RIGHT LIVING

An Anglo-American Tradition of Self-Help Medicine and Hygiene

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32. William Sweetser, Mental Hygiene: An Examination of the Intellect and Passions, designed to illustrate their influence on health and duration of life (New York: J. and H. G. Langley, 1843); Isaac Ray, Mental Hygiene (Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1863). General books on health and regimen ordinarily included sections on the passions—we would say emotions—and their role in the etiology of disease. In the second half of the nineteenth century, moreover, books and pamphlets devoted to the “nerves and nervous” became increasingly common in the English-speaking world.

33. For a useful recent introduction to the German literature, see David L. Cowen and Renate Wilson, “The Traffic in Medical Ideas: Popular Medical Texts as German Imports and American Imprints,” Caduceus 13 (1997): 67–80. In the colonial and early national years, the printing of German health advice was largely an eastern Pennsylvania enterprise. In the second half of the nineteenth century, mainstream English language health guides—such as those by Gunn and E. R. Foote—were translated and published in such cities as Cincinnati, St. Louis, and New York. By the end of the nineteenth century, the once abundant Pennsylvania German health imprints had largely died out.

How to Eat Like a Gentleman

*Dietetics and Ethics in Early Modern England*

A well-behaved stomach is a great part of liberty.

—Montaigne (quoting Seneca)

Consider two genres of books that were common in early modern England. One was the popular medical text. This sort of book was produced by medical practitioners and, quite often, by nonmedical men who for various reasons reckoned they had something worth saying on the subject. The general purpose of such works was to extend medical knowledge and to recommend courses of action to preserve health, cure disease, or prolong life. You could act as your own physician on many, if not all, occasions, and this genre told you how to do it, or at least reminded you of the value of what you might be presumed already to know. These books emphasized not so much diagnostics and therapeutics as dietetics—not just recommendations on what to eat and drink, but regimen and hygiene in their broadest aspects. This emphasis reflected the contemporary center of gravity in medical culture, and it also picked out a domain of action in which the maintenance of health was very much in readers’ own hands, importantly taking for granted the economic ability of readers to exercise choice about their diet. Lots of these kinds of books were written from the mid-sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, and even though we have little reliable knowledge of their circulation, ownership, and uses, we can be fairly sure that the average educated person was familiar with some of them.
Another genre of popular books was composed of practical ethical tracts, including so-called courtesy books. These were written by gentlemen great and small (or by "gentlemen's gentlemen"—tutors, governors, and companions) for other gentlemen who might appreciate a reminder of what the social game was all about, wanted to be recognized as gentlemen, desired that standing for their children and wished to raise them accordingly, had cultural goods to sell to gentlemanly society, or, for a variety of reasons, wished to know how gentlemen did or should behave. English courtesy books instructed readers about the authentic basis of gentility, and although they generally acknowledged that birth and wealth counted for much, they overwhelmingly stressed (alone or in various combinations) the role of virtue, education, piety, and easy good manners as the proper entitlements to gentlemanly status. Humanism and Puritanism each had their proprietary views of what the English gentleman ought to be and what was wrong with what he then was. These books explained how to live a virtuous life; how to behave in a polite, prudent, and civil manner; how to raise sons; how to pass muster; and sometimes, if necessary in a period of mask and mobility, just how to pass. There were lots of these books around too, and they were often inventoried in the emerging gentleman's "library" of the seventeenth-century English country or town house. Samuel Pepys—a tailor's son, but a well-connected one, and very much on the rise, always curious about how people behaved in circles above his—was an avid consumer of such books. And John Aubrey's practical thoughts on the education of gentlemen's sons recommended the reading of the better courtesy books for instilling in the young what he called "mundane prudence."

Manners and medicine do not seem, on the surface of things, to have much to do with each other. Books explaining how to behave like a gentleman might be presumed very different sorts of things than books explaining how to preserve health and live long. And, indeed, from all sorts of pertinent points of view, the two genres are distinct: frankly medical texts do not offer rules for when to "take the wall" and when to bear your head, and a courtesy book or essay in practical deportment is unlikely to contain instructions about whether boiled or roasted meats are more suitable for an atrabilious temperament. Yet there is an overlap in substance between the two genres, and it is a telling one: that which was considered dietetically good for you was also accounted morally good. The relationship between the medical and the moral was not merely metaphorical; it was constitutive. In doing what was good for you, you were doing what was good: materially constituting yourself as a virtuous and pru-
your discipline? What does dietetic advice look like when one encounters it not in explicitly medical tracts but in the literature of practical ethics written by and for gentlemen, instructing them how to live a virtuous, prudent, and effective life? What are the social-historical circumstances that mold the dietetic counsel one finds there? What broad agreements and what contests were there about the shape and content of this advice during the early modern period? What does the resulting picture show about the relationship between the layperson and the professional, between common sense and expertise? And, finally, what can this different angle of attack suggest about changing relations between health and virtue in the early modern and in the late modern constitutions?

Nothing to Excess:
Dietary Moderation and Gentlemanly Health

No English practical ethical text of which I am aware omitted passages of medical advice, and dietetics made up by far the biggest portion of that medical advice. The dietetic counsel one finds in this literature is remarkably stable over time and setting: it reckons prudence and robust common sense; it is skeptical of extremes, innovations, one-size-fits-all courses of action, and claims to external special expertise; but its very banality and cultural robustness is what makes it so deeply interesting.

In 1531 Thomas Elyot's The Governor commended temperance in all things and sobriety in diet: surfeit was bad for you, engendering "painful diseases and sicknesses." Thomas Gainsford's Rich Cabinet passed on the proverbial form: "Temperance in diet and exercise, will make a man say, a figge, for Gallen & Paracelus." That is to say, a temperate diet—like the apple—keeps the doctor away. When King James VI of Scotland (later James I of England) wrote to instruct his infant son and heir, Henry, how to live like a prince, he too warned against "using excesse of meate and drinke" and told him above all to "beare of drunkenesse." James Celand's The Instraction of a Young Noble-man (1612) followed the king's counsel closely: "[I]t is the preservation of health not to be filled with meate; & when a man eateth more meat then his stomacke is able to digest he becometh sicke." In the 1630s Henry Peacham's Complete Gentleman—also much influenced by royal views—said the same: the gentleman was to "be moderate" in regard of his health, "which is impaied by nothing more than excess in eating and drinking (let me also add tobacco-taking).

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Many dishes breed many diseases, dulloth the mind and understanding, and not only shorten but take away life." Gilbert Burnet's Thoughts on Education even pointed to proto-eugenic reasons for shunning "all wasting intemperance, and excesses": "[S]ince the minds of children are molded into the temper of that case and body wherein they are thrust, and the healthfulness and strength of their bodies is suitable to the source and fountain from whence they spring, it clearly appears that persons wasted by drunkenness or venery must procreate unhealthful, crazy, and often mean-spirited children."

