The Emergence of #Ilm al-Bayān: Classical Arabic Literary Theory in the Arabic East in the 7th/13th Century

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The Emergence of ʿIlm al-Bayān:
Classical Arabic Literary Theory in the
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The Emergence of *ʿIlm al-Bayān*:
Classical Arabic Literary Theory in the Arabic East in the 7th/13th Century

Abstract

This dissertation identifies a turning point in the development of literary theory as a discipline in the classical Arabic-Islamic world, starting in the Arabic East in the thirteenth century under the emerging framework of *ʿilm al-bayān* 'the science of good style'. Treating a range of poetic, rhetorical, and literary-critical matters that had been studied under various disciplinary headings since the ninth century, the discipline was now consciously recognized as having an underlying theory and an established canon. I trace this development beginning with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1239) and follow its progression throughout Greater Syria and Egypt as late as the end of the fourteenth century, after the standard theory of rhetoric (*ʿilm al-balāgha*) emerged within the *madrasa* institution. I then analyze in depth one test case for literary-theoretical thinking in this time and place, namely, *majāz* 'figurative language'. Although linguistic theories about *majāz*, inspired by Islamic legal theory, had become a hallmark of literary studies, I argue that literary scholars implicitly espoused a non-linguistic conception of the notion, akin to *kadhib* 'lie' (a term not used due to its negative theological connotations). My analysis demonstrates that despite tensions between being a science concerned with hermeneutics and one concerned with poetics, *ʿilm al-bayān* was essentially the latter.

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Professors Andras Hamori and Geert Jan van Gelder generously agreed to supervise this study, and I am deeply thankful to them for sharing with me so much of their knowledge and time. Professor Hamori was especially helpful in his attention to the logic of my arguments. He has become more than an advisor to me. Professor van Gelder was especially helpful in pointing out additional scholarly and literary references, and in his close attention to poetic allusions, attributions, and *dhawq*. Both were meticulous in their comments on my translations, especially of poetry, and in their countless corrections of style and essence. Their dedication to this project following Professor Heinrichs' passing is something for which I will always be indebted.

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My parents have been my supporters from the very beginning. My father used to say I

Introduction

Classical Arabic literary theory[1] has become a widely recognized field of modern scholarly research despite the most basic fact that a standard name for this 'discipline' is absent in the Arabic sources. In the high ʿAbbāsid era (roughly third/ninth to fifth/eleventh centuries), considered to be the formative age of literary theory, a variety of terms were used, notably *naqd* lit. 'assaying' (later 'criticism'), *faṣāḥa*, *balāgha* (both) 'eloquence', *al-ʿilm bi-l-shiʿr* 'the knowledge of poetry', and *badīʿ* lit. 'novel' (later a collective noun for 'literary devices'). The later, ubiquitous appellation of *ʿilm al-balāgha* 'the science of eloquence' refers to the scholastic systematization of the discipline of 'rhetoric', an ancillary science to legal and religious education, beginning in the eighth/fourteenth century. The lack of a unified name in the early period certainly did not deter modern scholars from researching this multifaceted body of knowledge and from formulating its history and development, especially in the high ʿAbbāsid era. Similarly, the scholastic discipline of rhetoric – although far from being adequately studied – has been roughly charted in the literature and has been given an initial historical account beginning with Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sakkākī in the sixth/twelfth-seventh/thirteenth centuries.[2]

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[1] I use the expression "literary theory" to refer to poetics, rhetoric and literary criticism as defined by Wolfhart Heinrichs in his "Poetik, Rhetorik, Literaturkritik, Metrik und Reimlehre," in Helmut Gätje (ed.), *Grundriss der arabischen Philologie*, vol. 2 (Literaturwissenschaft), Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1987, 177-207, here: 177. I refer to it as "classical" in opposition to "modern," complying with Thomas Bauer, "In Search of 'Post-Classical' Literature: A Review Article," *Mamluk Studies Review* 11.2 (2007), 137-67, here: 140-41. I sometimes use "medieval" for "classical," despite ibid., 145.

[2] The most comprehensive is the entry "Naḳd" in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition* by Wolfhart Heinrichs. For studies specifically on poetic criticism see the classic Amjad Trabulsi, *La critique poétique des arabes jusqu'au Vᵉ siècle de l'Hégire (XIᵉ siècle de J.C)*, Damascus: Institut français de Damas, 1955, and the more recent Wen-Chin Ouyang, *Literary Criticism in Medieval Arabic-Islamic Culture: The Making of a Tradition*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997. For scholastic rhetoric, the most substantive contributions are by William Smyth: "Controversy in a Tradition of Commentary: The Academic Legacy of al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm*," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 112.4 (1992), 589-97; "The Canonical Formulation of *ʿIlm al-Balāgha* and al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm*," *Der Islam* 72 (1995), 7-24. Further studies are cited in Chapter 1.

The history of literary theory in between the 'formative' age and the 'mature' age of scholasticism, however, has yet to be written. Since the scholastic science of rhetoric has often been viewed by modern scholars as an 'end result' in Arabic literary theory, works that were written in sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries that did *not* exhibit these 'end-result-tendencies' – have usually been accorded a minor place in its history. We find this bias in the works of modern Western scholars and scholars from the Arab world alike. This dissertation looks at literary-critical works written in this 'interim' stage in a specific geographic area in order to bring to light the array of theoretical and critical possibilities that perhaps did not find their way into the 'end-result' of rhetorical studies, but are nevertheless crucial for our understanding of classical Arabic literary theory. Various aspects of such works have been, of course, touched upon in the literature, and none of the works are unknown to scholars (some perhaps little known), but studying them comprehensively as a unit yields insights that have hitherto escaped our attention. First and foremost among these is the recognition that a disciplinary crystallization was taking place at this time, to an extent that was unprecedented in the tradition of Arabic writings on the verbal arts.

The most prominent, and indeed well-known among these sixth/twelfth-seventh/thirteenth century literary scholars is the Syrian statesman and critic Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239). His *magnum opus*, *al-Mathal al-sāʾir fī adab al-kātib wa-l-shāʿir* ('The Current Saying: On the Knowhow of the Scribe and Poet'), acts as a focus of-sorts in the dissertation, but by no means is it our primary aim of study. We are interested, rather, in researching his work in relation to other works written around the same time and – no less important – *place*, in order to determine whether the *Mathal* was a singular 'event' or rather part of a larger tradition. In

concentrating on the locality in which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was writing – namely, Greater Syria[3] and Egypt (the Arabic East) – we are guided in part by the scholar's own statements in the *Mathal*, revealing his marked local patriotism. Doing so also serves as the first comprehensive implementation, in the field of literary theory, of the model advocated by Thomas Bauer for time- and place-specific research in Arabic literature.[4]

Looking at Arabic literary theory by period and place is by no means new. Iḥsān ʿAbbās' second-to-last chapter in his *Tārīkh al-Naqd al-Adabī ʿinda al-ʿArab* deals with literary criticism in Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the sixth and seventh centuries AH.[5] In the chapter, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is given the most attention, roughly half of its thirty-odd pages, while the rest of the chapter is dedicated to five additional scholars, the work of one of whom is lost. ʿAbbās stresses the literary unity in the geographic area under discussion, a unity which according to him exhibited an eschewal of Greek influence and displayed a more 'poetic', 'native-Arabic' approach to criticism.[6] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's explicit eschewal of Aristotelian poetics and rhetoric has become somewhat famous since its inclusion in Vicente Cantarino's translations of select treatments of poetics.[7] ʿAbbās further stresses Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's prominent role in criticism; his novel approach to

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[3] By Greater Syria I mean the most inclusive interpretation of this region, including northwestern Iraq and southern Anatolia, or the historical Jazīra. When I say above that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn – a scholar most associated with Mosul – is 'Syrian' I do have 'Greater Syria' in mind. (As we shall see, he did not identify himself as an "Iraqi.")

[4] Bauer, "In Search," 144-45. He says: "Italians are completely satisfied with sorting their literature according to centuries" (ibid., 145). In dynastic terms (which is what Bauer prefers) our study would correspond to the late Ayyūbid and early Mamlūk period.

[5] Iḥsān ʿAbbās, *Tārīkh al-naqd al-adabī ʿinda al-ʿarab: naqd al-shiʿr min al-qarn al-thānī ḥattā al-qarn al-thāmin al-hijrī*, Beirut: Dār al-Amāna, 1971, 575-611 (English: 'The History of Arabic Literary Criticism from the 2nd until the 8th Century AH').

[6] Ibid., 575-78.

[7] *Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age: Selection of Texts Accompanied by a Preliminary Study*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, 192-93. This book was one of the first volumes in the series *Studies in Arabic Literature* (vol. 4), and it offered the English reader translations of an array of 'classical' (pre-Mamlūk) literary-critical works. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was one of twelve theorists chosen for the collection.

poetic motifs (one that does not give preference to the temporal precedence of a motif); and his statistical approach to the evaluation of poets.[8] The *lafẓ-maʿnā* pairing (form-content) together with the *shiʿr-nathr* pairing (poetry-prose) are the major topics discussed by ʿAbbās with regards to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn.

In a survey of Arabic criticism in the "post-classical" era (i.e., post-ʿAbbāsid), William Smyth also assigns a rather prominent place for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn.[9] Smyth too situates Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn within a separate tradition, an *"adabī"* one.[10] This is one out of five traditions in criticism that Smyth identifies between 1150 and 1850: applied criticism (= specific evaluations of poets), *adab* works (= [probably] anthologies on Arabic literary-linguistic *paideia*), *balāgha* (= scholastic rhetoric), *badīʿ* (= works concerned with rhetorical figures), and philosophical works (= works displaying Aristotelian influence).[11] Smyth echoes ʿAbbās' notion of the 'poetic' characteristic of the *adabī* works by claiming that the latter "focus on poetry, while *balāgha* works are more generally concerned with the semantics of language."[12] Smyth does not define what he means by *adab* works except that (1) they are at the heart of the critical tradition, and (2) they "provide the definition and discussion of most terms associated with poetry and Arabic style".[13] Smyth might have in mind the third meaning of *adab* outlined by Heinrichs, namely: "a

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[8] *Tārīkh*, 592-608.

[9] William Smyth, "Criticism in the Post-Classical Period: A Survey," in Roger Allen and D.S. Richards (eds.), *Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 387-417, here: 387, 391-97, 400-401, 416-17.

[10] Ibid., 394.

[11] Ibid., 394-412. Two 'minor' additional traditions are (1) commentaries on poetic illustrations (cited in famous critical works) or on whole poems, and (2) works on prosody. I say 'minor' because each is given a page-length description (ibid., 412-14).

[12] Ibid., 394.

[13] Ibid.

body of knowledge in the linguistic and literary field which comprises the genre of literature just mentioned [i.e., anecdotal and anthological literature meant to provide quotable material for the bel-esprit], but includes further ancillary disciplines like grammar etc."[14] Smyth presents the main topics Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn deals with and elaborates specifically on the *lafẓ-maʿnā* issue and the *shiʿr-nathr* issue (cf. ʿAbbās). More importantly, Smyth situates Ibn al-Athīr within the *kuttāb* (scribes) tradition of scholarly output. In addition, he introduces a scale that measures the authors' interest in grammar in order to help classify "post-classical" works on criticism: Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is located on a 'higher' end of this scale "since he places style firmly in a grammatical context."[15] (How precisely grammar figures into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work is not elaborated upon.)

Since Smyth is working within the paradigm of the "post-classical" framework,[16] it is perhaps not surprising to find evaluations such as the following: "Ibn al-Athīr does not present very much on these topics that is new;" "Accordingly, Ibn al-Athīr does not create new topics or structure for critical discussion;"[17] and so on. The language of stagnation seeps through in other modern works as well. According to Wolfhart Heinrichs, the works of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn "show him as an independent mind who brings new life for a while to *the already ossifying* discipline of literary theory" (emphasis mine).[18] In Geert Jan van Gelder's words, "Ibn al-Athīr is one of the

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[14] Wolfhart Heinrichs, "The Classification of the Sciences and the Consolidation of Philology in Classical Islam," in Jan Willem Drijvers and Alasdair A. MacDonald (eds.), *Centres of Learning: Learning and Location in Pre-Modern Europe and the Near East*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995, 119-39, here: 120. It is not in fact clear how Smyth differentiates between the *adab*-strand and the all-*badīʿ*-strand; it seems that the only thing setting them apart is their form (the latter – essentially, a 'list'). The works on single figures of speech or the *badīʿiyya* commentaries which Smyth includes as *badīʿ* ("Criticism," 407) are, of course, more specialized.

[15] Ibid., 401.

[16] The harshest criticism of this approach (discernible throughout the volume in which Smyth's survey appears) is Thomas Bauer's review (2007).

[17] (Both) Smyth, "Criticism," 394. But then there is also this (ibid., 387): "The work of Ibn al-Athīr is perhaps the last greatest statement of critical sensibility in pre-modern Arabic literature."

[18] W.P. Heinrichs, "Ibn al-Athīr, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn," in Julie Scott Meisami and Paul Starkey (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of*

last original authors in Arabic criticism, although his originality is not as great as he would have

us believe […]" (emphasis mine).[19] Describing Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn as "last" in a line of original

thinkers occurs elsewhere.[20] Judging by Suzanne Stetkevych's remarks in her seminal work on

the ʿAbbāsid poet-anthologist Abū Tammām (d. 232/846), one could get the impression that *no*

new major topic or method for critical discussion was set down after Ibn al-Muʿtazz (d. 296/908)

and al-Ṣūlī (d. 335/946).[21] By this logic, Arabic literary criticism 'ended' soon after it began!

Obviously, then, using the quest for 'new ideas/topics' as an analytical modus operandi will not

lead us very far. (The same would hold for researching, say, the history of modern linguistics.)

Scholars writing on literary theory in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries in

Egypt and Syria have usually been described as lacking a "system" and being indifferent towards

"theory." This has been said with regards Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's younger contemporary in Egypt, Ibn

Abī al-Iṣbaʿ (d. 654/1256),[22] whose presentation of his literary theory in the form of a list – his

output is a listing of rhetorical figures – only enhances this impression. In a long line of thought

stretching back to the period under examination, the scholarship of the likes of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and

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Arabic Literature, 2 vols., London; New York: Routledge, 1998 (henceforth: *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature*), 1: 314-316, here: 315.

[19] Geert Jan van Gelder, *Beyond the Line: Classical Arabic Literary Critics on the Coherence and Unity of the Poem*, Studies in Arabic Literature, vol. 8., Leiden: Brill, 1982, 10.

[20] E.g., ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Ashtar, "Ākhir al-nuqqād al-ʿarab al-qudamā: Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr," *Majallat Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya bi-Dimashq* 42.3 (1967), 525-536 (English: 'The Last of the Ancient Arab Critics: Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr', in the *Journal of the Academy of the Arabic Language in Damascus*).

[21] Suzanne P. Stetkevych, *Abū Tammām and the Poetics of the ʿAbbāsid Age*, Leiden: Brill, 1991, 39 and 52 (respectively): "the major topics and prevailing method of the introductory section of the *Akhbār* [= al-Ṣūlī's work] set the pace which later critics were to follow, notably al-Āmidī in the *Muwāzanah* and al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī in the *Wasāṭah*"; "At the outset it should be remarked that the selection of topics for critical treatment by al-Āmidī, as well as the contents of the various sections, reflects the pervasive influence of the author's predecessors, Ibn al-Muʿtazz and al-Ṣūlī." Since Stetkevych goes on to analyze *in depth* both the works of al-Āmidī and al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī, these statements should not be taken as a marker of her methodology. One should note that it is the work of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī in the fifth/eleventh century that is usually marked as the set-off point of 'stagnation' in Arabic literary theory (see, e.g., Shawqī Ḍayf, *al-Naqd*, [Cairo]: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1964, 96, 105).

[22] Geert Jan van Gelder, "Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* 1: 305.

Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ is said to have formed a "Western" school of rhetoric, contrasted with the "Eastern" school of al-Abū Yaʿqūb Sakkākī (d. 626/1229), their contemporary in the Islamic East, which was more concerned with theory. ("West" here is west of Iran.) Already in the work of the historian-critic Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406), a 'Western' school was differentiated by virtue of its occupation with *badīʿ* 'literary devices'. Ibn Khaldūn distinguished between the Westerners (*ahl al-maghāriba*) and Easterners (*ahl al-mashāriqa*) by assigning the latter a more prominent interest in *sharḥ* 'commentary' and *taʿlīm* 'scholasticism' due to the deeper history of "civilization" (*ʿumrān*) in the Persian lands.[23] Even earlier, the Egyptian Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1372) assigned to the people of his land (*ahl bilādinā*; i.e., the Egyptian scholars) "sound [literary] taste and understanding" (*al-dhawq al-salīm wa-l-fahm al-mustaqīm*), whereas the Easterners (*ahl bilād al-mashriq*) were said to be taken by the rational sciences and logic.[24] The idea of "sound taste" contrasting "[dry] scholasticism" (with a hint of Arabs-versus-Persians undertones) goes back to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn himself, in a prefatory passage on the virtues of his work. No mention of 'East' and 'West' is made, and since the contrast occurs in the form of apologetics, it points to a common topos of the time.[25] Indeed, even the ultimate 'scholasticist'

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[23] Thus most of the exponents of this school are Persians (*ʿajam*). See ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Khaldūn, *Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Wāfī, 4 vols., Cairo: Lajnat al-Bayān al-ʿArabī, 1962, 4: 1265. Both ʿAbbās and Smyth end their study with a look at Ibn Khaldūn's synopsis (*Tārīkh*, 613-30; "Criticism," 414-17).

[24] Bahāʾ al-Dīn Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Kāfī al-Subkī, *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ fī sharḥ talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*, ed. Khalīl Ibrāhīm Khalīl, 4 pts. in 2 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001, 1: 146 (English: 'The Bride of the Wedding Feasts: On [al-Qazwīnī's] *Epitome of the Key*').

[25] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Mathal al-sāʾir fī adab al-kātib wa-l-shāʿir*, eds. Aḥmad al-Ḥūfī and Badawī Ṭabāna, 4 vols., Cairo: Maktabat Nahḍat Miṣr, 1959-196[5], 1: 38 (the passage is translated in Chapter 1), 2: 3-5 (another apologetic passage where it seems that he is making a claim against formal learning and for intuition alone when discussing the lack of relevance of Greek rhetoric and poetics to the study of "rhetorical themes (*maʿānī*)," but is in fact pointing instead to his own work which should be sufficient for the reader, *wa-fī kitābī hādhā mā yughnīka wa-huwa kāfin*). Some remarks that point to his preference for "Arabs" – at least in poetry – are treated in Part Two of the dissertation.

al-Sakkākī defers to the ultimate supremacy of *al-dhawq al-salīm*.[26]

The East-West dichotomy persisted. Aḥmad Maṭlūb, in his 700-page study on al-Qazwīnī, devotes a brief subsection to the "two *balāghī* schools": the "*kalāmī*" school in the East, made up of Iranian and Turkic scholars, and the "*adabī*" school in the Arab lands, namely Iraq, Syria and Egypt, one of the leading authorities of which is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (*aḥad aqṭāb hādhihi l-madrasa*).[27] We find the same sentiment in Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām's study of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, Ḥifnī Muḥammad Sharaf's study of Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, and various prefaces to critical editions produced in the Arab world, a sentiment which later surfaces in the studies of Western scholars as well.[28] If we recall, it was ʿAbbās' very premise that Iraq, Syria and Egypt constituted an independent unit in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries. According to him, literary critics in Egypt and al-Shām (Greater Syria) eschewed, or even loathed any Greek notion of any field of knowledge, stating that this hostility may be some subconscious reaction to the crusades – an experience that those in the 'East' did not undergo.[29] Heinrichs reminds us, however, that Greek influence in Arabic literary theory was rare across the board, and the fact that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn even mentions 'philosophizing' literary notions is an

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[26] Aḥmad Maṭlūb, *al-Balāgha ʿinda al-Sakkākī*, Baghdad: Maktabat al-Nahḍa, 1964, 184; Smyth, "Criticism," 416.

[27] Aḥmad Maṭlūb, *al-Qazwīnī wa-shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ*, Baghdad: Maktabat al-Nahḍa, 1967, 35-37, here: 36. See also Maṭlūb's short article on Ibn al-Athīr published in the Iraqi journal *al-Muʿallim al-Jadīd* 22.5 (1959), 74-79, here: 77-78.

[28] Here the divide is often termed *ʿaqlī/adabī* rather than *kalāmī/adabī*. See Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām, *Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr wa-juhūduhu fī l-naqd wa-l-balāgha*, Alexandria: Munshaʾat al-Maʿārif, [1982? Originally published 1958], 312-53, esp. 324-29 (though he sometimes offers a more nuanced presentation than his remarks on p. 312 suggest); Ḥifnī Muḥammad Sharaf, *Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ al-miṣrī bayna ʿulamāʾ al-balāgha*, [Cairo]: Maktabat Nahḍat Miṣr, [1961?], 364-83, esp. 372 (he then situates Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ within a more specific 'Egyptian' school, said to merge the two 'tendencies' and to serve as a model for the modern critic); Smyth, "Criticism," 414-15 (with qualifications, see below); van Gelder, "Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ." As for the 'obsession' with *badīʿ*, Sallām draws a structural connection between the rhetorical embellishments and the visual artistic phenomenon of the arabesque 'embellishments', which flourished in the Ayyūbid court (*Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn*, 19-20).

[29] ʿAbbās, *Tārīkh*, 575-56.

idiosyncrasy.[30] Sallām would take this claim even further (see below).

Although explicit engagement with the Arabic commentaries on Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* was rare in the works of Arabic literary theory 'proper' (those written in the Maghrib excluded), the so-called "aversion to (Greek) philosophy" in the Arabic East in the sixth/twelfth and seventh/thirteenth centuries is part of a more complex story. It is true that anti-philosophizing sentiment in 'religious' disciplines can be discerned during this period, but such sentiments were not limited to the Arabic-speaking lands.[31] In fact, the influence of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) and *falsafa* in general only *increased* in the Arabic East during this time, as attested by a first-hand account of the prominent theologian and legal scholar living in Greater Syria and Egypt, Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233). According to him, "[t]he fascination of the people of our time and the scholars of our age in studying the sciences of the ancients and borrowing from old philosophers has increased, such that it led them away from studying [l]egal matters and religious issues," to the point that one of them may "imagin[e] that he is one of the firmly-grounded philosophers […] and fooled by the bombastic words and strange-sounding names that he hears, such as 'hyle', 'element' (*usṭuqus*), 'element' (*ʿunṣur*), 'matter', 'form', 'First Cause', 'Active Intellect', Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, Proclus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, etc.! The utmost of the most erudite among them is to have superficial knowledge of the words, instead of [knowing their] meanings."[32] Al-Āmidī

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[30] W.P. Heinrichs, "Naḳd," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*, Brill Online, under the heading "Philosophical poetics and the *Maghribī* 'school'." See also *idem*, *Arabische Dichtung und griechische Poetik: Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannīs Grundlegung der Poetik mit Hilfe aristotelischer Begriffe*, Beiruter Texte und Studien, Band 8, Beirut; Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1969, 110-11. Heinrichs does not speak of an 'East'-'West' divide.

[31] For examples of theologians in the Islamic East rejecting the 'philosophizing' physics and metaphysics of Ibn Sīnā see Ayman Shihadeh, "From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī: 6th/12th Century Developments in Muslim Philosophical Theology," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 15 (2005), 141-79, esp. 151-56. Shihadeh refers to such scholars as "Ghazālian *mutakallim*[*ūn*]" (ibid., 161), because they followed the anti-*falsafa* approach of al-Ghazālī.

[32] Ibid., 148. Shihadeh is quoting from al-Āmidī's unpublished *Daqāʾiq al-ḥaqāʾiq*. I gather from the account above

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describes an environment in which it was meaningful for scholars to portray themselves as being conversant with *falsafa*, even if by pretense. This, in turn, fueled some resentment against the 'ancient' sciences, but the resentment can only be understood in light of the increase in the prevalence of philosophical studies in this time and place.[33] Given this environment, it is not surprising that someone like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, who probably knew al-Āmidī personally,[34] would dabble – however superficially – in a work of philosophical poetics like that of Ibn Sīnā.[35]

Smyth offers some qualifications for the East-West narrative, but for him they concern the 'West' alone, and only partially. He points to the variety of works produced in Syria and North Africa beyond the tradition of "*badīʿ*," from the Hellenistic-inspired literary theory of the North African al-Qarṭājannī (d. 639/1242), to the Sakkākian-inspired work of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (a Syrian, d. 739/1338), to the study of 'non-standard' verse by Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. 750/1349).[36] By Smyth's account, however, someone like Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ would still fit the paradigm of the 'West' – even though, as we shall see, he is at times a close follower of Fakhr al-

that this state of affairs was common in oral exchanges (i.e., involving scholars he came into contact with), not just written ones. Shihadeh's protagonists are otherwise from the eastern Islamic world (Bukhara, Samarqand, etc.).

[33] This is nicely illustrated in the entry on the esteemed Shāfiʿī legal theorist and genius in philosophy and mathematics, Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn Yūnus (d. 639/1242, based in Mosul), in Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās, 8 vols., Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977, 5: 311-18 (English: 'Obituaries of Eminent Men and Reports of Contemporaries'). The Syrian/Iraqi Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) and his peers exceedingly admired Kamāl al-Dīn, to the point that Ibn Khallikān had to state that he was not engaging in *mughālāt* 'exaggeration' (ibid. 5: 314): Ḥanafīs flocked to study Ḥanafī law with him even though he was a Shāfiʿī; he taught Jews and Christians their own Scriptures; he was the only one who could understand the nomenclature of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī when the latter's books first arrived in Mosul; he was the type of scholar that one did not ask who he had studied with and who his teachers were, *fa-innahu akbar min dhālika* (ibid.). And yet, several scholars in Ibn Khallikān's vicinity doubted Kamāl al-Dīn's religious commitment, and one can certainly detect that there was some resentment to logic and other rational sciences (ibid. 5: 313-14, 316-17).

[34] We find his autograph on what was probably a very early work by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn; see fn. 508.

[35] On Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's engagement with Ibn Sīnā see fn. 40 and §5.1, "*Tawassuʿ* (and the Influence of Ibn Sīnā)."

[36] Smyth, "Criticism," 415. With regards to the 'East', he says (ibid.): "Ibn Khaldūn's characterization of the eastern part of the Islamic world is fairly accurate since the main authors in the *balāgha* tradition (i.e. al-Rāzī, al-Sakkākī and al-Taftazānī [sic]) all lived in central Asia." Al-Qazwīnī, despite his name, is a Syrian and an Arab.

Dīn al-Rāzī (an 'Easterner', d. 606/1209) – and someone like the ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Zanjānī (active 660/1262) would fit the paradigm of the 'East' – even though, as we shall see, his adherence to al-Sakkākī is at times marginal in light of the more prominent interest he had in poetry and *badīʿ*. Similarly, Sallām would have us treat the Syrian Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651/1253) along the lines of the 'East'[37] – even though, as we shall see, he is at times better understood in light of views espoused by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn in the 'West' than views espoused by al-Rāzī and al-Sakkākī in the 'East'.

The underlying assumption enabling the discourse of an East-West dichotomy in Arabic literary theory has to do with the legacy of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081). Considered the greatest mind in Arabic literary-linguistic thinking, al-Jurjānī inspired the so-called theory-based method in the East, and thus anyone who did not follow his lead the way al-Sakkākī did had been commonly viewed as being 'inconsistent' at best, or 'incorrect' at worst. We often come across comments according to which the non-Sakkākian scholars are "wrong" or that they "confuse categories" (this is especially apparent in research coming out of the Arab world).[38] And yet the tendency to take the Sakkākian views as a yardstick for 'correctness' has often been coupled with hailing the non-'Eastern' scholar (especially Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn) as having a 'holistic', 'true' approach to criticism.[39] The tension – if not paradox – reaches a height with

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[37] Sallām, *Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn*, 320-22. He also treats the Syrian al-Tanūkhī (fl. end of 7th/13th cent.) along 'eastern' lines, not mentioning the fact that much of his work is a listing of *badīʿ*!

[38] An extreme example is ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Shaykh, *Dirāsāt fī al-balāgha ʿinda Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr*, Alexandria: Muʾassasat Shabāb al-Jāmiʿa, 1986. For the general bias towards al-Jurjānī see, e.g., Māzin al-Mubārak, *al-Mūjaz fī tārīkh al-balāgha*, 2nd ed., Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1979 (English: 'A Concise Study of the History of Rhetoric').

[39] Of the numerous examples we may cite Sallām, *Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn*, 199, 316, 377, 379; al-Shaykh, *Dirāsāt*, 17, 152-53, 156, 167, 271-72; and (though less apparent) Muḥammad Ṣūfiyya, *al-Mabāḥith al-bayāniyya bayna Ibn al-Athīr wa-l-ʿAlawī*, Tripoli, Libya: al-Munshaʾa al-ʿĀmma, 1984, 189-90. Sallām seems to be critical of the Ayyūbid period in general, making statements that echo similar attitudes towards the period of *inḥiṭāṭ* 'decline' after the high ʿAbbāsid era.

Sallām, who on the one hand extols Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's 'Arabness' in the field of criticism, but on the other hand identifies his most substantial achievements with notions associated with *Greek* thinking: mimesis (*muḥākāt*) and image-evocation (*takhyīl*)![40] The fact of the matter remains that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and others in his time and locale were lumped together in the category of "sixth/twelfth-seventh/thirteenth century Iraq-Syria-Egypt" (cf. ʿAbbās) simply based on what they were not – followers of al-Jurjānī – and not on what they were. This dissertation explores what they were.[41]

Once we move away from anachronistic assumptions and take a serious look at the literary-theoretical works themselves, we find that grouping those works written in the Arabic East in the sixth/twelfth century together with the ones written in the seventh/thirteenth century

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[40] Sallām, *Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn*, 178-83, 250-51, 384-85, 387. The first is, in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's words, *ḥikāya* or *ḥikāyat al-ḥāl* 'imitation of a [real-life] situation', and Sallām identifies it (although using the term *muḥākāt*) as a unique idea in 'native' Arabic literary theory (not knowing it is based on a brief account by Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī? See §4.1, fn. 517). Sallām does not think that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was directly drawing on Aristotelian poetics here but rather that it was an outcome of some general awareness to some general Greek notions (ibid., 250). Sallām's treatment of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's occasional comments on *takhyīl* somewhat anticipates Lara Harb's *Poetic Marvels: Wonder and Aesthetic Experience in Medieval Arabic Literary Theory*, unpublished PhD dissertation, New York University, 2013. In the case of *takhyīl*, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was usually drawing on al-Jurjānī (see §5.1). As we shall see, philosophical poetics and 'native' literary criticism sometimes reached similar results (cf. Harb's findings on 'wonder'). In general, with regards to the question of Greek influence, I follow the 'doctrine' of the so-called *voie diffuse*, which stipulates lines of influence via contact with scholars rather than direct textual engagement, or the *voie érudite* (adjusting Versteegh's use to the later period, see C.H.M [Kees] Versteegh, *Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking*, Studies in Semitic Languages and Linguistics, vol. 7. Leiden: Brill, 1977, 9, 178; this view is implicitly endorsed by Robert C. McKinney in *The Case of Rhyme versus Reason: Ibn al-Rūmī and his Poetics in Context*, Brill Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures, vol. 28, Leiden: Brill, 2004, 125-27). Such direct-but-indirect contact would be especially true for someone as famous and well-connected as Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. In the case of Ibn Sīnā's work, we have a near case of *voie érudite* since Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn tells us explicitly that some *mutafalsif* made a comment to him about Ibn Sīnā's poetics and rhetoric and "a type of Greek poetry" (probably tragedy) and then got up and *showed* him the relevant passages from the *Shifāʾ*. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn then remarks, in his comical-critical way, that once he saw it he found Ibn Sīnā (or the book, per Cantarino) to be ignorant ([…] *wa-qāma* [*baʿḍ al-mutafalsifīn*] *fa-aḥḍara Kitāba l-Shifāʾi li-Abī ʿAliyyin wa-waqqafanī ʿalā mā dhakarahu fa-lammā waqaftu ʿalayhi -stajhaltuhu*; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 5-6; Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 110; Cantarino, *Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age*, 193). Surely something of it must have stuck in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's mind! In any case, this is not the *voie érudite* that we find with al-Qarṭājannī, who cited Ibn Sīnā verbatim (Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 155 fn. 1).

[41] There are two dissertations on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn written in the UK in the late '70s and '80s which I have been unable to access. The first is by Muḥammad ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān al-Hadlac: *Diyaʾ-ad-Dīn* [sic] *Ibn al-Athīr and His Contribution to the Science of Rhetoric*, University of Edinburgh, 1978. The second is by A.K.A.A. ElSalem (Abdul Karim El-Salem): *Rhetoric in al-Mathal al-Sāʾir: Ibn al-Athīr's Contribution to ʿIlm al-Balāgha*, University of Cambridge, 1985. The latter is cited in Adrian Gully, *The Culture of Letter-Writing in Pre-Modern Islamic Society*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008, 139, 161, but otherwise I have not found any reference to them.

simply does not hold. This dissertation argues, rather, that starting in the seventh/thirteenth century scholars of literary theory increasingly viewed their efforts as part of a field of inquiry termed *ʿilm al-bayān*, to a degree of disciplinary coherence that had not previously been seen. *ʿIlm al-bayān* referred to the science of good style, or the science of eloquence, and was held as a rational science bound by rational rules. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is the first scholar that we know of to speak of the field in these terms. Unlike the later *ʿilm al-balāgha*, the discipline of *ʿilm al-bayān* was not a systemization of al-Jurjānī's work, not because al-Jurjānī was unknown in the Arabic East during this time -- in fact, the name *ʿilm al-bayān* probably derives from him -- but because scholars were not necessarily swept away by his ideas. This stands in opposition to modern, or even later medieval perceptions about the influence that al-Jurjānī or his redactors had on scholars who read him. The scope of study of *ʿilm al-bayān* corresponded to the contents that one customarily comes across in the early writings on literary theory (that is, from the high ʿAbbāsid era). The innovation of *ʿilm al-bayān* starting in the 1200s in the Arabic East was, rather, one of terminology and one of conception. On the level of terminology, this was the first time literary-theoretical scholars began using – increasingly and consistently – an agreed-upon heading for their scholarly affiliation. This heading was in turn back-projected to earlier works on literary theory that were seen as a canon in the field. On the level of conception, this was the first time scholars displayed increasing awareness, both within the field and outside of it, of the disciplinary coherence of *ʿilm al-bayān*, and more specifically, of its scientific nature.

The disciplinary coherence of the newly formed *ʿilm al-bayān* is examined in Part One of the dissertation. The purpose of Part One is to establish the historical fact of its emergence and consolidation as a cohesive field of inquiry in the Arabic East starting in the 1200s. For this purpose we look at the way Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn himself envisaged the field and its canon (Chapter 1), at

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several works on the classification of the sciences as well as works on literary theory written in the century or so after Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn (Chapter 2), and we also take an aside to discuss early uses of *bayān* and *ʿilm al-bayān* prior to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn (Chapter 3). One of the main features of *ʿilm al-bayān* was its claim to being a theoretical science with a practical application, namely, the ability to compose (*taʾlīf*) verse and epistolary prose.[42] The concern with the practical aspect of literary composition might undermine the declared theoretical underpinning of the discipline: strictly speaking, theory is the very negation of practice (Aristotle's *praxis*). But for many of the authors we shall look at, the application of theoretical knowledge was inseparable from theory itself. Even when we find attempts to distinguish between the two, like in the work of Ibn Khaldūn, vestiges of the theory-cum-practice approach are discernible (e.g., via the discussion of *dhawq*).

In Part Two we delve into some of the works on *ʿilm al-bayān* and their authors (Chapter 4), and hone in on one literary-theoretical topic – *majāz* 'figurative[43] language' – to see how

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[42] Literary composition as a topic of interest may be found in most of the ealier writings on literary theory, but without the claim to scientificity.

[43] Using the English term "figurative" is not without problems. For one thing, it might give the impression that we are dealing only with visual images, figures and forms, to the exclusion of more 'mental' images: this is not my intention. Rather, I find that "figurative langague" – more than, say, "tropical language" (a term that does denote non-visual images) – is the most common term in English that is contrasted with "literal language." Moreover, "trope" in its wide sense implies a device like simile (Chris Baldick, "Trope," *The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms*, 4th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), and simile was not necessarily seen as *majāz*: in the later Arabic rhetorical tradition it was necessarily *excluded* from *majāz*. Trope in its narrow sense – "us[ing] a word or phrase in a sense other than what is propoer to it" (from the Greek "turn"; T. Bahti and J.C. Mann, "Trope," in Roland Greene et al. [eds.], *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, 4th ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, 1463-64) – is not compatible with the notion of *majāz* that does include *tashbīh*. The other point to be made is that in contemporary scholarship we find devices like irony and rhetorical questions being treated as a form of "figurative" speech (e.g., Robert J. Fogelin, *Figuratively Speaking*, 2nd ed. revised, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 1-26), even though such cases would not count as *majāz* in the classical Arabic sources (close terms for irony are *al-jidd yurād bih al-hazl* or *tahakkum*). John Searle gives a more accurate picture when he juxtaposes literal utterances with (i) metaphorical utterances, (ii) ironical utterances, and (iii) indirect speech acts (also known as implicatures) (John R. Searle, "Metaphor," in Patrick Hanks and Rachel Giora [eds.], *Metaphor and Figurative Language*, 6 vols., London: Routledge, 2012, 109-39, here: 118-19 [originally in *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 76-116]). According to this scheme, *majāz* would correspond to metaphorical language, but because classical Arabic sources identify the device 'metaphor' as one subtype of 'metaphorical language', the latter term has usually been avoided in moderm scholarship (Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Metaphorologie-Traditionen im Klassischen Arabisch," in S. Leder with H. Kilpatrick, B. Martel-Thoumian, H. Schönig [eds.], *Studies in Arabic and Islam: Proceedings of the 19th Congress, Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, Halle 1998*, Leuven, Belgium: U. Peeters, 2002,

disciplinary coherence plays out in thematic terms (Chapter 5). *Majāz* is a useful test-case for examining thematic coherence in *ʿilm al-bayān* because we have a fair amount of knowledge about the early development of the concept as well as its eventual, supposedly 'correct' expression in the Sakkākian-inspired *ʿilm al-balāgha*: pinpointing adherence to versus divergence from the Sakkākian model is, therefore, tenable.

But the significance of focusing on *majāz* goes beyond the historical question of *ʿilm al-bayān*, for in many ways – to paraphrase Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn – it is at the heart of the literary-theoretical endeavor.[44] *Majāz* is a key concept not only in classical Arabic literary theory, but also in legal theory, theology, lexicography and Sufi thought, and has attracted increasing attention in recent years, to the point that it has been identified as a major component in the "meaning" of Islam itself.[45] Most of the focus has been on Islamic legal theory, a field of study that contains a lengthy prolegomenon on philosophical-linguistic matters, including the question of figurative language. Here scholars concentrated especially on the juristic understanding of the difference between what a text 'says' and what it 'means', and the resulting contribution of their research has been more to the question of *lafẓ* versus *maʿnā* (here: 'plain wording' versus

217-26, here: 217; cf. Shahab Ahmed below). Given sufficient clarifications (especially with regards to metonymy and simile), one would probably be justified in translating *majāz* as 'metaphorical language', but for our present study, the common "figurative language/speech" will do (see also W. Martin, "Metaphor," *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, 863-70, esp. 863: "Any attempt to define metaphor positively […] will inevitably apply to other tropes. Some critics accept this consequence and call all tropes metaphors.").

[44] Referring to a preliminary chapter on *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*, he states (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 105): "This section is a great important matter among the important matters of *ʿilm al-bayān*; nay, it is *ʿilm al-bayān* in its entirety" (*wa-hādhā l-faṣlu muhimmun kabīrun min muhimmāti ʿilmi l-bayāni lā bal huwa ʿilmu l-bayāni bi-ajmaʿihi*). See also von Grunebaum's assessment in the opening of Chapter 1. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn makes similar statements on the importance of other literary devices, and while this one seems more emphatic, I would not conclude that *majāz* is the most important topic in the field (see below).

[45] Shahab Ahmed, *What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016, 386-97. Ahmed uses the less technical "metaphor," which in English (and already ancient Greek?) can be a non-technical way of referring to figurative language in general. From his discussion and examples it is clear that he has the Arabic (or "Islamic") term *majāz* in mind (e.g., p. 395, 396 fn. 195).

'intended meaning') than to the question of figurative language.[46] This is attested, first and foremost, by the fact that *majāz* is rarely translated in these studies as 'figurative language'.[47] The reluctance to translate *majāz* as 'figurative language' has crossed over to studies on Arabic literary theory as well, the underlying reason being that we still do not quite know what *majāz* meant for the literary theorists.[48] Our case study in Chapter 5 is meant to fill some of that void.

This dissertation makes no claim to treat every author writing on literary-theoretical matters in the Arabic East during the seventh/thirteenth century. We know, for instance, that some authors did not adhere to the new framework of *ʿilm al-bayān*, like al-Muẓaffar al-Ḥusaynī (d. 656/1258) and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 655 or 6/1257 or 8); both were Baghdadi scholars, and perhaps the prevalence of *ʿilm al-bayān* did not reach Baghdad in the mid-1200s.[49] Furthermore,

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[46] Mohamed Mohamed Yunis Ali, *Medieval Islamic Pragmatics: Sunni Legal Theorists' Models of Textual Communication*, Richmond, Surrey: Routledge, 2000; David R. Vishanoff, *The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law*, American Oriental Series, vol. 93, New Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 2011; Robert Gleave, *Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. Already Lowry alerts to the "linguistic turn" in Islamic legal theory in Joseph E. Lowry, "Some Preliminary Observations on al-Šāfiʿī and Later *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*: The Case of the Term *bayān*," *Arabica* 55 (2008), 505-27, here: 526. Alexander Key speaks more generally of the culture's "obsession" with langague in his *A Linguistic Frame of Mind: ar-Rāġib al-Iṣfahānī and what it meant to be ambiguous*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2012 (*passim*).

[47] Vishanoff has "transgressive usage" (*Formation*, e.g., 21). Gleave, who in the index has "non-literal, diverted usage" (*Islam and Literalism*, 211) and admits that "non-literal" as a translation is "uninformative" (p. 36), often leaves the term untranslated, but also speaks of "non-literal *meaning*" (emphasis mine; p. 10 fn. 20), which causes some confusion because *majāz* in the medieval sources commonly describes the expression itself ("X is *majāz*"; Gleave recognizes this point with regards to *ḥaqīqa*, p. 37). Ali is the only one who does not shy from "figurative use" (*Medieval Islamic Pragmatics*, e.g., 73), but he provides many other nuances depending on the scholar he treats, thus also creating the impression that in legal theory *majāz* did not necessarily mean figurative language.

[48] The two most recent examples are Key, *Linguistic Frame of Mind*, who usually opts for "non-literal [language/ expression]" (e.g., p. 26, 180), and Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, who uses "figurative language/speech" but often precedes it with a cautious "roughly" or "more or less corresponds to," especially in the context of al-Jurjānī (e.g., p. 81, 87, 149, and esp. 201 fn. 645). This latter point accentuates the fact that scholars still do not quite know what al-Jurjānī meant by *majāz*, and we will attend to this question in Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

[49] For Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd see Chapter 1 (§1.2). He approached the study of literary theory from the aspect of *kitāba* 'scribal education' (he was primarily a legal scholar). For al-Ḥusaynī, the field of study was poetry (*shiʿr, qarīḍ*). See al-Muẓaffar b. al-Faḍl al-ʿAlawī (al-Ḥusaynī), *Naḍrat al-ighrīḍ fī nuṣrat al-qarīḍ*, ed. Nuhā ʿĀrif al-Ḥasan, Damascus: Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya, 1976 (English: 'The Beauty of the Palm Tree Spadix: On the Triumph of Poetry'). The Baghdadi al-Ṭūfī, whom we treat in Part Two, lived half a century later, which may explain his awareness of and adherence to *ʿilm al-bayān*.

in order to strengthen our findings, one would have to look for references to literary theory or the literary scholars in adjacent fields, like legal theory and grammar, as well as the biographical dictionaries, to see whether they coincide with ʿilm al-bayān and ʿulamāʾ al-bayān in the sense that we find them being used in literary theory proper and in works on the classification of the sciences. This falls outside the scope of our study and should be taken up in future research.[50] Likewise, in our discussion of majāz our purpose is to highlight its most distinctive features within the domain of literary theory, and at times this leads to a disproportionate treatment of one scholar over the other, or of one issue within majāz over the other. The number of pages we devote to any given scholar or topic does not necessarily reflect the prominence of that scholar or topic vis-à-vis the others, or the prominence that the scholar gave to that specific discussion; it reflects, rather, the usefulness of that specific discussion to our understanding of majāz. Indeed, our study might give the impression that majāz was the most important topic of discussion for the literary theorists: it was not (despite Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's comment above). Future research on the intricacies of other notions that were of paramount interest to literary theorists might show why some – like conciseness and prolixity (ījāz wa-iṭnāb) – would later find a prominent place in the Sakkākian tradition, while others – like paronomasia (tajnīs) – would not.[51]

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[50] We cite one legal scholar, Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392), in §2.3. Ibn Khallikān speaks of ʿilm al-bayān as a discipline that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn studied during his early education (see §4.1), and the phrase seems to be recognized as a discipline heading outside the context of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. For but one example see Ibn Khallikān's entry on Jaʿfar al-Barmakī (d. 187/803), where he cites ahl al-bayān – i.e., the scholars of ʿilm al-bayān – in reference to the literary device called "almond finger stuffing" (ḥashw al-lawzīnaj), a poetic practice in which a word or phrase is used as "padding" to fit the meter (Wafayāt 1: 330).

[51] And here a distinction should be drawn between al-Sakkākī and al-Qazwīnī, because al-Qazwīnī later incorporated strictly 'poetic' topics like thematic transitions (takhalluṣ) and literary influence (sariqāt), while the earlier al-Sakkākī did not. ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī actually treats tajnīs in the opening of his Asrār al-balāgha, and it was certainly of interest to Qurʾānic scholars (see, for instance, the discussion within badāʾiʿ al-Qurʾān "good Qurʾānic rhetorical figures" in the later Aḥmad b. Muṣṭafā Ṭashköprüzāde, Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍūʿāt al-ʿulūm, eds. Kāmil Bakrī and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Abū al-Nūr, 3 vols., [Cairo]: Dār al-Kutub al-Ḥadītha, [1968], 2: 502-503 [English: 'The Key for Happiness and the Light [leading to] Mastery: On the Subject-Matters of the Sciences']). Another topic of interest might be change in word order (taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr), an important issue within the Sakkākian tradition: Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn treats it at some length, but earlier literary theorists outside philology

Methodologically I follow Wolfhart Heinrichs and Dmitry Frolov in differentiating medieval scholars' theoretical pronouncements from the *shawāhid* 'illustrative examples' they adduce, as an alternative or independent avenue to make an assessment of their views. Frolov remarks,

> [P]oetic citations constitute the main bulk of any philological text, be it metrical or not (see, for instance, *Kitāb al-badīʿ* by Ibn al-Muʿtazz). Scarcity of verbal definitions and descriptions and abundance of poetic illustrations account for the importance of *shawāhid* as an alternative way of explicating a rule or a phenomenon. This means that nothing is accidental in the set of these illustrations.[52]

Heinrichs elaborates,

> In this [*majāz* in Abū ʿUbayda] as in many other cases in literary theory and related fields it is important to keep the author's theoretical pronouncements or hints at such apart from his *shawâhid* material as two independent avenues to an understanding of his ideas, the reason being that, especially in the early days of literary and hermeneutical studies, an author may have a correct feeling of phenomena belonging together without being able to express this feeling in adequate terminology.[53]

Adjusting this to the seventh/thirteenth century, when adequate terminology usually did exist, we can say that the theoretical portions of the text were often an expression of commonly held opinions by earlier scholars – what we may call 'academic convention' – to which the scholar at hand did not give much thought and, perhaps, did not necessarily

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and Qurʾānic stylistics typically do not. *Iṭnāb* is used in a positive sense: knowing when it is meaningful to use more words 'than necessary'.

[52] Dmitry Frolov, *Classical Arabic Verse: History and Theory of ʿArūḍ*, Studies in Arabic Literature, vol. 21, Leiden: Brill, 2000, 338 (parentheses his).

[53] Wolfhart Heinrichs, "On the Genesis of the *ḥaqîqa-majâz* Dichotomy," *Studia Islamica* 59 (1984), 111-40, here: 118 fn. 2. For an application of this method in another classical Arabic field, citing Heinrichs, see Almog Kasher, *The Ẓarf in Medieval Arabic Grammatical Theory*, PhD Dissertation, Bar Ilan University, 2006, 10 [in Hebrew]. Of course, the method can be applied when we have no theoretical pronouncements at all (or hardly at all) as we see, e.g., in van Gelder's analysis of *shawāhid* patterning to make a case for the critics' conception of 'thematic unity' (*Beyond the Line*, 196-98, 202-203), or in Hamori's analysis of commentarial remarks on poetic and Qurʾānic verses to make a case for the scholars' conception of links between textual units (Andras Hamori, "Some Schemes of Reading in al-Marzūqī, al-Iskāfī and Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī," in Sasson Somekh [ed.], *Studies in Medieval Arabic and Hebrew Poetics* [= *Israel Oriental Studies* 11], Leiden: Brill, 1991, 13-20).

endorse. Of course, theoretical pronouncements remain a necessary component of our analysis, but they must be verified against the *shawāhid* and ensuing commentary and against the categorization scheme of the work.

Part One: The Emergence of ʿIlm al-Bayān

Introduction

In his concise article on the notion of *bayān* lit. 'clarity' in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, G.E. von Grunebaum makes the following statement after discussing the development of the notion until the fifth/eleventh century:

> When Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1234) writes *al-Mathal al-Sāʾir fī Adab al-Kātib wa ʼl-Shāʿir* thinking on *bayān* has taken a new turn. To what extent it was Ibn al-Athīr himself who was responsible for this change we have no means of deciding. Ibn al-Athīr places […] the *ʿilm al-bayān* in the same relation to the composition of both poetry and prose as the science of the *uṣūl al-fiḳh* [legal theory] to the individual judicial statutes or decisions, *aḥkām*.[54]

Von Grunebaum goes on to give a brief summary of the *Mathal*'s structure and contents, and adds:

> The heartpiece of the *ʿilm al-bayān* is to Ibn al-Athīr the doctrine of *ḥaḳīḳa* and *madjāz*, the proper and the transferred use of words […][55]

Part One of the dissertation may be seen as an enlargement of von Grunebaum's treatment of *bayān*, not so much in isolation, but rather in conjunction with *ʿilm*: that is, *ʿilm al-bayān* 'the science of clarity', or: 'the science of clear expression'. We will investigate "[t]o what extent it was Ibn al-Athīr himself who was responsible for this change" in elevating the science to a highly theoretical one. We will also examine, perhaps more importantly, to what extent his attempts were successful in influencing later authors. (They were.) This part will show that *ʿilm*

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[54] G.E. von Grunebaum, "*Bayān*," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*, Brill Online.

[55] Ibid.

al-bayān became a recognized field of inquiry at the turn of the seventh/thirteenth century and remained so until the fourteenth century (*ca.* 1200-1400), only to be trumped by the better-known *and very different* tradition of *ʿilm al-balāgha* 'science of eloquence', that is: standard rhetoric.

Part One is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 1 we will look closely into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr's portrayal of *ʿilm al-bayān* in his primary literary-critical works, *al-Mathal al-sāʾir fī adab al-kātib wa-l-shāʿir* ('The Talk of the Town [lit. The Current Saying]: On the Knowhow of the Scribe and the Poet') and his earlier-written 'forerunner', *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ṣināʿat al-manẓūm min al-kalām wa-l-manthūr* ('The Large Compilation: On the Craft of Versified and Unversified Speech'). We will compare the status Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn assigns to *ʿilm al-bayān* with the status assigned, especially by al-Ghazālī, to other sciences regarded as highly theoretical, *viz.* logic and legal theory. We will also examine Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's attempts to form a canon of *ʿilm al-bayān*. In Chapter 2 vestiges of this *ʿilm al-bayān* in later sources will be examined. A case will be made for the consolidated notion of a literary-theoretical discipline, a development which did not characterize earlier literary-critical works (which I refer to as the early *naqd* works). Later works to be investigated include literary-critical and non-literary-critical works, primarily those dealing with the classification of the sciences. In Chapter 3 we will attend to notions of *bayān* prior to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, both as a larger notion of 'expression' and as a narrower notion related to eloquence studies.

If at all modern researchers attended to the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* they portrayed it as a synonym of the standard *ʿilm al-balāgha* (Arthur Schaade, Ramzi Baalbaki, Joseph Lowry, Pierre Larcher).[56] Others have recognized that *ʿilm al-bayān* may denote literary theory as a

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[56] A. Schaade, "Bayān," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, first edition*: "*ʿIlm al-bayān* is often used synonymously with *ʿIlm al-Balāgha* […] although strictly it only denotes a subsection of it." See also §2.1 and the introduction to §2.3,

whole, including its early permutations; implicitly it is seen as one out of several common designations for the field (von Grunebaum, Badawī Ṭabāna, Shawqī Ḍayf).[57] Of course, as a subfield, *ʿilm al-bayān* has long been recognized to denote the study of imagery in the later *ʿilm al-balāgha* (see Chapter 2). As of yet, however, the emergence of a science called *ʿilm bayān* in the seventh/thirteenth century and its identification as a new generic development has gone in the

below. Baalbaki implicitly identifies "the discipline of *bayān*" more specifically with *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, the first subsection of the standard *ʿilm al-balāgha*. But he also speaks of the discipline in more general terms and of a group called "*bayāniyyūn*" as if they were in existence during the time Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. See Ramzi Baalbaki, "A 7ᵗʰ-8ᵗʰ H. Century Controversy: Ibn al-Athīr on *Naḥw* and *Bayān*," in Andrei A. Avram, Anca Focşeneanu and George Grigore (eds.), *A Festschrift for Nadia Anghelescu*, Bucharest: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2011, 85-105, esp. 86, 94-95, 97, 102-3. Ironically, he does recognize Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's "conviction that the discipline which examines *faṣāḥa* and *balāgha* (i.e. *bayān*) is distinct from other disciplines" (p. 97, parentheses his), but he interprets this as a break from the science of grammar rather than a new development within the Arabic literary-critical tradition (*naqd*), a development that has nothing to do with grammar. (Notably, Baalbaki is a scholar of the Arabic grammatical tradition.) Lowry, a scholar of Islamic legal theory, remarks enigmatically that "by the time we are in a world of full-fledged books on *uṣūl al-fiqh* [the books he treats range from the fourth/tenth to the eighth/fourteenth centuries], the science of Arabic rhetoric, which has become highly evolved, comes to be denoted as *balāġa*, possibly *ḫiṭāba*, but sometimes also as *ʿilm al-bayān* […]"; see Lowry, "Preliminary Observations," 510. Apparently Lowry is referring to the standard *ʿilm al-balāgha* ("highly evolved") rather than the early *naqd* works. Pierre Larcher mentions Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's use of *ʿilm al-bayān* as referring to "the entirety" of rhetoric, but he presents the contents of this discipline as if they are coextensive with those of al-Qazwīnī's rhetoric. See Pierre Larcher, "Arabic Linguistic Tradition II: Pragmatics," in Jonathan Owens (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Arabic Linguistics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, 185-212, here: 188-89.

[57] Von Grunebaum states ("Bayān," closing paragraph) with regards to a work wrongly attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) that the latter "still uses *ʿilm al-bayān* for rhetoric [literary theory] as a whole." Ṭabāna also sees *bayān* as a reference to the study of the literary art in general (*dirāsat al-fann al-adabī*) and acknowledges that it was sometimes called *badīʿ*, *faṣāḥa* or *balāgha*; see Badawī Ṭabāna, *al-Bayān al-ʿarabī: dirāsa fī taṭawwur al-fikra al-balāghiyya ʿinda al-ʿarab wa-manāhijihā wa-maṣādirihā al-kubrā*, 6ᵗʰ ed., Cairo: Maktabat al-Anjilū al-Miṣriyya, 1976, 15, 18 (English: 'Arabic Rhetoric: A Study in the Development of the Arabs' Rhetorical Thinking and its Greater Methods and Sources'). See also Gully, *Culture of Letter-Writing*, 30, where Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *ʿilm al-bayān* is glossed as "literary criticism in its broadest sense," and George Makdisi, *The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and the Christian West, With Special Reference to Scholasticism*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990, 141, 144, where *ʿilm al-bayān* is said to designate "rhetoric." Ṭabāna is the only modern scholar to author a book solely from the perspective of *ʿilm al-bayān*, beginning with the early meanings of *bayān* in the third/ninth and fourth/tenth centuries and ending with the tenets of the standard subfield within *ʿilm al-balāgha*. This is his *ʿIlm al-bayān: dirāsa tārīkhiyya fanniyya fī uṣūl al-balāgha al-ʿarabiyya*, [Cairo]: Maktabat al-Anjilū al-Miṣriyya, [1962] (English: 'The Science of *Bayān*: A Historical Analytic Study in the Origins of Arabic Rhetoric'). Ṭabāna too fails to recognize a new disciplinary development with the efforts of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn (he identifies the latter's *ʿilm al-bayān* with the epistolary art; p. 18). The only scholar to notice that later seventh/thirteenth century writers who used the term *ʿilm bayān* to refer to "rhetorical studies" in general (*mabāḥith al-balāgha*) were actually following Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is Shawqī Ḍayf. This is mentioned in passing in his *al-Balāgha: taṭawwur wa-tārīkh*, Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1965, 317, 324 (English: 'Rhetoric: Development and History'). It does not help that *bayān* in Modern Standard Arabic simply means 'rhetoric' and is synonymous with *balāgha* (see fn. 229). We thus find many uses of the word *bayān* in modern titles that refer simply to literary theory or 'rhetoric' in general (like Ṭabāna's *al-Bayān al-ʿarabī*).

scholarship unnoticed. This is partly due to the fact that many medieval scholars themselves were oblivious to the matter.[58]

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[58] The clearest example is al-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363) in his *Nuṣrat al-thāʾir*, a 'refutation' of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*. At one point al-Ṣafadī notes that he does not know what Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn meant by *bayān*: for al-Ṣafadī it referred either to the sub-ʿ*ilm al-bayān* or to ʿ*ilm al-maʿānī* – both subfields of the standard ʿ*ilm al-balāgha*. See Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, *Nuṣrat al-thāʾir ʿalā al-mathal al-sāʾir*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī Sulṭānī, Damascus: [Maṭbaʿat Khālid al-Ṭarābīshī, 1972], 78-82 (English: 'Support of the Rebel against *The Talk of the Town*' [Heinrichs' translation in "Ibn al-Athīr," 315]).

Chapter 1:

ʿIlm al-Bayān in the Eyes of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr

1.1. *bi-manzilat uṣūl al-fiqh*: The Discipline is Scientific

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239) is the first author of an extant work who consciously attends to the notion of *ʿilm al-bayān*.[59] To be sure, he does not devote a chapter to the meaning of *ʿilm al-bayān* in any of his works nor does he provide us with a clear definition. But the explicit representation of *ʿilm al-bayān* as an independent and highly theoretical field in both his literary-theoretical works makes Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn a major figure in the notion's development. While he is certainly not the first scholar to speak of the study of literary-theoretical matters in terms of a discipline or craft (*ṣināʿa*),[60] he is the first to speak of it in terms of a 'scientific' undertaking.

After a brief *invocatio* opening his mature work, *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn states:

> *wa-baʿdu fa-inna ʿilma l-bayāni li-taʾlīfi l-naẓmi wa-l-nathri bi-manzilati uṣūli l-fiqhi li-l-aḥkāmi wa-adillati l-aḥkām*
>
> Let us proceed. The science of *bayān* (lit. '[verbal] clarity') vis-à-vis the composition of verse and prose has the same status as [the science of] legal theory does vis-à-vis the legal rulings and the [textual] evidence of the legal rulings.[61]

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[59] Sometimes this expression appears as *ʿilm al-bayān min al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha* "*ʿilm al-bayān*, namely, eloquence"; see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 119-20. But cf. ibid. 1: 39, where *faṣāḥa-balāgha* are said to be the (subject-) matter of the discipline (in the philosophical sense; see following fn.).

[60] For a famous example which was translated in Cantarino, *Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age*, 152-54, see Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī, *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, ed. ʿAbd al-Mutaʿāl al-Ṣaʿīdī, Cairo: Muḥammad ʿAlī Ṣabīḥ, 1969, 82-84 (English: 'The Secret of Eloquence'). Here al-Khafājī speaks of speech composition as a craft, and he enumerates the five elements that every craft is said to contain, as defined by the philosophers (*ḥukamāʾ*): matter (e.g., "wood"), craftsman (e.g., "carpenter"), form (e.g., "square," if a chair), instrument (e.g., "saw"), and purpose (e.g., "something to sit on"). Cf. *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 39. We will look at how other early scholars saw their disciplinary affiliation in §1.2. See also Ouyang, *Literary Criticism*, 166-99, 237-42.

[61] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 35. The term *ḥukm* pl. *aḥkām* has a variety of meanings in legal theory, from the more specific 'legal status/qualification' assigned to a certain act to the more general 'law, legal ruling, rule of law'. See Joseph Schacht, "*Aḥkām*," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*; Aron Zysow, *The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1984, 181, 229, 261, 359, 467; Devin Stewart, "Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd al-Ẓāhirī's Manual of Jurisprudence, *al-Wuṣūl ilā maʿrifat al-uṣūl*,"

What exactly is the analogy that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is making with legal theory? The interpretation differs depending on whether we lay the emphasis on the *aḥkām*, here: laws or legal rulings, or whether we lay it on *adillat al-aḥkām*, the legal sources or textual evidence for the legal rulings. According to Wael Hallaq, "[…] the declared, and indeed main, purpose of Islamic legal theory was to formulate rulings (*aḥkām*) concerning cases whose solutions had not been explicitly stated in the first two material sources [i.e., the Qurʾān and prophetic *ḥadīth*]." But in a footnote Hallaq adds that "[a]nother important function of legal theory, one that is assumed and rarely articulated in works of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, is the justification and 're-enactment' of the processes of legal reasoning behind existing rules."[62] For al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) the very essence of 'legal theory' is the *adillat al-aḥkām* (*uṣūl al-fiqh ʿibāra ʿan adillat hādhihi al-aḥkām*), implying the study of textual proofs regarding existing rulings; similarly, Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) states that the "foundations/roots of the law are the [textual] evidence of the law" (*fa-ammā uṣūl al-fiqh hiya adillat al-fiqh*).[63] This would suggest the reverse of Hallaq's assessment: the assumed purpose of legal theory was to formulate rulings concerning new cases, whereas the declared purpose was to justify the process of legal reasoning. The shift in focus is from a primarily hermeneutical endeavor (*adillat al-aḥkām*) to a more practical endeavor guiding the jurist in producing *new* rulings (*aḥkām*). Going back to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's analogy, if we focus on

in Bernard G. Weiss (ed.), *Studies in Islamic Legal Theory*, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, vol. 15, Leiden: Brill, 2002, 99-158, here: 102 fn. 6, 104-105, 108.

[62] Wael B. Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 1-2. See also Al-Shāfiʿī, *The Epistle on Legal Theory*, edited and translated by Joseph E. Lowry, Library of Arabic Literature, New York: New York University Press, 2013, xxii.

[63] Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl*, ed. Ḥamza Ibn Zuhayr Ḥāfiẓ, 4 vols., Medina: 1413 [1993 or 4], 1: 9 (English: 'The Best Pick in Legal Theory'); Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, *al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām*, 4 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Khidīwiyya, 1914, 1: 8 (English: 'The Master [Work] on the Foundations of Legal Rulings'). The same idea is expressed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, though in a less succinct manner; see his *al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh*, ed. Ṭāhā Jābir Fayyāḍ al-ʿAlwānī, 2 vols. in 6, Riyadh: Jāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad Ibn Suʿūd al-Islāmiyya, Lajnat al-Buḥūth wa-l-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1979-1981, vol. 1 pt. 1, 94-95 (English: 'The Result on the Science of Legal Theory').

the *aḥkām*, then the purpose of *ʿilm al-bayān* is to enable the composer to come up with new artistic speech just as the purpose of *uṣūl al-fiqh* is to enable the legal authority to derive new legal rulings. If we focus on *adillat al-aḥkām*, which implies existing laws rather than new ones, then the resulting analogy is: just as the interpretation of the textual sources of the law regarding known cases form the basis of legal theory, likewise the interpretation of existing verse and prose form the basis of *ʿilm al-bayān*. The difference is between a poetics and a hermeneutics.

The tension between a discipline aiming to enable the creation of new poems and letters and a discipline aiming to explain existing poems and letters is present throughout the works of *ʿilm al-bayān* under our examination. But the explicit reference that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn makes here to *taʾlīf* 'composition' swings the pendulum towards a poetics. It is well known that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn saw himself primarily as a *kātib* 'state secretary' and a *kātib*'s educator (the term *inshāʾ* is not used), as evinced across his oeuvre (discussed in Part Two) and especially in his work on prosification, that is, forming new literary material from existing exemplars.[64] Moreover, reference to *taʾlīf* and the *muʾallif* 'composer' are copious throughout the *Mathal*. At one point Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn even equates – seemingly inadvertently – the science of *bayān* with the craft of composing speech, be it verse or prose (*ṣināʿat taʾlīf al-kalām min al-manẓūm wa-l-manthūr*).[65]

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[64] *Al-Washy al-marqūm fī ḥall al-manẓūm*, ed. Jamīl Saʿīd, [Baghdad]: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿIrāqī, 1989 (English: 'The Striped Embroidery on Turning Verse into Prose' [Heinrichs' translation in "Ibn al-Athīr," 315]). See Amidu Sanni's study of this work, *Arabic Theory of Prosification and Versification: On ḥall and naẓm in Arabic Theoretical Discourse*, Beiruter Texte und Studien, Band 70, Beirut: Steiner, 1998. Many modern scholars who deal with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn see him primarily in his capacity as a leading figure in epistolary composition. See for instance Gully, *Culture of Letter-Writing*, 30: "[I]n spite of the absence of the term *inshāʾ* in al-Maṯal al-sāʾir, I am going to assume that for him [Ibn al-Athīr] the epistolary genre, eloquence and *inšāʾ* were inseparable components." (It is here that Gully describes *ʿilm al-bayān* as "the branch of communication concerned with eloquence and clarity of expression, and, I suppose, the term in his [Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's] vocabulary for literary criticism in its broadest sense"; ibid., and see fn. 57 above.) We should mention that the art of letter-writing or secretaryship (*kitāba*) is recognized by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn as just that: an art (*fann*), not a science (*ʿilm*) (e.g., al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 56), although one cannot be certain that this difference was at all significant for him. He adds that it takes many years to acquire this art; ibid., 64 (see also Part Two, §4.1).

[65] One of the preliminary sections of the *Mathal* titled "on the tools of *ʿilm al-bayān*" (*fī ālāt ʿilm al-bayān wa-adawātih*; i.e., on the disciplines needed as prerequisites to *ʿilm al-bayān*) opens with the following statement:

It is clear that many of his discussions are directed toward *muʾallif al-kalām*, making 'the composers of speech' the audience for whom *ʿilm al-bayān* is intended. Indeed, in the entry on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn in *The Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* Wolfhart Heinrichs parenthetically glosses *ʿilm al-bayān* as "a theory of literary *composition*."[66]

Brief as his declaration of the status of *ʿilm al-bayān* may be, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn succinctly makes the case for a theoretical discipline – *ʿilm al-bayān* – with a practical application – producing literary speech.[67] At the end of his lean preface, in which he states the work's content, method and predecessors (see below), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn reiterates more explicitly the practical application of *ʿilm al-bayān*: "For the purpose [of *ʿilm al-bayān*/his book on *ʿilm al-bayān*][68] is to achieve the instruction (*taʿlīm*) of the words (*kalim*) with which necklaces are strung and gemmed [i.e., speech is composed] and minds are enchanted and beguiled."[69] Here one also finds the pedagogical import of *ʿilm al-bayān* in the term *taʿlīm* that enables the learner to compose speech. But the pedagogical aspect should not be overstated, as Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn alerts the reader in the following paragraph – the paragraph concluding the preface[70] – that more beneficial than instruction is perfecting one's 'good ear' (*dhawq*), that is, practicing and getting accustomed to

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"Know that craft of speech composition, be it verse or prose, requires many tools" (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 40). He thereby substituted the expression *ʿilm al-bayān* in the section's title with "the craft of speech composition".

[66] Emphasis added. See Heinrichs, "Ibn al-Athīr," 315.

[67] Taking *kalām* in the phrase *taʾlīf al-kalām* as a shorthand for *kalām balīgh* 'eloquent speech', which could also be rendered as 'literary speech' or 'artistic speech' (in other words, it does not refer to ordinary speech). The latter two are given as translations for *kalām balīgh* by van Gelder in "Literary Criticism as Literature," in Lale Behzadi and Vahid Behmardi (eds.), *The Weaving of Words: Approaches to Classical Arabic Prose*, Beirut: Orient Institut; Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2009, 55-75, here: 55.

[68] The phrase *hādhā l-ʿilm*, referring to *ʿilm al-bayān*, appears in the preceding line (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 37.2ᵉ).

[69] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 37-8. Minds are beguiled, or deceived (*tukhdaʿu*), in the sense that false things can be presented as true, through such devices as *taḥsīn al-qabīḥ* 'beautifying the ugly' and the like (see §5.1).

[70] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 38. By 'paragraph' I mean what I find to be a logical stopping point, which usually agrees with the editors' paragraphing decisions.

(good) speech (*qawl*). In fact, says Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, although the reader may find "a master" in his book, the place where *ʿilm al-bayān* really resides is with "the ruler of sound taste" (or 'good ear').[71] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn expounds this with an analogical metaphor, saying that he is preparing the road for the reader just as the maker of a sword would put it in someone's right hand: carrying the blade does not mean facing battle, and by implication, having a built road does not mean taking it.[72] In other words, the burden to fully apply *ʿilm al-bayān* falls on the reader.

The conflation of the 'theoretical' and the 'practical' recurs in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's remarks, but even though modern scholars often emphasize his predilection for *dhawq* rather than *taʿlīm* (see Introduction), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn often veers towards the theoretical. He explicitly attends to this question at a later point in the *Mathal* and rules in favor of 'theory'. Under the section on eloquence (*fī al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha*), he poses the following question:[73] "Were the types of eloquence in *ʿilm al-bayān* derived by induction from the poems of the Bedouin or by speculation and the judgment of reason (*bi-l-naẓar wa-qaḍiyyat al-ʿaql*)?"[74] His reply is

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[71] Ibid. As one might expect, much of the preface is written in effortless *sajʿ* (I placed the mark "/" to indicate the end of a parallel member): *wa-ʿlam ayyuhā l-nāẓiru fī kitābī anna madāra ʿilmi l-bayāni ʿalā ḥākimi l-dhawqi l-salīm / alladhi huwa anfaʿu min dhawqi l-taʿlīm / wa-hādhā l-kitābu wa-in kāna fīmā yulqīhi ilayka ustādhā / wa-idhā saʾalta ʿammā yuntafaʿu bihi fī fannihi qīla laka hādhā / fa-inna l-durbata wa-l-idmāna ajdā ʿalayka nafʿā* […] *wa-yajʿalāni ʿusraka mina l-qawli imkānā* […] "Know, O you studying my book, that the pivot of *ʿilm al-bayān* [rests] upon the ruler of sound taste, which is more beneficial than inculcated taste. Even though this book is a master teacher of what it conveys to you, and even though when you ask [people] to name one book on the subject that is beneficial they say "This one!" – practice and devotion are more advantageous to you in gain […] and can turn your stress in [making good] speech into a capability."

[72] Ibid. (and notice the Old-Arabic-style construction "*mathal* [X] *ka*-[Y]" for 'X is like Y'): *wa-mā mathalī fīmā mahhadtuhu laka min hādhā l-ṭarīqi illā ka-man ṭabaʿa sayfan wa-waḍaʿahu fī yamīnika li-tuqātila bihi* […] *fa-inna ḥamla l-niṣāl / ghayru mubāsharati l-qitāl.* As van Gelder points out ("Literary Criticism as Literature," 56): "*Sajʿ* is by no means a necessary component [of literary prose] but merely one of the numerous stylistic and rhetorical devices that contribute to the literary character of a text, such as metaphor, simile, irony, allusion, forms of repetition and parallelism and other figures, tropes and schemes, and fiction." Indeed, what makes such passages by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn "effortless" (see previous fn.) is exactly his employment of metaphors and analogies.

[73] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 119. The section begins on 1: 112. Von Grunebaum mentions this issue in his article on *bayān* as it appears in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's 'refutation', *al-Falak al-dāʾir*. My interpretation differs slightly because Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's discussion includes *dhawq* in a place that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not include.

[74] *hal ukhidha ʿilmu l-bayāni min ḍurūbi l-faṣāḥati wa-l-balāghati bi-l-istiqrāʾi min ashʿāri l-ʿarabi am bi-l-naẓari*

unequivocal (and fashioned in a manner reminiscent of a theologian's argumentation): *ʿilm al-bayān* is not derived by induction; those who composed poems and sermons devised/invented (*ibtadaʿū*) the eloquence that they produced by speculation and judgment of reason. (Notice the confused conflation of *ʿilm al-bayān* and actual production; see below.) Had it been the case that they derived it by induction from the products of those who came before them, this would lead by finite regress (*yatasalsalu*) to the first person who could not have inferred it by induction but rather invented his eloquence.[75] The passage is meant to underscore the scientific method of *ʿilm al-bayān*: it implies that induction as a method is based upon *naql* or transmission of previous literary speech, whereas speculation as a method is based upon *ʿaql* or reason.

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn reinforces his claim in the following passage by way of comparison to the science of grammar. Whereas the science of *bayān* was derived (*ustunbiṭa*) by speculation and the judgment of reason, he says, grammar was handed down from the coiner of the language (*wāḍiʿ*) through tradition (*taqlīd* lit. 'imitation'). The coiner could just as well have used the accusative ending for the subject of a verbal clause and the nominative for the direct object, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn contends, but with *ʿilm al-bayān* one could not have substituted an ugly expression for a beautiful one. It is true, he continues, that once people heard that the *fāʿil* is *marfūʿ* and the *mafʿūl* is *manṣūb*, they derived evidence and reasoning for this – but this reasoning he calls "flimsy" (*wāhiya*).[76] This is not an attack on *ʿilm al-naḥw*, as some scholars of the Arabic

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wa-qaḍiyyati l-ʿaql; ibid. 1: 119. Note the idiosyncratic phrase *ʿilm al-bayān min al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha* (or *ʿilm al-bayān min ḍurūb al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha*) which recurs three times in this and in the following passage (ibid. 1: 119.5, 119.3ᵉ, 120.2-3). I have translated this phrase as "[types of] eloquence in *ʿilm al-bayān*." lit. "*ʿilm al-bayān*, namely eloquence." This probably has to do with the fact that for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, as explained in ibid. 1: 39, eloquence is the "matter" (in the philosophical sense, i.e., subject-matter) of the science.

[75] Ibid. 1: 119.

[76] Ibid. 1: 119-20. Cf. the nearly-proverbial "weaker than a grammarian's argument" (*aḍʿaf min ḥujjat al-naḥwī*), taken from a line by Ibn Fāris describing the languid eyes of a Turkish girl (Geert Jan van Gelder, "Against the Arabic Grammarians: Some Poems," in Bilal Orfali [ed.], *In the Shadow of Arabic: The Centrality of Language to*

grammatical tradition would have us think.[77] It is true that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not spare his harsh

criticism from grammarians (or philologists more broadly), but this has to do with their poetic

opinions, not with the grammatical endeavor per se.[78] The fact of the matter is that the so-called

'anti-grammar' passage is derived nearly verbatim from ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī,[79] who was an

illustrious grammarian, and we will discuss al-Jurjānī's influence in more detail in Part Two. The

purpose of the passage in question is merely to justify the perceived scientificity of *ʿilm al-*

bayān, and it suggests that *ʿilm al-bayān* was not yet seen as a consolidated discipline.

The conflation we find in these passages between the 'theoretical' and the 'practical' is a

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Arabic Culture. Studies Presented to Ramzi Baalbaki on the Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday, Studies in Semitic Languages and Linguistic, vol. 63, Leiden: Brill, 2011, 249-63, here: 249).

[77] Both Baalbaki and Gully dwell on the implications of this passage. See Baalbaki, "*Naḥw* and *Bayān*," *passim*; Adrian Gully, "Two of a Kind? Ibn Hišām al-Anṣārī on *Naḥw* and Ibn al-Atīr on *Balāgha*," in Lutz Edzard and Janet Watson (eds.), *Grammar as a Window onto Arabic Humanism: A Collection of Articles in Honour of Michael G. Carter*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006, 84-107, esp. 87-97. They, and especially Baalbaki ("*Naḥw* and *Bayān*," 103), take *ʿilm al-bayān* as a historical offshoot of the science of grammar – which is how the later *ʿilm al-maʿānī* was eventually interpreted – without any regard to the early *naqd* works and the *adab al-kātib* tradition. Gully over-adheres to Martin Irvine's *The Making of Textual Culture: 'Grammatica' and Literary Theory, 350-1100*, and thus exaggerates the role Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn assigns to the study of grammar ("[…] grammar was the pivot around which that textual culture functioned [referring to the secretary's culture]," p. 89, somewhat anticipating Muhsin al-Musawi's *The Medieval Islamic Republic of Letters*). For a study on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's attitude towards grammar and grammarians in the *Mathal* see the booklet by Aḥmad Sulaymān Yāqūt, *al-Naḥw wa-l-nuḥāh ʿinda Ibn al-Athīr fī al-Mathal al-sāʾir*, Alexandria: Dār al-Maʿrifa al-Jāmiʿiyya, 1989.

[78] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 40. See also Ignác Goldziher's "[…] so kehrt sich Ibn al-Atīr an mehreren Stellen seines Werkes gegen die Competenz der Philologen in Sachen des Geschmackes" (*Abhandlungen zur arabischen Philologie*, 2 vols., Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1896, 1: 164). As we shall see in Part Two, there is a long history of literary critics censuring grammarians (or early philologists) for writing ill-suited *dīwān*-commentaries since they often limited their comments to difficult vocabulary and the syntax of a line, and often 'missed' the literary point of the poetic line. Ibn Jinnī's commentary on the poetry of al-Mutanabbī is a prime case in point. Traditionally, many early philologists (some of whom were also famous grammarians) delved in matters of *naqd* – and it is this last aspect that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, as well as critics before him, disapproved of. One example is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's annoyance with the "Baghdadi grammarian" Ibn al-Dahhān and "one of his Mosuli students" for degrading al-Mutanabbī: authors within "the scholars of *bayān*" and "the specialists among them," he says, give al-Mutanabbī his full due! (*wa-l-muṣannifu min ʿulamāʾi l-bayāni wa-l-mukhtaṣṣīna minhum yuʿṭī l-Mutanabbiyya ḥaqqahu mina l-faḍīla*); see *al-Istidrāk fī al-akhdh ʿalā al-maʾākhidh al-Kindiyya min al-maʿānī al-Ṭāʾiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām, Alexandria: Munshaʾat al-Maʿārif, 2005, 27 (English: 'The Rectification of the Critique of the Kindite [al-Mutanabbī's] Borrowings from the Ṭayyiʾite [Abū Tammām's] Motifs' [Heinrichs' translation, with modification, in "Ibn al-Athīr," 315]).

[79] ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir, Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, [1984], 395 (English: 'Intimations of [the Qurʾān's] Inimitability').

result, first, of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's engagement with al-Jurjānī, who used the phrase ʿilm al-bayān (albeit only one time) to simply mean 'the *knowledge* of eloquence' (see §3.2), and second, of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's labored, even contrived attempt to establish ʿilm al-bayān as an independent, theoretical science. This strongly suggests that a field of knowledge called ʿilm al-bayān was not quite recognized as an independent, 'scientific' discipline during Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's time. (That Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not coin the phrase is evident from the lack of any boastful comments which he surely would have made had he had coined it.) 'Theory' is given the upper hand if we go by his initial wording in the opening of the *Mathal*: ʿilm al-bayān li-taʾlīf al-naẓm wa-l-nathr "the science of *bayān* for [the purpose of] composing verse and prose."[80]

The case for 'theory' is made more strongly in the work predating the *Mathal*, al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, which is generally regarded as a 'trial-run' for the former.[81] The importance of the *Jāmiʿ* in our study could not be overstated: because its thematic framework coincides with that of the *Mathal* (as opposed to other works by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn), it is possible to isolate change from continuity in the development of his critical thinking.[82] In the case of envisaging ʿilm al-bayān we have a clear case of continuity. In the opening of his preface Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn states that the composition of eloquent/literary speech (taʾlīf al-kalām) can only be fathomed by studying ʿilm al-bayān, "which is like a measure/scale (bi-manzilat al-mīzān) for this craft."[83] Once again, ʿilm

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[80] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 35, and above.

[81] Heinrichs, "Ibn al-Athīr," 315.

[82] We are fortunate to have a similar case with Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, who also authored two literary-critical works with more or less the same framework.

[83] *ammā baʿdu fa-lammā kāna taʾlīfu l-kalāmi mimmā lā yūqafu ʿalā ghawrihi wa-lā yuʿrafu kunhu amrihi illā bi-l-iṭṭilāʿi ʿalā ʿilmi l-bayāni -lladhī huwa li-hādhihi l-ṣināʿati bi-manzilati l-mīzān* […] "Let us proceed. Since we cannot get to the bottom of literary composition nor can we fathom its true nature unless we study ʿilm al-bayān, which is like a measure/scale for this craft […]"; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ṣināʿat al-manẓūm min al-kalām wa-l-manthūr*, eds. Muṣṭafā Jawād and Jamīl Saʿīd, Baghdad: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī al-ʿIrāqī, 1956, 1.

al-bayān is seen as a theoretical science with a practical application in the form of literary composition. In a later section we find a discussion on eloquence (*al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha*), perhaps anticipating the passage in the *Mathal*, that claims that eloquence is derived by *al-naẓar wa-qaḍiyyat al-ʿaql*. Here in the *Jāmiʿ*, the discussion is in the form of a quotation from "one of the authors among the scholars" (*baʿḍ al-muṣannifīn min al-ʿulamāʾ*) – again probably al-Jurjānī – who stresses the need to exert contemplation (*tadabbur*), reflection (*taʾammul*) and speculation (*tafakkur*) when studying the knowledge/science of eloquence.[84] Here the editors of the *Jāmiʿ*, Jawād and Saʿīd, point to a specific passage in the *Dalāʾil* from which it was supposedly taken, though admittedly, it is far from a literal quotation.[85] Either way, conceiving of eloquence and/or *ʿilm al-bayān* as a knowledge/discipline requiring reflection and speculation – indeed, as a 'rational' affair – is consistent in both Ḍiyāʾ al-Din's literary-theoretical works.

In order to contextualize the theoretical status that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn assigns to *ʿilm al-bayān*, it may be useful to look at other sciences considered to hold a high theoretical status, specifically those that *ʿilm al-bayān* are likened to: logic (see *bi-manzilat al-mīzān* in the *Jāmiʿ*) and legal theory (see *bi-manzilat uṣūl al-fiqh* in the *Mathal*). One scholar, whose work on logic and legal

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[84] *fa-innaka idhā naẓarta ilā hādhā l-ʿilmi l-sharīfi -ḥtajta ʿinda dhālika ilā ṭūli makthin wa-tadabbur / wa-kathrati taʾammulin wa-tafakkur*; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 76 (*sajʿ* marking is mine; the strange *makth* might be a misreading of *baḥth*). The phrase *hādhā l-ʿilm* refers to *al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha* several lines earlier. Eloquence seems to be conceived as a 'knowledge' as it is used interchangeably in this passage with *maʿrifa*, but it could very well refer to an actual 'science'.

[85] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 76 fns. 2-3, 77 fn. 1. The passage is fairly distant from the wording found in the *Dalāʾil*, 37, and in the old edition, *Kitāb Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz fī ʿilm al-maʿānī*, eds. Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Muḥammad Maḥmūd al-Turkuzī al-Shinqīṭī, overseen and with fotenotes by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Manār, [1912], 31 (English: 'Intimations of [the Qurʾān's] Inimitability'). The idea is taken up again elsewhere by al-Jurjānī, e.g. *Dalāʾil* (ed. Shākir), 395 – the passage that inspired Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's comments in the *Mathal* – where al-Jurjānī states that knowledge of *iʿrāb* 'inflection' is not exerted by reflection (*laysa huwa mimmā yustanbaṭu bi-l-fikr*). We should point out that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn often draws on and quotes from al-Jurjānī in passages that display meticulous *sajʿ*. As van Gelder tells us, "[t]he ideas proposed in these works [the two works of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī] were no less novel than their style, which is essayistic, often passionate […] and when ʿAbd al-Qāhir writes about poetic language and imagery his prose style is itself of a quality […]" (*Classical Arabic Literature: A Library of Arabic Literature Anthology*, selected and translated by Geert Jan van Gelder, New York: New York University Press, 2013, 281). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn never quotes al-Jurjānī by name; rarely, as here, does he allude to him (*baʿḍ al-muṣannifīn*).

theory became well known, and whom Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn mentions by name, is al-Ghazālī. In the

following pages we will examine how al-Ghazālī viewed the disciplinary status of logic and legal

theory in order to better understand Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's stance on ʿilm al-bayān. Looking at al-

Ghazālī's works in this context does not imply that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn necessarily read them, but as

part of his cultural and intellectual life, we may surmise that he was aware of many of the ideas

therein (especially the 'superficial' ones, like the status of a discipline vis-à-vis other

disciplines).[86] Alexander Treiger shows that al-Ghazālī displayed a constant preoccupation with

the classification of the sciences across his scholarly writings.[87] To me this indicates the degree

to which a scholar could harness influence and authority by "redraw[ing] the map of the

sciences."[88] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's claim to authority is implicit both in his portrayal of the field he is

writing in as scientific, and, as we shall see in §1.2, in his presentation of the canon of the field.

Let us begin with logic. Logic is often glossed as a *mīzān*, a measure or standard by

which all other sciences – and (new) knowledge itself – are attained.[89] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn expressed

explicit aversion to philosophical (Aristotelian) poetics, but this does not mean he did not accept

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[86] And see Introduction, fn. 40, on the difference between the *voie diffuse* and *voie érudite*.

[87] Alexander Treiger, "Al-Ghazālī's Classification of the Sciences and Descriptions of the Highest Theoretical Science," *Dîvân: Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi* 16.1 (30) (2011), 1-32, here: 2-3.

[88] Quote from ibid., 3. Al-Ghazālī redrew the map of the sciences "in order to make room for his new sciences, "the sciences of the hereafter," at the expense of the traditional religious sciences […]."

[89] See, e.g., ʿAlī b. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī, *al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd* [or: *ḥudūd*] *al-manṭiq*, in *Rasāʾil Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās, 4 vols., Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr, 1983, 4: 93-356, here: 102-104 (English: 'Facilitating [One's Path] to the Brink of Logic'). The famous *Īsāghūjī* ('Introduction [to Logic]', commentary to Porphyry's *Isagoge*) by Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1265) starts with the remark that the treatise provides "what must be made present to the mind for anyone who begins [undertaking] any of the sciences" (*li-man yabtadiʾu fī shayʾin mina l-ʿulūm*); see *Majmūʿ al-mutūn al-kabīr*, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā, 1958, 377-386, here: 377. On al-Ghazālī's understanding of *al-mīzān* as "the balance of knowledge, the criterion for testing the validity of arguments" see Michael E. Marmura, "Ghazali's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic," in George F. Hourani (ed.), *Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975, 100-111, here: 102-103. For a later common view on logic as "an instrument that enables one to acquire other sciences" whose aim is "to ensure man against errors of reasoning" see Khaled El-Rouayheb, "Sunni Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500-1800," *Islamic Law and Society* 11 (2004), 213-232, here: 216 (the opinion quoted is of the sixteenth-century Shāfiʿī Egyptian Jurist, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ramlī [d. 957/1550]).

a 'de-foreignized', 'appropriated' discipline like logic, especially after al-Ghazālī's famous

endorsement thereof (and probably well before that).[90] In fact, as we have seen in the

Introduction, the study of logic and the philosophical sciences in general increased in the Arabic

East during Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's time. In the preface to *Miʿyār al-ʿilm* al-Ghazālī places logic (without

using the term *manṭiq*) implicitly within the rational sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-naẓariyya*) and claims

that the goal of the work is to make understood the ways of thought and speculation.[91] He

continues by saying that in order to reduce errors in reasoning he has organized his book "as a

standard/criterion for speculation and reflection, as a measure/scale for investigation and

contemplation, as a polisher of the mind and a sharpener of the faculty of thought and reason."[92]

Ironically, the analogy that al-Ghazālī's gives for the function of the discipline is to the

philological sciences. According to him, the relation of the science of logic (or his book) to

"those things that guide the minds" (?, *adillat al-ʿuqūl*) is equivalent to the relation of prosody to

poetry or grammar to correct inflection (*iʿrāb*): just as corrupt meter can only be known by the

measure (*mīzān*) of prosody and corrupt inflection by the touchstone (*miḥakk*) of grammar –

likewise correct and corrupt proof can only be distinguished by his book (or by the science of

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[90] For al-Ghazālī's endorsement of logic see, for instance, the first part of his *uṣūl* work, *al-Muṣṭaṣfā*, which is essentially an introduction to logic (that is, definition and proof [i.e., syllogism]); *al-Mustaṣfā* 1: 35-87 (*fī al-ḥadd*), 88-175 (*al-burhān* [otherwise known as *qiyās* in logical works]). He refers to these preliminary sections as being part of *madārik al-ʿuqūl* "the rational sources of the intellect [?]" and says it is like the "[camel's] extra-load (*ʿilāwa*) on *ʿilm al-uṣūl*," 1: 175. He then refers the readers wanting more information to his works dealing solely with logic: *Miḥakk al-naẓar* and *Miʿyār al-ʿilm*. According to Shihadeh, al-Ghazālī's introduction of logic to *kalām* was "by no means consistent or definitive, but pragmatic" ("From al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī," 148). Logic was endorsed even earlier with scholars supplanting common syllogistic premises with legal ones. Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) and his *al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq* is perhaps the best known. See Anwar G. Chejne, "Ibn Ḥazm of Cordova on Logic," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 104.1 (1984), 57-72, esp. 57, 61-63.

[91] Al-Imām al-Ghazālī, *Manṭiq Tahāfut al-falāsifa al-musammā Miʿyār al-ʿilm*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1961, 59 (English: 'The Logic [section] of [the work] *Incoherence of the Philosophers* called *The Criterion of Knowledge*'). According to Dunyā this work is originally one of the three parts of al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*, but this is a bit incongruent with al-Ghazālī's citation of the *Tahāfut* in this work (*Miʿyār*, 60). I am not attending to al-Ghazālī's other logical work, *Miḥakk al-naẓar*, since prefatory remarks on the status of the discipline are absent.

[92] *rattabnā hādhā l-kitāba miʿyāran li-l-naẓari wa-l-iʿtibār / wa-mīzānan li-l-baḥthi wa-l-iftikār / wa-ṣayqalan li-l-dhihn / wa-mishḥadhan li-quwwati l-fikri wa-l-ʿaql* (*Miʿyār*, 59).

logic).[93] This was a common analogy, as it is also attested in the work of the literary critic Ibn

Sinān al-Khafājī (d. 466/1074) and in earlier works of the classification of the sciences.[94]

As banal as these analogies may seem, they are quite telling of the apologetics

surrounding 'disciplines on the rise'. In the case of al-Ghazālī, prosody and grammar were long

well-established disciplines that he could adduce as a justification for logic as a science *qua*

science. In the case of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, logic and legal theory were well-established *rational*

disciplines that he could adduce as a justification for *ʿilm al-bayān* as a highly theoretical

science. The need for *ʿilm al-bayān* as a discipline *qua* discipline required less justification:

topics included in *ʿilm al-bayān* have been revered for centuries by critics, philologists and

Qurʾānic literary scholars.[95] But as opposed to logic and legal theory, these topics did not seem

to be bound by 'scientific rules'. It is the very idea that they were bound by scientific rules that

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn attempts to justify and demonstrate. One cannot fully appreciate his claim to

scientificity unless one takes into accout the increase in the study of *falsafa* that was taking place

in the Arabic East during this time (see Introduction).

While we cannot say with certainty that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn read al-Ghazālī's purely logical

works, in the case of legal theory we stand on firmer ground: Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn tells us so. Both in the

Jāmiʿ and in the *Mathal* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn recounts fourteen types of *majāz*, and in the latter work he

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[93] *Miʿyār*, 60, and see fn. 2 by the editor, who thinks that it may have been more appropriate to speak of *hādhā al-ʿilm* rather than *hādhā al-kitāb*.

[94] *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, 85-86; Ouyang, *Literary Criticism*, 29-30. For al-Khafājī the analogue to good meter and correct grammar is the knowledge of eloquence (*balāgha*). He claims that even if one can distinguish between eloquent and non-eloquent speech, his book is still useful because it defines the reasons (*ḥukm, ʿilal, wujūh, asbāb*) for preferring one utterance over the other. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is clearly moving in a different direction by abandoning the analogy to prosody and grammar.

[95] This will be discussed in more detail in §1.2. By Qurʾānic 'literary' scholars I mean people like Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) and his *Taʾwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān* ('Interpreting the [lexical/stylistic] Difficulties of the Qurʾān'): the approach to the topic comes more from a literary-linguistic point of view, although the dogmatic angle is not at all absent.

explicitly cites his source: "I was looking into one of the works of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, God have mercy upon him, which he authored on legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*), and I found that he mentioned literal and figurative speech and classified figurative speech into fourteen categories […]"[96] The work cited does not seem to have survived.[97] We shall look, then, into al-Ghazālī's famous *al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl* 'The Best Pick in Legal Theory' to get an idea of the 'Ghazālian model' that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was exposed to. We are not claiming that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn necessarily read the *Mustaṣfā* but given al-Ghazālī's influence, it is safe to assume he was well familiar with many of the ideas expressed therein. One specific legal issue will be addressed below. Another reason that makes the *Mustaṣfā* a good source for us to consult is that it lent itself to the layman. Evidence suggests that the *Mustaṣfā* was considered an elementary, rather than sophisticated, piece of legal scholarship.[98]

Al-Ghazālī speaks in the preface to his *Mustaṣfā* of three disciplinary categories: (1) the purely rational (*ʿaqlī maḥḍ*), like arithmetic, geometry and astronomy; (2) the purely traditional (or transmission-based, *naqlī maḥḍ*), like *ḥadīth* and *tafsīr* 'Qurʾānic commentary'; and (3) the one in which reason and tradition are combined (*mā izdawaja fīhi al-ʿaql wa-l-samʿ*), like legal theory.[99] It is not clear where stylistics and literary theory (though non-existent at this point as a consolidated discipline) would fit in this scheme, but what is clear is this: the traditional sciences do not fare well. Engaging in the traditional sciences is (more) commonplace, says al-Ghazālī,

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[96] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 88 ff; cf. *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 28-29. For al-Ghazālī, *majāz* was more narrowly a designation of various types of metonymies and dead metaphors.

[97] This has been corroborated to me by Frank Griffel in a personal communication during the 222nd meeting of the American Oriental Society in Boston, March 16-19, 2012.

[98] This is based on a remark Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī made to students he encountered at Ṭūs, "You are wasting your lives reading *Kitāb al-Mustaṣfā*," along with other criticisms he raised in his *Munāẓarāt*. See Robert Wisnovsky, "Towards a Genealogy of Avicennism," *Oriens* 42 (2014), 323-63, here: 333 fn. 15.

[99] *Al-Mustaṣfā* 1: 3-4. For a thorough account see Treiger, "Al-Ghazālī's Classification of the Sciences," 17-22.

since the young and the old have equal footing in it as memorization suffices for their attainment; there is no role for the mind/reason in them. Engaging in the rational sciences, on the other hand, may lead to reward in the afterlife. But as may be expected, the noblest type of science is the one that combines the rational with the traditional, like *uṣūl al-fiqh*.[100] Given this account, it would seem that anyone familiar with this 'model' intending to anchor the subject matter he is writing on in 'disciplinary' terms would choose the more rational strain over the traditional one. I believe that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's analogies of *ʿilm al-bayān* to logic and especially to legal theory corroborate this view.

Al-Ghazālī did not conceive of legal theory primarily as a method to derive new legal rulings, as we have seen above. Rather, the denotation of the science called *uṣūl al-fiqh* according to al-Ghazālī's prefatory remarks is the knowledge of establishing the evidence-sources of the law, the conditions of their soundness and the ways in which they demonstrate – so we assume – *existing* legal rulings (*wa-wujūh dalālatihā ʿalā l-aḥkām*).[101] As we have seen, this is what Wael Hallaq referred to as "the justification and 're-enactment' of the processes of legal reasoning behind existing rules."[102] Nevertheless, al-Ghazālī also pays attention to new legal rulings via his treatment of the *mujtahid* (see below), and to a non-specialist like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, the gist of the science was to create new legal rulings. This is facilitated by the way al-Ghazālī expounds on the meaning of *uṣūl al-fiqh* in terms derived from the root *th.m.r* 'to bear

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[100] *Al-Mustaṣfā* 1: 3-4. Later al-Ghazālī provides a two-fold classification, rational (*ʿaqliyya*) and religious (*dīniyya*), and legal theory is places within the latter. It seems that this opposition has a more 'ontological' nature, as al-Ghazālī focuses on the difference between *uṣūl* and *kalām* 'speculative theology' from an ontological perspective (ibid. 1: 12-17). According to Louis Gardet, al-Ghazālī used the opposition *al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya–al-ʿulūm al-sharʿiyya wa-l-dīniyya* "freely" ("ʿAḳliyyāt," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*). For a more nuanced account of al-Ghazālī's views on the ranking of the sciences see Treiger, "Al-Ghazālī's Classification of the Sciences."

[101] *Al-Mustaṣfā* 1: 11.

[102] Hallaq, *A History of Islamic Legal Theories*, 1-2, and above.

fruit'.[103] In al-Ghazālī's scheme, the first principle of *uṣūl al-fiqh* addresses the *aḥkām*, usually in the more specific sense of 'legal qualifications/statuses' that are assigned to certain acts (traditionally five: obligatory, recommended, indifferent, reprehensible, forbidden). Al-Ghazālī refers to the *aḥkām* as *al-thamara* 'fruit' or *al-thamara al-maṭlūba* 'the sought-after fruit'.[104] The second principle is the evidence for the law (*adilla*), or the prooftext, referred to as *al-muthmir* 'the one[s] bearing fruit'; that is, the Qurʾān, *ḥadīth* and *ijmāʿ*.[105] The third principle is the method of extracting the evidence (*wujūh dalālat al-adilla*) or *al-istithmār* 'extracting fruit'. The fourth concerns the one deriving [new] legal rulings (*mujtahid*) or *al-mustathmir* 'the one extracting the fruit'. The *mustathmir* is countered with the *muqallid* 'imitator [i.e., one not deriving new legal rulings]'.[106] The book is divided into four large sections called *aqṭāb* 'poles', each devoted to the four principles discussed.[107] The section on *aḥkām* gives the impression that it is the existing rulings that are the topic of interest, but because it is couched in terms of 'fruit' and the process of its 'production' (the 'extraction', the one 'extracting', etc.), it is plain to see how this could be understood as something 'new'. As a side-note we may add that al-Ghazālī's use of *istithmār* reminds us of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's discussion of *istikhrāj*, the extraction or derivation of fresh images and ideas (*maʿānī*) from existing ones.[108] It so happens that the vast majority of examples of invented images (*maʿānī mukhtaraʿa* or *mubtadaʿa*) that are said to be 'extracted'

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[103] The following is based on *al-Mustaṣfā* 1: 18-25. I am not claiming al-Ghazālī was the first or only scholar to do so; in fact, my aim is not to make any claims about *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Rather, I am interested in looking at the discipline the way Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and other non-specialists would have.

[104] Ibid. 1: 19, 176 ff. This section also deals with the *ḥākim* 'ruler' (God), the ruled (or non-ruled, like the young or incompetent), the sphere of things ruled upon (actions not essences), and more.

[105] Ibid. 1: 22-23, and vol. 2. *Ijmāʿ* refers to the unanimous agreement among religious authorities regarding a ruling.

[106] Ibid. 1: 25, vol. 3 (for *istithmār*), vol. 4 (for *al-mustathmir*).

[107] Incidentally or not, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn structures his *Jāmiʿ* around two large sections, called *aqṭāb*.

[108] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 3-69. We will discuss some aspects of this topic in Part Two.

illustrate extraction from one of the legal *adilla*, namely, *ḥadīth*.[109]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn seems to have been influenced by specific legal notions as well, a fact which in turn reinforces our contention that his disciplinary vision for *ʿilm al-bayān* was inspired, directly or indirectly, by al-Ghazālī. Evidence of legal thinking associated with al-Ghazālī surfaces in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's presentation of eloquence (specifically acoustic eloquence, *faṣāḥa*) as a relational notion (*amr iḍāfī*) rather than an absolute one.[110] This is an opinion he espouses in the *Jāmiʿ* and later forsakes entirely in the *Mathal*.[111] Al-Ghazālī famously refuted the Muʿtazilī notion that human acts can be described as good (*ḥasan*) or bad (*qabīḥ*) in and of themselves, that is, that there is something inherent (*waṣf dhātī*) to the act determining its moral quality.[112] Al-Ghazālī rather proposed the idea of *ḥusn* and *qubḥ* being two relational notions (*amrān iḍāfiyyān*), as opposed to, say, the quality of blackness and whiteness.[113] In the *Jāmiʿ* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn uses surprisingly identical terms to describe the quality of lexical-acoustic eloquence as a relational notion. In this he is refuting the words of his predecessor, Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (d. 466/1074), who by presenting the "conditions" of single-word eloquence essentially formulated it as an objective property that can be attained. (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is also following a line of thought

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[109] For derivations of *istikhrāj* (*mustakhraj*, *istakhrajtu*, etc.) see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 8, 18-19, 20, 35-36, 43-44, 55-56. In the last of these (p. 56) he lays out his method of *istikhrāj* from the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*, but in his actual examples, the *istikhrāj* is primarily from *ḥadīth*. Sometimes *mustanbaṭ* is used (2: 33). The idea of image extraction is not elaborated upon in the *Jāmiʿ*; much of the corresponding chapter there on *maʿānī* was incorporated into the last section of the *maʿānī* discussion in the *Mathal* (*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 68-72, *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 63 ff).

[110] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 77-79. *Faṣāḥa* refers here to the acoustic and lexical aspect of eloquence (*faṣāḥa*) rather than the more semantic one (*balāgha*) (ibid., 79-81). Another example of engagement with legal thinking comes up when Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn compares what he calls *al-tarjīḥ bayna l-maʿānī / tarjīḥ bayānī* with the *tarjīḥ fiqhī* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 86-96, including "what the lawyers call *mafhūm al-khiṭāb*"), a discussion that is later scathingly criticized by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd as being entirely useless and wrong (vol. 4 of *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*, 72-76).

[111] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 218-24, esp. 222.

[112] *Al-Mustaṣfā* 1: 178-94, esp. 180-82.

[113] Ibid. 1: 181; also *awṣāf iḍāfiyya*, 1: 182-83.

expressed by al-Jurjānī; see Part Two.) Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn relates as follows:

> *wa-ʿlam ayḍan anna l-faṣāḥata amrun iḍāfiyyun ka-l-ḥusni wa-l-qubḥi wa-l-kalāmu l-faṣīḥu laysa kalāman makhṣūṣan bi-ʿaynihi bal kullu man fahima kalāman wa-ʿarafahu fa-huwa faṣīḥun bi-l-nisbati ilayhi li-annahu ẓāhirun ʿindahu wa-wāḍiḥun ladayhi wa-mimmā yuqawwī hādhā l-qawla anna l-lafẓa -lladhī lā naʿudduhu naḥnu fī zamāninā hādhā faṣīḥan wa-nakrahuhu li-ʿadami -stiʿmālihi wa-gharābatihi kāna ʿinda man taqaddamanā min arbābi l-taʾlīfi mustaʿmalan fī zamānihim mutaʿārafan mushtahiran [...] wa-lawi -stuʿmila fī zamāninā hādhā la-stunkira wa-stubshiʿa wa-ḥukima ʿalā qāʾilihi bi-l-jahli wa-l-taʿassuf*

> Know also that [lexical-acoustic] eloquence is a relational notion like goodness [or: beauty] and badness [or: ugliness], for eloquent speech is not endowed [with qualities] in and of itself. Rather, anyone who understands a certain speech and approves of it, then it is eloquent in his view [lit. in 'relation' to him] because it is evident and clear for him. What strengthens this opinion is that words that we ourselves do not consider as eloquent in this day of ours and dislike due to their lack of usage and rareness – used to be in use, common and widespread during the time of the masters of composition who came before us [in their speech]. If it [such speech] were used in this day of ours it would be loathed and found repugnant, and its speaker would be deemed ignorant and deviating.[114]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn abandons this view later on, probably in an attempt to implicitly refute the view held by al-Jurjānī, according to which eloquence has not to do with the single word. But since the terminology of a relational notion is not found in the work of al-Khafājī or al-Jurjānī, it attests to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's awareness of some peripheral legal thinking.

1.2. *al-aʾimma al-mashhūrīna fīhi*: The Discipline has a Canon

So far we have dealt with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's effort – almost forced effort – to establish a disciplinary framework to a science called *ʿilm al-bayān*. I claim that by doing this he presented a consolidated notion of the field of stylistics and literary theory, one that was absent up until his

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[114] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 77.

time. In fact, that such a notion was absent during the classical ʿAbbāsid era is one of Wen-chin Ouyang's conclusions in her work on 'classical' Arabic literary criticism (third/ninth to fifth/eleventh century).[115] To borrow her words, what Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did was exactly to provide "a cohesive vision of its [the field's] function"[116] by assigning it a rational status and aiming it at a practical purpose, namely the production of literary speech. But a unified vision of the discipline is not the only feature that Ouyang speaks of that was lacking in the early period. According to her, a second feature absent from the critical tradition was "a shared definition of an authoritative specialist." The reason for this lay in the conflicting interests of different specialists engaging in the literary-critical endeavor: the transmitters and collectors of poetry, the religious scholars studying *iʿjāz* (the inimitability of the Qurʾān), the secretaries (*kuttāb*) and the modern poets.[117] She sees the absence of these two features at the basis of the unsuccessful attempt "to establish poetic criticism as an independent and integral discipline of learning."[118] In this section we will look at the second feature Ouyang recounts, namely, the establishment of an authority (or authorities), or what I shall also refer to as the establishment of a canon in the field.

After his brief declaration of the status of ʿ*ilm al-bayān* in the *Mathal*, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn goes on to provide a 'canon' of-sorts for this science (*fīhi*, referring to ʿ*ilm al-bayān*). The canon

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[115] Ouyang, *Literary Criticism*, esp. 204-209. One should keep in mind that she is looking especially into poetic criticism (ʿ*ilm al-shiʿr*, *al-ʿilm bi-l-shiʿr* and *naqd al-shiʿr*) and not into general stylistics and literary theory. Thus, works on the stylistics of the Qurʾān, for instance, are not part of her purview. Nevertheless, I think her conclusions hold for the larger tradition of literary theory and criticism as well. What is more, her insights on what makes a scholarly tradition a coherent tradition are very useful for our purposes.

[116] Ibid., 207.

[117] Ibid. This will be discussed in more detail below. For historical and thematic accounts on the development of the literary-critical tradition see Heinrichs, "*Naḳd*"; van Gelder's introduction ("Exordium") to *Beyond the Line*, 1-14; Thomas Bauer, "Arabische Kultur," in Gert Ueding (ed.), *Rhetorik: Begriff, Geschichte, Internationalität*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2005, 283-300, esp. 285-91. The latter's contribution lies mainly in treating the Standard Theory; for the early period he seems to rely heavily on Heinrichs' *Naḳd* entry (or *idem*, "Poetik") without recognition.

[118] Ouyang, *Literary Criticism*, 207.

comprises two works: *Kitāb al-Muwāzana* by Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥasan b. Bishr al-Āmidī (d. 371/981) and *Sirr al-faṣāḥa* by Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Sinān al-Khafājī (d. 466/1074).[119] This would be a noteworthy endorsement on the part of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, considering that his canon was downsized from seven works in the *Jāmiʿ* to two in the *Mathal*, were it not for the fact that one of these – al-Khafājī's work – is scathingly criticized at the outset.[120] Although al-Āmidī's *Muwāzana* is generally lauded, one cannot escape the conclusion that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is trying to establish himself as the only real authority in *ʿilm al-bayān* (perhaps as one would expect in a preface). But Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn gives us more evidence to strengthen this conclusion by presenting an approach to what we may call 'scientific *salafism*' in literary theory. This approach consists of identifying and defining literary devices (*ḍurūb* lit. 'types/categories' of *ʿilm al-bayān*[121]) from the primary sources to the apparent exclusion of intervening 'middle-men':

> *wa-kuntu ʿathartu ʿalā ḍurūbin minhu fī ghuḍūni l-Qurʾāni l-karīmi wa-lam ajid aḥadan mimman taqaddamanī taʿarraḍa li-dhikri shayʾin minhā*
> [...] *wa-hadānī -llāhu li-btidāʿi ashyāʾa lam takun min qablī mubtadaʿatan wa-manaḥanī darajata l-ijtihādi -llatī lā takūnu aqwāluhā tābiʿatan wa-innamā hiya muttabaʿatun*
> I had discovered categories of it (*ʿilm al-bayān*) within the noble Qurʾān and did not see anyone of those who preceded me make mention of any of them.
> [...] God guided me to the invention of things that were not before me invented and granted me a level of creative individual judgment (*ijtihād*) whose opinions do not

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[119] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 35-36. He prefaces his endorsement with the words *wa-lam ajid mā yuntafaʿu bihi fī dhālika illā* [...] "The only beneficial [works] in that [*ʿilm al-bayān*] are [...]"

[120] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 36. He claims that al-Khafājī paid too much attention to the discussion of sounds (*aṣwāt*, from an ontological point of view) and phonemes (*ḥurūf*), as well as properties of the single word (*al-lafẓa al-mufrada*). It is this latter criticism that ignited Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's advancement of the idea of lexical-acoustic eloquence being a relational notion.

[121] *ḍurūb kathīra minhu*; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 37. The suffixed pronoun *-hu* refers back to *ʿilm al-bayān* appearing on p. 35 (and see editors' fn. 1 on p. 37).

'follow' but are rather 'followed'.[122]

The primary text Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn speaks of in this approach is the Qurʾān; technically, early poetry would fall into this category as well. We might remark that *ijtihād* was a proverbial mark of Shāfiʿism, or at least that Shāfiʿī scholars had a reputation for avoiding *taqlīd* in their methodology of legal studies.[123] I cannot say whether Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own Shāfiʿī affiliation has anything to do with his expressed method, but we increasingly find these type of pronouncements in later works of literary theory as well. In the *Jāmiʿ* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn gives a more detailed account of his method, which we shall come back to later.

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not ignore earlier scholarly sources. He remarks that in addition to the categories he singlehandedly extracted, he supplanted other categories recorded in the early works (*ḍurūb ukhar mudawwana fī al-kutub al-mutaqaddima*).[124] But as we have seen, besides al-Āmidī's and al-Khafājī's works, we do not know – at least at the outset – which works would fall into this category. A more clearly defined 'canon' in the field of *ʿilm al-bayān* can be found in his early work, the *Jāmiʿ*. There he invokes a list of five additional "famous masters in it [the discipline of *ʿilm al-bayān*]" (*al-aʾimma al-mashhūrīna fīhi*) and unnamed "others" whose works will be cited in his book.[125] The masters enumerated are (only names, no citation of works) Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā al-Rummānī (d. 384/994), Abū ʿUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868 or 9), Qudāma b. Jaʿfar al-Kātib (d. *ca.* 337/948), Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. after 400/1010) and Abū al-ʿAlāʾ

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[122] Ibid. 1: 37.

[123] Ahmed El Shamsy, "Rethinking *Taqlīd* in the Early Shāfiʿī School," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 128.1 (2008), 1-23, esp. 7, 11-12.

[124] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 37.

[125] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 2-3. To refer to these scholars he also uses *ʿulamāʾ* and *arbāb*.

Muḥammad b. Ghānim, known as al-Ghānimī (*fl.* 5th/11th century).[126]

The works of these scholars, in addition to al-Āmidī's and al-Khafājī's, represent the wide range of what we may call the early *naqd* works.[127] Al-Rummānī and his *al-Nukat fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*[128] would represent the more exegetical strand of literary theory and the occupation with the inimitable character of the Qurʾān. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī mentions the knowledge of *iʿjāz* as one of the main goals of his work *Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn*, but he undoubtedly represents a more poetical strand of literary theory occupied with the 'modern style' of poetry known as *badīʿ*.[129] The works of Qudāma b. Jaʿfar and al-Khafājī, *Naqd al-shiʿr* and *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, may reflect the imprint of logical thinking, or at least the attempt to structure the discussions of literary theory along logical lines (ontological in the case of al-Khafājī, beginning with the single sound and working his way up to conceptual thinking). More notably, they reflect the occupation of the *kuttāb* with literary theory.[130] Al-Āmidī too was a secretary, as well as an accomplished poet and trained grammarian, and his work *al-Muwāzana bayna shiʿr Abī Tammām wa-l-Buḥturī* best represents 'applied criticism'.[131] His classicizing preferences perhaps also align him with the 'philological' strand of literary theory concerned with collecting and commenting on ancient

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[126] Ibid.

[127] And see Heinrichs, "Naḳd"; *idem*, "Literary Theory: The Problem of its Efficiency," in G.E. von Grunebaum (ed.), *Arabic Poetry: Theory and Development*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1973, 19-69, here: 21-22, 28-32.

[128] In what follows we are assuming which works of the mentioned 'masters' Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was familiar with. In the case of al-Rummānī, it may well be the case that the main work he had in mind is the now lost *Kitāb al-Bayān* (!); see Heinrichs, "Literary Theory," 28 fn. 44 (citing Brockelmann).

[129] Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, *Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn al-kitāba wa-l-shiʿr*, eds. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī and Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, [Cairo]: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, [1971], 7 (English: 'The Book of the Two Crafts: Scribal Arts and Poetry'); Heinrichs, "Naḳd," under "The influence of the Ḳurʾānic discourse"; *idem*, "Literary Theory," 31, within the context of the strand of the new poets. By 'new' and 'modern' we mean, of course, the ʿAbbāsid poets.

[130] Heinrichs, "Literary Theory," 31; *idem*, "Naḳd," under "The real founders of *naḳd*: the secretaries" and "Further systematical research."

[131] Heinrichs, "Literary Theory," 31; *idem*, "Naḳd," under "The controversy around Abū Tammām."

poetry.[132] Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* could reflect a pre-systematic stage of literary theory – it contains a plethora of material that would later find its way into the classical *naqd* works – but admittedly, is more appropriately part of the *adab* tradition (and according to some, Muʿtazilī philosophy).[133] This leaves us with the otherwise unknown al-Ghānimī whose work appears to be non-extant.[134]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn back-projects *ʿilm al-bayān* as the common heading to the endeavor of the scholars he cites despite the fact that such a heading was lacking. To be sure, the literary-critical topics analyzed in these books did indeed overlap but were never recognized as an agreed-upon scientific genre. If we look at the headings they themselves used, Al-Āmidī's 'genre' would probably best be defined as *shiʿr* or *ṣināʿat al-shiʿr* (sometimes: *al-ʿilm bi-l-shiʿr*): poetry.[135]

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[132] Heinrichs, "Literary Theory," 30. Al-Āmidī did not collect poetry and is not enumerated as part of the philological strand, which is the earliest and 'rawest' expression of literary theory. But in his lack of predilection for the *badīʿ* style he definitely stands out among the other 'masters' mentioned by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. Interestingly, according to al-Āmidī (Heinrichs, "Naḳd," under "The controversy around Abū Tammām") the adherents of the 'ancient' style are the secretaries, Bedouins and 'natural' poets, whereas the adherents of the 'modern' style are the mannerist and philosophizing poets as well as 'the people of conceits' (*ahl al-maʿānī*). This does not reflect the bulk of literary-theoretical thinking, even during the classical ʿAbbāsid era, as is seen – first and foremost – by the *badīʿ* predilection of the secretary and poet (and one-day caliph) Ibn al-Muʿtazz.

[133] For details see Chapter 3.

[134] Brockelmann, Sezgin, Ziriklī and Kaḥḥāla do not contain information on al-Ghānimī in their monumental reference works. A later "Ibn Ghānim" (d. after 1258) is mentioned by Brockelmann (as well as Ziriklī and Kaḥḥāla); see Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Leiden: Brill, 1943, 1949, 3 Supplemental vols., 1937-1942, Suppl. 3: 599 (henceforth *GAL*). The editors of the *Jāmiʿ*, however, cite information from al-Samʿānī's (d. 562/1166) *al-Ansāb*, its *mukhtaṣar* by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's brother, ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233) and al-Bākharzī's (d. 467/1075) *Dumyat al-Qaṣr* that provide us with the following: al-Ghānimī was a poet and an *adīb* from amongst the poets praising the Saljūq vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092); he is attributed to Herāt by his *nisba* and was active in the Eastern Islamic world. No dates of birth/death are given; no work on literary theory is cited (*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 2 fn. 5).

[135] Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥasan b. Bishr al-Āmidī, *al-Muwāzana bayna shiʿr Abī Tammām wa-l-Buḥturī*, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr, 2 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1961, 1965; vol. 3 ed. ʿAbd Allāh Ḥamad Muḥārib, Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1990, 1: 402-405 (English: 'The Weighing of the Poetry of Abū Tammām [reflecting 'modern' poetical diction] and al-Buḥturī [Abū Tammām's student, reflecting a 'classicizing' ancient Bedouin diction]'). In our terms the genre he is writing in could also be classified as poetic commentary, as he conducts his 'balancing', or comparison between the two poets line-by-line (or segment-by-segment), reminding us of a *dīwān* commentary. The endeavors of the poetic commentators have usually not been considered part of the literary- theoretical tradition. But as Hamori shows, because their work was only explanatory and not prescriptive they often revealed "a careful reader's perception in ways missing from the rhetoric [i.e., *naqd*] books." See Andras Hamori, "Reading al-Mutanabbī's Ode on the Siege of al-Ḥadaṯ," in Wadād al-Qāḍī (ed.), *Studia Arabica et Islamica: Festschrift for Iḥsān ʿAbbās on his*

Qudāma uses the classical *naqd* heading (here: the non-metaphorical 'assaying', the precursor for 'criticism'), with the assessment of poetry in mind (*al-ʿilm bi-l-shiʿr*, *ṣināʿat al-shiʿr*).[136] Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī uses the heading 'eloquence' or 'the knowledge of eloquence' (*ʿilm al-balāgha wa-maʿrifat al-faṣāḥa*) as well as 'the craft of speech' (*ṣanʿat al-kalām*).[137] Likewise does al-Khafājī (*faṣāḥa*; *taʾlīf al-kalām*), who also speaks of 'criticism'.[138] Al-Rummānī's work, although under the heading *iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, is a study of *balāgha* 'eloquence'.[139] The one heading missing from this range – one that became common indeed – is *badīʿ* (originally: 'new [style]'), here: 'the study of literary devices', starting with Ibn al-Muʿtazz (d. 296/908).[140] The

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Sixtieth Birthday, [Beirut]: American University of Beirut, 1981, 195-206, esp. 199-200 and 203-205, here: 203. Smyth does include the genre of the commentary as part of 'post-classical' criticism but his treatment is very brief ("Criticism," 412-13). While al-Āmidī's work deals with poetry in terms of poetic themes and poetic evaluation, it does not deal with poetics in the strict sense (i.e., the process of composition) such as we find in Ibn Ṭabāṭabā's (d. 322/934) *ʿIyār al-shiʿr* ('The Criterion of Poetry'; see Heinrichs, "Naḳd," under "The real founders of *naḳd*: the secretaries").

[136] Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, *Naqd al-shiʿr*, ed. S.A. Bonebakker, Leiden: Brill, 1956, 1-3 (English: 'The Assaying of Poetry'). For the non-metaphorical meaning of *naqd* see Heinrichs, "Naḳd," introductory paragraph.

[137] *Al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 7-8, 11. Seemingly, Abū Hilāl oscillates between *balāgha* as a 'knowledge' and *balāgha* as a 'science': on one hand *ʿilm* is used synonymously with *maʿrifa* (p. 7, twice), and on the other he speaks of that *ʿilm* in relation to other *ʿulūm*. But on second reading, the other *ʿulūm* are also used in the sense of 'knowledges' rather than full-fledged disciplines: Abū Hilāl says (p. 8) that the knowledge of eloquence should come before all other knowledges after "[the knowledge of] the oneness of God" and His justice. As we find later with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, Abū Hilāl claims that without this knowledge one cannot "fashion (*yaṣnaʿ*) a *qaṣīda* or compose a *risāla* 'epistle'" (ibid.). According to Kanazi, the work is intended explicitly as a compilation of all material on *balāgha*; see George Kanazi, *Studies in the Kitāb al-Ṣināʿatayn of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī*, Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1989, 36.

[138] *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, 3 (*faṣāḥa*), 82-84 (*taʾlīf al-kalām*), 139 (*ṣināʿat naqd al-kalām al-muʾallaf* "the craft of criticizing compound speech"), 5 (*ahl naqd al-kalām* "the scholars of speech criticism").

[139] Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā al-Rummānī, *al-Nukat fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* in Muḥammad Khalaf Allāh and Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām (eds.), *Thalāth rasāʾil fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān li-l-Rummānī wa-l-Khaṭṭābī wa-ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī*, Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, [1956?], 69-104, here: 69-70 (English: 'Notes on the Inimitability of the Qurʾān'). The short treatise amounts to a presentation of ten categories of *balāgha* (the last of which is *bayān*, to be discussed in §3.1).

[140] ʿAbd Allāh Ibn al-Muʿtazz, *Kitāb al-Badīʿ*, ed. Ignatius Kratchkovsky, London: Gibb Memorial, 1935. Later well-known examples are Usāma b. Munqidh's (d. 584/1188) *al-Badīʿ fī naqd al-shiʿr* and Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's (d. 654/1256) *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*. *Badīʿ* as a heading is at times on par with *ʿilm al-bayān*: Ibn al-Athīr al-Ḥalabī attends to this question explicitly (see §2.3 below), and al-Zanjānī uses the heading *badīʿ* in the Islamic East (see Part Two, §4.3).

heading *ʿilm al-bayān* was not, or was little known, and perhaps al-Ghānimī used it.[141] Shawqī

Ḍayf thinks the term *ʿilm al-bayān* was coined by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, the word *bayān* itself borrowed

from al-Jāḥiẓ.[142] But if the combination of *ʿilm* with *bayān* was new, we do not believe Ḍiyāʾ al-

Dīn would have missed the opportunity to tell us so. What *was* new was the combination of

giving *ʿilm al-bayān* a 'scientific' disciplinary framework and assigning it a canon of previous

non-*ʿilm-al-bayān* works.

One might ask at this point why the list of previous authorities "in the field" shrunk from

seven in the *Jāmiʿ* to two in the *Mathal*. While professional reasons concerning the merit and

relevance of the five omitted works could be cited, I am not convinced that such motives stood at

the basis of this decision, especially because the omitted works are copiously referred to (or

incorporated without acknowledgement) throughout the *Mathal*. What it may have more to do

with is, again, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's attempt to establish himself as the only true authority in the field –

and if not himself, then scholars in his locale. Proving this argument may be impossible, but the

following could be presented as evidence for a very well-educated guess. Heinrichs alluded to

this local patriotism when he observed Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's "aesthetic preference for Syrian poetry of

the 'neo-classical' kind."[143]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was a man of the Jazīra,[144] roughly the area covering northwestern Iraq,

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[141] Previous scholars like al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) and al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) did use the heading *ʿilm al-bayān* following ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, but according to Abu Deeb, the latter "does not […] use these phrases [*ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *ʿilm al-bayān*] as technical terms […]" (K. Abu Deeb, "al-Djurdjānī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition* [Supplement]). Al-Zamakhsharī used *ʿilm al-bayān* in an ambiguous technical sense, and with al-Rāzī we seem to have a non-technical use, following al-Jurjānī. For discussion see §3.2.

[142] Shawqī Ḍayf, *al-Balāgha*, 317, 324. For Ḍayf (and other scholars East and West) *bayān* is understood simply as a synonym for *balāgha*, *ʿilm al-bayān* as a synonym for eloquence studies.

[143] Heinrichs, "Ibn al-Athīr," 315, and §4.1 for details.

[144] And not just because of his *nisba* "al-Jazarī" (which refers to his place of birth). For his biography see §4.1.

northeastern Syria and southeastern Turkey. Born in Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar – present day Cizre in

southeastern Turkey – the locale Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was most probably associated with is Mosul in

northwestern Iraq. His father was a prominent Mosuli statesman and was assigned to Cizre

where he moved with his family. But it was only his early education that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn received

in Cizre, later moving back to Mosul and continuing the bulk of his education there. He did serve

shortly under Saladin in Egypt during his early adulthood, but nearly all of his later posts as

Ayyūbid and Zangid vizier/senior secretary were in modern-day Syria, northern Iraq and

southern Turkey: Damascus, Aleppo and Salkhad (Ṣarkhad) in Syria; Irbil, Sinjar and Mosul in

Iraq; Samsat (Sumaysāṭ) in Turkey. He died while on mission from the governor of Mosul to the

capital Baghdad. The only locale in which he was said to have "settled" is Mosul.[145] "Iraqi"

would not fit his affiliation – this by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own account in the *Mathal* – as we find

"Iraqis," and specifically Baghdadis, singled out and disparaged as scholars.[146] This may be a

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[145] Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* 5: 389-397, esp. 390-91, 396. The order of his locations was: Cizre, Mosul, Cairo, Damascus, Mosul, Cairo, Salkhad, Samsat, Aleppo, Mosul, Irbil, Sinjar, and finally, again, Mosul (*Wafayāt* 5: 390-91 and C. Cahen, "La Correspondance de Ḍiyā [sic] ad-Dîn ibn al-Athīr: Liste de lettres et textes de diplômes," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 14.1 [1952], 34-43). It is with regards to this last move to Mosul that Ibn Khallikān says that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn took it as his home and settled (*wa-ttakhadhahā dāra iqāmatihi wa-staqarra*; *Wafayāt* 5: 391). The information about his death in Baghdad Ibn Khallikān derives from Ibn al-Mustawfī's (d. 637/1239) *Tārīkh Irbil*, seemingly from a volume that has not survived. A more exact date of death, according to Ibn Khallikān, was taken from Ibn al-Najjār al-Baghdādī's (d. 643/1245) *[Dhayl] Tārīkh Baghdād*, from a volume which, too, has not survived. Notably, all later biographies of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn are closely derived from the *Wafayāt*. See Part Two, §4.1.

[146] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 59, referring to Ibn Aflaḥ al-Baghdādī's *Muqaddima* which "the Iraqis pay [much] attention to, praise and eagerly apply themselves to (or: prostrate upon)" (*wa-li-l-ʿirāqiyyīna bihā* [referring the book's deliberations on eloquence] *ʿināyatun wa-hum wāṣifūna lahā wa-mukibbūna ʿalayhā*). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn obviously excludes himself from the "Iraqis." He then goes on to sharply criticize the quality of the work as a whole as being purely based on example, not explanation (e.g., "*faṣāḥa* is like so-and-so's saying […]"), followed by more specific criticism regarding Ibn al-Aflaḥ's notion of newly-formed images (*al-maʿānī al-mubtadaʿa*); *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 59-63. On Ibn Aflaḥ and his work see Geert Jan van Gelder, *Two Arabic Treatises on Stylistics: al-Marghīnānī's al-Maḥāsin fī 'l-naẓm wa-'l-nathr, and Ibn Aflaḥ's Muqaddima, formerly ascribed to al-Marghīnānī*, Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1987, 10-14, 26-41. (The recent edition, entitled *al-Badīʿ*, ed. Ibrāhīm Ṣāliḥ, Abu Dhabi: Dār al-Kutub al-Waṭaniyya, 2009, is unavailable to me.) For other denigrating references to "Iraqis" or "one of the Iraqis" see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 69, 129 (but compare 3: 108, 215 where he offers praise). He also refers dismissively (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 29) to the well-known *Tadhkira* of Ibn Ḥamdūn "the Baghdadi" (d. 562/1167) – a scholar who did not go by the *nisba* "al-Baghdādī"! See F. Rosenthal, "Ibn Ḥamdūn," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*.

sign of capital-periphery rivalry, similar to the better-known rivalry with Egypt and its most notable epistolographer, al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil (d. 596/1200) – albeit one should keep in mind that by this point Baghdad had probably long lost its central prestige.[147]

Of all the "famous masters in it [ʿilm al-bayān]" mentioned in the *Jāmiʿ*, only two are associated with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's locale, the two that made it into the *Mathal*.[148] Beginning with Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī, one could find it perplexing that the work is so heavily criticized at the outset: why, then, would Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn endorse it in the first place as one of the two only books "beneficial in it [ʿilm al-bayān]"?[149] The fifth/eleventh-century Ibn Sinān was a northern Syrian scholar and senior statesman, as well as a poet, born into a noble family in the province of Aleppo. He was the student of another famous Syrian, the poet Abū ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (d. 449/1057), whom he often mentions in his *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*.[150] This strong geographic affinity with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's locale could explain how Ibn Sinān's work made it into the *Mathal*'s preface. With Abū al-Qāsim al-Āmidī we have a different story. His work is highly praised by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn at the outset (with no reservations), and Āmid – or Diarbakir, as it is currently known – is also located in the Jazīra area, in present day southern Turkey. The only caveat is that besides his namesake "al-Āmidī", Abū al-Qāsim had no actual affiliation with Āmid! Born in Basra, he

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[147] On the rivalry with al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil see Heinrichs, "Ibn al-Athīr," 315, who describes this as "friendly competition"; also: Muhsin al-Musawi, "Pre-Modern Belletristic Prose," in Roger Allen and D.S. Richards (eds.), *Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 101-33, here: 102, 106. As we shall see (§4.1), al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil was a mentor for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn (by the latter's own account). On Baghdad's decline in prestige see Michael Cooperson, "Baghdad in Rhetoric and Narrative," *Muqarnas* 13 (1996), 99-113, here: 99, quoted in Elias Muhanna, *Encyclopaedism in the Mamluk Period: The Composition of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Nuwayrī's (d. 1333) Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2012, 43.

[148] Qudāma and al-Rummānī lived and worked in Baghdad; al-Jāḥiẓ in Basra and Baghdad; Abū Hilāl probably in Baghdad and Esfahan; al-Ghānimī in the Eastern Islamic world (*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 2 fn. 5). For the first four see *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*, *qq.v.*

[149] *fī dhālika*; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 35, and above.

[150] Al-Ṣaʿīdī's introduction to *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, *jīm-dāl*; Heinrichs, "Naḳd," under "Further systematical research." For references to his *shaykh* see, e.g., *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, 61, 80, 128.

received much of his education in Baghdad and was associated with philologists and *kuttāb* there.[151] Being further removed in time from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's lifetime than Ibn Sinān was, it could be the case that the life of the fourth/tenth century Abū al-Qāsim was less-known to him. But one cannot know for sure.

Besides the Jazīrite endorsement in the preface of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's later work and the mild hints of local patriotism in the work itself,[152] we have the slightly later perspective of the Baghdadi Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 655 or 6/1257 or 8). By the latter's own account, he read the *Mathal* while busy with his chancery duties in the beginning of Dhū al-Ḥijja 633/August 1236 and wrote a 'refutation' – or rather, a work pointing out argumentativeness, cantankerousness, self-boasting and belittling of past scholars in the *Mathal* – within a fortnight.[153] This ignited a tradition of 'refutations' and 'counter-refutations' on the *Mathal*; again, not so much containing essential arguments but rather more nitpicking of usually-minor points, and finding fault in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own oeuvre which he cited as exemplary *shawāhid*. What is interesting in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's account is that at one point he aims his words directly at the author of the *Mathal* and at the leaders (*ruʾasāʾ*, *akābir*) of his town, and Mosulites in general. Because it strengthens our hypothesis that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn fashioned his 'canon' of *ʿilm al-bayān* along locality lines, the following (highly stylized) passage from the preface of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's work merits quotation

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[151] Wolfhart P. Heinrichs, "al-Āmidī, Abū l-Qāsim," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three*.

[152] See the references to the "Iraqis" above, fn. 146.

