Sino-European Economic Relations

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Sino-European Economic Relations

Richard N. Cooper

How has Europe responded to the emergence of China as a major participant in the world economy, from an inconsequential position two decades ago? This paper will present some of the basic facts and recent trends of growing economic interaction between China and Europe. Then it will take up some issues where economic developments in China raise concerns in Europe: energy, environment, macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other current economic issues of contention. Third, it will take up the evolution of official dialogue between Europe and China in the economic arena, including institutionalization of such dialogue. Comparisons will be made with the United States.

My key finding is that China’s emergence on the world scene is affecting both the European and United States’ economies in similar ways. Much of the political talk coming from Europe and China currently stresses friendship and opportunity but just below the surface the issues and challenges being addressed
across Eurasia are remarkably similar to those being addressed across the Pacific. Where there are differences these are largely in terms of magnitude, not matters of principle. This in fact is probably good news for Beijing since it illustrates the strong degree to which China is becoming integrated into the entire world economy, not just an old world or new world portion of it.

The first step in making such broad comparisons is to appreciate the sizes of these economies and the sharply different degrees of integration within each. China, Europe, and the United States are each continental sized economies and are thus useful comparison points. Individual states in Europe, in contrast, are more open and more specialized than either China or the United States and thus are problematic in making direct comparisons. Yet much of our economic information is still based on individual states. Degrees of internal integration are quite different also-- with the United States a highly integrated economy, with Europe becoming more integrated across the EU member states and with China in some ways highly integrated with a strong central government yet in other ways still highly provincial in terms of the ability of resources to move within the country. These all make for important distinctions in how trade and other economic data can be utilized and in
interpreting how economic policy is made at each level of government.

Europe and United States are roughly the same size, when allowance is made for the fact that the European Union (EU-15, fifteen members throughout, before the enlargement by ten countries in 2004) is not only a customs union but by now largely a single market, in capital and most services and labor, as well as in goods. The EU-15 has a GDP about the same as that of the United States, while Euroland (the 12 countries that have adopted a common currency, the euro) is smaller than the USA — these comparisons measured in US dollars of course depending on the exchange rate used between the dollar and the euro and other European currencies: $1.2/euro was used here, applied to 2003 data. Exports are remarkably similar, if intra-EU trade is excluded: the EU exported $940 billion to the rest of the world in 2002; US exports were $958 billion. The EU-15 is notably larger in population -- 380 million as against the 291 million of the United States -- but has a lower average per capita income.

The enlargement of the European Union by the addition of 10 countries in 2004 of course alters these figures in Europe's favor, by adding 75 million people and increasing GDP by about five percent, but these new additions will not be fully
integrated into the EU for at least a decade.

By global standards Europeans, like Americans, are very rich, although like Americans they do not typically appreciate that fact. In purchasing power parity (ppp) terms their average income is about 70 percent that of Americans (enlargement will lower this ratio somewhat).

If trade among EU members is excluded on grounds of being internal to the EU, Europe's ratio of (external) imports to GDP is also similar to that of the United States -- 13.4 percent, compared to 14.5 percent for US in 2002. This ratio will actually fall somewhat following enlargement, as most trade of the new members is with the EU. The EU ratio of (external) exports to GDP is slightly higher than that of the United States. Individual European countries are of course much more open than these figures suggest, but then so are American states. An important difference is that Europeans are much more conscious of their dependence on foreign trade than are Americans, because the EU is much newer than the United States, and internal EU trade remains to many Europeans external to their countries. Both economies have a similar well-diversified structure, in that they are simultaneously large exporters but also large importers of manufactured goods, and also large exporters but also large importers of agricultural products.
Both are net importers of raw materials, particularly petroleum and its products, and natural gas.

China has three times the population of the EU before enlargement and is four times as large as the United States. Its GDP, however, is only about a tenth as large as either, with aggregate data highly imprecise. China entered the world economy from its period of Maoist autarky in the late 1970s, at first tentatively, then with gradually increasing commitment, to the point at which in 2003, a boom year in China, it became the third largest trading entity in the world. Still far behind the EU and the USA, it had surpassed Japan in imports and came close in terms of exports. The rapid growth of the Chinese economy, seven percent a year for over two decades even on conservative estimates, led by a 14 percent annual average growth in exports, inevitably has had a major impact on the world economy, including Europe. European (= EU-15 throughout, except where noted) merchandise imports from China were $2.6 billion in 1982; by 2003 they had grown to $108 billion, a growth of 20 percent a year. The corresponding figures for the USA are not that different, $2.5 billion and $133 billion, 21 percent a year. European exports to China increased from $2.3 billion to $45 billion over the same period, slower growth than European imports but faster growth than US exports to China.
China's share of world value-added in manufacturing rose from 1.5 percent in 1980 to 7.1 percent in 2000, exceeding by the latter year all European economies except Germany at 8.5 percent. The share of the five largest European economies together fell from 29.4 percent in 1980 to 23.1 percent in 2000. China's share in world exports of manufactured goods rose from 1.0 percent in 1981 to 6.5 percent in 2000 (Unido 2004, p.151, 183).