Even strongly "Puritan" courtesy texts criticized contemporary dietary excess for practical medical reasons. Restoration gallants made debauchery their profession, but they would surely pay for their pleasure: "The Table is the Altar where they sacrifice their Healths to their Appetites; and Temperance to Luxury." Gentlemanly infatuation with exotic and expensive foods was proverbial: "What's farre fetched and deare bought is meat for Gentlemen." Jean Gaillard's Compleat Gentleman (1678) cautioned parents to accustom their children early to sobriety and temperance in their diet. They should be bred to approach the table "not so much to please their palate, as to nourish their body... for exuberancy of food causes surfeits, which do endanger their life... [P]lain food is more nourishing, and less hurtful, than that which is accounted more exquisite; because the palate is pleased with it, though it be otherwise with the stomach." And when John Locke, writing more as a household governor than as a philosopher, or even as an Oxford physician, composed his 1693 tract on the education of gentlemen's sons, he too advocated a "plain and simple diet." Little meat, much bread, few spices, small beer only: drunkenness, glutony, and gormandizing to be avoided at all costs. The English ate far too much meat, and to this intemperate habit Locke imputed "a great Part" of the "Diseases in England." The third Earl of Shaftesbury, whose early education was entrusted to Locke, later commended temperance and a moderate diet in his Inquiry Concerning Virtue. And so said virtually all the English courtesy and practical ethical writers from the mid-sixteenth to the early eighteenth century.

English moralists' commendation of dietary moderation had a national bite to it. Continental as well as local voices of temperance reckoned that the English were tucking into far too much beef and swelling down far too much ale and that this was bad for their health. English writers of practical ethical texts, one might think, had a vested interest in criticizing contemporary dietary excess, and in judging that things were much worse than they had been in the English past. Yet these dietary jeremiads were often plausibly specific in their
condemnations of new habits of gentlemanly intemperance, and present-day historians broadly agree with them about the facts of the matter. Anna Bryson, for example, describes the English court dinner "as a competitive exercise in conspicuous consumption"; Lawrence Stone reckons that the massive consumption of flesh-reaching mountainous proportions at the court of James I—was a possible cause of a gentlemanly plague of bladder and kidney stone; and Roy Porter and George Rousseau document eighteenth-century appreciations of a causal link between an epidemic of fashionable gout and increased English intake of meat and strong drink. It was common—in England but also on the Continent—to blame new fashions in excess on the influence of foreigners. Peckham said that the English once had a national reputation for sobriety but that the imitation of Dutch and German drinking habits had ruined all that. Englishmen were now, Peckham judged, unhealthier, weaker, and even shorter than the victors of Agincourt, and this was attributed to overeating and overdrinking. Seventeenth-century ethical writers identified this as an age of "luxury": not just dietary excess, but "delicacy," exoticism, variety, and complexity were often assigned to the influence of effete, debauched, and papist France and Italy. And when these authors pointed to the early Stuart and Restoration court as the center of such unwholesome practices, the criticism of dietary sophistication and excess became an element in one of the major political conflicts of the seventeenth century: Court versus Country ideologies.

The English defenders of Good Old Roast Beef, and lots of it, were not, of course, bereft of a response, insisting that such fare was physiologically appropriate to their damp and chilly climate; that it bred stout, hot-blooded heroes; that such straightforward and lavishly portioned viands were suited to honest English natures; and, at a level less often surfacing in print, that dietary abundance was a mark of gentlemanly hospitality, generosity, and gusto. "Gluttony was honourable," Roy Porter wrote of eighteenth-century English gentlemanly society: "[H]andsome eating was a token of success, and hospitality admired. Englishmen tucked in and took their boards and bellies." That great eighteenth-century Tory and gourmand, Samuel Johnson, showed just what the dietary moralists were up against when he famously announced, "He who does not mind his belly will hardly mind any thing else." Dr. Johnson at table was not a pretty sight: "While in the act of eating, the veins of his forehead swelled, and generally a strong perspiration was visible. To those whose sensations were delicate, this could not but be disgusting." Preaching and practice in ethical matters commonly diverge. So the first

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Stuart king—whose court was in fact renowned for its culinary extravagance—formally commended a plain and simple diet. Nor was there anything very novel about the terms in which the English ethical writers criticized intemperance: dietary surfeit, as well as excessive variety and elaboration, had been widely identified as unhealthy and unwholesome since antiquity, and ancient medics and moralists pervasively accounted theirs an age of unhealthy excess. As a general rule, the Golden Age of moderation tends always to lie in the past. Moreover, while English condemnations of dietary excess were shaped by local conditions, texts much read by the English that were written by foreigners and that primarily addressed foreign settings added their support. Almost no book writer in any early modern cultural context said that frequent gorging or boozing was good for the body. Erasmus’s Christian Prince was to flee from "excessive drinking and eating." Castiglione blandly said that it was "well known" that the ideal courtier "ought not to profess to be a great eater or drinker." And the conference of Stefano Guazzo’s Civile Conversation "all agree[d] in blaming and condemning of them, who never cease to fill their bellies up to the throat, and whose love and lyfe consisteth in spending their time in eating and drinking, and in riotous and excessive gluttonie." Even the cynical duce de La Rochefoucauld pointed to the prudence of dietary moderation: "[W]e would like to eat more but fear we shall be sick." When educated Englishmen read the ancients—whether in Latin, in Greek, or in English translation—they saw the continuity of the counsel of moderation. If they conceded ancient authority—and, despite the so-called moderns of the Scientific Revolution, they almost all did—then they saw in that great continuity further warrants for dietetic wisdom. Educated Englishmen could, and did, get their counsel of dietary moderation from ancient ethical and political tracts as well as from the medical writings of Hippocrates, Galen, Celsus, Pliny, and Orabasius. They could find temperament recommended in the moral writings of Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Plutarch, and Seneca, and, indeed, many early modern ethical tracts were little more than palimpsests of such ancient sources. Absolutely everywhere that bookish counsel was offered to early modern gentlemen, the Road to Wellville was signed by the Golden Mean.

The Dietetics of Virtue: Moderation and Mastery

Three sorts of Good Things happened if you observed the dietary Golden Mean. First, you preserved your health and obtained all the desiderata that de-
pended upon health; second, you displayed your wisdom and virtue and acquired a valuable public reputation; third, you created the material conditions in your own body for enhanced virtue and wisdom. The first Good Thing is possibly still familiar to early twenty-first-century readers even if its grandmotherly common sense sets it against both the particularity and physiological detail of current voices of medical expertise and the rampant food-faddism of the culture that often pretends to owe its authority to medical expertise.

But the other two Good Things are rather less familiar to late moderns and deserve explication. Dietary moderation was a display of wisdom and prudence for several reasons. If you observed moderation, you also showed that you cared for your health. For a private person this was personal prudence—even when glossed by a religious idiom that made the human body God’s temple—but for a public person, other matters were at stake. Gentlemanly, and especially courtly, eating and drinking were overwhelmingly public acts, and they were public acts saturated with meaning. You tended to be observed as you ate and drank—at court, in the household, or in public eating and drinking places; communal eating and drinking constituted social order; displayed social order; and sent finely tuned social messages back and forth among the diners and drinkers. The “pledging of healths” followed strict rules of precedence and carried messages of desired changes in precedence. The offering of choice hunks of meat, the manner and order in which these were offered, and the conditions under which one was obliged to accept, or allowed to decline, offered morsels, were acts rich in hierarchical significance. And, as we now understand through the work of Norbert Elias and his followers, the “civilizing process” of bodily control that is supposed to have done so much to configure the modern social agent was particularly visible on those occasions when gentlemen and aristocrats met to eat and drink together. James I underlined for his son the political importance of resisting any temptation to eat privately: “Therefore, as Kings use oft to eat publickly, it is meet and honorable that ye also do so, as well to eschew the opinion that ye love not to haunt companie, which is one of the markes of a Tyrant, as likewises, that your delightes to eate privatley, be not thought to be for private satisfying of your gluttonie, which ye would be ashamed should be publicklie see ne.” “A good behaviour at Table,” Gailhard wrote, “is a strong proof of a good Education.” If you want to be treated like a gentleman, don’t eat like a pig.

