Helen Epigrammatopoios

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Helen Epigrammatopoios

Ancient commentators identify several passages in the *Iliad* as “epigrams.” This paper explores the consequences of taking the scholia literally and understanding these passages in terms of inscription. Two tristichs spoken by Helen in the *teikhoskopia* are singled out for special attention. These lines can be construed not only as epigrams in the general sense, but more specifically as captions appended to an image of the Achaeans encamped on the plain of Troy. Since Helen’s lines to a certain extent correspond to the function and style of catalogic poetry, reading them specifically as captions leads to a more nuanced understanding of both Homeric poetry and Homeric self-reference. By contrasting Helen’s “epigrams” with those of Hektor, one can also discern a gender-based differentiation of poetic functions.

No Greek literary genre is more inextricably linked to the technology of writing than the epigram, which derives its defining characteristics from the exigencies of inscription. It may therefore seem somewhat incongruent to discernible gestures toward this most scriptural genre in the most thoroughly “oral” texts that survive from antiquity, the Homeric *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Nevertheless, even dedicated oralists allow for a certain Homeric awareness of or relation to written (inscribed) poetry. The canonical example is the sepulchral epigram which Hektor imagines for himself at *Il.* 7.89–90. Ancient commentators, who, we hope, knew a great deal more about the conventions of epigram than we ourselves, likewise identify this passage as epigrammatic—along with several others, which have for

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the most part escaped the attention of modern critics. A notable exception to this critical ellipsis is Onofrio Vox’s concise but penetrating article, “Epigrammi in Omero,” which assembles and comments briefly on all the Iliadic passages defined in ancient commentaries as “epigrams” or “epigrammatic.”

Vox brings together five passages from the *Iliad*, the diversity of which suggests that “Homer” indulges in a much more intimate contact with writing than moderns generally admit.

This paper will focus on two of these passages, a total of some six lines spoken by Helen to Priam as she points out to him the chief figures of the Achaean host, in a scene customarily known as the *teikhoskopia*. My argument will proceed, in the early stages, by the method of hypothesis, supposing that there might be some reason to take the scholia at face value and attribute some “inscriptional” quality to Helen’s lines, and seeing what consequences can be drawn from this supposition. I use the term “inscriptional” with a special force: I mean to indicate a mode of linguistic reference that points more or less directly to some external object—without necessarily involving the use of writing. The defining characteristic of the inscription in this sense is that it owes some part of its existence to an object of reference.

Helen’s two epigrams, I will argue, correspond to a particular subclass of epigram. To the extent that Helen can be read as a figure for self-conscious reflection on the nature of poetry itself, her epigrams prove essential to an understanding of the way in which Homeric poetry understands its relation to other poetic genres and to poetry in general.

By proposing an “inscriptional” mode of reference which is independent of any actual practice of writing, I am taking what could be called a grammatological approach, in the sense in which that term has been deployed (most famously) by Jacques Derrida. From this perspective, the revolution of writing, the truly radical innovation in verbal expression, is not the actual moment of transcribing speech with graphic signs (transcription in itself does not necessarily alter the character of an utterance); rather, it is a particular mode of reference which destabilizes the *hic et nunc* of an utterance, often by positing or creating a gap, a discontinuity, between utterance and referent.

This is a revolution which *does not require the technology*

3. This is not intended as a universal definition, nor is it meant to cover every instance of inscription even in the Greek world: there are obviously many kinds of inscription that do not fall into this category. Other commonly invoked notions of inscription focus on the materiality of the inscribed word, its permanence, etc.
4. The *teikhoskopia* is an essential component of Clader’s interpretation of Helen as a poet-figure; see Clader 1976: 6–11, and esp. 33, which speaks of Helen’s *pharmakon* (in the *Odyssey*) as “a brief symbol for Homer’s extended self-conscious expression of the effect of epic poetry.” Cf. also Jenkins 1999: 220n.33 and 225n.48. Clader and Jenkins tend to assimilate Helen’s poetic activity to the model of the epic singer. I shall argue the necessity for a much more subtle anatomy of the poetic craft.
6. Cf. Spivak 1997: lxix on Derrida’s “archi-écriture”: “The usual notion of writing in the narrow sense does contain the elements of the structure of writing in general: the absence of the ‘author’ and of the ‘subject-matter,’ interpretability, the deployment of a space and time that is not
of writing in order to take place. I would therefore wish to avoid the implication, in the case of the observed correspondences between the Homeric text and certain specific modes of inscription, that the Homeric text has necessarily used real inscriptions as models, and hence that the relevant portions of the text must be chronologically posterior to a real practice of inscription. I am perfectly happy to suppose, after Derrida, a “writing before the letter.” From the grammatological point of view it becomes unnecessary to establish a strict chronology relating the Homeric text to an epigraphical practice which, to my knowledge, does not leave an unambiguous trace in the archeological record until ca. 400: we may suppose that the epic incorporates modes of reference which enjoyed an existence in speech, as “writing in general,” prior to their transcription as “writing in the narrow sense.” But for readers who should feel that the correspondences I will outline here are rather more suggestive of an awareness of actual epigraphical practice (a position to which I have often been attracted during the writing of the following pages, but which I have refrained from embracing because it imposes unnecessary limitations on my argument), I would leave open the possibility that the passages I will discuss derive from a relatively later phase of Homeric tradition. Allowance for such a possibility is made by several accounts of the transmission and fixation of the Homeric text, including that particular account to which I subscribe, namely, Nagy’s “evolutionary” model, which allows for varying degrees of “recomposition” well into the historical period. Indeed, in consideration of the possible Panathenaic overtones of the weaving motifs I shall discuss later in this paper, I would be quite satisfied with a hypothesis situating the passages in question in Nagy’s “definitive” (extending from the mid-sixth to the late fourth century) or “standardizing” (late fourth to mid-second century) periods, both of which are “centralized in Athens.”

Let us begin with a survey of the five epigrammatic passages singled out by Vox. Numbers 2 and 3, Helen’s lines, are the principal object of our interest:

"its own" (emphasis mine). With this last phrase Spivak points to the destabilization of the hic et nunc characteristic of “writing in general.”

7. CEG 105, discussed below. The other monument featuring in my discussion, the Chest of Kupselos, is supposed to have belonged to the sixth century.

8. Nagy 1996: 29–63 (esp. 41–43). At 99–100 Nagy gives references to several alternative models of a “sixth-century recension” or “Panathenaic text,” any of which would suffice for my purposes. See also Wilson 2002: 11 for documentation of the “growing body of scholarship that places the textualization stage of Homeric epic . . . well into the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.E.”

9. Alluded to in the Appendix.

10. Nagy 1996: 42, who adds, “A context for the definitive period . . . is a pan-Hellenic festival like the Panathenaia at Athens . . . ” Note the potentially Athenian resonances of Il. 3.201 (cf. LSJ s.v. kranaos on the use of Kranaoi to mean “the people of Attika”), and the fact that the Catalogue of Ships, which is implicated in my argument, shows signs of Athenian tampering (cf. the comments in West’s apparatus ad Il. 2.558).

11. The scholia and ancient commentators who refer to these passages as “epigrams” or “epigrammatic” are as follows (all references to the scholia follow Erbse’s edition): (1) AT 3.156–
1. οὐ νέµεσι Ῥο̂μεγαπερισποmενεα̋ καὶ ἐyüκνήµιδα̋ ᾿Αχαιοὺ̋ Τρ/οmεγαπερισποmενε/ιοτασυβεταδ/θυοτεσνγλριγητ ἀµφὶ γυναικὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἄλγεα πάσχει ν/cολονγρεεκ αἰ ν/οmεγαπερισποmενε̋ ἀθανάτη/ιοτασυβετασι θε/εταπερισποmενε/ιοτα̋ εἰ̋ /οmεγαλενισπερισποmενεπα ἔοικεν/cολονγρεεκ 3.156–58

No cause for reproach that Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans should for such a woman suffer woes through the long years: terribly is she like the immortal goddesses in appearance.\textsuperscript{12}

2. οὔτός γ’ ΄Ατρείδης εὐφ’ χρείων Ἀγαµέµνων, ἀµφότερον βασιλεύ̋ τ’ ἀγάθος κρατερός τ’ αἰχµητής δαήρ αὐτ’ ἐμὸς ἐσχε κυνόπιδος, εἴ τοτ’ ἐγν γε. 3.178–80

This is the son of Atreus, wide-ranging Agamemnon, both a noble king and a valiant spearman; and he was also husband’s brother—if ever there was such a one—to dog-faced me.

3. οὔτος δ’ αὐ δ’ Λαερτιάδης πολύμητι Ὀδυσσεύ̋, ὃς τράφη ἐν δήµω Ἰθάκη̋ κρανα/εταπερισποmενε̋ περ ἐούση̋ εἰδὼ̋ παντοίου̋ τε δόλου̋ καὶ µήδεα πυκνά. 3.200–202

This again is the son of Laertes, Odysseus of many contrivances, who was born in the deme of Ithaca, rocky though it be, knowing tricks of all kinds and well-made counsels.

4. ‘Εκτορο̋ ἥδε γυνὴ ὃ̋ ἀριστεύεσκε µάχεσθαι Τρώων ἱπποδάµων ὅτε ᾽Ιλιον ἀµφεµάχοντο. 6.460–61

This is the wife of Hektor, who was best at fighting of the horse-taming Trojans when they fought about Ilion.

5. ἀνδρὸ̋ µὲν τόδε σ/εταπερισποmεµα πάλαι κατατεθνη/οmεγαπερισποmενετο̋, ὃν ποτ’ ἀριστεύοντα κατέκτανε φαίδιµο̋ Ἐκτωρ. 7.89–90

This is the \textit{sêma} of a man long dead, whom once shining Hektor slew at the height of his glory.

\textsuperscript{58b}; (2) T 3.178 (ἐπιγραµµατικὸ̌ς), AbT 1.29d (which refers to 3.179 as τὸ ἐπίγραµµα); (3) AbT 3.200–202 (τὸ ἐπίγραµµα); (4) bT 6.460b and Ps.-Plutarch \textit{De Homero} 2.215, which also mentions (5). These Homeric epigrams were evidently an established part of the scholiastic tradition, as represented above all by the bT-scholia. Van der Valk 1963: 133–34 discusses the value of “the great exegetical commentary on the \textit{Iliad} which we indicate by the name of bT.” The bT-scholia are generally regarded as free from the influence of late sources (ibid. 414).

\textsuperscript{12} I have consulted the Loeb text and published commentaries for help with this and subsequent translations.
From this synopsis one can easily see that Vox’s material reveals a number of internal divisions. There is first of all the matter of the noticeably restricted distribution of these passages within the poem. Numbers 1 through 3 occur within some fifty lines of each other, in connection with the same episode: the first describes Helen’s appearance to the assembled Trojan leaders, and thus belongs to the narrative frame of the teikhoskopia, while the latter two comprise Helen’s first two descriptions, of Agamemnon and Odysseus, respectively. Numbers 4 and 5 likewise occur within an integrated narrative unit centered on Hektor as he visits the city and returns to battle. The differentiation of these lines on the basis of narrative distribution is to a certain extent reflected by their divergence in terms of theme and function. An overtly sepulchral character distinguishes the two epigrams of the “Hektorad”—not by coincidence, since an anxiety over the death and burial of the hero defines the thematics of the relationship between Hektor and Andromakhê, a relationship which receives its most sustained development precisely in this section of the poem. It is not immediately obvious whether the three epigrams of the teikhoskopia share any analogous feature which would make them similarly appropriate to their context; number 1 presents a particular problem, to which I shall later return. For the time being I would like simply to point out that the teikhoskopia is not an isolated unit, but constitutes a segment of a larger narrative movement. In theme and structure it stands in close relation to the Catalogue of Ships in Book 2 and the epipôlêsis of Book 4. These architectonic connections situate the lines in question in a larger textual network that will prove especially significant when we consider the “catalogic” properties of Helen’s lines.

Similar results can be obtained by the application of other criteria. Köchly had first drawn attention to epigrams 1 and 3 as a result of his interest in strophic patterns of three lines, noting that the scholiast cites 3.156ff. as the very founding instance of the trigônon epigramma. A formal opposition in the number of lines thus reinforces the division based on distribution. Syntax to a certain extent unites Hektor’s distichs with Helen’s tristichs, for 2 through 5 all utilize a demonstrative pronoun in the nominative and a relative clause. At a more fundamental level, however, syntax divides the former group from the latter.

13. Lines 6.460–61, by which a living person is made to serve as the monument for a deceased hero, obviously represent a very significant manipulation of the common epitaph formula “this is the sêma of so-and-so,” as we see it for instance in 7.89–90. See below for comments on one consequence of this very significant maneuver.

14. Clader 1976: 9 relates Helen’s lines to the Catalogue of Ships. Köchly 1881: 73 also recognizes the teikhoskopia’s participation in a larger movement, speaking of the teikhoskopia and the epipôlêsis of Book 4 as “die doppelte Musterung.”


16. For more on the trigônon, which was recognized in antiquity as a distinctive form, see below; the autonomy of the distichon needs no further proof than the extensive treatment of Lausberg 1982a.