As with the United States, leading European firms have invested heavily in China. Unlike the typical foreign direct investment (FDI) from China’s neighbors in East Asia, which is aimed at building a platform for labor-intensive exports to the rest of the world, European and American FDI is mainly aimed at serving China’s huge domestic market. Since most of the growth of Chinese exports has derived from foreign firms or joint ventures between Chinese and foreign firms (China's preferred mode during the 1980s), this difference has affected the patterns of trade. China is a large importer of components, especially from other East Asian economies, which are assembled into finished products, mainly consumer goods, for sale in the USA or Europe. Thus China tends to run trade deficits with other east Asian countries (except Hong Kong, the major entrepot for Chinese trade), as well as with oil exporting countries, but
significant trade surpluses with Europe and especially the United States. Taken altogether, China has produced modest overall trade surpluses in recent years, although it grew rapidly in 2005.

Recent Economic Trends

Merchandise trade between China and Europe has grown rapidly, both exports and especially imports, seen from Europe's perspective (which in general will be adopted here). By 2003 China was the second most important origin of Europe's imports, after the United States, and the third most important destination for Europe's exports, after the United States and Switzerland, but as a market China remained only one-fifth as important as the United States ($45 billion versus $247 billion). Europe's trade with China is diversified in terms of commodity composition, although machinery and transport equipment account for two-thirds of European exports, non-electrical machinery being the dominant category, alone accounting for 31 percent of European exports of $32 billion in 2002. Office and telecommunications products (24%), clothing (13%), electrical products (9%), and toys and games (8%) were Europe's main imports from China, which totaled $77 billion in 2002 (WTO 2003, pp.90-91). There was extensive two-way trade in
chemical products, semi-manufactures, and miscellaneous consumer goods.

China's rapid growth and changing trade structure taken together led to the result that by 2003 China accounted for 8.9 percent of EU-15 imports (excluding intra-EU trade), up from 0.7 percent in 1980 and 2.0 percent in 1990. These figures reflect a slightly less important role of China in the European economy than it has in the US economy where the corresponding import shares were 12.5 percent in 2003, 0.5 percent in 1980, and 3.2 percent in 1990) (Prasad 2004, p.6).

Over this same 23 year period, the European share of China's imports actually fell from 15.8 percent to 12.9 percent (the US decline was even more pronounced, from 19.6 to 8.2 percent), although of course the value of sales increased dramatically.

China’s importance as a destination for European exports has also grown over time, although much less dramatically, from 0.8 percent of European exports to the world in 1980 and 1.2 percent in 1990 to 4.2 percent in 2003. (The corresponding figures for US exports are 1.7, 1.2, and 3.9 percent.) But this is much less than the spectacular growth in importance to China’s neighbors. China’s share of South Korea's exports rose from nothing in 1980 to 20.5 percent in 2003, and from 3.9 to
13.6 percent of Japan's exports (Prasad 2004, p.8).

Germany is far and away Europe's largest exporter to China, accounting for about 46 percent of China's imports from Europe, with France and Italy together accounting for 21 percent. Germany is also the largest national importer from China, but the Netherlands and Britain are not far behind, followed at some distance by Italy and France.

Foreign Direct Investment. Some European firms have shown an interest in investing in the Chinese market since it began to open in 1979; Volkswagen entered in the early 1980s, and by 2003 European brands accounted for 40 percent of the three million automobiles sold in China. By the end of 2002 the total stock of European FDI in China reached $34 billion, accounting for 7.6 percent of all FDI in China, a slightly larger share than that of the United States. Again, such numbers must be interpreted with caution. Nearly half of the $448 billion in FDI in China is registered in Hong Kong. A substantial fraction of this is thought to originate in China itself, round-tripping through Hong Kong to take advantage of the tax and foreign exchange privileges, not available to domestic firms, that were afforded to foreign enterprises, but some may reflect US or European-based firms located in Hong Kong.

