# Introduction: Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era

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Social Resilience in the Neo-Liberal Era

Edited by

Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont

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SOCIAL RESILIENCE IN THE NEO-LIBERAL ERA

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Acknowledgments
This book is dedicated to Chaviva Hošek – visionary for a better society
Introduction: Social Resilience in the Neo-Liberal Era

Peter A. Hall and Michèle Lamont

This book is an effort to assess developments in a neo-liberal era spanning the last three decades of global history. Although social science examines many phenomena, it looks only rarely at what Pierson (2003) calls ‘big, slow-moving processes’. We are often not aware of the sands shifting beneath our feet as events change the character of the times in diffuse ways. Beginning in the 1980s, the growing influence of market-oriented ideas constituted just such a process, global in scope, pervasive in effects. We want to know: what consequences did neo-liberal ideas and policies have for social, economic and political life? But even more central to this inquiry is a desire to understand the process whereby neo-liberal ideas worked their way into the policies of governments, the operation of organizations and the lives of ordinary people. In that respect, this volume is an investigation into the dynamics of social change.

Compared to many studies, this one involves a shift in optics. Neo-liberalism is often analyzed as a set of policy reforms reflecting a class politics that ranges capital against labor (Duménil and Lévy 2004; Harvey 2005). While that approach has some validity, such perspectives tend to treat a multidimensional set of developments ideas in largely economic terms and sometimes overemphasize the negative effects of neo-liberalism. Perspectives that treat neo-liberalism as a cultural phenomenon offer a useful corrective but often overstate the domination of neo-liberal ideas over social life. In this volume, we try to integrate economic, political and cultural analyses of neo-liberalism; and, instead of seeing it as a development with

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1 For their comments and suggestions, we thank the members of the Successful Societies program, and particularly William Sewell, Jr., as well as Mary Brinton, Paul Leduc Browne, Mazen Elfakhani, Robert Fishman, Marion Fourcade, Francois Harelimana, Devesh Kapur Robert Sampson, Jennifer Silva, and Martin Schröder.
homogenous effects across space and time, we view it as a more open-ended stimulus that provoked a diversity of responses.

Developments associated with neo-liberalism, such as the opening of markets and new policy regimes, put important constraints on many people, usually linked to their social positions. But it also offered opportunities and new tools from which a response to such developments could be fashioned. In short, one of the core arguments of this book is that neo-liberalism brought forth various types of creative responses. The results were far from similar across populations and national settings, not only because neo-liberal initiatives were more intense in some times and places, but because people responded to them differently, drawing upon cultural and institutional resources distinctive to those settings. The effects of neo-liberalism must be seen as the product of syncretic social processes that engaged many actors mobilizing multiple instruments in the social, economic and political environment.

This is also a book about social resilience. Although neo-liberal initiatives improved the lives of some people, it also posed profound challenges to the well-being of many groups, communities and individuals, as more intense market competition reallocated resources and market logics worked their way into ever more spheres of social life. We are interested in the ways in which groups sustained their well-being in the face of such challenges, and we see this as a problem of social resilience. We use the term ‘social resilience’ to refer to the capacity of groups of people bound together in an organization, class, racial group, community or nation to sustain and advance their well-being in the face of challenges to it. Although our focus here is on the response to neo-liberalism, we conceptualize social resilience broadly to encompass the capacities of societies to cope with many kinds of challenges.
Social resilience is an essential characteristic of what we call successful societies – namely, societies that provide their members with the resources to live healthy, secure and fulfilling lives. We are especially interested in understanding the sources of social resilience, and we look for them in the institutional and cultural resources that groups and individuals people mobilize them to sustain their well-being. In that respect, this book builds on our previous endeavor, *Successful Societies: How Institutions and Culture Affect Health* (Hall and Lamont 2009) which was also concerned with the resources that sustain people’s capabilities for coping with challenges. Both books are the product of intensive intellectual collaboration over several years among a group of scholars drawn from a wide range of disciplines.

Our approach to social resilience can be contrasted with influential perspectives that emphasize the psychological qualities needed to cope with various types of shocks. We are less interested in individual traits than in the social and cultural frameworks underpinning resilience, and we are skeptical about the efforts of some governments to find in individual resilience the solution to social problems. Even though many working class Americans believe they should find within themselves the psychological energy and resources to deal with structural insecurity and rising inequality (e.g. Silva 2012; Sharone 2013), we look for the institutional and cultural resources that underpin resilience in the wider social environment.

Studying social resilience entails making linkages between the micro, meso, and macro levels of inquiry. Therefore, drawing on a range of analytical and disciplinary tools, we integrate accounts of the shifts in macro and meso contexts associated with neo-liberalism with an examination of the impact those shifts had on what is perceived, conceived and experienced at

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2 On resilience as an object of government policy and sponsored research, see [http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience](http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience) and [http://www.amiando.com/WLVKYLO.html](http://www.amiando.com/WLVKYLO.html).
the individual level (Lefebvre 1974). While the emphasis of each chapter varies, our focus is not only on the institutional and cultural changes structuring the contexts in which people live, but on self-concepts, orders of worth and criteria of evaluation linked to the social dynamics of inclusion and exclusion (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Lamont 1992, 2000; Foucault 2008).

**The Challenges and Impact of the Neo-liberal Era**

The past three decades, which we term the ‘neo-liberal era’, have seen profound economic, political and cultural changes with global reach. We are most interested in those associated with neo-liberalism, understood as a wide-ranging shift in prevalent ideas and social relationships privileging more intense market competition, less state intervention, and an entrepreneurial orientation to action (Harvey 2005). To some extent, of course, these are longstanding features of capitalism, whose prominence has ebbed and flowed over time (Sewell 2008). But we see the recent period as one in which they have come to the fore again with a new intensity.

While there are important economic dimensions to these developments, including heightened competition in more open markets for goods, capital and labor, at their heart was a series of shifts in thinking and discourse among ordinary citizens and elites. Some of these developments are bound up with globalization, but even the opening of global markets was contingent on changes in policy inspired by neo-liberal paradigms. Therefore, we group a wide range of developments together under the rubric of neo-liberalism.³ Many are described in more detail in the next chapter by Peter Evans and William Sewell, which also describes the historical emergence of neo-liberalism, initially as an economic ideology and then as a social and political

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³ Of course, many elements of neo-liberalism are closely tied to the history of capitalism itself (see Harvey 2005; Jobert and Theret 1994) and Centeno and Cohen 2012).
phenomenon inspired, at least in part, by the economic crises of the 1970s. However, we begin with a brief summary of what we mean by the term.