17. Lausberg 1982a: 35 identifies the syntactic structure of our numbers 4 and 5 as “der charakteristische Grundaufbau des inschriftlichen Epigramms.”
The distinction between a proper noun in the nominative, as in Helen’s lines, and in the genitive, as in Hektor’s, is no less significant in this regard than the tremendous difference in emphasis (i.e. deixis) produced by the pronouns used in each case. Vox quite rightly draws attention to “il segnale oûpßoû” which distinguishes Helen’s tristichs from the “Hektorad” distichs and their use of “il segnale ôðe, cosi come negli epigrammi reali.” I shall return to this point momentarily, and to Vox’s problematic notion of what constitutes a “real” epigram. Finally, there is the complex matter of speaking voice. The houtos-epigrams present the simplest case, being spoken straightforwardly by Helen. The two quasi-epitaphs are both pronounced by Hektor himself, although he imagines them to be spoken by an anonymous speaker at some unidentified point in the future. The first tristich, exceptionally, is not uttered by a single, identifiable person, but in the less distinctive, corporate voice of the Trojan elders. Aside from this apparent exception, the formal and syntactic divergences we have observed are thus reinforced, not only by a difference in speaker, but by a difference in the speaker’s gender as well. It is worth considering what significance may lie behind the fact that the sepulchral epigrams are assigned to a male speaker (Hektor), while the female speaker pronounces epigrams which are, somehow, different. This paper hopes to assess in more precise terms just what makes Helen’s epigrams peculiar.

In many of the aspects I have just pointed to—syntax, deixis, voice—the first epigram stands apart from the rest. This tristich displays none of the typically epigrammatic features that distinguish the other lines. It is far from obvious why the scholiast should have felt these lines to be an exemplary, indeed the exemplary, instance of the trigônon epigramma. In fact these lines count as epigram for altogether different reasons. Although these reasons will prove to be emblematic of the function of epigram in the teîkhoskopia, they must await exposition until the proper moment. For now, I shall fix my attention on my primary object of interest, the lines spoken by Helen.

The scholiasts’ attribution of an epigrammatic quality to these lines raises an initial question: do the scholia point merely to the formal features of the lines (asserting that they are simply like epigrams), or do they wish to attribute to them a properly epigrammatic function? It seems safer, and generally more likely, to assume that the scholiasts have stylistic features in mind. I will argue that the scholia are right to observe a formally epigrammatic character, and that these observations are confirmed by observable correspondences with real epigrams.

19. The contrast between Hektor’s epigrams, imagined as pronounced by an anonymous (presumably male) speaker, and those of Helen, which are firmly anchored to her own voice, should be viewed in light of the comments of Gutzwiller 2004: 383: “Verse inscriptions carved on stone were in the early period of Greek culture always anonymous . . . As a result, the voice heard in inscribed verse was unmarked and so gendered male . . . if the voice in an epigram was marked as that of a woman, it had then to be heard as a personal voice, not an anonymous or generic one.”
But I will make the further claim that, in addition to an epigrammatic form, these lines have as well an epigrammatic function (which may or may not lie in the background of the scholiasts’ comments). My discussion will therefore move from consideration of the formal features of Helen’s lines to their functional deployment in the poem; I hope to show that the Homeric text accommodates an awareness of more than the mere surface features of a particular mode of discourse.

The scholia provide, at best, only elliptical justifications for their use of the term “epigram.” With reference to our number 4, the scholion bT 6.460, ἐπιγραµµατικὸν ἔχει τύπον ὁ στίχος (“the line has an epigrammatic character”), evidently refers to the observable formal features of the couplet. It is, however, unclear whether any such formal concerns lie in the background of the comment on number 3, ἐν βραχε/ιοταπερισποmενε τὸ ἐπίγραµµα πάντα ἔχει (“the epigram comprises everything in brief”), or whether the scholiast has in mind only the compressed brevity of the lines. In the latter case, the scholiast would be in accord with Lausberg, who feels that the three tristichs of Book 3 are epigrammatic to the extent that in each “handelt es sich um kurze Personencharakterisierungen.”

Nevertheless, a definition of epigram only in terms of Kürze und Umfang, in Lausberg’s terms, glosses over not only the marked style which distinguishes the latter four from the anomalous first epigram, but also the syntactic divergences which oppose Hektor’s epigrams to Helen’s. In order, therefore, better to discern the specific qualities of Helen’s epigrammatic oeuvre, I will begin by contrasting them with Hektor’s more straightforward epitaphs.

Helen’s epigrams on Agamemnon and Odysseus present exactly the same structure. Following Vox (p. 69), we can schematize it as follows:

οὐτος + patronymic + epithet + proper name + expansion (epithet or relative clause)

All the primary constituents are in the nominative; the copula is suppressed. Helen continues her identification of the Achaean leaders by pointing out Ajax: οὔτοι δ’ Αίας ἐστι πελώριο, ἕρκο ᾎ Αχαι/οmεγαπερισποmενεν (“this is mighty Ajax, bulwark of the Achaeans,” 3.229). This line repeats some features of the essential form, but omits the patronymic and adds the copula. Hektor’s epigrams likewise share a common form, but it is one that differs substantially from Helen’s paradigm. Though it is more difficult to describe schematically, we might represent it thus:

noun₁ (G) + ὁδε + noun₂ (N) + modifier₁

where “noun₁” designates the memorialized person, and “noun₂” the memorial itself. Characteristic of this epigrammatic form is its apparently indirect relation to the ultimate object of reference, the memorialized individual. (The text refers not to the individual but to the material object, the sêma, which in turn represents

him/her. The “indirection” produced by the mediation of a material object between text and referent nevertheless proves only apparent, for in the case of such “egocentric” inscriptions, text and object are conceived of as a single entity—a point developed below. The patronymic and epithet are noticeably absent here. Surprisingly, although they have an honorific quality which would seem eminently appropriate to the memorializing epigram, these features seem less essential to Hektor’s sepulchral mode than to Helen’s merely descriptive one. The archaeological record tends to confirm this general characterization. The well-known Arniadas inscription (CEG 145, ca. 600?) likewise lacks a patronymic, an omission that might be explained by supposing an intertextual engagement with Hektor’s imagined epitaph; the same cannot be said, however, for the famous Phrasikleia inscription (CEG 24, ca. 540?). On the other hand, the correlation of a patronymic and heroic epithet with a proper name in the nominative does seem to be typical of a particular mode of epigram, for the only passage in the Odyssey designated by the scholia as an epigramma is the disguised Athena’s pronouncement: Μέντης Ἀγχιάλοιο δαΐφρονος εὕχομαι εἰναι / υἱὸς (“I declare myself to be Menteś, the son of wise Ankhialos,” 1.180–81). This purely declarative statement is obviously not monumental, as Hektor’s epitaphs; in fact, this line is a perfect analogue to Helen’s tristichs, except for the minor difference that in this case the speaker identifies himself rather than another. Identification or specification seems to be the primary function of this type of epigram. These epigrams are tags or labels which the speaker attaches to a referent.

21. The “indirection” of the egocentric funerary sêma is thus indicative of the inseparability of text from monument. Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 228 (focusing on the status of the monument rather than the status of the text, as here) ties this feature of grave inscriptions to the function of the sêma as metonymic signifier. She also notes the fact that, while “no grave statue is identified as the deceased by an inscription, but always as the sêma of the deceased,” votive statues are often identified with the dedicator by an inscription naming him/her in the nominative. Syntactically, then, such dedicatory inscriptions are closer to Helen’s model than Hektor’s, a circumstance which I would explain by suggesting that dedicatory inscriptions by their very nature tend to function as Beischriften (in the sense developed below). Two of Sourvinou-Inwood’s examples, the inscriptions naming Ornithē and Philippe in a group dedication, in fact function precisely as name-labels identifying the statues.

22. Lumpp 1963: 213–14, who adduces the Phrasikleia inscription in order to counter the view of those who felt a patronymic to be so wanting in the Arniadas text that Χάροψ (genitive Χάροψ) should be read in place of χαροπό̋, an epithet naturally applied to Ares. Svenbro 1993, who invests a great deal in Phrasikleia’s relation to the “paternal hearth,” does not comment on the absence of the patronymic in this key text.

23. D-scholia ad loc.: εὐχομαι εἰναι (perhaps with reference only to the first three words?). For the formulation εὐχομαι εἰναι, see below on Aeschylus Th. 646, and cf. CEG 195 and esp. 413.

24. As shown by Muellner 1976: 74n.9, this “minor” difference is nevertheless quite exceptional, since it violates the general prohibition against mentioning one’s own name. Muellner cites three Homeric instances in which the violation of this prohibition coincides with the speaker’s (purported) emergence from disguise. The poetic effect of Athena-Mentês’ statement thus depends on the powerful force of tradition in Homeric poetry: the hearer / reader sensitive to the conventions of disguise experiences a heightened sense of dramatic irony.
In Vox’s analysis, the distinguishing characteristic of Helen’s epigrams is the use of *houtos* in place of Hektor’s *hode*. Yet, as Vox himself notes, *hode* maintains a kind of background presence in the *teikhoskopia* lines. Each of Helen’s identifications is offered in response to a question from Priam. Priam always poses his question with the demonstrative *hode*. Thus:

\[
\omega \varsigma \mu α καί τόνθ’ ἄνδρα πελώριον ἐξονομήνης
\delta' τις ὅδ’ ἐστίν Ἀχαῖος ἄνηρ ἡ' ὑς τε μέγας τε.
\]

(3.166–67)

... and that you may also name for me this mighty man, whoever is this Achaean man, valiant and great.

\[
eιτ' ἄγε μοι καί τόνθε φίλον τέχος ὅς τις ὧδ’ ἐστιν.
\]

(3.192)

And this one too, my child—come, tell me who this is.

\[
τις τ’ ἄρ’ ὧδ’ ἄλλος Ἀχαῖος ἄνηρ ἡ' ὑς τε μέγας τε
\]

(3.226)

Who then is this other Achaean man, valiant and great?

In each case Helen responds, *οὔτος δ’ (γ’)*. It is as if *houtos* in Helen’s answer simply marks the place for the *hode* supplied by Priam’s question. The identification seems in a way to have been split between two interlocutors. This raises the question: if Priam had been able to pronounce the identifications himself, without the mediation of Helen, would we find *hode* in place of *houtos*? The question is to a certain extent misleading, since such a situation would differ fundamentally from the scene we are examining in at least two ways. Firstly, there would be no dialogue; an affirmative answer to our question might on that account be thought attributable simply to the lack of dialogism. But we must keep in mind that our situation involves not two but three terms (speaker, hearer, and object of reference), the relations among which are radically altered by the removal of one of the interlocutors. *Hode* in a direct identification by Priam might therefore signal a change in the relation to the object of reference just as much as the absence or presence of an interlocutor. Posing the question is nevertheless worthwhile, since it forces us to confront the decisive issue of whether the *houtos* in Helen’s lines is determined by their situation in a dialogue or by their (still only hypothetical) “inscriptional” status. That is, our response to this question depends on whether we read Helen’s lines simply as part of an exchange with Priam, and only metaphorically “epigrams,” or whether we attribute to them a certain degree of autonomy, as *epigrammata* in their own right, defined by a particular relation to an object. In formulating our response, we must be careful to distinguish two very different circumstances which might determine the operative force of deixis: on the one hand, a real, living speech situation in which two interlocutors are present
and interact with each other; and on the other, an inscriptive situation, in which the interlocutors are only notionally (virtually) present.

Vox opts for the former approach when he emphasizes the close connection between question and answer: “Ο/υπσιλονασπερπερισποmενετο̋ nelle risposte di Elena implica cioè una stretta dipendenza di queste dalle domande di Priamo: i tristici descrittivi non possono essere autonomi, come accade per gli epigrammi reali.” For Vox, the “dependent” nature of houtos gives Helen’s lines their “dialogic” quality, while their purely “descriptive” function seems to make them somehow unreal as epigrams. Bakker expresses a similar view, going even so far as to suggest that houtos is tied fundamentally to the structure of the dialogue: “Helen’s answer acknowledges Priam’s earlier perception. Helen’s and Priam’s joint seeing is in fact the very point of the use of o/υτος. We may say, then, that o/υτος is not only deictic, but also ‘dialogic.’ ”

Without question, Helen’s epigrams appear as a response to Priam’s questions; they are conceived and constructed as part of a dialogue, or better, an interrogation, in which the viewer demands the identification of the object he sees. We should remember, however, that epigrams are conventionally and implicitly understood to participate in dialogic situations; it is virtually their nature to answer the interrogation of a notional reader or viewer. Let us suppose for a moment that there is something “inscriptional” about Helen’s words, that is, that they are determined primarily by their special relation to an object of reference rather than by their occurrence in dialogue. Under this assumption we can read Helen’s interaction with Priam as a dramatization of the conventional interaction between the interrogating voice and the answering voice which becomes a virtual commonplace of later literary epigram. In the context of inscription, however, mere dialogism is not sufficient to control the deployment of hode / houtos, as we see from the following inscription from Halikarnassos (CEG 429, ca. 475?), which scripts an exchange identical to the one between Priam and Helen.

\[
\begin{aligned}
\alphaυδη & \; \text{τεχνησασα ληθο, λεγε τις τωδ η} [\text{γαλαμ}]

\sigmaτησεν & \text{Απο&lambda;λωνος βομον ἔπαγλασ[σα].}

\Piασυμυνυς & \text{υιος Κασβωλλιος, ει μετο[σορίνεις]}

\epsilonξειπεν, & \text{δεκατην τηνδ άνεθηκε θε[δι].}
\end{aligned}
\]

25. Vox 1975: 69, my emphasis. Cf. the judgment of Lausberg 1982a: 36: “Syntaktisch sind allerdings hier die Verse durch Partikeln, anders als ein in sich selbständiges Epigramm, in den Kontext integriert.” Lausberg makes a valid point; see below for the epigrammatic effect of the lack of connecting particles in the first tristich in our list. Notice, however, that the epigram “quoted” at Aesch. Th. 646–47 includes a δε analogous to that in Il. 3.200.