King James’s Basilicon Doron showed acute sensitivity to the obligation towards temperance that bore specially upon a prince. People inferred a king’s true nature from observing his conduct at table. Accordingly, James advised his son to let his table behavior make a powerful display of self-control: “One of the publikest indifferent actiones of a King, & that manyest (especiallie strangers) wil narrowly take heed to, is, his manner of refection at his Table and his behaviour thereat.” Keep your dishes simple, eat of them with restraint, and never allow yourself to succumb to gluttony or drunkenness. “whiche is a beastlie vice, namelie in a King.” (And if King James himself had not gone to The Globe to see Shakespeare’s Henry IV, many of those who read Basilicon Doron had vividly in mind Prince Hal’s youthful revels with the gluttonous John Falstaff and his cool rejection of his fat friend on assuming the throne: “Make more thy grace and less thy body hence.”) These were all practical matters: on the one hand, a prince (or, indeed, any other public person) who showed that he cared little for his health also showed that he cared little for those people and public enterprises that depended upon him and his capacity for reliable, rational, and effective action. That is why the French physician Laurent Joubert said that princes had a special obligation to their health and to the dietary moderation that would secure health. First, the prince “must serve as a true model for his subjects and deputies and must be of a great perfection, more divine than human in sobresty [and] countenance.” Whatever the prince does, his subjects will emulate. Second, the prince has a lot to do and may be called to decisive action at any moment. For practical reasons he cannot allow himself to be ill or incapacitated by surfeit of food or drink. Third, the prince must execute policy over extended periods of time. A long and healthy life is the material condition for effective policy, for securing succession, and for ensuring the safety and stability of the state.

Such injunctions towards dietary moderation could be, and often were, conveyed in a secular medical idiom: eat moderately and you will live a long and healthy life. Or they might be cast in ripely rhetorical economic terms: Lord Burghley counseled his son towards a “plentiful” hospitality, but one kept well within “the measure of thine owne estate,” for, he said, he had never encountered “any man gowe poore by keeping an orderly Table”; and Josiah Dare condemned those “Epicures and Belly Gods [who] gulch down their Estates by gulps, till in the end they come to be glad of a dry Crust . . . [T]he Purses of such Prodigals may be said to be poor by their great goings on, while their Bellies may be said to be rich by their great comings in.” But the practical ethical literature more often spoke of temperance in frankly moral and religious language. And here it was said that the overwhelming fault of dietary excess
was that it gave proof that the appetite and bestial had gained sway over the rational, spiritual, and, therefore, uniquely human part of one’s nature. That sensibility was utterly stable from the ancient Greek moralists to the seventeenth-century English ethical writers. Pagan or Christian, High or Low Church—it made little difference. Human beings were Great Amphibians; hybrid creations, partly animal and partly divine, and it was understood across a broad sweep of European culture that the self was a field of contest between rational will and appetitive desire. Accordingly, he who succumbed to excess—in food, drink, venery, or emotion—displayed a failure of rational control. The glutton or drunkard was more beast than human being. Indeed, he was worse than the beasts, “for they do never exceed the measure prescribed by nature, but man will not be measured by the rule of his own reason.” And the same hierarchy of control also followed the contours of social rank and order: the gentleman showed his entitlements through control of the appetites, while the absence of authentic gentility was displayed by the absence of restraint. Dietary excess, a French ethical writer noted, “is the vice of brutish men,” and Lord Burghley said that he had “never heard any commendation ascribed to a drunkard more than the well bearing of his drinkes, which is a commendation fitter for a brewer’s horse or a drayman, then for either a Gentleman or Servingman.” Authentic “generosity”—that is, in early modern usage, the virtuous essence of gentility—“teacheth men to temperate in feeding, sober in drinking.”

Almost all practical ethical texts said the same sort of thing. The Courtier made the secular observation that temperance “brings under the sway of reason that which is perverse in our passions.” Elyot followed Plotinus’s commendation of temperance as that which “keep[s] desire under the yoke of reason” and which permits us “to covet nothing which may be repentat.” The Puritanical Gentle Sinner gave the same advice in a religious idiom: “The Gentleman is too much a man to be without all passion, but he is not so much a beast as to be governed by it.” Temperance gives him “Empire over himselfe, where he gives Law to his Affections, and limits the extravagances of Appetite, and the insatiable cravings of sensuality.” Sir Walter Raleigh’s advice to his son quantified the measure of drink along a scale leading from well-being and virtue to disease and vice: “[T]he first draught serveth for health, the second for pleasure, the third for shame, the fourth for madness.” Richard Lingard’s avuncular counsel to a new graduate commended dietary moderation: It “discover[s] you to be your own Master; for he is a miserable Slave that is under the Tyranny of his Passions: and that Fountain teeming pair, Lust and Rage must especially be subdued.” William de Britaine’s prudential guide to how to get on in Restoration society traced the causal link between political control and the display of self-control: “He who commands himself, commands the World too; and the more Authority you have over others, the more command you must have over your self.” And Locke’s practical educational tract said “that the Principle of all Virtue and Excellency lies in a Power of denying our selves the Satisfaction of our own Desires, where Reason does not authorize them.” Virtue could be acquired by practice, so dietary temperance should be practiced early.

The practical ethical literature was therefore almost unanimous in its commendation of dietary moderation as a mark of virtue. More fundamentally, however, temperance, or deliberate moderation, was considered a virtue in itself: so said the ancients, and so said early modern ethical writers. Castiglione observed that “many other virtues are born of temperance, for when a mind is attuned to this harmony, then through the reason it easily receives true fortitude, that makes it intrepid and safe from every danger, and almost puts it above human passions.” Elyot wrote that the other virtues followed temperance, “as a sad and discreet matron and reverent governess,” preventing excess in all other ways of being. The royal herald Lodowick Bryskett noted that temperance is “the rule and measure of Vertue, upon which dependeth mans felicitie,” and cited Platonic authority for the view that temperance is “the guardien or safe keeper of all human vertues.” Thomas Gainsford wrote that temperance is “the protectrix of all other vertues,” and Richard Brathwaite agreed that “no vertue can subsist without Moderation,” the foundation and root of all other virtues. King James gave royal warrant to the ancient hierarchy that made temperance the “Queue of all the reste” of the virtues: without self-command one could not realize any virtuous end. If virtue consisted of the Golden Mean, then temperance was literally the master virtue.

The six Galenic “nonnaturals” were those forms of behavior presumed to be under volitional control whose rational management constituted the practice of traditional medical dietetics. The usual list of nonnaturals current in the early modern period included one’s exposure to ambient air (the sort of place you decided to put your dwelling or spend your time), diet (in the strict sense of meat and drink), sleeping and waking, exercise and rest, retentions and evacuations (including sexual release), and the passions of the mind. There is no more concrete sign of the common terrain occupied by practical ethics and practical dietetics in early modern England than the fact that several ethical
texts explicitly structured their counsel through a list of the nonnaturals, while others did so implicitly or diffusely. Rationally managed moderation of the nonnaturals just was virtuous and prudent, and no special indication was, or needed to be, given that consideration had here moved from moral onto medical terrain. That is because no such cultural shift had in fact occurred.