During the period 1998-2002 European firms newly invested
roughly $4 billion a year in China, about the same magnitude as US firms during the same period of time, demonstrating a continuing if not an accelerating interest.

FDI in China has two quite different motivations. One is to take advantage of inexpensive and abundant Chinese labor to produce for export, and indeed it is such investment that China initially desired to attract, through establishment of the Special Economic Zones in the 1980s. Foreign investment in the SEZs got special tax privileges and infra-structure support, and in effect operated outside the customs and foreign exchange area of China, in that imports for processing for re-export, and the capital equipment needed, could enter free of import duties; and foreign exchange regulations were considerably more generous than they were for domestic firms.

Over time the rest of the economy has been significantly liberalized, and the geographic domain of the SEZ privileges extended, so the discrepancy in treatment between domestic and foreign firms (including foreign firms in joint ventures, the officially favored mode in the 1980s) has diminished over time. Under the accession agreement for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), China committed to eliminating quantitative restrictions on imports and to significant reductions in import tariffs by 2006. However, China's domestic market is still
afforded significant protection against imports (the average unweighted tariff for all products was 12.4 percent in 2002, low by comparison with many other developing countries, and scheduled to fall further by 2006, but higher than Europe's 4.4 percent or the US 3.9 percent (WTO 2003, p.208).

The other motivation for FDI in China is to produce for sale in the large and rapidly growing domestic market, sometimes because of cost advantages for doing so, but sometimes to take advantage of the protection provided by Chinese policy. The latter condition is especially true for automobiles and automotive components, and both European firms (VW, Mercedes, Citroen, Peugeot) and US firms (GM, Ford, Chrysler's Jeep, now DaimlerChrysler) have responded by investing in automotive production in China, as have several Japanese firms.

As it happens most Asian direct investment in China has been export-oriented, while most American and European investment has been oriented to the domestic market - with significant exceptions to both generalizations.

The Current Economic Agenda

When Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Europe in May 2004, he had two major requests: that China should be accorded market-
economy status, a matter especially important for calculating anti-dumping duties (ADD); and that Europe should drop its embargo of arms sales to China, imposed following June 1989 massacre of students at Tiananmen Square. He was denied both requests, although both France's Chirac and Germany's Schroeder indicated their support for dropping the arms embargo. It would of course be of major concern to the United States if France, say, were to sell modern anti-ship missiles to China, or if Germany were to sell modern diesel submarines.

When China joined the WTO in December 2001, it was denied market-economy status by the United States, the European Union, and other countries due to internal prices that were seen as distorted in important ways and thus not reflecting their scarcity value to the Chinese economy. This means that when dumping charges (= selling below fair market value) are brought against Chinese products, the actual costs of production in China are ignored in determining "fair market value." Instead, fair market value is constructed artificially, usually by drawing on cost information from some market economy, (e.g., India is sometimes the proxy used for China) that is similarly situated with respect to the products in question. China claims (correctly) that this practice is grossly unfair, since the determination of fair market value for purposes of assessing
anti-dumping duties is essentially an arbitrary construction. China also claims that in fact it is (nearly) a market economy, and that especially for exports, Chinese costs are fair and reasonable, not subsidized or otherwise badly distorted.

The European Commission in June 2004 found that China still did not meet four of its previously determined five tests for a market economy. In particular, the role of the government in micro-managing the economy was still considerable, the country lacked transparent and non-discriminatory company law, property rights were not secure, a bankruptcy law was not effectively in place, the financial system did not operate independently of the state, and there were no standard accounting principles which firms were obliged to follow (making corporate accounts, where they exist, untrustworthy for determining Chinese costs) (Financial Times, June 28, 2004). The EU had 32 antidumping measures in force against Chinese products, covering about 0.5 percent of China's exports to Europe, and 22 investigations in process. The negative influence of the antidumping process is arguably far wider than the products actually covered, since the antidumping regime creates enormous uncertainty for Chinese firms wanting to export to the EU (a similar problem exists in the United States).

During his April 2004 visit to China, Commission President
Romano Prodi identified several contemporary European concerns with China in the economic arena. Prodi first mentioned the fact that China's currency is linked to the US dollar, and observed that China had a significant trade surplus and simultaneously was experiencing domestic over-heating. "As an economist," and explicitly without offering advice to China, and in this regard disassociating himself from the United States, Prodi observed that an appreciation of the yuan might serve China's near-term as well as its long-term interests "to avoid bringing any major and long-term imbalances to bear on the delicate world equilibrium."