28. For an overview of these “dialogue” epigrams, see Barrio Vega 1989.

Cunning voice of the stone, tell me, who set up
this monument, in adornment of the altar of Apollo?
Panamüês, son of Kasböllis, if you bid me
speak, dedicated this tithe to the god.

The first interlocutor uses *hode* to indicate the object of reference, just as Priam does; but the answer is given using this same pronoun. Other factors, besides the alternation of speaking voices, must be at work here to determine the use of pronouns. And if we suspect that similar factors might be at play in the context of Helen’s exchange with Priam, it will not be sufficient to offer verbal exchange as an explanation for Helen’s use of *houtos*. The properly inscriptional situation involves three terms, not two. We must examine more closely the consequences of Helen’s deictic shift, paying special attention to the operation of deixis in inscriptional situations.

“In ancient Greek, *hode* is precisely a first-person demonstrative pronoun. Consequently, *hode* situates the object or person that it qualifies in the immediate sphere of the speaker as opposed to that of the person addressed.”31 *Houtos*, by contrast, is a “second-person” demonstrative, situating its referent with respect to the addressee.32 Thus Priam’s use of *hode* to point to Agamemnon seems quite natural, for he speaks from his own perspective, although one supposes he might have used *houtos* had he wished to empathize more with Helen’s point of view.33 But what about the use of *hode* in the Panamüês inscription—or in inscription in general, since Svenbro has shown that this pronoun is the premier indicator of the “egocentric” characteristic perspective of archaic Greek inscriptions?34 The first interlocutor appears to utter *hode* for the same reason as Priam: he is interested in an object which he sees. But if the inscription refers to an object available to perception by one or another speaker, why does the second interlocutor not follow the rules of politeness and answer, as Helen, with *houtos*? If we were dealing with two distinct voices, two distinct perspectives, the double *hode* would present certain difficulties. But the simple fact is that both “voices” emanate from the same stone. We should not be misled by the illusion that the inscription transcribes a “real” dialogue between two subjective awarenesses, each of whom

30. One might object that the first interlocutor asks not about the monument itself, but about the dedicator, so that the deixis of τόδε and τήντθυοτεσνγλριγητ lies outside the exchange of question and answer. But the epigram clearly conceives of the monument itself (the only thing a notional speaker could point to) as prompting the question.
31. Svenbro 1993: 33. Bakker 1999: 6 schematizes the three Greek pronouns of deixis as follows: “ὁδε for speaker-oriented deixis . . . ο/υπσιλονασπερπερισπομενετο̋ for the designation of what is more remote than the interlocutors in the current speech event.”
33. An example cited by Bakker 1999: 7 shows that *houtos* is quite at home in direct questions, even where the speaker demands knowledge for himself: τίς δ’ ο/υτοσ κατά νήφας ἀνά στρατόν ἔρχεται οίσις (II. 10.82).
34. Svenbro 1993: 26–43, especially 29: “[the earliest Greek inscriptions] assume the egó of the speech-act.”
may perceive the object in question. The seemingly incongruous opposition of a double *hode* derives from the fact that the inscription, and the voice which utters it, are inevitably anchored to the object itself, the referent of *hode*. This incongruity arises from the very form of inscription, which unites an object and the text that refers to it. “For as long as the inscription can be read, the object will be there. No one could lay greater claim than the object itself to the Hierheit of the written speech-act.”

Inscriptional deixis is determined primarily not by the relation between two virtual speakers, but by the relation of the utterance to a third term, the object of reference.

Inscription thus alters somewhat the conditions of deixis as it operates in spoken discourse, for it serves in this case to indicate spatial contiguity (in fact, consubstantiality) between object and text, while it otherwise indexes the proximity of an object to the speaker or addressee. In fact, for true inscribed epigrams—*Aufschriften*, in Raubitschek’s well-suited terminology—the notional unity of object and text is a *sine qua non*: the epigram as *Aufschrift* “eine Inschrift ist die eng und einzigartig mit einem Denkmal verbunden ist.”

The persistent first-personality of early inscriptions is symptomatic of their unique relationship with their monuments, corresponding not to the first person of some unidentified speaker (who will not be persistently present before the object), but the first person of the speech event itself, an event which necessarily involves the presence of the object or monument. In other words, the monument is the key, not the speaker. In fact, the egocentrism of the *Aufschrift* (the Panamües inscription is a premier example) reveals a fundamental disregard or non-awareness of the speaker as a distinct subjectivity in his/her own right. These monuments do

35. Svenbro 1993: 42.
36. Bakker 1999: 7 ties the “explicit linkage of οὐς·θεσθῃ·μετομεν·το·σύ that we find in Attic dramatic discourse” to a “dialogic” use of *houtos*. I would argue, however, that we cannot fully account for the use of *houtos* in Attic drama without taking account of the relation between the audience and the dramatic spectacle. In addition to the “dialogic” relation between interlocutors on stage, the structure of theater also gives rise to a triangular system of relations, analogous to the “inscriptional” structure I have described, comprising a speaker (on stage), a hearer (the audience), and an object of reference (the theatrical spectacle). Cf. Peponi 2004: 300 on second-person deixis in Alcman 1 as a fundamentally theatrical gesture that marks the “viewing audience” as “an indispensable factor in the performance” (note also the discussion of Aristotle’s formulation ὡς τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ on p. 310; Peponi’s article is part of an *Arethusa* special issue on the poetics of deixis, much of which is of relevance). For examples of *houtos* which may involve a quasi-inscriptional force, see e.g. Aesch. Ag. 1404, 1523 and Soph. Aj. 970. For tragedy as *écriture*, see below.
37. Raubitschek 1968: 3. Note that the mere act of inscription is not sufficient to establish the special relationship between epigram and object constitutive of the *Aufschrift*. In adopting Raubitschek’s terminology, I must be very careful to distinguish it from the deceptively similar terminology of Haüsle 1979: 46–47, who adopts Janell’s binary scheme of “die Auf- oder Beischriften und die eigentlichen Inschriften.” Haüsle’s terms have virtually the opposite value of the same words in Raubitschek. While the latter opposes *Aufschriften* to *Beischriften*, these two terms are nearly synonymous for Haüsle; *Inschrift*, which for Raubitschek denotes generally any text inscribed on some material, for Haüsle indicates that specific form of writing which is indifferent to the material on which it is inscribed.
not look forward to some eventual moment of contact with a passerby; they recognize only a timeless, undifferentiated, and absolute present, which is voiced in the first person quite simply because it does not acknowledge any other point of view. Such a perspective explains the curious use of *hode* in the Panamuês inscription, where deixis serves to indicate the contiguity of object and text. Now, it is clear that we cannot posit a similar contiguity for the *teikhoskopia*, neither for Helen’s “epigrams” nor for Priam’s *hode* cues. The *teikhoskopia* is constructed in such a way as to emphasize the gap between the words spoken on the walls and the Greeks on the plain below (the wall itself is the most concrete symbol of the radical divide between the Trojan and the Greek spheres). That does not mean, however, that the operation of deixis is here free from the influence of inscriptive forces, i.e., forces oriented around the relation between language and referent. There is a type of inscription which, although it functions without regard for contiguity, is nevertheless determined fundamentally by its relation to an object of reference: this is the *Beischrift* (again in Raubitschek’s terms), the caption or legend, which has as its only goal the explanation or identification of an object. No longer a necessary component of the object, without which the object cannot function, the *Beischrift* is merely a supplement which serves to specify, condense, or otherwise “capture” the meaning of an object: a *captio* in the true sense. The *Beischrift* can also be an *Inschrift*, of course, carved upon the object it describes. But it is characterized precisely by its indifference to the place of inscription: as was often done with temple dedications, such identifying captions could be placed as easily on a plaque next to the dedica-

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38. Contrast the anonymous first-person of the passerby as mourner, which (though rare) begins to appear in the mid-sixth century—that is, contemporaneously with the destabilization of the monumental present (see below). Examples: *CEG* 43, 51 (with an important divergence from Hansen’s text: see Lewis 1987: 188), 470, and *SEG* 41.540a, none of which is earlier than 550. Dedicatory inscriptions furnish an early and pronounced deviation from the purely monumental point of view, for many incorporate a second-person address to the god (e.g. *CEG* 326, ca. 700–675). In the first place, however, one should note that the god’s point of view is not confined to human temporal and spatial limits, and that therefore this appeal to a second person does not necessarily undermine the absolute present of the monument. Secondly, many of these inscriptions negotiate the deictic shift with a strong syntactic boundary, which essentially insulates one sphere of reference from the other (cf. Day 2000: 53). For me, the “deviations” evidenced by dedicatory inscriptions indicate that they naturally tend to fall outside the class of *Aufschriften*; cf. above, n.21.

39. The *teikhoskopia* seems to me to be a more elaborate version of the theme “Trojan women speaking about Greek heroes” as attested by *Ilias Parva* fr. 2 Allen. That text, however, appears to have lacked the explicitly deictic element—the actual pointing to the Greek army—which gives the *teikhoskopia* its unique referential structure, with discourse on one side, and referent on the other, of the wall. It is this structure (the congruence with the structuralist opposition signifier / signified is readily apparent) which makes the scene eminently appropriate as a dramatization or theater of writing.

40. Raubitschek 1968: 21: “Beischriften haben den einzigen Zweck eine bildliche Darstellung zu erklären”; dedicatory inscriptions, for Raubitschek, generally fall into this category. Raubitschek draws special attention to the use of *Namensbeischriften* in archaic vase painting.
tion as on the dedication itself. The indissolubility of the Beischrift arises from its relation to its referent: as supplement, the caption presumes an object which is notionally complete and suffers itself to be extrinsic to that object. We may contrast the form of the sepulchral monument, which cannot fulfill its function of procuring kleos without its inscription to evoke the name of the deceased.\(^{41}\) Such monumental inscriptions are structurally (and often materially) one with their objects.

To the extent that the caption points to an extrinsic image, rather than to a monument with which it is consubstantial, we can say that the caption is characterized by a notional (even if not an actual) disjunction between the object and the text. This disjunction has linguistic consequences: once object and text are thus severed from one another, the object can no longer lay claim to the “Hierheit” of the speech event, which henceforth occurs in some other, undefined place—undefined because the speech event is not anchored to the object of reference. This immediately destabilizes the “monumental” first person, since the basic condition for monumental “egocentrism”—the assumption that monument and text will always be co-present—is no longer met. Several alternatives remain to the inscription as Beischrift, unable as it is to link itself directly to the monument in an absolute present. Firstly, it can either link itself to the present of the viewer of the object; or it can eschew deixis altogether. In the former case, the text of the inscription can assimilate itself to the voice of the viewer, who will presumably be present whenever the inscription is activated—in which case the text may exhibit the first-person hode, which now refers to the viewer’s present. But this configuration is deceptive, in that the inscription poses as the pronouncement of a potential reader in a manner that obscures the true status of the words as a supplement to the object which confronts the reader / viewer from an indeterminate, intermediate space. A more honest posture—one that more accurately reflects the disposition of the three constituent parts of the speech event (the notional speaker, who is also the reader / viewer, the words transcribed by the inscription, and the object of reference)—is shown by inscriptions which appeal to the reader / viewer as a second person (using the pronoun houtos).\(^{42}\) These inscriptions maintain a distinct (though indefinite) place for themselves, referencing the object while at the same time acknowledging the viewer as the subjectivity which determines the present of the speech event. Such a posture is

\(^{41}\) Cf. Svenbro 1993: 62: “The inscription is a machine designed to produce kleos.” In the contrast between the specification achieved by the Beischrift and the pure activation of the name produced by the monumental Aufschrift, one can perhaps sense the factors that make the patronymic appropriate to contexts of identification, but less so to the sepulchral epigram.

\(^{42}\) An early, and interesting, example is CEG 13 (575–550?), the epitaph for Tettikhos, which combines an appeal to the viewer with the deictic τα/υπσιλονπερισπομενετ/θυοτεσνγλριγητ. The pronoun’s antecedent might be thought to be Tettikhos’ sufferings, but cf. Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 147 on the grave monument as the “point of reference for, and focus of, the action represented in . . . the epigram, and thus the focus of its reading.”
even more honest than that of inscriptions which deploy no deixis whatsoever, for the latter offer no means of relating viewer, object, and text.\(^{43}\)

For Svenbro, the shift away from “egocentrism” has a radical linguistic effect, even on those inscriptions that continue to use the traditional \textit{hode}: while the pronoun formerly referred to the egô (as “Hierheit”) of the monument, it now refers to that of the reader (who pronounces \textit{hode} with the meaning “this object before me”).\(^{44}\) (This, incidentally, is precisely the force with which Priam uses the word.) Thus, even in this less “honest” case of superficial similarity, a multiplicity of constituents has replaced a prior unity: where there was only one absolute entity, the monument, there are now two, the monument and the viewer / reader. This is at one and the same time a discovery of another person external to the object (the viewer), and of the object itself, which no longer appears as an absolute totality, but is isolated and focused by the viewer’s gaze. In fact, the linguistic shift identified by Svenbro corresponds entirely to Marcel Detienne’s notion of the discovery of the artistic image. Detienne argues that the discovery of the art object occurs at that very moment when the artist recognizes himself as a creative subject, and he identifies Simonides as the representative of this change.\(^{45}\) A major sign of this discovery in Detienne’s view is the widespread appearance of artists’ signatures on statues and paintings. The signature, of course, is a premier example of a \textit{Beischrift} in the sense developed here. We may compare the signature of Polugnôtos in the Delphic Leskhê, which Pausanias 10.27.4 attributes to Simonides, and note the absence of any sort of deixis: γράψε Πολύγνωτος. Θάσιος γένος, \{δ/θυοτεσνγλριγητ\} Ἀγλαοῒφολνος / νίς, περθομένην Ἰλιου ἄφροτολ(? (“Polugnôtos, Thasian by birth, son of Aglaophôn, painted the sack of Ilion’s acropolis”).\(^{46}\) As Svenbro’s insights make clear, the artist’s discovery of himself as a creative subject is also at the same time the viewer’s discovery of himself as a viewing subject.\(^{47}\)

\(^{43}\) Cf. \textit{CEG} 19 (550–530?: reference to viewer with no deixis), 40 (530–520?), 193 (dedicatory, ca. 525–510?).

