as a

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theological commentary on the Qurʾān, whereby the author goes verse by verse, according to the order of the sūras, explicating doctrinal and legal-theoretical issues. According to al-Ṭūfī, an examination of the Qurʾān within the field of doctrinal theology has gone by the wayside in his times.613 In al-Ṣaʿqa al-ghanābiyya, a defense of the study of Arabic grammar and philology, al-Ṭūfī dedicates the bulk of the work to syntactic analyses of Qurʾānic verses which have a bearing on legal issues.614 His work on disputation, Ṭāfṣīr, or exegesis, directly, in his commentaries on several sūras of the Qurʾān, written during his time in prison.615 In this sense, his work on literary theory titled al-Īkṣīr fī ʿilm al-ṭāfṣīr complements his other engagements with Qurʾānic commentary.617

613 Al-Ṭūfī, al-Iṣḥārāt 1: 206 (wa-innāma ʿadala l-mutaʾ akhkhirūna fī uṣūli l-dīni ʿani - tibārī l-kitābī wa-l-sunna).


615 Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawī b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Saʿīd al-Ṭūfī, Mawāʿid al-ḥays fī fawāʾid Imruʾ al-Qays, ed. Muṣṭafā ʿUlayyān, Amman: Dār al-Bāṣhīr, 1994 (English: ‘Tables Full of Sweets, On the Meaning of [the Poetry of] Imruʾ al-Qays’, following al-Ṭūfī’s explanation of the title, p. 118). Hays is an assortment of bread, butter and candy, and what prompted al-Ṭūfī to use this in the title of his work was – besides rhyme considerations – a piece of Hays that was thrown to him during one of his travels by a group of people on their way to the pilgrimage; it was, he says, the best Hays he ever ate (Mawāʿid, 119). This is not the only connection he makes between food and cultural literacy: in his explanation of the word ḍab – referring, in its technical meaning, to philological knowledge – he says that it derives out of the meaning of ḍab ‘calling people to come and eat’ (al-Ṣaʿqa, 221; in this he follows the traditional etymology, cf. maʿdubah). Following the chapter in this book dealing with segments of Imruʾ al-Qays’s poetry that resemble one another across his oeuvre, al-Ṭūfī says that this exercise “has many benefits” and that he employed it in his (now lost) al-Riyyād al-nawādir fī al-ashbāb wa-l-nawāzīr, “a book of commentary” (wa-huwa kitābī taṭṣīrin); Mawāʿid, 157. In other words, this method in poetic criticism is useful in studying parallels or analogous passages in the Qurʾān.

616 Demiri, Muslim Exegesis, 530. Note too that Brockelmann treats him under the rubric ‘Qorʾānwissenschaften’ (GAL 2: 132, Suppl. 2: 133-34).

617 Al-Ṭūfī Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawī b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Ṣarṣarī al-Baghdādī, al-Īkṣīr fī ʿilm al-ṭāfṣīr, ed. ʿAbd al-
Al-Ṭūfī’s interest in the philological studies went beyond their application to exegesis. In addition to the Iḵsīr and his work on Imru’ al-Qays, al-Ṭūfī also authored a commentary on al-Ḥaḍīrī’s Maqāmāt and a work on poetics. The latter, titled al-Shīʿ ār ʿalā mukhtār al-ashʿār ~“The Distinguishing Token on the Best Poems Spoken,” is a work of pure poetic criticism and it seems to have been an early work by al-Ṭūfī.618

As its title suggests, the Iḵsīr purports to deal directly with the discipline and rules of exegesis (ʿilm al-tafsīr, ʿilm al-Kitāb, qawāʿid al-tafsīr).619 The difficulty of the science of tafsīr, says al-Ṭūfī in the opening of the work, is something that has preoccupied him for some time. Having found that the authors of exegetical works did not consentaneously attend to this issue, he set out to lay down a rule (qānūn) that one could go by and rely on when writing a work of tafsīr.620 He precedes this undertaking with a detailed critique of the historical development of exegetical practices, one that resulted in a haphazard and subjective scholarly endeavor (kathura al-dakhal fī al-tafsīr; taṣrīḥ kathīr min al-mufassirīn bi-nisbat aqwālihim ilā anfusihim).621 Interestingly, however, the crux of al-Ṭūfī’s efforts lies within the study of stylistics, that is, outside the exegetical practice proper. The awaited qānūn that he so forcefully speaks about is in

Qādir Husayn, Cairo: Maktabat al-Ḏābi wa-Maṭbaʿatuḥā, 1977 (English: ‘An Elixir in the Science of Tafsīr’). We do not know when the work was composed. According to Demiri, the book treats “the importance and role of linguistics in Qur’ānic exegesis” (Muslim Exegesis, 529). She continues (ibid., parentheses hers): “It also reflects upon the literary (faṣāḥa and balāgha) and stylistic features (ṭanāb and taqdīm-taʾkhīr) of the Qurʾān.”

618 For his Maqāmāt commentary see Kâtip Çelebi, Kashf al-zunūn 2: 1790; Demiri, Muslim Exegesis, 534. For his work on poetics see al-Iṣḥārāt, editor’s introduction 1: 142-43; Demiri, Muslim Exegesis, 531. The work was recently edited, based on a unicum in Beyazit State Library: Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawāl al-Ṭūfī, al-Shīʿ ār ʿalā mukhtār naqd al-ashʿār, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Nāṣīr al-Mānī’, Riyadh: Jāmiʿat al-Malik Saʿūd, Kursī al-Duktūr ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz al-Mānī’ li-Dirāsāt al-Lughā al-ʿArabiyya wa-ʿAbūlībāhā, 2011. It became available to me at the very final stages of writing, and I was unable to incorporate it here.

619 Al-Iḵsīr, 1, where all three terms appear. Demiri lists the work as al-Iḵsīr fī qawāʿid al-tafsīr (Muslim Exegesis, 529).

620 Al-Iḵsīr, 1, 11, 16.

621 Ibid., 6-11, 15-16, 25-27 (the quotes are taken from p. 6 and p. 9: “much disorder has taken place in exegesis”; “the fact that many exegetes explicitly attribute their opinions to themselves”).
fact marginalized in favor of rhetorical and literary-theoretical issues, which constitute the bulk of the work – a close reworking of Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn’s al-Jāmi’  al-kabīr, which is highly praised by al-Ṭūfī at the outset. 622 When it is discussed, the qānūn does not quite present a neat methodology for the exegete, and judging by al-Ṭūfī’s account, it may well explain the alleged lawlessness in the field. 623 The rule goes as follows: whenever the divine discourse is not plainly understood (bayyin bi-nafsihi, al-mafhūm), one must have recourse to interpretation relying either on an irrefutable rational proof, an abundantly-transmitted prophetic report, a scholarly consensus, or a solitary report that is sound. 624 Things become less clear-cut, however, when none of these measures are applicable. In this case, it must be examined whether weaker evidence may corroborate ‘what is understood’ (al-mafhūm, mā fuhima) from the plain wording or from the implied meanings of the wording – here terminology from legal theory is employed – even if this leads to multiple meanings of the text. Al-Ṭūfī’s assertion, according to which all meanings in this case would be plausible, stands somewhat at odds with his earlier critique of the multiplicity of exegetical opinions. To be sure, emphasis is put on interpretation of the lafẓ ‘wording’, as long as it accords with a plausible intention of the speaker (murād, irāda) – that is, God’s intention. 625


623 The explanation of the qānūn runs several paragraphs; see al-Iksīr, 11-14.

624 Ibid., 11. This puts al-Ṭūfī add odds with the exegetical project espoused by Ibn Taymiyya and, indeed, points to the marginality of the so-called al-tafsīr bi-l-mā’thur (exegesis based on the words of the Prophet-companions-successors) even within Ḣanbāli circles. On the marginal place of the latter in tafsīr (but its infiltration, nevertheless, into Western academic scholarship) see the important study by Walid Saleh, “Preliminary Remarks on the Historiography of tafsīr in Arabic: A History of the Book Approach,” Journal of Qur’ānic Studies 12 (2010), 6-40.

625 Ibid., 12-13. Here he gives several examples of verses which allow more than one interpretation, glossed yafūzu ‘permissible’. He calls this ihtimāl al-lafẓ li-l-wujūh al-muta’addida “an utterance/wording allowing several meanings” (ibid., 13.10), and the rationale behind it is explained thus: wa-hīna’ idhīn yafuṣu l-tavassulu ilā l-murādi l-muta ʾayyani bi-ṭarīqin qawiyyin rājihin mina l-ṭuruqi l-mutaqaddimi dhikruhā aw ghayrihā in amkana wa-in lam...
The insistence on a plausible interpretation of plain *lafz* is perhaps the one clear connecting point between the aim of the work and its actual focus, namely, stylistic matters. The study of literary-critical topics is referred to as ‘*ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān* and ‘*ilm al-bayān* interchangeably. The former – ‘*ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān* – is the nomenclature of al-Sakkākī and others following him in the Islamic East (like al-Zanjānī); there is no direct imprint of al-Sakkākī. The latter – ‘*ilm al-bayān* – is undoubtedly taken from Diyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr’s *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, a work al-Ṭūfī praises as the best treatise written on the topic, and one he follows closely in the structuring of the *Iksīr*.626 The practitioners of the field are referred to as ‘*ulamāʾ al-bayān* (not quotations from Diyāʾ al-Dīn).627 The phrase ‘*ulamāʾ al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān* does not occur. When discussing the virtue of studying this field, he attends solely to the etymology and noble citations of the word *bayān*, disregarding the word *maʾānī* (even though he earlier provides a definition of *maʾānī* in the phrase ‘*ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān*’).628

And yet, al-Ṭūfī is aware of emerging ‘standard’ notions. In passing, he acknowledges

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626 For ‘*ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān* see e.g., al-Iksīr, 22.3, 29.2 (cf. editor’s fn. 1), 31.7. For ‘*ilm al-bayān* see e.g., 37.1-2, 42.8, 42.13-15, 62.14-15, 97.12 (‘*ilm al-bayān wa-l-balāgha*), 109.2. With regards to ‘*ilm al-bayān* it should be noted that these instances (besides, perhaps, 109.2) are not a quotation from Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s work but are rather clearly al-Ṭūfī’s own words. Interestingly, when he speaks of Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s work, he says it is the best one written on the topic of ‘*ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān* (p. 29). Clearly these headings are used interchangeably.

627 *Al-Iksīr*, 41.3, 37.1-2 (arbāb hādhā l-‘*ilm*, referring to ‘*ilm al-bayān*).

628 Ibid., 34-38. For the definitions of ‘*ilm*, maʾānī and *bayān* see pp. 30-31.
‘ilm al-maʾānī separately as a—seemingly—functional-syntactic science that characterized the exegetical works of al-Zajjāj (d. 311/923), al-Farrāʾ (d. 207/822 or 208/823) and al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), along with syntax and morphology. Similarly, his ‘philosophical’ definition of the science carries a somewhat functional-syntactic tone, as he speaks of the functions (ahkām) of alfāz and maʾānī and exemplifies his definition with an instance of change in word order (taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr), a topic later treated within the standard ‘ilm al-maʾānī. But when discussing maʾānī as the (philosophical) ‘matter’ of the field (mawḍūʿ), he claims it includes all of its non-essential attributes (ʿawārid), going beyond the confines of functional syntax: in addition to change in word order, elision, brevity and prolixity—topics we later find in the standard section of ‘ilm al-maʾānī—he also includes kināya ‘periphrasis’ and alghāz ‘riddles’, topics later subsumed under ‘ilm al-bayān or ‘ilm al-badīʿ. The non-philosophical definition of ‘ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān is much broader and speaks of a science that is concerned with verbal expressions ( alfāz) and making intentions (murād) clear using expressions. In other words, despite the affiliation the phrase ‘ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān has with the emerging standard theory, in al-Ṭūfī’s work it is markedly non-standard. What is more, the contents of the book are arranged in accordance with the structure of Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr (similarly found in his al-Mathal al-sāʾir). This includes sections such as the tools of composition (ālāt al-taʾlīf), methods of learning composition (al-ṭarīq ilā maʿrifat al-taʾlīf), and the merits of prose

629 Ibid., 25. Interestingly, he claims that most of the later exegetical works are based on the verbal sciences, which include lexicography (or knowledge of rare words, gharīb), syntax, morphology and variant readings of the Qurʾān (qirāʾāt).

630 Ibid., 32-33.

631 Ibid., 32. It is probably wrong altogether to speak of the standard notion in this context because at this stage things were not yet clear cut, and al-Ṭūfī reflects this. My point is to show that his use of ‘ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān should not be read as a ‘standard’ appellation.

632 Ibid., 31 (fa-maʾānī qawlinā ‘ilmu l-maʾānī wa-l-bayānī l-ʿilm l-murādu bi-l-alfāzī wa-izhārī l-murādī biḥā).
over poetry.\textsuperscript{633}

The study of ‘ilm al-bayān forms the third part (al-qism al-thālith) of al-Ţūfī’s Iksīr,\textsuperscript{634} which is the most voluminous in the book (the first two sections run twenty-eight pages in the printed edition; the book is over three hundred and thirty pages long). This third part is divided into an introduction and two divisions (sg. jumla), the first division dealing with general principles (aḥkām) of ‘ilm al-bayān and the second with particular ones, following Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn’s structure in the Jāmiʿ (who named his divisions quṭb). The introduction, however, is al-Ţūfī’s own prolegomenon. It includes three points (sg. baḥth), the first on definitions, the second on the virtue of the field via a discussion of the merits of bayān ‘fine speech’, and the third – which lacks a title – on the existence of an ‘appropriate necessitating [element/entity]’ (muqtadīn munāsib) that makes a certain speech (kalām) specific, or particular (ikhtiṣāṣ, takhṣīṣ) to a certain context.\textsuperscript{635} It is on this last point (al-baḥth al-thālith) which we shall dwell in a moment.

First we must reiterate the fact that no clear explanation is provided for treating ‘ilm (al-maʿānī wa-) al-bayān in a work on meta-tafsīr or ‘ilm al-Qurʾān.\textsuperscript{636} ‘Ilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān is cited as the last out of twelve sciences which the Qurʾān – or knowledge of the Qurʾān, or science of the Qurʾān – is said to encompass.\textsuperscript{637} Besides the proverbial li-kawnihi min anfās ‘ulūm al-Qurʾān “since it is the most valuable of Qurʾānic sciences,” no compelling argument is

\textsuperscript{633} Ibid., 44 ff., 59 ff. and 100 ff., respectively. It should be noted that the definitions al-Ţūfī provides are his own (i.e., not taken from Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn).

\textsuperscript{634} Ibid., 29 ff.

\textsuperscript{635} Ibid., 30-33 (al-baḥth al-awwal), 34-38 (al-baḥth al-thānī), 39-43 (al-baḥth al-thālith).

\textsuperscript{636} The phrase ‘ilm al-Qurʾān appears, e.g., in ibid., 18.5\textsuperscript{e}, 27.12.

\textsuperscript{637} In al-Iksīr, 17.2, it is said that the Qurʾān encompasses these sciences, and in 18.5\textsuperscript{e} ‘ilm al-Qurʾān is used – which would probably mean here ‘knowledge of the Qurʾān’, although ‘science of the Qurʾān’ is also possible. Al-Ţūfī later states (ibid., 25) that these are the sciences that the exegete (mufassār) should know.
provided for singling it out in the *Iksīr*.\(^{638}\) One suspects he was aware of al-Zamakhshārī’s use of these headings in his commentary *al-Kashshāf* (see Part One, §3.2). The sciences al-Ṭūfī lists are characterized as being either verbal (*lafẓ*) or non-verbal (*ma’nawī* ‘mental’) in nature. We alluded above to the high regard he pays to the interpretation of the text’s *lafẓ* as a possible explanation for focusing on ‘ilm al-bayān. And yet, oddly, ‘ilm al-bayān is enumerated among the non-verbal (*ma’nawī*) sciences, alongside disciplines such as physics (*ʿilm wujūdī*), history and legal theory!\(^{639}\) What is more, from his characterization of the exegetical works of al-Zājīj, al-Farrāʾ and al-Zamakhshārī (see above), it would seem that ‘ilm al-*maʿānī* is actually seen as a verbal science.\(^{640}\)

Greater clues for the relevance of ‘ilm al-bayān to Qur’ānic exegesis, and for the very nature of ‘ilm al-bayān itself, are found almost in passing toward the end of *al-baḥth al-thānī* and within *al-baḥth al-thālith*, once again, preceding the beginning of the study of ‘ilm al-bayān proper. In these contexts only ‘ilm al-bayān is used (not ‘ilm al-*maʿānī* wa-l-bayān). The first comment of interest is al-Ṭūfī’s claim that the Qur’ān came down “according to the rule (*qānūn*) of ‘ilm al-bayān.”\(^{641}\) In a later, slightly modified remark, he states that the Qur’ān is “based on the utmost level of ‘ilm al-bayān.”\(^{642}\) Here the phrase ‘ilm al-bayān is not so much used as a referent to a body of knowledge as it is to a force of nature. It would be inappropriate, in this

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\(^{638}\) Ibid., 29. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the science dealt with in the *Iksīr* as ‘ilm al-bayān, especially since it is more commonly used in the *Iksīr* (and not as quotations from Diyyāʾ al-Dīn, see above).

\(^{639}\) Ibid., 18-22. Al-Ṭūfī clarifies that by ‘verbal’ versus ‘mental’ he means that the former is mediated by linguistic expression (*lafẓ*), whereas the latter is not (p. 27).

\(^{640}\) ‘ilm al-*maʿānī* is enumerated among the *ahkām lughawīya* ‘linguistic functions’ alongside syntax and morphology (ibid., 25).

\(^{641}\) *Al-Iksīr*, 37.1-2* (nazala ’alā wafq qānūn ’ilm al-bayān).

\(^{642}\) Ibid., 42.13 (*...al-Qurʾān al-mutawaqqif* ’alā aqṣā marātib ’ilm al-bayān).
context, to separate 'ilm as ‘science’ from bayān; instead, 'ilm al-bayān as a whole seems to refer to ‘fine speech’ as an observable phenomenon and could be interchanged with the single notion of bayān. And yet in that same context al-Ṭūfī references the masters of this science (arbāb hādhā al- 'ilm). Beyond the terminological inconsistency, this demonstrates to what extent the notion of bayān and 'ilm al-bayān have become recognized as a rational affair, rather than a textually-transmitted knowledge, a development we associate with Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s effort (see Part One, §1.1).

The second point to be made, gleaned out of his al-baḥṭh al-thālith, is al-Ṭūfī’s implicit identification of 'ilm al-bayān with the process of finding a cause for a specific linguistic choice. According to al-Ṭūfī, any particular way of speaking appearing in a certain context (takhṣīṣ, ikhtiṣāṣ) is due to an appropriate necessitating element/entity (muqtaḍīn munāsib). This holds true for Qur’ānic speech and for regular speech alike (wurūd al-kalām Qur’ān kāna aw ghayrah; the latter also: kalām al-ādamiyyīn). Were it not that a particular characteristic (pl. aḥwāl) of speech – such as change in word order, prolixity, elision, etc. – was singled out for a certain context due to such a necessitating element, that would result in choosing one explanation for that particularity over another without sufficient cause (a process termed tarjīḥ min ghayr murajjiḥ lit. “preferring [one option] without something to make [that option] preferred”). The term muqtaḍīn munāsib is correlated with the legal notion of 'illa and may thus be reduced to the

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643 ṭā khilāfa anna l-Qurʾāna nazala ‘alā wafqi ‘ilmī l-bayānī bal arbābī hādhā l-‘ilmī kamalūhu mina l-Qurʾānī “there is no dispute that the Qurʾān came down according to the rule of good speech; in fact the masters of this field ('ilm al-bayān) complemented it from the Qurʾān” (ibid., 37.1-2). Al-Ṭūfī uses 'ilm al-bayān first as a denotation of bayān ‘good speech’ and second as a denotation of the field of studying good speech.

644 Ibid., 39-43.

645 Ibid., 39, 42.

646 Usually translated in modern scholarship as “preponderance without a preponderator” and sometimes compared to Leibniz’s “principle of sufficient reason.”
notion of ‘cause’. The entire section (baḥth) is devoted to proving the existence of a muqtaḍīn munāsib (exhibiting, in the process, his mastery of the art of disputation). At one point he even makes the claim, when refuting an objection from an imagined opponent, that determining the question of taʿlīl al-afʿāl ‘whether God’s actions have a reason’ is ultimately based on the study of ʿilm al-bayān, endowing the discipline with doctrinal importance.

It is here that we find the starkest tension between al-Ṭūfī’s conception of ʿilm al-bayān as a hermeneutical endeavor and his conception of it as a literary one. On one hand, ʿilm al-bayān is seen as venue through which one may determine the exact reason (muqtaḍīn munāsib) of God’s choice of words in any given verse, an undertaking that the exegete is most likely to engage in. This endeavor is similar to but distinct from the question of iʿjāz al-Qurʾān ‘the Qur’ān’s inimitability’. On the other hand, he stresses on several occasions that his undertaking concerns “speech in general” (muṭlaq al-kalām) and “the speech of humans” (kalām al-ādamiyyīn), and he predicates the entire book on the work of a scholar (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn) whose primary interest was literary composition. These tensions are emblematic of ʿilm al-bayān as a whole, as it developed in the period of the seventh/thirteenth century and in the locale of the

Ibid., 40-41.

648 taʿlīl al-afʿāl mabniyy ʿalā ʿilm al-bayān bi-l-wasāʾit al-madhkūra; ibid., 42. The argument goes as follows: in order to study God’s actions, one must first look at His essence; in order to study His essence, one must study the revealed law (sharʿ); in order to do that, one must study the miracle (muʿjiz); in order to do that, one must study Qurʾān, which is the miracle; and in order to do that one must study ‘ilm al-bayān. The common Ashʿarī position regarding the question of taʿlīl al-afʿāl is that God’s actions cannot have a reason. This is in opposition to the Muʿtaṣibī stance, which holds that His actions are in fact caused by a reason (muʿallala), a view shared by the Ḥanbalīs. On this question see Fakhir al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Ahmad Hijāzī al-Saqqā, 2 vols., Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyāt al-Azhariyya, 1989, 1: 350-54; al-Rāzī ascribes the view in support of taʿlīl not only to the Muʿtaṣibī but also to “most of the recent legal theorists” (akthar al-mutaʿ akhkhīrin min al-fuqahāʾ; p. 350).

649 Some discussion of iʿjāz may be found within the deliberation of the merits of prose over poetry (al-Ikṣīr, 100-101). But al-Ṭūfī does not set out to prove the miraculous nature of the Qurʾān the way earlier literary scholars did; he does not even devote a section to addressing its various explanations.

wa-lā shakka annā rattabnā l-baḥthā fī muṭlaqī l-kalāmī lā fī khusūṣi kawnihī Qurʾān “there is no doubt that we put together the study in [reference to] speech in general, not in its being specifically Qurʾān (al-Ikṣīr, 42.2:35). See also ibid., 39.2 (… wurūd al-kalām Qurʾānī kāna aw ghayrahu), and above.
Arabic East. And yet, among the scholars we are studying, al-Ṭūfī is the closest one to approach ‘ilm al-bayān from a standpoint of hermeneutics. This comes across in his analysis of majāz.
Chapter 5:
*Majāz* in Literary Theory Revisited

**Preliminaries**

As a technical term in classical Arabic literary theory, *majāz* was an innovation. When it first appeared in literary theoretical writings in the course of the fourth/tenth century, it was used inconsistently and – mostly – in passing. It was only in the fifth/eleventh century, with the works of Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1065) in the West and ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081) in the East that we may speak of the integration of the concept of *majāz* into the field of literary theory. After that, *majāz* became a common component in literary writings, referring roughly to figurative language. Thanks to the work of Wolfhart Heinrichs, our knowledge of the early development of the concept, especially before it entered the field of literary theory, is quite firm, and we also know quite a bit about al-Jurjānī’s conception of the notion, especially as it was channeled via later scholars (al-Sakkākī, al-Qazwīnī). But within literary theory proper, the implicit wisdom is that “the potential of the *majāz* theory” was never realized in a meaningful way beyond the achievements of al-Jurjānī. Our aim in this chapter is to revisit the integration of

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651 One could debate whether al-Jurjānī should be treated here at all given that his disciplinary affiliations do not align with literary theory (see Part One, §3.2, but cf. Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 227-28). On the occurrences of *majāz* in early literary theory see Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 270-76. He ends with al-Jurjānī but does not mention Ibn Rashīq in this context (a contemporary of al-Jurjānī in the Islamic West), which is surprising given that the two reached a few similar results (Ibn Rashīq in a far more cursory way), and Heinrichs is well aware of Ibn Rashīq’s views on *majāz* (*Hand of the Northwind*, 48-49). There is also the work of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (early fifth/eleventh century), but when he uses the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* pairing he does so in the theological-hermeneutical sense and in the lexicographical sense (using *istiʿāra* as well), less in the literary context (see below). Similar is the case of Ibn Sinān al-Khaṭāfī (fifth/eleventh century), who uses *majāz* in the lexicographical sense of the word.

652 And yet, even in a later work such as Usāma b. Munqidh’s (d. 584/1188) *al-Badīʿ fi naqd al-shiʿr*, eds. Aḥmad Aḥmad Badawī and Ḥāmid ʿAbd al-Majīd, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1960, there is no mention of *majāz*. The issue of the marginality of *majāz* in literary theory is discussed in §5.3.

653 The quote is taken from Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 271, who is referring here to the use of *majāz* in literary theory prior to al-Jurjānī, but I think it is a fair assessment of the state of the research with regards to *majāz* in literary theory in general. See also Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 140.
majāz into literary theory by focusing on its understanding within the works of ḩilm al-bayān.

We find that despite the growing dissemination of ‘Jurjānian’ notions, majāz in this time and place was not quite a reflection of al-Jurjānī’s thought and that early ideas about the concept in literary theory continued to prevail. What emerges is a different theory of majāz in literary theory proper, one that was not explicitly defined but nevertheless posed a viable alternative to the theories of al-Jurjānī.

Before the term majāz entered the field of literary theory in the fourth/tenth century, it was used in old philological exegesis of the Qur’ān, in Muʿtazilī theological circles, and in the realm of lexicography. In old philological exegesis – Abū ʿUbayda’s (d. 209/824) Majāz al-Qurʾān is the clear example here – majāz was not set in opposition to ḥaqīqa and it did not (usually) refer to the utterance itself but rather to its explanation (“its majāz is so-and-so”). It was thus akin to maʾnā, taqdim, taftīr and taʾwil. The Qur’ānic utterances that “had” a majāz displayed ‘irregularities’ and ‘oddities’ that disrupted the one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning. But these disruptions were primarily of a grammatical nature, and it was rare to encounter figurative language among those majāz phenomena. Majāz is best translated here as ‘rewording’ or ‘meaning’. Muʿtazilī theologians introduced the innovation of ḥaqīqa ‘literal

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654 For a thorough study of the first two uses of majāz see Heinrichs, “Genesis” and idem, “Contacts.”

655 Fuat Sezgin, Majāz al-Qurʾān, editor’s introduction, 18-19; Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 117-29, esp. 124, 128. Almagor situates the use of majāz here within the literature of maʾānī al-Qurʾān (“Early,” 263 [307]). For examples in which majāz referred to the utterance itself and not its explanation, or it could be taken either way (like: majāz al-Qurʾān!), see Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 119, 125-28 (Heinrichs and Almagor disagree on this point).

656 Thus, in Q 41:11 “[God addressing heaven and earth:] Come willingly or unwillingly! They (f. dual) said: we come willingly (m. pl.),” Abū ʿUbayda is concerned with heaven and earth speaking first in the feminine dual and then in masculine plural, but not with the fact that they are speaking in the first place! (see Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 119-20). Many of these oddities find their way into Ibn Fāris’ al-Šāhibī and al-Thaʾlibī’s Fiqh al-lugha, under the rubric of sunan al-ʿarab “the way Arabs talk” (lit. “[linguistic] habits of the Arabs”; see Part One, “The Philological Sense(s) of Bayān”).

657 Or in Udo Simon’s words, “Majāz in this context stands for ‘another way to say it’” (Udo Simon, “Majāz,” Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics, Brill Online. Note, however, that majāz is not “predominantly
speech’ as a counterpart to majāz. Now majāz applied to the utterance itself and referred mostly to figurative speech, as a tool to explain anthropomorphic language in the Qur’ān concerning God (like His sitting on a throne). It seems that in the early stages of this usage, theologians/philosophers like al-Kindī (d. 256/873) and al-Nāshi’ al-Akbar (d. 293/906) used the ḥaqīqa-majāz dyad in the realm of reality/ontological truth (the original meaning of ḥaqīqa), not in the realm of language: the ‘true’ existence (that of God) was contrasted with the ‘derivative’ one (that of mankind), not the literal with the figurative as it would eventually be used.659 In the realm of lexicography, majāz again was not set in opposition to ḥaqīqa: it referred to idiomatic expressions, but unlike the old Abū ʿUbaydan utterances, these were limited to the lexicon, not grammar.660 They covered what we would identify today as conceptual metaphors, dead

658 Non-figurative categories listed under majāz in the theological context, as well as in legal theory, have been commonly understood to be a relic of the old philological-hermeneutical usage. Thus, ellipsis (ḥadīf) and pleonasm (ziyāda) are not, strictly speaking, figurative, although in the case of ellipsis the expressions could also be explained by way of figurative usage. The famous example is Q 12: 82 “ask the town”: if understood as ḥadīf, an elided ahl ‘people’ (of the town) is restored; if understood as majāz, the word “town” is taken figuratively to mean, by way of metonymy, its people (Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 258-66). There is a parallel tendency in modern Western scholarship: “Some linguists argue that m[etonymy] and synecdoche can often be understood as nonfigurative expressions that result from verbal deletions intended to reduce redundancy” (Wallace Martin, “Metonymy,” The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

659 For al-Nāshi’ al-Akbar see Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 136-37; “Contacts,” 256-57. Al-Kindī uses majāz both in a linguistic and in an ontological way in his brief epistle on the “real doer” (al-fā’il al-ḥaqīq) versus the “doer by extension” (al-fā’il... alladhī huwa bi-l-majāz). When bi-l-majāz is contrasted with al-ḥaqīq/bi-l-ḥaqīqa (real doer/doer by extension), he seems to refer to reality: only God, he says, is a real doer, whereas human doers do not actually “do” (and later: that their “action” is not an action in reality). But he also uses majāz explicitly on the level of language when he states that all doers “are named ‘doers’ by extension” (emphasis added; tusammā fā ilātin bi-l-majāz). See Risālat al-Kindī fī fā’il al-ḥaqīq al-awwal al-tāmm wa-l-fā’il al-nāqiṣ alladhī huwa bi-l-majāz, in Roshdi Rashed and Jean Jolivet (eds. and trans.), Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d’al-Kindī, vol. 2: Metaphysique et cosmologie, Leiden: Brill, 1998, 169-171. See also Vishanoff, Formation, 22, on a similar take by al-Ash’arī (d. 324/936). The ontological understanding of ḥaqīqa-majāz is later reflected in Sufi thinking and in the famous adage, al-majāzu qanṭaratu l-ḥaqīqa “the ‘figurative’ is the bridge towards the ‘proper’,” i.e., “the world is the bridge to the Divine” (Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 257), to be discussed later in Ahmed, What Is Islam?, 393-97 (also Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Paired Metaphors in Muḥdath Poetry,” Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies 1 [1986], 1-22, here: 17).

660 Thus, instead of speaking of “idiomatic expressions” in the context of Abū ʿUbayda the way Heinrichs does, I would prefer “linguistic inconsistencies/anomalies/ambiguities.” In the lexicographical context majāz referred to the utterances themselves, not their explanation.
metaphors, metonymies, and idiomatic sayings; in other words, they displayed figurative language.\textsuperscript{661} Moreover, they all found their way into the dictionaries, either as regular entries or under special headings (majāz, istiʿāra/mustaʿār, even kināya), but either way they were conceived of as part of the Arabic lexicon.\textsuperscript{662} Unlike the majāz of the theologians, these idiomatic lexical expressions did not have, and could not be reworded into, a counterpart ḥaqīqa: they were, to use the later terms, themselves part of ḥaqīqa.\textsuperscript{663} Majāz is best rendered here as ‘lexical semantic extension’ (and at times, ‘conceptual metaphor’).\textsuperscript{664}

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\textsuperscript{661} This could serve as an important link between the old non-figurative meaning of majāz and the new figurative meaning found in theology and legal theory. Heinrichs pondered over what could account for the shrinking in meaning of majāz to “metaphorical language,” and his hypothesis in “Genesis,” 139, still does not explain it. Of course, historically, the lexicographical use of majāz could have, and very well may have, postdated the theological one. It is of note that already al-Kalbī (d. 146/763) mentions the ḥaqīqa-majāz dichotomy at the outset of his Qur’ānic exegesis (though not in the body of his work; see Kees Versteegh, Arabic Grammar and Qur’ānic Exegesis in Early Islam, Leiden: Brill, 1993, 106, 122, quoted in Simon, “Majāz”), meaning that the use of majāz as a reference to some form of figurative speech (perhaps in this lexicographical sense, despite the counterpart ḥaqīqa?) was known early on, even before the time of Abū ʿUbayda (this would change the historical narrative laid out by Ibn Taymiyya). Versteegh thinks that majāz by al-Kalbī included the category of muqaddam wa-muʾākhkhar (Grammar and Exegesis, 106), but this assessment is purely anachronistic. On the authenticity of early tafsīrs see ibid., 41-62, but according to Gilliot, the tafsīr of al-Kalbī “demeure énigmatique” (Claude Gilliot, “Cornelis H.M. Versteegh, Arabic Grammar and Qur’ānic Exegesis in Early Islam [Review],” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 146.1 [1996], 207-211, here: 210).

\textsuperscript{662} My analysis is based on an examination of Ibn Durayd’s Jamharat al-lughā, al-Zamakhsharī’s Asās al-balāgha, al-Thaʿālibī’s Fiqh al-lugha, and Ibn Manẓūr’s Lisān al-‘arab (the last as a “control” text). Of course many other sources corroborate my conclusion. For instance, it seems that al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (fl. ≤ 409/1018) uses majāz in this sense, at least in his dictionary; see Key, Linguistic Frame of Mind, 131-32 (and see Baalbakī, below). Ibn Sinān al-Khaḍāfī also has this meaning of majāz in mind when he speaks of it within the various categorizations of the Arabic lexicon (Sīr, 34, 100; he uses the word kalām in this context, but also lugha and alfāz ‘words’). Even the early al-Jāḥiẓ, who uses majāz in several distinct senses, may employ the term to refer to conceptual metaphors and idiomatic sayings that are part of the lexicon (see the examples cited in Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 134). The fact that scholars like al-Rāghib and al-Khaḍāfī employ the term ḥaqīqa in their discursive pronouncements, even though majāz in this sense has no equivalent ḥaqīqa, bears witness to the influence that the theological understanding of the term had on adjacent fields, especially in cases like metonymies and conceptual verb metaphors where one could easily postulate a ḥaqīqa. We say above that all of the aforementioned idioms were conceived of as part of the lexicon, but it should be stressed that scholars recognized that the lexicon was two-tiered: the primordial vocabulary, and the fully-established conventional vocabulary (e.g., first yad referred to the human body part, then it referred to ‘favor’ or ‘power’, which is carried out via one’s hand). Phrases that point to this two-tier aspect are ašl, “[X=Y] thumma qīla [X],” “[X] min [X],” and they are preserved in ‘ordinary’ dictionaries as well.

\textsuperscript{663} Metonymies and conceptual metaphors probably formed the most important tangent point between the theological understanding of majāz and the lexical one, because they could easily be said to have a ḥaqīqa. See also the early occurrence of the dyad ḥaqīqa-majāz in the exegesis of al-Kalbī, fn. 661.

\textsuperscript{664} On semantic extension from a modern perspective applied mostly to modern Arabic see Mohssen Esseesey, “Semantic Extension,” Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics, Brill Online.
Majāz of the Lexicographers

Because the lexicographical sense of majāz has ramifications for our understanding of majāz in literary theory, and because it has not been identified as an independent meaning of majāz in modern research, we should pause on its usage here. The sources often make the assertion that knowledge of majāz rests with the ahl al-lughā ‘lexicographers’. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), who offered the first well-developed account of majāz in legal theory, claimed that the lexicographers wrote books on majāz in which they state whether a given word is ḥaqīqa or majāz. Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) is also said to have deferred to the lexicographers in matters of majāz. But according Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), this was a lie created by the theologians in order to justify their understanding of majāz as non-literal language. Heinrichs concludes that since we do not have such lexicographical works on majāz – the closest one, by Ibn Durayd (d. 321/933), contains the term istīʿara, not majāz – Ibn Taymiyya was essentially correct. But too much emphasis should not be placed on this terminological inconsistency, and evidence from the late fourth/tenth and into the sixth/twelfth centuries shows that ‘figurative’ or ‘borrowed’ uses of words were sometimes mentioned as such in the dictionaries. Unlike the

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665 It will become clear, however, that majāz in this sense is somewhat indistinguishable from istīʿara in its “Koranic” sense, as Heinrichs refers to it (quotation marks his), which he discusses with regards to Ibn Qutayba and al-Rummānī (Hand of the Northwind, 14, 30-32, 37, 53). Notably, Heinrichs recognizes (at least in the case of Ibn Qutayba) that the examples cited are “idiomatic,” “an integral part of the language,” and “fixed elements of the language” (ibid., 31). The lexicographical sense of majāz later proliferated in the works of legal theory.

666 Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 267-68. Heinrichs remarks, “An intriguing statement, to say the least! It is not easy to see what books he might be referring to […] It looks as if al-Jaṣṣāṣ is talking from hearsay rather than referring to a number of books on his desk (or carpet).”

667 Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 116 (see also §5.2 for further examples).


669 Ibid.

670 In other words, instead of proceeding from the term to its denotatum, I am making the shawāhid my point of departure.
claim of al-Jaṣṣāṣ, however, they were not set against the term ḥaqīqa. (This does not refute the claim that the theologians were indeed looking to corroborate their theories using ‘outsiders’.)

The clearest example of a dictionary that contains listings of majāz usage is Asās al-balāgha by al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144). Al-Zamakhsharī follows most root entries with a list of majāz usages (“wa-min al-majāz… [idiom]”). Although this is a much later dictionary – after majāz had been fully developed in legal theory and had taken hold in literary theory – the fact that it does not couple majāz with ḥaqīqa points to an earlier understanding of the term.671 (He uses the ḥaqīqa-majāz dichotomy elsewhere.672) Interestingly, al-Zamakhsharī does not normally provide an explanation for the idiomatic expression, assuming that his audience would know its meaning. His purpose, then, is simply to point out idiomatic expressions in the vocabulary.673

Sometimes, instead of the heading wa-min al-majāz, we find wa-min al-mustaʿār or wa-min al-istiʿāra ‘borrowed/borrowing’ (in fact, most of the entries within the letter ‘ayn674); occasionally,

671 There is some earlier evidence as well. According to Baalbaki, Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) in his dictionary Maqāyīs al-lugha also included “metaphorical usage” in some lemmata, “normally towards their end.” Similarly, the contemporaneous al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī in his al-Mufradāt fī gharīb al-Qurʾān attends to metaphorical usage of words. See the important and long-awaited Ramzi Baalbaki, The Arabic Lexicographical Tradition: From the 2nd/8th to the 12th/18th Century, Handbook of Oriental Studies, vol. 107, Brill: Leiden, 2014, 359, 69-70. Al-Zamakhsharī is treated in ibid., 356-63. For Baalbaki, the “general” lemmata in al-Zamakhsharī are taken as the “literal” or “ḥaqīqī” usage, even though he recognizes the absence of the term ḥaqīqa and notices that there is not always a difference between the words listed as regular entries and the words listed as majāz.

672 It even appears once in his dictionary, within the stylized preface: “Among them [the book’s special features] is the establishing of rules for good language (?, faṣl al-khīṭāb) and eloquent speech, by setting aside the majāz from the ḥaqīqa and the indirect expression from the explicit one (kināya/tasrīḥ)” (Asās, 8; the saj rhyme is faṣih/tasrīḥ). Needless to say, in the course of the dictionary there is no mention of ḥaqīqa.

673 One doubts that he did so for apologetic purposes due to his Muʿtazilī affiliation. Rather, we would say that it was his genuine interest in the Arabic lexicon that drove this project. Baalbaki goes further in saying that al-Zamakhsharī wanted to provide the aspiring writer of prose/poetry raw materials for good composition (Lexicographical Tradition, 359, 362). It is of note, then, that he incorporated shawāhid from the poetry of the muḥdathūn, even as late as al-Maʿarrī (ibid., 362).

674 Several exceptions have wa-min al-majāz: ʿ.ḥ.th, ʿ.ḥ.b, ʿ.ḥ.l, ʿ.ḍ.ḍ, ʿ.ʃ.j, ʿ.q.s, ʿ.q.l, ʿ.n.n, and ʿ.y.n (Asās al-balāgha, 409, 411, 412, 423, 428, 430, 431, 437, 443). If one were to overanalyze this point, one would postulate that he started writing the dictionary with the letter ‘ayn, following the old phonetic ordering of letters, and that he first used the terms found in Ibn Durayd, only to change them to majāz later on (al-Zamakhsharī ends up with the abjad system).
he uses wa-min al-kināya ‘indirect expression’; yet other times, there is no heading at all.\textsuperscript{675} If we compare some of the majāz entries listed here with the entries listed in the two sections on metaphorical usage in the end of Ibn Durayd’s dictionary Jamharat al-lugha,\textsuperscript{676} we find interesting overlap. Cross-referencing these with al-Thaʿālibī’s (d. 429/1038) Fiqh al-lugha, a work on ‘lexicology’,\textsuperscript{677} and with Ibn Manzūr’s (d. 711/1311 or 2) Lisān al-ʿarab, a ‘regular’ dictionary amalgamating early sources, we find further overlap. The examples are not necessarily identical, but the linguistic phenomena that they reflect are. In fact, if we revisit the early works of Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), Taʿwil mushkil al-Qurʿān, and al-Rummānī (d. 384/994), al-Nukat fī iʾjāz al-Qurʿān, who tackle metaphorical language in the Qurʿān, we find that the vast majority of shawāhid reflect the lexicographical majāz we are treating below.\textsuperscript{678} Let us discuss a few

\textsuperscript{675} In other words, even within the general portion of the entry we come across idiomatic usage, and vice versa, some majāz words one would expect to find as regular ones (e.g., aʿyān ‘notables’ is cited under majāz; Asās, 443). See also Baalbaki, Lexicographical Tradition, 360. When the heading wa-min al-kināya occurs, it is usually in addition to wa-min al-majāz, but without any apparent difference (see, e.g. Asās, 449, s.v. gh.r.f). Another heading we may come across is wa-min al-mushtaqq minhu ‘derivative of it’ (e.g., Asās, 23), which may very well be connected to al-Jāḥiẓ’s use of ishtiqaq with regards to figurative language (see Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 134, fn. 1).

\textsuperscript{676} The appendices – which do not even follow one another – are titled bāb al-istiʿārāt “section on borrowings” and bāb mā yustaʿāru fa-yutakallamu bīhi fī ghayr mawddī’ī hi “section on that which is borrowed and spoken in a place that is not its own.” Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ibn Durayd, Kitāb Jamharat al-lugha, ed. Ramzi Munir Baʿalbāki, 3 vols, Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1988, 3: 1255-57, 1312-1313. On the difference between the two appendices see Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 37-38 (note that what Heinrichs identifies here as verb metaphors are conceptual metaphors; see below). Within the second appendix, Ibn Durayd makes a connection between idiomatic sayings and the old poetic meaning of istiʿārā as a metaphor containing a ‘foreign’ element (i.e., no substratum), whereby it is a physical object that is deemed ‘borrowed’, not a linguistic element (we elaborate on this in the course of the chapter). Al-Zamakshari does not make such distinctions within his majāz entries.

\textsuperscript{677} Baalbaki (Lexicographical Tradition, 268) lists it under the “multithematic works” of the mubawwab lexic (or in Baalbaki’s terms, onomasiological: proceeding from the question “how does one convey X [a notion]?”) whereas the alphabetical, semasiological dictionaries proceed from the question “what is the meaning of Y [a word]?”). On the meaning of lexicology vs. lexicography see Part One, “The Philological Sense(s) of Bayān”.

\textsuperscript{678} Taʿwil, 103-84 (using the terms majāz and istiʿāra); al-Nukat, 79-87 (using the term istiʿāra [and contrasting it with haqīqa]). See also fn. 665. This comes fairly close to saying that there is no real figurative speech in the Qurʾān. But al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1016) does include ‘live’ metaphors in his Talkhīṣ al-bayān fī majāzāt al-Qurʾān, although admittedly, they are hard to find. One example is tabawwa ā […] l-īmāna “made their dwelling in belief” (Q 59:9); al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, Talkhīṣ al-bayān fī majāzāt al-Qurʾān, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ghānī Ḥasan, Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyā, 1955, 330. This usage does not appear in the dictionaries (that is, tabawwaʿa + entity that is not a dwelling place), but Ibn Manzūr does cite it as a case of an utterance ‘alā l-mathal, which I take to refer to ‘live’ figurative speech (Lisān al-ʿarab 1: 382, and see the meaning of mathal as figurative speech/metaphor below). Interestingly, this is an example Diyyāʾ al-Dīn dwells on (no pun intended), pointing to his
cases; the following categorization is mine and is meant purely for explanatory purposes.

**Conceptual Metaphors**

Ibn Durayd tells us that the verb ‘to bury’ originally applied to “the dead” but then extended to “secrets,” as in, “he buried his secret, i.e., concealed it.” This is an example of a conceptual metaphor: at first glance nothing seems to be metaphorical about ‘burying one’s secret’, but it is, to apply Lakoff and Johnson’s terms, a “metaphor we live by.” It reflects a way in which our conceptual system perceives reality through metaphors, in this case the conceptual metaphor

**IDEAS ARE PEOPLE** (compare: “His ideas will live on forever,” “Cognitive psychology is still in its infancy,” “Where did you dig up that idea?”).

Ibn Durayd lists this entry under his bāb al-istiʿārāt. Al-Amakhsharī has it under the majāz listings of the root d.f.n. Al-Thaʿālibī does not have this specific example under the section fī al-majāz, but all of the examples that he does adduce under that section are conceptual metaphors, like fawqa ‘above’ applied to something that is ‘less’ (MORE IS UP metaphor, even if it is more ‘smallness’) or akala ‘eating [up]’ in the interest in ‘live’ metaphors. Another example is the famous “wing of humility” in Q 17:24 wa-khaḍḍahumā jānāḥa l-dhulli “lower unto them [your parents] the wing of humility”; variations of the phrase khafaḍḍa jānāḥahū are recorded in the lexicons, but not the combination jānāḥ+dhull (Majāzāt al-Qurʾān, 200; Asās, 102 [j.n.h], 170 [kh.f.d], 206-207 [dh.l.f]; Lisān al-ʿarab 1: 697, 2: 1211, 3: 1513 [in all three cases the verse is adduced but not as a lexical entry]). To those who may be tempted to dismiss the body of Arabic lexicographical works as circular and unreliable, I suggest searching for further examples of Qur’ānic metaphors that are not cited in the dictionaries as part of conventional vocabulary.

679 Jamhara 3: 1256 (wa-l-dafnu dafnu l-mayyiti thumma qīla dafana sīrahu idhā katamahu). To express other extensions in the lexicon he also uses variations of the formula, “X means Y, then it became so prevalent (kathura) that they said X1.”

680 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003 [originally 1980], 47. The examples are theirs. According to them (p. 46), what structures our conceptual view of the world is metaphorical (in part), and this metaphorical structure is reflected “in our literal language.” Elsewhere they refer to these metaphors as “conventional metaphors” (e.g., ibid., 196-97) or even “literal metaphors” (ibid., 209).

681 Asās, 191 (s.v. d.f.n). For a ‘regular’ entry see Ibn Manzūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 2: 1397-98. He preserves the idea of a lexical extension with regards to this word by referring to ‘burying the dead’ as the asl ‘origin; basic usage’.

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sense of ‘consuming entirely’ (‘eating up’ money, a fire ‘eating up’ wood; [NON-ETERNAL/ PERISHABLE] ENTITIES ARE FOOD metaphor). The second half of Ibn Durayd’s bāb al-istiʿārāt contains additional conceptual metaphors, like ẓamiʾ tu ḫa liqāʾika “I was thirsty [i.e. yearning] to see you” (compare the English “to have a thirst for [something]”; IDEAS ARE FOOD [/DRINK] metaphor), also cited by al-Zamakhsharī as one of the majāz instances of ẓ.m. 684

What I am referring to here as conceptual metaphors is not a stand-alone concept (for that see ‘dead metaphor’), but rather a relational one. On the grammatical level, this relation typically involves a verb. The “metaphorical” choice of a certain verb (‘to bury’, ‘to thirst for’) is dictated not by the stand-alone concepts of ‘burying’ or ‘being thirsty’, but rather by a certain metaphor that structures our conceptual system, like IDEAS ARE PEOPLE/FOOD. Such metaphors are part of a system, meaning that they manifest themselves on a variety of literal expressions: the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR yields ‘defending’ a claim, ‘winning’ an argument, ‘attacking’ one’s weak point, etc. 685 For our purposes here, we are limiting the notion of

682 Metaphors We Live By, 15. Lakoff and Johnson’s examples do not cover a case of ‘more in smallness’, but it is clear that is still based on the conceptual metaphor MORE [OF ANYTHING] IS UP. Citing al-Jāḥiz, al-Thaʿālibī provides the stock example Q 2:26 “God is not ashamed to strike a similitude even of a gnat, or anything smaller,” to which al-Farrāʾ (d. 207/822) is said to have remarked, “wa-mā jāwāḥa is [said] with regards to small things, but God knows best!” (Fiqh al-lugha, 399). In al-Jāḥiz’s wording, as it is reflected by al-Thaʿālibī, majāz is connected to the idea of jawāz ‘acceptability’ (“The [ancient] Arabs allow [such-and-such]”). Cf. the listing of this meaning of jāwāḥa, fairly at the outset, in Lisān al-ʿarab 5: 3487 (or Lane, Lexicon, 2462).

683 Fiqh al-lugha, 397-98: akala l-māl (“by which they mean nothing but annihilation [or total exhaustion/consumption],” wa-innamā yadhhabūna ilā l-fanāʾ), akalat-hu l-nār (in al-Zamakhsharī, akalat al-nār al-haqab; Asās, 19). Lakoff and Johnson do not speak of this specific metaphor but an adjacent one, IDEAS ARE FOOD (Metaphors We Live By, 46). Whereas jāwāḥa was an orientational metaphor (UP/DOWN, FRONT/BACK), these are ontological ones (ibid., 25). To explain how it is that the fire is doing the eating (not just the wood being consumed by it), Lakoff and Johnson would say (p. 33) that “[p]erhaps the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object is further specified as being a person,” i.e., personification. Al-Zamakhsharī specifies the factitive version of the first example, namely fulūn […] akkala mālī wa-sharrabahu ay af amahu l-nās (referring to a Robin Hood-type person?). For a listing of these examples as regular dictionary entries see Lisān al-ʿarab 1: 101 (or Lane, Lexicon, 71).

684 Jamhara 3: 1256; Asās, 404 (“I am thirsty to see you”). For the contents of the first half of Ibn Durayd’s bāb al-istiʿārāt see ‘metonymy’ below.

685 Metaphors We Live By, 4.
conceptual metaphors to those that are based on fundamental human perception of the physical and non-physical world or on human understanding of cause and effect; in other words, those that are fairly universal. (I am excluding metonymy here since it is a single-term figurative expression.) Lakoff and Johnson make no claim for universality, and they stress that some conceptual metaphors are culturally-specific.⁶⁸⁶ I have no intention of getting into a discussion with them, or with any of the modern Western linguists for that matter; my aim, rather, is to provide distinctions that could help illuminate a facet of medieval Arabic linguistic thought. The culturally-specific ‘conceptual metaphors’ are treated under ‘idiomatic sayings’ (e.g., “his garment slept” for “his garment became worn out”).

*Dead Metaphors*

Dead metaphors refer here to those metaphorical expressions (in Lakoff and Johnson’s terms) that are not part of a full-fledged system: they are isolated instantiations of a certain conceptual metaphor. Grammatically they tend to be nouns. The Arabic *raʾs al-māl* lit. ‘head of property’ i.e. ‘capital’ is a reflection of the conceptual metaphor *PROPERTY IS A PERSON*, but no additional expressions of this metaphorical concept are reflected in the language (*‘the foot of property’*).

According to Lakoff and Johnson, “[i]f any metaphorical expressions deserve to be called “dead,” it is these [...].”⁶⁸⁷ Al-Thaʿālibī’s section titled *istiʿāra* is dedicated to dead metaphors and to idiomatic sayings (some conceptual metaphors as well). What these expressions typically have in common is that they contain a ‘foreign object’, usually but not always a human body

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⁶⁸⁶ Ibid., 42, 118, 227, 231.

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid., 55 (52-55 for the “partial nature of metaphorical structuring”). The examples they provide are ‘foot of a mountain’, ‘a head of cabbage’, ‘a leg of a table’. In general, Lakoff and Johnson are loath to refer to their findings as “dead metaphors,” a term they attribute to the ‘objectivist’ strand of linguistics (ibid., 211-12). Identifying the above cases as primarily “noun” metaphors in mine. One cannot help but notice that the vast majority of the conceptual metaphors that Lakoff and Johnson adduce involve a verb; more than that: they are the archetypal ones (see the examples “wasting time,” “attacking positions,” and “going our separate ways” in ibid., 55).
Examples of dead metaphors include *anf al-jabal* ‘the nose of the mountain’ for ‘a prominent part of the mountain’, *kabid al-samā’* ‘the liver of the sky’ for ‘the meridian’, *yad al-dahr* ‘the hand of time’ probably in the sense of *yad l-dahr* ‘until the [length of the] hand of time’ for ‘never’, or phrases with *umm* ‘mother’: *umm al-kitāb* ‘the essence of the book’ (Q 13:39, 43:4, some say a reference to *al-lawḥ al-mahfūz*), *umm al-qurā* ‘the greatest town’ (Q 6:92, usually taken as a reference to Mecca), *umm al-nujūm* ‘the milky way’, *ummuḥāt al-khayr* ‘the best goods of the earth’. They are listed by al-Zamakhsharī as *majāz* uses. One might have expected to find here fixed terms such as *asad* ‘lion’ for ‘brave’ or *ḥimār* ‘ass’ for ‘stupid’, but the lexicographers do not mention these occurrences. One exception is *maʾfūn* in the sense of ‘mentally drained out, stupid’: originally, Ibn Durayd and al-Zamakhsharī tell us, *afn* referred to ‘a she-camel whose milk is all drained out’.

An example of a verbal dead metaphor (that I would not characterize as a conceptual metaphor) is the verb *arāda* ‘to want’ in the sense of ‘is about to’. Al-Thaʿālibī cites “so-and-so is about to (*yurīdu*) die” and the Qurʾānic “a wall about to tumble down” (Q 18:77) under the

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688 Hence this use of *istiʿāra* is tied to the old poetic meaning of the term as ‘object borrowing’ (al-Thaʿālibī even cites several of the classical poetic ‘borrowings’ in the following section dealing with *istiʿārāt* found in the Qurʾān and in ancient Arabic poetry). One of the reasons I am placing little to no emphasis on the terms themselves is that Ibn Durayd’s *bāb al-istiʿārāt* does not contain expressions containing ‘foreign objects’! There we find what we are terming here metonymies, conceptual metaphors, and idiomatic expressions. The place where we find ‘foreign objects’ is his *bāb mā yustaʿāru* (etc.) (though more specific cases than *raʾs al-māl*, see below), meaning he is using the term *istiʿāra* in each of the sections differently.

689 Al-Thaʿālibī, *Fiqh al-lugha*, 326-28/al-Zamakhsharī, Asās, 23, 113, 711, 21, respectively. Al-Zamakhsharī does not adduce the Qurʾānic *umm* examples; al-Thaʿālibī does not adduce the non-Qurʾānic ones. The example *yad al-dahr* is vocalized in al-Thaʿālibī (by the editor?) as *yadu l-dahri*: perhaps it does not mean *abadan* here but rather something like ‘fate’; see Ibn Fāris’ example of *yad l-dayr* in Part One, “The Philological Sense(s) of *Bayān*.”

690 This should not be confused with the ‘unmarked’ sentences “Zayd is a lion” or “I saw a lion,” which the medieval Arabic scholars give as archetypal examples for ‘live’ metaphors.

691 This is an example of an entry that appears without the *majāz* heading in al-Zamakhsharī’s work (the heading *majāz* is absent for the root *a.f.n.*; see also Baalbaki’s observations, above). But al-Zamakhsharī preserves the idea of a semantic extension here by stating that the word is “from” (min), i.e. originally applied to, *afinat al-nāqa* (Ibn Durayd has *al-afin qillat laban al-nāqa thumma yuqālu* [...]}. See Jamhara 3: 1256; Asās, 19.
heading “section on the attribution of an action to [an entity] which is not the doer in reality.”

The Qur’ānic example is then glossed as min tawassuʿ (lit. extension) al-ʿarab fī l-majāz wa-l-istiʿāra, preserving the identification of such a case with the lexicographical terminology of semantic extension. Other verbal dead metaphors are clear semantic extensions (expressed by Ibn Durayd via their maṣdar) like wirk ‘coming to’ (originally: coming to a source of water) and nujʿa ‘asking for’ (originally: asking for rain/searching for pasture).

**Metonymies**

Metonymies form a considerable part of Ibn Durayd’s bāb al-istiʿārāt. Grammatically a noun (or a phrase acting as a single term), a metonymic expression refers to its denotatum not by its original name but rather by the name of an entity/idea that is related to it. There is a variety of metonymic relations; common ones include the part for whole (synecdoche), physical contiguity, producer for product, place for event, etc. Like the conceptual metaphor and dead metaphor, they are fixed expressions in the lexicon. Some of the examples in Ibn Durayd’s bāb al-istiʿārāt appear in al-Zamakhsharī’s dictionary as majāz (in general, al-Zamakhsharī does not include many metonymies). Al-Tha’ālibī does away with the headings istiʿāra or majāz and opts instead for the more precise [fīmā] yunāsibuhu wa-yuqāribuhu “section on [expressions] that are related

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692 *Fiqh al-lugha*, 396-97 (fī ʿidāfat al-fīʾ l ilā mā laysa bi-fīʾ ilin ʿalā l-haqīqa). The term haqīqa refers here to the real world, not to literal language. Two primary cases are discussed, ‘wanting’ and ‘saying’ (qawl). Al-Tha’ālibī himself states (via an anecdote attributed to al-Ṣūfī [d. 267/946]) that qāla is not like arāda since the latter has a different meaning – “lexically” (fī l-lugha) – when applied to “a non-discerning entity” (ghayr mumayyīz). In our terms, qāla attributed to an inanimate being would be a case of ‘live’ metaphor. The section that immediately follows fī ʿidāfat al-fīʾ l [etc.] is the one on majāz.

693 Ibid., 396. Al-Zamakhsharī cites the Qur’ānic example among the majāz occurrences of r.w.y.d [sic], but with no accompanying explanation (Asās, 258). For the listing of this meaning of arāda in the regular dictionaries see *Līsān al-ʿarab* 3: 1772; Lane, *Lexicon*, 1184.

694 *Jamhara* 3: 1255-56; Asās, 671 (warada al-māʾ is placed under the general entry; warada al-balad under majāz), 621 (nujʿa under the general entry; intajaʿa ‘asking for a favor’ under majāz). Ibn Manzūr preserves different interpretations for warada in these senses (*Līsān al-ʿarab* 6: 4810-11; for n.j.ʿ see 6: 4353).
Common examples for metonymies are samāʾ ‘sky’ for ‘rain’, ghayth ‘rain’ for ‘vegetation [produced by the rain]’, and rāwiya ‘camel carrying the leather water-bag’ for ‘leather water-bag’. 696

**Idiomatic Sayings**

By far most of the entries that we come across in al-Zamakhshāri’s listings of majāz are what we would call idiomatic sayings. They are probably a result of some underlying conceptual metaphor, but since they are culturally-specific, it is not always easy to identify them. What is more, they are not systematic expressions of a conceptual metaphor (sakata ‘anhu al-ghaḍab occurs but something like *takallama bihi al-ghaḍab does not). Examples can also be found in the second part of Ibn Duryad’s bāb al-istiʿārāt and in his bāb mā yustaʿāru fa-yutakallamu bihi fī ghayr mawḍiʾihi (the latter exhibiting ‘misplaced’ entities, usually animal body parts applied to humans or to a different animal). Al-Thaʿālibī cites them across sections, most notably istiʿāra. 697 Here are some examples, followed by the place of their citation by the lexicographers; some are akin to proverbs 698: nāma thawbī “my garment became worn out (lit. slept)” [bāb al-

695 *Fiqh al-lugha*, 348. He also includes here the cases of “a sleeping/wakeful night” (laylun nāʾimun/sāhirun) for ‘a night in which people go to sleep/stay awake’ (yunāmu fihi/yusʾharu fihi), which we later find in al-Jurjānī. I think they are better aligned with our examples of idiomatic expressions, below.

696 Ibn Durayd, *Jamhara* 3: 1255-56. Al-Zamakhshāri cites the metonymic meaning of samāʾ in Asās, 309 (where it is said to refer more specifically to copious rain), but there is no mention of ghayth as vegetation or rāwiya as the water-bag. For al-Thaʿālibī’s examples see *Fiqh al-lugha*, 348, but some appear also within the section “mentioning the place and intending who[what] is in it” (ibid., 346), like “city” for its inhabitants or “pot” for the food inside it.

697 *Fiqh al-lugha*, 426-28. All in all, this section contains dead metaphors (of the type raʾs al-māl), idiomatic expressions (of the type tanafassa al-rabīʿ, see below), and proverbial sayings (“adab is food for the soul,” “youth is the first fruit of life,” “white hair is the address of death.”).

698 And yet with regards to clear-cut proverbs al-Zamakhshāri will tell us it is a mathal ‘proverb’. One example is anā aʿrifu l-arnaba wa-udhunayhā lit. “I know the hare along with its ears,” which means something like “I know the issue from all its sides” (wa-fī l-mathali anā aʿrifu l-arnaba wa-udhunayhā ay aʿrifuhu wa-lā yakhfaʾ alayya kamā lā takhfāʾ alayya l-arnabu; Asās, 14). The layer of lexicographical writings that deal with majāz (istiʿāra) are thus a distant cousin of the lexicographical literature on amthāl and in some cases, gharīb (on the latter two see Baalbaki, *Lexicographical Tradition*, 63 ff., 100 ff.).
istiʿārāt; majāz], 699 jā’a nāshiran udhunayhi “he came threatening/coveting (lit. spreading [pricking up] his ears)” [bāb mā yustaraʿ; majāz], 700 kashafati l-ḥarbu ‘an sāqihā “the battle became vehement (lit. revealed its shank)” [istiʿāra; majāz], 701 tanaffasa l-ṣubḥu “morning appeared (lit. sighed/took a breath)” [istiʿāra; majāz], 702 sakata ‘anhu l-ghadabu “his anger subsided (lit. became silent)” [majāz], 703 ishtaʿala l-ṣuṣrā ‘ala l-shayban/ishtaʿala l-ṣuṣrā fī l-raʾs “the head became full of (lit. was inflamed with) white hair” [majāz].