Second, the EU was concerned with Chinese sanitary standard bans on products of animal origin. Third, a "major EU priority" is to assure China's compliance with its WTO commitments. Under this heading Prodi identified several particular concerns: a) new Chinese rules that effectively close the construction sector to European companies; b) much higher hurdles for European banks and telecom operators than agreed at WTO accession; c) restrictions on exports of raw materials from China, especially coke, creating shortages in Europe; d) a continuing lack of overall transparency, and a tendency to erect new regulatory barriers as tariffs are lowered. Distinctive telecommunications standards were specifically mentioned, and the desirability of
having worldwide technological standards (ironic, coming from Europe, which has specialized in separate technical standards, such as in TV broadcasting and mobile phones, not to mention foods).

Finally, Prodi expressed "ongoing anxieties in relation to China's approach to human rights, good governance, respect for the environment and rule of law."

Another recent source of European concern with economic developments in China can be found in Kaiser (2004), summarizing a task force assigned to prepare for an October 2004 summit meeting between the EU and ASEAN plus 3, which includes both China and Japan. Three major economic areas calling for closer and more effective Asian-European collaboration are identified.

First is energy security. Growing demands in China and Southeast Asia for energy imply growing world dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf region, and the attendant uncertainties associated with such growing dependence. China's net imports of oil, for instance, have grown from nothing in 1994 to about 2.1 million barrels a day in 2003, and are expected to grow by a further 7 mb/d by 2020. Although European demand for energy is expected to grow only modestly in the coming decades, Europe too will become more dependent on imported oil and gas as production in the North Sea declines and as coal use and nuclear power are
phased down further. Thus Europe's energy future is closely intertwined with that of China, which so far has been unable to discover nearly enough new indigenous oil to cover its rapidly growing need for oil. With that in mind, at least some Europeans urge much closer energy cooperation with China and other Asian countries to strengthen short-term supply management through national oil stock-piles in Asia, something that Japan has and China is actively pursuing, and through associating China somehow with the oil-sharing scheme of the International Energy Agency in the event of a serious disturbance to the world's supply of oil. Second, European help in enhancing improved energy efficiency in China, for which there is much scope. Third, encouraging China to join the Energy Charter Treaty, or at least follow its prescriptions closely, with a view both to improving efficiency in the use of energy and to providing a more secure climate for energy investments and for cross-border infrastructure projects. Fourth, enhance European-Asian cooperation on research and development, again with a view to improving energy efficiency and reducing reliance on fossil fuels in the long run (Godement 2004, appendix).

A second, separate but closely related, European concern, is with greenhouse gas emissions and the prospects for global climate change. China holds abundant coal reserves, in contrast
to oil, and continued rapid economic growth implies growing
demand inter alia for electricity. Despite the fact that new
power plants in China are much more efficient than existing
plants, China's already large consumption of coal is expected to
double between 2001 and 2025, with an attendant increase in
emissions of carbon dioxide, a major greenhouse gas (EIA 2004).
Some Europeans therefore see a strong interest in engaging China
actively in approaches to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions,
something that China to date has considered low priority,
although to reduce heavy local air pollution China would also
like to improve greatly the efficiency of its use of coal and
where possible substitute natural gas for coal, both of which
would contribute to mitigating climate change. Europeans are
pushing hard for greater use of renewable sources of energy, and
have developed some useful technology for doing so, especially
harnessing wind.

A third area for closer economic cooperation concerns
pushing ahead with multilateral trade negotiations, currently
the Doha Round, explicitly "to resist tendencies toward a US-
centered system of trade bilateralism" which would undermine the
multilateralism of the WTO and reduce the prospects for a
successful Doha Round (Kaiser 2004, p.12).

While President Prodi touched only lightly on the question
of China's exchange rate policy, Europe in fact has considerable interest in China's macroeconomic performance, hence its macroeconomic policy, including exchange rate policy. If, as many believe, the US current account deficit (at over five percent of GDP) is unsustainably large, some adjustment in the dollar exchange rate will eventually be necessary (e.g., Goldstein 2004).