\(^{44}\) Svenbro 1993: 36–67, who dates the shift to around 550. This usage thus falls together with the anonymous first-person mourner noted above, n.38.

\(^{45}\) Detienne 1996: 109: “the artist’s discovery of himself was intimately associated with the invention of the image”; 197n.17: “Simonides seems to mark the moment when the Greeks discovered the image and seems to have been the first to theorize it.” Raubitschek 1968: 3 similarly places Simonides at the origin of non-monumental epigram: “Mit Simonides scheint das literarische Epigramm im eigentlichen Sinne anzufangen….”

\(^{46}\) The ambivalence of deixis in artists’ signatures from a very early date may be a sign of their natural “\textit{Beischriftlichkeit},” their tendency to be cut off from the monumental present. Signatures which omit any form of deixis (and are often merely appended to verse inscriptions): \textit{CEG} 14 (560–550?), 50, 52, 193, 198, 209, 419, etc. Signatures which maintain first-person deixis: \textit{CEG} 34 (ca. 530?), 42, 211, 396, etc. I note that the very early “signature” of Idameneus (\textit{CEG} 459, ca. 600–575?) is altogether exceptional, and the nature of the monument unclear (cf. Hansen’s remarks on why it cannot be a grave inscription). The explicitly monumental purpose of this text (\textit{ασπιρατεί να κλέο̋είη}) appears to me to distinguish it sharply from other, later signatures.

\(^{47}\) This is a point brought across by Svenbro 1993: 36: “The reader of a nonegocentric \textit{sêma} can occupy the position of the writer without clashing with another egô that the latter has staged.” That is, the reader of such a \textit{sêma} is allowed a new autonomy, even when his words have already been
Simonides, of course, is more a figurehead or culture hero for the new epigrammatic form than an actual instigator or practitioner, since the authenticity of the epigrams (as well as many of the other poems) ascribed to him is altogether questionable. But he has played a curious role in earlier discussions of the epigrammatic houtos. Fick used two Simonidean epigrams to support his claim that the use of houtos in the sense of hode was a distinctive feature of the Corinthian dialect.

Thus he erased the peculiar deictic force of houtos in these texts and replaced it with Simonides’ sensitivity for local color: “Simonides besass das wunderbare talent, in der mundart aller griechischen stämme zu dichten.”

One of two relevant Simonidean epigrams neglected by Fick—presumably because they undermined his Corinthian hypothesis—nevertheless seems to me to exemplify perfectly the inscriptive force of houtos peculiar to the (non-monumental) Beischrift, while the anecdote contextualizing it could serve as an allegorical account of the transition from an unmediated monumental absolute to the more complex situation of a monument mediated by writing. According to legend, Simonides carved the following inscription on an unmarked funeral monument after the shade of the deceased saved him from a disastrous sea voyage:

οὗτος ὁ τοῦ Κείων Σιμωνίδου ἑστὶ σωτήρ,
δός καὶ τεθνήσας ζῶντι παρέσχε χάριν.

(85 GP)

This is the savior of Simonides of Keos, who even in death gave cause for gratitude to one who still lives.

Reappropriating the conventions of traditional monumental inscription in the direction of the Beischrift, Simonides’ rewriting of the blank funeral monument does everything in its power to undermine the monumental absolute. In the first place, houtos opens up a gulf between the monument and the external viewer, scripted by the monument. Svenbro’s entire analysis develops around the interrelation of writer and reader, which we may generalize to include also the artist and viewer. For an attested link between acknowledgment of the artist and acknowledgment of the viewer in the context of inscription, see CEG 150 (early fifth century), in which the artist’s signature accompanies an injunction to the viewer to behold the object.

48. Fick 1886: vii. Fick used Simonides 10 and 13 GP, but the inscriptions on the Kupselos Chest provided the weightier part of his evidence. The Kupselos Chest texts are a crucial part of my own discussion, below.

49. Ibid. vi.

50. Simonides 67 and 85 GP exhibit the tell-tale houtos, but lack any Corinthian associations. The attribution for both epigrams is at least as questionable as it is for the texts cited by Fick. Gow and Page reject Simonidean authorship for both (Gow and Page 1965: 2.518 and Page 1981: 300)—as they do for 10 GP (Page 1981: 201). But once again, I am concerned less with the authenticity of these texts than with the fact that Greek tradition associated them with the particular historical moment represented by Simonides.

51. The story is given by the scholion BD 160.14 to Aristides’ Huper tôn tettarôn (3.533 Dindorf).
thus dissolving the illusion of an absolute present in time and space. This effect is reinforced by the fact that the monument’s power to memorialize has been usurped and placed in the service of one who is unavoidably elsewhere.\textsuperscript{52} In a traditional sepulchral epitaph, the genitival proper name would indicate the person memorialized, with whom the monument is “isonymous,”\textsuperscript{53} and whom the monument metonymically signifies.\textsuperscript{54} Now, however, the name indicates one who is absent—in fact, still alive, while the dummy subject of the monument, the person whom the monument represents metonymically, remains anonymously dead. More than just a clever oxymoron in the context of a sepulchral inscription, ζῶντι leaves the story of Simonides’ encounter with the deceased open-ended and permanently defers any kind of monumental closure. The blank monument, by contrast with Simonides’ disruptive and destabilizing inscription, corresponds to the primordial unity of monument and text. The story stages the unwritten space of the monumental present giving way to the deferral (in Derrida’s language, \textit{différence}) engendered by writing.

Simonides is not a master of dialects—he is a master of writing, and of the new form of the epigram as \textit{Beischrift}.\textsuperscript{55} A certain dialogism is implicit in such epigrams, which no longer exist solely for the sake of the monument, but reach out to the viewer / reader, shattering the absolute monumental present. Thus they seem to speak to the reader, and to answer his inquisitive gaze. Nevertheless, this dialogism is less the result of a real or imagined conversation than a consequence of the distinctive structure of an epigram that no longer has a definitive place, except somewhere between the object and the viewer, as mediator between the two. These epigrams participate in a dialogue not so much because they answer any real demand for knowledge, but because, cut off from the absolute presence of the monument, they must position themselves vis-à-vis someone else, a second person.

It would be a mistake to look for a decisive moment of transition, a single chronological point when inscriptions shift suddenly from cooperation in the monumental absolute to a more disjunctive relation. By force of tradition, \textit{hode} maintains an enduring position in the genre of epigram; nor should we discount the relevance of local conventions to particular instances.\textsuperscript{56} In point of fact, we find many inscriptions after the mid-sixth century which appear to mix \textit{hode} and \textit{houtos} indiscriminately in the same referential context (e.g. \textit{CEG} 139). This ambivalence,

\begin{itemize}
\item 52. In this respect the Simonidean epigram is prefigured by Hektor’s own inscriptive \textit{coup de grâce} at 7.89–90 (no. 5 above).
\item 53. Svenbro 1993: 37.
\item 54. The function of the grave monument as metonymic signifier, by virtue of the presence (in most cases) of the deceased’s remains, is developed at length by Sourvinou-Inwood 1995.
\item 55. Although it would be a topic for another paper, I believe one could argue that the Simonidean dictum ἡ ποιητικὴ ζω/ιοτασυβοmεγαγραφία λαλο/υπσιλονπερισποmενεσα, ἡ δὲ ζω/ιοτασυβοmεγαγραφία ποιητικὴ σιωπ/οmεγαπερισποmενεσα (as cited by Ps.-Plu. \textit{De Hom.} 2.216) depends on the structure of the captioned image.
\end{itemize}
however, may itself be indicative of the destabilization of the monumental present. Furthermore the alternation is sometimes deployed in suggestive ways which do not, on second glance, seem so ambivalent after all. I find two instances in which the shift from hode to houtos marks the shift from reference to the monument as memorial (of the deceased or of the dedicator) to reference to the monument as an object crafted by the artisan. Houtos in these examples is distinctive of the mode of signature, and distinguishes the crafted object from the object in its true monumental function, in accordance with Detienne’s notion of the “invention of the image.” We see in this usage of houtos a tendency to cut off or isolate the object of reference from its surrounding context, a tendency which gives the pronoun an inherent affinity for the mode of captions or labels, insofar as the latter often identify and pick out particular figures from larger scenes. It is with this force in mind that we should read what is perhaps the most striking example of inscriptional houtos in a sepulchral epigram:

οὔτος ὃς ἐνθάδε κεῖταί ἔχει μὲν τόνομα χριῶ, ὑμῖν ἔσχε δὲ ψυχὴν ἔσχε δικαιοτάτο.

(CEG 105, ca. 400?)

This one who lies here has the name of “ram,” but he had the soul of a man most just.

This text is added beneath the name of the deceased, Κριοταπερισπομενεο, which is inscribed on the stèle in significantly larger letters. It is precisely the relation of the epigram to this name that, I suggest, explains this signal use of houtos. The epigram, which exploits a pun as the mainspring of its rhetorical structure, must point to the name as something distinct from the monument as a whole. Houtos calls the reader’s attention to the name itself as a distinct object of interest, isolating it from its context in much the same way as the labels identifying Dermys and Kitylos (see previous note). Even the visual arrangement of the stèle suggests the relation of a caption to an image.

57. CEG 26 (sepulchral, ca. 540–530?): τόδ’ Ἀρχίο στι σάμαξ χαδελφάς ψιλές, : Εὐκοσίδες: δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐπιλεξαν καλὸν . . .; CEG 418 (dedicatory, end of the sixth century?): ταῖ Διός, ἕκταντο δέκα σάμαξ ἐγκλαμα: ὕψι γὰρ ἐπευκαστέον τὸν ἀγαλματίαν Γρόπαν (see Hansen’s comments for the interpretation that makes Grophos the sculptor, and perhaps also a co-dedicator).

58. We find this force in another inscription with mixed deixis, CEG 167 (ca. 400?), in which τότο . . . τὸ σάμα contrasts with ὅπον πάρα τήνδε. Hode here deploys a kind of “choric” deixis (reference to the space that encompasses the speech event) which should remind us of phrases such as hāde gā in choral lyric, esp. in Attic drama (cf. Danielewicz 1990: 12–13).

59. Cf. the remarks of Sourvinou-Inwood 1995: 164–65 on the names (in the nominative) inscribed on the stèle for Dermys and Kitylos; she contrasts the function of these labels and the figures they identify with the function of the monument as a whole. For houtos in a label identifying a figure in a vase-painting, see Immerwahr 1990: no. 229 (τα/υπσιλονπερισπομενερο/ασπιρατε〈ο〉/υπσιλονπερισπομενετο, ca. 550–530).

60. Cf. Peek 601 (first century BC), appended to a relief representing the deceased: Διφίλου οὗτος ὅδ’ ἐστι τύπος. . . .
houtos which, by means of its particularizing or isolating force, demonstrates the capability of the Beischrift (especially as caption) to undermine the monumental absolute.

These lengthy remarks have been necessary by way of answer to Vox’s accusation that Helen’s lines “non possono essere autonomi, come accade per gli epigrammi reali.” I have endeavored to show that houtos in Helen’s epigrams need not indicate their “strict dependence” on Priam’s words (Helen could just as easily have spoken these lines unprompted), but is rather characteristic of a particular mode of inscription, the Beischrift, which mediates between a viewer and an object. Such inscriptions are not “autonomous” to the extent that they do not speak from any privileged position of subjectivity: the only subjectivity they recognize is that of the reader / viewer.61 But they are “autonomous” to the extent that they do not require the prior formulation of a demand or request; they are quite happy to stand on their own. And they undoubtedly conform to a very real form of epigram. In fact, a work of sculpture essential to the history of Corinthian art (despite the fact that it is no longer extant) demonstrates the “reality” and “autonomy” of such second-person Beischriften. I mean the sixth-century Chest of Kupselos, a carved cedar box with ivory and gold appliqué dedicated at Olympia by the Kupselidai of Corinth, which Pausanias describes in detail (5.17.5ff.).62 The larnax bore a series of sculpted friezes in which most of the figures were labeled.63 In some cases, scenes were labeled by whole verses or distichs, which Pausanias meticulously copies out.64 I do not think one could find anywhere a closer parallel for Helen’s tristichs than this couplet, which accompanied an image of Apollo leading the chorus of the Muses:

Λατοίδα οὔτος τάχ’ ἄναξ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων.
Μοῦσαι δ’ ὁμι’ αὐτόν, χαρίεις χορός, αἰσι κατάρχει.65

(5.18.4)

This is the son of Leto, far-shooting lord Apollo, and the Muses about him, graceful chorus, whom he leads.