So, for example, Peacham's practical observations on contemporary English mores listed those things upon which both health and the ability to do civic good principally depended, "which are air, eating, drinking, sleep and waking, moving and exercise, and passions of the mind: that we may live to serve God, to do our king and country service, to be a comfort to our friends and helpful to our children and others that depend on us, let us follow sobriety and temperance, and have, as Tully saith, a diligent care of our health, which we shall be sure to do if we will observe and keep that one short, but true, rule of Hippocrates: 'All things moderately and in measure.'" And Locke's influential educational text started out with a series of counsels that rigorously followed the traditional list of nonnaturals. Note especially that the control of the passions—or, as we would say, the emotions—counts as a key item in ethical discourse. Moralists have always counseled the control of anger and of avarice, and so they did in early modern England. Yet the place of the passions in the list of Galenic nonnaturals also establishes their place at the very center of medical dietetics, regimen, and hygiene. Looked at from the point of view of explicitly ethical writers, temperance in the nonnaturals seemed the soundest moral advice, while explicitly medical writers were similarly struck by the coincidence between what was good for you and what was good. In 1724 George Cheyne's Essay of Health and Long Life announced, "The infinitely wise Author of Nature has so contrived Things, that the most remarkable Rules of preserving Life and Health are moral Duties commanded us, so true it is, that Godliness has the Promises of this Life, as well as that to come."

Temperance is a virtue; following the dictates of temperance leads you to the Golden Mean in the observation of all other virtues; and, finally, dietary temperance creates the moral-physical conditions for virtuous thinking and acting. Virtue is circular. The circle is closed by widely shared notions—again, continuous with antiquity—about how diet influences the operation of the mind. Francis Bacon wrote, "It is certain... that the brain is as it were under the protection of the stomach, and therefore the things which comfort and fortify the stomach by consent assist the brain, and may be transferred to this place." Other writers placed greater emphasis on the potential of dietary excess to corrupt the mind. Sine Cerere et Baccho friget Venus was the old adage, common in both medical and civic circles. Excess in food and drink, especially of gross food and strong drink, fed both sexual desire and anger. That is why practical ethical writers could say, "Gluttony and Drunkenness are the mother of al vices." The passions could not be effectively controlled, nor could the mind reason clearly, when the fires of desire and rage were stoked by dietary excess. "What operation can a minde make," Cleland asked, "when it is darkened with the thicke vapours of the braine? Who can thinke that a faire Lute filled ful with earth is able to make a sweet Harmonie?... [N]o more is the minde able to exercise anie good function, when the stomacke is stuffed with victuals. How ought Noble men then, whose mindes are ordained to shine before others in al vertuous and laudable actions, stop the abuse of abominable Epicurisme?" Dietary excess was bad for your body, but the gross blood and vapors bred by excess also "dulles the mind and understanding." By contrast, Charron said of temperance, "Neither is it serviceable to the bodie only, but to the minde too, which thereby is kept pure, capable of wisdome and good counsell." But when the mind was clouded by dietary excess, then the rational ability to control excess was compromised. The virtuous mind/body circle induced by temperance then became truly vicious. By the 1730s the fashionable physician George Cheyne, building on Hippocratic and Galenic dietetic ideas, had developed an elaborate and systematic theory of the dietary causation of melancholy—"the English malady"—a major contribution to which was excess and to which a sovereign remedy was a severe and formulaic "lowering diet."

What the Mean Meant:Specifying Dietary Moderation

Like all the Aristotelian virtues, dietary moderation was poised between two vicious extremes. The practical ethical literature, however, overwhelmingly concentrated on the vices of excess, commending temperance in opposition to gluttony, drunkenness, delicacy, and overelaboration. The authors of such tracts were appearing in the person of the moralist, and the audiences they had in view were those gentlemen and aristocrats who had the resources to indulge themselves and who, in moralists' opinion, were in fact now indulging themselves on a spectacular scale. Nevertheless, there was also a minor theme in early modern ethical writing that picked out the vices attending the ascetic extreme.
Dietary asceticism was well known in early modern society; those who endorsed and embraced it spoke from some of that society's most authoritative platforms; and its cultural significance was widely understood within gentlemanly circles. Even so, dietary asceticism was very rarely advocated by ethical writers addressing themselves to civic actors, and, indeed, the practical dangers and social inconveniences of asceticism were sometimes spelled out. Asceticism was seen as strongly linked to the character of spiritual intellectuals and to patterns of disengagement and private contemplation that shaped their lives. Such asceticism and disengagement might be accorded high cultural value in civic society, but moralists generally warned gentlemen to avoid these practices. They were just not suited to the lives led by civic actors. They offended against gentlemanly obligations to generosity; they counted as a disagreeable display of self-indulge and prissiness; they blocked the quotidian rhythms of gentlemanly social interaction; and, as I shall soon note, they might constitute both practical and social risks to the adaptability and mobility central to gentlemanly life.

If practical ethical writers would not have their readers be gluttons and drunkards, neither did they approve asceticism. 65 Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* excoriated excess—ancient and modern—at length but more briefly noted the mischief wrought on their bodies and minds by those going to the other extreme: "too ceremonious and strict diet, being over precise, Cockney-like, curious in their observation of meats . . . just so many ounces at dinner . . . a diet-drink in the morning, cock-broth . . . [T]o sounder bodies this is too nice and most absurd." This was uncivil and unsound, but there were other dangers: monks and anchorites were well known to have driven themselves mad "through immoderate fasting." 66 Henry Peacham was one of several practical ethical writers who warned against going too far in the avoidance of dietary excess: "Neither desire I you should be so abstemious as not to remember a friend with a hearty draught, since wine was created to make the heart merry, for 'what is the life of man if it want wine'? Moderately taken, it preserveth health, comforteth and disperseth the natural heat over all the whole body, allays choleric humors, expelling the same with the sweat, etc., tempereth melancholy, and, as one saith, hath in itself a drawing virtue to procure friendship." 67

To eat and drink like a gentleman was, then, to eat and drink both temperately and reasonably. So said virtually all the practical ethical writers of the period. The commendation of routine interpenetration by any author pretending to prescribe a virtuous and prudent life is almost inconceivable. The Golden Mean was so thoroughly institutionalized in both ethical and medical canons that its denial would violate good sense and decency. The sensibility of the carnivalesque did indeed reject temperance, as did exercises of cultural subversion or inversion, but these rejections underlined just how central temperance was to early modern tradition, to orthodoxy, and to common sense. 72 Moderation was therefore a great cultural prize, and because it was such a prize, there were contests for giving its counsel specific content and for defining what moderation meant.

That content and meaning could and did vary in early modern England, yet it is noteworthy how variation, and even conflict, occurred while holding stable much or even all of the prescriptive form that counseled dietary moderation and that identified moderation as both morally good and medically good for one. The views of Francis Bacon are particularly pertinent in this connection. Bacon wrote a lot about medicine. Like several other "modern" natural philosophers of the Scientific Revolution, he considered that the medical profession was in a sorry state and that physicians' relative inability to prevent disease, to cure disease, and to extend human life were largely owing to deficiencies in physiological knowledge. "Medicine," he judged, "is a science which hath been . . . more professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than advanced." 73