[153] *Al-Falak al-dāʾir ʿalā al-Mathal al-sāʾir* in volume 4 of al-Ḥūfī and Ṭabāna (eds.), *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*, 31-310, here: 31-35 (English: 'The Revolving Sphere Crushing *The Talk of the Town*' [Heinrichs' translation in "Ibn al-Athīr," 315]). This is three years before Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's death. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd recognizes Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn as "*al-Mawṣilī*" but gets his name a bit off: *Naṣīr al-Dīn* [instead of Naṣr Allāh Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn] *b. Muḥammad al-Mawṣilī al-maʿrūf bi-Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazīra* [sic] (*al-Falak al-dāʾir*, 31-32). Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd does offer some praise for the *Mathal*: its style (*inshāʾuhu wa-ṣināʿatuhu*; p. 32). For a brief biography of his life see editors' introduction in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 4: 15-16. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd directs criticism against the *Mathal* also in his more famous work, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*, a commentary on the Shīʿī collection of sermons, narrations etc. attributed to ʿAlī. It is apparent that in this later work he devoted more thought to his criticism against some of the claims made by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, and not just against his haughtiness (probably owing to the fact that he spent more than fifteen days to write the *Sharḥ*!).

in full:[154]

wa-minhā anna jamāʿatan min akābiri l-mawṣili qad ḥasuna ẓannuhum fī hādhā l-kitābi jiddan wa-taʿaṣṣabū lahu ḥattā faḍḍalūhu ʿalā akthari l-kutubi l-muṣannafati fī hādhā l-fanni wa-awṣalū minhu nusakhan maʿdūdatan ilā madīnati l-salāmi wa-ashāʿūhu wa-tadāwalahu kathīrun min ahlihā

fa-ʿaraḍtu ʿalayhi bi-hādhā l-kitābi wa-taqarrabtu bihi ilā l-khizānati l-sharīfati l-muqaddasati l-nabawiyyati l-imāmiyyati l-mustanṣiriyyati ʿamara -llāhu taʿālā bi-ʿimāratihā andiyata l-faḍli wa-ribāʿahu / wa-aṭāla bi-ṭūli baqāʾi mālikihā yada l-ʿilmi wa-bāʿahu / wa-jaʿala malāʾikata l-samāʾi anṣārahu wa-ashyāʿahu / kamā jaʿala mulūka l-arḍi aʿwānahu wa-atbāʿahu

wa-kāna aktharu qaṣdī fī dhālika an yaʿlama muṣannifu hādhā l-kitābi wa-ruʾasāʾu baldatihi anna min aṣāghiri khawali hādhihi l-dawlati l-sharīfati – fa-l-ʿujbu mubīrun wa-lā unbiʾu ʿannī fa-mithlī kathīrun – man idhā alghaza adrā / wa-idhā ḍaraba afrā / wa-idhā rashaqa aṣmā / wa-idhā nakaʾa admā / wa-anna dāra l-salāmi wa-ḥaḍrata l-imāmi mā khalat kamā tazʿumu l-mawāṣilatu mimman idhā sūbiqa khallā / wa-idhā būsira fāza bi-l-qidḥi l-muʿallā / wa-idhā khaṭaba khaḍaʿat li-barāʿatihi l-manāṣil / wa-idhā kataba sajadat li-barāʿatihi l-dhawābil / wa-idhā shāʾa ʿallama l-nāsa l-siḥra wa-mā unzila ʿalā l-malakayni bi-bābil / wa-anna fī l-aghfāli l-maghmūrīna min raʿāyāhā man law ḥaḍara la-qarrat lahu l-shaqāshiq / wa-law naṭaqa la-tajallat bi-shumūsihi l-mahāriq / wa-law jarrada ḥusāma qalamihi la-qāla l-maliku li-l-sayfi -ghrub fa-anta ṭāliq / fa-kayfa bi-sadanati kaʿbatihā wa-l-ḥāffīna bi-sharīfi suddatihā fuḥūli l-balāghati -lladhīna idhā rakaḍa aḥaduhum fī ḥalbati l-bayāni akhjala l-burūqa wa-sakhira bi-l-riyāḥ / wa-idhā ḍaraba l-aʿdāʾa bi-ṣārimi l-lisāni qadda l-salūqiyya l-muḍāʿafa ḥattā tūqida nāru l-ḥubāḥibi fī l-ṣifāḥ

Among them [the reasons that prompted me to write a 'refutation' of the work] is that a group of the leaders of Mosul had a very high opinion of this book [Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *Mathal*] and clung enthusiastically to it to a point that they gave it preference over most of the books written in this field (*fann*); they sent several copies of it to Baghdad and made it known, and it circulated among many of its people.

So I raised objections against him with this book and with it gained access to the holy

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[154] *Al-Falak al-dāʾir*, 32-4. I have benefited from the editors' footnotes. When applicable I added *sajʿ* demarcations. The suffixed pronoun in *wa-minhā* opening the passage is referring to [*fa-ḥadānī ʿalā…*] *umūr* "things [that lead me to write the refutation]" (ibid., 32.6).

noble prophetic (ʿAbbāsid) caliphal library of the Mustanṣiriyya *madrasa* [founded in 631/1234 in Baghdad by the caliph al-Mustanṣir, r. 623-640/1226-1242],[155] may God make the meeting places and quarters of erudition prosperous with its building, and may He prolong the hand and arm of knowledge with the longevity of its owner [i.e., the caliph], and make the angels of heaven his [the caliph's] supporters and followers, just as He made the kings of the earth [i.e., the local sovereigns] his helpers and adherents.

The greater part of my intention in that [i.e., writing the 'refutation'] is that the author of this book [the *Mathal*] and the leaders of his town may know that among the smallest servants of this noble dynasty [the ʿAbbāsids] – conceit is destructive and I am not informing about myself since there are many like me[156] – are those who, if they speak in riddles they [nevertheless] make [their intended idea] known,[157] and if they strike they slit [open the skin], and if they let fly their arrows they shoot dead on the spot, and if they scrape the scab [of a wound] they cause it to bleed. [I am doing this so that he and they may know] that Baghdad and the [community of the] Caliph are not devoid – as the Mosulis claim – of those who, if they are are challenged to stay ahead they leave [their opponents far behind], and if they are challenged to be outquickened[158] they win with the best divining arrow [of the *maysir*], and if they deliver a sermon swords yield [to them] due to their skill, and if they write a chancery letter spears prostrate due to their skill, and if they want they can "teach people sorcery and that which was sent down upon the two angels of Babylon."[159] [I am doing this so that he and they may know] that among the

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[155] J. Pedersen et al., "Madrasa," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*, and Hansjörg Schmid, *Die Madrasa des Kalifen Al-Mustansir in Baghdad: eine baugeschichtliche Untersuchung der ersten universalen Rechtshochschule des Islam, mit einer Abhandlung über den sogenannten Palast in der Zitadelle in Baghdad*, Mainz am Rhein: Zabern, 1980. According to Schmid (p. 1) the *madrasa* was founded in 625/1227 and was the first to accommodate all four Sunnī schools of the law (on this last point see also Wilfred Madelung, "The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks," in *idem*, *Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam*, London: Variorum Reprints, 1985, II, 109-68, here: 164). It is unlikely that it had a Shīʿī wing as well, and *Imāmī* here is probably just a reference to the ʿAbbāsids (Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's Shīʿī inclinations can be seen from his *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*). The library was said to have held eighty thousand volumes; it was dispossessed during the Mongol invasion.

[156] This is a typical modesty topos.

[157] Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's point here and in the following clauses is that even though he is merely one of the *aṣāghir khawal al-dawla*, he and others like him in Baghdad nevertheless excel in what they do: they are able to speak clearly even when delivering riddles (i.e., speak allusively), to inflict severe wounds even when they scratch, etc.

[158] Not quite a word in English but neither is *bāsara* in Arabic (see editors' note, *al-Falak al-dāʾir*, 33 fn. 5, who interpret it as *ghālaba wa-sābaqa*). A more accurate non-English word for *būsira* that would preserve the sense of form I *basara* would be "to be outfirsted."

[159] A reference to Hārūt and Mārūt in Qurʾān 2: 102, two angels who were allegedly banished from the heavens and

anonymous obscure people of its [Baghdad's] subjects are those who, if they utter a [he-camel's] bray it comes out sonorous and fluent,[160] and if they speak the parchments come to light by their suns [of eloquence],[161] and if they unsheathe the [sword-]edge of their pen the king says to the sword "go away for you are divorced!" And [if among Baghdad's obscure people there are many who excel] how [much more so is that the case] with the gatekeepers of its [Baghdad's] Kaʿba[162] and those surrounding its noble threshold, the 'stallions' of eloquence[163] who, if one of them runs in the race-track of good style (*bayān*) he puts to shame flashes of lightning and mocks the winds,[164] and if he strikes enemies with a sharp tongue he cuts through the double-layered Salūqī coat of mail until the fire of the fire-fly is ignited in the sides of the blades [of the sword-like tongue]![165]

To recapitulate the main points in this passage: Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd acknowledges the great popularity of the *Mathal* among Mosuli leaders (probably leading scholars and *kuttāb*); he notes their claim to superiority (probably as *kuttāb*); and he upholds the Baghdadi supremacy in

disclosed to humans the secrets of sorcery. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd is using this as an exaggeration of his abilities.

[160] The faucial bags (*shiqshiqa* pl. *shaqāqiq*) are placed behind the palate of the he-camel and are inflated and blown out from the side of the mouth when the he-camel is excited; the *shiqshiqa* is an image of eloquence (Edward William Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., 1955-1956, 1579). The verb *hadara* usually refers to a camel's bray but *hadarat shiqshiqatuhu* is an idiom meaning "his utterance was sonorous and fluent" (ibid., 1579, 2886). The phrase thus literally means, "when they bray [a camel's bray] the faucial bags are in place for them." Another possibility is that by using the verb *qarra* Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd is making a play on words on the phrase *qarrat ʿaynuhu* 'he (lit. his eye) was delighted', that is, 'his *shaqāshiq* are delighted' (though the preposition *lahu* is then less accounted for).

[161] There is a play on words here since another meaning of *mahāriq* is 'deserts'. The image of 'suns' in the context of eloquence is a fairly common one.

[162] "Baghdad's Kaʿba" is a reference to the caliph himself; the gatekeepers – to his *kuttāb*.

[163] *Fuḥūl* lit. 'stallions' in reference to poets is an old designation for the 'masters of poetry'. For the profile of a *faḥl* – typically a Jāhilī poet – according to al-Aṣmaʿī (d. 213/828, other dates are also given) see Heinrichs, "Naḳd," under "Criticism of poetry among the philologists."

[164] A fast horse is often likened to a flash of lightning or to the wind. See Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, *Dīwān al-maʿānī*, 2 vols. in 1, Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudsī, 1352 [1933-34], 2: 107-108 (*fī ṣifāt al-khayl*).

[165] The last clause is taken almost verbatim from a line by al-Nābigha (active 6th cent. CE) describing the swords of the Ghassānids (see *al-Falak al-dāʾir*, 34 n. 6). For a similar idea expressed by al-Kumayt (d. 126/743 or 4) see Lane, *Lexicon*, 498. Another translation could be: "until the fire of Ḥubāḥib (= Abū Ḥubāḥib, an allegedly niggardly man who never lighted but a faint fire for fear of attracting guests) is ignited…" (Lane, *Lexicon*, 497; *al-Falak al-dāʾir*, 34 fn. 6).

matters of good style as Baghdad houses the *kuttāb* of the caliph himself (Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd being one of them).

In the passage Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd alludes to a "field/art" (*fann*) to which the *Mathal* belongs: in light of the preceding points, it is probable that he is referring to the scribal arts. The fact that he does not mention *ʿilm al-bayān* as a discipline-heading serves as additional proof that *ʿilm al-bayān* was not a recognized field of study during the early 1200s.[166] As mentioned above, we take the testimonial by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd as circumstantial evidence supporting what we believe to be Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's intentions to establish himself and scholars in his locale – the Jazīra, or parts of Greater Syria – as authorities in the science called *ʿilm al-bayān*.

Back in the *Jāmiʿ*, after specifying the 'extended' list of authorities in the field, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn expounds on his method and process of writing his work, which I have referred to above as scientific *salafism*. His description of the approach runs as follows:[167] first he began reading the work of "the famous masters [of *ʿilm al-bayān*]"; then, after some time not having consulted those works, he perused the holy Qurʾān and found interesting and subtle points "of this mode" (*min hādhā al-naḥw*, i.e. *ʿilm al-bayān*); next he subjected those scholarly works to an investigation of the points that he had found in the Qurʾān, only to discover that they had overlooked them; then he scrutinized the Qurʾān more carefully and "extracted (*istakhrajtu*) from it at that point thirty categories (*ḍurūb*) of *ʿilm al-bayān*" which no other scholar had previously mentioned; next he began writing the book in order to benefit the "composer of speech [poetry and prose]"; finally, during the editing process (*taḥqīq*) he revisited the books of the

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[166] See also *al-Falak al-dāʾir*, 39-40, where Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd makes mention of the knowledge/science of the poetic craft (*ʿilm ṣināʿat al-shiʿr*, including rhyme and meter) and criticism (*naqd al-shiʿr wa-l-kalām*) but not *ʿilm al-bayān*.

[167] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 1-3, esp. 3, for which the following is a close summary.

aforementioned scholars, at which point new subtleties occurred to him, thus rarely did he leave their comments unchanged.

As we can see from this detailed account (the corresponding account in the *Mathal* runs much shorter), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's approach relies heavily on his own personal judgment and ingenuity. But without consultation of previous authorities in the field the method is ineffective since it lacks a point of reference. By outlining his approach he both establishes former scholars as authorities in *ʿilm al-bayān* and establishes himself as their superior. This tendency is only reinforced in his later book, the *Mathal*, where the list of authorities drops to two and the emphasis lies solely on his *ijtihād* (see quoted passage above, p. 42).[168]

Summing Up

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn aligns both his literary-theoretical works with the scientific framework of *ʿilm al-bayān*, a disciplinary designation with little to no recognition at the turn of the seventh/thirteenth century. Inspired by the sciences of legal theory and logic, and especially by the work of al-Ghazālī, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn makes a forced attempt to vouch for his subject matter's scientificity in an endeavor to bind the 'old' stylistic discussions by rational, or scientific rules. This seems to be an innovation in literary theory. Whether Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn himself succeeds in living up to his declared intentions will be subject to scrutiny in subsequent chapters.

In his attempt to consolidate the field of literary theory Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also presents the reader with a canon of sorts in the field by back-projecting previous works on criticism, eloquence, poetry and more under the heading of *ʿilm al-bayān*. In a progression from his earlier

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[168] In his later *al-Washy al-marqūm* he proclaims to follow the method of *ijtihād* rather than *taqlīd*, but here it is said in the context of *ṣināʿat al-kitāba* (see *al-Washy al-marqūm*, 46, 52, and 47 for a reference to his earlier written *Mathal*).

to his later work, we see that the authorities he attempts to establish become limited to his locale, the Jazīra, and eventually to himself. Evidence from a contemporary 'reply' to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's later work, written by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, reinforces this hypothesis.

Chapter 2:
Evidence of *ʿIlm al-Bayān* in Later Sources

Following Ouyang's guidelines, we have looked at the two components found in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work that make a body of knowledge "an independent field of intellectual inquiry." These are (1) a consolidated definition of the field, and (2) a shared definition of an authoritative specialist.[169] But the conception of a literary-theoretical science called *ʿilm al-bayān* as an independent field of study does not necessarily mean its historical success in view of later generations. After addressing the essence of *ʿilm al-bayān* in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's eyes, we shall now turn to the question of it existence, or in philosophical terms: after asking the *mā* 'what (is it)' we are now asking the *hal* 'whether (it exists)'. Did there come to be a widely recognized discipline termed *ʿilm al-bayān* that referred to an overall science of verbal arts following the endeavors of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn? Or was *ʿilm al-bayān* again one out of several viable options of approaching the field? If *ʿilm al-bayān* did emerge as a consolidated discipline of literary theory, was Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn perceived as one of its authoritative specialists?

In what follows we shall attend to hitherto unnoticed traces of *ʿilm al-bayān* found in later sources, bringing to light an independent science that seems to have existed throughout the 1200s and parts of the 1300s, only to be trumped by the later formalized *ʿilm al-balāgha* lit. 'the science of eloquence', i.e. 'scholastic rhetoric' or the Standard Theory, as Bauer refers to it.[170] Because the later sources we are looking at saw the field primarily through the prism of *ʿilm al-balāgha*, we must rely on a close reading of several key passages that nevertheless display vestiges of the earlier *ʿilm al-bayān*. The later hegemony of *ʿilm al-balāgha* may explain why the

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[169] Ouyang, *Literary Criticism*, 204, 207, and above.

[170] Standardtheorie; see Bauer, "Arabische Kultur," *Rhetorik*, 291 ff.

existence of *ʿilm al-bayān* as a consolidated science has escaped the attention of modern scholars and many medieval scholars. The fact that the later sources we are looking at are cognizant of *ʿilm al-balāgha* makes the implied references to the earlier *ʿilm al-bayān* all the more telling. For anyone conducting future work on the Standard Theory, our findings also show that the development of *ʿilm al-balāgha* was not instantaneous, even after the appearance of staple works in the field such as those by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, known as Khaṭīb Dimashq 'The Preacher of Damascus' (d. 739/1338).[171] We shall first examine works on the classification of the sciences, preceded by a prefatory word on the formalized *ʿilm al-balāgha*; we will then proceed to literary-theoretical works betraying evidence of our *ʿilm al-bayān*.

2.1. The Standard Theory

No one disputes that *ʿilm al-balāgha* was a consolidated discipline. It emerged in the eighth/ fourteenth century as an aid to the education of the legal scholar in the *madrasa* and has been taught as such up until modern times. Its canon could not be clearer, with the works of al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229), *Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm*, and al-Qazwīnī, *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*, inspired by the 'forefather' ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081).[172] The term *ʿilm al-balāgha* is

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[171] We should keep in mind that the focus of this dissertation is on the central Arabic-speaking Islamic world. Despite his name, al-Qazwīnī had no apparent connection with Qazvin and was in fact of pure Arab descent. See W.P. Heinrichs, "al-Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* 1: 439-40. (His forefathers may have settled in the East after the Islamic conquests and then fled due to the Mongol invasions, but there is no evidence of this in the biographies.)

[172] This is the usual narrative we find in the scholarship regarding scholastic rhetoric. Sometimes it is referred to as "[…] al-Sakkākī and al-Ḳazwīnī and their school" or "the system of al-Sakkākī and al-Ḳazwīnī"; S.A. Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-Bayān," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. Other times it is referred to as scholastic rhetoric or simply rhetoric. For further background on *ʿilm al-balāgha* see A.F. Mehren, *Die Rhetorik der Araber*, Hildesheim; New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1970; Aḥmad Maṭlūb, *Al-Qazwīnī wa-shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ*; Bauer, "Arabische Kultur," *Rhetorik*, 291-99; Smyth, "Canonical Formulation"; van Gelder, *Beyond the Line*, 8-10; and the following articles in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*: A. Schaade, G.E. von Grunebaum, "Balāgha"; von Grunebaum, "Bayān"; S.A. Bonebakker, "al-Ḳazwīnī"; W.P. Heinrichs, "al-Sakkākī." For a late 'Persianate' take on *ʿilm al-balāgha* see M. Garcin de Tassy, *Rhétorique et prosodie des langues de l'Orient musulman*, 2ⁿᵈ éd. revue, corr., et augm., Paris: Maisonneuve, 1873.

al-Qazwīnī's.[173] By the time al-Sakkākī's work became widely known in the central Arabic-speaking lands via al-Qazwīnī's *Talkhīṣ* the term *ʿilm al-bayān* came to denote the second subfield within the 'new' science of eloquence, the first subfield being *ʿilm al-maʿānī* ~'functional grammar' or 'semantics of syntax' and the third *ʿilm al-badīʿ* 'figures of speech' or 'rhetorical embellishments'.[174] This latter *ʿilm al-bayān* dealt more narrowly with imagery (our term) and with the foundational forms of figurative language (*majāz*).[175] Indeed, in modern scholarship both West and East, the term *ʿilm al-bayān* is associated almost entirely with the

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[173] Or more precisely, *ʿilm al-balāgha wa-tawābiʿuhā* "the science of eloquence and its supplements"; Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Khatīb Al-Qazwīnī, *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ fī al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān wa-l-badīʿ: wa-bi-l-hāmish sharḥuhu Mukhtaṣar al-maʿānī li-Masʿūd b. ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī*, [Cairo]: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1938, 6 (English: 'The Epitome of the *Key* [al-Sakkākī's *Key to the Sciences*] on *maʿānī*, *bayān* and *badīʿ*, along with its Commentary *The Epitome of the maʿānī*'); idem, *al-Īḍāḥ fī ʿulūm al-balāgha*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Munʿim Khafājī, 2 vols. in 1, 4th ed., Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1975, 70 (English: 'The Clarification in the Studies of Eloquence'). The 'supplements' are traditionally understood to be a reference to *ʿilm al-badīʿ* (see below), as in al-Taftāzānī's take in *Talkhīṣ*, 6, but I take it to refer strictly to the appendices (*mulḥaqāt*) dealing with 'plagiarism' (*sariqāt*) and with 'good structure' (*ḥusn al-ibtidāʾ wa-l-takhalluṣ wa-l-intihāʾ*); see *Talkhīṣ*, 367-92 and *al-Īḍāḥ*, 556-600 (the term *mulḥaqāt* appears in *al-Īḍāḥ*, 556). The heading *ʿilm al-balāgha* seems to have replaced *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, which was used by al-Sakkākī, but can also be seen in later works. One example is Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *Sharḥ ʿUqūd al-jumān fī ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1939 (English: 'Commentary on *The Pearl Necklaces on the study of maʿānī and bayān*'). Al-Suyūṭī also preserves the heading *ʿilm al-bayān* for the entire science, on which see §2.3 below.

[174] For *ʿilm al-maʿānī* 'pragmatics' could also be appropriate. Bonebakker ("al-Maʿānī wa 'l-Bayān") translates *ʿilm al-maʿānī* as "the theory of functional, appropriate style" or "semantics of syntax" (*maʿānī* being the *maʿānī al-naḥw*) and *ʿilm al-bayān* as "science of figurative expression" or "science of exposition" following Mehren. Schaade and von Grunebaum ("Balāgha") render the scholastic *ʿilm al-bayān* "modes of presentation." Heinrichs ("al-Sakkākī") renders it: "lit. 'elucidating discourse' = 'indirect presentation by way of images'." Going back to Bonebakker, he says that the terms *maʿānī* and *bayān* were used by al-Zamakhsharī in the *Kashshāf* and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in the *Nihāya* "in too vague a way to justify any conclusions" (see Chapter 3). He adds that al-Sakkākī took *ʿilm al-bayān* to be part of the study of *ʿilm al-maʿānī*. With respect to *badīʿ* Bonebakker says: "This section continues the older tradition of rhetorical studies initiated by Ibn al-Muʿtazz and Ḳudāma […]," referring here to what we have called the early *naqd* works. For Bonebakker, a work such as the *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr* of Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ (see §2.3) represents "handbooks by authors who followed the 'older' school." Regarding the usual tripartite structure of *ʿilm al-balāgha* one should note later, Persianate strands of this discipline that lacked the section on *maʿānī* but included a lengthy treatment of prosody and separate chapters on riddles/allusions and plagiarism. See de Tassy, *Rhétorique*, vi, who bases his work on the *Ḥadāyiq al-balāghat* written in the eighteenth century by Mīr Shams al-Dīn Faqīr of Delhi.

[175] 'Imagery' is an inexact term, for the 'images' here are not necessarily visual, as the term might suggest. 'The study of tropes' would also be an inaccurate designation for the standard *ʿilm al-bayān*: while some tropes – indeed, the major ones (simile, metaphor, metonymy) – are treated in *ʿilm al-bayān*, many tropes are treated in *ʿilm al-badīʿ*. The fact that the meaning of *bayān* in the heading *ʿilm al-bayān* is left undefined by the standard theorists is perplexing (and frustrating). Interestingly, a term that could be taken to denote 'imagery' or 'images' is *maʿānī* (as in the *maʿānī* we find in works like that of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī).

narrower, highly specialized sub-science within the tripartite system of the Standard Theory.[176]

After preliminary 'semantic' discussions, *tashbīh* lit. 'likening' was the first category to be treated under the section of the standard *ʿilm al-bayān*; we may refer to it as a theory of comparison or similarity. This formed the basis for the second category, *viz. majāz* 'figurative language', which included metonymies and synecdoches (*majāz mursal*) on one hand and a vast range of metaphors (*istiʿāra*) on the other. Finally, in the third category, various forms of periphrasis (*kināya*) were discussed.[177] According to this scheme, and owing to the thought of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, neither *tashbīh* nor *kināya* were considered part of figurative language (*majāz*).[178]

When dealing with the Standard Theory one must keep in mind its function and its place of instruction (the *madrasa*), two components which are intertwined. As Heinrichs remarks, "[…] the main goal of [scholastic] rhetoric is as a tool to understand the *iʿd̲j̲āz al-Ḳurʾān*."[179] This is in contrast to Bonebakker's assessment, according to which "[i]t is conceivable that al-Sakkākī and al-Ḳazwīnī tried to programme the study of rhetoric in such a way that the reader

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[176] Exceptions include scholars who recognize that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn spoke of *ʿilm al-bayān* but saw it as another name for *ʿilm al-balāgha* (see Chapter 1, introduction).

[177] Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf b. Abī Bakr Muḥammad b. ʿAlī Al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm*, ed. Naʿīm Zarzūr, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1987, 329-422 (English: 'Key to the Sciences'); al-Qazwīnī, *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*, 218-314. The preliminary 'semantic' discussions refer to the study of *dalāla* 'signification' (i.e., of 'words' vis-à-vis 'referents' in the world/mind), as one may find in the opening of a logical treatise (e.g., al-Abharī, *Īsāghūjī*, 377 ff.).

[178] For the clear case of *tashbīh* see ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, *Asrār al-balāgha*, ed. Hellmut Ritter, Istanbul: Istanbul Government Press, 1954, 221-22 [14/3] (English: 'The Secrets of Eloquence'); corroborated in Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Rāzī, *Nihāyat al-ījāz fī dirāyat al-iʿjāz*, eds. Ibrāhīm al-Sāmarrāʾī and Muḥammad Barakāt Ḥamdī Abū ʿAlī, Amman: Dār al-Fikr, 1985, 110 / ed. Bakrī Shaykh Amīn, Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1985, 222 (English: 'The Utmost Abridgment in the Comprehension of [the Qurʾān's] Inimitability'). For the less-explicit case of *kināya* see al-Jurjānī, *Dalāʾil*, 66-67; corroborated in al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, eds. al-Sāmarrāʾī and Abū ʿAlī, 136 / ed. Amīn, 272, as well as Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary Theory in Islam: The Case of *Majāz*," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* 7 (1991-92), 253-284, here: 281, and *idem*, "Rhetorical Figures," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* 2: 656-62, here: 661. Cf. Erez Naaman's more cautious take in his "Women Who Cough and Men Who Hunt: Taboo and Euphemism (*kināya*) in the Medieval Islamic World," *Journal of American Oriental Society* 133.3 (2013), 467-93, here: 470-73.

[179] Heinrichs, "Naḳd," under "Philosophical poetics and the Maghribī 'school'."

would become familiar first with the elementary skills of composition, then with the characteristics of literature as a form of art, and finally with some stylistic devices used by accomplished poets and writers."[180] In fact, the Standard Theory did not seem to be concerned with composition at all (perhaps only minimally). Even as the literature grew to unfathomable magnitudes of commentaries, supercommentaries and glosses, and may be seen as independent of the legal education, its essence nevertheless seems[181] to concern a theory of language and philosophy of language in the analytical sense, which can be of relevance for the legal scholar. As a hermeneutics first and foremost, it has not to do with the practical aspect of composing poetry and ornate prose. We might point out that *ʿilm al-balāgha* was not the only emerging science within the *madrasa* domain: to this we may add the science of semantics (*ʿilm al-waḍʿ*) and the science of disputation (*ʿilm al-munāẓara*), two additional disciplines emerging in the eighth/fourteenth century as aids to religious training.[182]

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[180] Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-Bayān."

[181] I say "seems" because a study of the later Standard Theory remains to be written (both in the synchronic and diachronic sense). Similar to later logical works (until recently), the later *balāgha* works are largely uncharted territory. One exception is the third part of Maṭlūb's *al-Qazwīnī wa-shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ*, esp. 529-609. For a recent change in the logical sphere see Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic*, Leiden: Brill, 2010. For a good start in Western scholarship in the field of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* (but limited to al-Sakkākī) see Udo Gerald Simon, *Mittelalterliche arabische Sprachbetrachtung zwischen Grammatik und Rhetorik: ʿilm al-maʿānī bei as-Sakkākī*, Heidelberg: Heidelberger Orientverlag, 1993. He starts with a short history of the field which includes the works of ʿAbd al-Qāhir, al-Zamakhsharī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (pp. 16-30) and includes a brief but useful list of later authors (pp. 31-33). An important contribution is Smyth, "Controversy in a Tradition of Commentary," who outlines the major players in the field and their scholarly method.

[182] On *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* see the work of Bernard Weiss, starting with his dissertation, *Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of waḍʿ al-lughah and its Development*, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1966. On *ʿilm al-munāẓara* see another unpublished dissertation: Larry Benjamin Miller, *Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth to the Fourteenth Centuries*, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 1984. I think the most appropriate translation for *ʿilm al-waḍʿ* lit. 'the science of coining [of words]' is 'semantics' (in the logical sense) or 'lexical semantics', as the science deals with the 'senses' and 'references' – two major notions of semantics – of pronouns, morphological forms, and more.

2.2. ʿIlm al-Bayān in Works on the Classification of the Sciences

Since the term ʿilm al-bayān is associated almost entirely with the second sub-discipline of the Standard Theory, let us begin our investigation of works of the classification of the sciences with a much later one, written in the tenth/sixteenth century. In the work of the famous Ottoman Anatolian scholar Ṭashköprüzāde (Ṭāshkubrīzāda, d. 968/1560), *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda*, the definition of ʿilm al-bayān replicates the one given by al-Qazwīnī – a definition replicated, in fact, in the vast majority of subsequent studies, including the modern *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (*q.v.* "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-Bayān"):

> *wa-huwa maʿrifatu īrādi l-maʿnā l-wāḥidi fī ṭuruqin mukhtalifatin fī wuḍūḥi l-dalālati*
> It [ʿilm al-bayān] is the knowledge of expressing one and the same idea in ways differing in [their degree of] clear indication [to that idea.][183]

Surprisingly, Ṭashköprüzāde does not provide the rubric ʿilm al-balāgha as an independent science; he seems to be taking it for granted.[184] What he does, rather, is treat ʿilm al-maʿānī, ʿilm al-bayān and ʿilm al-badīʿ in succession, declaring that the three sciences cannot be

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[183] Ṭashköprüzāde, *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* 1: 201. See also Kâtip Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī al-kutub wa-l-funūn*, eds. Şerefettin Yaltakaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge, 2 vols., Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d. (reprint of the 1941-1955 Istanbul edition), 1: 259-60. On Ṭashköprüzāde see Barbara Fleming, "Ṭashköprüzāde," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. A more literal rendering of the passage would be: "It is the knowledge of delivering one meaning in ways different in clarity of indication". The wording of al-Qazwīnī differs slightly (and my translation in the final square brackets above reflects it): *wa-huwa ʿilmun yuʿrafu bihi īrādu l-maʿnā l-wāḥidi bi-ṭuruqin mukhtalifatin fī wuḍūḥi l-dalālati **ʿalayhi*** (emphasis added); see *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*, 218, and *al-Īḍāḥ*, 326. My translation more closely reflects al-Taftāzānī's understanding of al-Qazwīnī, which could be rendered: "[…] expressing *any* one idea in different ways according to *various degrees of* clear indication" (emphasis added); al-Taftāzānī, *Mukhtaṣar al-maʿānī* in *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*, 218-19. Bonebakker's translation of al-Qazwīnī's definition ("al-Maʿānī wa 'l-bayān") runs as follows: "the science through which one knows how to express one and the same concept in ways which differ as to the degree of clarity achieved in indicating this concept." For al-Sakkākī's account of ʿilm al-bayān, which inspired that of al-Qazwīnī, see *Miftāḥ al-ʿulūm*, 329-30. The knowledge of expressing one idea in differing ways is not equivalent to *taʾlīf* in the sense of composing epistolary prose and poetry.

[184] For references to ʿilm al-balāgha see *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* 1: 200.5-6, 203.13. The reason for not providing the heading here seems to be the account given by Ibn al-Akfānī, whom he follows (see below).

detached from one another.[185] It is for this reason that he waits until the end of his explication of ʿilm al-badīʿ to specify the works that were written in all three funūn 'branches'.[186] As can be expected, al-Sakkākī is at the forefront of these authors. But at the end of each sub-science Ṭashköprüzāde does specify a scant number of works dealing solely with that specialized science. The single work said to deal with ʿilm al-bayān is "al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr by Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī."[187] Incidentally, Ṭashköprüzāde is thinking of Diyāʾ al-Dīn's brother, the one who specialized in ʾilm al-tafsīr 'the science of Qurʾānic exegesis' and authored the al-Tafsīr al-kabīr.[188] Since the Jāmiʿ by Ibn al-Athīr is *not* limited to the topics found in the scholastic ʿilm al-bayān, I see its mention here as a vestige of the 'old' understanding of ʿilm al-bayān as a supra-heading for stylistics and literary theory. To be sure, Ṭashköprüzāde's account of ʿilm al-bayān conforms to the standard rhetorical understanding of the term – and for our purposes it acts as a 'control' text – but the fact that he maintains an association between ʿilm al-bayān and an "Ibn al-Athīr" serves as a first hint of the incongruence we find in later sources between ʿilm al-bayān as a field within the

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[185] *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* 1: 200.3ᵉ (*fa-lammā lam yufraz* [ʾilm al-maʿānī] ʿani l-bayāni wa-l-badīʿ […]).

[186] Ibid. and 1: 202.5ᵉ. The list of these works is long indeed; see *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* 1: 202-214 (usually commentaries and supercommentaries from the eighth/fourteenth century); it illustrates how much work still needs to be done in this later, philosophically-minded science.

[187] But in the Hydeabad edition, both this work and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Nihāya* are cited, just as we find in the earlier Ibn al-Akfānī (see below). See Aḥmad b. Muṣṭafā Ṭashköprüzāde, *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda fī mawḍūʿāt al-ʿulūm*, under the supervision of Sharafuddin Ahmed, 3 vols., Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1977, 1: 181. This may be an earlier version of Ṭashköprüzāde's work.

[188] *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* (eds. Bakrī and al-Nūr) 1: 201.5-6ᵉ. The brother alluded to is better-known today as a *ḥadīth* scholar: Majd al-Dīn al-Mubārak Ibn al-Athīr (d. 606/1210); see F. Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Athīr," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. Walid Saleh identifies Majd al-Dīn as "the initiator of a trend in quranic exegesis of reworking *al-Kashf* [of al-Thaʿlabī, d. 427/1035] into newly authored commentaries," which more specifically combined *al-Kashf* and *al-Kashshāf* of al-Zamakhsharī (which, in turn, is a reaction to *al-Kashf*). The title of Majd al-Dīn's *tafsīr*, now lost, is *al-Inṣāf fī al-jamʿ bayna al-Kashf wa-l-Kashshāf*. See Walid A. Saleh, *The Formation of the Classical Tafsīr Tradition: The Qurʾān Commentary of al-Thaʿlabī (D. 427/1035)*, Boston: Brill, 2004, 206. It is not clear if this work is identical with *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr* mentioned by Ṭashköprüzāde.

Standard Theory and *ʿilm al-bayān* as a supra-science.[189]

In his account of the three sub-sciences of the science of eloquence Ṭashköprüzāde is highly indebted to the earlier Ibn al-Akfānī (d. 739/1348), a scholar from the Jazīra working in Mamlūk Egypt.[190] In the latter's small treatise on the classification of the sciences, *Irshād al-qāṣid*, he treats the sciences of *al-maʿānī*, *al-bayān* and *al-badīʿ* as three of the ten sub-sciences of *ʿilm al-adab* 'the science of philology'.[191] Ibn al-Akfānī does not use the heading *ʿilm al-balāgha*. In fact, he states that it is often the case that the topics of all three sciences are treated together ("with one another") – that is, in a mixed manner that is not neatly divided into *maʿānī*, *bayān* and *badīʿ*.[192] By this Ibn al-Akfānī seems to be alluding to the 'old' *naqd* works, which would include works like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's.

More revealing, however, of the tension between the 'old' understanding of stylistics/literary theory and the 'new' neatly-divided Standard Theory is the wording of his

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[189] We might point out parenthetically that Ṭashköprüzāde repeats the discussion of *maʿānī-bayān-badīʿ* (though not in these terms) in his treatment of *furūʿ ʿilm al-tafsīr* 'the science of Qurʾānic commentary: specific studies'. Here Ṭashköprüzāde deals with the literary-linguistic themse more specifically: e.g., the types of predication, conciseness, metaphors, the various literary devices (termed here *badāʾiʿ al-Qurʾān*), etc. (*Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* 2: 380-595 for the entire section on the *furūʿ*, and 450-510 for the topics that overlap with literary theory). Here Ṭashköprüzāde is not following Ibn al-Akfānī. The importance of literary theory to Qurʾānic studies is discussed in Part Two, §4.4 and especially §4.5. See also our discussion of Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ in §2.3.

[190] See J.J. Witkam, "Ibn al-Akfānī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*, who states that the whole organizational scheme of *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* is based upon Ibn al-Akfānī's work.

[191] Shams al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. Sāʿid Ibn al-Akfānī al-Anṣārī al-Sinjārī, *Kitāb Irshād al-qāṣid ilā asnā al-maqāṣid*, in Jan Just Witkam, *De egyptische arts Ibn al-Akfānī (gest. 749/1348) en zijn indeling van de wetenschappen*, Leiden: Ter Lugt Pers, 1989, 22-27 [443-438] (English: 'Leading the Aspirer to the Highest Aspirations'). The sub-sciences of *ʿilm al-adab* are lexicography (*ʿilm al-lugha*), morphology (*ʿilm al-taṣrīf*), functional grammar (*ʿilm al-maʿānī*), literary production (*ʿilm al-bayān* – see below), speech ornamentation (*ʿilm al-badīʿ*), metrics (*ʿilm al-ʿarūḍ*), rhyme (*ʿilm al-qawāfī*), syntax (*ʿilm al-naḥw*), the rules of orthography (*ʿilm qawānīn al-kitāba*) and the rules of recitation (*ʿilm qawānīn al-qirāʾa*). On *adab* as a reference to the philological sciences see Heinrichs, "Classification."

[192] *wa-kathīran mā tudhkaru masāʾilu l-ʿulūmi l-thalāthati baʿḍuhā maʿa baʿdin*; *Irshād al-qāṣid*, 24.3-4 [441]. At the end of his synopsis of *ʿilm al-badīʿ* Ibn al-Akfānī does enumerate the works that comprise of all three sciences (*wa-mina l-kutubi l-mushtamilati ʿalā ʿulūmi l-maʿānī wa-l-bayāni wa-l-badīʿi…*); see 24.5-4[e]. He ends with a statement (24.2-1[e]) on the highmost status that these (three) sciences hold, being as they are the means to understanding the Holy Scripture and the words of the Prophet – the two instances of inimitable eloquence (cf. what we said above about the function of the Standard Theory as a hermeneutical science).

synopsis of ʿilm al-bayān itself. While the synopses of ʿilm al-maʿānī and ʿilm al-badīʿ

correspond, more or less,[193] to the later standard understanding thereof, ʿilm al-bayān is

explained in different terms:

> *al-qawlu fī l-bayāni wa-huwa ʿilmun yuʿrafu fīhi aḥwālu l-aqāwīli l-murakkabati l-*
> *maʾkhūdhati ʿani l-fuṣaḥāʾi wa-l-bulaghāʾi mina l-khuṭabi wa-l-rasāʾili wa-l-ashʿāri min*
> *jihati balāghatihā wa-khuluwwihā ʿani l-lakani wa-taʾdiyatihā l-maṭlūba bi-hā wāfiyatan*
> *wa-manfaʿatuhu ḥuṣūlu l-malakati ʿalā inshāʾi l-aqāwīli l-madhkūrati bi-ḥasabi l-maʾlūfi*
> *minhā kāfiyatan fī l-tafhīmi wa-l-tabyīni idhā uḍīfa dhālika ilā ṭabʿin munqādin wa-*
> *dhihnin waqqād*
>
> *Bayān*: It is a science in which one comes to know the patterns[194] of the compound
> statements[195] of sermons, letters and poems received from the verbally skillful and
> eloquent [people]. [One comes to know them] from the perspective of their eloquence,
> their lack of incorrect usage and their conveyance of what is desired by them in a
> complete manner. Its [the science's] benefit:[196] attaining the habitual ability[197] to
> compose the abovementioned statements according to what is customary among them
> [the statements], in a manner that adequately makes [the desired idea] understood and

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[193] The subject matter of *maʿānī* is the types of predication and its contextual aptness (ibid., 23-24 [442-441]). The subject matter of *badīʿ* is the embellishments/ornamentation of speech (ibid., 24). In the realm of *badīʿ* Ibn al-Akfānī's account slightly departs from the standard understanding: he claims that what is investigated for the purpose of 'beautification' is the *substances* (*mawādd*) of the 'poetic' statements ("whether poetry or prose"). This could lead one to conclude that Ibn al-Akfānī had only the mental figures (or figures of thought) in mind, rather than the purely verbal, or aural figures. I am not certain of the meaning of *mawādd* here.

[194] Following Bonebakker's translation of *aḥwāl* in the definition of ʿilm al-maʿānī given by al-Qazwīnī ("al-Maʿānī wa 'l-bayān"). Other possibilities for *aḥwāl*: cases; conditions; states; circumstances.

[195] Other translations for *aqāwīl* could be "speech", "sayings" or "utterances". I opted for the more philosophical understanding of the term (cf. the *aqāwīl shiʿriyya* 'poetic statements' found in works of philosophical poetics) considering Ibn al-Akfānī's background as a physician and, thus, his deep familiarity with philosophy. Indeed, the very writing of a work on the classification of the sciences is deeply rooted in philosophical tradition: first, the philosophical sciences are always accorded a high status in such works, and second, these works are typically written by philosophers (al-Fārābī [d. 339/950] and his *Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm* are the prime example). Technically, the understanding of *aqāwīl* as 'statements' would preclude non-declarative sentences (that is, sentences with regards to which one cannot say if they are true or false, like interrogatives, exclamations and the like), but I do not think Ibn al-Akfānī has this exclusion in mind.

[196] For each science Ibn al-Akfānī states (1) its "benefit" or "usefulness" (*wa-manfaʿatuhu*), and (2) which sciences are needed as a prerequisite to it (*wa-yaḥtāju ilā*).

[197] Or: 'habitus'. *Malaka* is usually taken to be an innate quality, but clearly here it is seen as a faculty that can be acquired; this agrees with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's view of the nature of composition.

clear, if we add to that a receptive nature[198] and a brilliant mind.[199]

What is most striking about this account is that it bears no resemblance to the standard sub-science of imagery (cf. the Qazwīnian account of ʿilm al-bayān, above.) The field of ʿilm al-bayān as it is presented by Ibn al-Akfānī is much wider in scope, as it includes all artistic and eloquent speech (and not just the figurative[200] ones), as they are found in poetry and in prose. It is, indeed, the most literary of the sciences subsumed under ʿilm al-adab. What is more, emphasis is put on the *production* of literary, or eloquent speech, as we find in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's delineation of the science (ʿilm al-bayān li-taʾlīf al-naẓm wa-l-nathr.) One could thus be justified in translating ʿilm al-bayān here as 'the science of literary production' (both in the passive and in the active sense)[201].

Ibn al-Akfānī then specifies the prerequisites for ʿilm al-bayān, namely lexicography, morphology, syntax and the memorization of eloquent statements (al-aqāwīl al-faṣīḥa), the most useful and exalted of which is the Qurʾān. He ends by mentioning the works dedicated solely to ʿilm al-bayān. These are "*Kitāb Nihāyat al-iʿjāz* by al-Imām Fakhr al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb" and, as we find later in Ṭashköprüzāde, "*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr* by Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī."[202] Whether Ibn al-Akfānī had our Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn in mind (rather than his brother) is

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[198] Lit. 'compliant nature' (root *q.w.d*), but in conjunction with *ṭabʿ* it carries a positive connotation. Another option is to read it as *minqād*, the intensive form *mifʿāl* of the adjective *nāqid*, hence: 'highly critical nature' – but this usage is unattested.

[199] *Irshād al-qāṣid*, 24 [441].

[200] Or those primary literary devices that contain imagery: simile, metonymy, metaphor, periphrasis (*tashbīh, majāz, kināya*).

[201] That is, the study of eloquent verbal products (passive) and developing the ability to produce them (active).

[202] Ibid. The "*iʿjāz*" is ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz*; the work by al-Rāzī is an abridgement of both the *Dalāʾil* and the *Asrār al-balāgha* (stated explicitly in *Nihāya*, ed. Amīn, 74-75). It is Fakhr al-Dīn's father who was the preacher (*khaṭīb*) in their native town, Rayy; Fakhr al-Dīn was therefore known as Ibn al-Khaṭīb, not al-Khaṭīb. See C.G. Anawati, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. The title *Nihāyat al-iʿjāz* is

unclear. Even if we are justified in presuming that the *Jāmiʿ* was correctly attributed to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn,[203] it does not answer the question of why it was the *Jāmiʿ* that was mentioned here rather than the *Mathal*. One possible explanation is that the *Mathal* was seen as a work in which "the topics of all three sciences are treated together" (see above), whereas the less known *Jāmiʿ* was not. This would mean that Ibn al-Akfānī had not actually seen the *Jāmiʿ* since it, too, treats "together" the topics later to be considered either *maʿānī*, *bayān* or *badīʿ*. The most pressing point for our purposes is the memory of an overarching *ʿilm al-bayān* coextensive with the science delineated in the *Mathal* and the *Jāmiʿ*, and the identification of an "Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī" with this development. The mention of al-Rāzī is also important. In his epitome of al-Jurjānī's work, *Nihāyat al-ījāz*, al-Rāzī speaks of *ʿilm al-bayān*, seemingly in a non-technical sense following al-Jurjānī (see §3.2), and his work influenced many subsequent scholars of literary theory (see §2.3 and Part Two). His inclusion here by Ibn al-Akfānī probably has to do with his reputation as a *muḥaqqiq*, an independently-minded critical thinker (see §4.4). As we shall see, however, al-Rāzī's work is by no means a study of literary composition, in the way that is outlined by Ibn al-Akfānī.

Terminologically, Ibn al-Akfānī uses *ʿilm al-bayān* in the context of the *maʿānī-bayān-badīʿ* triad, but content-wise he fills the term with the 'old' substance of an overarching discipline of verbal arts. In the famous *Muqaddima* by the North African historian and thinker Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) we find the opposite occurrence in play: the substance is the standardized tenets of *ʿilm al-balāgha* but the term used to identify them is

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probably an ellipsis for the full *Nihāyat al-ījāz fī dirāyat al-iʿjāz*, rather than a mistake (Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ refers to it as the *Iʿjāz* of Ibn al-Khaṭīb, see §2.3).

[203] One argument in support of this presumption would be the geographical (Jazīra/Egypt) and chronological (about a century) affinity between Ibn al-Akfānī and Abnāʾ al-Athīr.

ʿilm al-bayān.[204] In other words, the name Ibn Khaldūn uses for what we know as the standardized science of eloquence is *ʿilm al-bayān*. Here *ʿilm al-bayān* is presented as the third of the four Arabic sciences (*ʿulūm al-lisān al-ʿarabī*), the others being grammar, lexicography and *ʿilm al-adab* (to be discussed shortly).[205] *ʿIlm al-bayān* includes the three subtypes (*ṣinf* pl. *aṣnāf*) familiar to us from the Standard Theory, namely (1) functional grammar (or: contextual aptness, oddly termed *ʿilm al-balāgha*!), (2) implied meaning (*ʿilm al-bayān* – on this translation below), and (3) embellishments (*ʿilm al-badīʿ*).[206] The reason given for naming the supra-heading "*ʿilm al-bayān*" has, in fact, to do with the hypo-heading *ʿilm al-bayān* (*al-ṣinf al-thānī*): according to Ibn Khaldūn, it was the first among the three to be discussed by the 'ancients' (*al-aqdamīn*), so the 'moderns' named the discipline after it.[207]

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[204] Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddima* (ed. Wāfī) 4: 1263 ff. / Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddima: An Introduction to History*, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, 2nd ed., with corrections and augmented bibliography, 3 vols., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967, 3: 332-9; henceforth: "Rosenthal (trans.)." / Ibn Khaldūn, *Discours sur l'histoire universelle (Al-Muqaddima)*: Traduction nouvelle, préf. et notes par Vincent Monteil, 3 vols., Beirut: Commission internationale pour la traduction des chefs-d'oeuvre, 1967-1968, 3: 1256 ff. / Ibn Khaldūn, *Die Muqaddima: Betrachtungen zur Weltgeschichte*, Aus dem Arabischen übertragen und mit einer Einführung von Alma Giese, Unter Mitwirkung von Wolfhart Heinrichs, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2011, 489. Rosenthal translates *ʿilm al-bayān* as "[t]he science of syntax and style and literary criticism" (Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 332), seemingly taking the first subdivision dealing with functional grammar as 'syntax' (probably because topics we classify nowadays as part of pragmatics were seen at the time to be part of syntax). See also Monteil's translation (*Discours* 3: 1256) as "syntaxe et stylistique". Giese has "Stilistik/Rhetorik" (*Die Muqaddima*, 489).

[205] *Muqaddima* 4: 1254 (Rosenthal has "sciences concerned with the Arabic language" for *ʿulūm al-lisān al-ʿarabī*; Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 319). It should be noted that *ʿilm al-naḥw* is not limited to syntax as one would gather from the discussion in *Muqaddima* 4: 1254-58 dealing entirely with case endings. In his introductory words of *ʿilm al-bayān* (4: 1263) Ibn Khaldūn does include *abniyat al-kalimāt* within *ʿilm al-naḥw*, that is, morphology.

[206] Ibid. 4: 1263-64, and in slightly different terms 4: 1307-1308. According to Ibn Khaldūn the three-fold discipline is chronologically posterior to the science of syntax and the science of lexicography (4: 1263). For the use of (*ʿilm*) *al-balāgha* in the sense of (what we know as) *ʿilm al-maʿānī* see 4: 1264.8-6^e, 1279.7 ff., 1280.12, 1287.3-4, 1291.1-2, 1293.6 ff., 1310.11-13, 1311.3-4 (Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 335 translates this as 'the science of rhetoric').

[207] *Muqaddima* 4: 1265. This seems to be Ibn Khaldūn's own interpretation. Though elsewhere he states (4: 1229) that the topics of (the supra) *ʿilm al-bayān* were historically first scattered throughout the grammar books: but as is well known, figurative speech, similes and the like (=*al-ṣinf al-thānī*) fell *outside* the purview of the grammarians. Regarding the 'ancients', Ibn Khaldūn does not mention any scholar by name but does say that once the topics had started to accumulate, Jaʿfar b. Yaḥyā (the Barmakid?; cf. Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 336, fn. 1299), al-Jāḥiẓ, Qudāma and their like wrote deficient books on them (the topics of the supra *ʿilm al-bayān*) until finally came al-Sakkākī and

Furthermore, *ʿilm al-bayān* is taken to be a highly theoretical science divorced from the art of speech production,[208] in contradistinction to the 'incorporated' view we saw in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and Ibn al-Akfānī. In fact, good speech composition (or: good style) is accorded independent status in Ibn Khaldūn's scheme as it constitutes the object of the last of the four Arabic sciences, namely *ʿilm al-adab*. Thus *ʿilm al-bayān* is coupled with grammar with respect to its scientific methodology – they both contain *qawānīn ʿilmiyya* 'theoretical/ scientific rules' which are susceptible to *qiyās* 'analogical reasoning' – whereas *ʿilm al-adab* lacks such methodology.[209] The gist of *ʿilm al-adab* is to enable one to produce good poetry and good prose according to the ways of the ancient Arabs such that it exhibits the composer's well-rounded education.[210] The only 'methodology' *ʿilm al-adab* has to offer is the memorization, or "implanting in the mind" of the "moldings/patterns" (*asālīb*,

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turned the discipline into its final, refined form (*Muqaddima* 4: 1265). ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī is not mentioned in this context but is mentioned earlier, alongside al-Sakkākī, as the essential founder (a term not used) of *ʿilm al-bayān* (*Muqaddima* 4: 1229 / Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 286, 534 [index]). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr is not mentioned anywhere in the work (his brother, the historian ʿIzz al-Dīn, amply is; see Rosenthal [trans.], 3: index). Notably, the editor of the *Muqaddima*, ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Wāfī, states that "in the past" (*qadīman*) the term *bayān* was used to comprise all three subfields (*Muqaddima* 4: 1229 fn. 1670).

[208] […] *kāna fannu taʾlīfi l-kalāmi munfaridan ʿan naẓari l-naḥwiyyi wa-l-bayāniyyi wa-l-ʿarūḍiyyi* "[…] the art of speech composition is separated from the consideration[s] of the grammarian, the scholar of *bayān* [for discussion and translation of *bayānī* see below] and the prosodist"; *Muqaddima* 4: 1294.7-6ᵉ and fn. 1761 (the text is vocalized *taʾālīf*, in the plural form) / Rosenthal (trans.) 3: 380. See also *Muqaddima* 4: 1267 ff., 1279 ff., 1293 ff.

[209] Ibid. 4: 1279.2-1ᵉ (*al-qawānīn al-ʿilmiyya* […] *-llatī stanbaṭahā ahlu ṣināʿati l-lisāni*), 1280.8 (*al-qawānīn al-naḥwiyya wa-l-bayāniyya*), 1282.9 (*al-qawānīn al-bayāniyya*), 1293.5-4ᵉ (*qawānīn al-balāgha* […] *ʿilmiyya wa-qiyāsiyya*) (by *balāgha* he means here the standard *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, see above), 1294.1 (*al-qawānīn al-ʿilmiyya min al-ʿarabiyya* [synonymous with *naḥw*] *wa-l-bayān*).

[210] Ibid. 4: 1267 ff. Ibn Khaldūn admits that, unlike other sciences, *ʿilm al-adab* has no 'subject-matter' (*mawḍūʿ*); rather, its 'fruit' – to excel in the arts of prose and poetry – is identical with the science itself. Ibn Khaldūn tells us that according to his teachers, the foundational works on *ʿilm al-adab* four (*Muqaddima* 4: 1267-8): *Adab al-kātib* of Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), *al-Kāmil* of al-Mubarrad (d. 286/898), *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* of al-Jāḥiẓ and *al-Nawādir* (= *al-Amālī*?) of al-Qālī (d. 356/967). Despite the philological nature of some of these works (esp. *Adab al-kātib*, which seems out of place), what makes them qualify for this 'science' is that they contain "authentic texts" (*mutūn*) of the speech of the Arabs (*kalām al-ʿarab*), that is, they are a faithful source for old poems and literary prose (*Muqaddima* 4: 1267.13-16). See also van Gelder, "Literary Criticism as Literature," 56, and fn. 2, for the probable source for this account (where we find, instead of Ibn Qutayba's *Adab al-kātib*, the *Zahra* – i.e., *Zahr al-ādāb* – by al-Ḥuṣrī [d. 413/1022]).

qawālib; cf. Ibn al-Akfānī's *aḥwāl*) of the ancient Arabic speech – that is, poetry and high prose – a process which cannot be set into rules and cannot be achieved by analogical reasoning.[211]

If *ʿilm al-bayān* by Ibn Khaldūn reflects the Sakkākian strand of rhetoric studies, one should not be surprised, and would in fact expect to find it delineated as a science possessing *qawānīn ʿilmiyya*. But the picture portrayed in the *Muqaddima* is more complex than that, as it betrays evidence of 'our' earlier *ʿilm al-bayān*. This evidence is found in Ibn Khaldūn's treatment of *dhawq* lit. 'taste', here: 'linguistic aptitude', a notion claimed to be under the scrutiny of the "scholars of *bayān*"![212] According to Ibn Khaldūn, it was in fact the *bayān* scholars who coined the term.[213] Since the standard theorists rarely, if ever, spoke of *dhawq*, Ibn Khaldūn must have in mind here the 'old' stylisticians.[214] *Dhawq* is portrayed here in remarkably similar terms to those of *ʿilm al-adab*: it is described as the possession of the

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[211] Ibid. 4: 1267, 1290-91, 1294. In all these sections Ibn Khaldūn repeats the notion of creating a *ṣūra dhihniyya* 'mental form' of those memorized patterns. In essence, it is a 'mechanical' process that has not to do with linguistic training or knowledge. The idea of 'implanting' such patterns in the mind is an old one and was used by al-Jāḥiẓ and Ibn Ṭabāṭabā. Al-Jāḥiẓ uses the image of setting up a nest in the heart, wherein eggs are laid which later hatch chickens that eventually learn to fly; for Ibn Ṭabāṭabā it is an ingot cast from various metals or a river made up of various streams (see Lidia Bettini, "On *Lafẓ* and *Maʿnā* Again: Some Aspects of Their Relationship According to the *Balāġiyyūn*," in Giuliano Lancioni and Lidia Bettini [eds.], *The Word in Arabic*, Leiden: Brill, 2011, 109-43, here: 115). Although more attention is given to poetry, Ibn Khaldūn explicitly says that in speaking of *qawālib* he is referring to literary prose as well (*Muqaddima* 4: 1294.8). Ibn Khaldūn makes the same distinction of theoretical versus practical knowledge when he deals with the acquisition of 'everyday' (as opposed to literary) ancient Arabic: the ability to acquire the linguistic habit (*malakat hādhā al-lisān*) does not equal the knowledge of the rules and methods underlying that habit (e.g., 4: 1276-79). The idea of the acquisition of the ancient Arabic linguistic habit is almost indistinguishable from the notion of *dhawq* (see below).

[212] Ibid. 4: 1279-82, under the title *faṣl fī tafsīr al-dhawq fī muṣṭalaḥ ahl al-bayān wa-taḥqīq maʿnāhu* […] "On the explanation of *dhawq* in the nomenclature of the scholars of *bayān* and the presentation of its real meaning […]" (4: 1279). The opening statement of the section is: *iʿlam anna lafẓata l-dhawqi yatadāwaluhā l-muʿtanūna bi-funūni l-bayāni* "Know that the word *dhawq* is in current use in the deliberations of those who devote their attention to the [various] branches of *bayān*" (4: 1279).

[213] […] *ism al-dhawq alladhī iṣṭalaḥa ʿalayhi ahl ṣināʿat al-bayān*; ibid. 4: 1280.5ᵉ.

[214] Rosenthal even translates *bayān* here as 'literary criticism' and *ahl al-bayān* as 'literary critics' (Rosenthal [trans.] 3: 358, 360). Al-Sakkākī did talk of *dhawq* as a component to be revered in eloquence (Maṭlūb, *al-Balāgha ʿinda al-Sakkākī*, 184; Smyth, "Criticism," 416), but he did not expound on its methods of attainment or its place in his system nor did he make extensive use of the notion.

linguistic habit (*malaka*) of the (ancient) Arabic speech exhibiting contextual aptness (*balāgha*);[215] like *ʿilm al-adab*, it is attained only by continual practice, not by 'theory'.[216] Precisely because the notion of *dhawq* is portrayed as a 'practical' skill falling outside the 'theoretical' purview of *ʿilm al-bayān*, it is revealing to see how Ibn Khaldūn still sees it as part of the outlook of the *bayān* scholars. What we have here is a testament to the gradual development and change of perception towards *bayān* studies, *bayān* scholars and *bayān* scientificity. The preoccupation with a practical notion like *dhawq* by the *bayān* scholars diminishes the professed scientificity of the discipline, at least by Ibn Khaldūn's own terms.

The tensions surrounding *ʿilm al-bayān* do not end with *dhawq*. The tenets themselves of Ibn Khaldūn's *ʿilm al-bayān* do not entirely conform to the standard *ʿilm al-balāgha*. First we have the – admittedly less consequential – terminological inconsistencies: *ʿilm al-bayān* (Ibn Khaldūn) for *ʿilm al-balāgha* (standard); *ʿilm al-balāgha* (Ibn Khaldūn) for *ʿilm al-maʿānī* (standard). These terminological differences are actually sorted out in a later passage in the *Muqaddima* which seems to have been added after Ibn Khaldūn's move to Egypt at the age of fifty.[217] Second, and more importantly, the second subfield termed *ʿilm al-bayān* (the section on imagery) essentially lacks two of the paramount notions found in the Standard Theory: *majāz* 'figurative speech' and *tashbīh* 'comparison; simile'.[218] The

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[215] *ḥusūlu malakati l-balāghati li-l-lisāni wa-qad marra tafsīru l-balāghati wa-annahā muṭābaqatu l-kalāmi li-l-maʿnā min jamīʿi wujūhihi bi-khawāṣṣa taqaʿu li-l-tarākībi fī ifādati dhālika* (*Muqaddima* 4: 1279).

[216] Ibid. 4: 1279.1-2^e.

[217] Ibid. 4: 1307-1309. On the 'Egyptian edition' of the *Muqaddima* see Rosenthal (trans.) 1: Translator's Introduction, and below. In Wāfī's edition, the entire section (*Muqaddima* 4: 1307-11) appears in square brackets which, in his notation, means that it appeared in two of the four manuscripts used in "the Paris edition" (Quatremère, 1858), as well as in one manuscript in the Taymūriyya library (see *Muqaddima* 4: 1307, 2: 669 fn. 900, and 698, fn. 944; Rosenthal [trans.] 1: lxxxviii and c-ci).

[218] *Majāz* appears once in this context: *Muqaddima* 4: 1307.2^e, part of the later 'Egyptian edition'. But cf. 4: 1264.6-7 where *ḥaqīqa* (the standard counterpart of *majāz*) is opposed with *istiʿāra*. An additional inconsistency vis-à-vis the Standard Theory is found in that same passage added later in Egypt, where he says (4: 1307.14) that the rules of

subfield called ʿilm al-bayān that Ibn Khaldūn knew of studied *implied meaning*, the main

components of which were *istiʿāra* 'metaphor' and *kināya* 'periphrasis'. There is no clear

term used for 'implied meaning' but Ibn Khaldūn does speak of "meaning/intending"

(conjugations of *irāda*) the *lāzim* 'consequence' or the *malzūm* 'cause' of the utterance.[219]

The discussion derives directly or indirectly from al-Sakkākī, but makes no reference to the

all-important notion of *majāz*.[220] Implied meaning is of two kinds: (1) intending the

'consequence' of the utterance (*lāzim* lit. "a thing [logically] following") as in the case of

metaphor (*istiʿāra*): "Zayd is a lion"→"Zayd is brave" (the second follows the first); and (2)

intending the 'cause' of the utterance (*malzūm* lit. "a thing being [logically] followed [by

something else]") as in the case of periphrasis (*kināya*): "Zayd has many ashes [of the

cooking pot]"←"Zayd is hospitable" (the second is logically followed by the first).[221]

Discussions on implied meaning did comprise the prefatory remarks to the standard sub-

science of imagery (see §2.1). But when implied meaning becomes the focus of the entire

subfield, as is the case with Ibn Khaldūn's synopsis, it is my understanding that all

utterances under investigation must be taken *literally* rather than figuratively, thus excluding

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grammar (*al-qawānīn al-ʿarabiyya*) are subsumed under the rules of ʿilm al-maʿānī (or *fann al-balāgha*). He also disagrees with the 'modern' view that *badīʿ* was part of *balāgha* (the knowledge of contextual aptness; 4: 1310.10-14).

[219] This is a paraphrase of ibid. 4: 1264.5-8: *thumma qad yadullu bi-l-lafẓi wa-lā yurādu manṭūquhu wa-yurādū lāzimuhu* […] *fa-lā turīdu* […] *wa-innamā turīdu* […] *wa-qad turīdu bi-l-lafẓi l-murakkabi l-dalālata ʿalā malzūmihi* […] *wa-turīdu bihi* […].

[220] On al-Sakkākī's treatment of the "relationships of adherence (*luzūm*)," as Smyth refers to it, see Smyth, "Canonical Formulation," 17-21.

[221] *Muqaddima* 4: 1264, 1307.3ᵉ ff.

the notion of *majāz*. The notion of *tashbīh* is not treated by Ibn Khaldūn and is only vaguely alluded to.[222]

When dealing with the *Muqaddima* one must keep in mind that its contents reflect the knowledge prevalent in northwestern Africa in the second half of the eighth/fourteenth century. Most of the work was written in the Islamic West, and even after Ibn Khaldūn moved to the eastern Islamic world (Egypt) at the age of fifty he kept his later 'editions' of the *Muqaddima* more or less faithful to the early versions (that is, there were additions and corrections, but rarely did he rewrite previous expositions).[223] This means that the knowledge of an overarching *ʿilm al-bayān* had been entrenched well before Ibn Khaldūn's time, because the ideas he relays represented the perceived wisdom of his teachers and peers back West.[224] The pervasiveness of the 'old' conception of *ʿilm al-bayān* comes across, first,

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[222] Even in the later passage that exhibits the 'corrected' appellations for the discipline and sub-disciplines, his single mention of *majāz* and allusion to *tashbīh* is not in line with the Standard Theory. He states: *thumma yantaqilu l-dhihnu ilā lāzimihi [lāzim al-maʿnā] aw malzūmihi aw **shibhihi** fa-yakūnu fīha **majāzan immā** bi-stiʿāratin **aw** kināyatin* "The mind then goes to [a meaning] that follows it [*viz.* that follows the 'first' or 'immediate' meaning of the utterance] or [to a meaning] that is followed by it [i.e., is the cause of the first meaning] or [to a meaning of something] similar to it, in [either case of] which it is *majāz* 'figurative speech' either through metaphor or through periphrasis" (*Muqaddima* 4: 1307.2-3ᵉ; emphasis added). The implication that *kināya* is also a type of *majāz* goes against the Standard Theory. The notion of *tashbīh* is less accounted for, but it seems that it too is part of *majāz*, another idea broadly rejected by the standard theorists. An alternative understanding of this passage would be to take *majāz* not as 'figurative speech' but as 'implied speech' (speech that is understood by *going beyond* what is uttered, but 'what is uttered' is to be taken literally): here, as well, it would diverge from the Standard Theory which spoke explicitly of non-literal speech.

[223] This is the view espoused by Rosenthal. See Rosenthal (trans.) 1: Translator's Introduction, esp. xxix, xliii, lx-lxi, lxviii-lxxi, lxxxviii and civ-cvii. According to him (1: cv-cvi), "[i]t would be wrong to consider the successive stages of the text of the *Muqaddima* as 'recensions' in the proper sense of the term. For instance, Ibn Khaldûn never changed the passages where he speaks of himself as still in the Maghrib. His additions and corrections were jotted down unsystematically in a long-drawn-out process, much as a modern author might add notes in the margins of his published works." Rosenthal adds that Ibn Khaldūn did rectify obvious mistakes committed earlier. Wāfī, the editor of the *Muqaddima*, holds a different view: according to him (*Muqaddima* 1: 162-63 [editor's introduction]), it is in fact impossible to distinguish between what Ibn Khaldūn wrote in the West and what he later changed in the East. This is unless there are clear contextual markers indicating the place or time of his statements (several examples are given by Wāfī in 1: 163-65).

[224] "[…] we should perhaps be justified in assuming that practically every matter of detail found in the *Muqaddimah* was probably not original with Ibn Khaldûn, but had been previously expressed elsewhere." Rosenthal (trans.) 1: lxxxv; see also xliii. It may be added that Ibn Khaldūn exhibited marked local patriotism outwardly by dressing in the style of his native northwest African region after moving to Egypt (1: lxiv).

via the terminological vestige of *ʿilm al-bayān* as the signifier of scholastic rhetoric (though Ibn al-Akfānī too did not use the term *ʿilm al-balāgha*). Second, it comes across via the substantial vestiges we find in the understanding of *dhawq* as part of the discipline's purview. Third, it comes across via the 'professionalization' of *ʿilm al-bayān* seen through such expressions containing the *nisba* form of *bayān* as *qawānīn bayāniyya* as well as occupation-headings like the *bayānī* (alongside the *naḥwī* 'grammarian' and *ʿarūḍī* 'prosodist') and *ahl al-bayān*.[225] The phrases that are used to refer to this group of scholars in the context of the discussion of *dhawq* alone are *ahl al-bayān, ahl ṣināʿat al-bayān* "the people of the craft of *bayān*," *al-muʿtanūn bi-funūn al-bayān* "those who devote their attention to the [various] branches of *bayān*," *ahl al-qawānīn* […] *al-bayāniyya* "the people of the *bayānī* rules", and *man yanẓuru fī hādhihi al-qawānīn al-bayāniyya* "those who study the rules of *bayān*".[226]

The *bayānī* of Ibn Khaldūn did not exactly reflect the 'new' rhetorician, but it did not conform to the 'old' concept of the stylistician or literary theorist either. His treatment of *ʿilm al-bayān* shows us that the development of *ʿilm al-balāgha* was not uniform and clear-cut, nor was it all-sweeping, as one might gather from the 'formal' account of its development.[227] It shows us that even as late as Ibn Khaldūn's time its consolidation was far from complete and it highlights once more the lacuna in our understanding of the earlier *ʿilm al-bayān*. The conflation of *ʿilm al-adab* and *dhawq* may indicate that separating *ʿilm al-adab* from *ʿilm al-bayān* was Ibn Khaldūn's own innovation, and that according to his

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[225] E.g., *Muqaddima* 4: 1294.6ᵉ (*bayānī*), 1279.4 and 1307.5 (*ahl al-bayān*), 1280.5ᵉ (*ahl ṣināʿat al-bayān*).

[226] Ibid. 4: 1279.4, 1280.5ᵉ, 1279.6, 1280.8, 1282.9, respectively.

[227] That is, the Jurjānī-Sakkākī-Qazwīnī-route that, in turn, changed the landscape of pre-modern Arabic literary-theoretical studies.

received wisdom, literary composition was part of ʿilm al-bayān. Ibn Khaldūn does not mention Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr anywhere in his account.[228] Indeed, this may be the only caveat in associating ʿilm al-bayān directly with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's efforts.

2.3. ʿIlm al-Bayān in Literary-Theoretical Works

Relics of an overarching discipline called ʿilm al-bayān can be seen not only in later works on the classification of the sciences or multi-thematic historical works but also in literary-theoretical works themselves. To be sure, many of the vestiges are terminological. It seems that very shortly after Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's time (mid-seventh/thirteenth century) the term ʿilm al-bayān as a signifier for literary-theoretical studies and the expression ʿulamāʾ al-bayān as a signifier for its scholarly practitioners swept the critical landscape. In later centuries the term ʿilm al-bayān became so prevalent that we even find it lexicalized in Hans Wehr's dictionary as 'rhetoric'.[229] Indeed, the term is preserved with reference to the Standard Theory as well, as evinced in the works of Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1372), al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), al-Zarkashī (794/1392), al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), and al-Tahānawī (12th/18th cent.), among others.[230]

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[228] Rosenthal [trans.] 3: index.

[229] Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic: Arabic-English*, edited by J. Milton Cowan, 3rd printing, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1980, 88. For *bayān* (without ʿilm) as 'rhetoric' see also Lane, *Lexicon*, 288; J.G. Hava, *al-Farāʾid al-durriyya fī al-lughatayn al-ʿarabiyya wa-l-inklīziyya: Arabic-English Dictionary*, Beirut: Catholic Press, 1915, 54.

[230] For al-Subkī see below. Al-Taftāzānī tells us that the term *al-bayān* is "often applied to the three [sub-]sciences [of ʿilm al-balāgha]" (*kathīran mā yuṭlaqu l-bayānu ʿalā l-ʿulūmi l-thalātha*); Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd b. ʿUmar al-Taftāzānī, *al-Muṭawwal sharḥ talkhīṣ miftāḥ al-ʿulūm*, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Hindāwī, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001, 286 (English: 'The Exhaustive Commentary on [al-Qazwīnī's] *Epitome of the Key to the Sciences*). Al-Suyūṭī, *Sharḥ ʿUqūd al-jumān*, 3, is relying, *inter alia*, on al-Zarkashī's legal work: Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Bahādur al-Zarkashī, *al-Manthūr fī al-qawāʿid: fiqh Shāfiʿī*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl, 2 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000, 13 (English: 'The Diffuse [Account] on Legal Maxims/Principles: Shāfiʿī Law'). See also Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *Ḥusn al-muḥāḍara fī tārīkh Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 2 vols., Cairo: Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1967-68, 338, 343 (English: 'The Excellent Historical Reports Worth Quoting About Egypt and Cairo'; translation adopted from Stephanie B. Thomas, *The*

As we saw above, the literary scholar writing closest in time to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's writing of the *Mathal* in the first third of the seventh/thirteenth century was Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, who completed his 'response' to the *Mathal* in 633/1236. Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd did not pay any conscious attention to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's use of the term *ʿilm al-bayān*. It either went unnoticed or it was interpreted as one out of several names for literary-theoretical studies. Judging by his preface (see §1.2), Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd interpreted the *Mathal* primarily as a work for *kuttāb* education. But he did quote the term *ʿilm al-bayān* if it appeared in a passage he was criticizing. Such was the case in the passage in which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn claims that *ʿilm al-bayān* is a rational science as opposed to the science of grammar. Sure enough, we find out in his reply that Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's grievance concerns solely the claims on grammar being a 'traditional' science. He ignores the claim on *ʿilm al-bayān*, and this enforces our contention that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's generic innovation had gone by him unnoticed.

We have a different story with the slightly later writer Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ (d. 654/1256), an Egyptian scholar and litterateur.[231] Like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, he authored two works on literary-critical matters, and like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, he provides at the outset a list of authorities in the discipline he is writing in (though Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's lists are much longer indeed). But the change in framework we find between Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's first book and his second book is striking. While the first, more comprehensive work titled *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, completed in

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Concept of Muḥāḍara in the Adab Anthology with Special Reference to al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī's Muḥāḍarāt al-udabāʾ, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2000, 93); Muḥammad ʿAlī b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥasan Basaj, 4 vols., 2nd ed., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2006, 1: 210 (English: 'The Uncoverer of the Technical Terms of the Sciences'). According to al-Tahānawī's interpretation of al-Taftāzānī's *Muṭawwal*, some use *ʿilm al-bayān* to signify *maʿānī*, *bayān* and *badīʿ* in their entirety, while others use it to signify *bayān* and *badīʿ* alone (see fn. 174 on the Persianate Indian work forming the basis of de Tassy's book, which lacked the section on *maʿānī*). Already al-Qazwīnī noted the terminological overlaps in *Talkhīṣ*, 23; see also Larcher, "Pragmatics," *Oxford Handbook of Arabic Linguistics*, 188, 195.

[231] Van Gelder, "Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature*, 305.

640/1242 or 1243, is framed under the heading *badīʿ* 'rhetorical figures', the second work

titled *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān* is framed explicitly under the disciplinary terms of *ʿilm al-bayān*.[232] It

is not that Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ shows no disciplinary awareness in the *Taḥrīr*: he consciously

chooses the term *badīʿ* as the heading of the science he is writing in (*hādhā l-ʿilm*) and even

differentiates between *badīʿ* studies and studies concerned more broadly with eloquence

(*balāgha*, *faṣāḥa*) or criticism (*naqd*).[233] For him, the limits of *badīʿ* are clear: he criticizes

Usāma b. Munqidh (d. 584/1188) for including poetic faults (*ʿuyūb*) and 'plagiarism'

(*sariqāt*) in his book on *badīʿ*, implying that they exceed its scope.[234] Like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, Ibn

Abī al-Iṣbaʿ is concerned with his active role in extracting (*istikhrāj*, *istinbāṭ*) new literary

devices, which he identifies explicitly as rhetorical figures (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not use the

terminology of *badīʿ* here).[235] There is little doubt that Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ envisages *badīʿ* as

the overarching frame for his work. In fact, in one of the manuscripts the title of the book

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[232] ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr fī ṣināʿat al-shiʿr wa-l-nathr wa-bayān iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, ed. Ḥifnī Muḥammad Sharaf, Cairo: al-Majlis al-Aʿlā li-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-Islāmī, [1963], 83-87 (English: ~'Foolproofing the Foolproof Composition: On the Craft of Poetry and Prose and the Manifestation of the Qurʾān's Inimitability)'; *idem*, *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, ed. Ḥifnī Muḥammad Sharaf, [Cairo]: Maktabat Nahḍat Miṣr, 1957, 3-4 (English: 'The Rhetorical Figures of the Qurʾān'). For the *Taḥrīr*'s time of composition see *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 57, 67-69 (editor's introduction). The *Badīʿ* is also known under the title *al-Burhān fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* and was later edited based on a newly discovered manuscript in Chester Beatty; see Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ al-Miṣrī, *al-Burhān fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān aw Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, eds. Aḥmad Maṭlūb and Khadīja al-Ḥadīthī, Baghdad: al-Majmaʿ al-ʿIlmī, 2006. *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān* began as an appendix for another work written by Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, *Bayān al-burhān fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* ('Manifestation of the Proof: On the Qurʾān's inimitability'), described by him as "the task of his lifetime"; see *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 3, 15. According to the Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīthī (*al-Burhān*, 19), this work is identical to the *Taḥrīr*, but given Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's own reference to the *Taḥrīr* in the preface alongside the *Bayān al-burhān* (see below), this seems unlikely.

[233] *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 87 (including the occurrence of *hādhā al-ʿilm*, referring to *al-badīʿ* on pp. 83-87). More specifically he states that scholars usually refer to "such-and-such" a figure of speech or component of speech-beautification (*maḥāsin al-kalām*) as *badīʿ* – except for those who write books on the sum total of eloquence (*majmūʿ al-balāgha*) or on revealing the true essence of eloquence (*kunh al-faṣāḥa*) or on criticism (*naqd*). These latter authors, he says, may refer to figures of speech however they may wish. He begins with an interesting history of *badīʿ*-studies starting with Ibn al-Muʿtazz and Qudāma, demonstrating how the term *badīʿ* gained prevalence over *maḥāsin al-kalām* (ibid., 83 ff).

[234] Ibid., 91.

[235] Ibid., 94, and §1.2 above for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's discussion of *ḍurūb* in this context.

appears explicitly as *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr fī ʿilm al-badīʿ*.[236] Finally, the long list of books he

provides in his preface, about forty in number, are said either to be devoted to "this science"

(*mā huwa munfarid bihi*, referring to *hādhā l-ʿilm*), meaning *badīʿ*, or to include it (*mā*

hādhā l-ʿilm aw baʿḍuhu dākhil fī baʿḍihi).[237]

The preface to his later work, written in old-age,[238] repeats many of the points

discussed in the preface to the *Taḥrīr*. Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿʾ's point of interest is the categories of

badīʿ, though this time only those rhetorical figures appearing in the Qurʾān (hence the title

Badīʿ al-Qurʾān).[239] Here too he stresses his own *ijtihād* (our term) in extracting (*istikhrāj*,

istinbāṭ) categories of *badīʿ*.[240] Here too he provides a long list of works in the field, more

than twice as long as his list in the *Taḥrīr* and including almost all of those mentioned

there.[241] But "the field" with which these books are said to be either coextensive or wider in

scope, in almost the exact wording as we find in the *Taḥrīr*, is no longer identified as *badīʿ*

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[236] Ibid., 67 (editor's introduction). This is the principal manuscript Sharaf relied on (MS Shahīd ʿAlī 2170 in Istanbul). Smyth ("Criticism," 406) categorizes the *Taḥrīr* under *badīʿ* studies.

[237] *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 87. Works whose scope is wider than *badīʿ* range from the classical *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* of al-Jāḥiẓ to the exegetical *al-Kashshāf* of al-Zamakhsharī to the commentary of *ḥadīth Umm Zarʿ* by al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (d. 544/1149). Works whose scope is (probably in Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿʾ's eyes) coextensive with *badīʿ* are those by al-Āmidī, Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Ibn Rashīq, and more. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is also included. See *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 87-91. Such 'inventories' of bibliographical references were to become common; for the reading list that Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. 749/1348) provides see Muhsin J. al-Musawi, *The Medieval Islamic Republic of Letters: Arabic Knowledge Construction*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015, 227, and the last four pages between p. 146 and p. 147. Al-Musawi draws a direct line of influence between Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ and al-Ḥillī in the latter's listing of a bibliography (ibid., 115), but others have done so as well (see the case of al-Subkī, below).

[238] *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 4, where he refers to his *shaykhūkha*. On p. 15 he mentions his earlier written *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*.

[239] Its reputation as a work dedicated solely to the devices in the Qurʾān continues well beyond Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿʾs time; Ṭashköprüzāde cites his book as a leading source under the chapter on *badāʾiʿ al-Qurʾān* (*Miftāḥ al-saʿāda*, eds. Bakrī and al-Nūr, 2: 494, where we find the erroneous Abū al-Iṣbagh and Ibn Abī al-Iṣbagh, and *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda*, Hyderabad ed., 2: 338, with the correct name).

[240] *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 14-15.

[241] Ibid., 3-13.

but rather as *ʿilm al-bayān*.[242] The authorities in the discipline are no longer referred to as authorities in *badīʿ* but rather as scholars, learned and eloquent men (*ʿulamāʾ*, *fuḍalāʾ*, *bulaghāʾ*) in *ʿilm al-bayān*.[243] He occasionally refers to "scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān*" throughout the work as well.[244] It is clear that these scholars are identical to those he identified earlier as scholars in *badīʿ*, even though his interest now is in Qurʾānic rhetorical figures. No special mention is made of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn; his work is cited as one out of many.[245]

Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ is commonly portrayed in modern research as continuing 'older' traditions of rhetorical writings, where the various literary devices are presented as a list (otherwise known as works devoted to *badīʿ*).[246] But by no means should the mode of presentation affect our characterization of a work (cf. the case of medieval commentaries). Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, which like the *Taḥrīr* is organized in list-form, is at times better understood in light of the emerging Standard Theory than it is in light of older writings because of the growing influence of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Especially in the case of *majāz* and *istiʿāra*, passages from al-Rāzī's epitome of al-Jurjānī's oeuvre are cited explicitly and verbatim, and they contain such notions that were to become standard as

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[242] Ibid., 4. The phrase *mā huwa munfarid bi-hādhā al-ʿilm wa-*[…] *mā hādhā al-ʿilm dākhil fī athnāʾihi* (line 5) refers to *ʿilm al-bayān* (line 2).

[243] Ibid.

[244] Ibid., 26.1ᵉ (*al-muḥaqqiqūn min ʿilm al-bayān*; context: the chapter on *istiʿāra* 'metaphor'), 121.3 (*ʿilm al-bayān*; context: the technical [*ṣināʿī*] meaning of *istithnāʾ* 'exception'), 178.15 (*arbāb ʿilm al-bayān*; context: the chapter on *majāz* 'figurative speech').

[245] *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 91; *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 12. Only the *Mathal* is cited in the former; both the *Mathal* and *al-Washy al-marqūm* are cited in the latter.

[246] Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa ʾl-Bayān"; van Gelder, "Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ"; Smyth, "Criticism," 405-406; Ḥifnī Muḥammad Sharaf's introductions to the *Taḥrīr* and *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*; and other scholars who espouse the view of a 'Western' school of literary criticism (see Introduction). One exception is al-Musawi (*Islamic Republic of Letters*, 219), who describes Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ as ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's "loyal Egyptian follower"! (no reference for this claim is cited). In al-Musawi's understanding, rhetoric following al-Sakkākī has become part of "grammar in its broadest sense" (ibid.).

"single-term [or: predicate] *majāz*" (*majāz fī al-muthbat*) and "*majāz* on the level of predication" (*majāz fī al-ithbāt*; to be discussed in Chapter 5).[247] Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ enumerates the work of al-Rāzī already in the preface to the *Taḥrīr*, but he does not yet incorporate his views therein (indeed, he may not have actually seen al-Rāzī's work).[248] More than that, Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ lists al-Jurjānī's *Asrār al-balāgha* and *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz* already in the *Taḥrīr* (and later again in the *Badīʿ*), but once again, there is no indication that he engaged with these works firsthand, especially given the fact that he possibly thought ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī was the earlier al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī (d. 392/1002), author of the *Wasāṭa*.[249]

Because of some of the 'standard' leanings we find in the later *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, and due to its limited interest in literary devices in the Qurʾān, the question arises whether Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's disciplinary alignment with *ʿilm al-bayān* has more to do with the influence of al-Rāzī and his preoccupation with the Qurʾān's linguistic excellence than with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and his preoccupation with literary composition. With regards to the rising popularity of the term *ʿilm al-bayān*, the answer probably lies somewhere in the middle, even though al-Rāzī's own use of *ʿilm al-bayān* was only minimally technical (see §3.2). But with regards to the scope of the study of *ʿilm al-bayān*, there is little doubt that it was wider than the study of Qurʾānic style, as the long list of works provided both in the *Taḥrīr* and *Badīʿ al-*

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[247] *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 17-19 and 176-78, for conspicuous citations of al-Rāzī and would-be standard notions.

[248] *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 89-90; *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 5. In both places al-Rāzī's *Nihāya* is referred to as *Iʿjāz Ibn al-Khaṭīb*.

[249] Ibid. (for both works), and also *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 178 (the sentence in parentheses where we come across *kalām al-Qāḍī [al-Jurjānī]* appears in the principal manuscript and in three out of the five remaining manuscripts that Sharaf relied on; in the manuscript used in the later edition, this sentence does not appear; *al-Burhān*, 243-44). In one instance al-Jurjānī's name is cited in full, but this is probably a quotation from al-Rāzī. In the *Taḥrīr*, the *Wasāṭa* is not listed immediately after the *Dalāʾil* and *Asrār*, suggesting that he saw the latter two in a separate context, probably the work of al-Rāzī, or that he recognized that they were different authors only to forget this in his old age (when he wrote *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*).

Qurʾān cover the entire range of literary-theoretical studies. Al-Rāzī, on the other hand, is mainly concerned with logical-linguistic features of eloquence and his brief treatment of rhetorical devices is presented in the technical context of *naẓm*, a principle belonging to syntax.[250]

Besides *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān* by Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, several additional works written in the Arabic East in the seventh/thirteenth century purport to deal with *ʿilm al-bayān*. These are *al-Tibyān fī ʿilm al-bayān* by the Syrian Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651/1253),[251] *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa* by the Iranian turned Levantine Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. after 693/1294), *Muqaddimat tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb* by the Palestinian Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298),[252] *al-Iksīr fī ʿilm al-tafsīr* by the Iraqi Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316), and *al-Aqṣā al-qarīb* by the Syrian Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Tanūkhī (*fl.* end of 7th/13th century).[253] Most of these will form the focus of our analysis in Part Two; like *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, some of them deal specifically with Qurʾānic style. This has to do with the growing importance of the literary-theoretical inquiry within the Qurʾānic commentarial tradition, which was probably propelled by al-Zamakhsharī's *Kashshāf*. But as we shall from our case study of *majāz*, the majority of these works display an unequivocal alignment with more literary-leaning notions

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[250] Al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 277 ff., 285-97 (references are henceforth to the Amīn edition). As opposed to other discussions, "this category," al-Rāzī says – referring to the literary devices – "has no rule that can be memorized" (*thumma laysa li-hādhā l-bābi qānūnun yuḥfaẓu*; ibid., 285, and cf. Ibn Khaldūn). We will look at the structure of the *Nihāya* as a comparison to Ibn al-Zamlakānī in Part Two, §4.2.

[251] Alongside his *al-Burhān al-kāshif ʿan iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* and *al-Mujīd fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān al-majīd*.

[252] Formerly known as [*Kitāb*] *al-Fawāʾid al-mushawwiq ilā ʿulūm al-Qurʾān wa-ʿilm al-bayān* and wrongly attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350).

[253] Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Tanūkhī, *al-Aqṣā al-qarīb fī ʿilm al-bayān*, [Cairo]: [Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda], 1327 [1909]. The work opens with a lengthy prolegomenon on logic (ibid., 2-32); after prefatory definitions of 'eloquence' and phonological and morphological discussions (pp. 32-40) begins the bulk of the work, which enumerates the literary devices (in al-Tanūkhī's terms, *maʿānī*) that form the study of *ʿilm al-bayān* (p. 40 ff.). He refers explicitly to "that which has become customarily called *ʿilm al-bayān*" (ibid., 32), and references to this science heading abound in the work.

than with Qurʾānic-leaning ones. This suggests that despite the growing affinity between Arabic literary theory in the form of *ʿilm al-bayān* and Qurʾānic exegesis, the former was still primarily concerned with literary composition, not with hermeneutics.

Evidence of a wide-ranging *ʿilm al-bayān* can be found well into the eighth/fourteenth century, similar to what we encountered with Ibn al-Akfānī and Ibn Khaldūn. Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 773/1372) living in Mamlūk Egypt is a case in point. His work, *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ*, is an elaborate and dense commentary on al-Qazwīnī's *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ* and as such is in line with the Standard Theory. Subsequently, the science to which he attributes his book is *ʿilm al-balāgha*, following al-Qazwīnī, and the strict tripartite structure of discipline is held throughout.[254] And yet, the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* as a reference to the supra-science, rather than the second sub-science, crops up twice in his (fascinating) introduction to the work. In the first instance, al-Subkī explains why scholars from Egypt have concentrated – rather than on rational sciences and logic – on the sciences of lexicography, grammar, positive law, *ḥadīth* and Qurʾānic commentary: it is because these are the 'outcome' or 'substance' of *ʿilm al-bayān* (one would expect here: *ʿilm al-balāgha*).[255] In the second instance, al-Subkī speaks of the scholarly merits of his father and the vastness of his knowledge: it is from him, says al-Subkī, that he picked up the study of

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[254] Bahāʾ al-Dīn Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-Kāfī al-Subkī, *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ fī sharḥ talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*, ed. Khalīl Ibrāhīm Khalīl, 4 pts. in 2 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001 (English: 'The Bride of the Wedding Feasts: On [al-Qazwīnī's] *Epitome of the Key*'). This commentary was traditionally available to scholars via the vast twentieth-century compendium *Shurūḥ al-talkhīṣ*, containing the commentaries on al-Qazwīnī's *Talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ* by al-Taftāzānī (his *Mukhtaṣar*), by Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Maghribī (his *Mawāhib al-fattāḥ fī sharḥ talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*), by Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Subkī (*ʿArūs al-afrāḥ fī sharḥ talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ*) and by al-Dasūqī (a supercommentary on al-Taftāzānī's commentary). I have used the recent edition, noting that punctuation and footnotes should be used with caution.

[255] *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ* 1: 146.2-4ᵉ (*al-ʿulūm allatī hiya natīja aw mādda li-ʿilm al-bayān*). He presents this claim to reinforce his conviction that the Egyptians mastered all matters concerning eloquence and style, as opposed to the 'Easterners'.

ʿilm al-bayān (again, one would expect here: *ʿilm al-balāgha*).[256]

Interestingly, the expression *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*, or *ʿulamāʾ al-balāgha* for that matter, does not appear as a common phrase in the work. It seems to be, in fact, quite rare. This is due to al-Subkī's rigorous system of citation and referencing that would preclude him from attributing an opinion to such an unspecified group as "scholars of eloquence" (cf. modern scholarly guidelines of citation). Taking the chapter on *tashbīh* 'comparison; simile' as a case study, we find that the number of scholars he cites not only by name but also by work (if they authored more than one) is quite staggering. Specific opinions, and sometimes exact quotations, are attributed to over forty scholars (forty-two scholars, fifty works), among whom are literary theorists, grammarians, lexicographers and religious scholars (lawyers, theologians).[257] The term *al-bayāniyyūn* appears once; it probably refers to scholars writing on topics that coincide with the standard sub-science *ʿilm al-bayān*.[258] The term *ʿulamāʾ al-*

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[256] Ibid. 1: 156.7-8 (*wa-huwa alladhī talaqqaftu ʿanhu ʿilm al-bayān*). One should point out that in this instance the choice of *ʿilm al-bayān* may have been prompted by his use of *sajʿ*, as the following parallel member ends with *ḥisān*. Other hints of *ʿilm al-bayān* appear in several of the titles of the works al-Subkī consulted and cited in his preface. One example is a work by his teacher Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1348 or 9) titled *al-Muqaddima fī ʿilm al-bayān* (ibid. 1: 160). The 'reading list' that al-Subkī provides is long indeed.

[257] Ibid. 2: 148-234. The range of works exceeds that which is mentioned in the preface. Oft cited literary theorists are: 'classical' ones – Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1065; e.g. 2: 180.12, 197.6-7), "ʿAbd al-Laṭīf" al-Baghdādī (meaning Abū Ṭāhir, d. 1123, [not the thirteenth century philosopher since he quotes the *Qawānīn* [sic] *al-balāgha*]; e.g. 2: 165.6, 173.1^e-174.1, 185.8, 196.5, 232.6^e); 'modern' and/or 'standard' ones – al-Zanjānī (alive 660/1261 or 2; e.g. 2: 165.1^e, 170.3^e), al-Tanūkhī (*fl.* end of 7th/13th century; e.g. 2: 153.10, 166.4), al-Ṭībī (Sharaf al-Dīn, d. 743/1343; e.g. 2: 156.5^e, 195.2,7) al-Khaṭībī (Shams al-Dīn al-Khalkhālī, d. *ca.* 745/1345; e.g. 2: 148.11, 163.9^e, 224.9). This in addition to countless references to al-Zamakhsharī, Fakhr al-Dīn, al-Sakkākī and al-Qazwīnī's *Īḍāḥ*. If general scholarly groups are mentioned, they are non-literary theorists: *ahl al-lugha* 'lexicographers' (2: 163.1, 194.1^e), *al-qawm* 'people' (referring here to theologians and philosophers, 2: 174.4^e), *al-mutakallimīn* 'theologians' (2: 175.4), *al-ḥukamāʾ* 'philosophers' (2: 175.5), *al-baṣriyyūn* 'the Baṣran [grammarians]' (2: 193.11), *al-kūfiyyūn* 'the Kūfan [grammarians]' (2: 194.1). Many of the individuals of these groups are subsequently mentioned explicitly. After discussing several opinions he may summarize what the 'majority' perceive (*al-jumhūr, al-aktharīn*; 2: 167.3^e,7^e, 191.9^e).

[258] *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ* 2: 195.11. The context: al-Subkī asserts that the *bayāniyyūn* did not formulate precisely (*lam yuḥarrir*) the meanings of the various particles (or words) of comparison. (Al-Subkī dutifully fills the void.)

bayān appears once, within a quotation from al-Khaṭībī (a 'standardist', d. *ca.* 745/1345).[259]

The term *ʿilm al-bayān* appears once, in reference to the standard sub-science.[260] Given these findings it is all the more surprising to find terminological vestiges of the earlier, supra *ʿilm al-bayān* in al-Subkī's preface.[261]

An eighth/fourteenth-century scholar whose work exhibits much more substantive evidence of our *ʿilm al-bayān* is the prolific Yemeni scholar and Zaydī *imām* al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza al-ʿAlawī (d. 745 or 749/1344 or 1348). His work on 'rhetoric' titled *al-Ṭirāz al-mutaḍammin li-asrār al-balāgha wa-ʿulūm ḥaqāʾiq al-iʿjāz* is often linked in modern scholarship to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr.[262] The *Ṭirāz* is an intricately woven work with multi-layered chapters (sg. *fann*), sub-chapters (sg. *bāb*) and sub-sub-chapters (sg. *qāʿida*, *baḥth*, *faṣl*, *qism* and *tanbīh*, to name a few), often displaying recursive categories. Thus, it is not uncommon to find the same topic being treated in different levels of the *Ṭirāz*'s system and from different perspectives, one such case being *ʿilm al-bayān*. While al-

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[259] Ibid. 2: 223.1. Al-Khaṭībī is, in turn, quoting al-Sakkākī and by *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* he probably means the scholars writing on the standard sub-science. As strange as it may be to refer to scholars of only one sub-science, he is in fact following practice of al-Sakkākī, who himself referred to scholars working within each sub-science as distinct groups. See for instance *ʿulamāʾ ʿilm al-maʿānī* in al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ*, 199.4 and *aṣḥāb ʿilm al-bayān* in *Miftāḥ*, 338.3ᵉ (probably the place where al-Khaṭībī quotes from).

[260] Ibid. 2: 150.8ᵉ.

[261] If we extrapolate our findings to later works of the Standard Theory, we may expect to find that the phrases *ʿilm al-bayān* and *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* are either absent altogether due to a robust methodology of citation or are a reference to the standard category dealing with imagery. This is besides the occasional prefatory occurrence of the phrase as a synonym of *ʿilm al-balāgha*, as noted above, fn. 230.

[262] Amīr al-Muʾminīn Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza b. ʿAlī b. Ibrāhīm al-ʿAlawī al-Yamanī, *al-Ṭirāz al-mutaḍammin li-asrār al-balāgha wa-ʿulūm ḥaqāʾiq al-iʿjāz*, Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Khidīwīya, Maṭbaʿat al-Muqtaṭaf, 1914 (English: 'The Embroidery Comprising the Secrets of Eloquence and the Knowledge of the True Nature of the Inimitability [of the Qurʾān]'). Due to his Shīʿī leanings, al-ʿAlawī always makes sure to provide explanatory examples (*shawāhid*) from the sayings of ʿAlī. For a brief biography of al-ʿAlawī see G.J.H. van Gelder, "Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza al-ʿAlawī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. A brief discussion of the *Ṭirāz* can be found in S.A. Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-bayān"; Aḥmad Maṭlūb, *al-Balāgha ʿinda al-Sakkākī*, 357-68; and *idem*, *al-Qazwīnī wa-shurūḥ al-Talkhīṣ*, 512-13. All of them point to the explicit affinity between this and *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*. For a book-length comparison between the two authors see Ṣūfiyya, *al-Mabāḥith al-bayāniyya*.

ʿAlawī was very much aware of and working within the standard rhetorical tradition, the topic of his book is unequivocally *ʿilm al-bayān*.[263] Deemed the centerpiece of the Arabic sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-adabiyya*), *ʿilm al-bayān* is not only repeatedly mentioned as the target discipline, its practitioners are also referred to throughout via the heading *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*.[264]

But al-ʿAlawī was not a 'standard' scholar of the Standard Theory. Because he derives his knowledge from four main works reflecting different traditions, only one of which linked to al-Sakkākī, the outcome is a very idiosyncratic approach to rhetorical studies. The four works dealing with *ʿilm al-bayān* (*al-dawāwīn al-muʾallafa fīhi*) that al-ʿAlawī says he consulted are *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* by Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Tibyān* by Ibn al-Zamlakānī, *al-Nihāya* by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and *al-Miṣbāḥ* by Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik.[265] To untangle the meaning behind *ʿilm al-bayān* we must attend to each of the perspectives it is given in the *Ṭirāz*, depending on its position within his system. Even within one system, *ʿilm al-bayān* could refer either to the supra-heading or to the subfield on imagery, for which

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[263] Examples of *ʿilm al-bayān* (sometimes *ʿulūm al-bayān*) from the beginning of the work are *al-Ṭirāz* 1: 2, 6, 8, 15-16, 27, 29, 31, 43. Instances of *hādhā al-ʿilm* "this science" referring back to *ʿilm al-bayān* are 1: 3, 4, 6.

[264] *Al-Ṭirāz* 1: 2. The Arabic sciences, mentioned in 1: 20-23, are lexicography, syntax, morphology and *bayān* (we could also translate 'philological' for *adabiyya*). For *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* see *al-Ṭirāz* 1: 8, 47 (alongside the *uṣūliyyūn* 'legal theorists'), 83 (alongside *ʿulamāʾ al-dīn* 'theologians' and the *uṣūliyyūn*), and below. *ʿUlamāʾ al-adab* also occurs; see 1: 3. For *al-bulaghāʾ* and *ahl al-faṣāḥa*, by which he means eloquent people (not necessarily trained in eloquence studies) see 2: 45. For *ʿulūm al-balāgha* see, e.g., 2: 130, 232. Within the chapter on *iltifāt* a myriad of headings are used: *ʿulūm al-balāgha* (2: 131), *ʿulūm al-bayān* (2: 133), *ʿulūm al-faṣāḥa* (2: 134), and *ʿilm al-maʿānī* (2: 131), to which the topic of *iltifāt* (change in grammatical person, or deictic shifting) belongs.

[265] The only 'standardist' is Badr al-Dīn Ibn Mālik (d. 686/1287). The names given by al-ʿAlawī differ slightly, but given the correct titles and the closeness to the authors' names, there remains little doubt as to the identity of the works. See *Ṭirāz* 1: 3-4; S.A. Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-bayān" (following Maṭlūb). For me, the little doubt that remains concerns Ibn al-Zamlakānī's *al-Tibyān*: on one hand, it inspired al-ʿAlawī's discussion of *dalālāt ifrādiyya* ~'the study of single-word signifiers' and the intricate structure of his work, but on the other hand, the quotations on *tashbīh* supposedly taken from the *Tibyān* are incorrect since the *Tibyān* lacks a chapter on *tashbīh* (*Ṭirāz* 1: 262-63). For *al-dawāwīn al-muʾallafa fīhi* see *al-Ṭirāz* 1:3, referring to *ʿilm al-bayān* in 1:2.

he uses the term *majāz*.[266] On the highest level we find *ʿilm al-bayān* (sometimes: *ʿulūm al-bayān*) as the subject matter of the work.[267] But al-ʿAlawī also recognizes the terms *ʿilm al-maʿānī* or *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* as names of the discipline. His solution: to interpret *ʿilm al-maʿānī* as the domain of eloquence on the level of words in combination (*balāgha*) and *ʿilm al-bayān* as the domain of eloquence on the level of words in isolation (*faṣāḥa*).[268] We thus encounter *ʿilm al-balāgha wa-l-faṣāḥa* as synonymous with *ʿilm al-bayān*.[269]

On the second level we find *ʿilm al-bayān* as comprising the standard categories of imagery (by his account, all subsumed under *majāz*). This section opens the major portion of the work, followed by two sections said to be part of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and a final section on *ʿilm al-badīʿ*.[270] All three fields are subsumed under the supra-*ʿilm al-bayān* with which al-ʿAlawī opened his work: he refers to *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* whether discussing topics in *ʿilm al-maʿānī*, *ʿilm al-bayān* (standard) or *ʿilm al-badīʿ*.[271] On the third level he addresses the three

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[266] For instance, *ʿilm al-bayān* in *al-Ṭirāz* 1: 43 refers to the subfield, even though he is still dealing with the 'preliminaries' of the supra-*ʿilm al-bayān* and has not yet begun the chapter on the sub-*ʿilm al-bayān*. For the sub-*ʿilm al-bayān* as synonymous with the study of *majāz* see ibid. 1: 43-44, 196-97. Regarding the controversy of whether or not *tashbīh* is part of *majāz* al-ʿAlawī proposes, after deliberating the various views, that the whole question is pointless or simply 'semantics'! (*wa-laysa yataʿallaqu bihi kabīru fāʾidatin wa-rubbamā kāna l-khilāfu fī dhālika lafẓiyyan fa-ʿadalnā ʿanhu*; ibid. 1: 266). We discuss this "pointless" question in length in Chapter 5.

[267] In the flowery introduction, after stating that *ʿilm al-bayān* is the centerpiece of the Arabic sciences ("the leader of its soldiers" or "the black of its eyes", ibid. 1: 2), al-ʿAlawī says that the intention of his work is to deal with "this science" (ibid. 1: 3), referring by this to *ʿilm al-bayān* mentioned in the previous paragraph.

[268] Ibid. 1: 9-14. But his deliberations are not as clear-cut as one might expect: in ibid. 1: 12-13 he refers to *ʿilm al-bayān* as dealing with the substances of single words *and* combined words.

[269] Ibid. 1: 11 and 22 are the clearest instances. In 1: 16 he speaks of *ʿilm al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha* as the subject-matter (*mawḍūʿ* in the philosophical sense) of *ʿilm al-bayān*, as we saw in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work.

[270] Ibid. 1: 196–2: 9.The major portion of the work comprises the second mega-chapter titled *al-fann al-thānī min ʿulūm hādhā al-kitāb*; it starts in ibid. 1: 183 and ends in 3: 212. The two chapters dealing with *ʿilm al-maʿānī* are *dalālāt ifrādiyya* ~"the study of single-word signifiers" and *murāʿāt aḥwāl al-taʾlīf* ~"considerations in composition" (on the latter see below).

[271] For *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* under the chapter on *majāz* (=the standard *ʿilm al-bayān*) see ibid. 1: 198-9, 206, 250, 256, 260 (together with *ʿulamāʾ al-balāgha*), 368, 375, 426. For *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* under the two chapters dealing with *ʿilm al-maʿānī* see 2: 19 (in the context of definiteness), 66-67 (fronting the direct object), 203 (affirming particles), 231 (purposeful prolixity). The phrase *ʿulūm al-bayān* itself appears within the discussions of *ʿilm al-maʿānī*; see 2:

subfields from the perspective of *iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*; this comprises the final portion of the work. He oddly repeats many of the topics discussed earlier, except for many 'standard' topics in *ʿilm al-maʿānī* which are presented for the first time. The categories expressed at this level are closest to those of the Standard Theory. Here *ʿilm al-bayān* is presented as a narrower science than *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and is presumably subsumed under it (following, indirectly, the view of al-Sakkākī).[272]

Like the account of Ibn Khaldūn, the work of Ḥamza al-ʿAlawī reflects a compound view of *ʿilm al-bayān* owing, probably, to its author's relatively remote location in the Islamic world which may have impeded a more complete transmission of knowledge in this domain. More importantly, like Ibn Khaldūn al-ʿAlawī too displays hints of the major role literary composition (*taʾlīf*) plays in *ʿilm al-bayān* (Ibn Khaldūn implicitly, through his discussion of *dhawq*). In the *Ṭirāz* this takes the form of the second chapter dealing with the allegedly standard *ʿilm al-maʿānī*. The chapter, titled *murāʿāt aḥwāl al-taʾlīf* ~'considerations in composition', targets the "patterns of literary speech" (*asālīb al-kalām*) and includes topics such as good structure, (purposeful) prolixity, appropriate openings and good transitions.[273] In these sections the perspective of the *nāẓim* and *nāthir* are attended to, whether the intention is to compose a letter, a sermon, a book, a *qaṣīda*, or a note (?, *qirṭās*).[274] The wording *murāʿāt aḥwāl al-taʾlīf* is derived from Ibn al-Zamlakānī's *Tibyān*:

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93 (sentence-elision), 176-77 (emphasis). For *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* under *ʿilm al-badīʿ* see 2: 354, 404, 3: 4, 84 (various figures of speech).

[272] *Al-Ṭirāz* 3: 349. This last mega-chapter of the work starts in 3: 213. On al-Sakkākī's view of *ʿilm al-bayān* being part of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* see fn. 174.

[273] Ibid. 2: 221-353. *Asālīb al-kalām* occurs in 2: 222 (*asālīb al-naẓm wa-l-nathr* in 2: 244). On *kalām* in this context as *kalām balīgh* see above, fn. 67.

[274] Ibid. 2: 222, 243-44.

for Ibn al-Zamlakānī *taʾlīf* means 'composition' in the semantic-syntactic sense of words in combination rather than in isolation, and the ensuing study is primarily syntactic (or functional-grammatical).[275] But al-ʿAlawī creatively reworks its topics to fit many of the traditional topics dealing with literary composition.

As a final piece of evidence for the supra-*ʿilm al-bayān* in the sense that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr spoke of, we adduce the work of the early eighth/fourteenth-century Syrian-Egyptian Najm al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr al-Ḥalabī (d. 737/1336 or 7, no relation to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn). Titled *Jawhar al-kanz*, the work is an epitome of *Kanz al-barāʿa*, written by his father ʿImād al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 699/1299 or 1300), which did not survive.[276] This book reflects a tradition closest to that in which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn wrote – that of scribal education – and purports to belong to the discipline called *ʿilm al-adab*, here: 'the science of [chancery] knowhow', also referred to as *ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ* 'the craft of [scribal] composition'.[277] By Najm al-Dīn's own admission,

[i]*qtaṣartu minhu* [*al-kitāb alladhī allafahu wālidī*][278] *ʿalā dhikri mā yaḥtāju ilayhi kātibu*

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[275] ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Zamlakānī, *al-Tibyān fī ʿilm al-bayān al-muṭliʿ ʿalā iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, ed. Aḥmad Maṭlūb and Khadīja al-Ḥadīthī, Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-ʿĀnī, 1964, 89-162 (English: 'The Demonstration on the Science of *Bayān* Revealing the Inimitability of the Qurʾān'). See also Part Two, §4.2.

[276] Najm al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Ismāʿīl Ibn al-Athīr al-Ḥalabī, *Jawhar al-kanz: Mukhtaṣar kitāb Kanz al-barāʿa fī adawāt dhawī al-yarāʿa*, ed. Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām, Alexandria: Munshaʾāt Dār al-Maʿārif, [1974] (English: 'The Essential Element of the *Kanz* [*Treasure*]: An Epitome of the Book *The Treasure of Proficiency in the Tools of Those Who Possess the Writing Reed*'). The father wrote the *Kanz* (sometimes identified as *Kanz al-balāgha*) by taking notes from his own father, Tāj al-Dīn. That the work was written in the first quarter, or the first third of the eighth/fourteenth century is concluded by Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām in the introduction of the work, p.8. Smyth mentions this work in the context of *badīʿ* and anthological works ("Criticism," 407, 415).

[277] For *ʿilm al-adab* see *Jawhar al-kanz*, 27.4[e]; for *ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ* see ibid., 33.5. When speaking of scholars in the field he uses the phrase *ʿulamāʾ hādhā l-fann* (pp. 28-29), referring presumably to *ʿilm al-adab*. Later Najm al-Dīn directs his words to *al-ṭālib al-adīb* 'the aspiring litterateur' (p. 50), which for him is synonymous with the aspiring secretary (*murīd ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ*, p. 614). Smyth ("Criticism," 407) mentions the father's work within the context of *badīʿ* studies but seems to categorize it as a work of *adab*. Although Smyth derives his comments from the *Jawhar* he does not attend to the latter's disciplinary affiliation.

[278] Ibid., 27.

l-inshāʾi mina l-ʿulūmi wa-l-faḍāʾili li-yuʿadda kātiban

I limited [the book that my father authored] to mentioning the knowledges and merits that

the chancery secretary needs in order to be considered a secretary.[279]

The result is a work not unlike *ʿUmdat al-kuttāb* by Abū Jaʿfar al-Naḥḥās (d. 338/950) or the

chapters on *kitāba* and *naqd al-shiʿr* in the famous *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm* by al-Khuwārizmī (d.

387/997 or 98) or *Mawādd al-bayān* by ʿAlī b. Khalaf al-Kātib (*fl.* second half of 5th/11th

cent.), excluding sections dealing with the conventions of administrative departments other

than the chancery.[280] The work is structured as an enumeration of *badīʿ* categories, not all of

which are figures of speech.[281] In fact, the last third of the work is dedicated to poetics in

general. While Najm al-Dīn does not mention the standard rhetorical tradition, living in the

time and place that he did he must have been aware of it.

What is striking about Najm al-Dīn's account is that he attends to the disciplinary

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[279] Ibid., 28.

[280] Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Naḥḥās, *ʿUmdat al-kuttāb*, ed. Fuat Sezgin, facsimile edition, publications of the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, series C, vol. 62, Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1999 (English: 'The Pillar for the Penmen' [Sezgin's translation]) and identical to *Ṣināʿat al-kuttāb*, ed. Badr Aḥmad Ḍayf, Beirut: Dār al-ʿUlūm al-ʿArabiyya, 1990 (English: 'The Craft of the Secretaries'); Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Yūsuf al-Khuwārizmī al-Kātib, *Kitāb Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, ed. G. van Vloten, Lugduni-Batavorum: Brill, 1895, 72-79, 94-97 (English: 'The Keys to the Sciences'); ʿAlī b. Khalaf al-Kātib, *Mawādd al-bayān*, ed. Fuat Sezgin, facsimile edition, publications of the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science, series C, vol. 39, Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1986 (English: 'The Elements of Good Written Style' [Sezgin's translation]). The scribal strand of literary-theoretical works culminates in later 'encyclopedias' such as the famous one by al-Nuwayrī (d. 733/1333); see the last section of his Book Two (on the human being) devoted to the art of secretaryship, vol. 7 of Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat fī funūn al-adab*, 18 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1923-1997 (English: 'The Ultimate Ambition in the Branches of Erudition' [Muhanna's translation in *Encyclopaedism in the Mamluk Period*]). Notably, al-Nuwayrī treats topics in "the sciences of *maʿānī*, *bayān* and *badīʿ*" (7: 35-36) but otherwise uses *kitāba* as the heading for his endeavor. The term *inshāʾ* for *kitāba* would become in common use during this period.

[281] Najm al-Dīn refers to them all as *anwāʿ/aqsām al-badīʿ* (*Jawhar al-kanz*, 49-50), but we also find *anwāʿ al-bayān* (p. 91) and *anwāʿ al-badīʿ wa-l-bayān* (p. 605, and below). Of the many categories which are not, strictly speaking, figures of speech we may cite transitions (*takhalluṣ*, p. 157), predicates in noun-initial sentences (p. 277), invective (p. 309 [a very long chapter]), poetic rhymes (p. 410), and prosification of poetic and Qurʾānic verses (p. 607). The poetic sections are reminiscent of Ibn Rashīq's *al-ʿUmda fī maḥāsin al-shiʿr wa-ādābihi wa-naqdihi*, and Najm al-Dīn quotes him. Most categories open with the formulaic: X = *an yafʿal al-mutakallim* [*kadhā wa-kadhā*] "[category] X is when the speaker does [so and so]." The *mutakallim* here is the *kātib*.

headings *ʿilm al-bayān* and *badīʿ* and depicts the former in terms remarkably similar to those employed by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn:

> *ʿilmu l-bayāni fī ṣināʿati l-inshāʾi bi-manzilati mīzānin naʿrifu bihi min maḥāsini l-kalāmi mā rajaḥa wa-mā shaḥḥa wa-miḥakkin idhā ʿuriḍat ʿalayhi l-maʿānī ubriza minhā mā fasada wa-mā saḥḥa yaftaqiru ilayhi kullu man naẓara fī kitābi -llāhi taʿālā wa-kalāmi rasūlihi ṣallā -llāhu ʿalayhi wa-sallama […]*
>
> *wa-ʿilmu l-bayāni laysa lahu ḥaddun fa-nadhkurahu fa-innahu lam yataʿarraf aḥadun min ʿulamāʾi l-bayāni ilā dhikri ḥaddin yuḥaddu bihi ʿilmu l-bayāni wa-innamā ʿarrafūhu bi-shayʾin ghayri l-ḥaddi wa-huwa l-mawḍūʿu wa-l-rasmu*
>
> *fa-ammā mawḍūʿu ʿilmi l-bayāni fa-huwa kalāmu l-ʿarabi wa-l-faṣāḥatu wa-l-balāghatu […] wa-l-aḥwāl[u] l-ʿāridat[u] li-dhātihi hiya -llatī yubḥathu ʿanhā mithlu maḥāsinihi -llatī yūṣafu bihā wa-hiya jawdatu l-alfāẓi wa-salāmatuhā wa-balāghatu l-maʿānī wa-tamakkunuhā*
>
> *wa-ammā rasmu ʿilmi l-bayāni fa-qad qāla ʿulamāʾu l-bayāni idhā lam yakun li-hādhā l-ʿilmi ḥaddun yudhkaru bihi fa-lā budda min rasmin yuʿrafu bihi […] fa-qāla baʿḍuhum ʿilmu l-bayāni ṣināʿatun naẓariyyatun maqṣūduhā maʿrifatu maḥāsini l-kalāmi fa-qawluhu naẓariyyatun[i] -ḥtirāzun min fiʿliyyatin wa-qawluhu maqṣūduhā maʿrifatu maḥāsini l-kalāmi -ḥtirāzun min ʿilmi l-ʿarabiyyati wa-ʿilmi l-lughati idh maqṣūdu ʿilmi l-lughati maʿrifatu mawḍūʿi l-lafẓi l-ifrādī wa-maqṣūdu ʿilmi l-naḥwi maʿrifatu ṣawābi l-kalāmi min khaṭaʾihi fī l-nuṭqi wa-maqṣūdu hādhā l-ʿilmi maʿrifatu dhālika l-ṣawāb*

The science of *bayān* in the craft of composition is equivalent to a measure/scale by which we may know which beautifying-elements of speech outweigh others, and a touchstone upon which if ideas are displayed, it is made manifest which are corrupt and which are sound. Anyone who examines the Book of God, may He be exalted, and the words of His prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, requires it [this science] […][282]

The science of *bayān* has no [essential] definition that we can mention, for none of the scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* made any mention of a definition by which *ʿilm al-bayān* can be defined. Rather, they made it known by something other than [an essential] definition: the 'matter' [of the science] and [its] description [i.e., a non-essential definition].

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[282] Tropes such as these point to the growing importance of *ʿilm al-bayān* to Qurʾānic hermeneutics, as noted above, and I think it is a testament to Najm al-Dīn's awareness of the emerging Standard Theory (or at least Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī).

As for the [subject-]matter of *ʿilm al-bayān*, it is the speech of the Bedouin and eloquence [of form and content] […] and the conditions inherently occurring in it (*aḥwāl ʿāriḍa li-dhātihi*)[283] that are examined, such as the beautifying-elements that [the Bedouin speech] is described with, to wit, the excellence and flawlessness of the words and the eloquence and mastery of the meanings.

As for the description of *ʿilm al-bayān*, the scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* said: "If there is no definition that can be mentioned for this science, we must [provide] a description with which it can be identified." […] So one of [the scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān*] said: "*ʿilm al-bayān* is a theoretical craft, the aim of which is to know the beautifying-elements of speech." His saying "theoretical" is meant to exclude "practical" and his saying "the aim of which is to know the beautifying-elements of speech" is meant to exclude the science of grammar and the science of lexicography. For the aim of lexicography is to know the coined [meaning] of the single word and the aim of grammar is to know the speech's right from wrong when speaking. The aim of *this* science is the correct knowledge of that [the beautifying-elements of speech].[284]

Najm al-Dīn delineates *ʿilm al-bayān* as a strictly theoretical science, but one that is not at all similar to the Standard Theory – the supposedly 'theoretical' rhetorical science par excellence. The theoretical science of *ʿilm al-bayān* is situated, rather, within the "craft of composition" (*ʿilm al-bayān fī ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ*) and to a modern reader would seem far from theoretical. Najm al-Dīn himself seems to be struggling with this 'scientific' character of the field, as evinced by his repetitive statements on the fact that scholars have been unable to provide an essential definition (in the logical sense) for *ʿilm al-bayān*. He in fact continues by saying that distinguishing between *ʿilm al-bayān* and *badīʿ* is often quite difficult.[285] The scholars of the latter, however, are identified by him as *ʿulamāʾ al-adab*

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[283] The meaning of *aḥwāl ʿāriḍa li-dhātihi* is explained in *Jawhar al-kanz*, 47, with illustrations from grammar, medicine and legal theory. Despite its odd construction, it seems to refer to essential topics within a given field rather than non-essential accidents.

[284] Ibid. 46-47.

[285] Ibid., 48-49.

'scholars of [scribal] knowhow', whereas the scholars of the former are clearly termed *'ulamāʾ al-bayān* 'scholars of *'ilm al-bayān*' (*'ulamāʾ al-badīʿ* does not occur).[286] Since Najm al-Dīn is not quoting Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn verbatim (at least not from an extant work), one may assume that the perception of *'ilm al-bayān* as a theoretical, consolidated discipline gained traction throughout the seventh/thirteenth century. This theoretical discipline was independent of the development of what would become the Standard Theory.

Summing Up

The increasing hegemony of the standard rhetorical theory notwithstanding, we are able to identify traces of a widely-recognized discipline called *'ilm al-bayān* up until the late eighth/fourteenth century. A major differentiation point between this *'ilm al-bayān* and the Standard Theory lies in the function of literary production: the practical aspect of composing poetry and ornate prose was a hallmark of our *'ilm al-bayān*, whereas in the Standard Theory it was marginal. Any references to *taʾlīf* in this sense in the later works, be they works on the division of the sciences or on literary theoretical matters, are indicative of a science close to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *'ilm al-bayān li-taʾlīf al-naẓm wa-l-nathr* (Ibn al-Akfānī's "attaining the habitual ability to compose [compound] statements [of sermons, letters and poems]"; Ibn Khaldūn's presentation of *dhawq* within the purview of the scholars of *bayān*; al-ʿAlawī's reworking of *murāʿāt aḥwāl al-taʾlīf* from a grammatical interpretation to a literary-productional one; Najm al-Dīn's *'ilm al-bayān fī ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ*). The professed scientificity of the discipline called *'ilm al-bayān* was probably facilitated by the rise of the

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[286] For *'ulamāʾ al-adab* see ibid., 48-49, 427, 431 (the last two: *ahl al-adab*, which may refer to litterateurs in general). For *'ulamāʾ al-bayān*, cited in categories that exceed the standard sections on imagery (such as paronomasia and good openings), see ibid., 42-43, 60, 91, 101, 118, 218.

Standard Theory (Ibn Khaldūn), but vestiges of this recognition in a non-'standard'-context can also be detected (Najm al-Dīn).

The unheeded distinction in later sources between the supra-ʿilm al-bayān as a science of style and the hypo-ʿilm al-bayān as the standard sub-science of imagery may explain why the generic innovation of the former went unnoticed in modern scholarship. Even within the heartland of standard-rhetoric territory, terminological vestiges of ʿilm al-bayān as the appellation of the supra-science may abide (e.g., al-Subkī).

The association of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr with the disciplinary consolidation of ʿilm al-bayān is not always attested in the sources. An important exception is Ibn al-Akfānī, who mentions the work of an "Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī" as dealing solely with (the supposedly hypo-)ʿilm al-bayān. It is noteworthy that this association persists even in the late work of Ṭashköprüzāde, whose ʿilm al-bayān is an unequivocal reference to the standard subfield of imagery. Most compelling is the progression we find in the work of Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, a younger contemporary of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, from the disciplinary framework of badīʿ in his first book to ʿilm al-bayān in his second. Even if not directly linked to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's efforts, this change in framework seems to have been meaningful rather than arbitrary, and it testifies to the rapid dissemination of ʿilm al-bayān as a new paradigm for literary-theoretical and literary-critical studies.

Chapter 3:
Bayān and ʿ*Ilm al-Bayān* Prior to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn

The purpose of this chapter is to strengthen our hypothesis that the disciplinary development of

ʿ*ilm al-bayān* in the seventh/thirteenth century is to be associated, on a terminological level, with

the efforts of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr rather than with earlier instantiations of the term *bayān* or

ʿ*ilm al-bayān*. Two decades ago Heinrichs remarked that "the notion of *bayān* 'clarity',

'distinctness' [is] a notion that is not clear and distinct at all and in dire need of a monograph."[287]

While advances in the study of *bayān* have been made since the publication of von Grunebaum's

article in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Heinrichs' words still hold true today. The following will

not fill the void – it is not intended as such – but it provides some further clarification on the

understanding of the term in classical Arabic-Islamic writings.

Looking at the term *bayān* in earlier centuries, we shall differentiate between four strands

of its meaning: the legal-hermeneutic, the philosophical, the philological and the scribal. What

we have here is a case of "bi-genesis": the legal and philosophical meanings of the term are

derived from one lexical meaning of *bayān*, roughly 'sign'/'indication', and the philological and

scribal meaning of the term are derived from another lexical meaning of the word, namely,

'eloquence'. Scholars espousing the legal-hermeneutic meaning(s) of *bayān* are al-Shāfiʿī (d.

204/820) and subsequent legal scholars; this has been recently studied by Joseph Lowry, James

Montgomery and David Vishanoff. Scholars espousing the philosophical meaning are al-Jāḥiẓ

(d. 255/868 or 9), Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm Ibn Wahb al-Kātib (4th/10th cent.) and Ibn Ḥazm (d.

456/1064); aspects of this have been studied by Montgomery and Lowry (though not in these

terms), as well as others who have focused their study on al-Jāḥiẓ. The philological meaning of

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[287] Heinrichs, "Contacts," 271.

bayān is less 'technical' and is set forth by Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) and in a slightly different

instantiation, by al-Rummānī (d. 384/994). Finally, the scribal meaning of *bayān* is, too, less

technical and comes across in works of secretaries like Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī (d. after 400/1010)

and ʿAlī b. Khalaf al-Kātib (*fl.* second half of 5th/11th cent.). Both the philological and the scribal

meanings have not been attended to as such in modern research, probably because they are not

technical terms per se. The philological meaning has been alluded to by Heinrichs and

Montgomery; the scribal meaning by Sezgin.

 As for the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* in earlier centuries, it seems that the first scholar to have

used it is none other than ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081). Following him

were al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209). *If* at all any of them

used it in a technical sense of a full-fledged discipline, it was al-Zamakhsharī.

 Where Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr derived his understanding of *ʿilm al-bayān* from is

unclear. It will be claimed that he was exposed to the phrase probably in the work of ʿAbd al-

Qāhir al-Jurjānī (or non-extant sources quoting him), but he filled the term *bayān* itself with the

non-technical meaning he was familiar with: the scribal one.

3.1. The Term *bayān*

Three different lexical meanings of *bayān* are attested in the dictionaries. The first, according to

Ibn Manẓūr (d. 711/1311 or 2), is "that by means of which a thing is clarified/becomes clear,

such as an indication or the like" / "an indication, or the like, by means of which a thing is

clarified" (*mā buyyina bihi l-shayʾu mina l-dalālati wa-ghayrihā*). The second meaning is

"clarity," being the *maṣdar* 'verbal noun' of *bāna* "to be/become clear" (*ittaḍaḥa*).

Etymologically, the "clarity" of a thing is probably connected to what David Larsen has

described as "the abstract 'evidentness' of a thing by virtue of its *difference or separability* from

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its surroundings."[288] The third meaning is "eloquence" (*al-faṣāḥa wa-l-lasan*) or "clear

expression with mental acuteness" (*al-ifṣāḥ maʿa dhakāʾ*) or "making manifest the intended

[meaning] with the most eloquent expression" (*iẓhār al-maqṣūd bi-ablagh lafẓ*).[289] Since form II

bayyana is said to be both transitive ("to clarify") and intransitive ("to be clear"), *bayān* is

sometimes interpreted as a *maṣdar* of *bayyana* as well, i.e. either as "clarity" (intransitive) or

"clarification" (transitive).[290] The three occurrences of *bayān* (as a noun) in the Qurʾān are in fact

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[288] David Charles Larsen, *Means of Intelligibility*, PhD Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2007, 97-99, emphasis his (the title of the dissertation refers to al-Jāḥiẓ's *wasāʾil al-bayān*; see below). Larsen provides other cases in the Arabic language where the act of interpretation is predicated on distinguishability, like *faṣala* and *faraqa*, comparing this to the Saussurian notion of "difference" within a system as a precondition for the production of meaning (pp. 98-101; he also compares this to Derrida's discussion of the etymology of the Latin verb *differre*). If we adhere to Larsen's etymology, the first and second meanings of *bayān* given by Ibn Manẓūr are essentially the same. (Larsen cites Lane's definition of *bayān* in full, parts of which rest on Ibn Manẓūr's deliberations.) Strictly speaking, however, the first and second meanings of *bayān* display different processes of semiosis: in the first case it is a "sign" that imparts knowledge about a thing (implying a mediation); in the second case it is the thing itself that imparts knowledge (about itself). This tension will be apparent when we discuss the philosophical sense of *bayān*.

[289] The last of these is attributed to the early lexicographer Ibn Shumayl (d. 203/819), according to whom the origin of the meaning of *bayān* as 'eloquence' is "clearness" (or "the quality of being revealed," *al-kashf wa-l-ẓuhūr*). See Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab*, 6 vols., 3rd ed., [n.p.]: Dār al-Maʿārif, [n.d.], 1: 406, 2nd column [for meanings one and two], 407, 2nd column [for meaning three; the verb *qāla* seems to be referring back to Ibn Shumayl] (English: 'The Tongue of the Arabs'). See also Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Azharī, *Tahdhīb al-lugha*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 15 vols., Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyya li-l-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarjama, 1967, 15: 495-502 (where *bayān* is given the additional meaning of 'ability to discern', p. 496, and see fn. 292 below) (English: 'Refinement of the Lexicon'); Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad Ibn Fāris, *Muʿjam maqāyīs al-lugha*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1969, 1: 328 (only meaning three) (English: 'The Measures of the Language, Organized Alphabetically'); *idem*, *Mujmal al-lugha*, ed. Hādī Ḥasan Ḥammūdī, 5 vols., Kuwait: Maʿhad al-Makhṭūṭāt al-ʿArabiyya, al-Munaẓẓama al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Tarbiya wa-l-Thaqāfa wa-l-ʿUlūm, 1985, 1: 308 (*bayān* = *al-kashf ʿan al-shayʾ* "the uncovering of a thing") (English: 'The Sum Total of the Lexicon'); Ismāʿīl b. Ḥammād al-Jawharī, *al-Ṣiḥāḥ [/al-Ṣaḥāḥ]: Tāj al-lugha wa-ṣiḥāḥ al-ʿarabiyya*, ed. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Ghafūr ʿAṭṭār, 6 vols., Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1979, 5: 2082-83 (note especially meaning one) (English: 'The Correct [Uses]: The Crown of the Lexicon and the Correct [Uses] of Arabic'); Jār Allāh Abū al-Qāsim Maḥmūd b. ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī, *Asās al-balāgha*, Beirut: Dār Ṣādir; Dār Bayrūt, 1965, 58 (English: 'The Foundation of Eloquence'); Abū al-Baqāʾ Ayyūb b. Mūsā al-Kaffawī, *al-Kulliyyāt*, ed. ʿAdnān Darwīsh and Muḥammad al-Maṣrī, 5 vols., Damascus: Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1974, 1: 395-97 (English: 'Universals'); al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf* 1: 206-7; Lane, *Lexicon*, 288; and the first paragraph of von Grunebaum, "Bayān." Al-Zamakhsharī famously provides the *majāz* meaning of words in his dictionary (here: idiomatic uses of the words, not their figurative meaning), but no such usage of *bayān* is provided. Frustrating is the account in al-Khalīl b. Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī, *Kitāb al-ʿAyn*, eds. Mahdī al-Makhzūmī and Ibrāhīm al-Sāmarrāʾī, 8 vols., [Baghdad]: al-Jumhūriyya al-ʿIrāqiyya, Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Iʿlām, 1980-1985, 8: 381 (English: 'The Book [beginning with the letter] ʿAyn'), where we find: *wa-l-bayān maʿrūf* "The [meaning] of *bayān*: you know"!

[290] Al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf* 1: 207 (*wa-bi-l-jumlati fa-huwa* [*bayān*] *immā maṣdaru bāna wa-huwa lāzimun wa-maʿnāhu l-ẓuhūru aw maṣdaru bayyana wa-huwa qad yakūnu lāziman* […] *wa-qad yakūnu mutaʿaddiyan*). Ibn Manẓūr does not say so explicitly – for him the *maṣdar* of *bayyana* is *tabyīn* or *tibyān* – but by giving the first meaning of *bayān* as a type of *dalāla* 'indication' and by using the passive form II *buyyina* [*bihi*] to expound on it,

interpreted by medieval exegetes and modern translators as having a transitive sense: "This is an *exposition* for mankind, and a guidance, and an admonition" (Q 3:138 [*Āl ʿImrān*]); "The All-merciful has taught the Koran. He has created man and He has taught him the *Explanation*" (Q 55:1-4 [*al-Raḥmān*]); "Then ours it is to *explain* it" (Q 75:19 [*al-Qiyāma*]).[291] Even the most

he is essentially presenting *bayān* as a transitive notion (*Lisān al-ʿarab*, 1: 406-7). Cf. al-Zamakhsharī (*Asās al-balāgha*, 58) who glosses *bayān* as *ḥujja* 'proof' and al-Tahānawī (*Kashshāf* 1: 207) who glosses *bayān* as *iʿlām* 'making [something] known'. That form II verbs may carry an intransitive sense is not mentioned by Wright in his *Grammar* (W. Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, 3rd ed. reprint, 2 vols. in 1, [n.p.]: Simon Wallenberg Press, 2007, 1: 31-32); it is probably an atypical instantiation of the verb form. Lane (*Lexicon*, 288) assesses the transitivity of *bayān* simply as a substantive of form II *bayyana*, paralleling this occurrence to *salām* from *sallama* and *kalām* from *kallama*. Wright reminds us, however, that a verb like *sallama* is actually denominative, that is, derives from *salām*, rather than the other way around.