**Neo-Liberalism**

The defining feature of the neo-liberal age has been the rise of market ideologies which, at their apogee, approached the ‘market fundamentalism’ Somers (2008) has described. They were marked by a resurgent faith in the power of markets to secure efficient outcomes, whose corollary was declining confidence in the capacity of states to allocate resources efficiently. As such ideologies gained traction in domestic politics and the international sphere, they called into question the principles used to justify many kinds of state intervention, forcing governments to reconsider how they delivered public services and the division of labor between the public and private sectors (Blyth 2002; Prasad 2006).

Such issues are central to the collective imaginary of a society. We use the term collective imaginary to describe the overarching narratives that tell people what their society is about, what its past embodies and its future portends, who belongs to it, and what kinds of behavior merit social respect. Although there are distinctive features to every national imaginary, the latter also draw on international imaginaries, considered in chapters by Will Kymlicka, Jane Jenson and Ron Levi on human rights, social rights and multiculturalism. In line with other analyses, we see the neo-liberal era as one defined, not only by a new set of policy regimes, but by a collective reimagining of communities (Anderson 1983). The effects were far-reaching and multifaceted. Governments and international agencies were called upon to rethink their missions, and individuals faced profound redefinitions in the criteria for social worth, as
economic performance and market status became more central markers for social and cultural membership.\(^4\)

This process of change was never simple or seamless. Even in the most settled of times, people subscribe with varying degrees of enthusiasm to some elements in the collective imaginary, while rejecting others. As neo-liberal narratives came to prominence, they were taken up with fervor by some groups and stoutly resisted by others. Neo-liberalism did not impose a new framework of ideas so much as set in motion a series of contests over ideological and material resources – inside societies and states. It shifted the context in which everyone had to operate, generating new opportunities and constraints that are the focal points of our analysis.

One reason we emphasize the neo-liberal imaginary is the range of its import. In their most familiar forms, neo-liberal ideas endorsed the value of market competition. They called for a rearrangement of state-market relations and, in some guises, for a shift to more robust civil societies that could perform the tasks at which states were no longer thought to be efficient. Where others had once seen families or communities, growing numbers of economists and policy makers began to posit congeries of economic actors driven by a market calculus. In some instances, market competition was deliberately extended to new spheres, including the delivery of health care and public services. In others, the growing popularity of market logics altered the *modus operandi* of organizations through ancillary processes, such as the adoption of ranking systems that promote competitive behavior (Espeland and Sauder 2007).

These developments can be seen as a contemporary manifestation of the dictum that different historical periods typically authorize different modes of action. Ours is a period that has authorized self-interested market behavior in settings where it might once not have been

\(^4\) On social and cultural membership, see Lamont (1992; 2000), Jenson and Papillon (2000) and Ong (2006)
legitimate. That, in turn, has inspired some reconfiguration in social relationships. If never freeing people completely from the restraining bonds of moral sentiment, neo-liberal ways of thinking often led to a decline in the respect accorded norms of communal solidarity (Streeck 2009). In many parts of the world, the growth of markets in goods for which people once depended on local patrons or personal relationships could be liberating (Kapur et al. 2011). People’s choices often increased, although with redistributive consequences as the availability of some goods became more dependent on income. In some cases, such developments may be altering local social orders by shifting people’s willingness to invest in certain kinds of communal relationships.

In much the same way, neo-liberalism inspired changes in the dominant scripts of personhood toward ones more focused on a person’s individuality and productivity (Greenhouse 2009). It promoted new criteria of worth that encouraged many people to approach their lives as if they were “projects” (Boltanski and Chiappello 2007). As more value was attached to the capacity to prosper on competitive markets, people who had once derived self-respect from being ‘hard-workers’ found that was no longer enough: one now had to be a worker with high productivity deploying skills validated by the market, signaling worth and social membership through consumption (Lamont and Molnar 2001). Developments such as these have a bearing on the terms in which social recognition is granted and self-concepts formed. Over time, the narratives people used to describe themselves changed, with implications for what they thought they could do and how they saw themselves as acting in the world (Polletta et al. 2011; Abelmann 2003). Socio-economic status, often intertwined with notions of moral status, became more central to the matrix through which individuals conceived their self-worth – although with notable cross-national variations (Lamont 1992; 2000).
In some cases, these developments may have been emancipatory, and in others not. Although it is difficult to establish how far-reaching such changes have been, some of the most consequential aspects of neo-liberalism lie in its implications for human subjectivities (Greenhouse 2009; Ong 2006).\(^5\) Once again, however, these changes cannot be understood as the imposition of neo-liberal modes of thinking on entirely plastic individuals. People responded to neo-liberal values with varying degrees of enthusiasm and resistance, and many people turned neo-liberal ideas to their own purposes (to establish racial equality, for instance, as noted in the chapter by Lamont, Welburn, and Fleming on African-American responses to stigmatization). There is wide variation in the extent to which neo-liberalism inspired new visions of agency.

Neo-Liberal Reform in the Economic and Political Realms

The concrete impact of neo-liberal ideas is most obvious, of course, in the political realm, where they altered prevailing views about the appropriate relationship between the public and private sectors. Evans and Sewell provide a sweeping survey of these developments notable for its attention to the cultural as well as the political plane. Mainstream party platforms moved in neo-liberal directions on both sides of the political spectrum and in many parts of the developed and developing world (Iversen 2006; Mudge 2011). As a result, the cultural matrix defining the ‘center of gravity’ of political discourse was transformed. In the United States, for instance, the term ‘liberal’ took on a negative valence, as the success of neo-conservative movements altered the terms in which even their opponents characterized their own positions (Gross, Medvetz and Russell 2011).\(^6\) Encouraged by international agencies, governments across the world privatized public services (including public utilities, highways, prisons, schools, and hospitals) and

\(^5\) On the gendered dimensions of subjectivity promoted by neo-liberalism see Walkerdine (2003).

\(^6\) In the United States, the positions we characterize as neo-liberal were often adopted by organizations described there as neo-conservative. See Vaïsse (2010).
‘deregulated’ markets with a view to promoting competition (Vogel 1996). Welfare programs were reconfigured into ‘workfare’ programs in order to push recipients into employment under the guise of making them more ‘self-reliant’ (Guetzkow 2010; Duvoux 2009; Miller and Rose 2008).

Jane Jenson and Ron Levi see the political significance of neo-liberalism in three developments affecting many spheres of policy-making. These include a shift in scale, as functions formerly performed by national states were passed to lower levels of government or to international regimes (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010). Policies put a new emphasis on the individualization of risk, responsibility and reward; and governments pursued a ‘new public management’ that built market competition into the delivery of public services, accompanied by ‘technologies of performance’ based on monitoring, ranking and benchmarking (Miller and Rose 2008; Lascoumes and Le Galès 2004).

Corresponding economic developments have been equally consequential. Accelerated by technological developments and rising demand for services, the opening of world markets, made possible by neo-liberal policies, shifted relative prices and the feasibility of producing some kinds of goods in particular countries. The results were a shift in the economic opportunity structures facing many workers, rising levels of national income inequality, and rapid rates of growth in many parts of the developing world.