Bacon was specially unimpressed with the state of medical dietetics. Traditional advocacy of the dietary Golden Mean had become, to a degree, trite and unreflective, and it had never been informed by an adequate stock of valid empirical knowledge. Adherence to the Mean was still to count as prudence, but one must properly understand where the Mean was located and what were the nature and consequences of extremes. So Bacon—in both his essay "Of Regiment of Health" and his much longer tract on "Life and Death"—appropriated Celsus as authority for a respecification of dietary moderation. In the essay, Bacon wrote, "Celsus could never have spoken it as a Physician, had he not been a Wise Man withal; when he giveth it, for one of the great precepts of Health and Lasting: That a Man doe vary, and entechange Contraries; But with an Inclination to the more benigne Extreme: Use Fasting and full Eating, but rather full Eating: Watching and Sleep, but rather Sleep, Sitting, and Exercise, but rather Exercise; and the like." 74 And in his philosophical work on longevity and health, Bacon similarly said, "Where extremes are prejudicial, the mean is the best; but where extremes are beneficial, the mean is mostly
worthless ... [We should not neglect the advice of Celsus, a wise as well as a learned physician, who advises variety and change of diet, but with an inclination to the liberal side: namely that a man should at one time accustom himself to watching, at another to sleep, but oftener to sleep; sometimes fast and sometimes feast; sometimes strenuously exert, sometimes relax the faculties of his mind, but oftener the latter.] Bacon was here disputing that dietary extremes were necessarily vicious and damaging. Often, if not always, moving towards one extreme might be in itself more beneficial than moving towards the other—eating a lot was better than fasting, sleeping a lot was better than staying awake—and, when this was manifestly the case, then the point of prudence was shifted towards—though not reaching—the beneficial extreme. Bacon practiced what he preached: his seventeenth-century biographer noted that Bacon followed "rather a plentiful and liberal diet, as his stomach would bear it, than a restrained." And his nineteenth-century editors observed: "He could make nothing of a great dinner. He said, if he were to sup for a wager he would dine with a Lord Mayor." Bacon not only wrote but ate like a Lord Chancellor.

It was, Bacon recognized, fashionable to associate dietary abstinence with longevity, and perhaps there was indeed a causal relationship of this sort: "It seems to be approved by experience that a spare and almost Pythagorean diet, such as is prescribed by the stricter order of monastic life, or the institutions of hermits ... produces longevity." But there was no absolute certainty in the matter—later in the same tract Bacon wrote that "[f]requent fasting is bad for longevity"—nor was it evident that longevity was the only relevant consideration. Bacon cited evidence that, among those "as live freely and in the common way"—that is to say, civic actors—"the greatest gluttons, and those most devoted to good living, are often found the most long-lived." Nor was he aware of any solid evidence that rigorous observance of the so-called middle diet contributed to longevity, even though it might be a prudent way to health. If you really want to live according to the exact rule of moderation, then you are going to have to do it with very great care, more care than the public actor may wish to, or may be able to, devote to such things. More care, indeed, than it might be worth.

Celsus did indeed point out the medical benefits of a varied diet and way of life, but Bacon went his ancient authority one better: The Mean might be defined in terms of its momentary location between dietary extremes. In this case, the counsel of moderation would be: Drink two glasses of wine a day; never drink ten a day; and there's no good in having any wine-free days. Alternatively, the Mean might be redefined by what we would now call a statistical distribution over time of daily behaviors. And in this case, the voice of temperance would say: Drink ten glasses of wine in a day if you wish, but don't make a habit of it. Bacon, it appears, meant to revere dietary moderation along the latter lines. He concluded his discussion of how the body operated on aliment by offering advice at odds with dominant medical and moral counsel: "With regard to the quantity of meat and drink, it occurs to me that a little excess is sometimes good for the irrigation of the body, whence immoderate fasting and deep potations are not to be entirely forbidden." 79

Here Bacon was articulating, and giving philosophical and gentlemanly cachet to, a dietary sensibility that evidently ran deep in lay culture, however much it was disapproved by physicians, priests, and most moralizing authors. The vomiting and purging induced by dietary excess was considered to cleanse the system, to get rid of accumulated crud and noxious substances, and to give the body a healthy catharsis. As was common in early modern gentlemanly society, Bacon himself often "took physic" for these purposes, but apparently only his personal recipe for a maceration of rhubarb in a little white wine and beer to "carry away the grosser humours of the body." Describing himself as "ever puddering in physic," Bacon acted largely as his own physician and dosed himself in moderation, with very great attention to detail. 80 Montaigne, whose essays Bacon much admired, similarly wrote together medicine and manners in commending the occasional binge: "He will even plunge often into excess, if he will take my advice; otherwise the slightest dissipation will ruin him, and he will become awkward and disagreeable company." 81 Sir Thomas Browne's later compilation of commonly received errors recorded the view "[t]hat 'tis good to be drunk once a month, is a common flattery of sensuality, supporting it self upon physick, and the healthfull effects of inebration." 82 Laurent Joubert deplored the popular saying "There are more old drunkards than there are old physicians," while also identifying ancient authority—Celsus again—for the advice that one should sometimes eat to surfeit. 83 And John Aubrey's life of Thomas Hobbes recorded the philosopher as saying "that he did believe he had been in excess in his life, a hundred times; which, considering his great age, did not amount to above once a yeare. When he did drinke, he would drinke to excess to have the benefit of Vomiting, which he did easily ... but he never was, nor could not endure to be, habitually a good fellow, i.e. to drinke every day wine with company, which, though not to drunkennesse, spoiles the
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these other concerns. That is why Bacon's early biographer, giving the details of the Lord Chancellor's program of self-medication, felt obliged to insist that he did indeed live physically, but not miserably.89

If you were actually ill, then, of course, you should summon your physician and accept his best advice. It was important to your part in the active life that you got better as quickly as you could. But if you were not actually ill, there was no reason to submit yourself to the severely ordered regimens prescribed by medical counsels of moderation. This principle was widely known among early modern medical and moral writers as the Rule of Celsus. In the original, the rule went like this: "A man in health, who is both vigorous and his own master, should be under no obligatory rules, and have no need, either for a medical attendant, or for a rubber and anointer. His kind of life should afford him variety."80 The Rule of Celsus—the rule of no rule—had all the appeal of common sense; its dictates appeared both to accommodate prudential considerations and to fit with much of what counted as reliable physiological knowledge. Over a period of time—both lay and medical voices said—your body got accustomed to your usual diet and to the usual rhythms of your life. You submitted yourself at your peril to abrupt dietary change, or to the rigorous rule of dietary system. That is the sense of Seneca's maxim "A well-behaved stomach is a great part of liberty": if you have a healthy stomach, then you are not legitimately subject to any rules but those of your own normal patterns of life. Integrity is a circumstance of good digestion. Nor was it just lay public actors who fell in with the Rule of Celsus. It was such a prize that it was cited approvingly by a number of early modern physicians who elsewhere displayed their predilection for the sovereignty of expert dietary system. In these connections, physicians gave themselves considerable flexibility in specifying when patients were in fact healthy or; appearances tending to deceive, actually ill or at imminent risk of becoming so.81

More to the point, ethical writers dwelt extensively on why "living physically" was neither proper nor practical for the man who meant to act effectively on a public stage. King James wanted his son and heir to appreciate the link between dietary adaptability and effective rule. The consideration here was wholly political. In a face-to-face society, the showing of legitimate condescension—noblese oblige—commonly took place at table, and this is where table manners might merge with matters of state. For physiological as well as prudential reasons you had to get used to what eating whatever was served, wherever you had to be. That is why James admonished his son to "eat in a manly,

To Live Physically is to Live Miserably:
The Dietary Vicissitudes of the Active Life