[291] Al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf* 1: 207; *The Koran Interpreted*, A Translation by A.J. Arberry, reprint., 2 vols. in 1, New York: Touchstone, 1996, 1:90, 2: 251, 313; *The Qurʾān*, Hebrew Translation from the Arabic, annotations, appendices and index by Uri Rubin, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2005, 58, 496 (*bayān* in Q 55:4 is translated as "verbal eloquence", p. 444). The translation above is Arberry's. For the occurrences of *bayān* in the Qurʾān see Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī, *al-Muʿjam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-Qurʾān al-karīm*, Beirut: Dār al-Fikr; Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1994, 184 (English: 'A Concordance of the Qurʾān'). As opposed to the *maṣdar*, other forms of the root *b.y.n* in the sense of 'to clarify/be clear' are plentiful. For common exegetical interpretations see Abū al-Qāsim Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq al-tanzīl wa-ʿuyūn al-aqāwīl fī wujūh al-taʾwīl*, 4 vols., Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1966, 1: 465, 4: 43, 191 (English: 'The Uncoverer of the True Meanings of the Revelation and of the Best Opinions on the Methods of Interpretation'); Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr* [*Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*], 32 vols., Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Bahiyya al-Miṣriyya, [1934-1962], 7: 12, 29: 85, 30: 225 (English: 'The Large Commentary' [known as *The Keys to the Unknown*]); Nāṣir al-Dīn Abū Khayr ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUmar b. Muḥammad al-Bayḍāwī, *Anwār al-tanzīl wa-asrār al-taʾwīl al-maʿrūf bi-Tafsīr al-Bayḍāwī*, prepared and prefaced by Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī, 5 vols. in 2, Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1998, 2: 39, 5: 170, 266 (English: ~'The Rays of Revelation and Secret Ways of Interpretation', known as *al-Bayḍāwī's [Qurʾānic] Commentary*). The only instance for which *bayān* may be seen intransitively is Q 3:138 (by al-Bayḍāwī, *Tafsīr* 2: 39, not al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf* 1: 465, who glosses it as *īḍāḥ*, or al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr* 7:12, who sees it as a type of *dalāla*). For Q 55:4 see also Lane, *Lexicon*, 289, whose first translation of *bayān* here is "the manifestation of everything [needful to be known]" (the subsequent translations provided are more interpretive). One scholar who translates *bayān* in all three verses of the Qurʾān as 'clarity' (i.e., intransitively) is Montgomery. He oddly looks for the meaning of *bayān* in a fourth/tenth century exegesis (al-Ṭabarī) instead of starting with its lexical sense(s) in the dictionaries. Because of this lexicographical oversight he is unaware of the transitive sense of *bayān* and tries to bundle all three lexical meanings of the word – a 'sign'/'indication', 'clarity', 'eloquence' (see Ibn Manẓūr, above) – into one. Montgomery's conclusion runs as follows: "that (a) in the Qurʾān, *bayān* is, according to some scholars […] possibly a synonym for the Revelation; (b) that in [the second and third verses] it is semantically implicated in the notion of *qurʾān* and (c) that in all three passages it bears the meaning both of clarity of expression and of exposition or elucidation: Allāh declares His intentions not only to enunciate the Revelation but also to express it with clarity and in order to guide man […] All three occurrences involve the notion of communication between God and man and their proper roles in this process." See James E. Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *Kitāb al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," in Julia Bray (ed.), *Writing and Representation in Medieval Islam*, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Literatures, vol. 11, London: Routledge, 2006, 91-152, here: 122-23. Reiterated in James E. Montgomery, *Al-Jāḥiẓ: In Praise of Books*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013, 292 and 505 fn. 15. Of course, the text of the verses does not lend itself to the conflation of *bayān* with *qurʾān* or the revelation; this is an exegetical interpretation (what is more, it would be an odd repetition of verse 55:2 *ʿallama l-Qurʾān*). For uses of the root *b.y.n* in the Qurʾān see Joseph Dichy, "Aux sources interprétatives de la rhétorique arabe et de l'exégèse coranique: la non transparence du langage, de la racine

famous of these – *al-Raḥmān • ʿallama l-Qurʾān • khalaqa l-insān • ʿallamahu l-bayān* (Q 55:1-4) – is interpreted by al-Zamakhsharī in clear transitive terms, *viz.* "clear speech" as "making plain/manifest that which is in the mind/ heart".[292]

Several occurrences of *bayān* in the prophetic tradition (*ḥadīth*) display a usage similar to that of the first lexical meaning of the word, *viz.* a type of proof or indication; in two cases *bayān* is connected with the third meaning of the word, *viz.* eloquence.[293] Three occurrences of *bayān* in pre-Islamic poetry – two by Zuhayr (d. *ca.* 609), one by al-Aʿshā (d. *ca.* 7/629) – are rather scant and varied in meaning to merit a unified conclusion. In one instance it refers to a "sign" of a wound of the she-camel's young calf (Zuhayr); in another it refers to the (generous) "giving" of the poet's patron (Zuhayr); and yet in another it refers to "evidence/knowledge" that the poet has regarding his patron's victorious battles.[294] Besides the second occurrence, which is derived from

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/b-y-n/ dans le Coran aus conceptions d'al-Ǧāḥiẓ et d'Ibn Qutayba," in Frédérique Woerther (ed.), *Literary and Philosphical Rhetoric in the Greek, Syriac and Arabic Worlds*, Hildesheim: Olms, 2009, 245-78, here: 248-55, and Daniel A. Madigan, *The Qurʾān's Self-Image: Writing and Authority in Islam's Scripture*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001, 153-57 (*bayān* not treated). I have not yet consulted Manfred Kropp, "*Lisān ʿarabiyy mubīn* – „klares Arabisch"? oder: „offenbar Arabisch", gar „geoffenbartes Arabisch"?", in Andrew Rippin and Roberto Tottoli (eds), *Books and Written Culture of the Islamic World: Studies Presented to Claude Gilliot on the Occasion of His 75ᵗʰ Birthday*, Leiden: Brill, 2015, 271–87.

[292] *al-manṭiqu l-faṣīḥu l-muʿribu ʿammā fī l-ḍamīr*; al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf* 4: 43. This quality is said to differentiate Man from the rest of the animals (see also al-Rāzī and al-Bayḍāwī, cited in the previous footnote.) A better understanding of the word *bayān* here is probably 'the ability to discern' (see al-Azharī's entry in fn. 289, and some of the explanations in the Qurʾānic commentaries). This sense of *bayān* is commonly absent in the dictionaries (al-Azharī is an exception), but it connects *bayān* to the meaning of the root *b.y.n* in other Semitic languages and it better explains the nature of God's teaching *bayān* (I hope to look at this question in a future study).

[293] I limit myself to A.J. Wensinck, *al-Muʿjam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-ḥadīth al-nabawī ʿan al-kutub al-sitta wa-ʿan Musnad al-Dārimī wa-Muwaṭṭaʾ Mālik wa-Musnad Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, 8 vols., Leiden: Brill, 1936-1988, 1: 259 (English: 'A Concordance of the *ḥadīth*, from the six [canonical] works as well as the *Musnad* of al-Dārimī, the *Muwaṭṭaʾ* of Mālik and the *Musnad* of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal'). For *bayān* in the sense of 'eloquence' see the famous saying (also Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab*, 1: 407, 2ⁿᵈ and 3ʳᵈ columns): *inna min al-bayāni [la-]siḥran* "Indeed, there is [an element] of enchantment in eloquence" and the more negative *al-ḥayāʾu wa-l-ʿiyyu shuʿbatāni mina l-īmān wa-l-badhāʾu wa-l-bayānu shuʿbatāni mina l-nifāq* "shame and inexpressiveness are two branches of belief while foulness and expressiveness are two branches of hypocrisy." The former saying is akin to ʿUmar's "*wa-llāhi inna hādhā la-l-siḥru l-ḥalāl!*" said in admiration of eloquent speech.

[294] Albert Arazi and Salman Masalha, *al-ʿIqd al-thamīn fī dawāwīn al-shuʿarāʾ al-sitta al-jāhiliyyīn: ṭabʿa jadīda wa-muʿjam mufahras*, based on W. Ahlwardt's *The Divans of the Six Ancient Arabic Poets*, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Institute of Asian and African Studies, 1999, 282 [index], 47 (English title: *Six Early Arab*

an obscure (read: old) meaning of *abāna* as *aʿṭā* 'to give',[295] *bayān* seems to correspond most to

the sense of *dalāla* (the first meaning recoreded by Ibn Manẓūr).

The Legal-Hermeneutic Sense(s) of Bayān

The first usage of *bayān* in a semi-technical sense comes, to the best of our knowledge, from

Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī's (d. 204/820) *Risāla*, a work that came to be seen as the

foundational book in legal theory.[296] Al-Shāfiʿī probably inspired the philosophical technical

meaning of *bayān* as well, which is preserved in the work of al-Jāḥiẓ, but we shall treat it

separately (see below). What exactly *bayān* refers to in al-Shāfiʿī's *Risāla* has long been a topic

of debate and has been recently addressed by James Montgomery, Joseph Lowry and David

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Poets, New Edition and Concordance); Al-Mukhtār Kurayyim, *al-Muʿjam al-mufahras li-alfāẓ al-shiʿr al-jāhilī wa-maʿānīhi: ʿarabī-ʿarabī*, Beirut: Maktabat Lubnān Nāshirūn, 2010, 410 [index], 196, 233, 285 (English: 'A Concordance and Dictionary of Pre-Islamic Poetry: Arabic-Arabic'). Case #1, line 17 of a *Dāliyya* by Zuhayr opening with *ghashītu diyāran* "I visited abodes…" praising Harim b. Sinān b. Abī Ḥāritha al-Murrī (d. *ca.* 608, a chief of the Banū Murra) reads: *aḍāʿat fa-lam tughfar lahā khalawātuhā // fa-lāqat bayānan ʿinda ākhiri maʿhadī* [meter: *ṭawīl*] "She [the she-camel] neglected [her youngster] – her times of solitude were not forgiven – then, she came across a sign [of her calf's wound, according to al-Shantamarī: "skin, traces of flesh, blood and the like"] where she last saw [him]"; see Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā, *Shiʿr Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā ṣanaʿahu al-Aʿlam al-Shantamarī*, ed. Fakhr al-Dīn Qabāwa, Aleppo: al-Maktaba al-ʿArabiyya, 1970, 179 (English: 'The Poetry of Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā, arranged by al-Shantamarī [d. 476/1083 or 4]') (only the first part of the work contains al-Shantamarī's commentary; the second part contains poems commented by the editor). Another version has *fa-lam tughfar lahā ghafalātuhā* "her acts of negligence with respect to her young one were not forgiven her" (Lane, *Lexicon*, 2273; translation his). Case #2, line 20 of a *Nūniyya* by Zuhayr also praising Harim b. Sinān and opening with *tabayyan khalīlī* "Look, my friend…" reads (+ second hemistich of previous line): (*taḍammana rislan ḥājatī -bnu Sinānī*) *wa-ḥājata ghayrī innahū dhū mawāridin // wa-dhū maṣdarin min nāʾilin wa-bayānī* [meter: *ṭawīl*] "(Ibn Sinān guaranteed my need with gentleness) as well as the need of others; indeed he is one to whom [people] come [when it comes to] bestowing and giving"; *Shiʿr Zuhayr*, 291. This piece is not part of al-Shantamarī's commentary; the editor glosses *bayān* as *balāgha*. Cf. Kurayyim, *al-Muʿjam*, 410, who claims that *bayān* in the poetry of Zuhayr means 'eloquence' (*balāgha wa-faṣāḥa*). Case #3, line 40 of a *Rāʾiyya* by al-Aʿshā dedicated to Hawdha b. ʿAlī al-Ḥanafī (d. 9/630, a leader of the tribe Ḥanīfa b. Lujaym who were in conflict with the tribe of Tamīm) that opens with *ghashīta li-laylā* "You came to Laylā…" reads: *fa-sāʾil tamīman wa-ʿindī l-bayānu // wa-in taktumū tajidūnī khabīrā* [meter: *mutaqārib*] "[addressing Hawdha] Inquire Tamīm [about what you inflicted upon them] – I have the evidence/knowledge [of that]; [addressing Tamīm] and if you conceal [Hawdha's victory] I have knowledge [or: I will inform of it]"; see Maymūn b. Qays al-Aʿshā al-Kabīr, *Dīwān al-Aʿshā al-Kabīr*, commentary by Muḥammad Muḥammad Ḥusayn, 2nd ed., first published by Rudolf Geyer, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Sharqī li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, [1968], 129.

[295] For this meaning see Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 1: 404, 2nd column, though *bayān* is not attested as a *maṣdar* of form IV *abāna*. But since all of *bayyana*, *abāna*, *tabayyana* and *istabāna* (forms II, IV, V and X) are said to be either transitive or intransitive and thus synonymous with *bāna*, I am allowing the poet (and myself) this license.

[296] E.g., Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddima* 3: 1030-31, as a later example.

Vishanoff. For Montgomery the central theme behind al-Shāfiʿī's *bayān* is the Arabic language (ʿ*arabiyya*, the language of the ancient Arabs). According to him, "the discussion of the Arabic nature of the Qurʾān […] can hardly be distinguished from the discussion of *bayān* […] in Shāfiʿī's own jurisprudential definitions," and the notion of clarity is "virtual[ly] synonym[ous]" with the ʿ*arabiyya*.[297] Montgomery gauges this understanding from al-Shāfiʿī's various pronouncements regarding those to whom the Qurʾān was directed and in whose language it was revealed, and regarding the extensiveness (*ittisāʿ*) – Vishanoff would add, ambiguities – of the Arabic language.[298]

Lowry delves more deeply into al-Shāfiʿī's conception of *bayān*. In his understanding, *bayān* refers to God's communication of legal norms via the Qurʾān and/or the Sunna (the prophetic *ḥadīth*), as it represents, at the core, "a statement, communication, or address, from God, to someone, in the Arabic language" and "resembles the term *ḫiṭāb* in later *uṣūl al-fiqh*."[299] In his recent translation of al-Shāfiʿī's *Risāla*, Lowry renders *bayān* as "legislative statement."[300]

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[297] Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 105-106.

[298] Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, *al-Risāla*, ed. Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir, [Cairo]: [al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī], 1940, 21 para. 54 (*annahā bayānun li-man khūṭiba bihā mimman nazala l-Qurʾānu bi-lisānihi* – on this sentence see below), 26 para. 74 (*fa-kāna bayyinan ʿinda man khūṭiba bi-hādhā l-āya*), 40 para. 127 (*anna jamīʿa kitābi -llāhi innamā nazala bi-lisāni l-ʿarab*), 42 para. 138 (*wa-lisānu l-ʿarab awsaʿu l-alsinati madhhaban*) – to name a few prominent examples. Vishanoff is referring to various features of the Arabic language via the heading "ambiguities," and thus to al-Shāfiʿī's treatment of those features as "a hermeneutic of ambiguity." See Vishanoff, *Formation*, 46-48, 50-61 (here: 46, 50).

[299] Lowry, "Preliminary Observations," 507; *idem*, "Does Shāfiʿī Have a Theory of 'Four Sources' of Law?," in Bernard G. Weiss (ed.), *Studies in Islamic Legal Theory*, Leiden: Brill, 2002, 23-50, here: 47 (where *bayān* is glossed as "a statement of a legal rule"); *idem*, *Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī*, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, vol. 30, Leiden: Brill, 2007, 49. Vishanoff accentuates the point of *bayān* being a communication "from God" even further when he stresses the Qurʾānic focus of al-Shāfiʿī's thought (*Formation*, 38-40). Cf. similarly al-Juwaynī's (d. 478/1085) understanding of al-Shāfiʿī's *bayān*, which he interprets as Qurʾān-centric. Lowry disagrees with this take; see "Preliminary Observations," 521, and *Early Islamic Legal Theory*, 46-47.

[300] Lowry (trans.), *The Epistle*, 15 (and *passim*; also "legislative statements" in the plural). Already Mottahedeh translates *bayān* as "clear statement" in his translation of an influential twentieth-century Shīʿī work of legal theory; see Muḥammad Bāqir aṣ-Ṣadr, *Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence*, translated with an introduction by Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, Oxford: Oneworld, 2003, 175.

According to Lowry, through postulating the mechanism of *bayān* al-Shāfiʿī is setting up a description of the law's structure, or "architecture," that "aims to demonstrate that the Qurʾān and the Sunna function together, in several different ways to express rules of law."[301] Lowry takes the four, and later five, categories of *bayān* detailed by al-Shāfiʿī as a typology of textual combinations by which norms are "announced."[302] The combinations are: norms announced "by the Qurʾān alone, by the Qurʾān and the Sunna together, by the Sunna alone, or by inference [*ijtihād*] based on the Qurʾān and/or the Sunna."[303] Lowry takes the four-fold set of categories and the subsequent discussion of five categories, to refer to the same essential combinations (Vishanoff will disagree, see below).[304] Most importantly, Lowry identifies that by *bayān* al-Shāfiʿī does not mean a hierarchy of clarity, as do many of the later *uṣūlīs*, but merely a typology of clarity; al-Shāfiʿī's *bayān* is structural whereas *bayān* according to most of the later legal theorists is qualitative.[305] It is probably in this sense that Lowry describes al-Shāfiʿī's *bayān* as being "mostly intransitive." [306]

Vishanoff pinpoints two senses of *bayān* in al-Shāfiʿī's thinking rather than one, owing to the differences between the four-fold presentation of *bayān* and the later five-fold categorization. The first sense, expounded on by the four categories (Qurʾān[1]; Qurʾān-Sunna[2]; Sunna[3]; *ijtihād*[4]) is "to make known," that is, the "four ways in which the Qurʾān reveals the law." The

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[301] Lowry, *Early Islamic Legal Theory*, 48.

[302] That *bayān* involves norms that are necessarily "announced," "communicated" or "expressed" is something Lowry stresses (e.g. "Preliminary Observations," 507-508, 525).

[303] Lowry, "Preliminary Observations," 508; *idem*, "Four Sources of Law," 47-49.

[304] Al-Shāfiʿī, *al-Risāla*, 21-22 (four categories), 26-40 (five categories).

[305] For elaboration see *"*Preliminary Observations," 514-24; *idem*, *Early Islamic Legal Theory*, 55-57.

[306] Lowry, "Preliminary Observations," 513, 519-20, 523-24 (here: 520).

second sense, expounded on by the five categories, is "to clarify" since those categories concern, according to Vishanoff, the "ways in which the Qurʾān is clarified by other evidence" (a redundant confirmation on a Qurʾānic text by another text[1]; an elaboration or modification by another text on a rather clear Qurʾānic text[2]; an elaboration by another text on an undetailed Qurʾānic text[3]; a prophetic report unrelated to any legal text in the Qurʾān[4]; and natural evidence[5]).[307] By identifying this second sense of *bayān* Vishanoff is narrowing the differences between al-Shāfiʿī's *bayān* and later *uṣūlīs'* use of the term.

We should pause at some of the wording al-Shāfiʿī employs here, because it lends itself to a dualism that also surfaces later in non-legal writings. Several *uṣūlīs* famously complain about al-Shāfiʿī's prefatory passage on *bayān* as being either a poor definition of *bayān* or no definition at all,[308] and I certainly cannot make better sense of it.[309] First, the title al-Shāfiʿī gives to his treatment of the topic is not *al-bayān* or *mā al-bayān* "what is *bayān*," as one might

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[307] For the two senses see Vishanoff, *Formation*, 52; for the meaning of the five categories as a means by which "the Qurʾān's legal meaning can be 'made clear'" see ibid., 42-43. According to Vishanoff, the ways in which the law is revealed ultimately go back to the Qurʾān. We should mention that later in the *Risāla* (32-33 paras. 97-101), we find a further categorization of *bayān* into three categories (or ways, *wujūh*). Al-Shāfiʿī presents this in the context of category 4 in the five-fold categorization, and it is said with respect to *al-farāʾiḍ al-manṣūṣa fī kitāb Allāh*, which Lowry translates as "textually explicit obligations" (*The Epistle*, 27; no trace of *fī kitāb Allāh*). I am not sure how this categorization fits with the other ones. The categories here are: the Qurʾān alone, the Qurʾān with an elaboration by the prophetic Sunna, and the prophetic Sunna without a clear Qurʾānic text. Here he does away with *ijtihād*. Once again, all three categories are reducible to the Qurʾān (*wa-kullu shayʾin minhā bayānun fī kitābi -llāh* "All of these are legislative statements in the Book of God"; *al-Risāla* 32 para. 97, 33 para. 101/Lowry [trans.], *The Epistle*, 27), adding credence to the understanding of *bayān* as being ultimately tied to the Qurʾān. In this passage we find a hint of a qualitative sense of *bayān*, when al-Shāfiʿī speaks of some categories as being "of the utmost clarity" (*ʿalā ghāyat al-bayān*; *al-Risāla*, 32 paras. 98-99).

[308] Vishanoff, *Formation*, 39 fn. 145.

[309] For recent translations of *al-Risāla*, 21, paras. 53-54, see Lowry (trans.), *The Epistle*, 15; Vishanoff, *Formation*, 39; Ahmed El Shamsy, *From Tradition to Law: The Origins and Early Development of the Shāfiʿī School of Law in Ninth-Century Egypt*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009, 59. One of the many textual problems in this passage has to do with the *maʿānī* (*maʿānin*) to which the resumptive pronouns in *annahā* and *bihā* refer in *annahā bayānun li-man khūṭiba bihā* (also the feminine marker in *mutaqāribat al-istiwāʾ*): this gives the impression that what is addressed to those to whom the Qurʾān was revealed was the *maʿānī* of *bayān*, rendering the phrase *annahā bayānun* rather redundant. Vishanoff takes *maʿānin* to be a reference to the "types" of *bayān*; Lowry and El Shamsy ignore it, as they take the feminine resumptive pronoun as a reference to the masculine *bayān* or to the Qurʾān.

expect, but rather *kayfa al-bayān* "how is *bayān*" or "the modalities of *bayān*."[310] We will return

to this shortly. Once al-Shāfiʿī goes on to enumerate the categories of *bayān* (four and later five),

he elaborates on nearly all of them using conjugations of *abāna* 'to make evident', *bayyana* (do.)

and *dalla* 'to indicate', the subject of these transitive verbs being God, the Prophet or natural

signs. The very opening sentence of his presentation of the categories is *fa-jimāʿu mā abāna -*

llāhu li-khalqihi [*fī kitābihi*] "The sum total of that which God made evident for His creation [in

his Book…]."[311] Considering the occurrences of such verbs, *bayān* is clearly a transitive notion

in the lexical sense we have seen above, and Lowry even translates the verb *abāna* here as the

"legislative statements that God has provided".[312] In this sense *bayān* refers to God's

pronouncements about the law, and *kayfa al-bayān* refers to ways in which God imparts

knowledge about the law (even if it is mediated by the prophetic literature or by inference, it is

ultimately based on Scripture). But at the same time, *bayān* also carries an intransitive sense and

refers not to the communication of that legal knowledge, but to the legal knowledge itself: *kayfa*

al-bayān would thus refer to the ways in which knowledge about the law comes about.[313] In the

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[310] *Al-Risāla*, 21 (including *wujūh* in para. 55); Lowry (trans.), *The Epistle*, 15; M. Bernand, "*Bayān* selon les *Uṣūliyyūn*," *Arabica* 42 (1995), 145-60, here: 150, 152.

[311] *Al-Risāla*, 21 para. 55 (quoted above), 21 para. 56 (*mā abānahu li-khalqihi naṣṣan*; *ghayr dhālika mimmā bayyana naṣṣan*) [category one], 22 para. 57 (*wa-bayyana* […] *ʿalā lisān nabiyyihi*) [category two], 23 para. 65 (*fa-dallahum jalla thanāʾuhu*), 24 para. 68 (*mimmā dallahum ʿalayhi*) [category four], 28 para. 82 (*fa-kānat al-dalāla fī hādhā* [referring to a Qurʾānic verse]) [category one, second list], 29 para. 86 (*atā kitābu -llāh ʿalā l-bayān*), para. 87 (*fa-bayyana rasūlu -llāh* […] *wa-dalla ʿalā anna*), para. 88 (*wa-dallat al-sunna*; *wa-dalla l-nabiyy*; *wa-dalla ʿalā anna*; *dalla ʿalā annahu*) [category two, second list], 31 para. 95 (*thumma bayyana ʿalā lisān rasūlihi*) [category three, second list], 32 para. 97 (*wa-bayyana* [*Allāh*]) para. 99 (*fa-bayyana rasūl Allāh ʿan Allāh*), 33 para. 100 (*mā bayyanahu ʿan sunnat nabiyyihi*) [category four, second list], 38 para. 116 (*wa-abāna* [*Allāh*] *anna*) [category five, second list]. Even the categories which are not expounded on using these verbs contain other transitive verbs, like *faraḍa* 'to impose', which reveal the transitive notion behind *bayān*; see, e.g., *al-Risāla*, 22 para. 59 [category four, first list]: *mā faraḍa Allāh ʿalā khalqihi al-ijtihād fī ṭalabihi* "That [i.e., legal knowledge] which, in order for his people to obtain, God imposed inference." Notice that all categories are reduced, again, to the Qurʾān (*mā abāna Allāh li-khalqihi fī kitābihi*).

[312] Lowry (trans.), *The Epistle*, 15.

[313] This is also evident from the phrase *annahā bayānun li-man khūṭiba bihā*: "they [the cryptic *maʿānī*, see above] make things clear to those to whom they are addressed" (Vishanoff, *Formation*, 39), which could also mean "they

'transitive' reading the emphasis is more on the communication itself and its method (be it linguistic or not, explicit or not, etc.), and as such *bayān* can be translated as 'divine communication [about the law]'. In the 'intransitive' reading, the emphasis is more on the content of communication, or the knowledge itself of the law, and as such *bayān* can be translated as 'knowledge [about the law]'. To be sure, for al-Shāfiʿī the concept of *bayān* is rather consistent, and given the verbal use of *abāna*, *bayyana*, and *dalla*, its primary sense is transitive.[314] The dualism of the term tells us not so much about al-Shāfiʿī's thinking as it does about the inherent ambiguity of the term *bayān* itself (more on this below).

It is true that the categories of *bayān* here, that is, the "ways" in which the law is made known, are ultimately mediated by language, but I am not sure al-Shāfiʿī had this emphasis in mind. For him *bayān* is derived from the first lexical meaning of the word, namely, a type of 'sign' or 'indication' (*mā buyyina bihi l-shayʾu mina l-dalālati wa-ghayrihā*; see above), and whether or not those signs are linguistic is, at the basis of al-Shāfiʿī's conceoption of *bayān*, less relevant.[315] Montgomery's connection between *bayān* and the ʿ*arabiyya* is interesting indeed – we will come across this in Ibn Fāris' work – but such an identity is not set up by al-Shāfiʿī (he speaks of the language's ambiguities and the necessity to master them, but in and of themselves, they are distinct from the notion of *bayān*).

As we move away from al-Shāfiʿī to later legal theorists we find that their conception of

are clear to those to whom they are addressed," making *bayān* synonymous with the following *mutaqāribat al-istiwāʾ*, which Vishanoff translates as "equivalent [in their clarity]" (brackets his) and could also be translated as "equally/easily plain/direct" (see also El Shamsy, *From Tradition to Law*, 59, on *istiwāʾ*).

[314] See also Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Klassisch-arabische Theorien dichterischer Rede," in Holger Preissler and Heidi Stein (eds.), *Annäherungen an das Fremde. XXVI. Deutscher Orientalistentag vom 25. Bis 29.9.1995 in Leipzig* (= *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Supplement 11), Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998, 199-208, here: 199-200, fn. 2. Heinrichs recognizes the dual sense of "clarity"-"clarification" that the legal theorists' definitions of *bayān* often imply, and that as a technical term, it usually means "clarification."

[315] In this sense, later *uṣūlī* interpretations of *bayān* as *dalīl* are not so disconnected from al-Shāfiʿī's ideas (for *bayān* as *dalīl* see, e.g., Lowry, "Preliminary Observations," 522).

bayān as a hermeneutical tool usually involves a clarifatory relationship between texts.

According to many of the later *uṣūlīs*, *bayān* refers to the ways in which one text makes another

clearer with regards to legal norms, thus assigning the term a more pronounced qualitative

sense.[316] Lowry shows that *bayān* gradually came to refer to various levels of communicative

clarity, shifting the emphasis to the role of the addressee, or recipient, in interpretating those

levels. This process reflects what Lowry refers to as the "linguistic turn" in later legal thinking –

essentially, the main concern of Vishanoff's work.[317]

The Philosophical Sense(s) of Bayān

The common denominator between the legal sense of *bayān* and the philosophical one is that

both are derived from the first lexical meaning of the word, namely, a type of 'sign' by which a

thing becomes known. But whereas the former is limited to knowledge about legal 'things', the

latter is more general. We could nevertheless refer to both senses of *bayān* as 'a mechanism of

imparting[318] knowledge'.

Abū ʿUthmān ʿAmr b. Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868 or 9) is the first author to leave us a

written documentation of *bayān* in its philosophical sense in his famous 'humanist' masterpieces,

Kitāb al-Ḥayawān 'Books of Animals' and *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 'Clear Expression/Eloquence

and Exposition'.[319] Al-Jāḥiẓ's notion of *bayān* has usually been interpreted as a theory of

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[316] This is based on the views of al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980), Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392) – all discussed by Lowry, "Preliminary Observations," 514-24.

[317] Lowry, "Preliminary Observations," 525-27; Vishanoff, *Formation*, xiii-xiv.

[318] The verb 'to impart [knowledge]', unlike 'to convey' or 'to communicate', is etymologically connected to the notion of parting or dividing, and as such it evokes one of the main meanings of the root *b.y.n*, namely, 'to part'. See Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab*, 1: 403-406, and Larsen's discussion of separability above.

[319] Montgomery now prefers 'The Book of Living' for *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān*, following Saʿīd Manṣūr's understanding of *ḥayawān* as equivalent to the meaning of the word in Q 29:64, "The next dwelling – it is living (*ḥayawān*; 'life' in Arberry's renderring)." See Montgomery, *In Praise of Books*, 9-10. Lately, 'The Book of Living Beings' has

communication akin to modern semiotics.[320] Scholars pursuing this line of thought have tended

to investigate al-Jāḥiẓ's notion of *bayān* in isolation.[321]

Bayān is in fact used in two senses by al-Jāḥiẓ: the first is non-technical and implicit and

refers to 'clarity of expression' (i.e., eloquence); the second is technical and explicit and refers to

a philosophical mechanism of signification. What we are interested in here is the second use of

the term, but a word should be said about the first. *Bayān* as 'eloquence' is most apparent in the

opening of *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*: although lacking a clear preface, not to mention an explanation

of the work's title, al-Jāḥiẓ does begin with a type of 'definition' of *bayān* by treating its primary

antonym – befitting the famous adage *tuʿraf al-ashyāʾ bi-aḍdādihā* "things are known/defined by

their opposites" – namely, *ʿiyy* 'inarticulateness/ linguistic ineptitude' (or *ḥaṣar* 'inability to

express one's mind'; one of the very definitions of *ʿiyy* given in the dictionaries is "the opposite

of *bayān*").[322] It is clear that this unspoken sense of *bayān* is different from the explicit

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become a common translation for the title, presumably due to the central place human beings hold in the book. I still prefer 'The Book of Animals', for 'man' is part of the genus 'animal' and al-Jāḥiẓ was well familiar with Aristotelian notions of genera and species ('Living Beings' leaves out this sense). For additional translations of *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* see Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 122, and the references stated therein. The translation above is Pellat's. Montgomery opts for the literal 'Clarity and Clarification'. Skarżyńska-Bocheńska takes the title of the work as *al-Bayān wa-l-tabayyun*, following al-Shāhid al-Būshaykhī, and thus translates it as "Livre de la communication et de la perception"; see Krystyna Skarżyńska-Bocheńska, "Entre al-Ǧāḥiẓ et Bakhtine: Le [sic] théorie de la communication chez érudit [sic] arabe du 9ᵉ siècle et chez chercheurs européens contemporains," in Miklós Maróth (ed.), *Problems in Arabic Literature*, Piliscsaba: The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2004, 91-101, here: 91. As we shall see, it is probably best to keep to Pellat's translation since *bayān* in *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* (as opposed to the *Ḥayawān*) refers primarily to 'eloquence'.

[320] Yasir Suleiman, "*Bayān* as a Principle of Taxonomy: Linguistic Elements in Jāḥiẓ's Thinking," in J.F. Healy and V. Porter (eds.), *Studies on Arabia in Honour of G. Rex Smith*, Oxford: Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of Manchester, 2002, 273-95, here: 277-79, 289, who speaks of the forms of human *bayān* as "semiological systems"; Skarżyńska-Bocheńska, "Entre al-Ǧāḥiẓ et Bakhtine" (and her earlier studies cited therein); Lale Behzadi, *Sprache und Verstehen: al-Ǧāḥiẓ über die Vollkommenheit des Ausdrucks*, Diskurse der Arabistik, Bd. 14, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009.

[321] Montgomery and Lowry analyse al-Jāḥiẓ's *bayān* in more contextual terms, but mostly limited to al-Shāfiʿī.

[322] Abū ʿUthmān ʿAmr b. Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 4 vols., Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, [1968], 1: 3-7, and more broadly 3-74. Al-Jāḥiẓ treats a range of linguistic 'ineptitudes' in this long section, including speech impediments and consonant-mispronunciations, and a number of typical Jāḥiẓian digressions, a long one of which is on poets who are also good orators (a talent he deems rare, p. 45). Ibn Manẓūr records al-Jawharī's definition: *wa-l-ʿiyyu khilāfu l-bayān* (*Lisān al-ʿarab* 4: 3202, 2ⁿᵈ column). For a different, and

presentation of the notion in the following section titled *bāb al-bayān*.[323] *Bayān* as 'eloquence'

serves as one of the main components of the 'project' al-Jāḥiẓ is committed to, to wit: preserving

(and promoting) the customs, codes and heritage of the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia, culminating

in their linguistic excellence.[324]

But the technical sense of *bayān* is first presented in his earlier work, the *Ḥayawān*, not in

al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn, and the two discussions of the notion are slightly different.[325] The context

of the first discussion of *bayān* is *ḥikma*, a term that usually denotes 'divine wisdom' or

'intelligent design' (also *tadbīr*), and is a philosophical principle that underlies the *Ḥayawān*,

according to which "God's providence [or: design] can be seen in the lowliest creatures of His

creation."[326] As it is presented in the passage in question, the meaning of *ḥikma* oscillates

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detailed, presentation of the prefatory sections of al-Jāḥiẓ's work see Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 115-22. According to him (p. 122), "the first section of Jāḥiẓ's *Bayān* [i.e., pp. 3-74] establishes the three principal domains in which the treatise will operate: the divine nature of *bayān* and its significance for mankind; Muʿtazilism as the bastion of the of the beliefs of the Community; the analysis and survey of linguistic ineptitude and speech defects as political, religious, moral and legal failings."

[323] *Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 75 fn. 1, where Hārūn states that the heading appears in all but two manuscripts.

[324] This is referred to by Pellat as the "Arabic humanities"; Ch. Pellat, "al-<u>Dj</u>āḥiz," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. See also Michael Zwettler, "Abu ʿUthman ʿAmr bin Bahr al-Jahiz," in George N. Atiyeh et al. (eds.), *The Genius of Arab Civilization: Source of Renaissance*, 3rd ed., New York: New York University Press, 1992, 76-79, here: 78, and Suleiman, "*Bayān* as a Principle of Taxonomy," 276-77, 284-85, 290. For an analysis of al-Jāḥiẓ's *bayān* in the sense of '[situational] eloquence' see Thomas, *The Concept of Muḥāḍara*, 99-107. The overall polyvalence of the term *bayān* in al-Jāḥiẓ has been recognized by Behzadi in *Sprache und Verstehen*, 58; cf. Krystyna Skarżyńska-Bocheńska, "Some Aspects of al-Jāḥiẓ's Rhetorical Theory," *Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies* 3 (1990), 89-116, here: 93-94. One translation Behzadi offers for *bayān* is "correspondence" or "balanced equivalence", to express not only the 'transmittable' aspect of *bayān* but also the 'decipherable' aspect thereof. Behzadi is committed to the concept of *bayān* as a theory of communication; in her interpretation, the discussion of *ʿiyy* is an instantiation of an act of communication 'gone wrong' (*Sprache und Verstehen*, 96-107).

[325] Abū ʿUthmān ʿAmr b. Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 7 vols., 2nd ed., Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1966, 1: 33-35 and 6: 5-6. On the chronology of al-Jāḥiẓ's authoring of the *Bayān* vis-à-vis the *Ḥayawān* see Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 111-14.

[326] Geert Jan van Gelder, "Beautifying the Ugly and Uglifying the Beautiful: The Paradox in Classical Arabic Literature," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 48.2 (2003), 321-51, here: 333. Pellat states: "[…] the main idea which emerges from the work [*Kitāb al-Ḥayawān*] is that everything in nature has a meaning and use, and that everything proves the existence and wisdom of God"; see Charles Pellat, "Al-Jāḥiẓ," in Julia Ashtiany et al. (eds.), *Cambridge History of Arabic Literature: ʿAbbasid Belles-Lettres*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 78-95, here: 87. See further Ibrahim Geries, "Le Système Éthique d'al-Ǧāḥiẓ," *Studia Islamica* 56 (1982), 51-68, here: 54-58,

between 'divine wisdom' and 'wisdom of worldly things'. Because all worldly things are a reflection of God, this distinction might be a moot one for al-Jāḥiẓ: *ḥikma* could refer, at the same time, both to Wisdom and to the manifestation of Wisdom (a primitive precursor to monism?).[327]

Let us closely summarize the passage in question, which appears in the opening sections of the *Ḥayawān* dealing with the various divisions of creation.[328] According to al-Jāḥiẓ, all things in the universe contain, or are themselves, *ḥikma* (*wa-wajadnā l-ʿālam bi-mā fīhi ḥikmatan*). These worldly things "were created" as such (*juʿila ḥikmatan*), implicitly by God. There are two types of wisdom. The first type does not realize or understand wisdom (*lā yaʿqilu l-ḥimka*), presumably its own inherent wisdom, nor does it understand what follows from the wisdom (*ʿāqibat al-ḥikma*), presumably God's existence and design. This type encompasses animals and inanimate beings, and al-Jāḥiẓ refers to it as the irrational (*ghayr al-ʿāqil*). The second type of wisdom understands wisdom and what follows from it; it encompasses Man, and al-Jāḥiẓ refers to it as the rational (*al-ʿāqil*). Both types of wisdom are the same in that they are an indication or a sign (*dalāla*, *dalīl*) that they themselves are 'wisdom'.[329] Montgomery refers to *dalīl* in this context as a "probative sign,"[330] implying that it is specifically a sign of divinity, and I follow

and Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 131, *In Praise of Books*, 278 ff., 391, 427. Al-Jāḥiẓ sometimes interchanges *ḥikma* with *tadbīr* 'providence'; e.g., *al-Ḥayawān* 1: 34.4-5.

[327] Montgomery renders *ḥikma* as "wisdom" or "instance of wisdom" (*In Praise of Books*, 435). Suleiman interprets *ḥikma* as "semantic import" or "meaning" and the worldly entities as "signifiers of meaning" ("*Bayān* as a Principle of Taxonomy," 278, 280). I think *ḥikma* refers primarily to the 'meaning' of God (as the creator) and only secondarily to other types of meaning (like sickness, etc., that humans can infer from inanimate objects or situations; al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Ḥayawān* 1: 34, and below).

[328] *Al-Ḥayawān* 1: 33-35. For a most recent paraphrase see Montgomery, *In Praise of Books*, 435-36.

[329] The resumptive pronoun in *al-dalāla ʿalā annahu ḥikma* refers to *al-shayʾ al-ʿāqil wa-ghayr al-ʿāqil*, that is, to the entities themselves – not, say, to God (*al-Ḥayawān* 1: 33). On the meaning of *dalāla* as *dalīl* see Lane, *Lexicon*, 901. Other options for *dalīl*: a thing that carries signification; signifier.

[330] *In Praise of Books*, 435, and Part 5 of his book ("The Architecture of Design").

him by translating *dalīl* here as "a sign of *ḥikma*." Al-Jāḥiẓ continues by saying that the two

types of *ḥikma* differ in that the irrational being is a sign of *ḥikma* (*dalīl*) that cannot itself 'seek

indication' or infer (*yastadillu*), whereas the rational being is a sign of *ḥikma* that can make

inferences (*dalīl mustadill*). At this point the notion of *bayān* is introduced:

> *thumma juʿila li-l-mustadilli sababun yadullu bihi ʿalā wujūhi -stidlālihi wa-wujūhi mā*
> *nataja lahu l-istidlālu wa-sammaw dhālika bayānan*
> Then a means was made for the inferring being by which he could indicate/signify the
> various methods of his inference as well as the various results of his inference (lit. that
> which his inference brought forth), and that [the means, or faculty] was named *bayān*.[331]

Al-Jāḥiẓ says that four types of "means of indication/signification" (*bayān*) were created (*juʿila*):

speech, writing, calculating (with fingers), and gesturing.[332] He then proceeds to argue, in some

detail, that the non-inferring sign of wisdom (*al-dalīl alladhī lā yastadillu*) also has[333] a "means

of indication" (*bayān*) by the fact that it "enables the one seeking indication from it (*al-*

mustadilla min nafsihi), and leads anyone who examines it (*kulla man fakkara fīhi*), to [gain]

knowledge (*maʿrifa*) of the proof (*burhān*) that is reposited in it [in the irrational being], and of

the indication [of wisdom] (*dalāla*) that it is filled with, and of the wondrous wisdom (*ʿajīb al-*

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[331] *Al-Ḥayawān* 1: 33.3-4ᵉ. Suleiman describes this "means of generating and processing meaning" as "faculty-like" ("*Bayān* as a Principle of Taxonomy," 280). Behzadi presents it as an "access" (Zugang) to the signifiable world (*Sprache und Verstehen*, 58). Montgomery translates *bayān* as "clarity" and *dalāla* as "probative signs" (*In Praise of Books*, 435); here Montgomery recognizes a shift in focus between the presentation of *bayān* in the *Ḥayawān* and that in *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*. Following Montgomery, I am essentially disregarding the second instance of *wujūh* (in *wujūh mā nataja lahu l-istidlāl*) in my translation. Larsen discusses the possible indebtedness of this passage to Aristotle's discussion of the sign/reference (*Means of Intelligibility*, 13-15, 102; his translation should be treated with caution).

[332] *Al-Ḥayawān* 1: 33. For a detailed account of these categories see, e.g., Suleiman, "*Bayān* as a Principle of Taxonomy," 281-86; Behzadi, *Sprache und Verstehen*, 62-77. Both scholars set it as their aim to situate al-Jāḥiẓ's thought within modern theories of language and communication. To them we may add Skarżyńska-Bocheńska, who renders *bayān* directly as "communication"; see "Entre al-Ğāḥiẓ et Bakhtine," *passim*.

[333] This is understood, first, by the *iḍāfa* construction implying possession, *bayān al-dalīl alladhī lā yastadillu* (*al-Ḥayawān* 1: 34), and later, by the specific remark that the inanimate object "shares with the living speaking (/rational) man in [having?] *bayān*" (*qad shāraka fī l-bayāni l-insāna al-ḥayya l-nāṭiqa*; ibid. 1: 35).

ḥima) that it is deposited with."[334] In other words, *bayān* is not a means to signify meaning in general, but specifically the meaning of God's existence and design (i.e., *ḥikma*). Al-Jāḥiẓ concedes that those who see *bayān* as containing five categories, to include the irrational entities, are correct as well.[335]

Al-Jāḥiẓ provides several examples for irrational beings imparting knowledge that can be 'deciphered' by rational beings, but in my understanding, these are not meant as primary examples of *bayān*. Rather, they are adduced as analogies in order to *prove* that irrational beings can 'speak' – most specifically – of their wisdom. Al-Jāḥiẓ states that inanimate beings "speak insofar as they [offer] indication [of *ḥikma*] […] as if the design (*tadbīr*) and wisdom (*ḥikma*) within them are informers to those who seek information from them and speakers to those who ask them to speak back, *just as* (*kamā*) leanness and fading of color inform of illness, and *just as* fleshiness and brightness (of color) speak of good health" (emphasis added).[336] In other words, just as leanness etc. can inform us of certain realities, likewise objects can inform us of the most basic reality – 'wisdom' – via *bayān*. *Bayān* is first and foremost a mechanism of imparting knowledge of *ḥikma*, not any knowledge.

I take the poetic examples that al-Jāḥiẓ then adduces in a similar vein of analogical proof, although I recognize that they can be, and have been read as examples of *bayān* par

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[334] Ibid. 1: 34.

[335] Ibid. 1: 35. Al-Jāḥiẓ does not give a heading to this category as he later does in *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, but he mentions "the position of an object and its stature" (*mawḍūʿ al-jism wa-niṣbatuhu*; *al-Ḥayawān* 1: 35, and see below).

[336] Ibid. 1: 34 (*fa-l-ajsāmu l-khursu l-ṣāmitatu nāṭiqatun min jihati l-dalālati […] ʿalā anna -lladhī fīhā mina l-tadbīri wa-l-ḥikmati mukhbirun li-mani -stakhbarahu wa-nāṭiqun li-mani -stanṭaqahu **kamā** khabbara l-huzālu wa-kusūfu l-lawni ʿan sūʾi l-ḥāli wa-**kamā** yanṭiqu l-simanu wa-ḥusnu l-naḍrati ʿan ḥusni l-ḥāli*) (emphasis mine). If they had been meant as examples of *bayān*, I think the wording would be different.

excellence.[337] The examples are interesting, because such cases would later come to be seen as

majāz (see Part Two), whereas for al-Jāḥiẓ and later Ibn Wahb al-Kātib, they are a reflection of

true reality. The examples include provision-bags loaded on camels "giving praise" to the caliph

(a line by the Umayyad poet Nuṣayb 'al-Akbar'); eyes "informing" about that which is in the

hearts (anonymous poetic line); a wolf "requesting [knowledge]" from the wind (a line by the

mukhaḍram poet al-ʿUklī); feathers of a raven falling off piecemeal likened to a pair of shears

because he "informs" [of separation] (a line by the Jāhilī poet ʿAntara); a land "replying" to an

inquirer about [Him] who plowed [it for] its rivers, planted its trees and gathered its fruit (related

in the *Qiṣaṣ al-anbiyāʾ* by al-Faḍl b. ʿĪsā b. Abān).[338] In the last example we find the term *iʿtibār*

'a lesson to be derived',[339] which Ibn Wahb will later employ to express the imparting of

knowledge by inanimate beings.

If in the context of the *Ḥayawān*, *bayān* is not a means of signifying any meaning

whatsoever but is a means of signifying specifically divine/worldly wisdom (*ḥikma*, *tadbīr*) – the

focus of the notion shifts in the later *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*. This is because in the later work, al-

Jāḥiẓ approaches the topic from the perspective of *bayān* as 'eloquence' (see above), and

because he is probably adjusting his presentation to the ideas laid out by al-Shāfiʿī, whom he

alludes to by citing "one of the mighty man of words."[340] The chapter titled *bāb al-bayān*,

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[337] See the modern studies cited above. Al-Jāḥiẓ himself and others following him would come to view such cases from the point of view of *bayān*.

[338] Ibid. 1: 34-35.

[339] *fa-in lam tujibka ḥiwāran ajābatka -ʿtibāran* "and if [the land] does not reply to you by conversation, it will reply to you as a lesson that can be derived" (ibid. 1: 35). For the meaning of *iʿtibār* as "a lesson [ʿibra] to be derived" see Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 4: 2783, 2nd-3rd columns, 2782, 2nd column; Lane, *Lexicon*, 1937: "He took, or regarded, what he witnessed, or saw, or beheld, as an indication, or evidence, of what was concealed from him."

[340] *Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 75, where the chapter opens with *qāla baʿḍu jahābidhati al-alfāẓi wa-nuqqādi l-maʿānī*; El Shamsy, *From Tradition to Law*, 206.

appearing immediately after the work's opening section, begins with the idea of making known ideas/meanings (*maʿānī*) which subsist in the hearts (lit. 'breasts') and minds of *people*,[341] thus creating a direct link between the universal philosophical mechanism of *bayān* and the *bayān* pertaining solely to humans. Here too al-Jāḥiẓ presents *bayān* as a 'sign' and as a 'means', keeping in line with the primary lexical sense of the word: "A clear sign/indication (*dalāla*) of a hidden meaning – that is the *bayān* that you heard God Almighy speak in praise of […]"; "By whichever means you reach [a state of] making [something] understood and [by whichever means] you elucidate a meaning – that is *bayān* in that situation."[342] Here *dalāla* is used in a general sense, devoid of the notion of *ḥikma*, and is now equivalent to *bayān* in that the categories, which were identified previously in the *Ḥayawān* as categories of *bayān*, are now presented as categories of *al-dalālāt ʿalā l-maʿānī* "significations of meanings/concepts," whether verbal or not (*min lafẓ wa-ghayr lafẓ*). They are presented directly as being five-fold,

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[341] *al-maʿānī al-qāʾima fī ṣudūr al-nās al-mutaṣawwara fī adhhānihim* [etc.]; *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 75. For a translation of the entire paragraph see Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 126. He interprets (p. 127) this and other segments as a testament to the fact that "Jāḥiẓ's system is a performative ethics, in which man's character is defined through his actions and not through his intentions: his moral duty is to enable his companions to understand his intentions through endowing them with *bayān*" (see also Montgomery, *In Praise of Books*, 322). I do not see al-Jāḥiẓ's discussions of (human) communication to pertain to ethics (by which Montgomery is following the famous claims made by Michael Carter on speech as action). If anything, a man *cannot but help* express his true nature by his speech, revealing a kind of 'perceptional-relativism': any situation can be perceived differently by different people depending on their status, profession, etc. This idea is developed by Montgomery in his later study of *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* via what he calls "the speech-nature insight." Especially revealing are the examples al-Jāḥiẓ provides of those professionals who use technical vocabulary in their speech in non-professional settings because their perception of a situation is relative to their background. Montgomery does not use the term relativism in this context but does speak of 'determinism'; he examines the issue in light of many later theological discussions on the topic. See James E. Montgomery, "Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 2.175-207, Part 1," *Middle Eastern Literatures* 11.2 (2008), 169-91, esp. 171-74; *idem*, "Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥiẓ, *Kitāb al-bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, 2.175-207, Part 4," *Middle Eastern Literatures* 12.3 (2009), 213-32. On the 'genre' of literary speech put into the mouth of artisans and other tradesmen see Joseph Sadan, "Kings and Craftsmen, A Pattern of Contrasts: On the History of a Mediaeval Arabic Humoristic Form," *Studia Islamica* 56 (1982), 5-49 (Part I) and 62 (1985), 89-120 (Part II).

[342] *Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 75.2-3ᵉ (*wa-l-dalālatu l-ẓāhiratu ʿalā l-maʿnā l-khafiyyi huwa l-bayānu -lladhī samiʿta -llāha ʿazza wa-jalla yamdaḥuhu* […]); ibid. 1: 76.4-5 (*fa-bi-ayyi shayʾin balaghta l-ifhāma wa-awḍaḥta ʿani l-maʿnā fa-dhālika huwa l-bayānu fī dhālika l-mawḍiʿ*).

and *bayān* in turn is defined as that which reveals a meaning (*maʿnā*) to the listener.[343]

Signification imparted by inanimate entities is termed *niṣba* 'position', a term that has been

associated with the seventh Aristotelian category *to keisthai* already in the late third/ninth

century scribal manual *al-Risāla al-ʿAdhrāʾ*.[344] Referred to as *al-ḥāl al-dālla* "the indicative

situation" and *al-ḥāl al-nāṭiqa bi-ghayr al-lafẓ* "the non-verbal expressive situation," this

category is exemplified with many of the same examples that al-Jāḥiẓ adduced in his

Ḥayawān.[345]

 Montgomery, and Lowry following him, contends that al-Jāḥiẓ's theory of *bayān* is a

reaction to, and engagement with, al-Shāfiʿī's treatment of the notion.[346] Ahmed El Shamsy has

found a nearly verbatim account of parts of the passage we find in *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*, put into

the mouth of al-Shāfiʿī – "one of […] the mighty men of words" – by one of his students.[347] The

term *bayān* is not mentioned in this account: the five-fold categorization deals, as we find above,

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[343] *Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 76.

[344] See von Grunebaum, "Bayān" and Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 128-29, 131. Von Grunebaum cites additional medieval scholars who attend (explicitly or not) to al-Jāḥiẓ's five-fold categorization. Behzadi translated *niṣba* as "the emblematicality of Being" (Die Zeichenhaftigkeit des Seins) or "universal reference" (*Sprache und Verstehen*, 76, 174). For the connection between *bayān*, esp. *niṣba*, and *ḥikma* see Rajāʾ Ibn Salāma, "Fī l-niṣba wa-l-bayān wa-miḥnat al-maʿnā," *Fuṣūl* 15:4 (1997), 299–308, here: 301-303. Further studies on *niṣba* are (not seen): C.A. Nallino, "Del vocabola arabo 'niṣbah' (con 'ṣād')," *Revista degli Studi Orientali* 8 (1919–20), 637–46; Katia Zakharia, "C'est cela qui, entre 'nous' et 'eux', fait la difference: Le concept de *niṣba* dans le *Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*," in Cristina de la Puente (ed.), *Identidades marginales* (Estudios onomástico-biográficos de Al-Andalus 13), Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto de Filología, Departamento de Estudios Arabes, 2003, 15–51.

[345] *Al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 81-83. One of the additional examples al-Jāḥiẓ provides is "Alexander was more talkative yesterday than he is today, but he is more exhortative today than he was yesterday," said upon the death of Alexander the Great. The standard idiom for this phenomenon became *lisān al-ḥāl*.

[346] Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 103, 126, 131-32; *idem*, "Speech and Nature: Part 4," 224; Lowry, "Preliminary Observations," 510-14, 525-26. According to Montgomery ("Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 131), *niṣba* occupies a place similar to that of *ijtihād* in al-Shāfiʿī's system.

[347] Ibn ʿAsākir, *Tārīkh madīnat Dimashq*, ed. Muḥibb al-Dīn Abū Saʿīd ʿUmar b. Gharāma al-ʿAmrawī, 80 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1995-2000, 51: 356; El Shamsy, *From Tradition to Law*, 206-207. The quotation is related by Abū Thawr, al-Shāfiʿī's student. El Shamsy postulates that al-Jāḥiẓ did not cite al-Shāfiʿī by name because the person he dedicated his work to, the grand judge of Baghdad Ibn Abī Duwād, was ultimately in charge of persecuting al-Shāfiʿī's students in Egypt during that time.

with *al-dalālāt ʿalā l-maʿānī*, and with the nature of words vis-à-vis ideas/concepts. This suggests that rather than being a reactionary response to al-Shāfiʿī, al-Jāḥiẓ's account was an endorsement. Al-Jāḥiẓ repurposes the five-fold categorization of signification into a theory of *bayān*, which for al-Jāḥiẓ originally concerned the notion of *ḥikma*, but the terms he later uses in *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* are closer to the original wording used by al-Shāfiʿī. The theory of signification (*al-dalālāt ʿalā l-maʿānī*) that is attributed to al-Shāfiʿī is not equivalent to the theory of *bayān* that al-Shāfiʿī lays out in the *Risāla*, not least of which because the term *bayān* is absent from the former. Al-Shāfiʿī's theory of signification revolves primarily around 'human' meanings; his theory of *bayān* in the *Risāla* is "nourished by and directed at legal speculation,"[348] and has more to do with 'divine' meanings (regarding the law). Furthermore, al-Shāfiʿī's project in the *Risāla* is deontological at its core – it does not concern absolute truths.[349] Conversely, the work of al-Jāḥiẓ, especially the *Ḥayawān* in which the theory of *bayān* first appears, is first and foremost assertoric, dealing with the absolute truth that "everything in nature has a meaning and use, and […] everything proves the existence and wisdom of God."[350]

For later generations the theory of *al-dalālāt ʿalā l-maʿānī* became inextricable from the theory of *bayān*, and it became associated almost entirely with al-Jāḥiẓ (not al-Shāfiʿī). In the century following al-Jāḥiẓ, Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Wahb al-Kātib (*fl.* 4th/10th century) authored a book devoted to *aqsām al-bayān* "the categories of *bayān*."[351] His conception of the notion,

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[348] A claim that Montgomery made with regards to al-Jāḥiẓ's theorizing ("Speech and Nature, Part 4," 224).

[349] Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 103.

[350] Pellat, "al-Jāḥiẓ," 87. For Montgomery, al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* deals with the "should be," not with the "is": "[*al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* is] a riposte to, and engagement with Shāfiʿī's salvationist deontology as encapsulated in the theory of *bayān* in the *Risāla*. For Jāḥiẓ presents an axiology – a theory of ultimate values – in which man's reasoning intellect dominates: man has to decide how he should live" (Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 103).

[351] Abū al-Ḥusayn Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm b. Sulaymān b. Wahb al-Kātib, *al-Burhān fī wujūh al-bayān*, eds. Aḥmad

according to von Grunebaum, "is very different, and both wider and narrower, than that which Djāḥiẓ endeavored to formulate."[352] Though unrelated this time to the notion of *ḥikma*, there is little doubt that Ibn Wahb's *bayān* is inspired by the same philosophical-epistemological questions of meaning-production that we find in al-Shāfiʿī's/al-Jāḥiẓ's theory of *al-dalālāt ʿalā l-maʿānī*. Ibn Wahb's conception of *bayān* is linked explicitly to al-Jāḥiẓ at the outset, as he states that the purpose of his work is to provide more information (but not too much) on the categories of *bayān* that al-Jāḥiẓ spoke of in his *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*.[353] According to Ibn Wahb, *bayān* subsists in four loci which seem to be answering the question, "how does knowledge (of a thing) come about?" Each locus, in turn, forms a section in the book. *Bayān* is often inseparable from the very concept of 'knowledge'.

The work opens with an aside on 'reason' (*ʿaql*), a faculty which only man possesses, and its twofold division into 'innate' and 'acquired' (*mawhūb, maksūb*).[354] From there he proceeds to the four modes of *bayān* (which we will keep in its most common literal translation for the sake of simplicity): (1) *iʿtibār* 'a lesson [or: knowledge] that can be derived': "the clarity of things in/by themselves for him who takes notice of them/takes them as a sign and seeks knowledge [or: signification] from them";[355] (2) *iʿtiqād* '[forming an] opinion/belief': "the clarity that is

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Maṭlūb and Khadīja al-Ḥadīthī, Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-ʿĀnī, 1967, 52, 54 (English: 'The Demonstration on the Modes of Expression'). For biographical information on this little known scholar who was part of the Banū Wahb family of scribes see P. Shinar, "Ibn Wahb," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition* (Supplement). Shinar sees the *Burhān* as "an interesting attempt to apply Greek, Muʿtazilī and Imāmī doctrines to Arabic rhetoric." Heinrichs translates *bayān* in this work as 'unhiddenness'; see W.P. Heinrichs, "Rhetoric and Poetics," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature*, 2: 653.

[352] Von Grunebaum, "Bayān." He does not spell out the differences.

[353] *Al-Burhān*, 51-52. It is not surprising, then, to find no trace of *ḥikma*, since *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān* is not mentioned.

[354] Ibid., 54-59. The initial terms that he uses to describe *ʿaql* are similar to some of the explanations of *bayān* that we find in Qurʾānic exegetical literature (see fns. 291-92): that which enables humans to distinguish between good and bad.

[355] Ibid., 60.2, 62.5, 73.3: *bayān al-ashyāʾ bi-dhawātihā li-man iʿtabara bihā wa-ṭalaba al-bayān minhā; al-ashyāʾ*

achieved in the heart at [the time of] reflection and reasoning";[356] (3) *ʿibāra* '[verbal] expression': "clarity [achieved] by language/speech";[357] (4) *kitāb* 'writing': "clarity [achieved] by writing; it is the one that reaches those who are far and absent."[358] Ibn Wahb omits two communicative categories of *bayān* enumerated by al-Jāḥiẓ (calculating and gesturing)[359] but adds the category of 'opinion formation', which may come across as arbitrarily distinguishable from the first mode of *bayān* (clarity in "things in themselves").

The topics treated within the first two modes – *iʿtibār* and *iʿtiqād* – are philosophical in nature, as they address logic (syllogism, definition, the Aristotelian categories, philosophical meanings of particles) and epistemology (types of reports, certainty versus belief versus probability, types of perception and levels of knowledge).[360] Under the mode of *iʿtibār* we find that some things (*ashyāʾ*) "have a clear/manifest *bayān*" while others have "a covert/inner" one (*ẓāhir* versus *bāṭin*, evoking Imāmī ideas).[361] What is probably meant here is that some things are known evidently while others are not. Ibn Wahb identifies the evident ones with things that can be known (*udrika, tabayyun*) by our perception and by our mind (e.g., the hotness of fire; universal truths like "the whole is greater than the part"). Conversely, in order to know (*ʿilm*) the covert/inner nature of things one must rely either on (1) syllogistic inference (*qiyās*) or (2) a

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tubayyan bi-dhawātihā li-man tabayyan.

[356] Ibid., 60.3 (and 101 ff.): *al-bayān alladhī yuḥṣalu (yaḥṣulu?) fī al-qalb ʿinda iʿmāl al-fikr wa-l-lubb.*

[357] Ibid., 60.4: *al-bayān bi-l-lisān*; 111.3: *al-bayān bi-l-qawl.*

[358] Ibid., 60.4-5 (and 313 ff.): *al-bayān bi-l-kitāb wa-huwa alladhī yablughu man baʿuda wa-ghāba.*

[359] But gesturing is mentioned later on within the third category (*ʿibāra*), under the topic of *waḥy* ~'non-verbal suggestion' (ibid., 140-41).

[360] Ibid., 73-108.

[361] Ibid., 73.

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report (*khabar*) or (3) probability and estimation (*al-ẓann wa-l-takhmīn*).[362] Under the mode of

iʿtiqād Ibn Wahb discusses knowledge (*maʿrifa*, *ʿilm*) that is undoubtedly true (*ḥaqq*),

knowledge that requires proof (*mushtabah*) and knowledge that is undoubtedly false (*bāṭil*), all

of which depend on the quality of the premises (either self-evident, disputed upon or evidently

false).[363] Of all four modes of *bayān*, *iʿtiqād* is given the shortest account, merely seven pages in

the printed edition;[364] adding to that the overlap in the treatment of knowledge-types, this would

strengthen our assessment that *iʿtiqād* was not a well-thought-out category and, in many respects,

is indistinguishable from *iʿtibār*.

Under *ʿibāra* Ibn Wahb attends to speech characteristics that are common to all

languages (mostly sentence-types: declarative/non-declarative) and those that are specific to the

Arabic language (morphology, comparison, a range of implied speech, change in person/word

order, the fundamentals of poetry, the fundamentals of prose, disputation, various speech

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[362] On the knowledge of evident things see ibid., 73. The verb *udrika* is used both for what is perceived by the senses and for what is known by the mind intuitively (*tabayyun* 'perception' is used for the former only). The noun *ʿilm* with regards to knowledge of covert things appears on the same page. For the treatment of *qiyās*, as well as definition, the Aristotelian categories and the philosophical meanings of particles, see ibid., 76-87. Ibn Wahb refers the reader who wishes to obtain further information to "the books written on logic" (*al-kutub al-mawḍūʿa fī al-manṭiq*, p. 86; also p. 116). *Khabar* is of two kinds (pp. 88-91): certain (*yaqīn*) or uncertain (*taṣdīq*; i.e., such that one must decide whether or not to believe). Reports evoking certainty are divided into (1) vastly authenticated ones (this includes 'common knowledge'), (2) prophetic ones or (3) authoritatively authenticated ones (those that are widely transmitted by the *khāṣṣa* '[religious?] elite' or *ʿulamāʾ* 'scholars'). The first and third types are expounded upon using the term *tawātur* (p. 88, 90). Reports that one must decide whether or not to believe are those transmitted by single/a small number of persons (pp. 90-91, 97). As for the third category, *ẓann* 'probability', it can act as certain knowledge (*yaqīn*) for those who adhere to it (p. 91, 96-97). Examples include various divinations (especially augury based on flight of birds and the like, pp. 92-93) and the wise judgment of ʿAlī (to which he is ascribed the famous Solomonian 'splitting of the baby' story, pp. 95-96).

[363] *Al-Burhān*, 101-104. On the near-synonymity between *bayān* and *maʿrifa*/*ʿilm* here consider the following, opening the account on *iʿtiqād*: "We have said that when things are made clear to the minds by their own essences, and when their abstract qualities (?, *maʿānī*) and inner selves are interpreted to the hearts, then that which is discovered for he who takes notice of their true nature *becomes knowledge and cognizance* that are embedded in his soul. *This bayān is of three types* [...]" (ibid., 101.3-5; emphasis added) – clearly *bayān* here can be interchangeable with *maʿrifa wa-ʿilm* (*qad qulnā inna l-ashyāʾa idhā buyyinat bi-dhawātihā li-l-ʿuqūli wa-turjimat ʿan maʿānīhā* [*wa-bawāṭinihā*, in one ms.] *li-l-qulūbi ṣāra mā yankashifu li-l-mutabayyini min ḥaqīqatihā maʿrifatan wa-ʿilman markūzayni fī nafsihi. wa-hādhā l-bayānu ʿalā thalāthati aḍrubin* [...]).

[364] Ibid., 101-108.

categorizations such as jest/earnest and true/false, and more).[365] Under *kitāb* Ibn Wahb treats the various types of civil positions in the government (sg. *kātib*) and their official duties.[366] As with the case of *iʿtibār*, Ibn Wahb maintains the distinction between *ẓāhir* and *bāṭin* when dealing with *ʿibāra* and *kitāb*. In the former case he opens the discussion with implied speech ("that which requires interpretation"); in the latter case he closes the discussion with conventions of, what we may call, encryption.[367] The *ẓāhir / bāṭin* dualism that characterizes the three major modes of *bayān* is probably inspired, as Pesach Shinar suggests, by his Imāmī leanings.[368]

Because Ibn Wahb expounds upon the first two *bayān* modes using the derivations of *ʿilm*, *idrāk*, *tabayyun* and *maʿrifa*, we may conclude that *bayān* is very close in meaning to 'knowledge'. But this near-synonymity is less borne out in the case of the third and fourth modes of *bayān*, namely 'verbal expression' and 'writing', where we find many of the common topics studied in early *naqd* works, in scribal literature and in *adab* anthologies. Indeed, this is where the bulk of the work lies.[369] We are thus at a loss to find a unifying translation for *bayān* that would suit all four modes; 'expression' is perhaps the most inclusive, in the sense of 'manifestation of an essence'.

The philosophical underpinnings of the notion of *bayān* espoused by al-Jāḥiẓ and Ibn Wahb receive further affirmation in the fifth/eleventh century by the Andalusian Ibn Ḥazm (d.

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[365] Ibid., 111-22 (for 'universal' characteristics), 123-309 (for 'Arabic' characteristics; some of these are presented in Wolfhart Heinrichs, *The Hand of the Northwind: Opinions on Metaphor and the Early Meaning of istiʿāra in Arabic Poetics*, [Mainz]: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft; Wiesbaden: Steiner [im Komm.], 1971, 37).

[366] Ibid., 313-438. This includes positions like the *ṣāḥib al-shurṭa* ~'police chief' (pp. 393-400) and the *ḥājib* ~'chamberlain'(pp. 420-25).

[367] *Al-Burhān*, 111-12 (for the *ẓāhir / bāṭin* distinction within *ʿibāra*), 425-37 (for *kitāba ẓāhira / bāṭina*). Some types of *bāṭin* speech could correspond to modern notions of implicature (p. 111; e.g., when God says [Q 41:40] "Do what you will," He is not literally authorizing man to do whatever he likes).

[368] Shinar, "Ibn Wahb." On the minor place the second mode (*iʿtiqād*) holds in Ibn Wahb's system see above.

[369] Ibid., 111-309 (for *ʿibāra*); 313-438 (for *kitāb*).

456/1064), who prefaces his work on logic with an aside on *bayān*.[370] How precisely *bayān* fits into the field of logic is not spelled out, but it seems to serve as an epistemological or even metaphysical foundation to the logical inquiry. According to Ibn Ḥazm, all things created by God may have four levels of *bayān*, which in this context could be interchanged – and later was interchanged – with *wujūd* 'existence'.[371] These levels (*marātib*, *wujūh*) are closely aligned with Ibn Wahb's presentation, but in Ibn Ḥazm's system they are presented as hierarchical prerequisites. As a hierarchy, they are evocative of Aristotle's "spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds," opening the *De Interpretatione*.[372] The first level of *bayān* is the 'real' existence of a thing, "for if it is real (*ḥaqq*) then its being known/noticed (*istibānatuhā*) is possible, even if at that time there is no one in existence who seeks to know/take notice of it (*mustabīn*) […] since that which does not exist – there is no way to know/notice it (*istibānatihi*)."[373] This first level is a prerequisite to the rest. The second level is "the knowledge/exitence (*bayān*) [of things] by/for him who seeks to know it (*man istabānahā*)," that is, mental existence.[374] The third is vocal speech (presented in physiological terms). The fourth is agreed-upon signs: this includes writing systems, gestures,

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[370] Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Taqrīb*, 94-97. I thank David Owen for alerting me to this section of Ibn Ḥazm's work.

[371] *Al-Taqrīb*, 95. In Ṭashköprüzāde's *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda*, as quoted by Kâtip Çelebi, it is stated that "things have an existence on four levels […] and each preceding one is a means to the following one (*li-l-ashyāʾ wujūd fī arbaʿ marātib* […] *wa-kull sābiq minhā wasīla ilā l-lāḥiq*; *Kashf al-ẓunūn* 1: 14). The four levels of existence are writing (*kitāba*), verbal expression (*ʿibāra*), minds (*adhʾhān*), and things themselves (*aʿyān*). Incidentally, here Çelebi encapsulates the standard subfield of *ʿilm al-bayān* in terms of *dalāla* (ibid. 1: 13).

[372] *De Interpretatione* 16a3: Aristotle, *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, translated with notes by J.L. Ackrill, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963 [2002 reprint], 43, 113-14). According to Heinrichs ("Contacts," 271), already in Ibn Wahb's system each level of *bayān* presupposes the preceding one (I have not found explicit evidence for this).

[373] *Al-Taqrīb*, 95.2-4ᵉ (*fa-innahā idhā kānat ḥaqqan fa-qad amkanati -stibānatuhā wa-in lam yakun lahā mustabīnun ḥīna ʾidhin mawjūdun* […] *idh mā lam yakun mawjūdan fa-lā sabīlun ilā -stibānatihi*).

[374] Ibid., 95.1ᵉ (*bayānuhā ʿinda mani -stabānahā*).

and more.[375]

In order to understand how *bayān* can stand both for the knowledge of a thing and for the existence of the thing itself, we might be reminded that classical Arabic-Islamic definitions of *ʿilm* sometimes depict "knowledge" as "the object known" (*al-maʿlūm*) or the object as it is known in the mind (*al-mawjūd al-dhihnī*).[376] In Ibn Ḥazm's account, the equivalence between *bayān* and a thing's existence is most apparent in the first level of *bayān*. As for the equivalence between *bayān* and knowledge, which we already came across in the work of Ibn Wahb, here too common definitions of *ʿilm* are a telling source, as we find one strand of definitions in which *ʿilm* is understood in terms of "clear understanding" and "clarification" (*bayyana*, *abāna*, *tabayyun*).[377]

In Ibn Ḥazm's and Ibn Wahb's versions of *bayān*, more so than the one we find in al-Jāḥiẓ, *bayān* is not a "means" to knowing a thing as it is the knowledge itself of a thing, or even the thing itself (two sides of the same coin). To complicate matters further, Ibn Ḥazm uses *bayān* in other senses as well (we find this to a lesser extent in the work of Ibn Wahb[378]). Before speaking of the four levels of *bayān*, Ibn Ḥazm states that humans' knowledge of "the names of things" (inspired by Q 2:31 "He taught Adam the names, all of them") enables them "to express

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[375] Ibid., 96-97.

[376] Franz Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam*, 2nd ed., with an Introduction by Dimitri Gutas, Leiden: Brill, 2007, 52-53 (definitions A-9, A-11). Rosenthal stresses, though, that "[i]t seems to have been considered an established fact that the object known (*maʿlūm*) is prior to knowledge" (ibid., 51). He translates *al-mawjūd al-dhihnī* as "the mentally existing object."

[377] Ibid., 58. For a clear instance in Ibn Ḥazm's account in which *bayān* stands for 'knowledge', consider the statement, *fa-min dhālika mā yudriku l-aʿmā bihā l-bayāna* "of it [non-verbal signs] is that through which the blind man perceives knowledge (*bayān*)" (*al-Taqrīb*, 97.10-11).

[378] I found two cases of non-technical uses in Ibn Wahb's *Burhān*. In the first case, *bayān* refers to the clarity of the Qurʾān, which is said to have been brought down via the prophet Muḥammad using the Arabic language (*al-Burhān*, 112); *bayān* seems to be used synonymously with the Qurʾān. In the second instance, *bayān* is used to simply mean 'eloquence', or 'good style' (cf. the scribal meaning of *bayān* below), with regards to poetic components that can make a piece of poetry either praiseworthy or blameworthy (ibid., 175).

[the nature of] all beings" (*al-bayān ʿan jamīʿ al-mawjūdāt*).[379] Here *bayān* refers the human

faculty of expression from a transitive perspective: it is not equivalent to the 'existence' of a

thing in speech or writing (categories 3 and 4 in his theory of *bayān*). Furthermore, in the

opening of the *Taqrīb*, *bayān* is invariably presented as a faculty specific to humans, whereas in

the beginning of the *bayān* treatment several paragraphs later, *bayān* is presented as something

common to all "things" (*ashyāʾ*) in the world.[380] This tension between the human and universal

aspects of *bayān* goes all the way back to al-Jāḥiẓ.

The Philological Sense(s) of Bayān

Montgomery interpreted al-Shāfiʿī's conception of *bayān* as virtually synonymous with the

features of the *ʿarabiyya* (the Arabic of the ancient Arabs), especially its 'extensiveness'

(*ittisāʿ*).[381] As we have seen, however, the textual evidence in the *Risāla* did not quite support

this interpretation: while it is true that the law can only be known by the medium of language, in

this case Arabic, along with its vastness and ambiguities, al-Shāfiʿī was not explicit in referring

to it as *bayān*. Nearly two centuries after al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) was. In his work *al-*

Ṣāḥibī, dedicated to the study of lexicology or the theory of lexicography (*uṣūl ʿilm al-ʿarab*

'principles of the science of [the language of] the [ancient] Arabs', as opposed to plain

lexicography, the *furūʿ*), Ibn Fāris explicitly equates *bayān* with the vagaries of the Arabic

language.[382] He does so regardless of the legal aspect of the language as his main interest lies in

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[379] *Al-Taqrīb*, 94.8.

[380] Ibid., 93.4ᵉ-94.6ᵉ (for the opening of the *Taqrīb*); 95.8ᵉ ff. (for the opening of the *bayān* treatment).

[381] Montgomery, "Al-Jāḥiẓ's *al-Bayān wa al-Tabyīn*," 105-106, and above.

[382] Abū al-Ḥusayn Aḥmad b. Fāris al-Qazwīnī, *al-Ṣāḥibī fī fiqh al-lugha wa-sunan al-ʿarab fī kalāmihā*, ed. Moustafa El-Chouémi, Beirut: Muʾassasat Badrān li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1963, 29-30, 40 (English: 'The Ṣāḥibite [named after the vizier al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād, d. 385/995, to whom the work was dedicated]: On the Science of Lexicology and the Ways the Arabs Talk' [on the translation of *sunan* see below]). On Ibn Fāris see H. Fleisch, "Ibn

philological inquiry (the study of language primarily from the perspective of the lexicon, [morpho]phonology and idiomatic usage, less so syntax). His work seems to be a product of staunch anti-Shuʿūbī sentiment. Ibn Fāris is not working in isolation from the religious domain: he stresses the need of exegetes, legal scholars and *ḥadīth* scholars to master the *uṣūl al-lugha*, and he even uses *bayān* at one point as a technical term akin to the usage of the post-Shāfiʿī legal theorists.[383] But his primary use of the term is unequivocally philological in nature, as we shall now see.

    Bayān appears in one of the preliminary chapters of the work titled "On that the language of the [ancient] Arabs is the most distinguished and most extensive (*awsaʿ*)."[384] According to Ibn Fāris, *bayān* is the utmost term that can be given to describe a language, and it was with this word that God chose to describe the Arabic language and distinguish it from all others.[385] *Bayān* here is thus clearly derived from the third lexical meaning of the word (see Ibn Manẓūr above),

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Fāris," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. The *Ṣāḥibī* has been a primary source for the later famous philological work *al-Muzhir* by al-Suyūṭī (as evinced by El-Chouémi's editorial notes). The term 'lexicology' is used by Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 45, to differentiate the study of the "principles" (*uṣūl*) of the lexicon from the the study of its individual cases (*furūʿ*), i.e. the meanings of words in the dictionaries. Ibn Fāris explains this difference between *uṣūl* and *furūʿ* in *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 29-30 (I derive *uṣūl ʿilm al-ʿarab* from 29.10: *inna li-ʿilmi l-ʿarabi aṣlan wa-farʿan* "the science of [the language of] the Arabs has a foundation and a branch [i.e., a theoretical aspect and an 'applied' one concerning the single cases].") He refers to this science also by the phrase *uṣūl al-lugha* 'the foundations of the lexicon' or: the theory of lexicography (*al-Ṣāḥibī*, 64.8-9) and by the phrase *fiqh al-lugha* in the title.

[383] For the call on "anyone who is connected in any way to the knowledge of the Qurʾān, the Sunna and the legal opinions (*futyā*)" to master the foundations of lexicography see *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 64-66 (he also adds syntax, *ʿilm al-ʿarabiyya*, as an important prerequisite). For the use of *bayān* in the sense of a "clarification" of one Qurʾānic segment upon another see ibid., 240-42, especially the third category enumerated therein, which is also called *jawābāt* lit. 'replies'. Ibn Fāris also has legal opinions of his own, stemming from his interpretation of certains lexicological questions (e.g., ibid., 196).

[384] *Al-Ṣāḥibī*, 40.3 (*bāb al-qawl ʿalā anna lughat al-ʿarab afḍal al-lughāt wa-awsaʿuhā*). The chapter runs up to p. 47. The *ʿarab* here refer to speakers of Old-Arabic dialects or Ur-Classical Arabic: speakers of Arabic dialects who lived in temporal and geographical proximity to the Prophet. In short I will refer to these speakers as '[ancient/pre-Islamic] Arabs'.

[385] Ibid., 40.

namely, eloquence. Even the occurrence of the word in the famous Q 55: 3-4, *khalaqa l-insān*

ʿallamahu l-bayān, is interpreted as something like "the unique eloquence of the Arabic

language."[386] The fact that in this verse God gave precedence to (*qaddama*) *bayān* over His other

creations (the celestial bodies specified in the following verse), and the fact that he reserved

(*khaṣṣa*) it for Arabic, and Arabic alone, proves that other languages fall short of it and are lower

in stature.[387] Ibn Fāris acknowledges that there are levels (*marātib*) in *bayān*, and stresses their

qualitative nature: merely making oneself understood, as the non-Arabic speaker or the dumb can

(using gestures), is the lowest of *bayān* levels (*akhass marātib al-bayān*).[388]

Since *bayān* goes beyond 'intelligibility' to mean a very specific kind of eloquence, what

are the features that merit Arabic the *bayān* epithet? The first component Ibn Fāris mentions that

differentiates Arabic from other languages is its *saʿa* 'vastness', by which he means the

extensive amount of synonyms found in the language. An anonymous scholar is then cited as

mentioning other features, such as metaphorical usage of words (*istiʿāra*), comparison/analogy

(?, *tamthīl*), phonological metathesis / syntactic-semantic inversion (*qalb*), change in word order

(*taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr*) "and other [instances] of the [linguistic] ways of the Arabs in the Qurʾān

(*sunan al-ʿarab fī l-Qurʾān*)."[389] But once again it is the *saʿa*, or *ittisāʿ* – or *majāz* – which seems

to be at the crux of the matter: the same unnamed scholar – who turns out to be Ibn Qutayba (d.

276/889) – says that the reason no one is able to translate the Qurʾān into other languuages, as

opposed to the other scriptures, is "because the the non-Arabs (or specifically Persians, *al-ʿajam*)

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[386] Ibid., and see fn. 291 for common interpretations of the verse.

[387] Ibid.

[388] Ibid., 40-41.

[389] Ibid., 41. On Ibn Fāris's understanding of *istiʿāra* as "word-borrowing" see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 46. Notably, the *Ṣāḥibī* lacks a chapter on *tamthīl*, hence my hesitation in translating the term.

are not extensive in their idiomatic language (*majāz*) the way the Arabs are" (*li-anna l-ʿajama lam tattasiʿ fī l-majāzi -ttisāʿa l-ʿarab*).[390] Then Ibn Fāris goes on to provide an array of "untranslatable" phenomena unique to Arabic, ranging from idioms (e.g. *nijāruhā nāruhā* "every origin [of camels] has its mark" or *yad^a l-dahr* lit. 'until [the length of] the hand of time': "never") to phonological processes (*mīʿād* for **miwʿād* 'promise' or *yā Ḥāri* for "O Ḥārith") to the vastness of synonyms (one hundred and fifty names for 'lion' [some claim five hundred]; two hundred for 'beard'; seventy for 'stone').[391] By far the vast majority of examples adduced are idioms and other lexical 'gems', the last batch of which are given the title "words that glimmer in their [the Arabs'] speech like lanterns in the darkness" (this long list of examples is limited entirely to those whose root starts with the letter *qāf*! One is *iqtaḥafa* 'to drink [a beverage] till the very last drop').[392]

This is where the chapter on the superiority of Arabic ends, and along with it, any further mention of *bayān* in this sense. *Bayān* can thus hardly qualify as a full-fledged technical term in the foregoing context. We are nevertheless dwelling on it for two reasons: first, the unquestionable overlap between this term and the phrase *sunan al-ʿarab*, on which we will shortly elaborate; second, because this account may explain the appellation *ʿilm al-bayān* in its 'standard' rhetorical sense, that is, the name for the standard theory of imagery found in the second subfield of *ʿilm al-balāgha*. It is Heinrichs who tells us that "[t]he name [of the subfield

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[390] *Al-Ṣāḥibī*, 41.6-11; 30.6 (here: *tawassuʿ al-ʿarab fī mukhāṭabātihā* "the extensiveness of the Arabs in their conversations"). For Ibn Qutayba's corresponding passage see *Taʾwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān*, ed. Aḥmad Ṣaqr, 2nd ed., Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, 1973, 21 (English: 'Interpreting the [Lexical/Stylistic] Difficulties of the Qurʾān'); also Heinrichs, "Genesis," 130-31. On *majāz* as 'idiomatic language' see Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

[391] For *nijārhuhā nāruhā* see *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 42.5 (including editor's note) and Lane, *Lexicon*, 2769; it refers to external cues that may give evidence to hidden qualities. For *yad^a l-dahr* see *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 44.2ᵉ (and editor's note). For the phonological processes see ibid., 43.3-12.

[392] Ibid., 46.3 ff. Ibn Fāris ends the chapter (47.1-2) by saying that he could have filled volumes upon volumes on the matter.

on imagery] has to do with the original function of similes and other figurative usages in the Koran";[393] perhaps it is Ibn Fāris's account that stands at the basis of his assertion. If we recall Ibn Qutayba's (quoted anonymously) elaboration on the virtue of Arabic – what Ibn Fāris called *bayān* – the first two instances of *sunan al-ʿarab* he mentioned dealt with figurative speech (*isitʿāra* and *tamthīl*), and the Arabs were said "to be extensive in their *majāz*."[394]

But for Ibn Fāris the host of phenomena within *sunan al-ʿarab* that merit Arabic the heading *bayān* go well beyond figurative speech and imagery, as we have seen, to include phonological and other lexical phenomenoa. What does the phrase *sunan al-ʿarab*, then, mean? Primarily it refers to "the ways in which the [pre-Islamic] Arabs talk." After examples of "untranslatable" Qurʾānic verses are adduced, an interlocutor asks whether there are comparable examples *fī sunan al-ʿarab wa-nuẓūmihā*, which I take to mean "in the Arabs' everyday speech and [sentence] structures," that is, if there are comparable examples of untranslatable speech beyond the Qurʾān.[395] Ibn Fāris replies that there are, and he provides some. Of course "Arabs' ordinary way of talking" may appear in the Qurʾān, which explains the phrase *sunan al-ʿarab fī*

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[393] W.P. Heinrichs, "Rhetorical Figures," 661. No further elaboration provided. The meaning of *bayān* in the standard *ʿilm al-bayān* remains unclear.

[394] Though once again, one cannot be sure of what *tamthīl* denotes. Nevertheless, it is probably closer in meaning to figurative language than *qalb* or *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* are.

[395] *Al-Ṣāḥibī*, 41. If *nuẓūm* is meant in the grammatical sense of "syntactic structures," it is not unlike the later use of *naẓm* by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (see also the phrases *nuẓūm kitāb Allāh* and *nuẓūm al-Qurʾān* in ibid., 198.13, 243.1). The phrase *sunan al-ʿarab* probably differs from Sībawayhi's *ḥadd al-kalām* or *wajh al-kalām*, which Aryeh Levin interprets as "the ordinary way of speech," at least if we judge by Abū ʿUbayda's (d. 210/825) contrast beteween the idioms found in the Arabs' speech and *wajh al-kalām* 'the [normal] way of speech' (Heinrichs, "Genesis," 129; for *ḥadd/wajh al-kalām* see Aryeh Levin, "Sībawayhi's View of the Syntactical Structure of *kāna wa-ʾaxawātuhā*," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 1 [1979], 185-213, here: 211, reprinted in Aryeh Levin, *Arabic Linguistic Thought and Dialectology*, Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1998, article V). Al-Thaʿālibī (d. 429/1038) uses the phrase *sunan al-ʿarab* in more or less the same way that Ibn Fāris does; see Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Thaʿālibī, *Fiqh al-lugha wa-sirr al-ʿarabiyya*, ed. Sulaymān Salīm al-Bawwāb, Damascus: Dār al-Ḥikma, 1984, p. 341 ff. (part II of the work, passim).

al-Qurʾān (see above).[396] In the preface Ibn Fāris claims that the inquiry into *uṣūl al-lugha*

covers, besides the question of the origin of language, "the [linguistic] patterns of the Arabs' in

their discourse [synonymous with *sunan al-ʿarab*] and their [the patterns'] diversity in ordinary

and non-ordinary [ways of speech]" (*rusūm al-ʿarab fī mukhāṭabātihā wa-mā lahā min al-iftinān*

taḥqīqan wa-majāzan).[397] According to this statement, not only is "the Arabs' ordinary way of

talking" a major component of Ibn Fāris's field of inquiry, but so is their idiomatic, or non-

ordinary usage (*majāz*).

What *majāz* refers to here and its relation to *sunan al-ʿarab* is unclear, according to

Heinrichs.[398] Given its prominence in the preface, however, we may infer that *majāz* refers to a

wide range of phenomena, probably even wider than the subcategories presented by Ibn Qutayba

in his *Taʾwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān*, to include all "unnatural" ways of speech, similar to the old

presentation of *majāz* by Abū ʿUbayda (d. 210/825).[399] What is more, one is easily lead to infer

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[396] This was a common notion. Already Abū ʿUbayda states, *wa-fī l-Qurʾāni mithlu mā fī l-kalāmi l-ʿarabī* "the Qurʾān contains the same [features] that [everyday] Arabic speech contains." See Abū ʿUbayda Maʿmar b. al-Muthannā al-Taymī, *Majāz al-Qurʾān*, ed. Fuat Sezgin, 2 vols., Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, [n.d.], 1: 8 (English: 'Explanatory Re-writing of the Qurʾān', translation adopted from Heinrichs, "Genesis," 127-29); also Ella Almagor, "The Early Meaning of *Majāz* and the Nature of Abū ʿUbayda's Exegesis," in Andrew Rippin (ed.), *The Qurʾān: Formative Interpretation*, Aldershot; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999, 263-82, here: 266-70 [originally in Y. Navon et al. (eds.), *Studia orientalia memoriae D.H. Baneth*, Jerusalem, 1979, 307-26, here: 310-314]. We have seen a similar sentiment in al-Shāfiʿī's *Risāla*.

[397] *Al-Ṣāḥibī*, 29.5-4ᵉ.

[398] Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 45.

[399] For Abū ʿUbayda's understanding of the *majāz* phenomena as "cover[ing] any imaginable violation of the mirror character of language" see Heinrichs, "Genesis," 122. Heinrichs adds (p. 123): "All these violations of the 'natural' sentence are permissible, only if they are idiomatic and acceptable to the native speakers of the language, the *ʿarab*." Unlike Abū ʿUbayda, for Ibn Fāris *majāz* does not refer to the interpretation of the idiom but rather to the idiom itself; on the difference between the two see ibid., 123-28, 130, and Chapter 5 Preliminaries. For a general account of Abū ʿUbayda's understanding of the Arabic language, which is quite similar to that of Ibn Fāris, see ibid., 129. For Ibn Qutayba's account, who indeed puts more emphasis on figurative speech within *majāz* than Abū ʿUbayda does, see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 31; *idem*, "Genesis," 130-32. Both Abū ʿUbayda and Ibn Qutayba speak of the features of Arabic in a similar fashion to the way Ibn Fāris does, but the term *bayān* is not prominent therein (Ibn Qutayba uses it, for instance in *Taʾwīl*, 12, but only as one out of several words designating 'eloquence').

that the second half of Ibn Fāris's work, following the chapter titled *sunan al-ʿarab fī ḥaqāʾiq al-kalām wa-l-majāz* (~"the ways the Arabs talk, plainly and idiomatically"), falls entirely under the rubric of *majāz*. The category of *kaff* 'suppression of the nominal predicate', for instance, which is mentioned explicitly in the *ḥaqāʾiq-majāz* chapter and is identified as *majāz*, appears only some sixty pages after that chapter. So do other categories, which we can infer to be part of *majāz*, like *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* (change in word order), *iʿāra* (lit. 'lending': analogy-based metaphor) or the first sub-category of *kināya* (here: euphemism).[400] Regarding one later chapter, the *sharṭ* (conditional clauses), Ibn Fāris says unequivocally that there are conditionals that are non-literal (*majāz*) since they do not display a necessary apodosis.[401] Even the category of *istiʿāra* (here: word-transfer), said explicitly to be part of *majāz*, appears after two phonological categories subsequent to the *ḥaqāʾiq-majāz* chapter.[402] Following this line of interpretation, and since we find intervening phonological and morphological categories up until many of those (presumably) *majāz* categories, we could conclude that *majāz* as 'idiomatic usage' may well occur on the level of the phoneme or morpheme and not just the lexeme or clause. *Majāz* would thus be one of the major, if not the major component in "the ways the Arabs talk" (*sunan al-ʿarab*), and therefore a prominent feature of *bayān*.[403]

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[400] The chapter on *ḥaqīqa*/*ḥaqāʾiq* and *majāz* appears about mid-way into the work – *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 196-201 – subsequent to the following mega-discussions: parts of speech; semantics of particles; and semantics of sentences (e.g., declarative versus non-declarative). *Kaff* is mentioned as a type of *majāz* in ibid., 197.1ᵉ, but the chapter devoted to it only appears on p. 256. For the chapters on *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* (which Ibn Qutayba considers *majāz*), *iʿāra* and *kināya* see ibid., 246-47, 257 and 260, respectively.

[401] Ibid., 259-60.

[402] Ibid., 204-205. More on Ibn Fāris's view on *istiʿāra* can be found in Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 45-47.

[403] One should, however, take into account the following counter-evidence: First, Ibn Fāris is not explicit in the categories that he considers to be *majāz*; only *tashbīh* (comparison), *istiʿāra* and *kaff* are explicitly pointed out to in the *ḥaqāʾiq-majāz* chapter (*al-Ṣāḥibī*, 197.1ᵉ. Several illustrations of *tashbīh* are provided but it is not accorded a separate chapter.) Second, in one statement Ibn Fāris actually differentiates between "these two categories" (i.e., the *ḥaqāʾiq* and the *majāz*) and "the categories of *sunan al-ʿarab* that will appear after these two which we will mention," implying that those subsequent *sunan al-ʿarab* categories do *not* overlap with *majāz*. See ibid., 198.13-15:

To conclude thus far: *bayān* in Ibn Fāris's notation refers to the special features of the Arabic language which render it unique; it is largely coextensive with "the ways the Arabs talk" (*sunan al-ʿarab*), and it is not fully used as a technical term. One major component of *sunan al-ʿarab* is their 'idiomatic' usage of the language, viz. *majāz*. *Majāz* here is not limited to figurative speech or imagery: if any of the subsequent theorists made the connection between *majāz* as 'trope' and *bayān* (cf. the Standard Theory), it was because they filled the term *majāz* with their later, narrower, understanding thereof. The meaning of *majāz* as idiomatic language will be studied in Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

A different instantiation of the philological sense of *bayān* can be found in the epistle on the inimitability of the Qurʾān, *al-Nukat fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, by the exegete and 'philosophizing' grammarian, the Muʿtazilī ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā al-Rummānī (d. 384/994).[404] Deviding his presentation of *balāgha* 'eloquence' into ten categories, al-Rummānī introduces *bayān* or *ḥusn al-bayān* 'good [suggestive] expression' as the last of the ten.[405]

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wa-jāʾa hādhāni l-bābāni fī nuẓūmi kitābi -llāhi jalla thanāʾuhu wa-ka-dhālika mā yajīʾu baʿdahumā mā [should read *mimmā*?] *nadhkuruhu min sunani l-ʿarabi li-takūna ḥujjatu -llāhi jalla -smuhu ʿalayhim ākad* "These two categories [*ḥaqāʾiq* and *majāz*] appear in the structures of the Book of God, glorified be His praise, and likewise the other [categories] of *sunan al-ʿarab* that will appear after these two which we will mention, in order that the proof of God, exalted be His name, may be firmer for them." Notably, *majāz* as general 'idiomatic usage' (especially on the lexical level) can be seen in al-Zamakhsharī's dictionary *Asās al-balāgha* where many entries are succeeded by their *majāz* meaning, to wit: idiomatic. This meaning is similar to Ibn Fāris's "untranslatable" examples provided in the chapter on the superiority of Arabic, where *bayān* in the philological sense is introduced (more on al-Zamakhsharī's dictionary in Chapter 5 Preliminaries).

[404] On his fame as an exegete in the biographical dictionaries see Bruce Fudge, "*Taḍmīn*: The Notion of 'Implication' according to al-Rummānī," in Beatrice Gruendler (ed.) with the assistance of Michael Cooperson, *Classical Arabic Humanities in Their Own Terms: Festschrift for Wolfhart Heinrichs on his 65th Birthday Presented by his Students and Colleagues*, Leiden: Brill, 2008, 468-92, here: 470. Carter describes the *Nukat* as a "full-blooded [Muʿtazilī] manifesto" as evinced, e.g., by the rejection of the *ṣarfa* notion 'diverting [people from attempting to imitate the Qurʾān]', or by the acknowledgment that the imitation of the Qurʾān is theoretically possible, or by the intent "to create a systematic justification of *taʾwīl*" ['interpretation beyond the text's face value']). See M.G. Carter, "Linguistic Science and Orthodoxy in Conflict: The Case of al-Rummānī," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* 1 (1984), 212-32, esp. 223-31, (quotations from and 223-24 and 228). Interestingly, Carter refers parenthetically to *bayān* as a property belonging to God ("the secrets of God's *bayān*"; "God's particular, Arabic *bayān*," p. 231).

[405] Al-Rummānī, *al-Nukat*, 70 (where the category is called *ḥusn al-bayān*), 98-99 (where the category is given the

Similar to Ibn Fāris's use of the word, *bayān* here refers to a quality inherent in the (Arabic) language, and it too is coextensive with speech that is not direct or explicit (though not quite 'idiomatic' as we saw with Ibn Fāris): it refers primarily to speech that implies, or is suggestive of a semantic import not conveyed explicitly on its 'surface level'.[406] The entirety of examples adduced for 'good suggestive expression' are Qurʾānic, and the semantic import implicitly suggested therein informs, as Bruce Fudge has noted, "of the function, or speech act, of its utterance on the reader/auditor."[407] These functions, or rhetorical effects, range from *taḥdhīr* 'warning' to *waʿd/waʿīd* 'promise/threat' to *taqrīʿ* 'admonition' and many more. After each verse cited, al-Rummānī specifies the corresponding function (all in all nineteen verses/passages are cited, falling into ten 'functional' categories).[408] To demonstrate al-Rummānī's sense of *bayān* we may cite his first example: "The Qurʾān in its entirety is [conveyed] in the utmost good [suggestive] expression; among that is His saying, may He be exalted, *They left how many gardens and fountains, sown fields, and how noble a station* [Q 44:26]: this is an extraordinary [piece] of [suggestive] expression (*bayān*) that affirms a warning against the self-delusion that there will be a granted delay."[409]

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heading *bayān*, 98.1 and 99.1, though *ḥusn al-bayān* is also used, 98.4^e and 99.10).

[406] *Al-Nukat*, 99-101. I am concluding that it is a property inherent in the language at large and not just in the Qurʾānic idiom from al-Rummānī's prefacing words, *wa-l-bayānu fī l-kalām* […] "*Bayān* in speech is […]" rather than, say, *wa-l-bayānu fī l-Qurʾān* or *wa-l-bayānu fī kalāmi -llāh*. Technically speaking, and judging from his wording, *bayān* may very well be a universal linguistic property in al-Rummānī's conception that is not limited to Arabic.

[407] Fudge, "*Taḍmīn*," 484, though Fudge uses this with regards to *taḍmīn* and not *bayān* (on the correspondence of the two see below). Using terminology evocative of Paul Grice's theory of implicatures is not a bad idea in this case, especially since al-Rummānī's examples are so aligned with Gricean pragmatics. Fudge refers explicitly to Grice and John Searle in ibid., 486.

[408] *Al-Nukat* 99-101.

[409] *wa-l-Qurʾānu kulluhu fī nihāyati ḥusni l-bayāni fa-min dhālika qawluhu taʿālā "kam tarakū min jannātin wa-ʿuyūnin wa-zurūʿin wa-makānin karīm" fa-hādhā bayānun ʿajībun yūjibu l-taḥdhīra mina l-ightirāri bi-l-imhāli*; *al-Nukat*, 99. Also cited in Fudge, "*Taḍmīn*," 485, with several other examples.

Before delving into the 'best' examples of *bayān*, al-Rummānī starts with a neutral

explanation of it as a linguistic phenomenon in which a 'thing'/'notion' (*maʿnā*) may be

expressed (or: made known) either by using its designated name/noun (*ism*) or attribute/adjective

(*ṣifa*), or by using a combination of words (*taʾlīf*) without reverting to its designated signifier.

Illustrations of this last category are *ghulāmu zaydin* 'Zayd's slave-boy' and *qātil* 'killer'. In the

first case we have a combination of words indicating property (*mulk*), i.e. that the slave-boy

belongs to Zayd, even though the designated word for 'belonging' is not used; this is referred to

as *dalālat al-taʾlīf* 'syntactic indication'. In the second case we have a morphological form

indicating a slain person (*maqtūl*) and the act of killing (*qatl*), even though the designated words

for those two notions are not used; this is referred to as *dalālat al-ishtiqāq* 'morphological/

derivational indication'. Since the bulk of the chapter is devoted to notions expressed *not* via

their designated nouns/adjectives, we conclude that *bayān* and *ḥusn al-bayān* refer here primarily

to implied, or suggested signification. This renders *bayān* virtually indistinguishable from the

eighth category of *balāgha* expounded on by al-Rummānī, namely *taḍmīn* 'implication' – a

correspondence duly noted by Fudge.[410] As Fudge has shown from fragments of al-Rummānī's

Tafsīr, each explanation of a verse is concluded with "and the verse implicitly contains" (*wa-qad*

taḍammanati l-āyatu) followed by its appropriate functional purpose (or semantic import),

displaying identical categories to the ones we come across in the chapter on *bayān* in the

Nukat.[411]

Although *bayān* in al-Rummānī's notation refers primarily to suggestive language, his

chapter actually opens with the philosophical sense of the term (akin to al-Jāḥiẓ's or Ibn Wahb's

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[410] Fudge, "*Taḍmīn*," 484-86.

[411] Ibid., 481-83.

conception).[412] What is more, several lines later we also come across the lexical meaning of *bayān* as, simply, 'eloquence'.[413] In other words, even within a brief account of *bayān* such as al-Rummānī's, one could come across several senses the word. That the main sense of the word here concerns the function, or extralinguistic purpose of the phrase, is gleaned out of the examples adduced for *bayān*, which demonstrate entirely the 'suggestive' expressions, as shown above. This is corroborated by Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī's treatment of *bayān* in his lexicographical work on semantically related notions. Here *bayān* is discussed in relation to the notion of *fāʾida* 'communicative value [of an utterance]' and al-Rummānī is quoted by name.[414] This may suggest that al-Rummānī's idea of *bayān* was much more 'technical' than the *bayān* Ibn Fāris espoused. Despite the differences between the two we are considering both part of the philological sense of *bayān* since they are presented as a phenomenon integral to the (Arabic) language that goes beyond mere 'clarity of expression', or 'eloquence', to reflect cases in which the meaning of an utterance does not directly, or 'naturally', correspond to its wording.

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[412] Al-Rummānī defines *bayān* as "the bringing-forth of [something] by which the distinction of a 'thing' from another [thing] becomes/is made apparent in perception" (*al-bayānu huwa l-iḥḍāru li-mā yaẓharu/yuẓharu bihi tamayyuzu l-shayʾi min ghayrihi fī l-idrāk*); *al-Nukat*, 98.2 (taking *idārik* as a typo for *idrāk* [corrected in 2ⁿᵈ edition, 1968, p. 106]). This wording tallies well with the sense of *bayān* we are familiar with as 'a means by which a thing is made known'; cf. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī's citation of "ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā's" definition of *bayān* as *mā dhukira li-yuʿrafa bihi ghayruhu* "that which is mentioned so that another [thing] may be *known*" (emphasis added); see *al-Furūq fī al-lugha*, ed. Lajnat Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī fī Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 5ᵗʰ ed., Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1983, 52.6-7ᵉ (English: '[Semantic] Distinctions in the Lexicon'). Al-Rummānī then specifies the four categories of *bayān* as 'speech' (*kalām*), 'situation' (*ḥāl*, probably natural signs or signs by inanimate beings), 'gesture' (*ishāra*) and '[codified] sign' (*ʿalāma*, probably writing); *al-Nukat*, 98.3. Meaningless speech – such as speech that is disordered (in the syntactic [?] sense) or impossible (in the logical sense) (*al-kalām al-mukhallaṭ wa-l-muḥāl*) – is not considered *bayān* since "the distinction of a thing from another [thing] is not made apparent" (ibid., 98.4-5).

[413] *Al-Nukat*, 98.4 ff.

[414] *Al-Furūq*, 52-53, and see fn. 412. Al-ʿAskarī only mentions the simple syntactic examples provided by al-Rummānī (like *ghulāmu zaydin*) without the more complex Qurʾānic instances revealing the functional import of a verse. For further definitions of *bayān* that al-ʿAskarī provides see *al-Furūq*, 53-54, where both the legal-hermeneutical and the philosophical senses of *bayān* are stressed.

The Scribal Sense of Bayān

Among the various senses of *bayān* we are attending to, the scribal sense of the term is the least technical. It seems to be a lexical development out of the third definition of the word by Ibn Manẓūr, *viz.* 'eloquence' – a narrowing down of its scope to signify specifically scribal eloquence, or 'good written style'. This last phrase is inspired by Fuat Sezgin's translation of a mid-fifth/eleventh century title intended for scribal education. Called *Mawādd al-bayān* and written by the Fāṭimid ʿAlī b. Khalaf al-Kātib (d. after 437/1045), the work aims at providing the essentials to the art of secretaryship (*al-ṣināʿa al-kitābiyya*) and is clearly not concerned with 'eloquence' in general nor with the philosophical concept of 'imparting knowledge' (or the other technical meanings of *bayān*).[415] "The Elements [or Stuff] of Good Written Style" is thus an appropriate rendering of the title. The work joins a long tradition of manuals written for secretaries and was quoted widely in the famous mega-manual *Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā* by al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/1418), an encyclopedic specimen of administrative literature.[416]

But scribal manuals have come a long way since the third/ninth-century *Adab al-kātib* by Ibn Qutayba, and the *Mawādd* undoubtedly reflects a later permutation of such works. *Adab al-kātib* is a prescriptive work of *philology* par excellence: its author is concerned with rectifying errors in the realm of the lexicon, phonology, morphology and orthography. Mastering such lexical distinctions as the 'pregnancy' of a mare versus that of a she-camel or a lioness was something to be expected of an aspiring ʿAbbāsid scribe, and was duly noted in *Adab al-kātib*. Likewise were chapters on correct orthography of *alif al-waṣl*, hypercorrections in the

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[415] For *al-ṣināʿa al-kitābiyya* see *Mawādd*, 4. The work does contain a chapter on *bayān* that is heavily influenced by al-Jāḥiẓ (ibid., 144-51), but this sense of the word is different from the work's title and intent.

[416] Ibid., editor's introduction.

pronunciation of the glottal stop or the semantics of verb form *afʿala*.[417] Gradually, however, the focus shifted from linguistic prescriptivism to *stylistic* prescriptivism, placing more emphasis on the content of a scribal epistle, especially its ornate prose and stylistic devices. This development may be linked to the rise of the 'new' poetic style, the *badīʿ*, along with its heightened mannerism and the literature on poetic devices that grew around it. This in turn seems to have influenced the edifying literature on epistolary writing.[418]

The (broad) shift in scribal educational literature from philology to style is nicely illustrated by comparing the fourth/tenth century work of Abū Jaʿfar al-Naḥḥās called *ʿUmdat al-kuttāb* (or *Ṣināʿat al-kuttāb*) with ʿAlī b. Khalaf's work mentioned above, written the following century. Whereas al-Naḥḥās places most of his emphasis on correct orthography, correct titles and endings, appropriateness in addressing, correct morphology and the common scribal errors, ʿAlī b. Khalaf turns most of his attention to the figures of speech (under the heading of *badīʿ*), including common errors therein, and intertextuality (literary influence and appropriate allusions).[419] Since ʿAlī b. Khalaf is clearly interested in matters of style in the scribal arts but does not spell out the particular meaning of *bayān* in the title *Mawādd al-bayān*, we may say that

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[417] Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh b. Muslim b. Qutayba, *Adab al-kātib*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā, [1936], 167, 229-34, 360-68, 436-44, 447-55, respectively (English: 'The Knowhow [Necessary for] the Secretary').

[418] On the growing importance of rhymed prose, literary tropes and literary allusions in the *risāla* genre in later centuries see Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, "The Essay and Debate (*al-risāla* and *al-munāẓara*)," in *Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period*, 134-44, here: 134-35, 137, and al-Musawi, "Pre-Modern Belletristic Prose," 103, 107. Ibn Khaldūn objected to the "poetic styles" found in chanery correspondences (ibid., 108). One should keep in mind, however, that historically speaking it was probably the 'new' poetry that was influenced by oratory prose rather than the other way around; see Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Early Ornate Prose and the Rhetorization of Poetry in Arabic Literature," in Frédérique Woerther (ed.), *Literary and Philosphical Rhetoric in the Greek, Syriac and Arabic Worlds*, Hildesheim: Olms, 2009, 215-34. McKinney shows how the poetry of Ibn al-Rūmī (d. *ca.* 283/896) evolved in the direction of prose (*Rhyme versus Reason*, 293 ff.), but also treats the phenomenon of prose evolving in the direction of poetry (ibid., 311). In the *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm* of al-Khuwārizmī (d. 387/997 or 98), the "prosaic" literary devices (i.e., those used by the chancery scribes) and the poetic literary devices are still listed separately (*Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, 72-79, 94-97; there is minimal overlap).

[419] Al-Naḥḥās, *ʿUmdat al-kuttāb*, table of contents; ʿAlī b. Khalaf, *Mawādd*, table of contents.

bayān as 'good style' is a non-technical use of the word. What differentiates this meaning of the word from the original lexical sense of 'eloquence' is, once again, the context in which it appears: works of scribal education.

Usage of the word *bayān* in the scribal sense seems scarce, but we can point to some specific occurrences. When we looked at Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's 'refutation' of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *Mathal* in Chapter 1, we saw that when he criticized the scholar-scribes of Mosul, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd spoke of Baghdadī scribes as "stallions of eloquence" (*fuḥūl al-balāgha*) who "run in the race-track of good style" (*idhā rakaḍa aḥaduhum fī ḥalbat al-bayān*).[420] Here *bayān* and *balāgha* 'eloquence' appear in the very same sentence, suggesting they could have distinct meanings – *balāgha* referring to eloquence in general (oral and written) and *bayān* more specifically to good written style. Of course, the *bayān-balāgha* pair could be a mere stylistic variation. A more telling example appears in the *Ṣināʿatayn* of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī and is later quoted anonymously in Najm al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr's *Jawhar al-kanz* (Abū Hilāl, too, is quoting from an unnamed source). Here we find the following account, opening the chapter on good openings (*mabādiʾ* in Abū Hilāl's terms, *barāʿat al-istihlāl* in Najm al-Dīn's):

> *qāla baʿḍu l-kuttābi aḥsinū maʿāshira l-kuttābi l-ibtidāʾāti fa-innahunna dalāʾilu l-bayān*
> One of the secretaries said: "O fellow secretaries, master [the skill of writing] openings, for they are the signs of good written style."[421]

Context would preclude taking *bayān* as a reference to the broader notion of 'eloquence' – whether oral or written – because the statement is specifically addressed to the secretaries, and the secretaries deal with the written word (as opposed to, say, the orators). Thus, 'good written

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[420] Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *al-Falak al-dāʾir*, 34.

[421] Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 451 and verbatim in Najm al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, *Jawhar al-kanz*, 218.

style' is a more appropriate understanding of *bayān* here, one that demonstrates the lexical development of *bayān* from the more general meaning of 'eloquence'.

3.2. The Phrase *ʿIlm al-Bayān*

The term *bayān* appears in dictionaries and in a variety of scholarly works prior to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn; this has facilitated our attempt to ascertain its origins and meanings. With the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān*, however, we stand on less solid ground and find that tracing its history is trickier. The phrase seems to have appeared *ex nihilo* in the introduction to the work *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz* by the great literary theorist (our term) ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081). The work itself was not written within the tradition of the early literary critics, but rather, as Margaret Larkin convincingly shows, as a polemic against Muʿtazilī and non-Muʿtazilī theologians of his day for their inept study of the Qurʾān's inimitable style.[422] Al-Jurjānī's intended audience of scholars outside the literary-critical tradition is something one should keep in mind when looking at his use of the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān*.

In a preface that runs over sixty pages in the common printed edition,[423] al-Jurjānī mentions the phrase fairly at the outset, following his extolment of knowledge (*ʿilm*) as a virtue above all virtues (*faḍāʾil*).[424] Within this general domain of knowledge as a virtue, he asserts that

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[422] Margaret Larkin, *The Theology of Meaning: ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's Theory of Discourse*, American Oriental Series, vol. 79, New Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 1995, esp. pp. 14-23. Among the evidence she brings forth, Larkin highlights passages in which ʿAbd al-Qāhir tries to convince his audience to take up the (serious) study of poetry: such a defense would not have been needed had his listeners been literary theorists (including those with a bent towards *iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*). That he directed his teachings towards Muʿtazilīs and Ashʿarīs alike, though he himself was an Ashʿarī, can be seen *inter alia* from his treatment of *majāz* (ibid., 99-100).

[423] The editor Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir does not demarcate a preface in his appended table of contents; however, the wording of pp. 64-65 of the *Dalāʾil* is emblematic of a closing of a preface (see Peter Freimark, *Das Vorwort als literasche Form in der arabischen Literatur*, Inaugural-Dissertation, Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster, 1967, 28).

[424] Al-Jurjānī, *Dalāʾil*, 5.

one cannot find a knowledge (*lā tarā ʿilman*) that "has a more solid root, more towering

branches, sweeter fruits, fresher water, nobler offspring/results, and a brighter lamp" than *ʿilm

al-bayān*.[425] Because *ʿilm al-bayān* is seen as a type of *faḍīla*, it is clear that what al-Jurjānī has

in mind here is a mental capacity (knowledge)[426] rather than a scholarly discipline. That the

phrase refers to 'the knowledge of *bayān*' and not to *bayān* as a discipline manifests itself in his

subsequent elaboration on the benefits of *bayān*. Here al-Jurjānī speaks of *bayān* as a synonym

of eloquence and verbal skill, and he describes it as a property that allows the tongue to "weave

embroidery, mould a piece of jewelry, articulate pearls, utter enchantment" and so forth, not

unlike descriptions we find in earlier works such as the *Ṣināʿatayn* of al-ʿAskarī.[427] In later

passages within the long introduction, al-Jurjānī discusses *faṣāḥa*, *balāgha*, *bayān* and *barāʿa*

'[verbal] skill' all in the same breath.[428] The phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* appears only once, in that

single occurrence in the *Dalāʾil*'s preface.

Al-Jurjānī is not oblivious to the scholarly field of literary theory. He speaks (critically)

of previous scholars and their writings in the field to which he refers as *ʿilm al-faṣāḥa*, *ʿilm al-

faṣāḥa wa-l-bayān* or *ʿilm al-balāgha*. These are used interchangeably, and in some instances he

probably has the non-technical 'knowledge of eloquence' in mind (*ʿilm al-faṣāḥa* seems to be the

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[425] *thumma innaka lā tarā ʿilman huwa arsakhu aṣlan wa-absaqu farʿan wa-aḥlā janan wa-aʿdhabu wirdan wa-akramu nitājan wa-anwaru sirājan min ʿilmi l-bayān* (*Dalāʾil*, 5.1-2ᵉ).

[426] And see Larkin's translation of *bayān* here as "expressive ability" (*Theology*, 20).

[427] *Dalāʾil*, 6; al-ʿAskarī, *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 7-9 (where the phrase *ʿilm al-balāgha* is used in a non-technical sense). The entire passage by al-Jurjānī is commonly replicated in later sources that rely directly or indirectly on the work of al-Jurjānī; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Zamlakānī, Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Naqīb are a case in point (see Part Two, Chapter 4).

[428] *Dalāʾil*, 34, 37, 43. See also his non-technical usage of *ʿilm al-balāgha* in *al-Risāla al-Shāfiya* in Muḥammad Khalaf Allāh and Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām (eds.), *Thalāth rasāʾil fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān li-l-Rummānī wa-l-Khaṭṭābī wa-ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī*, Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, [1956?], 105-44, here: 108 (passage beginning in 107.4ᵉ) / *Dalāʾil*, 576.3.

most technical).[429] In one reference in his *Asrār al-balāgha*, al-Jurjānī speaks of the scholars of

the literary-theoretical field as *al-ʿārifīna bi-hādhā l-shaʾni aʿnī ʿilma l-khaṭābati wa-naqda l-*

shiʿri wa-lladhīna waḍaʿū l-kutuba fī aqsāmi l-badīʿ "those who are knowledgeable in this issue,

I mean the science of oratory[430] and poetic criticism, and those who wrote books on categories of

literary devices."[431] Al-Jurjānī is referring here to what we have called collectively the early

naqd works, and they include treatments of the various figures of speech, especially those

associated with the 'modern' ʿAbbāsid poetic style. The phrase *ʿilm al-khaṭāba wa-naqd al-shiʿr*

hints at earlier writings on the eloquence of preachers and the critical assessment of poetry, and it

is probably meant to designate one scholarly endeavor (though possibly two: *ʿilm al-khaṭāba* and

naqd al-shiʿr). The phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* as a reference to a scientific field does not occur.

Modern scholars have recognized the non-technical character of the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān*

in al-Jurjānī's work, and have agreed that disciplinary headings such as *ʿilm al-bayān* and *ʿilm*

al-maʿānī are later ones.[432] Nevertheless, it has become common to speak of the *Asrār al-*

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[429] For *ʿilm al-balāgha* see *Dalāʾil*, 174.3, 252.13-14; for and *ʿilm al-faṣāḥa* see ibid., 12.9, 37.5, 455-56 (several occurrences, including one instance of *ʿilm al-faṣāḥa wa-l-bayān*). In some cases the editor Shākir puts *ʿilm al-faṣāḥa* within quotation marks, presumably those where the phrase refers to a scholarly discipline (I agree with his readings). I did not find any additional references to these phrases, nor to others like *nuqqād*, *naqd al-shiʿr*, etc. Phrases such as *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān/balāgha/faṣāḥa* do not occur. In *al-Risālā al-shāfiya*, 107 (/ *Dalāʾil*, 575), al-Jurjānī refers to those who have knowledge in the "states" (*aḥwāl*) and "ranks" (*marātib*) of poets and orators, "and in *ʿilm al-adab* in general" – probably a reference to the knowledge/science of lexicography, grammar, poetry and other philological endeavors (like prosody). For the understanding of philological sciences by fourth/tenth-century scholars – though the term *adab* is usually not used – see Heinrichs, "Classification of the Sciences." The first list that we have that enumerates linguistic (philological) sciences under the technical heading *al-ʿulūm al-adabiyya* is by the sixth/twelfth-century al-Zamakhsharī (ibid., 121, 138, and below). But even before that, Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (fifth/eleventh century) makes a distinction between the *ʿulūm adabiyya* and the *ʿulūm sharʿiyya* (linguistic/religious sciences; *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, 3).

[430] It is less likely that al-Jurjānī is referring here to rhetoric in the Aristotelian philosophical sense, also termed *khaṭāba*.

[431] *Asrār*, 368 (and 369 for the phrases *ahl al-khaṭāba wa-naqd al-shiʿr* and *ahl al-ʿilm bi-l-shiʿr*).

[432] Abu Deeb, "al-D̲j̲urd̲j̲ānī;" Larkin, *Theology*, 20; Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-Bayān." Compare ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Lāshīn, *al-Tarākīb al-naḥwiyya min al-wijha al-balāghiyya ʿinda ʿAbd al-Qāhir*, Riyadh: Dār al-Mirrīkh, 1980, 236, where *ʿilm al-bayān* is recognized in a technical sense vis-à-vis grammar.

balāgha as treating imagery (= the later ʿ*ilm al-bayān*) and of the *Dalāʾil* as treating the semantics of syntax (= the later ʿ*ilm al-maʿānī*), although al-Jurjānī himself claims no adherence to any discipline (and in any case, the *Asrār* deals with more than just imagery, as the *Dalāʾil* deals with more than just semantics of syntax). In a recent study, Khalfallah Nejmeddine argues that al-Jurjānī explicitly sets out to establish a new discipline, according to him termed ʿ*ilm al-maʿānī* 'the science of literary themes' and aimed at exploring the relations between "ideas-themes" and "reason."[433] While Nejmeddine is correct to bring into focus al-Jurjānī's understanding of literary *maʿānī* (as opposed to the *maʿānī al-naḥw*), the two passages he relies on simply do not support a reading of ʿ*ilm al-maʿānī* as a discipline heading nor do they point to any explicit claim by the author to found a new science.[434] In fact, any remarks hinting at al-Jurjānī's own disciplinary affiliation lead to the science of grammar: beyond his concentration on *naẓm* 'syntactic arrangement' as a grammatical, and specifically syntactic principle,[435] he states

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[433] Nejmeddine Khalfallah, *La théorie sémantique de ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (m. 1078)*, Paris: Harmattan, 2014, 104-106.

[434] The passage that Khalfallah claims contains the phrase ʿ*ilm al-maʿānī* only has *amr al-maʿānī* (*Asrār*, 25, and correcting Khalfallah's citation of p. 26; *Théorie*, 104 fn. 2, 105 fn. 2). Khalfallah himself translates that latter phrase as "l'état des *maʿānī*" (*Théorie*, 105). The passage that he claims contains an announcement by al-Jurjānī to establish a new science – "*Dalāʾil*, 9" (*Théorie*, 104) – is in fact p. 9 of *al-Madkhal fī Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz min imlāʾihi*, several folios that Rashīd Riḍā (who oversaw the 1912 ʿAbduh edition) placed in the beginning of the *Dalāʾil*, and which Shākir places outside the *Dalāʾil* (see the title page following the *Madkhal*). The *Madkhal* ends with a poem written by al-Jurjānī, in which he summarizes the tenets of *naẓm* as a syntactic principle (*ḥukm min al-naḥw*; *al-Madkhal*, 10.1ᵉ). It reads like a didactic poem (despite the non-didactic meter, *basīṭ*). In line 2 – the line Khalfallah relies on – al-Jurjānī states, "The only way to prove a miracle in syntactic arrangement (*naẓm*) is through that which I set about to reveal" (*mā min sabīlin ilā ithbāti muʿjizatin // fī l-naẓmi illā bi-mā aṣbaḥtu ubdīhī*; *al-Madkhal*, 9). Khalfallah takes this line as proof of al-Jurjānī's invention of the science, obviously following the comment made by Rashīd Riḍā, and reproduced in Shākir's edition, *wa-fī hādhā l-bayt taṣrīḥ ayḍan bi-annahu huwa al-wāḍiʿ li-l-fann* (*al-Madkhal*, 9 fn. 6), disclosing Riḍā's own anachronistic understanding of al-Jurjānī's work. (The ʿAbduh edition that I consult does not contain the *Madkhal* although it is specified in the table of contents.) It is true that al-Jurjānī is announcing that his work will reveal new insights on the topic (here: the inimitability of the Qurʾān, or "a miracle in syntactic arrangement"), but this type of declaration is a common topos in medieval prefaces.

[435] On *naẓm* as a syntactic principle see Larkin, *Theology*, 50-54, and Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 198-99, 213 ff., though they usually prefer to translate *naẓm* with the more softened "composition" or "sentence construction." With regards to the role of grammar in al-Jurjānī's thought, Larkin states, "… it is as if grammar [AN: specifically syntax] is a blueprint for the thinking of the originator of discourse." The idea that semantic relations in a sentence are inextricably tied to syntactic relations (cf. Chomsky) has a long history in the study of grammar, where it is common to say that "syntax (lit. case/mood-endings) is that which distinguishes between meanings" (*al-iʿrāb huwa al-fāriq*

in the prefatory comments to *al-Risāla al-shāfiya* (on the inimitability of the Qurʾān) that in his

discussions he "follows a path that resembles more the convention of the scholars of grammar

(ʿ*ulamāʾ al-ʿarabiyya*) and goes more in their way."[436] After his own lifetime, we find references

to al-Jurjānī as "the grammarian" (*al-naḥwī*), at the very least in the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-

Rāzī (both in his legal theory and in his rhetoric).[437] This does not mean that al-Jurjānī wrote his

treatises/lectures on literary theory necessarily in his capacity as a grammarian – especially since

they were meant for an audience of theologians (see above) – but it does point to an absence of a

well-defined disciplinary home with which his endeavors may align. The tendency in the modern

era to view al-Jurjānī's work anachronistically as the founder of a discipline and as associated

therefore with the Standard Theory probably goes back to the modernist reformer Rashīd Riḍā

(d. 1935), who edited the *Asrār* and oversaw the edition of the *Dalāʾil*. The titles of the works as

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bayna al-maʿānī; Ibn Fāris, *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 66). Al-Rāzī too supports a grammatical understanding of the notion of *naẓm* (*Nihāya*, 277).

[436] *wa-ḥadhawtu l-kalāma ḥadhwan huwa bi-ʿurfi ʿulamāʾi l-ʿarabiyyati ashbahu wa-fī ṭarīqihim adhhabu* (*al-Risāla al-shāfiya*, 107 / *Dalāʾil*, 575). Al-Jurjānī's main grammatical work is the *Muqtaṣid*, a 'middle-sized' commentary on Abū Hilāl al-Fārisī's *al-Īḍāḥ* (he also wrote a long and a short commentary on it), and he is also known for his *Miʾat ʿāmil* (see also Larkin, *Theology*, 1-3). On the phrase ʿ*ilm al-ʿarabiyya* as a reference to the science of grammar, and even more specifically to syntax, see for instance Ibn Fāris, *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 66 (where it is equated with *iʿrāb*), and the discussions of Ibn Khaldūn above (§2.2).

[437] E.g., *Nihāya*, 74; *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 447. Ibn Khaldūn states that al-Jurjānī (along with al-Sakkākī) concentrated on topics that had been part of "the books of grammar" (*Muqaddima* 4: 1229). Al-Muṭarrizī's (d. 610/1213) study of literary devices in the prolegomenon to his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī's *Maqāmāt* also encorporates direct quotations from al-Jurjānī's work, and one must suspect that it was due to al-Muṭarrizī's endeavors as a grammarian that he was at all aware of al-Jurjānī's efforts in literary theory. Al-Muṭarrizī (nicknamed "*khalīfat al-Zamakhsharī*") wrote a popular compendium on Arabic grammar called *al-Miṣbāḥ fī al-naḥw*, and it was based on three small monographs on grammar by al-Jurjānī himself (R. Sellheim, "al-Muṭarrizī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *second edition*). It should be noted here that in one instance al-Muṭarrizī uses the term ʿ*ulamāʾ al-bayān* in a direct quotation from al-Jurjānī, but the original passage does not contain that phrase (Nāṣir b. ʿAbd al-Sayyid al-Muṭarrizī, *Hādhā sharḥ laṭīf li-Abī al-Muẓaffar Nāṣir b. al-Muṭarrizī ʿalā al-Maqāmāt allatī anshaʾahā al-Imām jamāl al-ʿaṣr Abī al-Qāsim b. ʿAlī al-Ḥarīrī*, [Tehran?: s.n.], 1272 [1856], f. 4r [which contains another use of the phrase ʿ*ulamāʾ al-bayān*, not as part of a quotation]; cf. *Dalāʾil*, 66). One suspects the use of ʿ*ulamāʾ al-bayān* here is indebted to al-Zamakhsharī, especially since the phrase later appears in the context of *iltifāt* (f. 10r; "*Ṣāḥib al-Kashshāf*" is cited explicitly in f. 15r). Al-Muṭarrizī elsewhere uses the headings *nuqqād al-kalām* and *ahl al-naqd* (f. 2v) as well as *badīʿ* (f. 8r ff.), and the framework of his treatment seems to be the notion of *balāgha* (f. 2r) and *faṣāḥa* (f. 5v). Al-Muṭarrizī did pass through Baghdad twice and had disputations with scholars there (Sellheim, "al-Muṭarrizī"), but it was in the year 601 AH, probably before the heading ʿ*ilm al-bayān* became in wide use.

they appear in these editions are *Asrār al-balāgha fī ʿilm al-bayān* and *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz fī ʿilm al-maʿānī*, respectively.[438]

It must be pointed out that although the works of al-Jurjānī may have slowly gained traction after his lifetime, al-Jurjānī the man remained little known. In his early work, Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ cites "the *iʿjāz* of al-Jurjānī, called *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz*" as well as his *Asrār al-balāgha*, but he takes this al-Jurjānī to be the literary critic and chief judge of Rayy, al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī (d. 392/1002), author of the *Wasāṭa*.[439] Even in Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's later work, *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, which aligns itself more closely with 'standardist' views, an (imagined) dispute between Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Jurjānī is presented as one between al-Rāzī and "the Qāḍī"; this is even while we find one citation of al-Jurjānī's name in full ("al-Imām al-ʿallāma ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī").[440] And yet, Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ lists the *Dalāʾil* and *Asrār* among the works that are noteworthy of study in the field of *badīʿ*, later reformulated as *ʿilm al-bayān*.

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[438] *Asrār al-balāgha fī ʿilm al-bayān*, ed. Rashīd Riḍā, 4th ed., Cairo: Dār al-Manār, 1947 [originally published 1902]; *Dalāʾil*, ed. ʿAbduh – although here the phrase *fī ʿilm al-maʿānī* appears within brackets. Kâtip Çelebi (d. 1067/1657) in his massive bibliographic work also lists the *Asrār* and the *Dalāʾil* as *Asrār al-balāgha fī al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* and *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz fī al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* (*Kashf al-ẓunūn* 1: 83, 759), but the latter phrases are probably descriptive and not part of the title: in the former case the phrase *fī al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* is printed in bold, as if part of the title, but in the latter it is not; also, Çelebi lists another work titled *Asrār al-balāgha* (not necessarily a work on literary theory) by the Andalusi-born Syrian-based physician and litterateur ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Jilyānī (d. 602/1206, whom Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn alludes to in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 211), and obviously al-Jilyānī's work is titled simply *Asrār al-balāgha* (corroborated by al-Jilyānī himself in ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Jilyānī, *Dīwān al-Mubashshirāt wa-l-qudsiyyāt*, ed. ʿAbd al-Jalīl Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Mahdī, Amman: Dār al-Bashīr, 1989, 151). Note that the *Dalāʾil* is listed by Çelebi under the category *ʿilm dalāʾil al-iʿjāz* (it is the sole work mentioned therein). Before him Ibn Khaldūn recognizes the indebtedness of the discipline of *ʿilm al-bayān* to the works of al-Jurjānī and al-Sakkākī (*Muqaddima* 4: 1229), but he speaks of their works as being the roots/source (*uṣūl*) for *ʿilm al-bayān*, not as part of a pre-existing *ʿilm al-bayān* (see also al-Ṣafadī, *Nuṣra*, 281-82, who uses similar terms).

[439] *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 89-90; *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 5. Only in the latter work does Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ mention the three works – the *Dalāʾil*, *Asrār* and *Wasāṭa* – in the same breadth, suggesting that in the earlier *Taḥrīr* he may have still been unsure about the identity of the later al-Jurjānī.

[440] *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 177 (and see editor's fn. 3 on), probably quoting the *Nihāya* – although in *Nihāya*, 172, wherefrom the quotation is taken, the text reads *qāla al-shaykh al-imām*. Al-Jurjānī's name appears in full most notably in the introduction to the *Nihāya* (p. 74). The "dispute" in question concerns the nature and definition of *majāz*; Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ is correct to call out al-Rāzī's initial characterization of *majāz* as incompatible with al-Jurjānī's notion of *majāz ʿaqlī* (*majāz* on the level of predication, see Part Two), but al-Rāzī ultimately adheres to al-Jurjānī's theories in full.

In the famous Qurʾānic commentary *al-Kashshāf* by al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* takes on a technical meaning, and along with it, *ʿilm al-maʿānī*.[441] Heinrichs translates *ʿilm al-maʿānī* as "stylistics" and *ʿilm al-bayān* as "theory of tropical expressions,"[442] as the terms are later understood in the Standard Theory. The fact of the matter is, however, that we do not know what al-Zamakhsharī had in mind when he used those disciplinary headings. In the preface to his Qurʾānic exegesis, al-Zamakhsharī states that the best equipped scholar to delve into *ʿilm al-tafsīr* – described by him as the most majestic of sciences (*ʿulūm*) – is not the leading lawyer, nor is it the leading theologian, *ḥadīth* expert, preacher, grammarian or lexicographer. Rather, he says, it is he who is proficient in "two sciences that are peculiar to the Qurʾān, and they are the science of *maʿānī* and the science of *bayān*."[443] He describes the process of becoming proficient in these fields as a long one, and as one that requires some knowledge of all disciplines (a common trope), within which he singles out grammar and the patterns (*asālīb*) of poetry and prose.[444] Mention of these two disciplines is not restricted to his Qurʾānic commentary, and in the introduction to his work on prosody, al-Zamakhsharī lists *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *ʿilm al-bayān* among the philological sciences (*al-ʿulūm al-adabiyya*), following syntax and preceding prosody.[445] The terms appear in some of his other

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[441] Among the works of al-Zamakhsharī, the *Kashshāf* famously contains strategies from the field of literary theory. His other works, like the dictionary *Asās al-balāgha* or the grammatical work *al-Mufaṣṣal*, are less relevant for our purposes. I did not yet consult his strict *adab* work, *Rabīʿ al-abrār*.

[442] Heinrichs, "Classification of the Sciences," 138.

[443] Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf* 1: 15-16. He mentions the two sciences again in 1: 20.

[444] Ibid. 1: 16-17.

[445] Abū al-Qāsim Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm fī ʿilm al-ʿarūḍ*, ed. Bahīja Bāqir al-Ḥasanī, Baghdad: Maktabat al-Andalus, 1969, 53. The full list can be found in Heinrichs, "Classification of the sciences," 138.

works as well.[446] But this too does not lead us to a closer understanding of the denotata of those terms.

In order to better grasp which topics belong specifically to ʿilm al-maʿānī and which topics to ʿilm al-bayān one would have to study the contexts of their occurrences within the *Kashshāf*. In his comprehensive study of al-Zamakhsharī's rhetoric in the *Kashshāf*, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Abū Mūsā devotes a careful account to this very question, and his results are inconclusive.[447] He finds instances in which the phrase ʿilm al-maʿānī or ʿulamāʾ al-maʿānī points to the study of the semantic and/or pragmatic import of a sentence, inextricably linking it to the later understanding of ʿilm al-maʿānī as the study of syntactic structures vis-à-vis their situational functions. But the specific topics that al-Zamakhsharī addresses here do not always find their way into the later ʿilm al-maʿānī. One case involves taʿrīḍ ~'implicature', that is, using a syntactic structure that suggests the intended meaning but is not explicit (later normally studied within the standard ʿilm al-bayān).[448] Another case is of a much more poetic provenance, as it involves the question of using images in "correct" situations and addressing themes with what is deemed appropriate for the poetic purpose (gharaḍ), such as knowing the terms appropriate for praise (madḥ).[449] This topic is sometimes subsumed within the later standard ʿilm al-badīʿ, but is sometimes absent from the Standard Theory altogether.

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[446] Muḥammad Ḥusayn Abū Mūsā, *al-Balāgha al-Qurʾāniyya fī tafsīr al-Zamakhsharī wa-atharuhā fī l-dirāsāt al-balāghiyya*, [Cairo:] Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, [1974?], 199. Abū Mūsā cites his *Aʿjab al-ʿajab* (a commentary on al-Shanfarā's *Lāmiyyat al-ʿarab*), the *Mufaṣṣal* (grammar book), and his *dīwān*. To these we may add his dictionary: see *Asās al-balāgha*, 8. Abū Mūsā says he was hoping al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī in his commentary of the *Kashshāf* would explain these terms as they appear in the preface, but he does not. This too points to the idiosyncrasy of these phrases in al-Zamakhsharī's work.

[447] Abū Mūsā, *al-Balāgha al-Qurʾāniyya fī tafsīr al-Zamakhsharī*, 199-204.

[448] Ibid., 199-200.

[449] Ibid., 201-202.

In the case of ʿilm al-bayān, Abū Mūsā's discussion is much terser. He finds instances of ʿilm al-bayān that point to the study of imagery in the word of God, referencing *takhyīl*, *tamthīl*, *tashbīh* and *kināya*, but he also finds mention of ʿilm al-bayān within the context of syntactic arrangement (*naẓm*), pointing to a non-standard understanding of this field. The topic of *al-faṣl wa-l-waṣl* is a case in point: it studies how sentences connect syntactically to one another into a larger discourse and is later normally discussed under ʿilm al-maʿānī. Abū Mūsā states that al-Zamakhsharī's use of ʿilm al-bayān as a reference to the study of imagery recurs in the *Kashshāf*. The only instance that Abū Mūsā singles out is al-Zamakhsharī's comments on Q 34:67, "The earth together shall be His handful on the Day of Resurrection, and the heavens shall be rolled up in His right hand," which is explained in terms of *takhyīl*, here: "a visualisation of an abstract notion such as God's majesty and omnipotence."[450] Interestingly, it is with regards to this "category in ʿilm al-bayān" that al-Zamakhsharī speaks of such pictorial depictions as transcending the question of literal or figurative usage ("…without taking the 'handful' or the 'right hand' into the realm of the literal or that of the figurative"[451]). From a 'standard' point of view, the study of *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* was just about tantamount to ʿilm al-bayān as a whole, although one could argue that the treatment of *tashbīh* 'comparison' also transcends the discourse of *ḥaqīqa/majāz*. In any event, we cannot clearly define what al-Zamakhsharī meant by the headings ʿilm al-maʿānī and ʿilm al-bayān. In the case of ʿilm al-bayān, there is no hint of al-Jurjānī's non-technical use of the phrase. In fact, in his exegesis al-Zamakhsharī makes only a

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[450] Ibid., 203. Quote taken from Wolfhart Heinrichs, "*Takhyīl*: Make-Believe and Image Creation in Arabic Literary Theory," in Geert Jan van Gelder and Marlé Hammond (eds.), *Takhyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics*, [Cambridge, U.K.]: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008, 1-14, here: 13.