However, liberalization was not a monolithic process. One of the striking observations of Evans and Sewell is that governments embraced neo-liberal policies with widely-varying degrees of enthusiasm and implemented them in terms adapted to local contexts. The complexion of neo-liberal policies also changed over time (Peck and Tickell 2002). The picture that emerges from this study is, not one in which neo-liberal discourse achieves complete dominance, but one
in which counter-currents are engaged wherever neo-liberal initiatives are proposed, often producing a fragmentation of discourses and diversities in policy. Hall and Thelen (2009) underline this point when they note that many of the initiatives often described as ‘neo-liberal’ have very different effects and that the effects even of similar policies vary by national context.

Much the same can be said about the impact of neo-liberal policies on overall economic well-being. Evans and Sewell observe that the economic effects of neo-liberal reform varied with the context into which it was introduced. In countries where markets had been highly restricted, as in China and the post-communist states of Eastern Europe, neo-liberal reform brought real benefits, such as increased trade and greater access to consumption goods. By contrast, such reforms rarely inspired the high rates of growth once promised in the developed economies. The most favorable aggregate effects seem to have come in the developing world. Rapid economic growth in the emerging economies of Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe owes much to neo-liberal policies. Economic reform provided new opportunities to many people otherwise earning a subsistence living in rural communities (Collier and Dollar 2002: 49). International trade brought them new markets and products, and global communication opened up new vistas on life. People locked into traditional communities found in market logics a new basis from which to mount claims for equality, much as eighteenth century Europeans once had (Kapur et al. 2010; Sewell 2010). In terms of its aggregate economic and political effects, neo-liberalism has been far from a purely negative phenomenon.

New Inequalities

However, neo-liberal reform has also had profound distributive effects. When markets are made more open or competitive, the opportunity structure changes and some people gain, while others lose. In general, those with the resources and skills to prosper on competitive markets do well,
while those lacking in such resources are disadvantaged, even if they had the right skill-sets for a previous era. This redistribution of opportunity has been reflected in rising levels of income inequality in both developed and developing countries. Thus, neo-liberal reform has posed stringent challenges to specific social groups.

How widespread those challenges are varies by national context. In the emerging economies where neo-liberal reform inspired rapid rates of growth, new markets have offered opportunities to many people aspiring to middle-class positions (Ravallion 2009; Kharas 2010). By contrast, in most of the developed democracies, even the middle class has seen its well-being stagnate in recent decades, as Lucy Barnes and Peter Hall note in this volume. Large gains at the top of the earnings distribution have not been matched in the lower half (Fischer et al. 1996; Piketty and Saez 2003; Bartels 2008). The result has been an unprecedented concentration of wealth in the hands of the corporate class in the U.S. and U.K. and rising inter-generational inequality in many countries (Hacker and Pierson 2010; Chauvel 2010).

Other dimensions of neo-liberal policy also imposed hardships on people in the lower socioeconomic strata. Initiatives that weakened the labor movement undercut the organizations best placed to defend these people (Fantasia and Voss 2004). Changes to the benefit levels, duration and eligibility requirements of social benefits reduced the level of social protection available to them, while ancillary developments privatized risk (Smith 2002; Uchitelle 2006; Hacker 2008; Jacobs and Newman 2008). Growing numbers of people have been forced into precarious positions marked by low pay and minimal social benefits, from which it is difficult to escape (Gautié and Schmitt 2010). In some countries, these developments have deepened social divisions, notably between labor-market insiders and outsiders (Palier and Thelen 2010). Despite the labor activation schemes that have been a hallmark of the neo-liberal era, there are durable
differences between those engaged in social networks through work and those suffering from insecurity and social isolation as a result of poverty or unemployment that limits their access to income, sociability and in some cases even health care (Paugam, Gallie and Jacob 2003; Palier et al. 2012). Many societies are now better described by frameworks of social exclusion than of social capital (Daly and Silver 2008; Paugam 1996; Silver 1994; Castel 1995).

Moreover, the effects of such developments are by no means entirely economic. The shifts in relative prices that accompany the opening of markets induce corresponding shifts in social status, even when they enrich the community as a whole. The status of those with skills in higher demand increases, while people whose status was based on outmoded skills or older institutional orders are threatened, for instance, as the jobs they held move to the global south. Effects of this sort stretch into the family, where women called upon to work to support the household sometimes gain, while underemployed men who might once have been the principal breadwinners, lose stature. In both developed and developing economies, therefore, the more intense market competition characteristic of the neo-liberal age gives rise to heightened status anxieties.

As various forms of social protection, both traditional and modern, have fallen, rising levels of material insecurity have threatened everyone. Even affluent members of the middle class have developed new concerns about reproducing their class position. Growing numbers of middle-class parents are devoting increasing amounts of resources to improving the prospects for their children (Lareau 2003; Aurini et al, forthcoming). For ordinary workers already under pressure to demonstrate self-reliance in a neo-liberal world, the presence of the poor in public spaces keeps alive a ‘fear of falling’; and rising competition for jobs intensifies people’s concerns about losing ground vis-à-vis lower status groups (Duvoux 2009; Ehrenreich 1989;
Newman 1989). The result has been rising xenophobia and declining support for poor relief (Art 2011; Skocpol and Williamson 2012).

Developments such as these have implications not only for individuals but for the character of national communities. Chauvel (2010) suggests, for instance, that long-term effects are likely to follow from the widespread fears market insecurity has induced in the younger generations. Those fears are not only affecting self-concepts and levels of social engagement; they are also affecting their shared representations of the symbolic community (who cares for whom) in terms likely to be durable over the coming years (see also Brinton 2008). In much the same way, the shifts in self-concept associated with neo-liberalism have political implications. Neo-liberalism generally leads people to think of themselves as governed less by others and more by themselves (Greenhouse 2009). While that has advantages for some individuals, it tends to feed declining levels of trust in the public authorities. Moreover, those suffering most from rising levels of inequality are most prone to distrust government and to doubt their capacities to influence it (Lascoumes and Bezes 2009). A self-perpetuating cycle is then set in motion, as declining levels of civic engagement among these groups reduce electoral pressure on governments to redistribute resources (Anderson and Beramendi 2012).

Growing social divisions between insiders and outsiders also weaken the capacity of the public authorities to legitimate policies based on appeals to social solidarity (Palier et al 2012). As we have noted, more intense competition for jobs and associated status anxieties feed a growing hostility toward immigrants. In France, for example, where southern European migrants were once regarded as contributors to the French economy (Noiriel 2006), non-European migrants are now more often resented as intruders (Bail 2008). In her chapter for this book, Leanne Son Hing identifies a set of psychological dynamics that connect more intense market
competition with more prejudice against out-groups; and Barnes and Hall find more hostility to immigrants where the gap in well-being between the upper and lower middle class is larger. Although, the meritocratic values promoted by neo-liberalism should lead, in principle, to less discrimination, Son Hing notes that people primed by such values are more likely to express prejudice and people exposed to prejudice are more likely to suffer adverse effects if they subscribe to neo-liberal values.