Literary Theory: From Ibn Rashīq and al-Jurjānī to Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ

Old writings on literary theory contained their own vocabulary to refer to figurative language before the influx of the term majāz. Mathal and istiʿāra were the most conspicuous. Mathal lit. ‘likeness; proverb’ might refer to an image, an analogy, an analogue (that is, the thing to which a topic is compared), a metaphor, or figurative speech in general. Istiʿāra lit. ‘borrowing’ was more technical, and in its old poetic sense referred de facto to instances of personification, or ‘animalization’ in the case of non-human analogues taken from the animal world (like portraying death as a beast of prey). In Heinrichs’ terms, this is the loan metaphor or the analogy-based

699 Jamhara 3: 1256; Asās, 659, s.v. n.w.m. The reason I am not counting nāma here as a dead metaphor is because there is no evidence that it is applied to other subjects in this sense of ‘becoming worn out’, the way arāda did in the sense of ‘is about to’. I am not treating it as a conceptual metaphor because – beyond the fact that it is culturally specific (there are no equivalent expressions in the languages that I know) – there is also no evidence that it is systematic (**“the garment woke up”).

700 Jamhara 3: 1312 [threatening]; Asās, 14, s.v. ḏh.n [coveting]. Cf. Lane, Lexicon, 43.

701 Fiqh al-lugha, 427; Asās, 314 (where we find the variation qāmat al-ḥarbaʿ ala sāqihā, instead of kashafati... ‘an). Cf. Ibn Qutayba’s discussion of Q 68:42 yawma yukshaʿu ‘an sāqi in Taʾwil, 137.

702 Al-Thaʿalibī cites “spring appeared,” which means the verb could perhaps be taken as a dead metaphor. But the fact that tanaffasa is reserved for ‘morning’, ‘day’ and ‘spring’ suggests a more specific idiomatic usage here. Al-Thaʿalibī does not explain the expression, he merely lists it. According to al-Zamakhshari (and some earlier sources, see Lisān al-ʿarab 6: 4502, 3rd column), tanaffasa here means tāla ‘to become extended’, but if tāla is taken to mean ‘to extend into the sky’ (Lane, Lexicon, 1895), then it is identical with ‘appear’. See Fiqh al-lugha, 427; Asās, 648.

703 Asās, 302; Lisān al-ʿarab 3: 2046, 3rd column (sakata l-ghadabu).

704 Ibid., 332; Lisān al-ʿarab 4: 2281. Many of these examples appear in the work of al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (see fn. 678).
metaphor with no substratum (also ‘old’ metaphor). The term majāz itself was absent from early writings on literary theory, like Tha’lab’s (d. 291/904) Qawā‘id al-shi’r and Ibn al-Mu’tazz’s (d. 296/908) Kitāb al-Badī’. Other literary theorists used it in passing. Qudāma b. Ja’far (d. ca. 337/948) preserves the old sense of majāz as ~ma‘nā, but also of majāz in the sense of lexical extensions discussed above. In other treatises of this period the term is used again either in passing (‘Iyār al-shi’r of Ibn Ṭāḥatabā [d. 322/934], the Muwāzana of al-Āmidī [d. 371/981]), or in a way that blends earlier traditions (the Sinā‘atayn of al-‘Askarī [d. after 400/1010]), or in an altogether idiosyncratic sense (Hilyat al-muhāḍara of al-Ḫātimī [d. 388/998]).

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705 On the old use of mathal see S.A. Bonebakker, “Isti’āra,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, Brill Online; Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 14; “Genesis,” 122 (also the “somewhat vague hendiadys” mathal wa-tashbīh), 135; idem, “Isti’āra and Badi’” and their Terminological Relationship in Early Arabic Literary Criticism,” Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften 1 (1984), 180-211, here: 195. This sense of mathal can be found outside literary theory as well. The old hendiadys tashbīh wa-mathal resurfaces in later works: see, e.g., Mathal al-sā‘ir 2: 364. For mathal in the sense of analogy see Al-Qāḍī ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Jurjānī, al-Wasāṭa bayna al-Mutanabbī wa-khuṣūmīh, eds. Muhammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrahīm and ‘Alī Muḥammad al-Bajawī, 2nd ed., Cairo: ‘Īsā al-Bābī al-Halabi, 1951, 41 (English: ‘The Mediation between al-Mutanabbī and his Opponents’). On the old use of isti’āra see Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind. Above I use “personification” (or animalization) to represent the literary phenomenon that the shawāhid de facto reflect. The theorists themselves did not explain such metaphors in terms of personification, and elsewhere in this chapter I usually defer to Heinrichs’ nomenclature. Theorists were perfectly capable of expressing the notion of personification when they so wished, as in “saying [something] about an inanimate being by [mention of] a human action” (an tu‘bīra al-‘arab ‘ani l-jamād bi-fi li l-insān; al-Tha‘lībī, Fiqh al-lugha, 396) and other similar expressions, found especially in poetic commentaries (see one example in §5.5, with respect to the poetic wa-mu‘arrasin li-l-ghaythī).


707 Ibid., 271.

708 Naqīd, 129, with respect to the juxtaposition of ‘blindness’ and eyesight. Specifically, majāz is connected to tawassu‘ al-lugha ‘[semantic] extension in the lexicon’ (the full phrase is huwa fi tawassu‘ al-lugha wa-tasammuh al-‘arab fi l-lafz jā iz ‘alā ṭarīq al-majāz).


710 Ibid., 273-74. Even here majāz is used fairly in passing. The lexicographical sense of majāz that we outlined above takes center stage, mostly under the term isti’āra (al-Sinā‘atayn, 274-90). The theological sense of majāz can be seen in ibid., 276, when it is claimed that “every isti’āra and majāz must have a ḥaqqīa.” But once al-‘Askarī reaches the poetic examples (ibid., 290-315) the term majāz disappears, suggesting that it was not yet integrated into literary theory proper. See also Kanazi, Studies, 150. Al-Ṭūfī seems to be following al-‘Askarī in al-Shī‘ār, 81-82.

711 Al-Ḫātimī’s category of majāz al-shi’r means here “going beyond [correct usage] due to poetic necessity,” akin to
In the work of Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1065) majāz has become better integrated as a literary theoretical concept. Here majāz is defined as a hypernym and a hyponym. On the first level, what is identified as majāz are the “beauties of speech” (embellishments? literary devices in general? mahāsin al-kalām\(^{713}\)), like simile and metaphor (tashbīh, istiʿāra). Majāz as a hypernym thus refers to a category that subsumes several literary devices beneath it. On the second level, majāz as a hyponym refers to one of the subcategories (bāb bi-ʿaynihi) of majāz-the-hypernym, primarily, metonymy. Metonymy is referred to by a variation on al-Thaʿālibī’s [fīmā] yunāsibuhu wa-yuqāribuhu (see above): an yusammā al-shayʾ bi-sm mā qārabahu aw kāna minhu bi-sababin “that a thing be called by the name of that which is near it or in some relation to it.”\(^{714}\) The first example is the stock samāʾ for ‘rain’, but as further examples of this type of majāz are adduced, we also come across instances of conceptual metaphors (“eating” for “destroying”) and idiomatic sayings (shajarun qad šāha “trees crying out” for “growing tall”), which the author presumably viewed as part of conventional Arabic vocabulary and phraseology.\(^{715}\) One source Ibn Rashīq draws from explicitly with regards to the hyponym majāz is Ibn Qutayba.\(^{716}\)

ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081), Ibn Rashīq’s contemporary in the

\(\text{dārūrat al-shiʾr, and is contrasted with mahuṣin al-shiʾr. This is my own interpretation of Abū 'Alī Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Muẓaffār al-Ḥātimī, Ḥilyat al-muḥādara fī ṣināʿat al-shiʾr, ed. Jaʿfar al-Kittānī, 2 vols., Baghdad: al-Jumhūriyya al-Iraqiyya, Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Īlam, Dār al-Rashīd, 1979, 1: 130-31 (esp. the comment by al-Aṣmaʿī), 2: 3-26; cf. Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 275 fn. 50. Heinrichs is correct that some of the phenomena that al-Ḥātimī lists are akin to the phenomena that Abū 'Ubayda subjects to interpretation (“Contacts,” 274-76).}\)

\(^{712}\) Al-ʿUmda 1: 266-68. See also Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 48-49.

\(^{713}\) Ibid. 1: 266. It is not equivalent to all badīʾ categories here (cf. 1: 268), but rather to specific devices within badīʾ that can “admit interpretation” (iḥtiṃālīhi wujūḥ al-taʾwil, 1: 266; also Hand of the Northwind, 49).

\(^{714}\) Al-ʿUmda 1: 266.

\(^{715}\) Ibid., 266-68. The full saying is “In the land of the tribe of so-and-so there are trees that ‘cried out’” (bi-ardī banī fulānin shajarun qad sāha). He then rejects some examples as mere lexical extensions (my term) by adducing poetic lines that would suggest otherwise.

\(^{716}\) Ibid., 267. Ibn Rashīq’s treatment of majāz deserves a fuller account than the one given above.
East, also preserves the lexicographical understanding of majāz within his theory of the concept, which he thoroughly lays out in the end of his Asrār al-balāgha.\footnote{Al-Jurjānī, Asrār, 324-89. The sections in pp. 324-64 (Ritter’s paragraphs 21-23) close the Asrār; pp. 365-89 (paragraphs 24-26) are an appendix to the Asrār, probably meant as such (see Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 276-77, following Ritter [see §5.2]). In the Dalā’il, mentions of majāz are sporadic. For modern treatments of al-Jurjānī’s theory of majāz (a complete account is still lacking) see Kamal Abu Deeb, Al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Poetic Imagery, Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1979, 189-92, 230-33; Larkin, Theology, 72-109 (ch. 4, aptly titled “The Problem of Majāz”); Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 276-84, esp. 278-79; Harb, Poetic Marvels, 198-211.} In fact, it seems that the vast majority of phenomena that al-Jurjānī identifies and examines as majāz – in what is perhaps the most extensive treatment of majāz to date – are part of conventional language: metonymies, dead metaphors/idiomatic sayings, and most of all, conceptual metaphors.\footnote{Cf. the unsubstantiated statement by Simon, “Majāz,” that “[majāz, as presented by al-Jurjānī, is a communicative strategy meant to go beyond the limits of conventional language and create new fields of associations.” By “conventional language” I am not necessarily limiting the discussion to Arabic. Al-Jurjānī himself recognizes that many of the same tropes occur across languages (like ‘lion’ for ‘brave’; Asrār, 32-33). See Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 281 (and cf. 284). Similarly, the conceptual metaphors (our term) that he treats are probably universal. See also, Larkin, Theology, 75: “[I]n his treatment of majāz, al-Jurjānī undertook […] to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underlying the individual rhetorical devices.” I am not trying to suggest that al-Jurjānī was some kind of precursor to the modern cognitive linguists (Lakoff et al.): he was, on the contrary, what they would term an objectivist – seeing similarity as subsisting in truth between two entities (see Larkin, Theology, 90).} Nothing better attests to the lexicographical dimension of majāz than the miniscule number of poetic shawāhid in this lengthy theoretical analysis (the Asrār otherwise abounds with poetry citations).

Al-Jurjānī introduces the innovative distinction between majāz fī l-muthbat \lit{lit. “majāz in [the single-term concept] that is affirmed/predicated [of something]”} (later known as majāz lughawī \textquoteleft{lexical majāz’}) and majāz fī l-ithbāt \lit{lit. “majāz in the affirmation/predication [of one thing of another]”} (later known as majāz ‘aqūlī ‘majāz on the level of reason’, i.e. ‘logical/conceptual majāz’).\footnote{Asrār, 324, 338, 342 ff., 376 ff.; Larkin, Theology, 96 ff.} Majāz fī l-muthbat amounts to a single-word figurative expression, and the common examples al-Jurjānī adduces for it are metonymies (which occur on the level of the noun), like yad ‘hand’ for ‘favor’ or īṣba ‘finger’ for ‘positive mark’, noun metaphors (which we would call dead metaphors) like asad ‘lion’ for ‘brave’, and verb metaphors (which we would...
call dead metaphors or idiomatic sayings) like *ahyā* ‘to bring to life’ with regards to *ard* ‘land’ (found in Q 35:9) to denote “a land filled with newly-grown vegetation” (variations of the idiom *ahyā arḍan mayyita* “to revive dead land” occur in the dictionaries\(^\text{720}\).\(^\text{721}\) In the case of metonymy, he recognizes explicitly the conventional, non-novel character of the expressions.\(^\text{722}\)

The second category, *majāz fī l-ithbāt*, refers to figurative speech on the level of the sentence because all single words are used literally, according to al-Jurjānī, and it is only the predication (or logical judgment, *hukm*) that is figurative. The stock examples are of the type “Time/days/nights made the man perish/the young grow old” or “Spring brought about the blossoms” in which the true doer is God, not the passage of time or the arrival of a season.\(^\text{723}\)

Although some theological implications are at stake,\(^\text{724}\) what al-Jurjānī is touching upon here is the (universal) linguistic habit to express causation – i.e., true predication – in terms of


\(^{721}\) Al-Jurjānī, *Aṣrār*, 325-29, 343-45, 349. The inclusion of *asad* here (ibid., 325) would later become a thorny topic: is the simple equational judgment “‘Ayd is a lion,” which presupposes the statement “I saw a lion [referring to ‘Ayd],” part of *majāz lughawī* or *majāz ‘aqlī*? For discussion see §5.2. Perhaps it is inaccurate to refer to the *asad* metaphor above as ‘dead’ since it is merely used as an archetypal example for the ‘live’ metaphor. Further research is required here.

\(^{722}\) Ibid., 367-69. He says with regards to the *majāz* cases of ‘hand’-for-‘favor’ (in our words: metonymy), that they are more accurately a case of mimicking former usage, like the proverb (*mathal*), and that the question deserves a separate discussion. It is here that al-Jurjānī invokes Ibn Durayd’s “inaccurate” use of *istiʿāra* to express such cases, and the dictionaries in general (*kutub al-lugha*), and it is here that he recognizes that not every *majāz* is *badīʿ*, as is implied by the books of the literary critics. We will revisit these passages in §5.3 (*Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī*).

\(^{723}\) Ibid., 342-43, 346, 377. The first is exemplified in poetic (1) citations – for translations see Abu Deeb, *al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 231-32; Larkin, *Theology*, 231-32; Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 278. We should say that not only are all words used literally, but they all have a referent in the real world (or in our conception of it): in “hand of the north wind,” all words are used literally, but hand does not refer to any actual entity. This type of metaphor seems to be excluded from his notion of *majāz fī l-ithbāt*, judging by the *shawāhid* of the latter. *Majāz ‘aqlī* (as it is later known) is therefore not equivalent to *kadhib* (see below). Al-Jurjānī’s discussions of the “doer in reality” are strongly reminiscent of theological discussions of the type we encountered with al-Kindī (fn. 659).

\(^{724}\) “Predicating acts of God is clearly what is at the heart of the discussion […]” (Larkin, *Theology*, 99). Human agency vis-à-vis God is one theological implication of the discussion; Larkin convincingly shows that al-Jurjānī is in discussion here with ‘Abd al-Jabbār and his Mu’tazī ilk. See also al-Kindī.
‘correlation’ (the term sabab is sometimes used this context). In other words, he recognizes that humans commonly and by convention conceive of certain events or actions ‘metaphorically’ in the mind. Al-Jurjānī further exemplifies this with sentences like “The knife cut,” “The sword killed” and “Seeing you made me happy”, where it is not the ‘knife’, ‘sword’ or ‘seeing’ that are doing the action but are instead co-occurring with it. I think it is safe to refer to such cases as conceptual metaphors (as we have used the term above) because they are embedded

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725 The idea of correlation is presented rather explicitly in ibid., 347.15-16 (and elsewhere): “Because blossoms come to existence only when spring comes to existence (lā yūjād illā bi-wujūd al-rabī’), it seems to us as if (tuwuhhima) spring has an influence in [bringing about] their existence (taʾthīr fī wujūdihī), and hence it [bringing the flowers into existence] was predicated of it [spring].” For sabab see, e.g., Asrār, 356, 358 – not to be confused with sabab/ashabī in the context of metonymic relations in the single-word majāz (e.g., Asrār, 367).

726 When he discusses (ibid., 356) how it is that “spring” is made into a doer in such sentences, despite the fact that it is illogical to predicate an action of a non-able being (ithbāt al-fiʾ l-ghayr al-qādir lā yaṣīḥhu fi qadāyā l-ʿuqāl), al-Jurjānī remarks that it is done “according to common convention among people” (ʿalā l-ʿurfi l-jārī bayna l-nās), and because he speaks of the ‘aqīl here, he is not staying within the confines of one specific language (see fn. 728). With respect to faʿala l-rabīʿ (saying that spring did something), al-Jurjānī maintains that what people do (conceptually, and hence it is reflected in their language) is as follows: at the time when (fiʾ) an action/event takes place (“exists”), they take the thing that is associated with (sabab) the existence of the action of its doer, or the thing that is “like” a thing associated with it (ka-l-sabab), and make it as if (ka-annahu) it is the [actual] doer (wa-ʿalā l-urfi l-jārī bayna l-nāsī an yajʾ alā l-shayʾa idhā kāna sababan aw ka-l-sababī fī wujūdī l-fi li min fāʾ ilīhi ka-annahu fāʾ ilūn; ibid.) (By ka-l-sabab he might be distinguishing between ontologically ‘real’ association and conceptually ‘perceived’ association). The linguistic habit (here: isnād ‘predication’) closely depends on the real-world, physical habit – in his words, the ‘āda that is ordained by God – thus further underscoring the universal and yet conventional aspect of al-Jurjānī’s majāz fi l-ithbāt. He says (ibid.): “When God, praise be to Him, ordained the habit and made the matter such that trees would put forth leaves [etc.] at the time of spring, it so seemed [ṣāra yutawahhamu], on the face of it and by way of habit, as if the existence of these things [leaves on trees, etc.] requires spring, so the verb was predicated of it [i.e., spring] according to this interpretation and ‘reduction’” (emphasis added; fa-lammā aṯrā ṭallāḥu subhānahu l-ʿadat wa-anfadhla ṭalqiyattā an tārirqa l-ashjārī [...] fi zamāni l-rabīʾ i šaʾra yutawahhamu fi zāhirī l-amrī wa-majrā l-ʿadatī ka-annā li-wujūdi ṭāḥīhi l-ashāyiʾa kā ḥabarā ilā l-rabīʾī fa-ʿusmida l-fi l-i layhiʿ alā ḥadhā l-taʾawwuli wa-l-tanzīl). Note that when he speaks of isnād (a linguistic notion), fiʾl usually means “verb,” but when he speaks of ithbāt (a synonym of isnād on the linguistic level but also a reference to an extra-linguistic notion of attribution), fiʾl usually means – at least in this context – “action/event.” Cf. Ritter’s looser translation in Die Geheimnisse der Wortkunst des ‛Abdalqāhir al-Curcānī, trans. Hellmut Ritter, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1959, 415 (23/6); he is correct to draw attention to theological discussions here (fn. 2), but I am not sure this has specifically to do with the “Ash’ārī” rejection of causality (cf. al-Kindī’s discussion of the doer).

727 Asrār, 356, 358-59, 344. To be more exact, al-Jurjānī provides the examples of the knife cutting and sword killing as linguistic evidence for his argument (mā yaḍullu ʿalā anna [...]; ibid., 358). By pointing to so many everyday instances of ‘figurative’ predication, al-Jurjānī is coming closer to a position espoused by Ibn Jinnī, that all language is majāz (on which see §5.1). The example by al-Jurjānī “Seeing you made me happy” contains both a majāz fi l-ithbāt, as explained above, but also a majāz fi l-muthbat because the original Arabic is “Seeing you enlivened me” (aḥyatīn rū yatūka), where the verb aḥyā “means ānasa, sarra, and the like” (ibid., 344). I ‘translated’ the single-word majāz above in order to exemplify the ‘logical’ majāz. Some aspects of the verbal sentence (or verb in general) vis-à-vis majāz are treated by Larkin in Theology, 94-96 (highlighting the theological dimension).
universally in our everyday, literal language. Al-Jurjānī is therefore studying the question of majāz primarily as a philosophical linguist (who is invested in theology).

Two centuries later, Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’ (d. 654/1256) represents a stage in literary theory in which the term majāz regularly appeared in treatises of the field. And yet, his work exemplifies two varying traditions of majāz in literary theory – the first is the early, supposedly ‘inconsistent’ literary theoretical one, and the second is the model proposed by al-Jurjānī (via the mediation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) that differentiates majāz fī l-muthbat from majāz fī l-ithbāt. In his first book, Tahrīr al-taḥbīr, Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’ states that majāz is a genus (jins) covering many species (anwāʿ), ranging from metaphor (istiʿāra), exaggeration (mubālagha) and indirect allusions (ishāra, irdāf) to simile (tashbīh) and analogy (tamthīl). One of the species (nawʿ) of majāz refers to elisions and metonymies (our term) and “the critics […] kept the name majāz for it.”

In other words, Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’ follows Ibn Rashīq in viewing majāz as a category for metaphors, similes etc. on one hand, and as a subcategory for certain linguistic conventions on the other. In Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’’s later work, Badīʿ al-Qurʾān, there is little trace of this theory.

728 Based partly on al-Jurjānī’s own words in Asrār, 345: with regards to the logical judgment (ḥukm) that takes place when a sentence-majāz is uttered, the author tells us that “the only recourse and way [to understand] it is via pure reason, and [a specific] vocabulary (lugha) has no share in it […] The Arab [judges] it just like the Persian, and the Persian like the Turk, because the judgments of reason (qadāyā al-ʿuqūl/Ritter: die Urteile des Verstandes) are the foundations and bases upon which other things are built.” (I am reading fa-l-marjiʿa fī hi wa-l-wajhu ilayhi l-ʿaqlu l-mahḍu for fa-l-marjiʿa fī hi wa-l-wajhu ilā l-ʿaqli l-mahḍi; see also Ritter, Geheimnisse, 402.) This is not the same as saying that the Persian and Turk also express such utterances in the same way (not simply decipher them), but it seems that the phenomenon al-Jurjānī is targeting is fairly universal.

729 Lakoff and Johnson include some treatment of causation in Metaphors We Live By, 27 (under “Identifying Causes”) and 69-72 (where causation is defined in terms of a ‘prototype’, to wit: direct manipulation). To further underscore the non-‘poetic’ nature of al-Jurjānī’s majāz, consider the remarks by Heinrichs (“Contacts,” 278), at least with regards to the sentence-majāz, that “it is quite clear that this kind of trope has little relevance for poetry and balāgha studies” and that “[i]ts proper place is in the kalām-tafsīr discussions.” This begs the question, in what way is al-Jurjānī’s theory of majāz a contribution to literary theory proper, and how istiʿāra is at all reconcilable with this view of majāz!

730 Tahrīr, 457-58 (quote taken from p. 457).

731 Ḥadhf here is reminiscent of the phenomena treated by Abū ʿUbayda, and see fn. 658 above.
and in its stead we find the notions of single-word majāz and majāz on the level of predication. Much of the discussion is taken verbatim (and explicitly so) from the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.

Majāz as Kadhib

- Those who reject the presence of majāz in the Qurʾān

In the ‘old’ view as presented in Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’ (and Ibn Rashīq before him), majāz covered literary devices such as simile and exaggeration, which were not part of the majāz phenomena in the traditions of old Qurʾānic exegesis, theology or lexicography. What did majāz mean, then, in a purely literary context? One clue to this answer may be provided by the early Ibn Ṭabāṭabā (d. 322/934), who was the first literary theorist to use the term majāz – albeit in passing – and specifically within the context of poetics. In his use of the term, majāz is contrasted with haqīqa not in the sense of ‘literal speech’ but in its primary sense of ‘reality’. This can be seen both from Ibn Ṭabāṭabā’s ‘theoretical pronouncement’ and from his comment on one of the shawāhid. In the first case, he instructs the poet to “use majāz that comes close to haqīqa.” In the second case, he remarks that having the she-camel complain of the imminent journey using direct speech (ḥikāya), the way al-Muthaqqab al-ʿAbdī (pre-Islamic poet) does in two of his lines, is “majāz that is remote from haqīqa.” In both cases, haqīqa cannot be referring to the world of language

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732 Badīʿ al-Qurʾān, 175-79. The little trace we do find for the ‘old’ theory is in ibid., 178-79, but with regards to majāz-the-hyponym, not majāz as a cover term for simile, exaggeration, etc. See also Part One, §2.3.

733 This according to Ṭashkoprüzāde: he writes that the minority of scholars who reject the presence of majāz in the Qurʾān do so because they mistakenly believe that majāz and kadhib are one and the same; they are, he says, wrong (Miftāḥ al-saʿāda, eds. Bakrī and al-ʿūr, 2: 450).

734 Strictly speaking, Ibn Rashīq does not classify exaggeration as part of majāz (as in Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’), but he does contrast it with haqīqa, here: ‘reality’, and al-haqāʾiq ‘true things’ (al-ʿUmda 2: 60, in the context of ghuluw, seemingly indistinguishable from his category of mubālagha; ibid., 53 ff; see §5.1, “The Discourse of Kadhib”).

735 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Ṭabāṭabā al-ʿAlawī, ʿIyār al-shīr, eds. Ṭāhā al-Ḥājirī and Muḥammad Zaghlūl
(speaking of figurative speech [or something similar] as being close to/remote from literal speech does not make much sense), but rather the physical world. Similarly, in his definition of majāz, Ibn Rashīq speaks of expressions that go beyond the ḥaqāʾiq but are not completely absurd: here too the reference is to real-world essences and to the law of nature, not to literal expressions.\footnote{Sallām, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā, 1956, 119-120; Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 272.}

Heinrichs has shown that in the early stages of the ḥaqīqa-majāz pairing, the domain to which the terms referred “could have gone either way” because ḥaqīqa had a primary meaning of ‘reality’ or ‘true essence’ (= real world) and majāz had a primary meaning of ‘interpretation’ or ‘idiom’ (= world of language).\footnote{\textit{Al-ʿUmda} 1: 266 (it is ambiguous because the subject of the sentence is the alfāẓ; Heinrichs has “proper meaning[s]” for ḥaqāʾiq in \textit{Hand of the Northwind}, 48).} In fact, in early theological circles (and later, in Sufi ones), ḥaqīqa referred to the true reality of God and majāz to the derivative reality of mankind. If majāz affected the term ḥaqīqa, the pairing would be placed in the linguistic domain; if ḥaqīqa affected the term majāz, it would be placed in the ontological one.\footnote{Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 137.} The opposite of ḥaqīqa in its ontological sense of ‘truth’ would be kadhib ‘falsehood, lie’. Ibn Qutayba recognizes this when he states that those who refute the Qurʾān by pointing out the majāz in it are using majāz in the sense of kadhib, claiming that “a wall does not ‘want’\footnote{Ibid., 136-37; Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 256; and above.} and a town is not ‘asked’” (a reference to Q 18:77 and 12:82). Ibn Qutayba rejects this claim saying, “If majāz were untrue (kadhib), and every action attributed to a non-animal [entity] were false (bāṭil), then most of our speech would be corrupt, because we say ‘the plants grew’, ‘the tree extended high’, ‘the fruit ripened’,\footnote{Referring to the idiomatic use of the verb arāda in the sense of ‘about to’ (see above).}
‘the mountain stood’, and ‘the price was low’. These sentences, as we have seen, are part of everyday conceptual thinking and can be seen as ‘literal’ metaphorical expressions (including the common metonymy PLACE FOR INHABITANTS).

But an early testimony indicates that kadhib can and perhaps did refer to non-lexicoalized figurative language, by none other than the grammarian Sībawayh (d. ca. 180/796), who adduced “I carried the mountain” (ḥamaltu al-jabal) and “I drank (all) the water of the ocean” (sharibtu māʾ al-baḥr) to exemplify the category of speech termed mustaqīm kadhib ‘straight (i.e., grammatical) [and] lie’. Such expressions do not appear in the dictionaries, and one strongly senses that they had a ‘poetic’ meaning along the lines of “I overcame the impossible” or “I ‘conquered the world’.”

Sībawayh’s so-called soundness-classification of speech, where the term kadhib appears, forms one of the brief preliminary chapters of his Kitāb, referred to collectively as the Risāla.
and evidence suggests that some ideas expressed therein are extraneous to Sībawayh’s linguistic thinking, and even to linguistic thinking in general; kadhib is then no longer treated in the body of the Kitāb. For this reason, we cannot know if Sībawayh himself took those sentences literally or not, and for our purposes, it does not necessarily matter. In at least one later account we find the phrase sharibtu māʾ al-bāhr being used figuratively, and one could certainly surmise that both this sentence and hamaltu al-jabal had a “meaning,” whether they were concoctions of Sībawayh (his teachers/peers) or not. Of course, the idea of kadhib, if not specifically related to figurative language, has a long history in relation to poetry, beginning with the famous Qur’ānic verse in Sūrat al-Shu‘arāʾ, in which poets are said to “say what they do not

744 For instance, the term muḥāl as it is defined in the Risāla does not match its actual use in the course of the Kitāb, and the term isnād, laid out in the Risāla, is practically absent (the term, not the notion of predication) from the rest of the work (for the first see Noy, “Muḥāl,” and 27-28 fn. 3, 55 fn. 107, for further evaluations of the Risāla by Talmon and Carter). I am not an adherent of the Greek Hypothesis regarding the evolution of Arabic grammatical thinking, but I do think that several chapters in the Risāla are largely a product of Hellenistic/Roman teachings. Other examples are the brief chapter on polysemy and synonymy which, in this early stage, belongs more to the sphere of logic than to grammar (cf. the opening of Aristotle’s Categories), or the discussion of the parts of speech in the opening of the Kitāb (cf. the terms used to describe ‘noun’ and ‘verb’ in De Interpretatione 16a19 and 16b6; see Ackrill [trans.], 3, 43-44). Therefore, I am not convinced that Sībawayh’s “general principles” of grammar are “totally [my emphasis] foreign” to Aristotle’s works, as Troupeau and others conclude (Gérard Troupeau, “La Risālat al-Kitāb de Sībawayhi,” Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 48 [1973], 323-38, here: 324). He is right to poing out that the De Interpretatione and Poetics were not yet translated into Arabic at this point, but postulating a method of voie diffuse, especially with regards to the elementary topics, is certainly not unlikely.


746 Sayf al-Dīn al-ʿĀmidī relates that he encountered the famous philosopher al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) in Aleppo, where al-Suhrawardī told him that in a dream he saw himself as if he were drinking the water of the ocean (ka-annī sharibtu māʾa l-bāḥr) and that this meant he would inevitably possess the whole world (la budda an amlika l-arḍa). See Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt 6: 272 (I thank Geert Jan van Gelder for the reference). My point is not to read al-Suhrawardī into Sībawayh. The above interpretation is my own (and tentative). I think that for the kadhib sentences to be meaningless, we would have had to find sentences such as “the siwāk was pregnant”: like carrying a mountain and drinking an ocean, it is impossible in reality, but finding a plausible meaning for it is much harder. Cf. the modern “semantically ill-formed” sentences, which are notated with the symbol #: the example Andrew Carnie provides is “#The toothbrush is pregnant,” and as he says, toothbrushes cannot be pregnant “except in the world of fantasy/science fiction or poetry” (I would add very modern poetry; see Syntax: A Generative Introduction, 3rd ed., Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 14-15).
do” (Q 26: 226), or the proverbial ḥṣan al-shiʿr akdhabu hu “the best poetry is the most untruthful,” and continuing with the Aristotelian poetic tradition in Arabic, in which the concept of aqāwil kādhiba “false statements” takes center stage.⁷⁴⁷

The shawāhid that the literary theorists adduce for majāz are more in line with the shawāhid that Sībawayh adduces for mustaqīm kadhib than they are with the shawāhid that the theologians or lexicographers adduce for majāz. This is probably not a coincidence. While Heinrichs is correct in asserting that the conception of figurative expression as ‘untrue’ (or “non-accordance with reality”), which was reflected in Ibn Qutayba, “did not find any followers […] among the literary theorists,”⁷⁴⁸ this assertion holds mostly at the level of explicit theoretical pronouncements. Once we examine the categories subsumed under majāz and the shawāhid and commentarial remarks that follow, a more complex picture emerges. The use of a term such as kadhib in the context of majāz had too many negative theological and moral connotations and was probably eschewed early on (in other spheres, the use of literary kadhib endured),⁷⁴⁹ but the notion of figurative language as an utterance that is not true to reality probably underpinned the

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⁷⁴⁸ Arabische Dichtung, 58-59, with a possible exception in al-Jurjānī’s takhyīl ‘mock aetiology’ (ibid., 59).

In what follows we explore this underlying conception of majāz in literary theory, and the results – as will presently become clear – are sometimes messy.\footnote{Even the so-called logically-coherent theory of al-Jurjānī is ‘messy’ in that isti‘āra is not quite reconcilable with his theory of majāz. The least ‘messy’ theory of majāz and \textit{application thereof} to literary analysis is, without a doubt, the one by Diyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (cf. Bonebakker, “Isti‘āra”)}

\section*{5.1. An Alternative Theory of Majāz: Diyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr}

Diyā’ al-Dīn’s deliberations on majāz and on the categories subsumed under majāz offer us an illuminating case study for his literary-theoretical thinking. It is one of the clear topics in which his thought develops from the earlier Jāmi‘ to the later Mathal, and it is one of the clear topics in which he offers an innovation that is distinctively different from the discussions produced by other literary theorists.

Diyā’ al-Dīn’s primary innovation in the Mathal lies in his conceptualization of majāz as encompassing two large categories: \textit{tawassu‘} ‘[fictitious] extension [of reality]’ and \textit{tashbīh} ‘figurative comparison’ (including metaphor and analogy). It is with regards to several sub-categories within \textit{tashbīh} and \textit{tawassu‘} (the latter of which is afforded much less space) that Diyā’ al-Dīn addresses literary phenomena that are not commonly targeted in classical Arabic literary theory, namely, personification, genitive metaphors and verb metaphors. It is noteworthy that no other literary theorist after him followed his classification.\footnote{Especially revealing is that his ‘refuters’ Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd and al-Ṣafadī did not attend to his classification.} Despite the innovation introduced by Diyā’ al-Dīn, his underlying theory of \textit{tawassu‘} and \textit{tashbīh} reflected an implicit thinking about majāz that was prevalent, probably since the early writings of literary theory

\footnote{It can also be seen in some of the parallel works in the tradition of Aristotelian Arabic poetics, although not under the technical term majāz (see fn. 799 below). It must be stressed that the majāz \textit{uqlī} associated with al-Jurjānī is not equivalent to kadhib (this will be highlighted especially in our treatment of Ibn al-Zamlakānī).}
proper, namely, that majāz involved a proposition that was untrue (kadhib, a term not used). This seems to have been the case even as theories on word-transfer explicitly entered the field of literary theory (originally by the hands of al-Rummānī).

By the time  Diyā’ al-Dīn was writing, the theory of a word transfer had become in wide use in legal theory and it appeared regularly in literary theory as well. We will discuss how the legal notion of majāz figured in  Diyā’ al-Dīn’s work and how, despite incorporating it in his analysis, he did not feel at home with this theory. We will also look at other influences on his theory of majāz and how his thinking developed from his earlier work to the later one. Then we will delve into  Diyā’ al-Dīn’s own understanding of tawassuʿ and tashbīh, and the place kināya held within this scheme.

The Legal Underpinnings of Majāz

In both works  Diyā’ al-Dīn addresses the question of majāz in two places: in a general prolegomenon under the preliminary sections (al-ashyāʾ al-ʿāmma in the Jāmiʿ; muqaddima in the Mathal) and then again in the opening of al-ṣināʿa al-maʾnawiyya when discussing metaphor and comparison (this is done peripherally in the Jāmiʿ and more extensively in the Mathal).

753 But see al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 2: 29 (to be discussed below). Cf. al-Rāzī, who explicitly distinguishes between majāz and kadhib in both his literary theory and in his legal theory; Nihāya, 169, 181-82, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 1 pt. 1, 461.

754 From the account above it sounds as if the notion of majāz was monolithic in legal theory, but it was not. See, e.g. Vishanoff, Formation, 56-57, 125-26, 165-69, 240-42. What I mean by a ‘legal’ understanding of majāz is the general idea according to which a word is not used to express the meaning for which it was originally coined. See also Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics, 106-109. It must also be added that the legal theoretical discussions of majāz originated in theological works (and in general many discussions found in kalām eventually migrated into usūl al-fiqh). Indeed, for the early period, looking at kalām (Mu tazili at this point) as a source for discussions on majāz makes more sense (this is what Heinrichs did in his formative articles on majāz), but in the later period – after the discipline of legal theory matured – it is more appropriate to look at the genre of usūl al-fiqh as a source for this topic since works of kalām no longer treated majāz as one of its core dogmatic issues. For a historical account on the origin of the majāz discussions in classical Arabic sources see Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya, Kitāb al-Imān, ed. al-Sayyid Muhammad Badr al-Dīn al-Naṣī al-Ḥalabī, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, [1907], 34-36, summarized in Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 115-17.

755 Respectively, al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 28-32, 82-98, and al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 1: 105-12, 2: 70-161. For a partial translation of the latter into English see Hoda El Sadda, “Figurative Discourse in Medieval Arabic Criticism:
This does not include the question of *kināya*, which he treats elsewhere. It too has a bearing on his view of *majāz*, and we will discuss it separately.

Under the preliminary discussion of *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* we find what I refer to as the common legal understanding of the notion, especially in Ẓiyāʾ al-Dīn’s *Jāmiʿ*. As a representative source for the treatment of *majāz* in *uṣūl al-fiqh* I take al-Bāqillānī’s (d. 403/1013) *al-Taqrīb wa-l-irshād*. We know from Ẓiyāʾ al-Dīn’s own account that he consulted a work on *uṣūl al-fiqh* by al-Ghazālī in which the topic of *majāz* was treated, but this work did not survive. In al-Ghazālī’s *Mustasfā* the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dyad is (oddly) not treated. Thus a work like the *Taqrīb*, written by the Ashʿarī al-Bāqillānī, is a good candidate for finding typological similarities, and given its fame, it was probably known to al-Ghazālī. For other ideas that are not found in the *Taqrīb* I use the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh*), even though the latter’s discussions are too discursive to have been of use for Ẓiyāʾ al-Dīn, and more importantly, they incorporate the theories of al-Jurjānī on the matter, the heart of which Ẓiyāʾ al-Dīn is either unaware of or purposely ignores (Ẓiyāʾ al-Dīn’s awareness of the *Asrār* – where the topic of *majāz* was comprehensively treated – will be discussed below). The major common


756 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 88 (the topic he discusses there is mentioned, without acknowledging al-Ghazālī, in *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 28-30, and here Ẓiyāʾ al-Dīn attributes it to his own thinking!). It is probably this work by al-Ghazālī that al-Rāzī is quoting in *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 482-86. I thank Frank Griffel who, in a personal communication during the 222nd meeting of the American Oriental Society in Boston, March 16-19, 2012, corroborated to me that the work in question did not survive.

757 In other words, there is no trace of ‘single-term *majāz*’ and ‘logical *majāz*’ in Ẓiyāʾ al-Dīn’s oeuvre. Al-Rāzī followed al-Jurjānī’s theory both in his literary theory (the *Nihāya*) and his legal theory (the *Maḥṣūl*). It seems that al-Rāzī was an anomaly in incorporating the notion of *majāz* ‘aqlī in legal theory: usually, it is the single-word figurative usage that one finds in *uṣūl al-fiqh*. As al-Rāzī himself states (*al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 447), *wa-qad jāʾa fī l-Qurʾān wa-l-akhbār mina l-aqsāmi l-thalāthati shayʿun kathīrun wa-l-ṣūlūyyūna lam yatanabbahū li-l-farqi bayna ḥādithi l-aqsāmi wa-innāmā lakkhasahu [labīzahu in one ms.] al-shaykh Abu l-Qāhir l-naḥwiyyu “These three categories [viz., *majāz* in the single word, *majāz* on the level of the sentence/proposition, and *majāz* both in the single word and on the level of the sentence] appear a lot in the Qurʾān and in the prophetic accounts, but the legal theorists are (were?) not mindful of the distinction between these categories; it was only the Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qāhir the grammarian who explained [this issue].” El Shamsy corroborates al-Rāzī’s assessment when he glosses *ḥaqīqa-majāz* as “word-level literalism [in the case of *ḥaqīqa*]” and *ẓāhir* as “sentence-level literalism”; Ahmed El
points found both in the legal accounts and in Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s work may be summarized as follows:

[Based on a comparison with al-Bāqillānī’s Taqrīb:] As a technical term applied to speech, the term ḥaqīqa refers to a word (qawl per al-Bāqillānī, lafẓ per Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn) that is used in accordance with the original meaning for which it was assigned or coined (more Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s use of the term wāḍ’ below). The term majāz refers to what is used to express something other than what the word was originally coined for. When applied to speech, ḥaqīqa and majāz are opposite counterparts, but if ḥaqīqa is used in the sense of a thing’s quiddity or essence, it does not have a counterpart notion. Every expression used figuratively has a literal meaning, but not every literal meaning has a figurative usage. Some words cannot have a figurative usage, such as proper names (like Zayd and ‘Amr; al-Bāqillānī adds the qualification: unless it is used to refer to one’s oeuvre or thought, like “I memorized Sībawayh”) and the summa genera (categories that have no higher genus, like ma’lūm ‘what is known’). The difference between ḥaqīqa and majāz is that literal usage can, in essence, be applied universally (jāriya ‘alā l-ʿumūm fī nasāʾīr), whereas figurative usage cannot be extrapolated to other contexts (bāb) by analogy (in al-Bāqillānī’s words, maqṣūr ‘alā mawdī’ihi lā yuqāsu ‘alayhi). Thus, a word like ‘knowing’ (ʿālim) can be applied to anyone who can be said to know, but a word like ‘to

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759 In the later Mathal we even find the technical phrase ḥaqīqa lughawiyya (al-Mathal al-sāʾīr 1: 106), which was so prevalent in works of usūl al-fiqh.

760 ‘Word’ is more accurate than, say ‘expression’, since all the examples involve single words, and the definition itself only makes sense if we are dealing with the level of the word (what is ‘coined’ or ‘assigned’ is a single word). See also al-ʿĀmidī, *al-Iḥkām*, 1: 36-47, 61-68, 71-73, who in his linguistic preliminaries (mabādiʾ lughawiyya) treats majāz under the linguistic category of ism ‘noun’ (not verb, particle, or sentence).

761 Cf. Lakoff and Johnson’s “He likes to read the Marquis de Sade. (= the writings of the marquis)” (*Metaphors We Live By*, 35 [parentheses, italics and punctuation theirs]).

762 Once more, we see that the idea of ḥaqīqa rests on the level of the word: it is not that the active participle ‘ālim is
ask’ can be used figuratively only in the same semantic context in which the figurative usage was attested,763 such that “to ask the campsite” is permissible since it is of the same context as “to ask the remains” (the famous address of the pre-Islamic poet to the beloved’s deserted campsite), but one cannot by analogy apply this figurative usage to other contexts and say, “ask the rock” or “ask the beast.”764

[Based on a comparison with al-Rāzī’s Maḥṣūl:]765

When a word is used in a figurative sense, there must be a contextual element (qarīna) that points to the fact that the usage is not literal.766 The lawyers (or legal theorists, fuqahāʾ in Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s words) differentiate between an original literal usage and conventional usage (ḥaqīqa ’urfīyya in legal parlance, or ’urf in Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s words). Conventional usage involves a word that people usually recognize as literal, but is in origin a figurative usage of another literal meaning. Such is the case of the word ghāʾīṭ originally ‘depression in the ground’ that came to denote ‘privy’. However, Diyāʾ al-Dīn rejects this distinction. According to him, it is true that commoners “like the shoemaker, blacksmith, carpenter and baker” only know this word to mean ‘privy’, but no one should take them into consideration in such matters. When the educated elite hear the word, so his argument goes, they only think of its original literal meaning (‘depression in the ground’).767 There are many perceived here as a phrase that implicitly contains a pronoun (*ʿālim huwa); rather it is presented as an independent lexeme that is divorced from a ‘doer’. Likewise is the case with verbs (saʾala). This question is tackled explicitly in the work of al-Jurjānī, later summarized in al-Rāzī, Niḥāya, 174-76.

763 Compare this with Vishanoff, Formation, 166, who concludes from this that “no speaker (not even a divine speaker) is free to invent unprecedented figures of speech” (parentheses his). I do not think this is what al-Bāqillānī is arguing (at least here). One could potentially invent a new figurative usage, but that usage would be singular and could not then be extrapolated to other contexts. Accordingly, if one invents the figurative phrase “the wind is toying with the branches” (from a line by Ibn Khafāja, see §5.3 below), that does not mean that after the expression has become in use one could say “the building is toying with the fence” (my example); rather, it would have to remain within the same attested semantic category (bāb in al-Bāqillānī’s words) – in this case weather phenomena affecting nature – like “the raindrops are toying with the leaves” (my example). See also Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 269: one cannot by analogy say “those who beat God” following the Qurʾānic “those who hurt God.”

764 Elsewhere in his discussion of majāz – in the context of tawassu’ – Diyāʾ al-Dīn treats exactly such cases of speaking animals.

765 Al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 1 pt. 1, 395-486 (pp. 410-13 and 453-54 for ḥaqīqa ʿurfīyya [much more space is devoted to ḥaqīqa sharʿīyya, pp. 414-44, a notion that Diyāʾ al-Dīn does not address]; pp. 449-54 and 399-402 for the categories of majāz mufrad; the notion of qarīna is found passim – the most explanatory account on pp. 461, 481); al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 28-30; al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 108-109, 2: 88-96.

766 The notion of a qarīna was already known to Ibn Jimnī (al-Khaṣṣāʾīṣ 2: 442), but here it is apparent that Diyāʾ al-Dīn is reacting to the legal scholars or lawyers (fuqahāʾ).

767 As proof Diyāʾ al-Dīn says that otherwise, the Qurʾānic verse in which this word appears (Q 5:6) would not have
categories of majāz (al-Rāzī confines this to al-majāz al-mufrad ‘majāz in the single word’), the vast majority of which are metonymic in nature. The categories presented by Ḳiyā’ al-Dīn are based on the account of al-Ghazālī, and there usually is overlap between these and the ones presented by al-Rāzī. Some representative categories are majāz based on a relationship of means/end (‘wine’ for ‘grapes’), part/whole (‘face’ for ‘person’), [perceived-] cause/result (‘sky’ for ‘rain’, or place/thing per al-Ghazālī), similarity (or unique attribute, ‘lion’ for ‘brave’: this would count today as a dead metaphor), and physical contiguity (‘a water-bag carrier camel’ [rāwiya] for ‘leather water-bag’). Other categories are the (old) notions of “majāz by subtraction” (nuqṣ/nuqsān) and “majāz by addition” (ziyāda) – a relic from the early exegetical works like Abū Ubayda’s – the first referring to an elision of a constituent (Q 12:82 wa-s’ali l-qaryā “ask the town” for “ask the people of the town”) and the second referring to a superfluous constituent (ka- in Q 42:11 laysa ka-mithlihi shay’n “like Him there is naught” or mā in Q 3:159 fa-bi-mā raḥmatin mina -llāhi “it is due to mercy from God”).

To recapitulate, the major legal notions of the majāz theory as they figure into the work of Ḳiyā’ al-Dīn are: (a) wad ‘word coinage/assignment’: if a word is used to convey a meaning other than the one for which it was originally assigned, then that usage is majāz; (b) qarīna ‘contextual

768 This relic finds its way into a definition of ḥaqīqa and majāz cited by the Mu’tazilī theologian Abū ‘Abd Allāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/980), as it is quoted in al-Rāzī, al-Maḥṣūl, vol. 1 pt. 1, 399: (for ḥaqīqa) mā -ntazama lafžuhā ma nāhā min ghayrī yīdātān wa-lā nuqṣān in wa-lā nāqīn, (for majāz) alladhihā lā yantaṣūmu lafżuhu ma nāhu innā li-ziyādatin aw li-nuqṣānin aw li-naqīlin “(for literal speech) that [speech] whose wording corresponds [not a common usage of the verb intazama] to its meaning, without addition, subtraction or transference [of meaning]” “(for figurative speech) whose wording does not correspond its meaning, either due to addition or to subtraction or to transference.” Al-Baṣrī cites this definition, without attribution, as a less acceptable definition (al-Taqrīb 1: 353). For the slightly different and more elaborate treatment of this topic in the legal theory of al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981) see Heinrichs, “Genesis,” 258-66 (where we find ḥadīf ‘ellipsis’ for nuqṣān; the term ḥadīf is indeed more prevalent in later works, such as the case of ‘Izz al-Dīn b. ‘Abd al-Salām’s al-Iṣḥārā ilā l-jāz fi ba’d ʾ awwā’ al-majāz [see §5.4]).

769 In the Mathal Ḳiyā’ al-Dīn rejects the idea that ziyāda is a type of majāz (but not nuqṣān) since all words are used according to their original coinage, and what it more, the use of supposedly ‘superfluous’ elements occurs in the speech of the Bedouin (an example is given, after which al-Ghazālī is “excused” from not knowing this, since “eloquence” is not his field; al-Mathal al-sā’ır 2: 93-94). Al-Baṣrī explains the reason ziyāda is considered majāz through the example of ka-mithlihi (al-Taqrīb 1: 353): here ka- denotes here a ø meaning rather than the meaning ‘like’, therefore it is used not according to its original coinage (li-annāhā waradat ghayra mufidatin wa-hiya fi la-ṭalī mawūdī ’atun li-l-ifādati fa-ṣūrat musta’ malatan fi ghayrī mā wud’i at lahu).
element’: a qarīna indicates that a figurative, rather than literal usage is intended; (c) haqīqa ‘urfiyya ‘literal usage based on convention’: some words are literal by convention, even though they have a different meaning in the original lexicon; (d) most of the majāz categories are metonymic; others are dead metaphor or addition/elision of a constituent; (e) not every linguistic category can have a majāz usage: proper names are a case in point; (f) the (observational) difference between literal and figurative usage concerns distribution: literal words may be applied universally in all contexts (jāriya ‘alā l-‘umūm fī naẓā‘ir) whereas figurative ones may only be applied in the same semantic context in which they were attested.

What is conspicuously absent here is the explicit appeal to the terminology of naql ‘[word] transfer’. It is, rather, implicit in the writings of al-Rāzī and ʿiyā’ al-Dīn in the sense that the term naql appears but is not explained (and it is completely absent from al-Bāqillānī’s account). Historically the term naql in literary theory was associated with discussions on istiʿāra in the sense of a simile-based metaphor, where one word is substituted for another based on a similarity between the two notions expressed therein. It would seem that naql was later used in a non-technical sense to refer to the end result of the process of majāz usage: if a word is used not according to its original coinage one could colloquially say it transferred from one meaning to another. Al-Rāzī cites a common conceit in which the use of a word not according to its original coinage is similar to something that is transferred from its place (shabīhun bi-l-muntaqali ‘an mawdī ‘īhi). When proving one of the many fine points in his discussion al-Rāzī

770 But see the definitions of haqīqa-majāz attributed to Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī, which explicitly incorporate the notion of naql (fn. 768).

771 Al-Rummānī is the most famous example; see al-Nukat, 79 (al-istiʿāratu taʿlīqu l-ʿibārati ʿalā ghayri mā wuḍī at lahu ʿfi ʿasīl l-lughāti ʿalā jīhai l-naqli l-l-ibānati; […] qad nuqīla ʿan ʿasīl ʿīlī farʿīn).

772 Al-Mahṣūl, vol. 1 pt. 1, 396, reading mawdī instead of mawdūʿ (as it appears in 4 out of the 6 mss. used; the editor preferred the minority mawdūʿ). Speaking of the etymology majāz as a physical place [mawdī] is so
states that “majāz only comes about when a word (lafẓ) transfers from one thing (i.e., meaning) to another (naql al-lafẓ min shay’ ilā shay’) due to a relationship between them [the two meanings].” This in turn entails three principles, he continues: (a) assigning [the word] an original/primary [meaning] (waḍʿuhu li-l-aṣl), (b) transferring it to a derivative [meaning] (naqluhu li-l-far’), and (c) a reason for the transfer (ʾilla li-l-naql). Since this account is embedded in al-Rāzī’s deliberation, and even though he does not begin with it and would hardly endorse the idea that there was any actual transfer, we can say that the notion of naql is inextricable from the idea of majāz as “using a word not according to its original coinage.” Thus, I henceforth refer this idea about majāz, for short, as “the word-transfer theory.”

Focusing on the Mathal, where Điyā’ al-Dīn’s theory of majāz takes its mature form, we find that in the theoretical portions of his treatment he clearly makes the case for a word-transfer theory. Sometimes this is expressed as the transfer of the meaning from the enunciated word (lafẓ) that was coined for it to another word (lafẓ); other times this is expressed as the transfer of the enunciated word (or name, ism) to another meaning (musammā lit. ‘the thing named’, referring to the notion we have in our mind of ‘the thing named’). With reference to the second case, the enunciated word (ism) ‘sun’ is said to be transferred to (the meaning) ‘pretty face’ (according to the first understanding, taking the same example, the meaning of ‘pretty face’ would be the thing transferred to the word ‘sun’). The difference may be benign, and it could

ubiquitous in the medieval writings that there is little doubt that this is the word intended. Điyā’ al-Dīn speaks of this etymology as well; see below.

773 Ibid., 473.

774 wa-l-majāz huwa naqlu l-ma’nā ‘ani l-lafẓi l-mawdū‘i lahu ilā lafżi ākhara ghayrihi “majāz is the transfer of a meaning from the word that was coined for it [in the lexicon] to another word”; al-Mathal al-sā‘ir 1: 107.

775 fa-l-ismu l-mawdū‘u bi-izā‘i l-musammā huwa ḥaqīqatun lahu fa-idhā muqila ilā ghayrihi sāra majāzan “The word coined vis-à-vis the thing named [i.e., the idea/meaning] is its [the meaning’s] ḥaqīqa ‘literal usage’; if it [the ism] is transferred to another [meaning] it becomes majāz” ; ibid. And also ibid., wa-idhā naqalnā l-shamsa ilā l-
represent for  al-Dīn two sides of the same coin. But then we come across a third usage of naql: that of ḥaqīqa itself being transferred to majāz. Ibn al-Athīr probably means this to be a metadiscourse comment, as he contends the following: “Rather, orators and poets engage extensively in [creating] varieties of motifs (? al-asālīb al-ma’nawiyya) so they transfer literal usage into figurative usage.”776 I pause on these different uses of naql because they leave an impression that Dīyā’ al-Dīn does not feel at home with the naql terminology, and hence, the naql theory (and as we will see later, he did not really endorse it).

Another inconsistency arises with regards to the usage of the term waḍ’ lit. ‘setting down’ to refer to the process in which words are coined in the original vocabulary of the language. We find that it is sometimes the ‘wording’ that is said to be set down for the ‘meaning’ and elsewhere it is the other way around. In the definition of linguistic (lughawīyya, lafżīyya) ḥaqīqa, it is glossed as dalālat al-lafz ‘alā al-ma’nā al-mawdū’ lahu fī aṣl al-lugha “the indication of a word to the meaning set down for it in the original (or basic) lexicon [lit. in the basis of the lexicon/language].”777 What is ‘set down’ here is the meaning. Immediately following is the definition of majāz in which it is the wording that is said to be ‘set down’ for the meaning: (naql al-ma’nā ‘an) al-lafz al-mawdū’ lahu [li-l-ma’nā].778 I suspect this type of inconsistency was a common one in literary theory. Like the idea of naql, determining which

776 wa-innamā ahlu l-khaṭābatī wa-l-shi’ri tawassa‘ū fī l-asālībi l-ma’nawiyyati fa-naqalū l-ḥaqiqata ilā l-majāzi; ibid. 1: 109. Compare this especially to fa-idhā nuqila ilā ghayrihī šāra majāzan (mentioned above) “if it is transferred to [another word] it becomes majāz.”

777 Ibid. 1: 106-107.

778 Ibid. 1: 107. See also several lines down, where the name (ism) is that which is said to be ‘set down’ for the named thing (musammā): al-ism al-mawdū’ bi-izā’ al-musammā (see also above) and waḍ’ al-asmā’ ‘alā al-musammayāt (ibid. 1: 109).
component is set down for the other may reflect two sides of the same coin (no pun intended), although in English, when we speak of ‘coining’ words, it is clear that it is the wording, or enunciated element, that is coined for the meaning. As an example from earlier literary-theoretical works which may explain the odd al-maˈnā al-mawḍūʾ lahu, we might cite the perplexing phrase mawḍūʾ ʿat al-maˈānī found in al-Āmidī’s work on the critical comparison between the poetry of Abū Tammām and al-Buḥturī. There, mawḍūʾ ʿat al-maˈānī is mentioned alongside the term majāzāt. In an earlier study (The Hand of the Northwind), Heinrichs translates al-Āmidī’s passage in full and renders mawḍūʾ ʿat al-maˈānī as “what is coinable and usable in the way of poetic motifs” and majāzāt as “the ways of expression exceeding the proper meaning of language.” In a later work (“Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory in Islam”), he translates the former as “the bases (mawḍūʾ ʿat) of poetic motifs” (parentheses and question mark his). Another option could be that maˈānī here refers to plain meanings (not poetic motifs) and that mawḍūʾ ʿat al-maˈānī is contrasted with majāzāt rather than coordinated with it and thus refers to the original literal way of expressing a certain meaning, literally “[words] coined [for] meanings.” But because of the phrasing of this idea in the idāfa

779 Al-Āmidī, al-Muwāzana, 1: 250.


781 Mawḍūʾ ʿat could be translated here as “conventional, normal, usual” (cf. al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s phrase mawḍūʾ al-lughā as a reference to the original vocabulary of the language; Heinrichs, “Contacts,” 269), but it is important to keep in mind that mawḍūʾ ʿat al-maˈānī does not refer to conventional meanings but to the conventional way of expressing those meanings. The context is al-Āmidī’s analysis of Imruʿ al-Qays’ famous loan (‘old’) metaphor, “And I said to it (sc. the night) when it stretched out its back and followed up with (its) hind quarters and struggled to get up with (its) breast” (fa-qultu lahū lammā tamaṭṭ bi-ṣulbih // wa-arḍafa a jāzan va-nā a bi-kalkalī; Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 3-4). In order to explain this image (a long night like a camel slow to rise), al-Āmidī does not fully use the terminology of a ‘night’-‘camel’ analogy (= ‘old’, tamthīl-based metaphor) but rather incorporates his recognition of word substitutions (“breast” for “first part of night” etc., i.e. ‘new’, tashbih-based metaphor; more on these below). It is in this latter context that the contrast mawḍūʾ ʿat al-maˈānī – majāzāt should be understood because it is here that we find explanations in terms of word transfer (and he even speaks of the closeness of the metaphors to reality, haqīqa). One challenge to my interpretation is the word wa-l-istīʿārī ‘[metaphorical] borrowings’ put in square brackets by the editor Saqr; if it is indeed part of the original text, the opposition mawḍūʾ ʿat al-maˈānī – majāzāt is less strong: man lam yaˈ rif mawḍūʾ ʿāti al-maˈānī [wa-l-istīʿārī] wa-lā l-majāzātī “he who does not
construction, it lends itself to the sense that the meanings are the ones coined, akin to the
construction of an improper *idāfa* (as if the *maʿānī* are the ones set down). Thus the locus of
*waḍ* could be said, freely and inaccurately, to subsist either in the *maʿnā* or in the *lafẓ*, just as
*nafač* was used freely to refer either to a transfer of the meaning to the uttered word, or the uttered
word to the meaning, or *haqīqa* to *majāz*. In both cases one gets the sense that *nafač* and *waḍ* were extraneous notions in Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s work, as they originally were in Arabic literary theory
in general.

**Philological Underpinnings of Majāz**

Beyond the legal layers of Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s theoretical exposé of *majāz*, we also find an
engagement with the ideas on *majāz* expressed by Ibn Jinnī, a grammarian and philologist from
the 4th/10th century. In the *Jāmiʿ* these ideas are presented without acknowledgement, probably
because at this stage Diyāʾ al-Dīn still endorsed them (thus there was sense in presenting them as
his own). Once his thinking on the matter evolved in the *Mathal* and he rejected those ideas, it
seems that he had no problem citing Ibn Jinnī by name and source, *al-Khaṣāʾīš*. Often

know the proper usages nor the metaphorical borrowings nor the figurative usages” (al-ʿĀmidī, *Muwāzana*, 1: 250). I
could not find an explanation to the bracket notation in Ǧaqr’s preface. Heinrichs translates the bracketed word in his
earlier work but seems to disregard it in the later one.

782 The resemblance to the *idāfa* ghayr *haqīqīyya* is only by form, not meaning. Compare to *mahmūd al-sīra* ‘one
whose conduct is praiseworthy’, where the first term of the construct is the adjective of the second (see Wright,
*Grammar* 2: 221). By contrast, in *mawḍūʿat al-maʿānī*, the first term may seem as an adjective by form but is a noun
in meaning. I might be overanalyzing this point, but my purpose is to show the extraneousness both of *nafač* and
*waḍ* in literary theory, to the extent that literary scholars used them freely and inaccurately (in Arabic, *tasāmuḥ*).

783 Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, in his response to the *Mathal*, devotes considerable attention to the ‘legal’ aspects of Diyāʾ al-
Dīn’s discussion (*al-Falak al-dāʾir* in vol. 4 of *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*, 79-86, 198-214), and pays no attention to the
actual categories of *majāz*. We must keep in mind that contrary to other literary theorists, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd was an
accomplished *usūlī* (L. Veccia Vaglieri, “Ibn Abī ’l-Ḥadīd,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*). If Ibn Abī al-
Ḥadīd’s response is somewhat relevant to our discussion because he was a (younger) contemporary of Diyāʾ al-Dīn,
the response by al-Ṣafadī is not. His work is reflective of the changes occurring after the advent of the standard
theory (see esp. *Nuṣrā*, 78-82).

784 *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 30-32; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 84-87, and 1: 106, where he refers to him implicitly. For the
characterized in modern research as a remarkable book, and once described as “a veritable encyclopedia of all conceivable topics of interest to the linguist,” the *Khaṣāʾīš* is not a common source for the literary theorist due to its primary concern with grammatical, lexical and phonological meta-questions. (Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī relies on Ibn Jinnī for his phonological and meta-lexical discussions.) The *Khaṣāʾīš* is important in our context because it probably inspired Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s categorization scheme of *majāz*, at least on a terminological level.