[451] Translated by Heinrichs in ibid., based on *al-Kashshāf* 3: 408-409.

single mention of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī.[452] It is noteworthy that the phrase *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*

occurs more frequently in the *Kashshāf* than the phrase *ʿulamāʾ al-maʿānī*, but in both cases it is

less than a handful of times.[453]

Almost a century later Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) writes an epitome of the *Asrār*

and *Dalāʾil* and seems unaware of al-Zamakhsharī's employment of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *ʿilm al-*

bayān as discipline headings. Al-Rāzī's own use of *ʿilm al-bayān* is only slightly more technical

than the one by al-Jurjānī. He reproduces al-Jurjānī's passage in which the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān*

appears, and adds that it was the grammarian ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī who "extracted the

principles and rules of this discipline," thereby charging the term *ʿilm* with a more technical

understanding of 'discipline'.[454] However, later on al-Rāzī refers to the discipline invariably as

ʿilm al-faṣāḥa,[455] and to *balāgha* 'eloquence' as a property rather than a discipline.[456] I have not

come across additional references to this field of inquiry or to its scholars (as a group) in the

main body of al-Rāzī's work.[457] The scholar most cited – not surprisingly given the

commentarial nature of the work – is "al-shaykh al-imām," that is, al-Jurjānī himself. The

Nihāya is thus not situated within any clearly defined scholarly field but is meant to deal, as its

title suggests, with the properties of eloquence as they contribute to one's understanding of the

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[452] *Al-Kashshāf* 4: 11 (Q 50:39), where he mentions *al-Imām ʿAbd al-Qāhir*. I thank Matthew Keegan for this reference. I also searched a readable PDF version of the work, using the search words "ʿAbd al-Qāhir," "al-Jurjānī," "Abū Bakr," "al-Imām," "al-ʿAllāma," and "al-Naḥwī."

[453] Four instances for *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*, one for *ʿulamāʾ al-maʿānī*.

[454] *Nihāya*, 74 (*al-imām majd al-islām ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-naḥwī al-Jurjānī* […] *istakhraja uṣūl hādhā al-ʿilm wa-qawānīnahu* […]).

[455] Ibid., 82-84.

[456] E.g., ibid., 321.

[457] We do find references to former scholars, but al-Rāzī does not affiliate them with any group. See, e.g., ibid., 231, where al-Rummānī ("ʿAlī b. Īsā") is quoted. He also references the *ʿuqalāʾ* 'wise men' (e.g., ibid., 233), presumably the theologians, and within the discussion of *iʿjāz* he cites al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār by name (ibid., 381).

Qurʾān's linguistic excellence. Al-Rāzī's treatment of this topic should be viewed not only in light of his activities as a theologian, but also in light of his work as an exegete.[458] That he did not recognize al-Zamakhsharī's usage of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *ʿilm al-bayān* suggests that the latter's terms remained marginal in subsequent centuries, and there is a debate if even al-Sakkākī was building on this usage when he spoke of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* and *ʿilm al-bayān* in the *Miftāḥ*.[459]

Summing Up

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not explain what he means by the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* nor does he claim precedence for its usage. This would suggest that he was exposed to some use of the phrase, but as of yet we have no textual evidence for a broad employment of the term in a disciplinary context prior to his time. Al-Jurjānī's single usage of the phrase was non-technical and was hardly taken up by al-Rāzī; al-Zamakhsharī usage of *ʿilm al-bayān* alongside *ʿilm al-maʿānī* remained idiosyncratic in his works, and it debatable if even al-Sakkākī was aware of, or was building on it. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was well familiar with al-Zamakhsharī's Qurʾānic exegesis, as it was an extremely popular work. But if he derived the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* from the *Kashshāf*, one would expect to find some reference to *ʿilm al-maʿānī* as well (and we do not). As we shall see in Part Two, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn engaged directly with the work of al-Jurjānī without explicitly mentioning him. It is thus likely that he picked up on al-Jurjānī's prefatory remark on *ʿilm al-bayān*. But whereas for al-Jurjānī the specific word *bayān* was synonymous with *balāgha*,

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[458] For a recent study of al-Rāzī see Tariq Jaffer, *Rāzī: Master of Qurʾānic Interpretation and Theological Reasoning*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 (not seen).

[459] Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-Bayān." We mentioned above (fn. 437) one probable exception to the subsequent marginality of al-Zamakhsharī's discipline headings: we come across the phrase *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* in al-Muṭarrizī's introduction to his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī's *Maqāmāt*, and this usage was most likely inspired by al-Zamakhsharī (*Sharḥ*, f. 4r [two occurrences; the context is *tamthīl ʿalā ḥadd al-istiʿāra* 'metaphorical illustrative analogy' and *kināya* 'periphrasis']).

faṣāḥa, and *barāʾa* and meant 'eloquence' (the third lexical meaning of the word), for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn *bayān* was probably associated with the lexical extension of the word as it was used in scribal circles, namely, 'good written style'. There is no hint in the works of those preceding Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn of the theoretical status of *ʿilm al-bayān* as a distinct and 'scientific' discipline. As a disciplinary heading *ʿilm al-bayān* is best translated as "the science of good style."

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not partake in the philosophical – epistemological or metaphysical – discussions of *bayān* as a mechanism of imparting knowledge, nor did he engage in the legal manifestations of the term. He was likely familiar with the philological association of the "language of the ancient Arabs" with *bayān*, but this type of discourse was probably antiquated by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's time.

Part Two: *ʿIlm al-bayān* in the Seventh/Thirteenth Century

__Introduction__

Throughout the seventh/thirteenth century, scholars working in the field of literary theory in the Arabic East adhered to the disciplinary framework of *ʿilm al-bayān*. In Part Two of the dissertation we will take a closer look at some of these works. At the macro level (Chapter 4), we will study the contexts of these works on *ʿilm al-bayān*: their authors, scholarly affiliations, and the structuring of the material within *ʿilm al-bayān* proper. At the micro level (Chapter 5), we will study the concept of *majāz* as a test case for literary-theoretical thinking during this period. The scholars we focus on are Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239), Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651/1253), Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. after 693/1294, not to be confused with Fakhr al-Dīn), Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298), and Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316).

As in older *naqd* works, authors can reflect different tendencies in literary theory, or *ʿilm al-bayān* in the context of seventh/thirteenth-century Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn reflects the scribal and critical bent of *ʿilm al-bayān*. We closely examine his works and place within the literary critical tradition. Ibn al-Zamlakānī builds on the thought of al-Jurjānī and his work reflects the influx of grammatical thinking (semantic-syntactic) into literary theory. Nevertheless, his conception of *majāz* is in line with older and contemporary views in literary theory proper. Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī reflects a poetic bent of *ʿilm al-bayān*, being a poet himself and a product of Arabic-Persian poetical learning. Ibn al-Naqīb reflects exegetical leanings in *ʿilm al-bayān* and the study of literary theory for the purpose of Qurʾānic hermeneutics. Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī reflects similar tendencies. Al-Ṭūfī slightly exceeds our time frame by flowing into the eighth/fourteenth century, but the way he builds (explicitly) on the work of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn merits

his inclusion here. He is the only author whose conception of *majāz* is not in line with that of other scholars in the field. Hence, he is the exception that proves the rule.

Additional works that one might consider in studying *ʿilm al-bayān* in this time and place are those by Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ (d. 654/1256) and Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Tanūkhī (fl. end of 7th/13th century). We looked at Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr* and *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān* in Part One, and references will be made to them when needed in Part Two. Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ reflects scribal and critical tendencies in *ʿilm al-bayān*, as was the case with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. Al-Tanūkhī's *al-Aqṣā al-qarīb* reflects the integration of logic into *ʿilm al-bayān*, although his work is essentially a study of literary devices.

Chapter 4 ("The Critical Landscape") is meant, in many ways, to give context to the study of *majāz* in *ʿilm al-bayān*, which is our focus in Chapter 5 ("*Majāz* in Literary Theory Revisited"). The resulting contextualization forms an independent study on *ʿilm al-bayān* in the seventh/thirteenth century. If the reader so wishes, s/he may choose to follow the sections on each author in Chapter 4 with the respective treatment of *majāz* in Chapter 5.

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Chapter 4:

The Critical Landscape

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4.1. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239), *al-Mathal*, *al-Jāmiʿ* and More

Abū al-Fatḥ Naṣr Allāh b. Abī al-Karam Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Shaybānī, known as Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī and by his honorific name Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, was a very well-known statesman, vizier, prose writer and critic working in the service of Ayyūbid and Zangid rulers.[460] He was one of the three renowned Ibn al-Athīr brothers who left their mark on Arabic-Islamic scholarship. The *nisba* al-Jazarī refers to their place of birth, Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar (modern-day Cizre in southeast Turkey) in the historical Jazīra region, where their father, a high official, was stationed by the Zangids of Mosul. All three brothers were known by the name of Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazarī.[461] The eldest brother, Majd al-Dīn Abū al-Saʿādāt al-Mubārak (d. 606/1210), lived his entire adult life in Mosul and worked in the service of the Atabegs there.

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[460] F. Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Athīr," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*; Heinrichs, "Ibn al-Athīr"; Brockelmann, *GAL* 1: 357-58, Suppl. 1: 521; Khayr al-Dīn al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām: qāmūs tarājim li-ashhar al-rijāl wa-l-nisāʾ min al-ʿarab wa-l-mustaʿribīn wa-l-mustashriqīn*, 11 vols. in 13, 3ʳᵈ ed., [Beirut: s.n., 1969?], 8: 354; ʿUmar Riḍā Kaḥḥāla, *Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn: tarājim muṣannifī al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya*, Damascus: Maṭbaʿat al-Taraqqī, 1957-61, 13: 98-99; D.S. Margoliouth, "On the 'Royal Correspondence' of Ḍiya'-eddin Eljazari," *Actes du dixième Congrès international des orientalistes, session de Genève, 1894*, Leiden: Brill, 1896, Section III, 7-21; Cahen, "La Correspondance"; van Gelder, *Beyond the Line*, 146; introduction to *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 9 ff. According to Rosenthal, the correct name of the father is probably Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm and not Muḥammad *b. Muḥammad* b. ʿAbd al-Karīm (see also introduction to *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 6). For the main biographies on Ibn al-Athīr see Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* 5: 389-97; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, *Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ*, ed. Muḥibb al-Dīn Abū Saʿīd ʿUmar b. Gharāma al-ʿAmrawī, 19 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997, 16: 363-64; Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, *Kitāb al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt*, 32 vols., Leipzig: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, F.A. Brockhaus, 1931-[2013], 27 (ed. Otfried Weintritt, Beirut: In Kommission bei "Das Arabische Buch" Berlin, 1997): 34-39; ʿAbd Allāh b. Asʿad ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Yāfiʿī, *Mirʾāt al-janān wa-ʿibrat al-yaqẓān fī maʿrifat mā yuʿtabaru min ḥawādith al-zamān*, 4 vols. in 2, Hyderabad: Maṭbaʿat Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-Niẓāmiyya, [1918-1920], 4: 97-100; Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-wuʿāt fī ṭabaqāt al-lughawiyyīn wa-l-nuḥāt*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 2 vols., Cairo: Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, [1964-1965], 2: 315; Abū al-Falāḥ ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Ibn al-ʿImād al-Ḥanbalī, *Shadarāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab*, 8 vols. in 4, Beirut: al-Maktab al-Tijārī li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1966, 5: 187-89 (quoting also from Ibn al-Ahdal [d. 855/1481]).

[461] Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* 3: 348 (ʿIzz al-Dīn), 4: 141 (Majd al-Dīn). This could explain the misattribution of *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr* to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's older brother, who was also a high official (and see next fn.). Ibn Khallikān also refers to Jazīrat Ibn ʿUmar as Jazīrat Ibnay ʿUmar, an explanation of which is found in *Wafayāt* 3: 349-50.

As a scholar, he is best known for engaging with Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*, and he is also said to have written a work on the secretarial art.[462] The middle brother, ʿIzz al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī (d. 630/1233), was the famous chronicler of Zangid history and the writer of the monumental work of history, *al-Kāmil* (also partial to the Zangids), which is probably best known today due to its detailed account of the crusades.[463] Beyond political affiliation, the strong ties the family had to the Jazīra region was also of a financial nature, as it owned real estate in Cizre and in Mosul and invested in commercial enterprises.[464]

The youngest brother Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was the most prominent of the three brothers in political terms, and also the one who attracted the most antagonism. The literary competition he had with his older contemporary, the famous Egyptian epistolographer al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil (d. 596/1200) was friendly enough,[465] but as a statesman, he often found himself in dire straits. One would consider it a literary trope to portray a high official fleeing the city in a box or in disguise for fear of retribution, so it is quite telling that in Ibn Khallikān's biographical entry Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is reported to have done so twice![466] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own style in his scholarly writings reveals him to be of a somewhat arrogant nature, and this is reflected in the combative response to *al-*

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[462] Ibid. 4: 141-42; Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Athīr"; see also Part One, fn. 188. Ibn Khallikān says (*Wafayāt* 4: 141) that "he has a small work on the secretarial craft" (*wa-lahu kitābun laṭīfun* [in the sense of *laṭīf al-ḥajm*] *fī fanni l-kitāba*). This could be the source of the later attribution of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr* to Majd al-Dīn. See also van Gelder, *Beyond the Line*, 146.

[463] *Wafayāt* 3: 348-50; Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Athīr." ʿIzz al-Dīn also wrote religious biographies. Ibn Khaldūn refers to ʿIzz al-Dīn on numerous occasions (see fn. 207).

[464] Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Athīr"; Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām's introduction to *al-Istidrāk*, 7.

[465] Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* 5: 396 (also Part One, fn. 147). The two served together under Saladin (*Wafayāt* 5: 390), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn seemingly as his disciple (see below), and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn wrote a *risāla* of condolence upon al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil's death (Margoliouth, "Royal Correspondence," 10-11).

[466] *Wafayāt* 5: 390-91, the first time when fleeing Damascus after it had been taken from al-Malik al-Afḍal (Saladin's son), and the second time when fleeing Cairo after it was conquered by al-Malik al-ʿĀdil (Saladin's brother). According to Ibn Khallikān, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn wrote a *risāla* on the second incident.

Mathal al-sāʾir by the Baghdadi caliphal chancery scribe Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (see Part One), as

well as in other later accounts. Nevertheless, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was held in very high esteem: Ibn al-

Mustawfī gave him excessive praise in his *History of Irbil* and Ibn Khallikān related the strong

affection his own father had for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. (Ibn Khallikān regretted never having met Ḍiyāʾ

al-Dīn in person during his frequent visits from Irbil to Mosul.)[467] This reverence is due, no

doubt, to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's fame as an epistolographer. Ibn Khallikān clearly admired his style, as

he devoted considerable space in his biographical entry to citations from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's letters,

along with a commentary on the originality of certain images (sg. *maʿnā*).[468] This was not meant

so much as a critique as it was a literary exercise on behalf of Ibn Khallikān, who used it to show

his own skill.[469]

The biographical information surrounding Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's life comes largely from Ibn

Khallikān's (d. 681/1282) work. Two earlier accounts that Ibn Khallikān relies on – an entry in

Ibn al-Mustawfī's (d. 637/1239) *Tārīkh Irbil* and one in Ibn al-Najjār al-Baghdādī's (d.

643/1245) *Dhayl tārīkh Baghdād* – did not survive, and the later biographies rely almost entirely

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[467] Ibid., 391, 396 (he did meet his brother the historian, with whom he was extremely impressed; *Wafayāt* 3: 349). But al-Ṣafadī clearly disliked him, as is apparent both in his refutation of the *Mathal* and in the biography itself. In the latter (*al-Wāfī* 27: 35-36), he claims that people did not like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's attacks on al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, on al-Ḥarīrī and especially on al-Mutanabbī. While it is true that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was especially critical of al-Ḥarīrī, it is not true that he did not hold them in high regard despite the occasional criticism. This is especially evident in the case of al-Mutanabbī, on whom Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn wrote an entire commentary, criticizing Ibn al-Dahhān's claims about al-Mutanabbī's many borrowings from Abū Tammām; this is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *al-Istidrāk fī l-akhdh ʿalā l-maʾākhidh al-Kindiyya* [referring to al-Mutanabbī] *min al-maʿānī al-Ṭāʾiyya* [referring to Abū Tammām]. Even in the case of al-Ḥarīrī, there is a recognition on the part of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn of his talent (see below). Continuing on the point of rivalries: it has also been reported (*Siyar* 16: 364, preceded by the qualifying *wa-qīla*) that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn had a strife with his brother the historian (later this is mentioned as a fact, without *wa-qīla* in *al-Wāfī* 27: 34 and then again in *Shadharāt* 5: 188, quoting [Ibn Khaldūn's?] "*al-ʿIbar*"). This may have to do with the fact that ʿIzz al-Dīn did not make mention of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn in his histories. Claude Cahen refutes that there was any rift between the two, based on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's letters, in "La Correspondance," 37. Ibn Khallikān makes no mention of the strife.

[468] *Wafayāt* 5: 392-96.

[469] For another example of this practice see ibid. 1: 330 (under the entry of Jaʿfar al-Barmakī).

on Ibn Khallikān.[470] But we also have Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own letters, both official and non-official, as a source for his biography, and Claude Cahen used many of them to reconstruct Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's life (sometimes at odds with the account found in Ibn Khallikān).[471]

Serving briefly under Saladin in Egypt, Ḍiyāʾ al-Din became the vizier of Saladin's son, al-Malik al-Afḍal in Damascus in 589/1193. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn followed al-Afḍal to Cairo, Samsat (Sumaysāṭ, southeastern Turkey) and Salkhad (Ṣarkhad, southern Syria), with an interval in which he was employed by the emir of Mosul Arslān Shāh. After al-Afḍal, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn briefly joined al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī (al-Afḍal's brother) in Aleppo, and then moved to Mosul in 607/1211, followed by Irbil, Sinjar and finally Mosul again. It was in his final stage in Mosul, starting in 618/1221, that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn became chief chancellor (*kātib al-inshāʾ*) of the Zangid ruler Nāṣir al-Dīn Maḥmūd and his atabeg at the time and later successor, Badr al-Dīn Luʾluʾ. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn died in Baghdad in 637/1239 during a diplomatic mission on behalf of the Mosul governor.[472]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's political allegiance to the region of Greater Syria and the Jazīra translated into literary and scholarly preferences as well. He showed a preference for literary critics from the region to the detriment of others (see Part One, §1.2) especially from central and southern

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[470] *Wafayāt*, 396, for references to the two earlier works (Ibn Khallikān views Ibn al-Najjār, whose work he calls *Tārīkh Baghdād*, as the more reliable one). For the later biographies see above, fn. 460. To get a sense of the historical distance from Ibn Khallikān: al-Dhahabī died in 748/1348, al-Ṣafadī died in 764/1363, al-Yāfiʿī died in 768/1367, al-Suyūṭī died in 911/1505, and Ibn al-ʿImād died in 1089/1679.

[471] For instance, Cahen finds ("La Correspondance," 35) that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was associated with Saladin already in 583/1187 (587/1191 is recorded as the official start date), and that after al-Afḍal's loss of Damascus, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn fled to Mosul rather than Cairo (cf. *Wafayāt* 5: 390). For a modern edition of his collected letters (Ibn Khallikān speaks of several volumes of letters, and a one-volume collection of his best letters) see *Rasāʾil Ibn al-Athīr*, ed. Anīs al-Maqdisī, Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1959.

[472] *Wafayāt* 5: 389-97; Cahen, "La Correspondance"; fn. 460 above. For a list of dignitaries to whom, and on behalf of whom, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn wrote letters see *Rasāʾil Ibn al-Athīr*, 7-8.

Iraq, which he associated with grammatical centers of learning.[473] Furthermore, by all accounts

he favored the 'modern' poets of Syria, like Dīk al-Jinn (d. *ca.* 245/849), Abū Tammām (d.

232/846), al-Buḥturī (d. 284/897), and al-Mutanabbī (d. 354/965), to the detriment of more

Eastern poets, usually of Persian origin, like Abū Nuwās (d. *ca.* 198/813), Ibn al-Ḥajjāj (d.

391/1001), al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1016) and Mihyār al-Daylamī (d. 428/1037).[474] Of course by

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's time those favored poets were no longer 'modern', and he displays his own

traditionalism especially when it comes to visual word play as seen in the *Maqāmāt* of al-Ḥarīrī

(d. 516/1122) or in the tree-shaped poems of the Andalusi (turned Syrian) physician and

litterateur al-Jilyānī (d. 602/1206).[475] He also criticizes al-Ḥarīrī's 'redundant' style of *sajʿ*,

which was supposedly also practiced by Ibn Nubāta (d. 374/984-5) in his sermons (the latter not

quite 'modern'!).[476] He does recognize al-Ḥarīrī's unique talent in writing *maqāmāt*, but says that

this talent did not cross over to the epistolary art, and he describes al-Ḥarīrī's attempt to become

a state scribe in Baghdad as disastrous (perhaps a common trope).[477]

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[473] This is apparent, e.g., from *al-Istidrāk*, 45-48.

[474] *Al-Istidrāk*, 59, for a conversation he had with a Damascene friend on his choice of memorizing the *ghazal* of the latter poets versus the *ghazal* of Abū Tammām and al-Mutanabbī. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn compiled a collection of poems by the Syrian poets, mentioned in Ibn Khallikān's entry (see below). See also Heinrichs, "Ibn al-Athīr," 315. This is, of course, a general predilection: we find numerous places where the other poets' material is praised.

[475] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 210-11. With regards to the visual word plays of al-Ḥarīrī, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn specifically refers to alternations between dotted (*muʿjam*) and undotted (*muhmal*) letters or entire words. In the case of ʿAbd al-Munʿim al-Jilyānī, whom Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn refers to as the *adīb* from *ahl al-maghrib* and not by name (it is understood that he met him personally), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn concedes that there is some meaning (*maʿnā*) in his poetry but that essentially it is "a kind of drivel (*hadhayān*)" (see also Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* 7: 50, where an esteemed *adīb* from "the West" mentions a literary session he attended in Mosul at Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr's place). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is especially harsh on al-Ḥarīrī, situating his technique outside the boundaries of *ʿilm al-bayān*. He also criticizes al-Ḥarīrī on his 'artificial' use of *tawshīḥ*, a device which itself is rather artful (when every line of a poem can be disjointed at a certain point, leading to another poem with a different meter; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 216-17).

[476] Ibid. 1: 278. By *sajʿ* here he is referring specifically to the use of parallel members. He equates this supposedly bad type of *sajʿ* with mere verbiage (*taṭwīl*), since the second parallel member is seen as a near-exact repetition of the first.

[477] Ibid. 1: 41-43, 362 (where his prose is adduced), building on the common idea of professionalization (going back to al-Jāḥiẓ): that poets who are good, e.g., in *madīḥ* are not necessarily good in *hijāʾ*; likewise is the case, he says,

Little is known about Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's education and teachers. Ibn Khallikān tells us that after his early years in Cizre, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn received his formative education in Mosul, where he studied the religious sciences and memorized the Qurʾān, much of the *ḥadīth*, and a fair share of grammar, lexicography and "*ʿilm al-bayān*" (or, anachronistically, "*ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*" in al-Ṣafadī's terms).[478] By far the best known account comes from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn himself, who says in the opening of his work on prosification that he memorized the entire *dīwāns* of Abū Tammām, al-Buḥturī and al-Mutanabbī, a point which later biographers like to dwell on.[479] A collection of poems that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn assembled, by Abū Tammām, al-Buḥturī, Dīk al-Jinn and al-Mutanabbī (all Syrian), is said to be a useful anthology to memorize.[480] We also find out from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own account that ʿAbd al-Raḥīm b. ʿAlī al-Baysānī – i.e., al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil – was a kind of mentor for him, exemplifying what he viewed as the correct approach to the scribal art.[481]

What characterizes the writing style of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is not so much its *adabī* inclinations (per modern scholars)[482] but rather its biographical-historical content. Whereas *adab* works are made up of numerous anecdotes that are of a literary nature, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's works are replete

with the writer of prose. A similar claim was made against al-Hamadhānī; see Devin Stewart, "Professional Literary Mendicancy in the *Letters* and *Maqāmāt* of Badīʿ al-Zamān al-Hamadhānī," in Beatrice Gruendler and Louise Marlow (eds.), *Writers and Rulers: Perspectives on their Relationship from Abbasid to Safavid Times*, Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2004, 39-49, here: 39, 41. Famously, al-Jāḥiẓ himself could not hold his post as a *kātib* for more than three days (Pellat, "Al-Jāḥiẓ," 80).

[478] *Wafayāt* 5: 389, *al-Wāfī* 27: 35. In the future, one might want to check how common the heading *ʿilm al-bayān* was in Ibn Khallikān's work (we mentioned one case of *ahl al-bayān* in *Wafayāt* 1: 330).

[479] *Al-Washy al-marqūm*, 56; *al-Istidrāk*, 37 (Abū Tammām and al-Mutanabbī); *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 136-37; *Wafayāt* 5: 389; *Siyar* 16: 363; *Mirʾāt al-janān* 4: 97-98; *Bughya* 2: 315 (a point al-Suyūṭī chooses to incorporate even though the entry is a mere paragraph long); *Shadarāt* 5: 188. Al-Ṣafadī, not surprisingly given his animosity toward Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, does not mention this fact.

[480] *Wafayāt* 5: 392. The collection did not survive.

[481] *Al-Wahsy al-marqūm*, 54-55, 57.

[482] Primarily ʿAbbās, *Tārīkh al-naqd al-adabī*, 575-78, and Smyth, "Criticism in the Post-Classical Period," 394-401.

with personal stories, often preceded by a statement on the place and date in which they occurred.[483] To my mind, this puts him in line with the biographical or historical work rather than the *adab* genre. To the personal accounts we may add the citation of personal letters as exemplary illustrations (*shawāhid*), all of which add up to a clear portrait of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's personality. Thus we learn of interactions Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn had with laymen such as a Bedouin Nabatean, a Christian, a woman, and a soldier (primarily as troves for verbal pearls of wisdom), or with scholars such as Aristotelian philosophers (whom he thought were irrelevant for the purposes of literary theory) and legal scholars.[484] Furthermore we learn that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn may have had some knowledge of Syriac and Persian, as he speaks of beautiful instances of indirect speech found in the Christian scriptures and in Iranian lore.[485] Elsewhere he cites a beautiful

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[483] Representative examples are *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 100-105 (esp. 103), 229-30; *al-Istidrāk*, 45-46, 59-60; *al-Washy al-marqūm*, 54, 57. Compare this to the *adabī* content in, e.g., *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 29; *al-Istidrāk*, 77.

[484] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 100-105 (for the laymen), 1: 229-30 and 2: 5-6 (for the Aristotelian philosopher, as well as Ibn Sīnā), and 1: 60 (for the *faqīh*). Here we should reiterate that although he famously criticizes the Aristotelian strand of poetics and rhetoric, in no way did he object to the study of logic (see, e.g., ibid. 2: 115, and §1.1, where he models *ʿilm al-bayān* on the theoretical status of logic). The passage in which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn criticizes Ibn Sīnā's dealings with Aristotelian rhetoric and poetics has become famous through its inclusion in Vicente Cantarino's translated anthology of Arabic poetics; it is partially translated already in Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 110-11, and discussed in *idem*, "Naḳd." In the passage Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn states that neither Ibn Sīnā nor even the Greeks themselves made use of such theories in composing their own poetry and ornate prose. The passage was recently translated and discussed in Pierre Larcher, "Rhétoriques "grecque" et "hellénisante" vues par Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-ʾAṯīr (VIIᵉ/XIIIᵉ siècle)," *Quaderni di Studi Arabi, N.S.* 9 (2014), 115-30 (he is unaware of Cantarino). Like Iḥsān ʿAbbās (*Tārīkh*, 575-76), Larcher takes the passage as an attestation to the "permanence" of an anti-philosophical and anti-logical reaction, which I view as an anachronistic 'Ibn Taymiyyan' reading into earlier texts. If anything, I would emphasize the apologetic tone of this passage, as if Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is attempting to ward off any potential claims that someone of his stature should be aware of Aristotelian rhetoric and poetics and should take them into account in his literary theory (see also Introduction, on the increase in interest in philosophy and the Greek sciences in the Arabic East during this time). Heinrichs says that we have no reason to believe Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is speaking to an imaginary opponent here (*Arabische Dichtung*, 17), and see our discussion of *tawassuʿ* in §5.1. This suggests that some people in his scholarly circles were, in some form or another, engaging with those texts. Readings such as ʿAbbās's and Larcher's are reflective of the "marginality thesis" regarding the 'extraneousness' of philosophy in Islam, a thesis that has permeated the scholarly literature of Arabic and Islamic studies. A.I. Sabra calls attention to the falsity of this view in his "The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: A Preliminary Statement," *History of Science* 25 (1987), 223-43, and it is discussed in detail in Ahmed, *What is Islam?*, 14-15 (and elsewhere).

[485] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 75. The chapter deals with *kināya* (generally in his work: a single-word euphemistic metaphor, see §5.1) and *taʿrīḍ* (generally in his work: implicature). The only concrete example cited is the Iranian one: One of Khosrow's emirs banished his wife because he learned that Khosrow had frequented her. After she informed the king, he called the emir and said, "I heard that you have a spring of sweet water but do not drink from

image he heard in Persian poetry.[486] From an encounter he had with a Jew, we also learn that

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was not oblivious to formal characteristics of the Hebrew language.[487]

Scholarly Works

All of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's scholarly works are concerned with literary criticism and the secretarial art,

including a collection of his letters. The best known scholarly work is the two-volume *al-Mathal*

al-sāʾir fī adab al-kātib wa-l-shāʿir ('The Current Saying on the Knowhow of the State Scribe

and the Poet'), written by Cahen's account around 608 AH.[488] It created a stir already in Ḍiyāʾ

al-Dīn's lifetime. According to the Baghdadi caliphal scribe Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, it was extremely

popular especially among the Mosul scholars (see Part One), and it is the first work that the

biographers credit Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn with. It was the target of several responses, both positive and

negative, the best known being the rebuttals by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd and al-Ṣafadī.[489] In Ibn

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it. What is the reason for that?" The emir replied, "I heard that the lion comes down to [drink from] it so I was afraid of it." This type of language is euphemistic because it involves the taboo of women and sex (and see §5.1 below).

[486] *Ibid.* 2: 33 (it sounds like he heard it directly in Persian: […] *samiʿtu hādhā fī shiʿr al-furs li-baʿḍ shuʿarāʾihim*). The image in question is that when the sun shines on the white lotus (*nīlūfar*) its petals open, and when it disappears they close. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn used it in a letter to describe someone's handsome form, saying that even if he walks past a white lotus at night, its petals open. In a more famous passage closing the *Mathal* (4: 12), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also speaks of Persian poetry which is epic in nature, citing Ferdowsī's *Shāhnāma*, in contradistinction to the Arabic poetic tradition.

[487] *Ibid.* 1: 267-68. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn only mentions this Jew whom he met in Egypt (described as a leading scholar in his community) because "even he" thought that Arabic was the best language of all, as it eliminated by his account unnecessary elements found in older languages. The Jew gives as an example the Hebrew pattern of *pōʿēl* (transliterated as *fūʿīl* in Arabic) which was supposedly simplified in Arabic to *faʿal*. The word exemplifying this is *gōmēl* (transliterated as *kūmīl*), supposedly the precursor to the Arabic *jamal* 'camel'. I am not sure what Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn/the Jew has in mind here – at first glance I thought this was a reference to the *gōmēl* prayer – but it could be that the Hebrew *gāmāl* 'camel' was pronounced at the time and in that locale as *gōmēl*, not unlike the shift we find in Yemeni Hebrew or in European Ashkenazi pronunciation *ā→ō* (*māqōm→mōqəm*). However, we should keep in mind that Hebrew was used then as a written language and that if it was spoken, it was for liturgical purposes; this brings us back to the *gōmēl* prayer. *Wa-llāhu aʿlam.*

[488] "La Correspondance," 37, though I wish more evidence had been provided. Ibn Khallikān mentions that the work was in two volumes (*Wafayāt* 5: 391).

[489] For other responses see *Kashf al-ẓunūn* 2: 1586 (and cf. *al-Wāfī* 27: 35). Ibn al-ʿAssāl wrote a *mukhtaṣar* of the work (al-Subkī, *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ* 1: 159, probably a reference to the Christian scholar active in the 7th/13th century).

Khallikān's words, it is the most comprehensive work on the secretarial art (*fann al-kitāba*).[490] It

clearly eclipsed the earlier version of the work, *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ṣināʿat al-manẓūm min al-*

kalām wa-l-manthūr ('The Large Compilation on the Craft of Versified and Unversified

Speech'), as the title does not appear in the biographies and is attributed, rather, to one of his

brothers.[491] There is little doubt that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn authored the work.[492] Also intended for the

state scribe is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *al-Washy al-marqūm fī ḥall al-manẓūm* ('The Striped Embroidery

on Turning Verse into Prose'), on methods for incorporating poetic allusions into epistolary

prose.[493] This underscores the 'subjugation' of the poetic art to epistolography.[494]

The work *al-Miftāḥ al-munshā li-ḥadīqat al-inshā* ('The Erected Key for the Garden of

Letter-Writing') is a short manual for secretaries in the strict sense, and modern scholars have

debated whether the attribution to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is correct.[495] While it differs from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's

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[490] *Wafayāt* 5: 391 ("he [Ḍīyāʾ al-Dīn] did not leave any component concerning the secretarial art unmentioned").

[491] Al-Subkī, *ʿArūs al-afrāḥ* 1: 159 attributes the *Jāmiʿ* to "his [Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's] brother"; Ṭashköprüzāde in his *Miftāḥ al-saʿāda* attributes it to the religious scholar Majd al-Dīn. We already mentioned above (fn. 462) that Ibn Khallikān credits Majd al-Dīn with a work on *kitāba* (no title given). According to Kâtip Çelebi (*Kashf al-ẓunūn* 1: 571), the *Jāmiʿ* was written by the middle brother, the historian, and the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* is part of its title (*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ʿilm al-bayān*).

[492] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, editors' introduction, 39-40, who see the work as a *muswadda* for the *Mathal*. See also Sallām, *Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn*, 68-69. Besides the identical structure and, many times, contents, here too Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn gives his own letters (and even verse) as *shawāhid*, but at a substantially lower rate and in a more humble manner (e.g., *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 94-95. I am assuming these samples did not make it into the *Mathal* or his *Rasāʾil* collection because his later letters were better.) See also Muḥammad al-Ṭāhir Ibn ʿĀshūr, "Naẓra fī kitāb al-Jāmiʿ li-Ibn al-Athīr," *Majallat Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya bi-Dimashq* 31 (1961), 672–77, who argues that the *Jāmiʿ* is later than the *Mathal* (he lists eight arguments, all of which point to differences between the two works but not to chronological precedence). It might be added that ʿĀshūr sees (p. 674) the *Jāmiʿ* as the "theoretical" treatise akin to the works of al-Jurjānī and al-Sakkākī, and the *Mathal* as the "practical" one. Our analysis of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's theory on *majāz* will clearly point to the *Mathal* as the more developed and later work of the two.

[493] This includes Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*. A thorough study of this work is Amidu Sanni's *Arabic Theory of Prosification and Versification*.

[494] An explicit discussion on the supremacy of prose over poetry closes the *Mathal* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 4: 4-12), and it has become well known through Cantarino, *Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age*, 191-98. As Smyth tells us regarding expressions of 'superiority', "for many authors criticism served as an apology for their own work" ("Criticism," 416).

[495] The work is intended for the apprentice; on the face of it, it bears little stylistic or thematic resemblance to Ḍiyāʾ

usual style – the didactic character of the genre demands, after all, a rather limited approach – it

is not unlikely that he authored the work. This is borne out by an authoritative preface

(formulaic, to be sure, but intended as a model for the apprentice), by the aggrandizement of the

chancery among the state offices, by the intimate knowledge of writing conventions relative to

Arab/Persian or Muslim/Non-Muslim scribes, and by certain thematic similarities.[496]

His literary-critical work, *al-Istidrāk fī al-akhdh ʿalā al-maʾākhidh al-kindiyya min al-*

maʿānī al-ṭāʾiyya ('The Rectification of the Critique of the Kindite Borrowings from the

Ṭayyiʾite Motifs'), is a response to the work written by the Baghdadi grammarian Ibn al-Dahhān

(d. 569/1174)[497] on the poetic borrowings of al-Mutanabbī from Abū Tammām. Preceded by a

long theoretical introduction,[498] the work later lays out numerous additional cases not mentioned

by Ibn al-Dahhān in which al-Mutanabbī borrowed images from Abū Tammām, and it specifies,

when relevant, why al-Mutanabbī's later iteration of the motif is in fact better. As a later work (it

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al-Dīn's writings. See Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Miftāḥ al-munshā li-ḥadīqat al-inshā*, ed. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Ḥasan al-Shaykh, Alexandria: Muʾassasat Shabāb al-Jāmiʿa, 1990. The title is not mentioned in the biographies, but it is mentioned in *GAL* Suppl. 1: 521. Abdul Karim Ahmad Abed El-Salem, *Rhetoric in al-Mathal al-Sāʾir: Ibn al-Athīr's Contribution to ʿIlm al-Balāgha*, PhD Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1985 (which I am unable to access), is of the view that the attribution is false (Gully, *The Culture of Letter-Writing*, 139, 161), whereas al-Shaykh, the editor of the *Miftāḥ*, thinks it is correct. Al-Shaykh cites Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's reference to a book he wrote on invocations (*adʿiya*) containing one hundred in number: the *Miftāḥ* itself contains over seventy (*al-Miftāḥ al-munshā*, 36-38).

[496] *Al-Miftāḥ al-munshā*, 51-54, 61, 83-85. In terms of thematic similarities: (1) as in his other works, the author is committed to the differentiation between *taʿrīḍ* as (usually) implicature and *kināya* as (at least here) a single-word alluding metaphor (p. 96); (2) here too he is committed to the unit of the *sajʿa*, as he presents many of the rhetorical figures (whether sound or sense) in terms relative to the *sajʿa* (pp. 91-92, 95, 100, 103). The *sajʿa* is the single parallel member of a segment of rhymed prose and it is a unit of speech that he elaborates on in the *Mathal* (see Devin Stewart, "*Sajʿ* in the Qurʾān: Prosody and structure," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 21 [1990], 101-139, here: 113 ff.); (3) he ends the work with a snippet of poetry segments, apparently meant to be memorized – this is in line with his view that memorization of poetry aids in the crafting of epistolary letters. Conversely, the *shawāhid* that are adduced are often of ancient poetry. Again, this might be due to the genre that necessitates knowledge of the ancient Arab poetic way. One idiosyncrasy is that the section on rhetorical figures is presented primarily as a tool of the poetic art and only secondarily as relevant for the craft of prose (*al-Miftāḥ al-munshā*, 53).

[497] According to Ibn Khallikān, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's oldest brother Majd al-Dīn studied grammar from Ibn al-Dahhān (*Wafayāt* 4: 141). The translation of the title is Heinrichs'.

[498] *Al-Istidrāk*, 25-91, which amounts to about a third of the book (Sallām's edition is less than 200 pages).

was written after the *Mathal*), it exhibits Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's most mature form of poetic criticism and mastery of the poetic art.[499] The work is a commentary both on al-Mutanabbī's and on Abū Tammām's imagery – the two seem to be his favorite poets[500] – but in essence, it is a commentary on the very practice of borrowing images.[501] By presenting many of the borrowings (*maʾākhidh*) as an act of *improving on* earlier images, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn betrays his preference for later poets vis-à-vis the ancients, and implicitly, his preference for the scribal art, of which the entire essence is perfecting old motifs.[502]

On the face of it, based on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's known titles, there is nothing hinting at his involvement with the development of *ʿilm al-bayān* as a theoretical discipline on the rise. The *Jāmiʿ* was known under the title *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr fī ʿilm al-bayān*, according to Kâtip Çelebi,[503] and it is probably due to this fact that later works on the classification of the sciences specify the *Jāmiʿ* within the context of *ʿilm al-bayān* (see Part One, §2.2). The title and fame of the *Mathal* rested primarily on its character as a resource for the state scribe, so it is not surprising that it did not find its way into the rubric of *ʿilm al-bayān* in those later works.

But we do have one work attributed to him that contains the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* in the title: this is *al-Burhān fī ʿilm al-bayān* ('The Proof on the Science of Good Style'), mentioned by Brockelmann but not in the biographical sources.[504] The manuscript of the work, housed in the

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[499] Ibid., 42, for a reference to the *Mathal*.

[500] While much of the introduction reads like a stark defense of al-Mutanabbī (against the view of Ibn al-Dahhān), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does say at one point that he finds Abū Tammām to be *ashʿar* "a better poet" than al-Mutanabbī and any other poet, "as [would] anyone having knowledge of *ʿilm al-bayān*" (*al-Istidrāk*, 53, also 44).

[501] See esp. ibid., 77 ff.

[502] And see ibid., 80, where the method of deciding which poet or poetic line is better is said to be applicable to the scribal art.

[503] *Kashf al-ẓunūn* 1: 571.

[504] *GAL* 1: 358.

Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, turns out to be identical, with slight changes, to the *Kifāyat al-ṭālib fī naqd kalām al-shāʿir wa-l-kātib* ('A Primer [lit. what suffices for the student] on Criticizing the Speech of the Poet and the Scribe'), also ascribed to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and also unspecified in the biographies.[505] It is not clear how the work came to be known under two different titles; the fact that both are attributed to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn potentially corroborates his authorship of the work. But the style and themes of the work differ markedly from those exhibited in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's other works (much more so than *al-Miftāḥ al-munshā*, which had some hints of his style and themes).[506] If *al-Miftāḥ al-munshā* was a beginner's manual for the state scribe, the *Burhān/Kifāya* is a beginner's manual for the poet, an abridgment of Ibn Rashīq's encyclopedic work on poetry and poetics, the *ʿUmda*.[507] If Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did write it, it must have been as an exercise in an early stage of his life, before his own thought on literary criticism developed.[508] We mention

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[505] MS Wetzstein I 80; Wilhelm Ahlwardt, *Verzeichnis der arabischen Handschriften*, 10 vols., Hildesheim; New York: Georg Holms, 1980-1981 (reprint of the 1887 and 1889-1899 editions), 6: 393-94 (item no. 7248); Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, *Kifāyat al-ṭālib fī naqd kalām al-shāʿir wa-l-kātib*, eds. Nūrī al-Qaysī, Ḥātim al-Ḍāmin and Hilāl Nājī, [Mosul]: Min Manshūrāt Jāmiʿat al-Mawṣil, 1982. One discernible change is that the *Kifāya* opens with a chapter on *badīʿ* whereas in the *Burhān* it appears much later (f.70r), after the strictly poetic sections of the work and before the enumeration of rhetorical figures. To the best of knowledge, no modern scholar (West or East) besides Ahlwardt has consulted the text of the *Burhān*.

[506] One instance of thematic discrepancy is the following: in the discussion of indirect speech (*ishāra*) in the *Burhān/Kifāya* (*Burhān* f.96v, 97v; *Kifāya*, 173-76) there is no hint of his later asserted differentiation between *kināya* (one-word alluding metaphor, usually euphemism) and *taʿrīḍ* (implicature), a differentiation found even in the earlier *Jāmiʿ* (156-57, 166-69). In terms of style: the work lacks any authoritative voice – indeed, any authorial voice at all.

[507] On the identification of the work as a digest of the *ʿUmda* see *Kifāya*, editors' introduction, 25, and Taïeb El Achèche, "La *Kifāyat al-ṭālib* attribuée à Ḍiyāʾ al-dīn ibn al-Aṯīr," *Arabica* 19.2 (1972): 177-89, here: 185-86.

[508] This is one of the hypotheses posed by El Achèche, who does not settle the matter of attribution ("La *Kifāyat al-ṭālib*," 187-88). Sallām mentions it, following Brockelmann and an early modern work on the history of Mosul (*Ibn al-Athīr wa-juhūduhu fī l-naqd*, 72, referring to Sulaymān Ṣāʾigh's *Tārīkh al-Mawṣil*). Smyth takes Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's authorship of the *Kifāya* for granted ("Criticism in the Post-Classical Period," 394). Further remarks on attribution: First, the copy that we have of the *Burhān* was written during Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's lifetime, as it contains in the title page an autograph of the legal theorist Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233). The work was copied by the latter's son, Yūsuf b. ʿAlī al-Āmidī, who copied it "for himself" (*katabahu li-nafsihi*, f.1r; cf. Ahlwardt, *Verzeichnis* 6: 394, who mentions that it was copied in 650/1252, but I did not find this date). Given Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī's presence in Syria and Egypt and his association at times with Ayyūbid rulers (Bernard G. Weiss, "al-Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three*), it is not unlikely that he came across Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn in person. Second, Ibn Maʿṣūm ascribes the *Kifāya* to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn in his comprehensive compilation on (non-standard) rhetoric, *Anwār al-rabīʿ*,

the *Burhān/Kifāya* here because it contains references to the scholarly group called *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*,[509] so if the work was authored by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, the heading of the discipline had already been in use in his early days. Of course in the *Mathal* and *Jāmiʿ*, *ʿilm al-bayān* is a fait accompli, with references to the discipline heading and the scholarly group throughout.

This leads us to the major works that are of interest to us here, the *Mathal* and the *Jāmiʿ*.[510] The two works are dedicated to the discipline called *ʿilm al-bayān* – in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's understanding: 'the science of good style' – which, according to him, is the theory behind literary composition (see Part One). The structure of both works broadly overlaps. The *Jāmiʿ* is divided into two large parts (sg. *quṭb*). The first deals with "general matters" such as prerequisite sciences, methods of learning the scribal art, a prolegomenon on *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*, and phonological sections concerning the nature of the Arabic language. The second part deals with "particular matters" and is a study of the rhetorical devices (*aṣnāf ʿilm al-bayān*), concerned both with sense (*al-ṣināʿa al-maʿnawiyya*) and with sound (*al-ṣināʿa al-lafẓiyya*).[511] In the *Mathal* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn takes most of the "general matters" in the *Jāmiʿ* and turns them into a large prefatory section (*muqaddima*). The *muqaddima* contains several new chapters, e.g., a short one

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and assumes it was written after the *Mathal* (following him also the editors of the *Kifāya*: introduction, 25). This cannot be correct, but it may serve as additional evidence that the work was authored by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. Third, the work does contain themes that are consistent with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's thought, such as the identification of *tashbīh* 'comparison; simile' as a type of *majāz* (*al-Burhān* f.86v; *Kifāya*, 157) but this cannot be taken in support of his authorship since already Ibn Rashīq and others viewed *tashbīh* as *majāz* (see §5.1). Also, we find that it is not Abū Tammām that is favored over other poets, as we did in the *Istidrāk*, but rather Ibn al-Rūmī (a non-Syrian) due to his invention of many motifs (*awlā bi-sm shāʿir li-kathrat ikhtirāʿihi*); Abū Tammām is presented as employing too many metaphors (*istiʿāra wa-badīʿ*) (*al-Burhān* f.70v-71r; *Kifāya*, 40-41). This is a direct quotation of Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥasan Ibn Rashīq, *al-ʿUmda fī maḥāsin al-shiʿr wa-ādābihi wa-naqdihi*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, 2 vols., 4th ed., Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1972, 1: 286, also 2: 238, 244-45 (English: 'The Support on the Good Qualities of Poetry, its Customs and Evaluation').

[509] *Al-Burhān* f.70r; *Kifāya*, 40.

[510] For a detailed account of their contents see Sallām, *Ibn al-Athīr wa-juhūduhu fī al-naqd*, 75-123.

[511] Phonological discussions, both in the *Jāmiʿ* (pp. 33-63) and in the *Mathal* (1: 210-69) are found under the chapter dealing with single words (*al-alfāẓ al-mufrada / al-lafẓa al-mufrada*). The inclusion of phonology is inspired by Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (*Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, 13-21).

on the (philosophical) "subject-matter" of *ʿilm al-bayān* (to wit: eloquence, *al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha*), and a very long one on turning verse, as well as Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* citations, into artistic prose (i.e., 'prosification', later enlarged into a separate work, *al-Washy al-marqūm*).[512] Following the *Muqaddima* are two large sections (sg. *maqāla*), the first on all matters concerning sound (*al-ṣināʿa al-lafẓiyya*). The phonological sections that appeared in the *Jāmiʿ*'s "general matters" are now situated here, as a preparation for the study of *sajʿ* 'rhymed prose' and other literary devices concerned with sound.[513] *Sajʿ* plays an important role in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's literary theory and analysis of Qurʾānic style.[514] The second *maqāla* deals with all matters concerning sense (*al-ṣināʿa al-maʿnawiyya*), varying from metaphor to brevity, the stylistics of prepositions, literary borrowings (*sariqāt*), and more.

The section that opens the study on sense (*al-ṣināʿa al-maʿnawiyya* lit. 'the mental craft')[515] is an enlargement of a four-page chapter in the *Jāmiʿ* dealing with the invention of motifs or images (*maʿānī*). It is often unclear where the boundaries are between this discussion and the one dealing with turning verse into prose (the long chapter appearing in the *muqaddima*, see above).[516] Indeed both sections form a poetics of image-creation, which in turn form part of a poetics of letter-writing. Detailing the mechanism for creating new motifs, and following the

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[512] Respectively: *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 39-40 (inspired by al-Khafājī – whose treatment is translated in Cantarino, *Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age*, 152-54) and 1: 125-209 (along with numerous examples from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own letters). For his statement on enlarging the section in the *Mathal* into an independent work, and in the process correcting errors he had made, see *al-Washy al-marqūm*, 47-48. Conversely, the *Mathal* contains two explicit references to the *Washy* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 161, 2: 36), indicating that he may have continued updating the *Mathal* later on in life or that he wrote the two concurrently.

[513] This is roughly half of the first volume of the common printed edition, *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 210-414.

[514] Stewart, "*Sajʿ* in the Qurʾān," 113-39.

[515] One should differentiate here Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's idea of *maʿānī* vis-à-vis al-Khafājī's: for the latter, the realm of *maʿānī* was purely logical and had no place in it for language (*Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, 225-26), such that metaphor, for instance, was not treated under *maʿānī* but rather under *al-alfāẓ al-muʾallafa*.

[516] In both sections we find a reference to his *al-Washy al-marqūm* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 161, 2: 36).

lead of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn distinguishes between two kinds of motifs, namely, those that are not modeled upon previous motifs and those that are.[517] Within the former, motifs can be invented in two ways. The first is creating a motif based on a new, real-life occurrence; it is an imitation (ḥikāya) of what is present before one's eyes. It is on the basis of this passage that Sallām wonders about the influence of the Greek notion of muḥākāt 'mimesis' on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's thought, despite the latter's explicit eschewal of Greek rhetoric and poetics.[518] The second way of inventing motifs is presented as a much harder method, as it is in essence a creation of images ex nihilo.[519] What ensues is a listing of poetic examples that contain supposedly truly invented images (Ar. ibdāʿ, mubtadaʿ, mukhtaraʿ). And yet when he moves on to adduce prose examples – all of which coming from his own oeuvre – many of the invented images are presented as an extraction (istinbāṭ, istikhrāj) from earlier motifs, found primarily in ḥadīth.[520] It is here where the discussion becomes indistinguishable from the notion of prosification (ḥall). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn equates the invention of motifs with the process of finding the unknown in algebraic equations; under the section on turning verse into prose, he presents it as analogous to an elixir in alchemy, in which a new metal is extracted.[521] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn revisits some of these issues under the long

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[517] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 7ff. and 2: 58 ff., respectively. See also Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 90-94. The discussion is based on the very short account in al-ʿAskarī, *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 75.13-17.

[518] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 7-20, 141; Sallām, *Ibn al-Athīr wa-juhūduhu fī l-naqd*, 250-51.

[519] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 20-58. It is noteworthy that the context in which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn revisits this issue is *tashbīh* (ibid. 2: 141-42), especially when we consider that mimesis was often translated as the hendiadys *tashbīh wa-muḥākāt* (cf. Ibn Rashīq, *al-ʿUmda* 2: 294, and our discussion of *tashbīh* below). See also the arguable identity between the *kutub al-maʿānī* (catalogues of images, like that of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī) and *kutub al-tashbīhāt* (Beatrice Gruendler, "Motif vs. Genre: Reflections on the *Dīwān al-Maʿānī* of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī," in Thomas Bauer and Angelika Neuwirth [eds.], *Ghazal as World Literature I: Transformations of a Literary Genre*, Beirut: Ergon Verlag Würzburg in Kommission, 2005, 57-85, here: 60).

[520] Ibid. 2: 32-58. While he is trying to create a model for the aspiring state scribe in creating new images, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also maintains that this skill is divinely inspired (*fayḍ ilāhī*) and cannot be taught (2: 55).

[521] Ibid. 1: 161.

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chapter on poetic borrowings.[522]

Unacknowledged Engagement with ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī

Some of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's unique stances stem from his engagement with scholarly works that were

not commonly used in literary theory up until his time, namely Ibn Jinnī's (d. 392/1002)

Khaṣāʾiṣ, al-Zamakhsharī's (d. 538/1144) *Kashshāf*, and ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's (d. 471/1078

or 474/1081) *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz*. It is Ibn Jinnī's deliberations about *majāz* that inspired Ḍiyāʾ al-

Dīn's own theory on the matter in his later-written *Mathal* (one could say he employed *istikhrāj*

here!); this will be discussed below (§5.1).[523] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also appropriated Ibn Jinnī's

discussions on *shajāʿat al-ʿarabiyya* lit. 'the boldness (or courage) of the Arabic language', a

reference to certain 'irregular' syntactic phenomena that are inherent in the language (some of

which figured into the early grammatical-hermeneutical discussions of *majāz* in Abū ʿUbayda's

[d. 209/824] *Majāz al-Qurʾān*).[524] Al-Zamakhsharī's discussions on change in grammatical

person (*iltifāt* lit. 'turning the face to [s.t. /s.o.]') inspired Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own take on the

matter.[525] Both scholars are mentioned by name.

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[522] Ibid. 3: 218-92 (*al-sariqāt al-shiʿriyya*).

[523] Al-Rāzī also engaged with Ibn Jinnī's view on *majāz*; *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 468-71.

[524] Ibn Jinnī, *al-Khaṣāʾiṣ* 2: 360-441; a*l-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 98-122; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 170-91 (where the *shajāʿat al-ʿarabiyya* is restricted to the phenomenon of *iltifāt*, here: 'change in grammatical person/tense'). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn refers to the *Khaṣāʾiṣ* by name. According to 19th-century Buṭrus al-Bustānī, *shajāʿat al-ʿarabiyya* was a reference to elision (*ḥadhf*), according to some of the rhetoricians (Ar. *ahl al-bayān*); *Kitāb Muḥīṭ al-muḥīṭ ay qāmūs muṭawwal li-l-lugha al-ʿarabiyya*, Beirut: [s.n.], 1867-1870, 1055. For some of the overlap with Abū ʿUbayda's categories, see those enumerated in John Wansbrough, "*Majāz al-Qurʾān*: Periphrastic Exegesis," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 2 (1970), 247-66, here: 248-54. For another discussion stemming from Ibn Jinnī, this time without acknowledgement, see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 67-69 (and editors' footnotes). Ibn Jinnī himself states (*al-Khaṣāʾiṣ* 2: 446) that many instances of *majāz* are part of the phenomenon of *shajāʿat al-lugha*, such as elision, pleonasm, change in word order, change in grammatical gender or number (*al-ḥaml ʿalā l-maʿnā*) and morphological irregularities (*taḥrīf*). In Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work *shajāʿat al-ʿarabiyya* is restricted to syntactic irregularities.

[525] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 171-73. For a comprehensive study of literary devices in the *Mathal* (and to a lesser extent the *Jāmiʿ*) that are indebted to al-Zamakhsharī see Abū Mūsā, *al-Balāgha al-Qurʾāniyya fī tafsīr al-Zamakhsharī*, 539-87, 653-60.

Unnamed is ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, some of whose passages are quoted without acknowledgement. Whether Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn had direct access to his work is unclear, but evidence suggests that he did. The near-quotations are from *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz*, but influences from *Asrār al-balāgha* are also discernible (the latter will be discussed in §5.1).[526] The passages in question concern the underlying argument made in the *Dalāʾil*, namely that eloquence does not stem from a single word in isolation but rather from the position of that word within a construction (*naẓm*/*tartīb* per al-Jurjānī, *tarkīb* per Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn).[527] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adopts this particular point but there is no discernible trace of al-Jurjānī's resulting elaboration on the "imports of syntax" (*maʿānī al-naḥw*), which forms the heart of al-Jurjānī's *Dalāʾil*.[528] Also, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn derives only a partial notion of al-Jurjānī's *naẓm*. Like al-Jurjānī, he adduces the Qurʾānic verse "And it was said, *O earth, swallow your water, and O sky, abate (your rain)*; and the water was made[529] to subside, the affair was accomplished, and [the ark] settled on [mount] al-Jūdī; and it was said,

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[526] Bonebakker points out that the *Asrār* and *Dalāʾil* "were inaccessible to some scholars even in the Middle Ages" (Bonebakker, "al-Ḳazwīnī"): perhaps the accessibility to al-Jurjānī's work was not so partial at this stage in this place (see also the work of Ibn al-Zamlakānī in §4.2). It is of note that the principal manuscript used by Hellmut Ritter in his edition of the *Asrār* was a copy completed in Jumādā II 660/May 1262 in Jabal al-Ṣāliḥiyya near Damascus (see *Asrār*, editor's introduction, 25). Although this is some time after Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's death in 637/1239, it is an indication that it was known in the Arabic East before al-Qazwīnī. Nevertheless, al-Jurjānī's works were definitely not widely known in this time and place.

[527] *Dalāʾil*, 43-48 (esp. 45-47, though the discussion runs until p. 65); *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 211-18 (esp. 211, 214); *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 64-67 (where al-Jurjānī's claims are taken at face value). Al-Jurjānī is reacting to claims made, *inter alia*, by al-Jāḥiẓ.

[528] Al-Jurjānī states (*Dalāʾil*, 100) that discussions on *naẓm* (earlier also referred to as *tartīb* and again later: ibid., 359 ff.) must precede discussions on metaphor (see also ibid., 393). As an example, he shows how the beauty of the famous Qurʾānic *wa-shtaʿala l-raʾsu shayban* (Q 19:4) "[my] head is aflame with hoariness" has in fact to do with syntactic matters: predicating "aflame" of "head" rather than "hoariness" directly (similarly Q 54:12 *wa-fajjarnā l-arḍa ʿuyūnan* "we made the earth gush forth springs"; *Dalāʾil*, 102); or expressing the meaning of a possession when no syntactic possessive (*iḍāfa*) is uttered ("the head" instead of "my head"; ibid., 102). The grammatical underpinnings of al-Jurjānī's theory of imagery deserve a separate study. Heinrichs translates *maʿānī al-naḥw* as "the meanings of syntactic relations" ("ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* 1: 17; see also Abu Deeb, *Al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 43, 62).

[529] I am deliberately translating this in the passive, rather than the usual translation "and the water subsided," because al-Jurjānī explicitly refers to the passive construction of this and the following verb, as well as to other syntactic features (*Dalāʾil*, 45-46; e.g., the added possessive pronoun *ki* to *maʾaki*, instead of *iblaʿī l-māʾ*, or the repetition of *qīla* at the end of the verse). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not repeat any of these details.

Away with the unjust people," in a paragraph that is almost identical to the one found in the *Dalāʾil.* Then Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn repeats almost verbatim the idea that one word may be beautiful in one context but ugly in another (the phrase *ayyuhā l-mutaʾammil* is sometimes a giveaway for al-Jurjānī's style).[530] But the examples that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces are fundamentally different from the ones al-Jurjānī adduced, showing that he did not quite subscribe to the latter's theory on the irrelevance of the single word in evaluating eloquence. The examples that al-Jurjānī brings forth involve an independent lexeme, always a noun. The examples reflect a classicizing approach on the part of al-Jurjānī, as the first involves the word *al-akhdaʿ* 'neck vein', said to be beautiful in a verse from the *Ḥamāsa* and in a verse by al-Buḥturī (a classicizing poet) but ugly in the verse of Abū Tammām, and in the second example, it is al-Mutanabbī's use of the word *shayʾ* that is criticized vis-à-vis beautiful usages in early poetry.[531] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn would hardly endorse these examples. The ones that he gives, however, do not involve independent nouns but rather dependent constituents, like a verb requiring a prepositional complement, or a prepositional phrase. Thus, the fault is explicitly said to lie in the *tarkīb* (like using a verb without its prepositional complement), missing the whole point al-Jurjānī was trying to make regarding the single word. It is ironic that at this point Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn boasts of his thinking and speculation in this subtle matter, "to which no other scholar before him attended."[532] (In their 'reponses', Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd and al-Ṣafadī are silent on this matter.)

As it turns out, in the *Mathal* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn holds the exact view that al-Jurjānī was trying

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[530] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 214; *Dalāʾil*, 45 (for both paragraphs). The editors of the *Mathal* point to this passage of the *Dalāʾil* in their footnotes.

[531] *Dalāʾil*, 46-48. In the earlier-written *Jāmiʿ* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn had no problem adducing the first example (*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 66-67).

[532] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 214-18, and 215 for the boasting (to which the editors respond, fn. 3, with an accusatory tone).

to refute, namely, that words can be beautiful in and of themselves and have not to do with their meaning. (He still agrees with al-Jurjānī regarding the importance of *tarkīb* in evaluating beautiful style.)[533] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn claims that since words are made up of sounds, they either sound beautiful or they do not, just as the ear finds the tune of a string instrument beautiful and the sound of a donkey bray disagreeable, and just as the mouth finds the taste of honey sweet and that of the colocynth (*ḥanẓal*) bitter.[534] Thus, it is not that one person would find a certain word ugly and another would find the very same word beautiful: the beauty of words is not a relational property (*iḍāfī*) but rather an inherent one (*dhawawī*, see the comparison to honey/colocynth, which all people find sweet/bitter).[535] This is the opposite stance from the position he held in the *Jāmiʿ*, where the notion of acoustic eloquence (*faṣāḥa*) was said to be relational (see §1.1, p. 39).[536] In the *Mathal* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn holds the view that the single evaluator of the beauty of a word is the sense of hearing.[537] In contrast, the entire project of the *Dalāʾil* was to refute the idea that a word has a certain beauty: the beauty, rather, lies in its meaning (and its relation to the other constituents in the sentence). At one point al-Jurjānī added the stipulation, "unless you mean the composition of tunes, but that is not what we are dealing with at all" (see below).[538] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's discussion, so it turns out, revolves precisely around the tune-like quality of single words, a topic that was irrelevant for al-Jurjānī. We might recall that in the *Jāmiʿ* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn gave a direct quotation from "one of the authors among the scholars" (*baʿḍ al-muṣannifīn min al-*

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[533] Stated generally in ibid. 1: 116.

[534] Ibid., 219, 221.

[535] Ibid., 222.

[536] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 77.

[537] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 224.

[538] *Dalāʾil*, 395.

ʿulamāʾ), claiming that in studying the meaning of eloquence one cannot remain on the level of general claims but must delve into the details and exert contemplation, reflection and speculation.[539] It was here that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn spoke of the relational nature of eloquence. The fact that this view was abandoned in the *Mathal* shows us that it was not due to his obliviousness to al-Jurjānī's ideas, but rather due to a conscious departure from his stance. As proof for his claims, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn provides three synonymous words, two of which are beautiful and one of which is not. The fact that all three indicate the intended meaning equally, he says, shows that eloquence goes back to the *lafẓ* rather than the *maʿnā*.[540]

It is in this context that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn then makes the comparison between the rational basis of eloquence (or *ʿilm al-bayān*) and the non-rational basis of grammar (or the science of grammar, see §1.1).[541] There can be little doubt that this claim, too, has its origin in al-Jurjānī's *Dalāʾil*. We might recall that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn argues that the categories of grammar (*aqsām al-naḥw*, referring specifically to case endings) were derived from the coiner of the language by imitation (or tradition, *taqlīd*), such that reason (*ʿaql*) would not reject it if the subject of a verb-initial sentence were assigned the accusative and the object were assigned the nominative. Compare this to al-Jurjānī's,

> […] *al-ʿilm[u] bi-l-iʿrābi mushtarakun bayna l-ʿarabi kullihim wa-laysa huwa mimmā yustanbaṭu bi-l-fikri wa-yustaʿānu ʿalayhi bi-rawiyyati fa-laysa aḥaduhum bi-anna iʿrāba l-fāʿili l-rafʿu awi l-mafʿūli l-naṣbu wa-l-muḍāfi ilayhi l-jarru bi-aʿlama min ghayrihi wa-lā dhāka mimmā yaḥtājūna fīhi ilā ḥiddati dhihnin wa-quwwati khāṭirin*

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[539] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 76-77.

[540] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 115 (acknowledged also in *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 64-65); cf. *Dalāʾil*, 43-44, where excellence is attributed, rather, to the *maʿnā*.

[541] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 119-20.

The knowledge of case endings is common to all Arabs and it is not something that is derived by contemplation or aided by reflection, for not one of them [the Arabs] is more knowledgeable than the other with respect to the fact that the case ending of the subject (in a verb-initial sentence) is nominative, or that of the object is accusative, and that of the second term of the construct is genitive: that is not something in which one needs a sharp intellect and an apt mind.[542]

Then Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn goes on to say that this is not the case with the knowledge of eloquence (or the disciplinary ʿilm al-bayān),

li-annahu -stunbiṭa bi-l-naẓari wa-qaḍiyyati l-ʿaqli min ghayri wāḍiʿi l-lughati wa-lam yuftaqar fīhi ilā l-tawqīfi minhu bal ukhidhat alfāẓun wa-maʿānin ʿalā hayʾatin makhṣūṣatin wa-ḥakama lahā l-ʿaqlu bi-maziyyatin mina l-ḥusni lā yushārikuhā fīhā ghayruhā fa-inna kulla ʿārifin bi-asrāri l-kalāmi min ayyi lughatin kānat mina l-lughāti yaʿlamu anna ikhrāja l-maʿānī fī alfāẓin ḥasanatin rāʾiqatin yaladhdhuhā l-samʿu wa-lā yanbū ʿanhā l-ṭabʿu khayrun min ikhrājihā fī alfāẓin qabīḥatin mustakrahatin yanbū ʿanhā l-samʿu […]

because [eloquence/ʿilm al-bayān] was derived by speculation and the judgment of reason without [any influence from] the coiner of the language, and there is no need in this [process/ʿilm] for him (the coiner) to provide input. Rather, words and meanings were combined (?, *ukhidhat*) according to a particular form, and reason judged it to have an excellence in beauty which is not shared by any other (form). For every person knowledgeable in the mysteries of speech, no matter the language it is in, knows that uttering notions in beautiful clear words, which the ear finds delight in and natural disposition does not move away from, is better than uttering it in ugly loathed words, which the ear finds repugnant […][543]

Compare this to al-Jurjānī's passage preceding the one just quoted,

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[542] *Dalāʾil*, 395. Al-Jurjānī goes on to say that what *does* require intellect is to identify the reason ("that which necessitates," *mā yūjibu*, *al-waṣf al-mūjib*) for placing a constituent (*shayʾ*) in the *fāʿil* position when it is done figuratively, alluding here to the notion of *majāz ḥukmī* discussed in *Dalāʾil*, 293 (a notion not found in the work of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn). The passage above is also translated and discussed in Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 208 (citing also *Dalāʾil*, 98). Harb's point is that in al-Jurjānī's mind, eloquence is only truly achieved if there is some kind of reflection and thought on the part of the listener.

[543] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 120.

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thumma innā naʿlamu anna l-maziyyata l-maṭlūbata fī hādhā l-bābi maziyyatun fīmā ṭarīquhu l-fikru wa-l-naẓaru min ghayri shubhatin wa-muḥālun an yakūna l-lafẓu lahu ṣifatun tustanbaṭu bi-l-fikri wa-yustaʿānu ʿalayhā bi-l-rawiyyati -llāhumma illā an turīda taʾlīfa l-naghami wa-laysa dhālika mimmā naḥnu fīhi bi-sabīlin

Then we know that the desired excellence in this domain is an excellence in [a matter] that is grasped through contemplation and speculation without a doubt, and it is impossible for a word to have a property that can be derived by speculation or be [determined] with the aid of reflection, unless you mean the composition of a tune, but that is not what we are dealing with at all.[544]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn takes al-Jurjānī's idea that in order to evaluate eloquence one must exert speculation, and he takes his idea that knowledge of case endings has not to do with speculation. He also agrees with al-Jurjānī that speculation does not determine the eloquence of single words, but whereas Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn concludes that the knowledge of single-word eloquence is intuitive and universal akin to the perception of beautiful tunes, for al-Jurjānī the single word is simply irrelevant.[545]

Al-Jurjānī's idea of eloquence finds its way to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's epitome of the *Asrār* and *Dalāʾil*, but the latter's discussion is much more technical, with the use of such notions as *dalāla waḍʿiyya/lafẓiyya* 'signification derived from [the sound of] a word coined in the lexicon'.[546] It is clear that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not derive his passages from al-Rāzī but rather directly from the *Dalāʾil* (or a source quoting the *Dalāʾil*). This is significant for several reasons. First, it shows us that while al-Jurjānī's work is usually thought to be inaccessible to medieval

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[544] *Dalāʾil*, 395.

[545] We should mention that the discussion in the *Mathal* appears in two places, (a) in one of the chapters of the long *muqaddima* titled *fī l-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 112), and (b) in the opening of the section on *al-ṣināʿa al-lafẓiyya*, when discussing the euphonic character of the single word (ibid., 1: 210).

[546] *Nihāya*, 87-117. The chapter that follows (ibid., 117-46) is on cases where eloquence is precisely due to the single word!

scholars,[547] this is probably less true in the case of the *Dalāʾil*. Second, and more importantly, it

shows us that it was probably al-Jurjānī more than anyone else who inspired Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn to

delineate his field in rational terms, and it was probably al-Jurjānī who prompted him to use the

phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* as the heading for the discipline he was writing in (although al-Jurjānī used

the term non-technically). And yet, the project that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn produced was markedly

different from that of al-Jurjānī. This goes against the common narrative one finds in the history

of Arabic literary theory, namely, that whoever came across al-Jurjānī's work was swept away by

his ideas. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn engaged with the periphery of al-Jurjānī's theory ("where does eloquence

lie"), first subscribing to it in his early *Jāmiʿ* (acknowledging the difficulty of determining

eloquence based on the single word since it is a relational notion), and then rejecting it in the

Mathal (in favor of the importance of sound in determining eloquence). As we shall see in our

discussion of *majāz*, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also engaged with some of al-Jurjānī's ideas found in the

Asrār, but these did not constitute the heart of al-Jurjānī's theories, and the two scholars arrive at

very different conclusions regarding the nature of *majāz*.

The differences between al-Jurjānī's views and the views of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn probably have

to do with the fact that they approach a similar set of questions from different perspectives. In the

passages we discuss above al-Jurjānī is primarily concerned with the way in which eloquence is

achieved.[548] What matters to him is the listener's appreciation of literary speech, and he seeks to

understand how (literary) language is processed. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is thinking of eloquence as a

science. What matters to him is the critic's evaluation of literary speech, and he seeks to define

how literary language can be produced.

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[547] Bonebakker, "al-Ḳazwīnī." As we shall see in §4.2, Ibn al-Zamlakānī is another scholar from the central Arabic-speaking lands who had direct access to al-Jurjānī's *Dalāʾil*.

[548] Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 208.

4.2. Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 651/1253), *al-Tibyān*, *al-Burhān* and *al-Mujīd*

Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Khalaf al-Zamlakānī, also known as Ibn Khaṭīb Zamalkā, was a Syrian Shāfiʿī scholar from Zamalkā (or Zamlukā; originally Zamalukā), in the agricultural plain of the Ghūṭa outside Damascus. The little we know of his life and work is associated solely with Syria, where he worked as a judge in Salkhad (Ṣarkhad, southern modern-day Syria), taught at a *madrasa* in Baalbek (modern-day Lebanon) and died in Damascus. He is portrayed in the biographies as having expertise in *al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, that is, the standard rhetorical tradition, but is mainly known as the grandfather of the influential Shāfiʿī scholar and religious leader in Syria, Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Zamlakānī (d. 727/1327). Our Ibn al-Zamlakānī also wrote poetry, a snippet of which has survived.[549] Most of his works concern the style of the Qurʾān, first and foremost from a grammatical or functional-grammatical point of view, but he also wrote on pure grammar (a commentary on al-Zamakhsharī's *Mufaṣṣal*) and on creedal and legal issues.[550]

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[549] On ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Ibn al-Zamlakānī see Brockelmann, *GAL* Suppl. 1: 736 (also *GAL*, 1st ed., 1: 415); Kaḥḥāla, *Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn* 6: 209; Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā*, eds. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥilw and Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Ṭanāḥī, 10 vols., [Cairo]: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, [1964-1976], 8: 316 (*wa-kānat lahu maʿrifa tāmma bi-l-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*). The few extant samples of Ibn al-Zamlakānī's poetry can be found in Ibn al-Zamlakānī, *al-Tibyān fī ʿilm al-bayān al-muṭliʿ ʿalā iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, eds. Aḥmad Maṭlūb and Khadīja al-Ḥadīthī, Baghdad: Maktabat al-ʿĀnī, 1964, editors' introduction, 10-11 (English: 'The Clarification on the Science of Clear Speech, Demonstrating the Qurʾān's Inimitability'). On the grandson Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Zamlakānī, and his complex attitude toward Ibn Taymiyya, see Sherman A. Jackson, "Ibn Taymiyyah on Trial in Damascus," *Journal of Semitic Studies* 39.1 (1994), 41-85, here: 48. This Ibn al-Zamlakānī was a contemporary of the fellow Damascene and religious leader Jalāl al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, and it is likely that the two were acquainted (for instance, both were appointed chief judge in the same year, 724 AH – al-Qazwīnī chief Shāfiʿī judge in Damascus and Ibn al-Zamlakānī chief judge of Aleppo – and both were congratulated by the poet Ibn Nubāta on the occasion. See Thomas Bauer, "Ibn Nubāta al-Miṣrī (686-768/1287-1366): Life and Works. Part I: The Life of Ibn Nubāta," *Mamluk Studies Review* 12.1 [2008], 1-35, here: 19).

[550] An updated list of his nine known works can be found in Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Zamlakānī, *al-Burhān al-kāshif ʿan iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, eds. Khadīja al-Ḥadīthī and Aḥmad Maṭlūb, Baghdad: Maktabat al-ʿĀnī, 1974, 18-24 (English: The Proof, Uncovering the Qurʾān's Inimitability'). The editor of the *Mujīd* contests the attribution of one of these works to Ibn al-Zamlakānī the grandfather. See Ibn Khaṭīb Zamlakān Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Khalaf al-Anṣārī al-Zamlakānī, *al-Mujīd fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān al-majīd*, ed. Shaʿbān Ṣalāḥ, Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa al-ʿArabiyya, 1989, 12 (English: 'The Excellent [Account], On the Inimitability of the Noble Qurʾān'). The latter title is also known as *al-Mufīd* ('the beneficial') *fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān al-majīd* (*al-Mujīd*, 58; *al-Tibyān*, 12).

The three works by Ibn al-Zamlakānī under consideration here are those that merited him knowledge of *al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*, although no influence of al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229), or even Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), is apparent.[551] Like Fakhr al-Dīn, Ibn al-Zamlakānī was a direct 'redactor' of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081) work, albeit unlike the former, Ibn al-Zamlakānī was solely aware of *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz* (and not *Asrār al-balāgha*), commonly described as the more grammatical of al-Jurjānī's two literary-theoretical works.

We do not know how Ibn al-Zamlakānī became acquainted with al-Jurjānī's work, which remained little known in the central Arabic-speaking lands until the time of al-Qazwīnī. Ibn al-Zamlakānī probably knew al-Jurjānī in his capacity as a grammarian (see his commentary on al-Zamakhsharī's *Mufaṣṣal*): it seems that both al-Zamakhsharī and al-Muṭarrizī (d. 610/1213), who wrote books on grammar, were aware of al-Jurjānī via this route as well.[552] Another explanation is that a teacher from the East brought along with him the knowledge of al-Jurjānī, given the influx of Iranian and Turkic scholars into the Arabic East as the Mongols were making inroads into the eastern Islamic lands.[553] But if this were the case, it does not explain why a close reading of ʿAbd al-Qāhir's work in the Arabic East remained an isolated occurrence (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's

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[551] Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīthī surmise (*wa-aghlab al-ẓann*; *al-Tibyān*, 16) the opposite, that he benefited from both al-Rāzī's *Nihāya* and from al-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ* (without any further evidence). There is one reference to al-Rāzī in the *Tibyān* with regards to the latter's definition of the noun (*al-Tibyān*, 51), but it is more likely that Ibn al-Zamlakānī found this in another of al-Rāzī's works, especially since the contested point is alluded to in *Nihāya*, 158-59. As we shall see, the structures of both works differ (although both add a section on rhetorical figures) and Ibn al-Zamlakānī seems to be completely unaware of al-Rāzī's conception of *majāz*. A single additional reference to al-Rāzī in Ibn al-Zamlakānī's *Burhān*, on the etymology of the word *majāz*, is in fact taken from the former's work on legal theory. See *al-Burhān*, 99 and al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 396.

[552] See fn. 437 on al-Muṭarrizī's digest of several of al-Jurjānī's grammar books. Ibn al-Zamlakānī must have been aware of al-Zamakhsharī's *Kashshāf* as well, but as we have noted, the latter only mentions al-Jurjānī there once (fn. 452).

[553] On the migration of eastern Ḥanafī scholars due to this reason (among others) see Madelung, "The Spread of Māturīdism and the Turks," 141. Cf. Khaled El-Rouayheb's contextualization of eleventh/seventeenth century intellectual history in the Ottoman Empire in his *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 13-59, 131-72. We have no knowledge of Ibn al-Zamlakānī himself traveling to the East nor do we know the identity of his teachers.

engagement with al-Jurjānī was far too implicit). What is more, we would expect Ibn al-Zamlakānī to give more frequent mentions of al-Jurjānī by name.[554] The fact that he rarely does so also underscores that al-Jurjānī was minimally known in this time and place. Given al-Jurjānī's primary affiliation as a grammarian (§3.2), the grammar route is the most likely line of influence. It must be noted, however, that knowledge of al-Jurjānī was definitely on the rise in the Arabic East: the principal manuscript used by Ritter for his edition of al-Jurjānī's *Asrār al-balāgha* was completed near Damascus in 660/1262, that is, not long after Ibn al-Zamlakānī's death.[555]

Of the three works by Ibn al-Zamlakānī, the best-known and apparently the first one written is *al-Tibyān fī ʿilm al-bayān*. The book, which the author completed on the 20th of Ramaḍān 637/April 21, 1240, reached a wide circulation fairly quickly, as it was met with a 'rebuttal' by the Andalusian Abū al-Muṭarrif Ibn ʿAmīra (d. 658/1260) shortly thereafter (relatively speaking: less than twenty years).[556] The *Tibyān* is dedicated to a Damascene vizier,

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[554] As we shall see, explicit reference to al-Jurjānī is minimal and two of Ibn al-Zamlakānī's three works are entirely devoid of any mention of him. Compare this to al-Sakkākī, for instance, who often makes mention of *al-Imām ʿAbd al-Qāhir* (e.g., *Miftāḥ*, 371), and even more so Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who mentions *al-Shaykh al-Imām* on almost every page.

[555] *Asrār*, editor's introduction, 25. Shākir in his edition of the *Dalāʾil* used a manuscript from mid-Rabīʿ al-Awwal 568/November 1172 as one of the two principal manuscripts; it was copied directly from a copy by ʿAbd al-Qāhir himself and contains the latter's own marginal notes. This suggests that the copy was from the Eastern Islamic world. The other principal manuscript has no date or indication of place. Shākir also consulted the Riḍā edition, which is based on three manuscripts, but we have no information about their provenance. Al-Jurjānī's epistle on the inimitability of the Qurʾān, *al-Risāla al-Shāfiya*, is part of the 1172 copy.

[556] Muḥammad Ibn Sharīfa, who edited the 'refutation' of the *Tibyān*, relied on a manuscript of the *Tibyān* from the Escorial (MS Escorial 223, not used by Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīthī), and the above is based on his description of the colophon. See Abū al-Muṭarrif Aḥmad b. ʿAmīra, *al-Tanbīhāt ʿalā mā fī l-Tibyān min al-tamwīhāt*, ed. Muḥammad Ibn Sharīfa, Casablanca: Maṭbaʿat al-Najāḥ al-Jadīda, 1991 [apparently a reprint of the edition written in the sixties] 14, 16 (and see p. 15 fn. 50, where Ibn Sharīfa states that he wrote the introduction before the edition of the *Tibyān* appeared) (English: 'Notifications On What the *Tibyān* Contains of Falsifications'). The earliest manuscript of the *Tibyān* that Maṭlūb and al-Ḥadīthī mention (though did not consult) is a Yale manuscript written in 641 AH (*al-Tibyān*, 20).

one Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Amīn.[557] The second work, *al-Burhān,* was completed in Dhū al-Ḥijja

645/April 1248 and appears to be an expansion of the *Tibyān*.[558] The third work, *al-Mujīd,* is

meant as an abridgement (*ikhtiṣār*) of the *Tibyān,* as explicitly stated by the author at the

outset.[559] The fact that Ibn al-Zamlakānī wrote both a 'long commentary' and a 'short

commentary' on the *Tibyān* also points to the popularity that this work gained during his

lifetime. Only the *Tibyān* refers to ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī by name and presents itself as a

reworking of his work.[560] Readers familiar solely with the *Burhān* or *Mujīd* would potentially be

oblivious to any link with a former luminary in the field of literary-theoretical studies. In fact,

within the *Tibyān* itself, apart from the preface, al-Jurjānī is only mentioned twice.[561]

There are slight variations in the structure of the three works at hand, but the nucleus is

the same: (i) prefatory remarks on the nature and definitions of *ʿilm al-bayān*; (ii) a section on

studies at the level of single words (*al-dalālāt al-ifrādiyya* 'single-word significations'), where a

treatment of *majāz* can be found as well as properties of several words and parts of speech in

different syntactic contexts (e.g., the function of a noun and verb as predicate, the functional

meanings of lexemes such as *kull* 'every; all', *kāda* 'to almost [do s.th]', and *inna* 'indeed'); and

(iii) a section on the patterns of words in combination (*murāʿāt aḥwāl al-taʾlīf* 'regarding the

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[557] *Al-Tibyān,* 32.

[558] *Al-Burhān,* 318 (for the colophon), 325 (for another manuscript used). The author does not say that this is an expansion of the *Tibyān* – this is my own impression of the work, despite the fact that the structure differs at times. It is clear, though, that much of the contents of the *Tibyān* appear here with more details, and that other relevant chapters were added. In my mind, the section that was omitted – on rhetorical figures – does not impair the fact that the *Burhān* is a faithful extension of the *Tibyān*.

[559] *Al-Mujīd,* 68.

[560] *Al-Tibyān,* 30.

[561] Ibid., 65, 126. The rest of the references cited on p. 216 are citations by the editors in the footnotes. This is not to say that Ibn al-Zamlakānī did not give him his fair due: in the preface he introduces him as *al-imām al-ʿālim al-ḥabr al-niḥrīr ʿalam al-muḥaqqiqīn ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī raḥimahu -llāh.*

states/patterns of putting [words] together'), where a treatment of mostly[562] grammatical, or

functional grammatical topics can be found (e.g., change in word order, functions of the various

categories of nominal sentences, the adjoining of sentences, and more).[563] The *Tibyān* and the

Mujīd also contain a section on rhetorical devices, conceived of as part of *ʿilm al-badīʿ* (termed *fī*

maʿrifat aḥwāl al-lafẓ wa-asmāʾ aṣnāfihi fī ʿilm al-badīʿ "on knowing the states/patterns of the

wording and the names of its categories within the science of the figures of speech"). In addition,

there is an appendix (*lawāḥiq*) in the *Tibyān* that discusses the way in which the Qurʾān's

eloquence makes it inimitable (not repeated in the *Mujīd*).

While the *Burhān* (the 'long commentary' of the *Tibyān*) adds many subsections to the

nuclear structure laid out above – as well as an entire section on the Qurʾān's inimitability – it

omits the listing of rhetorical figures.[564] Several chapters have been added to the section on

grammatical considerations ('words in combination'), among which are a handful of rhetorical

figures,[565] but the most discernible expansion is of the section on single words. In addition to

addressing a wider variety of lexical items and their functions, we also find a prolegomenon on

basic notions of expression, such as the modes of signification (speech, writing, gesturing, etc.),

the reference of signification (a notion in the mind or an entity in reality), and more.[566]

Furthermore, the section on *majāz* is now preceded by a treatment of metonymies (or *majāz*

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[562] And yet, it contains some sections that have not quite to do with grammar, like the section on conceptual comparisons termed *tamthīl*, not to be confused with *tamthīl* in the sense of metaphorical analogy, treated under section ii. See *al-Tibyān*, 108-109.

[563] Respectively: *al-Tibyān*, 30-33, 37-48, 89-162; *al-Burhān*, 44-50, 105-24, (roughly) 199-301. In *al-Mujīd* this nucleus constitutes the entire work excluding the section on rhetorical figures (157 ff.). We might recall that al-ʿAlawī in his *Ṭirāz* reworked the section on *murāʿāt aḥwāl al-taʾlīf* to fit *taʾlīf* in the sense of literary composition (§2.3).

[564] *Al-Burhān*, 53-76 (the section on *iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*).

[565] Ibid., 310-15.

[566] Ibid., 83-88.

ifrādī 'single-word *majāz*') and is appended by a chapter on *tashbīh*.[567] The influence of Fakhr

al-Dīn al-Rāzī is perhaps more discernible in the *Burhān* than it is in the earlier *Tibyān*, even

though this does not change Ibn al-Zamlakānī's basic presentation of *majāz*, which differs from

that of al-Rāzī. The few rhetorical figures discussed in the *Burhān* are now imbedded – much

like we find in al-Rāzī's *Nihāya* – within other sections of the work. Unlike the *Nihāya*, and

departing from the *Tibyān*, the illustrations given for these figures are almost entirely

Qurʾānic.[568] This situates the *Burhān* more firmly within the tradition of Qurʾānic stylistics,

although in truth, already the *Tibyān* reflects this tendency. As Ibn al-Zamlakānī states in the

Tibyān, he limited the number of literary devices to twenty-six, since several have already been

discussed under the first two sections (single words, words in combination).[569] In this he

implicitly acknowledges that some of his grammatical discussions (one might surmise: *ījāz*,

ḥadhf) are treated as rhetorical devices by other scholars. It is thus less meaningful, to my mind,

that the *Burhān* lacks a section devoted to rhetorical devices.

Since both al-Rāzī and Ibn al-Zamlakānī are direct 'redactors' or 'commentators' of al-

Jurjānī, a glance at al-Rāzī's structuring of the latter's work is in order. Al-Rāzī's *Nihāya* is also

predicated on the distinction between studies concerning single words (*fī al-mufradāt*, in al-

Rāzī's terms) and those concerning words in construction (*fī al-naẓm* lit. 'stringing of pearls').

This is an interesting point of similarity, as it is not an obvious choice in structuring al-Jurjānī's

work, and it could point to Ibn al-Zamlakānī's familiarity with the *Nihāya*. Like the *Tibyān* and

its follow-ups, grammatical topics are treated in the *Nihāya* within the section on *naẓm*, and

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[567] Ibid., 102-104, 125-32. In fact, the discussion of *tashbīh* is done within the context of *tamthīl*, which constitutes the entirety of *al-nawʿ al-thālith* in ibid., 120-32.

[568] One exception is *al-Burhān*, 314, under *iltifāt* (change in grammatical person, or deictic shifting), where a three-line passage by Imruʾ al-Qays is adduced.

[569] *Al-Tibyān*, 166.

majāz and its categories are treated under the *mufradāt*, although they involve more than one word (a point which Ibn ʿAmīra criticized Ibn al-Zamlakānī for!).[570] But within the *mufradāt*, al-Rāzī makes a distinction between signification on the level of form (*al-dalāla al-lafẓiyya*) and significations on the level of meaning (*al-dalālāt al-maʿnawiyya*), and it is here that the approach of *Nihāya* and that of the *Tibyān* (and its follow-ups) differ most. Under the *dalāla lafẓiyya* we find phonetic and phonological discussions leading to the figures of speech concerned with sound (like paronomasia, rhyming prose members, anticipation of the rhyme word at the beginning of the line). (Other figures of speech are treated under *naẓm*.)[571] Under *dalālāt maʿnawiyya* we find chapters on predication, verb complements, sentence types and definiteness, but more importantly, an extensive section on the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dyad, on *tashbīh* 'comparison/simile' and on *istiʿāra* 'metaphor' (the section on *kināya* 'periphrasis' is brief). By contrast, Ibn al-Zamlakānī's treatment of *majāz* is relatively brief, incongruent with al-Jurjānī's theory (the latter repeated by al-Rāzī), and impervious to the question of *tashbīh* (although a separate treatment of it is added in the *Burhān*).[572] Adding to the fact that Ibn al-Zamlakānī is unaware of al-Jurjānī's *Asrār* (which was used by al-Rāzī), we can safely conclude that if he had any familiarity with the *Nihāya*, it was a vague one, and that any typological resemblance

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[570] *Al-Tanbīhāt*, 55. Ibn al-Zamlakānī should have started, Ibn ʿAmīra maintains, with metonymies (word not used) like 'touching' for 'having intercourse' etc. It is interesting that in the *Burhān*, this is exactly what Ibn al-Zamlakānī does (though probably not due to Ibn ʿAmīra). We will discuss below why *majāz* is treated under the 'single word'.

[571] *Nihāya*, 113-46 (for considerations regarding the *dalāla lafẓiyya*, including figures of speech concerning sound); 283-97 (for figures of speech concerning sense, treated under *naẓm*). We are using the terms "concerning sound" and "concerning sense," but al-Rāzī does not explicitly make this distinction. In fact, he does not even identify them as *badīʿ*. At one point he uses the term *maḥāsin* 'beauties' (ibid., 122, or *ḥusn* in 284); elsewhere he speaks of *wujūh* ~'characteristics' (ibid., 285) that cannot be set into a rule that can be memorized (*thumma laysa li-hādhā l-bābi qānūnun yuḥfaẓu fa-innahu yajīʾu ʿalā wujūhin shattā wa-naḥnu nushīru hunā ilā baʿḍi l-wujūhi l-muʿtabara*; ibid., 285).

[572] Ibn al-Zamlakānī does have a few comments on comparing two things to two other things, as a comment (*tanbīh*) following the discussion of the three *majāz* categories. He also discusses some questions of similarity as a side-note to *istiʿāra*.

between that and the work of Ibn al-Zamlakānī could be coincidental. It is plausible that after writing the *Tibyān*, he was further exposed to topics occurring in the *Nihāya*, but this did not change his basic outlook.

For Ibn al-Zamlakānī, *ʿilm al-bayān* refers primarily to al-Jurjānī's idea of *tawakhkhī maʿānī al-naḥw fī al-tarkīb* lit. 'aiming [one's attention] at the semantic imports of syntax in a construction', i.e. studying how divergent syntactic constructions convey different meanings. Lexicography and syntax (*ʿilmay al-lugha wa-l-iʿrab*), he says, should be prerequisites.[573] The term *ʿilm al-maʿānī* does not occur. The definition of *ʿilm al-bayān* is later modified in the *Burhān* to include the study of *maʿānī al-majāz* lit. 'the meanings of [utterances which] go beyond [the straightforward expression]', and probably here, 'the forms of figurative speech'.[574] An addition such as this to the definition of *ʿilm al-bayān* could be an expression of 'standardist' influences, although of course, the standard *ʿilm al-bayān* looks at topics beyond what is strictly viewed as *majāz* (to wit, *tashbīh* and *kināya*).

4.3. Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. after 693/1294), *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa*

Not much is known about Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Rāzī, a Ḥanafī and Ṣūfī scholar originally from Rayy who worked in Egypt, Syria and Turkey. According to one account, the lacuna surrounding his life – he is absent from the biographical dictionaries up until the seventeenth century – has to do with his relative brief presence in the Arabic speaking lands and

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[573] *Al-Tibyān*, 32-33 (32.13-15 for *tawakhkhī maʿānī al-naḥw*). Repeated more succinctly in *al-Mujīd*, 68.

[574] *Al-Burhān*, 44: "As for its [*ʿilm al-bayān*] essence [i.e., definition], it is a science in which the forms (*maʿānī*) of figurative speech are known along with its various levels and the minding of the imports (*maʿānī*) of syntax within a construction." I suspect that the phrase *maʿānī al-majāz* is used here to complement the phrase *maʿānī al-naḥw*, but I do not think 'meanings' or 'imports' is an appropriate rendering of the former.

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his ensuing move to Konya, where Turkish sources subsequently ignored him as well.[575] But

Zayn al-Dīn was famous in his lifetime, as he was a prolifc writer and held several official

positions (see below). Zayn al-Dīn wrote an abbreviation of al-Jawharī's famous dictionary *al-*

Ṣiḥāḥ (or *al-Ṣaḥāh*), several exegetical works, both philologically and doctrinally oriented,

collections on positive law (Ḥanafī) and prophetic sayings, a Ṣūfī commentary, two works on

literary theory, a short catalogue of novel poetic images, and a commentary on al-Ḥarīrī's (d.

516/1122) *Maqāmāt*.[576] Traditionally, his death year was set after 666/1276, but evidence from

his literary-theoretical work suggests that he lived until the end of the seventh/thirteenth century

(see below).

In light of his endeavors in lexicography, literary theory, poetic imagery and poetic (here:

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[575] This is according to Aḥmad Shuʿla, the editor of *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa*, based on the account of eighteenth-century Ibn al-Ghazzī (d. 1167/1753 or 1754) in his *Dīwān al-Islām*. See Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Rāzī, *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa*, ed. Aḥmad al-Nādī Shuʿla, Cairo: Dār al-Ṭibāʿa al-Muḥammadiyya, 1982, 20-21 (English: 'The Garden of Eloquence'). He is listed in a few medieval works, like al-Maqrīzī's *Khiṭaṭ* (Brockelmann, *GAL* Suppl. 1: 658). Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām sees him as part of the larger migration of scholars who fled the eastern Islamic world following the advancement of the Mongols. See Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Rāzī, *Maghānī al-maʿānī*, ed. Muḥammad Zaghlūl Sallām, Alexandria: Munshaʾat al-Maʿārif, [1987], 29-30 (English: 'The Abodes [or: Manifestations, per Salām] of Images'). According to seventeenth-century Kâtip Çelebi, Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī completed his work *Gharīb al-Qurʾān* in 668/1269 (or 1270; *Kashf al-ẓunūn* 2: 1208), but elsewhere it is stated that he died after 660/1262 (1: 92; see also 1: 297 and 2: 1072-73, where no death year is given). For determining his death date see below. On Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī see also al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām* 6: 279.

[576] For a detailed list of eleven works, indlucing *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa*, see Brockelmann, *GAL* 1: 478 and Suppl. 1: 658-59; also al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām* 6: 279; *Rawḍa*, 24-31; *Kashf al-ẓunūn* (citations in previous footnote); Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Rāzī al-Ḥanafī, *Asʾilat al-Qurʾān al-majīd wa-ajwibatuhā*, ed. Ibrāhīm ʿAṭwa ʿIwaḍ, Qum: Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Anṣārī, 1970 (originally Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1961), panj-shesh (al-Anṣari's introduction), alif-bā (ʿIwaḍ's introduction) (English: 'Questions and Answers in the Noble Qurʾān'). In the preface to the *Asʾila* – a more doctrinally-oriented work – Zayn al-Dīn refers the reader (p. 1) to his more 'philological' exegetical work, the one dedicated to *wujūh al-iʿrāb* and *al-maʿānī* (here in the general sense of "meanings" – as in the old-fasioned verse-by-verse lexical and syntactic interpretation). This is probably his *Gharīb al-Qurʾān* (*wa-rattaba tartīb al-Jawharī* [alphabetically according to last radical] *ḍamma fīhi shayʾan min al-iʿrāb wa-l-maʿānī*; *Kashf al-ẓunūn* 2: 1208 [in Çelebi's words the *maʿānī* sound more aligned with the standard *ʿilm al-maʿānī*]). Shuʿla consulted one manuscript of Zayn al-Dīn's commentary on the *Maqāmāt*; he says that it contains many lexical and literary-critical explanations, as well as references to his work "*Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa fī ʿilm al-bayān*" (*Rawḍa*, 29-30). *Maghānī al-maʿānī* is the work on novel poetic images, and it is probably identical to what Brockelmann lists as *Muʿānī al-maʿānī* (*GAL* 1: 478). Sallām believes it is equivalent to *Kitāb fī al-abyāt allatī yutamaththalu bihā* ('On Verses that People Cite as Examples', manuscript form; *Rawḍa*, 18), but Zayn al-Dīn explicitly refers to verses that are used as quotations and those that are not (*Maghānī*, 37), so this is perhaps a different work.

maqāma) commentary, his interest in philological and poetic studies could not be overstated. His published work on literary theory, *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa* ('The Garden of Eloquence'), bears witness to his other literary-critical undertakings. First, Zayn al-Dīn refers to his now lost *Dawḥat al-balāgha* ('The Great Tree of Eloquence'), which is a study on what he views as the three most important figures of speech – *tashbīh*, *istiʿāra*, and *tawriya* 'double entendre' – and their exemplifications in poetry and prose, ancient and modern, eastern and western. He adds that one of the leading poets in constructing beautiful metaphors, both in modern and ancient times, is the Andalusian Ibn Khafāja (d. 533/1138 or 1139), whose exemplar poetry abounds in the *Dawḥa*.[577] Second, in the *Rawḍa* Zayn al-Dīn hints at his keen interest in the *maqāma*. Although he does not refer explicitly to his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī's *Maqāmāt* – perhaps it was written after the *Rawḍa* – the work is replete with an unusual number of illustrations from the *maqāma* genre, especially compared with other literary-theoretical works.[578] Zayn al-Dīn also has a predilection for al-Qāḍī al-Arrajānī (d. 544/1149), whose poetry is the one most cited in his catalogue of

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[577] *Rawḍa*, 88-89, 113, and editor's introduction, 30-31. One wonders if the imagery of gardens and trees with relation to eloquence (*rawḍat al-faṣāḥa*, *dawḥat al-balāgha*) has anything to do with Ibn Khafāja's often nature-centered poetry (on which see Magda M. al-Nowaihi, *The Poetry of Ibn Khafājah: A Literary Analysis*, Studies in Arabic Literature, vol. 16, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993, 14 ff. [quoting also Bürgel]). Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī uses the imagery of food to relate to good speech (*adab* in his words); see below.

[578] Shuʿla's index only cites the first occurrence of each scholar/poet mentioned. For references to al-Ḥarīrī's *Maqāmāt* (sometimes also to the commentary by al-Muṭarrizī [d. 610/1213]) see *Rawḍa*, 83, 116, 132, 135, 150, 155-57, 160-61, 166-67, 173, 178-79, 183, 185-86, 188, 190, 192, 195-97, 201-203, 205-207, 209, 215, 217-18, 225-26, 229-30, 235, 242-43, 245, 256, 258-60, 264, 266, 270, 276, 279, 295-96, 298-302, 306, 310. In the last instance (incidentally, the last literary device discussed), al-Ḥarīrī is mentioned under the topic of *iḥtidhāʾ*, a type of literary influence (the term *sariqāt* is not used) in which one follows the style of another without taking his wording or motifs: al-Ḥarīrī is given as an example of "writing (*waḍʿ*) the *maqāmāt* due to [the influence of] Badīʿ al-Zamān al-Hamadhānī" (*Rawḍa*, 310). As expected, many of the illustrations from al-Ḥarīrī have to do with figures of wording (like *tajnīs*, *tasjīʿ*), but by no means are they limited to them. The unusual dominance of *shawāhid* taken from al-Ḥarīrī should probably be understood in the context of al-Muṭarrizī, who prefaced his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī's *Maqāmāt* with a prolegomenon on literary devices. Al-Muṭarrizī relies explicitly on ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī as he refers to him by name; al-Muṭarrizī, *Sharḥ*, f. 2r, 4r. In this sense it is also worthy to note that al-Zamakhsharī himself (another Easterner) wrote a *maqāma* collection, which according to Abū Mūsā was well-known (*al-Balāgha al-Qurʾāniyya fī tafsīr al-Zamakhsharī*, 55. It differs from al-Ḥarīrī's model: see Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, *Maqama: A History of a Genre*, Diskurse der Arabistik 5, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002, 179 ff., but it does resemble the common *maqāma* model in its exhortatory character, on which see Ailin Qian, *The Maqāmah as Prosimetrum: A Comparative Investigation of its Origin, Form and Structure*, PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2012, 167-68).

exemplar images, far more than that of Abū Tammām or al-Mutanabbī, the common luminaries in poetic illustrations.[579] According to Zayn al-Dīn, no other poet invented as many abstract comparisons (*tashbīhāt ʿaqliyya*) as did al-Qāḍī al-Arrajānī.[580]

The *Rawḍa* also offers some biographical information on Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī. First, he was a poet himself and a writer of epistles (*rasāʾil*), samples of which are cited among the repertoire of *shawāhid* adduced (not unlike what we find with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr). All of his verses cited are in praise of rulers and high officials, and one of his prose samples describes a scene in a debate-*majlis*. The verses extol the sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir (II Yūsuf b. al-ʿAzīz, r. 634-58/1236-60 in Aleppo and 648-58/1250-60 in Damascus), the Aleppo vizier Muʾayyad al-Dīn al-Shaybānī (d. 658/1260), and the sultan al-Malik Najm al-Dīn (Ghāzī II b. Qara Arslan, r. 693-712/1294-1312 in Mardin, southeast Turkey).[581] This suggests that Zayn al-Dīn held some

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[579] *Maghānī*, 121(compare 122 for Abū Tammām, 123 for Ibn al-Rūmī [d. 283/896] and 127 for al-Mutanabbī).

[580] *Rawḍa*, 71. Here, too, Zayn al-Dīn refers the reader to the *Dawḥa*, where illustrations of such comparisons can be found. Van Gelder noted Zayn al-Dīn's unique choices of *shawāhid* in "A Good Cause: Fantastic Aetiology (*Ḥusn al-taʿlīl*) in Arabic Poetics," in Geert Jan van Gelder and Marlé Hammond (eds.), *Takhyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics*, [Cambridge, U.K.]: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2008, 221-37, here: 230.

[581] Of the eighteen *shawāhid* of his own writing cited, the majority are poetic citations: six are in praise of al-Malik al-Nāṣir (*Rawḍa*, 73-74, 83, 137, 141, 290 – said to be recited in 650 AH, 292 – said to be recited in 645 AH), three are in praise of Muʾayyad al-Dīn (ibid., 143, 202, 204), three are in praise of Najm al-Dīn (ibid., 77, 145-46 [prose], 237), one is in praise of either the Ayyūbid or the Artuqid ruler (ibid., 137 [*mawlānā al-sulṭān*]), and one is unattributed (ibid., 283 – the line is nevertheless *madḥ*). The epithet *mawlānā* precedes the mentioning of both sultans. They are mentioned both in all manuscripts used by Shuʿla; Muʾayyad al-Dīn is only mentioned in the "Tīmūrid manuscript," probably the earliest of the manuscripts as it lacks several sections on poetic forms appearing at the end of the work (ibid., 292 fn. 2). Information on reign dates can be found in Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The New Islamic Dynasties*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 70-71, 195. For "al-Wazīr al-Qifṭī" Muʾayyad al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Yūsuf, vizier of Aleppo and brother of the historian Jamāl al-Dīn and also vizier see Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr al-aʿlām*, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī, 52 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1988, 48: 335-36; al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt*, 6 (ed. S. Dedering, 1972): 172, 30 (eds. Benjamin Jokisch and Muḥammad al-Ḥujayrī, 2004): 38. For the prose segments of his own writing that Zayn al-Dīn adduces see *Rawḍa*, 102, 123, 146 (a description of one Badr al-Dīn in the *majlis munāẓara*), 147, 153. Dating the authorship of the *Rawḍa* is not straightforward. Since all references to the patrons indicate that they were in still rule (with phrases such as *khallada Allāh dawlatahu, aʿazza Allāh anṣārahu*, etc.), one concludes that he wrote the work while in Aleppo and later updated it in Mardin, where he supposedly dedicated it to the Artuqid sultan Najm al-Dīn (this dedication according to the catalogue in Dār al-Kutub, *Rawḍa*, 18, 34). In one manuscript of the work (*Rawḍa*, 312) the copy date of Sunday, 5 Ramadan 634 is given (corresponding to May 9, 1237), that is, early in al-Malik al-Nāṣir's rule. (It should be noted that the 5th of Ramadan 634 actually occurred on a Saturday.)

sort of official position in the Ayyūbid court in Aleppo and later in the Artuqid court in Mardin, or he at least enjoyed their patronage. It also suggests that he died after 693/1294, when Ghāzī II came into power, i.e., later than the commonly held date of 666/1276.[582]

The fact that Zayn al-Dīn was a poet himself may explain his emphatically 'poetic' outlook in his small work (*mukhtaṣar*) under discussion, *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa*, one that lacks the Qurʾānic perspective that we find in other works on *ʿilm al-bayān*.[583] For Zayn al-Dīn, *ʿilm al-bayān* is situated among the disciplines within *ʿilm al-adab* or *funūn al-adab* (here: the Arabic sciences) and is seen as the most important of these. Several laudatory comments on *ʿilm al-bayān* are taken verbatim (probably indirectly) from ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's *Dalāʾil*, in a section where the latter praises 'the knowledge of clear speech/eloquence' (*ʿilm al-bayān*). Parts of this section find their way into the work of Ibn al-Zamlakānī and Ibn al-Naqīb.[584] Although Zayn al-Dīn admits that one (or some) contemporary scholar refers to the discipline as *ṣināʿat al-badīʿ* 'the craft of rhetorical devices', he usually refers to the practitioners of the science as *ʿulamāʾ ʿilm al-bayān* and to the science itself as *ʿilm al-bayān*, sometimes interchanging it with *funūn al-balāgha* or *ṣanāʾiʿ al-badīʿ*.[585] The work reads like a usual listing of literary devices,

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[582] For the common dates see Shuʿla, *Rawḍa*, 23; al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām* 6: 279; van Gelder, "A Good Cause," 230. Sallām prefers the death year 696 AH, without explanation (*Maghānī*, 30). Kâtip Çelebi states that he died after 660/1262 (*Kashf al-ẓunūn* 1: 92) and yet his *Gharīb al-Qurʾān* is said to have been completed in 668/1269 (or 1270; *ibid.* 2: 1208). According to the catalogue in Dār al-Kutub (*Rawḍa*, 18 fn. 2, 34), Zayn al-Dīn wrote the *Rawḍa* in the name of the sultan Najm al-Dīn b. Qara Arslan Ghāzī II. According to Shuʿla and others, the title 'sultan' was also given to members of Ottoman ruling families, so Ghāzī II was not ruler yet when Zayn al-Dīn dedicated his verse to him (*Rawḍa*, 22*)*. The death date I settle on, after 693/1294, is close to Sallām's unreferenced death year, which I suspect is correct (and wish he explained).

[583] Though he does, of course, pay homage to the knowledge of the inimitability of the Qurʾān via *ʿilm al-bayān*; *Rawḍa*, 55. For his self-description of the work as a *mukhtaṣar* see 55.2ᵉ, 231.

[584] *Rawḍa*, 55 (*laysa* […] *fann arsakh aṣlan wa-absaq farʿan wa-aḥlā janan wa-aʿdhab wirdan* […]); *Dalāʾil*, 5-6; *al-Tibyān*, 32; al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 72-73; and see section on Ibn al-Naqīb below.

[585] *Rawḍa*, 54 ([…] *ʿilm al-bayān alladhī yusammīhi baʿḍ al-mutaʾakhkhirīn ṣināʿat al-badīʿ*), 63 (*funūn al-balāgha*), 89 (*funūn ʿilm al-bayān wa-ṣināʿat al-badīʿ*), 109 (*ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*), 118 (*ʿilm al-bayān*, quoting al-Zamakhsharī), 119 (*ṣanāʾiʿ al-badīʿ*), 193 (*funūn ʿilm al-bayān*), 211 (*ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*), 221 (*ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*), 231 (*kutub ʿilm al-bayān*), 254 (*ʿulamāʾ ʿilm al-bayān*).

and it is implicitly directed at the beginner poet or secretary as most devices are prefaced with the formulaic "that the poet or secretary do [such and such]."

Some sections in the *Rawḍa* deal exclusively with poetry, such as poetic forms that rely on visual word play or riddles (*muwashshaḥ*, *murabbaʿ*), poetic forms that combine Arabic and Persian verse (*mulammaʿ*, *tarjama*), and the topic of poetic influence (*mā yaqaʿ bayn al-shuʿarāʾ*).[586] As the foregoing terms show, it would seem that Zayn al-Dīn displays idiosyncratic terminology for certain rhetorical figures.[587] However, since there are precedents for some of these terms in early Persian poetics – in the works of Rādūyānī (active 5th/11th cent.), Rashīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ (d. end of 6th/12th cent.), and Shams-i Qays (fl. first half of 7th/13th cent.) – Zayn al-Dīn's efforts should be understood within the context of that tradition as well.[588] Zayn al-Dīn

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[586] *Rawḍa*, 293, 294, 296, 305, 307, respectively. The *muwashshaḥ* and *murabbaʿ* here having nothing to do with the well-known strophic forms called *muwashshaḥ* and *murabbaʿ*. *Muwashshaḥ* is the placing of letters or words in certain positions in the lines which ultimately make up the name of the *mamdūḥ* or an adage; the line Zayn al-Dīn adduces is Arabic but the segments make up an expression in Persian (ibid., 293). *Murabbaʿ* is a poem that can be read horizontally or vertically (ibid., 294). The two devices are to be understood in a Persian context. Yet a different meaning of form II *w.sh.ḥ* in a poetic context is the device called *tawshīḥ*, which is when the beginning of a verse bears evidence for the listener to guess its final rhyme (Qudāma, *Naqd*, 96-97; al-ʿAskarī, *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 397-99), or according to a different meaning, when every line of a poem can be disjointed at a certain point, leading to another poem with a different meter (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 216-17). Shams-i Qays uses *tawshīḥ/muwashshaḥ* as a cover term for various devices: (1) *tawshīḥ*: identical to the *tawshīḥ* mentioned by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn; (2) *muwashshaḥ*: identical to the *muwashshaḥ* in the *Rawḍa* (but even more elaborate, and the resulting additions of segments yield sayings in Arabic!); (3) *muwashshaḥ*: tree-shaped and other geometrically-shaped poems, which also contain an embedded line (visually); (4) *tawshīḥ*: poems in "chessboard" shape that can be read horizontically or vertically, seemingly identical to the *murabbaʿ* in the *Rawḍa*. See Shams-i Qays (Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Qays al-Rāzī), *al-Muʿjam fī maʿāyīr ashʿār al-ʿajam*, ed. Sirus Shamisa, Tehran: Firdaws, 1373 [1994 or 1995], 336-45 (English: 'A Compendium of the Standards of Persian Poetry'; title translation by N. Chalisova, "Persian Rhetoric: Elm-e Badiʿ and Elm-e Bayân," in J.T.P de Bruijn [ed.], *General Introduction to Persian Literature*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2009, 139-71, here: 158). On *mulammaʿ* see Nargis Virani, "*Mulammaʿ* in Islamic Literatures," in Beatrice Gruendler (ed.), with the Assistance of Michael Cooperson, *Classical Arabic Humanities in Their Own Terms: Festschrift for Wolfhart Heinrichs on 65th Birthday Presented by his Students and Colleages*, Leiden: Brill, 2008, 291-324, esp. 292, where she says that this device is not found in Arabic literary criticism.

[587] See also van Gelder, "A Good Cause," 230 (where the term *taʾkīd* covers, *inter alia*, fantastic aetiology). Another instance may be the figure termed *muʿammā*: commonly denoting a poetic riddle (or enigmatic poem) both in the Arabic and in the Persian contexts, here the *muʿammā* refers specifically to a line that contains within it hints of the name of the patron or beloved (*Rawḍa*, 305). For the common Arabic understanding (and how it differs from *lughz*) see Erez Naaman, *Literature and Literary People at the Court of al-Ṣāḥib Ibn ʿAbbād*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009, 103-105; for the common Persian understanding see Chalisova, "Persian Rhetoric," 156-57.

[588] Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Rādūyānī [sic], *Tarjumān al-balāgha*, ed. Ahmed Ateş, Istanbul: İbrahim Horoz

quotes "al-Rashīd al-Waṭwāṭ" once, but in a section unrelated to the 'Persian' literary devices.[589]

No special mention of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is made, but Zayn al-Dīn does cite al-Ghānimī, one of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's sources.[590] Similarly, no mention of 'standardist' scholars is made, though we do come across some terms and notions that are associated with the (eventual) standard tradition. One scholar who is most probably the source of such would-be standard notions is ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Zanjānī (active 660/1262), who spent most of his scholarly life in the Islamic East. The third part of al-Zanjānī's literary theoretical work, *Miʿyār al-nuẓẓār*, displays several structural similarities with the *Rawḍa*, and it is probably al-Zanjānī who Zayn al-Dīn is referring to in using the term *badīʿ*, since the former uses *ʿilm al-badīʿ* as a cover term for "the two sciences of *maʿānī* and *bayān*" (an appellation found in al-Zamakhsharī and al-Sakkākī).[591] The

Basimevi, 1949, 4-7 (table of contents, Persian text, and e.g. 115-18 for *tarjama*; I am not certain his *murabbaʿ* and *muwashshaḥ* are identical to Zayn al-Dīn's account) (English: 'The Interpreter of Eloquence'); Rashīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ, *Ḥadāyiq al-siḥr fī daqāyiq al-shiʿr*, ed. and trans. N.Yu. Chalisova, Moscow: Izdatel'stwo "Nauka," 1985, esp. 292-304 (Persian text; note especially the identical explanation and *shāhid* for *murabbaʿ*) (English: 'The Gardens of Enchantment on the Fine Points of Poetry'); Shams-i Qays, *al-Muʿjam*, e.g. 336-45 (the case of *tawshīḥ/ muwashshaḥ*). Note al-Waṭwāṭ's choice of title *ḥadāyiq* 'gardens' vis-à-vis Zayn al-Dīn's *rawḍa* and *dawḥa*. None of the Persian works are referenced in the *Rawḍa*, but the Arabic work by al-Waṭwāṭ is (see above), as well as a line by al-Waṭwāṭ, adduced anonymously (*Rawḍa*, 76 fn.2). In addition to Persian context, the *maqāma* context is also of relevance, since some of these poetic forms are exhibited in *maqāma* literature: see, e.g., Zayn al-Dīn's citation of a verse by al-Ḥarīrī in the device called *musammaṭ* (*Rawḍa*, 195, and editor's fn.1).

[589] *Rawḍa*, 198, in the section on morphology-based paronomasia (*ishtiqāq*). Here both al-Muṭarrizī and al-Waṭwāṭ are quoted in succession, the first presumably from his commentary on al-Ḥarīrī's *maqāmāt*, and the second presumably from his Arabic work on poetics (now lost), since the Qurʾānic example he adduces does not match any of the ones cited in the *Ḥadāyiq* (p. 237; but the argument is the same – namely, that *ishtiqāq* was considered by the specialists as a type of *tajnīs*). Zayn al-Dīn quotes al-Muṭarrizī on another occasion, also in the context of *tajnīs* (*Rawḍa*, 192-93).

[590] *Rawḍa*, 144, 190. A sample of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's prose is adduced (ibid., 134-35).

[591] Abū l-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Ibrāhīm al-Kharajī al-Zanjānī, *Miʿyār al-nuẓẓār fī ʿulūm al-ashʿār, al-qism al-thālith fī l-badīʿ*, ed. ʿAbd al-Munʿim Sayyid ʿAbd al-Salām al-Ashqar, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Amāna, 1995, 3 (English: 'A Standard for the Students of the Poetic Disciplines'). Here, too, remarks on the merit of the science are derived from ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's famous passage (see above). Here, too, many illustrations by al-Ḥarīrī are provided. Al-Zanjānī is author of the more popular *al-Taṣrīf al-ʿIzzī* ('The Morphology [Book] of ʿIzz al-Dīn'), on which many commentaries were written, the most famous of which is by al-Taftāzānī. See Wolfhart Heinrichs [signed "Eds."], "al-Zandjānī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. Similar to Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī, also much of al-Zanjānī's life is obscure, including his date of death. He spent some time in Mosul and the last part of his life in Baghdad, where he wrote the *Taṣrīf*, but most of his life was spent in various cities in the Islamic East (Brockelmann situates him within the scholars of Baghdad; *GAL* 1: 336-37, Suppl. 1: 497-98). According to al-Ashqar, he wrote the *Miʿyār* in Bukhara (*Miʿyār*, editor's introduction, 33). This may explain al-Zanjānī's unawareness of the

Miʿyār is devoted to the entirety of poetic disciplines, including metrics and rhyme, but the third

part on rhetorical figures seems to have been a source Zayn al-Dīn was familiar with. Metaphor

and figurative language are a case in point and will be discussed below. One last work worthy of

mention within the 'standard'-like sphere is al-Zamakhsharī's *Kashshāf*, whose possible

influence on Zayn al-Dīn's study of metaphor will also be discussed below.

The *Rawḍa* opens with brief definitions of near-synonyms that mean 'eloquence': *faṣāḥa*,

balāgha, *bayān* and *ījāz* (*bayān* is said to be close in meaning to *faṣāḥa*; *balāgha* is closely

associated with *ījāz*).[592] Then the ten most noble figures of speech are discussed (*ashraf funūn al-*

balāgha). These are primarily devices concerned with sense: simile/comparison (*tashbīh*),

metaphor (*istiʿāra*), double entendre (*tawriya*, also called *īhām*, *takhyīl* or *mughālaṭa*),

appropriate complementing [of an image] (*tanāsub*), emphatic confirmation (*taʾkīd*, which

includes the notion of fantastic aetiology, better known as *ḥusn al-taʿlīl*), embedded well-known

poetic quotation (*taḍmīn*), and embedded quotation from the revelation (*iqtibās*). Some of the ten

categories are devices concerned with sound: mirror sentences (*ʿaks al-jumal*), mirror words

(*qalb*) and paronomasia (*tajnīs*).[593] The remainder of the work is devoted to an array of

additional literary devices, both concerned with sense (e.g. antithesis, *taḍādd* or *muṭābaqa*;

exaggeration, *al-ighrāq fī l-ṣifa*) and concerned with sound or form (e.g., certain poetic forms

called *muwashshaḥ*, *murabbaʿ*, *musammaṭ* and more).[594] It seems that the concluding categories

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growing pervasiveness of *ʿilm al-bayān* as a heading for literary-theoretical studies, at least in the central Arabic speaking lands. The only scholar I am aware of who lived in the Islamic East and used the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān/ ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* is al-Muṭarrizī (see fn. 437); he was probably following al-Jurjānī directly.

[592] *Rawḍa*, 57-62. Under one of two *ījāz* types the example of *wa-sʾali l-qarya* "ask the city" is adduced (Q 18:82). Ibn al-Zamlakānī counted this as a case of metonymy.

[593] *Rawḍa*, 63-193. Many of these ten categories are further divided into sub-categories (for some reason he refers to them as nine categories in ibid., 193).

[594] Ibid., 194-312, and see our discussion of the Persian context, above.

in the book dealing with poetic forms and with poetic influence (*mā yaqaʿ bayn al-shuʿarāʾ*
~"that which is up for grabs for the poets") was added by Zayn al-Dīn in a later iteration of the
work.[595] Interestingly, as a clearly poetic work directed at beginner writers of verse or prose,
noteworthy is the absence of a chapter on *majāz*.

4.4. Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298), Introduction to *Tafsīr*

Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, known as "Ibn al-Naqīb the exegete," was a Palestinian
scholar with origins from Balkh who worked in Mamlūk Cairo and Jerusalem. He was born in
Jerusalem, and after moving to Cairo he taught at several *madrasas*, among them the ʿĀshūriyya,
and was associated with the al-Azhar mosque. According to the sources, he was a very well
respected scholar and a prominent Ṣūfī. The grammarian Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī (d. 745/1344)
and the historian al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348) were among his students. Ibn al-Naqīb is known for a
single work, an extensive Qurʾānic commentary said to have combined the works of fifty
exegetes and a variety of exegetical material. (It numbered eighty volumes according to one
account; seventy according to another; yet ninety-nine according to a third.)[596]

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[595] Ibid., 293-312, which is absent from the early Tīmūrid manuscript (see ibid., 292, and above). We should mention here a newer edition of the *Rawḍa* based on a much corrupted manuscript from Chester Beatty; the editor corrects its many errors. This manuscript is even later than the ones Shuʿla used for his edition, as the structure is more developed and additional 'standard' terms appear. For instance, all literary devices are numbered – fifty-four in all – and are presented at the outset by the author. Also, a brief note about the disagreement surrounding the definitions of *maʿānī*, *bayān* and *badīʿ* is given, suggesting that he was now aware of the tripartite terms. Many of the *shawāhid* are different, including those of his own authoring. Less than a handful of illustrations of his own writing are now adduced and no patron is mentioned. See Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr al-Rāzī, *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa*, ed. Khālid ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Jabr, Amman: Dār al-Wāʾil, 2005.

[596] Al-Ziriklī, *al-Aʿlām* 7: 21; al-Ṣafadī, *Kitāb al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt*, 3 (ed. S. Dedering, 1953): 136-37; Muḥammad b. Shākir al-Kutubī, *Fawāt al-wafayāt wa-l-dhayl ʿalayhā*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās, 5 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1973-78?, 3: 382-83; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad al-ʿUlaymī, *al-Uns al-jalīl bi-tārīkh al-Quds wa-l-Khalīl*, ed. Muḥammad Baḥr al-ʿUlūm, 2 vols., Najaf: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya, 1968, 2: 217; Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-Sulūk li-maʿrifat duwal al-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyāda, 4 vols. in 12, Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1956-73, 1: 881; and editor's introduction of Abū ʿAbd Allāh Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Balkhī al-Maqdisī al-Ḥanafī, *Muqaddimat tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb* (formerly known as Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's *al-Fawāʾid al-mushawwiq ilā ʿulūm al-Qurʾān wa-ʿilm al-bayān*), ed. Zakariyyā Saʿīd ʿAlī, Cairo:

While most of Ibn al-Naqīb's voluminous *tafsīr* did not survive, we do have what is

believed to be the introduction to that work, formerly known as *al-Fawāʾid al-mushawwiq ilā*

ʿulūm al-Qurʾān wa-ʿilm al-bayān and falsely attributed to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d.

751/1350).[597] This introduction is mentioned by Abū Ḥayyān (d. 745/1344) in the preface to his

Qurʾānic commentary *al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ* as one of the two most comprehensive works in "*ʿilm al-*

bayān wa-l-badīʿ," the other being Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī's (d. 684/1285) *Minhāj al-bulaghāʾ*.

According to Abū Ḥayyān, the work consisted of two volumes and was prefaced to Ibn al-

Naqīb's work on *tafsīr*.[598] Zakariyya Saʿīd ʿAlī republished the *Fawāʾid* as *Muqaddimat tafsīr*

Ibn al-Naqīb after examining a variety of idiosyncratic usages of rhetorical notions in Abū

Ḥayyān's *tafsīr* that correspond to usages in the alleged *Fawāʾid*, and cross-referenced them with

evidence from al-Suyūṭī's (d. 911/1505) *Sharḥ ʿuqūd al-jumān*, a rhetorical work within the

standard system.[599] Together with evidence from the preface, which contains phraseology

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Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1995, 32-36. Brockelmann does not cite him. ʿUlaymī gives another possible death date of 697/1297. Ibn al-Naqīb's *tafsīr* is titled *al-Taḥrīr wa-l-taḥbīr li-aqwāl aʾimmat al-tafsīr fī maʿānī kalām al-Samīʿ al-Baṣīr* (*Muqaddimat tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb*, editor's introduction, 36, citing Kâtip Çelebi).

[597] See the work republished by Zakariyyā Saʿīd ʿAlī in the previous footnote. According to ʿAlī, various sections of the *tafsīr* remain in manuscript form in Istanbul, Cairo, Rabat, Marrakesh, Tunis and Baghdad (*Muqaddima*, editor's introduction, 37-38, and fn. 5 on pp. 38-39). The edition of the original *Fawāʾid* that I consulted is Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Kitāb al-Fawāʾid al-mushawwiq ilā ʿulūm al-Qurʾān wa-ʿilm al-bayān*, Gujranwala: Dār Nashr al-Kutub al-Islāmiyya, 1974 (which is a reprint of the 1909 Cairo edition, ed. Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn al-Naʿsānī).

[598] *Muqaddima*, editor's introduction, 23; Athīr al-Dīn Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Andalusī al-Gharnāṭī al-Jayyānī al-shahīr bi-Abī Ḥayyān, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr al-musammā bi-l-baḥr al-muḥīṭ*, 8 vols., Riyadh: Maktabat al-Naṣr al-Ḥadītha, [n.d.], (reprint of the 1911 Cairo edition), 1: 6.17-21 (English: 'The Large Commentary called The Encompassing Ocean'). Abū Ḥayyān later uses the phrases *ʿilm al-balāgha wa-l-bayān* (ibid., 1: 9.11).

[599] *Muqaddima*, editor's introduction, 21-29. ʿAlī also looked at al-Suyūṭī's *al-Itqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* for some of his corroborations. The idiosyncratic rhetorical usages include notions such as *al-iḥtijāj al-naẓarī*, *talmīḥ*, *tawriya*, and more. Among the other evidence ʿAlī gives for the misattribution of the work to Ibn al-Qayyim and its identification as the introduction to Ibn al-Naqīb's *tafsīr*, we may mention (i) none of the biographical entries acknowledge a work by Ibn al-Qayyim titled *al-Fawāʾid* (*Muqaddima*, editor's introduction, 13-14); (ii) Ibn al-Qayyim – a Ḥanbalī – famously rejected the existence of *majāz* in language, let alone in the Qurʾān, and the alleged *Fawāʾid* acknowledges a *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dichotomy (ibid., 15-17); and (iii) there are respectful references in the work to al-Zamakhsharī, al-Rāzī and Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (whereas elsewhere Ibn al-Qayyim spoke of them unfavorably). It should be mentioned that ʿAlī republished the work under the title *Muqaddimat tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb fī ʿilm al-bayān wa-l-maʿānī wa-l-badīʿ wa-iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*, but we do not know the exact title of the work.

grounded in the Qurʾānic commentary tradition, one is strongly inclined to accept the work as the

introduction to Ibn al-Naqīb's *tafsīr*.[600]

The subject matter of Ibn al-Naqīb's *Muqaddima* is unequivocally *ʿilm al-bayān*. Ibn al-

Naqīb dedicates the work to this field and to the various manifestations of it (*ʿilm al-bayān*) in

the Qurʾān, closely aligning himself with the tradition of writings on *badīʿ*, or the listing of

literary devices.[601] Indeed, the appellation of *ʿilm al-bayān* covers the old *naqd* and *badīʿ* works,

as the scholars of this science (*ʿulamāʾ ʿilm al-bayān*) whose work Ibn al-Naqīb says to have

consulted include the early Ibn al-Muʿtazz, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥātimī (d. 388/998) and Abū Hilāl al-

ʿAskarī. But *ʿilm al-bayān* is represented as a science alongside lexicography and grammar,

which together with knowledge of the poems, sermons, letters, *rajaz*-metered verse and primitive

rhymed prose of the Arabs, constitute the crux of identifying the Qurʾān's merit.[602] According to

this account, *ʿilm al-bayān* is an endeavor distinct from the examination of (*naẓara fī*) the Arabs'

literary repertoire, and is thus afforded a 'scientific' status. Recounting a motif we already

encountered in the work of Ibn al-Zamlakānī and Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī (and originating from al-

Jurjānī), Ibn al-Naqīb states that no discipline in the Islamic sciences has been abandoned and

forgotten like that of *ʿilm al-bayān*.[603] Other *ʿilm al-bayān* sources Ibn al-Naqīb cites in his

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[600] Typical commentarial themes include the Qurʾānic "genres" (*amr-nahy*, *waʿd-waʿīd*, *mawāʿiẓ*, *qiṣaṣ*, etc.) and the unique idiom that makes it inimitable (*Muqaddima*, 6-11). Furthermore, at the end of the work the author provides definitions for the terms *Qurʾān*, *sūra*, *āya*, *kalima* and *ḥarf*, a section "which should have been mentioned earlier in the beginning of the book" (ibid., 506).

[601] *wa-sanūridu fī kitābinā hādhā uṣūlan muʾaṣṣalatan wa-fawāʾida mufaṣṣalatan min ʿilmi l-bayāni wa-mā warada naẓīruhu fī l-Qurʾāni*; ibid., 12. References to *ʿilm al-bayān* and *ʿulamāʾ/arbāb ʿilm al-bayān* abound (*ulamāʾ hādhihi l-ṣināʿa* also recurs). Examples are ibid., 15.2-3ᵉ, 20.8, 21.1, 96.4 (*anwāʿ al-bayān wa-aṣnāf al-badīʿ*), 148.9, 166.12, 167.4 (*ḍurūb ʿilm al-bayān*), 325.3 (note typo), 380.4, 498.3.

[602] *wa-innamā yaʿrifu faḍla l-Qurʾāni man ʿarafa kalāma l-ʿarabi fa-ʿarafa ʿilma l-lughati wa-ʿilma l-ʿarabiyyati wa-ʿilma l-bayāni wa-naẓara fī ashʿāri l-ʿarabi wa-khuṭabihā wa-muqāwalātihā fī mawāṭini -ftikhārihā wa-rasāʾilihā wa-arājīzihā wa-asjāʿihā […]*; ibid., 12.

[603] Ibid., 15; Ibn al-Zamlakānī, *al-Tibyān*, 32 (following al-Jurjānī, *Dalāʾil*, 6).

preface are the *Mathal* and *Jāmiʿ* by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, *Kitāb al-Badīʿ* of Usāma b.

Munqidh (d. 584/1188), a work called *Nihāyat al-taʾmīl fī kashf asrār al-tanzīl* by Ibn al-

Zamlakānī ("Kamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Anṣārī"), and a work called *al-*

Tafrīʿ fī ʿilm al-badīʿ by Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ.[604] The scholar most cited by name in Ibn al-Naqīb's

work is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr.[605] Others whose imprint in the work is visible are Fakhr al-Dīn

al-Rāzī (his epitome of al-Jurjānī's works) and ʿIzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Sulamī (his work

on *majāz*). Their influence will be discussed under the deliberation of *majāz*.

Ibn al-Naqīb refers to *badīʿ* as a science – *ʿilm* – as well (although, as in the case of Ibn

Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, the phrase *ʿilm al-badīʿ* does not occur). In an idiosyncratic usage, he claims that

badīʿ as a science refers to the figures of speech pertaining primarily to wording.[606] Accordingly,

what follows is a study of literary devices concerned with sound (*bimā yataʿallaqu bi-l-alfāẓ*),

whereas the preceding literary devices were concerned with sense (*fīmā yataʿallaqu bi-l-*

maʿānī).[607] But even within the section on the aural literary devices, or the so-called study of

badīʿ, the scholarly group Ibn al-Naqīb defers to is *ʿulamāʾ ʿilm al-bayān*,[608] revealing a de facto

prevalence of the heading *ʿilm al-bayān* as the framework of study.

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[604] *Muqaddima*, 12-15. According to Zakariyyā ʿAlī, the latter is equivalent to *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*. The title by Ibn al-Zamlakānī is a work of *tafsīr* (ibid., editor's introduction, 64); it is mentioned by Kâtip Çelebi (ibid., 14, fn. 4). Two unknown works by al-Zanjānī (author of the *Miʿyār*) are also cited by Ibn al-Naqīb as sources (and cf. ibid., 14, fn. 3, and editor's introduction, 60-62). It is noteworthy that Ibn al-Naqīb attributes both the *Jāmiʿ* and the *Mathal* to the same person (cf. the common misattribution of the *Jāmiʿ* to one of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's brothers, §4.1).

[605] Ibid., 642-43.

[606] The definition he provides runs as follows: *wa-l-badīʿu ʿilmun yubḥathu fīhi ʿan aḥwāli l-lafẓi l-muʾallafi min ḥaythu lā yumkinu an yuʾtā bihi illā bi-ḥusni -ntiẓāmin* "*badīʿ* is a science in which the states/patterns of words in composition [as opposed to words in isolation] are examined, such that they can only be uttered in a well-ordered fashion" (ibid., 451; *al-Fawāʾid*, 218). It may seem from this definition that the *lafẓ* is a reference to the hypernym 'word', which includes both its wording and its meaning (cf. Ibn Sīnā's definition of speech as *al-lafẓ al-muʾallaf*), but in fact, Ibn al-Naqīb is using *lafẓ* here as a hyponym for 'wording'.

[607] *Muqaddima*, 176, 451.

[608] E.g., ibid., 498, when discussing *tajnīs* 'paronomasia'.