We see here that some of the most important effects of neo-liberalism emerge from complex dynamics in which economic and political developments interact with shifting views of cultural membership and community. To take another classic example, in many countries, rising levels of economic inequality have been accompanied by increasing spatial segregation in housing between income and ethnic groups (Prêteceille 2009; Massey and Denton 1994). That segregation then narrows prevailing definitions of the symbolic community (namely, those with whom we feel a sense of solidarity or responsibility as part of ‘us’) which, in turn, encourages further segregation (Lamont 2000). Neo-liberal schemata also encourage people to feel more mobile in social and spatial terms (Jasper 2001) and thus more disconnected from any particular community (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears 2006, but cf. Fischer 2011). While that might promote intergroup interchanges, it can also make people feel more vulnerable and defensive vis-à-vis other social groups.

Our broad point is that the redistribution of advantage and disadvantage associated with neo-liberalism follows not only from how markets reallocate resources but from how neo-liberalism shifts discursive structures. Of central importance are the categories people use to assess worth. Neo-liberal ideas promote particular frames used by people to define how they should live their lives, what they are capable of, and for what they can hope. These are
constitutive elements of horizons of possibility and of the contours of symbolic communities. A discourse that elevates market criteria of worth tends to classify people who are affluent into a bounded community and to marginalize those with fewer economic resources. Corresponding ideas about productivity are often used to draw rigid moral boundaries around people who are unemployed, low-skilled or low-paid, thereby narrowing the circle of people to whom citizens feel a sense of responsibility. Moreover, by defining worth in terms of levels of income or productivity they can never attain, neo-liberal schemata can be disabling for people with low levels of income or skill. They come to be defined (and often self-define) as “losers” – especially in societies that do not support varied matrices of worth, based on morality, solidarity or other attributes unrelated to income (Lamont 2000).

The precise impact of developments such as these is hard to assess, of course, and they are to some extent part of an older story about capitalism. Over history, as markets expanded, consumption came to be viewed more widely as a marker of cultural membership, often in competition with notions grounding cultural membership in citizenship rights (Marshall 1950). Galbraith (1958) and Marcuse (1964) saw such processes at work in the 1950s, but they may have been intensified under the influence of a highly-commercial media during the 1980s and 1990s (Schor 1998; Comarroff and Comaroff 2001). Commercial considerations are certainly penetrating more deeply into spheres of life once construed as autonomous from them (Zelizer 2010). Such tendencies are especially marked in countries such as China (Hanser 2008; Davis 2000) and Russia (Shevchenko 2001) which moved from command to market economies. However, Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) argue that even long-established market economies have seen the rise of a new model of individuality that views the most valued social actor as a networking entrepreneur developing his or her human capital for the purpose of achieving
individual success. Barnes and Hall find some evidence for such shifts in attitudes; and, in his chapter, James Dunn charts changes in housing policy based on corresponding shifts in premises about how actors will behave.

_A Syncretic Social Process_

Neo-liberalism must not be seen, however, as a blanket laid over the world. The process whereby neo-liberal schemas acquired influence over policy-making and popular beliefs is ultimately best described as a syncretic social process. Neo-liberal schemas had significant effects on the course of events: they were not simply a smokescreen behind which a politics driven by material or ideal interests went on exactly as before. But their social impact was inflected by the creativity with which political actors used them and conditioned by the contexts into which they were introduced. In many cases, actors devoted to a particular cause found they could pursue it by adopting the language made widely available in the neo-liberal era (with references to benchmarking, return on investment, social entrepreneurship, best practices, and the like). By framing their demands in new terms, many groups could advance longstanding purposes. Over time, however, these shifts in strategy often affected the character of politics and what it secured. In that regard, neo-liberal schemas changed the course of events in ways reminiscent of how new institutions change the outcomes of strategic interaction. Even when they did not change underlying preferences, they often altered what actors could achieve.

This characterization is borne out in the chapters by Will Kymlicka, and Jane Jenson and Ron Levi. They consider the impact of neo-liberalism on international regimes and find, for the most part, that, influential though they were, neo-liberal ideas did not significantly blunt the force of regimes promoting multiculturalism or human rights (see also Dezalay and Garth 2002). Although regimes for social protection shifted dramatically, they left social safety nets in place
in the developed democracies. Like the gnarled pines to which Jenson and Levi refer, these regimes bent with the wind to survive relatively intact.

There is some variation across these regimes. The international human rights regime was always the most congruent with neo-liberal ideals and, after initial opposition in the U. S., many neo-liberals came to see the promotion of markets and of human rights as complementary endeavors. Advocates for multiculturalism initially met neo-liberal opposition but were able to adjust their appeals to fit a ‘liberal multiculturalism’ that could be used to advance minority rights, especially where multicultural principles were already institutionalized. Welfare regimes changed more radically over these decades, in directions that privileged means-testing and tied benefits to participation in the workforce; and, as the chapter by Clyde Hertzman and Arjumand Siddiqi indicates, some of these reforms had adverse effects on working families. But regimes of social protection were redesigned and reinterpreted as ‘social investment’ to accommodate a neo-liberal logic, and survived.

These chapters describe a process in which the advocates for particular regimes accommodated themselves to a neo-liberal imaginary by turning it to their own purposes. Immigrant groups seeking political recognition, such as some south Asian communities in Canada, began to present themselves, less as ethnic groups seeking rights, and more as transnational entrepreneurs capable of leveraging their foreign contacts in the service of national economic success. Human rights activists exploited the systems of ranking and monitoring favored by neo-liberals to develop more effective ways of enforcing the regime; and, in the name of social investment, social spending could sometimes be increased.

In all spheres, the process whereby neo-liberal schemas acquired influence was marked by dissonance and active negotiation, as multiple actors sought to turn those ideas to their
purposes, while others resisted in the name of alternative values. Resistance was a recurrent feature of the syncretic processes at work here, and the development of counter-narratives was empowering for some groups. What emerged in each society was distinctive, based on how the response to developments was negotiated within its symbolic community. Similar initiatives were greeted quite differently, for instance, in the U.S and France. Although both countries experienced waves of neo-liberal reform, there was little public mobilization against them in the U.S. until the Occupy movement emerged after the financial crisis of 2008-09, while France experienced repeated protests against neo-liberal policies over three decades, undertaken in the name of social solidarity (Storey 2011). Just as globalization failed to produce the transnational convergence in culture that many expected, the reaction to neo-liberalism in national political communities remains diverse (Norris and Inglehart 2009).