61. Of course, not even the monumental Aufschrift is aware of anything similar to our notion of subjectivity. Only the non-egocentric hode (“this object before me”) betokens such an awareness. Those who wish to valorize Helen in the teikhoskopia by finding in her an example of an exceptionally independent, public woman’s voice (see, above all, Suzuki 1989: 16, 19, and 39 ff.) must take account of the fact that her words—at least those analyzed here—make no claims of autonomous subjectivity.

62. Der Neue Pauly (s.v. Kupseloslade, pp. 997–98) describes Pausanias’ description as “eine wichtige Quelle für die Erforschung der archa. Bilderwelt.” For the date, see Bowra 1963: 147 and Robertson 1975: 140–41. According to this chronology, the Kupselos Chest would be roughly contemporary with the shift we have examined from the perspective of both Svenbro and Detienne.

63. Pausanias 5.17.6: τον δ’ ε’ (sc. ζωιοτασυβετα) ἐπι τ’ ήρανακ ηπιγράμµατα ἐπεστι τοὺς πλείοσι…

64. Raubitschek 1968: 23: “Zweifellos hat sich also Pausanias sehr für die Inschriften interessiert und sie so gut er konnte abgezeichnet.”

65. Robert 1888: 436, following Haupt 1876: 466, suggests emending to Λατοίδα οὔτος γάρ ἄναξ, which would parallel Il. 3.178ff. even on the level of particles.
This distich contains all the elements identified by Vox in Helen’s Odysseus-epigram: demonstrative houtos modifying a noun phrase composed of proper name, epithet, and patronymic, and a final relative clause. Similar phraseology appears in the caption to an image of Herakles stealing the apples of the Hesperides, in a line identifying Agamemnon’s opponent in a fight over the corpse of Iphidamas, and in the very interesting caption on Agamemnon’s shield in this scene, which serves as a simultaneous Bildzeichnung for the shield device, and for the figure as a whole: οὗτος μὲν Φόβος ἔστι βροτῶν ὁ δ’ ἔχων Ἀγαμέμνον (“this is the Fear of mortals; the one holding him, Agamemnon.” 5.19.4.). Of nine stichic captions read on the Kupselos Chest by Pausanias, four show the distinctive houtos characteristic of the “caption” mode; four have no deixis whatsoever, which itself indicates the gap between inscription and referent; one, exceptionally, uses hode.

Raubitschek suggestively proposes that the mode of description deployed by these inscriptions in some way prefigures that of Hellenistic epideictic epigram: “wir in fast allen Fällen bewusst beschreibende und erklärende Sprüche vor uns haben; das wird dadurch angedeutet, dass in fünf Fällen die Hauptfigur

66. Αἴτλας οὐρανόν οὗτος ἔχει, τά δὲ μάλα μεθήσει, ibid.
67. Ἰριδάμας οὗτός τε Κόων περιμάρναται αὐτοῦ, 5.19.4.
68. The sophisticated mise-en-abîme should remind us of the diploun sêma carried by Poluneikês in Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes (the other famous teikhoskopía), which likewise refers both to the figures on the shield and the person bearing it: Δίκη δ’ ἄρ’ εἶναι ρήσων, ὡς τὰ γράμματα / λέγει: “Κατάξα δ’ ἄνδρα τόνδε ...” (646–47). Space does not permit me to explore the complicated play of image and reality, which is above all a problem of referentiality focused by the insessional referent; produced by this instance of inscription. This uniquely equivocal Bildzeichnung will lead to a crisis concerning the identification of Dikê: η δή: ἵνε ἐνεπενδύθη ψευδώνυμος / Δική (670–71). The formulation Δική δ’ ἄρ’ εἶναι ρήσων should be compared to the “epigram” pronounced by Athena, likewise a self-identification: Μέντητες ... εὑρομαι εἶναι: (Od. 1.180); but note that εὑρομαι is “by polar contrast a literally egocentric word” (Muellner 1976: 78). Aeschylus’ wording suggests to me that we are meant to envision a shield with two distinct inscriptions: a Namensbeischrift affixed to the figure of Dikê and an inscription transcribing the words “spoken” by the figure. (For the use of the latter on Athenian vases, cf. Kretschmer 1894: 86ff.). Aeschylus’ text remains purposefully ambiguous, however, precisely so that Eteoklês can call the identity of the figure into question. The playful use of a shield as a place of inscription is attested archeologically as well: on the Siphnian treasury at Delphi the artist has signed the reliefs on the shield in this scene, which serves as a simultaneous Bildzeichnung by this instance of inscription. This uniquely equivocal form of expression, while εὔχοµαι in Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes—call the identity of the border of a sculpted shield carried by one of the figures (CEG 449).

69. One of these (Μήδειαν Χάδων γαμεῖε, κέλεται δ’ Ἀφροδίτα, 5.18.3) bears a certain resemblance, syntactically and metrically, to CEG 452 (ca. 580–575), a very interesting example of an early stichic caption: Πυρὶ προχορεύοµεν / αὐτῷ δέ θόκ ὀλίπα. Even at this early date, I suggest that the lack of deixis is indicative of the caption to undermine the monumental present. Note that the double reference of this inscription (which designates both the painted figure and the owner of the flask) is similar to the mise-en-abîme described in the previous note, while the use of autós as the “hinge” connecting two referents recalls the epigram labeling Iphidamas (above, n.67).

70. Ἐρμέας οὗ Αἰλεάνδρῳ διεύκυνε διατητὴν / τοῦ εἰδίους Ἡραν καὶ Αθανακαὶ Αρροδίταν, 5.19.5. The need, for metrical reasons, to place Hermes’ name in line-initial position may have contributed to this use of hode: cf. the position of τόδε at Il. 7.89.
We may take his comments as an indication of the transitional quality of these lines, which still betray a strong connection to an underlying epic tradition, but seem somehow to move beyond it. Pausanias appears to react to this same quality when he hesitates over the authorship of the epigrams: he ascribes their content to the epic poetry of Eumélos, but is forced to admit that “some other” is likely responsible for the text as it stands on the Chest.72 The progressive tendency foregrounded by Pausanias and theorized by Raubitschek derives from a tiny change, a minimal divergence from traditional epic diction exemplified by the label identifying Atlas (Ἄτλας οὐρανὸν οὕτος ἔχει . . .). As noted by Jones and others, the inscription reproduces almost exactly (Jones terms it a “parody”) the first hemistich of Hesiod Theogony 518: Ἄτλας οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχει κρατερ/εταπερισπομενε̋ ὑπ/θυοτεσνγλριγητ ἀνάγκη̋ (“Atlas holds the wide heavens by harsh necessity”).73 This is a change of a single word, so inconspicuous, so natural, even, that we might hesitate to see it as a true divergence from the traditional narrative medium: the ornamental epithet (the hallmark of epic style) is replaced by the pronoun which links the text to its object of reference. But this minimal divergence, with the link it establishes between two very different orders of expression, verbal and visual, marks a sea change in the representational status of language. Modern critics will recognize in this shift the inaugural move of what has come to be known as écriture—that is, the epistemological system which accounts for language not as a self-contained mode of direct expression deriving its coherence from a single moment of communication, but as the complex interaction of diacritical signs whose reference necessarily carries beyond the moment of utterance in a manner which dissolves any notional unity of time or place. The Kupselos Chest thus responds very well to the apparatus elaborated by Segal, whose analysis of tragic écriture develops precisely through an examination of “la coexistence d’une représentation verbale et d’une représentation visuelle.”74

Viewed from this perspective, the captions on the Kupselos Chest lie somewhere between epic poetry and later literary forms—the forms of écriture. The peculiar binary form of an image and its attached caption provides, as it were, the

72. 5.19.10: τὰ ἐπιγράµµατα δὲ τὰ ἐπ’ αὐτῆς τάχα µέν που καὶ ἄλλας τις ἄν εἰη πεποιηκώ̋, τὰς δὲ ὑπονοίας τὸ πολύ ες Εὐµήλον τὸν Κορίνθιον εἰοταλενισπερισπομενεχεν ἡµ/ιοταπερισποmενε ν . . . .
74. Segal 1988: 334. The crisis of identification provoked by the inscription on Poluneikês’ shield, noted above, is the perfect example of how the coexistence of verbal and visual representation typical of tragic écriture “entraîne, presque sur tous les points, une sorte de dichotomie, de contradiction ou de paradoxe dans l’existence de la vérité” (ibid.).
missing link between the two. In fact, I would suggest that in this binary form we find a convenient theoretical tool for conceptualizing the relation between epic diegesis and epideictic or ekphrastic genres: the epic narratives are like a vast tableau comprised of many figures and actions, with a narrative content expressed in its own particular medium; each of its details at the same time elicits a response expressed in a different medium, and tied to a vision which is inclined to circumscribe and select elements that epic has woven into a continuous fabric. Naturally, this conceptual model has no historical or genetic force: it cannot account for the evolution of genres. It is simply a way of thinking about the relation between (oral) epic and (written) smaller forms that brings this relation into line with the notion of écriture as the coexistence of disparate orders of representation. Or, to construct the model in the terms of a different, but entirely congruent, theory, we might invoke Havelock’s notion of Socratic dialectic as the “rephrasing” of oral tradition which provided the impetus for the written revolution in Greece. Havelock describes this dialectic in words that could apply just as easily to the relation between epigrammatic captions and their imagistic referents: “This rephrasing will substitute for a poetised image of act or event . . . a paraphrase thereof, which will yield a descriptive statement or proposition of some kind, which then becomes the basis of . . . ‘Socrates’ primary questions,’ namely, ‘is X Y?’ or ‘What is X?’”

It is important to note that the seeds of this mentality—whether we call it “écriture” or “dialectic”—first germinate within the traditional medium itself (Socrates was notoriously averse to writing). Indeed, I believe that just such a mentality underlies the Homeric representation of Helen as epigrammatist.

Jenkins voices a popular conception of Helen’s role in the teikhoskopia when he writes, “Helen can be seen as a poetess in her own right, singing her own catalogue of warriors. . . . For the space of the teikhoskopia, Helen is a singer, responding to the audience of Priam.”

Yet, if my hypothesis is


76. Havelock 1963: 214n.29.

77. What I have here described as a theoretical model is in other cultures realized not as a mere metaphor but as actual practice. In the Rajasthani epic of Pîbûjî, singers perform before a large painted story-cloth (par) which portrays the entirety of the epic cycle in one synthetic tableau. As the singer performs selected episodes, he points to the appropriate sections of the par—which nevertheless does not consist of separate scenes but rather represents “a sweeping geographic continuum,” an indivisible whole (Smith 1991: 64–65). Yet, despite the impossibility of dividing the par into component scenes, the painted cloth is not intended to be viewable in its entirety by the audience directly. The singer, who “reads the par,” is responsible for mediating between this total vision and his listeners. This mediation involves a considerable amount of selection from and segmentation of a notional whole, since the epic is never performed in its entirety (Smith 1986: 53). The tension between a notional whole and its segmented parts—a tension articulated in terms of an opposition of visual and verbal—corresponds precisely to the model I have suggested for the relation between “total” epic narratives and certain “smaller” genres.

78. Jenkins 1999: 220n.33. Clader 1976: 9 has the classic statement: Helen in the teikhoskopia “is the author of what is essentially a second catalogue, almost immediately following the first.”
correct, Helen’s hexameters are quite far from oral epic song. They belong to an altogether different class of poetry, that of epigram; they furthermore distinguish themselves from other Iliadic epigrams in that they adopt the explicit form of the Beischrift or caption. While Helen’s lines do have certain catalogic properties, they comprise a very special kind of catalogue, one that selects specific items out of a continuous, notional whole.\textsuperscript{79} That said, however, it must be admitted that the Iliad by virtue of its structure seems to endorse Helen’s epigrams as a kind of catalogue, for it places them quite precisely between the initial catalogue of forces in Book 2 and the epipolēsis of Book 4.

Jenkins’ view is an appealing one: if true, it would mean that Helen, performing as an epic singer before the council of Trojan elders, has bridged the traditional gender gap of Greek culture, which generally confines women to the private sphere and leaves the public sphere (including the performance of martial epic) to men. While it may be true that Helen’s epigrams are in some important respects analogous to the catalogue of the epic poet, we must nevertheless treat this analogy very carefully. In any case, we must stop short of concluding summarily from this analogy that Helen in fact adopts the role of the epic poet. Jenkins’ view holds only if it can be shown that Helen interacts with Priam directly, that she serves as the immediate contact between him and the battlefield below. Only in this case can we suppose that Helen has truly left behind the private sphere of domestic interiority. Once again the problem of the “autonomy” of Helen’s verses—the degree to which they depend on direct interaction with Priam—becomes all-important, as does the imperative not to be misled by the fact that the epic narrative dramatizes (by necessity) a configuration that could be understood as archetypally inscriptive.