The *Muqaddima* is divided into three large sections: the first deals with *majāz* and

comprises twenty-four categories; the second deals with conceptual figures of speech (*mā*

yataʿallaqu bi-l-maʿānī or *balāgha*) and comprises eighty-four categories; the third deals with

aural and rhythmical figures of speech (*mā yataʿallaqu bi-l-alfāẓ* or *faṣāḥa*, specifically

identified as *badīʿ*) and comprises twenty-four categories.[609] The figures of speech presented are

not limited to those that occur in the Qurʾān (despite the author's original intention), resulting in

a collection not unlike other works on *badīʿ*. Preceding the first section are some prefatory

definitions (of *balāgha*, *faṣāḥa*, *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*). Following the last section are several

'appendices' that include (i) key definitions of Qurʾānic terms (*Qurʾān*, *sūra*, *āya*, *kalima*, *ḥarf*),

(ii) a presentation of the various views on the Qurʾān's inimitability, and (iii) a brief enumeration

of nearly a hundred and twenty categories of "[God's] address" (*khiṭāb*) found in the Qurʾān.[610]

The latter enumeration of *khiṭāb* overlaps, to a certain degree, with *majāz* categories, but it is

wider in scope. It is presented as a notion constituting all types of variation and 'deviation' in

speech (*talwīn al-khiṭāb wa-maʿdūluhu*), with a focus on lexical 'deviation' (such as

metonymies) and pragmatic 'deviation' (such as implicatures).[611] Perhaps it is a testament to the

early usage of *majāz* as encompassing all types of non-transparent idiomatic speech.

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[609] *Muqaddima*, 17-176, 176-449, 451-505, respectively. Ibn al-Naqīb states, in error, that the first section comprises eighty-four categories (p. 17), but later the correct number appears (p. 176). On the *balāgha-faṣāḥa* difference see ibid., 20, 451. The aural and rhythmical figures of speech are not devoid of 'conceptual' figures. For example, *fakk* (as opposed to *sabk*) refers to a 'disconnection' between one hemistich (or parallel member) and another, similar to a parenthetical comment (ibid., 467). Similarly, *al-ḥall wa-l-ʿaqd* 'prosification and versification' (ibid., 468) does not involve pure wording or rhythm.

[610] Ibid., 19-25 (prefatory definitions), 506-10 (appended definition), 511-25 (*iʿjāz al-Qurʾān*), 526-34 (types of *khiṭāb*).

[611] Some examples will be given below, §5.4.

4.5. Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316), *al-Iksīr fī ʿilm al-tafsīr*

Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī was an Iraqi scholar from Ṣarṣar who worked primarily in Mamlūk Cairo. He was educated in Baghdad and later in Damascus, where he came in contact with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328). Al-Ṭūfī wrote prolifically on a variety of themes, from law, exegesis, theology and interreligious polemics, to Ḥadīth and philology, including literary theory. He is an interesting character in the pre-modern scholarly tradition because he does not fit neatly into usual rubrics of identification: known primarily for his Ḥanbalī affiliation – his view on *maṣlaḥa* 'public interest' being a contentious point – he was also seen as having Shīʿī leanings, an accusation which allegedly caused his imprisonment in Egypt. Prior to his imprisonment, al-Ṭūfī held teaching positions at the Manṣūriyya and Nāṣiriyya colleges. Of his notable edited works we may mention the *Commentary on the Christian Scriptures* (recently edited by Lejla Demiri), *Divine Intimations to Doctrinal Investigations* (published by Abū ʿĀṣim Ḥasan b. ʿAbbās b. Quṭb), and *The Banner of Exhilaration on the Science of Disputation* (edited by Wolfhart Heinrichs).[612]

A common thread within al-Ṭūfī's works is the centrality of Qurʾānic exegesis therein, though not couched in these terms. His *al-Ishārāt al-Ilāhiyya*, noted above, can be described as a

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[612] Lajla Demiri, *Muslim Exegesis of the Bible in Medieval Cairo. Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī's (d. 716/1316) Commentary on the Christian Scriptures. A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation with an Introduction*, Leiden: Brill, 2013 (a critical edition of *al-Taʿālīq ʿalā l-Anājīl al-arbaʿa wa-l-taʿlīq ʿalā l-Tawrāh wa-ʿalā ghayrihā min kutub al-anbiyāʾ*); *al-Ishārāt al-ilāhiyya ilā l-mabāḥith al-uṣūliyya*, prepared for publication by Abū ʿĀṣim Ḥasan b. ʿAbbās b. Quṭb, 3 vols., Cairo: al-Fārūq al-Ḥadītha li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa-l-Nashr, 2002; *ʿAlam al-jadhal fī ʿilm al-jadal. Das Banner der Frölichkeit über die Wissenschaft vom Disput*, ed. Wolfhart Heinrichs, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1987. On al-Ṭūfī's life, and the Shīʿī question, see Khālid b. Fawzī b. ʿAbd-Ḥamīd Ḥamza, introduction to *al-Ishārāt al-ilāhiyya*, 88-92, and Demiri, *Muslim Exegesis*, 3-15. Both reject the Shīʿī accusation, though Demiri notes Devin Stewart's reasons for accepting it (p. 11). But one should note in this context the relatively frequent references al-Ṭūfī gives to the poetry and critical comments of one Ibn al-Muqarrab al-Baḥrānī, an East-Arabian poet-critic of the early seventh/thirteenth century who had strong Shīʿī leanings (for the citations see the appendix to al-Ṭūfī's literary critical work discussed below; on Ibn al-Muqarrab see Safa Khulusi, "A Thirteenth Century Poet from Bahrain," *Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies* 6 [1976], 91-102). Demiri shows that al-Ṭūfī was not a well-known student of the Ḥanbalī scholar Ibn Taymiyya, but was rather one out of many students who attended his sessions. Demiri includes a very useful, and detailed, appendix of al-Ṭūfī's works (*Muslim Exegesis*, 529 ff.). See also Brockelmann, *GAL* 2: 132, Suppl. 2: 133-34.

theological commentary on the Qurʾān, whereby the author goes verse by verse, according to the order of the *sūras*, explicating doctrinal and legal-theoretical issues. According to al-Ṭūfī, an examination of the Qurʾān within the field of doctrinal theology has gone by the wayside in his times.[613] In *al-Ṣaʿqa al-ghaḍabiyya*, a defense of the study of Arabic grammar and philology, al-Ṭūfī dedicates the bulk of the work to syntactic analyses of Qurʾānic verses which have a bearing on legal issues.[614] His work on disputation, *ʿAlam al-jadhal*, is likewise a study of Qurʾānic verses, this time from the view point of dialectics. Even his strictly literary-critical work on the poetry of Imruʾ al-Qays contains methodological measures that are proclaimed to be informative for Qurʾānic exegetical study.[615] He also tackled *tafsīr*, or exegesis, directly, in his commentaries on several *sūras* of the Qurʾān, written during his time in prison.[616] In this sense, his work on literary theory titled *al-Iksīr fī ʿilm al-tafsīr* complements his other engagements with Qurʾānic commentary.[617]

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[613] Al-Ṭūfī, *al-Ishārāt* 1: 206 (*wa-innamā ʿadala l-mutaʾakhkhirūna fī uṣūli l-dīni ʿani -ʿtibāri l-kitābi wa-l-sunna*).

[614] Abū al-Rabīʿ Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawī b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Ṭūfī, *al-Ṣaʿqa al-ghaḍabiyya fī al-radd ʿalā munkirī al-ʿarabiyya*, ed. Muḥammad b. Khālid al-Fāḍil, Riyadh: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1997, 329-631 (English: 'The Wrathful Blast of Thunder, On Rejecting Those Who Deny [the Study of] Arabic'). Most of the grammatical questions revolve around the function of particles (ibid., 373); the topics are arranged according the order of chapters found in *al-Muḥarrar fī al-fiqh*, a Ḥanbalī legal treatise (ibid., 374).

[615] Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawī b. ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Saʿīd al-Ṭūfī, *Mawāʾid al-ḥays fī fawāʾid Imriʾ al-Qays*, ed. Muṣṭafā ʿUlayyān, Amman: Dār al-Bashīr, 1994 (English: 'Tables Full of Sweets, On the Meanings of [the Poetry of] Imruʾ al-Qays', following al-Ṭūfī's explanation of the title, p. 118). Ḥays is an assortment of bread, butter and candy, and what prompted al-Ṭūfī to use this in the title of his work was – besides rhyme considerations – a piece of Ḥays that was thrown to him during one of his travels by a group of people on their way to the pilgrimage: it was, he says, the best Ḥays he ever ate (*Mawāʾid*, 119). This is not the only connection he makes between food and cultural literacy: in his explanation of the word *adab* – referring, in its technical meaning, to philological knowledge – he says that it derives out of the meaning of *adb* 'calling people to come and eat' (*al-Ṣaʿqa*, 221; in this he follows the traditional etymology, cf. *maʾduba*). Following the chapter in this book dealing with segments of Imruʾ al-Qays's poetry that resemble one another across his oeuvre, al-Ṭūfī says that this exercise "has many benefits" and that he employed it in his (now lost) *al-Riyāḍ al-nawāḍir fī al-ashbāh wa-l-nawāẓir*, "a book of commentary" (*wa-huwa kitābu tafsīrin*); *Mawāʾid*, 157. In other words, this method in poetic criticism is useful in studying parallels or analogous passages in the Qurʾān.

[616] Demiri, *Muslim Exegesis*, 530. Note too that Brockelmann treats him under the rubric 'Qorʾānwissenschaften' (*GAL* 2: 132, Suppl. 2: 133-34).

[617] Al-Ṭūfī Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawī b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Ṣarṣarī al-Baghdādī, *al-Iksīr fī ʿilm al-tafsīr*, ed. ʿAbd al-

Al-Ṭūfī's interest in the philological studies went beyond their application to exegesis. In addition to the *Iksīr* and his work on Imruʾ al-Qays, al-Ṭūfī also authored a commentary on al-Ḥarīrī's *Maqāmāt* and a work on poetics. The latter, titled *al-Shiʿār ʿalā mukhtār al-ashʿār* ~"The Distinguishing Token on the Best Poems Spoken," is a work of pure poetic criticism and it seems to have been an early work by al-Ṭūfī.[618]

As its title suggests, the *Iksīr* purports to deal directly with the discipline and rules of exegesis (*ʿilm al-tafsīr, ʿilm al-Kitāb, qawāʿid al-tafsīr*).[619] The difficulty of the science of *tafsīr*, says al-Ṭūfī in the opening of the work, is something that has preoccupied him for some time. Having found that the authors of exegetical works did not consentaneously attend to this issue, he set out to lay down a rule (*qānūn*) that one could go by and rely on when writing a work of *tafsīr*.[620] He precedes this undertaking with a detailed critique of the historical development of exegetical practices, one that resulted in a haphazard and subjective scholarly endeavor (*kathura al-dakhal fī al-tafsīr; taṣrīḥ kathīr min al-mufassirīn bi-nisbat aqwālihim ilā anfusihim*).[621] Interestingly, however, the crux of al-Ṭūfī's efforts lies within the study of stylistics, that is, outside the exegetical practice proper. The awaited *qānūn* that he so forcefully speaks about is in

Qādir Ḥusayn, Cairo: Maktabat al-Ādāb wa-Maṭbaʿatuhā, 1977 (English: 'An Elixir in the Science of *Tafsīr*'). We do not know when the work was composed. According to Demiri, the book treats "the importance and role of linguistics in Qurʾānic exegesis" (*Muslim Exegesis*, 529). She continues (ibid., parentheses hers): "It also reflects upon the literary (*faṣāḥa* and *balāgha*) and stylistic features (*ījāz-iṭnāb* and *taqdīm-taʾkhīr*) of the Qurʾān."

[618] For his *Maqāmāt* commentary see Kâtip Çelebi, *Kashf al-ẓunūn* 2: 1790; Demiri, *Muslim Exegesis*, 534. For his work on poetics see *al-Ishārāt*, editor's introduction 1: 142-43; Demiri, *Muslim Exegesis*, 531. The work was recently edited, based on a unicum in Beyazit State Library: Najm al-Dīn Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī, *al-Shiʿār ʿalā mukhtār naqd al-ashʿār*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Nāṣir al-Māniʿ, Riyadh: Jāmiʿat al-Malik Saʿūd, Kursī al-Duktūr ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Māniʿ li-Dirāsāt al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya wa-Ādābihā, 2011. It became available to me at the very final stages of writing, and I was unable to incoroporate it here.

[619] *Al-Iksīr*, 1, where all three terms appear. Demiri lists the work as *al-Iksīr fī qawāʿid al-tafsīr* (*Muslim Exegesis*, 529).

[620] *Al-Iksīr*, 1, 11, 16.

[621] Ibid., 6-11, 15-16, 25-27 (the quotes are taken from p. 6 and p. 9: "much disorder has taken place in exegesis"; "the fact that many exegetes explicitly attribute their opinions to themselves").

fact marginalized in favor of rhetorical and literary-theoretical issues, which constitute the bulk

of the work – a close reworking of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, which is highly praised by

al-Ṭūfī at the outset.[622] When it is discussed, the *qānūn* does not quite present a neat

methodology for the exegete, and judging by al-Ṭūfī's account, it may well explain the alleged

lawlessness in the field.[623] The rule goes as follows: whenever the divine discourse is not plainly

understood (*bayyin bi-nafsihi*, *al-mafhūm*), one must have recourse to interpretation relying

either on an irrefutable rational proof, an abundantly-transmitted prophetic report, a scholarly

consensus, or a solitary report that is sound.[624] Things become less clear-cut, however, when

none of these measures are applicable. In this case, it must be examined whether weaker

evidence may corroborate 'what is understood' (*al-mafhūm*, *mā fuhima*) from the plain wording

or from the implied meanings of the wording – here terminology from legal theory is employed –

even if this leads to multiple meanings of the text. Al-Ṭūfī's assertion, according to which all

meanings in this case would be plausible, stands somewhat at odds with his earlier critique of the

multiplicity of exegetical opinions. To be sure, emphasis is put on interpretation of the *lafẓ*

'wording', as long as it accords with a plausible intention of the speaker (*murād*, *irāda*) – that is,

God's intention.[625]

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[622] Devin Stewart characterizes the *Iksīr* as a work on rhetoric of the Qurʾān. He provides instances in which sections of the *Iksīr* repeat Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's statements almost verbatim. See Devin Stewart, "Poetic License in the Qurʾān: Ibn al-Ṣāʾigh al-Ḥanafī's *Iḥkām al-rāy fī aḥkām al-āy*," *Journal of Qurʾanic Studies* 11.1 (2009), 1-56, here: 27.

[623] The explanation of the *qānūn* runs several paragraphs; see *al-Iksīr*, 11-14.

[624] Ibid., 11. This puts al-Ṭūfī add odds with the exegetical project espoused by Ibn Taymiyya and, indeed, points to the marginality of the so-called *al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr* (exegesis based on the words of the Prophet-companions-successors) even within Ḥanbalī circles. On the marginal place of the latter in *tafsīr* (but its infiltration, nevertheless, into Western academic scholarship) see the important study by Walid Saleh, "Preliminary Remarks on the Historiography of *tafsīr* in Arabic: A History of the Book Approach," *Journal of Qurʾanic Studies* 12 (2010), 6-40.

[625] Ibid., 12-13. Here he gives several examples of verses which allow more than one interpretation, glossed *yajūzu* 'permissible'. He calls this *iḥtimāl al-lafẓ li-l-wujūh al-mutaʿaddida* "an utterance/wording allowing several meanings" (ibid., 13.10), and the rationale behind it is explained thus: *wa-ḥīnaʾidhin yajibu l-tawaṣṣulu ilā l-murādi l-mutaʿayyani bi-ṭarīqin qawiyyin rājiḥin mina l-ṭuruqi l-mutaqaddimi dhikruhā aw ghayrihā in amkana wa-in lam*

The insistence on a plausible interpretation of plain *lafẓ* is perhaps the one clear

connecting point between the aim of the work and its actual focus, namely, stylistic matters. The

study of literary-critical topics is referred to as *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* and *ʿilm al-bayān*

interchangeably. The former – *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* – is the nomenclature of al-Sakkākī

and others following him in the Islamic East (like al-Zanjānī); there is no direct imprint of al-

Sakkākī. The latter – *ʿilm al-bayān* – is undoubtedly taken from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr's *al-*

Jāmiʿ al-kabīr, a work al-Ṭūfī praises as the best treatise written on the topic, and one he follows

closely in the structuring of the *Iksīr*.[626] The practitioners of the field are referred to as *ʿulamāʾ*

al-bayān (not quotations from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn).[627] The phrase *ʿulamāʾ al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* does

not occur. When discussing the virtue of studying this field, he attends solely to the etymology

and noble citations of the word *bayān*, disregarding the word *maʿānī* (even though he earlier

provides a definition of *maʿānī* in the phrase *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*).[628]

And yet, al-Ṭūfī is aware of emerging 'standard' notions. In passing, he acknowledges

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yashtamil ʿalā l-tanāquḍi bal kāna mujarrada -khtilāfin wa-taʿaddudi aqwālin fa-ini -ḥtamala l-lafẓu jamīʿaha wa-amkana an takūna murādatan minhu wajaba ḥamluhu ʿalā jamīʿihā mā amkana sawāʾan kāna -iḥtimāluhu lahā musāwiyan aw kāna fī baʿḍihā arjaḥa min baʿḍin "Then [when there is more than one possibility], one must reach the specific intention [in that context] in a strong method that is preferable to the method mentioned above [i.e., those specified in his *qānūn*], or others if possible, as long as it does not contain a contradiction but is merely a difference of opinion and a plurality of sayings. If the utterance allows all of them [those opinions], and it is possible that it be one intention of it [the wording], then it [the wording] must be taken according to all of them, as far as possible, whether they are all equally acceptable or one is superior to another" (ibid., 12.1ᵉ-13.4). Terms apparently inspired by *uṣūl al-fiqh* are *al-mafhūm min ẓāhir al-lafẓ/faḥwāhu/maʿqūluhu* (ibid., 12), roughly: the immediate meaning of the apparent/literal utterance vs. the implied meaning (*maʿqūl* and *faḥwā* seem to be used here synonymously; in other contexts it is the *mafhūm* that refers to implied meaning; see Ali, *Medieval Muslim Pragmatics*, 189; Vishanoff, *Formation*, 307).

[626] For *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* see e.g., *al-Iksīr*, 22.3ᵉ, 29.2 (cf. editor's fn. 1), 31.7. For *ʿilm al-bayān* see e.g., 37.1-2ᵉ, 42.8, 42.13-15, 62.14-15, 97.12 (*ʿilm al-bayān wa-l-balāgha*), 109.2. With regards to *ʿilm al-bayān* it should be noted that these instances (besides, perhaps, 109.2) are not a quotation from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work but are rather clearly al-Ṭūfī's own words. Interestingly, when he speaks of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work, he says it is the best one written on the topic of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* (p. 29). Clearly these headings are used interchangeably.

[627] *Al-Iksīr*, 41.3, 37.1-2ᵉ (*arbāb hādhā l-ʿilm*, referring to *ʿilm al-bayān*).

[628] Ibid., 34-38. For the definitions of *ʿilm*, *maʿānī* and *bayān* see pp. 30-31.

ʿilm al-maʿānī separately as a – seemingly – functional-syntactic science that characterized the exegetical works of al-Zajjāj (d. 311/923), al-Farrāʾ (d. 207/822 or 208/823) and al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), along with syntax and morphology.[629] Similarly, his 'philosophical' definition of the science carries a somewhat functional-syntactic tone, as he speaks of the functions (*aḥkām*) of *alfāẓ* and *maʿānī* and exemplifies his definition with an instance of change in word order (*taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr*), a topic later treated within the standard *ʿilm al-maʿānī*.[630] But when discussing *maʿānī* as the (philosophical) 'matter' of the field (*mawḍūʿ*), he claims it includes all of its non-essential attributes (*ʿawāriḍ*), going beyond the confines of functional syntax: in addition to change in word order, elision, brevity and prolixity – topics we later find in the standard section of *ʿilm al-maʿānī* – he also includes *kināya* 'periphrasis' and *alghāz* 'riddles', topics later subsumed under *ʿilm al-bayān* or *ʿilm al-badīʿ*.[631] The non-philosophical definition of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* is much broader and speaks of a science that is concerned with verbal expressions (*alfāẓ*) and making intentions (*murād*) clear using expressions.[632] In other words, despite the affiliation the phrase *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* has with the emerging standard theory, in al-Ṭūfī's work it is markedly non-standard. What is more, the contents of the book are arranged in accordance with the structure of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr* (similarly found in his *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*). This includes sections such as the tools of composition (*ālāt al-taʾlīf*), methods of learning composition (*al-ṭarīq ilā maʿrifat al-taʾlīf*), and the merits of prose

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[629] Ibid., 25. Interestingly, he claims that most of the later exegetical works are based on the verbal sciences, which include lexicography (or knowledge of rare words, *gharīb*), syntax, morphology and variant readings of the Qurʾān (*qirāʾāt*).

[630] Ibid., 32-33.

[631] Ibid., 32. It is probably wrong altogether to speak of the standard notion in this context because at this stage things were not yet clear cut, and al-Ṭūfī reflects this. My point is to show that his use of *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* should not be read as a 'standard' appellation.

[632] Ibid., 31 (*fa-maʿnā qawlinā ʿilmu l-maʿānī wa-l-bayāni l-ʿilmu l-murādu bi-l-alfāẓi wa-iẓhāri l-murādi bihā*).

over poetry.[633]

The study of *ʿilm al-bayān* forms the third part (*al-qism al-thālith*) of al-Ṭūfī's *Iksīr*,[634] which is the most voluminous in the book (the first two sections run twenty-eight pages in the printed edition; the book is over three hundred and thirty pages long). This third part is divided into an introduction and two divisions (sg. *jumla*), the first division dealing with general principles (*aḥkām*) of *ʿilm al-bayān* and the second with particular ones, following Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's structure in the *Jāmiʿ* (who named his divisions *quṭb*). The introduction, however, is al-Ṭūfī's own prolegomenon. It includes three points (sg. *baḥth*), the first on definitions, the second on the virtue of the field via a discussion of the merits of *bayān* 'fine speech', and the third – which lacks a title – on the existence of an 'appropriate necessitating [element/entity]' (*muqtaḍin munāsib*) that makes a certain speech (*kalām*) specific, or particular (*ikhtiṣāṣ*, *takhṣīṣ*) to a certain context.[635] It is on this last point (*al-baḥth al-thālith*) which we shall dwell in a moment.

First we must reiterate the fact that no clear explanation is provided for treating *ʿilm (al-maʿānī wa-) al-bayān* in a work on meta-*tafsīr* or *ʿilm al-Qurʾān*.[636] *ʿIlm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* is cited as the last out of twelve sciences which the Qurʾān – or knowledge of the Qurʾān, or science of the Qurʾān – is said to encompass.[637] Besides the proverbial *li-kawnihi min anfas ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* "since it is the most valuable of Qurʾānic sciences," no compelling argument is

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[633] Ibid., 44 ff., 59 ff. and 100 ff., respectively. It should be noted that the definitions al-Ṭūfī provides are his own (i.e., not taken from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn).

[634] Ibid., 29 ff.

[635] Ibid., 30-33 (*al-baḥth al-awwal*), 34-38 (*al-baḥth al-thānī*), 39-43 (*al-baḥth al-thālith*).

[636] The phrase *ʿilm al-Qurʾān* appears, e.g., in ibid., 18.5ᵉ, 27.12.

[637] In *al-Iksīr*, 17.2, it is said that the Qurʾān encompasses these sciences, and in 18.5ᵉ *ʿilm al-Qurʾān* is used – which would probably mean here 'knowledge of the Qurʾān', although 'science of the Qurʾān' is also possible. Al-Ṭūfī later states (ibid., 25) that these are the sciences that the exegete (*mufassir*) should know.

provided for singling it out in the *Iksīr*.[638] One suspects he was aware of al-Zamakhsharī's use of these headings in his commentary *al-Kashshāf* (see Part One, §3.2). The sciences al-Ṭūfī lists are characterized as being either verbal (*lafẓī*) or non-verbal (*maʿnawī* 'mental') in nature. We alluded above to the high regard he pays to the interpretation of the text's *lafẓ* as a possible explanation for focusing on *ʿilm al-bayān*. And yet, oddly, *ʿilm al-bayān* is enumerated among the non-verbal (*maʿnawī*) sciences, alongside disciplines such as physics (*ʿilm wujūdī*), history and legal theory![639] What is more, from his characterization of the exegetical works of al-Zajjāj, al-Farrāʾ and al-Zamakhsharī (see above), it would seem that *ʿilm al-maʿānī* is actually seen as a verbal science.[640]

Greater clues for the relevance of *ʿilm al-bayān* to Qurʾānic exegesis, and for the very nature of *ʿilm al-bayān* itself, are found almost in passing toward the end of *al-baḥth al-thānī* and within *al-baḥth al-thālith*, once again, preceding the beginning of the study of *ʿilm al-bayān* proper. In these contexts only *ʿilm al-bayān* is used (not *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*). The first comment of interest is al-Ṭūfī's claim that the Qurʾān came down "according to the rule (*qānūn*) of *ʿilm al-bayān*."[641] In a later, slightly modified remark, he states that the Qurʾān is "based on the utmost level of *ʿilm al-bayān*."[642] Here the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* is not so much used as a referent to a body of knowledge as it is to a force of nature. It would be inappropriate, in this

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[638] Ibid., 29. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the science dealt with in the *Iksīr* as *ʿilm al-bayān*, especially since it is more commonly used in the *Iksīr* (and not as quotations from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, see above).

[639] Ibid., 18-22. Al-Ṭūfī clarifies that by 'verbal' versus 'mental' he means that the former is mediated by linguistic expression (*lafẓ*), whereas the latter is not (p. 27).

[640] *ʿIlm al-maʿānī* is enumerated among the *aḥkām lughawiyya* 'linguistic functions' alongside syntax and morphology (ibid., 25).

[641] *Al-Iksīr*, 37.1-2ᵉ (*nazala ʿalā wafq qānūn ʿilm al-bayān*).

[642] Ibid., 42.13 (*...al-Qurʾān al-mutawaqqif ʿalā aqṣā marātib ʿilm al-bayān*).

contex, to separate *ʿilm* as 'science' from *bayān*; instead, *ʿilm al-bayān* as a whole seems to refer

to 'fine speech' as an observable phenomenon and could be interchanged with the single notion

of *bayān*. And yet in that same context al-Ṭūfī references the masters of this science (*arbāb*

hādhā al-ʿilm).[643] Beyond the terminological inconsistency, this demonstrates to what extent the

notion of *bayān* and *ʿilm al-bayān* have become recognized as a rational affair, rather than a

textually-transmitted knowledge, a development we associate with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's effort (see Part

One, §1.1).

The second point to be made, gleaned out of his *al-baḥth al-thālith*, is al-Ṭūfī's implicit

identification of *ʿilm al-bayān* with the process of finding a cause for a specific linguistic

choice.[644] According to al-Ṭūfī, any particular way of speaking appearing in a certain context

(*takhṣīṣ, ikhtiṣāṣ*) is due to an appropriate necessitating element/entity (*muqtaḍin munāsib*). This

holds true for Qurʾānic speech and for regular speech alike (*wurūd al-kalām Qurʾānan kāna aw*

ghayrahu; the latter also: *kalām al-ādamiyyīn*).[645] Were it not that a particular characteristic (pl.

aḥwāl) of speech – such as change in word order, prolixity, elision, etc. – was singled out for a

certain context due to such a necessitating element, that would result in choosing one explanation

for that particularity over another without sufficient cause (a process termed *tarjīḥ min ghayr*

murajjiḥ lit. "preferring [one option] without something to make [that option] preferred").[646] The

term *muqtaḍin munāsib* is correlated with the legal notion of *ʿilla* and may thus be reduced to the

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[643] *lā khilāfa anna l-Qurʾāna nazala ʿalā wafqi ʿilmi l-bayāni bal arbābu hādhā l-ʿilmi kammalūhu mina l-Qurʾāni* "there is no dispute that the Qurʾān came down according to the rule of good speech; in fact the masters of this field (*ʿilm al-bayān*) complemented it from the Qurʾān" (ibid., 37.1-2ᵉ). Al-Ṭūfī uses *ʿilm al-bayān* first as a denotation of *bayān* 'good speech' and second as a denotation of the field of studying good speech.

[644] Ibid., 39-43.

[645] Ibid., 39, 42.

[646] Usually translated in modern scholarship as "preponderance without a preponderator" and sometimes compared to Leibniz's "principle of sufficient reason."

notion of 'cause'.[647] The entire section (*baḥth*) is devoted to proving the existence of a *muqtaḍin munāsib* (exhibiting, in the process, his mastery of the art of disputation). At one point he even makes the claim, when refuting an objection from an imagined opponent, that determining the question of *taʿlīl al-afʿāl* 'whether God's actions have a reason' is ultimately based on the study of *ʿilm al-bayān*, endowing the discipline with doctrinal importance.[648]

It is here that we find the starkest tension between al-Ṭūfī's conception of *ʿilm al-bayān* as a hermeneutical endeavor and his conception of it as a literary one. On one hand, *ʿilm al-bayān* is seen as venue through which one may determine the exact reason (*muqtaḍin munāsib*) of God's choice of words in any given verse, an undertaking that the exegete is most likely to engage in. This endeavor is similar to but distinct from the question of *iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* 'the Qurʾān's inimitability'.[649] On the other hand, he stresses on several occasions that his undertaking concerns "speech in gereal" (*muṭlaq al-kalām*) and "the speech of humans" (*kalām al-ādamiyyīn*),[650] and he predicates the entire book on the work of a scholar (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn) whose primary interest was literary composition. These tensions are emblematic of *ʿilm al-bayān* as a whole, as it developed in the period of the seventh/thirteenth century and in the locale of the

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[647] Ibid., 40-41.

[648] *taʿlīl al-afʿāl mabniyy ʿalā ʿilm al-bayān bi-l-wasāʾiṭ al-madhkūra*; ibid., 42. The argument goes as follows: in order to study God's actions, one must first look at His essence; in order to study His essence, one must study the revealed law (*sharʿ*); in order to do that, one must study the miracle (*muʿjiz*); in order to do that, one must study Qurʾān, which is the miracle; and in order to do that one must study *ʿilm al-bayān*. The common Ashʿarī position regarding the question of *taʿlīl al-afʿāl* is that God's actions cannot have a reason. This is in opposition to the Muʿtazilī stance, which holds that His actions are in fact caused by a reason (*muʿallala*), a view shared by the Ḥanbalīs. On this question see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā, 2 vols., Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyya, 1989, 1: 350-54; al-Rāzī ascribes the view in support of *taʿlīl* not only to the Muʿtazilīs but also to "most of the recent legal theorists" (*akthar al-mutaʾakhkhirīn min al-fuqahāʾ*, p. 350).

[649] Some discussion of *iʿjāz* may be found within the deliberation of the merits of prose over poetry (*al-Iksīr*, 100-101). But al-Ṭūfī does not set out to prove the miraculous nature of the Qurʾān the way earlier literary scholars did; he does not even devote a section to addressing its various explanations.

[650] *wa-lā shakka annā rattabnā l-baḥtha fī muṭlaqi l-kalāmi lā fī khuṣūṣi kawnihi Qurʾānan* "there is no doubt that we put together the study in [reference to] speech in general, not in its being specifically Qurʾān (*al-Iksīr*, 42.2-3ᵉ). See also ibid., 39.2 (*... wurūd al-kalām Qurʾānan kāna aw ghayrahu*), and above.

Arabic East. And yet, among the scholars we are studying, al-Ṭūfī is the closest one to approach

ʿilm al-bayān from a standpoint of hermeneutics. This comes across in his analysis of *majāz*.

Chapter 5:
Majāz in Literary Theory Revisited

Preliminaries

As a technical term in classical Arabic literary theory, *majāz* was an innovation. When it first

appeared in literary theoretical writings in the course of the fourth/tenth century, it was used

inconsistently and – mostly – in passing. It was only in the fifth/eleventh century, with the works

of Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1065) in the West and ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081)

in the East that we may speak of the integration of the concept of *majāz* into the field of literary

theory.[651] After that, *majāz* became a common component in literary writings, referring roughly

to figurative language.[652] Thanks to the work of Wolfhart Heinrichs, our knowledge of the early

development of the concept, especially before it entered the field of literary theory, is quite firm,

and we also know quite a bit about al-Jurjānī's conception of the notion, especially as it was

channeled via later scholars (al-Sakkākī, al-Qazwīnī). But within literary theory proper, the

implicit wisdom is that "the potential of the *majāz* theory"[653] was never realized in a meaningful

way beyond the achievements of al-Jurjānī. Our aim in this chapter is to revisit the integration of

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[651] One could debate whether al-Jurjānī should be treated here at all given that his disciplinary affiliations do not align with literary theory (see Part One, §3.2, but cf. Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 227-28). On the occurrences of *majāz* in early literary theory see Heinrichs, "Contacts," 270-76. He ends with al-Jurjānī but does not mention Ibn Rashīq in this context (a contemporary of al-Jurjānī in the Islamic West), which is surprising given that the two reached a few similar results (Ibn Rashīq in a far more cursory way), and Heinrichs is well aware of Ibn Rashīq's views on *majāz* (*Hand of the Northwind*, 48-49). There is also the work of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (early fifth/eleventh century), but when he uses the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* pairing he does so in the theological-hermeneutical sense and in the lexicographical sense (using *istiʿāra* as well), less in the literary context (see below). Similar is the case of Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (fifth/eleventh century), who uses *majāz* in the lexicographical sense of the word.

[652] And yet, even in a later work such as Usāma b. Munqidh's (d. 584/1188) *al-Badīʿ fī naqd al-shiʿr*, eds. Aḥmad Aḥmad Badawī and Ḥāmid ʿAbd al-Majīd, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1960, there is no mention of *majāz*. The issue of the marginality of *majāz* in literary theory is discussed in §5.3.

[653] The quote is taken from Heinrichs, "Contacts," 271, who is referring here to the use of *majāz* in literary theory prior to al-Jurjānī, but I think it is a fair assessment of the state of the research with regards to *majāz* in literary theory in general. See also Heinrichs, "Genesis," 140.

majāz into literary theory by focusing on its understanding within the works of ʿilm al-bayān. We find that despite the growing dissemination of 'Jurjānian' notions, *majāz* in this time and place was not quite a reflection of al-Jurjānī's thought and that early ideas about the concept in literary theory continued to prevail. What emerges is a different theory of *majāz* in literary theory proper, one that was not explicitly defined but nevertheless posed a viable alternative to the theories of al-Jurjānī.

Before the term *majāz* entered the field of literary theory in the fourth/tenth century, it was used in old philological exegesis of the Qurʾān, in Muʿtazilī theological circles, and in the realm of lexicography.[654] In old philological exegesis – Abū ʿUbayda's (d. 209/824) *Majāz al-Qurʾān* is the clear example here – *majāz* was not set in opposition to *ḥaqīqa* and it did not (usually) refer to the utterance itself but rather to its explanation ("its *majāz* is so-and-so"). It was thus akin to *maʿnā*, *taqdīr*, *tafsīr* and *taʾwīl*.[655] The Qurʾānic utterances that "had" a *majāz* displayed 'irregularities' and 'oddities' that disrupted the one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning. But these disruptions were primarily of a grammatical nature, and it was rare to encounter figurative language among those *majāz* phenomena.[656] *Majāz* is best translated here as 'rewording' or 'meaning'.[657] Muʿtazilī theologians introduced the innovation of *ḥaqīqa* 'literal

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[654] For a thorough study of the first two uses of *majāz* see Heinrichs, "Genesis" and *idem*, "Contacts."

[655] Fuat Sezgin, *Majāz al-Qurʾān*, editor's introduction, 18-19; Heinrichs, "Genesis," 117-29, esp. 124, 128. Almagor situates the use of *majāz* here within the literature of *maʿānī al-Qurʾān* ("Early," 263 [307]). For examples in which *majāz* referred to the utterance itself and not its explanation, or it could be taken either way (like: *majāz al-Qurʾān*!), see Heinrichs, "Genesis," 119, 125-28 (Heinrichs and Almagor disagree on this point).

[656] Thus, in Q 41:11 "[God addressing heaven and earth:] *Come willingly or unwillingly!* They (f. dual) said: *we come willingly* (m. pl.)," Abū ʿUbayda is concerned with heaven and earth speaking first in the feminine dual and then in masculine plural, but not with the fact that they are speaking in the first place! (see Heinrichs, "Genesis," 119-20). Many of these oddities find their way into Ibn Fāris' *al-Ṣāḥibī* and al-Thaʿālibī's *Fiqh al-lugha*, under the rubric of *sunan al-ʿarab* "the way Arabs talk" (lit. "[linguistic] habits of the Arabs"; see Part One, "The Philological Sense(s) of *Bayān*").

[657] Or in Udo Simon's words, "*Majāz* in this context stands for 'another way to say it'" (Udo Simon, "Majāz," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, Brill Online. Note, however, that *majāz* is *not* "predominantly

speech' as a counterpart to *majāz*. Now *majāz* applied to the utterance itself and referred

mostly[658] to figurative speech, as a tool to explain anthropomorphic language in the Qurʾān

concerning God (like His sitting on a throne). It seems that in the early stages of this usage,

theologians/philosophers like al-Kindī (d. 256/873) and al-Nāshiʾ al-Akbar (d. 293/906) used the

ḥaqīqa-majāz dyad in the realm of reality/ontological truth (the original meaning of *ḥaqīqa*), not

in the realm of language: the 'true' existence (that of God) was contrasted with the 'derivative'

one (that of mankind), not the literal with the figurative as it would eventually be used.[659] In the

realm of lexicography, *majāz* again was not set in opposition to *ḥaqīqa*: it referred to idiomatic

expressions, but unlike the old Abū ʿUbaydan utterances, these were limited to the lexicon, not

grammar.[660] They covered what we would identify today as conceptual metaphors, dead

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used for rhetorical devices"!) I am simplifying Heinrichs' "explanatory re-writing."

[658] Non-figurative categories listed under *majāz* in the theological context, as well as in legal theory, have been commonly understood to be a relic of the old philological-hermeneutical usage. Thus, ellipsis (*ḥadhf*) and pleonasm (*ziyāda*) are not, strictly speaking, figurative, although in the case of ellipsis the expressions could also be explained by way of figurative usage. The famous example is Q 12: 82 "ask the town": if understood as *ḥadhf*, an elided *ahl* 'people' (of the town) is restored; if understood as *majāz*, the word "town" is taken figuratively to mean, by way of metonymy, its people (Heinrichs, "Contacts," 258-66). There is a parallel tendency in modern Western scholarship: "Some linguists argue that m[etonymy] and synecdoche can often be understood as nonfigurative expressions that result from verbal deletions intended to reduce redundancy" (Wallace Martin, "Metonymy," *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[659] For al-Nāshiʾ al-Akbar see Heinrichs, "Genesis," 136-37; "Contacts," 256-57. Al-Kindī uses *majāz* both in a linguistic and in an ontological way in his brief epistle on the "real doer" (*al-fāʿil al-ḥaqq*) versus the "doer by extension" (*al-fāʿil… alladhī huwa bi-l-majāz*). When *bi-l-majāz* is contrasted with *al-ḥaqq/bi-l-ḥaqīqa* (real doer/doer by extension), he seems to refer to reality: only God, he says, is a real doer, whereas human doers do not actually "do" (and later: that their "action" is not an action in reality). But he also uses *majāz* explicitly on the level of language when he states that all doers "are *named* 'doers' by extension" (emphasis added; *tusammā fāʿilātin bi-l-majāz*). See *Risālat al-Kindī fī l-Fāʿil al-ḥaqq al-awwal al-tāmm wa-l-fāʿil al-nāqiṣ alladhī huwa bi-l-majāz*, in Roshdi Rashed and Jean Jolivet (eds. and trans.), *Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-Kindī*, vol. 2: *Métaphysique et cosmologie*, Leiden: Brill, 1998, 169-171. See also Vishanoff, *Formation*, 22, on a similar take by al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936). The ontological understanding of *ḥaqīqa-majāz* is later reflected in Sufi thinking and in the famous adage, *al-majāzu qanṭaratu l-ḥaqīqa* "the 'figurative' is the bridge towards the 'proper'," i.e., "the world is the bridge to the Divine" (Heinrichs, "Contacts," 257), to be discussed later in Ahmed, *What Is Islam?*, 393-97 (also Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors in *Muḥdath* Poetry," *Occasional Papers of the School of Abbasid Studies* 1 [1986], 1-22, here: 17).

[660] Thus, instead of speaking of "idiomatic expressions" in the context of Abū ʿUbayda the way Heinrichs does, I would prefer "linguistic inconsistencies/anomalies/ambiguities." In the lexicographical context *majāz* referred to the utterances themselves, not their explanation.

metaphors, metonymies, and idiomatic sayings; in other words, they displayed figurative

language.[661] Moreover, they all found their way into the dictionaries, either as regular entries or

under special headings (*majāz*, *istiʿāra/mustaʿār*, even *kināya*), but either way they were

conceived of as part of the Arabic lexicon.[662] Unlike the *majāz* of the theologians, these

idiomatic lexical expressions did not have, and could not be reworded into, a counterpart *ḥaqīqa*:

they were, to use the later terms, themselves part of *ḥaqīqa*.[663] *Majāz* is best rendered here as

'lexical semantic extension' (and at times, 'conceptual metaphor').[664]

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[661] This could serve as an important link between the old non-figurative meaning of *majāz* and the new figurative meaning found in theology and legal theory. Heinrichs pondered over what could account for the shrinking in meaning of *majāz* to "metaphorical language," and his hypothesis in "Genesis," 139, still does not explain it. Of course, historically, the lexicographical use of *majāz* could have, and very well may have, postdated the theological one. It is of note that already al-Kalbī (d. 146/763) mentions the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dichotomy at the outset of his Qurʾānic exegesis (though not in the body of his work; see Kees Versteegh, *Arabic Grammar and Qurʾānic Exegesis in Early Islam*, Leiden: Brill, 1993, 106, 122, quoted in Simon, "Majāz"), meaning that the use of *majāz* as a reference to some form of figurative speech (perhaps in this lexicographical sense, despite the counterpart *ḥaqīqa*?) was known early on, even before the time of Abū ʿUbayda (this would change the historical narrative laid out by Ibn Taymiyya). Versteegh thinks that *majāz* by al-Kalbī included the category of *muqaddam wa-muʾakhkhar* (*Grammar and Exegesis*, 106), but this assessment is purely anachronistic. On the authenticity of early *tafsīr*s see ibid., 41-62, but according to Gilliot, the *tafsīr* of al-Kalabī "demeure énigmatique" (Claude Gilliot, "Cornelis H.M. Versteegh, *Arabic Grammar and Qurʾānic Exegesis in Early Islam* [Review]," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 146.1 [1996], 207-211, here: 210).

[662] My analysis is based on an examination of Ibn Durayd's *Jamharat al-lugha*, al-Zamakhsharī's *Asās al-balāgha*, al-Thaʿālibī's *Fiqh al-lugha*, and Ibn Manẓūr's *Lisān al-ʿarab* (the last as a "control" text). Of course many other sources corroborate my conclusion. For instance, it seems that al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (fl. ≤ 409/1018) uses *majāz* in this sense, at least in his dictionary; see Key, *Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 131-32 (and see Baalbaki, below). Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī also has this meaning of *majāz* in mind when he speaks of it within the various categorizations of the Arabic lexicon (*Sirr*, 34, 100; he uses the word *kalām* in this context, but also *lugha* and *alfāẓ* 'words'). Even the early al-Jāḥiẓ, who uses *majāz* in several distinct senses, may employ the term to refer to conceptual metaphors and idiomatic sayings that are part of the lexicon (see the examples cited in Heinrichs, "Genesis," 134). The fact that scholars like al-Rāghib and al-Khafājī employ the term *ḥaqīqa* in their discursive pronouncements, even though *majāz* in this sense has no equivalent *ḥaqīqa*, bears witness to the influence that the theological understanding of the term had on adjacent fields, especially in cases like metonymies and conceptual verb metaphors where one could easily postulate a *ḥaqīqa*. We say above that all of the aforementioned idioms were conceived of as part of the lexicon, but it should be stressed that scholars recognized that the lexicon was two-tiered: the primordial vocabulary, and the fully-established conventional vocabulary (e.g., first *yad* referred to the human body part, then it referred to 'favor' or 'power', which is carried out via one's hand). Phrases that point to this two-tier aspect are *aṣl*, "[X=Y] thumma qīla [X_1]," "[X_1] min [X]," and they are preserved in 'ordinary' dictionaries as well.

[663] Metonymies and conceptual metaphors probably formed the most important tangent point between the theological understanding of *majāz* and the lexical one, because they could easily be said to have a *ḥaqīqa*. See also the early occurrence of the dyad *ḥaqīqa-majāz* in the exegesis of al-Kalbī, fn. 661.

[664] On semantic extension from a modern perspective applied mostly to modern Arabic see Mohssen Esseesy, "Semantic Extension," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, Brill Online.

Majāz of the Lexicographers

Because the lexicographical sense of *majāz* has ramifications for our understanding of *majāz* in literary theory, and because it has not been identified as an independent meaning of *majāz* in modern research,[665] we should pause on its usage here. The sources often make the assertion that knowledge of *majāz* rests with the *ahl al-lugha* 'lexicographers'. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), who offered the first well-developed account of *majāz* in legal theory, claimed that the lexicographers wrote books on *majāz* in which they state whether a given word is *ḥaqīqa* or *majāz*.[666] Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) is also said to have deferred to the lexicographers in matters of *majāz*.[667] But according Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), this was a lie created by the theologians in order to justify their understanding of *majāz* as non-literal language.[668] Heinrichs concludes that since we do not have such lexicographical works on *majāz* – the closest one, by Ibn Durayd (d. 321/933), contains the term *istiʿāra*, not *majāz* – Ibn Taymiyya was essentially correct.[669] But too much emphasis should not be placed on this terminological inconsistency,[670] and evidence from the late fourth/tenth and into the sixth/twelfth centuries shows that 'figurative' or 'borrowed' uses of words were sometimes mentioned as such in the dictionaries. Unlike the

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[665] It will become clear, however, that *majāz* in this sense is somewhat indistinguishable from *istiʿāra* in its "Koranic" sense, as Heinrichs refers to it (quotation marks his), which he discusses with regards to Ibn Qutayba and al-Rummānī (*Hand of the Northwind*, 14, 30-32, 37, 53). Notably, Heinrichs recognizes (at least in the case of Ibn Qutayba) that the examples cited are "idiomatic," "an integral part of the language," and "fixed elements of the language" (ibid., 31). The lexicographical sense of *majāz* later proliferated in the works of legal theory.

[666] Heinrichs, "Contacts," 267-68. Heinrichs remarks, "An intriguing statement, to say the least! It is not easy to see what books he might be referring to […] [I]t looks as if al-Jaṣṣāṣ is talking from hearsay rather than referring to a number of books on his desk (or carpet)."

[667] Heinrichs, "Genesis," 116 (see also §5.2 for further examples).

[668] Ibid.; "Contacts," 268.

[669] Ibid.

[670] In other words, instead of proceeding from the term to its denotatum, I am making the *shawāhid* my point of departure.

claim of al-Jaṣṣāṣ, however, they were not set against the term *ḥaqīqa*. (This does not refute the claim that the theologians were indeed looking to corroborate their theories using 'outsiders'.)

The clearest example of a dictionary that contains listings of *majāz* usage is *Asās al-balāgha* by al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144). Al-Zamakhsharī follows most root entries with a list of *majāz* usages ("*wa-min al-majāz…* [idiom]"). Although this is a much later dictionary – after *majāz* had been fully developed in legal theory and had taken hold in literary theory – the fact that it does not couple *majāz* with *ḥaqīqa* points to an earlier understanding of the term.[671] (He uses the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dichotomy elsewhere.[672]) Interestingly, al-Zamakhsharī does not normally provide an explanation for the idiomatic expression, assuming that his audience would know its meaning. His purpose, then, is simply to point out idiomatic expressions in the vocabulary.[673] Sometimes, instead of the heading *wa-min al-majāz*, we find *wa-min al-mustaʿār* or *wa-min al-istiʿāra* 'borrowed/borrowing' (in fact, most of the entries within the letter *ʿayn*[674]); occasionally,

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[671] There is some earlier evidence as well. According to Baalbaki, Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004) in his dictionary *Maqāyīs al-lugha* also included "metaphorical usage" in some lemmata, "normally towards their end." Similarly, the contemporaneous al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī in his *al-Mufradāt fī gharīb al-Qurʾān* attends to metaphorical usage of words. See the important and long-awaited Ramzi Baalbaki, *The Arabic Lexicographical Tradition: From the 2nd/8th to the 12th/18th Century*, Handbook of Oriental Studies, vol. 107, Brill: Leiden, 2014, 359, 69-70. Al-Zamakhsharī is treated in ibid., 356-63. For Baalbaki, the "general" lemmata in al-Zamakhsharī are taken as the "literal" or "*ḥaqīqī*" usage, even though he recognizes the absence of the term *ḥaqīqa* and notices that there is not always a difference between the words listed as regular entries and the words listed as *majāz*.

[672] It even appears once in his dictionary, within the stylized preface: "Among them [the book's special features] is the establishing of rules for good language (?, *faṣl al-khiṭāb*) and eloquent speech, by setting aside the *majāz* from the *ḥaqīqa* and the indirect expression from the explicit one (*kināya/taṣrīḥ*)" (*Asās*, 8; the *sajʿ* rhyme is *faṣīḥ/taṣrīḥ*). Needless to say, in the course of the dictionary there is no mention of *ḥaqīqa*.

[673] One doubts that he did so for apologetic purposes due to his Muʿtazilī affiliation. Rather, we would say that it was his genuine interest in the Arabic lexicon that drove this project. Baalbaki goes further in saying that al-Zamakhsharī wanted to provide the aspiring writer of prose/poetry raw materials for good composition (*Lexicographical Tradition*, 359, 362). It is of note, then, that he incorporated *shawāhid* from the poetry of the *muḥdathūn*, even as late as al-Maʿarrī (ibid., 362).

[674] Several exceptions have *wa-min al-majāz*: ʿ.th.th, ʿ.dh.b, ʿ.dh.l, ʿ.ḍ.d, ʿ.f.f, ʿ.q.ṣ, ʿ.q.l, ʿ.n.n, and ʿ.y.n (*Asās al-balāgha*, 409, 411, 412, 423, 428, 430, 431, 437, 443). If one were to overanalyze this point, one would postulate that he started writing the dictionary with the letter *ʿayn*, following the old phonetic ordering of letters, and that he first used the terms found in Ibn Durayd, only to change them to *majāz* later on (al-Zamakhsharī ends up with the *abjad* system).

he uses *wa-min al-kināya* 'indirect expression'; yet other times, there is no heading at all.[675] If

we compare some of the *majāz* entries listed here with the entries listed in the two sections on

metaphorical usage in the end of Ibn Durayd's dictionary *Jamharat al-lugha*,[676] we find

interesting overlap. Cross-referencing these with al-Thaʿālibī's (d. 429/1038) *Fiqh al-lugha*, a

work on 'lexicology',[677] and with Ibn Manẓūr's (d. 711/1311 or 2) *Lisān al-ʿarab*, a 'regular'

dictionary amalgamating early sources, we find further overlap. The examples are not necessarily

identical, but the linguistic phenomena that they reflect are. In fact, if we revisit the early works

of Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), *Taʾwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān*, and al-Rummānī (d. 384/994), *al-Nukat*

fī iʿjāz al-Qurʾān, who tackle metaphorical language in the Qurʾān, we find that the vast majority

of *shawāhid* reflect the lexicographical *majāz* we are treating below.[678] Let us discuss a few

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[675] In other words, even within the general portion of the entry we come across idiomatic usage, and vice versa, some *majāz* words one would expect to find as regular ones (e.g., *aʿyān* 'notables' is cited under *majāz*; *Asās*, 443). See also Baalbaki, *Lexicographical Tradition*, 360. When the heading *wa-min al-kināya* occurs, it is usually in addition to *wa-min al-majāz*, but without any apparent difference (see, e.g. *Asās*, 449, s.v. *gh.r.f*). Another heading we may come across is *wa-min al-mushtaqq minhu* 'derivative of it' (e.g., *Asās*, 23), which may very well be connected to al-Jāḥiẓ's use of *ishtiqāq* with regards to figurative language (see Heinrichs, "Genesis," 134, fn. 1).

[676] The appendices – which do not even follow one another – are titled *bāb al-istiʿārāt* "section on borrowings" and *bāb mā yustaʿāru fa-yutakallamu bihi fī ghayr mawḍiʿihi* "section on that which is borrowed and spoken in a place that is not its own." Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan Ibn Durayd, *Kitāb Jamharat al-lugha*, ed. Ramzī Munīr Baʿalbakī, 3 vols, Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1988, 3: 1255-57, 1312-1313. On the difference between the two appendices see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 37-38 (note that what Heinrichs identifies here as verb metaphors are conceptual metaphors; see below). Within the second appendix, Ibn Durayd makes a connection between idiomatic sayings and the old poetic meaning of *istiʿāra* as a metaphor containing a 'foreign' element (i.e., no substratum), whereby it is a physical object that is deemed 'borrowed', not a linguistic element (we elaborate on this in the course of the chapter). Al-Zamakhsharī does not make such distinctions within his *majāz* entries.

[677] Baalbaki (*Lexicographical Tradition*, 268) lists it under the "multithematic works" of the *mubawwab* lexica (or in Baalbaki's terms, onomasiological: proceeding from the question "how does one convey X [a notion]?" whereas the alphabetical, semasiological dictionaries proceed from the question "what is the meaning of Y [a word]?"). On the meaning of lexicology vs. lexicography see Part One, "The Philological Sense(s) of *Bayān*".

[678] *Taʾwīl*, 103-84 (using the terms *majāz* and *istiʿāra*); *al-Nukat*, 79-87 (using the term *istiʿāra* [and contrasting it with *ḥaqīqa*]). See also fn. 665. This comes fairly close to saying that there is no real figurative speech in the Qurʾān. But al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (d. 406/1016) does include 'live' metaphors in his *Talkhīṣ al-bayān fī majāzāt al-Qurʾān*, although admittedly, they are hard to find. One example is *tabawwaʾū [...] l-īmāna* "made their dwelling in belief" (Q 59:9); al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ al-bayān fī majāzāt al-Qurʾān*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ghanī Ḥasan, Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 1955, 330. This usage does not appear in the dictionaries (that is, *tabawwaʾa* + entity that is not a dwelling place), but Ibn Manẓūr does cite it as a case of an utterance *ʿalā l-mathal*, which I take to refer to 'live' figurative speech (*Lisān al-ʿarab* 1: 382, and see the meaning of *mathal* as figurative speech/metaphor below). Interestingly, this is an example Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn dwells on (no pun intended), pointing to his

cases; the following categorization is mine and is meant purely for explanatory purposes.

Conceptual Metaphors

Ibn Durayd tells us that the verb 'to bury' originally applied to "the dead" but then extended to "secrets," as in, "he buried his secret, i.e., concealed it."[679] This is an example of a conceptual metaphor: at first glance nothing seems to be metaphorical about 'burying one's secret', but it is, to apply Lakoff and Johnson's terms, a "metaphor we live by." It reflects a way in which our conceptual system perceives reality through metaphors, in this case the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE PEOPLE (compare: "His ideas will *live on* forever," "Cognitive psychology is still in its *infancy*," "Where did you *dig up* that idea?").[680] Ibn Durayd lists this entry under his *bāb al-istiʿārāt*. Al-Zamakhsharī has it under the *majāz* listings of the root *d.f.n*.[681] Al-Thaʿālibī does not have this specific example under the section *fī al-majāz*, but *all of the examples* that he does adduce under that section are conceptual metaphors, like *fawqa* 'above' applied to something that is 'less' (MORE IS UP metaphor, even if it is more 'smallness')[682] or *akala* 'eating [up]' in the

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interest in 'live' metaphors. Another example is the famous "wing of humility" in Q 17:24 *wa-khfiḍ lahumā janāḥa l-dhulli* "lower unto them [your parents] the wing of humility": variations of the phrase *khafaḍa janāḥahu* are recorded in the lexicons, but not the combination *janāḥ+dhull* (*Majāzāt al-Qurʾān*, 200; *Asās*, 102 [*j.n.ḥ*], 170 [*kh.f.ḍ*], 206-207 [*dh.l.l*]; *Lisān al-ʿarab* 1: 697, 2: 1211, 3: 1513 [in all three cases the verse is adduced but not as a lexical entry]). To those who may be tempted to dismiss the body of Arabic lexicographical works as circular and unreliable, I suggest searching for further examples of Qurʾānic metaphors that are not cited in the dictionaries as part of conventional vocabulary.

[679] *Jamhara* 3: 1256 (*wa-l-dafnu dafnu l-mayyiti thumma qīla dafana sirrahu idhā katamahu*). To express other extensions in the lexicon he also uses variations of the formula, "X means Y, then it became so prevalent (*kathura*) that they said X_1."

[680] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003 [originally 1980], 47. The examples are theirs. According to them (p. 46), what structures our conceptual view of the world is metaphorical (in part), and this metaphorical structure is reflected "in our literal language." Elsewhere they refer to these metaphors as "conventional metaphors" (e.g., ibid., 196-97) or even "literal metaphors" (ibid., 209).

[681] *Asās*, 191 (s.v. *d.f.n*). For a 'regular' entry see Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 2: 1397-98. He preserves the idea of a lexical extension with regards to this word by referring to 'burying the dead' as the *aṣl* 'origin; basic usage'.

sense of 'consuming entirely' ('eating up' money, a fire 'eating up' wood; [NON-ETERNAL/

PERISHABLE] ENTITIES ARE FOOD metaphor).[683] The second half of Ibn Durayd's *bāb al-istiʿārāt*

contains additional conceptual metaphors, like *ẓamiʾtu ilā liqāʾika* "I was thirsty [i.e. yearning]

to see you" (compare the English "to have a thirst for [something]"; IDEAS ARE FOOD [/DRINK]

metaphor), also cited by al-Zamakhsharī as one of the *majāz* instances of *ẓ.m.ʾ*.[684]

What I am referring to here as conceptual metaphors is not a stand-alone concept (for that

see 'dead metaphor'), but rather a relational one. On the grammatical level, this relation typically

involves a verb. The "metaphorical" choice of a certain verb ('to bury', 'to thirst for') is dictated

not by the stand-alone concepts of 'burying' or 'being thirsty', but rather by a certain metaphor

that structures our conceptual system, like IDEAS ARE PEOPLE/FOOD. Such metaphors are part of

a system, meaning that they manifest themselves on a variety of literal expressions: the

conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR yields → 'defending' a claim, 'winning' an argument,

'attacking' one's weak point, etc.[685] For our purposes here, we are limiting the notion of

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[682] *Metaphors We Live By*, 15. Lakoff and Johnson's examples do not cover a case of 'more in smallness', but it is clear that is still based on the conceptual metaphor MORE [OF ANYTHING] IS UP. Citing al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Thaʿālibī provides the stock example Q 2:26 "God is not ashamed to strike a similitude even of a gnat, or aught above it [i.e., anything smaller]," to which al-Farrāʾ (d. 207/822) is said to have remarked, "*wa-mā fawqahā* is [said] with regards to small things, but God knows best!" (*Fiqh al-lugha*, 399). In al-Jāḥiẓ's wording, as it is reflected by al-Thaʿālibī, *majāz* is connected to the idea of *jawāz* 'acceptability' ("The [ancient] Arabs allow [such-and-such]"). Cf. the listing of this meaning of *fawqa*, fairly at the outset, in *Lisān al-ʿarab* 5: 3487 (or Lane, *Lexicon*, 2462).

[683] *Fiqh al-lugha*, 397-98: *akala l-māl* ("by which they mean nothing but annihilation [or total exhaustion/ consumption]," *wa-innamā yadhhabūna ilā l-fanāʾ*), *akalat-hu l-nār* (in al-Zamakhsharī, *akalat al-nār al-ḥaṭab*; *Asās*, 19). Lakoff and Johnson do not speak of this specific metaphor but an adjacent one, IDEAS ARE FOOD (*Metaphors We Live By*, 46). Whereas *fawqa* was an orientational metaphor (UP/DOWN, FRONT/BACK), these are ontological ones (ibid., 25). To explain how it is that the *fire* is doing the eating (not just the wood being consumed by it), Lakoff and Johnson would say (p. 33) that "[p]erhaps the most obvious ontological metaphors are those where the physical object is further specified as being a person," i.e., personification. Al-Zamakhsharī specifies the factitive version of the first example, namely *fulān* […] *akkala mālī wa-sharrabahu ay aṭʿamahu l-nās* (referring to a Robin Hood-type person?). For a listing of these examples as regular dictionary entries see *Lisān al-ʿarab* 1: 101 (or Lane, *Lexicon*, 71).

[684] *Jamhara* 3: 1256; *Asās*, 404 ("I am thirsty to see you"). For the contents of the first half of Ibn Durayd's *bāb al-istiʿārāt* see 'metonymy' below.

[685] *Metaphors We Live By*, 4.

conceptual metaphors to those that are based on fundamental human perception of the physical

and non-physical world or on human understanding of cause and effect; in other words, those

that are fairly universal. (I am excluding metonymy here since it is a single-term figurative

expression.) Lakoff and Johnson make no claim for universality, and they stress that some

conceptual metaphors are culturally-specific.[686] I have no intention of getting into a discussion

with them, or with any of the modern Western linguists for that matter; my aim, rather, is to

provide distinctions that could help illuminate a facet of medieval Arabic linguistic thought. The

culturally-specific 'conceptual metaphors' are treated under 'idiomatic sayings' (e.g., "his

garment slept" for "his garment became worn out").

Dead Metaphors

Dead metaphors refer here to those metaphorical expressions (in Lakoff and Johnson's terms)

that are not part of a full-fledged system: they are isolated instantiations of a certain conceptual

metaphor. Grammatically they tend to be nouns. The Arabic *raʾs al-māl* lit. 'head of property'

i.e. 'capital' is a reflection of the conceptual metaphor PROPERTY IS A PERSON, but no additional

expressions of this metaphorical concept are reflected in the language (*'the foot of property').

According to Lakoff and Johnson, "[i]f any metaphorical expressions deserve to be called

"dead," it is these [...]."[687] Al-Thaʿālibī's section titled *istiʿāra* is dedicated to dead metaphors

and to idiomatic sayings (some conceptual metaphors as well). What these expressions typically

have in common is that they contain a 'foreign object', usually but not always a human body

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[686] Ibid., 42, 118, 227, 231.

[687] Ibid., 55 (52-55 for the "partial nature of metaphorical structuring"). The examples they provide are 'foot of a mountain', 'a head of cabbage', 'a leg of a table'. In general, Lakoff and Johnson are loath to refer to their findings as "dead metaphors," a term they attribute to the 'objectivist' strand of linguistics (ibid., 211-12). Identifying the above cases as primarily "noun" metaphors in mine. One cannot help but notice that the vast majority of the conceptual metaphors that Lakoff and Johnson adduce involve a verb; more than that: they are the archetypal ones (see the examples "wasting time," "attacking positions," and "going our separate ways" in ibid., 55).

part.[688] Examples of dead metaphors include *anf al-jabal* 'the nose of the mountain' for 'a prominent part of the mountain', *kabid al-samāʾ* 'the liver of the sky' for 'the meridian', *yad al-dahr* 'the hand of time' probably in the sense of *yad^a l-dahr* 'until the [length of the] hand of time' for 'never', or phrases with *umm* 'mother': *umm al-kitāb* 'the essence of the book' (Q 13:39, 43:4, some say a reference to *al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ*), *umm al-qurā* 'the greatest town' (Q 6: 92, usually taken as a reference to Mecca), *umm al-nujūm* 'the milky way', *ummuhāt al-khayr* 'the best goods of the earth'. They are listed by al-Zamakhsharī as *majāz* uses.[689] One might have expected to find here fixed terms such as *asad* 'lion' for 'brave'[690] or *ḥimār* 'ass' for 'stupid', but the lexicographers do not mention these occurrences. One exception is *maʾfūn* in the sense of 'mentally drained out, stupid': originally, Ibn Durayd and al-Zamakhsharī tell us, *afn* referred to 'a she-camel whose milk is all drained out'.[691]

An example of a verbal dead metaphor (that I would not characterize as a conceptual metaphor) is the verb *arāda* 'to want' in the sense of 'is about to'. Al-Thaʿālibī cites "so-and-so is about to (*yurīdu*) die" and the Qurʾānic "a wall about to tumble down" (Q 18:77) under the

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[688] Hence this use of *istiʿāra* is tied to the old poetic meaning of the term as 'object borrowing' (al-Thaʿālibī even cites several of the classical poetic 'borrowings' in the following section dealing with *istiʿārāt* found in the Qurʾān and in ancient Arabic poetry). One of the reasons I am placing little to no emphasis on the terms themselves is that Ibn Durayd's *bāb al-istiʿārāt* does *not* contain expressions containing 'foreign objects'! There we find what we are terming here metonymies, conceptual metaphors, and idiomatic expressions. The place where we find 'foreign objects' is his *bāb mā yustaʿāru [etc.]* (though more specific cases than *raʾs al-māl*, see below), meaning he is using the term *istiʿāra* in each of the sections differently.

[689] Al-Thaʿālibī, *Fiqh al-lugha*, 326-28/al-Zamakhsharī, *Asās*, 23, 113, 711, 21, respectively. Al-Zamakhsharī does not adduce the Qurʾānic *umm* examples; al-Thaʿālibī does not adduce the non-Qurʾānic ones. The example *yad al-dahr* is vocalized in al-Thaʿālibī (by the editor?) as *yadu l-dahri*: perhaps it does not mean *abadan* here but rather something like 'fate'; see Ibn Fāris' example of *yad^a l-dayr* in Part One, "The Philological Sense(s) of *Bayān*."

[690] This should not be confused with the 'unmarked' sentences "Zayd is a lion" or "I saw a lion," which the medieval Arabic scholars give as archetypal examples for 'live' metaphors.

[691] This is an example of an entry that appears without the *majāz* heading in al-Zamakhsharī's work (the heading *majāz* is absent for the root *a.f.n.*; see also Baalbaki's observations, above). But al-Zamakhsharī preserves the idea of a semantic extension here by stating that the word is "from" (*min*), i.e. originally applied to, *afinat al-nāqa* (Ibn Durayd has *al-afn qillat laban al-nāqa thumma yuqālu [...]*). See *Jamhara* 3: 1256; *Asās*, 19.

heading "section on the attribution of an action to [an entity] which is not the doer in reality."[692]

The Qurʾānic example is then glossed as *min tawassuʿ* (lit. extension) *al-ʿarab fī l-majāz wa-l-istiʿāra*, preserving the identification of such a case with the lexicographical terminology of semantic extension.[693] Other verbal dead metaphors are clear semantic extensions (expressed by Ibn Durayd via their *maṣdar*) like *wird* 'coming to' (originally: coming to a source of water) and *nujʿa* 'asking for' (originally: asking for rain/searching for pasture).[694]

Metonymies

Metonymies form a considerable part of Ibn Durayd's *bāb al-istiʿārāt*. Grammatically a noun (or a phrase acting as a single term), a metonymic expression refers to its denotatum not by its original name but rather by the name of an entity/idea that is related to it. There is a variety of metonymic relations; common ones include the part for whole (synecdoche), physical contiguity, producer for product, place for event, etc. Like the conceptual metaphor and dead metaphor, they are fixed expressions in the lexicon. Some of the examples in Ibn Durayd's *bāb al-istiʿārāt* appear in al-Zamakhsharī's dictionary as *majāz* (in general, al-Zamakhsharī does not include many metonymies). Al-Thaʿālibī does away with the headings *istiʿāra* or *majāz* and opts instead for the more precise [*fīmā*] *yunāsibuhu wa-yuqāribuhu* "section on [expressions] that are related

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[692] *Fiqh al-lugha*, 396-97 (*fī iḍāfat al-fiʿl ilā mā laysa bi-fāʿilin ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa*). The term *ḥaqīqa* refers here to the real world, not to literal language. Two primary cases are discussed, 'wanting' and 'saying' (*qawl*). Al-Thaʿālibī himself states (via an anecdote attributed to al-Ṣūlī [d. 267/946]) that *qāla* is not like *arāda* since the latter has a different meaning – "lexically" (*fī l-lugha*) – when applied to "a non-discerning entity" (*ghayr mumayyiz*). In our terms, *qāla* attributed to an inanimate being would be a case of 'live' metaphor. The section that immediately follows *fī iḍāfat al-fiʿl [etc.]* is the one on *majāz*.

[693] Ibid., 396. Al-Zamakhsharī cites the Qurʾānic example among the *majāz* occurrences of *r.w.y.d* [sic], but with no accompanying explanation (*Asās*, 258). For the listing of this meaning of *arāda* in the regular dictionaries see *Lisān al-ʿarab* 3: 1772; Lane, *Lexicon*, 1184.

[694] *Jamhara* 3: 1255-56; *Asās*, 671 (*warada al-māʾ* is placed under the general entry; *warada al-balad* under *majāz*), 621 (*nujʿa* under the general entry; *intajaʿa* 'asking for a favor' under *majāz*). Ibn Manẓūr preserves different interpretations for *warada* in these senses (*Lisān al-ʿarab* 6: 4810-11; for *n.j.ʿ* see 6: 4353).

[to the intended meaning] and are [physically] near it."[695] Common examples for metonymies are

samāʾ 'sky' for 'rain', *ghayth* 'rain' for 'vegetation [produced by the rain]', and *rāwiya* 'camel

carrying the leather water-bag' for 'leather water-bag'.[696]

Idiomatic Sayings

By far most of the entries that we come across in al-Zamakhsharī's listings of *majāz* are what we

would call idiomatic sayings. They are probably a result of some underlying conceptual

metaphor, but since they are culturally-specific, it is not always easy to identify them. What is

more, they are not systematic expressions of a conceptual metaphor (*sakata ʿanhu al-ghaḍab*

occurs but something like **takallama bihi al-ghaḍab* does not). Examples can also be found in

the second part of Ibn Duryad's *bāb al-istiʿārāt* and in his *bāb mā yustaʿāru fa-yutakallamu bihi*

fī ghayr mawḍiʿihi (the latter exhibiting 'misplaced' entities, usually animal body parts applied to

humans or to a different animal). Al-Thaʿālibī cites them across sections, most notably

istiʿāra.[697] Here are some examples, followed by the place of their citation by the lexicographers;

some are akin to proverbs[698]: *nāma thawbī* "my garment became worn out (lit. slept)" [*bāb al-*

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[695] *Fiqh al-lugha*, 348. He also includes here the cases of "a sleeping/wakeful night" (*laylun nāʾimun/sāhirun*) for 'a night in which people go to sleep/stay awake' (*yunāmu fīhi/yusʾharu fīhi*), which we later find in al-Jurjānī. I think they are better aligned with our examples of idiomatic expressions, below.

[696] Ibn Durayd, *Jamhara* 3: 1255-56. Al-Zamakhsharī cites the metonymic meaning of *samāʾ* in *Asās*, 309 (where it is said to refer more specifically to copious rain), but there is no mention of *ghayth* as vegetation or *rāwiya* as the water-bag. For al-Thaʿālibī's examples see *Fiqh al-lugha*, 348, but some appear also within the section "mentioning the place and intending who[/what] is in it" (ibid., 346), like "city" for its inhabitants or "pot" for the food inside it.

[697] *Fiqh al-lugha*, 426-28. All in all, this section contains dead metaphors (of the type *raʾs al-māl*), idiomatic expressions (of the type *tanafassa al-rabīʿ*, see below), and proverbial sayings ("*adab* is food for the soul," "youth is the first fruit of life," "white hair is the address of death.").

[698] And yet with regards to clear-cut proverbs al-Zamakhsharī will tell us it is a *mathal* 'proverb'. One example is *anā aʿrifu l-arnaba wa-udhunayhā* lit. "I know the hare along with its ears," which means something like "I know the issue from all its sides" (*wa-fī l-mathali anā aʿrifu l-arnaba wa-udhunayhā ay aʿrifuhu wa-lā yakhfā ʿalayya kamā lā takhfā ʿalayya l-arnabu*; *Asās*, 14). The layer of lexicographical writings that deal with *majāz* (/*istiʿāra*) are thus a distant cousin of the lexicographical literature on *amthāl* and in some cases, *gharīb* (on the latter two see Baalbaki, *Lexicographical Tradition*, 63 ff., 100 ff.).

istiʿārāt; *majāz*],[699] *jāʾa nāshiran udhunayhi* "he came threatening/coveting (lit. spreading [pricking up] his ears)" [*bāb mā yustaʿāru*; *majāz*],[700] *kashafati l-ḥarbu ʿan sāqihā* "the battle became vehement (lit. revealed its shank)" [*istiʿāra*; *majāz*],[701] *tanaffasa l-ṣubḥu* "morning appeared (lit. sighed/took a breath)" [*istiʿāra*; *majāz*];[702] *sakata ʿanhu l-ghaḍabu* "his anger subsided (lit. became silent)" [*majāz*];[703] *ishtaʿala l-raʾsu shayban/ishtaʿala l-shaybu fī l-raʾs* "the head became full of (lit. was inflamed with) white hair" [*majāz*].[704]

Literary Theory: From Ibn Rashīq and al-Jurjānī to Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ

Old writings on literary theory contained their own vocabulary to refer to figurative language before the influx of the term *majāz*. *Mathal* and *istiʿāra* were the most conspicuous. *Mathal* lit. 'likeness; proverb' might refer to an image, an analogy, an analogue (that is, the thing to which a topic is compared), a metaphor, or figurative speech in general. *Istiʿāra* lit. 'borrowing' was more technical, and in its old poetic sense referred de facto to instances of personification, or 'animalization' in the case of non-human analogues taken from the animal world (like portraying death as a beast of prey). In Heinrichs' terms, this is the loan metaphor or the analogy-based

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[699] *Jamhara* 3: 1256; *Asās*, 659, s.v. *n.w.m*. The reason I am not counting *nāma* here as a dead metaphor is because there is no evidence that it is applied to other subjects in this sense of 'becoming worn out', the way *arāda* did in the sense of 'is about to'. I am not treating it as a conceptual metaphor because – beyond the fact that it is culturally specific (there are no equivalent expressions in the languages that I know) – there is also no evidence that it is systematic (*"the garment woke up").

[700] *Jamhara* 3: 1312 [threatening]; *Asās*, 14, s.v. *ʾ.dh.n* [coveting]. Cf. Lane, *Lexicon*, 43.

[701] *Fiqh al-lugha*, 427; *Asās*, 314 (where we find the variation *qāmat al-ḥarb ʿalā sāqihā*, instead of *kashafat… ʿan*). Cf. Ibn Qutayba's discussion of Q 68:42 *yawma yukshafu ʿan sāqin* in *Taʾwīl*, 137.

[702] Al-Thaʿālibī cites "spring appeared," which means the verb could perhaps be taken as a dead metaphor. But the fact that *tanafassa* is reserved for 'morning', 'day' and 'spring' suggests a more specific idiomatic usage here. Al-Thaʿālibī does not explain the expression, he merely lists it. According to al-Zamakhsharī (and some earlier sources, see *Lisān al-ʿarab* 6: 4502, 3rd column), *tanafassa* here means *ṭāla* 'to become extended', but if *ṭāla* is taken to mean 'to extend into the sky' (Lane, *Lexicon*, 1895), then it is identical with 'appear'. See *Fiqh al-lugha*, 427; *Asās*, 648.

[703] *Asās*, 302; *Lisān al-ʿarab* 3: 2046, 3rd column (*sakata l-ghaḍabu*).

[704] Ibid., 332; *Lisān al-ʿarab* 4: 2281. Many of these examples appear in the work of al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (see fn. 678).

metaphor with no substratum (also 'old' metaphor).[705] The term *majāz* itself was absent from early writings on literary theory, like Thaʿlab's (d. 291/904) *Qawāʿid al-shiʿr* and Ibn al-Muʿtazz's (d. 296/908) *Kitāb al-Badīʿ*.[706] Other literary theorists used it in passing. Qudāma b. Jaʿfar (d. *ca.* 337/948) preserves the old sense of *majāz* as ~*maʿnā*,[707] but also of *majāz* in the sense of lexical extensions discussed above.[708] In other treatises of this period the term is used again either in passing (*ʿIyār al-shiʿr* of Ibn Ṭabāṭabā [d. 322/934], the *Muwāzana* of al-Āmidī [d. 371/981]),[709] or in a way that blends earlier traditions (the *Ṣināʿatayn* of al-ʿAskarī [d. after 400/1010]),[710] or in an altogether idiosyncratic sense (*Ḥilyat al-muḥāḍara* of al-Ḥātimī [d. 388/998]).[711]

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[705] On the old use of *mathal* see S.A. Bonebakker, "Istiʿāra," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*, Brill Online; Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 14; "Genesis," 122 (also the "somewhat vague hendiadys" *mathal wa-tashbīh*), 135; *idem*, "*Istiʿāra* and *Badīʿ* and their Terminological Relationship in Early Arabic Literary Criticism," *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften* 1 (1984), 180-211, here: 195. This sense of *mathal* can be found outside literary theory as well. The old hendiadys *tashbīh wa-mathal* resurfaces in later works: see, e.g., *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 364. For *mathal* in the sense of analogy see Al-Qāḍī ʿAlī b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Jurjānī, *al-Wasāṭa bayna al-Mutanabbī wa-khuṣūmih*, eds. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī, 2nd ed., Cairo: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1951, 41 (English: 'The Mediation between al-Mutanabbī and his Opponents'). On the old use of *istiʿāra* see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*. Above I use "personification" (or animalization) to represent the literary phenomenon that the *shawāhid* de facto reflect. The theorists themselves did not explain such metaphors in terms of personification, and elsewhere in this chapter I usually defer to Heinrichs' nomenclature. Theorists were perfectly capable of expressing the notion of personification when they so wished, as in "saying [something] about an inanimate being by [mention of] a human action" (*an tuʿabbira* [*al-ʿarab*] *ʿani l-jamād bi-fiʿli l-insān*; al-Thaʿālibī, *Fiqh al-lugha*, 396) and other similar expressions, found especially in poetic commentaries (see one example in §5.5, with respect to the poetic *wa-muʿarrasin li-l-ghaythi*).

[706] Heinrichs, "Contacts," 271.

[707] Ibid., 271.

[708] *Naqd*, 129, with respect to the juxtaposition of 'blindness' and eyesight. Specifically, *majāz* is connected to *tawassuʿ al-lugha* '[semantic] extension in the lexicon' (the full phrase is *huwa fī tawassuʿ al-lugha wa-tasammuḥ al-ʿarab fī l-lafẓ jāʾiz ʿalā ṭarīq al-majāz*).

[709] Heinrichs, "Contacts," 272-73.

[710] Ibid., 273-74. Even here *majāz* is used fairly in passing. The lexicographical sense of *majāz* that we outlined above takes center stage, mostly under the term *istiʿāra* (*al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 274-90). The theological sense of *majāz* can be seen in ibid., 276, when it is claimed that "every *istiʿāra* and *majāz* must have a *ḥaqīqa*." But once al-ʿAskarī reaches the poetic examples (ibid., 290-315) the term *majāz* disappears, suggesting that it was not yet integrated into literary theory proper. See also Kanazi, *Studies*, 150. Al-Ṭūfī seems to be following al-ʿAskarī in *al-Shiʿār*, 81-82.

[711] Al-Ḥātimī's category of *majāz al-shiʿr* means here "going beyond [correct usage] due to poetic necessity," akin to

In the work of Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1065) *majāz* has become better integrated as a literary theoretical concept.[712] Here *majāz* is defined as a hypernym and a hyponym. On the first level, what is identified as *majāz* are the "beauties of speech" (embellishments? literary devices in general? *maḥāsin al-kalām*[713]), like simile and metaphor (*tashbīh*, *istiʿāra*). *Majāz* as a hypernym thus refers to a category that subsumes several literary devices beneath it. On the second level, *majāz* as a hyponym refers to one of the subcategories (*bāb bi-ʿaynihi*) of *majāz*-the-hypernym, primarily, metonymy. Metonymy is referred to by a variation on al-Thaʿālibī's [*fīmā*] *yunāsibuhu wa-yuqāribuhu* (see above): *an yusammā al-shayʾ bi-sm mā qārabahu aw kāna minhu bi-sababin* "that a thing be called by the name of that which is near it or in some relation to it."[714] The first example is the stock *samāʾ* for 'rain', but as further examples of this type of *majāz* are adduced, we also come across instances of conceptual metaphors ("eating" for "destroying") and idiomatic sayings (*shajarun qad ṣāḥa* "trees crying out" for "growing tall"), which the author presumably viewed as part of conventional Arabic vocabulary and phraseology.[715] One source Ibn Rashīq draws from explicitly with regards to the hyponym *majāz* is Ibn Qutayba.[716]

ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081), Ibn Rashīq's contemporary in the

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ḍarūrat al-shiʿr, and is contrasted with *maḥāsin al-shiʿr*. This is my own interpretation of Abū ʿAlī Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. al-Muẓaffar al-Ḥātimī, *Ḥilyat al-muḥāḍara fī ṣināʿat al-shiʿr*, ed. Jaʿfar al-Kittānī, 2 vols., Baghdad: al-Jumhūriyya al-ʿIrāqiyya, Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Iʿlām, Dār al-Rashīd, 1979, 1: 130-31 (esp. the comment by al-Aṣmaʿī), 2: 3-26; cf. Heinrichs, "Contacts," 275 fn. 50. Heinrichs is correct that some of the phenomena that al-Ḥātimī lists are akin to the phenomena that Abū ʿUbayda subjects to interpretation ("Contacts," 274-76).

[712] *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 266-68. See also Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 48-49.

[713] Ibid. 1: 266. It is not equivalent to all *badīʿ* categories here (cf. 1: 268), but rather to specific devices within *badīʿ* that can "admit interpretation" (*iḥtimālihi wujūh al-taʾwīl*, 1: 266; also *Hand of the Northwind*, 49).

[714] *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 266.

[715] Ibid., 266-68. The full saying is "In the land of the tribe of so-and-so there are trees that 'cried out'" (*bi-arḍi banī fulānin shajarun qad ṣāḥa*). He then rejects some examples as mere lexical extensions (my term) by adducing poetic lines that would suggest otherwise.

[716] Ibid., 267. Ibn Rashīq's treatment of *majāz* deserves a fuller account than the one given above.

East, also preserves the lexicographical understanding of *majāz* within his theory of the concept, which he thoroughly lays out in the end of his *Asrār al-balāgha*.[717] In fact, it seems that the vast majority of phenomena that al-Jurjānī identifies and examines as *majāz* – in what is perhaps the most extensive treatment of *majāz* to date – are part of conventional language: metonymies, dead metaphors/idiomatic sayings, and most of all, conceptual metaphors.[718] Nothing better attests to the lexicographical dimension of *majāz* than the miniscule number of poetic *shawāhid* in this lengthy theoretical analysis (the *Asrār* otherwise abounds with poetry citations).

Al-Jurjānī introduces the innovative distinction between *majāz fī l-muthbat* lit. "*majāz* in [the single-term concept] that is affirmed/predicated [of something]" (later known as *majāz lughawī* 'lexical *majāz*') and *majāz fī l-ithbāt* lit. "*majāz* in the affirmation/predication [of one thing of another]" (later known as *majāz ʿaqlī* '*majāz* on the level of reason', i.e. 'logical/conceptual *majāz*').[719] *Majāz fī l-muthbat* amounts to a single-word figurative expression, and the common examples al-Jurjānī adduces for it are metonymies (which occur on the level of the noun), like *yad* 'hand' for 'favor' or *iṣbaʿ* 'finger' for 'positive mark', noun metaphors (which we would call dead metaphors) like *asad* 'lion' for 'brave', and verb metaphors (which we would

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[717] Al-Jurjānī, *Asrār*, 324-89. The sections in pp. 324-64 (Ritter's paragraphs 21-23) close the *Asrār*; pp. 365-89 (paragraphs 24-26) are an appendix to the *Asrār*, probably meant as such (see Heinrichs, "Contacts," 276-77, following Ritter [see §5.2]). In the *Dalāʾil*, mentions of *majāz* are sporadic. For modern treatments of al-Jurjānī's theory of *majāz* (a complete account is still lacking) see Kamal Abu Deeb, *Al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1979, 189-92, 230-33; Larkin, *Theology*, 72-109 (ch. 4, aptly titled "The Problem of *Majāz*"); Heinrichs, "Contacts," 276-84, esp. 278-79; Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 198-211.

[718] Cf. the unsubstantiated statement by Simon, "Majāz," that "[m]ajāz, as presented by al-Jurjānī, is a communicative strategy meant to go beyond the limits of conventional language and create new fields of associations." By "conventional language" I am not necessarily limiting the discussion to Arabic. Al-Jurjānī himself recognizes that many of the same tropes occur across languages (like 'lion' for 'brave'; *Asrār*, 32-33). See Heinrichs, "Contacts," 281 (and cf. 284). Similarly, the conceptual metaphors (our term) that he treats are probably universal. See also, Larkin, *Theology*, 75: "[I]n his treatment of *majāz*, al-Jurjānī undertook […] to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underlying the individual rhetorical devices." I am not trying to suggest that al-Jurjānī was some kind of precursor to the modern cognitive linguists (Lakoff et al.): he was, on the contrary, what they would term an objectivist – seeing similarity as subsisting in truth between two entities (see Larkin, *Theology*, 90).

[719] *Asrār*, 324, 338, 342 ff., 376 ff.; Larkin, *Theology*, 96 ff.

call dead metaphors or idiomatic sayings) like *aḥyā* 'to bring to life' with regards to *arḍ* 'land' (found in Q 35:9) to denote "a land filled with newly-grown vegetation" (variations of the idiom *aḥyā arḍan mayyita* "to revive dead land" occur in the dictionaries[720]).[721] In the case of metonymy, he recognizes explicitly the conventional, non-novel character of the expressions.[722] The second category, *majāz fī l-ithbāt*, refers to figurative speech on the level of the sentence because all single words are used literally, according to al-Jurjānī, and it is only the predication (or logical judgment, *ḥukm*) that is figurative. The stock examples are of the type "Time/days/nights made the man perish/the young grow old" or "Spring brought about the blossoms" in which the true doer is God, not the passage of time or the arrival of a season.[723] Although some theological implications are at stake,[724] what al-Jurjānī is touching upon here is the (universal) linguistic habit to express causation – i.e., true predication – in terms of

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[720] Al-Zamakhsharī, *Asās*, 150; Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 2: 1077 (1st and 2nd columns). As in the case of the dictionaries discussed above, however, *asad* in the sense of 'brave' is not listed in the dictionaries.

[721] Al-Jurjānī, *Asrār*, 325-29, 343-45, 349. The inclusion of *asad* here (ibid., 325) would later become a thorny topic: is the simple equational judgment "Zayd is a lion," which presupposes the statement "I saw a lion [referring to Zayd]," part of *majāz lughawī* or *majāz ʿaqlī*? For discussion see §5.2. Perhaps it is inaccurate to refer to the *asad* metaphor above as 'dead' since it is merely used as an archetypal example for the 'live' metaphor. Further research is required here.

[722] Ibid., 367-69. He says with regards to the *majāz* cases of 'hand'-for-'favor' (in our words: metonymy), that they are more accurately a case of mimicking former usage, like the proverb (*mathal*), and that the question deserves a separate discussion. It is here that al-Jurjānī invokes Ibn Durayd's "inaccurate" use of *istiʿāra* to express such cases, and the dictionaries in general (*kutub al-lugha*), and it is here that he recognizes that not every *majāz* is *badīʿ*, as is implied by the books of the literary critics. We will revisit these passages in §5.3 (Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī).

[723] Ibid., 342-43, 346, 377. The first is exemplified in poetic (!) citations – for translations see Abu Deeb, *al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 231-32; Larkin, *Theology*, 231-32; Heinrichs, "Contacts," 278. We should say that not only are all words used literally, but they all have a referent in the real world (or in our conception of it): in "hand of the north wind," all words are used literally, but hand does not refer to any actual entity. This type of metaphor seems to be excluded from his notion of *majāz fī l-ithbāt*, judging by the *shawāhid* of the latter. *Majāz ʿaqlī* (as it is later known) is therefore not equivalent to *kadhib* (see below). Al-Jurjānī's discussions of the "doer in reality" are strongly reminiscent of theological discussions of the type we encountered with al-Kindī (fn. 659).

[724] "Predicating acts of God is clearly what is at the heart of the discussion […]" (Larkin, *Theology*, 99). Human agency vis-à-vis God is one theological implication of the discussion; Larkin convincingly shows that al-Jurjānī is in discussion here with ʿAbd al-Jabbār and his Muʿtazilī ilk. See also al-Kindī.

'correlation' (the term *sabab* is sometimes used this context).[725] In other words, he recognizes

that humans commonly and by convention conceive of certain events or actions 'metaphorically'

in the mind.[726] Al-Jurjānī further exemplifies this with sentences like "The knife cut," "The

sword killed" and "Seeing you made me happy", where it is not the 'knife', 'sword' or 'seeing'

that are doing the action but are instead co-occurring with it.[727] I think it is safe to refer to such

cases as conceptual metaphors (as we have used the term above) because they are embedded

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[725] The idea of correlation is presented rather explicitly in ibid., 347.15-16 (and elsewhere): "Because blossoms come to existence only when spring comes to existence (*lā yūjad illā bi-wujūd al-rabīʿ*), it seems to us as if (*tuwuhhima*) spring has an influence in [bringing about] their existence (*taʾthīr fī wujūdihi*), and hence it [bringing the flowers into existence] was predicated of it [spring]." For *sabab* see, e.g., *Asrār*, 356, 358 – not to be confused with *sabab*/*asbāb* in the context of metonymic relations in the single-word *majāz* (e.g., *Asrār*, 367).

[726] When he discusses (ibid., 356) how it is that "spring" is made into a doer in such sentences, despite the fact that it is illogical to predicate an action of a non-able being (*ithbāt al-fiʿl li-ghayr al-qādir lā yaṣiḥḥu fī qaḍāyā l-ʿuqūl*), al-Jurjānī remarks that it is done "according to common convention among people" (*ʿalā l-ʿurfi l-jārī bayna l-nās*), and because he speaks of the *ʿaql* here, he is not staying within the confines of one specific language (see fn. 728). With respect to *faʿala l-rabīʿ* (saying that *spring* did something), al-Jurjānī maintains that what people do (conceptually, and hence it is reflected in their language) is as follows: at the time when (*fī*) an action(/event) takes place ("exists"), they take the thing that is associated with (*sabab*) the existence of the action of its doer, or the thing that is "like" a thing associated with it (*ka-l-sabab*), and make it as if (*ka-annahu*) it is the [actual] doer (*wa-ʿalā l-urfi l-jārī bayna l-nāsi an yajʿalū l-shayʾa idhā kāna sababan aw ka-l-sababi fī wujūdi l-fiʿli min fāʿilihi ka-annahu fāʿilun*; ibid.) (By *ka-l-sabab* he might be distinguishing between ontologically 'real' association and conceptually 'perceived' association). The linguistic habit (here: *isnād* 'predication') closely depends on the real-world, physical habit – in his words, the *ʿāda* that is ordained by God – thus further underscoring the universal and yet conventional aspect of al-Jurjānī's *majāz fī l-ithbāt*. He says (ibid.): "When God, praise be to Him, ordained the habit and made the matter such that trees would put forth leaves [etc.] *at the time of* spring, it so seemed [*ṣāra yutawahhamu*], on the face of it and by way of habit, as if the existence of these things [leaves on trees, etc.] requires spring, so the verb was predicated of it [i.e., spring] according to this interpretation and 'reduction'" (emphasis added; *fa-lammā ajrā -llāhu subḥānahu l-ʿādata wa-anfadha l-qaḍiyyata an tūriqa l-ashjāru* […] *fī zamāni l-rabīʿi ṣāra yutawahhamu fī ẓāhiri l-amri wa-majrā l-ʿādati ka-anna li-wujūdi hādhihi l-ashyāʾi ḥājatan ilā l-rabīʿi fa-usnida l-fiʿlu ilayhi ʿalā hādhā l-taʾawwuli wa-l-tanzīl*). Note that when he speaks of *isnād* (a linguistic notion), *fiʿl* usually means "verb," but when he speaks of *ithbāt* (a synonym of *isnād* on the linguistic level but also a reference to an extra-linguistic notion of attribution), *fiʿl* usually means – at least in this context – "action/event." Cf. Ritter's looser translation in *Die Geheimnisse der Wortkunst des ʿAbdalqāhir al-Curcānī*, trans. Hellmut Ritter, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1959, 415 (23/6); he is correct to draw attention to theological discussions here (fn. 2), but I am not sure this has specifically to do with the "Ashʿarī" rejection of causality (cf. al-Kindī's discussion of the doer).

[727] *Asrār*, 356, 358-59, 344. To be more exact, al-Jurjānī provides the examples of the knife cutting and sword killing as linguistic *evidence* for his argument (*mā yadullu ʿalā anna* […]; ibid., 358). By pointing to so many everday instances of 'figurative' predication, al-Jurjānī is coming closer to a position espoused by Ibn Jinnī, that all language is *majāz* (on which see §5.1). The example by al-Jurjānī "Seeing you made me happy" contains both a *majāz fī l-ithbāt*, as explained above, but also a *majāz fī l-muthbat* because the original Arabic is "Seeing you enlivened me" (*aḥyatnī ruʾyatuka*), where the verb *aḥyā* "means *ānasa*, *sarra*, and the like" (ibid., 344). I 'translated' the single-word *majāz* above in order to exemplify the 'logical' *majāz*. Some aspects of the verbal sentence (or verb in general) vis-à-vis *majāz* are treated by Larkin in *Theology*, 94-96 (highlighting the theological dimension).

universally[728] in our everyday, *literal* language.[729] Al-Jurjānī is therefore studying the question of

majāz primarily as a philosophical linguist (who is invested in theology).

Two centuries later, Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ (d. 654/1256) represents a stage in literary theory in

which the term *majāz* regularly appeared in treatises of the field. And yet, his work exemplifies

two varying traditions of *majāz* in literary theory – the first is the early, supposedly 'inconsistent'

literary theoretical one, and the second is the model proposed by al-Jurjānī (via the mediation of

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) that differentiates *majāz fī l-muthbat* from *majāz fī l-ithbāt*. In his first

book, *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ states that *majāz* is a genus (*jins*) covering many species

(*anwāʿ*), ranging from metaphor (*istiʿāra*), exaggeration (*mubālagha*) and indirect allusions

(*ishāra, irdāf*) to simile (*tashbīh*) and analogy (*tamthīl*). One of the species (*nawʿ*) of *majāz*

refers to elisions and metonymies (our term) and "the critics […] kept the name *majāz* for it."[730]

In other words, Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ follows Ibn Rashīq in viewing *majāz* as a category for

metaphors, similes etc. on one hand, and as a subcategory for certain linguistic conventions on

the other.[731] In Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's later work, *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, there is little trace of this theory

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[728] Based partly on al-Jurjānī's own words in *Asrār*, 345: with regards to the logical judgment (*ḥukm*) that takes place when a sentence-*majāz* is uttered, the author tells us that "the only recourse and way [to understand] it is via pure reason, and [a specific] vocabulary (*lugha*) has no share in it […] The Arab [judges] it just like the Persian, and the Persian like the Turk, because the judgments of reason (*qaḍāyā al-ʿuqūl*/Ritter: die Urteile des Verstandes) are the foundations and bases upon which other things are built." (I am reading *fa-l-marjiʿu fīhi wa-l-wajhu ilayhi l-ʿaqlu l-maḥḍu* for *fa-l-marjiʿu fīhi wa-l-wajhu ilā l-ʿaqli l-maḥḍi*; see also Ritter, *Geheimnisse*, 402.) This is not the same as saying that the Persian and Turk also *express* such utterances in the same way (not simply decipher them), but it seems that the phenomenon al-Jurjānī is targeting is fairly universal.

[729] Lakoff and Johnson include some treatment of causation in *Metaphors We Live By*, 27 (under "Identifying Causes") and 69-72 (where causation is defined in terms of a 'prototype', to wit: direct manipulation). To further underscore the non-'poetic' nature of al-Jurjānī's *majāz*, consider the remarks by Heinrichs ("Contacts," 278), at least with regards to the sentence-*majāz*, that "it is quite clear that this kind of trope has little relevance for poetry and *balāgha* studies" and that "[i]ts proper place is in the *kalām-tafsīr* discussions." This begs the question, in what way is al-Jurjānī's theory of *majāz* a contribution to literary theory proper, and how *istiʿāra* is at all reconcilable with this view of *majāz*!

[730] *Taḥrīr*, 457-58 (quote taken from p. 457).

[731] *Ḥadhf* here is reminiscent of the phenomena treated by Abū ʿUbayda, and see fn. 658 above.

and in its stead we find the notions of single-word *majāz* and *majāz* on the level of predication. Much of the discussion is taken verbatim (and explicitly so) from the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.[732]

Majāz as Kadhib

> *al-majāz akhū l-kadhib* "*majāz* is the brother of lie"
> - Those who reject the presence of *majāz* in the Qurʾān[733]

In the 'old' view as presented in Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ (and Ibn Rashīq before him), *majāz* covered literary devices such as simile and exaggeration[734], which were not part of the *majāz* phenomena in the traditions of old Qurʾānic exegesis, theology or lexicography. What did *majāz* mean, then, in a purely literary context? One clue to this answer may be provided by the early Ibn Ṭabāṭabā (d. 322/934), who was the first literary theorist to use the term *majāz* – albeit in passing – and specifically within the context of poetics. In his use of the term, *majāz* is contrasted with *ḥaqīqa* not in the sense of 'literal speech' but in its primary sense of 'reality'. This can be seen both from Ibn Ṭabāṭabā's 'theoretical pronouncement' and from his comment on one of the *shawāhid*. In the first case, he instructs the poet to "use *majāz* that comes close to *ḥaqīqa*." In the second case, he remarks that having the she-camel complain of the imminent journey using direct speech (*ḥikāya*), the way al-Muthaqqab al-ʿAbdī (pre-Islamic poet) does in two of his lines, is "*majāz* that is remote from *ḥaqīqa*."[735] In both cases, *ḥaqīqa* cannot be referring to the world of language

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[732] *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 175-79. The little trace we do find for the 'old' theory is in ibid., 178-79, but with regards to *majāz*-the-hyponym, not *majāz* as a cover term for simile, exaggeration, etc. See also Part One, §2.3.

[733] This according to Ṭashköprüzāde: he writes that the minority of scholars who reject the presence of *majāz* in the Qurʾān do so because they mistakenly believe that *majāz* and *kadhib* are one and the same; they are, he says, wrong (*Miftāḥ al-saʿāda*, eds. Bakrī and al-Nūr, 2: 450).

[734] Strictly speaking, Ibn Rashīq does not classify exaggeration as part of *majāz* (as in Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ), but he does contrast it with *ḥaqīqa*, here: 'reality', and *al-ḥaqāʾiq* 'true things' (*al-ʿUmda* 2: 60, in the context of *ghuluww*, seemingly indistinguishable from his category of *mubālagha*; ibid., 53 ff; see §5.1, "The Discourse of *Kadhib*").

[735] Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn Ṭabāṭabā al-ʿAlawī, *ʿIyār al-shiʿr*, eds. Ṭāhā al-Ḥājirī and Muḥammad Zaghlūl

(speaking of figurative speech [or something similar] as being close to/remote from literal speech does not make much sense), but rather the physical world. Similarly, in his definition of *majāz*, Ibn Rashīq speaks of expressions that go beyond the *ḥaqāʾiq* but are not completely absurd: here too the reference is to real-world essences and to the law of nature, not to literal expressions.[736]

Heinrichs has shown that in the early stages of the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* pairing, the domain to which the terms referred "could have gone either way" because *ḥaqīqa* had a primary meaning of 'reality' or 'true essence' (= real world) and *majāz* had a primary meaning of 'interpretation' or 'idiom' (= world of language).[737] In fact, in early theological circles (and later, in Sufi ones), *ḥaqīqa* referred to the true reality of God and *majāz* to the derivative reality of mankind. If *majāz* affected the term *ḥaqīqa*, the pairing would be placed in the linguistic domain; if *ḥaqīqa* affected the term *majāz*, it would be placed in the ontological one.[738] The opposite of *ḥaqīqa* in its ontological sense of 'truth' would be *kadhib* 'falsehood, lie'. Ibn Qutayba recognizes this when he states that those who refute the Qurʾān by pointing out the *majāz* in it are using *majāz* in the sense of *kadhib*, claiming that "a wall does not 'want'[739] and a town is not 'asked'" (a reference to Q 18:77 and 12:82). Ibn Qutayba rejects this claim saying, "If *majāz* were untrue (*kadhib*), and every action attributed to a non-animal [entity] were false (*bāṭil*), then most of our speech would be corrupt, because we say 'the plants grew', 'the tree extended high', 'the fruit ripened',

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Sallām, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā, 1956, 119-120; Heinrichs, "Contacts," 272.

[736] *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 266 (it is ambiguous because the subject of the sentence is the *alfāẓ*; Heinrichs has "proper meaning[s]" for *ḥaqāʾiq* in *Hand of the Northwind*, 48).

[737] Heinrichs, "Genesis," 137.

[738] Ibid., 136-37; Heinrichs, "Contacts," 256; and above.

[739] Referring to the idiomatic use of the verb *arāda* in the sense of 'about to' (see above).

'the mountain stood', and 'the price was low'."[740] These sentences, as we have seen, are part of everyday conceptual thinking and can be seen as 'literal' metaphorical expressions (including the common metonymy PLACE FOR INHABITANTS[741]).

But an early testimony indicates that *kadhib* can and perhaps did refer to non-'lexicalized' figurative language, by none other than the grammarian Sībawayh (d. *ca.* 180/796), who adduced "I carried the mountain" (*ḥamaltu al-jabal*) and "I drank (all) the water of the ocean" (*sharibtu māʾ al-baḥr*) to exemplify the category of speech termed *mustaqīm kadhib* 'straight (i.e., grammatical) [and] lie'.[742] Such expressions do not appear in the dictionaries,[743] and one strongly senses that they had a 'poetic' meaning along the lines of "I overcame the impossible" or "I 'conquered the world'."

Sībawayh's so-called soundness-classification of speech, where the term *kadhib* appears, forms one of the brief preliminary chapters of his *Kitāb*, referred to collectively as the *Risāla*,

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[740] Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 132 (followed by more examples from everyday language). Ibn Qutayba is pointing here to what we have referred to above as conceptual metaphors. Indeed, al-Jurjānī would also say that such sentences – and *majāz* in general – are not false (Larkin, *Theology*, 86; for al-Jurjānī, *majāz* was not about conformity to truth).

[741] Günter Radden and Zoltán Kövecses, "Towards a Theory of Metonymy," in Klaus-Uwe Panther and Günter Radden (eds.), *Metonymy in Language and Thought*, Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1999, 17-59, here: 41.

[742] Abū Bishr ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān b. Qanbar Sībawayh, *al-Kitāb: Kitāb Sībawayh*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, 5 vols., [Cairo]: Dār al-Qalam, 1966-1977, 1: 25-26. *Mustaqīm* 'straight' probably refers to grammatical correctness, not semantic or logical soundness (see my "Don't Be Absurd: The Term *Muḥāl* in Sībawayhi's *Kitāb*," in Amal Elesha Marogy [ed.], *The Foundations of Arabic Linguistics: Sībawayhi and Early Arabic Grammatical Theory*, with a forward by M.G. Carter, Leiden: Brill, 2012, 27-58, here: 30-31, 36-37; this in accordance with Jahn [1895], cited in ibid., 30 fn. 12). There is also the odd category of *muḥāl kadhib*, exemplified by the sentence, *"I shall drink the water of the ocean yesterday": the utility of this concocted category to linguistic (/philosophical-linguistic) thinking is not in the least clear.

[743] Consulting *Asās al-balāgha* and *Lisān al-ʿarab*, s.vv. *ḥ.m.l*, *j.b.l*, *sh.r.b*, *m.w.h*, *b.ḥ.r*. The first example by Sībawayh should not be confused with conceptual metaphors like 'bearing' (*ḥamala*) a sin, on which see *Lisān al-ʿarab* 2: 1001. In the case *sh.r.b.*, Ibn Manẓūr records a line by Abū Dhuʾayb (1st/7th cent.) that speaks of drinking the water of the sea, but in a more literal (if anthropomorphizing) sense: the clouds are said to drink the water of the sea before pouring down the rain (*Lisān al-ʿarab* 4: 2221; Ibn Manẓūr is only interested in it because of the redundant preposition *bi-* in *sharibnā bi-māʾi l-baḥri*). If we were to apply later notions here, Sībawayh's examples would count as *tamthīl* 'metaphorical exemplification' (see §5.1).

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and evidence suggests that some ideas expressed therein are extraneous to Sībawayh's linguistic thinking, and even to linguistic thinking in general; *kadhib* is then no longer treated in the body of the *Kitāb*.[744] For this reason, we cannot know if Sībawayh himself took those sentences literally or not, and for our purposes, it does not necessarily matter.[745] In at least one later account we find the phrase *sharibtu māʾ al-baḥr* being used figuratively, and one could certainly surmise that both this sentence and *ḥamaltu al-jabal* had a "meaning," whether they were concoctions of Sībawayh (/his teachers/peers) or not.[746] Of course, the idea of *kadhib*, if not spefically related to figurative language, has a long history in relation to poetry, beginning with the famous Qurʾānic verse in *Sūrat al-Shuʿarāʾ*, in which poets are said to "say what they do not

[744] For instance, the term *muḥāl* as it is defined in the *Risāla* does not match its actual use in the course of the *Kitāb*, and the term *isnād*, laid out in the *Risāla*, is practically absent (the term, not the notion of predication) from the rest of the work (for the first see Noy, "*Muḥāl*," and 27-28 fn. 3, 55 fn. 107, for further evaluations of the *Risāla* by Talmon and Carter). I am not an adherent of the Greek Hypothesis regarding the evolution of Arabic grammatical thinking, but I do think that several chapters in the *Risāla* are largely a product of Hellenistic/Roman teachings. Other examples are the brief chapter on polysemy and synonymy which, in this early stage, belongs more to the sphere of logic than to grammar (cf. the opening of Aristotle's *Categories*), or the discussion of the parts of speech in the opening of the *Kitāb* (cf. the terms used to describe 'noun' and 'verb' in *De Interpretatione* 16a19 and 16b6; see Ackrill [trans.], 3, 43-44). Therefore, I am not convinced that Sībawayh's "general principles" of grammar are "*totally* [my emphasis] foreign" to Aristotle's works, as Troupeau and others conclude (Gérard Troupeau, "La *Risālat al-Kitāb* de Sībawayhi," *Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph* 48 [1973], 323-38, here: 324). He is right to poing out that the *De Interpretatione* and *Poetics* were not yet translated into Arabic at this point, but postulating a method of *voie diffuse*, especially with regards to the elementary topics, is certainly not unlikely.

[745] Later scholars tried to make sense of Sībawayh's classification. See Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī, *Sharḥ Kitāb Sībawayh*, eds. Ramaḍān ʿAbd al-Tawwāb (et al.), 10 vols., [Cairo]: al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb, 1986-[2006], 2: 91-92, 94, and Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī, *Aqsām al-akhbār*, ed. ʿAlī Jābir al-Manṣūri, *al-Mawrid* 7.3 (1978), 201-20, here: 202-204. Both recognize that *kadhib* here is different from the 'unverifiable' lie, like when someone says he went somewhere or did something, but in actuality did not. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī engages with Sībawayh's idea of speech-soundness but he reworks it into a classification of *maʿānī* (*al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 67). For al-ʿAskarī, 'carrying a mountain' is not inconceivable: God could potentially ordain it.

[746] Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī relates that he encountered the famous philosopher al-Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) in Aleppo, where al-Suhrawardī told him that in a dream he saw himself as if he were drinking the water of the ocean (*ka-annī sharibtu māʾa l-baḥri*) and that this meant he would inevitably possess the whole world (*lā budda an amlika l-arḍa*). See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* 6: 272 (I thank Geert Jan van Gelder for the reference). My point is not to read al-Suhrawardī into Sībawayh. The above interpretation is my own (and tentative). I think that for the *kadhib* sentences to be meaningless, we would have had to find sentences such as "the *siwāk* was pregnant": like carrying a mountain and drinking an ocean, it is impossible in reality, but finding a plausible meaning for it is much harder. Cf. the modern "semantically ill-formed" sentences, which are notated with the symbol #: the example Andrew Carnie provides is "#The toothbrush is pregnant," and as he says, toothbrushes cannot be pregnant "except in the world of fantasy/science fiction or poetry" (I would add very modern poetry; see *Syntax: A Generative Introduction*, 3rd ed., Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 14-15).

do" (Q 26: 226), or the proverbial *aḥsan al-shiʿr akdhabuhu* "the best poetry is the most untruthful," and continuing with the Aristotelian poetic tradition in Arabic, in which the concept of *aqāwīl kādhiba* 'false statements' takes center stage.[747]

The *shawāhid* that the literary theorists adduce for *majāz* are more in line with the *shawāhid* that Sībawayh adduces for *mustaqīm kadhib* than they are with the *shawāhid* that the theologians or lexicographers adduce for *majāz*. This is probably not a coincidence. While Heinrichs is correct in asserting that the conception of figurative expression as 'untrue' (or "non-accordance with reality"), which was reflected in Ibn Qutayba, "did not find any followers […] among the literary theorists,"[748] this assertion holds mostly at the level of explicit theoretical pronouncements. Once we examine the categories subsumed under *majāz* and the *shawāhid* and commentarial remarks that follow, a more complex picture emerges. The use of a *term* such as *kadhib* in the context of *majāz* had too many negative theological and moral connotations and was probably eschewed early on (in other spheres, the use of literary *kadhib* endured),[749] but the *notion* of figurative language as an utterance that is not true to reality probably underpinned the

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[747] Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Fārābī, *Maqāla fī Qawānīn ṣināʿat al-shuʿarāʾ li-l-muʿallim al-thānī*, in *al-Manṭiqiyyāt li-l-Fārābī*, ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dānish Pajuh, Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʿUẓmā al-Marʿashī al-Najafī, 1987, 493.3-4ᵉ, 494.2ᵉ, where poetic statements (*al-aqāwīl al-shiʿriyya*) are subsumed under untrue statements (*al-aqāwīl al-kādhiba*); "Fārābī's Canons of Poetry," ed. and trans. Arthur J. Arberry, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 17 (1938), 266-78; J. Christoph Bürgel, "„Die beste Dichtung ist die lügenreichste": Wesen und Bedeutung eines literarischen Streites des arabischen Mittelalters im Lichte komparatistischer Betrachtung," *Oriens* 23/24 (1974), 7-102, here: 25 ff., 39 ff. The pairing of the logical arts with the truth values of the premises (false premises in the case of poetic statements) goes back to the late Alexandrian commentators of Aristotle and is best represented in Elias' (fl. 550) commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* (Heinrichs, "*Takhyīl*," 3-5).

[748] *Arabische Dichtung*, 58-59, with a possible exception in al-Jurjānī's *takhyīl* 'mock aetiology' (ibid., 59).

[749] See §5.1 below, "The Discourse of *Kadhib*." Heinrichs distinguishes five issues concerning *kadhib* (*Arabische Dichtung*, 56-68): (1) *kadhib* in the general sense of lies; (2) *kadhib* in the context of *majāz*; (3) *kadhib* in the form of hyperbole; (4) *kadhib* in the form of *takhyīl* by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī; (5) *kadhib* in the form of *ikhtilāq* by the Maghribī Ḥāzim al-Qarṭājannī (d. 639/1242). On the problem of falsehood in poetry as depicted by the early theorists see Renate Jacobi, "Dichtung und Lüge in der arabischen Literaturtheorie," *Der Islam* 49 (1972), 85-99; Bürgel, "Die beste Dichtung"; Mansour Ajami, *The Alchemy of Glory: The Dialectic of Truthfulness and Untruthfulness in Medieval Arabic Literary Criticism*, Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1988.

literary conception of *majāz*.[750] In what follows we explore this underlying conception of *majāz* in literary theory, and the results – as will presently become clear – are sometimes messy.[751]

5.1. An Alternative Theory of *Majāz*: Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's deliberations on *majāz* and on the categories subsumed under *majāz* offer us an illuminating case study for his literary-theoretical thinking. It is one of the clear topics in which his thought develops from the earlier *Jāmiʿ* to the later *Mathal*, and it is one of the clear topics in which he offers an innovation that is distinctively different from the discussions produced by other literary theorists.

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's primary innovation in the *Mathal* lies in his conceptualization of *majāz* as encompassing two large categories: *tawassuʿ* '[fictitious] extension [of reality]' and *tashbīh* 'figurative comparison' (including metaphor and analogy). It is with regards to several sub-categories within *tashbīh* and *tawassuʿ* (the latter of which is afforded much less space) that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn addresses literary phenomena that are not commonly targeted in classical Arabic literary theory, namely, personification, genitive metaphors and verb metaphors. It is noteworthy that no other literary theorist after him followed his classification.[752] Despite the innovation introduced by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, his underlying theory of *tawassuʿ* and *tashbīh* reflected an implicit thinking about *majāz* that was prevalent, probably since the early writings of literary theory

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[750] It can also be seen in some of the parallel works in the tradition of Aristotelian Arabic poetics, although not under the technical term *majāz* (see fn. 799 below). It must be stressed that the *majāz ʿaqlī* associated with al-Jurjānī is not equivalent to *kadhib* (this will be highlighted especially in our treatment of Ibn al-Zamlakānī).

[751] Even the so-called logically-coherent theory of al-Jurjānī is 'messy' in that *istiʿāra* is not quite reconcilable with his theory of *majāz*. The least 'messy' theory of *majāz* and *application thereof* to literary analysis is, without a doubt, the one by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr (cf. Bonebakker, "Istiʿāra").

[752] Especially revealing is that his 'refuters' Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd and al-Ṣafadī did not attend to his classification.

proper, namely, that *majāz* involved a proposition that was untrue (*kadhib*, a term not used).[753]

This seems to have been the case even as theories on word-transfer explicitly entered the field of

literary theory (originally by the hands of al-Rummānī).

By the time Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was writing, the theory of a word transfer had become in wide

use in legal theory and it appeared regularly in literary theory as well. We will discuss how the

legal notion of *majāz* figured in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work and how, despite incorporating it in his

analysis, he did not feel at home with this theory.[754] We will also look at other influences on his

theory of *majāz* and how his thinking developed from his earlier work to the later one. Then we

will delve into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own understanding of *tawassuʿ* and *tashbīh*, and the place *kināya*

held within this scheme.

The Legal Underpinnings of Majāz

In both works Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn addresses the question of *majāz* in two places: in a general

prolegomenon under the preliminary sections (*al-ashyāʾ al-ʿāmma* in the *Jāmiʿ*; *muqaddima* in

the *Mathal*) and then again in the opening of *al-ṣināʿa al-maʿnawiyya* when discussing metaphor

and comparison (this is done peripherally in the *Jāmiʿ* and more extensively in the *Mathal*).[755]

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[753] But see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 29 (to be discussed below). Cf. al-Rāzī, who explicitly distinguishes between *majāz* and *kadhib* in both his literary theory and in his legal theory; *Nihāya*, 169, 181-82, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 461.

[754] From the account above it sounds as if the notion of *majāz* was monolithic in legal theory, but it was not. See, e.g. Vishanoff, *Formation*, 56-57, 125-26, 165-69, 240-42. What I mean by a 'legal' understanding of *majāz* is the general idea according to which a word is not used to express the meaning for which it was originally coined. See also Ali, *Medieval Islamic Pragmatics*, 106-109. It must also be added that the legal theoretical discussions of *majāz* originated in theological works (and in general many discussions found in *kalām* eventually migrated into *uṣūl al-fiqh*). Indeed, for the early period, looking at *kalām* (Muʿtazilī at this point) as a source for discussions on *majāz* makes more sense (this is what Heinrichs did in his formative articles on *majāz*), but in the later period – after the discipline of legal theory matured – it is more appropriate to look at the genre of *uṣūl al-fiqh* as a source for this topic since works of *kalām* no longer treated *majāz* as one of its core dogmatic issues. For a historical account on the origin of the *majāz* discussions in classical Arabic sources see Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyya, *Kitāb al-Īmān*, ed. al-Sayyid Muḥammad Badr al-Dīn al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Saʿāda, [1907], 34-36, summarized in Heinrichs, "Genesis," 115-17.

[755] Respectively, *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 28-32, 82-98, and *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 105-12, 2: 70-161. For a partial translation of the latter into English see Hoda El Sadda, "Figurative Discourse in Medieval Arabic Criticism:

This does not include the question of *kināya*, which he treats elsewhere. It too has a bearing on his view of *majāz*, and we will discuss it separately.

Under the preliminary discussion of *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* we find what I refer to as the common legal understanding of the notion, especially in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ*. As a representative source for the treatment of *majāz* in *uṣūl al-fiqh* I take al-Bāqillānī's (d. 403/1013) *al-Taqrīb wa-l-irshād*. We know from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own account that he consulted a work on *uṣūl al-fiqh* by al-Ghazālī in which the topic of *majāz* was treated, but this work did not survive.[756] In al-Ghazālī's *Mustaṣfā* the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dyad is (oddly) not treated. Thus a work like the *Taqrīb*, written by the Ashʿarī al-Bāqillānī, is a good candidate for finding typological similarities, and given its fame, it was probably known to al-Ghazālī. For other ideas that are not found in the *Taqrīb* I use the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (*al-Maḥṣūl fī ʿilm uṣūl al-fiqh*), even though the latter's discussions are too discursive to have been of use for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, and more importantly, they incorporate the theories of al-Jurjānī on the matter, the heart of which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is either unaware of or purposely ignores (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's awareness of the *Asrār* – where the topic of *majāz* was comprehensively treated –will be discussed below).[757] The major common

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Introduction and Translation," *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics* 12 (1992), 95-109.

[756] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 88 (the topic he discusses there is mentioned, without acknowledging al-Ghazālī, in *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 28-30, and here Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn attributes it to his own thinking!). It is probably this work by al-Ghazālī that al-Rāzī is quoting in *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1. pt. 1, 482-86. I thank Frank Griffel who, in a personal communication during the 222nd meeting of the American Oriental Society in Boston, March 16-19, 2012, corroborated to me that the work in question did not survive.

[757] In other words, there is no trace of 'single-term *majāz*' and 'logical *majāz*' in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's oeuvre. Al-Rāzī followed al-Jurjānī's theory both in his literary theory (the *Nihāya*) and his legal theory (the *Maḥṣūl*). It seems that al-Rāzī was an anomaly in incorporating the notion of *majāz ʿaqlī* in legal theory: usually, it is the single-word figurative usage that one finds in *uṣūl al-fiqh*. As al-Rāzī himself states (*al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 447), *wa-qad jāʾa fī l-Qurʾāni wa-l-akhbāri mina l-aqsāmi l-thalāthati shayʾun kathīrun wa-l-uṣūliyyūna lam yatanabbahū li-l-farqi bayna hādhihi l-aqsāmi wa-innamā lakhkhaṣahu* [*laḥiẓahu* in one ms.] *al-shaykhu ʿAbdu l-Qāhiri l-naḥwiyyu* "These three categories [*viz.*, *majāz* in the single word, *majāz* on the level of the sentence/proposition, and *majāz* both in the single word and on the level of the sentence] appear a lot in the Qurʾān and in the prophetic accounts, but the legal theorists are (were?) not mindful of the distinction between these categories; it was only the Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qāhir the grammarian who explained [this issue]." El Shamsy corroborates al-Rāzī's assessment when he glosses *ḥaqīqa/majāz* as "word-level literalism [in the case of *ḥaqīqa*]" and *ẓāhir* as "sentence-level literalism"; Ahmed El

points found both in the legal accounts and in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work may be summarized as follows:

> [Based on a comparison with al-Bāqillānī's *Taqrīb*:][758]
> As a technical term applied to speech,[759] the term *ḥaqīqa* refers to a word[760] (*qawl* per al-Bāqillānī, *lafẓ* per Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn) that is used in accordance with the original meaning for which it was assigned or coined (more Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's use of the term *waḍʿ* below). The term *majāz* refers to what is used to express something other than what the word was originally coined for. When applied to speech, *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* are opposite counterparts, but if *ḥaqīqa* is used in the sense of a thing's quiddity or essence, it does not have a counterpart notion. Every expression used figuratively has a literal meaning, but not every literal meaning has a figurative usage. Some words cannot have a figurative usage, such as proper names (like Zayd and ʿAmr; al-Bāqillānī adds the qualification: unless it is used to refer to one's oeuvre or thought, like "I memorized Sībawayh"[761]) and the summa genera (categories that have no higher genus, like *maʿlūm* 'what is known'). The difference between *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* is that literal usage can, in essence, be applied universally (*jāriya ʿalā l-ʿumūm fī naẓāʾir*), whereas figurative usage cannot be extrapolated to other contexts (*bāb*) by analogy (in al-Bāqillānī's words, *maqṣūr ʿalā mawḍiʿihi lā yuqāsu ʿalayhi*). Thus, a word like 'knowing' (*ʿālim*)[762] can be applied to anyone who can be said to know, but a word like 'to

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Shamsy, "Robert Gleave, *Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory* (Review)," *Islamic Law and Society* 22 (2015), 148-52, here: 151. When he says that "[t]he terms *waḍʿ*, *ḥaqīqa*, and *majāz* refer to individual words, each standing of a specific referent" (ibid., 150), El Shamsy all but confirms that *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* are lexicographical categories (the lexicon being the locus of single words, usually). This is also apparent from Ali, *Medieval Islamic Pragmatics*, 106, 108.

[758] Al-Qāḍī Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, *al-Taqrīb wa-l-irshād (al-ṣaghīr)*, ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAlī Abū Zunayd, 3 vols., Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1998, 1: 352-60; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 28-30; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 105-10. These ideas are also found in al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 395-486.

[759] In the later *Mathal* we even find the technical phrase *ḥaqīqa lughawiyya* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 106), which was so prevalent in works of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.

[760] 'Word' is more accurate than, say 'expression', since all the examples involve single words, and the definition itself only makes sense if we are dealing with the level of the word (what is 'coined' or 'assigned' is a single word). See also al-Āmidī, *al-Iḥkām*, 1: 36-47, 61-68, 71-73, who in his linguistic preliminaries (*mabādiʾ lughawiyya*) treats *majāz* under the linguistic category of *ism* 'noun' (not verb, particle, or sentence).

[761] Cf. Lakoff and Johnson's "He likes to read the *Marquis de Sade*. (= the writings of the marquis)" (*Metaphors We Live By*, 35 [parentheses, italics and punctuation theirs]).

[762] Once more, we see that the idea of *ḥaqīqa* rests on the level of the word: it is not that the active participle *ʿālim* is

ask' can be used figuratively only in the same semantic context in which the figurative usage was attested,[763] such that "to ask the campsite" is permissible since it is of the same context as "to ask the remains" (the famous address of the pre-Islamic poet to the beloved's deserted campsite), but one cannot by analogy apply this figurative usage to other contexts and say, "ask the rock" or "ask the beast."[764]

[Based on a comparison with al-Rāzī's *Maḥṣūl*:][765]

When a word is used in a figurative sense, there must be a contextual element (*qarīna*) that points to the fact that the usage is not literal.[766] The lawyers (or legal theorists, *fuqahāʾ* in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's words) differentiate between an original literal usage and conventional usage (*ḥaqīqa ʿurfiyya* in legal parlance, or *ʿurf* in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's words). Conventional usage involves a word that people usually recognize as literal, but is in origin a figurative usage of another literal meaning. Such is the case of the word *ghāʾiṭ* originally 'depression in the ground' that came to denote 'privy'. However, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn rejects this distinction. According to him, it is true that commoners "like the shoemaker, blacksmith, carpenter and baker" only know this word to mean 'privy', but no one should take them into consideration in such matters. When the educated elite hear the word, so his argument goes, they only think of its original literal meaning ('depression in the ground').[767] There are many

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perceived here as a phrase that implicitly contains a pronoun (* *ʿālim huwa*); rather it is presented as an independent lexeme that is divorced from a 'doer'. Likewise is the case with verbs (*saʾala*). This question is tackled explicitly in the work of al-Jurjānī, later summarized in al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 174-76.

[763] Compare this with Vishanoff, *Formation*, 166, who concludes from this that "no speaker (not even a divine speaker) is free to invent unprecedented figures of speech" (parentheses his). I do not think this is what al-Bāqillānī is arguing (at least here). One could potentially invent a new figurative usage, but that usage would be singular and could not then be extrapolated to other contexts. Accordingly, if one invents the figurative phrase "the wind is toying with the branches" (from a line by Ibn Khafāja, see §5.3 below), that does not mean that after the expression has become in use one could say "the building is toying with the fence" (my example); rather, it would have to remain within the same attested semantic category (*bāb* in al-Bāqillānī's words) – in this case weather phenomena affecting nature – like "the raindrops are toying with the leaves" (my example). See also Heinrichs, "Contacts," 269: one cannot by analogy say "those who beat God" following the Qurʾānic "those who hurt God."

[764] Elsewhere in his discussion of *majāz* – in the context of *tawassuʿ* – Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn treats exactly such cases of speaking animals.

[765] Al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 395-486 (pp. 410-13 and 453-54 for *ḥaqīqa ʿurfiyya* [much more space is devoted to *ḥaqīqa sharʿiyya*, pp. 414-44, a notion that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not address]; pp. 449-54 and 399-402 for the categories of *majāz mufrad*; the notion of *qarīna* is found *passim* – the most explanatory account on pp. 461, 481); *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 28-30; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 108-109, 2: 88-96.

[766] The notion of a *qarīna* was already known to Ibn Jinnī (*al-Khaṣāʾiṣ* 2: 442), but here it is apparent that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is reacting to the legal scholars or lawyers (*fuqahāʾ*).

[767] As proof Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn says that otherwise, the Qurʾānic verse in which this word appears (Q 5:6) would not have

categories of *majāz* (al-Rāzī confines this to *al-majāz al-mufrad* '*majāz* in the single word'), the vast majority of which are metonymic in nature. The categories presented by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn are based on the account of al-Ghazālī, and there usually is overlap between these and the ones presented by al-Rāzī. Some representative categories are *majāz* based on a relationship of means/end ('wine' for 'grapes'), part/whole ('face' for 'person'), [perceived-] cause/result ('sky' for 'rain', or place/thing per al-Ghazālī), similarity (or unique attribute, 'lion' for 'brave': this would count today as a dead metaphor), and physical contiguity ('a water-bag carrier camel' [*rāwiya*] for 'leather water-bag'). Other categories are the (old) notions of "*majāz* by subtraction" (*naqṣ/nuqṣān*) and "*majāz* by addition" (*ziyāda*) – a relic from the early exegetical works like Abū ʿUbayda's[768] – the first referring to an elision of a constituent (Q 12:82 *wa-sʾali l-qarya* "ask the town" for "ask the people of the town") and the second referring to a superfluous constituent (*ka-* in Q 42:11 *laysa ka-mithlihi shayʾun* "like Him there is naught" or *mā* in Q 3:159 *fa-bi-mā raḥmatin mina -llāhi* "it is due to mercy from God").[769]

To recapitulate, the major legal notions of the *majāz* theory as they figure into the work of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn are: (a) *waḍʿ* 'word coinage/assignment': if a word is used to convey a meaning other than the one for which it was originally assigned, then that usage is *majāz*; (b) *qarīna* 'contextual

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contained a contextual element that prevents one from understanding it in the sense of 'depression in the ground' (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 108-109).

[768] This relic finds its way into a definition of *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* cited by the Muʿtazilī theologian Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī (d. 369/980), as it is quoted in al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 399: (for *ḥaqīqa*) *mā -ntaẓama lafẓuhā maʿnāhā min ghayri ziyādatin wa-lā nuqṣānin wa-lā naqlin*, (for *majāz*) *alladhī lā yantaẓimu lafẓuhu maʿnāhu immā li-ziyādatin aw li-nuqṣānin aw li-naqlin* "(for literal speech) that [speech] whose wording corresponds [not a common usage of the verb *intaẓama*] to its meaning, without addition, subtraction or transference [of meaning]"/"(for figurative speech) that whose wording does not correspond its meaning, either due to addition or to subtraction or to transference." Al-Bāqillānī cites this definition, without attribution, as a less acceptable definition (*al-Taqrīb* 1: 353). For the slightly different and more elaborate treatment of this topic in the legal theory of al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981) see Heinrichs, "Genesis," 258-66 (where we find *ḥadhf* 'ellipsis' for *nuqṣān*; the term *ḥadhf* is indeed more prevalent in later works, such as the case of ʿIzz al-Dīn b. ʿAbd al-Salām's *al-Ishāra ilā l-ījāz fī baʿḍ anwāʿ al-majāz* [see §5.4]).

[769] In the *Mathal* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn rejects the idea that *ziyāda* is a type of *majāz* (but not *nuqṣān*) since all words are used according to their original coinage, and what it is more, the use of supposedly 'superfluous' elements occurs in the speech of the Bedouin (an example is given, after which al-Ghazālī is "excused" from not knowing this, since "eloquence" is not his field; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 93-94). Al-Bāqillānī explains the reason *ziyāda* is considered *majāz* through the example of *ka-mithlihi* (*al-Taqrīb* 1: 353): here *ka-* denotes here a ø meaning rather than the meaning 'like', therefore it is used not according to its original coinage (*li-annahā waradat ghayra mufīdatin wa-hiya fī l-aṣli mawḍūʿatun li-l-ifādati fa-ṣārat mustaʿmalatan fī ghayri mā wuḍiʿat lahu*).

element': a *qarīna* indicates that a figurative, rather than literal usage is intended; (c) *ḥaqīqa ʿurfiyya* 'literal usage based on convention': some words are literal by convention, even though they have a different meaning in the original lexicon; (d) most of the *majāz* categories are metonymic; others are dead metaphor or addition/elision of a constituent; (e) not every linguistic category can have a *majāz* usage: proper names are a case in point; (f) the (observational) difference between literal and figurative usage concerns distribution: literal words may be applied universally in all contexts (*jāriya ʿalā l-ʿumūm fī naẓāʾir*) whereas figurative ones may only be applied in the same semantic context in which they were attested.

What is conspicuously absent here is the explicit appeal to the terminology of *naql* '[word] transfer'. It is, rather, implicit in the writings of al-Rāzī and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn in the sense that the term *naql* appears but is not explained (and it is completely absent from al-Bāqillānī's account).[770] Historically the term *naql* in literary theory was associated with discussions on *istiʿāra* in the sense of a simile-based metaphor, where one word is substituted for another based on a similarity between the two notions expressed therein.[771] It would seem that *naql* was later used in a non-technical sense to refer to the end result of the process of *majāz* usage: if a word is used not according to its original coinage one could colloquially say it transferred from one meaning to another. Al-Rāzī cites a common conceit in which the use of a word not according to its original coinage is similar to something that is transferred from its place (*shabīhun bi-l-muntaqali ʿan mawḍiʿihi*).[772] When proving one of the many fine points in his discussion al-Rāzī

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[770] But see the definitions of *ḥaqīqa-majāz* attributed to Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Baṣrī, which explicitly incorporate the notion of *naql* (fn. 768).

[771] Al-Rummānī is the most famous example; see *al-Nukat*, 79 (*al-istiʿāratu taʿlīqu l-ʿibārati ʿalā ghayri mā wuḍiʿat lahu fī aṣli l-lughati ʿalā jihati l-naqli li-l-ibānati*; […] *qad nuqila ʿan aṣlin ilā farʿin*).

[772] *Al-Maḥṣūl*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 396, reading *mawḍiʿ* instead of *mawḍūʿ* (as it appears in 4 out of the 6 mss. used; the editor preferred the minority *mawḍūʿ*). Speaking of the etymology *majāz* as a physical place [*mawḍiʿ*] is so

states that "*majāz* only comes about when a word (*lafẓ*) transfers from one thing (i.e., meaning) to another (*naql al-lafẓ min shayʾ ilā shayʾ*) due to a relationship between them [the two meanings]." This in turn entails three principles, he continues: (a) assigning [the word] an original/primary [meaning] (*waḍʿuhu li-l-aṣl*), (b) transferring it to a derivative [meaning] (*naqluhu li-l-farʿ*), and (c) a reason for the transfer (*ʿilla li-l-naql*).[773] Since this account is embedded in al-Rāzī's deliberation, and even though he does not begin with it and would hardly endorse the idea that there was any *actual* transfer, we can say that the notion of *naql* is inextricable from the idea of *majāz* as "using a word not according to its original coinage." Thus, I henceforth refer this idea about *majāz*, for short, as "the word-transfer theory."

Focusing on the *Mathal*, where Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's theory of *majāz* takes its mature form, we find that in the theoretical portions of his treatment he clearly makes the case for a word-transfer theory. Sometimes this is expressed as the transfer of the meaning from the enunciated word (*lafẓ*) that was coined for it to another word (*lafẓ*);[774] other times this is expressed as the transfer of the enunciated word (or name, *ism*) to another meaning (*musammā* lit. 'the thing named', referring to the notion we have in our mind of 'the thing named'). With reference to the second case, the enunciated word (*ism*) 'sun' is said to be transferred to (the meaning) 'pretty face' (according to the first understanding, taking the same example, the meaning of 'pretty face' would be the thing transferred to the word 'sun').[775] The difference may be benign, and it could

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ubiquitous in the medieval writings that there is little doubt that this is the word intended. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn speaks of this etymology as well; see below.

[773] Ibid., 473.

[774] *wa-l-majāz huwa naqlu l-maʿnā ʿani l-lafẓi l-mawḍūʿi lahu ilā lafẓin ākhara ghayrihi* "*majāz* is the transfer of a meaning from the word that was coined for it [in the lexicon] to another word"; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 107.

[775] *fa-l-ismu l-mawḍūʿu bi-izāʾi l-musammā huwa ḥaqīqatun lahu fa-idhā nuqila ilā ghayrihi ṣāra majāzan* "The word coined vis-à-vis the thing named [i.e., the idea/meaning] is its [the meaning's] *ḥaqīqa* 'literal usage'; if it [the *ism*] is transferred to another [meaning] it becomes *majāz*" ; ibid. And also ibid., *wa-idhā naqalnā l-shamsa ilā l-*

represent for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn two sides of the same coin. But then we come across a third usage of *naql*: that of *ḥaqīqa* itself being transferred to *majāz*. Ibn al-Athīr probably means this to be a metadiscourse comment, as he contends the following: "Rather, orators and poets engage extensively in [creating] varieties of motifs (?, *al-asālīb al-maʿnawiyya*) so they transfer literal usage into figurative usage."[776] I pause on these different uses of *naql* because they leave an impression that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not feel at home with the *naql* terminology, and hence, the *naql* theory (and as we will see later, he did not really endorse it).