Two points that Ibn Jinnī makes find their way into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s work. The first is that every occurrence of *majāz* displays three elements (*maʿānin*): a semantic extension of a word’s meaning (*ittisāʿ*), a comparison (*tashbīh*), and an exaggeration (*tawkīd*). Thus in the Qur’ānic “And We admitted him into Our mercy” (Q 21:75, *wa-adkhalnāhu fī raḥmatinā*), there is (a) a semantic expansion in the lexeme *raḥma*, since it now acts as a word of direction or location (*asmāʾ al-jihāt wa-l-maḥāll*); (b) a comparison, since “mercy” is likened to something that can be entered, even though one cannot ‘enter’ mercy; and (c) an exaggeration, since it is made into something that can be seen as a physical entity. The other point Ibn Jinnī espoused was that

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786 Al-Khafājī, *Sīr*, 13-21 (where he relies without acknowledgement on Ibn Jinnī’s *Sīr šīnāʿ at al-iʿrāb*), 39-49 (where he relies on the *Khaṣāʾīš*). By meta-lexical questions I mean, e.g., the question of the origin of language (or its lexicon). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also incorporates without acknowledgment Ibn Jinnī’s differentiation between *ishtiqaq* ṣaghīr and *ishtiqaq* kabīr ‘lesser/greater derivation’ in his own discussion on the literary device he calls *ishtiqaq* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 195-99).

787 See Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s analysis of Ibn Jinnī’s use of *tawkīd* here in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 86. I follow him in concluding that by *tawkīd* Ibn Jinnī meant, in this context, exaggeration and not emphasis (and see also *al-Khaṣāʾīš* 2: 448, where we come across *li-l-ittisāʿ* wa-l-mubālagha wa-tashbīh al-qalīl bi-l-kathīr rather than *tawkīd*).

788 Al-Khaṣāʾīš 2: 442-44; *al-Jāmīʿ al-kabīr*, 30-31; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 85. There is some variation in wording regarding the explanation of the third element. The entire claim regarding *ittisāʿ*, *tashbīh* and *tawkīd* being present in the case of *majāz* is rejected in ibid. 2: 85-87.
most of the language’s vocabulary was, in fact, majāz.⁷⁸⁹ According to him, most verbs displayed this since a verb expresses the genus of an action, but if one says qāma zaydun “Zayd stood up,” it is obvious that Zayd did not perform all of the standing in the world, past present or future. Likewise, in darabtu zaydan “I hit Zayd,” it is not the entirety of Zayd that is hit, neither is the entirety of his head if it is specified in darabtu zaydan raʾsahu “I hit Zayd’s head.”⁷⁹⁰ Both of these ideas by Ibn Jinnī are embraced in the Jāmiʿ and later rejected in the Mathal.

Engagement with al-Jurjānī’s Asrār al-balāgha and Philosophical Poetics

In addition to the legal and philological dimensions of Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s theoretical discussion of majāz, we find some comments that are evocative of al-Jurjānī. We mentioned above that an ‘observational’ difference between ḥaqīqa and majāz was stated, with regards to the distribution of literal versus figurative usage. In the Mathal Diyāʾ al-Dīn presents another difference between the two, this time of a more literary provenance (in his words, fī bāb al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha “in the domain of eloquence”). He uses the same phrasing, in the same paragraph, both with regards to rhetorical speech (or oratorical, al-kalām al-khaṭābī) and with regards to figurative speech (majāz, later al-ʿibāra al-majāziyya): that they establish the intended meaning in the soul of the recipient by evoking an image (al-takhyīl wa-l-taṣwīr, which I take as a hendiadys),⁷⁹¹ as if it is

⁷⁸⁹ Ibn Jinnī’s views can only be understood against the backdrop of the lexicographical use of majāz.

⁷⁹⁰ Al-Khaṣāʾīs 2: 447-57; al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 31-32. This is implicitly rejected in al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 106, where Diyāʾ al-Dīn states that the claims according to which all language is ḥaqīqa or all language is majāz amount to the same argument, and neither is correct.

⁷⁹¹ This meaning of takhyīl would correspond to the meaning of the term in philosophical poetics, namely, “the creation, on the part of the poet, of an image in the mind of the listener”; see Heinrichs, “Takhyīl,” 2. But Heinrichs also speaks (p. 1) of the semantics of khayyala as a denominative form II verb meaning “creating a khayāl in the mind” (Heinrichs speaks of the illusionary dimension of this idea), so admittedly, the dictionary meaning of the word and its philosophical technical meaning are not too far apart. It is possible that Diyāʾ al-Dīn was exposed to some ideas from philosophical poetics, perhaps as they seeped into literary theory proper. For the quintessential character of philosophical poetics as dealing with al-takhyīl wa-l-taṣawwur wa-l-tamatthul [tamthīl] wa-mā ashbahahā see al-Khuwārizmī’s paragraph-length description of the Poetics (biyūṭīqī) in Maḫfūṭ al-ʿulūm, 152.
almost seen before one’s eyes (ithbāt al-gharaḍ al-maṣūd fī nafs al-sāmiʾ bi-l-takhyīl wa-l-tašwīr ḥattā yakādu yunzaru ilayhi ‘iyānan […] al-farq bayna al-qawlayn fī l-tašwīr wa-l-takhyīl wa-ithbāt al-gharaḍ al-maṣūd fī nafs al-sāmiʾ). 792 Thus, when comparing “Zayd is a lion” with its literal version (ḥaqīqa) “Zayd is brave,” Diyāʾ al-Dīn states that the listener only perceives the idea that Zayd is courageous in the latter case, whereas in the former one has an image (yukhayyalu ‘inda dhālika) of the lion’s form (ṣūrat al-asad wa-hay’atuhu), including its great might (quwwat batṣhihi) and its crushing of its prey (daqq al-farāʾis). 793

This echoes a statement made by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī in the Aṣrār with regards to the metaphorical (istiʿāra) “I saw a lion [referring to a brave man],” which is said to plant (īqāʾ) in the soul of the listener the image of a lion (ṣūrat al-asad) “in its might (batṣhihi), audacity, fortitude, strength, and other characteristics (maʿānī) that are centered in its nature that have to do with courage.” 794 The same idea is expressed in slightly different terms in the Dalāʾ il. 795 Whether Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s statement is derived directly from al-Jurjānī is unclear, especially when we consider the following comment by Diyāʾ al-Dīn. He says that of the more wondrous things a figurative expression (ʿibāra majāziyya) can do is move the listener away from a person’s natural character such that the miser becomes magnanimous, the coward courageous and the reckless judicious. This type of speech, he continues, can have an intoxicating affect on the addressee to

792 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 110-11 (for the second: “the difference between the two expressions [literal and figurative] lies in the evocation of an image and in [this ‘evocative’ mode of] establishing the intended meaning in the soul of the hearer”); also 2: 364.

793 Ibid. 1: 111. The subject of khayyala here is probably not the listener but rather the thing imagined (ṣūra etc.), hence yukhayyalu in the passive.

794 Aṣrār, 31-32; also 223.14-15.

795 E.g., Dalāʾ il, 70-73, where the force of the affirmation (or predication, ithbāt, ījāb, hukm) is said to be firmer in the case of a sentence like “I saw a lion [referring to a brave man],” and the difference between this type of speech and a direct one is the way of affirmation (ṭarīq ithbātihi lahā wa-taqrīrihi iyyāhā, p. 71), not the meaning itself that is expressed.

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such an extent that it can change his behavior.\textsuperscript{796} This point is rather evocative of old sayings about poetry, according to which it can raise the ignorant from lowly rank and lower the perfect from high rank, alluding to the effects of a \textit{madḥ} or \textit{hijāʾ}.\textsuperscript{797} This notion was thus common in Arabic literary theory, but here Ąiyāʾ al-Dīn combines the rhetorical (\textit{al-kalām al-khatābī}) with the poetic (making the miser magnanimous etc.) with the figurative (majāz, al-ʿibāra al-
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dmajāziyya).\textsuperscript{798} It gives a strong hint to his conception of majāz at the logical, or extra-linguistic level (which we will elaborate shortly), rather than the lexical level as his opening definition states, and it comes very close to the idea we find in philosophical poetics (specifically al-Fārābī) regarding the nature of poetic statements as being false (in addition to evoking images and being imitative by use of figurative speech).\textsuperscript{799}

\textsuperscript{796} \textit{Al-Mathal al-sāʾir} 1: 111.

\textsuperscript{797} See, e.g., Ibn Rashīq, \textit{al-ʿUmda} 1: 40 (under the chapter titled bābu man rafāʾahu l-shīʿ ru wa-man waḍaʾahu); also Ibn Fāris, \textit{al-Ṣāhibī}, 274, quoting a scholar: “If it [the poetry] is [said] in jest it mocks, and if it is in earnest it is untrue (kadhaba).” This idea cannot be divorced from the Qurānic statement on poets, “Do you not see how they wander in every valley and say that which they do not do” (Q 26:225-26, a-lam tara annahum fī kulli wādin yahīmūna wa-annahum yaqūlūna mā lā yafʿalūna), cited in the same context, al-Ṣāhibī, 273. See also van Gelder, “Beautifying the Ugly,” 325-26, citing \textit{inter alia} Nizāmī Arūḍī’s (mid 6\textsuperscript{th} /12\textsuperscript{th} cent.) \textit{Chahar maqāla}: “Poetry is that art whereby the poet arranges imaginary propositions, and adapts the deductions, with the result that he can make a little thing appear great and a great thing small […].” For further study of this question see McKinney, \textit{Rhyme versus Reason}, 190-97, along with the more explicit comments in the early sources on making the true appear false and the false true (using the terms ḥagg and bāṭil, pp. 194-96).

\textsuperscript{798} Although mixing the rhetorical with the poetic should not be overemphasized, especially since the activity of the khaṭāb (later kātib) and that of the shāʿir were recognized early on as being, in substance, identical. See Heinrichs, “Klassisch-arabische Theorien dichterischer Rede,” 201, and see his citation of the saying by the poet al-ʿAttābī (d. 208/823 or later), al-shīʿ ru rasāʾ ilu ma qūdatun wa-l-rasāʾ ilu shi ṭaḥāl “Poetry is ‘bound’ [in the formal sense of rhyme and meter] epistles and epistles are ‘unbound’ poetry.”

\textsuperscript{799} Among al-Fārābī’s (d. 339/950) writings on poetics this can be seen in \textit{Qawānīn šināʿ at al-shuʾ ārāʾ}, where poetic statements (al-aqāwil al-shīʿa riyya) are subsumed under ‘untrue’ statements (al-aqāwil al-kādhība); al-Fārābī, \textit{Maqāla fī Qawānīn šināʿ at al-shuʾ ārāʾ}, 493.3-4. The pairing of the logical arts with the truth values of the premises see Heinrichs, \textit{“Takhvīl,”} 3 ff. The pairing of the logical arts with the internal faculties (imagination-based in the case of poetic statements) is represented in early on by John Philoponus (6\textsuperscript{th} cent.) and later by Paul the Persian, as preserved in the work of Miskawayh (d. 421/1020) (ibid.). As for the aspect of figurative language, al-Fārābī used takhvīl and muhākāt in a complimentary way to refer (ultimately) to figurative language; later Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) separated the two, and the connection was resumed again later in the work of the Maghribī al-Sijilmāsī (d. after 704/1304). See Heinrichs, \textit{“Takhvīl,”} 5-6, 8, 10 (a thorough elaboration on al-Fārābī can be found in idem, “Die antike Verknüpfung von phantasie und Dichtung bei den Arabern,” \textit{Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft} 128.2 [1978], 252-98). A connection between poetic statements and the term majāz
The Discourse of Kadhib

The discourse of falsehood (kadhib) in Ḳiyāʾ al-Dīn’s work is practically non-existent. It appears once in the context of ʿifrāt ‘hyperbole’. Here Ḳiyāʾ al-Dīn exhumes the old controversy about falsehood in poetry which was epitomized in the saying aḥsanu l-shiʿrī akdhabuhu “the best poetry is the most untruthful,” which in turn prompted the reply aḥsanu l-shiʿrī aṣdaquhu “the best poetry is the most truthful.” For Ḳiyāʾ al-Dīn the use of hyperbole is commendable precisely because “the best poetry is the most untruthful,” and more than that, he adds, “the most truthful [poetry] is the most untruthful” (bal aṣdaquhu akdhabuhu). But Ḳiyāʾ al-Dīn does not relate cases of hyperbole to majāz, even though most of the examples display figurative language, as in ʿAntara’s (6th cent.) [meter: kāmil]

wa-ana l-manīyyatu fi l-mawāṭīnī kullihā
wa-l-taʿnu minnī sābīqu l-ājālī

“I am death on all fronts,

was made by Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198); see Abū al-Walīd Ibn Rushd, Talkhīṣ Kitāb Aqvāwīl al-shiʿrī (= al-Sharḥ al-wasīṭ), in Fann al-shīrī: maʿa al-tarjama al-arabīyya al-qadīma wa-shurūḥī al-Fārābī wa- Ibn Sinā wa-Ibn Rushd, ed. ’Abd al-Rahmān Badawī, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1953, 199-250, here: 243, discussed in Ajami, Alchemy, 60-61. See also Harb, Poetic Marvels, 17-18, and 70-73 for an elaboration on al-Sijilmāsī’s understanding of majāz. For the connection between muḥakāt and metaphors in a Persian context see Justine Landau, “Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Poetic Imagination in the Arabic and Persian Philosophical Tradition,” in Ali Asghar Seyed-Gohrab (ed.), Metaphor and Imagery in Persian Poetry, Leiden: Brill, 2012, 15-66, here: 44, and 50-52 for the connection between kadhib and metaphors. Gregor Schoeler goes so far as to state that “Arabo-Islamic philosophical poetics is essentially a theory of figurative language” and that all figurative utterances are “poetic” (i.e., part of the aqvāwīl shiʿrīyya) even if they occur outside poetry – in speeches and in everyday language (“The ‘Poetic Syllogism’ Revisited,” Oriens 41 [2013], 1-26, here: 5-6, 17-18, and see references therein to his earlier work on the poetic syllogism, as well as the works of Black and Aouad).

800 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 191. See also Ajami, Alchemy, 83-85. That hyperbole was one of the contexts in which untruthfulness was discussed in works of ‘indigenous’ Arabic literary theory (as opposed to the philosophically oriented ones) is discussed, e.g., in Heinrichs, “Klassisch-arabisiche Theorien dichterischer Rede,” 205.

801 A representative example is al-Marzūqī (d. 421/1030) in his commentary on the Ḥamāṣa, an anthology of old Bedouin poetry assembled by Abī Tammām; for discussion see Ajami, Alchemy, 9-12. In the Jāmī’, 229, Ḳiyāʾ al-Dīn ascribes the preference for aḥsanu l-shiʿrī akdhabuhu in the context of ghuṭūw to Qudāmā b. Jaʿfar. See also Jacobi, “Dichtung und Lüge”; Bürgel, “Die beste Dichtung,” 55-76 (including the question of exaggeration); and Ajami, Alchemy.
In the Jāmiʿ Diyāʾ al-Dīn elaborates on where he sees the exaggeration: “For a thrust cannot precede predestined times of death, because a predestined time of death cannot come sooner or later. Some have claimed that ‘preceding’ makes more sense (aqrubu amran) than ‘following’ [the predestined time of death], except that both of them are an exaggeration in expression.”

Note that the phrase is rather expressive of reality – a thrust did take place, men did die – as opposed to the figurative (and untrue) expression “I am death” (anā l-maniyyatu), which Diyāʾ al-Dīn does not comment on. Part of the disassociation between the discourse of hyperbole/lies and the discourse of figurative language probably lies in the fact that exaggeration was heavily associated with madiḥ ‘praise poetry’. This is clear when Diyāʾ al-Dīn discusses the opposite of ifrāṭ, namely, tafrīṭ ‘failing to do what one ought’ i.e., “failing to praise appropriately,” where the explicit appeal to madh (and its conjugations) abounds. Because hyperbole is contextualized within the framework of praise poetry, which by default involves real people and real occurrences, ‘reality’ is ultimately adhered to, much more so than in the case of ‘unmarked’ figurative speech.

We do find a direct connection between exaggeration and majāz in the slightly later work of Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’. In his first literary theoretical study, Tahrīr al-taḥbīr, he espouses the view

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802 Al-Mathal al-sāʿir 3: 191, and fns. 2-3 for other versions of this verse. I adopt, with some changes, Ajami’s translation in Alchemy, 83 (he translates more examples from the Mathal on pp. 84-85).

803 Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 228. The example is left uncommented in the Mathal.

804 For another poetic example and commentary see ibid., 228-29, inspired by an explicit quotation from al-Jāḥiz’s Kitāb al-Hayawan.

805 Al-Mathal al-sāʿir 3: 178-91. Although all the examples are taken from poetry, it is clear that the entire discussion has special implications for the state scribe, who must learn to address the recipient in appropriate terms (see esp. ibid., 187-91). For more on the question of decorum see J.S. Meisami, “Truth and Poetry,” Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature 2: 781-82, here: 781. Note that tafrīṭ can also have the opposite meaning of “praising immoderately” (Lane, Lexicon, 2376).
that majāz is a genus for several categories, one of which is mubālagha ‘exaggeration’. Because he is following Ibn Rashīq in viewing majāz as a hypernym for figurative speech (subsuming metaphor, comparison, exaggeration and indirect allusions) as well as a hyponym for metonymy, we might postulate that it was not uncommon to view mubālagha or ifrāṭ as majāz.

Despite upholding the view that “the most truthful poetry is the most untruthful,” Ḯiyā’ al-Dīn ends the discussion with an appeal to a midway between tafrīḥ and ifrāṭ, namely iqtiṣād ‘moderation’ (complying with the old preference for the golden mean, going back to the Greeks). Here he adds the common opinion that if one precedes the phrase with law ‘as if’ or yakādu ‘almost’, the exaggeration is toned down. It is noteworthy that the first example he adduces is the Qur’ānic “The lightning almost snatches away their sight” (Q 2:20, yakādu l-barqu yakḥtafū abṣārahūm), a common example that figures into many seventh/thirteenth-century discussions on metaphor.

This serves as a direct link between the ‘untruthfulness’ of exaggeration and the ‘untruthful’ nature of figurative speech, as implicitly conceived by Ḯiyā’ al-Dīn. His differentiation between a literal statement and figurative one in terms of al-tašwīr wa-l-takhyīl, a hendiadys for ‘evoking images’, links Ḯiyā’ al-Dīn’s ‘organic’ conception of majāz (which we will attend to shortly) to the philosophical poetical association between image-

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806 Taḥrīr, 457-58.

807 Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘ discusses mubālagha under the category termed al-ifrāṭ fī al-ṣifā ‘exaggerating an attribute’ (Taḥrīr, 147-58, following the nomenclature of Ibn al-Muṭazz). This chapter too is replete with notions of truth and falsehood. He does not say at the outset that the device is part of majāz; some subcategories, rather, are recognized as majāz (ibid., 152-53, ending with a comment that suggests that mubālagha as a whole is divided into two, “majāzī” and “ḥaqīqī”). See also also ibid., 321-26, for his discussion of ighrāq and ghusul, more extreme forms of exaggeration: here majāz is not used.

808 Later stated explicitly by Ibn Abī al-Iṣba‘, wa-khayr al-umūr awsāṭuhā (ibid., 150).

809 Al-Mathal al-sā‘ir 3: 194. This appears in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Nihāya, Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Rawḍa, al-Zanjānī’s Miḥār and Ibn al-Naqqāb’s Muqaddima (see §5.4).
Further Engagement with al-Jurjānī: Differentiating Tashbīḥ from Istiʿāra

Before we delve into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s categorization of majāz in the Mathal, and without overemphasizing the influence of al-Jurjānī, one must bear in mind that some of the latter’s comments on metaphor infiltrate Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s discussion, either by direct or indirect influence. I think it is worth lingering on, especially because al-Jurjānī attends to these points in the Asrār, not the Dalāʾil, a work that did not seem to be accessible to scholars, especially outside of the Islamic East. First, the archetypal examples of majāz that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces in the theoretical exposé in the Mathal are ‘lion’ (asad) for ‘brave’, ‘sun’ (shams) for ‘pretty face’ and ‘ocean’ (baḥr) for ‘generous’. Although they common examples (the first already standard in Aristotle), I find it suspicious that the very same examples are found in al-Jurjānī’s introductory deliberation on the ‘meaningful’ (mufīd) metaphor (with badr in addition to shams), the exact place that al-Jurjānī mentions the speaker’s planting in the soul of the listener the image of a lion in its might, audacity, etc., which we discussed above. More importantly, like al-Jurjānī Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn postulates that the essence of metaphor, and that which sets it apart from simile, is that in a metaphor the topic (primum comparationis) is ‘concealed’ and only the analogue (secundum comparationis) is mentioned, as in “I saw a lion,” whereas in a simile both topic and analogue

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810 This association is not borne out in all works of Arabic philosophical poetics; see fn. 799. Despite the similarity of terms, it is al-Jurjānī’s discussion of metaphor that probably influenced Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, not his discussion of takhyīl, which is a separate literary device conceived by al-Jurjānī as ‘fantastic aetiology (/reinterpretation)’, that is, assigning a fantastic cause to a certain occurrence.

811 Asrār, 31-32; al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 1: 107, 111. The meaningful metaphor is the one that al-Jurjānī pays most of his attention to (Asrār, 31 ff.). The non-meaningful or ‘inexpressive’ metaphor is the one in which body parts are expressed using the corresponding parts in other species, e.g. marsin ‘nose of a solid-hoofed animal’ for anf ‘[human] nose’ (Asrār, 29 ff.). In other words, there is no conceived ‘purpose’ (fāʾida) in the latter case. For Aristotle’s famous example of ‘lion’ for ‘brave’ (Achilles) when discussing the difference between simile and metaphor, see Rhetoric III, 4 (trans. W. Rhys Roberts, New York: Cosimo, 2010, 126).
are mentioned, as in “Zayd is a lion” (where the particle of comparison is omitted). There are several terminological inconsistencies in Diyā’ al-Dīn’s work: ‘topic’ is referred to as mushabbah bihi, manqūl or manqūl ilayhi, and mustaʾār lahu; ‘analogue’ is called mushabbah, manqūl or manqūl ilayhi, and mustaʾār). Although the recognition of “Zayd is a lion” as a simile rather than a metaphor is an old one (see, e.g., the Wasāṭa), the terms used by Diyā’ al-Dīn to elaborate on this recognition seem to be derivative of al-Jurjānī. One of the points al-Jurjānī makes is that not every simile (complete with its particle of comparison) can be rendered into a metaphor in which the topic is not expressed. As an example he provides, inter alia, the prophetic saying, al-nāsu ka’abilin miʾatin lā tajidu fīhā rāḥilatan “People are like a hundred camels in which you cannot find one that is fit for riding (or: saddled and conspicuous).” One cannot say, al-Jurjānī contends, “I saw a hundred camels in which you cannot find one that is fit for riding” and mean “I saw people,” as was the case with “I saw a lion” in the sense of “a man like a lion.”

812 Asrār, 223, 227, 296-300; al-Mathal al-sāʿir 2: 71-77. For further discussion see Harb, Poetic Marvels, 202-203.

813 Al-Mathal al-sāʿir 2: 71.8 (we would expect mushabbah bihi for the analogue and mushabbah for the topic), 72.7 ff. (where it is the manqūl ilayhi that is said to be “mentioned”), 74.1-2 (it is the manqūl that is said to be “mentioned”), 77.1 ff. (with mustaʾār and mustaʾār lahu there is consistency). This is a representative sample. These inconsistencies can be added to the ones we discussed above regarding naqīl and waḍʿ. The discourse of manqūl-manqūl ilayhi has a wide scope of reference, as it refers to the two sides of any figurative expression, not just those based on comparison. The most surprising inconsistency is with the terms mushabbah and mushabbah bihi, and it is probably not an error of a copyist or editor: see the edition of Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, 2 vols., Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1939, 1: 356; a nineteenth century printed edition containing Ibn Qutayba’s Adab al-kātib and a digital domain that we find a ‘rectified’ phrasing: see the Word version prepared by Maktabat Mishkāt al-Islāmiyya, where instead of wa-l-tashbīḥu l-madhḥūfu an yudhkar l-mushabbahu dīna l-mushabbah bihi wa-yusammā stiʿāratan (faculty.mu.edu.sa/download.php?fid=6475; identical to the text in http://www.alwaraq.net/Core/AlwaraqSrv/bookpage?book=157&session=ABBVFAGFGFHAAYER&fkey=2&page=1&option=1 [p. 126]) .

814 Al-Qādiri al-Jurjānī, al-Wasāṭa, 41. It appears that ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī was influenced by the Wasāṭa.

815 Asrār 226-27. For a slightly different version of the prophetic saying see Lane, Lexicon, 1055. Al-Rāzī treats this issue in a condensed fashion in Nihāyah, 246-47. In Asrār, 100-101, al-Jurjānī discusses this example in the context of tamthīl (see below). Al-Jurjānī’s larger differentiation between tashbīḥ and istīʿār does not pass over to Diyā’ al-
in those cases in which one can restore (taqdîr) the particle of comparison and keep the beauty (ḥusn, yahsûnu, istihsân, malâha) of the statement intact, one is dealing with a simile (in which the particle was omitted), and in those cases in which restoring the particle results in a statement that is permissible (yajûzu, jawâz) but no longer beautiful, one is dealing with a metaphor. Thus, restoring “Zayd is like a lion” for “Zayd is a lion” remains beautiful, but in the case of al-Sharîf al-Raḍî’s (d. 406/1016, quoted without attribution) [meter: kāmil]

\[
\text{far‘ā‘u in nahaḍat li-hājatihā} \\
\text{‘ajila l-qadibu wa-abţa‘a l-di‘ šū}
\]

“A full-haired one, whenever she stands up to do her affair
the twig moves quickly and the round sand hill is slow,”

restoring “a physique (qadd) moves quickly like a twig, and buttocks (ridf) are slow like a round sand hill” leads to an uncomely result. What ِiyā‘ al-Dīn does not say explicitly is that it is uncomely because restoring the particle of comparison in these cases necessitates the restoration of the unexpressed topic (qadd, ridf), which causes the statement to lose its charm. A similar example is provided in the ِiyā‘ al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ, where the poetic line and ensuing comment are

\[
\text{Dīn’s work: according to al-Jurjānī, the point of tashbîh (‘Zayd is a lion’) is to relate that a similarity exists between the two things, whereas the point of isti‘ āra is to relate something else, beyond the existence of a similarity (‘A lion is approaching’) (Harb, Poetic Marvels, 202-203).}
\]


817 Ibid. 2: 73 (and fn. 1 for the meaning of di‘s), 75, 76. According to al-Ḥalâwī’s edition of the dīwân (Dīwân al-Sharîf al-Raḍî, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafâ Ḥalâwī, 2 vols., Beirut: Sharîkat Dâr al-Arqam b. Abî al-Arqam, 1999, 1: 585), di‘hs ‘corpulent woman’ should be read for di‘s, but this would destroy the symmetry with qadib (Ḥulw’s edition runs until the letter dâl). Di‘s (with kathīb) is a standard, very common image for ridf. For di‘s see also Ibn Manzûr, Lisân al-‘arab 2: 1380-81, where a poetic shâhid is adduced in which a delicate twig (qadibu bānin) is mentioned in the context of two round sand hills (di‘ zatânh). On the contrast between quick and slow parts of a woman see also the lines by al-Mu ammil (a muḥkāram poet), man ra‘ a mithla ḥubbati / tashbîhu l-badra idhâ badâ ̣| tadhkulu l-yawma thumma tad- / khulu ardâfuhâ ghadâ ̣ “Who’s seen the like of my beloved? She resembles a full moon. || She herself will arrive today; her bum tomorrow, before noon!” (sometimes adduced as an example of exaggeration; see, e.g., al-‘Askārî, al-Ṣinâ‘ atayn, 374; Usâma b. Muṣqîd, al-Bâdî‘, 107). I thank Geert Jan van Gelder for the reference and translation.
taken almost verbatim from al-Jurjānī’s Dalāʾ īl.818 I read this as a direct appropriation of al-Jurjānī’s idea, according to which not every full-fledged comparison can be expressed in the form of a metaphor (topic unexpressed):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Not every } \textit{tashbīḥ} \text{ can be reworked into an } \textit{istiʿāra} \text{ (topic suppressed)} & \quad \text{[al-Jurjānī]} \\
\text{Not every } \textit{istiʿāra} \text{ (topic suppressed) can be reworked into a beautiful } \textit{tashbīḥ} & \quad \text{[Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn]}
\end{align*}
\]

We might add that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn ends his discussion in the Mathal with the boasting statement, “So consider carefully what I have pointed to and reflect on it, so that you find that I have mentioned what no one before me has in this manner.”819 Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn made similar statements when he lifted unacknowledged sections from al-Ghazālī (in the Jāmiʿ) and when he quoted without attribution the Dalāʾ īl on the virtue of word arrangement (see §4.1).820 (This does not mean that every time Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn boasts of his original thinking we should assume plagiarism.) In the case of articulating the essence of metaphor as a comparison in which the topic is not expressed, one can assume direct influence from al-Jurjānī. In the case of differentiating ‘permissible’ reconstructions of a comparison versus ‘beautiful’ reconstructions, and making that the basis of identifying a metaphor versus a comparison with no particle, one can assume an appropriation of al-Jurjānī’s ideas – in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s words, a case of istinbāṭ or istikhrāj.

Further Engagement with al-Jurjānī: Analogy

In a similar vein, earlier in the Asrār al-Jurjānī speaks of the process of restoring the unexpressed topic (and along with it, the particle of comparison) in the famous case of the substratum-less

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818 Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 84; Dalāʾ īl, 450-51. I discuss this passage in §5.5.

819 Al-Mathal al-sāʾ īr 2: 77.

metaphor epitomized in Labīd’s [meter: kāmil]

\[
\text{wa-ghadāti rihin qad kashaftu wa-qirratin} \\
\text{idh ašbāhat bi-yadi l-shamāli zimāmuḥā} \\
\text{“Many a cold and windy morning I went forth} \\
\text{When its reins were in the hand of the north wind.”}^{821}
\]

The context is al-Jurjānī’s famous differentiation between metaphors that have a substratum

\(\text{(...shay’ ma’lūm yumkin an yunaṣṣ ‘alayhi, shay’ yushār ilayh, and other expressions), like “I saw a lion”} \text{ (substratum of lion }= \text{Zayd), and metaphors that do not have a substratum, like “hand of the north wind”} \text{ (substratum of hand }= \text{o).}^{822}\)

In the first case, contends al-Jurjānī, going back and articulating to the full comparison comes easily \((\text{idhā raja’ta [...] ilā l-tashbīh [...] wajadtahu ya’īka ‘afwan})\), leading to \(\text{ra’aytu rajulan ka-l-asad or ra’aytu mithla l-asad or shabīhan bi-l-asad “I saw a man like/similar to a lion.” But in the second case the comparison is not quite \(\text{idh ašbaḥa shay’un mithlu l-yadi li-l-shamāl “when something like a hand comes to belong to the north wind”;}\) rather, one must exert reflection \((\text{tu’milu ta’ammulan wa-fikran})\) to reach the following full-fledged comparison \((\text{tashbīh})\): “when the north wind, which, in its power to affect the morning, has the semblance of a (man) commanding \((\text{mālik})\) in (his ability to) manipulate a thing in his hand […].”\(^{823}\)

What underlies al-Jurjānī’s differentiation is that the comparison in this type of metaphor is a complex analogy, not a simple simile.\(^{824}\) In his appropriation of this

\(^{821}\) Asrār, 43. I adopt the translation from Stetkevych, Abū Tammām and the Poetics of the ‘Abbāsid Age, 25.

\(^{822}\) Asrār, 42-43. We will look into this differentiation by al-Jurjānī more closely in §5.2.

\(^{823}\) Ibid., 44-45 (see also 224, 228-31). I read this as a conditional sentence with no apodosis, but see Ritter (trans.), Geheimnisse, 66, for an idiomatic rendering that does express an apodosis. Modern thinkers have also attended to the “difficulty of identifying the simile that corresponds to a given metaphor;” see for instance (wherefrom the quote is derived) Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors Mean,” Critical Inquiry 5.1 (1978), 31-47, here: 38.

\(^{824}\) Heinrichs, “Paired Metaphors,” 3-4: “A closer analysis shows that the \text{istiʿāra} is based on a \text{tamthīl}, an analogy between […]” We should state that authors in the standard tradition do not use the term \text{tamthīl} in this context.
idea Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn speaks of cases of *tashbīḥ* – for him a cover term for both simile and analogy – where it is difficult to restore the particle of comparison, i.e., articulate the full analogy, and it must be done by exerting contemplation (Arabic: *ishkāl fī taqdīr adāt al-tashbīḥ; yushkilu taqdīr adāt al-tashbīḥ fīhi wa-innahu yuḥṭāju fī taqdīrihā ilā naẓar*).\(^{825}\) The first classification of *tashbīḥ* (without the particle of comparison), out of several classifications that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn presents in the *Mathal*, is based on grammatical considerations. According to him the further one moves along the categories – five in number – the harder it becomes to reconstruct the full comparison. We will now elaborate on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s envisioning of the hierarchy of these categories, in order to demonstrate how indebted he is to the discussions in the *Asrār*, and how he nevertheless comes up with his own version of the difficulty in articulating the full comparison of a simile/analogy. His examples (none of which are used by al-Jurjānī) often display what we would identify as metaphors. This is because (a) in the Western tradition, if both topic and analogue are expressed but the particle of comparison is missing, the sentence is viewed as a metaphor, and many of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s examples reflect exactly such cases; (b) in some of his examples the topic is in fact suppressed, and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn often finds justifications for counting them as cases of *tashbīḥ*.\(^{826}\) This discussion is important also because it illuminates the relationship he envisions between *tashbīḥ* and *istiʿāra*, and it sheds light on little-discussed poetic devices such as genitive metaphors and verb metaphors.

The first category of *tashbīḥ* presented by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn comes in the form of (*yaqaʿu mawqiʿa*) a simple equational sentence (*al-mubtadaʾ wa-l-khabar mufradayn* “single noun-initial subject and single predicate”) like “Zayd is a lion.” Here, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn says, the way of restoring

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\(^{825}\) *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 116, 121.

\(^{826}\) See esp. the discrepancy between ibid.2: 117.1-3\(^{2}\) and 121.3-8.
the particle of comparison becomes apparent intuitively and immediately (*bi-badīhat al-naẓar ‘alā l-fawr*; cf. al-Jurjānī above). In the second category, also a noun-initial sentence, the predicate (*khabar*) is a composite phrase of a genitive construct (*jumla murakkaba min muḍāf wa-muḍāf ilayhi*). Here, in order to articulate the full comparison, the word order of the construct must often be inverted (and especially when the *idāfa* is indefinite, he adds) as in the case of the prophetic “Truffles are the smallpox of the earth” (*al-kam’atu judariyyu l-ard*), which can be articulated in full (rather clumsily by Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn) as “Truffles for the earth are like smallpox.” Another example is al-Buḥtūrī’s (d. 284/897) [meter: ṭawīl]

\[
ghamāmu samāḥin lā yaghibbu lahū ḥayan
wa-mis’aru ḥarbin lā yaḍi’u lahū witrū
\]

“(You are) Clouds of generosity, whose abundant rain does not skip a day,
and a stirrer of the fire of war, for whom no blood vengeance is neglected,”

which is reconstructed as “generosity like clouds” (*samāḥun ka-l-ghamāmi*, with an implied subject *huwa* referring to the praised one). He says that a more difficult case in restoring the particle of comparison in this category (*wa-min hādhā l-naw’ mā yushkilu taqdīr adāt al-tashbīh fīh*) is Abū Tammām’s (d. 232/846) [meter: khafīf]

\[
Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 117. The implied pronoun *huwa* is Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s reconstruction.
“What an eye’s pasturage and an amatory prelude’s valley, which the days abraded in Malḥūb.”

According to Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn, “Abū Tammām’s intention is to describe this place as having been beautiful, but then its beauty went away, so he said that the eye used to take pleasure in looking at it just as (ka-) the freely grazing livestock [take pleasure] in the pasturage, and that he (the poet) used to recite amatory sections in [his] poems due to [the place’s] beauty and pleasantness.” He continues: “and if we reconstruct (qaddarnā) the particle of comparison here we would say, It is as if the eye had a pasturage (ka-annahu kāna li-l-ʿayni marʿ an) and the amatory prelude had an abode and home.”

Here we find a tension between Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s adherence to his invented scheme of reconstructing the particle of comparison, which sometimes leads to clumsy results (saying it is as if the eye had a pastorage does not do much more to spell out the analogy than the original “the eye’s pasturage,” despite the added ka-annahu), and his more ‘authentic’ parsing of the line in which he articulates the analogy in natural terms (the eye takes pleasure in looking at a place just as livestock take pleasure in grazing in the pasturage).

Like al-Jurjānī Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn takes pains to identify the underlying analogy, but Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn does not speak of the absence of a substratum in this context (see al-Jurjānī’s discussion of

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831 Ibid. 2: 118, in praise of the vizier Sulaymān b. Waḥb; al-Khaṭṭīb al-Tibrīzhī, Sharḥ dīwān Abī Tammām, ed. Muhammad ṬAbdul ṬAbzām, 4 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1957–1965, 1: 122. The place name Malḥūb (in Arabia) is commonly used in poetry according to al-Tibrīzhī (ibid.). Another possibility is the reading marʿā ʿīn “pasture of kine” and hence wādī nasīb “valley of kin” (if anyone would play on the word nasīb within the very nasīb of a poem, it would be Abū Tammām). According to al-Ṣūfī, some actually read it as ʿin, while others thought ʿīn was a misreading (Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣūfī, Sharḥ al-Ṣūfī li-Dīwān Abī Tammām, ed. Khalaf Rashīd Nuḥmān, 3 vols., [Baghdad]: al-Jumhūriyya al-ʾIrāqiyya, Wizārat al-lām, [1978?], 1: 225). All in all Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces three examples for the second category: the prophetic saying and the lines by al-Buḥṣūrī and Abū Tammām.

832 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 118. The particle li- merely articulates explicitly the idea of ‘belonging’ that is expressed in this type of idāfa (as opposed to min or fī that are reconstructed in kaʾsu fiddatin and sawmu l-yawmi, respectively; see Wright, Grammar 2: 199–200).
“the hand of the north wind” above). It is critical to point out that although both constructions are *idāfas*, and both contain an element with no substratum, al-Jurjānī’s *yad al-shamāl* is typologically different from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s *ghamāmu samāḥin* or *marʿ āʿaynin*. In the former, the element “hand” is necessary for depicting the image (because the “reins” are in it). In the latter, “clouds” and “eye” could – strictly speaking, not artistically – be omitted without impairing the image (generosity pouring constant rain; a pasturage which Time abraded). This is what Wolfhart Heinrichs referred to as an “adjacent” element of a metaphor “dangling in the air” or “semantically [but not poetically] superfluous.” The two are also different from a historical perspective, as the first was more common in ancient poetry, and the second more common in “modern” (*muḥdath*) poetry. The fact that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn attends to the more recent phenomenon in poetic metaphors means that the older phenomenon became less and less relevant for the critic, and perhaps it was seen as less beautiful, from a poetic point of view. As we shall see later, many metaphors that were scorned contained in them an ascription of a body part to an inanimate being; perhaps “the hand of the north wind” and “the claws of death” were lumped in that category even though they displayed lively personifications, unlike “clouds of

833 Heinrichs, “Paired Metaphors,” 7. Also, in “clouds of generosity” the genitive form is an identifying one (clouds=generosity), whereas in “hand of the north wind” it is ascriptive (hand belongs to north wind), on which see §5.2, §5.5.

834 Heinrichs points to the different generating mechanism in the two types of metaphor (ibid., 5): in the first case (here “hand of the north wind,” Heinrichs adduces “claws of death” ), “… the ancient poet would start from an analogy and project the analogue onto the topic, thus creating an image which, although possibly containing an imaginary element, would seem natural,” whereas the *muḥdath* poet “would often construct an imaginary element by taking an already existing metaphor (mostly a verb metaphor) and proceeding on the level of the analogue to an adjacent element with no counterpart in the topic.” One example Heinrichs provides is “leading the reins of the pupils” (*iqtadat… aʿinnata l-hadaqi*) from a line by Abū Nuwās, commenting that (ibid., 6) “it would be perfectly possible to turn *al-hadaq* (“the pupils of the eyes”) into a direct object of the verb *iqtadat…” (he then stresses that he is talking about the semantic level, not the poetical one, since “the ‘reins’ very aptly evoke the image of the spellbound eyeballs moving left and right without any volition of their own” [following the comments of al-Qādī al-Jurjānī]).
It is also worth pointing out that the two genitive metaphors that Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces by al-Buḥṭurī and Abū Tammām are not only different from the old “hand of the north wind,” but they are also different from each other. In the vast majority of ‘modern’ genitive metaphors, the metaphorical element is the first term of the construct, as was the case with “clouds of generosity” and “smallpox of the earth” (compare: “young she-camel of praise,” “bowl of drowsiness,” “head of the night,” “mountain-passes of poetry”). But in “pasturage of an eye” and “valley of an amatory prelude,” the first terms of the construct are used literally: the predicate of the sentence, “abraded,” refers to the pasturage and the valley. Here there is an actual pasturage where an actual eye is looking, and an actual valley where an actual nasīb is recited. To apply the terms of al-Jurjānī, we would say that the words are used literally – and have a real-world substratum – but the form itself of the genitive construct is figurative (a kind of “majāz ʿaqlī” on the level of iḍāfa).

Resuming Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s discussion of the difficulty in reconstructing a full-fledged simile out of metaphorical comparisons, we now reach the third category of complexity in tashbīḥ (in which the particle is elided), after the simple equational sentence and the genitive

835 And see ibid., 10-11: “[…] the ancients used the imaginary metaphor predominantly for abstract or non-tangible objects often for the purpose of personification […]”

836 Some of the many examples adduced by Heinrichs in his “Paired Metaphors” (the first two examples are actually not by muḥdathūn poets). All nineteen examples that Heinrichs adduces in his article that contain a genitive metaphor display the metaphorical element in the first term of the construct. The case “mountain-passes of poetry,” also by Abū Tammām (and part of the larger “mountain-passes of earth and of poetry” [ʿiqāb al-ard wa-šīr]), may seem comparable to “a valley of an amatory prelude” (wādī nasīb), but in the first case the subject of the statement is the second term of the construct, “poetry” (where the verbal predicate is metaphorical, fara tu ʿiqāba l-ard wa-šīrī madīthan lahā “I ascended the mountain-passes of earth and of poetry praising him” for “I exerted my special poetical talent”; ibid., 15) whereas in wādī nasīb the subject is the first term, “valley.” The case of “smallpox of the earth” is slightly different: first, ‘smallpox’ has a substratum (truffles) whereas “mountain-passes of poetry” does not, and second, the two terms are not equated (smallpox ≠earth, mountainpasses=poetry) and are thus more in line with “hand of the north wind” (even though ‘hand’=∅).

837 Or, even if the whole scene is imaginative, it abides by the laws of nature – unlike wind with a hand. I am still struggling to give a ‘formal’ classification of this metaphor.
construct. It is presented as a case in which both the noun-initial subject (mubtadaʾ) and the predicate (khabar) are composite phrases (jumlatayn). From the single example adduced, a prophetic saying, it is not too clear what he has in mind: “Is it not the reaped produce of their tongues [speech uttered against others] that makes people prostrate on their noses in the fire of hell?!” (hal yakubbu l-nāsa ‘alā manākhrihim fī nāri jahannama illā ḥaṣāʾ idu alsinatihim).  

Doiāʾ al-Dīn’s reconstructed comparison consists of an equational sentence with composite expressions (iḍāfas in this case) in the subject and predicate positions, and perhaps this is what he meant by jumlatayn: “the speech of tongues is like the reaped seed-produce of the reaping hooks” (kalāmu l-alsinati ka-ḥaṣāʾ idi l-manājili). He concedes that the analogue “reaping hook” is not expressed, but maintains that its ‘attribute’ (? , ṣifā) – “reaped seed-produce” (i.e., what is reaped by the hook) – is. Doiāʾ al-Dīn is not content with a mere metaphorical substitution of ḥaṣāʾ id – surely it would suffice (and would fit his definition of majāz). He opts rather for a complete analogy that includes the instrument (tongues=reaping hooks) as well as the result or product (speech=reaped seeds), probably out of a recognition that ḥaṣāʾ id is best perceived here visually, and is thus incomplete without the manājil. The visual aspect of Doiāʾ al-Dīn’s understanding of metaphor will be discussed in more detail in §5.5.

The fourth and fifth categories of comparison are the hardest, according to Doiāʾ al-Dīn (ashkal al-aqsām al-madhkūra), to reconstruct as explicit similes/analogies, and people do not

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838 Al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 2: 116. Again, by jumla Doiāʾ al-Dīn does not necessarily mean here a stand-alone sentence, as the grammarians use it.

839 On the rarity of a transitive form I verb (kabba) having a corresponding intransitive form IV verb (akabba) see Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿarab 5: 3803.

840 Al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 2: 118-19. This exact comparison is elaborated on in Lane, Lexicon, 582 (under ḥaṣāʾ id alsinatihim).

841 Here correctly referred to as the mushabbah bihi (al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 2: 119).
often realize (lā yatafṣatana lahumā) that they are cases of *tashbīh*.\(^{842}\) Indeed, to the modern reader they read as metaphors. The fourth category comes in the form of a verbal sentence (yāridu ʿalā wajh al-fiʿl wa-l-fāʿil);\(^{843}\) we would identify it as a type of verb metaphor. Two examples are adduced. The first is the Qur’ānic “And those who made the abode, and belief, their dwelling place before them” (my literal translation of Q 59:9, *wa-lladhīna tabawwa ʿū l-dārā wa-l-ʿīmāna min qablīhim*).\(^{844}\) Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn reconstructs the analogy as “they, in their belief, are like a man taking an abode as his dwelling place (*ka-l-mutabawwiʿ i dāran*), that is, they took ‘belief’ as a house to dwell in, by which [God] describes their becoming firmly established in it.”\(^{845}\) What is especially striking about this case is how easily the verb could have been interpreted as a metaphor, just as we see in many other authors who display tendencies of adherence to the word-transfer theory. As we shall see in subsequent sections (especially §5.5), cases comparable to *tabawwa ʿū l-ʿīmān* would increasingly be seen as unequivocal metaphors in which the *maṣdar* is used “not according to its original coinage.”\(^{846}\) If Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn had adhered to the definition he provided in his theoretical exposé of *majāz*, he would have taken the verb *tabawwaʿa* as a metaphor for *ittakhadha* ‘to take’ or something of the like. Instead, Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn takes the verb *literally* (*tabawwaʿa* as ‘to take s.t. as a dwelling’) and reconstructs an analogy to explain the expression, which he nevertheless views – on the whole – as figurative. Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn’s departure from a different approach, *viz.*, taking the verb as an *istiʿāra*, is a conscious one,

\(^{842}\) Ibid.

\(^{843}\) Ibid. 2: 116.

\(^{844}\) Ibid. 2: 119 (fixing the typo *al-dāra l-ʿīmāna* [rectified in the 2nd printing of 1973, 2: 118]). The *dār* is usually taken as a reference to Medina, and the phrase as a whole to the early *ansār* of the prophet. Arberry’s translation is “And those who made their dwelling in the abode, and in belief, before them.”

\(^{845}\) Ibid.

\(^{846}\) And see al-Jurjānī, *Asrār*, 48 ff.
as is evident from him mentioning those scholars who do not realize that the instances in point are cases of tashbīḥ (see above).

In the second example he provides for the fourth category, the distinction between tashbīḥ and the conventional notion of istiʿāra is much less clear. This is Abū Tammām’s [meter: khaṭīf]

\begin{verbatim}
naṭaqaṭ muqālattu l-fatā l-malhāfī
fa-tashakkat bi-fayḍi dam ‘in dharūfī
“The eyeball of the anxious young man spoke
and lamented with a river of tears shed”\end{verbatim}{847}

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn begins by restoring a simile, “the tears of the eye are like the speech of the tongue,” and then proceeds to reconstruct the analogy, “it is as if the crying eye articulates what is in the heart” (al-ʿaynu l-bākiyatū ka-annāmā tanṭiqū bi-mā fī l-ḍamīr).\end{verbatim}{848} Attributing speech to inanimate beings has long attracted attention by literary critics, especially early ones, in the context of a pre-word-transfer theory of metaphor, and in this Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn displays continuity with the early Arabic literary theoretical tradition (albeit under the heading of tashbīḥ).\end{verbatim}{849} We will deal with a different case of applying speech to inanimate objects in the context of tawassuʿ; indeed, according to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s own deliberations, this case could count as tawassuʿ.

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\begin{verbatim}
847 Damʿun dharīfun or madhrūfun is the common expression (Lane, Lexicon, 963); dharūf would be the intensive form of the adjectival faʿāl (on which see Wright, Grammar 1: 136). Other renderings for fayḍ can be ‘overflow’ or ‘abundant water’; I had Justin Timberlake’s “Cry Me a River” in mind.

848 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 119.

849 See, e.g., Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl, 106, 109 ff. and more so Ibn Wahb al-Kātib, al-Burhān, 60-62, 143-44, where we find an overlap in shawāhid. See also Ibn Rushd, Talkhīṣ, in Fann al-shiʿr, 243. Interestingly, in Ibn Wahb’s deliberations of such examples, the “talking campsites” and such are reflective of the real world rather than a fictional one (al-Burhān, 60-62, 143.12-13) since inanimate beings do impart knowledge. This is connected to his philosophical conception of bayān which is closely aligned with al-Jāhiz’s philosophical bayān (see §3.1). Al-Jāhiz’s examples for the signification that is imparted by inanimate beings and deduced by rational ones also reflect true reality (leaness as a sign of illness; “informing” eyes; etc).
The fifth and final category within the ‘grammatical’ classification of *tashbīḥ* takes the form of “striking an example/similitude” (*al-mathal al-maḍrūb*). This category, _DST_ al-Dīn maintains, “confuses many scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* and they mix it with metaphor.” He provides two poetic examples, both are lines by al-Farazdaq (d. ca. 110/728), and then an example which according to him is erroneously identified by scholars as *tashbīḥ*. The first example is part of an invective against Jarīr [meter: *kāmil*],

\[
mā ḍarrā Taghliba Wāʾ ilin a-hajawtahā
am bulta ḥaythu tanāṭāha l-bahrāni
\]

“It does not damage the (tribe of) Taghlib. B. Wāʾ il whether you lampoon them or piss where the two great rivers [Tigris and Euphrates] collide.”

_DST_ al-Dīn reconstructed the analogy “just as pissing into the junction of the two seas [Diyā’ al-Dīn’s understanding] has no effect whatsoever, likewise your lampooning of those people (the Banū Taghlib) has no effect whatsoever.” The second example is al-Farazdaq’s [meter: *ṭawīl*]

\[
qawārīṣu taʾīnī wa-taḥtaqirīnahā
wa-qad yamlaʾu l-qatru l-ināʾ a fa-yufʿamū
\]

“Biting words come my way, and you hold them of no worth; But (even) drops of water can fill a vessel to excess”

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851 Ibid. 2: 121.

852 Since he is speaking of pissing, and in the context of an invective, it is doubtful that what al-Farazdaq has in mind, as _DST_ al-Dīn seems to imply (*Al-Mathal al-sāʿ ēr* 2: 120), is the Qur’ānic *majmaʿ al-bahrāyn* (Q 18:60), which refers to a mythical “junction of two seas” and is considered in some Islamic lore to be the abode of al-Khiḍr (sharing typological affinities with the Water of Life in the Alexander romance; *The Qurʾān*, Hebrew trans. Uri Rubin, 242). Referring to a place that al-Farazdaq and his audience would be well familiar with – Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab, where the Tigris and Euphrates merge – would have a livelier effect on the invective. On *bahr* as *nahr ʿaẓīm*, including its application to rivers like the Euphrates and Nile, see *Lisān al-ʿarab* 1: 216.

853 *Al-Mathal al-sāʿ ēr* 2: 120; see previous fn. on his understanding of the line as a reference to *majmaʿ al-bahrāyn*.

854 Ibid., and see editors’ fn. 3 for a slightly different version.
Diya’ al-Din comments: “he compared the harsh words that come to him, being held of no worth, to drops of water that fill a vessel despite their small size, referring by that to the idea that an abundance (of something) can turn a small issue to a big one.”

In other words, the poet’s persona admits that he is hurt by the petty invective directed at him, since there is so much of it.

Both lines by al-Farazdaq exhibit a “striking of an example” that is virtually indistinguishable from al-Jurjani’s notion of *tamthil* lit. “to utter an example/similitude (mathal),” epitomized by the famous “He puts one leg forward and another one backward” to refer to a hesitant man. For al-Jurjani a *tamthil* ‘metaphorical exemplification’ is a complex *tashbih*, which manifests itself grammatically in the form of a sentence (or sentences, or a phrase equivalent to a sentence) rather than the single word. Al-Jurjani uses the term *mathal* interchangeably with *tamthil* and at one point even speaks of “striking” a similitude/giving an example (*al-mathal... qad yudrabu*). The *mathal* is an illustrative (or Ritter: “graphic”) example

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855 Ibid. 2: 120-21.

856 Taking *mathhala* here as a denominative of *mathal* (see Wright, Grammar 1: 32, for the denominative sense of form II verbs). That al-Jurjani himself endorses this etymology is evident from several of his discussions of *tamthil*, e.g., *Asrar*, 87, wa-kulu mā là yasihihu an yusammā tamthilan fa-lafzu l-mathali là yusta malu fihi ayydan “in cases that cannot be called *tamthil*, you would not use the word *mathal* to describe them either.” Ritter translates *mathal* as “(bildliche) Sentenz” (*Geheimnisse*, 112; parentheses his) or “figurative sentence” (also “graphic figurative sentence” and “picturesque”; *Asrar*, editor’s introduction, 14, 17).

857 *Asrar*, 92-101, and editor’s introduction, 13-17, for discussion. By “a phrase equivalent to a sentence” I am referring to phrases that contain an element with verbal force like the *maṣdar*, the participle, etc.

858 Ritter presents *mathal*, the figurative/graphic/picturesque sentence (see fn. 856), as a subtype of *tamthil* (*Asrar*, editor’s introduction, 14). I did not find evidence of a sub-classification in the text; rather, according to my understanding, *mathal* and *tamthil* are used interchangeably (*Asrar*, 220-223 contain clear examples) and all instances of *tamthil* display a usage of a graphic sentence (see also Heinrichs’ note in *Hand of the Northwind*, 7.11-13). For more on *tamthil* see Abu Deeb, *Al-Jurjani’s Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 67-68, 145-46, and especially 237-42. Abu Deeb too speaks of a classification within *tamthil*, one based on *istiʿara* (i.e., it is a figurative sentence) and one based on *tashbīh* (all words are used literally, and see *Asrar*, 220.3-4, 223.4-6). Abu Deeb also consults the *Dalāʾ il* in this context (*Al-Jurjani’s Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 238, fn. 32), which I think may be the source of some confusion; in the *Dalāʾ il* al-Jurjani may be departing from some views he expressed in the *Asrar*. Once more, to me it currently seems that al-Jurjani is speaking of only one *tamthil*, and that his *tamthil* is identical to Diya’ al-Din’s *al-mathal al-madrūb*. Al-Jurjani does provide a gradation of *tamthil* in *Asrar*, 109.12 ff., differentiating between providing a “rare/unnatural and odd” *mathal* and providing a *mathal* that is not unusual. In my understanding, al-Jurjani does not intend this to be a formal classifying marker, but it is undeniable that the ‘unnatural’ case of *tamthil* is comparable to his notion of *takhyīl*: in both cases, an unusual incidence acts as a corroborating “mock” explanation.
sentence that exemplifies, by metaphorical analogy, the topic of discussion. In Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s examples the illustrations were: urinating into the ocean does not add to the water level; filling a vessel with water drops eventually causes it to overflow. Compare the two lines by al-Farazdaq with the following line by Ibn al-Muʿtazz, provided by al-Jurjānī in his discussion of *tamthīl* [meter: *kāmil*]

\begin{quote}

\begin{align*}
\textit{iṣbīr ʿalā maḍādi l-ḥasū} & \\
\text{di fa-inna ṣabraka qāṭiluh} & \\
\textit{fa-l-nāru taʿkulu nafsahā} & \\
\text{in lam taḥḍid mā taʿkuluh} & \\
\end{align*}

“Be patient when faced with torment (caused by) an envious person, for your patience will kill him; (After all,) fire eats itself out when it finds nothing else to eat.”

\end{quote}

In all these cases the illustrative example, *mathal*, is not too far from the Qur’ānic notion of *mathal*, which generally refers to “any item of discourse featuring one object or event illuminating another […] reality by comparison.”\(^{860}\) The idea of an illustrative analogy as a literary device – once referred to by Heinrichs as a “mock analogy”\(^{861}\) – is not new with al-


\(^{860}\) A.H. Mathias Zahnis, “Parable,” *Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān*, Brill Online. Zahnis states, however, that not all Qurʾānic *amthāl* exhibit a comparison, and that they usually illuminate “less tangible” reality. In the case of poetry, the reality illuminated is tangible and readily understood – the poets are just being creative in depicting it.

\(^{861}\) Heinrichs, “Rhetorical figures,” 661 (“because the insinuated aspect of comparison is not valid”); Kanazi goes even further and calls the statement “seemingly absurd” (*Studies*, 179). According to Heinrichs, “[m]ock analogies belong to the category of *takhīl* ‘phantastic reinterpretation of reality,’ a phenomenon identified by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī” (“Rhetorical figures,” 661).
According to al-Jurjānī himself, Abū Aḥmad al-ʿAskarī (d. 382/993, teacher of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī) treated “this type of speech” under the term mumāthala, and to al-Jurjānī’s mind, he should not have differentiated it from mathal or tamthīl. But it is Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Abū Aḥmad’s student, who treats this notion under the heading al-istishhād wa-l-iḥtijāj ‘adducing [mock] evidence (Ar. shāhid, ḥujja).’

Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, his student, the term mumāthala is a periphrastic expression (akin to al-Jurjānī’s kināya) but is readily figurative (as opposed to al-Jurjānī’s kināya, which in his terms is not. See §5.2 below). An example for Abū Hilāl’s mumāthala is “so and so has clean clothes” for ‘pure of blemish’ (almost like a euphemism). In his commentary of the examples, Abū Hilāl often employs the term tamthīl. See al-Ṣināʿ atayn, 364-68.

If we look back at Abū Hilāl’s treatment of tadhyīl (which is contrasted with musāwāt and išāra, but

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863 A quick consultation with Abū Ahmad’s extant works did not yield any results for mumāthala (al-Masūn fi l-adab, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Ḥārūn, Kuwait: Dāʾirat al-Maṭbūʿāt wa-l-Nashr, 1960; al-Taḏīl bayna balīghatay l-ʿarab wa-l-ajam, ed. Ḥamad b. Nāṣir al-Dukhayyīl, Buraydah: Nādī al-Qāsim al-Adabī, [1998]). For Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, his student, the term mumāthala is a periphrastic expression (akin to al-Jurjānī’s kināya) but is readily figurative (as opposed to al-Jurjānī’s kināya, which in his terms is not. See §5.2 below). An example for Abū Hilāl’s mumāthala is “so and so has clean clothes” for ‘pure of blemish’ (almost like a euphemism). In his commentary of the examples, Abū Hilāl often employs the term tamthīl. See al-Ṣināʿ atayn, 364-68.

864 Al-Ṣināʿ atayn, 434-37. See also Kanazi, Studies, 178-80. Kanazi too points out the equivalence between this literary device and al-Jurjānī’s tamthīl (pp. 179-80).


866 Al-Ṣināʿ atayn, 435. Otherwise the poetic shawāhid are not identical to those found in the Mathal / Asrār.

867 Ibid., 437: wa-yaddhulu aktharu ḥudūhi l-amthilati fī l-tashbīhi aydān. By tashbīh he likely means ‘analogy’ here (or at least the more general ‘comparison’).
has no negative connotation) we again find that an ‘added comment’ is expressed to reinforce the statement, but here, the extra motif (or ‘appendix’) is not imaginary or “mock” as we find in al-istishhād wa-l-iḥtijāj, but is rather plainly true to reality. Take the following line by Abū Nuwās (d. ca. 198/813), which is the last example Abū Hilāl adduces for tadhyīl, [meter: kāmil]

\[
\begin{align*}
'\text{ārama l-zamānu 'alā -lladhīna 'ahidtahum} \\
\text{biki qāṭīna wa-li-l-zamāni 'urāmū}
\end{align*}
\]

“Time has been harsh to those you knew in the past,
who lived in you [the abode] -- Time is harsh!”

Abū Hilāl comments, “and his saying, Time is harsh, is a tadhyīl.”

The appended comment (tadhyīl) is structurally equivalent to the illustrative analogy (tamthīl / mathal maḍrub / istishhād wa-iḥtijāj), in that they are uttered as a “commentary” on reality, and usually at the end of the sentence. In the case of tadhyīl, the commentary is...

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868 Musāwāt is commonly regarded as a correspondence between the amount of words uttered and the intended meaning (x=y), and īshāra as expressing fewer words to convey the intended meaning (x=y-1). In this context, tadhyīl (or other terms like it) can sometimes have a negative connotation because it is seen as an unnecessary exceeding of limits (x=y+1). (Notation: ‘x’ is the meaning, ‘y’ is the amount of words). In fact Abū Hilāl himself conveys this negative layer by saying that it is most appropriately directly at the ‘slow’ people; this is after he praises the merits of tadhyīl (ibid., 387).


870 Al-Ṣinā‘atayn, 389. See also Kanazi, Studies, 153-54.

871 See Kanazi, Studies, 154, for the possibility of tadhyīl appearing before the main idea (and a different structure in the first example by al-Farazdaq). I personally find the common structure of the ‘appended commentary’ -- whether it is in the form of tadhyīl or tamthīl -- to be one of the more distinctive and beautiful features of classical Arabic poetry. It extends to later Persian poetry as well and is one of the foundations of the so-called sabk-e hindī. For but one example, see the following by Kalīm Kāshānī (d. 1061/1651):

The world never lasts, however stubborn your grasp,
However tightly one closes the fist,
The color of the henna always fades away
straightforward because it is (perceived as) ‘real’ and true’. In the case of tamthīl, the commentary (or analogy or explanation) is a product of the poet’s imagination, which lends itself to an understanding of that commentary as being ‘untrue’.\textsuperscript{872} I think this is what stands at the basis of Ḍiyā’-al-Dīn’s perception of this type of tashbīḥ as figurative (and how tashbīḥ in general is conceived as majāz will be discussed below). It is true that as a literary device, the illustrative analogy was known before al-Jurjānī and that in the case of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī we even find an identical example to one of the two examples adduced by Ḍiyā’-al-Dīn. Nevertheless, it is likelier that Ḍiyā’-al-Dīn was influenced by al-Jurjānī here: besides the terminological affinity tamthīl-mathal, Ḍiyā’-al-Dīn opens the chapter on tashbīḥ by stating that “scholars of ‘ilm al-bayān have distinguished between tashbīḥ and tamthīl, devoting separate chapters to each category, even though they are one and the same lexically (lit. in the basis of the lexicon)... I do not know how those scholars (ulāʾika l-ʿulamāʾ) were unaware of this despite its obviousness!”\textsuperscript{873} Ḍiyā’-al-Dīn rather envisioned tashbīḥ as covering both the simple simile (with or without the particle of comparison) and the complex analogy. Whether the phrase “those scholars” actually referred to more than one scholar is unclear; but that it was a reference to al-

\textit{Studies} 19 [2004], 1-93, here: 30 [with an emended translation], 75, also: 11, 25-26).