**The Sources of Social Resilience**

If one objective of this book is to analyze the effects of neo-liberalism, the other is to develop an understanding of how individuals, communities and societies secured their well-being in the face of its challenges. We think of this as a problem of understanding the bases for social resilience.

The impact of neo-liberal initiatives was not uniform. In many instances, neo-liberal reforms opened up new opportunities for people and laid the foundation for faster economic growth. However, as we have noted, socioeconomic change on this scale inevitably poses challenges to the groups and individuals facing it. Reforms that accelerated the reorganization of the economy exposed large groups of people to social dislocation and had profound redistributive effects. In the developed political economies, they altered the basis for social protection and increased economic insecurity especially at the bottom of the socioeconomic
ladder (Hacker et al. 2010). We have also noted that neo-liberalism affected self-concepts and criteria of worth in terms that were challenging for many people. Even when the ultimate effect of neo-liberal initiatives was to increase opportunities, the need to devise new personal strategies to cope with them could be daunting. Thus, we think it makes good sense to ask how people sustained their well-being in the face of the challenges of the neo-liberal era.

The Meaning of Social Resilience

The term ‘resilience’ features most prominently in three literatures – on ecology, developmental psychology, and the response to disaster (e.g. Masten 2010; Cottle 2001). In the literature on ecology, resilience is generally seen as the property of a system, understood as an ecology of closely-linked parts. The early literature was concerned primarily with ecologies of the natural world but a growing body of work sees social relations as fundamental components of such systems (Adger et al. 2001). In the first instance, resilience was understood as a property that allows the system to recover its prior state after suffering a shock, but ecologists have recently begun to see resilience in more dynamic terms, much as we do, emphasizing adaptation or transformation over return to an earlier state. In one pioneering formulation, Folke (2006: 259) notes that:

Resilience is currently defined in the literature as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and re-organize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks…But resilience is not only about being persistent or robust to disturbance. It is also about the opportunities that disturbance...

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7 There is variation, of course, across people and contexts in how challenging any given development is. Even the death of a child is experienced differently, depending on whether such deaths are exceptional or routine in one’s environment (Schepers-Hughes 1993), and the intensity of the shock posed by unemployment, for instance, may depend on the extent to which individuals define their worth through their professional selves (Sharone 2010).

8 There is also a growing literature on organizational resilience. See Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003.
opens up in terms of recombination of evolved structures and processes, renewal of the system and emergence of new trajectories. In this sense, resilience provides adaptive capacity…

In developmental psychology, the term resilience is generally used to describe an outcome, characterized by satisfactory performance (academic or otherwise) after an individual has been exposed to factors that put this performance at risk, such as poverty or the loss of a parent (Schoon 2006). Studies link this kind of resilience to the availability of close attachments or a supportive and disciplined environment. Resilience is usually seen as a characteristic of the individual, associated with better coping skills, multiple domains of the self or stress-response characteristics that mitigate the negative effects of risk factors. However, sociologically-oriented psychologists have developed related formulations, such as the concept of self-efficacy proposed by Bandura (1977, 1982), to understand how people feel empowered or constrained by their social world. This literature has also inspired influential social analyses, such as the study by Furstenburg and others (1999) of successful parenting strategies among low-income families in Philadelphia (see also Carlson and England 2011).

We draw on the insights of these literatures but define resilience somewhat differently. Our principal concern is with well-being broadly defined and how it is secured by groups of people more or less bound together in an organization, class, racial group, community or country. Accordingly, we use the term social resilience to denote an outcome in which the members of a group sustain their well-being in the face of challenges to it. We define well-being broadly to include physical and psychological health, material sustenance, and the sense of dignity and belonging that comes with being a recognized member of the community (Taylor 1992). We avoid specifying a precise hierarchy of needs or self-actualization as the goal because current
research suggests that the value attached to these is culturally-specific to particular classes or nations (cf. Sen 1993). We see resilience in dynamic terms, not as the capacity to return to a prior state, but as the achievement of well-being even when that entails significant modifications to behavior or to the social frameworks that structure and give meaning to behavior. At issue is the capacity of individuals or groups to secure favorable outcomes (material, cultural, emotional) under new circumstances, and if need be, by new means.

Social Resilience as a Process

We are most interested in exploring the sources of social resilience. What confers social resilience? To what extent did developments during the neo-liberal era bring such factors to the fore? Or did neo-liberalism erode the factors on which resilience depends?

We look in particular at how the institutional structures and cultural repertoires available to people by virtue of how they are embedded in various sets of social relations enhance their capacities to sustain their well-being in challenging circumstances. In that respect, these essays build on the formulations of our previous collective work, Successful Societies (Hall and Lamont 2009), which argued that well-being is conditioned by the balance between the life challenges people face and their capabilities for coping with them. We suggested that capabilities depend on access, not only to economic resources, but to cultural and social resources embodied in networks, social hierarchies and cultural repertoires. This book can be read as an effort to extend the concept of social resources and to analyze their role in contexts of social change.

The chapters that follow find that people fashion responses to challenges from resources found in multiple spheres nested inside one another – ranging from the family, neighborhood and local community to the region, nation-state and transnational regimes (Sampson, Morenoff and Earls 1999). Indeed, one feature of the contemporary era is the interdependence visible between
these levels, as the media carry national and international tropes into the heart of the family, and local communities depend on national states or transnational organizations for crucial forms of support. The prospects of immigrants within a local community, for instance, cannot be understood without taking into account the recognition given minorities by national symbolic communities, the multicultural principles to which they might appeal, and the concrete resources and services provided by national policies (Bloemraad 2006; Kymlicka 2007). Even international regimes are relevant by virtue of how they support human rights and transnational linkages among migrant groups (Soysal 1994; Merry and Levitt 2009). Thus, to understand the situation of vulnerable groups, we need to consider not only the groups themselves but the institutional and cultural scaffolding surrounding them, with an eye to the opportunities it offers and forecloses (Lamont 2009).

One of our conclusions is that social resilience is the result of active processes of response. Groups do not simply call passively on existing sets of resources. Social resilience is the product of much more creative processes in which people assemble a variety of tools, including collective resources and new images of themselves, to sustain their well-being in the face of social change. In some instances, those tools are features of existing context – in others, they are made available by neo-liberalism itself. In many respects, this is another story about ‘culture in action’ (Swidler 1986) as meaning-making that occurs in the course of everyday interaction and collective political endeavor.