Helen does not, in fact, describe the battlefield in a direct, unmediated way. Her own view, and viewing, of the Achaeans is structured in advance by an artifact of her own creation. When Iris goes to summon Helen to the walls, she finds her engaged in a signal act of artistic production:

\begin{quote}

τὴν δ’ εὐρ’ ἐν μεγάρῳ ἤ δὲ μέγαν ἱστὸν ὕφαινε,
διπλᾶσα πορφυρέην, πολέας δ’ ἐνέπασσεν ἄειθλους
Τρώων θ’ ἵπποδάμων καὶ Αχαίων χαλκοχιτῶν
οὐς ἑθεν εἰνεκ’ ἐπασχον ὑπ’ Ἀρηος παλαιάων
\end{quote}

(3.125–28)

She found her in the megaron; and she was weaving a great web, crimson with double fold, and she interspersed the many ordeals of horse-taming Trojans and bronze-clad Achaeans, which they were suffering at the hands of Ares on her account.

\textsuperscript{79} Cf. Vox 1975: 69, who describes Helen’s words as “un catalogo selettivo espresso in forma diretta” (my emphasis), and note the force of \textit{ge} in the “epigram” on Agamemnon, which underlines the “isolating” force of \textit{houtos} described above.
Modern critics are not alone in recognizing that Helen’s tapestry depicts precisely the ordeals of the heroes on the plains of Troy, thus corresponding in general terms to the content of the *Iliad* itself.80 Ancient commentators likewise saw in Helen’s web the very “paradigm” for the *Iliad*: in the scholiast’s words, ἀξιόχρεων ἀρχέτυπον ἀνέπλασεν ὁ ποιητὴς τῆς ἱδίας ποιήσεως (“the poet has fashioned a noteworthy paradigm for his own poetry,” bT 126–27).81 There is, however, more than just a general, thematic correspondence. Iris, the divine spokeswoman, invites Helen to the Skaian Gates in words that equate the woven images specifically with the spectacle which Helen is about to see from the walls:

δεύτερθυοτεσσαυρίγητ ἰθί, νύμφα φίλη, ἵνα θέασελα ἔργα ὡραιτρόων θῇ ἑποδάμων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχριτῶνον: (3.130–31)

Come hither, dear bride, that you may behold the marvelous deeds of horse-taming Trojans and bronze-clad Achaeans.

The very line which had described the subject of Helen’s tapestry refers a mere four verses later to the battlefield vista.82 Iris refers to the spectacle of the Achaeans as θέασελα ἔργα; these words too signal the correspondence of crafted image and epic “event.” The formula occurs on only two other occasions in Homer, both in the *Nekuia*. Alkinoos asks Odysseus to continue narrating his encounters with the ghosts of heroes with the request σὺ δέ µοι λέγε θέασελα ἔργα (“but you tell me the marvelous deeds,” 11.374). After telling of Agamemnon, Achilles, and others, Odysseus closes his tale with a description of Herakles, who wore a sword-belt ἰνα θέασελα ἔργα τέτυκτο (“where his marvelous deeds were figured,” 11.610): Odysseus delivers the goods requested by Alkinoos precisely in the form of a sculpted image.83 The compositional ring—which also creates a kind of *mise-en-abîme*—establishes an equivalence between Odysseus’ narration and

80. Clader 1976: 6–9, esp. 8: “She is working in designs of struggling warriors, weaving the very fabric of heroic epic.” Nagy 1990: 138 glosses ἄθλους as a reference to “the martial efforts, all considered together, of Achaeans and Trojans alike in the Trojan War”; at Nagy 1979: 295 he notes the “connotations of poetic theme.”

81. See Lausberg 1982b: 117ff., who argues that the tapestries of Arachne and Minerva in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* actualize the scholiast’s interpretation. Lausberg’s emphasis on the catalogic properties of Arachne’s weaving in relation to the style of the *Metamorphoses* as a whole has important implications for my own reading of Helen and her relation to the catalogue form.


83. The belt itself receives a short two-line ekphrasis, making it a kind of micro-version of the *Aspis*. Griffin 1987: 102 offers an interpretation of the belt as a figure for specifically Iliadic epic poetry.
the crafted artifact. Similarly, in Iris’ speech the phrase θέσκελα εργα indicates
the correspondence between the epic narrative and Helen’s handiwork.

Iris thus calls Helen to witness what she has already visualized and pictured
on her web. When she mounts the Trojan walls, she hardly needs to look out in
order to identify the figures; she can simply “read,” or pronounce, the captions she
might have applied to her figural representation. In other words, as much as they
appear to refer to the vista observed by Priam and the others, her epigrams could
as easily refer to her own construction of that scene, a crafted object in its own
right. They stand in the same relation to her tapestry as the lines of “Eumêlos” to
the Kupselos Chest. In any case, the accuracy of Helen’s words—her qualification
to identify authoritatively the Greek heroes—is guaranteed by an object which is
kept safely in the private space of the megaron, apart from the public space where
the Trojan elders deliberate. This guarantee is at the same time, however, a pre-
determination of Helen’s words; she is in a way denied the situational flexibility
required by those who participate in public deliberation. We must be sensitive
here to the implications of the correlation between Helen’s words on the walls
and her woven tapestry, which tends to reduce Helen to a mere object interrogated
by the male gaze. (This is the same reduction accomplished by one of the
Iliad’s other “inscriptions,” Hektor’s auto-epitaph at 6.460–61 [no. 4 above], by
which he transforms Andromakhê into his funeral monument—a stële, that is, the
place of writing.) From one point of view the poem, by connecting the tapestry
to Helen’s appearance on the walls, does everything it can to keep Helen from
interacting directly in a male context. The “dialogue” between Priam and Helen
then becomes only a kind of dramatic explication of the convention according to
which a monument’s inscription answers the questions of a passerby. By the same
token, Priam’s questions are only superficially necessary as a dramatic prompt
or cue for the activation in speech of epigrams with a prior, autonomous existence.
In this respect, his questions function precisely as the interrogatives in the earliest
dialogue epigrams, which serve as mere “pretexts” for a description of an object,
a statue, or a person.

84. The correspondence between the two occurrences of θέσκελα εργα is noted by Pache 1999:
32. Note that Alkinoos asks for (and receives) a catalogue-style narration (ατρεκέω κατάλε/κσιον,
11.370). The catalogue form may be tied to the fact that Odysseus is asked to report as an eyewitness
(εἴ τι να . . . ἱδε, 11.371); cf. n.96, below. It is just possible that the use of the formula θέσκελα εργα
here is tied to the fact that Odysseus is describing the eidôla of heroes; the only other occurrence
of the adjective theskelos in Homer is at Il. 23.107, with reference to the eidôlon of Patroklos.
85. Some readers may be surprised to learn of the archeologically attested practice of weaving
captions into tapestries. I include a short discussion of this practice in the Appendix, below.
86. As I attempt to show below, Zeuxis’ Helen (which I believe plays on the Stesichorean
tradition of Helen’s eidôlon) makes the same reduction of Helen to a crafted object—and to a certain
extent confirms my reading of this scene.
fondo descriptivos, en los que las preguntas del viandante ... son sólo un pretexto para hacer una
descripción...”
When she has finished her identifications, Helen suggests that she could go on to give a full-fledged catalogue:

νῦν δ’ ἄλλους μὲν πάντας ὅρω ἐλίκωτας Ἀχαιούς,
οὔς κεν ἐὗ γνώθην καὶ τ’ οὐνόμα μυθησάμην…

(3.234–35)

And now I see all the other quick-glancing Achaeans, whom well I could recognize and their names tell….

As Jenkins observes, the wording here implies the catalogic mode (as does the rhetorical recusatio). We may compare the famous invocation of the Muses which opens the Catalogue of Ships:

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μούσαι Όλυμπια δῶματε ἐς ὑμεῖς ὑπερπερισπομενε οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὔδ’ ὀνομήνω. . . .

(2.484–88)

Now tell me, Muses who dwell on Olympus—
for you are goddesses, and you are present and know all, while we hear only the kleos, and know nothing for certain—
who were the leaders and chiefs of the Danaans?
I could not tell nor name the throng….

More striking, however, than the parallel rhetoric and phrasing of these passages is the parallel manner in which the speaker in each case references the catalogued objects. Bakker draws attention to the exceptional use of houtos in the direct voice of the narrator to summarize the content of the Catalogue: οὗτοι ἄρ’ ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίραι καὶ ἱσχίσματο ἑυμερήσαν (“These, then, were the leaders and chiefs of the Danaans,” 2.760). For Bakker, this is yet another instance of “dialogic” houtos, entirely analogous to Helen’s use of the pronoun: it answers the question posed by the poet in 2.487. Once again we are confronted with the same question: does houtos signal dependence on a first interlocutor’s demand for knowledge, or does it function independently, as an initiator in its own right of a particular mode of reference? The question is perhaps even more important here than it was previously. In formulating an answer we should be aware that we are supposing a fundamental analogy between Helen’s lines and the Catalogue of Ships. But rather than force the conclusion that Helen in the teikhoskopia adopts the role of an epic poet, this analogy should compel us to question the homogeneity of the Homeric text; that is, it should lead to speculation as to what might differentiate

89. Bakker 1999: 8 and esp. 9, “the closing formula has to be taken in close connection with the famous invocation of the Muses,” with n.24, which emphasizes the dialogic exchange with the Muses.
the Catalogue and catalogic poetry from epic narrative proper. The question is not “what makes the teikhoskopia like a catalogue?” but “what makes the Catalogue like the teikhoskopia?”

One might be tempted to understand the exchange between the poet and the Muses as the demand for knowledge by one who is ignorant. However, the inequality between the Muses and the poet is not at all one of knowledge or ignorance, but rather one of different orders of knowledge. We must remember that οὐδὲξα derives from the root *wid- “see,” and therefore means not “I know” but “I have seen: therefore I know.”\(^\text{90}\) The poet knows only the kleos, the “acoustic renown,” of heroes, and has seen nothing (οὐδὲ τι ἴδµεν)—this does not mean, however, that he knows nothing.\(^\text{91}\) The Muses on the other hand are present as eyewitnesses to the whole of history. This is precisely the difference between visual and aural (or verbal) knowledge, as indeed the ancient commentators recognized: Eustathius comments on the poet’s request, λεχθείη ἂν ὑπὸ τ/οµεγαπερισποµενεν ἀκο/εταπερισποµενε/ιοτασυβετα τι παρειληφότων πρὸ̋ το网首页α̋ καὶ αὐτόπτα̋ το/υπσιλονπερισποµενε πράγµα̋ (“[such a thing] would be said by those who have received an oral report of something to those with first-hand knowledge as eyewitnesses of the event,” 261). The Muses have seen what the poet has only heard. The entirety of the epic tradition, represented by the Muses, is conceived as a visual order of knowledge. The Catalogue of Ships represents the most sustained attempt to translate the Muses’ total vision into the language of the oral poet. Far from being the Muses’ answer to the poet’s question, the οὐπσιλανασπερπερισποµενετοι of line 760, pronounced in the poet’s voice (but not truly the poet’s words, just as the words pronounced by the reader of an epigram are not truly his\(^\text{92}\)), acknowledges the epic vision of the Muses, and places the poet’s words in the same relation to this vision as that of Helen’s epigrams vis-à-vis her tapestry. At this moment, the poet speaks with the voice of inscription, just as Helen in the teikhoskopia.\(^\text{93}\) With this final caption the

90. Nagy 1990: 250, who discusses the root in the context of juridical terms such as històr, “eyewitness.”
91. For kleos as “acoustic renown,” see Svenbro 1993: 164 and passim.
92. Svenbro 1993 presents the most rigorous working out of this problem.
93. The Muses’ vision thus guarantees the accuracy of the Catalogue in the same way that Helen’s prior visualization guarantees the authority of the identifications she pronounces to Priam. Much remains to be said about the cultural paradigm that entrusts to women, as holders of privileged access to an order that is notionally fixed (here, vision), the guarantee that assures the value of what is transacted in a flexible register (that of discourse, for instance of the epic poet or of the Trojan elders) among men. Especially interesting in the context of oral epic traditions is the articulation of this paradigm in terms of the opposition writing / speech (performance). For Helen as epigrammatist I would offer as comparandum the legend propagated among certain 19th-century singers of Bosnian epic who claimed that the ultimate source for many of their songs was a book originally owned by a Turkish girl known as “white-faced Ajka” (Marjanović 1998: 102; I am grateful to Peter McMurray for sharing with me this discovery). In a future project I hope to relate this phenomenon not to a specific anthropology of writing, but to a more general anthropology of exchange (as outlined for Pacific societies by Weiner 1992 and Godelier 1999) in cultures which exclude women from the exchange circuits generating relations of (political and social) power among men. This analysis
poet gestures toward the vast tableau embodied in tradition. Bakker himself is sensitive to the referential function of ο/υπσιλονασπερπερισποmενετοι here, which gestures toward an object (the epic tableau) suddenly conjured before the audience: “Instead of being ‘contained’ within the narrative, the past becomes now the real thing, a reality before everyone’s eyes at which the poet can point.” 94 If Helen’s parallel usage were not enough to establish that the poet here conceives the object of reference as a specifically visual reality, we could point also to the significant use of ar(a) in this line, for this “evidentiary” particle functions precisely as a marker “of visual evidence in the here and now of the speaker; more precisely [it marks] the interpretation of such visual evidence.” 95 That is, ar(a) marks the linguistic response to or rephrasing of a visual spectacle. The essential structure of the caption is thus fundamental to the way in which Homeric epic conceptualizes the non-mimetic mode of the catalogue, as a distinctive sub-component of the broader epic fabric. 96

What I have described is not merely the implicit or latent structure of the Homeric text; in fact, this conceptualization of catalogue poetry as the captioning of an implied image was actualized in ancient art. Discussing Athenian achievements in painting, Plutarch recalls the story of Euphranōr’s Theseus, situated in the Stoa Eleutherios with a Dêmokratia and a Dêmos. 97 This remarkable painting once elicited from an anonymous viewer a kind of spontaneous caption: τὸν δ/θυοτεσνγλριγητ Εὐφράνο̋ ἰδών τι̋ ε/ιοταλενισπερισποmεν οὐκ ἀφυ/οmεγαπερισποmενε̋ “δ/εταπερισποmεµον ᾿Ερεχθ/εταπερισποmεο̋ µεγαλήτορο̋, ὅν ποτ/θυοτεσνγλριγητ ᾿Αθήνη / θρέψ ∆ιὸ̋ θυγάτηρ” (“on seeing Euphranōr’s painting, someone said quite elegantly, ‘dêmos of great-hearted Erekhtheus, reared of old by Athena, daughter of Zeus,’” De gloria Ath. 346a-b). 98 The sight of Euphranōr’s master-

views oral tradition as one of the most important circuits of exchange in traditional societies, and oral texts as objects of exchange.