\textsuperscript{872} Strictly speaking, every analogy is true. According to the philosopher Nelson Goodman, “anything is in some way like anything else” (my emphasis) and Donald Davidson, also a philosopher, goes even further by saying, “everything is like everything” (my emphasis); see Robert J. Fogelin, \textit{Figuratively Speaking}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. revised, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 50, 57, but cf. 58 fn. 7 (these statements can apply both to level of the simile and to that of the analogy). See also Borges’ “There are infinite things upon the earth; any one of them can be compared to any other” (from Averroës’ \textit{Search} in Jorge Luis Borges, \textit{The Aleph and Other Stories}, New York: Penguin Books, 2004, 69-78, here: 75). The ‘truthfulness’ of the analogies (from a strict philosophical perspective) are evident in the examples we came across illustrating the mathal madrūb/tamthīl/istishhād: pissing into a river has no effect = your lampooning has no effect; petty criticisms can pile up over time and effect me = drops of water can eventually fill a vessel to excess; being patient with an envious person can eventually stop his feeling of envy = a fire eventually extinguishes itself; (and see below:) you are dead but still your soul endures = even a sword with no handle or belt can cut. We will resume the question of truthfulness in similarity claims when we discuss the inclusion of tashbīḥ within majāz.

\textsuperscript{873} \textit{Al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir} 2: 116.
Jurjānī is blatantly evident.\textsuperscript{874}

\textit{Majāz in the Mathal: A New Classification}

As we have seen so far, many of the literary examples discussed in the context of \textit{tashbīḥ} are indistinguishable from (a modern notion of) metaphor. Other examples outside \textit{tashbīḥ} may also reflect cases of metaphor. The criterion for classification of \textit{majāz}, then, transcends the conformity or non-conformity to metaphor. We shall now take a step back and look at the larger classification scheme that ʿiyā al-Dīn offers in the \textit{Mathal}, departing both from his earlier \textit{Jāmiʿ} and from earlier literary-theoretical accounts. Hinting at his innovation is his prefacing of the scheme with the words, “It has become manifest to me through sound reflection…,” after which \textit{majāz} is divided into two general categories: ‘extension in speech’ (\textit{tawassuʿ fī l-kalām}; sometimes \textit{ittisāʿ}) and ‘comparison’ (\textit{tashbīḥ}).\textsuperscript{875}

‘Comparison’ is further classified into two categories: complete (\textit{tāmm}) and elliptical (\textit{mahdhūf}), the first referring to cases in which both sides of the comparison are mentioned, and the second to cases in which only the analogue is mentioned, not the topic (see above for

\textsuperscript{874} But see \textit{Asrār}, 84, for a recognition by al-Jurjānī that \textit{tamthīl} is a subtype of \textit{tashbīḥ}. We mentioned above that besides the two examples for \textit{al-mathal al-madrūb} ʿDiyāʿ al-Dīn also cites a line that scholars erroneously interpret as an illustrative analogy (referred to here by the cover-term \textit{tashbīḥ}), but is – to ʿDiyāʿ al-Dīn’s mind – a case of \textit{istiʿāra} (\textit{al-Mathal al-sāʿīr} 2: 121). This example is al-Buḥturi’s lament of a boy [meter: \textit{tawīl}] \textit{taʿāza fa-inna l-sayfā yamīḥ wa-in wahat // hamā iluhāʾ anhū wa-khallāhu qāʾimuh} (correcting the typo in vocalization \textit{qāʾimahu}) “Take solace, for the sword cuts even if its shoulder belts are too weak to hold it (\textit{`anhu}) and its hilt left its place” (see also al-Buḥturi, \textit{Dīwān} 3: 1956). Although the line is not adduced in the \textit{Asrār} (or \textit{Dalāʾ i]), this example too points directly at al-Jurjānī, who would likely have considered it to be a case of \textit{tamthīl} (or even \textit{takhyīl}), not \textit{istiʿāra}. To me it seems like an unequivocal case of illustrative analogy, but according to ʿDiyāʿ al-Dīn, the lamented boy is the unexpressed topic here, and the intended sense is (\textit{ka-annahu qāʿa}), “Take solace, for you are like a sword that cuts even though its shoulder belts are too weak and its hilt left its place” (\textit{al-Mathal al-sāʿīr} 2: 121).

\textsuperscript{875} \textit{Al-Mathal al-sāʿīr} 2: 71, 1: 106. We addressed above the ‘suspicious’ character of such self-congratulatory phraseology, which may point to an unacknowledged borrowing by ʿDiyāʿ al-Dīn. In the case of the classification of \textit{majāz}, I have not yet found evidence of an earlier scholar espousing such a scheme. On the level of terminology, it is likely that the terms \textit{tawassuʿ} and \textit{tashbīḥ} were inspired by Ibn Jinnī’s account on the necessary components found in \textit{majāz} (in addition to \textit{tawkīd} ‘exaggeration’; see above). On the level of \textit{substance}, it could be the case that his thinking on \textit{majāz} categories was influenced by al-Jurjānī’s observations on the difference between metaphor that contains a substratum and metaphor that does not (\textit{Asrār}, 42 ff.): in the case of \textit{tawassuʿ}, there is usually no substratum.

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discussion). It is this latter category, according to Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn, that is termed istiʿāra lit. ‘borrowing’. But he goes on to say that the term istiʿāra (as a technical term) was only coined to differentiate the elliptical comparison from the complete comparison (wuḍiʿa lī-l-farqi baynahu wa-bayna l-tashbīhi l-tāmm), but that otherwise, both terms, tashbīh and istiʿāra, could be applied to both categories since they convey a shared meaning (wa-illā fa-kilāhumā yajūzu an yuṭlaqa ʿalayhi -smu l-tashbīhi wa-yajūzu an yuṭlaqa ʿalayhi -smu l-istiʿārati li-shtirākihimā fī l-maʿnā). In other words, Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn blurs the distinction between tashbīh and istiʿāra by ascribing to them the same essential denotation. This denotation is not couched in terms of ‘similarity’ as one might expect (and as some of the shawāhid later show), but rather in terms of ‘commonality’, ‘relation’ or ‘connection’ (primarily mushāraka; also munāsaba, wuṣla, and once wajh) between the two sides of the figurative expression. By blurring the distinction Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn is essentially marginalizing istiʿāra in favor of tashbīh, although he later concedes (wa-in shiʿta qulta) that majāz can be said to have three categories: tawassuʿ fī l-kalām, tashbīh and istiʿāra. In terms of space, the category that is afforded the most attention is tashbīh (totaling 46 pages in the printed edition of al-Ḥūfī and Ṭabāna), then istiʿāra (20 pages of examples and occasional commentary) (an additional 9 pages on the theoretical difference between tashbīh and istiʿāra, discussed above), and finally tawassuʿ (about 6 pages). In terms of ‘chronology’, the chapter on istiʿāra appears first, with an embedded aside on tawassuʿ (and other asides), and the chapter on tashbīh appears second.

876 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 71.
877 Ibid. 2: 72, 78, 81-83 (mushāraka), 79, 83 (munāsaba), 82.8 (wajh), 1: 106 (wuṣla).
878 Ibid. 2: 71 (also 83).
879 For the chapter titled fī l-istiʿāra see ibid. 2: 70-115. It is the first category (al-nawʿ al-awwal) of the ‘mental craft’ (al-sināʿa al-maʿnawīya) or literary devices concerned with sense. The chapter includes the following discussions: the difference between istiʿāra and tashbīh, tawassuʿ, Ibn Jinnī’s analysis of majāz, al-Ghazālī’s
The category of *tawassuʿ* is placed and discussed under the chapter titled *fī l-istiʿāra*, but Ǧiyāʾ al-Dīn does not spell out the reason for subsuming the former under the latter. Of course there is little doubt that the two are conceived of as typologically separate. The dividing line between *tashbīḥ-istiʿāra* and *tawassuʿ* is the element of *mushāraka* just mentioned: whereas the former category(ies) is based on some relation between the two sides of the figurative expression (topic-analogue), in the latter category there is nothing relating one to the other.\(^880\) (Although we shall see that at least one type of *tashbīḥ* is essentially indistinguishable from *tawassuʿ*). I see the placement of *tawassuʿ* within the chapter on *istiʿāra* as a nod to tradition: the examples Ǧiyāʾ al-Dīn cites for *tawassuʿ* are commonly identified by previous scholars as instances of *istiʿāra*, and he was undoubtedly aware of that.\(^881\) The examples and corresponding commentary show that the ‘old’ poetic\(^882\) meaning of the term *istiʿāra*, as borrowing an element (not a word) from a foreign context and placing it ‘on loan’ in the context of the topic, is what Ǧiyāʾ al-Dīn relegates to *tawassuʿ*. The ascription of a ‘foreign’ element usually entails personification (a term not used), such as ascribing body parts or speech to non-human and inanimate beings (see examples below). In essence, Ǧiyāʾ al-Dīn is excluding cases of ‘ascription’ from the domain of *istiʿāra*. The other side of the picture is that *istiʿāra* now fully conforms to what Heinrichs has identified as ‘new’ or simile-based metaphors (the “narcissus-for-eye” metaphors; for elaboration see categorization of *majāz*, and many examples with occasional commentary, appended by a five-page critique of al-Khafājī’s understanding of Imruʿ al-Qays’ famous line on the long night which is like a camel slow to rise. This latter ‘appendix’ is discussed in detail in Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 23-25. For the chapter titled *fī l-tashbīḥ* (the second literary device concerned with sense) see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 116-61.

\(^880\) Ibid. 2: 72, 78.2-3e, 82.2, 82.2e.

\(^881\) In other words, I think he is aware “of the change of meaning that has occurred to the term *istiʿāra* since the time of al-Khafājī” (cf. Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 24).

\(^882\) This is in contrast to the old ‘exegetical’ meaning of *istiʿāra*, to wit, the borrowing of words (see, e.g., *Hand of the Northwind*, 53, and our discussion above on its later formulation in *uṣūl al-fiqh*, albeit in the form of the term *majāz*, not *istiʿāra*).
If in the works of literary theory up until the 5th/11th century chapters on istiʿāra tended to display a mixing of the two types of metaphor, the loan metaphor and the simile-based metaphor\textsuperscript{884} – with ɬiyā’ al-Dīn we find a neat separation between the two. This neat separation is usually associated with the work of al-Jurjānī (and al-Sakkākī following him), who explicitly acknowledged two types of istiʿāra.\textsuperscript{885} What is interesting with ɬiyā’ al-Dīn – who was likely influenced by al-Jurjānī here – is that he does away with the term istiʿāra altogether when it comes to the loan metaphor. In effect, his solution is “neater” than the one offered by al-Jurjānī, since istiʿāra now denotes only one notion, not two.

Once again, speaking of ‘metaphor’ in ɬiyā’ al-Dīn’s classification of majāz would be inappropriate since metaphor appears across categories. It is more appropriate to speak of figurative language based on “perceived” mutual relation (usually similarity\textsuperscript{886}) between topic and analogue, and figurative language based on “imposed” mutual relation between the two

\textsuperscript{883} Heinrichs, \textit{Hand of the Northwind}, 1-3 and passim. That ɬiyā’ al-Dīn “adheres to a strict tashbīḥ-based single-term notion of istiʿāra” has already been identified by Heinrichs (ibid., 24). Heinrichs does not treat ɬiyā’ al-Dīn’s views on istiʿāra as such, but is more concerned (pp. 23-25) with the latter’s critique of al-Khafājī’s understanding of Imru’ al-Qays’ line mentioned above. Of special interest for our purposes is the first point Heinrichs enumerates on p. 24.

\textsuperscript{884} Hand of the Northwind, Part Two and Part Three. Strictly speaking, Heinrichs does not give a full account of the shawāhid in these scholars’ chapters on istiʿāra (see. p. 53 for his suggestions for further research), save for the case of Tha’lab’s (d. 291/904) \textit{Qawāʾid al-shīr} (pp. 3-6). However, it seems rather apparent from the shawāhid that are discussed that the earlier the scholar, the likelier it is that the examples – regardless of the definition of istiʿāra – exhibit loan metaphors, or at least that the scholar’s comments on the examples contain “old” phraseology (e.g., “[the poet] borrowed [the object/mental image] X for Y”). In fact in Tha’lab’s case there is a clear discrepancy between a “new” definition of istiʿāra and “old” shawāhid (ibid. 32-33). The analysis of chapters on istiʿāra ends with the 5th/11th century scholar al-Khafājī (pp. 51-52, out of 16 scholars studied). ɬiyā’ al-Dīn is treated earlier (pp. 23-25, and see previous fn.), but it is not intended as a systematic look at metaphor after the time of al-Jurjānī and al-Khafājī.

\textsuperscript{885} Ibid., 1-2; \textit{Asrār}, 42 ff. Heinrichs commonly speaks of a metaphor based on tashbīḥ and a metaphor based on tamthīl, using the “fixed” terms of later theorists (\textit{Hand of the Northwind}, 6-7). We should keep in mind, though, that al-Jurjānī himself does not explain the difference between the two types of metaphors in these terms (as far as I can tell): for him the difference lies in the fact that one has a substratum (\textit{shay’ ma lūm yuṃkin an yuṇass` alayhi, shay` yushār ilayh}, and other expressions) while the other does not (\textit{Asrār}, 42 ff., and see our discussion of analogy above; cf. Hand of the Northwind, 7).

\textsuperscript{886} And see our discussion below on kināya, in which one of the (implicit) relations is contiguity.
(imposed, that is, by the poet). The first type of figurative language is based on a paradigmatic conception of the utterance; the second is based on a syntagmatic conception. In a syntagmatic conception, the two components are conceived of as simply being juxtaposed side by side (either as verb-subject or muḍāf-muḍāf ilayhi, see below), whereas the paradigmatic conception acknowledges a juxtaposition based on substitution (due primarily to similarity, but sometimes due to contiguity, see below). Another way to parse the categories of majāz is according to linguistic makeup: whereas istiʿāra is a single-word metaphor, tashbih (where the particle of comparison is omitted) and tawassuʿ are sentence metaphors. In this respect, as we shall see, kināya aligns closely with istiʿāra. The single-word metaphor is the only category in which we find a true conformity between the examples adduced and the definition of majāz that speaks of “using a word not according to its original coinage.” Nevertheless, in some of Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn’s comments on examples we find a tension between taking the words literally or figuratively.

_Tawassuʿ (and the Influence of Ibn Sīnā)_

Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn distinguishes between two types of tawassuʿ or fictional ascription: one is in the form of a genitive construct (ʿalā wajh al-idāfa) – its usage is deemed ‘ugly’; the other is in non-genitive forms (ʿalā ghayr wajh al-idāfa) – its usage is deemed beautiful. The genitive ascription is considered ugly because of the remoteness between the two idāfa terms (li-buʿdi mā bayna l-mudāfi wa-l-mudāfi ilayhi), and the examples cited are commonly perceived by earlier

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887 By this I do not mean to refer to metonymy, as the term commonly denotes, most famously in Roman Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances,” in Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle (eds.), _Fundamentals of Language_, 2nd rev. ed., The Hague: Mouton, 1971, 68-96. In metonymy there is a relation of contiguity between the two sides of the figurative expression, whereas in tawassuʿ there is no (perceived) relation between the two. What I am referring to as syntagmatic (and paradigmatic) is not the _relationship_ between the two components but rather Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn’s _conception_ of the figurative usage.

888 Al-Mathal al-sāʾīr 2: 79, 81.

889 Ibid. 2: 79.
scholars as ugly *istiʿārāt*. (Of course it is inconsistent to speak of a remote relation here since the whole premise is an absence of relation; see below.) The first two examples are lines by Abū Nuwās, the first listed as a ‘remote’ metaphor in Ibn Rashīq’s *ʿUmda* and the second listed as an ugly metaphor in al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī’s *Wasāṭa*; the context is praise of the patron’s generosity, [meter: *ramal*]

\[
\text{buḥha sa} \text{w}t\text{u} \text{l-māli mimmā}
\]
\[
\text{mi} \text{nka} \text{yashkū wa-ya} \text{sīhū}
\]

“The voice of money turned hoarse from complaining about you and screaming (that it does not want to be dispersed)”

and [meter: *ramal*]

\[
\text{mā li-rijli l-māli ams} \text{at}
\]
\[
\text{tashtakī m} \text{inka} \text{l-kalālā}
\]

“How is it that the leg of money comes (every) evening and complains to you of (its) fatigue?”

It is not the ascription of an animate action (screaming, complaining) to the inanimate being (money) that bothers ʿiyā ἀl-Dīn here. In fact ʿiyā ἀl-Dīn provides a better way, from a line by Muslim b. al-Walīd (d. 207/823), to express the idea that money ‘complains’ to the patron of his injustice in thinking so little of it by ‘getting rid’ of it (*anna l-māla yataẓallamu min ihānatika iyyāhu bi-l-tamzīq*): this is the verb metaphor *tazallama l-mālu* (“money complained of the injustice…”). Rather, the problem in his view lies in the ascription (*iḏāfa* – not in the

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890 *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 270 (along with the “uglier” case of “leg of separation”); *al-Wasāṭa*, 58.

891 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 89; Abū Nuwās, *Dīwān* 1 (2nd ed.): 153.

892 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 79, 154; Abū Nuwās, *Dīwān* 1: 307, 5: 430 (the latter in a section on his poetry that is condemned as being *ghathth, bārid*). In other words: if you treated money justly by not scattering it, it would not be fatigued by coming to you daily ‘by foot’ in search for justice. This is what money would say to the patron if it attempted to get justice in the face of its ‘oppression’ (see previous line, *yā Abā Ishāqa law tunṣafu // minka l-mālu qālā*).

893 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 79. According to Usāma b. Munqidh, Muslim was influenced by Abū Nuwās here! (al-
grammatical sense, see below) of “voice” – a property, not action – to “money.”

As Diyā’ al-Dīn says of the second example, “ascribing (iḍāfa) a leg to ‘money’ is uglier than ascribing voice [to it]!” For Diyā’ al-Dīn describing money as ‘complaining’ about being given away makes sense, but describing money as having an actual voice does not, let alone a leg. The next two examples are by Abū Tammām, who is said to have used such constructions “a lot” because of his obsession (tatabbu’ lit. ‘making successive or repeated endeavors to attain it’) with lexical and morphological puns (mumāthala and tajnīs). In these examples we find that “cutting” (or: skin, or: figure; qadd) is ascribed to “separation” (nawā), “joint bone” (kaʿb) is ascribed to “honor” (ʿird), and “cheek” (khadd) is ascribed to “money” (māl).

These types of genitive metaphors are still strongly connected to the discourse of comparison in Diyā’ al-Dīn’s thinking, since additional examples thereof are listed under the chapter on tashbīh among the ugly comparisons.

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894 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 80. Although on its own, the phrase ṣawt al-māl simply means “the sound of coins”; it was clearly, then, the combination with buḥḥa that bothered Diyā’ al-Dīn and Ibn Rashīq. Usāma actually liked the verse, and he gives Muslim’s line above as an example of good ‘literary theft’, that is, drawing on a good line (Abū uwās’) and keeping it good (al-Badī’, 187: naql al-jazl ilā l-jazl).


896 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 80-81, and see editors’ fns. For additional examples see, e.g., al-Āmidī, al-Muwāzana 1: 245-50; Schippers, “Genitive Metaphor,” 256-60. The line by Abū Tammām which contains qadd runs as follows [meter: ṭawīl]: wa-kam ahrazat minkum ʿalā qubhi qaddihā // ṣurūfu l-nawā min murhaʃin ḥanasi l-qaddī “How much the vicissitudes of Separation, with its ugly cut, have kept you [the absent loved ones] apart from the slender-waisted figure [i.e., me]!” (and see line 1, al-Tibrīzī, Sharḥ 2: 109, where it is the poet’s persona speaking). For the various understandings of qadd see ibid. 2: 110. If qadd means “skin” (adīm), it refers more precisely to “the freshly frayed skin of a lamb” (mask al-sakhla); like ‘figure’, it would then stand metonymically for Separation’s image/appearance. But Diyā’ al-Dīn does not take it as ‘figure’ since he thinks that the line ends with a mumāthala, a play on words based on a homonym, necessitating that the two qadds in the line have different meanings.

that *tawassuʿ* (referring to the subtype discussed here) is nothing other than a ‘remote’ comparison with no particle of comparison;\(^{898}\) in doing so he admits some form of ‘relation’ between the two sides of the figurative expression. In other words, and since he speaks of *tashbīḥ* here, he recognizes that the figurative expression is based on a comparison (or more specifically analogy), even though this comparison is verbally ill-constrained in his eyes (*fa-l-māʾ nā ḥasan wa-l-taʿbīr ʿanhu qabīḥ*).\(^{899}\)

It is in the second subtype of *tawassuʿ* that we find a true case of an absence of relation between the two sides of the figurative expression. If the comments on the genitive metaphors above contained references to *tashbīḥ* or *buʿd*, with the examples of the second subtype the comments are consistently in the form, *idh lā mushāraka bayna... wa-*... “since there is no shared point between X and Y.” This subtype, we may recall, is deemed beautiful by ʿDiyāʾ al-

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\(^{898}\) Ibid. 2: 153-54, ʿalā annahu [...] *idhā [...] kāna bayna l-mushabbahī wa-l-mushabbahī bihi buʿdun [...] wa-lladhī yaridu minhu muḍmara l-adātī lā yakūnu dhālika illā fī l-qismī l-wāḥidī min aqsāmi l-majāzīyyi (sic) wa-huwa l-tawassuʿu* “Although... if... there is a remoteness between topic and analogue... that which comes without a particle of comparison only occurs in one category of the figurative (usage), and that is *tawassuʿ*.” (Majāzī also occurs in the edition of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, 1: 417, and in the nineteenth century edition of al-Maḥāra al-Bahiyya, 160.10.) Then ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces the second example we saw above by Abū Nuwās (*mā li-riḍī l-māli...*), followed by the comment, “and he made a leg belong to money (*fa-ja ala li-l-māli riṭīlī*) and that is a remote comparison (*tashbīḥ baʿīd*), and there is no need to repeat here what we said there [under the chapter on *tawassuʿ*] in its entirety...” (ibid. ed. al-Ḥūfī and Ṭabarīna 2: 154). Already in his response to one of the lines by Abū Tamamā back in the section on *tawassuʿ*, ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn comments, *fa-ṣaḍdītu l-qaddī ilā l-nawā mina l-tashbīhi l-baʿīdi l-baʿīdī* (ibid. 2: 80). One should note that some of the examples under *tawassuʿ* and later under ‘bad comparisons’ are replicated (along with some of the same comments), without acknowledgement, in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd commentary on *Nahj al-balāgha*; this is the same Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd who wrote the first known response to the *Mathal* (Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 20 vols., Cairo: Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1959, 1: 215-16). In other words, the category of *tawassuʿ* is rejected by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd in favor of ‘traditional’ notions. We mentioned above that in the actual refutation of *Mathal*, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd is silent with regards to ʿDiyāʾ al-Dīn’s new categorization scheme. As an *uṣūlī*, he pays all of his attention to the legal aspects of *majāz*.

\(^{899}\) Quote taken from *al-Mathal al-sāʿīr* 2: 79, in response to the line “The voice of money turned hoarse...” It is interesting to note in this context that the philosopher Ibn Rushd adduces such genitive metaphors (our term) as Abū Tamām’s famous “water of blame” (*māʾ ʿal-malām*) and “milk-bowls of death” (*kuthab al-mawt*, both to be discussed in §5.5) within the context of *tashbīḥ* (also called *muḥākāt ’mimesis’*), and glosses them as *ghayr munāṣīb* (Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ*, in *Fann al-shīr*, 223-24). From within the philosophic poetical tradition it is Ibn Rushd’s work that lends itself most to a comparison with literary theory proper, since he suffuses his discussions with examples from poetry of “the Arabs” (and references to notions held “*indanā*”), thus going beyond the Greek literary tradition.
And it is this type that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn speaks of when he first introduces the notion of *tawassuʿ* (using the term *ittisāʿ*) in his theoretical discussion of *majāz* under the preliminary chapters of the *Mathal*. In other words, it is this subtype that stands at the core of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s conception of *tawassuʿ*. (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn may have added the genitive metaphors later, recognizing the affinity between the two.) Under the preliminary chapter on *majāz* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn presents the etymology of the word in terms of passing or crossing over (*intiqāl, ‘ubūr*) from one place (*makān, maḥall*) to another, an etymology commonly found in *majāz* discussions. But he then compares two types of physical (*ḥaqīqī*) crossing over to figurative crossing over: in the first type there is a connection (*wuṣla*, or *mushābaha* more specifically) between the place one is crossing from and one is crossing to, like passing from a smooth terrain to a smooth terrain, or from a rugged terrain to a rugged one (*sahl/waʿr*). Such is the case in the figurative ‘passing over’ *Zaydun asadun* “Zayd is a lion” (the heading *tashbīḥ* is not used here). Conversely, passing from a smooth terrain to a rugged one or vice versa is “like their saying in the book *Kalīla wa-Dimna*: the lion said or the fox said, for there is no connection (*wuṣla*) whatsoever between [the notion of] ‘saying’ (*al-qawl*) and these two [animals].”

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s appeal to the animal fables of *Kalīla wa-Dimna* as the archetypal examples of *ittisāʿ*/ *tawassuʿ* is especially pertinent, since by doing so he admits into the discourse of literary theory the phenomenon of ‘fiction’. As has been shown by Rina Drory, the apologetics used by the *maqāmāt* writers in their prefaces often involved a request to their readers “to regard their *maqāmāt* in the same way as they regard fables and stories told by

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900 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 81-83.
901 Ibid. 1: 106.
902 Ibid. 1: 105-106. Note that there is no hint here of another type of *ittisāʿ*/ *tawassuʿ*, namely, the ‘bad’ genitive metaphors.
animals or inanimate objects.” Drory writes,

Maqāmāt authors turned to it in order to gain recognition for their literary innovation precisely because of the fundamental poetic basis of evident fictionality they felt was common to both Kalīla wa-Dimna and their compositions.

In other words, Kalīla wa-Dimna was code for the ‘untrue’ or fictional, and Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn was probably well aware of this. Like the fantastic tale (khurāfa), discourse surrounding animal fables (mainly in adab anthologies) as well as the maqāmāt genre contained references to “truth” and “lie/falsehood.” In one account, the khurāfa is glossed as ḥadīthun lā ḥaqīqata lahu “a story that has no truth” and in another, as mā yukadhdhibūnahu mina l-ahādīthi “stories that people find to be untrue,” such that ḥaqīqa is contrasted with kadhib. In this sense, Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn’s tawassu’ aligns well with kadhib, the opposite of ḥaqīqa (in its non-linguistic sense), making the leap to majāz rather seamless.

That Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn was familiar with the apologetic discourse used in the maqāmāt is evident from his portrayal of tawassu’ as something that merely concerns “speech” (kalām, lugha, ‘ibāra). The phrases he uses are li-ṭalab al-tawassu’ fī l-kalām “in order to pursue extension in speech,” tawassu’ fī l-‘ibāra “extension in expression,” ittisā’an maḥdān “mere

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906 The first is from al-Nahrawānī’s (5th/11th cent.) al-Jalīs al-sāliḥ, the second is from Ibn Manẓūr’s definition in Liṣān al-’arab (ibid., 156). The ‘falsehood’ in stories of the maqāmāt are not unlike what Kilito terms “opaque” anecdotes with respect to al-Jāḥiẓ (Abdelfattah Kilito, The Author and His Doubles: Essays on Classical Arabic Culture, translated by Michael Cooper with a Foreword by Roger Allen, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2001, 57-58).
extension [in speech],” ṯalab al-tawassuʿ lā ghayr “to seek ‘extension’ [in speech], nothing else,” ṯalab al-lattisāʿ fī asālib al-kalām “seeking extension in the patterns of speech,” and the important comment, fa-ammā l-tawassuʿu fa-innahu yudhkaru li-ṣarrufi fī l-lughati lā li-fāʿidatin ukhrā “as for tawassuʿ, it is mentioned to [show] versatility/artifice (ṭaṣṣarruf) in speech, not for any other purpose.”

That is the same discourse we find Ibn Nāqiyyā (d. 485/1092) using in the preface to his Maqāmāt, saying that “placing words of wisdom in the tongues of animals […] is only a [show of] versatility/artifice in expression […] waḍʿi l-hikmati ‘alā alsinati l-bahāʿi […] wa-innamā huwa ṭaṣṣarrufun fī l-ʿibāra).”

The use of ṭaṣṣarruf here alludes to the idea of cunning (ḥīla), a term which itself is associated with ‘fictive’ writings. (Al-Ḥarīrī and Ibn Sharaf acknowledge the fictive character of their maqāmāt but do not use the terminology of kalām/lugha/ʿibāra as the locus of ‘manipulation’.)

Expressions such as tawassuʿ fī l-kalām strongly evoke the old philological idea of lexical extensions, or some type of change on the level of speech itself. Why the insistence on kalām/ʿibāra/lugha when in fact what is being manipulated or ‘expanded’ is not language but reality? After all, in a sentence like “The lion said,” nothing linguistic is being changed but rather the outside world, to include a speaking lion. One explanation for making this question a

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907 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 1: 106, 2: 71, 78, 82. Cf. the use of this expression in the context of change in grammatical person (termed by him tajrīd) in ibid. 2: 163, 165.

908 Ibn Nāqiyyā, Maqāmāt in Maqāmāt al-Ḥanafī wa-Ibn Nāqiyyā wa-ghayrihimā, [ed. Oskar Rescher], Istanbul: Aḥmad Kāmil, [1914], 123.


linguistic one can be found in Ibn Sīnā’s (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, which incidentally – or not – Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn claims he saw passages from. According to Ibn Sīnā, a work like Kalīla wa-Dīmna is excluded from the realm of poetry because it deals with “that which exists only in speech/words” (fīmā wujūduhu fī l-qawli faqaṭ) rather than that which exists, or could exist, in the real world (fīmā wujida wa-yūjadu). In this sense, talking about manipulations taking place only on the linguistic plain is appropriate.

We can be fairly certain that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was familiar with the philosophical notion of things “existing” only in the domain of speech (qawl/kalām/ʿibāra/lugha) directly from Ibn Sīnā’s Shifāʾ, a book that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn singles out by name in his opening discussion of maʿānī ‘motifs; themes; images’. The passage in which Ibn Sīnā speaks of the non-existent aspect of fables and parables (among which is Kalīla wa-Dīmna) is part of a larger argument that Ibn Sīnā is making, following Aristotle, namely that poetry deals with universals (al-kullī), not particulars (al-juzʿīyyāt). Thus, says Ibn Sīnā, poetry “speaks about one person [i.e., a ‘particular’] as if

911 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 5-6, and see Introduction, fn. 40, on the question of a semi-voie érudite here. I do not know if the maqāmāt writers were also influenced by the philosophers here or whether it was a common idea to speak of ‘fiction’ as a reality that subsists in speech alone.

912 From Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifāʾ, in Fann al-shīr maʾa al-tarjama al-ʿarabiyya al-qadīma wa-shurūḥ al-Fārābī wa-Ibn Sīnā wa-Ibn Rushd, ed. ʿAbd al-Rahmān Badawi, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1953, 159-98, here: 183. Quoted in Zadeh, “Wiles of Creation,” 43. The contrast here is between animal fables (specifically versified versions thereof), which speak of things that do not exist, and ‘real’ poetry, which speaks of things that can exist (I say “can” or “could” exist based on the beginning of the passage). Compare Ibn Sīnā’s passage to Aristotle, Poetics, 1451a35-1451b5, where the poet is said to relate not things that have happened, but things that may happen (Aristotle, Poetics: With the Tractatus Coislinianus, a hypothetical reconstruction of Poetics II, and the fragments of the On Poets, translated with notes by Richard Janko, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987, 12). For further discussion and translation of Ibn Sīnā’s passage see Bürgel, “Die beste Dichtung,” 47-48; he translates qawl as “the words (in question)” (parentheses his). Because Ibn Sīnā concurs with Aristotle here (see below), the verb wujida in fīmā wujida wa-yūjadu is essentially synonymous with the modal yūjdau ‘could exist’ as wujida does not refer to that which actually exists but to that which technically (potentially) exists. In this sense someone like Mayya ‘exists’ as Dhū al-Rumma’s beloved – although she did not actually exist – but speaking lions do not (if we take Mayya to be an invented name, see below). For another translation of this passage see Ismail M. Dahiyat, Avicenna’s Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle: A Critical Study with an Annotated Translation of the Text, Leiden: Brill, 1974, 99-100.

913 Ibn Sīnā, Fann al-shīr, 183, and Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Janko, 12; the explanatory heading that Janko adds for this section is “Poetry should represent universals, not particulars.”
(an occurrence) happened only to him, and they (the poets) make up a name for (that) one person alone, even though he does not exist," whereas in fact, that person stands for some type of universal character or phenomenon. In this sense, poems that deal with “particular events that [actually] took place” (ahuwāl juz’iyya qad wujidat) are of a lesser poetry. The fact that poetry deals with universals (ahkama bi-l-ḥukm al-kulli “makes a universal judgment”) renders it closer to philosophy than any other type of speech. If we check what prompted Diya’ al-Dīn to speak about Ibn Sīnā in the first place, we find that it was a controversy about whether it was possible to limit “rhetorical themes” (al-ma’anī al-khaṭābiyya) to a set of principles (usūl), from which poets/orators can benefit. Diya’ al-Dīn’s claim was that such a reduction, which according to him was first laid out by the Greek philosophers, would only be “general” (kulli) and could not possibly cover the endless amount of “particular themes” (juz’ iyyāt al-ma’anī). It was this

914 wa-ammā dhālika l-naw’u mina l-kalāmi [i.e., al-shi’r] fa-innamā yaqūlu fī wāḥidin ʿalā annahu ʿāridun lahu wahdahu wa-yakānu dhālika l-wāhidu qadi ḫāturi ʿa lahu -smu wāḥidin faqat wa-lā wujūda lahu (Ibn Sīnā, Fann al-shi’r, 183). Bürgel (“Die beste Dichtung,” 48) thinks that this statement refers to the types of speech that are not poetry (“Jene andere Gattung der Rede”), but this is a mistake: first, on a syntactic level, dhālika means “the former” and the previous sentence speaks of al-shi’r, al-falsafa, and al-kalām al-ākhar, making poetry ‘the former’; second – and this becomes clear only if we consult the Poetics – Aristotle makes clear that poetry does not deal with actual events (that would be the domain of history, including history in verse), but with events that may take place: “[...] it is the function of a poet to relate not things that have happened but things that may happen”; “A universal is the sort of thing that a certain kind of person may well say or do in accordance with probability or necessity—this is what poetry aims at, although it assigns names [to the people]. A particular is what Alcibiades did or what he suffered” (Aristotle, Poetics, trans. Janko, 12). Bürgel himself recognizes this last point, but because of the mistranslation he thinks that Ibn Sīnā misunderstood Aristotle. Dahiyat also mistranslates this and takes the statement to be a reference to the fables (Avicenna’s Commentary, 100).

915 To take an example from Arabic poetry, “Mayya” and “Laylā” would be the invented names and those beloveds would stand for The Beloved. I do not know if Ibn Sīnā has any Arabic poems in mind here or only the Greek ones.

916 Fann al-shi’r, 183. Ibn Sīnā says that this type of poetry is not told “according to [the manner of] image evocation” (i.e., there is no need for takhyīl because all the events and characters are real), from which I extrapolate that it is of a lesser poetry. If he is following Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā probably has in mind here versified history.

917 That, together with the fact that poetry deals with the mawjud, probably here: the essences of things, regardless of their actual manifestation in particular ‘existing things’ (because the objects in poetry do not actually exist).

918 Al-Mathal al-sā’ir 2: 3. Diya’ al-Dīn might be talking about the old notion we come across in literary theory that expressions are limited but ideas are limitless. I do not know why he would frame ‘ideas’ here as ma’anī khaṭābiyya, other than to impress certain scholars (cf. fn. 484 and Introduction, pp. 9-10) and to cement the superiorty of his theory over other theories, including the Greek theories.
question (to which he provides arguments and counter-arguments) that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and “a philosopher” were conferring about when the discussion “got carried away [emphasis mine] to something that Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā mentioned in the Rhetoric and Poetics.”919 Because of the identity in terms, one has reason to suspect that this topic was the question of universals/particulars as the object of poetry. It is then that the philosopher “got up and brought Abū ʿAlī’s Shifāʾ and showed Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn what he had mentioned […]”920 Because the “type of Greek poery called ‘lagody’ (i.e., tragedy)” is cited here, it is clear that the philosopher showed Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn a section from the Poetics, not the Rhetoric.921 It is the passage on the juzʿ iyyāt/kullī in Ibn Sīnā’s Poetics that contains the notion that Kalīla wa-Dīnna deals with fīmā wujūduhu fī l-qawli faqat.

It is important to stress that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and Ibn Sīnā are not in conversation with one another: their point of departure is different, and the question they are arguing is different. But the fact that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn attends to the quintessential statements within Kalīla wa-Dīnna (“The lion said”) in the context of majāz using wording that evokes Ibn Sīnā’s dicussion of Kalīla wa-Dīnna reinforces our hypothesis that majāz deals with that which does not conform to reality. Although the two scholars are not in dialog, there is an interesting corollary to their discussions.

919 Ibid. 2: 5. The phrase fī l-khāṭāba wa-l-shīr could either refer the names of the Aristotelian works (as translated above) or to the topic of rhetoric and poetics (“something he mentioned about rhetoric and poetics,” as Heinrichs takes it in Arabische Dichtung, 110; cf. Cantarino, Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age, 193, who combines the two readings.)

920 Ibid.

921 Cf. Larcher, “Rhétoriques “grecque”,” 122-24, who takes a more literal approach and looks for specific passages, both in Ibn Sīnā’s Rhetoric and Poetics, that contain mention of tragedy (so literal that he searches whether ‘tragedy’ is transliterated in those passages with an interdental dh or not). I see no tangible connection between the passages that Larcher looks at and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s discussion; but if we want to take a literal approach – the passage we deal with above on the universal aspect of poetry is immediately followed by a paragraph on tragedy (with an interdental: ṭrāghūdhiyā). Jean-Patrick Guillaume may be right to suggest that lāghūdhiyā was Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s own play on words with laghw ‘empy talk, nonsense’, which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn later uses to qualify Ibn Sīnā’s poetics (Larcher, “Rhétoriques “grecque”,” 121 fn. 23). On Larcher’s perpetuation of the “marginality thesis” see above, fn. 484.
Ibn Sīnā is arguing that poetry speaks of universals and hence deals with the potentially-existent, not the actually-existent: the details of the poems – persons, places, events – are merely stand-ins for something universal that ‘could’ be real. Hence, one might expect to find Kalīla wa-Dīmna to be included within this domain: after all, as Bürgel points out, the characters in these fables stand for universal types, like the king, vizier, etc. But what takes precedence for Ibn Sīnā in evaluating such fables as non-poetic is not the aspect of universals (which would render them ‘poetic’) but the aspect of non-existence. The fact that Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn attends to statements within Kalīla wa-Dīmna in the context of majāz might give the impression that for him, it is precisely the aspect of non-existence that would render them poetic.

Regardless of whether one is convinced that Ibn Sīnā had any influence here, the fact remains that Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn treats tawassuʿ as an operation taking place in language, as if one can speak of existence in the domain of language – in Ibn Sīnā’s words, fīmā wujūduhu fī l-qawl. Whether it is a question of direct influence or the reaching of similar conclusions independently, this topic brings the philosophical-poetical tradition and the ‘native’ Arabic literary tradition closer.

Ḏiyā’ al-Dīn provides five examples for the commendable type of tawassuʿ, in addition to the archetypal “The lion said” and “The fox said,” mentioned in the preliminary chapter on majāz: two are Qur’ānic verses, one is a prophetic saying, and two are poetic verses. They all exhibit clear instances of personification, where a human (insān) ‘action’ is ascribed to an

922 “Die beste Dichtung,” 48. Bürgel therefore thinks that Ibn Sīnā misunderstood Aristotle because by Aristotle’s account, such fables would count as universal and hence ‘poetic’. But we should keep in mind that Aristotle did not speak of animal fables in this context, so we do not know how ‘poetic’ he would evaluate them. (I agree with Bürgel that a versified Kalīla wa-Dīmna would easily lend itself to be considered poetry, just like, say, a versified Sesame Street.)

923 Other questions in which we find typological affinity between the two traditions are figurative speech (in the sense of untrue or fictive), tashbīḥ in the sense of muhākāt (see “Why is Tashbīḥ Majāz?” below), and wonder (Harb, Poetic Marvels). See also §4.1.
The term Ğiyāʾ al-Dīn uses for such ascription or attribution in his comments on the examples is īḍāfa or nisba: fa-nisbat al-qawl ilā l-samāʾ wa-l-ard min bāb al-tawassuʿ “attributing ‘speech’ to the heaven and the earth is a case of tawassuʿ”; fa-īḍāfat al-maḥabba ilā l-jabal min bāb al-tawassuʿ “ascribing ‘love’ to a mountain is a case of tawassuʿ.” 925 It is clear that in this context īḍāfa does not refer to the genitive, but rather to the extralinguistic notion of ascription, and it was the same term Ğiyāʾ al-Dīn used to gloss the examples of the genitive metaphors discussed above (“ascribing a leg to money”). I thus choose the term ‘fictional ascription’ to refer to tawassuʿ, but ‘personification’ would also be appropriate. In both subtypes of tawassuʿ it is a human characteristic (body part or action) that is being attributed.926

Most of the comments on the examples include the remark, “And there is no relation (mushāraka) between X [the notion ascribed] to Y [the inanimate object].” 927 The Qurʾānic examples are Q 41:11 “Then He lifted Himself to heaven when it was smoke, and said to it and to the earth, Come willingly or unwillingly! They said, We come willingly” and Q 44:29 “Neither heaven nor earth wept for them, nor were they respited.” These examples are discussed by Ibn Qutayba in his Taʿwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān in the context of majāz and istiʿāra (which are mostly perceived as lexical items), where he provides his own explanations for the personified heaven and earth (the root w.s. ʿ does not occur).928 Similarly, Ğiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces the prophetic

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924 The most explicit opposition between insān and jamād is in al-Mathal al-sāʿir 2: 81.
925 Ibid. 2: 81-82. Nisba only occurs once.
926 Note that in the ascription of qadd to nawā discussed in ibid. 2: 80 and above, qadd (in my understanding) is a maṣdar of qadda ‘to cut’, such that it is an action that is being ascribed here rather than a body part, making it better aligned with the second type of tawassuʿ.
927 Ibid. 2: 81-82.
928 Taʿwīl, 106, 112, 167-70 (see also editors’ fins. 1 and 2 in al-Mathal al-sāʿir 2: 81). In the second Qurʾānic verse,
account according to which the prophet looked at Uḥud one day and said, “This is a mountain that loves us and that we love.”

In the second set of examples – two poetic verses – Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn treats the phenomenon of “addressing the [campsite] remains” (mukhāṭabat al-ṭulūl) and “asking the rocks” (musā’ alat al-ahjār), saying that this phenomenon comes “according to this [manner],” i.e., that it reflects a case of tawassu’. Here too the fictional character of the material is evident: when the poet (especially the muḥdath one!) claims to arrive at the campsite and to ‘speak’ to its remains, it is clear that the occurrence is ‘untrue’. The first is Abū Tammām’s [meter: tawīl]

\[a\text{-}maydānā\ lāhwī\ \text{man\ atāha\ laka\ l-bilā}\]
\[\text{fa}\text{-}ā\text{-}asbaḥta\ maydānā\ l-ṣabā\ wa\text{-}l\text{-}janā\ ibī\]

“O abode (maydān) of my pleasure, who ordained decay upon you?

You became the race-course (maydān) of east and south winds [galloping around]”

The second is al-Mutanabbi’s [meter: kāmil]

Ibn Qutayba’s solution (Ṭa’wil, 167-68) is to ‘reduce’ the sentence to an idiomatic expression in Arabic: when a very important man dies, to express the gravity of the situation “the Arabs say” that the sun turned dark on him, the moon is eclipsed, and the wind, lightning, heaven and earth cry. It is noteworthy that he takes care to point out that this case does not constitute kadhib (ibid., 168); it is, rather, a case of a lexical item that can be used to refer to different notions (i.e., “cry” can be said of a person, of skies, wind, earth, etc). The verb used is mutawātīʿūna, where the subject of tawāṭū’ – whether already a technical term or not (~’univocality’, ‘equal application’) – is things (wind, skies), not words. The rest of the explanations that Ibn Qutayba provides are from former authorities (wa-qālū ...). Specifically regarding God’s speech (as in His speech to heaven and earth; ibid., 106), it is interpreted as an expression of God’s creation (iḥād li-l-maʿānī, kawwannāhumā). Here too the understanding of the figurative component (qawl) is ‘reduced’ to a lexical explanation. Ibn Qutayba’s outlook, as opposed to Diyā’ al-Dīn’s, is purely Qur’ānic. For more on Ibn Qutayba’s understanding of majāz and isti āra, and his conception of the majāzāt as “an integral part of the language as it was used […] by the ancient Arabs” see Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 30-31, and Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

929 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 82.

930 Ibid. and al-Tibrīzī, Sharh 1: 208 for variations on bilā. The east and south winds are a merismus here, or two components (commonly opposites) that stand for everything (cf. Imru’ al-Qays’ vs. 2: min janūbin wa-shamʿalāi). There is a play on words with the first instance of maydān: the poet’s persona is clearly addressing the abandoned abode, but by using maydān he is also implicitly comparing pleasure (as he later does winds) to horses/camels galloping around the race-course, evoking such idioms as “to ride one’s passion” (rakība hawāhu) or al-Nābigā’s “the steed of folly is youth” (fa-inna maṭiyīyata l-jahli l-shabābū).
Đıyā’ al-Dīn responds to the first line by equating the address to “the effaced dwellings and obliterated rocks” to the Qur’ānic wa-s’ali l-qaryata “ask the town” (Q 12:82), saying that there is no sense (wajh) in addressing anything but “the people” (ahl), that is, the people of the dwellings and the people of the town. Here Đıyā’ al-Dīn is mediating, albeit it in passing, between the exegetical discourse of an elided ‘human’ addressee and the literary discourse of fictional ascription. He does not linger on this point, probably because he recognizes that the line only makes sense if the poet’s persona is addressing the landscape itself, not the people who were dwelling there. In other words, the lines can be understood only if one assumes the fictional character of the scene. Invoking the Qur’ānic reference is sign, rather, of the historical merging of exegetical and literary traditions when it comes to interpreting majāz.

Đıyā’ al-Dīn revisits the question of tawassu’, along with al-Mutanabbī’s example, when he criticizes Ibn Jinnī’s interpretation of majāz as necessarily entailing ittisā’. Here Đıyā’ al-Dīn glosses ittisā’ as a case in which “an attribute/adjective (ṣifa min al-ṣifāt) is applied to an entity/noun (mawṣūf) that is not qualified to be applied to it (layṣa aḥlan li-an tujrā ʿalayhi) due to a remoteness between [the entity] and [the attribute].” Although Đıyā’ al-Dīn is referring to the commendable – and primary – type of tawassu’, his definition would apply to the genitive

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932 Al-Mathal al-sā’ir 2: 82.

933 Ibid. 2: 87. On Ibn Jinnī’s view of majāz as entailing the three components of lexical extension (ittisā’), comparison (tashbīh) and exaggeration (tawkīd/mubālagha) see p. 239 above.

934 Ibid.
metaphor as well (attributing voice to money). He then goes on to say, in what reads like an 
extraneous insertion, that had there been a relation (munāsaba) between the ṣīfa and mawṣūf, it 
would then have been “a type of analogy/syllogism (qiyyās) in assessing (lit. taking, ġaml) a thing 
according to what resembles it (yunāsibuḥu wa-yushākiluhu), in which case it would be tashbīh 
or istiʿāra.” Referring to tashbīh/istiʿāra in terms of qiyyās is once again evocative of Ibn Sīnā, 
who was the clearest among the philosophers to formulate metaphor as the logical conclusion of 
a syllogistic process, even though Ǧiyāʿ al-Dīn earlier ridicules the claim that rhetorical speech 
(al-kalâm al-khaṭābī) “is based on two premises and a conclusion.” In any event, it is clear 
that Ǧiyāʿ al-Dīn singles out tawassuʿ as the fictive literary device par excellence, in that – 
unlike tashbīh (/istiʿāra) – it does not follow a deductive process and is thus the farthest removed 
from any real-world logic/knowledge. I am not aware of any later critic who followed up on 
Ǧiyāʿ al-Dīn’s use of tawassuʿ.

Istiʿāra and Kināya

As we saw above, istiʿāra is distinguished from the other subtypes of majāz by being the only 
category in which the locus of ‘figurativeness’ is the single word. It is what Heinrichs 
characterized as a tashbīh-based single-term metaphor. There is a tension in the text of the

935 Ibid.

936 Ibid. 2: 6. He adds that even when Ibn Sīnā himself composed poetry or rhymed prose he did not have two 
premises and a conclusion in mind. On Ibn Sīnā’s formulation of metaphor as the conclusion of a syllogism see 
Deborah L. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy, Leiden: Brill, 1990, 
209-18 (al-Fārābī was less explicit); Schoeler, “‘Poetic Syllogism’ Revisited” (and references therein to his earlier 
“Der poetische Syllogismus: Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der ‘logischen’ Poetik der Araber,” and other studies). 
Seemingly, Ǧiyāʿ al-Dīn does not equate poetical/rhetorical statements with metaphors, but he does make a 
connection between the two when he discusses the “literary” difference between ḥaqīqa and majāz (see pp. 240-42 
above).

937 A quote from Geert Jan van Gelder will suffice here (on the biases the modern critic): “A certain bias, it is true, is 
not easily avoided altogether. One cannot escape a sense of frustration when early critics […] or when a promising 
start by one critic is not followed up by his successors” (Beyond the Line, 208).
Mathal between conceiving this word as a metaphorical substitution for something else, and a literal understanding of the word as the analogue of an omitted topic. Perceiving a substitution here would conform to the ‘legal’ definition of word transfer; indeed, even within the chapter on istiʿāra Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn still speaks of a process of naql. But this stands in opposition to his assuming of an omitted topic: for if the topic is omitted, then the ‘metaphorical’ word cannot possibly stand for that missing element, but it rather must be taken literally as the analogue for that topic. The comments that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn supplies for the (many) examples of istiʿāra demonstrate this tension. For instance, in commenting on the first example, Q 14:1 “Alif lām rāʾ”, A book we have sent down to you that you may bring forth mankind from the darknesses to the light,” Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn uses the exegetical terminology of a word-metaphor – “Darknesses and light are a metaphor for (istiʿāra li-) unbelief and belief or error and right guidance” – but then he reconstructs the underlying intension of the verse which reveals a literal understanding of those words, “It is as if He said, that you may bring forth mankind from unbelief which is like darkness to belief which is like light.”

However, as we read on through the examples, over a dozen printed pages, it becomes clear that the words are used as stand-ins for other notions, especially in the poetic examples, which exhibit ‘worn-out’ metaphors that are sometimes part of larger conceits. Among them are the common ‘gazelle’ for ‘woman’, ‘daisy’ for ‘mouth’, ‘twigs’ for ‘pretty physiques’, and ‘(shooting) star’ for ‘lance’. A case in which worn-out metaphors form part of a larger conceit

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938 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 83. On one hand he speaks of naql al-maʾnā min lafẓ ilā lafẓ, and on the other hand, of ṣayy dhikr al-manqūl ilayhi. As a general rule, I do not take one’s own definitions as evidence for their conception of a notion, especially if the shawāhid and the comments on them tell us otherwise. But in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s case of istiʿāra, the commentary sometimes displays a tension between a ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’ understanding of the word.

939 Ibid. 2: 96. See more examples on pp. 96-97.

940 Ibid. 2: 100-102.
is al-Mutanabbī’s [meter: *mansarīḥ*]

\begin{quote}
\textit{kullu jarīḥin turjā salāmatuhū}
\textit{illā jarīḥan dahat-hu 'aynāhā}
\textit{tabullu khaddayya kullamā -btasamat}
\textit{min maṭarīn barquhū thanāyāhā}
\end{quote}

“We can hope for the safety of every wounded one,
except for the wounded who was struck by her eyes;
They [her eyes] water my cheeks, whenever she smiles,
with a rain whose lightning is her teeth.”

Diyyā’ al-Dīn comments that what makes the metaphor (*istiʿāra*) in the second line beautiful “is the mentioning of the ‘rain’ along with the ‘lightning’.”

In other words, the worn-out metaphor ‘rain’ for ‘tears’ (flowing on the lover’s cheeks) is then made into a larger conceit by adding a ‘flash of lightning’ to the image, which is supposedly caused by the flash (!) of her smile. In fact, though this is not mentioned by the critics, not only is the image of lightning added, but also – implicitly – the image of clouds, expressed by “her eyes,” the syntactic subject. The single-

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941 Ibid. 2: 107; al-Wāḥīdī, *Sharḥ*, 759-60 (where *illā fuʿādan* appears for *illā jarīhan*). This is a paradox because normally the eyes that moisten the cheeks belong to the same face; here the poet is playing with the image and having her eyes be the source of his wet cheeks (*tabullu* would thus a poetic license for the dual *tabullāni*, unless it is the unnamed woman who pouring the rain, in which case the manipulation of the poetic conceit is less stark; see below). Besides the contemporary Geert Jan van Gelder, critics have not attended to this aspect of the line (elaboration below). Ibn Jinnī treats it from a literal perspective – which leads to a comical result – while the other commentators, and Diyyā’ al-Dīn, are interested more in the mere concurrence of tears and lightning.

942 *Al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir* 2: 108.

943 Ibid.

944 The eyes are the ones wetting – i.e. pouring rain on – the cheeks. Thus, the beloved is made to be the heaven, being the locus of both clouds and lightning and controlling the rain, whereas the lover is the mere earth, being the locus of the rain and having no control over it. Ibn Jinnī, who recognizes the syntax of the lines correctly, is ridiculed (rightly) by Diyyā’ al-Dīn and by critics before him for taking the beloved to be literally bending over the lover and wetting his cheeks from her saliva (or tears, per Ibn Fūrajja; al-Wāḥīdī, *Sharḥ*, 759-60). This ignites on the part of Diyyā’ al-Dīn the common grievance that the practitioner of “the art of grammar and syntax” is not that of “the art of eloquence” (*al-Mathal al-sāʿ ir* 2: 108-109). Ibn Jinnī was an ‘easy’ target for the ‘real’ critics: on al-Wāḥīdī’s more general critique of Ibn Jinnī see Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Obscurity in Classical Arabic Poetry,” *Mediaevalia* 19 (1996 [for 1993]), 239-59, here: 244-45. Al-Wāḥīdī’s explanation, however, is not satisfying either since – strictly speaking from the syntax of the lines – it is not his tears that are wetting his cheeks. For Ibn Jinnī, the syntax of the lines overrides the literary conceit and his result is comically literal; al-Wāḥīdī, however, ignores the
word image (rain for tears) has become so hackneyed that it is practically ‘lexicalized’ in the vocabulary, i.e., it acts as a ‘poetic’ dead metaphor, upon which elaborations of the image can be made.

Other examples are al-Buḥṭurī’s “five clouds” for “fingers,” to which are added the “thunderbolt” in the “palm of the hand,” or Abū Tammām’s [meter: 

\[ \text{two additional lines quoted}]^{946}

\[
\text{kuntu ar′ā l-nujūma ḥattā idhā mā fāraqūnī amsaytu ar′ā l-nujūmā}
\]

“I used to watch the stars (i.e., the beloved) so much that even when they left me, I kept ‘watching the stars’ (i.e., staying up all night)”\(^{947}\)

Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s only comment is that the metaphor occurs in the third line. In the text of the ḏīwān, we find budūr ‘full moons’ for the first occurrence of nujūm; al-Tibrīzī provides two other readings: khudūr ‘woman’s chambers’ and khudūd ‘cheeks’, but not nujūm,\(^{948}\) suggesting that the first nujūm might be an error (despite the nice paronomasia with the second nujūm). One suspects that by istiʿāra Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn is referring to the common noun metaphor budūr for “pretty faces,” but even if nujūm is not a slip of the pen and is made to stand for the beloved, it is likely that it is this noun that he views as istiʿāra and not the verb raʿā ‘to herd; graze’, which is syntax. This is not the first time that Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn mocks others for taking a sentence literally rather than figuratively; see Al-Mathal al-ṣāʾir 2: 29).

\(^{945}\) Ibid. 2: 105.

\(^{946}\) In the two preceding lines the poet’s persona deals with the pain of finding the campsite remains, but cf. al-Tibrīzī, Sharḥ 3: 222-23, where these lines appear after the line quoted above, not before. In light of the ‘atomistic’ discourse of Arabic poetry it is noteworthy that Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn often quotes the intended shāhid within the context of its preceding/following lines and sometimes (as here) provides the opening line of the poem as well.

\(^{947}\) Al-Mathal al-ṣāʾir 2: 104, and editors’ fns. The first raʿā l-nujūm literally means “to graze the stars” (see below) and the second raʿā l-nujūm “to herd the stars,” but I kept the verb ‘watch’ to convey the identity of the phrase in both hemistichs.

\(^{948}\) Al-Tibrīzī, Sharḥ 3: 222.
also a metaphor. This is because first, only a noun metaphor can stand for an object that is ‘suppressed’ (*maṭwī al-dhikr*), and second, taken in context with the rest of the *shawāhid* and accompanying comments that all point to nouns/nominal phrases, a verb metaphor is unlikely Diyā’ al-Dīn’s intention here. Once the hackneyed metaphor “X for beloved” is in place, it is further elaborated: first, by placing it within a verbal phrase (*raʿā l-nejūm/budūr*) which yields the additional metaphor, “grazing the [beloved]” for “kissing the beloved” (if we follow al-Tibrīzī’s explanation for “grazing the cheeks”); and second, by mentioning the proverbial expression “herding the stars” for “staying up at night,” which builds on the image of moon(s) (if *budūr*) to include the stars (or, if *nejūm*, adds a paronomasia).

Since the bulk of the examples in our chapter refer to well-known nominal stand-ins for an unexpressed topic, I shall refer to *istiʿāra* in this context as ‘poetic dead metaphor’, or the very hackneyed nominal metaphor. Some instances even verge on the ‘common’ dead

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949 Used earlier in the chapter, e.g. *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 84, 98 (or variations; e.g., p. 97: *ṭuwiya... dhikr al-mustaʿār lahu; ṭayy al-mustaʿār lahu*).

950 Lane, *Lexicon*, 1108 (“waiting for the time when they disappear”). The basis of this expression is not metaphoric but rather metonymic: it is based not on similarity but on the concomitance between night and the appearance of stars. *Raʿā l-nejūm* is an idiomatic phrase of the type we encountered above (*nāma l-thawb* etc.).

951 The other two variations on *nejūm* – *khudūd* or *khudūr* – are incompatible with Diyā’ al-Dīn’s theory. In the case of “cheeks,” they can either be taken literally (“grazing” them would be a metaphor for kissing them, but the cheeks remain cheeks) or be taken figuratively to be a metonymy for the beloved (grazing the figurative cheeks=kissing the beloved, not necessarily her cheeks). Neither a literal understanding nor a metonymic one fits the other examples in the chapter. In the case of “woman’s chambers,” if it is literal, “grazing them” would amount to frequent visiting of the beloved’s house, and if it is figurative, it would again be by way of metonymy (visiting the beloved, not necessarily her courtiers). *nejūm* as a reference to the beloved may be too cryptic, in which case it would be a form of riddle (on which see below). If the line were adduced out of context, one could be made to believe that the *istiʿāra* referred to the verb metaphor *raʿā*, but as aforementioned, this is unlikely here.

952 As always, we should say that the vast majority of examples reflect poetic dead metaphors, but not all of them, especially if we take into account the exegetical underpinnings of such discussions. Thus, in the example Diyā’ al-Dīn provides in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 96-97, Q 14:46, “mountains” (in the accusative) for “God’s decree” is not a hackneyed image. Given his view of *istiʿāra*, it is plain to see why he took to criticizing al-Khafājī’s understanding of Imru’ al-Qays’ famous line, “And I said to it (sc. the night) when it stretched out its back and followed up with (its) hind quarters and struggled to get up with (its) breast”: no component here reflects a poetic dead metaphor and Diyā’ al-Dīn rightly treats it as a case of analogy (with no particle of comparison, *tashbih mudmar al-adāṭ*; for more on his critique see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 23-25).
metaphor, like ‘darkness’ and ‘light’ for ‘wrong’ and ‘right’ (in the Qur’ānic case we saw above, wrong/right belief).

In other cases, especially the examples drawn from everyday speech of the ancient Arabs, including sayings by the Prophet and early orators, istiʿāra is more in line with the idiomatic or proverbial expression, not unlike the second occurrence of raʿā l-nujūm above, in the sense of staying up at night. Examples are:

(1) From a prophetic saying, the expression ḥādhim al-ladhdhāt lit. “the eraser of pleasures” for “death.”

(2) The old Arab adage (apparently corrupted here), said upon seeing the lunar crescent (ʿinda ruʿyat al-hilāl): lā marḥaban bi-l-lajīni muqarribi ajalin wa-maḥlin “No welcome to ‘stomped-on ground leaves’ (a sign of the approaching collector of debt), bringer of due date and draught!” The adage apparently refers to debts that need to be paid back at the beginning of the month (when the lunar crescent appears), thus ending the fixed term of the loan and starting a period of hardship (“draught”). The dictionaries/poetic catalogues have slightly different, and more probable versions: lā marḥaban bi-muḥilli l-dayni muqarribi l-ajali “No welcome to a collector of debt, bringer of due date!” and (perhaps the original) lā marḥaban bi-ḥujayn, muḥilli l-dayn, wa-muqarribi l-ḥayn, “No

953 Al-Mathal al-sāʾ ir 2: 98. Note that this expression is based on contiguity, not similarity (see below).

954 Ibid. The editors vocalize muqarrib as muqarribu ajalin. The lajīn is a type of paste given to camels, which is made out of “tree leaves that were stomped on” (waraq al-shajar yuḥbaṭu) mixed with some flour or barley (Līsān al-ʿarab 5: 4002), but the phrase khabṭ waraq al-shajar refers to a man’s coming to seek benefit from someone else without any tie of relationship, “because he who does so must beat the ground with his feet” (Lane, Lexicon, 698 [s.v. khabṭ]). Lajīn (if not corrupt) could have been extended from referencing ‘an approaching seeker of benefit’ to ‘an approaching collector of debt’. Ajal, usually ‘(end of) fixed term’, refers here to the “time of falling due” (Lane, Lexicon, 25).