Another inconsistency arises with regards to the usage of the term *waḍʿ* lit. 'setting down' to refer to the process in which words are coined in the original vocabulary of the language. We find that it is sometimes the 'wording' that is said to be set down for the 'meaning' and elsewhere it is the other way around. In the definition of linguistic (*lughawiyya*, *lafẓiyya*) *ḥaqīqa*, it is glossed as *dalālat al-lafẓ ʿalā al-maʿnā al-mawḍūʿ lahu fī aṣl al-lugha* "the indication of a word to the meaning set down for it in the original (or basic) lexicon [lit. in the basis of the lexicon/language]."[777] What is 'set down' here is the meaning. Immediately following is the definition of *majāz* in which it is the wording that is said to be 'set down' for the meaning: (*naql al-maʿnā ʿan*) *al-lafẓ al-mawḍūʿ lahu* [*li-l-maʿnā*].[778] I suspect this type of inconsistency was a common one in literary theory. Like the idea of *naql*, determining which

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wajhi l-malīḥi istiʿāratan kāna dhālika lahu majāzan lā ḥaqīqa "If we transfer [the word] 'sun' to the [intended meaning] 'pretty fact' metaphorically, then that [the word 'sun'] is its [the meaning's] *majāz*, not [its] *ḥaqīqa*" and ibid. 1: 110, *li-naqli l-alfāẓi mina l-ḥaqīqati ilā ghayrihā* "[…] due to the transference of words from [their] literal usage to something else."

[776] *wa-innamā ahlu l-khaṭābati wa-l-shiʿri tawassaʿū fī l-asālībi l-maʿnawiyyati fa-naqalū l-ḥaqīqata ilā l-majāzi*; ibid. 1: 109. Compare this especially to *fa-idhā nuqila ilā ghayrihi ṣāra majāzan* (mentioned above) "if it is transferred to [another word] it becomes *majāz*."

[777] Ibid. 1: 106-107.

[778] Ibid. 1: 107. See also several lines down, where the name (*ism*) is that which is said to be 'set down' for the named thing (*musammā*): *al-ism al-mawḍūʿ bi-izāʾ al-musammā* (see also above) and *waḍʿ al-asmāʾ ʿalā al-musammayāt* (ibid. 1: 109).

component is set down for the other may reflect two sides of the same coin (no pun intended),

although in English, when we speak of 'coining' words, it is clear that it is the wording, or

enunciated element, that is coined for the meaning. As an example from earlier literary-

theoretical works which may explain the odd *al-maʿnā al-mawḍūʿ lahu*, we might cite the

perplexing phrase *mawḍūʿāt al-maʿānī* found in al-Āmidī's work on the critical comparison

between the poetry of Abū Tammām and al-Buḥturī. There, *mawḍūʿāt al-maʿānī* is mentioned

alongside the term *majāzāt*.[779] In an earlier study (*The Hand of the Northwind*), Heinrichs

translates al-Āmidī's passage in full and renders *mawḍūʿāt al-maʿānī* as "what is coinable and

usable in the way of poetic motifs" and *majāzāt* as "the ways of expression exceeding the proper

meaning of language." In a later work ("Contacts between Scriptural Hermeneutics and Literary

Theory in Islam"), he translates the former as "the bases (? *mawḍūʿāt*) of poetic motifs"

(parentheses and question mark his).[780] Another option could be that *maʿānī* here refers to plain

meanings (not poetic motifs) and that *mawḍūʿāt al-maʿānī* is contrasted with *majāzāt* rather than

coordinated with it and thus refers to the original literal way of expressing a certain meaning,

literally "[words] coined [for] meanings."[781] But because of the phrasing of this idea in the *iḍāfa*

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[779] Al-Āmidī, *al-Muwāzana*, 1: 250.

[780] Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 17-19; "Contacts," 273.

[781] *Mawḍūʿāt* could be translated here as "conventional, normal, usual" (cf. al-Jaṣṣāṣ's phrase *mawḍūʿ al-lugha* as a reference to the original vocabulary of the language; Heinrichs, "Contacts," 269), but it is important to keep in mind that *mawḍūʿāt al-maʿānī* does not refer to conventional meanings but to the conventional way of expressing those meanings. The context is al-Āmidī's analysis of Imruʾ al-Qays' famous loan ('old') metaphor, "And I said to it (sc. the night) when it stretched out its back and followed up with (its) hind quarters and struggled to get up with (its) breast" (*fa-qultu lahū lammā tamaṭṭā bi-ṣulbihī // wa-ardafa aʿjāzan wa-nāʾa bi-kalkalī*; Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 3-4). In order to explain this image (a long night like a camel slow to rise), al-Āmidī does not fully use the terminology of a 'night'-'camel' analogy (= 'old', *tamthīl*-based metaphor) but rather incorporates his recognition of word substitutions ("breast" for "first part of night" etc., i.e. 'new', *tashbīh*-based metaphor; more on these below). It is in this latter context that the contrast *mawḍūʿāt al-maʿānī – majāzāt* should be understood because it is here that we find explanations in terms of word transfer (and he even speaks of the closeness of the metaphors to reality, *ḥaqīqa*). One challenge to my interpretation is the word *wa-l-istiʿārāt* '[metaphorical] borrowings' put in square brackets by the editor Ṣaqr; if it is indeed part of the original text, the opposition *mawḍūʿāt al-maʿānī – majāzāt* is less strong: *man lam yaʿrif mawḍūʿāti al-maʿānī [wa-l-istiʿārāti] wa-lā l-majāzāti* "he who does not

construction, it lends itself to the sense that the meanings are the ones coined, akin to the

construction of an improper *iḍāfa* (as if the *maʿānī* are the ones set down).[782] Thus the locus of

waḍʿ could be said, freely and inaccurately, to subsist either in the *maʿnā* or in the *lafẓ*, just as

naql was used freely to refer either to a transfer of the meaning to the uttered word, or the uttered

word to the meaning, or *ḥaqīqa* to *majāz*. In both cases one gets the sense that *naql* and *waḍʿ*

were extraneous notions in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work, as they originally were in Arabic literary theory

in general.[783]

Philological Underpinnings of Majāz

Beyond the legal layers of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's theoretical exposé of *majāz*, we also find an

engagement with the ideas on *majāz* expressed by Ibn Jinnī, a grammarian and philologist from

the 4th/10th century. In the *Jāmiʿ* these ideas are presented without acknowledgement, probably

because at this stage Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn still endorsed them (thus there was sense in presenting them as

his own). Once his thinking on the matter evolved in the *Mathal* and he rejected those ideas, it

seems that he had no problem citing Ibn Jinnī by name and source, *al-Khaṣāʾiṣ*.[784] Often

know the proper usages nor the metaphorical borrowings nor the figurative usages" (al-Āmidī, *Muwāzana*, 1: 250). I could not find an explanation to the bracket notation in Ṣaqr's preface. Heinrichs translates the bracketed word in his earlier work but seems to disregard it in the later one.

[782] The resemblance to the *iḍāfa ghayr ḥaqīqiyya* is only by form, not meaning. Compare to *maḥmūd al-sīra* 'one whose conduct is praiseworthy', where the first term of the construct is the adjective of the second (see Wright, *Grammar* 2: 221). By contrast, in *mawḍūʿāt al-maʿānī*, the first term may seem as an adjective by form but is a noun in meaning. I might be overanalyzing this point, but my purpose is to show the extraneousness both of *naql* and *waḍʿ* in literary theory, to the extent that literary scholars used them freely and inaccurately (in Arabic, *tasāmuḥ*).

[783] Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, in his response to the *Mathal*, devotes considerable attention to the 'legal' aspects of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's discussion (*al-Falak al-dāʾir* in vol. 4 of *al-Mathal al-sāʾir*, 79-86, 198-214), and pays *no* attention to the actual categories of *majāz*. We must keep in mind that contrary to other literary theorists, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd was an accomplished *uṣūlī* (L. Veccia Vaglieri, "Ibn Abī 'l-Ḥadīd," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*). If Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd's response is somewhat relevant to our discussion because he was a (younger) contemporary of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, the response by al-Ṣafadī is not. His work is reflective of the changes occurring after the advent of the standard theory (see esp. *Nuṣra*, 78-82).

[784] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 30-32; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 84-87, and 1: 106, where he refers to him implicitly. For the corresponding discussion see Abū al-Fatḥ ʿUthmān Ibn Jinnī, *al-Khaṣāʾiṣ*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Najjār, 3 vols.,

characterized in modern research as a remarkable book, and once described as "a veritable encyclopedia of all conceivable topics of interest to the linguist,"[785] the *Khaṣāʾiṣ* is not a common source for the literary theorist due to its primary concern with grammatical, lexical and phonological meta-questions. (Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī relies on Ibn Jinnī for his phonological and meta-lexical discussions.)[786] The *Khaṣāʾiṣ* is important in our context because it probably inspired Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's categorization scheme of *majāz*, at least on a terminological level.

Two points that Ibn Jinnī makes find their way into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work. The first is that every occurrence of *majāz* displays three elements (*maʿānin*): a semantic extension of a word's meaning (*ittisāʿ*), a comparison (*tashbīh*), and an exaggeration (*tawkīd*).[787] Thus in the Qurʾānic "And We admitted him into Our mercy" (Q 21:75, *wa-adkhalnāhu fī raḥmatinā*), there is (a) a semantic expansion in the lexeme *raḥma*, since it now acts as a word of direction or location (*asmāʾ al-jihāt wa-l-maḥāll*); (b) a comparison, since "mercy" is likened to something that can be entered, even though one cannot 'enter' mercy; and (c) an exaggeration, since it is made into something that can be seen as a physical entity.[788] The other point Ibn Jinnī espoused was that

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Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1952-1956, 2: 442-57 (English: 'The Special Features [of Arabic]').

[785] Kees Versteegh, *Landmarks in Linguistic Thought III: The Arabic Linguistic Tradition*, London: Routledge, 1997, 103.

[786] Al-Khafājī, *Sirr*, 13-21 (where he relies without acknowledgement on Ibn Jinnī's *Sirr ṣināʿat al-iʿrāb*), 39-49 (where he relies on the *Khaṣāʾiṣ*). By meta-lexical questions I mean, e.g., the question of the origin of language (or its lexicon). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also incorporates without acknowledgment Ibn Jinnī's differentiation between *ishtiqāq ṣaghīr* and *ishtiqāq kabīr* 'lesser/greater derivation' in his own discussion on the literary device he calls *ishtiqāq* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 195-99).

[787] See Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's analysis of Ibn Jinnī's use of *tawkīd* here in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 86. I follow him in concluding that by *tawkīd* Ibn Jinnī meant, in this context, exaggeration and not emphasis (and see also *al-Khaṣāʾiṣ* 2: 448, where we come across *li-l-ittisāʿ wa-l-mubālagha wa-tashbīh al-qalīl bi-l-kathīr* rather than *tawkīd*).

[788] *Al-Khaṣāʾiṣ* 2: 442-44; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 30-31; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 85. There is some variation in wording regarding the explanation of the third element. The entire claim regarding *ittisāʿ*, *tashbīh* and *tawkīd* being present in the case of *majāz* is rejected in ibid. 2: 85-87.

most of the language's vocabulary was, in fact, *majāz*.[789] According to him, most verbs displayed this since a verb expresses the genus of an action, but if one says *qāma zaydun* "Zayd stood up," it is obvious that Zayd did not perform all of the standing in the world, past present or future. Likewise, in *ḍarabtu zaydan* "I hit Zayd," it is not the entirety of Zayd that is hit, neither is the entirety of his head if it is specified in *ḍarabtu zaydan raʾsahu* "I hit Zayd's head."[790] Both of these ideas by Ibn Jinnī are embraced in the *Jāmiʿ* and later rejected in the *Mathal*.

Engagement with al-Jurjānī's Asrār al-balāgha and Philosophical Poetics

In addition to the legal and philological dimensions of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's theoretical discussion of *majāz*, we find some comments that are evocative of al-Jurjānī. We mentioned above that an 'observational' difference between *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* was stated, with regards to the distribution of literal versus figurative usage. In the *Mathal* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn presents another difference between the two, this time of a more literary provenance (in his words, *fī bāb al-faṣāḥa wa-l-balāgha* "in the domain of eloquence"). He uses the same phrasing, in the same paragraph, both with regards to rhetorical speech (or oratorical, *al-kalām al-khaṭābī*) and with regards to figurative speech (*majāz*, later *al-ʿibāra al-majāziyya*): that they establish the intended meaning in the soul of the recipient by evoking an image (*al-takhyīl wa-l-taṣwīr*, which I take as a hendiadys),[791] as if it is

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[789] Ibn Jinnī's views can only be understood against the backdrop of the lexicographical use of *majāz*.

[790] *Al-Khaṣāʾiṣ* 2: 447-57; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 31-32. This is implicitly rejected in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 106, where Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn states that the claims according to which all language is *ḥaqīqa* or all language is *majāz* amount to the same argument, and neither is correct.

[791] This meaning of *takhyīl* would correspond to the meaning of the term in philosophical poetics, namely, "the creation, on the part of the poet, of an image in the mind of the listener"; see Heinrichs, "*Takhyīl*," 2. But Heinrichs also speaks (p. 1) of the semantics of *khayyala* as a denominative form II verb meaning "creating a *khayāl* in the mind" (Heinrichs speaks of the illusionary dimension of this idea), so admittedly, the dictionary meaning of the word and its philosophical technical meaning are not too far apart. It is possible that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was exposed to some ideas from philosophical poetics, perhaps as they seeped into literary theory proper. For the quintessential character of philosophical poetics as dealing with *al-takhyīl wa-l-taṣawwur wa-l-tamaththul [/tamthīl] wa-mā ashbahahā* see al-Khuwārizmī's paragraph-length description of the *Poetics* (*biyūṭīqī*) in *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm*, 152.

almost seen before one's eyes (*ithbāt al-gharaḍ al-maqṣūd fī nafs al-sāmiʿ bi-l-takhyīl wa-l-taṣwīr ḥattā yakādu yunẓaru ilayhi ʿiyānan* […] *al-farq bayna al-qawlayn fī l-taṣwīr wa-l-takhyīl wa-ithbāt al-gharaḍ al-maqṣūd fī nafs al-sāmiʿ*).[792] Thus, when comparing "Zayd is a lion" with its literal version (*ḥaqīqa*) "Zayd is brave," Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn states that the listener only perceives the idea that Zayd is courageous in the latter case, whereas in the former one has an image (*yukhayyalu ʿinda dhālika*) of the lion's form (*ṣūrat al-asad wa-hayʾatuhu*), including its great might (*quwwat baṭshihi*) and its crushing of its prey (*daqq al-farāʾis*).[793]

This echoes a statement made by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī in the *Asrār* with regards to the metaphorical (*istiʿāra*) "I saw a lion [referring to a brave man]," which is said to plant (*īqāʿ*) in the soul of the listener the image of a lion (*ṣūrat al-asad*) "in its might (*baṭshihi*), audacity, fortitude, strength, and other characteristics (*maʿānī*) that are centered in its nature that have to do with courage."[794] The same idea is expressed in slightly different terms in the *Dalāʾil*.[795] Whether Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's statement is derived directly from al-Jurjānī is unclear, especially when we consider the following comment by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. He says that of the more wondrous things a figurative expression (*ʿibāra majāziyya*) can do is move the listener away from a person's natural character such that the miser becomes magnanimous, the coward courageous and the reckless judicious. This type of speech, he continues, can have an intoxicating affect on the addressee to

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[792] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 110-11 (for the second: "the difference between the two expressions [literal and figurative] lies in the evocation of an image and in [this 'evocative' mode of] establishing the intended meaning in the soul of the hearer"); also 2: 364.

[793] Ibid. 1: 111. The subject of *khayyala* here is probably not the listener but rather the thing imagined (*ṣūra* etc.), hence *yukhayyalu* in the passive.

[794] *Asrār*, 31-32; also 223.14-15.

[795] E.g., *Dalāʾil*, 70-73, where the force of the affirmation (or predication, *ithbāt*, *ījāb*, *ḥukm*) is said to be firmer in the case of a sentence like "I saw a lion [referring to a brave man]," and the difference between this type of speech and a direct one is the *way* of affirmation (*ṭarīq ithbātihi lahā wa-taqrīrihi iyyāhā*, p. 71), not the meaning itself that is expressed.

such an extent that it can change his behavior.[796] This point is rather evocative of old sayings about poetry, according to which it can raise the ignorant from lowly rank and lower the perfect from high rank, alluding to the effects of a *madḥ* or *hijāʾ*.[797] This notion was thus common in Arabic literary theory, but here Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn combines the rhetorical (*al-kalām al-khaṭābī*) with the poetic (making the miser magnanimous etc.) with the figurative (*majāz, al-ʿibāra al-majāziyya*).[798] It gives a strong hint to his conception of *majāz* at the logical, or extra-linguistic level (which we will elaborate shortly), rather than the lexical level as his opening definition states, and it comes very close to the idea we find in philosophical poetics (specifically al-Fārābī) regarding the nature of poetic statements as being false (in addition to evoking images and being imitative by use of figurative speech).[799]

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[796] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 111.

[797] See, e.g., Ibn Rashīq, *al-ʿUmda* 1: 40 (under the chapter titled *bābu man rafaʿahu l-shiʿru wa-man waḍaʿahu*); also Ibn Fāris, *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 274, quoting a scholar: "If it [the poetry] is [said] in jest it mocks, and if it is in earnest it is untrue (*kadhaba*)." This idea cannot be divorced from the Qurʾānic statement on poets, "Do you not see how they wander in every valley and say that which they do not do" (Q 26:225-26, *a-lam tara annahum fī kulli wādin yahīmūna wa-annahum yaqūlūna mā lā yafʿalūna*), cited in the same context, *al-Ṣāḥibī*, 273. See also van Gelder, "Beautifying the Ugly," 325-26, citing *inter alia* Niẓāmī Aruḍī's (mid 6th/12th cent.) *Chahar maqāla*: "Poetry is that art whereby the poet arranges imaginary propositions, and adapts the deductions, with the result that he can make a little thing appear great and a great thing small […]." For further study of this question see McKinney, *Rhyme versus Reason*, 190-97, along with the more explicit comments in the early sources on making the true appear false and the false true (using the terms *ḥaqq* and *bāṭil*, pp. 194-96).

[798] Although mixing the rhetorical with the poetic should not be overemphasized, especially since the activity of the *khaṭīb* (later *kātib*) and that of the *shāʿir* were recognized early on as being, in substance, identical. See Heinrichs, "Klassisch-arabische Theorien dichterischer Rede," 201, and see his citation of the saying by the poet al-ʿAttābī (d. 208/823 or later), *al-shiʿru rasāʾilu maʿqūdatun wa-l-rasāʾilu shiʿrun maḥlūl* "Poetry is 'bound' [in the formal sense of rhyme and meter] epistles and epistles are 'unbound' poetry."

[799] Among al-Fārābī's (d. 339/950) writings on poetics this can be seen in *Qawānīn ṣināʿat al-shuʿārāʾ*, where poetic statements (*al-aqāwīl al-shiʿriyya*) are subsumed under 'untrue' statements (*al-aqāwīl al-kādhiba*); al-Fārābī, *Maqāla fī Qawānīn ṣināʿat al-shuʿarāʾ*, 493.3-4ᵉ, 494.2ᵉ. On the pairing of the logical arts with the truth values of the premises see Heinrichs, "*Takhyīl*," 3 ff. The pairing of the logical arts with the internal faculties (imagination-based in the case of poetic statements) is represented in early on by John Philoponus (6th cent.) and later by Paul the Persian, as preserved in the work of Miskawayh (d. 421/1020) (ibid.). As for the aspect of figurative language, al-Fārābī used *takhyīl* and *muḥākāt* in a complimentary way to refer (ultimately) to figurative language; later Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037) separated the two, and the connection was resumed again later in the work of the Maghribī al-Sijilmāsī (d. after 704/1304). See Heinrichs, "*Takhyīl*," 5-6, 8, 10 (a thorough elaboration on al-Fārābī can be found in *idem*, "Die antike Verknüpfung von phantasia und Dichtung bei den Arabern," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 128.2 [1978], 252-98). A connection between poetic statements and the term *majāz*

The Discourse of Kadhib

The discourse of falsehood (*kadhib*) in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work is practically non-existent. It appears once in the context of *ifrāṭ* 'hyperbole'.[800] Here Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn exhumes the old controversy about falsehood in poetry which was epitomized in the saying *aḥsanu l-shiʿri akdhabuhu* "the best poetry is the most untruthful," which in turn prompted the reply *aḥsanu l-shiʿri aṣdaquhu* "the best poetry is the most truthful."[801] For Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn the use of hyperbole is commendable precisely because "the best poetry is the most untruthful," and more than that, he adds, "the most truthful [poetry] is the most untruthful" (*bal aṣdaquhu akdhabuhu*). But Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not relate cases of hyperbole to *majāz*, even though most of the examples display figurative language, as in ʿAntara's (6th cent.) [meter: *kāmil*]

> *wa-ana l-maniyyatu fi-l-mawāṭini kullihā*
> *wa-l-ṭaʿnu minnī sābiqu l-ājālī*
> "I am death on all fronts,

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was made by Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198); see Abū al-Walīd Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ Kitāb Arisṭūṭālis fī l-shiʿr (= al-Sharḥ al-wasīṭ)*, in *Fann al-shiʿr: maʿa al-tarjama al-ʿarabiyya al-qadīma wa-shurūḥ al-Fārābī wa-Ibn Sīnā wa-Ibn Rushd*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1953, 199-250, here: 243, discussed in Ajami, *Alchemy*, 60-61. See also Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 17-18, and 70-73 for an elaboration on al-Sijilmāsī's understanding of *majāz*. For the connection between *muḥākāt* and metaphors in a Persian context see Justine Landau, "Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and Poetic Imagination in the Arabic and Persian Philosophical Tradition," in Ali Asghar Seyed-Gohrab (ed.), *Metaphor and Imagery in Persian Poetry*, Leiden: Brill, 2012, 15-66, here: 44, and 50-52 for the connection between *kadhib* and metaphors. Gregor Schoeler goes so far as to state that "Arabo-Islamic philosophical poetics is essentially a theory of figurative language" and that all figurative utterances are "poetic" (i.e., part of the *aqāwīl shiʿriyya*) even if they occur outside poetry – in speeches and in everyday language ("The 'Poetic Syllogism' Revisited," *Oriens* 41 [2013], 1-26, here: 5-6, 17-18, and see references therein to his earlier work on the poetic syllogism, as well as the works of Black and Aouad).

[800] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 191. See also Ajami, *Alchemy*, 83-85. That hyperbole was one of the contexts in which untruthfulness was discussed in works of 'indigenous' Arabic literary theory (as opposed to the philosophically oriented ones) is discussed, e.g., in Heinrichs, "Klassisch-arabische Theorien dichterischer Rede," 205.

[801] A representative example is al-Marzūqī (d. 421/1030) in his commentary on the *Ḥamāsa*, an anthology of old Bedouin poetry assembled by Abū Tammām; for discussion see Ajami, *Alchemy*, 9-12. In the *Jāmiʿ*, 229, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn ascribes the preference for *aḥsanu l-shiʿri akdhabuhu* in the context of *ghuluww* to Qudāma b. Jaʿfar. See also Jacobi, "Dichtung und Lüge"; Bürgel, "Die beste Dichtung," 55-76 (including the question of exaggeration); and Ajami, *Alchemy*.

my thrust precedes [men's] predestined times of death"[802]

In the *Jāmiʿ* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn elaborates on where he sees the exaggeration: "For a thrust cannot precede predestined times of death, because a predestined time of death cannot come sooner or later. Some have claimed that 'preceding' makes more sense (*aqrabu amran*) than 'following' [the predestined time of death], except that both of them are an exaggeration in expression."[803] Note that the phrase is rather expressive of reality – a thrust did take place, men did die – as opposed to the figurative (and untrue) expression "I am death" (*anā l-maniyyatu*), which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not comment on.[804] Part of the disassociation between the discourse of hyperbole/lies and the discourse of figurative language probably lies in the fact that exaggeration was heavily associated with *madīḥ* 'praise poetry'. This is clear when Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn discusses the opposite of *ifrāṭ*, namely, *tafrīṭ* 'failing to do what one ought' i.e., "failing to praise appropriately," where the explicit appeal to *madḥ* (and its conjugations) abounds.[805] Because hyperbole is contextualized within the framework of praise poetry, which by default involves real people and real occurrences, 'reality' is ultimately adhered to, much more so than in the case of 'unmarked' figurative speech.

We do find a direct connection between exaggeration and *majāz* in the slightly later work of Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ. In his first literary theoretical study, *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, he espouses the view

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[802] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 191, and fns. 2-3 for other versions of this verse. I adopt, with some changes, Ajami's translation in *Alchemy*, 83 (he translates more examples from the *Mathal* on pp. 84-85).

[803] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 228. The example is left uncommented in the *Mathal*.

[804] For another poetic example and commentary see ibid., 228-29, inspired by an explicit quotation from al-Jāḥiẓ's *Kitāb al-Ḥayawān*.

[805] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 178-91. Although all the examples are taken from poetry, it is clear that the entire discussion has special implications for the state scribe, who must learn to address the recipient in appropriate terms (see esp. ibid., 187-91). For more on the question of decorum see J.S. Meisami, "Truth and Poetry," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* 2: 781-82, here: 781. Note that *tafrīṭ* can also have the opposite meaning of "praising immoderately" (Lane, *Lexicon*, 2376).

that *majāz* is a genus for several categories, one of which is *mubālagha* 'exaggeration'.[806]

Because he is following Ibn Rashīq in viewing *majāz* as a hypernym for figurative speech

(subsuming metaphor, comparison, exaggeration and indirect allusions) as well as a hyponym for

metonymy, we might postulate that it was not uncommon to view *mubālagha* or *ifrāṭ* as

majāz.[807]

Despite upholding the view that "the most truthful poetry is the most untruthful," Ḍiyāʾ

al-Dīn ends the discussion with an appeal to a midway between *tafrīṭ* and *ifrāṭ*, namely *iqtiṣād*

'moderation' (complying with the old preference for the golden mean, going back to the

Greeks).[808] Here he adds the common opinion that if one precedes the phrase with *law* 'as if' or

yakādu 'almost', the exaggeration is toned down. It is noteworthy that the first example he

adduces is the Qurʾānic "The lightning almost snatches away their sight" (Q 2:20, *yakādu l-*

barqu yakhṭafu abṣārahum), a common example that figures into many seventh/thirteenth-

century discussions on metaphor.[809] This serves as a direct link between the 'untruthfulness' of

exaggeration and the 'untruthful' nature of figurative speech, as implicitly conceived by Ḍiyāʾ al-

Dīn. His differentiation between a literal statement and figurative one in terms of *al-taṣwīr wa-l-*

takhyīl, a hendiadys for 'evoking images', links Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's 'organic' conception of *majāz*

(which we will attend to shortly) to the philosophical poetical association between image-

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[806] *Taḥrīr*, 457-58.

[807] Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ discusses *mubālagha* under the category termed *al-ifrāṭ fī al-ṣifa* 'exaggerating an attribute' (*Taḥrīr*, 147-58, following the nomenclature of Ibn al-Muʿtazz). This chapter too is replete with notions of truth and falsehood. He does not say at the outset that the device is part of *majāz*; some subcategories, rather, are recognized as *majāz* (ibid., 152-53, ending with a comment that suggests that *mubālagha* as a whole is divided into two, "*majāzī*" and "*ḥaqīqī*"). See also also ibid., 321-26, for his discussion of *ighrāq* and *ghuluww*, more extreme forms of exaggeration: here *majāz* is not used.

[808] Later stated explicitly by Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, *wa-khayr al-umūr awsāṭuhā* (ibid., 150).

[809] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 194. This appears in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Nihāya*, Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Rawḍa*, al-Zanjānī's *Miʿyār* and Ibn al-Naqīb's *Muqaddima* (see §5.4).

evocation and figurative usage, perhaps via al-Jurjānī's discussion of metaphor.[810]

Further Engagement with al-Jurjānī: Differentiating Tashbīh from Istiʿāra

Before we delve into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's categorization of *majāz* in the *Mathal*, and without

overemphasizing the influence of al-Jurjānī, one must bear in mind that some of the latter's

comments on metaphor infiltrate Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's discussion, either by direct or indirect influence.

I think it is worth lingering on, especially because al-Jurjānī attends to these points in the *Asrār*,

not the *Dalāʾil*, a work that did not seem to be accessible to scholars, especially outside of the

Islamic East. First, the archetypal examples of *majāz* that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces in the theoretical

exposé in the *Mathal* are 'lion' (*asad*) for 'brave', 'sun' (*shams*) for 'pretty face' and 'ocean'

(*baḥr*) for 'generous'. Although they common examples (the first already standard in Aristotle), I

find it suspicious that the very same examples are found in al-Jurjānī's introductory deliberation

on the 'meaningful' (*mufīd*) metaphor (with *badr* in addition to *shams*), the exact place that al-

Jurjānī mentions the speaker's planting in the soul of the listener the image of a lion in its might,

audacity, etc., which we discussed above.[811] More importantly, like al-Jurjānī Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn

postulates that the essence of metaphor, and that which sets it apart from simile, is that in a

metaphor the topic (primum comparationis) is 'concealed' and only the analogue (secundum

comparationis) is mentioned, as in "I saw a lion," whereas in a simile both topic and analogue

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[810] This association is not borne out in all works of Arabic philosophical poetics; see fn. 799. Despite the similarity of terms, it is al-Jurjānī's discussion of *metaphor* that probably influenced Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, not his discussion of *takhyīl*, which is a separate literary device conceived by al-Jurjānī as 'fantastic aetiology (/reinterpretation)', that is, assigning a fantastic cause to a certain occurrence.

[811] *Asrār*, 31-32; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 107, 111. The meaningful metaphor is the one that al-Jurjānī pays most of his attention to (*Asrār*, 31 ff.). The non-meaningful or 'inexpressive' metaphor is the one in which body parts are expressed using the corresponding parts in other species, e.g. *marsin* 'nose of a solid-hoofed animal' for *anf* '[human] nose' (*Asrār*, 29 ff.). In other words, there is no conceived 'purpose' (*fāʾida*) in the latter case. For Aristotle's famous example of 'lion' for 'brave' (Achilles) when discussing the difference between simile and metaphor, see *Rhetoric* III, 4 (trans. W. Rhys Roberts, New York: Cosimo, 2010, 126).

are mentioned, as in "Zayd is a lion" (where the particle of comparison is omitted).[812] (There are

several terminological inconsistencies in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work: 'topic' is referred to as

mushabbah bihi, *manqūl* or *manqūl ilayhi*, and *mustaʿār lahu*; 'analogue' is called *mushabbah*,

manqūl or *manqūl ilayhi*, and *mustaʿār*).[813] Although the recognition of "Zayd is a lion" as a

simile rather than a metaphor is an old one (see, e.g., the *Wasāṭa*),[814] the terms used by Ḍiyāʾ al-

Dīn to elaborate on this recognition seem to be derivative of al-Jurjānī. One of the points al-

Jurjānī makes is that not every simile (complete with its particle of comparison) can be rendered

into a metaphor in which the topic is not expressed. As an example he provides, *inter alia*, the

prophetic saying, *al-nāsu ka-ibilin miʾatin lā tajidu fīhā rāḥilatan* "People are like a hundred

camels in which you cannot find one that is fit for riding (or: saddled and conspicuous)." One

cannot say, al-Jurjānī contends, "I saw a hundred camels in which you cannot find one that is fit

for riding" and mean "I saw people," as was the case with "I saw a lion" in the sense of "a man

like a lion."[815] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn appropriates this idea and claims – from the opposite direction – that

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[812] *Asrār*, 223, 227, 296-300; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 71-77. For further discussion see Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 202-203.

[813] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 71.8 (we would expect *mushabbah bihi* for the analogue and *mushabbah* for the topic), 72.7 ff. (where it is the *manqūl ilayhi* that is said to be "mentioned"), 74.1-2 (it is the *manqūl* that is said to be "mentioned", 77.1 ff. (with *mustaʿār* and *mustaʿār lahu* there is consistency). This is a representative sample. These inconsistencies can be added to the ones we discussed above regarding *naql* and *waḍʿ*. The discourse of *manqūl-manqūl ilayhi* has a wide scope of reference, as it refers to the two sides of any figurative expression, not just those based on comparison. The most surprising inconsistency is with the terms *mushabbah* and *mushabbah bihi*, and it is probably not an error of a copyist or editor: see the edition of Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, 2 vols., Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1939, 1: 356; a nineteenth century printed edition containing Ibn Qutayba's *Adab al-kātib* on the margins, Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Bahiyya, 1312 [1894], 138.2ᵉ; and an early Būlāq edition (s.d.), 214.4-5ᵉ. It is only in the digital domain that we find a 'rectified' phrasing: see the Word version prepared by *Maktabat Mishkāt al-Islāmiyya*, where instead of *wa-l-tashbīhu l-maḥdhūfu an yudhkara l-mushabbahu dūna l-mushabbah bihi wa-yusammā stiʿāratan*, we find the 'correct' *wa-l-tashbīhu l-maḥdhūfu an yudhkara l-mushabbahu bihi wa-yusammā stiʿāratan* (faculty.mu.edu.sa/download.php?fid=6475; identical to the text in http://www.alwaraq.net/Core/AlwaraqSrv/bookpage?book=157&session=ABBBVFAGFGFHAAWER&fkey=2&page=1&option=1 [p. 126]) .

[814] Al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī, *al-Wasāṭa*, 41. It appears that ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī was influenced by the *Wasāṭa*.

[815] *Asrār* 226-27. For a slightly different version of the prophetic saying see Lane, *Lexicon*, 1055. Al-Rāzī treats this issue in a condensed fashion in *Nihāya*, 246-47. In *Asrār*, 100-101, al-Jurjānī discusses this example in the context of *tamthīl* (see below). Al-Jurjānī's larger differentiation between *tashbīh* and *istiʿāra* does not pass over to Ḍiyāʾ al-

in those cases in which one can restore (*taqdīr*) the particle of comparison and keep the beauty

(*ḥusn, yaḥsunu, istiḥsān, malāḥa*) of the statement intact, one is dealing with a simile (in which

the particle was omitted), and in those cases in which restoring the particle results in a statement

that is permissible (*yajūzu, jawāz*) but no longer beautiful, one is dealing with a metaphor.[816]

Thus, restoring "Zayd is like a lion" for "Zayd is a lion" remains beautiful, but in the case of al-

Sharīf al-Raḍī's (d. 406/1016, quoted without attribution) [meter: *kāmil*]

> *farʿāʾu in nahaḍat li-ḥājatihā*
> > *ʿajila l-qaḍību wa-abṭaʾa l-diʿṣū*
>
> "A full-haired one, whenever she stands up to do her affair
> > the twig moves quickly and the round sand hill is slow,"[817]

restoring "a physique (*qadd*) moves quickly like a twig, and buttocks (*ridf*) are slow like a round

sand hill" leads to an uncomely result. What Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not say explicitly is that it is

uncomely because restoring the particle of comparison in these cases necessitates the restoration

of the unexpressed topic (*qadd, ridf*), which causes the statement to lose its charm. A similar

example is provided in the Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ*, where the poetic line and ensuing comment are

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Dīn's work: according to al-Jurjānī, the point of *tashbīh* ("Zayd is a lion") is to relate that a similarity exists between the two things, whereas the point of *istiʿāra* is to relate something else, beyond the existence of a similarity ("A lion is approaching") (Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 202-203).

[816] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 73-76, 121-22 (the passages are rather repetitive, and the gist of it is expressed on p. 74, *wa-jumlatu l-amri annā narā adāta l-tashbīhi yaḥsunu iẓhāruhā fī mawḍiʿin dūna mawḍiʿin fa-ʿalimnā anna l-mawḍiʿa -lladhī yaḥsunu iẓhāruhā fīhi ghayru l-mawḍiʿi -lladhī lā yaḥsunu iẓhāruhā fīhi fa-sammaynā l-mawḍiʿa -lladhī yaḥsunu iẓhāruhā fīhi tashbīhan muḍmara l-adāti wa-lladhī lā yaḥsunu iẓhāruhā fīhi -stiʿāratan*).

[817] Ibid. 2: 73 (and fn. 1 for the meaning of *diʿṣ*), 75, 76. According to al-Ḥalāwī's edition of the *dīwān* (*Dīwān al-Sharīf al-Raḍī*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ḥalāwī, 2 vols., Beirut: Sharikat Dār al-Arqam b. Abī al-Arqam, 1999, 1: 585), *dighṣ* 'corpulent woman' should be read for *diʿṣ*, but this would destroy the symmetry with *qaḍīb* (Ḥulw's edition runs until the letter *dāl*). *Diʿṣ* (with *kathīb*) is a standard, very common image for *ridf*. For *diʿṣ* see also Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 2: 1380-81, where a poetic *shāhid* is adduced in which a delicate twig (*qaḍību bānin*) is mentioned in the context of two round sand hills (*diʿṣatāni*). On the contrast between quick and slow parts of a woman see also the lines by al-Muʾammil (a *mukhaḍram* poet), *man raʾā mithla ḥubbatī / tushbihu l-badra idhā badā || tadkhulu l-yawma thumma tad- / khulu ardāfuhā ghadā* "Who's seen the like of my beloved? She resembles a full moon. || She herself will arrive today; her bum tomorrow, before noon!" (sometimes adduced as an example of exaggeration; see, e.g., al-ʿAskarī, *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 374; Usāma b. Munqidh, *al-Badīʿ*, 107). I thank Geert Jan van Gelder for the reference and translation.

taken almost verbatim from al-Jurjānī's *Dalāʾil*.[818] I read this as a direct appropriation of al-Jurjānī's idea, according to which not every full-fledged comparison can be expressed in the form of a metaphor (topic unexpressed):

> Not every *tashbīh* can be reworked into an *istiʿāra* (topic suppressed) [al-Jurjānī]
> $\downarrow$
> Not every *istiʿāra* (topic suppressed) can be reworked into a beautiful *tashbīh* [Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn]

We might add that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn ends his discussion in the *Mathal* with the boasting statement, "So consider carefully what I have pointed to and reflect on it, so that you find that I have mentioned what no one before me has in this manner."[819] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn made similar statements when he lifted unacknowledged sections from al-Ghazālī (in the *Jāmiʿ*) and when he quoted without attribution the *Dalāʾil* on the virtue of word arrangement (see §4.1).[820] (This does not mean that every time Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn boasts of his original thinking we should assume plagiarism.) In the case of articulating the essence of metaphor as a comparison in which the topic is not expressed, one can assume direct influence from al-Jurjānī. In the case of differentiating 'permissible' reconstructions of a comparison versus 'beautiful' reconstructions, and making that the basis of identifying a metaphor versus a comparison with no particle, one can assume an appropriation of al-Jurjānī's ideas – in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's words, a case of *istinbāṭ* or *istikhrāj*.

Further Engagement with al-Jurjānī: Analogy

In a similar vein, earlier in the *Asrār* al-Jurjānī speaks of the process of restoring the unexpressed topic (and along with it, the particle of comparison) in the famous case of the substratum-less

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[818] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 84; *Dalāʾil*, 450-51. I discuss this passage in §5.5.

[819] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 77.

[820] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 28; *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 215.

metaphor epitomized in Labīd's [meter: *kāmil*]

> *wa-ghadāti rīḥin qad kashaftu wa-qirratin*
> *idh aṣbaḥat bi-yadi l-shamāli zimāmuhā*
> "Many a cold and windy morning I went forth
> When its reins were in the hand of the north wind."[821]

The context is al-Jurjānī's famous differentiation between metaphors that have a substratum (*shayʾ maʿlūm yumkin an yunaṣṣ ʿalayhi*, *shayʾ yushār ilayh*, and other expressions), like "I saw a lion" (substratum of lion=Zayd), and metaphors that do not have a substratum, like "hand of the north wind" (substratum of hand=ø).[822] In the first case, contends al-Jurjānī, going back and articulating to the full comparison comes easily (*idhā rajaʿta* […] *ilā l-tashbīh* […] *wajadtahu yaʾtīka ʿafwan*), leading to *raʾaytu rajulan ka-l-asad* or *raʾaytu mithla l-asad* or *shabīhan bi-l-asad* "I saw a man like/similar to a lion." But in the second case the comparison is not quite *idh aṣbaḥa shayʾun mithlu l-yadi li-l-shamāl* *"when something like a hand comes to belong to the north wind"; rather, one must exert reflection (*tuʿmilu taʾammulan wa-fikran*) to reach the following full-fledged comparison (*tashbīh*): "when the north wind, which, in its power to affect the morning, has the semblance of a (man) commanding (*mālik*) in (his ability to) manipulate a thing in his hand […]."[823] What underlies al-Jurjānī's differentiation is that the comparison in this type of metaphor is a complex analogy, not a simple simile.[824] In his appropriation of this

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[821] *Asrār*, 43. I adopt the translation from Stetkevych, *Abū Tammām and the Poetics of the ʿAbbāsid Age*, 25.

[822] *Asrār*, 42-43. We will look into this differentiation by al-Jurjānī more closely in §5.2.

[823] Ibid., 44-45 (see also 224, 228-31). I read this as a conditional sentence with no apodosis, but see Ritter (trans.), *Geheimnisse*, 66, for an idiomatic rendering that does express an apodosis. Modern thinkers have also attended to the "difficulty of identifying the simile that corresponds to a given metaphor;" see for instance (wherefrom the quote is derived) Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean," *Critical Inquiry* 5.1 (1978), 31-47, here: 38.

[824] Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors," 3-4: "A closer analysis shows that the *istiʿāra* is based on a *tamthīl*, an analogy between […]." We should state that authors in the standard tradition do not use the term *tamthīl* in this context.

idea Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn speaks of cases of *tashbīh* – for him a cover term for both simile and analogy – where it is difficult to restore the particle of comparison, i.e., articulate the full analogy, and it must be done by exerting contemplation (Arabic: *ishkāl fī taqdīr adāt al-tashbīh*; *yushkilu taqdīr adāt al-tashbīh fīhi wa-innahu yuḥtāju fī taqdīrihā ilā naẓar*).[825] The first classification of *tashbīh* (without the particle of comparison), out of several classifications that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn presents in the *Mathal*, is based on grammatical considerations. According to him the further one moves along the categories – five in number – the harder it becomes to reconstruct the full comparison. We will now elaborate on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's envisioning of the hierarchy of these categories, in order to demonstrate how indebted he is to the discussions in the *Asrār*, and how he nevertheless comes up with his own version of the difficulty in articulating the full comparison of a simile/analogy. His examples (none of which are used by al-Jurjānī) often display what we would identify as metaphors. This is because (a) in the Western tradition, if both topic and analogue are expressed but the particle of comparison is missing, the sentence is viewed as a metaphor, and many of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's examples reflect exactly such cases; (b) in some of his examples the topic is in fact suppressed, and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn often finds justifications for counting them as cases of *tashbīh*.[826] This discussion is important also because it illuminates the relationship he envisions between *tashbīh* and *istiʿāra*, and it sheds light on little-discussed poetic devices such as genitive metaphors and verb metaphors.

The first category of *tashbīh* presented by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn comes in the form of (*yaqaʿu mawqiʿa*) a simple equational sentence (*al-mubtadaʾ wa-l-khabar mufradayn* "single noun-initial subject and single predicate") like "Zayd is a lion." Here, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn says, the way of restoring

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[825] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 116, 121.

[826] See esp. the discrepancy between ibid. 2: 117.1-3ᵉ and 121.3-8.

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the particle of comparison becomes apparent intuitively and immediately (*bi-badīhat al-naẓar ʿalā l-fawr*; cf. al-Jurjānī above).[827] In the second category, also a noun-initial sentence, the predicate (*khabar*) is a composite phrase of a genitive construct (*jumla murakkaba min muḍāf wa-muḍāf ilayhi*).[828] Here, in order to articulate the full comparison, the word order of the construct must often be inverted (and especially when the *iḍāfa* is indefinite, he adds) as in the case of the prophetic "Truffles are the smallpox of the earth" (*al-kamʾatu judariyyu l-arḍ*), which can be articulated in full (rather clumsily by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn) as "Truffles for the earth are like smallpox." Another example is al-Buḥturī's (d. 284/897) [meter: *ṭawīl*]

> *ghamāmu samāḥin lā yaghibbu lahū ḥayan*
> *wa-misʿaru ḥarbin lā yaḍīʿu lahū witrū*
> "(You are) Clouds of generosity, whose abundant rain does not skip a day,
> and a stirrer of the fire of war, for whom no blood vengeance is neglected,"[829]

which is reconstructed as "generosity like clouds" (*samāḥun ka-l-ghamāmi*, with an implied subject *huwa* referring to the praised one).[830] He says that a more difficult case in restoring the particle of comparison in this category (*wa-min hādhā l-nawʿ mā yushkilu taqdīr adāt al-tashbīh fīh*) is Abū Tammām's (d. 232/846) [meter: *khafīf*]

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[827] Ibid. 2: 116-17. See another comment by al-Jurjānī in *Asrār*, 84, […] *yuʿrafu l-maqṣūdu mina l-tashbīhi fīhi bi-badīhati l-samāʿ* "… the intention of the simile (or simple comparison) in [this case] is known intuitively upon hearing [it]."

[828] Ibid. 2: 116. When he says that the predicate is a *jumla* composed of the first and second term of the construct, he is referring to a group of words (opposite *mufrad*) rather than a complete grammatical sentence (*jumla*). It is true that grammarians presuppose an implicit verb such as *yastaqirru* "to rest, to be settled" in many noun-initial sentences, turning the predicate, essentially, into a sentence, but they do so only in the context of predicates consisting of prepositional phrases (such as *zaydun fī l-dāri*).

[829] Ibid. 2: 117 (and fn. 2 for the editors' correction of the original *yuḥibbu* for *yaghibbu*). This is line 15 of al-Buḥturī's poem beginning with *matā lāḥa barqun* […] in praise of the patron and army general al-Fatḥ b. Khāqān (see *Dīwān al-Buḥturī*, ed. Ḥasan Kāmil al-Ṣayrafī, 5 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1963-1964, 2: 845, and cf. editors' note in the *Mathal*). The verb *ghabba* literally means 'to come every other day'.

[830] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 117. The implied pronoun *huwa* is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's reconstruction.

> *ayyu marʿā ʿaynin wa-wādī nasībī*
>
> *laḥabat-hu l-ayyāmu fī malḥūbī*
>
> "What an eye's pasturage and an amatory prelude's valley,
>
> which the days abraded in Malḥūb."[831]

According to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, "Abū Tammām's intention is to describe this place as having been beautiful, but then its beauty went away, so he said that the eye used to take pleasure in looking at it just as (*ka-*) the freely grazing livestock [take pleasure] in the pasturage, and that he (the poet) used to recite amatory sections in [his] poems due to [the place's] beauty and pleasantness." He continues: "and if we reconstruct (*qaddarnā*) the particle of comparison here we would say, *It is as if the eye had a pasturage (ka-annahu kāna li-l-ʿayni marʿan) and the amatory prelude had an abode and home*."[832] Here we find a tension between Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's adherence to his invented scheme of reconstructing the particle of comparison, which sometimes leads to clumsy results (saying it is as if the eye had a pastorage does not do much more to spell out the analogy than the original "the eye's pasturage," despite the added *ka-annahu*), and his more 'authentic' parsing of the line in which he articulates the analogy in natural terms (the eye takes pleasure in looking at a place just as livestock take pleasure in grazing in the pasturage).

Like al-Jurjānī Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn takes pains to identify the underlying analogy, but Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not speak of the absence of a substratum in this context (see al-Jurjānī's discussion of

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[831] Ibid. 2: 118, in praise of the vizier Sulaymān b. Wahb; al-Khaṭīb al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ dīwān Abī Tammām*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbduh ʿAzzām, 4 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1957-1965, 1: 122. The place name Malḥūb (in Arabia) is commonly used in poetry according to al-Tibrīzī (ibid.). Another possiblitiy is the reading *marʿā ʿīn* "pasture of kine" and hence *wādī nasīb* "valley of kin" (if anyone would play on the word *nasīb* within the very *nasīb* of a poem, it would be Abū Tammām). According to al-Ṣūlī, some actually read it as *ʿīn*, while others thought *ʿīn* was a misreading (Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Ṣūlī, *Sharḥ al-Ṣūlī li-Dīwān Abī Tammām*, ed. Khalaf Rashīd Nuʿmān, 3 vols., [Baghdad]: al-Jumhūriyya al-ʿIrāqiyya, Wizārat al-Iʿlām, [1978?], 1: 225). All in all Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces three examples for the second category: the prophetic saying and the lines by al-Buḥturī and Abū Tammām.

[832] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 118. The particle *li-* merely articulates explicitly the idea of 'belonging' that is expressed in this type of *iḍāfa* (as opposed to *min* or *fī* that are reconstructed in *kaʾsu fiḍḍatin* and *ṣawmu l-yawmi*, respectively; see Wright, *Grammar* 2: 199-200).

"the hand of the north wind" above). It is critical to point out that although both constructions are *iḍāfas*, and both contain an element with no substratum, al-Jurjānī's *yad al-shamāl* is typologically different from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *ghamāmu samāḥin* or *marʿā ʿaynin*. In the former, the element "hand" is necessary for depicting the image (because the "reins" are in it). In the latter, "clouds" and "eye" could – strictly speaking, not artistically – be omitted without impairing the image (generosity pouring constant rain; a pasturage which Time abraded). This is what Wolfhart Heinrichs referred to as an "adjacent" element of a metaphor "dangling in the air" or "semantically [but not poetically] superfluous."[833] The two are also different from a historical perspective, as the first was more common in ancient poetry, and the second more common in "modern" (*muḥdath*) poetry.[834] The fact that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn attends to the more recent phenomenon in poetic metaphors means that the older phenomenon became less and less relevant for the critic, and perhaps it was seen as less beautiful, from a poetic point of view. As we shall see later, many metaphors that were scorned contained in them an ascription of a body part to an inanimate being; perhaps "the hand of the north wind" and "the claws of death" were lumped in that category even though they displayed lively personifications, unlike "clouds of

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[833] Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors," 7. Also, in "clouds of generosity" the genitive form is an identifying one (clouds=generosity), whereas in "hand of the north wind" it is ascriptive (hand belongs to north wind), on which see §5.2, §5.5.

[834] Heinrichs points to the different generating mechanism in the two types of metaphor (ibid., 5): in the first case (here "hand of the north wind," Heinrichs adduces "claws of death"), "… the ancient poet would start from an analogy and project the analogue onto the topic, thus creating an image which, although possibly containing an imaginary element, would seem natural," whereas the *muḥdath* poet "would often construct an imaginary element by taking an already existing metaphor (mostly a verb metaphor) and proceeding on the level of the analogue to an adjacent element with no counterpart in the topic." One example Heinrichs provides is "leading the reins of the pupils" (*iqtadat… aʿinnata l-ḥadaqi*) from a line by Abū Nuwās, commenting that (ibid., 6) "it would be perfectly possible to turn *al-ḥadaq* ("the pupils of the eyes") into a direct object of the verb *iqtadat…*" (he then stresses that he is talking about the semantic level, not the poetical one, since "the 'reins' very aptly evoke the image of the spellbound eyeballs moving left and right without any volition of their own" [following the comments of al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī]).

generosity."[835] It is also worth pointing out that the two genitive metaphors that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn

adduces by al-Buḥturī and Abū Tammām are not only different from the old "hand of the north

wind," but they are also different from each other. In the vast majority of 'modern' genitive

metaphors, the metaphorical element is the first term of the construct, as was the case with

"clouds of generosity" and "smallpox of the earth" (compare: "young she-camel of praise,"

"bowl of drowsiness," "head of the night," "mountain-passes of poetry"[836]). But in "pasturage of

an eye" and "valley of an amatory prelude," the first terms of the contruct are used literally: the

predicate of the sentence, "abraded," refers to the pasturage and the valley. Here there is an

actual pasturage where an actual eye is looking, and an actual valley where an actual *nasīb* is

recited.[837] To apply the terms of al-Jurjānī, we would say that the words are used literally – and

have a real-world substratum – but the form itself of the genitive construct is figurative (a kind of

"*majāz ʿaqlī*" on the level of *iḍāfa*).

Resuming Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's discussion of the difficulty in reconstructing a full-fledged

simile out of metaphorical comparisons, we now reach the third category of complexity in

tashbīh (in which the particle is elided), after the simple equational sentence and the genitive

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[835] And see ibid., 10-11: "[…] the ancients used the imaginary metaphor predominantly for abstract or non-tangible objects often for the purpose of personification […]."

[836] Some of the many examples adduced by Heinrichs in his "Paired Metaphors" (the first two examples are actually not by *muḥdathūn* poets). All nineteen examples that Heinrichs adduces in his article that contain a genitive metaphor display the metaphorical element in the first term of the construct. The case "mountain-passes of poetry," also by Abū Tammām (and part of the larger "mountain-passes of earth and of poetry" [*ʿiqāb al-arḍ wa-l-shiʿr*]), may seem comparable to "a valley of an amatory prelude" (*wādī nasīb*), but in the first case the subject of the statement is the second term of the construct, "poetry" (where the verbal predicate is metaphorical, *faraʿtu ʿiqāba l-arḍi wa-l-shiʿri mādiḥan lahū* "I ascended the mountain-passes of earth and of poetry praising him" for "I exerted my special poetical talent"; ibid., 15) whereas in *wādī nasīb* the subject is the first term, "valley." The case of "smallpox of the earth" is slightly different: first, 'smallpox' has a substratum (truffles) whereas "mountain-passes of poetry" does not, and second, the two terms are not equated (smallpox ≠earth, moutainpasses=poetry) and are thus more in line with "hand of the north wind" (even though 'hand'=ø).

[837] Or, even if the whole scene is imagenary, it abides by the laws of nature – unlike wind with a hand. I am still struggling to give a 'formal' classification of this metaphor.

construct. It is presented as a case in which both the noun-initial subject (*mubtadaʾ*) and the predicate (*khabar*) are composite phrases (*jumlatayni*[838]). From the single example adduced, a prophetic saying, it is not too clear what he has in mind: "Is it not the reaped produce of their tongues [speech uttered against others] that makes people prostrate on their noses in the fire of hell?!" (*hal yakubbu l-nāsa ʿalā manākhirihim fī nāri jahannama illā ḥaṣāʾidu alsinatihim*).[839] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's reconstructed comparison consists of an equational sentence with composite expressions (*iḍāfas* in this case) in the subject and predicate positions, and perhaps this is what he meant by *jumlatayn*: "the speech of tongues is like the reaped seed-produce of the reaping hooks" (*kalāmu l-alsinati ka-ḥaṣāʾidi l-manājili*).[840] He concedes that the analogue[841] "reaping hook" is not expressed, but maintains that its 'attribute' (?, *ṣifa*) – "reaped seed-produce" (i.e., what is reaped by the hook) – is. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is not content with a mere metaphorical substitution of *ḥaṣāʾid* – surely it would suffice (and would fit his definition of *majāz*). He opts rather for a complete analogy that includes the instrument (tongues=reaping hooks) as well as the result or product (speech=reaped seeds), probably out of a recognition that *ḥaṣāʾid* is best perceived here visually, and is thus incomplete without the *manājil*. The visual aspect of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's understanding of metaphor will be discussed in more detail in §5.5.

The fourth and fifth categories of comparison are the hardest, according to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn (*ashkal al-aqsām al-madhkūra*), to reconstruct as explicit similes/analogies, and people do not

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[838] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 116. Again, by *jumla* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not necessarily mean here a stand-alone sentence, as the grammarians use it.

[839] On the rarity of a transitive form I verb (*kabba*) having a corresponding intransitive form IV verb (*akabba*) see Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 5: 3803.

[840] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 118-19. This exact comparison is elaborated on in Lane, *Lexicon*, 582 (under *ḥaṣāʾid alsinatihim*).

[841] Here correctly referred to as the *mushabbah bihi* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 119).

often realize (*lā yatafaṭṭanu lahumā*) that they are cases of *tashbīh*.[842] Indeed, to the modern

reader they read as metaphors. The fourth category comes in the form of a verbal sentence

(*yaridu ʿalā wajh al-fiʿl wa-l-fāʿil*);[843] we would identify it as a type of verb metaphor. Two

examples are adduced. The first is the Qurʾānic "And those who made the abode, and belief,

their dwelling place before them" (my literal translation of Q 59:9, *wa-lladhīna tabawwaʾū l-*

dāra wa-l-ʾīmāna min qablihim).[844] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn reconstructs the analogy as "they, in their

belief, are like a man taking an abode as his dwelling place (*ka-l-mutabawwiʾi dāran*), that is,

they took 'belief' as a house to dwell in, by which [God] describes their becoming firmly

established in it."[845] What is especially striking about this case is how easily the verb could have

been interpreted as a metaphor, just as we see in many other authors who display tendencies of

adherence to the word-transfer theory. As we shall see in subsequent sections (especially §5.5),

cases comparable to *tabawwaʾū l-ʾīmān* would increasingly be seen as unequivocal metaphors in

which the *maṣdar* is used "not according to its original coinage."[846] If Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn had adhered

to the definition he provided in his theoretical exposé of *majāz*, he would have taken the verb

tabawwaʾa as a metaphor for *ittakhadha* 'to take' or something of the like. Instead, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn

takes the verb *literally* (*tabawwaʾa* as 'to take s.t. as a dwelling') and reconstructs an analogy to

explain the expression, which he nevertheless views – on the whole – as figurative. Ḍiyāʾ al-

Dīn's departure from a different approach, *viz.*, taking the verb as an *istiʿāra*, is a conscious one,

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[842] Ibid.

[843] Ibid. 2: 116.

[844] Ibid. 2: 119 (fixing the typo *al-dāra l-ʾīmāna* [rectified in the 2nd printing of 1973, 2: 118]). The *dār* is usually taken as a reference to Medina, and the phrase as a whole to the early *anṣār* of the prophet. Arberry's translation is "And those who made their dwelling in the abode, and in belief, before them."

[845] Ibid.

[846] And see al-Jurjānī, *Asrār*, 48 ff.

as is evident from him mentioning those scholars who do not realize that the instances in point are cases of *tashbīh* (see above).

In the second example he provides for the fourth category, the distinction between *tashbīh* and the conventional notion of *istiʿāra* is much less clear. This is Abū Tammām's [meter: *khafīf*]

> *naṭaqat muqlatu l-fatā l-malhūfi*
> *fa-tashakkat bi-fayḍi damʿin dharūfī*
> "The eyeball of the anxious young man spoke
> and lamented with a river of tears shed"[847]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn begins by restoring a simile, "the tears of the eye are like the speech of the tongue," and then proceeds to reconstruct the analogy, "it is as if the crying eye articulates what is in the heart" (*al-ʿaynu l-bākiyatu ka-annamā tanṭiqu bi-mā fī l-ḍamīr*).[848] Attributing speech to inanimate beings has long attracted attention by literary critics, especially early ones, in the context of a pre-word-transfer theory of metaphor, and in this Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn displays continuity with the early Arabic literary theoretical tradition (albeit under the heading of *tashbīh*).[849] We will deal with a different case of applying speech to inanimate objects in the context of *tawassuʿ*; indeed, according to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own deliberations, this case could count as *tawassuʿ*.

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[847] *Damʿun dharīfun* or *madhrūfun* is the common expression (Lane, *Lexicon*, 963); *dharūf* would be the intensive form of the adjectival *faʿūl* (on which see Wright, *Grammar* 1: 136). Other renderings for *fayḍ* can be 'overflow' or 'abundant water'; I had Justin Timberlake's "Cry Me a River" in mind.

[848] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 119.

[849] See, e.g., Ibn Qutayba, *Taʾwīl*, 106, 109 ff. and more so Ibn Wahb al-Kātib, *al-Burhān*, 60-62, 143-44, where we find an overlap in *shawāhid*. See also Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ*, in *Fann al-shiʿr*, 243. Interestingly, in Ibn Wahb's deliberations of such examples, the "talking campsites" and such are reflective of the *real* world rather than a fictional one (*al-Burhān*, 60-62, 143.12-13) since inanimate beings do impart knowledge. This is connected to his philosophical conception of *bayān* which is closely aligned with al-Jāḥiẓ's philosophical *bayān* (see §3.1). Al-Jāḥiẓ's examples for the signification that is imparted by inanimate beings and deduced by rational ones also reflect true reality (leanness as a sign of illness; "informing" eyes; etc).

The fifth and final category within the 'grammatical' classification of *tashbīh* takes the form of "striking an example/similitude" (*al-mathal al-maḍrūb*).[850] This category, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn maintains, "confuses many scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* and they mix it with metaphor."[851] He provides two poetic examples, both are lines by al-Farazdaq (d. *ca.* 110/728), and then an example which according to him is erroneously identified by scholars as *tashbīh*. The first example is part of an invective against Jarīr [meter: *kāmil*],

> *mā ḍarra Taghliba Wāʾilin a-hajawtahā*
> *am bulta ḥaythu tanāṭaḥa l-baḥrāni*
> "It does not damage the (tribe of) Taghlib. B. Wāʾil whether you lampoon them
> or piss where the two great rivers [Tigris and Euphrates] collide"[852]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn reconstructed the analogy "just as pissing into the junction of the two seas [Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's understanding] has no effect whatsoever, likewise your lampooning of those people (the Banū Taghlib) has no effect whatsoever."[853] The second example is al-Farazdaq's [meter: *ṭawīl*]

> *qawāriṣu taʾtīnī wa-taḥtaqirūnahā*
> *wa-qad yamlaʾu l-qaṭru l-ināʾa fa-yufʿamū*
> "Biting words come my way, and you hold them of no worth;
> But (even) drops of water can fill a vessel to excess"[854]

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[850] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 116.

[851] Ibid. 2: 121.

[852] Since he is speaking of pissing, and in the context of an invective, it is doubtful that what al-Farazdaq has in mind, as Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn seems to imply (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 120), is the Qurʾānic *majmaʿ al-baḥrayn* (Q 18:60), which refers to a mythical "junction of two seas" and is considered in some Islamic lore to be the abode of al-Khiḍr (sharing typological affinities with the Water of Life in the Alexander romance; *The Qurʾān*, Hebrew trans. Uri Rubin, 242). Referring to a place that al-Farazdaq and his audience would be well familiar with – Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab, where the Tigris and Euphrates merge – would have a livelier effect on the invective. On *baḥr* as *nahr ʿaẓīm*, including its application to rivers like the Euphrates and Nile, see *Lisān al-ʿarab* 1: 216.

[853] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 120; see previous fn. on his understanding of the line as a reference to *majmaʿ al-baḥrayn*.

[854] Ibid., and see editors' fn. 3 for a slightly different version.

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn comments: "he compared the harsh words that come to him, being held of no worth, to drops of water that fill a vessel despite their small size, referring by that to the idea that an abundance (of something) can turn a small issue to a big one."[855] In other words, the poet's persona admits that he is hurt by the petty invective directed at him, since there is so much of it.

Both lines by al-Farazdaq exhibit a "striking of an example" that is virtually indistinguishable from al-Jurjānī's notion of *tamthīl* lit. "to utter an example/similitude (*mathal*),"[856] epitomized by the famous "He puts one leg forward and another one backward" to refer to a hesitant man. For al-Jurjānī a *tamthīl* 'metaphorical exemplification' is a complex *tashbīh*, which manifests itself grammatically in the form of a sentence (or sentences, or a phrase equivalent to a sentence) rather than the single word.[857] Al-Jurjānī uses the term *mathal* interchangeably with *tamthīl* and at one point even speaks of "striking" a similitude/giving an example (*al-mathal… qad yuḍrabu*).[858] The *mathal* is an illustrative (or Ritter: "graphic")

[855] Ibid. 2: 120-21.

[856] Taking *maththala* here as a denominative of *mathal* (see Wright, *Grammar* 1: 32, for the denominative sense of form II verbs). That al-Jurjānī himself endorses this etymology is evident from several of his discussions of *tamthīl*, e.g., *Asrār*, 87, *wa-kullu mā lā yaṣiḥḥu an yusammā tamthīlan fa-lafẓu l-mathali lā yustaʿmalu fīhi ayḍan* "in cases that cannot be called *tamthīl*, you would not use the word *mathal* to describe them either." Ritter translates *mathal* as "(bildliche) sentenz" (*Geheimnisse*, 112; parentheses his) or "figurative sentence" (also "graphic figurative sentence" and "picturesque"; *Asrār*, editor's introduction, 14, 17).

[857] *Asrār*, 92-101, and editor's introduction, 13-17, for discussion. By "a phrase equivalent to a sentence" I am referring to phrases that contain an element with verbal force like the *maṣdar*, the participle, etc.

[858] Ritter presents *mathal*, the figurative/graphic/picturesque sentence (see fn. 856), as a subtype of *tamthīl* (*Asrār*, editor's introduction, 14). I did not find evidence of a sub-classification in the text; rather, according to my understanding, *mathal* and *tamthīl* are used interchangeably (*Asrār*, 220-223 contain clear examples) and all instances of *tamthīl* display a usage of a graphic sentence (see also Heinrichs' note in *Hand of the Northwind*, 7.11-13). For more on *tamthīl* see Abu Deeb, *Al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 67-68, 145-46, and especially 237-42. Abu Deeb too speaks of a classification within *tamthīl*, one based on *istiʿāra* (i.e., it is a figurative sentence) and one based on *tashbīh* (all words are used literally, and see *Asrār*, 220.3-4, 223.4-6). Abu Deeb also consults the *Dalāʾil* in this context (*Al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 238, fn. 32), which I think may be the source of some confusion; in the *Dalāʾil* al-Jurjānī may be departing from some views he expressed in the *Asrār*. Once more, to me it currently seems that al-Jurjānī is speaking of only one *tamthīl*, and that his *tamthīl* is identical to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *al-mathal al-maḍrūb*. Al-Jurjānī does provide a gradation of *tamthīl* in *Asrār*, 109.12 ff., differentiating between providing a "rare/unusual and odd" *mathal* and providing a *mathal* that is not unusual. In my understanding, al-Jurjānī does not intend this to be a formal classifying marker, but it is undeniable that the 'unusual' case of *tamthīl* is comparable to his notion of *takhyīl*: in both cases, an unusual incidence acts as a corroborating "mock" explanation

sentence that exemplifies, by metaphorical analogy, the topic of discussion. In Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's

examples the illustrations were: urinating into the ocean does not add to the water level; filling a

vessel with water drops eventually causes it to overflow. Compare the two lines by al-Farazdaq

with the following line by Ibn al-Muʿtazz, provided by al-Jurjānī in his discussion of *tamthīl*

[meter: *kāmil*]

> *iṣbir ʿalā maḍaḍi l-ḥasū*
> > *di fa-inna ṣabraka qātiluh*
> *fa-l-nāru taʾkulu nafsahā*
> > *in lam tajid mā taʾkuluh*
> "Be patient when faced with torment (caused by) an envious person,
> > for your patience will kill him;
> (After all,) fire eats itself out
> > when it finds nothing else to eat."[859]

In all these cases the illustrative example, *mathal*, is not too far from the Qurʾānic notion of

mathal, which generally refers to "any item of discourse featuring one object or event

illuminating another […] reality by comparison."[860] The idea of an illustrative analogy as a

literary device – once referred to by Heinrichs as a "mock analogy"[861] – is not new with al-

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for reality. An affinity between *tamthīl* and *takhyīl* has already been identified by van Gelder in "A Good Cause," 226, and more so by Heinrichs in "Rhetorical Figures," 661 (more on this affinity below).

[859] *Asrār*, 86; translation (with minor changes) from Abu Deeb, *Al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 242; Ibn al-Muʿtazz, *Dīwān*, Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1961, 389 (with slight changes: *ḥasad* for *maḍaḍ*, *baʿḍahā* for *nafsahā*).

[860] A.H. Mathias Zahniser, "Parable," *Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān*, Brill Online. Zahniser states, however, that not all Qurʾānic *amthāl* exhibit a comparison, and that they usually illuminate "less tangible" reality. In the case of poetry, the reality illuminated is tangible and readily understood – the poets are just being creative in depicting it.

[861] Heinrichs, "Rhetorical figures," 661 ("because the insinuated aspect of comparison is not valid"); Kanazi goes even further and calls the statement "seemingly absurd" (*Studies*, 179). According to Heinrichs, "[m]ock analogies belong to the category of *takhyīl* 'phantastic reinterpretation of reality,' a phenomenon identified by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī" ("Rhetorical figures," 661).

Jurjānī.[862] According to al-Jurjānī himself, Abū Aḥmad al-ʿAskarī (d. 382/993, teacher of Abū

Hilāl al-ʿAskarī) treated "this type of speech" under the term *mumāthala*, and to al-Jurjānī's

mind, he should not have differentiated it from *mathal* or *tamthīl*.[863] But it is Abū Hilāl al-

ʿAskarī, Abū Aḥmad's student, who treats this notion under the heading *al-istishhād wa-l-iḥtijāj*

'adducing [mock] evidence (Ar. *shāhid, ḥujja*)'.[864] According to Abū Hilāl, this category –

which enables the creation of a new motif (*tawlīd al-maʿnā*) – acts like the literary device termed

tadhyīl ~'appending a comment' (see below), and he explains 'mock evidence' thus: "It is when

you present a motif and then confirm it by (giving) another motif that acts like evidence for the

first and like proof for its correctness."[865] One of the examples is the very line by al-Farazdaq on

the vessel filled with water drops, which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn provides.[866] Abū Hilāl ends the discussion

by saying that "most of these examples are also included in the category of *tashbīh*."[867] If we

look back at Abū Hilāl's treatment of *tadhyīl* (which is contrasted with *musāwāt* and *ishāra*, but

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[862] See Ibn Rashīq, *al-ʿUmda* 1: 277-80.

[863] A quick consultation with Abū Aḥmad's extant works did not yield any results for *mumāthala* (*al-Maṣūn fī l-adab*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, Kuwait: Dāʾirat al-Maṭbūʿāt wa-l-Nashr, 1960; *al-Tafḍīl bayna balāghatay l-ʿarab wa-l-ʿajam*, ed. Ḥamad b. Nāṣir al-Dukhayyil, Buraydah: Nādī al-Qāsim al-Adabī, [1998]). For Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, his student, the term *mumāthala* is a periphrastic expression (akin to al-Jurjānī's *kināya*) but is readily figurative (as opposed to al-Jurjānī's *kināya*, which in his terms is not. See §5.2 below). An example for Abū Hilāl's *mumāthala* is "so and so has clean clothes" for 'pure of blemish' (almost like a euphemism). In his commentary of the examples, Abū Hilāl often employs the term *tamthīl*. See *al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 364-68.

[864] *Al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 434-37. See also Kanazi, *Studies*, 178-80. Kanazi too points out the equivalence between this literary device and al-Jurjānī's *tamthīl* (pp. 179-80).

[865] *Al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 434: *wa-majrāhu majrā l-tadhyīli li-tawlīdi l-maʿnā* (lit. "it acts like *tadhyīl* for creating a motif") *wa-huwa an taʾtiya bi-maʿnan thumma tuʾakkidahu bi-maʿnan ākhara yajrī majrā l-istishhādi ʿalā l-awwali wa-l-ḥujjati ʿalā ṣiḥḥatihi*. I read *istishhād* here in the sense of *shāhid* 'evidence', as he then uses *ḥujja*, not *iḥtijāj*. See also McKinney, *Rhyme versus Reason*, 288 (a case of "*tawārud*"). For a different understanding see Beatrice Gruendler, *Medieval Arabic Praise Poetry: Ibn al-Rūmī and the Patron's Redemption*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, 208, quoted in van Gelder, "A Good Cause," 226.

[866] *Al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 435. Otherwise the poetic *shawāhid* are not identical to those found in the *Mathal / Asrār*.

[867] Ibid., 437: *wa-yadkhulu aktharu hādhihi l-amthilati fī l-tashbīhi ayḍan*. By *tashbīh* he likely means 'analogy' here (or at least the more general 'comparison').

has no negative connotation)[868] we again find that an 'added comment' is expressed to reinforce the statement, but here, the extra motif (or 'appendix') is not imaginary or "mock" as we find in *al-istishhād wa-l-iḥtijāj*, but is rather plainly true to reality. Take the following line by Abū Nuwās (d. *ca.* 198/813), which is the last example Abū Hilāl adduces for *tadhyīl*, [meter: *kāmil*]

> *ʿarama l-zamānu ʿalā -lladhīna ʿahidtahum*
> *biki qāṭinīna wa-li-l-zamāni ʿurāmū*
> "Time has been harsh to those you knew in the past,
> who lived in you [the abode] -- Time is harsh!"[869]

Abū Hilāl comments, "and his saying, *Time is harsh*, is a *tadhyīl*."[870]

The appended comment (*tadhyīl*) is structurally equivalent to the illustrative analogy (*tamthīl / mathal maḍrūb / istishhād wa-iḥtijāj*), in that they are uttered as a "commentary" on reality, and usually at the end of the sentence.[871] In the case of *tadhyīl*, the commentary is

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[868] *Musāwāt* is commonly regarded as a correspondence between the amount of words uttered and the intended meaning (x=y), and *ishāra* as expressing fewer words to convey the intended meaning (x=y-1). In this context, *tadhyīl* (or other terms like it) can sometimes have a negative connotation because it is seen as an unnecessary exceeding of limits (x=y+1). (Notation: 'x' is the meaning, 'y' is the amount of words). In fact Abū Hilāl himself conveys this negative layer by saying that it is most appropriately directly at the 'slow' people; this is after he praises the merits of *tadhyīl* (ibid., 387).

[869] This second line of the poem addresses the abandoned abode mentioned in line 1: *yā dāru mā faʿalat biki l-ayyāmu // ḍāmatki wa-l-ayyāmu laysa tuḍāmu*; see *Dīwān Abī Nuwās al-Ḥasan b. Hāniʾ al-Ḥakamī*, eds. Ewald Wagner and Gregor Schoeler, 6 vols., Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1958-2006, 1 (2nd ed., 2001): 126. In fact, the first line also ends with a kind of *tadhyīl*: "O abode, how the Days have damaged you -- Days [themselves] cannot be damaged!"

[870] *Al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 389. See also Kanazi, *Studies*, 153-54.

[871] See Kanazi, *Studies*, 154, for the possibility of *tadhyīl* appearing before the main idea (and a different structure in the first example by al-Farazdaq). I personally find the common structure of the 'appended commentary' – whether it is in the form of *tadhyīl* or *tamthīl* – to be one of the more distinctive and beautiful features of classical Arabic poetry. It extends to later Persian poetry as well and is one of the foundations of the so-called *sabk-e hindī*. For but one example, see the following by Kalīm Kāshānī (d. 1061/1651):
> The world never lasts, however stubborn your grasp,
> However tightly one closes the fist,
> The color of the henna always fades away
(cited in Shamsur Rahman Faruqi, "A Stranger in the City: The Poetics of *Sabk-e Hindi*," *The Annual of Urdu*

straightforward because it is (perceived as) 'real' and true'. In the case of *tamthīl*, the

commentary (or analogy or explanation) is a product of the poet's imagination, which lends itself

to an understanding of that commentary as being 'untrue'.[872] I think this is what stands at the

basis of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's perception of this type of *tashbīh* as figurative (and how *tashbīh* in

general is conceived as *majāz* will be discussed below). It is true that as a literary device, the

illustrative analogy was known before al-Jurjānī and that in the case of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī we

even find an identical example to one of the two examples adduced by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn.

Nevertheless, it is likelier that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was influenced by al-Jurjānī here: besides the

terminological affinity *tamthīl-mathal*, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn opens the chapter on *tashbīh* by stating that

"scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* have distinguished between *tashbīh* and *tamthīl*, devoting separate

chapters to each category, even though they are one and the same lexically (lit. in the basis of the

lexicon)… I do not know how those scholars (*ulāʾika l-ʿulamāʾ*) were unaware of this despite its

obviousness!"[873] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn rather envisioned *tashbīh* as covering both the simple simile (with

or without the particle of comparison) and the complex analogy. Whether the phrase "those

scholars" actually referred to more than one scholar is unclear; but that it was a reference to al-

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Studies 19 [2004], 1-93, here: 30 [with an emended translation], 75, also: 11, 25-26).

[872] Strictly speaking, every analogy is true. According to the philosopher Nelson Goodman, "anything is *in some way* like anything else" (my emphasis) and Donald Davidson, also a philosopher, goes even further by saying, "everything *is* like everything" (my emphasis); see Robert J. Fogelin, *Figuratively Speaking*, 2nd ed. revised, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 50, 57, but cf. 58 fn. 7 (these statements can apply both to level of the simile and to that of the analogy). See also Borges' "There are infinite things upon the earth; any one of them can be compared to any other" (from *Averroës' Search* in Jorge Luis Borges, *The Aleph and Other Stories*, New York: Penguin Books, 2004, 69-78, here: 75). The 'truthfulness' of the analogies (from a strict philosophical perspective) are evident in the examples we came across illustrating the *mathal maḍrūb/tamthīl/istishhād*: pissing into a river has no effect = your lampooning has no effect; petty criticisms can pile up over time and effect me = drops of water can eventually fill a vessel to excess; being patient with an envious person can eventually stop his feeling of envy = a fire eventually extinguishes itself; (and see below:) you are dead but still your soul endures = even a sword with no handle or belt can cut. We will resume the question of truthfulness in similarity claims when we discuss the inclusion of *tashbīh* within *majāz*.

[873] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 116.

Jurjānī is blatantly evident.[874]

Majāz in the Mathal: A New Classification

As we have seen so far, many of the literary examples discussed in the context of *tashbīh* are

indistinguishable from (a modern notion of) metaphor. Other examples outside *tashbīh* may also

reflect cases of metaphor. The criterion for classification of *majāz*, then, transcends the

conformity or non-conformity to metaphor. We shall now take a step back and look at the larger

classification scheme that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn offers in the *Mathal*, departing both from his earlier

Jāmiʿ and from earlier literary-theoretical accounts. Hinting at his innovation is his prefacing of

the scheme with the words, "It has become manifest to me through sound reflection…," after

which *majāz* is divided into two general categories: 'extension in speech' (*tawassuʿ fī l-kalām*;

sometimes *ittisāʿ*) and 'comparison' (*tashbīh*).[875]

   'Comparison' is further classified into two categories: complete (*tāmm*) and elliptical

(*maḥdhūf*), the first referring to cases in which both sides of the comparison are mentioned, and

the second to cases in which only the analogue is mentioned, not the topic (see above for

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[874] But see *Asrār*, 84, for a recognition by al-Jurjānī that *tamthīl* is a subtype of *tashbīh*. We mentioned above that besides the two examples for *al-mathal al-maḍrūb* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also cites a line that scholars erroneously interpret as an illustrative analogy (referred to here by the cover-term *tashbīh*), but is – to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's mind – a case of *istiʿāra* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 121). This example is al-Buḥturī's lament of a boy [meter: *ṭawīl*] *taʿazza fa-inna l-sayfa yamḍī wa-in wahat // ḥamāʾiluhū ʿanhū wa-khallāhu qāʾimuh* (correcting the typo in vocalization *qāʾimahu*) "Take solace, for the sword cuts even if its shoulder belts are too weak to hold it (*ʿanhu*) and its hilt left its place" (see also al-Buḥturī, *Dīwān* 3: 1956). Although the line is not adduced in the *Asrār* (or *Dalāʾil*), this example too points directly at al-Jurjānī, who would likely have considered it to be a case of *tamthīl* (or even *takhyīl*), not *istiʿāra*. To me it seems like an unequivocal case of illustrative analogy, but according to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, the lamented boy is the unexpressed topic here, and the intended sense is (*ka-annahu qāla*), "Take solace, for you are like a sword that cuts even though its shoulder belts are too weak and its hilt left its place" (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 121).

[875] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 71, 1: 106. We addressed above the 'suspicious' character of such self-congratulatory phraseology, which may point to an unacknowledged borrowing by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. In the case of the classification of *majāz*, I have not yet found evidence of an earlier scholar espousing such a scheme. On the level of *terminology*, it is likely that the terms *tawassuʿ* and *tashbīh* were inspired by Ibn Jinnī's account on the necessary components found in *majāz* (in addition to *tawkīd* 'exaggeration'; see above). On the level of *substance*, it could be the case that his thinking on *majāz* categories was influenced by al-Jurjānī's observations on the difference between metaphor that contains a substratum and metaphor that does not (*Asrār*, 42 ff.): in the case of *tawassuʿ*, there is usually no substratum.

discussion). It is this latter category, according to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, that is termed *istiʿāra* lit. 'borrowing'. But he goes on to say that the term *istiʿāra* (as a technical term) was only coined to differentiate the elliptical comparison from the complete comparison (*wuḍiʿa li-l-farqi baynahu wa-bayna l-tashbīhi l-tāmm*), but that otherwise, both terms, *tashbīh* and *istiʿāra*, could be applied to both categories since they convey a shared meaning (*wa-illā fa-kilāhumā yajūzu an yuṭlaqa ʿalayhi -smu l-tashbīhi wa-yajūzu an yuṭlaqa ʿalayhi -smu l-istiʿārati li-shtirākihimā fī l-maʿnā*).[876] In other words, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn blurs the distinction between *tashbīh* and *istiʿāra* by ascribing to them the same essential denotation. This denotation is not couched in terms of 'similarity' as one might expect (and as some of the *shawāhid* later show), but rather in terms of 'commonality', 'relation' or 'connection' (primarily *mushāraka*; also *munāsaba*, *wuṣla*, and once *wajh*)[877] between the two sides of the figurative expression. By blurring the distinction Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is essentially marginalizing *istiʿāra* in favor of *tashbīh*, although he later concedes (*wa-in shiʾta qulta*) that *majāz* can be said to have three categories: *tawassuʿ fī l-kalām*, *tashbīh* and *istiʿāra*.[878] In terms of space, the category that is afforded the most attention is *tashbīh* (totaling 46 pages in the printed edition of al-Ḥūfī and Ṭabāna), then *istiʿāra* (20 pages of examples and occasional commentary) (an additional 9 pages on the theoretical difference between *tashbīh* and *istiʿāra*, discussed above), and finally *tawassuʿ* (about 6 pages). In terms of 'chronology', the chapter on *istiʿāra* appears first, with an embedded aside on *tawassuʿ* (and other asides), and the chapter on *tashbīh* appears second.[879]

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[876] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 71.

[877] Ibid. 2: 72, 78, 81-83 (*mushāraka*), 79, 83 (*munāsaba*), 82.8 (*wajh*), 1: 106 (*wuṣla*).

[878] Ibid. 2: 71 (also 83).

[879] For the chapter titled *fī l-istiʿāra* see ibid. 2: 70-115. It is the first category (*al-nawʿ al-awwal*) of the 'mental craft' (*al-ṣināʿa al-maʿnawiyya*) or literary devices concerned with sense. The chapter includes the following discussions: the difference between *istiʿāra* and *tashbīh*, *tawassuʿ*, Ibn Jinnī's analysis of *majāz*, al-Ghazālī's

The category of *tawassuʿ* is placed and discussed under the chapter titled *fī l-istiʿāra*, but Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not spell out the reason for subsuming the former under the latter. Of course there is little doubt that the two are conceived of as typologically separate. The dividing line between *tashbīh-istiʿāra* and *tawassuʿ* is the element of *mushāraka* just mentioned: whereas the former category(ies) is based on some relation between the two sides of the figurative expression (topic-analogue), in the latter category there is nothing relating one to the other.[880] (Although we shall see that at least one type of *tashbīh* is essentially indistinguishable from *tawassuʿ*). I see the placement of *tawassuʿ* within the chapter on *istiʿāra* as a nod to tradition: the examples Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn cites for *tawassuʿ* are commonly identified by previous scholars as instances of *istiʿāra*, and he was undoubtedly aware of that.[881] The examples and corresponding commentary show that the 'old' poetic[882] meaning of the term *istiʿāra*, as borrowing an *element* (not a word) from a foreign context and placing it 'on loan' in the context of the topic, is what Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn relegates to *tawassuʿ*. The ascription of a 'foreign' element usually entails personification (a term not used), such as ascribing body parts or speech to non-human and inanimate beings (see examples below). In essence, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is excluding cases of 'ascription' from the domain of *istiʿāra*. The other side of the picture is that *istiʿāra* now fully conforms to what Heinrichs has identified as 'new' or simile-based metaphors (the "narcissus-for-eye" metaphors; for elaboration see

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categorization of *majāz*, and many examples with occasional commentary, appended by a five-page critique of al-Khafājī's understanding of Imruʾ al-Qays' famous line on the long night which is like a camel slow to rise. This latter 'appendix' is discussed in detail in Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 23-25. For the chapter titled *fī l-tashbīh* (the second literary device concerned with sense) see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 116-61.

[880] Ibid. 2: 72, 78.2-3ᵉ, 82.2, 82.2ᵉ.

[881] In other words, I think he is aware "of the change of meaning that has occurred to the term *istiʿāra* since the time of al-Khafājī" (cf. Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 24).

[882] This is in contrast to the old 'exegetical' meaning of *istiʿāra*, to wit, the borrowing of words (see, e.g., *Hand of the Northwind*, 53, and our discussion above on its later formulation in *uṣūl al-fiqh*, albeit in the form of the term *majāz*, not *istiʿāra*).

below).[883] If in the works of literary theory up until the 5th/11th century chapters on *istiʿāra* tended to display a mixing of the two types of metaphor, the loan metaphor and the simile-based metaphor[884] – with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn we find a neat separation between the two. This neat separation is usually associated with the work of al-Jurjānī (and al-Sakkākī following him), who explicitly acknowledged two types of *istiʿāra*.[885] What is interesting with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn – who was likely influenced by al-Jurjānī here – is that he does away with the term *istiʿāra* altogether when it comes to the loan metaphor. In effect, his solution is "neater" than the one offered by al-Jurjānī, since *istiʿāra* now denotes only one notion, not two.

Once again, speaking of 'metaphor' in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's classification of *majāz* would be inappropriate since metaphor appears across categories. It is more appropriate to speak of figurative language based on "perceived" mutual relation (usually similarity[886]) between topic and analogue, and figurative language based on "imposed" mutual relation between the two

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[883] Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 1-3 and *passim*. That Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn "adheres to a strict *tashbīh*-based single-term notion of *istiʿāra*" has already been identified by Heinrichs (ibid., 24). Heinrichs does not treat Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's views on *istiʿāra* as such, but is more concerned (pp. 23-25) with the latter's critique of al-Khafājī's understanding of Imruʾ al-Qays' line mentioned above. Of special interest for our purposes is the first point Heinrichs enumerates on p. 24.

[884] *Hand of the Northwind*, Part Two and Part Three. Strictly speaking, Heinrichs does not give a full account of the *shawāhid* in these scholars' chapters on *istiʿāra* (see. p. 53 for his suggestions for further research), save for the case of Thaʿlab's (d. 291/904) *Qawāʿid al-shiʿr* (pp. 3-6). However, it seems rather apparent from the *shawāhid* that are discussed that the earlier the scholar, the likelier it is that the examples – regardless of the definition of *istiʿāra* – exhibit loan metaphors, or at least that the scholar's comments on the examples contain "old" phraseology (e.g., "[the poet] borrowed [the object/mental image] X for Y"). In fact in Thaʿlab's case there is a clear discrepancy between a "new" definition of *istiʿāra* and "old" *shawāhid* (ibid. 32-33). The analysis of chapters on *istiʿāra* ends with the 5th/11th century scholar al-Khafājī (pp. 51-52, out of 16 scholars studied). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is treated earlier (pp. 23-25, and see previous fn.), but it is not intended as a systematic look at metaphor after the time of al-Jurjānī and al-Khafājī.

[885] Ibid., 1-2; *Asrār*, 42 ff. Heinrichs commonly speaks of a metaphor based on *tashbīh* and a metaphor based on *tamthīl*, using the "fixed" terms of later theorists (*Hand of the Northwind*, 6-7). We should keep in mind, though, that al-Jurjānī himself does not explain the difference between the two types of metaphors in these terms (as far as I can tell): for him the difference lies in the fact that one has a substratum (*shayʾ maʿlūm yumkin an yunaṣṣ ʿalayhi, shayʾ yushār ilayh*, and other expressions) while the other does not (*Asrār*, 42 ff., and see our discussion of analogy above; cf. *Hand of the Northwind*, 7).

[886] And see our discussion below on *kināya*, in which one of the (implicit) relations is contiguity.

(imposed, that is, by the poet). The first type of figurative language is based on a paradigmatic conception of the utterance; the second is based on a syntagmatic[887] conception. In a syntagmatic conception, the two components are conceived of as simply being juxtaposed side by side (either as verb-subject or *muḍāf-muḍāf ilayhi*, see below), whereas the paradigmatic conception acknowledges a juxtaposition based on substitution (due primarily to similarity, but sometimes due to contiguity, see below). Another way to parse the categories of *majāz* is according to linguistic makeup: whereas *istiʿāra* is a single-word metaphor, *tashbīh* (where the particle of comparison is omitted) and *tawassuʿ* are sentence metaphors. In this respect, as we shall see, *kināya* aligns closely with *istiʿāra*. The single-word metaphor is the only category in which we find a true conformity between the examples adduced and the definition of *majāz* that speaks of "using a word not according to its original coinage." Neverthess, in some of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's comments on examples we find a tension between taking the words literally or figuratively.

Tawassuʿ (and the Influence of Ibn Sīnā)

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn distinguishes between two types of *tawassuʿ* or fictional ascription: one is in the form of a genitive construct (ʿalā wajh al-iḍāfa) – its usage is deemed 'ugly'; the other is in non-genitive forms (ʿalā ghayr wajh al-iḍāfa) – its usage is deemed beautiful.[888] The genitive ascription is considered ugly because of the remoteness between the two *iḍāfa* terms (*li-buʿdi mā bayna l-muḍāfi wa-l-muḍāfi ilayhi*),[889] and the examples cited are commonly perceived by earlier

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[887] By this I do not mean to refer to metonymy, as the term commonly denotes, most famously in Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances," in Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle (eds.), *Fundamentals of Language*, 2nd rev. ed., The Hague: Mouton, 1971, 68-96. In metonymy there is a relation of contiguity between the two sides of the figurative expression, whereas in *tawassuʿ* there is *no* (perceived) relation between the two. What I am referring to as syntagmatic (and paradigmatic) is not the *relationship* between the two components but rather Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *conception* of the figurative usage.

[888] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 79, 81.

[889] Ibid. 2: 79.

scholars as ugly *istiʿārāt*. (Of course it is inconsistent to speak of a remote relation here since the whole premise is an *absence* of relation; see below.) The first two examples are lines by Abū Nuwās, the first listed as a 'remote' metaphor in Ibn Rashīq's *ʿUmda* and the second listed as an ugly metaphor in al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī's *Wasāṭa*;[890] the context is praise of the patron's generosity, [meter: *ramal*]

> *buḥḥa ṣawtu l-māli mimmā*
> *minka yashkū wa-yaṣīḥū*
> "The voice of money turned hoarse from
> complaining about you and screaming (that it does not want to be dispersed)"[891]

and [meter: *ramal*]

> *mā li-rijli l-māli amsat*
> *tashtakī minka l-kalālā*
> "How is it that the leg of money comes (every) evening
> and complains to you of (its) fatigue?!"[892]

It is not the ascription of an animate action (screaming, complaining) to the inanimate being (money) that bothers Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn here. In fact Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn provides a better way, from a line by Muslim b. al-Walīd (d. 207/823), to express the idea that money 'complains' to the patron of his injustice in thinking so little of it by 'getting rid' of it (*anna l-māla yataẓallamu min ihānatika iyyāhu bi-l-tamzīq*): this is the verb metaphor *taẓallama l-mālu* ("money complained of the injustice…").[893] Rather, the problem in his view lies in the ascription (*iḍāfa* – not in the

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[890] *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 270 (along with the "uglier" case of "leg of separation"); *al-Wasāṭa*, 58.

[891] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 89; Abū Nuwās, *Dīwān* 1 (2nd ed.): 153.

[892] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 79, 154; Abū Nuwās, *Dīwān* 1: 307, 5: 430 (the latter in a section on his poetry that is condemned as being *ghathth*, *bārid*). In other words: if you treated money justly by not scattering it, it would not be fatigued by coming to you daily 'by foot' in search for justice. This is what money would say to the patron if it attempted to get justice in the face of its 'oppression' (see previous line, *yā Abā Isḥāqa law tunṣafu // minka l-mālu qālā*).

[893] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 79. According to Usāma b. Munqidh, Muslim was influenced by Abū Nuwās here! (*al-*

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grammatical sense, see below) of "voice" – a property, not action – to "money."[894] As Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn says of the second example, "ascribing (iḍāfa) a leg to 'money' is uglier than ascribing voice [to it]!" For Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn describing money as 'complaining' about being given away makes sense, but describing money as having an actual voice does not, let alone a leg. The next two examples are by Abū Tammām, who is said to have used such constructions "a lot" because of his obsession (tatabbuʿ lit. 'making successive or repeated endeavors to attain it') with lexical and morphological puns (mumāthala and tajnīs).[895] In these examples we find that "cutting" (or: skin, or: figure; qadd) is ascribed to "separation" (nawā), "joint bone" (kaʿb) is ascribed to "honor" (ʿirḍ), and "cheek" (khadd) is ascribed to "money" (māl).[896]

These types of genitive metaphors are still strongly connected to the discourse of comparison in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's thinking, since additional examples thereof are listed under the chapter on tashbīh among the ugly comparisons.[897] In that section Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn states explicitly

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Badīʿ, 187).

[894] Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 80. Although on its own, the phrase ṣawt al-māl simply means "the sound of coins"; it was clearly, then, the combination with buḥḥa that bothered Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and Ibn Rashīq. Usāma actually liked the verse, and he gives Muslim's line above as an example of good 'literary theft', that is, drawing on a good line (Abū Nuwās') and keeping it good (al-Badīʿ, 187: naql al-jazl ilā l-jazl).

[895] Ibid. 2: 80. Mumāthala is used here to refer to puns based on homonyms (qadd-qadd), while tajnīs refers to other types of paronomasia that are enabled by the Arabic morphology and root system. On Abū Tammām's proverbial obsession with punning see for instance Arie Schippers, "The Genitive Metaphor in the Poetry of ʾAbū Tammām," in Rudolph Peters (ed.), Proceedings of the Ninth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabisants et Islamisants, Amsterdam 1st to 7th September 1978, Leiden: Brill, 1981, 248-60, here: 252.

[896] Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 80-81, and see editors' fns. For additional examples see, e.g., al-Āmidī, al-Muwāzana 1: 245-50; Schippers, "Genitive Metaphor," 256-60. The line by Abū Tammām which contains qadd runs as follows [meter: ṭawīl]: wa-kam aḥrazat minkum ʿalā qubḥi qaddihā // ṣurūfu l-nawā min murhafin ḥasani l-qaddī "How much the vicissitudes of Separation, with its ugly cut, have kept you [the absent loved ones] apart from the slender-waisted figure [i.e., me]!" (and see line 1, al-Tibrīzī, Sharḥ 2: 109, where it is the poet's persona speaking). For the various understandings of qadd see ibid. 2: 110. If qadd means "skin" (adīm), it refers more preceisely to "the freshly frayed skin of a lamb" (mask al-sakhla); like 'figure', it would then stand metonymically for Separation's image/appearance. But Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not take it as 'figure' since he thinks that the line ends with a mumāthala, a play on words based on a homonym, necessitating that the two qadds in the line have different meanings.

[897] Al-Mathal al-sāʾir 2: 153-58, esp. 154-55.

that *tawassuʿ* (referring to the subtype discussed here) is nothing other than a 'remote'

comparison with no particle of comparison;[898] in doing so he admits some form of 'relation'

between the two sides of the figurative expression. In other words, and since he speaks of *tashbīh*

here, he recognizes that the figurative expression is based on a comparison (or more specifically

analogy), even though this comparison is verbally ill-construed in his eyes (*fa-l-maʿnā ḥasan wa-*

l-taʿbīr ʿanhu qabīḥ).[899]

It is in the second subtype of *tawassuʿ* that we find a true case of an absence of relation

between the two sides of the figurative expression. If the comments on the genitive metaphors

above contained references to *tashbīh* or *buʿd*, with the examples of the second subtype the

comments are consistently in the form, *idh lā mushāraka bayna… wa-…* "since there is no

shared point between X and Y." This subtype, we may recall, is deemed beautiful by Ḍiyāʾ al-

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[898] Ibid. 2: 153-54, *ʿalā annahu [...] idhā [...] kāna bayna l-mushabbahi wa-l-mushabbahi bihi buʿdun [...] wa-lladhī yaridu minhu muḍmara l-adāti lā yakūnu dhālika illā fī l-qismi l-wāḥidi min aqsāmi l-majāziyyi* (sic) *wa-huwa l-tawassuʿu* "Although… if… there is a remoteness between topic and analogue… that which comes without a particle of comparison only occurs in one category of the figurative (usage), and that is *tawassuʿ*." (*Majāzī* also occurs in the edition of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, 1: 417, and in the nineteenth century edition of al-Maṭbaʿa al-Bahiyya, 160.10.) Then Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces the second example we saw above by Abū Nuwās (*mā li-rijli l-māli…*), followed by the comment, "and he made a leg belong to money (*fa-jaʿala li-l-māli rijlan*) and that is a remote comparison (*tashbīh baʿīd*), and there is no need to repeat here what we said there [under the chapter on *tawassuʿ*] in its entirety…" (ibid. ed. al-Ḥūfī and Ṭabāna 2: 154). Already in his response to one of the lines by Abū Tammām back in the section on *tawassuʿ*, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn comments, *fa-iḍāfatu l-qaddi ilā l-nawā mina l-tashbīhi l-baʿīdi l-baʿīd*" (ibid. 2: 80). One should note that some of the examples under *tawassuʿ* and later under 'bad comparisons' are replicated (along with some of the same comments), without acknowledgement, in Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd commentary on *Nahj al-balāgha*; this is the same Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd who wrote the first known response to the *Mathal* (Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahj al-balāgha*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 20 vols., Cairo: Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1959, 1: 215-16). In other words, the category of *tawassuʿ* is rejected by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd in favor of 'traditional' notions. We mentioned above that in the actual refutation of *Mathal*, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd is silent with regards to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's new categorization scheme. As an *uṣūlī*, he pays all of his attention to the legal aspects of *majāz*.

[899] Quote taken from *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 79, in response to the line "The voice of money turned hoarse…" It is interesting to note in this context that the philosopher Ibn Rushd adduces such genitive metaphors (our term) as Abū Tammām's famous "water of blame" (*māʾ al-malām*) and "milk-bowls of death" (*kuthab al-mawt*, both to be discussed in §5.5) within the context of *tashbīh* (also called *muḥākāt* 'mimesis'), and glosses them as *ghayr munāsib* (Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ*, in *Fann al-shiʿr*, 223-24). From within the philosophical poetical tradition it is Ibn Rushd's work that lends itself most to a comparison with literary theory proper, since he suffuses his discussions with examples from poetry of "the Arabs" (and references to notions held "*ʿindanā*"), thus going beyond the Greek literary tradition.

Dīn.[900] And it is this type that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn speaks of when he first introduces the notion of

tawassuʿ (using the term *ittisāʿ*) in his theoretical discussion of *majāz* under the preliminary

chapters of the *Mathal*.[901] In other words, it is this subtype that stands at the core of Ḍiyāʾ al-

Dīn's conception of *tawassuʿ*. (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn may have added the genitive metaphors later,

recognizing the affinity between the two.) Under the preliminary chapter on *majāz* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn

presents the etymology of the word in terms of passing or crossing over (*intiqāl*, *ʿubūr*) from one

place (*makān*, *maḥall*) to another, an etymology commonly found in *majāz* discussions. But he

then compares two types of physical (*ḥaqīqī*) crossing over to figurative crossing over: in the

first type there is a connection (*wuṣla*, or *mushābaha* more specifically) between the place one is

crossing from and one is crossing to, like passing from a smooth terrain to a smooth terrain, or

from a rugged terrain to a rugged one (*sahl/waʿr*). Such is the case in the figurative 'passing

over' *Zaydun asadun* "Zayd is a lion" (the heading *tashbīh* is not used here). Conversely, passing

from a smooth terrain to a rugged one or vice versa is "like their saying in the book *Kalīla wa-

Dimna*: *the lion said* or *the fox said*, for there is no connection (*wuṣla*) whatsoever between [the

notion of] 'saying' (*al-qawl*) and these two [animals]."[902]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's appeal to the animal fables of *Kalīla wa-Dimna* as the archetypal

examples of *ittisāʿ/tawassuʿ* is especially pertinent, since by doing so he admits into the

discourse of literary theory the phenomenon of 'fiction'. As has been shown by Rina Drory, the

apologetics used by the *maqāmāt* writers in their prefaces often involved a request to their

readers "to regard their *maqāmāt* in the same way as they regard fables and stories told by

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[900] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 81-83.

[901] Ibid. 1: 106.

[902] Ibid. 1: 105-106. Note that there is no hint here of another type of *ittisāʿ/tawassuʿ*, namely, the 'bad' genitive metaphors.

animals or inanimate objects."[903] The representative example for such fables was *Kalīla wa-Dimna*.[904] Drory writes,

> *Maqāmāt* authors turned to it in order to gain recognition for their literary innovation precisely because of the fundamental poetic basis of evident fictionality they felt was common to both *Kalīla wa-Dimna* and their compositions.[905]

In other words, *Kalīla wa-Dimna* was code for the 'untrue' or fictional, and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was probably well aware of this. Like the fantastic tale (*khurāfa*), discourse surrounding animal fables (mainly in *adab* anthologies) as well as the *maqāmāt* genre contained references to "truth" and "lie/falsehood." In one account, the *khurāfa* is glossed as *ḥadīthun lā ḥaqīqata lahu* "a story that has no truth" and in another, as *mā yukadhdhibūnahu mina l-aḥādīthi* "stories that people find to be untrue," such that *ḥaqīqa* is contrasted with *kadhib*.[906] In this sense, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *tawassuʿ* aligns well with *kadhib*, the opposite of *ḥaqīqa* (in its non-linguistic sense), making the leap to *majāz* rather seamless.

That Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was familiar with the apologetic discourse used in the *maqāmāt* is evident from his portrayal of *tawassuʿ* as something that merely concerns "speech" (*kalām*, *lugha*, *ʿibāra*). The phrases he uses are *li-ṭalab al-tawassuʿ fī l-kalām* "in order to pursue extension in speech," *tawassuʿ fī l-ʿibāra* "extension in expression," *ittisāʿan maḥḍan* "mere

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[903] Rina Drory, "Three Attempts to Legitimize Fiction in Classical Arabic Literature," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 18 (1994), 146-64, here: 157.

[904] Ibid., with an elaboration in Rina Drory, *Models and Contacts: Arabic Literature and Its Impact on Medieval Jewish Culture*, Leiden: Brill, 2000, 24 fn. 31.

[905] Drory, "Three Attempts," 158.

[906] The first is from al-Nahrawānī's (5th/11th cent.) *al-Jalīs al-ṣāliḥ*; the second is from Ibn Manẓūr's definition in *Lisān al-ʿarab* (ibid., 156). The 'falsehood' in stories of the *maqāmāt* are not unlike what Kilito terms "opaque" anecdotes with respect to al-Jāḥiẓ (Abdelfattah Kilito, *The Author and His Doubles: Essays on Classical Arabic Culture*, translated by Michael Cooperson with a Foreword by Roger Allen, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2001, 57-58).

extension [in speech]," *ṭalab al-tawassuʿ lā ghayr* "to seek 'extension' [in speech], nothing else,"

ṭalaban li-l-ittisāʿ fī asālīb al-kalām "seeking extension in the patterns of speech," and the

important comment, *fa-ammā l-tawassuʿu fa-innahu yudhkaru li-l-taṣarrufi fī l-lughati lā li-*

fāʾidatin ukhrā "as for *tawassuʿ*, it is mentioned to [show] versatility/artifice (*taṣarruf*) in

speech, not for any other purpose."[907] That is the same discourse we find Ibn Nāqiyā (d.

485/1092) using in the preface to his *Maqāmāt*, saying that "placing words of wisdom in the

tongues of animals […] is only a [show of] versatility/artifice in expression ([…] *waḍʿi l-ḥikmati*

ʿalā alsinati l-bahāʾimi […] *wa-innamā huwa taṣarrufun fī l-ʿibāra*)."[908] The use of *taṣarruf* here

alludes to the idea of cunning (*ḥīla*), a term which itself is associated with 'fictive' writings.[909]

(Al-Ḥarīrī and Ibn Sharaf acknowledge the fictive character of their *maqāmāt* but do not use the

terminology of *kalām/lugha/ʿibāra* as the locus of 'manipulation'.[910])

Expressions such as *tawassuʿ fī l-kalām* strongly evoke the old philological idea of

lexical extensions, or some type of change on the level of speech itself. Why the insistence on

kalām/ʿibāra/lugha when in fact what is being manipulated or 'expanded' is not language but

reality? After all, in a sentence like "The lion said," nothing linguistic is being changed but rather

the outside world, to include a speaking lion. One explanation for making this question a

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[907] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 1: 106, 2: 71, 78, 82. Cf. the use of this expression in the context of change in grammatical person (termed by him *tajrīd*) in ibid. 2: 163, 165.

[908] Ibn Nāqiyā, *Maqāmāt* in *Maqāmāt al-Ḥanafī wa-Ibn Nāqiyā wa-ghayrihimā*, [ed. Oskar Rescher], Istanbul: Aḥmad Kāmil, [1914], 123.

[909] For *taṣarruf* as exhibiting *ṣarf* in the sense of *ḥīla* see Lane, *Lexicon*, 1681. On the use of *ḥīla/ḥiyal* in the context of *ʿajāʾib* literature see Travis Zadeh, "The Wiles of Creation: Philosophy, Fiction, and the *ʿAjāʾib* Tradition," *Middle Eastern Literatures* 13.1 (2010), 21-48, here: 32-33, 35 (including al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī's explanation of *ḥīla* for the purpose of *ḥikma*, p. 33 fn. 43).

[910] Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin al-Qaysī al-Sharīshī, *Sharḥ Maqāmāt al-Ḥarīrī*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 5 vols., Sidon; Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 1992 [reprint of the Cairo 1970-1976 edition?], 1: 21, 41, 45-46; Ibn Sharaf al-Qayrawānī (d. 460/1067), *Questions de critique littéraire (Masâʾil al-intiqâd)*, ed. and trans. Charles Pellat, Algiers: Éditions Carbonel, 1953, 4-5.

linguistic one can be found in Ibn Sīnā's (Avicenna, d. 428/1037) commentary on Aristotle's

Poetics, which incidentally – or not – Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn claims he saw passages from.[911] According to

Ibn Sīnā, a work like *Kalīla wa-Dimna* is excluded from the realm of poetry because it deals with

"that which exists only in speech/words" (*fīmā wujūduhu fī l-qawli faqaṭ*) rather than that which

exists, or could exist, in the real world (*fīmā wujida wa-yūjadu*).[912] In this sense, talking about

manipulations taking place only on the linguistic plain is appropriate.

We can be fairly certain that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn was familiar with the philosophical notion of

things "existing" only in the domain of speech (*qawl/kalām/ʿibāra/lugha*) directly from Ibn

Sīnā's *Shifāʾ*, a book that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn singles out by name in his opening discussion of *maʿānī*

'motifs; themes; images'. The passage in which Ibn Sīnā speaks of the non-existent aspect of

fables and parables (among which is *Kalīla wa-Dimna*) is part of a larger argument that Ibn Sīnā

is making, following Aristotle, namely that poetry deals with universals (*al-kullī*), not particulars

(*al-juzʾiyyāt*).[913] Thus, says Ibn Sīnā, poetry "speaks about one person [i.e., a 'particular'] as if

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[911] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 5-6, and see Introduction, fn. 40, on the question of a semi-*voie érudite* here. I do not know if the *maqāmāt* writers were also influenced by the philosophers here or whether it was a common idea to speak of 'fiction' as a reality that subsists in speech alone.

[912] From Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifāʾ*, in *Fann al-shiʿr: maʿa al-tarjama al-ʿarabiyya al-qadīma wa-shurūḥ al-Fārābī wa-Ibn Sīnā wa-Ibn Rushd*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1953, 159-98, here: 183. Quoted in Zadeh, "Wiles of Creation," 43. The contrast here is between animal fables (specifically versified versions thereof), which speak of things that do not exist, and 'real' poetry, which speaks of things that can exist (I say "can" or "could" exist based on the beginning of the passage). Compare Ibn Sīnā's passage to Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451a35-1451b5, where the poet is said to relate not things that have happened, but things that may happen (Aristotle, *Poetics: With the Tractatus Coislinianus, a hypothetical reconstruction of Poetics II, and the fragments of the On Poets*, translated with notes by Richard Janko, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987, 12). For further discussion and translation of Ibn Sīnā's passage see Bürgel, "Die beste Dichtung," 47-48; he translates *qawl* as "the words (in question)" (parentheses his). Because Ibn Sīnā concurs with Aristotle here (see below), the verb *wujida* in *fīmā wujida wa-yūjadu* is essentially synonymous with the modal *yūjdau* 'could exist' as *wujida* does not refer to that which *actually* exists but to that which *technically* (potentially) exists. In this sense someone like Mayya 'exists' as Dhū al-Rumma's beloved – although she did not actually exist – but speaking lions do not (if we take Mayya to be an invented name, see below). For another translation of this passage see Ismail M. Dahiyat, *Avicenna's Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle: A Critical Study with an Annotated Translation of the Text*, Leiden: Brill, 1974, 99-100.

[913] Ibn Sīnā, *Fann al-shiʿr*, 183, and Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Janko, 12; the explanatory heading that Janko adds for this section is "Poetry should represent universals, not particulars."

(an occurrence) happened only to him, and they (the poets) make up a name for (that) one person alone, even though he does not exist,"[914] whereas in fact, that person stands for some type of universal character or phenomenon.[915] In this sense, poems that deal with "particular events that [actually] took place" (*aḥwāl juzʾiyya qad wujidat*) are of a lesser poetry.[916] The fact that poetry deals with universals (*aḥkama bi-l-ḥukm al-kullī* "makes a universal judgment") renders it closer to philosophy than any other type of speech.[917] If we check what prompted Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn to speak about Ibn Sīnā in the first place, we find that it was a controversy about whether it was possible to limit "rhetorical themes" (*al-maʿānī al-khaṭābiyya*) to a set of principles (*uṣūl*), from which poets/orators can benefit. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's claim was that such a reduction, which according to him was first laid out by the Greek philosophers, would only be "general" (*kullī*) and could not possibly cover the endless amount of "particular themes" (*juzʾiyyāt al-maʿānī*).[918] It was this

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[914] *wa-ammā dhālika l-nawʿu mina l-kalāmi* [i.e., *al-shiʿr*] *fa-innamā yaqūlu fī wāḥidin ʿalā annahu ʿāriḍun lahu waḥdahu wa-yakūnu dhālika l-wāḥidu qadi -khturiʿa lahu -smu wāḥidin faqaṭ wa-lā wujūda lahu* (Ibn Sīnā, *Fann al-shiʿr*, 183). Bürgel ("Die beste Dichtung," 48) thinks that this statement refers to the types of speech that are *not* poetry ("Jene andere Gattung der Rede"), but this is a mistake: first, on a syntactic level, *dhālika* means "the former" and the previous sentence speaks of *al-shiʿr*, *al-falsafa*, and *al-kalām al-ākhar*, making poetry 'the former'; second – and this becomes clear only if we consult the *Poetics* – Aristotle makes clear that poetry does not deal with actual events (that would be the domain of history, including history in verse), but with events that *may* take place: "[…] it is the function of a poet to relate not things that have happened but things that may happen"; "A universal is the sort of thing that a certain kind of person may well say or do in accordance with probability or necessity—this is what poetry aims at, although it assigns names [to the people]. A particular is what Alcibiades did or what he suffered" (Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Janko, 12). Bürgel himself recognizes this last point, but because of the mistranslation he thinks that Ibn Sīnā misunderstood Aristotle. Dahiyat also mistranslates this and takes the statement to be a reference to the fables (*Avicenna's Commentary*, 100).

[915] To take an example from Arabic poetry, "Mayya" and "Laylā" would be the invented names and those beloveds would stand for The Beloved. I do not know if Ibn Sīnā has any Arabic poems in mind here or only the Greek ones.

[916] *Fann al-shiʿr*, 183. Ibn Sīnā says that this type of poetry is not told "according to [the manner of] image evocation" (i.e., there is no need for *takhyīl* because all the events and characters are real), from which I extrapolate that it is of a lesser poetry. If he is following Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā probably has in mind here versified history.

[917] That, together with the fact that poetry deals with the *mawjūd*, probably here: the essences of things, regardless of their actual manifestation in particular 'existing things' (because the objects in poetry do not actually exist).

[918] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 3. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn might be talking about the old notion we come across in literary theory that expressions are limited but ideas are limitless. I do not know why he would frame 'ideas' here as *maʿānī khaṭābiyya*, other than to impress certain scholars (cf. fn. 484 and Introduction, pp. 9-10) and to cement the superiorty of his theory over other theories, including the Greek theories.

question (to which he provides arguments and counter-arguments) that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and "a philosopher" were conferring about when the discussion "*got carried away* [emphasis mine] to something that Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā mentioned in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*."[919] Because of the identity in terms, one has reason to suspect that this topic was the question of universals/particulars as the object of poetry. It is then that the philosopher "got up and brought Abū ʿAlī's *Shifāʾ* and showed [Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn] what he had mentioned [...]."[920] Because the "type of Greek poery called 'lagody' (i.e., tragedy)" is cited here, it is clear that the philosopher showed Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn a section from the *Poetics*, not the *Rhetoric*.[921] It is the passage on the *juzʾiyyāt/kullī* in Ibn Sīnā's *Poetics* that contains the notion that *Kalīla wa-Dimna* deals with *fīmā wujūduhu fī l-qawli faqaṭ*.

It is important to stress that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and Ibn Sīnā are not in conversation with one another: their point of departure is different, and the question they are arguing is different. But the fact that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn attends to the quintessential statements within *Kalīla wa-Dimna* ("The lion said") in the context of *majāz* using wording that evokes Ibn Sīnā's dicusssion of *Kalīla wa-Dimna* reinforces our hypothesis that *majāz* deals with that which does not conform to reality. Although the two scholars are not in dialog, there is an interesting corollary to their discussions.

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[919] Ibid. 2: 5. The phrase *fī l-khaṭāba wa-l-shiʿr* could either refer the names of the Aristotelian works (as translated above) or to the topic of rhetoric and poetics ("something he mentioned about rhetoric and poetics," as Heinrichs takes it in *Arabische Dichtung*, 110; cf. Cantarino, *Arabic Poetics in the Golden Age*, 193, who combines the two readings.)

[920] Ibid.

[921] Cf. Larcher, "Rhétoriques "grecque"," 122-24, who takes a more literal approach and looks for specific passages, both in Ibn Sīnā's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, that contain mention of tragedy (so literal that he searches whether 'tragedy' is transliterated in those passages with an interdental *dh* or not). I see no tangible connection between the passages that Larcher looks at and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's discussion; but if we want to take a literal approach – the passage we deal with above on the universal aspect of poetry is immediately followed by a paragraph on tragedy (with an interdental: *ṭrāghūdhiyā*). Jean-Patrick Guillaume may be right to suggest that *lāghūdhiyā* was Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's own play on words with *laghw* 'empy talk, nonsense', which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn later uses to qualify Ibn Sīnā's poetics (Larcher, "Rhétoriques "grecque"," 121 fn. 23). On Larcher's perpetuation of the "marginality thesis" see above, fn. 484.

Ibn Sīnā is arguing that poetry speaks of universals and hence deals with the potentially-existent, not the actually-existent: the details of the poems – persons, places, events – are merely stand-ins for something universal that 'could' be real. Hence, one might expect to find *Kalīla wa-Dimna* to be included within this domain: after all, as Bürgel points out, the characters in these fables stand for universal types, like the king, vizier, etc.[922] But what takes precedence for Ibn Sīnā in evaluating such fables as non-poetic is *not* the aspect of universals (which would render them 'poetic') but the aspect of non-existence. The fact that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn attends to statements within *Kalīla wa-Dimna* in the context of *majāz* might give the impression that for him, it is precisely the aspect of non-existence that would render them poetic.

Regardless of whether one is convinced that Ibn Sīnā had any influence here, the fact remains that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn treats *tawassuʿ* as an operation taking place in language, as if one can speak of existence in the domain of language – in Ibn Sīnā's words, *fīmā wujūduhu fī l-qawl*. Whether it is a question of direct influence or the reaching of similar conclusions independently, this topic brings the philosophical-poetical tradition and the 'native' Arabic literary tradition closer.[923]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn provides five examples for the commendable type of *tawassuʿ*, in addition to the archetypal "The lion said" and "The fox said," mentioned in the preliminary chapter on *majāz*: two are Qurʾānic verses, one is a prophetic saying, and two are poetic verses. They all exhibit clear instances of personification, where a human (*insān*) 'action' is ascribed to an

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[922] "Die beste Dichtung," 48. Bürgel therefore thinks that Ibn Sīnā misunderstood Aristotle because by Aristotle's account, such fables would count as universal and hence 'poetic'. But we should keep in mind that Aristotle did not speak of animal fables in this context, so we do not know how 'poetic' he would evaluate them. (I agree with Bürgel that a versified *Kalīla wa-Dimna* would easily lend itself to be considered poetry, just like, say, a versified *Sesame Street*.)

[923] Other questions in which we find typological affinity between the two traditions are figurative speech (in the sense of untrue or fictive), *tashbīh* in the sense of *muḥākāt* (see "Why is *Tashbīh Majāz*?" below), and wonder (Harb, *Poetic Marvels*). See also §4.1.

inanimate object (*jamād*).[924] The term Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn uses for such ascription or attribution in his comments on the examples is *iḍāfa* or *nisba*: *fa-nisbat al-qawl ilā l-samāʾ wa-l-arḍ min bāb al-tawassuʿ* "attributing 'speech' to the heaven and the earth is a case of *tawassuʿ*"; *fa-iḍāfat al-maḥabba ilā l-jabal min bāb al-tawassuʿ* "ascribing 'love' to a mountain is a case of *tawassuʿ*."[925] It is clear that in this context *iḍāfa* does not refer to the genitive, but rather to the extralinguistic notion of ascription, and it was the same term Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn used to gloss the examples of the genitive metaphors discussed above ("ascribing a leg to money"). I thus choose the term 'fictional ascription' to refer to *tawassuʿ*, but 'personification' would also be appropriate. In both subtypes of *tawassuʿ* it is a human characteristic (body part or action) that is being attributed.[926]

Most of the comments on the examples include the remark, "And there is no relation (*mushāraka*) between X [the notion ascribed] to Y [the inanimate object]."[927] The Qurʾānic examples are Q 41:11 "Then He lifted Himself to heaven when it was smoke, and said to it and to the earth, *Come willingly or unwillingly!* They said, *We come willingly*" and Q 44:29 "Neither heaven nor earth wept for them, nor were they respited." These examples are discussed by Ibn Qutayba in his *Taʾwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān* in the context of *majāz* and *istiʿāra* (which are mostly perceived as lexical items), where he provides his own explanations for the personified heaven and earth (the root *w.s.ʿ* does not occur).[928] Similarly, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces the prophetic

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[924] The most explicit opposition between *insān* and *jamād* is in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 81.

[925] Ibid. 2: 81-82. *Nisba* only occurs once.

[926] Note that in the ascription of *qadd* to *nawā* discussed in ibid. 2: 80 and above, *qadd* (in my understanding) is a *maṣdar* of *qadda* 'to cut', such that it is an *action* that is being ascribed here rather than a body part, making it better aligned with the second type of *tawassuʿ*.

[927] Ibid. 2: 81-82.

[928] *Taʾwīl*, 106, 112, 167-70 (see also editors' fns. 1 and 2 in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 81). In the second Qurʾānic verse,

account according to which the prophet looked at Uḥud one day and said, "This is a mountain that loves us and that we love."[929]

In the second set of examples – two poetic verses – Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn treats the phenomenon of "addressing the [campsite] remains" (*mukhāṭabat al-ṭulūl*) and "asking the rocks" (*musāʾalat al-aḥjār*), saying that this phenomenon comes "according to this [manner]," i.e., that it reflects a case of *tawassuʿ*. Here too the fictional character of the material is evident: when the poet (especially the *muḥdath* one!) claims to arrive at the campsite and to 'speak' to its remains, it is clear that the occurrence is 'untrue'. The first is Abū Tammām's [meter:*ṭawīl*]

> *a-maydāna lahwī man atāḥa laka l-bilā*
> > *fa-aṣbaḥta maydāna l-ṣabā wa-l-janāʾibī*
> "O abode (*maydān*) of my pleasure, who ordained decay upon you?
> > You became the race-course (*maydān*) of east and south winds [galloping around]"[930]

The second is al-Mutanabbī's [meter: *kāmil*]

Ibn Qutayba's solution (*Taʾwīl*, 167-68) is to 'reduce' the sentence to an idiomatic expression in Arabic: when a very important man dies, to express the gravity of the situation "the Arabs say" that the sun turned dark on him, the moon is eclipsed, and the wind, lightning, heaven and earth cry. It is noteworthy that he takes care to point out that this case does not constitute *kadhib* (ibid., 168); it is, rather, a case of a lexical item that can be used to refer to different notions (i.e., "cry" can be said of a person, of skies, wind, earth, etc). The verb used is *mutawāṭiʾūna*, where the subject of *tawāṭuʾ* – whether already a technical term or not (~'univocality', 'equal application') – is things (wind, skies), not words. The rest of the explanations that Ibn Qutayba provides are from former authorities (*wa-qālū…*). Specifically regarding God's speech (as in His speech to heaven and earth; ibid., 106), it is interpreted as an expression of God's creation (*ījād li-l-maʿānī, kawwannāhumā*). Here too the understanding of the figurative component (*qawl*) is 'reduced' to a lexical explanation. Ibn Qutayba's outlook, as opposed to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's, is purely Qurʾānic. For more on Ibn Qutayba's understanding of *majāz* and *istiʿāra*, and his conception of the *majāzāt* as "an integral part of the language as it was used […] by the ancient Arabs" see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 30-31, and Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

[929] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 82.

[930] Ibid. and al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 1: 208 for variations on *bilā*. The east and south winds are a merismus here, or two components (commonly opposites) that stand for everything (cf. Imruʾ al-Qays' vs. 2: *min janūbin wa-shamʾalī*). There is a play on words with the first instance of *maydān*: the poet's persona is clearly addressing the abandoned abode, but by using *maydān* he is also implicitly comparing pleasure (as he later does winds) to horses/camels galloping around the race-course, evoking such idioms as "to ride one's passion" (*rakiba hawāhu*) or al-Nābigha's "the steed of folly is youth" (*fa-inna maṭiyyata l-jahli l-shabābū*).

> *ithlith fa-innā ayyuhā l-ṭalalū*
>   *nabkī wa-turzimu taḥtanā l-ibilū*
>
> "Be a third (to us), O remains! For we (my mount and I)
>   are weeping, while the camels below us utter a cry of yearning"[931]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn responds to the first line by equating the address to "the effaced dwellings and obliterated rocks" to the Qurʾānic *wa-sʾali l-qaryata* "ask the town" (Q 12:82), saying that there is no sense (*wajh*) in addressing anything but "the people" (*ahl*), that is, the people of the dwellings and the people of the town.[932] Here Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is mediating, albeit it in passing, between the exegetical discourse of an elided 'human' addressee and the literary discourse of fictional ascription. He does not linger on this point, probably because he recognizes that the line only makes sense if the poet's persona is addressing the landscape itself, not the people who were dwelling there. In other words, the lines can be understood only if one assumes the fictional character of the scene. Invoking the Qurʾānic reference is sign, rather, of the historical merging of exegetical and literary traditions when it comes to interpreting *majāz*.

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn revisits the question of *tawassuʿ*, along with al-Mutanabbī's example, when he criticizes Ibn Jinnī's interpretation of *majāz* as necessarily entailing *ittisāʿ*.[933] Here Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn glosses *ittisāʿ* as a case in which "an attribute/adjective (*ṣifa min al-ṣifāt*) is applied to an entity/noun (*mawṣūf*) that is not qualified to be applied to it (*laysa ahlan li-an tujrā ʿalayhi*) due to a remoteness between [the entity] and [the attribute]."[934] Although Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is referring to the commendable – and primary – type of *tawassuʿ*, his definition would apply to the genitive

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[931] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 82; Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Wāḥidī, *Dīwān Abī al-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī wa-fī athnāʾ matnihi Sharḥ al-Imām al-ʿAllāma al-Wāḥidī*, ed. Friedrich Dieterici, Berlin: Mittler, 1861, 775.

[932] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 82.

[933] Ibid. 2: 87. On Ibn Jinnī's view of *majāz* as entailing the three components of lexical extension (*ittisāʿ*), comparison (*tashbīh*) and exaggeration (*tawkīd/mubālagha*) see p. 239 above.

[934] Ibid.

metaphor as well (attributing voice to money). He then goes on to say, in what reads like an extraneous insertion, that had there been a relation (*munāsaba*) between the *ṣifa* and *mawṣūf*, it would then have been "a type of analogy/syllogism (*qiyās*) in assessing (lit. taking, *ḥaml*) a thing according to what resembles it (*yunāsibuhu wa-yushākiluhu*), in which case it would be *tashbīh* or *istiʿāra*."[935] Referring to *tashbīh/istiʿāra* in terms of *qiyās* is once again evocative of Ibn Sīnā, who was the clearest among the philosophers to formulate metaphor as the logical conclusion of a syllogistic process, even though Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn earlier ridicules the claim that rhetorical speech (*al-kalām al-khaṭābī*) "is based on two premises and a conclusion."[936] In any event, it is clear that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn singles out *tawassuʿ* as the fictive literary device par excellence, in that – unlike *tashbīh* (/*istiʿāra*) – it does not follow a deductive process and is thus the farthest removed from any real-world logic/knowledge. I am not aware of any later critic who followed up on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's use of *tawassuʿ*.[937]

Istiʿāra and *Kināya*

As we saw above, *istiʿāra* is distinguished from the other subtypes of *majāz* by being the only category in which the locus of 'figurativeness' is the single word. It is what Heinrichs characterized as a *tashbīh*-based single-term metaphor. There is a tension in the text of the

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[935] Ibid.

[936] Ibid. 2: 6. He adds that even when Ibn Sīnā himself composed poetry or rhymed prose he did not have two premises and a conclusion in mind. On Ibn Sīnā's formulation of metaphor as the conclusion of a syllogism see Deborah L. Black, *Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy*, Leiden: Brill, 1990, 209-18 (al-Fārābī was less explicit); Schoeler, "'Poetic Syllogism' Revisited" (and references therein to his earlier "Der poetische Syllogismus: Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis der 'logischen' Poetik der Araber," and other studies). Seemingly, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not equate poetical/rhetorical statements with metaphors, but he does make a connection between the two when he discusses the "literary" difference between *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* (see pp. 240-42 above).

[937] A quote from Geert Jan van Gelder will suffice here (on the biases the modern critic): "A certain bias, it is true, is not easily avoided altogether. One cannot escape a sense of frustration when early critics […] or when a promising start by one critic is not followed up by his successors" (*Beyond the Line*, 208).

Mathal between conceiving this word as a metaphorical substitution for something else, and a literal understanding of the word as the analogue of an omitted topic. Perceiving a substitution here would conform to the 'legal' definition of word transfer; indeed, even within the chapter on *istiʿāra* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn still speaks of a process of *naql*.[938] But this stands in opposition to his assuming of an omitted topic: for if the topic is omitted, then the 'metaphorical' word cannot possibly stand for that missing element, but it rather must be taken literally as the analogue for that topic. The comments that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn supplies for the (many) examples of *istiʿāra* demonstrate this tension. For instance, in commenting on the first example, Q 14:1 "*Alif lām rāʾ*, A book we have sent down to you that you may bring forth mankind from the darknesses to the light," Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn uses the exegetical terminology of a word-metaphor – "Darknesses and light are a metaphor for (*istiʿāra li-*) unbelief and belief or error and right guidance" – but then he reconstructs the underlying intension of the verse which reveals a literal understanding of those words, "It is as if He said, *that you may bring forth mankind from unbelief which is like darkness to belief which is like light.*"[939]

However, as we read on through the examples, over a dozen printed pages, it becomes clear that the words are used as stand-ins for other notions, especially in the poetic examples, which exhibit 'worn-out' metaphors that are sometimes part of larger conceits. Among them are the common 'gazelle' for 'woman', 'daisy' for 'mouth', 'twigs' for 'pretty physiques', and '(shooting) star' for 'lance'.[940] A case in which worn-out metaphors form part of a larger conceit

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[938] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 83. On one hand he speaks of *naql al-maʿnā min lafẓ ilā lafẓ*, and on the other hand, of *ṭayy dhikr al-manqūl ilayhi*. As a general rule, I do not take one's own definitions as evidence for their conception of a notion, especially if the *shawāhid* and the comments on them tell us otherwise. But in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's case of *istiʿāra*, the commentary sometimes displays a tension between a 'literal' and 'figurative' understanding of the word.

[939] Ibid. 2: 96. See more examples on pp. 96-97.

[940] Ibid. 2: 100-102.

is al-Mutanabbī's [meter: *munsariḥ*]

> *kullu jarīḥin turjā salāmatuhū*
>> *illā jarīḥan dahat-hu ʿaynāhā*
> *tabullu khaddayya kullamā -btasamat*
>> *min maṭarin barquhū thanāyāhā*
> "We can hope for the safety of every wounded one,
>> except for the wounded who was struck by her eyes;
> They [her eyes] water my cheeks, whenever she smiles,
>> with a rain whose lightning is her teeth."[941]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn comments that what makes the metaphor (*istiʿāra*) in the second line beautiful "is the mentioning of the 'rain' along with the 'lightning'."[942] In other words, the worn-out metaphor 'rain' for 'tears' (flowing on the lover's cheeks) is then made into a larger conceit by adding a 'flash of lightning' to the image, which is supposedly caused by the flash (!) of her smile.[943] In fact, though this is not mentioned by the critics, not only is the image of lightning added, but also – implicitly – the image of clouds, expressed by "her eyes," the syntactic subject.[944] The single-

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[941] Ibid. 2: 107; al-Wāḥidī, *Sharḥ*, 759-60 (where *illā fuʾādan* appears for *illā jarīḥan*). This is a paradox because normally the eyes that moisten the cheeks belong to the same face; here the poet is playing with the image and having *her* eyes be the source of his wet cheeks (*tabullu* would thus a poetic license for the dual *tabullāni*, unless it is the unnamed woman who pouring the rain, in which case the manipulation of the poetic conceit is less stark; see below). Besides the contemporary Geert Jan van Gelder, critics have not attended to this aspect of the line (elaboration below). Ibn Jinnī treats it from a literal perspective – which leads to a comical result – while the other commentators, and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, are interested more in the mere concurrence of tears and lightning.

[942] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 108.

[943] Ibid.

[944] The eyes are the ones wetting – i.e. pouring rain on – the cheeks. Thus, the beloved is made to be the heaven, being the locus of both clouds and lightning and controlling the rain, whereas the lover is the mere earth, being the locus of the rain and having no control over it. Ibn Jinnī, who recognizes the syntax of the lines correctly, is ridiculed (rightly) by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and by critics before him for taking the beloved to be literally bending over the lover and wetting his cheeks from her saliva (or tears, per Ibn Fūrajja; al-Wāḥidī, *Sharḥ*, 759-60). This ignites on the part of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn the common grievance that the practitioner of "the art of grammar and syntax" is not that of "the art of eloquence" (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 108-109). Ibn Jinnī was an 'easy' target for the 'real' critics: on al-Wāḥidī's more general critique of Ibn Jinnī see Wolfhart Heinrichs, "Obscurity in Classical Arabic Poetry," *Mediaevalia* 19 (1996 [for 1993]), 239-59, here: 244-45. Al-Wāḥidī's explanation, however, is not satisfying either since – strictly speaking from the syntax of the lines – it is not *his* tears that are wetting his cheeks. For Ibn Jinnī, the syntax of the lines overrides the literary conceit and his result is comically literal; al-Wāḥidī, however, ignores the

word image (rain for tears) has become so hackneyed that it is practically 'lexicalized' in the vocabulary, i.e., it acts as a 'poetic' dead metaphor, upon which elaborations of the image can be made.

Other examples are al-Buḥturī's "five clouds" for "fingers," to which are added the "thunderbolt" in the "palm of the hand,"[945] or Abū Tammām's [meter: *khafīf*]

> [two additional lines quoted][946]
> *kuntu arʿā l-nujūma ḥattā idhā mā*
> > *fāraqūnī amsaytu arʿā l-nujūmā*
> "I used to watch the stars (i.e., the beloved) so much that even
> > when they left me, I kept 'watching the stars' (i.e., staying up all night)"[947]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's only comment is that the metaphor occurs in the third line. In the text of the *dīwān*, we find *budūr* 'full moons' for the first occurrence of *nujūm*; al-Tibrīzī provides two other readings: *khudūr* 'woman's chambers' and *khudūd* 'cheeks', but not *nujūm*,[948] suggesting that the first *nujūm* might be an error (despite the nice paronomasia with the second *nujūm*). One suspects that by *istiʿāra* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is referring to the common noun metaphor *budūr* for "pretty faces," but even if *nujūm* is not a slip of the pen and is made to stand for the beloved, it is likely that it is this noun that he views as *istiʿāra* and not the verb *raʿā* 'to herd; graze', which is

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syntax. This is not the first time that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn mocks others for taking a sentence literally rather than figuratively; see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 29).

[945] Ibid. 2: 105.