94. Bakker 1999: 8; the similarities to the Pâbûjî epic are remarkable.
96. I emphasize the non-mimetic nature of the catalogue in order to distance myself from Vox, who believes the Iliadic epigrams to be fundamentally “dramatic.” Bakker 1999: 9n.23 notes another instance of ο/υπσιλονασπερπερισποmενετοι ἄρ/θυοτεσνγλριγητ at Il. 16.351 and comments, “the narrative section to which this statement refers has clear catalogic properties.” Homeric poetics consistently associate the catalogic style with the narration of visual experience. Thus Nestor’s tale in Od. 3, an eye-witness account (3.97), concludes a catalogue of fallen warriors with the recusatio which conventionally marks the style (3.113ff.). Helen’s tale in Od. 4—her most “epic” speech outside the teikhoskopia—is an eye-witness account (the pharmakon associates her narration with visual experience by antithesis: 4.226), and is likewise marked as “catalogic” by a formulaic recusatio (4.240 ~ 11.328, II. 2.488; cf. II. 3.235 and n.88 above). The eyewitness accounts of Books 3 and 4 are linked by another formula, expressive of the connection between vision and catalogic narration, which connects them also to Telemachus’ narration of his own adventures on his return to Ithaca (κατάλε/κσιον ὅπω̋ ἤντησα̋ ὀπωπ/εταπερισποmε̋, 3.97 ~ 4.327, 17.44). Thus Telemachus achieves the goal set for him by Athena (1.94–95): by going in search of tales of his father, he acquires material for his own tale.

97. Paus. 1.3.3. These three figures appear to have been part of a single composition; Pausanias’ words imply that they were read as a single work: δηλο/ιοταπερισποmενε δὲ ἡ γραφὴ Θησέα ε/ιοταλενισπερισποmενε ναι τὸν καταστήσαντα Ἕλληνα πολιτεύεσθαι.
98. Nachstädt’s apparatus records the judgment of Pohlenz, that the viewer’s remark applies not to the Theseus but to the Dêmos beside it; see previous note. Note that the constituents of this
piece compels the anonymous viewer to recite two verses from the Catalogue of Ships (2.547–48). That the viewer’s experience of the painted image should be programmed, so to speak, by the Homeric Catalogue is surprising, to say the least; even more so is the fact that Plutarch feels this act of reception to be οὐκ ἄφημεν. But our surprise subsides somewhat when we realize that, already in Homer, the Catalogue functions as the translation into words of a notional visual totality. In light of what has been said about the implicit visualization of the Catalogue, it is not surprising that Plutarch judges this coupling of word and image as elegant—as it were, almost natural. The entries of the Catalogue are born captions.

The virtual caption of the Theseus leads me back, at last, to the one Iliadic epigram which has so far been left out of the discussion, 3.156–58 (no. 1 above). I suggested at the beginning of this paper that the scholiast’s reasons for declaring this tristich to be the very founding instance of the trigōnon epigramma were far from obvious. The lines reveal none of the epigrammatic features we have noted so far, and even according to the classic definition of the trigōnon (that the lines may be read in any order) they are less than a success. So unconvincing are these lines as an example of epigrammatic form that one wonders whether they did not originally receive the designation “epigram” for other reasons. In fact, these lines had famously been used as a caption or legend to a work that occupied a premier place in ancient histories of art: Zeuxis’ Helen. The scandalous story of Zeuxis’ boldness (Aristides calls him ὁ ὑβριστής) in subscribing Homer’s words to his own image of the nude Helen is repeated several times in antiquity; this historical use of the Homeric text as a genuine epigram most likely lies at the root of the scholiastic tradition. The case of Euphranor’s Theseus shows that a caption

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99. The tristich on Asios in the catalogue of Trojan allies (Il. 2.837–39) presents another interesting case: τόν ἄλλον Ἴτακάλης ἄρσος, ἄρχισος άνεσον, / ἄρσος Ἴτακάλης, ἐν Ἀριστήβηθεν γέρων ἱπποι / εἴθων μεγάλοι, ποταμοῦ ἄνεσον Σελλήνῃ. Eustathius describes the epanalepsis of the name metaphorically as a kind of “inscription” that imprints Asios on the reader’s mind, and goes on to cite one of the heroic epigrams attributed to the Aristotelian Peplos (cf. Wendling 1891: 564ff.). The metaphor of inscription may seem merely incidental—but note that the last two lines of this tristich follow exactly the “epigrammatic” pattern of Helen’s tristichs (proper name + patronymic + relative clause), except for the omission of the demonstrative and the displacement of the epithet to the preceding line.

100. This is the justification offered by the scholiast: ἄρσον γάρ τῶν τριῶν στίχων ἄφημεν, ἄδιάκορον. But reading in the order 2–3–1, for instance, produces very poor results. The scholiast’s explanation is partly ameliorated by the complete lack of any connecting particles. This makes it at least theoretically possible to read the lines in any order. The Midas epigram, also attributed to Homer, is usually offered as the founding instance of the trigōnon (cf. Pl. Phdr. 264c-d, with Hermia’s scholion ad loc. [p. 231 Couvreur]; also the anonymous scholion on Arist. SE 171a6–7). Philost. Her. 55.5 has a nice example of this most “archaic” form, again without connecting particles, suitably attributed to Herakles.

101. V. Max. 3.7 ext. 3; Aristid. Peri tou para. 386. Note that both authors give only the first two lines (3.156–57), i.e., they do not consider this an example of the trigōnon. I suspect that the scholiast has come across an abbreviated reference to these lines as an epigramma and has attempted
could be meant to represent or specify the viewer’s response. Zeuxis could not have found a more appropriate text for this purpose, for in Homer, too, the lines serve as a kind of caption: they represent the linguistic response to the spectacle of Helen’s appearance—they are a spontaneous legend provided by the Trojan elders. As the teikhoskopia dramatizes the conventional epigrammatic dialogue, the scene of Helen’s appearance dramatizes the structure of Zeuxis’ work, which consists of a visual and a verbal component; or, conversely, Zeuxis’ painting recapitulates the structure inherent already in the Iliad. The lines subscribed by Zeuxis thus doubly refer to an act of reception. While they serve as the spontaneous expression of an aesthetic response to Helen in the Iliad, they program the response of the viewer of the Helen. The implication is that we are meant to respond to Zeuxis’ painted image of Helen just as the Trojan elders reacted to the “real thing” in Homer. The artist’s presumption that his own work could equal the “real” Helen is precisely what qualifies Zeuxis’ action as “outrageous” in Aristides’ view, ὡσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ ποιοῦν εἰκόνα τε Ἑλένης ποιήσαι καὶ τὸν Δία Ἑλένην αὐτὴν γεννήσαι. (“as though Zeuxis were doing the same thing in making an image of Helen as Zeus in fathering Helen herself,” 386). But one should consider the subtle irony of Aristides’ remark in light of the Stesichorean tradition, of which he was undoubtedly aware, that it was not the “real” Helen who went to Troy (and hence appeared at the Skaian Gates), but an eidolon, an image crafted by the gods. That is, from the Stesichorean point of view, the Trojan elders are themselves reacting to a work of art. Zeuxis has found not only the perfect text to script the moment of artistic reception, but the perfect subject to display his mimetic art: Helen, the Helen of Stesichorus’ Troy, is the subject for mimēsis, since she is herself a mimēsis of the “real” Helen. 102

The tradition of Helen’s eidolon lessens somewhat the offence of the equivalence implied by Zeuxis’ painting, which does not, after all, equate an image with the inimitable original, but only with another image. The crucial link in this chain of equivalences is the text of the caption itself, which in fact facilitates the equation by means of its particular mode of reference. I have argued that the text appropriated by Zeuxis functions essentially as a caption even in its original Iliadic context. True to this function, the text gestures toward its object of reference with a deictic pronoun—not, however, with one that we have already encountered, but with the qualitative toiosde (τοιόσος ἄμφὶ γυναικὶ, 3.157). This

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102. In the Odyssey as well Helen has an uncanny affinity for mimēsis: she is able to imitate the voices of all the Argive wives (4.279). It is no coincidence that Gorgias’ great manifesto of écriture also takes Helen as its subject. His Encomium of Helen is analogous to Zeuxis’ own project: it constructs an extended parallel between the power of visual images and that of the written word. See Segal 1988: 340 and 343.
word has the peculiar effect of making Helen “stand for” something else—namely the sort of beauty which would justify a war. “It’s no wonder we fought a war over such a beautiful woman,” say the Trojan elders, not “over this beautiful woman.” The wonderful thing about Zeuxis’ caption is that it remains just as true when applied to his painted Helen as it was when applied to the “original” Helen of Troy—both can be understood equally well as representatives or signs of beauty. The Trojan elders speak of Helen precisely as of an image, a representative—almost as though they would not be surprised to find that what they saw was only an eidolon.

Now, it is this epiphany of an image and its evocation of a caption which separates Helen’s woven representation of the heroes from her epigrammatic legends. The Bildzeichnung pronounced by the Trojan elders intercedes precisely between Helen at the loom and the teikhoskopia proper. If one were prepared to ascribe some significance to the disposition of episodes in the epic, one might say that it is this epiphany which firmly establishes image and text as two different orders of representation. For Gotthold Lessing, one of the great theorists of epigram, Zeuxis’ Helen is the classic example of the unbridgeable gap between verbal and visual art, a divide which he elsewhere formulates specifically in terms of the caption; in the Iliad, the epigrammatic utterance which served Zeuxis as caption very concretely divides the image (Helen’s tapestry) from its legend.

In the theoretical portions of this paper, I have argued that the peculiar form of the Beischrift or caption arises from the dissolution of the unity of inscription and monument characteristic of archaic “egocentric” inscriptions. I have also suggested that the dialogism which appears in later epigrammatic forms is not, originally, a dramatic function, but merely a consequence of the gap between object and Beischrift: after the unity of the monument has been dissolved, the inscription comes to occupy a separate (though indefinite) space; from this space of writing, the inscription “answers” the interrogation of the viewer. On the other hand, dialogue is impossible when object and epigram are one, for it is a

103. I am aware that a more precise rendering of τοι/επερισπομενε/ιοτασυβεταδ/θυοτεσνγητ ἀµφὶ γυναικὶ might be “over this woman, so beautiful as she is.” That is, the demonstrative toiosde points to the quality in respect to which the assertion is true. This does not, however, affect my basic point, since even according to this reading Helen is made to be the particular representative of a quality which is not equivalent to her, which is distinct from her—i.e., she still “stands for” beauty. The declaration which closes the Trojan elders’ remark—“terribly is she like (ἔοικεν) . . .”—has the same effect of pointing to Helen’s qualities, rather than the woman herself.

104. Lessing 1984: 115: “Zeuxis painted a Helen and had the courage to write at the bottom of his picture those famous lines of Homer in which the delighted elders confess their feelings. Never were painting and poetry engaged in a more even contest. The victory remained undecided, and both deserved a crown.” Cf. p. 72 for the gap between poetry and painting expressed in terms of the caption. Lessing’s essay “Zerstreute Anmerkungen über das Epigramm und einige der vornehmsten Epigrammatisten” begins with a valuable meditation on the translation of Greek epigramma. Lessing’s list of possible renderings looks forward to Raubitschek’s more scientific classification: Überschrift, Aufschrift, Inschrift, Sinnschrift, Sinngedicht (Lessing 1970: 118).
characteristic of such absolute monuments that they recognize only one place, one speaker, one moment in time.

I hope to have established in a more concrete fashion, however, the need to reevaluate our view of Helen as a poet-figure. The communis opinio has it that Helen in the teikhoskopia adopts the role of an epic singer. Scholarship has in general handled the delicate question of poetic reflection with a blunt instrument: any poetic self-reference is taken to be a reference to Homeric poetry conceived (wrongly) as a univocally “epic” medium and to Homer as the prototypical epic poet. Thus Helen, if she displays any poetic qualities, becomes a figure for the epic poet; no regard is given to the specific nature of Helen’s poetry, especially in contrast to the activity of such (male) figures as Dêmodokos or Phêmios. On closer inspection, Helen behaves in some fairly idiosyncratic ways, extremely uncharacteristic of the epic poet in his public domain: in an intimate, private setting she recalls an Odyssean anecdote; she sings an elaborate lament for her brother-in-law; and she gives “epigrammatic” descriptions of the Achaean leaders. In no case does she produce a straightforward epic diegesis. What is needed here is a considerably more subtle differentiation of “self-reference”: just as the Homeric text can accommodate or incorporate diverse genres, it can accommodate diverse reflections on the nature of poetic creation. Helen is quite far from a figure for the epic poet. It is significant, however, that this female figure accommodates reflections on several genres, while male poet-figures are decidedly less multi-faceted.