955 Ibn Manẓūr, Līsān al-ʿarab 2: 974; al-Khalīl, Kitāb al-ʿAyn 3: 27. Ajal could also be a reference to death here, as an exaggeration of the hardship that would follow (like ‘draught’ in Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s version; in Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s version, ‘death’ is less probable, because the following ‘draught’ would be irrelevant for the dead).
welcome to a little hook (i.e., the crescent), collector of debt, bringer of death!

Because the hilāl is a sign of a negative event here – paying back debt – it acts as a bad omen (see below).

(3) From the famous address of the Umayyad governor al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf (d. 95/714), the expression nathala kinānatahu wa-ʿajamahā ʿūdan ʿūdan lit. “he cleaned the dust off his arrow-quiver and tested [the arrows] rod by rod” for “he displayed his men and examined them one by one to the utmost diligence.”

These expressions are rooted in the Arabic lexicon. In fact, some of them we may characterize as euphemisms (Ar. kināya).

The case of the sighting of a new moon as an

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957 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 98.

958 That euphemisms are listed as entries in the dictionaries has already been noted by Pellat (“Kināya,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition): “It is quite possible in fact, that independent of dialectical variants, the abundance of synonyms is sometimes due to the listing, by the lexicographers, of euphemistic terms whose origin is not indicated.” See also Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 67.1-3, where an explanation of the kināya in a line by Abū Tammām reads like a dictionary entry. For an opposite example of a dead metaphor identified as a kināya see ibid. 3: 63 (“water” as a so-called kināya for “knowledge”). This is due to the non-technical use of kanā bi-ʿan as “referring to Y indirectly by saying X” (and see below).

959 The relationship between taboo in society and euphemism in the Arabic language in the medieval Arabophone world has been studied in depth by Erez aaman, “Women Who Cough.” Death is the 11th topic listed in al-Thaʿālibī’s (d. 429/1039) Kitāb al-kināya (ibid., 474-75, and 476 on death as a taboo in other societies). Battle and killing are also loci for euphemistic expressions (ibid.) and see Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 100 for a euphemism for ‘war’. See also Ch. Pellat, “Kināya.” For another example of a euphemistic reference to death see Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 62. Generosity is typically not a target for euphemistic expression due to its high regard in society. In this sense, the kināya that ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī is talking about (“having much ashes of the cooking pot”) is not a euphemism. Furthermore, in al-Jurjānī’s notation, kināya is a sentence that logically implies the actual meaning intended. By contrast, in the single-term euphemism the word does not necessarily imply the intended meaning: there is nothing in the word “touching” to logically imply “having sexual intercourse” or in “stomped-on leaves bringing near death/draught” to necessarily imply “new moon.” Conversely, “having many ashes under the cooking-pot” necessarily
inauspicious occasion (for paying debt) could also demonstrate euphemistic usage. This leads us to ʿIyāʿ al-Dīn’s discussion of ʿināya, which he identifies explicitly as a subcategory of ʿistiʿāra. But before we turn to that chapter, we should point out an important remark that he makes with regards to ʿistiʿāra that highlights the affinity between the two.

According to ʿIyāʿ al-Dīn, the occurrence of an ʿistiʿāra is rare (qaʿil), both in the Qurʾān and in ‘eloquent discourse’, namely, letters, sermons and poems (faṣīḥ al-kalām min al-rasāʾil wa-l-ḥuṭab wa-l-ʿashʿār). This paucity ʿIyāʿ al-Dīn attributes to the difficulty (lā yatayassaru) of composing speech in which the topic is not expressed (“concealed”), as opposed to how easy and common (kathīr sahl) it is to produce speech in which both topic and analogue appear together. Although ‘composition’ and ‘production’ are not mentioned explicitly, it is clear that this observation is made from a writer’s point of view: the bar that poetic dead metaphors and euphemisms set is quite high, and to create a new one ex nihilo without leading to a cryptic result is rather challenging, if not impossible (cf. the cryptic character of lā marḥaban bi-l-ḥajin…).

From the perspective of creating speech about an unspoken topic, the ʿistiʿāra shares an affinity implies that a large amount of food is being cooked, larger than what is needed for the person’s family, and hence intended for guests (for further discussion of al-Jurjānī’s ʿināya see §5.2).

960 Al-Thaʿālibī and the judge Ahmad al-Jurjānī (d. 482/1089) devote special chapters to inauspicious expressions (Naaman, “Women Who Cough,” 477), where they cite the use of antonyms to refer to the inauspicious entities, like “a place of safety” for a waterless desert, due to its inauspicious character (one can die there while traveling). This is not the case in saying that the lajīn/muḥill al-dāyin/hujayn is not welcome, since the expressions are not “beautified.” It is euphemistic, rather, because of the refrain from uttering the explicit word for the inauspicious occasion, namely, the time of the month to pay back debt. See also Pellat, “Kināya,” and, for an elaboration on the mechanism of euphemism in Arabic, “Women Who Cough,” 486-91.

961 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 55; Naaman, “Women Who Cough,” 472. Diyāʾ al-Dīn’s explanation for not addressing ʿināya when he spoke of majāz is that he followed the common tradition of treating ʿināya together with taʿrīḍ. He then provides (al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 56) a poetic line which was wrongly identified, to his mind, as ʿināya rather than ʿistiʿāra, and acknowledges that it may be difficult at times to distinguish the two (in this case distinguishing the two is made possible by looking at the line in the context of its three subsequent lines: al-bayt al-ʿawwal […] bi-mufradīhi vs. al-abyāt fī jumlātihā). For another example – this time a Qurʾānic one – of an ʿistiʿāra supposedly wrongly identified by al-Farrāʾ as a ʿināya see ibid. 3: 63. Most probably this is due to the early non-technical use of “X ʿināyaʾ ʿan Y” as a reference to a (dead) metaphor.

962 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 97.
with the riddle (\textit{uhjiyya}, \textit{lughz}): this is a type of speech that indicates the intended topic “not by way of \textit{haqîqa}, not by way of \textit{majâz}, not by way of pragmatic implication (\textit{mafhûm}), but is rather something that must be guessed (\textit{yuḥdasu wa-yuhzaru}).”\footnote{Ibid. 3: 85-86, under the chapter titled \textit{ahâjî}, the 21\textsuperscript{st} literary device concerned with sense. \textit{Diya’} al-Dîn relates the \textit{ahâjî} also to \textit{mughâlatât ma’nawiyya ‘deceptions’}, a literary device based on double-entendre (3: 76 ff., 84). The \textit{mafhûm} refers to what the utterance suggests but does not state explicitly – a term he uses with reference to \textit{ta’rîd}, for him: ‘implicature’. The archetypal example is “By God, I am in need, and I have nothing in my hand,” of which the pragmatic import is a request for a handout (\textit{ta’rîd bi-l-talab}; 3: 56-57). The examples for \textit{ta’rîd} are mostly Qur\'anic (3: 72-75), and as Abû Mûsâ shows, \textit{Diya’} al-Dîn’s understanding of the notion is inspired by al-Zamakhsharî (al-Balâgha al-Qur\’âniyya fī tafsîr al-Zamakhsharî, 575-78).} \textit{Diya’} al-Dîn even states that the riddle may “sometimes resemble a \textit{kinâya}.”\footnote{\textit{Al-Mathal al-sâ’ir} 3: 84.} Seen from this regard, the poetic dead metaphor (or euphemism) is a riddle that does not demand from the listener any pondering over its meaning.\footnote{A clear example of the riddle-like quality that an \textit{isti’âra} may possess comes from the single illustration of \textit{isti’âra} that \textit{Diya’} al-Dîn provides from his own letters (ibid. 2: 98-99). The letter, written upon the request of a friend, is a “description” (\textit{an asîfa lahu}) of two Turkish slaves with whom the friend was infatuated, one wearing a red \textit{qabâ’} (long tunic) and the other a black one. The result resembles a very obvious riddle: two “moons on branches,” the clothes of one of whom “comes from the redness of his cheeks” and the other “from the blackness of his (dyed) eyelid.” Likewise, \textit{Diya’} al-Dîn adduces a poetic line containing a description that could apply both to a horse and to the male organ (the latter of which would invite a euphemistic expression), and states that it was ‘wrongly’ identified as a riddle rather than a \textit{kinâya} (ibid. 3: 84-85, 68-69). This too demonstrates the riddle-like quality that a \textit{kinâya} may possess. In another example (3: 75), from “the language of the Persians,” Khosrow says to an emir whose wife he (the king) was having an affair with, “I heard that you have a spring of sweet water but do not drink from it. What is the reason for that?” to which the emir replied, “I heard that the lion comes down to [drink from] it so I was afraid of it.” Once again, the cause for \textit{Diya’} al-Dîn’s identification of such an example as \textit{kinâya} rather than \textit{uhjiyya} stems from the taboo subject of fornication.} A conclusion we may draw, then, regarding an important difference between the subcategories of \textit{majâz} is that the composer of speech does not really participate in the creation of an \textit{isti’âra/kinâya},\footnote{Where the poet/letter writer/preacher does show his creativity with \textit{isti’âra} is when he embeds it with other literary devices into a larger conceit, as we saw with the “lightning” added to the “rain,” and the (more literal) use of “watching the stars” as “watching the beloved,” where “stars” (originally “moons”) stand for the beloved (not to mention, of course, the literal devices concerned with sound, another important locus for creativity.) whereas in the case of other figurative expressions identified as \textit{majâz} (\textit{tashbîh} and \textit{tawassu’}), he does.

The treatment of \textit{kinâya} by \textit{Diya’} al-Dîn has received some attention in recent
scholarship by Charles Pellat and Erez Naaman in their respective studies of the notion.  

Both have shown that Ḥiyā’ al-Dīn conceives of kināya as an expression that can be interpreted both in its literal and in its figurative sense, or in Ḥiyā’ al-Dīn’s words, that both ḥaqīqa and majāz “contend” (tajādhaba) for the expression.  

The topic is presented under the chapter titled al-kināya wa-l-taʿrīḍ, the nineteenth literary device concerned with sense.  

It contains a long discourse on definitions and refutations of false arguments, and in it Ḥiyā’ al-Dīn engages in a discussion with the legal theorists (ʿulamāʾ uṣūl al-fiqh, aʾimmat al-fiqh; al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ghazālī are singled out by name).  

The majority of the examples in this rather lengthy chapter of 26 pages (4 of which on taʿrīḍ) are from the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, and early anecdotal reports, once again signaling the ‘non-poetic’ character of the notion.  

When illustrations from poetry are adduced, they either display ‘dead’ usage or riddle-speech concerning a taboo (which invites euphemistic expression).  

Kināya is the only category within Ḥiyā’ al-Dīn’s system of majāz (excluding the legal

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968 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 51, 53, 63. Pellat says, more exactly, that the expression could be interpreted either literally or figuratively.

969 Ibid. 3: 49-75.

970 Ibid. 3: 51, 63.

971 Ibid. 3: 49-66 (strictly speaking, the “examples” section begins on p. 62, but the account preceding it is replete with examples from the Revelation).

972 Ibid. 3: 66-70. It is only because the poetic riddle-speech concerns a taboo topic that Ḥiyā’ al-Dīn excludes it from the more ‘neutral’ category of riddle (uhjiyya or mughālata maʿnawiyya). A famous anecdote (3: 68-69, 84-85) concerns an early well-known ʿinnīn ‘impotent’ “who did not have sex with women,” who composes an epigram on what can be taken as a description of a horse but is really a description of his organ. Sometimes the examples are not entirely euphemistic: in a four-line example by Abū Nuwās (3: 69-70), Ḥiyā’ al-Dīn deems beautiful the expression atrāf al-rimāḥ “the edges of the lances” for “the intended organ,” but he pays no regard to the following line in which the explicit ayr is mentioned. The poetic illustrations are followed by illustrations of “ugly” euphemisms (3: 70-72), which, as Naaman points out, may refer to dysphemisms – offensive, rather than euphemistic, expressions (“shit” instead of “poop”), or to orthophemisms – expressions that are too explicit (“feces”), following the “X-phemistic set” of Allan and Burridge (“Women Who Cough,” 478-85).
discourse) in which we come across figurative speech based on contiguity (a term not used). The archetypal ‘touching’ (lams) for ‘copulating’ (jimāʾ) is the clearest example, where we see a case of pars pro toto. DOCTYPE al-Dīn recognizes that some cases of kināya are based on similarity (shabahiyya) while others are not. Although his efforts do not yield convincing results, he grapples with these differences head-on. According to him, when kināya comes in the form of words in combination, the similarity and correlation (or analogy, munāsaba) are stronger when compared with kināya in the single word. An example for the first is “so and so has clean clothing” (fulān naqī al-thawb, words in combination), where DOCTYPE al-Dīn reconstructs “clothing clean of filth are like a reputation unblemished with moral vice.” Conversely, he contends that if we say “touching is like copulating” (a single word kināya), “the similarity is not as strong” (lam takun bi-tilka l-daraja fī quwwat al-mushābaha). DOCTYPE al-Dīn senses that the latter is not like the former – we would say that there is no similarity at all but rather contiguity (“touching is like copulating” is not quite an acceptable sentence) – but he nevertheless remains committed to the notion of an analogy or likeness (tamthīl) underlying kināya. We may also point out that most of the single-word euphemisms he adduces are in fact based on similarity rather than contiguity, like ‘ewes’ (sg. naʿja) for ‘women’. The latter are technically

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973 But see above hādhim al-ladhdhāt for “death” – which DOCTYPE al-Dīn discussed under istiʿāra.

974 Ibid. 3: 59.

975 “Category membership is incompatible with assertions of similarity,” such that if “Copper is a metal” is acceptable, then “Copper is like a metal” is not acceptable (Boaz Keysar, “On the Functional Equivalence of Literal and Metaphorical Interpretations in Discourse,” Journal of Memory and Language 28 [1989], 375-85, here: 380-81, emphasis his). Granted, in our example the relationship between “touching” and “copulating” is not quite class membership (hyponymy) – perhaps (?) it is a part-whole relationship (meronymy) – nevertheless, taken at face-value, the statement is not quite right (although one could imagine a context in which it is said, for instance by a hypersensitive amorous person).

976 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 59.

977 Ibid. According to him, the common attribute (wasf jāmiʿ) between naʿja and woman is their respective femininity (hence, he says, naʿja was chosen rather than the masculine kabsh; 3: 53).
better suited for Diyā’ al-Dīn’s conception of istiʿāra (cf. ‘gazelle’ for ‘woman’, above), but once again, because the examples involve a taboo (women, genitalia, etc.), he opts for kināya.978

The historic nature of kināya as a cover term for a variety of “indirect wording” is directly linked to the non-technical expression “X kināya ʿan Y,” that is, “avoiding mentioning Y explicitly by saying X.”979 Thus, literary expressions that are allusive but not euphemistic also figure into Diyā’ al-Dīn’s chapter. He tends to the historic980 category of irdāf ‘[implying what] logically follows [from the expression]’, such as fulān ʿazīm al-ramād “so and so has a great (amount) of ashes” for feeding others with much food, a sign of generosity.981 Diyā’ al-Dīn recognizes that this type of speech subsists in words in combination (lafẓ murakkab), rather than a single word. Moreover, he recognizes that the allusive expression is a logical consequence (lāzīm, also dalīl ‘proof’) of the thing alluded to (specifically an attribute, ṣifa) and that this differentiates the category of irdāf from other types of kināyāt (bi-khilāf ghayrihā min al-kināyāt).982 Indeed, we would say that the examples reflect periphrasis (or circumlocution), not euphemism.983 He stops short, however, of excluding irdāf entirely from the category of kināya, even though it does not fit the notion’s definition: every word in “having many ashes,” and the

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978 Compare this with his scorning of those who interpret “clothes” as “heart” (qalb) by way of kināya in Q 74:4 “and your clothes, purify” (wa-thīyābaka fa-ṣaḥīḥ), on the pretense that there is no “common attribute” (wasf ḫāʾim) between them. Here – it seems - Diyā’ al-Dīn prefers to treat the expression disjunctively (clothes are a metaphor for heart) rather than conjunctively (clothes are a metonym for the person wearing them), but we must acknowledge that the main reason for rejecting kināya here is the lack of a taboo (I follow Naaman’s appropriation of the terms ‘disjunctive’ and ‘conjunctive’ in “Women Who Cough”).

979 See also Joseph Dichy, “Kināya,” Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics, Brill Online.

980 See Qudāma b. Jā’far, Nagd al-shi’r, 88-90 (the root k.n.y does not occur). Ibn Abī l-Iṣba’ continues this tradition, as he treats periphrastic utterances under the heading al-irdāf wa-l-taḥbīr (Tahrīr al-taḥbīr, 207 ff.) and euphemism under al-kināya (ibid., 143 ff.; also Bāḍī al-Qurʾān, 83 and 53, respectively).

981 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 58, 60-61.

982 Ibid. 3: 60.

983 This is not to say that a euphemism cannot come in the form of a periphrasis; for some examples (not in Diyā’ al-Dīn’s work) see Naaman, “Women Who Cough,” 491.
proposition as a whole, must be taken literally, and there is no room for majāz in its interpretation.\footnote{This type of kināya, which is what ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī has in mind when he speaks of kināya, will be discussed in more detail in §5.2. Because al-Jurjānī’s kināya is typologically different from euphemism, treating it here, and examining its ramifications on the understanding of majāz, would be misleading in the context above.} Furthermore, in many of the shawāhid that reflect riddle-speech – where the topic of discussion could be understood either literally or as a euphemism for a taboo – majāz too, in the sense of a word shift, does not take place.\footnote{Ibid. 3: 62 ff. The examples that do not reflect euphemistic usage, like “having much ashes” for “generosity,” should be read in light of earlier works dealing with irdāf (or kināya in the sense of irdāf).} In other words, although it is within the discussion of kināya that we see an explicit conformity to the original definition of majāz, there remain many linguistic phenomena subsumed under kināya that defy this rule.

A final note must be made on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s very definition of kināya as an expression (specifically word, lafẓa) that can be taken both literally and figuratively.\footnote{Ibid. 3: 51-52 (52.2 for lafẓa).} Besides the Qur’ānic verse that he adduces throughout the chapter, Q 4:43 “[draw not near to prayer when...] Or [when] you have touched women” – where lāmasa could be interpreted (haml) both as ‘touching’ and as ‘copulating’ since both actions would require ablution prior to prayer – Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s definition is simply untenable. For it is the only the majāz sense – i.e., the euphemistic one – that is intended in kināya, not the literal one (e.g., ‘ewe’ for ‘women’ in Q 38:23 “Behold, this my brother has ninety-nine ewes, and I have one ewe”).\footnote{Ibid. 3: 51, 53-54.} Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, in fact, recognizes this. A closer look at his comments on shawāhid reveals that what he has in mind, rather, is that both the literal and figurative readings in kināya lead to semantically permissible utterances (yasīhhu, yajūzu and conjugations), even though it is only the figurative sense that is intended

\footnote{The verse is quoted in ibid. 3: 53, 59, without explicitly saying that only the majāz sense is intended. Even in the archetypal lams for jimāʿ (without a context), it is really the majāz meaning that is intended.}
(arāda, murād, yushīru). He states at the outset that what sets kināya apart from all other categories of majāz, is that in all other categories, taking the utterance at face value (ʿalā jānib al-haqīqa) would result in an impossible meaning (la-staḥāla l-maʿnā). As proof, he adduces the archetypal tashbīh utterance, “Zayd is a lion” (particle of comparison omitted): semantically only a majāz reading is possible, he says, “because Zayd is not (that) four-legged hairy animal with a tail and fangs and claws.” I use the word “semantically” in this context since iyā al-Dīn is basing his assessment of the utterance on one’s knowledge of the world. Indeed, another way to characterize the “semantic impermissibility” (istaḥāla l-maʿnā) of such utterances would be to describe them as false (kadhib), but as we saw above, the discourse of kadhib was too far removed to be discussed within the context of majāz.

This is the closest iyā al-Dīn gets to stating explicitly that all the categories of majāz (aqsām al-majāz), besides kināya, exhibit utterances that are untrue if taken at face value. We shall now turn to the category of tashbīh to see to what extent the utterances subsumed therein are untrue.

989 For yasibhu see ibid. 3: 51.15, 63.3⁰, for jāza – 63.3⁰, 64.1⁰-65.4, yajāzu – 51.4-5⁰, jāʾiz – 68.6 (opp. yushīru, 68.5). For arāda and murād see 3: 65.3⁰-66.3.

990 Ibid. 3: 51. The opposition between istaḥāla and jāza in a grammatical (primarily syntactic) sense appears already in Sībawayh (see Noy, “Muhāl,” 31, 37). Here diyā al-Dīn is using the dyad in a semantic sense.

991 Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 3: 51-52. Another case exemplifying this is his commentary on Q 14:46 “[…] so that the mountains will be removed” (ibid. 3: 63, and 2: 96-97, where he explains that istiʿāra occurs only when jibāl is in the accusative, not nominative).

992 As we noted above (fn. 952), we must stress that things are not always clear-cut. When discussing a sub-type of taṣrīḥ (maintaining a rhyme in both hemistichs) called taṣrīḥ mukarrar, in which the last word of the two hemistichs is identical (ibid. 1: 341), diyā al-Dīn speaks of majāz as if it resides in the single word (al-lafza al-majāziyya), even though he is referring to a ‘live’ poetic metaphor. The line is Abū Tammām’s (meter: ṭawīl) fatan kāna sharban li-l-ʿufātī wa-martaʿā // fa-ṣabha li-l-hindiyyati l-biḍī martāʾa (I follow the orthography in al-Tibrīzī, Sharh 4: 100) “A man in the prime of his life, he was a watering place and a pasture for seekers of subsistence, and for Indian swords – a pasture.” The line is adduced as a superior type of taṣrīḥ mukarrar, due to the fact that the repeated word is figurative, “where the meaning can differ” (lafza majāziyya yakhtalifu l-maʿnā fīhā). Diyā al-Dīn might be taking the second instance of martaʾ in a more literal sense than the first (even though it, too, is part of a figurative sentence): the first instance of martaʾ would be akin to a hackneyed metaphor (for: he provides food and
Why is Tashbīh Majāz?

In this dissertation I usually translate tashbīh as ‘comparison’, and sometimes more specifically as ‘simile’. ‘Comparison’ is a rather loose translation: it does not convey the idea inherent in the verbal noun of form II shabbaha, that a comparison is being made or stated. For our purposes in the present section I would like to translate tashbīh in a more accurate manner, but a phrase such as “stating a similitude” is not satisfactory either, since the term tashbīh within the works of Arabic literary theory refers ultimately to a literary-linguistic phenomenon, not to an act of the poet/letter writer/preacher. ‘Simile’ does refer to the phenomenon itself, but it excludes other cases that the category of tashbīh traditionally covers, namely metaphors and analogies. For the purpose of evaluating why tashbīh is considered majāz, I propose “similarity statement.”

Kamal Abu Deeb speaks of tashbīh in similar terms when he refers to it as “a process of establishing similarity between objects.” In our context of ʿIyāʿ al-Dīn’s work, we would say that the similarity is established between objects (single-term simile) and between situations (sentence-long analogies) alike. In modern research similarity statements, or judgments of similarity, have commonly been considered within the purview of philosophy or cognitive psychology, and they have entered the study of metaphor by the hand of the philosophers of shelter for those seeking it), and in the second instance the poet would be referring to the (deceased) patron as a battle hero literally collecting all the swords of his enemy (in battle). I am not sure what he has in mind here, but in any case ʿIyāʿ al-Dīn reverts to majāz on the level of the lexeme for clear reasons: the context of a repeated lafẓa in taṣrīʿ. Incidentally, the vocalization that the editors of the Mathal provide – murtaʿā and martaʿā – might be reflective of Abū Tammām’s original intention, but for ʿIyāʿ al-Dīn this was a case of taṣrīʿ mukarrar.

By “traditionally” I am referring to works of the high ʿAbbāsid era or later works that have not been influenced by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. By “metaphors” I am referring to sentences of the type “Zayd is a lion,” which Western thought considers a metaphor but in the Arabic tradition is recognized as a tashbīh muḍmar al-adāt.

I am limiting my use of “similarity statement” to this section because, as will become presently apparent, “similarity statement” too is not an appropriate rendering for the literary device of tashbīh.

Abu Deeb, Al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Poetic Imagery, 67, and passim with reference to “similarity.”
language rather than the cognitive linguists. Speaking of *tashbīḥ* in terms of a similarity statement will help us determine why *tashbīḥ* is considered *majāz*, especially in the case of a full-fledged simile (containing the word of similitude).

Al-Jurjānī famously rejects the inclusion of *tashbīḥ* in the sense of ‘simile’ within *majāz*, or figurative speech, on the grounds that every word therein is used according to its literal sense. Viewing simile as literal speech was an innovation, and at least one scholar (Ibn al-Naqīb) ascribes this opinion to “the later scholars” (*muta’akhkhirī hādhihi l-ṣinā’ā*). An explicit inclusion of *tashbīḥ* within *majāz* can be seen in Ibn Rashīq’s *ʿUmda*. But even before the term *majāz* infiltrated works of Arabic literary theory, there was recognition of two types of similarity statements (*tashbīḥ*). This differentiation between similarity statements stands at the basis of Ibn Rashīq’s identification of *tashbīḥ* as *majāz*. Al-Rummānī’s (d. 384/994) epistle on the inimitability of the Qurʾān may reflect the ‘pre-*majāz* stage’ in Arabic literary theory.

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996 The term itself originates in geometry. Representative examples are Amos Tversky, “Features of Similarity,” *Psychological Review* 84.4 (1977), 327-52; Andrew Ortony, “Beyond Literal Similarity,” *Psychological Review* 86.3 (1979), 161-80; Fogelin, *Figuratively Speaking*. (For a criticism of this approach see, e.g., Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar, “Understanding Metaphorical Comparisons: Beyond Similarity,” *Psychological Review* 97.1 [1990], 3-18.) The representative work on metaphor from the perspective of cognitive linguistics is Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, whose treatment of conceptual metaphors is usually devoid of discussions on similarity (in fact, they think it is incorrect). Thomas Bauer thinks that modern treatments of metaphor would have been more adequate had they incorporated a theory of comparison (he does not say similarity) within them (“Arabische Kultur,” *Rhetorik*, 296). The modern accounts on metaphor that he has in mind are clearly the more conventional philosophical ones.

997 *Asrār*, 222, and see §5.4 for elaboration. In the modern era scholars have normally thought of simile in terms of literal speech, thus any inclusion of *tashbīḥ* within *majāz* was considered ‘incorrect’ (Heinrichs uses “unexpected” with regards to Ibn Rashīq; *Hand of the Northwind*, 49).

998 See §5.4.

999 *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 266, 268, 286, 2: 294; see also Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 57. Before that Ibn Fāris also explicitly includes *tashbīḥ* within *majāz*, in a brief passage about the nature of *majāz* (al-Ṣāhibī, 197-98): note that the second example of *tashbīḥ* exhibits the particle of comparison *ka*-, meaning that by *tashbīḥ* Ibn Fāris is not only thinking of ‘metaphors’ containing both topic and analogue and no particle of comparison, but also straightforward similes.

1000 Although he does not use the term *majāz*, the idea of a word transfer does come across in al-Rummānī’s work, when he discusses *istiʿāra* (al-Nukat, 79). On works of *i jāz* al-Qurʾān being part and parcel of the early *naqd* works see Part One, §1.2.
According to him there are two types of similarity statements (al-tashbīḥ ‘alā wajhayn), “a similarity statement belonging to eloquence” or eloquent comparison (tashbīḥ balāgha) and “a similarity statement belonging to reality” or real comparison (tashbīḥ ḥaqīqa). The first is exemplified by comparing (tashbīḥ) the actions of the unbelievers to a mirage (sarāb) in the desert (Q 24:39). The second, he says, “is like [saying], This dinar is like this dinar so take whichever you like.”¹⁰⁰¹ In other words, similarity statements in the realm of reality – or ‘real’ similarity statements – are perceived as denoting an identity between two objects: the two dinars are identical. This is supported by the dictionary meaning of shibh (and conjugations) which is explained in terms of mithl (and conjugations), the latter denoting more of an identity than the former since it is defined as a “word of equality (lit. making equal)” (kalimat taswiya).¹⁰⁰²

In the account by Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1065) a century later, we see that a differentiation between two types of similarity statements is maintained, but here the term majāz takes the place of al-Rummānī’s tashbīḥ balāgha. This is facilitated, of course, by the dual sense of ḥaqīqa as either ontological reality or literal speech. According to Ibn Rashīq, the difference between tashbīḥ and wasf ‘description’ – the latter of which is said to encompass poetry almost entirely – is that in wasf one gives information about the essence of a thing (ikhbār ‘an ḥaqīqat al-shay’),

¹⁰⁰¹ Al-Nukat, 75.

¹⁰⁰² Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿarab 6: 4132 (s.v. m.th.l). Ibn Barrī is then quotes as stating that the difference between mumāthala ‘resemblance/correspondence’ and musāwāt ‘equality’ is that musāwāt can be established between two objects of the same genus or two objects of different genera, whereas mumāthala is only between two objects of the same genus. From this perspective we gather that mumāthala denotes more of an identity than musāwāt! Mithl and shibh are treated as synonyms, but shibh is explained by terms of mithl (ibid.), not the other way around (ibid. 4: 2189 [s.v. sh.b.h]). From the examples it is apparent that among the lexemes (or morphemes) denoting mumāthala is ka-: “the color of X is like the color of Y” (lawnuhu ka-lawnihi), “X tastes like Y” (ṭaʾamuhu ka-ṭaʾamihi), and that if one says “X is completely like Y” (huwa mithluhu ‘alā l-ṭlāq), it means “X takes the place of Y” (annahu yasuddu masaddahu; ibid. 6: 4132). In sum, it is not a stretch to use the term ‘identity’ in our context above. Cf. the claim by the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Țumlūs (d. 620/1223), according to which “[w]ith the help of a syllogism […] a poet induces the belief that two similar things are one and the same, i.e., identical” (Schoeler, “Poetic Syllogism’ Revisited,” 9; emphasis his). According to Schoeler, this is not unlike al-Fārābī’s own conclusion.
but *tashbīḥ* “is *majāz* and *tamthīl*.”1003 What *majāz* denotes here is not quite figurative speech; *ḥaqīqa* too refers to ontological reality in this context (as it did for al-Rummānī above). The hendiadys *majāz wa-tamthīl* probably refers to a figurative representation of a thing (compare *muḥākāt*), rather than the thing itself.1004 The idea of *tashbīḥ* as a representation of “an image that is imitated” (*ṣūra tuḥkār*) is present in the *Mathal* itself.1005 Within Ibn Rashīq’s chapter on *tashbīḥ*, he defines the notion as “a description of a thing by means of that which approximates it (or: is nearly equal to it, *qārabahu*) and resembles it (*shākalahu*) in one aspect or many, not in all of its aspects, because if it agreed with it entirely, it would be it (i.e., the two would be identical).”1006 From this definition it would seem that the similarity described in the similarity statement is a “real” one, if only partial (i.e., the two things compared are, in actuality, similar).

But earlier Ibn Rashīq explains the inclusion of *tashbīḥ* within *majāz* on the grounds that “in most cases the two things resembling one another only resemble one another approximately by ‘indulgence’ and convention, not in reality” (*fa-li-anna l-mutashābihayni fī akthari l-ashyā’ī*).


1005 *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 141. This is connected to ʿDiyāʾ al-ʿDīn’s differentiation between two mechanisms of creating new motifs, the first based on imitation and the second on creation *ex nihilo* (see §4.1). In the context above ʿDiyāʾ al-ʿDīn does not use the term “representation”; he speaks, rather, of comparisons emanating from (ṣadaraʾ *an*) different processes, either an image that is seen and hence imitated or an image that is not seen but is invented in the mind. According to him, if the comparison is not based on an actual visual image, the resulting *tashbīḥ* is more affected (or artful, *asynā* ). Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, who inspired ʿDiyāʾ al-ʿDīn’s account here (al-Ṣināʾ atayn, 75) does not use any terms derived from the root *ḥ.k.y*.

1006 Al-ʿUmda 1: 286.
Yatashbahā ni bi-l-muqārabatī `alā l-musāmaḥatī wa-l-iṣṭilāḥī lā `alā l-haqīqa). In other words, we ‘grant’ that one object is similar to another object, and this is supported by common usage, but the two are not really alike. One is reminded here of John Searle’s example, “Richard is a gorilla,” in the sense that “Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth”: in reality, research has shown, gorillas are not fierce and nasty at all, but are rather “shy, sensitive creatures, given to bouts of sentimentality.” In this case the similarity statement “Richard is like a gorilla” (my example) would be literally false but figuratively true, for what we mean by that statement “according to iṣṭilāḥ” is that Richard is fierce, nasty, etc. From Ibn Rashīq’s account we might conclude that the similarity statement that does not (necessarily) reflect ‘real’ similarity is what the literary theorists call tashbīḥ, and because it is not ‘real’, it is identified as majāz.

1007 Ibid. 1: 268.


1009 Searle uses this example to show that metaphorical assertions are not necessarily assertions of similarity (ibid.). While the aim of his work is not to claim that all assertions of similarity in the realm of simile are metaphorical (or figurative), as Ortony and Fogelin are (see below), he does recognize that “[p]erhaps this is one way we might distinguish between figurative similes and literal statements of similarity. Figurative similes need not necessarily commit the speaker to a literal statement of similarity” (ibid., 120), and that “there seem to be a great many metaphorical utterances where there is no relevant literal corresponding similarity between S and P. If we insist that there are always such similes, it looks as if we would have to interpret them metaphorically [...]” (ibid., 123, also 124; both emphases added). See also Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 213 ff., on a critique of the ‘objectivist’ account of similarity.

1010 Compare this to the “literalist” approach, according to which there are tashbihāt that are true (mā kāna min al-tashbihāt šādiqan), presumably a reference to similarity claims that express ‘real’ similarity, and tashbihāt that are untrue (al-tashbihāt al-kādhiba), referring to similarity claims that do not express similarity that exists in the real world. This approach comes across in many of the literary theoretical works, in addition to and regardless of statements such as those we are speaking of above (usually in the form of ‘remote’ comparisons, not false ones). For one literalist approach (wherefrom the quotes are taken) see Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, ‘Iyār al-shiʿr, 23 and 4, respectively. On the latter’s traditionalism in championing ‘truthfulness’ in poetry see Ajami, Alchemy, 31-35. A category such as ḥusn al-tashbih also suggests that some similarity claims are perceived as better than others, perhaps in their truthfulness (e.g., Ibn al-Muʿtazz, al-Badīʿ, 68). Al-Jurjānī takes a literalist view when he says that metaphor (istiʿāra) is meant to establish/affirm “a similarity that is there (i.e., exists)” (iṭḥāb shabah hunāka); see Asrār, 252 (the passage and context are discussed in Harb, Poetic Marvels, 163; also Asrār, 154-55 and Poetic Marvels, 166). Not surprisingly, a literalist approach is also present in the philosophical tradition (cf. the statements by Davidson and Goodman, also philosophers, that everything/anything is like/in some way like everthing/anything else, fn. 872, also expressed by Searle, “Metaphor,” 123: “Similarity is a vacuous predicate: any two things are similar in some
Another differentiation between two types of similarity statements is made by the early philologist al-Aṣmaʿī (d. ca. 208/823) and is preserved in the ‘Umda.\textsuperscript{1011} The first type of similarity statement (\textit{tashbīh}) according to al-Aṣmaʿī is “a determination by conjecture” or estimation (\textit{taqdir}, ‘alā l-taqdir)\textsuperscript{1012} and the second is “an establishment of truth” (\textit{tahqīq}, ‘alā l-tahqīq).\textsuperscript{1013} The elaboration on this classification reads like Ibn Rashīq’s initial definition: the \textit{tashbīh taqdir} is a comparison of one aspect only, and the \textit{tashbīh tahqīq} is a complete comparison or comparison of essence (\textit{nafs}), like comparing (\textit{tashbīh}) a crow to a crow, a redness of an anemone flower to a redness of an anemone flower, etc. (hence, again: comparison = identity). But the use of \textit{tahqīq}, like al-Rummānī’s \textit{tashbīh haqīqa}, lends itself to an opposition with \textit{majāz} once the latter term enters the works of literary theory proper. It must be stressed, however, that al-Aṣmaʿī’s explanation differs from the argument made by Ibn Rashīq, \textit{yatashābahāni} […] ‘alā l-musāma wa-l-istilāḥ lā `alā l-ḥaqīqa: in this specific argument by Ibn Rashīq, two things that we think are alike may not really be alike, but we say they are alike based on custom (a lion may not really be brave); in al-Aṣmaʿī’s argument, echoed in al-Rummānī’s work and even in Ibn Rashīq’s, if the resemblance is only in one aspect, the two things are not really alike because only identical things (crow-crow, specific redness-specific respect or other”). When al-Fārābī discusses similarity (\textit{shabah}) in the Rhetoric in the context of the philosophical \textit{tamthīl} (analogy or argument from example), it is presented as something that exists in reality (\textit{mawjūd}) and is, strictly speaking, seen as an identity (in species, genus; see the dictionary definition above). Thus, he says, Zayd and ‘Amr “resemble one another in humanhood, animalhood, and bodyhood,” that is, both are human, animals, and a substance, in that those properties (sg. \textit{ma’nā}) exist in them. In the \textit{tamthīl} of the philosophers, an opponent could reject that there is a similarity between the two objects (\textit{daf’ihi al-shabah bayna l-amrān}): this implies that in a debate, the truth can be reached on whether or not a similarity actually exists between the two (Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Khaṭāba, in al-Manṭiqīyyāt li-l-Fārābī, 456-92, here: 490-91).

\textsuperscript{1011} \textit{Al-ʿUmda} 1: 287. The quotations from al-Aṣmaʿī begin on page 286, and the relevant passage above opens with \textit{wa-qāla fi mawḍiʿ ākhar}. After that, the voice of Ibn Rashīq resumes and this is marked by \textit{qāla šāhīb al-kitāb}.

\textsuperscript{1012} Lane, \textit{Lexicon}, 2494.

\textsuperscript{1013} Ibid., 606.
redness\textsuperscript{1014}) can really be alike. Regardless of the reasoning behind it, both understandings lead to the same result: the two things that are likened to one another in the second type of \textit{tashbīh} are not \textit{really} alike.

Some modern philosophers have also distinguished between literal statements of similarity and figurative (or non-literal or metaphorical) ones, the latter comprising of metaphors and similes.\textsuperscript{1015} The vast majority of modern accounts, however, tend to identify simile as a literal statement, especially vis-à-vis metaphor.\textsuperscript{1016} Since this debate is not unknown in modern research, I think we are justified in appropriating the modern terms for this discussion. Hence, \textit{tashbīh} as a literary device in the context of those medieval theorists who view it as \textit{majāz} may be appropriately rendered as ‘figurative comparison’\textsuperscript{1017}.

Other literary theorists in the Arabic tradition have preserved a distinction between two types of similarity statements, not least of which is ḏiyā’ al-Dīn himself in his early work, the

\textsuperscript{1014} The genus, in other words, must be identical, even in the case of attributes like redness. Thus, al-ʿAṣmaʾī’s \textit{tashbīh tahlīq/ʿalā l-tahlīq} would not include the resemblance of a red flower to red lips, since it is not the same ‘genus’ of redness. The philosophical-linguistic category that encompasses attributes that ‘differ’ depending on the species/genus at hand is termed \textit{tashkīk} (the ‘whiteness’ of a person is not like the ‘whiteness’ of snow, the ‘existence’ of a person is not like the ‘existence’ of God, etc.). On \textit{tashkīk} as a reference to concepts that apply to entities unequally (or in varying degrees: “by modulation”) see Alexander Treiger, “Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (\textit{Tashkīk al-Wujūd, Analogia Entis}) and its Greek and Arabic Sources,” in Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman (eds.), \textit{Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas}, Leiden: Brill, 2012, 327-63.

\textsuperscript{1015} See the works of Tversky, Ortony and Fogelin quoted above.

\textsuperscript{1016} See the discussion in Fogelin, \textit{Figuratively Speaking}, 33-66 (ch. 4). One criterion that is raised for determining the nature of the similarity statement lies in the principle of reversibility or symmetry: if the similarity claim is reversible (“If \textit{a} is like \textit{b}, then \textit{b} is like \textit{a}”), then it is a literal one; if it is not reversible (“A lion is like a man), then it is figurative (but both Fogelin, \textit{Figuratively Speaking}, 61, and Ortony, “Beyond Literal Similarity,” 171, recognize that even literal claims of similarity can be asymmetrical). Note that in the Arabic tradition, figurative claims of similarity can be symmetrical: this is the category called \textit{al-tard wa-l-ʿaks} (or sometimes simply ‘aks), when the moon is compared to the face of the patron rather than vice versa! (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn discusses it in \textit{al-Mathal al-sāʿir} 2: 158).

\textsuperscript{1017} The term ‘figurative comparison’ as a reference to both metaphor and simile is used most consistently by Fogelin.
Jāmiʿ.1018 There Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn combines the various early arguments into one, identifying the complete comparison (a comparison of all aspects) as ḥaqīqa and the partial comparison (one aspect) as majāz, saying that the latter is true (ṣawāb) only in terms of customary usage (ʿurf).1019 This implies that he would take a statement such as “Zayd is like a lion” to be untrue.1020 In the Mathal he does not repeat this passage but rather takes it for granted that tashbīh is part of figurative speech. Indeed, in Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn’s initial classification, majāz encompasses only two categories, the first being tawassuʿ and the second – tashbīh. The chapter devoted to tashbīh includes, as we have seen, cases of ordinary predicative metaphors as well as illustrative analogies, but numerous examples are simple similes, and whether or not the particle of comparison (ka-, ka-anna) appears in any of the above seems to be irrelevant for the author.1021 Much of the chapter is devoted to ‘psychological’ aspects of similarity claims, such as comparing physical objects to physical objects, mental concepts to objects, mental concepts to concepts, etc. These discussions have been common since the early works of literary theory and

1018 Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 90. Another theorist in whose work we find this distinction is al-Rāghib al-Īṣfahānī (fl. ≤ 409/1018) in his unpublished Kūṭb mīn kalām al-Rāghib fī l-bādiʿ; see Alexander Key, “Language and Literature in al-Rāghib al-Īṣfahānī,” in Bruno de Nicola, Yonatan Mendel and Husain Qutbuddin (eds.), Reflections on Knowledge and Language in Middle Eastern Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010, 32-62 here: 54 (but note, with regards to fn. 80, that this is not the distinction made by al-Jurjānī). Al-Rāghib also distinguishes between ījāz in the realm of ḥaqīqa and ījāz in the realm of balāgha (ibid.). Qudāma takes a literalist’s approach, but his account (Naqd, 55-56) is undeniably tied to the distinction between two types of similarity claims. For a later occurrence see Ibn Abī al-Īṣbaʿ, Tahrīr al-tahbīr, 159, 457; he later implicitly renounces this view in Bādīʿ al-Qurʾān, 58, where he simply speaks of “the technical tashbīh [in literary theory]” (al-tashbīh al-ṣināʿī).

1019 For a full quotation and discussion see §5.4 (including the correction of ʿarab to ʿurf in al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 90).

1020 The sentence he adduces here is “Zayd is a lion” (a tashbīh), not “Zayd is like a lion” (ibid. and §5.4). But cf. the discussion in al-Mathal al-sāʿir 2: 167-70, under the chapter of tajrīd (here: change in grammatical person) and within a reply to Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī, where Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn does exhibit a literalist’s approach when he takes the difference between the courage of the lion and the courage of a person to simply be a matter of degree. This would imply that the real reason “Zayd is not like a lion” is that the word “like” itself denotes identity (cf. the shibh/mithl discussion in fn. 1002) rather than similarity. This echoes the two approaches we saw in the ‘Umda.

1021 Al-Mathal al-sāʿir 2: 133-53. See, specifically, pp. 140-41, where a tashbīh by al-Buḥṭūrī is compared with a tashbīh by Ibn al-Rūmī. That the first contains the particle ka- and the second does not is simply irrelevant to Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn’s assessment of those figurative comparisons.

\textit{Summing Up}

\textit{Diyā’ al-Dīn’s primary understanding of \textit{majāz} within two components, fictional ascription (\textit{tawassuʿ}) and figurative comparison (\textit{tashbīh}), is an innovation in classical Arabic literary theory. It reflects his basic conception of \textit{majāz} as speech that is not semantically true: foxes do not talk; Zayd is not really like a lion. \textit{Diyā’ al-Dīn} then concedes and goes on to recognize \textit{istiʿāra} as an additional category of \textit{majāz}, but his initial reluctance signals that \textit{istiʿāra} is indeed separate from his understanding of \textit{tawassuʿ} and \textit{tashbīh}, as it is the only category of \textit{majāz} (and within it \textit{kināya}) that is based on linguistic knowledge. The so-called word shifts that occur in dead poetic metaphors and euphemisms (\textit{istiʿāra} and \textit{kināya}) are not typically found in \textit{tawassuʿ} and \textit{tashbīh}. Technically speaking, one could propose that \textit{ka-} ‘like’ can be used either literally (literal similarity statements) or figuratively (figurative similarity statements), such that a word shift would occur on the level of the particle of similitude – but this is not an argument that \textit{Diyā’ al-Dīn} makes (or any other Arabic theorist I am aware of, for that matter). The figurativeness lies in extralinguistic knowledge rather than knowledge about words. (It is noteworthy in this context that \textit{Diyā’ al-Dīn} does not treat metonymies, which are deeply rooted in the knowledge of words.) A more important difference between \textit{Diyā’ al-Dīn’s} conception of \textit{tawassuʿ-\textit{tashbīh}} and \textit{istiʿāra-\textit{kināya}} is that the latter reflect dead usage in the lexicon and in poetry/literary prose, including the hackneyed metaphors, whereas the former are continually created by the composer.}
of speech. Ŭiyā’ al-Dīn’s primary categorization of majāz into tawassuʿ and tashbih should be viewed in light of his practical occupation with literary composition.

That majāz is primarily understood by Ŭiyā’ al-Dīn as a statement that is untrue and not as a figurative substitution of a word is implicit in his work. In the Jāmiʿ he comes close to stating this explicitly, with his comment regarding the sentence “Zayd is a lion” (a tashbih with no particle of similitude) that Zayd is not really (ʿalā l-haqīqa) a lion. Here haqīqa is used in an extralinguistic sense, as a reference to reality and truth. Juxtaposed with this sense of haqīqa, the term majāz would readily refer to that which does not occur in reality, rather than a figurative understanding of the word ‘lion’.

While Ŭiyā’ al-Dīn develops a new categorization scheme for majāz in the Mathal, his basic thinking about majāz is not very different from the one espoused in the Jāmiʿ, not least of which because tashbih is recognized already there as a type of majāz. In doing so Ŭiyā’ al-Dīn displays continuity with early writings on literary theory (pre-Jurjānī) as well as with writings within the philosophical poetical tradition.
5.2. A Unique Commentary on al-Jurjānī: Ibn al-Zamlakānī

Due to the predominance of syntactic matters in the Tihyān, it is perhaps not surprising that the treatment of majāz in Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s work is rather brief. One comment about the meaning of ḥaqīqa and majāz leads to a brief chapter on the categories of majāz: kināya ‘periphrasis’, istiʿāra ‘metaphor’ and tamthīl ‘metaphorical exemplification’, in that order.1023 Most of the attention is devoted to periphrasis – a category differentiated by al-Jurjānī from majāz1024 – and to metaphor.

The chapter is situated at the very beginning of the Tihyān, as it opens the study of dalālāt ifrādiyya ‘single-word signification’. None of the majāz examples or categories display single words, and this raises the question of the rationale behind treating the topic in this particular context. Indeed, it is one of the objections raised by Ibn ʿAmīra in his ‘refutation’ of the work. It is clear, nevertheless, that Ibn al-Zamlakānī stands behind this placement since he repeats it later on in the work, saying that excellence in periphrasis, metaphorical exemplification, and anything displaying majāz wa-tawassu’ goes back to the single word (al-laḥẓ al-mufrad).1025 What Ibn al-Zamlakānī has in mind here is that the study of periphrasis and metaphors rests on lexicographical knowledge (essentially, a study of single words), whereas other issues rest on grammatical, specifically syntactic, knowledge. To corroborate this understanding, one might be reminded of the prerequisites that Ibn al-Zamlakānī posits to the study of īlm al-bayān, namely, lexicography (lugha) and syntax (iʿrāb).1026 Since most of his studies are functional-grammatical in essence, it is quite apparent that for the study of majāz

1024 Al-Jurjānī, Dalāʾīl, 66-67 and more explicitly, al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 272 and al-Sakkākī, Mifṭāḥ, 403.
1025 Al-Tihyān, 159. This is drawn directly from Dalāʾīl, 429-30.
1026 Al-Tihyān, 33.
syntax is simply irrelevant, hence the appeal to lexicography. The connection of majāz to the study of lugha is apparent in the works of Ibn Jinnī (d. 392/1001) and Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004), as channeled into the major later lexicological compendium by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), al-Muzhir. Here the claim is made, as it is in parallel works on legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), that knowledge of ḥaqīqa and majāz rests in the hands of the lexicographers (ahl al-lugha) (and see Chapter 5 Preliminaries).1027

Several additional comments pertaining to majāz are scattered elsewhere in the work, most importantly, under the chapter of majāz isnādī ‘majāz on the level of predication’, a notion developed by al-Jurjānī (later known as majāz ‘aqlī).1028 Here Ibn al-Zamlakānī recognizes the existence of single-word majāz (majāz ifrādī, later known as majāz lughawī), although only in the Burhān does he devote an entire section (albeit brief) to the topic. There, the examples of majāz ifrādī reveal that we are dealing with metonymies, although one subclass of dead metaphors also occurs.1029 Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s understanding of majāz isnādī has some repercussions for our understanding of his notion of metaphor that, interestingly, reveal a debate arising already in al-Jurjānī’s thought. This will be discussed below. The other discussions in which the topic of majāz comes up are under a literary device termed tamthīl, in this context: ‘conceptual comparison’; under the ways of sentence indication (dalālat al-kalām); and under

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1027 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, al-Muzhir fī ʿulūm al-lugha wa-anwāʿihā, eds. Muḥammad Ahmad Jād al-Mawlawī Bek, Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī, 2 vols., 3rd ed., Cairo: Maktabat al-Ḥaram li-l-Turāth, n.d., 1: 362; al-ʿĀmidī, al-Īḥkām 1: 45, 61-62; Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 114. Not surprisingly, there were backlashes to this view even among early scholars who were unwilling to accept the lexicographers’ authority on such matters (ibid.). By lexicology we mean the theory behind lexicography (see §3.1). It must be said that the other chapters within the dalālat al-ifrādiyya are also under the purview of the lexicographers besides, perhaps, the discussions of the verb and noun in the position of the predicate (al-Tibyān, 49-54).

1028 Al-Tibyān, 106-108.

1029 Al-Burhān, 102-104. ‘Naming a thing by the name of that which resembles it’ is exemplified by naming a brave person ‘lion’ and a stupid person ‘ass’. On treating ‘lion’ and ‘ass’ as dead metaphors see Chapter 5 Preliminaries.
the discussion of eloquence (*faṣāḥa*).\(^{1030}\)

What is most striking about Ibn al-Zamīlākānī’s treatment is that while the opening chapter dealing with *kināya-istiʿāra-tamthīl* is titled *fī al-ḥaqīqa wa-l-majāz*, it is not the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* pair that underpins the discussion, but rather the terms *zāhir* ‘surface level; apparent [meaning]’ and *ghayr al-zāhir* ‘non-surface level; non-apparent [meaning]’. The chapter opens with a statement that could have just as well done without these terms, and yet, they supersede the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dyad:

\[
\text{al-bābu l-awwalu fī l-ḥaqīqati wa-l-majāzi fa-naqīlu l-lafzu immā an yurāda bihi zahiruhu fī dhālika l-istiṣṭilāhi wa-huwa ka-l-asadi idhā urīda bihi l-ḥayawānu l-μuftarisu aw ghayru zāhirihī wa-huwa l-majāzu thumma l-majāzu madāruhu l-aʾammu `alā aqsāmin thalāthatin l-kināyati wa-l-istiʿārati wa-l-tamthīl}
\]

Chapter one, on literal and figurative speech. What is meant by a verbal expression is either its surface meaning in that [particular linguistic] convention, and that is like ‘lion’ if what is meant by it is the beast of prey, or its non-surface meaning, and that is figurative speech. Now figurative speech broadly revolves around three categories: periphrasis, metaphor and metaphorical exemplification (or illustrative analogy by way of metaphor) […]\(^{1031}\)

We say that Ibn al-Zamīlākānī could have done without the *zāhir-ghayr zāhir* terminology because in many of the parallel texts we come across, we essentially find the same argument using only the terms *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*: the notion of linguistic convention (*iṣṭilāh*) is associated with the literal/figurative discourse; adducing the meaning of lion as a beast of prey is commonly done under the *ḥaqīqa* umbrella. In fact in the *Mujīd*, and probably as an effort to simplify the

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\(^{1030}\) *Al-Tibyān*, 108-109 (not to be confused with *tamthīl* in the sense of metaphorical exemplification), 154-55, and 159-62, respectively. In the context of pp. 154-55 it seems that Ibn al-Zamīlākānī is using *kalām* in its grammatical sense of ‘[independent] sentence’, rather than ‘speech’ in general. The discussion of ‘conceptual comparison’ in the *Mujīd* is done under the heading *tashbīh* rather than *tamthīl* (*al-Mujīd*, 124-25).

\(^{1031}\) *Al-Tibyān*, 37.
discussion, he minimizes the use of ṣāḥir in favor of ḥaqīqa.\textsuperscript{1032} In the Burhān he adds a more legally-oriented presentation of ḥaqīqa-majāz, to the detriment of the notion of ṣāḥir.\textsuperscript{1033} The discourse of ghayr ṣāḥir is taken directly from al-Jurjānī, in a passage in which the category of “intending the non-surface level” (al-murād bih ghayr ṣāhirih) is presented as one encompassing both kināya and majāz (making clear that kināya and majāz should be distinguished from one another).\textsuperscript{1034} In the discussion that ensues al-Jurjānī makes use of the notion of ṣāḥir (not quite a technical term) by mentioning it alongside expressions such as ṣāḥir al-amr and ṣāḥir al-lafẓ,\textsuperscript{1035} but by no means does this come at the expense of a theory of majāz. Unlike al-Jurjānī, Ibn al-Zamlakānī is equating ghayr ṣāḥir with majāz (ghayru ṣāhirih wa-huwa l-majāz),\textsuperscript{1036} a process which results in: (i) identifying kināya as a category of majāz; and (ii) marginalizing the very relevance of majāz to kināya, istiʿāra and tamthīl.

It should be noted parenthetically that ṣāḥir as a technical term is commonly associated with legal theoretical thinking and refers to an obvious, default meaning of a text, but it does not overlap with ḥaqīqa. In fact, it emerged as a category of speech that, on one hand is plainly understood, and on the other, could admit differing interpretations. Coincidentally or not, it was a Shāfiʿī Ashʿarī – Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015) – who developed this notion into its evolved state (al-Jurjānī too was a Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī). According to David Vishanoff, the development reflected

\textsuperscript{1032} Al-Mujīd, 73. The simplified version runs as follows: matā urīda bi-l-lafẓi ṣāhiruhu fī dhālika l-istilāḥī fa-huwa l-ḥaqīqatu wa-illā fa-huwa l-majāzu “Whenever what is meant by a verbal expression is its apparent meaning in that linguistic convention – it is literal speech; otherwise – it is figurative speech.”

\textsuperscript{1033} Al-Burhān, 98-99.

\textsuperscript{1034} Dalāʾil, 66.

\textsuperscript{1035} Ibid., 69, 71, 73.

\textsuperscript{1036} Al-Tibyān, 37.
a marginalization of the category of *majāz* in several strands of legal theory.\textsuperscript{1037} Whether al-Jurjānī’s use of *zāhir* is in any way indebted to this type of legal thinking is a question for further research. On the face of it (no pun intended) it seems that al-Jurjānī’s usage of *zāhir* is more akin to its non-technical instantiations in grammatical writings, as a reference to the prima facie meaning of a sentence.

The passage opening Ibn al-Zamalakānī’s discussion is not the only manifestation of the lesser-relevance of *majāz* in his literary theory. In a later passage under the discussion of ‘sentence indication’ (*dalālat al-kalām*), he states that *kināya*, *istiʿāra* and *tamthīl* constitute utterances that derive their meaning from what the meaning of the sentence logically indicates (*mustafād min dalālat maʿnāhu*) rather than what the meaning of the sentence plainly is (*mustafād minhu*). The latter is termed *maʿnā* and the former *maʿnā maʿnā l-laftāz* ‘the meaning [or implication] of the sentence meaning’. The term *majāz* is not used.\textsuperscript{1038} Presenting *kināya-istiʿāra-tamthīl* as instances of ‘sentence indication’ can be traced directly to al-Jurjānī’s discussion of *maʿnā al-maʿnā*.\textsuperscript{1039} The examples Ibn al-Zamalakānī discusses are solely cases of periphrasis, such as “late morning sleeper (f.)” (*naʾūm al-ḍuḥā*), an expression meaning (*maqṣūd*) that a woman is living in luxury and has people who tend to her needs (therefore obviating her need to wake up early in the morning).\textsuperscript{1040} Here the term ḥaqīqa is used, in that the


\textsuperscript{1038} Al-Tibyān, 154-55.

\textsuperscript{1039} *Dalāʾil*, 262-63.

\textsuperscript{1040} The cultural Bedouin context of this phrase is provided in some detail by al-Sakkākī in *Miftāḥ*, 402. The phrase comes from Imru’ al-Qays’ celebrated *muʿallaqa* (not typically used in other texts, except as a quotation of Imru’ al-Qays). Judging by the dictionaries it is not clear whether it is an idiomatic expression: al-Zamakhshārī does not cite it in the *Asās*, but it does appear in *Lisān al-ʿarab* 6: 4584.
phrase “late morning sleeper” indicates from a literal perspective (yadullu min jihat al-haqiqa) the notion of “sleeping late in the morning” (al-nawm fī l-ḍuḥā).1041 And yet the actual meaning of the phrase is presented under the headings maqṣūd and murād ‘intention’ rather than the ḥaqiqa-counterpart, majāz, in spite of the fact that he explicitly subsumes such cases under majāz in the beginning of his work. Resorting to rubrics such as ghayr ẓāhir or ma ‘nā ma ‘nā al-lafz seems to alleviate an implicit problem Ibn al-Zamlakānī has with the notion of majāz, and especially with regards to kināya where all words are used literally and the predication is literal (in our example: she really does wake up late in the morning). To explore what exactly this ‘problem’ is, let us turn to the categories that Ibn al-Zamlakānī subsumes under majāz.

Kināya

The section on kināya, containing the largest number of poetic examples, is in fact a chapter on two types of periphrasis, following al-Jurjānī’s discussion in the Dalāʾīl.1042 Ibn al-Zamlakānī treats the two via his discussion of shawāhid,1043 all but one of the examples (the last one) are

1041 Al-Tībyān, 154.

1042 Dalāʾīl, 306-14 (and see below). For the sociolinguistic significance of kināya see Erez Naaman’s “Women Who Cough,” which opens with a theoretical introduction on kināya as a rhetorical notion (pp. 469-73). The distinction al-Jurjānī draws between the two types of kināya, and its contextualization within his engagement with ‘predication’ (see below), has been largely overlooked in modern scholarship (including Dichy’s thorough entry, “Kināya,” and Pellat’s “Kināya”). Abu Deeb does mention “another type of kināya” (Al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Poetic Imagery, 166), but his discussion is solely from the perspective of the image and the associations it evokes (and see also pp. 76-80, 164-67). The two types (and later third) are cited in Ali Ahmad Hussein, The Rhetorical Fabric of the Traditional Arabic Qaṣīda in Its Formative Stages: A Comparative Study of the Rhetoric in Two Traditional Poems by ‘Alqama l-Fahl and Bashshār b. Burd, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 98, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2015, 44-45 (he attends to the truthfulness of the expressions but reaches a different result; his translation of kināya here as ‘metonymy’ is confusing). Harb addresses some aspects of iḥbāt with respect to kināya (Poetic Marvels, 201, 204) but only speaks of one category of kināya.

1043 In other words, he does not start with a clear-cut “al-kināya ʿalā dārbayn” or the like. The way he does it is thus: after stating the archetypal examples of the type “having many ashes” (=category #1), Ibn al-Zamlakānī adduces a poetic line which is in fact an example of category #2, and then a second line which is an example of category #1. Then, with the following verse illustrations, he says whether they are equivalent to (nāẓir) the first example or to the second one. A “neater” presentation of the categories can be found in al-Sakkākī (three categories, see below) and in later standard rhetoric, channeled into Hussein, Rhetorical Fabric (see previous fn.) via Mehren.
derived from al-Jurjānī. The first category of *kināya* is equivalent to the example above, the archetype being “so-and-so has many ashes of the cooking-pot” (*fulān kathīr ramād al-qidr*) intending a large number of meals being served to guests (*wa-l-murād kathrat al-qirā*), and hence, a hospitable man. Three poetic examples of this case are adduced and they all play on the same theme of generosity. First is the anonymous (1*st*/8*th* cent.) [meter: *wāfir*]

\[
\text{wa-mā yaku fiyya min ʿaybin fa-innī} \\
\text{jabānu l-kalbi mahzūlu l-faṣīlī}
\]

“There is no blemish in me, for I am one whose
dog is a coward and whose young camel is emaciated.”

The explicit version would be (*wa-law ʿarrah la-qāla*), “it is known that my ‘front yard’ [or house] is frequented, my dog does not growl in the face of guests who visit me, and I slaughter she-camels and leave their youngsters thin [because they can no longer suckle from their mothers].” The second example is (probably) Nuṣayb’s (d. ca. 108/726) [meter: *mutaqārib*]

\[
\text{li-ʿAbdi l-ʿAzīzi ʿalā qawmihī} \\
\text{fa-bābuka asʿhalu abwābihim} \\
\text{wa-kalbuka ānasu bi-l-zāʾ irīna} \\
\]

“ʿAbd al-Azīz (b. Marwān, Umayyad governor of Egypt) [bestows] on his people,
and on others, visible benevolences
For your door is the easiest among their doors [to open],
your house is frequented and prosperous,

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1044 *Dalāʾil*, 306-14, sometimes with slight variations in the wording of the line or in its attribution. The *shāhid* cited in *al-Tībān*, 41, is indeed absent from one of the mss. (editors’ fn. 2).