Physicians were piqued by the respecification of moderation as occasional excess, but gentlemanly society nevertheless had excellent reasons for choosing to ignore the physicians. Bacon's essay on regimen aphoristically summed up the relevant consideration: "In Sicknesse, respect Health principally; And in Health, Action."86 The early modern public actor—the gentleman, the courtier, the politician, the diplomat, the merchant, the soldier—came down firmly on the action side in the ancient debate between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa. In natural philosophy, Bacon's modernizing reforms were meant to reshape intellectual inquiry to fit the exigencies of political and economic action.87 So, in medicine, Bacon reckoned that the legitimate test of medical practice was its ability to enhance the capacity for action. And in no case should medical counsel withdraw otherwise healthy men from the active sphere. If occasional feasting and boozing were central to the public life—and in early modern England they spectacularly were—then it could not possibly be a point of prudence or of morality to embrace medical counsel that removed public actors from those scenes in which public action occurred and in which social solidarity was made and subverted. The sort of self-indulgent discipline that was acceptable for sequestered scholars, monks, or retired gentlemen was not proper or permissible for the civic actor. La Rochefoucauld declared, "To keep well by too strict a regimen is a tedious disease in itself."88 And when the proverbial voice similarly said that "[T]o live physically"—that is, according to the commands of physic—"was to live miserably," two things were meant: first, that it was not pleasant for your body; second, that it was a socially unacceptable way of living. The rigorous dietetics of moderation had to be tempered by other important ethical concerns, and, indeed, the meaning of moderation might even be respecified so as to align the notion of temperance with...
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preferred his own experience of his body, and its responses to regimen, to physicians' expert advice and artificial systems. The intellectual basis of being able to act as "your own physician" was adequate self-knowledge. No one could know one's body and its responses to food, drink, and patterns of living as well as oneself, but the price of such knowledge was painstaking attention. A prudent man should acquire and value such dietary self-knowledge, and Montaigne accounted himself such a man: "I study myself more than any other subject. That is my metaphysics, that is my physics." The essay "Of Experience" was composed when Montaigne was fifty-six years old—well past the age at which (as the old saying had it) a man should no longer need a physician. Montaigne here deliberated upon what he had learned, how it bore upon his own proper regimen, and how he then stood in relation to external medical expertise.

"Of Experience" was an eloquent expression of Montaigne's well-known skepticism about external expertise and a vigorous defense of the moral and practical integrity that such skepticism assisted. In form, it is an essay about the general superiority of prudence to systemic pretension; in substantial content, it is in fact a dietary tract about the management of the Galenic nonnaturals. If you were a prudent person, then over the years your dietary routine had been informed by the patterns of your body's responses to food and drink, and, in turn, your body had grown accustomed to that dietary routine: "I believe nothing with more certainty than this: that I cannot be hurt by the use of things that I have been long accustomed to." Your appetite was a pretty reliable guide to what was good for you. If you liked it, it probably liked you. "I have never," Montaigne said, "received harm from any action that was really pleasant to me... Both in health and in sickness I have readily let myself follow my urgent appetites. I give great authority to my desires and inclinations. I do not like to cure trouble by trouble... My appetite in many things has of its own accord suited and adapted itself rather happily to the health of my stomach... It is for habit to give form to our life, just as it pleases; it is all-powerful in that; it is Circe's drink, which varies our nature as it sees fit." Even if your physicians urgently advised it, radical alteration in long-established customs could be bad for you: "Change of any sort is disturbing and hurtful." Montaigne was no fool: when his body began speaking to him in unaccustomed ways, he listened. When sharp sauces started to disagree with him, he went off them and his taste followed suit; when ill, wine lost its savor and he gave it up. But in ordinary circumstances, habit, having become a second nature, was to be respected, and
Montaigne thought that you should be careful about making abrupt changes in dietary routine unless they were absolutely necessary. Still, soldier and public actor that he once had been, Montaigne did not portray himself as a slave to habit: "I have no habit that has not varied according to circumstances"; "The best of my bodily qualities is that I am flexible"; "I was trained for freedom and adaptability." Vicissitudes of life were one thing; the sudden changes that flowed from adopting your doctor's expert systems were quite another.70

Montaigne saw no reason not to consult with physicians when he was genuinely ill, even if he suspected that, in general, they knew little and could do less: "The arts that promise to keep our body and our soul in health promise us much; but at the same time there are none that keep their promise less."70 Expert physicians disagreed among themselves, and, so, if you didn't like the dietary advice that one offered, you could always pitch one doctor's favored rules against another's: "If your doctor does not think it good for you to sleep, to drink wine, or to eat such-and-such a food, don't worry: I'll find you another who will not agree with him." For that reason alone, you might as well do what you thought best, or nothing at all. The curative power of nature was, in any case, probably more effective than the art of any doctor: "We should give free passage to diseases; and I find that they do not stay so long with me, who let them go ahead; and some of those that are considered most stubborn and tenacious, I have shaken off by their own decadence, without help and without art, and against the rules of medicine. Let us give Nature a chance; she knows her business better than we do."70

If you put the conduct of your life under the care of physicians, Montaigne too thought they would make you miserable. Forbidding this and forbidding that, the doctors unman you and, ultimately, undo you: "If they do no other good, they do at least this, that they prepare their patients early for death, undermining little by little and cutting off their enjoyment of life."70 It was a widely shared general ethical principle that a man who was a slave to system was less than a man. He who was ruled by others, or by a book of rules, was no free actor; he lacked the integrity central to gentlemanly identity.70 Montaigne's essay took that general moral case and made it specific to dietetics. Change was physiologically and morally good, better and more possible for youth than age: "A young man should violate his own rules to arouse his vigor and keep it from growing moly and lax. [There] is no way of life so stupid and feeble as that which is conducted by rules and discipline." "The most unsuitable quality for a gentleman," Montaigne declared, "is overfastidiousness and

bondage to certain particular ways." Not to do, not to eat, or not to drink what was going wherever you were was "shameful": "Let such men stick to their kitchens. In anyone else it is unbecoming, but in a military man it is bad and intolerable; he . . . should get used to every change and vicissitude of life." By all means, listen to those who may have authentic medical expertise, but do not give up your freedom of action in so doing. Montaigne said that he knew of, and pitted, "several gentlemen who, by the stupidity of their doctors, have made prisoners of themselves, though still young and sound in health . . . We should conform to the best rules, but not enslave ourselves to them."70

One established role for philosophical knowledge in relation to medicine was its ability to guide the physician in preventing and curing disease. Skeptical of the ability of current knowledge to achieve these ends, Montaigne embraced another long-established role for philosophy: it could and should reconcile us to the inevitable circumstances of our mortal condition. To live like a man, one must learn to suffer like a man, and, finally, to die like a man: "We must meekly suffer the laws of our condition. We are born to grow old, to grow weak, to be sick, in spite of all medicine . . . We must learn to endure what we cannot avoid." And when it is time to die, one should die philosophically and well rather than live on stupidly and miserably: "Is it so great a thing to be alive?"70

The physicians didn't like such talk; they rarely do. Traditional medical dietetics did indeed stress the importance of self-knowledge and the dietetic practice that depended upon this self-knowledge. But physicians also insisted upon the necessity of being consulted in disease, upon the acknowledgment of their expertise in pronouncing whether patients really were well or ill, and upon their role in supervising and guiding patients' self-knowledge. So, for example, Montaigne's contemporary Joubert countered the apparently fashionable idea that there were other legitimate gentlemanly values than looking after one's health, or that submission to expert medical systems was anything but right and wise. It was, the physician wrote, very prudent to live young as if you were old, for then you really would attain vigorous old age. Or, as the proverb had it, "young old, old young." And if princes and public actors objected that they were busy and that it was better for them "to be loose and not observe any rules, schedules, or system," then Joubert settled for the best that he could get, and more than they were usually accustomed to giving. Such people should nevertheless observe "the strictest codes and rules [they] can possibly manage to apply, as much as . . . circumstances will allow."70 The Jesuit Leonard Lessius also knew his target when he wrote of the reluctance of
civic actors to take the best medical advice: "[T]he Wills and Humours of Men (we know) are stubborn and uncontrollable, and their Appetites too un Governable to admit of any violent Restraints. Men (we see) will, at least the generality of them, eat and drink, and live according to the ordinary Course of the World, and indulge their sensual Appetites in everything to the full. Thus comes it to pass, that all their other Care and Dilligence concerning these Physical maxims, or Prescripts, in the End produce little or no benefit at all." They are fools to live like this and they show their foolishness in blaming physicians for what they have brought upon themselves, "leav[ing] all entirely to Nature, and Event. To live physically they hold (according to the old Proverb) is to live miserably; and they look upon it as a very great Unhappiness for a Man to be di eted, to be denied the free Use (perhaps) of an insatiable Appetite, or Desire."  