The possibility of discerning a gender-based differentiation of poetic functions leads me to one final consideration in connection with Helen’s role as epigrammatist. In the public setting of the teikhoskopia, Helen does not speak, but writes. Antiquity knows many women who, deprived of a public voice, must express themselves in writing. Philomela’s woven grammata are only the most famous example.\(^\text{105}\) Svenbro has shown that the figure of Sappho is inextricably bound to the written word;\(^\text{106}\) she, too, was an epigrammatist.\(^\text{107}\) Indeed, Stehle finds discernibly inscriptive techniques in Sappho’s poetry.\(^\text{108}\) Significantly, her analysis depends on an observation of the “split” opened up by Sappho’s text between

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\(^{105}\) Cf. Apollod. 3.14.8: ἡ δὲ ύφήνασα ἐν πέπλῳ γράμματα διὰ τούτων ἐμήνυσε Πρόκνη τὰς ἰδίας συμφορὰς. Guarducci 1967–1978: 1.441 is uncertain whether these grammata should be understood as pictures or letters.


\(^{107}\) Nossis consciously projects Sappho as a model for her own epigrams (Skinner 1991: 34). The debate surrounding the epithet ἄγνωστον Ὀμηρον in Antipater of Thessalonika’s epigram on the nine canonical poetesses (AP 9.26, l. 3) is likewise indicative of Sappho’s epigrammatic tendencies: the phrase is placed between the epigrammatist Anyte and Sappho, and seems intended to be taken apo koinou (cf. Skiadas 1965: 130ff.). I have chosen to use the rare word epigrammatopoios in my title because of its occurrence at Phld. Po. 5.37 (in Mangoni’s edition): καὶ τὸν ἐπιγραμματοποίον καὶ Σαπφοὶς.

\(^{108}\) Stehle 1997: 262–318. Note esp. 311: “women could represent themselves in writing, where they were not bodily present. Authoritative speaking was taken up by the inscribed object, so the woman’s own voice was not represented, but in this displaced form women put their names and
the voice of the performer and the voice of the speaker—an observation, that is, of the destabilizing effect central to the grammatological approach I described at the beginning of this paper. The comic poet Antiphanes exploits this view of Sappho when he has her relate the riddle of a φυσίθηλεια (“feminine nature”), which turns out to be none other than epistolê, the epistle, whose grammata, “letters,” speak despite the fact that they are aphôna, “voiceless.”

Inscribed letters traditionally compensate women for the congenital condition of being aphônai, as is playfully suggested by the following inscription from Galatia:111


The earth brought me forth voiceless in the mountains, a chaste maiden, silent before but now speaking to all, declaring the fate of the deceased by the contrivances of the chisel.

Considering that Greek culture persistently denies a voice to women except in the medium of writing, it is perhaps not surprising to find that women—invisible through so much of literary history—dominate the early stages of literary epigram (Erinna, Moero, Anyte, and Nossis play important roles in the development of the genre). In this way, Helen epigrammatopoios might tell us not only how “Homer” conceives his relation to other poetic genres, but how Greek culture in general conceived the poetic potential of women.

APPENDIX

Some readers may be surprised by the suggestion that Helen’s tapestry may be thought to contain even notional Beischriften. While the captions accompany-actions before the public.” Stehle believes that Sappho “may have drawn from inscriptional practice a way of lending herself authority” (ibid.).

109. Stehle 1997: 290, who also acknowledges a debt to Derrida on the first page of her Preface. At 312–14, Stehle develops the notion of a progressive “autonomy” of inscriptions vis-à-vis their monuments, a notion that has much in common with the shift from Aufschrift to Beischrift I have suggested here.


111. Peek 1184, discussed by Rose 1923: 163, who asks, “Has the writer distorted the phraseology to mean, not a statue of a virgin, but a virgin or unwrought stone?” As I read it, the epigram plays on the fact that the stone, aphônai in its natural state “in the mountains” but now speaking by virtue of the inscription, has been carved to represent a parthenos—who is also voiceless according to cultural norms, able to speak (as Philomela) only through writing. Note that the inscription refers to a korê standing over the grave of a male corpse.
ing painted and sculpted images are generally well represented in primary and secondary literature, relatively little information is available about the weaving of figural textiles, let alone the inclusion of written letters in the design.\textsuperscript{112}

The practice of weaving pictured story-cloths is well attested in both the literary and archaeological remains of the classical period; in Barber’s view the Greek technique stems from the Bronze Age.\textsuperscript{113} Evidence for the application of captions or legends to such textiles requires a bit more synthesis. Ancient textiles are naturally only sparsely represented in the archaeological record; nevertheless, a few surviving Egyptian examples suggest that the technique of weaving inscriptions or labels into figural designs was widespread in antiquity. One outstanding third- or fourth-century AD specimen, now in Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts, shows a female and a male figure, and labels them respectively [Α]ΡΙΑ∆Η and ∆ΕΙΟΥΣΟΣ.\textsuperscript{114} Significantly, in this case the labels are inwoven into the fabric, and not applied subsequently by embroidery or appliqué; hence they were created with the fabric, as an integral part of the design. Guarducci sees nothing exceptional in this practice, even by earlier Greek standards: “l’uso d’intessere inscrizioni nelle stoffe è da considerarsi molte più antico.”\textsuperscript{115} Indeed, several anecdotes about famous garments would seem to retroject the technique into the fifth century BC. The elder Pliny recalls a story about Zeuxis—by all accounts a pioneer in the use of captions—who acquired so much wealth ut in ostentatione earum Olympiae aureis litteris in palliorum tesseris intextum nomen suum ostentaret (“that in order to display it at Olympia he showed his own name woven into the tesserae of his cloak in golden letters,” NH 35.62).\textsuperscript{116}

Although “Aristotle” (Mir. 838a) does not make specific mention of text or labels, Jacobsthal felt that the wonderful himation of the Sybarite Alkisthenes—“an autobiography in pictures,” probably a fifth-century work—must have contained labels throughout.\textsuperscript{117} Slightly more reliable is the reference to ἵερὰ ἱµάτια ἐφ/θυοτεσνγλριγητ...
οἷς καὶ χρυσὰ γράμματα ἣν δηλοῦντα τοὺς ἀναθέντας in the hypothesis to Demosthenes’ 25th oration. These are not necessarily inwoven inscriptions, but the context makes it clear that they were firmly attached to the garments in question.

The garments referred to in this last case are temple dedications, in all likelihood associated with the cult of Artemis. And in fact, the temple inventories of the Athenian cult of Artemis Brauronia—perhaps the very scene of the Demosthenic crime—provide the clearest evidence for the use of captions on textiles of the classical period. Zeuxis’ garment was obviously a prestige piece, but the temple records indicate that the technique was actually quite widespread. Numerous items are described as “having” (ἐχοντα) inscriptions, some of them in gold; the frequently repeated terms anepigraphos / agraphos suggest that it was not an exception but the norm for garments to have some kind of label. Linders expresses some caution as to the manner in which these labels were executed: since they seem most often to have indicated donors’ names, she has reasonably suggested that they were either embroidered on the fabric or otherwise attached as separate tags.

In some cases the inventories seem to refer to more or less complete dedicatory inscriptions, of the type “so-and-so dedicated to Artemis”; these must also have been added to complete garments at the time of dedication. There can be no doubt, however, about the letters on Kallipe’s dedication, singled out with special emphasis: χιθωνίσκοκτενὼ περιποίκιλο, Καλλίπη/ολογρεεκ ουπισιλονκτεμενε ἔχει γράµ[µα|α ἐνυφασµένα (IG II–III^2 1514.7–9). Peripoikilos—which distinguishes this item from many others described as simply poikilos—likely indicates that the khithōniskos was decorated with figured scenes, like the epiblema of Nikoboulê.

As the letters were explicitly woven into the fabric, they probably

118. Linders 1972: 13: the defendant claimed that the priestess had ordered him to carry the garments πρὸς τὸ ιερὰν κυνηγήσιον.
119. See Linders 1972 for an overview. The inscriptions describe dedications made in the mid-fourth century. Other fifth-century inscriptions have also been attributed to the same series, but they cannot be positively associated with the Brauronion (ibid., p. 3).
122. Linders 1972: 13 renders IG II–III^2 1514.40–41, παιδίου χλανίσκιον λευκὸν καρτόν, ἱερὸν ἐπιγ[εγ]ραπται ᾿Αρτέµιδο̋ as “with the inscription ‘Sacred to Artemis.’ ” One should compare the inscribed textiles used as temple dedications at Apul. Met. 6.3: videt dona pretiosa et lacinias auro litteratas ramis arborum postibusque suffixas, quae cum gratia facti nomen deae, cui fuerant dicata, testabantur.
123. IG II–III^2 1514.31–32: σηµειον ἐ[χ]ει [ἐ]μεσοι, Δίονυσος σπένδων καὶ γυνὴ οἰνοχοβάλα. One suspects that this garment likewise contained labels, like the fourth-century Egyptian fabric mentioned above. To the designation περιποικίλοι I would compare the wording of the scholion to Arist. Aves 827, which describes the Panathenaic peplos: τὴ θηνα πολιάδι οὖσθ τέκλος ἐγίνετο παμποίκλα ὃν ἄνεφερον ἐν τῇ πομπῇ τῶν θηναίων (text as given in White’s edition). In the great supplicatio of Athena in Iliad 6, Hekabē chooses the most outstanding peplos out of many παμποίκλα ἑργὰ γυναικῶν (6.289); this passage likely has connections to the Panathenaia (Nagy 2002: 93–94).
did not comprise a dedicatory inscription; the most likely inference is that they labeled the figures in the design.\textsuperscript{124}

It may not be inopportune at this point to mention an epigram associated with the first professional weavers of the Panathenaic \textit{peplos}, Akesás and Helikón.\textsuperscript{125} According to Athenaeus 48b, an example of their work in Delphi displayed an epigram testifying to their connection to Pallas:

\begin{quote}
ἤκµασε δ’ ή τὸν πουκάλων ύφη μάλιστα ἐντέχνου περὶ αὐτὰ γενοµένων Ἀκεσά καὶ Ἑλικὸνος τῶν Κυρίων... ἐν Πυθὸι γοῦν ἐπὶ τινὸς ἔργου ἐπιγέγραπται

τεῦξ’ Ἑλικόν Ἀκεσά Σαλαµίνοις, ὃ ἐν χερσὶν πότνια θεσπεσίην Παλλὰς ἐπιγέγραπται χάριν.\textsuperscript{126}
\end{quote}

The weaving of decorated fabrics flourished at the time of the Cyprians Akesás and Helikón, who were especially skilled at such works....

Indeed, at Delphi there is a certain work with the inscription:

The Saliminian Helikón, son of Akesás, crafted [it], in whose hands mistress Pallas infused divine grace.

Mansfield feels that a different Helikón must be meant;\textsuperscript{127} but that ancient tradition associated this Pythian fabric with the Panathenaic weavers is suggested by Eustathius, who repeats Athenaeus nearly word for word in his discussion of the term \textit{λιοταπερισπομενετα} in \textit{Od.} 1.130 (αὐτὴν δ’ θρόνον εἰσάασε ἄγων, ὑπὸ λιοταπερισπομενετα πετάσα) — a line referring to the chair that Telemachus places before Mentés-Athena. It is hard to see why Eustathius would bring Akesás and his son into the discussion if scholarly tradition had not connected this scene with the ritual presentation of textiles (above all the Panathenaic \textit{peplos}) to the goddess. Preger doubted that the inscription could have been an original part of the fabric in Delphi,\textsuperscript{128} nor can we judge from the text of Athenaeus whether the epigram was attached to the garment or merely placed next to it. The nature of the actual artifact, however,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} A possibility entertained by Wace 1952: 112–13. Strangely, Linders 1972: 9 writes that “the phrase ... probably implies that these letters did not convey a meaning to those who wrote the inventory.” At n.13, however, she considers the possibility that the maker of the fabric wove her own name as signature.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Zen. \textit{Ep.} 1.56: οὕτω γὰρ πρῶτοι τὸ πολιάαδας Αθηναὸς πέπλον ἐπιστύχης. Mansfield 1985 has established that the \textit{peplos} presented at the quadrennial Great Panathenaia was made by professional weavers (as Zenobius’ use of \textit{dēmiourget}, incidentally, indicates), being woven in other years by Attic girls.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Reading this epigram, one thinks of Ovid’s lines on Arachne: \textit{sive levi teretem versabat pollice fusum, / seu pingeat acu; scire a Pallade doctam} (6.22–23). This description of the weaver’s art corresponds remarkably well to the etymological meanings of the names Akesás ("needle") and Helikón ("twister"), noted by Barber 1992: 113n.28.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Mansfield 1985: 54.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Preger 1891: 138: “dissimillimum est pervestustis temporibus, septimo vel sexto saeculo, disticho textorem vestem exornasse neque satis habuisse suum nomen dedicandique verbum acu inscribere.” He does not consider the possibility of an inwoven inscription.
\end{itemize}
is ultimately less important for our purposes than the simple fact that tradition acknowledged the first great *peplos* craftsman as an epigrammatist.

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Abbreviations


*SEG* Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum. Amsterdam–

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