1045 *Al-Tībān*, 37.

1046 The editors attribute the line to Ibn Harma (1*st*/8*th* cent.), but it does not occur in his *Dīwān* and all the other critics who quote it attribute it to an anonymous poet.

1047 Ibid., 38. The line is quoted anonymously. Strictly speaking, the *faṣīl* refers to a young camel that has just weaned from its mother, but it can also mean a young camel in general, weaned or not. See Lane, *Lexicon*, 2406-2407.
and your dog is more gladdened by visitors
than a mother is by her visiting daughter”

The third example is (probably) Ibn Harma’s (1st/8th cent.) [meter: ṭawīl]

\[
yakādu idhā mā abṣara l-dayfā muqbilan
\]
\[
yukallimuhū min ḥubbihī wa-hwa aʿjamū
\]
When [the dog] noticed a guest coming near,
he would almost speak to [the guest] out of love for him, though he cannot speak” 1048

All word usages in these examples are literal ones, and the propositions expressed therein – exaggerated, to be sure – could also be taken literally. That is, dogs that are exposed to many visitors are indeed more amicable to people than dogs that are not. Hospitable people who host many guests do indeed slaughter more camels. But a non-literal meaning of these propositions is also possible if one assumes, for instance, that these generous people were not in possession of dogs to begin with! 1049

There is reason to believe that Ibn al-Zamlakānī did not, in fact, take such propositions as literally true, and this can be deduced from the second type of kināya presented in the chapter. Here a certain characteristic is attributed not directly to the person, but (usually) to an imagined entity that is metonymically connected to that person. Examples include (I am citing four out of the ten adduced) Ziyād al-Aʿjam’s (d. ca. 100/718) [meter: kāmil]

\[
inna l-samāḥata wa-l-murūʿaṭa wa-l-nadā
\]

1048 Ibid., 39. The last line, according to the editors, is either by Ibn Harma or al-Nābigha al-Jaḍī (the early critics attribute it to the former).

1049 Cf. Larkin, Theology, 87; Harb, Poetic Marvels, 201; Hussein, Rhetorical Fabric, 45. Al-Jurjānī himself is ambiguous here (Dalāʿ īl, 66): he does not say explicitly that the expression of the kināya is true on a literal level, but because he uses the phrases ridfuḥu fi l-wujiḥūd “its logical consequence in existence [reality?]” and min šaʾ niḥi an yarḍafahu fi l-wujiḥūdi wa-an yakāna idhā kāna “it is its nature to logically follow it in existence, and to take place if that takes place,” one assumes that he views it as an actual reflection of reality. One wonders how Ibn al-Zamlakānī read this passage, in light of his views (below).
Generosity, virtue and liberality are in a round tent pitched over Ibn al-Hashraj.

Yazīd b. al-Ḥakam’s (d. ca. 102/720) [meter: munṣarīḥ]

Generosity, nobility, excellence, righteousness and good conduct are [bound] in your shackle;

the more curious (gharāba) case such as al-Buḥturī’s [meter: kāmil]

Did you not see [how] Nobility unloaded its camel’s saddle [i.e. stayed] among the people of Ṭalḥa, then did not go away?!

and this anonymous segment, which represents a “wondrous type” (fann gharīb) of the category [meter: tawīl] (“said with regards to the Barmakids”)

I asked Generosity and Liberality, why is it I see you’ve taken lowliness in exchange for eternal high rank? and why is it that the pillar of nobility got torn down?

They said, we were afflicted by (the death of) Ibn Yahyā Muḥammad.
I said, but did you not die along with his death? for you had been his servants at every assembly
They said, we stuck around so that we’d be consoled by reflecting upon his loss for a stretch of one day, then we’ll follow him the next day.\footnote{For the poetic examples above see \textit{al-Tibyān}, 38-41. Regarding the last poetic segment, see a similar two-liner by Abū Nuwās dedicated to Yaḥyā b. Khālid (\textit{Dīwān} 1: 339). For uses of this motif by other poets, including al-Mutanabbī, see Usāma b. Munqidh, \textit{al-Badī‘}, 236-37 (within the section on “intertextuality”: bāb al-sāḥiq wa-l-lāhiq wa-l-tadāwul wa-l-tanāwul, pp. 222-49). The Barmakids were known – at least as a literary conceit – for their exceeding generosity (e.g., Antonella Gheresetti, “An Unpublished Anthology of the Mamlūk Period on Generosity and Generous Men,” \textit{Mamluk Studies Review} 13 [2009], 107-20, here: 116). The idea in this passage is that now that Ibn Yaḥyā Muhammad has died, no instance of generosity and liberality can live up to what it was through him, thus those qualities are better off (i.e., they would get “eternal high rank”) by dying along with him.}

In all of the examples above, the attribute (ṣīfa) that is predicated or asserted (ithbāt) of the patron is said to reside not within the person itself, but next to him: in a tent pitched over him, in his shackle, or as a personified entity following him around (this last type being ‘strange’ and ‘wondrous’). It is not difficult to see that this subcategory within \textit{kināya} is more in line with metaphor than it is with the first subcategory because – unlike the “late morning sleeper” – the propositions expressed therein are evidently false: generosity is not really in a tent or shackle, let alone an entity that can speak or “take a load off.” Ibn al-Zamlakānī does not spell out how the second subcategory of \textit{kināya} differs from \textit{istiʿāra} (which we will discuss shortly), a category that also contains false propositions. We may surmise nevertheless that it is because a proposition in the former is based on contiguity whereas a proposition in the latter is based on similarity.\footnote{This distinction is somewhat alluded to in \textit{al-Burhān}, 125, where Ibn al-Zamlakānī says that the explicit particle of comparison (ka) cannot be reconstructed in the case of \textit{kināya}. It is probably due to such contiguous relations that \textit{kināya} is often still translated in modern scholarship as ‘metonymy’. For recent examples see Pierre Larcher, “Pragmatics,” \textit{Oxford Handbook of Arabic Linguistics}, 196-97; Ali Ahmad Hussein, “The Rhetoric of Hudhālī Wine Poetry,” \textit{Oriens} 43 (2015), 1-53, here: 28-29 (also in his new \textit{Rhetorical Fabric}); and Dichy, “Kināya.” Cf. Naaman, “Women Who Cough,” 471-72. Harb, \textit{Poetic Marvels}, 201 fn. 643, recognizes that \textit{kināya} does not mean ‘metonymy’ in al-Jurjānī’s work, but elsewhere she translates \textit{kināya} as metonymy (e.g., 49, 69, 81-82, 87, 234; perhaps in the philosophical poetical context \textit{kināya} does mean ‘metonymy’ – it is not explained what the philosophers mean by it). According to Bauer (“Arabische Kultur,” \textit{Rhetorik}, 295), \textit{kināya} overlaps with the “less precisely defined categories” of circumlocution, metonymy and synecdoche. Strictly speaking, metonymy is a single-word affair of the type “the pen” for “writing” or “the press” for “journalism,” whereas the examples above are more aligned with periphrasis or circumlocution, i.e., a longer textual unit reflecting a roundabout way of expression.}
Also left unanswered is why the two subcategories are subsumed together under *kināya* in the first place. In the corresponding deliberation in the *Dalāʾil*, al-Jurjānī provides an illuminating explanation, where he draws a distinction between the *ṣifa* and *ithbāt al-ṣifa*. As he sees it, “just as they resort to alluding and hinting (*kināya wa-τaʿrīḍ, also *ramz* and *ishāra*) with regards to the very attribute (*nafs al-ṣifa*), likewise they do so with regards to affirming (/asserting/predicating) that attribute (*ithbāt al-ṣifa*) [of a person].” In “late morning sleeper” or “having an emaciated young camel” what is alluded to is the very attribute itself: rich, generous. In addition to *ṣifa* it is also termed *wasf* and *maʿnā*. In “generosity is in a tent/shackle, etc.” the very attribute is stated explicitly (“generosity”) but the person to whom it is attributed is alluded to in a roundabout way. It is two sides of the same coin: in attributing B to A, either B is expressed indirectly or A is expressed indirectly (or more precisely, the attribution to A). This is an important aspect of al-Jurjānī’s conception of *kināya* (a topic not treated in

expression. See the entries “metonymy” and “periphrasis” in Thomas O. Sloane (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 and Baldick, *The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms*. In the Arabic works there is usually a clear distinction between utterances of the periphrastic *kināya* type and regular metonymies, which may be discussed under the heading *majāz* or the more technical *majāz ifrādī/mursal* (or, in the old works like that of Ibn Durayd, *istiʿāra*). It is true that in non-technical usage, especially in earlier works, we sometimes come across the expression “*X kināya ’an Y*” in the sense of metonymy (e.g., al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ al-bayān fi majāzāt al-Qurʾān*, 353, with reference to Q 74:4 *wa-thiyābaka fā-τaḥhir, if “clothes” are taken as a metonym for the person wearing them)*.

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1053 *Dalāʾil*, 306-14.

1054 An idiomatic rendering of […] *kamā yaṣna ūna fī nafsī l-ṣifati bi-an yadhhabū bihā madhhaba l-kināyati wa-l-taʿrīḍi ka-dhālika yadhhabūna fī ithbāti l-ṣifati hādhā l-madhhaba; Dalāʾil*, 306. The phrase *min jānib al-taʿrīḍ wa-l-kināya wa-l-ramz wa-l-ishāra* occurs in ibid., 306.9-10. One is tempted to conclude that in al-Jurjānī’s use, *kināya* is not quite a technical term, and cf. al-Jāhiz’s use of the phrase *al-kināya wa-l-taʿrīḍ* in his *al-Bayān wa-l-tabīyīn* as quoted in Dichy, “*Kināya*”.

1055 E.g., *Dalāʾil*, 306.12-13, 307.1, 307.9-10, 312.8. When al-Jurjānī first introduces the notion of *kināya* (ibid., 66), he speaks of *ithbāt maʾnan min al-maʾāni* (not predicating the attribute of someone but simply asserting its existence), thus *maʾnā* is used synonymously with *ṣifa*. This might explain Harb’s description of *kināya* as “words that can be employed to affirm another statement” rather than a statement in and of itself (*Poetic Marvels*, 204).

1056 Al-Sakkākī develops this distinction even further. He sees the connection between B and A as a matter of *tākhsīs* ‘specification’ (making a certain attribute specific to someone) that can manifest itself not only via predication (*insnād*) but also through annexation (*idāfah*; see *Miftāḥ*, 407-408 (he also identifies a third subtype of *kināya*, p. 404).
the Asrār) as it reveals his underlying interest in logical predication (ithbāt), particularly of an attribute, which one might say underpins many of his other discussions, not least of which is the basic notion of istiʿāra (predicating “lion” of a person, for “brave”).

Istiʿāra as Majāz Isnādī

While the reader of Ibn al-Zamlakānī may be oblivious to the underlying preoccupation with predication present in the Dalāʾil, the discussion of istiʿāra reveals that the notion of majāz here is logical (on the level of predication) rather than lexical. The chapter opens with an enumeration of two types of istiʿāra: one in which something is made into something else and one in which something is made to own something else. “I saw a lion” is an example of the first (the said person was “made into” a lion), and for the second, the famous hemistich by Labīd (d. 41/661) is adduced, “when the reins of [the morning] were in the hand of the north wind” (the north wind is “made to own” a hand). The type “I saw a lion” is then carefully differentiated from the more explicit “Zayd is a lion,” in which the topic (Zayd) is mentioned, and hence reflects a “comparison/simile by way of exaggeration,” not a metaphor (a common distinction from the very early critical works). The crux of the distinction lies in the degree to which something is ‘confirmed’ or ‘asserted’ in the mind of the recipient: nazala manzilat al-shayʿ al-thābit alladhī lam tabqa lahu ḥāja ilā l-akhdh fī ithbātihi “is in the status of a confirmed/established thing

1057 This requires further research, but see Dalāʾil, 71-73, 431-32, 438-42 for the importance of ithbāt and khabar within the poetic context of kināya, istiʿāra and tamthīl (Larkin recognizes in passing the focus on ithbāt rather than the mutthbat in the context of majāz in Theology, 55, and Harb goes into further detail in Poetic Marvels, 190 ff., with some interesting results, especially with regards to tashbīḥ/tamthīl). Al-Jurjānī’s other concerns with predication are of a more grammatical nature. See, for instance, the discussion on the morphosemantic distinction between predicating an imperfect verb (of the yafʿalu form) of a topic versus predicating a participle (of the fāʾil form), in terms of gradation of the attribute; Dalāʾil, 173-77. His more famous treatment of predication includes the functional distinction between a definite and indefinite predicate (ibid., 177 ff. [the chapter starting on p. 173 is titled al-qawl ʿalā jurūq fī al-khabar]). This is an important and overlooked tangent point between al-Jurjānī’s grammatical theory and his poetics (with theological implications in the background).

1058 Al-Tībān, 41-42. This distinction will be elaborated upon when we discuss Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī.
which is in no need of affirmation.” In “I saw a lion,” Zayd is being asserted as a lion to such a
degree that the identity is immediate (min awwal wahla); conversely, in “Zayd is a lion” the
identity is spoon-fed, as the utterance/speaker “instructs you of/makes you understand that an
essence of a human-being is claimed to be an essence of a lion” (afhamaka ḥaqīqata insānī -
dduʿiya annahā ḥaqīqatu asadin).1059 It is once again the notion of ithbāt that is at the crux of the
argument, but this time it is acknowledged that there are degrees in the affirmation of an identity.
Paradoxically, when the thing being identified as something else is not mentioned, the identity is
stronger, since it leaves no trace of a false attribution.

Interestingly, the poetic examples of istiʿāra – only three are adduced – reflect a different
type of metaphor, one in line with the type “Zayd is a lion,” because in all three cases the topic of
comparison is stated. Ibn al-Zamlakānī provides them as examples of eloquent metaphors (balīgh
al-istiʿāra).1060 In doing this he is directly following al-Jurjānī, who adduced them when
discussing unique metaphors (al-khāṣṣī al-nādir) as opposed to everyday hackneyed ones (al-
ʿāmmī al-mubtadhal).1061 Later in the Burhān, however, Ibn al-Zamlakānī recognizes the
discrepancy and now presents those examples as cases “oscillating between metaphor and
explicit simile” (yataraddadu/dāʾir bayna l-istiʿāra wa-ṣarīḥ al-tashbīh).1062 (In the Mujīd no
poetic examples are provided besides the archetypal metaphors.) The first example is the
anonymous [meter: basīṭ]1063

1059 Ibid., 42.
1060 Ibid., 42-43.
1061 Dalāʿīl, 74-78.
1062 Al-Burhān, 113-15. He is also embedding here al-Jurjānī’s notion of phantastic aetiology (though the term
takhyīl is not used).
1063 All three examples are from al-Tibyān, 42-43; cf. Dalāʿīl, 76-78.
al-yawmu yawmāni mudh ghuyyiba ‘an baṣṣarī
nafsī fidā ’uka mā dhanbī fa-a’iadhīrū
umsī wa-uṣbiḥu lā alqāka wā-ḥazanā
la-qad ta’annaqa fi makrūhiya l-qadarū
“[Each] day is two since you’ve been absent from my eye
My soul is your ransom; what is my sin so that I could give an excuse for it?
I go night and day not encountering you; O the grief!
Indeed Fate has found delight in my calamity [inflicted by him]1064

The second is Ibn al-Mu’azz’s [meter: ṭawīl]

yunājīniya l-ikhlāfu min taḥti maṭlihī
wa-takhtaṣimu l-āmālu wa-l-ya’su fi ṣadrī
“False Promise is whispering [a secret] to me in its state of delaying [its fulfillment],
while Hopes and Despair are going at it in my breast”1065

The third example is a segment “recited by al-Jāhiẓ” [meter: ṭawīl]

la-qad kunta fī qawmin ‘alayka asḥihāṭin
bi-nafsika illā anna mā tāha tā’iḥū
yawaddīna law khāṭū ‘alayka julūdahum
wa-lā yadfa’u l-mawta l-nufūsu l-shaḥā’iḥū
[addressing himself:]
“You were among people miserly towards you of yourself (they would not let you go),
but whatever goes must be going
They wish they could sew their skins over you [so as to never let you go]

1064 Literally ghuyyiba ‘an means ‘to cause s.o. to be absent’. The indicative verbal mood in fa-a’iadhīrū is a poetic license for the subjunctive. For the common pausal form following the particle of lamentation wā see Wright, Grammar 2: 93. The text in al-Tibyān, 42, mistakenly has wā-ḥarabā (vocalizes by the editors wa-āḥarabā; correct in the Dalā’īl). The phrases lā alqāka and ta’annaqa fi makrūhī could be a playful allusion to the phrase laqiyahu bi- mākrūh ‘he did to him a thing disliked’ (Lane, Lexicon, suppl., 3012). The notion of Fate taking delight in afflicting calamities should also be understood in light of the phrase makārih al-dahr.

1065 For ikhlāf as the future-tense equivalent of kadhib (which is used with respect to the past) see Lane, Lexicon, 794. The phrase min taḥti literally means ‘under’. See ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Mu’tazz bi-Allāh, Diwān asḥīʿ al-Amīr Abī Ḍabbās, ed. Muḥammad Badr Sharīf, 2 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Maʾārif, 1977-1978, 2: 259. The Dār Sādir edition, 232, has a rather different version for the first hemistich: tujāḍhibunī l-atreṣṭa bi-l-waṣṣli wa-l-qilā “My arms are pulling me in a tug of war between bond and hate.”
But [even] Miserly Souls cannot ward off death

In these lines all words are used according their literal meaning, besides perhaps the idiomatic ‘ransom’ in “your soul is my ransom.” Otherwise, the metaphors are instances of personification: fate finding delight in calamity; false promise whispering a secret; hope and despair struggling one another; miserly souls warding off death (hence they are capitalized above).

Do these cases conform in Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s mind to al-Jurjānī’s idea of majāz fi l-iṭḥbāt (which he also terms majāz ḥukmī ‘majāz on the level of the proposition’)? Ibn al-Zamlakānī attends to this notion under the heading majāz isnādī ‘majāz on the level of predication’ (discussed under part II of his book) and it, indeed, seems inseparable from his idea of istiʿāra. Following al-Jurjānī, it is said of this type,

\[ hādhā l-fannu dākhilun 'alā l-nisbati lā 'alā dhawāti l-kalami [sg. kalima] l-mufradati \]

wa-mithāluhu qawluka nahārukaṣāʾimun wa-layluka qāʾimun wa-nāma laylī wa-tajallāhāmmī fa-l-tajawwuzu fī sā 'imun wa-qāʾim laysa min ijiḥati dalālatihi l-iifrādiyyati wa-lākin min ijiḥati ijrāʾihimā khabarayni 'alā l-nahāri wa-layli.  

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1066 The poet is probably saying that he wishes to go fight and expose himself to danger, but his fellow tribesmen will not allow him, thereby alluding to Q 33:18-19, “God would surely know those of you who hinder, and those who say to their brothers, ‘Come to us’, and come to battle but little, being niggardly towards you.” The version in al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn 1: 50 runs slightly different: lawla ʿanna man ṣaḥ… and wa-hal yadfaʿu… The lines are attributed here to “al-Agharr al-shāʿir,” perhaps – as Hārūn notes – one of the two poets of the tribe Yashkur b. Wā’il called thus in Abū al-Qāsim al-Hasan b. Bishr al-Āmidī, al-Muʿtalif wa-l-mukhtalif fi ṣamāʿ al-shuʿarāʾ wa-kunāhum wa-alqābihim wa-ansābihim wa-ḥaḍirihihim, ed. F. Krenkow, reprint, Beirut: Dār al-Īl, 1991, 48. Yet in another source, each line is attributed to a different poet, although the two lines are cited in succession (the second attribution within square brackets): the first to Muṭṭārif b. Jaʿwana al-Dabbī, the second to one al-M.shr.k (unvowelled) al-Mawsili; see al-Khālidiyān (Abū Bakr b. Muḥammad al-Khālidī and Abū ʿUthmān Saʿīd b. Hishām al-Khālidī), al-Asbāḥ wa-l-nāzāʾir min ashʿar al-mutaqaddimān wa-l-Jāhiliyya wa-l-mukhadramān, ed. al-Sayyid Muḥammad Yūsuf, 2 vols., Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾīf wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1958, 1965, 2: 204.

1067 Al-Jurjānī refers to this type of figurative speech in various ways; for majāz ḥukmī see, e.g., Dalāʾil, 296, 298-99 (or fi l-ḥukm or fi akhlām, recurring in ibid., 293-301). In the Asrār we find majāz fi l-iṭḥbāt recurring (e.g., Asrār, 342 ff.) and also majāz min taʾrīq al-maʾnā wa-l-maʾāqil, which Ritter translates as “trope in the domain of reason” (editor’s introduction, 24). Also the rare majāz ʿaqlī occurs (e.g., Asrār, 380), a term which would later become standard. In his later Burhān, Ibn al-Zamlakānī refers to it as majāz ʿaqlī (al-Burhān, 100).
This type enters upon the [level of] predicative relation, not the single words themselves, like saying “your day is fasting, your night is rising [for prayer]” [for: you are fasting in the day during Ramadān and praying at night] and “my night slept and my worry became manifest” [for: instead of sleeping at night, I was up with distress]. For the transgression in ‘fasting’ and ‘rising’ is not from the perspective of its single signification but rather from the perspective of making them act as predicates of ‘day’ and ‘night’.1068

Then, surprisingly, when discussing the poetic illustrations, both aspects of Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s archetypal metaphor come to the surface: (1) the idea of an affirmation of identity; and (2) the ascription of an object to something else. Below are the poetic illustrations Ibn al-Zamlakānī provides for majāz isnādī, along with the comments that align them with his declared notion of istiʿāra. Al-Mutanabbi’s well-known [meter: wāfir]

badat qamar an wa-mālat khūṭa bānin
wa-fāḥat ʿanbar an wa-rātan ghażālā
“She appeared – a moon, leaned over – a delicate twig,
let out a sweet scent – ambergris, and gazed – a gazelle”

[Identity: “[the poet] made her the very moon itself” (jaʿalahā ʿayna l-qamar). This is not equivalent to “she appeared moon-like” (ḥadhf muḍāf taqdiru hu mithl) because the resulting meaning would be less “grounded” (aʿqʿad)]1069

Al-Khansāʾ’s [meter: basīf]

tāтаʿu mā rataʿ at ḥattā idhā -ddakarat
fa-innamā hiya iqbal wa-idbārū
[said of a she-camel whose foal died:]
“She pastures as she pleases, until she becomes reminded of it, then she is nothing but a movement forward and backward”


1069 Al-Tibyān, 107.
The very line by Labīd presented at the outset of the *istiʿāra* discussion [meter: *kāmil*]

*wa-ghadāti rīhin qad kashaftu wa-qirratin*

*iddh asbahat bi-yadi l-shamāli zimāmuḥā*

“Many a cold and windy morning I went forth

When its reins were in the hand of the north wind”

[Ascription: “There is nothing there that can be claimed to be similar to the hand such that the hand would be an analogue of it, but rather it is imagination and fancy (*takhyīl wa-wahm*) of an existence of something [a topic, a substratum] for which that [the hand] was borrowed […] the idea is that [the poet] likened the north wind in its handling (or directing) of the morning as it occurs in nature to a reins of a camel in his [the camel rider’s] hand, such that he handles it according to his will; when [the poet] meant that, he made a hand belong to the north wind (*jaʿala li-l-shamāli yadan*) and reins over the morning.”]^{1071}

And finally, the anonymous *rajaz* hemistich:

*tasqīka kaffu l-layli akʾusa l-karā*

“The hand of night is giving you cups of sleep to drink”

[Ascription: “[the poet] gave ‘cups’ on loan to ‘sleep’ (*istaʿara li-l-karā l-akʾus*) [i.e., sleep is made to own ‘cups’] […] when [the poet] made it [the night] be a cupbearer, then he made it own a hand (*jaʿala lahu kaffan*).]^{1072}

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^{1071} Al-Tībyān, 107. I take *takhyīl wa-wahm* here as a hendiadys for the non-technical ‘fancy’. Heinrichs touches upon this non-technical sense of *takhyīl* in “Takhyīl,” 2.

^{1072} Al-Tībyān, 107-108. The version in *Dalāʾil*, 461, is *saqat-hu kaffū l-layli akwāsa l-karā*. The line is by Abū Nuwās (*Dīwān* 2: 300), from a hunting *urjūza*. The ‘vulgar’ *akwās* (from *kās*, for *kaʾs*) appears as *akʾus* in al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī, *al-Wasāṭa*, 211.
This final example is then explicitly identified as a metaphor, and specifically a ‘groomed metaphor’ (*tarshīḥ al-istiʿāra*, see §5.5), based on the equation “the intoxication of sleep is like the intoxication of wine.” What Ibn al-Zamlakānī does not spell out is this: because the analogue is taken from the realm of wine, ‘cups’ were added to elaborate the metaphor from the analogue’s perspective (i.e., to “groom” the metaphor).\textsuperscript{1073} He then provides another example of ‘cup borrowing’ (*istiʿārat al-kaʾs*), following al-Jurjānī, namely, [meter: *basīṭ*

\[ \text{wa-qad saqā l-qawma kaʾsa l-naʾsati l-saharū} \]

“Sleeplessness has given the people a cup of drowsiness to drink,”\textsuperscript{1074}

and it is once again assumed that the ‘cup’ has no substratum in the topic domain – hence, it may be taken literally. In sum, all the examples adduced under *majāz isnādī* are identical, structurally and semantically, to the cases discussed under Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s chapter on *istiʿāra*.

Although it is afforded only one paragraph in the *Tibyān*, the third category subsumed under *majāz – tamthīl* – also points to a logical basis of *majāz*. Ibn al-Zamlakānī presents it essentially as a metaphor (following al-Jurjānī), as he maintains, “It is *majāz* only if it comes in the manner of a metaphor (*ʿalā ḥadd al-istiʿāra*).” The category of *tamthīl* – which, as we have seen in al-Jurjānī, refers to metaphorical exemplification or illustrative analogy (by way of metaphor) – is not exemplified by poetic illustrations. Instead, only archetypal sayings are adduced, such as “So-and-so puts one leg forward and the other one backward” (“said with regards to a hesitant man”), or “You are blowing on a non-fire” (“for someone who is doing

\textsuperscript{1073} The case of *tarshīḥ al-istiʿāra* will be discussed in some detail under Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī. More information on it is provided by Ibn al-Zamlakānī in *al-Burhān*, 100-101. As far as I am aware it is absent from the work of al-Jurjānī. The generating mechanism of metaphors such as ‘hand of night giving cups of sleeps to drink’, in which the element ‘hand’ is semantically, though not poetically, redundant (the meaning would be the same if it were simply ‘night’ giving the cups, not the ‘hand’ of night) – is treated by Heinrichs in “Paired Metaphors,” 5 ff.

something and not achieving the goal”). The explicit version, “In your hesitance you are like someone who puts one leg forward and another backward,” it is stated, would not be part of majāz (lam yakun min bāb al-majāz). We may conclude from this statement that it is the form of direct predication, or direct attribution, that stands at the basis of tamthīl, much like we saw with the identity-based metaphor.1075 This statement also suggests, implicitly, that Ibn al-Zamlakānī followed al-Jurjānī in excluding tashbīh, or any sentence containing ka- and other particles of comparison, from the domain of majāz (cf. the stance of his younger contemporary, Ibn al-Naqīb, below).

Unlike the shawāhid of istiʿāra in which both topic and analogue were mentioned, in the case of tamthīl the topic is indeed not mentioned. Here the unexpressed topic is the attribute (or ‘action’) of being hesitant (or ineffective, in the second example). In this respect tamthīl is more in line with kināya (type #1):

So-and-so has many ashes ➔ is generous
So-and-so puts one leg forward and the other one backward ➔ is hesitant

Because tamthīl aligns with kināya (at least one subsype of it) with respect to expressing an attribute/action – the predicate of the sentence – in a roundabout way, it adds another rationale for viewing kināya and tamthīl as belonging to the same category. That category seems to be the extra-linguistic notion of majāz.

A Departure from al-Jurjānī’s Majāz fī l-Ithbāt

To corroborate Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s equation of majāz in literary theory as, essentially, majāz isnādī, it is useful to look at the later Burhān, where Ibn al-Zamlakānī all but says so explicitly.

1075 For tamthīl see al-Tibyān, 44 and Dalāʾ il, 68-69. In the Burhān he enlarges the discussion (al-Burhān, 120-132) to include also a treatment of similarity (tashbīh).
Here, as already mentioned, the ḥaqīqa-majāz chapter is enlarged, and it now includes – in addition to definitions – a section devoted to ‘majāz in the single word’ (majāz ifrādī). The discussion is markedly uṣūlī in tone: all examples are Qur’ānic (or ḥadīth) and we even find an explicit reference to the uṣūliyyūn. The examples are primarily metonymies of the type ‘hand’ (yad) for ‘power’ (qudra) or ‘town’/‘caravan’ (qarya, īr) for ‘the people of the town/caravan’. Following this chapter is the triad kināya-istiʿāra-tamthīl, presented under the heading “[cases] in which the usage of majāz is predominant” (fīmā yaghlibu -stiʾmāluhu min al-majāz). Since it appears immediately after majāz ifrādī, it is not a big leap to assume that those three categories are conceived of as majāz isnādī. And yet, he is reluctant to spell out this conception. The reluctance we find both here and earlier in the Tibyān reflects, what I believe to be Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s recognition that his implicit conception of majāz – statements that do not conform to reality – is at odds with the prevalent rejection of a notion like kadhib in the domain of majāz.

As we conclude Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s treatment of majāz, it is important to stress that his interpretation stems solely from the Dalāʾil, which reflects a later development in al-Jurjānī’s thinking (it was written after the Asrār). Whereas the Asrār was appended by a very long

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1076 Al-Burhān, 103. The section runs from p. 102 to p. 104.
1077 Ibid., 102-104. We also come across metonymies in verbs (or verbal dead metaphors), as in the first example sāla l-wādī ‘the river flowed’ for ‘came’ (al-qābil). The famous case of Q 12:82 wa-sʾali l-qaryati llatī kunnā fīhā fīhā wa-l- īra is commonly interpreted in the sources as an elision (ḥadhf) of the first term of the construct (ibid., 104). As we have seen (Chapter 5 Preliminaries, fn. 658), interpreting it as a metonymy or as deletion were common in the early sources. We will look at metonymies in more detail when we discuss Ibn al-Naqīb.
1078 Ibid., 105.
1079 See ibid., 119, where al-Khansāʾ’s line is adduced as a case of majāz isnādī “equivalent to” (naẓūr) metaphor.
1080 And note too Larkin’s treatment of majāz, which relies almost entirely on the Asrār (Theology, 73). Her main concern, we might recall, is to contextualize al-Jurjānī’s work vis-à-vis the theological tradition and especially the work of Abd al-Jabbār.
treatment of majāz, in the Dalāʾil a full treatment of majāz is deemed by al-Jurjānī unnecessary, and comments about the concept are thus scant.\textsuperscript{1081} In the Asrār, al-Jurjānī in fact devotes attention to the very question of whether metaphors such as “I saw a lion” reflect majāz by means of the vocabulary of the language (lexical majāz) or majāz by means of reason (logical majāz). His conclusion is decidedly in support of the former view: although, he says, the person is claimed to be within the species of ‘lion’ and he is imagined as one of the lions, it is still the case – he maintains – that the resulting usage of the word asad here is not according to its original coinage since it is only the limited notion of ‘courageousness’ that is ultimately expressed, not the entirety of the lion’s features.\textsuperscript{1082} In the Dalāʾil we find some indications that his view may have evolved to the opposite position: equating istiʿāra with kināya, he says that the way to comprehend the former – like the latter – is via the maʿqūl (what is conceived in the mind by way of reason) and not the lafẓ (the wording itself).\textsuperscript{1083} He also stressed the notion of metaphor as iddiʿāʾ ‘making a claim’.\textsuperscript{1084} But without knowledge of the Asrār, one is unaware that al-Jurjānī had already taken these ideas into account when reaching what was perhaps his

\textsuperscript{1081} Dalāʾil, 66: “Discussion of that [viz., majāz] can be long, and I already mentioned elsewhere the correct view; here I will limit myself to mentioning what is most common of it and apparent.” The mere fact that the treatment of majāz is relegated to the end of the Asrār (pp. 324-64), which is then appended by what reads like a separate risāla on majāz (pp. 365-89) is, in itself, meaningful. According to Ritter (editor’s introduction, 24), it may have started out as a separate treatise, but was then added, possibly by al-Jurjānī himself, to the Asrār. See also Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

\textsuperscript{1082} Asrār, 279-81 (a fascinating discussion which deserves closer study).

\textsuperscript{1083} Dalāʾil, 439-40.

\textsuperscript{1084} Ibid., 434-45, 437. But consider the rather explicit comment made in Dalāʾil, 367, according to which “if we study [this question] thoroughly/look at the true nature [of this question] (idhā haqqaqnā), we do not find that the word (lafẓ) ‘lion’ is necessarily used for something other than what it was coined for […] and this, if you get the essence [of my argument] (idhā bāṣṣalta), is a ‘going beyond’ (tajawwuz) on your part in the meaning of the word, not the word itself (fī maʿnā l-lafẓ lā l-lafẓ).” It is probably this comment that al-Rāzī is referring to with regards to al-Jurjānī’s view in the Dalāʾil. What makes this passage slightly ambiguous is al-Jurjānī’s recognition that there still is a tajawwuz present in the “meaning of the word,” and perhaps this is a reference to the sentence as a whole (maʿnā l-lafẓ as “the implication of the wording”) even though lafẓ had just been used with reference to a single word.
final verdict in favor of the ‘lexical majāz’ (later termed majāz lughawī) with respect to identifying metaphors.1085

In the later commentarial tradition of al-Jurjānī’s work (via Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Sakkākī), the view of metaphor as a case of majāz lughawī won the day.1086 What seems to have been the issue here is that recognizing such metaphors as majāz ‘aqlī would make them inseparable from a false claim (kadhib, bāṭil),1087 even though, as we have seen in the Preliminaries to Chapter 5, this is not borne out in al-Jurjānī’s own work. Since the shawāhid al-Jurjānī adduced were all reflective of a truthful occurrence (gray hair did actually appear; plants did actually grow in the spring; the speaker was actually happy to see the addressee), one could hardly say that he espoused the view of majāz fī l-ithbāt as a reflection of falsehood. The problem arises, I would say, with al-Jurjānī’s classification of istiʿāra as a subcategory of majāz

1085 In other words: even if the way to comprehending a sentence like “I saw a lion” (in reference to ʿayd) is by reason and not by wording – i.e., understanding that ʿayd is claimed to be part of the species ‘lion’ – this does not contradict the fact that at the end of the day, the word ʿasad itself is being used metaphorically, since its specific meaning here is ‘very courageous’. Conversely, it could indeed be the case that al-Jurjānī now espoused the view that “I saw a lion” is a case of – to use the later term – majāz ʿaqlī (as evinced, e.g., by Dalāʾil ʿilā, 367 or 295, where raʾaytu asadan is commented on in the context of majāz ḥukmī; also, al-Rāzī is perspicacious enough for us to trust his judgement, when he says in Nihāya, 236, that al-Jurjānī went back and forth on this question). It should be clarified that “I saw a lion” is the archetypal stock example of an (implicitly creative) identifying metaphor and should not be confused with what I refer to as dead metaphors which are seen as single-word majāz that have become part of the Arabic vocabulary (see also Ibn al-Naqīb below).

1086 The later works in the Standard Theory are largely uncharted territory, so to make any claim regarding the later rhetorical tradition is rather tentative. Especially important would be the works of two scholarly luminaries in Tamerlane’s court, “al-Saʿd” and “al-Sayyid” – that is, Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1389) and al-Sayyid al-Šarīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) – both of whom wrote commentaries on al-Qazwīnī’s work. This is a question I hope to study in a future project. For now what can be said is that al-Rāzī supports the view of majāz lughawī (he references the discussion in both the Asrār and Dalāʾ ilā; Nihāya, 235-37), and so does al-Sakkākī – who goes so far as to reject the notion of majāz ʿaqlī altogether (Miṣfāḥ, 370-72, 400-401, who also relies on al-Jurjānī’s debate on the matter; cf. al-Šaʿaḍī, Nusra, 79). Al-Qazwīnī follows the majāz lughawī line as well; Talkhīṣ, 267-72. See also Bonbakker, “Istiʿāra,” and the late take by Ibn Maʿṣūm (d. 1107/1705): according to him, viewing istiʿāra as majāz lughawī was the opinion of the jumhūr (ʿAlī ʿadr al-Dīn Ibn Maʿṣūm al-Madaḥīnī, Anwār al-rabīʿ fī anwāʿ al-baḍīʿ, ed. Shākir Hādī Shukr, 7 vols., Karbala: Maktabat al-ʿIrfān, 1968-69, 1: 244-45). The debate carried on to later Persian poetics; see de Tassy, Rhétorique, 43-44.

1087 E.g., al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 237, citing al-Jurjānī’s stance that viewing istiʿāra as majāz on the level of ithbāt would amount to kadhib (al-Jurjānī is concerned here with false predications of God).
in the first place, because the examples he adduces for istiʿāra constitute ‘false’ statements. Indeed, the discourse of kadhib so prevalent in early works on poetics has all but disappeared in works of the seventh/thirteenth century. What majāz may have been – in the context of literary theory proper in this time and place – was a notion superimposed on the old idea of kadhib. Ibn al-Zamlakānī’s efforts reflect therefore a unique interpretation of al-Jurjānī’s work, much in line with former – and contemporaneous – views about the nature of majāz in literary language, as expressed in works of ʿilm al-bayān written in Greater Syria and Egypt.

5.3. Persian Poetics in the Arabic East: Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī

The most conspicuous aspect of Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s views on non-literal speech is the resounding absence of a chapter on majāz in his literary-theoretical work, Rawḍat al-faṣāha. This does not mean that the work does not merit an examination of the majāz question, as Zayn al-Dīn does refer to it on the odd occasion. What emerges from the following account is that despite the absence of such a chapter, Zayn al-Dīn probably has a sense of what majāz means, but because of the absence of such a chapter, he assigns a very peripheral role to it in the study of literary theory or ʿilm al-bayān.

The primary figure of speech said to be a part of majāz is metaphor (istiʿāra). Two

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1088 The problem is even starker in al-Jurjānī’s second category of istiʿāra, namely, a metaphor with no substratum of the type “hand of the north wind.” As we have seen in Chapter 5 Preliminaries, al-Jurjānī’s treatment of majāz was essentially a study of metaphorical conceptual thinking (including metonymy) from a philosophical linguistic perspective – a topic for which istiʿāra is rather irrelevant. What makes istiʿāra or kināya relevant to al-Jurjānī’s theory of majāz seems to be the question of predication, not ‘figurative speech’. But al-Jurjānī says repeatedly that istiʿāra is a subcategory of majāz: would he view it as majāz ʿaqli despite the fact that the statements therein are ‘untrue’? It certainly does not seem compatible with majāz lughawī since all words in “hand of the north wind” are used literally. Cf. Abu Deeb, al-Jurjānī’s Theory of Poetic Imagery, 233. This question deserves a separate study.

1089 Note, however, that Ibn al-Zamlakānī was not alone in this interpretation. The Easterner al-Muṭarrīzī also takes majāz as a category (jins) that includes istiʿāra, tamthīl and kināya (Sharḥ, f. 2v; cf. Sallām, Ibn al-Athīr wa-juhūduhu fī l-naqd, 316, who reads ʾījāz for majāz).

1090 Rawḍa, 90 (al-istiʿāra qism min aqsām al-majāz). In the later version of the work (ed. al-Jabr) slight variations
additional figures “connected to metaphor” (yattāsilu bi-l-istiʿāra) are also conceived of as majāz, namely, metaphorical exemplification (tamthīl), as in “I see you put one leg forward and the other one backward” (for a hesitant man), and periphrasis (kināya), as in “he has many ashes [of the cooking-pot]” (for a generous man). The latter two are only briefly touched upon.\textsuperscript{1091} The section on istiʿāra is imbued with what was to become standard rhetorical notions, such as the differentiation between a metaphor based on identification or predication (“making something [become] something [else] that is not it”) and one based on ascription (“making something belong to something else that it does not have”), a metaphor in which the analogue is only alluded to (such as ‘beast of prey’ in “death sinking its claws in”), and the notions of tarshīḥ and tajrīd.\textsuperscript{1092} Furthermore, when discussing the verb metaphor, Zayn al-Dīn differentiates between a metaphor “from the side of the subject [or agent or doer, fāʿil]” and one “from the side of the object [or patient, mafʿūl].”\textsuperscript{1093} All these are reminiscent of notions originating in ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, especially since the ‘standard’ terms are not used.\textsuperscript{1094} The editor Shuʿla in fact adds the standard terms as titles – istiʿāra taṣrīḥīyya ‘explicit metaphor’, istiʿāra makniyya ‘metaphor by allusion’ and [istiʿāra] tabaʿiyya ‘secondary metaphor’ or ‘non-noun metaphor’ – but it is evident that they did not originate with the text.\textsuperscript{1095} Zayn al-Dīn could have had direct knowledge in this and other chapters occur. These will be mentioned when relevant.

\textsuperscript{1091} Ibid., 109-13.

\textsuperscript{1092} Ibid., 91-92, 107. The topic of tarshīḥ/tajrīd will be discussed under Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī.

\textsuperscript{1093} Ibid., 95-97.

\textsuperscript{1094} Asrār 42-45 and Dalāʾīl, 67 (for the difference between an identifying metaphor and an ascriptive one), Asrār 50-51 (for verb metaphors from the point of view of the fāʿīl or mafʿūl). See the corresponding passages, and in slightly different terms, in al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 232, 243-45. The discussion of a metaphor alluding to an analogue without explicitly mentioning it is found in ibid., 251, and I am not sure it directly originates in al-Jurjānī. A hint of this notion can be found in Asrār, 43-44, and it is inseparable from the ascriptive metaphor.

\textsuperscript{1095} All titles within the section on istiʿāra and most titles within the chapter on tashbīḥ seem to have been added by the editor (Rawḍa, 63-113). Evidence for the former: Zayn al-Dīn starts by presenting the two types of metaphor, the
of ṣAbd al-Qāhir’s work, but it is more likely that it was mediated by his redactors like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (though he uses what was to become standard terms), Ibn al-Zamlakānī, Ṣız al-Dīn al-Zanjānī (not a direct redactor), or another source.

Marginalizing Majāz

Zayn al-Dīn opens the chapter on ḳistī’āra with, what I read as, a contrast between its classification within the categories of majāz and its true nature, or actual definition:

> al-ḳistī’āratu qismun min aqsāmi l-majāzī wa-hiya fī l-haqqīqati tashbihun ḥudhifa minhu ḥarfu l-tashbihī lafzan wa-ṭaqdīran wa-li-ḥadāḥ qāla ba’duhum fī ḥaddi l-ḳistī’āratī hiya -ddi’ā u ma’nā l-haqqīqati fī l-shay’i muḥbālaghatan fī l-tashbihī wa-mithālūhu annaka idhā qulta ra’aytu asadan wa-anta turīdu bihi rajulan shujā’ān fa-aṣlu murādiqa an taqūla ra’aytu rajulan huwa ka-l-asadi fī shajā’atīhi wa-shiddati batṣhihi fa-qulta ra’aytu asadan fa-kāna dhālika ablاغhu li-annaka ja’alta l-shajā’ata wājibatān lahu lāzimatan limā [lammā?] ja’alṭuhu ‘ayna l-asadi bi-i’aratika -sma l-asadi lahu

Metaphor is one of the categories of figurative speech but (wa-)1096 it is in reality (or: true essence) a comparison in which the particle of comparison was omitted [both] on the surface level and the underlying level [or: both on the level of the wording and when restoring the intended wording], and this is why someone said in the definition of metaphor [probably referring to al-Zanjānī], “It is the claiming of the essence/meaning of the literal word in something [else] in order to exaggerate a comparison.” An example of it is that if you say “I saw a lion” and you mean by it ‘a brave man’, then your original one based on predication and the one based on ascription, and then smoothly goes on to say wa-l-fārq bayna l-qismayn (ibid., 91-92). The title “al-fārq bayna l-ḳistī’āra l-tasrīḥiyya wa-l-makniyya” appearing right prior to it breaks the organic continuation between p. 91 and p. 92. What is more, in no other place does Zayn al-Dīn mention the tasrīḥiyya-makniyya division. To add to that, the other category (wa-min al-ḳistī’āra qism ākhar; ibid., 107) that Zayn al-Dīn mentions in which the analogue (e.g. ‘beast of prey’) is not mentioned is also given the title ḳistī’āra makniyya, the same one used for metaphor based on ascription. Similarly, the other titles in these chapters read as insertions in the text. The newer edition of the Rawḍa (ed. al-Jabr, 42-58) does not have such titles, and in the chapter on tashbihī they are put in square brackets.

1096 Even if we do not take the wa- to be a contrast warranting the translation “but” and translated it as “‘Metaphor is one of the categories of figurative speech. It is in reality a comparison [...]’ – the opposition between majāz and tashbihī via the phrase fī l-haqīqa would indicate that by Zayn al-Dīn’s time, tashbihī had been commonly excluded from majāz. Hence, stating that metaphor is majāz and in reality a type of tashbihī (= non-majāz) also expresses that contrast.
intention is to say “I saw a man who is like a lion in his bravery and in the intensity of his courage,” and then you said “I saw a lion.” That is more eloquent because you made ‘bravery’ a necessary [attribute] for him [that is] intrinsic since you made him be/become the lion itself by your lending to him [i.e., the man] the name/noun ‘lion’.  

That Zayn al-Dīn intended to contrast between the common inclusion of istiʿāra within majāz and its actual essence as a comparison is corroborated in the chapter on metaphor found in the newer edition of the work. Here a differentiation is made between the meaning of istiʿāra “in the dictionary sense” (or literally, fi l-lugha), “in essence” (? , fi l-maʾnā) and “as a technical term” (fi l-iṣṭilāḥ). The majāz inclusion is mentioned under the first meaning. Admittedly, I am not quite sure how the essential meaning and the technical meaning differ, nor do I understand why majāz is mentioned on the level of the lugha (and here the text may be corrupted), but it is clear to me that metaphor is essentially (fi l-maʾnā) understood by him as a comparison, possibly rendering its inclusion within majāz as irrelevant. As he later reiterates, “comparison […] is the original intention behind metaphor” (al-tashbīḥ… huwa al-maqṣūd al-aṣlī min al-istiʿāra).

One assumes that by Zayn al-Dīn’s time, the exclusion of tashbīh from majāz was widely recognized (see Ibn al-Naqīb’s remarks in §5.4), and therefore, by recognizing istiʿāra as tashbīh Zayn al-Dīn is implicitly excluding istiʿāra from majāz. The notion of a ‘claiming’ (iddiʿāʾ) of an essence (maʾnā) of a thing to be within something else – a notion originating with al-

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1097 Rawḍa, 90. Al-Zanjānī’s chapter on metaphor opens with the definition hiya -ddiʿāʾu maʾnā l-haqīqati fi l-shaʿy (Miʿyār, 67), therefore it is possible that Zayn al-Dīn is alluding to him (al-Jurjānī has iddiʿāʾ maʾnā al-ism; Dalāʾil, 437). With regards to the notion of the absence of the particle of comparison lafẓan wa-taqdīran, I am not sure why it also includes the underlying level (perhaps the absence of the topic ‘man’). It might be connected to a comment made by al-Muṭṭarīzī (Sharḥ, 3v), according to which the topic in istiʿāra is omitted lafẓan wa-taqdīran. In Rawḍa, ed. al-Jabr, we find that what is being lent is the musammā ‘the thing named’ (the referent in the mind) rather than the ism ‘name’ itself. Cf. Asrār, 42, where al-Jurjānī also speaks of (in his earlier iteration of the metaphor theory) transference (naqf) of the musammā.

1098 Rawḍa, ed. al-Jabr, 51.

1099 Rawḍa (ed. Shuʿla), 92.
Jurjānī\textsuperscript{1100} – also opens the possibility of making majāz superfluous, at least on the level of the lexeme.

And yet later in the chapter we see that metaphor is not merely about logical judgments (iddīʾāʾ). Zayn al-Dīn conceives of istīʿāra as something entering the lafż ‘wording’ (wa-l-lafżu - lladhī tadhkūluhu l-istiʿāratu), confining it to the level of the two parts of speech, noun and verb.\textsuperscript{1101} On the level of the noun two categories are differentiated (and see above): (i) the identifying metaphor, an tajʿala l-shayʿa l-shayʿa laysa bihi, such as identifying a man with a lion in “I saw a lion,” and (ii) the ascriptive metaphor, an tajʿala l-shayʿa li-l-shayʿi laysa lahu, like ascribing ‘humility’ to a wing in “lower unto them the wing of humility” (Q 17:24). The difference between the two, it is stated, is that the first type is easily reduced to a simile/explicit comparison – “I saw a man who is like a lion,” but the second type is not – *“lower unto them of humility something like a wing”\textsuperscript{1102} Here he says, in a passage derived almost verbatim probably from al-Zanjānī’s Miʿyār (originally in al-Jurjānī’s Asrār), that those who attempt to find a substratum (shayʿun yumkinu l-ishāratu ilayhi “something that can be pointed to”) in every metaphor, as in the second category, may end up anthropomorphizing God.\textsuperscript{1103} It is in this passage that we find one of the only references to the pair of terms ḥaqīqa and majāz throughout the chapter, when speaking of the borrowed word (al-ism al-mustaʿār) in the literal state and in the figurative state (ḥālat al-ḥaqīqa/ḥālat al-majāz).

\textsuperscript{1100} Dalāʾīl, 437, where he retracts the notion of naql in favor of iddīʾāʾ. Since al-Jurjānī speaks of iddīʾāʾ maʾnā al-ism rather than maʾnā al-ḥaqīqa, he possibly had a more ‘grammatical’ maʾnā in mind, that is, ‘meaning’ instead of ‘essence’.

\textsuperscript{1101} Rawḍa, 91.

\textsuperscript{1102} Ibid., 91-93.

\textsuperscript{1103} Ibid., 93-94 (and corrections in parsing the paragraph in Rawḍa, ed. al-Jabr, 52-53); Miʿyār, 85; Asrār, 47; al-Tībūn, 108. For a similar claim made by al-Rāghib al-İsfahānī see Key, Linguistic Frame of Mind, 194, and one suspects that it originated with the theologians (not necessarily Muʿtazīlī, for al-Jurjānī was an Ashʿarī).
If the explanations and illustrations surrounding the noun metaphor are not unique to Zayn al-Dīn, the same holds true for the verb metaphor. All illustrations are identical to the ones found in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Nihāya, including an illustration from al-Ḥarīrī (al-Zanjānī uses them as well, and adds several more).\textsuperscript{1104} Explanatory comments are brief: if a metaphor enters a verb it is either metaphorical vis-à-vis the doer (/subject) or vis-à-vis the entity to which something is done (/object). One minor variation occurs. Zayn al-Dīn provides Q 2:20 “The lightning almost snatches away their sight” (yakādu l-barqu yakḥṭafu abṣārahūm) as an example for the fā‘il aspect (i.e., lightning is only metaphorically snatching), whereas al-Rāzī gives it as an example for both the fā‘il and mafʿūl aspects (also sight is only metaphorically snatched). Both readings rest on extralinguistic assumptions: lightning cannot snatch; eyesight cannot be snatched (or, if Zayn al-Dīn’s omission is intentional, eyesight can be snatched [by God]). What is not explained, and remains unclear (also in the Nihāya and Miʿyār), is whether a mere substitution of verb would reflect the literal meaning. For even if we posit more literal verbs like ‘take away’ or ‘eliminate’ for yakḥṭafu, predicating them of ‘lightning’ would still remain metaphorical. (This example is not provided by al-Jurjānī.)

\textit{Comparison in the Form of Iḍāfa}

Metaphors come in all manner of syntactic guises. The favorite one for philosophers is the predicative metaphor. The favorite one for the poet is probably the genitive metaphor.\textsuperscript{1105}

\textquote{Andrew Ortony, \textit{Understanding Metaphors}, Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Cambridge, MA: Bolt, Beranek and Newman, 1980, 16.}

In the discussion following the comments on the verb metaphor Zayn al-Dīn presents a classification of metaphor from a different aspect (wa-ḥlam anna l-istiʿārata tanqasimu bi-ṭarīqin

\textsuperscript{1104} Rawḍa, 95-97; Nihāya, 243-44; Miʿyār, 71-74. See also Ibn al-Naqīb, \textit{Mugaddima}, 105-106.

\textsuperscript{1105} Andrew Ortony, \textit{Understanding Metaphors}, Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Cambridge, MA: Bolt, Beranek and Newman, 1980, 16.
ākhara ilā qismayni). This, from what I can tell, is Zayn al-Dīn’s own classification, or at least it is the only notion within the chapter not derived from al-Rāzī and al-Zanjānī (nor from Ibn al-Zamlakānī). The first category of this new classification is “applying the name of the analogue [i.e., the word signifying the analogue] to the topic without a genitive construct” (an yuṭlaqa -smu l-mustaʿāri ʿalā l-mustaʿāri lahu min ghayri iḍāfatin), as in “I saw a lion” for “a brave man.” In the later edition of the work it is termed the ‘unrestricted’ metaphor (iṭlāqī). The second category is “annexing [within a genitive construct] the name of the analogue to the topic” (an yuḍāfa -smu l-mustaʿāri ilā l-mustaʿāri lahu), later termed the ‘annexed’ metaphor (iḍāfī). This type of metaphor, he says, occurs more commonly than the first type. Not incidentally, it is very common in Persian poetry, and the notion could be derived from Persian poetics. What is meant here is what Wolfhart Heinrichs calls a non-imaginary identifying genitive metaphor based on a simile, where “the central element of the analogue is retained in the image and forms a genitive metaphor with the topical element it is meant to interpret.”

The single example Zayn al-Dīn provides for the ‘genitive metaphor’ is a line by the Andalusian Ibn Khafāja: [meter: kāmil]

wa-l-rīhu tal’abu bi-l-ghusūni wa-qad jarā
dhahabu l-aṣilī ʿalā lujayni l-māʾi

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1106 Rawda, 98.
1108 Though I did not find evidence of this in the works of Rādūyānī, al-Waṭwāt, Shams-i Qays or for that matter, the later compilation by the polymath Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥusayn al-Wā’īz Kāšīfī (d. 910/1504 or 1505), Badāyiʿ al-aṭfār fī ṣanāʿīʿ al-asbāb, ed. Rahim Musul’mankulov, Moscow: Nauka, 1977 (English [trans. Marta Simidehieva]: ‘Wondrous Thoughts on Poetical Tropes’). A category of ‘genitive metaphor’ (here in the sense of ascriptive genitive) does appear – in the Persian Wikipedia entry of metaphor! Dīyāʿ al-Dīn also dealt with metaphors (tashbīh in his words) that occur in the form of a genitive; see his parsing of al-Buḥtūrī’s ghamāmu samāḥin and Abū Tammām’s marʾa ʿaynī and wādī nasīb in §5.1, “Further Engagement with al-Jurjānī: Analogy.”

1109 Heinrichs, “Paired Metaphors,” 9, 12. For more on Heinrichs’ classification see discussion under Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī.
“The wind is toying with the branches while
gold of late afternoon flows on silver of water”

Here ‘gold’ (analogue) is ‘late afternoon’ (topic) and ‘silver’ (analogue) is ‘water’ (topic), and what is meant is “to compare the yellowness of the sun during sunset to gold and the whiteness of the water to silver.” At least on the level of the lexeme, ‘gold’ and ‘silver’ are intended literally. One should stress that ‘gold’ and ‘silver’ are not acting here as color adjectives as would, say, ḥmar al-wajh “red-faced,” that is, as what the grammarians call idāfa ghayr ḥaqīqiyya “improper [!] annexation.” Rather, they are proper nouns denoting the chemical elements of gold and silver. This should also not be confused with cases in which the material (like silver) is annexed the noun and acts as its adjective, but occupies the position of the muḍāf ilayhi (second term of the construct), not the muḍāf (first term of the construct), like bayḍatu fiddatin ‘a silver egg’ or thawbu ḥarīrin ‘a silk dress’. In the latter type of idāfa the grammarians insert an elided min “[made] of,” which is inappropriate in our example above. According to Wright, the type of idāfa expressed above – in fact, he cites a single example, lujayn al-mā’! – is identified by the medieval grammarians as a case of idāfat al-tashbīh “comparative genitive construct.” I am not sure who these grammarians are, but they are probably later ones. As stated by Wright, the expression lujayn al-mā’ would be parsed as “al-lujaynu -lladhī huwa l-

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1110 Rawda, 99. The original utterance, he says (see ed. al-Jabr, 54), would be “the rays of sun, which are like gold, fall upon the surface of the water, which is like silver.”

1111 Wright, Grammar 2: 199-200, 202. Wright does adduce one instance of a muḍāf ilayhi (“genitive” in his words) that indicates the form of a material, in which case the material would be the first term of the construct: fiddatu l-darāhim ‘the silver of the dirhams’ (ibid. 2: 199, his translation). I am not sure how this phrase differs from dirhamu fiddatin, but in any case, here too ‘silver’ is not meant as a color adjective.

1112 According to them it is a special case of idāfat al-tafsīr/al-bayān (ibid. 2: 232, 234.). It is the single example adduced for the “comparative annexation” (his words). I am not aware of grammatical discussions of this type of idāfa during this time.
māʾu, i.e. al-māʾu -lladhī huwa mithlu l-lujaynī" or in our words, “silver that is water” = “water that is like silver.” Judging by this parsing, what we have here is a likeness between entities (T₁≈T₂) expressed as an identity between entities (T₁=T₂), not in the form of an equational sentence (“Zayd is a lion”) but in the form of an idāfa (~“the lion of Zayd”). What is figurative in lujayn al-māʾ, then, is not simply the verbal form of an idāfa (in that silver does not “belong” to water), but the implicit expression of a comparison as an identity (in the form of the idāfa). The genitive metaphor that Zayn al-Dīn treats here is therefore similar – on a theoretical level – to the simple equational metaphor. But artistically, of course, the two are different, and appealing explicitly to idāfa in the context of discussions of metaphors was rare. In fact, Zayn al-Dīn is the only literary theorist I am aware of who identifies the ‘equational’ genitive metaphor as a distinct category and who uses the explicit term idāfa.¹¹¹²

**Positing a Literal Substrate**

In order to connect the new classification of metaphor (unrestricted/annexed) with the former classification (noun/verb), Zayn al-Dīn asserts that the annexed metaphor is limited to nouns, whereas the unrestricted one can occur in nouns and in verbs. It is here that he sheds some light on his conception of the verb metaphor, where for the unrestricted verb metaphor in Ibn Durayd’s (d. 321/933) wa-shtaʿala l-mubyaḍḍu fī muswaddīhī [meter: rajaz] “the whiteness flamed through its blackness” Zayn al-Dīn presupposes the full wa-dabbage l-bayāḍu fī l-sawādi wa-saʿā fihi ka-dabībi l-nāri fī l-shayʿi l-mushtaʿi lī “the whiteness spread through the blackness

¹¹¹³ Ibid. 2: 232.

¹¹¹⁴ As we may recall, ʿĪyāʾ al-Dīn recognizes a type of figurative speech based on idāfa (al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 79), but for him, this was not a type of metaphor! More importantly, perhaps, is that ʿĪyāʾ al-Dīn’s genitive metaphor (i.e., what we may term ‘genitive metaphor’) was based on attribution, not identification. It is plausible that the notion of a genitive metaphor was known in Persian poetics, but as aforementioned, I did not find evidence for this. Or perhaps it was via the grammarians.
and advanced quickly in it like the spreading of a fire in a burning thing.”1115 In other words, with regards to the verb metaphor, Zayn al-Dīn takes a non-literal approach (i.e., literal verbs can be presupposed instead of the metaphorical ones), whereas with the noun metaphor, all nominal elements were taken literally: ‘lion’ (as something claimed of a man), ‘wing’ (as something ascribed to humility without there necessarily being a substratum), or ‘gold’/‘silver’ (as the analogues of sunset/water). It would seem that while majāz with respect to istiʿāra on the level of the verb is conceived as a straightforward linguistic notion, majāz with respect to istiʿāra on the level of the noun is conceived as an extralinguistic notion: the words are used literally but the predication or ascription of one to the other is figurative, superficially akin to Ḥāfiz al-Jurjānī’s majāz fī l-ithbāt. According to this interpretation, providing the example of lightning snatching away eyesight would be a mere expression of following the received wisdom (for it is more than a lexical verb metaphor) rather than one of Zayn al-Dīn’s own views.

To add to the complexity of the matter, in a very short list of “elegant” (laṭīfa) metaphors provided by Zayn al-Dīn, a distinction may be drawn between the Qur’ānic examples and the poetic ones. One might presume that these examples are all of Zayn al-Dīn’s choosing (one is from his own prose epistles) and therefore reflect a more authentic picture of his conception of metaphor. And yet, it is hard to reach a conclusion: in the Qur’ānic examples, both nouns and verbs can be reverted into literal counterparts, pointing to a very linguistic, indeed lexical, understanding of the notion; the metaphors in the poetic examples are, inter alia, of the simile-based identifying genitive metaphors mentioned above, where the nouns must be taken literally. It does not help that Zayn al-Dīn does not add any commentary to these favorable metaphors. The Qur’ānic examples are (literal substitutions of metaphorical expressions are notated as

1115 Rawḍa, 100.
the head being “aflame” with hoariness (Q 19:4, SUB “spread”); the “keys” of the unseen (Q 6:59, SUB “access”); “white/black thread of dawn” (Q 2: 187, SUB day/night or light/darkness).