The alternative, a sharp slowdown in US growth, is neither in the interests of the United States nor of the rest of the world. Yet a significant depreciation of the dollar will create discomfort for all countries which rely heavily on export-led growth, including many European countries. To the extent large countries such as Japan and China inhibit or even prevent appreciation of their currencies against the dollar, the burden of adjustment is shifted to those countries not preventing such appreciation, most notably the European Community and especially the twelve members that have adopted the euro (= Euroland), whose central bank (ECB) is charged with maintaining price stability, not international competitiveness, and which by its charter can neither solicit nor receive guidance from member governments. Since the core economies of Euroland (Germany, France, Italy) are not performing well, bearing the main adjustment through appreciation of the euro against the dollar
will aggravate their weak macroeconomic performance. Thus, as Prodi hinted, appreciation of the Chinese yuan against the dollar would not merely help China cool its over-heated economy, but could also distribute more widely the adjustment to an improved US current account position. It is sometimes suggested that China should diversify its large and growing foreign exchange reserves out of dollars and into other currencies, notably the euro. Indeed, market rumor suggests that this is already happening to modest degree. And no doubt some European chests would swell with pride in the knowledge that the People's Bank of China (PBOC) was investing significantly in euros. But in this regard China -- and Europe -- confront a dilemma. China's reserves rise, not as a result of a decision to augment reserves, but as a by-product of China's exchange rate policy, which was to maintain the yuan at 8.28 per US dollar. In July 2005 China formally shifted its reference rate to a basket of currencies, including the euro and several Asian currencies, but it has allowed only slight appreciation against the US dollar. Chinese purchases of euros instead of dollars, even more a switch from dollars to euros, would appreciate both the yuan and the euro against the dollar, something that neither region desires in present circumstances. So China's holdings of euros are likely for the time being to be small and experimental,
exploring what euro-denominated securities can be purchased, in what volume, and how liquid they are. The PBOC allegedly keeps the ECB informed of its actions, but this delicate topic is not on the official agenda.

**Official EU-Chinese Dialogue**

In 1974 EC sent letter to all non-market economies asking whether they would like to start discussions to establish normal trading relations. Only China even responded to the letter. Still under Mao's rule, China was interested in some counter-weight to its very uncomfortable relations with the USSR and its recently improved but still touchy relationship with the United States. A series of discussions began. Initially Chinese leaders tended to focus on strategic issues (e.g. how many hydrogen bombs does Europe have?), but by the early 1990s focus had shifted heavily to trade and investment.

Since that inquiry thirty years ago Europe -- both the EC Commission and member states -- has established extensive regular official contact with China on economic issues. A trade agreement was signed in 1978, a year before the 1979 trade agreement with the United States, and a considerably expanded trade and economic cooperation agreement came in 1985. By now, an extensive system of high- and mid-level Sino-European
consultations has been established, capped at the political level by an annual summit, with once or twice a year ministerial meetings and annual meetings of the political directors. A joint economic committee has been established at the ministerial level, supported by an economic and trade working group. In addition, working groups exist on environmental issues, on energy, on the information society, on industrial policy and regulation, on maritime transport, and on science and technology. In the sights of the European Commission are further working groups on human resource development, competition policy, sanitary standards, intellectual property rights, customs cooperation, satellite navigation, and nuclear research cooperation (EC Commission 2003, pp. 17, 27).

What can we make of all this activity? Some of it, at the technical level, is designed to solve practical problems, e.g. of customs clearance procedures or product standards. Some of it, on the EU side, is simply and explicitly to raise the profile in Chinese consciousness of Europe and especially of the European Union. Some of it, on both sides, is to establish and maintain a working relationship at several levels that can discuss and perhaps even block unacceptable moves by Russia, which stands physically between China and the EU, or by the United States. China in particular desires to diversify its
international relations to provide a counter-weight to both Russia and the USA. China of course is also interested in trade access to Europe, inward investment, and European technology.

China has learned, however, that despite its extensive evolution the EU is not yet a sovereign entity that can deal with China on equal terms across a wide range of issues. China has therefore also maintained extensive contacts, even in the economic arena, directly with EU member states. (The European Council, made up of state representatives, makes Europe’s economic policy decisions.) And the member states have reciprocated. During 1997, for instance, the Presidents of France and Portugal visited China, as did the Prime Minister of Italy and many national ministers, in addition to VP Leon Brittan from the EC Commission. There were also nine bilateral high-level meetings with officials from EC members (Almanac... 1998/99, p.426-7). The pace of bilateral meetings has continued, despite an extensive EU-wide agenda. For example, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Brussels in May 2004, but he also visited Berlin, Rome, Dublin, and London on the same trip. Also during 2004 the prime minister of Denmark visited China and President Hu Jintao visited France. Commission President Barroso visited China in July 2005, and President Hu visited Britain, Germany, and Spain. Numerous visits at ministerial
level also occurred between member states and Chinese ministers, both in Europe and in China.