[946] In the two preceding lines the poet's persona deals with the pain of finding the campsite remains, but cf. al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 3: 222-23, where these lines appear after the line quoted above, not before. In light of the 'atomistic' discourse of Arabic poetry it is noteworthy that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn often quotes the intended *shāhid* within the context of its preceding/following lines and sometimes (as here) provides the opening line of the poem as well.

[947] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 104, and editors' fns. The first *raʿā l-nujūm* literally means "to graze the stars" (see below) and the second *raʿā l-nujūm* "to herd the stars," but I kept the verb 'watch' to convey the identity of the phrase in both hemistichs.

[948] Al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 3: 222.

also a metaphor. This is because first, only a noun metaphor can stand for an object that is 'suppressed' (*maṭwī al-dhikr*[949]), and second, taken in context with the rest of the *shawāhid* and accompanying comments that all point to nouns/nominal phrases, a verb metaphor is unlikely Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's intention here. Once the hackneyed metaphor "X for beloved" is in place, it is further elaborated: first, by a placing it within a verbal phrase (*raʿā l-nujūm/budūr*) which yields the additional metaphor, "grazing the [beloved]" for "kissing the beloved" (if we follow al-Tibrīzī's explanation for "grazing the cheeks"); and second, by mentioning the proverbial expression "herding the stars" for "staying up at night,"[950] which builds on the image of moon(s) (if *budūr*) to include the stars (or, if *nujūm*, adds a paronomasia).[951]

Since the bulk of the examples in our chapter refer to well-known nominal stand-ins for an unexpressed topic, I shall refer to *istiʿāra* in this context as 'poetic dead metaphor', or the very hackneyed nominal metaphor.[952] Some instances even verge on the 'common' dead

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[949] Used earlier in the chapter, e.g. *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 84, 98 (or variations; e.g., p. 97: *ṭuwiya… dhikr al-mustaʿār lahu*; *ṭayy al-mustaʿār lahu*).

[950] Lane, *Lexicon*, 1108 ("waiting for the time when they disappear"). The basis of this expression is not metaphoric but rather metonymic: it is based not on similarity but on the concomitance between night and the appearance of stars. *Raʿā l-nujūm* is an idiomatic phrase of the type we encountered above (*nāma l-thawb* etc.).

[951] The other two variations on *nujūm – khudūd* or *khudūr* – are incompatible with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's theory. In the case of "cheeks," they can either be taken literally ("grazing" them would be a metaphor for kissing them, but the cheeks remain cheeks) or be taken figuratively to be a metonymy for the beloved (grazing the figurative cheeks=kissing the beloved, not necessarily her cheeks). Neither a literal understanding nor a metonymic one fits the other examples in the chapter. In the case of "woman's chambers," if it is literal, "grazing them" would amount to frequent visiting of the beloved's house, and if it is figurative, it would again be by way of metonymy (visiting the beloved, not necessarily her courters). *Nujūm* as a reference to the beloved may be too cryptic, in which case it would be a form of riddle (on which see below). If the line were adduced out of context, one could be made to believe that the *istiʿāra* referred to the verb metaphor *raʿā*, but as aforementioned, this is unlikely here.

[952] As always, we should say that the vast majority of examples reflect poetic dead metaphors, but not all of them, especially if we take into account the exegetical underpinnings of such discussions. Thus, in the example Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn provides in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 96-97, Q 14:46, "mountains" (in the accusative) for "God's decree" is not a hackneyed image. Given his view of *istiʿāra*, it is plain to see why he took to criticizing al-Khafājī's understanding of Imruʾ al-Qays' famous line, "And I said to it (sc. the night) when it stretched out its back and followed up with (its) hind quarters and struggled to get up with (its) breast": no component here reflects a poetic dead metaphor and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn rightly treats it as a case of analogy (with no particle of comparison, *tashbīh muḍmar al-adāt*; for more on his critique see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 23-25).

metaphor, like 'darkness' and 'light' for 'wrong' and 'right' (in the Qurʾānic case we saw above, wrong/right belief).

In other cases, especially the examples drawn from everyday speech of the ancient Arabs, including sayings by the Prophet and early orators, *istiʿāra* is more in line with the idiomatic or proverbial expression, not unlike the second occurrence of *raʿā l-nujūm* above, in the sense of staying up at night. Examples are:

(1) From a prophetic saying, the expression *hādhim al-ladhdhāt* lit. "the eraser of pleasures" for "death."[953]

(2) The old Arab adage (apparently corrupted here), said upon seeing the lunar crescent (*ʿinda ruʾyat al-hilāl*): *lā marḥaban bi-l-lajīni muqarribi ajalin wa-maḥlin* "No welcome to 'stomped-on ground leaves' (a sign of the approaching collector of debt), bringer of due date and draught!"[954] The adage apparently refers to debts that need to be paid back at the beginning of the month (when the lunar crescent appears), thus ending the fixed term of the loan and starting a period of hardship ("draught"). The dictionaries/poetic catalogues have slightly different, and more probable versions: *lā marḥaban bi-muḥilli l-dayni muqarribi l-ajali* "No welcome to a collector of debt, bringer of due date!";[955] and (perhaps the original) *lā marḥaban bi-ḥujayn, muḥilli l-dayn, wa-muqarribi l-ḥayn*, "No

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[953] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 98. Note that this expression is based on contiguity, not similarity (see below).

[954] *Ibid.* The editors vocalize *muqarrib* as *muqarribu ajalin*. The *lajīn* is a type of paste given to camels, which is made out of "tree leaves that were stomped on" (*waraq al-shajar yukhbaṭu*) mixed with some flour or barley (*Lisān al-ʿarab* 5: 4002), but the phrase *khabṭ waraq al-shajar* refers to a man's coming to seek benefit from someone else without any tie of relationship, "because he who does so must beat the ground with his feet" (Lane, *Lexicon*, 698 [s.v. *khabṭ*]). *Lajīn* (if not corrupt) could have been extended from referencing 'an approaching seeker of benefit' to 'an approaching collector of debt'. *Ajal*, usually '(end of) fixed term', refers here to the "time of falling due" (Lane, *Lexicon*, 25).

[955] Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 2: 974; al-Khalīl, *Kitāb al-ʿAyn* 3: 27. *Ajal* could also be a reference to death here, as an exaggeration of the hardship that would follow (like 'draught' in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's version; in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's version, 'death' is less probable, because the following 'draught' would be irrelevant for the dead).

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welcome to a little hook (i.e., the crescent), collector of debt, bringer of death!"[956]

Because the *hilāl* is a sign of a negative event here – paying back debt – it acts as a bad

omen (see below).

(3) From the famous address of the Umayyad governor al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf (d. 95/714), the
expression *nathala kinānatahu wa-ʿajamahā ʿūdan ʿūdan* lit. "he cleaned the dust off his
arrow-quiver and tested [the arrows] rod by rod" for "he displayed his men and examined
them one by one to the utmost diligence."[957]

These expressions are rooted in the Arabic lexicon. In fact, some of them we may characterize as

euphemisms (Ar. *kināya*).[958] This is especially evident with a case like 'death', which constitutes

a common social taboo across societies, inviting a use of a euphemistic expression, i.e., an

acceptable manner of referring to that taboo.[959] The case of the sighting of a new moon as an

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[956] Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad b. Yūsuf al-Tīfāshī, hadhdhabahu Ibn Manẓūr Muḥammad b. Jalāl al-Dīn b. Mukarram, *Surūr al-nafs bi-madārik al-ḥawāss al-khams*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās, Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr, 1980, 78-79. This is the only version that makes any reference to the actual new moon (by mention of *ḥujayn*). 'Death' is an exaggeration for hard times, like 'draught'. Al-Tīfāshī (/Ibn Manẓūr) includes additional sayings by the Arabs that censure the new moon. I thank Geert Jan van Gelder for alerting me to the additional versions of the *lā marḥaban* adage.

[957] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 98.

[958] That euphemisms are listed as entries in the dictionaries has already been noted by Pellat ("Kināya," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*): "It is quite possible in fact, that independent of dialectical variants, the abundance of synonyms is sometimes due to the listing, by the lexicographers, of euphemistic terms whose origin is not indicated." See also *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 67.1-3ᵉ, where an explanation of the *kināya* in a line by Abū Tammām reads like a dictionary entry. For an opposite example of a dead metaphor identified as a *kināya* see ibid. 3: 63 ("water" as a so-called *kināya* for "knowledge"). This is due to the non-technical use of *kanā bi- ʿan* as "referring to Y indirectly by saying X" (and see below).

[959] The relationship between taboo in society and euphemism in the Arabic language in the medieval Arabophone world has been studied in depth by Erez Naaman, "Women Who Cough." Death is the 11ᵗʰ topic listed in al-Thaʿālibī's (d. 429/1039) *Kitāb al-kināya* (ibid., 474-75, and 476 on death as a taboo in other societies). Battle and killing are also loci for euphemistic expressions (ibid.) and see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 100 for a euphemism for 'war'. See also Ch. Pellat, "Kināya." For another example of a euphemistic reference to death see *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 62. Generosity is typically not a target for euphemistic expression due to its high regard in society. In this sense, the *kināya* that ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī is talking about ("having much ashes of the cooking pot") is not a euphemism. Furthermore, in al-Jurjānī's notation, *kināya* is a sentence that logically implies the actual meaning intended. By contrast, in the single-term euphemism the word does not necessarily *imply* the intended meaning: there is nothing in the word "touching" to logically imply "having sexual intercourse" or in "stomped-on leaves bringing near death/ draught" to necessarily imply "new moon." Conversely, "having many ashes under the cooking-pot" necessarily

inauspicious occasion (for paying debt) could also demonstrate euphemistic usage.[960] This leads

us to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's discussion of *kināya*, which he identifies explicitly as a subcategory of

istiʿāra.[961] But before we turn to that chapter, we should point out an important remark that he

makes with regards to *istiʿāra* that highlights the affinity between the two.

According to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, the occurrence of an *istiʿāra* is rare (*qalīl*), both in the Qurʾān

and in 'eloquent discourse', namely, letters, sermons and poems (*faṣīḥ al-kalām min al-rasāʾil*

wa-l-khuṭab wa-l-ashʿār). This paucity Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn attributes to the difficulty (*lā yatayassaru*)

of composing speech in which the topic is not expressed ("concealed"), as opposed to how easy

and common (*kathīr sahl*) it is to produce speech in which both topic and analogue appear

together.[962] Although 'composition' and 'production' are not mentioned explicitly, it is clear that

this observation is made from a writer's point of view: the bar that poetic dead metaphors and

euphemisms set is quite high, and to create a new one *ex nihilo* without leading to a cryptic result

is rather challenging, if not impossible (cf. the cryptic character of *lā marḥaban bi-l-lajīn…*).

From the perspective of creating speech about an unspoken topic, the *istiʿāra* shares an affinity

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implies that a large amount of food is being cooked, larger than what is needed for the person's family, and hence intended for guests (for further discussion of al-Jurjānī's *kināya* see §5.2).

[960] Al-Thaʿālibī and the judge Aḥmad al-Jurjānī (d. 482/1089) devote special chapters to inauspicious expressions (Naaman, "Women Who Cough," 477), where they cite the use of antonyms to refer to the inauspicious entities, like "a place of safety" for a waterless desert, due to its inauspicious character (one can die there while traveling). This is not the case in saying that the *lajīn/muḥill al-dayn/ḥujayn* is not welcome, since the expressions are not "beautified." It is euphemistic, rather, because of the refrain from uttering the explicit word for the inauspicious occasion, namely, the time of the month to pay back debt. See also Pellat, "Kināya," and, for an elaboration on the mechanism of euphemism in Arabic, "Women Who Cough," 486-91.

[961] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 55; Naaman, "Women Who Cough," 472. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's explanation for not addressing *kināya* when he spoke of *majāz* is that he followed the common tradition of treating *kināya* together with *taʿrīḍ*. He then provides (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 56) a poetic line which was wrongly identified, to his mind, as *kināya* rather than *istiʿāra*, and acknowledges that it may be difficult at times to distinguish the two (in this case distinguishing the two is made possible by looking at the line in the context of its three subsequent lines: *al-bayt al-awwal* […] *bi-mufradihi* vs. *al-abyāt fī jumlatihā*). For another example – this time a Qurʾānic one – of an *istiʿāra* supposedly wrongly identified by al-Farrāʾ as a *kināya* see ibid. 3: 63. Most probably this is due to the early non-technical use of "X *kināya ʿan* Y" as a reference to a (dead) metaphor.

[962] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 97.

with the riddle (*uḥjiyya, lughz*): this is a type of speech that indicates the intended topic "not by way of *ḥaqīqa*, not by way of *majāz*, not by way of pragmatic implication (*mafhūm*), but is rather something that must be guessed (*yuḥdasu wa-yuḥzaru*)."[963] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn even states that the riddle may "sometimes resemble a *kināya*."[964] Seen from this regard, the poetic dead metaphor (or euphemism) is a riddle that does not demand from the listener any pondering over its meaning.[965] A conclusion we may draw, then, regarding an important difference between the subcategories of *majāz* is that the composer of speech does not really participate in the creation of an *istiʿāra/kināya*,[966] whereas in the case of other figurative expressions identified as *majāz* (*tashbīh* and *tawassuʿ*), he does.

The treatment of *kināya* by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn has received some attention in recent

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[963] Ibid. 3: 85-86, under the chapter titled *aḥājī*, the 21st literary device concerned with sense. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn relates the *aḥājī* also to *mughālaṭāt maʿnawiyya* 'deceptions', a literary device based on double-entendre (3: 76 ff., 84). The *mafhūm* refers to what the utterance suggests but does not state explicitly – a term he uses with reference to *taʿrīḍ*, for him: 'implicature'. The archetypal example is "By God, I am in need, and I have nothing in my hand," of which the pragmatic import is a request for a handout (*taʿrīḍ bi-l-ṭalab*; 3: 56-57). The examples for *taʿrīḍ* are mostly Qurʾānic (3: 72-75), and as Abū Mūsā shows, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's understanding of the notion is inspired by al-Zamakhsharī (*al-Balāgha al-Qurʾāniyya fī tafsīr al-Zamakhsharī*, 575-78).

[964] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 84.

[965] A clear example of the riddle-like quality that an *istiʿāra* may possess comes from the single illustration of *istiʿāra* that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn provides from his own letters (ibid. 2: 98-99). The letter, written upon the request of a friend, is a "description" (*an aṣifa lahu*) of two Turkish slaves with whom the friend was infatuated, one wearing a red *qabāʾ* (long tunic) and the other a black one. The result resembles a very obvious riddle: two "moons on branches," the clothes of one of whom "comes from the redness of his cheeks" and the other "from the blackness of his (dyed) eyelid." Likewise, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adduces a poetic line containing a description that could apply both to a horse and to the male organ (the latter of which would invite a euphemistic expression), and states that it was 'wrongly' identified as a riddle rather than a *kināya* (ibid. 3: 84-85, 68-69). This too demonstrates the riddle-like quality that a *kināya* may possess. In another example (3: 75), from "the language of the Persians," Khosrow says to an emir whose wife he (the king) was having an affair with, "I heard that you have a spring of sweet water but do not drink from it. What is the reason for that?" to which the emir replied, "I heard that the lion comes down to [drink from] it so I was afraid of it." Once again, the cause for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's identification of such an example as *kināya* rather than *uḥjiyya* stems from the taboo subject of fornication.

[966] Where the poet/letter writer/preacher does show his creativity with *istiʿāra* is when he embeds it with other literary devices into a larger conceit, as we saw with the "lightning" added to the "rain," and the (more literal) use of "watching the stars" as "watching the beloved," where "stars" (originally "moons") stand for the beloved (not to mention, of course, the literary devices concerned with sound, another important locus for creativity.)

scholarship by Charles Pellat and Erez Naaman in their respective studies of the notion.[967] Both

have shown that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn conceives of *kināya* as an expression that can be interpreted both

in its literal and in its figurative sense, or in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's words, that both *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*

"contend" (*tajādhaba*) for the expression.[968] The topic is presented under the chapter titled *al-*

kināya wa-l-taʿrīḍ, the nineteenth literary device concerned with sense.[969] It contains a long

discourse on definitions and refutations of false arguments, and in it Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn engages in a

discussion with the legal theorists (*ʿulamāʾ uṣūl al-fiqh*, *aʾimmat al-fiqh*; al-Shāfiʿī and al-

Ghazālī are singled out by name).[970] The majority of the examples in this rather lengthy chapter

of 26 pages (4 of which on *taʿrīḍ*) are from the Qurʾān, *ḥadīth*, and early anecdotal reports, once

again signaling the 'non-poetic' character of the notion.[971] When illustrations from poetry are

adduced, they either display 'dead' usage or riddle-speech concerning a taboo (which invites

euphemistic expression).[972]

    Kināya is the only category within Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's system of *majāz* (excluding the legal

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[967] Pellat, "Kināya;" Naaman, "Women Who Cough." See also Mehren, *Rhetorik*, 41-42, 92.

[968] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 51, 53, 63. Pellat says, more exactly, that the expression could be interpreted *either* literally *or* figuratively.

[969] Ibid. 3: 49-75.

[970] Ibid. 3: 51, 63.

[971] Ibid. 3: 49-66 (strictly speaking, the "examples" section begins on p. 62, but the account preceding it is replete with examples from the Revelation).

[972] Ibid. 3: 66-70. It is only because the poetic riddle-speech concerns a taboo topic that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn excludes it from the more 'neutral' category of riddle (*uḥjiyya* or *mughālaṭa maʿnawiyya*). A famous anecdote (3: 68-69, 84-85) concerns an early well-known *ʿinnīn* 'impotent' "who did not have sex with women," who composes an epigram on what can be taken as a description of a horse but is really a description of his organ. Sometimes the examples are not entirely euphemistic: in a four-line example by Abū Nuwās (3: 69-70), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn deems beautiful the expression *aṭrāf al-rimāḥ* "the edges of the lances" for "the intended organ," but he pays no regard to the following line in which the explicit *ayr* is mentioned. The poetic illustrations are followed by illustrations of "ugly" euphemisms (3: 70-72), which, as Naaman points out, may refer to dysphemisms – offensive, rather than euphemistic, expressions ("shit" instead of "poop"), or to orthophemisms – expressions that are too explicit ("feces"), following the "X-phemistic set" of Allan and Burridge ("Women Who Cough," 478-85).

discourse) in which we come across figurative speech based on contiguity (a term not used).[973]

The archetypal 'touching' (*lams*) for 'copulating' (*jimāʿ*) is the clearest example, where we see a case of *pars pro toto*. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn recognizes that some cases of *kināya* are based on similarity (*shabahiyya*) while others are not. Although his efforts do not yield convincing results, he grapples with these differences head-on. According to him, when *kināya* comes in the form of words in combination, the similarity and correlation (or analogy, *munāsaba*) are stronger when compared with *kināya* in the single word. An example for the first is "so and so has clean clothing" (*fulān naqī al-thawb*, words in combination), where Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn reconstructs "clothing clean of filth are like a reputation unblemished with moral vice." Conversely, he contends that if we say "touching is like copulating" (a single word *kināya*), "the similarity is not as strong" (*lam takun bi-tilka l-daraja fī quwwat al-mushābaha*).[974] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn senses that the latter is not like the former – *we* would say that there is no similarity at all but rather contiguity ("touching is like copulating" is not quite an acceptable sentence)[975] – but he nevertheless remains committed to the notion of an analogy or likeness (*tamthīl*) underlying *kināya*.[976] We may also point out that most of the single-word euphemisms he adduces are in fact based on similarity rather than contiguity, like 'ewes' (sg. *naʿja*) for 'women'.[977] The latter are technically

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[973] But see above *hādhim al-ladhdhāt* for "death" – which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn discussed under *istiʿāra*.

[974] Ibid. 3: 59.

[975] "Category membership is incompatible with assertions of similarity," such that if "Copper is a metal" is acceptable, then "Copper is *like* a metal" is not acceptable (Boaz Keysar, "On the Functional Equivalence of Literal and Metaphorical Interpretations in Discourse," *Journal of Memory and Language* 28 [1989], 375-85, here: 380-81, emphasis his). Granted, in our example the relationship between "touching" and "copulating" is not quite class membership (hyponymy) – perhaps (?) it is a part-whole relationship (meronymy) – nevertheless, taken at face-value, the statement is not quite right (although one could imagine a context in which it is said, for instance by a hypersensitive amorous person).

[976] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 59.

[977] Ibid. According to him, the common attribute (*waṣf jāmiʿ*) between *naʿja* and woman is their respective femininity (hence, he says, *naʿja* was chosen rather than the masculine *kabsh*; 3: 53).

better suited for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's conception of *istiʿāra* (cf. 'gazelle' for 'woman', above), but once again, because the examples involve a taboo (women, genitalia, etc.), he opts for *kināya*.[978]

The historic nature of *kināya* as a cover term for a variety of "indirect wording" is directly linked to the non-technical expression "X *kināya ʿan* Y," that is, "avoiding mentioning Y explicitly by saying X."[979] Thus, literary expressions that are allusive but not euphemistic also figure into Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's chapter. He tends to the historic[980] category of *irdāf* '[implying what] logically follows [from the expression]', such as *fulān ʿaẓīm al-ramād* "so and so has a great (amount) of ashes" for feeding others with much food, a sign of generosity.[981] Diyāʾ al-Dīn recognizes that this type of speech subsists in words in combination (*lafẓ murakkab*), rather than a single word. Moreover, he recognizes that the allusive expression is a logical consequence (*lāzim*, also *dalīl* 'proof') of the thing alluded to (specifically an attribute, *ṣifa*) and that this differentiates the category of *irdāf* from other types of *kināyāt* (*bi-khilāf ghayrihā min al-kināyāt*).[982] Indeed, we would say that the examples reflect periphrasis (or circumlocution), not euphemism.[983] He stops short, however, of excluding *irdāf* entirely from the category of *kināya*, even though it does not fit the notion's definition: every word in "having many ashes," and the

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[978] Compare this with his scorning of those who interpret "clothes" as "heart" (*qalb*) by way of *kināya* in Q 74:4 "and your clothes, purify" (*wa-thiyābaka fa-ṭahhir*), on the pretense that there is no "common attribute" (*waṣf jāmiʿ*) between them. Here – it seems - Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn prefers to treat the expression disjunctively (clothes are a *metaphor* for heart) rather than conjunctively (clothes are a *metonym* for the person wearing them), but we must acknowledge that the main reason for rejecting *kināya* here is the lack of a taboo (I follow Naaman's appropriation of the terms 'disjunctive' and 'conjunctive' in "Women Who Cough").

[979] See also Joseph Dichy, "Kināya," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics*, Brill Online.

[980] See Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, *Naqd al-shiʿr*, 88-90 (the root *k.n.y* does not occur). Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ continues this tradition, as he treats periphrastic utterances under the heading *al-irdāf wa-l-tatbīʿ* (*Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 207 ff.) and euphemism under *al-kināya* (ibid., 143 ff.; also *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 83 and 53, respectively).

[981] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 58, 60-61.

[982] Ibid. 3: 60.

[983] This is not to say that a euphemism cannot come in the form of a periphrasis; for some examples (not in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work) see Naaman, "Women Who Cough," 491.

proposition as a whole, must be taken literally, and there is no room for *majāz* in its interpretation.[984] Furthermore, in many of the *shawāhid* that reflect riddle-speech – where the topic of discussion could be understood either literally or as a euphemism for a taboo – *majāz* too, in the sense of a word shift, does not take place.[985] In other words, although it is within the discussion of *kināya* that we see an explicit conformity to the original definition of *majāz*, there remain many linguistic phenomena subsumed under *kināya* that defy this rule.

A final note must be made on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's very definition of *kināya* as an expression (specifically word, *lafẓa*) that can be taken both literally and figuratively.[986] Besides the Qurʾānic verse that he adduces throughout the chapter, Q 4:43 "[draw not near to prayer when…] Or [when] you have touched women"[987] – where *lāmasa* could be interpreted (*ḥaml*) both as 'touching' and as 'copulating' since both actions would require ablution prior to prayer – Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's definition is simply untenable. For it is the only the *majāz* sense – i.e., the euphemistic one – that is intended in *kināya*, not the literal one (e.g., 'ewe' for 'women' in Q 38:23 "Behold, this my brother has ninety-nine ewes, and I have one ewe").[988] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, in fact, recognizes this. A closer look at his comments on *shawāhid* reveals that what he has in mind, rather, is that both the literal and figurative readings in *kināya* lead to semantically permissible utterances (*yaṣiḥḥu*, *yajūzu* and conjugations), even though it is only the figurative sense that is intended

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[984] This type of *kināya*, which is what ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī has in mind when he speaks of *kināya*, will be discussed in more detail in §5.2. Because al-Jurjānī's *kināya* is typologically different from euphemism, treating it here, and examining its ramifications on the understanding of *majāz*, would be misleading in the context above.

[985] Ibid. 3: 62 ff. The examples that do not reflect euphemistic usage, like "having much ashes" for "generosity," should be read in light of earlier works dealing with *irdāf* (or *kināya* in the sense of *irdāf*).

[986] Ibid. 3: 51-52 (52.2 for *lafẓa*).

[987] Ibid. 3: 51, 53-54.

[988] The verse is quoted in ibid. 3: 53, 59, without explicitly saying that only the *majāz* sense is intended. Even in the archetypal *lams* for *jimāʿ* (without a context), it is really the *majāz* meaning that is intended.

(*arāda*, *murād*, *yushīru*).[989] He states at the outset that what sets *kināya* apart from all other categories of *majāz*, is that in all other categories, taking the utterance at face value (ʿalā jānib al-ḥaqīqa) would result in an impossible meaning (*la-staḥāla l-maʿnā*).[990] As proof, he adduces the archetypal *tashbīh* utterance, "Zayd is a lion" (particle of comparison omitted): semantically only a *majāz* reading is possible, he says, "because Zayd is not (that) four-legged hairy animal with a tail and fangs and claws."[991] I use the word "semantically" in this context since Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is basing his assessment of the utterance on one's knowledge of the world. Indeed, another way to characterize the "semantic impermissibility" (*istaḥāla l-maʿnā*) of such utterances would be to describe them as false (*kadhib*), but as we saw above, the discourse of *kadhib* was too far removed to be discussed within the context of *majāz*.

This is the closest Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn gets to stating explicitly that all the categories of *majāz* (*aqsām al-majāz*), besides *kināya*, exhibit utterances that are untrue if taken at face value. We shall now turn to the category of *tashbīh* to see to what extent the utterances subsumed therein are untrue.[992]

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[989] For *yaṣiḥḥu* see ibid. 3: 51.15, 63.3ᵉ, for *jāza* – 63.3ᵉ, 64.1ᵉ-65.4, *yajūzu* – 51.4-5ᵉ, *jāʾiz* – 68.6 (opp. *yushīru*, 68.5). For *arāda* and *murād* see 3: 65.3ᵉ-66.3.

[990] Ibid. 3: 51. The opposition between *istaḥāla* and *jāza* in a grammatical (primarily syntactic) sense appears already in Sībawayh (see Noy, "*Muḥāl*," 31, 37). Here Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is using the dyad in a semantic sense.

[991] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 3: 51-52. Another case exemplifying this is his commentary on Q 14:46 "[…] so that the mountains will be removed" (ibid. 3: 63, and 2: 96-97, where he explains that *istiʿāra* occurs only when *jibāl* is in the accusative, not nominative).

[992] As we noted above (fn. 952), we must stress that things are not always clear-cut. When discussing a sub-type of *taṣrīʿ* (maintaining a rhyme in both hemistichs) called *taṣrīʿ mukarrar*, in which the last word of the two hemistichs is identical (ibid. 1: 341), Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn speaks of *majāz* as if it resides in the single word (*al-lafẓa al-majāziyya*), even though he is referring to a 'live' poetic metaphor. The line is Abū Tammām's (meter: *ṭawīl*) *fatan kāna sharban li-l-ʿufāti wa-martaʿā // fa-aṣbaḥa li-l-hindiyyati l-bīḍi martaʿā* (I follow the orthography in al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 4: 100) "A man in the prime of his life, he was a watering place and a pasture for seekers of subsistence, and for Indian swords – a pasture." The line is adduced as a superior type of *taṣrīʿ mukarrar*, due to the fact that the repeated word is figurative, "where the meaning can differ" (*lafẓa majāziyya yakhtalifu l-maʿnā fīhā*). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn might be taking the second instance of *martaʿ* in a more literal sense than the first (even though it, too, is part of a figurative sentence): the first instance of *martaʿ* would be akin to a hackneyed metaphor (for: he provides food and

Why is Tashbīh Majāz?

In this dissertation I usually translate *tashbīh* as 'comparison', and sometimes more specifically as 'simile'. 'Comparison' is a rather loose translation: it does not convey the idea inherent in the verbal noun of form II *shabbaha*, that a comparison is being *made* or *stated*. For our purposes in the present section I would like to translate *tashbīh* in a more accurate manner, but a phrase such as "stating a similitude" is not satisfactory either, since the term *tashbīh* within the works of Arabic literary theory refers ultimately to a literary-linguistic *phenomenon*, not to an act of the poet/letter writer/preacher. 'Simile' does refer to the phenomenon itself, but it excludes other cases that the category of *tashbīh* traditionally covers, namely metaphors and analogies.[993] For the purpose of evaluating why *tashbīh* is considered *majāz*, I propose "similarity statement."[994] Kamal Abu Deeb speaks of *tashbīh* in similar terms when he refers to it as "a process of establishing similarity between objects."[995] In our context of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's work, we would say that the similarity is established between objects (single-term simile) and between situations (sentence-long analogies) alike. In modern research similarity statements, or judgments of similarity, have commonly been considered within the purview of philosophy or cognitive psychology, and they have entered the study of metaphor by the hand of the philosophers of

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shelter for those seeking it), and in the second instance the poet would be referring to the (deceased) patron as a battle hero literally collecting all the swords of his enemy (in battle). I am not sure what he has in mind here, but in any case Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn reverts to *majāz* on the level of the lexeme for clear reasons: the context of a repeated *lafẓa* in *taṣrīʿ*. Incidentally, the vocalization that the editors of the *Mathal* provide – *murtaʿā* and *martaʿā* – might be reflective of Abū Tammām's original intention, but for Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn this was a case of *taṣrīʿ mukarrar*.

[993] By "traditionally" I am referring to works of the high ʿAbbāsid era or later works that have not been influenced by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī. By "metaphors" I am referring to sentences of the type "Zayd is a lion," which Western thought considers a metaphor but in the Arabic tradition is recognized as a *tashbīh muḍmar al-adāt*.

[994] I am limiting my use of "similarity statement" to this section because, as will become presently apparent, "similarity statement" too is not an appropriate rendering for the literary device of *tashbīh*.

[995] Abu Deeb, *Al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 67, and *passim* with reference to "similarity."

language rather than the cognitive linguists.[996] Speaking of *tashbīh* in terms of a similarity statement will help us determine why *tashbīh* is considered *majāz*, especially in the case of a full-fledged simile (containing the word of similitude).

Al-Jurjānī famously rejects the inclusion of *tashbīh* in the sense of 'simile' within *majāz*, or figurative speech, on the grounds that every word therein is used according to its literal sense.[997] Viewing simile as literal speech was an innovation, and at least one scholar (Ibn al-Naqīb) ascribes this opinion to "the later scholars" (*mutaʾakhkhirī hādhihi l-ṣināʿa*).[998] An explicit inclusion of *tashbīh* within *majāz* can be seen in Ibn Rashīq's *ʿUmda*.[999] But even before the term *majāz* infiltrated works of Arabic literary theory, there was recognition of two types of similarity statements (*tashbīh*). This differentiation between similarity statements stands at the basis of Ibn Rashīq's identification of *tashbīh* as *majāz*. Al-Rummānī's (d. 384/994) epistle on the inimitability of the Qurʾān may reflect the 'pre-*majāz* stage' in Arabic literary theory.[1000]

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[996] The term itself originates in geometry. Representative examples are Amos Tversky, "Features of Similarity," *Psychological Review* 84.4 (1977), 327-52; Andrew Ortony, "Beyond Literal Similarity," *Psychological Review* 86.3 (1979), 161-80; Fogelin, *Figuratively Speaking*. (For a criticism of this approach see, e.g., Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar, "Understanding Metaphorical Comparisons: Beyond Similarity," *Psychological Review* 97.1 [1990], 3-18.) The representative work on metaphor from the perspective of cognitive linguistics is Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, whose treatment of conceptual metaphors is usually devoid of discussions on similarity (in fact, they think it is incorrect). Thomas Bauer thinks that modern treatments of metaphor would have been more adequate had they incorporated a theory of comparison (he does not say similarity) within them ("Arabische Kultur," *Rhetorik*, 296). The modern accounts on metaphor that he has in mind are clearly the more conventional philosophical ones.

[997] *Asrār*, 222, and see §5.4 for elaboration. In the modern era scholars have normally thought of simile in terms of literal speech, thus any inclusion of *tashbīh* within *majāz* was considered 'incorrect' (Heinrichs uses "unexpected" with regards to Ibn Rashīq; *Hand of the Northwind*, 49).

[998] See §5.4.

[999] *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 266, 268, 286, 2: 294; see also Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 57. Before that Ibn Fāris also explicitly includes *tashbīh* within *majāz*, in a brief passage about the nature of *majāz* (*al-Ṣāḥibī*, 197-98): note that the second example of *tashbīh* exhibits the particle of comparison *ka-*, meaning that by *tashbīh* Ibn Fāris is not only thinking of 'metaphors' containing both topic and analogue and no particle of comparison, but also straightforward similes.

[1000] Although he does not use the term *majāz*, the *idea* of a word transfer does come across in al-Rummānī's work, when he discusses *istiʿāra* (*al-Nukat*, 79). On works of *iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* being part and parcel of the early *naqd* works see Part One, §1.2.

According to him there are two types of similarity statements (*al-tashbīh ʿalā wajhayn*), "a similarity statement belonging to eloquence" or eloquent comparison (*tashbīh balāgha*) and "a similarity statement belonging to reality" or real comparison (*tashbīh ḥaqīqa*). The first is exemplified by comparing (*tashbīh*) the actions of the unbelievers to a mirage (*sarāb*) in the desert (Q 24:39). The second, he says, "is like [saying], *This dinar is like this dinar so take whichever you like*."[1001] In other words, similarity statements in the realm of reality – or 'real' similarity statements – are perceived as denoting an identity between two objects: the two dinars are identical. This is supported by the dictionary meaning of *shibh* (and conjugations) which is explained in terms of *mithl* (and conjugations), the latter denoting more of an identity than the former since it is defined as a "word of equality (lit. making equal)" (*kalimat taswiya*).[1002]

In the account by Ibn Rashīq (d. 456/1065) a century later, we see that a differentiation between two types of similarity statements is maintained, but here the term *majāz* takes the place of al-Rummānī's *tashbīh balāgha*. This is facilitated, of course, by the dual sense of *ḥaqīqa* as either ontological reality or literal speech. According to Ibn Rashīq, the difference between *tashbīh* and *waṣf* 'description' – the latter of which is said to encompass poetry almost entirely – is that in *waṣf* one gives information about the essence of a thing (*ikhbār ʿan ḥaqīqat al-shayʾ*),

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[1001] *Al-Nukat*, 75.

[1002] Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 6: 4132 (s.v. *m.th.l*). Ibn Barrī is then quotes as stating that the difference between *mumāthala* 'resemblance/correspondence' and *musāwāt* 'equality' is that *musāwāt* can be established between two objects of the same genus or two objects of different genera, whereas *mumāthala* is only between two objects of the same genus. From this perspective we gather that *mumāthala* denotes more of an identity than *musāwāt*! *Mithl* and *shibh* are treated as synonyms, but *shibh* is explained by terms of *mithl* (ibid.), not the other way around (ibid. 4: 2189 [s.v. *sh.b.h*]). From the examples it is apparent that among the lexemes (or morphemes) denoting *mumāthala* is *ka-*: "the color of X is like the color of Y" (*lawnuhu ka-lawnihi*), "X tastes like Y" (*ṭaʿmuhu ka-ṭaʿmihi*), and that if one says "X is completely like Y" (*huwa mithluhu ʿalā l-iṭlāq*), it means "X takes the place of Y" (*annahu yasuddu masadduhu*; ibid. 6: 4132). In sum, it is not a stretch to use the term 'identity' in our context above. Cf. the claim by the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Ṭumlūṣ (d. 620/1223), according to which "[w]ith the help of a syllogism […] a poet induces the belief that two *similar* things are one and the same, i.e., identical" (Schoeler, "'Poetic Syllogism' Revisited," 9; emphasis his). According to Schoeler, this is not unlike al-Fārābī's own conclusion.

but *tashbīh* "is *majāz* and *tamthīl*."[1003] What *majāz* denotes here is not quite figurative speech; *ḥaqīqa* too refers to ontological reality in this context (as it did for al-Rummānī above). The hendiadys *majāz wa-tamthīl* probably refers to a figurative representation of a thing (compare *muḥākāt*), rather than the thing itself.[1004] The idea of *tashbīh* as a representation of "an image that is imitated" (*ṣūra tuḥkā*) is present in the *Mathal* itself.[1005] Within Ibn Rashīq's chapter on *tashbīh*, he defines the notion as "a description of a thing by means of that which approximates it (or: is nearly equal to it, *qārabahu*) and resembles it (*shākalahu*) in one aspect or many, not in all of its aspects, because if it agreed with it entirely, it would be it (i.e., the two would be identical)."[1006] From this definition it would seem that the similarity described in the similarity statement is a "real" one, if only partial (i.e., the two things compared are, in actuality, similar). But earlier Ibn Rashīq explains the inclusion of *tashbīh* within *majāz* on the grounds that "in most cases the two things resembling one another only resemble one another approximately by 'indulgence' and convention, not in reality" (*fa-li-anna l-mutashābihayni fī akthari l-ashyāʾi*

[1003] Ibn Rashīq, *al-ʿUmda* 2: 294; Heinrichs, *Arabische Dichtung*, 57.

[1004] On this aspect of *muḥākāt* see Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 21. It is noteworthy that mimesis was translated from the Syriac in the early work of Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940) as the hendiadys *al-ḥikāya wa-l-tashbīh* or *al-tashbīh wa-l-ḥikāya/al-tashbīh wa-l-muḥākāt*, and also *al-tashabbuh wa-l-muḥākāt*, with the corresponding verbs *yushabbih wa-yuḥākī* (and conjugations). See Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus, *Kitāb Arisṭūṭālis fī l-shuʿarā* [sic], in David Samuel Margoliouth, *Analecta Orientalia ad poeticam Aristoteleam*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2000 [reprint of the 1887 edition], 1-76, here: 1-8. In Badawī's edition the phrase *tashabbuh wa-muḥākāt* at the opening of the work appears as *al-tashbīh wa-l-muḥākāt* (*Kitāb Arisṭūṭālis fī l-shuʿarāʾ* [sic] in *Fann al-shiʿr: maʿa al-tarjama al-ʿarabiyya al-qadīma wa-shurūḥ al-Fārābī wa-Ibn Sīnā wa-Ibn Rushd*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa al-Miṣriyya, 1953, 83-145, here: 86). The phrase *al-tashbīh wa-l-muḥākāt* appears again in Ibn Rushd's (d. 595/1198) commentary on the *Poetics*, along with *al-muḥākūna wa-l-mushabbihūna* (Ibn Rushd, *Talkhīṣ*, in *Fann al-shiʿr*, 204, 206, 222).

[1005] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 141. This is connected to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's differentiation between two mechanisms of creating new motifs, the first based on imitation and the second on creation *ex nihilo* (see §4.1). In the context above Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not use the term "representation"; he speaks, rather, of comparisons eminating from (*ṣadara ʿan*) different processes, either an image that is seen and hence imitated or an image that is not seen but is invented in the mind. According to him, if the comparison is not based on an actual visual image, the resulting *tashbīh* is more affected (or artful, *aṣnaʿ*). Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, who inspired Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's account here (*al-Ṣināʿatayn*, 75) does not use any terms derived from the root *ḥ.k.y.*

[1006] *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 286.

innamā yatashābahāni bi-l-muqārabati ʿalā l-musāmaḥati wa-l-iṣṭilāḥi lā ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa).[1007] In

other words, we 'grant' that one object is similar to another object, and this is supported by

common usage, but the two are not *really* alike. One is reminded here of John Searle's example,

"Richard is a gorilla," in the sense that "Richard is fierce, nasty, prone to violence, and so forth":

in reality, research has shown, gorillas are not fierce and nasty at all, but are rather "shy,

sensitive creatures, given to bouts of sentimentality."[1008] In this case the similarity statement

"Richard is *like* a gorilla" (my example) would be literally false but figuratively true, for what

we mean by that statement "according to *iṣṭilāḥ*" is that Richard is fierce, nasty, etc.[1009] From Ibn

Rashīq's account we might conclude that the similarity statement that does not (necessarily)

reflect 'real' similarity is what the literary theorists call *tashbīh*, and because it is not 'real', it is

identified as *majāz*.[1010]

[1007] Ibid. 1: 268.

[1008] Searle, "Metaphor," 118-19.

[1009] Searle uses this example to show that metaphorical assertions are not necessarily assertions of similarity (ibid.). While the aim of his work is not to claim that all assertions of similarity in the realm of simile are metaphorical (or figurative), as Ortony and Fogelin are (see below), he does recognize that "[p]erhaps this is one way we might distinguish between figurative similes and literal statements of similarity. Figurative similes need not necessarily commit the speaker to a literal statement of similarity" (ibid., 120), and that "there seem to be a great many metaphorical utterances where there is no relevant *literal* corresponding similarity between *S* and *P*. If we insist that there are always such similes, it looks as if we would have to interpret them *metaphorically* […]" (ibid., 123, also 124; both emphases added). See also Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 213 ff., on a critique of the 'objectivist' account of similarity.

[1010] Compare this to the "literalist" approach, according to which there are *tashbīhāt* that are true (*mā kāna min al-tashbīh ṣādiqan*), presumably a reference to similarity claims that express 'real' similarity, and *tashbīhāt* that are untrue (*al-tashbīhāt al-kādhiba*), referring to similarity claims that do not express similarity that exists in the real world. This approach comes across in many of the literary theoretical works, *in addition to and regardless of* statements such as those we are speaking of above (usually in the form of 'remote' comparisons, not false ones). For one literalist approach (wherefrom the quotes are taken) see Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, *ʿIyār al-shiʿr*, 23 and 4, respectively. On the latter's traditionalism in championing 'truthfulness' in poetry see Ajami, *Alchemy*, 31-35. A category such as *ḥusn al-tashbīh* also suggests that some similarity claims are perceived as better than others, perhaps in their truthfulness (e.g., Ibn al-Muʿtazz, *al-Badīʿ*, 68). Al-Jurjānī takes a literalist view when he says that metaphor (*istiʿāra*) is meant to establish/affirm "a similarity that is there (i.e., exists)" (*ithbāt shabah hunāka*); see *Asrār*, 252 (the passage and context are discussed in Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 163; also *Asrār*, 154-55 and *Poetic Marvels*, 166). Not surprisingly, a literalist approach is also present in the philosophical tradition (cf. the statements by Davidson and Goodman, also philosophers, that everything/anything is like/in some way like everthing/anything else, fn. 872, also expressed by Searle, "Metaphor," 123: "Similarity is a vacuous predicate: any two things are similar in some

Another differentiation between two types of similarity statements is made by the early philologist al-Aṣmaʿī (d. *ca.* 208/823) and is preserved in the *ʿUmda*.[1011] The first type of similarity statement (*tashbīh*) according to al-Aṣmaʿī is "a determination by conjecture" or estimation (*taqdīr*, *ʿalā l-taqdīr*)[1012] and the second is "an establishment of truth" (*taḥqīq*, *ʿalā l-taḥqīq*).[1013] The elaboration on this classification reads like Ibn Rashīq's initial definition: the *tashbīh taqdīr* is a comparison of one aspect only, and the *tashbīh taḥqīq* is a complete comparison or comparison of essence (*nafs*), like comparing (*tashbīh*) a crow to a crow, a redness of an anemone flower to a redness of an anemone flower, etc. (hence, again: comparison = identity). But the use of *taḥqīq*, like al-Rummānī's *tashbīh ḥaqīqa*, lends itself to an opposition with *majāz* once the latter term enters the works of literary theory proper. It must be stressed, however, that al-Aṣmaʿī's explanation differs from the argument made by Ibn Rashīq, *yatashābahāni* [...] *ʿalā l-musāmaḥa wa-l-iṣṭilāḥ lā ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa*: in this specific argument by Ibn Rashīq, two things that we think are alike may not really be alike, but we say they are alike based on custom (a lion may not really be brave); in al-Aṣmaʿī's argument, echoed in al-Rummānī's work and even in Ibn Rashīq's, if the resemblance is only in one aspect, the two things are not really alike because only identical things (crow-crow, specific redness-specific

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respect or other"). When al-Fārābī discusses similarity (*shabah*) in the *Rhetoric* in the context of the philosophical *tamthīl* (analogy or argument from example), it is presented as something that exists in reality (*mawjūd*) and is, strictly speaking, seen as an identity (in species, genus; see the dictionary definition above). Thus, he says, Zayd and ʿAmr "resemble one another in humanhood, animalhood, and bodyhood," that is, both *are* human, animals, and a substance, in that those properties (sg. *maʿnā*) exist in them. In the *tamthīl* of the philosophers, an opponent could reject that there is a similarity between the two objects (*dafʿihi al-shabah bayna l-amrayn*): this implies that in a debate, the truth can be reached on whether or not a similarity actually exists between the two (Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Khaṭāba*, in *al-Manṭiqiyyāt li-l-Fārābi*, 456-92, here: 490-91).

[1011] *Al-ʿUmda* 1: 287. The quotations from al-Aṣmaʿī begin on page 286, and the relevant passage above opens with *wa-qāla fī mawḍiʿ ākhar*. After that, the voice of Ibn Rashīq resumes and this is marked by *qāla ṣāḥib al-kitāb*.

[1012] Lane, *Lexicon*, 2494.

[1013] Ibid., 606.

redness[1014]) can really be alike. Regardless of the reasoning behind it, both understandings lead to the same result: the two things that are likened to one another in the second type of *tashbīh* are not *really* alike.

Some modern philosophers have also distinguished between literal statements of similarity and figurative (or non-literal or metaphorical) ones, the latter comprising of metaphors and similes.[1015] The vast majority of modern accounts, however, tend to identify simile as a literal statement, especially vis-à-vis metaphor.[1016] Since this debate is not unknown in modern research, I think we are justified in appropriating the modern terms for this discussion. Hence, *tashbīh* as a literary device in the context of those medieval theorists who view it as *majāz* may be appropriately rendered as 'figurative comparison'.[1017]

Other literary theorists in the Arabic tradition have preserved a distinction between two types of similarity statements, not least of which is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn himself in his early work, the

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[1014] The genus, in other words, must be identical, even in the case of attributes like redness. Thus, al-Aṣmaʿī's *tashbīh taḥqīq/ʿalā l-taḥqīq* would not include the resemblance of a red flower to red lips, since it is not the same 'genus' of redness. The philosophical-linguistic category that encompasses attributes that 'differ' depending on the species/genus at hand is termed *tashkīk* (the 'whiteness' of a person is not like the 'whiteness' of snow, the 'existence' of a person is not like the 'existence' of God, etc.). On *tashkīk* as a reference to concepts that apply to entities unequally (or in varying degrees: "by modulation") see Alexander Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (*Tashkīk al-Wujūd, Analogia Entis*) and its Greek and Arabic Sources," in Felicitas Opwis and David Reisman (eds.), *Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas*, Leiden: Brill, 2012, 327-63.

[1015] See the works of Tversky, Ortony and Fogelin quoted above.

[1016] See the discussion in Fogelin, *Figuratively Speaking*, 33-66 (ch. 4). One criterion that is raised for determining the nature of the similarity statement lies in the principle of reversibility or symmetry: if the similarity claim is reversible ("If *a* is like *b*, then *b* is like *a*"), then it is a literal one; if it is not reversible (*"A lion is like a man), then it is figurative (but both Fogelin, *Figuratively Speaking*, 61, and Ortony, "Beyond Literal Similarity," 171, recognize that even literal claims of similarity can be asymmetrical). Note that in the Arabic tradition, figurative claims of similarity can be symmetrical: this is the category called *al-ṭard wa-l-ʿaks* (or sometimes simply *ʿaks*), when the moon is compared to the face of the patron rather than vice versa! (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn discusses it in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 158).

[1017] The term 'figurative comparison' as a reference to both metaphor and simile is used most consistently by Fogelin.

Jāmi.[1018] There Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn combines the various early arguments into one, identifying the

complete comparison (a comparison of all aspects) as *ḥaqīqa* and the partial comparison (one

aspect) as *majāz*, saying that the latter is true (*ṣawāb*) only in terms of customary usage (*ʿurf*).[1019]

This implies that he would take a statement such as "Zayd is like a lion" to be untrue.[1020] In the

Mathal he does not repeat this passage but rather takes it for granted that *tashbīh* is part of

figurative speech. Indeed, in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's initial classification, *majāz* encompasses only two

categories, the first being *tawassuʿ* and the second – *tashbīh*. The chapter devoted to *tashbīh*

includes, as we have seen, cases of ordinary predicative metaphors as well as illustrative

analogies, but numerous examples are simple similes, and whether or not the particle of

comparison (*ka-*, *ka-anna*) appears in any of the above seems to be irrelevant for the author.[1021]

Much of the chapter is devoted to 'psychological' aspects of similarity claims, such as

comparing physical objects to physical objects, mental concepts to objects, mental concepts to

concepts, etc. These discussions have been common since the early works of literary theory and

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[1018] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 90. Another theorist in whose work we find this distinction is al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (fl. ≤ 409/1018) in his unpublished *Kitāb min kalām al-Rāghib fī l-badīʿ*; see Alexander Key, "Language and Literature in al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī," in Bruno de Nicola, Yonatan Mendel and Husain Qutbuddin (eds.), *Reflections on Knowledge and Language in Middle Eastern Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010, 32-62 here: 54 (but note, with regards to fn. 80, that this is not the distinction made by al-Jurjānī). Al-Rāghib also distinguishes between *ījāz* in the realm of *ḥaqīqa* and *ījāz* in the realm of *balāgha* (ibid.). Qudāma takes a literalist's approach, but his account (*Naqd*, 55-56) is undeniably tied to the distinction between two types of similarity claims. For a later occurrence see Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ, *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, 159, 457; he later implicitly renounces this view in *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 58, where he simply speaks of "the technical *tashbīh* [in literary theory]" (*al-tashbīh al-ṣināʿī*).

[1019] For a full quotation and discussion see §5.4 (including the correction of *ʿarab* to *ʿurf* in *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 90).

[1020] The sentence he adduces here is "Zayd is a lion" (a *tashbīh*), not "Zayd is like a lion" (ibid. and §5.4). But cf. the discussion in *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 167-70, under the chapter of *tajrīd* (here: change in grammatical person) and within a reply to Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī, where Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does exhibit a literalist's approach when he takes the difference between the courage of the lion and the courage of a person to simply be a matter of degree. This would imply that the real reason "Zayd is not like a lion" is that the word "like" itself denotes identity (cf. the *shibh*/*mithl* discussion in fn. 1002) rather than similarity. This echoes the two approaches we saw in the *ʿUmda*.

[1021] *Al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 133-53. See, specifically, pp. 140-41, where a *tashbīh* by al-Buḥturī is compared with a *tashbīh* by Ibn al-Rūmī. That the first contains the particle *ka-* and the second does not is simply irrelevant to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's assessment of those figurative comparisons.

have received much attention in Abu Deeb's study of imagery in al-Jurjānī, and elsewhere.[1022]

Summing Up

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's primary understanding of *majāz* within two components, fictional ascription (*tawassuʿ*) and figurative comparison (*tashbīh*), is an innovation in classical Arabic literary theory. It reflects his basic conception of *majāz* as speech that is not semantically true: foxes do not talk; Zayd is not really like a lion. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn then concedes and goes on to recognize *istiʿāra* as an additional category of *majāz*, but his initial reluctance signals that *istiʿāra* is indeed separate from his understanding of *tawassuʿ* and *tashbīh*, as it is the only category of *majāz* (and within it *kināya*) that is based on linguistic knowledge. The so-called word shifts that occur in dead poetic metaphors and euphemisms (*istiʿāra* and *kināya*) are not typically found in *tawassuʿ* and *tashbīh*. Technically speaking, one could propose that *ka-* 'like' can be used either literally (literal similarity statements) or figuratively (figurative similarity statements), such that a word shift would occur on the level of the particle of similitude – but this is not an argument that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn makes (or any other Arabic theorist I am aware of, for that matter). The figurativeness lies in extralinguistic knowledge rather than knowledge about words. (It is noteworthy in this context that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not treat metonymies, which are deeply rooted in the knowledge of words.) A more important difference between Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's conception of *tawassuʿ-tashbīh* and *istiʿāra-kināya* is that the latter reflect dead usage in the lexicon and in poetry/literary prose, including the hackneyed metaphors, whereas the former are continually created by the composer

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[1022] Abu Deeb, *Al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, esp. chs. 3 and 7. This aspect has been discussed in the context of wonder in Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 91-135. The two types of comparison attributed to al-Jurjānī revolve around the process of discovery and the unusualness of the image. For a detailed account on al-Sakkākī's treatment of *tashbīh* from a 'psychological' perspective see William Smyth, "Some Quick Rules Ut Pictura Poesis: The Rules for Simile in *Miftāḥ al-ʿUlūm*," *Oriens* 33 (1992), 215-229. Early treatments of the subject in Arabic literary theory (before al-Jurjānī) include Ibn Ṭabāṭabā, *ʿIyār*, 10-11, 17-31; al-Rummānī, *al-Nukat*, 74-75; al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī, *al-Wasāṭa*, 471 ff.; Qudāma, *Naqd*, 55-63 (in his comments on *shawāhid*); Ibn Wahb, *al-Burhān*, 130-31.

of speech. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's primary categorization of *majāz* into *tawassuʿ* and *tashbīh* should be viewed in light of his practical occupation with literary composition.

That *majāz* is primarily understood by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn as a statement that is untrue and not as a figurative substitution of a word is implicit in his work. In the *Jāmiʿ* he comes close to stating this explicitly, with his comment regarding the sentence "Zayd is a lion" (a *tashbīh* with no particle of similitude) that Zayd is not really (*ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa*) a lion. Here *ḥaqīqa* is used in an extralinguistic sense, as a reference to reality and truth. Juxtaposed with this sense of *ḥaqīqa*, the term *majāz* would readily refer to that which does not occur in reality, rather than a figurative understanding of the word 'lion'.

While Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn develops a new categorization scheme for *majāz* in the *Mathal*, his basic thinking about *majāz* is not very different from the one espoused in the *Jāmiʿ*, not least of which because *tashbīh* is recognized already there as a type of *majāz*. In doing so Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn displays continuity with early writings on literary theory (pre-Jurjānī) as well as with writings within the philosophical poetical tradition.

5.2. A Unique Commentary on al-Jurjānī: Ibn al-Zamlakānī

Due to the predominance of syntactic matters in the *Tibyān*, it is perhaps not surprising that the treatment of *majāz* in Ibn al-Zamlakānī's work is rather brief. One comment about the meaning of *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* leads to a brief chapter on the categories of *majāz*: *kināya* 'periphrasis', *istiʿāra* 'metaphor' and *tamthīl* 'metaphorical exemplification', in that order.[1023] Most of the attention is devoted to periphrasis – a category differentiated by al-Jurjānī from *majāz*[1024] – and to metaphor.

The chapter is situated at the very beginning of the *Tibyān*, as it opens the study of *dalālāt ifrādiyya* 'single-word signification'. None of the *majāz* examples or categories display single words, and this raises the question of the rationale behind treating the topic in this particular context. Indeed, it is one of the objections raised by Ibn ʿAmīra in his 'refutation' of the work. It is clear, nevertheless, that Ibn al-Zamlakānī stands behind this placement since he repeats it later on in the work, saying that excellence in periphrasis, metaphorical exemplification, and anything displaying *majāz wa-tawassuʿ* goes back to the single word (*al-lafẓ al-mufrad*).[1025] What Ibn al-Zamlakānī has in mind here is that the study of periphrasis and metaphors rests on lexicographical knowledge (essentially, a study of single words), whereas other issues rest on grammatical, specifically syntactic, knowledge. To corroborate this understanding, one might be reminded of the prerequisites that Ibn al-Zamlakānī posits to the study of *ʿilm al-bayān*, namely, lexicography (*lugha*) and syntax (*iʿrāb*).[1026] Since most of his studies are functional-grammatical in essence, it is quite apparent that for the study of *majāz*

[1023] *Al-Tibyān*, 37-48.

[1024] Al-Jurjānī, *Dalāʾil*, 66-67 and more explicitly, al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 272 and al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ*, 403.

[1025] *Al-Tibyān*, 159. This is drawn directly from *Dalāʾil*, 429-30.

[1026] *Al-Tibyān*, 33.

syntax is simply irrelevant, hence the appeal to lexicography. The connection of *majāz* to the study of *lugha* is apparent in the works of Ibn Jinnī (d. 392/1001) and Ibn Fāris (d. 395/1004), as channeled into the major later lexicological compendium by al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), *al-Muzhir*. Here the claim is made, as it is in parallel works on legal theory (*uṣūl al-fiqh*), that knowledge of *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* rests in the hands of the lexicographers (*ahl al-lugha*) (and see Chapter 5 Preliminaries).[1027]

Several additional comments pertaining to *majāz* are scattered elsewhere in the work, most importantly, under the chapter of *majāz isnādī* 'majāz on the level of predication', a notion developed by al-Jurjānī (later known as *majāz ʿaqlī*).[1028] Here Ibn al-Zamlakānī recognizes the existence of single-word *majāz* (*majāz ifrādī*, later known as *majāz lughawī*), although only in the *Burhān* does he devote an entire section (albeit brief) to the topic. There, the examples of *majāz ifrādī* reveal that we are dealing with metonymies, although one subclass of dead metaphors also occurs.[1029] Ibn al-Zamlakānī's understanding of *majāz isnādī* has some repercussions for our understanding of his notion of metaphor that, interestingly, reveal a debate arising already in al-Jurjānī's thought. This will be discussed below. The other discussions in which the topic of *majāz* comes up are under a literary device termed *tamthīl*, in this context: 'conceptual comparison'; under the ways of sentence indication (*dalālat al-kalām*); and under

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[1027] ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, *al-Muzhir fī ʿulūm al-lugha wa-anwāʿihā*, eds. Muḥammad Aḥmad Jād al-Mawlā Bek, Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm and ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī, 2 vols., 3rd ed., Cairo: Maktabat al-Ḥaram li-l-Turāth, n.d., 1: 362; al-Āmidī, *al-Iḥkām* 1: 45, 61-62; Gleave, *Islam and Literalism*, 114. Not surprisingly, there were backlashes to this view even among early scholars who were unwilling to accept the lexicographers' authority on such matters (ibid.). By lexicology we mean the theory behind lexicography (see §3.1). It must be said that the other chapters within the *dalālāt ifrādiyya* are also under the purview of the lexicographers besides, perhaps, the discussions of the verb and noun in the position of the predicate (*al-Tibyān*, 49-54).

[1028] *Al-Tibyān*, 106-108.

[1029] *Al-Burhān*, 102-104. 'Naming a thing by the name of that which resembles it' is exemplified by naming a brave person 'lion' and a stupid person 'ass'. On treating 'lion' and 'ass' as dead metaphors see Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

the discussion of eloquence (*faṣāḥa*).[1030]

What is most striking about Ibn al-Zamlakānī's treatment is that while the opening chapter dealing with *kināya-istiʿāra-tamthīl* is titled *fī al-ḥaqīqa wa-l-majāz*, it is not the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* pair that underpins the discussion, but rather the terms *ẓāhir* 'surface level; apparent [meaning]' and *ghayr al-ẓāhir* 'non-surface level; non-apparent [meaning]'. The chapter opens with a statement that could have just as well done without these terms, and yet, they supersede the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dyad:

> *al-bābu l-awwalu fī l-ḥaqīqati wa-l-majāzi fa-naqūlu l-lafẓu immā an yurāda bihi ẓahiruhu fī dhālika l-iṣṭilāḥi wa-huwa ka-l-asadi idhā urīda bihi l-ḥayawānu l-muftarisu aw ghayru ẓāhirihi wa-huwa l-majāzu thumma l-majāzu madāruhu l-aʿammu ʿalā aqsāmin thalāthatin[i] l-kināyati wa-l-istiʿārati wa-l-tamthīl*
>
> Chapter one, on literal and figurative speech. What is meant by a verbal expression is either its surface meaning in that [particular linguistic] convention, and that is like 'lion' if what is meant by it is the beast of prey, or its non-surface meaning, and that is figurative speech. Now figurative speech broadly revolves around three categories: periphrasis, metaphor and metaphorical exemplification (or illustrative analogy by way of metaphor) […].[1031]

We say that Ibn al-Zamlakānī could have done without the *ẓāhir-ghayr ẓāhir* terminology because in many of the parallel texts we come across, we essentially find the same argument using only the terms *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*: the notion of linguistic convention (*iṣṭilāḥ*) is associated with the literal/figurative discourse; adducing the meaning of lion as a beast of prey is commonly done under the *ḥaqīqa* umbrella. In fact in the *Mujīd*, and probably as an effort to simplify the

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[1030] *Al-Tibyān*, 108-109 (not to be confused with *tamthīl* in the sense of metaphorical exemplification), 154-55, and 159-62, respectively. In the context of pp. 154-55 it seems that Ibn al-Zamlakānī is using *kalām* in its grammatical sense of '[independent] sentence', rather than 'speech' in general. The discussion of 'conceptual comparison' in the *Mujīd* is done under the heading *tashbīh* rather than *tamthīl* (*al-Mujīd*, 124-25).

[1031] *Al-Tibyān*, 37.

discussion, he minimizes the use of *ẓāhir* in favor of *ḥaqīqa*.[1032] In the *Burhān* he adds a more

legally-oriented presentation of *ḥaqīqa-majāz*, to the detriment of the notion of *ẓāhir*.[1033] The

discourse of *ghayr ẓāhir* is taken directly from al-Jurjānī, in a passage in which the category of

"intending the non-surface level" (*al-murād bih ghayr ẓāhirih*) is presented as one encompassing

both *kināya* and *majāz* (making clear that *kināya* and *majāz* should be distinguished from one

another).[1034] In the discussion that ensues al-Jurjānī makes use of the notion of *ẓāhir* (not quite a

technical term) by mentioning it alongside expressions such as *ẓāhir al-amr* and *ẓāhir al-lafẓ*,[1035]

but by no means does this come at the expense of a theory of *majāz*. Unlike al-Jurjānī, Ibn al-

Zamlakānī is equating *ghayr ẓāhir* with *majāz* (*ghayru ẓāhirihi wa-huwa l-majāz*),[1036] a process

which results in: (i) identifying *kināya* as a category of *majāz*; and (ii) marginalizing the very

relevance of *majāz* to *kināya*, *istiʿāra* and *tamthīl*.

It should be noted parenthetically that *ẓāhir* as a technical term is commonly associated

with legal theoretical thinking and refers to an obvious, default meaning of a text, but it does not

overlap with *ḥaqīqa*. In fact, it emerged as a category of speech that, on one hand is plainly

understood, and on the other, could admit differing interpretations. Coincidentally or not, it was a

Shāfiʿī Ashʿarī – Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015) – who developed this notion into its evolved state (al-

Jurjānī too was a Shāfiʿī and Ashʿarī). According to David Vishanoff, the development reflected

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[1032] *Al-Mujīd*, 73. The simplified version runs as follows: *matā urīda bi-l-lafẓi ẓāhiruhu fī dhālika l-iṣṭilāḥi fa-huwa l-ḥaqīqatu wa-illā fa-huwa l-majāzu* "Whenever what is meant by a verbal expression is its apparent meaning in that linguistic convention – it is literal speech; otherwise – it is figurative speech."

[1033] *Al-Burhān*, 98-99.

[1034] *Dalāʾil*, 66.

[1035] Ibid., 69, 71, 73.

[1036] *Al-Tibyān*, 37.

a marginalization of the category of *majāz* in several strands of legal theory.[1037] Whether al-Jurjānī's use of *ẓāhir* is in any way indebted to this type of legal thinking is a question for further research. On the face of it (no pun intended) it seems that al-Jurjānī's usage of *ẓāhir* is more akin to its non-technical instantiations in grammatical writings, as a reference to the prima facie meaning of a sentence.

The passage opening Ibn al-Zamlakānī's discussion is not the only manifestation of the lesser-relevance of *majāz* in his literary theory. In a later passage under the discussion of 'sentence indication' (*dalālat al-kalām*), he states that *kināya*, *istiʿāra* and *tamthīl* constitute utterances that derive their meaning from what the meaning of the sentence logically indicates (*mustafād min dalālat maʿnāhu*) rather than what the meaning of the sentence plainly is (*mustafād minhu*). The latter is termed *maʿnā* and the former *maʿnā maʿnā l-lafẓ* 'the meaning [or implication] of the sentence meaning'. The term *majāz* is not used.[1038] Presenting *kināya-istiʿāra-tamthīl* as instances of 'sentence indication' can be traced directly to al-Jurjānī's discussion of *maʿnā al-maʿnā*.[1039] The examples Ibn al-Zamlakānī discusses are solely cases of periphrasis, such as "late morning sleeper (f.)" (*naʾūm al-ḍuḥā*), an expression meaning (*maqṣūd*) that a woman is living in luxury and has people who tend to her needs (therefore obviating her need to wake up early in the morning).[1040] Here the term *ḥaqīqa* is used, in that the

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[1037] Vishanoff, *Formation*, 194-95, 208. According to him, it was the law-oriented theorists (as opposed to the theology-oriented theorists) who marginalized *majāz*. The *ẓāhir* meaning does not take into account the speaker's intention (al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf* 3: 173). On the general legal sense of *ẓāhir* see also Ali, *Medieval Islamic Pragmatics*, 128-30; Gleave, *Islam and Literalism*, 49-52; El Shamsy, "*Islam and Literalism* (Review)," 151.

[1038] *Al-Tibyān*, 154-55.

[1039] *Dalāʾil*, 262-63.

[1040] The cultural Bedouin context of this phrase is provided in some detail by al-Sakkākī in *Miftāḥ*, 402. The phrase comes from Imruʾ al-Qays' celebrated *muʿallaqa* (not typically used in other texts, except as a quotation of Imruʾ al-Qays). Judging by the dictionaries it is not clear whether it is an idiomatic expression: al-Zamakhsharī does not cite it in the *Asās*, but it does appear in *Lisān al-ʿarab* 6: 4584.

phrase "late morning sleeper" indicates from a literal perspective (*yadullu min jihat al-ḥaqīqa*)

the notion of "sleeping late in the morning" (*al-nawm fī l-ḍuḥā*).[1041] And yet the actual meaning

of the phrase is presented under the headings *maqṣūd* and *murād* 'intention' rather than the

ḥaqīqa-counterpart, *majāz*, in spite of the fact that he explicitly subsumes such cases under *majāz*

in the beginning of his work. Resorting to rubrics such as *ghayr ẓāhir* or *maʿnā maʿnā al-lafẓ*

seems to alleviate an implicit problem Ibn al-Zamlakānī has with the notion of *majāz*, and

especially with regards to *kināya* where all words are used literally and the predication is literal

(in our example: she really does wake up late in the morning). To explore what exactly this

'problem' is, let us turn to the categories that Ibn al-Zamlakānī subsumes under *majāz*.

Kināya

The section on *kināya*, containing the largest number of poetic examples, is in fact a chapter on

two types of periphrasis, following al-Jurjānī's discussion in the *Dalāʾil*.[1042] Ibn al-Zamlakānī

treats the two via his discussion of *shawāhid*;[1043] all but one of the examples (the last one) are

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[1041] *Al-Tibyān*, 154.

[1042] *Dalāʾil*, 306-14 (and see below). For the sociolinguistic significance of *kināya* see Erez Naaman's "Women Who Cough," which opens with a theoretical introduction on *kināya* as a rhetorical notion (pp. 469-73). The distinction al-Jurjānī draws between the two types of *kināya*, and its contextualization within his engagement with 'predication' (see below), has been largely overlooked in modern scholarship (including Dichy's thorough entry, "Kināya," and Pellat's "Kināya"). Abu Deeb does mention "another type of *kināya*" (*Al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 166), but his discussion is solely from the perspective of the image and the associations it evokes (and see also pp. 76-80, 164-67). The two types (and later third) are cited in Ali Ahmad Hussein, *The Rhetorical Fabric of the Traditional Arabic Qaṣīda in Its Formative Stages: A Comparative Study of the Rhetoric in Two Traditional Poems by ʿAlqama l-Faḥl and Bashshār b. Burd*, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 98, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2015, 44-45 (he attends to the truthfulness of the expressions but reaches a different result; his translation of *kināya* here as 'metonymy' is confusing). Harb addresses some aspects of *ithbāt* with respect to *kināya* (*Poetic Marvels*, 201, 204) but only speaks of one category of *kināya*.

[1043] In other words, he does not start with a clear-cut "*al-kināya ʿalā ḍarbayn*" or the like. The way he does it is thus: after stating the archetypal examples of the type "having many ashes" (=category #1), Ibn al-Zamlakānī adduces a poetic line which is in fact an example of category #2, and then a second line which is an example of category #1. Then, with the following verse illustrations, he says whether they are equivalent to (*naẓīr*) the first example or to the second one. A "neater" presentation of the categories can be found in al-Sakkākī (three categories, see below) and in later standard rhetoric, channeled into Hussein, *Rhetorical Fabric* (see previous fn.) via Mehren.

derived from al-Jurjānī.[1044] The first category of *kināya* is equivalent to the example above, the archetype being "so-and-so has many ashes of the cooking-pot" (*fulān kathīr ramād al-qidr*) intending a large number of meals being served to guests (*wa-l-murād kathrat al-qirā*), and hence, a hospitable man.[1045] Three poetic examples of this case are adduced and they all play on the same theme of generosity. First is the anonymous (1st/8th cent.) [meter: *wāfir*]

> *wa-mā yaku fiyya min ʿaybin fa-innī*
>> *jabānu l-kalbi mahzūlu l-faṣīlī*
> "There is no blemish in me, for I am one whose
>> dog is a coward and whose young camel is emaciated"[1046]

The explicit version would be (*wa-law ṣarraḥa la-qāla*), "it is known that my 'front yard' [or house] is frequented, my dog does not growl in the face of guests who visit me, and I slaughter she-camels and leave their youngsters thin [because they can no longer suckle from their mothers]."[1047] The second example is (probably) Nuṣayb's (d. *ca.* 108/726) [meter: *mutaqārib*]

> *li-ʿAbdi l-ʿAzīzi ʿalā qawmihī*   *wa-ghayrihimū minanun ẓāhirah*
> *fa-bābuka as'halu abwābihim*   *wa-dāruka maʾhūlatun ʿāmirah*
> *wa-kalbuka ānasu bi-l-zāʾirīna*   *mina l-ummi bi-l-ibnati l-zāʾirah*
> "ʿAbd al-Azīz (b. Marwān, Umayyad governor of Egypt) [bestows] on his people,
>> and on others, visible benevolences
> For your door is the easiest among their doors [to open],
>> your house is frequented and prosperous,

[1044] *Dalāʾil*, 306-14, sometimes with slight variations in the wording of the line or in its attribution. The *shāhid* cited in *al-Tibyān*, 41, is indeed absent from one of the mss. (editors' fn. 2).

[1045] *Al-Tibyān*, 37.

[1046] The editors attribute the line to Ibn Harma (1st/8th cent.), but it does not occur in his *Dīwān* and all the other critics who quote it attribute it to an anonymous poet.

[1047] Ibid., 38. The line is quoted anonymously. Strictly speaking, the *faṣīl* refers to a young camel that has just weaned from its mother, but it can also mean a young camel in general, weaned or not. See Lane, *Lexicon*, 2406-2407.

and your dog is more gladdened by visitors

> than a mother is by her visiting daughter"

The third example is (probably) Ibn Harma's (1ˢᵗ/8ᵗʰ cent.) [meter: *ṭawīl*]

> *yakādu idhā mā abṣara l-ḍayfa muqbilan*
>> *yukallimuhū min ḥubbihī wa-hwa aʿjamū*
> When [the dog] noticed a guest coming near,
>> he would almost speak to [the guest] out of love for him, though he cannot speak" [1048]

All word usages in these examples are literal ones, and the propositions expressed therein – exaggerated, to be sure – could also be taken literally. That is, dogs that are exposed to many visitors are indeed more amicable to people than dogs that are not. Hospitable people who host many guests do indeed slaughter more camels. But a non-literal meaning of these propositions is also possible if one assumes, for instance, that these generous people were not in possession of dogs to begin with! [1049]

There is reason to believe that Ibn al-Zamlakānī did not, in fact, take such propositions as literally true, and this can be deduced from the second type of *kināya* presented in the chapter. Here a certain characteristic is attributed not directly to the person, but (usually) to an imagined entity that is metonymically connected to that person. Examples include (I am citing four out of the ten adduced) Ziyād al-Aʿjam's (d. *ca.* 100/718) [meter: *kāmil*]

> *inna l-samāḥata wa-l-murūʾata wa-l-nadā*

[1048] Ibid., 39. The last line, according to the editors, is either by Ibn Harma or al-Nābigha al-Jaʿdī (the early critics attribute it to the former).

[1049] Cf. Larkin, *Theology*, 87; Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 201; Hussein, *Rhetorical Fabric*, 45. Al-Jurjānī himself is ambiguous here (*Dalāʾil*, 66): he does not say explicitly that the expression of the *kināya* is true on a literal level, but because he uses the phrases *ridfuhu fī l-wujūd* "its logical consequence in existence [reality?]" and *min shaʾnihi an yardafahu fī l-wujūdi wa-an yakūna idhā kāna* "it is its nature to logically follow it in existence, and to take place if that takes place," one assumes that he views it as an actual reflection of reality. One wonders how Ibn al-Zamlakānī read this passage, in light of his views (below).

fī qubbatin ḍuribat ʿalā -Bni l-Ḥashrajī

"Generosity, virtue and liberality are

    in a round tent pitched over Ibn al-Ḥashraj";[1050]

Yazīd b. al-Ḥakam's (d. *ca.* 102/720) [meter: *munṣariḥ*]

    aṣbaḥa fī qaydika l-samāḥatu wa-l-maj

        -du wa-faḍlu l-ṣalāḥi wa-l-ḥasabī

"Generosity, nobility, excellence, rightness and good conduct

    are [bound] in your shackle";

the more curious (*gharāba*) case such as al-Buḥturī's [meter: *kāmil*]

    a-wa-mā raʾayta l-majda alqā raḥlahū

        fī Āli Ṭalḥata thumma lam yataḥawwalī

"Did you not see [how] Nobility unloaded its camel's saddle [i.e. stayed]

    among the people of Ṭalḥa, then did not go away?!"

and this anonymous segment, which represents a "wondrous type" (*fann gharīb*) of the category

[meter: *ṭawīl*] ("said with regards to the Barmakids")

    saʾaltu l-nadā wa-l-jūda mā lī arākumā

        tabaddaltumā dhullan bi-ʿizzin muʾabbadī

    wa-mā bālu rukni l-majdi amsā muhaddaman

        fa-qālā uṣibnā bi-Bni Yaḥyā Muḥammadī

    fa-qultu fa-hallā muttumā ʿinda mawtihi

        wa-qad kuntumā ʿabdayhi fī kulli mashhadī

    fa-qālā aqamnā kay nuʿazzā bi-faqdihi

        masāfata yawmin thumma natlūhu fī ghadī

"I asked Generosity and Liberality, *why is it I see you've*

    taken lowliness in exchange for eternal high rank?

and why is it that the pillar of nobility got torn down?

    They said, *we were afflicted by (the death of) Ibn Yaḥyā Muḥammad*

[1050] Translation adopted from Naaman, "Women Who Cough," 469 (with minor changes).

I said, *but did you not die along with his death?*

for you had been his servants at every assembly

They said, *we stuck around so that we'd be consoled by [reflecting upon] his loss*

for a stretch of one day, then we'll follow him the next day"[1051]

In all of the examples above, the attribute (*ṣifa*) that is predicated or asserted (*ithbāt*) of the patron is said to reside not within the person itself, but next to him: in a tent pitched over him, in his shackle, or as a personified entity following him around (this last type being 'strange' and 'wondrous'). It is not difficult to see that this subcategory within *kināya* is more in line with metaphor than it is with the first subcategory because – unlike the "late morning sleeper" – the propositions expressed therein are evidently false: generosity is not really in a tent or shackle, let alone an entity that can speak or "take a load off." Ibn al-Zamlakānī does not spell out how the second subcategory of *kināya* differs from *istiʿāra* (which we will discuss shortly), a category that also contains false propositions. We may surmise nevertheless that it is because a proposition in the former is based on contiguity whereas a proposition in the latter is based on similarity.[1052]

[1051] For the poetic examples above see *al-Tibyān*, 38-41. Regarding the last poetic segment, see a similar two-liner by Abū Nuwās dedicated to Yaḥyā b. Khālid (*Dīwān* 1: 339). For uses of this motif by other poets, including al-Mutanabbī, see Usāma b. Munqidh, *al-Badīʿ*, 236-37 (within the section on "intertextuality": *bāb al-sābiq wa-l-lāḥiq wa-l-tadāwul wa-l-tanāwul*, pp. 222-49). The Barmakids were known – at least as a literary conceit – for their exceeding generosity (e.g., Antonella Gheresetti, "An Unpublished Anthology of the Mamlūk Period on Generosity and Generous Men," *Mamluk Studies Review* 13 [2009], 107-20, here: 116). The idea in this passage is that now that Ibn Yaḥyā Muḥammad has died, no instance of generosity and liberality can live up to what it was through him, thus those qualities are better off (i.e., they would get "eternal high rank") by dying along with him.

[1052] This distinction is somewhat alluded to in *al-Burhān*, 125, where Ibn al-Zamlakānī says that the explicit particle of comparison (*ka-*) cannot be reconstructed in the case of *kināya*. It is probably due to such contiguous relations that *kināya* is often still translated in modern scholarship as 'metonymy'. For recent examples see Pierre Larcher, "Pragmatics," *Oxford Handbook of Arabic Linguistics*, 196-97; Ali Ahmad Hussein, "The Rhetoric of Hudhalī Wine Poetry," *Oriens* 43 (2015), 1-53, here: 28-29 (also in his new *Rhetorical Fabric*); and Dichy, "Kināya." Cf. Naaman, "Women Who Cough," 471-72. Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 201 fn. 643, recognizes that *kināya* does not mean 'metonymy' in al-Jurjānī's work, but elsewhere she translates *kināya* as metonymy (e.g., 49, 69, 81-82, 87, 234; perhaps in the philosophical poetical context *kināya* does mean 'metonymy' – it is not explained what the philosophers mean by it). According to Bauer ("Arabische Kultur," *Rhetorik*, 295), *kināya* overlaps with the "less precisely defined categories" of circumlocution, metonymy and synecdoche. Strictly speaking, metonymy is a single-word affair of the type "the pen" for "writing" or "the press" for "journalism," whereas the examples above are more aligned with periphrasis or circumlocution, i.e., a longer textual unit reflecting a roundabout way of

Also left unanswered is why the two subcategories are subsumed together under *kināya* in the first place. In the corresponding deliberation in the *Dalāʾil*, al-Jurjānī provides an illuminating explanation, where he draws a distinction between the *ṣifa* and *ithbāt al-ṣifa*.[1053] As he sees it, "just as they resort to alluding and hinting (*kināya wa-taʿrīḍ*, also *ramz* and *ishāra*) with regards to the very attribute (*nafs al-ṣifa*), likewise they do so with regards to affirming (/asserting/predicating) that attribute (*ithbāt al-ṣifa*) [of a person]."[1054] In "late morning sleeper" or "having an emaciated young camel" what is alluded to is the very attribute itself: rich, generous. In addition to *ṣifa* it is also termed *waṣf* and *maʿnā*.[1055] In "generosity is in a tent/shackle, etc." the very attribute is stated explicitly ("generosity") but the person to whom it is attributed is alluded to in a roundabout way. It is two sides of the same coin: in attributing B to A, either B is expressed indirectly or A is expressed indirectly (or more precisely, the attribution to A).[1056] This is an important aspect of al-Jurjānī's conception of *kināya* (a topic not treated in

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expression. See the entries "metonymy" and "periphrasis" in Thomas O. Sloane (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 and Baldick, *The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms*. In the Arabic works there is usually a clear distinction between utterances of the periphrastic *kināya* type and regular metonymies, which may be discussed under the heading *majāz* or the more technical *majāz ifrādī/mursal* (or, in the old works like that of Ibn Durayd, *istiʿāra*). It is true that in non-technical usage, especially in earlier works, we sometimes come across the expression "X *kināya* *ʿan* Y" in the sense of metonymy (e.g., al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, *Talkhīṣ al-bayān fī majāzāt al-Qurʾān*, 353, with reference to Q 74:4 *wa-thiyābaka fa-ṭahhir*, if "clothes" are taken as a metonym for the person wearing them).

[1053] *Dalāʾil*, 306-14.

[1054] An idiomatic rendering of […] *kamā yaṣnaʿūna fī nafsi l-ṣifati bi-an yadhhabū bihā madhhaba l-kināyati wa-l-taʿrīḍi ka-dhālika yadhhabūna fī ithbāti l-ṣifati hādhā l-madhhaba*; *Dalāʾil*, 306. The phrase *min jānib al-taʿrīḍ wa-l-kināya wa-l-ramz wa-l-ishāra* occurs in ibid., 306.9-10. One is tempted to conclude that in al-Jurjānī's use, *kināya* is not quite a technical term, and cf. al-Jāḥiẓ's use of the phrase *al-kināya wa-l-taʿrīḍ* in his *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* as quoted in Dichy, "Kināya".

[1055] E.g., *Dalāʾil*, 306.12-13, 307.1, 307.9-10, 312.8. When al-Jurjānī first introduces the notion of *kināya* (ibid., 66), he speaks of *ithbāt maʿnan min al-maʿānī* (not predicating the attribute *of someone* but simply asserting its existence), thus *maʿnā* is used synonymously with *ṣifa*. This might explain Harb's description of *kināya* as "words that can be employed to affirm another statement" rather than a statement in and of itself (*Poetic Marvels*, 204).

[1056] Al-Sakkākī develops this distinction even further. He sees the connection between B and A as a matter of *takhṣīṣ* 'specification' (making a certain attribute specific to someone) that can manifest itself not only via predication (*isnād*) but also through annexation (*iḍāfa*); see *Miftāḥ*, 407-408 (he also identifies a third subtype of *kināya*, p. 404).

the *Asrār*) as it reveals his underlying interest in logical predication (*ithbāt*), particularly of an attribute, which one might say underpins many of his other discussions, not least of which is the basic notion of *istiʿāra* (predicating "lion" of a person, for "brave").[1057]

Istiʿāra as Majāz Isnādī

While the reader of Ibn al-Zamlakānī may be oblivious to the underlying preoccupation with predication present in the *Dalāʾil*, the discussion of *istiʿāra* reveals that the notion of *majāz* here is logical (on the level of predication) rather than lexical. The chapter opens with an enumeration of two types of *istiʿāra*: one in which something is made into something else and one in which something is made to own something else.[1058] "I saw a lion" is an example of the first (the said person was "made into" a lion), and for the second, the famous hemistich by Labīd (d. 41/661) is adduced, "when the reins of [the morning] were in the hand of the north wind" (the north wind is "made to own" a hand). The type "I saw a lion" is then carefully differentiated from the more explicit "Zayd is a lion," in which the topic (Zayd) is mentioned, and hence reflects a "comparison/simile by way of exaggeration," not a metaphor (a common distinction from the very early critical works). The crux of the distinction lies in the degree to which something is 'confirmed' or 'asserted' in the mind of the recipient: *nazala manzilat al-shayʾ al-thābit alladhī lam tabqa lahu ḥāja ilā l-akhdh fī ithbātihi* "is in the status of a confirmed/established thing

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[1057] This requires further research, but see *Dalāʾil*, 71-73, 431-32, 438-42 for the importance of *ithbāt* and *khabar* within the poetic context of *kināya*, *istiʿāra* and *tamthīl* (Larkin recognizes in passing the focus on *ithbāt* rather than the *muthbat* in the context of *majāz* in *Theology*, 55, and Harb goes into further detail in *Poetic Marvels*, 190 ff., with some interesting results, especially with regards to *tashbīh/tamthīl*). Al-Jurjānī's other concerns with predication are of a more grammatical nature. See, for instance, the discussion on the morphosemantic distinction between predicating an imperfect verb (of the *yafʿalu* form) of a topic versus predicating a participle (of the *fāʿil* form), in terms of gradation of the attribute; *Dalāʾil*, 173-77. His more famous treatment of predication includes the functional distinction between a definite and indefinite predicate (ibid., 177 ff. [the chapter starting on p. 173 is titled *al-qawl ʿalā furūq fī al-khabar*]). This is an important and overlooked tangent point between al-Jurjānī's grammatical theory and his poetics (with theological implications in the background).

[1058] *Al-Tibyān*, 41-42. This distinction will be elaborated upon when we discuss Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī.

which is in no need of affirmation." In "I saw a lion," Zayd is being asserted as a lion to such a degree that the identity is immediate (*min awwal wahla*); conversely, in "Zayd is a lion" the identity is spoon-fed, as the utterance/speaker "instructs you of/makes you understand that an essence of a human-being is claimed to be an essence of a lion" (*afhamaka ḥaqīqata insānin^i - dduʿiya annahā ḥaqīqatu asadin*).[1059] It is once again the notion of *ithbāt* that is at the crux of the argument, but this time it is acknowledged that there are degrees in the affirmation of an identity. Paradoxically, when the thing being identified as something else is not mentioned, the identity is stronger, since it leaves no trace of a false attribution.

Interestingly, the poetic examples of *istiʿāra* – only three are adduced – reflect a different type of metaphor, one in line with the type "Zayd is a lion," because in all three cases the topic of comparison is stated. Ibn al-Zamlakānī provides them as examples of eloquent metaphors (*balīgh al-istiʿāra*).[1060] In doing this he is directly following al-Jurjānī, who adduced them when discussing unique metaphors (*al-khāṣṣī al-nādir*) as opposed to everyday hackneyed ones (*al-ʿāmmī al-mubtadhal*).[1061] Later in the *Burhān*, however, Ibn al-Zamlakānī recognizes the discrepancy and now presents those examples as cases "oscillating between metaphor and explicit simile" (*yataraddadu/dāʾir bayna l-istiʿāra wa-ṣarīḥ al-tashbīh*).[1062] (In the *Mujīd* no poetic examples are provided besides the archetypal metaphors.) The first example is the anonymous [meter: *basīṭ*][1063]

[1059] Ibid., 42.

[1060] Ibid., 42-43.

[1061] *Dalāʾil*, 74-78.

[1062] *Al-Burhān*, 113-15. He is also embedding here al-Jurjānī's notion of phantastic aetiology (though the term *takhyīl* is not used).

[1063] All three examples are from *al-Tibyān*, 42-43; cf. *Dalāʾil*, 76-78.

al-yawmu yawmāni mudh ghuyyibta ʿan baṣarī

   nafsī fidāʾuka mā dhanbī fa-aʿtadhirū

umsī wa-uṣbiḥu lā alqāka wā-ḥazanā

   la-qad taʾannaqa fī makrūhiya l-qadarū

"[Each] day is two since you've been absent from my eye

   My soul is your ransom; what is my sin so that I could give an excuse for it?

I go night and day not encountering you; O the grief!

   Indeed Fate has found delight in my calamity [inflicted by him][1064]

The second is Ibn al-Muʿtazz's [meter: *ṭawīl*]

yunājīniya l-ikhlāfu min taḥti maṭlihī

   wa-takhtaṣimu l-āmālu wa-l-yaʾsu fī ṣadrī

 "False Promise is whispering [a secret] to me in its state of delaying [its fulfillment],

   while Hopes and Despair are going at it in my breast"[1065]

The third example is a segment "recited by al-Jāḥiẓ" [meter: *ṭawīl*]

la-qad kunta fī qawmin ʿalayka ashiḥḥatin

   bi-nafsika illā anna mā ṭāḥa ṭāʾiḥū

yawaddūna law khāṭū ʿalayka julūdahum

   wa-lā yadfaʿu l-mawta l-nufūsu l-shaḥāʾiḥū

[addressing himself:]

"You were among people miserly towards you of yourself (they would not let you go),

   but whatever goes must be going

They wish they could sew their skins over you [so as to never let you go]

[1064] Literally *ghuyyiba ʿan* means 'to cause s.o. to be absent'. The indicative verbal mood in *fa-aʿtadhiru* is a poetic license for the subjunctive. For the common pausal form following the particle of lamentation *wā* see Wright, *Grammar* 2: 93. The text in *al-Tibyān*, 42, mistakenly has *wā-ḥarabā* (vocalizes by the editors *wa-āḥarabā*; correct in the *Dalāʾil*). The phrases *lā alqāka* and *taʾannaqa fī makrūhī* could be a playful allusion to the phrase *laqiyahu bi-makrūh* 'he did to him a thing disliked' (Lane, *Lexicon*, suppl., 3012). The notion of Fate taking delight in afflicting calamities should also be understood in light of the phrase *makārih al-dahr*.

[1065] For *ikhlāf* as the future-tense equivalent of *kadhib* (which is used with respect to the past) see Lane, *Lexicon*, 794. The phase *min taḥti* literally means 'under'. See ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Muʿtazz bi-Allāh, *Dīwān ashʿār al-Amīr Abī ʿAbbās*, ed. Muḥammad Badīʿ Sharīf, 2 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1977-1978, 2: 259. The *Dār Ṣādir* edition, 232, has a rather different version for the first hemistich: *tujādhibunī l-aṭrāfu bi-l-waṣli wa-l-qilā* "My arms are pulling me in a tug of war between bond and hate."

But [even] Miserly Souls cannot ward off death"[1066]

In these lines all words are used according their literal meaning, besides perhaps the idiomatic 'ransom' in "your soul is my ransom." Otherwise, the metaphors are instances of personification: fate finding delight in calamity; false promise whispering a secret; hope and despair struggling one another; miserly souls warding off death (hence they are capitalized above).

Do these cases conform in Ibn al-Zamlakānī's mind to al-Jurjānī's idea of *majāz fī l-ithbāt* (which he also terms *majāz ḥukmī* '*majāz* on the level of the proposition')?[1067] Ibn al-Zamlakānī attends to this notion under the heading *majāz isnādī* '*majāz* on the level of predication' (discussed under part II of his book) and it, indeed, seems inseparable from his idea of *istiʿāra*. Following al-Jurjānī, it is said of this type,

> *hādhā l-fannu dākhilun ʿalā l-nisbati lā ʿalā dhawāti l-kilami* [sg. *kalima*] *l-mufradati wa-mithāluhu qawluka nahāruka ṣāʾimun wa-layluka qāʾimun wa-nāma laylī wa-tajallā hammī fa-l-tajawwuzu fī ṣāʾimun wa-qāʾimun laysa min jihati dalālatihi l-ifrādiyyati wa-lākin min jihati ijrāʾihimā khabarayni ʿalā l-nahāri wa-l-layli*

[1066] The poet is probably saying that he wishes to go fight and expose himself to danger, but his fellow tribesmen will not allow him, thereby alluding to Q 33:18-19, "God would surely know those of you who hinder, and those who say to their brothers, 'Come to us', and come to batthle but little, being niggardly towards you." The version in *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn* 1: 50 runs slightly different: *lawlā anna man ṭāḥa…* and *wa-hal yadfaʿu…* The lines are attributed here to "al-Agharr *al-shāʿir*," perhaps – as Hārūn notes – one of the two poets of the tribe Yashkur b. Wāʾil called thus in Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥasan b. Bishr al-Āmidī, *al-Muʾtalif wa-l-mukhtalif fī asmāʾ al-shuʿarāʾ wa-kunāhum wa-alqābihim wa-ansābihim wa-baʿḍ shiʿrihim*, ed. F. Krenkow, reprint, Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1991, 48. Yet in another source, each line is attributed to a different poet, although the two lines are cited in succession (the second attribution within square brackets): the first to Muṭarrif b. Jaʿwana al-Ḍabbī, the second to one al-M.shr.k (unvowelled) al-Mawṣilī; see al-Khālidiyyān (Abū Bakr b. Muḥammad al-Khālidī and Abū ʿUthmān Saʿīd b. Hishām al-Khālidī), *al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir min ashʿār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-Jāhiliyya wa-l-mukhaḍramīn*, ed. al-Sayyid Muḥammad Yūsuf, 2 vols., Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾlīf wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, 1958, 1965, 2: 204.

[1067] Al-Jurjānī refers to this type of figurative speech in various ways; for *majāz ḥukmī* see, e.g., *Dalāʾil*, 296, 298-99 (or *fī l-ḥukm* or *fī aḥkām*, recurring in ibid., 293-301). In the *Asrār* we find *majāz fī l-ithbāt* recurring (e.g., *Asrār*, 342 ff.) and also *majāz min ṭarīq al-maʿnā wa-l-maʿqūl*, which Ritter translates as "trope in the domain of reason" (editor's introduction, 24). Also the rare *majāz ʿaqlī* occurs (e.g., *Asrār*, 380), a term which would later become standard. In his later *Burhān*, Ibn al-Zamlakānī refers to it as *majāz ʿaqlī* (*al-Burhān*, 100).

This type enters upon the [level of] predicative relation, not the single words themselves, like saying "your day is fasting, your night is rising [for prayer]" [for: you are fasting in the day during Ramaḍān and praying at night] and "my night slept and my worry became manifest" [for: instead of sleeping at night, I was up with distress]. For the transgression in 'fasting' and 'rising' is not from the perspective of its single signification but rather from the perspective of making them act as predicates of 'day' and 'night'.[1068]

Then, surprisingly, when discussing the poetic illustrations, both aspects of Ibn al-Zamlakānī's archetypal metaphor come to the surface: (1) the idea of an affirmation of identity; and (2) the ascription of an object to something else. Below are the poetic illustrations Ibn al-Zamlakānī provides for *majāz isnādī*, along with the comments that align them with his declared notion of *istiʿāra*. Al-Mutanabbī's well-known [meter: *wāfir*]

> *badat qamaran wa-mālat khūṭa bānin*
>> *wa-fāḥat ʿanbaran wa-ranat ghazālā*
> "She appeared – a moon, leaned over – a delicate twig,
>> let out a sweet scent – ambergris, and gazed – a gazelle"

[Identity: "[the poet] made her the very moon itself" (*jaʿalahā ʿayna l-qamar*). This is not equivalent to "she appeared moon-like" (*ḥadhf muḍāf taqdīruhu mithl*) because the resulting meaning would be less "grounded" (*aqʿad*)][1069]

Al-Khansāʾ's [meter: *basiṭ*]

> *tartaʿu mā rataʿat ḥattā idhā -ddakarat*
>> *fa-innamā hiya iqbālun wa-idbārū*
> [said of a she-camel whose foal died:]
> "She pastures as she pleases, until she becomes reminded of it,
>> then she is nothing but a movement forward and backward"

[1068] *Al-Tibyān*, 106-107; cf. *Dalāʾil* 293-303, 449-50.

[1069] *Al-Tibyān*, 107.

[Identity: "as if the she-camel in its entirety is the going forward and backward such that it's as if she had embodied it" (*ka-anna l-nāqata bi-jumlatihā iqbālun wa-idbārun ḥattā ka-annahā tajasammat minhā*)][1070]

The very line by Labīd presented at the outset of the *istiʿāra* discussion [meter: *kāmil*]

> *wa-ghadāti rīḥin qad kashaftu wa-qirratin*
> *idh aṣbaḥat bi-yadi l-shamāli zimāmuhā*
> "Many a cold and windy morning I went forth
> When its reins were in the hand of the north wind"

[Ascription: "There is nothing there that can be claimed to be similar to the hand such that the hand would be an analogue of it, but rather it is imagination and fancy (*takhyīl wa-wahm*) of an existence of something [a topic, a substratum] for which that [the hand] was borrowed […] the idea is that [the poet] likened the north wind in its handling (or directing) of the morning as it occurs in nature to a reins of a camel in his [the camel rider's] hand, such that he handles it according to his will; when [the poet] meant that, he made a hand belong to the north wind (*jaʿala li-l-shamāli yadan*) and reins over the morning."][1071]

And finally, the anonymous *rajaz* hemistich:

> *tasqīka kaffu l-layli akʾusa l-karā*
> "The hand of night is giving you cups of sleep to drink"

[Ascription: "[the poet] gave 'cups' on loan to 'sleep' (*istaʿāra li-l-karā l-akʾus*) [i.e., sleep is made to own 'cups'] […] when [the poet] made it [the night] be a cupbearer, then he made it own a hand (*jaʿala lahu kaffan*)."][1072]

[1070] Ibid. I am avoiding the more idiomatic translation of Alan Jones': "it runs forwards and backwards" in order to express that very idea of identity of which Ibn al-Zamlakānī is speaking (Alan Jones, *Early Arabic Poetry, Select Poems: Edition, Translation and Commentary*, 2nd ed., Reading: Ithaca Press, 2011, 136).

[1071] *Al-Tibyān*, 107. I take *takhyīl wa-wahm* here as a hendiadys for the non-technical 'fancy'. Heinrichs touches upon this non-technical sense of *takhyīl* in "Takhyīl," 2.

[1072] *Al-Tibyān*, 107-108. The version in *Dalāʾil*, 461, is *saqat-hu kaffu l-layli akwāsa l-karā*. The line is by Abū Nuwās (*Dīwān* 2: 300), from a hunting *urjūza*. The 'vulgar' *akwās* (from *kās*, for *kaʾs*) appears as *akʾus* in al-Qāḍī al-Jurjānī, *al-Wasāṭa*, 211.

This final example is then explicitly identified as a metaphor, and specifically a 'groomed metaphor' (*tarshīḥ al-istiʿāra*, see §5.5), based on the equation "the intoxication of sleep is like the intoxication of wine." What Ibn al-Zamlakānī does not spell out is this: because the analogue is taken from the realm of wine, 'cups' were added to elaborate the metaphor from the analogue's perspective (i.e., to "groom" the metaphor).[1073] He then provides another example of 'cup borrowing' (*istiʿārat al-kaʾs*), following al-Jurjānī, namely, [meter: *basīṭ*]

> *wa-qad saqā l-qawma kaʾsa l-naʿsati l-saharū*
> "Sleeplessness has given the people a cup of drowsiness to drink,"[1074]

and it is once again assumed that the 'cup' has no substratum in the topic domain – hence, it may be taken literally. In sum, all the examples adduced under *majāz isnādī* are identical, structurally and semantically, to the cases discussed under Ibn al-Zamlakānī's chapter on *istiʿāra*.

Although it is afforded only one paragraph in the *Tibyān*, the third category subsumed under *majāz* – *tamthīl* – also points to a logical basis of *majāz*. Ibn al-Zamlakānī presents it essentially as a metaphor (following al-Jurjānī), as he maintains, "It is *majāz* only if it comes in the manner of a metaphor (*ʿalā ḥadd al-istiʿāra*)." The category of *tamthīl* – which, as we have seen in al-Jurjānī, refers to metaphorical exemplification or illustrative analogy (by way of metaphor) – is not exemplified by poetic illustrations. Instead, only archetypal sayings are adduced, such as "So-and-so puts one leg forward and the other one backward" ("said with regards to a hesitant man"), or "You are blowing on a non-fire" ("for someone who is doing

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[1073] The case of *tarshīḥ al-istiʿāra* will be discussed in some detail under Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī. More information on it is provided by Ibn al-Zamlakānī in *al-Burhān*, 100-101. As far as I am aware it is absent from the work of al-Jurjānī. The generating mechanism of metaphors such as 'hand of night giving cups of sleeps to drink', in which the element 'hand' is semantically, though not poetically, redundant (the meaning would be the same if it were simply 'night' giving the cups, not the 'hand' of night) – is treated by Heinrichs in "Paired Metaphors," 5 ff.

[1074] *Al-Tibyān*, 108; *Dalāʾil*, 461. The line is by Abū Dahbal al-Jumaḥī in Abū Tammām's *Ḥamāsa* (Abū ʿAlī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Marzūqī, *Sharḥ Dīwān al-Ḥamāsa*, eds. Aḥmad Amīn and ʿAbd al-Salām Hārūn, 2 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1991, 2: 1350).

something and not achieving the goal"). The explicit version, "In your hesitance you are like someone who puts one leg forward and another backward," it is stated, would not be part of *majāz* (*lam yakun min bāb al-majāz*). We may conclude from this statement that it is the form of direct predication, or direct attribution, that stands at the basis of *tamthīl*, much like we saw with the identity-based metaphor.[1075] This statement also suggests, implicitly, that Ibn al-Zamlakānī followed al-Jurjānī in excluding *tashbīh*, or any sentence containing *ka-* and other particles of comparison, from the domain of *majāz* (cf. the stance of his younger contemporary, Ibn al-Naqīb, below).

Unlike the *shawāhid* of *istiʿāra* in which both topic and analogue were mentioned, in the case of *tamthīl* the topic is indeed not mentioned. Here the unexpressed topic is the attribute (or 'action') of being hesitant (or ineffective, in the second example). In this respect *tamthīl* is more in line with *kināya* (type #1):

> So-and-so <u>has many ashes</u> → is generous
> So-and-so <u>puts one leg forward and the other one backward</u> → is hesitant

Because *tamthīl* aligns with *kināya* (at least one subsype of it) with respect to expressing an attribute/action – the predicate of the sentence – in a roundabout way, it adds another rationale for viewing *kināya* and *tamthīl* as belonging to the same category. That category seems to be the extra-linguistic notion of *majāz*.

A Departure from al-Jurjānī's Majāz fī l-Ithbāt

To corroborate Ibn al-Zamlakānī's equation of *majāz* in literary theory as, essentially, *majāz isnādī*, it is useful to look at the later *Burhān*, where Ibn al-Zamlakānī all but says so explicitly.

[1075] For *tamthīl* see *al-Tibyān*, 44 and *Dalāʾil*, 68-69. In the *Burhān* he enlarges the discussion (*al-Burhān*, 120-132) to include also a treatment of similarity (*tashbīh*).

Here, as already mentioned, the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* chapter is enlarged, and it now includes – in addition to definitions – a section devoted to '*majāz* in the single word' (*majāz ifrādī*). The discussion is markedly *uṣūlī* in tone: all examples are Qurʾānic (or *ḥadīth*) and we even find an explicit reference to the *uṣūliyyūn*.[1076] The examples are primarily metonymies of the type 'hand' (*yad*) for 'power' (*qudra*) or 'town'/'caravan' (*qarya*, *ʿīr*) for 'the people of the town/ caravan'.[1077] Following this chapter is the triad *kināya-istiʿāra-tamthīl*, presented under the heading "[cases] in which the usage of *majāz* is predominant" (*fīmā yaghlibu -stiʿmāluhu min al-majāz*).[1078] Since it appears immediately after *majāz ifrādī*, it is not a big leap to assume that those three categories are conceived of as *majāz isnādī*. And yet, he is reluctant to spell out this conception.[1079] The reluctance we find both here and earlier in the *Tibyān* reflects, what I believe to be Ibn al-Zamlakānī's recognition that his implicit conception of *majāz* – statements that do not conform to reality – is at odds with the prevalent rejection of a notion like *kadhib* in the domain of *majāz*.

As we conclude Ibn al-Zamlakānī's treatment of *majāz*, it is important to stress that his interpretation stems solely from the *Dalāʾil*, which reflects a later development in al-Jurjānī's thinking (it was written after the *Asrār*).[1080] Whereas the *Asrār* was appended by a very long

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[1076] *Al-Burhān*, 103. The section runs from p. 102 to p. 104.

[1077] Ibid., 102-104. We also come across metonymies in verbs (or verbal dead metaphors), as in the first example *sāla l-wādī* 'the river flowed' for 'came' (*al-qābil*). The famous case of Q 12:82 *wa-sʾali l-qaryati llatī kunnā fīhā wa-l-ʿīra* is commonly interpreted in the sources as an elision (*ḥadhf*) of the first term of the construct (ibid., 104). As we have seen (Chapter 5 Preliminaries, fn. 658), interpreting it as a metonymy or as deletion were common in the early sources. We will look at metonymies in more detail when we discuss Ibn al-Naqīb.

[1078] Ibid., 105.

[1079] See ibid., 119, where al-Khansāʾ's line is adduced as a case of *majāz isnādī* "equivalent to" (*naẓīr*) metaphor.

[1080] And note too Larkin's treatment of *majāz*, which relies almost entirely on the *Asrār* (*Theology*, 73). Her main concern, we might recall, is to contextualize al-Jurjānī's work vis-à-vis the theological tradition and especially the work of ʿAbd al-Jabbār.

treatment of *majāz*, in the *Dalāʾil* a full treatment of *majāz* is deemed by al-Jurjānī unnecessary, and comments about the concept are thus scant.[1081] In the *Asrār*, al-Jurjānī in fact devotes attention to the very question of whether metaphors such as "I saw a lion" reflect *majāz* by means of the vocabulary of the language (lexical *majāz*) or *majāz* by means of reason (logical *majāz*). His conclusion is decidedly in support of the former view: although, he says, the person is claimed to be within the species of 'lion' and he is imagined as one of the lions, it is still the case – he maintains – that the resulting usage of the word *asad* here is not according to its original coinage since it is only the limited notion of 'courageousness' that is ultimately expressed, not the entirety of the lion's features.[1082] In the *Dalāʾil* we find some indications that his view may have evolved to the opposite position: equating *istiʿāra* with *kināya*, he says that the way to comprehend the former – like the latter – is via the *maʿqūl* (what is conceived in the mind by way of reason) and not the *lafẓ* (the wording itself).[1083] He also stressed the notion of metaphor as *iddiʿāʾ* 'making a claim'.[1084] But without knowledge of the *Asrār*, one is unaware that al-Jurjānī had already taken these ideas into account when reaching what was perhaps his

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[1081] *Dalāʾil*, 66: "Discussion of that [*viz.*, *majāz*] can be long, and I already mentioned elsewhere the correct view; here I will limit myself to mentioning what is most common of it and apparent." The mere fact that the treatment of *majāz* is relegated to the end of the *Asrār* (pp. 324-64), which is then appended by what reads like a separate *risāla* on *majāz* (pp. 365-89) is, in itself, meaningful. According to Ritter (editor's introduction, 24), it may have started out as a separate treatise, but was then added, possibly by al-Jurjānī himself, to the *Asrār*. See also Chapter 5 Preliminaries.

[1082] *Asrār*, 279-81 (a fascinating discussion which deserves closer study).

[1083] *Dalāʾil*, 439-40.

[1084] Ibid., 434-45, 437. But consider the rather explicit comment made in *Dalāʾil*, 367, according to which "if we study [this question] thoroughly/look at the true nature [of this question] (*idhā ḥaqqaqnā*), we do not find that the word (*lafẓ*) 'lion' is necessarily used for something other than what it was coined for […] and this, if you get the essence [of my argument] (*idhā ḥaṣṣalta*), is a 'going beyond' (*tajawwuz*) on your part in the meaning of the word, not the word itself (*fī maʿnā l-lafẓ lā l-lafẓ*)." It is probably this comment that al-Rāzī is referring to with regards to al-Jurjānī's view in the *Dalāʾil*. What makes this passage slightly ambiguous is al-Jurjānī's recognition that there still is a *tajawwuz* present in the "meaning of the word," and perhaps this is a reference to the sentence as a whole (*maʿnā l-lafẓ* as "the implication of the wording") even though *lafẓ* had just been used with reference to a single word.

final verdict in favor of the 'lexical *majāz*' (later termed *majāz lughawī*) with respect to identifying metaphors.[1085]

In the later commentarial tradition of al-Jurjānī's work (via Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and al-Sakkākī), the view of metaphor as a case of *majāz lughawī* won the day.[1086] What seems to have been the issue here is that recognizing such metaphors as *majāz ʿaqlī* would make them inseparable from a false claim (*kadhib, bāṭil*),[1087] even though, as we have seen in the Preliminaries to Chapter 5, this is not borne out in al-Jurjānī's own work. Since the *shawāhid* al-Jurjānī adduced were all reflective of a truthful occurrence (gray hair did actually appear; plants did actually grow in the spring; the speaker was actually happy to see the addressee), one could hardly say that he espoused the view of *majāz fī l-ithbāt* as a reflection of falsehood. The problem arises, I would say, with al-Jurjānī's classification of *istiʿāra* as a subcategory of *majāz*

[1085] In other words: even if the way to comprehending a sentence like "I saw a lion" (in reference to Zayd) is by reason and not by wording – i.e., understanding that Zayd is claimed to be part of the species 'lion' – this does not contradict the fact that at the end of the day, the word *asad* itself is being used metaphorically, since its specific meaning here is 'very courageous'. Conversely, it could indeed be the case that al-Jurjānī now espoused the view that "I saw a lion" is a case of – to use the later term – *majāz ʿaqlī* (as evinced, e.g., by *Dalāʾil*, 367 or 295, where *raʾaytu asadan* is commented on in the context of *majāz ḥukmī*; also, al-Rāzī is perspicacious enough for us to trust his judgement, when he says in *Nihāya*, 236, that al-Jurjānī went back and forth on this question). It should be clarified that "I saw a lion" is the archetypal stock example of an (implicitly creative) identifying metaphor and should not be confused with what I refer to as dead metaphors which are seen as single-word *majāz* that have become part of the Arabic vocabulary (see also Ibn al-Naqīb below).

[1086] The later works in the Standard Theory are largely uncharted territory, so to make any claim regarding the later rhetorical tradition is rather tentative. Especially important would be the works of two scholarly luminaries in Tamerlane's court, "al-Saʿd" and "al-Sayyid" – that is, Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1389) and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) – both of whom wrote commentaries on al-Qazwīnī's work. This is a question I hope to study in a future project. For now what can be said is that al-Rāzī supports the view of *majāz lughawī* (he references the discussion in both the *Asrār* and *Dalāʾil*; *Nihāya*, 235-37), and so does al-Sakkākī – who goes so far as to reject the notion of *majāz ʿaqlī* altogether (*Miftāḥ*, 370-72, 400-401, who also relies on al-Jurjānī's debate on the matter; cf. al-Ṣafadī, *Nuṣra*, 79). Al-Qazwīnī follows the *majāz lughawī* line as well; *Talkhīṣ*, 267-72. See also Bonbakker, "Istiʿāra," and the late take by Ibn Maʿṣūm (d. 1107/1705): according to him, viewing *istiʿāra* as *majāz lughawī* was the opinion of the *jumhūr* (ʿAlī Ṣadr al-Dīn Ibn Maʿṣūm al-Madanī, *Anwār al-rabīʿ fī anwāʿ al-badīʿ*, ed. Shākir Hādī Shukr, 7 vols., Karbala: Maktabat al-ʿIrfān, 1968-69, 1: 244-45). The debate carried on to later Persian poetics; see de Tassy, *Rhétorique*, 43-44.

[1087] E.g., al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 237, citing al-Jurjānī's stance that viewing *istiʿāra* as *majāz* on the level of *ithbāt* would amount to *kadhib* (al-Jurjānī is concerned here with false predications of God).

in the first place, because the examples he adduces for *istiʿāra* constitute 'false' statements.[1088]

Indeed, the discourse of *kadhib* so prevalent in early works on poetics has all but disappeared in works of the seventh/thirteenth century. What *majāz* may have been – in the context of literary theory proper in this time and place – was a notion superimposed on the old idea of *kadhib*. Ibn al-Zamlakānī's efforts reflect therefore a unique interpretation of al-Jurjānī's work, much in line with former – and contemporaneous – views about the nature of *majāz* in literary language, as expressed in works of *ʿilm al-bayān* written in Greater Syria and Egypt.[1089]

5.3. Persian Poetics in the Arabic East: Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī

The most conspicuous aspect of Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī's views on non-literal speech is the resounding absence of a chapter on *majāz* in his literary-theoretical work, *Rawḍat al-faṣāḥa*. This does not mean that the work does not merit an examination of the *majāz* question, as Zayn al-Dīn does refer to it on the odd occasion. What emerges from the following account is that despite the absence of such a chapter, Zayn al-Dīn probably has a sense of what *majāz* means, but because of the absence of such a chapter, he assigns a very peripheral role to it in the study of literary theory or *ʿilm al-bayān*.

The primary figure of speech said to be a part of *majāz* is metaphor (*istiʿāra*).[1090] Two

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[1088] The problem is even starker in al-Jurjānī's second category of *istiʿāra*, namely, a metaphor with no substratum of the type "hand of the north wind." As we have seen in Chapter 5 Preliminaries, al-Jurjānī's treatment of *majāz* was essentially a study of metaphorical conceptual thinking (including metonymy) from a philosophical linguistc perspective – a topic for which *istiʿāra* is rather irrelevant. What makes *istiʿāra* or *kināya* relevant to al-Jurjānī's theory of *majāz* seems to be the question of predication, not 'figurative speech'. But al-Jurjānī says repeatedly that *istiʿāra* is a subcategory of *majāz*: would he view it as *majāz ʿaqlī* despite the fact that the statements therein are 'untrue'? It certainly does not seem compatible with *majāz lughawī* since all words in "hand of the north wind" are used literally. Cf. Abu Deeb, *al-Jurjānī's Theory of Poetic Imagery*, 233. This question deserves a separate study.

[1089] Note, however, that Ibn al-Zamlakānī was not alone in this interpretation. The Easterner al-Muṭarrizī also takes *majāz* as a category (*jins*) that includes *istiʿāra*, *tamthīl* and *kināya* (*Sharḥ*, f. 2v; cf. Sallām, *Ibn al-Athīr wa-juhūduhu fī l-naqd*, 316, who reads *ījāz* for *majāz*).

[1090] *Rawḍa*, 90 (*al-istiʿāra qism min aqsām al-majāz*). In the later version of the work (ed. al-Jabr) slight variations

additional figures "connected to metaphor" (*yattaṣilu bi-l-istiʿāra*) are also conceived of as

majāz, namely, metaphorical exemplification (*tamthīl*), as in "I see you put one leg forward and

the other one backward" (for a hesitant man), and periphrasis (*kināya*), as in "he has many ashes

[of the cooking-pot]" (for a generous man). The latter two are only briefly touched upon.[1091] The

section on *istiʿāra* is imbued with what was to become standard rhetorical notions, such as the

differentiation between a metaphor based on identification or predication ("making something

[become] something [else] that is not it") and one based on ascription ("making something

belong to something else that it does not have"), a metaphor in which the analogue is only

alluded to (such as 'beast of prey' in "death sinking its claws in"), and the notions of *tarshīḥ* and

tajrīd.[1092] Furthermore, when discussing the verb metaphor, Zayn al-Dīn differentiates between a

metaphor "from the side of the subject [or agent or doer, *fāʿil*]" and one "from the side of the

object [or patient, *mafʿūl*]."[1093] All these are reminiscent of notions originating in ʿAbd al-Qāhir

al-Jurjānī, especially since the 'standard' terms are not used.[1094] The editor Shuʿla in fact adds

the standard terms as titles – *istiʿāra taṣrīḥiyya* 'explicit metaphor', *istiʿāra makniyya* 'metaphor

by allusion' and [*istiʿāra*] *tabaʿiyya* 'secondary metaphor' or 'non-noun metaphor' – but it is

evident that they did not originate with the text.[1095] Zayn al-Dīn could have had direct knowledge

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in this and other chapters occur. These will be mentioned when relevant.

[1091] Ibid., 109-13.

[1092] Ibid., 91-92, 107. The topic of *tarshīḥ/tajrīd* will be discussed under Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī.

[1093] Ibid., 95-97.

[1094] *Asrār* 42-45 and *Dalāʾil*, 67 (for the difference between an identifying metaphor and an ascriptive one), *Asrār* 50-51 (for verb metaphors from the point of view of the *fāʿil* or *mafʿūl*). See the corresponding passages, and in slightly different terms, in al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 232, 243-45. The discussion of a metaphor alluding to an analogue without explicitly mentioning it is found in ibid., 251, and I am not sure it directly originates in al-Jurjānī. A hint of this notion can be found in *Asrār*, 43-44, and it is inseparable from the ascriptive metaphor.

[1095] All titles within the section on *istiʿāra* and most titles within the chapter on *tashbīh* seem to have been added by the editor (*Rawḍa*, 63-113). Evidence for the former: Zayn al-Dīn starts by presenting the two types of metaphor, the

of ʿAbd al-Qāhir's work, but it is more likely that it was mediated by his redactors like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (though he uses what was to become standard terms), Ibn al-Zamlakānī, ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Zanjānī (not a direct redactor), or another source.

Marginalizing Majāz

Zayn al-Dīn opens the chapter on *istiʿāra* with, what I read as, a contrast between its classification within the categories of *majāz* and its true nature, or actual definition:

> *al-istiʿāratu qismun min aqsāmi l-majāzi wa-hiya fī l-ḥaqīqati tashbīhun ḥudhifa minhu ḥarfu l-tashbīhi lafẓan wa-taqdīran wa-li-hādhā qāla baʿḍuhum fī ḥaddi l-istiʿārati hiya -ddiʿāʾu maʿnā l-ḥaqīqati fī l-shayʾi mubālaghatan fī l-tashbīhi wa-mithāluhu annaka idhā qulta raʾaytu asadan wa-anta turīdu bihi rajulan shujāʿan fa-aṣlu murādika an taqūla raʾaytu rajulan huwa ka-l-asadi fī shajāʿatihi wa-shiddati baṭshihi fa-qulta raʾaytu asadan fa-kāna dhālika ablaghu li-annaka jaʿalta l-shajāʿata wājibatan lahu lāzimatan limā [lammā?] jaʿaltahu ʿayna l-asadi bi-iʿāratika -sma l-asadi lahu*

Metaphor is one of the categories of figurative speech but (*wa-*)[1096] it is in reality (or: true essence) a comparison in which the particle of comparison was omitted [both] on the surface level and the underlying level [or: both on the level of the wording and when restoring the intended wording], and this is why someone said in the definition of metaphor [probably referring to al-Zanjānī], "It is the claiming of the essence/meaning of the literal word in something [else] in order to exaggerate a comparison." An example of it is that if you say "I saw a lion" and you mean by it 'a brave man', then your original

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one based on predication and the one based on ascription, and then smoothly goes on to say *wa-l-farq bayna l-qismayn* (ibid., 91-92). The title "*al-farq bayna l-istiʿāra l-taṣrīḥiyya wa-l-makniyya*" appearing right prior to it breaks the organic continuation between p. 91 and p. 92. What is more, in no other place does Zayn al-Dīn mention the *taṣrīḥiyya-makniyya* division. To add to that, the other category (*wa-min al-istiʿāra qism ākhar*; ibid., 107) that Zayn al-Dīn mentions in which the analogue (e.g. 'beast of prey') is not mentioned is also given the title *istiʿāra makniyya*, the same one used for metaphor based on ascription. Similarly, the other titles in these chapters read as insertions in the text. The newer edition of the *Rawḍa* (ed. al-Jabr, 42-58) does not have such titles, and in the chapter on *tashbih* they are put in square brackets.

[1096] Even if we do not take the *wa-* to be a contrast warranting the translation "but" and translated it as "Metaphor is one of the categories of figurative speech. It is in reality a comparison […]" – the opposition between *majāz* and *tashbīh* via the phrase *fī l-ḥaqīqa* would indicate that by Zayn al-Dīn's time, *tashbīh* had been commonly excluded from *majāz*. Hence, stating that metaphor is *majāz* and in reality a type of *tashbīh* (= non-*majāz*) also expresses that contrast.

intention is to say "I saw a man who is like a lion in his bravery and in the intensity of his courage," and then you said "I saw a lion." That is more eloquent because you made 'bravery' a necessary [attribute] for him [that is] intrinsic since you made him be/become the lion itself by your lending to him [i.e., the man] the name/noun 'lion'.[1097]

That Zayn al-Dīn intended to contrast between the common inclusion of *istiʿāra* within *majāz* and its actual essence as a comparison is corroborated in the chapter on metaphor found in the newer edition of the work. Here a differentiation is made between the meaning of *istiʿāra* "in the dictionary sense" (or literally, *fī l-lugha*), "in essence" (?, *fī l-maʿnā*) and "as a technical term" (*fī l-iṣṭilāḥ*). The *majāz* inclusion is mentioned under the first meaning.[1098] Admittedly, I am not quite sure how the essential meaning and the technical meaning differ, nor do I understand why *majāz* is mentioned on the level of the *lugha* (and here the text may be corrupted), but it is clear to me that metaphor is essentially (*fī l-maʿnā*) understood by him as a comparison, possibly rendering its inclusion within *majāz* as irrelevant. As he later reiterates, "comparison […] is the original intention behind metaphor" (*al-tashbīh… huwa al-maqṣūd al-aṣlī min al-istiʿāra*).[1099] One assumes that by Zayn al-Dīn's time, the exclusion of *tashbīh* from *majāz* was widely recognized (see Ibn al-Naqīb's remarks in §5.4), and therefore, by recognizing *istiʿāra* as *tashbīh* Zayn al-Dīn is implicitly excluding *istiʿāra* from *majāz*. The notion of a 'claiming' (*iddiʿāʾ*) of an essence (*maʿnā*) of a thing to be within something else – a notion originating with al-

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[1097] *Rawḍa*, 90. Al-Zanjānī's chapter on metaphor opens with the definition *hiya -ddiʿāʾu maʿnā l-ḥaqīqati fī l-shaʾy* (*Miʿyār*, 67), therefore it is possible that Zayn al-Dīn is alluding to him (al-Jurjānī has *iddiʿāʾ maʿnā al-ism*; *Dalāʾil*, 437). With regards to the notion of the absence of the particle of comparison *lafẓan wa-taqdīran*, I am not sure why it also includes the underlying level (perhaps the absence of the topic 'man'). It might be connected to a comment made by al-Muṭarrizī (*Sharḥ*, 3v), according to which the topic in *istiʿāra* is omitted *lafẓan wa-taqdīran*. In *Rawḍa*, ed. al-Jabr, we find that what is being lent is the *musammā* 'the thing named' (the referent in the mind) rather than the *ism* 'name' itself. Cf. *Asrār*, 42, where al-Jurjānī also speaks of (in his earlier iteration of the metaphor theory) transference (*naql*) of the *musammā*.

[1098] *Rawḍa*, ed. al-Jabr, 51.

[1099] *Rawḍa* (ed. Shuʿla), 92.

Jurjānī[1100] – also opens the possibility of making *majāz* superfluous, at least on the level of the lexeme.

And yet later in the chapter we see that metaphor is not merely about logical judgments (*iddiʿāʾ*). Zayn al-Dīn conceives of *istiʿāra* as something entering the *lafẓ* 'wording' (*wa-l-lafẓu -lladhī tadkhuluhu l-istiʿāratu*), confining it to the level of the two parts of speech, noun and verb.[1101] On the level of the noun two categories are differentiated (and see above): (i) the identifying metaphor, *an tajʿala l-shayʾa l-shayʾa laysa bihi*, such as identifying a man with a lion in "I saw a lion," and (ii) the ascriptive metaphor, *an tajʿala l-shayʾa li-l-shayʾi laysa lahu*, like ascribing 'humility' to a wing in "lower unto them the wing of humility" (Q 17:24). The difference between the two, it is stated, is that the first type is easily reduced to a simile/explicit comparison –"I saw a man who is like a lion," but the second type is not – *"lower unto them of humility something like a wing".[1102] Here he says, in a passage derived almost verbatim probably from al-Zanjānī's *Miʿyār* (originally in al-Jurjānī's *Asrār*), that those who attempt to find a substratum (*shayʾun yumkinu l-ishāratu ilayhi* "something that can be pointed to") in every metaphor, as in the second category, may end up anthopomorphizing God.[1103] It is in this passage that we find one of the only references to the pair of terms *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* throughout the chapter, when speaking of the borrowed word (*al-ism al-mustaʿār*) in the literal state and in the figurative state (*ḥālat al-ḥaqīqa/ḥālat al-majāz*).

[1100] *Dalāʾil*, 437, where he retracts the notion of *naql* in favor of *iddiʿāʾ*. Since al-Jurjānī speaks of *iddiʿāʾ maʿnā al-ism* rather than *maʿnā al-ḥaqīqa*, he possibly had a more 'grammatical' *maʿnā* in mind, that is, 'meaning' instead of 'essence'.

[1101] *Rawḍa*, 91.

[1102] Ibid., 91-93.

[1103] Ibid., 93-94 (and corrections in parsing the paragraph in *Rawḍa*, ed. al-Jabr, 52-53); *Miʿyār*, 85; *Asrār*, 47; *al-Tibyān*, 108. For a similar claim made by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī see Key, *Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 194, and one suspects that it originated with the theologians (not necessarily Muʿtazilī, for al-Jurjānī was an Ashʿarī).

If the explanations and illustrations surrounding the noun metaphor are not unique to

Zayn al-Dīn, the same holds true for the verb metaphor. All illustrations are identical to the ones

found in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's *Nihāya*, including an illustration from al-Ḥarīrī (al-Zanjānī uses

them as well, and adds several more).[1104] Explanatory comments are brief: if a metaphor enters a

verb it is either metaphorical vis-à-vis the doer (/subject) or vis-à-vis the entity to which

something is done (/object). One minor variation occurs. Zayn al-Dīn provides Q 2:20 "The

lightning almost snatches away their sight" (*yakādu l-barqu yakhṭafu abṣārahum*) as an example

for the *fāʿil* aspect (i.e., lightning is only metaphorically snatching), whereas al-Rāzī gives it as

an example for both the *fāʿil* and *mafʿūl* aspects (also sight is only metaphorically snatched).

Both readings rest on extralinguistic assumptions: lightning cannot snatch; eyesight cannot be

snatched (or, if Zayn al-Dīn's omission is intentional, eyesight can be snatched [by God]). What

is not explained, and remains unclear (also in the *Nihāya* and *Miʿyār*), is whether a mere

substitution of verb would reflect the literal meaning. For even if we posit more literal verbs like

'take away' or 'eliminate' for *yakhṭafu*, predicating them of 'lightning' would still remain

metaphorical. (This example is not provided by al-Jurjānī.)

Comparison in the Form of Iḍāfa

> Metaphors come in all manner of syntactic guises. The favorite one for philosophers is
> the predicative metaphor. The favorite one for the poet is probably the genitive metaphor.
> - Andrew Ortony, *Understanding Metaphors*[1105]

In the discussion following the comments on the verb metaphor Zayn al-Dīn presents a

classification of metaphor from a different aspect (*wa-ʿlam anna l-istiʿārata tanqasimu bi-ṭarīqin*

[1104] *Rawḍa*, 95-97; *Nihāya*, 243-44; *Miʿyār*, 71-74. See also Ibn al-Naqīb, *Muqaddima*, 105-106.

[1105] Andrew Ortony, *Understanding Metaphors*, Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;
Cambridge, MA: Bolt, Beranek and Newman, 1980, 16.

ākhara ilā qismayni).[1106] This, from what I can tell, is Zayn al-Dīn's own classification, or at least it is the only notion within the chapter not derived from al-Rāzī and al-Zanjānī (nor from Ibn al-Zamlakānī). The first category of this new classification is "applying the name of the analogue [i.e., the word signifying the analogue] to the topic without a genitive construct" (*an yuṭlaqa -smu l-mustaʿāri ʿalā l-mustaʿāri lahu min ghayri iḍāfatin*), as in "I saw a lion" for "a brave man." In the later edition of the work it is termed the 'unrestricted' metaphor (*iṭlāqī*). The second category is "annexing [within a genitive construct] the name of the analogue to the topic" (*an yuḍāfa -smu l-mustaʿāri ilā l-mustaʿāri lahu*), later termed the 'annexed' metaphor (*iḍāfī*). This type of metaphor, he says, occurs more commonly than the first type.[1107] Not incidentally, it is very common in Persian poetry, and the notion could be derived from Persian poetics.[1108] What is meant here is what Wolfhart Heinrichs calls a non-imaginary identifying genitive metaphor based on a simile, where "the central element of the analogue is retained in the image and forms a genitive metaphor with the topical element it is meant to interpret."[1109]

The single example Zayn al-Dīn provides for the 'genitive metaphor' is a line by the Andalusian Ibn Khafāja: [meter: *kāmil*]

> *wa-l-rīḥu talʿabu bi-l-ghuṣūni wa-qad jarā*
> *dhahabu l-aṣīli ʿalā lujayni l-māʾi*

[1106] *Rawḍa*, 98.

[1107] Ibid.; ed. al-Jabr, 53-54.

[1108] Though I did not find evidence of this in the works of Rādūyānī, al-Waṭwāṭ, Shams-i Qays or for that matter, the later compilation by the polymath Kamāl al-Dīn Ḥusayn al-Wāʿiẓ Kāshifī (d. 910/1504 or 1505), *Badāyiʿ al-afkār fī ṣanāyiʿ al-ashʿār*, ed. Rahim Musul'mankulov, Moscow: Nauka, 1977 (English [trans. Marta Simidchieva]: 'Wondrous Thoughts on Poetical Tropes'). A category of 'genitive metaphor' (here in the sense of ascriptive genitive) does appear – in the Persian Wikipedia entry of metaphor! Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn also dealt with metaphors (*tashbīh* in his words) that occur in the form of a genitive; see his parsing of al-Buḥturī's *ghamāmu samāḥin* and Abū Tammām's *marʿā ʿaynin* and *wādī nasīb* in §5.1, "Further Engagement with al-Jurjānī: Analogy."

[1109] Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors," 9, 12. For more on Heinrichs' classification see discussion under Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī.

> "The wind is toying with the branches while
>
> gold of late afternoon flows on silver of water"

Here 'gold' (analogue) *is* 'late afternoon' (topic) and 'silver' (analogue) *is* 'water' (topic), and what is meant is "to compare the yellowness of the sun during sunset to gold and the whiteness of the water to silver."[1110] At least on the level of the lexeme, 'gold' and 'silver' are intended literally. One should stress that 'gold' and 'silver' are not acting here as color adjectives as would, say, *aḥmar al-wajh* "red-faced," that is, as what the grammarians call *iḍāfa ghayr ḥaqīqiyya* "improper [!] annexation." Rather, they are proper nouns denoting the chemical elements of gold and silver. This should also not be confused with cases in which the material (like silver) is annexed the noun and acts as its adjective, but occupies the position of the *muḍāf ilayhi* (second term of the construct), not the *muḍāf* (first term of the construct), like *bayḍatu fiḍḍatin* 'a silver egg' or *thawbu ḥarīrin* 'a silk dress'. In the latter type of *iḍāfa* the grammarians insert an elided *min* "[made] of," which is inappropriate in our example above.[1111] According to Wright, the type of *iḍāfa* expressed above – in fact, he cites a single example, *lujayn al-māʾ*! – is identified by the medieval grammarians as a case of *iḍāfat al-tashbīh* "comparative genitive construct."[1112] I am not sure who these grammarians are, but they are probably later ones. As stated by Wright, the expression *lujayn al-māʾ* would be parsed as "*al-lujaynu -lladhī huwa l-*

[1110] *Rawḍa*, 99. The original utterance, he says (see ed. al-Jabr , 54), would be "the rays of sun, which are like gold, fall upon the surface of the water, which is like silver."

[1111] Wright, *Grammar* 2: 199-200, 202. Wright does adduce one instance of a *muḍāf ilayhi* ("genitive" in his words) that indicates the form of a material, in which case the material would be the first term of the construct: *fiḍḍatu l-darāhimi* 'the silver of the dirhams' (ibid. 2: 199, his translation). I am not sure how this phrase differs from *dirhamu fiḍḍatin*, but in any case, here too 'silver' is not meant as a color adjective.

[1112] According to them it is a special case of *iḍāfat al-tafsīr/al-bayān* (ibid. 2: 232, 234.). It is the single example adduced for the "comparative annexation" (his words). I am not aware of grammatical discussions of this type of *iḍāfa* during this time.

māʾu, i.e. *al-māʾu -lladhī huwa mithlu l-lujayni*"[1113] or in our words, "silver that *is* water" =

"water that is *like* silver." Judging by this parsing, what we have here is a likeness between

entities ($T_1 \approx T_2$) expressed as an identity between entities ($T_1=T_2$), not in the form of an

equational sentence ("Zayd is a lion") but in the form of an *iḍāfa* (~"the lion of Zayd"). What is

figurative in *lujayn al-māʾ*, then, is not simply the verbal form of an *iḍāfa* (in that silver does not

"belong" to water), but the implicit expression of a comparison as an identity (in the form of the

iḍāfa). The genitive metaphor that Zayn al-Dīn treats here is therefore similar – on a theoretical

level – to the simple equational metaphor. But artistically, of course, the two are different, and

appealing explicitly to *iḍāfa* in the context of discussions of metaphors was rare. In fact, Zayn al-

Dīn is the only literary theorist I am aware of who identifies the 'equational' genitive metaphor

as a distinct category and who uses the explicit term *iḍāfa*.[1114]

Positing a Literal Substrate

In order to connect the new classification of metaphor (unrestricted/annexed) with the former

classification (noun/verb), Zayn al-Dīn asserts that the annexed metaphor is limited to nouns,

whereas the unrestricted one can occur in nouns and in verbs. It is here that he sheds some light

on his conception of the verb metaphor, where for the unrestricted verb metaphor in Ibn

Durayd's (d. 321/933) *wa-shtaʿala l-mubyaḍḍu fī muswaddihī* [meter: *rajaz*] "the whiteness

flamed through its blackness" Zayn al-Dīn presupposes the full *wa-dabba l-bayāḍu fī l-sawādi*

wa-saʿā fīhi ka-dabības l-nāri fī l-shayʾi l-mushtaʿili "the whiteness spread through the blackness

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[1113] *Ibid.* 2: 232.