Marcos Ancelovici’s study of the response of French trade unions to developments in the neo-liberal era underlines this point. Contemporary analyses often treat ‘globalization’ and ‘neo-liberalism’ as if they were exogenous shocks of homogenous character. But Ancelovici shows that organizations experienced neo-liberalism as a series of developments unfolding in time that
had to be interpreted, and these interpretations were filtered through the matrix of concerns preoccupying each actor. Thus, French trade unions experienced ‘globalization’ and ‘neo-liberalism’ as an organizational challenge manifested in declining levels of membership; and their response was oriented to this problem. When neo-liberalism is understood at the level of lived realities, it becomes apparent that how the problem is perceived varies across contexts and each response constructed from cultural repertoires forged out of previous experiences (Lamont and Thévenot 2000). In an analysis with resonance for other types of agents, Ancelovici breaks this response down into processes of narration, learning and institutionalization. He finds that organizations with more heterogeneous repertoires and leaders with more organizational autonomy devised a more resilient response.

*The Role of States and Social Organizations*

As Polanyi (1944) observed some years ago, states have long been the most important potential counterweight to markets: their regulations shape market competition; they are the source for public goods that markets do not supply and for measures mitigating the adverse effects of markets on vulnerable groups. Therefore, states should have been important sources of social resilience during the neo-liberal era, and our findings confirm that they often were. Evans and Sewell note that aggregate well-being was sustained more effectively in countries where neo-liberal initiatives were accompanied by substantial new efforts at social protection, as in France, Brazil, Taiwan and South Korea. From a neo-liberal perspective, it may seem antithetical for governments to increase social spending and market competition in tandem, but they often did so with salutary effects.

In parallel terms, Barnes and Hall find that the lower-middle class has been better off where governments did not simply increase social spending but targeted it on redistribution; and
the chapter by Keating, Siddiqi and Nguyen attributes better developmental health outcomes in Canada, compared to the U.S., to higher levels of public provision and policies that decoupled access to basic goods such as healthcare and education from income (see also Zuberi 2006). They argue that investment in basic goods such as education can mediate the long-term effects of neo-liberal initiatives on adolescent health and development. These findings resonate with a literature attributing the economic success of the ‘small states’ of northern Europe to the ways in which they linked flexible responses to world markets to significant levels of social protection (Katzenstein 1985; cf. Rodrik 1997).

However, states do not automatically operate as factors of social resilience. In many instances, governmental initiatives were central to the intensification of market competition, and the levels of social protection they provided varied dramatically across countries. Like societies, states were sites for competition between advocates of neo-liberal reform and those attempting to limit its effects, and much depended on the balance of power between them (Mudge 2008).

Relevant here is the finding of Barnes and Hall that the well-being of the working class is better where trade unions are stronger. Some analysts see trade unions as part of the economic problem rather than the solution; and neo-liberal initiatives have sent many unions into serious decline. But trade unions emerge as one of the organizations most central to the well-being of people in the lower socioeconomic strata, in particular, because of their political role as advocates for those people. Barnes and Hall find that a person’s well-being is more strongly affected by the density of trade union membership in the country as a whole than by whether he or she is a member of a union. Trade unions seem to contribute to social resilience by shifting the balance of power between advocates and opponents of social protection. In this context,
dramatic declines in union membership are as one of the most durable and deleterious legacies of the neo-liberal era (Western and Rosenfeld 2011).

However, social resilience also has roots in other forms of social organization, and, in the case of Québec, Gérard Bouchard explores a classic example. For most of the last twenty years, aggregate well-being has been sustained more effectively in Québec than in the other provinces of Canada. Bouchard attributes much of this success to the ways in which the province has nurtured a ‘social economy’ marked by large numbers of cooperatives, enterprises supported by quasi-public organizations and some notable deliberative processes. Public policies helped sustain this model, but it was built on networks of social organization. In these respects, Québec resembles the regions of northern Italy and Germany that flourished in competitive world markets by forsaking highly competitive market relations at home for more collaborative inter-firm relationships built on dense social networks supporting a culture of cooperation (Piore and Sabel 1984; Streeck 1991; Herrigel 1996).

Social networks underpin social resilience in other ways as well. A large literature suggests that ties to families, friends and acquaintances constitute social resources on which people can draw to cope with many kinds of challenges (Liebenberg and Unger 2009; Berkman 1997; Berkman and Glass 2000; Sampson et al 2002). From such connections, people secure information, logistical, and emotional support. Barnes and Hall find that these types of social connectedness were important during the neo-liberal era. Over the past three decades, people with closer ties to family and friends reported consistently higher levels of subjective well-being; and, as analysts of social capital posit, well-being was higher in countries with denser networks of civic engagement (Putnam 2000). Social connectedness in the form of direct ties between people is a source of social resilience, and likely to be even more powerful when accompanied
by forms of social recognition that define a wide range of individuals as valued members of the community (Fraser and Honneth 2003; Barnes et al. 2008).  

_The Role of Collective Imaginaries_

Other forms of social connectedness can also contribute to social resilience. Societies are bound together, not only through social ties, but also through collective imaginaries. As we have noted, these imaginaries embody narratives about the past and future of the community, who belongs to it, and what its chief qualities are (Bouchard 2003 and in this volume). As such, they often stand in a mutually-reinforcing relationship with the social organizations and policies that promote social resilience. Bouchard shows that longstanding myths about the character and history of Québec underpinned social solidarity there, sustaining both its social economy and social safety net. We see a similar phenomenon in the Nordic countries, where, despite neo-liberal reforms, collective imaginaries that promote a sense of shared social responsibility have provided crucial support for the social organizations and policies that contribute to social resilience (Berman 2006; Offe 2011). In parallel terms, Keating, Siddiqi and Nguyen attribute better outcomes in Canada, not only to differences between Canadian and American policies, but to the ways in which neo-liberal scripts were filtered through their collective imaginaries.

Collective imaginaries can also be direct sources of resilience for individuals and groups by virtue of how they specify and support collective identities. In their chapter for this volume, Michèle Lamont, Jessica Welburn and Crystal Fleming show that the strategies deployed by members of stigmatized groups to counter racism draw heavily on national collective imaginaries. African-Americans often rely, for instance, not only on principles of equality central to the American creed, which empower them to confront racism, but on other dimensions

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9 On the relationship between social capital, networks and meaning, see Fishman (2009) and Pachucki and Breiger (2011).
of the American imaginary, sometimes associated with neo-liberalism (such as those that attach value to individual effort and personal consumption), to buttress their sense of social belonging in the face of racist stereotyping. Those strategies of confrontation are quite different from their counterparts in Brazil (where celebrating racial mixing prevails) and Israel (where Ethiopian Jews and Mizrahis tend to downplay discrimination and emphasize their shared Jewishness and belonging to the Zionist nation). In such contexts the collective identities developed by minority groups are also important. There is evidence that attachment to a strong collective identity bolsters self-concepts and reduces the adverse psychological impact of experiences of immigration or racial discrimination (e.g. Feliciano 2005; Oyserman et al. 2006). Such strategies are made possible by available cultural repertoires which make some approaches to gaining recognition more successful than others (Lamont and Thévenot 2000).