**Comparisons with the United States**

There are many similarities between Europe and the United States in their economic relations with China. China has emerged as a major trading and investment partner of both, being especially a source of electronic products, clothing, and miscellaneous consumer products. Both run significant bilateral trade deficits with China, although the European deficit is substantially smaller than that of the United States (reflecting in large part the large US deficit with the entire world, in contrast with Europe's small surplus). On China's side, these imbalances arise in part as a result of China's emergence as the major manufacturing processing center, where many components are imported, especially from other Asian countries, and assembled for export to the world's two largest markets, Europe and the United States, and increasingly also to Japan. Both are concerned about a surge of clothing imports from China after the expiration of the Multi-fiber Agreement under which bilateral textile and apparel trade have been under restraint on a product-by-product basis, and both took steps after a surge in China’s exports in early 2005 to restrict imports of selected
apparel products. Both are concerned about what is widely (but
not necessarily correctly) considered an under-valued RMB. Both
are concerned with continuing violations of intellectual
property rights in China. Both are concerned with the absence
of transparency in Chinese policy-making, promulgation of
regulations, and general rule of law in China. On a broader
scale, both are concerned with violations of human rights in
China, a fact that occasionally intrudes into the economic
arena. (Amnesty International and Transparency International are
European, not American NGOs. Free Tibet sentiment is perhaps
stronger in Europe, especially Germany, than in the United
States.) Both are anxious about China's meeting the commitments
it made on accession to the WTO.

On China's side, non-market status and its implications for
the numerous anti-dumping cases are a concern with both Europe
and the United States. And it would like to see a removal of
the sanctions, mainly export controls on military equipment,
which both areas imposed following the Tianamen uprising in June
1989. China especially pressed Europe on this point during
2004-2005, and received support from French President Chirac and
German Chancellor Schroeder, but by mid-2005 it looked as though
the removal of these sanctions would be postponed, partly on
grounds that China had not responded sufficiently to Europe’s
concerns about human rights, partly because of 2005 Chinese legislation calling for (re)absorption of Taiwan by force if necessary, partly no doubt also because the American government protested strongly against such removal.

On each of these topics US concerns have been louder and more public than is the case for Europe, partly no doubt reflecting different magnitudes of the concerns, but partly also reflecting different styles of international diplomacy, which in turn reflect in part the parliamentary systems of government prevalent in Europe, as opposed to the US system in which the executive branch is in continual tension with Congress, the legislative branch.

Despite the extensive growth of economic ties between Europe and China, there is in Europe, compared with the United States, a sense of remoteness. China is not much interested in Europe, beyond its role as a market, as a source of technology, and as a partial counter-weight to the United States. Europe, while potentially interested in China, has an agenda filled with more pressing issues: making EU enlargement work, and deciding how much further to go; reforming domestic tax and social welfare systems; immigration; and in foreign relations, dealing with the United States and with Russia. Thus while China is of growing
importance, and is of great interest to those European firms (e.g. Siemens, Alcatel, several auto firms) that have invested in China, it never quite reaches the top, or even the second level, of the European agenda -- despite the large number of meetings.

This is perhaps in part because China has no natural patron in Europe. While some individual European leaders are apparently seriously interested in China, the external orientation of European countries is directed elsewhere, largely for historical and cultural reasons: Britain toward India and South Asia, France toward francophonie, mainly Africa, Germany toward eastern Europe and Russia, Spain increasingly toward Latin America -- and above all inward toward building Europe. It is true that some leading European private but well-connected think tanks -- Britain's Royal Institute of International Affairs, France's Ifri, Germany's Council on Foreign Relations -- all have programs specifically on China, not only doing studies, but also engaging with Chinese counterparts and sponsoring meetings on various aspects of China.

While China borders Russia, it is physically remote; and Europe lacks the security engagement of the United States in East Asia, including with Taiwan. Moreover, Europe lacks the strong sentiment toward China that still resides in the United
States, perhaps because of extensive American missionary activity in China in the late 19th century, the US role in inhibiting the political colonization of China through its "open door" policy, and direct US support for China against the Japanese during the Second World War.

Europe and China are however natural partners in holding in check the US superpower, with its inevitable tendencies toward unilateralism and the imposition of US preferences and priorities on the rest of the world. They are also natural partners in their wariness of Russia, with a shared desire to shape a benign future there.

Endnotes