In the eighteenth century even the great dietary doctor George Cheyne recognized the strength of gentlemanly moral resistance to medical rule: "The Reflection is not more common than just, That he who lives physically must live miserably. The Truth is, too great Nicety and Exactness about every minute Circumstance that may impair our Health, is such a Yoke and Slavery, as no Man of a generous free Spirit would submit to. 'Tis, as a Poet expresses it, to die for fear of Dying." Yet Cheyne made his considerable living by peddling dietary advice to those well-heeled gentlemen he judged were, if not actually ill, then in imminent danger of becoming so. And therefore he tempered his appreciation of polite moral resistance by appealing to another set of ethical sensibilities also acknowledged in gentlemanly society: "But then, on the other Hand, to cut off our Days by Intemperance, Indiscretion, and guilty Passions, to live miserably for the sake of gratifying a sweet Tooth, or a brutal Ich; to die Martyrs to our Luxury and Wantonness, is equally beneath the Dignity of human Nature, and contrary to the Homage we owe to the Author of our Being. Without some Degree of Health, we can neither be agreeable to ourselves, nor useful to our Friends,"  

Expertise, Integrity, and Common Sense: Early and Late Modern Dietetics  

If you were a poor person in the early modern period, you would act as your own physician largely because you could not afford the services of a medical expert. And if you were radically inclined, or if your material interests were at stake, you might assert the adequacy or superiority of self-treatment as a way of breaking up the medical profession's corporate power and political privileges. But if you were a free-acting gentleman in this period, neither of these considerations typically had much to do with pervasive assertions of medical self-knowledge or with skepticism towards medical expertise. Rather, you acted very substantially as your own physician because you wanted to, especially in circumstances where self-knowledge was central to medical assessments and where medical advice bore upon the fabric of everyday life and upon the identity and integrity of the self. Dietetic self-knowledge and self-care were marks of mundane prudence and moral integrity.

The management of the Galenic nonnaturals constituted the prescriptive part of early modern medical dietetics, but it also made up a substantial part of the early modern cultural practices that established personal identity and social worth. This is just a way of rephrasing the observation that medical dietetics inhabited the same cultural terrain as practical morality. And yet that cohabitation could and did give rise to conflict as well as to consensus—conflict between medical expertise and gentlemanly common sense and conflict between the goals of physicians and those of public actors. Insofar as gentlemen were not professionally qualified, they were, like the "vulgar" laypeople with respect to physicians. But their knowledge was not so easy to condemn as that of the vulgar, nor was it so easy medically to objectify them and their "conditions," nor, again, to dispute their definitions of the situations in which medical counsel might or might not have pertinence or potency. Early modern gentlemen, that is to say, were laypeople of a very special sort. They had a voice, arguably more audible in literate culture than that of the physicians whom they occasionally employed. Gentlemanly prudence could not be dismissed as mere common sense or as meretricious "low" knowledge; gentlemanly self-knowledge was hard to gainsay; and gentlemanly goals formed a framework for evaluating physicians' advice whose legitimacy could be challenged only with great difficulty. When early modern gentlemen concurred with what physicians counseled, their assent was consequential, and when they did not, their dissent caused potentially serious problems for the credibility and the social grip of medical expertise.

What has become of that early modern dietetic common domain? One could argue that it dissolved long ago. To a considerable extent, the cultures of moral discourse and of medical expertise have gone their separate ways, though it would be very wrong to describe the divorce as absolute. The adage
You are what you eat" survives as a vestige of a largely lost dietetic culture, while the modern biochemistry of food metabolism gives the formula a renewed charge of credibility at the cost of a fundamental change in meaning. So far as the medical profession is concerned, dietetics no longer exists as a discrete subject in the curriculum. The "dietician" is widely understood to be someone arranging institutional meals for maximum nutritional content at minimum cost; the "nutrition scientist" may study metabolic pathways at many removes from the offer of practical counsel; and the heaps of dietary advice that polysize saturate the common culture tend overwhelmingly to pick out the virtues or vices of specific food items in relation to specific conditions or diseases. None of these bears anything but a lexical relationship to the early modern culture of dietetics. The counsel of dietary moderation may be hard to discern in the contemporary culture of medical expertise and in what the laity seems to expect of that expertise. Quackery—defined as identifying simple explanations and remedies for complex conditions—is in the ascendant, and one could plausibly describe present-day lay attitudes to diet, disease, and health as an incoherent assemblage of discrete quackeries. The medical profession has almost wholly given up the role of counseling individuals on their way of life, save with respect to disease-specific conjectures (for example, exercise and a low-fat diet in relation to coronary artery disease; stress reduction in connection with hypertension). Conversely, patients can rarely effectively insist that the advice of medical experts should be weighed against the range of their own life goals. The dietetic voice of moderation, insofar as it is audible at all in late modern culture, tends to come from sources other than medical experts.

Early modern gentlemanly acknowledgment that the dietetic counsel of moderation might itself have to be qualified by the demands of civility has similarly lost much of its force. If the character of the gentleman no longer exists, nevertheless the scenes of public life and social interaction that gave rise to Montaigne's and Bacon's commendation of dietary decorum still do. Yet some years ago, I gave a dinner party for eight that required—on medical and on ideological grounds—the preparation of four different menus. As to drink, two people would take no red wine, two others would take no wine at all, and one would not drink German wine. Both health and politics effectively trumped civility.

Scaled up, stripped down, and generalized, these observations about the career of dietetics are just familiar truisms about contemporary culture. They bear a family resemblance to academic cultural-theoretical truisms about modernity that plausibly talk about cultural specialization and differentiation,
And, while the counsel of dietary moderation is indeed hard to hear in modern culture, it is far from impossible to hear it, and, on hearing it, to be reminded of its sheer common sense and unassailable authority. As I finish this chapter, the current issue of the New Yorker brings me Julia Child’s irresistible, and only slightly modernized, expression of the ancient Rule of Celsus: “A low-fat diet . . . What does that mean? I think it’s unhealthy to eliminate things from your diet. Who knows what they have in them that you might need? Of course, I’m addressing myself to normal, healthy people . . . What I’m trying to do is encourage people to embrace moderation—small helpings, no seconds, no snacking, a little bit of everything, and above all, have a good time.”

Notes


9. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley, 3 vols. (New York: Vintage Books, 1988–90), 2:97–139; see also 3:140–41. (In these connections, Foucault did not cite Edelstein et al., nor, in the approved French academic manner, did he acknowledge the work of any other living or recently deceased scholar. But it is hard to


13. [Thomas Gainsford], The Rich Cabinet furnished with varieties of Excellent Discriptions, Exquisite Characters, Witty Discourses, and Delightful Histories, Devine and Morall... Whereunto is Annexed the Epitome of Good Manners, extracted from Mr John de la Casa, ... (1616; reprint, Amsterdam: Da Capo Press for Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1972), 143v.