These analyses are the tip of an important iceberg. The shared cultural references, myths and narratives embodied in collective imaginaries can buttress an individual’s sense of self and capabilities in many ways. People depend on the cultural tools such imaginaries provide to make sense of challenges and to imagine solutions to them (Small, Harding and Lamont 2010; Swidler 1986). At stake are the possible futures people imagine and pursue for themselves and their communities (Markus and Nurius 1986). Chandler and Lalonde (1998) show, for instance, that differences in suicide rates across first-nation communities in British Columbia are conditioned by the community’s ability to transmit to its younger members a sense of pride in its collective identity and history. Particularly important are broader narratives about recognition and dignity, often conveyed by school policies about the display of group-distinctive ways of dressing, speaking, and demonstrating collective identity (Carter 2012).
Alongside these collective imaginaries are a range of ancillary cultural structures likely to be consequential for social resilience. Because people find strategies for action by observing the behavior of those around them, many aspects of local cultural orders can be important for social resilience. Young (2006) shows, for instance, how marginalized black men imagine paths to upward mobility. Cultural frameworks specific to particular ethnic groups may be enabling or disabling. African-Americans are less likely than Latinos, for example, to seek help finding employment or to recommend co-ethnics for jobs, partly because widespread stereotypes about welfare dependency among African-Americans encourage them to invest more strongly in notions of self-reliance (Smith 2010). Exploring what cultural repertoires contribute to recognition and social resilience should be an important item on contemporary research agendas.

However, neo-liberalism may have effects of its own on collective imaginaries, and these also deserve more exploration. Because neo-liberal ideals privilege market criteria for assessing worth, they should bolster the self-concepts of skilled market players but threaten people who lack marketable resources. The resilience of the latter may depend on whether they have at their disposal alternative repertoires for evaluating themselves (such as moral repertoires), so that they are not entirely dependent on the dominant standards for status (Lamont 2000). However, some societies support such repertoires better than others (Lamont 2000), and the influence of neo-liberal narratives may have narrowed that range.

James Dunn’s chapter for this volume illustrates how complex the effects of neo-liberalism are. He notes that many ways that housing sustains resilience at the micro-level; in particular, it has developmental value for children and serves as a source of ontological security for adults. But access to supportive housing is dependent on conditions at multiple scales, ranging from the housing policies of the locality to the terms on which international markets
supply finance. Because of interdependencies across these planes, it is difficult to determine the net effect of neo-liberal developments on housing, but this is clearly a case in which the fate of an important source of resilience at the micro-level depends on meso- and macro-level processes that proceed without much regard for the ultimate implications for social resilience.

*Collective Capacities: The Interplay of Culture and Institutions*

Social resilience depends not only on the features of society on which individuals draw to enhance their capabilities but also on the capacity of communities to mount collective responses to challenges. We have already noted the roles that states can play in this process, which turn on their capacities to redistribute resources, supply public goods on terms independent of income, and encourage forms of social organization that maintain employment and social solidarity. However, several chapters of this book identify collective capacities that are important at the local level and explore the conditions that sustain them. They point, in particular, to the importance of capacities to supply collective goods, understood as something more than standard public goods.

Clyde Hertzman and Arjumand Siddiqi note that efforts to foster early childhood development, crucial for the entire community’s long term well-being, cannot be understood simply as a matter of providing public goods. Thinking of early childhood development as a public good fails to capture the fact that fostering it requires active cooperation from multiple actors in the local community, ranging from school superintendents to parents and local business people. To convey this, Hertzman and Siddiqi describe early childhood development as a ‘collective-implementation good’ – a term that can also be applied to other endeavors central to the social resilience of a community –seeing it as the product of government policy but one that can be produced only with the sustained involvement of durable, inter-sectoral coalitions.
In a different setting, Ann Swidler examines a similar problem, namely, how collective goods are supplied in African villages. Collective goods are goods that improve the well-being of the community and would not be supplied by markets because their benefits are non-excludable; but, like collective-implemention goods, they are supplied only through active forms of cooperation.\(^\text{10}\) Capacities to provide such goods are crucial to a community’s ability to maintain its well-being in the face of challenges. Therefore, understanding how they are generated is important for understanding social resilience.

Swidler’s findings highlight the contributions that appropriate institutions and cultural frameworks make to such capacities. In the villages of Malawi, she finds that the institution of the local chief is crucial to the provision of collective goods, and she sees the ‘chief’ as a culturally-constituted institution made possible by the shared narratives of the community. Those narratives accord chiefs a position from which they can seek the cooperation of the members of the community in collective endeavors. Their authority is bolstered by traditional control over symbolic resources, of the sort embodied in participation at a funeral, and by control over the allocation of some minor material resources, such as coupons for fertilizer. However, it is the culturally-embedded role of the chief that is crucial to the supply of collective goods. By eliciting cooperation and ensuring everyone knows that the costs of contributing to the collectivity are being equally shared, chiefs provide assurances that encourage cooperation. They are the keystone for an arch of interdependencies that reaffirms the value attached to the collectivity.

This analysis has implications beyond African villages. Like Tsai’s (2006) work on public goods in China, it suggests that a desire for status often motivates actors’ contributions to collective goods and that collective goods are more likely to be supplied where shared narratives,\(^\text{10}\)

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\(^{10}\) For parallel discussion of such problems in the case of common pool resources, see Ostrom (2005).
reinforced by ritual, emphasize the value of the collectivity. Hertzman and Siddiqi observe that similar narratives support complex interdependencies in modern communities; and there is evidence that the search for recognition within local status orders may motivate public-spirited action even inside institutional hierarchies (Willer 2009). In short, markets and hierarchies are not the only instruments available for organizing collective endeavor, and the contribution formal institutions make to the social resilience of a community often depends on their interplay with extant cultural frameworks (cf. Williamson 1985; Dobbin 1994; Ostrom 2005). Cultural and institutional structures can either reinforce or undercut one another, as they do in schools where peer-based status orders collide with teacher-driven status orders (Carter 2005; Warikoo 2010).

These observations have special pertinence for developments during the neo-liberal era. As neo-liberal ideas, about entrepreneurial behavior for example, became more popular, they often shifted the cultural frameworks underpinning institutional practices, giving rise to new forms of behavior. Schröder (2011) shows, for example, that the willingness of companies to offshore production to low-cost countries was not driven entirely by clear-cut economic circumstances but often influenced by managers’ embrace of neo-liberal narratives. By the same token, market-oriented initiatives to improve the well-being of local communities in the developing world have had mixed success partly because many have not been attentive enough to local cultural contexts (Vollan 2008). Where such experiments ignore the social resources embedded in local cultural practices, they may destroy rather than create collective capacities (Swidler and Watkins 2009; Rao and Walton 2004). However, resilience is not given by a static set of cultural frameworks. As we have noted, resilient outcomes usually demand active processes to engage and sustain the appropriate frameworks. Swidler emphasizes how ritualized activities reaffirm the value attached to the
collectivity. Bouchard notes the importance of collective consultation, in the Estates General, to the successes of Québec politics. Hertzman and Siddiqi find that durable inter-sectoral coalitions for early childhood development depend on processes of concerted mobilization; and Ancelovici sees active processes of learning and institutionalization in the CFDT’s response to neo-liberalism. Social resilience ultimately depends on what might be called ‘cultural frameworks in action’ and the use actors make of the ‘strategic capacities’ for concerted response to challenges that institutions confer on them.