The poetic examples display extended parallel images of the topic and analogue, very common in muḥdath poetry, and are initially constructed on a simile-based identifying genitive metaphors (many of which are conceits): the live coal of the cheek burning the ambergris of the mole, from which the smoke betrays the first growth of the beard (image of the topic: first hairs growing on the [red] cheeks wherein lies a mole || image of the analogue: live coal burning ambergris [black] and creating smoke that emits good fragrance || elements with no SUB: live coal [unless it refers to the black hair of the beard], burning, smoke); inciting one to ride [SUB take on] the brisk winning racehorses of pleasure before the sun of forenoon sucks the saliva of [SUB dries] the morning rain from the mouths [or teeth, SUB petals] of the daisies (image of the topic: hastening one to enjoy worldly pleasures early in the morning, before the sun dries up the daisies from the morning rain || images of the analogue: riding a brisk horse that comes in first in a race; sucking saliva from, or kissing, the beloved’s mouth || elements with no SUB: briskness,

1116 Ibid., 101.
1117 Ibid., 101-102.
1118 Likening the mole to ambergris (or a disk of ambergris) is a common trope both in Arabic and in Persian poetry, where the blackness of ambergris is commonly contrasted with the ‘burning’ red cheeks. Many examples are cited in Adam Talib, “Woven Together as Though Randomly Strung: Variations in Collections of Naevi Poetry Compiled by al-Nuwayrī and al-Sarī al-Raffā‘,” Mamluk Studies Review 17 (2013), 23-43. See also David Pinault, Story-Telling Techniques in the Arabian Nights, Leiden: Brill, 1992, 67, 92; Geert Jan van Gelder, “The Ḥammām: A Space Between Heaven and Hell,” Quaderni di Studi Arabi, N.S. 3 (2008), 9-24, here: 13; Edward G. Browne, “Biographies of Persian Poets Contained in Ch. V, §6, of the Tārikh-i-Guzida, or ‘Select History’, of Ḥamdullāh Mustawfī of Qazvin,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Oct. 1900 and Jan. 1901), 721-62, here: 737. The metaphor above is taken from a line by one Ḥamād al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (fl. 7th/13th cent.), quoted anonymously in the Rawḍa (he and his line are mentioned in Ibn Khallikān, Ṭawāfīḥ 6: 251) [meter: ḥaḍīf]: jamratu l-khaddi aḥragat ‘anbara l-khā//li fa-min dhālika l-dukhâni ʿidhârū (or ʿidhâruh, per Ibn Khallikān, and cf. Rawḍa, ed. al-Jabr, 57). Al-Ṣafadī compiled an entire anthology on moles in poetry (Kashf al-ḥāl fī wasf al-khâl), and mole-verse are collected within larger anthologies by early and later litterateurs alike (see Talib, “Woven”).
winning racehorses); (in a prose sample from one of Zayn al-Dīn’s letters) marveling at the way the sucked lustre of the front teeth glitters, and the tower of glass gleams, and the sun of wine shines (identifying metaphors: tower = wineglass, sun = wine). As evident from these examples, the elements that cannot be reduced to a literal phrase are often constructed in order to expand the realm of the analogue in a process sometimes referred to as tarshīḥ ‘grooming’. In fact, Ibn Hamdīs’s lines on taking pleasures in the morning are also discussed under this category. The notions of tarshīḥ and its opposite, tajrīd, will be discussed under the views of al-Ṭūfī, but for now suffice it to say that all lexical constituents are meant to be taken literally.

The ‘extension’ of metaphors is one of the major processes analyzed by Heinrichs in his study of imagery in muḥdath poetry.

To this range of noun and verb metaphors we might add the additional type of metaphor mentioned at the end of the chapter, namely the one in which the analogue is alluded to but not mentioned. “Death sinking its claws in” is one of the stock examples – the analogue ‘beast of

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1119 These are the two lines by the Sicilian Ibn Hamdīs (d. 527/1133) [meter: sarīʿ]: bākir ilā l-ladhdhāti wa-rkab lahā // sawābiq l-lahwī dhawātī l-mirāḥ | min qabli an tarshufa shamsu l-ḍuḥā // rīqa l-ghawādī min thughūri l-aqāḥ. The sawābiq are things that come first, and are here – esp. due to the concomitant verb wa-rkab – a reference to horses coming in first in a race (cf. the expression sabaqa l-faras fī l-ḥalba; Lane, Lexicon, 1299). The prepositional phrase lahā probably means “for (the sake of) them [these pleasures].” Literally, dhawāt al-mirāḥ translates as ‘having exceeding briskness’ (ibid., 2705).

1120 Rawḍa, 103; ed. al-Jabr, 56. According to Zayn al-Dīn’s later version (ibid.), “when the poet mentioned the hastening (mubākara), he borrowed for it [the notion of] riding (rukāb), then he ‘groomed’ the metaphor with what it (the domain of the analogue) demands, and that is the mentioning of the horses coming in first and the briskness; likewise when he says in the second line, “before the sun of forenoon sucks the saliva of the morning rain,” the analogue is the sucking and the topic is the sun [?, the text might be corrupted] and he added to the analogue, which is the sucking, by mentioning the saliva and the mouth, and the meaning of it is the sun’s removal of the shade, when rising, from the mouths [sic!] of the daisies that are located in the highest tops of mountains, elevated places and hills” (lammā dhakara l-mubākara -sta’āra lahā l-rukāba thumma rashshahahā [cf. editor’s fn. 2] bi-mā yaqaṭīḥi wa-ma nahu izālatu l-shamsi l-zilla | inda l-shurūqī min thughūri l-aqāḥi [sic] -lā hā yā bi-ala ruʿūsī l-jibālī wa-l-ravābī wa-l-ākāmī). In the earlier edition it is simply stated that [the notion of] “sucking” is for “the sun’s diminishing of the shade,” which was then extended (‘groomed’) by the mention of saliva and mouth.

1122 Heinrichs, “Paired Metaphors,” esp. 5-9 (the term tarshīḥ is not used).
pray’ is alluded to by the verbal phrase but is not mentioned – but a Qur’ānic example, Q 2:27 “Those who unravel [usually translated: break] God’s covenant” (alladhīna yanquḍūna ‘ahda - llāhi), strongly points to the influence of al-Zamakhsharī, who discusses this verse in the very same terms. (The verse is not cited in the works of Fakh al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Zamlakānī or al-Zanjānī and the type of metaphor is left unnamed.) Here the unstated analogue is ‘rope’ (ḥabl), which was supposedly ‘lent’ (‘alā annahu qadi -stuʿīra) to the notion of a covenant, leading in turn to the choice of the verb naqāda ‘to unravel, untwist’, said of a rope.\footnote{Rawḍa 107-108 (and see Shu’la’s note on p. 108); al-Zamakhsharī, al-Kashshāf 1: 268. We as outsiders would say that the case of naqāda is part of the ‘lexicographical’ notion of majāz, because it has become lexicalized.} In both examples, all nouns and verbs are meant at the literal level.

\textit{Toward a Unifying Principle?}

Looking now at the range of metaphorical examples discussed in the chapter, one is hard-pressed to draw a conclusion as to how they can all be subsumed under a single notion of majāz. (The same holds true if one tries to draw a conclusion regarding istiʿāra.) To find a unifying principle underlying Zayn al-Dīn’s conception of the notion, let us turn to the other categories he classified as majāz: \textit{tamthīl} ‘metaphorical exemplification’, as in “I see you put one leg forward and the other backward” (for a hesitant man), and \textit{kināya} ‘periphrasis’, as in “he has many ashes [of the cooking-pot]” (for a generous man). The section is very brief, and it opens thus:

\begin{quote}
wa-mimmā yattaṣṣilu bi-l-istiʿārati ayḍāni l-tamthīlu wa-l-kināyatu li-shtirāki l-thalāthati fī kawnihā majāzan wa-fī kawnihā ka-l-furūʿi li l-tashbīhi -lladhī huwa ḥaqiqatun bi-lā khilāfin bayna ṭulamāʾi l-bayānī fa-li-dhālika alḥaqtuhumā bi-himā
\end{quote}

Among [the categories that] are also connected to metaphor [i.e., in addition to \textit{tarshīḥ}, \textit{tajrīd} and the implied-analogue metaphor – all of which are part and parcel of metaphor]
are the metaphorical exemplification and periphrasis because all three [istiʿāra, tamthīl and kināya] share the fact that they are majāz and that they are like derivatives of the simile (or: comparison), which is indisputably literal speech (ḥaqīqa) according to the scholars of the science of bayān, and that is why I appended them (tamthīl and kināya) to them (tashbīh and istiʿāra).\textsuperscript{1124}

Zayn al-Dīn recognizes, following one of al-Jurjānī’s signature observations later reiterated by al-Rāzī, that simile (tashbīh) is literal speech (ḥaqīqa), but unlike al-Jurjānī, that periphrasis (kināya) is not.\textsuperscript{1125} Here the imprint of Ibn al-Zamlakānī is discernible (see §5.2), where kināya was presented as the very first type of majāz and tamthīl was given the caveat that if the full comparison was stated, it would no longer count as majāz (“I see that in his hesitation he is like someone who puts one leg forward and the other one backward”).\textsuperscript{1126} Al-Zanjānī in the Islamic East differentiated between kināya and majāz like al-Rāzī, but a vestige of a possibly older view is found within his chapter on majāz, where majāz is said to be a genus (jins) of istiʿāra, tamthīl and kināya.\textsuperscript{1127} It seems to have become common wisdom during this time to view kināya as majāz.

The definition that Zayn al-Dīn provides for kināya does not explicitly explain why it is part of non-literal language: “It is expressing a notion by [mentioning] one of its [logical] consequents” (fa-hiya l-taʾbīru ‘ani l-maʾnā bi-baʾdi lawāzimīhi). In our example, the logical consequent of being generous is cooking a lot of food for one’s guests, resulting, in turn, in many

\textsuperscript{1124} Rawḍa, 109.

\textsuperscript{1125} Al-Jurjānī, Asrār, 221-22 and al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 222 (for tashbīh); Dalāʾil, 66-67 and Nihāya, 272 (for kināya).

\textsuperscript{1126} Al-Tihyān, 37, 44. This last assertion explicitly excludes tashbīh from majāz.

\textsuperscript{1127} Miʾyār, 90, 95 (where majāz and kināya are differentiated) and 20 (where the former is said to encompass the latter: wa-l-majāzu aʾamma mina l-istiʿāratī wa-l-tamthīlī wa-l-kināyatī fa-huwa jinsun lahā). As a reminder, this opinion has nothing to do with Ḫiyāʾ al-Dīn’s views on kināya, which for him was a different phenomenon altogether: (usually) a single-term euphemistic expression.
ashes under the cooking-pot. Here all lexical constituents are meant at the literal level, and the predication is meant at the literal level, but the intended meaning nevertheless involves an implied one beyond the literal one stated. In this way, so it seems, Zayn al-Dīn makes a connection between periphrasis and metaphor: just as the intention of saying that a man “has many ashes” is not that he has many ashes, likewise the intention of saying “she shot me an arrow whose feather is kohl” is not that the woman shot an arrow at the man. As we have seen with Ibn al-Zamlakānī, there was also a structural resemblance between kināya and tamthīl, in that they both express an attribute/action indirectly. Does majāz for Zayn al-Dīn mean nothing but al-Jurjānī’s ma ‘nā al-ma ‘nā “the meaning [or: implication] of the meaning [of the sentence],” which encompassed both majāz and kināya?

Zayn al-Dīn’s conception of majāz seems to go beyond the notion of implied or indirect sentence meaning. After all, there are other categories among the rhetorical devices that embody this notion but are not considered by him to be majāz, like “the apposite request/eloquent beggary” (ḥusn al-ṭalab) and “deduced praise” (al-madh al-mufarra’), which involve implicatures, i.e. utterances that hint at the intended meaning but do not express them explicitly. One common principle found among the categories of istī ‘āra-tamthīl-kināya is that they are all imbued with images: burned ambergris, ashes under cooking-pots, moving legs. The use of images for the purpose of communicating an intended idea could stand at the basis of Zayn al-Dīn’s conception of majāz, especially since he sees the variety of majāz categories as

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1128 Al-Sakkākī more accurately identifies a series of logical consequences, not just one (Miftāḥ, 405).

1129 The example is taken from Rawḍa, 103, discussed under the ‘groomed’ metaphor (tarshīḥ).

1130 E.g., Dalāʾ il, 262-63.

harking back to the notion of tashbīh (ka-l-furū` li-l-tashbīh) – a device concerned with images par excellence (and even though in kināya no comparison is involved!). But interpreting majāz as the use of imagery in speech is also not free of caveats. First, there is nothing etymological connecting the term majāz with “images” (usually it is the idea of “going beyond” that stands at the etymological basis of the term). Second, following this rational, one would expect to find tashbīh among the categories of majāz, especially given the remark ka-l-furū` li-l-tashbīh. While the ‘theoretical status’ of tashbīh in Zayn al-Dīn’s work is not made clear, one of the subtypes of tashbīh is in fact considered to be a part of metaphor (qism min aqsām al-istiʿāra), and by implication, majāz. This is the “emphasized simile” (tashbīh muʾakkad), in which “one thing is compared to another in meaning (?) and in intention without the particle of comparison” (tashbīhu l-shayʾi bi-l-shayʾi maʿnan wa-irādatan min ghayri adāti l-tashbīhi). The examples are of the type “she let pour [SUB shed] a pearl [SUB tear] from a narcissus [SUB eye]” (fa-amṭarat luʾluʾan min narjisin), where each constituent reflects a common conceit for the notion of the topic (raining pearls for shedding tears; narcissi for eyes). In some examples both topic and analogue are mentioned. This seems to be a relic of the old controversy of whether an

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1132 The same holds true for the phrase ʿilm al-bayān in standard rhetoric which refers, de facto, to the study of imagery: there is nothing connecting the term bayān, etymologically, with imagery.

1133 Rawḍa, 78; ed. al-Jabr, 47, which contains the addition: fa-yujʿala l-mushabbahu ʿayna l-mushabbahi bihi “so that the topic becomes the very analogue itself.” Al-Zanjānī also identifies a type of tashbīh that is majāz, whose rule (ḥukm) is that of the metaphor, but for him it is the sentence type “I see you move one leg forward and the other backward” (Miʿyār, 98). Al-Zanjānī explicitly states (ibid., 66) that the only type of simile/comparison considered to be majāz by the “scholars of bayān” is the one that comes “in the manner of the metaphor” (ʿalā ḥadd al-istiʿāra). As an aside, it is not clear whether ʿulamāʾ al-bayān denotes here the students of the standard second subfield ʿilm al-bayān or the scholars of literary theory in general.

1134 Rawḍa, 82, from a line by al-Waʾwāʾ al-Dimashqī (d. ca. 385/995).

1135 E.g., in a line by Zayn al-Dīn himself, in praise of al-Malik al-Nāṣir (who ruled in Aleppo and Damascus): “His cheeks are apples, his eyes a narcissus, his side [of the mouth?] is a myrtle, his saliva wine” (ibid., 83). He also mentions the more archetypal “Zayd is the lion” (sic: Zaydun l-asadu, comparing it with Zaydun ka-l-asadi; ibid., 84).
utterance displaying both topic and analogue of the type “Zayd is a lion” is a metaphor or a simile (as opposed to “I saw a lion,” where the topic is not mentioned), preserving one tangible connection between the notions of majāz and tashbīh.

If we compare Zayn al-Dīn with Ibn al-Zamlakānī, we find that both viewed majāz as a category comprising istiʿāra, tamthīl and kināya, and both rejected the inclusion of tashbīh therein (Ibn al-Zamlakānī implicitly, Zayn al-Dīn explicitly). They both seem to take the majāz as expressing ‘untrue’ propositions (unlike al-Jurjānī), but understand tashbīh as expressing ‘true’ propositions (following al-Jurjānī). They are preserving, on one hand, an older implicit understanding of majāz as kadhib (=Ibn Rashīq, Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn), but on the other hand, they take an ‘objectivist’ stance with regards to the simile by treating the ‘figurative’ similarity claim the same way they would the ‘literal’ similarity claim (≠ Ibn Rashīq, Ɗiyā’ al-Dīn). Conceiving of majāz as incompatible with tashbīh says not so much about their view on majāz as it does of their view on tashbīh. In other words, an underlying understanding of majāz as “literary kadhib” still persists for scholars like Ibn al-Zamlakānī and Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī, but an understanding of tashbīh as ‘false’ comparison does not.

To conclude Zayn al-Dīn’s treatment of non-literal speech we must return to the fact that no chapter on majāz is included in the book – a mukhtaṣar, to be sure – but nevertheless a work on literary theory. By the seventh/thirteenth century, any work touching upon stylistics, poetics and rhetoric customarily included at least some comment about the ḥaqīqa-majāz dyad, and the fact that this work does not merits our attention. The fact that we are hard-pressed to find a

1136 Not all instances of tashbīh muʾakkad lack the particle of comparison: in Zayn al-Dīn’s classification, the “reversible” simile, where the more salient is compared to the less salient (the full moon is like one’s face/forehead), is part of tashbīh muʾakkad, and here the example exhibits the explicit mīthl (ibid., 84). He terms this device “turning the source into a derivative and the derivative into a source.” The more common term for this device, tashbīh al-ʿaks, is used by Zayn al-Dīn for another device (the one immediately following), the “mirroring” simile, in which both A is compared to B and B to A, in the same line (even if the comparison is from different aspects).
common denominator between the majāz categories is not unique to Zayn al-Dīn’s work, and it would be tempting to conclude that the author realized this as well. More reasonable would be first, to point out that he took for granted the reader’s knowledge on majāz, and second, to be reminded of the fact that his outlook was primarily poetic (as opposed to, say, Ibn al-Zamlakānī).

*Majāz is Not Necessarily Badī‘*

Al-Zanjānī from the Islamic East also had a uniquely poetic outlook – the first two parts of the *Miʿyār* deal with meter and rhyme – but he did include the common prolegomenon on ḥaqīqa and majāz. His treatment is relatively brief and highly indebted to al-Jurjānī and al-Rāzī, as it contrasts lexical majāz (majāz fī l-muthbat ‘majāz in the predicate/the thing affirmed’) with logical majāz (majāz fī l-ithbāt ‘majāz on the [level of] predication/affirmation’). And yet, he later makes an interesting comment about majāz when explaining why it is broader than istiʿāra: first, in every metaphor there must be an intended exaggeration, a condition that does not apply for majāz (this is irrelevant for our purposes), and second, every metaphor is a part of badī‘ but not every majāz is (kull istiʿāra min al-badī‘ wa-laysa kull majāz minhu). What al-Zanjānī means here by badī‘ is not the field he terms ʿilm al-badī‘ (which encompasses the sciences of maʿānī and bayān), since majāz is considered part of it by the mere treatment of if in the book. Rather, what is meant by badī‘ is either the narrow scope of poetic embellishments – those figures of speech considered to be beautifying elements (maḥāsin), whose treatment is preceded by the phrase wa-min aqsām al-badī‘ – or the abstract notion of ‘something novel,

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1137 *Miʿyār*, 17-24 (the entire chapter), esp. 20-24 (the lexical/logical majāz). Incidentally, it is here that al-Zanjānī “slips” and considers kināya to be a part of majāz as well (p. 20). It is also noteworthy that he, too, refers to the third part of his work (or the work as a whole) as a mukhtasar (ibid., 400).

1138 Ibid., 68 (wa-l-istiʿāratu akhassu mina l-majāzī idh qasdu l-mubālaghati sharṭun fī l-istiʿāra dūna l-majāzī wa-aydan fa-kullu -stiʿāratin mina l-badīʿi wa-laysa kullu majāzin minhu).

1139 See ibid., 3 (ʿilm al-badī‘ al-mushtamilʿ alāʿ ilmay al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān), and §4.3 above.
original’, which is what *badī‘* literally means.\(^{1140}\) Since the embellishments are clearly
demarcated by al-Zanjānī by the use of *wa-min aqsām al-badī‘* and metaphor falls outside this
demarcation,\(^{1141}\) it is likely that *badī‘* refers here to novel and original poetic speech (including
artistic prose). By this account, not every instance of *majāz* is novel since much of it has become
lexicalized, that is, part of the conventional lexicon. Metaphors would thus be part of the original
and novel types of speech, whereas *majāz* may be excluded from it by not always displaying
novelty.\(^{1142}\)

Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī was probably familiar with this notion, which harks back to al-
Jurjānī’s *Asrār*. There, al-Jurjānī made the claim that it would be preposterous (*bayyin al-fasād*)
to view every *majāz* as *badī‘*, but the context of his claim was specifically the metonymy (a term
not used), a figurative word based on contiguity (*sabab, mulābasa*, etc.), not metaphor, a

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\(^{1140}\) See Heinrichs, “*Badī‘*,” *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* 1: 122-23, here: 122, for the literal meaning. Literary
devices within the narrower scope of embellishments in al-Zanjānī’s work include echo (repeating the rhyme word
at the beginning of the line, *radd al-‘ajuz ‘alā l-sadr*), antithesis (*taḥbīq*), and more (Mi’yār 206, 219, preceded by
the phrase *wa-min aqsām al-badī‘*). There is another meaning of *badī‘* not relevant for our purposes, namely, ‘the
new style of poetry’, the essence of which was the use of ‘bold’ metaphors (imaginary metaphors with no
substratum, based on analogy, and usually combined with other rhetorical devices; Heinrichs, “*Isti‘āra and Badī‘*,”
esp. 180, 187, 190-91, 195, 200 fn. 34, 204).

\(^{1141}\) This is contrary to the early Ibn al-Mu‘tazz, who treats *isti‘āra* as one of the major figures in *badī‘* (Heinrichs,
“*Isti‘āra and Badī‘*,” 187).

\(^{1142}\) Ibn Rashīq (and many others) also makes a connection, albeit implicitly, between *badī‘* as “innovation” (*ibdā‘*)
and metaphors/similes, because all of the *shawāhid* he adduces for newly-created images (*ma‘ānī*) are metaphors
and similes/analogies (al-‘Umāda 1: 262-65; he titles the chapter *bāb al-mukhtara‘ wa-l-badī‘* but later tries to
distinguish *badī‘* from *ikhtirā‘* in an unconvincing argument). See also the case of the “catalogues of images” (*kutub
al-ma‘ānī*) which are essentially collections of *tashbihāt* (fn. 519). Alexander Key elaborates on the idea of *badī‘*
with regards to al-Rāghib al-İsfahānī (fl. ≤ 409/1018) and argues that the term *badī‘* as ‘innovation’ is
indistinguishable from *badī‘* as ‘rhetorical figures’ because all rhetorical figures require from the poet/prose writer
an innovative use of language (*Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 175 ff., esp. 177, 179). The authors that we are dealing
with here do not necessarily display this. First, some *isti‘ārāt* – esp. the single-word ‘hackneyed’ ones (Diyā‘ al-
Dīn’s understanding) – do not involve innovation (and Diyā‘ al-Dīn all but says so, see pp. 290-91 above). Second,
authors usually attend to ‘conventional majāz’ in these works (the majāz of the lexicographers: metonymy,
conceptual metaphor, etc.), and it too is not part of innovative language. I have not seen al-Rāghib’s ms. on *badī‘*
(*Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 53, 180-85), and one wonders if he treats ‘lexicalized’ metaphors here. It will be
mentioned that the work contains a chapter on the *hāqiqa-majāz* dyad (ibid., 180; used here in the lexical sense?).
According to Key (ibid., 197), any form of “literary innovation” (*badī‘*) may become part of the lexicon, provided
that it becomes sufficiently widespread: Key is probably speaking of the innovations of the ancient Arabs here.
figurative word based on similarity (*tashbih*). Al-Zanjānī may have recognized that many expressions, beyond metonymy, that were tagged as *majāz* by older scholars (inside and outside literary theory) were lexicalized and hence not *badī‘*. As a scholar of poetics, he would mostly be interested in novel expressions, not those that can be found in the dictionaries. Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī probably had a similar view, and accordingly, marginalized the place of *majāz* within literary-theoretical studies.

Lastly, we must return to the fact that Zayn al-Dīn’s work is closely aligned with early Persian works on poetics. Within this early Persian tradition, *majāz* too played no role in the study of literary devices. Both Rādūyānī (active 5th/11th cent.), who wrote the first Persian work on stylistics, and Rashīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ (d. end of 6th/12th cent.) in his *Ḥadāyiq al-sihr* ‘Gardens of Enchantment’ do not mention the notion of *majāz* (although they do speak of a proper [*ḥaqīqī*] word/meaning when briefly explicating the notion of *istiʿāra*). Shams-i Qays does make use of *majāz* but only as a terse prolegomenon to metaphor. According to Benedikt Reinert, because the Perisan literary tradition lacked the sacrosanct equivalent of the Qur’ān, the Qur’ānic hermeneutical component so prevalent in the Arabic works was non-

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1143 *Asrār*, 368 (24/5, esp. ll. 15-18). In the appendix to the *Asrār* (paragraphs 24-26), al-Jurjānī begins with the type ‘hand’-for-‘favor’ – what we would call metonymy – and the word (*qawl*) he uses for this type is simply *majāz* (*Asrār*, 366.6). But later he uses *majāz* in a more general sense of figurative language (e.g., 368.3-5). As a side note, it is not clear why al-Jurjānī would make the very obvious claim (ibid.) that every *istiʿāra* is *majāz* but not every *majāz* is *istiʿāra*: surely, this was in no need of proof. I wonder if by *istiʿāra* he specifically meant here metonymy, like Ibn Duryad, whom he quotes the following page. (Later al-Jurjānī uses *istiʿāra* in the strict sense of figurative expression based on similarity.)

1144 In this respect Key is correct to say that “for [al-Rāghib al-Īsfahānī] and many of his contemporaries the term *badī‘* primarily served to isolate and recognize innovation” (*Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 177), but what I would add is that this puts *badī‘* – a literary notion – at odds with *majāz*, a linguistic notion.

1145 *Tarjumān*, 40-43; *Ḥadāyiq*, 256-57 (Persian text).

exist in Persian rhetoric. By this rationale, the notion of *majāz* as figurative language which emerged in the context of Qur’ānic hermeneutics was irrelevant for the Persian literary theorists. It just so happens that the Persian context tallies well with a more “native-Arabic” marginalization of *majāz* that was occurring at the same time, namely, by Ibn al-Zamlakānī (§5.2).

5.4. Literary Theory in the Context of *Tafsīr*: Ibn al-Naqīb

In contrast to many of the other works we are looking at, Ibn al-Naqīb devotes a considerable portion of his work to the topic of *majāz*. Just the mere volume of the study suggests that *majāz* by Ibn al-Naqīb entails more than a narrow scope of non-literal usage. The study forms the first out of three sections in Ibn al-Naqīb’s *Muqaddima* and is partially indebted to a work on *majāz* written by the slightly earlier ‘Izz al-Dīn (“al-‘Izz”) b. ‘Abd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), the famous Damascene Shāfi‘ī jurist and judge, nicknamed Sulṭān al-‘ulamā’ ‘Sultan of the scholars’. Al-‘Izz’s work, *al-Ishāra ilā al-ījāz fī baʿḍ anwāʿ al-majāz*, serves as a framework to Ibn al-Naqīb’s section on *majāz* but much of its contents are revised (especially the sections we will look at), probably due to the *uṣūlī* underpinnings of the former. It would seem that the fact that it was a reflection of views prevalent in legal theory did not go unnoticed by Ibn al-Naqīb. Suffice it to

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1147 B. Reinert, “al-Ma’ānī wa ‘l-bayān; In Persian,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition* (and a more extreme, and inaccurate, position in Faruqi, *Sabk-e Hindi*, 35: “[…] all Arab literary theory originated from exegeses on the Qurʾān”). To be sure, Reinert is thinking here of the Sakkākian model of rhetoric, but in fact, none of the earlier works of Arabic literary theory can be understood without the Qur’ānic context. I am therefore generalizing his observation.

mention the conspicuous absence of *istiʿāra* in the long list of ʿIzz al-Dīn’s majāz categories to situate the work within a different tradition.\footnote{The term *istiʿāra* is briefly mentioned as a possible synonym of majāz; see *al-Ishāra*, 29-30. The work by al-ʿIzz deserves a separate study. Zakariyyā ʿAlī, the editor of Ibn al-Naqīb’s *Muqaddima*, conducted an initial comparison between the contents of the two works; see *Muqaddima*, 65-66.}

The section on majāz in Ibn al-Naqīb’s *Muqaddima* contains twenty-four categories that range from metonymies and metaphors to brevity and change in word order. In case there is any doubt that this range of linguistic phenomena constitutes a part of majāz in Ibn al-Naqīb’s thought, he ends the discussion with an affirmation that each of “the twenty-four categories that we have mentioned among the categories of majāz” could be further classified into many more subcategories, if one endeavored to do so.\footnote{*Muqaddima*, 176.} The vast majority of these categories are metonymies, synecdoches and dead metaphors, and these are the ones closely aligned with ʿIzz al-Dīn’s work on majāz: e.g., referring to ‘what is known’ (*maʿlūm*, or other passive notions expressed by the passive participle) by using the word ‘knowledge’ (*ʿilm*, or other *maṣdars*), referring to the outcome (*musabbab*) by its cause (*sabab*), referring to the whole (*al-kull*) by the part (*al-baʿḍ*), dead metaphors (‘light’ for ‘belief’, ‘lion’ for ‘brave man’), and many more.\footnote{*Muqaddima*, 25 ff. (under the category of majāz al-taʿbir bi-lafz al-mutaʿallaq bihi ’an al-mutaʿalliq, roughly: a figurative word in which a thing is expressed by using a word that is grammatically [?] connected to it), 36 ff., 46 ff., 68 (under the category al-tajawwuz fi al-asmāʾ; the term ‘dead metaphors’ is ours). We noted above the absence of *istiʿāra* in ʿIzz al-Dīn’s work: it should be reminded that dead metaphors do not conform to the typical discussions of *istiʿāra* in Arabic literary theory, despite the fact that the stock example is ‘lion’ for ‘brave man’. Ibn al-Naqīb’s discussion of *istiʿāra* reflects the diversity of metaphor in poetry, and many of the examples would not count as dead metaphors.}

Many of these cases are lexicalized instances of majāz, that is, they have become part of the very lexicon of Arabic. Only three categories do not reflect this lexical tendency, and not incidentally, they are not derived from ʿIzz al-Dīn’s *Ishāra*. These are metaphor (*istiʿāra*), simile (*tashbīh*),
and change in word order (taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr).\textsuperscript{1152} In all three, the discussion begins with the query, \textit{hal huwa min al-majāz am lā} “is it part of majāz or not?”, suggesting a conscious engagement on Ibn al-Naqīb’s part with the suitability of certain linguistic phenomena with the concept of majāz.\textsuperscript{1153}

\textit{Rejection of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī}

Considering that some of the theoretical deliberation is adopted from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s \textit{Nihāyat al-ījāz fī dirāyat al-i ḟ ūz} (the epitome of ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s \textit{Dalāʾil al-i ḟ ūz} and \textit{Asrār al-balāgha}), it is interesting to see how those views are reconciled with Ibn al-Naqīb’s majāz classification, especially those sections not derived from al-ʿIzz’s \textit{Ishāra}. In this case, one must decide which impulse takes precedence in assessing his conceptions: the quoted material from earlier scholars or the ‘metadata’ material, that is, Ibn al-Naqīb’s arrangement and choice of categories. On one hand, the latter impulse should take precedence, since it constitutes a more conscious and deliberate act than quoting from stock sources in the field. In this sense, the arrangement of material (the one not derived from al-ʿIzz) is akin to the analyses of poetic illustrations (\textit{shawāhid}) in that it may reveal a more genuine view by the author rather than an accepted view or received wisdom. But on the other hand, if the quoted material is from a revered source, and one that is recognized as such, it may perhaps be the arrangement of the

\textsuperscript{1152} Another category that does not display ‘lexical’ types of majāz is the one titled al-ījāz wa-l-ikhtiṣār ‘brevity’ (\textit{Muqaddima}, 139-65) which is closely aligned with ḥadhf ‘ellipsis’, usually here: common syntactic deletions. Rather than lexical ‘idiosyncracies’, what we have here are primarily syntactic ones. Ḥadhf was treated extensively by ʿIzz al-Dīn but he did not subsume it under majāz (al-Ishāra, 6-27, with nineteen subcategories). I think that because the \textit{Ishāra} was known as a book on majāz, readers took it as a matter of course that ʿIzz al-Dīn would consider ḥadhf as majāz, following the tradition dating back to Abū ʿUbayda. The fact that the Ibn al-Naqīb does not open the chapter on brevity with the query, \textit{hal huwa min al-majāz am lā}, may attest this.

\textsuperscript{1153} \textit{Muqaddima}, 88, 112, 139, 166. Several subsections within the category termed al-tajawwuz fī al-afāl also do not confirm to the vast range of metonymies and dead metaphors, but rather to morphological ‘non-transparency’ (\textit{Muqaddima}, 69 ff., such as the use of the form yafʿalu to express a past tense, faʿala for future tense, the declarative form for the imperative, and more). On the other hand, many categories within ījāz are instances other than ḥadhf ‘elision’, and would reflect discussions found in al-ʿIzz’s \textit{Ishāra}.
material that reflects the received wisdom and the recounted opinion that reflects the personal view. In the case of Ibn al-Naqīb’s conception of majāz it seems that the metadata material takes precedence.\footnote{In this sense, Ibn al-Naqīb’s choices of arrangement would be different than the early compilatory efforts of scholars like al-ʿAskarī in his ʿŠināʿ atayn. The latter, for instance, is commonly understood to be pure amalgamation without much thought behind it (see, e.g., Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, 45). I think the deliberation below will show that Ibn al-Naqīb’s choices betray a more tightly-knit theory than was the case with earlier literary-critical compilations.}

The most prominent case in point illustrating the complexity of Ibn al-Naqīb’s views on majāz is tashbīh ‘simile; comparison’. Occupying the twenty-first category of majāz, the discussion of tashbīh opens with the explicit debate regarding its inclusion within majāz.\footnote{The topics that are discussed in the chapter of tashbīh revolve primarily around the types of comparisons: physical versus conceptual, simple versus composite, and more (Mugaddima 114-33). He also includes the topics of tamthīl, here: the illustrative analogy (or metaphorical exemplification, ibid., 135), and proverbs (ibid., 135-38).}

There is little doubt that the brief section titled hal huwa min al-majāz aw là concludes in the negative:

\begin{verbatim}
ammā l-awwallu [hal huwa mina l-majāzi aw là] fa-lladhi 'alayhi jumhūru ahli hādhīhi l-ṣināʾati anna l-tashbīha min anwāʾi l-majāzi wa-tašānīfuhum kulluhā tuṣārriḥu bi-
dhālika wa-tushīru ilayhi wa-dhahaba l-muḥaqiqūna min mutaʾakhkhirī hādhīhi l-
ṣināʾati wahudhāquhum ilā anna l-tashbīha laysa mina l-majāzi li-annahu maʾnan mina l-
maʾāni wa-lahu ġurūfun wa-alfāzun tadullu 'alayhi waḏʿan kāna l-kalāmū ḥaqiqatān aw majāzan fa-idhā qulta zaydun ka-l-asadi wa-hādhā l-khabaru ka-l-shamsī fī l-
shuhrati wa-lahu raʿyun ka-l-sayfī fī l-maḏāʾi lam yakun mithla naqli l-lafzī ʿan
mawḍiʾi fi fa-lā yakuna majāzan
\end{verbatim}

As for the first (question) [is it part of majāz or not], the opinion that the majority of the scholars of this craft hold is that simile is [counted] among the types of figurative speech, and all of their writings make this explicit and mention it. [But] the independently-minded critical thinkers and thoroughly learned from among the later [scholars] of this craft hold the view that simile is not [a type] of figurative speech because it is one of the meanings/notions [that exist], and [therefore] has particles and words that signify it by original coinage, whether the utterance is literal or figurative. So if you say “Zayd is like a lion,” “This account is like the sun in [its] conspicuousness,” and “He has an opinion
that is like a sword in [its] sharpness,” it is not like transferring a word from the original meaning for which it was coined (mawḍūʿ) and is thus not figurative speech.\footnote{Muqaddima, 113, and see editor’s fn. 2. The muḥaqiq is a scholar who employs tahqīq “independent critical research” rather than taqāḍ “uncritical continuation of early work” (and see El-Rouayheb, Intellectual History, 28, 32-33). The hurūf wa-alfāẓ (that signify a notion) could be taken as a hendiadys to simply mean ‘words’ (al-Ḥurūf wa-ʿl-Maʿānī, 222). As for the contentious maʿan min al-maʿānī, Bonebakker takes this term as “a principle of syntax” in the context of al-Ḥurūf’s discussion of naẓm, and thus as “a way of formulating a common syntactic construction” with respect to tashbīh (Bonebakker, “al-Maʿānī wa l-Bayān”). I do not think, however, that the expression is connected here to al-Ḥurūf’s notion of maʿānī al-naḥw, or semantic implications of certain syntactic relations. Rather, it seems to refer simply to a concept, notion or meaning, for which there is mirror a word that can denote it. For evidence see below.}

One such “independently-minded critical scholar” is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, whose explanation of the non-inclusion of tashbīḥ within majāz is taken almost verbatim and without acknowledgement by Ibn al-Naqīb, an explanation which, in turn, is closely adopted from al-Jurjānī’s deliberation in the Aṣrār.\footnote{Al-Rāzī, Nihāya, 222; al-Jurjānī, Aṣrār, 221-22. When Ibn al-Naqīb later quotes again from al-Rāzī, anonymously, he precedes it with once more with a reference to the “independently-minded critical scholars” (fa-qāla l-muḥaqiqīna min ‘ulamāʾ hādhā l-shaʿr n; Muqaddima, 114, and see also 104).} There, al-Jurjānī speaks of the notion of ‘likening’ as a notion/concept (maʿnan min al-maʿānī) that has words signifying it. Thus, using those words – seemingly a reference to ka-, ka-anna, mithl, and the like – reflects a literal usage of speech, as would be the case with any other notion (sāʾir al-maʿānī) expressed using the word for which it was coined (mawḍūʿ):

\textit{li-anna l-tashbīha maʾnan mina l-maʾānī wa-lahu hurūfun wa-asmāʾ an tadulūʿ ʿalayhi fa-idhā ʿurri ḥaqiqațan ka-l-ḥukmi fī sāʾir l-maʾānī fa-rifhu}

Because ‘likening’ is a notion; it has particles and nouns that signify it. So if the mentioning of that [i.e., the word] which is coined/set down to signify it [i.e., the notion of ‘likening’] is made explicit – then the utterance is literal, just as is the case with [all] other notions. So know that!\footnote{Aṣrār, 222. As a terminological aside, note that the term mawḍūʿ is used by al-Jurjānī and Ibn al-Naqīb to denote both sides of the same coin, viz. the original usage of a word. Ibn al-Naqīb uses mawḍūʿ (in the passage quoted above) to refer the original meaning for which the word was coined; al-Jurjānī uses it to refer to the original word coined for a certain meaning (as he does in his purely grammatical work, Kitāb al-Muqtaṣid fī sharḥ al-Īdāh, ed.}
For al-Jurjānī, then, a sentence containing the particle of comparison, or any other explicit expression of comparison, would unequivocally be a literal one.\textsuperscript{1159}

Whether Ibn al-Naqīb fully accepts al-Rāzī’s view is questionable. First, when stating that there are words that signify the notion of ‘likening’, he adds the stipulation: “whether the utterance [perhaps here: sentence] is literal or figurative” (kāna l-kalāmu ḥaqīqatan aw majāzan). This opens the possibility of admitting either a literal or figurative understating of a sentence that contains the notion of likening (i.e., the particle of comparison). Second, and reinforcing the latter conclusion, one of the two definitions Ibn al-Naqīb provides for tashbīh also admits either a literal or figurative understanding. Both definitions are again unacknowledged quotations, this time from Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ (not repeated in the Mathal). According to the definition in question, tashbīh is “indicating [the fact that] two things share a property (ma’nān min al-ma’ānī), and that one of them may take the place of the other, \textit{whether it is by way of ḥaqīqa or majāz}” (emphasis added; al-dalālatu ‘alā -ṣhtirāki shay’ayni fī ma’nān mina l-ma’ānī wa-anna aḥadahumā yasuddu masadda l-ākhari wa-yanūbu manābahu sawā’ an kāna dhālika ḥaqīqatan aw majāzan).\textsuperscript{1160}

The ḥaqīqa case is then explained as a case in which one says with regards to two entities, that one of them resembles the other in all of its qualities (jamī’ awṣafīhi), like two black entities, or white ones, and the like. The majāz case is explained as a case in which one says

\textsuperscript{1159} Ibn al-Zamlakānī followed al-Jurjānī in taking the ḥurūf wa-asmaʾ/alfāẓ are a reference to the particles and words of similitude: a-lā tarā annaka idhā shabbahta zaydan bi-l-asadi bi-dalālatihi l-waḍ īyyati qulta zaydun yushbihu l-asada fī shajāʿ atihi “Don’t you see that if you likened Zayd to a lion using its original signification you, would say ‘Zayd resembles a lion in his courage’” (al-Burhān, 122).

\textsuperscript{1160} Muqaddima, 113; al-Jāmiʾ al-kabīr, 90. This definition is the second, and more elaborate, of the two definitions provided by Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn; it is preceded by yuqālu, which may indicate that it was less favored (in Ibn al-Naqīb’s version, it is preceded by wa-qāla qawmun).
with regards to two entities, that one of them resembles the other in one of its qualities (baʿḍ awṣāfiḥi), like saying “Zayd is a lion.” The critical statement is what follows:

fa-hādhā l-qawlu [zaydun asadun] sawābun min ḥaythu l-ʿurfi wa-dākhilun fī bābi l-mubālaghati illā annahu lam yakun zaydun asadan ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa

This saying [“Zayd is a lion”] is correct in terms of conventional usage and is included within the category of exaggeration, except that Zayd is not really (or: in truth) a lion.

The key terms here are ṣawāb and ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa, which point to the realm of the real world, or actual reality, rather than the realm of language. It would seem, then, that the opposite of ḥaqīqa – majāz – is too understood, at least in the context of tashbīh, on the ontological level. Not only is Ibn al-Naqīb implicitly rejecting al-Rāzī’s inclusion of simile within majāz, his understanding of majāz seems to differ entirely by forsaking its linguistic aspect.

As we have seen, the tension between an ontological and linguistic understanding of the

1161 Muqaddima, 113-14; al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 90. See also our discussion of tashbīh in §5.1. As a reminder, a sentence like “Zayd is a lion” (no particle of comparison) has long been considered a simile in classical Arabic thinking rather than a metaphor (as would be in the Western tradition), since the topic (“Zayd”) is mentioned.

1162 Muqaddima, 114; al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 90. Note the lacuna in al-Fawāʾid, 55, rectified in the Muqaddima, based on an earlier edition of the Fawāʾid. As the editor ʿAlī notes, the wording here rectifies a typo in the text of the Jāmiʿ, where ʿurf should be read instead of ʿarab (and see al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 90, fn. 2, explaining why the editor inserted [kalām] al-ʿarab). Heinrichs translates ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa in Ibn Qutayba’s Taʾwīl as “in truth” in the context of God’s speech (“Genesis,” 131).

1163 See also Chapter 5 Preliminaries and §5.1.

1164 Perhaps as additional evidence for his inclusion of tashbīh within majāz, we may cite Ibn al-Naqīb’s use of the term majāz al-tashbīh elsewhere in his work (e.g., Muqaddima, 37, 86), although this term is probably derived from al-ʿIzz’s Ishāra. There, a large section on tashbīh occupies the forty-fourth category of majāz, in which a hundred and nine subcategories of tashbīh are enumerated. The notion of tashbīh by al-ʿIzz differs fundamentally and would probably best be understood as lexicalized cases of dead metaphors based on some kind of comparison, such as using the notion of istiqāma ‘straightness’ to denote good deeds (al-Ishāra, 88). In this sense, the lexicographical sense of majāz is clearly preserved. Let us add that al-ʿIzz too admits either a literal or figurative sense for tashbīh, but for a different reason (al-Ishāra, 85): when the particle of comparison is expressed, it is a case of tashbīh ḥaqīqa, and when it is not, it is tashbīh majāz. An example for the latter would be Q 33:6 wa-azwājuhu ummuhātum “his wives are their mothers” – a case not unlike the ones found in Ibn al-Naqīb’s work, but once again, the vast majority of examples that follow this short preamble (under the heading majāz al-tashbīh) are cases of dead metaphors (al-Ishāra, 87-136).
ḥaqīqa-majāz pairing was a hallmark of early (third/ninth century) theological deliberations.\textsuperscript{1165} In this sense, ‘Izz al-Dīn’s Ishāra is reflective of that tradition – not the literary tradition of Ibn Rashīq et al. – and some of the ambiguity surrounding the ontological/linguistic aspect passes on to Ibn al-Naqīb’s Muqaddima. Many of the metonymic sections, for instance, are explained by reverting to ‘reality’ and ‘real existence’, especially with respect to God’s actions. The key expression here is, once more, ‘alā l-haqīqa ‘really, in truth’, but also fī l-haqīqa ‘in actuality’ and ḥaqīqī ‘real’ occur. For instance, with respect to ‘scheming’ (makara) and ‘deceiving’ (khādiʿ) mentioned in several Qur’ānic verses, it is not the possible meanings of the words that are discussed, but rather the extralinguistic possibilities of what God actually did (yaḥtāmu an yakūna makru -llāhi ḥaqīqiyyan).\textsuperscript{1166} Similarly, certain verbs are understood as being attributed to God rather than the expressed subject, since it is He who performed them in truth (al-muqaddim/al-mukhrij/al-nāzi’ ‘alā l-haqīqa huwa -llāh ta’alā).\textsuperscript{1167} This operation is not limited to God: the verb akhadha mīthāq ‘to take a covenant’ is understood as figurative when said of women, since “the taker in truth is the person in authority and the woman is the one who gives permission” (al-ākhidhu ‘alā l-haqīqati huwa l-waliyyu wa-l-mar’atu l-ādhinatu fīhi).\textsuperscript{1168} Once again, the interpreter (Ibn al-Naqīb, ‘Izz al-Dīn) appeals to the real world when assessing this instance of majāz.

If the case of tashbīh and many of the metonymic categories of majāz point to an extralinguistic notion of majāz, with isti’āra we have a more conventional proceeding grounded

\textsuperscript{1165} See Chapter 5 Preliminaries and fn. 659.

\textsuperscript{1166} Muqaddima, 36-37.

\textsuperscript{1167} Ibid., 42. The verbs ‘bringing forth [a calamity]’, ‘repelling’, and ‘driving out’ are originally predicated of either unknown entities or Satan. Cf. the early discussion of al-Kindī regarding al-fā’ il al-haqq in fn. 659.

\textsuperscript{1168} Ibid. (with respect to Q 4:21 wa-akhadhna minkum mīthāqan ghalīzan “they have taken from you a strong covenant”).
in language and reflective of both ‘classical’ literary theory and ‘standard’ rhetorical notions.

Much of the chapter is adopted from al-Rāzī’s Nihāya and includes standard categories such as the ‘imaginary metaphor’ (istiʿāra takhyīliyya) and ‘metaphor by allusion’ (istiʿāra bi-l-kināya). And yet, the chapter may provide some context for Ibn al-Naqīb’s cautionary attitude toward Fakhr al-Dīn. As previously mentioned, here too the question ḥal huwa min al-majāz am lā precedes the discussion, but this time al-Rāzī is mentioned by name as the single scholar who went against the decidedly mainstream opinion that holds metaphor to be a type of majāz.

According to Ibn al-Naqīb, al-Rāzī claims there to be “no [word/meaning] transfer” (ʿadam al-naql) in the case of metaphor, thus excluding it from being figurative speech. This view is not quite observed, one might state, in al-Rāzī’s Nihāya. However, we have seen from examining al-Jurjānī’s own thesis on majāz (metonymies, conceptual metaphors, etc.), that it is hard to reconcile istiʿāra with majāz. Obviously no scholar would explicitly exclude istiʿāra from majāz, and the fact that Ibn al-Naqīb ascribes this view to al-Rāzī shows that the latter, while recognized as a muḥaqqiq, was not necessarily perceived as being right.

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1169 Ibid., 107, 110. See Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s treatment above and Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī’s below. Still, we also find references to Dīyā’ al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ (ibid., 102, 106). As aforementioned, a chapter on istiʿāra is absent in ʿIzz al-Dīn’s Ishāra. The editor of the Muqaddima also cites unacknowledged references to al-ʿAnjānī’s Miʿyār.

1170 Muqaddima, 89.

1171 At certain points (e.g., Nihāya, 232, 234) it does indeed seem like al-Rāzī is rejecting the notion of majāz with regards to istiʿāra, despite other textual evidence pointing to the contrary (ibid., 213, 237). For instance, in proving that naql ‘transference’ occurs only in meaning (maʿnā) and not wording (lafẓ, ism), he analyzes the cases of “Zayd is a lion” and “reins in the hand of the north wind” (from the famous Labīd line) in terms of ʿiddi ʿa ‘a claiming’ rather than naql, a deliberation from which one could conclude that the notion of majāz is rejected altogether (ibid., 234). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, when glossing his own definition of istiʿāra (ibid., 232, and repeated with acknowledgement in Muqaddima, 91), al-Rāzī explains that the stipulation “for the purpose of exaggerating the comparison” (li-ajli l-mubālaghati fī l-tashbīh) is mentioned in order for it “to be distinguished from majāz” (li-tatamayyaza bihi ʿani l-majāz; Nihāya, 231 [all but the principal manuscript have li-yatamayyaza, see editor’s fn. 4]). Al-Rāzī is possibly referring here to dead metaphors (majāz cases based on similarity, but no ‘exaggeration’ thereof) and to metonymies (majāz cases based on contiguity rather than similarity). In any event, it is true that in some of his comments al-Jurjānī (not mentioned by Ibn al-Naqīb) in his later work, the Dalā’il, espouses the view that istiʿāra does not concern word transfer.

1172 This can be seen from Ibn Abī al-Iṣba’i’s late work as well: we may recall that in the Badīʿ al-Qurʿān he
Rāzī’s ‘eccentric’ position on *istiʿāra* in mind when dealing with the question of *tashbīḥ*. The case of *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* (change in word order) – the other category that opens with *hal huwa min al-majāz am lā* – exemplifies again the noncommittal attitude of Ibn al-Naqīb towards the boundaries of *majāz*. The reason for non-inclusion, namely the absence of a word/meaning transfer, seems theoretically sound, as did the reason for the non-inclusion of *tashbīḥ* within *majāz*. But once more, we must rely on the mere choice of placing this category within *majāz* to glean Ibn al-Naqīb’s support of its inclusion therein.1173

**Idiomatic Language vis-à-vis Majāz**

The actual definitions of *majāz* and *ḥaqīqa* reflect, not surprisingly, a linguistic understanding of the terms, which was well in place in legal and theological works. Probably following the wording of al-Rāzī, a distinction is made between *majāz* on the level of single words (*fī l-mufradāt*) and *majāz* on the level of sentences (*fī l-jumal*).1174 The preceding account suggests, however, that Ibn al-Naqīb did not heed these definitions. Also telling is the paragraph opening the theoretical discussion on *majāz* (which contains the various definitions and stipulations), which speaks of the reason due to which the Arabs use *majāz* in their language (*al-maʾnā alladhī istaʿmalat al-ʿarab al-majāz min ajlihi*). Here the old discourse of *al-ittisāʿ fī l-kalām* abandons the older ‘literary’ view of *majāz*, which was present in his *Tahrīr al-tahbīr*, in favor of the theory laid out by al-Rāzī. But he is also willing to criticize al-Rāzī when necessary (*Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 128), either due to a warranted reason or as a show of “counter-ḥaqīq.”

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1173 *Muqaddima*, 166. The reason provided for counting *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* within *majāz* is that mentioning first what deserves to be mentioned later is equivalent to (*ka-*) something transferred (*manqūl*). Early sources famously include change in word order in the purview of *majāz*, such as Ibn Qutayba. This category too is absent from *ʿIzz al-Dīn’s Ishāra*.

1174 *Muqaddima*, 23; *Nihāya*, 169-73. Ibn al-Naqīb also alludes, briefly, to discussions found in *ʿIzz al-Dīn’s Ishāra* (*Muqaddima*, 24; *Ishāra*, 28) on the degrees of ‘connectivity’ between a *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* (for al-ʿIzz here: ‘pragmatic’ *majāz*, or implicatures, like saying to a woman one wishes to divorce *iʿtaddī wa-stabriʾī raḥimakī “Observe the ‘idda period [-three menstruation cycles] and keep your womb ‘clean’” for “abstain from intercourse during this period”). Ibn al-Naqīb states that more information on the degrees of connectivity can be found in works dealing with *usūl al-fiqh*, presumably viewing the work of ’Izz al-Dīn as part of the tradition of legal theory.
‘extensiveness in speech’ comes up, and the ‘pleasure’ the Arabs take in expressing a plethora of meanings, evoking the older understanding of majāz as ‘idiomatic language’. Following this motif, Ibn al-Naqīb states that Arabs used majāz so much that it was more in use than ‘transparent speech’ (al-ḥaqā’iq). This leads us to the closing section of Ibn al-Naqīb’s work, in which over one hundred categories of non-transparent or ‘deviant’ types of linguistic phenomena found in the Qurʾān are enumerated. This appendix of-sorts resembles a table of contents for many of the majāz categories, but interestingly, here Ibn al-Naqīb does not use the term majāz (al-tajawwuz bi-X ʿan Y occurs for several categories after the ninety-ninth one). Rather, the list is presented as types of address (from God) that encompass all kinds of eloquent usage, either deviating from transparent wording or not. De facto, the vast majority of categories reflect the non-transparent usage.

The terminology of deviation in this appendix presents a distinction between talwīn al-khiṭāb wa-maʿdūlūhu “variation and deviance in address” or maʿdūl bihi ʿan ḥaqīqatihi ilā masmūʿ ihi “[speech] which is diverted from its literal/real [meaning] to the [meaning] of what is heard from it,” on one hand, and bāqīn ʿalā aṣli madlūlihi wa-mawḍūʿ ihi “remaining in accordance with its original referent and meaning for which it was coined,” on the other. Despite the absence of the term majāz here, the term ḥaqīqa is present and represents the basic form from which ‘divergence’ occurs (maʿdūl bihi ʿan ḥaqīqatihi). It would seem that this list of non-transparent usage reflects the purely linguistic notion of majāz, aking to the old philological

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1175 Muqaddima, 22-23.

1176 Ibid., 526-34.

1177 The handful of transparent speech categories include cases such as ‘addressing a species’, ‘addressing an individual’, ‘the address of praise’, ‘the address of blame’; see ibid., 526-27.

1178 Ibid., 526. The term masmūʿ seems to be taken from legal theory.
use of the term. Not surprisingly, all examples display lexicalized usage, that is, usage that has become part of the convention of the Arabic language, even if not originally ‘transparent’. This is in opposition to a case like *tashbīḥ*, which pointed to an ontological understanding of *majāz*, or what we may term ‘the poetic majāz’.

To highlight the difference between the poetic *majāz* and lexicalized *majāz*, it may be useful to say a few more words about the appendix. The variety of ‘deviating’ speech categories enumerated in the appendix include grammatical deviation, such as addressing the singular by using the plural; lexical deviation, such as using the word ‘force’ to express ‘weapon’ (i.e., metonymies; the majority of categories falls under this rubric); morphological deviation, such as using the *faʿala* form (*al-māḍī*) to express a future tense; and pragmatic deviation, such as using the declarative mood to express a prohibition. All instances are germane to conventional everyday speech, not poetic speech. It is noteworthy that *tashbīḥ*, *istiʿāra* and *taqdim wa-taʾkhīr* are absent from this long list, especially since Ibn al-Naṣīb presented the list as encompassing all types of eloquent language. What is more, the phrase *khāṭaba al-ʿarab bi-lisānihim* “He addressed the Arabs using their tongue” (to explain God’s wording) points to everyday speech, not poetic. The grounding of the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* pairing in a purely linguistic discourse appears towards the end of the list, when Ibn al-Naṣīb enumerates deviant usage of particles (what we would regard as lexical deviation). Here one of the particles is glossed as being used *ḥaqīqatan fī* […] *wa-majāzan fī* “literally/original [to denote X] and non-transparently/idiomatically [to denote Y].” More often, however, we find that the opposition is made between *ḥaqīqatan fī* […]

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1179 Ibid., 527, 530 and 533, respectively.

1180 Ibid. 527 (*funūn al-balāgha wa-ḍurūb al-faṣāḥa wa-ajnās al-tajnīs wa-badāʾiʿ al-badīʿ wa-mahāsin al-ḥikam wa-l-amthāl*). Notably, the editor characterizes the entire section as a general overview, or table of contents, for the categories of eloquence (*funūn al-balāgha*) that had been mentioned previously (ibid., 526 fn. 1, 686).
and *tajawwaza bihā ʿan [...] “it [the particle] is used beyond [its original, transparent meaning] to [denote Y].”* The relative absence of the term *majāz* in this section in favor of *tajawwaza*, and the presence – nevertheless – of the term *ḥaqīqa*, may point to a different understanding of *majāz* in the body of Ibn al-Naqīb’s work, one that has ontological reality at its core (as reflected in language), rather than language proper. What is more, despite the Qur’ānic bent of his work, Ibn al-Naqīb preserves an understanding of *majāz*, at least in the body of his work, that is markedly poetic.

5.5. Putting Theory into Unusual Practice: Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī

Following Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr in *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī presents his meta-discourse on *ḥaqīqa-majāz* under the first division of the work dealing with “general properties of ʿilm al-bayān,” whereas the individual figures of speech (*anwāʿ ʿilm al-bayān*), among them those that reflect figurative language, under the second division dealing with “particular properties of ʿilm al-bayān.” Al-Ṭūfī does not normally specify whether a certain figure of speech is literal or non-literal, *istiʿāra* being a notable exception. As in other chapters, the chapter on *ḥaqīqa-majāz* follows closely that found in the *Jāmiʿ*, with notable modifications. Al-Ṭūfī does not take as a minority view the notion that the word *ḥaqīqa* is a homonym, as did Ɗiyāʾ al-Dīn in the *Jāmiʿ*. Rather, it is presented as a homonym from the outset, signifying both the essence of a thing (*dhāt, māhiyya*), i.e., an extra-linguistic notion, and a word used according

**References**

1181 Ibid., 533-34.

1182 *Al-Iksīr*, 60-67 and 109 ff.

1183 *wa-bi-hādhā l-qaydī tanfāṣīlu ʿan sāʾīri wujūhi l-majāz “with this restriction [the purpose of exaggerating similarity] it [istiʿāra] is set apart from the other types of non-literal speech“ (ibid., 109.8-9).
to its original coinage, i.e., a linguistic notion. Majāz is introduced as the counterpart to the linguistic notion of *ḥaqīqa*. Al-Ṭūfī presents a list of majāz categories, the contents of which we may classify as metonymies and dead metaphors. He limits the list Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn specified (derived from al-Ghazālī) to ten categories, reflecting ten major relations between concepts. These include, *inter alia*, effect-cause (metonymy: naming wine ‘grapes’), whole-part (synecdoche: naming a single sūra or verse ‘Qurān’), physical contiguity (synecdoche: naming the leather water-bag a rāwiya ‘camel carrying the water-bag’) and similarity (dead metaphor: naming a stupid person ‘ass’).

**Limiting Majāz to the Single Word**

Despite his presentation of a shorter list of majāz types, al-Ṭūfī acknowledges that the number of relations and associations (*al-ʿalāqa wa-l-munāsabāt, jihāt al-ʿalāqa*) between things or concepts (*ashyāʾ*) is limitless. The relation between concepts, presented at times as one between words (*lafẓān*), is referred to as *al-ʿalāqa al-mujawwiza* ‘transgressing relation’ and could not be overstated in al-Ṭūfī’s conception of majāz. In an earlier comment under one of the preliminary sections of the work, he observes two opinions regarding the formation of

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1184 The definition offered by al-Ṭūfī to the linguistic notion is formulated more rigorously to accommodate the notions of *ḥaqīqa sharʿīya* ‘legal literal usage’ (as in ṣalāt in the sense of the Islamic ritualistic prayer) and *ḥaqīqa ʿurfiyya* ‘customary [rather than original to the lexicon] literal usage’ (as in dābba in the sense of four-legged animal). See ibid., 60. Compare Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn’s *al-lafz al-dāll ʿalā mawdūʿ iḥi al-aṣlī* “a word indicating its original coinage” (al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 28) with al-Ṭūfī’s *al-lafz al-musta’mal fī mawdūʿ iḥi al-mutakhāṭab bihi ʿinda irādat al-takhāṭub “a word used according to the coinage that was spoken at the time the discourse was intended” (al-Iksīr, 60).

1185 *Al-Iksīr*, 60.9.

1186 Ibid., 60-62.

1187 Ibid., 64.11-12; see also 60.12.

1188 Ibid., 60.12. Here he is limiting the relation to *mushābaha* ‘similarity’, but this is probably an oversight. In choosing the word ‘transgressing’ I follow Vishanoff, *Formation*, 21 (without the negative connotation it has in English). For *lafzān* see *Al-Iksīr*, 66.7.
figurative usage. According to the first, perhaps alluding to the position espoused by scholars such as the Ashʿarī al-Bāqillānī, majāz is determined according to transmitted knowledge (naql), that is, previous Arabic usage (istiʿmāl). According to the second position, favored by al-Ṭūfī and seemingly most of the scholars of ʿilm al-bayān (ʿulamāʾ al-bayān), majāz is conditioned upon a word transfer (naql) that stems from an apparent relation (ʿalāqa zāhira): “whenever we find it [this condition] we ‘transgress’ and use [the figurative expression].” In other words, it is due to the ʿalāqa that one may create (a word not explicitly used by al-Ṭūfī) new figurative expressions. However, this position is at odds with the examples provided in the haqīqa-majāz chapter, all of which reflect usage that has become part of the lexicon. What is more, the remark reveals the place naql ‘word/meaning transfer’ holds in the conception of majāz. Although not specified elsewhere, it is clear that the notion of naql is implicitly understood to stand at the basis of figurative usage, limiting the phenomenon to the single word (lafẓ). At one point al-Ṭūfī even states that the pillars (arkān) of majāz are the two words (lafzān) and the relation between them (ʿalāqa), giving credence to this limitation.

We now move to the study of istiʿāra by al-Ṭūfī to determine how a limited notion of majāz is reconciled with metaphors that may not display single word tropes. Here, al-Ṭūfī turns out to be more rigorous in his presentation, as he displays independence both in the structuring of the chapter as well as in analyses of specific metaphors that contradict the view of ʿiyā ʿal-Dīn. First, al-Ṭūfī is explicit in stating that istiʿāra is a type of majāz. He repeats the definition he gave for majāz almost verbatim – a use of a word not according to its original coinage – adding the condition that its purpose is to exaggerate a comparison, a restriction that separates istiʿāra

1189 Al-Iksîr, 41, and repeated in 66. The resumptive pronoun in fa-ḥaythu wajadnāhu tajawwaznā wa-staʿmalnā refers to shart al-majāz (41.6). For al-Bāqillānī’s view see §5.1, “The Legal Underpinnings of Majāz.”
from other majāz types.\textsuperscript{1190} Diyā’ al-Dīn did not speak of original word coinage in this context, and in the Jāmi’ he did not even associate isti’āra with majāz explicitly. To be sure, this is the only place majāz is mentioned by al-Ṭūfī within the chapter of isti’āra.