[1114] As we may recall, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn recognizes a type of figurative speech based on *iḍāfa* (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 79), but for him, this was not a type of metaphor! More importantly, perhaps, is that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's genitive metaphor (i.e., what we may term 'genitive metaphor') was based on attribution, not identification. It is plausible that the notion of a genitive metaphor was known in Persian poetics, but as aforementioned, I did not find evidence for this. Or perhaps it was via the grammarians.

and advanced quickly in it like the spreading of a fire in a burning thing."[1115] In other words, with regards to the verb metaphor, Zayn al-Dīn takes a non-literal approach (i.e., literal verbs can be presupposed instead of the metaphorical ones), whereas with the noun metaphor, all nominal elements were taken literally: 'lion' (as something claimed of a man), 'wing' (as something ascribed to humility without there necessarily being a substratum), or 'gold'/'silver' (as the analogues of sunset/water). It would seem that while *majāz* with respect to *istiʿāra* on the level of the verb is conceived as a straightforward linguistic notion, *majāz* with respect to *istiʿāra* on the level of the noun is conceived as an extralinguistic notion: the words are used literally but the predication or ascription of one to the other is figurative, superficially akin to ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's *majāz fī l-ithbāt*. According to this interpretation, providing the example of lightning snatching away eyesight would be a mere expression of following the received wisdom (for it is more than a lexical verb metaphor) rather than one of Zayn al-Dīn's own views.

To add to the complexity of the matter, in a very short list of "elegant" (*laṭīfa*) metaphors provided by Zayn al-Dīn, a distinction may be drawn between the Qurʾānic examples and the poetic ones. One might presume that these examples are all of Zayn al-Dīn's choosing (one is from his own prose epistles) and therefore reflect a more authentic picture of his conception of metaphor. And yet, it is hard to reach a conclusion: in the Qurʾānic examples, both nouns and verbs can be reverted into literal counterparts, pointing to a very linguistic, indeed lexical, understanding of the notion; the metaphors in the poetic examples are, *inter alia*, of the simile-based identifying genitive metaphors mentioned above, where the nouns must be taken literally. It does not help that Zayn al-Dīn does not add any commentary to these favorable metaphors. The Qurʾānic examples are (literal substitutions of metaphorical expressions are notated as

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[1115] *Rawḍa*, 100.

SUB):[1116] the head being "aflame" with hoariness (Q 19:4, SUB "spread"); the "keys" of the unseen (Q 6:59, SUB "access"); "white/black thread of dawn" (Q 2: 187, SUB day/night or light/darkness).

The poetic examples display extended parallel images of the topic and analogue, very common in *muḥdath* poetry, and are initially constructed on a simile-based identifying genitive metaphors (many of which are conceits):[1117] the live coal of the cheek burning the ambergris of the mole, from which the smoke betrays the first growth of the beard (image of the topic: first hairs growing on the [red] cheeks wherein lies a mole || image of the analogue: live coal burning ambergris [black] and creating smoke that emits good fragrance || elements with no SUB: live coal [unless it refers to the black hair of the beard], burning, smoke);[1118] inciting one to ride [SUB take on] the brisk winning racehorses of pleasure before the sun of forenoon sucks the saliva of [SUB dries] the morning rain from the mouths [or teeth, SUB petals] of the daisies (image of the topic: hastening one to enjoy worldly pleasures early in the morning, before the sun dries up the daisies from the morning rain || images of the analogue: riding a brisk horse that comes in first in a race; sucking saliva from, or kissing, the beloved's mouth || elements with no SUB: briskness,

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[1116] Ibid., 101.

[1117] Ibid., 101-102.

[1118] Likening the mole to ambergris (or a disk of ambergris) is a common trope both in Arabic and in Persian poetry, where the blackness of ambergris is commonly contrasted with the 'burning' red cheeks. Many examples are cited in Adam Talib, "Woven Together as Though Randomly Strung: Variations in Collections of Naevi Poetry Compiled by al-Nuwayrī and al-Sarī al-Raffāʾ," *Mamluk Studies Review* 17 (2013), 23-43. See also David Pinault, *Story-Telling Techniques in the Arabian Nights*, Leiden: Brill, 1992, 67, 92; Geert Jan van Gelder, "The Ḥammām: A Space Between Heaven and Hell," *Quaderni di Studi Arabi, N.S.* 3 (2008), 9-24, here: 13; Edward G. Browne, "Biographies of Persian Poets Contained in Ch. V, §6, of the *Táríkh-i-Guzída*, or 'Select History', of Ḥamduʾlláh Mustawfī of Qazvín," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (Oct. 1900 and Jan. 1901), 721-62, here: 737. The metaphor above is taken from a line by one ʿImād al-Dīn al-Maḥallī (fl. 7th/13th cent.), quoted anonymously in the *Rawḍa* (he and his line are mentioned in Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt* 6: 251) [meter: *khafīf*]: *jamratu l-khaddi aḥraqat ʿanbara l-khā//li fa-min dhālika l-dukhāni ʿidhārū* (or *ʿidhāruh*, per Ibn Khallikān, and cf. *Rawḍa*, ed. al-Jabr, 57). Al-Ṣafadī compiled an entire anthology on moles in poetry (*Kashf al-ḥāl fī waṣf al-khāl*), and mole-verses are collected within larger anthologies by early and later litterateurs alike (see Talib, "Woven").

winning racehorses);[1119] (in a prose sample from one of Zayn al-Dīn's letters) marveling at the

way the sucked lustre of the front teeth glitters, and the tower of glass gleams, and the sun of

wine shines (identifying metaphors: tower = wineglass, sun = wine).[1120] As evident from these

examples, the elements that cannot be reduced to a literal phrase are often constructed in order to

expand the realm of the analogue in a process sometimes referred to as *tarshīḥ* 'grooming'. In

fact, Ibn Ḥamdīs's lines on taking pleasures in the morning are also discussed under this

category.[1121] The notions of *tarshīḥ* and its opposite, *tajrīd*, will be discussed under the views of

al-Ṭūfī, but for now suffice it to say that all lexical constituents are meant to be taken literally.

The 'extension' of metaphors is one of the major processes analyzed by Heinrichs in his study of

imagery in *muḥdath* poetry.[1122]

To this range of noun and verb metaphors we might add the additional type of metaphor

mentioned at the end of the chapter, namely the one in which the analogue is alluded to but not

mentioned. "Death sinking its claws in" is one of the stock examples – the analogue 'beast of

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[1119] These are the two lines by the Sicilian Ibn Ḥamdīs (d. 527/1133) [meter: *sarīʿ*]: *bākir ilā l-ladhdhāti wa-rkab laha // sawābiqa l-lahwi dhawāti l-mirāḥ | min qabli an tarshufa shamsu l-ḍuḥā // rīqa l-ghawādī min thughūri l-aqāḥ*. The *sawābiq* are things that come first, and are here – esp. due to the concomitant verb *wa-rkab* – a reference to horses coming in first in a race (cf. the expression *sabaqa l-faras fī l-ḥalba*; Lane, *Lexicon*, 1299). The prepositional phrase *lahā* probably means "for (the sake of) them [these pleasures]." Literally, *dhawāt al-mirāḥ* translates as 'having exceeding briskness' (ibid., 2705).

[1120] *mā taraqraqa ẓalmu[a?] thanāyā murshaf wa-taʾallaqa burju zujājin wa-ashraqat shamsu qarqaf*.

[1121] *Rawḍa*, 103; ed. al-Jabr, 56. According to Zayn al-Dīn's later version (ibid.), "when the poet mentioned the hastening (*mubākara*), he borrowed for it [the notion of] riding (*rukūb*), then he 'groomed' the metaphor with what it (the domain of the analogue) demands, and that is the mentioning of the horses coming in first and the briskness; likewise when he says in the second line, "before the sun of forenoon sucks the saliva of the morning rain," the analogue is the sucking and the topic is the sun [?, the text might be corrupted] and he added to the analogue, which is the sucking, by mentioning the saliva and the mouth, and the meaning of it is the sun's removal of the shade, when rising, from the mouths [sic!] of the daisies that are located in the highest tops of mountains, elevated places and hills" (*lammā dhakara l-mubākarata -staʿāra lahā l-rukūba thumma rashshaḥahā* [cf. editor's fn. 2] *bi-mā yaqtaḍīhi wa-maʿnāhu izālatu l-shamsi l-ẓilla ʿinda l-shurūqi min thughūri l-aqāḥi* [sic] *-llatī hiya bi-aʿlā ruʾūsi l-jibāli wa-l-rawābī wa-l-ākāmi*). In the earlier edition it is simply stated that [the notion of] "sucking" is for "the sun's diminishing of the shade," which was then extended ("groomed") by the mention of saliva and mouth.

[1122] Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors," esp. 5-9 (the term *tarshīḥ* is not used).

pray' is alluded to by the verbal phrase but is not mentioned – but a Qurʾānic example, Q 2:27 "Those who unravel [usually translated: break] God's covenant" (*alladhīna yanquḍūna ʿahda - llāhi*), strongly points to the influence of al-Zamakhsharī, who discusses this verse in the very same terms. (The verse is not cited in the works of Fakh al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Ibn al-Zamlakānī or al-Zanjānī and the type of metaphor is left unnamed.) Here the unstated analogue is 'rope' (*ḥabl*), which was supposedly 'lent' (*ʿalā annahu qadi -stuʿīra*) to the notion of a covenant, leading in turn to the choice of the verb *naqaḍa* 'to unravel, untwist', said of a rope.[1123] In both examples, all nouns and verbs are meant at the literal level.

Toward a Unifying Principle?

Looking now at the range of metaphorical examples discussed in the chapter, one is hard-pressed to draw a conclusion as to how they can all be subsumed under a single notion of *majāz*. (The same holds true if one tries to draw a conclusion regarding *istiʿāra*.) To find a unifying principle underlying Zayn al-Dīn's conception of the notion, let us turn to the other categories he classified as *majāz*: *tamthīl* 'metaphorical exemplification', as in "I see you put one leg forward and the other backward" (for a hesitant man), and *kināya* 'periphrasis', as in "he has many ashes [of the cooking-pot]" (for a generous man). The section is very brief, and it opens thus:

> *wa-mimmā yattaṣilu bi-l-istiʿārati ayḍani l-tamthīlu wa-l-kināyatu li-shtirāki l-thalāthati fī kawnihā majāzan wa-fī kawnihā ka-l-furūʿi li-l-tashbīhi -lladhī huwa ḥaqīqatun bi-lā khilāfin bayna ʿulamāʾi l-bayāni fa-li-dhālika alḥaqtuhumā bi-himā*
> Among [the categories that] are also connected to metaphor [i.e., in addition to *tarshīḥ*, *tajrīd* and the implied-analogue metaphor – all of which are part and parcel of metaphor]

[1123] *Rawḍa* 107-108 (and see Shuʿla's note on p. 108); al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf* 1: 268. We as outsiders would say that the case of *naqaḍa* is part of the 'lexicographical' notion of *majāz*, because it has become lexicalized.

are the metaphorical exemplification and periphrasis because all three [*istiʿāra*, *tamthīl* and *kināya*] share the fact that they are *majāz* and that they are like derivatives of the simile (or: comparison), which is indisputably literal speech (*ḥaqīqa*) according to the scholars of the science of *bayān*, and that is why I appended them (*tamthīl* and *kināya*) to them (*tashbīh* and *istiʿāra*).[1124]

Zayn al-Dīn recognizes, following one of al-Jurjānī's signature observations later reiterated by al-Rāzī, that simile (*tashbīh*) is literal speech (*ḥaqīqa*), but unlike al-Jurjānī, that periphrasis (*kināya*) is not.[1125] Here the imprint of Ibn al-Zamlakānī is discernible (see §5.2), where *kināya* was presented as the very first type of *majāz* and *tamthīl* was given the caveat that if the full comparison was stated, it would no longer count as *majāz* ("I see that in his hesitation he is like someone who puts one leg forward and the other one backward").[1126] Al-Zanjānī in the Islamic East differentiated between *kināya* and *majāz* like al-Rāzī, but a vestige of a possibly older view is found within his chapter on *majāz*, where *majāz* is said to be a genus (*jins*) of *istiʿāra*, *tamthīl* and *kināya*.[1127] It seems to have become common wisdom during this time to view *kināya* as *majāz*.

The definition that Zayn al-Dīn provides for *kināya* does not explicitly explain why it is part of non-literal language: "It is expressing a notion by [mentioning] one of its [logical] consequents" (*fa-hiya l-taʿbīru ʿani l-maʿnā bi-baʿḍi lawāzimihi*). In our example, the logical consequent of being generous is cooking a lot of food for one's guests, resulting, in turn, in many

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[1124] *Rawḍa*, 109.

[1125] Al-Jurjānī, *Asrār*, 221-22 and al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 222 (for *tashbīh*); *Dalāʾil*, 66-67 and *Nihāya*, 272 (for *kināya*).

[1126] *Al-Tibyān*, 37, 44. This last assertion explicitly excludes *tashbīh* from *majāz*.

[1127] *Miʿyār*, 90, 95 (where *majāz* and *kināya* are differentiated) and 20 (where the former is said to encompass the latter: *wa-l-majāzu aʿammu mina l-istiʿārati wa-l-tamthīli wa-l-kināyati fa-huwa jinsun lahā*). As a reminder, this opinion has nothing to do with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's views on *kināya*, which for him was a different phenomenon altogether: (usually) a single-term euphemistic expression.

ashes under the cooking-pot.[1128] Here all lexical constituents are meant at the literal level, and the predication is meant at the literal level, but the intended meaning nevertheless involves an implied one beyond the literal one stated. In this way, so it seems, Zayn al-Dīn makes a connection between periphrasis and metaphor: just as the intention of saying that a man "has many ashes" is not that he has many ashes, likewise the intention of saying "she shot me an arrow whose feather is kohl" is not that the woman shot an arrow at the man.[1129] As we have seen with Ibn al-Zamlakānī, there was also a structural resemblance between *kināya* and *tamthīl*, in that they both express an attribute/action indirectly. Does *majāz* for Zayn al-Dīn mean nothing but al-Jurjānī's *maʿnā al-maʿnā* "the meaning [or: implication] of the meaning [of the sentence]," which encompassed both *majāz* and *kināya*?[1130]

Zayn al-Dīn's conception of *majāz* seems to go beyond the notion of implied or indirect sentence meaning. After all, there are other categories among the rhetorical devices that embody this notion but are not considered by him to be *majāz*, like "the apposite request/eloquent beggary" (*ḥusn al-ṭalab*) and "deduced praise" (*al-madḥ al-mufarraʿ*), which involve implicatures, i.e. utterances that hint at the intended meaning but do not express them explicitly.[1131] One common principle found among the categories of *istiʿāra-tamthīl-kināya* is that they are all imbued with images: burned ambergris, ashes under cooking-pots, moving legs. The use of images for the purpose of communicating an intended idea could stand at the basis of Zayn al-Dīn's conception of *majāz*, especially since he sees the variety of *majāz* categories as

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[1128] Al-Sakkākī more accurately identifies a series of logical consequences, not just one (*Miftāḥ*, 405).

[1129] The example is taken from *Rawḍa*, 103, discussed under the 'groomed' metaphor (*tarshīḥ*).

[1130] E.g., *Dalāʾil*, 262-63.

[1131] Ibid., 245-48. On the former literary device see Geert Jan van Gelder, "The Apposite Request: A Small Chapter in Persian and Arabic Rhetoric," *Edebiyât* 12 (2001), 1-13, from which I take the phrase "eloquent beggary" (p. 8).

harking back to the notion of *tashbīh* (*ka-l-furūʿ li-l-tashbīh*) – a device concerned with images par excellence (and even though in *kināya* no comparison is involved!). But interpreting *majāz* as the use of imagery in speech is also not free of caveats. First, there is nothing etymological connecting the term *majāz* with "images" (usually it is the idea of "going beyond" that stands at the etymological basis of the term).[1132] Second, following this rational, one would expect to find *tashbīh* among the categories of *majāz*, especially given the remark *ka-l-furūʿ li-l-tashbīh*. While the 'theoretical status' of *tashbīh* in Zayn al-Dīn's work is not made clear, one of the subtypes of *tashbīh* is in fact considered to be a part of metaphor (*qism min aqsām al-istiʿāra*), and by implication, *majāz*. This is the "emphasized simile" (*tashbīh muʾakkad*), in which "one thing is compared to another in meaning(?) and in intention without the particle of comparison" (*tashbīhu l-shayʾi bi-l-shayʾi maʿnan wa-irādatan min ghayri adāti l-tashbīhi*).[1133] The examples are of the type "she let pour [SUB shed] a pearl [SUB tear] from a narcissus [SUB eye]" (*fa-amṭarat luʾluʾan min narjisin*), where each constituent reflects a common conceit for the notion of the topic (raining pearls for shedding tears; narcissi for eyes).[1134] In some examples both topic and analogue are mentioned.[1135] This seems to be a relic of the old controversy of whether an

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[1132] The same holds true for the phrase *ʿilm al-bayān* in standard rhetoric which refers, de facto, to the study of imagery: there is nothing connecting the term *bayān*, etymologically, with imagery.

[1133] *Rawḍa*, 78; ed. al-Jabr, 47, which contains the addition: *fa-yujʿala l-mushabbahu ʿayna l-mushabbahi bihi* "so that the topic becomes the very analogue itself." Al-Zanjānī also identifies a type of *tashbīh* that is *majāz*, whose rule (*ḥukm*) is that of the metaphor, but for him it is the sentence type "I see you move one leg forward and the other backward" (*Miʿyār*, 98). Al-Zanjānī explicitly states (ibid., 66) that the only type of simile/comparison considered to be *majāz* by the "the scholars of *bayān*" is the one that comes "in the manner of the metaphor" (*ʿalā ḥadd al-istiʿāra*). As an aside, it is not clear whether *ʿulamāʾ al-bayān* denotes here the students of the standard second subfield *ʿilm al-bayān* or the scholars of literary theory in general.

[1134] *Rawḍa*, 82, from a line by al-Waʾwāʾ al-Dimashqī (d. *ca*. 385/995).

[1135] E.g., in a line by Zayn al-Dīn himself, in praise of al-Malik al-Nāṣir (who ruled in Aleppo and Damascus): "His cheeks are apples, his eyes a narcissus, his side [of the mouth?] is a myrtle, his saliva wine" (ibid., 83). He also mentions the more archetypal "Zayd is the lion" (sic: *Zaydunⁱ l-asadu*, comparing it with *Zaydun ka-l-asadi*; ibid., 84).

utterance displaying both topic and analogue of the type "Zayd is a lion" is a metaphor or a simile (as opposed to "I saw a lion," where the topic is not mentioned), preserving one tangible connection between the notions of *majāz* and *tashbīh*.[1136]

If we compare Zayn al-Dīn with Ibn al-Zamlakānī, we find that both viewed *majāz* as a category comprising *istiʿāra*, *tamthīl* and *kināya*, and both rejected the inclusion of *tashbīh* therein (Ibn al-Zamlakānī implicitly, Zayn al-Dīn explicitly). They both seem to take the *majāz* as expressing 'untrue' propositions (unlike al-Jurjānī), but understand *tashbīh* as expressing 'true' propositions (following al-Jurjānī). They are preserving, on one hand, an older implicit understanding of *majāz* as *kadhib* (=Ibn Rashīq, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn), but on the other hand, they take an 'objectivist' stance with regards to the simile by treating the 'figurative' similarity claim the same way they would the 'literal' similarity claim (≠ Ibn Rashīq, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn). Conceiving of *majāz* as incompatible with *tashbīh* says not so much about their view on *majāz* as it does of their view on *tashbīh*. In other words, an underlying understanding of *majāz* as "literary *kadhib*" still persists for scholars like Ibn al-Zamlakānī and Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī, but an understanding of *tashbīh* as 'false' comparison does not.

To conclude Zayn al-Dīn's treatment of non-literal speech we must return to the fact that no chapter on *majāz* is included in the book – a *mukhtaṣar*, to be sure – but nevertheless a work on literary theory. By the seventh/thirteenth century, any work touching upon stylistics, poetics and rhetoric customarily included at least some comment about the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dyad, and the fact that this work does not merits our attention. The fact that we are hard-pressed to find a

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[1136] Not all instances of *tashbīh muʾakkad* lack the particle of comparison: in Zayn al-Dīn's classification, the "reversible" simile, where the more salient is compared to the less salient (the full moon is like one's face/forehead), is part of *tashbīh muʾakkad*, and here the example exhibits the explicit *mithl* (ibid., 84). He terms this device "turning the source into a derivative and the derivative into a source." The more common term for this device, *tashbīh al-ʿaks*, is used by Zayn al-Dīn for another device (the one immediately following), the "mirroring" simile, in which both A is compared to B and B to A, in the same line (even if the comparison is from different aspects).

common denominator between the *majāz* categories is not unique to Zayn al-Dīn's work, and it would be tempting to conclude that the author realized this as well. More reasonable would be first, to point out that he took for granted the reader's knowledge on *majāz*, and second, to be reminded of the fact that his outlook was primarily poetic (as opposed to, say, Ibn al-Zamlakānī).

Majāz is Not Necessarily Badīʿ

Al-Zanjānī from the Islamic East also had a uniquely poetic outlook – the first two parts of the *Miʿyār* deal with meter and rhyme – but he *did* include the common prolegomenon on *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*. His treatment is relatively brief and highly indebted to al-Jurjānī and al-Rāzī, as it contrasts lexical *majāz* (*majāz fī l-muthbat* 'majāz in the predicate/the thing affirmed') with logical *majāz* (*majāz fī l-ithbāt* 'majāz on the [level of] predication/affirmation').[1137] And yet, he later makes an interesting comment about *majāz* when explaining why it is broader than *istiʿāra*: first, in every metaphor there must be an intended exaggeration, a condition that does not apply for *majāz* (this is irrelevant for our purposes), and second, every metaphor is a part of *badīʿ* but not every *majāz* is (*kull istiʿāra min al-badīʿ wa-laysa kull majāz minhu*).[1138] What al-Zanjānī means here by *badīʿ* is not the field he terms *ʿilm al-badīʿ* (which encompasses the sciences of *maʿānī* and *bayān*), since *majāz* is considered part of it by the mere treatment of if in the book.[1139] Rather, what is meant by *badīʿ* is either the narrow scope of poetic embellishments – those figures of speech considered to be beautifying elements (*maḥāsin*), whose treatment is preceded by the phrase *wa-min aqsām al-badīʿ* – or the abstract notion of 'something novel,

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[1137] *Miʿyār*, 17-24 (the entire chapter), esp. 20-24 (the lexical/logical *majāz*). Incidentally, it is here that al-Zanjānī "slips" and considers *kināya* to be a part of *majāz* as well (p. 20). It is also noteworthy that he, too, refers to the third part of his work (or the work as a whole) as a *mukhtaṣar* (ibid., 400).

[1138] Ibid., 68 (*wa-l-istiʿāratu akhaṣṣu mina l-majāzi idh qaṣdu l-mubālaghati sharṭun fī l-istiʿāra dūna l-majāzi wa-ayḍan fa-kullu -stiʿāratin mina l-badīʿi wa-laysa kullu majāzin minhu*).

[1139] See ibid., 3 (*ʿilm al-badīʿ al-mushtamil ʿalā ʿilmay al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*), and §4.3 above.

original', which is what *badīʿ* literally means.[1140] Since the embellishments are clearly

demarcated by al-Zanjānī by the use of *wa-min aqsām al-badīʿ* and metaphor falls outside this

demarcation,[1141] it is likely that *badīʿ* refers here to novel and original poetic speech (including

artistic prose). By this account, not every instance of *majāz* is novel since much of it has become

lexicalized, that is, part of the conventional lexicon. Metaphors would thus be part of the original

and novel types of speech, whereas *majāz* may be excluded from it by not always displaying

novelty.[1142]

    Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī was probably familiar with this notion, which harks back to al-

Jurjānī's *Asrār*. There, al-Jurjānī made the claim that it would be preposterous (*bayyin al-fasād*)

to view every *majāz* as *badīʿ*, but the context of his claim was specifically the metonymy (a term

not used), a figurative word based on contiguity (*sabab*, *mulābasa*, etc.), not metaphor, a

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[1140] See Heinrichs, "*Badīʿ*," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature* 1: 122-23, here: 122, for the literal meaning. Literary devices within the narrower scope of embellishments in al-Zanjānī's work include echo (repeating the rhyme word at the beginning of the line, *radd al-ʿajuz ʿalā l-ṣadr*), antithesis (*taṭbīq*), and more (*Miʿyār* 206, 219, preceded by the phrase *wa-min aqsām al-badīʿ*). There is another meaning of *badīʿ* not relevant for our purposes, namely, 'the new style of poetry', the essence of which was the use of 'bold' metaphors (imaginary metaphors with no substratum, based on analogy, and usually combined with other rhetorical devices; Heinrichs, "*Istiʿāra and Badīʿ*," esp. 180, 187, 190-91, 195, 200 fn. 34, 204).

[1141] This is contrary to the early Ibn al-Muʿtazz, who treats *istiʿāra* as one of the major figures in *badīʿ* (Heinrichs, "*Istiʿāra and Badīʿ*," 187).

[1142] Ibn Rashīq (and many others) also makes a connection, albeit implicitly, between *badīʿ* as "innovation" (*ibdāʿ*) and metaphors/similes, because all of the *shawāhid* he adduces for newly-created images (*maʿānī*) are metaphors and similes/analogies (*al-ʿUmda* 1: 262-65; he titles the chapter *bāb al-mukhtaraʿ wa-l-badīʿ* but later tries to distinguish *badīʿ* from *ikhtirāʿ* in an unconvincing argument). See also the case of the "catalogues of images" (*kutub al-maʿānī*) which are essentically collections of *tashbīhāt* (fn. 519). Alexander Key elaborates on the idea of *badīʿ* with regards to al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (fl. ≤ 409/1018) and argues that the term *badīʿ* as 'innovation' is indistinguishable from *badīʿ* as 'rhetorical figures' because all rhetorical figures require from the poet/prose writer an innovative use of language (*Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 175 ff., esp. 177, 179). The authors that we are dealing with here do not necessarily display this. First, some *istiʿārāt* – esp. the single-word 'hackneyed' ones (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's understanding) – do not involve innovation (and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn all but says so, see pp. 290-91 above). Second, authors usually attend to 'conventional *majāz*' in these works (the *majāz* of the lexicographers: metonymy, conceptual metaphor, etc.), and it too is not part of innovative language. I have not seen al-Rāghib's ms. on *badīʿ* (*Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 53, 180-85), and one wonders if he treats 'lexicalized' metaphors here. It will be mentioned that the work contains a chapter on the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* dyad (ibid., 180; used here in the lexical sense?). According to Key (ibid., 197), any form of "literary innovation" (*badīʿ*) may become part of the lexicon, provided that it becomes sufficiently widespread: Key is probably speaking of the innovations of the ancient Arabs here.

figurative word based on similarity (*tashbīh*).[1143] Al-Zanjānī may have recognized that many

expressions, beyond metonymy, that were tagged as *majāz* by older scholars (inside and outside

literary theory) were lexicalized and hence not *badīʿ*. As a scholar of poetics, he would mostly be

interested in novel expressions, not those that can be found in the dictionaries. Zayn al-Dīn al-

Rāzī probably had a similar view, and accordingly, marginalized the place of *majāz* within

literary-theoretical studies.[1144]

Lastly, we must return to the fact that Zayn al-Dīn's work is closely aligned with early

Persian works on poetics. Within this early Persian tradition, *majāz* too played no role in the

study of literary devices. Both Rādūyānī (active 5th/11th cent.), who wrote the first Persian work

on stylistics, and Rashīd al-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ (d. end of 6th/12th cent.) in his *Ḥadāyiq al-siḥr*

'Gardens of Enchantment' do not mention the notion of *majāz* (although they do speak of a

proper [*ḥaqīqī*] word/meaning when briefly explicating the notion of *istiʿāra*).[1145] Shams-i Qays

does make use of *majāz* but only as a terse prolegomenon to metaphor.[1146] According to

Benedikt Reinert, because the Perisan literary tradition lacked the sacrosanct equivalent of the

Qurʾān, the Qurʾānic hermenuetical component so prevalent in the Arabic works was non-

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[1143] *Asrār*, 368 (24/5, esp. ll. 15-18). In the appendix to the *Asrār* (paragraphs 24-26), al-Jurjānī begins with the type 'hand'-for-'favor' – what we would call metonymy – and the word (*qawl*) he uses for this type is simply *majāz* (*Asrār*, 366.6). But later he uses *majāz* in a more general sense of figurative language (e.g., 368.3-5). As a side note, it is not clear why al-Jurjānī would make the very obvious claim (ibid.) that every *istiʿāra* is *majāz* but not every *majāz* is *istiʿāra*: surely, this was in no need of proof. I wonder if by *istiʿāra* he specifically meant here metonymy, like Ibn Duryad, whom he quotes the following page. (Later al-Jurjānī uses *istiʿāra* in the strict sense of figurative expression based on similarity.)

[1144] In this respect Key is correct to say that "for [al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī] and many of his contemporaries the term *badīʿ* primarily served to isolate and recognize innovation" (*Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 177), but what I would add is that this puts *badīʿ* – a literary notion – at odds with *majāz*, a linguistic notion.

[1145] *Tarjumān*, 40-43; *Ḥadāyiq*, 256-57 (Persian text).

[1146] *Al-Muʿjam*, 317-18. Tellingly, Landau translates *majāz* here as "image" vis-à-vis "reality" (*ḥaqīqat*), although she later uses the more common "figurative/proper use"; see Justine Landau, *De rythme et de raison: Lecture croisée de deux traits de poétique persans du XIIIᵉ siècle*, Paris: Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2013, 149.

existent in Persian rhetoric.[1147] By this rationale, the notion of *majāz* as figurative language which emerged in the context of Qurʾānic hermeneutics was irrelevant for the Persian literary theorists. It just so happens that the Persian context tallies well with a more "native-Arabic" marginalization of *majāz* that was occurring at the same time, namely, by Ibn al-Zamlakānī (§5.2).

5.4. Literary Theory in the Context of *Tafsīr*: Ibn al-Naqīb

In contrast to many of the other works we are looking at, Ibn al-Naqīb devotes a considerable portion of his work to the topic of *majāz*. Just the mere volume of the study suggests that *majāz* by Ibn al-Naqīb entails more than a narrow scope of non-literal usage. The study forms the first out of three sections in Ibn al-Naqīb's *Muqaddima* and is partially indebted to a work on *majāz* written by the slightly earlier ʿIzz al-Dīn ("al-ʿIzz") b. ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1262), the famous Damascene Shāfiʿī jurist and judge, nicknamed *Sulṭān al-ʿulamāʾ* 'Sultan of the scholars'.[1148] Al-ʿIzz's work, *al-Ishāra ilā al-ījāz fī baʿḍ anwāʿ al-majāz*, serves as a framework to Ibn al-Naqīb's section on *majāz* but much of its contents are revised (especially the sections we will look at), probably due to the *uṣūlī* underpinnings of the former. It would seem that the fact that it was a reflection of views prevalent in legal theory did not go unnoticed by Ibn al-Naqīb. Suffice it to

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[1147] B. Reinert, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-bayān; In Persian," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition* (and a more extreme, and inaccurate, position in Faruqi, *Sabk-e Hindi*, 35: "[…] all Arab literary theory originated from exegeses on the Qurʾān"). To be sure, Reinert is thinking here of the Sakkākian model of rhetoric, but in fact, none of the earlier works of Arabic literary theory can be understood without the Qurʾānic context. I am therefore generalizing his observation.

[1148] ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Sulamī, *al-Ishāra ilā l-ījāz fī baʿḍ anwāʿ al-majāz*, Medina: al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya, [196-?] (several other recent editions have come out, apparently due to al-ʿIzz's modern-day popularity. English: 'Pointing to Conciseness on some of Types of Non-literal Speech'). On al-ʿIzz's life see E. Chaumont, "al-Sulamī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition*. The *Ishāra* is also referred to as *Majāz al-Qurʾān*, seemingly because of the overwhelming Qurʾānic examples and the large section on Qurʾānic illustrations of *ḥadhf al-muḍāf* (elision of the first term of the construct), arranged according to the order of the *sūras*. Ibn al-Naqīb refers to this work as *al-Majāz* (*wa-qāla l-shaykhu l-imāmu ʿIzzi l-Dīni -bni ʿAbdi l-Salāmi fī kitābihi l-maʿrūfi bi-l-majāz*; *Muqaddimat tafsīr Ibn al-Naqīb*, 70). See also fn. 1152 below.

mention the conspicuous absence of *istiʿāra* in the long list of ʿIzz al-Dīn's *majāz* categories to situate the work within a different tradition.[1149]

The section on *majāz* in Ibn al-Naqīb's *Muqaddima* contains twenty-four categories that range from metonymies and metaphors to brevity and change in word order. In case there is any doubt that this range of linguistic phenomena constitutes a part of *majāz* in Ibn al-Naqīb's thought, he ends the discussion with an affirmation that each of "the twenty-four categories that we have mentioned among the categories of *majāz*" could be further classified into many more subcategories, if one endeavored to do so.[1150] The vast majority of these categories are metonymies, synecdoches and dead metaphors, and these are the ones closely aligned with ʿIzz al-Dīn's work on *majāz*: e.g., referring to 'what is known' (*maʿlūm*, or other passive notions expressed by the passive participle) by using the word 'knowledge' (*ʿilm*, or other *maṣdars*), referring to the outcome (*musabbab*) by its cause (*sabab*), referring to the whole (*al-kull*) by the part (*al-baʿḍ*), dead metaphors ('light' for 'belief', 'lion' for 'brave man'), and many more.[1151] Many of these cases are lexicalized instances of *majāz*, that is, they have become part of the very lexicon of Arabic. Only three categories do not reflect this lexical tendency, and not incidentally, they are not derived from ʿIzz al-Dīn's *Ishāra*. These are metaphor (*istiʿāra*), simile (*tashbīh*),

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[1149] The term *istiʿāra* is briefly mentioned as a possible synonym of *majāz*; see *al-Ishāra*, 29-30. The work by al-ʿIzz deserves a separate study. Zakariyyā ʿAlī, the editor of Ibn al-Naqīb's *Muqaddima*, conducted an initial comparison between the contents of the two works; see *Muqaddima*, 65-66.

[1150] *Muqaddima*, 176.

[1151] *Muqaddima*, 25 ff. (under the category of *majāz al-taʿbīr bi-lafẓ al-mutaʿallaq bihi ʿan al-mutaʿalliq*, roughly: a figurative word in which a thing is expressed by using a word that is grammatically [?] connected to it), 36 ff., 46 ff., 68 (under the category *al-tajawwuz fī al-asmāʾ*; the term 'dead metaphors' is ours). We noted above the absence of *istiʿāra* in ʿIzz al-Dīn's work: it should be reminded that dead metaphors do not conform to the typical discussions of *istiʿāra* in Arabic literary theory, despite the fact that the stock example is 'lion' for 'brave man'. Ibn al-Naqīb's discussion of *istiʿāra* reflects the diversity of metaphor in poetry, and many of the examples would not count as dead metaphors.

and change in word order (*taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr*).[1152] In all three, the discussion begins with the

query, *hal huwa min al-majāz am lā* "is it part of *majāz* or not?", suggesting a conscious

engagement on Ibn al-Naqīb's part with the suitability of certain linguistic phenomena with the

concept of *majāz*.[1153]

Rejection of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

Considering that some of the theoretical deliberation is adopted from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's

Nihāyat al-ījāz fī dirāyat al-iʿjāz (the epitome of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's *Dalāʾil al-iʿjāz* and

Asrār al-balāgha), it is interesting to see how those views are reconciled with Ibn al-Naqīb's

majāz classification, especially those sections not derived from al-ʿIzz's *Ishāra*. In this case, one

must decide which impulse takes precedence in assessing his conceptions: the quoted material

from earlier scholars or the 'metadata' material, that is, Ibn al-Naqīb's arrangement and choice of

categories. On one hand, the latter impulse should take precedence, since it constitutes a more

conscious and deliberate act than quoting from stock sources in the field. In this sense, the

arrangement of material (the one not derived from al-ʿIzz) is akin to the analyses of poetic

illustrations (*shawāhid*) in that it may reveal a more genuine view by the author rather than an

accepted view or received wisdom. But on the other hand, if the quoted material is from a

revered source, and one that is recognized as such, it may perhaps be the arrangement of the

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[1152] Another category that does not display 'lexical' types of *majāz* is the one titled *al-ījāz wa-l-ikhtiṣār* 'brevity' (*Muqaddima*, 139-65) which is closely aligned with *ḥadhf* 'ellipsis', usually here: common syntactic deletions. Rather than lexical 'idiosyncracies', what we have here are primarily syntactic ones. *Ḥadhf* was treated extensively by ʿIzz al-Dīn but he did not subsume it under *majāz* (*al-Ishāra*, 6-27, with nineteen subcategories). I think that because the *Ishāra* was known as a book on *majāz*, readers took it as a matter of course that ʿIzz al-Dīn would consider *ḥadhf* as *majāz*, following the tradition dating back to Abū ʿUbayda. The fact that the Ibn al-Naqīb does not open the chapter on brevity with the query, *hal huwa min al-majāz am lā*, may attest this.

[1153] *Muqaddima*, 88, 112, 139, 166. Several subsections within the category termed *al-tajawwuz fī al-afʿāl* also do not confirm to the vast range of metonymies and dead metaphors, but rather to morphological 'non-transparency' (*Muqaddima*, 69 ff., such as the use of the form *yafʿalu* to express a past tense, *faʿala* for future tense, the declarative form for the imperative, and more). On the other hand, many categories within *ījāz* are instances other than *ḥadhf* 'elision', and would reflect discussions found in al-ʿIzz's *Ishāra*.

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material that reflects the received wisdom and the recounted opinion that reflects the personal view. In the case of Ibn al-Naqīb's conception of *majāz* it seems that the metadata material takes precedence.[1154]

The most prominent case in point illustrating the complexity of Ibn al-Naqīb's views on *majāz* is *tashbīh* 'simile; comparison'. Occupying the twenty-first category of *majāz*, the discussion of *tashbīh* opens with the explicit debate regarding its inclusion within *majāz*.[1155] There is little doubt that the brief section titled *hal huwa min al-majāz aw lā* concludes in the negative:

> *ammā l-awwalu [hal huwa mina l-majāzi aw lā] fa-lladhī ʿalayhi jumhūru ahli hādhihi l-ṣināʿati anna l-tashbīha min anwāʿi l-majāzi wa-taṣānīfuhum kulluhā tuṣarriḥu bi-dhālika wa-tushīru ilayhi wa-dhahaba l-muḥaqqiqūna min mutaʾakhkhirī hādhihi l-ṣināʿati wa-ḥudhdhāquhum ilā anna l-tashbīha laysa mina l-majāzi li-annahu maʿnan mina l-maʿānī wa-lahu ḥurūfun wa-alfāẓun tadullu ʿalayhi waḍʿan kāna l-kalāmu ḥaqīqatan aw majāzan fa-idhā qulta zaydun ka-l-asadi wa-hādhā l-khabaru ka-l-shamsi fī l-shuhrati wa-lahu raʾyun ka-l-sayfi fī l-maḍāʾi lam yakun mithla naqli l-lafẓi ʿan mawḍiʿihi fa-lā yakuna majāzan*

> As for the first (question) [is it part of *majāz* or not], the opinion that the majority of the scholars of this craft hold is that simile is [counted] among the types of figurative speech, and all of their writings make this explicit and mention it. [But] the independently-minded critical thinkers and thoroughly learned from among the later [scholars] of this craft hold the view that simile is not [a type] of figurative speech because it is one of the meanings/notions [that exist], and [therefore] has particles and words that signify it by original coinage, whether the utterance is literal or figurative. So if you say "Zayd is like a lion," "This account is like the sun in [its] conspicuousness," and "He has an opinion

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[1154] In this sense, Ibn al-Naqīb's choices of arrangement would be different than the early compilatory efforts of scholars like al-ʿAskarī in his *Ṣināʿatayn*. The latter, for instance, is commonly understood to be pure amalgamation without much thought behind it (see, e.g., Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, 45). I think the deliberation below will show that Ibn al-Naqīb's choices betray a more tightly-knit theory than was the case with earlier literary-critical compilations.

[1155] The topics that are discussed in the chapter of *tashbīh* revolve primarily around the types of comparisons: physical versus conceptual, simple versus composite, and more (*Muqaddima* 114-33). He also includes the topics of *tamthīl*, here: the illustrative analogy (or metaphorical exemplification, ibid., 135), and proverbs (ibid., 135-38).

that is like a sword in [its] sharpness," it is not like transferring a word from the original meaning for which it was coined (*mawḍūʿ*) and is thus not figurative speech.[1156]

One such "independently-minded critical scholar" is Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, whose explanation of the non-inclusion of *tashbīh* within *majāz* is taken almost verbatim and without acknowledgement by Ibn al-Naqīb, an explanation which, in turn, is closely adopted from al-Jurjānī's deliberation in the *Asrār*.[1157] There, al-Jurjānī speaks of the notion of 'likening' as a notion/concept (*maʿnan min al-maʿānī*) that has words signifying it. Thus, using those words – seemingly a reference to *ka-*, *ka-anna*, *mithl*, and the like – reflects a literal usage of speech, as would be the case with any other notion (*sāʾir al-maʿānī*) expressed using the word for which it was coined (*mawḍūʿ*):

> *li-anna l-tashbīha maʿnan mina l-maʿānī wa-lahu ḥurūfun wa-asmāʾun tadullu ʿalayhi fa-idhā ṣurriḥa bi-dhikri mā huwa mawḍūʿun li-l-dalālati ʿalayhi kāna l-kalāmu ḥaqīqatan ka-l-ḥukmi fī sāʾiri l-maʿānī fa-ʿrifhu*
>
> Because 'likening' is a notion; it has particles and nouns that signify it. So if the mentioning of that [i.e., the word] which is coined/set down to signify it [i.e., the notion of 'likening'] is made explicit – then the utterance is literal, just as is the case with [all] other notions. So know that![1158]

[1156] *Muqaddima*, 113, and see editor's fn. 2. The *muḥaqqiq* is a scholar who employs *taḥqīq* 'independent critical research' rather than *taqlīd* 'uncritical continuation of early work' (and see El-Rouayheb, *Intellectual History*, 28, 32-33). The *ḥurūf wa-alfāẓ* (that signify a notion) could be taken as a hendiadys to simply mean 'words' (al-Jurjānī uses *ḥurūf wa-asmāʾ*; *Asrār*, 222). As for the contentious *maʿnan min al-maʿānī*, Bonebakker takes this term as "a principle of syntax" in the context of al-Jurjānī's discussion of *naẓm*, and thus as "a way of formulating a common syntactic construction" with respect to *tashbīh* (Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-Bayān"). I do not think, however, that the expression is connected here to al-Jurjānī's notion of *maʿānī al-naḥw*, or semantic implications of certain syntactic relations. Rather, it seems to refer simply to a concept, notion or meaning, for which there is mirror a word that can denote it. For evidence see below.

[1157] Al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 222; al-Jurjānī, *Asrār*, 221-22. When Ibn al-Naqīb later quotes again from al-Rāzī, anonymously, he precedes it with once more with a reference to the "independently-minded critical scholars" (*fa-qāla l-muḥaqqiqūna min ʿulamāʾ hādhā l-shaʾn*; *Muqaddima*, 114, and see also 104).

[1158] *Asrār*, 222. As a terminological aside, note that the term *mawḍūʿ* is used by al-Jurjānī and Ibn al-Naqīb to denote both sides of the same coin, *viz.* the original usage of a word. Ibn al-Naqīb uses *mawḍūʿ* (in the passage quoted above) to refer the original *meaning* for which the word was coined; al-Jurjānī uses it to refer to the original *word* coined for a certain meaning (as he does in his purely grammatical work, *Kitāb al-Muqtaṣid fī sharḥ al-Īḍāḥ*, ed.

For al-Jurjānī, then, a sentence containing the particle of comparison, or any other explicit expression of comparison, would unequivocally be a literal one.[1159]

Whether Ibn al-Naqīb fully accepts al-Rāzī's view is questionable. First, when stating that there are words that signify the notion of 'likening', he adds the stipulation: "whether the utterance [perhaps here: sentence] is literal or figurative" (*kāna l-kalāmu ḥaqīqatan aw majāzan*). This opens the possibility of admitting either a literal or figurative understating of a sentence that contains the notion of likening (i.e., the particle of comparison). Second, and reinforcing the latter conclusion, one of the two definitions Ibn al-Naqīb provides for *tashbīh* also admits either a literal or figurative understanding. Both definitions are again unacknowledged quotations, this time from Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ* (not repeated in the *Mathal*). According to the definition in question, *tashbīh* is "indicating [the fact that] two things share a property (*maʿnan min al-maʿānī*), and that one of them may take the place of the other, *whether it is by way of ḥaqīqa or majāz*" (emphasis added; *al-dalālatu ʿalā -shtirāki shayʾayni fī maʿnan mina l-maʿānī wa-anna aḥadahumā yasuddu masadda l-ākhari wa-yanūbu manābahu sawāʾan kāna dhālika ḥaqīqatan aw majāzan*).[1160] The *ḥaqīqa* case is then explained as a case in which one says with regards to two entities, that one of them resembles the other in all of its qualities (*jamīʿ awṣāfihi*), like two black entities, or white ones, and the like. The *majāz* case is explained as a case in which one says

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Kāẓim Baḥr al-Marjān, 2 vols., [Baghdad]: al-Jumhūriyya al-ʿIrāqiyya, Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-l-Iʿlām, Dār al-Rashīd li-l-Nashr, 1982, 2: 71).

[1159] Ibn al-Zamlakānī followed al-Jurjānī in taking the *ḥurūf wa-asmāʾ/alfāẓ* are a reference to the particles and words of similitude: *a-lā tarā annaka idhā shabbahta zaydan bi-l-asadi bi-dalālatihi l-waḍʿiyyati qulta zaydun yushbihu l-asada fī shajāʿatihi* "Don't you see that if you likened Zayd to a lion using its original signification you, would say 'Zayd resembles a lion in his courage'" (*al-Burhān*, 122).

[1160] *Muqaddima*, 113; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 90. This definition is the second, and more elaborate, of the two definitions provided by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn; it is preceded by *yuqālu*, which may indicate that it was less favored (in Ibn al-Naqīb's version, it is preceded by *wa-qāla qawmun*).

with regards to two entities, that one of them resembles the other in one of its qualities (*baʿḍ awṣāfihi*), like saying "Zayd is a lion."[1161] The critical statement is what follows:

> *fa-hādhā l-qawlu [zaydun asadun] ṣawābun min ḥaythu l-ʿurfi wa-dākhilun fī bābi l-mubālaghati illā annahu lam yakun zaydun asadan ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa*
> This saying ["Zayd is a lion"] is correct in terms of conventional usage and is included within the category of exaggeration, except that Zayd is not really (or: in truth) a lion.[1162]

The key terms here are *ṣawāb* and *ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa*, which point to the realm of the real world, or actual reality, rather than the realm of language. It would seem, then, that the opposite of *ḥaqīqa* – *majāz* – is too understood, at least in the context of *tashbīh*, on the ontological level.[1163] Not only is Ibn al-Naqīb implicitly rejecting al-Rāzī's inclusion of simile within *majāz*, his understanding of *majāz* seems to differ entirely by forsaking its linguistic aspect.[1164]

As we have seen, the tension between an ontological and linguistic understanding of the

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[1161] *Muqaddima*, 113-14; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 90. See also our discussion of *tashbīh* in §5.1. As a reminder, a sentence like "Zayd is a lion" (no particle of comparison) has long been considered a simile in classical Arabic thinking rather than a metaphor (as would be in the Western tradition), since the topic ("Zayd") is mentioned.

[1162] *Muqaddima*, 114; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 90. Note the lacuna in *al-Fawāʾid*, 55, rectified in the *Muqaddima*, based on an earlier edition of the *Fawāʾid*. As the editor ʿAlī notes, the wording here rectifies a typo in the text of the *Jāmiʿ*, where *ʿurf* should be read instead of *ʿarab* (and see *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 90, fn. 2, explaining why the editor inserted *[kalām] al-ʿarab*). Heinrichs translates *ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa* in Ibn Qutayba's *Taʾwīl* as "in truth" in the context of God's speech ("Genesis," 131).

[1163] See also Chapter 5 Preliminaries and §5.1.

[1164] Perhaps as additional evidence for his inclusion of *tashbīh* within *majāz*, we may cite Ibn al-Naqīb's use of the term *majāz al-tashbīh* elsewhere in his work (e.g., *Muqaddima*, 37, 86), although this term is probably derived from al-ʿIzz's *Ishāra*. There, a large section on *tashbīh* occupies the forty-fourth category of *majāz*, in which a hundred and nine subcategories of *tashbīh* are enumerated. The notion of *tashbīh* by al-ʿIzz differs fundamentally and would probably best be understood as lexicalized cases of dead metaphors based on some kind of comparison, such as using the notion of *istiqāma* 'straightness' to denote good deeds (*al-Ishāra*, 88). In this sense, the lexicographical sense of *majāz* is clearly preserved. Let us add that al-ʿIzz too admits either a literal or figurative sense for *tashbīh*, but for a different reason (*al-Ishāra*, 85): when the particle of comparison is expressed, it is a case of *tashbīh ḥaqīqa*, and when it is not, it is *tashbīh majāz*. An example for the latter would be Q 33:6 *wa-azwājuhu ummuhātuhum* "his wives are their mothers" – a case not unlike the ones found in Ibn al-Naqīb's work, but once again, the vast majority of examples that follow this short preamble (under the heading *majāz al-tashbīh*) are cases of dead metaphors (*al-Ishāra*, 87-136).

ḥaqīqa-majāz pairing was a hallmark of early (third/ninth century) theological deliberations.[1165] In this sense, ʿIzz al-Dīn's *Ishāra* is reflective of that tradition – not the literary tradition of Ibn Rashīq et al. – and some of the ambiguity surrounding the ontological/linguistic aspect passes on to Ibn al-Naqīb's *Muqaddima*. Many of the metonymic sections, for instance, are explained by reverting to 'reality' and 'real existence', especially with respect to God's actions. The key expression here is, once more, *ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa* 'really, in truth', but also *fī l-ḥaqīqa* 'in actuality' and *ḥaqīqī* 'real' occur. For instance, with respect to 'scheming' (*makara*) and 'deceiving' (*khādiʿ*) mentioned in several Qurʾānic verses, it is not the possible meanings of the words that are discussed, but rather the extralinguistic possibilities of what God actually *did* (*yaḥtamilu an yakūna makru -llāhi ḥaqīqiyyan*).[1166] Similarly, certain verbs are understood as being attributed to God rather than the expressed subject, since it is He who performed them *in truth* (*al-muqaddim/al-mukhrij/al-nāziʿ ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa huwa -llāh taʿālā*).[1167] This operation is not limited to God: the verb *akhadha mīthāq* 'to take a covenant' is understood as figurative when said of women, since "the taker *in truth* is the person in authority and the woman is the one who gives permission" (*al-ākhidhu ʿalā l-ḥaqīqati huwa l-waliyyu wa-l-marʾatu l-ādhinatu fīhi*).[1168] Once again, the interpreter (Ibn al-Naqīb, ʿIzz al-Dīn) appeals to the real world when assessing this instance of *majāz*.

If the case of *tashbīh* and many of the metonymic categories of *majāz* point to an extralinguistic notion of *majāz*, with *istiʿāra* we have a more conventional proceeding grounded

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[1165] See Chapter 5 Preliminaries and fn. 659.

[1166] *Muqaddima*, 36-37.

[1167] Ibid., 42. The verbs 'bringing forth [a calamity]', 'repelling', and 'driving out' are originally predicated of either unknown entities or Satan. Cf. the early discussion of al-Kindī regarding *al-fāʿil al-ḥaqq* in fn. 659.

[1168] Ibid. (with respect to Q 4:21 *wa-akhadhna minkum mīthāqan ghalīẓan* "they have taken from you a strong covenant").

in language and reflective of both 'classical' literary theory and 'standard' rhetorical notions. Much of the chapter is adopted from al-Rāzī's *Nihāya* and includes standard categories such as the 'imaginary metaphor' (*istiʿāra takhyīliyya*) and 'metaphor by allusion' (*istiʿāra bi-l-kināya*).[1169] And yet, the chapter may provide some context for Ibn al-Naqīb's cautionary attitude toward Fakhr al-Dīn. As previously mentioned, here too the question *hal huwa min al-majāz am lā* precedes the discussion, but this time al-Rāzī is mentioned by name as the single scholar who went against the decidedly mainstream opinion that holds metaphor to be a type of *majāz*. According to Ibn al-Naqīb, al-Rāzī claims there to be "no [word/meaning] transfer" (*ʿadam al-naql*) in the case of metaphor, thus excluding it from being figurative speech.[1170] This view is not quite observed, one might state, in al-Rāzī's *Nihāya*.[1171] However, we have seen from examining al-Jurjānī's own thesis on *majāz* (metonymies, conceptual metaphors, etc.), that it is hard to reconcile *istiʿāra* with *majāz*. Obviously no scholar would explicitly exclude *istiʿāra* from *majāz*, and the fact that Ibn al-Naqīb ascribes this view to al-Rāzī shows that the latter, while recognized as a *muḥaqqiq*, was not necessarily perceived as being right.[1172] Ibn al-Naqīb probably has al-

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[1169] Ibid., 107, 110. See Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī's treatment above and Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī's below. Still, we also find references to Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ* (ibid., 102, 106). As aforementioned, a chapter on *istiʿāra* is absent in ʿIzz al-Dīn's *Ishāra*. The editor of the *Muqaddima* also cites unacknowledged references to al-Zanjānī's *Miʿyār*.

[1170] *Muqaddima*, 89.

[1171] At certain points (e.g., *Nihāya*, 232, 234) it does indeed seem like al-Rāzī is rejecting the notion of *majāz* with regards to *istiʿāra*, despite other textual evidence pointing to the contrary (ibid., 213, 237). For instance, in proving that *naql* 'transference' occurs only in meaning (*maʿnā*) and not wording (*lafẓ, ism*), he analyzes the cases of "Zayd is a lion" and "reins in the hand of the north wind" (from the famous Labīd line) in terms of *iddiʿāʾ* 'a claiming' rather than *naql*, a deliberation from which one could conclude that the notion of *majāz* is rejected altogether (ibid., 234). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, when glossing his own definition of *istiʿāra* (ibid., 232, and repeated with acknowledgement in *Muqaddima*, 91), al-Rāzī explains that the stipulation "for the purpose of exaggerating the comparison" (*li-ajli l-mubālaghati fī l-tashbīh*) is mentioned in order for it "to be distinguished from *majāz*" (*li-tatamayyaza bihi ʿani l-majāz*; *Nihāya*, 231 [all but the principal manuscript have *li-yatamayyaza*, see editor's fn. 4]). Al-Rāzī is possibly referring here to dead metaphors (*majāz* cases based on similarity, but no 'exaggeration' thereof) and to metonymies (*majāz* cases based on contiguity rather than similarity). In any event, it is true that in some of his comments al-Jurjānī (not mentioned by Ibn al-Naqīb) in his later work, the *Dalāʾil*, espouses the view that *istiʿāra* does not concern word transfer.

[1172] This can be seen from Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ's late work as well: we may recall that in the *Badīʿ al-Qurʾān* he

Rāzī's 'eccentric' position on *istiʿāra* in mind when dealing with the question of *tashbīh*. The case of *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* (change in word order) – the other category that opens with *hal huwa min al-majāz am lā* – exemplifies again the noncommittal attitude of Ibn al-Naqīb towards the boundaries of *majāz*. The reason for non-inclusion, namely the absence of a word/meaning transfer, seems theoretically sound, as did the reason for the non-inclusion of *tashbīh* within *majāz*. But once more, we must rely on the mere choice of placing this category within *majāz* to glean Ibn al-Naqīb's support of its inclusion therein.[1173]

Idiomatic Language vis-à-vis Majāz

The actual definitions of *majāz* and *ḥaqīqa* reflect, not surprisingly, a linguistic understanding of the terms, which was well in place in legal and theological works. Probably following the wording of al-Rāzī, a distinction is made between *majāz* on the level of single words (*fī l-mufradāt*) and *majāz* on the level of sentences (*fī l-jumal*).[1174] The preceding account suggests, however, that Ibn al-Naqīb did not heed these definitions. Also telling is the paragraph opening the theoretical discussion on *majāz* (which contains the various definitions and stipulations), which speaks of the reason due to which the Arabs use *majāz* in their language (*al-maʿnā alladhī istaʿmalat al-ʿarab al-majāz min ajlihi*). Here the old discourse of *al-ittisāʿ fī l-kalām*

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abandons the older 'literary' view of *majāz*, which was present in his *Taḥrīr al-taḥbīr*, in favor of the theory laid out by al-Rāzī. But he is also willing to criticize al-Rāzī when necessary (*Badīʿ al-Qurʾān*, 128), either due to a warranted reason or as a show of "counter-*taḥqīq*."

[1173] *Muqaddima*, 166. The reason provided for counting *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* within *majāz* is that mentioning first what deserves to be mentioned later is equivalent to (*ka-*) something transferred (*manqūl*). Early sources famously include change in word order in the purview of *majāz*, such as Ibn Qutayba. This category too is absent from ʿIzz al-Dīn's *Ishāra*.

[1174] *Muqaddima*, 23; *Nihāya*, 169-73. Ibn al-Naqīb also alludes, briefly, to discussions found in ʿIzz al-Dīn's *Ishāra* (*Muqaddima*, 24; *Ishāra*, 28) on the degrees of 'connectivity' between a *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz* (for al-ʿIzz here: 'pragmatic' *majāz*, or implicatures, like saying to a woman one wishes to divorce *iʿtaddī wa-stabriʾī raḥimaki* "Observe the *ʿidda* period [~three menstruation cycles] and keep your womb 'clean'" for "abstain from intercourse during this period"). Ibn al-Naqīb states that more information on the degrees of connectivity can be found in works dealing with *uṣūl al-fiqh*, presumably viewing the work of ʿIzz al-Dīn as part of the tradition of legal theory.

'extensiveness in speech' comes up, and the 'pleasure' the Arabs take in expressing a plethora of meanings, evoking the older understanding of *majāz* as 'idiomatic language'. Following this motif, Ibn al-Naqīb states that Arabs used *majāz* so much that it was more in use than 'transparent speech' (*al-ḥaqāʾiq*).[1175] This leads us to the closing section of Ibn al-Naqīb's work, in which over one hundred categories of non-transparent or 'deviant' types of linguistic phenomena found in the Qurʾān are enumerated.[1176] This appendix of-sorts resembles a table of contents for many of the *majāz* categories, but interestingly, here Ibn al-Naqīb does not use the term *majāz* (*al-tajawwuz bi-X ʿan Y* occurs for several categories after the ninety-ninth one). Rather, the list is presented as types of address (from God) that encompass all kinds of eloquent usage, either deviating from transparent wording or not. De facto, the vast majority of categories reflect the non-transparent usage.[1177]

The terminology of deviation in this appendix presents a distinction between *talwīn al-khiṭāb wa-maʿdūluhu* "variation and deviance in address" or *maʿdūl bihi ʿan ḥaqīqatihi ilā masmūʿihi* "[speech] which is diverted from its literal/real [meaning] to the [meaning] of what is heard from it," on one hand, and *bāqin ʿalā aṣli madlūlihi wa-mawḍūʿihi* "remaining in accordance with its original referent and meaning for which it was coined," on the other.[1178] Despite the absence of the term *majāz* here, the term *ḥaqīqa* is present and represents the basic form from which 'divergence' occurs (*maʿdūl bihi ʿan ḥaqīqatihi*). It would seem that *this* list of non-transparent usage reflects the purely linguistic notion of *majāz*, aking to the old philological

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[1175] *Muqaddima*, 22-23.

[1176] Ibid., 526-34.

[1177] The handful of transparent speech categories include cases such as 'addressing a species', 'addressing an individual', 'the address of praise', 'the address of blame'; see ibid., 526-27.

[1178] Ibid., 526. The term *masmūʿ* seems to be taken from legal theory.

use of the term. Not surprisingly, all examples display lexicalized usage, that is, usage that has become part of the convention of the Arabic language, even if not originally 'transparent'. This is in opposition to a case like *tashbīh*, which pointed to an ontological understanding of *majāz*, or what we may term 'the poetic *majāz*'.

To highlight the difference between the poetic *majāz* and lexicalized *majāz*, it may be useful to say a few more words about the appendix. The variety of 'deviating' speech categories enumerated in the appendix include grammatical deviation, such as addressing the singular by using the plural; lexical deviation, such as using the word 'force' to express 'weapon' (i.e., metonymies; the majority of categories falls under this rubric); morphological deviation, such as using the *faʿala* form (*al-māḍī*) to express a future tense; and pragmatic deviation, such as using the declarative mood to express a prohibition.[1179] All instances are germane to conventional everyday speech, not poetic speech. It is noteworthy that *tashbīh*, *istiʿāra* and *taqdīm wa-taʾkhīr* are absent from this long list, especially since Ibn al-Naqīb presented the list as encompassing all types of eloquent language.[1180] What is more, the phrase *khāṭaba al-ʿarab bi-lisānihim* "He addressed the Arabs using their tongue" (to explain God's wording) points to everyday speech, not poetic. The grounding of the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* pairing in a purely linguistic discourse appears towards the end of the list, when Ibn al-Naqīb enumerates deviant usage of particles (what we would regard as lexical deviation). Here one of the particles is glossed as being used *ḥaqīqatan fī* […] *wa-majāzan fī* "literally/originally [to denote X] and non-transparently/idiomatically [to denote Y]." More often, however, we find that the opposition is made between *ḥaqīqatan fī […]*

[1179] Ibid., 527, 530 and 533, respectively.

[1180] Ibid. 527 (*funūn al-balāgha wa-ḍurūb al-faṣāḥa wa-ajnās al-tajnīs wa-badāʾiʿ al-badīʿ wa-maḥāsin al-ḥikam wa-l-amthāl*). Notably, the editor characterizes the entire section as a general overview, or table of contents, for the categories of eloquence (*funūn al-balāgha*) that had been mentioned previously (ibid., 526 fn. 1, 686).

and *tajawwaza bihā ʿan [...]* "it [the particle] is used beyond [its original, transparent meaning] to [denote Y]."[1181] The relative absence of the term *majāz* in this section in favor of *tajawwaza*, and the presence – nevertheless – of the term *ḥaqīqa*, may point to a different understanding of *majāz* in the body of Ibn al-Naqīb's work, one that has ontological reality at its core (as reflected in language), rather than language proper. What is more, despite the Qurʾānic bent of his work, Ibn al-Naqīb preserves an understanding of *majāz*, at least in the body of his work, that is markedly poetic.

5.5. Putting Theory into Unusual Practice: Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī

Following Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr in *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī presents his meta-discourse on *ḥaqīqa-majāz* under the first division of the work dealing with "general properties of ʿilm al-bayān," whereas the individual figures of speech (*anwāʿ ʿilm al-bayān*), among them those that reflect figurative language, under the second division dealing with "particular properties of ʿilm al-bayān."[1182] Al-Ṭūfī does not normally specify whether a certain figure of speech is literal or non-literal, *istiʿāra* being a notable exception.[1183] As in other chapters, the chapter on *ḥaqīqa-majāz* follows closely that found in the *Jāmiʿ*, with notable modifications. Al-Ṭūfī does not take as a minority view the notion that the word *ḥaqīqa* is a homonym, as did Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn in the *Jāmiʿ*. Rather, it is presented as a homonym from the outset, signifying both the essence of a thing (*dhāt*, *māhiyya*), i.e., an extra-linguistic notion, and a word used according

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[1181] Ibid., 533-34.

[1182] *Al-Iksīr*, 60-67 and 109 ff.

[1183] *wa-bi-hādhā l-qaydi tanfaṣilu ʿan sāʾiri wujūhi l-majāz* "with this restriction [the purpose of exaggerating similarity] it [*istiʿāra*] is set apart from the other types of non-literal speech" (ibid., 109.8-9).

to its original coinage, i.e., a linguistic notion.[1184] *Majāz* is introduced as the counterpart to the

linguistic notion of *ḥaqīqa*.[1185] Al-Ṭūfī presents a list of *majāz* categories, the contents of which

we may classify as metonymies and dead metaphors. He limits the list Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn specified

(derived from al-Ghazālī) to ten categories, reflecting ten major relations between concepts.

These include, *inter alia*, effect-cause (metonymy: naming wine 'grapes'), whole-part

(synecdoche: naming a single *sūra* or verse 'Qurʾān'), physical contiguity (synecdoche: naming

the leather water-bag a *rāwiya* 'camel carrying the water-bag') and similarity (dead metaphor:

naming a stupid person 'ass').[1186]

Limiting Majāz to the Single Word

Despite his presentation of a shorter list of *majāz* types, al-Ṭūfī acknowledges that the number of

relations and associations (*al-ʿalāqāt wa-l-munāsabāt*, *jihāt al-ʿalāqa*) between things or

concepts (*ashyāʾ*) is limitless.[1187] The relation between concepts, presented at times as one

between words (*lafẓān*), is referred to as *al-ʿalāqa al-mujawwiza* 'transgressing relation' and

could not be overstated in al-Ṭūfī's conception of *majāz*.[1188] In an earlier comment under one of

the preliminary sections of the work, he observes two opinions regarding the formation of

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[1184] The definition offered by al-Ṭūfī to the linguistic notion is formulated more rigorously to accommodate the notions of *ḥaqīqa sharʿiyya* 'legal literal usage' (as in *ṣalāt* in the sense of the Islamic ritualistic prayer) and *ḥaqīqa ʿurfiyya* 'customary [rather than original to the lexicon] literal usage' (as in *dābba* in the sense of four-legged animal). See ibid., 60. Compare Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *al-lafẓ al-dāll ʿalā mawḍūʿihi al-aṣlī* "a word indicating its original coinage" (*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 28) with al-Ṭūfī's *al-lafẓ al-mustaʿmal fī mawḍūʿihi al-mutakhāṭab bihi ʿinda irādat al-takhāṭub* "a word used according to the coinage that was spoken at the time the discourse was intended" (*al-Iksīr*, 60).

[1185] *Al-Iksīr*, 60.9.

[1186] Ibid., 60-62.

[1187] Ibid., 64.11-12; see also 60.12.

[1188] Ibid., 60.12. Here he is limiting the relation to *mushābaha* 'similarity', but this is probably an oversight. In choosing the word 'transgressing' I follow Vishanoff, *Formation*, 21 (without the negative connotation it has in English). For *lafẓān* see *al-Iksīr*, 66.7.

figurative usage. According to the first, perhaps alluding to the position espoused by scholars such as the Ashʿarī al-Bāqillānī, *majāz* is determined according to transmitted knowledge (*naql*), that is, previous Arabic usage (*istiʿmāl*). According to the second position, favored by al-Ṭūfī and seemingly most of the scholars of *ʿilm al-bayān* (*ʿulamāʾ al-bayān*), *majāz* is conditioned upon a word transfer (*naql*) that stems from an apparent relation (*ʿalāqa ẓāhira*): "whenever we find it [this condition] we 'transgress' and use [the figurative expression]."[1189] In other words, it is due to the *ʿalāqa* that one may create (a word not explicitly used by al-Ṭūfī) new figurative expressions. However, this position is at odds with the examples provided in the *ḥaqīqa-majāz* chapter, all of which reflect usage that has become part of the lexicon. What is more, the remark reveals the place *naql* 'word/meaning transfer' holds in the conception of *majāz*. Although not specified elsewhere, it is clear that the notion of *naql* is implicitly understood to stand at the basis of figurative usage, limiting the phenomenon to the single word (*lafẓ*). At one point al-Ṭūfī even states that the pillars (*arkān*) of *majāz* are the two words (*lafẓān*) and the relation between them (*ʿalāqa*), giving credence to this limitation.

We now move to the study of *istiʿāra* by al-Ṭūfī to determine how a limited notion of *majāz* is reconciled with metaphors that may not display single word tropes. Here, al-Ṭūfī turns out to be more rigorous in his presentation, as he displays independence both in the structuring of the chapter as well as in analyses of specific metaphors that contradict the view of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. First, al-Ṭūfī is explicit in stating that *istiʿāra* is a type of *majāz*. He repeats the definition he gave for *majāz* almost verbatim – a use of a word not according to its original coinage – adding the condition that its purpose is to exaggerate a comparison, a restriction that separates *istiʿāra*

[1189] *Al-Iksīr*, 41, and repeated in 66. The resumptive pronoun in *fa-ḥaythu wajadnāhu tajawwaznā wa-staʿmalnā* refers to *sharṭ al-majāz* (41.6). For al-Bāqillānī's view see §5.1, "The Legal Underpinnings of *Majāz*."

from other *majāz* types.[1190] Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn did not speak of original word coinage in this context, and in the *Jāmiʿ* he did not even associate *istiʿāra* with *majāz* explicitly. To be sure, this is the only place *majāz* is mentioned by al-Ṭūfī within the chapter of *istiʿāra*.

Second, the rigor al-Ṭūfī displays can be demonstrated by the poetic examples he adduces (those that do not appear in the *Jāmiʿ*) and by the commentary he provides on them. The first poetic example in the chapter is one not mentioned by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn. It is designed to show that in the archetypal metaphor, the topic of comparison is absent ("I saw a lion" – topic not mentioned, versus "Zayd is a lion" – topic mentioned), but more importantly, it implicitly suggests that the archetypal metaphor is a noun metaphor. The line is from Zuhayr's *Muʿallaqa* (d. *ca.* 609) [meter: *ṭawīl*]

> *ladā asadin shākī l-silāḥi muqadhdhafin*
> *lahū libadun aẓfāruhū lam tuqallamī*
> "Before a lion, [his] weapon iron-sharp, full of flesh,
> He has manes, his nails not cut" [1191]

Noun metaphors, adjective metaphors, verb metaphors and particle metaphors are categories that

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[1190] *istiʿmālu l-lafẓi fī ghayri mā -ṣṭuliḥa ʿalayhi fī waḍʿi l-takhāṭubi li-l-mubālagha fī l-tashbīhi wa-bi-hādhā l-qaydi tanfaṣilu ʿan sāʾiri wujūhi l-majāz*; *al-Iksīr*, 109.

[1191] Ibid., 109. In my translation I follow the main interpretations presented in the commentaries by Abū Bakr al-Anbārī (d. 328/940) and al-Shantamarī's (d. 476/1083 or 1084). *Muqadhdhaf* is glossed as *kathīr al-laḥm* but could also mean "being thrown [blows] at." See Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Qāsim al-Anbārī, *Sharḥ al-qaṣāʾid al-sabʿ al-ṭiwāl*, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn, Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, [1963], 277-79 (where the version of the verse is slightly different); Abū al-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf b. Sulaymān b. ʿĪsā al-Aʿlam al-Shantamarī, *Sharḥ dīwān Zuhayr b. Abī Sulmā al-Muzanī*, [Cairo:] al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥamīdiyya, 1323 [1905 or 1906], 10-11. The commentators acknowledge that by *asad* Zuhayr means (*arāda*) 'army' (*jaysh*), and that the rest of the line is grammatically predicated of 'lion' (*wa-ḥamala lafẓ al-bayt ʿalā al-asad* in al-Shantamarī; *wa-l-lafẓ ʿalā l-asad* in al-Anbārī). Al-Anbārī recognizes that it is a metaphor by saying that the lion is a *mathal* for the army (see Chapter 5 Preliminaries on the early meaning of *mathal*). Al-Shantamarī does not use the terminology of *mathal* or *istiʿāra* here. His focus is on the use of 'nails' to refer to 'weapon', and the verb he uses to express this trope is *kanā* 'to allude, call' (*kanā bi-l-aẓfār ʿan al-silāḥ*). Incidentally – or not – the first poetic example for *istiʿāra* cited by al-Qazwīnī is this one (it was not used by al-Sakkākī); see al-Qazwīnī, *Talkhīṣ*, 268 and *al-Īḍāḥ*, 407 (it was also dicussed by al-Zamakhsharī with regards to Q 2: 18 *ṣummun bukmun ʿumyun* "Deaf, dumb, blind" in *al-Kashshāf* 1: 205, on whether there is any element alluding to the topic, hence rendering it a *tashbīh balīgh*, not *istiʿāra*).

al-Ṭūfī explicitly designates later on in the chapter.[1192] One may surmise that he preferred to start with Zuhayr's line rather than the first poetic example adduced by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn since the latter contained a verb metaphor. This is the second example al-Ṭūfī adduces, Ibn al-Muʿtazz's (not mentioned by name) [meter: *madīd*]

> *athmarat aghṣānu rāḥatihī*
> *li-junāti l-ḥusni ʿunnābā*
> "The branches of the palm of his hand produced
> jujube fruit for the harvesters of beauty" [1193]

Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn limited his gloss to the noun metaphors, in a passage derived almost verbatim from al-Jurjānī's *Dalāʾil* (unacknowledged, of course).[1194] The focus was on fingers-for-branches, seekers of beauty-for-harvesters, and (implicitly) henna-dyed fingertips-for-jujube fruit. Al-Ṭūfī adds to these and spells out the verb metaphor in *athmarat* (= 'to appear') as well. Moreover, whereas Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, following al-Jurjānī, explicated the metaphor, and others like it, in terms of a comparison, al-Ṭūfī's commentary betrays a consistency of conceiving of *istiʿāra* as a word transfer/borrowing:

> [Ḍiyāʾ al-Din, following al-Jurjānī]
> *a-lā tarā annaka law kallafta nafsaka an tuẓhira l-tashbīha wa-tufṣiḥa bihi -ḥtajta ilā an*
> *taqūla athmarat aṣābiʿu yadihi -llatī hiya ka-l-aghṣāni li-ṭālibi l-ḥusni shibha l-ʿunnābi*
> *min aṭrāfihā l-makhḍūlati* [should be *makhḍūba*] *wa-man lahu adnā tashabbuthin bi-*

[1192] *Al-Iksīr*, 112. According to Ibn al-Naqīb (*Muqaddima*, 106), this section appears already in the *Jāmiʿ*. In legal theory the discussion of *majāz* is customarily confined to the noun (e.g. al-Āmidī, *al-Iḥkām* 1: 36 ff., assuming that metaphor is a subtype of *majāz*). Al-Zamakhsharī states that *istiʿāra* may appear in nouns, adjectives (*ṣifāt*) and verbs (*al-Kashshāf* 1: 204); al-Ṭūfī may be following al-Zamakhsharī here. Before al-Zamakhsharī (and before al-Jurjānī), al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī makes a distinction between metaphors occurring in nouns, verbs, particles, and more, in his work on *badīʿ* (Key, *Linguistic Frame of Mind*, 180).

[1193] Ibid., 110 and *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 84; Ibn al-Muʿtazz, *Dīwān* (ed. Sharīf), 1: 228.

[1194] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 84; *Dalāʾil*, 450-51.

hādhihi l-ṣināʿati yaʿlamu l-faḍīlata bayna mā taḍammanahu hādhā l-baytu mina l-istiʿārati wa-bayna iẓhārihi ilā l-tashbīhi fa-ʿrif dhālika wa-qis ʿalayhi

Don't you see that if you take it upon yourself to make the comparison visible and utter it explicitly, you would need to say: "The fingers of his hands, which are like branches, produced for the seeker of beauty something jujube-like from its moist [shoud be: dyed (with henna)] edges." Anyone with the least grounding in this craft can distinguish the excellence that the metaphor in this line has from its formulation as an explicit simile. So know that and deduce from it![1195]

[Al-Ṭūfī]

fa-staʿāra l-ithmāra li-l-ẓuhūri wa-l-aghṣāna li-l-aṣābiʿi wa-l-ijtināʾa li-l-ṭalabi wa-l-ʿunnāba li-l-anāmili l-makhṣūṣati [again, probably *al-makhḍūba*] *fa-law aẓhara l-tashbīha bi-an qīla ẓahara min aṣābiʿi yadihi -llatī hiya ka-l-aghṣāni li-ṭālibī l-ḥusni shibhu l-ʿunnābi la-ṭāla l-kalāmu wa-rakka wa-zāla rawnaquhu*

[The poet] borrowed [the word] "producing (bearing fruit)" for [the notion of] "appearing" and [the word] "branches" for [the notion of] "fingers" and [the word] "harvest" for [the notion of] "quest" and [the word] "jujube" for [the notion of] the given [or (henna-)dyed] "fingertips." Had he made the comparison/simile explicit by saying, "There appeared from the fingers of his hand, which are like branches, for the seekers of beauty something jujube-like," then the utterance would be lengthy and weak, and its splendor would disappear.[1196]

Although al-Ṭūfī embeds Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's reformulation of the metaphor as a simile, the discourse he uses accentuates the idea that a *word* has been borrowed. His response to *shawāhid*, both Qurʾānic and poetic, strictly follow the formulaic *fa-staʿāra X li-Y* "he borrowed X for Y," or more often, *fa-staʿāra lafẓ al-X li-Y* "he borrowed the word X for [the notion] Y," whether the metaphor is a noun or a verb (in which case the verb is reduced to its *maṣdar*).[1197] This type of

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[1195] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 84; al-Jurjānī, *Dalāʾil*, 450-51. The passage is discussed in Harb, *Poetic Marvels*, 211; it later appears in al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 248, al-Zanjānī, *Miʿyār*, 69-70, and elsewhere.

[1196] *Al-Iksīr*, 110.

[1197] Ibid., 110.10-11, 111.6 (for *fa-staʿāra X li-Y*), 113.12, 113.3e-114.2, 114.5, 114.14-15, 115.9, 115.13, 115.1e-116.1 (for *fa-staʿāra lafẓ al-X li-Y*). In one instance *lafẓ* is replaced with *ism*; see 115.7.

phraseology is not to be confused with the "old" phraseology of the loan metaphor, in which formulas such as *fa-staʿāra li-Y X* (or the like) referred to the borrowing of an object (or the mental image of that object), not the borrowing of a word.[1198]

In light of al-Ṭūfī's strict evaluation of metaphors as word borrowings, it is revealing to see how he resolves sentence-long ascriptive metaphors (loan-metaphors in Heinrichs' nomenclature). Heinrichs has pinpointed a development in the notion's theory in which *istiʿāra* was reduced from an analogy-based, sentence-long notion to a single-term notion. He notes the final stage of this evolution with al-Sakkākī's reworking of the loan-metaphor ("death sinking its claws in," the so-called "'old' metaphor") into single-term metaphors.[1199] We do not know if al-Ṭūfī was directly influenced by al-Sakkākī but it is likely that he was exposed to standardists' theories. The important difference between al-Sakkākī's 'reduction' and al-Ṭūfī's one is that the latter maintains a nomenclature of word-transfer whereas al-Sakkākī does not.[1200] Our interest here lies in what al-Ṭūfī's solution may tell us about his conception of *majāz*.

Commentary on Shawāhid

Al-Ṭūfī's does not resolve sentence-long metaphors in a uniform way. Several cases he subsumes under the categories of *tarshīḥ* and *tajrīd*, subclasses of metaphor which seem well established by al-Ṭūfī's time. And yet other cases he keeps in line with the word-transfer theory, a choice that may strike us as odd. Beginning with the latter alternative, let us consider the following line by Abū Tammām: [meter: *kāmil*]

[1198] On the "old" phraseology see Heinrichs, *Hand of the Northwind*, e.g., 32-33.

[1199] Ibid., 14.

[1200] Al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ*, 376-77, 378-79. Although at certain points al-Sakkākī does employ the terminology of "naming Y 'X'" (*an tuṭliqa ʿalā* […] *ism* […]); see 377.1, 377.7, 377.11-12.

wa-muʿarrasin li-l-ghaythi takhfiqu baynahū

rāyātu kulli dujunnatin waṭfāʾī

"Many a place for the rain to settle in for the night, where

the banners of every low-hanging dark cloud flutter"[1201]

In praising this line, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn employs the terminology of *jaʿl al-shayʾ li-l-shayʾ* "making something belong to something else," a phrase commonly used in the analysis of 'old' ascriptive metaphors, as Heinrichs has demonstrated.[1202] What is being ascribed here is 'banners' to 'clouds' and Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn seems to be using the phrase to denote a genitive metaphor. According to him, the poet "made the banners [tug banners or banners hung horizontally] belong to the clouds" because "the cloud that is hanging down, which becomes evident in the sky [lit. 'air'] to the observer when the cloud is pouring forth, is similar (*mushābih*) to the dangling forelocks of the banners [in their string-like manner]."[1203] According to this analysis, the genitive metaphor is an identifying one (the banners are the rainclouds) and is based on the comparison: just as banners look when they dangle down, likewise clouds look when they are pouring rain. (In other words, it is not an attributive genitive metaphor of the type "claws of death," despite the wording

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[1201] Ibid., 113; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 85 and the commentaries by al-Khaṭīb al-Tibrīzī (d. 502/1109) and Ibn al-Mustawfī (d. 637/1239) on Abū Tammām's *dīwān*: al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 1: 26-27; Abū al-Barakāt Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mubārak b. Aḥmad al-Irbilī al-maʿrūf bi-Ibn al-Mustawfī, *al-Niẓām fī sharḥ shiʿr al-Mutanabbī wa-Abī Tammām*, ed. Khalaf Rashīd Nuʿmān, 12 vols., Baghdad: Dār al-Shuʾūn al-Thaqāfiyya al-ʿĀmma, 1989, 1: 231-32. The preceding line is Abū Tammām's famous *lā tasqinī māʾa l-malāmi fa-innanī // ṣabbun qadi -staʿdhabtu māʾa bukāʾī* "Do not give me water of blame to drink, for I am in love [and] have found the water of my tears [lit. weeping] to be sweet." The literal translation of (*takhfiqu*) *baynahu* above is "(to flutter) in front of it [the resting place for the night]."

[1202] A summary can be found in *Hand of the Northwind*, 1-2. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn praises the line, but it is still placed below the highest level of metaphors, those that are in the Qurʾān and are inimitable; see *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 85.

[1203] *fa-ḥaythu jaʿala li-l-saḥābati rāyātin kāna dhālika munāsiban li-anna l-haydaba -lladhī yastabīnu li-l-nāẓiri fī l-jawwi ʿinda -nsikābi l-saḥābati yakūnu mushābihan li-dhawāʾibi l-rāyāti*; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 85. When the low-hanging cloud pours out rain, it looks like strings (see the definitions of *haydab* in Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-ʿarab* 6: 4629). The banner Abū Tammām is referring to may be a tug banner, a pole with circularly arranged horse or yak tail hairs at the top. Tug banners are commonly associated with the Mongols but may have been known earlier in the Middle East. The white-haired tug banner symbolized peacetime whereas the black-haired one symbolized wartime. In our case the black tug banner would be appropriate since the clouds are dark and the cacophony of heavy rain would resemble that of war (cf. pre-Islamic images of lightning, below). Alternatively, this could simply be a reference to a banner hung horizontally with unwoven strings at the bottom (*hudb al-qaṭīfa*; see ibid. and below).

jaʿl al-shayʾ li-l-shayʾ.) As Heinrichs has shown, this type of genitive metaphor became common in the poetry of the *muḥdathūn* and is made possible by a concomitant verb metaphor – in our case 'flutter'.[1204] In glossing the verb (*qawl*) *yakhfiqu*, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn adds an auditory component to the image in addition to the visual one, saying that "when the wind blows on the banners, they flutter due to their swaying, and they sound like a cloud when it pours rain, especially [in the case of] a heavy low-hanging cloud."[1205]

Al-Ṭūfī glosses the line differently. Because he goes word by word, explicating what each one stands for (*fa-staʿāra lafẓ al-muʿarras li-…*, *wa-lafẓ khufūq al-rāya* [to refer to the verb *yahkfiqu*] *li-…*, etc.), he breaks down the image to its basic constituents. Thus, the word 'banner' stands for "a cloud approaching the earth" (*hudb al-saḥāba*), as if it were "the unwoven ends of the extremities of a garment" (*hudb al-qaṭīfa*), and the word 'fluttering' stands for "the brisk movement [within] the cloud while it pours rain" (*hubūb al-saḥāba ʿinda humūlihā wa-nṣibābihā*).[1206] According to this interpretation, there is no longer a unified visual image of a banner fluttering, for it is now the clouds that are conceived of as fluttering (metaphorically), not the banner. Instead of an animated and auditory image, what we have is a series of discrete static

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[1204] According to Heinrichs' scheme, this metaphor would be classified as a "non-imaginary 'old' metaphor plus verb metaphor" and more accurately, as an "old" metaphor, non-imaginary (vs. imaginary), containing an identifying genitive construction (vs. attribute genitive construction), based on a simile (vs. not based on a simile). This is a theoretical classification based on Heinrichs' observations and does not directly reflect medieval classifications. See Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors," 4, 9. It is an 'old' metaphor since it contains "the intrusion of an element into a context that is foreign to it in the real world" (ibid., 4). It is non-imaginary because banners are not being truly ascribed to the rainclouds (unless the rainclouds are likened to army troops, in which case the banners would be truly ascriptive). The genitive metaphor is based on a simile because, at least according to the analyses of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn and al-Ṭūfī, there is a direct similarity between the banners and the rainclouds (we would probably say it is not based on a simile; see Heinrich, "*Istiʿāra* and *Badīʿ*," 197, and fn. 27, where he describes such metaphors as less typical).

[1205] *wa-ammā qawluhu yakhfiqu fa-huwa ayḍan ḥasanun marḍiyyun li-anna l-rīḥa idhā habbat ʿalā l-rāyāti khafaqat bi-nawdihā wa-jāʾa lahā ṣawtun ka-ṣawti l-saḥābati fī -nsikābihā [wa-] humūlihā wa-nṣibābihā; al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 85. Sound images for thunder/wind in pre-Islamic poetry are rare but they do exist (see below).

[1206] *Al-Iksīr*, 113-14. He glosses the meaning of *khufūq* as *iḍṭirāb* 'flickering' (cf. images in pre-Islamic poetry, below).

snapshots: first, a banner hanging down, then the brisk change of composition ('fluttering') within the cloud while it rains. To be sure, each constituent of the metaphor is based on a similarity (conforming to al-Ṭūfī's *istiʿāra* definition) – at one point he even uses the word *jāmiʿ* 'common attribute' to express this – but there is no longer a perception of an animated analogy.[1207] Note that although he changes Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's interpretation, al-Ṭūfī still uses the same expressions, such as *hubūb* (used by the former in reference to the wind), *humūl wa-nṣibāb* (used by the former in the context of the storm's sound), etc.

It should still be underscored that al-Ṭūfī's interpretation of this image is inspired directly by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's account: the banners/the fluttering are a metaphor for the raining cloud. For if we look at the poetic commentaries on Abū Tammām's poetry, we find that the interpretations of "the fluttering banners of the dark rainclouds" differ entirely. According to Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (d. 449/1058), whose commentary is preserved by his student al-Tibrīzī (d. 502/1109), the banners of the rainclouds stand for "lightning" (*burūq*, no mention of the verb 'to flutter').[1208] According to al-Ṣūlī (d. 335/946), as recorded by Ibn al-Mustawfī (d. 637/1239), the fluttering of the banners refer to "the abundance of rain in this place" (emphasis on rain, not cloud).[1209]

[1207] Heinrichs points out to the loss of the unity of the image within the elaborate metaphor-scheme of al-Sakkākī (W.P. Heinrichs, "Metaphor," *Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature*, 1: 522-24, herer: 524). The loss of the unity of the image is thus also observed in non-Sakkākian traditions (but that share a primarily Qurʾānic, rather than literary-minded approach). The question I am trying to answer is how a non-animated view of the image (due to the breaking down of the sentence metaphor) reflects on critics' view of *majāz*.

[1208] Al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 1: 27 (*wa-l-rāyātu yaʿnī bihā l-burūqa li-annahā tushabbahu bihā* […] *wa-innamā arāda l-barqa li-annahu yushabbahu bi-l-rāyāti*). In this case, if we return to Heinrichs' analysis of metaphor, the genitive construction would be attributive (the banners are not the rainclouds). But it would still be a non-imaginary metaphor (?) because a substratum – albeit unstated – exists (i.e., 'lightning', as opposed to the 'claws' of death which have no equivalent). A case like this is perhaps what Heinrichs alludes to in stating that there exist other analogy-based metaphors besides the 'inexpressive' ones ('hoof' for 'foot'), in which the transferred element has a counterpart in the domain of the topic (banners = lightning). See Heinrichs, "Metaphorologie-Traditionen," 220.

[1209] Ibn al-Mustawfī, *al-Niẓām* 1: 231 (*takhfiqu fīhi [sic] rāyātun hādhā mathalun arāda kathrata l-maṭari fī hādhā l-mawḍiʿi*). Note that her uses the old term *mathal* here to designate 'metaphor'.

Images from pre-Islamic poetry could probably support all interpretations (if at all Abū Tammām was influenced by them).[1210]

The poetic commentaries are useful for another reason. They reveal that neither Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn (in the *Jāmiʿ*) nor al-Ṭūfī dwell on the sentence metaphor *wa-muʿarrasin li-l-ghaythi* "many a place for the rain to settle in for the night," a metaphor that takes center-stage in the commentators' accounts. Al-Maʿarrī sees the phrase as metaphorical (*min al-mustaʿār*) since the term *taʿrīs* 'alighting at a place during the latter part of the night' (*al-nuzūl fī ākhir al-layl*) is only known for beings that have a corporeal form such as animals (*dhawī al-shukhūṣ min al-ḥayawān*).[1211] In other words, he takes it as a case of personification, since rain does not have a corporeal form and therefore cannot be attributed the act of settling in for the night. One commentator, as quoted by Ibn al-Mustawfī, reinforces this view by using the terminology *jaʿala li-l-ghaythi muʿarrasan* "he [the poet] made the rain have a resting place for the night," saying that the poet did so "by way of metaphor" (*ʿalā l-istiʿāra*).[1212] Al-Ṣūlī has a different

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[1210] Descriptions of clouds and rain within the context of pre-Islamic 'lightning scenes' are very common. See Ali Ahmad Hussein, *The Lightning-Scene in Ancient Arabic Poetry: Function, Narration and Idiosyncrasy in Pre-Islamic and Early Islamic Poetry*, Arabische Studien 3, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009, 190-224. A direct connection between a low-hanging cloud (usually *haydab*) and lightning is, however, not a common one in pre-Islamic poetry, but it does exist; see ibid., 197, 224. Common images for lightning during that period were lamps, horses, fire, and less frequently, a sword, a shield, the fluttering of a wing (*ka-takhfāqi l-janāḥi*), and a white cloth; see ibid., 182-90. Banners could be a development of the sword image as another type of element from the battlefield, or it could be a take on the fluttering of a wing (note the same verb use. I am not certain about how the image of a wing fluttering stands for lightning: probably its swift, blink-of-the-eye action). If the banners refer however to the raining cloud, it could be a take on the image of the flickering (verb *iḍṭaraba*) of a low-hanging raincloud due to the blowing of the wind (ibid., 224). In this case the verb *iḍṭaraba* is used for the clouds, but it could also refer to the lightning (Hussein notes the phrase *iḍṭaraba l-barqu fī l-saḥāb*, ibid.). Another option is that the banners (*rāyāt*) are a take on the image of the heavy leathern water bags (*rawāyā*) – and note the paronomasia – that pour out water (ibid., 201-202). Images for the sounds made by the storm (as we found in Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn) are rare (ibid., 223-24, 227). For exemplar images, both 'ancient' and 'modern' ('Abbāsid), of "clouds, rain, lightning, thunder, snow and frost" see Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, *Dīwān al-maʿānī* 2: 3-12. Arie Schippers cites this metaphor in his list of genitive metaphors found in the poetry of Abū Tammām; he takes it for granted that the "banners of the dark rainclouds" refer to flashes of lightning ("Genitive Metaphor," 256).

[1211] Al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 1: 26-27.

[1212] Ibn al-Mustawfī, *al-Niẓām* 1: 232. The name of the source Ibn al-Mustawfī is quoting is illegible in the manuscript (see editor's fn. 17).

understanding: when *muʿarras* is used in the context of people (*qawm*), it refers to their stopping place in the latter part of the night, but when it is used in the context of rain, it refers to the place where rain pours.[1213] In other words, he is assigning a *literal* sense to the phrase by expanding the lexical meaning of the verb *ʿarrasa*. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does not attend at all to this image. For al-Ṭūfī, this is simply a single-word metaphor, rather than a sentence metaphor: the word (*lafẓ*) *muʿarras*, which refers to the place of alighting at night, was borrowed to refer to the place of rainfall.[1214] Any notion of personification, and more broadly of an animated, rather than static image, is absent.[1215]

Another result of al-Ṭūfī's (impressive) conformity to his theory of metaphor is that it may come at the broader expense of regarding an image as visual at all (not just as animated). The following line by Abū Tammām, which Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn deemed very ugly, may demonstrate the process: [meter: *khafīf*]

> *yawma fatḥin saqā usūda l-ḍawāḥī*
>
> *kuthaba l-mawti rāʾiban wa-ḥalībā*
>
> "On the day of conquest he gave the desert lions
>
> milk bowls of death to drink, both thickened milk and fresh" [1216]

[1213] Ibid.

[1214] *Al-Iksīr*, 113 (*fa-staʿāra lafẓa l-muʿarrasi wa-huwa mawḍiʿu l-taʿrīsi li-mawḍiʿi wuqūʿi l-ghaythi*).

[1215] In Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's later scheme in the *Mathal*, this case would align with *tawassuʿ*. We might add that another major theme in the commentaries is to explain how *dujunna* 'darkness' – a word used to describe 'night' – is used in reference to 'clouds'. For al-Ṭūfī, once more, the solution is simple: the word was borrowed for the notion of 'black cloud' (ibid., 114). For another example of al-Ṭūfī's avoidance of interpreting a sentence metaphor as an animated image for the sake of conformity to his theory see ibid., where *ṣaʿubat* [*al-khamr*] "the wine was hard" is glossed as "wine that was impossible to drink [without water]," and *rāḍa l-māʾu* "the water tamed [it]" as "made [its drinking] easier" (from a line taken from the same poem by Abū Tammām). But we might point out here that in his gloss, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn makes no mention of the verb metaphors (*al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 86).

[1216] *Al-Iksīr*, 114-16; *al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 88; al-Tibrīzī, *Sharḥ* 1: 179; Ibn al-Mustawfī, *al-Niẓām*, 2: 254. *Kuthba* could mean a small portion of milk or the quantity of one milking or the quantity that is contained in a bowl or cup of the kind called *qadaḥ*; see Lane, *Lexicon*, 2592. 'Bowl' seems to be appropriate for all meanings (a small portion of milk and a quantity of one milking could fit in it). According to one copy of al-Ṣūlī's (?) commentary, *kuthab al-*

In the *Jāmiʿ* Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn rejects the metaphor as having no point of comparison (*tabāʿud*) probably because he pictures a visual image of milk bowls – with its variety of milk – given to the enemy. (The terminology he uses is "making the milk bowls belong to death").[1217] Considered visually, the representation of inflicting death on the enemy using milk bowls is indeed out of the ordinary ('creative' in our terms). But for al-Ṭūfī, this is deemed an outstanding metaphor because he ingenuously identifies a very precise topic for the analogue of 'thickened milk' (coagulated milk) and 'fresh milk', namely, those who died slowly in battle versus those who died immediately.[1218] If one assumes this interpretation, the words *rāʾib* and *ḥalīb* are simply meant to trigger in the mind of the recipient the analogy of slow/fast death rather the visual image of *actual* milk bowls given to the enemy. In al-Ṭūfī's solution the poet is no longer creating a visual allusion, but rather an intellectual one. Similarly, Abū Tammām's depiction of his patron's generosity using the images of the "head/hump/skin/stomach-waste (*farth*)/veins/ bones of generosity" is not deemed ugly by al-Ṭūfī the way it was by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, but rather seen as a reference to the famous Umayyad anecdote in which al-Farazdaq (d. *ca.* 110/728) ascribes those body parts to 'poetry' (and which he thinks Abū Tammām is explicitly alluding to).[1219] Once more, the image al-Ṭūfī conceives of is intellectual, not visual.[1220]

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mawt is glossed as *juraʿ al-mawt* 'mouthfuls/doses of death' (*wa-fī nuskhatin* [in reference to *qāla l-Ṣūlī?*] *kuthaba l-mawti ay juraʿa l-mawti; al-Niẓām* 2: 254). The meaning of *al-ḍawāḥī* according to al-Ṣūlī (ibid.) is *mā ẓahara min kulli shayʾin* "any object that is visible," similar to the meaning of *ḍāḥiya* as anything (place, object, body part) that is exposed to the sun (*Lisān al-ʿarab* 4: 2561-62). On *ḍāḥiya* as *bādiya* see ibid. 4: 2562, 1st column.

[1217] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 88. What is more, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn thinks 'death' should be expressed via a negative metaphor, not a positive one like 'milk'.

[1218] *Al-Iksīr*, 115-16. He also refutes Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's point on negative images of death by giving an example of pre-Islamic poetry in which death is depicted as a glass of wine given to the enemy to drink (here too he finds a point of similarity in the form of 'absence of mind' [*ghayba*] caused both by death and by intoxication).

[1219] Ibid., 116. Al-Ṭūfī refers both to 'poetry' and to 'generosity' as "abstract notions" (?, *maʿnayayn*), to which the anecdote can be related. The anecdote in question is al-Farazdaq's allegory of the history of poetry, in which poetry is described as a slaughtered camel, and the present-day (Umayyad) poets as having only the remains of that

Repurposing Tarshīḥ and Tajrīd

Returning now the other mechanism by which al-Ṭūfī resolves sentence metaphors, this is done

by means of *tarshīḥ al-istiʿāra* lit. 'grooming a metaphor' and *tajrīd al-istiʿāra* lit. 'making a

metaphor bare', two categories or tendencies in the creation of metaphor.[1221] These have become

common notions in literary theory during this time: they were treated by al-Zamakhsharī (not

quite in those terms), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Sakkākī, al-Zanjānī, Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Ibn

al-Naqīb (but not by al-Jurjānī or Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn).[1222] In the case of *tarshīḥ* 'groomed metaphor',

the domain of the analogue (*mustaʿār* or *mustaʿār minhu*) is 'supported' with additional elements

whereas in *tajrīd* 'bare metaphor', it is 'deprived' and the domain of the topic (*mustaʿār lahu*) is

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magnificent camel. See Abū Zayd Muḥammad b. Abī al-Khaṭṭāb al-Qurashī, *Jamharat ashʿār al-ʿarab fī al-jāhiliyya wa-l-islām*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bajāwī, Cairo: Nahḍat Miṣr, n.d., 63, 67.

[1220] The discussion of this metaphor ends with a statement which is slightly corrupted in the manuscript and which I am unable to make sense of. After stating that no one would reproach al-Farazdaq nor accuse him of "making 'poetry' an actual camel" (*jaʿalta l-shiʿra jamalan ʿalā l-ḥaqīqa*), al-Ṭūfī concludes: *wa-l-istiʿāratu fī al-ḥaqīqati hiya l-tashbīhu fī l-maʿnā* (this is the editor's understanding of the corrupted original wording: *wa-l-istiʿāra hiya al-ḥaqīqa al-tashbīh fī l-maʿnā*; see ibid., fn. 3) lit. "metaphor in actuality is a comparison in meaning [or abstract notion, see previous fn.]." This seems to mean that metaphor amounts to a comparison between notions, or finding within a notion a certain likeness (to something else), akin to the statements we came across in Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī, that metaphor is in essence a comparison. The phrase *al-tashbīh fī l-maʿnā* could also mean something like "giving a corporeal body (here: camel body parts) to an abstract notion (here: poetry, generosity)" (cf. the religious meaning of *tashbīh* as 'anthropomorphism'), but it is an unlikely reading (it would refute al-Ṭūfī's own analyses of metaphor, where we find no visual image).

[1221] *Tarshīḥ* originally refers to the grooming, licking, and prodding that an animal does to its young (*Lisān al-ʿarab* 3: 1649) or to the practice of a (human) mother putting milk in her baby's mouth bit by bit, so that the baby can get used to suckling (ibid.; Ibn Yaʿqūb al-Maghribī, *Mawāhib al-fattāḥ fī talkhīṣ al-miftāḥ* in *Shurūḥ al-talkhīṣ*, 4 vols., reprint, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, n.d., 4: 130). I use the word 'creation' (of a metaphor) above because in explaining the processes of these two tendencies, it is the poet who is the subject of the various verbs constituting those processes (*an yaʾtiya*, *an yadhkura*, *rāʿā*; *al-Iksīr*, 111-12). For a different sense of *tajrīd* see Heinrichs, "Rhetorical figures," 659. For yet another sense of *tajrīd* see below.

[1222] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Nihāya*, 249-51; al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ*, 385-87; al-Zanjānī, *Miʿyār*, 74-79; Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Rawḍa*, 103-106; Ibn al-Naqīb, *Muqaddima*, 107-108. In the case of al-Zamakhsharī, who seems to have been the first scholar to point out these phenomena, he calls the first category *al-majāz al-murashshaḥ* (*al-Kashshāf* 1: 193, 200 [Q 2:16-17]; *Asās*, 440 s.v. *ʿ.w.m*), and the second category is described but the term *tajrīd/mujarrad* is not used (see also Abū Mūsā, *al-Balāgha al-Qurʾāniyya fī tafsīr al-Zamakhsharī*, 421-24 [Q 16:112]). Ibn al-Zamlakānī, as a close 'redactor' of al-Jurjānī, does not treat it. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn heard of *tajrīd*, probably in the context of *istiʿāra*, but did not know its meaning (see below).

taken more into account.[1223] For instance, in the first line al-Ṭūfī adduced, *ladā asadin shākī l-silāḥi* "before a lion, [his] weapon iron-sharp," the expression *shākī l-silāḥ* reflects a *tajrīd*, since the mentioning of an iron-sharp weapon belongs to the domain of the topic (army troops), not the analogue (lion). Had the poet used the phrase *wāfī l-makhālib* "having ample claws," says al-Ṭūfī, this would have been *tarshīḥ* (as 'claws' are an additional element in the domain of the analogue). Indeed, he continues, the poet did use a *tarshīḥ* by mentioning later in the line the manes and the uncut nails (*lahu libadun azfāruhu lam tuqallamī*), thus "combining both a *tarshīḥ* and a *tajrīd* in one line."[1224]

Al-Ṭūfī repurposes the common notion of *tarshīḥ* to include the classic loan-metaphor examples treated by Heinrichs. These are (1) the famous line by Imruʾ al-Qays (6th cent.), *fa-qultu lahū lammā tamaṭṭā bi-ṣulbihī // wa-ardafa aʿjāzan wa-nāʾa bi-kalkalī* "And I said to it [the night] when it stretched out its back and followed up with [its] hindquarters and struggled to get up with [its] breast," and (2) the famous line by Abū Dhuʾayb (1st/7th cent.), *wa-idhā l-maniyyatu anshabat azfārahā // alfayta kulla tamīmatin lā tanfaʿū* "When death sinks its claws in, you find all amulets of no avail."[1225] The passage detailing these poetic examples are clearly inspired by someone other than Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, as the latter was unaware of the terms *tarshīḥ* and *tajrīd* in this sense.[1226] What is more, the presentation, as well as the use of terms, is quite

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[1223] For *mustaʿār* see *al-Iksīr*, 111.8, 112.4 (cf. editor's fn. 2); *mustaʿār minhu* is used later in 112.10.

[1224] Ibid., 112; also *Nihāya*, 249-51; *Rawḍa*, 103-106; *Miʿyār*, 74-79; *Muqaddima*, 107.

[1225] Translations are Heinrichs'; see *Hand of the Northwind*, 3-4. The early critics' theoretical analysis of the line by Imruʾ al-Qays is carefully detailed by Heinrichs in the second part of his book (ibid., 16-25; the latest critic cited is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn, whose discussion is a response to Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī's analysis, pp. 23-25).

[1226] In the *Jāmiʿ* there is no mention of these categories. In the *Mathal*, Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn does include a chapter on *tajrīd* – by his own account, a word (*ism*) he had heard but did not know the meaning of – but he basically made up its substance (*wa-dhakartu mā ataytu bihi min dhāt khāṭirī*) based on some preliminary remarks by Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī (*Mathal* 2: 162 ff.). In his conception (which is not in fact his own), *tajrīd* lit. 'abstraction' refers to 'internal dialogue' expressed by an address of the poet using the second person. On this see Geert Jan van Gelder, "The Abstracted Self in Arabic Poetry," *Journal of Arabic Literature* 14 (1983), 22-30, here: 26, 29. It is noteworthy that

polished. The line by Imruʾ al-Qays is given as an example of *tarshīḥ* containing an added element from the analogue-domain that is explicit (*muṭābaqatan wa-taṣrīḥan*). Thus, since the poet described the night as "stretching out" (*tamaṭṭī*), he completed the description with elements "demanded by [the image of stretching]" (*bi-mā yastadʿīhi*; *bi-mā yaqtaḍīhi*), namely "back, hindquarters and breast."[1227]

Ironically, this analysis restores the 'original' analogy that Heinrichs believes to have stood at the basis of the line: "the night – being so slow to depart – is compared to a camel that is unwilling to rise and go away," rather than taking *kalkal*, *ṣulb* and *ʿajuz* as "figurative equivalents of the beginning, middle, and end of the night respectively."[1228] Indeed, from al-Ṭūfī's analyses of *shawāhid* discussed above, it would seem most likely that he would espouse the latter, simile-based understanding of single-word metaphor. On one hand, this may indicate that the *tarshīḥ-tajrīd* discussion is extraneousness to al-Ṭūfī's own thinking, especially since it precedes al-Ṭūfī's own poetic analyses. What is more, the line by Abū Dhuʾayb is given as an example of *tarshīḥ* containing an added element from the analogue-domain that is implicit (*iltizāman wa-kināyatan*), a solution that is strongly reminiscent (at least at its core) of al-Sakkākī's *istiʿāra bi-l-kināya* 'metaphor by allusion'. According to the latter interpretation, the 'sinking claws' mentioned by the poet are necessary attributes of the unstated analogue, namely, lion.[1229] But on the other hand, it may not contradict al-Ṭūfī's theory of single-word substitutions

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while *tajrīd* lost any connection to *istiʿāra*, it appears in the *Mathal* immediately following the chapters on metaphor and simile. The source he consulted (oral or written) probably preserved that connection.

[1227] *Al-Iksīr*, 111.

[1228] *Hand of the Northwind*, 4.

[1229] On *istiʿāra bi-l-kināya* as an allusion to an unstated analogue see al-Sakkākī, *Miftāḥ*, 378-79; Heinrichs, "Metaphor," 523. The notion is associated with *istiʿāra takhyīliyya* 'imaginary metaphor', that is, when the poet imagines an entity (like death) to be something else (like predator), and then annexes to it elements from the imagined domain (like fangs and claws); *Miftāḥ*, 376-77. Heinrichs adds that the *istiʿāra takhyīliyya* is characterized

after all: it would merely bypass it. The elements "back," "breast," "claws" etc., would be in no need of a metaphorical interpretation because they are now 'free' to be interpreted literally thanks to the process of 'grooming the image'. Bypassing the need to interpret certain words metaphorically also solves the apparent incompatibility between the poetic notion of *istiʿāra* and a rigid definition of *majāz*. I am not aware of other theorists who treat the famous lines by Imruʾ al-Qays and Abū Dhuʾayb as cases of *tarshīḥ*.

Evidence of the 'discord' between *istiʿāra* and *majāz* crops up in al-Ṭūfī's work itself, where two idiosyncrasies in the text have *istiʿāra* and *majāz* grammatically contrasted. In the first instance, after adducing Qurʾānic examples that supposedly display metaphors in particles (*ḥurūf*), al-Ṭūfī concedes that they are "in fact [a case of] *majāz*, not *istiʿāra*, since there is no comparison in them".[1230] We could resolve this by simply saying that *istiʿāra* is merely more specific than *majāz*. The second instance in harder to resolve. Under the chapter of *kināya* (here periphrasis or euphemism), al-Ṭūfī discusses the difference between *kināya* and *majāz,* preceded by the comment that "the difference between *istiʿāra* and *majāz*" has already been stated.[1231] The interesting thing is that *kināya* is never claimed to be subsumed under *majāz* – the two are in fact conceptually contrasted (*humā ḍiddān*)[1232] – which may lead one to assume that *istiʿāra* and *majāz* are also distinct, rather than genetically related concepts. None of this discussion is inspired by Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn; in the *Jāmiʿ* he defined *kināya* in tropical terms, using both the

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by the lack of a substratum, since in 'claws of death' there is no underlying simile in which a part of 'death' could be likened to 'claws'. See Heinrichs, "*Takhyīl*," 13.

[1230] *wa-l-ḥaqqu anna hādhā majāzun wa-laysa -stiʿāratan idh lā tashbīha fīhi*; *al-Iksīr*, 113. The examples are Q 25:59 "so ask him about one well informed" (*fa-sʾal bihi khabīran*), where *bihi* means *ʿanhu*; and Q 19:97 "we have made it [the Qurʾān] easy by your tongue" (*fa-innamā yassarnāhu bi-lisānika*), where (an elided?) *ʿalayhi* should be understood. See *al-Iksīr*, 112.

[1231] *al-farqu bayna l-istiʿārati wa-l-majāzi mā sabaqa… wa-bayna l-kināyati wa-l-majāzi...*; ibid., 120-21.

[1232] Ibid., 121.

terminology of *majāz* and the terminology of using a word not according to its original coinage (*bi-ghayr lafẓihi al-mawḍūʿ lahu*).[1233]

This leads us to the sources of al-Ṭūfī's *Iksīr* other than Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's *Jāmiʿ*, sources that we may qualify as having 'standardist' leanings but were probably not Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī or al-Sakkākī. One such source is Ibn al-Muqarrab al-Baḥrānī, referred to only as "al-Baḥrānī," an East-Arabian poet-critic of the early seventh/thirteenth century who had strong Shīʿī leanings (al-Ṭūfī, we may recall, was suspected of having Shīʿī leanings).[1234] A consultation with the *Iksīr*'s appendices reveals that Ibn al-Muqarrab is cited ten times, citations that comprise both poetic *shawāhid* and critical comments. (The name of his work is not mentioned.) This makes Ibn al-Muqarrab the most quoted critic in the *Iksīr* after Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, and seemingly the only literary-critical source he directly consulted outside the *Jāmiʿ*.[1235] Ibn al-Muqarrab is quoted within the context of *kināya* as saying that the difference between *kināya* and *majāz* is that in *kināya*, "the original meaning […] is also intended" (whereas in *majāz* it is not)[1236] – interestingly, a view that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn later espouses in the *Mathal*. The clear differentiation between *kināya* and *majāz* is something we may associate with standard rhetorical theories.

Another hint at standard rhetorical notions is al-Ṭūfī's parenthetical recognition that verb metaphors could be taken as *majāz* on the level of predication, rather than a tropical usage of the

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[1233] *Al-Jāmiʿ al-kabīr*, 156.

[1234] See Khulusi, "A Thirteenth Century Poet from Bahrain"; *al-Iksīr*, 90, editor's fn. 3. According to Brockelmann (*GAL* 1: 302), Ibn al-Muqarrab spent some time in Mosul, where he met Yāqūt (d. 626/1229) in 617/1220, and died in Baghdad in 629/1232. This would place Ibn al-Muqarrab in close proximity with Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn.

[1235] *Al-Iksīr*, 363-67. Only three out of the ten citations are literary-critical remarks, but even so, it is more than any other literary scholar referenced. Quotations from Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskari, al-Ghānimī and Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī, which outnumber the times al-Baḥrānī is quoted – turn out to be mere embedded quotations from the *Jāmiʿ*. Of course, al-Ṭūfī probably consulted other works and left those references unacknowledged.

[1236] Ibid., 121.

actual verb (*wa-li-qāʾilin an yaqūla hādhā majāzun fī l-nisbati lā fī nafsi l-fiʿl*).[1237] This notion, indirectly indebted to ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī's *majāz fī l-ithbāt*, is incompatible with the views al-Ṭūfī expresses throughout his analyses of *shawāhid*, as we have seen.

Al-Ṭūfī's 'commentary' on the work of Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is an interesting one, and his treatment of *majāz* reveals that he is the exception that proves the rule. Whereas the works that we have studied were usually expressly committed to the word-transfer theory, it was rarely applied to actual analyses of poetic illustrations, thus showing that underlying the declared theory was a different one entirely: either an explicit appeal to an extra-linguistic notion (i.e., reality) or an appeal to the linguistic idea of predication, the affirmation of which rests on non-linguistic knowledge. Al-Ṭūfī is the only one – and much more so than the standard al-Sakkākī – who applies the declared theory to actual *shawāhid* analyses. His results yield unusual interpretations indeed of poetic specimens.

[1237] Ibid., 112.

Summing Up

Put the lights out when you finish in the living room.
Amelia Bedelia thought about this a minute. She switched off the lights. Then she carefully unscrewed each bulb. And Amelia Bedelia put the lights out. "So those things need to be aired out, too. Just like pillows and babies. Oh, I do have a lot to learn."
-Peggy Parish, *Amelia Bedelia*[1238]

To me this is like the story about the Byzantine emperor who had someone recite to him al-Mutanabbī's line, "As if camels of good breed were made to lie down on my eyelids // and when they were roused to get up, (the tears) could (finally) flow," and then asked about the meaning and they translated it for him, to which he said: "I've never heard of a poet more untruthful! Have you ever seen anyone have a camel lie down on his eye that did not kill him?!"

- Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 29[1239]

The contribution of ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī to Arabic literary thinking could not be overstated;

his lengthy deliberations on metaphor (*istiʿāra*) and mock analogy and aetiology (*tamthīl*,

takhyīl) are cases in point. But on the issue of *majāz* – which he relegates to the very end of the

Asrār – al-Jurjānī's contribution is primarily linguistic. He studies expressions that exhibit

figurative language but are grounded in the lexicon (and hence listed in the dictionaries), first

and foremost metonymies and conceptual metaphors, to use Lakoff and Johnson's terms. The

linguistic objects of his theorizing are such expressions that Amelia Bedelia would take literally:

they are part of our literal language. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn on the other hand, and others in the literary-

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[1238] Peggy Parish, *Amelia Bedelia*, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1992 [originally 1963].

[1239] The meter is *wāfir*; *anākha* ("make to lie down") means more specifically to make a camel lie down on its breast with its legs folded, as is done on the occasions of mounting and dismounting, etc. (Lane, *Lexicon*, 2864). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is criticizing here the "Baghdadi" literary critic Ibn Ḥamdūn (d. 562/1167), who took too literally the following two lines by saying in response that "the apparition does enter through the eyelid but is rather imagined in the soul!": [meter: *basīṭ*] "I'll rip through a woman's veil if it's 'playing hard to get' but won't penetrate if it's 'easy' || just as the nightly apparition refuses to enter the eyelid when it's open and will only enter it when it's closed" (*al-Mathal al-sāʾir* 2: 28). To Ibn Ḥamdūn's take Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn responds, "This is what someone who hasn't tasted from tree of eloquence would say!" (ibid., 2: 29). If the poet adhered to the 'true' nature of the apparition's workings and made it be imagined in the soul, the analogy would, of course, be lost. The fact that Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn is using the discourse of *kadhib* to refer to a false reading of figurative speech as literal speech (*mā samiʿtu bi-akdhaba min hādhā l-shāʿir*) accentuates the negative connotations *kadhib* remained to convey in the context of figurative language (cf. Ibn Qutayba's attack, Chapter 5 Preliminaries). For some context on the story of the Byzantine emperor and al-Mutanabbī's line above, which was already recounted in al-Khafājī, *Sirr al-faṣāḥa*, 40-41 (and even earlier?), see Geert Jan van Gelder, "Camels on Eyelids and the Bafflement of an Emperor: A Line of al-Mutanabbī «Translated» into Greek," *Proceedings of the XIIth Congress of the International Comparative Literature Association, 1988 Munich. vol. 3: Space and Boundaries of Literature*, Munich: Iudicium Verlag, 1990, 446-51.

theoretical tradition of ʿilm al-bayān (as well as some of the early naqd works), aim their theorizing at poetic expressions, like the line by al-Mutanabbī above: 'live' metaphors rather than 'dead' ones. For Lakoff and Johnson this differentiation is moot because in their mind what generates the non-conventional metaphor is exactly the conceptual metaphor expressed in our literal language.[1240] Classical Arabic literary theorists, however, would and did make such a distinction – at least implicitly. Despite the many theoretical pronouncements pointing to the understanding of majāz as 'shifts' on the level of the word, the shawāhid and majāz categories that literary theorists treat make the case for a primarily extra-linguistic understanding of the term. What makes certain utterances majāz is the fact that they are untrue (or not necessarily true, as in the case of "having many ashes"), akin to the old negative notion of kadhib 'lie'. Conventional figurative expressions like "the tree shouted out" for "grew tall" are also, strictly speaking, false, but because they have become 'lexicalized' they are understood to be true. The majāz of the literary theorists is therefore not equivalent to majāz ʿaqlī – at least not in al-Jurjānī's conception of the notion as a truthful statement (likewise with al-Rāzī; their term is majāz fī l-ithbāt). Al-Rāzī was an influential figure in the development of ʿilm al-bayān, even though literary production held a minimal place in his study, and he challenged the critics, especially on the question of majāz. Someone like Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ appropriated al-Rāzī's views wholeheartedly by backing down, in his later work, from his earlier inclusion of simile and exaggeration within the purview of majāz. But someone like Ibn al-Naqīb, who was a closer follower of al-Rāzī in terms of the occupation with Qurʾānic style, did not. This indicates that the so-called 'old' way of literary theory had an alternative and defensible theory to offer, and that majāz could be a meaningful – and creative – component in literary production.

[1240] Metaphors We Live By, 139 ff., and esp. 147 ff.

Conclusion

Studies on classical Arabic poetry have taken a new turn in recent years: from translation and commentary the focus is slowly shifting to the literary devices occurring in the poem. The devices in question are not modern Western ones superimposed on the medieval Arabic text (a method useful in its own right), but are indigenous categories as they are presented and explained by the medieval Arabic literary theorists. One can no longer understand Ibn al-Rūmī without knowing about the critics' treatment of *istiqṣāʾ al-maʿānī* 'exhausting an image to death',[1241] nor can one further understand the departure from pre-Islamic poetic conventions without going into the nitty-gritty of the literary devices line by line[1242] -- reinforcing the claim once made by van Gelder, that "[t]o study ancient Arabic theory and criticism […] is to study the poetry itself."[1243] But in order to make this shift in research a valid and compelling one, we must get the literary theory right.[1244] The fact of the matter remains that we still know less than we think. Arabic literary theory is usually seen to evolve to its 'coherent' disciplinary form with the scholastic *ʿilm al-balāgha*: we now see that a crystallization of the field was taking place in the Arabic East already in the seventh/thirteen century in the framework of *ʿilm al-bayān*, and independent of what was to become the Standard Theory. Arabic literary theorists like Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn Abī al-Iṣbaʿ are usually understood to be oblivious to al-Jurjānī: we now see that they engage with him either directly or through the mediation of al-Rāzī, leading at times to different

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[1241] McKinney, *Rhyme versus Reason*, 228-55.

[1242] A trend started most clearly by Hussein in "The Rhetoric of Hudhalī Wine Poetry" (2015) and now *Rhetorical Fabric* (2016), following Heinrichs' lead in "Muslim b. al-Walīd und *badīʿ*," in Wolfhart Heinrichs and Gregor Schoeler (eds.), *Festschrift Ewald Wagner zum 65. Geburtstag*, Studien zur arabischen Dichtung 2, Beiruter Texte und Studien, vol. 54, Beirut: Franz Steiner, 1994, 211-45.

[1243] Van Gelder, *Beyond the Line*, 208.

[1244] For instance, the category *majāz ʿaqlī* is being applied for this type of study, even though scholars are probably superimposing their own understanding of the term unto (at least) al-Jurjānī's view.

theoretical results. *Majāz* as a component of literary theory is usually seen to make sense only in the theory laid out by al-Jurjānī: we now see that it is non-Jurjānian concepts of *majāz* that are more suitable to explain the compatibility of *majāz* and *istiʿāra* (especially of the type "death sinking its claws in"), and that anyway, we do not fully know what al-Jurjānī meant by *majāz*. Finally, looking ahead to further research, al-Qazwīnī is commonly understood to be part of the school of al-Sakkākī: one now suspects that his attention to *badīʿ* is better understood in light of the nature of *ʿilm al-bayān* and that he viewed the 'hermeneutics' of al-Jurjānī and al-Sakkākī as a necessary element for 'poetics', or literary composition, thus reviving an outdated claim by Bonebakker.[1245]

I appeal to recent trends in the study of classical Arabic poetry to demonstrate the value that literary theory may have beyond the study of poetics, rhetoric and literary criticism.[1246] But the contribution of *this* dissertation has been emphatically to literary theory as a discipline and to theory itself, both literary and linguistic (because the two are not always easily distinguishable). It would be tempting to draw a connection between the theorists' perception of *majāz* as *literal* utterances that do not conform to reality and the poets' perception of "metaphor as fact" which

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[1245] Bonebakker, "al-Maʿānī wa 'l-Bayān," and see §2.1. According to Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ḥalabī, head of the Damascus chancery in the early eighth/fourteenth century who authored a book on the epistolary art, the works of al-Rummānī, al-Jurjānī (ʿAbd al-Qāhir, mentioned later), al-Rāzī, al-Sakkākī, and al-Khafājī (presumably Ibn Sinān) – which are mentioned in the same breath – are necessary for scribal education, that is, for learning to *produce* literary speech, not interpret it. For al-Ḥalabī, these authors are associated both with the Standard Theory (*ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān wa-l-badīʿ*) and with works concerned with *iʿjāz al-Qurʾān* (Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Sulaymān al-Ḥalabī, *Ḥusn al-tawassul ilā ṣināʿat al-tarassul*, Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Wahbiyya, 1298 AH, 11-12 [English: ~'The Best Path to the Epistolary Craft']; in al-Nuwayrī's version, *Nihāya* 7: 35, "Ibn al-Athīr" is mentioned as well). I thank Elias Muhanna for this reference. See also al-Ṭūfī, *al-Shiʿār*, 15, where *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān* (later *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān wa-l-badīʿ*) – which includes the works of 'standard' and non-'standard' authors alike (ibid., 25-27) – is glossed as "the knowledge of composing speech according to the best manner" (*maʿrifat taʾlīf al-kalām ʿalā l-wajh al-afḍal*).

[1246] That is, seeing classical Arabic literary theory beyond the lens of a "normative poetics" to being a constructive source of "practical poetics" (for a critique of this notion see Hamori, "Schemes of Reading," 13-14; the idea of normative/practical poetics is inspired by Dan Pagis in ibid., 14 fn. 5).

enabled them to "go on to create further metaphors from that fact."[1247] But I leave that judgment

for others to make.

[1247] On this poetic practice see Heinrichs, "Paired Metaphors," esp. 17; Bürgel, "Die beste Dichtung," 87 ff. The quote itself is from Faruqi, *Sabk-e Hindi*, 73, speaking of the later Persian poets (cited in Ahmed, *What Is Islam?*, 390). Poetic 'riddles' are no more than an extension of this practice (see the analysis in Yaron Klein, *Musical Instruments as Objects of Meaning in Classical Arabic Poetry and Philosophy*, PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2009, 83-100). The study of 'paired metaphors' by Heinrichs is, in my view, his single most important contribution to our understanding of mature classical Arabic poetry. I would have titled it "The Architecture of Arabic Metaphor."

Arabic Technical Terms: A Tentative Glossary

Bayān lit. 'sign/expression [of a thing]'; 'clarity/distinctness'; 'eloquence'

> 'Divine communication concerning the law' (al-Shāfiʿī).
> 'A means to signify *ḥikma*, divine wisdom/wisdom of worldly things' (al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Ḥayawān*).
> 'A means to impart knowledge or signify meaning' (al-Jāḥiẓ, *al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn*).
> 'Knowledge of an essence of a thing' (Ibn Wahb al-Kātib), or: 'existence/essence of a thing' (Ibn Ḥazm, to a lesser extent Ibn Wahb). Probably two sides of the same coin (cf. definitions of *ʿilm* as the *maʿlūm*).
> 'The unique eloquence of the Arabic of the ancient Arabs' (Ibn Fāris).
> 'Suggestive expression' (al-Rummānī, who also calls it *taḍmīn*). Statements or morphosyntactic constructions that have a semantic import not conveyed on the 'surface level'.
> 'Good style', esp. written style (an extension of the lexical meaning of *bayān* as 'eloquence' among the chancery secretaries).
> Additional meanings of *bayān*: a synonym of 'Qurʾān'; 'the ability to distinguish [between right and wrong, etc.]' (occurs in some Qurʾānic commentaries); 'clarification'; and more.

ʿIlm al-Bayān lit. 'the science of eloquence/clear speech'

> 'The science of good style': the common name for the discipline of literary theory as a whole starting in the 7th/13th century in the Arabic East. The discipline was understood to be 'theoretical' and 'rational', and earlier works on literary theory were often tagged retroactively with the heading *ʿilm al-bayān*.
> 'The science of expressing ideas by way of images, or: the science of figures of speech concerned with imagery': the second subfield within the tripartite *ʿilm al-balāgha* 'science of eloquence' or standard rhetoric, which was part of the *madrasa* curriculum starting in the 8th/14th century. *ʿIlm al-bayān* dealt with *tashbīh* (comparison), *majāz* (figurative language), and *kināya* (periphrasis).
> 'The science of standard rhetoric': sometimes used interchangeably with *ʿilm al-balāgha*. *ʿIlm al-balāgha* is also referred to as *ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān*.

Istiʿāra lit. 'borrowing', usually: 'metaphor'

> 'Ascriptive metaphor based on 'object' borrowing'; 'analogy-based metaphor': the old poetic sense of *istiʿāra*, in reference to such metaphors as "the hand of the north wind." Grammatically they tend to be genitive metaphors or verb metaphors.

There is usually no separate term for 'genitive metaphor' (Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr and especially Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī are exceptions).

'Single-term hackneyed metaphor, poetic dead metaphor' (literary theorists esp. after the 4th/10th century): in reference to such metaphors as "full moon" for "pretty face." These metaphors are based on a simile, and grammatically they tend to be nouns. Sometimes they are euphemistic ("gazelle" for "woman"). Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn implicitly recognizes the conventional character of *istiʿāra* when he states that it is hard for the poet/orator to create (our term) new ones.

Kināya lit. 'indirect expression'

'Euphemism' (a range of literary scholars). An expression that refers indirectly to a notion considered taboo in the culture (e.g., women, sex) or considered bad omens (e.g., the crescent moon). Euphemisms can occur as noun metaphors (see *istiʿāra*), single-term metonymies, and proverbs.

'Metonymy' (a range of literary scholars, philologists, religious scholars). Grammatically a noun (or phrase acting as a single-term notion). The term is used to refer to such semantic extensions as "sky" for "rain" or, in some cases, "town" for "people of the town." Other terms are used for this phenomenon, like *istiʿāra* (Ibn Durayd), *majāz mursal* (later followers of al-Jurjānī), or the more precise *fīmā yunāsibuhu wa-yuqāribuhu* "expressions that are based on association or contiguity with the intended meaning" (al-Thaʿālibī).

'Periphrasis' (al-Jurjānī and followers). A roundabout phrase that expresses the intended meaning via allusion (the common early term is *irdāf*). Although the intended meaning is logically connected to the meaning of the surface phrase, it is not a metonymy (which is a single-word affair). *Kināya* is of two types (al-Jurjānī, Ibn al-Zamlakānī): (i) expressing the *attribute* indirectly ("has a coward dog" for "generous"), (ii) expressing the *attribution* indirectly ("generosity is in so-and-so's shackle" for "generosity is in so-and-so"). For Ibn al-Zamlakānī, *kināya* was part of *majāz* in that it was literally untrue, or not necessarily true (the generous person in question might not literally have a dog [or might not literally be cooking food for his guests]; generosity is not literally in a shackle [or in a tent]). Periphrasis is seen as *majāz* also in the work of Zayn al-Dīn al-Rāzī and in one passage of al-Zanjānī.

Majāz lit. 'going beyond'

'Linguistic anomalies; seemingly incorrect usage' (Abū ʿUbayda [more precisely: the *meaning* or *rewording* of linguistic anomalies], al-Ḥātimī) The term *ḥaqīqa* 'literal speech' is not used as a counterpart.

'Idiomatic expressions in the lexicon', ranging from conceptual metaphors (in the modern
sense of the word, like "burying" a secret), metonymies (like "sky" for "rain"),
dead metaphors ("the nose of the mountain" for "the prominent part of the
mountain") and idiomatic sayings ("his garment slept" for "his garment became
worn out" or "morning sighed" for "morning appeared") (lexicographers; ʿAbd al-
Qāhir al-Jurjānī [pending further research]). The *shawāhid* that are adduced as
majāz are all listed in the dictionaries, either as regular entries or under special
headings.

~'Figurative language' (common in early theology), esp. anthropomorphic expressions
concerning God. Perhaps it is the language concerning humans (esp. predication
of actions) that is seen as *majāz* and the language concerning God that is seen as
ḥaqīqa lit. 'reality'. *Majāz* could mean derivative reality vis-à-vis the true
reality of God. There is always a counterpart *ḥaqīqa* 'true reality' or 'literal
speech'. Discussions of *majāz* in theology usually included some non-figurative
speech phenomena, like pleonasm and ellipsis.

'Figurative use of [single] words' (common in legal theory), esp. metonymies and dead
metaphors (i.e., single words or expressions that act as single words).

'Figurative language' (a range of literary theorists, common among those who did not
follow al-Jurjānī). Language that is untrue to reality or *kadhib* 'lie' (a term that
had too many negative connotations to be used in this context). This includes all
'live' metaphors (*istiʿāra*), explicit similes (*tashbīh*), and, depending on the
scholar, periphrasis (*kināya*). Most theorists also included within the category of
majāz, beyond the 'live' metaphors (a.k.a. *badīʿ*), the idiomatic expressions of the
lexicographers, i.e., dead usage, including euphemisms and single-term
hackneyed metaphors (what I call 'poetic dead metaphor', like "daisy" for
"mouth").

Majāz fī l-ithbāt 'conceptual metaphor' (al-Jurjānī)

Literally '*majāz* on the level of predication', a term coined by ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī.
Also known as *majāz isnādī*, *majāz ḥukmī*, and later *majāz ʿaqlī* 'logical *majāz*'. It seems
(pending further research) that by *majāz fī l-ithbāt* al-Jurjānī is referring to conceptual
metaphors (to use Lakoff and Johnson's terms) that are reflected in everyday *literal*
language, especially to instances of correlation that are conceived in the mind as
causation ("spring brought about blossoms," "seeing you made me happy," "the knife
cut"). Al-Jurjānī was probably following theological notions of *majāz* here. *Majāz fī l-
ithbāt* is not *kadhib* 'untruth', and is therefore not equivalent to the conception of *majāz*
that was implicit in the works of many literary theorists both before and after al-Jurjānī.
Al-Jurjānī's theory of *majāz* is a contribution to linguistics, not poetics (thus it is
relegated to the end of his *Asrār al-balāgha*). See also: *majāz* 'idiomatic expressions in

the language'. Because Ibn al-Zamlakānī followed the implicit *majāz*-as-*kadhib* theory, we cannot translate *majāz fī l-ithbāt* in his work as 'conceptual metaphor'. The relationship between *majāz fī l-ithbāt* and *istiʿāra* in al-Jurjānī's own thought is debated upon.

Majāz fī l-muthbat 'lexical *majāz*', usually: metonymy (al-Jurjānī)

Literally '*majāz* on the level of the predicate', a term coined by al-Jurjānī. Later termed *majāz ifrādī* and *majāz lughawī* (the latter term became standard). It refers to single-term lexical extensions, usually metonymies. See also *majāz* 'figurative use of [single] words' and 'idiomatic expressions in the lexicon'.

Tamthīl lit. 'striking an example, similitude (*mathal*)' (also: **al-mathal al-maḍrūb**)

'Metaphorical exemplification; mock evidence; illustrative analogy': an illustrative sentence that exemplifies, by metaphorical analogy, the topic of discussion (or provides the allure of evidence for it). ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī terms it *tamthīl* or *mathal*. Abū Aḥmad al-ʿAskarī terms it *mumāthala*. Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī terms it *al-istishhād wa-l-iḥtijāj* 'adducing [mock] evidence (Ar. *shāhid*, *ḥujja*)'. Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr terms it *al-mathal al-maḍrūb*. In poetry it usually occurs at the end of a line, as a kind of 'commentary' on reality. Since the commentary is not 'real', we may refer to it as 'mock analogy' (Heinrichs' term). It became common in Persian poetry as well. The archetypal example by al-Jurjānī is "so-and-so put one leg forward and the other one backward" to convey that he was hesitant. A common poetic example is al-Farazdaq's

> "Biting words come my way, and you hold them of no worth;
> But (even) drops of water can fill a vessel to excess."

Tashbīh lit. 'stating a similitude'; 'similarity claim'; 'comparison'

'Simile': according to many literary theorists, even after ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī, simile is not part of literal speech. It was seen as a figurative similarity claim or figurative comparison, as opposed to a literal similarity claim.

'Predicative metaphor': in Arabic terms, this is a 'simile' in which the particle of similitude is suppressed, of the type "Zayd is a lion." In Western terms, this is the most common metaphor discussed by linguists and philosophers: the predicative metaphor.

Tawassuʿ, also **ittisāʿ** lit. 'extension'

'lexical extension': as a non-technical term, *ittisāʿ* refers to the *majāz* of the

lexicographers, that is, semantic extensions in the lexicon that have become part of conventional vocabulary. It is usually used as a hendiadys with *majāz* (*ittisāʿan wa-majāzan*). *Ittisāʿ* has a possibly related technical meaning in grammar.

'fictional ascription': metaphors in which there is no 'perceived' relation between the topic and the analogue; rather, the relation between the two is 'imposed' (by poet). The term is Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr's. One subtype of *tawassuʿ* is equivalent to the old poetic notion of *istiʿāra* (in the form of genitive metaphors). Another subtype covers the phenomenon of speaking animals found in *Kalīla wa-Dimna* (sentence metaphors), revealing a probable influence by Ibn Sīnā on Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn's thinking.

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