After the Crisis…

The global economic crisis that began in 2008 can be seen as the culmination of the neo-liberal era. Indeed, its roots lie in the relaxation of government regulation and a blind faith in markets that encouraged unparalleled expansion of the financial sector and a vast increase in debt in many countries (Rajan 2010; Tett 2009). In addition to recession, the legacy is likely to be a politics of austerity lasting many years (Schaefer and Streeck 2013). One feature of this politics has been a growing sense of grievance, as unemployment rises in some countries and citizens wonder why banks were bailed out when they were not. That has increased support for parties and factions on the radical right and left, some explicitly opposed to neo-liberal policies. In the developing world, the crisis has discredited doctrines based on an overweening faith in markets and stimulated a resurgence of interest in the developmental state (Bresser-Pereira and Oreira 2012). But the hopes of some that the crisis will sound the death-knell for neo-liberal ideas and practices seem likely to be disappointed in anything but the very long term.

Neo-liberal narratives and practices are now so deeply embedded at multiple levels in the economy, polity and society that they are difficult to dislodge (Centeno and Cohen 2012; Mudge
Although the doctrine of ‘efficient markets’ has been discredited and Keynesian prescriptions for economic growth occasionally revived, few alternatives to the principles that became central to mainstream economics during the neoliberal era have gained traction (Hall 2013). Moreover, neo-liberal practices have been so deeply institutionalized by governments and other organizations that they will be difficult to rollback. Some banks have been nationalized and modest efforts made to stiffen financial regulation, but even governments that would like to pursue alternative policies are constrained by the internationalization of finance, which grants credit on the basis of how well they conform to neo-liberal practices. In the public sphere, the crisis has sparked a reaction, most visible in the Occupy movements that appeared in many countries, but it has inspired a competition for jobs and resources that tends to reinforce the *sauve qui peut* patterns of behavior characteristic of the neo-liberal era (Ancelovici 2012).

In this context, there is more reason than ever to be concerned about social resilience. Many groups are facing straitened circumstances. In the United States, Hacker *et al.* (2010) estimate that the level of economic insecurity has almost doubled since the 1980s, and Fischer (2012) cites estimates that about half of all Americans will have some experience of poverty between the ages of 25 and 75. In southern Europe, the situation is dramatically worse and taking a deep toll on all aspects of people’s well-being. In Greece, for instance, population health has deteriorated and suicides increased by more than 50 percent between 2007 and 2012 (Kentikelenis *et al.* 2011). Conditions such as these strain the capacity of social groups to sustain their well-being and make it even more urgent to identify the sources of social resilience.

**Conclusion**

No single volume can do full justice to the big, slow-moving process associated with neo-liberalism or to the sources of social resilience. However, the essays in this volume provide an
unusually multi-dimensional account of these phenomena. To appreciate the complexity of a sweeping macro-level process, we have tried to see it from the inside out as well as from the outside in, with an eye to the ways in which organized actors and ordinary people assimilated new sets of categories and turned them to their own purposes (Bourdieu 1998). We see the unfolding of neo-liberalism as a syncretic social process, marked by adjustment, resistance and creative transformation. It took place in a multi-layered social space replete with institutional frameworks and cultural repertoires out of which actors constructed responses to the opportunities and challenges of this era.

We have paid special attention to those challenges in order to advance understandings of social resilience defined as the capacity of groups to sustain their well-being. That entails charting the ways in which institutional practices and cultural repertoires are constitutive of the sources of social resilience. But we have also argued that social resilience is more than a matter of calling upon existing resources. It is an active process that mobilizes people with loyalties and attachments promoted by particular cultural frameworks – French trade union leaders, African chiefs, Canadian school superintendents, and members of stigmatized groups. These processes of adjustment often shade, in turn, into creative endeavor, as actors find new ways to deploy existing institutions or cultural repertoires and exploit the new categories and opportunities generated by a neo-liberal age. A reflexivity absent in physical systems plays an important role in these processes, as memories rooted in the shared history of communities are mobilized to imagine future paths and construct new grammars of action.

Our goal has been to advance a larger research agenda. Social resilience is a key characteristic of successful societies, seen as ones that perform well on indicators for population health, social inclusion and social justice. In such societies, a wide range of groups have at their
disposal the cultural and institutional resources needed to respond to successive challenges. If we are to understand what makes societies successful, we need to know more about how social resilience is constituted and operates. Moreover, as an optic, social resilience casts old issues into a new light. As a framework for approaching issues of social justice, it is an alternative to traditional right-left debates about threatened welfare states, the virtues and dangers of individualism, or the evils of government intervention. It transcends traditional disciplinary frameworks to consider how institutions work in tandem with cultural repertoires to constitute collective capabilities, and it considers issues of recognition and cultural membership in tandem with questions about the distribution of resources.

Our hope is that the studies in this volume will open up new agendas and provide inspiration for further research into the effects of neo-liberalism and the sources of social resilience. At the core of inquiries into social resilience must be the macro-micro link. At the macro-level, there is room for further modeling of adjustment to shocks (Bronfenbrenner 1979; Wuermli et al 2012). At the meso level we need a better understanding of how to keep institutions robust and cultural repertoires resonant. At the micro-level, we need deeper explorations of the connections between cultural repertoires, institutional frameworks and individual resilience of the sort indicated, for instance, by the finding that minority students with the best educational outcomes are typically ‘straddlers’ endowed with a strong group identity but also capacities to engage majority culture (Osterman et al 2006, Carter 2005). One route into this would be through studies of the social processes that support ‘possibilities and hopes’ understood as the institutional and cultural practices that allow individuals to negotiate new environments in flexible and ambitious ways.
Similarly, there is room for further investigation of the ways in which developments during the neo-liberal era have affected the sources of social resilience. We have made a number of observations about this but not undertaken a systematic assessment of which resources were eroded or augmented over the last thirty years; and more specific case studies will be needed to develop a fine-grained understanding of such issues. Moreover, the recessions that many countries experienced in the wake of the global financial crisis have posed new challenges for social groups that could fruitfully be analyzed within this framework. We see many opportunities for following up the formulations introduced in this book.
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