Second, the rigor al-Ṭūfī displays can be demonstrated by the poetic examples he adduces (those that do not appear in the Jāmi’) and by the commentary he provides on them. The first poetic example in the chapter is one not mentioned by Diyā’ al-Dīn. It is designed to show that in the archetypal metaphor, the topic of comparison is absent (“I saw a lion” – topic not mentioned, versus “Zayd is a lion” – topic mentioned), but more importantly, it implicitly suggests that the archetypal metaphor is a noun metaphor. The line is from Zuhayr’s Mu’allaqa (d. ca. 609)

\begin{quote}
ladā asadin shākī l-silāhi muqadhdhafin
lahā libadun azfāruhu lam tuqallamī
“Before a lion, [his] weapon iron-sharp, full of flesh,
He has manes, his nails not cut”\textsuperscript{1191}
\end{quote}

Noun metaphors, adjective metaphors, verb metaphors and particle metaphors are categories that

\textsuperscript{1190} isti’mālu l-lafẓī fī ghayri māṣṭuli ḥaʿalayhi fī waḍ’i l-takḥāṭubi li-l-mubālagha fī l-tashbīhi wa-bi-hādhā l-qaydi tanfaṣīlu ‘an sā’īri wujūhi l-majāz; al-Iksīr, 109.

\textsuperscript{1191} Ibid., 109. In my translation I follow the main interpretations presented in the commentaries by Abū Bakr al-Anbārī (d. 328/940) and al-Shantama’ī’s (d. 476/1083 or 1084). Muqadhdhaf is glossed as kathîr al-lahm but could also mean “being thrown [blows] at.” See Abū Bakr Muhammad b. Qāsim al-Anbārī, Sharḥ al-qasā‘ id al-sab` al-tiwāl, ed. ‘Abd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, [1963], 277-79 (where the version of the verse is slightly different); Abū al-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf b. Sulaymān b. ʿIsā al-A’lam al-Shantama’ī, Sharḥ dīwān Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā al-Muẓānī, [Cairo:] al-Matba’ a al-Ḥamādiyya, 1323 [1905 or 1906], 10-11. The commentators acknowledge that by asad Zuhayr means (arāda) `army` (jāysh), and that the rest of the line is grammatically predicated of `lion` (wa-ḥamala lafẓ al-bayt `alā l-asad in al-Shantama’ī; wa-l-lafẓ `alā l-asad in al-Anbārī). Al-Anbārī recognizes that it is a metaphor by saying that the lion is a mathal for the army (see Chapter 5 Preliminaries on the early meaning of mathal). Al-Shantama’ī does not use the terminology of mathal or isti’āra here. His focus is on the use of `nails` to refer to `weapon`, and the verb he uses to express this trope is kanā `to allude, call` (kanā bi-l-azfār `an al-silāh). Incidentally – or not – the first poetic example for isti’āra cited by al-Qazwīnī is this one (it was not used by al-Sakkākī); see al-Qazwīnī, Talkhīṣ, 268 and al-Iḍāh, 407 (it was also discussed by al-Zamakhshārī with regards to Q 2: 18 ṣummun bukmun ’umyun “Deaf, dumb, blind” in al-Kashshāf 1: 205, on whether there is any element alluding to the topic, hence rendering it a tashbīh balīgh, not isti’āra).
al-Ṭūfī explicitly designates later on in the chapter. One may surmise that he preferred to start with Zuhayr’s line rather than the first poetic example adduced by Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn since the latter contained a verb metaphor. This is the second example al-Ṭūfī adduces, Ibn al-Muʾtazz’s (not mentioned by name) [meter: madīḍ]

\[
\text{athmarat aghşānu rāḥatihī} \\
\text{li-junāti l-husni ʿunnābā}
\]

“The branches of the palm of his hand produced jujube fruit for the harvesters of beauty”

Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn limited his gloss to the noun metaphors, in a passage derived almost verbatim from al-Jurjānī’s Dalā’īl (unacknowledged, of course). The focus was on fingers-for-branches, seekers of beauty-for-harvesters, and (implicitly) henna-dyed fingertips-for-jujube fruit. Al-Ṭūfī adds to these and spells out the verb metaphor in athmarat (= ‘to appear’) as well. Moreover, whereas Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn, following al-Jurjānī, explicated the metaphor, and others like it, in terms of a comparison, al-Ṭūfī’s commentary betrays a consistency of conceiving of istiʿāra as a word transfer/borrowing:

[Ḫiyā’ al-Dīn, following al-Jurjānī]

\[
\text{a-lā tarā annaka law kallafta naʃsaka an tuẓhira l-tashbīha wa-tuʃjīha bihi ḥ-tajta ilā an} \\
\text{taqūla athmarat aʃābiʿu yadihi ʾl-latī hiya ka-l-agḥṣāni li-ṭālibi l-ḥusni shibha l-ʿunnābī} \\
\text{min aṭrāfihā l-makhḍūlati [should be makhḍūba] wa-man lahu adnā tashabbuthin bi-}
\]

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1192 Al-Iksīr, 112. According to Ibn al-Naṣīb (Muqaddima, 106), this section appears already in the Jāmiʿ. In legal theory the discussion of majāz is customarily confined to the noun (e.g. al-Āmidī, al-Iḥkām 1: 36 ff., assuming that metaphor is a subtype of majāz). Al-Zamakhšarī states that istiʿāra may appear in nouns, adjectives (ṣifāt) and verbs (al-Kashšāf 1: 204); al-Ṭūfī may be following al-Zamakhšarī here. Before al-Zamakhšarī (and before al-Jurjānī), al-Rāghib al-İṣfahānī makes a distinction between metaphors occurring in nouns, verbs, particles, and more, in his work on badiʾ (Key, Linguistic Frame of Mind, 180).

1193 Ibid., 110 and al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 84; Ibn al-Muʾtazz, Dīwān (ed. Sharīf), 1: 228.

1194 Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 84; Dalāʾīl, 450-51.
hādhihi l-ṣinā’ati ya’lamu l-faḍīlata bayna mā taḍammāna bayna l-baytu mina l-isti’āratī wa-bayna ẓirārihi ilā l-tashbīhi fa-’rif dhālika wa-qis’ alayhi

Don’t you see that if you take it upon yourself to make the comparison visible and utter it explicitly, you would need to say: “The fingers of his hands, which are like branches, produced for the seeker of beauty something jujube-like from its moist [should be: dyed (with henna)] edges.” Anyone with the least grounding in this craft can distinguish the excellence that the metaphor in this line has from its formulation as an explicit simile. So know that and deduce from it!1195

[Al-Ṭūfī]

[The poet] borrowed [the word] “producing (bearing fruit)” for [the notion of] “appearing” and [the word] “branches” for [the notion of] “fingers” and [the word] “harvest” for [the notion of] “quest” and [the word] “jujube” for [the notion of] the given [or (henna-)dyed] “fingertips.” Had he made the comparison/simile explicit by saying, “There appeared from the fingers of his hand, which are like branches, for the seekers of beauty something jujube-like,” then the utterance would be lengthy and weak, and its splendor would disappear.1196

Although al-Ṭūfī embeds Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn’s reformulation of the metaphor as a simile, the discourse he uses accentuates the idea that a word has been borrowed. His response to shawāhid, both Qur’ānic and poetic, strictly follow the formulaic fa-sta’āra X li-Y “he borrowed X for Y,” or more often, fa-sta’āra lafẓ al-X li-Y “he borrowed the word X for [the notion] Y,” whether the metaphor is a noun or a verb (in which case the verb is reduced to its maṣdar).1197 This type of

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1195 Al-Jāmi’ al-kabīr, 84; al-Jurjānī, Dalā’il, 450-51. The passage is discussed in Harb, Poetic Marvels, 211; it later appears in al-Rāzī, Ihāya, 248, al-Zanjānī, Mi’yār, 69-70, and elsewhere.

1196 Al-Iḵsīr, 110.

1197 Ibid., 110.10-11, 111.6 (for fa-sta’āra X li-Y), 113.12, 113.35-114.2, 114.5, 114.14-15, 115.9, 115.13, 115.14-115.15 (for fa-sta’āra lafẓ al-X li-Y). In one instance lafẓ is replaced with ism; see 115.7.
phraseology is not to be confused with the “old” phraseology of the loan metaphor, in which formulas such as fa-staʾāra li-Y X (or the like) referred to the borrowing of an object (or the mental image of that object), not the borrowing of a word.1198

In light of al-Ṭūfī’s strict evaluation of metaphors as word borrowings, it is revealing to see how he resolves sentence-long ascriptive metaphors (loan-metaphors in Heinrichs’ nomenclature). Heinrichs has pinpointed a development in the notion’s theory in which istiʿāra was reduced from an analogy-based, sentence-long notion to a single-term notion. He notes the final stage of this evolution with al-Sakkākī’s reworking of the loan-metaphor (“death sinking its claws in,” the so-called “‘old’ metaphor”) into single-term metaphors.1199 We do not know if al-Ṭūfī was directly influenced by al-Sakkākī but it is likely that he was exposed to standardists’ theories. The important difference between al-Sakkākī’s ‘reduction’ and al-Ṭūfī’s one is that the latter maintains a nomenclature of word-transfer whereas al-Sakkākī does not.1200 Our interest here lies in what al-Ṭūfī’s solution may tell us about his conception of majāz.

Commentary on Shawāhid

Al-Ṭūfī’s does not resolve sentence-long metaphors in a uniform way. Several cases he subsumes under the categories of tarshīḥ and tajrīd, subclasses of metaphor which seem well established by al-Ṭūfī’s time. And yet other cases he keeps in line with the word-transfer theory, a choice that may strike us as odd. Beginning with the latter alternative, let us consider the following line by Abū Tammām: [meter: kāmil]

1198 On the “old” phraseology see Heinrichs, Hand of the Northwind, e.g., 32-33.

1199 Ibid., 14.

1200 Al-Sakkākī, Miḥāḥ, 376-77, 378-79. Although at certain points al-Sakkākī does employ the terminology of “naming Y ‘X’” (an tuṭliqaʿ alā […] ism […]); see 377.1, 377.7, 377.11-12.
wa-mu’arrasin li-l-ghaythi takhfiq baynahū
rāyātu kulli dujunnatin wa ṭāfāʾī
“Many a place for the rain to settle in for the night, where
the banners of every low-hanging dark cloud flutter.” 1201

In praising this line, Ḳiyā’ al-Dīn employs the terminology of ja’l al-shayʿ ‘li-l-shayʿ ‘“making something belong to something else,” a phrase commonly used in the analysis of ‘old’ ascriptive metaphors, as Heinrichs has demonstrated. 1202 What is being ascribed here is ‘banners’ to ‘clouds’ and Ḳiyā’ al-Dīn seems to be using the phrase to denote a genitive metaphor. According to him, the poet “made the banners [tug banners or banners hung horizontally] belong to the clouds” because “the cloud that is hanging down, which becomes evident in the sky [lit. ‘air’] to the observer when the cloud is pouring forth, is similar (mushābih) to the dangling forelocks of the banners [in their string-like manner].” 1203 According to this analysis, the genitive metaphor is an identifying one (the banners are the rainclouds) and is based on the comparison: just as banners look when they dangle down, likewise clouds look when they are pouring rain. (In other words, it is not an attributive genitive metaphor of the type “claws of death,” despite the wording

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1201 Ibid., 113; al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 85 and the commentaries by al-Khaṭīb al-Tibrīzī (d. 502/1109) and Ibn al-Mustawfī (d. 637/1239) on Abū Tammām’s dīwān: al-Tibrīzī, Sharḥ 1: 26-27; Abū al-Barakāt Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mubārak b. Aḥmad al-Irbīfī al-maʾrūf bi-Ibn al-Mustawfī, al-Nīẓām fī sharḥ shīr al-Mutanabbī wa-Abī Tammām, ed. Khalaf Rashūd Nuʾmān, 12 vols., Baghdad: Dār al-Shūrūʿ al-Ṣawādī, 1989, 1: 231-32. The preceding line is Abū Tammām’s famous lā tasqīnī māʾa l-malāmī fa-ḥaythu yastaḥlibūn li-l-nāʿirī fī l-jawwi ʿinda -nsikābi l-saḥābat yakūnu mushābihan li-dhāwāʾ ibi l-rāyātī; al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 85. When the low-hanging cloud pours out rain, it looks like strings (see the definitions of ḥaydab in Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿarab 6: 4629). The banner Abū Tammām is referring to may be a tug banner, a pole with circularly arranged horse or yak tail hairs at the top. Tug banners are commonly associated with the Mongols but may have been known earlier in the Middle East. The white-haired tug banner symbolized peace time whereas the black-haired one symbolized wartime. In our case the black tug banner would be appropriate since the clouds are dark and the cacophony of heavy rain would resemble that of war (cf. pre-Islamic images of lightning, below). Alternatively, this could simply be a reference to a banner hung horizontally with unwoven strings at the bottom (ḥudb al-qaffa; see ibid. and below).

1202 A summary can be found in Hand of the Northwind, 1-2. Ḳiyā’ al-Dīn praises the line, but it is still placed below the highest level of metaphors, those that are in the Qur’ān and are inimitable; see al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 85.

1203 fa-ḥaythu jaʾala li-l-saḥābatī rāyātīn kāna dhālikā munāṣītan li-anīna l-haydaba -l-ladhī yastahlibūn li-l-nāʿirī fī l-jawwi ʿinda -nsikābi l-saḥābatī yakūnu mushābihan li-dhāwāʾ ibi l-rāyātī; al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 85. When the low-hanging cloud pours out rain, it looks like strings (see the definitions of ḥaydab in Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿarab 6: 4629). The banner Abū Tammām is referring to may be a tug banner, a pole with circularly arranged horse or yak tail hairs at the top. Tug banners are commonly associated with the Mongols but may have been known earlier in the Middle East. The white-haired tug banner symbolized peace time whereas the black-haired one symbolized wartime. In our case the black tug banner would be appropriate since the clouds are dark and the cacophony of heavy rain would resemble that of war (cf. pre-Islamic images of lightning, below). Alternatively, this could simply be a reference to a banner hung horizontally with unwoven strings at the bottom (ḥudb al-qaffa; see ibid. and below).
jaʿl al-shayʿ li-l-shayʿ’). As Heinrichs has shown, this type of genitive metaphor became common in the poetry of the muhdathūn and is made possible by a concomitant verb metaphor – in our case ‘flutter’. In glossing the verb (qawl) yakhfiqu, Dyā’ al-Dīn adds an auditory component to the image in addition to the visual one, saying that “when the wind blows on the banners, they flutter due to their swaying, and they sound like a cloud when it pours rain, especially [in the case of] a heavy low-hanging cloud.”

Al-Ṭūfī glosses the line differently. Because he goes word by word, explicating what each one stands for (fa-staʿāra lafẓ al-muʾarras li-..., wa-lafẓ khufūq al-rāya [to refer to the verb yakhfiqu] li-..., etc.), he breaks down the image to its basic constituents. Thus, the word ‘banner’ stands for “a cloud approaching the earth” (hudb al-saḥāba), as if it were “the unwoven ends of the extremities of a garment” (hudb al-qaṭīfa), and the word ‘fluttering’ stands for “the brisk movement [within] the cloud while it pours rain” (hubūb al-saḥāba ʿinda humūlihā wa-nṣibābihā). According to this interpretation, there is no longer a unified visual image of a banner fluttering, for it is now the clouds that are conceived of as fluttering (metaphorically), not the banner. Instead of an animated and auditory image, what we have is a series of discrete static images.

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1204 According to Heinrichs’ scheme, this metaphor would be classified as a “non-imaginary ‘old’ metaphor plus verb metaphor” and more accurately, as an “old” metaphor, non-imaginary (vs. imaginary), containing an identifying genitive construction (vs. attribute genitive construction), based on a simile (vs. not based on a simile). This is a theoretical classification based on Heinrichs’ observations and does not directly reflect medieval classifications. See Heinrichs, “Paired Metaphors,” 4, 9. It is an ‘old’ metaphor since it contains “the intrusion of an element into a context that is foreign to it in the real world” (ibid., 4). It is non-imaginary because banners are not truly ascribed to the rainclouds (unless the rainclouds are likened to army troops, in which case the banners would be truly ascriptive). The genitive metaphor is based on a simile because, at least according to the analyses of Dyā’ al-Dīn and al-Ṭūfī, there is a direct similarity between the banners and the rainclouds (we would probably say it is not based on a simile; see Heinrich, “Istilāʿ and Badt,”” 197, and fn. 27, where he describes such metaphors as less typical).

1205 wa-ammā qawluhu yakhfiqu fa-huwa aydān ḥasanun mardiyyun li-anna l-rīḥa idhā habbat ʿalā l-rāyūti khafqaqat bi-nawdihā wa-jā a laḥā ʿawtun ka-sawtī l-saḥābatī fī-nṣībābihā [wa-j humūlihā wa-nṣībābihā; al-Jāmī’ al-kabīr, 85. Sound images for thunder/wind in pre-Islamic poetry are rare but they do exist (see below).

1206 Al-Iksīr, 113-14. He glosses the meaning of khufūq as ādīrāb ‘flickering’ (cf. images in pre-Islamic poetry, below).
snapshots: first, a banner hanging down, then the brisk change of composition (‘fluttering’) within the cloud while it rains. To be sure, each constituent of the metaphor is based on a similarity (conforming to al-Ṭūfī’s istiʿāra definition) – at one point he even uses the word jāmiʿ ‘common attribute’ to express this – but there is no longer a perception of an animated analogy. Note that although he changes Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn’s interpretation, al-Ṭūfī still uses the same expressions, such as hubūb (used by the former in reference to the wind), humūl wa-nṣibāb (used by the former in the context of the storm’s sound), etc.

It should still be underscored that al-Ṭūfī’s interpretation of this image is inspired directly by Ḥiyāʾ al-Dīn’s account: the banners/the fluttering are a metaphor for the raining cloud. For if we look at the poetic commentaries on Abū Tammām’s poetry, we find that the interpretations of “the fluttering banners of the dark rainclouds” differ entirely. According to Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (d. 449/1058), whose commentary is preserved by his student al-Tibrīzī (d. 502/1109), the banners of the rainclouds stand for “lightning” (burūq, no mention of the verb ‘to flutter’).

According to al-Ṣūlī (d. 335/946), as recorded by Ibn al-Mustawfī (d. 637/1239), the fluttering of the banners refer to “the abundance of rain in this place” (emphasis on rain, not cloud).

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1207 Heinrichs points out to the loss of the unity of the image within the elaborate metaphor-scheme of al-Sakkākī (W.P. Heinrichs, “Metaphor,” Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature, 1: 522-24, herer: 524). The loss of the unity of the image is thus also observed in non-Sakkākian traditions (but that share a primarily Qur’ānic, rather than literary-minded approach). The question I am trying to answer is how a non-animated view of the image (due to the breaking down of the sentence metaphor) reflects on critics’ view of majāz.

1208 Al-Tibrīzī, Sharḥ 1: 27 (wa-l-rāyātū yaʾnī bihā l-burūqa li-annahā tushabbahu bihā [...] wa-innamā arāda l-barqa li-annahu yushabbahu bi-l-rāyātī). In this case, if we return to Heinrichs’ analysis of metaphor, the genitive construction would be attributive (the banners are not the rainclouds). But it would still be a non-imaginary metaphor (?) because a substratum – albeit unstated – exists (i.e., ‘lightning’, as opposed to the ‘claws’ of death which have no equivalent). A case like this is perhaps what Heinrichs alludes to in stating that there exist other analogy-based metaphors besides the ‘inexpressive’ ones (‘hoof’ for ‘foot’), in which the transferred element has a counterpart in the domain of the topic (banners = lightning). See Heinrichs, “Metaphorologie-Traditionen,” 220.

1209 Ibn al-Mustawfī, al-Nizām 1: 231 (takhfīqī fihi [sic] rāyātun hādhā mathalun arāda l-mafāri fī hādhā l-mawdūʾiẗ). Note that her uses the old term mathal here to designate ‘metaphor’.
Images from pre-Islamic poetry could probably support all interpretations (if at all Abū Tammām was influenced by them).\textsuperscript{1210}

The poetic commentaries are useful for another reason. They reveal that neither Diyāʾ al-Dīn nor al-Ṭūfī dwell on the sentence metaphor wa-muʿarrasin li-l-ghaythī “many a place for the rain to settle in for the night,” a metaphor that takes center-stage in the commentators’ accounts. Al-Maʿarrī sees the phrase as metaphorical (min al-mustaʿār) since the term taʿrīs “alighting at a place during the latter part of the night” (al-nuzūl fī ākhir al-layl) is only known for beings that have a corporeal form such as animals (dhawī al-shukhūs min al-ḥayawān).\textsuperscript{1211} In other words, he takes it as a case of personification, since rain does not have a corporeal form and therefore cannot be attributed the act of settling in for the night. One commentator, as quoted by Ibn al-Mustawfī, reinforces this view by using the terminology jaʿala li-l-ghaythi muʿarrasan “he [the poet] made the rain have a resting place for the night,” saying that the poet did so “by way of metaphor” (ʿalā l-istiʿāra).\textsuperscript{1212} Al-Ṣūlī has a different

\textsuperscript{1210} Descriptions of clouds and rain within the context of pre-Islamic ‘lightning scenes’ are very common. See Ali Ahmad Hussein, The Lightning-Scene in Ancient Arabic Poetry: Function, Narration and Idiosyncrasy in Pre-Islamic and Early Islamic Poetry, Arabische Studien 3, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009, 190-224. A direct connection between a low-hanging cloud (usually haydab) and lightning is, however, not a common one in pre-Islamic poetry, but it does exist; see ibid., 197, 224. Common images for lightning during that period were lamps, horses, fire, and less frequently, a sword, a shield, the fluttering of a wing (ka-takhfāqi l-janāḥi), and a white cloth; see ibid., 182-90. Banners could be a development of the sword image as another type of element from the battlefield, or it could be a take on the lightning of a wing (note the same verb use. I am not certain about how the image of a wing fluttering stands for lightning: probably its swift, blink-of-the-eye action). If the banners refer however to the raining cloud, it could be a take on the image of the flickering (verb iḍṭaraba) of a low-hanging raincloud due to the blowing of the wind (ibid., 224). In this case the verb iḍṭaraba is used for the clouds, but it could also refer to the lightning (Hussein notes the phrase iḍṭaraba l-barqu fī l-saḥāb, ibid.). Another option is that the banners (rāyāt) are a take on the image of the heavy leathern water bags (rawṭāyā) — and note the paronomasia — that pour out water (ibid., 201-202). Images for the sounds made by the storm (as we found in Diyāʾ al-Dīn) are rare (ibid., 223-24, 227). For exemplar images, both ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ (ʿAbbāsid), of “clouds, rain, lightning, thunder, snow and frost” see Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Diwān al-maʿānī 2: 3-12. Arie Schippers cites this metaphor in his list of genitive metaphors found in the poetry of Abū Tammām; he takes it for granted that the “banners of the dark rainclouds” refer to flashes of lightning (“Genitive Metaphor,” 256).

\textsuperscript{1211} Al-Tibrīzī, Sharḥ 1: 26-27.

\textsuperscript{1212} Ibn al-Mustawfī, al-Nizām 1: 232. The name of the source Ibn al-Mustawfī is quoting is illegible in the manuscript (see editor’s fn. 17).
understanding: when *muʿarras* is used in the context of people (*qawm*), it refers to their stopping place in the latter part of the night, but when it is used in the context of rain, it refers to the place where rain pours.\textsuperscript{1213} In other words, he is assigning a literal sense to the phrase by expanding the lexical meaning of the verb ‘*arrasa*. Ğiyā’ al-Dīn does not attend at all to this image. For al-Ŧūfī, this is simply a single-word metaphor, rather than a sentence metaphor: the word (*lafz*) *muʿarras*, which refers to the place of alighting at night, was borrowed to refer to the place of rainfall.\textsuperscript{1214} Any notion of personification, and more broadly of an animated, rather than static image, is absent.\textsuperscript{1215}

Another result of al-Ŧūfī’s (impressive) conformity to his theory of metaphor is that it may come at the broader expense of regarding an image as visual at all (not just as animated). The following line by Abū Tammām, which Ğiyā’ al-Dīn deemed very ugly, may demonstrate the process: [meter: *khafīf*]

\begin{quote}
*yawma *fatḥin saqā usūda l-ḍawāḥī
ḏ\\mu̱ḵholba l-mawdī ṟāʿiban wa-ẖalībā
ḏ\\mu̱ḻm̱ḵhaḏw̱ba l-
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“On the day of conquest he gave the desert lions milk bowls of death to drink, both thickened milk and fresh”\textsuperscript{1216}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1213} Ib\textup{d}.

\textsuperscript{1214} Al-Ikṣīr, 113 (fa-staʿāra *lafz* l-*muʿarrasi* wa-*huwa* mawdīʾu l-taʿrīsi li-mawḍīʾi *wuqūʿi* l-*ghaythi*).

\textsuperscript{1215} In Ğiyā’ al-Dīn’s later scheme in the Mathal, this case would align with *tawassuʿ*. We might add that another major theme in the commentaries is to explain how *dujuna* ‘darkness’ – a word used to describe ‘night’ – is used in reference to ‘clouds’. For al-Ŧūfī, once more, the solution is simple: the word was borrowed for the notion of ‘black cloud’ (ibid., 114). For another example of al-Ŧūfī’s avoidance of interpreting a sentence metaphor as an animated image for the sake of conformity to his theory see ibid., where *saʿubat [al-khamr]* “the wine was hard” is glossed as “wine that was impossible to drink [without water],” and *rūda l-māʿ u* “the water tamed [it]” as “made [its drinking] easier” (from a line taken from the same poem by Abū Tammām). But we might point out here that in his gloss, Ğiyā’ al-Dīn makes no mention of the verb metaphors (*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 86).

\textsuperscript{1216} Al-Ikṣīr, 114-16; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 88; al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 1: 179; Ibn al-Mustawfī, *al-Nizām*, 2: 254. *Kuthba* could mean a small portion of milk or the quantity of one milking or the quantity that is contained in a bowl or cup of the kind called *qadah*; see Lane, *Lexicon*, 2592. ‘Bowl’ seems to be appropriate for all meanings (a small portion of milk and a quantity of one milking could fit in it). According to one copy of al-Șūlī’s (?) commentary, *kuthab* al-
In the *Jāmiʿ  Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn* rejects the metaphor as having no point of comparison (*tabāʿud*) probably because he pictures a visual image of milk bowls – with its variety of milk – given to the enemy. (The terminology he uses is “making the milk bowls belong to death”).

Considered visually, the representation of inflicting death on the enemy using milk bowls is indeed out of the ordinary (‘creative’ in our terms). But for al-Ṭūfī, this is deemed an outstanding metaphor because he ingenuously identifies a very precise topic for the analogue of ‘thickened milk’ (coagulated milk) and ‘fresh milk’, namely, those who died slowly in battle versus those who died immediately. If one assumes this interpretation, the words *rāʾib* and *ḥalīb* are simply meant to trigger in the mind of the recipient the analogy of slow/fast death rather the visual image of actual milk bowls given to the enemy. In al-Ṭūfī’s solution the poet is no longer creating a visual allusion, but rather an intellectual one. Similarly, Abū Tammām’s depiction of his patron’s generosity using the images of the “head/hump/skin/stomach-waste (*farth*)/veins/bones of generosity” is not deemed ugly by al-Ṭūfī the way it was by Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn, but rather seen as a reference to the famous Umayyad anecdote in which al-Farazdaq (d. ca. 110/728) ascribes those body parts to ‘poetry’ (and which he thinks Abū Tammām is explicitly alluding to). Once more, the image al-Ṭūfī conceives of is intellectual, not visual.

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*mawt* is glossed as *juraʿ al-mawt* ‘mouthfuls/doses of death’ ([wa-fī nuskhatin [in reference to qāla l-Ṣūl?]] kuthaba l-mawti ay jura’a l-mawti; al-Nizām 2: 254). The meaning of *al-dawāḥi* according to al-Ṣūfī (ibid.) is *mā zahara mīn kulli shay’in* “any object that is visible,” similar to the meaning of *dāhiya* as anything (place, object, body part) that is exposed to the sun ([Lisān al-ʿarab 4: 2561-62]). On *dāhiya* as *bādiya* see ibid. 4: 2562, 1st column.

1217 *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 88. What is more, Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn thinks ‘death’ should be expressed via a negative metaphor, not a positive one like ‘milk’.

1218 *Al-Iksīr*, 115-16. He also refutes Ḍiyāʿ al-Dīn’s point on negative images of death by giving an example of pre-Islamic poetry in which death is depicted as a glass of wine given to the enemy to drink (here too he finds a point of similarity in the form of ‘absence of mind’ [*ghayba*] caused both by death and by intoxication).

1219 Ibid., 116. Al-Ṭūfī refers both to ‘poetry’ and to ‘generosity’ as “abstract notions” (? *ma’nayyn*), to which the anecdote can be related. The anecdote in question is al-Farazdaq’s allegory of the history of poetry, in which poetry is described as a slaughtered camel, and the present-day (Umayyad) poets as having only the remains of that
Repurposing Tarshīḥ and Tajrīḍ

Returning now the other mechanism by which al-Ṭūfī resolves sentence metaphors, this is done by means of *tarshīḥ al-istiʿāra* lit. ‘grooming a metaphor’ and *tajrīḍ al-istiʿāra* lit. ‘making a metaphor bare’, two categories or tendencies in the creation of metaphor. These have become common notions in literary theory during this time: they were treated by al-Zamakhsharī (not quite in those terms), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Sakkākī, al-Zanjānī, Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Naqīb (but not by al-Jurjānī or Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn). In the case of *tarshīḥ* ‘groomed metaphor’, the domain of the analogue (*mustaʿār* or *mustaʿār minhu*) is ‘supported’ with additional elements whereas in *tajrīḍ* ‘bare metaphor’, it is ‘deprived’ and the domain of the topic (*mustaʿār lahu*) is

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1220 The discussion of this metaphor ends with a statement which is slightly corrupted in the manuscript and which I am unable to make sense of. After stating that no one would reproach al-Farazdaq nor accuse him of “making poetry an actual camel” (*jaʿalta l-shīʿra jamaʿal al-l-haqiqā*), al-Ṭūfī concludes: *wa-l-istiʿāratu fī al-haqiqati hiya l-tashbīhu fī l-maʿnā* (this is the editor’s understanding of the corrupted original wording: *wa-l-istiʿāra hiya l-haqiqa al-tashbīh fī l-maʿnā*; see ibid., fn. 3) lit. “metaphor in actuality is a comparison in meaning [or abstract notion, see previous fn.].” This seems to mean that metaphor amounts to a comparison between notions, or finding within a notion a certain likeness (to something else), akin to the statements we came across in Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī, that metaphor is in essence a comparison. The phrase *al-tashbīh fī l-maʿnā* could also mean something like “giving a corporeal body (here: camel body parts) to an abstract notion (here: poetry, generosity)” (cf. the religious meaning of *tashbīh* as ‘anthropomorphism’), but it is an unlikely reading (it would refute al-Ṭūfī’s own analyses of metaphor, where we find no visual image).

1221 *Tarshīḥ* originally refers to the grooming, licking, and prodding that an animal does to its young (*Līsān al-ʿarab* 3: 1649) or to the practice of a (human) mother putting milk in her baby’s mouth bit by bit, so that the baby can get used to suckling (ibid.; Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Maghribī, *Mawāhib al-fattāḥī fī talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ* in *Shūrūḥ al-talkhīṣ*, 4 vols., reprint, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, n.d., 4: 130). I use the word ‘creation’ (of a metaphor) above because in explaining the processes of these two tendencies, it is the poet who is the subject of the various verbs constituting those processes (*an yaʿāya, an yadhkura, rāʾī, al-ilāsīr*, 111-12). For a different sense of *tajrīḍ* see Heinrichs, “Rhetorical figures,” 659. For yet another sense of *tajrīḍ* see below.

taken more into account. For instance, in the first line al-Ṭūfī adduced, *ladā asadin shākī l-silāḥi* “before a lion, [his] weapon iron-sharp,” the expression *shākī l-silāḥ* reflects a *tajrīd*, since the mentioning of an iron-sharp weapon belongs to the domain of the topic (army troops), not the analogue (lion). Had the poet used the phrase *wāfī l-makhālib* “having ample claws,” says al-Ṭūfī, this would have been *tarshīḥ* (as ‘claws’ are an additional element in the domain of the analogue). Indeed, he continues, the poet did use a *tarshīḥ* by mentioning later in the line the manes and the uncut nails (*lahu libadun ḥarfāruhu lam tuqalāmi*), thus “combining both a *tarshīḥ* and a *tajrīd* in one line.”

Al-Ṭūfī repurposes the common notion of *tarshīḥ* to include the classic loan-metaphor examples treated by Heinrichs. These are (1) the famous line by Imru’ al-Qays (6th cent.), *fāqultu lahū lammā tamaṭṭā bi-ṣulbihi / wa-arḍa fa’ jāzan wa-nā’ a bi-kalkalī* “And I said to it [the night] when it stretched out its back and followed up with [its] hindquarters and struggled to get up with [its] breast,” and (2) the famous line by Abū Dhu’ayb (1st/7th cent.), *wa-idhā l-maniyyatu anshabat ẓāfrahā / alfayta kullā tamīmatin là tanfa’ū* “When death sinks its claws in, you find all amulets of no avail.” The passage detailing these poetic examples are clearly inspired by someone other than Dīyā’ al-Dīn, as the latter was unaware of the terms *tarshīḥ* and *tajrīd* in this sense.

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1223 For *musta’ār* see *al-Iksīr*, 111.8, 112.4 (cf. editor’s fn. 2); *musta’ār min hu* is used later in 112.10.

1224 Ibid., 112; also *Nihāya*, 249-51; *Rawda*, 103-106; *Mi’yār*, 74-79; *Mujaddama*, 107.

1225 Translations are Heinrich’s; see *Hand of the Northwind*, 3-4. The early critics’ theoretical analysis of the line by Imru’ al-Qays is carefully detailed by Heinrichs in the second part of his book (ibid., 16-25; the latest critic cited is Dīyā’ al-Dīn, whose discussion is a response to Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī’s analysis, pp. 23-25).

1226 In the *Jāmi’* there is no mention of these categories. In the *Mathal*, Dīyā’ al-Dīn does include a chapter on *tajrīd* – by his own account, a word (*ism*) he had heard but did not know the meaning of – but he basically made up its substance (*wa-dhakartu mā ataytu bihi min dhāt ḥafi qāri)* based on some preliminary remarks by Abū ‘Ali al-Fārisī (*Mathal* 2: 162 ff.). In his conception (which is not in fact his own), *tajrīd* lit. ‘abstraction’ refers to ‘internal dialogue’ expressed by an address of the poet using the second person. On this see Geert Jan van Gelder, “The Abstracted Self in Arabic Poetry,” *Journal of Arabic Literature* 14 (1983), 22-30, here: 26, 29. It is noteworthy that
polished. The line by Imru’ al-Qays is given as an example of *tarshīḥ* containing an added element from the analogue-domain that is explicit (*muṭābaqatan wa-taṣrīḥan*). Thus, since the poet described the night as “stretching out” (*tamaṭṭī*), he completed the description with elements “demanded by [the image of stretching]” (*bi-mā yastaḍ’īhi; bi-mā yaqtaḍīhi*), namely “back, hindquarters and breast.”

Ironically, this analysis restores the ‘original’ analogy that Heinrichs believes to have stood at the basis of the line: “the night – being so slow to depart – is compared to a camel that is unwilling to rise and go away,” rather than taking *kalkal, ṣulb* and *‘ajuz* as “figurative equivalents of the beginning, middle, and end of the night respectively.” Indeed, from al-Ṭūfī’s analyses of *shawāhid* discussed above, it would seem most likely that he would espouse the latter, simile-based understanding of single-word metaphor. On one hand, this may indicate that the *tarshīḥ-tajrīd* discussion is extraneousness to al-Ṭūfī’s own thinking, especially since it precedes al-Ṭūfī’s own poetic analyses. What is more, the line by Abū Dhu‘ayb is given as an example of *tarshīḥ* containing an added element from the analogue-domain that is implicit (*iltizāman wa-kināyatatan*), a solution that is strongly reminiscent (at least at its core) of al-Sakkākī’s *istiʿāra bi-l-kināya* ‘metaphor by allusion’. According to the latter interpretation, the ‘sinking claws’ mentioned by the poet are necessary attributes of the unstated analogue, namely, lion. But on the other hand, it may not contradict al-Ṭūfī’s theory of single-word substitutions

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1227 *Al-Iksīr*, 111.

1228 *Hand of the Northwind, 4*.

1229 On *istiʿāra bi-l-kināya* as an allusion to an unstated analogue see al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ*, 378-79; Heinrichs, “Metaphor,” 523. The notion is associated with *istiʿāra takhyīliyya* ‘imaginary metaphor’, that is, when the poet imagines an entity (like death) to be something else (like predator), and then annexes to it elements from the imagined domain (like fangs and claws); *Miftāḥ*, 376-77. Heinrichs adds that the *istiʿāra takhyīliyya* is characterized while *tajrīd* lost any connection to *istiʿāra*, it appears in the *Mathal* immediately following the chapters on metaphor and simile. The source he consulted (oral or written) probably preserved that connection.
after all: it would merely bypass it. The elements “back,” “breast,” “claws” etc., would be in no need of a metaphorical interpretation because they are now ‘free’ to be interpreted literally thanks to the process of ‘grooming the image’. Bypassing the need to interpret certain words metaphorically also solves the apparent incompatibility between the poetic notion of istiʿāra and a rigid definition of majāz. I am not aware of other theorists who treat the famous lines by Imruʿ al-Qays and Abū Dhuʿayb as cases of tarshīḥ.

Evidence of the ‘discord’ between istiʿāra and majāz crops up in al-Ṭūfī’s work itself, where two idiosyncrasies in the text have istiʿāra and majāz grammatically contrasted. In the first instance, after adducing Qurʾānic examples that supposedly display metaphors in particles (ḥurūf), al-Ṭūfī concedes that they are “in fact [a case of] majāz, not istiʿāra, since there is no comparison in them”. We could resolve this by simply saying that istiʿāra is merely more specific than majāz. The second instance in harder to resolve. Under the chapter of kināya (here periphrasis or euphemism), al-Ṭūfī discusses the difference between kināya and majāz, preceded by the comment that “the difference between istiʿāra and majāz” has already been stated. The interesting thing is that kināya is never claimed to be subsumed under majāz – the two are in fact conceptually contrasted (humā ǧiddān) – which may lead one to assume that istiʿāra and majāz are also distinct, rather than genetically related concepts. None of this discussion is inspired by Ɗiyāʿ al-Dīn; in the Jāmiʿ he defined kināya in tropical terms, using both the

by the lack of a substratum, since in ‘claws of death’ there is no underlying simile in which a part of ‘death’ could be likened to ‘claws’. See Heinrichs, “Takhyīl,” 13.

1230 wa-l-ḥaqqu anna hādhā majāzūn wa-laysa -stiʿāratān idh lā tashbīha fīhi; al-Iksīr, 113. The examples are Q 25:59 “so ask him about one well informed” (fa-sʾal bihi khabīran), where bihi means ’anhu; and Q 19:97 “we have made it [the Qurʾān] easy by your tongue” (fa-ʾinnamā yassarnāhu bi-lisānika), where (an elided?) ʿalayhi should be understood. See al-Iksīr, 112.

1231 al-farqu bayna l-istiʿāratī wa-l-majāzī mā sabaqa... wa-bayna l-kināyati wa-l-majāzī...; ibid., 120-21.

1232 Ibid., 121.
terminology of majāz and the terminology of using a word not according to its original coinage (bi-ghayır lafżihi al-mawdū’ lahu).

This leads us to the sources of al-Ṭūfī’s Iksīr other than Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ, sources that we may qualify as having ‘standardist’ leanings but were probably not Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī or al-Sakkākī. One such source is Ibn al-Muqarrab al-Bahrānī, referred to only as “al-Bahrānī,” an East-Arabian poet-critic of the early seventh/thirteenth century who had strong Shīʿī leanings (al-Ṭūfī, we may recall, was suspected of having Shīʿī leanings). A consultation with the Iksīr’s appendices reveals that Ibn al-Muqarrab is cited ten times, citations that comprise both poetic shawāhid and critical comments. (The name of his work is not mentioned.) This makes Ibn al-Muqarrab the most quoted critic in the Iksīr after Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, and seemingly the only literary-critical source he directly consulted outside the Jāmiʿ. Ibn al-Muqarrab is quoted within the context of kināya as saying that the difference between kināya and majāz is that in kināya, “the original meaning […] is also intended” (whereas in majāz it is not) – interestingly, a view that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn later espouses in the Mathal. The clear differentiation between kināya and majāz is something we may associate with standard rhetorical theories.

Another hint at standard rhetorical notions is al-Ṭūfī’s parenthetical recognition that verb metaphors could be taken as majāz on the level of predication, rather than a tropical usage of the

1233 Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, 156.

1234 See Khulusi, “A Thirteenth Century Poet from Bahrain”; al-Iksīr, 90, editor’s fn. 3. According to Brockelmann (GAL 1: 302), Ibn al-Muqarrab spent some time in Mosul, where he met Yāqūt (d. 626/1229) in 617/1220, and died in Baghdad in 629/1232. This would place Ibn al-Muqarrab in close proximity with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn.

1235 Al-Iksīr, 363-67. Only three out of the ten citations are literary-critical remarks, but even so, it is more than any other literary scholar referenced. Quotations from Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskari, al-Ghānimī and Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī, which outnumber the times al-Bahrānī is quoted – turn out to be mere embedded quotations from the Jāmiʿ. Of course, al-Ṭūfī probably consulted other works and left those references unacknowledged.

1236 Ibid., 121.
actual verb (wa-li-qā’ilin an yaqūla hādhā majāzun fī l-nisbati lā fī nafsi l-fi ‘l). This notion, indirectly indebted to ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s majāz fī l-ithbāt, is incompatible with the views al-Ṭūfī expresses throughout his analyses of shawāhid, as we have seen.

Al-Ṭūfī’s ‘commentary’ on the work of Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn is an interesting one, and his treatment of majāz reveals that he is the exception that proves the rule. Whereas the works that we have studied were usually expressly committed to the word-transfer theory, it was rarely applied to actual analyses of poetic illustrations, thus showing that underlying the declared theory was a different one entirely: either an explicit appeal to an extra-linguistic notion (i.e., reality) or an appeal to the linguistic idea of predication, the affirmation of which rests on non-linguistic knowledge. Al-Ṭūfī is the only one – and much more so than the standard al-Sakkākī – who applies the declared theory to actual shawāhid analyses. His results yield unusual interpretations indeed of poetic specimens.

1237 Ibid., 112.
Put the lights out when you finish in the living room.

Amelia Bedelia thought about this a minute. She switched off the lights. Then she carefully unscrewed each bulb. And Amelia Bedelia put the lights out. “So those things need to be aired out, too. Just like pillows and babies. Oh, I do have a lot to learn.”

-Peggy Parish, *Amelia Bedelia*

To me this is like the story about the Byzantine emperor who had someone recite to him al-Mutanabbī’s line, “As if camels of good breed were made to lie down on my eyelids // and when they were roused to get up, (the tears) could (finally) flow,” and then asked about the meaning and they translated it for him, to which he said: “I’ve never heard of a poet more untruthful! Have you ever seen anyone have a camel lie down on his eye that did not kill him?!?”


The contribution of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī to Arabic literary thinking could not be overstated; his lengthy deliberations on metaphor (*istiʿāra*) and mock analogy and etymology (*tamthīl, takhyīl*) are cases in point. But on the issue of majāz – which he relegates to the very end of the *Asrār* – al-Jurjānī’s contribution is primarily linguistic. He studies expressions that exhibit figurative language but are grounded in the lexicon (and hence listed in the dictionaries), first and foremost metonymies and conceptual metaphors, to use Lakoff and Johnson’s terms. The linguistic objects of his theorizing are such expressions that Amelia Bedelia would take literally: they are part of our literal language. Diyā’ al-Dīn on the other hand, and others in the literary-

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1239 The meter is ṭawīfī, *anākha* (“make to lie down”) means more specifically to make a camel lie down on its breast with its legs folded, as is done on the occasions of mounting and dismounting, etc. (Lane, *Lexicon*, 2864). Diyā’ al-Dīn is criticizing here the “Baghdadi” literary critic Ibn Hamdūn (d. 562/1167), who took too literally the following two lines by saying in response that “the apparition does enter through the eyelid but is rather imagined in the soul!”: [meter: *baṣīfū*] “I’ll rip through a woman’s veil if it’s ‘playing hard to get’ but won’t penetrate if it’s ‘easy’ || just as the nightly apparition refuses to enter the eyelid when it’s open and will only enter it when it’s closed” (*al-Mathal al-sāʾ īr* 2: 28). To Ibn Hamdūn’s take Ḥiṣn refers to a false reading of figurative speech as literal speech (*mā samʿū bi-akdhaba min ḥāḏhā l-shāʿ īr*) accentuates the negative connotations *kadhīb* remained to convey in the context of figurative language (cf. Ibn Qutayba’s attack, Chapter 5 Preliminaries). For some context on the story of the Byzantine emperor and al-Mutanabbī’s line above, which was already recounted in al-Khafājī, *Sīr al-faṣāḥa*, 40-41 (and even earlier?), see Geert Jan van Gelder, “Camels on Eyelids and the Bafflement of an Emperor: A Line of al-Mutanabbī «Translated» into Greek,” *Proceedings of the XIlth Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, 1988 Munich. vol. 3: Space and Boundaries of Literature*, Munich: Iudicium Verlag, 1990, 446-51.
theoretical tradition of ʿilm al-bayān (as well as some of the early naqd works), aim their theorizing at poetic expressions, like the line by al-Mutanabbī above: ‘live’ metaphors rather than ‘dead’ ones. For Lakoff and Johnson this differentiation is moot because in their mind what generates the non-conventional metaphor is exactly the conceptual metaphor expressed in our literal language.1240 Classical Arabic literary theorists, however, would and did make such a distinction – at least implicitly. Despite the many theoretical pronouncements pointing to the understanding of majāz as ‘shifts’ on the level of the word, the shawāhid and majāz categories that literary theorists treat make the case for a primarily extra-linguistic understanding of the term. What makes certain utterances majāz is the fact that they are untrue (or not necessarily true, as in the case of “having many ashes”), akin to the old negative notion of kadhib ‘lie’. Conventional figurative expressions like “the tree shouted out” for “grew tall” are also, strictly speaking, false, but because they have become ‘lexicalized’ they are understood to be true. The majāz of the literary theorists is therefore not equivalent to majāz ʿaqlī – at least not in al-Jurjānī’s conception of the notion as a truthful statement (likewise with al-Rāzī; their term is majāz fī l-ithbāt). Al-Rāzī was an influential figure in the development of ʿilm al-bayān, even though literary production held a minimal place in his study, and he challenged the critics, especially on the question of majāz. Someone like Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿa appropriated al-Rāzī’s views wholeheartedly by backing down, in his later work, from his earlier inclusion of simile and exaggeration within the purview of majāz. But someone like Ibn al-Naqīb, who was a closer follower of al-Rāzī in terms of the occupation with Qur’ānic style, did not. This indicates that the so-called ‘old’ way of literary theory had an alternative and defensible theory to offer, and that majāz could be a meaningful – and creative – component in literary production.

1240 Metaphors We Live By, 139 ff., and esp. 147 ff.
Conclusion

Studies on classical Arabic poetry have taken a new turn in recent years: from translation and commentary the focus is slowly shifting to the literary devices occurring in the poem. The devices in question are not modern Western ones superimposed on the medieval Arabic text (a method useful in its own right), but are indigenous categories as they are presented and explained by the medieval Arabic literary theorists. One can no longer understand Ibn al-Rūmī without knowing about the critics’ treatment of *istiqṣā’ al-maʿānī* ‘exhausting an image to death’, nor can one further understand the departure from pre-Islamic poetic conventions without going into the nitty-gritty of the literary devices line by line -- reinforcing the claim once made by van Gelder, that “[t]o study ancient Arabic theory and criticism […] is to study the poetry itself.” But in order to make this shift in research a valid and compelling one, we must get the literary theory right. The fact of the matter remains that we still know less than we think. Arabic literary theory is usually seen to evolve to its ‘coherent’ disciplinary form with the scholastic *ʿilm al-balāgha*: we now see that a crystallization of the field was taking place in the Arabic East already in the seventh/thirteen century in the framework of *ʿilm al-bayān*, and independent of what was to become the Standard Theory. Arabic literary theorists like ʿIyā ʿal-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn Abī l-Iṣba’ are usually understood to be oblivious to al-Jurfānī: we now see that they engage with him either directly or through the mediation of al-Rāzī, leading at times to different

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1243 Van Gelder, *Beyond the Line*, 208.

1244 For instance, the category *majāz ʿaqlī* is being applied for this type of study, even though scholars are probably superimposing their own understanding of the term unto (at least) al-Jurfānī’s view.
theoretical results. Majāz as a component of literary theory is usually seen to make sense only in the theory laid out by al-Jurjānī: we now see that it is non-Jurjānīan concepts of majāz that are more suitable to explain the compatibility of majāz and istiʿāra (especially of the type “death sinking its claws in”), and that anyway, we do not fully know what al-Jurjānī meant by majāz. Finally, looking ahead to further research, al-Qazwīnī is commonly understood to be part of the school of al-Sakkākī: one now suspects that his attention to bāḍīʿ is better understood in light of the nature of ‘ilm al-bayān and that he viewed the ‘hermeneutics’ of al-Jurjānī and al-Sakkākī as a necessary element for ‘poetics’, or literary composition, thus reviving an outdated claim by Bonebakker.1245

I appeal to recent trends in the study of classical Arabic poetry to demonstrate the value that literary theory may have beyond the study of poetics, rhetoric and literary criticism.1246 But the contribution of this dissertation has been emphatically to literary theory as a discipline and to theory itself, both literary and linguistic (because the two are not always easily distinguishable). It would be tempting to draw a connection between the theorists’ perception of majāz as literal utterances that do not conform to reality and the poets’ perception of “metaphor as fact” which

1245 Bonebakker, “al-Maʾānī wa ’l-Bayān,” and see §2.1. According to Shihāb al-Dīn al-Halabī, head of the Damascus chancery in the early eighth/fourteenth century who authored a book on the epistolary art, the works of al-Rummānī, al-Jurjānī (‘Abd al-Qāhir, mentioned later), al-Rāzī, al-Sakkākī, and al-Khafājī (presumably Ibn Sinān) – which are mentioned in the same breath – are necessary for scribal education, that is, for learning to produce literary speech, not interpret it. For al-Halabī, these authors are associated both with the Standard Theory (‘ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān wa-l-bāḍī) and with works concerned with ijtāz al-Qurʾān (Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān al-Halabī, Ḥusn al-tawassul ilā šīnā at tarassul, Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa a al-Wahbiyya, 1298 AH, 11-12 [English: ~‘The Best Path to the Epistolary Craft’]; in al-Nuwayrī’s version, Nihāya 7: 35, “Ibn al-Athīr” is mentioned as well). I thank Elias Muhanna for this reference. See also al-Ṭūfī, al-Shīʿār, 15, where ‘ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān (later ‘ilm al-maʾānī wa-l-bayān wa-l-bāḍī) – which includes the works of ‘standard’ and non-‘standard’ authors alike (ibid., 25-27) – is glossed as “the knowledge of composing speech according to the best manner” (maʿrifat taʾlīf al-kalām ʿalā l-wājīl al-aḍdal).

1246 That is, seeing classical Arabic literary theory beyond the lens of a “normative poetics” to being a constructive source of “practical poetics” (for a critique of this notion see Hamori, “Schemes of Reading,” 13-14; the idea of normative/practical poetics is inspired by Dan Pagis in ibid., 14 fn. 5).
enabled them to “go on to create further metaphors from that fact.” But I leave that judgment for others to make.

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1247 On this poetic practice see Heinrichs, “Paired Metaphors,” esp. 17; Bürgel, “Die beste Dichtung,” 87 ff. The quote itself is from Faruqi, Sabk-e Hindi, 73, speaking of the later Persian poets (cited in Ahmed, What Is Islam?, 390). Poetic ‘riddles’ are no more than an extension of this practice (see the analysis in Yaron Klein, Musical Instruments as Objects of Meaning in Classical Arabic Poetry and Philosophy, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009, 83-100). The study of ‘paired metaphors’ by Heinrichs is, in my view, his single most important contribution to our understanding of mature classical Arabic poetry. I would have titled it “The Architecture of Arabic Metaphor.”
Arabic Technical Terms: A Tentative Glossary

Bayān lit. ‘sign/expression [of a thing]’; ‘clarity/distinctness’; ‘eloquence’

‘Divine communication concerning the law’ (al-Shāfi‘ī).
‘A means to signify ḥikma, divine wisdom/wisdom of worldly things’ (al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Hayawān).
‘A means to impart knowledge or signify meaning’ (al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Bayān wa-l-tabīn).
‘Knowledge of an essence of a thing’ (Ibn Wahb al-Kātib), or: ‘existence/essence of a thing’ (Ibn Ḥazm, to a lesser extent Ibn Wahb). Probably two sides of the same coin (cf. definitions of ‘ilm as the maʿlūm).
‘The unique eloquence of the Arabic of the ancient Arabs’ (Ibn Fāris).
‘Suggestive expression’ (al-Rummānī, who also calls it tadmīn). Statements or morphosyntactic constructions that have a semantic import not conveyed on the ‘surface level’.
‘Good style’, esp. written style (an extension of the lexical meaning of bayān as ‘eloquence’ among the chancery secretaries).
Additional meanings of bayān: a synonym of ‘Qurʾān’; ‘the ability to distinguish [between right and wrong, etc.]’ (occurs in some Qurʾānic commentaries); ‘clarification’; and more.

‘Ilm al-Bayān lit. ‘the science of eloquence/clear speech’

‘The science of good style’: the common name for the discipline of literary theory as a whole starting in the 7th/13th century in the Arabic East. The discipline was understood to be ‘theoretical’ and ‘rational’, and earlier works on literary theory were often tagged retroactively with the heading ‘ilm al-bayān.
‘The science of expressing ideas by way of images, or: the science of figures of speech concerned with imagery’: the second subfield within the tripartite ‘ilm al-balāgha ‘science of eloquence’ or standard rhetoric, which was part of the madrasa curriculum starting in the 8th/14th century. ‘Ilm al-bayān dealt with tashbīh (comparison), majāz (figurative language), and kināya (periphrasis).
‘The science of standard rhetoric’: sometimes used interchangeably with ‘ilm al-balāgha. ‘Ilm al-balāgha is also referred to as ‘ilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān.

Istīʿara lit. ‘borrowing’, usually: ‘metaphor’

‘Ascriptive metaphor based on ‘object’ borrowing’; ‘analogy-based metaphor’: the old poetic sense of istīʿara, in reference to such metaphors as “the hand of the north wind.” Grammatically they tend to be genitive metaphors or verb metaphors.
There is usually no separate term for ‘genitive metaphor’ (Diyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr and especially Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī are exceptions).

‘Single-term hackneyed metaphor, poetic dead metaphor’ (literary theorists esp. after the 4th/10th century): in reference to such metaphors as “full moon” for “pretty face.” These metaphors are based on a simile, and grammatically they tend to be nouns. Sometimes they are euphemistic (“gazelle” for “woman”). Diyā’ al-Dīn implicitly recognizes the conventional character of istiʿāra when he states that it is hard for the poet/orator to create (our term) new ones.

**Kināya** lit. ‘indirect expression’

‘Euphemism’ (a range of literary scholars). An expression that refers indirectly to a notion considered taboo in the culture (e.g., women, sex) or considered bad omens (e.g., the crescent moon). Euphemisms can occur as noun metaphors (see istiʿāra), single-term metonymies, and proverbs.

‘Metonymy’ (a range of literary scholars, philologists, religious scholars). Grammatically a noun (or phrase acting as a single-term notion). The term is used to refer to such semantic extensions as “sky” for “rain” or, in some cases, “town” for “people of the town.” Other terms are used for this phenomenon, like istiʿāra (Ibn Durayd), majāz mursal (later followers of al-Jurjānī), or the more precise fīmā yunāsibuhu wa-yuqāribuhu “expressions that are based on association or contiguity with the intended meaning” (al-Thaʿālibī).

‘Periphrasis’ (al-Jurjānī and followers). A roundabout phrase that expresses the intended meaning via allusion (the common early term is irdāf). Although the intended meaning is logically connected to the meaning of the surface phrase, it is not a metonymy (which is a single-word affair). Kināya is of two types (al-Jurjānī, Ibn al-Zamlakānī): (i) expressing the attribute indirectly (“has a coward dog” for “generous”), (ii) expressing the attribution indirectly (“generosity is in so-and-so’s shackle” for “generosity is in so-and-so”). For Ibn al-Zamlakānī, kināya was part of majāz in that it was literally untrue, or not necessarily true (the generous person in question might not literally have a dog [or might not literally be cooking food for his guests]; generosity is not literally in a shackle [or in a tent]). Periphrasis is seen as majāz also in the work of Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī and in one passage of al-Zanjānī.

**Majāz** lit. ‘going beyond’

‘Linguistic anomalies; seemingly incorrect usage’ (Abū ‘Ubayda [more precisely: the meaning or rewording of linguistic anomalies], al-Ḥātimī) The term ḥaqīqa ‘literal speech’ is not used as a counterpart.
‘Idiomatic expressions in the lexicon’, ranging from conceptual metaphors (in the modern sense of the word, like “burying” a secret), metonymies (like “sky” for “rain”), dead metaphors (“the nose of the mountain” for “the prominent part of the mountain”) and idiomatic sayings (“his garment slept” for “his garment became worn out” or “morning sighed” for “morning appeared”) (lexicographers; ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī [pending further research]). The shawāhid that are adduced as majāz are all listed in the dictionaries, either as regular entries or under special headings.

~‘Figurative language’ (common in early theology), esp. anthropomorphic expressions concerning God. Perhaps it is the language concerning humans (esp. predication of actions) that is seen as majāz and the language concerning God that is seen as ḥaqīqa lit. ‘reality’. Majāz could mean derivative reality vis-à-vis the true reality of God. There is always a counterpart ḥaqīqa ‘true reality’ or ‘literal speech’. Discussions of majāz in theology usually included some non-figurative speech phenomena, like pleonasm and ellipsis.

‘Figurative use of [single] words’ (common in legal theory), esp. metonymies and dead metaphors (i.e., single words or expressions that act as single words).

‘Figurative language’ (a range of literary theorists, common among those who did not follow al-Jurjānī). Language that is untrue to reality or kadhib ‘lie’ (a term that had too many negative connotations to be used in this context). This includes all ‘live’ metaphors (istiʿāra), explicit similes (tashbīh), and, depending on the scholar, periphrasis (kināya). Most theorists also included within the category of majāz, beyond the ‘live’ metaphors (a.k.a. badi’), the idiomatic expressions of the lexicographers, i.e., dead usage, including euphemisms and single-term hackneyed metaphors (what I call ‘poetic dead metaphor’, like “daisy” for “mouth”).

Majāz fī l-ithbāt ‘conceptual metaphor’ (al-Jurjānī)

Literally ‘majāz on the level of predication’, a term coined by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. Also known as majāz isnādī, majāz ḥukmī, and later majāz ʿaqlī ‘logical majāz’. It seems (pending further research) that by majāz fī l-ithbāt al-Jurjānī is referring to conceptual metaphors (to use Lakoff and Johnson’s terms) that are reflected in everyday literal language, especially to instances of correlation that are conceived in the mind as causation (“spring brought about blossoms,” “seeing you made me happy,” “the knife cut”). Al-Jurjānī was probably following theological notions of majāz here. Majāz fī l-ithbāt is not kadhib ‘untruth’, and is therefore not equivalent to the conception of majāz that was implicit in the works of many literary theorists both before and after al-Jurjānī. Al-Jurjānī’s theory of majāz is a contribution to linguistics, not poetics (thus it is relegated to the end of his Asrār al-balāgha). See also: majāz ‘idiomatic expressions in
the language’. Because Ibn al-Zamlakānī followed the implicit *majāz-as-kadhib* theory, we cannot translate *majāz fī l-ithbāt* in his work as ‘conceptual metaphor’. The relationship between *majāz fī l-ithbāt* and *istiʿāra* in al-Jurjānī’s own thought is debated upon.

*Majāz fī l-muthbat* ‘lexical *majāz*’, usually: metonymy (al-Jurjānī)

Literally ‘*majāz* on the level of the predicate’, a term coined by al-Jurjānī. Later termed *majāz ifrādī* and *majāz lughawī* (the latter term became standard). It refers to single-term lexical extensions, usually metonymies. See also *majāz* ‘figurative use of [single] words’ and ‘idiomatic expressions in the lexicon’.

*Tamthīl* lit. ‘striking an example, similitude (*mathal*)’ (also: *al-mathal al-maḍrūb*)

‘Metaphorical exemplification; mock evidence; illustrative analogy’: an illustrative sentence that exemplifies, by metaphorical analogy, the topic of discussion (or provides the allure of evidence for it). ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī terms it *tamthīl* or *mathal*. Abū Ahmad al-‘Askārī terms it *mumāthala*. Abū Hilāl al-‘Askārī terms it *al-istishḥād wa-l-iḥtiṭāj* ‘adducing [mock] evidence (Ar. *shāhid*, *ḥujja*)’. Ḍiyā’ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athūr terms it *al-mathal al-maḍrūb*. In poetry it usually occurs at the end of a line, as a kind of ‘commentary’ on reality. Since the commentary is not ‘real’, we may refer to it as ‘mock analogy’ (Heinrichs’ term). It became common in Persian poetry as well. The archetypal example by al-Jurjānī is “so-and-so put one leg forward and the other one backward” to convey that he was hesitant. A common poetic example is al-Farazdaq’s

> “Biting words come my way, and you hold them of no worth;  
> But (even) drops of water can fill a vessel to excess.”

*Tashbīḥ* lit. ‘stating a similitude’; ‘similarity claim’; ‘comparison’

‘Simile’: according to many literary theorists, even after ‘Abd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, simile is not part of literal speech. It was seen as a figurative similarity claim or figurative comparison, as opposed to a literal similarity claim.

‘Predicative metaphor’: in Arabic terms, this is a ‘simile’ in which the particle of similitude is suppressed, of the type “Zayd is a lion.” In Western terms, this is the most common metaphor discussed by linguists and philosophers: the predicative metaphor.

*Tawassuʿ*, also *ittisā* lit. ‘extension’

‘lexical extension’: as a non-technical term, *ittisā* refers to the *majāz* of the
lexicographers, that is, semantic extensions in the lexicon that have become part of conventional vocabulary. It is usually used as a hendiadys with majāz (ittisāʿ an wa-majāzan). Ittisāʿ has a possibly related technical meaning in grammar.

‘fictional ascription’: metaphors in which there is no ‘perceived’ relation between the topic and the analogue; rather, the relation between the two is ‘imposed’ (by poet). The term is diyāʿ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr’s. One subtype of tawassuʿ is equivalent to the old poetic notion of istiʿāra (in the form of genitive metaphors). Another subtype covers the phenomenon of speaking animals found in Kalīla wa-Dīmna (sentence metaphors), revealing a probable influence by Ibn Sīnā on diyāʿ al-Dīn’s thinking.
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