15. James Geland, The Instruction of a Young Noble-man (Oxford, 1612), 211. Large sections of Geland's tract are just (unacknowledged) quotations or close paraphrases of the king's Basilicon Doron.


25. In the 1540s Sir Thomas Elyot celebrated the nutritional virtues of English roast beef, while recognizing the possible dangers of excess: "Bife of Engelande to Englishmen, whiche are in hotth, bryngeth strange nouzhyngayne, but it maketh grosse bloud, and ingredenth melanchole." "The Castel of Holte" (London, 1541), 16c.


28. On this, see the learned and entertaining Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes.


37. King James, *Basilicon Doron*, 124.


42. Walter Raleigh, "Sir Walter Raleigh's Instructions to His Son and to Posterior," in *The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh*, 8 vols. (London, 1876), 8:557–70, quotation on 568. Raleigh was here quoting Anacharsis, reputed to be one of the Seven Sages of Antiquity.


47. Elyot, *Governor*, 209.


49. Walter Raleigh, "Sir Walter Raleigh's Instructions to His Son and to Posterity," in *The Works of Sir Walter Raleigh*, 8 vols. (London, 1876), 8:557–70, quotation on 568. Raleigh was here quoting Anacharsis, reputed to be one of the Seven Sages of Antiquity.


55. Lodowick Bryskett, *A Discoverse of Civill Life*, ed. Thomas E. Wright (1666; reprint, Northridge, Calif.: San Fernando Valley State College, 1970), 48, 162. This was apparently a popular early modern interpretation of Plato's Republic, IV, 430e–432b.

57. King James, *Basilicon Doron*, 100–101. See also Brathwait, *English Gentleman*, 305, 311. The identification of temperance as a virtue was not of course, uncommon in the early modern period. For *prudence* "as the general Queene, superintendent, and guide of all other vertues," see Charron, *Of Wisdom*, 350. Temperance was, for Charron, "not a special vertue, but general and common, the reasoning sauce of all the rest" (332). The translator dedicated the book to Henry, Prince of Wales.


60. Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, 9-24. Among other practical ethical tracts organizing their advice—to a greater or lesser extent—through a list of the nonnaturals, see King James's *Basilicon Doron*.


64. In a mid-sixteenth-century translation of Erasmus's *Proverbs*, the Latin tag was given as "Without meate and drink the lust of the body is colde"; alternatively, "The best way to tame carnall lust, is to kepe abstinence of meates and drinks"; and "A licorous [licentious] mouth a licorous tale." Desiderius Erasmus, *Proverbs or Adages*, ed. and trans. Richard Taverner (London, 1569), 34v. For medical proverbs generally, see Archer Taylor, *The Proverb* (1931; reprint, Berlin: Peter Lang, 1985), 121-29.


69. I have written elsewhere about the practices and significance of philosophical asceticism, and their juxtaposition with early modern civic sensibilities: see Shapin, "Philosopher and the Chicken," esp. 33-37.


71. Peacham, *Complete Gentleman*, 154. Peacham was here quoting Ecclesiasticus, a well-known compilation of maxims from the second century B.C.E.. The full passage is "What is life to a man derived of wine? / Was it not created to warm men's hearts? / Wine brings gaity and high spirits, / if a man knows when to drink and when to stop; / but wine in excess makes for bitter feelings / and leads to offence and retaliation." Jesus Ben Sirah, Ecclesiasticus or The Wisdom of Jesus Son of Strach, ed. John G. Smither (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 154.


74. Francis Bacon, "Of Regiment of Health," in *The Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral*, ed. Michael Kieran (1625; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 100-102, quotation on 101. Bacon's was a creative reading of what Celcus actually had to say on the matter in *De medicina*, while the editor of this edition of the Essays more circumspectly judges that "the notion of the 'benigne Extreme' is Bacon's emphasis" (237).
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87. See, especially, Julian Martín, Francis Bacon, the State, and the Reform of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); also Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

88. La Rochefoucauld, Maxims, 155.

89. Rawley, "Life of Bacon.," 17.

90. Celsius, De medicina, 1:43. See also Mark Grant, Dieting for an Emperor: A Translation of Books 1 and 4 of Oribasius' Medical Compilations with an Introduction and Commentary (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1957), 12.

91. For example, Joubert, Second Part of Popular Errors, 263 (the healthy man "while he is feeling well, belongs to himself and does not have to follow any rule or diet nor consult a physician"); John Arbuthnot, An Essay Concerning the Nature of Aliments, and the Choice of Them, according to the Different Constitutions of Human Bodies, . . . 4th ed. (1731; reprint, London: J. and R. Tonson, 1756), 178-79 (["A] healthy Man, under his own Government, ought not to tie himself to strict Rules, nor to abstain from any Sort of Food in common Use"); Mackenzie, History of Health, 135 (["A" man who is sound and strong should tie himself down to no particular rule of diet, nor imagine that he stands in need of a physician"); Benito Jerónimo Feijoo y Montecorvo, Rules for Preserving Health, particularly with regard to Staidous Persons, trans. anon. from the Spanish (London: [1800?]), 79-80, 85. See also Mikkel, Hygiene, 93-94, 102, 106, 108, 125, 130-31, 141. For the Rule in a popular medical text by a nonprofessional, see Elyot, Castel of Helth, 45r ("[A]s Cornelius Celsius said, A man that is hole and well at ease, and is at his lybertie, ought not to bind him selfe to rules, nor mede a phisition"); also Leonard Lesstis, Hygiencor: Or, A Treatise of the Means of Health and Long Life, In A Treatise of Health and Long Life, with the Sure Means of Attaining It, in Two Books. The First by Leonard Lesstis, The Second by Lewis Cornaro, a Noble Venetian: Translated into English, by Timothy Smith, Apothecary (ca. 1600; reprint, London, 1743), 23-24 ("For [generally speaking] any Sort of Food that is common to one suits agreeably enough with hale Constitutions").

92. King James, Basilicon Doron, 125, 127; and, following the king, Celadon, Instrucion of a Young Noble-man, 212: "I think it best to accustom your selfe unto the Countrie where you are.


94. Peacham, Complete Gentleman, 151. See also Lingard, Letter of Advice, 41.

95. Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 11-12.

96. Gaillard, Complete Gentleman, pt. 1, 85-86; Edward Panton, Speculae Juventutis or, a True Mirror . . . (London, 1671), 188.


98. Descartes's version ran this way: "So, as Tiberius Caesar said (or Cato, I think), no one who has reached the age of thirty should need a doctor, since at that age he is quite able to know himself through experience what is good or bad for him, and so be his own doctor." John Cottingham, ed. and trans., Descartes' Conversations with Burman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 51. The source is in fact Suetonius's Life of Tiberius.


100. Montaigne, "Of Experience," 827.

101. Ibid., 833.

Montaigne, "Of Experience," 830–31. Compare Charron: "It is one of the vanities & follies of man, to prescribe laws and rules that exceed the use and capacity of men, as some Philosophers and Doctors have done. They propose strange and elevated forms or images of life, or at leastwise so difficult and austeres, that the practice of them is impossible at least for a long time, yea the attempt is dangerous to manie." Charron, Of Wisdom, 197.


Joubert, Second Part of Popular Errors, 262.

Lessius, Hygiasticon, 2–3. Lessius was not himself a physician; he taught philosophy and divinity at the Jesuits' college at Louvain.


Julia Child, quoted in Calvin Tomkins, "Table Talk," New Yorker, 8 November 1999, 32.